Fifty years in the Royal Navy

FIFTY YEARS IN THE ROYAL NAVY

FIFTY YEARS IN
THE ROYAL NAVY

BY

ADMIRAL SIR PERCY SCOTT, BT.5

K.C.B., K.C.V.O., HON. LL.D. CAM.

WITH ILLUSTRA TIONS

v

I

/

LONDON :
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W

1919

DA

All rights reserved.

PREFACE

IN this volume I have set down the recollections
of a lifetime of sixty-five years. It deals with my
service in the Royal Navy during a period of over
half a century. I entered it when most of the ships
were propelled by wind, steam being only an
auxiliary; our gun carriages differed little from
those of Queen Elizabeth's day ; midshipmen were
punished in peculiar ways, and seamen received the
" cat " for comparatively minor offences. In 1913 I
was retired at my own request, and I thought that
my active career had ended. I was mistaken, for,
as these pages record, I was drawn into the back-
waters of the War and became associated again
with gunnery matters, with the fight against the
enemy's submarines, and with the defence of
London against aircraft, rendering to the best
of my ability what service I could do to the
country. I should not have decided to issue
these chapters, which I began writing by way of
recreation and amusement after I had gone on the
retired list, if I did not hope that they might serve
a useful purpose in future years.

From the time when I was a junior lieutenant I
was interested in gunnery, realising its importance,
and this book is devoted mainly to describing my
efforts, assisted by other officers — in particular,

vi PREFACE

Admirals of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone
and Viscount Jellicoe — to improve the shooting of
the British Fleet.

How far these pages may prove of general
interest I cannot tell, but they will at least show
how opposed the Navy can be to necessary re-
forms, involving radical departures from traditional
routine ; the extent to which national interests
may be injured owing to conservative forces within,
and without, the public services ; and what injury
the country may suffer from politicians interfering
in technical matters, which they necessarily do not
understand. It is my hope that ultimate benefit
may result from an honest attempt to shed light
upon matters of vital concern to the nation by
means of my personal record. In that belief, these
reminiscences have been published, and I would
only wish to add that nothing has been set down
in malice. My intention has been not to attack
persons, but to expose rather the weaknesses and
defects of our administrative machinery, in so far
as I had experience of it.

Obstinate opposition to change and reform is,
in my opinion, a crime. In these days of rapid
advance of science and swift development of
mechanics, unless we move ahead we are bound
to become retrograde. In order to hold our place
in the world, in naval as well as in other affairs, we
must encourage initiative, and, above all, so far
as the Sea Service is concerned, inculcate in our
officers ideas consistent with a modern steam
Navy, instead of clinging to traditions and routines
which were good in their day, but are now obsolete.
And I may add that I have not much belief in the

PREFACE vii

influence of an elaborately organised Naval Staff
at the Admiralty, for the best creation of that
character, possessed by Germany, failed under the
test of war, as Lord Jellicoe's book on the record
of the Grand Fleet has revealed. The Navy does
not require a greatly expanded Naval Staff sitting
in offices at the Admiralty performing routine
work, most of which is unnecessary and seems to
be done mainly in order to swell the number of
officials employed. The Service requires open-
eyed, well-educated, progressive, practical seamen,
spending most of their time afloat, and when
employed at the Admiralty not immersed in day-
to-day routine, but with time to think of the needs
of the future and how they should be met.

But the root of bad naval administration lies, in
my opinion, in the system by which business at the
Admiralty is conducted. The civilian element,
being permanent, obtains too much influence, and
the naval element, which is always changing, has
too little influence. The spirit in which work is
done is wrong. There is insufficient incentive to
encourage the best men. If a man does nothing,
or next to nothing, he may be sure that he will do
no wrong and his career will not be endangered ;
hence there arises a general desire to shirk responsi-
bility and to evade making a decision until as many
sub-departments as possible are drawn into the
discussion. By that widely recognised means the
individual who should act evades his personal
responsibility and business is delayed, sometimes
with serious results to the country.

As an illustration I will take the case of a
proposal which is put forward for introducing

viii PREFACE

a new way of firing the guns in His Majesty's
ships, involving alterations of fittings, additional
electricity, structural changes, and also affecting
the engineering department. When the suggestion
reaches the Admiralty the original paper will be
marked to be sent for consideration to the Gunnery
Department, the Electrical Department, the Dock-
yard Department, the Chief Constructor's Depart-
ment, the Engineering Department, the Third Sea
Lord, and the First Sea Lord. No limit of time is
fixed ; each department can keep the paper as long
as it likes ; it is passed from one official to another,
the speed with which it moves depending upon the
pleasure of each official concerned — and frequently
it gets lost. I know of one case in which a letter
took upwards of a year to circulate through the
various departments of the Admiralty.

I suggest that this routine is radically wrong
and would not be tolerated by any man accustomed
to run a commercial firm. He would determine
to obtain the opinions of all concerned in any
suggestion in the quickest possible time. First
of all some one would decide if there was anything
in a proposal which merited its being examined.
If the decision was in the affirmative, several copies
would be typed and one copy sent to each person
whose opinion it was desired to obtain, bearing
the date and time when it was sent out and the
date for its return. In due course, the various
replies would reach the heads of the firnr and the
matter would be dealt with. Under some such
system business men conduct their affairs, and they
are amazed when they are brought in contact with
the Admiralty and other public departments.

PREFACE ix

War suspended to some extent this slow and
cumbersome method of conducting affairs at the
Admiralty, but my impression is that it was not
until Lord Jellicoe, on becoming First Sea Lord
and realising the trouble, put his foot down, that
the task of completing the reorganisation of the
Fleet for war made ' considerable headway. Lord
Fisher, it is true, speeded matters up, but he was
at the Admiralty only for a short period ; when
he left the routine was re-established and the
administration lumbered along slowly, to the
despair of many officers who realised what was
needed. Lord Jellicoe returned to the Admiralty
as First Sea Lord to find that the administration
had been slowed down at a period when the enemy
submarine campaign threatened every British
interest. With a strong hand he wrenched the
Admiralty from its conservative ways and, as
Admiral Sims has told us, the orders which he
gave for auxiliary craft and tens of thousands of
mines, and the encouragement which he lent to
scientists enabled us to master the greatest menace
which had ever threatened not merely the British
Fleet, but the British Empire.

War is the supreme test of a naval administra-
tion, and under that test the routine system of the
Admiralty, which is slow, was found wanting.
Napoleon once declared : " Strategy is the art of
making use of time and space. I am less chary,"
he added, " of the latter than the former. Space we
can recover — but time never" Because Admiralty
administration is deplorably slow, it proved unsuited
to war, and the nation owes much to Lord Fisher
and Lord Jellicoe for their efforts to speed matters

x PREFACE

up, for in war the enemy does not wait on the
convenience of a Government department in which
almost every one, civil and naval, is nervous
of taking responsibility and acting swiftly and
decisively. Successful war-making depends in a
large degree on time-saving — rapid, decisive action.
The country suffered unnecessarily, and the war
was unduly prolonged because that principle was
so often ignored.

It is for the country to decide whether the
Admiralty shall fall back into its old ways. The
policy of circumlocution and delay lies at the base
of our bad administration, and not, I am afraid,
by any means at the Admiralty only or at the
Admiralty conspicuously. At any rate, writing of
things I know at first hand, I am convinced we
can never hope to obtain a Fleet well equipped,
well organised, and well trained, until this system
of evading responsibility at the Admiralty is broken,
the circulation of papers is speeded up, and the
official who shirks responsibility is made to
suffer, instead of being promoted as " a safe
man." Individually Civil Servants are men of
wide interests whom it is a pleasure to meet, but
the system of the Civil Service is, in my opinion,
a public danger. This book has been written in
vain if it does not carry conviction that our naval
administration is based on wrong principles.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

ENTRY INTO THE NAVY

PAGE

Entry into the Navy — Life in the Britannia — My First Sea-
going Ship — A Sailing Passage to Bombay — Discipline on
Board — Chasing Slave Dhows — The Slave Market at Zanzi-
bar— Lessons in Seamanship — Gazetted Sub-Lieutenant —
With H.M.S. Active on the West Coast of Africa— Life on
Ascension Island — A Punitive Expedition up the Congo —
A Successful Operation — More Eiver Expeditions — On
Board the Guardship at Cowes — An Incident of the Crimea 1

CHAPTER II

A CRUISE ROUND THE WORLD

Admiralty Attitude towards Gunnery — Uselessness of Inspection
— A Typical Report of the Period — Course of Instruction on
board H.M.S. Excellent — Mud Island — Convict Labour — A
Scheme of Drainage — Gunnery Lieutenant of H.M.S. In-
constant— A Training Squadron — Masts and Sails — The
Young Princes as Midshipmen — The Boer War takes us
to the Cape — Voyage to Australia — Parting with the
Bacchante — Invention of an Electrical Range Transmitter
— How the Admiralty regarded it — Back in Simon's Bay —
A Fire on Board— Putting out the Flames in a Diver's
Dress . . --* . . . . , .% « , . 25

CHAPTER III

WITH THE NAVAL BRIGADE IN EGYPT

Ordered to Alexandria— Naval Brigade Ashore— Collecting Un-
exploded Shell — Fleet's Deplorable Shooting — Improvisa-
tion— Mounting 7-ton Guns — Blowing up a Dam — Queen
Victoria and her Troops— Bluejackets and their Medals , 4Q

xii CONTENTS

CHAPTER IV

H.M.S. EDINBURGH AND WHALE ISLAND

PAGE

H.M.S. Excellent again — King George's Gunnery Course—Im-
provements in Big Gun Targets — Service on board H.M.S.
Duke of Edinburgh — Making Ships look Pretty — Duke of
Edinburgh's Interest in Gunnery — Invention of a Signalling
Lamp — How the Admiralty treated it — Sinking of H.M.S.
Sultan — A Unique Salvage Operation — Back to Whale
Island — A Prophecy fulfilled — How a Cricket Pitch con-
verted the Admiralty — Convict Labour — A Committee on
Naval Uniform— A Naval Barnum— How the Royal Naval
Fund was instituted— Farewell to Whale Island ... 58

CHAPTER V

H.M.S. 8C7LLA AND GUNNERY

In the Mediterranean again — Condition of Gunnery and
Signalling — Revolutionising Night Signalling — The Ad-
miralty and Inventions — A Source of Discouragement —
The Boat that went Adrift — The Scylla's Cruise — Improve-
ment in Gunnery — A New Sub-calibre Gun and Target —
History of the " Dotter "— Prize Firing-— The Scylla's
Triumph — On Half -pay . 73

CHAPTER VI

HOW THE 4'7-INCH GUN BEACHED LADYSMITH

In Command of H.M.S. Terrible— State of the Ship's Gunnery
— Useless Appliances— Making Good Defects— Arrival at
the Cape — The South African War — Deficiency in Long-
range Guns — Mounting Naval Guns for Service Ashore —
Why the 4'7-inch Guns were sent to Ladysmith— Admiral Sir
Robert Harris's Statements— A Recital of the Facts— How
the Mountings were turned out — The Value of the 12-
pounders— Appointment as Military Commandant of Durban
— Prince Christian Victor of Schleswig-Holstein — A Keen
Soldier— Assistance in the Defence of Durban — General
Buller's Visit— The Man-hauled 4-7 -inch Gun— An Effective
Object Lesson — Communication with Ladysmith — Mounting
the Terrible's Searchlight on Shore— Successful Signalling . 90

CONTENTS xiii

CHAPTER VII

MARTIAL LAW IN DURBAN

PAGE

Military Commandant of Durban — Multifarious Duties — Censor-
ship : an Effective Threat— The Spy Trouble -A Boer
Agent's Claim for Damages — Contraband Difficulties — The
Bundesrath— Grans for General Buller — A Gun-Mounting in
Fifty-six Hours — Hospital Ships — Mr. Winston Churchill
— Eelief of Ladysmith — A Letter from Sir Bedvers Buller
— Farewell to Durban 113

CHAPTEB VIII

IN THE FAR EAST: THE BOXER RISING

H.M.S. Terrible' s Welcome in the East — Hong Kong's Lavish
Hospitality — News of the Boxer Outbreak — Orders at last 1
—Arrival at Taku — Tientsin's Plight— The Belief Column
— Long-range Guns left behind — A Neglected Base —
Anomalies of the Situation — Useless Appeal to the Admiral
— Belated Use of the Rejected Guns — Capture of Tientsin —
Belief of the Legations , :. 128

CHAPTEB IX

GUNNERY ON THE CHINA STATION

A Beturn to Gunnery at Sea — Besults of the First Prize Firing —
A Machine to increase Efficiency in Loading — The Deflec-
tion Teacher and its Effect on Shooting — Be-modelling the
Target — Target Practice of the Fleet — Underlining an
Inference — Admirals and Prize Firing — Back at Hong Kong
— Baising the Dredger Canton River — Lieut. Sims, U.S.A.,
and Gunnery — Sir Edward Seymour's Valuable Beforms —
Admiralty Opposition — Prize Firing of 1901 — First Ship of
the Navy — The Barfleur and the Terrible's Example — The
Admiralty and Improved Shooting — A Disastrous Order . 138

CHAPTEB X

WEI-HAI-WEI AND THE CRUISE HOME

Wei-hai-wei Controversy — Naval Base or Seaside Besort? —
Wei-hai-wei's Useless Forts — A Beport to the Admiralty —
Further Work stopped— Final Prize Firing— Petty Officer
Grounds' Record — The Homeward Voyage — A Congratu-
latory Address — Reception at Portsmouth — Visit to
Balmoral — The King's Deer Drive — How I shot a Hind —
His Majesty's Interest in Naval Gunnery .... 164

xiv CONTENTS

CHAPTEK XI

GUNNERY MUDDLE

PAGE

Efforts towards Reform — Admiralty Obstruction — Waste of
Ammunition — Official Reprimands — Two Gunnery Com-
mittees appointed — Conflicting Reports — The Centurion's
Gun Sights — A Tardy Discovery— The Dawn of a New Era 178

CHAPTER XII

INSPECTOR OF TARGET PRACTICE

My Appointment as Inspector of Target Practice — Battle
Practice Conditions — Order out of Chaos— Improvement at
Last— My Visit to Kiel— The Chief Defect of the German
Navy — A Lost Experiment — " Director Firing " . . . 189

CHAPTER XIII

H.M.S. GOOD HOPS WITH THE CHANNEL FLEET

In Command of the Second Cruiser Squadron — Obsolete Ideas
— Inadequate Training for War — Housemaiding the Ship
Paramount— The Test of War— Confusion and Unreadiness
— Wrong Pattern Torpedo — Lord Charles Beresford and the
Admiralty — H.M.S. Good Hope's Gunnery — First in the
whole Fleet — Our Cruise in Northern Waters — My New
Appointment — An Independent Command — A New Routine
and Efficiency . , ' . . . . . . . 198

CHAPTER XIV

AN IMPERIAL MISSION

En route to the Cape — Durban's Welcome — The National Con-
vention—Old Foes and New Friends— An Inland Trip— At
Pretoria and Johannesburg — Lavish Hospitality — Farewell
to Durban — Festivities at Capetown— Farewell Messages—
Off to the New World — Arrival at Rio— Promoted Vice-
Admiral — Brazilian Enthusiasm — The President's Visit to
the Good Hope — Uruguay and the Navy— Speeches at
Montevideo — The Pelorus at Buenos Ayres — A Great
Modern City — Departure from Montevideo— Battle Practice
at Tetuan — I haul down my Flag '. . . . . 214

CONTENTS xv

CHAPTER XV

VICISSITUDES OF DIRECTOR FIRING

PAGE

My New System of Routine — Approved by Lord Fisher but
generally Opposed — What Naval Gunnery means — No
further Employment at Sea — Back to Director Firing —
Success of the Neptune Trials — The Thunderer and Orion
Test — Superiority of Director Firing demonstrated — More
Admiralty Delay and a Stiff Protest— Warning unheeded
and Proposals rejected — Tragic Fruits of Neglect — History
of Parallel Firing — Position of Director Firing at the Out-
break of War — The First Dreadnought — Position of the
Mast — Perpetuating a Blunder — Mr. Churchill's Wise
Decision — A New Blunder in Exchange for the First . . 241

CHAPTER XVI

MY RETIREMENT FROM THE NAVY

A Letter from Prince Henry of Prussia— Created a Baronet and
promoted to Admiral — Menace of the Submarine — Protective
Measures necessary — The Official Attitude — Lessons of
Manoeuvres — The Admiralty unconvinced — Mr. Winston
Churchill's Suggestion — Director Firing — My Services dis-
pensed with— A Remarkable Letter from Whitehall . . 268

CHAPTER XVII

WAR — BACK TO WORK, 1914 AND 1915

The Shadow of Ireland — Letter to the Times on Submarines —
Criticisms by many Naval Officers — The War settles the
Controversy — The War Office and the Lack of Big Guns —
Lord Roberts' Advice ignored — Ten Months' Delay and
Repentance — The Fleet's Gun Equipment — Recall to the
Admiralty — Fitting out the Dummy Fleet — The Submarine
Problem demands Attention — Visit to the Grand Fleet —
The Peril of the Grand Fleet— Lord Fisher's Influence—
The Tragedy of the Battle of Jutland— Official Persistence
in Error — The Dardanelles Failure — Gunnery Practice in
the " Sixties "—Successive Changes in the Target— Value-
less Prize Firing — My Suggestions for Improvement —
Method adopted on the China Station and its Results —
Admiralty Opposition to its Adoption — King Edward's
interest in the Question — Admiralty insist on a New Rule
with Disastrous Effects —Immediate Improvement . . 273

xvi CONTENTS

CHAPTER XVIII

THE DEFENCE OF LONDON AGAINST ZEPPELINS

PAGE

A Providential Raid by a Zeppelin — London Undefended — My
Recall to the Admiralty — Deficiency of Guns — Unsuit-
able Ammunition — Commander Rawlinson's Good Work—
A Flying Visit to Paris — Co-operation of the French — My
Protest against Admiralty Methods — Termination of my
Command — The Anti-Aircraft Corps— Target Practice in
the Air 303

CHAPTER XIX

WAK REFLECTIONS— 1915-1917

i

Guns for the Army — Visit to the Front — Inferior Elevation of
the 9'2-inch Gun — The Mounting improved after Official
Delay — Naval Searchlights — A Primitive Method — My
Improved Design— A New System ultimately adopted—
A Letter from the Admiralty — The Dardanelles Commission
— A Question of Gunnery — The Essence of the Problem —
A Criticism of the Report ..321

APPENDIX I *

Progress of Gunnery . r, . . . . . . 335

APPENDIX II .... . . .... 337

INDEX . 347

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

ADMIRAL SIR PERCY SCOTT, BART., K.C.B., K.C.V.O.

Frontispiece

PAQK

TAKING AIM 31

SMOKE DRESSES facing 44

BOMBARDING ARABI'S LINE „ 52

7-INCH 7-TON GUN HASTILY MOUNTED AT EAMLEH . „ 52

THE AFTER-DECK OF H.M.S. " EDINBURGH," SHOWING THE

DECORATIONS facing 60

HOLYSTONING A DECK ....;. ,, 60

MENDING A SHOT-HOLE IN H.M.S. "SULTAN" . . v . 65

INSTRUCTIONAL FLASHER MADE ON BOARD H.M.S. " SCYLLA " facing 75

FLASHING LAMPS . 76

SEARCHLIGHT FLASHER MADE ON BOARD H.M.S. " SCYLLA " facing 76
THE " SCYLLA " PATTERN OF FLASHER BROUGHT INTO USE

DURING THE WAR . . .... . facing 78

H.M.S. " SCYLLA'S " EXTEMPORISED TELESCOPE SIGHT „ 82

LEE-METFORD AIMING RIFLE IN THE GUN . . . • 83

THE "DOTTER" . . . . . . . . facing 88

6-iNCH GUN SIGHT AS ALTERED IN H.M.S. "TERRIBLE" „ 92

4-7-iNCH GUN ON PLATFORM MOUNTING AS USED AT LADYSMITH „ 98

SPOTTING ON LADDERS IN CHINA . . « . facing 136

12-pouNDER DEFLECTION TEACHER . . ., . ,, 140

TARGETS OF THE NAVY ,, 142

OPERATIONS IN RIGHTING THE DREDGER . . . . . 147

" RECORD PERFORMANCES " facing 176

MY SON ENTERING PORTSMOUTH DOCKYARD, WHERE, AS CAPTAIN

OF THE " EXCELLENT," I HAD A RESIDENCE . facing 178

THE SPREAD OF SHOT „ 180

MY MOTOR-CAR, CHANGED INTO AN ARMOURED CAR, AS USED

DURING A SHAM FIGHT, ON 24TH FEB., 1904 . facing 186

xvii

xviii LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

PAQB

CHART OF HITS TO BOUNDS FIRED 193

" WITHOUT PREJUDICE " facing 194

"A LONG SIGHT BETTER" ,,196

THE SPLASH OF A 12-iNCH SHELL 245

BROADSIDE FIRING WHEN I JOINED THE NAVY . . facing 256

NAVAL GUNNERY : BROADSIDE FIRING ... ,, 258

THE SCOTT DIRECTOR TOWER 260

MODEL THAT I TOOK TO THE ADMIRALTY TO SHOW HOW THE

OBSERVER WOULD FARE OWING TO THE FUNNEL BEING IN

THE WRONG PLACE facing 264

H.M.S. " LlON " BEFORE AND AFTER ALTERATION OF OBSERVATION

TOWER . .,...' 266

MY OCCUPATION WHEN THE ADMIRALTY, HAD THEY APPRECIATED

MY DIRECTOR FIRING, WOULD HAVE KEPT ME BUSY facing 268

THE DUMMY FLEET „ 284

3-iNCH ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN IN ACTION ... „ 312

3-iNCH ANTI- AIRCRAFT GUN BEING TRANSPORTED . ,, 312
"!N MID-AIR" . . . , . , . . . .317

" DUAL CONTROL " , . . ;, . . . facing 318
FIELD CARRIAGE FOR 6-iNCH MARK VII. GUN FIRING A

29-LB. CHARGE . facing 322

ANGLE FIRING 330

FIFTY YEARS IN THE
ROYAL NAVY

CHAPTER I

ENTRY INTO THE NAVY

Entry into the Navy — Life in the Britannia — My First Sea-going Ship
— A Sailing Passage to Bombay — Discipline on Board — Chasing
Slave Dhows — The Slave Market at Zanzibar — Lessons in Seaman-
ship—Gazetted Sub-Lieutenant— With H.M.S. Active on the West
Coast of Africa — Life on Ascension Island — A Punitive Expedition
up the Congo — A Successful Operation — More River Expeditions
— On Board the Guardship at Cowes — An Incident of the Crimea.

THE association of my family with the Royal Navy
goes back for four generations ; my great-grand-
father was a captain in the Service. My grandfather
was a doctor and a man, I believe, of considerable
talent. He attempted some innovations in surgery
— an art which has, of course, been revolutionised
since his time ; but the medical profession in those
days did not welcome any departure from their
recognised and often primitive methods. His
inventions included some instruments for assisting
the deaf, which I understand came into general
use after his death. In the course of my career

1 was to experience the same sort of attitude on

i

2 ENTRY INTO THE NAVY

the part of those in authority, and I have some-
times reflected with a passing bitterness how little
the obstructive attitude of one generation in such
matters differs from that of another.

My father was a solicitor, a good linguist and
an excellent public speaker. Foreign business—
or the gaming-tables — took him to Baden Baden
once a year, and I am told that he was a perfect
loser. He was always very good to me and gave
me advice that has been invaluable. It was a
principle with him never to make a fuss about
anything, and he impressed upon me that every
occurrence, whatever it might be, should be taken
with imperturbable quiet. He would quote that
passage from " Pelham " who declares that among
the properly educated a calm pervaded all their
habits and actions, whereas the vulgar could
take neither a spoon nor an affront without
making an amazing noise about it. In discussing
my future career, he would point out to me that
in a household a fussy person could only disturb
the few inmates, but in a ship one fussy person
might disturb what was equivalent to a whole
village. How true I have found that statement
in H.M. Navy ! His ideas on education were as
quaint as those which exist at some of our large
English schools and colleges. He wanted me to
be taught only Latin and Greek, as he declared
that those languages were the foundation of every-
thing. I read Cassar with him, and having won
the first prize at my dame's school, thought I
knew something. Then I went on to the
University College School and continued to thrive
on Latin and Greek.

GAZETTED AS A CADET 3

At 11 \ years of age I got a nomination for the
Navy and was sent to Eastman's Naval Academy
at Portsmouth. I shall never forget my first
interview with the Headmaster. He asked me
what I knew. I rather proudly replied that I had
done " As in Presenti, Propria qui maribus, Caesar,
and had started Ovid." He told me that they
required living languages in the Navy, and that
I was dreadfully backward in all useful subjects.
He added that I should have to work half my
playtime, and even then he doubted if I should
be able to pass the qualifying naval examination.
Subsequently he took a great interest in me, was
most kind in helping me with my extra lessons,
and a month before the examination prophesied
that I was sure to pass.

The exciting day for us all at length arrived,
and about a hundred little boys presented them-
selves at the Royal Naval College, Portsmouth,
for examination. A week afterwards I was
gazetted a naval cadet in H.M. Navy. Sixty-
four had passed in. I was forty-sixth on the list
and one place above me was a candidate who
was destined to become Field-Marshal Viscount
French. Forty years later we, side by side,
marched past H.M. King Edward VII. at
Aldershot. Sir John French (as he then was)
commanded the Army and I the Naval Brigade.

Before joining the Britannia we naval cadets
were given a month's leave. My father thought
it would be a good thing for me to see something
of the war then in progress between Prussia and
Austria, so he took me to Germany. The
Prussians entered Wiesbaden the day we arrived.

4 ENTRY INTO THE NAVY

The next morning all the sentry boxes and flag-
staves were painted black and white instead of red
and white, and the Black Eagle was flying every-
where. In another town near where a battle had
been fought we saw a large square full of wounded
men and prisoners. Thus at the age of thirteen
I was an eye-witness of some of the effects of war.

On the 26th August, 1866, 1 went to Dart-
mouth and joined H.M.S. Britannia. She was
an old three-decker, fitted with a large mess-room
for the cadets. We each had a sea chest and
we slept in hammocks. The decks were well
saturated with salt water every morning, summer
and winter, and the authorities considered that
this hardened the cadets. Possibly it did ; at any
rate it weeded out those who were not strong.

We were kept in very good discipline. The
birch was used freely. It was administered
publicly with great ceremony, and was the only
punishment that incorrigible boys did not like.
No idea of disgrace was attached to it, but it hurt.
How stupid it is to talk of doing away with the
birch at our public schools ! In a large com-
munity of boys there will always be a small per-
centage of very black sheep who have no good
side to their nature to appeal to, and who, unless
well birched, will encourage other boys to follow
their bad example.

Shortly after I joined it was rumoured that the
damp and evil-smelling old ship was not a suitable
home for boys of between thirteen and fourteen
years of age, and that she was to be done away
with. The Commissioners of the Admiralty
considered the question, and successive Boards

FIRST SEA SERVICE 5

discussed it, but as the matter was important they
did not act hastily — their deliberations, in fact,
extended over about thirty years. Finally, in
1898, work was begun on a college on shore in
place of the Britannia, and the old ship of many
memories was doomed.

On leaving the Britannia I joined H.M.S.
Bristol, & 50-gun frigate; she was employed as a
sea-going training ship. From there, on the
25th August, 1868, I went to my first real sea-
going ship, the Forte, a 50-gun frigate of 2,364
tons. She had engines, but of such small horse-
power that they were only serviceable in a flat calm.

We started from Sheerness, and en route to
Portsmouth we youngsters were fortunately intro-
duced under sail to a gale of wind. Four hours
on deck, close-reefing the topsails and clearing
away broken spars, probably cured every one of
sea-sickness for the remainder of their lives — at
any rate, it cured me. An excitement of this sort
is, I believe, the only cure for sea-sickness. We
got to Spithead, and we midshipmen were delighted
at being turned out in the middle of the night for
a collision. Colliding with or being rammed by
another ship, or ramming another ship, is a neces-
sary part of an officer's education. In this case
the barque Blanche Maria had got across our bows,
at the change of the tide. There was a lot of
crunching, but eventually we got clear without
much damage. The Blanche Maria said that we
had given her a foul berth ; we declared she had
dragged her anchor. However that may be, we
midshipmen were all delighted at having seen a
collision.

6 ENTRY INTO THE NAVY

We left Portsmouth on the 2nd October, 1868,
practically to make a sailing passage to Bombay,
via the Cape of Good Hope. This we accomplished
in a little over three months.

In those old sailing days in fine weather it was
very delightful ; a man-pf-war was a gigantic yacht,
scrupulously clean, for we were seldom under steam
and as a consequence did not often coal. Shortage
of water for the purpose of washing was our great
inconvenience ; our Commander, either for economy
or to save the dirt of coaling, made a great fuss
about the coal used for condensing. Consequently
we were very often short of water for washing ;
water for drinking was not limited. On the main
deck there was a tank with a tin cup chained to
it, so that any one could get a drink. But there
was a little waste, as the men did not always drain
the cup dry. In order to check this, the Commander
introduced what was called a " suck- tap " ; the tap
and the cup were done away with and a pipe placed
in lieu of these, and any one wanting a drink had
to take the nasty lead pipe into his mouth and
suck the water up ; it was a beastly idea, which
our new Commander immediately did away
with.

In the evening the men always sang, and it was
very fine to hear a chorus of about 800 men and
boys, many of the latter with unbroken voices.
We had one young man who used to sing " A che'
la morte" and other tenor songs from Verdi's
operas, as well as many singers that I have heard
on the stage. The songs, however, were not always
of this high class.

I remember one or two lines of a very popular

LIFE IN A FRIGATE 7

song called "Mr. Buggins' Ball." The song, in
referring to the guests, described the dress of one :

" Round 'is arm 'e 'ad some crep'on,

'Cause 'is wife was dead, poor soul ;
Round 'is waist 'e 'ad an apron,
Because 'is breeches 'ad a 'ole."

We midshipmen knew all the men's songs, and
their parlance, which was sometimes strong ; many
of their comparisons and similes were often witty
and quite original.

During the Great War some people seemed to
think that milk, butter, cheese and vegetables were
necessities of life. In my first ship there were
about 750 men and boys in the perfection of health
and strength. Their rations at sea consisted of salt
beef, salt pork, pea soup, tea, cocoa and biscuit, the
last named generally full of insects called weevils.
Later on, preserved beef was introduced ; it was
issued in tins, very convenient for making into
paint pots and other recepticals. Its official name
was " Soup and bouilli " ; the bluejackets called it by
various names — "soup and bullion," "two buckets
of water and one onion," or it was called " bully
beef," but the most common name was " Fanny
Adams." At the time of the introduction of this
preserved meat into the Navy, a girl called Fanny
Adams disappeared, and a story got afloat that she
had been tinned, or as the Americans would say
canned. To this day the tins which contain pre-
served meat, and which are utilised for all sorts of
purposes, are called "Fanny's."

En route we found out what a magnificent
seaman our Captain, John Hobhouse Alexander,
was, and what a bully we had in our Commander.

8 ENTRY INTO THE NAVY

We midshipmen had a terrible time with the latter.
I contradicted him once, and as I happened to be
right, he never forgave me. I saw more of the
masthead than I did of the gun-room mess.
Sending a boy to sit up at the masthead on the
cross-trees was a funny kind of punishment. In
fine weather with a book it was rather pleasant ;
in bad weather you took up a waterproof. Mast-
head for the midshipmen, and the cat for the men,
was the Commander's motto. I saw one man
receive four dozen strokes of the cat on Monday
and three dozen on Saturday, and he took them
without a murmur. That is the spirit which made
this a great country ; we love men who take punish-
ment without flinching. This particular Com-
mander revelled in flogging, and the sight of it
seemed to be the only thing that gave him any
pleasure. It was a form of self-indulgence which
finally led to his ruin.

On arrival at Bombay, Captain Alexander went
home. We became the Senior Officer's ship on
the East Indies Station, and flew the broad pennant
of Commodore Sir Leopold Heath, K.C.B. He
was a clever, kind and able seaman. He made me
his A.D.C., an honour which I appreciated, but
which got me into further trouble with the Com-
mander, as he did not approve of it. I had more
leave stopped than ever and was continually under
punishment. However, an end came to it all under
the following circumstances. While the Com-
modore was up country in Ceylon, an able seaman
refused one morning to obey an order. The case
was investigated by the Commander, and at one
o'clock— two hours later — the offender received

HUNTING SLAVE DHOWS 9

four dozen lashes. On the Commodore's return
the man laid his case before him, and complained
that the King's Regulations, which order com-
manding officers not to inflict corporal punishment
until twenty-four hours after the offence, had not
been observed. The Commander was tried by
court-martial and dismissed the ship.

We spent a good deal of time on the East Coast
of Arabia, looking for slave dhows, but only caught
one. She was a small craft about 40 feet long,
but had on board a crew of five Arabs and eighty
slaves, consisting of ten youths, twelve women,
thirty-seven girls, twenty boys and one baby.
Those wretched beings were naked and horribly
emaciated, and had been so crowded that most of
them during their eighteen days' voyage had not
moved from the position they were packed into.
We took the slaves on board, washed and fed them
and dressed them in some sort of clothes and then,
having landed the Arabs, used the dhow as a target.
We opened fire on her with all our guns, but
expended a quarter's allowance of ammunition
without result and finally sank her by ramming.
This was my first lesson in gunnery.

The eighty slaves had come from a village a
few miles north of Zanzibar. While the men
were away fighting another tribe, the Arabs had
swept down and marched off all their women and
children, embarking them for the Persian Gulf,
where they would have got, on an average, about
£20 a head for them. The baby slave was rather
a difficulty, as none of the women would look
after it, but the boatswain made a sort of cradle
for it, a feeding arrangement was extemporised,

10 ENTRY INTO THE NAVY

and the child did very well. We eventually
landed the whole eighty at Aden, and got prize
bounty at the rate of £5 apiece for them. A
midshipman's share of the prize was £l 4s. 6d.

At Zanzibar the slave market was in full swing.
It was quite a large place in which all the slaves
sat round in concentric circles, with spaces in
between so that the buyer could pass through and
inspect them. They were arranged according to
their " chop," or quality. A first " chop " man
meant extremely good physique and youth. The
women were divided into two classes, those destined
for work and those suitable for adorning an Arab's
harem ; a nicely rounded-off maiden of eighteen
or twenty years could not be bought under about
£40. It was a loathsome sight to see the rich
old Arabs inspecting these girls as though they
were so much merchandise. The Arabs looked
dirty and generally had horribly diseased eyes,
upon which the flies settled ; they were too lazy
to brush them off. When I visited Zanzibar
thirty years afterwards I found that an English
cathedral had been erected on the site of the slave
market.

In chasing one dhow we went too near the
shore and bumped on a coral reef, whereby all our
false keel was knocked off and we leaked badly for
the remainder of the commission.

Our new Commander was a great success. He
gave us midshipmen plenty of boat-sailing, took
us on shore to play cricket, and encouraged sport
of every kind. He made us dress properly, and in
appearance set us a fine example. He took a long
time over his toilet, but when he did emerge from

SUNDAY ON BOARD SHIP 11

his cabin it was a beautiful sight, though he might
have worn a few less rings on his fingers.

The ship he absolutely transformed. All the
blacking was scraped off the masts and spars, and
canary-yellow substituted. The quarter-deck was
adorned with carving and gilt, the coamings of the
hatchways were all faced with satin-wood, the
gun-carriages were French-polished, and the shot
were painted blue with a gold band round them
and white top. Of course we could not have got
these shot into the guns had we wanted to fight,
but that was nothing. Some years afterwards the
Admiralty issued an order forbidding the painting
of shot and shell.

In a sailing ship the midshipmen were brought
into very close contact with the seamen, always
working with them aloft, on deck, and in boats.
This I think was a most desirable practice, as the
officers acquired at an early age that knowledge of
the men's customs and ideas which is really the
key to managing them. If officers nowadays
knew more about their men there would be
fewer defaulters.

One thing I learnt was how the sailor hated
Sunday. When he was turned out in the morning
it was — hurry out, it is Sunday ; hurry over dress-
ing, it is Sunday; hurry over breakfast, it is
Sunday ; get out of this, it is Sunday. At 9 A.M.
he was fallen-in on deck and his clothes were
inspected by his Lieutenant, whereby he might
get into trouble. Then the Captain walked round
and inspected clothes, and he again ran the risk of
something being wrong with his uniform. Then
the Captain went below and inspected every hole

c

12 ENTRY INTO THE NAVY

and corner of the ship. This occupied about two
hours, during which the men were left standing on
deck. At 11 o'clock there was church, which
generally was not over until after 12, so the men
got a cold dinner.

I learnt from the men what a godsend it
would be to them if they could only get an hour
on Sunday mornings to write letters, and when I
became a Captain 1 arranged for church always to
be over by 11 o'clock. By this means the men
got an hour to themselves, a hot dinner, and a
peaceful Sunday. It is a pity that all ships do not
adopt this routine.

In those days there were widely different
opinions about uniform, and great trouble was
caused. Some Captains encouraged men to orna-
ment their clothes with embroidery ; others did not
like it, so men had to cut it out again if they went
from one ship to another. Some Captains allowed
their officers to wear any fancy uniform they liked ;
others insisted on their wearing a blue frock-coat,
even on the West Coast of Africa. One Admiral
always wore a white billycock hat instead of a
uniform cap ; another wore a tall white Ascot hat.
There was no promotion by merit, all went by
patronage. Every Admiral on hauling down his
flag was allowed to make his Flag Lieutenant into
a Commander, and if a death vacancy occurred
on his station he could promote whom he liked —
generally a relative. Admiral Fremantle, in his
memoirs, says : " The young officer so promoted
often had no merit, and his promotion was a gross
injustice to those senior to him." * This was the

1 "The Navy as I have known it" (Cassell & Co.).

GUNROOM PUNISHMENTS 13

general opinion in the Navy, but the abuse con-
tinued until about 1880.

Our gunroom was sometimes conducted very
well. The youngsters who misbehaved themselves
were tried by the seniors, and if found guilty
" cobbed," that is, got two dozen smacks with a
dirk scabbard. If they had been reported to the
Captain they would have lost time, and their careers
in the Navy would, perhaps, have been spoiled.
The gun-room corrective while in operation hurt
the boy ; the service punishment hurt his career
and brought grief to his parents.

At Trincomalee we transferred the flag to
another frigate of 51 guns, the Glasgow, and
started under sail on our homeward voyage of
about 12,999 miles.

The night before reaching Sheerness, off Dunge-
ness, we had our second collision ; a steamer ran
into us and did a good deal of damage. Had we
been a merchant ship instead of a strongly built
frigate, we should have been sunk. The steamer
did not stop to ask how we were, but made off as
fast as she could. The Admiralty had great
difficulty in tracing her, but they eventually got
her.

On the 17th February, 1872, we paid off,
having been in commission for three and a half
years. To the midshipmen it was a sound three
and a half year's education in seamanship and in
travel. We had seen the ship twice go on shore,
and twice in a collision. This constituted my
introduction to the old Navy of the sailing-ship
days. Little did I think that I was to live to see
every familiar thing disappear, and to watch the

14 ENTRY INTO THE NAVY

growth of a new Navy, with marine turbines, high-
powered guns, automobile torpedoes, and to dis-
cuss the relative value of the Dreadnought and
the submarine.

At the expiration of my six weeks' leave, I
joined H.M.S. Hercules. She was our most
modern armoured ship, and carried fourteen 18-ton
guns. She could steam well, and the only blot
on her fighting capacity was that she had masts
and sails. The Navy did not in fact abandon
these relics of a past age till thirty years later :
it was thought to be a policy of economy, but it
was in fact one of real extravagance and folly. 1
was Signal Midshipman, and as we did a good
deal of manoeuvring I got some education in that
branch. Nothing of interest happened during the
year that I was in her, except that I experienced a
third collision. At Madeira the Northumberland
anchored ahead of us and parted her cable. She
fell across our ram, and we made a hole in her
that a horse and cart could have been driven into.
Fortunately the inner bottom saved her.

I was gazetted a Sub-Lieutenant on the 17th
December, 1872, and went to the Excellent and
the Naval College at Portsmouth to complete my
examinations. By July, 1873, these were finished,
and as the Ashantee War had broken out, I volun-
teered for service on the West Coast of Africa.
Commodore William Nathan Wrighte Hewett, V.C.,
was going out in the 10-gun screw frigate Active,
and he applied for me. There was, however, no
room for me in the ship, as she had already twelve
sub-lieutenants on board, so I took passage out in
a hospital ship and joined the Active at Cape

THE ASHANTEE WAR 15

Coast Castle. I was distressed that I could not
land with the Naval Brigade ; however, we people
who were left at the base had a busy time of it.

Sir Garnet Wolseley, who conducted the cam-
paign, arrived at Cape Coast Castle early in
October, and found that the Navy had done a
great deal to prepare the way for him. We under-
stood that this was his reason for taking a Naval
Brigade with him, leaving some of the troops
behind.

In December plenty of troops had arrived, but
the advance was delayed by the difficulty of getting
carriers, for the roads were impassable for vehicles
or mules. Each man carried 70 Ibs., a woman 40
Ibs., and a child 15 to 20 Ibs. for a distance of seven
miles. One woman gave birth to a baby en route ;
she put it in the bush. On her return she picked
it up, placed it in her empty packing case with a
bunch of bananas, and arrived at Cape Coast Castle,
smoking and smiling, with the packing case,
bananas, and baby on her head.

The Naval Brigade, under Commodore Hewett,
V.C., landed at the end of December, and on
the 6th February, Coomassie was entered and
burned, and peace followed on the 13th.

In the engagements, Lieutenant A. B. Crosbie,
R.M.L.I., Sub- Lieutenants Gerald Maltby and
Wyatt Rawson were wounded, and Sub-Lieutenant
Robert Munday was killed. Sub-Lieutenants
Ficklin and Bradshaw died of fever. Each of
these three young officers was an only son.

In this campaign the Active received the
following promotions and honours : Commo-
dore W. N. W. Hewett, V.C., to be K.C.B.,

16 ENTRY INTO THE NAVY

Staff-Surgeon Henry Fegan to be C.B., and Lieu-
tenant Adolphus Brett Crosbie was " mentioned."

At the conclusion of the campaign I broke my
leg, and was sent to hospital at the island of
Ascension. I soon got well, but could not go
back to my ship, so I had an opportunity of
studying this unique island. It is treated like a
man-of-war ; it has a captain, officers and crew,
with a few of their wives, but no other inhabitants.
If a baby is born on the island, its name is put on
the books and provisions allowed for it by the
Admiralty. There are no shops, but certain things
can be purchased at a canteen, and you buy your
clothes from the Cape of Good Hope, 1600 miles
distant. All the lower part of the island are lava
and clinker. In the centre stands Green Moun-
tain, a peak of cinder, from whose summit you
look down on the craters of about a dozen extinct
volcanoes. On the mountain the cinders, decom-
posing under the tropical sun's rays, have produced
a rich soil in which everything will flourish. I was
told that if you put your umbrella in the ground
it would grow.

The energetic naval inhabitants had put down
pheasants, partridges, and rabbits, and there were
about six hundred wild goats. I should think they
are there now, as they are very difficult to shoot.
I spent all day and every day stalking them, but
got very few.

We annexed the island when Napoleon went to
St. Helena, and the expense of keeping it up has
often been discussed. At the time we were there
the question of fortifying it was submitted to our
Commodore. We were told he was very much

PIRACY UP THE CONGO RIVER 17

against the proposal, and he suggested withdrawing
all the naval officers and men from the island and
leasing it to Messrs. Spiers and Pond for the turtle,
about three hundred and sixty of which were
turned in the year. They would have gladdened
the eyes of any City alderman.

The remaining part of 1874 brought the Active
some lively work. We got information that a
trading schooner, the Geraldine, while beating up
the Congo River, had got on shore, and had fallen
a victim to the pirates who infested the river. The
bandits had boarded the vessel, killed the crew, and
looted her. We went off at once at full speed and
anchored in the delta of the Congo.

On the following day, the Commodore, with a
small party of officers, proceeded up the river in a gun-
boat. We inspected the Geraldine, and found she
had been gutted ; the pirates had even commenced
stripping the copper off her bottom. We then
went on to a trading station about forty miles up, and
all the native chiefs were summoned to a palaver.

They arrived, armed, in war canoes ; we had
journeyed up without arms, notwithstanding the
apprehensions of the traders. Sir William Hewett,
however, did not know the meaning of fear.
Through our interpreter, he told them that unless
they produced at once the murderers, he would
later on, in the dry season, return and burn
every village from the mouth of the Congo to
where we were then. The chiefs refused to give
up the murderers (a decision which pleased us
young officers), so we returned to the Active, and
for the next few months were busy with prepara-
tions. All boats were plated with one-eighth inch

18 ENTRY INTO THE NAVY

steel plate from the gunwale two feet up ; guns,
rockets, provisions, and transport were provided.

At the end of August, the whole squadron,
consisting of the Active, Encounter ', Spiteful,
Merlin^ Foam, and Aerial, arrived in the Congo,
and the chiefs were again asked to surrender the
murderers. No reply being received, hostilities
were begun, and from the 30th of August to the
12th September, we were busy every day attack-
ing their villages and burning them. The villages
were generally situated up a creek off the river,
and these creeks were so overgrown with vegeta-
tion, that we had often to cut our way through, all
the time keeping up a brisk musketry fire into the
bush. The method of procedure was simple. On
nearing a village the boats carrying the guns
shelled the place all round as a preliminary to the
landing of the marines,1 who formed a cordon and
fired into the bush, while the remainder of the
brigade disembarked. An advance was then made,
firing the whole time. The villages were generally
found deserted and a search usually revealed some
relic of the Geraldine. Such operations ended
with the destruction of the village and canoes by
fire. Thus Sir William Hewett kept his promise
of burning everything from the entrance of the
river to Punta-da-Lenha. The lesson effectually
stopped piracy, and increased trade in the river.

At some of the villages the natives fired a great
deal, but our entire loss was only one killed and
six wounded. The forethought of the Commo-
dore in armouring our boats saved a great many

1 This was practically an artillery barrage, which, thought to be
new in 1917, was used in 1874.

STEAMBOAT SERVICE 19

casualties, as slugs discharged by the natives were
harmless against the steel plating.

I had command of the largest steamboat in our
flotilla. She was towed over from Ascension.
Our broadside fire was twenty-five marines on each
side, under the most able officer that I have ever
met in H.M. Navy, Lieutenant Adolphus Crosbie,
R. M.L.I. We were always the leading boat in
attacking and the last boat on leaving. The
marines were magnificent. At the boom of a
volley from the natives in the bush, which might
have meant death to them (as they were showing
well above the armour-plating), we always ducked.
The marines, on the other hand, did not move a
muscle, but came to the present at Crosbie's order
as if they were doing position drill.

At night the boat was sometimes a very trying
place to live in. Anchored up a creek, with a rain
awning over the top of the armour plating, no
fresh air could get in or foul air out, and the total
of seventy occupants inside, including thirty black
men, worked out at about ten cubic feet per man
— a condition which is, I understand, according to
the laws of hygiene, impossible for a human being
to live in. We managed to live, but it was not
pleasant, and I was always glad when the morning
came. We should have liked to bathe, but as a
crocodile rose to everything that was thrown over-
board bathing was not permissible. The hippo-
potami during the night were a source of annoyance ;
they breathe so noisily through their wide-opened
mouths. But though they came very near the
boats they did no harm.

After leaving the river the whole squadron

20 ENTRY INTO THE NAVY

suffered terribly from malarial poisoning, and two
officers and many men died, besides a large number
who were invalided.

Their Lordships the Commissioners of the
Admiralty signified their appreciation of the ex-
pedition by making the following promotions:
Sub-Lieutenant Percy Scott to be Lieutenant,
and Sub-Lieutenant A. C. Middlemas to be
Lieutenant.

In November, 1875, at Lagos, Commander
Verney Lovett Cameron came on board the ship,
having just completed a walk across Africa from
sea to sea. He started from Zanzibar in 1873
with two companions, to visit Dr. Livingstone. It
was their ill fate to find the famous explorer dead.
Captain Cameron completed his long walk alone,
his companion turning back. His walk as the
crow flies was 2000 miles ; by the route he took
it was 3000 miles. As the Americans say, it was
some walk !

Whereas 1874 and 1875 had produced plenty
of expeditions and promotions for the Active, 1876
opened peacefully, and the sub-lieutenants who
had recently joined complained of the humdrum
state of affairs. They had not long to wait for a
change. Before the end of January a letter arrived
from the Governor of Lagos, stating that the King
of Dahomey had been maltreating British subjects,
and asking for Naval assistance. The Commodore
—a man of action, if ever there was one — gave us
twenty-four hours to coal, provision, and fill up
with ammunition, and we were off at full speed
for Whydah, the port of Dahomey. We arrived
there in February, inquired into the case, and the

DECLARATION OF A BLOCKADE 21

King of Dahomey was ordered to pay a fine of
500 barrels of palm oil within three months on the
pain of a blockade of his coast. The fine was not
forthcoming, and the 1st July found us once more
anchored off Whydah with H.M.S. Spiteful and
H.M. Gunboat Ariel, and a blockade was declared.

The Commodore was full of fight, and " taking
Dahomey" was the only topic of conversation.
But we hung about Whydah for some time waiting
in vain for the authorities at home to make up
their minds as to what was to be done. The golden
opportunity of seizing Dahomey was lost, and as
subsequent events proved the task fell to the lot
of the French.

Whydah was not a very nice place to blockade,
as it is situated in about the hottest part of the
coast of Africa, and we were overjoyed when one
day a steamer came along with a signal flying —
" Important dispatch for you." The dispatch was
sent for, and in ten minutes steam was ordered for
full speed and preparations were at once commenced
for a landing party on a large scale.

What the official instructions disclosed was that
an English steamer had been attacked by natives
in the River Niger. The steamer had engaged in
regular trade up the river to the resentment of
the natives, who were determined to capture her.
Their method of attack was ingenious. As soon
as the vessel had passed the village of Akado, they
prepared for her return by stretching a rope across
the river — 150 yards at this spot — well securing
the ends of it round trees on the bank. I saw a
piece of this rope later and found it to have been
made of strong fibre plaited together so as to form

22 ENTRY INTO THE NAVY

a cable about eight inches in diameter. It was
kept on the surface by large cotton- wood floats.

In due course the steamer returned, and tried
to steam through the obstruction. The rope, how-
ever, stopped her, and immediately a murderous
fire from cannon and small arms was opened on
her and some of the crew were killed. Fortunately
the captain managed to cut the rope and the vessel
got clear.

