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•^
^1**
THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
H'EH']. 4-io 0, -s-
^N
^
THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
THE FIFTH ARMY
IN MARCH 1918. BY
W. SHAW SPARROW. WITH
AN INTRODUCTION BY
GENERAL SIR HUBERT GOUGH
AND TWENTY-ONE MAPS BY THE
AUTHOR
LONDON: JOHN LANE, THE BODLEY HEAD
NEW YORK: JOHN LANE COMPANY. MCMXXI
-^VA^* H:^rrK\N
VW . N* »\^\**¥. ^NW»Nl»l Ahl* IIM(f.A«, BMOLAAD.
AUTHOR'S NOTE TO THE SECOND EDITION
THESE are persons who circulate the opinion that in
March, 1918, the total AUied force on the Western
Front was equal in numbers to the German power.
Believers in tne Versailles Council keep this opinion
in dieulation, but they never try to support it with evidence.
They tdl us tiiat the French had 97 divisions ; and we know
that Hai^ had 58, nearly all in great need of drafts. Here
are 155 divisions. Ludendorflf lutd either 192 (the figures
riven by Haig), or 195 (the French flmres as pYem by Qeniral
Mangin). How do Uie Versailles rolk fill in the difference
between 155 and 192 divisions? They do not say. On
March 11> 1918, the American rifle strength in France was
49,000 men, and many of them were not yet sufficiently trained
to be sent into a tremendous battle. fSven if we count the
whole of them, 49,000 rifles form only five divisions with ten
battalions in each, and with a thousand men in each battalion.
Gin^ral Mangin — a very notable Fochite — ^has declared
(La Ranu des jSeva MoTuEes, June 1, 1920) that Ludendorff
had a superiority of 83 divisions, but without a reserve for
their mamtenanee. Ludendorff was certain that he had
enough superiority in both numbers and training to justify a
tremendous effort. I believe that the Allies had in all not
more than 162 divisions.
Since this book was published I have received the lament-
able news that Brigadier-Oeneral Dawson, D.S.O., who
oonunanded the South Afiricans, died of enteric fever last
October, while big game shooting in East Africa. There was
not a nobler actor in the great drama of March, 1918.
Some reviewers have accused me of '^ attacking '* Byng
beeaoae I try to show in focus certain events which belong
essentially to my subject, and which hitherto have been
either hidden or heavily veiled. Let me remind these critics
that the Third Army bias been used as a weapon with which
to slay tlie reputation of the Fifth. Apart from this, what
SECOND EDITION
\ .. *»^ ic^vi y ^otxld be perverted ?
^>. > t^^^Akti^ when his subject is
.-«^ .4%m:s oi (Mail are corrected in
4.% . .sx ^ "^lifier to pass fix)m nnavoid-
.. V .% .^i%v« ittdioeretion.
W. S« S.
INTRODUCTION
BY GSNSBAL SIB HUBERT DE LA P. GOUGH.
G.O.M.G., K.O.6., K.C.y.0.
*HEN Mr. Shaw Sparrow first asked me to write
an Introduction to his book, I refused, because
I felt the subject was too personal to myself.
Then I saw the following in the Morning
Pcti:—
•«IN MEMOBIAM.
"^To tlM g&orloos sad undying memory of the Heroes of the Fifth Army
who geve their Uvee for Britain, Kerch aist-Sand, 191S.
^ We thank Gk)d npon every remembranoe of yoo.
•*Iieet we forget."
After reading this remembrance I felt that my personal
indixiations did not count, and that I owed if to the glorious
and undying memory " of my Ciomrades of the Fifth Army,
HyiD^ as well as dead, to help to throw on their heroism
tlie light which has be^ so long withheld.
I write this Introduction, uien, in a full r^;ard of their
Memories and in no sense of my own capacity.
On the shoulders of the officers and men of the Fifth
Army was thrown practically the whole burden of holding
op lAadendorfTs powerful attack, one which was as carefully
and wAAj organized in all its details as it was weighty in
its physical and material resourcea As Mr. Shaw Sparrow
shows by his figures of the diyisions engfuzed, the great and
main blow was directed against the Fifth Army, two of
LodendofflTs armies being employed on this task.
Thus, the fate of France, cf Oreat Britain, of Europe,
rested with those few men who composed the Fifth Army,
and nrho, perforce scattered and unsupported, were worn
and ezhaostod by strain and fatigue for nights and days in
tU
viii INTBODUCTION
sooeeasion, yet still fought on against the numbers which tried
to overwhelm their defence.
There may have been men who showed weakness, indeed
there were, and some others made mistakes ; but it must not
be overlooked that though they might be British soldiers
they were also human beings. For no one to fiul would have
been beyond the power of human effort. And when we look
at the picture in its broad lines and see the numbers of
divisions engaged by all parties in the drama» then with
no more than justice we can assert that no soldiers of any
nation ever displayed so richly the military virtues of courage,
endurance, ana staunchness under a strain so long and so
terrible. •
We have been brought up to admire and praise ''the thin
Red line'' which so often stayed the foe. Never was the
Bed Line so thin as the Khaki Line which manned the long
front of forty-two miles for which the Fifth Army .was
responsible on March 21, 1918. Mr. Shaw Sparrow discusses
the reason for the thinness of our line here — a thinness known
to Ludendorff— and makes some valuable and interesting
observations.
The people of Great Britain, not to sa^ those of all the
Allies, owe the officers and men of the Fifth Army a debt
of gratitude which neither words nor deeds can sufficiently
repir^.
Unfortunately, owing to a variety of causes, to some of
which Mr. Shaw Sparrow refers, my countrymen, with few
exceptions (confined principidly to those bereaved ones who
lost their dearest and best), have not shown an appreciation
of the splendid deeds of these men.
This book throws some dear and true light on what they
were called upon to do, and how they did it, and it is my
sincere hope that my countr3nnen will realize from reading
its paces the splendour and the achievement of the soldiers
of the Fifth Army.
Mr. Shaw Sparrow has written a clear and powerful
narrative. His book gives proof of much research, and he
is in possession of valuable information which, I believe, will
be mainly new to the general public. From the point of
view of history, he writes clearly and lucidly of the broad
outlines of the story, and of the several absorbing questions
of military policy and strategy which centre round this
tremendous battle. But he does not confine himself to the
mere recital of the main events and their causes* He adds
INTBODUCTION ix
drama and reality to the tale by many personal anecdotes
which vivify the story and give it hie, enabling the reader
to judge what manner of men these were who were called on
to ta^ce the storm. The one would not be complete without
the other.
Flans, organization of preparation, and the orders of the
higher Commanders and Stafis of all forces engaged in a
giBat battle, have undoubtedly an enormous influence, often
a decisive one ; but in this world we can never escape, least
of all in a battle, from the human element. It is these
toadies which Mr. Shaw Sparrow has introduced into his
book which make his whole picture so real and gives it such
value. Whatever the plans may be, and whatever the pre-
parations and orders, it is inevitable that the conduct of the
officers and men actually engaged in a great struggle should
be of the utmost importance. It was so in this case, and to
a greater degree than is usual, for as a mere military problem
on paper, the battle was prod^ous. The troops of the Fifth
Army were exposed in such scanty numbers to an attack
80 wbU organized and so formidable that, without exaggeration
it can be said, they seemed to have no chance whatever of
saving the situation.
Tet they did save it^ and that they succeeded is due
entirely to the truly wonderful and magnificent manner in
which they fought and fought on. Courage to face terrific
dangers for a few hours would not have sufficed. Their
daim to honour rests on a much greater foundation than
this, since they supported fati^e and exhaustion through
dajTS and nights, ana yet maintained throughout their courage
and their ''will to act"
We wonder how they did it. I can only surmise that
it came from the great and gallant spirit that animated tiie
Fifth Armv, super-imposed on the virtues of honour and self-
aaerifioe which are the heritage of all our race.
Mr. Shaw Sparrow enables us in his paces to see elimpses
of the magnificent human element on whicm depended in the
last resort the safetv of the Cause. It was this element that
imposed strategical failure on LudendorfiT. It maintained
intact an ever thinning line, a line that perished, yet re-
mained cheerful; kept it intact in front of the Qerman
maswfw which strove to suree forward and to submerge
rapklly all the eonntrv beyond. These masses hoped to take
Amienii and Abbeville, in order to pin us aminst the sea;
they wished to take Paris also, and (perhaps the most potent
THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
izifluenoe of all) tl
peace.
Let me say, i>
a footnote to his
the fine temper
vividly : —
"A marked i
officers during i
the fighting li:
a good account
the report of .
Somme on th<
first-hand inii
* From what J
there seems 1
they have n
convinced ti
of the battl
nnmbers of
patting u})
attacking \.
and have
Divisional
that oncr
find thei.
have no«
Why
splendii
the Fit^
for me '
Th*
rooms,
most
repeni
is 6l<'>
peoji
(
trut:
to ^'
me.
wit
cei'
. ■— ^'
he
» *
.M '
j^womentSf
"^g^am^ war.
i; and in
^j^ :s doing so.
Belfort, to
tr.->.
HO
fironi of
>; made it
^>c^ where
fines and
^ iv^ aftteck on
Nyr IVtt^rlas Haig
^ ^;;x To the Fifth
-^^'^^w.rfbrafthe
* .^^ ^ M cfMalion of
.^ -«"
.,,-c*"*
^a^iaxU heavy loss
-\a vMODKeuvre en
INTRODUCTION xiii
retraite'* is usually the only correct course to adopt on
these occasions, for the essential thing is to sain time, to
delay the enemy, and not to secure territory. It is essential
also to presenre the containing force from overwhelming
defeat^ as of course, if it is once overwhelmed, the enemy
becomes free of all his movements, and he can gain ground
n4>idly.
In this case, the task set the ofBcers and men of the Fifth
Anny was particularly hard by reason of the great dispro-
portion in numbers which existed between the opposing forces.
A study of Mr. Shaw Sparrow's pages and ms maps will
show that the task imposed on the Fifth Army was fulfilled,
in spite of its immense difficulties, and in fact it is difficult
to recall from history a case in which a force has better
fulfilled that extremerjr difficult and dangerous r61e.
It was bitter, therefore, to the officers and men of the
Fifth Army, but more particularly to the families of those
who gave their lives in these dark da}rs of struggle, to hear
the misconceptions which were so freely bandira about of
th^ action and their conduct, and the luurd judgments passed
upon them.
For various reasons mv troops had taken over a part of
the line held by the Frencn Army. It may have been under-
stood by the British O.H.Q. that the French would be solely
responsible on my front for all supports and reserves; but
certainly it was not mv impression that all my supports and
reserves should come from French sources, though a plan of
gradual relief by French troops had been worked out, com-
mencing from the South. When I relieved the Third French
Army under G&i6ral Humbert^ it was withdrawn and posted
round Clermont. There I thought it remained. In reality
all the divisions of the French Army were ordered away
and posted elsewhere, G^niral Humbert and his Staff alone
romaining.
During the battle, when G&i£ral Humbert arrived at my
Headquarters to support the line, and eventually to take
it over as previously arranged, I said I was very glad to see
him, as my men were struggling against terrific odds. He
replied, however, ** Mais je n'ai que mon fimion,'* referring
to the small flag on his motor-car. This was not exactly
the amount of support that the moment seemed to require.
The difficulties and disorganization caused by the hurried
retam of French divisions m>m distant parts of the theatre
are re feired to by Mr. Shaw Sparrow.
xiy INTEODDCTION
One French Corps Staff arrived with a few candles for
a dozen Staff Officers simultaneously to study maps and
write orders. Verily we all had to improvise much.
Whatever the cause, the actual result anyhow was that
by Sunday, March 24, I believe I am correct in saying,
three British divisions had reached the Third Amy,*
while the fourth to arrive was sent to me, and was able to
get hurriedly into action that morning, but without previous
reconnaissance. This was the 8th Division, coming from
the vicinity of Ypres, viz. the left of the British line, whereas
the danger whicn the Fifth Army was struggling to meet
as best it could with its most inadequate resources was on
the extreme right of our line.
Mr. Shaw Sparrow justly criticizes the distance which
the 50th and 20th Divisions were from the front when the
battle opened. They were my local supports, though still
retained imder the orders of G.H.Q., for reasons previously
given by the C.G.S. to my sell
Mr. Shaw Sparrow's book is a serious and valuable con-
tribution to History, and the British public owe him a debt
of gratitude for a task of considerable research and ability
which does justice to British soldiers, and elucidates and
discusses in a dear and interesting manner the different
causes which influenced the battie, showing a real appre-
ciation of strategical principles, worthy of the consideration
of all military students.
H. P. GOUGH.
* The 42nd, in support eart of Adinfer on Muoh 28; the 62nd, in
Buppozt west oi Airee on the 24th ; the 85th, which on the filth dar fonght
under General Byng; and the 12th in the Friooort neighhonrhood on the
evening of the 25th.
CONTENTS
PA«B
INTBODUCnON. By Qxhsbal Sib Hubbbt db la Pobb Gouge,
QXyJLQ,, K.O.B., K.G.V.0 vii
PART I
THE PBE-BATTLE: DIFFIOULTIBS AND PEB-
PABATIONS, BBITISH AND OBBMAN
L How TO Bbqih • • 8
TL Ov A Nbw Fboht : Dbvbrob mjxd tsb Lmrre • « . • 10
m. BtaBBWOHT, ABD QOUOB'8 IflBXFBBTOBB 25
17. Haxo axd LuDBBDOBrv : thbib Gomibstb m Pbb-Bastlb Aivaibs 33
v. OXBBB FBB-BAXTLB COBTBSn of MiBD, with BOMB OF THBIB
i 40
VL Wis TBB FOO A HiBDBABGB TO THB FiFTB ABMT*8 DbFBBCB? . 66
PART II
THE BATTLE IN ITS MAIN ASPECTS
L Obbiiab Sbbixb ahd Bbitish Bbdoobtb : thb Fibst Day of
OlXAB TOB HOTIBB'B ATZACX 68
n. Hobbb'b AnAOX m otbb ob so bb Bafvlbd .
• •
m. Tbm Cbbtbb FiOBXiBa Kobxh abd South of thb Ybbmabb-
BOAD . • 100
IV. Tbm Gbbsbb Fiobtibo, eonii$med: Fbahbbtxllb, Gftanr,
HABBOBBXiBBB, ABB OTBBB GOM BAT8 .121
V. Tbb Kobthbbb Aitaobb : Pbbumibabt Ponm abb QuBmoRs 186
VL Tbb Joarr AnAOK by Mabwitz abb Oro tob Bblow: thb
Fan Dat'b Battle 146
VH. HABwm abb Bblow o o b t ibub thbib Joibt Attaosb • 169
XT
xvi CONTENTS
01PT 1E PICB
ym. Bomb Poxbtb avd 0bo88*Qus8txomb baibsd bt tei FOBsoono
168
IX. S^TUBDAT AHD BuxDAT IN TBB KoBannBii FxaBToro • • 174
X. Last Days ov thb Nobthsbn FxaBxnro • • .186
PART III
THE BATTLE IN SOME 0H08BN INCIDENTS
AND EPISODES
L A VBW SOAmBSD Imfbebixokb 901
n. Dawsoh'b Fxtb Huxdbbd. How nos Bodtr Avbioahb wzbb
OvBawRaLMBD: Bubdat, Mabgh S4, 1918 • ... 293
IIL A VBW LbTTBBB WBDCTBH bt OmOBBB OV THB Sixtff-fint
PZTIBXOH '932
PART IV
AFTERMATH, INCLUDING 0ONTBOVEBSIE8, SIDE
ISSUES, AND POLITICAL EFFECTS
I. Or thb Lobb of Pbbobhb abd Bapauvb • • • • 946
IL Thb Tbabbbbb of Fxfib Abkt Tboopb to thb Thibd Abmt . 966
III. Obxoib or TBB Cbbzbt Bpibodb 966
IV. How ofJB Mbb wbbb Bbubvbd IB thbzb Gbappxa aoadtbt
976
y. Uhitt of OomiABD 989
TL Tbb Tboubzob of Mixzstbbb 998
vn. Bomb Bz2» Ibbubb abd PounoAL Bftaoia .... 804
yilL WIDBBFBBAD iBTUBnCB ABD THB PbOKJI'B EQUITT . 819
INDBX 819
SKETCH MAPS
INSET PLATES
^ 1. Haieh 21, 1918 : Approzimata Ordm of BatUe, British and German
Between pages 40-41
•/S. Maano'B Oorps, with its Forward and Battle Zones, its Brigadee
and Battalions, and the Qerman Oorps and BiYisions
Bekoeenpagee 72»78
^8. Attaek on the FonurUeeUh DiTXBioxr, Maroh 21. Hntier breaks
through the Battle Zone, but hUB in his effort to cross the
OroflilOanal Bekoeenpagee 80-81
V4. The C4ris7 Drama and the very important Oombat of Harbonni^res
Betwempagee 128-129
^6. The Bomidary miitbig Byng and Googh Between pagu ISI^VSn
/ 8L 'WtaoX of the WmXk DxvnxoH and the Bnirenehed Land north and
sooth of it Bs^iosen fwgst 144-146
• T. Manh 21 and StS: German advanee to the P4ranne Bridgehead,
north and sooth of the Yermand-Amiens Boad
BtlMssM jMg«a 168-169
^a PoorDajioftheBotnat .... B sfcps e t t pages 18^186
/9. The Preworeion Byng's Bight andOentre on the Bvening of Maroh
26 B etwe en pagee 192-198
/IOl M^ to show how Dlrisions from the Fxvcb Abmt on Maroh 26
fonned tha Tbibd Abmt'b Bight Wing Be tmem pagee 272*273
IN THE TEXT
rAos
1. Skaleh Mi^ on whioh the German Flans oan be followed 49
2. Brig^les of the SMg-fi/nt Divnunr, with the Forward Zone and
itsBedonbts 71
3. Front of the iXgl^temdi DnriBzos at 6 pjn. of Maroh 21 77
4« Maloolm's Front alter Colonel Little's arrival, Manh 26, 1918,
oTsning 126
6. FlesqniArss SaUent, March 21, 1918, with the German Divisions,
and the land lost by oor Thibd Abut north*west of the Salient 149
6. Zone Map, Northern Flirting 161
7. Sooth Afrioan Front, March 21, 1918, and the Land held below it
by the 2VMii<y->lri« Diyisios 166
8. Cavalry Fight at CoUeqr, March 24, 1918 219
9. Laet Stand of the Booth Afrioan Brigade 223
la Tbe Nesle Sector 283
lU Th« Crista nottb-weit of the Ancre, Manh 26» 1918 ... 269
zvii
THE FIFTH ARMY'S ORDER OF BATTLE
FROM NORTH TO SOUTH:
MABCH 21, 1918
1. Tib Corps. Sir W. N. Ck>ngreTe, V.O., KO.B., M.Y.O. Its front
— 14,000 yuds wide — ^went sonthward irom a point about half a mile
nortii of Qooaeanconrt, at the top of a hill about 400 yards west of
Ooimeliea, through Qauche Wood to Vauoellette farm, then south-
eastward to Ep^y and Bonssoy. Afew hundred yards south of Bonssov
the aimUenih (South Irish) Division, 7th Corps, joined the Sixty-tkith
Dimioir, 19th Corps. Congreve had three divisions in line :
Ntmikf at first under H. H. Tudor, who commanded finely through
four days of battle until Blaoklook returned from leave in England.
TwmUy^fini^ D. G. M. Campbell
aimtemUk, South Irish, Sir An^att Hull
Beasrves: ThMff'fuinih Divisioir, £. Feetham; he was killed in
aeUoo whOe visiting his troops in the front line.
a 19th Corps, Sir H. E. Watts, K.C.B., C.M.Q. Its frontage of
naariy 18,000 juds went southward from its union with Congreve to
about 1600 vards south of Pontruet, across the river Omignon. Two
divWons in line* both below strength :
Siz^f-HsBiht Lancashire troops, NeiU Malcolm, who was wounded;
Twrn U y-fowrfh^ A. C. Daly.
Beserves : Fimt Cavalbt Division, B. L. MuUens, and Fifiieih (North
En|^) Divmov, at first under Brigadier A. F. U. Stookley, B.A.*
8. 18lh Corps, Sir F. Ivor Masse, E.C.B., C.Y.O., D.S.O. Its
frantMe dasped upon 81 Qoentin and was 18,000 yards wide, extending
fran ns union with Watta, near Gricourt, southward to St. Quentin-
Vendooil road, west of Itsnoouri Three divisions in line :
SiMy-llrti, Sir Colin Maokende ;
7M'lwtik,W. deli. Williams; and
TkfiH^'mmth, Ulster, O. S. W. Nugent.
Beasrves: TwrniMtik DivmoH, W. Dou^as Smith.
It reached the battlefield on ih» evening of March 31, detained too
kstg by Q.H.Q.
• A few days belore the battle, greatly to the regret of onr Firb Abmt,
the able finmmander of this Division, Pine-Ooffin, V.C., wss rsmovad to
anothir post bj O.BLQ. The new Commander, H. Jaolonn, D.8.O., of the
Bedtedft, had not arrived when the Hflifdh Divuioir, early on the leoond
dey, entsvid the baHle, almost too late. It wss nearly kept too long by
%x ORDEB OF BARLB
4. h$d CV9f«i Bit B. H. K. VMm. KjCLILO, CJBL Uh baaka^ to
Ihi. uuuUi oi HMrMt WM dOfiOO ysii^ iw i luiin i ■■■iiirtil alons 14,000
w^i.U U> Uitt Utv«r 01m. In » «bI hmm tUi laiilMliiBi woSd have
Ih i« ^iMk\t I bul v«ry little nbk feO bsfewBOB Janwiy 1 and Ifareh SL
ivIh< i.Uuu iUiMi u|H IM tha imter ehnnHli mnowvi and liwwmH ahallow
U..1 K<MUbki iK> the rlrer had mill iiiiaMiiii -?ah», Ob^tliraadiviaiona
u .w luUutfMMlhUMOMdini^ywideaiidpflalsviiRBit:
hi.i^iUyuik, Htf Vielor Coaper;
fc,A{*i.iith, H. Lee; and
/ yty . ii/Ai^A, A. 11. B. 0«lor«
U..(i..(Vi*a. H9^ond and TAtnl GaTauv Dmnoas, Bobart Gfaenlj
4M I \ U. \V. Uiaftuao.
PART I
THE PRE-BATTLE
DIFFICULTIES AND PREPARATIONS
BRITISH AND GERMAN
B
THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
CHAPTER I
HOW TO BSGIH
§1
THE second battle of the Somme may be called also the
second battle of St Quentin. It began on March
21, 1918. Its main phases lasted throogh eight
days, and rolled over so many sqoaare miles of land
thai details gathered aionnd them into limitless confusion.
Is it possible to resolve this anarchy of items into a truthful
whole ? Perhaps this labour may be impossible, but yet it is
one which many a writer might well attack with unstinted
patience.
Too much detail is always a lie to those gifts of the mind
thai reduce a chaos into harmony, map out for us the accumu-
Utions of research, and reveal how their coUective worth may
be brought to bear on the same object
An immense battle has four united parts, into each of
which details throm^ and Jostle :
L The pre^BattU Period of Difficulties and Pr¶iioTis,
when incessant contests of mind and will go on between
those who have decided to attack and those who are obliged
to settle down on a defensive policy. The whole fighting
mAj be determined by these pre-battle affairs ; so they should
be summed up and weijghed with impartial carefulness.
IL The Battle in tts Main Aepecta. — This part is beset
with 80 m^y difficulties that no writer can hope to beat
them alL He can do no more than offer his own epitome
to that open and keen debate out of which, perhans, as the
geDeratioDs pass, a complete one may come. The last word
CD all big subjects may be left to the last man— or maybe
the last woman.
IIL The Battle in eame Ohoeen Indiemie amd Epiaodee. —
8
4 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
Every writer will make a different selection, following his
own bent ; but the general effect is likely to be the same, just
as honest samples represent the mass.
lY. The BatUe'a Aftermath, imduding CoTUrovefmea, Side
Iseiiee, and Political Effede, — ^As often as possible controversy
should be separated from narration; it inflames the party
temper, and warm discussion and narrative should not be
mingled together unless we wish to destroy the value of both.
For all that, facts around which disputes are rife must be stated
in their proper places, and sometimes repeated, since huge
battles have many events that overlap from the same causes ;
it is the disputes themselves which, as often as possible,
should be placed among the aftermath of armed strifa
I have used this division into four parts, and have tried
earnestly to see the whole subject under the form of visual
conception, in pictures dear to the mind, this being the only
method of work that is worth while.
Part lY. has been a very distressing one to study, and for
two reasons. Haig was deplorably short of men. During 1917
he had not received even the minimum levies he had asked
for, and afterwards his increasing needs were unsupported by
proportionate reinforcements. So he was obliged to keep his
best divisions far too long in the line of trench routine, and
his combatant strength nad in it far too many men who
were imperfectly trained. These distressing facts were hidden
from the people, and the public temper became one of over-
confidence. Then Ludenaorff struck, and at once the British
people passed into reaction. Over-confidence vanished, and
slander and injustice poured over our Fifth Abmt both during
and after its ordeal against huge odds. There are times when
the political party temper becomes as eager to find scapegoats
as big game hunters are to shoot lions and tigers. And in
war too many persons like to regard truth as a mere candle,
a smoking, feeble thing long displaced by more brilliant
lights, and fit to be put out by Dora's extinguisher.
Sir F. Maurice has declared that in March, 1918, Haig*s
rifle and sabre strength — namely, the number of troops avail-
able for duty in the trenches — was inferior bv 180,000 men
to the power that it possessed in March, 1917, when the British
front was much narrower. Could a graver charge than this
be brought against a British War Cabinet ? Sir F. Maurice's
figures will be found in his epitome of " The Last Four Months/'
They remain unchallenged, and help to comDlete the inftirma-
tion which Earl Haig himself has publishea in his Dispatch
HOW TO BEGIN 5
on the batile. Yet the War Cabinet, while practising un-
faimeas to the Fifth Arht, strove to Ude the tragic need of
more men. For three months, or thereabouts, to take an
example, the official dispatch from Q.H.Q. was withheld from
publication ; and when at last it appeared as a Supplement
to the Zomiofi Oazette, October 21, 1918, some passages were
cat» and the British people were occupied with Qermany's
^>proaehing do¥mfall.
When Bcap^oat-seeking was in its first freshness, a war
eorrespondent at the front, Mr. Hamilton Fyfe, after watching
many phases of the retreat, wanted to tell in print what he
knew to be true. He tried, and was forbidden. Authority
would not let him.*
'* It was not thought desirable then to show up the f alse-
neaa of the view taken by many English reviews and news-
papen, that upon the Fifth Abht ky the responsibility for
the lo68 of so much ground to the enemy ; that this Army was
badly handled and therefore unable to put up a stout resist-
ance ; and that it ' let down ' the Third Army, which, but for
the eoUapse of the Fifth, would have been able to hold its
ground* This view in my opinion is grotesquely at odds with
the truth. . . /' t
It was indeed ; and a slander grotesquely un&ir to Gough
and his men was unfair also to Bvng and his troops, against
whom a reaction would set in when suppressed facts found
their way at last into print. Who can explain why two
British armies were not kept on the same level towards the
natioD's patriotism and truthfulness ? To slander the Fifth
Armt, while magnifying hugely what the Third had achieved,
18^ one of those foliies wbidi are worse than crimes. Both
did their beet in the most fateful battle of the whole war ;
together they spoilt LudendorfTs ample strategy, as Ludendorff
himself admits ; but we owe much greater gratitude to the
FtTTH Armt, because the odds against it everywhere on March
21 certainly exceeded three to one, while Byng along his
narrower front had seventeen divisions with which to oppose
twenty-four. On the rights along a stretch of 80,000 yards,
Qoogh had an average of only one bayonet to the yard, while
the German average was four; and the odds against his right
were as high in guns, machine gons, and mortus.
On the first&y,it is true, Byng was attacked on only two
portions of his firont: directly and formidably from Sena^
* In this ctM, I regrat to My, suthority ww G.H.Q.
t GoMfiiNfiorofY BtfVMV, Jsnoftry, 1919.
6 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
River down to the Bapaume-Cambrai road ; . indirectly » but
menacingly, across Flesqui^res salient Along this total
frontage the foe had fourteen divisions in line, including one
just north of the river, and nine in support, while Byng had
eight in line and seven in support ; but during the first day's
5:rapple Byng reinforced his fighting line with three divisions
rom his reserves.
§n
Troubles caused by injustice are not the only painful
difficulties that students of this battle have to encounter.
Among other troubles there is the profusion of names, military
and geographical, by which most readers of the war's battles
are irritoted. Very often they give a sort of dropsy to a
printed page. Can anything be done to set limits to this
annoyance ? Now and then a name can be deleted without
harm to history ; but there are no means of saving readers
from close attention. Maps must be studied if a battle is to
be seen by the mind; and many corps, divisions, brigades,
battalions, must be named, with many villages, towns, rivers,
and other essential elements in a battle. Personal names can
be shortened in one way only — ^by omitting title& If we
speak bluntly of Haig, as we do of Nelson and Wellington,
we are briefly admirative, not curtly rude. In this book, then,
titles will be given only here and there ; and some other
brevity can be cot by linking leaders with their positions.
The surname Ludendorff) for example, applies not only to the
General himself but also to the German Higher Command,
just as the surname Haig sums up the whole policy of his
O.H.Q. Similarly, the surnames Oough and Bjmg mean the
British Fifth and Third Armies, just as Otto von Below,
briefly Below, represents the Seventeenth German Arbcy,
and Oskar von Hutier, briefly Hutier, the Eighteenth
German Army. Or suppose we say that Maxse, CoMreve, and
Watts are hard pressed along their battle fronts. Surely this
phrasing is briefer and better than to say : " The 18th, 7th,
and 19th Corps are hard pressed along theiribattle fronts, under
command respectively of Lieut-Generals Sir F. Ivor Maxse,
K.O.B., C.V.O., D.S.O., Sir W. N. Congreve,V.C.,K.C.B.,M.V.O.,
and Sir H. E, Watts, KO.B., C.M.G." When official dispatches
are written with this excessive courtesy the movement of
battle stories cannot be rapid ; it is impeded by high and
higher titles.
HOW TO BEGIN 7
Then there is the word Divinon, whieh appears far more
oAen in military writing than is good for narration. Some-
tunes it cannot be deleted, but often it can, happily, and in
tiwo ways :
1. When a ntumeral begiita with a capital letter and is
printed in italica,it7nean8ihatii is the n/wniber of a Division^
Ofnd that the word** division" isomitted. Example : '' Aftera
ni^ht journey with a march of seven miles through fog, the
Vxflidk came up, bringing necessary help to the Tv^nty-fov/rth
and Sixty-sixth.**
2. The names of Divisional Commanders can be used to
den<iie their commands. Examples : Stockley represents the
Fiftieth, Daly the Twenty-foiurth, and Neill Malcolm the
Stxty^siadh.
So it is necessary to show Qough's order of battle, with its
eorps, divisions, and principal offlcer& For this reason, vn the
Table of Contents, after the List of Maps, I have shown the
fowr corps on their fronts. If readers will consult this
Order of Battle when a new surname is mentioned in the
text, they will help greatly in the hard task of simplifying a
sdentific battle teemmg with difficulties.
§ni
It is a belief amonff many persons that the only writers
who should treat of the War are those who witnessed the
battles with their own eyes. For two reasons this belief
might well be put aside. First, if the War is to be
remembered by a whole nation as Uie most painful and useful
in history, its ups and downs ot awful way ward-
should take hold of and shake scores and scores of lay
anthors, as in past times British battles put a spell over
Sonth^y^ Carlyle» Macaulay, Einglake, and a great many other
authors, major and minor. There are laymen who, like
myself, would sooner read good books on great battles than
most novels-
Military writing addressed to professional soldiers may be
limited to the technical anatomy of war ; but other military
writing must pay honour to tiiat very important democrat
who is forgotten hy most specialists — ^the general reader who
does genendly read, as often as not in odd half-hours after
his day^s work. Besides, few real soldiers are dry-as-dusts.
Welliiutoi was as charmed as were schoolboys by chapter
nv. of Charles (yMaUey^ where Lever relates the battle on th 3
8 THE FIFTH AEMY IN MARCH, 1918
Douro» in a style not often equalled by military writing.
The Great Duke wondered how Lever knew certain facts that
he tells. Let many try to emulate this right passion for great
deeds that Lever here reveals !
Next, anyone who fights inside the swirl and fever of a
modem battle sees only the small span of ground over which
he advances or retreats ; and frequently he misjudges events on
his flank only a few hundreds of jasds off. Indeed, only a
soldier here and there admits that his battalion was compelled
to fall back ; most soldiers complain that their flank was left
in the air by a neighbouring umt, whose troops have precisely
the same tale to telL At &st I was worried by this general
complaint.
Only from ofiicers who are not always inside the fever of
a battle — only from commanders over brigades, divisions, and
corps, and armies — do we get more or less in focus extending
views of large and larger fronts. The lesser Generals sift and
collect evidence for the Army Commander, who alone knows
what is passing all along his front ; knows all this roughly,
since events may chancre all at once : and here and there in
widespread fighting, a glp of sUence iiritates the Commandet's
mind, for it adds jesses to that dread uncertainty which
rules over aU armed strife till a battle ends.
An Army Commander, then, is a mincJ-witness, not an
^2/6- witness ; a new sort of historian who receives reports
from expert sifters, and whose intellect must have vision as
well as coolness and candour. Soldiers inside a great battle
are like persons in a sand storm, while the vision of an Army
Commander is like a^spectator who from a favourable distance
sees a grand stretch of groyne-protected shore and a storm
tide flooding or ebbing.
As for lay students of the War's immensity, they should
practise the craft of map-drawing. More than anything else in
the study of war it compels the mind to keep at close quarters
with very troublesome points and problems. For this reason
I have given more than twelve weeks to map-drawing alone ;
and soon I began to feel that modem trench warfare has a
certain kindredship with fundamental problems of architecture
and engineering; problems of jolts, thrusts, repercussions,
recoils ; of action and reaction, and poise and equipoisa
To overwhelm equipoise on Gbugh's wide front was the
nut which Ludendorff wanted to crack, aided by lessons
gathered from past failures in attack, both German and
Allied. To keep a sort of devious or vagrant stability, after
HOW TO BEGIN 9
▼ui odds had crumbled a very thin defence, was the duty
▼hidi Gongh and his officers and men had to fulfil, and just
managed to fulfil, in spite of indescribable sufferings. As Sir
F. Maurice says, ''our men showed coolness, courage, deter-
mination, and endurance in adversity which pass all under-
standing and are beyond all praise, but they should never,
and need never have been called upon for such sacrifices as
they made without stint and without complaint.'' *
Since August, 1918, this battle has occupied my days, very
often till midnight ; authentic materials of many sorts have
turned me into their pupil ; and I hope never to forget their
best lessons — ^lessons of gratitude, and also of reverence. Once
more, in this grapple against enormous odds, British states-
manship asked P^vidence to let our country perish; and
onee more this request was nearly granted. Aa Clemenceau
has stated, '* we were playing a hand on which hung the fate
of the Fatherland."
^ ««Th« IiMt Foot Monthe," p. 64.
CHAPTER II
ON A NEW FRONT: DEFENCE AND ITS UMTTS
§1
AT the dose of 1917 a Tommy said of the Fifth Armt :
/ Y " ^t's always bein' moved abart to tackle nasty jobs/'
2^ \ but nasty jobs by dozens came to all troops after
deep dugouts and elaborate trench S3r8tems were in-
troduced by German caution and thoroughness. Gk>ugh and
his oflScers and men may have had more than a fair share of
the nastiest jobs, though their ordeal in the horrific Tpres
salient seems to have been less abominable than was that of
Plumer's troops when they plodded through mud and blood
and captured Passchendaele.
After the Ypres salient campaign had ended, the Fifth
Abmt rested for a brief time in General Reserve. Then, on
December 18, 1917, it was put on a new front, replacing
a portion of Byng's forces on a twelve-mile line from a point
about half a mile north of Gouzeaucourt to the Omignon River.
The 7lh Corps came under its command, and the Cavalry
Corps also.
I^early a month later, between Januarv 10 and 12, 1918,
a one-corps front was taken over by Gough from the French
Third Armt ; it ran southward from the Omignon to a point
south-east of St. Quentin and north-east of Urvillers. And
one more change was to come, between January 26 and
February 3, when the French Third Armt was relieved on
another one-corps front as far south as Barisis, a village south
of the Oise between two forests, Coucy and St Gobain.*
Much controversy has eddied around this transfer of land
from French to British troopB,t but at present we pass away
from it in order to keep at close quarters with the main
sequence of events. From February 3, 1918, Gough had
* Pray keep these dates before your mind; their bearing on the pre*
paration work to be done is very important,
t Part I., p. 26, and Part lY., p. SOO.
10
A NEW FRONT: DEFENCE AND ITS LIMITS 11
forty-two miles of front to safeguard across the heart » of
IVanoe, and the work to be done was enormous. Every mile
had to be remodelled and combined in accordance with a series
of rules issued by Q.H.Q. on December 14, 1917. When
eompaied with these rules, even the land taken over from
Bynff was unfit for the most recent phases of defence ; and as
for the French fronts, they had a forward area well dug and
ruf plied with shelters; but the main battle positions had
nouing but a belt of wire, and neither roads nor railways were
yei good enough for the lessons which had been learnt from
recent bitter experience.
Only a cable here and there had been buried below the
reach of shells, and no area of defence was organized in depth.
Stretches of the front had been ravaged by a German retreat
in the spring of 1917,* and along the Oise and Somme sectors,
dry weather was having a very bad effect, drying marshes,
nanowing water channels, and making rivers ^ttdually ford-
able between the usual points of passage. So new problems
of defence were thrust by unusual dry weather on Haig
and Gough, problems too extensive to be solved in about
■even weeks, but not too extensive to be considered in this
book from several standpoints.
B(UUe Zone, — ^Planned for defence to a great depth, varying
from 2000 to 3000 yards, with good successive lines carefully
aied and combined* Diagonal switch trenches gave support
to strong points and wired strategical places. It was hoped
that they would stop the foe frt>m spreading outwards and
reeling up our position, if he managed to penetnite at dangerous
spots in our defences.t The m<^ important localities were
always garrisoned. Plans and preparations for the best use
of troops both in defensive battle and in counter-attack were
worked out with skilly partly for the service of those men
who were chosen to guard the various sectors, and parti v for
the proper handling of reinforcements arriving from elsewhere.
Fcrwa/rd Zone. — Its defensive scheme was ordered also
in deptii, and, of course, its garrison was always on guard
against surprise, to break up the foe's attacks, and to
fbrae him to waste large quantities of ammunition and to
* The grwt *' Alberioh Morement,'^ between Ama and Soiaaons, hy whioh
Ladendorfl withdrew hia troopa to ue Siegfried Line, and pnt ont of joint
tbe AlUed plana of oombined attack. Thia retreat began on March 16, and
«M eaoled throosh without a bceak in a few Ug atagea.
t The facanoh trenohea caUed awitchea, forming protective flanka to pat the
ioe Into pooketa II he geta throogh at dangerona pointa, turn atretohea of
eooDtry mto blind alleya, ao to apeak.
12 THE FIFTH AEMY IN MABCH, 1918
bleed an increasing number of bis brigades. The backbone of
defence in this zone was a combination of wire entanglements
with machine guns very well hidden in dugouts.
Becur Zone. — ^Ludendorff struck when the rear lines were
very imperfect, ranging in depth from a foot to thirty-six
inches. A foot deep seems to have been about the average in
most places. These lines were placed from four to eight miles
behind the battle zone, and G.H.Q. did all that could be done
in a few weeks, always in conjunction with our armies, to
choose the best positions, and to spit-lock their projected
defences. They formed very good nalting places for stem
rearguard actions, but not for a decisive stand by weak
numbers against superior forces constantly renewed. Yet
they were valued greatly, even far too much, by G.H.Q., as
the official dispatch proves.
The whole defensive scheme, very ample and cautious,
was copied from German principles and precedents; and if
Ludendorff had not struck Wore it was brought to completion,
G.H.Q. and its armies would have had reason to be surprised
and very glad. The work to be done being enormous, priority
had to be given as follows to certain essentials : —
1. Wire.
2. Shell-proof accommodation, including machine-gun
emplacements, observation posts, and battle headquarters.
3. Communications, including roads, tracks, railways, and
communication trenches.
4. Earthworks.
On March 21, the battle zone in most sectors was finished —
that is to say, a decisive grapple could have been fought in it
by a defence reasonably manned. Its weaker parts, as a rule,
were those taken over from the French. Had there been
time. Watts would have added further strength to his battle
zone ; and this applies also to Butler's 80,000 yards of front.
For the rest^ the battle zone lay at varying distances behind the
outpost area, sometimes touching it, and within 1500 yards of
forward sentry posts, as on Gough's extreme left. Sometimes,
as in Maxse's Corps, a stretch of imf ortified country, in places
2000 yards wide or more, connected the outpost zone with our
battle zone, and gave natural cover for manoeuvring.
I have drawn a detailed map of Maxse's Corps, which
faced St. Quentin, and have shown which battalions defended
the zones, and which German divisions assailed them. The
grapple was one of thin British brigades against German
divisions at full battle strength.
A NEW FRONT: DEFENCE AND ITS LIMITS 18
As for the lightly-held outpost screen oovering our main
positionSy it bad many excellent redoubts or strongj^MtSy which
were held to the last with the utmost courage, as we shall see.
Into his forward or outpost zone, Gough put a third part of
his men, reserving two-thirds for his battle zone. Or, counting
reserve troops, the proportion was two-ninths in the outpost
area and seven-ninths m the battle zone. Each defensive belt
or zone had a front linci with a support line 300 yards behind ;
next, a certain number of strongpomts or redoubts ; and last,
a reserve line. Trenches were not continuous in the outpost
screen, where men in detached groups had to attack the foe
with a criss-cross of machine-gun fire ; while in the battle
2one and rear defence continuous lines were used as often as
possible.
Here and there men were employed in sections, in ^ blobs,"
as by our Eighteenth. * Military opinion was moving away
from continuous lines, with communication trenches — obvious
and steady tar^ts for artillery fire. Australians and New
Zealanders liked to place their men in " blobs," well dug in
and supporting one another by machine-gun barrage ; and it
was found that men placed underground in disport " slits "
suffered fewer casualties than men in trenches. A ''slit"
was two feet broad, six feet long, and six feet deep : just room
enough for two men. At one end was a step on which the
men stood to fire. When slits were dug in ploughed land, they
were very hard to see, and only direct nits made them unsafe.
StiU, an Australian said to me, ** Oh yes, one felt all right
ui a slit till a flight of Hun planes flew low overhead ; and
then, somehow, a slit seemed to be a good acre square — and
certain to be bombed in."
When defences are formed into deep systems, and when
they have to be manned by young troops rapidly trained, it
seems a hazardous venture to use min and scattered garrisons,
as human impulses are never so gregarious as in times of peril,
and too much nerve strain should not be thrust on very brave
boy troops who were recently civilians. One extensive
ledoubt, for example, held by a tiny force, had a dozen
scattered posts, and from six or seven the lads fdl back through
sheer loneliness, when an attack followed hard upon the
German creeping barrage. They came .together, forming a
company; then they were as cool as a bMrd meeting, and
held their foee at bay in a very fine spirit.
* A nvm&nX bigfamiiig wilb » ospiM and ptiated in iteliot mMni th«
Bonber of ft divUcni.
!-l THE SUfTTH iBSlY IN MABCH, 1918
Xow MM tlMB G^.ij. sfiv«s ate tike impnasion that its
uiiHMW tvw«nift ytxMitAiiiMHS wis too barwncntic ; thai it
«te-iMMur attvl 'u«hiuBaaUbaaw«ieWdliiigt(xi and Napoleon
^ibou iMki^ h«i w tw s**t to do the work of Teteraiu. Its
>wubM^ Ml IficwtNiuy ot' Force maHy impl^ that British
.utuK-« tu t^tU*^ b<ki nw«ivt»d tite eomiUete tramin? described
.H Nik^vu ttE» uocoMsary to tiw odoeatioii of a British soldier^
»' uwu:it,£ >>t' &h»o tdttm years. Thon^ Q-H-Q. knew that
uvo ^'^Mu Akmy was vsry weak in nambera, and also
•,\MM(K>w.\t v>X' vvubhM tioo{M, ceoentlj oiTiliaos, it issued these
> ^ !■•«>««# 1^' IfltriM. — Eeonomy of troops must be studied in
iMvMu i^i^ (Kwi^^*'''* *^ allotting troops to defences, in order
vhsku khtt -.uvu^th vt reserves. Both tactical and strategical,
uhA« bi» ast j(>sMbl aa possible. At the same time, dejemcea
.*tv>.{,.nU ii> 4«v>ttr« vu««aU« taaticai featwrea must be con-
ML^.-w^^'i iamU vuiopMtdy garrUoned. The stronger and
tK^i.v4 \iWvi the d«>b>ooes w«> and the more impassable the
v>:>M«Ms>^<.«v fctttf tewer wen will be required to hold them, and
vv<M.<vvt"'.'^t^,v the laKer the reserves to be held in hand. As
bit.' vvv>^^ <,>u (htfM Jefenoes progresses it should be possible
;^^l^l.k'U' W vvduee the numbers allotted to the defence oi
^1^ ki<iik\Mvl «v>u«> aud thus inoreaae the nombers available
*, i\\.^'*V*»«, ' i_ . .„
i'itu-> ^> tMUU ivserves irom a grave weaKness in nne
,nv'iVi*'* •'*>'*^v wvewtretohed aoroas forty-two miles of vital
UvVMit ut «u aJvvuture which I am unable to understand,
' -^:- ^ ^( uutllar risks in bridge building. No
V ] " We oan't afford more material and
[t varry our bridge safely haUway across this
iV(U\ fJever mind. We'll take risks. By
i lighter than it ought to be we'll reach the
\, atul perhaps luck won't be too deviHsh
ktiWM aoi'tiiui during a gale." ^Still, O.H.Q.
vM with risks its insufficient man-power ;
<Mt the beat way is another question, over
M\wi fait to debate keenly.
I«>|>lli," uya an Enelish Colonel, "means
WvH-~» wv^N" ■«*»«■«» and greater difficulty in keepiog up
y,^««nwi\>**iv»t*." V*""" no doubt; and a dire fact in the battle
,li ,v.t>4 i«utk|)tv4' W'iUuiiuu hitherto unnoticed by writers;
w 11". U . ^*w* tt'V ttu'Wtuxi ■ooea, and a battle area well placed
I 'mvvA vM^t^ u«it)lt^ \\»-\^ l>ee& much better than the three
\ V >N'kts<> ^litwK by ll.tl.Q., as on several occasiona the
A NEW FBONT: DEFENCE AND ITS LIMITS 16
batUe sone of one division was outflanked by the foe's rapid
advance b^ond the single forward zone of a neighbouring
division. On the first day this happened both norUi and
south of Maxse's Corps, whose positions were uncommonly
stroog.
Ludendorff learnt from events to fear a single forward zonoy
as men retreating from it after a bad grapple Drought disorder
wiUi them into the main blEtttle area. But the Fifth Army's
forward defence was accepted by^ every one as a great position
ot trust where all must fight as in forlorn hopes. Only a few
men returned from it, and these few, almost without
exceptions, returned honourably, under orders, after many a
noble combat like those which are told in this book, Chapter
L, Part II.
§11
In several maps I have shown portions of the defensive
aystemsy sometimes with their battauons, but as my drawings
would have to be reduced by a block-maker to a1x)ut a thini
of their size, I could not give the trenches in elaborate ground
plans.
Thouffh the finished work in these zones was all that could
be brought to completion, many complaints have be^i printed.
According to some ideal critics, wonderful trenches were due
bat not held ; according to others, no trenches could be held
because none had been made ; and on August 7, 1918, Mr.
lioyd George told the House of Commons that '' Practically
the whole British front was new ground which had been
won from the enemy where there had been no time to set up
defences^ and these tired troops, instead of enjoying rest, or
instead of having time for training, had to niake aefence&''
The exaggeration in this quotation is evident. There is no
reference to the huge labour squads, or to the vast amount of
work which was done with the utmost care. And why did
the Prime Minister speak of our tired troops without deploring
the main cause of their fatigue— -that bUmg off in the supply
of enough men for which nis Qovemment was responsible ?
Ha said that *^ Our troops were tired by a prolonged offensive,
by the most exhausting conditions under which any troops
ever fought." Why, then, were they not reinforced adequately
and in tune for Ludendorff's offensive ?
Here, too, is another criticism. It is written by a war
correspondent who witnessed for himself many phases of the
16 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MARCH, 1918
reireati after seeing beforehand the positions in which our
troops awaited the attack, and the preparations made in the
rear of those positions for defensive action in the event of the
front lines bemg overran :—
" My own opinion is that the positions prepared for the
troops to fall back upon, one after another, in the event of
their being hard pressed, might have been more effectively
wired. But this criticism applies with equal force to the
Thibd Armt front. ... I have a note in my diary of a
conversation I had with Qough as early as January 30. He
said then : ' The Germans might very Ukely attack his army
front, and would probably gain some ground if they did. The
beet line of defence would be the line of the Somme. Until
they got across that there would be no tragedy. It might be
a tragedy if they did I ' This view had been discussed with
Q.H.Q., and G.H.Q. knew the strength of the Somme and other
defences quite as well as Gough. Yet very little was done to
improve our positions anywhere. I recollect thinking, some
weeks after tne enemy had been brought to a standstill before
Amiens, when trenches were being dug and wired in every
direction and to a great depth even behind Amiens, that if
the British Army had done half this amount of work before
the 21st of MaiHch, there would have been no retreat • . .
BritiBh Q.H.Q. knew, thanks to the activity of the Intelligence
Department under General Cox (whose accidental death
deprived the Army of a painstaking and vij^rous o£5cerJ
where the blow would falL Most Generals of Division refused
to believe that there would be any blow. A fortnight before
the offensive opened I heard from the Staff of one of the Fifth
Aricy divisions that they could not see why G.H.Q. had
warned them to be prepared. * But neither at Fifth Army
Headquarters nor at Montreuil did any illusion prevail Since
he knew that the Fifth Army would be attacked with vast
numbers, and knew also its weakness, Haig must be blamed
no less than Gough if the preparations were inadequate." —
HEunilton Fyfe, Contemporary Review, January, 1919.
These views from an article otherwise right in aim are
misleading for several reasons. First of all, they produce a
false impression, though their writer hates injustice and wants
to be entirely true. When writing about modernized war,
with its enormous complexity and its millions and millions of
* Serenl divfiioiial oomsiMiders, wiildag to rati and train thair men,
oompUunsd to Oaneral Googh against tba inoiiiant dateoa Ubonr ; but th^
wara told, of oouna, to drlta on and on frith dafaniWe piapibTation.
A NEW FRONT: DEFENCE AND ITS LIMITS 17
detaehed facts, correct impression is all-important ; the
complexity and innumerable facts cannot be given, and if
they conld be, most civilian readers would fail to understand
them. Even Haig's dispatch is too difficult for most lay
readers, who find it a mere confusion for a lecturer to explain
with much aid from lantern slides and large G.H.Q. maps.
Now correct impression depends partly on a right suppression
of most minor items, and partly on what may be called an
axiomatic epitome of major facts. Hence it is absurd to
dwell on those rear defences which could not be finished
unless other systems of defence nearer the coming attack were
neglected. Maxse was satisfied with his forward and battle
positions, which were excellent ; Congreve regarded his own
unes as the best he had seen in France ; and Butler and Watts
did all that could be achieved in the time.
On Gongh's front, the Labour Commandant, in thirteen
weeks — December 22 to March 16 — found that his men
increased from 26,567 to 67,967, these last figures including
12,255 Italians, 5185 Chinese, 10,272 prisoners of war, 4446
Indians, and 35,809 British — a Labour League of Nations.
These men had a day's rest in the week, not all at the same
time, of course, but in daily batches of fifteen per cent ; and
men were needed every day for area employments, escorts for
priscmers of war. Labour Group Staff, and some were sick ;
tmt, after all these deductions were made, the Tnen daily at
work increased in thirteen iveeks from 13,468 to 40,212,
though Haig had 125 miles of front all threatened by German
preparations, and thus all in need of Labour Commandants
and their enterprise. . . . Uaig himself says that there was
not labour enough for all his pressing needs.
General Smuts visited the British front — ^in February, I
think — ^to inspect defences for the War Cabinet ; he reported
that FifTH Armt work, well ordered and organized, was
being pushed on with energy ; and here and there in this
book we shall see how alert and wide awake were the
preparations. A very great strain had to be borne by the
Si^ud Service, for example, and also by the Administrative
StaflEs, who, while supplying the retreat with food and
ammunition, had more than 60,000 non-combatants and
Labour Units to carry away to safety, with huge masses of
stores, and I^iW numbers of agricultural implements. More
than 250 bri<^;es had to be prepared for destruction, as an
army which settles down on a defensive policy must have all
things ready to frustrate the foe's efforts to aavance.
c
"^^ ?!FHE ,aaLT :y xabch;. ins
ii ii^ tt) Ml &r too HHdi stole by
a» ttsandk syotoH^ jost as our
too mn^of saMMiir,till at last
u»0> vMiiu *tei*4dir :ai»vi» ivttii tiaao nor get «p wxthoat help if
-^x'^<sc^ ^ ^ I iiMij i» t3u 315 ^mw» mco Bok of a sort either to
^ o*2»^nBH««& ,'r A,* ^^ittw ^^or oMft to lean on them overmach.
.Htonr .»4«:i«o^vMuiu ^M« 1mv«» hoeaiDade in a scamper against
^ 4 iM «.^ >«K «.% . .«tta !»oe$4 v/t o«tr SMBt * had worked so hard
tirkrt* tt«Mft i2Kkh :jjm'« x:t*«r by hsart the material agencies
%.»v.»t %vuAvk K*^^ .a«iia :i)£ira^ ^ worst days. They could
w«^^mi^ a]NMiiM«vi)t)L: ^ Tbaee places won't give Fritz a
.^ .aKmh ^Notu ^v : ^ If we stick it all rights these
>Ukmav; w^;.» ta^ to vio dhs trick.** And this mood is
>^ t»» >nit4i .Wto Jor jcnas resifttance,
V v>^>wMiJWM<^ ^itta toamr of Napoleon dwells upon the
i^>^ ^■ %mk; KV ^iB W ai;^ l«»ii8$ott «bi«t scood troops ought always to
<v^ *Na«t^v^M. :^N«.*«%^ to tihiir &sU works; beoiuse they are
>^^« V s^^ ;i»; >%«^«itt ^ih^ pu|V sicoiid fiddle to the protection
,«^M^ v^^ Ttt^tittKa^i ^u^ctk ni# Chevalier du Teil, who in
^^ N^v"^ >«k4 «i y.vQ^v«»ttft #Mgr on artilleiT, and who was
%.\ %*'. ^^% N«.eK>H -It 4^^ Y^ttMtt^ in which Napoleon was to
S \ N>i^%\M^«^ vMv ua^ tMOU w\Mr^s the danger of depending
^v ^v^vA >^ >£v^c>^>n: '^^ U ic^ admitted by instructed and
-\sx.v^vv. s^(Kn^-v ^)^ ^Y Uiei^«ce baaed solely upon en-
4s^.n*jkn» i*v^; N\»«<. ^ ;ik>!«^uto«^ toirtrary to all grand views
N ^>N A %^v v«v« >^^>a ^K«te<tb;<ij^ 0^*^ iW art of war, and in short
hV^ «v.v 1KVV4KV Vd^ W^v4r WD^ thai d the great generals."
^ %>x .s v^'*^*^ ^>>M^ t^M ^^ iMor triMich on Qough's over-
vuvNV^Vv r\A«>f \MKi % A,\^ iNm tNittMl our men to feel too
x^>A vKv ^.«%vv v^t^^ j^iit^ ^v:^ v>f f^\\>Metve &tigue 1^^
V ' vsx X . ^..ys^ ;M^^ 4^vt^ ^^<aii»# «» Kaid as to hold off the
% >^^x^v %.xx. ^ s^^s v^ ^MV ^^K!i» vMT muKi w^MiM have sent our
vnv« ^ v>v>»^ w ^^v"^ ^w«mm^ TIm^ ^Hnme was onlv about
v^x^ ^\n a\\\ .%«n» %t^i}^^^v>i K^^wtt^ bridges made path-
• ; %>*N % VvV V N*^- ^*^ 1^ ^ fiwr nwre dependent on
*Vo . >^^ xo\\^ ^%^ >^ ^iMMimak J t nAoco x it was also a help
A NEW FRONT: DEFENCE AND ITS LIMITS 19
to them that they were tied loosely, not tightly, as our foes
were» to the machine named scientific warfare. The German,
keen and enterprising while his routine keeps in gear, is apt
to lose edge when his leaders' plans get entangled ; and many
Qerman mvisions cannot be crowded together in an assault
without causiiig at last much confusion. Bri^rades of different
divisions get jumbled together, and break-tnrough becomes
necessary to give the mass freedom of movement and deploying
valuei
To make second-rate compromise serve our turn is one of
our national whims, or habits ; and in adversity it is a great
friend to our troopa The Fifth Abicy was obliged to make
ahift^ for its men nad had no experience in the art of retreat-
ing; unlike their Commander, who served his country during
the retreat from Mons, as well as in the first battle of Ypres.
Do civilians know what retreating means ? Not many,
and it is a nut to crack how to make dear in words the worst
peril — namely, that gaps form inevitably unless enough re-
inforcements are at nand along the whole line. When a
oalient is formed by the act of uimstinff inwards some miles
of battle-firont, the line around the swent is plainly much
longer than the salient's width at its base ; and thus an army
in retreat, if it forms a salient, extends its lines ever more and
more, while casualties make it ever more unfit to resist attack
from greatly superior number& Tet a fine retreat must go on
bending without breaking. It must not halt long enough to
be overwhelmed by num^ra Can we compare it to stretched
elastic which grows weaker as it grows longer ? Tes ; but
not to a eingU piece of elastic, beciBiuse a retreat is made in
many stretcMng pieces called battalions, brigades, divisions,
and corps. Each of these units is a piece of humanized
elastie, likely to be broken by excessive stretching to fill gaps.
Later we shall see that Qough had few reserves, and that nis
I08M8 on the first and second days were very severa So the
stretching; was always far too much to be safe ; and the foe
made this danger more perilous by attacking the points at
whidi divisions and corps and armies were joined together.
Tet our young troops, recently civilians, though handicapped
also by a lack of pre-battle training (as Haig has pointed out),
were not swallowed up by a veritoble cyclone of scientific
warfara In spite of mistakes, they made shift so well that
we dvilians onght to be very grateful and very humbla
Take deven wooden matches to represent the divisions in
linci and three others to denote the reserve in£uitryi adding a
20 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
match cut into three equal parts for the cavaby.* Draw a
long line on a sheet of paper, and put the eleven matches upon
it close together. And now begin to rehearse the reti^t,
forming a salient that grows deeper and deeper. Yery soon
you wm understand aU about natural gaps, and the need of
many reserves, even if no casualties enfeeble the divisions.
Let me ask you to take up these matters into your under-
standing. Tnr to think of them till you see them as pictures ;
then you will follow the retreat with awe, and with other
heart-searching emotions. Perhaps you will come to the
humbled opinion that most men of our race need either
military or naval discipline to make them effectual as friends
to their native land, partly because their general outlook is
too insular for their world-wide Empire, and partly because
their civilian dislike of discipUne runs into fads and senti-
mental illusiona As a people we need what we hate —
discipline, with its unity of action.
Side by side with all these important matters, which help
to give a massed impression of the influences at work in war,
let me ask you to feel the growling of airplanes that practise
for the coming battle, and that go forth after dark, whenever
a ground mist does not prevent them, in order to spy on the
foe's night movements. Many times before thcj battle began
they flew low during the evening over hostile defences and
dropped flares; but they could not see German troops and
guns in the act of being moved up with all possible stealth,
nor could they hear the German soldier songs which night
discipline could not stop. These songs troubled Ludendorff,
whose anxiety caused nim to expect more stealth from his
men than hundreds of thousands were able to give in their
crowd-moods. What a picture it is — Ludendorfi' in his Head-
quarters biting his nails because troops passiag by night
through villages towards the battle front break suddenly into
song, while overhead British airplanes drop flares !
Careful plans were drawn up for launching the Fifth
Arht airplanes on a given signal to counter-attack the foe's
infimtry, and batteries, and roads, and bridges. Every target
was mapped in the plans, then studied carenilly by those who
were chosen to assail it with bombs. Never before had this
method of employing air flights been used on anything like
such a grand scale, nor organized with so much skill and
completeness. Later it was copied by other British armies.
* The three divisions of cavalry in our Futh Abky equalled in man*
power the average rifle strength of an infantry diviiion.
A NEW FRONT: DEFENCE AND ITS LIMITS 21
Ladendorff and his Generals were equally active with their
mirplaneB. and with results which came as a surprise to
many British soldiers ; but not to Gough^ who never under-
vmlned the foe's initiative and perseverance. The airmanship
on both sides during the battle was as keen and ffood as are
first-rate football teams in a cup tie — strained to uxe utmost,
intrepid, full of resource and cunning. In some points, as in
oontiu^ patrols, the German airplanes had an advantage over
our own, according to Fifth Abmy officers. They discovered
our new fronts swiftly, with the result that heavy guns were
soon in action against our new positions. German infantry
liirhted flares as soon as they were asked to do so by their
i£-eooat8. Briefly, the Ge Jan training in these thiii^ was
excellent. Ludendorff speaks of this training (vol. ii., p. 677) :
''In order to provide aircraft support for the infantry,
special battle aeroplane flights were formed. As had hitherto
been done by individual airmen, they dived down from great
heights and flew along at a low level, attacking with madiine
guns and light bombs the infantry lines, the artiUery, and, as
the practice extended, the enemy's reserves and transport
columns, as well as columns of troops coming up from farther
in the rear.
^Originally intended to be an 'auxiliary' arm to the
infiuitry, these battle-flights were finally given important
tactical tasks. Thus the air force gained a new fleld of activity
of the greatest importance. Airmen, in the course of their
duties, were not only reconnaissance troops who had to fight ;
they were not only bomb-carriers for destructive work far in
Uie foe's rear, but they had also, like infantry, artiUery, and
all other arms, to take part in the fighting on the ^und.
like the other combatant forces, they were a destructive arm
in the great battle on land. This, indeed, became their main
object, and the aerial combat was only a means of attain-
ingit
Who can explain why newspaper propagandists told the
British people that German airmen in March, 1918, were
bunglers ? One writer said :
" The Germans intended to overwhelm us when the great
attack began, at which moment Richtho&n and all the
circuses of the air duly made their number. But meanwhile
our men had so established their ascendancy over the in-
suflBdently tnuned young entry of the enemy that not even
the appearance of the German stars could alter matters. The
enemy had at least 1000 aeroplanes on the scene when the
22 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
attack began, but their training was inadequate, while ours
was better than ever, and though the fighting has been as
usual mainly over the German lines, all the advantage has
been with our men.''
This propaganda, being far and away too excessive, was as
harmful as the zeal with which British pressmen throughout
the war magnified hugely the German casualties till nothing
said by newspapers on the foe's losses was believed^ except by
those who preferred any sort of over-sanguine fudge to an
unpleasant fact To belittle a foe's training and courage is a
stupid act if you wish to do justice to your own men. The
writer from whom I have just quoted must have known that
he had gone much too far, because he ended his remarks by
throwing a chill on any over-confidence which his falsely
triumphant picture might produce in simple readers :
'' At the same time it must be said that in a great action
of this ultra-modem stamp we see the Air Force in better
perspective, and realize that, good and valuable though it be,
it does not alter the general course of events. To arrest
a great attack, as we now see, our airmen must number
thousands instead of hundreds, and the old Nelsonian maxim
that numbers alone annihilate is shown to be as applicable to
the air as it is to the land and the sea."
In a quotation from Ludendorflf (p. 21) we have seen
what German airmen were trained and expected to do,
and those over the Fifth Abmt's front were thoroughly
enterprising: so it is necessary for us to connect this fact
with every phase of the ordeal through which our troops
battled their way. My researches do not leave me to believe
that the airmen on either side gained ascendancy over the
other. Both sides had so much work to do both in and from
the air that they had no leisure in which to think of duelling
for superiority. British airmen were handicapped by two
circumstances. First, as soon as French reinforcements began
to arrive our air flights were worried because the French
horizon-blue uniforms resembled from above the German
field-grey ; and as these French uniforms were usually behind
the Sritish fighting front, air scouting for information be-
came difficult, and now and then erroneous. More than once
news was sent to the Army's H.Q. that German troops were
active in the British rear, Frendi horizon-blue having been
mistaken for German field-grey. Next, through nearly three
whole days German airmen could concentrate mainly on the
battle itself because the Allied reinforcements came up slowly
A NEW FRONT: DEFENCE AND ITS LIMITS 28
and gradually, while our own ainnen had to divide their
power between the battle and the vast Gtorman reserves, who,
"whether second and third line troops or last reserves, thronged
the German rear till the battle was nearing its end. Ludendorff
says that his troops suffered heavilv from airplane bombing,
especially those who were mounted; and from the first day
onward our own troops were greatly harassed by the same
new weapon.
On the second day, for instance, the South African Brigade
was very much troubled by German planea Dawson, their
Brigadier, says : —
" The retirement of the artillery had been going on in the
meantime, but the enemy's planes to the number of about
thirty were causing the teams considerable annoyance. They
were also continually flying along the trenches, firing at the
Another Brigadier, Robert White of the Sixty-f/rst, writing
of the same day, says : —
** During the afternoon fighting in Beauvois the Germans
had some twenty aeroplanes hovering over the village and
diving with extraordinary daring almost into the streets. Of
these, two were shot down by our men at very dose rifle
range. I am inclined to think that this occurred right along
the line."
It has been very unfSfidr to our troops deliberately to hide
what German aircraft did against our infantry and artillery.
Truth still remains in the War with her eyes bandaged and
her tongue tied. Surely it is time that she should be restored
to Peace with her eyes uncovered and her tongue free to tell
what she knows. In Much, 1918, pressmen and officials
forgot, unhappily, that a great nation in a time of danger
should prove by her words and by her acts that she is
genuinely great, and therefore above untruth.
Even at GJ9.Q.» apparently, there was an inclination to
undervalue the foe's airmen. Early in the battle an official
summary of news stated that their morale had not improved
because they flew low I How could they use machine-guns
in the fighting on the ground, or be alert in contact patrols,
if they flew hi A ?
And now uiat we have seen that the airplane training,
both British and German, was usually thorough, let us note
some otiier things in the routine of preparation. Plans
were drawn up and issued for a swift garrisoning of all
positions, by reserves as well as by line troops; and all
s^ ,»x «s.«> v^..^*i«.^H«.«« >;<««»4:h .uttvc^ ^\r tfiiftT ttid nidit^ in
■> - V : ^ ■*•** vv«^-*-.x -ii^^AT :iiii$is» aad pofiitioDa As
.^ ^^ ..«.-, ^ \ . V ''^••.'•te.T* uc 3ttfitit« '*' Older was issued ;
«. . x.<v- ^x^ -^v «v^^ 4.* .*v.;>«m:^ ^ e^)$iiiB(r guns were put into
V ^. V .. v« .. • « «v -«cie. ^^•«a«^i vA hsoetde roads^and known
N V %%.v *,v. **v> /i.iHH: ITiirrH AufT orders — ^''Prepare
V 'i-« sii. V >s.%^^v*^t.v ^N% *)cu ^ trooos got ready at once to
x^ . >. .,^vs.wv %iui >i;W(i^), and ^Man Battle Stations/'
x« >.. s.. •«...« .V *avui U'^ucIms and redoubts, and the
V, <^ ^s *^ .v;v....>^ Kioa» %tth a sodden laugh here and there,
\^^ - • N- >^^^^ s ^«^ ^"a ;ik wciitit^t defenee.
- Kv^> ^s.s«v H^riv ivb^MWRMd again and again, and the
'n^. s vv^ w^ v^^x ^i v>ii^Uidi person, perhaps they bored
' X ^ ,xxx ^x«^ 04 s% thvisjiiott General tells me that his own
. > V H \^ \ ^ sa^ *v:>^MtW oJf *^ Man Battle Stations," were
V .«^ ^ . H \n\ .\^ \v«Ail ^noiHK The foe had not attacked, you
vsv XX K V V s\ visovhv^iv thal» after all their toU through a
. ^^ . N4 . K>.. v\\^\ " b^iU had aeored off them*" What a
X X A V ^*s\v ^'^^^ whi^ (\>uch el British grumbling!
CHAPTER III
FOBESIOHT, AND OOUOR's KANIFESTOES
§1
WHAT is the greatest quality in preparations for a
battle ? Forethought, foresight, vision. As
early as February 3, 1918, in a conference at
Catelet, Dough warned his leading officers that
danger might come from across the Oise — ^an unpleasant
prediction oecause this river hitherto had been an effective
oarrier along 16,000 yards of uneven front, and French states-
meii had used this fact as an argument when they insisted on
an extension of Haig*s line by more than twenty-eight miles
If 16,000 yards of this total distance needed no more defence
than a line of far-scattered outposts, the French Ministry
had reason to be urgent in their policy, though it was opposed
by some French Generals as well as by Haig, whose combatant
strength chanced to be at a low ebb, while Norfolk and Ireland
were alert with reserves.
Two passages in the official dispatch suggest that G.H.Q.
and Gough thought of the Oise in different ways, and that
0«H.Q.'s way was not the better one. The first passage runs
as follows :
"From Gouzeauoourt to the Oise River at Moy, forty
German divisions were set in motion on the first day. An
event which, having regard to the nature of the ground, was
not considered proMible, was that the enemy would be able to
extend the flank of his attack in any considerable strength
beyond Moy. The rapid dnring of the marshes, due to an
exceptionally dry spring, in met enabled the enem^ to attack
this lightly held front with three fresh divisions, m addition
to the three divisions already in line." *
Why was this flank attack considered improbable by
O.H.Q. ? The dry weather began at the end or December,
• » Hftig'fl I>ispatohM,*' voL U., p. 186.
25
26 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MAECH, 1918
1917, and continued till the outbreak of LudendorflTs offensive,
apart from a few showers. So its effect on marshes and on
the Oise's depth and width were known ; and on February 3,
before any marsh was hardened, Grough foretold a riverside
attack because Oskar von Hutier and the Eighteenth Gebman
Arm7 had been put into the line from the River Omignon
to a point facing Vendeuil, and Hutier's character and past
actions were warnings to be studied. So Gough said to his
leading officers at Catelet :
** It should be impressed on all subordinate commanders
that although things are quiet at present, the storm may come,
and in view of the fact that the battle of Biga was opened by
the enemy [Oskar von Hutier] forcing the passage of the
Duna, that section of the line guarded by the Oise should not
be considered as immune from attack."
And now let us read the second passage from O.H.Q/8
dispatch :
"On the extreme right, the valley of the Biver Oise,
normfiJly marshy and inmost impassable during the early
spring, was, owing to the exceptioiudly drv weather, passable
for imantry almost evenrwhere, and formed no serious obstacle.
This applies equally to the valley of the River Somme, which in
the latter stage of the battle was easily negotiated by the hostile
infantry between the recognized points of passage. A much
l€urger number of troops would therefore have been required
to render the defence of these rivers secure. These forces, how-
ever^ were not availcMe except at the expense ofcih&rand rruyre
vital j>ortions of my front, and as the exertional weaiher
conditions could not nave been foreseen by the enemy at the
tim£ when the preparations for his offensive were vmdertaJcen,
there was a strong possibility that he would not be ahle to take
advantage of them.** *
In an earlier part of his dispatch (vol. ii., p. 184), Haig
runs counter to himself, when speaking of Oough's forty-two
miles front :
" Over ten miles of this front between Amigny Rouy and
Alaincourt were protected by the marshes of tne Oise River
and Canal, and were therefore held more lightlv than the
remainder of the line ; but on the whole front of this [Fifth]
Abmt the number of divisions in line only allowed of an
average of one division to some 6750 yards of front."
Gough held definite opinions, as we have seen ; and it is
* My italics ; the woirdisg is very important, " Haig's DispatcheB,** vol. ii.,
p. S17.
FORESIGHT, AND GOUGH'S MANIFESTOES 27
irorth notice also that his conferenee at Catelet on Febmary 8
should recall to memory another important date.
" By tiie beginning of Febrnary/* says Ludendorff^ ^ the
attack was fix^ to commence on March 21> although the
mtoation in the East was still quite obscure. The imlitary
flitiiationy however, made a dedsion imperative. Later we
eoald idways make changes, but we should be unable to make
a finesh start''
Are we to suppose that changes would not be made in
Hotier's attitude toward the Oise when continuous dry
ireaiher gradually made the river fordable and some of its
majnahes a pretty firm pathway ? Still, as we shall see, politics
at home ruled over Haig's distribution of defensive power.
Owing to the need of men, there was only a choice between
bad compromises; all sorts of shifts had to be adopted;
tho^h they were known to be perilous.
¥or all that, one may venture to see something question-
able in G.H.Q.'s words: ''These forces were not available
except at the expense of other and more vital portions of my
finont/* Surely vital things are vital; there's no real need
to give them a comparative and a superlativa It is with
sectors of a battle front as it is with vital organs of the
human body ; when one perishes, of what use are the others ?
Around this question, or one akin to it, as we shall see, Luden-
dorflTs mind revolved when he formed his immense plan of
ipaign.
What this campaign would be was another question dis-
cossed on Febmaiy 8, at Catelet, and Oough's forecast was to
a big extent accurate.
** The main attack may be expected against the Third and
Fifth Bbitish Armies, with Axniens for its objective."
This prophecy was based on five reasons. At that date
noticeable German preparations had not been made elsewhere,
and good divisions were being withdrawn from the German
line facing Gough's front and Byng'a While these good
divisions were passing throueh a thorough training:, they were
being reconstituted in their old corps. Within an eighty miles
radius of St Quentin sixty-four German divisions were in
line, and thirty-nine in reserve, besides about fifty farther
awmy. It would have been perilous to think that present
quiet did not foretell a storm. Above all, Hutier^s presence
was a warning. The great General who had captured Riga
and whose meuiods were original, masterful, swift and fierce,
was unfit to be put as a mere feint along a span of front vital
'^ TT"^ -JillT Hi" SJlSCH. 1918
S* i4«sia. vrote to GLH.Q^ and at
Li •*
.^ i .s^c '«:^' JKT^M ^«fi :iai» tta^ at Siga» has
^u» '± o%Hto&w :v ::2«» T^fts B^msH Asmt trxmL In
-^ .««« «. o» ^^^c* ^ctaars^ M niitfii completefy on surprise.
.^«ra^c^ c ;L^^Ufec<wt)n» kept a^vmlgrmiks away from
. ^ -vu^ M.«^ .> ^><^ft^ tt 'ih) wvacd acoa witlimfive to eight
.<4,^ ^ V. '^ !.> MUa:^ rh» «:cnal tiattle was preceded by a
^v^^wi.> .v^v^^o.^^tK ^v. aott«aekmoftarorgImempIaoe-
%N«^ > v..xi^c ,t\.t»vxntr^ to repeat on the Oise, and
^«^«^«& "^/-.^ .uKi i:k«> r^vt^r OliugiKn» his rapid surprise
^v^v«^ ''^ ^«M t Vi^ >«atii6iMu»ii f Stt^pose his onslaught to
>\>k^.^«>NL iii:^ {Mnl» «fed spoke of it in the con-
i'Oi^ ttoaA ^^ Corps Comroandere would go
I iv<iiili!^ of ai«asures that would have to
«N%<^>>. ' w^ loQ^ U would take to move up
Vx .N .«jKMi V dtt^ :$uf^ ^ 4hi»U all hack roads with their
^ w^^«%..^v ^u^«^ aivi^4Vtt«. )«MD^ t^\n> that they will have to
^v. .^sss^U V;^\% N4W»tu»|( sHk thiAr way up; and recon-
..^ v«!^fisv»< >^sa.v« >^ uMi^ >iit^ a vWw to preparing tracks
v..^;^^^^ vs. v«ii« v4> >%i\^ia ;ikvvidai(j: ctoss roada All officers
tx^^ vWvk% v\Hui«MM*UiMx ^pwardii lobe taken to the spot in
^x ys N^ ^vv^v V v>a >aW ^n«4^^mi«i <^' their headquarters, and to
V^^^ ^"^^ W ^^^tU %»i^ % iki^w gas^ 80 gas drill and
V * ^ N>^^ i4M^Kv^v>^% sv Vx t^HMKvraik elOn were obligatory.
V ^x ^ ^ -v. is\\viiMiw\\ <^^ iM<(:i *.\>Miii 4h^ W <Uy the foe's int^tions.
\^ .A ^^.vv .K^ivs^ U4 \h^%^ vV^^ ^HfeUuMd a scheme for de-
...V v.i^ \A\«^v4 ^v^iK^tvb^H <i^ ih^HMand or fifteen hundred
V ^ v\ ^x «v v\su^^ .tv«i^ tson^ l^nny C\wps Obmmander was
V .knvs .n^^h-u wsi^iK ;iMKit i^k^ viWd^N^y theoi along a span of
^ V .x« % N.^«4>4i svi x^N^K Vt^j^ MTM la b0 done delibrntel^, but
^, ^ >4 A vs\k\ •u«NV4^i4K^iH!i 4W9^M>i «jt wooM attract suspicion to
^ u s Vxy^ \^ v^ ^ vVr^ vXwwMAder had gapped the
vxx. \ >^ ^ v^^ V V^l >j^««^ W WM to g#l them photographed
XN V \\ '^v ^^v^«lN^ \t lk# M4H^ were repaired at once,
\4.N.\ v^^vvSM i^v «Mi^ 9ty^^ U mi|^t well show that
* -s'
P0BE8IGHT, AND GOUGE'S MANIFESTOES 29
We pass on to moral influenoes, prime things in war.
Krsi-rate pre-battle appeals, at once inspiriting and prophetic,
are uncommon. Here are two examples. The first one is a
manifesto addressed by Qough to Divisional Commanders and
Brigadiers : —
** HEADQUABTBBa,
Fifth Abicy,
Jcmiuary 25, 1918.
''DsAB , I enclose a paper I wrote by way of
showing our young officers and our men what the general
ntnation now is, and the necessity for a renewal of our
Goorage and our Resolution. I particularly wanted to point
oat also how every one can help by maintaining a cheerful
spirit all round.
** But» on second thoughts, I realize that these appeals from
Army Commanders do not carry so much weight, because they
lack the essential personal touch. Young officers and men
will listen to and believe their seniors whom they personally
know or see, but a mere name carries very little weight.
" The only officers, therefore, who can make these appeals
success are the Divisional Commanders and Brigadiers,
who can speak to all their troops, and whom the latter
personally know and trust I therefore decided merely to
send you this paper, and I would be very obliged if you would
speak to your officers and men on these lines when you get an
opportunity. I am sure there is no greater service we can
do at this moment for our Country than to show our troops
exactly what the situation is, and what is necessary if our
future is to be safeguarded.
** The spirit which should animate us all, not only out here,
but at home, is that expressed by Abraham lancolu, in the
American North v. South War, which had then be^a going on
for about four years : —
'* ' We accepted this war for one object^ a worthy object,
and the war wiU end when that object is attained. Under
God, I hope it will never end until that time.* ''
Second Manifesto : Issued by Gouqh to his Army,
January 25» 1918.
''Having at their disposal a large number of divisions
released froiai the Russian fronty there is a probability that
80 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABCH. 1918
the^ Oebicans will employ them in striking a blow at the
Allies on the Western front in the hopes of gaining a decisive
victory.
"They are openly stating that blood must be spilt like
wateri but that it will be worth it, as the coming battle will
be the last battle of the war ; and after that will come the
loiu;ed-for German peace with all the world under their heel»
including^ and more particularly, our own beloved Country
and People.
** A great deal of this is being said to raise the hopes and
morale of their men, who are war-wearv, and to stiffen their
resolution, but there may well be real intention to attack
behind these words.
** Should such an.attack come on us, I am confident that it
will find all of us and our neighbours ready and united in
their resolve to defeat it ; but this in itself is not enough to
ensure success imless all have striven to the utmost beforehand
to render success certain by concentrating all their endeavours
on making our defences such that, however sudden or strong
the attack may be, it will, without fail, be broken by the
efficacy of our defences as well as by the gallantry of our
troops. In view of the uncertainty as to when this attack
may be launched, each day is of importance and should be
taken full advantage of. Every trench dug, machine-gun
emplaced, length of wire put out, may prove of vital importance
in holding up the enemy.
" There is no doubt that this attack, if it should come, will
be the climax of the German effort^ and if all the necessary
preparations have been made to meet it, and each officer and
man welcomes it as all German counter-attacks have been
welcomed in the past, then it will cause them as heavy
sacrifices and as bitter a defeat as they suffered in any of their
great attacks, such as the first battle of Ypres, or Verdun, and
such a blow may be given to the German Power that Peace
will indeed come, but the Peace which is the only acceptable
one to the Allies, a Peace which as the result of victory will
ensure our women and children security.
'' This is, therefore, the great crisis of the war, but it is
also one of the great crises of the world's history.
*' Are Liberty, Honesty, Truth, and Courage, for which our
Fathers fought and died and which they handed down to us
to keep as an example to the whole world, are these great
British virtues to go down in ruin before the brutality, the
ruthleisnesBi the deceit and cunning of the German ?
F0EE8IGHT, AND COUGH'S MANIFESTOES 81
* I know I can with oonfidenee voioe the spirit of British
sotdioB whea I say — ^Nevul
" Our Country took up this stragg^ in order to maintain
great and noUe ideals as well as to defend the safety of our
homeB, of oor people, and all that is most dear. We began
the war with enthusiasm. It is only nataral that, after three
and a half years of this terrible struggle, many of us feel
weary and would be glad of Peace — ^but only of the Peace that
seeores all the great ideals for which we have suffered and
fought. Enthusiasm may die down, but DuTT remains.
Duty and grit have carried our race through all struggles in
the past
" It is essential that we should all realize what still lies in
the balance — ^the safety of our homes, of our women and
children, our industries, our Countiy ; the ideal of justice and
liberty on the one side, and on the other, with the certain loss of
all these, lie poverty and slavery to the Boche for all Europe.
** In this coming struggle we need have no doubts if we
are all nerved and ready.
** Although the Boche Armies still stand firm to all outward
appearance, like a dam against a flood, there has been a very
great deal of disint^fration going on which we do not yet see.
The blows, defeats, and losses they have suffered have lowered
the courage and spirit of the Boche soldier greatly, but their
people behind them are still more stricken and shaken.
When the dam finally will burst, one cannot say, but when it
does, it will probably go with great suddenness.
^ What is now required are gallant and cheerful hearts,
putting our utmost energy into all work for improving our
defences ; and when the time comes, showing a grit, determina-
tion, and pluck which will inflict bloody bsses in the Boche
ranks and give their troops a shattering blow.
** We must not only keep cheerful here, but it is important
that all officers, however junior, and all the men shoula try to
keep the People at home equally cheerful, confident, and
patientb Officers and men out here must realize one great
iMd in such a struggle as we are engaged in, and that
IB that it is not only the Armies which are fighting, but the
whole people, and ttiat as the disintegration of the German
strength will almost certainly begin by the breaking of the
ivill and discipline of the German people before it goes deep
bto their army, as happened in Russia, bo it is essential to
help and support and cheer our own People at home.
'* In thus addressing yoU| I think it is necessary to recall
ka * ^
^*
In ,
- i-.^^*i«» XL ai» gMBMntry,
"^-^-^ «?^ m»x x^ ibitter any
^-ir c-*m: .mt iiioab mud our
^ ;£^ ^ . U!!«» ^*' ii^ Boehe, and
««» :$aoaId all show
.«^ . - - iv"^ JK itot ruBm and in oar-
*.. '•%• u%aiurv — jQit^ the soldiers of
t»«« ."^Mtt p«:d^nMd in the past
< ...,c< . *^- ^ * ^-^^ >»t.. aj^^--4»«fe irikich speak to
V . ^<N r. ^^»ai ^ old riinreh walls of
^^ V « *^^*« »^*^^ li^iiuirt BMnjr different foes,
^.> ^^ H » v:x ^ -^^ »v wa^:A;Iiii!9rs of the Regiments
.V w%^..u^ Mc 'bn^&ybhers ; and, when the
, ^ . ^li^ 4v iMM^ «id ^ prepared that we shall
.w.* . ^ «^^ a iigii^ p«^ deeds that our sons
% . X a»». V %* Hr'ii,;hH». s/^ 1^18 : you proved your-
. « V ^*v^ >iuc^ wi^ a smile on your lips
'v«^«^v * V v^^MAatioo is proud of you/ "
^ 0*
CHAPTER IV
HAIG AND LUDENDORFP: THEIR CONTESTS IN
PRE-BATTLE AFFAIRS
IN the meantime Ludendorff was training three large
armies with which he hoped to win a conclusive
victory ; and then^ swiftly, and as secretly as possible.
he imited them to his line troops facing Byng and
Gough, while menacing other areas, both French and British.
As many German units arrived at their fighting stations
iast in time to begin the battle, Gough and Byng did not
know till tiiey were assailed how much force would be active
against them at any point A great offensive had been fore-
seen, but its distribution of power was hidden, and thus very
worrying to those who waited.
Even if Haig had been able to place large reserves behind
all threatened spans of his fighting front, Ludendorff's on-
slaoffht would have been more formidable than any other
whidi German troops had undertaken. In comparison with
its power and skill the first advance to the Mame would have
seemed only a crude rehearsal, and the Verdun campaign only
a fumbled bleeding away of vitality.
To be British is to be irrational, and Haiff, in his time of
greatest danger, had no choice but to be too politically British,
since be ha^ not men enough to safeguard all his known
responsibilities; known, we must believe, to statesmen in
London as well as to soldiers in France. That very sinister
handicap that weighed against the Expeditionary Force in
1914, was pressing again ominously both on and behind our
troops in Ixanoe. To be short of reserves is tantamount to
having a foe in the rear, placed there by statesmen, who alone,
with sanction from Parliament and the people, can supply the
nation's armed forces with enough power.
Haig had to jraard 125 miles of vital front with fewer men
than Ludendorff assembled on March 21 against fifty-four
miles. ''In all," Haig relates, "at least sixty-four German
divisions took ]Murt in the operations on the first day of battle,
33 D
84 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
a number considerably exceeding the total forces composing
the entire British Army in France."
Ludendorff gives fifty-nine as the complete number of
British divisions ; * also he knew that they, like his own
divisions, were cut down to ten battalions apiece. His
knowledge of Haig's weakness was equal to Haig's knowledge
of the increased German power. Between November 1, 1917,
and March 21, 1918, the number of German divisions in the
west had risen from 146 to 192 : an increase of forty-six. Let
us suppose that every division in this increase had the same
strength as our Ninth, whose units happened to be better
manned than the average strength of Fifth Armt battalions,
402 ofi&cers and 12,039 other ranks. This assumption means
that Ludendorff reinforced his western front with 18,492
officers and 653,794 other ranks.
Allied joumalista magnified hugely the number of men
brought by Ludendorff to France from Italy, Rumania,
Galicia, the Bukovina, and Bussia. Would that this exaggera-
tion, habitual in propaganda, had caused the Lloyd Ueorge
Coalition, not to mass troops on the ELast Coast of England,
as in Norfolk, but to supply Haig with enough combatant
strength! Then the Fifth Armt would not have been a
Jimmy Wilde who would be obliged to fight through a week
against a German Carpentier I
Ludendorff assailed it with by far his greatest vigour
while thrusting nearer the coast with very large, though lesser,
forces. In this way he made a great concurrent battle on a
continuous line which would become of decisive value to his
plans if the much bigger southern attacks could crumble the
St. Quentin defence and then break through at chosen places
with operative force and purpose. Mere local rents and tears
would be of no use to his ample strategical aims. They could
be patched. Certain spans of defence must be annihilated,
and swiftly, else reinforcements would arrive.
Gough knew in a few hours that enormous odds were
active on his whole front against his few divisions, while
Byng was hard set along only 18,000 yards of his line. This
minor grapple may be called the battle of Bapaume- Arras.
Byng's front in all was 46,000 yards wide (26f miles),
spanning south-eastward as a whole from a point just souUi
of Gavrelle to the south base-angle of Flesqui^res salient,
about half a mile north of Gouzeaucourt. Byng had seven-
teen infantry divisions, including the Guaras, ten in line,
* One division too many, fifty-eight boisg the total number.
HAIG AND LUDENDORFF 86
seven in sapport, and opposed to ihem were twenty-four
German infantry divisions, fifteen in line, nine in support.
Clearly Byng was well manned for scientific defence with the
most recent weapons from entrenched position& The only
perils he had to fear were the hazards of war, those chance
blows, often like blows from a malign fate, that come as
frequently in battles as they do in boxing.
A mystery has been thrown over the number of divisions
in our thibd Armt, with the result that writers have been
misled into errors. In several articles I have ^ven the
number as nineteen, two divisions too many, while Sir F«
Maurice, in his vivid epitome of " The Last Four Months,''
gives only fifteen, two divisions less than the correct number.
The G.H.Q. dispatch would have prevented much misunder-
standing if it had announced in 1918 the full strength of
Byng's Army, just as it published the full strength of Cough's.
As for the reinforcements along the Third Army's front,
map evidence shows that the Forty-second Division was in
support east of Adinfer on the evening of March 23. Next
day, in the evening, the Siasty-aecond was in support west of
Anas, and by nightfall of the fifth day the Twd/th was active
hard by Frioourt. On March 26 the Fowrth Australians
entered the battle, together with a New Zealand division ;
and the bulk of Gough's northern Corps, under Congreve,
reinforced Byng's right from Bray-sur-Somme almost into
Albertb There on the seventh day the Third Australians did
good work.
North of Byng — ^north frt)m Oavrelle, that is to say — ^was
the British FuSt Armt, under Sir EL S. Home, whose
southern wing, on March 28, played a very useful part in
Byng 8 battle.
Gough's front was nearly 75,000 yards wide (42 miles),
about a third part of the whole line occupied by Haig's full
combatant strength. It ran south-east from its union with
B^jmg's right down to La Fere, then south-west to Barisis, a
village south of the Oise, between the forests of Couev and
St. GobaixL On this wide front across the heart of France
there were only fourteen infantry divisions and three divisions
ofcav^. A cavalry in totafman-powerequidled another
foot division. They were in support, and their positions
when the battle began are shown in my large map of the
approximate Order of Battle, British and German.
Eleven infantry divisions were in line, and after the first
day, Gough had three infantiy divisions m reserve. On
>»v ( !^.tt ««t-r x« c>wu i^iCMzse GlH.Q.
t^vw v» >«i»» tic-^^kC^. ,r^«^*» «.*tAa :mm tBMk The
-•v<««-%x. N. "^i^H" »■ 'i****^* ft ''m'^'ii iMors. vrtvra m tlie
»*«^>^< <i ^^fti.v«« ^ %: • -3 i>:f '\-*!t«/i inr 3»^ feadk the
\ .N^ ««v .'s^^ •« ^^:aA t >tJ4*t.vos ^uu tSMOMofhts eATsliy.
.* >v>— ^ >"^v '^.^u •iiNii-jv w^ VTj* lit ci(>i$«» wewre. And
v«M wiv »».<vc %t»^ <.* 'Hvs^;^** v^Oogh'sj front— odds in
..^^ v*.v. AK^v^* iv ^^*i<v ^«^« t^MivM tti^^ttftr^ To qaote from
X v?»v*.^ w .h: *WN*t»dii ^* oh« FtFTH Abmt Were
w >>%^ -^^v V u%Ap^ h«^. k\.; ui Jiati^^ ia suidi strength as
.*«. <^H «•«• ^ c. > vkv\. \% «w >HhKuy \m it^ front**
v^..^>.^ '«v ^«. ^»H*^ uivNbt>r — Qbbddi Atlenby had under
\« . ^ . » ^VK. .» X».^^4.«v %i^vu« I >0»000 white troops^ though
% ^v ;«4 Xx > ^^^^s^ V a^vX gA^NtfitttOii of the Indian Army
^ ^ *^ V . c %\« I.NV. v^s; % >«^Miv Hti>MUtt of Indian troops for
^. . * sN. u N > .^v.i^s ^4^v %s«uiW. W<^ :»bottld, therefore, have
.vs SN «v «.« V H^w.^\^v% lU IhIi^ ISSttt b^ sending Haig at
V Vn » - ^ s ' icv ^ vXHivMvtvt^It^ r^intoreement of white
s N . *\ v.>* Vv vviUs\ \vHf i uHiiii^ however, was moved from
X %v . ^ \*u.\s.wv ^H.K **"*'»^ tiuVMr the German blow had
A X V • .V >.. v**».vvv Wi >cuiS>iW the most serious reverse
H . » \,v\v XV ,w*a.^ ^iw %lK^l^vvaweaf the war."* .
^V V ^ - ^ *^ -N >*vU uxWUHHi while Qough and his officers
, . v\ , V V. V .\*xvui4w^ th^ i*>Nfc»etit wleal against odds
V s V s. u *K^ VH*ii hK\K>4Y v4f Hritish battles? Some
X \ N^s .Kv ,^\vs4i *i>»iai4 W4WI 5ihown by O.H.Q. towards
V ,. <** ^^ ^*vV* ^^^ t^^"^ tVvMit was nearer to the
,s. '\ ..^ ;v. Vvi \w^ ^vs^'m* 9k letreat North of Byng
'» \ . > 4n... ^-4 vCvNrtM «^v> vK»»eir %f> the coast tiH no land
. . . V \. s \v% vfcivSv^u^ ^U9ktai^t peril to the seaports; and
V. \ v\ \ .A v^.4o*^w\ ^^^AVi at a K>w ebb, it was thought
V > v^ ^ V vA vA '^ vvu Ww^H auU hi» troops than to run them
.V ^ ^ »'. N \. u 4iMvk us^thv^*i\w\^l areas. Besides, German
, , ^ V ^ V ^H. V j^^v^uk M\^»Uu Koad were known to be
\ * V. xvvi. iui vANN^kv^*^>lv \Uy wtvather had hardened
. ; vv u v\ .^^ a ^^K ^*^ Mwflt for an attack during
, V^^*'* W^^ *^ li^*l^ (iround might be lost
. H,S xiiiSiNNk vu tk^ lv>"i Valley, though some French
iM ' I v«i ^\ vv W\^^K U^s^U«ik#Na Bit F, Miuiloe, p. 19.
HAIG AND LUDENDOBPP 87
northern oollieries were in this army area, as well as important
tactical features by which our lateral communications were
covered. Only south-east of Arras, and notably along Qough's
fronts was there room for a retreat ; and even here an operative
break-through — a wide enough span of defence overwhelmed,
annihilated — would be a disaster not to be weighed and
measured till its travelling mischief were known completely.
For instance, what would happen if the main German
effort were along the area between Sensee River and P^ronne,
towards the sea ? " If this blow succeeded/' says Ludendorff,
" the strategic result might indeed be enormous, as we should
separate the bulk of the English Army from the French and
crowd it up with its back to the sea."
Or, again, what if the foe achieved his annihilating
break-through south-west of St. Quentin ? Here a well-fed
advance — south-west, north-west, and also due west — would
have no definite limit, other than that enforced bv fatigue
and by such reinforcements as the French could hurry
feverishly into action — two in&ntry divisions without guns
by the evening of March 23, and a division of cavalry. No
matter where a swift and complete break-through came, the
British position south and north of it would be most precari-
ously damnable, since Ludendorff had men enough for huge
turning movements; and as for an advance due west aftor
Boch a catastrophe, it would have found on Qough's front
just enough reserves to be brushed aside. No wonder Q.H.Q.
was in the position of a jzambler who, before risking his last
gold, tries to brace himself by forming as hopeful an estimate
as he may venture to form about his chances! Consider
this passage: —
** The extent of our front made it impossible with the
forces under my command to have adequate reserves at aU
poimUs threatened. It was therefore neceaaary to ensure the
ea/etv of certain sectors which were vital, ana to accept risks
at others ••••'*
Would our northern and northernmost areas be safe if
Qough's defence, which would bear all the risks, were
aiuuhilated at one of several sectors? No. Their safety
would be cancelled, as Ludendorff knew. So the safety of
EUg's whole line was no firmer than the streng^ of its weaker
places, jins good generalship at these places. The Tay Bridge
was Quite safe in places, but a gale wrecked 8000 feet of it,
and tne rest became f utUe.
• «< Hftig*t Dispakhof ,** toL ii., p. 916.
88 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
G.H.Q. continueB : —
** In the southern sector alone it was possible, under extreme
pressure, to give ground to some extent without serious
consequences. ..."
As 6.H.Q. was placing all the risks on Oough's forty-two
miles of front, a third portion of the whole British line, why
speak of his giving ground to some extent under extrcTne
pressure, and without serious consequences ? To what extent,
for instajice ? Is it not with extreme pressure that attacking
Oenerals hope, and hope logically, to annihilate defence along
known weak: sectors ?
G.H.Q. goes on : —
"• . . . give ground to some extent without serious
consequences, over the area devastated by the enemy in his
retreat in the spring of 1917. The troops holding this latter
part of the front could fall back to meet their reinforcements,
which need not necessarily be pushed forward so far or so
rapidly as elsewhere. ...
I cannot feign to be convinced by this reasoning, which
is completely antagonistic to the precision employed by
architects and engineers when safety has to be considered side
by side with the force of thrusts. G.H.Q. has no guess what
weight of well-trained attack will be hurled against " troops
holding this latter part of the front"; nor whether this
weight, at present unknown, will include squadrons of tanks.
Yet O.H.Q. assumes that these troops will fall back to meet
their reinforcements ; but will they do this all right, no matter
what or how much the pressure may be ? It is dangerous
reasoning to suppose that reinforcements " need not necessarily
be pushra forward so far or so rapidly as elsewhere. ..." A
wise old axiom says that reinforcements should be kept near
the troops in the line of battle.
By reasoning in a way that invites criticism, G.H.Q. draws
public attention away from the main point of all : namely,
that political authority has left Haig at a low ebb in numbers
and in training also. As war means casualties among the
young and strong, risks imposed by insufficient means of
defence cannot be stated in words too stark.
The dispatch continues : —
" Moreover, the southern sector could be reinforced with
French troops more easily than any other portion of the British
line.*'
Here is another assumption in support of which no pre-
battle hopes or arguments could be at all useful, because
HAIG AND LUDENDORFP 89
LndendorfF had only to glance at his map in order to see that
French reserves were near to Qough's light and centre, and
were thus a danger to the German plans. From this fact
Ludendorff would pass on to the inevitable question : " By
what means can French reserves be kept away from the St.
Qaentin front, at least for several days ? "
Haig ends by saying that he " considered it unsound to
nujintaiTi a considerable force of British reserves south of the
River Somme, while it was yet unknown where and to what
extent the enemy would commit his reserves."
Here, in briei, is the policy of compromise chosen in France
because greatly impoverished rifle strength made gambling
with perO a game to be played boldly.
Little by little this policy will be judged by events, always
final as military critics. At present only two or three points
need a little attention. Norfolk was well manned with troops
and not at all nervous. A friend of mine was amazed by their
number in the Norwich neighbourhood. How does this alert-
ness look side by side with gambling compromise in France ?
Such compromise in great war, as history proves, is likely to
be useful only when its employers are confronted by generals
of no importance. Position maps, and maps of a whole front
can be read as correctly by capable foes as by a O.H.Q. which
is obliged to put incalculable risks into plans of defence ; and
were Ludenoorff and his Staff at all likely to misread the
north-westerly run of Haig's line towards the Channel Ports ?
If Ludendorff is not the greatest soldier produced by
Prussian training and ambition, he can be placed on a level
with the greater Moltke, for the work done under the direction
of his O.H.Q. — done in Russia, Rumania, Italy, and France —
18 hard to parallel in magnitude and in consequences. At
present his Qualities as a Ueneral are undervalued by Allied
critics, as Napoleon's were undervalued when Napier was
assailed because he dared to see them correctly; out even
those who sneer at Ludendorff as '^a mere tactician, a very
poor strategist," cannot fail to look on it as a tragic mis-
fortune that G.H.Q. should have been compelled to take risks
which could not be hidden, since Ludendorff knew the total
number of Haig's divisions, and the weakness of Qough's wide
front ; knew, too, how Haig's reserves would be affected by
sectors near and nearer to the coast ; and, again, what P6tain
and the French feared most of all from a great offensive.
With these particidars before his mind, Ludendorff could
go ahead with the development of his plans by means of
cunning in wide-stretching preparations.
CHAPTER V
OTHER PBE-BATTLE CONTESTS OF MIND, WITH SOME OF
THEIB EFFECTS
§1
ALARQE map in this book gives the whole battlefield
as it was on the morning of March 21, 1918, before
the foe let loose his thoroughly trained storm divi-
sions. It enables us to see (a) what Ludendorff learnt
from the front line's westerly course northward from La Fbre
to the north of Lens, and (&) why he massed troops at some
places more formidably than at others. The map shows the
twenty-one line divisions under Gough and Byng, and their
reserves, but not their reinforcements. Facing our line troops
are the huge German armies with their reserves, but not
with their reinforcements.*
* Otto Ton Below ooinmanded the Sevbsitbxnth German Abxt, and Von
der Marwitz the Second. They employed in all the same ncunher of troops,
28 diviaions each, including three which they used torn by turn. From first
to last Hutier and Gayl employed 85 divisions, including the ThM Bavarians
and Fourteenth Reserve, which belonged to Boehn's Anny when the battle
began, and threatened Gough's extreme right along the IBarisis sector. As
regards reinforcements, I oner for oritioism what at present I believe to be
approximately accurate. In Otto von Below's reiuforoements there were
seven divisions, probably: Twelfth, TMirty^hih, Forty^flrsi, and Hund^
and Eighty-seventh; Fifth Bavarian Bbssbve, Ttoenty-firH Bbsbbve, and
Twenty-third Bbbebvb. Marwitz's reinforcements, seven divisions : Twenty-
iixthf Fifty-fourth, Third NawU, Chtarde Era. Division, and three from
Below's first-line troops. Fourth, Hundred and Eleventh, and Hundred and
Nineteenth. Hutier's reinforcements, ten divisions: Twenty-third, Four-
teenth, Fifty-first, Fifty-second, Two Hundred and Forty-third, Tenth Rbsxeve,
Eightieth Kesbbve, Seventh Besbbvb, First Guards, and Two Hundred and
Forty-second Division. Next, as regazds German mounted troops, I can gain
no information as to their total strragth ; so I cannot say whether they were
more or less numerous than the men in Gout's three cavalry divisions. On
the first day it was reported to the Eighteenth that a post in Vert Ohssseur
Valley had been captured by German cavalry; divisional mounted troops,
probably, who had been sent forward to keep in touch with the advance.
There is no other record of German cavalry in the Eighteenth's experiences.
Ludendorff made no attempt to use cavalrjr in hu^ turning movements, as
Badenny has employed them frequently m Russia's counter-blows againnt
Poland.
40
\ ^
OTHER PRE-BATTLE CONTESTS OF MIND 41
There was no need to continue the front line beyond Lens,
because any reader can see that less and less land oonld be
Slven up with safety near and nearer the Channel Ports. To
udendorff this matter must have been as trite as A B C ; so he
had to find out how he could use most aptly for the develop-
ment of his central aim those weaknesses in Haig's strategical
position which were revealed plainly in the map, and those
other weaknesses which he nad learnt by otner means —
namely, the total number of Haig^s divisions, their reduction
to ten battalions apiece^ and the very inadequate rifle strength
on Oough's over-s^tched front.
What, then, was his central aim? Allied writers have
summed it up variously. About six months before Ludendorffs
book was published, I formed my own reading from his order
of battle, the disposition and the movements of his armies,
when considered in their relation to the north-westerly run of
a British battle line which from the first lacked equipoise,
since its defence was too weakly armed in some places and
well armed in others. No revealing evidence could have been
better than this, and I find that we reading I got from it is
confirmed by LudendorflTs comments on his central aim.
What he desired most of all, as less costly in losses and thus
most inspiring to his troops and to the German civil popula-
tion, whose temper had enfeebled greatly, was a continuous
advance to go on for several months^ unf oldinj^ its scenes and
acts at different places as the plot of a well- written tragedy is
develooed to a cumax by a master playwright. If long oreaks
divided the acts of his tragedy, each act would be a new
beginning ; his troops would have time to lose their confidence,
their araour; Qerman civilians would grow suspicious, and
perhaps seditious, in the midst of their nunger ; defence and
attack would renew their stretch together, and American
troops would pour into France. This last consideration must
have put nightmare into Ludendorfi's dajrs, since he was going
to gamble with the whole of his reserves, while we and the
Frrach could look forward trustfully to the arrival of vast
American armies.
Lodendorff confirms this readii^. During his preparations
he thought much of the U.S. A., and ran the risk of interfering
with the Qerman Naval authorities bv pressing for more and
more submarines in order that the U-boat campaign might be
directed simultaneously against two objectives— «eabome
oommeroe and transports with American troops. The sea
being so spacious and wireless telegrapliy so accurate and
42 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
swift in the tranBmission of wamings, he considered that
hunting for American transports ought not to be done by
submarines withdrawn from relentless attacks on mercantile
marines. Some Reichstag deputies wrote to him and said that
more submarines could and should be built. Consider a few
brief quotations from LudendorflTs book :
** llie question was : What will be the rate of supply of
submarines in the spring of 1918 ? Will the submarines, even
if they have been unable to damage England decisively, have
so far reduced tonnage that the new American troops cannot
come over in a short time, and will they be able to strike at
American transports while engaged in destroying hostile
tonnage generally?" (vol. ii. p. 538) . . . "The American
danger rendered it desirable to strike in the West as early as
possible ; the state of training of the Arm^fr for attack enabled
us to contemplate doing so about the middle of March. At
that season, too, horses would find some grazing which, in
view of the shortage of forage, was a necessary consideration "
(vol. ii, p. 544). • • • " About New Year, 1918, the opinion of
the [German] Navy was as optimistic as ever. I had, however,
become more sceptical, and felt obliged to count on the new
American formations beginning to arrive in the spring of 1918.
In what numbers they would appear could not be foreseen ;
but it might be taken as certain that they would not balance
the loss of Russia; further, the relative strengths would be
more in our feivour in the spring than in the late summer and
autumn, unless indeed we hiad by then gained a great victory "
(vol. ii., p. 5S9).
A great victory! Ludendorfi regarded this as essential
not onfy because of the power that could come from more
than a hundred millions of U.S JL subiects, but also because
his own partners, including social, political, and industriid
Germany, were anxieties that increased from week to week.
Statesmen were slack in releasing reservists from munition
factories, but not slack in asking for specialist workmen from
the armies ; were lethargic towards skrimshangers, wastrels,
slackers, and other dregs ; and seeds from the Russian revo-
lution were being imported by many a soldier from the Eastern
fronts while German civilians here and there got similar seeds
from ffnawing privation. Turkey was the one partner that
seemea to be in earnest, but she was weak and out of gear,
and in need of more German battalions than Ludendorlf could
supply. Bulgaria had occupied fdl the land that she desired
to keep, so her interest in the war had waned, and Ludendorff
OTHEB PRE-BATTLE CONTESTS OP MIND 48
knew ihat she eonld be trusted only so long as he and his
tn>op8 won victories. He adds, too, that in Bnlgaria there
had always been many persons in pympathy with the Entente.
Bat as he was in need of men he could not be tactful all along
the line towards Bulgarian sentiment. Indeed, he ruffled it
by moving Bulgarian troops to Macedonia in order to release
a few (3erman formations (vol. ii., p. 544).
As for Austria-Hungary, after the loss of 1,800,000 men in
prisoners alone, their Axiny was so worn, and so short of
recruits, that it needed a new German backbone, which could
not be supplied. Luckily, too, Ludendorff was obliged to
withdraw m>m the Itidian front the six German divisions — ^a
fact to be remembered with gratitude when we recall to
memory the way in which through several days the Austrian
Piave offensive hung in the balance. Then it collapsed, and a
ereat wave of disappointment, most helpful to ourselves, shook
Germany from end to end, and put out the last flickers of
battle temper in that hotchpot of discordant ethnology called
the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
** In 1917," says Ludendorff, " we had already received an
intimation from the Imperial and Royal Government that the
[Austrian] Army could go on fighting for only a limited
Criod ; we might anticipate something similar in 1918. We
d to take into consideration that Austria-Hungary might
actuallv arrive at the end of her militaiy power. It was
clear that her political power would not last one hour longer.
Nothing but the Army held the Dual Monarchy together." *
This forecast was proved by events to be true, though we
are aU unwiUing to admit how very untrustworthy from the
first was the ramshackle main partner in Germany's habitual
agsression. To admit this plam fact side by side with the
doeat of Bnssia, Serbia, Rumania, and the invasion of Italy, is
to put a most distressing bitterness into truth. And Germany's
other partners had recently been defeated in great war ; another
hateful thing, since it throws into higher relief the resistance
shown by sixty-eight millions of Germans — a resistanoe
supported by Allied blundering, pre-war and wartime. Still,
Ludendorff was shackled by ^1 these matters while he and
his Staff were developing their plans for 1918. Hence thev
must be stated here, and frankly weighed and measured.
Again, (German railway trucks were scarce, so they had to
be used mainly for inilitary needs, and not to bring some
ease to a hunger-stricken Empire.
* Ludendorff, vol. U., pp. 689-40.
44 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MARCH, 1918
Never before in armed warfare had such a tremendous
gamble been undertaken as a last resort LudendorflTs only
hope was to strike with his complete power while Haig^s rifle
strength was weak and before the new American armies could
be brought across 3000 miles of sea. If he could annihilate
chosen portions of the Fifth Armf, while crumbling all the
rest of its lean vigour, the American troops would arrive too
late ; and if he failed to do this his advance must be at least
great enough at selected places to set in motion other offensives,
else long breaks between the battles would nullify, to a great
extent, the effect of each battle on the Allied resistance, while
the German armies would have to renew themselves from
returned wounded, and not from fresh drafts. On February
13, 1918, in an audience at Homburg with the Kaiser and the
Chancellor, Ludendorff said : —
" The battle in the West is the greatest military task that
has ever been imposed upon an army, and one which England
and France have been trying for two years to compass
Yesterday I spoke with the Commander of the Sbventh Abiiy ;
he told me that the more he thought about this task, the more
impressed he was with its maenituda This is how all
responsible men in the West thmk.* I believe, too, that I,
who have to furnish the Field-Marshal with the foundation
on which he bases his request for His Majesty's decision, atn
more than any one impressed by the immensity of the under-
taking. It cannot be successfully accomplished unlesis the
authorities who conduct the war are relieved of all intoler-
able shackles, unless the very last man is employed in the
decisive conflict, and is animated, not only by love for his
Emperor and his native land, but by confidence in the strength
of the military leadership and the greatness of our country
These spiritual forces must not be underestimated, they are the
foundation of the greatest deeds. They must be strengthened
by the energy of our action in the East. The Army in the
West is waiting for the opportunity to act We must not
* Thli anxiety to a thing to be noted, because Brittoh propaganda was
oonttantly referrinff to Oerman boastf ulnese, forgetting the horrible tragedieB
that oame from AUied over-oonfldenoe. Even Sir F. Maozioe telle hto readers
that *' the Germans were more confident and boastful than they had been any
time dnoe their first victories of August, 1914." In my studiee I have founa
oonsiderabW less boastfidness among the Germans than unong the Entente
Powers. The amasing trench systems introduced by the foe denote con-
summate caution, not over-confidence ; and what Garman (General would have
chosen to leave a vital front in need of men, as our Government did t The
over-confldsttce produced by tiie first battle of the Mame weakened the Western
AUies through three years.
OTHER PBE-BATTLE CONTESTS OP MIND 45
itnagiBe that this offensive will be like those in Galicia or
Italy ; it wiU be an vmmenae struggle that wUl begin at one
point, continue at a/nother, and taJce a long Jime; it is
difficult, but it will be victorious." *
But what if this continuous campaign were baffled in the
first battle by Oough and his officers and men, aided by
Byng's troops ? On Oough's front of forty-two miles there
was all the room that vast odds required — or seemed to require
—for annihilating blowa But a Oeneral has always to
eonsider the possibility of failure : —
^ The crown of success would be an operation in which we
could bring to bear the whole of our superiority. It was our
great object If we did not succeed at the first attack, we
should have to do so at the next ; by then, indeed, the situation
would have become less favourable — how much less favourable
would depend upon the rate of arrival and value of the
Americans, and on the losses which both sides sustained.
Everything was based on the assumption that we should do
well in this respect^ and although, of course, I expected our
own Army to he weakened, I hoped it would be less so than
that of the enen^. By continuing to attack we should still
retain the initiativa More I could not aim at I reported
to the Emperor that the Army was assembled ana well
prepared to undertake the biggest task in its history." f
Maig speaks of the foe's exceUent offensive training, and
Ladendorff hoped that this thorough training would keep in
battle its mam chiuucteristics— disciplined and combmed
initiative among all ranks, extended order in all onsets;
swiftness in setUing down on defence as soon as attack came
upon a steady, strong resistance fitted to cause great losses ;
and readiness on behalf of the ruck divisions to follow their
storm troops fearlessly, aided by the profusion of guns, machine
guns and mortars which had been collected close behind the
foremost lines, and now and then placed even in advance of
the jumping-off ground. Each division had a company oi
medium trench mortars. These weapons were made as mobile
as possible, and were allotted as required to battalions, together
witn flame projectors, which could be used at the shortest
ranges against cellars, dugouts, and blockhouses. Ludendorff
sa^'^s of his artillery : —
" For the advance of the infantry in offensive battle con-
centrated preparation by massed artillery was of the utmost
* Lndendorff, toL iL, pp. 687-88«
t Ihid., ToL U., pp. 68S^.
/
:as y jriiH asik: Di mabch. i918
in bnai^ op twenty to tliirty
^.rrr^n^s ^vt«« A ^^JBUHMi ^tma^ «> «HBti kiloneler (eleveii
atttr?^ OMT^. .t. .ruK :u >$ anacked. Xo man had ever
*^ c^ >^iL»* •omjc-'xiuw: still je«> had anTQBeeTer thought
K A^i .^aMJ^r«i«l^ I aottiiQmaca hnried ca the foe. These
%VM> -ju^^i^ iMifi^!^ ;»ift<«^; And Tec the haltle area was so
<Msi ^^tei( ,%t?ift u>f<$i# ^oaattcbe^ <Mf sie«I did not destroy all
ctk .*jL4riUEa% ;u>in^v:» 6Huid fiur Kv moth to da These
*M»N8^^ «. ^-xurs diiid ;uttmusttfii»t had to he goi up dose
V .V Civa«v^4i :iK^. vmlv thtt^ cwud they oigige taigets
:i. v.. t%A a^^ ix-^ JMitt lijOBi^ ^thottt iftTuig to chaoge
v.>^ .«A tcN .;v \>*«.(..t> prv^ttijtisied. At the saaae time, they
\*«. V >. sx^^M>:>a tvitt vtiew^ Knh firv^at the firoot and from
w AvSNAn .% ^iuidMd $ttii» Y^c^ bctx^t to hear on each
\ V w w». > V vvHi^h ^ iSjit v<i A a lU^Ie Wes than TS,000 yards),
>«v viMv,' ivv%«ii{s> vWr^ ht^iixb^Kt hv $ixty-eightk and say thi^
.V V. -^x^^^ ^v^iHT ^^c^K^ «h^ Ftrni Akmt vas about 6800,
v^^sv «>v\«.«N,v%«t ^Ht»i'Iov^ the wv«xi» ^^«k\hiI a hundred guns
s^ «^a v^NKuvv.vv't Uvttt %> W attacked.^ Troidi mortars,
\^ax« ^%«Nv>Uiu ;MKi iKHiv\\ ar^ not to be induded in this
^M^s^M v^.^.oi v« ' iW A«»trian gunnMS and guns proved
,v ^.. c \^Wi hsi|»t»4S>\ tv>r ihe ammunition brought with them
>»,x.« ,%.< >s;« u^N>a ^\v w^w^ wkthdimim.
^^ Kv^ ^xu^uKHUji gv4t%M^ of muHl and will went on both
\o%Nv;.4 ^w v\tuKya t^M^Uir« and those who caused hitches,
%.x «vv' \v^v^'uv•^^0v4^«u^lul munition fiictories and our own I
I N «.>^v >kv v^^uX g^^ iKeaii the more strenuously we should
V v v*H «^ vu.i y4A>^v« v^ ihe vju^lion why Haig, in his hour of
.NX, vv^« w-^^.. >«kH.A Iv^l ^NNK^u^'i^ied with enou|^ rifle strength,
\ ^^^.% V^ v^^^ (VAkKhca^'^HN) by a battle firont whose weak
-V ^.^ v«N^ w*^>^ )s.^lA w^re revealed to all students by
MI
V u *«^4xt\ . ' .,< ;Ks>o^ ma)>M» the foe's Hkrher Command came
s X ^ . . X A . V^n «t Uku^^l iuerease the soldierly and watchful
., . .\ V \ '' \ Ua'^ tv'A^ the Channel Ports and for the French
\ k sNS* u. \..v l*\ UHVCva^dug this solidtude, by taming
v^ . \ \. ^^'wv)xvu^^\4^ or misgiving; reinforcements
. ^s' w • ^^ a UsvuK iU^ujjVa fron^ in order that they
« ^ .« si x' .^us(^^ \vi>' muv>h nearer to the coasts whero
*\'
OTHEB PBE-BATTLE CONTESTS OP MIND 47
no British retreat oaght ever to be allowed by Haig. And to
Ludendorff and his colleagues it mast have been equally
essential to increase the natural and soldierly nervousness felt
hy P6tain and the French for Beims, Champa^e, Verdun,
and Paris. By no other means could they sterilize throu£^h
several days the French reserves, while titanic assaults
were being delivered on the known weakness of Qough's
army.
Little by little, and with great care, the foe began to
display an acceleration of work from Flauuders to the Gise,
also on both sides of Beims, and elsewhere. Concerning the
need of feints in his preparations, Ludendorff writes : —
" It took weeks, and required considerable foresight and
the most detailed preliminary work to concentrate the troops
in a confined area, bring up by rail the tremendous quantities
of ammunition and other stores of all sorts, carry out the work
allotted to the troops themselves, such as preparing battery
positions, screening roads, constructing anti-aircraft shelters,
and preparing gear for crossing the Frenches, and finally to
deploy for battle. Of course all this increased the danger of
discovery. It was therefore necessanr to commence dummy
works on the fronts remote from the attack, which, as a
matter of fiuit, served as the basis of attack later on. But the
bulk of the available labour troops were required on the front
of attack at an early date. The preparations on other fronts
eould not be extensive, but there was some chance of mis-
\ms the enemy, and the deception was to be completed by
lUy conducted defensive measures ... *
" Feints and preparations for further attack were made
between Ypres and Lens, by the group of Crown Prince
Rupprecbt ; by the German Crown Prince s group, particularly
between Beims and the Argonne ; by the new-formed group of
von Gallwit2, on the old battlefields of Verdun ; and by the
cnx>up of Duke Albrecht, between Saarburg in Lorraine and
Ste. Marie-aux-Mines, and also in the Sundgau." f
Nothing half-headed entered into the foe's widespread
feinting and preparation, which appealed as strongly to the
French G.H.Q. as it did to Haig's, stimulating anxiety in both.
British and IVench airmen reported on the increased activity
behind the German front, and by the dose of February, 1918,
it was dear that although hostile preparations advanced
^ VoL IL, p. 689. An atUck must pTopww also for seU-dofenco, sinoe it
"t Vol a, p. SsT*^
SOB ?TRK ABXT IX MABCH» 191S
omosite Googfa'fi
^a^|p% 4ft ^iik svfas of Hiwit, and between j^ns
^ m hiajBtrnt sdieiiode for
^ OfciMi^pi Ik fd »Teft fiy Sdfort ; so he kept
W'^Mir^wariN^k^egtobeaMetoiMe tliem therewith-
^^ JM^r si^Mki % «Nd ftr tkiii ttriaa Henee he could not
>^iiM mumSmnmm^ Ii> Qgi^ H^ut from periiape two or
^kti»# ^H^Mie ^VMMi^ ^ he was ane that Ladendorff's
^^wiMt i^Mi» i)M«^ Md BjQ|( w«TO not great feints to
VK^MMM 4 w«o^ ^a ^amahi^g aam Uow against IVench lines.
^- tf^Himu lliia yjqir la »haaistllaiA,itwas known that
A^ ^UMaji hritol Wm wkii^ axtansiTa pr^Moations for an
'JauMX^ vft li^ KiNtea liroa^ and that these preparations
^v^ ;ib^HHi»j^ tte anlvaimd . « « The bombardment on the
%mUi^ <NM i^^ybwrA 31] had been aeeompanied by great
^^uiiiK;v ;jNi}^>ii^ ^Mi both sidea of Reima It eonld not be
.*v>m4WH»t w^iA wrtaia^ that this was a feint nntil the
» iMn »A Mi^Mlt th^ ^iliah had been in prt^gress for some days,
t^ iHN4Hy ¥ik^l haY^ wiployed a {yurtion of his reserres in
V^'H %m¥^ avM ih^ kaowMge of this possibility necessarily
'44;Kiv4hn4 th^ vj&»teib^lioii and utilisation of the Frend^
("HkHi a^ vk^bi W eoavineing; bnt we are told also by
vMi ^> vi^ thi^ v4lfoMid di»()ateh. that P6tain and Haig made a
wv^ W%)^ Wv)&ava ii^ th# main reinforoement of Grough's
OvkMi >j^4%h lf^vlM^h f^NNTve^ should a great crisis develop
^\v4v . ^ i¥ baltWdi i^iust great odds the first phases of the
%\,M,4^ ai^v thii^ aM>*l lui^ly to produce disaster, together with
\ \V4> v^\£ip<al Mod «ur reinforcements ample enough in
uuiM^ aud w vth Ih^r t\iU equipments, military and adminis-
VA«^wk\^ ^vu^i th^M^ the pn»-battle agreement between
Un^i ausk yviaMik Mira» a hostage ffiven to fortune. It had
us^ vvi^\ \ah*^ aA a |>«'e))aration for prompt and adequate
V^u |h^ V\v4ich nkXp of QougVs fronts then, Ludendorfl
uw^v^ vv<^( hwi Mi^- batUe aim-^m aim, also, with two purposes.
iW Wk ^uavW vl uii^)H>saible for F^tain to send enough help to
SKvu^k M svK^^ aa a grava crisis came ; and, if with his huge
^^^4VK\4^Y v4' stvaagUi he could overpower Qough's ngh^ he
W<4\^ auv'tk^VA^ l\\4^l ivav^ for a forward thrust^ while Hutier's
Ml au4 V)^V« lUlV divivions, aided by Boehn's troops in the
« Uslii t«L ILi p. 818.
OTHEB PBE-BATTLE CONTESTS OP MIND 49
St Qobain sector, pressed on rapidly to Ghauny and towards
Pontoise and NoyoiL*
Hntier^s soathem boundary crossed the Oise at Pontoise,
while his northern boundary was through the Omignon
valley to and along the great westwa^-going highway
running firom Yermand to Amiens. So it is easy to see what
Hutier and Boehn wanted to do with their ioint and immense
forces, twenty-five diviaiofiis, and ten divisions used as
reeervM during the battle^ There is, or there seems to be,
reason to say Aat Oa^'s troops were a semi-detavshed part of
Boehn's anny, whose Tkilfd Mvarisfltt sod FtfwrUMth Kemrvn
^ Sm the xittp tbowiag the Gennui Miniee in peiltl0&«
E
60 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
threatened Gough's liaison with the French north and south
of Barisis.
The map considered in its relation to Hutier's power and
Gayl's four divisions suggested to me that Ludendorff
desired to extend his attack across the Oise below Chauny
and in the Pontoise sector. Several military experts ran
counter to this belief; but now I find that Ludendorff*
anticipated the broadening of his attack both towards the
Oise's farther bank and also towards Arras. How could he
have £Euled to anticipate the possibility of these movements ?
On the first and second days, if he swaUowed up Gough's veiy
thin right wing, the way would be opened for a very swift
drive to the Oise south of .Chauny, and also south-east of
Noyon ; and if Hutier and Qayl reached this river while their
troops were ardent and fresh and powerful, they could try to
cross the Oise south of Chauny, and also to pass down the
Oise valley to Compi^ne, aided by Boehn's right wing, under
Wichura, from the neighbourhood of Manicamp.t If these
aims could be made real, Ludendorff would be able to
manoeuvre into action all his prepared strength on both sides
of Reims ; and a moment might arrive when Gallwitz might
be let slip either against Verdun itself, or in a flanking move-
ment to compel a withdrawal firom the fortress. Gallwitz
was in immediate command both of his own Third Akhy
and also of Army Detachment " C."
Of course, nothing less than a complete break-through — ^a
deep span of front amiihilated — could open such a great and
swiit flanking movement south-west and across the Oise*
Still, vast odds are collected and let loose to produce
annihilation along chosen sectors.
Briefly, the south-westerly evil within the possible range
of Hutier and his colleagues was not limited to the act of
driving a wedge between Qough and the French. A thorough
break-through south-west of St. Quentin would have extended
this scope incalculably. Two other offensives might have
been fired off by it, and the more trouble Hutier and Gayl
caused among the French south-west and south-east of Noyon,
then of Oompi^ne, the easier it would be for the remaining
troops to forge ahead— on one side to Montdidier ana
• Vol. ii., D. 663.
t Doriag tne letrest G«iier«l Butler, of our 8rd Oorps, mutt hmve thought
oi th«M d«Dg«n, lor on Ifttoh 26, ftt about four ajn., he wnmed hie osviury
through Bri0i(dier Portal that strong patrols were to be sent to Sempigny and
Pontoise, ana that the loe was to be prevented from Grossing the Oise.
OTHER PRE-BATTLE CONTESTS OP MIND 51
Rerrepont on the other, moving shoulder to shoulder with
Harwitz's left wing, towards Amiens and AbbeviUa
Hutier chose leading officers whom he had tested, placing
Lnttwitz with the 3rd Corps on his northern boundary, and
Cetinger south of him with the 9th Corps. Then in southerly
saocession came Webem's 17th Corps and Conta with the 4th
Corps. On March 21, between the Omignon River and our
lines south of Yendeuil, about thirteen miles, Hutier had
eleven divisions in line, and eight, if not nine, in near support,
as well as four reserve divisions on a complete war footing,
bat not in mv map. These were the TwerUy-third, First
Oucmia, and seventh and TefrUh Reserve Divisions. Add to
this vast power Gayl's flanking force of four divisions in the
La f%re sector, and Boehn's two divisions along the St.
Gobain lines. What was the British force that opposed these
Grerman legions till the first French division came up at
breathless pace, without guns and without administrative
equipments? It was a ^rce of seven infantry divisions,
aideS by two of cavalry, and hardly one of the units had a
full complement of men. Yet its bravery was maligned,
pitilessly slandered, while Ministers were received with loud
applause at public meetings. Are nations easier to hoodwink
than children ?
The minor grapple abo, under Marwitz, had very great
strength, as my map shows. On March 21, seventeen of its
divisions were massed against Qough along a front of about
twelve miles, while the remaining four faced Byng's right
around the exterior arc of Flesquieres salient, * inside of which
O.H.Q. and Byng had placed no fewer than three divisions.
I wish I knew why. The salient was far too narrow and too
shallow for a big fight ; it could be ransacked with a criss-
cross of German gunfire ; and its defences, both natural and
military, were very formidable, what with a captured portion
of Hindenburg's line and Highland Ridge, not to speak of
other defences. It is impossible, then, to omit asking whether
this British salient, as formidable as it was narrow and shallow,
really needed a crowded protection from three divisions?
Later we shall see how puzzling tiiis question is both tactically
and atrategically.t
The Gennan troops massed north and south of the salient
^WetbftUiMihalihMafoiizof Marwitz's diTisiooB had a vwy strong re-
MlloBMy «ll60l agAlmi Gougfa's Ult, ao they aboold be indudad in the power
UmI wnMMid ftgainet our Fdtr Abut.
t Bee pp. 1^140, 141, 167, 16S, 109, lei, 165, 166, 167.
52 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MAECH, 1918
prove that the foe intended to follow the routine which is
necessary when a small and strong salient — ^a sort of pocket
Hercules — ^might easily beat a surprise front attack.* His
aim was to leave the body of the salient alone while he tried
to cut his way through near the base-angles, in order to break
in behind its rear defence line and to capture its garrison.
This routine was particularly dangerous because the salient's
north base*an^le at Demicourt was over four miles to the
noTth'west of me south base-angle near Gouzeaucourt, as you
will find by drawing an upright line from Demicourt south-
ward. Now, as the custance north-west between Gouzeauoourt
and Demicourt was and is only about 6i miles, this point
is very important. No wonder Ludendoi^ collected twelve
divisions — six in line, six in support— on a front of about five
miles north-west of the salient, partly to strike towards
Bapaume, partly to take the salient's rear as their objective,
while north of them another cluster of divisions extended to
the River Scarpe ! No wonder, too, that Ludendorff in his
book shows how eager he was to cut ofi* By ng's three divisions
within the salient !
We shaU see that this pressure on Byng caused compli-
cations among these divisioV and that IZ these comphW
tions had varied unwelcome effects on Gough's lefL Luckily,
Ludendorff seems to have underestimate the number of
divisions in Byng's forces ; he knew they were more numerous
than Gough's ; but if he had known their full number he
could not have expected all that he did expect from Otto von
Below. It is Haig, in fact, not Ludendorff, who shows the
very grave trouble caused by Below's chance blows, aided by
Marwitz's extreme right.
G.H.Q., according to the official dispatch, believed the
principal German attack would fall between Senste river and
the neighbourhood of Bapaume-Cambrai road ; and although
this great northern thrust had no more force than that of
Marwitz south of Flesqui&res salient, yet Byng's seventeen
divisions on a narrow front were not excessive owing to the
great peril which would have come if the attack on the second
day had captured Bapaume, with its road running south-
west to Albert, and had crossed the Arras-Bapaume road
westward.
Draw an upright line south of Bapaume and you will find
that it passes about four miles west of — i,e. behind — F^ronne.
This fact alone shows how greatly Ludendorff wbs aided in
* Ludvndorfi'i bdbk oonflmn tills map cfvtdBnoiiB.
OTHER PRE-BATTLE CONTESTS OF MIND 68
his deBigns by the north-westerly run of the battle line coast-
ward, and also how necessary it was to have a big defensive
power to protect Bapanme and the northern rear of Flesqni^res
salient. When I tell you that the boundaiy uniting Gough
and Byng passed just sonth of Mananeourt and Combles, you
will see at once how bad it would have been for Qongh's left
if Bapaume had fallen on the second day. Would it have
fallen then if Byng's front had been as thinly manned as
Oouffh's ? * I believe the answer Tes will come to any frank
mind that studies Haig's dispatch side by side with a large
map; so there's no reason for us to agree with the many
critics who have questioned the 'need of giving the Third
Abmt so many troops per mile in excess of Gough's. The
Uiing to be deplored is that the same number per mile could
not possibly be given to the Fifth Army. Then Gough on
the nrst day would have had thirty divisions with which to
oppose the German forty-three.
Study that semi-salient extending from the Sensfo river to
Bapaume-Gambrai road; note how it thrusts the German
power on a broadish front menacingly towards Bapaume and
Ervillers. Then turn to page 154 and note how pressure
from this north-westerly bastion affected the salient on
Man)h21.
Moreover, in the northern battle the inner winss of Below's
and liarwits's equal armies were ordered not omy to cut off
the salient fix>m behind^ they were ordered also to take the
strain off each other in turn, and to push through between
Cnnailles and P^ronne ; but the realization of these aims
needed such a sequent unity of success that its miscarriage
would be brought about by any among the bigger hazards of
war. Ludendorff, for instance, could not foresee the incom-
parable defence of the Scottish Ninth, Gough's left flank
division, which, again and again, was of great help to troops
both north and south of it — a fact long concealed and even
now but little known.
Though the northern battle was very great, and though
from the fourth day it became through two days and nights
the more dangerous, because the Third Army's centre was
broken, presumably by a chance blow, and its southern corps
had ominous gaps between its divisions, as Haig has described,
^ BsBMmbsr, the sy«ng» length of front held by MohTBOLD Abmt divlaion
in line WM about 4700 yards, while eaoh Fittb Abmt division in line hed to
gaaid some 6760 yxdn of front. Remember, too, that Byng's reserves were
mneh kigv thsa Oongh's.
64 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
yet we must never forget that the most perilous blows were
struck through four &y8 by Qayl and Hutier in the south,
and that Hutier and his colleagues had always more powerful
forces than either Marwitz or Below. And it is also necessary
to remember that Hutier's reinforcements, ten divisions,
equalled the number of French divisions hurried into the
battle between the third and eighth days, gunless^ and sorely
handicapped by other hindrances to success.
Two other facts also must be stated. First, LudendorfF
himself chose the Eighteenth German Army, Hutier's, as the
one through which he could express his own influence in the
most convenient way (voL ii., pp. 691-92) :
^For the decisive operation the Seventeenth* and
Second f Armies were to remain under the orders of the Army
^roup of Crown Prince Rupprecht. The Eighteenth Army
joined that of the German Crown Prince. Remembering the
November campaign in Poland in 1914, 1 meant to exercise a
far-reaching influence on the course of the battle. That was
difficult if it was being conducted by one group only ; every
intervention was only too apt to become mere interference
from above* It was desirable to make the fullest possible use
of the resources of the group of the German Crown Prince,
and this was facilitated by the organization adopted. ..."
This group extended to Reims and between Reims and the
Argonne. Hutier, then, was to be the first of this group, apart
from Boehn's right wing, to take part in the great offensive ;
and the best artillery ofiicer in the whole German Army,
Colonel Bruchmiiller, was given to Hutier^s H.Q. as Artillery
General Ludendorff speeS:s of him ardently, smd says that
Hutier's artillery was completely imbued with BruchmuUer's
spirit.
But we must not suppose that Ludendorff was over-
confident. Indeed, he was ill at ease. He did not know
how much strength had been added to those portions of the
British front which for a longish time had aided him in his
plans by being weak. " The weakest part," Ludendorff says
in his book, " was on both sides of St Quentin. . . • Whether
this weakness would continue I could not know."} As a
consequence, doubts were troublesome. To cause and increase
• Below*8 Army. f Marwitz's.
X VoL ii., p. 690. He addfl : "Taotios had to be considered before purely
strategical objects, which it is futile to porsne unless tactical success is possible.
A stra logical plan which ignores the tactical factor is foredoomed to failure.
Of bhis the ^itente's attacks during the first three years of the war afford
liumDrocs examples."
OTHER PRB-BATTLE CONTESTS OP MIND 56
nnoertainty has remained the essence of war, despite airplane
Loe and other new sorts of spying.
One doubt very harassing to LudendoriBr was the weather.
"* At noon on the 20th;' he writes, " O.H.Q. had to face
the great decision whether the attack was to commence
on the 21st or be put off*. Every delay must have increased
the difficulties of troops, crowded together dose up to the
enemy. Already the tension was very hard to bear. The
psychological pressure of the mass was urging them forward.
*' And yet our artillery relied on gas for its effect, and this
was dependent on the direction and strength of the wind. I
had to rely on the forecast submitted to me at 11 a.m. by my
meteorologist^ Lieutenant Dr. Schmaus. Up till the morning
of the 20th, strength and direction were by no means very
favourable ; indeed, it seemed almost necessary to put off the
attack. This would have been very hard to do. So I was very
anxious to see what sort of report I should get. It was not
strikingly favourable, but it did indicate that the attack was
possible. At 12 noon the Army Groups were told that the
programme would be carried out. Now it could no longer be
stopped. Everything must run its course. O.H.Q., higher
commanders, and troops had all done their duty. The rest
was in the hands of fate ..." *
^ «* My War Memories, 1914-1918,*' by General Ladendorff, toI. ii., pp. 596-
7-S. HatehinBon & Go.
CHAPTER VI
WAS THE FOO A HINDRANCE TO THE FIFTH ABMT'S DEFENCE ?
ONE thing in the seoondbattle of the Somme is described
by both sides as a very great hindrance ; and thus
we must try to see, as warily as we can, whether it
hampered one side more than the other. On March
21 and 22, from dawn till midday, or a little later, a thick white
fog enveloped the battlefield, hiding the fight from airmen,
blotting out signals from scouts on land, and masking the fire
of artifieryi rifles, and machine guns. German artillerymen
knew not which parts of our line held up the German attack ;
they could continue the routine of their creeping barrage, but
they could not aid when their infeuitry was in difficulties,
nor could they **Bpoi*' those of our rans which had been
removed to alternative positions as in Maxse's ground. More
important still, the foe's artillery could not bring concentrated
fire to bear on those places where our machine gunners were
lodged underground in masked pits fifteen feet (foep. Surely
this fact was a great help to our defence. Ludendorff spealu.
admiringly of our hidden machine ffuns, and notes the losses
that they produced. Yet no good thing has yet been written
by a Britisn soldier about the thick fog which hid rents in our
battle front on the mornings of two terrible days, March 21
and 22. From Haig himseu down to the youngest subaltern
who wrote letters home, runs a firm conviction that all the
military drawbacks caused by fog were active against Gough
and Byng. It is easy to understand whv onenrided views are
set astir oy great penis, but history is like an auditor, it must
be free from bias in order that its profit and loss accounts
may be correct.
If Ludendorff and his Generals could have assailed through
a fog with large squadrons of tanks, as Foch and Haiff did on
that most famous day, August 8, 1918, 1 could easily snare the
British belief that focr lUlies itself with the attacking side ; bat
a huge ipfiBmtry onslaught, dependent on combined action along
neany forty miles of oontinuoiis front, apart firom Byng's, has
WAS THE FOG A HINDRANCE? 57
to be looked afc differently in its many various relations to fog.
Both sides were afraid of killing their own men with shells and
maehine-gnn fire ; neither conld see how the battle was going,
and German storm troops could not be seen by the masses
behind them. No doubt the foe was aided by fog over no-
manVland and into our forward zone; but a sufficient
number of smoke shells might have been almost equally
effective for this purpose, and at anv moment, in answer to
signals, a smoke cloud could have been put where it was
wanted, ffidden by a f off from smoke shells, Austrian troops
got across the Piave, which may be regarded as a more
troublesome barrier than no-man's-land and a forward zone
ravMed by a creeping barrage, behind which the foe advance&
It is said that the foe could keep his direction in the fog
by following three things : his own oanage, our communica-
tion trenches, and the belts of wire guarding our support lines.
Yes, with difficulty ; but, on the other hand, could the advance
St up speed, could it go forward with that momentum which
ts men into the fury of attack and hides from them the
extent of their losses ? Did our own men, when they moved
over familiar ground to their battle stations, find that the fog
did not delay them ? They were greatly inconvenienced, as
we shall see. To move across cratored country in a fog must
have been a Uind, chilling business ; and when, after &layed
and long effort, Hutier and Marwitz got beyond the range of
their banage, their difficulties in the tog must have become
mater, for no mass of men could see fifty yards to rieht or
left or ahead. Officers must have been perplexed ; cohesion
in the assault must have been more or less haphazard ; and
no Boche could have been sure that the advance was general
enough to be undangerous to his own battalion.
A war correspondent of the Vaaiische Zeitvmg said of the first
day's fight that the widest stretch of country was won south-
west of St. Quentin, " although dv/ring the morning Jiov/ra a
thick mist, which only the midday sv/n cUa/red away, diriurbed
our operatiom. Cwiaina of m,i8t gathered so tkicldy that
men Bcrvvna the field artillery, adva/ncing behind the infantry,
could haraly see their horees. Nevertheleaa there was no
pauee. BaUeries had to take their new objectwee v/nder fire
without direct and precise obeervaiion, cmd the infantry
always in the foq, and vnaided by methodical artillery pre-
paralion, had Uworiously to win posUums and sectors. Yet
the movemeTit eontiiwed and trench after trench was taken.'*
True : but the first day's results were so disappointing to
68 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH; 1918
LuJendorff Uiat the offiouJ bulletin ran as follows : ** Between
Oambrai and La F&re we have penetrated into portions of the
Kntfliah poaitions/' No more than that I
Xater Qeorge Weg^er, of the Cdogne Gazette, complained :
''Through the mornings of three days, for the most part
in thlok fog, positions liad usually to be taken by hand-to-
hand encounters.*' This means that flanking and enveloping
movements were harassed and confused by aenae white mist ;
and those three days made up the first and most important
phase of the battle. Moving heavy artillery through a foff
(iver cratered and entrenched land must have been attended
by inanv hitches and delays : and the distribution of food and
AiruaunrUon to such hordes of advancing men must have been
baiilod also by foggy weather cJong such a wide front.
For in considering this miUtary problem we must re-
nittitilior that width of battle-front is exceedingly important
ill its bearing on an attack through fog. Along a oompara-
llvtily narrow frontage rapid and combined movement through
a f(ig, aided by a thorough creeping barrage, would be far and
away leas difficult, and the fog itself might well be invaluable
to the assailants, as it was in 1916 to Nivelle's famous
oouQter*attaok at Verdun. Ludendorff^s front being very
wide, swift and sure coordination, in accord with pre^
arranged plans, was essential everywhere ; it belonged to the
e»HHnoa of his huge aims. What he feared most of all was a
ragged and disjomted advance— the very thing likely to be
uaused bv fog on a spacious and extending frontl
lie declares in his book that fog impeded and retarded
German movement and prevented the superior training of his
trouim from reaping its full advantages. This superior train-
ing IH a fact ; it is referred to by Haig as well as by other
Hritish offloora "The majority of the Qerman divisions,"
ilaig relates, ''had spent many weeks and even months in
Qonoentrated training for ofiensive operations, and had reached
a high pitch of technical excellence in the attack." If this
exoullenoe had been aided by the fog — ^not locallv here and
there, but in large aspects and results — surely the Qerman
unuet with a huge superiority of numbers would have
travelled much farther than it ^tually did reach on the first
dav. iiudendorff ends his brief reference to the fog by saying :
**ThiH was the predominant opinion about it» but a few
thought it an advantage.''
1 lie main jpoint of all is the one of oo-ordinated speed and
uunnentum, oi awift, incessant^ and increasing impetus. The
WAS THE FOG A HINDBANGE? 59
Qennan leaders had formed two decisions: firsts that their
assault must be made on a very wide front beeanse small
salient-making was local and f atUe ; next» that a great many
divisions were necessary to crumble the western front, and then
to break through at chosen places, and that the initial slaughter
would be veiy grave. So they prepared the German people for
huge losses. Nothing less than gambling hugelv in casualties
eomd have a chance of solving the western problem — ^how to
break through, how to annihilate chosen portions of a deep
defence whidi has been crumbled aU along the line.
If a misty dawn had been followed by a bright^ dear,
windless day, the attack would have had what the soldiers
call ideal weather, and the full weight of its tremendous
power could have been hurled with gathering speed, against
our slender human lines, aided by smoke clouds placed
where they were necessary. Thank God, no such thing was
possible in a fog, which turned the assault into a series of
local operations, all blindfolded and very difScult And the
foe was prepared to pav in blood the far higher initial toll
that dear weather would have imposed upon the fury of rapid
movements, his purpose being to overwhelm by numbers and
to advance far on the first and second days. What early
gain of the first day was pushed on rapidly and witii
increasing force ? None : not even Essigny, MaissemVf and
Ronasoy. Let us, then, be thankful that fog, though a hindrance
to us in many matters, was, in the main, a boon to our defence,
delaying and confusing the attack and giving our commanders
time to form ripe decisions and to fall back with power.
After the first two days, for example, Maxse lost no guns,
thoujgh he felt in full measure the batteries and batterings of
Hutier^s legions.
The for^s^ing arguments were written long before
LudendorflTs book appeared; they run counter to opinions
hitherto published by British students and British officers.
Fog has been deplored as a friend to the German assault
Why should any one assume that a great many divisions can
attack in a fog without being jumbled up together and
delayed?
General Gough writes on.these matters : —
" The next point in your letter is the fog. A very difficult
and thorny pcontl My opinion is that at first, say, for a
oounle of hours, fog was a great disadvantage to the defence.
Haa it not been present, many of our machine-guns, very
skillfully hidden, would have taken a terrible toll. It is
60 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MARCH, 1918
possible — but, coDsidering the immense superiority of the
Oerman numbers, hardly probable — ^that this toll might have
repulsed tiie attack. But as soon as the foe had broken
through the first lines of resistance and was pushing on, he
must have found that command, co-operation, and communi-
cation became inceasingly difScult. Then — so I think — it is
quite true that fog was a very serious hindrance to the Hun-
How could he go ahead for a decision — a big decision, and a
rapid one ?
^In war, where all is uncertain, and where so many
influences are unceasingly at work, it is foolish to be dogmatic ;
but my summing up is this. K the day had been clear and
the attack had got through the first line of defence, losing
hugely more than it lost in the foff, the Oerman skill in the
movement of masses of men would have had opportunities to
exploit rapidly tiie first gains. LudendorflTs object was not a
limited one; it was unumited and supported by enormous
pushing power backed by vast reserves ; and in all unlimited
war aims, swiftness in execution is necessary throughout an
attack. Can we be certain that the Qermans would have been
stopped by their first losses on a dear day ? Their numbers
ana their training miJce it impossible for us to say Tes to this
S[ue6tion« On^the whole, then, it may be sfdd that the fog
avoured our Fifth Abht,"
PART II
THE BATTLE IN ITS MAIN ASPECTS
CHAPTER I
OEBMAN 8HEXLS AMD BBTTISH BEDOUBTS .* THB FIBST DAT OF
OSKAB YON HDTIEaEl'S ATTACK
§1
HUTIER was disturbed twice during his final arrange-
ments. In the evening of March 19, no fewer
than three thousand gas drums were fired from
projectors into St. Quentin, with a wind towards
Germany behind them; they caused much confusion. A
whole regimental staff was put out of action, as we learnt
afterwards from German prisoners.
Next evening, at ten o'clock, after our guns had poured in
a great many shelb, two companies of Warwickshire troops —
Shakespeare for ever! — raided the German trenches beyond
Fayet, nartly to get a few prisoners, and partly to leam how
much tne foe's ordinary line troops had been reinforced;
Fifteen Germans were captured, and three German regiments,
nine battalions, were found on a span of front formerly held
by one regiment, or three battalions. More valuable still was
the news that in five or six hours Ludendorff would open his
attack. This warning was made known at once to all Head-
quarters, British and French.*
When the noke of our Warwickshire raid had rumbled
itself away, a wonderful quietness came, a deepening hush,
with eery loneliness. Then a thick ground mist began to rise,
damp and clasping; it gathered like teased cotton wool around
sentries and outposts. The peace of nature before the strife
of man has been often unforgettable, as it is in the hours
preceding Wellington's battle on the Douro ; but the night
before the second Somme battle, with its uncanny stillness
and ita fog, has a poetry all its own, with underlying
melancholy, as if a consdenoe in war listens while old Eieath
* JjaAmAmU tsyi, I believe with traih, that on llareh IS or 19 two
QenwaiMi dwe rt ed from a tnnoh mortar oompasy and gave infonnation to tu
el the impeodiiig attack.
63
64 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
silently prepares a shroud for the brave men who are going to
be slam.
An officer of the Sixty-Jurat writes : —
*'The night was extraordinarily qoiet ... I tamed in
early, about 11 p.m., after telling my signallers to call me at
4 a.m. if nothing happened earlier. I slept well ; and at 4 a.m.
on the 2l8t not a sound was to be hearcL The line reported
all quiet. I went upstairs out of the dugout A dense ground
mist and a light north-west wind. I went back again to bed,
and at 4.40 I was wakened by a terrific bombardment. . • •**
Sir Hubert Gough, in his headquarters at Nesle, was
awakened also by the same noise, information was sought
by telephone, and a few orders were given. Afterwards
nothing more could be done till infantry &hting began. So
the General went back to bed and slept, for there would be
time for only short half-hours of sleep liter the bombardment
had passed into its creeping barrage, and it was important to
keep as fresh and cool as possible.
Earthquake voices grew louder and louder as twenty or
thirty batteries along each kilometre of German front poured
sheUs by the thousand into our defences, particularly between
the Rivers Scarpe and Oise, while high-velocity guns aimed
at railways and roads far behind. Many communications
were cut, many guns were knocked out; and let us try to
make real to ourselves the fact that the twenty-one divisions
in line on the fronts of our Fifth and Third Abmhes had each
either two or three battalions under shell-fire in the forward
zone.
As for the business of manning our battle zone, which
began a few minutes after the bombardment started,* men
groped through fog to their stations with sheUs screaming and
bursting all around. A curt oath, followed by a hoarse cry
through clenched teeth, came here and there from a wounded
man ; or some one fell with a peculiar, double-sounding thud,
a rifle here, a body there, and no movement afterwards.
Earth and stones and volcanic smoke fumes spouted into the
* For soma time this movexniBnt had been heralded by the ** Prepare for
AUaok " order. This waa a piece of Staff work confined to the Fme Abkt
preparations, taiA it kept the whole defence ale|rt, like the outposta oonatantljr
manned In uiX lonea of defence. Quez writea of March 31, 1918 : '* Bad not
the ' Prepare for Attack' warning coma in, I shoald ha^a been in pjjamaa,
^id might poiiibly have lain in bed for two or three minutes, listanlnffqaietly
and oomfortably while estimating the extent and intanaity of thebarxage.
Bat thii oooasini waa diffasant, and I was up and about a ooapla of minntM
mrtaaaant i
L9l8i p. 4m
after waking. Opening my door, I onooaatmd the not trnpiiaaat imell of
la m'/m a Hiiy gaa. . . .*^— BteilnoM^a Biatfatfm, October, 1\
OEBMAN SHELLS AND BBITISH BEDOUBTS 65
fog BB big new exatera were scooped by explosioDS in and
between many thousanda of old ones.
One garriaon, there is reason to believe, did not reach its
battle station* It set out for Contesoourt, but did not arrive
there, aeoording to a battery commander whose gans were in
this sector. £ad at Contesooort the Qermans got into our
battle aone, and made their wav by twos and threes down
woody vwumpB of the Somme valley. Who knows how many
of our men were either killed or wounded before breakfast by
shell-fire ?
If either Nelson or Wellington could have been present, he
would have been appalled by the unimaginable hellishness
invented since his day by science in slaughter ; but mankind
being a creature of custom, routine, convention, all in war is
right except the unfamiliar.
The nirUdh, west of St. Quentin, at the usual hour,
sent out a couple of patrols, each a platoon strong. One was
a patrol from the Second Wiltshires. Out it went into the
gathering white mist and disappeared: it was never seen
again. The other patrol had men from the Sixteenth Man-
chesters ; and at 4.40 a^m., when German shells began to seek
for the lives of men, it was in no-man's-land, and so cut off.
Then our counter-bombardment started, and the patrol found
itself between two fires. But it took its chance nonchalantly
—or shall we say cigarettefully f^lodgiug from crater to
crater ; and after seven o'clock it made ite way back into our
forward lone, where it fought all day long ; and then, with
half of its men lost, it withdrew into and Uirough the battle
aone. Was it all that remained of the Sixteenth Manchesters ?
From eig^t battalions in the frx>nt zone of Maxse's Corps, less
than fiftv men returned. All had fought to the very last
The bombardment fell on many wide spans of front, strik-
ing broadly east and north-east it Beims, and also here and
there between the Scarpe and Lens. Our positions from south
of the La BaBn6o Canal to the Biver Lys were profusely
shelled with gas, and battery areas between Messines and the
Ypres-Comines Canal were actively engaged. Dunkirk was
bombarded from the sea ; and Ludendo^ in his first bulletin
made astute reference to the firing duel in Belgian Flanders,
on both sides of Beims, in the Champagne, along the Lorraine
front also, and at Verdun. ''Our artillery,'' he said, "con-
tinued its destruction of enemy in&ntry positions and batteries
before yerdun.**
These were diversions to detun the Franco-British
66 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABCH, 1918
r88erye& Soaih of the Scarpe as far as La F^re, the shelling,
carefoUy disciplined, was in deadly earnest Byng's Army
grew taut and keen throughout its ten line divisions : and
Oodgh's Army, which started with aboat 66,000 infantry in
first line, and about 16,500 in reserve, was ready. Owing to
the fo^, our airmen oould not go out to attack all enemy
battenes in action and troops on the mova*
While the artillery work continued, many German divisions
trudged from anti-aircraft shelters to iheir places in the
storming line, or from villages in the rear to their support
stations. Now and then a British shell tore gaps in the
marching ranks. Secret night marches to the battlefield
must have tired a big percentage of men in each battalion.
Divisions chosen to begm the battle were disposed variously
for attack, but the formation most often used was this : two
regiments in the front line (six battalions) and a regiment
(three battalions) in divisional reserve. A rwiment was
echeloned in depth, having, as a rule, two battalions in first
line. It was reinforced in numbers more or less strong with
elements from the following units: companies of storm-
troops, companies of pioneers, companies of flame-throwers,
and mine-throwers, and cyclists ; also one and a half extra
machine-gun companies. A brigade's reserve seems to have
had an independent detachment of two <7clist companies and
an assault company. Half an hour after the attack bc^^an,
and at arranged times through about three hours, a division's
artillery — ^twelve field batteries and six heavy batteries — ^were
to be moved forward.
During five hours of intensive bombardment everfr unit in
these German forces moved in the white fog, leammg from
oflScers how the shelling advanced through its seven stages or
periods. Every fixed tiurget was known to the German
gunners ; its position had been accurately mapped and its
range oorrooUy measured : the errors of each Gennan gun had
been noted and tabulatea, and allowed for when firing, Uke
orriim of the day caused bv wind and atmospheric density.
In Mn way It was possible to determine, by means of simple
Ukh\^ fur M\y gun at any time, how mudi snould be added to,
iir tiiilil)rmtt0(i ri'om, the normal elevation of any target. Of
iiuiUbUj Mm}iii liad to be faultless, and among the necessary
Dui HiiiuM Mftroh 10, two houn btfora dftwn erery day, «irplAno patrols
o( Iha i)'iiPrM Ammv had raoonaollrad tha Garznan front syttem as far back aa
a gfiunral liaa, aliuut tbraa milai Mat of our outpotts. Flans ware employad,
iiu( il wa« liapoMilUa to mo Otcmaa motaniMiti atong roads.
GERMAN SHELLS AND BRITISH REDOUBTS 67
preUminaries was the determination tri^nometrical and topo-
graphical of all battery zero points on tne ground. The most
watehfol care had to be shown in marking targets on maps, as
determined by sound-ranging, flash-spottmg and aerial pnoto-
graphy. What infinite patience ! Ludencbrff says tiiat this
new artillery procedure set gunners bv the ears, particulariy
the senior gunners, bat that it fulfillea all expectations." 1^
exaggerates, for a good many of our guns had been moved to
alternative positions not yet discovered by the enemy.
At firsts for two hours, the German gunners searched for our
guns; then for thirfy minutes, going through three periods,
one half of the bombardment fired gas and high explosive
shells into our infimtry positions, while the other half went
on with its attack on our guns and mortars. Afterwards,
through a hundred and forty-five minutes, spedal parts of our
infantiy defences were ransacked by every German gun that
did not belong to the counter-battery groups ; and hundreds
of mortars, heavy, medium, and lights took part in a crescendo
of studied fire ; light morta^rs beginning to bark thirty minutes
before a creeping barrage started to travel from our outposts
up the forward zone to our line of redoubts at the fiur ena and
urther west
We must linger over this routine because it was the most
important fiictor in the foe's opening assault Ludendorif
thouffht of it with great anxiety during his preparations, and
his chosen storm troops practised with abarnigeof live shells,
in order that they mieht learn to keep dose benind a creeping
protection which exploded violently. They were trained to
advance in a thin wave constantly renewed fix)m behind. In
all the German training loose formations, with infantry
group tactics carefully worked out, were compulsory.
Ludendorff said : '' We must not copy the Allied mass tactics,
which offer advantages only in the case of untrained troops."
As it was quite impossible for him to foresee what form the
fighting would take when his infisLntry emerged from the
protecting barrage, anxiety caused him to be present at various
exerdses and to converse with many regimental officers. He
discovered that it was not at all easy for his troops to adopt
the open formation which he held up to them as essential.
Bight up to the middle of March every moment of time
available for training was urgently needed for attack
rehearsals, in which every in&nti^ group was expected to act
with swift initiativa
The barrage caused the greatest worry :— *
68 THE FIFa?H ABMY IN MABGH, 1918
'' It was evident that the closer the infantry could keep to
the barrage, the less time the English would have to leave
their dugouts, and the more chance there was of surprising
them in their dugout& ^ Consequently the barrage must not
advance faster than the infantry could follow. This pace had
to be fixed beforehand, for, in spite of hard thinVing and
experiments, it had been impossible to discover any means of
controlling the barrage. The nature and state of the ground
had also to be considered, as regards their effect on the
infantry's advance and the consequent pace of the barrage.
Stronger lines required a more prolonged bombardment, and
the barrage had to dwell on them longer. So it came about
that an advance of one kilometre (eleven hundred yards)
required as much as an hour. It was always a great mis-
fortune if the barrage got ahead ; the attack was then held
up only too easily. It could not be brought back agun
without great loss of time, and the infantry suffered losses
which it was the duty of all commanders to avoid." *
In these time matters, happily, fog was a great help to our
defence, impeding the attack when it passed over trench
systems ana over around profusely cratered with shell-holes,
while the routine barrage thundered onward. As the range
increased shorter range c^uns dropped out, so the barrage grew
thinner and thinner, tul at last, beyond extreme range, it
ceased, leaving the fog-bound attack unprotected. Some
artillery was moved up as rapidly as possible to support a
further advance, but hitch after hitch was inevitably happily,
in such a fog and across ground which in peace manceuvres,
aided by broad daylight, would have b^en indescribably
dilBcult
A regular scheme for bringing up a large force of artillery
and even larger masses of ammunition had been prepared, but
Lttdendorff savs that often too many guns were pushed up
compared witn the ammunition that could be brought in
wheeled vehicles over shell-holes and the Qerman and British
systems of trenches and wire. Vast quantities of sear were
needed to bridge the defensive belts. No one could see what
was happening fifty yards away ; and, happily, few German
divisions knew anything about the country ahead of them.
They had been trained to diow initiative anywhere except
in a fog. Even our own men felt lost on ground that they
knew perfectly. Thus, at 6.16 a.m. the commander of one
battalion, the 2/Fourth Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry,
* Lttdsndorfl, toL il», p, 679.
OEBMAN SHELLS AND BRITISH REDOUBTS 69
had a baffled adventnre. He was in the forward zone of the
Sixty-first^ holding Enghien Bedoubt with a company. He
had orders to leave his redoubt if a great deal of gas collected
there ; and cas becoming worse and worse, he went out in the
fog to see whether he could move his company to Champagne
traich, a better spot Though the Colonel knew bv neart
every nook and comer in his neighbourhood, he lost his way
before he had ffone fifty vards; and it took him about fifteen
minutes to find his way oack. He and his men remained in
the dugout, with gas olankets put down, knowix)|r that the
Germans would not attack until they believed i£ gas had
cleared away. But an officer went up frequently to put his
ear on the bombardment.
At half-past seven gas shelling ceased, and Enghien
Bedoubt was pounded with high explosives fix>m four
batteries. Shell after shell exploded, above all in the quarry,
a space about fifty yards by sixty.
Nearly two hours later there were barrage symptoms east-
ward that an attack through the fog had beffun*to plav at blind
man's buff with Destiny. How soon would it reacn the line
of eiffht redoubts ending the forward zone of Maxse's Corps ?
Womd the attacking troops have courage enough to keep
dose to this exploding bamer of projectiles ? Every one under-
ground in Engnien Bedoubt made ready for a rush upstairs.*
The barrage passed over : and when our men came up
they had to grope their way to their lonely poets.
To be unable to see more than a few yards was a great
ordeal — sometimes too g]raat — when a company of young
troops in a redoubt was divided between many isolated posts,
and attack came all at once from many quarters, with
the hiss and pin^ of bullets. A brave officer. Lieutenant
Bassett^ fell, shot m the head. Not a German could be seen ;
and for several minutes the garrison groped with strained
eyes into the f og^ and breathed almost as swimmers do when
tued and cold.
Near the quanry was a sunken road connectinff Fayet on
the east with JSoInon on the south-west ; and suddenly, close
by, some fifty Boches climbed out of this road. Bullets
welcomed them; and about five-and-twenty went down.
The rest sought seclusion in tiie roadway. But Fayet had
fidlen, and just beforo ten o'clock the foe entered a part of
Eoj^en Bedoubt^ capturing tiie sandpit.
^ I bsfe diftWB a d«tafl«d map o! ICtSM'i Oorpt, •■ wsU m a test-map of
70 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
At once a bombing^ reprisal was arranged. It went
briskly, led by Captain RowDotham, and the sandpit was our
own again. Only five posts now remained in ttie enemy's
hands ; the rest of Enghien was Oxford and Bucks.
Soon after eleven o'clock the Germans tried their luck
with bombs, aRsailing from three sides, and with a skill that
looked menacing. But our men had warmed to their work ;
their hearts were in it, for now they were freed from the
cold, clammy demon that rules over most young soldiers
when the blood is iced before battle by lonely waiting and a
troubled consciousness of past joys and present dangers. Set
firmly in a proper fighting vein, cool, firm, and fierce, they
stopped the attack, then drove it back.
Foiled, the enemy persisted, surrounding the whole ground
included in Enghien Redoubt and its posts. A rear post, No.
12, only about three hundred yards from Holnon village, was
in the thick of it^ till a Vidcers gun shot more than fifty
attackers. They could be seen through the fog, these dead or
wounded men, huddled into wire entanglements. No wonder
a Oerman war correspondent wrote of the blasts of death
that blew around the Molnon district Twelve hours later,
when the war correspondent of the Berlin Chxzette visited the
scene, wounded men were still there in long lines, Germans
on one side, our own men on the other ; and near by, in the
sunk road, was a terrible wreckage of guns, and horses, and
dead soldiers. For both sides had fought their best, each in
its own way. German platoons and companies came on as
blurred targets through the fog, and hour after hour handfuls
of British troops held them at bay. Self was lost in duty :
and this fact was equdUy active all along ourji/nn Une of
redovbta. Tommy had no time to cry : ** Outnumbered
again ! Why ? Isn't this war nearly four years old ? "
Towards midday the fog began to shred upwards, un-
covering Enghien. At any moment enfilade fire might com-
mence n'om the rear. What was happening to the Fifth
Gordons in Fresnoy Redoubt, two thousand yards northward ?
And to the 2/Eighth Worcesters in Ellis Redoubt, about a
thousand yards due south. Germans had passed between
these strongholds ; but had they settled themselves in Holnon
village? If so, nothing but a barrage from our eighteen-
pounders could save the quarry gamaon at Enghien from
shots in the back.*
Some one must visit Holnon before the fog dispersed.
* See the Map on page 71.
i
a
i
I
8
I
72 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MARCH, 1918
Some one — ^but who? The only other offioer at Battalioa.
H.Q. in Enghien, Lientenant Cunningham, had been so busy,
with a bravery all of a piece with Chinese Gordon's, ihafc
Colonel Wetherall thought it would be un£sur if he did not go
himself. So he chose two men and stole across the strip of
land separating No. 12 post from Holnon. The village was
empty.
On their way back one of our men was shot, while tho
Colonel was captured, with his other companion. Captors
and captives made their way to a shell-hole ; and there they
sat peaceably until a quarter to five in the afternoon. Thd
Germans chose many things from their prisoners' pockets^
but found no use for the Colonel's watch.
Cigarettes they liked very much, yet were willing to
share them with their owner ; and Tommy also might have
one if his Colonel did not mind. There was no unkindness,
but just a comnulsive communism in a shell-hole while a vast
battle rased. Jlianv bullets were flying about^ and the Bochea
were glad to regard two prisoners as quite enough for a day'a
peril. At a quarter to five one Gennan went away, wml&
the others took their prisoners to the rear, passing between
Enghien and Ellis Bedoubts towards the Faubourg Si Jean
at St. Quentin. All at once, about fifty yurds ofl^a British
6-inch ^ell exploded, and another was heard coming.
The Germans ran forward to a shell-hole. Their prisoners
ran back to Ian old trench, there to begin new adventures.
They were surrounded by Boches, who moved here and there
by companies and platoons. Yet all went well until they
reached our old line between Holnon and Bound ]ffill, where
many Germans were busy on the toil named '' consolidating " ;
and busy so close together that it was impossible to pass
between them. An hour toiled through its long seconda It
seemed an eternity. At last a platoon filnished its work and
moved off, leaving a gap through which an escape could be
made into other haasards.
Near midnight the Colonel reached Attilly, his brigade
headquarters, where he got his first drink since daybreak,
and where he learnt that Enghien Bedoubt had made a big
name under Cunningham. Not till half-past four in the
afternoon did the position there become hopeless. Then
Cunningham, completely surrounded with overwhelming
numbers, sent a telephone messam to his Brigadier, seeking
final ordera On the ch&teau side his quarry was enfiladeo.
What was he to do ?
6EBMAN SHELLS AND BBIIISH REDOUBTS 78
The Brigadier, Robert White, having praised a great
defence, told Ciuiningham to oat his way oat after destroying
the telephone gear. Farts of the redoubt were strewn with
Qerman dead, and its garrison, in proportion to its nomber of
men, had suffered as heavily. Qame to the last, it began to
eat its way through, and just a few machine-gunners, with
Lieutenant Richaras, had fortune for their friend, reaching
our battle zone more than a mile westward. And Cunning-
ham ? He was captured and, I fear, wounded.
Similar great deeds, let us remember, were achieved by the
other redoubt& En^hien is only an example. Thus the Second
Wiltahires did theur duty with thoroughness in the Epine
de DaUon, like the Sixteenth Muichesters in Manchester
Redoubt ; and on the front of our Thirty-sixth Division two
Ulster battalions were among the bravest of the brave, the
First Royal Luiiskilling Fusiliers repulsing not less than
twelve attacks on Fontaine-les-Clercs Redoubt, and the Royal
Lish Rifles holding on till half-past five in the afternoon,
when only thirty men remain unwounded. Some of these
Royal Lrish swam the canal at night, and did well in another
fi^t next day. And next day the Luuskillines also went on
with their grapple, after troops on their right nad been with-
drawn under orders. A noble defence, b v which every attack
was beaten off. At about three p.nL the officer in command sent
back a small party, whilst the rest fouffht grimly to the end.
A Victoria dross was won in l£uichester Redoubt by
lieui-Colonel Elstob, D.S.O., ILO., an officer in whom courage
was true geniua The official account of his inspired bravery
says : ** During the preliminaiy bombardment he encouraged
his men in the posts in the Redoubt by frequent visits, and,
when repeated attacks developed, conbx>llea the defence at
the points threatened, giving personal support with revolver,
rifle, and bombs. Single-handed he repulsed one bombing
assault^ driving back the enemy and inflicting severe casual-
tie& Later, when ammunition was required, he made several
journeys under severe fire in order to replenish the supply.
<< lluouffhout tiie day Lieut.-Colonel Elstob, although
twice wounded, showed the most fearless disregard of his own
safety, and l^ his encouragement and noble example inmired
his command to ^e fullest degrea The Manchester Redoubt
was surrounded in the first wave of the enemy attack, but by
means of the buried cable lieut-Colonel Elstob was able to
assure his Brinde CSommander that 'The lianchester Regiment
will defend Manchester Hill to the last' Some time after
74 THE FIFTH ABlfY IN MABGH, 1918
this posi WM OTenome by vastly sopsrior foross, and this
vtrj ipUuii oflker iras killed in the final assault^ having
maintamed to the end the doty which he had impressed on
his meib-HAanie^» ' Here we fight and here we die.' He set
throQghont the highest example of valooi:« determination^
enduranM^ and fine soldierly bearing."
After one o*elock» when the fog cleared away, airmen on
bolh udes beoame veiy active. Our own, as nsnal^ were very
brave ; on several occasions during the battle they prevented
% hostile attack from develqpiiig; and as to the German
airttten» they did not ^ in search of air-%hts, their business
being to help their mftntrv and to ooltoct accurate news.
Haiji says : ^ Later in the day» as visibility improved, large
nuittbers of low-^ying aeroplanes attacked our troops and
batterieik'*
Their low«>flying contact patrols, aiding the attack, found
our new Aronts too swiftly ; and their use of signal flares
eibiiie titun careftd practice. Fifth Abmt oflBcers write and
talk with firank respect of the foe's airmen.
§n
An eai'ly as midday, March 21, Hutier had found weak
)ila(HMi (u our thin line. Southwards he captured Essiffny
aiul W^Wtky, sirtkinff Butler's left flank and threatening
i\\ turn Maxte*s rlgat; and northward, along the Omignon
yuAWy, he hit the right wing;of Watts's Corps and began to
^\m\ MaxiH^V Ivft. capturing^avl^s Hill and Maissemy, and
imivlivtf tuwanl VlUediolles and Vermand, so as to readi the
niv^lMut lualn road to Amiens. In the afternoon it was
aui^Utftivl ttil^t Watts should try to retake Maissemj after
KUnmt had |mshed the enemy ftt>m a commandingposition on
M«i» M||U K^mud Wtween Maissemy and Holnon Wood.*
*rhU HiUok \Huran at 6.10 p.m., the 2/Fourth Boyal Berk-
Mhlum HMiHMuilivg Uie hlghlsnas from Hill Redoubt towards
KUlMumy Ul\lm»^ The heroic Colonel Dimmer, Y.C., another
\m\\ uf lu«|4iHHi e^nuiigei was leader. Unfortunately he led on
UMi^i^U^tk. aiul WM snot through the head at a verv short
ilUUiuiM mmi the Oeriuan trenches. His groom also was
)k\\M i^\\\\ hU ImrM Mainly because of Dimmer^s death, a
U\W\ hum, th«k attnek hUledl and the Berkshires withdrew
GEBICAN BHELLS AND BBITIBH BBD0UBT8 75
Let it be remembered that every infismtry brigade in action
was eompoeed of two, and not four, battalions, one battalion
having oeen lost with the forward zone, and in Febnuuy, 1918,
all British infiuitry brigades had been out by a battalion
apieee. By this diminishing economy, which came from the
ijrmy Council, nothing at all ^ood was done. As soon as
the battle began every Brigadier felt the need of a fourth
for counter-attack. The whole system of roti^emen^
disordered, and no battalion liked to leave its own brigade
and the traditions won by it during the War.* And another
point of equal importance must be stated candidly. Several
of Gough's divisions had been with him only a very brief
time. The Fiftidk^ for example, was allotted to the Fifth
Abmt only about a week before the battle began, and it
remained £ur in the rear, and also under G.H.Q.'s orders, till
the 21st of March. This was a great handicap, as the Fiftieth
had no chance of learning to feel at ease in the systems of
defence.
Every soldier in a defensive battle should understand not
only the relative value of the lines to be held, but also, of
eoorse, what will happen if the foe captures or outflanks a
dangerous portion of any main line, and there are no reserves
to &ve Imn out. When divisions are hurried into action
from a long distance, they cannot leam these things ; they
are aliens in the defensive zones.
G.H.Q. was fond of moving divisions from one coxps to
another. This was keenly felt all throueh the war. Divisions
were thrown into battle, offensive or defensive, under corps
commanders who did not know them ; and, of course, these
divisions were unacquainted with their new chiefs, who had
varying methoda And thejr were supported by stran^
artulery — another weakening influence. The Australians did
so well mainly because they maintained the corps organization
and knew their oonunander and their gunners. Much strength
would have been added to the Fifth Akmt if every one of its
few divisions had been in its ranks for three or four months.
When evening came the position was more menacing.
Hutier had pressed some hundinads of yards — ^from four to six
^ Hilg't ofltfoinn if pointed: **Apsrt from the xedooiiott in fighting
•Inaglh unrolTad hj this foofguiintiott, tho fiflkting sfBoianoj of units wm
io mime mieni affidtd. An rnifsmHIsr groaping of nnits wm introduoad
th«rab7, naoatdtatlng new methods of tsotiosl handling of tho trooos snd
ths disestding of old mothods to whioh snboxdinsts oommsndecs had bsen
11113
«•% ifj««r«.t:%4. ;^fi^:r^ ^iqCf isBigf finoftt^
,^ I ill .*J ^ .?««&
««^ ^rftMst ^w ^Mft MBit <&«ivt all hf
^. .«««^ ^kiM^ir'^ i^ 1^ XiKB»» n*^^ and
^^.^. ft a«» :Mfittd aott^ imi m saj^iort
4;,^^ i^ ^1^ ^itt(gmi^ wnJuf li w it -Oalooel
*^ .«^ Ml Mxrufi aonii iftTaded the battle
\^ • ^, .M«s. j*d ;tp bT the BWith Rifle
. ... «^ v«u pwpMTta hefcce the batUa
,^iMusip a6Q«l 400 yards west
|g» 'mat 3(N> to 000 yards west
tTL U4^ -iH^ IMtto swayed till night-
. !^.4i^ >wiiailvteaaahoat noonday, and
v-^^* w^, v^ jbe aitte ba t ta lions forming
, ,^5v *j*4**--v*>»^ -RiiHewirt Division, only
^^«.M^ai s^ oMve than a hundred each.
^ ,.„«tw v«tfv hMTi^, two battalions—
, . ^ x^«^«^ ELBL— being wiped out^ ^Mirt
^ . .. %ui&d itt the Trsnsport Camp at
^^ ^«uca :}l^iihe ESfi^th KB. was ordered
' U\. vi^^it litte* (behind the Crosat
,.^ >^ ::i;uiKw) : 1^ t^s movement was
^' . -sVMisk (baiika ehiefly to good rear^
^ ^ . cs ^^HK A. TwM^yson, kuled a few
'\< K-^Nv*^ Mo^abriUiantoounter^ittack
X ^^ .***Ni* ^ IMiaw; •».«tlM btoMtw of th«
VBOST or tea noHnsBTH vmnxm 4T 6 r.ic« or iubcb 9L
78 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
at Flavy-Ie-MarteL For the rest, the foe did not enter Clastres
till after 2 a.nL on March 22.
As for Lee and the Eighteemih, though they had a very
wide front of about 9500 yards, stoetchin^ from a point just
north of Travecy to a point that fietced the German line at
Alainconrt, thev managed to keep their deep battle ssone
everywhere, and several strongholdiB in the forward zone held
out all day, though four German divisions did their beet
Even at midnight rifle-fire was heard from one of the forward
redoubts manned by the Seventh Buflb ; and another redoubt
— ^it was '' Dublin, headquarters of the Seventh Buffs — with
a garrison of cooks, pioneers, sanitarv men, and a few stragglers,
b^t off several attacks in the artemoon.* Briefly, in the
grapple against the Eighteenth German Army, the EighteeoKlh
Division was to our southern front what our 18th Corps
was fiause to fieice with St. QuentiiL It resembled a well-built
groyne thrust into a high tide.
And our artillery ? Its officers and men were usually as
good as their guns. Thus Captain Haybittel of " C " Battery,
83rd Brigade, RF.A., put up a fight by which the left of
the battle zone of our 8rd Corps was Kept safe through a
critidd time. About noon most of his guns south of Benay
were rushed in the fog, yet he managed to remove their breew
blocks, and also to form up his detachments along the Benay-
Hinacourt road, where he held a bitter attacK for several
hours with rifies and a machine-^un. At the same time he
guarded his rear with two madime-guns, firing at German
masses who were leaving Lambay Wood. And later, when he
was cut off from these two euns, Haybittel took up a position
in their defence and checked the foe till nine in tne evening.
In all 1900 rounds were fired, and there can be no doubt that
the foe's casualties must have been severe.
A Kiel paper published from its war correspondent an
artillery battle-picture full of truth : —
''Our men tdl me of a heaw English battery which
continued coolly to fire behind our d^ennan line when our men
were already a hundred yards from the guns. Finally the
gun crews jumped to some machine-guns which were in
position for defence at dose quarters, and blazed away for
all they were worth until overcome by the storming
columns.''
* Th68e four diTiiionB were 0%jV% Tu)o Httndnd amd EkmUfh ^^
CosU's Thirty'fimrih, TMriy-MMiUi^ Mid SimdNd ami TMrd*
GEBMAN 8HELL3 AND BBTFISH BEDOUBTS 79
§in
For the rest, a battle line with damaged flanks needs
ite care. Happily the body of our defence — Maxse's
Corps — ^remained powerful all day. Its battle sone, with
fifteen redoubts in it, was almost intact There was a flaw at
Contesoourt and another at Boupy, but as yet neither caused
much anxiety.
At Boupy and Savy, where Qerman tanks led the attack,
at first witn success, w illiams fought finely with the Thirtieth.
At midnight the Seventeenth Manchesters and Second Bedfords
held the whole of their battle positions, while the Second Torks,
after a hard struggle asainst big numbers often renewed, had
lost no more than theur firont and support lines, retaining
their keep. Two hours later our lost trenches in this sector
wero recaptured by the Nineteenth Battalion of the Kincf s
liverpool Beffiment, apart from a small span of ground in me
firont line on both sides of the St Quentin-Bouny road.
Williams had twenty-four machine-guns well posted in his
battle Bone, and their teams had deep dugouts, trom most of
which the ffuios could be fired. They suffered little from
casualties during the bombardment: and their turn came
when the foe, after pushing patrols forward, assailed the
battle lone, coming on in waves sometimes, and soocietimes in
small columns that bunched.