We arrived off the mouth of the Niger on the
27th July, 1876, and our landing party, with guns
and rockets, were transferred to the gunboats
Cygnet and Ariel. The guns and their crews were
put on board the local steamer Sultan of Sokato.
On the following day the three ships proceeded up
the river to Akado, and found the ends of the
hawser, some well-dug rifle-pits, and three small
cannon. There being no sign of life, however, the
little squadron moved on to the town of Sabogrega.
Here, on attempting to land, the men were met
by fire from rifle-pits behind strong stockades. A
bombardment of the stockades was maintained
throughout the night and in the morning the
whole brigade were embarked in boats and at a
given signal dashed in under a heavy fire. The
stockade was carried, the native force driven back,
and the town burned.

Our losses were five officers wounded, one man
killed and nine wounded. Among the wounded
were the Commodore's secretary, Cecil Gibson,
and our chaplain, the Reverend Francis Lang.
They were not in the landing party, but seeing a
wounded seaman on the beach they pulled ashore
from the gunboat in a dinghy to bring him off.

RETURN TO PORTSMOUTH 23

A native in hiding fired at them while they were
lifting the man up and wounded them both very
severely.

Their Lordships marked their appreciation of
this expedition in the River Niger by promoting
Lieutenant Nesham to Commander, and Sub-
Lieutenants Harry Reynolds, John Casement,
Frank Thomas, and Bowden Triggs to Lieutenants.

We then returned to Whydah to assist in the
blockade, but the Commodore, as I have said,
could get no definite decision from the Govern-
ment and we left for the Cape of Good Hope.

In April, 1877, our eventful commission
terminated, and at Portsmouth Sir William
Hewett received a great ovation. He was cer-
tainly a wonderful man. In handling a ship
under sail he was a master sailor ; under fire he
was absolutely fearless ; and his boldness and swift-
ness in decision were equalled by his readiness to
take any and every responsibility. He had won
his Victoria Cross in the Crimea, and had seen
more war service than any officer in the Navy.
He was too go-ahead for the Admiralty, but
still, if we had gone to war, I am sure he would
have been put in command of the Fleet.

At the expiration of my leave, I went for a
short time to H.M.S. Warrior. We were guard-
ship at Cowes, as Queen Victoria was staying at
Osborne. One Sunday I had to take a dispatch
to her Majesty. 1 had delivered it, and was feel-
ing very proud of entering the portals of Osborne
House, when to my surprise the officer-in- waiting
told me not to go, as her Majesty might wish to
see me . A minute or two later he was conducting

24 ENTRY INTO THE NAVY

me to the lawn, where the Queen was sitting in a
chair with an awning looking through a pile of
correspondence. Her Majesty questioned me about
the ship, and then asked me how an officer named
Hyde was getting on, and whether I knew that he
lived at Osborne. I explained that my ignorance
on the matter was due to the short time I had been
in the ship. On my return I told Hyde, and he
said he and his brother had lived at Osborne under
the Queen's protection all their lives. His story
was a strange one. During the Crimean War the
Naval Brigade in returning to the coast passed the
scene of a massacre of some men, women, and
children. All were dead except two very young
boys, who were dreadfully wounded. The sailors
picked them up, took them to their ship, and they
gradually recovered. The question then arose what
was to be done with them, and her Majesty solved
the case by ordering them to be sent to England
and housing them at Osborne. They were called
Hyde after the captain of the ship which brought
them here. Her Majesty had them educated at
the Royal Naval School, New Cross, and they
eventually joined the Navy as clerks, and both
became assistant paymasters.

CHAPTER II

A CRUISE ROUND THE WORLD

Admiralty Attitude towards Gunnery — Uselessness of Inspection —
A typical Report of the Period — Course of Instruction on
H.M.S. Excellent — Mud Island — Convict Labour — A Scheme of
Drainage — Gunnery Lieutenant of H.M.S. Inconstant — A Training
Squadron — Masts and Sails — The Young Princes as Midshipmen
— The Boer War takes us to the Cape — Voyage to Australia —
Parting with the Bacchante — Invention of an Electrical Range
Transmitter — How the Admiralty regarded it — Back in Simon's
Bay — A Fire on Board — Putting out the Flames in a Diver's Dress.

THE gunnery of these days was deplorable, and
had been so for half a century. In the American
War of 1812-14, as a humiliating chapter in our
naval history records, we lost ship after ship owing
to the failure to practise our officers and men in
the use of their guns. One fine sailor, Captain
Broke, of the Shannon, taught his men to shoot
by putting over targets two or three times a week
and practising firing at them both with cannon
and small arms. He subsequently inflicted on the
Americans their first defeat ; it was by sheer good
shooting that the Shannon beat the Chesapeake.

This demonstration of what good gunnery could
achieve ought to have brought about an immediate
reform, but it was not until fifteen years after the
end of the war that the first real step was taken

25

26 A CRUISE ROUND THE WORLD

to educate the officers and men in using their guns.
In 1830, the Commissioners of the Admiralty de-
cided tentatively to allow H.M.S. Excellent, an old
74-gun line of battleship at Portsmouth, to be used
as a school for instruction in artillery. From 1830
to this date the Gunnery School at Portsmouth
has rendered yeoman service to the country by
endeavouring, against great opposition, to improve
the shooting of H.M. ships of war. In the Navy,
at the time I am speaking of, a knowledge of
gunnery was looked upon merely as an adjunct
to, and not as a necessary part of, an officer's
education. Those who knew nothing of gunnery,
and even boasted of the fact, laid the flattering
unction to their souls that they were practical
seamen. Gunnery officers were laughed at as
mere pedants and coiners of long words. Admiral
of the Fleet Sir Edward Seymour, in talking of
the Navy in 1852, says, " In those days the chief
things required in a man-of-war were smart men
aloft, cleanliness of the ship, the men's bedding
and her boats. Her gunnery was quite a secondary
thing."1

This view of what was needed in a man-of-war
survived in the Navy for half a century after the
date referred to by Sir Edward Seymour. For
many years the all-important event in each year
of a ship's commission was her inspection by the
Admiral, for if the ship was not clean, the Captain
would be superseded and the Executive Officer
would not be promoted. Gunnery did not matter.
The inspection report that went to the Admiralty

1 " My Naval Career and Travels," Sir E. H. Seymour, Admiral
of the Fleet : " The State of Gunnery."

AFTER FOUR CENTURIES 27

was in the form of a printed set of questions which
the Admiral had to answer, but it abstained from
all allusion to the state of efficiency or otherwise
of the ship in target practice with her guns. Ques-
tions on this subject were not added to the report
until the year 1903.

Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, in his book " Some
Recollections" (published in 1918), describes his
ship, the Pclorus, in 1857, as one of the first vessels
of the Navy to possess a gun-sight, and added that
it was then considered an epoch-making improve-
ment in naval gunnery. He tells us, further, that
the gun-mountings in H.M.S. Pelorus were of a
pattern practically identical with those used in
Queen Elizabeth's ships, and that the type survived
in the Navy for twenty years afterwards. This
pattern of mounting was in use when I joined the
Navy. It had a life of about four centuries, but
Sir Cyprian warns us that we must not infer
from this that the Admiralty were backward in
introducing improvements in ships' armaments —
although I point out in this volume that the Ad-
miralty in my time have been, and still are, very
backward in this respect. I cannot contradict Sir
Cyprian Bridge as to the attitude of the Admiralty
in 1857, but four hundred years for one pattern of
gun-mounting appears a long time ! It looks rather
like our clinging to masts and yards forty years
after they ought to have been abolished !

Sir Cyprian suggests that the stories which
have been current of late years as to the want
of attention to gunnery in the older Navy were
unworthy fabrications. That statement hits me
rather hard, because I have so frequently asserted

28 A CRUISE ROUND THE WORLD

the contrary, but in doing so I only took into con-
sideration my own fifty years' experience in the
Navy. This is the only mention that Sir Cyprian
makes of gunnery. His " Recollections," like
those of most of his contemporaries, consist largely
of descriptions, interesting descriptions, of the
places visited.

After an inspection in my early years it was
customary with many Admirals to send the Captain
of the ship a memorandum containing the gist of
the report dispatched to the Admiralty . If the
Admiral's memo, was unfavourable, it went into
the wraste-paper basket ; if favourable, copies of
it were made and circulated in the ship, and some-
times they got into the Press. Here is one copied
from the Naval and Military Record of September,
1902.

"H.M.S. Glory, Wei-Hai-Wei,

3rd of September, 1901.

" I have made the following remarks in
the report of the inspection of H.M.S. A street
under your command : —

" ' Ship's company of good physique, remark-
ably clean and well dressed ; state of bedding,
specially satisfactory.

" ' The stoker division formed a fine body
of clean and well-dressed men.

" ' At exercise the men moved very
smartly.

" ' The ship looks well inside and out, and
is very clean throughout. Her state is very
creditable to the Executive Officer, Sir Douglas
Brownrigg.

" < The tone of the ship generally seems to
me to be distinctly good.

H.M.S. EXCELLENT 29

"'Appearance of the Engine Rooms and
their appendages was very good.'

" (Signed) ,

"ADMIRAL."

This was a typical inspection of the period. It
contained no reference to the fact that the Astrcea
was one of the best shooting ships in the Navy,
nor did her captain and gunnery lieutenant get
one word of praise for all the trouble they had
taken to make the ship efficient as a fighting unit
of the Fleet. It was only her success in tailoring
and housemaiding and the state of the bedding
that secured commendation. No wonder that the
captains and gunnery officers of ships came to the
conclusion that they must devote their time and
attention to the appearance of ships and not to
battle-worthiness.

I have referred to this inspection report to
show how conservative the Navy was. Forty-nine
years had not changed what Sir Edward Seymour
says were the ideas in 1852 ; the cleanliness of
the ship and the state of the men's bedding were
still regarded as the most important factors of
efficiency.

In 1878 I joined H.M.S. Excellent to qualify
as a Gunnery Lieutenant. She was an old three-
decker, very badly found as regards the necessary
equipment for instruction in gunnery, so much so
that a lecture there on some particular weapon
generally concluded with the remark — "but this
is obsolete, and we have not got the new one to
show you." In those days a lieutenant qualified
in gunnery was an important asset in a man-of-
war. He was the only officer in the ship who

30 A CRUISE ROUND THE WORLD

knew anything about gunnery, and in an action he
would have had a great responsibility.

Our course of instruction was divided into two
parts — practical and theoretical. The former con-
sisted of learning how to load and fire the guns
and how to train the men, and was also concerned
with powder and ammunition and projectiles.
The theoretical part embraced differential and
integral calculus, conic sections, algebra, chemis-
try, physics, and a few other subjects with long
names. It was obvious that the practical part
should have been taken first as, in the event
of war breaking out, we thirty lieutenants could
have been sent to sea with sufficient practical
knowledge to manipulate the artillery. Our
instructor, a most brilliant lieutenant named Tyne
Ford Hammill, informed us that, although it was
wrong, we had to do the theoretical course first.
With a twinkle in his eye, he explained that the
defect had been pointed out, and that it would be
changed, but as the authorities did not move very
quickly in gunnery matters it would take time.
He was quite correct. The system was changed,
but not till twenty-six years afterwards.

The officers of H.M.S. Excellent took a great
interest in target practice ; it was carried out from
old gunboats, which were light and consequently
rolled a great deal. This made the practice very
difficult, and I think I can show that in those
days a good shot had to be born, he could not be
made.

The man who pointed the gun and fired it
stood about six feet in rear with a string in his hand
which, when pulled, fired the gun. On the gun

GUNNERY DIFFICULTIES 31

were two pieces of metal about four feet apart, one
was shaped like a V, the other like a V upside
down. To hit the mark the gun-layer had to pull

the string when the V, the inverted V, and the
target were all seen in one line from his eye. In
order to arrive at this all three must be seen very
distinctly. In other words, the eye had to see
three objects ; one at six feet, one at ten feet, and
the other at 3000 feet, all sharply defined. This
called upon the eye to do more than any camera
will do unless it is very much stopped down.
The eye is a very fine optical instrument and has
in certain circumstances sufficient range of focus
to comply with the requirements I have men-
tioned ; but it will only comply with these require-
ments under certain conditions of the stomach and
general state of health. We will call this having
the eye in order No. 1 necessity for hitting the
mark. The firer in those days had orders always
to fire as his gun was rolling upwards ; as the roll
would impart an upward movement to the shot,
he had to pull the string a little before the two V's
came in line with the target, but the roll varied, so
the " little before " varied and he had to judge how
much to allow. We will call this No. 2 necessity
for hitting the mark.

Then came the forward motion of the ship
from which the man was firing. This would cause
the shot to go forward and miss the mark, so he
had to have his V's a little behind the target when

32 A CRUISE ROUND THE WORLD

he pulled the string. This is No. 3 necessity for
hitting the mark. To acquire and put into practice
correctly these three requirements appears impos-
sible, but I have seen men place shot after shot
within a foot of a small flagstaff 1000 yards distant
from them. Truly the brain and eye can work
together in a wonderful manner.

Of many hundreds of seamen whom we trained
in shooting, one or two per cent, could do what I
have mentioned. The objective of the staff officers
of H.M.S. Excellent was to find some rules or
means of instruction that would increase the per-
centage of these men, but we landed on another
difficulty which quite stumped us.

A lieutenant — I wish I could remember his
name — pointed out that some men for the same
amount of roll fired earlier than others, but
obtained the same results; in other words, that
some men when they did a thing did it quicker
than others.

A very clever torpedo lieutenant of H.M.S.
Vernon took the matter up and declared that a
certain amount of time elapsed between the man
at the end of the string wishing to pull it and his
actually pulling it ; he described it to me that the
eye when the objects were in line telegraphed to
the brain that the string was to be pulled, the
brain telegraphed to the muscles of the hand to
pull it, and he pointed out that these two tele-
graphs occupied a certain amount of time, and
that this amount of time varied with different
people. To prove his theory a machine was made
— I think it was called the personal error machine.
Captain (afterwards Lord) Fisher, in explaining it

THE " FOOLOMETER " 33

to Queen Alexandra, called it the Foolometer, as
he said it measured how much of a fool you were ;
you thought you did a thing instantaneously but
you did not, and this machine registered how
much time elapsed between your thinking you had
done a thing and your doing it. The machine was
very simple, as far as my memory serves me, and
it is forty years ago. The person being tested was
told to pull a string when he saw the pointer move
of a galvanometer which was in front of him.

What happened was as follows : An electric
current was sent through the galvanometer which
caused the pointer to move ; it also caused a mark
to be made on a revolving cylinder. When the
person being tested pulled the string, it caused a
mark to be made on the cylinder. The distance
between the two marks represented the time that
elapsed between the eye seeing the pointer move
and the hand pulling the string.

This little lecture shows that the man who
pulled the string, or, as he was more commonly
called, the man behind the gun, had a lot to think
about.

The whole gunnery establishment consisted of
two line-of-battle ships (the Excellent being con-
nected by a bridge with the Calcutta), a very old
turret ship in which we learned turret drill, some
gunboats which, as I have said, took us out for
target practice, and an island where we were
taught infantry drill.

This island — Whale Island — which we very
appropriately called "Mud Island," has had a
peculiar history. In 1856 it was acquired by the
Admiralty, and subsequently was used as a

34 A CRUISE ROUND THE WORLD

dumping-ground for the mud and clay which was
excavated in forming the basins and docks of
Portsmouth Dockyard. One party of convicts in
the dockyard were employed in digging the clay
and harrowing it into railway trucks, which went
by a viaduct to Whale Island, where another party
of convicts emptied them. The whole island,
which is now of nearly 100 acres, has therefore been
twice in a wheelbarrow ; it seems almost too
colossal to believe, but, as nearly 1000 convicts
were working at it for about forty years, they
would move a very large amount. In depositing
the mud, no attempt was made to level it, or to
allow it to drain itself; and consequently the
whole place was a quagmire, only available for
drill after a long spell of dry weather. One small
portion which had been gravelled was capable of
being used at any time.

Being in those days anxious to keep in training
for running, I got the convicts to smooth down
a track about four feet broad and a quarter of a
mile round. They took great interest in it, filled
up the hollows, made little drains, and planted on it
every blade of grass they could secure. They even
arranged with their fellow convicts in the dock-
yards to collect carefully any grass they could find
and send it over. In a fortnight we had quite a
decent track. We then sowed it with grass seed,
and when it was sufficiently advanced, a party
of about fifteen of us used to go up to the island
at five in the morning to cut and roll it. It got
on so well that we were able to have athletic
sports. The success of the track suggested to me
that the whole might be levelled and drained, the

APPOINTED TO HM.S. INCOAWTANT 35

Excellent done away with, and a Gunnery Estab-
lishment built on the island. The ship was rotten
and would soon have had to be replaced by another ;
the expense of keeping her up was enormous, and
she was unsuitable in every way as a School of
Gunnery. I mentioned the idea to the authorities,
and they thought I had gone mad. It was con-
sidered to be the most ridiculous idea ever put
forward. " He wants us to live on Mud Island "
was the common chaff, and I could only retort that
some day the desire of all officers would be to live
on Mud Island. Events justified my prophecy,
and I was destined to return to Whale Island to
superintend the work of construction which was
to transform the mud flats into a great naval
establishment.

As to the Excellent, the one notable feature
of the School of Instruction was the diligence of
the officers and their zeal in striving against a sea
of opposition to improve the gunnery of H.M.
Navy.

Having completed the course, I served for a
year as an Instructing Lieutenant, and then
went to sea as Gunnery Lieutenant of H.M.S.
Inconstant, flagship of the Earl of Clanwilliam.
The squadron consisted of the Inconstant, Bac-
chante, Diamond and Topase, all fully-rigged
sailing ships. Prince Albert Victor and Prince
George (now King George V.) were serving as
midshipmen in the Bacchante.

The particular object of the squadron was to
train officers and men in the use of masts and sails,
which were very shortly to disappear and really
should have disappeared ten years before, since

36 A CRUISE ROUND THE WORLD

they hampered a ship in speed, and would have
been a severe encumbrance in an action. They
certainly afforded a fine gymnasium both for nerve
and body, and inculcated thought and resourceful-
ness, which were most valuable to men afterwards.
The sailoring sailor was not a machine. You
could teach him a certain amount, but he was
always having to use his brain to meet unexpected
difficulties as they presented themselves.

As a boy in the training ship he was taught
how to furl a sail on a jack-yard close down to the
deck. He found the yard laid pointing to the
wind, clewlines close up, and the sail, from con-
stant handling, as soft as a pocket handkerchief.
How easy it all was ! Then he went to sea and
discovered the difference. On a dark night, with
the ship rolling, he was awakened from his
slumbers by a scream " Topmen of the watch in
royals." In a pouring rain squall he had to feel
his way aloft to a yard 130 feet above the deck.
And when he and his mates got there what a
contrast to the training ship jack-yard ! The
sail is all aback, wet and as stiff as a board, the
clewlines have fouled, and perhaps one lift has
carried away. But the sail has to be furled, and
they think out some way of overcoming the diffi-
culties and furled it is. Fine training for a boy,
although it cost a good many lives !

The question of doing away with the masts
and sails was the theme of much discussion.
Those who favoured their abolition said that as we
should have no sails it was no use wasting time,
money and life, in training our officers and men to
use them. My gallant Captain declared that if

AN UNOPENED TELEGRAM 37

you wanted to make a jockey like Tod Sloan you
did not train him on a camel. What the argu-
ments were of those who wished to retain masts
and yards I do not exactly remember, but they
got their way, and the sinking of the Captain,
Eurydice and Atalanta, with a total of about 2000
officers and men in the prime of life, failed to alter
their opinion. Sails were not finally discarded
until after the sloop Condor went down in a gale
off Cape Flattery on 3rd December, 1901.

On the 16th October, 1880, we left Portsmouth
for a cruise round the world. The programme
was to visit Madeira, St. Vincent, Monte Video,
and the Falkland Islands, then sail round the
Horn to India, and return home by the Suez
Canal. The young Princes were to see the world.
We arrived at Monte Video on the 21st December,
and remained there until the 8th January, the
time being spent in entertainments of every
description. The Uruguayans are noted for their
hospitality.

Four days before we left for the Falkland
Islands, a telegram was sent by the Admiralty,
ordering us to proceed to the Cape of Good Hope
at full speed, and to prepare our brigade for
landing, as we were at war with the Boers. The
gentleman on shore who received this telegram
put it in his pocket and forgot to open it until
after we had left, so away we went 1400 miles in
a southerly direction instead of going east where
we were wanted.

When at length the telegram was opened
at Monte Video, a gunboat, the Swallow, was
dispatched with orders to try and catch us. The

38 A CRUISE ROUND THE WORLD

speed of the Swallow did not quite do justice
to her name. We reached the Falkland Islands
on the 25th January ; the Swallow arrived the
following day, and our Admiral the Earl of
Clanwilliam at once made a signal "Prepare for
immediately. Squadron is ordered to proceed to
the Cape of Good Hope with all dispatch."
During our 4000 miles voyage to the Cape of
twenty-two days, all preparations for landing an
expeditionary force were made. The men were
drilled and exercised in firing, our field guns were
got ready to land, and we could have put into the
field a very respectable force of about 1600 men.

On the 16th February we arrived at the Cape
of Good Hope and found that in December, when
we were enjoying ourselves at Monte Video, the
Boers had declared war upon us, and as we were,
as usual, unprepared they had been successful in
several engagements. In these circumstances we
doubled our efforts to make our brigade efficient
for landing, and hourly expected a telegram to
proceed to Natal and co-operate with the forces
there, for the military authorities were very short
of men and our 1600 might have turned the scale.
No more orders came, however, and we remained
at Simon's Bay, enjoying dances and dinner parties
while our troops suffered severe reverses at Laings
Neck and Majuba.

By the middle of March Sir Evelyn Wood, who
was in command, had sufficient troops to ensure
the defeat of the Boers, but the British Govern-
ment had meanwhile decided to make peace, and
the task thus left incomplete had to be undertaken
anew twenty years later.

THE TWO ROYAL MIDSHIPMEN 39

After peace had been signed, we lingered on at
the Cape until the 9th of April, when, to the
delight of every one, we weighed anchor and de-
parted on a 5000-mile voyage to Australia. On
the 12th May we arrived off Cape Lewen, and
during the night encountered some very heavy
weather. In the morning H.M.S. Bacchante, with
the two young Princes on board, was missing. We
spread out to search, and had a very anxious three
days, when fortunately we received a signal that
the Bacchante had put into Albany, in Western
Australia, her rudder having been disabled in the
gale.

A most pleasant six weeks followed at Mel-
bourne. Just before leaving their Royal Highnesses
joined the Inconstant, as the Bacchante (which
subsequently rejoined the squadron) was still under
repair at Albany, and we resumed our cruise,
visiting the Fiji Islands, Japan, China and Sing-
apore.

At Singapore we said good-bye to the Bacchante
with her royal midshipmen. She had been ordered
home via the Suez Canal, while we were to return
via the Cape. We had visited many interesting
places and seen much of the world. It had been a
sort of yachting cruise with endless entertainments.
Professionally we had spent two years in learning
how to manage a ship under sail, but I doubt if
any officer or man of the squadron was ever again
in a ship with sails. Our Captain, C. P. Fitzgerald,
was probably the most able seaman in the Navy
in regard to the management of sails. He could
work the Inconstant just like a yacht ; but it would
be no use mentioning some of the fine work I have

40 A CRUISE ROUND THE WORLD

seen him perform, because no one now would under-
stand or appreciate it.

In gunnery we were no worse than any other
ship. We fired sometimes, but the difficulty at
target practice was to communicate the range to
the guns. To overcome this obstacle I made an
electrical range transmitter, and submitted it to
the Admiralty in the following letter :—

" H.M.S. Inconstant,
"At Sea,

"3rd May, 1881.

" Sm,

" Having found great difficulty on board
this ship in getting the distance of the target
passed correctly from the masthead to the gun
deck, I have the honour to submit plans of an
Electrical Indicator which has been made on
board this ship, and seems to answer the
purpose satisfactorily.

" It consists of two dials, their faces marked
in hundreds of yards ; one is placed at the mast-
head or wherever the officer is stationed to
measure the distance, the other in the battery,
the two being connected by electric wires.

"As the distance alters, the observer at the
masthead moves the pointer of his dial to the
new figure ; the pointer of the battery dial
simultaneously makes a corresponding move-
ment, at the same time ringing a bell.

"The arrangement is exceedingly simple,
and though only roughly made on board this
ship by the armourer, it works well.

" I enclose a full explanation and drawings.
" I have the honour to be, sir,
" Your obedient servant,

"PERCY SCOTT,

"Lieut"

SLOW ADMINISTRATION 41

Fifteen months afterwards, on the 21st June,
1882, their Lordships wrote to the Admiral com-
manding the squadron: "You are to inform Lieu-
tenant Percy Scott that my Lords highly appreciate
the intelligence and zeal he has shown in the con-
struction of the instrument devised by him." On
my return to England, however, I found that my
invention had been pirated and patented by some
one else. Necessary as an instrument of this
description was for accurate firing, the Admiralty
did not supply it to the Service until twenty-five
years afterwards.1

In the middle of May we arrived at the Cape
of Good Hope and anchored in Simon's Bay, which
was so familiar to me. Simon's Bay was just the
same as I knew it ten years before. None of the
recommendations suggested by Sir William Hewett
for improving the dockyard had been carried out ;
there was not a fort of any description, nor was
there a dock or a railway in the place.

During our stay I went for a few days' leave to
Cape Town. On my return I found the ship was
on fire. At 8 p.m., a couple of hours earlier, dense
volumes of smoke arose from one of the after
compartments. It was found impossible to locate
the fire, and all the ship's fire appliances and fire
engines were engaged in pumping into the com-
partment, but as some of the water-tight manhole
doors were off for repair the whole of the after part
of the ship was being filled with water, and at the
same time no apparent effect was produced on the
flames. Efforts had also been made to get to

1 This is an illustration of methods of administration in 1881 ; but
things are not much better to-day.

42 A CRUISE ROUND THE WORLD

the fire by a man wearing the German smoke cap
supplied by the Admiralty for that purpose, but
he was nearly asphyxiated in the attempt.

Such was the situation on my return. Putting
on one of the caps, I went down myself and suc-
ceeded in discovering the seat of the outbreak.
But the labour of breathing in this horrible con-
trivance— with its gag in the mouth and goggles
that let the smoke through — left one without
strength to do any work. So I came up and got
into a diving dress. The dress and helmet were of
course very heavy, as they are made to withstand a
great pressure of water, and the descent of so many
ladders with this great weight was a difficult matter.
However, I got down with a hose and very soon
put the fire out. It had originated in one of the
storerooms where there were large kegs of butter,
lard, candles and the like. The butter was floating,
alight, on the water, and it only needed a little
water on the top of it to put an end to the mischief.
But with the extinguishing of the flames the light
went, and it was with some difficulty that I
managed to retrace my way through the dense
smoke by means of the air pipe.

During this ticklish operation the well-meaning
people on top kept on pulling my rope, which is
the ordinary signal to a diver to inquire if he is all
right. These jerks sometimes pulled me off a
ladder, and to be pulled over with one's head en-
cased in a tremendously heavy helmet was almost
enough to break one's back. Little wonder that I
got back pretty nearly done up. They carried me
clear of the smoke, unscrewed the face-plate of the
helmet, and found that I had enough energy left

A NEW TYPE OF SMOKE-DRESS 43

in me to express in forcible sea terms my opinion
of them for constantly jerking at my rope.

Incidents of this kind always teach a lesson of
one sort or another. On this occasion I learned
that the smoke- cap was of no use, that the only
way on board a ship to get at a fire and extinguish
it was to use the diver's dress, but that the diving
dress was too heavy, and that what we wanted was
some modification of it kept always ready in the
event of fire.

To meet the case, I had a light helmet made
out of a butter tin and attached to it a short coat
with a belt round the waist and bands round the
wrists. I tried this in smoke and it was most
satisfactory ; we adopted it in the Inconstant. I
have used it in every ship I have commanded since
that date, and have three times experienced its
efficacy in saving H.M. ships from destruction.
But the Admiralty did not bring it into use until
thirty years afterwards, though I am sure it would
frequently have proved of the greatest service in
all ships of war. The Captain of the Inconstant
reported on it in a letter as follows :

"H.M.S. Inconstant,
" Alexandria.

" 26th August, 1882.

" SIR,

" In compliance with your mems. of the
18th inst. directing a report to be made stating
whether the Service smoke-cap or respirator of
both patterns were tried on board this ship on
the occasion of the fire on the 5th of May last,
and with what result :

" I have the honour to report that both
were tried, with the result that they were found

44 A CRUISE ROUND THE WORLD

to be of very little use. The men appeared to
be able to breathe well enough through the
smoke- caps as long as they were standing still,
but directly they get excited and begin to take
violent exercise, as they are certain to do when
the ship is on fire, it appears that they are un-
able to get sufficient air to keep them from
choking. Possibly the medical profession
could explain in more elaborate terms the
reason for this result.

" Practically it was found during the fire on
board the Inconstant that the only apparatus by
which the fire could be approached was the
Service diving dress with air-pipe connected
and pump worked on the upper deck, but it
was found from the great weight of the helmet
and corslet and the cumbrous nature of the
dress movements were slow and but little work
could be done.

" Gun. Lieut. Percy Scott put on the
diving dress himself and descended into the
burning compartments and it was in conse-
quence of the experience gained upon this
occasion that he devised the ingenious, cheap,
and eminently practical modification of the
Service diving dress for use in case of fire, and
I venture to think that a few pounds expended
in furtherance of Lieut. Percy Scott's views,
might in all probability be the means of saving
one or perhaps more of H.M. ships from
destruction.

" I have the honour to be,

" Sir,
"Your ob. Servt,

" C. C. P. FITZGERALD,
" Captain.

"Ad. S. B. P. Seymour, G.C.B.,
" Commander-in-Chief."

AN ADMIRALTY REBUFF 45

Their Lordships thanked me for this inven-
tion, but added that they did not intend adopting
it, as the Loeb (German) smoke-cap appeared to
answer the purpose. This is just what it did
not do. The smoke helmet and coat was adopted
shortly afterwards by the New York Fire Brigade,
but it took the Admiralty, as I have said, thirty
years to come to a similar decision.

CHAPTER 111

WITH THE NAVAL BRIGADE IN EGYPT

Ordered to Alexandria — Naval Brigade Ashore — Collecting Unexploded\
Shell — Fleet's Deplorable Shooting — Improvisation — Mounting
7-ton Guns — Blowing up a Dam — Queen Victoria and her Troops
— Bluejackets and their Medals.

WE left the Cape of Good Hope on the 16th May,
1882, to proceed home, calling at St. Helena,
St. Vincent, and Gibraltar. At Gibraltar we
learned that disturbances had taken place in
Egypt, that the whole of the Mediterranean Fleet
was anchored off Alexandria, and that there would
probably be war. Again our Naval Brigade was
prepared for landing, coal and stores were taken in
with all dispatch, and we had high hopes that we
should be ordered to Alexandria. Four days
after our arrival at Gibraltar a signal was made,
" Inconstant proceed to Alexandria, calling at
Malta."

The delay at Gibraltar and further delays at
Malta and Cyprus brought us to Alexandria a
week too late to share in the bombardment. In
spite of that distressing fact, however, there was
still plenty of work to do and our brigade was
landed and remained on shore until the Battle of
Tel-el-Kebir terminated the war.

Arabi Pasha and his forces had already left the

46

THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGN 47

town and taken up a strongly entrenched line of
defence at Kafr Dowar : while the British Army
weakly held a position at Ramleh, a suburb a few
miles out of Alexandria. In these circumstances
it was still necessary to hold the forts and lines
of defence immediately round Alexandria, and part
of our men were employed for this purpose.

One detachment, under Lieut. H.S.H. Prince
Louis of Battenberg,1 occupied a position on the
left flank, and was quartered in the very much
knocked about Khedive's Palace. Another de-
tachment, under Lieut. Bourchier Wrey,2 went
out to the advanced lines at Ramleh ; and I,
with a detachment, took up quarters at Fort
Com-el-Dic.

The fort stood on high ground and commanded
a very extensive view. Our duty was to assist in
the defence of the lines if they were attacked, and
to maintain communication, by heliograph in the
daytime and by flashing lamp at night, with the
troops who were under Colonel Vandeleur.

I soon found that I was to be a sort of handy
Billy, and for anything that had to be done requisi-
tion was made on Com-el-Dic. The first thing I
was told to do was to collect all the unexploded
shell that had missed the forts and fallen into the
town during the bombardment. There were many
of them, of all sorts and sizes. Some from the
Inflexible 's 16-inch guns weighed 2000 Ibs. and
were very difficult to handle ; to get them out of
the houses we used mattresses and featherbeds.
Great care was necessary, as the fuses were in the

1 Now Admiral the Marquess of Milford Haven.

2 Afterwards Sir Bourchier Wrey, Bart.

48 WITH THE NAVAL BRIGADE

shells and an extra fall might send them off. An
attempt to take out the fuse of a shell had been
made with fatal results ; it exploded and killed
every one concerned. In carts well lined with soft
material we transferred these shells to a piece of
waste ground and buried them. An enormous
percentage of our shell failed to explode during
the bombardments, the reason being that they were
fired with reduced charges, and the construction of
the fuse was such that it would only operate when
a full charge was used,

Our next job was to go round all the forts that
had been bombarded, and bury the unexploded
shell. Our gunnery during the bombardment had
not been very good, and the town appeared to me
to have suffered more from the misses than the
forts had from the hits. I counted in the various
forts forty-two modern heavy guns, varying from
10-inch to 7-inch. Only ten of these had been
put out of action by gun-fire during a day's bom-
bardment from eight battleships carrying about
eighty guns varying from 16-inch to 7-inch, besides
a large number of lighter guns.

The Fleet fired in all 3000 rounds at the forts,
and as far as the enemy's guns were concerned
made ten hits. One would have thought that this
deplorable shooting would have brought home to
the Admiralty the necessity of some alteration in
our training for shooting, but it did not. They
were quite satisfied, inasmuch as it was better than
the Egyptian gunners' shooting. It certainly was,
for the ships of the Fleet, though at anchor for
most of the time, were not damaged to any extent.
But to be satisfied with our Fleet beating the

SOME BLUEJACKETS' COMMENTS 49

Egyptian gunners was not taking a very high
standard.

In one fort I found that some very good shoot-
ing had been made by 11 -inch guns, probably those
of the Temeraire. All round two of the guns
were strewn parts of 11 -inch projectiles fired by
our ships. One of these guns looked as if it
had been struck by a projectile on the top
near the trunnions, for the trunnion ring was
fractured. The other gun had received an 11 -inch
projectile on the underside of the embrasure,
and the front pivot was destroyed. Apparently
the Egyptian gunners paid no attention to this.
They fired it again, and from want of any hold-
ing down at the fore end it toppled over
backwards.

Bluejackets often say very quaint things, but,
without the customary adjectives, some of the
terseness of the remarks is lost. When gathering
up the unexploded projectiles in the town, we
found a gigantic 16-inch shell outside the door of
a baker's shop, but no external damage had been
done. A sailor gazed at it and remarked to

his mate, "I wonder how this thing came

here ; there is no hole anywhere." His mate
looked round, and seeing one of the extremely
narrow alleys of Alexandria behind him, replied,
" I suppose that it must have made this
street." As a matter of fact, it had come through
the roof, and the whole of the interior of the house
was wrecked.

On another occasion two bluejackets saw a
military officer approaching, wearing a belt with
a host of things, such as a knife, field-glasses,

50 WITH THE NAVAL BRIGADE

water-bottle, cigar-case, torch, etc., suspended from
it. Their conversation was as follows : " Bill, who
the - - is that ? " " Don't you know him ? Why,
he's the new Colonel." " Oh ! new Colonel, is he ?
Why, he only wants the candles to make him into
a regular Christmas-tree."

Arabi had mounted at Kafe Do war a 15- cm.
gun,1 which far outranged anything that we had.
As it was giving them an unpleasant time at
Ramleh, Sir Archibald Alison signalled to me to
come there, and when I arrived asked me if I could
manage to get a gun out of one of the forts which
would match this gun in range. He thought that
a 6 4 -pounder would be heavy enough, but his R.E.
and R.A. experts had said that it was impossible,
and he wanted it in position at Ramleh in four
days.

I galloped back to Com-el-Dic, turned the
company out, and with my two midshipmen,
Mark Kerr2 and Lacy, discussed the matter. I
knew that in Fort Pharos there was a large and
very serviceable sling waggon, and that Fort Ra-
saltin had three undamaged 7-in. 7-ton guns, which
were just double the size wanted by the General.
I sent Mark Kerr off with a party to get the sling
waggon, and Lacy with another party to get some
tackle, hydraulic jacks, and other stores which we
knew were in one of the forts. Meanwhile I went
to have a look at the guns. They were on a high
bank overlooking the sea, with a steep incline
behind them and a wall at the bottom of it. I
sat down opposite one of the guns, and think I

1 This gun is now at Whale Island, Portsmouth.

2 Afterwards Vice-Admiral Mark E. F. Kerr.

MOVING A 7-TON GUN 51

must have looked at it for an hour. Seven tons
of iron is a good weight to shift, but it had to
be done, for I had made up my mind that I
would not take out a lighter gun. Suddenly
I realised what a fool I was, and how easily
the thing could be done, and within the allotted
time.

Hurrying back to Com-el-Dic, I made some
drawings, requisitioned native labour to pull down
the wall during the night, and sent Mark Kerr to
arrange for a dozen cartloads of railway sleepers
to be at Rasaltin Fort on the following morn-
ing at daylight. Late that night I told Sir
Archibald Alison, whose quarters were at the
railway station just below Com-el-Dic Fort, that
I could get, within the prescribed time, a 7-ton
gun.

The next morning we dismounted the gun and
let it roll down the bank. We then secured it
under the sling waggon and took it across the city
to the railway station. This occupied all day, as
two or three times the road gave way under the
weight, and we had to unsling the gun, and with
hydraulic jacks get the wheel out of the hole. By
the next evening we had the slide, carriage, and
gun at Ramleh, and we mounted it in the following
manner. A platform of railway sleepers was put
down in the sand and the slide and carriage were
placed on it. To prevent the fore-end of the slide
jumping on firing, we fixed it down by chains
attached to heavy shot buried in the ground.
The 7-ton gun had to be detrained about a hun-
dred yards from the mounting and considerably
below its level. The problem was how to get this

52 WITH THE NAVAL BRIGADE

weight up the steep incline of sandy soil. On top
of the hill we made a very strong anchor out of
railway sleepers, which were let into the ground ;
attached to this was a block, with a hawser rove
through it, one end of which went to the gun and
the other to two locomotives on the railway line.
Two locomotives steaming ahead and more than
1000 men on the hawser meant some pull, and
the gun went up in double time.

Then came the difficulty of getting the 7-ton
gun on to its carriage. It required to be vertically
lifted about three feet. This we managed to do
by making an inclined plane of sleepers covered
with grease. Up this we shoved the gun with
hydraulic jacks. It took some time and some
shoving, but we got it in place.

On the 27th August we opened fire on Arabi's
works, and did great damage. The artist of our
brigade inscribed on the gun :—

"H.M.S. Inconstant.
Lay me true and load me tight
And HI play the Devil with Arabi's right. "

Subsequently Sir Archibald Alison wanted more
guns, so we brought up two more 7-ton guns and
mounted them on a hill near the waterworks.
With more time at our disposal we mounted these
more elaborately, burying a gun with its muzzle
upwards to form a front pivot. We made some
very good shooting with those weapons, and so did
Arabi at us. But his shells were perfectly harmless,
for they went deep into the soft sand and on
bursting only threw up a column of sand.

Just when the mounting of these guns was
finished, it was feared that Arabi might make an

BOMBARDING ARABIS LINE.

7-INCH 7-TON GUN, HASTILY MOUNTED AT RAMLEH.

7-INCH 7-TON GUN HASTILY MOUNTED AT RAMLEH.

[To face page 52.

RETURN TO PORTSMOUTH 53

advance upon us across the dry portion of Lake
Mariotis. It was therefore decided to flood this
portion. The scheme was to open the sea end
of the ditch round Fort Mex and allow the
water to flow through into Mariotis, but it meant
making a culvert in the railway embankment
and constructing a wall to ensure the water
going through the culvert. The Engineers under-
took to cut the culvert, and I, with the Inconstant 's
men, was to build the wall and finally to blow up
the dam at the sea end.

When the wall was finished, we well planted
the dam with guncotton mines, and took electric
leads from them to a point at a safe distance.
Admiral Sir William Dowell, K.C.B., came out to
do the final blow-up. He pressed the button, and
there was a gigantic explosion, followed by a
mighty rush of water. In a few days Mariotis
would have been flooded, but that very evening we
received orders to replace the dam again, as the
war was practically over, Tel-el-Kebir having
fallen on the 13th September.

On the 16th September, 1882, we returned
to the ship, and on the 26th left Alexandria for
Portsmouth, where we paid off in October.

Before leaving Alexandria Sir Evelyn Wood,
was kind enough to send for me, and read me
an extract from his dispatch : —

' ' 20th September, 1882.

" Men under the direction of Lieut. Scott
worked in a most praiseworthy manner in
mounting three 7-in. guns on the Water Tower
position. The sand being very heavy rendered

54 WITH THE NAVAL BRIGADE

the work most difficult. It is right I should
say that Major-Gen. Sir A. Alison had previous
to his departure spoken to me of Lieut. Scott's
work in the highest terms of praise. The
cutting of the Mex Dam was also an arduous
piece of work performed by Lieut. Scott and a
party of bluejackets."

From Major-General Sir Archibald Alison, K.C.B.

" Headquarters, 3rd Brigade,

" 30th August, 1882, 1 p.m.

"MY DEAR WOOD,

" I cannot leave this without sending you a
line to bring to your notice the excellent work
which Lieutenant Scott, of the Inconstant, has
rendered to me in bringing up heavy guns
under almost insuperable difficulties, in which
work he has been employed since the 1st inst.
He is one of those men with whom it is a
perfect pleasure to act ; he never makes diffi-
culties and never finds anything impossible. I
cannot too strongly recommend him to your
favourable notice. Excuse this line; every-
thing is packed and I have no writing materials
at hand. With all good wishes, and hoping
soon to see you up with us.

" Ever yours most sincerely,

" (Signed) A. ALISON."

Subsequently the Admiralty sent the following
communication : —

' e Duke of Wellington, Portsmouth,

" 9th November, 1882.

" Herewith you will receive an extract from
a Dispatch of Major Ardagh, C.B., R.E.,
bearing testimony to the valuable services
rendered by Lieutenant Scott, R.N., of H.M.S.

OFFICIAL COMMENDATIONS 55

Inconstant, and the men under his command, at
Ramleh.

" 2. This testimony to his skill and energy
is to be communicated to that officer, and he is
to be informed that their Lordships have much
pleasure in communicating it to him.
"(Signed) A. P. RYDER,

" Admiral, Commander-in- Chief.

" Captain Fitzgerald, H.M.S. Inconstant."

Extract from Report of Major J. C. Ardagh,
C.B., E.E.

" 17th October, 1882.

" Lieut. Scott, R.N., was employed under
me in arming the Ramleh position with heavy
guns belonging to the Egyptians, and got two
7-ton 7-in. rifled guns and a 40-pounder into
position. The difficulties attending the trans-
port of guns of this weight over the soft hills
of sand were got over in an incredibly short
space of time by the skill and efforts of
Lieutenant Scott and his bluejackets, and the
two heavy guns brought up by the Egyptians
to the Kafe Dowar position were held in check
until the surrender by the fire of these pieces.
" (Signed) J. C. ARDAGH,

"Major, R.E."

On the return of the troops, after the Egyptian
War, Queen Victoria graciously decided to receive
a contingent of the officers and men from every
ship and regiment that had served in the campaign,
and to present them with their medals personally.
I was made a sort of I-do-not-know-what of by the
men, who were collected from all parts of England.

56 WITH THE NAVAL BRIGADE

The Admiralty had arranged that they were to be
housed for the night at the Norfolk Hotel, close to
Paddington Station, and go on to Windsor the
next day.

The Admiralty informed me that I was to see
the men properly dressed and to explain to them
the etiquette of the occasion, which was to the
effect that they should, on coming opposite Her
Majesty, go down on the right knee, hold out
their right hand, receive their medal, then rise,
bow and be off.

We practised a few of the men at this cere-
monial, but it did not go very well. It was
evident that for the bluejacket to perform his part
gracefully a lot of practice would be necessary,
and bluejackets' Sunday trousers do not lend
themselves to bending down on the knee without
some risk of splitting. Perhaps fortunately, the
etiquette was altered, and late in the afternoon the
Admiralty informed me that the officers and men
would march by, receive their medal, and walk on.

I explained this alteration of the etiquette to a
boatswain's mate, and he conveyed it to the men
in the following terms, and in a voice which must
have made itself heard throughout the hotel.
" Now, do you 'ear there, the etiquette is altered ;
when you come opposite Her Majesty, you don't
go down on the knee, you stand up, take your 'at
off, hold your 'and out, and her Majesty puts your
medal in the palm. When you get it, don't go
examining it to see if it has got the proper name
on it, walk on : if it's not the right one, it will be
put square afterwards. It's like getting a pair of
boots from the ship's steward; if you get the

PRESENTATION OF MEDALS 57

wrong pair, it's rectified afterwards, you don't
argue about it at the time."

On the following day we went to Windsor.
We were assembled in the centre of a large
quadrangle, and when everything was ready Queen
Victoria came out and made a short speech. The
clearness and carrying power of Her Majesty's
voice was perfectly wonderful ; we all heard every
word, and the public who were on the other side
of the quadrangle could also hear. At the con-
clusion of the speech we all filed by and received
our medals.

CHAPTER IV

H.M.S. EDINBURGH AND WHALE ISLAND

H.M.S. Excellent again — King George's Gunnery Course — Improve-
ments in Big Gun Targets — Service on H.M.S. Duke of Edinburgh
— Making Ships look Pretty — Duke of Edinburgh's Interest in
Gunnery — Invention of a Signalling Lamp — How the Admiralty
treated it — Sinking of H.M.S. Sultan — A Unique Salvage Opera-
tion—Back to Whale Island— A Prophecy fulfilled— How a
Cricket Pitch converted the Admiralty — Convict Labour — A
Committee on Naval Uniform — A Naval Barnum — How the Royal
Naval Fund was instituted — Farewell to Whale Island.

IN 1883 I was appointed to H.M.S. Cambridge,
the School of Gunnery at Devonport. After
serving there six months, I was transferred to
H.M.S. Excellent, the Senior Gunnery School at
Portsmouth. Shortly after I arrived, I was told
that my idea of converting Whale Island into a
Gunnery School was well-known, and that it was
quite impossible ; a mud-heap the island had been
and a mud-heap it must remain.

This was not very encouraging, but I made
out a plan, showing barrack accommodation, with
all the necessary gun batteries and instruction
rooms, and laid it before Captain John Fisher
(now Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilver-
stone) who, after going most carefully into every
detail, took it to the Admiralty, and not only was
the conversion of Whale Island into a Gunnery

68

KING GEORGE AND GUNNERY 59

School accepted, but it was decided to begin the
work at once.

In 1885, King George V., as a Sub-Lieutenant,
joined the Excellent , to qualify in gunnery, and
I was appointed as his governor. His Majesty
passed most satisfactory examinations and dis-
played extraordinary proficiency as a rifle shot.

During the three years (1883 to 1886) that
Captain Fisher commanded the Excellent, great
strides were made in the introduction of breech-
loading and machine guns. An experimental
staff, which was much wanted, was brought into
existence, and the heavy-gun prize firing of the
Fleet was changed. Heretofore, ships had used
as a target a cask with a flag on it, and points
were awarded according to how much over or
short some one judged the misses to be. In
1884, Lieutenant Randolf Foote (later on an
Admiral), the Senior Lieutenant of the Excellent,
proposed that a large canvas target should be
used, and that only shots actually striking the
target should be counted. The firing ship was
to steam along a marked-out base line at a
known range. This proposal was adopted and
remained in force for twenty-one years. In those
days of the Excellent there was constant friction
between the Commander and First Lieutenant.
The Commander wanted to employ the men in
painting and housemaiding the ship; the First
Lieutenant wanted them employed in learning
gunnery, the raison d'etre of the men's presence
in the ship.

In 1886 I was promoted to Commander,
and shortly afterwards joined H.M.S. Duke of

F

60 H.M.S. EDINBURGH

Edinburgh , the most modern turret ship of that
time. With the co-operation of Lieutenant Peirse,
a very smart gunnery officer (afterwards Admiral
Sir R H. Peirse, K.C.B., M.V.O.), I started
training the officers and men in hitting the target,
using miniature rifles in the bores of the big guns,
and introduced many other appliances that are in
use to-day. But the innovation was not liked—
we were twenty years ahead of the times, and in
the end we had to do as others were doing. So
we gave up instruction in gunnery, spent money
on enamel paint, burnished up every bit of steel
on board, and soon got the reputation of being
a very smart ship. She was certainly very nice in
appearance. The nuts of all the bolts on the aft
deck were gilded, the magazine keys were electro-
plated, and statues of Mercury surmounted the
revolver racks. In short, nothing was left undone
to insure a good inspection.

In those days it was customary for a Com-
mander to spend half his pay, or more, in buying
paint to adorn H.M. ships, and it was the only
road to promotion. A ship had to look pretty ;
prettiness was necessary to promotion, and as the
Admiralty did not supply sufficient paint or
cleaning material for keeping the ship up to the
required standard, the officers had to find the
money for buying the necessary housemaiding
material. The prettiest ship I have ever seen was
the Alexandria. I was informed that £2000 had
been spent by the officers on her decoration.

In these circumstances it was no wonder that
the guns were not fired if it could be avoided, for
the powder then used had a most deleterious

THE AFT DECK OF H.M.S. " EDINBURGH," SHOWING THE DECORATIONS.

HOLYSTONING A DECK.

(Decks were wetted, then sanded, and bluejackets rubbed them with stones.)

[To face page 60.

A NEW SIGNALLING LAMP 61

effect on the paintwork, and one Commander who
had his whole ship enamelled told me that it cost
him £100 to repaint her after target practice.
Fortunately, target practice could easily be avoided ;
Admirals seldom asked any questions about it, as
their ships were generally the worst offenders.

The Duke of Edinburgh, who was then Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean, was an
exception to the general rule, and took a great
interest in gunnery ; but in the conditions then
prevailing — absence of competition, no encourage-
ment from the Admiralty, and the general impres-
sion in the Fleet that gunnery was of no importance
—it was impossible to improve matters.

As a Commander-in- Chief, the Duke of Edin-
burgh had, in my humble opinion, no equal. He
handled a Fleet magnificently, and introduced
many improvements in signals and manoeuvring.
At this period, when the Admiral wished to make
a signal at night to all the ships, about half a
dozen operators had to be employed making the
signal in different directions, so that all the ships
could see it. Even then it was difficult, as the
signalling lamp got mixed up with the other lights
in the ship.