Into these large-moving taigets our machine-gunners
fired, one gun using in all al]^ut 12,000 rounds, and two others
about 86,000. Attack i^ter attack was shattered, and the
many Qermans who clustered into the quarry on the north-
east of Boupy had terrible experiences, bullets ripping through
them and strewing the ground with many dead and woundM.
Yet the Gennan attadc did not give in. It went below
ground into trenches, or sought shelter behind ridges, and
rallied itself for another grapple.
If Gough had had reserves enough to replace the first day's
heavy caroalities, and also to drive Hutier from Haissemv,
Bssigny, Bena^p, Quessy, and Far^^ers, our position would
have been qmte jrood ; but, as Haig says, ** the forces at the
disposal of the Fifth A&ht were inadequate to meet and
hold an attack in such strength as that actually delivered by
the enemv on its firont "" I%e position being very bad after
the day^s losses, Gough came to a decision aspainful as it was
wissL Ha decided to withdraw his 8rd Uorps— ButlerV
!rHE FIFTH ABUT IN UABCH, 1918
id the CroBi Cinal. and to move the right divisicnt of
Uaxse'e tro(^ bebind the Somine m br u Fontaine-Ies^ercs,
'BJB ri^i wmdd be ovenrtiehiied if it stood still with its back
olose npoB the canaL It moat bend at once, bat conld it
stietiih with aaiety ? Had it men enoogh ?
At pEOBoit Botltt'e Corpe had caly a eavaliy division in
reserre, and it had lost a great many men. Few reinforce-
ments eoold be upeoted with absolate certainty, beeanse there
mi^t be an attau north of the La Baasde Cuul, where the
memy had made reparations, and because another offensive
was mepared on toe Bums front.
"It eoold not be determined with eertaioty that this was a
feint until the attack npon the British had bem in progress
for some days. Tbo enemy mif^t have employed a portion of
his leeerves in this ntetmsl sector, and the knowledge of this
poaaibility neeemarily inflaenoed the distiibation and utili-
Eatiuiof the French reserves." *
Bven if ciroamstanoes were favourable, British divisions
eould arrive only one by one and at intervals of two or three
days. F^rendi reinforcements woold oome as soon as possible,
bat arriving hurriedly from afu- they woold not have their
gone and transport, and at first their signal and staff organisa-
tion would be sketchy or improvised. Handicapped by this
want of neoeesary equipment they woold be faoe to face with
Hatier's enormoos pressure. How, then, ooold they do justice
to themselves ? Still they would lose no time. Our Allies
never hoodwinked themselves when they employed the word
" vital " in military phrases. They knew that every part of
the Franoo-Flemish mmt was vital, because, if any part of it
were overwhelmed, the effect on other parts would be
disastrous.
As Qermany's power b^an to crumble away as soon as the
Bulgarian front was shattered, so the Allied power in the
west would have crumbled away if any part of its front had
been annihilated ; and French oEBcers knew that Cktugh was
perilously ondertnanned oa a front forty-two miles wide
Hpanning the heart of France.
To many Frenchmen the battle against HuUer is known
as the battle of Fioardy,and such in tnith was its geographical
importance.
No doubt the first day's results were a failure to
Ludendorff and Hutier, who neither crossed the Crozat Canal
on the south nor reached Vermand with their right wing.
• Hklg'i DbpMoh.
OEBMAN SHBLLS AND BBITISH REDOUBTS 81
I
bat yet it was a tragical dav to us, the attack having
peQetrated at those points which were most npsetting to the
>^lfl^i«iA of our defence, while imposing very severe losses on
oar slender brigades.*
Qoogh was aided greatly by Batler, whose judgment was
cool, dear, and firm ; and Butler's divisional commanders iJso
were undismayed by their attenuated front of 80,000 yards, a
front only 16,000 vards less than that which was guarded by
the whole of Byngs Army. Tet little honour has been paid
to Butler^s Corps.
Few persons think under the form of visual conception ;
so few persons see that when only three infantry divisions,
aided bv some excellent cavalry, have to hold in a great
battle 80,000 yards of vital front, their re^nsibility tiirough
a critiod day is tremendous, and even tembla That BuUer
and his officers handled their brave troops well is proved by
the fact that the enemy was unable to press far beyond
Essigny and Benay, though these strategical villages were
captured at about midday.
As for the withdrawal by night across the Crozat Canal,
it went off well, and eased an excessive strain after grave
easualties.
^ LiodflDdoifl bfllitTM thftt loiDOO in a loiisftliiiff ^ff#n 4w u» hMvlar ihftii
tboM of AD ftdruidDg Altook, pftrily beoaoBe «U priaonen token %x% m daadto
ihair ildat lor the rati of the w«r. He wye that Ub loesea in the aatnnm of
1918 wace mnoh heavier than ihoee whioh he sofiered in his 1918 aMaoks.
And O^ntel Ifangin hae giTon Frenoh flgoree io prove thai it is more ooetly
In raanaltleB to loae liuid than to gain or regain it. Bat rarely this matter
depends to a great extent on the speed of an advance, very slow progress, as
In the mnddy and blood vYpres salient, being mnoh more harmful to storming
troops than a rapid advanoe would be, above aU after an operative break*
thfODgh.
CHAPTER n
hutier's attack koyes on to bb baffled
§1
IF we wish to see great magnitude in focus, and correct
peispectivey we most move away from immense things
till their details combine into groups and masses^
becoming not more noticeable than are twigs and
leaves in the fomee of noUe trees. As a landscape painter is
concerned with we beautiful varied channs of foliage^ not
with leaves, so historians, if ihm know their art^ pass from
items into the ffreat sweep and bulk of those generative
happenings which gather slowly to a climax and then break
up into new and rival movements, whereby tbe future will be
shaped. But details of war touch the heart so keenly, while
moving the bias of patriotism, that few persons wisn to see
recent big battles largely and truthfully, each in its own
amplitude, with the root causes of its vicissitudes.
Apply these reflections to Hutier's attack. Of what does
the main stoiy of this attack consist ? Are we to see how the
fight raged from hour to hour and day to day ? No. Daily
bulletins amplified make a diary of the battle, so congested
with scattered details that each day is a lesson in the anatomy
of war, not an act in a vast drama. OfScers go to school to
this diary, pondering over minutise, noting lessons, and
tabulating them for methodical use in the traimng of platoons,
companies, battalions, and divisions.
We studied the first day for two reasons. Hutier expected
to make big gaps north and south of Maxse's Corps, and the
first day of an oflTensive usually governs later events. On
March 21, Ludendorff and his agents missed their stride in
many places while doing about a half of their planned day's
work ; and before they could recover from the first dismay
caused by this ciroumistance. General Gough, by night, had
withdrawn his endangered right behind the Oroiat Canal and
HUTIEB'B ATTACK MOVES ON TO BE BAFFLED 88
Bome miles of the Sommei patting a perilous new beginning
before his foes, who had learnt what their losses had been ana
how their leffions had been disordered by fog and over-
thronged fighting. By good fortune, too, the seoond day was
foggy till about one o'dock;* so our damaged lines were
hidden, and a storm of machine-bullets ravaged the attack
when Hutier*s men, after many terrible attempts, managed at
Isst to cross the canal, sometimes on rafts, and to gain a
shallow firm footing on the western sida And in anotiier
matter the fog was as a grey-white shield to our defence. It
prevented Hutier^s infantry from seeing their storm troops.
Note carefully this fact about storm troops; it is very
important. The British Higher Command had copied many
thuigs from German war, but they had not copied what our
foes regarded as the most valuable agency in tneir attacks —
the enei]0etie use of storm companies and divisions: men
specially brave and trained, and proud of themselves. Their
purpose was twofold : not merely to storm and to be physically
fit for grave stress and strain, but also to be seen by the
masses behind them and to inspire emulation, as officers do by
leading and showing the way. They were ordered to go on
and on till they encountered a line of resistance ; and then,
after sending up white lights, were to strive hiurd to hold
firmly till the masses arrived, or enough men had made their
way *Dy threes and fours to their support. They obeyed this
planned routine, and our officers — ^wno hate cant as much as
they like pluok--admire the German storm troops.
In the use of storm troops there are some aisadvantages^
no doub^ since they are the cream of a nation's bravery ; and
most British and JVench officers believe — and the French
have employed storm troops — ^that the cream should be kept
in the milk. But we are dealing here with German action&
Our enemies had a £uth in storm troops that increased, partly
beeaose they wished to avoid excessive losses among young
levies and Uieir officers; and it is also true to say that better
soldiers than the German storm divisions did not appear
daring the war.f
• Ths te tn sU ita basrin^i on ftlia Uitla ii oonsUUred in Put L
t LodsDOorll, when ngreitiiig his hslf-foooeu in the hys Vftllej, which
ioUowwi iha flifsnfci of MftKoh, 191S, placet amoiu the omiee ilie ftot that his
men were not elonn tsoofe. It it quite probftUe that if we hed employed
gpuMi aiiaTilt oompenieB and diviaione, the loeses unoagonr inTmlnahle eabi.
pntentlsl WeUinotons, many of them— would lia^ mmhi lees wsstefnl end
heeil SMmMnfl Senaany besan to loee too many oiBoen as soon as her
armies wan ndnead by attrition to a militia recently trained. In every
^ THE FIFTH ABUY IN MABCH. 1918
T#<k V«l slovtt troops advaadng in a foff 7 What would
ibt^v K^ W 1^ ■atfwwT behind them ? like dectric lights in a
t^'C *« ^isiitt^ influence half useless. The ruck of Hutier's
4xvv^^>tt» «i^w them not; so their casualties were the more
i^^irtv^Ht to Hatier and tiie more helpful to our defence, the
v^^ v>f attack becoming ever more of a ruck as fresh storm
tavs^ Wcame fewer and fewer. Not once in the first three
^^y« wtitt the ruck of Hutier*s divisions led by storm troms at
Ky «M^) and momentum against any chosen place of our
t\>^^yyu lin^ ; Mxd this great {pKxl thing we owe in part to the
SM^^ \if lUind man's buff that the atttusk had to plav against
^)K bulit^tfi» trenches, shell-holes, barbed wire, and in part
t\^ thi^ (kct that no stage of awr retreat mu pui of too long,
^H«l lAfi <i<{«Ninoi became leg-tired, ratUed, and irritable wUh
i\\^i ki^fm and ^fforte.
\\\ U\v^ days our men fell back a very considerable
vlWUiUHK lluUer advanced with his right wing to and along
ihn Viirinand* Amiens road as far as the Somme, west of
Hk V\\vi^i and Brie; a distance of 26,600 yards. His centre
i^M^oiu^l iho Somme between Falvy and the west of Ham; a
^linUnof) of 80,000 yards in the deepest place. His southern
H«l\HUO<t had formed two bridgeheads: a shallow one south
\\t \\^\\\ and the Somme, and a deep one west of Crozat
Tho otH>Mtii|r at Ham, March 23, was a nasty blow. On
\\\\\ iii'tiviouH ni^ht, when our front troops were withdrawing to
t ltd liiiiMitus a iiap formed in their line in the neighbourhood
III lUiM, anil the foe, followiM closely, entered the town
\\\s\ IMH tht» i*arly morning. Before midday bodies of German
tMhMili V, at llt^l only in small numbers, ^t across the river
iuilWMtth Wmw and rithon, where the bridges had not been
itutMhliMi^ly iliMitthiyttd. In the afternoon, these forces became
MlhiMa MhoU|{h tiradiially to press back our troops, till a
nmIiUimI mmnii^i attack by the Twentieth end Bixty-Jiret about
VndHlitiiH h^Mtoii^d thii aituation in this locality. Totheeastof
IIUi< luilhl, himvy (tifhUng took place both around Ollesy, which
(liM hhitf lii&tii kv^mUxM and held till a late hour, and also
HiMUMii AMltluMV and llrouchy. The attack was reinforced,
MMil h|. IhmI, HMniiHi iiiKhti ihoae villages fell into the enemy's
ImiuU'
SVm Imhi nnw tn the Oerman bridgehead west of Crozat
mhu\ h9 MtN w«y dN AIIU4 WMttslltoi wtcs toe Ugh, loo ttteafs^Ml while
lit. Mhmmhh whv« hhIi null littttM Ibo q«Nlloa of ttorm troopi Is oMiila lo
HUTIEB'S ATTACK MOVES ON TO BE BAFFLED 85
Canal. After eaptariiur Jaasy. the foe hxA tracked oar with-
^wal wertw»a 6000 yards ; after eroasing the canal at
LieB» he had followed us 10,600 yarda ; and southward he had
captured ViUequier-Aumont In ihe south, also, aided by
Gayl, he was pressing down to Chauny. To meet this grave
throat, some French troras arrived on the third day, coming
at full speed, without their guns and administrative equip-
ment. Their business was to nelp our reinforced cavahy and
the lanff-€uffering Fifiy^eighth^ whose elastic units had urgent
need of help.* Chauny was on ihe way to Manicamp, and
Hutier hoped that Gayl and the German Sbvxnth Aaht,
after a complete fareak-ihrough« would be able to thrust south
and south-west from Manicamp, in conjunction with the same
preesure from his own troops Doth in the Noyon region, and
also south of the Qise at Yaresnes and Pontoise. Afiiogether,
then, on the evening of March 23, when the first phase of the
battle ended, the situation was dramatic. We had lost three
pontioiiSy our forward zone, battle zone, and incomplete rear
lines. But land lost bravely and without strategical disaster is
not a hostage riven to defeat ; it is an investment placed with
skill in compmsory prudence, and recoverable. And now let
us note what had happened to Hutier^s best men, whose loss
eould not be recovered by him and Ludendorj£
Fbst^ then, Hutier had thrown already into his first
line efforts to break through not less than fifteen of his own
divisions and Gayl's four, nineteen in all, with their storm
troops ; and his losses, though not even half so great as our
raopagandists declared (as u to make the German advance
looK superhuman), must have given him many disquieting
hours. When very large armies are taken from the ordinary
manhood of a country, they have in them the defects of
ordinary manhood, containing so many men who need
incessant watching by junior and non-commissioned officers
that severe losses among the best men, picked fighters, cause
much anxiety even when an advance keeps to its time-table,
and when the general casualties do not exceed the forecasts
of military auditors, who have studied earlier offensives
* On Hank SS, tioopt of tliii diTlilon did InndaAble work, when the f oo
tritd lo «RMi tho OroMt Osnal on niflf, nndar oof«r of mftohino-giuui snd
Iwnoh nwrtsri. Al one p.m. lie nisdo tbe psMage ftl Qnea^, snd want on
towsids yooai, until Oslor held him np st Tmnior. ItwMnotnntU e?«ning,
tlltr msay ooiHy oflorti* ibtA ho otptnred Twgnior, lais than • mUa wwt
ol CkoMi OtML Whnt oonld hsYS Msn more ndoehle to the Allied eenee
then wee thie pwdoagid leiiitenoe etsmoet oritioel timesnd ptooe? SqneUy
veloehle work wte done hj the SightmUh Diyxsxoh snd hj tlie Seeomd
G4TAUn.
86 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
and have tabled in averages the killed, wounded, and
missing.
To employ in first-line fighting daring the first three days
nineteen highly trained and trosted divisions, and to see many
thousands of shock troops vanish into the fog to be killed or
wounded, must have been very harassing to Hutier and his
commanders, whose time-table had not been kepti Their
advance, too, long before it had reached Noyon, tne first of
their prime aims, was becoming dogged b^ the ruekmen,
among whom were many who liked to dally in shell craters.
As the advance covered a great many square miles of land,
straggling was ea£fy. Men of combative temper went forward
as natuiully as boar hounds do, while the dead level of
German manhood had abundant opportunities to split up into
differing elements: an element that looted food in villages
and trira to find liquor ; an element of prudence that got a
stitch in its side and was glad to keep it there ; a fussy
element that wanted to be in force when prisoners were taken
to the rear; and a blunt, dull, almost candid element that
wished to be a scattered rearguard to an advance, having^ no
willingness to win and wear tiie B.M., or Bandage of Merits a
surgical dressing.
Among the causes given by Ludendorff for his half-suoeess
in the Lys Valley, you will find the complaint that his troops
often wasted time looking for food.
" The way in which uie troops stopped around captured
supplies, while individuals stayed behmd to search houses
and farms for food, were serious matters. This impaired
success and showed poor discipline. It was equally serious
that both our young company commanders and our senior
o£9cers did not feel strong enough to take disciplinary action
and to seize sufficient auUiority to enable them to lead their
men forward without delay. The absence of our old peace-
trained corps of officers was most severely felt . . ."
The German troops who fought against Gough and Byng
were specially trained, unlike those who attacked in the Lys
Valley, but smce they had long felt many effects of the Allied
blockade, the food which they captured in their advance must
have been a ffreat attraction to those among them who wished
to be laggards ; and Ludendorff says bluntly that they were
''checked by finding provisions." He complains, too, that
''numerous sUffhtly wounded made thii^ more difficult by
the stupid and displeasing way in which they hurried to
the rear."
HUTIBB'B ATTACK MOVES ON TO BE BAFFLED 87
Hainan nature in battles will show its wondrous variety
and its national variations, above all when bitter fighting
eontinnes for a long time ; and discipline tries to weld aU
dross elements into that level body of good homespun which,
ihoQgh it soon gets ** fed up with fighting/' has a firm sense
of dut^ and a pride always ready *' to stick it out.**
It IS with tnese varying constituents of ordinaiy mankind,
stiflfoned and led by the heroic minority, that a story of great
war has to deal, unless we have uncandid minds which turn
away from truth. Every nation in the war believed that her
own troops were the bravest of all, and took care to make no
printed leferences to any dross elements in her own armies,
though courts of inquiry and published reports of their
verdicts are invaluable as a natioxial tonic and traininj^. No
leader in the field, whether a sub. or an army comman<^, can
forget without danger, that the upper stratum of troops, the
heroic minority, has always to struggle in big battles not only
against the foe but also against theiowest strata of its own
comrades ; and for this reason, when in a fight against unusual
odds a defence bafBes an attack ably planned and well led, we
may be sure that dross elements became far more active in
the advance than in the retreat, owing partly to graver losses
among first-rate divisions.
According to Ludendorff, Qerman infantiy groups were
often lacking in enterprise, and often their co-operation with
companion arms had failed. They ** found special difficulty
in reorganizing themselves for defence at the dose of their
attack, and above all in recognirinR when no further success
was to be gained by continuing the assault. . • • At many
places madune-gun posts had given us [the German ^I'oopeJ
an undue amount of trouble, and so caused delay." Tnis
candour is refreshing after the camouflage which became
habitual among all the belligerents.
Even on March 22, Hutier had to draw upon his second
line, the Fifth Guards displacing Webem's Two Hvmd/red <md
Thirty-eigWi near St Simon, for example, and the Fifth
DivisiOK relieving the Eighty-eighth among Luttwitz's first*
line men. Not a good start, seeing that Hutier^s first line on
March 21 had in idl eleven divisions, apart fix>m Gayl's force.
Next day, when the resistance was local, rati^er than
incessant and general, Oetineer had to bring up his one
support, the Tvx) Hundred a/rut Thirty-firat, to attack on the
west of Ham towards Eppeville; and the First Bavarians,
piercingly ransacked by our machine-gunners at Jussy, asked
88 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABGH, 1918
to be withdrawn, but asked in vain, its support diTision, the
Tenth, bein^ already active on its right i7ow Lndendorff
desired particnlarly that the first-line divisions should fight
on through several days unrelieved, in order that second and
third line troops might be kept fresh and fit for swift opera-
tive movements after a break-through at one or other of
several chosen places.
Hutier's cyclone, then^had been split up by rude blasts
firom a destructive counter-wind, while a battle was growling
through its first phase or period, without arriving at any
point at the hour set down in Ludendorflf s plans.
Have we got LudendorflTs time-table ? This question is
asked frequency, and the answer to it is that there were two
time-tables probably, one advertised to cheer up the German
troops, and one known to superior officers alone. It would
have been very foolish if Ludendorff had said to his men :
" Youll meet with such a fierce resistance that you won*t be
able to take much on the first day." Surely he would
stimulate their confidence by saying: *Tou are splendid
fellows, and I expect you to go &r on the first day.' In a
French study of Hutier^s attack we read: ''L'objectif de la
premiere joum^e £tait^ semble-t-il, d'atteindre au Nord le
eours de la Somme, au Sud le canal du Crozat; mais en fin de
joumfe ces objectifs sont loin d'dtre atteinte." No doubt the
first day's work in the south was to cross the Crozat Canal on
the line Fareniers-Iiez-Jussy-St. Simon; but the present
writer cannot believe that in the north Ludendorff and Hutier
really expectedtto reach the Somme between Brie and St Christ.
This expectfition was too much at odds with western ex-
perience to be put into a confidential time-table; and the
pressure of Hutier's right — evidence worth trusting — showed
that the purpose in the minds of officers was to reach
Vermand and our Green Line offshoot running north on the
east of Caulaincourt, PoBuiUy, and Bemes. It took a couple
of dajrs to attain these objects, so on March 21 the attack lost
fiftyjper cent, of time.
Worse still, perhaps, from Hutier's point of view, were
two other considerations. If he arrived at Noyon without
annihilating a big part of the defence, or without enough
storm troops and other picked men, a drive down to Compi^gne
would be impossible; his losses might easily destroy the
offensive value of his masses by having in them a percentage
far too high of bom fighters, specisuly equipped by long
practice. Then his army would need, at least, a month's rest
HUTIBR'B ATTACK MOVES ON TO BE BAFFLED 89
for the training of new stoim troops and new machine-
guiners, another Hite body ; and a month's rest would throw
oat of gear LadendorflTs main purpose, a continuous campaign,
while enabling the Entente rowers to rally from then: wst
round, and to bring over American troops.
B^des, the retreat was drawing nearer and nearer to
reinforcements, nearly all French south of the Somme, but
including the British Eighth ; while Hutier's oommunications
len^ened over cratered land, and railways torn up, over
roads blasted into holes, and scores of bridges blown into
min& Thanks to thorough preparation, only six or seven
bridges during the whole retreat were left at all fit for the
enemy's use, hke one at Chipilly, where tibie charges failed to
have the necessary effect ; or, again, like the railway bridge at
PithoD, east of Ham, which, I believe, was under Q.H.Q. oraers
in the demolition scheme. Much rallantry was shown during
the demolition of bridgea At Tugny there were eleven
bridges, and in one, the safety fuse having fisdled. Second
Lieutenant Knox lit an instantaneous fuse with a match —
and escaped almost unhurt. One bridge at Falvy, blown up
at 430 p.m« on March 28, had the leads cut by German
bullets; out Seigeant Crossley repaired them under fire —
and the bridge went up all rieht. Maxse's Corps prepared
seventy-three bridges for demmition, and only five were dis-
appointments ; two of no consequence at Falvy, and two
lignt railway bridges, which, though burnt, were still of use
to inhsktrv ; fifth, a double steel lattice flirder at Ham, in
which, probably, tiie gun-cotton slabs failed to detonate.
Gose upon two hundred and fifty bridges were destroyed
by our Fifth Abmt, so Hutier and Marwitz had no end of
hindrances to get over, and always when they were most eager
to hurl divisions into a hand-to-hand grapple. Land gained
must have been an increasing burden to Hutier while he tried
vainly to make real the ideal of great attack — annihilation at
chosen places of a crumbling defence.
All these matters belong to the prospering side of Gough's
retreat ; and now we must be as frank towards dangerous
aq>ectB. Take our British feeling for retreats. When have
we been taught to remrd them as an essential and inevitable
part of loDff wars 7 Neither we nor our armies have received
eooog^ COM flood sense in this particular, with the result that
the oeosaionM necessity of bending to avoid breaking is not
accepted as a matter of course, as we accept an enforced
change of plan in a game of chess.
do THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH; 1918
In this matter, as in many othersi the most "popnlar"
British newspapers were a curse, teaching their reaaers to
think that every advance was a victory and eveiy retreat a
defeat. The propaganda of jubilant lies after Passchendaele,
like the premature ringing of joy-bells after the first phase of
Bypf^B blow at Camfarai, was to my mind hy8teri<»lly un-
British, and a very bad preparation for the spring of 1918.
Onr troops hate a retreat so ardently that, as I have said
before, no division will ever admit that it is obliged to fiEJl
back ; it blames a division on its flank, and says to its ofiEicers :
^ We conld stay here as long as you like, sir. Are we in the
air again ? I)amn ! " In Siese or in similar words, Tommy
makes known that he is adding to the wear and tear of a bad
time by chafing over a useful and necessary thing, the noble
art of wise retreating.
He should be as proud of his ability to retire ably as to
advance finely, since an attack foiled by an able retreat is to
the defence as a big victory of the second grade. Every foot
blister should be as a medal to him — a proof and recognition
of his duty done under orders, and for a purpose thought out
with that mingling of caution and temerity which belongs to
armed strife as to financial gambling. But in a time of head-
lined journalism all day long, when even the taking of a
ruined village in local fighting is profusely annotated, troops
are misled by a propaganda uiat confirms them not only in
their natural desire never to go back, but also in the shame
they feel when the need of giving ground comes upon them
in war as in football and boxm^.
In these sports candid criticism on all points has ever been
welcomed publicly, while in life or deaUi war defence and
attack are usually left unaided by that degree of reasonable
fault-finding which gives value to praise and admiration.
Why ? Would our tn)ops have harassed themselves during a
retreat if they had felt sure that people at home would grasp
the need of their withdrawal, and would cheer as gladly as do
the crowd at a cup tie when goal is relieved and a rushing
attack baffled ?
No such enthusiasm welcomed the second battle of the
Somme, except from those tamed pressmen at the front who
wrote glibly their too familiar columns for a censorship well
known, while the official bulletins showed fear of the battle's
maps, and the War Office issued a fondled report of its own
making.
Even to-day, essential moves in the retreat are questioned
HUTIEB'8 ATTACK MOVES ON TO BE BAFFLED 91
Bometimesy and sometimeB oondenmedy thonffh they had a
marked effeet on Hntiei^e failure to achieve ue main pivotal
MTtB of LudendorflTs plans. On March 28, for example,
uongh retired from tiiat unfinished line which guarded the
Somme from a point east of Boay4e-Grand» north-eastward to
Monchy Lagaehe and Haneonrt^ thence north as a portion of
the P^ronne bridgehead.
In Part lY. of this book, where some controversies are
stated and examined, these matters are shown in various
aspects. Swiftly and bravely Gongh had to make one of
those decisions which historians reconsider from age to am,
and always with a new zbaL There were many reasons why
he woold stand firm if he could, but they were cancelled as
infiuences by one fiEMst, a fact to be put into blunt words.
Watts could not promise to make a firm successful stand ; his
corps was in physical condition to be overthrown by a last
grapple against superior force renewed by fresh divisions.
And some other troops, overstrained almost to breaking-point,
needed rest— all tiie rest they could get— on guard west of
the Somme.
Behind the Somme our men took breath ; the]^ ** got their
second wind,'* and gained invaluable time for the incoming of
slow reinforcements. Malcolm's division, for example, whose
brave Lancashire brigades suffered perhaps heavier losses than
any others, guarded the crossings along the P6ronne sector
from about noonday on Murch 28 to about dusk on the
25tb— -with about 1500 rifies only, so severe had the losses
been in the SioGty-maih Division.
§n
In the evening of March 25, Hutier closed upon Noyon,
onty to find that he had not enough power to strike south and
•oath* west while keeping a firm pressure along his westward*
goin^^ firont. He maoe an effort, and then moved on towards
Laflnsny, Oanny-sur-Mats, and Montdidier, turning towards
the French a lengthening flank. This was a bad second best»
and its development to March 28, when his line ran south
and west of Montdidier and north to Marcelcave, biinffs us to
the end of Hutier's battie, in so far as the most of Gough's
remaining troops are concerned.
Two other phases came, extending the fiffht to April 4 ;
th^ were setthngKlown phases, and confirmed the work done
mamly by two British coipei Butlei^s and llaxse's, aided by
92 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABCH, 1918
the right wing of Watts's troops. The bantam-weight amateur
had roiled the heavy-weight professional, causing so many
braises and wounds that his own battered condition did not
seem to matter mnch.
Let us see what Hatier's position was from March 24 to
the evening of March 28. He had bled idl of his second-line
divisions and a part of his reserves. On March 24, when his
northern wing crossed the Sommei he called to the front at
St Christ the Siidh Division, and the Two Hundred and
Sixth went into action towards Voyennes. Two days later*
the advance continning by Chanlnes and Bosi^res, and all
second-line men being en^^i^ed, a reserve division began to
fight. It was the Two Swndred omd Forly-ihird, and
probably it relieved one of Luttwitz's, the Hwndred cmd
ThvrieentK
The central part of Hutier^s attack met with fierce
onposition across the Somma He was obliged to employ the
NvrUh Division; and two units from Aimy Reserve were
soon in battle, the Tenth BsaiSBVE on March 25, and the First
Guards on the 27th.
As for the left wing, perhaps its movements may have
been more difficult, particularly after reaching the Noyon-Boye
road. On March 25, the Gtorman Thvrty-thwL, Conta's group,
which had been in second line north of Jussy was united to
the ThiHy-fov/rtk and Thirty-aeveTUh, to screen a movement
towards we north-west made by the First Bavarians and the
Hwndredcmd Third, who were to become active again in the
neighbourhood of La^signy.
By the evening d March 28, Hutier had employed twenty-
two divisions^ apart from Gayl's and Boehn's; his reserves
were already like a half-empty barrel of wine that leaked ;
and anxiety had caused him to summon several units from
calm sectors of his front, the JMrd Bavarians arriving from
St. Gobain, and the Fowrteefdh Division and Eightieth
Kesebvb coming from Lorraine and Champagne.
To understand how bitter these facts must have been to
him we must remember that Hutier told his first-line troops
of March 21 that they would haveto fight for several con*
secutive dajrs without being relieved, and he warned his
Oorps Commanders also not to draw hastily on their supports
and reserves.
As Ludendorff says: ''The German Supreme Conmiand
attached dedsive importance to the attack being continued
for a period of some days by divisions in the first lina^ He
HUTIEB'8 ATTACK MOVES ON TO BE BAFFLED 98
adds: ** I opposed the view that these anita abready on the
aecond or third day should be relieved by divisions of the
seeond wave. At the beginning of the war we had fought
for weeks at a time without relief. Our existing troops, it is
true, were no longer capable of such a performance. But
even so, there was no need for such firequent relieb as many
would have liked to see." *
And what was Hutier to do with his wide flank extending
from Montdidier to the south-east of Noyon and thence to
Chauny ? To make such enormous efforts, and yet be unable
to follow the Oise a few miles to Compiif^nel To take
Montdidier only to be worried by the Avre bridgehead I To
come within gunshot of Amiens — and then to stand still,
bi^ed, completely spent I
As Lud^dorff says in his book, the strategical situation
was by no means favourable, though as yet a final opinion
could not be riven on its outlook, as the German operations
were still in uieir first stages. *' The Avre bridgehead,*' he
writes, ''was a special difficulty in the tactical sense. The
advisability of giving it up was discussed. But as this
would have shown the enemy that we had abandoned any
further attack on Amiens, we kept it . . . Strat^cally we
had not achieved what events of the 23rd, 24th, and 25th had
encouraged us to hope for. That we had also fiuled to take
Amiens, which would have rendered communication between
the enemy forces astride the Somme exceedinglv difficulty was
specially disappointing. Long-range bombiurament of the
railway establishmente of Amiens was by no means an
equivalent. . • .'*
LudendorflTs candour is manly, and it helps everj^ one to
appreciate what Cough's generalwip and British fijghting had
achieved when Hutier*s power was most formidable, and
before an^r French reinforcements had its full equipments,
either mihtary or administrative.
It was always, or nearly always, a British order that did
most effectively at the ri^ht moment an essential thing. On
the sixth day, for exampk, while two French divisions were
withdrawing south-west, and taking with them Nugent's
Ulstermen and Maxse's artillery, a remnant brigade of our
Twentieth fought a very valuable delaying action as it fell
back to the line Fresnoy-Villers-lte-Boye-La Damery, and Le
^ I&^UiiiwtEdt,lh«cswMiionioh tjiluii of diTitfooAl " lisp-teaiiBfl,'*
M Biillah imi caamffmUaM sfetrilmltd to Lotaidorfi'i taotios ta im
01 MABCa, 1918
(^^M. ^^■^gin^t^ml^moAweiAerly, It had ic»
*J"^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ 5,^ I^»« gnus, and ahoQt a hundred
^ ^ i—i— J with diMt and Bweat. and haggard
^^ ?^^-_ ^^i^mmt^tr. Captain E. P. Comhe was
*^^^^^ ^ i-^ h^F— * 4*y ^ Bnnshine — thia handfiil
y*?" "^* , .jy ,j,,M«i iihffi t T^'" C the foe till six in the
~El?S««Kva« «t <w men and their leaders were
.' , 'j.;^ ii«ii*«d to faht another roond, and this
** m^^^ «^ o» till orders were received for a
^Sm^ »ta BK^-mt to Beaufort. MeauUme, greatly
J5_Ii ■- ^"^ • t-i^-t aland at Lo Quesnoy, other men
§m
_. ii, ^^ boa a poasible atladc by Franco-
w ^"P* n,.*;-, .M (^ioed to fight on until the Lya
■»*'°^"''^i^JlA«rVSi ■• early as March 26,
**" *y *^ .,- r TT^ nSh to»aris Amiens, began.
"•*"'* *'"';II1Ij a BttW towaidB the sonth-west; and
t >e>»wa •► » » "S^j.,,,,^ .airta en his extended
**• "^^lij-.^fc^SiS stift-* !l».ly but surely.
*■>.««• «»• •»""'?,""__. ITC dinwaiB in aU, were
»!« !«»«»» •-»»~*^J;j, of shock troops to brealt
"»** ir ""^JJHSlraiaSi power. t«Md an assault
;^„^ »»w»ii>» ""~T*"T^s.loaU«i.withavediYisiona
S«'-««^'3iCStrf1«»SS. Bat his efforts
>f,Vl>:j«)r»t*ir'~r^l»l.t^ British and French
rt«lc«i««'St,'yii^rMto !>» ft""' uanower by
™. *»•*••«• "T ~ E^Z^ ». Haiwilfct and reeeiving
iiMiiii «k«« '•'"?"„ )i,,,i(,^^ Mrf laeeiving
W.i.V.»-« W«*«*™^„'Si 0^ ,»»ry^ th.
.v« W-.« » rrS Mr**^ BKDTl n«.on
>--^' ""' .7W-«.--n-
HUTIBB'B ATTACK MOVES ON TO BE BAFFLED 95
April 4, he and Marwitz strack together^ the greatest blow
oomiiiff from their sphere of union, though we battle ran
firom Moreuil down to Montdidier; but not much was
adiieyed.
The morningi attack, b^gun at seven o'clock, was repulsed
by the British right; but on the northern wing, immecuately
south of the Somme, our men were obliged to retire behind
le Hamel and Vaire Wood« During the afternoon another
thrust struck the British rights causing a dent in the neigh-
bourhood of Hangard Wood, while on the French front some
ground was lost on both sides of the Avre.
Contrary to Ludendorffs orders and training, waves of
attack came on in dense formation, and these targets felt the
full force of our machine-guns and artillery. Just north of
the Somme the Thvrd Austbaluns turned their artillery
on the foe's attack across the river, and, firing over open
sights with excellent effect^ were very helpful
As a whole Hutier^s filial effort was a fiulure. It did not
lessen anv of his anxieties. Indeed, Boehn seems to have
supplied him with troops, for I believe that two of Boehn's
divisions^ the Forty'Seventii Bbsxbvk and the Two Hundred
wnd Twrnty-third, were sent to be in support near Boye.
These particulars are very important They prove that
Hutier oomd not recover from Oough's retreat and its results.
It was during the first four or five days that Hutier shot his
bolt and missed his mark. His aim was to overwhelm while
his storm divisions were fresh and confident^ and before
reinforcements could reach our mea^ long line running
from the Omi^pon valley down to Banria
These special divisions of the foe's first line had been
trsined by Hutier himself in the neighbourhood of Fourmies-
Chimay, his H.Q. bein^ at Avesnes, and by means of careful
pnyag^da he had raised the ardour of bis whole army to a
nign pitch. A French study of the batUe says with truth : *
** Tou8 lea priaon/niera inierroaia oni dMariqu^ila avaient
M aouienvs par la certUvde de la vvdoire et de la fin
proehoMie de la gwerrtr
Weig^ these words welL Hutier's army entered the battle
to win a complete victory and to end the war. Then fog and
heavy losses and brigades jumbled up together threw chill
^ ^Jjm Optettons dt U ZVUl* Amte Alltmsnds (Annit Von
dn n Mmb M SAvril, 1918.** OnodQiisrtlwQ4ii4nldMAniitedaNoxdsi
do Notd^Ert. te-Mejor. ^ Bortao. No. 90,il9.^A holpfol tliidy with
lesilsnt Mspfc
96 THE FIFEH ABMY IK MABCB, 1918
Biter chin xmm its inmunoned eaiifidence» its ttdnt self-
belief ; and then ? May a atndent yentm to exfi re w his
belief that Hotaer ecmfoimded Goug^ with Haig ? To my
mind there is no doobi on this point.
Haig's rhameter in war is evident in all its actioiw. It is
a very cold and a vary unbending restdntian, unmoved by
those Napoleonic impolses which come from imaginative
fevonr at a white heat ; and Hntiei^s conduct showsthat heli ^
thought constantly of this duunscter, till Good's fire and
swift flexibility had baffled him several times. At aU costs,
on the eveninfi^ of March 21, Hntier ought to have pressed his
attack west ch Maissemy and west of Essigny and neuay, and
also in the Crozat CSanal r^on from Faigniers north-west-
ward ; but he paused to take breath, evidently believing that
the Britiah would be too obstinate and that he would be aUe
to deliver a decisive blow in the morning after his brigades
had been disentangled.
^ Fortunately, we were not unbendingly obstinate. Gough
withdrew his rights and in the morning Hutier had to attack
the Crozat Canal through a thick fog, noisy with our machine-
^m bullets, while west of Vermand he found our newly arrived
I'ifHeth DnnsiOK.
Even then both Hutier and Ludendorff continued to think
much more of Haig^s character in battle than of Gough's,
taking their cues too confidently firom that doggedness for
which British troops have always been famous, and which
Haig revealed in fall measure during the Somme campaign
of 1916 and later in the Tpres salient.*
A paragraph in Haig's dispatdb suggests that he would
have taken dedsive risks elang the Pfronne bridgeheadf No
doubt the central portion of LudendorflTs ofiensive showed a
leisurely confidence after breaching our Oreen Line close by
Nobescourt Farm, and also at Cauliuncourt This great error in
generalship aided our troops invaluably. It is explained only
by the assumption that Hutier and Marwitz expected our
men to stand for a conclusive grapple east of the river.
Happily, Geugh had a plan as simple as it was eflfectuaL
Knowing the physical condition of his men, he refused to
• Britbh Empira oMOftltiM in the Ypns stlkni-Jnly 31, 1017, ito
Nownbtt 4, UlT—wwe 1S,680 offlom snd 246,967 o«h«r nakM. Whst if
th«M troopf had been luad with the Itslism agidnsi Anstrls ? Thsdespwi
ftdvuoe on e nsrrow front, from July 80 to l^ovember SS, wu about 6) muet,
from Hm Top Stan, Wiallja netor, to N.E; of Pawtohimdaali.
t The paragr^h in qneitlon is quoted in Part IV. of this hook.
HUTIBB'B ATTACK MOVES ON TO BE BAFFLED 97
keep his bantam-weight force where the heavy-weight pro-
fessioiial could overpower it by incessant blows at dose
qoarters.
A great many persons have said that although Hatier and
his commanders handled their masses of troops with a skill
which invites the most careful attention, yet they failed to
bring their battle to a well-defined ending. No doubt this
criticism is true. The immense attack came as a cyclone and
blew itself out in gusts of dwindling violence ; ana note well
that what may be called the last gast did not come from
Hutier's army. It came frt>m Boehn s» and on April 6.
On this date Boehn attacked on the Oise's left bank from
Chauny to La F^re in the direction of Coucy la Yille, and
also £Euther south. ELis object was to push the French across
the Oise- Aisne Canal in order to give some security to Hutier's
long south flank ; and this aim he made real For all that,
not much ease was given to Hutier; week after week his
long south flank was there; and Fodi gathered troops and
made very strong positions below Noyon and thence to his
Montdidier sector. The foe noticed this menace, and made
preparations to ease the strain on Hutier. On June 7 Boehn
was to attack with the Seventh Gebman Abht south-west
of Soissons, while Hutier with the Eighteenth was to strike
Bimultaneously between Montdidier and Noyon. Happily,
this combination could not be brought about, as Hutier Ciiuld
not finish in time his artillery preparations. The attack was
postponed for two days; and we have still to learn why our
Allies, who were well prepared and in excellent positions, did
not crush Hutier's onset Once more the foe failed to reach
Gompiigne, but he formed a protective salient all the way
from south-east of Montdidier to south-east of Noyon. The
attack broke through a most difficult trench system, advancing
almost as fitf as Uie Aronde, and resisting heavy counter*
attacks along the M^ry sector. South of Noyon this bulwark
salient paased over formidable high ground just west of the
Oise. Consider, then, what the Allied position would have
been in March if Hutier and Gayl had crossed the Crozat
CSanal on the first day, with the way open both towards
Chauny and towards Noyon 1
Again, if we ask ourselves why Hutier's cyclone blew
itself out in gusts of dwindling violence, we come face to frbce
with a fset which is apt to h& forgotten by those who write
in the Press about strategy and tactics; namely, that tiie
most important thing in war is not the brain shown in tactics
the
Tietorj; xbejToavtd
oat ardcor. Tbar vaLs vcfe not cpl
CO fire witih that pfcoiiar Voaatt htmx viidi a gimi'itf \ie u « y
circalates firom heiiit to bean ihroo^ a vbcC-e anaj.
And tills cull mood behind Huoer's baxue finemsnataiml,
ineriiaLle ; it markfui a reaeikii that aeuied cowm mpcat bis
men after intpn«y LopefolDeBB had been th vanad again and
again bjr Good's hfr^oir.g obstinafT, which I compare to a
good Yew bow. Tbe big advance^ withoct a gcmiine ao ee MB^
was always Terj difficult* and also too costly ; and constantly
ahead of ii^ and imhfarfn, was the Briush fine of renmani
brigades, and the giadoal coming of Allied reinfoiceflMntB^
From the third day our Twentietk was helped greatly by
two rw«ia^i^« ba tteries of the motor-madiine-gmi sort; on
Maidi 26 seven bondred American en^rioeers joined Maxae to
dig themselTes in on a line coTerii^ IXanoin ; and as for the
Ffendi tnwps, firom dawn of the third day, giadoally, and in
gieai baste, they began to anriTe, withoat guns, and with no
more rifle ammmution than they cazried. No brave men
eoold have been more sorely handicapped. It was imposable
for them to be adcgnate, effectoaL i et somdiow, anyhow,
thcgr were pat in authority over our own offices and troc^ !
This was done offidally on the fifth day sooth of the Somme,
before Foch was appointed to Supreme Onmmand ; bnteailier
it was active in a piecemeal fafthion, and always with bad
resolts.
Perhaps nothing in this battle is more distresBing, or more
controversial, than the act of patting BriUsh officere and men
onder French commanders before the Fraich troops were
d jned cTcnivref on a complete war footing, with aU necessary
e({xdymtnU, both military and admimstrative. Thus to swop
HUTIEB'8 ATTACK MOVES ON TO BE BAFFLED 99
honee in mid-stream in the presence of Hatier^s immense
power ! What will historians think and say ? InPartlV.
of this book there is achapter on this peculiar use of reinforce-
ments, by which mnch confusion was caused, and which came,
among other things, from a lack of self-control aiUside the
battle, partly amonff those statesmen who had kept far too
many troops in the British Isle&
For the rest, some writers misinterpret LudendorflTs aim
in Hutier^s attack. One of them says : —
** The German object was not a specific break-through, but
a general crumbling. What wrecked this object was that
Lndendorff got the break-through, but not the crumbling."
I see no reason why the Muse of History should stand on
her head. Very high casualties prove that the Fifth Amnr's
incessant peril was general crumbling. Tet Hutier strove
▼ainly with all his might to prove that numbers alone
annihilate.
In this fact we find decisive proof that Cough's orders
were correct, and that they were carried out well by his
officers and men. Hutier can have no excuse to offer. His
army was first-rate; he had plenty of time before French
reinforcements began to come up, and there was room enough
along his front to break through a thin defence; to break
through operatively, in wid^sweeping movements opening
oat lixe a fiuL
CHAPTER m
THE CENTRE nOHTINO NOBTH AND 80VTB OF THE VBBMAMD-
AMIEN8 BOAD
§1
ON March 22, soon after midnight, our Fifiieth
Division arrived at the Somme and began to
detrain at Brie, feeling stiff, unwashed, and un-
gnmmed. Its North TSiglish troops, coming from
the district west of Rosi^res, had started an evening journey
after a brisk inarch had put too much sweat into their shirts ;
and imagine patience in troop trains I Has it not been
described as ** strap 'angin' all in a bloomin' 'eap without any
bloomin' straps " ?
G.H«Q. had kept this division too far off from the weakest
part of the Britbn fironi Two dsjs before the battle Gough
wanted to move it up, together with the Twentieth ; so he
appealed by telephone to G.H.Q. With what result ? The
C.G.S. viewed his reauest as a desire to use the reserves too
soon. In other words, the C.G.S. ran counter to a military
maxim which says that when Generals expect to be attacked,
they should keep their reserves at hand and entirely fit for
battle. To keep them at a long distance from the front is to
invite disaster. If G.H.Q. had ustened favourably to Gough's
appeal, the Fiftieth and Twentieth would not have w&n.
thrown into action under verv adverse conditions.
In a great hurry, and wiw much fatigue, the Fiftieth had
to reach those swirling borderlands norSi and south of the
Yeimand-Amiens road, where Hutier and Marwitz united
their attacks, striving with the utmost eneigy to separate
Watts from Maxse, while Watts was in trouble northward
near the Cologne River, where he and Congreve had to
encounter flanking pressure from the south-west of Bonssoy
and Templeux le Gu^rard.
Neill Malcolm and Daly had done wonders onlv to find
that their thin divisions had burned too much in the nunaoe of
100
THE GBNTBE FIOHTINO 101
battle. Lancashire lads of the SieUy-sixA * had shown tena-
eioos mettle* fighting as Lancashire archers used to fight when
English longb^!^ were feared throughout Enrope : but soldiers
all of gold pa^ themselves away in long necessary efibrts to
do overmueh.f There had been far too much strain from the
Qmignon vallev to the Biver Cologne— a nasty name for a
French river when seven German divisions on a front of about
five miles have been active for a whole day against two under-
manned British units. Both defence and attack cursed the
fog ; and when the fog cleared away and uncovered the attack
all muddled up in the valleys, our machine-guns were more
than enough to dismay the German jumble, tluit never seemed
to know how much success it had won, and certainly it was
very slow to profit by its gains. Benign fog I
For a considerable time on the second day there was a
frowsiness in the attack that came from yesterdays troubles. A
German prisoner told Colonel Lloyd of the Ninth Manchesters
that Marwits had no intention of attacking in the north
sector of Malcolm's front ; enemy troops were digging trenches
there ; and a wounded German officer declared that (3erman
casualties from German gas had been very large on the first
day, as the assault had begun too soon. If the German officer
had attributed the German gas casualties to owr shelling of
Hardcourt, he would probably have been right, as the German
gas when the attack began was too weak to put men out of
action*
• MaloQlm'f IMviiioii.
t The SMfy^Noifc foogbt oontiniimiBly from dftim, ICftcch 91, tffl the 1^
Uaxeh 30-81, ftad ito omnaltiiw, oonnling abo the mnl and siok, were perhapt
the hiftTieit of any. Ite menproved thai oompeiittTe Indntirlee and belliooeo
tade unions befriend the old British likingfor uows, braises, and battles. On
the sizth day, lor instance, the 5ic<|MM<fc was so short of officers that its
deple t ed companies were nierely improrised small teams, but yet they held on
wiih a grip little slackened, as though fighting were as natural to them as that
antomatio panting of thefr Inngs that gained lor them air enough to keep
them allfa. BTen when they seemed to be lar gone In locomotor ataxy, they
co ntri fed somehow to make good hobbling oonnter-strokes, as on the after-
noon of Matoh 30. Ftehaps the best episodes of their fighting were : (1) On
March 91, a oafahr oonnter-attack to Oarpeaa Oopse, and the holding of
this copse nntU a withdrawal on the second day ; (9) the recovery east and
north-east of HerriUy at about 11 aon. on March 99, which at the right
moment delayed the German advanoe to the PAronne bridgehead at
Kobeseoort Varm ; (8) holding the exits of Pteonne and the Tillage of Biaohes
(this in ooBjonotion with Feetham and the TMrly-iitfiifc) ; (4) Harbonniteas,
mTataabia aa waU as memomUy piotaresqne ; and (6) the Ust sport in
a ooontcr-biow near Hannrd, whoi its fsggsd men advanced as lac aa
a brigids of fraih Anstnlians, and forgot afterwards to Uow their own
teompets. Thefr total caaoaltles daring the operations ware nearly sevea
tlwQsaads, apart iRnn the sick and spent.
109 THE FIFEH ABMT IN MABCH, 1918
Bat these fikTomiiig dreoinstaiieeB were eoonterpoiaed by
our own losses and anxietiea. Daly^s men were badly bit,
like Oolin Maekensie's left;* and thus Uie centre of Googb's
Anny was in danger. Tbe FiftiA eoold not be too quick,
snoe it bad been kept too IcMig by GLH.Q.
From Brie to GmlaincoiiTt and tbe (keen Lme offihoot is
a maicb along tbe straight road towaixls Yermand ; a mardi
by nigfat of eight miles, if yon please, and through another
fog dense enough to baveastiong daspon things and persons.
Martin's Brigade marched to the P&onne bridgehead near
Hanconrt^ where its men had a short rest in some hots. After-
wards they took up their position in the main Green Line.
Their left rested near Boady, and their li^t was held by
the Hfth Doriiam Light Infimtiy, onder Major A. Ll Baimes,
who had his beadqnarters in Mobescoort Farm, like Neill
Malcolm, who ecnnmanded the Siadty-madOi. The main Green
Line, an essential part of the P^ronne Iwidgehead, was about
five hundred yards east of the rained (arm, and about the
same distance north of it^ as the line at this point f<»med a
sendeirdeL
Soon after ten o'doek the Fifth D.LX was lent for a
time to Neill Malcolm, who employed it to guard his left flank
against any attack which the foe might attempt from the
north of RuseL In the afternoon, at about half-past two, the
iSKasty-sirtA was ordered by its Corps to fight a rearguard
action and to withdraw through the nftidk^ who would hold
Green line. The brigade groups and attadied troops and
cavalry were to assemble at Buire, Courcelles and Ddu^t^but
the StaBty-^iadh'a divisional artiUery was to be left under the
command of the Fiftieth.
This withdraml was not attacked. It went smoothly,
and was completed before midnighL The Sixty-siaoth's head-
quarters left Nobescourt Farm at one o'doek, and, four and a
half hours later, opened at Doingt
Already the losses in each brigade of this brave division
were estimated as frt>m 40 to 50 officers and from 1200
to 1400 other ranka These were severe casualties, for the
Siocty-sixth entered battle with an average strength per
battalion of not more than 20 officers and 600 rifles: or
60 officers and 1800 rifles in each of the three hriisades.
* The SiaUn-finL A roedal order of the day, April 18, leoorded the
faci that rinoe Match SU, this diyiidon had fought aseuuit fourteen Qemuui
diviaioiiB, had identified three other unite hj oontaot, and on one afternoon
had taken prlaonen from three dlfEerent airplane flights.
THE CENTRE FIGHTING 108
Equal and similar losses also had been suffered by the
Twenty^fimrih, so thai our 19th Corps had urgent need of
the Fiftieth.
In all the Fiftieth had a wider front to guard than that
which is given in the official dispatch ; it exceeded 10,500 yards
by mudu South of Martin's Brigade was Rees's, that guarded
the Oreen Line offshoot from the north-west of Bemes to a
Doint just north of Poeuilly, where Riddell's Brigade of
Northumberland Fusiliers carried on the defence southward
to the wooded Omignon River near Yill^v^ue. Undulating
and timbered oount^ aided the Bocha Long belts of spinney
and weald ran east and west, hiding an inquisitive push
which at midday would squeeze us from Yermand and begin
to press westward.
At about eight o'clock Brigadier Riddell had his men hard
by their battle stations. With his three battalions, about
1800 rifles and some 800 stragglers, it was his duty to hold
6000 yards of very shallow trench, and yet have men enough
for counter-attacks. How was this duty to be fulfilled ?
Civilians have a very cloudy notion as to the span of
front which a small body of troops should be able to keep
secure. Experienced officers believe that 1500 vards of front
in a battle zone is all a battalion can hold ; and then it must
be supported by many more guns than our Fifth Abmt had
in Mafch. A mmous Corps Ck>amiander writes : —
^ I still think the forward zone should be as lightly held
as possible, and I would put a battalion even on 3000 yards
of tront there, and the other two battalions of a brigade each
on a 1500 yards front in the battle zona Thus the brigade
would be in depth. But we need on the spot in each brigade
a fourth battalion for counter-attacka As for the prev^ent
idea that reserves can be marched for miles and miles on the
day of battle to be handled by some genius on the spot who
ean foresee somehow where his jmnping-off place wul be for
his counter-attack by a battalion — all this may be splendid in
theory, but it doesn't work out in practice.*' *
* O.H.Q. has stOl to ezplftin not only why two-thiids of Ooogh'i Infuitry
rtiervM wen abMnt daring the first aAy*0 battle, bat Also why the offiohJ
ditpAtoh deoUies that they were present. Oonsider this qaotation : ** The Thisd
AaiiT dispoeed of eight divisions in line on the front of the enemy's initial
sttaok [from Sens^ Biver down to Byng's onion with the Fons Abict],
with seven divisions avaiUhle in reserve. The Fnrxa Aamr disposed of
foorteeii divisions end three eavalrv divisions, of whioh three infantry divisioiu
and three cavalry divisions were m reserve* The total British foroe on the
original battle front, therefore, on the morning of Haroh 21, was tw«nty-nlna
infantry divisions sfld three oavalry divisions, of whioh niaateen Infantry
104 THE FIFEH ABMY IN MABGH, 1918
^ Connter-aitackB might decide the day. Compared wiih
neic^hbonring troops, saeh as Colin Mackenzie's southward,
Bicklell's Northnmoerland Fusiliers had not yet turned a hair ;
so a great deal was expected from them. U would be well to
have a whole battalion for counter-attack, and its best position
would be at Tertry, a village just a mile or less behind Caulain*
court, and guarded by such bog and marsh as the Omignon
has made in this part of its course. The Fifth Fusiliers were
put in reserve east of Tertry, while the battle-line on our
right was held by the Fourth Battalion ; and northward, on
our left, the Sixth was hard at work digging.
^ Fog continued ; but at one o'clock, or thereabouts, it
thinn^ away, and parties of Daly's Division retired through
Biddell's lines, nearly all gassed and every one of them dead
stiff and weary. Two hours later, when the Brigadier was
visiting his front line east of Caulaincourt, some Qerman
planes came growling nearer and nearer till at last they were
able to drop bombs on lus defence and to open fire from their
machine-ffuns.
British planes were so busy attacking the German rear
and reserves that none was seen by the Northumberland
Fusiliers before March 24 Then, during a hot retreating
march from the neighbourhood of Misery to Foucaucourt,
some ffrowled above the Fusiliers, giving the Boche reserves
a speU of rest. Meantime Qerman airplanes had been very
active against our battle troops.
The Fusiliers could not have been pleased when they read
in the official bulletin of March 22, how ** the enemy's attack-
ing troops and reinforcements on the battlefield offered most
excellent targets to the pilots of our low-fiying machines, who
divlfliona were in line." As cmlj a pert of Byog's front wee assailed on the
fint day, tUs quotation omits two TmsD Abxy line divisions, while giving the
whole of Gough's, inolnding absent reserves, two Infantry divisions. I note,
also, that two of 6yng*s support divisions were mot available on the first day,
the Forty-flnt being west of Albert, in the Baisieux sector, and the ITMrty-
fint farther ofi still, in the north-west at Fr6villers. Yet O.H.Q. expected
that the main German blow would fall between Senste River and the neigh-
bourhood of Bapaume-Oambrai road. The Thirty-first was not even in
Byng's land. Support divisions were kept much too far from their battle-
fronts, because G.H.Q. wished to move them to other sectors if Gough and
Byng were not hard pressed. The need of more men being a h a r a ssin g
anxiety, this attitude towards four support divisions can be understood ;
but yet it was one of those manifestations of excessive caution which put
danger after danger into chosen risks. If Gough was to bear aU the risks,
oertainlv he needed all his supports close by his battle sone ; and the fighting
value of Byng's seven support divisions was greatly impaired because two
had to be hurried up from a long distance and thrown tired into the battle.
THE OENTBE FIGHTINO 105
poured many thousanda of roimds in them, cauaiiig iimamerable
CASQaltiea." This reads like joomalisin prepared for a
democraey feared by craven officials, for British soldiers do
not speak lightly of a foe's '^ innomeraUe casualties/'
particularly when their own losses are perilously high.
Besides, the Qerman air flights throughout the battle were as
enterprising as our own; from day to day, then, overhead,
we mast hear not only our own airplanes, but also the growl
of large hostile flights, with the purring swish of dispersed
bullets from machine»guna
A few minutes after the German airplanes appeared over
the Northumberland Fusiliers, our patrols were heard firing.
A creeping attack had begun to stretch its legs. Riddell ^t
back to his horses just in time to see a company of British
machine-gunners coming forward to " putt-puttr-putt*' In a
few minutes oar whole line was ablaze. Boches in waves
could be seen advancing; towards our Sixth Northumbrians,
who were using their nfles and Lewis guns with unflurried
rapidity. Time after time a wave came in, and broke ; eddied,
and went back in a swirl, leaving behind it, upon or dose to
our wire, a litter of killed and wounded. Twice the attack
got through ; and twice the Sixth Fusiliers delivered a noisy
counterblow, recovering lost ground and taking prisoners.
It was a most gallant a&ir— gallant on both side& An officer
writes:—
'^ Meanwhile, working through woods on the Omignon,
Boches had crossed the river souw-east of Caulaincourt ; and
coming through a gap which we understood was to be held
by another division on our rights he got round our right
flank.''
Hence a sound of firing over there, in the neighbourhood
of Cauliunoourt church. Near the church Colonel Bobb had
posted his reserve company. He had his headquarters in a
large mausoleum at the north-west end of Caulaincourt He
left it at (mce and joined his reserves ; took them forward
chaiginff ; and, by Jove I the turning movement recoiled, and
bunme^ and jostied back over the (hnignon !
But when you are short of men, every good thing is offiset
by something bad. A call for help came to Bobb : the left
Mrt of his line was in trouble ; and help could not be ffiven*
Every man was in action: and none could be withcuawn.
106 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABCH, 1918
How many troops had we in Ireland ? And bow many in
England ?
An hour before dvilian England enjoyed the cooneai of
afternoon tea, the Fnailiei^s Brigadier — ** a grand fellow in a
fight/' another General tells me — ^was feeling somewhat the
worse for wear. Five bnllets bad passed throo^b bis saddle
wallet, another bad ripped through his coat^ and bis groom's
mare had a nasty bead wonnd. The bullet through his coat
had ended a search for death plump against a safety razor case.
Such is war, scientific war. A bearded brigadier would have
been either badly wounded or killed.
Over there, through a dump of trees east of Caulaincourt-
PoBuilly road, another attack came on; and at the same
moment northern Caulainoourt was taken. Two companies of
Fifth Fusiliers were let slip, and got their stride at once, the
left company crossing the road north of the village. How
well it chaiged among the trees . • . with Frits in retreat !
Every one cheered as much as Englishmen ever cheer ; and was
it not a sight worth cheering ?
Northward the Sixth Fusiliers were holding nearly the
whole of their original line. On their right they had been
obliged to give up some ground to a point about a mile
souUi of PoBuilly. Caulaincourt had gone fix)m us^ but the
Brigadier was still in telephonic communication with the
mausoleum, which he knew was in Qerman bands. A
message came asking him to send reinforcements. If he
could and did all would be wdL What officer sent this
message? The Qerman refused to give bis name. There
were five British batteries of 18-pounders about a thousand
yards off, and the Brimdier turned them on to Caulaincourt
and its mausoleum. Did the Boche at the wire's end get his
answer?
Shortly afterwards our guns began to ransack the woods
about Caulainoourt and east of the Sixth Fusiliers. Shells
burst in among a dose attack with excellent results, causing
many casucdties east of Pceuilly, as Colonel .Bobinson
could see.
And now we must see what had happened to Martin's
Brigade. As soon as the Sixty-sioBth was ordered to with-
draw behind the Fiftieth, Uke the TiMfity-/(mWA, the Fifth
Durham light InGsmtiy returned to the main Green lane
about five hundred yards east of Nobescourt Farm. On
its right was one of Bees's battalions, the Fourth Torks. The
foe followed quickly, and at five p.m« these two battalions
THE CENTRE FIGHTING 107
were heavily attacked The Rfth Durham Light Infantry
did great execution with their Lewis guns and rifles, but a
portion of the main Qreen Line was lost, and Nobescourt
Farm itself was nearly captured. The advance got so close to
it that the 0.0. of the Fifth Durham Light Infantiy felt that
hifl headquarters ''was almost in the actual firing line."
In preparation for a last stand, every available man was
posted — signallers, servants, and other odds and ends — but
the attack was not pressed at once after Green line had been
reached and manned. Oaptain J. K. M. Hessler, who com-
manded B Company, was killed while fighting most gallantly,
and Lieutenant Scott was wounded and captured
In the meantime the Fourth Yorks had fared worse, losing
the CO. and a Major and the Adjutant, all killed. The
Colonel died while leading his reserve company in a desperate
counter-attack. It was badly hammered, tnis brave battalion,
and was pushed out of Green Line, but not so far as to out-
flank Nobescourt Farm, which Major Baimes kept as his
headquarters till one a.m. on March 28.
Hitherto it has been believed that the farm itself was
captured by the five o'clock onrush. A report to this effect
was sent to 19th Corps, whose Staff* passed it on to the Fifth
Abmt. Gough himself called up the Corps and threw doubts
on the report, but was assured that the report was authentic.
How did this misunderstanding arise ? There were two
possible, if not probable, explanations : —
1. The Green Line system was connected with places near
to it. Thus the official dispatch says : ** By 5.30 the enemy
had reached the third zone at different points, and was
attacking the Fiftieth Division heavily between Vill6v6que
and Boudy." Now Boudy was nearly 500 yards west of the
main Green line, and Yill6v^ue was about the same distance
south-east of the Green Line offshoot. So a report could
say : " The bridgehead has been broken at Boudy,'' and yet
Boudy itself might be all right Similarly, a report could
say : *' The bridgehead is broken at Nobescourt Farm," though
the farm itself had not yet fSEdlen.
2. I believe I am right in saying that the Nobescourt Farm
sector was in the area of Bees's brigade of the Fiftieth, but the
Fifth D.L.L, Martin's Brigade, occupied it after returning from
the work it did in the mominff for the Siscty-math Division,
It follows that divisional headquarters would appeal to Bees
for news of Nobescourt Fann.
In any case, the foe had settled himself in the main Green
108 THE FIFm ABMY IN MABCH. 1918
liine in the ndgfaboorhood of this fann. and liis inat line
was dose to the bats which had been set np in the Sum's
rains. A eoonter-attack &iled to dislodge him, and this
breach of the main brid^pehead had to be considered side by
side with three other eircanistances. One of them was the
loss of the Green line oflshoot south-east of PflBoiUy ; another
was the grave loss in casoalties which had stricken thennder-
manned 19th Corps; and the third was the fiust that, with no
reinforcements at hand, and with the FiftieA overstretched
on a front of nearly 14^500 yards, renewed ONmter-attacks
were undesirable^ It became neceasaiy to readjust the
ISfii&ik on a new line.
By nightfall of the 22nd Biddell's N<vthamberland
Fusiliers held a line immediatdv west and north of CSaulain-
courti then along their origmal Ime east of Poeuilly, where their
front was drawn bade a little to the road north of Poeuilly
in order to meet Rees's men, whose right had been driven in
slightly* The Fusiliers had lost the Green line offshoot
south-east of Poeuilly, but they were well established in
their new position, ud at «bout nine p.m. thmr right
nearly obtiuned touch with the TwmUf-famih near Monchy-
Lagache, and therefore near the main line di the Peronne
briogehead. The Fusiliers being west of Canlaincourt and
the TwiUg-fauHh about 2500 yards to the south-west^
Riddell*s right flank was open ; and the gap had to be filled
with all spare officers and men of the brigade staff
About midnight orders were received to withdraw in line
with the TwrnOy-famih, and by dawn the Fudliers reached
their new position immediately west of the Tertrv-Bonvincourt
road. Many men were set to dig trendies in poughed fields,
while many others had a hot brMk&sk With eoual success,
too^ Bees had slipped back by moonlisfat^ and as tor Martin's
Brigade, the Fifth Durham light Infantry withdrew at
three a.m, of the 23rd» and was niaoed in brigade reserve
behind the Sixth and Eighth Durham light Iraantry, who
were in line east of C2artigny.
Biddeirs withdrawal was timely, partlv because of the
breach of the PAronne bridgehead east of Nobescourt Farm,
and partly because at six p.m« on Mttdi 22, all artillery had
been sent back to a line south of Mons-en-Chaussie ; so it
could not have covered the Caulaincourt-Poeuilly positioiL
This tactical error had its origin in a false report which
reached the C!or|vi heailquarters that Pu^uilly haa hem lost
This village stands on high ground and commands the country
THE CENTRE FIOHTINQ 109
to ilie south and west; it was used as headqoarters by the
Sixtib Nortiramherland Fusiliers until four am. on March 23.
The brid^ at Gkahunooart and Tertry had been blown up.
No one Uked the new battle position— a dead flat plain
atretehing from it westward, with no eover anywhere until
Mons-enH}hau8sfe and its dump of trees on the southern end
▼aried a dreary monotone.
Soon after dawn Frits opened fire with his forward
machine-guns, and an hour later our men were ordered to fall
back to the ndlway line east of Athies.
"Watching this movement from high ground north of
Athies, it resembled a set-piece at Aldershot, one company
retiring in perfect order covered by the fire of another, while
an oflBcer commanding the Sixth Insiliers controlled the * field
day ' with his whistla'*
The retreat had not far to co, its destination being the
Somme's west banL Here the llorthumbrians were to occupy
an entrenched line and '' to hang on like grim death to a dead
nigper.'* They were in fine spirits, though they resented
theur retreat Fritz followed with caution, remembering his
losses and not yet knowing that our artillery during the night
had been witharawn across the Somme. There was only one
bridge by which Riddell's Fusiliers could cross this river — the
(me at Saint Christ, south of Athie& To cover the crossing it
was necessary to hold with rifles and machine-guns a small
village named Ennemain, perched up on highlands that over-
looked the country for some miles in every direction. Fritz
could advance unseen in one place only— east of Athies
through the wooded valley. Just east of mint Christ bridge
again, hi^h ground commanded Ennemain.
To this ground the Brigadier sent four machine-guns, the
last that remained ; ordered his Fifth Northumbrians to hold
Athies and Knnemain, while the Fourth and Sixth Battalions
slipped back among thick trees on the Omiguon's bank in
order to reach their new positicm and to cover from the west
Saint Christ and its bridge.
This bridge was under fire from Qerman heavies, but for
some reason or other the shelling stopped just when the Fourth
Northumbrians h^psk to cross. Botn battalions reached the
west bank without casualties, the Sixth with its left on Brie
bridge, and the Fourth covering the bridge at Saint Christ
A game of Uuff had scored very welL While the brigade
was crossing the river enemy troops crept with great caution
towards AUiies and Fjineinain , Leasee throw an icy chill
no THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABCH, 1918
over an attack when movement is not rapid onondi to carry
the unhit away from the killed and wounded. There is so
much mystery ahead, above all in (oggv weather, that human
nature during an impeded attack isukely to ^' see in eveiy
bush a bear " ; to-day^ bear being a machine-gun.
Leaving Captain Proctor's company as a rearguard at
Ennemain, the Fifth Northumberland Fusiliers moved down
the Omignon vcJley and made their crossing at Saint Christ;
it was hard, plodding work that lasted ninety minutes. The
men could hear that Proctor was hard set in a very brisk
rearguard action.
This young officer's business was to make his foes believe
that a whole brigade opposed the German advance; and
Proctor managed to circulate this illusion. Qerman battalions
were deployed withgreat care for a combat of much importance.
Then at last, a full two hours after noon, little Ennemain was
rushed from east and north, and Proctor and his company
were cut off from Saint Christ.
This hitch would not have mattered but for another. By
some mistake the four machine-suns east of Saint Christ had
been withdrawn. If they had kept to their posts — and they
had no right to move without written orders — they could
have covered Proctor back to the Somme. As it was Proctor
had no choice but to withdraw to Falvy, after holding two
German battalions with his tiny force^ not more than eighty
men.
On reaching the Somme at Falvy he found a bridge in
ruins, but he got across all right under cover of darkness
and rejoined his battalion, bringing with him about forty of his
first-rate men. Thanks to his and their cool valour, Riddell's
Brigade had time to arrange new dispositions and to settle
itself for another brisk encoimter.
In the afternoon, just before three o'clock, a few enemy
scouts appeared on the Somme's eastern bank. It was time
to blow up the bridge. Previously the Northumbrians had
destroyed all stores tnat could not be removed from hutments
on the east bank.
The Durham Light Infantry had equally stirring experi-
ences. Thus, for example, the Sixth Battalion was ordered
to cross the Somme by the Eterpigny footbridge. A route
across country was taken towards this bridge, which was
partly destroyed, and about three hundred yards long. As
no gap was found in the undergrowth and marshland, the
battalion turned aside through the Mesnil village, into which
THE CENTRE FIGHTING 111
the foe had already entered As soon as Z Company, the
leader, had reached the far side of the river, tne other
eompanies were attacked. They deployed at once, and,
though driven towards the marshes, they checked the enemy
and managed to cross the bridge with the loss of only two
officers and about twenty men. For this episode Captain
J. F. G. Aubin, llC, was awarded the D.S.O.
At nighty March 23-24, a creeping surprise attack tried to
cross the river over piled wreckage of bridge materials dam-
nung a shallow channel. A few Boches ftot across — and were
killed. Though this movement failed, there was a half -hour
of real danger, some troops on the right being taken all at
once by one of those unaccountable fears which the ancients
attributed to Pan. Even Wellington's pet division, a body of
veteran troops that never failed him and never suffered a
defeat, the immortal Light Division, was seized one night in
a wood with uncontrollable dread, and ran for dear life, not
knowing why. Similarly, on the Somme a good many troops
might have taken to their heels, carrying with them some
Fourth Northumberland Fusiliers, but for Lacey Thompson,
Captain and Adjutant, who at the right moment met tiie
retreating men and set their minds in order.
After the incipient panic had been stopped, a quiet night
passed through its misty moonshine into the dusk before
dawn. Some reinforcements had been picked up meantime
in the small village of Misery, where Riddell had set up his
quarters, and where the Twenty-second Entrenching Battalion
was lodged in snug huts.* It was without orders, and was
dad to Keep company with our Northumberland Fusiliers.
It was reported to be 600 strong.
A cold daybreak, with another thick mist, began the
fourth day of the batUei
It was Sunday — ^not a Waterloo Sunday, but a tragical one,
on Cough's front and on Byng's. Once more Watts had to
bear hearv losses and unusual pressure. But his men held
the line of the Somme against many attacks. At one place
only the assault gained ground, turning and pressing back
their ru;ht^ and pushing along the river from Ham, and
graduaify opening passages at Voy ennes and Bethencouri By
two p.m. some units of Sie Eighth Division— the first British
reinforcements on the Fifth Army's front — ^had been pushed
back west of Potte, two and a half miles from the Somme ;
* Tha Twenij-woond Entnnohing BatkJion being s long nAme, we wiU
epeak of il ee llw Twea^ieooad BetteUoo.
mt"^ 3" ^'^"g 1918
■otth-eart to the
L*-"^
.-^ ^ ■*
•. m
Bare and stiff
their whole
everything,
'"' came
a pageant
in tone until
they took
y^trsinmAamm tumed their
x&er Oeepi had its head-
i>h«Ting aE Ae ioad\ as though
nQCt^: iWMihmp iS^m a se i the tog, and it
UMB a Ttue vmcli was iiritating.
t wtfto. i< ij ' jac e apepi l^tft from bursting
sdllBd, mni Msaumg thsB wu brave
ttk Ifcrigaffiir found Us new diie^ Higor-
jkfwr food t2i^ went together to
,K >4sL Valeoha s Division, which held
8^ )oid^ V) Biacies. Several impor-
4i3«i!«»«c mni decided upon. Riddell's
_ ^ ^iffi«^ llalNiin m the high ground about
>^ . i.^ %^^a ^ia* «»c his troops were to be sent as a
i... ..^ A w ^ >^PiMQt >«<r rf mm wrongly known as
iu.,^dOa ^^ )^M leinforeed by the Kftli
>«.
^ Jr ' - -- -- s:^cv h^wAj^H ntxuDsa from kw* ia
'" ^HSMHiia <)< «i^ <«M ^ ^ ^^^ BnsiMer,
^,.. *^^ ^^^^^^[^^igyg^^i^Qld tad iinfcidy Una oofering
' ^ ^*^^ Hjmia. Mhi MsEoakftTt lo Um Bomme. Ooloikfll
* CT" >J\Ite^MiliQM«mpot into GnuiVt fone.
tai toBMAmy toooMooDvuilesftlao;
^ "^^ ^^v* >^>-^w ^tet» ani MB viko liad letained from
' '^^^^\ ^MiMiKMd toil th»wjdnyoM^ work dooebV
. .X. ^'^ T iiMfciZMWT QittMsl (WT dialikad tery muoL
. ^^ ^% ^^'ll?'^^^ 4^^ iMoiftil 9^'"^'^ ooUtotod aoiiily
f . .liTl^^Mrf^S^ ^'^'S^^ ^^ ^^"^ om,siidby
« % * A'
THE CENTBE FIGHTING 118
DarhAm Light Infantxy. Early in the morning of the 24th,
it was ordered to take post on the Barleux-Bia^es road and
to be ready for a swift counter-attack if the foe succeeded
in crossing the Somme near Biache& No attack was made
daring the morning, but at six p.m. the Germans forced a
crossing a little south of P6ronne. D Company of the Fifth
Durham Light Infantry was sent forward at once under
orders from the Brigadier ; it advanced twice, but was held
up by machine-gun and rifle fire. Realizing ithat its task
was impossible, it retired, and found a place m the line with
Neill Malcolm's men*
The foe had lodged himself on only a narrow span of land,
and made no immediate attempt to advance farther. Indeed,
tiie night passed quietly.
§ m
Riddell moved his men to the east of Assevillers, and
once more his tired Fusiliers began to entrench themselves,
doing as much work before dark as under-gardeners would
expect to do in a long, easy day.
Meantime, in the F^ronne sector, Maloohn and his remnant
brigades would have looked upon their situation as well in
hand but for two or three circumstances. On a map P^ronne
and its exits looked very strong, but trees and undergrowths
oa hoQx sides of the canal made the field of fire fieur firom good,
and the town itself offered the foe a covered advance to the
river. The Corps' policy, from about 9.20 a.m. on Sunday.
March 24, was to hold tixe river line in this sector until it
became untenable. Then Malcolm was to withdraw to the
line Herbecourt-Assevillers, with Feetham — a very good
officer-^n his left from Herbecourt to the Somme,* and
Jackscm on his right from Assevillers to Estr^ f
It happened that serious mischief was being done to th(^
Simty-BioBta by the short shooting of British guns north of
the river, apparently from the direction of Frise. Shells
exploded among Malcolm's machine-gunners, not only causing
many casualties, but also disturbing the morale of men who
had lost most of their experienced officers, both commissioned
and non-commissioned.
Some other matters also must be summoned up before our
* Fstfthtm, TMriy-nMA Dzvnxov. FMUm wis oft«a in Ihs front lint
wilb his tirtd umb, who w«rs dtvotod to him.
t JaehMB, Vifli$ih (Korlh Engliih) Dimiov.
t
114 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MARCH, 1918
minds in pictures ^ben we study the fight for the Somme
crossings and our gradual retreat from this riven We must
understand the German pressure above and below the border-
lands ; above, north of the Somme ; below, from St. Clurist to
Yoyennes, and south-east to Ham.
On Sunday, March 24, our enemies crossed the river at
Pargny and kept their footing on the west bank nn^Ving a
gap between Heneker and Douglas Smith.* At nightfall the
river line north of Ep&iancourt was held by us, but the gap
opposite Pargny had been ripped wider, and Boches had
settled themselves in Morchain. South of this point, Douglas
Smith, his left flank in the air, had exhausted ail his reserves
in a sequence of brilliant and useful reprisals ; and for this
reason in the afternoon, he retreated to the Libermont Canal.
Next day, March 25, there was no improvement. Haig
says: —
" South of the Somme the^ situation was less satis&ctoiy.
The greater portion of the defensive line along the river and
canal had been lost, and that which was still held by us was
endangered by the progress made by the enemy norUi of the
Somme. All local reserves had already been put into the fight^
cmd {here was no i/mmedicUe poaeilnlity oj acTidmg fii/mer
BrUiah troops to ike assistance of iks divisums in Ivns."^
Yet on this day, March 25, Congreve was taken from
Gough and put under the Third Army, and next morning he
and his troops were all on Third Arut land, apart from those
at Bmy. These happenings will be reviewed in their relation
to the northern fighting.
Even if the French reinforcements could have arrived with
all their equipments, their number on the 25th was not laige
enough to justify the transference of Congreve from Fifth
Aricy land to that of the Third Army wnkss Byng's position
had become more critical than Gough's. Haig says of the
outlook south of the Somme : —
" The French forces engaged were increasing steadily, and
on this day our Allies assumed responsibility for the batUe-
f ront south of the Somme, with general control of the British
troops operating in that sector. The situation still remained
critical, nowever, for every mile of the German advance added
to the length of front to be held, and, while the exhaustion
* W. 0. G. Henoker, the Eighth Ditibzoh, a flnt-Eaie fighter ; DooglM
Smith, the Twentieth,
t My i talios. " DiTtslons in line " iouth of the Somme ; remnant diyidooB,
remember, and reinforced by only one British diyieion, the Eighth,
(DHB OENIBE FI6H!I?IN6 116
of my diviaioDs was hourly growing more aeate» some days
had yet to pass before the Irenoh could bring up troops in
sufficient number to arrest the enemy's progress." *
There was also a gap between Maxse and Watts ; it was
widened by hostile attacks at Licourt ; and Nesle was captured,
while northward Watts' right was slowly pushed bade in the
direction of Chaulne& Mareh61ipot was burning, but, east of
Villers CSarbonnel and Barleuz, our border troops at midday
were still holding the line of the canal, and their greatest
danger was-naot the German pressure, with its adroit vigour,
but^-iheir lack of renewed strength, of fresh brigades,
numerous enough to stiffen adequately our defence from the
Biaches neighbourhood of P6ronne southward to EpAoanoourt.
How strange it is that although the great Amiens road
and its borderlands were plainly the centre of the main battle,
not only because Hutier and Marwits struck together with
their flank groups, but also because the borderlands north-
ymd extended to ^e Somme's southern bank, and southward
to Cfliaulnes, Rosi^res, Caiz, and the River Luce, yet, somehow,
our guardianship in this area» through lack of enough rein*
foroements, had to be borne from day to day by a Corps very
weak in numbers, Watts's. One thing only — ^a circumstance
that seems providential — saved Watts, preventing his defence
from being frayed through and broken before relief came in
what may be <»dled the fiangard hne, some 14,000 yards from
Lonffueau, the threshold of Atnien&
Two of Consreve's divisions — a small bodjr of South Irish
and gallant Feettiam with the staunch TAirfy-nmdii— happened
to be south of the Somme on March 25 ; Uiey remained with
Watts, and the Thirijf'^ninih did invaluable work, as we shall
see. Now, on the evening of the 28rd this division-— or the
most of it — was north of the river; next evening it was on
the (mposite side and guarding our line north of Malcolm's
Iiuie2khire tooops.
What an escape I If on the 25th it had been north of the
Somme, it would have gone to Byxigi and in twenty-four
hoors, or less^ would have been on THnu> Abmt ground with
Watts's First Cavalry and Congreve's Ninth snaTkiHtf-Jifth
Divmoirs, and other troops.
Are you perplexed by tneee matters ? lam. Theirbearing
on the oential fighting grows much stranger as the retreat from
• YoL iL, p. SKM. L«t me Mk tb« rtadv to kMp wr oarafallT In ailiid
IbMS qoototioM from tht O.H.Q. dlneloh. TMr Msring on tolsr aspMli
of Ito Mils te teriad M»d tnmofsUs. ^^
116 THE FIFTH ARBIY IN MABOH; 1918
P^ronne towards Amiens becomes more difficult and perilous*
There is only a narrow strip of land between the Somme and
the great Amiens road ; in one part — ^f rom north of Proyart
north-westwaid to CS^risy — it dwindles to about 4000 yards ;
and at this very part the greatest danger came into the
borderlands from across the river, because Byng retreated
more rapidly to the Ancre and the Somme at Sailly-le-Sec
than Watts retreated before intense German pressure
Unless readers understand these points, they cannot
possibly appreciate the priceless value of the work done in
the borderliuids, still under Gough's orders, happily, from that
moment of the fifth day when the river crossmgs along the
P6ronne sector became insecure.
The small bridgehead west of the canal, which the foe had
made by crossing from P^ronne's Foubourg de Paris, was not
dangerous, though troublesome ; our positions around the
hostile postp were all right, and a company from reserve had
been sent forward to reinforce them. But at about nine &m«
on the 26th bad things occurred at Eterpigny, four thousand
yards south of F^ronne, where the Pioneer Battalion of
the Fiftieth was acting under Heneker.* Covered by an
intense barrier fire, mainly from machine-ffuns, the enemy
made his crossing and advanced. The barrage sprayed
upon the Pioneers, causing them to lose confidence and
unity, and to retire in clusters through Barleuz towards
Assevillers.
As soon as this bad turn of events became known, the
Fifth Northumberland Fusiliers advanced south of Barleux,
while the Sixth remained in reserve on the western outskirts
of this village. Some of Heneker's own troops were busy also,
together with a few of Malcolm's, and Eterpigny was swept
clean arain. But it could not be held owing to a rapid sequence
of troubles.
At about ten a.m. Heneker heard that the right of his
centre brigade had been pressed back, and about the same time
his left brigade was breached He put into the fight all his
reserves, but reports said that the attack had pressed through
licourt^ 2500 yards west of the Somme canal, and about
5000 yards south-west of St. Christ. At Eterpigny, too, a new
crisis came. Germans began to move south-west on the road
to Villers Carbonnel, and they were active also in Barleuz
valley. Now this eager thrust west of Brie took the attack
once more to the Amiens highway.
THE CENTRE FIGHTING 117
A defensive flank was formed by Brigadier Borrett ; * it
spanned north of the road rtinning east from Barleoz to Lamire
Farm ; and Biddell sent two battolions of his Northumbrians
to hold the q>ar sonth-west of Barleox and to intervene
between Barleox and Villers Carbonnel.
A considerable amount of German fire — artillery, machine-
Ein, and trench-mortar — ^ponred into our forward positions
tween Lamire Farm and La Maisonette, causing many
casiialtie&
Some of our men retreated to the hiffh ground between the
Orme de Barleux and La Maisonette ; me majority would not
budge ; and their reserves moved about on the uopes of the
crest-lme, sometimes on the rear slopes, at other times not,
according as the hostile artillery fire increased or decreased.
Through the afternoon fighting was very brisk, and the out-
look was tiiat of a fight pretty well balanced. The attack had
gained some points, but with a disconcerting difficulty. Yes,
but events north and south of the borderland were untoward,
and shortly before six o'clock the Fifth Abmt's policy became
known. Watts was to retire as soon as it was dark upon
Estr^, Assevillers, and Herbeoourt
The German attack was handled deverl^, so it persevered,
and just after sunset it scored a point, turmng the right flank
of the Fifth Northumberland Fusiliers.
As for the units of Malcolm's Division, they were about
the strength of companies, and so mingled together after
many counter-strokes, and frequent interehanges of intrepid
help, that a very pexplexing question had to be answered.
Was it possible to withdraw from the battie to new positions ?
There appeared to be onlv one way of untying this
military knotted skein. Biddell had one battalion, his Sixth
Fusiliers^ a company of the Fifth, and six machine-guns
belonging to tiie Tank Corps. A company of Fifth Fusiliers
took up a line south of Barleux ; machine-gunners held the
eastern edge of Barleux ; and as for the SixUi Fusiliers, they
prolonged their line by deploying over high ground through
a network of old trenches to the north of this village. Mean-
while the Fourth Fusiliers at Assevillers had been ordered
to collect all stragglers, to ffive them food and water and
ammunition, and to post mem along the line between
Assevillers and Herbecourt.
At 7.30 pjn. the Sixty^aixth began to withdraw through
DimiOR; he comxnmndad tbrea remasnt battalions of
Lanosihin FosUtecs.
118 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MARCH, 1918
these lines^ and hj eiefat o'doek Gennans were trying to
enter Barienx! Tne Norttuimbriaiis hdtd their ground for
an hoar. Then oar madiine-gans were withdrawn; every
one got ready for a retreat; and when the^ fell back, it
930 pjn., a few riflemen were left behind to fire Y^iy
li^te and to keep up a continaoaa fiuilada All went weU.
In leas than two hours our men were back in the old trenches
at AssevillerB, and V^iy lights were still shining np from
Barleax, while rifle shote marked the line of oar rear^^nafd.
Meantime the Sixtysiasih had reached unmolested its new
quarters, and Riddell's Northumbrians were all right. They
nad had but few casualties. Not a man had Iwen left in
enemy hands.
It was on the same day, March 25, remember, that an
event in the Thibd Abut had an increasing influence on the
movements of all troops under Watta At 1.45 p.m. Gou^
received a message from Byi^s Army that its centre would
retire during the night behind the river Ancre, and that Con-
mve's Corps would pass from its own ground in order to form
Byng^s right from Albert to Bray inclusive. Now Bray-«ar-
Somme was more than six miles behind Qough*s left, and
to guard this big span of river with his few exhausted
fa-oops was a responsibility as urgent as it was sudden and
unexpected.
It had to be considered also in its relation to his ri^ht
flank, where the French, and the British troops mixed with
them, were hard-pressed. Butler's Corps reported that after
very heavy flghting on the wooded spurs and rid^^ east and
north-east of Noyon, the Allied line had been c&iven back.
In the evening Noyon fell, and both British and French
troops east of the town were ordered to withdraw southward
across the Oise. Thus the right flank was far from safe ; and
now the northern flank also was weakened and threatened.
But the main problem was clear and simple, as main problems
are usually in war. An army when undermanned and out-
numbered must concentrate all its power; to disperse its
units is to invite disaster, above all when they are spent
with fatigue; so Gough directed Watts to &11 back dui;^ng
the night to a line running from Hattenoourt to Frise, and t^
guard the Somme from ixise to Brav, where touch with the
Byng-Conrnve forces would be made. This narrowed the
riverside front by about two miles, Byn^'s right being still
about four miles behind Gough's left, despite Congreve's help.
The uncertainties of war!
THE CENTBE FIGHTING 119
SIV
The Northumberland FoailierB, after some hard bludgeon
work, were ordered to withdraw from ABaevillen ; but how ?
This townlet stands high, and the foe could watdi it from a
distance of three or four milea He had another attack in
preparation, and there was no fog. But smoke would be as
useful as fog if it were thick enough; and between Fay and
Estr^es, happily, were many militiuv huts with tarred roofs,
and these were fired. By good ludc, also, a friendly wind
blowing from the north-east carried thick smoke in rolling
clouds to the south-west, hiding all movements. An officer
says:
''We repeated the same tactics at Foucaucourt — ^a small
town of huts. It was here that an old sapper was found in
the act of locking up a shed in which an engine pumped
water to supply two large tanks and about a hundred feet of
horse-troughis. The old man intended to join our retreat
As he showed great reluctance to break his engine I smashed
its important parts with a hanmier. When last I saw him he
was looking at the damage done^ and muttering: 'There'U be
trouble over this.' Men behind the lines have very little
knowledge of war."
We have reached the sixth day of battle. German air-
planes flew low over Foucaucourt, and but for the smoke
cloud they would have seen our transport moving westward,
heralding another stride in a gradual retreat Rosi^res-
y au villers was to be Riddell's next line for a stand. Engineers
were busy there, with some infiuntry reinforoements, cQgging
trenchesL The Northumbrians needed food and rest, and there
would be neither if they failed to reach their new line in good
order.
Words cannot portray the incessant and compelling squeeze
which German tactics applied here and there on very painful
places of the Fifth Abht's elastic front An art student
said: ** Sometimes we were pressed out into a retreat as I
used to press out pigments nrom a tube ; and sometimes we
were like stags at bav, with yelping hounds all around us.
The very devil I" That the twentieth century A.D. should
have made war vastly worse than it was during the miscalled
Dark Ages is one of those differences between pretty phrases
and umr fads over which Satan must chuckle as ffladly as
old Fiustaff does over sack and wit and humour, liachine-
guns alone are so base-hearted in the progressive genius
120 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
which evolved them into their present halting-plaees of
deviliy, that the profase blood sned by them stains onr
ape iiidelibly. For all that, Ludendorff is right when he says
that daring the War the light machine-gun, ceasing to be an
auxiliary weapon, became the tme ^ infantryman,"* while the
infimtrjnnan of 1914 and earlier had dwindled to a ^rifle
earner*
The evolntion of weapons has ever been from worse to
worse in its effects on living persons and on living things.
Many novelties r^arded as crimes in one war have been
customs in the next— customs evolving towards something
worse. Consider the horror that Julias Gaesar would have
felt for machine-guns !
Sprayed often by machine-gun fire, the Northumberland
Fusihers continued to go back,covered by a ding-dong action by
rear-guarda Unhappilv, the Fifth Battalion lost two whole
platoons just east of Foucauoourt, in one of those gallant
combats that occurred in many places. And the Siaty-sixth
Division — or, to be correct, its heroic remnants — had in the
afternoon a grim struggle near Framerville, a small town
which the foe turned from the north by passing round a
Northumberland rear-guard.* But the rear-guard fousht on,
plaving its hot part well ; it saved Hill 109 west of Lihons
and kept a noisy front of fire north-westward towards
Framerville.
Four hours earlier, at noon, the main body had reached
the cross-roads south of Yauvillers; had asked for their
dinner, had received it and eaten it ; and then, smilingly, had
fallen asleep anyhow, anywhere, under a coverlet of genial
sunshine from a beautiful spring day. What will he not do,
the British soldier, if his manly appetite is not offended.
* The Fnunerville positions were bftd and distressing. There is a report
that the B.G.G.S. of the 19th Corps will never forget how he tried to get in
tonch with the Army hy means of a telephone line which, miknown to him,
had heen cut hy a bomb. He wished to obtain leave to witlidraw from
Framerville, so report says, and for half an hour— It was about 4 a.m.— he
•poke with a despairing persoMion.
OHAFTEB IV
THE GSNTRB FIOHTINQ — continued: FRAJfBRYiLLE, ciBJSYf
HABBONNdSSS, AMD OTHEB OOKBATS
§1
STIRRING events elustered In the afternoon of the
26th the Gkurmans took Framerville, less than a mile
south of the Amiens road and only 30,000 yards from
the city, lliey must be ousted. What troops were
fit for this counter-stroke ? Malcolm's were in the mpple,
and suffering from parched fati^e ; just then they comd ao no
more ; so the Fourth Northumberlimd Fusiliers were chosen,
and Jackson and Riddell walked to the north end of Yauvillers
to encourage the attack.
On the south-east of Framerville there was much con*
fusion. A few hundred men from two spent divisions, after
fighting almost without sleep through five oays and four nights,
had b^n shattered in a hot fights and were hobbling Mick,
confused rather than disordered, through the protective ranks
of the Fourth Northumberland Fusiliers. Colonel Anstey, a
staff officer of the Fi/Heth^ comforted the broken men, and
cheered the Fourth Fusiliers, who rushed Framerville under
a hail of machine-gun bullets from the church. In the church
German machine-gunners were found, safe and insolent, till
a few of our engineers entered the building and threw Uiem
neck and crop from the tower window.
Framerville was retaken apart from its north-west comer,
protected by German machine-guns in Rainecourt. In this
neighbourhood villages are very close together, and each was
a bastion or redoubt on the nearing way to Amiens.
At dusk on the 26th our order of battle was as follows
Feetham with the Th/My-ninth manned the Proyart sector ;
southward, just west of Framerville and north-east of
Yauvillers, was Malcolm's front, with the Northumbrians
continuing the line south to Rosi^res, where Heneker's men
121
122 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABGH, 1918
were in line, with remnants of Dale's brigades in the War-
villers neighbourhood south-west. During the night, March
26-279 our left was drawn back from the northern outskirts
of Proyart until it rested on the Sonmie north of Mericourt —
a townlet only about 2000 yards to the south-east of Chipilly,
and so dose by the riversiae district into which the Germans
entered on Wednesday morning, March 27.
More than any one else, then, the HiiHy^nth was
affected when the foe made his crossing to C£risy.* It
fought hard and well, but Watts's troops, let us remember,
were in a dangerous fix. Their front was too wide, and
eveiy part of it was vital to Amiens ; they longed for their
cavaJry, which had gone to the Thied Abmy, and also for
fresh faces, the commg of new rifle-strength. To have the
foe behind you is a startling experience wnen the foe is also
before you, and by dark, March 27, the Germans from Cerisy
had marched 5000 yards south-west to the great Amiens
road, and had taken Lamotte, a village projecting south of the
Amiens road from the south-east of Wfiafus^e-Abancourt.|
Now Lamotte is about 9000 yards nearer Amiens than the
Froyart-Framerville line. East of it, then, all British troops
and guns were outflanked perilously.
&>mehow, too, news of the British withdrawal from
Chipilly happened to travel slowly. A leading officer under
Watts heard of it only at 3 a.m. on March 27, when a
situation report was received from Sir W. N. Congreve ; and
all the reserves that he could scrape together were two
anno«r«d cars and about 300 men. wii sixiewis ^ons.
What was to be done ? Gough measured the crisis coolly
and quietly, declining to exaggerate the hostile force south of
the nver, and hoping that a counter-stroke would drive it
out. On the 27th, uien, all day long, while a fluctuating
battle raged along the Proyart-Bosik^es frontage, German
troops were behind our tired men. It was like Alexander
Dumas at his very best Episode after episode had in it the
elements of great adventure. For example, the South Irish
Division, already dwindled to a small body of men, ceased to
exist as a fighting unit. Cavalry north of the Somme, at
Gough's requesty pushed a division across the river at Corbie
and took Uamel on the flank of the foe's invasion. This
* By 8.16 p.m., WednesdAy, Mftroh 527, the Gensans had oroflsed from
ChipUly to O^nsy after repaLring the bridge.
f Lamotte-en-Santerre, not to be mistaken for Lamotte Brebidie, 6000
yards to the east of Amiens.
THE OENTBE FIGHTING 128
happened in the afternoon; and the foe — ahnost as exhausted
as oar own men — ^was impressed by this promnt action, and
also by Grant's Foroe * in entrenched line nom Maioeleave to
the west of Lunotte. He seemed to fear a coanter«blow.
§n
In a series of pictures I wish to show the main events of
day — a vexr critical day for Amiens — and one that every
one of ns shoold be glad to remember. Suddenly, and only
just in time» two scratch battslions arrived, Kinffham's and
Little's ; and Little is one of those instinctive sddiers that
our race produces, with much help from manly games and
sports.
On the third day of battle Little was in a quiet spot of
the Lake District, travelling home on leave. A newspaper
came ; it showed plainly that the great show had begun ; and
as Hargicourt was mentioned Little knew that his own
battalion, the Fifth Borderers, was fighting. He cauffht the
first train for Folkestone, and arrived there the following
mominff. A f off ! Boats were not running. Little crossed as
soon as ne could, and at seven p.m. on the 26th, with the help
of trains, lorries, and his leps, he reached Corbie, and got
from the O.C. of the Remforoement Camp a body of
stragglers, and some other troops, about six* hundred in all,
and six and twenty officers. At two a»m., on the 26th this
improvised foroe set out from Corbie. The creed of Too
LbJU, endemic in British? politics, had not found its way into
this true soldier I
As soon as it was daylight a halt was called, in order that
the leader and the led might learn to know each other.
Some experienced officers were present^ and to each of four
captains Little gave a company. No one knew exactly
where Malcolm's troops had reached in their retreat^ but some
transport men who passed him in the road gave Little a
due; and later in Lamotte he learnt that Malcolm was at
Harbonniirea
The battalion marched to Harbonni^res, and at once found
work to do. In the dusk, March 26, it was taken to relieve
those jaded Lancashire men who were in line west of Baine-
court, their left touching the Amiens road at that point
south-east of Rroyart where troops of the Thirty'^vnth held
• On Um «vinlng of fhs 9Tth Gnat retomad to hli own work, and Oaray
foppliod Us plMo.
124 THE FIFTH AEMY IN MABCH, 1918
the Beet-Sogar Factory. The Beet-Sugar Factory! How
romantic this detail will be a hundred yean hence !
Little's arrival was a godsend ; and about the same time
Kingham's little scratch force arrived. Evening sunlight
after a dark dav.
At last Malcobn's three brigadiers would be able to take
a genuine night's rest. Officers were very scarce, and in the
mormn^ — ^tluA eventful Wednesday, March 27---ihe Sixty-
9ixth*8 infantry, whose effective strength was considerably
less than that of a normal brigade, were under Lieut-Colonel
Woodcock, commander of the machine-gun battalion, with
Little virtually in control of the firont line.
Ardent^ inspired leadership would be needed in the front
line ; and it was there, and elsewhere. Malcolm, Jackson,
Little, Biddell, Woodcock, Whitehead, Hurlbatt, Oell,— how
well they fought, and how bravely they were seconded I But
it was touch and go.
At six a.m. a company of Kingham's force was sent to
reinforce Little. During the night the Northumberland
Fusiliers had taken over the defence of Vauvillers, aided by
120 men and 6 officers of the Fifth Durham Light Infantry,
and their left flank was in touch with the Sixty-sixth on the
cross-roads north-east of YauviUers. South of the Northum-
brians, in front of Bosi^res station, were other troops of the
Fifth Durham Light In&ntry; at and below Bosieres were
Heneker's men : * and a big attack upon Bosieres b^an at
nine o'clock and extended along the railway line.
Between ton and eleven the adventures of Little's force
began. Troops on its left — tired men of the remnant South
Irish, I believe— under a strong south-westerly pressure from
the Proyart district, were broken, and went ba!ck until they
were out of sisthU Then some Lancashire men on the right
had to yield before a pressing thrust, and they went westward
and out of sight Little's forward companies were exposed to
enfilade fire, and were ordered to come back about two
hundred yurds. During the movement they were badly
shelled by some field artillery, and sprayed also by machine-
guns ; but in a fine manner tJiey toox up their new positions.
Then with one company little ^ rezused " his left fiank,
and soon afterwards, with some Lancashire men, he was able
to form another defensive flank by drawing back his right.
But if counter>blows were not struck soon and keenly, the
position might become critical For this reason Little went
* Eighth l>mBiQS.
8
§
19S THE FIFTH ABMT DC MABCH, 1S18
iheB
fivbclp; Mil ■iiliBfc iti Fii|pliii nf tlw^ TrnrthmnTinr
~ " ~ " ~ " eri i lMiif i il the
Brigpdicr konied mMmj tbo gdt a eoonter-
OB the left. Hisb s3Be off our troops
the lights awi tfa^ mre told pee-
cia^ iriicte thqr were wanted, awi wlni tlfeqr ■"■^
The gi ca icat danger ap pe a re d to be the noitiiem one.
Tovaids the east an optn pbin etietdwd awiqr horn Harhon-
;; the light mihraj, whose dbeetion will be aeen in my
^ was a good brids^iead ; and west ct it^ nnniag firom
HarbonniereB statian &e north to the A»ii—t xoed, was a
system of tienehes protected
The msin dangers^ then, would eome from north and sooth
of this Haibonnieces Haae, mmteu the dire mieertainty of
The foe was said to be woiking roond by the Sonune» end
ITrnffhin with six hondred men was chosen to tantt on this
nor& ode a defiansive flank to Little. The Sooth Lash, and
a few Lsnesshire men, eontinned to &I1 bade, and soon the
sitoation wss very graveu
Conconrently a brisk ssmnlt devek^mi all along the North-
nmlnjan line snd much fiuther afield; end next the Fifth
Northomberbnd Fosiliera, misondentanding a proviaifxial
order, withdrew hurriedly to Harbonnieres. Esger Gennan
troops led the way into Uiis gap ; snd soon along the whole
fronts German batteries were in foil blast Harbonnieres wss
nnder fire, snd would be serspped by shells.
RiddeU's left flsnk was enveloped ; his centre was broken ;
and through shells thai borst m Harbonnihes, his Fifth
Fusiliers nuhde a scattered retreat What nastier loolsitoation
could have come from the lottery of war ?
No reserves were within resdi apart from two weak units;
the Twenly-Second Battalion, and the Eighth Durham Li^t
Ii^sntry, who had been sent to the north-west of Harbonnikes
to dig tiiemselves in to meet a possible attsck from Girisy.
At last the foe had his chance to annihilate a span of our
front Unless he stayed too long in the clustering villages to
search after food,* a break-threuffh seemed easily within his
power ; but not without a scramUe and much bayonet work.
Biddell ordered the whole brigade staff to turn out and to
* IhLiidsndatff'fbooktliereantivoorthiMXSDisikiOQtlM^rsyinwhioli
Us troops wv slfcnwtsd bj AUlad proviiiaiig. As for drink, wino, simple
sin ordmaimf maj have biSD found, now todithan, In oor dosertod doflo^,
tod other drink too, we may sarama, In ftbe oaatosni Ihel we left beiiind.
THE CENTRE FIGHTING 127
rally all stragglersy and then to go forward to Harbonni^red'
eastern limita A telephone message told the Twenty-Second
battalion to drive with a swift coanter-blow past the left of
the Sixth Northumbrians; and the D.LlL were directed to
advance round the north of Harbonni^re&
While the brigade staff assembled under Captain Bell and
Lieutenant Brown, stray men of the 8iaty*8ieBth were collected.
A small scratch body was nosed, including remnants of the
Field Companies, some Royal Engineers, and the Signal Staff
of Hunter^s bri^^ade. SheUs meantime dropped here and there
upon Harbonm^res, to detonate into spouting bricks and
mortar, tiles, slates, and odds and ends of timber.
Riddell was on horseback near Harbonnieres church,
sheltering below the tower. A few yards away were two
dead men, with three dead horses ; and on the dmrch steps,
drooping and alone, sat a little old withered nun. She would
not leave the church steps, this old nun, but hid herself when
efforts were made to rescue her. As soon as possible ^e came
back, with a firm feebleness; and why shoula she have wished
to live on when her world on earth were those clustered
villaffes close at hand which were disappearing one by one ?
Slie did not look up when the brigade staff went by on
their way to battle, marching in fours, and singing : " Good-
byes, Good-byee, there's a silver lining in the skyee ! " A shell
burst just before they turned into the square, dressed in all
sorts of kit, just as they had left their work. Cooks' sons,
and dukes' sons, and sons of a belted earl ; clerks in spectacles,
sappers, signalling oflBcers, staff officers in red caps, and men
who cleaned saucepans : ail were there, and with them some
tired, grim Northumbrians eager to rejoin their fellows. They
went eastward with a swinging stride, these mixed symbols of
a free-and-easy empire ; went eastward with tiiat doggerel
upon their lips and in their minds a new and strange glad*
ness, for this day in their lives made all the others worth
while. Soon they were out of sight; but now and then,
between reverberating shell explosions, a word or two of their
aonff could be heard. ** Good-byee . . . Skyee. ..." And
the little old nun did not move.
Riddell touched his horse and rode off at a gallop to the
lihons voad, on his way to that part of the light railway
which ran south-east. Here his odds and ends were gathered
for their counter-stroke, with other men.
It was a ffood line, beiiu; on the reverse slope of a hill and
thus unseen by G^erman otnoers.
128 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABCH, 1918
The Fourth Northnmberland FusilierB could be heard
fighting west of Vauvillers, while the Sixth Battidion
hammered away along the light railway almost as far south as
Bosi^res. To save a break-through a swift and extraordinary
blow was essential. Gould it be given ? Only the bri^nule
staff were fresh and fit ; but if the troops udled in Uieir
exhausted condition. Heaven alone knew what would be the
final result
From his horse Biddell could see more than those on foot.
When the foe was about three hundred yards away he
ordered the advance : and forward for fifty or sixty yards the
men ran in extended line ; halted, lay down, and then ?
They let the foe have it with rifle and Lewis g^un. The
German att€bck was in eight or ten waves. No need for the
right of our Sixth Fusiliers to advance. With half-a-dozen
machine-guns this battalion splashed the waves with raking
bullets : and one leading wave after another fell prone. It
hesitated ; then it turned, and eddied back into the support-
ing waves. Here was the moment every soldier loolus for !
Biddell ordered his whole line to go in with its bayonets, and
then galloped his poor old artillery horae in order to ring up
his gnus by telephone.
The guns, ready and alert, brought down their barrage
just east of the Bosi^res-Vauvillers road and right 'on top of
several supporting enemy waves. The effect was magical.
Our foes trooped away like crowds on a racecourse, and our
own men went on; sometimes as far as their line of the
morning, and sometimes farther. Yauvillers was retaken,
partly by Lancashire men under Lieut-Golonel E. A. Gell, and
partly by Northumberland Fusiliers. The advance actually
passed Lattle's line ; but no sooner did it stop than the Boche
attacked again, and then — then our own men hesitated.
They were spent. They turned about, and began to fall back,
while Little s troops raked the Germans with enfilade fire.
Meantime, advancing round the north of Harbonnibres,
the Devonshires from the Eighth Division, aided by some men
of the Fiftieth, had recaptured Framerville. This was a fine
counter-blow ; and, let us note, it was accompanied by eight
machine-guns taken out of tanks which arrived only just in
time, like Little and Eingham. Only just in time ! ijad the
troops in the British Isles ? How many precisely did they
numW ? More than 200,000 ?
What a day ! About sixteen miles from Amiens the foe
had had an opportunity to break through. His attaok was
THE CENTRE FIGHTING 129
dever and brave. Yet he had failed. And oar own success
was incomplete because most of our men were overdone when
they went into action, with the result, inevitably, that they
reached a point of exhaustion beyond which their will-power
ooold not carry them. This happened to Riddell's Northum-
berland Fusiliers. They had oeen completely successful,
taking prisoners and machine-guns, and driving the foe back
in disorder. Butthey were short of ammunition. Ammunition
was on its way to their front line when the men who had
done 8o well at Yauvillers began to letire towards the light
railway from which the counter-attack had set out At
RosibreB the right flank held fast; and Northumberland
Fusiliers, with a battalion of the Eigkth, made a fine effort to
recover Yauvillers. To ask exhausted troops to go forward
yet again was to court disaster. So it was decided to hold
the light railway and to reorganize all forces. Riddell and
Little collected a lot of men who had £Ekllen back, and
echeloned them behind Little's right Afterwards the
situation remained unchanged till nightfalL
The day's fiffhUng had been costly, Riddell's Fourth and
Fifth Fusiuers had not more than two hundred rifles between
them; and the Sixth Fusiliers had lost their nllant com-
manding officer. Colonel Wright, who was seriously wounded,
like Captain Lacey-Thompson of the Fourth Northumberland
Fusiliers. And losses were bitter and heavy in Malcolm's
small force ; they included lieut-Colonel Hurlbatt, killed —
a fine officer, whose death was as much deplored as that of
Dimmer and Elstob earlier in the battle.
Meantime, in Harbonni^res, the little old withered nun
remained alone and in action. "She was seen once more,"
says an officer, "on the church steps as usual, but dead,
a merciful shell having opened for her the gates of that
Other World she had lived her life to see."
§ m
At eleven p.m. Corps orders were received for another
short withdrawal at six o'clock next day. Six hours later
this order was cancelled by another. Our men were to take
up the line Caix-Guillancourt-Wiencourt and dig in, with
some French troops on their ri^ht and our Thirty-ninth on
their left. This change of policy had to be carried out in
a few minutes, and written orders alone would be accepted by
officers. Now it happened that the brigade Staff was in two
K
180 THE FIFTH AEMY IN MAECH, 1918
EartB — one Tiora de conibcU, the other almost in collapse thiotigh
itigne. And yet, somehow or other, the work was done
before we dyilians in Britain had got out of bed.
Though the work done at Harbonni^ree was (on this centre
front) the most satisfactory of the whole retreat, giving the
Boche such a thorough haid blow that he was in no condition
on the 28th to resume at once his adventures there, I see no
reason to doubt, as many do doubt, the expediency of this
new withdrawal Exhausted men after yet anower hard
fight suffered a reaction which a cold night increased ;* platoons
and companies were jumbled up together and in need of being
restored to their individual party spirit; and the C^risy
episode was not yet ended, so it was the main thing to l>e
considered by those who had many divisional fronts to review
when they came to fresh decisions. The C6risy episode at one
end of a battle front and an increasing menace to Montdidier
at the other, with danger spots between them ; this was the
general position ; and only persons on the spot could realize
what the enemy had suffered in his &ilure at Harbonni^res.
The Quillaucourt-Wiencourt line was used as a halting-
place only, because troops at Caix^ between ten and eleven a.m.,
were unsteady, and reported that their right was turned. An
effort was made to establish a defensive &nk from Cayeux to
Wiencourt; but the jumbled companies and platoons were
unfit for this job; and slowly during the day the retreat
continued to the general line Ignaucourt-Marcelcave.
Mischief begets mischief, and Watts and his troops were
feeling more and more the need of their First Cavalry
Division, and of those other B^fth Abmt men who were
ffuarding Third Arht land. Throughout the retreat in the
borderltmds, north and soutii of the Amiens road, in other
words, there was an intense yearning for such information as
divisional cavalry would have gathered. A troop of horse
would have done wonders, stopping rumours by the dozen and
anxieties by the score. As our ancestors got rid of archers
long before their use had become an obsolete contributive aid,
so we have disbanded too soon the divisional cavalry, as a
great many officers have learnt from bitter experience.
On March 28 an effort was made to recapture Lamotte.
The day before Maxse's men had been relieved by General
Mesple's French Corps, and one remnant division, the intrepid
Sixty-f/rat, Colin Mackenzie^ was brought up in 'buses from
the south to counter-attack against Lamotte. The southern
part of the assault was to be done by its jaded men, while
THE CENTBE FIGHTING 181
cavalry ^ would attack from the west Colin Mackenzie had
only about 2400 rificB left, and not a man was yet in a fit
condition to undeigo another fiery ordeaL Tet one and all
behaved with the greatest gallantry, though they had to
advance across fiat^ open grasdand with no cover and without
artillery support, for one 18-pounder is not artillery. The
attack b^gan at about noon, and a good bit of progress was
made, unhappily to no purpose, for the Germans had many
machine-guns in Lamotte and Bayonvillera At about
four p.m. Lamotte retaliated, the Boche beaming to shell
Maieelcave more heavily than usual; and as he was expected
to attack from Lamotte in order to get in behind Marcelcave,
some, of Colin Mackenzie's men were ordered to line the
Harcelcave-Villers-Bretonneux railway on a front of about
400 yards, with their right on Marcelcave facing north. Just
at dusk the foe attacked Marcelcave, aided by a good deal of
artillery; he advanced in two parties on each side of the
railway, coming on at a wide extension in about six waves.
After the village fell, a new defence was dug 600 yards
west of Marcelcave, rain falling heavily, and veterans of the
Sixty-Jint passed a quiet night there. The foe was nearly as
tired as our own troops ; and if the Allies could have employed
four or five fresh divisions for a simultaneous attack, great
and necessary things could certainly have been done. They
might have regained the Somme in a single day. Either on
this evening, or on that of the 27th, (^ugh called up the
C.G.S. to Elaig and expressed these views. Instead of fresh
troops, spent men were thrown into the cauldron, as when
Douglas Smith, whose division f was reduced to about 1000
rifles, was sent to reinforce Watts. It took line about M^^res
and helped on the 28th to succour Daly's few remaining
heroes.! Even the Fowrteenth and Eighteenth were brought
up to the Amiens front after their grapple against Hutier, so
pitiless in its consequences was the tn^cal need of more men.
Will civilized nations in a time of war ever impose a fitting
punishment on those statesmen who fail to supply enough
troops ? The best punishment would be immediate banish-
nient to the front battle line. To preserve the statesmen that
iail while sacrificing the flower of youth and bravery cannot
be less than horrible folly.
It was also on March 28, before midday, that Riddell
* The Fini Oataiat, now tetomed from north of the Somma.
t The IhperUUthf Mazse's Oorps.
t TumUy-fomrth Dxvxsiov, Watto'g Corps.
132 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MARCH, 1918 •
began a bitter experience. Oar left was in the hands of men
who, in seven days and nights, had managed to steal not
more than about eight hours of sleep. They had dug trenches
without number, and in their marches and counter-marches,
attacks and counter-attacks, had covered certainly not less
than sixty miles. Suddenly they were assailed when they
were in the act of scratching shelter for themselves in dusty,
ploughed land and in fields of young wheat. They were
defeated; and if we gallop north out of Calx along the
GuiUaucourt road, accompanying the Brigadier, we shiSl see
what happened. We breast a mil and reach the top. Below
is a deep broad valley. On our right, along the valley's
western side, and also over that hillock near the small wood
on the south-east of Guillaucourt, scattered troops are falling
back. They run all doubled up as men do under machine-gun
fire. Close at hand bullets flick up little spurts of dust from
ploughed fields, and we gallop into these fields and think of
the retreating men, not of advancing bullets. Some men
rally at once, though German machine-gunners have taken
the wood south-east of Guillaucourt, and their fire in enfilade
is a hail of torture.
But on our left, happily, our own machine-gunners are all
rights hidden on a hill crested by a small wood. Their fire
rattles most comfortingly into purring bursta Yet the attack
comes on ; it is only about eight hundred yards away, and its
aim is to reach a crest overlooking the valley and Caix. Then
Caix could be turned into a shambles and our centre and rights
enfiladed, would be untenable.
Below us on the south, sheltered by a steep-sided bank,
men of our Twenty-second Battalion are at dinner, and have
no guess of the surprise about to break upon them. We have
about seven hundred yards or so to gallop, but we cry to
them as we ride : " Fall in ! Fall in I " They sit in extended
order under the bank, and their officers hear us. They fall
in, in two ranks, and then they are told that at all costs they
must reach the hilltop before the German advance. First
they scramble up the steep bank. And then — then a surprise.
All of a sudden the notes of a hunting horn come thrillingly
from behind us, near the Harbonni^res road. It sounds to
''the pack," and General Jackson himself is huntsman.
" Forrwl away I " we ciy, every man Jack of us, for do we
not belong to the Don Quixote of nations and empires?
*' Forrard away, then ! " Up the hillside we go, but not so
fast as the men who dined so comfortably. These good
THE CENTRE FIGHTING 138
fellows reach the crest first — and back to Gaillaaconrt the
Boehe retreats.
We have saved the hill: but enemy machine-gans
hammer away from that copse south-east of Guillaucourt, and
many a good man is killed. Our left, too, is in the air, so a
eouole of platoons are sent west along the Caix-Guillaucourt
road into the woods to join hands with the ThiHy'^mth
Division.
The Siatysiacth retreated somewhat south-west until it
reached Hangard. On March 29 Neill Malcolm was wounded
at Domart, and A. J. Hunter assumed command of the division.
On this day, too, at Demuin, General Feetham was killed, I
grieve to state. At all times he thought of and for his men,
and knew when his presence among them under fire would
ease their strain during a critical time. He was in the first
line among his men when death came to him. He and his
division, &e Thirty-ninth, are remembered with gratitude
by the survivors of two corps — ^Watts's and Congreve'&
Nfext day Brigadier Borrett was wounded ; and thus to the
last the Sixty-aimlh was in the fire. Its final fight, a counter-
attack, came almost within reach of capturing a battery of
German field guns, and manv machine-guns, and firom two to
four hundred prisoner& Seldom have exhausted men made
an equal efibrt
In the afternoon of March 80, two attempts were made to
recapture the old Army line between Aubercourt and Marcel-
cave. One of them — at about 5 p.m. — was an Australian
attack ; it regained touch with Colin Mackenzie's right, but
was held up TOfore it reached Aubercourt Earlier, soon after
three o'dock. Brigadier Williams of the Sixiy-sixih, firom about
2500 yards south-east of Mut^cave, set a oounter^troke in
motion after coUecting all the men that he could find.
Colonel Little was among the leaders, and he says : —
** It was a fine show, just within an ace of being a huge
socoessL It was wondcurful to see the lines, hastily got
together, advancing under a perfect hail of machine-gun
bmlets and shrapnel I was on the left with some two or
three hundred men, and I saw something I had never seen
before, namely, Hun gunners firing over open sights at us and
running about feeding their guns. In a red-brick building
were four machine-guns spitting firsi with any number ox
others dotted about"
Deraite this unusual fire, the thin advancing line did not
^p. On the left it recaptured about two thousand yardR,
184 THE nPTH ABMY IN MABCH, 1918
but presently it reached a forward dope and came under a
heavier fire still, which our men found impassabla Ck>lonel
Little wished to go on, so eager was he to reach the German
battery. On the right, too, the advance was held up by
machine-guns, firing from the high ground north of Aubercourtw
At last, after sufiering severe casualties, the fight ended
Our men were pressed back again to the Hangard fine, which
ran northward from the viUage to Hangard Wood.
Later, at 8 p.m., the Sixty-^iath was relieved by the
Eighteenth Division; its various fighting units, apart fix>m
tnwsport^ had a total strength of about 2376 men, with some
107 officers.
§IV
Li this neck-or-nothing warfare, skeleton companies were
obliged to counterattack with the spirit of battalions and
skeleton platoons with the spirit of well-manned companies,
Riddeil's withdrawal drew closer and closer to the high
ground near White House and the two roads, Amiens-Boye,
Demuin-MoreuiL This neighbourhood was reached on March
29, the day on which the enemy attacked from the Avre to
Demuin. It was also on this day that the few unwounded
troops of our Fiftieth were joined to remnants of the
Twentieth.
For three days these genuine soldiers fought under Douglas
Smith. Once they were driven back towards Amiens perhaps
half a mile ; but after the first enemy rush they stood like
rocka And not only did they break attack after attack — ^they
regained some lost ground. How they did it was astoimdix]^,
so small was their number and so complete was their fiettigue.
At last^ on April 2, they were relieved by the remains of the
FovHeenth, 3rd Corps, which had been brought from Hutier's
southern battle for yet another ordeal. Then they limped
their way to Longueau — and a prolonged sleep.
Since March 22 they had been bufieted by the waves of
Hutier's right, and had felt many bad swirling reactions from
the doings of Marwitz and his divisions. Were tiiey proud
that they had helped to stalemate an enormous i>lan of
campaign as ably designed as the best in military history?
Not yet They had overpast the fag-end of their strength,
these Northumberland Fusiliers, and wanted to sleep now
that duty did not forbid rest.
On their way to Longueau, hard by Amiens, they met
THE GBNTBB EIGHTINO 185
Freneh Poilus by the thousand goin^eaBt wiih brisk oonfidenoe ;
and a great many British and French guns boomed into
thunderclaps of defiance, framing the foe that Amiens had
locked gates not to be forced
Ludendorff in his book says : —
" Strategically, we had not achieved what the events of
the 23rd, 24th» and 25th had encouraged us to hope for. That
we had also failed to take Amiens, which would have rendered
communication between the enemy's forces astride the Somme
exceedingly difficult, was specially disappointing. Long-range
bombardment of the railway establishments of Amiens was by
no means an equivalent
CHAPTER V
THE NOBTHERN ATTACKS: PREUUINART POINTS AND
QUESTION&
THE noiihem fighting came from two combined
offensives :
1. The northern portion of Marwitz's Army,
extending from Cologne Biver up to the Bapaame-
Cambrai road, at the north base-angle of Flesqui^res salient.
2. The battle of Bapaume-Arras, in which Otto von Below
attacked Byng's centre and left.
My subject being the Fifth Abmt, I shall speak only of
those influences which passed from Byng's front to Oough's,
and from Oough's to Byng's, When writing of the Third
Abmy I shall quote as often as I can from Haig's dispatch,
partly because a writer is always assumed te be too friendly
towards his own subject^ and partly because many persons
continue to repeat the slander that " the Byng Boys would
not have lost a vard but for Grough and his men, who let
them down badly.
Here and there new facts will be given ; and inferences
will be drawn both from Haig's evidence and from Army
maps. Some questioning criticism will be offered for impartial
debate : and let us make it a point of honour te be equally
frank towards both armies as both should be kept on the
same level towards our patriotism and fair play.
One useful and necessary thing is to xeep always before
our minds the boundary by which they were united. I show
it in a correct map« in order that readers may see at once its
vital importance to both armies in their hazardous retreat and
in their liaison troubles.
For some reason or other the official dispatdi neither
shows this boundary in a map nor describes it in words. Even
in the re-published dispateh, as edited by Haig's private
secretary, Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Borasten, this all-important
136
THE NOBTHEBN ATTACKS 187
boundary is not given completely. Tom to the second volume
of Haig^s book, and between pages 202-203 you will find
a laige coloured map, in which the boundary is given
correctly to a point south of Guillemont and no farther.
Tet it ought to have been given in full to the south of
Montauban, and thence sharplj^ south-west to Bray, as in
the entirely accurate map which I am able to give. As
a consequence all is vague in the boundary districts. No
reader unacquainted with official maps can see when Byng's
right keeps liaison with Gough's left, or when troops from
Oough's left have to guard a strip of Byng's land. I note also
that the dispatch becomes too indefinite as soon as Congreve,
with the bulk of 7th Corps, is transferred from Ooiu^h to take
over land from 5th Corps, Third Armt.* ^e Ninth
Division is praised for a gallant combat at Mdaulte, near
Albert, for example, but we are not told why Qough's left fluik
division, on the morning of the sixth day, had to fight about
four miles within Byng^s area. I have no inkling why the
Srfais-writers at O.H.Q., when preparing notes for the
ispatoht were so nebulous in these important particulars,
because G.H.Q. itself attached so much value to the boundary
unitiDg Cough and Byng that a revised boundary was planned,
and on February 22, 1918, at noon, the old boundary was
given up.
In my map both boundaries are given, and we must study
them carefully at once because the battle cannot be grasped
fairly unless we learn them by heart Note these points :
1. The new boundary from north-east of Gouzeaucourt to
a point south of Montauban is gentler as a whole in its south-
western course, and thus as a whole it is an easier boundary
for Byn^f s right to f oUow.
2. From south of Monteuban to a point a little north of
Bray-sur-aomme, the boundary runs steeply down to Bray,
forming a very narrow one-division front immediately west of
Bray. This riverside front would be held by Gouffh's left
flank division, the Ninth, aided by a reserve, and all troops
south of the Ninth, would cross the Somme at Bray to
reinforce the centre battle, north of the great highway to
All this would be done if Bjngs right retreated
* In the oolonred msp giTen In the second volome of Hslg*! book between
pegee 208-90B, the etonping of the bonndary s Uttle eonth-weet of QaUlemont
mftrks the point et whloh the balk of Gough*B northern Com lelnloroed the
Tsimo Abut, whoee right and centre were in great perU ; but this fact
ii left onezplained.
188 THE ilPTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
firmly along its soutliem boundary. If it failed to do ao, and
retreated under pressure due west to Albert, Fifth Abmt
troops would be drawn deep into Thibd Abmt land, and
Goi^^h's defence south of the Somme would be starved of
reinforcements coming from north of the river. This would
be a dangerous misfortune, because, as we have learnt from
Haig, O.H.Q. had no more reserves ready to send south of the
Somme ; all local reserves had already been put into the fight :
every mile of the German advance added to the length of
front to be held; and, while the exhaustion of our 19th Corps
was hourly growing more acute, some days had yet to
pass before the French could bring up troops in sufBcieoit
number to arrest the foe's progresa* Hence it was essential
that Byng's right should follow its southern boundary firmly
to Braynsur-Somme, in order that many of Qough's troops
might cross the river into the centre battle.
3. The new boundary increased Qough's responsibilities at
the very moment when he required more troops, not more
territories. A big expanse of new ground runs from west of
Fins down to Bray. Iti includes the Bois des Vaux, the Bois
St. Pierre Vaast, Bouohavesnes, Maurepas, Maricourt^ and
their neighbourhoods. No doubt this new land on Gough's
left supplied rear room for manoeuvres, an invaluable thing
when an army is weU manned; but obviously weakening
when insufiBcient rifle strength grows less as casualties
increase.
4. The old boundary, note with care, is probably the better
one, for its bold run south-west to Bouchavesnes afforded Byng
the opportunity of forming — ^with as much help as possible
from Gough's northern Corps, under Gongreve — a strong flank
looking south-east on any German effort to reach F6ronne, if
only he could hold his ground in front of Bapaume. Such a
flank, even if it were not pushed forward to Moislains and
the Mt. St Quentin, would be the best of all guardians for
F^ronne ; it might cancel the loss even of the Pdronne bridge-
head. The Hue of the Cajoud du Nord and the River Tortille was
obviously the best rear line for this flank pressure. Hence
it would be interesting to know why Q.H.Q., after altering the
boundary, did not set apart enough reserve strength to hold
a firm fiank along the line (let us say) of Qouzeaucourt, Fins,
Nurlu, and on towards Pdronne.t donsider what we owed in
* See the quoUtions given from Haig in Part II., chapter lii., pp. 114, 116,
of this book.
t After-thought suggests that perhaps G.H.Q. thought that it had done
THE NOBTHEBN ATTACKS 189
the Lys battle — ^whieh followed at onoe the events of March,
1918— to the firm flank running north-west fix>m Givenchy to
Clarence Biver. It was this steady, stalwart line that baffled
LudendorflTs efforts to capture Hazebrouck and to throw us
back on the coast. Gough had no men for a virile flank
ronninff south-west from Gouzeauconrt; the utmost his left
could do was to keep a reserve battalion at the boundary in
Dessart Wood ; and as for the Third Army, it had on the
boundaiy, between Equancourt and Manancourt» only a very
thin brigade of the Second, while no fewer than three divisions
wera p&oed. with 0.H.Q.'8 approval, in the narrow and
shallow Elesquitees salient. Mere is another point which
pussies me incessantly. • . .
The salient^ much too small for a bi^ battle, was not at
all likely to be assailed by a front attack oecause its defences,
both natural and militaiy, were very formidable, what with
Highland Bidge, and a captured portion of Hindenbure^s line,
abundant wire, many well-hidaen machine-guns, and other
defences. LudendoifTs aim, inevitably, was to cut off its
garrison ; and hence the salient itself, thrusting a blunt ne^ro-
nose towards Gambrai, was a thing of secondary value, which,
indeed, might be turned into a trap. The useful and necessary
things to consider were the defences across the base of it, and
a very powerful system of trenches to guard its north flank,
base-angle, and rear; next,a not less powerful protection for the
south mink and rear. Why, then, place a crowded garrison
of three divisions in the saJieut ? Is it not quite true that
strength at the wron^^ places means perilous waste in battles,
while at right places it wins victory ?
Even in peace manceuvres thiee divisions could not be
moved easily after dark from a }daoe so cramping. The few
roads would become over-thronged ; here and there a wheeled
tiling would break down and block the way ; and as for those
troops who had to go steeply south-west from the Yillers
Plouich sector to Equancourt and Manancourt, they mi^ht
easily get into hitches and scrapes. In actual war all diffi-
culties were multiplied vastly. Haig tells us that Byng's
ri^ht remained till the evening of March 22 on Highland
Sidge and in the Hindenburg Tine, with the most southern
troops holding Yillers Plouich as a bastion. We are not told
why these defences were held so long, when the position both
•0. OttUlnly Byng't wm fwy mooh the rtrongar British umjjMK jaid of
noQnd, and Byng bsd to dasl manly with tha Qwauai Moooury sttsok.
Ferhapa O.H.Q. beUsvsd thst ho hsd tcoopi enoogb to mMtsU ezigeiioiflB.
140 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABCH, 1918
north-west and south-west of the salient had been menacing
all day ; but we do team that in the evening of March 22 the
foe made a heavy flank attack against YiUers Plouich as well
as a delaying onset at Havrincourt. These German move-
ments were repulsed, but nothing could have been worse for
a retreat south-west. The foe followed vigorously through
the night, and, as we shall see, Byng's right was pressed away
from its liaison with Gough.
Hitches occur in all complicated retreats, and never
should they be magnified ; but from time to time they must
be noted, not because they are blameworthy, but because
of their efiects. Till Byngand G.H.Q. explain the whole
of their policy towards flesqui^res salient, no student,
military or other, can understand either the absence of enough
reserves along the boundary or the presence of so many
troops in the salient Some persons assume that as the
salient was won in a battle which had a misfortunate final
phase, both G.H.Q. and the Third Abmt valued it over-
much, in accordance with that natural habit of mind which
magnifies anything done with great difficulty. There's no
need here to nave views on this point, as the main object here
is to state problems and to see whether they are foes or friends
to that equipoise which defence needs when it is assailed.
§n
When we look at the boundary in its relation both to
Flesquieres salient and to the whole retreat^ we must keep
always before our minds a principle of war which may be
accepted as a permanent axiom. If two military forces make
a continuous line in a battle, like Byng's force and Gough's,
and if one i^ strong while the other is weak, the stronger
force should regard it as an obligation to hold and keep mm
union with the weaker. The reasons : —
1. When the strong force fails to do this, the weak one
has to extend its flank into the strong one's ground ; so its
weakness is weakened — a terrible fact when it is f^hting
against great odds, while the strong one has less pressure to
hold oft
2. If the strong force, like the weak one, has odds against
it, firm union with the weak one is equally imperative, since
the weak one is less fitted to bear overstrain ; and if the weak
is overwhelmed in the boundary districts, the strong force has
its flank rolled up and its rear invaded.
THE NORTHERN ATTACKS 141
3. Hence it is an act of self-help for the strong force
always to keep enough reserved strength at the boundary,
and to do aU in its power to reinforce its weak neighbour at
necessary moments.
Sound principles in war are obvious common sense ; hence
they fare often in battles as trite ffood aphorisms do in every-
day life— badly. What need would there have been for Fifth
Armt troops on Third Army land if the stronger army had
retreated in time from Flesqui^res salient and hful held either
a firm flank or a firm course along the boundary ?
In a question of this importont sort a writer of history
cannot bMt about the bush ; so it is necessary for me to say
that I have sought in vain, both in official maps and in
authentic written evidence, for prompt and efiSdctive liaison
movements by the units of Bjmgs right
Yet every one must have met Third Armt men who have
said : " Our right flank, you know, was uncovered by GougL*'
To receive reinforcement from Gough, and then to nring this
allegation lagainst him, is somewhat contradictory. North of
the Somme troops from the Fifth Army held much more
than their own ground till they were relieved, mainly by
Australians. Here is a fact, and a fieust is neither cancelled
nor hurt by a thousand arguments.
The precis-writers at O.ELQ. seem to have forgotten this
platitude, for at one point they accepted a view gathered
from Byng's southernmost division — a view expressed by all
units when they are ob%ed to retreat, namely, that their
flank was left in the air by their neighbours. In other words,
the Foriy-aeveTUk Division, 6th Corps, Third Army, declares
that its flank was left in the air bv the Ninth Division, 7th
Corps, Fifth Army; while the Ninth blames the Forty-
sevmth for the same routine misdeed. Which of these
allegations is correct ? O.H.Q. takes sides with the Forty^'
aetmUh, paying no attention to the presence of the Ninth's
left on land which ought to have been held by the Forty-
seventh's south brigade. Further, G.H.Q. has passed over in
oilenoe the frequent and pointed warnings sent by Gh>ugh's
left to Byng's right* So a student is natiually perplexed and
surprised.
As O.H.Q. has published errors in this matter, and as
historical truth is our aim, I give a chapter in Part IV. as a
refutation. But a quiet statement of tacts must go hand-in-
hand with the recognition that precis-writers are liable to
hlunder here and there while striving to reduce into order a
142 THE FIFTH AEMY IN MARCH, 1918
chaos of details ; and when a Commander-in-Chief, with vast
current affiurs pressing upon him, has to compile a lon^ dispatch
on a battle several monuis old, errors made by pr6cis- writers
pass into an authoritative document. For all that students
cannot help being troubled by the way in which all boundary
matters are treated in the dispatch. Readers are not told
that even such important places in the defence as Combles
and Morval are within Bjrng's sphere, though bad events
happen there, and the Ninth's Highlanders iSy to restore a
very menacing situation.
One point more. As it is necessary for a strong armv
always to hold strong liaison with a weak one, so in a weak
army it is essential tiiat the component units should strive
unceasingly to protect the land within their own boundaries
and to keep strong union with one another. No unit has men
to spare, and hence it cannot send help to a neighbour with-
out impairing its own weakness. Here is another common*
place that adds drama and pathos to the interchanges of help
that Gough's units gave to one another, while Marwitz was
aiding Otto von Below.
Ludendorff hoped that these Oerman officers would take
stress and strain off each other turn by turn, and that they
would manage to push through between P6ronne, Bapaume
and Ervillers, while the central and southern offensives over-
whelmed a very thin defence before Allied resources could
arrive.
§m
Let me ask you to examine my map of the whole battle-
field with the massed Oerman armies in their approximate
order of battle. It is dear that Otto von Below's power,
redoubtable as it is, must be regarded as a minor one, com-
pared with the odds which assailed Gou^h. Below and
Marwitz employed in all twenty -eight divisions each, includ-
ing three that they shared together. These three divisions
were the Fowrth, the Hundred and NvneteeTUh, and Hvmdred
a/nd EUventK Marwitz had thirteen in first line, eight in
support, and seven in reinforcements, while Below had twelve
in first line, nine in support, and seven in reinforcements.
Only four divisions in the Marwitz groups, when fighting
began, were in line against Byng ; they were those arouna
Flesquitees salient ; and soon they became as troublesome to
Qough's lefib wing as they were to Byng*s right So the
^
144 THE FIFTH AEMY IN MABCH, 1918
defence which the NinOi had prepared as the goa r dian ol
Ooogh's left and rear.
Within its own territory, too, the NirUh would protect
Byng's right, but not, of course, without adequate 8upi>ort
from its neighbour. Happily it was a powerful divisiona
with a commander of impressive character and uncommoa
good gifts as a soldier. Not yet have Tudor and his men
received much credit for their work, except from the foe, who
had many reasons to speak of their brigades with wondering
respect. It is a thousand pities that Byng did not place the
OuABDS Division on his extreme right; then the NirUh
would have had a collaborator as great as itself, and many a
good result would have aided the defence.
Both infantry and ffunners were aided by some special
training. For nearly six weeks they had been out of the
line, and through half of this time had been exercised in
sham open warfare. In the circumstances, then, the Ninth was
fortunate ; and after its brief training there was work enough
with spade and pick to teach its men to know their defences
and to keep their sinews from being slackened by dugouts
and trenches. One and all were entirely fit. Their order
of battle :
Left Front, the 26th (Highland) Brigade commanded by
Kennedy : Eighth Black Watch, Seventh Seaf orths, and Fifth
Camerons ; 74 officers and 2593 other ranks ; an average of
864 rifles per battalion, including '' details '' ; so the brigade
of three battalions was only 407 men below maximum
strength. This was too many for such a huge battle, but the
NintK was lucky in its numbers nevertheless. Sir F. Maurice
certainly is right when he says, concerning Haig's fifty-eight
divisions, " hardly a battalion, a battery, or a squadron had
its full complement of men" in March, 1918.*
Right Front, a fine South African Brigade, commanded by
Dawson ; 91 officers and 2718 other ranks ; an average of 907
rifles per battalion, including '' details."
Divisional artillenr had 107 officers and 2452 other ranks ;
the Ninth Battalion Machine Oun Corps, 37 officers and 753
other ranks ; and as for the reserves, in the Ninth Seaf orth
Highlanders, Pioneers, there were 24 officers and 857 other
ranks; and the 27th (Lowland) Brigade, commanded by
Croft, consisting of the Eleventh and Twelfth Boyal Scots
and the Sixth King's Own Scottish Borderers, poss^sed 2636
men and 69 officers.
<* " The LMt Four Months," p. 19.
I
I
THE NOBTHEBN ATTACKS 145
The total man-power, with artillerymen, machine-gunners,
and pioneers, was 402 officers and 12;039 men. The total
rifle-strength, indading pioneers, was below the maximum
by 1195 men. For all that, what a blessing it would have
been if this man-power had been present and active in every
division of our Fifth Armt.
Each brigade in the battle front employed one half of its
forces to defend the forward zone and one half to guard the
battle zone. In the forward ssone men were to fight as in
forlorn hopes; no counter-attack on a large scale would be
made to rescue them or to recover what they had lost. Their
liattle zone was the main theatre ; artillery posts were chosen
principally for its protection; and if the loe broke into it,
and no order for a withdrawal came, counter-blows were to
be struck with fuU strength.
The Corps Commander, General Congreve, was very well
satisfied bow with the Ninth and with his Corps' defences.
His front was too deep and too wide to be manned all
through, so it was held by a series of strongposts or redoubts,
with guns and machine-guns covering all intervals. On the
left, and also on the extreme right, where deep valleys lay,
the field of fire was pretty bad ; elsewhere it was very good
aad widespread. As for strongposts, taken from left to
right, they were Oouzeaucourt village, St Quentin Ridge,
and Oaudie Wood,* Chapel Hill and Vaucellette Farm,
Peizi^, Ep^y, Malassise Farm, and Ronasoy. Behind these
there were other strongposts in every zona The defences
were called from front to rear the Jmd Line, Yellow line.
Brown line and Oreen Line. This last was heavily wired,
but shallow, here as elsewhere. Still, it had some mined dug-
outB» like the other lines.
* Th6M three were in the NhUh*i area.
CHAPTER VI
THE JOINT ATTACK BT MABWITZ AND OTTO YON BELOW:
THE FIB8T DAY'S BATTLE
§1
ON March 21 the salient itself was ahnost a haven of
rest. Near the northern base anffle the SeveTi*
teenih was active with its left wing, and there
was a tepid raid of perhaps two battalions
against a part of Oorringe's line; but from the upper base
angle north-westward to the Senses River, between eight
and nine miles, a very grim conflict was active all day
long. Otto von Below's left and centre were at work,
crashing with nine well-armed divisions, and Byng, north*
west of the salient^ on these eight or nine miles, had to throw
eight divisions into fierce action : the Thirds Thirtif-faurik,
Fartutk, Fifty^Twnih, Twenty-fifth, Sixth, Fifty-fini, and
NmeUefuvth.* Marwitz had four divisions around &e salient,
watching the British three inside: the SeveWUevUh on the
British kft, the SixtyAhird in our centre, and in the south,
fonning liaison with Gough's left, the Forty^ieoemiih^ London
Territorials. As the northern part of the SevefifUMmth was in
action on the first day, Byng had % divisions inside the
fighting. Along equal spans of front Gough had never more
than 3^ divisions, usually less, though the odds against him
were a great deal heavier.
It is commonly supposed that on March 21 the Grerman
armies employed many of their second-line troops. This error is
circulated even by Lieut.-C!olonel John Buchan, in his excellent
book on " The South African Forces in France " (p. 170) :—
" Against nineteen British divisions in line Ludendorff had
hurled thirty-seven divisions as the first wave, and before the
* The Tweniy»iifth oame during the day izom Bapaume, and the Fortieth
from a point on the Biver Orinchon, about seven or eight znilee toath-weat ol
Arras. It went to the St. Leger sector, a danger spot.
146
JOINT ATTACK BY MABWITZ AND VON BELOW 147
dark fell not less than sixty-fonr Gterman divisions had taken
part in the battle-Hi number much exceeding &e total
strength of the British Army in France."
I wish Ludendorff had oeen mad enough to act in this
preposterous manner. His first-Hue divisions were veir
numerous and so dose together that they could not attack
throu^rh a whole morning of thick fog without getting iheir
units into much confusion ; and his new tactics had for their
central aim the art of getting the man-power of massed
formations without offering thick targets to hostile fire. So
his first-line divisions were trained to advance in a thin wave
with the men in open order, and constantly renewed in
strength from the rear. Those brigades who had to follow
the slowly creeping barrage were practised behind a barrier
fire of live shells ; and as Ludendora desired above all thin^
to achieve his purpose with the suiallest possible loss m
casualties, he^ opposed energetically the use of second Une
divisions durioff the battle's opening phase. To crowd into
action more and more divisions wouM ruin inevitably his firm
belief both in open order and in highly specialised bodies of
troops welded by practice into the common pack of carefully
trained ordinary nflemen. On the second day, here and there^
a second line division was called into the first line, but even
these few exceptions were so at variance with Ludendorff^s
tactics that they must have been a bitter disappointment to
him. ^ Note in nis book how eager he was always to keep his
men in open order and to fi^rht Uiromrh several days with the
nnt*une divisions only.
Otto von Below's nine divisions on eight or nine miles
of front must have lost in the fog their open order; and in
meeting eight British divisions during the day, in a new
Waterloo fought between forces of almost equal strength, their
losses must nave been unusually severe. Indeed, Ludendorff
says that Below's losses were too heavy on the first two days,
and that his capacity for later work was impaired by those
losses. B^ng, too, must have suffered severely, for heavy
losses are mevitable when almost equal powers keep at death-
grip through two terrific days. As for the northern pact of
the salient, Byns^s Seventeenth had agunst it Marwits'^B right
fiank division, the Tweniy-fowrth Rssxrve aided by Below's
left flank division, the Hv/iwrei amd Nvneleenth.
By midday on the 21st Byng's battle zone was entered at
Beveml points, but fortunately not astride the Canal du Nord,
>^uining about midway between BLavrincourt and Hermies^
148 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MAECH, 1918
and thus of vital need to the salient's garrison. Not much
general progress was made here, thanks to Robertson and the
SeverUeenih ; but farther west Doignies was lost, and Louvaval
also, and the battle zone had been stabbed at Noreuil, and
Longatte, and Ecoust St. Mein.
Ludendorff imagines that Otto von BeloVs troops lost the
protective barrage, bat this view is contradicted by the rapid
advance against a very powerful defence.
** Fighting in and in front of our battle positions continued
with the greatest intensity throughout the afternoon and
evening,'' says Haig. " On the Third Abht front, our line
in the Flesqui^res salient had not been heavily attacked, and
was substantially intact. Beyond this sector, fierce fighting
took place aroimd Demicourt and Doignies, and north of the
village of Beaumetz-lez-Cambrai. In this area the Fifty-fir^^
under G. T. C. Carter-Campbell, was heavily engaged, but
from noon onwards practically no progress was made by the
enemy. A counter-attack carried out by two battalions of the
Nindeenth,* G. D. Jeffreys commanding the division, with a
company of tanks, recovered a portion of this ground in the
face of strong resistance, and secured a few prisoners^ though
it proved unaole to clear the village of Doignies.
" Lagnicourt fell into the enemy's hands during the after-
noon, and heavy attacks were made also between Noreuil and
Croisilles. At one time, hostile infantry were reported to
have broken through the rear line of our battle positions in
this sector in the direction of Hory. By nightfall the
situation had been restored;! but meanwhile, the enemy
had reached the outskirts of St. Leger and was attacking the
Thvrty-fovHh, under C. L. Nicholson, about Croisilles heavily
from the south-west. A strong attack launched at five p.m.
against the Tliird, under command of 0. J. Deverell, north of
Fontaine-les-Croisilles, on the left bank of the Sens6e River,
was broken up by machine-gun fire." %
* A support division broaght into action by » menaoing situation ; and so
vere two otner divisions, the ForHeth and TSotnty-fifth. On the second day
Bvng had twelve divisions in action : ThWd^ Quards, Thirty-fourth, FortUtJi,
F%fty-mnth, Sixth, Ttoenty-fiWi^ffimtemUh, Fifty-first ; and three in the saUenk
On the thiid day, from the Soarpe down to the neighbourhood of our Fifth
Abmt'b boundary, fifteen divisions were fighting : Fifteenth, Third, Quards,
Thirty-fotirth, Thirty-first, Fortieth, Fifty-ninth, Forty-first, Ttoenty-fiftJi^
Nineteenth, Fifty-first, Second, Seventeenth, Sixty-third, Forty-seventh,
t This fact shows the value of abundant reserves on the spot. Qongh'a
troops as a rule had to oounter-attaok with numbers tragioaUy small. But
the break-through towards Mory is very remarkable.
X Vol. ii., pp. 18&>190. Note the leverage preflsure from south-tcest
againit OroiriUes, a very important stronghold.
JOINT ATTACK BY MARWITZ AND VON BELOW 149
Correct maps show what this infonnation means. On
March 21, along a narrow span of eight or nine miles, Byng
lost almost the same varying depth of land as Gough lost on
Mb very wide front, as at Cnapel Hill, Bonssoy, Le Verguier,
Maissemy, Holnon, Savy, Gontescourt, Essigny, and Quessy.
T?
^ t 1 i A
««^i
^coii
tUi
»o«^^
.lAii
; MABCH SI, 1918, WITB
BT CUB nOBD ABUT
OBBMAH P I V mOBS , ABD TBX LABD
WB8T OV THB BAUBBT.
Of course, an advancing battle line cannot be given at all
aoeorately, since it alters from honr to hour ; and it should
be measured from the attack's startiniif pointy and not from
the defenders' line* My map on p. 149 gives the line from
which Byng's troops were pressed back, not the line from
150 THE FIFTH ABlfY IN MABCH, 1918
wliidi the attack set forth on its adventoreflL South of St.
Leger — ^in the Eooost St. Mein sector — the hostile advance
was about 6000 yards ; along the Bi^paome-Cambrai road,
about 4700 yards; and the loss of Doignies, with German
messare to the ontakirto of Beanmets and Morehies, menaced
flesqmeres silent, enforcdng a withdrawal* Morchies and
St. Leger were dose by the end of the battle nme. When
the foe broke through towards Moiy, happily to be turned
back, he was on his way to the rear zone. On the first day,
evidently, Byng lost more than Goujzh in depth of finont per
brigade of man-power in action, yet mlse rumour began to do
great injustice to the Fifth Abmy. Very soon the loss of
Essigny was a shock to most persons, while the break-through
towards Moiy and the critical position of St. Lecer and
CroisUles, even when known, were scarcely criticized at all
Many things in the moods of war feelings are inscrutable^
Meantime, south of the salient, Congreve and Watta had
been hard set in a defence of equal grip and ferocity; and
the land lost, though not deep,t had unbalanced the defence
south of Tudor's bturier division, above all in the neighboui^
hoods of Bonssoy and Templeux with ita quarries. About
noon Congreve heard that Germans had broken throu^ on
his ri^t, perhaps through the right of Hull's South Irish,
our SioBteerUh Division, or perhaps through the left wing of
Malcolm's capital fighters. In any case, a turning movement
was active. It came uphill from Cologne valley, broke
through the switch running along a ridge fix>m Ronasoy to
Brown Line, and TOt into our guns covering this part of
Coogreve's front. A brigade of South Irish tried to recov^
the switch. The^ got no farther than Brown line from the
south of St. Emihe, and they were badly shaken by the day's
ordeaL A good many of them, I fear, did not fight as weU
as they might have fought; but the Second Munsters held
the southern part of Ep6hy — an inestimable boon to our
defence.
Hour after hour was spent by Congreve and Watta in
bitter hard poimding all along the line, apart from that
* At BoiiMoy the South Irish lost abont 4700 yards; at Malssemy tlia
Tweniif'/ourth went back about 6760 yards; and as for the Fomttenih at
Sssigny, from 7000 to 7600 yards is the estimated loss.
t Indeed, the defenoe by nnits below strength in our 19th Corps was
astonishingly good, but very costly in oasoalties. On a front of nearly
wa
18,000 yards Watts had only two infantry divisions, aided by the First
Oavaxat, whioh on liaroh SI was brought from the Pteonne seotor into the
fighting area north-east of Yermand.
152 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
portion of Tador's front which £aced Gonzeanoonrt and north-
ward. Here no serions attack was made, as LndendorflTs
purpose was to unsettle Tudor by indirect means.* Pressure
west of Ronssoy and Templeux continued, and as the advance
appeared to have made headway down Cologne valley and to
be fixed in parts of Brown line east of St. Emilie, Congreve
ordered two brigades of Feetham's Division, the Thirty-nirUh,
to entrench a switch from Brown Line at Sauloomt over
high ground east and above Longavesnes to the north end of
Tincourt Wood, where it would meet the Green line.
Tudor lost only Gauche Wood, but not untU the South
African defence had maimed the foe's attack ; and on two
occasions the brave South Africans helped Campbell t to
recapture Chapel Hill on Tudor's right flank. These brilliant
comcMkts must be described, in onler that their full worth
may be known to those who have not studied them closely.
§11
At about five minutes to nine, after the foe's creeping
barrage had begun to herald the German storm troops, fog
on the Ni/niKs front was more freakish than elsewhere.
Some patches of light — '' as frt>m a flight of blushing angels
unseen" — ^got into it, for the attack used a smoke screen
from belching trench mortars when advancing against Gauche
Wood, the extreme south-eastern comer of the NintKs
forward zone, just a little south of Quentin Redoubt.
The foe came on with true courage and thorough training ;
scrambled into the Wood, at flrst from the east^ and now
the South African garrison — ^"B" company of the Second
Regiment, under Captain Garnet Green, a cool and resourceful
officer — had a very stem grapple to pass through.
It held four strong posts, three inside uie Wood and
one in the open on the south-west side. A single company
was divided between these posts, so every man had to
do his very best, aided in the Wood by two machine-guns and
* Tndor = Ninth Dxvisiok. Please keep alwayi in mind that the Qermui
policy WM to break their way through the Ttomtv-fl/rst and the Soath Irish,
or SixteefUh. Two results of this policy were that the Nviith*B right was
constantly being nncoTered by the TwefiU^ilrita left, while the TwefUy-flinVt
right was being unoovered by the S%xUmtW$ left Always to remember this
crumbling stress and strain south of the Nvnth is essential to a right under-
Rtanding both of the Mn^V« magnificent work and also of the enormous
pressure against Gough's northern corps.
t The Twenty-flrst Divibiok.
JOINT ATTACK BY BIARWITZ AND VON BELOW 168
a detaehment of the Brigade Trench Mortar Batteiy under
lient Hadlow.
If an assault had come from the east alone, there would
have been less cause for anxiety, a direct attack beinff
a simple matter of "bludgeon work," or * damned hard
Kunding," to use Wellin^n's descriptions; but it got
tween the South African outposts north of Qaudie Wood,
crossing Lancashire Trench, and entered from the north
over &>mme Alley, another trench. Several posts were
surrounded.
This enveloping thrust was patient and skilful,^ like the
defence, which fought with a will under Lieutenants Bancroft
and Beviss. At iMt Bancroft was overwhelmed. Only one
of his men escaped. But Beviss had better fortune. His
troops — about half of a platoon — ^fouffht their way back to
Captain Qreen and took up their <fefenee again. As for
machine-gunners, and those who served light trench mortars,
they held on till they were either killed or captured.
When Qreen knew that his foes were active on three sides^
in overpowering numbers, he withdrew his men sullenly from
Qauche Wood to join the fourth post in the open ground on
the south-west Oncoming Germans lost their open order,
they were dose togeUier. Perhaps the screen of smoke and
mist made them recldess; in any case Lewis guns ripped holes
at point-blank ranse in their bundung waves. So numerous
were their losses uiat they did not try to get bevond the
Wood's western ed^. Instead, they began to dig themselves
in, though in full view of the next Britiw line.
Many Germans in the Wood could be seen slao from the
Quentin Redoubt, and the garrison there^ a company of the
First South Africans, fired at them with Lewis guns and
rifles. Then Dawson, the South African Brigadier, ordered
the whole of his artillery to ravage the lost ground ; so the
foe's position there became an awful blend of earthquake
with bursting volcanoes. Still, Gauche Wood was lost.
Green's company went into battle with 150 or 160 men; it
came out with only 36 or 40.
Northward, all day long, there was little stir. Kennedy's
lers were not attacked, as LudendorflTs aim was to
outflank the NirUh from the south by crumbling a way rapidly
* OmUIii OrMa, in s tdaplions oonvtnskioii, told Dswion, his Brindisr,
thu «*iM GtfBsa offiottt wan laftding their man magnifioenthr, sod were
oomlag on ebflolntely regudleas of danger." He added, «* We'te killed e beU
of • lot of them."
154 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABGH, 1918
through the Twenity-fi/rst and Siarfemt&w The Twenty-faret,
CamiK)ell's men, at about noon, lost Chapel Hill, and as this
mishap outflanked the South Afiiean Brigade, Dawson gave
immeaiate help. He turned southward those of his men who
held Lowland Support (the rear trench of Yellow line), west
of Chapel Hill, forming a good flank on the enemy's advance;
and early in the afternoon a reserve company of the Natal
Regiment was sent to stiffen this flank. It encountered the
Germans on the hill's northern slope ; there was a bomb fight,
and neither side could progress.
At this moment the South African forward troops were
about a mile east of the hill, dangerously outflanked. South-
ward the attack pressed on agamst the TweTdy-jirst and iStcD-
t^entik, and then worse news came. After midday the foe got
behind Yellow line, and Genin WeU Copse was assailed till
some South African Scottish brought relief by means of
flanking fire, aided by some machine-gunners .who were
station^ in the ruins of Bevelon Farm. My map^ of the
Ninth's whole front will make these facts dear, and wiU show
also how insidiously perilous were the foe's efforts to crumble
his way through the TwefUy-frrst and Hull's South Irish, the
Sixteenth. If those linked bastions, EpAy and Peizi&e, had
not remained firm on their high ground, a big disaster would
certainly have happened.
Just after dusk, two N.C.O. patrols, each with a corporal
and two men, were sent out^ and they brouffht in between
them nearly fifty German prisoners, who, when tiiey came
forward and surrendered, declared that the German casualtieB
had been appalling, as none could live in such a hot fire.
The main business for the South Africans was to retake
Chapel HilL Captain Bunco's company of the South African
Scottish was ordered to do this noisy, scrambling work, and
late in the afternoon, iust after dusk, it overran Chapel Hill and
took some trenches also on the south and south-eastern dopes.
Then posts could be established between the hill and Genin
Well Copse.
Although Tudor's uniiy with Campbell was protected by
a firm grip on Chapel Hill, Lowland Support, Bevelon Farm,
and Bailton,^ yet events in Cologne vaiiW and north of it
threatened his line of retreat south-west Then at five pjn. a
message fix>m Congreve's B.G.G.S. brought the news that the
5th Corps, TflntD Abmt, would fiOI back by niffht to its
Bed line, which was a continuation of Tudors Ydlow line.
This withdrawal would uncover Tud(»^s forward zone, and
156 THE FIFTH AEMY IN MABCH, 1918
thus he would be obliged to retire with Gorringe's right
wing.
This withdrawal may have come as a surprise to Grorringe
and the Forty-seventh^ as it did to Tudor and the Ni/nm;
because at 4.40 p.m. the Ninth was in communication with
the Forty-aeveTith, and no bad news was related. Indeed the
news was cheery. According to German prisoners^ the raid
on the Forty-aeventii was carried out by only two battidions !
If the TaiBD Abmy's most southern division was not kept in
touch during the day with events north of the salient^ troops
inside the salient's lower flank had an imperfect knowledge of
the main events and also of their own position as affect^ by
these events.
In anv case, Below and Marwitz had done so much
mischief that there was cause for anxiety.
Watts, with his intrepid but weak divisions, Daly's and
Malcolm's, had done a great deal more than a reasonable
country should have askra them to attempt. On the right
they had lost Maissemy, a key village, and on their left the
Templeux positions, strategiciu pointo, but they had managed
by desperate coimter-attacks, very costly and fatiguing, not
only to keep the centre of their battle zone, but al^ to check
the foe's advance where it was most harmful Malcolm gave
ground slowly, losing between 10.30 a.m. and nightfall not
more than about 45M) yarda At nightfall his right rested
near Le Yeiguier, where some of Daly's troops — ^the 8th
battalion of the Queen's, belonging to the 17 th Brigade —
fought brilliantly.
A Victoria Cross was won in the Le Verguier sector by
Lance-Corporal John William Saver, of the Eighth Boyal
West Surrey Regiment, when holding for two hours, in face
of incessant attacks, the flank of a small isolated post. The
official account says : " Owing to mist the enemy approached
the post from both sides to within thirty yards before being
discovered. Lance-Corporal Sayer, however, on his own
initiative and without assistance, beat off a succession of
flank attacks and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy.
Though attacked by rifle and machine-gun fire, bayonet and
bombs, he repulsed all attacks, killing many and wounding
others. During the whole time he was continuously exposed
to rifle and nmchine^gun fire, but he showed the utmost
contempt of danger, and his conduct was an inspiration to alL
His skilful use of fire of all description enabled the post to
hold out till nearly all the garrison had been killed and
JOINT ATTACK BY MAEWITZ AND VON BELOW 167
himaelf wounded and captured. He subseqaently died as a
reault of wonnds at Le Cateau."
Equally brilliant and helpful was Major Whitworth's
defence ci CSarpeza Copse, vnth a mixed force of cavalry and
Manchester soldiers, it held the attack at bay until Malcolm
was ordered to retire, on March 22. Whitworth died of
wounds — ^to be gratefully remembered by all survivors of
Gouffh's Army.
Though Watts's Corps, both infantry and cavalry, had
acted as a strong breakwater, heavy losses, united to the
disorganization caused by confused fighting in the fog, set
anxious thoughts astir ; for next day, early in the morning,
Marwitz would certainly try to open gaps west of Maissemy
and Bonssoy. Beinforoements ! Here, as elsewhere, they
were needed at once.
Congreve had kept Ep^hy and Fezi^re in his centre, but
both were doomed ; and the loss of Bonssov, united to bad
events south of this village, presaged an early withdrawal to
ease the Sixteenth and Twnty-fird as well afi the overstrained
men of Watts's Corps.
Campbdl's left had been so badly hit that Tudor was
told to extend his right and take over Chapel HilL This had
been done already by two counter-attacks, but some Lincoln
troops remained on the hill itself, and also between Chapel
Hill and Bevelon Farm. After dark they were relieved oy
the South Africans. Already, then, Tudor* was called
upon by external events to widen his front southward into
land not his own, and soon he had to extend northward also,
and therefore into Third Abmt ground. The South Africans
were reinforced with a reserve battalion, the Eleventh Boyal
Scots.
As soon as possible Tudor began to withdraw from his
forward zone in order to keep firm liaison with Byn£;^s with-
dxuwaL The railway in Qouzeaucourt valley was held by an
advanced guard until two a.m., March 22, and Bed Line three
hours lonffer. For some reason or other, Marwitz did not
attack either against Tudor or against the flanks of Flesqui^res
salient^ whose garrison got back early to Highland Bid^, and
thence westward along the Hindenburg Line to Havnncourt
and Hermies.
Ludendorff must have known that these withdrawals
were inevitable, since they were brought about by his own
troops. Why, Uien, did he fail to harry them by night raids
* Tn^ts Ninth Dimiov.
158 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABCH, 1918
cuid attacks ? No interference came from him ; all was qoiet
apart from some sploshing detonations of gas shells in Dessart
Wood. Why ? An assault on the salient's southern flank,
pressing north-west, belonged to ihe ABC of generalship;
and on the evening of March 22, when a more important
retreat was in preparation, Villers-Plouich n/oas assailed, as
we know, and with considerable force and bite. Havrinoourt
also was attacked north of Exuette River and on the
Bapaume-Cambrai railway. We have much reason to be
thimkful that they were not set in action during tiiie night
of March 21-22. LudendorfiF and Marwitz missed an
opportunity, and their inattention can be explained in two
ways only ; that they misunderstood the alertness of Gough's
generalship, and tha.t our Fifth Abmt's defence, and the
huddle of brigades which fog and congested fighting had
imposed on Marwitz, as on Below and on Hutier, had caused
so much anxiety among German leaders that many local
events were neglected, while some others could not be
exploited.
CHAPTER VII
MABWITZ AUD BKLOW COBmMUS TBXUt JOINT ATTACKS
rB second day, like the firsts seemed to have no
dawn. Its drama began in a foff, which compelled
both sides, after a bitter cold nighty almost without
sleep, to warm themselves in another mixed game of
hide-and-seek and blind man's buff with Destiny.
Here and there on Qoogh's widened front the morning
attack was hesitant, deject^ slow ; but it was wide-awake
immediately sonth of the Ninth, and also in Otto von Below's
pressure on Byng.
Let us see what happened north-west of Flesqui&res salient.
" Farther north," says Haig, " fighting was severe and
ecntinuous throughout the day. Portly before noon the
enemy attacked Hermies strongly from the north-west»* and
repeated his attacks at intervals during the remainder of
the day. These attacks were completely repulsed by the
Seventeenth. Heavy losses were inflicted on the German
infimtry in the fighting in this area, the leading wave of a
strong attack launched between Hermies and Maumets-less-
Cambrai being destroyed by our fire." [Our own losses, too, of
course, were very severe, but in oflScial dispatches our own
losses are passed over in silence.]
" In the neighbourhood of Beiftumets the enemv continued
his assaults with great determination, but was held by the
Fifty-firet and a brigade of the TweTUy^fiflh until the
eveni^. Sir E. O. T. Bainbridge commanding the Twenty^
fifth Division. Ou/r troope were then witharcuwn vmaer
orders to poeUuma south of the vUlage. Very severe fighting
took place at Vaubc Wood and Yaiux Yraucourt^ as well as
^ Kola lUs noonmhy. Nortli-ifiaBt of H«miM misiiB that tli« attaok
■o ol liiP Mt from DoigiitMifM driviiig s wadgo behind Hermies And nftrrowisf
the Quiow nlient, from whioh three of Bjag^e dhliioiie haye to retreat.
160 THE FIFTH ABICT IN MABGH, 1918
about 8L Leger and north of Ooiailles, which laMer viUctge
owr troops had evaaiated during the night"
My italics. The loas of CnnsilleB needs as maeh attention
as the loss of Essigny or Haissemy. This applies also to
Beanmets, near the western edge of the battle zone, and
about a mile north of the Bapanme-Gambrai railway. So,
about seven miles from YiUers-Plouich, there was heavy
German pre s s ure to the north-west; aiui fiir to the north-
west^ for if you draw an upright line due south from the
centre of Beaumets, you will mid that it passes through the
west outskirts of Ytres, and Ytres lies about six and a half
miles west — ^by a little south — of Yillers-Plouich. Further,
when the defence fell back to the south of Beaumets, turning
its back towards the Bapaume-O&mbrai railway, it showed
that the attack was trying energetically to invade the
salient's rear. Witih this keen pressure coming southward
from the north-west^ a retreat from the salient was becoming
more and more difficult. In such dose fighting between
almost equal forces on a narrow frontage, ^th sides must
have lost heavily. Who knows why the official dispatch
glides over too many Third Armt losses, while speaking
with full historic frankness of the Fifth's? The dispatch
continues : —
^ At Vrauoourt the enemy broke through the rear line of
the battle zone and penetrated into the village. There he
was counter-attacked by infantry and tanks, and driven out.
Farther west, after heavy fighting, his troops forced their way
into our positions along the line of the (>oisilIes-H6iiin-sur-
Cojeul road. On the left of this attack troops of the Thirty-
fawrth maintained themselves in St. Leger until the afternoon,
when they fell back to a line of trenches just west of the
villaga To the north the Third DrvisiON brought back their
right flank to a line facing south-east, and in this position
successfully beat off a heavy attack." *
Study this information on a good map, and at once it
becomes evident that Byng, hard pressed all day long, would
be obliged by night to recover balance by two withdrawals.
The protective barrier looking south-east made by the Thirds
right wins was ugly and artificial, positions due north of it
being outflanked ; and for tins reason Byng's troops with-
drew from the remainder of their forward positions as far
north as the Scarpe, taking up the rear line of their battle
zone between Henin and Fampoux. The foe followed this
• Vol. iL, pp. 192-98.
MABWTFZ AND BELOW CONTINUE THE ATTACKS 161
retreat, and early on Satarday morning llareh 23, as the
diapatch relates, he found a cap about JfoiT in Byngfs new
front and rear aone. Now Hoiy is only about four miles
north of Bqpaume, and Bapaume was to Byng what P^ronne
was to Gough, approximately. Below's men and Marwitz^s
right struck with great force, and unluckily fortune aided
theuL
From inside Flesquiires salient Byng withdrew by night
some 6000 yards in the deepest place. His line north and
east of Hermies crossed the Canal du Nord and then went
south throufl4i Havrincourt Wood to the east and south-east
of Mets-en-Couture ; but was it able to join hands firmly
with Oongh's left ?
Before answering this question, let us note the equally
powerful squeese south of Tudor^s lines. Friday, March 22,
was a galling day. Between ten and eleven o'clock Marwitz
began to thrast into some weak places, as into the gap he had
made on the first day between Campbell's left and Dawson's
South African Brigade^ And St. femelie fell, then Villers
Faucon, and EpShj and PeLd^re had reached the fiig-end
of a noble strij^ggle. North of Cologne River, then, was a
distressinff outl^c ; and south of it also, apart from Carpesa
Copse and a brilliant counter-attack east and north-east of
HerviUy, to be described later in a chapter on Episodes. At
Le Verguier Daly's men were gripped with increasing force,
but they did not retire till about noonday on the 22nc^ when
they were ordered to fidl back from a position almost sur-
rounded ; and northward a conven;in|^ danger from bc^
sides of the Colcjgne menaced RoiBel with envelopment from
the rear* So in the afternoon our troops around Roisel were
ordered to withdraw behind Green Line, between Bemes and
Boudy, and to gain breath andsome rest behind the M/Heth.^
On Congreve's front all day long the main anxiety was
lest Marwits should get round the right fiank which was
stretched across the Cologne River. Two divisions, Hull's
and Oampbell's, had suffered mve losses. The South Irish
infantry were reported to be omy about a thousand strong, and
Dawson's South African Brigade, fighting stoutly and idmost
incessantly, perished on the second day to neari^ the same
number of nfles. Already Congreve's r es e rve division, the
flMlly fsvwtfi DtaMB Ousriip Z Wim. The M«s ItaeW Ml «h«
hi^ia dy sa d «bs7 ^^ aU« ^ ^Mtoh «h« Boeb« ttaaagfmi oontfeg Ibnvwd
from ttlB|ilSQX«
162 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MABCH, 1918
Thiriy'^vn;^, had lost its ooanteivattack Yalne, sinoe a wastio^
battle-*firont must be repaired and renewed. Shortly after
noon the Soutii African brigadier received orders to retire bv
4.80 p.m. to Brown Line, and to be ready later to fall bai^
on Qreen Line, about three miles more to the west. This
withdrawal b^san w^ ; but soon it was observed, and the
foe in strengl^ took up the tndL On he came, looking
eagerly confident, tUl the Second S.A. Infantry sprayed over
Mm with ballets at close quartera
Meantime our Highlanders on Tudor's left were quiet;
some of them patrolled Qouzeaucourt until midday, when it
became known that the Army's poligr was to fi^t rearguard
actions to delay and ravage the foe s power. Tudor was to
fiidl back to Qreen Line from north of Epinette Wood to the
south of Equaneourt. So his brigades were ordered to with-
draw to their Brown Line by 4.30 p.m., and to begin three
hours later to move back to Green Line.
Dawson was warned about the retirement to Green line,
but he did not receive the message in which the precise time
of his leaving Brown line was given. Somehow it miscarried ;
but, as Colonel Buchan has related, Dawson sent Captain
Beverley, his Acting Brigade Major, to deliver the order to
the battaliona Beverlev went off on horseback, and before
five o'clock all troops had their instructions, though Beverley's
horse was shot under him.
It was a brave ride, for at four o'dock Brown line was
breached at Guyenoourt ; and although a prompt counter-blow
just managed to check a venomous thrust, matters in this
neighbourhood were very critical, and every one understood
that a retreat south-west could no longer be made without
difficulty.
Guyencourt was a redoubt village about 2000 yards south
of Heudecourt and in the Tiventy-Ji/rst^a land. Aiter its fall,
German storm troops turned nortiiward and began to roll up
our line to the South African right flank. In a twinkling,
Dawson's three battalions, now enfeebled by heavy losses,
were in great peril, threatened by envelopment; Could the
advance be held till darkness would cover a withdrawal ? As
the boundary uniting Gough and Byng ran south-west, this
Gennan drive due west tlm)ugh Guyenoourt imperilled the
NvntKs retreat. What if the foe nad men enough to go
ahead for a decision— a bigdeoision, and a rapid one ?
Communication with Ds^wson became impossible* Yet
platoons and companies neve^ wavered^ never hesitated.
MABWITZ AND BELOW CONTINUE THE ATTACKS 168
Janior officers threw out defenmve flanks and handled rear*
guard actions with a skill which Dawson will never forget.
But for this veteran coolness in the junior rai^« the South
Africans would have been trapped.
Some thirty German airplanes aided the attack. They
flew low, and the putt-putt-putt of their machine-guns
harassed the teams of our artillery, raked our trenches, and
continued their eflTorts till about sunset At this hour, in
a flaring twilight, very noisv with explosions, observers at
Sorel-le-Qrand, west of Heudecourt, could see the foe dimly,
advancing in full strength southward on their right flank.
Sorel was noisy with our passing artillery, lame and blood-
stained with our wounded, and in other ways thronged, as
with details of departmentisJ units retreating towards Green
Line. For Heudecourt in the NvniKe own land had &llen«
and the attack had only a mile or so to advance on SoreL
At all costs it must be checked.
Dawson climbed up a wall in Sorel to see the whole battle-
field. Everywhere the countryside was an inferno wondrous
and varied in contrasts of rival human eflTorts and of devasta-
ting flames and explosions. Heudecourt spouted like a
volcano, and other villages were burning. Barracks and stores
flared ; ammunition dumps detonated ; and Sorel itself was
becoming a swirl of wind-blown smoke flashing with streaks
of fire. Field ambulances were trying with beautiful courage
to get the wounded away from Heudecourt, while batteries at
thundering speed obeyed their orders^ and fugitives of many
sorts crowded the roads. Meantime, over there on the right,
grey and menacing German troops pressed on, wave after
wave, column after column. A more precarious position could
not well be imagined. What could be done, then ?
Dawson turned out his H.Q. staff and put it into trenches
east of Sorel. Two companies of Bleventn Royal Soots took
up a position south and south-west of Heudecourt ; the Sixth
K.O.S. Borderers manned high ground from Sorel south to
li^ramont^ about 3500 yards ; some field artillery came into
action also south of Sorel ; and in this way the heavy, per-
severing onrush of panting Germans was stopped for a
tima
Before a new thrust could be set in movement, our last
guns went westward safely, and Dawson with his brave H.Q.
made their way to Moislains some 5000 yards west of Green
lina All guns on the NvwtKs front were saved except a
forward anti4aak gun which was bogged, and ten pieces of
164 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABGH. 1918
field artillery, south of Sore!* the teams of whieh did not come
up in time. So these guns were destroyed.
The Soath Africans, parched with a thirst which cannot
be described, and adiing everywhere with jhtiffue, beat off all
attacks tiU 7.30 p.m. Then they were ordered to retire
northward before striking west as the Germans had moved
northward behind the South African front The withdrawal
was bravely managed, particolarly by Colonel Christian of
the Second Regiment, whose troops were most perilously
situated. For the most part the withdrawal moved along
the Brown line to the Fins-Qouzeancoort road, and then
tnmed westward and marched to Fins^ followed very closely
by the Gtorman advance.
" B " Company of the Second Begiment had no chance at
alL It began the day at the old quarry on the east of
Heudecourt, and was destroyed, fighting to the last, with its
intrepid leader. Captain Qreen.
It had been arranged that the Seventh Seaforths and
Fifth Camerons should retire through Fpis to Etricourt ; but
German storm troops got into Fins before the last Highland
companies could pass through, and a roundabout way had to
be sought in the darkness, A few Fifth Camerons did not
receive the order to retire ; it fSedled to reach them, so they
stayed in Tellow Line until ten p.m., and then fought their
way out and joined their battalion, bringing with them a
German ofScer and seventeen prisoners.
By ten p.nL, March 22, all divisions of Congreve's Corps
had either manned or were nearing Green Line, and orders
were issued to fight on this front. A certain amount of
Corps artillery — about two brigades, mainly South Irish —
had been lost; the rest was withdrawn safely to cover
Green Line.
At the same hour a message from Gough made known the
fact that Marwitz had broken the Oreen Lme ahovJt five
humdred yards east and satUhreaet of NobeacouH FarTn,^
in Watts's territory, and Congreve was directed to retire to
new positions as soon as a serious attack was made on his
portion of the Green Line. Congreve would be responsible
for a front running from La Chapellette, south of r^ronne,
to the Thibd AaMT's boundary, about halfway between
Moislains and Mananoourt.
He called together his Divisional Commanders to explain
m
* Fray note thiB bieaoh oaMfnUy. NdbeMcnirft'Finn mxA tht Giiiiii Llae
this neigkboUriuM fomttia pnci Si tbi EVMui^ bxld^hifit.
MARWITZ AND BELOW CONTINUE THE ATTACKS 166
the situation, telling them that since the battle was develoD-
ing into a series of rearguard actions, it would be impossibie
for him to control scatteiml, rapid and local fights, apiurt from
giving broad nneral lines, on which all must pat up the
sternest possiUe resistance. He must leave them to learn
from events when a retirement was timely; but on no
account were they to lose touch with units on their flanks,
and Gough was very insistent on the need of holding close
and strong liaison with Byng.
The story of this liaison in its opening incidents has to
be told now, and I wish to make it dear, b^use it has been
mistold, and also because of later events and their conse-
Quencea We are concerned with the boundary divisions —
IfivUh and Forty-aeveTUk, and remember that the Nvath was
in Gough's Army and served under H. H« Tudor, while the
Fcfiy^Befistntk served in Byng's Army under Gorringe.
Further, the Nimik belonged to the 7th Corps, commanded
by CoDgreve, and the Fcrly^BefomUh to the 5th Corps, com-
manded by Fanshawa
If these divisions misunderstood each other and failed to
fidl back together with mutual support, hitehes and scrapes
would come, and Marwita would be aided greatiy by a ois-
jointed British defence, as we have seen (p. 140). The
stronger army ought to have been especially alert in this
matter, wishing not only to help the weaker as much as
possible, but also to prevent itself from being pushed away
m>m its southern boundary. On Friday morning, March 22,
the NimUCB H.Q. sent a Staff Officer to explain tiie situation
to the Forby^sewnUk, and soon after midday a teleohone
message warned the F<niy-9evem4h not only that the jfifMi
might be ordered to feJl back from the Brown lane, but also
that any withdrawal on the NimJOCs part, being south-west
along tlie boundary, would widen the front to be held by the
Finiy-mvmith, which was on Highland Ridge, in the north-
east, and seeminffly at ease there.
After Tudor nad received orders to retire upon Green
line, the Staff Officer returned from the Fcrly-seventh and
the news he brought was diseoneertii^. The FcTty'9tvenik
was to retire to Brown lane only, and could not accept the
rsspoDsibility of connecting its right on Brown
TudoK^s left on the Green. In plainer words, Bvng's right
wing would neither fall back in nne with Gough s northern
corps nor hold a firm flank alons the boundary. It left its
flank and rear to be covered by the Nimih Division, as
166 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MAUCH, 1918
though Bynff^s Army were mneh weaker, nofc much sfeconger,
than Ooagh a So the border problems were beooming too
Gilbertiaa to be fit for the drama of a retreat
As the NvrUh had alrauly widened its front soothwaid, it
would endanger itsdf if it took over lines north-eastward
from the F^ysevenih. This important matter was dis-
cussed by telephone with Gongreve, and in the OTening it
became known that the FoHy^aevenith^ after all« would retire
to Green line. The (question " When ? " was very imnortant^
since the German policy was to roll up the Ninth by oestroy-
ing the two divisions south of it
At 7.80 p.m« the NinvOi telephoned to the Fariy^seventk
to make known the position of its own troops, and was told
that a brigade of the Seoand DiviaioK, Tmni) AB]ftr--^m-
fortmiately, it was a weak one in numbers — ^was in reserve
at Hananconrt and Eqnanconrt Later, at 9.10 p.m., this
brigade was placed temponoily under the Ninth. Here was
a very welcome addition of strength, as already the Ninth's
front had increased to about 7500 yards.