It occurred to me that if we could put a light
on the top of the mast the ships all round would
see it, and that the difficulty of its being confused
with other lamps would be removed. Accordingly
I had a lamp made with a screen which we could
pull up and down by means of a wire, and so make
flashing signals. The Duke of Edinburgh adopted
it in his flagship, and many other ships copied it.

This lamp had an interesting career, extending

62 H.M.S. EDINBURGH

over many years. The authorities saw the utility
of it, but did not wish to adopt it — whether or not
because it was my invention is a matter on which
I will offer no opinion. So they turned it upside
down, christened it the " Gravity Lamp," and
introduced it for use in the Navy as their own
invention.

As soon as it came into general use, this lamp
proved a failure, as the shade, by its own weight,
would not cut off the light quickly enough, and
frequently would not fall at all. By way of
obviating the difficulty they put springs on the
top of it, but discovered there was insufficient
room for them. Finally, after years of trial and
waste of money, they were compelled to adopt my
original suggestion, and a lamp of this description
is still used by the British and other Navies of the
world.

The only interesting and instructive event that
took place during the Edinburgh's commission was
the salvage of H.M.S. Sultan, one of our finest
ships. She was practically raised by a French
engineer with a staff of twelve men, and his method
of raising her, novel at the time, is now recognised
and used by all salvage companies.

It was on the 6th March, 1889, that H.M.S.
Sultan, while practising firing torpedoes, struck on
a rock in the Comino Channel. Every endeavour
to tow her off failed, and seven days afterwards,
during a northerly gale, she was washed off the
rock and sank in 42 feet of water. An examination
of the hull of the vessel by divers, revealed that
the damages sustained were so excessive that all
hope of getting her up was abandoned. The

THE SALVAGE OF H.M.S. SULTAN 63

Admiralty offered £50,000 to any one who would
raise her and bring her into Malta Harbour, but
the representatives of two or three firms who
had a look at her agreed in regarding the task
as impossible.

Two months later, a French engineer, named
Chambon, who was employed in the Corinth Canal,
paid her a visit and, to the surprise of every one,
expressed an opinion that she could be raised quite
easily. A contract was at once made with the
Admiralty by which they were to pay £50,000 if
the Sultan was in Malta Harbour before the end of
the year.

Speculation was rife as to how many men-of-
war M. Chambon would require to assist him, and
how much plant he would bring. He required no
help, and arrived in a tiny steamer called the
Utile, with a total crew of twelve, six of whom
were divers. The only plant he brought was brains.

He started his work on the 24th June by
cautiously blasting away such rocks as were too
close to the ship's side to enable the work to be
undertaken on the holes that had been discovered.
The task of closing up the larger fractures in the
ship's bottom was then begun, and one by one the
holes were sealed up in the following ingenious
manner.

From templates taken by the divers of the
curvature of the ship's bottom in the vicinity of
the hole, a wooden frame was prepared. This was
sent down, and the divers secured it round the
hole. Across this frame planks were nailed, and
as each plank was put in its place, the space
between it and the plating was filled in with a

64 H.M.S. EDINBURGH

mixture of bricks, mortar, and cement, and thus
a solid sheathing was formed over the hole.

The excellence of this work can be seen from
the pictures on the opposite page ; it was a master-
piece of diving skill. Meanwhile the work of
making watertight the upper deck, including
hatchways, ports, and ventilators, was proceeded
with, and the various pumps put on board by the
dockyard were got ready for pumping her out.

At the end of a month, on the 27th July, all
the holes were sealed up, the pumps were started,
and the ship was lifted. Unfortunately a gale of
wind sprang up. The Sultan sank again, and, in
striking the bottom, did more damage to the hull.
This disheartening occurrence only strengthened
M. Chambon's indomitable energy. Directly the
weather moderated, the divers went down, repaired
the hull, and on the 17th August the pumps were
started and the Sultan floated.

Then followed catastrophe number two. While
she was being moved, the ship was caught by the
current, and knocked up against a rock, displacing
a patch. She filled, and sank for the third time.

The reports of the divers as to the extent of
the damage done by this third sinking were very
discouraging ; but nothing would deter M. Cham-
bon from completing his work. Renewed energy
was put into it, and, nine days afterwards, on the
26th August, the Sultan was up again and towed
into Malta Harbour. I was in charge of a large
party of men from the Edinburgh to assist in
docking and clearing her.

The ship must have been splendidly built.
After sinking three times and being on the bottom

EXTEMPORISED SHEATHING 65

66 H.M.S. EDINBURGH

for six months, she showed no signs of structural
weakness. As the water was pumped out, we
turned the engines and trained the guns, which
showed that she was not out of line. In a month
or two she steamed home.

At the Fleet Regatta we took the first prize
very easily with a boat which had been converted
into a model of our own ship. She steamed about
and fired her guns in a way that must have been
astonishing to the spectators who were not in the
secret of her internal economy. The method of
her working was this. Six men were employed in
turning crank handles, which revolved the screw
and sent the vessel ahead at a good speed. The
Captain steered her from forward with his head in
the pilot tower, and one man was allotted to each
turret, training it round and firing the guns, which
consisted of rifles in a tube. In the funnel was a
small fire to give her the appearance of being under
steam. Vessels similar to this one were used three
years afterwards at the Royal Naval Exhibition,
and twenty-five years afterwards, during the War,
I was asked to construct a dummy fleet.

My two years and six months in the Edinburgh
was a most enjoyable time — quite a yachting trip.
We visited all the places of interest in the Mediter-
ranean during the summer and spent most of the
winter at Malta. Sometimes we went away for a
shooting trip, and had excellent sport, I remember
that one day at Patras four guns got three
hundred he^i.

In February, 1890, I was obliged to say good-
bye to this most comfortable ship and her charming
officers. The Admiralty had taken the barracks at

COMMANDER OF H.M.S. EXCELLENT 67

Whale Island seriously in hand, and I was appointed
Commander of H.M.S. Excellent, to superintend
the bricks and mortar.

I found that my original plan for this island
had been much departed from. Instead of the
crescent right round the north side, a lot of
detached blocks were being built, and placed in
such a manner as to make expansion difficult.

Things generally were in rather a confused
state. As the Excellent would not hold all the
men, part of them had been sent to Whale Island
and part to a ship in the harbour. This was very
unsatisfactory, both for instruction and for dis-
cipline, and I persuaded the Captain (Captain
Pearson) to transfer every one to Whale Island.
Thus was fulfilled the prophecy I had made twelve
years before, that Mud Island would become the
Gunnery School of the Navy. We said good-bye
to the old ship that had served as a Gunnery
School for thirty-two years, and as she was eighty-
one years old it was time that she went.

The architectural aspect of Whale Island was
peculiar. Although many buildings had been
erected and many were in process of construction,
no attempt had been made to deal with the problem
of road-making, levelling and draining. To have
suggested such a scheme to the Admiralty would
have meant stopping it for ever, so I went to work
differently. By sending round a subscription list
to the Navy I got enough money to make a
thoroughly good cricket pitch in the centre of the
island. It was well drained and chalked under,
and stood out in wonderful contrast to the
quagmire of mud and dirt surrounding it.

68 H.M.S. EDINBURGH

Shortly after the completion of this pitch, their
Lordships, the Commissioners of the Admiralty,
visited the Island. I took them across to the
pitch ; they walked to it up to their ankles in mud,
and orders were promptly given for the island to
be drained and levelled. With the aid of four
hundred convicts the work proceeded very rapidly.

As my particular business was to attend to the
constructive works in progress at the time, and as
most of it was being done by this class of labour, I
had a good deal to do with the convicts. Those
employed at the island were all men under a long
sentence of imprisonment. Some were what the
chief warder called "lifers," but the majority of
them had committed no great crime, their fate
being rather due to their parentage and early
environment than to their own actions. They had
not committed a burglary or attempted murder—
they had not it in them to do so ; they were there
for an accumulation of thefts, most of them having
been brought up to thieve. Their minds were
wrong and their constitutions bad, and it was
probably only being in prison that saved them
from dying. To have put them into a lethal
chamber would have been far better for the
majority of them, and for the State.

The four hundred convicts working on Whale
Island were divided into gangs of twenty-five each,
and each gang was supervised by a warder equipped
with a sword and a whistle. In addition there
were about twelve outlying sentries with rifles.

The convicts worked with spades, shovels, crow-
bars, heavy hammers, and all sorts of tools with
which they could attack a warder, and I asked the

REFORM OF NAVAL UNIFORM 69

principal warder one day why the warders were
so seldom attacked, surrounded as they were by
men who could fell them at any moment. His
reply was to this effect : " Our safety is in their
blackguardism. An old convict knows that it is
no use attacking a warder. If he kills him he will
be hanged; if he even hurts him he will be
severely punished. The ' old 'un ' knows what
to do. He eggs on the novice to attack a warder
and agrees to support him in an attack. The
novice, falling into the trap, attacks a warder,
whereupon the ' old 'un ' downs him with his
spade and thereby gets a remission of his sentence.
That is the reason why we are so very seldom
attacked."

Convicts on the island were employed in every
description of work — as builders, carpenters and
blacksmiths, in making roads, erecting targets,
draining, levelling and railway work. Their work
was slow, but wonderfully good, and it was sur-
prising what interest they took in it. The principal
warder frequently pointed out to me how much
superior his men's work was to that of the con-
tractor.

Among the convicts were several well-educated
gentlemen of all professions, the Church not being
excepted. There was no lack of ability, and there
was even competition between the gangs in carry-
ing out their task ; the self- constituted leaders of
each gang made the remainder do their work well.

In 1880, during my period of service at Whale
Island, thle Prince of Wales called the attention
of the Admiralty to the state of naval uniform.
The officers were practically wearing what they

70 H.M.S. EDINBURGH

liked, and the regulations had not been revised for
many years. A committee was formed consisting
of the Duke of Edinburgh, Captain H. Boyes, and
myself, and I had to go up to London three days
a week to attend these deliberations, to the great
interruption of my work as Commander of the
Excellent. Interminable arguments went on in
the Navy as to what uniforms should be done away
with and what retained. We took the opinions of
an enormous number of officers, and fads and
fancies of all sorts were put before us.

Ultimately a very concise book of regulations
was drawn up, with copious illustrations, giving
the exact shape and dimensions of every article of
a naval officer's uniform. H.R.H. wanted pictures
of everything for, as he wisely said, they convey
much more than writing. The book has now been
in existence for twenty-three years. Very few
changes have since been found necessary, and we
no longer see naval officers in the various fancy
dresses in which they used to appear before the
committee's report.

In the following year, although I was very busy
in getting the new Gunnery School into order, I
was again called upon to act in a " side show."

A certain number of philanthropic gentlemen
wished to raise a fund to assist the widows and
orphans and other dependent relatives of seamen
who had lost their lives in the service of their
country. A very strong committee was formed,
with the Prince of Wales and the Duke of
Edinburgh as patrons, and it was decided to hold
a Naval Exhibition in London. I was put on the
committee and asked to suggest some novelties

A MIMIC NAVAL BATTLE 71

that would draw the people. 1 was to be a sort of
" Barnum."

The committee accepted my proposal to bring
150 men up from the Excellent, and give a field
gun display, such as is seen every year now at the
Naval and Military Tournament. My second
proposal was to build a lake for the purpose of a
mimic naval battle, using vessels of the same
description as that I made in H.M.S. Edinburgh,
as described on page 66.

This proposal met with a lot of opposition, as
the lake and surrounding stands were to cost over
£2000. The Duke of Edinburgh came to the
rescue, however, pointing out that the novelty of
a naval fight on the water was sure to prove
attractive, and that with stand accommodation for
500, and two daily performances, the exhibition
might reap a profit of more than £100 per day.
The scheme was then agreed to.

Lieutenant Lionel Wells, of H.M.S. Fernon,
greatly assisted me and introduced many new
features of naval warfare, including the firing of
a Whitehead torpedo. In the end it was found
the lake had well paid for itself and had made
more money than any other section. The exhibi-
tion indeed was a great success, and I believe had
a balance of £50,000 after paying all expenses.
This money was invested and the interest derived
from it is to this day used to afford assistance to
widows. The fund is called the Royal Naval Fund,
and the patron is H.M. the King,

In 1882 great strides were made in perfecting
Whale Island as a barracks, but its efficiency as a
School of Gunnery advanced but slowly. For bricks

72 H.M.S. EDINBURGH

and mortar there was plenty of money, but none
was ever forthcoming for providing us with the
necessary guns and ammunition for instruction.
Consequently the training of the officers and men,
for which the establishment existed, was not what
it ought to have been, though we did our best
with what material we could get. All our firing
was carried out at a cask with a flag on it, and the
qualification of the men's shooting was assessed on
where the misses went. In the Fleet at sea no
progress had been made in shooting with heavy
guns ; the appearance of the ships and the state
of their paintwork still remained the prime
consideration.

My time as Commander came to an end in
January, 1893, when I was promoted to Captain.
Three years of my career in the Navy had been
spent in striving to make Whale Island efficient in
barracks, comfort and discipline. I should add that
as all new appliances for naval warfare came to
Whale Island for trial, I was able to keep myself
up to date in gunnery matters, and then I was
appointed to the Ordnance Committee, on which
I served until 1896.

CHAPTER V

H.M.S. SOYLLA AND GUNNERY

In the Mediterranean again — Condition of Gunnery and Signalling —
Revolutionising Night Signalling — The Admiralty and Inventions
— A Source of Discouragement — The Boat that went Adrift — The
Scylla's Cruise— Improvement in Gunnery — A New Sub-calibre
Gun and Target — History of the " Dotter "—Prize Firing— The
Scylla's Triumph— Half-pay.

ON the 28th May, 1896, I was appointed Captain
of H.M.S. Scylla, a cruiser of 3400 tons, armed
with two 6-inch and six 4 "7-inch guns, and we left
England to join the flag of Admiral Sir Michael
Culme Seymour, G.C.B., the Commander-in-Chief
of the Mediterranean Fleet.

It was six years since I had left the Mediter-
ranean, and I expected to find great improvements
in the routine in gunnery and in signalling. To
my surprise everything was just as it had been ;
no advance had been made in any way, except in
the housemaiding of the ships. The state of the
paintwork was the one and only idea. To be the
cleanest ship in the Fleet was still the objective
for every one ; nothing else mattered.

The quarter's allowance of ammunition had to
be expended somehow, and the custom throughout
the Navy was to make a signal, "Spread for
target practice — expend a quarter's ammunition,
and rejoin my flag at such and such a time." The
ships of the Fleet radiated in all directions and got

73

74 H.M.S. SCYLLA AND GUNNERY

rid of their ammunition as quickly as they could.
How the ammunition was expended did not matter.
The orders to the ships were to expend a quarter's
ammunition, and the important thing was to get
the practice over and rejoin the flagship at the
time specified.

At the end of my first year in commission,
Admiral Sir John O. Hopkins was appointed to
command the Fleet, and I found that he had ideas
of fleet manoeuvres, gunnery and signalling far in
advance of any other Admiral with whom I had
served.

Night signalling had very little improved since
I was in H.M.S. Edinburgh, and though a lamp
on the truck had been introduced into the Navy,
it was too slow to be of much use. I found that
all the signalmen on board H.M.S. Scylla except
one, the yeoman, G. H. Glover, were quite un-
reliable in the work of taking in signals at night ;
and in October I put all the signalmen under
instruction. By day they were exercised with a
small venetian-blind shutter, which made the
shorts and longs of the Morse code, and by night
with the truck flashing lamp. The venetian-blind
idea was new, so the Admiralty " turned it down."
During the War twenty-six years afterwards, in
1917, it was resurrected and found to be very
useful ; it was also used horizontally for com-
municating with aeroplanes.

Reading 90 groups of five letters each, a total
of 450 letters, was rather a severe exercise. At
first we had to make it very slowly, and even then
there was a high percentage of mistakes. But
after two months' instruction the men were perfect.

PROGRESS IN SIGNALLING 75

They could read the 450 letters at almost telegraphic
speed, and their superiority over the other ships of
the Fleet was so marked that the Commander-in-
Chief called upon me to report :

(1) What steps I had taken to instruct the

signalmen of H.M.S. Scylla in night
signalling.

(2) To make any suggestions I could as regards

improving the instruction of the signalmen
of the Squadron.

(3) What apparatus I had used to bring about

such phenomenal results.

I drew up a full report on these points and the
Commander-in-Chief ordered the system of instruc-
tion to be adopted by the Mediterranean Squadron.
The energetic Flag Lieutenant (now Capt. H. G.
Sandiman) used to exercise the Fleet every night ;
competition was introduced and prizes were given
for special efficiency. In a very short time the
night signalling of the Squadron was completely
revolutionised ; it was found to be quicker and
more reliable than day signalling.

On the 17th September, 1898, the Flag Lieu-
tenant sent in the following report :

"H.M.S. Ramillies, Malta,

" 17th September, 1898.

" Sir,

" I have the honour to bring to your notice
that the present appliances supplied to H.M.
Navy for signalling at night are inadequate and
unsatisfactory.

" I. The Truck Lamp.
" Captain Percy Scott has invented an
electric truck flashing lantern which fulfils all

G

76 H.M.S. SCYLLA AND GUNNERY

requirements. The lantern consists of a lamp
surrounded by a series of slats as in a Venetian
blind ; when the operator presses a key these
slats turn radially to the light and so expose it ;
when he releases the key the light is obscured.

" These lamps have undergone a very severe
trial of from eighteen months to two years ;
they have proved themselves reliable, have been
used for general work, and all the night signal
exercises ; I attribute the high degree of accuracy
in night signals which the Squadron has arrived
at mainly to the fact of being able to exercise
the signalmen with a lamp which makes true
Morse at any rate of speed,

THE TRUCK PLASHING LAMP.

COLOMB'S MODIFIED FLASHING LAMP.

" II. Colomb's Flashing Lamp.
This lamp is rarely used

in

its present
form, on account of the following defects in it.

(1) The obscuration is incomplete.

(2) The travel of the shade is too long.

SEARCHLIGHT FLASHER MADE ON BOARD H.M.S. " SCYLLA."

[To face page 76.

A SERIES OF INVENTIONS 77

(3) The handle is inconveniently placed and
after a time gets too hot to hold.

" Captain Scott has invented a shutter to
overcome these defects ; it is worked by a suit-
able side lever, can be easily fitted to the
existing lanterns, and answers all requirements.

"III. Flashing Arrangements for Searchlight.

66 The obscuring disc supplied by the Service
is a most clumsy and unreliable contrivance.
The disc itself shuts off very little light. It
frequently carries away owing to excessive
heat ; the method of working it is irksome, the
lever being too high up, on the wrong side of
the projector, moving in a wrong direction, with
too long a beat.

" In fact everything that can be wrong is
wrong.

"Captain Scott has invented a shutter1 which
is placed in front of the lens ; it is worked by a
handle on the right, moving at a short beat and
in a suitable direction. It is a pleasure to
make Morse with it. Three have been on trial.
" In conclusion I would submit that the
following, which have been thoroughly tried,
be adopted in H.M. Service :

i. Captain Scott's cylinder lamp for use
on the truck and at each end of the
bridge.

ii. Captain Scott's shutter for existing
service lanterns, with alternative fitting
for oil or electric light,
iii. A flashing arrangement for searchlight
on the same principle as Captain Scott's
shutter.1

1 This machine was used by every ship of the Fleet during the
War, for signalling both by day or by night.

78 H.M.S. SCYLLA AND GUNNERY

" In view also of what I consider to be the
satisfactory state of the signalling of the
Squadron here, I submit that the scheme of
instruction and instruments which have brought
it about may be generally adopted in the
Fleet.

" The scheme was submitted to you by
Captain Scott early in 1897, and has been in
use ever since.

" H. G. SANDIMAN,

" Flag Lieutenant."

Important as the suggestions were it was many
years before they were acted on, and during that
time the appliance supplied to H.M. Navy for
signalling at night remained, in the Flag Lieu-
tenant's phrase, " inadequate and unsatisfactory."

In H.M. Navy an officer is allowed to patent
an invention, provided that he submits it to the
Admiralty and agrees to comply with some rather
drastic official conditions. On the 10th January,
1899, I applied to patent some of the machines I
had invented while in H.M.S. Scylla. Their
Lordships, on the 15th March, 1899, replied that
they were pleased to accede to my request, but
they added that the fact of my holding a number
of patents would, in their Lordships' opinion, con-
stitute a grave objection to my being selected for
any scientific or administrative post in H.M.
Service.

I discussed this letter with the Commander-in-
Chief, Sir John O. Hopkins, who had occupied
various positions on the Board of Admiralty and
knew their ways. He advised me, in the circum-
stances, to withdraw my application and not to

THE " SCYLLA " PATTERN OF INSTRUCTIONAL FLASHER BROUGHT INTO USE DURING

THE WAR,

[To face page 78.

MISTAKEN ADMIRALTY POLICY 79

send the Admiralty any more of my inventions.
I withdrew my application, but I am sorry to say
I did send the Admiralty some more inventions.
They were for a long time boycotted: and the
country lost the use of them.

The threat conveyed to me by their Lordships
was a distinct infraction of the King's Regulations.
Moreover, such an attitude was most harmful to
H.M. Navy, for it could only have the effect of
discouraging officers from thinking out and devising
mechanism for improving the efficiency of the
Fleet. The faculty of inventing or devising is a
valuable asset to the country, a fact fully demon-
strated by the Great War. Where, for example,
should we have been without the officers who
conceived the idea of Q ships and many other
ingenious devises for destroying submarines ?

The action of their Lordships, which practically
precluded me from patenting any of my inventions,
was freely discussed in the Fleet and much
criticised. The view taken was that, if the holding
of patents was prejudicial to an officer's career, then
officers could not patent anything, and they became,
in fact, debarred from exercising a right which is
otherwise common to all.

An officer, who was a real mechanical genius,
came to me for advice with regard to an exceed-
ingly clever device he had invented for improving
the efficiency of the Whitehead torpedo. He
pointed out to me that he knew it would be boy-
cotted if he submitted it officially, as that had
been the fate of most of his suggestions. Finally,
he decided to sell it to the Whitehead factory, and
that company having adopted it, brought it into

80 H.M.S. SCYLLA AND GUNNERY

use at once, and H.M. Navy benefited by its
introduction ! Such are the results of blind
officialism !

In 1897, at night, during a gale of wind the
flagship had a boat washed away, and there was
evidence of its having been much damaged before
it got adrift. Wood does not sink, and the remains,
after travelling some hundreds of miles, turned up
finally at Ajaccio in Corsica. Rather a fuss was
made about the incident, as the discovery in the
wrecked boat of a bluejacket's cap with the ribbon
of H.M.S. Ramillies started a rumour that an
attempt had been made to spy on the French
fortress. The Commander-in-Chief sent me to
explain matters and to bring back the remains of
the boat. The explanation was quite satisfactory
and the French gave me a most charming welcome.

The acting English Consul drove me round
and showed me all the places of interest in the
town, and we visited the house where the great
Napoleon was born. At the top of the street in
which this house stands is a statue of the five sons
of Madame -Napoleon, all kings, erected, as the
date inscribed on it shows, sixty years after her
death. Why, one wonders, did they not put it up
during her lifetime ? No other woman has ever
been the mother of five sons all of whom became
kings.

On our return voyage to Malta, my First Lieu-
tenant, a very able officer, named Pennant Lloyd,
pointed out to me that the recovered boat could
be very easily repaired by our carpenter, and that
we badly wanted a boat for rough work. After
this conversation I was not surprised to find that

THE GUNNERY PROBLEM 81

the boat on the following morning presented a
much worse appearance than when we found her.
On arrival at Malta a sort of Coroner's inquest
took place, the president being an officer who
afterwards became head of the London Fire
Brigade. My First Lieutenant argued strongly
that the boat was of no use except for firewood,
and eventually the Board took that view and she
was condemned to be broken up. Instead of
breaking her up, however, we patched her up,
and she did very useful work for a long time.

Gunnery was a difficult problem to attack.
There were no efficient targets, the gun sights
were bad, and the expenditure of ammunition had
to be carried out at stated times and under con-
ditions that afforded little scope for instruction.
Our sub-calibre gun was inaccurate and of very
little use for instructing the men. However truly
a man might lay his gun with it, the shot would
not necessarily hit the mark.

In such circumstances it was very difficult to
make any progress in rapid hitting. In 1897 and
1898 we complied with the general rules as to drill
and the expenditure of the quarterly allowance of
ammunition, and we carried out our prize firings
with very poor results.

In 1898 I was ordered to go for a cruise to
Crete and various places, and as the order meant
that I should be away from the Fleet for some
time, the Commander-in- Chief, Sir John Hopkins,
gave me permission to carry out any changes in
gunnery which I considered might improve the
shooting of the Scylla.

In Chapter II. I mentioned the three difficulties

82 H.M.S. SCYLLA AND GUNNERY

that the firer had to contend with. No. 3 had
disappeared, as a lateral correction had been added
to all gun sights. I therefore had to overcome
only the optical difficulty, and the necessity of
waiting for the ship to roll the alignment on.
Using a telescope as a gun sight would remove
the optical difficulties. It would give the firer
only one point to align on the target instead of
two ; he would be able to see the target more
distinctly, and he could adjust the focus of the
telescope to meet any imperfection of his eye.

To alter the existing gun sight was not difficult.
We simply pivoted a bar carrying a telescope on
the fore sight and allowed it to rest on the rear
sight. We experimented with this, using the one-
inch Admiralty pattern sub-calibre gun, and ob-
tained very bad results, which the men attributed
to the telescope. This threw me back a great deal,
as it wras difficult to convince them that the fault
rested with the sub-calibre gun and not with the
sight.

Opposite to Candia in Crete was an uninhabited
island which we made use of for many purposes.
I took the sub-calibre gun there, mounted it on
a rigid platform, and fired at a target. The eleva-
tion being the same for every round, all the shots
should have gone in approximately the same spot,
instead of which they went all over the place.
This demonstration proved to the men that their
erratic shooting was due to the gun and not to the
telescope sight, and thus restored confidence in the
gun sight. The one-inch sub-calibre gun supplied
by the Admiralty for instructional purposes only
we condemned as worse than useless. It was

8
^

*>

s,

A NEW SUB-CALIBRE GUN

88

relegated to the storeroom and never appeared
again.

Something had to be made to take its place.
The conditions which I wanted the new sub-calibre
gun to fulfil were —

(1) It should shoot straight.

(2) The same trigger that fired the gun should
fire the sub-calibre.

(3) It should be capable of loading and firing
with great rapidity.

To meet these requirements I had a disc made
to fit into the breach of the gun. In the centre of
it was fixed a rifle, the fore end of the barrel having
a cone-piece on it fitting into the bore of the gun.
An armature was attached to the rifle trigger and
an electro-magnet placed opposite to it, the wires
therefrom being taken to the trigger of the gun.

LEE-METFORD AIMING KIFLE IN THE GUN.

We thus had an accurately shooting rifle rigidly
fixed in the bore of the gun, and capable of being
fired by the ordinary gun mechanism. It was
brought into use for instructional purposes on
board the Scylla, and proved to be a great success.
Photographs and drawings of this sub-calibre rifle

84 H.M.S. SCYLLA AND GUNNERY

were sent to the Admiralty in 1898, but they
declined to adopt it. Had they done so the Navy
would have had an efficient instructional weapon
and the country would have been saved £40,000
a year in ammunition, the relative prices of the
cartridges of the one-inch and the Lee-Metford
being, one-inch, £110 per 1000, and Lee-Metford,
£4 per 1000. This rifle was generally adopted
in the Navy seven years afterwards. This delay
caused a waste of the country's money to the
extent of half a million sterling, and very much
retarded our progress in gunnery. Readers with
technical knowledge will ask why, if better results
were obtained from ammunition costing £4 per
1000 than from ammunition costing £110 per 1000,
was the suggestion not adopted ? The answer is,
that in Government offices they do not like sug-
gestions coming from outside which could have
originated in the office itself. It was the same
with all my proposals. They were all boycotted,
because the people — mostly my juniors in age,
and with far less experience — dealt with these
matters at the Admiralty, and felt aggrieved that
the suggestions had not emanated from themselves.
The accuracy obtained with this rifle in com-
bination with the telescope sight was marvellous,
but a difficulty cropped up. According to the
Admiralty drill the man who pointed the gun was
to adjust his sight ; that is, raise or lower it accord-
ing to where his shot went. But when using a
telescope the man had one eye at the telescope and
the other one shut, so he could not possibly adjust
the sight. To meet this difficulty I increased the
gun's crew by one man, whose duty was to raise

NEW TYPE OF TARGET 85

or lower the sight according to the orders of the
pointer. He was called the " sight-setter." The
Admiralty hauled me over the coals for the inno-
vation, but four years afterwards a sight-setter was
allowed to every gun in the Navy.

Our next trouble was that we had no towing
target — the Admiralty did not supply one. What
was required was a target that could be towed
rapidly past the ship, so as to exercise the men in
following it, and teach them to adjust their gun
sights in accordance with the speed of their own
ship and the speed of the target. Accordingly I
had a box made about 12 feet long and 9 inches in
section. It was filled with cork so as not to sink
when struck with bullets, it carried a flag, and a
keel was added underneath to keep the flag-staff
vertical, It would tow at very high speed, and
answered our purpose in every way, and we prac-
tised at it whenever we could get an opportunity.1

The next problem to solve was the provision of
a target at which to fire Service ammunition. The
target supplied by the Admiralty for the purpose
was of no use. It consisted of a triangular base
with a mast at each angle, and was canvassed all
round.

If you hit it the canvas behind made the hole
invisible, and it was no use trying to teach the
men to shoot if they could not see whether they
were hitting or not. So I made a new target,2
consisting simply of boards separated by iron rods,
two masts and a sail 6 feet by 6 feet. When this

1 Though much required in the Navy, the Admiralty would not
adopt it.

2 The Admiralty would not adopt it for six years. Then it came
into general use and is in use to this day.

86 H.M.S. SCYLLA AND GUNNERY

target was hit the hole made by the shot could
easily be seen.

With our telescope sight and efficient sub-
calibre gun, we fired thousands of rounds, and the
accuracy of aim went ahead by leaps and bounds.
One day, when there was a considerable swell and
the ship was rolling, we carried out some practice,
and the results were shocking, The firing was
very slow and, with the exception of one man, no
one put his shot anywhere near the target.

I watched this one man very carefully during
his firing, and saw that he could work his elevating
wheel with such dexterity and speed as to keep
his sight steady on the target notwithstanding the
rolling of the ship.

What one man could do intuitively the others
could be taught to do, but inasmuch as the ship
did not always roll, the difficulty was to find out
how to teach them. For some days I was at a
loss how to solve this final problem. It was a
serious one, for had we met an enemy in a seaway
our shooting would have been shockingly bad.
One man had demonstrated that in him, whatever
the cause might be (he had just had seven days
cells), there existed a union between his eye look-
ing through the telescope and his hand on the
elevating wheel which enabled him to work that
wheel in the right direction and at exactly the
correct speed to compensate for the roll of the
ship. How to make the other men like him ?
Fortunately it occurred to me that I could design
a contrivance with a target moving up and down
at about the same rate as a ship rolls, and compel
the pointer to manipulate his elevating wheel quick

THE "DOTTER" 87

enough to follow it. This contrivance was made,
and the men christened it the " Dotter."

A description of the arrangement may be of
interest. On a vertical board, opposite to the
muzzle of the gun, was a metal frame which, by
means of rollers and a handle, could be moved up
and down at either a slow or a fast rate. On this
frame was painted a bull's-eye, and beside it was a
card with a line drawn upon it. On the face of
the board, and moved either up or down by the
muzzle of the gun, was a carrier containing a
pencil. When the men under instruction pressed
the trigger of the gun the pencil, actuated by an
electrical contrivance, made a dot on the card, and
the pencil at the same time moved a space to the
right. If the gun was truly pointed at the bull's-
eye at the moment of firing, the dot would be in
line with the bull's-eye. If the gun was not truly
pointed, the amount of error was indicated on the
card.

At this machine the men were given constant
practice, and in a very short time they were able
to follow the target up and down with remarkable
accuracy. In other words they had all learned to
do what the one man had done intuitively.

The next time we went out firing there
was a considerable roll, but it made no differ-
ence to the men, whose shooting was admirable,
a fact which I attribute entirely to their course of
instruction at the " Dotter." We had got rid
of the second difficulty which I have referred to
on page 82.

On the 2nd September, 1898, I wrote to Sir
John Hopkins, thanking him for the great assistance

88 H.M.S. SCYLLA AND GUNNERY

he had given me in my endeavours to improve
the gunnery of H.M.S. Scylla, and I pointed out
that in our recent practices our shooting, owing to
the "Dotter," had so improved that at the next
prize firing I anticipated making seventy or eighty
per cent, of hits.

On the 26th May, 1899, we carried out our
prize firing. At that time independent umpires
were not considered necessary, but I took out
three with me, Captain R. B. Farquhar, of H.M.S.
Nymphe, and two lieutenants from H.M.S. Illus-
trious. The six 4*7 guns fired seventy rounds and
made fifty-six hits, which was exactly eighty per
cent., and placed the little cruiser Scylla at the top
of the Navy in heavy-gun shooting, and made a
record that had never been approached before.
H.M.S. Scylla also won the Mediterranean Chal-
lenge Cup for rifle shooting.

It was strange that although every station en-
couraged rifle shooting and had a challenge cup
for the best ship, on no station was a cup or
reward of any sort offered for the ship making the
most hits in heavy-gun shooting. Sir John
Hopkins, in December, 1888, offered to present a
cup, and I drew out a scale of points and regula-
tions for the competition. But he met with too
much opposition from the senior officers in the
Fleet to carry it through, and, unfortunately for the
Navy, his time as Commander-in-Chief was nearly
expiring. Had he remained a little longer on the
station, I feel sure that we should have seen intro-
duced under his command all the improvements in
gunnery for which we had to wait six long years.

On my return to England in June, 1899, I

:.

THE '' DOTTER.

[To face page 88.

DELAY AND WASTE 89

explained and submitted drawings to the Admiralty
of the " Dotter," and it went through the ordinary
Admiralty procedure. As in the case of my
flashing lamp, they tried to improve on it. On the
15th January, 1901, their Lordships wrote to the
Commander-in-Chief China Station: "Trials are
being carried out with an improved pattern of
Captain Scott's apparatus with a view of its intro-
duction and supply to the Service." In December,
1902, I saw the official pattern. All the "im-
proved " dotters had to be altered at great
expense, and we had lost three years of instruction
with the apparatus. Fifteen years after this the
Admiralty did the same thing in war-time with the
depth charge. An efficient pattern was submitted
to them, but a year was lost of its use because they
wanted to improve on it,

After paying off H.M.S. Scylla I was for a few
months on half-pay. What a shocking injustice is
half-pay to the officers of the Navy ! For instance,
a captain, fifty years old, after thirty-five years of
service in the Navy, with probably a wife and
family, received £4 7s. 6d. a week, less income tax
— not the wage of a decent mechanic or hard-
working miner.1

1 In July, 1919, this old injustice was at last remedied.

CHAPTER VI

HOW THE 4*7-INCH GUN REACHED LADYSMITH

In Command of H.M.S. Terrible— State of the Ship's Gunnery — Useless
Appliances — Making Good Defects — Arrival at the Cape — The
South African War — Deficiency in Long-Range Guns — Mounting
Naval Guns for Service Ashore — Why the 4*7 Guns were sent to
Ladysmith — Admiral Sir Robert Harris's Statements — A Recital
of the Facts — How the Mountings were turned out — The Value
of the 12-pounders — I am appointed Military Commandant of
Durban — Prince Christian Victor of Schleswig-Holstein — A Keen
Soldier — Assistance in the Defence of Durban — General Buller's
Visit— The Man-hauled 47— An Effective Object Lesson— Com-
munication with Ladysmith — Mounting the Terrible's Searchlight
Ashore — Successful Signalling.

AFTER a few months' leave I was sent for by
Mr. Goschen, the First Lord of the Admiralty,
and informed that I should be appointed to H.M.S.
Terrible and proceed, via the Suez Canal, to China,
where I should meet H.M.S. Powerful, a sister
ship, which we were to relieve. The Terrible was
what was known as a protected cruiser and the
largest of her type in the Navy, displacing 14,440
tons. She had attained a speed of 22-41 knots on
a four hours' trial, which was regarded as a won-
derful achievement. The Terrible mounted two
9*2-inch and twelve 6-inch guns.1

I did not much like the appointment, as I felt
sure that we should have war in South Africa, and

1 Later on — in 1903 — four more 6-inch guns were added.
90

WAR WITH THE TRANSVAAL 91

I hoped to get there somehow or other. The First
Lord declined to let me go out via the Cape, as all
the arrangements for both ships coaling at Port
Said had been made.

During the ensuing days, our relations with the
Transvaal Republic became still more strained, and
I made another application to go out via the Cape,
only to meet with a second refusal. It annoyed
me, as it seemed such a reasonable thing for the
two ships to be heading for the part of the world
where war seemed so probable — the Powerful
having already been ordered to the Cape — instead
of going in the opposite direction. At the last
moment something happened, and the next day,
the 18th September, 1899, I received a telegram
to proceed to China via the Cape of Good Hope.
We lost no time, and left on the 19th, calling at
Las Palmas and St. Helena for coal.

St. Helena was in a very bad way. Few ships
had called there, and, without any industry, the
island had no money. But my experience of
St. Helena is that when things are in a bad way,
something always turns up. I wondered what the
saving event would be this time. Six months later
the island was a very busy spot, with four thousand
Boer prisoners to feed and look after.

I found the ship's company of the Terrible
lamentably ignorant as regards gunnery, but very
keen on learning, and very anxious to equal the
Scylla's score, though they were rather dubious as
to whether it had ever really been made. Eighty
per cent, of hits looked so impossible to them in
those days.

No instructional apparatus was supplied by the

92 THE 47-IN. GUN AT LADYSMITH

Admiralty, but I took some out with rne, and
during the passage both officers and men were kept
busy in acquiring a knowledge of shooting, with
all descriptions of weapons from the revolver to the
9 '2-inch gun.

At this time, when no interest was taken in
ships hitting the target or not, the appliances for
laying the guns were deplorably bad. The guns
themselves were good, and the authorities seemed
to think that the matter ended there, and that the
gun sight, which is the all-important element in
hitting, was of no consequence.

From the fighting point of view, I made an
inspection of H.M.S. Terrible on leaving England,
and found that the gun sights of the 9*2 -inch guns
were wrongly constructed and unserviceable ; that
the gun sights of the 6-inch guns were unservice-
able, as they could not be adjusted with sufficient
accuracy ; and that as for the bowr guns put in for
firing when chasing an enemy, the object of pursuit
would be invisible through the sight, as the port
was not large enough, and the guns could not be
loaded for want of room to open the breech. These
defects applied not to H.M.S. Terrible alone, but
to every ship.

If we met an enemy I wanted to have a chance,
so the only thing to do was to alter these ridiculous
contrivances supplied by the Admiralty as best we
could. The low-power telescopes we replaced by
others of high power, and we made the cross-wires
by making free with the head of a midshipman who
had marvellously fine hair. In order to be able to
set the sight accurately for the range, I put on a
long pointer which gave a very open reading, and

THE IMPORTANCE OF GUN SIGHTS 93

made a new deflection arrangement so that it could
be adjusted by a sight-setter. A very good sight
was the result and many ships copied it. At the
bow guns I put up a looking-glass, which enabled
the layer to see through the other side of the port.
The 9 "2-inch gun sights were so bad that we could
do little with them. However, we managed to get
them accurate for our ordinary target-practice range.
Such defects as those enumerated arose from the
fact that gun sights were never properly tested ;
at the gunnery trials of the ship no aimed rounds
were fired. In fact, very often the gun sights were
not on board the ship. If the guns went off, the
authorities were satisfied ; whether they could hit
anything or not was regarded as a matter of no
importance.

On the 14th October, 1899, we arrived at the
Cape and learnt that the Boers had crossed our
frontier two days before. This meant war, and
attention had to be turned from preparing for a sea
fight to seeing what we could do to assist the Army.

The Boers had no navy, and it was quite im-
possible for any Power to send a fleet out to attack
us at the Cape. Hence the ship's guns were avail-
able if they were required by the Army. I was
surprised to find that the Navy had made no pro-
vision for mounting heavy guns to cope with the
superior artillery of the Boers. The omission was
contrary to tradition, as the Navy has always helped
the Army with big guns.

Our Army had no long-range weapons, and on
board the ship the only guns fitted on wheels for
shore work were short 12 -pounders, which were no
better than the Army guns. Curiously enough,

94 THE 47-IN. GUN AT LADYSMITH

these guns, specially supplied by the Admiralty for
land service work, were the only guns which the
Terrible did not use for land service.

After being twenty-four hours at the Cape, I
realised the seriousness of the situation. We had
insufficient troops to resist the Boer invasion ; our
base was 6000 miles from the scene of operations,
and we had no artillery to cope with the enemy's,
either in power or in range. It was the experience
of the Crimea and the Indian Mutiny and Egypt
over again.

We had on board long-range 12-pounder guns,
specially supplied for use against torpedo boats.
They were superior in range to any field artillery
that either we or the, Boers had in the field. It
occurred to me that there would be no difficulty
in mounting these guns on wheels for service on
shore. I purchased a pair of Cape waggon wheels
and an axle-tree, and made a sketch embodying
my rough ideas.

Mr. Johns, our excellent carpenter, remained
up all night with some of his shipwrights and black-
smiths hard at work, and in twenty-four hours we
had this little gun ready. To make sure that
everything was right, we fired a few rounds, and
the mounting behaved very well.

In a week we could have placed in the field
fifty of these guns, and, hitched up to the tail of
a Cape waggon which would serve as a limber for
the ammunition, I anticipated that they could go
anywhere, as was to be demonstrated later.

The mounting looked rather amateurish, and I
had great difficulty in convincing the authorities
that it was not a toy, and a still greater difficulty

THE GREAT EMERGENCY 95

in persuading them that long-range guns must be
met with long-range guns. In the face of much
obstruction I hammered away, and by the 25th
October four were ready, and as it turned out they
were badly wanted, for by that date Mafeking and
Kimberley were invested, and Sir George White
had retreated to Ladysmith and was threatened
with investment.

Much has been said and written about the two
4 '7-inch naval gnns that assisted in the defence of
Ladysmith. Replying for the Navy at a Mayoral
banquet, Admiral Sir R. Harris, who was Com-
mander-in-Chief at the Cape of Good Hope Station
at the time, was reported by a newspaper to have
said :

" On the 25th October at 4.30 p.m., to be
precise, a telegram came from Sir Walter Hely-
Hutchinson, the Governor of Natal, saying that
General Sir George White in Ladysmith found
his guns out-ranged by the Boer guns, and he
asked for naval guns. He (Admiral Harris)
telegraphed to the officer commanding the line
of communications, asking if he had mountings
for naval guns. The reply came that he had
not. Captain Lambton was dining with him.
Captain Percy Scott was lying outside in the
Terrible. He signalled to Captain Scott to see
what he could do. Captain Scott replied :
'Give me until 8 o'clock.' Admiral Harris
replied : < All right, I will.' And the next day
Captain Scott came along with his design for
the mountings of the gun."

In his book entitled "From Naval Cadet to
Admiral " (1913), Admiral Sir Robert Harris makes
the following reference to the guns :

THE 4-7-IN. GUN AT LADYSMITH

"On October 25th, at 1.30 p.m., the
Governor of Natal telegraphed to me—' Follow-
ing from Sir George White October 24 : " In
view of heavy guns being brought by General
Joubert from the north, I would suggest that
Navy be consulted with the view of their send-
ing here detachments of bluejackets with guns
firing heavy projectiles at long ranges." Very
fully realising the urgency of Sir George White's
position, I informed the G.O.C., Capetown that
I would supply two 4 '7-inch guns, and asked
him if he could supply shore mountings for
them. This latter question I put because I
knew that there were two 4 '7-inch guns mounted
on the Capetown defences. On his at once
answering in the negative, and the matter being
too pressing for any argument, I asked the
Gunnery Lieutenant of my flagship if he could
design or plan shore mountings for these guns
without any delay. He replied that he could
not. I then at once signalled for Captain Percy
Scott of the Terrible to come to me, and ex-
plained to him that I wanted temporary designs
to mount two 4 '7-inch guns on shore immedi-
ately, or at any rate by 8 a.m. to-morrow.
Captain Scott promptly replied — ' I will have
them ready by that time.' And he did

so."

These two accounts are misleading. I was not
sent for, and, although the urgent telegram arrived
at 4 p.m., I never heard anything of it until 9 p.m.,
and then only by pure accident. Had I known of
the telegram earlier, Captain Lambton could have
had four guns instead of two, and I could have
tested the mountings, demonstrating that there
was no need to concrete them down.

A FORTUNATE COINCIDENCE 97

Let me now relate what actually took place.

On the 25th October, 1899, I read in a Cape
evening paper that the powerful electric lights of
Kimberley could be seen from where our troops
were. It was obvious, therefore, that we could
establish communication by a flashing searchlight.
I made out a design for mounting a searchlight on
a railway truck, and signalled to the Admiral to
ask him if I could come and see him after dinner
with reference to it. He replied, " Yes." I little
thought that this visit to the Admiral, which was
prompted by what I read in an evening paper,
would result in getting two 47-inch guns into
Ladysmith in the nick of time, and that, had I not
read that local paper, Ladysmith would have had
no artillery to keep the Boer siege guns at such a
distance that they were unable to make accurate
firing.

At 9 p.m. my drawings of the searchlight on a
truck being complete, I visited the Admiral, ex-
plained the idea, and obtained his sanction to
proceeding with it.

The Admiral then informed me that he had
received an urgent telegram from Sir George
White in Ladysmith asking if it were possible for
the Navy to send him some long-range 4 '7-inch
guns, but that, having consulted his experts, he
found it was impossible to get mountings for them.
He had, therefore, decided to send the Powerful,
commanded by Captain the Hon. Hedworth
Lambton, at 5 o'clock on the following day, with
the four long-range 12-pounders which had been
mounted by me and were ready.

I pointed out that I could see no reason why

98 THE 47-IN. GUN AT LADYSMITH

Sir George White should not have the guns he
asked for. There was no more difficulty in making
a mounting for a 4 '7-inch gun than for a 12-
pounder ; in fact, it was easier. To the Admiral's
question whether I could have two ready by 5 p.m.
on the following day, I replied that I could, if the
Dockyard gave me every assistance. This being
agreed to, I returned to my ship and made out a
pencil drawing of the arrangement, which was very
simple.

I ordered an ink copy of the drawing to be
made for the Dockyard to work by. The task was
entrusted to an engineer lieutenant, the copy to
be ready by six o'clock in the morning. Owing
to some misinterpretation of my instructions, the
drawing had not been commenced when I called
for it in the morning. My pencil sketch was, how-
ever, quite good enough for the purpose, and I
mention this incident only because it was stated in
the Press that, although I conceived the idea of the
mounting, the details were worked out by an
engineer. I was further considered ungenerous for
not mentioning in* my dispatches the assistance
given me by this officer, and a question was
subsequently asked in Parliament.1

1 House of Commons, 20th Oct., 1902.— Sir William Allan asked
the First Lord of the Admiralty if he would state who designed the
gun carriage for the guns used in Ladysmith.

Reply : The gun carriages for the guns used at Ladysmith were
designed by Captain Percy Scott, and were constructed under his
immediate supervision.

Sir William Allan : May I ask the right hon. gentleman if he is
aware that the gun carriage was designed hy Assistant-Engineer
Roscrudge, and not by Captain Percy Scott ?

The First Lord : I am quite clear that the facts are as I have stated
them.

•8.

IMPROVISED GUN MOUNTINGS 99

In preparing the design I wished it to meet the
following requirements :—

I. The guns must be able to turn on the plat-
form, and fire in any direction.
II. The platform must be sufficiently stable not

to require concreting down.

III. The arrangement must be such that if the
gun was not required in one position, it
could be quickly transferred to another.

The first requirement I met by putting the
baulks in the form of a cross, which gave almost
equal stability all round, the second by using baulks
12 feet long, and the third by leaving the nuts of
the bolts on the top, so that the pedestal could be
quickly unscrewed.

The Dockyard worked well, and by 4 p.m. both
mountings were ready. Some " know-alls " were
quite certain that the platforms would require
concreting down. I was certain they would not,
but as I had not time to demonstrate this I took
the precaution of sending with the mountings
sixteen old 12-inch 600-lb. shot, and some chain,
with which to anchor down, if necessary, the ends
of the timbers.1

The Powerful left at 5 p.m. under full speed for
Durban, where the guns were entrained for Lady-
smith. Immediately on arrival the 12-pounders
were brought into action. They opened fire at
7000 yards on the Boer artillery, and kept it in
check while Sir George White was withdrawing
his own guns into the town.

1 Nine years afterwards I visited Ladysmith, and the Mayor told
me that no one had ever been able to solve the mystery of how these
12-inch shot got to Ladysmith.

100 THE 4-7-IN. GUN AT LADYSMITH

In this initial action, the Gunnery Lieutenant of
the Powerful, to whom I had given the instructions
for mounting the 47-inch guns, was unfortunately
killed, and the mounting of the guns fell into the
hands of some one else, who unfortunately concreted
them in, thereby destroying their mobility. This
mistake may have been due to the following
telegram sent by Admiral Sir Robert Harris :
" I am sending in Powerful, due at Durban on
the 29th, two 4'7-inch guns, on extemporised
mountings. Efficient SOLID PLATFORM accommo-
dation should be ready for them."

The day after the Powerful left we had another
mounting ready, and for the benefit of the wise-
acres who had doubted its stability and thought a
solid platform necessary, I fired the gun without
sinking the platform into the earth at all, with the
result that the platform did no more than jump
slightly. To test how long it took to dismantle
the mounting and take it to another position, we
fired a round in one position and in half an hour
had the gun ready for firing in another position
100 yards away, thus demonstrating that the
mounting fulfilled the conditions of mobility. A
great number of these mountings were used during
the late war.

These platform mountings were the best I
could do in the ten hours given me by Admiral
Sir Robert Harris, but as our Army had no heavy
guns at all, it was necessary to extemporise quickly
a more mobile mounting which would move with
troops in the field.

It was no good preparing an elaborate design.
I had to investigate the resources of the Dockyard,

A QUESTION OF AMMUNITION 101

and see what could be made quickly. In the
blacksmiths' shop I found some 4-inch square bar
iron. This settled the design, which I drew on
the door in chalk. The 4-inch bar was to be heated
and a hole worked in it of sufficient diameter to
receive the coned pedestal of a 4*7-inch gun mount-
ing, the ends being then drawn down and turned
for the wheels. In a minute the blacksmith was
under way making it. I then went over to the
plate shop, and found a circular piece of f-inch
plate about 4 feet in diameter, with a hole in
the middle of it. This was the very thing. Two
pieces of angle-iron worked round the edge of it to
carry a broad tyre, a brass box as a nave with a
few pieces of angle-iron radiating, and there was
the wheel. A wooden trail and the mounting was
complete. The Dockyard worked splendidly, and
in forty- eight hours we had a gun on wheels which
in range and accuracy was better than any weapon
which either the Boers or our Army had in the field.1

It was heavy, of course, but the guns on these
mountings could always keep up with any infantry
regiment. At Durban, later on, when time was
not so pressing, I had another carriage made, which
was much lighter.