Despite this reinforcement the position remained very
menacing. What would happen to the Foriy-aeventh t It
was far m the north-east, and a heavy fluik attack against
Yillers-Plonich had to be driven off before a retreat under
pressure could begin. Also an attack against Havrinoonrt
would hinder a re&eat from the central portion of the salient
Fansbawe had remained to6 long on Highland Ridge and in
Hindenburg's line. How b tms lack of judgment to be
explained ? Note first of all that two divisions in the salient
the Forly'9eve7Uh and 8iaiy-thirdf were not really assailed till
the evening of March 22. Their defences were very strong,
the attack and its cutting-off pressure were not close by ; so
visible causes for anxiety were absent, while visible reasons
for quiet confidence were present And the next point to be
noted is that Byng and ms officers did not protest against
the slanderous out(^ — ^ The Byng Boys have been let down
by Gough's men, who have been badly handled 1 " As it is
not in the nature of British officers to do wrong wittingly, we
have reason to infer that Byng^s riffht wing misunderstood
its dut^ towards Gough's left, and that its ill-^grounded
accusatKms against Gough's left were accepted as fiusts by
Fanshawe^ B;^, and G.B.Q. Why, I cannot suggesl^ because
I have no conj^ure to offer. The accusations were refuted
by the presence of the Ninth Highbmders in Bjm^B Land,
as well as by the urgent warnings sent by the Ninth to
MABWrrZ AND BELOW CONTINUE THE ATTACKS 167
its northern partner ; and Bjng^s right ought to have remem-
bered that Gongh's di visiona on the average had to hdd nearly
60^ per oeni more front than Byng^s, thoogh very nearlv
twice as many Qerman divisions attaoked Qongh as feu
npon Bvng. Had these &cts been understood, surelv the
Third Armt oould not have fiuled to connect itself wiu the
weaker army by means of a strong and steady flank. To
leave this work to the Ninth was to make a very perilous
and bad beginning in a most hazardous retreat
The necessary thing was to guard as much land as
possible ; so the NiiUh'$ left flank was thrown forward to
a point about a thousand yards north of Fins, while its right
rested on the north end of Epinette Wood, about fifteen
hundred yards south of Nurlu. At the north end of this
front were men of the Second Division; but when would
they be able to secure touch with the Forly-'seventh t Hope
was expressed by 5th Corps that a complete liaison would oe
formed by 6 a.m* on the 28rd. Meantime there was a gap ;
and there was reason also to be anxious about the NirUka
south flank, as the German desire to deave their way through
the Twenty "Jir^ had not weakened in the least
At midmght two things were certain on Gough's left
flank. One of them was that enough timely warning had
bean given to Byng^s right; and the other, that Mannts's
tactics were working towards a great climax both north and
south of the Ninth Division.
CHAPTER Vm
*
SOME POINTS AND CROSS-QUESTIONS RAISED BT THE FORE-
GOIKQ CHAFTEBS
§1
THE breach of the main Oreen Line in the neighbour-
hood of Nobescoart Farm proved that the high
pressure of the foe's attack was directed with skul,
in order to cancel tho worth of that sketchy system
of defence called our P£ronne bridgehead postions. So I
have made a map-— a correct one^ I Mlieve^— to show clearly,
among other important matters, what effects this breach had
on the balance of our battle front Thrust and counter-
thrust, poise and equipoise, these are things to be studied
as carenilly in fighting fronts as in architecture and
engineering.
To retreat effectively against perilous odds is a seait^
after stability, akin to that which occurs when a bridge has
to be built across one of those rivers which rise into sudden
floods and scour into the foundations of piers and abutments.
The bridge-builder has to defeat this scouring onrush of
waters, only he cannot move away from it as a wise General
retires from excessive thrusts and concussions ; but when a
Oeneral is not wise, when he allows his army to be swallowed
up bv superior numbers, there is much resemblance between
the oisaster and an ill-built bridge which is carried away by
storm and spate.
To bend like a yew bow, in order not to break like an
unpliant stick, was the essential generalship which our Fifth
Armt was set to obey while reinforcements were coming
gradually into line. Apart from some gunless French
infantry, with some Frencm cavalry, in the south of Hutier^s
battle, no support could reach our fraying lines before
Sunday morning, March 24. Durin^r Saturday and Sunday
the Eighth Division — the only British reinrorcement that
168
SOME POINTS AND 0B08S-QUESTI0NS 169
would aid Watts*- would be detmiiied at and near Neele;
and aboat then O. M. Franks with the ITmiy-J/iftk wonld
b^gin to join Oongreva^ But an immediate need of men for
two big battles against perilous odds coold not be made less
aeate by these coming event&
So at niffhtfidli lureh S2, the situation was eritical, not
that we had lost a great deal of land against Iftarwits, or
against Hutier and Marwita on the borderlsnds north and
south of the Yermand-Amiens road, but beeanse menacing
thrusts at dangerous places had upset the balsnoe of our
prepared drfenoes, with the result that our weakness in
numbers had for its companion a lack of structural fitness
or equilibrium. I think nere of another analogy. An arch
too weak for its purpose must be dangerous enough in a
bridge, but if you dislodge its keystone you know at once
that a notice in red letters must be put up to forbid heavy
traffic— above all during bad weather.
Now the Ptomne bridgehead positions mav be compared,
without any extravagance, to an arch unfit for its omce ; it
was good enough for a rearguard acUou, but far too unfimshed
and too thinly manned for a deeieive fight; and the breach a
trifle east and south-'Cast of Nobescourt Farm may be com*
pared, also without any extravagance, to a keystone badly
And another structural m^ter invites attention. Oerman
Commanders liked to attack slantingly from right to left —
firam north to south-west Yet our corps and divisional
boundaries^ like the boundarv line between Bvng and (}ou(^
ran in this direction, as a rule, so the foe had rat to attack
on a slanting front along one of our boundaries, while assail-
ing due west on a sector a few miles south, in order to cause
grave troubles in the retreat of our men.
It mwars to me, then, that boundaries running due west
might have been much better both for the resistance of an
army dangerously undermanned, and also for the liaison
between Byng and Oough. Attacks cutting across them in
a south-westerly direction would have offerra flanks to our
counter-blows ; and since the advance on the first two days
was not n^>id but slow, surely we should have had many
fihances of damaging the foe*s exposed fianks. Laymen are
too apt to f OTget that an advance nas no comfort ^en the
* This ezoaUmt dMrioa oune from the Ypnt ndghboorhood. If it bed
hmn ml toelbwwA mooli Mrlier in tlie beltle, iti telna to the defmoe
wonld haft bin doobM, il not inted InbM.
170 THE FIFTH ABMY m MABOH, 1918
defenders can torn againsfc its right or left in a keen, swift
counter-stroke.
If^ now, yon torn to my map^ yon will find it eas^ to
apply these reflections. Two Corps boundaries are gjyon,
one "between Congreve and Watts, and one between Watts
and Maxsa Both nm south-west ; the former down to and
along the Cologne Biver, and the Maxse-Watts line in a wavy
course to the east and south of Trefoon.
The map relates also what happened <m the first two da^
from Holnon to the north of Saulcourt, 21,600 yards away in
the north-westb Four British divisions and their supports
are in action; and let us remember that both cavalry and
tanks have been very helpful to Watts, as in tiie counter^
blow near Hervilly, aoout elevenajn. on March 22. This good
stroke was invaluable. It prevented the attack finom reach*
in^ Green lane near Nobescourt Farm, and enaUed the
F%fiieth, after its tiresome journey and a foroed march
through foff, to take up its positions with its three brigades
over-rtretimed alonff ureen Line, while sending one of its
battalions^ the Fifth Durham light In£uitryi under Major
A. L. RaimeS) to help the Siaiy-aixih, whose left might be
assailed by a Qerman thrust from the north of BoiseL
Five of Maxse's battle zone redoubts are shown by my
map in the north of Colin Mackensde's front ; and note how
the^ were outflanked on the first day by the pressure through
Maissemy towards Villecholles. Next day this pressure
carried the German advance through Vermand to the
Green Line ofiGshoot between Foeuilly and Bemes, 5000 yards;
and south of the Yermand-Amiens road a part of the Green
Line ofEshoot was overrun, and both Canlainoourt and Trefixm
passed into German hands. Stability had gone firom this
portion of our structural defence.
Another part of the bridgehead positions faced the
attack west of Tertoy, east of l^nignes, and on both sides of
Hancourt northward and north*westward. Just north of
Hancourt we find Nobescourt Farm, winch Uie foe nearly
captured at five o'clock in the afternoon of the second day,
after breachine the main Green Line some 600 yards away.
Even if the Ureen Line offiahoot had not been lost east of
Canlainoourt and Trefcon, this breach of the Pfronne bridge-
head dose by Nobescourt Farm would have enforced a ni^t
retreat from Yilldv^ue, Pceuillyi Bemes, whose position
below it on the south-east would have been dominated by
this grave menace to the main bridgehead.
SOME POINTS AND CfiOBB-QUESTIONS 171
Waits * had not men enough to mend the bridgeheed, hie
liMes haying been Teiy grave; and it was dear to him that
an eA>rt to keep his ground east of the Somme woold thmst
his few and jaded troops into a very unwise forlorn hope^
They wonld %ht to the very kst^ bat at last they would oe
routed by far superior numbers; and afterwards 7 • . . Then
Marwitz and HuUer would be free to go ahead.
WattSy then, received sanetion to withdraw behind the
Somme; and this move, for another reason, was timely, a
gap having formed between Watts and Mazse, leaving the
remains of Daly's Division in Che air about Oroix Mdigneuz.
§n
Though this withdrawal was helpful and essential, and
thou^ unfinished prspaiations had been made for it by
O.H.Q., Qough's juc^gment is questioned by one set <^ crities
and ccmdemned by another. Neither set has an argument
or a fact which was not dear to Gkmgh and his Oorps Com*
manders; but when oontioversial minds have fixed ideas,
they make shift contentedly without new facts sod fresh
argumentsL
Recently one such mind said to me: ^A devilish bad
boaineBB to lose the P^roone bridgehead I It hit our national
tmstige bdow the bdt^ and mma us cut a very poor figure
before our Allies! And on French soil, tool How many
IVeneh bridges did we destroy, and what was their value in
money and in traffic communication ? Our men should have
been firm — ashamed to budge I "
An tmreasoning mood of this powerful sort goes its own
way like the wind, and like the wmd it has influence— often
hannfuL For this reason I return to this bridgehead question
in the Part on Oontroversies» so as to show it in other aspects,
nioagh O.H.Q/S instructions were sometimes rather lax in
their use of stereotyped phrases or in sentences that cancelled
eadi other, yet, beyond aU question, a retreat behind the
Somme was looked upon as a likdy and useful move when
the Somme defences were planned, and manv thousands of
men were set to work upon them in a race agamst insufficient
time.
Before the battle Gough had gathered from O.H.Q.
inatroetions, both written and spoken, that since the crisis
in man«power was a grave threat to Haig^s widened front»
• WeMi e 19ih Ooips,
172 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABCH, 1918
too mABy riskB in batUe were not to be taken with the Fiyth
Abmt; tibiat its divisions were to be nursed as carefully aa
possible if a determined assault upon them were made hv
superior numbers ; and that it miffht well be desirable to faU
back to the rearward defences of P^ronne and the Somme
while linking up with the TmitD Armt on the north, and
preparing for counter-blows.
Certain matters, of course, belonged to the rudiments of
common sense ; as, for example, that we Fifth Abht, though
dangerously week in numbero,had to guard as long as possible
the French flank on its right and Byng's flank on its lefl^
whUe reeeivmg adequate support from these JUmka, Also it
was obvious mat the loss of P&onne, if this centre of com-
municatioDs became of operative use to the foe, would be
very bad ; hence an emergency aone was roughed in behind
the Somme to P^ronne, and thence north-eastward behind
the Tortille River. But it was — and is— equally obvious to
good sense that an army too weak in numbers cannot fi^ht a
Waterloo day after day, and that its Ck>mmander must Team
partly from the condition of his troops, partly from the
enemv's power and concussions, when nis line must bend
swiftly in order to avoid snapping into fragments.
To fight at all costs against superior power in a retreat is
to hold on as long as you can without suffering disaster ; and
then to be clever in delaying actions while patching the gtifs
in your retreating and periling divisions. It was thus that
Qough and his Army fought through days and nights; and
when cavillers declare that Qough nursed his Army overmuch
and should have kept it longer at dose grip with the German
hordes, they show not only that they do not call up into
pictorial presence before their minds what our men had to
endure, but also that they are ignorant of what our men lost
in casualties, though nursed as carefully as possible by trJ^
Commanders. When a Corps of five divisions loses in a battle
26,000 in casualties; when another of four divisions loses
nearly 22,000; and when two other Corps have an e^ual
average loss in their brigades, we know that they have borne
to the frill all that they could bear and that doser contact wiUi
superior numbeis would have been criminal and fiitaL
Indeed, there are times when I cannot help thinking that
tiie retreat was not rapid enough. I say to mysdf, for
example : "^ Between 10.80 of March 21 and onepinL of the
second day, our troons east of Hargicourfe and Vuleret were
pressed back only aoout 6500 yar^ in the centre^ and less
SOME POINTS AND 0B08S-QUEBTION8 178
than 7600 yards along the Watts-Cdngreve bonndaiy. iVom
the line east of Hargiooort south-weet to Nobescourt Fann,
which was nearly lost late in the afternoon of the second day
is 10,500 yarda Was this very alow withdrawal in a stannw
defence worth the drain of casnalties that oar brave men
anffered? Watts had divisions mnch below strength, and
their tenacity, shown so clearly on correct maps, boi:^t its
gradual giving of |proand at a very high prica'*
In these questioning moods, too, as I have said before, I
cannot help wondering also whether the system of defence
chosen by G.H.Q. — a Forward Zone, a Battle Zone, and a
Bear Zone» three defensive belts, sited at considerable distance
from each other — ^were in keeping with what may be called
the genius of modemiised attack. Early on the first day,
several times, the battle zone was turned by the loss of a
village on its flank, as when Marwita on the first day pressed
beyond Bonssov and Templeuic, on the boundary between
Ocmgreve and watta Would it have been better to employ
two forward cones with a strip of open country between
than, and the batUe aone several miles behind wem f In
the soath— the battle aoainst Hutier— the Crosat Canal would
have been a part of we second forward aone ; and in the
eentane and north, the P^nne bridgehead and its continuatioa
into TmBD Abut land.
These reflections are given here for the purpose of showing
that when cavillers find trait with Gough and his Army, they
let their ideas run in a rut or groove and pay no attention to
eroasHiueations and other matters also. Hazard plays a part
so incalculable in all battles^ and above all in battles along
very wide fronts, that students cannot review their opinions
too frequently, making allowance after allowance for inevitable
hitches.
OHAFTER IX
SATOBDAT AKD SVNDAT IN TBI NOBTHKBH FIOHTINO
§n
WATTS, tinder cover of reaigoards, got safely away
with his gtms and stores and impedimenta ; but
on readiing his positions bdiind the Somme, he
had 18,000 yards of river line to guard hy
scattered poets, with small reserves at all known eroesings.
Best, then, had to go hand in hand with a vigilance always
wide-awake, and Ilestdid not get the bestof the bamin. On
the third day, late in the afternoon, enteiprisingBoche patrols
picked their way forward and made several efibrts to reach the
right bank, only to be shot down by oar gunners.
As soon as Watts retired from ibe P£onne l^dgehead, it
became necessary for Oongreve to fall back, and he was
directed to man a line extending from La Chapellette, below
Pdronne, to Doingt, cnarding P^ronne itself, thence north-
eastward to Bussn and Aizecourt^ and on to theOreen line at
Nnrlu and Equanconrt. We have seen that the lfinih*s
vanguard reached Green Line on the evening of the second
day, at about ten o'clock. Its rearguards, of course, were well
ahead, and always on the look out for Byng's right flank
troops of the Forly'SeverUk.
At 6.26 a^m. on Saturday, March 28, in a misty cold gloom,
when our men were stiff and sore after another bad vigil, the
NirUh received orders from its Corps to hold Oreen Line with
rearguards only, and to draw the rest of its troops to the line
of the Canal du Nord, north of Moislains, and the Tortille
river south of this village. It was to help the movemmts of
the Tweniy^f/nt whose left was hard pressed. As this move
affected By xig a right, a warning was sent at once to 5th Coips»
whose troops, as we have seen, had not fallen back in con-
fonnity vrith their southern aUy« To recover from a bad start
is often as difficult as to produce a masterpiece, and 5th
Corpse by remaining in ilsRiui^reB salient to be asBsiled on
174
THE NOBTHEBN FIGHTING CQNTINIJBD 175
the evening of the second day, made an iinlaeky start, which
enabled the attack to worry its retreat all night in the
manner meet likely to push our two armies aparL To do
this, and to envelop 5th Corps from south and north, was one
of LndendorjOTs pnme objects ; hence 5th Corps' right wonld
have been wise if it had retired to Green Line with the Ninth
DiYisiON, or if it had formed with enough troops a strong
flank running south-west from Villers Plouich to Equancourt
By fidling to do either of these things, it was pressed gradually
away from its liaison with the TfirUh; nrst to Metae-on-
Couture, and then, during the morning of March 23» to Four
Winds Farm, south-west of Ttres, about 8500 yards north of
ihe boundary at Manancourt. Here the Forty-aevewOi fought
very bravely in the open till nightfall, when it was pushed to
the east of Rooquigny, still farther from its union with
Gough's left.
Meanwhile the Nimtk was harried by events of eaual
moment. Its withdrawal to the Canal du Nord was fuU of
stirring episodes. The foe, covered by a barrage from guns
and trencn mortars, assailed Green line. On our left, after a
stem grapple, this attack was broken by Scottish Highlanders,
but it did much harm on the right, capturing Epinette Wood,
from which the K.O.S. Borderers got out with difficidty.
Then both Highlanders md Lowlanders, aided by rearguurdsi
began in broad daylight to withdraw, always under pressure ;
there was no artiUety to cover them, as it had to oe taken
across the Canal du Nord; yet slowly, and skiUully, they
carried out their movement all right, and the German losses
were severe. By two pjn. the Nvnih was in position behind
the Canal du Nord from Moislains to the beet-sugar factory
north of Etrioourt, about 2750 yards within the Thisd Abxt 8
arem At the beet-sugar fiictoiy about 750 men of the Second
DrvisiOH continued Uie line eastward to about a tiiousand
yards north of Fins, also in Thibd Abxt ffround.
Before noon, at eleven o'clock, the Ninth's G.O.C. made
an urgent visit to 5th Corps, Thibd Abmt, because the position
was becoming much too perilous. The foe was trjring to
envelop 5th (x>rp8, and the Ninth was strugg^ling to prevent
this envelopment, but its front had stretched to about 11,000
yards, so effeetive defence became more and more difficult and
baardous. The Highlanders were guarding land which
ought to be held by the Jforfy-araenA, though they were
needed urgently in their own ground. These matters were
plaeed before the 5th Corps' B.G.0.8., who at once consulted
t\ ;\ iUUKH, 1918
...^.^n.^.:. Stennission was gnuited
Mv;^ 4itf Forty^aeventk'a tmht
.. ^ * ^. rxioA — ^from north of l^ns
^.* > * nmdi of Equanooort (V. 4,
. •»». xaier was aelivered, and I
.^ ^ , ttrnt was taken over by the
•^..-^Oii^ became gregarious. After
..^ «««Igo was driven between tiie
... i»^ uoMi^ southward, the Twenty-
•Q .HMtfih of Bouchavesnes, onoover-
« .«!«/ were posted on the Bpine de
. .w«M* Bouchavesnes and Moislaina
^>4,«w4i was the pressure which the
^.ao Mainst! It shows how the
^^i^KHM^y from day to day to annihi-
.V V'/zOA; and also how the Nvnth,
^ iis s>wn fix)ntier8, had to be always
«<4i Wellington's fiftvourite troops,
-**«^«i0» ever behaved better than tne
ft^a lAve received no thanks from
. ^v >.iUe recognition from the British
. .«^ »t South Africa, Dawson has related
V *i.i%i slay along his frontage ;—
is »« AttU supplies were arranged in dumps
^ ^ *« ^ first result of the retirement was
^.^^^ J^mps had to be destroyed by us.
>MiU fpt supplies and ammunition only
.^a ^^ a long way off. There was great
\ ..^ «%4M» and ammunition. Tanks and
.% 1^ y^^iol, and machine-gunners could
><>..44 >M was held by the reserve brigade,
^ u^«>»lMid Brigade, and ' details ' ; namely,
« v> ><iU «^^ I^Q taken into the battle were
^ .^N.^ 4^) pu^ i^ to ^oI<^ ^^ Ui^^ Details
*" V \v<y well. We never get the best out
' ^x if )^ own formation. Details will put
r^ ^^ ^Ul not endure the absolute hell that
"^^ %^ their own nlatoons and companies.
Vk^ like line* and nald it very welL The
>«<« ik^ei^* Thi^ eama dn tA '
\
THE NOBTHBBN FIGHTING CONTINUED 177
imbfaits. But the time came when the details had the order
to retire ; it was a bad order. It said, * Retire as soon as yoa
get this.' In five minutes the battalion of details was in full
retreat^ and <niee they got going like that there was no
stopping them. The Qennans, as soon as they saw these
fellows going, got np and began to fire» but although within
tor^ yards they were so excited that th^ could hit no one
at first Then they cut the wire, and after a few minutes
they got the machine-guns and riflemen on the parapet, and
did Ajgreat deal of damage to our details as they were retiring.
'' nie orders of the &uth Afirican Brigade that day were
that it was not to be in the front line, bcMuse it had borne
the brunt of the fight the other two days. It was to be in
support on the right But the other two brigades, owing to
the loss of the battali(m of details, could not oover the boat,
so tilie South African Brigade had to go into the firont line
again. We retired slowly, in accordance with orders, until
we reached the Tortille River. I went up some high ground
on the left, and to my consternation found no infantry on the
hiU. I vent back to the road, and while I was there, two
officers and forty men belonging to the division on our right
came along. I ordered them to go up and hold that hiH
The officer in oonmutnd said that he could not do it ; his men
were absolutely done. He said that these forty men were the
remains of about three hundred, and that they had had no
food whatever since the attack started two days before. I
replied that I could not help it; the work had to be done. I
promised them rations and rum, and supplied the rations and
rum, and sent them up the hill with my orisade major to put
them in position. Half an hour aftenrards I went to see, and
thev had all gone. I oiu^ht to have recognised that they had
had a bad time of it ana had reached that stage when troops
were no longer reliable. In this stage there is only one wav
to hold troops— -by the influence of an officer or non-com. with
a stronger personality, who will use his fists, and if this does
not work, will use his revolver."
Dawson watched the TtuerUy'^JirBt DivisiOK retirii^. Two
thin Unee of British were covering the retirement of the third,
and following came wave after wave, and column after column
of Gemans to a depth of about a mila It struck him as
ridiculous to see these two thin lines of British troqps keeping
their end up, but all the same they had to withdraw. They
wont back till they were two miles in the rear. Then Dawson
had a gap of two miles open westward on his right flank. If
178 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABCH, 1918
ihe (JermanB turned to the north they would cut off his
troops. While he was wondering what to do, the details, who
had retired with the transport, were sent back again, and he
formed a line of posts to protect the gap on his flank.
Before sunset the G.O«C. visited I)aw8on and told him to
retire after dark to a ridge just west of Bouchavesnes, while
Lowlanders were to man the near or east edge of St Pierre
Yaast Wood. At all costs this line must be hdd.
Then the G.O.C. hastened northward to see Kennedy, his
Highland brigadier, whose troops at two p.m. held a line
from about a mile or less below Mesnil-en-Arrouaise to a
point north-west of Etricourt, pretty close to a well-known
beet-sugar factory. From this point, as we have seen, about
760 men of the Secoo^d Division carried on the line to the
north of Fins; but they found their hard job too hot^ and
before dusk they retired north-westward, without orders.
No doubt bitter attacks in the afternoon were very trying.
As soon as these men of the Second fell back towards
Bocquisny, the Highlanders pulled in their line till it
spannea a portion of Byng^s land from about Mesnil to
Saillisel's rums just north of the boundary.
This was the position of aflGurs when the G.O.C. visited
Kennedy, his Highland brigadier. What could be done ? A
safe retreat could not be made by twilight. It would be seen
by the foe, who at once would strike. The Highlanders were
completely stranded on Thiro Abbiy land, with both flanka
uncovered by gapa After dark they could close down south-
ward till their right joined the Lowlanders along the east
edge of St. Pierre Vaast Wood, while their left rested still on
Brig's land in front of Saillisel.
These ticklish movements by night were to be done by
four am. on Sunday, March 24; and with help of rare good
luck, accompanied by cool and swift leading, idl went well
enough, though at midnight or thereabouts, the Lowlanders
had to beat off a determined push. But toe these night
manoeuvres, both Highlanders and Lowlanders might easily
have shared the fate of their comrades, the South Africans,
who on Sunday, March 24, were surrounded and overwhelmed
because the Nvnth had no reserves left^ having been compelled
by events to extend beyond its own boundaries.
Though the night manosuvres had reunited the Low-
landers and Highlanders, everybody knew that one danger
had been exchanged for another, for if the 6th Oorps^ Third
Abict, did not close down rapidly,a gap would exist at four a.nL
THE NOBTHBSN FIGHTING OONTIKUBD 179
on Sunday between SaiHinel and MesniL So a warning of
this danger was sent at once to Ooogh.
§n
If the Ninth DivisiOH had made a eomplete report of all
partienlarB, no mistake could have been made by tne prMs-
writere at O.Q.H« But chivalnr interfered. liaison troops
in a time of peril should not fidl back without orders ; but
those men of the Second were few in number, they had had a
trying experience, and afterwards their brigsdier was killed
in action. So the Ninth's H.Q. made no complaints. But
complaints were raised by the Forty-aeventh, as by other
TfllBD Abmt troops, and some influenced the prMs-writers
at G.H.Q., and found their way into the official dispatch. Thb
result is that the British people have been asked to condemn
the Ninth, who warned Byws left affain and again, and
then held some two miles ox Thibd Abhy land. Such is
human nature ! We feel more or less unkind to those who
humble us by helping us in a time of great need, while we
are fond of those whom we help.
The dispatch says not a word of the earnest warnings
which Byng^s right received from Qough's left, ineludinff a
personal visit from the Ninth's O.O.C. to 5th Corps in oraer
to see Bovd, the RG.Q.9L; and the precis-writers pass over
the bounduy uniting Byng and Gough as if ignorant of its
place in G^dLQ. maps.
The dispatch begins by saving that 5th Oorns, Third
Abht, during the morning of ICwsh tS, continued its wiUi-
drawal, covered W rearguards who were heavily engsffed. It
Ml "back from the Meta-en-Gouture salient to the defences
of the third nme about Ytres.** Turn to my map of the
boundary districts and note the postion of Ytres. From its
most southern point to the boundary below Bquancourt is
some 4500 yarosy and the distance is about 500 yards more
to the boundaiy below Mananeourt Further, Green Line
pesBod east of Equancourt to the east of Ytres, and the
NintiCs vanguard reached this line at about ten p.m. of the
second day, keeping rearguards well ahead. Was it Mife and
right for 5th Corps to postpone its arrival at Green line to
i& morning of the 28raf It was warned W the southern
events wbidi compelled the Ninth to withdraw. It was
warned also b^ events at Hermies, Beanmeta and Vaalx.
Why, then, did it not puU out of Vlesquitees salient in order to
180 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
retire wiih its southern partner, and to avoid the risks it ran
of disaster owing to the enemy's success in the north 7 Oa
the evening of the first day, when a withdrawal by 6th Corps,
Thibd Abmy, uncovered the NinOCa forward zone, the Nvriik
retired at once with its neighbour. Surely this example was
one to be followed, since firm unison between our two armies
was essential ? Yet the dispatch has not a word to say on
those important matters. I^or does it speak of the very able
way in which the attack was handled in accordance with
LudendorfiTs aima
On the other hand, it declares that 5th Corps was pushed
north-west because Congreve's troops had been withdrawn
under orders from Green Line to the Canal du Nord, north
of Moislains; a movement rendered necessary, as we have
seen, by southern events. Even if 5th Corps' right had
followed the boundary during the night, instead of going
west to Metz-en-Couture and Ytres, uiis official statement
would be aside from the main point--a belated retreat from
the salient Then we are told that the Forty-aefvewtk Division
and the brigade of the Second made vigorous efforts to re-
establish toudh with the Fifth Abmt !
We have seen what happened to that brigade of the
Second ; and anxiety about the Forty'^aeven^h not only detained
the Highlanders in Byng's land, it caused the Ninth's G.O.C. to
visit 6th Corpa
One cannot help r^prettin^ that the boundary is f oigotten
in the official dispatch^ Mu(£ misunderstanding arises from
this fact We are told how the Forty^eevenih, on the fourth
day, held the village of Rocquicny from sunrise well into the
af teraoon, beating off all assaults till the foe worked round
their flank between Rocquigny and Le Transloy and forced
them to retreat. A splendid fight; but something more
should have been said. The Forty'Seventh was fiur m>m its
southern boundary. It ought to have defended both Morval
and Combles.
§ III
At 2.50 on Sunday morning, March 24, the South Afrifflmff
sent a message as follows to their G.O.C. : —
'* Twenty 'first Division reports that CWry* is in the
^ Cntfcy-for-Somme, » littla more th«a 4000 ysids ■onth-wMt of Boa-
ohftTatnMp tnd about 6000 yacdi nozth-wMt of Ptonm«. A msry iauMrteni
Gorsum raootM, Irat boob ootmtoztd Along H«m Bpox 1^ two balMioiii of
THE NORTHEBN FIGHTINO CONnNUBD 181
hands of enemy^ and that the v are making a farther retirement
to nun toueh witii their flank."
The TweTUy-frrst^ firom the first day, as we have seen, had
heen badly hit^ and the German pressure continued to be so
keen npon its left wing that it fell baek more rapidly than
the South Africans, whose retirement began at 9.46 p.nL of
the 28rd. By three ikm., March 24» the Soath Africans — about
600 men in all — ^took up their positions north of the road
running between Le Foret and Banoourt During the nisht^
touch was obtained by the South African right with the lefk
brigade of the Twenty-fint, which had retirra and then had
adTanced a^^ain. As for the South Africsn left flank, it was
in^ touch with a company of the K.O.S. Borderers, but not
with the other Borderers who were in reserve south of
Bancourt. A mounted patrol was sent out, as well as several
infantry patrols, but dl attempts to find the Lowlanders
Ikiled, the weather being foggy.
Before dawn a mishap came out of a ftJse report Our
Hi^|hlanders» hearing that the Lowlanders had fallen back,
which was fidse, withdrew to Bapaum^P&onne road to be
in line with them ; and the message reporting this move did
not reach the O.O.C. till 7.6 a.m. About five hours lost !
As quickly as possible three tanks at Combles were sent
to a front between Marritees Wood and Bancourt It was
hoped that they would fiU the gap between the South Africans
and our Lowlanders. Thev came too late. At eight o'clock
the Lowlanders were attacked in front and on both flanks, the
biggest jolts comin^acainst the right flank ; but at this point
happily, the Sixth &.0.& Borderers, bom south of Bancourt
delayed the turning movement long enough to let other troops
reti^D from St Pierre Yaast Wood and to take post covering
Combles, whne Thibd Army troops had not arrived.
Here a brisk stand was made for an hour or so ; abrilliant
rearguard action, but not so good, of course, as the very noble
last stand of Dawson's five hundred.
Li the part on Episodes, I give a full description of the
South AMcan Brigade's last stand, which, like the rest of the
Ninth's defence, s^ck admiration into the German leaders.
At a most critical time and place it stopped the German
advance for a littie more than seven hours, causing a great
block of German troops, guns and transport From west of
the Tkkrti^fifik Dimioa, who bed Jwl anlvsd sftsr s long foioad nutfeh.
When oor ooo&lry spm to wsr, slwsTt onnidj, hor only ssfo Ally Is moxolfiil
PrOTldODOi.
182 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABCH, 1918
Bouchayemes to Aizeooort-le-Haat the road was packed with
a doable Ime of delayed German troops and equipments.
General Byn^ and his officers can never be grateful enough
to the South Africans. Colonel Buchan says, very well : — ^
** It was no piece of fruitless gallantry. • . • indeed, it is
not too much to say that on that fevered Sabbath the stand
of the [South African] Brigade saved the British front. It
was the hour of von der Marwitz's most deadly thrust.
While Qough was struggling at the river crossings, the Thibd
Abmy had been forced west of Morval and Bajpaume, far over
our did battle ground of the Somme. The breach between
the two armies was hourly widening. But for the self-
sacrifice of the (S.A.) Brigade at Manidres Wood and the
delay in ilie German advance at its most critical point, it is
dottbtftil whether Byng could ever have established that line
on which, before the end of March, he held the enemy/' ^
aided by many troops from Gough's left wing, and by other
reinforcements.
The foe understood what our NtTiih had achieved.
"On the road to Le Gateau/' says Buchan, "a party of
British officers was stopped by the Emperor, who asked if
any one present belonged to the Ninth Di visiOK. * I want to
see a man of that division/ he said, ' for if all the divisions
had fought like the NmUh I would not have had any troops
left to carry on the attack.' "
The Highlanders also encountered many perils. They
withdrew to a ridge south of Morval, on Third Abmt land,
but their rearguard, about 150 Fifth Camerons, had their
right flank turned. At first they retired to Lesboeufisi, beine
unaware that the foe had broken through Bvng^s right flank
and had taken Combles, Morval, Lesboeufs, along about 5000
yards of front ; and then they marched to Flers and joined
the 62nd Brig^e, SevenUenfUh Division, t
It was at 4.15 p.m. that the Thibd Abht reported to
Gough : " Hie enemy has broken through our risht flank and
has occupied Combles, Morval and Lestoufa" Owing mainly
to this disaster, Oongreve's Gorps^ heavily pressed also along ito
whole fix>nt, fdl bad: by evening to the line Hem-Maurepaa
All that the Staff could collect of caViilry, Canadian motor
• iigoath AMoan Foroee in Vmnoe/' p. 191. Colonel Baoban puts a plain
matter poiniedlT, nnlike the a.RQ. IMspatoh, whioh gUdee over the South
Alrioan aefeooelna lew ionnal phraees andtvithoat firainlnips ite wideq^read
t The J r^iolned their own onit on Monday eyening, Ifaroh 5U{.
THE NOBTHEBN FIGHTING CONTINDED 183
inacliine-gtaia» and the crews and goxifi of some tanks, were
thrown out on the left to the north-west in the direction of
Bemalay Wood;* and, thoi^ still not in touch with the
Thi£D Abxt, the exposed flame was more or less covered. But
now our line behind the Somme made a very sharp angle
westward fix>m P&ronne ; it would be enfiladed and taken in
reverse from the northern bank.
Haig relates how Byng was affected by the loss of Combles^
Morval and Lesboenfs. The advance "threatened to sever
the connection between the Fifth sod Third Amass and the
situation was serious." " In view of this situation the 6th
and 4th Oorps, TmBD Abmt, were ordered to fall back to
the general line, Basentin-Le Sani-Qrevillers-Ervillers • . •
The withdrawal of the right and centre of the Thibd Akmt was
carried out daring the afternoon and evening in drcumstaaces
of great difficulty, as cm the right flank bodies of Gterman
infantry were already between our troops and the positions to
which they were directed to fall back. In this withdrawal
valuable service was rendered by twelve machine*guns of the
8ixty4hiTd Division Machine-Gun Battalion, in LesboBufB.
Theee guns held up the enemy's advance from Morval at
a critiod period, nring 25,000 rounds into the enemy's
advancing masses, and by their action enabling their division
to readi the position aan^ed to it.
'' By nightfall the divisions of the 6th Corps had taken up
their line successfully between Baaentin, High Wood, Eau-
court I'Abbaye and Ligny-Thilloy.t Before midnight the
troops of the 4th Corps, who had carried out their witk-
drmwal by stages in the free of constant attacks, were
establidiea on the line assiffned to them west of Bapaume,
between Le Barque and Ervfllers. Touch between the eeveral
dMeiane of the 6ih Gone o/nd between 6ih and 4ith Corpe,
however^ toae not property eetoMiahed,"
Note this last sentence with care. As the 5th Corps was
separated from the 4th, there was a breach in the centre of
Byng^s Army ; and as its own divisions were not in touch
* BMutey Wooa, Mtl of IConteabMi. in Bjag^i ««...
t BliU ftf torn tba boundary: 5ta Oom oas^t to lia^ bson at
MonUobftn m well m Bamtln. Instaed of syng't troops at Montaaban
tboio woto nowly arriiFod onlti oC the Fimt Catalbt, whidi, daring Uie after-
noon of Meroh 84, errived there, oomSng from Watli'e oadermaaaed Oorpi.
The diepaleh mentions the erriral of Fini OkVASMt nniti at IContanban, but
iocgete to My that Montaoban wee in Byng'e aree, and that en inoreaiing
Blnln wee thrown npon Qoogh'i left end centre by the dieonity in Byiig'e
MhOeive. Thie dieonity le teodbed, bat not its rwolti on Ooagh'e traope.
184 THE FIFTH ABMY IN HABGH, 1918
there is no difficulty in understanding why 5th Corps* right
could not join hands with the Nmth Division.
What remained of the Highlanders, after a stand on the
Morval-Oombles positions, which, as the map shows, was far
in Byng's land, retired to the rid^e south of Ginchy, also in
Thibd Abmy land, and there took dieir revenge with machine"
guns and Lewis guns, fiHng on masses of German troops who
were advancing in column of fours along the road.
Many other Acperiences marked the fourth day, and
among them was the origin of Colonel Hadow's force. At
about five p.m., when some Highlanders were withdrawing to
Maricourt^ some three hnndrra of the Eighth Black Watch,
under Hadow,^ had their right turned and retreated north-
ward. Around this body ouier men gathered until Hadow's
force was two thousand strong. It served under Congreve,
holding a position for two daya:— March 27 and 28 — ^between
Mericoiurt TAbb^ and Sailly le Sec; then it was relieved,
and the Highlanders returned to their own division.
On the fourth day, again, Congreve began to receive the
Thwty-itfik Division as reinforcements. It came from the
SiooND Abmt, and arrived mainly by battalions of difierent
brimdes, and there was no time to oif[anize its units.
Troops of the Thirty-fi/ih detrained at Bray-sur-Somme,
were hurried along the north bank of the river to support
Congreve. Already the German advance had passed CUry,
and was pressinff hard upon Tudor's and Campbell's remnants
when these and some other reinforcements came upon the
scene. The Fifteenth Cheshires and Fifteenth Notts and Derby
did very well, counter-attacking witii success; and after-
wards a line was taken up from the river at Hem north into
Thibd Abmt land at LonguevaL For a moment danmr in
this sector was averted ; out Marwitz very neariy mack real
the main purpose of his attack. To think of it is to grow
cold. And the whole line north of the Army boundaiv had
such an unstable form that it presaged few good thing&
Indeed, boundary troubles went on and on. At first they
were caused by the fact that 6th Corps remained too far in
the north-east ; then, suddenly, 6th Corps went back too fast
and was too far in the north-west Hazard and hitches
during a modernized retreat make a gambling hell unfit even
for Milton's fisJlen ancels.
On this Sunday, March 24, the Ninth was attached to the
^irhf-fifih Division, commanded by Franks, and the Twelfth
ighland Light Infantry of the Tkiky-fifOi^ less one company,
THE NOBTHEBN FIGHTING GONTINUSD 185
184 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABGH, 1918
\
THE NOBTHEBN FIGHTING CONTINUED 185
reinforced the NintL At three p.m. the Twelfth Highland
Li^t Infiuitry retook lianrepas, bat held it only a ahort
while as troope on the right were obliged tofidl bade between
Hardeoonrt ud CSl&ry-aiuvSomme.
Again, students will note that the Firtt Oavalrt at
Montauban were not nf*ed as mounted troops. Gampbell, of
the Twentj^first, desired to use them mounted, but the Corps
did not) and I beUeve could not, give him leave. In fightine
of this nature O AQ. opposed the use of mounted troops, I
belieya Dismounted men of the First Catalbt did great
work on the 24th and 26th, guaiding the open left SaSk at
Tribes Wood and Montanban; but is it riffht to believe that
their value as mobile reinforoementB would have been greatly
inereaaed if thejr had not been separated from their horses ?
Aided by maehme-^ns, and empWed as genuine eavahy,
they miffht have mmed touch with Byng at Basentin, dosing
the cap between uie 6th and 7th Corps.
fietween the second and fourth days a very welcome
addition of power was eoUeeted by Conffreve in Pironne :
stragglers, leave men from England, and o&er odds and ends,
four or five thousand in aU eventually, and commanded by
laeut-Colond Huni Their first business was to put into a
state of defence the line Susanna, Yaux Wood, Mancourt, and
Montanban; and th^ did good service both in their work
and afterwards in defending their line. Later, too, Congreve
ooUeeted another seratdi force, this time in Corbie, and put it
into the Old Amiens defences from the Somme to the Anere,
covering Corbia
This collecting of ^ scratch " parties, which were rapidly
^nganiaed into &iny homogeneous forces, was being constantly
done by the Staff and Commanders of the Fifth Armt.
Carey's Force, so called, is one among manv examples, and a
creditable proof of the activity, energy, and forethought shown
by the whole defence. But for ttus general alertness the
IiRH Abict could not possibly have hda off the vast Oerman
power lannched by Lnoendcnrff. To bold off an attack of this
magnitude and organisation, and then to tire it into exhaustion
were wonderful achievements. France and our own country
do not yet understand in full what they owe to the Fifth
Abht's few divisions, but they are beginning to understand.
If
C5HAPTER X
LAST DATS OF THE KOBTHEBK FIGHTING
ON Monday, March 25, I regret to state, all FiFxp
Abmy troop north of the Somme vere transferred
from Gough to Byng. They made np the bulk of
7Ui Corps, under Congreve, and in f oor-and-twenty
hours they formed Byng's right wing from Bray almost to
Albert, and thus on Thibd Ajuct land, apart frwn Bray itself.
By good luck, as we have seen (p. 115), two of Congreve's
divisions had passed south of the Somme ; both were remnants,
but yet invaluable to Watts, who was greatlv harassed in the
centre battle. The 7th Corps men who reinforced Byng were
the Ni/nUh and TwerUy-Jirst, remnants both, the Thirty-^fih, a
newcomer and powerful, the First Cavalry, and Hunt's and
Hadow's Forces, important scratch bodies.
This act of swopping horses in midstream is too con-
troversial for discussion here, so I have placed it in Part IV.,
together with a map which I have made to iUustrate its
effects. With his own troops Byng was unable to follow his
southern boundary from montauban to Bray-snr-Somme ;
indeed, his right never closed down into MontaulMm, so
troubled was it by gaps between its divisions as well as by the
breach between the 4th and 5th Corps*
Mishaps of this bad sort are likely to occur in all retreats,
and these were very unfortunate because they threatened
Amiens from the north-east Ludendorff and his ofBcers were
very eager to break through north and north-west of Albert.
Ebnpily, Marwitz*s rans and transport moved with great
difficulty over the old Somme battlefield* and Otto von Bdow,
after his gr^)ple at dose quarters against almost equal
numbers, was exhausted, as LudendorfT declares. So it
happened that the foe was out of gear at the very moment
when our Third A&mt was passing through its most perilous
crisis.
186
LAST DAYS OF THE NOBTHEBN FIGHTING 187
On Mareh 25, the gap in Byng^s oentoe became the greatest
danger of aJl, and it remained ao till early in the afternoon of
the next day, iHien New Zealand and Australian troops
prerented the whole Ancre line from being outflanked in the
neighboorhoods of Buoraoy, Hibateme and Colincampa.
Bven this timely relief did not save the town of Albert^ which
fell into Marwitz's hands during Ihe night of Mareh 2ft-27.
General Monash in his book gives a black pietore of the
position at Albert, bat we must make allowance for his
ine o s san t bias. He is oat to praise his own men and not to
write eool hirtory seen in tme proportion and perspecttva I
do not know for what reason he overstates his views, because
the British people and their newspapers praised the Australian
troops nnstmtmghr, even to the extent of being nedeetfol
towards the bawbone of the Allied eanse in the West —
nnboastfnl Tommies enlisted in the British Ides and serving in
line divisiona Bat although General Monash does not arrive
at historv, he enables as to fed the romoar-filled wrong
notions that drealated while the battle was being foa^t;
and we learn from him also how very false were the opinions
formed l^ reinforoements who were hurried through forced
marches till they came upon the &itish inftntry retreating.
General Monash wants as to believe that Australian troops
rescued Amiena As a matter of plain fisict^ the Australian
reinforoements had easy jobs compared with those that French
reeerves undertook in the sontib, that our Eufhtk Division
tackled grandly from dav to day in the centnJ battle, and
that faced the iTiinrty'fiflhj when its battalions came into the
grapple one by one, breathless after forced marching,
we read how two brigades of the Fau^rlh Australians,
though over-tired by previous forced marching, came up on
the 27th from the Basseuz area to the high ground west and
south-west of Albert. This town in the night had fallen, and
the position was critical, mainly because the defence had been
in batUe since the Slst, but partly because the attack, though
almost as tired as the defence, had a superiority of numbera
General Monash says tiiat the two Australian brigades
formed an ** already over-tired infantry,*' before they started
their heavy route march from the Baaaeux area; but their
Iktigue did not come from days and nights of battie; in
eomparison with our line troops they were fresh and flt^ and
thus exceedingly welcome. Monash dedaree that their forced
nuuth —
*was more than justified, for the mere presence, in a
188 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MARCH, 1918
podtion of readiness, of these two Austmlian Brindes, did
much to steady the situation opposite Albert* by heartening
tiie line troops and stimulating tneir Commanders to hang on
for a little longer." •
Monash likes touches of this latter sorL In his case, as in
a game of bowls, bias acts at once and often too much.
Consider another passage ; —
''So &r, the pressure of the enemy upon my front had not
been serious. It was obvious that he had, as yet^ very little
artillery at his disposaL We had not, however, found our
front totally devoid of defenders. During the forenoon [of
the 27th], a few troops of our oavaby, and a force under
Brigadier-Qeneral Cummings, comprising about 1600 mixed
infimti^, the remnants of a la^ge num ror of different units
of the TmsD Abmt, were slowly withdrawing under pressure
from the advancing German patrols. These valiant 'die-
hards,' deserving of the greatest praise in comparison with
the many thousands of weir comrades who had withdrawn
from any further attempt to stem the onflowing tide, were
now ordered to retire through my outpost line, thus leaving
the Australian Infantry at last face to mce with the enemy •''t
I wish that General Monash had been with Byngf s troops
on March 21, and that he had fought on through the retreat
till it reached Albert. Then the iMginning of his book would
have had focus, perspective, experience, eympathy, history,
and, in fact, a very different character.
§11
Harassed by gathering stress and strain, which came to
their culminating point between Sunday and Tuesday,
March 24 and 26, the TmBD Abmt was not master of its own
movements till gaps in its front had been filled. If its right
win^ had been able to follow its southern boundary to Bray-
sur-Somme, ^eat good tiiii]^ would have happened, of course,
because all t ifth Army troops would have crossed the river
at Bray into the central battle, apart from those who would
have held the verv narrow front east of the town while
keeping liaison with Byng's right. The central battle needed
reiiuorcement at the very moment when Congreve had to
relieve Byng's 6th Corps from Uie soutii suburbs of Albert
south-east to Bra^.
There are writers who say that the Fifth Abmt troops
* " AnitnJUn Y iotoriet ia Vnnoe in 1918,** p. 80. t Mi., ^ 89.
LAST DAYS OF THE NORTHERN FIOHTINQ 189
tranBferred to Byngwere preaaed back. Even Sir F. Mftorioe,
in an oTeisight, has made this mistake, sayingp page 42 of his
book : ''This new right of the Thuid Aninr waa preaaed back
north of the Somme, and the Fifth Abm7 aonth of the river,
finding ita flank expoaed, had to continue ita retreat"
The mistake in this quotation is too big to be passed over
in silence. On the fifth day 7th Corps fought splendidly,
defeating a hard-jireaaed attack, and holding a line from the
Somme through Haricourt and on to the north of Montauban
A menacing gap remained unfilled north*weat of Montauban,
becauae 5th Corps was passing through perils that in-
creased. Theee perila gathered towards uieir climax during
the day; and the breach in Byng^a centre, between 4th and
5th Corpa, became more threateninff, with the reault that
Byxig himaelf onk^ed 7th Corps to fiul back after dark from
the Maricourt line. It was this order that uncovered Ooush's
l«fi aouth of the river, after 7th Corpa, by defeating the me*8
effbrta to breaJc through, had aaved Amiens,
At thia pointy then, I wish to work into a drama aome
veiy atrikinff contraata firom the official dispatch.
On llarcn 25, north of the Somme, between the neighbour*
hood of Hem northward to Trdnea Wood (aome 3000 yards
east of Montauban, and in Thibd Abmt ground) —
''all the enemy's attacks were held. Though their left
flank * was constantly in the air, the various forces operating
in tins sector maintained a gallant and most sucoeaaml resist-
ance all day, counter-attackii^ frequently. Prisoners from
five Oennan divisions were taken by us in the course of this
fighting, and the enemy's casualties were stated by them to
have been abnormally heavy."
Congreve's troops achieved these good things, extending
their left wellinto Thibd Abht land and yet unable to find the
5th Corps' right. Those prisoners taken from five Qerman
divisions were captured mamly by the brave Thvrty-fifih, com-
manded by O. M. Franks, after a combat so full of ups and
downs that the veiy last reserve had to be used with the utmost
vi^ur. For the tired attack, reinforced, had risen into good
spirits, believing that it had a fine dumce to break through
north of Montauban and on the Maricourt line ; and no doutyt
it would have broken through but for the Thirhf fifth, a
recent reinf oreementk
As the official dispatch does not make real tons the touch*
* Msasly, lei^raHsiIha Mh Cotyt, bno Asmt.
190 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABCH, 1918
and-go perils on the Marioourt line and north of Montaubuiy
let us take a glance at the work done by the Tkirty-ilfikf the
NiifUh, and the First Cayalbt, remembering that a break-
through, here, added to the increasing menace north of
Albert, would have been fatal. By way of introduction we
will consider this northern menace first : —
" At noon," says Haig, "firesh attacks developed in great
force, and under the wei^t of the assault the right of the 4th
Corps, with which the divisions of the 5th Corps were not
in touch, was gradually pressed back.* The enemy gained
Or^villers, in which neighbourhood the Nineteenth was hotly
engaged ; and also Bihucourt^" f north-west of Bapaume.
In plain words, the foe was widening the gap in our
Third Abmt's centoe ; and by ill fortune, too, there was no
stability south of Gr^villers to the boundary at Montauban,
apart from that which was formed by Congreve's men north
and east of Montauban. Haig says : — %
** Between Montauban and the neighbourhood of Or^viUers
(nM' troops had been vnuMe to eetcMieh touch on the Vine to
which they had wUhchuwn on March 24!. After heavy
fighting throughout the morning and the earl^r part of the
afternoon, in which the Sixty-tni/rd Division in particular,
under C. K Laurie, beat off a number of strong assaults,
dwieiona eormnenced to fall hack individuaUy towa/rda the
Ancre^ vndemng the gap betiveen the 6ih and 4<ft Corps.
"During the aft^noon the enemy reached Courcelette,
and was pressing on through the cap in our line in the
direction of Pys and Irles, seriously ttureatening the flank of
the 4th Corps. It became clear that the Third Arxt, which
on this day had assumed command of all troops north of the
Somme, would have to continus the wilhd/rawal of its centre
to the Ime of the River Ancre^ah'eady crossed hycertai/n, ofowr
troops neoAT Beaucourt. All possible steps were taken to
secure this line, but by nightfall hostile patrols had reached
the right bank of the Ancre north of Miraumont, aTid were
pushing forward hettoeen the flavJcs of the 5ih and 4th Corps
%n the direction of Serre and PuisveuaxiVr-UonL In
view of this situation, the 4th Corps fell back by stages
* LodflDdorfl dadlares that on the filth day Otto von Below'f Army iras
oiiita ezhanited, and Haig in a footnote (voL iL, p. 199) xefecs to thia
dedacation by LadendoifE ; lo I do not ondentend this Acaat pieieoxe on
the light of 4th Corps. Whence did this pnssaze oome? Vrom Blow's
eshansted troops f
t VoLiL,p.902.
I The italios are mine.— 'W. S. 6.
LAST DAYS OF THE NOBTHBBN FIGHTING 191
doriag the night and mominff to the line Bnoqnoy-Ablain-
zevelle, in toneh with the 6t£ CoqM abont Boyellee. On
the right the remaining divisions of the Third Abmt were
withdnwn under orders to the line Brav*sar-Somme-Albert,*
and thenee took up positions along the west bank of the
Anere to the neighbonrhood of Beaumont HameL'^f
Turn to a map and sketch in this information, and at onee
it will be dear to you that the aet of holding the Somme
front safe from Hem northward to the north of Montauban was
one of deeiaive importance. The Thiriy-fiflh was the groyne
or break- water, but it was a newcomer which had arrived
mainly by battalions of diflbrent brigades^and these battalions
had to be used as soon as they arrived On the tragical
Sunday, March 24, for example, it was the Sherwoods and
Cheshires who at daybreak arrived at Maricourt, under
Brigadier Marindin, to be sent forward at once to retake Hem
Spur. During Sunday other battalions arrived, the Seven-
teenth Boyal Scots, who hurried to support l^urindin; tiie
Twelfth Highland light Infantfy, who were sent at onee
to help the Ninltk, and the Nineteenth Nortliumberland
Fusilien, Pioneera Several battalions, and amonff them the
Fourth North Staffords, arrived after dark or during the
nipfht of the 24th-26th. CJonsider the feverishness of tiiis
reinforcing, nearly all the troops marching from 12 to 14 miles,
because a desire to move them by 'bus could not be put into
effective action.
By seven in the evening the TweiUy-fi/rst was relieved by
the Thirty'fifih, and what was left of them withdrew into
rseerve near Bray. By Oongreve's order, the G.O.C of the
Tkirly-fi/ih, O. M. Franks, took command of all 7th Corps
troops, north of the Somme ; namely, his own division, and
remnants of the Ninth and Twenty-fir^ the First Cavalbt,
and the scratch or improvised unit.
At six aon. on the 25th our riffht sector from Curlu to the
south end of Bois Favi^re was held by a brigade of the Thirty^
fifth under M arindin. In the Maricourt defences were three
composite battalions ; and the JVinifc with its supports jguarded
the left sector from Bois Faviere to Bemafay wood, just east
of Montauban, and on Thibd Abmy land. The NinMg
supports were a mixture of units from the Thirty^J^th, two
^ Ttes dhkteas w«m Ooagrsvs*a, dnvn bif Sfs&li Inio land whieh lbs
SIh Oom would hs¥e htld bos toe its trooblM. ^ote, too, thAt Baoquoy is
la* potitioa from whioh ibs whole Anon lino msj bo oatflaoksd.
t Vol. iL, f. aos.
192 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABCH» 1918
battalions from Pollard's brigade, and the Nineteenth
Northumberland Fasiliers. Two battalions of the Thirty 'fifik
were in reserve.
All day long, till five p.m., fighting was very keen and
sometimes very critical. In tiie morning persistent efforts
were made by the foe to tarn oar left fiank through the gap
which Byng's troops were unable to fill owing to tiieir flrave
troubles. Brigadier Legard with dismounted men of the
Fvr^ Cavalry did some fine work on Thibd Abxt ground,
shooting the attack at point-blank range, and holdmg out
well firom the south ot Bemafay Wood to north-east of
Montauban and thence westward some 2000 ytods ; while the
NtTithf meantime, were hard pressed in front of Maricourt.
Artillery barrage was directed to the north of Montauban
from the east of Bemafay Wood. By noon a battalion of the
Tkiaiy-ffthf and all three battalions of the Cavalry Brigade,
formed a defensive fiank north of MontaubazL About an
hour later it was said that a brigade of Bvng's Seventeenth
was holding a line from north of Bemafay Wood to the
south-east of Bazentin le Qrand, and that the other brigades
were reforming east of Fricouri Touch with them could not
be made, however, neither then nor later.
During the afternoon the whole of our troops passed
through desperate combats. Favi^re Wood was lost and
r^^ained. Bemafay Wood was turned from the south-west
when we lost the Briqueterie, but a counter-attack ejected the
foe. In the south, on our right, British supports were thrown
back off Curlu Spur as far as the Maricourt line, and a
successful counter-blow wIls followed by anotiier set-back.
Beinforced, our men went ahead again and pushed the foe
back from 600 to 700 yards.
Meantime the attack proned from EEardecourt against the
centre of our main position, and broke into Maricourt ; but
at 6.20 p.m., after bitter, fluctuating efforts, and after Franks
had used up his last reserves, Maricourt became safe again,
and our whole line from Bemafay Wood to the Somme was
intact^ and also very cheerful, for every man knew that the
Boche had been badly beaten. In tiie final counter-attack
had been pressed even &e Brigade ELQ. of the 104th and
106th Infantry Brigades — officers, clerks, servants, signallers
and runners, so short were we of mexL After this really glorious
combat, steel helmets were worn jauntily aslant on many
heads ; cheers rang out here and there ; and then, suddenly,
at about 6.30 p.m., chilling news came. The TmRD Abvt,
1 ' .
■< *■»• .
I I . r •
!tf
If
«' .
LAST DAYS OF THE NOBTHBBN FIGHTING 198
owing to troubles north and south of Albert, would withdraw
Congreve's troops and transport to the Anere, holding as
a rearguard position the line Bray-Albert
To stop a break-through and then to be ordered to &Xl
baek from the land just saved ! There's no greater trial in a
retreat^ periiaM above all when tnx^ feel alootost exhausted,
and so parched that water has no appreciable effect on thirst
But it could not be helped. The position north of Albert was
notyet relieved. There was ** a dangerous gap about Serre,''
as daig points out On the other himd —
** considerable reinforcements had now come into line, and
had shown their ability to hold the enemy, whose troops were
becoming tired, while we transport difficulties experienced by
him in the area of the old Somme battlefield were increasing.
Other reinforcements were comins; up rapidly, and there
seemed every hope that the line of the Ancre would be secured
and the enemy stopped north of the Somme " (vol. ii., p. 203).
Unfortunately, all these zeinforcenisiits <m the Third
Army's front did not at <mce bring equipose to the battle line.
Next day, March 26, was a very srave one north of Albert.
Between Hamel and Puisieux, as Maig explains, the situation
was not yet dear. '' A gap still existed in this area between
the 6th and 4th Corps " ; and Qerman in&ntxy pressed through
the gap and worked their way forward till they ** occupied
Colincamps with machine-^ffuns," threatening to outflank the
whole Ancre line by a soutii-westerly drive aeoompanied by
a thrust west and north«west
In Ftot IV. we shall see what happened afterwards when
we study the transfer of Gongreve and his troops to Bvnff's
right wing, and the origin of the C^risy episode by which we
centre battie was aCEscted so dramaticallv (p. 268>
To my mind it was nothing less then providential that
G.H.Q., on February 22, 1918, altered the boundary uniting
the two armies^ gnatly lessening that south-western slant
which aided Marwits so much by baflUng Byng^s right wing
and by drawing CSongreve deeper and deeper into Third
Army ground. No other matter in the oattle is Tnore
important than this to our two armies. But the superlative
bravery of the Ninth Divmiov is equally important to them
both. It is plain, too, that after the breach was made between
Faodiawe*s 6th Corps and Harper^s 4th Corps, which was
accompanied by the openuiff of gaps in 6th Corps, a retreat
80Uth*west by Byng^s rignt was impossiblcL A general
194 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABCH, 1918
oloaizig-ap towards the north became necessary, in order to
lessen gaps whUe falling back both firmly and qnickly.
§ni
It was Gongreve's Corps that felt with most searching
pain the force of Marwitz's attacks, and its losses were veiv
h^h, amonntixu? to 25fiOO men and 186^ gans, of which 27
were heavies. These losses came to five divisionsi not alone to
the original fonr—Sioeleenth, Tioenty-first, Ninths and 2%it^y«
nin^Ay reinforced by the Thirty-fiftk. The great barrier division,
the Nvnth, Scottish and South African, lost a general average
of 38*47 per cent, including pioneers, machine-gunners, and
artillerymen, but not including Royal Engineers. Officers
killed, 28 ; wounded, 96 ; missing, 94 ; total 213. Other ranks
killed, 279 ; wounded, 1625 ; missing, 2670 ; total 4574 apart
from the sick and completely exhausted.*
The Nimih won great Lne amoD^ German officers and
men. Here is the tertimony of Captam G. Peirson, who was
captured while holding the appoinUnent of Brigade-Major in
the SiaUenth (Sooth Irish) Division : —
'^ After b^g captured at Lamotte, near Corbie, I was
taken to the Gcnnan battalion headquarters for examination
by an intelligence officer. In the course of this examination
the officer aued me if I knew the Ninth Division ; he said
that the fight it put up was considered one of the best on the
whole front; and particularly the last stand of the South
African Brigade at (I think) Moislains, which, he said, was
magnificent Both men and officers fought to the last against
overwhelming odds, the Brimdier himself being taken firing
a machine-gun, whilst his Brigade-Major was killed beside
him.t
''After this conversation I was sent to Le Cateau, and on
the way many German officers spoke to me, and all mentioned
the splendid fight put up by the South Africans. On reaching
Le dateau I met two British officers who said that while their
party was being marched to this place they were stopped by
the Kaiser, who asked if any one present belonged to the
Nmth Division. The Kaiser then said that had m divisions
fought as well as the Niwth Division he would have had no
^ Amonfl the " mining " were other dead snd other wotmded, of oonne.
t BrigMier Dawion has oontradioted thia atatement about iila having
Area a tnaohine^san before he mM taken. There ma no maohine-gan
ammnnition to fire.
LAST DAYS OF THE NOBTHEBN FIGHTING 196
more troops to cany on his attack with. The truth of this
statement I camiot vooch for, and tmfortonately I have for*
flotten the names of the oflbsers, bat Brigadier*Qeneral
Bellingham and lieutenant-Colonel Gell were both at Le
Gateau at the time and heard the story.*
'^On my way to Le Gateau I met Mtween thirty and forty
men of the South African Brigade working as prisoners o£
war close to Ep6hy. They were in a very bad condition, as
no rations were allowed them, and they had to exist on what
the individual German soldiers chose to give them, and what
they could find in the old trenches, consequently nearly all of
them were suffering from dysentery."
Tee, the Scottish and South African Division was genuinely
great» and the whole of Congreve's Gorpe, as we have seen,
had a history full of value. Parts of it fought on till April 4,
on which day Gcmffreve handed over his command to the
chivalrous Birdwood and the Australians.
§IV
On Hareh 27 it was dear that the cyclone let loose in the
nortiiem fighting had lost its reserve force and was dwindling
away, just like Hutier's in the south. One reason was the
vety serious loss of men suflfored by Otto von Below, who
attacked on a narrow fix>nt against a Kitish force not in the
least under-manned for defence. His brigades, too, inevitably,
during fogs, must have got into dense formations^ offering
excellent ts^ts for many of Byng*s machine-guns. Again,
when an armv on a narrow fiftmt has men enough for a
defensive battle, the forces at death-grips produce a mortal
fatigue, a prostration not to be borne without great effort
by the very bravest^ as the French and BritLsh found at
Waterloo, which was a skirnushing brief battle compared
with Byng^s grapple against Belows left and centre and
Marwiti^s right wing.
Very fortunately, Marwits's inner wing in its advance
towards Albert was greatly harassed by old shell-holes and
trenches, and at last stuck fast in the western edge of the
Somme's old battlefield.
One part of Below's Army, the north or right wing, had
been inactive, so on March 28, it was ordered to assail and
take the hi^h ground commanding Arras. The fiffht began
in the mormng, t>etween seven and eight o'clock, and although
* DftWBon hMurd ihs mum rtocy whmi a pttoonor in Qsnuuijr.
196 THE FIFTH AEMY IN MABCH, 1918
the attack was a minor one compared with Hutier's onslaught
against Gough's right, it had a £ar-reachinff object by which
it is made memorable for ever. Arras and her heights were
the north abutments of that British defence which, with
French help, was hardening around the huge arc of the new
German salient. If these abutments could be carried the
least effect would be an effectual opening for Ludendorff's
next blow — at Armenti^res and in the Lys valley; but a
strong advance beyond Arras, with adecjuate turning move-
ments, would throw the whole defence into backwara-going
action, while imperilling the Channel ports and, probably,
unlocking the gates into Amiens.
The fight extended from Fuisieux to the north-east of
Arras, and when Below found that he was checked on his
northern flank, he struck vigorously towards Arras along the
Scarpe valley, hoping that he would earn freedom for the
development of his plans. Happily, since March 23, this
thrust had been foreseen ; ample preparation had been made
for it by Byng, aided by G.H.Q. ; and though a slice of land was
lost, no real structural harm was done to the brave defence.
Below extended the fight north of Gavrelle and struck our
13th Corps, forming the riffht of the British First Army
commanded by Home. This fact is often passed over. Let
us remember, then, that our First Armt with its right flank
troops helped to defend Arras.
Uermans declare that their troops were too slow in their
attack, pausing too often and too long, though their original
strength had been reinforced by three divisions ; and Luden-
dorff himself, as though ignorant of the number of divisions in
Byng's Army, blames Otto von BeloVs troops for the gradual
miscarriage of his northern plans.
" Immediately prior to the assault," says Haig, " masses of
German infantry with artillery in rear of them were observed
drawn up in close formation on Greenland Hill, and were
shelled by our artillery. North of the Scarpe, about Bceux,
great execution was done at point>blank range by single guns,
which we had placed in forward positions dose up to our
front line.* The enemy's infantry in this sector are reported
to have advanced almost shoulder to shoulder in six lines,
and on the whole front our machine-gunners obtained most
favourable targets."
* Tbe detaolunentB of oertain forward IS-pounder gnng, after firing all
their ammnnition and destroying their guns, got away safely on bloycdes
along the main Douai road to Arw.
LAST DAYS OF THE NOBTHEBN FIGHTING 197
I find in oar offieiai mape of the German Order of Battle
that Below's troops north of the Searpe to his onion with
Qoast at Aeheville and Bonvrev were as follows, from north
southward : Two Hwndred ana Fortieth, Acheville-Fresnoy
sector; Forty 'first, between Fresnoy and Oppv; Fi^
Bavarian Besebve, between Oppy and OaTrelle ; ana Twenty^
third BBaKBVi, from Qavrelle * to the Searpe. Four divisions
in line on a front of about 6^ miles.
South of the Searpe to Puisieoxy about 15 miles, thirteen
mostly battle-worn, were in line, as follows,
beginning at Puisieux itself: Twenty-fourth, Third Guards,
Fifth Bavarians, Hwnd/red amd Jsinety^^fth, Sixteenth
Bavarians, Two Hwndred and Thirty-ninlht Two Hwndred
and TwefUy-Ji/ret, Siaoih Bavarian, Twenty^eiasth Besebve, Two
Hwndred and Thirby-fowrth and Thirty^eixth, Twdfth, and
the Hwndred and Eighty-fifth south of the Searpe between
Pelves and Monchy.
" The weight and momentum of his [the enemv's] assault,"
says Haig, ''and the courage of his infantry, who sought to
cut their way through our wire by hand under the fire of our
machine-guns, sufficed to carry the enemy through the gaps
which his bombardment had made in our outpost Une. There-
after, raked by the fire of our outposts, whose ffarrisons
tuned their machine-guns and shot at the enemy's advancing
lines from flank and rear, and met by an accurate and intense
fire from all arms, his troops wero everywhere stopped and
thrown back with the heaviest loss beforo our battle
positions.'' t
Below's southern onset, after all-day fighting, was defeated
by the Guards DivisiOH and the l%irty^rtt ; by the Forby^
eeoond, which drove off two thrusts from the direction of
Ablainievelle, and by the Siadty-aeeond^ aided by a brimde of
the Fcwrih Australians, whose comHned efforts beat off some
bitter onsets against Bucquoy by the Fifth Bavarians, aided
by the Third Prussian Guards.
In the Arras neighbourhoods, along the Scarpe's north
bank, where Below's object was to gain the general line,
llmy-Bailleul-St Laurent-Blangy, our Fowrth and Fifty^aiaBih
had a hard struggle in which two fresh German divisions
were engaged supported by two divisions of line troops;
while immediately south of the Searpe were four German
• Bang's toft fiftod s Ultls south of Gstnllo, to OtnoUo llMlf wm in
no's Ana.
t V6L tt^ p. SU
198 THE FIFTH ARBIY IN MABCH, 1918
divisions, two of which had heen ordered to e^»tore
Arras and the heights overlooking the town. In this sector
noble work was done by the Third and FiJUenlh Bbttibh
Divisions, Eight Britiw divisions and a brigade of the
Fourth Australums divide the honour of this big combat
No combat of the war is a better illustration of capital
defence with enough men on a front very well gunned and
prepared. The attack's failure was a bitter setback to
Luaendorff's aims, and we can never be too giatefiil to the
officers and men who fought under Byng and with the Fibst
Army's most southern troops. For all that, it was not the
power behind the attack which made this combat so im-
portant. The Fifth Abmy faced and baffled hugely greater
odds. But the German aim at Arras was a big one^ and in
attempting to make it real, Ludendorff wasted a ^reat many
men, who would have been invaluable to him in the Lys
valley and at Armentidres and Kemmel. In other words, his
blow against Arras was a military mistake ; it was easy to
foresee and it came so late in the battle that it could not
possibly be a surprise. Its effect was to complete the ravages
m Below's Army, with the result that Ludendorff had no
storm divisions for the Lys battle.
PAKT ni
THE BATTLE IN SOME CHOSEN
INCIDENTS AND EPISODES
204 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MABGH, 1918
trench. The battery fired several fine volleys ; I heard them
for a long time. It was slow work crawlmg away without
being seen, and when I had got 600 yards and was trying to
get my bearing — I don't know what time it was. Then I
noticed that no fire came from the battery. There was no
sound at all for over ten minutes. Then about a hundred
Germans rushed forward and started bombing the gun-pits,
and some of our men came up. I saw about a dozen of them
marched off as prisoners.' . . . 'You are(^uite sure Major
HarviUe was killed ? ' asked the Colonel qmetly. ' Yes, sir :
he fell right in my gun-pit. . . •'
"We idl stood silent, looking on the ground. Poor
Harville ! . . . A gallant, upright soul. The very best type
of the civilian soloier who is fighting this war for England.
. . . Before the war a professional man who had given no
thought to fighting ; when he became a soldier it was because
he understood thoroughly, and believed in completely, all that
for which he was ready to give his life. A dean-living, truly
religious man, too, who loathed loose talk and swearinj?, and
lived up to his ideals even amid the slime and filth of war.
And his braveiy was that of the honest man who fears and
vet faces danger, not the bull-headed heroism of the ' man who
Knows no fear.' Poor Harville !
** The sergeant spoke again. * Before I came back here,
sir, after the enemy had marched off our men, A Battery
turned their guns on the Qermans in B Battery's position.'
< Did they ? ' said the Colonel, his face lighting up. ' Splendid t '
. . . 'Yes, sii^; they fired well, a hundred rounds, I should
think. They scattered all the Germans, sir; they ran
Ukemad.'"
And this cool, factf ul seigeant, who maps out what we
may call the topography of the spiritual life active in
bloodshed, belongs to our hectic days of liewspaper headlines
and splash pages ! He tells the truth, coldly and calmly and
courteously, at a time when the art of trade sellings like the
virtue of war propaganda, resembles that Western American
concerning whom a comrade said in a tombstone epitaph,
''As a trath-crusher he was uzurivalled." Could anything
prove more clearly that drill and discipline are great sedatives
and tonics?
Not v^thout exceptions though, as another stoiy told by
Quex bears witness. The Colond speaks, March 22 : —
" Extraordinaiy attitude of mind some of the men out here
nowadays have. Last night they brought in one of the —— 's.
A FEW SCATTERED DfPBESSIONS 205
who was eaptared by the Boche in the momin^, but escaped
uid got back to the battalion. He said that tneir enemy set
prisoners bringing ammnnition np to the front line. When
he was asked how he escaped, he said that a shell killed the
moT^n-charg^ of the party and he got away. The mamrvtfi^
charge,^ repeated the Colonel with sooni. *^ He spoke as if the
Boche N.CCO. were a sort of foreman, and as if bringing np
ammnnition which was to be shot at yonr own conntrymen
was the most ordinary thinff in the world — Bah I "
And yet, frankly, which in pre-war times did we as a
nation try to deserve — ^the cool, faetful sergeant, placid and
locid thronghout a tragedy, or this shadow of a man whose
somame should be Bah ? Recall the tides of sentimentality
which flowed and ebbed in our country through sixty years
or so ; and think of recent days when the Union Jack did not
fly above our Board Schools lest it offend idealists. If any
sreat people ever strove to turn themselves into cranks and
mvalios, it was the British people between the Crimea and
1914 ; imd even to-day an amasmg '' logic of dreams" tries to
undo the restorative traditions whioh our fighting men have
added to our naticmal leoeiea and heirlooms. In March,
1919, at a public meeting, 1 was told hv several speakers that
Consdentious Objectors were the wars real saints, and that
Conscription was a very evil thing. A soldier protested and
several young men left the hall ; out flabby sentimentalities
were cheered bv most of the persons present. No speaker
thought it worth while to ezphun how we should have &red
as a nation if tlurtv or forty per cent of our young man*power
had been aflUcted by Ccmseientious Objection, or if Con*
scription, too lon(^ delayed, had not been introduced at last.
To pit improvised armies against the German war machine
was like pittmg improvised fleets against our British Navy;
and yet, despite the lack of military training through half a
oentmry and more, our impromptu divisions and corps not only
managed to carry on real war m a way that every director of
the Qerman machine respected ; they contrived also to make
shift under conditions which our old long-service veterans
wonld have found most damnable. A Futh Abmt officer
writes:—
''Save fixr the Colonel and two or three of the signallers
and a couple of servants, none of us were experienced Mldiers ;
all our previous experience had been in attack ; it was some-
thing new this feelmg that a powerful, energetic, determined
foe was beating down our opposition and getting nearer and
206 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABOH, 1918
nearer. Yet, whatever they may have f elt^ not <me of our
little band showed signs of depression or nervons excitement.
The signaUing-seiseant was cursing the sanitary orderly for
not having clearea up a particular litter of tins and empty
cigarette packets ; the officer's cook was peeling potatoes for
dinner, and I heard the old wheeler singing softly to himself
some stupid, old-time, music-hall ditty.
The substance of this quotation applies to the whole
Fifth Armt. The percentage of experienced soldiers was a
small one in the ranks and N.C.O/s; and not even one
division had had enough rest and special training after the
terrible year, 1817. Thus a Corps Commander wrote : ** I
know scores of instances in the recent fighting where one or
two trained companies could have stopped the whole local
retirement ! " From the purgatory of fixed warfare in trenches
to the hell of mobile warfare in a retreat hard pressed, with
fialse rumours for ever in the air, and the knowledge that on
a front so wide splendid success alone one sector was always
at the mercy of an overpowering &nk movement against
another; all this and a ^reat deal more made a transforma-
tion from trench fighting to open warfiftre nothing less
than abominable to troops who were not instructed enough
to be exnerienced soldiers. Yet from the first morning the
thoroughly trained attackers leamt that tiiey dared not take
liberties and that their time-table was far behind LudendorflTs
plans and needs.
And the cause— the spiritual cause ? Fighting tempera-
ment Though cant enables us to astound other nations by
chattering always about our gentle pacifiran, yet the size of
the British Empire proves to all the world that our tiny
British Isles have produced the most instinctively aggressive
breed of men the world has ever seen. In our mixed blood,
happily, there is no unenterprising strain from a timid and
craven race. Iberian, Boman, Anfflo-Saxon, Celt, Norman,
and sea-going Viking have left in &e nation's veins mingled
drops of their blood; and certainly we provoke suspicion
among our allies abroad whenever we permit the old Puritan
humbug in our sub-consciousness to prattle about our native
meekness and our hatred of aggression. We hate aggression
as a ^d boxer hates to receive a blow on the point Thei«
remains more fighting temperament in the British breed of
men than in any other breed, thanks to inherited quidities
iftid sports. Even our F^Mnfists are never happy unless they
are attacking human nature both as a whole and in detail ;
A FEW 8CATTEBED IMPBE88ION8 207
and the separated eharities of oar three or four hundred
modified Cluriatiaa ereeds nuurk the same native belligerency.
But for this inborn and hereditary spirit, a combative
individualism, an aggressive tenacity as natural as the heart's
automatic beat, our £ifth Abmt, despite the sound generalship
that governed its big movements, would certunly have been
worn out and swept away by LudendorflTs lemons.
No attack could have been better trained, and more
divisions could not have been used by Ludendorff without
overpacking his front with taif^ets and jumbling up the
brigades, uerman message dogs, seen on Watts's Imes, seem
to nave done their work umiindered by tog ; and it was
between Watts's flank and those of Qmgreve and Masse that
the enemy got early opportunities to forge ahead, as at
Bonssoy and Maissemy. i et he was slow, finding the defence
so gripping, as at Ep6hy, where the Second Munsters stuck
it out noUy, under Colonel Ireland, fatally wounded, and
Ireland's officers, Chandler (killed), Whelan, Eidd (severely
woondedX Waldegmve, Strachan, King, Cahill (killed), and
two or three others.
The German offidal news chronicled the defence (March 28) :
''Hdghts of Epihy captured after a hard struggle in which
the British were surrounded.'" Lieutenant Whelan held out
in £p6hy till noon of the second day. Enemy aircraft gave
the Second Munsters a bad time, u Companv brought one
down with Lewis-gun fire, and a rifleman with a single shot
ended another by shooting the German pilot Lieutenant
Kidd's defence of MaLsuasise Farm, outflianked early on the
first day and rushed, was so fine that some German Staff
Officers spoke of it afterwards with many compliments ; and
what could have been higher in temper than Lieutenant
Whelan*s yard-l^-yard grapple in Bidge Beserve and Tetard
Wood? Me had only C Company and a few of & Every bay
of Whelan's trench was a battiefield, men rallyingover and
over again ; though cut down to haJf handf uls. When the
German aamilt troops had pressed Whelan back into the last
two or three bays in Tetard Wood, 4.80 p.m., Mardi 21, he
side-stepped into the trench at the head of Catelet yaU^,and
thence under orders he fell bade fighting to tiie ruins of Bp^hy,
where survivors of B Company were fighting as bravely as
his own men. The German losses were widespread and very
large* On the first day, as soon as the fog lifted, German
infintiy were disclosed packed along Oatelet valley, and were
raked by mgid fire* Kfles and madune-guns» again, aimed
908 THE FEFEH AEXY 15 YXRrTT. 1918
to flodi
1^ vntil
The
far niiMHhiii m TiBliwitiirii InOetoL And
tkk cpnode k an the MR Botehfe been» the So«lh Irish
too ■■■J of thai woe sot of s pieee with
the SceoBd MiMftcn, whose pfaKk won dhunock witih five
kmTC% aot to he tnorhed Ij- chaage aad dny.
of thio tcBeotj'-— ODBd it wee is vogae en our
Anrr's froot — seeds eool aDBdi sad sliOBg wills end
swift dsdnons: fighting teHpcaasad, in two woids. To
whoi one is oestcn is to know ako tiist one's fighting
oat of joinly not whsi it oeg^t to he ; end
egsm and egsin dnrieg the sseond hettle of ^e Somne hodies
01 Oenaaninfiaitiy USUI ed that thar thiaiiugh tnaninghad not
endowed thsas w» the grit whieh tnie e omh a t j ^o n css has
natorsllj. Many of them, hapiBly, so^gAit ovetmodi after
the fine of kMt leristaiiee. Thus an Si^ish Golonei of the
SiactgmBttk noted that the whole ad^nnee against his front
wss methodiesl nntil ponisheil; then it ssemed for a time
to eoDapee; espeeiaDy if easualtieB were inereedng; and an
attempt was made to find a weak spot dsewhere^
(n his own men this Goknel said that they were eontent
to hdd on as long as thej were asked to remain ; that their
eomage and individual dieeriness was indiflpotable, and that
m m<Mt tfying eiieiimstances of gas and fog it was a treat to
see their grip and their disdpfine.
He praised hi^^y the eeieeted and specialist troops in the
German attack, noting as lessons two points : —
l.Th^lightiDaeh]ii»-gaiuiwe(epiishedforwaidi«gardl<«
01 opposiuon*
2. That weak spots on the flanks of our strong posts were
found, chiefly by contact airplanes ; flares from the ground
were sent np frequently, and our pomtions were then made
known to German gunners^ who got on the target with
immediate aceunMnr.
Another British officer, a Brigade-Major, belonging to the
Biabu first Division, saw at dose quarters how the German
maoDine worked. Let us see what his enerienees were.
A Boche attack had broken a Coloners right flank, and
this Brigade-Maior went to find reinforcements. He returned
to BeauTois and found it deeerted except by gas ; so he set
A FEW SCATTERED IMPRESSIONS 209
off down the Gennaine road. A party of some fifty British
stragglers were met and sent ap to reinforce. Then he went
farther along and saw another party, which he hailed^ but
Kt no reply, except a signal to keep quiet. Then all at once,
fore he knew what hful happened, he was rushed by about
twenty Boohes.
'' The first one fired at me at point-blank range," says the
Brigade-Major, ''and though he missed me, the &sh knocked
me straight oyer, and before I could do anything the whole
party was around me.
** I must say the officers treated me very well, though my
eeeorts were very rough. I had an intensely interesting and
unhappy four hours with them, as they got ready for a further
attack. For all my hatred I could not help admiring them
intensely, for their deployment, discipline and preparation
were an eye-opener.
** They extended into battle order without hardly a sound,
and they lay down preparatory for the next assault, bringing
up mules dragging lignt trench mortars, machine-guns and
ammunition.
^ After a little they handed me over to two ruffians with
rsTolyers which they kept wagging at me and marched me
back* The shame of bring taken unhmmed and the prospect
of the indignities ahead decided me to make a bolt for it
when I could. I waited my chance till the attention of the
escort was distracted by a shell, and then I fell on the nearest
man, hurling him as hard as I could at the other and roUin^r
them both into the ditch. They sprang up at once and fired
seyeral shots at me, but I was awaw'
The same officer said that he thought the greatest lesson
to be learnt firom Qerman methods was the yalue of personal
initiatiya Propaganda used to tell us in a routine that
German soldiers had no initiative, when, as a matter of plain
fiftct^ a great many of them were first-rate in this great
^u^ty • Ludendom set the greatest store by it^ and fostered
it by every possible means. Also, in his book, he never fails
to note when and where it is absent. Note, then, what the
British Brigade-Major says : —
" German patrols went forward on their own with limit-
less objectives and led by N.CO.'s or even privates. I can
testify to the sldll of their movement and their thrusting
policy, for I had not a look in with the patrol that got me.
They were a good mile through our broken line within a
very short time of breiJdng it and still going strong. How
P
210 THE FIFTH ABKY IN IIABCH, 1918
ihey kept eomieefcioo mwaiiiyatay to me* aadlooidd not
help woDderiog how maoy of oor men weie tnined to mA a
pitch. Their poliqreeeiiied to he to eease fire with the artiDery
when it had done ite woric, and give free ]day to these patn^
in the hope that our line between their penetntionB wookL
give way, ae often it did*
In oor officers, when they look back on tho days of St
it is always a joy to note a hrie^ eha^y, searehii^
candoor, instmctive^ and sound all thioi^;h, like the same
quality in the modest genius of Darwin; and nnless civilian
Britain shows the same candour towards the merits in
German warfiure, no general tmderstandmg of oor Fifth
Abxt's valour and endoianoe is at all possible. Man by man,
division b^ division, corps by corps, the Qennans were modi
better trained, and certainly threefold more nnmeroos^ and
something more than threefold; they were professional
soldiers, while our own were amateor; and yet a saperior
inborn pugnacity carried our men throng — a point to be
noted by idl who are nympholepts of perpetoal peace.
Here is a series of pictures drawn oy an c^cer of the
Fifth Durham Light Infantry, which belonged to Martin's
Brigade of the Fi^ieth Division. The time is the morning
of the fifth day, and the position is behind P^nne in the
Biaches neighbourhood. A lull in the fighting was foreteUing
another Oerman attack : —
"We were quietly resting when word came in that the
Germans had established another bridgehead, this time at
Eterpigny. We were ordered to counter-attack, and at once
set ofi*, A Company leading in a sort of * artillery formation.*
We lutd to set tlu:ough a lot of old wire which was rather
awkward As we advanced we were suddenly attacked by five
or six hostile airplanes flying low and firing at us with
their machine-guns. It was r^er alarming, but I did not
see a single man hit. When we got into the open country
between fiarleuz and the Canal, I saw that tiie troops in
front were coming back in crowds, and as things looked very
black I decided to seize and hold the high ground immediately
in front. So we took up a position commanding the shallow
yjalley leading from the Somme to Barleuz, and at the same
time we rallira the men retiring past us and tried to form a
line across the low-ljong ground.
** For some hours nothing more ham>ened, but during the
afternoon the Germans crossed the &omme in hordes and
pushed back the thin British line. Our two advanced
A FEW 8CATTEBED IHPBEB8ION8 211
eompanies withdrew with the Sixty-aisBth Division men, after
inflietmg heavy casualties on the enemy, and rejoined us.
We took up a soitaUe position on the high groond and rallied
asmanymenasweconfd. A platoon of the Seventh DJ1.L were
on onr rights and some men of this battalion were on oar left.
We got exoellent signalling oommnnication with lamps and
a post that the battalion signalling sergeant had established
near Brigade H.Q.
''It was eztraordinarilv interesting to watch the Germans
working up to and around our flanka. They seemed to come
down &e hill at the far, or east, side of the Somme, at first
in twos and threes, followed by larger bodies such as platoons.
Then, after crossing the Somme Canal, they worked their
way in small groups till they had accumulated the required
number of men at a certain point Tliey fired white flares to
show where they had got to, and gradually made their way
to within two hundred yards of us. Further to the south, on
the fiur side of the valley, we could see them working their
way along the high ground near Villers CarbonneL It was
rather alarming, as we could see that they were round our
right flank and had sot at least a mile past us.
'^I signalled bac^ to the Brigadier to inform him how
dangerous our position was, but his reply was a definite order
not to withdraw, but to stay and flght it out. W^ therefore
settled down, realizing that in the morning, we should be
surrounded and overwhelmed with no possible chance of
escape. Just before dusk the Germans had massed some
two hundred vards in front of us, so I signalled back to the
Brigadier, and he put some IS-pounders on to them in fine
style. Our gunners had the ran^ to a nicety, and dispelled
any idea the enemy had of attacking us.
** Later in the evening I thought again that he would
attack, so I tried to get our artillery on again, but this time
there was no reply m>m Brigade H.Q.» and we understood
that they had cone and that we were now on our own. The
Seventh D.LX liad received orders to withdraw, but in spite
of this the Seventh D.L.L officer on our riffht offered to stay
with his platoon and fight it out with us. A singularly brave
thinffto ao as it simply meant that he would share our fate.
*^he day had ended, and it was a fine moonlit mstht
At about 8 p.m. I had reason to think that some mistake bad
occurred, and Rowe and I, like drowning men clutching at
straws, got on to the road towards where Brigade H.Q. had
been, just to see if we could get any information. As we got
212 THE FIFTH AEMY IN MAECH, 1918
out of the trench on to the road we heard the click of a rifle
bolt^ and thought the enemy was on us. like a flash we
were across the road and into the ditch with our revolvers
out. A false alann : it was a party of Seventh D.L.I. with-
drawing. I explained the position to the officer in charge,
and he agreed to stay and watch our flank till we got b^k
from Bri^bde H.Q.
** When we had gone three or four hundred yards down
the road, we found a platoon of Northumberland Fusiliers of
our own division ; they told us that they had been told off to
cover the withdrawal of the Fifth and Seventh D.L.I., and
had wondered what had happened to us, as practically all the
other troops had gone. It was clear from tnis that orders to
withdraw had been sent us, but had gone astray. It was not
long before we were moving in single file, as quickly as
possible, down the sunken road skirting Barleux.
'*An awesome business. There was a bright moon, so
the Germans had a good chance both of discovering that our
line was being withcuawn, and also of closing up and cutting
off our retreat. It is extraordinary what a noise three or
four hundred men make on a still night, however hard they
are trying to move quietlv.
" Near Barleux a Bowe patrol, or what we thought was a
Boche patrol, glided in front of us. They did not molest us,
but we went on still more on the qvA, vive than ever, with
our revolvers and rifles ready for instant action.
'' The next excitement was that our guide took the wrong
turn, and we found ourselves almost in Barleux, which we
believed was held by the enemy 1 Quickly we halted the
men, and the N.F. officer and myself went back whispering
' About turn ' to each man as we passed him, tiU we got to
the road junction where the guide had gone astray. Then
we got hold of the halves of the battalion, as it were, and
pulled them after us along the right road. Nothing more
happened. We sot away without a shot having been fired at
us ; and eventually reached the new line established through
Estr^es and Assevillers. Here we took up a position that was
waiting for us. ..."
In these sketches, so frank and unpretentious, we find the
temper of our Territorials. But in truthful pictures of war
we must remember also some other phases of the defence,
natural phases, but unpleasant
Amid such a whirlpool of infantry attack, and such a
whirlwind of shot and shelli some dr^ did appear both
A FEW 8GATTEBED IMPBE8SION8 218
among Gongh's men and among Bynpf a. The wine of bravery
has lees, and there were moments when a body of our troops,
long overstrained, got out of hand Occasional local panics
led to stampedes ; but this epidemic fear soon halted, and took
breath, and turned to bay once more. Stragglers were some-
times too numerous, but as soon as they were collected, they
fought at once with renewed grit and pride; and as to the
smidl number that failed, and failed badly, harmfully, they
have in their aftermath of shame far more pain than they
deserve^ for a battle of this unusual power and horror needs
qualities of brain and body which the weak do not possess.
I dislike very much several pictures of the Great Retreat
which General Monash has ventured to publish, though
they display neither soldierly judgment nor sympathetic
apprehension. They are daily journalism awaiting headlines.
Here is a sketch of Byng^s troops (pp. 24-25, ''Australian
Victories in France in 1918 ") :—
*' Basseux rests on the main road from Doullens to Arras,
which lies roughly parallel to the line along which, as
subsequently transpired, the vanguard of the enemy was
endeavouring to advance at that part of the front That
main road I found packed, for the whole of the length which
I had to traverse, with a steadily retreating collection of
heterogeneous units, service vehicles, and guns of all imafl^-
able types and sizes, intermingled with hundreds of civmaa
refugees, and farm waggons, carts, trollies and barrows packed
high with pathetic loi^ of household effects. The retrograde
movement;was orderly and methodical enough, and tiiere was
nothing in the nature of a rout, but it was nevertheless a
determmed movement to the rear which evidenced notlung
but a desire to keep moving.'^
As the Third Abut men in retreat had been in the battle
six days and five nights, and as Monash and lus troops had
not yet fought even an hour, the underlying criticism in
this quotation has an unpleasant tone. A schoolboy would
describe it " as altogether too cocky."
§m
There would have been less wear and tear if horsemen had
been more common on the Fifth Abmt's extending front
Haig notes that^
''their appearance in the battle gave great encouragement
to the infantry''; and that *an the southern battle-front,
214 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABCH, 1918
and particnlarly in the fiditing abont Nqyon, ca^ahv were
once more employed wiui great effect^ and proved their
extreme value in warfiEure of a more open nature. On more
than one occasion they were able by rapid and suooessfiil action
to restore a doubtful situation/'
In Butler's Corps cavahy were invaluable from the first
day onwards.
"So urgent was the demand for more mounted men»" sbjb
Haig, '^that arrangements were made during the progress
of the battle to provide with horses severu regiments of
Yeomanry who had but recently been dismounted K>r emplov-
ment with other arm& In common with the rest of the
cavabry, these Yeomanry did excellent service. Without the
assistance of mounted troops, skilfully handled and gallantly
led, the enemy could scarcely have been prevented from
breaking through the long and thinly-held front of broken
and wooded ground before the French reinforcements had
had time to arrive."
But let us try to view these matters closely, passing into
essential details. G.H.Q.'s attitude to cavalry maybe divided
into a first period of over-confidence, and a second period of
under^valuation. In the first period cavalry came up in state
to complete a foretold break-through ; and as a break-through
was never achieved, the arrival of cavabrv became a bitter
joke to infantry officers and men. " Oh, damn I the cavsJry
have come up, so our advance must have stopped I " In the
reactionary period, two cavalry divisions were given up ; and
is there [reason to believe tbiat the others were used often
enough as mounted troops? To bring up cavalrymen in
lorries, for example, is not at all likdy to keep men and
horses together; and as three cavahy divisions equal the
man-power of only one infantry division, a division of cavalry
is nothing more than a brigade of infkntry when it is em-
ployed dismounted and at a long distance from its horsea If
the cavalrv divisions on Oough's front could have been split
up into mvisional mounted men for the infiemtry brigades,
would their value have been increased? And would this
arrangement have made it necessary for G.H.Q. to find, bv
hook or by crook, more rifle strength and guns for Gough s
fisff-stretching defence ? Even in our 3rd Corps, where CAvSbey
formed the British supports, divisional mounted troops were
needed, as by the Eighteenth,
General Gough believes that we should have got fiu* more
value out of the cavalry if they had been organized in smaller
A FEW 8GATTEBED IMPBEBSIONS 215
units and then attached to the infantry; but O.H.Q. had
other views in March» 1918. From these points let us pass
on to some very interesting personal experienoes written by a
distinffoished officer of the Third Cavalbt : —
"On arrival in the 8rd Corps area» this division was
ordered to form a dismounted division and to go forward to
oocui^ certain points of the defensive line. In the subsequent
retirements which took plaoe» difficulty was experienced in
carrying equipment, rations, ammunition, warm British coats,
et&, owing to the unsuitability of the kit of the cavalry
soldier for actinff for prolonged periods dismounted ; hence
some equipment had to be abandoned. The horses on this
occasion were sent back some miles under orders of the Corps,
and were not seen again by the units for three or four days.
It has been brought out time after time during the operations
that the horses must be kept within reasonable reach of the
dismounted men, otherwise the latter lose a great deal of their
mobility. Mounted men must always be attached to a dis-
mounted brigade for use as orderlies, patrols, etc., and a
mounted reserve kept in hand for counter-attack, or moving
quickly to a threatened point, even when the remainder of the
units are acting dismounted.
" Fade horses for Hotchkiss, machine-gunsy and tools and
ammunition, led b^ men on foot, should always accompany
the dismounted brigade or regiment, if it is found that the
remainder of the horses for tactical reasons must be sent some
distance away. Otherwise, men are used up in canying the
above equipment
''It was found that when cavalry was sent forward to
take up a position to check the enemy, or to fill up a gap
which nad occurred in the line, the situmon was very obscure,
Mid it was very necessary to send officers* patrols forward at
once to see the situation.
" In retiring from one position to another it was found
advisable to retire by a flank to avoid hostile artillery
fire. • . •
'' If a retirement of cavalry b to take place when holding
part of a line, it should not be carried out mounted. Led horses
should first c^ all be got away, and then the dismounted men
should retire on foot An instance of this occurred with
Barman's Force on the 26th March, in the vicinity of Dives.
The IVench save way on the left about Candor, and Lieut-
Colonel Ooolrs detachment of the 8eo(md Cavalry Division,
bad to withdraw. The withdrawal was carried out mounted
216 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABCH, 1918
with the result that confusion occurred, and difficulty was
experienced in taking up the appointed line in rear* Also,
the fact of mounted men moving back has a demoralizing
effect on other troops, especially imantry, in the vicinity, and
is apt to cause premature wiUidrawals elsewhere. On the
same day the withdrawal of a detachment of the Third
Cavalry Divisiok from Bois des Essarts was carried out
by sending the horses away beforehand, with satisfactory
results. • • •
''The work of patrols throughout the operations was
excellent. In the case of Harman's Force, the 3rd Corps
were quite in the dark as regards the situation until recon-
naissances by officer's patrols were carried out. It was the
practice from March 23 to 26 to keep four officer's patrols
— strength one officer and ten other ranks — at General
Harman's Headquarters, for employment as required. These
patrols started out before dawn each day and were drawn in
after dark. They worked in certain sectors of the front and
supplied reliable information, not onlv of the position of the
enemv's advancing troops, but also of our own infieuitry or of
the Irench troops. Reports were submitted eveiy two hours,
on an average, by mounted dispatch riders. These patrol
leaders were able to visit advanced Company, Regimental and
Brigade Headquarters, British and French, sending a con-
tinuous stream of information of the situation on a front of
five or seven miles, which proved invaluable to the Higher
Command No casualties to patrols were reported, although
they worked often in front of our infantry in close touch
with the enemy. The utmost self-reliance and bravery were
shown. . • •
*' It is the general opinion that liaison with French troops
was bad. The average French interpreter has no military
knowledge or vocabiuary, and is quite useless for liaison
purposes. In the case of Heunnan's Force, liuson was carried
out by means of French-speaking Briti^ officers; this was
also done in the case of General Seely's Force, and . General
Seymour's, and it worked welL . • ."
At first the First Cavalbt Division was with Watts, but
one deed has been assigned in print to its Commander that
belongs to the 9th Cavalry Brigade and the H.Q. of the
Sixty-sixth Division ; the recapture of ground east of HerviUv
in a dual attack by tank and horse. Imagine the Roism-
Monti^y road running from north-west towards the south.
Here in the south is Montigny. Over there, east of the road.
A FEW 8CATTEBED IHPBE8SION8 217
18 Hervilly. West by south of the road, some 3000 yards off,
18 Nobesooort Farm. From this point the tank attack set out»
goiBg east, while from Montignv the 9th Cavalbt Bbioadb
advmodd, moving in an easterly enrye northward ; and by
good fortmie the diffieolt oo-operation was perf eet This
oonnter-attaek took place on the second dAj, ftt aboat eleven
o'clock in the morning; and although it feoled to retake the
whole of Hervilly Wwxl, yet it hurt the foe badly at the very
moment when he was trying not only to develop a snccess of
the first day at Templeax-le-Qa6rarcC but to reach and take
the Oreen Line hard by Nobescourt Farm, an important part
of the P&nonne bridgehead.
The First Cayalbt did a lot of digging, once through a
whole night, but, as we have seen, its most noteworthy
experience was this— that it had to be sent from Watts,
whoee Corps became increasingly weak, to ease border troubles
on and near TmBB Abmt luid, where dangers were even
more threatening. Afterwards, on the mominj^ of March 25,
it was among the Fifth Abmt troops that remf orced Byng.
Then, two days later, it crossed the Somme and rejoined the
Futh Abmt.
From liaieh 21 to April 11 the First Cayalbt lost 1277
in casualties : officers kiUed 14, wounded 64, missing 9 ; other
ranks killed 166, wounded 801, missing 22a
All the cavalry units did won<terf ully well, whether
mounted or dismounted, but, as a rule, I believe, the mounted
were the more serviceable. Monognu>hs for students of war
are certain to be written about Harman's Force, Portal's
Force, and other excellent bodies, such as Seely's, Seymour's,
Burt's, Paterson's, Legard's, and others.
It is interesting to note that while our infiuitry, as a rule,
lost more in missing than in recovered wounded, the cavalry
lost more in recovered wounded than in missing. Let us
take an example, choosing the Second Cavalbt and the
Eighteenth Ikfakibt.
The Bigkteenih had 82 officers killed, 64 wounded, and
110 missing; and among the other radcs, 299 men were
killed, 1809 were wounded, and the missing numbered 2649.
The Beeond Cavalbt, between March 21 and 26 in-
clusive, suffered as follows: Officers killed, 10; wounded,
88 ; missing, 8. Other ranks killed, 121 ; wounded, 622 ;
mining, 146. Between March 27 and A^ril 1, the losses
were: Officers killed, 10; wounded, 48; missing, 2. Other
ranks killed, 145 ; wounded, 781 ; missing, 98.
218 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MAECH. 1918
Considered as a whole, eontrastiye figures of this kind are
not diffienlt to explain. No cavalry manned the forward
zone, the zone of forlorn hope, from which few men returned
becaose they fonght on till they were killed or captnred.
Farther, in&ntry as a rule formed the rearguards, and in
delaying actions by rearguards a great many men are sur-
rounded, or cut off, and taken prisoners. It is their duty to
sacrifice themselves for the sake of the general defence.
These points are self-evident, but a noteworthy question
arises: ''Are infantrymen under modem conditions handi-
capped so much during a retreat that in future wars they will
be displaced partly by mounted machine-gunners, and partly
by tanks ? Have they had their day ? Will they disappear
as archers and crossbowmen and pikemen disappeared ?
Perhaps tibe fiercest cavalry fight was the capture of the
Bois de Moreuil, March 80, by the Canadian Cavalry
Bbigade. The Germans had captured M&si^res and were
advancing rapidly towards Amiens. So the brigade was
ordered to cross the Noye and Avre Rivers at once and to
engage and delay the enemy. It crossed at Castel and
marcmed due east to the northern part of the Bois de MoreuiL
At this point machine-guns from the wood's northern face
fired upon the Brigade, and as Germans within the wood had
a full dear view of the whole valley leading up to Amiens, a
swift and successful attack by the Canadians was imperative.
The story of what occurred reads like a brilliant page by
Alexander Dumas. Both sides fought with extraor&iaty
courage. The wood was taken little by little after complicated
movements and the bitterest of bitter fighting, in which
squadrons commanded by Nordheimer, Newcomen, Timmia,
and Flowerdew suffered heavily and won a fiime not to be
forgotten. Consider a passage from the Brigade report : —
''Lord Strathcona's Horse (R.C.) were then ordered to
send one squadron under Lieutenant Flowerdew to pass
round the north-east comer of the wood at a gallop in support
of Captain Nordheimer, while the remaining two squadrons of
the regiment advanced to the attack dismounted on the north-
western face. Nordheimer's squadron got into the wood and
engaged the enemy in hand-to-hand combat. Many of the
enemy were kUled, all refusing to surrender; but a laige
party, estimated about 300, retired from the woiod south-CMt
of the point where Nordheimer*s squadron had entered it.
This party was charged by lieutenant Flowerdew, and many
Germans were killed with the sword as they ran to meet the
,<9Aamc««'tt
220 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MARCH, 1918
eavaliy with the iMiyonet, showing no signs of surrender.
Flowerdew, having passed through them, mieeled about and
charged again. He then galloped into the wood at the
centre of the eastern face, established himsell, and was joined
by the dismounted party of his regiment. Fierce hand-to-
hand fighting ensuea in all the north-east part of the wood,
resulting ultunately in the complete capture of this portion
of the wood and the killing of aJl the German garrison. The
enemy's resistance was most stubborn; one badly wounded
German, shot through both legs and the stomach, refused to
allow the stretcher-bearers to move him, saying he would
sooner die uncaptured • . • Our losses were severe, most
regiments having lost from half to one-third of their officer^
and a similar proportion of their men. • • .*'
I give a sketch-map to illustrate another action of import-
ance ; it was fought by a detachment of the Third Cavalry
Division in the neighbourhood of Villeselve. On March 24,
at 8.30 ajn., this division received orders at Berlancourt to
move forward in the direction of Gugny to support dis-
organized infantry, whose line had broken at Villeselve.
Sron our cavalry re-established the front from Beaumont to the
neighbourhood of Eaucourt. Then they were withdrawn to
help the Nvnth French Division, but this movement caused
the line to break again, so Harman issued orders for another
restoration. The 7th and Canadian Brigades were sent
mounted round the southern side of Villeselve, and they
formed a line from Beaumont, the left of the French position,
to the road-junction half a mUe north-west of Beaulieu. The
6th Brigade, under Major Williams, was sent through GoUezy
in order that they mieht charge through the German line,
and then swing right-handed in a north-east direction along
the foe's fi^nt, using the sword only.
The detadunent [160 men in allj moved along the main road
to Villeselve, taking the sunken track that goes north into
CoUezy. It came under machine-gun fire from the neigh-
bourhood of Golancourt, but put itself under cover of a big
farm at the south-east exit of CoUezy. It was formed into
three troops by regiments ; our Third Dragoon Guards under
Lieutenant Vincent forming the first wave, our Tenth Hussars
under Major Williams the second wave, and the Boyals under
Captain Turner the third wave.
The attack was made in infantry attack formation ; the
first two waves in line extended, and the third in sections,
but covering the fianks of the two leading wave& The
A FEW 8GATTEBED IMPBES8I0NS 221
Third Draeoon Guards rode towards Copse A, meetiiig some
Germaa infitntry, who were either killed or captured. Several
Germans ran into the copse, but they were followed on foot^ and
shot in the back at point-blank range.
As for the Tenth Hussars and £>yals, Williams led them
on the west side of Copse A, and here the greater part of the
enemy's force was posted. For about a thousand yards our
men were under machine-gun fire, and the last two hundred
y tfds was ploughed land. But the attack was in hifih spirits
and cheered lustily, and when it reached the plou^ed land
the foe benn to surrender. The Hussars rode straight
ihrouffh, and the Royals followed, mopping up small parties
who had run together after the Tentn hM passed through
them.
After this m6Ue the " Rally " was sounded ; prisoners were
ooUeeted, 106 in i^, and the wounded were picked up. Then
the squadron returned to the main Berlancourt- Villeselve
road. Our own losses were high, about seventy-three, but
the counter-attack had a good influence on the infantry, who
with renewed confidence pushed forward to a line running
from the outskirts of Golancourt almost to Eaucourt, indud-
ing Hill 81. His result enabled two Ulster battalions, who
were cut oft in the neighbourhood of Cugny, to retire on
Villeselve, where they were reassembled and sent back into
the line.
In briefi we owe to all arms an inexpressible debt of
gratitude.
CHAPTER n
Dawson's Five Hundred
HOW THE SOUTH AFRICANS VTERE OVERWHELMED: SUNDAY,
MARCH 24, 1918
AT 9.45 on Saturday evening Dawson's South African
troops, now reanced to about five hundred in all,
^ picked their way towards their posts in the NvuMs
chosen line. By three o'clock on Sundaymominf
they took up their ground north-west of Marribres Wood, and
north of a road running between Le ForSt and Bancourt.
Their right had gained touch with Campbell's left, a touch
frail and uncertain, as German patrols haa entered Cl^ry-sur-
Somme, about two thousand four hundred yards from the
southern outskirts of Bois Marribres. Dawson's left had
linked itself to a company of E.O.S. Borderers, but did it
find the rest of this Lowland battalion, which was in reserve
south of Rancourt, some two thousand yards from Bois
Harrises' north end? Three patrols tried to find it, but
ecurly morning fog made their search ineffectual
Dawson was on a ridge, with two remnant battalions
looking south and one facing east, whence front attack would
come. One good trench and two or three bad ones, with a good
many shell-holes, were his earthworks. He took up his head-
quarters in a support trench about three hundred vards behind
the front line. Ground went eastward downhill to a small
valley, then sloped up and made a somewhat higher ridge,
where our foes, while spying on the South African actions, chose
damnable fine places for machine-guns. About one thousand
yards parted the front line from Ihis German vantage ground.
While fog was passing away Dawson visited his men,
improved their stations, and braced them up with a few
right words of crisp pre-battle talk. They had two hundred
rounds of ammunition apiece, besides a fair supply of Lewis
drums. But a section of machine-gunners was down in luck ;
it had only three belts I What was to be done ? Three
THE SOUTH AFRICANS OVERWHELBfED 223
machine-gmiB and their men were sent away — ^formidable and
yet naelefle. And another troable was present. In the tiny
S.A. force were too many good offioerSy some being new*
eomersy and it seemed a crime to waste them. One battalion,
a strength dwindled to a hundred and ten all ranks.
had fourteen officers, for instance. Since March 20 no man
had had any hot food or any hot tea. All their rations had
been cold. And three cold nights without sleep, and long
days in which fighting, sweat, and thirst had collected fog,
dust, gas, and shell fumes, had exhausted most bodies \m%
224 a!HE FIFTH ABMY IN MABGH, 1918
yet in heart all were fit for their forlorn hope. Dawaon spoke
to his lieutenant-Clolonels, Heal and Christian, telling ^em
that their field of battle was to be held against all odds in a
thorough fight to a finish. No man was to retire without
orders; every one must do his best to the very last^ no
matter what might be done by neighbouring troops on the
flanks. And a report of this decision was sent by runner to
Tudor, the G.O.C.
It was fortunate indeed that Congreve had chosen at this
E)int a fight to a finish ; fortunate, too, that both Tudor and
awson were fighters bom, for Marwitz, on this tragical
Sunday, had maae up his mind to cain an operative break-
through both north and south of the boundary uniting Gough
and Byng. North of the boundary he got through along the line
Combles, Morval, Lesbceufs, but south of the boundaryihe was
foiled mainly by the splendid bravery of the South .^J&icans,
but importantly also by the fine way in which two battalions
of the Thvrty-fifih Division, the Fifteenth Cheshires and
Fifteenth Notts and Derbies, hurried into action soon after
dawn, though fagged by a severe forced m%rch, seized Hem
Spur, and stopped the German flanking advance from C16ry.
Further, if the Nvnih Division's Highlanders had not bem
compelled by events in the Thibd &Hn to fight on Byng's
ground, the South Africans might have been rescued.
At about nine a.m., as Dawson himself has related, the
enemy deployed for attack, and got his machine-guns into
action in some old trenches on the ridge one thousand yards
east of our front line. His artillery opened fire at the same
time. Half an hour later a British airplane passed over, and
a feeling of intense gladness heart^ied the South Africans,
for the airplane seemed to be a link with the British troops
behind. Dawson waved to the pilot, and the pilot waved
back ; but perhaps the movement of his hand was not friendly.
Perhaps, indeed, the pilot mistook the South Afiicans for
Germana In any case, at ten am. British field artillery, by
accident — ^Erom we direction evidently of the Ttoenty-Jirst
Division— opened a very accurate fire on Dawson's position,
one batteiy oeing laid on the trench in which Brigaae Head-
quarters was situated. One mounted and two dismounted
messenf^ers were sent back,but the fire continued till eleven a.m.,
when the batteries apparently retired ; and afterwards, apart
from some heavy gun-firinc on Bouchavesne^ no more British
guns were heard. Though a number of British shells fell in
Dawson's trendies, they are believed not to have caused any
THE SOUTH AFBIGAN8 OVEBWHELMED 225
casualties. But it was found necessary to remove Brigade
Headquarters to a shell-hole in the vicinity.
When Marwitz^s troops, who were grey, blurred moving
spots on their ridge-crest^ came west downhill, they were
swift and prudent, advancing in all about two hundred and
fiftv yards. A rush across the narrow valley was not in their
oraers. To dimb a ridge afterwards would need more nerve
and vigotur than were natural after three days of continuous
overstrain. So the front attack was easy to hold ; and another
from due south, more difficult perhaps, was shot to a stand-
stilL An hour or so went by ; and then from north-east came
a very clever, even a picturesque onrush. The Boche set fire to
dried grass, used wind-blown smoke as a screen, and, com-
bining nis movements with gunfire skilfully directed, picked
his way slowlv forward till he got almost within charging
distance of S JL front line. Between one hundred and two
hundred yards were all that he had to rush. Through some
hours he strove to get nearer, but always in vain, so accurate
was the 8. A. shooting. Dawson, knowing that his ammunition
eould not be replenished, had ordered his men never to shoot
at random, but to use their rifles with slow, prudent care, wait-
ing till field-grey taigets drew near enough to be pot-shots.
Fmmr at lonmr ranges than four hundr^ yards was to be
Early in hb attack the Boche tried to use a field-gun
only a thousand yards off. Such cool cheek angered the
defenders at first ; it seemed too insolent, too arrogant. Then
it amused them, and by reaction eased their stress and strain.
They were in a theatre out of doors, and that field-gun, now
being wheeled forward by hand in sudden, violent efforts,
was the play. Major Ormiston, of the 1st S.A. Infantry,
eve orders to a Lewis gunner, while his riflemen held their
Bath and kept their eyes on the German field-piece. Putt-
putt-puttr I The Lewis gun was in action . . • and well on
its taimt, for the Boche gunners, almost ready to open fire,
were idl knocked out ''Ah I** our men ezdaimed in a sort of
drawling, husky sigh ; and then a rattle of cheers, hoarse and
stem, rang from the British defence.
Tlie Boche did not accept his failure tamely. He bore
malice ; and with his usual detailed thoroughness began to
plot and |ilan, as if his day's fight were a siege and not a hold-up
to be finished quickly. Later, with renewed pluck, he made
another attempt, in a movement far and away more dramatic.
This time bis field-gun had its team of horses, and came at a
Q
236 THE FIFEH ABMY IN MABCH, 1918
gallop into the areiUL Wasted energjr! The same Lewis
goimer — ^I wish I knew his name I — had the same eool mind
and the same steady hand and effectual eye. He fired : and
tiie team got out oi hand, OYertomed its field-piece, men and
horses gomg down tog^her — a great huddle that pkmged
and stmgg^ed. No wonder the defence shoated with joy.
And anc^^ cheeiing thing came hefore noon. A messenger
arriyed from Tador, bringing with him the news tbat
troops bom oar Thirty-fifth were coming np, an invalnaUe
reinforcement, and had been <Mrdered to form line bdiind the
Soath Africans, half a mile away. Dawson passed on the
news to his men, and sent word back to Tndor by runner that
the frontal attack had been held, and that his line at 1L40
was stiU intact^ despite dangerous movements in the north
and south. No other message came to Tudor from his SA.
Bricade.
In the afternoon, at about two o'clock, British troops on
Dawson's right and left retired. This incident caused one of
his own officers on his left, with some thirty men, to believe
that a general retirement had been ordered* Believing this,
thev b^an to tall back past the shell-hole in whidi Dawson
had his Headquarters. Major Cochran and CSaptain Beverley
went to stop tnem, accompanied by a seigeant-major named
Keith. At once German machine-guns became exceedingly
busy, concentrating fire on the movements in Dawson's arena.
It was easy to stop the retreating men and to place them in a
position £Budng north, perhaps a hundred yards north of
Dawson's hole ; but, unfortunately, brave Cochran was killed,
hit in the neck by a machine-gun bullet^ and Ormiston was
dangerously wounded by an advance Gennan scout, at a
range of about sixty yards, and was left out there in the
open. Wounded men, if possible, went or were taken to
an old trench that led to the Headquarters shell-hole ; and
tiiose who were too much hurt to use a rifle were iJlowed
at first to leave the battlefield. Others were sent back to
tiieir firing-line, and always they went willingly. But a
magnificent fighting temper needs ammunition, and by two
p.m. ammunition became short, and Dawson was completely
surrounded. Every round was collected from casualties, and
men who were not in the front line, or who had no need to
use their rifles, pMsed on their rounds to comrades in front
On our west side German snipers were alert and trouUe-
some ; from north, within two hundred yards of Dawson's ILQ^
came another irritating fire; so Lieutenant Cooper, with some
THE SOUTH APBICAN8 OVERWHELMED 227
twenty men of the Second Bmiinent^ was sent a hundred
yards northwards in order to hold some shell-holes from which
a very useful counterHmiping could be done by cool, firm pluck.
Cooper and his garrison cannot be praised too mucL They
suffered such heavy losses that they needed frequent reinforce-
ments. Cooper himself was hit, and about an hour later a
fragment of shell killed him. But his influence remained;
his few men went on firing till their ammunition had gone.
Between two and three o'clock a thrill of excited hope-
fulness passed all at once through the defenders, as signs of
agitation appeared among the besiegers. Then a wounded
man from Cooper's handful came to Headquarters and said :
** Our men are coming up, and some Germans are bolting for
all they are worth 1 In fact, north of Dawson's H.Q. the
foe fell back, a good target in retreat, and soon German
artillery put down a rapid stiff barrage westward, behind
Dawson's battlefield. Why ? Then some one cried : '' We
can see the Germans surrendering ! " This cry was repeated.
Had troops from our Thirty "fifth begun to arrive ? Hope said
** Tes" in every British mind ; so our men were heartened —
heartened in vain, unfortunately. No battalion of the
Thvrtjf-fifth had yet had time to come so far. The battlefield
being small and quite surrounded, German fire from the west
may have hit Germans in the north and east, causing their
leaders to believe that British reinforcements were arriving.
" About this time," says Buchan, " Lieutenant-Colonel Heal,
commanding the Fiist Regiment, was killed. He had already
been twice wounded in the action, but insisted on remaining
with his men. He had in the highest degree every quality
which makes a fine soldier. I quote from a letter of one of
his oflicersL ' Bv this time it was evident to all that we were
boimd to go under, but even then Colonel Heal refused to be
depressed. God knows how he kept so cheeiy all through
that hell ; but right up to when I last saw him, about five
minutes before he was lulled, he had a smile on his face and a
pleasant word for us alL* "*
At four p.m. a bad outlook cast a chill over every one.
Dawson's men could not hold out much longer. They were
sick with the nausea called overstrain ; ammunition was all
but gone ; machine-guns and Lewis guns were silent. Since
nine a»m. artillery fire had poured on theS.A. fronts causing so
moeh dust and falling earth that rifles had to be cleaned
fo»queiiUy. Itoimeg^
• ** SoQlli AliSosn YoMit ia Vrsnot," ^ 18S.
228 THE FIFTH ABMY IN KABCH, 1918
15 cm., tmseen batteries for the meet part. light irench
mortars also were in action, ravaging the north-east part of the
8.A. fronts Casualties everywhere had been veiy high, and
at four o'clock Dawson had only a few isolated fi;roups of men.
Still, though control was now impossible, and i^oo^ hope of
relief had gone, an effort would be made to hold on till dark,
when survivors oonld try to open a path westward.
At 4.20 Dawson had a very great shock. He sawa white
flag! Through field-glasses he watched it carefully, and
80on, to his intense reUef, he could see that it was a German
artillery flag. But some harm had been done, several South
Africans having accepted the flag as an official surrender. A
quarter of an hour later, the last glimmer of hope went out
like a lighted candle in the wind.
Beyond H.Q., in the east-north-east, a new attack came into
full view ; it proved to be one of three fresh battalions. At
this moment tne S A. defence had about one hundred effectives,
almost without ammunition, and scattered over too much
ground. A few shots brought our rounds to an end; the
attack came on in waves, cheering and screaming, and all
was over.
" Dawson, with Christian and Beverley, walked out in
front of a group [of Gtermans] which had gathered round
them, and was greeted with shouts of ' Why have you killed
80 many of us ? * and ' Whv did you not surrender sooner? '
One man said, 'Now we shall soon have peace,' at which
Dawson shook bis head. Before he went eastward into
captivity he was allowed to find Cochran's body, and rescue
his papers." *
For over seven hours handfuls of South Africans, heroic
and indomitable, had held up the Qerman in&ntry and all
the mms and transport which were to advance by the
Bou(£avesnes-Comble8 road. After the fight this road was
seen to be blocked for miles and miles. No wonder German
leaders were amazed by such a magnificent stand.
Though the S. A. Brigade had ended its last fight, it did not
disappear entirely, I rejoice to say. Two thin companies had
lost their way on a dark night, and another small party had
become detached from the brigade. These troops, along with
some details and the transport of the brigade, about four
hundred and -fifty rifles, were collected near Maricourt^ and
formed into a composite battalion under lieutenant-Colonel
• Bnchan, p. 188.
THE SOUTH AFBIGANS OVERWHELMED 229
Totmg, who had been in charge of the S.A. details. So
Dawson's fine spirit did not vaniw altogether from the battle.
For the rest, I learn from Colonel ^achan that Dawson
daring the fight had moments of questioninff doubt He
wondmd whether his final stand woold be justified by its
results. In his diary Dawson wrote : —
*' I cannot see that under the circumstances I had any option
but to remain till the end. Far better to go down fiffhting
against heavy odds than that it should be said we failed to
carry out our orders. To retire would be against all the
traditions of the service.'*
No combat in the whole battle was more useful and
necessanr, and even more so to Byng than to Goiu[h. U
the y.U. were granted to the superior herobm of units,
and not to the superior heroism of occasional men one
by one, the South African Brigade would certainly have
won and received this honour bv its unlimited valour not
only on Sunday, March 24, but also on the 2l8t and 22nd.
As Oeneral Tudor has said, '* None but the best could have
S^t through on the 22nd from the Yellow lane with
eudecourt in the hands of the enemy."
Tet for some reason G.H.Q. glides over the South African
defence and its exceedingly great value. It says onlythat
the foe's advance at the junction of the Fifth and Third
''succeeded in isolating a part of the South African Briflade,
Ninth DivisiOK, near Marriires Wood, north of CMry • These
troops maintained a most gallant resistance until 4.80 p.m.,
when they had fired off all their ammunition and only about
100 men remained unwounded. Early in the afternoon
German infantry entered Combles ** Fin J^yng's area], " and
having gained the high ground at Morval were advandng
towards Lesboeufs. Their continued progress threatened to
sever the connection between the Fifth and Third Armikb
and the situation was serious."
What a scrappy and patchy account of the most terrible
hours in Harwite's advance I There is no recognition of the
fiict thai the South African five hundred, by holding firmly
throuffh a long morning, and by continuing their intrepid stand
till huf-past rour in the afternoon, were certainly as invaluable
to Byng as they were to Gough. Indeed, Byng's southern
troops, as the <uspatch recognises, were at Kocquigny and
Barastre, and Uius far off frDm a firm liaison with Cough's
left. Note the result. With its Highlanders the NxrUh
380 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABCH, 1918
endesvomed to do work which oo^i to hsre heen dooe by
the 8oath brigade of Byngf s tiAt flank divkian, the F&riy^
tevenik, while Dttwaon, just BoaSici the bovndaiy, prerented
a break-throng
If Bawson'e troops had been wiped out in the morning,
dieaeter could not have been evaded. The eonnectian between
Bjmt and Goash woold have been eompietely sev^ed. By
eontinning to bold on after the fall of ComUeB and Morval,
Dawiion confirmed the valne of the work done by troops of the
Thirty -fifih west of CUty, and by the NinA'a Highlanders in
Byngs own area. But for him and his five hmidred, a
rescuing line could not have been formed and held fitom the
Somme at Hem to Trdnes Wood and LongnevaL
Dawson writes as follows of his men : —
" It is impossible for me to do justiee to the magnificent
courage displayed by all ranks under my command during
this i^ioo. For the two years I have been in France I have
seen nothing better. Until the end they appeared to me quite
perfect, ^e men were cool and alert, taking advantage of
every opportunity, and, when required, moving forward over
the open under the hottest machine-gun fire and within 100
yards of the enemy. They seemed not to know fear, and in
my opinion they put forth the greatest effort of whidi human
nature is capable. I myself witnessed several cases of great
gallantry, but do not know the names of the men. The
Tnajority, ofcouaraef vriU Tiever he known. It must be home in
mind that the Brigade was in an exhausted state before the
action, and in the fighting of the three previous days it was
reduced in numbers from a trench strength of over 1800 to 600."
I am glad that Dawson does not know the names of those
men because I wish to honour the South Afiican bravery in its
Brigade form. ** The majority, of course, will never be known "
in acts of courage; and hence there will always be much
unfairness in the distribution of medals.
Medals are all very well, but corporate spirit in great deeds
wiU endure longer in history and be more useful to the next
generations.
For all that, just a few examples of bravery may be given
hera
Two hours after Major Ormiston was wounded, a man
went out over the open and wanted to bring him to our
trench. Ormiston refused to go. "I am dying," he saidi
** and shall be dead in an hour or so. It would be quite a
waete of time to get me in.'' But the man insisted on
THE SOUTH AFRICANS OVERWHELMED 281
reseoiiig the officer. He talked with Onniston, and prevailed
on him to oome; and when Ormiaton tried to move ne foond
that he was regaining the loss of hia legs, which had been
paralysed. They crept from shell-hole to shell-hole till they
reached the trench. This adventure would have been im-
possible if the defence had not had the snperiority of fire.
Onr fellows conld show their heads while the Germans daied
not show theirs. ^ It was an exoeedinglv brave action,'' says
Dawson, "but by right the man should have been oourt-
martiaUed. For it was not his business to m looking for
wounded; his job was to flghi. All the same, he was a Brave
feUow."
^ Lieutenant Cooper, of the Second Regiment, about two
in the afternoon, came in looking as white as a sheets and
saying that he had been hit in the chest It was found that
the bullet had hit his box respirator and given him a heavy
blow in the chest, but had not gone through. Cooper sat down
till the colour returned to his fiice, when he said, ' Now Fm
S>ing bade' Out he went over the o^en and rejoined his men.
bout ten minutes later a man came m and said: 'Lieutenant
Cooper is killed. A piece of the last big shell hit him.'"
''At one time in this front trench, where the artilleiy fire
was exceedingly heavy, only two men were left alive, one
being Father Hill, and the other a private of the First
Regiment, and a linen dumper by trade. Among all the brave
men on tins day he was conspicuous for his courage. Two
shells burst on the parapet, and it seemed as if the next
would be in the trencL The man said : 'I have been praying
hard for the last four hours.' ' Then vou have beaten me at
it^' Father EQll answered. • . . They both survived, I rejoice
to say."
** Another man, with both legs shattered, sat in the trench
and refused to let any one bind up his wounds ; and with a
smile on his fiMC he handed up his ammunition, packet by
packet, to the men who were firing. • • •'*
CHAPTER m
A FEW LETTEBS WBHTEN B7 OFFICEBS OF THE
aiXTT-FIBST DIVI8I0N
§11
FROM a wounded Major to his wounded Brigadier : —
"The battalion had breakfast at Lmguevoisin
[about a mile and a quarter south-east of Nesle]
and then marched back {i.e, westward] to Billancourt
where Brigade H.Q. was. We were just going to have a rest
(having put posts out on all the roads), when we received a
report that the Germans had broken through Nesle. So we
all stood to and lined the . Billancourt-Herly road. However,
it was a false alarm and was said to have been started by
a person in the uniform of a R.A.M.C. captain whom the
police were trying to catch, but I do not think they were
successful. Heaps of troops received this rumour and had
altered their plans accordingly.*
''At 6 p.m. on the 2Srd we had orders to go to
Languevoisin again and billet ourselves, which we did.
Bri^ide remained at Billancourt. Then we actually had
more or less of a night's rest.
^ On the morning of the 24th, Brigade telephoned to say
we were to go to . The wire went ' Dis ' in the middle
of the message, so I started off with the battalion, and the
CO. went to Brigade to find out the rest of the message. As
we went through Breuil I reported to General Evans, who
told me that the situation was changed, and that we must not
cross the canal. However, at this moment the CO. came
along to say that the Brigade had changed the orders and we
* GemuuiB In Allied nnifonn behind otu lines were aotive^Bpreading
mmoors. On Mwoh S9, one of oar brigadiers, while oiylng important orders
in the field, was interrupted by a man in medioal uniform, who came up and
said with great excitement that Germans werein the woods a hundred vards off.
The brifladier told him to go to that plaoe which is assumed to be much
hotter than the Bed Sea. His orders given, he called for the excited doctor,
only to find that the fellow had ridden away east on a motor-cycle.
284 THE FIFTH ABlfY IN MABCH, 1918
were to form a bridgehead over the CSaaal [do Nord] ; it was
arranged that the OloiioeBten were to form a faridgdbead josi
west of with some troq^isof the Thoentieth DivisiOK, and
the test of his brigade with some French troope and some of
the 188rd Brioade formed one at BreoiL So we hurried
off down the canal and got into position aboat noon. Ilien
we had a mesBace to say that we were nnder the TwentieA
DinsiOH for orcterB, and shortly afterwards had orders from
O&O. iL of the Twentieth to cross the canal and try to form a
defiansive flank for the 59th E^gadb, which was withdrawing
on to the canal hard pressed by the enemy with its right
flank in tiie air. We were just starting oat to do this when
the orders were changed again, and we had to send only one
company, and the oUier uiree companies were sent back to
the bri^ehead at BreniL
** G Company crossed the canal and had advanced only
a few hmidied yards in open order when they were suddenly
enfiladed by a Glerman machine-gun and some infimtry ; so
they got down and opened rapid nre and gave the Gkrmans
as fi;ood as they sot themselves. It was here that poor little
La&e was kiUed; he was O.C. Company at the time and
stood on a slight mound. In tiie end more Germans came up
and C Company had to withdraw ; this was about 2 p jn. [on
March 241.
** In the meantime the other three companies were forming
a bridgehead at Breuil, all was quiet here except for a German
cavalry patrol which swung off as soon as it was fired at.
Here we remained till about 8 D.m., losing about ten men
through our own artillery, whicn would fire right into our
men, although there were no Germans within 8(K) yards and
in spite of our frequent messagea . . .
'* During the mght the Germans came up into the trees on
the east of the canal, and, except for machine-gun fire on both
sides occasionallv, the nisht was quiet I forgot to say that
at 8 p.m. we haa received orders to withdraw to west of the
canal and blow up the bridge, which was done.
'' On the morning of <£e 25th the Germans put down a
h^vy machine-gun barrage on the village ; itlasted about an
hour. Xhere must have been thirty maddne-ffuns firing at
least; a few men lining the canal were hit it was about
this time that Colonel Lawson was very nearly hit twice by
a sniper who shot at him &om dose to the canal bank at
about eiffhty yards range. If he had not aimed at his head
he woula have got him.
A PEW LETTERS WRITTEN BY OFFICERS 286
''We hung on in and in front of Brenil all day. It was
noUoed that the Hans had established a H.Q. in a large hoose
abont 700 yards north-west of the village ; monnted orderlies
and others were oontinnally yisiiing it. So we put a section
behind a wall in the villa^ and they made loopholes in the
wall and fired at every one who went near the house. They
got several, too, and we Huns did not like it
^ Throughout the day the village was very heavily shelled
by the Huns, but a few RA.M.O. men from the Tw&ntidh
Division did very good work. When Colonel Wetherall was
hit» the CO. went to command the Brigade and I took over
the battalion. Howitt came up to see us from Brigade H.Q.,
which was just west of Languevoisin« He did damned well
throughout the show; he was always walking about and
visiting people, and worked like a black day and night.
" At 6 p.in. we suddenly saw all the English troops on our
right leave the canal and go back in streams; then the
Germans crossed the canal on our right, under heavy fire from
the Gloucesters, and began to get round our right flank which
was now hopelessly in the air. The Germans also tried to
cross opposite us, but we held them. Things began to look
nasty, but we knew our left was all right as Moore was there
with his battalion.
''We were scrapping hard with the Germans getting
stronger on our right ; so I formed a defensive flank with
B C(mipany, who were in support, and they did excellent
work and kept the Huns back.
** At this stage I received a written order direct firom the
Twentieth DrvisiOK, not vid Brigade, to sav that owing to the
failure of the Thirtielk Division to hold the line on our flank
we were to withdraw to Cressy; sol sent a message to Moore
and ordered the withdrawal of the Glouoesters. No doubt
the people on our right had received Uie same message ; that
is why they went hick.
** The withdrawal was carried out very well with covering
fire, in fact we were the only troops that I saw that used
covering fira
" Some of the older officers did awfully well, • . . and the
Company Serseant-Majors of A and B Companies did
splendidly. We took a few prisoners and Dudbridge was
largely responsible for the capture of an officer. We killed
a lot of Huns and did not simer so very heavily ourselves,
ihon^ poor Fotheigill was killed and C.&M. Phillips was
woundecL One platmn of B Company under C.S.1C. Aunoos
236 THE FIFTH AEMY IN MARCH, 1918
and Corporal Vinoent did a bit of a charge and acafctered the
Huns like blazes, and took a prisoner. . • •
" We reached Cressy just after dark to find a line of posts
held by a mixture of French and British troops, so sent out a
couple of patrols and thickened the line where necessary.
''At 12 midniffht^ 25-26, we had orders to march to
Roye ; so we called in the patrols and started off We cot to
Boye about 3 a.m. and had a meal and a little rest^ and then
started to march again at 6 a.m. The whole British Army
seemed to be on the road. We finally reached M^zi^res at
about 1 p.m., having done 21 miles since midnight. Hei^ we
had something to eat and then dug in, and were glad to see a
French cava&y regiment go through us along the main
Amiens-Boye road. By this time the CO. had come
back to us, as Colonel Bilton, Worcesters, had taken over
the Brigade. ...
'' Bosi^res had fallen * and the Germans were expected to
attack Caix at dawn. . . • Oloucesters were to dig in between
Le Quesnel and Hangest, with the Berks and Oxfords on our
left astride the mam Amiens road with the 182nd and
188rd Bbigades on our left. We moved up, got into
position, and started to dig in. No one knew who held
Hanges^ so we sent a patrol there and found a French
cavahy brigade in the village. This would be about 1 &m.
on the 27th inst.
" Also we sent patrols to Folies and Arvillers, which were
held by British troops. At this time there were two lines in
front of us, both held by British, one through Arvillers and
Folies, the other through Boudboir, Bouvroy, and Warvillers.
As soon as it was light the CO. sent me forward to find out
the situation. I discovered that Warvillers and Bouvroy had
fallen and that Folies, Bouchoir, and Arvillers were held by
troops of the 59th, 89th, and 90th Infantry Brigades. The
old ^ucks, now an enb-enching battalion, were attached to
the 59th Brioade.
"I had rather an interesting time in Bouchoir. Just
before I arrived a Colonel shot a Hun in the main street, at
about ten yards range ; he seems to have wandered in by
mistake. Then I met a subaltern with his platoon, who told
me the Germans were massing on the south of the road ; so I
had a look at them. Never have I seen so many Germans in
all my life ; a huge black mass about a mile away. With
* A false rnmonr. Bosi^res had not falleii,aa we know, Binoe it played an
all-important part in the great oombat of the 87th.
A FEW LETTEB8 WBITTEN BY OFFI0EB8 287
glasses one oould see howitzers, maehin^goiiB, trench mortars,
and field-gtms, as well as infantry. It was a wonderfnl siefat.
They seemed to be coming down the Boye road and then
moving off to the south, and some seemed to stop in a mass
about a mile from where we wera And we had plenty of
batteries and not a gun was firing.
'* So I looked at my map ; the place was 81 Central, I
remember ; and then I went off to the nearest battery and
told them to shoot at 81 Oentral, and they had not sot a map
between them, so I made them shoot off my map. Finally, I
got three more batteries on it, including a battery of
French 76*8.
" The Qermans did not attack Bouchoir, but a force moved
south of it and attacked and captured ArviUers. So Bouchoir
was evacuated and the 88rd Bbiqade was moved over to our
left near Hangeet, as the Qermans had not attacked Oeuz as
heavily as was expected.
''At 12.80 a.m. of the 28th we were relieved by the French
and told that we were going into rest
''We got into motor buses between Le Quesnel and
H^^res, but then they ^found that the Huns had broken
through farther north near Wienoourt and Quillauoourb* So
we rushed up to Maroeleave, got there about 8 p.m., had three
hours' rest, and went out and took up a fine position behind
a bit of wire with a fine field of fire west of the village just
before dawn.
"Then about 10 am. they pulled us out and we handed
the line over to a mixture of troops — Sixty-eixth Division
machine-gunners, a BJL Field CSompany from some division,
and also a Tunnelling Company that had never used rifles
before.'*
Then came the attacks on Lamotte and Haicelcave already
described.
"The end of it was that we were ordered to withdraw and
dig in, in the dark and a steady rain which was now falling,
600 yards west of the villagcf
^ Than wm no brMk-throagh on this front; Imt tho latitr thoivi twloo
how ditialoni during m ntnat hear IaIm nawt ahooft ono mioUmt. Whon our
Ststy-tictik Dmnov reaohad iho line Wianooart-OniUftOooart, 94K) a.nu,
Haroh 98, iho foe wm (mi too tired after his ezperienoee et Herbonniteee, on
the previona day, to give troaUe. But our own tcoopa alao were ^^done'* and
diaofganlaad ; toan waa no aooh thing aa a platoon or a oompaay ; and it was
deemed neoaaiarf to fall baok alowly to the line Ignaiiooart-lCaieelottfe, and
thm to xefoon tae ikelaton nniti.
t
288 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABGH, 1918
" The 29(ih was raiher quiet, the Hans did not attack, and
there was not mudi shelling, bat a little sniping and machine-
gun fire. ... At about 8.50 a.nL on the 30th, we noticed
that all the English troops in the south in the direction of
Hangaid were retiring in streams; at the same time the
Germans started to shell us a lot and opened heavy machine*
gunfire.
''So I went down to the line to see if every one was all
right; it was a curious line, within half a mile of us were
Oloucesters, Boyal Berks, Oxfords, Warwicks, and two
squadrons of yeomanry, and the servants and staff of the
Fifth Abmt Infantry School.
'* I saw some of the Berks and they were very cheery. I
asked who was then in command of them and they told me
the Intelligence Officer. I went over to speak to him, and as
we were talking a shrapnel shell burst near us and hit us
both. We were at the railway between the two villsffee
about 600 yards west of Marcelcave. He was rather badly
hit» poor fellow. I cannot remember his name ; they used to
call him John in the mess. . . •
" I am so pleased Colonel Lawson has got the D.S.O. He
was splendid all the time and as cool as possible. . . ."
What could be better than this letter? As simple as
Bunyan, and generous as a fine May day.
''I fear my writing is very bad, but my arm is not strong
again yet."
No, the letter was written in hospitaL Not a word of
floom appears in this quiet and chatty epitome of big events,
[ow Carlyle would have rejoiced to add such a letter to a
book of his I But yet it is only one letter from a great many,
all written in the same serene tone of conversational friend-
liness. Duty well done fits these officers naturally; their
courage needs nothing else as a symbol of Y.C. and D.S.O.
Our ''nervy" newspapers make much more ado over a
lawn tennis matoh than our officers and men made over the
most searching battle of the whole war. What will the
British people be after two hundred years of headlined
journalism ?
§n
A rearguard officer of the 2/FifUi Gloucesters writes from
hospital to the same Brigadier.
" With regard to mysdf , I was wounded in three places
A FEW LETTEBS WRITTEN BY OFFIGEBS
BUghUy on the 28th March in the oounter-aitaok on Warfns^e'
bat I was so tired that I took no notice, not even knowing
that they [^the wounds] were there. On the 29th I ffot pretty
badly buned, whichn^^ ^^ oontnsion of the spme and I
had to go down. When they undressed me at Bouen, much
to my surprise, there were the slight wounds. . • •
"I wilt tiy to give you a description of what happened to
our battalion after you lefL ... At about 5.80 p.m. on
March 22 our battalion was distributed in depth, A and B in
front, C behind, and my Company in rear. Rickerby and I
were in the front line ; the Boche rushed us, and we all fell
back on my Company line, which was on the railway. He
broke through the battalion on our right, leaving our flank
in the air. At about 10.30 pjn. that night the Boyal Berks,
who were on our left, told us that they had had orders to go
to Yoyennes at once with the 18Srd Briqads, to whom they
were attached. They went, also all the 188rd Bbigadb. I
told Colonel Lawson [Eleventh Hussars], who was the only
other officer practically there ; he had just come. He said we
should have to stay, as we had no orders to go there owinff to
the Brigade-Major bein^ captured; so we extended our une
and kept up fire. At this time S.A.A. was getting very short,
and the dump at Beauvois was burning very strongly. We
stayed in this line, with no one on our right, and no one on
our left» till about 8.80 a.m. on the 28rd, when the Colonel
thought we ought to go, as it would soon be lights and the
enemy would see that he was being held up by only about
150 men on 2000 yards of front* All night ne tried to rush
and bomb us, but we kept on firing at any movement. We
got out by sneaking around Beauvois and marching to
Yoyennes, then to Languevoisin, where we had brealdast.
We then moved to a place near Herly, but marched back to
Languevoisin, and slept the night of 28-24. At 10 a.m. on
the 24th we were rushed to Breuil, to hold the bridgehead,
and to cover the retirement of the Twentieth Division from
the canaL The 24th was without much incident We got
into cellars at Breuil the night of 24-25. Early in the
morning the Boche attacked the bridgel\ead we were holding,
but we drove him offl He shelled us very badly all day, but
we inflicted a lot of casualties on him. At about 4.80 p.m. on
* Thtts UO bcavs Bin osbm IbIo aelioD s* i of 5 a^a. on lUnk 8L At
SsjB. eu Um SMihMf iv«M oolv two idUm bMk from Ibsir odghisl potlU^
sad la tbs mstntfaBS thalr dMnoo, OoUn llsoksosU's, had hma tttift kff i for
iigh> saa Hty boom ly Ihrsi Q«Dsn divMoBg.
240 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABCH, 1918
the 25th the people on the bridgehead on our n^^ retired,
leaving as in the air, and the Boche got across it. We had to
retire to Ciessy as hard as we ooiud, after letting CSolonel
Moore's battalion — ^Twelfth E.B.RC. on our left— know.
''We had a few French mixed np with ns, and throogh
them I had some InncL I was fighting a rearguard action
with about twenty men and a L.O. when I saw some what I
thought to be French, but they seemed to be going the wrong
way. I ran to tell them, and captured a Hun captain,
sergeant, and batman, with some important maps. It was
getting dark by this time, so we got to Cressy, where we
stayed tiU 12 a.m.,* then marched to Roye on the 26th ; f and
after stopping there a little time we went on to M&sik^e&
We arrived were verv tired indeed, but dug a line and had
food. About 9 at nisht we moved up to Le Quesnel, where
we dug in again wiUiout much incident. ... At 9 p.m. on
the 27th we had orders to embuss and go to ViUers-Bretonneux.
When we got there we went on to Marcelcave. We counter-
attacked Warfus^e at 11 a.m., and retired back through
Marcelcave at about 6 p.m. on the 28th. . . . Willink was
wounded in this counter-attack at Warfusfie, but I did not
know that he was killed till I saw it in the Time8.
Colonel Lawson was simply grand. . . ." }
§ra
The late Colonel A. B. Lawson, 2/Fifth Oloucesters, writing
on Mfnr 9, 1918, said :—
" We got a Military Cross for Grarv who did very well, bar
for Dudbridge, and about a dozen M.M.'s. . . . Also they gave
me a D.S.O. ; don't quite know why except for escaping with
a whole skin when so many others had the oad luck not ta . • .
Things for the present are fairly quiet^ but probably the Boche
will develop another effort somewhere again liefore long;
after all his promises to his people he must continue, but I
•
* Getting away from GresBj was difficult. Another offioer writes: "I
found the Berks and got things fixed up, only to find to my horror
when I got hack to Greasy that a general withorawal had hoen ordered,
and we spent a Irantio evening txyiDg to separate the sheep from the goats to
hold the various villages. It was in this withdrawal that poor old Moore was
tiJian prisoner. • . . You are quite right. General Psgan is a topper, and
has already won all hearts. I wish, however, he was not quite so inoUferent
to shell-fire— he makes ma ashatned to duok."
t Covered hy a wsloome leaiqguaxd of armoured oars.
X UnhappUy killed on June 19, 1918.
• •
A FEW LBTTEBS WRITTEN BY OFFICERS 241
trust he will mt a knock and wear himself out and then
perhaps we shall get a bit of our own back.'*
" B he has many divisions like the one we met the other
da^ we shall not have a great deal of trouUe with him, and I
think it is a ywy &vourable sign that there are any to be
found who will ehuek it as some of them did« when they are
supposed to be having a suecessful offensive and should have
their tails rieht up. I saw one of them jump up and run into
our line and shake hands with a man in one of our posts as
he went past**
A note of discipline from Colonel Lawson : —
''As soon as we had got ammunition up and companies in
position east of Beauvois, the Boches started to come on.
A.YJS. was in command, in front line. I saw that they had
apparentlv got forward on our riffht, and then our front line
came back. I was rather angry about it because I had given
no orders, but X.Y.Z. told me he had told them to as his right
was in the air ; so I put them all in the third line. It would
have had to happen sooner or later, but I should have liked
it to have been done more gradually, with more ehooting at
the advancing Boches, while the retirement was going on,
because they gave a vei^ good target'*
Another Colonel, actmg as Brigadier, describes some events
on March 25 : —
"As Languevoisin was sure to be heavily shelled when
daylight came, I ordered at 5 pan. all men out of the village
and moved Brigade Headquarters back to a sunken road
600 yards west of the village. Things began to get noisy at
7.30 a.m, when Bennett reported that about two companies of
the enemy had tried to get across the canal at Quiquery, but
got it badly. They were supported by some fidd artillery
which, judging by the report, seemed to be firing at very
close range. I heard about this time that the ZVusnty-Momci
Frknch Division was coming up to counter-attadc from
Nesle in the direction of Rouy. Things on our left flank
were getting very imcomfortable, as apparently a very heavy
engagement was going on, and I began to see about 10 ikm.
lam bodies of our troops retiring. Soon after this platoons
of French inf antiy passed us and were cheered by our men.
They looked very fine men and very much for it.
''At 12.15 p.m. while standing over the telephone waiting
for the operator to ring up the division, a W^ot of shell hit me
in the neck and cut a small artery. The Brigade-Major.
Captain Howitt, with great presence of mind, got me on my
R
242 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
back, and being a very strong man, manaeed by half strang-
ling me to stop the bleeding after about half an hour, when
we got hold of tha doctor of the Royal Berks, who tied
me very tightly up. While this was going on, I heard that
the Germans had taken Nesle ; so I oraer^ up a company of
Glouoesters to the threatened flank and, not wishing to be
captured for a second time, I got two men to put me on a
bicycle and to push me towards Cressy, where the Field
Ambulance was. . . . From Gressy I went down to the G.G.&
at Roye and was evacuated to Rouen that nisht, thus for the
third time joining the ranks of the wounded.
PART IV
AFTERMATH
INCLUDING CONTROVERSIES, SIDE
ISSUES, AND POLITICAL EFFECTS
CHAPTER I
ON THB L088 OF PiBOMKC AND BAPAVMB
§1
rS dispatch says : —
''Behind the forward defencee of the Futth
Abmt, and in view of the smaller resources which
could be placed at the disposal of that Army
arrangements had been made for the construction of a strong
and carefully-dted bridgehead position covering P^ronne ana
the croedngs of the River Somme souUi of thai town. Con-
siderable progress had been made in the laying out of this
positiont tnough at the outbreak of the enemy's offensive its
defences were incomplete."* *
Incomplete f An indefinite word ! It never bruuDB before
any one's mind a clear picture. Through a fortnij^t or so
about lO/XX) Italians toued on the rear defences^ and made
them ffood enough for rearguard actions — if enough troops
reached them. Trenches varied in depth from a foot to
thirty-six inches. Wire was not continuous anywhere.
Isolated platoon posts along the northern sectors were wired,
as a rulcb while in the south there was less wire, because a
great deal more work had to be done there at express speed,
partly owing; as we have seen, to the effect of ory weather
on nvers and marshes. Briefly, the rear defences were too
ekstieally ambitious for the tame and labour which O.H.Q.
could put into them ; also the foe's airmen must have noted
and mapped their course. And who could foresee how many
troops would be lost in the forward and battle cones, or how
many would reach the rear lines ?
On February 9, 1918, Gough received from O.H.Q. a
document answering a letter wnioh he had sent there on
Febmaiy 1, Some quotations from it are useful and
• •« Hftis'i DIspslolMs,** vol. U., p. ISi.
t Th« ItaUot MS fliliM^— W. 8. &
246 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
" The Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief oonsiderB thai
in the event of a serious attack being made on your
Anny on a wide Eront^ your poUey should be to aecv/re wnd
proteet at aU costs the vmporicmt centre of Pironne a/nd the
Kiver Sorrvme to the sovth cf th/xt place, wmle strong counter-
attacks should be made both from the direction of P&tmne
and from the south possibly assisted by the French Third
Abmy."
What meaning are we to get from the routine phrase
*' secure and protect at all costs *' ? In other points the
directions belong to elementarv generalship. What subaltern
could have failed to see the miliary value of P^ronne and the
Somme ? Our stores^ dep6ts, and hospitals were west of the
Somme^ as every one knew ; so a Qerman invasion west of
the Somme — between P^ronne and Ham, for instance— would
be vastly harmful. Yet tiiis matter was not, and is not, the
main one. The main one is the fact that adequate defence of
the Somme line depended on the British Govemmenty who
alone could supply Haig with enough men and guns. If
enough reinforcements were not sent in time from inland to
France, retribution would fall as usual, on our young soldiers,
while Ministers might save themselves by using their eloquence
as a democratic li&belt.
Remembering these things, let us consider the phrase * to
protect at all costs." It has two meanings : to retire from a
thorough grapple against odds before the odds can gobble up
the defence, or to perish rather than give ground, as Wellington
at Waterloo was prepared to parish. Which of these mean-
ings was the Fifth Army to illustrate bv its conduct? We
are not told. When poison enters into a doctor's prescription,
is it not well to give Uie dose ?
The directions imply, though written six weeks before the
battle, that there will be good rear lines and enough men " to
secure and protect at all costs '' the positions named ; for it
could not be a reasonable defence for a delaying number of
troops to regard their lives as less valuable than land, since
defence overwhelmed does not stop the foe's advance. And if
strong counter-attacks were to be made from the direction of
P£ronne and also from the south, possibly helped by the
Third French Army, surely sufficient reserves should oe on
the spot and fully equipped. If they arrived without artillery
or without other necessary equipments, how could they be
effectual?
In the second paragraph G.H.Q. is contradictory :
THE LOBS OF PBBONNE AND BAFAUME 247
"While the Forward and Battle Zones in the Fifth Abmt
area should be fought generally in aoeoidanoe with the
prineinles hud down in G.H.Q., Na O.AJ>. 29 1/29, dated
14th December, 1917, the provisions of paragraph 6 regarding
the reinforcement of the Battle Zone and its re-establuhment
by coonter-attaok reonire some modification. NeW^ ia ihe
grawnd vMch theae Zones vmmediaiel/if protect ao important,
nor a/re ike eoTgvnwmicaiiume leadmg to them ao good aa to
totumnU reMifoToemefnia hevng thrown wto the fight, cownter^
aUouka on a large acale being lamiehed, or the hoMe being
fought auJt vn the BaiUe Zone, unless the genml situation at
ihe time makes such a course advisable. It may weU be
deairable to/all back tothe reanoa/rd defences of Fironne and
the Somme whUe linking up with the Thvrd (Britieh'] Army
an the norih, and prqpanrmg for
If O.H.Q. had put these orders in the first paragraph, its
instmetions would have been less perplexing. At present we
are fiMse to face with impossible thinffs. Since ** it may well
be derirable to faU back to <&s t^eoruiora defences of PAx>i^
the Somme,** what was the use of saying in the first paragraph
that P4ronne itself must be secured and protected at all costs ?
If our troops must allow themselves to be scuppered rather
than retreat behind the Somme, surely the command should
be given plainly, and surely there should be no talk about
rea^rard defencea The rearward defences of P^ronne were
behind the Somme ; the forward defences of P6ronne were the
leads, migor and minor.
order that there may be no danoerous gap between
your defensive systems and those of the Thibd Army, ahotUd
a vrithdrawal to the Pironne bridaehead or to the Une of the
RiveraSomme and TortiUe take jMice, the necessaiy switches
will be constructed under mutual arrangements to be made
by the Third and Fifth ABMua'*
^ In order that the above works may be completed with
the least possible delay, arrangements are being made for
the provision of the nec e ss a ry labour and transportation per*
sonnel for the construction of defenees and we nt
development of the existing road and Ught railway
As regards the organication and preparation of the rear«
ward defences, the main considerations in their relative order
of importance will be as follows : —
(a) ** The protection of the river crossings at Pironne will
be secured by a bridgehead. The defences of this Inridgehead
248 THE FIFTH AEMY IN MABCH, 1918
must be aited with a view to Beearing our road and
oommunications through Brie and P^ronne.
" The organization and preparations for the defence of the
P^ronne bridgehead will be comjdeted in detail as soon as
possible, including the provision of adequate communications,
%^, road and light railways, also additional bridges over the
Somme/'
(&) '* The reterUian of the line of the River Sommie will be
aeowred by the canstrticiion of an evneraency defer^ve Zone
as a e^nxmg retrenchTrieTU aJUmg the left oank of thai river as
fa/r north as Pironne and tlience northwards by ihe TortiUe
River. In connection with this defensive Zone small bridge-
heads will be constructed as required to secure the immediate
crossings over the river.
'' The organization of this emergency defensive Zone and
the construction of the defences will be carried out con-
currently with the work on the P^ronne bridgehead with
such labour as may be available after the requirements of the
latter have been fully provided for."
§11
And now let us think impartially of those events which
caused Goueh's withdrawal from the sketchy lines guarding
the Somme &om a point east of Bouy-le*Qrand, north-eastward
to Monchy-Lagache and Hancourt ; thence north, as a portion
of P^ronne's bridgehead. This line was the main Green Line ;
it crossed Huti^s northern boundary ({.e. the Yermand-
Amiens road) about a thousand yards south of Vraignes and
three thousand yards west of the minor Green line, an off-
shoot, a trifle east of Poeuilly ; so it was affected equally by
the attacks directed by Hutier and Marwitz. On both sides of
the road wide pressure was exceedingly strong, the southern
side feeling the concentrated force of Hutier's right, and
the northern side the massed power of Marwitz's lefL Early
in the battle this circumstance was ill-omened for five
reasons : —
1. Only about 6000 yards of straight road separated
Vermand from the main Green line; and at midday,
March 22, Vermand was lost, and the foe pressed westwaraa
towards the Green Line ofbhoot at Poeuilly, outflanking Maxse
and Watts.
Daly,* who began the battle weak in numbers, was in
THE LOBS OF pIsBONNE AND BAPAUHE 219
line* with many men gassed, and the rest gripped bv that
faiiffoe whieh fills the month with a saUva nke phlcjgm,
trickles in oold sweat down the body, and eonfases the mind,
while seeming to siTe to every limb and joint a rebellious
wit of its own. ifiuathon runners are tortared by a similar
fatigue, when the last three or four miles of open oountiy
have to be covered somehow, anyhow. Dased men had
siramled to the rear, where thejr were met and called together
by Jmgadier Biddell of the liftidh, whose Northumberland
Iiisiliem had reached the Oreen line oflhhoot^ between eight
and nine of the morning, March 22.
5. Another division of Watts*s Corps, Neill Malcolm's,*
also weak in numbers when the battle began, was losing too
many men in a noble fi^t aoainst Manrite; and Hutier's
right pressed dangerously on (x^ Mackenae's left,t owing
to the breach at Maissemy •
4. The Fiftieth (Nobth Enoush) Divisiok, after a tiring
oumey by night, reached the battle without its artillery and
machme-tfuns, which were coming by road.
6. It had only two brigades wmg the Oreen lane o£Bdioot
between Bemes and a point near Yul^v^ue— a twisting line
difficult to measure, but certunly more than 8000 yards; and
both brigades were so overstretched that their power of
eounter-cStack was greatly weakened. Biddell's brigade had
to guard five thouMnd yaids of line with three battalions
about 1800 men, and a reserve of 800 strap^lers from Dalv's
fronts whom he had brought top^ther during the day, ana a
part of whom he fed in the evemng.
Haig relates how, on March 22, as the day wore on, the
great concentratioo of German troops attacking west of St
Quentin, accompanied by untoward events north in the battle
against Marwits, had produced a very bad crisia During the
early afternoon our men east of Holnon Wood were forced to
withdraw from their battle-sone trenches ; while the Fiftieth,
after rroulsing heavy attacks throughout the morning, wero
attackea apain during the afternoon and evening and com-
nelled to give ground. Troops frmn the batUe aone, fighting
fiercely sad continnouslv, fell back through the Twentieth
and Fiftieth holding the third deftuosive sone between
Hi^peneourt, Vill^vlque, and Boudy, in the hope of re»
oiganiainff behind them. . . • By 5.S0 p.m. the enemy had
reached the third zone at different points, and was attacking
the Fiftieth heavily between ViUiv^ue and Boudy. This
• Th« Siaeiihmtik, f The 9kU/^pni Drniios.
250 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABOH, 1918
was a huge span of front for a single division to hold, Boudy
being a crowVflight of 5000 yards from Bemes, and the
trench had many bends and earves. O.H.Q. estimaies the
FiftieOCs front as some 10,600 yards, bat even a straight line
across country between Bonciy and Vill^v^ne measures
11,000, and the trench line was certainly 3000 yaids more in
its bends and curves. Hence the Fiftim waa greatly handi-
capped.
The dispatch says : —
*' Thou^ holding an extended front of some 10,500 jrards,
the division succeeded in checking the enemy's advance, and
by a successful counter-attack drove him temporarily from
the viUage of Gaulaincourt At the close of the engagement,
however, the troops of the FifUelk about Posuilly luid been
forced back, and by continued pressure along the south bank
of the Omiffnon iUver the enemy had opened a gap between
their right lank and the troops of the Siooiy^first . • . • and
of the Twentieth farther soutL At this gap, during the
late afternoon and evening, strong bodies of Qerman troops
broke through the third defensive ssone about Vaux and
Beauvois.**
In this quotation there is some misunderstanding. As a
matter of fact, Pceuilly was not lost by Biddell's NorOiumber-
land Fusiliers ; it was held till the oraer to retire came ; but
the Green line oflbhoot east of Caulaincourt was badly
breached. Though their right was driven in west of this line,
the Northumbrians at nightfall were commanding Caulaincourt
from a strong position well dug in. Here they remained until
four a.m. on March 23, when they were ordered to retire in
conjunction with the forces north and south.
Indeed, three divisions — ^the Fiftiefh, Tftentieih, and
jPMrfy-niiUA— covered the withdrawal of those troops who
were most exhausted by fighting and fatigue. Two or three
divisions had little fight left in them, so spent were they, so
parched by thirst^t ftnd dased with want of sleep. The foe
pressed the withdrawal, and Gough had thrown into the fight
all his reserves. As yet no further support was within reach
of the fighting, apart from a gunless French division and
some French cavalry in the souiS, just arrived.
Vol. ii., p. IM.
t ITha oounl^ In the gtmt bend of 'tiie Sooune is very ^ratedeBs, end our
troops suffered grieroosly from thirst. Later the small spring in Berlenx
Wood was a great refreshment to Maloohn's men, and- to other divisions, the
Eighth and Tkirty-mfUh.
THE LOSS OF F^ONNE AND BAPAUME 261
And it is worth noting that this gonlesB French diviaion.
the Hwndrei cmd Tweniy^Afih^ after maitshing fiur and very
bet, ISuled, deepite a very brave grapple, to aeliieve eacoeee
ki a eoonter^ktUek, beoanee it be(»me short of lifle ammuni-
tion. The eoonter-attaek began at six in the morning of the
third day ; its aim was to regain the Orosat Osnal between
Vonel and Tergnier; and trex^ of onr Eighteen^ took part
in it also. There was a mist, and the French sddiers did not
know the groond. In these very tnring cireamstances, a
British offieer, Colonel Bnshill, displayM fine leadership.
Taking charge of the French lc»ft as well as of his own two
oompanieSy m led the attack on, into an intense machine-gun
fire, and, though severely woimded in the head, rallied nis
troops sflain and again.* little proffress ooold be made, but
BosheUkept the line firm tiU noon, mien he and others learnt
from events that the ooanter«ttaek was f atila French
troops in large numbers came streaming back from VoneL
They had be^ heavily attacked, and their ammunition had
become too scarce. On the third day, then, effective help
from our Allies could not possibly be expected, above all east
of the Somme.
What was to be done? A fiJse move now would give
both Hutier and Marwitz a decisive opportunity. Th^ bad
numbers enough to annihilate if the overstrained British
would stand to fight it out at all costs, instead of withdrawing
at the right moment, as Jimmy Wilde would withdraw if he
were attacked by Oarpentier.
Would a stand be made at all costs along the bridgehead
pooitions f The temptation must have been very great, and
lor many reasons. After much fttigue from long delaying
aetions» there comes to most men a burning desire to reach a
demsicin one way or other. *' Let's kill ana win, or be killed
and beaten! To hell with this retreating!'' Here is the
final lallv of a true fighting temper. In a Waterloo its
gratification Ui pretty weU miraculous ; in the Second Sonmie
batUe would it not have been as &tal as suicide, and as
foolishf
Haig^s answer is memorable : —
**B(^rts that the enemy had forced the line of the Crozat
Canal, combined with the loss of the Vauz-Poeuilly positions,
and information obtained by the Air Service that tiie German
front as far back as Mont d*Origny was packed with
^ Ahm fonnlag s ifteady front Bmhsll wont to ths tmx to inska a rtporl
sod to hsTe hii hcsd bsndagod; Umd ha went baok to the flxliig lino.
252 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABCH, 1918
advancing troop, led the Fifth Abxt Comnuuider to recon-
sider hifl decision to offer battle a&eah east of the Sonune.
Considering that if involved in a general engagement his
tired troops might be exposed to a decisive defeat oefore help
could arrive, and that the situation might then be exploited
by the enemy to a disastrous extent, he decided to ccmtinue
the withdrawal at once to the west bank of the Somme.
'* On the morning of the 23rd March* therefore, confirming
instructions previously given by telephone, orders were issued
by the Fifth Army to we 19th Corps to cany out a gradual
witiidrawal to the line of the Somme. The 7th Ooips was
directed to conform to this movement, and to take up a
position on the general line Doingt-Nurlu.
"This order involved the Abandonment of the main
F^ronne bridgehead position. It greatly shortened the time
available for dearing our tnx^ and removable material from
the east bank of the river, for completing the necessary final
preparations for the destruction of the river and canal bridges,
for re-forming west of the river the divisions which bad
suffered most in the previous fighting, and generally for
securing the adequate defence of the river line."
These consequences of a withdrawal were quite clear to
Qough and his officers ; but, of course, material consequences
have to be viewed in war side by side with the physical state
of battle-worn troops. Earlier we have seen (p. 36) Haig's
remark that " the forces at the disposal of the Fifth Ajbmy
were inadequate to meet and hold an attack in such strength
as that actually delivered by the enemy on its front.*' This
being true when the battle began, it was more tragically true
three days later, after very severe losses and alon^ a wider
front. Tet the dispatch speaks of some divisions bemg rested
and refitted west of the Sonmiei while other divisions, almost
as fagged out by overstrain, do the work of both east of the
river. How much more could be expected from an army
urgently in need of large reinforcements from the first hours
of attack ?
There are critics who declare that Goi:^h's men were in a
less bad state to fight than to retreat. In <me sense this
criticism is true, beoiuse the duty of retreating at the rig^t
time is hateful, unless it is regarded with pnde as a duty.
Many of Wellington's veterans behaved badly in retreats,
and so did Moore's army on its way to Corunnay till it was
called upon to fight, when it proved that the exhilaration of
battle was a strong tonic after the weariness of forced
THE LOBS OF P^BONNE AND BAPAUME 268
marches. As a rale, it is easier to fiff ht than to retreat under
pressure. Bat let ns suppose that Gongh had kept his tired
men too long at dose quarters against superior numbers.
Osn any sane person suppose that our Fdth Abmt could
have home without breasing heavier losses than those that
tote its ranks from da^ to day ?
That Qough was right when he declined to take dedsive
risks east of the Somme is proved by a single fiMSt, namely*
that when an increasing num oer of Firench troops joined our
defence west of ihs 8omme^ they were driven back to Noyon
and Montdidier. So vast was the German pressure, that
even laise additions of strength in the defence could not
give stability to the ^hting front. If Gough, without re-
inforcements, had oontmued to face this pressure wi A his
bade to the Somme, would he not have enabled Hutier and
Marwits to adiieve their aims ?
Few men understand, said Napoleon, the strength of will
reauired by a Commander-in-Ohief when he risks the
existence of his army and of his nation in a batUe which,
in the nature of thinn, is always uncertain. True, no doubt ;
but an eaual strength of will — ^if not a greater strength — ^is
needed when a commander, in the heat and stress of a vast
battle, makes a ri^t decision plainly so unattractive that it
18 bound to be misunderstood and hated by those who are
far off from the atmosphere and pathology of the fighting
front
Many persons talk as thouffh Gough's few divisions should
have been compoeed — ^not of flesh and blood in a high fever
of overstrained battle-passion, but— of bullet-pnxn sted;
should have been as inanimate as tanks, and able to bear
through days and nights, without rest, unlimited iatigue.
Then there is the truth that official accounts do not reach
logic and history because they suppress facts which officers in
the field are obliged to weigh ana measure before they make
deduoos. To sup pr es s certain facts may seem to be patriotic,
but in major battles, as in written tragedies, cause and effect
are so ra^d and so cumulative in action and reaction, that
the omission of governing fiicts must always be wrong and
on&ir. As well ddete the handkerchief mm OOiMot It
jQia omit a fiMst in order to save the fedinfls of A and B and
C, yon are certain to be uigust to D and tt and F.
Everything that a commander in the fidd must weigh
and measure ought to be stated plainly in an account of me
dedaioBSL When fibote ftre omitted in a pubUdied verdict
864 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
ooniroversy is inyited, a painful thing when a war is one of
life or death.
In a war of life or death, moreover, when hundreds of
thousands perish, a single life or a single name has no more
worth than that which truth gives to it ; so truth alone has
public or historical value.
Gough and his CJommanders were obliged to consider
other losses besides killed, wounded, and missing. Handfuls
of their men here and there, finding the ocdeal too relenUess
for their physical and moral stamina, gave in; but their
behaviour was much better that that of many among
Wellington's troops in the ahnost mild retreat to Torres
Yedras. Still, those who broke, and straggled fiur out of the
grapple, are to be placed amon^ the losses. And we must
remember the sick. In one Osirps, for example^ between
March 21 and April 1, 47 officers and 12fiO men were put out
of action by sickness. In the first four days 14 officers and
348 men were out of action from illness; and by March 25
most of the forty battalions in this Corps were reduced by
leases to an average of only 200 men in each, for the nioneer
battalions had fought and had suffered casualties witu their
comrades. I am speaking of the 18th CrOips. On the night
of the third day its casualties were estimated as about 392
officers and about 11,681 other ranks, or thereabouts.
Siaely-fifrst Division, 121 officers, 3282 other ranks.
TkvrtMai, 132 officers, 4300 other ranks.
Thirty-Bixth^ 87 officers, 2515 other ranks.
TwefniieOiy 52 officers, 1634 other ranks.
How can official accounts of a battle be truthful when facts
of this sort are left out ?
Civilians have a hazy notion about the normal strength of
a division; and when, in official dispatches, a divisiooi is
mentioned fix>m day to day, without any reference to its
daily losses, a false impression is made on civilian minds, who
forget that divisions do not disappear with their men, but keep
their full rank as divisions, however wasted they may be by
losses. Yet the dispatch in even its republished form has no
footnotes on the casualties. German losses are refeired to
again and again, even in a new footnote (p. 189), while the
witish, though the most important to us all, are passed over
in silence. So readers are kept in the dark coneerning a
factor which rules through a retreat over defensive general-
iihip. Could anything be more at variaooe with the needs of
hifliory?
THE LOBS OF PEBONNE AND BAPAUME 256
Cooaider the men who were q>ent and who steaggled
ihiongh sheer numb &iigae. Every corps had sufferers of
this sort, hundreds of them, in fiiet ; so an increasing re-
sponsibility weld^ed on those men who were physically tougher
and stronger. The survival of the fittest to bear overstram is
never more active than in long fights against long odds.
We have seen, too, in Haig^s wor£k not only that "* the
strennooB efforts made by the Sritish forces daring 1917 had
left the Army at a low ebb in regard both to traimng and to
numbersy'* bat also that lack of men had prevented enough
training--eacoept with pick and spade and wira Now in a
retreat, after a long winter spell of trench warfSurCi all defects
of training diow themselves inevitably, above all when
exhaustion drugs the mind with poisoned blood, and when a
gyeatmanyexperienced junior oflKcers and non^-coma have been
either killed or wounded or captured. Only an army that is
war*w]se in open warfiure chooses unerringly the best positions
from which to fight in delaying actions, and displays in full
tactical measure the value oi itocouxage and tenacity. When
troope are young and jaded, and raw in <^>en warfare, are they
not certain to miss many opportunities, and in modem battles
moce than in the old ^nts, owing to the great width of battle-
front and to the disorcteiing effects of gaps and set*backs on
other sectors 7
Plainly, then, readers must leani to see war under the form
of visual conception : in pictures dear to the mind. Gough
had to flee facts trul^ ana fiilly, and to act at given moments
in a way which, in ma firm bcttraf, was the safest defence — ^not
for an ideal conception of his army, bui---for his army as it was
in plain troth day after day. The pith and marrow of his
f o r e eo die-hards and the gEtjat body of men who were soldiers
of firm duty rather than sddiers bocn — ^were wasting through
heavy cawialties ; and many of them, as the battle went on
and on, hobUed like sleep-walkers, whose legs were stiflbned
very much by rheumatism.
f m
Bot, after all« critioisnis published on the fall of Pfomne
have bad one very useful effect ; inviting stadents here and
there to review the whole drama as thoroughly as they can,
and to use their own minds without excessive fear of authority.
In flo doing, they cannot help wondering why there should
have been so much talk about the fall of rironne and none at
256 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
all about the loss of Bapatune— a strategical centre not only as
important to Byng as P^ronne was to Gbuffli, bat also,
probably, of more importance to the general defence, because
its position was to tne north-toes^ ox F£ronne and not only
nearer to the coast, but also convenient for a rapid flanking
advance on Albert.
Even Haig has been inadvertent, passing over the fidl of
Bapaume so swiftly and vagaely that many readers do not
notice what the phrasing means : —
'' Before midnight (March 24) the troops of the 4th Corps,
who had carried out their withdrawal by stages in the bee of
constant attacks, were established on the fine assigned to
them west of Bapaume, between La Barque and ErviOers." *
Not a word more !
When Bapaume fell, ** touch between the several divisions
of the 5th Corps, and between the 6th and 4th Corps, was not
properly established." Now both these Corps belonged to the
Third Abkt, and the quotation means that the Third Ahxt's
centre was broken, and that otiier jzaps had formed between
the divisions of 5th Corps. These mishaps were not
ameliorated for about eight and forty hours. Yet there is no
criticism in O.H.Q.'s dispatch, though a paragraph is ^ven to
the loss of P^ronne. I am very puzzled Are we to suppose
that the pr^is-writers at O.H.Q. were more genial to Byng than
to Gough ? Why criticize the under-manned army while
leaving the far stronger one free from criticiBm? Surely
students have a patriotic ri^ht to complain when they are
put in a false position towards two British armies ?
Turn to the map, and draw two horizontal lines^ one from
Bapaume to the far end of Flesqui^res salient, and one from
P^nne to the east of Le Yerguier. The first line is about
23,600 yards and the second about 21,600. Now, on the
evening of the fourth day, Byng's troops were struggling hard
on the eastern outskirts of napaume, and by midnight they
were obliged to Ml back behmd the town. On the same
evening Cough's troops were still behind the Somme along the
P&onne sector. Next day, between dawn and night&ll,
Byng^s men west of Bapaume retired to Miraumont, about
7600 yards, while Qough s troops behind P6ronne fell back in
the evening to Herb^urt sector, only about 6600 yards.
What cU) these matters prove ? Surely this: thataretreat
is in the nature of war when asuperior force strikes an inferior
one at the right places and upsets the balance of its deftnce.
• Vol tt., p. 900.
THE LOSS OF P^BONNE AND BAPAUME 257
So I rejoice that Watte's Corpsjust in time, got some restorative
rest benind the caoaliced Somiiie» and that other troops also
Mined their long second breath with this river before them.
In war minutes should be deemed as valuable as hours, and
hours as days, and days as months, and months as years ; and
thus the gain of time behind the shallow Somme was an
inestimable boon to the Allied Cause, whose reinforcements
had nearly always fiur to come, and arrived too often without
artillery and other necessaries, and sometimes in battalions of
different brigades, like our Thirtji-jiffk Division.
8
CHAPTER n
THE TRANSFER OF FIFTH ARMT TROOPS TO THE THIRD ARMT
§1
ON Monday, March 26, all Fifth Army troops north
of the Somme passed from Gough to Byng, Why ?
"What -was the motiTe power oehind tms act of
swopping horses in midstream ?
No explanation of any sort is given by the official
dispatch, which, indeed, gudes over it swiftly, and evoQ
indirectly: —
^It became dear that the Third Arut, which on this day
had assumed command of all troops north of the Somme, would
have to continue the withdrawal of its centre to the line of
the Biver Ancre, already crossed by certain of our troops near
Beaucourt " (about six miles north of Albert).^
Not a word more. Students are left in the dark as to
which divisions were taken from Gough and given toByng ; and
as for the differing effects of this policy on both armies, they are
passed over in silence, though i>olicy in war is tested always
Dy its results, not by good intentions nor by later explanations.
Sir F. Maurice says : —
** It was dear that the main object of the Germans was
to reach Amiens and that the weijB^ht of their attack was
falling upon the Fifth Armt. So, in order to allow Gough
to devote his whole attention to the enemy advancing south
of the river. Sir Douglas Haig placed that portion of the
Fifth Army which was north of the Somme under Byng, and
it then became a part of the Third Armt."
This explanation is genial, but, for a convincing reason,
it cannot be accepted as correct. On the same day, south of
the Somme, an event occurred which thrust so many d^w-
backs on Gough and his officers that they could not possibly
devote their whole attention v/nMndered to the German odds.
Though French reinforcements were still weak in numbers
• VoL u., p. soe.
20S
FBOM FIFTH ABMY TO THIRD ABMY 269
and 80 ill-anned that they ooold not do jostioe to their fine
qnalitiee, yet they were ordered, as we learn from Hug, " to
aanune xeeponaibility for the whole battle front south of the
Somme, with general control of the British troops operating
in that seetor. Strange, indeed ; for Haig tells ns luso that
"soms days had yet to jmiss before the frtnjck cofuJd bring up
euffiaimt ttrengA to arreet the enemy's progress.*' Am a
msMer of &et^ in the huge oentral battle, north and south of
the highway to Amiens, the whole defence remained in
British liands ; and southward, where the French were active,
with six ill-equipped divisions, by about nightfall of the fifth
day, British troops formed the maia defence, except in a few
sectora. Indeed, the attack had added to its odos as many
reinforcements as the French had brought into the battle ; so
Irtish guns of eveiy sort^ like British rifles and British
generalship and tenacity, were as essential on the fifth* day
as they were on the first Bemember, Hutier alone had ten,
if not twelve, divisions in his reinforcements; and it was
Hotier who assailed our 18th and 3rd Coips^ to whose relief
French troops were hurried.
Yetk somehow, anyhow, on this fifth day, Oough was
thrust officially under French orders south of the Somme,
thourii Foch liad not yet been appointed to Suj^reme Oom-
mana; and north of the Somme he was deprived of all
authorii^. He and his officers and men were slighted and
shackled, though they had still to go on proving that bad
stateflmanship in the Allied Councils could not ruin the Allied
Cs«sa In a later chapter these matters will be considered
fully. At present the main point is that Sir F. Maurice has
not expkdned the transfer of Ckmgreve, with the bulk of
7th Corps, from Gough to Bvng. Political interference,
IVenoh and British, was busyt ooing harm through fiaar ; but
as O.H.Q. made no protest at pmsent known to us, we cannot
at p r e s e nt free our Commander-in-Chief from all responsibility.
Borne laymen of influence believe— and in a democracy dl
dronlating opinions count till thejr are refuted — ^that Lord
Milner &fled entirely to see the nobilitv of the work achieved
by the Fifth Abut, and was not its mend either during or
after its ordeaL In March, 1918, and afterwards, he was
certainly a great influence, representing the British Qovem«
ment at the DouUens Conference on tne 26th of March, for
example; but, after all, wrong political actions in a time of
war diould be attributed, not to any one man, but to the
whole War GabineL
260 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABCH; 1918
Some military experts aiBrm that —
" Congreye went under Byng for the good and saffieient
reason tluit his line of retreat t^k him north of the Somme,
and it was desirable to have the river as a flank guard of the
force operating there.*'
This affirmation is unconvincing because Congreve's retreat
did not take him entirely north of the Somma We have
seen, indeed, that already the remains of two of his divisions,
the SiateeTM, and Tkvrty-ninih, had crossed the river to the
south bank (p. 115) ; and others would have crossed at Bray-
sur-Somme if Byng had been able with his own troops to
follow the army boundary from Montauban down to Bray —
a steep run south-west by which a narrow one-division front
was formed immediately east of Bray and in Gouffh's land.
Oongreve could have held this riverside front wiuL Hunt's
Force and a reserve, while the rest of his troops — ^the First
Cavalry, the Thvrty-fifth, and remnants of the Nim4h and
TwertUy-firsA^ would have followed the Sixteenth and Thirty'
nimih into the great centre battle. Bray, then, was the place
at which Byng could have taken command of all land north
of the Somme without harming the Fifth Armt'b fighting
strength.
j&|;ain, what sort of flank guard would the river be if the
defence on one side fell back more rapidly than that on the
other, uncovering the other's flank and rear ? In this matter
the troops on both riverside fronts had to guard each othei^s
rear, knowing that the Somme could be turned by the foe
into a passage way; and no impartial mind after studying
this battle can settle down in the belief that land north
of the Somme would be safer under Byng than under
Gough. If Gough's decisions had not been right, Luden-
dorn^s aims would certainly have been made real during
the first four days, so excellent were the German plans,
and so well trained were the odds — ^more than three to
one — ^which tried to annihilate a thin defence increasingly
overstretched. Further, if Gough's orders had not been
translated into effectual action by his officmi and troops,
all along a fortv-two miles front which became wider
and wider, complete disaster would have been inevitable.
Besults are facts in essence, and therefore too strong for a
great many persons. In this battle results depended on three
things : swirt and sufficient achievement by the attack, swift
and sufficient reinforcement W the defence, and such
generalship and tenacity in the Fibth Abmy as would ravage
FROM FIFTH ABMY TO THIBD ABMY 261
and baffle the attack till enough reserves had oome into line.
We have seen how slowly the resenres came up ; and Haig
assures us (voL iL, p. 205) that on the fifth day ** the whole
of the troops holding the BritLsh line south of the Somme
were now greatly exhausted, and the absence of reserves
behind them gave ground for considerable anxiety." And
now we must recall to memoiy another fsick, namely, that
Gough would have had thirty divisions if his front had
possessed the same man-power per mile as Byng^s. Why,
then, was ^vng reinforced with Fifth Abmy troops ?