After the relief of Ladysmith, when the
shortage of ammunition for the two 4 "7-inch guns
became generally known, a newspaper stated that
I was responsible for the limited amount of
ammunition sent into Ladysmith. I will make
it quite clear now that I was in no way responsible
for the shortage, that I used every endeavour to

1 Many guns were mounted on carriages similar to this one during
the late War.

102 THE 47-IN. GUN AT LADYSMITH

get more ammunition for them, and that had the
amount of ammunition which I pressed for gone
with the guns, Ladymith would not have suffered
as it did from the Boer bombardment.

On the 26th October, 1899, when the platforms
were being made at Simon's Bay, the question
arose as to what amount of ammunition Captain
Lambton should take with him for the two
guns. I suggested 5000 rounds, for the following
reasons : —

1. Simon's Bay was the base where the ammu-
nition was kept.

2. Plenty of ammunition was stored there.

3. The destination of the two guns was 1000
miles from Simon's Bay.

Captain Lambton agreed to my proposal, but
could not persuade Admiral Sir Robert Harris to
let him take more than one-tenth of this amount,
namely, 500 rounds. A 4 '7-inch gun can easily fire
ten rounds a minute; at this rate the two guns
could have used 500 rounds in about twenty-five
minutes.

The situation was very serious. More ammu-
nition had to be obtained somehow, so I advised
Captain Lambton, immediately on his arrival at
Durban, to take ammunition out of the ships that
were there, and say nothing to the Admiral about
it. This he agreed to do, and I felt more com-
fortable.

On my arrival at Durban six days afterwards,
the first question 1 asked the senior naval officer,
Captain Bearcroft, R.N., who received me, was,
"Did you give Lambton plenty of ammunition
out of the ships here ? "

AN UNFORTUNATE DELAY 103

He replied that Captain Lambton wired to
him for 500 rounds, that he got it out of the ship,
loaded it up, and had it ready to start, but he had
been so hauled over the coals for sending up two
12-pounders which Captain Lambton had wired
for, that he could not very well send off the
ammunition without the Admiral's permission.
The Admiral delayed in granting permission, and
when it did arrive, it was too late — the door of
Ladysmith was shut. I realised that Captain
Lambton was in Ladysmith for probably a pro-
longed siege, and that he had only 250 rounds of
ammunition per gun.

I examined the telegram book, and found as
follows : —

"31st October. From Captain Lambton
to Captain Bearcroft. ' Send immediately two
long 12-pounders to Maritzburg ; dispatch is
necessary. Send 500 rounds 4*7 ammunition.'

" 1st November, 1899. Admiral to Captain
Bearcroft. ' Guns should not have been sent
to Maritzburg without authority from me ; they
are to be returned to the Powerful forthwith.'

"1st November, 1899. Captain Bearcroft
to Admiral. ' Captain Lambton telegraphed
yesterday for 500 rounds of 4'7 ammunition.
Instructions are requested.'

" 1st November, 1899. Admiral to Captain
Bearcroft. ' No men, guns, or ammunition are
to be landed without permission from me.'

" 2nd November, 1899. Admiral to Captain
Bearcroft. Telegram 285. « Send 250 rounds
shrapnel shell and lyddite to Lambton ; re-
mainder will be sent in Puttiala arriving at
Durban on the 7th. Lambton has been in-
formed that ships at Durban are not under

104 THE 4-7-IN. GUN AT LADYSMITH

his orders and he must demand ammunition
from me."

The Admiral then appears to have altered his
mind, and decided to let Lambton have the
ammunition he had asked for. Later on the 2nd
of November came telegram 286. "In addition
to 250 rounds approved by telegram 285, send
250 rounds common shell."

Captain Bearcroft immediately on the receipt
of the Admiral's first telegram took 250 rounds
out of the truck he had loaded up and sent it on
by a special train to Ladysmith. On receipt
of the second telegram, he sent off the other 250
rounds by another special train. As stated, it was
too late, and both the trucks of ammunition were
sent back to Pietermaritzburg. Captain Lambton
had to go through a siege of 119 days with only
250 rounds of ammunition per gun. How ably
he eked out this very limited supply is mentioned
in Sir George White's dispatch :—

"Captain the Honourable H. Lambton, R.N.,1
reached Ladysmith in the nick of time. He
brought with him two 47-inch and four 12-
pounder guns, which proved to be the only
ordnance in my possession capable of equalling
in range the enemy's heavy guns. Although
the ammunition available was very limited,
Captain Lambton so economised it, that it
lasted out to the end of the siege (119 days),
and under his direction, the naval guns suc-
ceeded in keeping at a distance the enemy's
siege guns, a service which was of the utmost
importance."

1 Now Admiral of the Fleet Sir Hed worth Meux.

INVESTMENT OF THE GARRISON 105

But to return to my narrative : at Cape Town
I met Prince Christian Victor of Schleswig-
Holstein, who had come out to join his regiment,
the King's Royal Rifles, only to find it shut up
in Ladysmith.

The Prince told me he had volunteered to serve
anywhere pending the opportunity of joining his
regiment. He was a very keen soldier, but he was
a prince, and the authorities did not like to take
the responsibility of sending him to the Front.
He knew every gun the Boers had got, and was
one of the few officers I met who understood the
importance of heavy guns in the field, and who
fully realised our comparative impotency in regard
to artillery. After our interview, he wrote to me
that he had talked to more than one General about
heavy artillery, but could not get them to see that
Railhead would in many cases be our fighting
position, and that we could bring up guns of any
calibre we liked. Subsequent events showed how
sound were the views of this keen soldier.

By the end of October, 1899, Ladysmith was
shut in. The Boers were south of it at Tugela,
and there was nothing to prevent them marching
down and taking the undefended Durban.

Admiral Sir Robert Harris informed me that
the High Commissioner had appointed me Military
Commandant of Durban ; that I was to proceed
there in H.M.S. Terrible, and take what steps I
thought necessary to place the town in a defensive
position, utilising the Terrible's officers and men,
and the officers and men of the other ships stationed
there. I had, in fact, carte blanche to do any-
thing I could. We left Sirnonstown on the 3rd

106 THE 47-IN. GUN AT LADYSMITH

November, and I took all the campaigning stores
that I could lay my hands on.

Prince Christian Victor came round in the
ship with me, as the authorities at the Cape would
not take the responsibility of sending him to the
Front, and, with a plan of Durban which I had,
we discussed the best means of defending it. I
found my companion wonderfully quick in recog-
nising the vantage points which it would be essen-
tial to hold. We arrived at Durban on the 6th
November, and on the following day I rode
round the approaches to the town with the
Prince and Major Bousfield. We definitely settled
where the guns should be placed, arranging for
guides to pilot the various detachments to their
positions.

On the morning of the 8th the defence force,
consisting of 30 guns and 450 officers and men,
under the supreme command of Commander
Limpus, ranked up in the main street of Durban.
By ten o'clock the 100 bullocks and 60 horses were
spanned-in to the guns and waggons. Commander
Limpus reported that he was ready. I sounded
the advance from the Town Hall, the band played
" A Life on the Ocean Wave," and the little army
started. Prince Christian Victor, with the Mayor
of Durban and other civic dignitaries, watched the
procession with me from the Town Hall, and the
loyal Natalians cheered to the echo. The sailors,
in khaki and khaki-coloured straw hats, looked
very well. The officers were similarly dressed,
but carried a telescope instead of a sword. I
thought it would be more useful, and it turned
out to be so.

GENERAL BOTHA'S ADMISSION 107

By 4 p.m. all approaches to Durban by road or
rail, both east, north, and west, were guarded by
batteries, an armoured train was in readiness, and
I was able to wire to the Governor, Sir Walter
Hely Hutchinson, and to Admiral Sir Robert
Harris, that Durban was safe.

Nine years afterwards General Botha told me
that but for these guns he would have flown the
Vierkleur over the Town Hall at Durban, and he
certainly could have done so, for the Boers were
south of the Tugela in possession of the railway,
moving rapidly, and we had no army in Natal.
Indeed, Pietermaritzburg, the capital of the colony,
was considered in such jeopardy that the archives
were kept packed ready for dispatch to Durban.
Afterwards troops came in very rapidly and were
rushed through to Estcourt, and the Boers fell
back, eventually recrossing the Tugela.

Having assisted me .in making these disposi-
tions for defence, Prince Christian Victor left for
Pietermaritzburg in the vain hope of getting to
the scene, of the fighting north of Estcourt, and
on November 12th he wrote to me as follows :—

f ' Government House, Natal,

" November 12th, 1899.

" DEAR CAPTAIN SCOTT,

" I have been meaning to write for the past
few days to thank you for all you did for me,
and to say how much I appreciate your kind-
ness during the two days I spent on board the
Terrible.

"We were much relieved here at the arrival
of the troops, and I must say this battalion of
the West Yorks Regiment contains a splendid

108 THE 4-7-IN. GUN AT LADYSM1TH

body of men. I hear we get 12 battalions
of infantry, the Highland Brigade Light In-
fantry Brigade, and the English Brigade, so
that eventually we shall have 24 battalions of
infantry here ; we want guns, and I have im-
pressed H.E. with the importance of the naval
guns, and I think he is quite of my opinion.

" We understand that on Tuesday last they
attempted an attack on Ladysmith, and from
all accounts were repulsed with heavy loss. I
believe about 200 were killed ; all accounts
point to this number. I take it that in about
ten days' time we shall move forward to the
relief of Ladysmith, but all depends on our
artillery ; we must have guns ; T hope you
will arrange with General Clary to bring up
your guns.

" White wires the enemy have 22 guns of
superior calibre to his, and it is urgent to relieve
him as soon as possible. From what we can
gather, something has gone wrong in the Boer
camp ; they are very much depressed, but what
it is we cannot say ; I don't believe the rumour
of Joubert's death, and I don't know that it
would be a good thing for us, as he is old now
and is not a dasher.

" I think I shall be employed for a time
with General Hildyard ; he wants some one to
help him with his work ; it would suit me very
well.

" Yours very sincerely,

" CHRISTIAN VICTOR."

He next wired to me that he could not get to
the Front, and had nothing to do, I replied that
I was very hard pressed in starting martial law, and
had no military man with me, and that I could give

I GENERAL BULLER'S TELEGRAM 109

him plenty of work. Thereupon Prince Christian
Victor returned to Durban, joined my staff,
and greatly assisted me in framing rules and in
carrying out martial law. Then General Buller 's
arrival, towards the end of November, brought him
his longed-for opportunity. He proceeded to the
Front on the staff of General Hildyard, and took
part in all the battles up to the relief of Ladysmith.
As soon as he reached Durban, General Buller
examined a 47 gun. I told him the range, and
of some forced marches I had made the crews
do for exercise. One of these marches was as
follows. I wired to Commander Limpus — " Take
a 47 gun without oxen to Umgeni (6| miles),
fire a round, report time of leaving and time of
return." In five minutes, I got a reply — " Have
left " — and four hours afterwards I rode out to
meet them returning. They were almost back at
their camp, and coming up a hill. I have never
seen a finer sight. The 100 men were marching
magnificently, pulling for all they were worth.
It was November, that is to say, the height of
summer in Natal. Everything they had on was
sweated through. When they saw me they broke
into double time, and Commander Limpus, watch
in hand, said, " We shall do it in 4J hours," and they
did. This was enough for General Buller, and the
next day he wired to send the two 47-inch guns
and four 12-pounders to the Front, as soon as
possible. In our little camp the news was received
with cheers, and one sailor remarked that what
had done it was that " - —pull up from Umgeni."
I telegraphed to have a special train ready to start
at five p.m. and to clear the line (it was a single

110 THE 47 IN. GUN AT LADYSMITH

railway line) ; at a quarter to five I was at the
station, and at five o'clock to the minute, the train,
with guns, ammunition, officers, men and stores
steamed out of the station.

The General Manager of the Natal Government
Railways, Sir David Hunter, was a magnificent
man to deal with. Nothing was impossible with
him or even difficult, and no paper work was
required, nor had one to find an exacting official
to deal with. Any request that reached the works
got put in hand at once somehow, and they made
everything right for us, from gun mountings to
gun sights.

On the 28th November, General Buller wired
to me that I could call in the guns defending
Durban, put them where it was convenient for
the men, and where they would be given least
duty. This consideration for the men was
characteristic of General Buller, and made him
beloved by all who had the honour of serving
under him.

The railway works were so well found that
they were quite competent to make mountings
for 6-inch guns. I got out a design, and wrote
to General Buller asking him if he would like
some of these weapons. He replied that Admiral
Sir Robert Harris had made such a point of not
further denuding the ship of guns that he did not
like to ask him. I believe that if General Buller
had had six 6-inch guns at the Battle of Tugela,
Ladysmith would have been relieved three months
earlier than it was.

The only way that Ladysmith could com-
municate with us was by pigeon. Several owners

FURTHER ASSISTANCE NEEDED 111

of pigeons at Durban and the surroundings had
sent their birds into Ladysmith before it was
invested. These birds, with their message fixed
in a quill, were freed and at once made for their
home. If the home was in Durban, I got the
message quickly enough, but as some of the homes
they returned to were ten or twelve miles out of
the town, there was often a delay in the message
reaching me. Then I had to decipher it, and wire
it to General Buller. Only a very few pigeons
belonging to Ladysmith were in Durban. They
were soon used and we had no communication.

1 suggested to General Buller that I should
mount a searchlight on a truck as I had done to
get communication with Kimberley. He wired —
" Yes, as soon as possible. It is most necessary."
Anticipating his reply I had signalled to the
Terrible to send a searchlight on shore, with a
flasher which we had made on the venetian-blind
principle. On receipt of the General's telegram
I telephoned to Sir David Hunter that we wanted
a boiler and trucks. He replied, " We shall work
all night, and be ready to-morrow." I dispatched
my energetic torpedo officer, Lieutenant F. A.
Ogilvy, to find a dynamo. He found one in a
dredger and spent all night getting it out of her.
By noon the next day the installation was com-
plete, and the train steamed away to Frere. At
midnight Lieutenant Ogilvy wired to me — " Have
flashed a long cipher message from General Buller
to Sir George White." After this we had no
difficulty in communicating with Ladysmith.

General Buller found the long-range guns so
useful that he was continually telegraphing for

112 THE 4-7-IN. GUN AT LADYSM1TH

more, and by the 8th of December all had left
Durban, the total being two 4'7-inch guns and
sixteen long-range 12-pounders, all on the ex-
temporised carriages.

On the 15th December they were in action at
the Battle of Colenso, and General Buller in his
dispatch wrote : " Throughout the day the two
4-7-inch guns and four 12-pounder naval guns
were being admirably served, and succeeded in
silencing every one of the enemy's guns they could
locate."

For exceptional service during this battle, Mr.
E. B. Hutchinson, midshipman, and Mr. J.
Wright, gunner, of the Terrible, were awarded the
Conspicuous Service Cross.

CHAPTER VII

MARTIAL LAW IN DURBAN

Military Commandant of Durban — Multifarious Duties — Censorship :
an Effective Threat—The Spy Trouble— A Boer Agent's Claim for
Damages — Contraband Difficulties — The Bundesrath — Guns for
General Buller — A Gun Mounting in Fifty-six Hours — Hospital
Ships — Mr. Winston Churchill— Relief of Ladysmith — A Letter
from Sir Redvers Buller — Farewell to Durban.

WHEN I took over the military commandership
of Durban, there was scarcely a man left in the
town except those who, by nature of their
business in connection with the war, were pre-
cluded from going away to fight. The Colony of
Natal was loyal to the backbone.

Martial law had been proclaimed a few days
before I became Commandant by my predecessor,
Colonel Bethune. He had ordered all the native
drinking places to be closed at 9.30 p.m., and no
one was allowed outside their houses after eleven
p.m., unless they had a pass signed by the Com-
mandant. Owing to the absence of my predecessor,
this order for the few days it had been in existence
had not been very rigidly enforced.

1 spoke to the head of the police, and about
forty people spent a night in gaol. The next
night at a quarter to eleven, I made a tour of the
town with Superintendent Alexander. Everybody
was on the run, and when eleven o'clock struck,

113

114 MARTIAL LAW IN DURBAN

the town of Durban was like a city of the dead.
These satisfactory conditions continued throughout
the period of my command.

The law was very necessary. The number of
police was limited, and the town was full of spies
and criminals sent down from Pretoria and Johan-
nesburg when war broke out.

The inhabitants were not inconvenienced, as
passes were liberally given. On the other hand,
burglary and drunken brawls disappeared, and the
Magistrate, who generally had a busy time, told
me that he had no cases.

One night I was arrested by a policeman — a
new hand who did not know me. I had no pass.
He said, " You do not look a bad 'un, but my
orders are ' No pass, police station,' so come along."
At the station I was recognised, so they let me off.
I made a note in the charge book commending the
constable for doing his duty so well. Super-
intendent Alexander told me that after this remark
I should be well looked after, and I was. Police-
men appeared to spring up everywhere with
" Halt, your pass, please."

As an office in Durban, I used the Drill Hall,
and my staff consisted of Major Bousfield, of the
Durban Light Infantry ; Mr. Alexander, Super-
intendent of the Police ; Captain Frazer, who
acted as Press Censor ; Mr. E. H. Brooke, of the
Criminal Investigation Department ; Assistant-
Paymaster W. F. Cullinan, R.N., who was my
secretary, and Mr. R. A. Laycock, clerk, R.N.

Major Bousfield was a barrister with a large
practice. Unable to go to the Front with his
regiment on account of his health, he determined

A PRESS CENSORSHIP 115

to assist in the war somehow or other, and gave up
his business to join my staff. He worked from
nine in the morning till, very often, twelve at
night, and his services were afterwards rewarded
with a C.M.G.

Captain Frazer looked after the Press and
opened all the letters, from which we derived a
great deal of information. Some we re-posted,
some we kept, and these I sent on to the Governor,
Sir Walter Hely Hutchinson, who was making a
collection of them. The language in some of
them, especially those from ladies, was shocking.
One lady writing from Pretoria to a friend, said
that the British prisoners taken outside Ladysmith
had just come in, and explained what she would
like to do to each British officer.

Orders were given to the Press that all matter
relating to the war must go to the Censor. The
editor of one of the Durban papers called on me
and asked what would happen if they put in some-
thing without the Censor passing it. I explained
that one of my sailors would come round to his
office and chalk up on the door " Shut." That
was all that would happen. He bowed politely
and echoed, " Oh ! that is all that would happen."
The Press were really very good. I only once had
to put this rather drastic rule into operation.

In ordinary law a person is considered innocent
until he is proved guilty. In martial law, the boot
is on the other leg. The person is considered
guilty until he can prove his innocence. This
fundamental principle gave me facilities for dealing
with the suspects and spies, and we very soon had
them all safely lodged in the prison.

116 MARTIAL LAW IN DURBAN

A rumour got about that I had condemned
one of these suspects, a Mr. Marks, to be shot, and
the Boer Government wrote to say that if he were
shot, they would shoot six British officers. The
Imperial Government had to inform them that
this would be a violation of the recognised custom
of warfare. As to Mr. Marks, there was never
any intention of shooting him ; he was only being
taken care of.

In Durban there were many Boer agents who
attempted to buy war requisites, and send them to
the Portuguese town of Lorenzo Marques, whence
they would be dispatched to Pretoria.

For a few days we did not know how these
agents communicated with Pretoria, since their
letters did not go through the post. Mr. Sergeant
Brooke, who always found out everything, one day
brought me some letters incriminating two of the
agents.

He informed me that their procedure had
been to go on board the, steamer just before she
left for Lorenzo Marques and put the letters into
the ship's box, thus evading the censorship. One
of the pair, a Mr. X, as I would not let him go
back to Lorenzo Marques, asked leave to go to
Capetown on account of his health. I could not
withhold permission, and having reached Capetown
he took legal proceedings against me, claiming
£15,000 damages. Field-Marshal Lord Roberts
sent the claim on to me, and requested that I
would wire if I had a satisfactory answer to give.
I telegraphed to that effect, and in my subsequent
reply was able to answer each paragraph of the
lawyer's communication by quoting from his (Mr.

A CURIOUS INCIDENT 117

X's) own letters which, quite unknown to him,
had come into our possession. Two of the para-
graphs were as follows :—

The Lawyer's Letter. Extracts from Mr. X.'s Letter to his

" Our client is a loyal British *"*»" in Lorenzo Mar^ms'
subject trading at Lorenzo Mar- " Wire Pretoria that I have got
ques. He went to Durban solely the flour. It will leave here in
for the benefit of his health, and Saturday's boat. Be careful what
with no intention of procuring you write, as all letters are ex-
flour for the Boers. arained.

f 'Our client, finding it was ne- "They have got something,
cessary for him to obtain permission Your letters will get me into
from the Commandant to return prison. The flour, just before the
to Lorenzo Marques, called upon boat left, was taken out by order
Captain Percy Scott, and was of the Commandant. I have to pay
astonished at being told that he for shipping and unshipping it,
could not return." and now it is on my hands. I

very much doubt if I shall be able
to get back. I have to see the
Commandant to-morrow."

Mr. X's letters and those from his partner
clearly showed that they were procuring flour for
the Boers, who were short of the commodity and
paying very high prices for it.

I ended my letter by suggesting that if Mr. X
made any further claim, he should be prosecuted
for perjury.

The Field-Marshal wired to me that my reply
was quite satisfactory, and that Mr. X had been
informed in the sense of the last paragraph of my
letter.

The currency business gave us a lot of trouble
until an order given by Sir Alfred Milner,1 put
matters right. The Boer agents had brought all
their money down with them in Transvaal notes,

1 Afterwards Viscount Milner.

118 MARTIAL LAW IN DURBAN

and the proclamation forbade the banks cashing
Transvaal notes. This proclamation, however, hit
our refugees from Pretoria and Johannesburg and
other Boer towns very hardly, as their money was
also in notes. The difficulty was solved by Sir
Alfred Milner's telegraphic instruction that notes
could be cashed if I endorsed them. I endorsed
the notes for the refugees, but refused to endorse
the large sums required by the Boer agents.
Finding they could get no money, these gentry
left for Capetown, and we had much less trouble.

We were rather bothered by people who, not
understanding our office, thought we dealt with
all sorts of cases, including matrimonial differences.
Lunatics sometimes called, and put before us plans
for destroying all the Boers by poison, or asphyxi-
ating them by firing shells containing chloroform.
It was left to the German barbarians to introduce
such methods of perverted intelligence in the late
war.

I got a letter from a mysterious gentleman one

day, saying he wished to see me, but not at my

office. Finally, after some difficulty — for neither

the club nor the hotel suited him as a rendezvous

—a place of meeting was arranged.

He had come from Capetown, and wanted per-
mission to go on to Beira, on a somewhat peculiar
mission. The authorities at Capetown had learned
that the Boers were getting plenty of gold from
the Johannesburg mines, but that they were short
of dies to coin it into money. Intercepted letters
showed that dies had been made in Germany and
were coming out in a steamer which called at Beira.

My mysterious visitor wished to meet that

CONTRABAND OF WAR 119

steamer and take a passage 'in her to Lorenzo
Marques, where the dies were to be landed. I
arranged passages for him, and on his return to
Durban a few days afterwards, he informed me
that during the night he was in the steamer he
secured the dies and dropped them overboard.
I believe that this neatly executed raid incon-
venienced the Boers very much.

In addition to being Military Commandant,
I was the Senior Naval Officer on the Natal side,
and had to deal with the scrutiny of vessels carrying
contraband of war. All vessels bound for Lorenzo
Marques were boarded, and their papers examined.
To make matters difficult, the authorities at home
kept on changing their minds as to what was
contraband of war, and what was not. I received
strings of contradictory telegrams on the subject.
We were also supplied with very bad information.
When I got a telegram to seize a ship on the
ground that she had guns or some contraband
of war on board, it invariably turned out on
examination that she contained no contraband
goods, and the Government were obliged to pay
heavy damages for demurrage.

One day I got a wire to seize and examine a
German ship, the Bundesrath, as it was certain that
she was carrying arms for the Boers. A cruiser
brought the ship into Durban, and the whole of
her cargo was taken out. Nothing of a contraband
nature was found — another example of bad infor-
mation. From intercepted letters I discovered that
four of her passengers were Boers returning to
fight against us ; they admitted the fact to me in
writing.

120 MARTIAL LAW IN DURBAN

According to my reading of International Law,
they came under the heading of " Enemy belli-
gerents in a neutral ship," and I was entitled to
make prisoners of them. I did so. Four days
afterwards, when we had got all her cargo out,
I received a peremptory telegram to replace the
cargo at once, and allow the Bundesrath, with the
four Boers, to proceed to Lorenzo Marques. I
believe the country paid Germany £50,000 for
demurrage. Our Secret Service was, I am afraid,
not very good, and why I was made to release the
prisoners I have never been able to understand.

On the 16th January, 1900, while General
Buller was away at Spion Kop with both the
4 "7-inch guns, General Barton wired to me to
ask if I could mount a 47-inch gun on a railway
truck, as he wished to shell a new position that the
Boers had taken up.

Sir David Hunter provided a truck strengthened
up with timber. On it we put a platform mounting,
securing it with chains. Owing to the amount of
energy absorbed by the hydraulic cylinders, very
little of the recoil was transmitted to the truck.
Lady Randolph Churchill fired the test round, and
the gun was christened after her.

Later on General Buller wired to me to ask
the Admiral if he could have two more 4'7-inch
guns mounted on platforms similar to the Lady-
smith guns. Sir David Hunter put them in hand
instantly. We got a couple of guns out of H. M.S.
Philomel. In a few hours the mountings were
completed, and the guns went off by special train
to Chievely, and took a very active part in the
final bombardment of the Colenso position which,

. *

REQUEST FOR A 6-IN. GUN 121

when forced, opened the road for our troops into
Ladysmith.

General Buller subsequently informed me that
he liked this pattern of mounting. Enormous
rapidity of fire could be got out of it, as the aim
for the next round was very little deranged by
the act of firing. Moreover, what was really a
fortress gun was virtually converted into a field
gun, and its position could be quickly changed.

On the 8th February, having an appointment
with the Governor at Pietermaritzburg, I had just
taken my seat in the 4 p.m. train, when the follow-
ing telegram was handed to me : " Clear the line.
Urgent, No. 383. Have you a 6-inch gun on
carriage that I could move a mile or so across the
flat ? If you have, telegraph in my name to
Admiral, and ask if I may have one for a few days.
Utmost importance. If possible, I want it Monday,
12th, and you to work it. — Buller."

I wired back : " General Buller, Chievely.
Six-inch gun on mobile mounting will leave here
on Sunday night. — Percy Scott."

Then I began to consider how the mounting
was to be made in 72 hours. I sent a steamer
and a big lighter out to H.M.S. Terrible, and
signalled to her to send a 6-inch gun on shore.
I saw Sir David Hunter, and his men were
started on at once. Fqrtunately I remembered
that at Pietermaritzburg there was a pair of iron
wheels made for a 4 '7-inch gun, but discarded
on account of the tyres being too narrow. By
10 p.m. we had the gun from the Terrible and the
wheels from Maritzburg in the factory. The men
worked all night, putting broader tyres on the

122 MARTIAL LAW IN DURBAN

wheels, and formed up an axle-tree and trail. On
Saturday night at 12 o'clock, 56 hours after I
received the telegram, the mounting was practi-
cally finished. The work of the Durban men on
this mounting was magnificent; some worked
continuously for the 48 hours during which it was
under construction.

On Sunday morning 200 men were landed from
the Terrible. We dragged the gun with ropes
about two miles down to the beach, fired a few
rounds as a test, and took it back to the station.
There it was entrained and dispatched to Chievely,
and it arrived at daylight on the 12th.

The gun was used for bombarding the Boer
positions at Colenso, and fired 600 rounds, some at
a range of 16,000 yards, and we found that spotting
could be carried out even at this extreme range.

Among many other things, hospital ships were
brought within the province of my office. General
Buller wired to me : " Can you get a steamer and
convert her into a hospital ship ? " The steamer
agents met me very readily, and in a very short
time we had two well-equipped hospital ships.

During the last week in January a hospital ship,
flying the Union Jack and the American Stars and
Stripes, anchored in the roads. This was the
Maine, a vessel that had been bought and equipped
by American women as a very practical mark of
their sympathy for the sick and wounded soldiers
in South Africa. Lady Randolph Churchill, the
president of the committee of ladies who raised
the necessary funds, was on board the ship. Mr.
Winston Churchill, who was at Pietermaritzburg.
came down to meet his mother.

MR. CHURCHILL AT DURBAN 123

On the following day when the ship carne into
harbour, the Mayor of Durban and I called The
Mayor presented Lady Randolph with an address
from the Natalians, which expressed their apprecia-
tion of the American ladies' sympathy. I pre-
sented a martial law pass, and the manager of
the Natal Government Railway placed a saloon
carriage at her ladyship's disposal to travel any-
where she wished. We thus did our best to
recognise the kindly thought and generosity of a
friendly Power.

Mr. Winston Churchill arrived at Durban as
correspondent of the Morning Post. He was
twenty-six years of age, had written well, had
been in the Army, and had seen active service
with the Malakand, Tirah and Nile expeditions.
He had contested Oldham as a Unionist, and nearly
gained the seat.

A fortnight after his arrival, he went for a trip
in an armoured train dispatched to reconnoitre the
Boer positions. No precautions were taken, and
the Boers getting round to the rear, pulled up the
line. On the return journey the engine was de-
railed and a heavy fire opened on the train by a
commando who had concealed themselves with
two field guns.

Mr. Winston Churchill displayed great gallantry
in helping to get the engine and a truck on the
line again under a heavy fire, and I have always
thought that his gallantry might have been re-
warded. He was a civilian, it was his business to
run away, and he could have done so, but he stayed
to fight. As a rising man, however, he had many
enemies, and instead of getting a decoration, he

K

124 MARTIAL LAW IN DURBAN

had to bring a libel action against some of his
defamers.

This unwisely planned reconnoitre cost 50
killed and wounded, and 54 men were made
prisoners, among them some of our sailors and
Mr. Winston Churchill. A month later I received
a telegram announcing the latter 's escape.

On the 23rd Mr. Churchill arrived at Durban
and met with a great reception. The loyal
Natalians, delighted at his outwitting the slim
Boers, dragged his rickshaw in triumph to my office.
He looked very dishevelled, tired and worn, so I
suggested he should take a rest for a day or two
at Durban. His reply was, "When is the next
train for the Front ? " I told him in half an hour.
He decided to go by it. I accompanied him to
Pietermaritzburg, and 48 hours after his arrival at
Durban he was back on the spot where he was
taken prisoner a month before.

On the way up in the train, he told me about
his capture and escape, and of a plan he had devised
for the 4000 English prisoners in Pretoria to break
out, seize the armoury, where there were plenty
of rifles, make prisoners of Paul Kruger and Mr.
Stein, and hold Pretoria until the British arrived.
With a good leader, this daring scheme would un-
doubtedly have succeeded. What a chance thrown
away ! Fancy the excitement in England if a
telegram had announced : " English prisoners have
taken Pretoria. Kruger and Stein prisoners of
war." How often people have the ball at their
feet, but will not kick it !

Nine years after the war I met a Boer officer
at Pretoria who was in charge of our prisoners.

THE RELIEF OF LADYSMITH 125

I told him the story, and he said that it would
undoubtedly have succeeded, as the prisoners were
inadequately guarded. He added that the authori-
ties realised the thing could be done, and that was
why, after Mr. Churchill's escape, they stopped all
communication between the officers and men.

On the 29th March, Sir Walter Hely Hutchin-
son and Lady Randolph Churchill were dining
with me on board the Terrible, when the welcome
news arrived that Ladysmith was relieved. I
ordered the main brace to be spliced (for which
I subsequently got hauled over the coals by the
Admiralty). Every one in the town who could
get a firework, let it off, and there was jubilation
all round. On the strength of it the prisoners in
the gaol naively asked if they could not be let
out. I reflected, however, that Durban was very
peaceable with them under lock and key.

A few days afterwards I went up to Ladysmith
to congratulate General Buller and to say good-bye
to him, for I realised that I should now be soon
moving on to China. I saw Prince Christian
Victor, looking the picture of health, and in a
great state of delight at having been in all the
battles. Six months later, he succumbed to that
terrible enemy of our troops, enteric fever, and
was buried at Pretoria.

Early in March I received the following letter
from Sir Redvers Buller : —

" Ladysmith,

"March 7th, 1900.
"MY DEAR SCOTT,

" After as long a delay as I dared, I am
with a heavy heart sending back all the guns'

126 MARTIAL LAW IN DURBAN

crews of the Terrible, and, worse still, appoint-
ing a Commandant to Durban.

" Needs must, so I cannot help it, but I
cannot let you go without writing to tell you
how grateful to you I am for all you have done
for me, and for the splendid manner in which
you have administered Durban.

"Few people, I fear, realise how difficult
that work has been, because it has been so well
done. But I think both the Governor and I
do realise what your work has been, and
certainly I am most grateful to you.

" Of course I shall put this also forward
officially, but I could not let you go without
a God-speed and a word of thanks.
" Yours very truly,

"REDVERS BULLER."

On the 13th March our contingent returned
to Durban, rejoined the ship and changed from
khaki to naval uniform. I spent a fortnight in
clearing up my duties as Commandant of Durban,
ready for turning the post over to my successor,
Colonel Morris, C.B. From the Governor of the
Colony, as from the Town Council of Durban, I
received messages of appreciation, which I valued
greatly.1 On the 26th I said good-bye to all my
good friends at Durban, and a farewell dinner
given to me at the Club demonstrated what true,
honourable and loyal citizens to the Empire I was
leaving. I re-embarked on board the Terrible,
and the next day we weighed the anchor, which
had been down for nearly six months in the
Durban Roads, and, with a last signal to loyal

1 Cf. Appendix.

FINAL CONGRATULATIONS 127

Natal, the engines began to turn round, and we
shaped a course northward en route to China.

I lost no time in thanking and congratulating
Lieutenant Hughes Onslow on the admirable way
he had acted as captain of the ship during my
five months on shore. Owing to Lieutenant
Onslow's tact and ability the behaviour of the
portion of the ship's company that remained on
board was splendid. They had had no leave and
a very hard and trying time, but, notwithstanding
this, the highest discipline was maintained.

I congratulated Captain Limpus and the
officers and men under his command on the
admirable way they had behaved on shore when
acting as artillery to assist the Army, and read to
them letters from General Sir R. Buller and other
officers paying high tribute to their conduct.

Sir Redvers Buller repeatedly referred to the
assistance which the guns, mounted in accordance
with my design, rendered to the Army ; he
mentioned the matter in his dispatches, and he
wrote, on January 9th, 1903, that " It is impossible
to overestimate the value these guns were to the
Army in the field." These mountings were in the
nature of an invention, and Sir Redvers suggested
that, in accordance with the usual practice, a
monetary grant should be made to me. What
happened to his recommendation I do not know,
but at any rate nothing came of it, though the
vital character of the service which these guns on
my mountings rendered was no secret at the time,
and the design was revived in the Great War
which has recently closed.

CHAPTER VIII

IN THE FAR EAST : THE BOXER RISING

H.M.S. Terrible 's Welcome in the East — Hong Kong's Lavish Hospi-
tality— News of the Boxer Outbreak — Orders at last ! — Arrival at
Taku — Tientsin's Plight — The Relief Column — Long-range Guns
left behind — A Neglected Base — Anomalies of the Situation — Use-
less Appeal to the Admiral— Belated Use of the Rejected Guns-
Capture of Tientsin — Relief of the Legations.

ON board a man-of-war things happen quickly
and are quickly forgotten. Twenty-four hours
after leaving Durban, we had all settled down to
our ordinary routine again and both officers and
men were anxious to resume their work at naval
gunnery. Those who had landed had had practical
experience of a good telescope gun sight, and had
learned that if a gun is truly pointed the shot will
hit the mark aimed at.

On arriving at the Island of Mauritius on the
2nd April, 1900, we found a wonderful reception
prepared for us. Both officers and men were
most liberally entertained. I stayed at Govern-
ment House with Sir Charles and Lady Bruce,
and nothing could have exceeded their kindness
and hospitality. At Colombo, where we arrived
on the 1 6th, we again met with a most charming
reception. We sailed for Singapore on the 22nd
and 67i route we resumed our instruction in gun-
nery. In the Navy, competition is everything,

128

RECEPTION AT SINGAPORE 129

and the Terrible' s one idea was to beat the Scyttcts
80 per cent, of hits on a target.

As the officers and ship's company had been
working very hard in perfecting themselves in
gunnery, I thought I would give them a chance
of showing what they could do. Targets were
prepared, and on the 27th April I anchored in
the Straits of Malacca about twenty miles from
Singapore, to carry out heavy gun practice. Just
as we were going to start, I received an urgent
telegram from Singapore saying that they had
prepared a reception for us, and asking me if I
would arrive on the morrow. I could not say no,
so our practice had to be given up. This meant
that after eight months in commission we had not
fired a shot from our guns, or in any way prepared
ourselves for a naval engagement. Singapore
gave us a great reception. For four days balls,
banquets, and entertainments of every description
took place. The civil and military authorities left
nothing undone in entertaining my officers and
men, and the Governor, Sir Alexander Swettenham,
kindly asked me to stay with him at Singapore's
magnificent Government House.

One of the guests at the house was Sir
Alexander's brother, Sir Frank Swettenham (then
Resident- General of the Federated Malay States).
I had the honour of taking him up to Hong Kong
in the Terrible. He was clever and capable, and
I often wondered why he was not given a more
important post during the war. He knew well
the East, and Eastern manners, and was a skilled
diplomatist.

On the 8th May, 1900, we steamed through

130 THE BOXER RISING

the Ly-ee-mun Pass and met with a most wonder-
ful reception. From the Pass to the anchorage
off the town of Hong Kong, the water was solid
with steam launches, junks and boats of every
description, all decorated with flags, and all con-
tributing to a medley of sound by cheering, blow-
ing steam whistles or letting off Chinese crackers.
In China noise is regarded as a signification of joy ;
on this occasion it was rather a source of grief to
me, for it is a difficult passage from the Pass to
Hong Kong for a ship of such deep draft as the
Terrible. A rock that most ships steam over
had to be steamed round. With such a volume
of sound dinning our ears my navigator and I had
a difficulty in hearing one another.

On our anchoring Sir John Carrington came
on board and presented me with the following
address :—

" On behalf of the British Community of
Hong Kong, we beg to offer you and to
your officers and to the crew of this magnificent
vessel a very hearty welcome to this colony.

" We congratulate you on the opportunity
which was afforded to your ship by her appoint-
ment to this station in succession to H.M.S.
Powerful of taking part with her in the
operations in South Africa. How admirably
this opportunity was used is known to all the
world. We desire to acknowledge with the
deepest gratitude the devoted and invaluable
services rendered to the Empire by the Naval
Brigade in the advance towards Kimberley and
in the defence and relief of Ladysmith. We
are pleased to know that these services have
been cordially recognised by the Queen and by

"THE SALT OF THE SEA" 131

the Empire, and in particular that Her Majesty
has conferred upon you, sir, a Companionship
of the Bath in recognition of that fortunate
combination of scientific and practical ability
in you, without which Ladysmith would have
lacked her most effective weapons of defence.
We learn that Her Majesty has just reviewed
at Windsor the Naval Brigade from the
Powerful, and we hope that the people of
this colony will have an opportunity of witness-
ing a similar review of your ship's company on
shore.

"We agree with the late Mr. G. W.
Steevens that ' the Royal Navy is salt of
the sea and the salt of the earth also.' We feel
that we cannot do too much to show our
appreciation of the Navy, of the Naval Brigade,
and of the services rendered by the Terrible
in South Africa at a very critical period. In
these circumstances we account it a great
privilege to be able to extend this welcome to
yourself, your officers, and the crew, and to ask
you to give us the pleasure of receiving you
and them as guests at some entertainments
which we have been arranging for your and
their honour."

On behalf of the officers and men of the
Terrible I accepted the address and thanked
Sir John. I was then handed a programme of
entertainments that had been arranged for us.
Those who have been in Eastern countries will
know how hospitable they are, and how well they
entertain. Hong Kong is particularly well famed
in that respect. There were balls and dinners
every night and mixed bathing in the afternoons.
My officers forgot war and made up their minds

132 THE BOXER RISING

that the remainder of the commission was to be
gaiety and amusements. We had about ten days
of it, and then I received a letter indicating that
the Boxer rising was a serious matter and I
anticipated that the Navy would again be called
upon to assist the Army. Every day we expected
orders to go north, so I mounted up four long
12-pounders in readiness. Nevertheless, no orders
came ; with a serious war going on, we were left
for weeks at Hong Kong to amuse ourselves with
dancing and dinner parties.

At last, on the 15th June, orders came for the
Terrible to proceed to Taku and take up three
companies of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers. We left
the next day, and during the passage made arrange-
ments for landing men and guns as might be
required.

At daylight on the 21st June, 1900, we arrived
at Taku, and found a large fleet there of all nation-
alities. The general state of affairs was very
serious. The Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir
Edward Seymour, had left his ship on the 10th
of June to take command of an international
expeditionary force consisting of 2000 officers and
men, of whom 900 where British seamen and
marines from the Fleet. The object of the
expedition was to reach and relieve Peking, which
was besieged by the Boxers ; it was feared that if
they gained possession of the city all the Europeans
would be massacred.

We learned that the Admiral had got north
of Tientsin with his force by rail, but that since
the 13th, that is three days after he started, nothing
had been heard of him. Tientsin, garrisoned by

THE TIENTSIN RELIEF COLUMN 133

about 3000 troops, was closely besieged by the
Boxers and all communication was cut off. The
garrison were in dire want of food and ammu-
nition, and they had no guns of either power or
range to reply to the heavy bombardment from
the superior Chinese artillery. It was Ladysmith
over again.

The Taku forts that guard the entrance to the
Peiho River, on which Tientsin is situated, had been
taken by the allied forces, but a small fort a
little higher up the river was still in the Boxers'
possession. Hence the river could not be used by
boats to communicate with Tientsin, and the rail-
way was useless because it had been partially de-
stroyed by the Boxers. Such I found to be the
state of affairs when we arrived.

I was glad to be able to inform Admiral Sir
James Bruce, who was the senior British naval
officer, that we had four 12-pounders ready to
land, which would be equal in range to any of the
Chinese guns that were bombarding the European
settlement at Tientsin.

To my amazement the Admiral informed me
that one gun would be sufficient. It was to be
landed in the morning and go with the relief
column under General Stossel.

The Tientsin relief column started on the fol-
lowing morning, its composition being as follows : —
1200 Russians, 30 Italians, 150 Americans and 550
British (300 Royal Welsh* Fusiliers, 150 seamen,
100 Marines, with one long-range 12-pounder
gun).

It was well known that the Tientsin garrison
had no guns except obsolete, muzzle-loading

134 THE BOXER RISING

9 -pounders. It was equally well known that the
Chinese were bombarding the city with heavy, long-
range, modern Krupp guns.

The one arm that Tientsin wanted was the
long-range artillery which I had provided, but
which the Admiral would not send up. I was
told to go away to Chefoo and take the three guns
with me. Before leaving I landed at Tongku, the
base of operations, and had a look round in
company with Captain Wise of the U.S.A. Navy.
He pointed out that here was a base with no
Commandant, no one in authority, no one to
regulate the landing of troops, no accommodation
for the sick and wounded sent down from the
Front, no one to look after stores,' no reserve of
ammunition, in fact, no provision of any kind.
His time was fully employed in looking after the
train service, and he asked me if I would come
on shore and put things straight. I had been
Commandant for so long that I was not anxious
to perform the duties again, but in the national
interest I promised to write and offer my services
to the Admiral. I explained to this American
officer that on account of jealousy I did not think
the services of the Terrible would be used if they
could possibly be done without. He said at once,
" Oh, then that is why the guns that you had
ready have not been sent to the Front." I informed
him that not only were they not accepted, but I
was told to take them away with me. He
expressed himself forcibly and to the point, ending
up by saying, " The freak will cost them some
lives and some unpleasantness in Tientsin."

We then discussed other anomalies of the

CAPTURE OF A FORT 135

situation. The supposed invulnerable Taku forts,
mounting about 150 guns, were built to prevent
anyone entering the Peiho River, and so getting to
Tientsin. We had captured the forts and wanted
to go to Tientsin. Why did we not take a small
fort, almost in sight from where we were standing,
which was blocking our use of the river ? Captain
Wise declared that fifty men could do it, and he
was perfectly correct. A boat's crew of ten men
subsequently took it ; the Chinese all ran away.
The second anomaly was that for fourteen days
the railway which we required so badly was unavail-
able as the Boxers had destroyed certain parts of
it. On this point my companion remarked : "It
is your railway. Why does your Admiral not
wire to Japan for a shipload of sleepers and metals ?
They could have been here before this ? "

On my return I put all the points before the
Admiral and made another effort to get the other
three guns sent up to help Tientsin. The appeal
was useless. The Admiral would neither send up
any more guns, nor order material to repair the
line, and he expressed himself quite satisfied with
the arrangements at the base. Consequently the
Tientsin European settlement was almost entirely
destroyed by the Chinese guns. The Russians,
taking advantage of our apathy, repaired the rail-
way line, and then claimed it, and we had great
difficulty in regaining its possession.

I took the three guns away in the Terrible to
Chefoo, and while we were there, occupying our-
selves once more with dances and dinner parties,
we learned of Tientsin's very severe bombardment.
The Terrible was next ordered to Wei-hai-wei,

136 THE BOXER RISING

which meant taking the guns still further away
from where they were so urgently wanted. The
Times thus commented on the incident : —

" It was a grievous blunder not to send
these guns up to Tientsin with the relief column
in the first instance. Captain Scott had pre-
pared four to land with the Welsh Fusiliers,
but for some occult reason he was ordered to
land only one, and H.M.S. Terrible was sent
to Chefoo, where her guns were not wanted.
This is the sort of thing that to the lay mind is
incomprehensible. The settlements at Tientsin
were being bombarded, it was known that they
had next to no guns, it was known that the
Chinese had numbers of modern ones, and yet
three fine pieces of artillery ready for the road
are deliberately not sent with the relieving force.
The one 12-pounder that was sent from H.M.S.
Terrible did yeoman's service ; if four had been
sent instead of one, the position to-day would
have been assuredly less critical."

Later on, when the European settlement at
Tientsin had been mostly destroyed and many
lives lost, the other three 12 -pounders which I had
prepared were sent for in a great hurry. The
allied troops there mustered 12,000 men, and it
was decided to attack the native city from whence
the bombardment had issued. As the result
of hard fighting on the 13th and 14th of July,
the Chinese were driven out and the city was
captured.

Where our guns were placed the country was
very flat, making spotting difficult. We overcame
this obstacle by placing two long ladders one

s

i-H

I

THE ARMY'S THANKS 137

against the other and perching the spotter with
a telescope on the top.

Brigadier- General Dorward, who commanded
the British forces, wrote : " The success of the
operations was largely due to the manner in which
the Naval guns were worked by Lieut. Drummond
of H.M.S. Terrible, the accuracy of their fire alone
rendering possible steady fire on the part of the
troops against the strong Chinese position and
largely reducing the number of casualties."

I anticipated that after the capture of Tientsin
my officers and men would return to the ship, but
the value of artillery in war had been learned
(somewhat expensively), and it was decided that
the four 12-pounders should go with the relief
force to Pekin.

The international relief force, consisting of
English, American, Russian, Japanese and French
troops, with the four guns from the Terrible, left
Tientsin on the 3rd August, 1900. Pekin was
reached on the 15th, and the Legations, which had
been gallantly defended for two months, were
relieved. On the 7th of September officers and
men who had been to Pekin rejoined the Terrible.

CHAPTER IX

GUNNERY ON THE CHINA STATION

A Return to Gunnery at Sea— Results of the First Prize Firing— A
Machine to increase the Efficiency in Loading — The Deflection
Teacher and its Effect in Shooting — Remodelling the Target —
Target Practice of the Fleet — Underlining an Inference — Admirals
and Prize-Firing — Back at Hong Kong — Raising the Dredger
Canton Eiver— Lieut. Sims, U.S.A., and Gunnery — Sir Edward
Seymour's valuable Reforms — Admiralty Opposition — Prize Firing
of 1901— First Ship of the Navy— The Barfleur and the Terrible s
Example — The Admiralty and Improved Shooting — A Disastrous
Order.

WITH the conclusion of the Pekin operations,
H.M.S. Terrible had been a year in commission,
and we had done no gunnery practice, as most of
the crew had for seven months been employed as
shore artillerists. Their experience had demon-
strated to them the value of shooting straight, and
the ease with which it can be carried out on shore,
where the platform is steady. They had now to
learn to manipulate heavy guns at sea when the
ship is rolling. Both officers and men worked with
a will at the instructional " dotter," and in October,
1900, after a month's course of drill, the ship carried
out her first prize firing, and made 80 hits out of
104 rounds, a percentage of 76*8. The men were
very disappointed at not reaching the 80 per cent,
made by H.M.S. Scylla.

A percentage of 76 '8 hits to rounds fired was
far above anything that had ever been done before

138

THE DEFLECTION TEACHER 139

with a 6-inch gun, but I could see that better
results ought to be obtained.

After carefully analysing the firing I came to
the conclusion that the loading was not rapid
enough ; that the men had not had sufficient
practice in quickly altering the deflection on their
sights if the shot went right or left of the mark ;
that the men under some circumstances could not
see whether they had hit the target or not, and
were therefore not to blame if they missed. These
three defects had to be remedied,

To increase the rate of loading, I had an
arrangement made for giving the men the requisite
practice. It consisted of a breech block mounted
against two stanchions with a tray behind to take
the projectiles as they were put in. To ensure the
ramming being of sufficient force to drive the band
into the rifling, the men were compelled to send
the projectile with such velocity as to make it
travel the whole length of the tray. The guns'
crews were frequently practised at this machine,
and in a very short time their efficiency in loading
was doubled.

To teach the men to alter the deflection on
their sights quickly and correctly, I had an arrange-
ment made which was christened the " Deflection
Teacher." It consisted of a miniature rifle, fixed to
a gun in such a manner that although it could be
given a small vertical and horizontal movement,
the shot from it could never go anywhere but into
an iron box fixed to the muzzle of the gun.
Attached to a boom over the centre of the gun
was a wooden frame, into which paper targets
could be placed. The boom could be traversed

-.