Only a ^w hours after this event happened — ^by 1.45 on
March 26— Cough's H.Q. Staff was warned by the Third Abmy
that Byng's centre would fall back by night behind the Ancre,
and tbit Congreve's troops would hold from Albert to Bray
inclusive. In this fisust we draw dose to the best military reason
that could govern the transfer from the Thibd Abmt's
standpoint It is a £Mt with two meanings : —
1. The Thibd Abmt, owing to its broken centre, between
4th and 5th Corps^ and to gqps between the divisions of 5th
CSorps, intended to use troops from the Futh Abky to form
its right wing on its own scm.
2. The night retreat would uncover about six miles behind
Gough's left^ as we have seen in an earlier chapter (p. 118).
At this point several queetiona arise : ''Was G.H.Q. aware
of these two meanings when it either sanctioned or initiated
the trsnsfer of Qou^'s troops to Byng ? Did it know that
these troops in a few hours would be a reinforcement on the
Thibd Abmt's own flnound? And did it wonder by what
means Qough and Watts could guard about six uncovered
miles of riverside? If so, why are these important affiurs
omitted fit>m the dispatch I ^
Beinfordng the Thibd Abmt was amon^ the great deeds
done by the IlRH, and a very unfsir thinff is plainly implied
when it is passed over in silence by offlciiu pnnt and speech.
This unfair thing is that Gough*s judgment was distrusted
justly by G.ELQ. as b^ other powers when his northern Cons
(less two remnant divisions^ but lust strengthened by the
Thirty-Jifth), was suddenly taken nom him and placed under
the Thibd Abmt.
The dispatch is dated July 20, 1918, and for three months
the Oovemment feared to publish its criticisms. Consider
all the slander that poured over the Fdth Abut between
March 21 and October 21, and all the official injustice that
accompanied the defaming rumours which were noised abroad
262 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
by the common crowd. In these circomstanees, then, should
we not believe tiiat complete candour from all officiab. both
lay and military, would have been good for the whole nation —
both good and necessary ?
There was no need to hide the presence of Fifth ABmr
troops along about 8000 or 9000 yards of Byng^s riffht wing ; no
need, that 1 can see, for the dispatch shows plaiiS^ what was
happening in 4th and Sth Corps, and as soon as the foe
readied the Hibuteme sector, and occupied HA)ateme
cemetery with machine-guns, the Ancre line was badly out-
flanked from the north-west, and the presence of this great
menace justified the use of any essential reinforcements
which would ease the danger.
Congreve's troops were very conveniently placed ; and to
set them to hold &t)m 8000 to 9000 jrards of the Sth Corps*
front was to free this Corps for other necessary work. It would
fill the gaps between its divisions by closing up to the north,
and would collect nearly all its tired strengUi north of Albwt
If these reasons directed the transfer^ no doubt the use of
Fifth Army troops on the Third's own land was justified in
so far as it concerns the northern battle ; but when we look
south of the Somme, and recall to memory the centre fighting
north and south of Vermand-Amiens road, how can we fi^
to see that Oough's left south of the river was injured and
imperilled ? It needed those troops from C(»a^ve's Corps
who would have crossed the Somme at Bray if Sth Corps,
TmBD Army, had been able to keep to its soutnem boundary.
G.H.Q. had no troops to send tnere (apart from Heneker's
division, which was south of Amiens road); and if on the
fifth day enough reinforcements had mended the Third
Armt's broken centre, and had strengthened the Sth Corps' left,
then Sth Corps could have closed down south towards the
Army boundary — and also, I assume, towards a base, chosen
to serve its southern brigades. For the boundary between
Gough and Byng was not altered a month before the l»ttle
merely in order to keep map-makers busy. It entered at
once into the administration of both armiea
One point more. All students of war know that an
important river or valley forms tactioaJly one of the most
dangerous boundaries between allied armies. Yet the Somme
was chosen as a convenient dividing line, up to which the
French responsibility was to come after the whole Fifth
Army had been relieved " according to plan.** On March 2S,
the French were by no means fit to undertake this
FBOM FIFTH ABlfY 10 THIRD ARMY 96B
resDODflifaility. Britiah troopB in a number £ur too small had
to Daffle the foe in the neat central conflict; and hence the
sodden transfer of Gongns troops to Byng cannot be explained
or ezcosed b^ saving: "It helped the French to take oyer the
eenlcal fightinff.
I should like to be aUe to believe that Authority had no
other idea than the swift rdnforoement of the northern
defence when it put Oongreve under the Third Ashy, for
no other motive seems Sk all reasonabla But we must
remember some other things. One of them is the terrific
strain which pressed by day and ni^t on G.H.Q^ as on all
oflieers governing the defence ; and, again, we must never
forget that Supreme Authority collectM wrong notions from
the impeifect reports mingled with thronging rumours which
came unceasingliy from so manv miles <u moving frontb
Among these wrong notions was the belief -—or let us say the
assumption — ^that grave mishans in Byng's right were caused
by Gknigh's left Or, to use tne everyday phrase, that '* the
Byng boys had been let down by Gough's men.'* Soon after
the battle, in a scurried speech before the House of Commons,
the Prime MiniBter showed that he did not understand the
battle because his military advisers had put wrong notions
into his mind.
General Sir John Monash has shown veiy clearly, in his
book on *' Australian Victories in France in 1918,** how
prevalent these wrong notions wer^ his own conception
of the battle being completely out of focus and perspective.
GonsidBr this amaiing passage on the position of amirs at
I. on liareh 27. The
about one am. on Marai 27. The italics are mine: **!
gleaned fbrther that the 7th Corps was now the south flank
Corps of the Thibd Abmt, amkd that aa the Frrm Abmt, $outk
€fikeScfmm$f had practically melted away, while the French
were retiring south-westerly and leawng OfVi AouWy tn-
creoBvna gap Idween their north flank atid the Somme,
Oenerai Syng had reeolved to make every effort not only to
maintain the flank of hie Thibd Abmt on Ike Somme, but
aleo to prevent it being twmed from ihe eouth, while the
Commander-in-Chief was taking other measures to attempt
next day to fill the gap above almded to.** *
It would have been eaqr for General Monash to study the
battle as a whole before be wrote the opening pues of his
book. There was no need tot him to repeat in a book, long
afterwards^ the absurdly inaccurate views which he formed
• •• AttftltmUaa Ylotekt la Wnaoe in ma»*' p. S7.
264 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABGH, 1918
while his reserve troops were being ordered here and there, as
though Authority wavered a great deal in its attitude towuds
the use of its reinforcements. As Greneral Monash knew that
" the 7th Corps was now the south flank Corps of the Third
Abmt/' he ouffht also to have known that Gough's left had
just reinforced Byng's right ; and he could have leamt with-
out difficulty that on two successive days— March 25 and
26 — Third Army orders had uncovered Qough*s rear south of
the Somme. This was the only gap in the central batUe» and
General Monash would have been mterested to see how good
fighting and sound generalship saved a very bad situation.
How very ingenuous is the statement that '^ Qeneral Byng
had resolved to make every effort not only to maintain the
flank of his Third Army on the Somme, but also to prevent
it being turned from the south ? " Would that General Byng
had been able with his own troops to keep to his southern
boundary ! Then the battle would have been very different.
Still, General Monash's misconceptions enable us to guess why
Mr. Hamilton Fyfe tried in vain to publish refutations of
wild rumours, which had been accepted as true by too many
persons in high stations.
Though these and other misconceptions are absurd, yet, as
elements of a battle's history, they are things to be looked at
quietly. During a veir perilous retreat it may have been
quite natural to think that the much weaker anny on
tne much broader front would make more mistakes or be
more unlucky than the Third Army, which G.H.Q. had
strengthened with the greatest care as it expected the main
German blow to fall between Senste River aad the north
base-angle of Flesquitoes salient. As a rule, too, those who
are onlookers are apt to feel perilous events more nervously
than those who are inside the perils and thus too occupied for
brooding fear and speculation.
We may assume, then, without any sreat extravagance
that Authority, certainly overstrained, and certainly eager to
improve a huge crios, may have hoped to strengthen the
defence partly by giving Byng a wider front, partly by giving
Gough less to do. But misonderstandings, which may be
natural when immense battles are being fought idong a vast
and continuous line, should be corrected at the earliest
possible date and in the plainest words. Theoffidal dispatch
IS often vague when it should be definite, and by ill-fortune
these VBtfue passages do not help the people to understand the
loyal aid given by the Fifth Army to the Third. On the
PROM FIFTH ARMY TO THIRD ARMY 265
oontruy, a cynic miffht snggCBt, giving reasons, that facts are
being bidden officially because they throw too much light on
the Thibd Aemy's troubles. To lay stress on Uie fall of
P^ronne, for instancOi while gliding swiftly over the fall of
Bapaume, was, as we have seen, a Uunder by which students
would be provoked into search and research.^
* G«nenl MonMh points out that hia diviikm oa Mtfoh S9 reoeiTed
orden '* to moT« east, tii«t Is, bttokinto Flftiid6n,M[idnottoath totho Somins
TallBT, M sll hftd hoped* The pzworibad mov« duly ttftrtad, bat by ICftrohM,
had been Mzettad, lor 00dm had oomo to ommoI the more «nd await fresh
orders. . . . Later came detailed Instraotions that the division was to be
traosferred from the Anstralian Ooips to the 10th Corps, which latter was to
he O.H.Q. Bsserre, and that the whole division was to be moved the next
night to the Doollens area, the dismoonted troops bj rail, and the artillery
and other mounted units by route-march.** Now Donllens was the best
place from which Byng could be reinforced either at Albert or at Arras. And
noie, too, how time was wasted in the handling of these inTaluaUe Australian
lesaryes wasted by the BJghsr fkwninand, though from midday on the Slst
the position was critical along seTeral spans of a battle-front perilously in need
of men.
CHAPTER III
ORIGIN OF THE CUBIST EPISODE
THIS dramatic episode belongs to the transfer of
Gough's 7th Corps to Byi^*s right wing, and its
origin is a very aelicate thmg to write about It
occurred at a time when the crisis in the Thibd
Abht north of the Sotome was nearing its culminating point
with fortune strongly on the Oerman side.
In crises of this tenseness telephoned or spoken orders
cannot always be put afterwards in a written or typed form,
in accordance with routine, because the pressure of work
is determined by the foe's movements ; and a military order
coming from a mind abnormally active may have only a slight
effect on Uiat mind's memory. There can be no doubt that
Wellington's memory was not clear on several points in the
battle of Waterloo ; and some failure of memory occurred, I
believe, in several minds^ during and after the origin of
the C6risy episode. Here is an example from the official
dispatch : —
" Farther south, the Bray-sur-Somme- Albert line had been
taken up successfully on the night of March 25-26 \bv troops
moved into Third Army land from Oough's left], and fighting
of a minor character occurred during the momii^, particularly
at M6aulte, where troops of the NiifUk Division ^removed from
Oovph*8 left flank] beat off a strong attack [ahoutfour miles
inside Byng*s right wmgl. Owing, however, to a misunder-
standing, the Bray-sur-Somme-Alb^ line was regarded by tiie
local commander as being merely a stage in a further retumnent
to the line of the Ancre, south of Albert Accordingly, on the
id!temoon and evening of the 26th March, the withcuawal was
continued, and when the higher command became aware of
the situation the movement had already proceeded too far for
our former positions to be re-established.' *
As a matter of fact, there was no misunderstanding.
The Bray-Albert line was "merely a stage in a further
• Yd. li., pp. aoT-aoe.
266
OBIOIN OF THE d^BISY EPISODE 267
retirement to the line of the Anere, south of AlberL" As
sneh it is stated to be in Thibb Abict instructions, and
better instrootions ooold not have been given at the time
when thev were issued. Much later tiiey were changed, and
ehansed because the perilous position north and north-west
of Albert had improved ; but when the altered orders arrived,
troops at Bray and north-west of this town had be^run under
ordexs to obey the earlier instructions, as they had a much
greater distance to march before they reached the Ancre and
its very difficult crossingB over long bridges. Let us then con-
sider a brief and true time-table side by side with the
military events by which the first instructions were made
1. By 1.46 p.nL on Monday, March 26, Gou^ received a
message through bis Staff from the Third Abut
that Byng's troops were fiilling back b^ night
behind the Ancre, and that Congreve with his Corps
would hold firom Albert to Bray inclusive.
2. On the same day, at about seven p.m., the units of Con*
greve's troops received a Corps warning by telephone
that another withdrawal would occupy the night;
and at 8.46 jp.m. orders were received to tail bacK to
the line of^ the Bray-Albert road, rearguards to
remain in position till two am. These were Third
Abmt orders transmitted through Congreve and his
Staff Take their effect on me Ninth Division.
Highlanders were ordered to Dornancourt-sur-Ancre,
and the thin South African battalion to Bibemont*
sur-Anere, while tiie Lowlanders were to hold from
east of Mteulte to Albert exclusively. This in-
formation diows that the NvrUh'i fighting front was
for rearguard purposes.
8. At 2.16 ajn. on March 26, the Corps confirmed this
order and issued full ^dance to its divisional
commanders, the chief pomt being that they were to
fight on the Albert^Bray line to delay the foe as long
as poasihle, but without becoming so '' involved ** that
they would be unable to break off and retire.
Further, not only was the Bray- Albert line chosen
for reaivuard defence, but the Ancre itself, south-
west of Albert^ was to be regarded also as the
provisional main defence; provisional, for until
Djnff and G.H.Q. had learnt from events what
would happen in the night, and on March 26, to the
268 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MAECH, 1918
Thibd Abmt's broken centre and very distressed
5th Corps, what line of defence south and sontii-
west of Albert could be anything but provisional ?
Prospects were somewhat brighter after dusk on the 2£th ;
the foe was becoming tired, considerable reinforcements had
reached Byng, and others were coming up rapidly, as the
G.H.Q. dispatch narrate& But yet, unuickily, the crisis had
not passed away, because there was a '' dangerous gap about
Serre," in the H^buteme sector, and only twenty-two and
three-quarter miles north-east from the centre of Amiens. As
long as this gap existed, then, no line of defence below
Albert could be chosen by a soldier's mind as one fit for a
last stand north of the Somme ; and on March 26, during the
morning, "the situation was not yet dear between Brunei
and PuisiEux," * in the Serre-H^buteme neighbourhood. " A
gap still existed in this area between 6th and 4th Corps
tiirough which bodies of German in&ntry worked their way
f orwara and occupied Golincamps with machine-guns.'' Now
ColincampB is two and a half miles south-west of Hibuteme
and it outflanks the northern Ancre at Hamel badly, Hamel
being about three and a half miles to the south-east. At
Colincamps, then, the attack was culminating.
What happened afterwards? First of all the Sectmd
Division sent forward ''a section of field artillery, which
gallantly galloped into action and engamd them [the German
machine-gunsj over open sights," and so silenced them.t
Next, "early in the afternoon troops of the New Zealand
Division, under Sir A. H. Russell, retook Colincainps, while a
brigade of the Fowrth Austbauak Division, E. G. Sindair-
Madagan commanding the Division, filled the cap between
H^butome and Buequoy. In the fighting in wis area our
light tanks came into action for we first time and did
valuable service." Moreover, ** with the arrival of fresh troops,
our line on this part of the front became stable, and all
attempts made by the enemy during the [rest of the dayj to
drive in our positions about Buequoy and to tiie north were
repulsed with great loss." t
Clearly, then, it was not till '^ early in the afternoon of
March 26 '* that any change could be made in tiie pdicy that
• " Hftlg'B Dispatohfls." I ha^ drawn a Bkefcoli map to ihow thainfliiaiioo
of theea erents both on the Bray-Albert rearguard line and also on the river
Ancre eottth-weet of Albert.
t " Haig's DiBpatohee," tol. it., p. «7.
I v^TS., p. aeir.
270 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABGH, 1918
governed the defence between Albert and the Somme, because
a Qerman break-through south-west from the Serre-Ciolin-
camps sector would have been disastrous to the whole Ancre
line south-west of Albert So we return to the detailed
instructions issued at 2.15 a.m. on the 26th.
I note that when retirement from the rearguard Bray-
Albert line became necessaiy, Congreve's troops were to cross
the river Ancre and hold its northern bank as a rearguard
position. After the crossing all bridges were to be blown up,
and artillery would cover the crossing from the northern
bank, heavy guns coming into position north of the Amiens-
Albert road on a line named m the orders. Similarly, the
span of riverside front to be held by each unit, as by Hadow's
Force, was carefully noted in the orders. Thus the Thvrty-
fifths the mainstay, whose O.O.C. had been pkced in conmiand
of the Bray- Albert line, was told that its right must rest on
Buire in touch with the TwmJbu-pjrBS b left, and its left on
Demanoourt in touch with the Jnnt&'s right The Twenty-
fifriBX% right was to rest on Bibemont, supported and covered
by 2000 men under Hadow. As for the NirUVs le% it was
to form liaison at the outskirts of Albert with Byng^s 5th
Corps, which, but for its ill-fortune, would have needm none
of tnese Fifth Abht troops, nor the Australians and New
Zealanders at the other ena of its front.
Every detul helps to prove that at 2.15 a.m. on March 26
a retreat to and across the Ancre was the governing policy
between Albert and the Somme. Hence rearguard actions
must not prevent its frdfihnent by becoming too " involved,"
as soldiers say. But a change of policy took place, and in many
quarters it is attributed to a decision made by Foch at Doullens
on librch 26. Li these quarters it is believed that Foch
asked why the Bray-Albert line was to be held temporarily ;
that in his view it should be held with the utmost firmness.
If this belief is accurate — ^and surely a Generalissimo has
criticisms to offer — ^I assume that Foch expressed his judgment
early in the fd!temoony after much better news had oome
from Colincamps, Hjbuteme, and Bucquoy ; and certain it is
that, shortly after three p.m., another policy was announced
by telephone from Congreve's H.Q.
" Army orders tiiat every effort must be made to chedc
the enemy's advance by disputing ground. It is to be dis-
tinctly understood that no retirement is to take place unless
the tactical situation imperatively demands it"
In the meantime many things had happened. Transport
OBTOIN OF THE C&B3BY EPISODE 271
hftd been moved to and aeroes the Anore, and big guns also ;
this movement had progreeeed very welL Bat the right of
our line was in danger of being exposed, for troops in thb
part» under Brigadier Headlam, haa about seven miles to
mardi in retiring from Bray to Bibemont-snr^Anere, while
north of them the line ran westward till it was dose to the
river, with the result that the Ninth Division's small reserve
was already behind the Anore.
The southern troops at Bra]^ were a composite brigade of
the 2VMn<y-)i^, and very overured (hi their left^ across the
plateau, were two brigades of the ThiHy-fifth, and well
tMhind them was the tiiird brigade guarding Morkneourt
North-westward, covering M6a^te and Albert's southern
flMik, were troops of the NiaUk DrvisiOM. Field artillery
guarded the whole front, and well ahead of the line were out-
posts disposed in depth.*
If the northern part of this line went back too fast the
southern would be left far in the south-east and exposed ; so
a retirement in echelon would begin from the Bray end, and the
aO*a of the ThMy-mh decided that it should begin at three
p.iit, if no attack cleveloped« because a retreat after dark,
with the business of evoesing the river by long bridflesi might
get the right flank into very grave diflEiculties. T^e reserve
fariffade at Morlancourt would hold its position to cover the
wiudrawal, and then cross the river at ^uire.
At three poa, then, the retirement began fii>m the right
with the men disposed in depth, those nearest to Etinehem and
Morlancourt being the first to move. It included the Twenty-
firtt at Bray and the Thirty-fifth north-west of it. At the
same time the G.O.C. received the new Army order — ^Uiat the
Bray« Albert line was to be held. Haig says : '' By the time
the withdrawal had been stopped, the right of the Thibd
^ I baire dnwn s map to ihow thaia podiiooa. Tlie Fini Oavumi
wsoMd al aafsn p.m. ol tha S0th that, owlog to eranta farther north. Congrara'a
Oospa would fliU hack by night to tha Una Bray-Alhart, and that tha dla-
inoantad Murtj ol tha iVvl Oataxat waa to hold from B^ooort to Albart. So
I plaoad tbam thara In my map ; hot now I am donbtfol whathar any man ol
tba Fini Oatalkt wara abia to raaoh tha B^oonrt aector. At 1.16 ft.m. of tha
iSlh, tha Dloaountad Biigada oonoantintad at Camoy, ooreiad bj a laar-
gnaid, and at aiz ftjn. it borrowad iO Q.S. wasfooa from tha i/MJk D.*a aR.A.
and want to Bulxa-anr-Somma. On arriTlng thara at about aavan o'olock thay
otdarad to ratona to Bnaay-laa^Daoora. Latar, at 10.16 s.m., tba Fir»i
Oatalbt waa mada taaponalbla for tha oroaalnsa otar tha Anoia aoath of BIba-
aooft. In tha aonth of tba Una thay did asaaUant wQri[, aa Iqr Qananl Baal*.
Browna*a Oohnnn, anpportad by tha lat and Snd Oavalry Brigadaa, whioh tiU
p»9t halpadio hold tha foa't adtanoaon a Una north and aooth through
)
SIS THE FIFTH ASHT IX MABCH, 1»8
Ammt tested oa the Sonme abooi SoDy-fe-See, iridle tlie
FiRH Abiit still held the south fankof the SoBmenofth
of Proyart, about five miles Cuther east" ThenCore ii vas
dai^eroosly nneorered — and uneovcred, too^ in the mmj of
iU-fortane, faj Fdpih Abmt tioops iriio were leinfiarin g
Byng^sridii.
StiD, ttwEe was no ' nDBnndetstandinK.'' HO three pmL
the Thod Abmt's pdM7 as known to its ligM wing was a
withdrewal to and bdiina the Anere» with the Brey-Albert line
for reaignaid aetioo. One olnrioos point in this poliqr was td
{riaee TalnaUe equipmeni behind tne river; another, to pre-
Tent the crassings man being blocked ; and a thiid, not to be
eaog^t napping bdow Albert if the foe managed togo ahead
thrragh the gtif in the Tmsn Abmt's eentre. Why, then,
should any one be blamed! For one reason only. When
the mieertainty of war, combined with a diange of order
that arriTes too late, produces a dangerous poeitian, victims
are deoianded by imtme nerves near the spot and by nervoas
mmAm m^ ^ difltiuirft Tn ^Jiwt case KLumft I1118 fiallAn paitity on
the O.O.C. of the Hivriy^fifih^ who employed his jodgment
most carefiilly in obeying a Thibd Abmt order, and partly
on his CSocps Commander, who would have stopped the with-
drawal baa it been possible.
For the rest^ civilians wonder (a) why the withdrawal
coold not be stopped and tamed back, and (6) whether
the Thi/Hy-fifih Division, having passed all ri^t throogfa
the monung and its fighting, slmild have tamed back to
re-ooeopy the Albert-Bray line.
Troops of the Thirly-fifih, who had been continaooaly in
veary strennoos fighting since the S4th March, were now
aetoallpr in motion in a movement of retreat based upon
preceding orders received by their Commander. Does any
reader, not acquainted with the conditions of war, conceive
what it means in battle, to convey orders from a Division
Commander through Brigade and Battalion Headqaarter8»
down to companies and j^toons in the firing line ? It is a
matter of hours, and many hours, before the order, which left
Division Headquarteis by motor cyclist^ has filtered through
till it reaches the Company Commander by a runner, who mis
possiblv crannied for the last half mile under madiine-gun
fire. In some cases, it mav never reach him at all.
Imagine the chaos wnich would be created by such a
coimter order upon troops in movement in a rearguard
action along a front of four or five miles ! Some units would
ORIGIN OF THE C^ISY EPISODE 278
reeeive the order, perbftM, boon after others: Some would
never receive it at all| Deeauae the runners had been shot;
Some would be moving forward, others back ; confusion and
dismay would result in the most critical of all movements in
r — a retirement in fis^e of the enemv.
Such an 4>rder could not be circulated and acted upon,
disaster to the force engaged, till a stable line had
been reached. Between the line Albert-Bray and the line to
be held on the Ancre, no possibility existed of communicating
this order to the troons in such a manner that it could be put
into effect. It should, at leasts have reached the Commander
of the Thvrly-fifth before 10 a»m., whereas, it reached him —
and then only by telephone — shortly after 3 p.m. The
coonterorder was issued at least five hours too late, more
probflUy even mveti hou/n too late, for effective action. It
was israed when the CSommander, following hb previous
orden, could not act upon it without risking disaster to his
division and the whole line. A break in t£e line at this
point would have meant the loss of Amiena After visiting
the fronts seeing the situation, and consulting his brigadiers,
he decided^ that the counter order could not be acted upon
without disastrous consequences. And his decision was
justified next morning when the German attack was met and
repulsed by a stable hue, though he was no longer in command
ofit.
Moreover, the peril at Albert had not yet passed away.
Haig says, indeed: ''During the night of March 2&-27,
the enemy had gained possession of Albert after some fi^htixig
with our reaigurds in the town, and obtained a footmg in
Aveluy Wood.'* It is a fact, too, that alanning night rumours
received by some men of the intrepid Ninth caused a sUjjrht
panic in the neighbourhood of the Albert- Amiens road, which
was allayed by Captain Darling of the Eleventh Royal Scot&
Also a machine-gun which the foe had manoeuvred into a
position between the Ninth's posts did too much harm before
it was put out of action by a local counter-attack.
And now apply these night facts to the retreat from Bray.
As the foe baa troops enough to take Albert after dark, the
position at Bray would have been very dangerous if no with-
drawal had taken place. Though the retirement from Bray
was a veiy great peril to Oou^*b left south of the Somme,
yet I eannot help believing mA the peril might have been
much greater if the withdntwal had begun from Bray after
Albert felL It would have been a pressed withdrawal, and
T
274 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
after midnight, probably, with oar men depressed and ihe foe
heartened. Even on March 27 the position at Albert and
north of Albert was not altocether reassuring. Otto von
Below captured Ayette and AbMnzevelle, north of Buoquov,
and Marwitz tried hard to debouch from Albert^ happily with-
out success. A brigade of the Fov/rth AustraUans was lent
to our NirUh Division, which needed support As usual, the
foe pushed forward snipers and light machine-guns^ and as
usual much worry was caused by those manoeuvres.
As for the taproot causes of all the trouble, they were the
6th Corps' ill-luck and the breach in our Thibd Akbct's centre,
which remained open and very menacing from an hour un-
stated on March 24 till early in the afternoon ot Mareh 86.
Historians will wish to know why it was not mended earlier
with reinforcements. Australians are naturally proud that it
was mended by one of their brigades at a time when farther
delay would have been far and away too hazardous.
CHAPTER IV
HOW OUR MSN WERE RSLIEVED IN THUR GRAPPLE
AGAINST HUnER
51
** T ^ROM the time when the indieatioiiB of an oflEensive
L^ OQ mv front fiiet became definite/' says Haig, " I
I had been in dose tonoh with the Oommander*in*
Chief of the Freneh Anniea On different ocea-
moDB, as the battie developed, I diaeussed with him the
mtaation and the policy to be followed by the Allied Anniee.
As a result of a meeting held in the afternoon of March 28,
airangements were mMe for the French to take over as
rapidly as possible the front held b^ the Fifth Armt, sonth
of P^nne, and for the concentration of a strong force of
Fraich divisions on the southern portion of the battle
uTonv, • • • ^
When speaking of the fourth day, Haig savs: —
** Thougn French troops were oonunff rapidly to the assist-
ance of the 8rd Corps, which on this day passed under the
oommand of the Third FRENen Arht, the AJlied Forces were
not yet in sufficient straq^ to hold up the enemy's
advance." t
In these quotations the history is too official ; and since the
French are fiuied both for clarity of statement and for their firm
grasp on matters essential to oiscnssion and history, ther are
not at all likely to believe that cardinal matters should be
deleted from British accounts of St. Quentin's Week. Better
to pass an Act of Parliament to forbid all writing on the war
thim to be soueamiah towards operative facts.
Our 8rd Corps— Butler^s Corps— had 80,000 yards of land
to guard, only 16,000 less than that which the whole of
Byng^s Army had to protect ; and in comparison with the
uigeney of its needs from the first hour of battle, relief did
• VoL IL, p. 190. t VoL tt., p. 90S.
276 THE FIFTH AEMY IN MABCH, 1918
not, and could not in the circamstanoes, arrive rapidly. It
came with all possible speed, but French divisions arrived
here, and on the right of Mazse's front, without their equip-
ment, both militi^ and administrative. French Qenerals
came with their keenness, but their troops had no guns and
no more rifle cartridges than they carried; and for several
days both they and tibe Allied defence were weakened by
these grave hindrances. How then could the French do
justice to their fine Qualities ? And I regret to add that one
of the most reasonable of old military rules was broken by
the manner in which, under orders, the French reinforcements
gradually relieved our troops.
This old militajy rule concerns the use of reinforcements
during a battle. Mrst we have to see whether the French
reinforcements w^re able to arrive quickly enough to do
something more than balance our heavy casualties. By the
end of March a French cavalry division and ten divisions of
French infantry appeared in the fighting front, never at first
as complete units, since it takes a longish time for the
battalions of a division to be brought into action. These are
all that I am able to find, and their value as reinforcements
was very much lessened by the reinforcements which Hutier
and Marwitz had added to their odds. In Hutier's reinforce^
ments there were ten divisions. The French were enough to
give the front sufficient stability for local fighting but not to
justify counter-blows on an effective scale.* Here are the
days during which they are mapped for the first time : —
Third Day — First French C avalbt, and NirUk, Hwnd/red
wnd Twemty-fiftk Fbjsscb Infantry. The last was in the
battlefield at dawn ; the others appear in the evening map.
Fourth Day — Tenth, Siaty^eeamd, and elements of Twmty*
aeooncU
Fifth Day — Hvmdred omd Thvirty4hird,
Sixth Ttaj—ThiHy-fifih.
Seventh Day — F%fty-8ixth, Hwn&red and Siaty-eecondf
and HvauJhred cmd Siasty-math.
As Hutier's advance stretched a widening flank south
towards the Allied power, there is reason greatly to regret
that the Allied reinfercements could not be powerful enough
to strike such counter-blows as would have prevented Luden-
dorff from attacking at Armenti^res and the Lys. In these
* Haig MjB (toL iL, p. 284) tliai, by the snd of Maroh, aoma tan Qenau
diyisionB were aotiYe ac^dnst the French. Other French divisions * ^
daring the first week of April.
HOW OUR MEN WERE RELIEVED 277
ninf oroements, before April 9, were twelve Brifciah
who were replaced in the north by divisionB which had been
xedneed to skeletons by recent fighting, then hurriedly
repaired with drafts brought over from Enjo^and. Nezt^
suddenly and urgently, disaster on the Lys made claims upon
Foch and Haig, who hurried reserves north to the new battle.
Oould any set of circumstances have been more opposed to an
effeotiye use of reinforcements ?
Tet I do not understand all the mingled uncertainty,
scamper and improviBation that I meet with in the rehif ore-
ing. ** It was evidenV* nys General Monadi, *' that the plans
of the Higher Command were the subject of rapid changes, in
sympathy, probably, with fluctuations in the situation, which
were not ascertainable by me." Yet no fluctuations ran
counter to the plain lessons taught by the first day's fighting.
Reinforcements all alooR the line botii north and south of the
Somme was the main ksson, for Bynff had been oUi^^ to
employ, and therefore to tire, three of his reserve divisions.
It seems very strange, then, that G.H.Q/s reserves could not
be handled at once with method and comnosure. Though
Monash was warned on March 21 to prepare nis division for a
move, and to stand bv in readiness to start at a few hours'
notice, he was kept tilt the 26th in a state of uncertainty ; and
at last, at break of dav on the 26th, after seeing that eveiy
one was correctly on the move, he started out by motorcar
to the country behind Byng^s area, in order to find the 10th
Corps H.Q, They had moved from Hantdoque and sJso
fiom IVevent^ so in despair he went to Doullens, where
he ''tumbled into a scene of indescribable confusion. The
population were preparing to evacuate the town en mas0s,and
an exhausted and hungry soldiery was pouring into the
town from the east and south-east^ with excited tsles that the
German cavalry was on their beds. . . •" How was it that
Monash and his troops, eager to be in battle since the 2l8t,
were compelled to squander their energies through neariy
six whole days? Why were they not sent at once to the
PAronne bridgehead 7 And Mada^n's Division of Australians
had a similar experience. On the 26th, says Monash, it ^ had
already been on the move, by bus and route march, for three
days without rest'* On the move for three days — and not
once in the battle I
Could it have been helped 7 No doubt the root causes were
Haig^s impoverished rifle streangth, sod the horrible losses
whidi the fVench had sufiered since 1914. What care in the
278 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABCH, 1918
making of pie-battle plans conld prevent the aet of leinfoieing
from becoming too mueh like feverish improvisatiim ?
We have seen (p. 48) that one pre-battle plan ananged
between Haig and Pitainwas this: that if a danfferoos attack
fell on Gtongh's vide front the ehief reserves woiud oome from
the French. But F^tain, having Beims, Champagne, and P^b
very mnch in his mind, kq>t nis reserves far back, and he
could not or would not reinforce Gkmgh's risht till he was
certain that LudendorflTs attack on Oough and Byng was the
main German offensive.
Hence that slow arrival of Allied reserves which Ludsn-
dorff notices, and which causes him to believe that his
preparations for attack were little known to the Allied
Command. Ludendoitf argues that if his foes had been aware
of the vast concentration of Gtorman troops behind his Hues,
and had observed the hugely increased railway transport
which had been going on, ** the Entente's defensive measoreB
would have been more effective, and its reserves would have
arrived more quickly."
Further, when we consider the arrangements made betweoi
Haig and P6tain, two matters more enter this debate :
1. Was it a good thing in March, 1918, that nearly all the
French reinforcements were sent to Cough's front south of
the Somme, while nearly all the British went north of the
Somme to Byng ?
2. How should reinforcements be used on a stricken field ?
Is it their business to do no more than reinforce till they are
weU enouffh equipped to take over the fighting front ? Or
should autnorify outside the battle place them in a position of
command over the officers and men who have been in battle
from the start and whose local and general knowledge must
needs be fuller and better ?
These are test questions ; and now that the tremendous
events of March, 1918, are passing from phrases into fisM^
from propaganda into truth, no harm can be done if we study
them with temperate frmkness.
Let us look for the correct answer to the first question :
^ Was it a good thing that nearly all the French reinforoements
were sent to Cough's front south of the Somme, while nearly
all of the British went north of the Somme to Byng t "
§n
If we put this question in another form we shall draw
closer to its main issues. Was it wise to mingle too many
HOW OUB MEM WEBE BELIEVED 279
Freoek troops on one froEt with our own men when the
and fever of a retreat were gathering to a very haasardons
climax ? If not wise, was it inevitable 7 The answer to this
question is the answer to another — namely, for what reasons,
and by whose advice, were far too many troops detained in the
British Isles ?
Sir F. Maurice says» in his monograph on "The Last Four
Months/' page 54 : '' Had the Qo vemment taken in time the
measures wUch it had been urged to take, the reduction of
two cavalry divisions and of more than one hundred infantry
battali on s might have been avoided, and both Oouffh and
Byng mfht lu^ve had sufficient men to have enabled wem to
hold thear battle positions against all attacks, while Haig^s
reserve might have been incrSfcoed by at least two divisions."
When Mr. Lloyd Geoige qwke at Leeds, on December 7,
1918, he Bud« among other memorable things, ^ I need not teU
you about March 21, how, when the great crisis came, men
were hurried aeroas the ChanneL" N^d not tell us, indeed !
Are we to forget Hamlet and King Lear when we think of
their tragedies ? Ebug's want of enough men for his front of
125 miles was the taproot cause of aU our tragic troubles.
According to official figures published in the Time$ (on
January 2, 1920), our combatant strength in France on
March 11, 1918, was 1,298,000, including a rifle stEength of
616,000; and on April 1, it was only 1,181,124, indudW a
rifle strength of 528,617. Between these dates, then, we lost
161,876 in combatant strength, including 87,888 infantry.
These official flgures do not say wheUier the losses include
men on leave as well as battle casualties; but Ludendorff in
his book states that his armies in March took " some 90,000
unwounded prisonerB,** including the Frendu Further, are
we to believe that the official figures, as published in the
TimsB^ were checked and af^urovM by O.H.Q. ? In days of
propaganda, and of Government offices with publicity de-
partments, we cannot be too cautious. Is it a fact, then, that
on March 11, 1918, Haif^s 58 divisions had a rifle-strength of
616,000 men f Certaimv not I The figures mean that every
one of the 68 divisions had a few more than 10,600 riflemen.
Mere camouflage I Even the Ninth DrvisioN, comparatively
a well-manned unit, had no more than 8884 riflemen, including
pioneers and details. But the official fi^pires, though pro-
pagsndist, throw some light both on Haig^s weak numoers
and also on his looses.
Tet the Prime Minister, when speaking more than five
280 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MABCH, 1918
months after the battle, did not think it worth while to say
why abundant reinforcements were kept in the British Isles
till a terrific attack, long foreseen, had caused a gjreat crisis,
with a lamentable appeal for succour to President Wilson (see
p. 309). If Haig had been given resources enough for his
known responsibilities, there would have been no reason to
strike that bargain with P£tain which caused a sudden ming-
ling of French and British troops, with sudden changee of
command and much confusion. And is it not common know-
ledge that differing fighting temperaments among nations,
with their different methods, customs, traditions, do not
mingle together on a battle front? They come from dis-
tinguishing traits in racial character— great and endurinff
quuities which are changed only by slow and graduu
evolution. Even when they are trained together by the same
drill and firm discipline, tiie heat and stress of battle are
likely to separate them; and when they have Tict been
trained together, how can we reasonably expect them to
coalesce merely because they are suddenly thrown together
during a perilous retreat ?
As every one knows, a British brigade and a French one, so
unlike temperamentally and in fighting method, never wish to
fight alongside each other, miz^ up. Indeed, each believes
that it is let down by the other ; both are certain that they
support each other best when they have spheres of their own
in the battle front.
It is to be regretted, then» that the Fifth Abmt owed most
of its relief to the French, whose reserves could not oome up
swifUy enough to act as a genuine relieving force, strong
enough on the fourth or fifth day to take command without
" swopping horses in midstream."
§ m
When President Lincoln refused to swop horses while
crossing a stream, he employed in a great war the virtue of
humorous good sense; not by any means an easy gift to
display when the fever of rattle circulates from brain to
brain, magnifying both good and bad so much that few
persons see any event, as a whole, in focus and perspective.
Lincoln's maxim is good sense in all dangerous times, but
above all, when the stoeam is a river in spate, and both
horses are off their feet and trying to swim as corks do. Tet
Oough and his officers and men were set to swop horses.
HOW OUB MEN WERE RELIEVED 281
Mveral timeB, in a river boiline towards nqudB, when oontrary
enrrents were pressing in fiill flood acainst the horses.
Freneh troops wiuioot their artJUery and other essential
thinflSy thouffh operating on eroond for which Britidi com-
nanders had everv reason to xeel respoosiUe, were not placed
under British orders; it was onr troops who were placed
onder French ciders and in a disjointed manner to be
stadied as a warning by eveiy one of na Owing to these
frequent changes of command, imity of control was impossible.
Sometimes the French issaed ormrs direct to British sub-
ordinate units, without informing their British Commanders.
Oan any one believe that either Marlborough or Wellington,
in the middle of an enormous battle, would have sanctioned
these changes of ccnnmand, whidi seemed to imply bluntly
that British national pride did not exists that British officers
and troops were inferior to the French, and that the French
would have been humiliated if their rein&roements had obeyed
British orders until they took over the fighting front?
There are those who say that most Frenchmen outside the
battte looked upon Gough as a beaten General, imder whom
their troops could not serve until his men were relieved and
withdrawn. If this opinion did come into vogue outride the
battle— and many wihi opuiicnis were circulated — ^it would
have been corrected by a frank official statement giving the
perilous number of Qough's infantry when the battle bmn;
and certainly no Freneh soldier iniide the battle^oould have
been blind to our FmH Abmt's greatness, since its remnant
divisioDs— as battle-maps moved every day-^iever retreated
moTB rapidly than their Freneh Alliea Both Frendi and
British were assailed by a force which compelled them to
eboose between bending and breaking; and why should any
one have supposed tw a confusion in command would
be usefulf Surely a sudden change of treatment during
a great battle, as in a critical illness, however right in prin«
01^ becomes dangerous in prsetice when it is ^ppliedinaptiy
at an unfitting tune 7 Consider also the part played in
battle fa^ national feelings and qualities. Let us take an
iUusferation.
K Blttcher had arrived at three o'clock in the afternoon
of Waterloo, he and his men would have come under Welling-
ton, not Welluigton under Bl4cher ; and this would have been
f—wmtisl, quite aside from any question of military pre*
eminence. For mankind's gifts of the epirit are abnormally
sensitive to all influences, good and bad, during the heat and
282 THB FIFTH ABMY IN MABCH, 1918
siaress of a great battle. Every BritSah soldier on the field of
Waterloo was so ^ud of bemg under Wellington that his
whole nature was Wellin^tonized ; and this general feeling of
proud loyalty to tiie Chief was aocompanied by regimental
attachment of men to their officers^ Picton's men to Picton,
for example, and Colbome's to Oolbome Imagine, then, what
the shook wonld have been to oflfeers and men alike it
Bloeher had arrived at three in the afternoon and had taken
command of ihe British infiEUitry and of Wellington also.
And now apply this war psycholo^ — that is, this know-
ledge of the human mind and spirit m soldiers, one by one,
and in divisions united into an army — ^to Qough and his
officers and men. If any depleted divisions ever nad reason
to be proud of their leaders, they were those who baffled
Hutier and Marwitz when Marwitz and Hutier were at their
strongest They fought with intense British pride against
Gtermans; they knew that the undermanning was no fault
of their Army's H.Q. ; and from day to day their fraying
fiayed line stoetehed more and more, as when Maxse on the
fourth day aided Watts along about three thousand yards of
front jAjid then all at once, and bit by bit, they were taken
from their own officers and placed under the control of French
reinioroements, whose artillery and other needs were on the
road, fiur off. Was this fair to their natural desire to fight
on under British control till they were withdrawn fiK)m their
ordeal ? Would French troops in the Verdun campaign have
been willing to pass all at once from their own Generus to be
controlled by British reinforcements? I hope not, for the
most valuable thing in war is national pride among good
soldiers.
One of the most distinguished of Qough's officers has
written as f (dlows :*—
^Although the British formations were placed under
various French general officers for the purpose of fighting
the enemy, these French generals (through no fault of their
own) were at first unable to exereise command in the field,
either over their own or over our troops. They had been
sent up in a great hurry . . . without their stafEi, without
telephones and dispatch riders, without artillery and without
any small arm ammunition beyond the eighty rounds carried
on the men. They were short of transport and short of
machine-guns ; and this state of things lambed during several
days.
^' These difficulties were valiantly contended with, but
HOW OUB MEN WEBE BELIEVED 288
were a bindimiiea to handling troops effeethrely in contact
with a yigilant enemy. Qom oomndesbip got over the
difficoUy of laogoage and the difficulty of imderataiiding
forei^ methods, bat could not overcome the difficulty of
ob^ymg the contradiotoEy French orders which reached onr
nnita in qnick soceession.
''It thus transpired that oar subordinate formations w«re
compelled to look to their own Corps for tactical instractions
as well as for administrative services^ and the Corps Staff thus
became ennged in recondlinff French orders and French
wishes with what was practicable at the moment. This was
done as tactfully as possible, but with a firm intention of not
permitting the enemy to penetrate any gap inside the Fifth
BarnsH Abmt.
^The French retired south-westward fimn Boye at the
start Our line of retreat lay due west If we had implicitly
obeyed the French orders we received there would have been
qp of at least ten miles between Montdidier and Beaucourt
le French Generals on the spot at the time recognized this
situation, and there was never any friction between us ; but
it should be placed on record that a ten-mile cap was avoided
onlv by the finnness of purpose displayed by Qeneral Sir
Hubert Oough, oommandmg the Fifth Abmt. In hoi, we
held the cap in defiance of orders from superior French
Oenerak vnio were unacquainted with the local situation. • . .**
Let these matters be viewed frankly and temperately, side
by side with a sound military rule which says that reinforce-
ments ought to do no more than reinforce till the^ are properly
equiwed to take over the fitting front. Till then, they
should be governed by the arm v whose strength they restorei
Now and then sound principles in war have an application
Evemed by diflering circumstances, and there are critics who
lieve that the transfer of our Srd Corps on the fourth day to
the Thibd Fbknoh Abmt may have been useful, parti v because
the most southern division — ^the Fi/Sy-d^AtAA-haa become
detadied in French territory,* and partly because Butler^s
line f3t retreat was towards the Noyon region, which the
The
• ThkdiiTlfllon,UM JV^^y-fi^U^pMMdiuidarFrenohoon^^
Ito, Hid Ihofl before ihe loorth dey. On the etenlng of MMoh S9, a* ««
o'dook, OQZ EighimUh VmMum xMthred iaf onnalian IhftI Uw Ffftif-0ighih
hftd pMMd ondsr oonmiaiid of lb« Fnnoh, whoto Swidnd amd Tw m^ fiftk
Dmnoa mm moving np to Mpdn the Oront QmaaX lino aboai Vond Mid
TMgate. Tho SigktsmUh wm Mkod to o»«ponilo. TUi ovldflnoo mobi Io
•bow tb»l M loon im m gnnliM Vranoh dhrteldn wm bwflsd brnothlaMJy Into
i rigbt Al Atfbii
Mtfoo, U WM pat in oomiftind ow % Brititb dlriiion, wboM
bed nol bMtt fttfawkod, and wboM lofl bad foogbt masplfloenily.
284 THE FIFTH ABHY IN MABCH, 1918
French wete partienlarly eager to guard. On the oiher hand,
not all unitB of our 3rd Corps had oome naionlly into touch
with a French command, ^th cavalry and icdSuitry were
doing all that was possible mider their own officers; and how
is any one to believe that these British officers did not know
more abont current events and needs, both local and general,
than the French officers who arrived in great haste ?
As for the 18th Corps^ in its case there should be no doubt
at alL It bore with success the brunt o£ Hutier's attack.
Why, then, was it not permitted to fight entirely under its
own Army's control till its units were withdrawn? Why
impose on British troops a subordination to French reinforce*
ments which mAj be regarded by them as a political panic
coming from outside the ^hting or as censure passed publicly
on themselves and their officers ? In these matters I feel as
an Englishman who has always been greatly moved by British
battles, and who is certain that a great nation's just pride of
self-rofi^iect is a natural element of greatness which should be
treasured.
§IV
At first the French troops associated with our 18th Corps
took line along the Libermont Canal from Quiquery to
Libermont Four companies of French infantry reinforced
the right of the TwerUielh ; then this British unit — ^to which,
after we crossing of the Somme, remains of the Siaty-first were
attached — ^passed for a time under the French commander,
whose men belonged to the 2nd French Cavalry Corps, General
BobUot.
In the evening of March 24^ Oough and Bobilot discussed
a combined attack on the foe north-west of Nesle, to drive
him back over the Somme along the Betheneourt sector. An
extensive plan was debated and arranged. By night the
French Tufenty-aecond was to man the Ime Bouy le Grand-
Mesnil St Nicaise, in order to attack in a north-eastern
direction, while the Eighth British, under Heneker, was to
co-operate by thrusting south-east. And the British Twenty*
fowrth, brought forwwl from its position in reserve, was to
advance due east, assailing with all its might; and these
combined movements were to be set in action at 8 a.m. on
the morning of the fifth day. A barrage table was timed» and
our officers and men made all necessary preparations.
When dawn came the French wei^ not^ position; they
HOW OUB MEN WEBE BELIEVED 286
aeked for a postponement of three hours. Three honrs went
by ; no ohange in the situation occurred ; and then it became
known that General Bobilot had issued no definite orders
because he rmoded the whole scheme as a "project '* onl^, a
fight in an me of dreams. It is quite easy tor men to view
a piece of business differently when they speak different
languages^ and when reinforcements do not belong to an
Army Craunander^s direction.
But misunderstandings have results, not often welcome.
A German thrust advanced through Neale, and the French
Twenty-meand was driven back south*west a considerable
distance towards Bove. By noon, moreover, some three or
four mUes north of r7esle» heavy German columns of attack
debouched from Morchain and pushed the li^ht of Watts's
Corps through licourt and Pertain. By evemng Watta was
being attacked on the railway line from Omi£oourt north-
east to the Somme, but his tooops held their own, retaining
also the bridges of 8t Christ ana Brie. Then two pieces of
bad news haia to be weighed and measured. In the south
German pressure was closing upon Noyon, and in the north
Byng's right was to retire by night to the Bray-Albert line,
uncoverinff about six miles of Gough's flank and rear. So
Gough ordered Watts to withdraw to a new line in order to
ease as much as he could the northern menace, while Maxse
remained face to fiflM» with awkward matters, his troops and
the TfmiUfhaMmi French holding a line approximately as
follows — ^maulieu, liancourt, Foudies.
Next day, March 26, the oflBdal policy which, on March
26, placed the French in general control south of the
Somme, made matters worse. The British Thirty-Biaik was
relieved for a n>ell of rest by the French Sioety-Beoond, and
passed under French orders. Williams also* was placed
• ?nuisais s our TMrliia Dxnsiaii. II would be aUBooU to q^ too
highly of this anik whioh benn tha faettto with sboat seOO rlflM. A hrisf
ramiasiy of its domgi nmi thw : On lisroh SI WUUsmt'i simi lost tbdr
teWBsd sons, sftor e v«y tough wriitsnoa from the Shctaooth Msoohtttsn
SDdthsSooondWIltihlni. In thsoTsaiiigof thoMoonddiytha/winlofoad
out of thoir bsltis som: thoy fai this ease bslng the Saoond Torks, tha
D aw nl aa n th Mannhast ars, BaoondBadlOTds, and BaoondBoyal Soots Fosillaw,
Ods brigida was In Oorpa Bassrva. Thaj withdraw to Bam. Hsia on tha
morning of Haiah SA thi^f waia ptsssid baak, bat slowlj, and only aa fv aa
Libannont Canal, flva or stz nilas wast of Ham; and this Una tb^ bald tiU
IhaafHilngof tha90th,whanthi7wanraUafadbyVranohtrooDa. Ubanaonl
Oanalwaa tha fiuihast point to whlohtharwaia driven baok. OnthaS6th,in
Iha morning, thay took op anothar Una, Bowhoir-Bonnoy, and bald it flnnly
nntil Fnnoh troops raUarad thsm at UO p.m. on tha 98th. Than thaj got
a night's cast— tha fixit ona slooa tha batUo bsgn at dawn on Maron SI.
286 THE FIFTH ARMY IN HABGH, 1918
under the Ereneh Siasty-seoond, and the only tcoqps mm
remaining teehnioally under MaxBe» their Corps Commander,
were the T^venUeth (now returned to him trom a French
Commander) and the remains of Colin Mackemde's Division.
Then at five in the a£temooii MaKse was jdaeed under General
Humbert, Third Fbbnoh Abut ; and a few hours later our
troops knew that the Fifth Abmy as a whole had passed under
French oontrol, though the confusion caused by tne local sub-
ordination of our own troops to French reinforcements had
not yet been resolved into order.
Indeed, it was early oa the sixth day that two French
divisions^ the Twenty-aa^md and Siaty-'kcond^ when with-
drawing south-west towards the valley of the Avre, took
with them Nugent*s Ulstermen, the Thirty-aixth, and nearly
all of the 18th Corps artilleiy, both field-guns and heavies ;
and through the rest of tins day and ^ greater part of
March 27, our troops had to hold up the foe's advance unaided
by artillery support — ^not an easy thing to do, for although
the attack on these days was weak in gunfire, it had ent^
prise in several places.
Gough personally asked the French Commander, Gteneral
Humbert, to return the field-guns, if circumstances at present
detained the heavies; and l&s was promised for the next
day. Meanwhile orders were given to defend to the last
all roads and bridges, and to check the advance while
more French troops were being detrained at Montdidier and
elsewhere.
At four in the afternoon our 18th Corps received a French
order sent through Gough's H.Q. In tms order Mazse and
Watts were told that they must maintain at all costs the line
Guerbigny-Erohes - Bouchoir - Bou vroy-Bosi^res - Proyart — ^to
the Somme. French troops were in movement to relieve
them along this line.
But in a wide stretching retreat it is an easy matter at a
distance with a good map before you to fix on a strong line
and to issue finn orders, while generals on the spot are
striving here and there to learn precisely where the foe is
and where their own men are. On the morning of March 27,
for example, a few local situations were so obscure that some
small hitches occurred both to ourselves and to the Germans.
In the neighbourhood of Bouchoir some German transport
Next day the Frenoh withdrew, and maoy penona nid— and have oonHmiad
to say— that Williaixui and hifi men retiied. The habit of blaming ow Vm
Abkt has invented many myths^
HOW OUB MEN WEBE BELIEVED 887
rambled inadvertently throagfa our lines and was o^^tnred.
It belonged to the 56tii German Foot Artillery, and had in it
two loaded ammunition wagi|ODSy a wateraart with two
machine-gan8» a cooker full of soap, good or bad» and six
men fit to be prisonera. Again, early in the morning the
OJS.0.1. of our 2%vrty''9ixth, wishing to dear up the 8ituati<m
on his front, started in a car, ran mto a party of Germans^
and was captured Later the car was found oy one of our
ambulance motors and brought in.
For the rest, during the morning of this seventh day* it
became known that the Fifty^math French would rekeve
Nugent's XTlstermen at once ; that in the evening the
Hv/ndred and Tkvrty4hird French would replace Wifiiams,
and that General Mesple, of the French Army, would take
command over Mazse's front. Of course, tiiese British
divisions, and the others, were remnants only, glorious shreds
and patches ; but yet^ after their seven days and six nights
of incessant overstrain, somehow their stamina was fit for
other adventures, as there was work elsewhere for them to
do. What rest could there be t What but violence can be
done to the bravest of the brave when an army enters battie
very short of men, through no fault of its own ? Early on
the 28th, when Mazse handed over the command to Meqde's
4th French Corps, the Twentieth was still holding Hutier
astride the Boye-Amiens road near Le Quesnel ; the ThMiieth
and Thirty-Stxth, after being relieved, were to remain with
the French as long as they were required ; while Mackenzie's
men had gone north to hdp Watts at Tillers Bretonneuz.
Colin Mackenzie's troops had twelve days of continuous
fighting, with a night shift in 'buses from one Corps to
another. Their raiuB became trsfficalljr thin, of course, and
80 tired that really they seemed to oe stricken with locomotor
ataxy; but not a si^ of defeat was to be seen in any
face. Continuously, smce August 27, 19l7t they had been
in line, apart from a few imort periods in trains or on
the roads, when moving from one part of the line to
another.
As a nation we are very fond of talking about high
thoughts and right feelinos ; sometimes our virtue is confident
enough almost to imply ^t our British shoulder-blades are
adorned with an^ls winm brisk for fiight; but do we really
cheat ourselves mto the oelief that we have a moral riffht
not only to keep a division in line for seven whole montns,
but also to let it fight afterwards through twelve days and
288 THE FIFIH ABMY IN MABGH, 1918
eleven sights ? Here is one lesson to be learnt from the
immense battle against Hutier. It teadies ns to know the
difference between reasonable warfare and cmelty to our own
soldiers, who represent onr country's manhood at its very
best
CHAPTER V
UNITT OF OOMMAND
N this day, the 26th March," says the official
diapatch, " the GovenunentB of France and Great
Britain decided to pUce the supreme control of
the operations of the French and British forces
in France and Beldam in the hands of General Foch, who
accordingly assomea control''
I wish this quotation said a great deal more. Why
should it keep Democracy in the dark concerning many
things ? At tne very moment when Mr. Lloyd Georee was
appeaJing to President Wilson for succour, to to brought over
in ships withdrawn from our essential industries (p. 809X
General Foch received his new honour, yet American troops
were not placed under his control I Why announce a swift
change of policy before it was fit to be true Unity of
Command 7 And who would not be glad to know also for
what reason British politicians approved this poliq^ in the
middle of an enormous battle, when two British armies were
retreating on French soil ? Why were the v so poor in spirit ?
With much self-congratulation they tola the world that
British arms needed at once a French head Not a moment
more must be lost ! So our politicians talked to Dora, and
Dora inspired the Press by means of confidential fervour
enclosed within two envelopes, and soon a great flinging-up
of caps was a journalistic exercise all day long.
Our descendants will prefer that high story of Nelson,
who as a young man was in the Mediterranean with a
squadron too small for big dan|;er8, which at any moment
might appear along the offing m French white sails. Its
sailors were uneasy, so they cheered with relief when a
Neapolitan battleship sailed up under full canvas to reinforoe
the British weakness. Nekon was hurt and aogry, becaqse
he knew that his country had no rizht to sink into debt bom
the duty of being self-dependent The greater the nation the
less she can aficm to owe overmuch to her partners^-^bove
8S9
m- *
290 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABGH, 1918
all, to new oo-belligerents. What would Nelson have said to
a Prime Minister who, while British soldiers were retreatrng,
and when the worid hummed with fisdse aoeosations bron^t
against a British army, chose a (Generalissimo from one MLy
and begeed for armed succour from another ?
MrrTJoyd George has had a reputation as bright as
bubbles are, and it ia bursting like bubbles. A thousand
pities ; for he had fine instinctive ideas as well as matchlesB
ener^ ; but the most recent plausible talk from his trusted
associates deflected his right intuitions as a compass is
deflected by a magnet. He desired unity of command, only
to find that racial susceptibilities were as active in Allied
warfiire as they were and are in any other emulatioo. Dif-
ferent schools of opinion, both in our own country and in
France, viewed unity of command variously and opposinfi^Iy.
What Mr. Asquith says to-day about unity of command is
not of a piece with two or three other British beliefs or
convictions ; and if you tried to sum up briefly what was
said on this ^^t matter by the rival followers of Foch and
P^tain, and Nivelle, you would find that your epitome would
be discordant. Yes, and German autocracy discovered also
that unity of command was an ideal almost as elusive as a
mirage. German backbones did not ofiend Bulgaria and
Austria-Hungary, but German orders all along the line were
hated as a pmic^ of pinpricks. Ludendorff had to mind his
Ps and Q's.
All good and necessary things are unpeaceful, thev divide
us into rival sects, into squabbling schools; but the main
point to be considered here is not the selection of a
Generalissimo, it is the ^licv of taking this action suddenly,
hurriedly, feverishly, wmle the whole world talked about two
British armies in retreat across French soil, talked without
knowledge of governing fiu^ts, and seldom in a tone at all
good for Britain's fame abroad and dignify at home. Also,
while this talk continued, the War Office and the War
Cabinet made no effort at all to contradict it ; their silenoe
was a foe to our troops, and also an injustice which Kiwf/^rim^r
will never condone.
But officialism says : ** The appointment of a Generalissimo
was made imperative by the immediate dane^ of the
separation of tne French and British Armies.^ But this
dangerwasziotanewihiDff; it existed as a darkening menace
befiM the battle began. Tnrther, the main thing to be oon-
•idersd is not the appointment itself but tiieaot of announdng
UNITY OF COMMAND 291
k afc a most inopportoiie time and without oorreeUng the
slandora on Britiflh troops.
Ab a rule the manner of doing big things is as important
as are the thinm to be done; and to do a right thinff at a
wrong time is often neither less foolish nor lera hannm than
to ne^eet doing a right thing at the right moment. The
appointment of Fooh, abmpt and untimelyy was hated by
those who had not been camouflaged out of their British
dignity and self-respect A London artisan, with three sons
at the firont, put this natural feeling in picturesque word&
''Let's us down sharp, doesn't it?" he said to me. "And
what a smack in the eye for Haig, and a knock-out for
Oough and Byng ! Yes, Tet the noospapers are all a-bubble
with their old eye-wash!" ... ''All a-bubble with their
old ^e-washl" I like this mocking, scornful phrasing.
Isn't it good enough to be spoken by a Shakespearean
flharaeter 9
suited patriotism speaks plainly ; but statesmen are so
dragged by atmospheres unlike those of the world outside
dip^oaey that they are overapt to be foes to inborn sensitiye-
ness. Too often iJlied Councils were a tiresome orchestra
in which France held the conductor's baton, while the British
Empire played second fiddle, as if she were not the Allies*
composer and financier.
And was it fair to Foch himself thus to give him control
— hutriedl^y feverishlvy in the midst of a British retreat —
over all British foices in France and Bel^um, whUe journaliBts
with stock phrases tried to lift their readers into high
exDeetatians f
Was it supposed that he could gather all at once into his
hands^ '^ ]^ * wirade, the many strings of military goyern-
rnent^ British, Belgian, French, whidi wera necessary to
the firee successful use of his great gifts? If this im-
possible achierement wera not expected, what useful purpose
could be served at once by advertifling a decision wnich
seemed to a great many persons nothing less than a plain
act of censura passed on our own Qenerals and troops during
a British retreat on French soil ?
What if the Oovernments of France and Great Britain
did expect Foch all at once to improvise victory ? If so,
the^ ran the ffrave risk of undermining from the start what
thsur GeneraBssimo needed most of all — ^AlUed confidence
For it h^ypsoed in the ironical mischances of war that Foch
began his reign with three de f ea t s de f sa t s bad enough to
292 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABGH, 1918
have caused among the French a desire to displace Fodi by
retain. One defeat was at Armenti^res, Eemmel Hill, and
in the Lys Valley ; * another, far bigger and more humiliating,
was the swift German onrosh over the Chemin des Dames
and thence to the Mame, with leverage pressnre west and
south-west of Soissons; whOe- the third is described by
Ludendo^ as the battle of Noyon, which began on June 9,
and strengthened the long German flank betw^n Montdidier
and Noyon.
When these matters are weighed and measured, I am
certain that it would have been much fairer to Fodi, and
much fiEkirer also, of course, to our national pedigree and just
pride, if the act of appointing a French Cfeneralissimo had
been deferred till the retreat had ended, and till Mr. Lloyd
George had explained firanklpr that Gtough, through no fisuilt of
his own, began the battle perilously short of men ; had received
reinforcements with a slowness which could not be avoided ;
and yet had baffled the immense eflbrts of Hutier and Marwitz,
winning time both for the arrival of piecemeal relief and tor
the incoming of U.S.A. troops.
To my mind this unhurried and truthful policy would
have been not only the better one, but also the very best
There would have been in it no symptoms of nerves £ar
outside the battle, nerves among statesmen, and its truth
would have contradicted false rumours and debasing calumnies,
very painful and unjust to the stricken army whidi had done
so much against ''a world of odds," to use Shakespeare's
phrase correctly.
But although this poUcy appeals to me as evidently the
best, I am not unmindiul of the jostling circumstances which
ran counter to it, in political circles mamly, but not entirely,
as British Generalship had rival creeds and sects.
B«tw6en Vooh's Appolntmaift m OwmiaHiirimo uid the opming of tin
LyB bftttlA tbara were foorteen days. Henoe i% has been onfiiir U> oak aU the
blame on Haig, who had no real reserveB — no spare iroopa tomeetlne daagan
of a yast emezgenoy.
CHAPTER YI
Tai TBOUBtES OF MUnSTCRS
§1
NO stroke of nfttional miafortone oonld have been
wone than the fi^t that the greatest dancer to
oar aimiee in FhuDoe had grown under Lloyd
George's eoaUtion, not nnder that of Asquith and
Bonar Law. In 1916, just before Asquith fell, Germany's
oondition became desperate, as Ludendorff has confessed
Tet she made a swift xeoovery, and then brought us to the
very brink of ruin.
He who had spoken most eloquently against Too Late
had to reap a dire erop of evils m>m the same old periL
What was to be done ? Would Ministers admit their errors
of judgment, or would they pass into seapegoat hunting, the
last resort of unnerved statesmanship ? ¥^uld they employ
the hoaxing rhetoric called either camouflage or propacanda,
while unloading their mistakes <m good soldiers ? ^<mtical
human nature is not improved b^ crisis, and so critical was
the situation that dear reasoning and right action must
have been esctremely difficult. Though Ministers had failed
tn^cally their fidl from ofDlce would have caused harmful
pohtiosl disorder ; and yet their fall might have been brought
about by the people if the true causes of the retreat had
been admitted. Action and reaction being equal and opposite,
we must remember that Ministers had allowed the newspaper
Press the Momina Pori was an exception — ^to encourage
over«confidenos while Ludendorff was preparing his offensive.
So much was published about our airmen's ascendancy
over their opponents that a great many persons re^puded a
German attack as a f oU v to be smashed mo by our airplanes ;
and a fortnight before the foe struck Mr. woar Law affirmed
that ^ there would be no danf^us superiwity on the
Western front from the point of view of guns any more than
294 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABCH, 1918
from the point of view of men." Yob, and he was ''still a
little sceptical '^ about the foe's threatened oflenaive I
There is a wide difference between Bation Strength and
Combatant Strength, and Mr. Bonar Law may have meant
that the total Amed ration strength on the Western front
was larger than the combatant strenffth which Lndendorff
woold employ. In any case we have leamt from Haig that
Lodendorn on the first day employed "at least sixty-four
Oennan divisions ... a number considerably exceeding the
total forces composing the entire British Anny in France."
As Lndendorff assailed fifty-foor miles of oar fronts yAkh in
all was one hundred and twenty-five miles wide, the words
put into eirculafcion by Mr. Bonar Law were very indiscreet,
being not at all fit to tnrace his ooontiymen for an uncertain
ordeal or to aid his Government if our troops were obliged to
bend much in order to avoid breaking.
What military adviser save this eicoessive confidence to
Mr. Bonar Law ? The C.La.& ? Or did Mr. Bonar Law
collect his over-confidence at first hand from his own hopes?
In France, too, the same wild excess of hope was active.
Many a simple person prayed that Lndendorff would strike —
to receive at once a fitting punishment of defeat.
Then, of course, as soon as the crisis came, feeling in
France — a natural feeling of mordant anxiefy mingled with
irritation and swift unreasoning critidsm — ^made the positioa
of statesmen, both French and British, as delicate as it was
Serilous. Even details of the retreat^ and notably the
^ estruction of French bridges and railways, represented an
immense loss, both present and friture; and as a gun from
seventy-five miles dropped shells on Paris, much civilian
panic was added to political distress and fear. Many will
recall to memory a touching speech on this crisis made by
M. Clemenceau at Amiens, in July, 1919. The worst moments
in the Second Battle of the Somme were recalled : —
'* If the Germans took Amiens, what would be the con-
sequences ? This question was discussed at Abbeville, and
we asked whether it was better to try to hold up the advance
on Paris or to prevent the Germans from reacning the sea.
Two points of view were urged by men of equal weight and
authority. When I recall these hours I experience again one
of the greatest emotions a man can f eeL we were joying a
hand on which hung the fate of the Fatherland.*'
But althouj^h it is easy to keep heartily in touch with lUl
French amdeties, the crisis in France was much more than a
THE TBOUBLES OF MINI8TEB8 396
Freneh one; it was an Allied erisis which pressed as heavily
on Britiah prospeets as on French freedom. Sorely, then,
neither words nor acts should have been made of some con-
solation to the French unless they were at the same time
amply fiur both to onr national dignity and to our officers
ana men.
§n
Unluckily, this cardinal aspect of the erisis was passed
over almost without attention. Defiuning romoars were per-
mitted to dzealate; shortly after the battle a deplorable
speech was made by Mr. Llo vd Qeoige to the House of
OnnmoDS, a speech which he has not yet corrected, though
its errors were notable from the very moment they were
uttered; and while the Prime Minister was proving again
that his forte runs counter to an exact use of facts in a
sequence, a strange experience came to one of our war corre-
qx>ndents, Mr. ELamUton Fyfe, who desired to tell the truth,
only to find that Authority at the front would not let him,
though vile slanders were passing from random gossip into
printed innuendoes.
Already I have given a part of Mr. Fyfe's experiences
(p. 6), and now let us see what he savs concerning the
causes which made the people so easy to mislead. The public
acceptance of a false view in to be attributed, he believes : —
**\. To the refusal of the public to believe anything
written by war correspondents, a refusal for which I do not
blame the public, considering how often they had been
deceived before they realized &e conditions under which war
correspondents worked.
^ 2. To the loose and exaggerated accounts of the retreat
given by wounded men of the units which went to the relief
of the fiFTH Armt.
'^ 8. To the statement made in the House of Commons by
the Prime Minister, with incomplete knowledge and mis*
understanding of important fsusts.
''4 To the treatment of General Gough . • • who was
deprived of his command without court-martial or
inquiry. • . .'*
Note, too^ what was being said in France . —
''About tiie retreat, and especially the Fifth Abmt part
in it» many absurd stories were afloat What was particularly
unfiDctanate was that American soldiers arriving in France
296 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABGH; 1918
were apt to be told that British troops became a disorderly
rabble, that officers lost their heads, that men wandered like
sheep without a shepherd, and that their unworthy conduct
caused a grave set-back to the Allied Cause. Such stories
were, I d^ say, set agoing, many of them, by spies and
traitors, very lU^ely by paid German agents. They were
repeated by nabitual grumblers, by those who like to ' seem
to know/ and even by many who passed on this kind of talk
merely because they had nothing better to say. One story
which was widely told represented General Gough as having
dined in London * on the night pf March 21 1 **
In the large aspects of truth there was nothing obscure.
As Mr. Fy fe says : —
" The Germans had so many divisions that they could
take them out of the line as soon as they were tired and let
them recover. Our men had no intervals. They were on
their feet day and night. When they were not fighting, they
were falling back or hastily improving old defensive positions.
They grew so heavy-headed from want of sleep that officers
had to go round shaking them to keep them awake. Numbers
of them fell by the roadside and slept from exhaustion. This
largely swelled the numbers of prisoners taken by the enemy.
Yet throughout the six [eight] days of battle there was
nothing approaching a rout or a panic, there was no disorder
on the roads. I have seen other retreats with these features.
In this retreat there was hardly so much as disorganization
on any large scale . . . From hunger few suffered, thanks to
the devotion and steadiness of the Army Service Corps, and
to the regularity of the regimental arrangements for dis*
tributing rations. But what they suffered from weariness no
one can imagine. Yet they kept their faces towards the foe.
They never let him get through. Thus they spoiled his
plan . . ."t
And let us note also how the Germans in some of their
newspapers admitted that their strategic plan had miscarried.
On March 26, for instance, the Frankfort Oazette said bluntly :
* Didn't goaaip Bay Paris also, and on the same evening ? Two maginal
dinnen eaten on the same eyening in places fiur apart I
t Hamilton Fyfe, Contemporary B&vieWt January, 1919. Mr. Fyfe might
have added with trath that mnoh nonsense was ciroulated by the natnzal
vanity of reserves who arrived soddenly, and who knew nothing ol what the
men in line had sofiered since Iklaroh 21. Bven General Monash was moved by
this vanity, and magnified very much the work done by the Australians, who
did not enter the battle tUl the Germans were nearing the end of their
physical strength.
THE TBOXTBLEB OF MINIBTBB8 297
"^ A reftl advanoe has been cheeked hv the foe's obsiiiiaie
defence. As long as onr enemy is able to ooeapy ehosen
positions and to mend breaches in his dam with reserves,
operatiTe movements are impoesib W
Lndendorff himself gave vamings to Oennan oorre-
spondents. The British fought tenacioiislj, he said, and
concealed their machine-gnns with great sloU ; it had been
necessary to b^gin the battle with many Oennan divisions
who weie still fiitigaed by their night marches to the
battlefield; and forward movements were ardnona "BaU*
ways are torn up," he said, '* and oor horses are jaded, bat
every effort will oe made to keep tqp the speed now active
at ttie front" According to Herr Sdieuermann, of the
Berlin Tag€8zeitwngt Ludendorff made another remark : ** A
great battle has been f onght a victory gained : bat nobody
can ten what the result ot it will be." If these words
were given correctly by Schenermann, Ludendorff at once
described the battle accarately. His words admit that
he has been baffled in the big strat^c aspecia of his
plans.
Bot other things mast be kept before our minds, and
among them is the shifty self-help which clings around party
nolitica Beaconsfield described politics as ''a stinking pro-
feanon " ; but after all, this candour is too blunt it provokes
refmsals ; and my aim is to be fidr, and to make due allow-
ance for the terrible fix into which Ministers and their
advisers drifted
A few days after the battle ended Colonel Bepington
soouned up the case in the MomAng PoaL His first para*
graph said : —
""I notice that the Government Pt^ss is doing its best to
unload the responsibilities of its masters upon the soldiers,
and especially to blame our Command in France and our
FmH Abut for the success of the German attack on March 21
and subsequent davs. The War Office permit these insinua-
tions and innuendoes to be publishea broadcast without
reply, and therefore I am entitled to defend my old cam-
paigning comrades and to establish the facts.*'
Of course, this behaviour of the Government Press was
odious ; and much later— on October 21, 1918, when at last
Haig^s dispatch was published *— journalists on the Govern-
ment side were a mat deal too reticent, as though an awful
battle's horrible enects on young lives were ot less importance
• It ia dated jQl7 90.
298 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MABCH, 1918
than was the aot of tryinfi^ to hide the big nustakes made by
our Ministers and their advisers.
In several passages the dispateh appeals to me as perhaps
the most notable indictment of British Mimsters ever written
by a British Commander-in-Ghie£ Some parts of it were
deleted by the Oovemment; bat that Haig himself still
regards tne omitted parts as tu^efnly if not neoessair, to his
argument, is proved by the fact that they are marked by stars
(****) in the republished dispatch, as you will see by
taming to pi^^ 177, 178, and 179. These cats are all in
that portion of the dispatch which Mt. Lloyd George regaided
as a reflection on himself and his Cabinet.
Here are a few quotations ooUected from the dispatch as
published : —
" The broad facts of the change which took place in the
general war situation at the dose of 1917, ana the caosee
which led to it, have long been well known and need be
referred to but diortly.
'' The disappearance of Russia as a belligerent countiv on
the side of the Entente Powers had set free the great bulk of
the (German and Austrian divisions on the Eastern Front
Already at the befiinmnff of November, 1917, the transfer of
German divisions bom &e Russian to the Westwn front had
begun. It became certain [by the middle of Februaiy, 1918]
that the movement would be continued steadily untu
numerical superiority lay with the enemy. ..." *
" In threeand a half months twenty-eight infantry divisions
had been transferred from the Eastern theatre and six
infantzy divisions from the Italian theatre. There were
reports that further reinforcements were on their way to the
West, and it was also known that the enemv had greatly
increased his heavy artillery in the Western theatre daring
the same period. These reinforcements were more than were
necessary for defence, and, as thev were moved at a time
when the distribution of food ayd rael to the civil population
in Germany was rendered extremely difficult through lack of
rolling stock, I concluded that the enemy intended to attack
at an early date. . . .
''By the 2l6t March the number of German infantry
divisions in the Western theatre had risen to 192, an inereaae
of 46 since November 1, 1917. • • ." t
"Although the growing Army of the United States of
America might be expected eventually to restore the balance
• Vol. II, p. m. t Vol II., p. lea.
THE TROUBLES OF MINIBTEBS 299
in our &v<mr, a ooniBiderable period of time would be required
to enaUe that Army to develop its foil strength. Whfle it
would be possible for Gkrmany to complete her new disposi*
ttons early in the new year, the forces which America could
send to France before the season would permit aetive opera-
tions to be recommenced would not be large. • . /' *
'' The strenuous efforts made fay the British forces during
1917 had left the Army at a low ebb in regard both to training
and to numbers. It was therefore of the first importance, in
view of the expected German offensive, to fill up the ranks
as rapidly as possible and provide ample facilities for
training. • . ."t
But as the ranks were not filled up, " a defensive policy
was adopted*'; and " the extent of our front made it impos-
sible, with the forces under mv command, to have adequate
reserves at all points threatened. It was therefore necessary
to ensure the safety of certain sectors which were vital, and to
accept risks at others. • . . " t
What have Ministers to say t And upon whose military
advice did they act ?
Mr. Lloyd Oeoige has related how Sir Hemy Wilson
foretold the aim and place of Ludendorff's assault. Yet Haig
was left in great need of more men. Why?
Meantime, there's another side that invites questioning
comment. Did Q.H.Q.'s anxiety linger too long north <^
Bapaume-Cambrai road f Its dispatdE fails to note that a
vital whole is no stronger than its most vulnerable part;
hence Ludendorff struct hardest against the St Quentm
sectors.
Further, as Oough's front was one-third of Haig's whole
line, and as it spanned the very heart of France, I am
unable to see why all of the risks were crowded along its
areas. Hutier's attack alone is known in France as the
battle of Picardy I And tiiere is also the technicial question
of bearing strength. A girder showing uniform wear and
tear to a degree not immediately unsue is a much better
thinff to trust under jolting pressure than a ^prder perilously
weak along a third part of its lengtL This apphes also to
stretching dastie. I suggest, then, after making allowance
for the uncertainties of war, that when a O.H.Q. is compelled
to take great risks in defence, it might well spread them
uniformly firom end to end of tiie line rather than crowd them
•yoLU.,9.m. • t Vol IL. J. ITS.
S Vol ILt p. US.
800 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABGH, 1918
all along a third of the whole front Even when tiiis one-
third hius good luek againgfc odd^, and is only driven in badly,
reinforoements most m sent to it at hiffh-preasaie speed and
in greater numbers than an even distribntion of risks would
ne^, probably ; and if the foe, af tear causing this dLrolaoe-
ment of reserve strenffth, strikes elsewhere at a place skilfully
chosen, as Ludendorn struck against Armentitees and on the
Lys, the use of defensive reserves becomes flurried and
feverish a«in. Is it too much to say, then, that risks are
likely to. be multiplied when they are congested along one
wide area of a vast battle line, just as thejr are multiplied hj
concentration when a gambler stakes his all on a single
throw?
§ III
Though it is necessary to examine a case from all fair and
reasonable standpoints, the main point of all, no doubt» is the
great need of rine strength imposed on Q.H.Q. between the
xpres salient campaign and March 21, 1918. What defence
has been offered by the Government's followers ?
Many persons say : " G.H.Q. should have stopped all leave.
Why on March 21 were about 70,000 of its men on leave 1 "
The answer is plain, because every O.H.Q. has to keep over-
worked troops in a temper fit for battles. P^tain also was
obliged to grant leave to his trenchwom men. After the
immense losses suffered in 1916 and 1917, it would have been
an act of wild folly to add to the stress and strain by for-
bidding the usual routine that enabled brave soldiers to visit
their homes for a few days.
Other persons say : ''It was a verv bad mistake to extend
the British front. Lloyd George had no right to give way in
this matter."
The French b^^an to press for this relief in September,
1917. Much discussion followed, and went on till Januanr,
1918. Then the French lines were taken over by Gk>ugh in
two instalments, between January 10 and 12, and Januanr
26 and February S. Obviously, to increase the Frenw
reserves by takin^^ over a two-corps French front was to
impoverish the British resources at a bad time. But ^et the
French, from their own standpoint^ had right on their side.
Since 1914 they had held a very much wider frontage, while
British statesmen and pressmen talked about the increasing
millions recruited by the British Bmpire. This part of our
THE TBOUBLES OF HINI&TEB8 801
naiional propaganda made no reference at all to oombatant
strength; the ration strength alone was jriven, and it inolnded
troops in the British Isles, in India, fim>t» and elsewhere
galore. So Frenchmen, like hosts of Bnitidi persons, said
among themselves, '* Where are all these millions of British
troops ? How is it that a ay for more men comes incessantly
from British Qenerak in France and Flanders ? '*
After the Armistice, official propaganda announced that
our Empiro had employed 8,654,467 troops, while admitting
at the same time that^ in 1918, our strength on the Western
Front was as foUows : —
Bstioo ttrangtlk Oombstentitniigtli. BIfls ttisngUL
March 11 1,828,098 1,293,000 616,000
April 1 1,667,701 1,131424 628,617
September 23 1,752,829 1,200,181 498^06
November 11 1,781,678 1,164,790 461,748
We have seen already that these figures are propagandist^
and as a consequence nntrostworthy, but yet they admit
officially that rifle strength dwindled constantly, thon^ it
was too weak on March 11 ; while ration strength, after a
big loss, between March 11 and April 1, made a recoveiy
between April 1 and September 23. The falling off in com*
batant strength between March 11 and November 11 was
128,210, and in rifle strength, 164,251 Suppose the U.&A.
had not entered the war, would Foch's finale nave then been
at all feasible ? Moreover, as ration strongth figures, even if
correct in themselves, wero deceptive as regards rifle strength
and combatant numbers, the French people became more
and more uigent in their desire to see the British front
grow wider.
The weiffht of this deception was borne by Hiaig and his
Qenends. Consider, then, once mote, Haig^s most diffi<mlt
problems:—
** The strenuous efforts made bv the British forces during
1917 had left the Army at a low ebb in regard both to train-
ing and to numbers. It tons therefore of tkejiret importance,
in view of th0 eaopected Oemwn ofenaive^ to fill tip ihs n»nJb
a» rapuuy ae poeeiUe and provide ample faeiUiiee for
travMngJ*
'* So &r as the second of these requirsments was ccaceined,
two fikcton materially affected the situation* Firrtly, train*
ing had hitherto beoi primarily devoted to prepatation tor
• ISm llilki SM sriM^W. S. S.
803 a?HE FIFTH ABMY IN MABGH; 1918
ofGonsive operations. Secondly, the necessity for maintftiiwiig
the front-line systems of defence and the oonstniction of new-
lines on ground recently captured from the enemy had pre-
cluded i& development of rear-line systems to any great
degree.
" Under the new conditions the early construction of these
latter systems, involving the employment of every available
man on the work, became a matter of vital importance. In
consequence, it was difficult to carry out any elaborate course
of training in defensive tactics. On the other hand, in the
course of the strenuous fighting in 1916 and 1917 great
developments had taken place in the methods of conductmg a
defensive battle. It was essential that the lessons learned
therein should be assimilated rapidly and thoroughly by all
ranka"*
Compare this position with another >—
''Meanwhile, in marked contrast to our own position^''
says Haig, '' the large reserves in the Western thea^ which
the enemy was able to create for himself by the transfer of
numerous divisions from the East, enabled mm to carry out
extensive training with units completed to establishment. . • .
In all, at least sixty-four Qerman divisions took part in the
operations of the first dav of the battle, a number consider-
ably exceeding the total forces composing the entire British
Army in France. The majority of tiiese divisions had spent
many weeks, and even months, in concentrated training for
offensive operations, and had reached a high pitch of tecniiical
excellence in the attack."
Our own men had to snatch a bit of training, so tied were
ibey by holdin|r the lines and bjr hard toil with spade, pick
and barbed wire. A lucky division that obtainea two or
three weeks of trainings like the Ifintk, was helped greatly in
the batUe. The Thiniidh also, which took over its line on
Februarv 23, finding the forward zone almost finished, and
the battie zone well wired, was able to combine training with
manual toil, attacking sometimes, and sometimes defending,
trenches in the battie zone dug by its own troops. Counter-
attacks by brigades, battalioiis, companies, platooxis» were
worked out as '' Tactical Exercises without Troops,'' in many
cases down to Section Commanders; and by the troops them-
selves in the eases of companies and platoons. On itarch 21
and 22 one battalion carried ^out no fewer than ei^ht counter*
attacks over the actual ground on whidi the^ had previously
! Vol. IL, pp. 178^79.
THE TB0UBLE8 OF HINI8TEB8 808
been reheaned. In six of tiieae attadcB they took prisonen
and recovered lost lines.
And the artillery of the Thirtieth was fortunate also. In
January and February it was out of the line for nearlv six
weeksy wid weather and oountryside being very good, for
exereise, field training was constantly practised, with excellent
results. Indeed, after their division had been pushed from its
forward zone, its BJL did not lose a gun in profuse rearguard
fighting, though it kept dose to the infantry, often limbering
up after the infantry had passed throuffiL
What a blessing it would have been if everv British division
could have been trained as thoroughly as the German units
were 1 With us manual toU was the first essential
** All available men of the fighting units, with the exception
of a wy small proportion undergoing tiaimng, and all labour
units, were employed on these [pre^antion] iSkjk Though the
time wnd labau/r availabU were tn no Vfay adeauaie, if, as
tDos euepected, (he enemy intended to eommenee hie qfieneive
cperalione in the eoHy spring , a large portion of the work
woe in fact completed before the enemy la/wnehea hie great
attacL That so much was accomplished is due to the untiring
energy of all ranks of the fighting units, the Transportation
Service, and the Labour Corps.'' *
What have Ministers to say in their defence 7 And their
military advisers in London 7 What excuses or explanations
have they to offer 7
It is a national duty to press these auestions, since war
devours the most virile young men while leaving middle-aged
politicians in safety.
• Vol. U., pp. 119-180.
CHAPTER VII
80HE SIDE IS8UBS AND POUTIOAL BFFBCI8
§1
UNDER contemporary war conditions the usual weak-
nesses of statesmanship are likely to increase,
because it is almost impossible to tell the people
frankly about any need or danger by which the
reputations of leading statesmen are compromused. In the
autumn of 1917, Press correspondents at the front knew that
our combatant strength had shrunk far too mudi, but they did
not know how this vital fact could be printed and published.
George A. B. Dewar says, for instance : — *
''I came to the condusion, before the first week of the
battie was ended (ie. the battle of Cambrai, which beean on
November 20, 1917), that we wanted many more men for our
work in France ; but, though I tried hard to state this in print,
I was not allowed to do so. Authority would not allow me.
But I was able — as an indifferent second best— to get into
print before the battie was quite over, a statement mat . . .
* 13ie British force, with the material at its disposal, has done
great things by the well-prepared and suddcoily administered
stroke of uxe HmsD Abmt • • •' This was absolutely true.
** More men — ^this was our aching want at Cambrai, before
Gambrai, after Gambral (The munitions were all right
Thanks to the working classes at home, these goods were
delivered.) Coming over on the boat from France on one
occasion, I travelled with a member of the War Cabinet, and
ventured to say this to him. He mused, as if fhinlring aloud:
' The man-power question is becoming pressing ' ; but added,
* unfortunately, when we do find more men they are lost'
Passchendaele and the later Flanders fights were in his mind.
The casualties were heavy there. But that is war.
''When I returned to England I tried hiud to
• <«AYoii]i0erSoB." By Oeotsa A. B. Dtwar, Chant Biohaidf, Loodon,
1990, pi«e 187.
804
SOME SIDE ISSUES AND POUTICAL EFFECTS 806
this question ; for I dreaded what might happen in 1918 in
ease of a ffreat Qerman offensive — and what aetoally did
h^pen on March 21, 1918. Bat I was nnsuceessfa]. Then
how I wished I had a paper of my own to press the matter
home week after week, even day after day I I found the
terrible delusion prevalent that we had any amount of men but
no generalship, no light and leading. One gentleman to whom
I mentioned our urgent need replied that he could not give me
leave to agitate the question. If at any time we really were
in want of more men in France, all Haig needed to do was to
turn his cavalry into infantry. Fancy 1 one little Cavalry
Corps."
In war every one pays lip-service to Truth while showing
all day long th^ Truth is a peril to be evaded for the nation^
flood ! How easy it is to sajr that veracity will encourage the
foe, or dishearten our own civilians, or depress our troops in
the field, or offend our allies, or be nustaken for a want of
patriotism, or do harm to a statesman whom we like, or make
mischief in some other way. After the Armistice a wounded
Tommy said, *' They tell me weVe pulled through at last all
right 'cause our propergander told better lies than the German.
So I say to mysdf, * If tellin' lies is so JE'^^ ^ ^^^^» ^^7
should tellin' truth be good in peace 7
Ludendorff speaks enviously of our propaganda, so it must
have been effective; but yet m many ways it recoiled as a
boomeranff and hit our best interests badly, as it did by
inviting tne world to mistake our ration strength figures for
combatant power. Another mistake was to talk so much about
the German Scrap of Paper when neutral nations remembered
our treatment of Denmark in 1864, and knew how unprepared
we were in 1914 to fulfil with success our obligation to Belgium,
whose invasion had been foreseen by General Jofbe as well
as by Lord Roberts. In the midst of all this camouflage talk,
how could statesmen ask in good time for an extension of
compulsory service? After an invited tragedy had passed
through its first act, they were obliged to extend the age limit,
and to-day the result is evident. The people's hatred of
conscription is £ur greater than it ever was in pre-war days.
After tne Tpres salient campaign, with its vast losses . Ministers
had reason to say, partly in seu«defence, '' When we did find
mora men they were lost'* But they should have added that
when a nation declines to prepare herself for a long-threatened
war, and starts to improvise nuge armies after war has "been
declared, glorious young lives by the tens of thousands must
X
306 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
be thrown away before enough ezperienoe and training can be
collected from battles and eampaigna The youth of our
Empire had to serve an apprenticeship under fire of three
horrible years— 1915, 1916, 1917. Did any eain on the
Western Front offset the blood cost of this awfm apprentice-
ship ? And do many politicians consider this question side by
side with the pre-war follies ? *
Notiiing is better worth consideration while an austere
cenotaph to the Dead is heins built, for this monument should
mark national remorse as weU as national gratitude, since the
Dead have among them a vast number of lads who in pre-
war days were too boyish to care for any party game plajred
with votes as counters.
Sorrow for slain boys may have been among the reasons
that detained some 200,000 troops in the Britbh Isles while
Ludendcnrff was prepared for his immense blow. Many
S arsons have said : ^ The reserves at home were mainlv lads,
ow could Ministers send them into battle unless a bad crisis
demanded a wholesale sacrifice of boyish lives ? "
Tes, these boys were not among the voters who paid no
heed to Qerman warnings : and if Ministers remembered this
fact, and were guided by its abidine j^thos, they have one
good reason to offer for Hair's riskfuT difficulties.
On tiie seventh day of the battle, March 27, Colonel
Repington said in the Morning Post : —
'* I do not wish to refer now to the terrible reqKmsibilities
which our War Cabinet have incurred by their past blundere
and neglect. The moment of returning to this subject has
not yet come. Nothing that they can do now can retrieve
for many months to come the £ftults of omission and com-
mission which lie at their door. But I hope, in theit* natural
anxiety to appear to be doing something and to be busy, they
will not commit fresh follies. / ahomd ooThrider ii a folly
to throw into this hoilvn^ ca/idd/ron of a grecU batUe ihe yau4hs
between eighteen and mTieteenT^ow in training at home.** f
Many thousands of these boy troops were sent at once to
France; very soon the age limit was extended; and pro-
pagandists told us with pride how losses at the front were
being promptly balanced by reserves !
How amaring is the drama of British politics. Generation
* IiodtDdorfl notes what • gnat many perBons hftv« noted— Uml Aillid
loeees show a heavier percentage than the German, usnally much beaTier in
dead. In war thorongh training Is a sort of hall-effectual lifebelt.
t My itaUos.— W. S. S.
SOME BIDE ISSUES AND POLITICAL EFFECTS 80:
after generation a Bimilar sort of eloquent statesmanship
carries the political milk cans with a similar carelessness;
and as soon as inevitable bad waste occurs, most people say
in defence of it^ " Accidents will happen, of coarse, so let ns
not weep or swear over spilt milk I As though the words
" spilt milk " in matters of life and death were not a synonym
for ** causes/' which, like bad wounds healed into scars, have
at their best effects of an enduring sort.
Every nation condones her own wrong acts and tragic
blunders, perhaps more readily than she remembers those
committed by her foes ; and eveiv political party in a State
magnifies its rival's mistakes and sins while practising for-
giveness towards its own. And have you ever asked yourself,
and answered frankly, the terrible question : '* U there had
been no German crimes gradually to drive neutral after
neutral into the Allied cause, by what human means could
the original Entente Powers, Kussia excepted, have been
rescued from their own mistakes?'* No question in our
history is more searchiuK than this one. In the years to
come historians will dwell on it when they study tne awfal
events of ICaroh, 1918, and many another battle. The tragedy
of being Too Late, of being unprepared for a long-Uireatened
war, had evil consequences which only future generations will
know completely. . . .
Progress remains a halt-footed adventurer that revisits old
tra^^edies ; and those who pay in blood for this routine,
penodicaUy and by instalments, are soldiers and saUors,
young enough to bear immense dangers under conditions
which would kill middle-aged politicians.
It is neceosary thus to unite Uie second Somme battle
and the Fifth Arkt to those ample nermanent issues which
should always be present in written hbtories of a great war.
The origin of St Quentin's Week goes back to the year 1864,
when our country, by declining to fulfil her obligations to
Denmark, helped to start Prussia along a wide, smooth it)ad of
purposeful a gg r e ss i on.
Is it possible that the great need of laige reinforeements
on the Western Front was misunderstood by Ministers, as in
Mr. Bonar Law's speech ? If so, why and now did the mis-
understanding ariHC 7 Was the Prime Minister's mind fixed
.HO confidently on Palestine, and Mesopotamia, and Salonika,
808 THE FIFTH ARMY IN MARCH, 1918
that it could not see in focus the Western problems and
Eiril ? In bis speech at Leeds, December 7, 1918, the Prime
inister spoke]; with a zest akin to schoolboyish levity about
'^ side-shows," as though unmindful of his Cabinet's associa-
tion with the awful events of March. " If we had dropped
the side-shows," he said, ^ the war would not have been over
to-day. Turkey fell, Bulgaria fell, then Austria fell; and
Qermany said, 'Here, they are all gone; it is time we
stopped ' — ^and they are marching back as hard as they can."
Joyous actor ! As Ludendorff's offensive very nearly won the
war, light-hearted prattle about side-shows should come from
young joumalistsy and not from Ministers who left Haig
disastrously short of men.
And consider another point. If Ministers awaited the
arrival of American troops rather than ask the people to
accept an extension of compulsory service, did they fail to
perceive that the risk they were running was not only very
vast, but also vast in a way not to be weighed and measured
by forethought ?
To make ample allowance for the needs of our war
industries and for the restlessness of Labour is as easy as it is
necessary. When Ludendorff struck on March 21, a menacing
unrest was astir among our coal miners, and the Prime
Minister went to placate them with another speech, and with
comments on the huge battle. As a nation we were paying
penalty for that worship of volunteering which employed
such endless deceptive talk after real volunteering had been
displaced by white feathers and newspaper press gangs,
humiliating posters, and many other phases of vulgar and
noisy pressure. Labour was very eager to say that British
volunteers had beaten the German conscripts; and many
others besides manual workers had precisely the same wish.
They ventured even to insult their own Allies by declaring
that a British volunteer was equal in fighting value to at least
four foreign pressed men.
As compulsory service increased this mood, this illusion
about a voluntary service which in a few months ceased to
be either voluntary or dignified, the Government, between
Passchendaele and March, 1918, was unluckily situated. If
its members feared to ask for an extension of conscription,
then I, for one, would not be surprised; for this fear, if it
existed, was backed by peremptory needs in our shipyards
and in many other essential industries.
For all that, war obligations of a rival sort should be
SOME BIDE ISSUES AND POLITIGAL EFFECTS 809
weighed and measured fearleaaly, without any hias, becaune
the decisive test of a war policy is the result it produces. It
is bad if the results are oad, right if its results are good.
And this beine the sane and just rule in war, above all when
war claims mmions of young lives and means the life or the
death of nations, Ministers and their advisers must needs be
held responsible for the March retreat and its effects. They
alone could supply Haig with enough combatant strength.
Among the nuger effects which historians cannot fail to
note is the fiust that the Entente Powers, after March, 1918,
became dependent on American troops, who were hurried
across 3000 miles of sea in the manner described by Mr. Lloyd
George: —
'^ I need not tell you about March 21, how, when the great
crisis came, men were hurried across the ChanneLf I shall
never forget that morning when I sent a cable to President
Wilson, telling him what the facts were, and how it was
essential that we should get American help at the speediest
possible rate: inviting him to send 120,000 infantry and
machine-gunners per month to Europe. If he did that, wo
would do our beist to help to carry them. I sent that
telegram, and the following day came a reply from President
Wilson. ' Send your ships across, and we will send 120,000
men.' Then I mvited Sir Joseph Maclay, the Shipping
Controller, to 10, Downing Street, and said : * S&nd every
thip you can.* They were all engaged in essential trades,
because we were cut down right to the bone. There was
nothing that was not essentiaL We said : ' This %$ the time
for Wcmg risks.' We ran rieka with owr food, W0 ftm
riake with essential raw maJteruds. We said : ' The thing
todoistoget tfiese men acrosa at all hazard,' America sent
1,900,000 men across, and out of that number, 1,100,000
were carried by the British Mercantile Marine."
Thb vivid story is dramatic, but far from pleasant, and far
also from completeness, as it makes no reference to Oough and
Byng, whose armies, as Haig has said : —
" held up the German attack at all points for the greater part
of two oays, thereby rendering a service to their country and
to the Allied cause, the viSue of which cannot be over-
estimated* Thereafter, through many days of heavy and
continuous rearguard fighting, they succeeded in presenting a
barrier to the enemy's advance until such time as the arrival
* In s speeoh si Leada, DMWiber 7, 191S.
t Cottld Vollsir* hsT* wrlllso s more ejnkaX MBlsaoa ifaao ihli?
810 THE FIFTH ARMY IN HABGH, 1918
of British and French reinfoicements enabled his progress to
be checked." *
It is all very well for Mr. Lloyd Geor^ to relate how he
acted while the Fifth Abmt was grwphng against a world
of odds, but a cable to President Wilson could not have
been effectual if Qough and his few divisions had permitted
themselves to be overwhelmed. Besides^ Belgium was still
enslaved, and we set out to rescue her without any thought
of help from the U.S JL.
President Wilson, too, has given his own account of the
wonderful way in which American troops were poured into
Europe:- ^ F» F-
"A year ago [1917] we had sent 145,918 men overseas.
Since then we have sent 1,950,513, an average of 162,542
each month, the number, in fact, rising in May last (1918) to
245,951, in June to 278,760. in July to 807,182, and
continuing to reach similar figures in August and September
—in August 289,570, and in September 257,438.
" No such movement of troops ever took place before across
3000 miles of sea^ followed oy adequate equipment and
supplies, and carried safely through extraordinary dangers
which were alike strange and infinitely difficult to guard
against In all this movement only 758 men were lost by
enemy attack, 630 of whom were upon a single English
transport^ which was sunk near the Orkney Islands.
" I need not tell you what lay at the back of this sreat
movement of men anJ material. ^It is not invidious to*^
that at the back of it lay a supporting organization of the
industries of the country and of all of its pn^luotive activities
more complete, more thorough in the method and effective in
result^ more spirited and unanimous in purpose and effort
than any other ^at belligerent had been able to effect/'
These speedies by President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd
George have been hidden as much as possible by propagandists.
After prolonged war it is never difficult to hide deep un-
pleasant matters from a single generation, for ordinary
* VoL ii., p. 386. Hklg impoin the historic ynljte of thiB teatimony by
putting the Fifth and Tedbd Abmibs on the same level towards the grafcitade
of the Entente Powers. He begins by saying : ** On the Slst Sfaroh the troops of
the FiFKR and Thibd Abmxbb had thec^ory of sustaining the first and heaviest
blow of the Oerman ofiensive. Though assailed by a oonoentcation of hostile
forces which the enemy might well have oonsidered overwhebnisg, etc, etc."
This implies that great odds were active against the Thibd Abict, whereas the
plain truth is that Byng's battle was a very prolonged Waterloo in which
Bvngwu weU-manned for a defensive grapple with contemporary weapons.
The FOFTR Abmt's ordeal was vastly heavier and more terrible.
SOME SIDE I8BUES AND POLITICAL EFFECTS 311
peraons hav* very little gnup on caiues and effects, even &om
the natural temper of their minds. They do not look at
Uiings aa part of a whole, and often will sacrifioe the most
important and precious parts of a great historic lesson, or
admonition, from mere simplicity and want of ^)prehension.
To them a battle is no more than a militwy stady of
fighting ; they pass over its many side issaes and its aftermath,
whose ultimate oonseqoenoes are often more important than
the battle's upe and downs.
CHAPTER VIII
WIDESPREAD INJUSTICE AKD THE PEOPLE'S EQUITY
§1
WHAT is the worst result of political or offioial
injustice ?
This phase of injustice forms widespread
myths as tenacious as quitch grass ; breeds in its
defence a party temper which, like fanaticism, seems unable
to tell the truth ; and its partisans try to keep a whole
nation in a false position overswept by cross-currents of
unrest. These are shabby, low-bred evils^ but yet we do
not find amons them the very woist.
Why is it uiat political injustice, after it has been accepted
as equity by a great many simple persons, is extremely bard
to reach by those who attack it with facts ? There are two
reasons, and when they are united they compose the very
worst evil bred by poutical unfairness. Mr. Lloyd Qeorge
found it easy to be fluent about the cries for help that he sent
across 8000 miles of sea to President Wilson, and could
speak calmly of the reserves which were sent to Haig after a
great crisis, long foreseen, had come ; but how many words of
gratitude did he offer in the same speech to the young troops
under Gough and Byng who enabled Ludendorff to mourn
over the miscarriage of great strategical aims ? No such
word appeared in Press reports of his eloquence. Is this to be
the perennial mood of mind bred and fostered by politics ?
No person can run counter to it without seeming to be an
advocate, for every statesman belongs to a party, and
advocacy is distrusted by those — and they are very numerous
— ^who hate and shun the work of "makmg up their minds."
Instead of deciding when to say Tes or No to a difficult
question, they compromise weakly and say : '* Well, there's no
smoke without fire, you know. In this case, perhaps, a good
lot might be said for and against both sides. Who knows —
312
INJUSTICE AND THE PEOPLE'S EQUITY 818
and who cares ? It's two years old and more. Good Lord I
Whv bother?"
No matter how impartial fiMst-giving opponents to political
injostioe may be, their attack is certain to have warmth in it,
since injustice ehovld be hated ; and this warmth is noted at
once by the astnte devotees of injustice, who say, in speech
and in print, ** Here's the advocacy of over-sealoos firiends ! "
Then there's another troublesome hindrance. A great
many persons who have accepted an injustice as a truthful
thing do not read published fiftcts by wmch it is shown up ;
so they continue innocently to support the injustice. A full
year alter the second Somme battle a man told me that the
Third Armt would never have lost a yard had it not been
''let down" by Gough and his troops. I asked this man,
whose voice was educated, to read Haig's dispatch and to
Sip the battle on correct maps through a few honest days,
e shrugged his shoulders, smiled at me with irony, and said :
^lyyou remember Lloyd Geoi^'s speech in Parliament?
When did he go away from its plain statements ? **
What national Justice needs is a court of inquiry which
would be evenly mir and thorough towards Byng, Gough,
O.H.Q., and the Government
§11
A French artist and scout, Paul M. Maae, wrote as follows
some weeks after the battle : —
'' General Gough's name alone was sufficient to rally men
falling asleep after eight days' fighting. . . . Some remnants
of some of his divisions still remain mixed up with the
French. They have been told to go back and retire 100
yards behind the front line. As soon as they hear the rattle
of the machine-guns, they come up again and line up with
the French. I could tell vou heaps of wonderful tales about
these men, and trust one day to have the opportunity of doing
sa • . • What trash has been uttered . • . and what useless
words in front of the work which remains to be done.**
Another soldier, writing to a Divisional Commander,
says: —
''I shall never forset the morning he [General Gouffh]
went away. I met and saw him and nad quite a lonff enat
with him idone. Then we all said good-bye to him, and gave
him a send-off with a guard of 200 signallers with the
Artillery School Band playing ' Auld Lang Syne.* I tell you
814 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MARCH, 1918
it was an effort to keep back one's tears that day ; for one
felt how one was losing not only a great friend, but also a
Conunander who knew how to command, and whom one
could have followed jnst anywhere."
It was at about 4.30 p.nL on Thursday, March 28, that
Gou^ handed his command to Bawiinson. Haig says : —
''The nature of the fighting on the southern portion of the
battle-front, where our troops had been engaged for a full
week with an almost overwhelming superiority of hostile
forces, had thrown an exceptional strain upon the Fifth
Abmt Commander and his Staff. In order to avoid the loss
of efficiency which a oontinuanoe of such a strain might have
entailed, I decided to avail myself of the sendees of the Staff
of the FoxTBTH Armt, which was at this time in reserve.
General Sir H. S. Rawlinson, Bt., who had but recently ^ven
up the command on appointment to Versailles, accordingly
returned to his old army, and at 4.30 p.m. on this day
assumed command of the British forces south of the Somme.
At the same time the construction of new defence lines made
necessary by the enemy's advance called for the appointment
of an able and experienced Commander and Stall to direct
this work and extemporize garrisons for their defence. I
accordingly ordered GenenS Gough to undertake this
important task.''
This explanation comes from the chivalry of a noble-
minded soldier; but chivalric explanation cannot dismiss
from public knowledge and talk several familiar facts ; aa^ for
example, that Sir Hubert Gough was not emjployed again in the
war, Decause he was suspended by the political party spirit.
Let us be glad that battle-maps, when true, are blunts
impartial historians to be trusted entirely. The terrific
power of the German attack in March, 1918, is revealed by
comparing the ground lost by two British armies ; one on a
forty-two miles front and perilously short of enough troops ;
and the other on a twenty-seven miles fronts with only
one division less in line and a much laxger reserve. Any
frank, impartial mind, after studying correct maps of the
retreat made by these armies, will be brought by the logic of
cause and effect to a simple argument.
''Both armies belong to 3ie same Empire and contain
divisions of the same mettle, but the Guards are with Byng,
and most of the British Empire reinforcements go to him
during the most critical days of the fighting. Both armies
fight with equal valour ; and since the much stronger army
INJUSTICE AND THE PEOPLE'S EQUITY S16
on the mueh narrower front is compelled by the foe's power
to retreat in five days from Flesqui^res salient almost to
Hamel-snr-Ancre and Thiepval, aboat 22 miles, how comes it
that the mncb weaker army on the moch wider front is not
swallowed up in these five days by the same German power ?
" In these five days» again, the deepest loss of groond on
the weaker army's front is aboat 25 mues, from the south-east
of Urvillers west to the east of Hattenoourt Is the German
attack more numerous and more strenuous in its onslani^t on
Byn^s troops ? No, it is at its strongest against the weaker
British forces. What^ then, saves these weaker forces from
being overwhelmed ? It is right and timely and much superior
generalship ? What else can it be f "
Nothing else is visible. Nothing else is probable. For in
a long battle against great odds right generalship is an
incessant reinforcement by which the linger aspects and
results are determined; rieht generalship in brigades,
divisions, corps and army orders. To this conclusion eyerv
impartial ana truthful mind must arrive after studying ail
evidence now known ; the best part of this evidence being
that which makes oonect battle-maps» not debatable opinions
and belie&. It needs neither excuses nor apologies ; m curt
and plain fiMsts it passes judgment while acting as a cold
witnesB.
Ludendorff and his verv able Generals won a great many
acres from Gough, but what large strategic aims did they
make real ? None ! They failed to make an operative break-
through at every place where annihilation of Gough's defence
was essential to their plan of campaign* Ludendorff says :
*' While in the defence the [QermanJ forces in a given sector
were more evenly distributed, in the attack the problem toos
to diacover wme deciaive wint and anrmge the diepositions
accorditigly *' (vol. ii., p. 573). Well, he chose Gough's front—
the centre battle, as he calls it — because " the weakest part
was on both sides of St Quentin," and he " was inflnenoed by
the time factor and by tactical considerations, first among
them being the weakness of the enemy " (voL iL, p. 690). But
yet» after choosing his decisive point for a vast offensive, ud
after finding th^ this known weak point in the British
defence had become weaker through the parching effects of
dry weather on the Gise and its marshes, as on the Somme,
Ludendorff discovered that his Carpentier attacks could be
baffled by the Jimmy Wilde defence of the Firra Abmt. No
Cset in British battles is more notable than this one, and I
816 THE FIFTH ABMY IN MABGH, 1918
dare to doubt whether there is one so notable^ an attaek of
more than three against one along forty-two miles of front
being unique^ particularly when we remember that the front
widened as the salient's arc grew ampler.
Only at one place did the foe's enormous efforts lead on in
swift sequence to another advance ; and this one place was
very much nearer to Byng's front than to Gough's — at
Armentik'es and in the Lys Valley, and thus in one of those
northern sectors which on March 21 were most strongly
defended because of their nearness to the coast.
Surely we have a right to know why Sir Hubert Gough,
with several of his Generals, was withdrawn from further
active service in the War ? Was it because a loss of ground
accompanied his invaluable work ? No. Byng also lost ground,
considerably more in depth per brigade of man-power than
Gough ; and his services were retained on the Western front —
justly retained, unless British Gtenerals are to be suspended
whenever they are obliged to bend in order to avoid
breaking.
It is easy for impartial students to see that the FlFTfi
Abict possessed a Commander who knew what his men
should be expected to achieve ; when and where they should
be able to stand, and where and when they must £bl11 back to
evade annihilation. Only a man endowed with imaginative
sympathy, as well as with rare self-control, could have seen
and felt from dav to day, swiftly and correctly, a convulsed
and threatened une always too wide and far too thinly
defended along all sectors. Every sector of his front was
a patient in a high fever; the Commander had to be to
it as a physician ; and if he had ordered things unfit for its
remaining strength, a few miles of suffering would have
broken for ever, and a column of German troops would have
been free to pass through.
Would an inferior General have seen with his imagination
the whole vddening battle-front^ with its remnant brigades
and divisions? I cannot believe so. He would have pT&>
scribed for patients whom his mind did not see, whose
physical and moral state he could not apprehend; would
have asked always for too much, arguing to himself that
G.H.Q. and all folk at home would certainly expect what he
did demand frx)m his men ; and thtis, by failing to be in full
sympathy with his troops in their limitless ordeal by battle,
he would have lost all by striving to get impossible results.
And there is another point of very great value. In
INJUSTICE AND THE PEOPLE'S EQUITY 817
modem war an Army Commander aits and thinks and gives
orders, but the execution of his ideas passes at onee from his
hands. On the battlefield he has interpreters, and if they
fiidl his ideas are lost, no matter how great they may b&
Now G.H.Q. could do but little for the Fifth Abmt after
supplying it with a burden of risks. Even two of the three
reserve infantry divisions were not on the FmH Abxt's
front when the battle began, so anxious was Haig about
fronts nearer the coast So Oough and his GenenUs and
their few divisions had to win through the worst days with
their own united promptness and apt endurance. Army
orders would have oeen futile if they had been misapplied
in the field. Gou^ and his Army were one, then,and would
be one in our gratitude.
Marlborough was ruined by the indecisive campaign of
1711, and in 1809 WeUington was all but ruined by the
retreat from Talavera; for the British people, despite their
fighting temperament, have little miUtuy intuition or
judgment, ana are apt to attach too much value to deceptive
phnses coined by political leaders. But in the long run
they are loyal to their men of action, and make ample amends
for past unfairness and ingratitude.
Finallv, the wrong &ne to the Firra Armt and its
Commanmr came wholly from politicians and their mis-
advisers. Hi^, of course, had nothing to do with the misdeed
that closed a nmous general's career in the War, while with-
holding from him the right of appealmg to a court-martial.
I note, too, that our CSommander-m-Chief in his final disnUch,
when reviewing what he owes to his most notable officers,
dwells with pnde on the varied and great services of Sir
Hubert Oougn : —
''I desire to associate with them fie. the five Army
Commanders at the dose of the War] the names of General
Sir Charles Monro, who left the command of the FiBST
Abmt to assume the Chief Command in India ; of General
Sir Edmund Allenby, who, after conducting the operations of
the TmRD Army in the battie of Arras, 1917, has since led
our arms to victory in Palestine; and General Sir Hubert
Goi^h, who, after distinguished service as a Brigade,
Divisional and Corps Commander, commanded the Iifth
Abut (first known as the Resbbvb Abmt) during the battles
of the Somme and Anere in 1916, east of Ypres m 1917, and
finalljr in the great and gallant &;ht of Maittn, 1918, the story
of which is freah in the minds ofalL^
INDEX
▲namxa, 61, 994
AUftlnMTalto, 191, 197. 974
AolMviU0,197
AiniMn, BriiUh, 90-98, 74, 998
AlniiMi, OsniiMi, 91, 93,74, 104, 119,
168, 907, 910
AliplftM ooDted Mtroli, 91, 906
AiMOoart, 174, 188
•• Albtfioh lCoTom«it,*' 11
Albert, 104, 187, 188, 191, 198
AlberVBnj Una, 966 «< mo.
Allenby, OenenU Sir Eamand, 86,
817
AIUm dapendaot on AmerioMi i«-
InloroemMito, 801, 809, 810
AUM kMMi hmwiM than ih« Qtf-
man, 806
Amarioa. Ste United 8to(«
Amerion aid, Mr. Lloyd G«orgo
oriM out for, 9^, 990, 309
Amarioan engineeti, 98
AmjH^n^n troops, 806, 809, 810
ArniMM, 74, 98, 94, 119, 115, 116, 121,
199, 181, 184, 136, 187, 189, 196,
" At aU eofto," 179, 178, 994, 946
Atliie8,109
Atlftok on AriM, 195 ti 9§q,
AUilly, 79
Anberaoort, 188, 184
Anbigny, 84
Anbin, Oaptain J. F. G., lU
Anstnlian deleneai, 18
AiutraUan troops, 86, 101, 188, 141,
187,966
Aastria-Hongary, 48
Auftrlan vtUlfiry, 46
AadliaiT trooft, Qermnn, 66, 190
Avalny wood, 978
Atk bridgttfaMd, 96, 95
Atto BiT«r, 184, 918, 986
Ayatta, 974
B Battxbt, the etory of, 906, 904
Balnbridge, Sir B. G. T., 160
BMunoft, Ueut., 168
BapannM-ArcM, battle of, 186
Bapaome, 69, 68, 186, 188, 149, 161,
189,188
Bapanme-Cambrai road, 150, 168,
160
Baraetre, 980
Barlda, 86, 50, 96, 988
Barlenx, U8, 116, 116, U7, 118, 910,
919
Baeeett, Umt., 69
Baeneox, 187. 918
Battle of Pioardy, Fraoob nama lor
Hutler'i atlaok, 80
Battle sona, the, 11, 19, 146, 178
BatUee, nodeni, their foor parti or
periode, 8, 4
176, 188, 199, 196, 908, 911, 998» j Battlee,]nodam,betweenfUriy eqwU
foroet, 196, 810
Ancre Biver, 116,. 187, 190, 191, 198
Anore line In peril north-weet of
Albert, 187, 191, 198, 967>971
Anrtey, Oolooel, 191
Armentiteee, 196. 999, 816
Armv GomniaBdecs no longer ejre-
witneiMe, 8
Army Serrice Com, 996
Arrae, 148, 146, 1& it sm., 198, 918
Art of retreating, 19, 90, 84. 89, 90.
189,140
Artillery, 78, 95, 106, 108, 109, 119,
117, 194, 181, 144, 168, 168, 174,
Artillery prooedore. Hew German, i BayonTlllen, 181
66,67 I Baaentln, 188, 186, 199
ArriUere, 986 Beale-Biowne's oolnmn, 971
A«|alth. Mr. H. H.. 990, 993 , Bea4WDdUM on potttka, 997
AMavUlem. 119, 118, 116, 117, 190, Beauootirt^nr-Anere, 190
919 . Beauooort, near Medina, 988
319
820
INDEX
BMOtei^M
BaraBmi, 990, 966
Be«im0te, 148, ISO, 159, 160, 179
Beamnoiii-Haaiel, 191
Beaavoii, 98, 950
m co uft , 971
B6et«a0K fMtoriM, 194, 166, 178
BflMiim*0 OKpftMtj, 810
Bell; Gftpti^, 197
BelHngham, Bri^dier, 196
Below, Otto Ton, Gonmuuider of the
BmvmKTMMWTB Obbmav Abmt, 6,
40, 186, 149, 148, 146, 187, 196, 196,
198,974
Below Mxd Manriti, ihdr joint
atteokB, 148-168, 169-167, 168>198
Ben* J, 74, 78. 96
Bennett, Major Herbert, ^Foorth
Oxford and Book's Ugbt Infontiy,
941
Bemafaj Wood, 188, 191, 199
Bemet, 88, 161, 170
Bethenooort, 111, 984
Bererler, Oaptein, 169, 996, 998
Bevlfla,]ileat., 168
Biaoliee, 101, 119, U8, 910
Bihnoonrt, 190
Bilton, Oolonel, 986
Birdwood, Ooneral Sir W. B., 196
Blaok Watoh, 144, 184
Bl6oher, 981, 289
Boelm, General Yon, SBYmnee Gbb-
Mijr Abmt, 40, 48, 64, 99, 96, 97
Boie dee Beearti, 916
Bois FMtoe, 191, 199
Bois de Mareoil, 918
Boif St. Pierre Yaasi, 188, 178, 181
Bois des Vanx, 188
Bolsherlim in Gorman Arm j, 49
Bombardnwmt^ a terrible, opians the
battle on ICaroh 91, 1918...64-^
Bonar Law, 998, 994, 807
Boraston, Lient-Colonal J. EL, Haig's
private secretary, 186
Borderlands norui and south of
Byng's Army, 136-146, 146-168,
169-167, 176-198
Borderlands north and south of
Vermand-Amiens road, 100-190,
191-186
Borrett, Brindier, 117, 188
Bosanqnet, Captain, 119
BoQchayesnes, 188, 176, 178, 180
Booohoir, 986, 987, 986, 986
BoooIt, 109, 107, 161
Bonndflury uniting Gongh and Byng,
186, 187, 188, 140, 141, 149, Itt,
169, 176, 178, 179, 180, 182, 184,
186,198
BouffeVf 197
Boyd, B.G.G.& of 6th Corps, 179
B(^eDes,191
Bray-Albert line, 966 ei $m,
Bcay-sor-Somme, 114, 118, 186, 187,
138,184,191,960
Braaoh of Byng's eentre, 186, 187,
188, 189, 190, 196
B ra aoh of Groan line, Nobeaooort
Aon, 164, 168, 170
Breaking an old military rule, 976,
978,988
Brmdl, 984, 989
Bridgsheads, 84
Brid^ destruotUm of, 17, 18, 84,
89, 109, 110, 171, 986, 994
Biio, 84, 100, 109, 109, 119, 116, 948
Brigade-Major's adventure, 909, 910
Brigide of Seamd DtnaiOH truis-
ferred for a while to the Nmih,
166, 167 ; it retreats without orders,
178, 179, 180
Brigsde Staff at Harbonnltees»
episode of, 197-199
Brigades, British, deprivad of one
battalion apieoe, 76
Briquoterie, 199
Britain's pre-war self-neo^leot, its
horrible results, 909, 906
British Army in Franoe, March 91,
its total strength, 88, 84, 279, 801
British boundaries. Corps and
Divisional, their unfortunate slope
south-west, 109
British oombatlveness, 906, 907
British Corps, those in the Fzvih
Abxt. S€$ the Order of Battle
British Mercantile Marine, 809
British feeling s^pdnst retreats. 89, 90
Bbftzsh Fibst Abmt, 86, 196
British Gkyvemment, its aUitude to
Haig's dispatoh, 6
British guns fire on British troops,
118, 994, 984
British losses omitted from official
reports and dispatches, 169, 964
British officers, their chatty candour,
910
Brouchy, 84
Brown, Lieut., 197
Brown Line Defence System, 146,
160, 169, 162, 164, 166
Bmchmftller, Colonel, famous artil-
lery expert, 64
Buohan, John, Lieut.-Colonel, 146,
169, 182, 227
Bncquoy, 187, 190, 191, 968, 970, 974
Buire, 102, 970, 271
Bulgaria haranses Ludendorll, 49
INDEX
321
Bailor Oftpteio, 164
Bort*8 Foroe, il7
BuaUU, Ooloiul, 851
BaHa«174
Batter, Lieiii.-G«Deral Sir a H. K.,
OomiiMndar of 8rd Oorn, iliftllMid
80,000 jMdfl of Tim front on
Ooogh's right, 6. 19, 60, 74, 76, 80,
81, 01, 118^ 914, 976, 988
Byng, the ttrsngth of hlM Army,
6, 6, 84, 86, 108, 104; his rotre«t
to the Anore, 116, 118; reoelTee
troope from the Firb Abmt, 86,
199, 187, 968-966 ; tappraerion of
feete in Byng's bettie, 6, 186, 187,
966-974 ; hli right wing's drema,
187. 188, 189, 140, 141, 144, 166,
166, 174, 176, 177, 189, 184, 166,
186, 198 ; emploTi 81 dHkione on
the first dfty, 147 ; his bftttle sone
Ininded, 147, 148 ; Heig's eoooont
of Byng's first dfty, 148, 149 ; }dM
seoood dey, 160-161 ; nisled bj a
oonjeotnre, 166. 167; oannot be
grstefol enonsh to the South
Afrioftn Brigeoe,! 189; oentre of
his Armj broken, 188, 187, 190,
191,198; his 6th Corps reinfoned
bj QoQgh's northern troops, 186,
198, 968-966; his ordeel e pro-
longed WMerloo, 196; his greet
defsnoe of Ams, 196 §i sea. ; his
traaUes, 958-966
Ojhab, JqUqs, 190
Oehin of the Seoond Mnnsten,
907
Ceiz, 116, 199, 180, 189, 986, 987
Cembr»i, 91, 189
OempbeU, BCeJor-Qeneml D. Q. M.,
<vifnmending tlie TwmUy-fini D.,
148, 168, 164, 167, 161, 185
^^nm^Uw betteriiM, 90
OmedisB oe^rairy, 918
Oenedisn rsilwmy englneefs, 119
Genel da Kord, 188, 147, 174, 176,
180
Cettdor,905
Oennj-sor-Uete, 91
Gerey's Force, so celled, 119, 193,
186
Oemoy,971
Cerpen Oopss, 101, 167, 161
Oerter . OempbeU, M^or > Qenerel
O. T. 0., oomtnendhig the Fifty^
fini D., TmBD Abmt, 148
Owti(py,108
OMtd7918
Oesueltiss, British end Oermeo, 81,
68, 86, 86, 88, 91, 96, 101, 109, 106,
160, 164, 160, 179, 178, 176, 189,
194, 909, 907, 911, 990t 998, 964,
965,976,804
Oetelat Velley, 907
Oelor, Hejor-Qensrel A. B. B.,
Oowmender of the Fiftv^hih
D., on Ooogh's estrsoie ri|^t, 85
Oenlelnooart, 88, 96, 109, 104, 105,
106, 108, 100, 170
Oevmlry, British, 199, 918, 914-991,
805
Oevelry, Oenedien, 918
Qmylrj cesoelties, 217, 916
Oevehry, Qeimen, 40, 984
Oevelry in modem wer, veiue of, 91d,
914-991
Oeyenx,180
Oentre fighting, the, 100-190, 191-
186
0^^ crisis, 116. 191, 199, 196, 180.
Ohempegne, 66, 99
Ohendler of the Second Monsters,
907
Ohenndports, 86, 87, 196
Ohepel mu, 145, 149, 158, 154, 157
Ohealnes, 99, 115
Cheony, 50, 85, 98, 97
Ohemln das Demes, Fdch's defeet,
(Aevelier dn TUl, 18
Ohipilly, 89, 199
Ghrlstien, Oolco^ of the South
Atricen Brigade, 164, 994
ClMwioe Bher, M
OleBties,76
demaooaeo, 9, 994
OI4ry-sor-Somme, 180, 184, 185, 980
Oochren, Msjor. 996. 998
Oolbome at Weterloo, 989
Oolinoempe, 187, 198, 968, 970
OoUesy, cftvalry et, 990, 991
OollieEs,thair unrest in Kerch, 1918...
Oolcgne Blver. 100, 101, 186. 148,
1607169, 164, 161, 170
Ooohiess end competence shown by
Oough's Stefl, 909, 908
Oooper, lieut., 996, 981
OombetiYeoMS, British, 906, 907
Oombe, Oeptein B. P., M.O.. et Le
Qossaoy, 94
Oombles, 149, 180, 181, 189, 184, 980
OompiAgne, 60, 88, 98. 97
Gonlmnce et Oelelet, Ooogh's, 96-98
fUm ff ag— ift* fti Doollans. on Merfth 96.
IS...969, 966, 970, tn
Y
822
INDEX
GonfeMttoeat Hombnrg, Liid«iidorff*B,
44,45
Ooofosion oatued by the misoBe of
Frenoh reinforeements, 99, 276-
S88
OoDgreTe, Sir W. N., Y.G., «lc.,
Oommander of tlie 7ih Cksps, 6,
100, 114, 118, 1SI2, 188, 187, 188,
145, 150, 15S, 161, 164, 165, 166,
170, 184, 189, 190, 191, 198, 194,
195, 224, 260
OoDMientioiis Oiqecton, 205
Oonaoription, 205, 805, 808
Gonta, ueneral von, 51
Contact atralanea, Gennan, 21, 206
Gontescourt, 65, 79, 149
GontestB of mind, 88-89, 40-45
Gook, Lieat.-Golonel, 215
GorUa, 122, 128, 194
Gouoy la YUle, 97
Oonper, Major-G^eneral Sir Viotor
Goamr, Gommander of the FoMr-
toen&D.,76. See also under JVmr-
teenthDvnssxm
Gonioalette, 190
Gooroellee, 102
Gieeey, 285, 286, 240, 242
Groft, Brigadier-General, of the Ninth
D., 144
CroisiUee, 58, 148, 160
Gnriz M<dignenx, 171
GrooBley, Sergeant, his biaTery, 88
Grottt Oanal, 76, 81, 88, 84, 85, 96,
97,178
Gogny, 220, 221
GmnmingB, Brigadier-Qeneral, 188
Onnnfagnam, lieat., at Bnghien, 72,
78
Gnrln, 191
Dalt, Mejor-General A. 0., Gom-
mander of the TweTUy'fimrth
D., 19th Gorps, 100, 102, 104, 122,
181, 156, 161, 171
Darling, Gaptain, 278
Dawson, F. 8., Brigadier-General,
Oopnmander of the South African
Brigade in our NnUh Dxvibzon,
28, 144, 158, 161, 162. 168, 176,
177, 180, 181, 222-281
Dawson's Five Hundred, 222-281
Deceptive official figures, 279, 801
Decisive test of a war policy, 809
Defence in depth, its defects, 18, 14,
16
Defences of the Firb Abut, chap, ii.,
Part I., 10-24
Demiconrt, 52, 148
Demuin, 98, 112, 188, 184
Denmark, 805, 806
Demanoourt, 267, 270
Dessart Wood, 189, 158
" Details," 176, 177, 178
Details, ezoessive, S^ 82
Deverell, G. J., Major-General, 148
Devonshires of the Sigkih Dxvxuxm,
128
Dewar, George A. B., 804, 806
Difierenoe between ration strength
and combatant strength, 800, 801
Difierent fighting temperaia«Eits and
methods, 280
Difficulties of an army in retreat, 19,
20,89,90
Difficulties in writing on modernised
war, 8-7
Dimmer, Golonel, V.G., dies in
action, 74, 129
Dispatch rider, 162
Disunity in 5th Gorps, Byag's Army,
188, 184, 189, 190
Dives, 216
Divisional cavalry, 180, 214
Doignies, 148, 150
Doingt, 102, 174
Domart, 188
Douglas Smith, Major-Oeneral of tike
Twentieth DivmoR, 114, 181, 184
Doullens, 218, 259, 265, 270, 277
Doullens, a momentous conlsronoe
at, March 26, 1918...260, 265, 970,
277
Drama of British poUtics, 806, 807
Drama of Byng's right wing, 187,
188, 189, 140, 141, 144, 165, 166,
174, 175, 177, 182, 184, 185, 106,
189, 191. 192, 198
Dregs in the defence, 212, 218, 264
Drnmmond, Gaptain, 112
Dry weather, ite bad effects, 11, S5,
26, 86, 246, 815
Dublin Bedoubt, 78
Dudbridge of the Sixt^^firH D., 286,
240
Dugan's Brigade, 166
Dunkirk, 65
Durham Light Infantry, 102, 106,
107, 108, 110, 118
Bauooubt L*Abbatx, 188, 220, 221
Economy of Force, 14
Ecoust St. Mein, 148, 150
Eighth Black Watch, 144, 184
Eighth DxvmoH, under Heneker, 89,
HI, 114, 116, 124, 128, 129, 168,
187,284
Eighth Durham Light Infantry, 106,
126
INDEX
Kidhlh King's BojAl BIflt Corp*.
Bgktfa BUto Brigidt, f6
Bigblh Boyal Wert Sorrajri, 166
U^lemth Oocpt. Sw undmr Mmdw,
and tlM WtrtB Abmy's Ordm of
BftMto
gfaJblMii< lt DiTUios, 18, 40l T6, 78,
Ul, 814, 861, 888
Ktomtb Boyml Seoto, 144, ISI, 168,
BMob, Ijf«at..Gol<md, dlwgloctoqsly,
78,189
BDto Bedoabi, 70
jRim^ m^in^ 109
Biu^iImi Badoabt, defMiod of, 69, 70
B^^, 140, 180, 154, 107, 161, 196,
KpiDMiooiirt, 114, 116
BpiiM da DftUoii Badoabt, 78
l^liM da Ualaaalaa, 176
EplnaHa Wood, 168, 107, 176
BppaviUa,87
Eqaaneoori, 189, 168, 166, 174, 179
BrtUlart, 148, 188
BHlgny, 69, 74, 76, 96, 148, 160, 160
BsMm, lis, U7, 119, 818
Ktaipigiij, 810
Ktinahain, 871
Btrioonri, 164, 176, 178
Brolallon of waapom, 180
BTohanga of tfooM baiwaan HoUar
andlUrwItB, 94
Biparianaai of a Oafilrj Oommandar,
ai6«laie«
Bzoalla BiTar, 168
Faltt, 84, 89, 110
mMBpoa vUlaga, 160
Fkiuhawa, Uaal.-Oanana Sir £. A.,
Oonmandaf of 64b Cofpa, Ibt
aoolbam Com of Btoc'i Azny,
166, 166, 176, 198
VHKDkn, 76, 79, 96
Aivbra Wood, 191, 199
FWyalb 68, 69
iMlham, KaJor-OaDacal B., 101, U8,
U6, 181, 188, 168, 161
^ifttmik Dnrnxov, 148, 196
Fihaaolh ObaaUiaa, 184, 834
ratatttb MoMi and Darblai, 184, 894
mflitik DmaxHi, 86,76,86, 100, 108,
108, 106, lOr, 108, 181, 188, 184,
170, 810,*849
FIVTB Aaanr. Am oadar Qoogb
FUlb OaaMWiM, 144, 164, 188
Flftb Goipa, Byng'i Amy, 187-141,
164, 166, 167, 174, 176, 179, 180,
188, 186| 180, 190
Flftb Bordaion, 188
> Flftb Dorbam Ugbt Infantrr, 109,
106, 107, 106, ulTlSi, 170, 810
; Flftb OloQocatan, 884, 986, 986
Piftb Oordona, 70
Flftb Nortbumbarbuid Foiilian, 104,
106» 109, 110, 111, 116, 117, 180,
186,189
Fiflif^hih Divuiim, 86, 888
Fiflif'fint DiTiaiOH, 146, 148, 160
Fifty-miUh Dmaioii, 146, 148
Ftf^-neUh Dnrnioii, 197
[ Fugbttng tamparamant, 806, 807, 808,
• Final dinatcb, Haig'a, 817
I Final rally of a troa figbtlog tamper,
861
Fiam 188, 164, 107, 176, 178
Flxst Battle of tba Mama, ovar-
oonfidenoa produaad by It, 44
I FirU OAYAXMt Dinaxait, 115, 180,
I 181, 150, 188, 186, 186, 190, 199,
316, 817, 871
Fint Boyal Innlakillliig FniUlaia, 78
FUune ptojeotora, 45
FU^-la-Hartal, 78
j Fleeanlteea Mdlent, 84, 51, 68, 58,
186, 189, 140, 148, 146, 147, 148,
I 150, 157, 158, 159, 161, 166, 174,
• 179
Flowardaw's Squadron, 318, 319
Foob, Fleld-Manbal, ralnforoee tba
Moyon-Uontdldlar Una, 97; at
Donllana, 370; mointad to tba
SoDMine OoBunend. mq : n«ifci> in
blm, 391; beglni bis ralgn witb
daleatB,998
Fog and tba battle, 56^60, 88, 96,
101, 104, Ul, 138, 147, 168, 156.
167, 150, 181. 185, 807, 338
FoUee VUlaga, 886
! Fontalna-lat-aara Kedoobt, 78, 80
I Fteitalna-lea-Croialllee, 148
I Foiarigbt In war, 35, 36, 87
, #MMlbI>iyi8n»,Byng*a Army, 146,
: 148
Fort^^/irU Dintioii, Byng*a Army,
104,148
Jbri p ijcowd Dnnaiov, Byng'e Army,
86,197
Foriif- mv mUk Diynioa, Byng*i
Army, 146, 147. 146, 166, 166. IffT,
174, 175, 176, 179, 180, 880
Forward aooa. tbe, 11, 18, 145, 178
FotbetglU, of tbe SM^fini D^ 885
FMoauooort, 104. 118, 119, 180
824
INDEX
Fouohos, 265
Fourmies-Ohimay, 95
FourteetUh DiviaioH, 76, 131, 184
Four Windia Farm, 175
Fourth AuBtraliaDB, 85, 187, 197, 368,
274
Fourth Oorps, Thzbd Abmt, 168, 186,
169,190
Fourth DiYiszoK, 197
Fourth North Staffords, 191
Fourth Northumherland Fusiliers,
104, 109, 117, 121, 128, 129
Fourth Yorks, 106, 107
FcamerviUe, 120, 121, 122, 128
Framerville Ohurch, incident at, 121
Franks, Major-Gkneral G. MoK.,
oommanding the Thirty-fifth D.,
169, 184, 189, 191, 192, 270, 271,
272
French attempt to reooyer a span of
Orosat Oanal, 251
French Divisions, 276, 284, 285, 286
French reinforcements, 80, 98, 99,
114, 185, 168, 187, 258
French study of Hutier's attack, 88,
95
French Thibd Abmt, 246
Fresnoy Bedoubt, 70, 98, 197
FrMUers, 104
Ftevent, 277
Frioourt,192
Frise, 118
Frontajras, safe and unsafe, 108
Fjrfe, Haxnilton, war correspondent,
5, 16, 246, 295, 296
G.H.Q., attitude towards youthful-
ness, 14 ; towards defences, 11-17,
178 ; towards the foe's airmen, 28 ;
towards the Oise front, 25, 26;
invites criticism by a series of
aripments, 87>^9, 262 ; perplexing
in its views on risks, 87. 88, 89, 299,
800, 809; and on the German
intentions, 52; moves divisions
from corps to corps, 25; keeps
support divisions too far from the
batue front, 100, 108 ; nebulous in
all that concerns the boundary
troubles between Byng and Gknigh,
187, 188 ; accepts faulty information
concerning Byng's right and
Gongh's left, 141, 166, 177; the
drama of Flesquiires salient, 84,
51, 62, 58, 186, 189, 140, 142, 146,
147, 148, 150, 167, 168, 169, 161,
166, 174, 179; passes over British
losses, impairing its accounts of
battles, 159,258,264; 8omeG.H.Q.
instructions, 171, 246 ; seems to
undervalue the South African
bravery, 182, 229 ; attitude towards
mounted troops, 185, 214, 215;
passes over the loss of Bapaume,
256; reinforcing Byng with
Gough's northern troops, 258-265 ;
the official use of relxiforcementB,
88, 89, 48, 268, 264, 265, 276; the
retreat to and from the Bray-
Albert line, 266; trsdning pro-
blems, 801, 802
Gallwits, General von, 47, 60
Garnet Green, Oaptidn, 152, 163, 164
Gas attacks, 68, 101, 158
(Gauche Wood, 145, 152, 158
Gavrelle, 196, 197
Gayl, General von, 49, 50, 76, 85, 87,
& 97 148
GeU,' lieut-Oolonel E. A., 124, 128,
195
Genin Well Oopse, 154
German artillery, Ludendorff*s re-
marks on, 46, 46
German barrage, Ludendorfi speaks
of it, 68
German cavalry, 40, 284
German crimes and Allied blunders,
807
German divisions, 49, 61, 78, 87,
92,94,197. See also the laztte map
of the approximate Order of cattle,
British amd German
German gas attack, 67
German initiative, 209
(German message dogs, 207
German newspapers on the battle
296,297
German patrols, enterprise of, 909,
210
German reinforcements from Russia,
etc., 84; on Gough's front, 40
German shells and British redoubts,
68-61
German tanks, 79
German traixdng, its main cliar-
acteristios, 46, 46, 58
Germans in Allied uniforms behind
our lines, 282
Germany's wonderful resistance, 43
Ginohy, 184
Givenchy, 189
Glorious young lives thrown away,
806,806
G.0.0. of the Ninth D. makes an
urgent visit of warning to 5th
Corps, Third Asm, 176, 176
Gblancourt, 220, 221
Gkrringe, Major-GenenJ Sir G. F.,
INDEX
825
oanwniin<ting Um Fdrt^^mvenik D.,
Thzbd Abmt, 148, 146, 166, 166
Oongh, OmmmI Sir Habait da la
Poer, his need of man, 4, 88, 88,
61 ; ioma oauaes of ihli naad, 86,
87; naw front, 10, 11; hit de*
fandva tjilama, 11 «< tM . ; how ho
alloltad his troopi, 1^; ftmtelU
iha aim of LadanaorlTa attack, 96,
S7; hia manifaaloat, 99-88; his
frontage and diilsions, 86; his
ramarks on the fog, MMX); his
action at tha close of first day,
79-60, 88 ; his withdrawal from th«
P4fonna hrldgshaad, 91, 171, 179,
946-967; his ganaralship snooaads,
98, 96, 96, 97, 96, 99, 168, 168, 160,
186, 968, 960, 999, 816; an appeal
to GAQ., 100; his centra in
peril, 108; ha hears aU the risks,
104, 999, 800; raises Carer's Fbroe,
so called, 119; losee Oongrere's
troops transfened to Byng, 114,
116, 956-W6; his left nnoorered,
118 ; the 04risy episode, 116, 191,
199, 196, 180, 966-974; eefler to
gi^e a counter hlow, 181; nUsety
accused of " letting down " Byng^
right, 141; his left sends argent
warnings to Byng's right, 141, 176,
176; pressure against his northern
corps, 169 H ssg., 166, 166; hears
of the breach of Oreen Line in
Watts's defence, 164; accused of
nnnfaig his Army too much, 179 ;
was his retreat too slow rather
than too iMt? 179-178; his Staff,
909, 908 ; some men behaved badlj,
919, 918, 964; on cavalry, 914,
916; what he bed to weigh and
meesure, 964, 966: pdUtical inter,
feience puts Qough and his troops
under theccden of French offioers,
whoee divisions are gunless, 989 ;
suffers firom the cffidal bedtancr
In the use of ralnloroements, 976,
977, 978 ; stops agap which French
ocdess would have opened, 968;
aa arrangement with Oendral
BobOot, 984. 986; incident d the
guns, 986; the Fivtb Abmt ^ins
time for thelmportatlon of American
troope, 810 ; Oough suspended, and
Rawlinson assumss command
south of the Sonmie, 818, 814;
unity of splendid elmt fai the
Fvn AaMT. 816, 817; Hairs
recognition and giaMnl thanks In
bta Cat di<ipatah, 817
Oouasaueoart, 84, 69, 187, 188, 146,
167,169
Qovemment*s propagandist figures of
Haig's fighting strength, 979, 801
Government Press, SI97
Governments of France and Britain
put Fbch in supreme control,
989L.999
Grant, M^or-Genaral P. G., 119
Gray of the 9/Fifth Gloncesters, 940
Greenland Hill, 196
Green Line System of Defence, 76,
88, 96, 109, 108, 106, 107, 161, 169,
164, 166, 166, 170, 174, 176, 179
Grtfvillers, 188, 190
GuABoa Divmov, 144, 148, 197
Guerbigny, 986
Guillancourt, 199. 180, 189, 188, 986
Guillemont, 187
Gunlees French troope, 168, 976
Guyenoourt, 169
Hadlow, Lieut., 168
Hsig, very short of men, 4, 88 si seg.,
88; on German airplanes, 74; on
reducing the fighting strength of
brigades, 76; his character in
battle, 96 ; on the podtion south
of the Somme, 114; his Dispatch
fails to give the complete boundary
uniting Gough and Byng, 186,187 ;
on Bvng's first day, 148, 149; on
Byng's second day, 169; remarks
on the South African defence,
189; on the Ices of Oombles,
Morval, and LesboBub, 188; on
Franks*s fine defence, March 96,
189; on the breach of Byng's
centre, and the gape in Byng's
southern oorpe, 187, 190, 191, 198,
968, 970, 974; on the many ra>
Inforoemente sent to Byng, 198;
on the menace to the Anere line,
198; on the attack against Anas,
196, 197: on cavalr/, 918-914;
Implies that be would not have
rettred from the P4ionne bridge-
head, 961, 969 ; onlaekof tialnlng,
966; peesee over the loss of
Bapanme, 966 ; the official use of
reinforcements, 88, 89, 48, 968,
964,966,976; too vague in maHert
affeetlng Fiftb Abmt movements,
964, 966; on fall of Albert, 978;
anangsmente with P4tain, 48, 976,
978; on his diiBcultles, 998, 999.
801, 809; the appccilomnsBt of
risks, 87, 88, 89, 999, 900; on
826
INDEX
Gough's saspeoBioii, 814 ; hia pniae
of Sir Hubert Qongh, 817
Hftdow's foroe, 184, 186, 370
Ham, 84, 87, lU
Hamdl, 95, 122, 815
Hanooort, 91, 108, 170
Hangud, 95, 101, 115, 138, 134, 288
Hangefit, 236
Harbonnitees, 101, 119, 128, 126,
127-129, 180
Hardeooort, 185, 192
Hargioonrt, 101, 128, 172,178
Harm done by magnifying tbe
British Empire foroee, 279, 801
Harman, lia]or-Geii«ral, A. E. W.,
oommandixig ThM Cavalbt D.,
215, 216,^0
Harper, Iietit.-Q6naral, Sir Q. M.,
commanding 4th Corps, Thibd
Abmt, 198
Harvey, Colonel, 112
Hattenooort, 118, 815
Hanteloque, 277
Have inmntey bad their day? 218
Havrinoourt, 140, 147, 157, 158
Havrincourt Wood, 161
Haybittel, Captain, his valour, 78
Hasebroack, 189
Headlam, Brigadier, 271
Heal, Liettt.-Colonel, 224, 227
Herb4ooiirt, 118, 117, 256
H4bQteme, 187, 268, 270
Hem, 184, 189, 191
Hem Spur, 180, 191, 224
Heneker. Major-Oenenl W. Q. O.,
Bighth Divibion, 112, 114, 116,
121, 134
Henin, 160
Herly, 289
Hermles, 147, 157, 159, 161, 179
Heroic Ifaien-draper, 281
HervUly, 101, 161, 170
Hervilly Wood, 216, 217
Heseler, Captain J. K. M., 107
Hendeoonrt, 162, 168
HigUand Ridge, 51, 189, 157, 165
mghland Bri^ide, Ninik D., 142,
144, 158, 168, 164, 166, 175, 176,
178, 181, 188, 184, 224
High Wood, 188
Hill, Father, of the S^. Brigade,
281
HIU 109... 120
ma Redonbt, 74
Hinaoonrt, 76
HIndenbezg Line, 51, 189, 157, 166
Holnon, 69, 70, 72, 149, 170
Hohion Wood, 74, 249
Home, General Sir H. S., eom-
manding the Fibit Am, bom
Oavrelle northward, 85, 196
Hours of Marwiti*8 most deadly
thrust, 181, 182, 184, 187, 198,
221-281
Howoavalrv should withdraw, 216
How the German maohlue wortad,
209,210
Howitt, Captain, 285, 241
Hull, ICajor-GenoEal Sir C. P. A.,
143, 150, 154, 161
Humbert, G4n4ral, 286
Hunter's Brigade, 5t0<SMiaB<Jb D.,
127,188
Hunt's Foroe, 185, 186
Hurlbatt, Lieut. . Colonel, dies
gloriottslv, 124, 129
Hutier, O^dur von, commanding
EiOBXUBHiH Gmbkab Abmt, 6,
27, 28, 40, 48, 49, 51, 54, 94, 97, 184,
169, 282, 284, 287, 288
Hutier'B attack, 68-61, 88-99; ate
275-288
laHAUGOUBiT, 180
Indian labour, 17
Indian troops, 86
Injustioe to the Fivtb Abmt, 4, 5,
186, 150, 166, 354, 258-265, 995,
296, 810, 812-^17
Injufltioe, Political, and the People'e
Equity, 812-817
Interchanges of help between under-
manned units, 142
Ireland, Colonel, of the Second
Munsters, 207
Irles, 190
jAOxaoH, Major-Genexal H. C,
FifMh D., 112, 118, 121, 124, 182
JeSbtys^ ICajor-Genecal G. D., of
the Nimtemih D., 148
Joiire, 805
Joint attacks by Harwlttaad Below,
146-158, 159-167, 168-178, 174-196
Juasy, 76, 85, 87, 92
Kazbbb on the British NiiUh D., 188
Keith, Sergeant-Major, 226
TTpimTMA Hill, 196, 292
Kennedy, Brigadier, of the Ninih D.,
144, 158
Kidd, Lieut, of the Second Munsteie,
207
King, of the Second Munsters, 907
Kingfaam's scratch battalion at
Harbonni^ree, 128, 194, 126, 188
Knos, Second Lieut., his toivery,
89
INDEX >27
XjkBOHiMOMMUH^O I LlbanMmlOual,U4,SM«»6
La Ohftpdtolto, 164, 174 i Lioourt, llff » 116, S46
Lftboof Oorpt oa lh« Fxvtb Ammw*% \ UAnynoDi, 166
fnml, 17 I lias, 66
Lm«7 ThomptoD, OftpUin, 111, 169 ! Llgny-TUUoy, 168
LMk of takiDing, 601, 806. te ■!«> ! l2oDi, 160, 167
imdir Tteaning tj»mw%i« Afanlna, 69, 960
lADHMiy, 96 = LfaMobn troops, 157
lA F4ro, 66, 65, 97 Uttio, OolooaL of Iho Fifth Bocdor.
Uonlooiiri, 146 on, SitBtf-wktih D. , 196, 188, 184
Lftk^of Iho M:l|^4r9l D., 664 Llillo't tonloh telteliop. 198, 194,
lA lUiooDofcto, 117 196, 196, 198, 199, 186
LonlMj Wood, 78 LliaroIlM, 76
Lunin Turn, 117 rjoyd, Oolooal, 101
lAmoMo, 116, 169, 196k 160^ 181, 194, Uoyd Oooigo, onihoBrHiili dofonoat,
687 Iff ; pio-bolUa fftUnio of hli OoaU-
LaaoMhin Tnnoh, 168 tlon, 84, 88 ; and OuoT't foioo, 119 ;
iMOMUra Iraopo, 117,168, 164. 196, . bis ipaooh si Leod% 979, 960. 806,
bolwon Ibo lUl of Aaaolth and
Mareh, 1916...996; Us daj^oraUa
146 809, 818; his prasant rspaiat
LaanafoislB, 969, 986, 669 ' 990; failuia of his OoaUtloii
Tisasimy, 91, 99
UaTdftTi ol Noflhan fl6btiBC, 166- |
196 spsach in iha Honsa of OomflKms,
Laslslaadof Dawson'sFlvaHiiadfad, 906; his Baslaniisin, 807, 806; his
161, 169 orj for halp to Prasidflnt Wilson,
Lamon, Oolonal A. B., 984, 986, 9i0, | 989, 809, 810
941 _ _ _ London arliaaB and Foeh's appoint-
Lawsott, Oolonal* Blavsnth HnsMts, ' msnt, 991
989 ' London Ctasiltf, 6
UHifia, ICaJor-Oanaral 0. B., 190 • London Tariitorials, 146
lAjman and tha War, 7, 8 j Longatla, 148
Laapfrogging bj Qannan divisions, , Longavasnas, 169
9^146^147 I Longnaval, 164
La Baiqna, 188 ! Lorcalna, 99
U Oatsan, 107, 169, 194, 196 Loai of guns, 69, 168, 164, 194,
Lsads, Uoyd Qaoiga's spsaoh at, 979, 806
980,806,800,816 Loosof BMaama,9fi6;passsdoTar In
La Forit, 161, 999 Uia offioial di^aleh, 906
Lagifd, Btigadiar-Oanatal 0*A., 199, Loss of Paronna, 179, 946-807
917 LoumTal, 146
La MasnU-an-AEfooalsa. 110, 176, Lowland Brignda, MnU D., 144, 176,
179 176, 176, lil
La Qossnal, 996, 640, 987 > Lowland sapport, 164
La Qnssnoy, 96, 04 Liioa Bttar, 116
LasboMihi, 189, 168 Lodandorfl, his main proUsm, 6;
La Bats, 166 Imbs tha iocwaid sons, 14 ; on air>
La Tkansloy, 160 oralt, 91 ; his knowladgs ol HaiCs
Lettacs fvon British oOasn, ilO, . naadof mon,84, 87, 86; wasaldad
969-649 by tha British baltlafiont, 89; his
Lsvar, Ohadss, and WaUii^too, oantnd aim, 41: his fsar ol tha
7,6 U8^, 41-49; hampaiad by his
La Vsrgiiiar, 149, 166, 161 partnan, 49, 46 ; on liis fa
Lawismis, 168, 164, 607, 999, 996, , task, 44, 46; on his artillacy, 46,
996,997 46; onislBtB,47;howha
Linissn batwasn Oongh's Isit and tha Franoo-Biltish anxiety, 47, 48;
drag's ritfbt, 186, 166, 167, 176, , s^sr to ont off ths troops in
176, 179, 160, 166, 168, 164, 166, ' Flesooi^ias sattsnt, 06, 189, 140;
166. 189. 199 daddas to hsip Untisr PsrsoMlly.
64; on pa, 64; on thaiqg,66: on
828
INDEX
the Oermaii barrage, 67, 68; on
loflses during a retreat, 81; on
storm troops, 84 ; on f ood-searohing
by his troops, 86 ; his candour, 87,
186, 147 ; nis orders to first-line
troops, 88, 93, 146, 147; on his
unlavonxable strategical position,
96, 196 ; mistakes Gongh for Haig,
96; his aim in Hutier's attack mis-
miderstood, 99; on machine-guns
verBus iafasitty, 190; aims of the
northern fighting, 142 ; new tactics,
147 ; on Below's losses, 147 ; misses
an opportunity, 167, 168 ; anxious
to break through north of Albert,
186 ; on Below's exhausted troops,
190; his mistake in attacking
Arras, 198 ; his encouragement of
initiative, 209; surprised by the
slow arrival of Allied reinforoe-
ments, 278 ; on his capture of man,
S79; liudendorS anii unity of
command, 290; German news-
papers and liudendorfi, 297;
British propaganda, 806 ; on attack
and defence, 816
Uttwits, General von, 61, 87, 92
Ly-Fontaine, 76
Lya battle, 88, 86, 188, 196, 196, 292,
816
MAGHxmB-ouHB, 79, 88, 96, 104, 106,
109, 110, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120,
121, 124, 128» 181, 182, 188, 144,
148, 162, 168, 164, 188, 184, 196,
197, 210, 217, 218, 220, 221, 226,
227, 280, 284, 288, 261, 278, 274
Mackentie, Oolin, Major-General,
Simty-firai D., 102, 104, 181, 170,
289, 249, 286, 287, 288
lialssemy, 69, 79, 96, 149, 166, 167,
160, 170
Malcolm, Major-General Neill, Sixty-
akUh D., 91, 100, 101, 102, 112,
118, 116, 117, 121, 128, 124, 188,
148, 160, 166, 167, 249.
Malassise Farm, 146, 207, 208
Mananoourt, 189, 164, 166, 176, 179
•' Man Battle Stations," 24, 64
Manchester Bedoubtt 78
Manchester troops, 167
Manicamp, 60, 86
Mangin, Gh£n6ral, 81
Map-drawing, 8
Maps and map-making, 814, 816
Maroeloave, 91, 112, 128, 180, 181,
138, 287, 240
Maroh614pot, 116
Marieourt, 188, 184, 166, 189, 190,
191, 192
Marindin, Brig.-General A. H., 191
Marlborough, 281, 282, 317
Mame, 292
Marritott Wood, 181, 182, 222
Marteville, 74
Martin's Brigade, 102, 108, 106, 107,
210
Marwits, General von der, 40, 61, 68,
101, 186. 142^43, 147, 169, 282
Marwits and Hutier in the centre
fighting, 100-120, 121-136, 198, 194
Maurepas, 188, 185
Maurice, Sir F., on the need of men
in March, 1918, 4, 144; on the
Fifth Abmt'b courage, 9 ; on the
Thisd Army's strength, 86; on
Allenby*s excessive number of
white troops, 86 ; on German over-
confidence, 44 ; an oversight, 189 ;
on the transfer of Goagh*s northern
troops to Byng*s right wing, 368 ;
on the Government's neglect, 279
Maxse, Sir Ivor, commanding the
18th Gorps, FiVTB Asmr, 6; his
corps, 12, 14
Maxse's Oorps, 66, 69, 74, 76, 79, 82,
89, 91, 98, 100, 116, 130. 170, 276,
386
Maae, Paul M., 818
M4aulte, 187, 366, 967, 271
Men who behaved badly, 212, 218, 264
Mericourt, 122, 184
M4ry,97
Mesnil-en-Arrouaise, 110, 176, 179
Mesple, G4n6ral, 180, 287
Meti-en-Ooutnre, 161, 176, 179, 180
Mesidres, 181, 218, 286, 240
Military huts set on fire, 119
Military writing and laymen, 7, 8
Milner, Lord, was he unfriendly to
the Futb Abut ? 269
Miraumont, 190, 266
Misery, 104, 111
Misuse of rdnforcements, 276 H teg.
Mixing together French and British
troops, 280 ei aeq.
Modem battles, their division into
four parts or periods, 8, 4; mat
difficulties in writing about them.
6-8
Modem war has a certain kinship
with architecture, 8
Moislains, 138, 168, 164, 174, 176
Monash, Sir J., 187, 188, 218, 963,
266, 277, 296
Monchy-Lagache, 91, 106
Monro, General Sir Oharlea, 36, 817
INDEX
S29
lI<nig-«ii-01iMnte, 108, ICO
MootenlMtti, 187, 188, 186, 189, 190,
101,199,900
HonkUdier, 61, 91, 98, 94. 96, 97, 988,
986,999
Monlbmy, 916
Mont St. QTMotin, 188
Moodf of man in biiUto, 901, 909
Moora, liaot-Oolondl Oodlzey, of
tiM TiralfUi KJLB.O., 986, 940
Mond tnfliMPCM tn wv , 99
Monhftin, U4, 986
M oraoil, 94, 96, 119
Modanoonrt, 971
Marmimg PM, 998, 997, 806
MoKTSl, 149, 180, 189, 188, 184, 980
Morj, 148, 160, 100
Mort imporlMii thing in wmr, 97,
Namm in ths Wftr's tettlflt an loo
nam«roas,6, 7
Nftpolaon, 14, 968
••NMtyiobi"lnww,10
Natel tiooM, 164
National Klingi and polittet, 981,
Katoial gaps fonnod hj rttnallng,
19,90
Nation, 66, 989, 990
N^rvm ouUida tba ballla, 99, 909,
N«l6, 64, 160, 949, 984, 986
Nawooman't Bqnadxon, 916, 919
New Zealand tiooM, 187, 968
Niehobon, Hajor-Qenaral 0. L., 148
Ninth OaTairy Brigade, 916, 917
Himih Dirmoir, 68, 116, 187, 141,
148, 144, 146, 160, 169, 168, 164,
166, 166, 167, 160, 161, 169, 168,
166, 166, 167, 174, 176, 176, 179,
180, 181, 189, 184, 186, 186, 190,
101, 198, 194, 999, 994, 980, 966.
90r, 971, 978, 979, 809
Ninth ICaneheBten, 101
Ninth Seafortha, 144
Nineteenth Oorpe. 107, 108, 16a 8m
alaonnder Watte
mtitlmntk Dnruiov, 146, 148, 190
Nineteenth liverpooli, 79
Nineteenth Northomberland Fuel.
liea,191
NifaUe, Qenaialj 990
Nlveile and VeMnn, 66
Nobeaooort Vluin, 96. 101, 109, 106,
lOT, 164, 168, 100, 170, 178, 917
Noffdheimer'e Bqiiadion at tlie Boie
de MoranU, 918, 910
Non«U,148
Northern attaolce, the, 18fr-146, 146-
167, 168-196
Northumberland Faeiliere, 106, 104,
106, 106, 106, 109, 110, 111, 118,
U9, 190, 191, 194, 196, 197, 198,
199,184
Noye BiTor, 918
Noyon, 60, 86, 86, 88, 91, 98, 94, 97,
118, 988, 999
Nugent, Bfajor-Oenend O. 8. W., and
Ub Ulster troope, 98, 986, 987. See
alio Thirtg-Siitk Ditoioh
Nnn of Harbonnitee, the, 197, 199
Norla, 188, 167, 174
OamoBB, General Ton, 61, 87
OIBoen' patroli, 916, 916
Offiolal aoooimti of batUei omit too
many laoti, 968-966
Offioiaf hiitory, 968 e( iw., 976
Oiie front, 96, 97, 118
Old military role broken, 976, 978,
Olleiy, 84
Omi4coart.986
Omignon River, 10, 96, 101, 108, 104,
106,100
Om,197
Ordmary manhood in war, 86, 86, 87
Ormiston, IMor, 996, 980
Ootflanking the Anore line, 187,108,
969, 968, 970
Outflanking the Nmih Dmsiov, 169,
168, 164, 167, 168, 161, 169, 168,
166, 167, 176, 181
Ootpoet mtem of defenoe. See
f o^vard aone
Ofer^xmfldenoe, Britiih, 4, 44, 398,
994
Onri]len,04
Oxford and Booka Light Inftotry , 68,
70
PACifWft,906
Pann, lient-Ootonel, of the
Oknioaatem, who acted aa Brigadier
of 184th Brigkto after the Hon«
Robert White waa woonded, 940
Paleetine,86
Panic, 111, 918
Pargny,U4
Paila,994
Paraona, Sergeant^liajor, 986
Paeenhendaaie, 10, 90. 96, 904
Pateraon's Fdroa, 917
Patience in troop trains, 100
Pearaon, John, an Old Kngllsh Archer,
901
PeiiMm, Captain 0., 104
380
INDEX
Pdsi«n, 146, 154, UST, 161
PoWos 197
P6rozme, 58, 101, 113, 116, U2, 150,
172, 210, 245-257
P6ronne bridgehead, 91, 96, 101, 102,
108, 138, 161, 164, 169, 172, 174,
245-257
Pertain, 285
P6tain, G6n6ral, 39, 48, 275, 290, 292
300
Phillips, Sergea&t-Major, 235
Pioton at Waterloo, 282
Pieiiepont, 51
Hthon, 84, 89
Pleflsis de Boye, 94
PcBuilly, 88, 106, 108, 170
Points and Oioss-Questiona, 168-178
PoUtioal injiutioe and its effeois, 812,
313
Pollard's Brigade, 172
Pontoise, 49, 50, 85
Portal, Brigadier, 50, 217
Potte, 111
*« Prepare for Battle," 24, 64
" Prepare to Man Battle Stations,"
24
Prideanz-Bnme, Lieat.-Oolonel, 76
Proctor, Oaptain, 110
Propaganda, 279, 301, 804, 805
Providenoe and British statesmen, 9
Proyart, 116, 121, 122, 123, 124, 286
Pnisieox-au-Mont, 190, 198, 196
PyB,190
QuABT, General von, 197
Qnentin Bedonbt, 152, 158
Quessy, 76, 79, 85, 149
"Qnex," in Blaekwood*» Magaawet
201, 908, 204, 205, 206
Qniqaery, 241, 284
Racial susoeptibilities, 290
Bailton, 154
Baimes, Major A. L., 102, 107, 210
Rancoort, 181, 222
Ration strength versus oombatant
strength, 294, 801
Rawlinson, General Sir H. S.,
814
Rear lone, 12, 178, 245
Red Line Defence System, 145, 154
Rees's Brigade, Fiftieth Divxaiov,
108, 106, 107, 106, 112
ReinforoementB, wrong notions
formed by, 187
Reims, 47, 48, 50, 65, 80
Repington Colonel, 297, 806
Retreat from the Bray- Albert line,
96^-273
Retrealing from a narsow saUenl,
189,160
Retreating often more difitoult than
hard^ting, 252, 258
Reyelon Farm, 154, 157
Ribemont-sor-Anore, 267, 270, 271
Riohards, Ldeui., 78
mckerby of the 2/Fifth Glonoaiien,
289
RiddeU's Brigade, Fiftieih DxvisiQii,
103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 110, lU,
112, 113, 117, 119, 121, 124, 126,
127, 129, 131, 182, 184, 247
Ridge Reserve, 207, 208
** Rifle carriers," 120
Risks of war, 87, 38, 297, 300, 309
Roberts, Lord, 805
Robb, Colonel, 105
Robilot, G4n6ral, 984
Robinson, Colonel, 106
Rooqnigny, 175, 178, 180, 230
Rgbqz, 196
Roisel, 102, 161, 170
Ronssoy , 59, 100. 145, 149, 160, 162, 157
Rosidree, 92, 100, 115, 119, 121, 122,
128, 124, 128, 129, 286, 286
Ronpy, 79
Roimoy, 286, 286, 266
Rony-le-Grand, 91
Rowbotham, Captain, 70
Rows of the Fifth D.L.I., 211
Royal Fusiliers, 156
Royal Lrish Rifles, 78
Royals, 220, 221
Roye, 95, 286, 240, 286
Rnssell, Maior-General Sir A. H.,
268
RnssU's defeat, 298
Sazujbbii, 178, 179
SaUly-le- Sec, 116, 184
St. Christ, 84, 92, 109, UO, 114, 116
St. BmiUe, 150, 152, 161
St. Gobain, 35, 49
St. Leger, 146, 148, 15Q, 159, 160
St. Pierre Vaast Wood, 138, 178, 181
St. Qnentin, 8, 50, 64, 249
St. Qnentin Ridge, 145
St. Simon, 76, 87
Sacrifice of yoong lives caused by
political bungling, 202 el ss^.
Sapper, story of a, 119
Saulooart, 152, 170
Savy, 79, 149
Sayer, John William, Laaoa-Gorpml,
how he died in winning the Y.C.,
156
Scapegoat, Fiitb Abmy a politioal, 6,
297
INDEX
381
8oirp« RIvar. M, 08^ 148, 160, 196,
191
fl o^ > l«6d ImpraMions, 909-991
Sooii, Ltoui., 107
8or»p and fenpft of Pftper, 806
*" Seimtoh " ionm. 186
Saoond B»iUfl of the SomBM, 8, 4
SMond Bedf Olds, 79
Sedimd Oatalbt Ditiiiom, 85, 916,
917
BtBtmd IwAflnvDimioii, 189, 148,
166, 167, 176, 180, 968
B aoo p d Hiufltn, 160, 907, 908
BMond BoTBl Sooli, 986
SMODd ^teUzw, 66, 78, 986
SocoDd Torla, 79, 986
8m^*i foRM, 916, 917
Qmudt B\ym, 69, 68, 104, 146^ 148
Sam, 190^ 198,968
agvtnismth Dmnosi. 146, 147, 148,
169,199
8af«Dl6enUi Manohmtari, 79, 986
S6f«Dtee&lh Rojal Booto, 191
Sorenih Corps Ooogh't norihorn
Corps, eommMidad by Oongrtfe,
187, 166, 186, 189. 191, 969
SovodUi Bufis, 78
SoTanih Dragoon Onatds, 161
Saraolh Dorfaaiii Light Infanirr,
911,219
Savanlh Rifla Brigada, 76
SaraDlh Saaforiha, 164
SajiDOiir*! Fotoa, 916, 917,
Sida laraaa and Polltloal Bffaeta, 804-
817
Sida-ahofwa and Uojd Oaoiga, 808
Sinalalr-Maelagan, Major - Qaoaral
B. O., 966, 974, 9n
SixUmUh DiTniOH, Sooth Irish,
imdar Sir Amyall Unll, was a anil
of 7Ui Corps, 160. 169. 164. 167,
104,960
SIzlaanth Itanehsatan, 66, 78. 986
Sixth Durham Ught Intentrr, 104,
106, 106, lOe. 110
Siteth Diyiaiojff, 146, 148
Sixth King's Own Seoltlsh Botdancs,
144. 168. 175, 181
Sixth Northombarland Pnrillars, 116,
117. 197. 198. 129
Sidy-yirsl Divuioii, a unit of 18th
Corps, fought nndar Colin
Maokaniia. 28. 64, 69. 84, 109, 180,
181, 906, 960, 984
gjsriyssoswd Drnaiov, 86. 197
Siteiif.aigth DiTmiov, Lanoaahin
tr«>ps, nndar Naill Halooim, was s
onH of 19th Corps. 101, 108. lOG,
107, 116, 116, 117, 118, 190, 194.
197. 188, 184, 170, 908, 9U, 916,
987
Siflvfy-IMni Ditwoh, 146, 148, 166,
188,190
SUnnar, Brigadiar P. C. B., 76
Slighting tha Fivm Abmt during tha
battia,950
*< SUts," 18
Smoka soraan. 169
Soiasons. 97, 992
Sonuna AUaj Trsnoh, 168
Sonuna Una. 88, 91, 98, 96, 100, 110,
111, 118, 115. 116, 122, 126, 171,
179, 174, 188, 189. 192, 210, 911.
946-947, 970.
Soral4a-grand, 168
Sonth African Brigada, Hmih D.,
144, 152, 158, 154, 167, 160. 161,
162-164, 176, 177. 180, 181, 299-
981,267
** South African Foroas in Franea,"
bj Boohan, 146, 182
South Afrioan Soottiah, 154
Sonth Irish, 115, 122, 124, 12G, 150.
152, 164, 161, 164, 908
Spadalist Oarman troops, 908
Staff oiBoar from tha Mnifc warns tha
Awiy-sswniA, 166
Stataaman, Britiah, thair ooatoinary
mistakas, 9, 806, 807
Stocklay, Brigadiar-Qanaial A. F. U.,
7
Storm troopa, 88, 169
StraggUng, 86, 198, 197, 918
Straohan of tha Saoond Mnnstars,
907
Strathoonft's Hotaa, 918
Strong and wsak foroaa in Una
togsthar, a rula of war oonoaming,
140-141
Sabmarinas, Oarman, 41, 42
Suaanna, 18&
Switehaa, 11
Swopping honias in midstraam, 980
** TAoncAL axaroisss withoot tsoops,*'
Tanks in action, 149, 160, 170, 181,
188
Tanks and horia at HarriUj, 916,
217
Tamplaox-la-OuArard. 100, 160, 168,
166. 217
TannTson, Captoln ihs Hon. A., 70
Tenth Corps. 277
Tenth Hussars, 290, 921
Targnier. 86. 951,
TMry. lOi, 109
882
INDEX
Tetaid Wood, 207
Thiepval, 815
Thurd Austnlians, 85, 95
Thibd Abky. See under Byng
Third Ditxbioh, 146, 148, 160, 198
Third Cavauit Dzyisioh, 215, 216,
220. See alao under Harman
Third Oorps. See under Butler
Third Dragoon Guards, 220, 221
Thirst, sufierings from, 250
Thirteenth Ooi^, 196
TMriUth DmsiOH, 66, 79, 286, 285,
802. See also under Williams,
W. dell.
Thirty-flret Divisioh, 104, 148, 197
Thirty-fifOi Divibiqn, 115, 169, 181,
184, 186, 187, 189, 190, 191, 192,
194, 224, 226, 227, 280, 270, 271,
272, 278. See also under
Franks
TMrly-fourth DivxBiON, 146, 148, 160
Thirty-ninth Diyibion, 101, 115, 121,
122, 128, 129, 188, 152, 162, 194, 260,
260. See also under Feetham
Thirty-eiaUh Dxyxbxqm, 78, 84, 285,
286, 287. See also under Nugent
Timmis' Squadron, 218, 219
nnoourt, 152
Too Late, the Greed of, 128, 298,
807
Tortille Biver, 188, 172, 174, 177
Training, 16, 19, 21, 22, 67, 70, 152,
905,266, 208, 801, 802
Transfer of Gough's northern troops
to Byng*8 right wing, 186, 198, 258-
265
Transfer of land from Thibd Fbbnoh
ABMTto Gough, 10, 11, 25, 800
Trayeoy, 78'
Trefoon, 170
Trench mortars, 45, 168
TrOnes Wood, 185, 189
Troubles of lOnisters, 298-808
Truth uncommon in war, 4, 5, 805
Tudor, ICajor-General H. H., Ninth
D., 148, 160, 151, 152, 154, 156,
157, 162, 165, 175, 176, 179, 180,
224,226
Tugny, 89
Turkey, 42
Tumor, Oaptain, of the Boyals, 220
Twelfth DiTiBXOR, 85
Twelfth Highland light Infantry,
184, 1857191
Twelfth King's Boyal Rifle Corps,
240
Twelfth Boyal Scots, 144
Twentieth Ditxbxoiji, 86, 84, 90, 98,
100, 114, 181, 184, 284, 236, 289,
250, 284, 286, 287. Ses also under
Douglas Smith
Twenty-fifth DxvxBZOir, 146, 148, 159
Twen^'firet Divibzoh, 152, 154, 167,
162, 174, 176, 177, 180, 181, 186,
191, 194, 224, 270, 271. See also
under Campbell
Twenty-fourth Di7IBIOV,108, 106, 106,
122, 181, 284. See also under
Daly
Twenfy-second Entrenching Bat-
taUon, 111, 126, 127, 182
2/Fifth Gloucesters. 284, 235, 236
2/Fourth Boyal Berkshires, 74
2/Blghth Worcesters, 70
U-BoAT campaign, 41
Ulster troops, 78, 84, 285, 286, 287
United States of America, 41, 42, 44,
112, 809, 810.
U.S.A. bridgebuilders, 112
Unity of command, 289-292
UrvUlers, 76, 315
Vaire Wood, 95
Varesnes, 85
Vaucelletto Farm, 145
Yaulz Yrauoourt, 159, 179
YaUTiUers, U9, 120, 121, 128, 129
Yaux,260
Yauz Wood, 188
Yendeuil, 76
Yerdun, 38, 47, 50, 65
Yerlaines, 64
Yermand-Amiens road, 84, 170
Yermand, 88, 96, 102, 106, 150, 170
Y6ry lights, 118
Yictoria Cross, an episode, 73
another episode, 156
YiUechoUes, 79, 170
Yillequier-Aumont, 85
Yilleret, 172
YiUers Bretonneux, 181, 240
YiUers Oarbonnel, 115, 116, 117,
211
YiUers Fauoon, 161
Yillers-lte-Boye, 98
YiUers Plouich, 189, 140, 168, 160,
166, 174, 175
YiUeselve, 220
Ym4T4que, 106, 107, 170
Yincent, Corporal, 286
Yinoent, Lieut., 220
<• Yital*' portions of a front, 27, 80
Yon Boehn, GtaeraL See under
Boehn
Yon Below, Otto. See under Below
Yon Hutier, Oskar. See under
Hutler
VoBdwUarwlts,0«Mnl. Stenndw i VfUU, Uw Bob.
Uanriti "
ToiMl, as, SBl, 9i8
VtqwmiM, 93, 111. Hi, aS9
VnlSDM. 170
" rt. IM. 1T9
rut«, Uw Bob. Bobart, Brigadiu-
OttMnl, >8, T9, S88 ; lattws wriMa
Wau»OBAT«, oI tbs SMOBd Hnn-
■un, am
Wu OkUnak, BriUtb, lU gtvn
mUlBkM, «, S, 390, 8M, BOB
Wm oom^ondMite, 39S
WufntJa-AbMMoon, US, 3S9
WuBlngi MDt by Oongh't l«(t to
Wat prapaouidk, 101
WwVyiKc lu, sas
101, los, acM, aoti
Wftterioo, 196, an, 9B9
Wktti, sir B. B., OmiuDdsr ol the
IBth OoTM. 8, 13, 74, 91, 93, 110.
Ill, tl7, lis, laO, 181, isa, 160,
106, lU, 169, 170, 171, 173, 174,
ne, aiT, sss, sss
W«b«n, (Mtunl von, 51, S7
WaUIoctod and " OhulM O'lSanr/,"
7,8
WdtlngtoD, 14, 6S, 111, aei, 383, 817
WathHkll, Cokmal, n, 38S
WhtUD. Uont., oI tha Saoond
Wfdeolng H^a trant, 10, SS, 800
WiamMurt, Itt, 180, 3S6
WUlianu, If^or-Gananl W. da L„
366. 3m iim> ondar Tkiriitlh
Dmnaa
Williuia, Hajof , st OoUuy, 390
^UllBk. ol tha a/nmrth Btypri Backi,
910
WDmm), ffir HaniT, 399
WUaon, Pmldant, 389, 809. 810
Wm of htmnrj bM laaa, SU, 3H
WlnaatuitfMBMita, 13,70,108,194,
177, 107, 910, 808
Woodooak, UaoL-Ooloaal W. J.. 134
Wonhlp of valnntaariu, 808
Wright, OolMMl, 139
Wrong notlaiM oltoiiMad dnriiM Um
bktUa, 0, 10, 346, 9S8, 3U, 396,
Yonng, Llaat.-CMonal, 399
Yptai Mllant, 10, 96, 900
Ytna, 160, ITS. 179, 160
BY THE SAME AUTHOR
A Book of Bridges.
Pictoies by Fkank Bunowtn, R.A. Text bj W. Shaw
Sparrow. Containing 36 Colour Plue* and 36 LJne
Drawings. Crown 4to. 31s. 6d. net.
Also Large Paper Edition, limited to 75 numbered copies,
for sale in England and America. CrownFoUo{i5 X 10).
Printed on lund-made paper, with an original Uthogni[j)
by Frank Branowtn, of irtiich only the copies required
for this Edition will be printed, after which it will be taken
off the stone: £5 g».
Mi. Brangwyn'i work ii rcprcsenled in this book not aO\j bj thiity-a
latef in colour, reprodiictior- ' — -' *— "*■ '■-" ■— ' -'— "■
uDCioiH black and wUle cat
nokne BranpryQ GallciT.
The IctUTpMM b of the nvUcst inlerMt ami impotuace, for not onlj
hu Hr. Sparrow a tpecUl kDOwlcdee of Mr. Brangwyn'i art, bat aUo he
hu nude a pirticnlai itudj oT bridgei.
Prints and Drawings by Frank
Brangwyn.
With some oCher [biases of his art
By WALTUt Shaw Sparrow. Profusely lUustiated in
oJonr, and black and white, with reproductions of
drawings and pictures by Frank Brancwtn, R.A. Demy
4to. £a las. «d. net.
Tbe rcprodnctioDi fron Mr. Biancwyn'* prinu, drawingi and book
illntiatiaaa, Include Ibar doable peget IB colawcd coUotrpe, tineen IDn*-
tratiooa in tlmn, four and five coloan, iadndlof • oovble pace, and
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There ore abo nineiy black and white iUattratioot in tbe ten.
itirmitt Pll.^" .
raatiaaa. . . . The nlame.wbieh beacdlentlrprodacad, tbe printing of
>e pIMei and letterptot tMiw k joy to tbe eoonoMHor^ eye, riioald find a
loot oo tb* boobbdTts ot sO loren of Brilith art"
JOHN LANE, THE BODLEV HEAD, VIGO ST., W.i
The Road to En-dor :
Being an Account of how Two Prisoners of War at
Yozgad in Turkey Won Their Way to Freedom.
By E. H. Jones, Lieut. Indian Army Reserve. With
Illustrations by C. W. Hill, Lieut. Royal Air Force.
Seventh Edition. Crown 8vo. 8s« 6d. net.
Daily Telegraph, — "This is one of the most amazing, one of the most
realistic, grimmest, and at the same time most entertaining books ever given
to the pablic. ... as droll, and as marvellous as any to be found in the
' Arabian Nights.' . . . < The Road to En-dor' is a book with a thrill in
every page, is fall of genuine adventure . . . everybody should read it."
ifomingPost, — " It is easily the most surprising story of the escape of
prisoners of war which has yet appeared. . . . No more effective exposure
of the methods of the medium mu ever been written. . . . This book is
indeed an invaluable reduction to absurdity of the claims of the spiritualist
coteries." .
The War Diary of the 5 th Seaforth
Highlanders.
By Captain D. Sutherland. Second Edition. Crown
8yo. 6s« net.
The 5th Seaforths played an important part in the Great War, and
Captain Sutherland, wno was an officer in this battalion, has written a very
careful and accurate recoid of their activities. But the book is more than
a mere regimental record, for the author has added a really human interest
to his narrative by the introduction of just the ri^ht amount of incident and
by his own obvious interest in the fortunes of his battalion.
A Captive at Carlsruhe.
By Joseph Lee. Illustrated with drawings by the Author.
Crown 8vo. 78. 6d« net.
Mr. Joseph Lee is already known as the author of some of the finest
verse inspired by the war. " A Captive at Carlsruhe " discovers him as a
writer of equally distinguished and vivid prose. The book describes the
varied experience of a yoir's captivity in the cosmopolitan camp at Carlsruhe
and other ex-German prison camps, and will probably prove to be the most
complete picture of the difficulties and the diversions of that uneasy phase
of life which has so far appeared.
Small Craft.
By Lieut. G. H. P. Muhlhauser, R.N.R. With numerous
Illustrations from photography. Crown 8vo. te* 6d. net
This is an account of a sporting and unique adventure which took shape
at the beginning of the war, when a number of Cambridge undergraduates,
officered by yachtsmen, borrowed a small 270 ton steam yacht, the
Zarefahy and succeeded in getting themselves attached to the mine
sweeping service.
JOHN LANE, THE BODLEY HEAD, VIGO ST., W.x.
I
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