140 GUNNERY ON CHINA STATION

backwards and forwards by means of lines and a
winch. Constant practice with this machine had
the following results :—

(1) It taught the men to readjust their sights in
accordance with their last shot.

(2) It convinced them that if they did adjust
their sights correctly the shot would hit the mark
aimed at.

(3) It gave the firing number practice in
ordering the necessary alteration of sight, and the
sight-setter practice in carrying out the orders.

Teaching the men to be certain whether they
had hit or not was not as easy as I anticipated it
would be. One captain of a gun, as they were
then called, who fired eight rounds and made seven
hits, told me that he never saw a hole made in the
target after his fourth round, although he made
three more.

I had some targets made of different colours,
and cut a hole six inches in diameter in each one.
From a distance of 1600 yards all the captains of
guns examined these targets through their telescope
sights, and it was demonstrated that a hole can
only be seen in a target if there is a distinct con-
trast between the colour of the target and the
colour of the water which forms its background.
Hence if the water is white you want a dark
target, and if the water is dark you want a white
target. We most of us thought that the sea was
always the same colour, a sort of dark greeny-blue,
but it is not, for sometimes it is white and some-
times it is dark, and sometimes it changes from one
to the other quite suddenly. This to the layman
may sound peculiar, but I shall explain it later on.

THE COLOUR OF THE SEA 141

In all our practices, while one man was firing,
others were exercised in judging whether the target
was hit ; if it was a miss, they had to judge how
far it was left or right, or how much it was short or
over. The sailors called this " spotting drill," and
christened the officer or man who was spotting the
" Spotter."

Four years later, when their Lordships had
learned that the only way to hit was to spot, they
acknowledged the necessity of a spotter, but they
objected to the name, and ordered him to be called
the " Range Officer." This was stupid, because the
spotter need not necessarily be an officer — our best
spotter in the Terrible was a cook. Spotting is a

gift.

Nor did their Lordships' pedantry achieve its
object ; the officer or man who spots is to this day
called, as the Terrible seamen christened him, the
" Spotter."

To revert to the change in colour of the sea.
When one looks along it as in firing at a target, it
is of one colour in sunshine and of another colour
if there is no sun. Consequently, when the sun
goes behind a cloud you get a quick change from
one to the other. Another element that causes a
quick change is the wind. Many may have noticed
that when a meadow has been harrowed, the grass
differs in colour according to the way in which the
harrow has passed over it. It is the same with the
sea ; in a calm, if a slight breeze springs up and
passes along the surface of the water, you get a
similar change of colour as with the harrow and
the grass.

The pattern of prize-firing target then in use

142 GUNNERY ON CHINA STATION

was very unsatisfactory. The mass of wood above
water meant additional weight without additional
buoyancy. The masts which carried the sail were
frequently knocked down, and then the whole
thing collapsed and took hours to repair. To
obviate this state of affairs I obtained the Com-
mander-in-Chief s permission to remodel the target.
I placed the masts at the end of the raft, suspended
the canvas from them and did away with all the
unnecessary wood. This alteration was approved,
and in the following year's prize firing we had
little or no trouble owing to the shooting away of
masts.

Details of the alterations were sent home in
June, 1901, but the Admiralty declined to adopt
the plan, preferring the old pattern.1

After every target practice I used to have
posted on the notice board my comments on the
shooting. On this occasion I praised highly nine
out of the twelve guns' crews, but I characterised
the shooting of three of them as most discreditable.
This opinion found its way into the Press, and
one paper commented on it as follows : " The three
guns that Captain Percy Scott refers to as most
discreditable scored nine hits out of twenty-two
shots, or 41 per cent. No other ship in the Fleet
armed with these guns that year had made as much
as 41 per cent, of hits, and the average was only
28 per cent., so we may infer that Captain Percy
Scott considers the firing of the British Fleet as
something much worse than 'most discreditable."
That certainly was my opinion, for if two ships by

1 This improved pattern was not adopted for general use by the
Admiralty until 1905.

TARGETS OF THE NAVY.

THE ADMIRALTY PATTERN, "WHICH GENERALLY COLLAPSED IF HIT.

THE MODIFCATION MADE ON THE CHINA STATION.

[To face page 142.

A GLARING CONTRAST 143

giving proper instruction to the men and by using
extemporised appliances could obtain 80 per cent,
of hits from these guns, whereas the average of the
Fleet was only 28 per cent., then the Fleet was
52 per cent, of hits behind what it might have
been, or in other words the British Fleet was only
half as powerful as it ought to have been.

Mr. Arnold White, who took a great interest
in the gunnery of the Fleet, hit the Admiralty very
hard by publishing the fact that in our most up-to-
date Channel Fleet, the three most modern ships,
Magnificent, Mars, and Hannibal, each armed with
twelve 6-inch guns, had with their thirty-six guns
made only eighty-four hits, while the Terrible with
twelve guns had made eighty hits. By way of
making the comparison still more pointed he added
that two out of the three ships were Admirals'
flagships.

There were very good reasons for the gunnery
of the Fleet being in such a deplorable condition.
The Director of Naval Ordnance, who should be
the most important man at the Admiralty, was not
even a member of the Board ; he carried no weight
and was unable to improve matters. There was
no competition and consequently no incentive to
improve. No notice was taken of suggestions
made by officers who wished to improve the
gunnery of their ships: they were frequently
snubbed and from personal jealousy their ideas
were boycotted.

The prize firing, which was a test of the ships'
proficiency for battle, was, by Admiralty order, to
be carried out once a year, but any excuse was
accepted for not obeying the order. The following

144 GUNNERY ON CHINA STATION

table shows the number of ships that disobeyed
the Admiralty order :

1898. 1899. 1900. 1901.

Number of ships of the Fleet

that obeyed the order ... 139 136 121 127

Number of ships that did not

obey the order 33 32 39 47

Admirals seldom or never attended on board
their flagships when firing was taking place.

I remember when 1 was in H.M.S. Scylla the
case of an Admiral who devoted two days to the
inspection of his ship. He visited every part of
her, looked at all the paint-work, went most care-
fully into the dress of the men, the length of their
hair and the cleanliness of their clothing. As
regards housemaiding and tailoring no inspection
could have been more searching. On the third day
of the inspection the ship carried out the annual
prize firing with her heavy guns. It might be
taken for granted that the Admiral, having so care-
fully inspected the housemaiding of the ship, would
have remained on board to witness her proficiency
or otherwise in target practice, and from the results
form an opinion of her fighting value. I made a
bet that, as the Admiral did not attach any import-
ance to target practice, he would take himself on
shore before a shot was fired. I won the bet !

The annual return of the results of prize firing
was never issued till late in the following year, when
every one had forgotten all about it. It was a
natural consequence of the absence of all interest
in the shooting of the Fleet that no attempts were
made to improve the gun-sights. In 1900 they
were almost identical with the sights in use when I
first joined the Navy in 1868.

A FEAT IN SEAMANSHIP 145

On the 22nd November, 1900, we left Wei-hai-
wei, and after a visit to Japan arrived at Hong
Kong. The island had been recently visited by a
typhoon which did enormous damage in the har-
bour and caused an appalling loss of life amongst
the Chinese, many of their junks going to the
bottom with all hands. Among other wrecks was
a dredger called the Canton River. She had come
from England to work on the new Admiralty
Docks. She was 180 feet long, with a beam of
36 feet, and displacement of 1000 tons. During
the typhoon she was blown over and sank, three
hundred and eighty feet from the sea-wall, turning
bottom upwards. The first operation towards
getting her up was necessarily to right her, and
attempts had been made to do this, but without
success.

On the 17th December the lerrible arrived at
Hong Kong, and, finding the dredger still bottom
up, I made an offer to right her. The offer being
accepted, work was commenced on the 2nd January,
and she was righted on the 18th.

The turning of the dredger was effected
mainly by parbuckling, but this was assisted by
lifting her on the opposite side with " lumps," and
by forcing air into her, which displaced a large
amount of water and thereby lightened her. The
parbuckles were four in number, three of them
capable of giving a pull of 100 tons each, and the
fourth 50 tons — total pull: 350 tons. The par-
buckles were wire runners and tackles, with
manilla five-fold purchases, the hauling parts of
which were taken to steam winches on shore. The
standing parts of the wires were taken to anchors

146 GUNNERY ON CHINA STATION

buried in concrete. In all eight anchors were used,
varying in weight from 2| tons to 15 cwt. In
order not to bring too great a strain on any part
of the sea-wall, they were distributed over a
length of 100 feet.

The parbuckle chains were three double and
one single part of If -inch cable : they were passed
with a complete round-turn round the vessel, the
bights of the double ones and the end of the single
one being secured by shackles or lashings to suit-
able places on the upper deck ; the opposite ends
were brought up over the bilge and on to a barge
where the purchases were secured. Cradles were
placed on the bilge of the dredger to distribute the
strain and give leverage ; the barge was relied upon
to ensure an upward pull. (See Plate 1.) The
connection between the parbuckle chains and the
purchases offered some slight difficulty, as it was
found impossible to get any block which would
stand a strain of 100 tons. It was overcome by
making extemporary blocks out of the dredger's
spare links, which had holes in them at both ends.
Sheaves were cast and mounted between the links
on a pin of the same diameter as the holes ; at the
other end a similar pin was put through with a
sleeve piece on it to prevent the two parts closing
in. This sleeve had two thimbles on it, round
which was passed a bale-sling strop, the bights
being shackled to the ends of the parbuckle chain.
This precaution was taken to ensure the chains
bearing equal strains. (See Plate 1.) Counter
parbuckles were laid out to prevent the vessel
coming bodily in instead of turning.

A lift on the opposite side was obtained from

THE RIGHTING OF THE DREDGER 147

EXPLANATORY SKETCH Of THE OPERATIONS ^RIGHTING THE ORE06ER"C/lNTON(IKR"6yH.MS'taBi£

PLATE I.

M4SD CORAl BOTTOM CLEARED AWAY HITH GUN COTTON
IN ffROER TO 08T THE CN»lhJ UNCERKUTH

PLATE 2

RMTCN RlVtR

DISTANCE FROM OREOOIR TO LMB/XNKKENT WALL aao

PLATE 3.

PARTS Of 6» V«I7E MAUUA MAtfllNO «M»TS U«h TO FOOtBO&T » IUTEI1
W & CWJTAH Ct MODRMb IUMP STRAIN:. 2ii TOW OiVIOED AHOHO » MOW ^ TW Cn'CtHTUIIKW ' TOUt STfiHH JOO TOH5

148 GUNNERY ON CHINA STATION

the bow of a tank steamer, and from two " lumps."
These were filled and hove down at low water, and
pumped out during the operations as the tide rose.
(See Plate 2.) Air was pumped in by the
destroyer Handy, and the water in the upper
compartments of the vessel thus forced down to
the level marked X on Plate 1, materially assisted.

All being in readiness, on the 18th January the
winches were hove round and the vessel turned
over without a hitch.

When a purchase became " two blocks " a
carpenter's stopper was put on to take the strain,
and the block shifted. These stoppers were in-
valuable, and in future I had no hesitation in
trusting the heaviest strains to them. In the
righted position the vessel's upper deck was 9 feet
below high water, and an examination of it by
divers disclosed considerable damage. The bul-
warks being crushed in had opened the deck where
it joined the side, and several iron stays were forced
through. The leaks were mended, coffer dams,
raised above high water, placed round each hatch-
way, and by the 1st March she was ready for
pumping up.

Four pumps were started (12-in., 9-in., 8-in.
and 6-in.) ; the vessel, lightened, was turned round
at right angles to the sea-wall, and dragged into
shallower water. (See Plate 3.)

On the 2nd pumping was resumed, the idea
being to drag her along the bottom into still shal-
lower water. The stern purchase was hauled
taut, the vessel rose slightly, and there was every
appearance of her coming in, when, unfortunately,
a bad leak developed on the port side which the

MEETING WITH ADMIRAL SIMS 149

pump failed to keep under. This caused an excess
of buoyancy on the starboard side, giving the vessel
a list ; the great amount of top weight then came
into play, and she turned over.

On the llth March operations were started to
turn her back again. Nine anchors were laid out
in a line at right angles to her keel, and three par-
buckle tackles of 100 tons each were rigged from
them to six chains passed round the dredger. The
hauling parts of two of the tackles were taken to
the Centurion's foremost and after capstans ; the
third was taken to the capstan of the mooring
lump, which was secured to the Centurions
stern.

The total strain on the Centurion's moorings
was 75 tons. To assist, her port bower anchor
was laid out.

On the capstans being hove round the vessel
was turned to an upright position without any
difficulty. For a plan of the arrangement of
tackles reference should be made to Plate 3.

It was while stationed at Hong Kong that, early
in 1901, I had the pleasure of meeting Lieutenant
(afterwards Admiral) Wm. S. Sims, U.S. Navy,
at that time serving on board the battleship
Kentucky. He was a gunnery enthusiast and was
trying to impress upon his Naval authorities the
necessity of a reform in heavy-gun shooting. He
based his arguments upon a comparison of the very
bad shooting of the American Fleet at that time
and the records made by H.M.S. Terrible in China
in 1900 and 1901, pointing out that the fundamental
defect in training was that American scores were
based upon observation of the splashes of projectiles,

150 GUNNERY ON CHINA STATION

while British scores were a record of actual holes
made in a canvas target.

It is not inappropriate to my own reminiscences
to recall the part which Admiral Sims, as he after-
wards became, took in reforming the gunnery of
the United States Navy. Though then a junior
officer, he felt impelled to report to the Navy
Department at Washington on the unsatisfactory
methods of training men in gunnery. He little
anticipated the opposition which would be offered
to his suggestions and the annoyance which would
be occasioned by his criticisms. He began his
campaign in a moderate spirit as befitted a junior
officer addressing his seniors, observing all the
ordinary regulations in bringing his views to the
attention of the authorities. His memoranda
reached Washington and were acknowledged, but
he got little more satisfaction out of it than that.
He wrote again and again, and at length the Naval
authorities at Washington did not even take the
trouble to acknowledge his communications. At
last, this young naval lieutenant became desperate.
He sat down in his cabin and prepared a report on
the state of gunnery in the United States Fleet
and mailed it in duplicate, sending one copy to
President Roosevelt at White House, who since the
time when he had acted as Assistant Naval Secre-
tary had taken a great interest in everything
connected with the Fleet. I forget at the moment
to whom he sent the other copy. It was, of course,
a gross act of insubordination for a junior officer to
address the President, who was technically the
Commander-in-Chief of the whole Fleet, ignoring
the American Admiral on the station and all the

A FIGHT FOR GUNNERY 151

senior officers at Washington. But Lieut. Sims
accepted the risk. By some good chance the letter
to Mr. Roosevelt actually reached his own hands.
He sat down to study this young officer's letter.
He was rather shocked by his criticisms of existing
methods, but equally impressed by his suggestions
for reform. So he forthwith sent a communication
to the Navy Department stating that this young
man was to be immediately sent for, given an
opportunity of proving his contentions, and then,
if he failed, it was significantly added, the senior
officers in the department could do with him what
they liked without consulting the President.

So in due course an order reached Lieut. Sims,
directing him to return to Washington. When he
got there he found that, though the President had
shown that he was concerned in the matter, he had
not by any means rendered the path of Lieut. Sims
smooth and comfortable ; on the contrary, quite a
lot of people in influential positions were pre-
pared to put obstacles in the way of this upstart,
as they regarded him. Lieut. Sims worked on for
some time, and then he saw that he could make
little headway. Fortunately, one of the Admirals
serving in the department was impressed by his
knowledge, energy, and courage. He went to
White House and represented the position of
affairs to the President. The result was that
Lieut. Sims was forthwith appointed Naval Aide-
de-Camp to the President, which gave him
freedom of access to Mr. Roosevelt arid insured
his support.

In this way the traditional conservatism of many
older naval officers of the United States Navy was

152 GUNNERY ON CHINA STATION

broken down. At length, this daring lieutenant
was not only promoted, but a new office was
created for him, and he became Director of Target
Practice. Before he relinquished that appoint-
ment, the gunnery of the United States Navy
had been reformed, and he had become one of the
outstanding officers of the Fleet.

Some years later Captain Sims was in England,
and committed another indiscretion. In a speech
at a public dinner, given by the Lord Mayor at the
Mansion House, he said that if England was ever
menaced by a foreign power, "You may count
upon every ship, every man, every dollar, and
every drop of blood of your kindred across the
sea." As American naval officers are not allowed
to express in public opinions as to their country's
policy, Captain Sims was admonished ; but when
the United States decided to intervene in the
Great War, and Mr. Wilson had to select an
officer to command the American naval forces
in European waters, his choice fell upon this
" upstart " of earlier years, who was thus able to
show once more that " blood is thicker than water."

In this connection I may quote a letter I
received from an American officer giving an
account of the progress of reform : " With regard
to our target practice, a new billet has been created.
The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation considered
that one man ought to be responsible for the shoot-
ing of the Fleet, and selected Sims. His position
is a peculiar one. Nominally he is on special duty
acting under the Chief of the Bureau of Navi-
gation, but really he is the chief adviser on
all gunnery matters. Theoretically he has no

THE VALUE OF COMPETITION 153

authority, practically he has a lot, because the chief
does not fool around with what is on file, but acts
on his suggestions in the full belief that he has
studied the matter, and thereby can arrive at more
correct conclusions than those who have only
considered these matters incidentally. Lieutenant
Sims centralised the whole system of the training
of gun pointers, and made prize firing squarely
competitive, so that all ships might be graded on a
basis of their rapidity of hitting. The very first
practice under his system convinced the authorities
that he was right and that much of the gun gear
was all wrong."

The United States Navy made wonderful strides
in perfecting their shooting and quickly went ahead
of us, while we, for our part, were strenuously
resisting the competition the Americans believed
in. In the words of Lieutenant Sims himself,
" Competition is the chief incentive to do well.
To do well you must have good men and sound
gear. Competition will not only improve our men,
but it will force the authorities to bring our
fighting machines up to date."

Lieutenant Sims held the position of Director
of Target Practice until February, 1909. Event-
ually, as I have said, he became Aide to President
Roosevelt, in addition to his other duties, and
subsequently he was appointed, by order of the
President, to the command of the battleship
Minnesota, being the only man of his rank to
have such a command. Upon the completion
of his two-year term of sea service, he was
ordered to the Naval War College, at Newport,
from which he graduated two years later and

154 GUNNERY ON CHINA STATION

received the command of the Atlantic Torpedo
Flotilla. During his administration of this latter
command, the efficiency of the torpedoes and guns
of the destroyers was, I am told, very considerably
increased. He was singled out for special service
by President Roosevelt, and when the United
States entered the War in April, 1917, a guarantee
of effective co-operation between the British and
American Fleets was supplied by President
Wilson's appointment of Rear- Admiral Sims — for
he had reached that rank — in command of the
Unit^i States forces sent to British waters.

From this digression I return to the subject of
gunnery on the China Station. Early in 1901 Sir
Edward Seymour,1 the Commander-in-Chief, dis-
cussed with me the extraordinary results obtained
by H.M.S. Terrible in her prize firing of 1900,
and ordered me to preside over a committee to
draw up suggestions for improving the regula-
tions for prize firing in H.M.'s Fleet. I was to
be assisted by Captain John Jellicoe, Captain Sir
George Warrender, two Commanders, and ten
Gunnery Lieutenants. Every detail was gone into
most carefully, and a concise set of regulations were
drawn up. The Commander-in-Chief approved of
these, and they were adopted forthwith for use on
the China Station.

A copy of the committee's report was sent
to their Lordships the Commissioners of the
Admiralty, but they did nothing. I heard that
they would not accept the proposed reforms, and
discountenanced the modification of the target.
Furthermore, they highly disapproved of placing

1 Afterwards Admiral of the Fleet Sir Edward Seymour, O.M.

OFFICIAL INEPTITUDE 155

the ships in order of merit in the annual return,
instead of alphabetically. In short, they were
quite satisfied with everything as it was, and
strongly objected to encouraging emulation.

The report, of course, never got to the Lords
of the Admirality. They did not trouble their
heads about gunnery suggestions coming right
away from China Seas. The report went to a
very junior lieutenant of H.M.S. Excellent, the
gunnery establishment at Portsmouth. A good
many people in the Service, I believe, regarded the
results which we obtained in the Scylla and
Terrible successively with not a little suspicion.
1 dare say that this young officer, familiar with the
ordinary shooting of His Majesty's ships in those
days, could not believe that it was possible for any
ship with proper instruments and decent training
to do as well as we had done. So he turned the
report down, deciding there was nothing in it of
importance.

It may seem strange to readers who are un-
familiar with Admiralty methods that a very
junior lieutenant should have been in a position
to turn down important recommendations of a
very strong committee of officers, one of whom
was afterwards to become Commander-in- Chief of
the Grand Fleet and responsible for the safety
of the whole Empire and the success of the Allied
cause. These officers who formed the committee
possessed a wide experience of gunnery, and had
proved by results that the methods they proposed
had greatly increased the fighting efficiency of the
ships which had adopted them. This incident
furnished an illustration of bad administration. A

M

156 GUNNERY ON CHINA STATION

junior officer was able to hold back the whole
movement of gunnery progress, and thus placed
the Royal Navy at a disadvantage if war had come
before there was time to remedy the mistake.1

Sir Edward Seymour's decision was not affected
by the disapproval of his proposals. The com-
mittee's reforms and rules were brought into use,
and the shooting of the Fleet in China went
ahead enormously — a fact which later on extracted
an official acknowledgment.

In order further to encourage quick hitting on
the China Station, Sir Edward Seymour presented
a shield which was to go to the ship on his station
making the highest score in prize firing. This, of
course, the Admiralty could not stop. In his de-
termination to encourage emulation Sir Edward
Seymour went further. He issued an order that
the ship making the highest scores in prize firing
was to take the right of the line at all parades
on shore or whenever a brigade was landed. This
the Admiralty promptly countermanded by a curt
telegram, which I saw. On a later occasion a
question on the subject was asked in the House
of Commons. The Admiralty's reply was, to say
the least of it, strange. I leave the record of
question and Answer to speak for itself.

" Gunnery in the Navy.

16 Mr. Harmsworth asked the Financial
Secretary to the Admiralty whether the Admi-
ralty had countermanded Admiral Sir E. H.
Seymour's order when the Commander-in-Chief

1 The Committee's proposals were subsequently adopted in 1905 by
the Admiralty of which Lord Fisher was First Sea Lord.

THE VALUE OF EXAMPLE 157

in China, to the effect that the ship holding the
Seymour Challenge Cup for good shooting would
always take the right of the line at all parades
on shore or whenever a brigade was landed.

" Mr. Arnold Forster said the Admiralty
had given no orders with respect to this ques-
tion, which was one entirely within the discre-
tion of the Commander-in-Chief on the station."

I found a great many officers were sceptical as
to whether the Terrible had really made in 1900
nearly 77 per cent, of hits ; * it appeared to them
impossible. To obviate a recurrence of this doubt, I
took out in the ship seventeen independent umpires
for the 1901 firing, among them being Captain
Jellicoe, Captain Sir George Warrender, and Cap-
tain Windham.

The firing was not as good as I anticipated it
would be, as we had some miss-fires due to bad
ammunition, but the men were delighted to find
that they had equalled the Scylla and were again
first ship of the whole Navy. The twenty-four men
competing fired, in twenty-four minutes, 128 rounds
and made 102 hits, which is 80 per cent. The use
of the loading teacher, which I have mentioned,
had increased the rate of fire from 4 '3 in 1900 to
5 '3 in 1901. One man, named Grounds, actually
fired eight times in a minute and made eight hits.
Such a feat of shooting was then unprecedented.

Captain Sir George Warrender, of the Barfleur,
adopted the method of teaching employed in the
Terrible, and after a month's training carried out
prize firing. The result was conclusive. The ten
guns on the Barfleur fired 159 rounds and made

1 Seven years after this the average of the Fleet was 79 per cent.

158 GUNNERY ON CHINA STATION

114 hits ; the year before their record was 111
rounds and 47 hits. They had therefore nearly
doubled their fighting efficiency.

Apropos of this, Sir George Warrender told me
rather an amusing story. Being anxious to en-
courage his men to beat the Terrible, he promised
to pay two dollars to every man who made over
a certain number. The 114 hits rather astonished
and delighted him ; he had to pay £20. When
the payment was being made, one man, in gather-
ing up about £2, looked very glum. To an inquiry
if he did not like it, he replied with an indifferent
air, that he did not mind it. What, asked Sir
George, was the matter ? " Well," said the man,
"it is the way you very kindly give us 4s. a hit ;
we would have given you £l a hit to have beaten
the Terrible." This trifling incident revealed in a
flash what was wanted ; but the Admiralty were
blind to revelations.

I was within signalling distance of the Barfleur
when she carried out the firing. At the conclusion
of it Sir George made the following very pleasant
signal to me: "We have done splendidly — 159
rounds, 114 hits. This is nearly three times our
score of last year. We owe our success to your
instruction, and thank you."

In reporting to the Admiralty the great im-
provement in the Barfleur's shooting, Admiral Sir
Cyprian Bridge, who had become Commander-in-
Chief of the China Station, wrote—

" This shows that the advantages of Captain
Scott's system are not confined to his own ship,
but are making themselves felt in other ships of
the squadron.

ADMIRAL'S RECOMMENDATIONS 159

"I have carefully examined the system at
work, and have been much impressed by its
efficacy. Jt is based on recognition of certain
fundamental characteristics of human nature.
It allows for excitability and moments of ' exal-
tation ' in men loading, aiming, and firing ; and
goes a long way towards neutralising both, by
making provision for an immediate sedative.
In my opinion it is, in the highest sense of the
term, scientific. Therefore it is widely different
from ordinary systems of training men to shoot,
which consist essentially of mere repetitions
sure to degenerate, in time, into formalism.
Captain Scott's system is devised to put drill
in its proper place ; to make it an assistant in
attaining efficiency, not a master whose pre-
dominance renders the attainment of efficiency
impossible. I trust their Lordships will pro-
hibit attempts to spoil it on the plea of im-
proving it.

"CYPKIAN A. G. BRIDGE,

"Vice- Admiral."

Their Lordships did not take Sir Cyprian's
advice ; they tried to improve it and spoilt it.

In November, 1901, the Commissioners of the
Admiralty wrote directing me to report fully upon
the nature of the arrangements invented by me and
stated to have improved the shooting of H.M.S.
Terrible and Barfleur.

I reported fully, but the only action taken by
their Lordships was to issue an order which en-
tirely spoiled the shooting of the Fleet with the
smaller class of guns. In the Terrible the Com-
mander, Commander F. C. Ogilvy, and two Lieu-
tenants, Lieutenants R. Hutchinson and G. P.

160 GUNNERY ON CHINA STATION

England, had taken infinite pains in training the
crews of the 12-pounder, 6-pounder, and Maxim
guns. Telescope sights had been fitted to them,
and other arrangements had been brought into use
which I was anticipating would greatly increase
their rapidity of fire. The telescope sight on the
Maxim gun we found doubled its efficiency.

This training was entirely thrown away, for
under the Admiralty orders referred to the target
was at such a distance that the men could not see
whether they were hitting or missing. In these
circumstances skill was eliminated ; all the gunners
could do was to fire as fast as possible and trust to
luck.1

I may conclude this chapter with some obser-
vations on firing at long range. The South
African War had taught us that our guns on shore
could make good practice up to 16,000 yards, and
that from an elevated position we could spot the
fall of shot at that range. On board ship we had
never fired a gun at more than 1600 yards, which
is very little over the range used in the time of
Nelson. We knew that if we went into action we
must fight a long way outside this range to avoid
the risk of being sunk by a torpedo. We knew
that, whether firing across a room with a saloon-
pistol or firing a 12-inch gun at 16,000 yards,
there is only one way to hit the mark ; that is to
spot where your last shot or broadside has gone
and then alter your aim accordingly. We could
not do this as we had then, in 1902, no electrical
contrivance aloft (where the spotter must be in

1 This fatal error was not put right till March, 1905, when T became
Inspector of Target Practice.

LORD FISHER'S MISTAKE 161

long-range firing) for conveying to the guns the
range of the enemy, although I had devised and
used such a machine in H.M.S. Inconstant, twenty
years prior to this date.

All we had in 1902 was a voice-pipe, which
was, of course, useless when the guns were firing.
Consequent on this state of affairs, we could only
train our men in individual firing at a range short
enough for them to see whether they were hitting
the target or not, and they never fired a shot at
the range they would have had to use in action.

In 1901, Admiral Sir John Fisher attempted
long-range firing in the Mediterranean. His
idea was really to demonstrate to the Ad-
miralty that long-range firing could not be
successfully carried out without the necessary
implements, and so force the Admiralty into
supplying the instruments. His intention was
undoubtedly patriotic, but as it so happened it was
very bad for the country.

The Admiralty seized on it at once, and,
through Parliament, announced that successful
firing had been carried out at 6000 to 7000 yards,
and that orders had been issued that all fleets and
squadrons were in future to carry out their firings
at these or even longer ranges. This reply was
good enough for the House of Commons, and
enabled the Admiralty to continue jeopardising the
country, by not supplying instruments which were
necessary to enable the Navy to fight at the ranges
they would have to use in war-time.

An Admiral, writing to me on the subject, asked
me, since the Admiralty had issued no instructions
as to how the long-range firing was to be carried

162 GUNNERY ON CHINA STATION

out, to make a suggestion. I replied that the
Admiralty had not given any instructions because
they knew they could not be carried out without
the necessary instruments, and these they did not
want to supply. I advised him to inquire of the
Admiralty how, without the necessary instruments,
he was to carry out the long-range firing. This, I
added, would corner the Admiralty, and force
them to do something. The gallant Admiral did
not approve of cornering the Admiralty; he
pointed out to me that it was the duty of every
Naval officer to do as he was told, and make the
best use of the appliances that were supplied to
him. This was undoubtedly a very proper reply,
but if I had abided by such a sentiment, the
gunnery of the Navy would never have improved.

About a year afterwards, as Inspector of Target
Practice, I was on board this gallant and very
proper Admiral's ship during her battle practice.
The bugle sounded the " commence firing " and
after the allotted time the "cease firing." The
ship then closed on the target to count the hits.
There were none.

I dined with the very proper Admiral that
night and we discussed the shooting. He ad-
mitted that his ship's bad shooting was due to
the Admiralty, but argued that they were not to
blame because their money was controlled by
politicians who did not consider the welfare of
the nation, but only whether any proposal would
tend to keep them in office or not. Under these
conditions he did not agree with the five years'
attack that I admitted having made on the
Admiralty. I replied that possibly to some extent

AN ADMIRAL'S CONVERSION 163

the politicians were to blame, but that as I could
not attack them, my only course was to " go for "
the Admiralty. I think in the end he agreed with
me, for I saw afterwards a very strong letter from
his pen pointing out that long-range firing could
be no more carried out without the necessary in-
struments than one could make bricks without
straw.

CHAPTER X

WEI-HAI-WEI AND THE CRUISE HOME

Wei-hai-wei Controversy — Naval Base or Seaside Resort? — Wei-hai-
wei's Useless Forts — A Report to the Admiralty — Further Work
stopped — Final Prize Firing — Petty Officer Grounds' Record —
The Homeward Voyage — A Congratulatory Address — Reception
at Portsmouth — Visit to Balmoral — The King's Deer Drive — How
I shot a Hind — His Majesty's Interest in Naval Gunnery.

IN August, 1901, we visited Shen-Hai-Quon, a
Tartar city very like Peking, situated at the end
of the Great Wall of China. Just opposite to
where we anchored the Great Wall had been
pierced to allow the railway to pass through it, and
a lot of the huge bricks were lying about. A
midshipman brought one of these on board. I
asked him what he was going to do with it ; he
said that when he had money enough to build
a house he would use it as the corner-stone.

From here we went on to Japan and visited
most of the principal ports. At Tokyo we were
most handsomely entertained by the Japanese
Admiralty, and I met Admiral Shimura, a Japanese
officer who had been in the Duke of Edinburgh
with me, and whose brilliant services in the Chino-
Japanese War of 1894 had won him a distinguished
position. En route south we called at Wei-hai-
wei, and Dr. Morrison, then correspondent of the
Times, and now Political Adviser to the Chinese
Government, stayed with me for a couple of days.
What a wonderful man he is !

164

BRITISH FLAG AT WEI-HAI-WEI 165

Wei-hai-wei, which lies very near Port
Arthur, has been the subject of many discussions,
and owing to the vacillation of opinion an enor-
mous amount of British money has been wasted on
it. It was a very strongly fortified Chinese naval
station, and was captured by the Japanese from
China in 1895, Port Arthur falling into their hands
the same year.

Why the Japanese were not allowed to keep
the two fortresses which they had so gallantly
fought for and won, I do not know, but the
circumstances in which they were forced to
evacuate them are well known. Wei-hai-wei
came into Great Britain's possession in 1898, and
the question arose as to what we were to do
with it. The Terrible was at Wei-hai-wei from
June until September, 1900, so I had ample
opportunities of gauging its possibilities. It had
been in our possession for two years, but the
authorities had not decided what use they should
put it to.

With the Russians only 100 miles away at
Port Arthur, the Germans very near at Kiao-chau
and the Japanese not very far off with a powerful
fleet, it was obvious that unless we made it very
strong it would be no use to us. This meant
fortifying it, and fortifying the mainland opposite
to it. Hence this idea was out of the question,
and there appeared to be no other course open but
to leave it as it was and use it as a training station
for the British ships on the China Station, for
which purpose it was admirably situated, as there
were facilities for carrying out all the practices and
exercises necessary to prepare a man-of-war for

166 WEI-HAI-WEI AND CRUISE HOME

battle. I discussed the matter with Captain (after-
wards Viscount) Jellicoe, Sir Edward Seymour's
Chief of Staff, who had come down among the
wounded from Taku, and he held the same view.
Sir Frank Swettenham was also of this opinion, but
added that the portion of the mainland which
had been conceded to us should be used as a
seaside resort for the Europeans of North China.
Another suggestion was to build forts on the
island, but to have no dockyard and no break-
waters, and no forts on the mainland. It was
obvious to any one with a grain of common sense
that this scheme could not possibly be accepted.
Why fortify an island if you had nothing on it for
the forts to protect ? Why build forts which could
be shelled from the mainland, and why build forts
to protect a harbour which in war-time would not
have been safe to anchor in ?

An officer remarked to me that the suggestion
was so ridiculous and so impossible that he believed
H.M. Government would adopt it. I felt con-
strained to reprove this implicit disbelief in official
intelligence, but he proved to be right.

On my revisiting Wei-hai-wei at the end of
1901, I found that three forts had been almost
completed at a cost of about a quarter of a million
of money, and that much more was to be spent in
transforming the island into a military station.
The waste of money appeared to me so wicked
that I wrote officially to my gallant Commander-
in-Chief at that time, Sir Cyprian Bridge, pointing
out that the forts would be of no use when they
were finished, and suggesting that he should ask
the Admiralty to have any further work stopped.

COSTLY MISTAKES 167

This letter, I think, went into the waste-paper
basket, but fortunately for the British tax -payers, I
sent a copy of it privately to the Second Sea Lord
of the Admiralty, who replied to me that my letter
made the matter so clear that he had laid it before
the Board, and that they had advised the Govern-
ment to stop further work on the fortifications and
to withdraw the troops.

Shortly afterwards, we received a telegram at
Wei-hai-wei to stop further work on the forts.
When this order arrived, the forts were completed
with the exception of putting the guns into them.
In that state they remain as monuments of inde-
cision and vacillation of opinion.

In both Houses of Parliament questions were
asked respecting the production of reports and
documents showing the grounds of the Govern-
ment's decision to abandon the work of fortification.
In the House of Lords the Earl of Selborne
replied that the papers were confidential and would
not be produced. Viscount Goschen pointed out
that H.M. Government had come to the conclusion,
evidently on fresh information acquired, that the first
opinions as to the value of Wei-hai-wei as a naval
and -military base could not be sustained. Lord
Rosebery pointed out that four years before the
whole country had rung with praises of Wei-hai-wei
and its future value. It was to be a place of arms,
a naval station, a coaling station ; but now that
£270,000 had been spent on the forts and they were
nearly completed, the Government had suddenly
discovered that Wei-hai-wei was unsuited for the
purposes for which it had been so loudly proclaimed,
that it was only of value as a holiday resort, and

168 WE1-HAI-WEI AND CRUISE HOME

that the troops would be withdrawn from it and
the forts left unfinished.

In the House of Commons, on the 1 Oth February,
1902, Mr. Arnold Forster stated that the decision
to discontinue the fortifications was arrived at on
purely strategic grounds, and was not the result of
any special report, and that there were no docu-
ments to show, a statement at which Mr. Bryce
expressed a natural surprise.

In May, 1902, our third and last prize firing
took place. For two years we had been the best
ship in the Navy, but this time we had to come
down a little owing to very peculiar circumstances.
The firing took place at Mers Bay, a short distance
from Hong Kong, the weather was very bad, the
men could only with great difficulty work on the
targets, and most of our boats were stove in. It
was not a day when any other ship would have
fired, but I had such confidence in the gun layers
that I wished them to show that they could do as
well in rough weather as in fine. We commenced
firing. One gun layer, William Bate, a superb
shot, who for the last two years had never missed
the target, scored nothing — all misses a long way
over. Two or three men who fired after him got
very few hits. Feeling sure that there was some-
thing wrong with the cordite, I stopped the firing,
and had pressure gauges put in, with the result
that we discovered we were getting a ton more
pressure than we ought to have, and consequently
an abnormal velocity which sent all the shots over.
The gun sights were readjusted, and the remaining
twelve men who fired made 88*2 per cent, of hits.
I subsequently discovered that my energetic

HOMEWARD BOUND 169

torpedo lieutenant had been up all night testing
the primers in the cartridges. The tests had been
carried out in the ammunition passage which, as
we were under steam and in the tropics, was at a
temperature of at least 125° C. The fact that the
cordite was exposed to this temperature for the
night, of course accounted for the condition which
we found in the morning.

Petty Officer Grounds did not fire until after I
had ordered a readjustment of the sights. He
maintained his position as best shot in the ship by
firing hi one minute nine rounds and making seven
hits.

Two months after the prize firing, Grounds,
who had for three years been the best shot in the
whole of the British Navy, died suddenly from
cholera. This petty officer had established a record
which practically revolutionised our naval gunnery
and I regarded him as a man worth more than his
weight in gold.

On the 26th June, 1902, we were at Hong
Kong, and every one was anxious to do something
to commemorate the Coronation of King Edward
VII. I remembered having written Scylla in
human letters on the rocks at Candia, and decided
to write " God save the King " on the Terrible 's
side in the same way. The fourteen letters took
about two hundred and fifty men.

In July, 1902, we received orders to proceed to
England, and on the 29th we steamed out of
Hong Kong. We touched at Singapore, Aden,
Suez, Port Said, Malta and Gibraltar, arriving at
Portsmouth on the 18th September. As we
had left Portsmouth on the 19th September,

170 WEI-HAI-WEI AND CRUISE HOME

1899, we had been away for almost exactly three
years.

The Navy League sent me an address and the
Council of the Society of St. George a telegram,
both of which are reproduced below.

" To Captain Percy M. Scott, R.AT., C.B.,

H.M.S. « Terrible."
" SIR,

"The Executive Committee of the Navy
League, on behalf of the members of this
Society, would beg to tender to you, the officers
and crew of His Majesty's Ship Terrible, their
most cordial congratulations upon your safe
return to this country.

" As citizens and taxpayers, we take this
opportunity of conveying our thanks for the
great services by sea and land which you and
your ship's company have rendered to the
Empire, and we would refer especially to the
signal service performed by you in mounting
heavy guns for use before Ladysmith and in
the field, as also the improvement in gunnery
practice of the Navy, which has largely been the
result of the record firing by His Majesty's
Ship Terrible.

66 We have the honour to be, Sir,
" Your obedient servants,

" R. YERBURGH, President.
" E. R. FREMANTLE,

Vice-President.

" M. S. TROWER, Chairman of
the Executive Committee.
" WM. CAIUS CRUTCHLEY,

Secretary."

" The Council and Members of the Society

RECEPTION AT PORTSMOUTH 171

of St. George offer a very hearty welcome to
Captain Percy Scott and the officers and men
of the Terrible upon their return to the shores
of Old England. They have proved that they
did not forget (nor ever will) the imperishable
signal of heroic Nelson, 4 England expects every
man will do his duty.' '

On the 23rd the citizens of Portsmouth enter-
tained us at a public banquet. The Mayor,1 in
proposing the toast of " Our Guests," referred to
various incidents that had happened during the
commission, concluding his speech as follows : —

" On behalf of my fellow-townsmen, I
would say to you, the officers, petty officers,
and men of the Terrible, we feel that in tender-
ing you our tribute of respect and esteem and
our expression of heartful thanks, we are only
acting as the mouthpiece of the nation at large.
You have earned our deepest gratitude, and
maintained nobly and well the grand traditions
of our first line of defence."

In reply I said : —

" On behalf of the officers and men of the
Terrible, I beg to thank you very much for the
magnificent reception that the inhabitants of
Portsmouth have given us, and for the kind
manner in which you have proposed the toast.
The borough of Portsmouth has been for so
many years and is so closely connected with
His Majesty's Navy, that a welcome from its
citizens naturally finds full appreciation in the
hearts of a ship's company, most of whom have
residing in the neighbourhood all that is dear to

1 Major (afterwards Col. Sir) William Dupree.

N

172 WEI-HAT- WEI AND CRUISE HOME

them. I need hardly tell you how anxiously
the order for our return was looked forward to,
how eagerly all the home papers were scanned
for some indication of our relief being commis-
sioned, and how easily any rumours, no matter
how unreliable the authority, were seized upon
and believed, and it would be impossible for
me to make you realise how hearty was the
cheer which rang through the ship when I
passed word that orders had been received for
our return to Portsmouth. Much as we looked
forward to our return, your welcome has en-
tirely outdone anything that was dreamt of,
and your reception of us will, I am sure, never
be forgotten by any officer or man of the
Terrible.

66 With regard to the South African War,
even before it commenced I realised that it was
purely a soldiers' war. The Boers had no navy
to fight, no seaports for us to secure, no com-
merce for us to attack, and the theatre of
fighting was too far inland for a naval brigade
to go. The small number of infantry that we
could land would be inappreciable, and the only
field service guns that we had to land were of
the same pattern as the Royal Artillery. It,
therefore, appeared obvious that it was a war in
which the Navy could take but a small part.
A lucky chance, however, arose. The Boers
had got long-range mobile guns, and our Army
had not. This ill-wind blew good to us. It
was an easy matter to get a few Cape waggon
wheels, put a bit of wood on the top of them,
and on to that ship long-range 12-pounders ;
then one had a gun equal in range to those
employed by the Boers. When heavier guns,
such as 4 "7-inch and 6 inch, were required, it
only meant a little more wood and stronger

A REVIEW OF THE PAST 173

wheels. These guns were found rather useful,
and allowed the Navy to work once more
beside the sister Service in the field. The
manufacture of gun-mountings, however, was
not a very happy or fortunate event for me
personally, as it meant my being left at the
base to make more, and so precluded me from
commanding my own officers and men. How-
ever, they were fortunate enough to be com-
manded by Captain Jones, the present Flag
Captain here, an officer who, by his capability,
tact, and the cordial friendship which he ex-
tended to the * Terribles ' made it a pleasure to
work under him, and I was glad to hear from
him that they had done well. You mention,
Mr. Mayor, the services performed by Com-
mander Ogilvy, Mr. Wright, and their guns'
crews at the first battle of Colenso. The saving
of two 12-pounders by them on that occasion
was a feat which all of us in the Terrible have
been very proud of. When the native drivers
had all bolted and the bullocks had all been
shot, getting a couple of guns away was not an
easy matter.

"I am extremely obliged to you, Mr.
Mayor, for the kind way in which you have
referred to my services as Commandant of
Durban. Some of the duties I had to perform
there in restricting civil rights would have been
very irksome had I not been in such a loyal
colony as Natal, where the aim and object of
every one was to help, and I am glad to see that
the valuable services rendered by Sir David
Hunter and Major Bousfield have been recog-
nised by the country. In North China, the
officers and men again had an opportunity of
working ashore with the sister Service, and
eventually found themselves quartered in the

174 WEI-HA1-WEI AND CRUISE HOME

forbidden city of Peking, and I am very glad
to see that one man who was shot through the
brain there is well enough to enjoy your hos-
pitality to-night. I have to thank you also
for the very kind reference which you have
made to the shooting of the ship. 1 feel sure
that the captains of the guns and the officers
who have taken such care and trouble over their
instruction will fully appreciate your remarks
and, further, that your public reference to it on
this occasion will do much to stimulate a desire
in others to follow their example. As Captain
of the Terrible, it has always been a great
satisfaction to me to know that, if we had to
fight an enemy, I could go into action with a
perfect reliance on the men behind the gun. I
beg, again, in the name of the officers and men
to thank you and the citizens of Portsmouth
for this magnificent reception, and to assure you
that it is fully appreciated by us all, and at the
same time to add that on board the Terrible
we all appreciate our luck in coming in for two
campaigns, but we all know that we have done
no better than any other of His Majesty's ships
would have done under similar circumstances.
If in any little details the Terrible has been
successful, I owe it all to the loyal co-operation
of my officers and men."

On the 1st October, by royal command, I
visited the King at Balmoral. On arrival His
Majesty invested me with the insignia of Com-
mander of the Bath and Commander of the
Victorian Order, and presented me with a minia-
ture of the Commander of the Bath in order
that I might wear it at dinner. His Majesty
informed me that I should go with him the

PRESENT AT A DEER DRIVE 175

next day to a deer drive at Invercauld. The
next day, in driving over, His Majesty, noticing
that I was wearing a white shirt and collar, told
me that as soon as the drive commenced I must
cover them up as the deer had a very quick eye for
any spot of white.

The forest round Invercauld is an ideal country
for deer, having plenty of cover and, at the same
time, good open spaces. It was then let for the
shooting to Mr. Neumann. There were five rifles,
the King, Earl Howe, Sir John Willoughby,
Captain Gordon Wilson and myself. We were
placed in capital positions, and had not long to
wait before the deer came in sight. One group
looked as if they were coming towards me, but
they turned towards His Majesty, who brought the
stag down with a fine shot. Sir John Willoughby
and Captain Gordon Wilson also got a stag each.

In driving back to Balmoral His Majesty said
that as I had not got a stag he would send me out
the next morning stalking. I had an early break-
fast, and was driven out to the high ground near
Balmoral. En route I tried my rifle, which was a new
one. I paced out ninety yards, pinned an envelope
on a tree and fired at it. The bullet struck almost
in the centre, and the cautious gillie said this
" would do." We saw a good many deer, but they
were difficult to get at. After a very long crawrl
we came on a fine stag ; he was about eighty yards
off and facing me. I fired at the centre of his
chest, whereupon he turned to the right and
walked away. In horror I exclaimed that I had
missed. "Oh no," said the gillie in very broad
Scotch, "you hit him through the heart." We

176 WEI-HAI-WEI AND CRUISE HOME

found him quite dead about five yards from where
he was when I fired. The gillie informed me that
stags when shot through the heart often behave in
this eccentric manner.

We started off on another stalk and I got my
second stag, a very bad one with one horn broken.
It was an easy shot as he ran by me at about forty
yards. We then made a long detour round a hill,
and with a telescope could see a herd of about
twenty hinds with one fine stag. The wind was
favourable for us, and we got up to within about
seventy yards of them. The stag was standing
quite still and broadside on to me — it was an easy
shot. I fired at his shoulder, and to my chagrin
he went off unhurt. "I've missed him," I ex-
claimed to the gillie. "The hind took it," he
replied. The fact is that at the moment of firing
the hind had run up in front of the stag and the
bullet struck her spine instead of entering the
shoulder of the stag.

On my return to Balmoral the King congratu-
lated me on getting three heads. On my apolo-
gising for having shot a hind, His Majesty explained
that at this season of the year the old stags were
lazy and unappreciative of danger, and that the
hinds had to urge them on. For a hind to get the
bullet instead of the stag was not an infrequent
occurrence, as in looking over the sight of a rifle
you could not see what was below the point you
were aiming at. This explanation was a great
relief to me, as I thought I had committed a grave
offence in shooting a hind.

The next morning I had a long interview with
His Majesty with reference to gunnery results of

RECORD PERFORMANCES.

FRANCE : " Lucky girl ! She's got her ' Terrible ' Boy home again. My enfant
Terrible appears to be hopelessly at sea."

[The blazing indiscretion of the French Minister of Marine has lately been the
subject of general European comment.]

Reproduced by kind permission of proprietors of "Punch" Sept. 24, 1902.

[To face page 176.

KING EDWARD AND GUNNERY 177

H.M. Ships Scylla and Terrible. I explained that
the gunnery of the whole Fleet was in a deplorable
condition, and that the principal reasons for it were
the inefficiency of our gun sights, the lack of
interest taken in gunnery generally, and the absence
of competition. I told the story of Sir George
Warrender and his men, and His Majesty remarked
that every one knew that Englishmen would do
nothing without competition.

I went on to explain that the desire of the
Admiralty to keep the results secret was only
because the results were so bad, but that emulation
and competition could be attained by preparing
two returns — one confidential, giving the actual
number of rounds fired and hits made ; the other a
public return showing the ships in order of merit
on a system of points. As a result of the conversa-
tion His Majesty said that he would have a letter
written to the First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord
Selborne) suggesting the introduction of these two
returns.

On the evening of the 4th I left Balmoral.
The Terrible was rapidly dismantled, and on the
24th October was paid off. Punch published a
cartoon on the subject.

CHAPTER XI

GUNNERY MUDDLE

Efforts towards Reform — Admiralty Obstruction — Waste of Ammuni-
tion— Official Reprimands — Two Gunnery Committees appointed
— Conflicting Reports — The Centurion's Gun Sights — A Tardy
Discovery — The Dawn of a New Era.

ON the 1st April, 1903, I was appointed Captain
of H.M.S. Excellent, the School of Gunnery, and it
was quickly brought home to me what a flood of
opposition I should have against me if I attempted
to improve the shooting of the Fleet. The officers
of the Excellent were at first a little loth to believe
that all they had been doing was wrong, but their
ideas soon changed, and then they co-operated
most loyally and heartily with me.

In a very short time we modernised the in-
struction given to officers and men. All the
instructional machines that had proved so useful in
China were brought into use, and the qualifications
of the men as shots were decided on the number of
hits made on a target.

At this time, although the Fleet had not the
necessary instruments for the purpose,1 long-range
firing was being carried out. As to how it was to
be done no instruction had been issued, and the
Commanders-in- Chief were therefore left to carry

1 Of. Chapter IX.
178

MY SON ENTERING PORTSMOUTH DOCKYARD, WHERE, AS CAPTAIN OF H.M.S.
" EXCELLENT," I HAD A RESIDENCE.

[To face page 178.

BROADSIDE FIRING 179

it out in any way that seemed fit to them. The
Commanders-in- Chief on various stations held very
diverse opinions on the method to be employed,
and some strange battle practices resulted. In
some cases the ammunition might just as well have
been thrown overboard.

In order to help matters, 1 made some proposals
to the Admiralty in December, 1903, and suggested
that H.M.S. Drake, then commanded by Captain
John Jellicoe, should be placed at my disposal to
carry out certain experiments which were necessary
before putting forward a complete scheme of
practising for battle at what was then considered
to be long range.

I asked for H.M.S. Drake because I considered
that Captain Jellicoe l was at that time conspicuous
for his knowledge of gunnery among the captains
of the Fleet.

My scheme was exceedingly simple, it consisted
of firing broadsides. In a former chapter I have
pointed out that in the short-range practice it was
no use men firing unless they could see whether
their shot had hit or missed. This, of course, could
not apply to long-range firing, for it would be im-
possible to see a hit either on a target or an enemy
at four to five miles. In an action you might get
an indication that you were hitting by the enemy
kindly going down, blowing up, or catching fire,
but you could not make a target which would
perform these functions, so some new method had
to be devised from which an assumption could be
formed as to whether the target was being hit or
not. To meet the case I suggested that broadsides

1 Afterwards Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, O.M.

180

GUNNERY MUDDLE

should be fired, for the following reason. When a
volley, or broadside, say of six guns, is fired, the
shots do not all go in the same place, but open out
a little. Broadsides are sometimes very regular.
If they spread as indicated in the diagram and a
battleship is anywhere in the zone, she will evidently
be hit in her vital part (shaded) by three out of
the six shots.

Height out of water of hull
of ship, 36 ft. Beam or
breadth, 72 ft.

200 Yards

Here was the solution of the problem, for if the
observer saw one shot short of the target, he could
assume that he was hitting with some of the others.
This is what is called straddling the enemy.

That this was the only guide as to whether you
were hitting or not was not accepted as a fact until
1909, so we lost six years of progress, and even
when it was accepted it could not be put into
practice because we had no means by which we
could fire our guns in broadsides, so further pro-
gress was delayed.

The experiment I wanted carried out was in
connection with what I have referred to as the
zone. It was necessary to know into what space
the shots would probably fall, and if some of them
fell wide of the average, then the gun sights would
require correction. I called it calibrating the guns.
It had not been thought of before. Their Lord-
ships would not allow me to carry out this experi-

ADMIRALTY DISAPPROVAL 181

merit, and progress was hindered.1 In my letter
to the Admiralty applying for H.M.S. Drake I
pointed out to their Lordships that before she
could carry out the experiments it would be ne-
cessary to supply her with new gun sights. Since
1900 I had been pointing it out to them. Their
Lordships well knew that the gun sights were
inefficient, but they did not like being reminded
of the fact. So on the 2nd March, 1904, they
replied as follows : —

" Their Lordships strongly disapprove of the
remark which distinctly implies that the Drake
is not now furnished with serviceable sights,
whereas the sights fitted to her guns had every
improvement embodied in them when they were
designed and made, and are of the same pattern
as fitted to modern ships generally,"

Their Lordships did not approve of my en-
deavours to improve the gunnery of the Fleet,
and no steps were taken as regards calibration
until they went out of office. But though they
frowned on my proposition to investigate the long-
range firing question, a few months later they
decided to form two commitees, one presided over
by Admiral Sir Reginald Custance, in the Vener-
able ; the other presided over by Admiral Sir
Hed worth Lambton,2 in the Victorious. The two
committees were to have a free hand and fire what
ammunition they liked ; they were to investigate
thoroughly the whole subject of long-range firing ;
and they were to draw up a scheme of target

1 This necessary experiment was delayed until 1905.

2 Admiral of the Fleet Sir Hedworth Meux, M.P.

182 GUNNERY MUDDLE

practice, and decide what targets should be used.
At the conclusion of their experiments the two
bodies were to meet and send in one joint report.

After wasting an enormous amount of ammuni-
tion the committees found themselves diametrically
opposed on most of the important points, and in-
stead of a joint report they sent in two separate
documents.

Their Lordships decided that the suggestions
and system put forward by Sir Reginald Custance,
of the Venerable, should be adopted for use in all
ships, but they added a clause "that alternative
systems might be used instead of it."

The suggestions put forward by the Venerable
committee were so impossible that all ships took
advantage of the last paragraph of the Admiralty
letter, and the battle practice remained a "go as
you please " operation, every ship using any method
it preferred for grouping and firing its guns, and
every Commander-in- Chief adopting his own par-
ticular scheme. No rules were laid down by the
Admiralty and there was no competition.

Reorganising the Gunnery School and teaching
the men to shoot was quite an easy matter, but
when I surveyed the general state of the gunnery
in the Fleet I found it deplorable. And in the
background was an apathetic Admiralty disinclined
to improve it.

All the gun sights were inefficient ; we had no
proper regulations for prize firing, no proper targets,
no instruments for carrying out long-range firing,
no authorised scheme for battle, no suitable target
for long range. There was no scheme for testing
the gun-sights, and we had no efficient sub-calibre

AN OFFICIAL REPRIMAND 183

guns, and no efficient aiming rifle. The Germans
at this period were far ahead of us.

Although the Scylla and Terrible had shown
what could be done, and what was required, the
Admiralty had taken no steps to improve matters.
They had acted on none of the suggestions put
forward, nor would they allow that the gun sights
were inefficient.

In 1898 it had been demonstrated by H.M.S.
Scylla that when firing with a telescope sight the
man looked through the telescope with one eye
and shut the other. As he had not a third eye,
any corrections requiring to be applied to his sight,
either elevation or deflection, had to be put on by
another man. As explained in an earlier chapter,
I supplemented the guns' crew by a man and
christened him the " sight-setter." For this inno-
vation I got a reprimand from the Admiralty, but
about two years afterwards their Lordships recog-
nised the essential point and allowed an additional
man at each gun for sight-setting.

On inspecting some new gun sights on board
H.M.S. Lancaster in 1903, I found no provision
had been made for a sight-setter to work them,
and since they had many other defects also, I
referred to them in my report as inefficient. Their
Lordships, on the 27th October, 1903, informed me
that they did not approve of the tone of my letter.
They strongly deprecated the use of such an ex-
pression as " inefficient " when applied to fittings
which had been adopted by the Admiralty as the
outcome of many years of experience and after
consultations with eminent designers outside the
Service. All the gun sights of the Fleet were,

184 GUNNERY MUDDLE

nevertheless, inefficient, and every one knew it.
The Admiralty knew it, but they did not want to
do anything, and they boycotted every recom-
mendation I put forward.

Lord Charles Beresford, the Commander-in-
Chief of the Channel Fleet, had frequently referred
to the inefficiency of our gun sights, and Admiral
Sir Cyprian Bridge expressed his opinion of them
in the following language : "It would not be
possible to characterise with more than deserved
severity the atrocious scandal of our inefficient gun-
sights ; the sights of H.M.S. Centurion's guns were
so defective that she was not fit to go into action."

The story of H.M.S. Centurion is worth telling.
In 1904 new gun sights were made for her. It was
my duty as Captain of the Gunnery School to
examine them and report whether they were ser-
viceable or not. They were tested and found
incorrect, so I could not pass them. The Admi-
ralty tried to cajole me into passing them, but I
would not, so they sent down one of their own
officials who passed them, and the ship was sent
to China with gun sights so defective that, as
Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge stated, the ship was
not fit to go into action.

As the Admiralty remained immovable, on the
llth January, 1904, I wrote the following letter
to their Lordships :

" The most important item of any gun
mounting is the sighting appliance.

"Our sighting appliances for all natures of
guns are, I consider, at present most inefficient,
and my opinion is that all the guns in the
Navy should be re-sighted.

INEFFICIENT GUN SIGHTS 185

" It is unnecessary for me to specify the
defects, as I have so often done so during the
last five years. It is unnecessary for me to re-
capitulate the facts which have led to our gun
sights being in their present condition. I only
wish to again urge the importance of consider-
ation being given to the matter.

" I feel it my duty as Captain of the Excel-
lent to continue urging, and to place on record
that I have urged the matter to the utmost of
my power and ability, for in the event of war,
and our inefficiency in sighting proving dis-
astrous to the Fleet, had the Captain of the
Excellent not called the attention of the
authorities to the deficiency he would have
been criminally in fault."

This letter was too much for the Admiralty.
They did not reprimand me nor did they appear to
mind my again using the expression "inefficient."
They were obliged to do something, so they had a
conference and discovered (what every one else
knew) that all the gun sights of the Fleet were
inefficient, and that the guns of the whole Fleet would
have to be re-sighted.

Vitally important as the question was, their
Lordships proceeded in their usual dilatory and
unbusinesslike way, and consequently very little
was done towards re-sighting in 1904.

On February 24th, 1904, H.M. King Edward
VII. came to Portsmouth and visited Whale
Island. We had a sham fight and my motor-car
took part in the attack. It was covered in so as to
represent an armoured car, and a Maxim gun was
mounted beside the driver. Like all authors of
new ideas I was laughed at, but His Majesty

186 GUNNERY MUDDLE

informed me that he considered that armed motor-
cars would be a feature in future warfare. The
soundness of that view was fully demonstrated
during the late war, which saw the armed motor-car
develop under the pressure of events into the now
famous tank.

My two years as Captain of the Excellent were
one continuous battle with the Admiralty. They
were as determined that the gunnery of the Fleet
should not be improved as I was determined to
improve it. Every suggestion that they could
possibly delay, or turn down, they did. They
ruined the gun layers' test by increasing the range
to such an extent that the men could not see
whether they were hitting or missing ; they issued
such ridiculous instructions as regards the King's
Medal for good shooting that on some occasions it
had to be tossed for. During this period of mal-
administration Lord Selborne, who was the First
Lord of the Admiralty, was stumping the country,
and declaring in his speeches that, " Gunnery,
gunnery," was considered by the Admiralty to be
of vital importance. And on the 24th March, 1904,
he wrote to me as follows : " The Lords of the
Admiralty have for long devoted and are still
devoting their whole heart and soul to the question
of improving the gunnery of the Fleet."

Fortunately for the country, shortly afterwards,
before they could do any further harm to gunnery,
Lord Selborne and his Board were replaced at the
Admiralty, and, as Punch rightly surmised, there
was no more " Gunnery Hash."

I may perhaps refer here to an incident in my
career which was not naval. On the 13th June,

LL.D. OF CAMBRIDGE 187

1903, I was made an Honorary LL.D. of Cam-
bridge. The other recipients were the Duke of
Connaught, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord
Grenfell, and Sir John French. We were all
assembled in one of the colleges, where we were
provided with red gowns, and thence marched in
a procession across the grounds to the Senate
House.

The Senate House was crowded with under-
graduates, who gave us a wonderful reception, and
made some very funny remarks on our combina-
tion of full dress uniform and red gowns. The
Duke of Devonshire, who was Chancellor, stood on
a raised platform, and taking each recipient by the
hand made a speech in Latin. What he said about
me, translated into English, is as follows :

" Captain Percy Scott had distinguished
himself in naval warfare off the mouths of the
Niger, the Congo, and the Nile. As Com-
mander of H.M.S. Terrible, he had reached the
coast of Natal at a critical moment, when his
ingenuity and resourcefulness had made it
possible for the great naval guns of that vessel
to be effectively used on land, and thus supplied
our soldiers with absolutely unexpected rein-
forcements at a time when they were sorely
needed. He had since distinguished himself in
a similar manner off the coast of China, and
had brought his formidable cruiser safely back
to the harbours of England amid scenes of
enthusiastic congratulation. He was the fittest
recipient of the final crown of that day's
ceremony.

" ' Ceu pressse cum iam portum tetigere
carinae puppibus et laetae nautse imposuere

coronas.'

188 GUNNERY MUDDLE

The ceremony was followed by a luncheon,
a reception, a dinner, and a dance. Professor Sir
Alfred and Lady Ewing took me into their house
and made my couple of days at Cambridge very
enjoyable.

CHAPTER XII

INSPECTOR OF TARGET PRACTICE

Appointment as Inspector of Target Practice — Battle Practice Con-
ditions— Order out of Chaos — Improvement at Last — My Visit to
Kiel— The Chief Defect of the German Navy— A Lost Experiment
— " Director Firing."

ON the 24th February, 1905, I was appointed
" Inspector of Target Practice." By the terms of
the original Order in Council the position was
described as "Director of Target Practice," the
Admiralty desiring to copy what the United States
of America had already done in making Captain
W. Sims Director of Target Practice.

Captain Sims was a very able Director. He
was backed by the United States Naval Depart-
ment and by the President of the United States,
consequently he could do something. But if I had
been appointed as Director it would have been a
very different thing. I should only have been
backed by Sir John Jellicoe, who was then Director
of Naval Ordnance : but in name only, for he had
little power to do anything and was not a member
of the Board of Admiralty. It was useless for me
to try to play Captain Sims' part without his power,
so I got the name changed from " Director " to
" Inspector " of Target Practice.

We have never had a "Director" of Target

189

1 90 INSPECTOR OF TARGET PRACTICE

Practice, and, much as it is wanted, I do not think
we are ever likely to have one until the Admiralty
are forced into recognising that gunnery is of
importance.

The comment of Mr. Gibson Bowles, M.P., on
my appointment was unusual. He remarked that
Admiral Sir Percy Scott " had made the gunnery "
of the Navy in spite of the Admiralty, and asked
what the Admiral's new duties were, for he was a
" rather peculiar wild animal to let loose on a tame
Board of Admiralty" (Times, 8.3.05). Why Mr.
Gibson Bowles called me a " peculiar wild animal "
I do not know.

My new duties were to attend as many firing
practices as I could, report on them, and offer
suggestions for improvements. The first thing I
had to do was to carry out experiments for cali-
brating the gun sights, which the Admiralty had
disallowed in 1903. I do not think that they
realised the importance of it. The experiments
were quite successful. A calibration range was
established, and it has been in use ever since.

During 1905 I attended all the firings carried
out by the Channel, Atlantic and Mediterranean
Fleets, and had ample opportunity of seeing what
a terrible state we were in as regards preparedness
for war. To my lay readers it must appear a wonder-
ful thing that, although a man-of-war is in reality
only a platform to carry about guns, no attention
was given to teaching the officers and men how to
use the guns ; the whole energy of the Navy was
devoted to beautifying the ships.

Sir John Jellicoe, whose appointment as Director
of Naval Ordnance coincided with mine as Inspector

BATTLE PRACTICE

191

of Target Practice, had rescued the gun layers'
test from the chaos that Lord Selborne's adminis-
tration had left it in, and in 1905 it was carried out
in a fairly uniform manner. But the results were
shocking, the Fleet only hitting the target 56
times out of every 100 shots fired, and some
ships never hitting the target at all. My late
ship, H.M.S. Scylla, that had been top ship of the
Navy, came out at the bottom with a score of
NO HITS.

The battle practice for this year was deplorable.
No rules had been laid down, the Fleet had no
efficient sights for the guns, and they had none of
the necessary instruments for carrying out firing at
any range but a very short one. The consequence
was that in my first year as Inspector of Target
Practice the practice for battle was a " go as you
please." Each Fleet did as it liked. Some used
one pattern of target, some another ; some used the
target moored, some used it drifting ; some opened
fire at one range, some at another. As to organi-
sation, there was none, and as regards methods
of using the guns of the ship every gunnery
lieutenant of a ship adopted his own particular
method, and christened the method with some
wonderful name. Of the 68 ships whose battle
practice I attended—

21 ships styled their method of firing as Independent.

14
8
7
5
4
4
4
3

Salvoes.
Control.
Group Salvoes.
Broadsides.
Volleys.

Broadside Volleys.
Controller's Salvoes.
Rapid Independent.

192 INSPECTOR OF TARGET PRACTICE

3 ships styled their method of firing as Rapid.
2 Electric.

1 ship styled its

Slow.

Independent Control.
Group Volleys.
Rapid Controlled.
Volleys by Groups.
Single in Rotation.
Controlled Group Volleys.
Group Independent.
Sectional Volleys.

These various terms meant that all the gunnery
lieutenants were trying to do broadside firing
without the means to do it, and without any
assistance or guidance from the Admiralty. 1905
was a record year for gunnery in one way ; the
Director of Naval Ordnance, the Captain of the
Gunnery School, and the Inspector of Target
Practice were all working harmoniously together to
improve naval shooting. This friendly relation had
never existed in the Navy before.

The result of this very proper combination was
that during the latter part of 1905 I was very busy
in getting out new rules, the D.N.O. in getting
the neccessary material, and the Gunnery School
in giving the officers and men the necessary
training.

At the end of the year the battle practice
return was made out for the first time with the
ships in their order of merit, and competition was
thus introduced. These circumstances, combined
with courts of inquiry on all ships that did badly,
bore fruit in the following year, and the gunnery
of the Navy began to improve. In 1906 a great
many ships of the Fleet had efficient gun sights,
and some of the material necessary for carrying out

IMPROVED RESULTS

193

battle practice ; they had proper targets to shoot
at, and they had rules to guide them in carrying out

% of Hits

to

Rounds
fired.

80

O5

O5

OC5

70

60

50

40

30

This shows that from 1897 to 1900 no improvement was made in
shooting. From 1900 to 1903 there was improvement. In 1904 it went
back again owing to the unwise action of the Admiralty in increasing
the range. In 1905, 190(5, and 1907 it advanced rapidly.

the firings. The result was a very great improve-
ment in the battle practice, and the gun layers' test

194 INSPECTOR OF TARGET PRACTICE

advanced from a percentage of hits of 51 to a
percentage of 71.

The year 1907 showed a still further advance
in battle practice. Although the range was con-
siderably increased, the Fleet's average in hitting
the target was just double what it was in 1905. In
the gun layers' test the improvement was so marked
that it was decided to reduce the size of the target
for the firing in the following year's test. Many
men in 1907 never missed the target at all, and the
average of the whole Fleet was 79'1 of hits out of
every 100 rounds fired, which is nearly double what
it was in 1904.1

During the period of this great advance in
naval gunnery Sir John Fisher (now Lord Fisher
of Kilverstone) was First Sea Lord of the Ad-
miralty, and Sir John Jellicoe (now Viscount
Jellicoe of Scapa) was Director of Naval Ordnance.

In 1905 we had a very high appreciation of the
German Navy, but our information about it
appeared to be very limited, and as we knew
nothing of their gunnery I thought I would pay a
visit to Kiel. Prince Henry of Prussia, who was
then in command of the High Sea Fleet, sent his
Flag Commander and Flag Lieutenant to meet me
at the station, and I was conducted straight to his
schloss, my luggage being dispatched to the hotel.
In explanation of this arrangement Prince Henry
told me that he had to leave for Darmstadt in an
hour, and that he wanted to talk with me before his
departure. Our conversation was almost entirely
confined to gunnery. He had evidently followed
our progress very closely, and was quite depressed

1 Cf. Appendix I.

PUNCH, OR THE LONDON CHARIVARI. -DECEMBER 26, 1906.

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

BRITANNIA. "ACCEPT MY CONGRATULATIONS, SIRE, ON THE SPLENDID GROWTH OF YOUR NAVY. ANP, SJNCE
I HAVE Y00R ASSURANCE THAT YOUR PROGRAMME IS NOT AN AGGRESSIVE ONE. I FEEL SUBE YOU WILL BE
INTERESTED TO SEE WHAT / HAVE BEEN DOING IN THE LAST THREE YEARS!"

Reproduced by kind permission of the proprietors of " Punch,'

[To face page 194.

A VISIT TO KIEL 195

when he referred to his own great difficulties and
the impossibility of making a Navy on a short-
service principle, for a sailor could not be made in
three years. The system provided a reserve of
more than the numbers required, but these men,
he said, would be no good when called up. The
War was to prove the correctness of this opinion.
I had intended remaining at Kiel only three days,
but Prince Henry asked me to stay another day
so as to dine with him on his return. Meanwhile
he put at my disposal his Flag Commander and
Flag Lieutenant to show me round, but he added
that I must not ask to see their range-finder as it
was very secret. I did not want to see their
range-finder. I had tried it and condemned it.
Zeiss, the maker, always brought his inventions to
us before taking them to the Germans.

For the next four days I was all day and half
the night in the society of German officers who
all spoke English fluently and were all connected
with naval gunnery. I am quite sure that they
were selected officers, and that they decided day
by day what questions should be asked me, because
I was never asked the same question twice. We
were under the impression then that the Germans
knew everything about our Navy, and I was con-
sequently much surprised at the simplicity of their
queries. Some referred to things that were obsolete
in our Navy ; for others they could have found the
answers in almost any of our published books and
newspapers. In short, I came to the conclusion
that they knew very little. Nor, on reflection,
could it have been expected to be otherwise, since
they had no time to devote to the higher grades of

196 INSPECTOR OF TARGET PRACTICE

training in gunnery, all their time being taken up
in teaching the recruits the elementary part of a
sailor's education. Prince Henry's flagship, the
Deutschland, at that time had 60 per cent, of men
of under three years' service.

The German ships were in some respects very
good, as — in contradistinction to ourselves — the
race is quick in adopting new ideas, and their fire
control instruments were ahead of ours. The
backbone of a Navy is, however, the personnel,
and herein they failed. Training recruits in Kiel
harbour was like trying to make a sailor on the
Serpentine. Professionally their education was
bad, but it was bad morally also on account of the
example set to the men by their officers. I found
out that only a small percentage of the officers
were gentlemen, and that they treated the men
very badly. They were not sportsmen, they played
no games, and their only form of recreation was
beer and dissipation. This, no doubt, accounts for
their cowardly and brutal conduct during the War,
and also for the fact that their fleet, without firing
a shot, was driven into British harbours as meekly
as a flock of sheep.

After my visit to Kiel, having seen the enormous
elevation the Germans were giving their guns, I
realised that they contemplated firing at very long
range, and that we might expect a large proportion
of hits on the deck instead of on the side armour.
To test the matter I suggested using an armoured
hulk as a target, and a drawing of the ship was made.
Admiral Jellicoe, who was at the Admiralty,
was keenly interested, and some experiments were
carried out to see if as a measure of economy we

PUNCH, OR THE LONDON CHARIVARI.— OCTOBKR 19, 1904.

A LONG SIGHT BETTER.

JOHN BULL. "HULLO! NEW CHEF, EH? GOOD! I KNOW HIM. NO MORE GUNNERY
HASH NOW ! "

[The appointment of Sir Jons FisilES as First Sea Lord is a guarantee that such scandals as that of the Cc.ittur'wn gun-sishts'will not be repeated.

Reproduced by the kind permission of the Proprietors of " Punch."

[To face page 196.

THE CHANNEL FLEET 197

could use some of the old wrought-iron armour.
It was found that this old armour would not keep
out the modern shell prejectiles, and that we should
have to plate the hulk with the hardest armour.
Money could not be obtained for that purpose,
and the idea was dropped.1 The information we
should have gained from this experiment we learned
at the Battle of Jutland by the destruction of some
of our ships.2 After this battle additional deck
protection on an extensive scale was provided in
the majority of our heavy ships.

In the autumn of 1907 I had to give up the
post of Inspector of Target Practice, on being ap-
pointed to command the Second Cruiser Squadron
attached to the Channel Fleet, which was under
the command of Admiral Lord Charles Beresford.
At the same time Sir John Jellicoe left the Ad-
miralty to take command of the Atlantic Squadron.
During our time in office we not only managed to
introduce many reforms in naval gunnery, but tried
hard to introduce " director firing." Unfortu-
nately the Director of Naval Ordnance was not a
member of the Board of Admiralty, and conse-
quently carried no weight as regards naval gunnery,
and this very necessary method of firing was not
generally adopted until seven years afterwards,
when war proved that the guns in our ships were
of no use without it — a fact which throws a very
heavy responsibility upon the Board of Admiralty,
which boycotted its introduction in former years.

1 The last correspondence I had with the Admiralty about this hulk
target was dated 19th February, 1913. In that letter I again strongly
advocated the proposal.

2 "The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916," by Admiral Viscount Jellicoe,
p. 420.

CHAPTER XIII

H.M.S. GOOD HOPE WITH THE CHANNEL FLEET

En Command of the Second Cruiser Squadron — Obsolete Ideas — In-
adequate Training for War — Housemaiding the Ship Paramount —
The Test of War— Confusion and Unreadiness— Wrong Pattern
Torpedo— Lord Charles Beresford and the Admiralty— H.M.S.
Good Hope's Gunnery — First in the whole Fleet — Our Cruise in
Northern Waters — My New Appointment — An Independent Com-
mand— A New Routine and Efficiency.

ON the 15th July, 1907, I hoisted my flag in
command of the Second Cruiser Squadron, con-
sisting of the Good Hope, Argyll, Hampshire,
Duke of Edinburgh, Slack Prince, and Roxburgh.
We were attached to the Channel Fleet, and as
we were generally in company with it, I, as a
flag officer, had nothing to do ; a flag officer had
practically no control over his squadron when in
the presence of a senior officer.

Throughout the Navy in 1907 the rule was
that the senior officer made out a fixed routine
which all ships had to follow, irrespective of the
time they had been in commission. What exer-
cises the ships are to perform ; what clothes the
officers and men are to wear ; what boats the ships
are to use ; what awnings the ships are to spread ;
when the men are to wash their clothes ; when and
how the washed clothes are to be hung up, and
when they are to be taken down — all these are

198

POSITION OF SENIOR OFFICERS 199

matters over which captains of ships have no juris-
diction ; they are settled by the senior admiral
present.

One very important rule attached to the con-
duct of a fleet ; whenever the senior officer's ship
did anything, all the rest of the ships in the fleet
had to do likewise, and if the senior officer's ship
forgot to do what she ought to do, then the other
ships must not do it. Any one can see how this
makes for efficiency ! I remember coming up on
deck once and finding that, although it was pouring
with rain, the guns were not covered. I pitched
into the officer of the watch, but got the worst of
it; he informed me that he could not cover the
guns as the flagship had not yet covered hers. It
is the rule of the Service that a senior officer can
do no wrong. We preserve our manners at the
cost of efficiency.

Special permission could, under some circum-
stances, be obtained from the senior officer for not
following his example, but wireless telegraphy has
introduced a difficulty in deciding who the senior
officer is. On the occasion when I was senior
officer at Portland, an Admiral, junior to me, came
into the harbour with some washed clothes hanging
up to dry. Seeing that my flagship had no washed
clothes hanging up to dry, he made a signal, " Per-
mission is requested to keep my washed clothes
hanging up, as they are not dry." I granted him
the permission, but a heated argument took place
afterwards as to whether I was right or wrong in
so doing, as an officer, senior to me, was about ten
miles out to sea, and 1 could have passed the
request out to him by wireless telegraphy. No

200 WITH THE CHANNEL FLEET

decision had been arrived at on this important
point before I gave up command of the squadron.
The introduction of drying rooms for washed
clothes in H.M. ships has greatly reduced the
amount of signalling with regard to where and
how clothes are to be hung up.

One of my captains pointed out to me that on
account of the structure of his ship he sometimes
required an awning spread when the senior officer's
ship did not. I had to inform him that, although
I was in command of the squadron to which his
ship belonged, I had no authority to grant him
permission to spread an awning, but I could forward
his request on to the senior officer present.

Signalmen in all ships were trained to keep a
smart look-out to see if any ship had a pair of
trousers hanging in the wrong place. I suggested
that it would have been of more war value if they
were trained to find the periscope of a submarine.
Such an idea was considered very ridiculous ; no
departure could be made from the old and obsolete
notions which obtained throughout the Service.
Our brains and energy were not used in training
for war ; housemaiding the ships was to remain as
it had been the paramount consideration.

This is the training for war we all had, and the
expression "all" included, as a rule, their Lord-
ships the Commissioners of the Admiralty. Hence
it is not surprising that when war did come, the
Admiralty was in a state of dislocation and con-
fusion. One department was wiring to a squadron
of ships to do one thing, while another department
was giving it contrary orders. There was little
organisation and little method, and we allowed the

THE VALUE OF BRAINS 201

German cruisers in Far Eastern waters to get out
of port and prey upon our commerce, with the
result that we had to employ ships for several
months in rounding them up, whereas a little
intelligence properly directed would have blockaded
them all in their harbours on the day war was
declared or forced them to fight.

In addition, we had no up-to-date mine layers,
nor an efficient mine ; no properly fitted mine
sweepers ; no arrangements for guarding our ships
against mines ; no efficient method of using our
guns at night ; no anti-Zeppelin guns ; no anti-
submarine precautions ; no safe harbour for our
Fleet, and only a few ships (eight) were partly
fitted with a proper method of firing their guns.
Our torpedoes were so badly fitted that in the early
days of the war they went under the German ships
instead of hitting them. This was very galling to
our submarine officers and men, who displayed great
gallantry in getting at the German ships.

Training naval officers and men as housemaids
is not good for war ; brains are required. But,
however faulty our training in peace may have
been, it did not affect the character of the British
naval officer and seaman. Whether in a ship, sub-
marine, balloon, aeroplane, motor-car, tank, or as
a soldier, the men who bore an anchor on their
caps, and others who wore a sou'-wester, fought
with bravery not surpassed by any men in the
world. Of the many thousand who went to the
bottom of the ocean, a large number might be
alive now if in peace-time our legislators had
attended to the war preparedness of ships instead of
chiefly to the housemaiding of them. I once heard

202 WITH THE CHANNEL FLEET

a statement that " the blunders of our politicians
and legislators are paid for with the blood of our
sailors and soldiers." How terribly the War has
demonstrated the truth of this statement !

I return from this digression to resume my
narrative of the Good Hope. Having practically
no command of my squadron, I employed my time
in trying to improve the shooting, and I succeeded
so well that the Good Hope became, like the
Scylla and Terrible in other years, top ship of the
Navy. >'<

My senior officer, the Commander-in-Chief of
the Channel Fleet, was Admiral Lord Charles
Beresford,1 and it happened that the First Sea
Lord was Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Fisher.2
Lord Charles Beresford had on many occasions
expressed his disapproval of the policy of Lord
Fisher as regards his redistribution of the Fleet.

Lord Charles Beresford's grievance against the
Admiralty was that they were forming another
fleet in home waters under the name of the " Home
Fleet," and that it was not to be under his com-
mand. He explained to me that this Home Fleet 3
was a fraud on the public and a danger to the
State ; that so grave was the disorganisation and
confusion, that, if the country had been suddenly
attacked, the Navy, in his opinion, would have
suffered a reverse, if not a severe defeat. Lord

1 Afterwards raised to the Peerage as Lord Beresford. He was a most
popular officer. In the Navy we knew he was not a sailor, but thought
that he was a politician ; in the House of Commons, I have been told,
they knew he was not a politician, but thought he was a sailor. — P.S.

2 Afterwards Lord Fisher of Kilverstone.

3 The first Fleet of the Home Fleets later on became the Grand
Fleet.

A NAVAL CONTROVERSY 203

Charles appeared to be of opinion that he could
either enforce his views on the Admiralty, or
procure the retirement of the Sea Lords ; that the
Admiralty were not to remain in control of the
Navy unless they accepted him as a dictator of
what they should do. He was, in fact, to be an
admiralissimo.

I listened to all this. Very politely, I refused
to join in a campaign against the Board of
Amiralty. In so doing I fully appreciated that
my Commander-in-Chief would be much annoyed.
I remained firm in my determination to do my
duty to the country and the Admiralty as I saw it.
Soon afterwards, whether by a mere coincidence or
otherwise, a charge of insubordination was made
against me, and Lord Charles applied in the
strongest possible terms to the Admiralty that I
should be superseded in the command of my
squadron. Their Lordships, the Commissioners of
the Admiralty, of course, did not supersede me.

I should have been well content never to think
of this episode again, so trivial in its origin. But
there are strong reasons against ignoring the
matter. Under such headings as " Admirals'
Quarrel," " Difficulties in the Navy," " Scott too
Free," the incident was related, so far as the facts
were known, and commented on in the columns of
the daily and weekly Press throughout the country.
The story was retold in the Dominions ; it was
discussed with relish by the enterprising journals
of New York ; it woke journalistic echoes in Paris
and Berlin. While the newspapers were furiously
raging together, and for some time after, my
mouth was closed, and I was still on the active

204 WITH THE CHANNEL FLEET

list when four years later Lord Charles Beresford
published his book " The Betrayal," in which, with-
out mentioning me by name, he thought fit to cast
reflections upon my character and ability as an
officer. This attack seemed to me to demand
notice, and as soon as I retired on promotion to
Admiral, I took steps to present to the public,
through the courtesy of the editor of the British
Review, a "Reply to Lord Charles Beresford."1
There I am content to leave the matter.

My attention in the meantime was devoted to
fitting my flagship, H.M.S. Good Hope, with
"director firing," so that if she had to fight a
German there would be a chance of her remaining
on the top, instead of going to the bottom.2

This operation was difficult, as I could get no
assistance from the Admiralty, and was forced to
beg, borrow, or steal all the necessary material.
Fortunately, I had a very competent and clever
torpedo officer, Lieutenant Charles Rice (a son of
Admiral Sir Charles Rice). This officer made out
all the drawings, and supervised the work, which
could not have been done without him. His
untimely death was greatly regretted. He was
killed through the fall of an aeroplane in which he
had gone up to demonstrate the utility of a wire-
less telegraphy invention he had devised. The
nation lost a very valuable officer, and I lost a very
charming friend,

As H.M.S. Scylla and H.M.S. Terrible, my two
former ships, had been the top ships of the whole

1 The British Review, April, 1913.

2 H.M.S. Good Hope subsequently had to fight a German and she
went to the bottom with all hands, but she had not then the description
of director with which I fitted her.

H.M.S. GOOD HOPE'S SHOOTING 205

Fleet in shooting, H.M.S. Good Hope was very
anxious to occupy the same position. Both officers
and men worked hard, "and in the competitions
the ship came out top of the Channel Fleet, but
seventh in the whole Fleet. This result was
disappointing to me. It may be of interest to
give the figures :

CHANNEL FLEET.— GUN-LAYERS' THSTS RESULTS.

Heavy gun-layers' test.

Light Q.F. gun-layers' test.

12-pr.

6 and 3-pr.

Good Hope ... 6 '6
King Edward VII. 6-1

Good Hope
New Zealand

6'4
6-1

Good Hope 8'6
Argyll 6-4

Hibernia 5 '6

Africa

6-1

Irresistible ... 3 '6

Commonwealth 5*3

King Edward V

II. 5-7

Formidable ... 3 '3

Hampshire

4-8

Talbot ...

5-4

Venerable 2*5

Africa

4-8

Formidable

5-0

Talbot ...

4-8

Hindustan

5-0

Black Prince

4-7

Hibernia ...

4-6

Irresistible

4-5

Irresistible

4-2

Britannia ...

4-1

Commonwealth 3 '4

New Zealand

4-0

Venerable

. 2-4

Formidable

3-7

Juno

3-7

Venerable

3-6

Argyll ...

3-5

Roxburgh...

3-1

Hindustan

2-9

Dukeof Edinburgh 2'6

Sapphire 2 '3

Some of the scores by the Good Hope's gun
layers were out of the way — at least in those days—
so I append them. The Good Hope had to steam
at a speed of about twelve knots, and her gunners
were required to fire at a target measuring only
eighty square feet which was just under a mile
distant. The vessel mounted two 9 '2-inch guns of
the Mark X. type, firing 380 Ib. projectiles, and

206 WITH THE CHANNEL FLEET

sixteen 6-inch breechloading guns of the Mark VII.
type, firing 100 Ib. shells. The results were as
follows :

9'2-lNCH GUNS.

C. Todd, C.P.O

E. Burgess, P.O. 1st class

Total

Rounds fired.
8

9
18

Hits scored.
6
9

14

6-IsrcH GUNS.

E. H. Brown, Gunner R.M.A. ...

R. W. Newman, A.B

J. Brown, Gunner R.M.A.

L. S. Young, P.O. 1st class

A. C. Atkins, Corporal R.M.A. ...

A. Hazelgrove, A.B

F. J. White, P.O. 1st class
C. Parsons, P.O. 1st class

M. Flavin, A.B

A. Colwell, P.O. 1st class

C. Lord, C.P.O

C. E. Rice, Leading Seaman

C. W. Smith, Leading Seaman ...

C. J. Sommerill, P.O. 1st class ...

G. H. Cooper, Gunner R.M.A. ...
J. Dilkes, A.B

11

... 10

9

9

10

8

10

8

9

8

8

8

9

7

8

7

9

6

9

6

8

6

8

6

8

5

8

5

7 ••

5

9

2

140

106

The run for the 9 -2-inch guns was two minutes,
and for the 6-inch guns one minute, and therefore,
in summary, the average result of each gun per
minute was as follows :

Per minute each gun.

9'2-in. guns ...
6-in. guns

Rounds.
4-5
875

Hits.

3-5
6-6

The shooting with the 6 -inch guns was then
without parallel in the British Fleet.

The commanding officer of the Good Hope was
Captain E. H. Grafton, while the gunnery officer
was Lieut. J. L. S. Kirkness.

It was during Fleet manoeuvres of this year

AN ADMIRALTY ERROR 207

that we experienced great difficulty in the matter
of cipher messages. Under the system then in
use valuable time was frequently lost and many
mistakes occurred. I remember getting one signal
to take my ship to a certain spot indicated by
latitude and longitude. It was realised that a
mistake had been made when the position as indi-
cated proved to be the Sahara Desert.

Putting a message into cipher or de-coding a
cipher involved the use of several books, a process
which occupied much time and made it easy to
commit errors. I conceived the idea of a double
typewriter, the message being sent in cipher and,
passing through the typewriter, coming out en
clair.

I designed such a machine and submitted it in
February, 1907, to the Admiralty, who expressed
the following opinion on it : " The machine appears
to be indestructive, is quick in working, save for
a person unaccustomed to typewriting, and mis-
takes are improbable and easily detected and cor-
rected." Mr. Winston Churchill said that this
machine filled him with hope that I had solved or
was about to solve the difficult question.

The Admiralty " secret " patented the invention
and consigned it to themselves, and then, in accord-
ance with their usual practice, started to improve
upon it . Seven years afterwards, on the 6th of
July, 1914, their Lordships informed me that they
waived the right of secrecy of my invention, and
that I could put it on the open market if I wanted
to do so. In other words they turned it down, and
the Admiral had to fight the Battle of Jutland
with the handicap of the old appliances.

208 WITH THE CHANNEL FLEET

Lord Jellicoe has declared l that the time of the
receipt of a signal is not a true indication of the
time at which the officer making his report com-
menced his task. A variable but considerable time
is bound to elapse — a period which includes the
time taken to write out the report, to transmit it
to the wireless office or bridge, to code it, signal it,
de-code it on board the receiving ship, write it out
and transmit it to the bridge. It was this very
delay that my mechanical coder or de-coder was
designed to avoid.

Early in 1908, we went for a cruise round
Ireland and Scotland, and visited many interesting
places, finally getting back to Portsmouth in May,
1908. After a short stay, we received an order
again to paint the Fleet, this time to do honour to
M. Fallieres, the President of the French Republic,
who was to cross to Dover. Dover for a few days
was very gay in entertaining the officers and men
of the Leon Gambetta, the man-of-war which
brought over England's illustrious guest.

These international amenities concluded, the
Fleet went back to Portland, and H.M.S. Good
Hope carried out her 1908 firing test. This time
Captain Grafton and the officers obtained the
place they desired, namely, top ship of the Fleet.
The score of one hundred and twenty hits out of
one hundred and fifty rounds was then unpre-
cedented. I was very glad of it, as I liked every
ship I was in to be absolutely the best in shooting.

The routine, when with the Battle Fleet, was
dull and uninteresting. To get out a bower anchor
and get it back again is not the most exciting of

i Lord Jellicoe's "Grand Fleet, 1914-1916," p. 318.

A VISIT TO NORWAY 209

tasks, and even a pull round the Fleet becomes
monotonous after frequent repetition. The day of
these old-fashioned evolutions should have come to
an end long ago. Efficiency can only be arrived
at by allowing individual captains to arrange
independently for their men's training. A captain
had then hardly one day at his disposal for the
organisation of training classes in gunnery, and for
teaching things to his men which have far more
to do with modern warfare than exercises handed
down from the days of sailing ships.

Towards the middle of June the whole Fleet
started on a cruise, with Christiania as its first
halting-place. Such a large armada had never been
previously assembled in Norwegian waters, and
naturally excited considerable interest among the
inhabitants of Norway. The Good Hope found
herself relegated, with the cruiser squadron, to
Bygdo Bay, a charming creek from which it was
possible to land and walk the three miles into
Christiania, or go direct by boat to the town itself.
The officers thoroughly enjoyed the hospitality
showered upon them, and several of them had the
honour of being presented to King Haakon and his
charming consort, at a dinner given in the newly
decorated palace.

At this dinner I was asked if I could not provide
some little surprise for the morrow, when the King
and Queen of Norway were going to steam round
the Fleet. The request rather upset my appetite,
as I could not think of anything. Fortunately an
idea came. When I returned on board — very late
-I routed out the Commander. He and a few
carpenters stayed up all night, and the next morning

210 WITH THE CHANNEL FLEET

when His Majesty, the King of Norway, passed
H.M.S. Good Hope, he saw traced in human letters
on the ship's side the words " Leve Kongen," which
means, I believe, " Long live the King," or at any
rate it was the nearest that I could get to it in the
time. I was with the King, on board his yacht,
and both His Majesty and the] Queen were very
pleased.

The night before we left Christiania I gave
a ball on board the Good Hope, and a more
beautiful assemblage of ladies it would have been
very hard to see. When we broke up I heard
many an earnest farewell uttered, and many were
the pledges mutually given of another meeting.
For two or three days after leaving Christiania
my officers were very dull ; the fair ladies of the
northern city had made a deep impression on them.

After this event, H.M.S. Good Hope was
ordered home. We proceeded to Portsmouth, and
on the 30th July, 1908, I had an interview with
the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. McKenna,
who informed me that I should no longer be
troubled by Lord Charles Beresford, as the Ad-
miralty had decided to place me in command of
a squadron of cruisers to represent the Mother
Country in South Africa, during the time of the
assembly of the Convention for the discussion of
closer union between the various states of the great
sub-continent.

As regards the last signal made to me by Lord
Charles Beresford, Mr. McKenna informed me that
he was very anxious to hush the matter up ; that
he was going to make a statement in the House of
Commons justifying my action, and that he hoped

A VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA 211

in these circumstances I would say no more about
it. To this I agreed. Mr. McKenna made his
statement in the House. It was so evasive that
it would never have been questioned, had not
Lord Charles years afterwards revived the ques-
tion by writing and publishing an inaccurate
account of it.

Apart altogether from this personal matter,
there was an obvious reason for the Admiralty's
choice, since, with the possible exception of Sir
Hedworth Lambton (afterwards Sir Hedworth
Meux), I had been more closely associated with
South Africa during the war than any other Ad-
miral. I had many friends there, particularly in
Natal. I was delighted with my new appointment,
besides being more than pleased to get clear of the
Channel Fleet. In my year and a half I had not
been able to do anything, and I had learned nothing
except how not to manage a fleet.

While H.M.S. Good Hope was at Portsmouth,
preparing for her long cruise, an interesting cere-
mony took place. Princess Christian presented
the ship with some silver plate and a silk ensign,
which had been subscribed for by the ladies of
Cape Colony. In a short speech Her Royal High-
ness expressed her pleasure in making the presen-
tation, adding that her feelings with regard to
South Africa were of a very special nature — an
indirect reference to the lamented death of her
son, Prince Christian Victor, which awakened the
sympathetic interest of her hearers.

At last, on the 8th September, 1908, we left
Portsmouth, the squadron consisting of the Good
Hope (flagship), the Antrim, Carnarvon, and

212 WITH THE CHANNEL FLEET

Devonshire ; four fairly good ships. The moment
that I had been looking forward to for many years
had come at last. I was in command of a squadron
of H.M. ships, and was in a position to do away with
the existing routine, and convert all the ships into
schools, with every one on board learning some-
thing more useful about his profession than the
housemaiding part of it. A man-of-\var must, of
course, be housemaided — that is, she must be kept
clean. What I had to break down was the
tradition that housemaiding should be the chief
consideration. It had been so ever since I joined the
Service, and the advancement of the officers and
the men, and consequently the fighting efficiency
of the Navy, had been entirely subservient to it.

I gave an order to the squadron that all the
housemaiding was to be completed by 9 a.m., and
that from that time on all attention should be
devoted to training the officers and men in the
essentials of their profession. This order, com-
bined with breaking down some of the traditions
of the Navy, — good in their time, but now out of
date and obsolete, — had the desired effect, as the
following results will show.

When I joined the squadron the ships had been
fifteen months in commission, and during that time
they had trained (under the old method of doing
things) 900 men, which is 60 per month. In five
months of the new method they trained 1000
men, which is at the rate of 200 per month. The
new method practically more than trebled the
amount of instruction given, notwithstanding its
being a first attempt, carried out against some
opposition, and in difficult circumstances, as we

FIGHTING AGAINST CHANGE 213

were on a purely pleasure cruise. If this routine
had been maintained, and had been applied to the
whole Navy, it would have trebled the fighting
efficiency of the Fleet ; but when I left the
squadron on the 15th February, 1909, the routine
I had instituted, and the " director firing " I had
installed, were put on the scrap-heap, and the old
methods reinstalled. That is one way we had in
the Navy — a determination to fight against any
change, however desirable.

CHAPTER XIV

AN IMPERIAL MISSION

En Route to the Cape — Durban's Welcome — The National Convention
— Old Foes and New Friends — An Inland Trip — At Pretoria and
Johannesburg — Lavish Hospitalities — Farewell to Durban — Fes-
tivities at Capetown — Farewell Messages — Off to the New World
— Arrival at Rio — Promoted Vice-Admiral — Brazilian Enthusiasm
— The President's Visit to the Good Hope — Uruguay and the Navy —
Speeches at Montevideo — The Pelorus at Buenos Ayres — A Great
Modern City — Departure from Montevideo — Battle Practice at
Tetuan — I haul down my Flag.

THE start of tlje voyage was a trifle inauspicious,
for the weather was so boisterous that our departure
was delayed for a few hours, but by the time the
coast of Spain was sighted all traces of the gale had
disappeared. On the 18th September the ship
made her first stop at the barren island of St.
Vincent, one of the Cape de Verde group, on which
there is hardly a trace of vegetation from one end
to the other. The Eastern Telegraph Company
have a large transmitting station there with a staff
of over eighty strong, who seemed very pleased to
see the squadron. Thanks to their kindness, a
short stay, which would otherwise have been most
uninteresting, was rendered highly agreeable — a
pleasant foretaste of what was to come.

On the 5th October, after having been sixteen
days at sea, the squadron put into Saldanha Bay for
a couple of days, completed with coal, and then left

214

DURBAN HARBOUR 215

for Durban, where we were due to arrive in time
for the opening of the National Convention. On
Saturday, 10th October, the four cruisers rounded
the headland known as " The Bluff," which juts
out from Durban, and entered the harbour.

Thanks to the large sums spent on dredging
operations, Durban is one of the most commodious
of ports, and the inhabitants were naturally not a
little proud that ships of a draught of nearly 30 feet
could come right up to the side of the quay and be
tied up there just like a mail steamer. A great
crowd had collected at the " Point," where I was
to land, and at least 7000 of the townspeojfle must
have given me a welcome when I set foot in the
colony again after an absence of over eight years.
The Mayor, Mr. C. Henwood, and Town Council-
lors in their robes assembled on a dais which had
been erected for the ceremony of presenting an
address. After the usual introductions the Premier
delivered an address, in which he was good enough
to recall my past services in the colony and to
thank me and my brother officers for coming from
so far to lend dignity by our presence to an
historical occasion. In reply I thanked the colony
for the great honour done me in sending the Prime
Minister to greet me, and expressed my pleasure
at revisiting South Africa at the time of the
important Convention. The Town Clerk then
presented me with an engraved address enclosed in
a silver-gilt casket, of which perhaps the most
conspicuous feature was a water-colour picture
representing the squadron entering the harbour.

During the first week of the squadron's stay in
Durban, the four cruisers were thronged every day

216 AN IMPERIAL MISSION

with visitors, and entertainments galore were in
progress for the men whenever they went into the
town. A ball given on board the Good Hope
made a marked impression on the majority of the
guests, who were astonished at the ingenious
manner in which the handy men could at short
notice turn their floating box of machinery into a
brilliantly illuminated ball-room with the large
9*2-in. gun as an effective background. The meeting
of the Convention had brought to Durban nearly
all the celebrities of South Africa, and most of
them were amongst the guests present on this
occasion. I felt as I looked round the company
that there was something impressive in the very
fact of men like Generals Botha, De Wet, and
Delarey sitting down side by side with Lord
Selborne, Sir George Farrer, Sir Percy Fitz-
Patrick, and many others who had taken such a
prominent part in arms against them but a few
years previously. A tribute it was, too, to the
good feeling which had begun to reign in South
Africa,' and the general desire to heal the wounds
inflicted by a struggle which had in many parts
all the horrors of a civil war. There was some
speech- making in the course of the evening, and by
way of disposing of the many rumours afloat as to
the purpose of the squadron's visit, I quoted my
sailing orders, so that it might be definitely under-
stood that it was for the Convention, and for no
other purpose, that I and my squadron were at
Durban on October llth, the day on which the
Convention began.

Subsequently Sir Henry de Villiers, on behalf
of the Convention, of which he was President, sent

ARRIVAL AT PRETORIA 217

a message to England, through the High Com-
missioner, conveying to the King an expression of
" loyal gratitude for the gracious sympathy with
the people of South Africa in this important period
of their history, so signally manifested by His
Majesty in commanding the cruiser squadron,
under Rear- Admiral Sir Percy Scott, K.C.V.O., to
proceed to Durban to greet the Convention."

The following Sunday a contingent of men
from each ship set out on a week's trip to the
capitals of the inland States in a special train, and
I left Durban with fifty-five of the officers by
another special train. The Natal Government had
provided for the comfort of its guests in a most
splendid way. Their agent, Mr. Vivian, had
thought of everything ; beds, food, wine, cigars,
and even baths, were at the free disposal of all, and
the trip was a revelation to many who took part in
it of how comfortable railway travelling over long
distances in South Africa can be made under
favourable circumstances.

Most of the journey through the Transvaal
was accomplished by night, and at 9 a.m. on Wed-
nesday, the 21st October, we found ourselves at
Pretoria Station, where our hosts had arranged for
carriages to meet us. The men had arrived on
the previous day, and had already at this time set
out on their way to Johannesburg. Kruger's house
was certainly the most impressive of all the sights
in Pretoria, and one gained from its dimensions
and those of the simple verandah in front of it
some idea of the homely character of the famous
President. The old-fashioned little dining-room
contained a bust of the old Boer President, and

218 AN IMPERIAL MISSION

round it on all sides were a profusion of wreaths
sent from every part of the world at the time of
his funeral. In the cemetery not far off is the
grave with a marble bust at the head of it, and
within a few yards lie the remains of Prince
Christian Victor. Over the monument to this
brave young prince, who died for his country in
company with hundreds of others lying near him,
the officers of the Good Hope hung a wreath by
way of testifying their respect for the dead, and
their sympathy for the princess whom they had
welcomed on board but a few weeks previously.

Lunch was served at the Grand Hotel, and the
Chief Justice, Sir James Rose-Innes, in proposing
the health of the Navy, referred to the popularity
of sailors wherever they go, and especially of British
sailors. He spoke as one who had been the earliest
to suggest a contribution from the Cape Govern-
ment towards the upkeep of the Imperial marine,
because he felt how bound up the prosperity of
South Africa was with that of the Navy. Ministry
had followed Ministry since that time, but this vote
still stood in spite of the great financial difficulties
with which in recent years South Africa had been
confronted. He rejoiced also that this grant was
not coupled with any local conditions or local
control, for South Africa was not defended now off
Durban or off Capetown, but wherever the Empire's
foes were fought and smashed by the British Navy.
On rising to respond, I thanked our hosts on behalf
of the Navy, and reminded them that it was
Trafalgar Day, and that this day henceforth would
also be memorable to those present on account of
this visit to Pretoria. For myself, I added, it had

BANQUET AT JOHANNESBURG 219

another personal association, for it was the birthday
of my daughter, and had she been born three
years later, I felt sure that she would have been
christened " Pretoria."

After a most enjoyable stay at Pretoria we
went on to Johannesburg. The authorities there
had determined to crowd the maximum amount
of hospitality into the short time at their disposal,
so that no sooner had their guests returned to the
Carlton from afternoon sports in the famous
Wanderers' Ground than they found it necessary
to change for a dinner given in honour of the Fleet
by the Mayor and Councillors of the City. Lord
Methuen,the Acting Governor of the Transvaal, was
present at the banquet, which was described next
day in the papers as one of the most representative
gatherings ever seen at such a function in Johan-
nesburg. The Mayor, Mr. J. Thomson, proposing
the toast of the evening, "Our Navy," looked for
the time when the Transvaal would, like the Cape,
pay its quota towards the expenditure involved in
imperial defence. In my reply, I said I was going
to take upon myself the very heavy responsibility
of accepting on behalf of the Admiralty as much
of the gold of Johannesburg as its citizens could
afford to dispense with. Their Lordships would
take this gold and transmute it into iron in the
shape of battleships. I added that not only did
all my officers and men wish most emphatically to
revisit such a hospitable city, but I anticipated
some difficulty in getting them all away that
night.

The scene of our departure from the station
that evening was nearly as exciting as that of our

Q

220 AN IMPERIAL MISSION

arrival, for, in spite of a heavy downpour of rain,
large crowds had assembled to wish the sailors
good-bye. No regiment starting out on active
service could have received a more enthusiastic
send off, and as the train moved out of the station,
the cheering must have been heard all over the
town.

Next morning Bloemfontein was reached, and
here the Mayor had been joined by the military in
dispensing the hospitality of the capital of the
Orange River Colony. On arriving, the guests
were told off in groups of five or six, and each
group was allotted to one of the regiments who
had brought carriages to take the visitors to the
central square, where a large crowd had assembled
to welcome them. A platform had been erected
by the reception committee, and on the right of
the dais fifteen hundred school children at a given
signal sang the National Anthem, their treble
voices ringing out with a pleasing effect, enhanced,
probably, by the clearness of the air and the bright
sunshine streaming down on the square. The
Mayor, Mr. Chris Botha, in welcoming us, said
that the occasion was an historic one, if only for
the fact that it was the first time that a naval
brigade had ever visited Bloemfontein. In return
I expressed the hope that at some not very distant
date there might be a ship in the British Navy
bearing the name of the magnificent colony — a
sentiment which elicited loud cheers.1 From the
Orange River Colony we returned to Durban.

From every point of view the trip had been an

1 This hope was even more appropriately fulfilled, for during the
War a destroyer-leader was christened Botha.

A TRIBUTE TO THE MEN 221

unqualified success. Hundreds of inhabitants of
this newly-formed state to whom the British Navy
had previously been but a name were enabled to
see what our sailors looked like, and feel, as they
had never done before, a personal interest in our
premier fighting force. Moreover, I may venture
the hope that our visit did much to lessen the
bitterness left behind by the last great struggle for
predominance between the two races. The fact
that on the entertainment committees at all the
the towns visited Britons and Boers were vieing
with each other to welcome His Majesty's Navy
gives ground for this aspiration, and while it is easy
to multiply the directions in which good has
resulted from this week of hospitality and enter-
tainment, it is impossible to point to a single case
where it has done any harm.

Before dismissing the subject, I ought to put
on record the splendid behaviour of the men. The
temptations to excess were very numerous. The
Mayor of Johannesburg testified to their conduct
in a private letter to Lord Selborne, from which
the following extract is taken :

" Should you be writing to the Admiral
before he leaves our South African waters, I
shall feel obliged if you will add a note on my
behalf to the effect that the tone of the men,
when in Johannesburg, was a credit to them-
selves, to their Admiral Commanding-in-Chief,
and to his officers. Despite the pressing offers
made by our townspeople, at all times and in
all places, in the shape of liquid refreshment,
the men behaved themselves in an exemplary
manner. They were, indeed, a credit to the
Service to which they belong, and I feel it only

222 AN IMPERIAL MISSION

right to ask you to kindly pass on my personal
tribute in this respect to Admiral Sir Percy
Scott."

The Squadron sailed on Monday, the 26th.
Lord Selborne and Sir Matthew Nathan remained
on board the flagship until nearly the last moment,
and afterwards watched from the deck of the
transport Dufferin the four ships steam majestically
out of the splendid harbour which Natal has made.
The crews were all upon deck and as they cheered
their late hosts so the latter responded with equal
enthusiasm, until the cruisers were too far out at
sea for the sound of the acclamations to be heard.
Then the Governor of the Colony made the follow-
ing signal : " The cruiser squadron has made us\
more proud than ever of the British Fleet. The
High Commissioner, the Governor, and the people
of the Colony wish God-speed to all ranks." To
this I replied : " We thank you for your kindness.
We thank you for your hospitality."

The squadron next visited Port Elizabeth, a
handsome town, and very prosperous. The Mayor
received me in the market square, and in present-
ing an address from the townspeople, was good
enough to say that the name of Sir Percy Scott
had long been a household word in their midst.
For the next two days, the whole town was en fete,
and both officers and men had abundant oppor-
tunities for enjoying themselves.

On the 31st October, the Squadron left Port
Elizabeth for Simon's Bay. Here fleets and fleet-
men were no novelty to the inhabitants, but our
welcome was none the less cordial. Admiral Sir
George Egerton, the Commander-in- Chief of the

RECEPTION AT CAPETOWN 223

station, held an " at home " in honour of the visitors,
a highly successful function at which the large
attendance testified to the esteem in which the
local Admiral was held by his friends and neigh-
bours at the Cape.

After a few days at Simon's Bay, we went to
Capetown, and as the squadron came in sight of
Table Bay, it had been arranged that they should
see the word " Welcome " spelt on the hillside by
two thousand children dressed in white, and
grouped in such a way as to give the appearance of
letters when looked at from some distance off. The
idea was a very effective and pretty one, well
meriting the cordial thanks which I conveyed to
the children in the following signal : u Thank you
very much for your kind welcome. Through our
telescopes we saw how charming you all looked."

The citizens of Capetown had managed to
crowd into seven days a programme which might
well have lasted over treble the time. The only
shadow cast over the festivities was the regrettable
illness of Sir Walter Hely Hutchinson, the
Governor of the colony. His enforced absence
threw an additional burden on Mr. N. F. de Waal,
who acted as his deputy as well as that of the
Prime Minister, away busy at the Durban Con-
vention. How well he fulfilled his dual responsi-
bilities will be evident in what follows, and the
Navy had enough reason to be grateful to him and
Mrs. de Waal for all that they did to make the
visit to Capetown the brilliant success it was.

Long before the approach of the Fleet, the
Adderley Street end of the gaily decorated pier
and the whole of the foreshore were crowded with

224 AN IMPERIAL MISSION

many thousands of people anxious to get a glimpse
of the landing ceremonies. I went ashore, accom-
panied by the captains of my squadron, just before
noon and was welcomed by the acting Prime
Minister. At the Town Hall, the Mayor, Mr.
M. F. A. Smith, gave an address in which he re-
marked that the presence of the cruiser squadron
in South African waters seemed to say to the
people of South Africa, " The Fleet of the Empire
still protects you." It was my agreeable task
to tender my most sincere thanks for the cordial
welcome vouchsafed me on reaching the capital of
the colony of which my flagship bore the name.
The visit to Capetown fittingly closed the South
African tour, and I expressed the hope that before
long I might have to return to celebrate a closer
union of the colonies, which I trusted would bring
wealth and lasting peace to the sub-continent of
South Africa.

The whole town was decorated and illuminated
on this and the subsequent days of the visit. On
the afternoon of our arrival the Mayor gave a
garden party, at which my officers and I made the
acquaintance of the leading citizens, and a banquet
followed in the evening at the City Hall in honour
of their visitors. Mr. de Waal and several members
of the Cape Ministry, Mr. J. T. Molteno, Speaker of
the House, Mr. Hofmeyr, the veteran leader of the
Bond, were all present, and General Sir Reginald
Hart represented the sister Service. In proposing
the health of the guest of the evening, the Mayor
remarked that, as the four ships of the squadron
steamed into the waters of Table Bay, they seemed
like bearers of a fourfold message from the Mother

THE LAST SIGNAL 225

Country — the magnificent message of power, pro-
tection, peace, and prosperity, delivered at the door
of South Africa, at a time when the daughter
country was able to appreciate heartfully its com-
forting assurances. My response, I hope, did justice
to the cordiality of this welcome, and I ventured
to say that if ever South Africa was in danger from
without, possibly the Good Hope's guns might come
as a message of peace as truly as the presence of
myself and my officers there did that night.

Capetown did its best to overwhelm us all,
officers and men, with its brisk hospitality; our
few days' sojourn were crowded with festivities
and excursions. On the eve of our departure, I
gave a ball on board H.M.S. Good Hope, which
brought on board every one of any note in the
colony.

The send off accorded to the squadron the fol-
lowing afternoon was a remarkable one. Ministers
and financial magnates, generals and diplomats,
crowded on board until the last moment, as if
loth to leave the flagship of the squadron which
had brought such a wave of gaiety into Capetown.
As the Good Hope rounded the breakwater,
turning broadside on to the spectators ashore, I
sent a farewell message to the people of South
Africa in the following terms : —

" The last hawser that tied us to South
Africa is now hauled ashore, and with regret
we say good-bye ; but if it is true that to dwell
in the hearts of those we love is not to be
parted, then you are still with us. We leave
with you every good wish for closer union and
prosperity, and we take with us an appreciation

226 AN IMPERIAL MISSION

of your kindness and hospitality, which, if com-
pared in height, would top Natal's aasvogel's
nest ; if compared in depth, it rivals the deepest
gold mine in the Transvaal. In breadth it is
as boundless as the rolling plains of Orangia,
and in stability it will remain as does Cape
Colony's majestic Table Mountain, which now
looks down on us, and which we shall continue
to see when Cape Town is lost to sight, but
remains to memory dear."

Seven days at sea brought us to St. Helena—
a week of quiet routine which was perhaps no bad
thing for both officers and men after all the excite-
ment and late hours of the previous week. The
Governor of the island, Lieut.-Colonel Henry
Lionel Gallwey, did everything possible to make
us welcome, and invited several officers to make
Government House their home until their depar-
ture, an exceptional mark of kindness, which was
all the more appreciated as no hotel existed in
Jamestown. The squadron sailed on the 22nd
November for Rio Janeiro, at five p.m., the follow-
ing signals being exchanged just as the ships were
getting under way :—

From H.E. the Governor, to R.-A. Sir Percy
Scott.

" Good-bye ; sorry to lose you ; may good
luck always go with you and your squadron."

Reply.

6( Thank you very much. We are very
sorry to leave you, and hope to return to assist
in commemorating the success of the flax and

ARRIVAL AT RIO 227

lace industries which your Excellency has so
successfully started. We wish good fortune
to St. Helena."

Eight days later the Good Hope and her con-
sorts entered the harbour of the Brazilian capital-
one of the finest as well as one of the most beautiful
in the world. It was here I learned of my pro-
motion to Vice- Admiral, and my only feeling of
regret was the prospect of separation from the
squadron which I had commanded for so many
pleasant months. Not long after came the an-
nouncement of the appointment of Rear- Admiral
Hamilton as my successor.

Rio is now one of the healthiest large towns in
the world, and its death-rate is no greater than that
of London or Paris. Many of the officers and men
had been re vaccinated on the journey out, but it
was found that smallpox was so little to be feared
in Rio that the precaution might have been omitted
without any real danger to the health of the
squadron. Rio is indeed in every sense a modern
city, whose inhabitants call it, not without some
reason, the Paris of South America.

The Brazilian Government and the resident
English community had drawn up a splendid
programme for our entertainment. Many officers
of the Brazilian Navy had recently been to Eng-
land, and the cordiality they showed to the English
sailor-men was one of the most remarkable features
of the visit.

The round of festivities opened the day after
the squadron's arrival with a picnic to Petropolis,
organised by the British committee, foremost
amongst whom were Sir Milne Cheetham, the

228 AN IMPERIAL MISSION

acting Charge d' Affaires in the absence of the
Ambassador, Mr. Bax Ironside, and Mr. A. W. A.
Knox Little, Managing Director of the Leopoldina
Railway. Those who went to the picnic were
taken by steamer for about an hour to a landing
place on the coast where the rack railway starts
up the mountain on which Petropolis is situated.
Once on board, the British officers were introduced
to several of the Brazilian and English ladies who
were waiting for them. Acquaintanceships were
soon struck up, and the Brazilian naval officers
present did all in their power to make the new-
comers feel thoroughly at home. The entire outing
was, in fact, enjoyable in the highest degree, and
gave all who took part in it a very warm impression
of the hospitality of the Brazilians.

The chief feature of the next day's programme
was another picnic, this time to Corcovado, a lofty
eminence which forms as effective a background to
Rio as the Peak does to Hong Kong. A rack
train took the guests to the summit, from which
the view is one of the finest in the whole world. On
this occasion our hosts were the Brazilian Navy —
destined, as who could have dreamed then ? to
become our Allies in the Great War — and at the
luncheon Admiral Maurity referred to the old
friendship existing between the two Navies, and
to the fact that it was an Englishman, Admiral
Lord Cochrane, who was the first Admiral the
Brazilian marine ever had. I thanked our host in
a similar strain, assuring him how enchanted we
were with the warm welcome which had been
extended to us. The ball given that evening at
the Monroe Palace by Sir Milne Cheetham and

FAREWELL TO BRAZIL 229

his wife, who was a perfect hostess, will long be
remembered in Rio as one of the most brilliant
entertainments ever held there. On Sunday morn-
ing the President of the Republic came on board
the Good Hope with Admiral Maurity to make a
call of ceremony. The ships were all dressed to
receive him, and when he left, after making me
a few kind remarks, a fitting salute was fired in
his honour. The following day I held a reception
on board the flagship, to which about six or seven
hundred visitors came, and twenty-four hours later
the four ships got up anchor and steamed off amidst
cheers from the Brazilian ships in the harbour.

My farewell message to Brazil will serve to
convey an idea of the unstinted hospitality showered
on the squadron during its stay at Rio : —

" With regret we have to say good-bye to
Brazil, whose warm welcome to the squadron
has been so thoroughly appreciated by the
officers and men, and will, if possible, tend to
strengthen the feelings of cordial friendship
which already exist between Brazil and Great
Britain, two nations whose greatest ambition
is peace. The Brazilian Fleet has from time
immemorial been associated with English naval
officers, and we are therefore much interested
to see the great progress it is making, and to
learn that it will shortly be augmented by three
of the largest, most heavily armed, and most
modern ships in the world. We are grateful
to the Republic for the honour the President
did us in paying a visit to the squadron, an
honour which will be fully appreciated in
England. It has been a great pleasure to have
pointed out to us the improvements that have

230 AN IMPERIAL MISSION

recently been made in the capital, and the
activity which is still displayed in the direction
of progress points to Rio de Janeiro being in
the near future the most beautiful city in the
world. We leave you with every good wish
for your welfare, and take away with us an
ineffaceable recollection and appreciation of the
beauties of your country, and the hospitality of
the inhabitants."

On Saturday, the 12th December, the squadron
anchored about five miles from Monte Video, and
this distance throughout the, stay made it a matter
of time, and in rough weather of much difficulty,
getting to and from the ship. The ships at once
began preparing for coaling from the colliers which
had come out from England in advance to meet
them, and it was not until Monday of the week
following that officers or men were in any con-
dition to enjoy the liberal hospitality which was
everywhere waiting for them. As at Rio, an
entertainment committee had arranged a plan of
campaign which ensured that every one had a good
time, and the Government had put a large building
near the landing-place at the disposition of the
squadron as an information bureau, where the
sailors could find out everything they wanted and
get refreshments at a cheap rate. The President
had also very thoughtfully arranged for several
rooms at the Hotel Central to be occupied by any
British officers who cared to stop ashore during the
visit, so that a great number of them were able
to enjoy all the comforts of first-class hotel life
without the inconvenience of a bill to settle at the
finish.

WELCOME TO URUGUAY 231

An official reception was given at the British
Legation, on the afternoon of the 15th, by the
Minister, Mr. (now Sir) R. J. Kennedy. The
President of Uruguay, Dr. Williman, attended,
and the visitors were in turn presented to him.
Dr. Bachini, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, then
made a speech, in which, in the name of the Pre-
sident, he cordially welcomed the arrival of such
a powerful British Fleet in Uruguayan waters.
By its presence England showed her interest in
a young South American nation, which offered no
attraction but that of having utilised in her progress
the intelligent initiative and trained energies of
English pioneers. The great warships brought the
homage of England to a minor member of the
international family, and were a testimony to the
grandeur of those who sent them, for it was as if,
after having concluded the task of asserting the
right, they travelled round the world as a reminder
of the existence of that right and their determina-
tion to uphold it in the future.

I, in replying, noted with feelings of pardonable
pride the highly complimentary terms in which his
Excellency had alluded to the British Navy, and
expressed my sense of the high privilege it was to
command the squadron which had been sent to
show the interest which the English people took
in the welfare of Uruguay. I cordially agreed that
the rank and right of a sovereign country de-
pended, not upon its material size, but upon its
moral strength.

Next day, a banquet was given by the Minister
of War at Pocitos, an outlying suburb of Monte
Video. The decorations were conceived in the

232 AN IMPERIAL MISSION

most lavish style, and the table round which the
guests sat was in the shape of an anchor.

I venture to quote the two principal speeches
delivered on this occasion, not on account of their
personal interest, but as illustrating the feeling of
amity between Great Britain and this young Re-
public, which the visit of the squadron without
doubt helped to foster. The Minister of War
spoke as follows : —

"Mr. Admiral and gentlemen, the ties
which unite us to the noble British nation
are so great and numerous that it is a grateful
task to me to express in the name of my
Government the keen satisfaction which we
have felt in being able to offer Uruguayan hos-
pitality to the brave and distinguished members
of its glorious Navy who honour us with their
visit. And this satisfaction, gentlemen, is ex-
plicable, because from the commencement of
our history England has exercised a beneficent
influence in our destinies ; we have always
found in her a generous nation, disposed to
encourage the great efforts and beautiful mani-
festations of the incipient national life, and at
this happy moment it may be recalled that it
was the country of the world's Powers to recog-
nise the independence of the River Plate States
when we had conquered in loyal struggle the
right to be free. Even before, in the time of
trial, when Artigas, with his diminutive bands,
fought in the open country without further
hope for the triumph of his ideals than the risk
of life or death offered to the motherland, it
was an English mariner, the commander of a
warship at whose masthead floated the crimson
banner that the roar of the cannons has saluted

TRIBUTE TO BRITAIN 233

in innumerable naval victories, who signed with
the Uruguayan chieftain, thereby virtually re-
cognising our autonomy, a convention, which
may rank as the first treaty of our national
Chancellory. When the sovereignty of our
country was threatened by the tyrant Rosas,
we found in England a powerful ally, because,
just as she loved liberty for her own sons, so
did she also desire it for all the peoples of the
earth, ostentating among her blazons the legi-
timate title of the destroyer of human slavery.
In the development of this portion of American
land, in the advance towards the summit of
progress, on the road to which we walk with
unswerving faith, trusting in the action of work
and the treasures of the soil, England has a
considerable and most important share ; the
genius of her sons and her capital has trans-
formed the Republic, has threaded the territory
with railways and telegraphs, has raised colossal
works of engineering over her rivers, has popu-
lated the lands with breeding farms, has intro-
duced the races of live stock that constitute our
present animal wealth, and has carried the
powerful impulse of progress to all corners of
the country and to all branches of production
and labour. We might almost say that it is
to British capital that we owe the victory in
the peaceful struggles of advancement, daily
incorporating new progresses, until there is to-
day presented the beautiful picture of general
prosperity which we are able to offer the world,
and that stimulates us to pursue in order, in
legality, and in labour, the noble task of open-
ing this land to the efforts and intelligence of
all well-intentioned men who seek her own
welfare. The English who share our national
life well know that the Uruguayans are their

234 AN IMPERIAL MISSION

sincere friends, that our sentiments towards
them are fraternal, and that, whilst we admire
the grandeur of the United Kingdom, we also
admire the creative power of its sons, propa-
gators of civilisations throughout the world.
Gentlemen, to the glory of the British Navy,
and to the health of the Admiral and of his
distinguished companions in arms."

My reply was in the following terms :—

" Your Excellency and gentlemen, on
behalf of the captains, officers and men of the
squadron under my command, I beg to return
to your Excellency my most sincere thanks for
the kind reception and unprecedented hospi-
talities that have been accorded to us by the
Government of Uruguay and by the citizens of
Monte Video. I beg to thank your Excellency
for the kind way in which your Excellency has
referred in your speech to the British Navy.

" Your President granting me and my
officers an audience is an honour that will be
fully appreciated by my country. I thank your
Government for sending out the Montevideo to
sea to meet my squadron with a signal of wel-
come flying at the masthead. Through the
courtesy and kindness of your Government I
have had an opportunity of inspecting the ex-
tensions and improvements that are being made
to your already magnificent harbour, and of
seeing your splendid public buildings and your
great commercial industries. I have noted that
your scientific and charitable societies, your
National University, your compulsory educa-
tion, your excellent police and general organi-
sation, are all of the most modern character,
and compare favourably with any city in the
world. These advantages, combined with a

VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES 235

perfection of climate, are no doubt the founda-
tion of Monte Video's great commercial activity
and popularity.

" This Banquet to-night, in grandeur, in
floral decoration, in taste of illumination, in
harmony of colour and in perfection of all the
attributes of a banquet, eclipses anything that
I have seen before. It will be remembered by
us as a most striking example of the princely
magnificence of Uruguayan hospitality. Your
Excellency's table has, I observe, been arranged
in the form of an anchor. May I be allowed
to congratulate your Excellency on this happy
idea, for it is emblematical of the firmness with
which the memory of your hospitality will be
for ever embedded in our hearts.

" Again I thank your Excellency, and crave
your permission to raise my glass and drink a
bumper toast to the Government and the people
of Uruguay."

I was subsequently able to entertain my host
in the Good Hope, and also the French Minister
Resident, M. Kleczkowski, who had previously
invited me to lunch as a proof of the Anglo-French
friendship then happily existing. On the 17th, a
large reception was also held on my flagship, similar
to the one at Rio, and hundreds of Uruguayans
came out to enjoy the squadron's hospitality.

It was at this point in the tour that I sailed
in the Pelorus to Buenos Ayres, where, after an
official reception by the Argentine Naval Autho-
rities, I dined with the Minister of Marine at a
banquet given in his honour. Most of the time
of my short stay in the capital of the Argentine
Republic was spent in driving about in motor-cars
and inspecting the various sights of this splendid

236 AN IMPERIAL MISSION

city— the largest south of the Line. The night
before leaving I gave a farewell dinner at the
Jockey Club to the officers of the Argentine,
Swedish, and Italian Navies whom I had met
during my visit. The evidence of the Republic's
progress and prosperity had greatly impressed me,
and it may be of interest to reproduce the speech
I delivered on this occasion as a succinct record
of my impressions : —

"Your Excellency and gentlemen, as to-
night closes our stay in your magnificent capital,
I take the opportunity of expressing my warmest
thanks to your Excellency for the great hospi-
tality and kindness that have been shown to us
by the Government of Argentina and by the
people of Buenos Ayres. I hear that, as an
assurance of peace which is so necessary for
industrial development, your Government has
decided to add to your Navy ships of magnitude
and power second to none in the world and in
keeping with the wealth and grandeur of your
country. It is many years since I visited your
city, and it has improved beyond all recogni-
tion. Your Mayor has been kind enough to
drive me round a large portion of the city,
and I am lost in admiration of what I saw.

" Taking first your port : when I came here
before there was scarcely a pier to land at ;
to-day I steamed through acres of basins accom-
modating hundreds of large steamers of every
nationality. Such a sight brought home to me
the enormous commercial enterprise of your
country, its wealth and its importance. I saw
the wool, grain, and cotton industries, all
demonstrating the resources of Argentina. In
grain I learn that last year you exported over

PROGRESS OF ARGENTINA 237

3j million tons of wheat and over a million
tons of linseed, whilst maize reached nearly
two million tons, and oats nearly half a million.
For the current crop I hear that even larger
figures are expected. There seems to be no
doubt that ere long Argentina will be the
greatest exporting country of the world for
cereals. My visit to-day to Vicente Casaras
gave me an idea of the magnitude of your cattle
industry and the excellence of the stock, most
of which I am glad to hear, derives its origin
from my country.

" Turning to your city, I was driven through
miles of splendid avenues ornamented by
buildings which, in splendour, rival any in
the world, and your Mayor pointed out how
in every street the people moved with the
alacrity which marks business energy. Among
other things which indicated the wealth of the
country I was shown 30 millions of coined gold,
20 millions of which was in English sovereigns.
Your hippodrome with its treble racecourse,
your rifle ranges, your golf links, and this
wonderful Jockey Club, all show how much
sport is appreciated in Argentina. Your
Mayor afforded me the pleasure of seeing your
Opera House, a building of which I have never
seen the equal, and as marking the appreciation
of music in the Argentina I am informed that a
box at this opera for the season costs £900
sterling. I have also been taken to the Park at
Palermo, where I saw the wealth of magnificent
horses and carriages, and in those carriages, if I
may say so, the most beautifully dressed and
lovely ladies that I have ever seen in the world.

"These, your Excellency and gentlemen,
are the impressions I shall carry back with me
of Argentina and Buenos Aires. I drink to

238 AN IMPERIAL MISSION

your Excellency's health, and thank you for
doing me the honour of dining with me."

The day after my return to Monte Video,
Dr. Williman, the President, and the Uruguayan
Ministers came off to lunch on board the Good
Hope. As the President expressed his astonish-
ment at the enormous range of modern artillery, I
arranged on the spot for him to fire himself a full
charge from the 9 '2 gun, which he did by touching
a button, and had the satisfaction of seeing the
splash of the projectile rise from beyond the horizon.
It wanted but three days to Christmas, and Dr.
Williman, deploring that the sailors should have to
spend it at sea, begged me to stay at Monte Video
until after the 25th. As a result of this kindly
invitation, a telegram was despatched home to
H.M. the King, at the request of the President of
Uruguay, and, shortly after, a gracious reply came
in accordance with the latter's wishes. During
this extension of the visit, the hospitalty of the
residents went to even greater lengths than before,
and it was generally felt that the good relations
between England and Uruguay had been enor-
mously strengthened by such a fine squadron
showing the flag in a port where there is a large
English colony. Showing the flag occasionally in
a splendid fighting squadron like this is in fact
more effective than when it is seen in a small craft
of no fighting value.

We left for St. Vincent and proceeded to
Teneriffe, where we remained for three days. No
sooner had we anchored than invitations to various
entertainments began to pour in, and nothing could
have exceeded the warmth of our reception.

NIGHT-FIRING PRACTICE 239

The many kind invitations issued by our hosts
at Santa Cruz, combined with the shortness of our
visit, prevented any entertainment on the part of
my squadron, but I gave a large dinner party, at
which both the civil and military Governors, and
most of the leading residents, were present. The
British Consul was most kind in every way, both
officially and socially, and the good relations
obtaining between the local authorities and our
representative were most apparent.

From Teneriffe the squadron proceeded direct
to Gibraltar, where at once preparations were
begun for battle practice, and every one realised
the value of the various gunnery exercises car-
ried out during our long cruise. Among the
exercises we devoted a great deal of time to night-
firing practice; which had never been properly
provided for by the Admiralty. We had used
searchlights in the Navy for forty years, and had
known that the operator at the light could not put
the beam on to the object as the glare made it
invisible. The operator had consequently to be
"conned."1 The primitive method was for an
observer, who could see the object, to shout out
" go right " or " go left " or " up " or " down," with

an occasional "you fool, you've gone too far."

We improved upon this method by using wires and
wheels, and so transferred the actual manipulation
of the light to a point whence the operators could
see the object. The system worked excellently. I
reported it to the Admiralty, and they promptly
boycotted it, so that when war came six years
afterwards we had no device of the kind and the

1 To ' ' con " is the sea term for to direct.

240 AN IMPERIAL MISSION

primitive method of shouting was still being used.
Several ships, however, with their own artizans
copied the Good Hope's method.

The battle practice took place at Tetuan on the
10th February, 1909, and we used our extemporised
director firing. It was a great success, and clearly
demonstrated that all our ships should be fitted
with this description of firing. The Admiralty,
however, took two years before they ordered it to
be fitted to H.M.S. Neptune.

On the 15th February, 1909, I transferred the
command to Rear- Admiral Hamilton, and pro-
ceeded to England, accompanied by my staff, in
the Orient mail steamer.

I was given a very warm send off by the officers
of the squadron, and I do not hesitate to say that
I believe I took with me the sincere good wishes of
all hands under my command.

CHAPTER XV

VICISSITUDES OF DIRECTOR FIRING

My New System of Routine — Approved by Lord Fisher but generally
Opposed — What Naval Gunnery means — No further Employment
at Sea — Back to Director Firing — Success of the Neptune Trials —
The Thunderer and Orion Test — Superiority of Director Firing
demonstrated— More Admiralty Delay and a Stiff Protest — Warn-
ing unheeded and Proposals rejected — Tragic Fruits of Neglect —
History of Parallel Firing — Position of the Director Firing at the
Outbreak of War— The First Dreadnought— Position of the Mast
— Perpetuating a Blunder — Mr. Churchill's Wise Decision — A
New Blunder in Exchange for the First.

ON my arrival in London after transferring my
command, I saw the First Lord, Mr. McKenna, and
the First Sea Lord, now Lord Fisher of Kilverstone.
As already described, I had introduced a new rou-
tine in the Second Cruiser Squadron, economising
the time which the men spent on housemaiding
duties, in order to obtain farther opportunities of
training them in their war duties. The First Sea
Lord, who was then completing the series of naval
reforms which were to save the Fleet from defeat
and the Empire from ruin, discussed the new routine
I had introduced. He approved of the modifications
I had made, but added that I was far too much
ahead of my time, and that my departure from
tradition had caused a good deal of annoyance in
some quarters.

Subsequently I had the honour of an audience

241

242 DIRECTOR FIRING

with King Edward VII. He was much interested
in the visit to South Africa, and desired me to
explain to him the new system of instruction I
had devised and its effects.

In the same year I was entertained by the
Authors' Club in Whitehall Court, and I took
advantage of the occasion to endeavour to indicate
in proper language what was really meant when
reference was made to "naval gunnery." Sir
James Rennell Rodd, then the British Ambassador
at Rome, who was in England, had delayed re-
turning to his duties in order to preside. We had
met twenty years before, and his presence added
to my enjoyment of the evening. As I have not
given in these reminiscences anything in the way
of a popular account of what " naval gunnery "
really implies, I recall the salient part of this
little speech of mine : —

" Hitting with heavy guns is a subject to
which I have given some attention, but it is not
quite easy to talk about it except to my brother
officers, as naturally some of the most interesting
points in connection with it are confidential. I
can tell you some of the difficulties with which
we have to contend, but I cannot, in all cases,
tell you how we overcome them. Gunnery is
a term that I do not much like, as it has often
been used unassociated with hitting. Hit first,
hit hard, and keep on hitting is what we have
to do if we want to win. Strategy and tactics
count for nothing if we cannot hit ; the only
object of a man-of-war is to hit.

" Taking first the weapon — our most modem
naval gun is just double the length of this long
room, weighs 60 tons, will penetrate eight

ELEMENTS OF GUNNERY 243

inches of armour at thirteen miles, strikes a
blow of 53,000 foot-tons, and costs about £100
every time you let it off. Its shot is six times
my weight, in circumference it is what I am
round the chest, in height it is four inches
shorter than I am. The home for this projectile
is the enemy. The art of gunnery is to get it
to that home. To arrive at that we point the
gun at the moment of firing at a certain spot —
that spot is not the spot that you want to hit ;
the gun must be pointed high, so as to counter-
act the effect of gravity. The wear of the gun,
the temperature of the air, the density of the
air, the strength and direction of the wind, must
all be taken into consideration when settling
where you are to point the gun; wind is a
difficult factor to deal with, as it may be
blowing at different strengths, and in different
directions, at the various altitudes through
which the shot passes. In firing at a range
of fifteen miles, which is possible, the shot
would go to an altitude of 22,500 ft., which,
if my geography is correct, is 7,500 ft. over
the summit of Mont Blanc. You will realise
what a variety of atmospheres it would pass
through, and how impossible for any one on
earth to divine what will be the direction and
the force of the winds it will meet with in
its ascent and descent. When a mass of iron
the size of my body has to pass even five miles
through the air you may imagine what a
difference wind behind it, or in front of it, or
right or left of it, will make in its final
destination.

" I have not come to the end of our troubles
yet. When firing at a range of five miles,
which is about what some nations practise at
now, the shot takes 12 sees, to get to its

244 DIRECTOR FIRING

destination ; during that time the ship it is being
sent to, if steaming at the rate of twenty knots,
will have changed her position 120 yards. We
must point our gun in a direction which allows
for this. Then there is the forward movement
of your own ship, which will be imparted to the
projectile, and must be allowed for, and there
are other corrections to be applied. To hit
under these circumstances will appear to you a
very difficult problem, and it is. We only
expect to get our first shot approximately near ;
if we succeed in this, then the remainder is fairly
easy. The same rule governs hitting at five
miles that governs shooting across this room —
you look where the shot has gone and correct
your aim accordingly by pointing the gun more
up, or more down, or more to the right or to
the left. If you have not seen much heavy-
gun practice at sea, you may wonder how we
can at five miles see the splash made by a shot
striking the water. The answer is very simple
— the column of water thrown up is larger than
a battleship. Here is a picture of a battleship
showing the splash made by a projectile super-
imposed on it. Both are the same scale. You
will observe that the splash is higher than the
battleship's mast. I estimate that it contains
about 2000 tons of water ; such a splash would
drown a small ship.

" Having determined where the gun is to be
pointed, the next question is how is it to be
done? Two men are employed, each looking
through a telescope ; one has a wheel for con-
trolling the direction of the gun in azimuth, the
other a wheel for controlling the elevation. As
the ship is never steady, but always has a
certain amount of roll, the task these twro men
have is not easy, but by much practice a union

A SUGGESTIVE CONTRAST 245

246 DIRECTOR FIRING

between the eye looking through the telescope
and the hand on the wheel is established. As
the ship moves, so they instinctively move their
wheels to counteract it — in the same manner
that one's hand moves the handle-bar of a
bicycle.

" We have now got as far as pointing the
gun, and that if you do not hit you correct
your aim until you do hit. Here another
difficulty comes in. In firing at a target across
the room, we can see if we have made a bull's-
eye — at a longer distance on a rifle-range if we
make a bull's-eye it is signalled. In naval war-
fare at the distance we engage at we cannot see
whether we have hit or not, and we cannot
expect the enemy to signal to us that we are
hitting. He may intimate to us that we are
hitting by running away, sinking, or catching
fire ; but we want an earlier intimation of hitting
than this, and we get it — but the method I can-
not disclose.

" That we are able to master most of the
difficulties to which I have referred is proved
by the fact that we now make a higher per-
centage of hits at 8000 yards than we did a few
years ago at 1000 yards."

Shortly after I had left the Good Hope the
director-firing apparatus which I had taken such
infinite trouble to instal in her was put on the scrap-
heap, and with it my routine for training men for
war. I heard that the Admiralty did not approve
of any departure from their (unsatisfactory) system 1
of firing, and that the fact of holding the views I did
on the question of routine would be a grave objection
to my further employment, as my opinions would

1 They really had no system.

DIRECTOR FIRING 247

be sure to clash with those of my superiors, who
had no wish to abandon the routine followed
by the Fleet with little alterations since the sail
era.

About this time the Admiralty suggested to me
that I should probably not hoist my flag again, and
that I should be doing more service to the country
by continuing my work on director firing than by
going to sea. The irony of this assurance appealed
to my sense of humour, for I well knew that the
Admiralty, as a body, were moving heaven and
earth to prevent director firing being adopted.

Nevertheless, fully realising that I was relegated
to half-pay, I busied myself about this special work.
The invention had been on the shelf at the
Admiralty for six years, and was strenuously con-
demned by those who had not taken the pains to
study its possibilities, or even to understand it.
Fortunately for the country, Sir John Jellicoe was
now a member of the Board, being Controller of
the Navy, and he decided to fit it in H.M.S.
Neptune. In conjunction with Messrs. Vickers, I
prepared drawings, which I took to the Admiralty
in June, 1910. They were approved, the work on
them was started, and in December, 1910, the in-
stallation on board H.M.S. Neptune was completed.
About the same time the Admiralty realised that,
though I had been working on this scheme of
director firing for more than a year, I had received
no pay for so doing. On the 14th June their Lord-
ships wrote to me to the effect that they were
pleased to appoint me on committee pay while
associated with the Admiralty in connection with
director firing.

248 DIRECTOR FIRING

Before passing on, I should refer to my flying
visit to Mexico. In March, 1910, I received an
invitation to travel from New York to the city of
Mexico and back in a special train, which would
stop at all the places of interest en route. In
Mexico I was to have the honour of being
presented to the President, General Porfirio Diaz.
That prospect quite settled the question ; I accepted
with pleasure, for I had always regarded General
Porfirio Diaz as one of the most wonderful men in
the world.

From the conquest of Mexico by Cortes in
1520 to the death of Maximilian in 1867, the
country of Mexico had been in a constant state of
war, either driving out invaders or coping with
internal revolutions, the latter chiefly brought
about by the greed of the Church. With the death
of Maximilian and the evacuation of the French,
all foreign interference ceased, and the Mexicans
began to govern themselves ; but it took ten years
for them to find a man with a sufficiently iron will
to exterminate the clerical greed for power and
plunder, and to stamp out the brigands that in-
fested and ruined the country.

In 1 877, General Porfirio Diaz seized by a bold
coup the reins of government, became President,
and practically remained in office for thirty years.
This long rule made a new era in Mexican history.
With firm hand Diaz suppressed all brigandage
and attempts at revolutions ; peace was maintained ;
foreign capital flowed into the country, and with it
came prosperity and a commencement of develop-
ment. I say a commencement, because up to the
time of my visit the natural resources of the

A TRIBUTE TO MEXICO 249

country had only been scratched, and a vast area
was still unexploited.

It was apparent to me that there was nothing
that the country would not either grow or yield.
Even in my short tour I passed through land rich
in oil ; I saw gold mines, silver mines, copper
mines, precious stone mines, and was told that
there was an abundance of every metal. As
regards agriculture, everything seemed to grow ;
even the desert where one saw nothing but sand
dotted over with cactus trees only wanted water
on it to change it into the most productive soil.
After passing over hundreds of miles of desert, we
emerged on to a plateau of rich soil, where fruit of
every description was growing in profusion. It
was the same desert, but it had been watered by
an irrigation company then recently started by
President Diaz.

From my visit to Mexico, seeing it as I did in
prosperity and with almost unlimited possibilities,
I came to the conclusion that it would become the
richest country in the world, and I was naturally
very anxious to meet the man who had changed it
from a country of bloodshed and brigandage to one
enjoying peace and prosperity, and who had started
the development of its resources and riches.

On the 29th March, 1910, at the Palace in
Mexico City, I had the honour and pleasure of
being presented to General Porfirio Diaz. He
was then nearly eighty years of age, but did not
look more than sixty. A short, dark man, with
a wiry and well-knit figure, he had very Indian
features and piercing black eyes. He looked
the sort of man who could rule any one. I

250 DIRECTOR FIRING

was told that he was the son of an innkeeper and
that his grandmother was a pure Indian of a
Mexican tribe who were renowned for the beauty
of their women and the savageness of their men.

With advancing age, his iron will (so necessary
in Mexico) relaxed, the revolutionists became
active, and Diaz was compelled to retire from the
Presidency and leave the country he had hardly
ever been out of during the eighty years of his
life.

President after President succeeded Diaz, but
they only acted for a short time, assassination or
resignation terminating their periods of office, and
the country soon fell into a worse state of brigand-
age than it had ever been in.

Later on the control of Mexico fell into the
hands of two men, Villa and Carransa, whom it
would be gross flattery to call brigands. Under
their rule atrocities obtained as bad as those com-
mitted by the Germans during the War ; the city
of Mexico was pillaged ; civilians and priests were
murdered ; and the nuns in the convents subjected
to unmentionable treatment.

I took an interest in Mexican affairs, because
during my visit I formed such a favourable opinion
of the possibilities of the country that I invested
money in their railways and other enterprises.
With the exit of Diaz, what he had accomplished
in thirty years was quickly undone and the country
ruined. It is a mistake to suggest that the rule
of Porfirio Diaz was one of terror only. The
Mexicans -certainly feared him, but at the same
time they loved him; he had brought prosperity
to them. He was a valiant warrior and a fine

H.M.S. NEPTUNE'S TRIALS 251

statesman ; he knew men and how to manage them,
and he feared nothing. He was the strong man
that Mexico wanted and that England wanted
badly during the war. This wonderful man, the
maker of Mexico and Mexico's truest patriot, died
an exile in Paris on the 2nd July, 1915, in his
eighty-fifth year.

In January, 1911, 1 joined H.M.S. Neptune
to superintend the trials. A month was spent
at Aranchi Bay, Sardinia, in testing the instru-
ments and in educating the officers and men in
their use. On the llth March, 1911, at Gibraltar,
the final trial took place, and proved most success-
ful. At a subsequent interview at the Admiralty,
Mr. McKenna, then First Lord, remarked that
the Neptune had attained such a rapidity of fire
that she would expend all her ammunition in
thirty minutes, which would never do. I pointed
out that if the shells hit their targets the enemy
might be sunk in thirty seconds. This was a view
of the matter which was apparently new to him.

Sir John Jellicoe, who by that time had taken
up his appointmeut as Commander-in- Chief of the
Atlantic Squadron, was present at the trial, and
on the strength of it he advised the Admiralty to
fit the director to all ships at once. This the
Admiralty were reluctant to do, and they were
supported in this opposition by Admiral Sir
Francis Bridgeman, then Commander-in-Chief of
the Home Fleet, and flying his flag on board
H.M.S. Neptune, the only ship in which it had
been tried. Matters were thus delayed a great
deal, and it was not until late in the year that
orders were given for the Thunderer to be fitted.

s

252 DIRECTOR FIRING

Mr. Winston Churchill, who had become First
Lord, informed me that he was determined that the
system of firing should be given a fair trial, and asked
what I thought would be the best way to arrange
it. I suggested that the Admiralty should tell off
a ship similar to the Thunderer, and that they should
go out together and fire at separate targets, thus
ensuring the same conditions of wind, light and
weather for both ships. Mr. Churchill considered
this a fair and sporting offer, especially as it left
the Admiralty the power to choose their best ship
and one which had been longer in commission than
the Thunderer.

There were many delays and changes in the
programme, and it was not until November, 1912,
that the final trial came off. The Admiralty
selected the Orion; she had been nine months
longer in commission than the Thunderer, and
had the reputation of being the best shooting ship
of the Navy.

On the 13th November the Fleet, under Admiral
Sir John Jellicoe, steamed out of Bantry Bay into
the Atlantic, and the two competing ships were
placed in position :

Target. Target.

~\,

Thunderer. Orion.

The range was nine thousand yards, the ships
were steaming at twelve knots' speed, and the
targets were being towed at the same speed.
Immediately the signal was made to open fire both
ships commenced, the Thunderer making beautiful

LORD JELLICOE'S OPINION 253

shooting and the Orion sending her shot all over
the place. At the end of three minutes " cease
fire " was signalled, and an examination of the
targets showed that the Thunderer had scored six
times as many hits as the Orion.

The superiority of director firing was thus
demonstrated, and the country has to thank Sir
John Jellicoe and Mr. Winston Churchill for its
introduction into the Navy. Had they not inter-
vened, the opposition to it would still have been
maintained, and we should probably have gone to
war without any of our ships having an efficient
method of firing their guns.

I cannot omit quoting in this connection a
passage from Lord Jellicoe's book.1 He there
says that—

" A great extension of the system of
director firing, by which one officer or man
could lay and fire all the guns, was made.
The situation in this respect before the War
was that a few ships had been fitted for the
system which had been devised by Admiral
Sir Percy Scott. But a very large number
of officers were sceptical as to its value com-
pared with the alternative system ; there was
considerable opposition to it, and the great
majority of the ships were not fitted. In some
cases the system was not favoured even in the
ships provided with it.

" It had fallen to my lot in 1912 to carry
out competitive trials of the director system
and the alternative system already in use, and
the results of these trials had fully confirmed
me in my previous opinion of the great value

1 "The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916."

254 DIRECTOR FIRING

of the director system. I was able to press
these views on my return to the Admiralty
at the end of 1912 as Second Sea Lord, and
it was then decided to provide all the later
ships with the arrangement. Little progress
had, however, been made when the War broke
out, only eight battleships having been fitted.

"Early in 1915 arrangements were made,
with the assistance of Sir Percy Scott, and the
warm support of Lord Fisher, then First Sea
Lord, by which the battleships and battle
cruisers were supplied with this system, without
being put out of action or sent to a dockyard
for the purpose. The necessary instruments
were manufactured at various contractors' shops,
and the very laborious task of fitting them,
and the heavy electric cables, on board the
ships was carried out by electricians sent to
the various bases. The complicated work
naturally took a considerable time, and many
vexatious delays occurred ; but gradually all
ships were fitted, Sir Percy Scott rendering
invaluable assistance at headquarters.

" As a first step, the system was fitted to
the heavy guns mounted in turrets, and by
the date of the Battle of Jutland there were
few ships that were not supplied with the
system, although six of those last fitted had
not had much experience with it.

"The conditions under which that action
was fought converted any waverers at once to
a firm belief in the director system, and there
was never afterwards any doubt expressed as
to its great value.

"Further efforts were made later to
accelerate the work, and the system was ex-
tended to smaller vessels. This had been the
intention even before the action, but there

A WARNING LETTER 255

were then still many who were unconvinced.
However, during the remainder of 1916 and
1917 the work was pressed forward, and the
system became universal for all guns and in
all classes of ships."

When Lord Jellicoe refers to " few ships " being
without the director firer at the Battle of Jutland,
he is dealing only with the main armament.1 The
work of completing the equipment of the Fleet,
main guns and secondary guns, had not, indeed,
been finished when the Armistice was signed.

It was after the Agadir scare in 1911, when we
nearly went to war, that my anxiety about the
Fleet became acute, for I well knew how terribly
deficient we were in gunnery, and what great
strides the Germans had made in that direction
since my visit to Kiel in 1905. Accordingly, on
the llth December, of that year, I wrote to the
Admiralty as follows : —

"The Germans, I am informed, have for
some years used a very good modification of
the Director System, which allows them to
fight the guns of their ships in parallel. As we
cannot do this efficiently, it gives the Germans
such a superiority in gun-fire that if a British
Fleet engaged a German Fleet of similar vessels,
the British Fleet would be badly beaten in
moderate weather, but annihilated if it was
rough.

" I make this statement with profound
regret and concern for my country, but no one
with any knowledge of the modern conditions
of shooting can contradict it.

1 Of. "The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916/' page 374.

256 DIRECTOR FIRING

"For six years I have urged their Lord-
ships, the Commissioners of the Admiralty, to
adopt a system of fighting the guns in parallel ;
had I not done so, and did I not continue to
urge it, in the event of war I should feel myself
criminally responsible for the defeat we should
sustain if our Fleet engaged another Fleet in
which the guns are fitted for firing in parallel."

This letter was tantamount to accusing their
Lordships of jeopardising the safety of the nation,
and I hoped that they would either try me by
Court Martial for so indicting them or take some
action which would give our ships a chance of
success, if they had to fight an action in rough
weather. Their Lordships did not like the kindly
warning I had addressed to them, and they did
nothing.

On the 10th February, 1912, I wrote another
letter, making suggestions for improving the firing of
the Fleet. Three hundred and seventy-three days
after the receipt of this letter, that is, in February,
1913, their Lordships replied that it had been
decided not to adopt my proposals at present. To
me, a year and eight days appeared rather a long
time for them to take in making up their minds,
but at the Admiralty time was of no consequence.

Two years after these letters were written, in
rough weather, H.M.S. Good Hope and H.M.S.
Monmouth engaged the German armoured cruisers
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. The two British ships
had no means of fighting their guns efficiently in
such weather, so they were both easily annihi-
lated by the German gun-fire, and every soul on
board them went to the bottom. It was what

CO

a

I

THE BATTLE OF CORONEL 257

I had expected, what I had predicted, and what
I had strenuously tried to avert. Fifteen hundred
brave officers and men were sacrificed because the
Admiralty had not fitted the ships with any means
for fighting their guns in a sea-way.

The Germans said that the shooting of the
Good Hope and Monmouth was very bad. No
doubt it was, but this was no reflection upon the
gunnery ability of Admiral Cradock and his officers
and men. We may be quite certain that they
bravely and skilfully fought the guns. Failure to
hit the enemy was in no way due to want of skill ;
it was due to the ships lacking the necessary
instruments to enable them to use their guns
efficiently in rough weather. In a sea-way when a
ship is rolling, there is only one method of effec-
tively using the guns ; they must be laid parallel
and fired simultaneously as a broadside. To arrive
at this, certain instruments are necessary. The
Good Hope and Monmouth were without these
instruments, and as a consequence they were unable
to use their guns effectively against the enemy.

The principle of laying guns parallel and firing
them simultaneously is not new ; I was taught it
in the first ship in which I went to sea. She was
an old sailing frigate, armed with 64-pounder
truck guns, but we could parallel our guns
although the method used was somewhat prim-
itive. When this description of firing was to be
used, the captain of the gun stretched a line
(called the convergence line) from the centre of the
port to the rear, and held it vertically over a mark
on the deck. Then the men, with handspikes and
tackles, hove the gun round until the sights were

258 DIRECTOR FIRING

parallel to the line. In this way all the guns of
the broadside were placed fairly correctly for direc-
tion, and the allowance for convergence was intro-
duced. For elevation a wooden batten was used,
marked in degrees with a good open reading ; the
guns were laid by it and fired simultaneously by
word of command.

From the foregoing it will be seen that half a
century ago we could lay our guns parallel for
direction and elevation, and fire them simul-
taneously as a broadside. This is exactly what we
re-introduced into our Navy in 1914. We called
it by three names — Parallel Firing, Director
Firing, or Broadside Firing by directing gun.

It must appear strange to my readers that we
re-introduced in 1914 a system of firing that we had
in the Navy fifty years before. The question
naturally arises, if it was a good system, and if it
was the only system by which guns could be fought
when the weather was rough, why was it ever
dropped ? I will explain.

As the guns and mountings improved, so
improvements were made in the converged firing
arrangement I have already described. The intro-
duction of electric firing enabled the guns to be
fired from a position aloft, or remote from the guns.
This caused director firing to be introduced, the
director being a sort of master gun sight which
was placed in some position from whence the
officer operating it could obtain a good view of the
enemy.

In 1885 a very excellent director was designed
by Lieutenant R. H. Peirse,1 but as we had no

1 Afterwards Vice- Admiral Sir Richard Peirse, K.C.B.

NAVAL GUNNEEY.

I. — FIRING*BROADSIDES — THE FALL OF THE SHOT.

II. — STRADDLING THE TARGET.

III. — ANOTHER BROADSIDE.

[To face page 25S.

PROFESSIONAL JEALOUSY 259

efficient communications, difficulties arose and this
description of firing was given up, broadside firing
by directing gun taking its place. In rough
weather this was an exceedingly effective manner
of firing simultaneous broadsides, and it was
generally adopted by us and all foreign nations.
It was such a good method of firing the guns that
one would have thought it might have been kept
secret, but a full description of it appeared in our
drill book, which could be bought by any foreigner
for a shilling.

In 1897 we commenced putting our guns into
casemates, that is, a sort of armoured room ;
each gun was in a separate room and the com-
munication between them was very bad. This
precluded us from using broadside firing by direct-
ing guns. Consequently after that date we had
no form of parallel firing, which meant that we
had no effective way of using our guns in rough
weather.

It was to solve this problem that, in 1905, I
revived director firing, and, owing to the great
advance that had been made in electric communi-
cations, was able to devise a very good form of it,
the details of which have been kept secret. I sub-
mitted the invention to the Admiralty, who had it
secretly patented, consigned it to themselves, and
then boycotted it until 1911, when, as explained,
Sir John Jellicoe insisted on H.M.S. Neptune being
fitted with it.

The boycot for many years of this description
of firing was not because the Admiralty were
ignorant of its efficiency. It was boycotted
simply from professional jealousy, and the boycot

260

DIRECTOR FIRING

jeopardised the safety of the Fleet, which means
the safety of the nation.

Scott Director Tower- -
Range Finder Control Position- -

Sketch view of the Director.

In 1906, shortly after the Dreadnought class
of vessel had been introduced, it was found :

FINE-WEATHER GUNNERY 261

1. That they could not carry out a chasing
action, as when at high speed the spray washed
over the gun sights and prevented the men from
seeing the enemy.

2. With the wind in certain directions the
smoke from the foremost guns interfered with
firing the after guns, and so prevented the ship
from making full use of her armament.

These were two very serious and grave defects,
for they materially reduced the power of a
Dreadnought ; and they obviously should have
been eliminated if possible. The Admiralty had
two courses open to them.

(a) To adopt director firing, which eliminated
both of the defects named.

(b) To arrange that when practising for battle
no right ahead firing took place, and that the
target should always be in such a position as
regards the wind that the firing ship was not
inconvenienced by smoke.

The Admiralty adopted course (b), and as a
consequence of this, for five years our officers and
men were trained in a system of firing which could
be effectively used only when the weather was fine
and the enemy was met on a restricted bearing as
regards the direction of the wind. In the mean-
time the Germans were fitting all their ships with
a system of firing very similar to director firing.

I mention the circumstance, not to expose the
neglect of the Admiralty, but because I am
writing a personal narrative. I was the pioneer
of director firing, and to that fact was due the long
delay in its introduction. In 1912 Mr. Winston
Churchill decided that director firing was to be

262 DIRECTOR FIRING

fitted in twenty-nine of our Dreadnought battle-
ships and battle cruisers, but the Admiralty did
not hurry. No start was made until 1913, so when
in August, 1914, war was declared, the British
Navy had only eight ships fitted. But what was
most strange was that, when war came, work was
stopped on the other twenty-one ships, and was
not resumed until three months afterwards, when
I returned to the Admiralty. The jealousy and
quarrelling in Service circles in England during the
War was a valuable asset to our enemies.

In 1904 the advantage of directing the fire of
guns from aloft was apparent to all gunnery
officers, and it was recognised by them that the
only object of having a mast was, to give the
officer in the ship an elevated position from whence
to control the fire, and to carry a wireless.

In this year Lord Fisher's Dreadnought was
designed. She was a sensational ship, representing
the initiation of a new type. In tonnage, speed,
and armament, she beat all battleships then afloat.

She was the first vessel to have all her guns of
the same pattern. Her predecessors had mixed
armaments ; the ships of the King Edward VII.
class had 12-inch guns, 9*2-inch guns and 6-inch
guns, and this made them very difficult to fight.
The mounting of only one pattern of gun was a
most important innovation as regards fighting
efficiency, and Lord Fisher deserves great credit
for having introduced it. But alas, when he left
office some years later he took his brain with him,
and a brainless Admiralty started again to build
ships with mixed armaments. Some of them were
converted during the war, and then we started

THE DREADNOUGHT SHIPS 263

to build serviceable cruisers with one pattern of
gun only, and all on the middle line.

The Dreadnought had the then wonderful
armament of ten 12-inch guns, which, if properly
equipped and handled, would have made her the
most powerful ship in the world. But she was
launched into the Fleet without a method of
fighting the guns being considered, and to make
matters worse the mast which carried the observa-
tion station whence the guns were to be controlled
was placed abaft the funnel, so that the unfor-
tunate officer controlling the firing of the guns
would be roasted.

On one occasion, after the look-out man had
gone aloft, the ship steamed at a high speed
against a head wind, so that the mast near the
top of the funnel got almost red-hot. The result
was that the look-out man could not come down
for his meals, and it was necessary to hoist food
up to him by the signal-haulyards, which had
luckily not been burned through.

In the next class, the Temeraire, Bellerophon,
Superb, and in the following class, the St. Vincent,
Collingwood, and Vanguard, as well as the Neptune,
this blunder was not repeated ; the mast was put
before the funnel, and the observation station upon
it was therefore available for the purpose for which
it was designed.

In 1907, when the vital importance of an aloft
position for controlling the fire of the guns had
been even more completely demonstrated, and we
had elaborate range-finders and fire-control instru-
ments aloft, I heard, to my horror, that the
Admiralty intended laying down more ships with

264 DIRECTOR FIRING

the funnel before the mast. Such a decision
practically meant that the ships would be of no
use for fighting purposes, unless they went stern
first into action. I took the liberty of pointing
out this amazing blunder to the Admiralty, and
got myself very much disliked for my pains. The
Board of Admiralty were well aware of the blunder
that they had made, but they wanted it hushed
up, instead of being reminded of it. Mr. McKenna's
reply was evasive. He said that the design of a ship
had to embrace possibilities of which I was perhaps
ignorant, and which were confidential. That was
a ridiculous and absurd statement. What could
be confidential so far as I was concerned ? He
could give me no reason for putting the mast in the
wrong place ! That was the fact to be concealed.

The position then was this : the Colossus, Her-
cules, Orion, Thunderer, Monarch, and Conqueror
all had the funnel where the mast ought to be, and
the mast where the funnel ought to be. To make
matters worse, it was decided to repeat the blunder
in the Indefatigable, New Zealand, Lion, Princess
Eoyal, Queen Mary, and the Tiger.

I had a model made, and took it to Mr. Winston
Churchill,- who had succeeded Mr. McKenna in
1911, and explained the gravity of an error which
we were going to repeat in the ships under con-
struction. I pointed out to him that the only way
to hit an enemy was to judge how far over or short
the shots were, and to alter the aim accordingly —
in other words, that the hitting power of a man-of-
war depended mainly upon observation of fire. I
further explained that the efficiency of the observa-
tion would depend upon two things : the personal

A COSTLY MISTAKE 265

ability of the observer and the height of the position
assigned for him to observe from ; that practically
the all-important detail in the design of a fighting
ship was the position of the observation station;
that we were ignoring this fact and putting the
observation station in a position which made it
actually untenable under most conditions of wind.

Mr. Churchill saw what a bad mistake had been
made, and asked me what could be done. I replied
that only one thing was possible — namely, to take
the funnel and mast out and change their positions ;
and that would probably cost about £50,000 to
£60,000 per ship. The First Lord, with his
characteristic boldness, overrode the opinion of his
naval colleagues and insisted upon this step being
taken. This must always be a good mark for Mr.
Churchill.

The first ship to be taken in hand was the Lion,
and she was altered as shown on the following
page— from " A " to " B."

This alteration made the observation station
tenable under most conditions of wind, and it was
so far satisfactory ; but in correcting the one blunder
their Lordships introduced another, which was worse
than the one they were remedying. They took out
the strong tripod mast, which was sufficiently rigid
to carry a director-tower, and replaced it with a
light one unsuitable for carrying the tower. To
try and avert this second blunder in the other seven
ships under construction, I had an interview early
in July, 1912, with Mr. Churchill, and pointed out
the seriousness of the defect. He explained to me
that the whole Board of the Admiralty were very
much opposed to my system of director firing, and

266

DIRECTOR FIRING

A LATE REPENTANCE 267

that as they were quite certain that it would never
be adopted, he had been obliged to agree to their
proposals that a light mast, capable only of carrying
a small observation station for the officer directing
the fire, should be put in, instead of one suitable
for carrying a director tower. Thereupon I pointed
out to the First Lord that his Board were ignorant
and did not know what they were talking about ;
that their objection to director firing was not
founded on substantial reasons; and that their
stupid decision would put the country to the ex-
pense of carrying out fresh alterations in seven
ships — either strengthening the masts they had
put in, or pulling them out and putting in new
ones.

Mr. Churchill's reply was to the effect that he
could not alter the policy of the Board ; and I do
not think he ought to be condemned for this
decision, because the question was purely a naval
and technical one. As I failed in my attempt to
avert the blunder with the First Lord, I tried the
First Sea Lord, but met with no success, and the
blunder was perpetrated.

Subsequently, of course, the masts of all these
ships had either to be taken out or strengthened r, at
an enormous expense to the country.

CHAPTER XVI

MY RETIREMENT FROM THE NAVY

A Letter from Prince Henry of Prussia— Created a Baronet and pro-
moted to Admiral — Menace of the Submarine — Protective Measures
necessary — The Official Attitude — Lessons of Manoeuvres —The
Admiralty unconvinced — Mr. Winston Churchill's Suggestion —
Director Firing — My Services dispensed with — A Remarkable
Letter from Whitehall.

AFTER the successful trial of director firing in
November, 1912, a further trial took place between
the Thunderer and Orion at Portland. A paper
reported that at this trial the Thunderer had been
beaten, and the headline was " Surprising Defeat
of Sir Percy Scott's ' Director ' System'"

Prince Henry of Prussia, who was at the time
staying in London, sent me the cutting, and
pointed out to me that this rather contradicted
what had previously appeared in the Press. I
telegraphed back that newspapers were not always
quite accurate, and in reply received the following
letter :-

"MY DEAR ADMIRAL SCOTT,

" I herewith return your telegrams with
thanks ! Prince Bismarck is supposed to have
remarked once, commenting on the Press : * The
papers sometimes really say the truth, from
which it does not result, however, that every-
thing they say is always true ! ' This seems to
me a similar case !

" Always yours most sincerely,

" HENRY OF PRUSSIA."

268

THE DILATORY ADMIRALTY 269

On the following day Prince Henry did me the
honour of calling upon me at my house, and we
had a long talk over gunnery matters. H.R.H.
said the principle of my firing was, of course, well
known in Germany, though the details of it were
not known, and that they were installing in their
ships possibly a somewhat similar "system. He
reminded me of the fact that I had seen at Kiel
a system which at that time was ahead of
ours.

The subsequent War demonstrated that the
Germans were nothing short of barbarians, and we
tarred them all with the same brush, but I think
that had Prince Henry of Prussia been Emperor
of Germany instead of his brother, the Germans
would not have been encouraged to sink hospital
ships, poison wells, use poisonous gas, insult, starve,
and torture prisoners, and commit other atrocities
that have disgraced Germany's name throughout
the whole civilised world.

As I knew that the Germans were improving
their system of firing, I tried in vain to hustle the
Admiralty into getting some more ships fitted with
director firing. They proceeded in their ordinary
leisurely manner, pursuing a dilatory system which
would break any commercial firm in a week. Time
was to them of no importance. Left thus with
nothing to do, I went to Murren, and when the
Admiralty ought to have caused me to be very
busy getting the Navy ready to fight, I was busy
skating.

Just before the end of the year I received a
letter from Mr. Asquith, intimating that he had
suggested to the King that I should be made a

270 MY RETIREMENT FROM THE NAVY

Baronet for my services in connection with gun-
nery progress, and that His Majesty had approved.

Early in 1913 I was promoted to Admiral, and
1 retired. It did not appear to me to be of any
use remaining on the Active List, as I should only
have been blocking the way for younger men. I
had been in H.M. Navy for forty-seven years.

I was still employed by the Admiralty in
director firing, and there was much more to be
done, for their Lordships had not even sanctioned
it for the secondary armament, for which it was as
much required as for the heavy guns.

In addition to this work my thoughts were
much occupied on " submarines." I had been for
a long time trying to find some way of successfully
attacking them. I found the problem a very
difficult one, and as no one else appeared to have
evolved a successful method of locating and destroy-
ing these newly-devised craft, their advent into sea
warfare was a real menace, and necessitated a
revolution in our naval building programme.

I took the liberty of pointing out to the
Admiralty that the Germans were building many
submarines, and large ones ; that we wanted many
more for the protection of our coasts and colonies ;
and that we wanted aeroplanes to search for sub-
marines, and more fast destroyers with which to
attack them.

I found that their Lordships did not realise the
potentialities of the submarine, or the deadliness
of the torpedo, their theory being that the sub-
marine was an untried weapon, and that the
torpedo was inaccurate. That this view should
have been held at the Admiralty I considered a

VALUE OF THE SUBMARINE 271

danger to the country, for it was obvious that if
their Lordships did not recognise the power of the
submarines they would not consider any anti-
submarine measures necessary. The official view
was the more surprising since in all recent naval
manoeuvres the submarine had over and over again
demonstrated its deadliness of attack, and it should
have been apparent to every one that the introduc-
tion of these vessels had revolutionised naval war-
fare and put into the hands of the Germans a
weapon of far more use to them than their fleet
of battleships.

As I could not convince the Admiralty that the
submarine was anything more than a toy, I con-
sidered it my duty to communicate with the Press.
On the 15th December, 1913, I wrote a letter but
withheld it on representations by a member of
Parliament that the Little Navyites, then very
powerful in the country, might use it as a
weapon to cut down the Navy Estimates, and that
I should better serve the country by waiting until
the estimates were passed, and Mr. Winston
Churchill had got the money. He could then, if
he agreed with me, easily strike off some battle-
ships from the building programme, and spend the
money voted for their construction on submarines,
aircraft, and anti-submarine measures.

Their Lordships were so annoyed with me for
venturing to put their heads straight as regards
submarines that at the end of the year they took
away the pay that I had been receiving for helping
them with director firing. Their letter was re-
markable for the statement that the installation was
practically completed in several ships and that the

272 MY RETIREMENT FROM THE NAVY

manufacture of the gear was in a very advanced
stage. As a matter of fact, it was only completed
in two ships and was not even designed for the
various classes of ships in which it was to be in-
stalled. In this letter, dated the 30th December,
1913, the Admiralty bade me farewell, expressing
" their high appreciation " of my services in con-
nection with "this sighting gear" and referring
to its "marked success."

CHAPTER XVII

WAR — BACK TO WORK, 1914 AND 1915

The Shadow of Ireland — Letter to the Times on Submarines — Criticisms
by many Naval Officers — The War settles the Controversy — The
War Office and the Lack of Big Guns — Lord Roberts' Advice
ignored — Ten Months' Delay and Repentance — The Fleet's Gun
Equipment — Recall to the Admiralty — Fitting out the Dummy
Fleet — The Submarine Problem demands Attention — Visit to the
Grand Fleet— The Peril of the Grand Fleet— Lord Fisher's
Influence — The Tragedy of the Battle of Jutland— Official Persist-
ence in Error — The Dardanelles Failure — Gunnery Practice in the
"Sixties''— Successive Changes in the Target — Valueless Prize
Firing — My Suggestions for Improvement — Method adopted on
the China Station and its Results — Admiralty Opposition to
its Adoption — King Edward's Interest in the Question — New
Admiralty Rules adopted — Their Disastrous Effects — Captain
Jellicoe's Action — Immediate Improvement.

IN the early part of the year 1914, having nothing
to do, and as Ireland was arming for a civil
war, I thought I would join the Ulster Field
Force, but they had so many military officers
ready to serve with them that I was not wanted.

I was disgusted to find that there was a secret
plot by which the Navy was to take part in the
attack on Ulster. It was terrible to realise that
the Royal Navy was to be employed against a
section of Irishmen who were loyal to our King
and the country, and that the civil war was to take
place simply because a certain number of men
wanted to remain in Parliament.

The situation was unique. The political party

273

274 WAR— BACK TO WORK

in office had two courses open to them : one to go
out of office and have no civil war ; the other to
remain in office and have a civil war. It seems in-
credible that two hundred and seventy Englishmen
should be ready to embark on all the horrors of
war sooner than give up their seats in Parliament,
but that is exactly what they decided to do.

This unhappy state of affairs did a great deal
of harm both in the Army and the Navy, and
contributed in many ways to the unprepared
state in which in some respects the Great War
found us.

In due course the Navy Estimates for 1914-
1915 were published, and as the substance of them
revealed that the Admiralty had realised neither
the menace that submarines were to this island
country nor the necessity of providing measures
against them, I sent a letter to the Times on the
4th June, 1914, the gist of which was as follows : —

"That as we had sufficient battleships,
but not sufficient submarines and aircraft, we
should stop building battleships and spend the
money voted for their construction on the
submarines and the aircraft that we urgently
needed.

" That submarines and aircraft had entirely
revolutionised naval warfare.

" That if we were at war with a country
within striking distance of submarines, battle-
ships on the high seas would be in great danger ;
that even in harbour they would not be immune
from attack unless the harbour was quite a safe
one.

" That probably if we went to war, we
should at once lock our battleships up in a safe

NAVAL CRITICISMS 275

harbour, and that the enemy would do the
same.

" That all naval strategy was upset, as no
fleet could hide from the eye of the aeroplane.

" That submarines could deliver a deadly
attack in broad daylight.

" That battleships could not bombard an
enemy if his ports were adequately protected
by submarines.

" That the enemy's submarines would come
to our coasts and destroy everything they could

see."

i

These were the salient points of my letter.
The statements were not mere effects of my
imagination; they were facts which every naval
officer should have known, and all the young Navy
did know of them. But the seniors still regarded
the submarine as a toy. Consequently the critics
fell heavily on me and treated me as an incom-
petent agitator.

As I had made a study of submarines for some
years, I naturally knew something about them ; it
was my profession to know about them, and I
should have been professionally ignorant had I not
known about them. The criticisms on my letter
showed how little the country knew about sub-
marines ; as regards the Press I was not surprised,
because all submarine work had been kept secret.
What surprised me was that five Admirals rushed
into print to tell the world how little they knew.

Admiral Sir E. Fremantle described my letter
as a mischievous scare.

Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge said I had not
gone thoroughly into the matter.

276 WAR— BACK TO WORK

Admiral Bacon was astonished at my publishing
views with an authoritativeness which could only
be justified by an accuracy of knowledge which it
was difficult for him to see that I had at my dis-
posal. He pointed out the great difficulties that
there were in navigating a submarine.

Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman (the late First
Sea Lord of the Admiralty) referred to submarines
as inaccurate and undeveloped weapons. This was,
of course, the view that I knew the Admiralty had
taken of submarines, and hence the necessity for
me to write to the papers.

Lord Charles Beresford stated that submarines
could only operate in the day-time ; that they were
highly vulnerable, and that a machine-gun could
put them out of action.

It appeared strange to me that these gallant
officers should think that I did not know what I
was talking about, practically classing me as pro-
fessionally ignorant. If before writing to the
papers they had consulted any midshipman, he
could have explained to them that my letter to the
Times was not a scare, but a warning ; he could
have taught them that submarines were not difficult
to navigate ; that torpedoes were not inaccurate if
properly handled ; that submarines were not un-
developed weapons ; that a machine-gun could not
put a submarine out of action, and that submarines
could operate at night-time.

I, as well as most thinking naval officers,
naturally knew before the war what submarines
could do ; the public have since learned ; so the
criticisms on my warning may be interesting.
Here are some of them : —

"A MISCHIEVOUS SCARE" 277

"Lord Sydenham regards Sir Percy Scott's
theory as a 'fantastic dream,' and considers that
Sir Percy Scott does not appear to have grasped
the logical results of his theories." — Hampshire
Telegraph, June 12th, 1914.

" Sir Percy Scott's ideas approach the boundaries
of midsummer madness." — Pall Mall Gazette, June
5th, 1914.

" Admiral Sir E. Fremantle describes Sir Percy
Scott's eulogy of the submarine as a mischievous
scare." — Portsmouth Times, June 12th, 1914.

" The views of Sir Percy Scott depend upon
unsupported conjectures, quite natural to a mind
deeply imbued with the sense of perfection of
modern mechanical contrivances, but dangerous if
translated into national policy. His letter interests
me greatly because it exactly illustrates the con-
flict of opinion which may arise between the
mechanical engineer and the student of naval war.
On the high seas the chances of submarines will
be few, as they will require for their existence a
parent ship which, on Sir Percy Scott's hypothesis,
must disappear."-— Lord Sydenham.

" As a romance, or even a prophecy, Sir Percy
Scott's forecast is fantastic, but as practical tactics
it is so premature as to be almost certainly fatal ;
it may safely be relegated to the novel shelf. '-
Manchester Courier, June 6th, 1914.

" Sir Percy Scott's is a very impressive picture.
Written by a literary man doing a scientific novel
or scare tale, it would pass well enough. But is it
what we have the right to expect from a most
accomplished naval gunner, and a naval officer of
approved capacity? The imaginative, fancy-picture-
making spirit of the thing is out of place over Sir
Percy Scott's name." — Manchester Guardian, .June
6th, 1914.

Admiral Bacon writes : " It is rather astonishing

278 WAR— BACK TO WORK

to find Sir Percy Scott rushing into print and
publishing views with an authoritativeness which
could only be justified by an accuracy of know-
ledge which it is difficult to see that he has at his
disposal."- — Times, June 15th, 1914.

" To speak frankly, Sir Percy Scott's letter was
a most approved example of the mare's-nest.
Lord Sydenham and other writers have shown
how perfectly ridiculous it is to treat the submarine
as if it were a weapon of precision which could be
relied upon to do the kind of things it is expected
to do in Sir Percy Scott's futurist idea of naval
warfare." — -Spectator, June 13th, 1914.

" Mr. Hannon (Secretary of the Navy League)
says the statements contained in Sir Percy Scott's
letter are premature, ill-advised and calculated to
do serious harm to the cause of maintenance of
British supremacy at sea." — Globe, June 6th, 1914.

"Is Sir Percy Scott a dreamer of dreams like
Admiral Aube ? Or is he a precursor of practical
achievements ? Let us not forget that the dreams
of to-day are often the realities of to-morrow." —
Daily Grraphic.

" Sir Percy Scott has conceivably described the
actual conditions which will prevail in 1920 or
1930."— Belfast News, June 6th, 1914.

" It may be that in years to come a war will
show that Sir Percy Scott was before his time.
This is a possibility, if not a probability." — Naval
and Military Record, June 10th, 1914.

Lord Charles Beresford writes : " A submarine
cannot stay any length* of time under water,
because it must frequently come into harbour to
replenish its electric batteries." — Times, July 7th,
1914.

" Mr. David Hannay throws doubt upon the
value of the submarine. Indeed, he seems to
regard it as little better than a clever scientific

FURTHER CRITICISMS 279

toy. Doubtless, he suggests, it has potentialities,
but these are at present of a very limited and
unproved kind." — Times, June 26th, 1914.

Mr. H. W. Wilson writes : "A submarine
cannot in any case do her work without the support
of surface ships." — Daily Mail, June llth, 1914.

" The chances of the submarine in the serious
warfare of the future are much smaller than Sir
Percy Scott imagines. Sir Percy Scott has given
to the submarine credit for qualities which have
yet to be proved."— Outlook, July 10th, 1914.

u At the present time submarines cannot com-
municate with one another, neither do they possess
any serious utility at night-time, and in rough
weather they may be utterly ignored." — Engineer,
June 12th, 1914.

"On the face of Sir Percy Scott's statement, one
can only say that the submarine has not yet
reached the stage of development that justifies the
gallant Admiral's estimate of its value in war." —
Daily Graphic, June 5th, 1914.

" The submarine, a slow vessel, is dependent for
vision on the sea-plane which has three or four
times her speed, and must maintain that speed."—
Pall Mall Gazette, September 7th, 1914.

Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman, First Sea
Lord, thus criticises Sir Percy Scott's contentions :
" Sir Percy Scott's letter contains nothing that is
new to the Admiralty authorities, except that in
his statement he advises an immediate reduction
in the shipbuilding programme, and recourse to
what are at present inaccurate and undeveloped
weapons, in place of battleships." — Daily Mail,
June 8th, 1914.

Lord Beresford writes : " The submarine can
only operate by day and in clear weather, and it is
practically useless in misty weather." — Times, July
llth, 1914.

280 WAR— BACK TO WORK

" Submarines can be shadowed until compelled
to rise, and then they are doomed." — Observer,
June 7th, 1914.

" Sir Percy Scott himself writes as if the sub-
marine were always invisible, and as if her speed
when submerged were the same as her speed on
the surface. The submarine is only invisible for a
small part of the time ; she can stay below perhaps
six hours at a stretch. Once she comes to the
surface, she is the most vulnerable of all craft.
Moreover, they are but little danger to a fleet
under way." — Observer, June 14th, 1914.

Lord Sydenham writes : " On the surface the
submarine is a most inferior destroyer, slow,
supremely vulnerable and unsuitable for long
habitation."— Times, June 6th, 1914.

Lord Charles Beresford writes : " A submarine
is highly vulnerable; a machine-gun or well-
directed bullets could put it out of action." —
Times, July llth, 1914.

Mr. Arnold White writes that " if war is
declared our Dreadnoughts would have to be
tucked away in some safe harbour, and that the
place for the German Dreadnoughts would be in
the Kiel Canal with both ends sealed up." — Referee,
June 14th, 1914.

"The effects of the torpedo have continually
fallen far behind expectation. It is far from being
certain that battleships, even when struck, will be
destroyed beyond repair." — Observer, June 7th,
1914.

" The basis of the argument held by Sir Percy
Scott lies in the statement that 6 submarines and
aeroplanes have revolutionised the naval warfare.
No fleet can hide from the aeroplane, and the
submarine can deliver a deadly attack even in
broad daylight.' Each of these points, however,
seems to be capable of argument." — Sunday Times.

BIG GUNS FOR THE ARMY 281

These criticisms call for no comment. Journa-
lists who wrote in depreciation of what I had
suggested were not to blame. They knew no
more about submarines than I did about newspaper
production. They merely repeated the views of
some officers of the Navy. Point by point the
War has answered all the criticisms of my letter
and fully demonstrated that submarines and aero-
planes have revolutionised warfare.

On the 4th August, 1914, war was declared
against Germany. I wrote to the Admiralty and
offered to serve in any capacity they thought fit.
I suggested that 1 might possibly be of use in
assisting to get director firing into our ships, or
hastily mounting heavy guns for land service.
Their Lordships did not even condescend to
acknowledge the receipt of my letter, so I amused
myself gardening at Ascot, where I was living.

One day in September, 1914, I met Field-
Marshal Earl Roberts, who also lived at Ascot.
He pointed out to me how deplorably short we
were at the front of long-range guns, and asked
me if I could quickly mount some on the same
sort of carriage that I made in South Africa. I
replied that as, with limited resources in South
Africa, we were able to mount one 6-inch gun
in 48 hours, we could easily in this country, by
dividing the work between our dockyards, mount
100 in a month.

Lord Roberts was so delighted with the idea
that he went straight to the War Office to see
Lord Kitchener, and after a lapse of a few days
he wrote me, enclosing a letter from the Secretary
for War. Lord Kitchener, under date September

282 WAR— BACK TO WORK

15th, 1914, explained the position, adding that he
had discussed my suggestions at the War Office
with those concerned. He remarked that steps
had already been taken to provide 6-inch howitzers
carrying a hundred-pound shell, both lyddite and
shrapnel, and that arrangements had been made
for 6 -inch guns on mobile carriages to be sent to
the front. While thanking me for my offer, he
added that at that time the War Office did not
" want any extra guns."

Neither the War Office nor the Admiralty had
at that time learned the value of long-range guns.
Lord Roberts said: "They will learn by bitter
experience," and this was the case. Ten months
afterwards, in July, 1915, they found all their
guns outranged by the Germans. The War Office
then asked me if I could quickly mount eight 6-inch
Mark VII. guns, having a range of 20,000 yards.
I prepared a design practically on the same lines
as that of the 6-inch gun used in South Africa.
The work was undertaken by Chatham Dockyard,
and in a very short space of time these eight guns
were doing useful work against the Germans, their
40° of elevation enabling them to out-range every
other gun we had at the front.

In the early stage of the war the state of our
Navy as regards gunnery efficiency was deplorable,
though two years had elapsed since it had been
clearly demonstrated that director firing was the
only system of firing which would give us a chance
of success in action, and although it was well
known that the Germans had some form of
director firing in all their ships. When war was
declared we had orly eight ships fitted to fire their

THE BATTLE OF CORONEL 283

heavy guns by director, and not one ship fitted, or
being fitted, to fire her 6-inch guns by the same
method.

I urged the authorities to do something, but
they would not move. I was informed that the
First Sea Lord, H.S.H. Prince Louis of Battenberg,1
who was responsible to the nation for the efficiency
of our Fleet in gunnery, had the matter well in
hand.

Almost directly after the war commenced
German submarines became very active, sending
to the bottom the Pathfinder, Cressy, Rogue,
Aboukir, and Hawke, with a loss of about 4000
officers and men drowned. These vessels were
patrolling at slow speed off a coast very near to
the enemy's submarine base. Why they were
sent there no one knows, but that the Admiralty
sent them there is revealed in Lord Jellicoe's book.
Their destruction was inevitable. The loss was
the price the country had to pay for the Admiralty
regarding submarines as toys.

On the 1st November, 1914, my old ship the
Good Hope, in company with the Monmouth,
Glasgow, and Otranto, engaged the German
cruisers Scharnhorst, Gneisnau, Leipzig, and
Dresden in the Pacific. After a short action the
Good Hope and Monmouth were both sunk by
the Germans' superior shooting. These ships were
caught in bad weather, and as neither of them was
fitted with any efficient system of firing their
guns in such weather, they were, as predicted in
my letter to the Admiralty of 10th December,

1 Now the Marquis of Milford Haven.

U

284 WAR— BACK TO WORK

191 1,1 annihilated without doing any appreciable
damage to the enemy.

These two ships were sacrificed because the
Admiralty would not fit them with efficient means
of firing their guns in a sea-way. Had the
system with which I had fitted the Good Hope
been completed and retained in her, I dare say she
might have seen further service and saved the
gallant Cradock and his men on this occasion.

During October, after the heavy losses that our
Navy had sustained, the feeling of the general
public that we ought not to have a Prince of
foreign birth at the head of our Navy manifested
itself, and Prince Louis of Battenberg resigned his
position as First Sea Lord on the 30th October,
his place being taken by Admiral of the Fleet
Lord Fisher.

On the 3rd November, 1914, the First Lord,
Mr. Winston Churchill, sent for me, and informed
me that their Lordships had decided to employ me
at the Admiralty on special service in connection
with the gunnery of the Fleet, and I was appointed
" Adviser to their Lordships on matters connected
with the gunnery efficiency of the Fleet." I was
further directed to investigate the question of at-
tacking the enemy's submarines, and to put for-
ward any suggestions that 1 could in that direction.

Before embarking on either of these duties 1
was told to design and equip a fleet of dummy
battleships, taking ordinary merchant ships and
converting them so that, even at short distance,
they had the appearance of battleships. Mr. F.
Skeens, a very able Admiralty draftsman, prepared

1 Cf. Chapter XV.

THE DUMMY FLEET.

A MERCHANT SHIP BEFORE CONVERSION.

THE SAME MERCHANT SHIP AFTER CONVERSION.

[To face page 284.

"THE S.C. SQUADRON" 285

tracings of the merchant steamers, and tracings
to the same scale of types of our battleships. One
tracing was put over the other and the necessary
transformation quickly decided on. It was much
more simple than I anticipated.

The next day Messrs. Harland & Wolff had
about 2000 men cutting sixteen fine merchant
ships to pieces. How splendidly this firm did
their work can be seen from the photographs.

The question of equipping this squadron with
officers and men was a difficult one, but I had the
good fortune to meet Captain Haddock, C.B., who
had given up command of the Olympic. He had
been with me in H.M.S. Edinburgh in 1886.

I took Captain Haddock to the Admiralty,
and suggested that they should make him into a
Commodore, and place him in command of the
squadron, with full power to ship the necessary
officers and men. This squadron had to be given
a name, and I suggested the S.C. Squadron, or
the Special Coastal Squadron. "S.C. Squadron"
could also mean " Scare Crow Squadron." You
could take your choice ! One of these ships was,
I believe, sunk by a Hun submarine whose
captain, when he found she was only a dummy,
went mad and blew his brains out.

The purchase of the ships to form this squadron,
and the expense of altering them cost about
£1,000,000. How these ships were to be usefully
employed was not divulged to me. If some deep
scheme existed in which they were to take
part, it never matured, for a short time after
their alteration, changes having occurred at the
Admiralty including the retirement of Lord Fisher,

286 WAR— BACK TO WORK

those that remained of them were converted back
again.

At the beginning of the war, in my opinion we
could better afford to lose a battleship than a
merchant ship, but that was not the Admiralty
opinion. They commandeered them in the most
ruthless and reckless manner, sinking them to
make breakwaters, and putting them to any use
except bringing food to this country. It was
further proof that the Admiralty did not believe
in the submarine menace ; the warning which I
had given them and the nation was still unheeded.
It was not until the third year of the war, when
four million tons of merchant shipping had been
sent to the bottom, that the Admiralty woke up
and started to order merchant ships to be built,
and even then their orders were so bound up with
red tape that the builders could not proceed with
alacrity. A shipbuilder told me that in placing an
order the Admiralty sent him so many forms to
fill in that he had to tell them they could have the
ships or the forms, but they could not have both.

With regard to attacking submarines, as the
Admiralty before the war regarded them as little
more than toys, it was only natural that no progress
had been made in the direction of taking measures
for destroying them. A committee had certainly
been at work for some time, but had evolved
nothing.

When I came on the scene, which was about
one hundred and twenty days after war was
declared, I found that they had not even taken
steps to put rams on our trawlers and torpedo
boat destroyers, or to give them a weapon to

MYSTERY OF THE DEPTH CHARGE 287

attack a submarine if they happened to pass over
her. The Badger had rammed one, but her round
stem did not do enough damage to sink the
submarine, and when she passed over her she had
no bomb to throw down at her. To meet the case,
I suggested that rams should be put on our torpedo
boats, destroyers and trawlers, and that was done.
I designed and submitted a bomb which could be
thrown down on to a submarine if she was on or
near the surface. This suggestion was accepted
and rapidly introduced.

The depth charge, which ultimately turned out
to be the antidote to the submarine, furnishes a
remarkable illustration of Admiralty methods.
Who invented it ? It has even been suggested
that it was an American. What are the facts ?
On the 1st October, 1914, Captain P. H. Colomb
submitted the design of a depth charge, actuated
by a hydrostatic valve. On the 19th October
Admiral Sir Charles Madden made a similar
proposal, and suggested a howitzer to " lob " the
charges out. Although I was head of the Anti-
Submarine Department at the Admiralty, I was
left in ignorance of both these proposals — an
illustration of bad administration and the extent
to which the Admiralty works in watertight
compartments, one not knowing what the other
is doing. So, on the 16th November, I proposed
a depth charge which could be dropped from an
aeroplane or surface craft. The idea was so simple
that these depth charges could have been supplied
in quantities by the end of the year. What
happened ? These three valuable suggestions were
treated in the usual Admiralty way — efforts were

288 WAR— BACK TO WORK

made to improve on the idea in order to produce
something which would bear the hall mark of the
Admiralty, with the result that, instead of having
a depth charge and ejecting howitzer at the end of
1914, we did not get them until 1916. It was a
serious matter, for I have no doubt that had the
depth charge come into use in 1914, as it could
have done, it would have saved a loss of about
£200,000,000.

We were very short of fast surface boats — the
submarine's greatest enemy. In connection with
this shortage rather a peculiar thing happened.
On the 30th June, 1914, that is just before the
outbreak of war, one of the guests at a dinner
party asked what was the antidote for submarine.
In my reply I mentioned that very fast surface
boats carrying a gun would be useful. Exactly
one year after this, on the 30th June, 1915, this
gentleman brought me a good design of a very fast
(40 knots) hydroplane motor boat, 60 feet long.
I took the design to the Admiralty, and they
promptly turned it down. One year after this
they ordered a few hydroplane 40-feet long motor
boats. They were not of much use. A year
afterwards, in April 1917, they ordered a large
number of similar boats of 55 feet in length.
Two years' waste of time, and we were at war !

I next had to turn to a much more difficult
problem, the gunnery of the Fleet. I went up to
Scapa Flow in the Orkneys (13th November, 1914),
and had a long interview with Sir John Jellicoe.
The Grand Fleet was assembled in this harbour for
strategic reasons, and also to keep the ships as far
away as possible from the German submarines.

GERMAN SPIES HANGED 289

The Commander-in- Chief discussed with me the
terrible state of affairs, the salient point of which
was that for strategic reasons he was obliged to
keep the Grand Fleet at Scapa, that German
aeroplanes had been over the harbour, and must
be quite conversant with the anchorage of the
Fleet and the unprotected approaches, that he
was doing all he could to make the anchorage safe,
but that the measures were not complete and that
any night submarines might come in and send the
Grand Fleet to the bottom. When I said " Good
night " to Lord Jellicoe, I added, " Shall we be
here in the morning ? " His laconic reply was,
" I wonder."

Why the Fleet was not destroyed, I cannot
imagine. Either the German submarines lacked
pluck, or possibly as the Commander-in-Chief of
the Grand Fleet suggests in his book, the German
mind could not believe that we could be such
fools as to place our Fleet in a position where
it was open to submarine or destroyer attack. If
this was in the German mind, why was he not
enterprising enough to use it ?

A story is told that a German airman, having
reported that they could see no defences at Scapa,
two spies were sent, and at that time it was very
easy for them to get over. They reported that
there was no protection. The Germans promptly
shot them, as they considered they were lying.
They then sent two more ; they were not going to
take any risks, so they reported that our Fleet was
as safe as theirs was in the Kiel Canal. Perhaps
this is why the Germans did not win, as they
could have won, in 1914. If the Germans had

290 WAR— BACK TO WORK

had half a dozen men of the stamp of our sub-
marine commanders, we should now be a German
colony. This knowledge will be the bitterest pill
that the Germans have ever had to swallow.

And before I leave this subject of the unpre-
paredness of the Grand Fleet in some respects for
war, I must revert to the criticism of Lord Jellicoe
for not pursuing the German Navy after the battle
of Jutland and fighting them on the night 31st
May-lst June. Lord Jellicoe had a very good
reason for not doing so. The British Fleet was
not properly equipped for fighting an action at
night. The German Fleet was. Consequently, to
fight them at night would have only been to court
disaster. Lord Jellicoe's business was to preserve
the Grand Fleet, the main defence of the Empire,
as well as of the Allied cause, not to risk its exist-
ence. I have been asked why the Grand Fleet
was not so well prepared to fight a night action
as the German Navy. My answer is, "Ask the
Admiralty." The German Fleet went back, only
to come out again when they crossed the North Sea
like a flock of sheep to surrender. The German
sailors were made in Kiel Harbour. This harbour
is like the Serpentine — and a sailor cannot be trained
on the Serpentine, and that is what was the matter
with the German Navy.

It was very gratifying to find the Grand Fleet
all cheery in spite of the dangers that confronted
it — drilling night and day at their guns, and doing
everything possible to improve the efficiency of
themselves and of their weapons. It was the
weapons that I had been sent up to inquire about,
and the conditions made me very anxious. Only

CONFERENCE WITH FIRST LORD 291

eight ships of the whole Fleet had their main
armament fitted for director firing, and all work
on the other ships had been suspended on the out-
break of war. Practically a hundred days had been
lost, and, to make matters worse, none of the
necessary electric cables and fittings had been
ordered. Fitting the secondary armament with
director firing had not been contemplated.

Such a state of things seems incredible. One
would have thought that, although their Lordships
paid no attention to my warning in 1911, the
moment war was known to be inevitable they
would have bestirred themselves and ordered all
the material necessary to put the Fleet in a state of
gunnery efficiency. But practically nothing had
been done.

I had a conference with the First Lord (Mr.
Winston Churchill) and the First Sea Lord (Lord
Fisher), and pointed out to them the serious state
of affairs, and how badly we should fare if the
German Fleet came out.1 They realised the posi-
sition and approved of practically all the ships
being fitted with director firing, including vessels
of the Warrior and Defence class ; and some small
cruisers of the Cordelia class ; and further, they
agreed that I could arrange it without being
held up by the ordinary Admiralty red tape. I
took their approval to Sir James Marshall, the
Director of Dockyard Work, and to the late Mr.
Forcy, the Director of Stores ; without any letter-
writing they acted on it at once. Drillers were
sent up to the Fleet to commence the wiring,

1 Fortunately for the country the German Fleet did not come out
until eighteen months afterwards.

292 WAR—BACK TO WORK

and the necessary cables and fittings were ordered.
The Wolseley Motor Car Company ceased making
motors to make director instruments. Con-
sequently the fitting of the ships went on rapidly,
and had the " push " been maintained our whole
Fleet would have been equipped by the end
of 1915.

In May, 1915, unfortunately for the nation,
Lord Fisher left the Admiralty and all the " push "
ceased. I no longer had any influence ; the authori-
ties went back to their apathetic way of doing
things ; time, even in warfare, was not considered
of any importance by them.

The result of this was that at the Battle of
Jutland, fought on the 31st May, 1916, the Com-
mander-in- Chief had only six ships of his Fleet
completely fitted with director firing — that is main
as well as secondary armament ; he had several
ships with their primary armament not fitted ; he
had not a single cruiser in the Fleet fitted for
director firing,- he had no Zeppelins as eyes for
his Fleet ; his guns were out-ranged by those
of the Germans. He had to use projectiles
inferior to those used by the Germans ; and in
firing at night he was utterly outclassed by the
enemy.

In one portion of the Fleet I had a very
personal interest — the cruisers of the Warrior, Black
Prince, and Defence classes. They had a mixed
armament of 9'2-inch and 7*5-inch guns, and con-
sequently were very difficult ships to fight unless
they had director firing. Lord Fisher had ap-
proved of this class of ship being fitted with director
firing in November, 1914, but the Admiralty did

"NOT A DOG'S CHANCE" 293

not place the order until April, 1915. It was their
Lordships' intention to place the order in January,
1915, which was far too late ; but the papers
were mislaid, which caused a delay of three
months.

The Germans in the Jutland Battle sent these
three ships to the bottom, and I lost my elder son,
a midshipman, sixteen years of age. A week
before he went into action he said to me : " Father,
if we have a scrap, our gunnery lieutenant says
we shall not have a dog's chance, as our extempo-
rised director which we have rigged up is not
reliable, and the Germans can out-range our guns.
We have only got 15° of elevation ; the Germans
have got 30°. They will be pumping shell into
us and our guns won't reach them by a couple of
miles."

My midshipman son was quite correct ; they
had not a dog's chance. All our guns were out-
ranged by the Germans. This superiority of range
was conceded by our own Board of Admiralty to
the German nation. In 1905 I paid a visit to Kiel,
as I have already mentioned, and on my return to
London, informed the Admiralty that the Germans
were giving their guns 30° of elevation. The
Director of Naval Ordnance at that time, Sir John
Jellicoe, was in favour of increasing our elevation,
but, as I have already explained, the Director ol
Naval Ordnance was only Director in name. He
was not a Lord of the Admiralty and had no power,
so nothing was done. We continued to give our
guns only 13|° of elevation. Four years after-
wards, in 1909, we increased the elevation in new
ships to 15°. In 1911 we increased it to 20°, and

294 WAR— BACK TO WORK

in 1915, a year after war was declared, the
Admiralty did what they ought to have done ten
years before, that is they decided that in all new
ships the guns should be capable of firing at 30°
of elevation. Finally, in 1917 they increased the
elevation in some ships to 40°.

My readers may not be quite conversant with
the term " elevation," and the importance of it,
so I will explain. Within certain limits the higher
you point a gun up, the further the shot will go,
For example, if you fire a 12-inch gun at 15°
elevation, the shot goes 16,000 yards ; if you fire
at 30° the shot goes 24,000. Therefore, a ship
that can fire her guns at 30° has 8,000 yards more
range than a ship that can only fire her guns up
to 15° elevation. They both have the same guns ;
the increase in range is simply due to the platform
in the one case allowing the gun to be raised to an
angle of 30° instead of to only 15°.

Early in the year 1915 it was decided to build
some monitors, carrying guns of 15-inch, 14-inch,
and 9'2-inch calibre. As these vessels were for
bombardment purposes, it was essential that their
guns should be capable of firing at a high elevation,
so as to obtain a long range. This essential had
unfortunately been overlooked by the Gunnery
Department. I called Lord Fisher's attention to
it, and offered to increase their elevation from 13J°
to 30°, without delaying the ships, provided that
I could break through all Admiralty ideas. There
was to be no paper work, and no red-tape. He
agreed to this. I rang up Messrs. Armstrong,
Whit worth & Co., of Newcastle-on-Tyne, discussed
the subject with them, and got them to send me

METHODS OF EFFICIENCY 295

a drawing by the night mail. In the morning I
showed it to Lord Fisher ; he approved the proposal
and I wired to Newcastle, directing Armstrong to
proceed with the alteration. The whole operation
took twenty-two hours. There was, of course,
nothing wonderful about it ; it merely illustrated
how all work during the war should have been
done. Lord Fisher was very pleased with the
celerity with which it was carried out, but the
paper brigade at the Admiralty did not like their
ordinary red-tape ideas being over-ridden, and
wrote to the Armstrong firm, informing them that
I was only acting in an advisory capacity to the
Admiralty, and Admiralty approval should be
obtained in accordance with the usual practice.
If this business had been attempted with the usual
Admiralty practice it would have taken a month
to get the paper work through, and probably it
would not have been done at all.

What a curse to the nation red-tapism was
during the War ! I received a letter containing
a shocking example of it. At Malta there were
three of our submarines eager to go out and sink
the Goeben and Breslau. They were not allowed
to do so because they had been sent to Malta for
" defence purpose." How could they have better
defended Malta than by sinking these two ships ?
It would not have been surprising had the officers
turned a blind eye to their orders, and gone out
and sunk them.

On the 13th January, 1915, I was sent for by
the First Lord (Mr. Winston Churchill) and he
told me that H.M.S. Queen Elizabeth was going
out to the Dardanelles, that the Navy was going

296 WAR— BACK TO WORK

to smash all the forts and go through to Constanti-
nople, and that I could go in command.

I could not accept the offer as I knew it was
an impossible task for the inefficient ships then in
the Mediterranean to perform. What was done
is now a matter of history ; practically everything
that we could do wrong we did. Our casualties
were :—

Men. Battleships Sunk.

Killed . I . . 23,035 Irresistible . 15,000 tons.

Wounded . . . 73,008 Ocean
Missing . . . 10,567 Goliath
Sick . ...»•' . 90,000 Triumph

Majestic
Bouvert

12,950
12,950
11,800
14,900
12,000

196,610 79,600 „

For our legislators the Dardanelles will probably
be the blackest page in the War's history ; for our
seamen and soldiers it will be one of the brightest.
They landed under conditions which no other
troops in the world would have faced, and displayed
bravery unequalled in any other theatre of war.

The landing in the Dardanelles and the subse-
quent retirement we can for ever be proud of; our
nation must ever be ashamed of the authorities
responsible for the plan of attack.

As I have referred to inefficient ships in the
Mediterranean, it may be convenient at this point
to summarize the general course of gunnery prac-
tice during my period of service in the Royal Navy.
In 1866 when I joined the Navy the allowance of
practice ammunition was eight rounds per gun per
quarter. This ammunition was supposed to be
expended at a cask carrying a flag, some one aloft
judging where the misses went. Points were

PROGRESS OF GUNNERY 297

awarded and prizes given. Many ships avoided
carrying out this firing. In some cases the practice
ammunition was thrown overboard, and I know
of one case where the powder was sold and paint
bought with the proceeds.

In 1881 the cask was done away with, and a
triangular canvas target substituted for it. The
ship firing steamed round on the sides of a square.
Hits could not be counted, as a shot hitting one
side of the target made a hole in the opposite side
also. Moreover, the target generally fell down
when it was hit.

In 1885 it was decided to have a target on
which hits could be counted, and to award prizes
for hits only, whether ricochet or not. The target,
15 feet high and 40 feet long, was moored, and the
ship steamed by it on a marked-out base, at a range
varying from 1600 to 1400 yards.

In 1892 the dimensions of the target were
altered to 16 feet 9 inches high and 20 feet long,
the other conditions remaining the same. The
target had three masts, and if one was struck the
whole canvas generally came down. In such an
event the instructions were that the target was to
be repaired before going on, but the order was
seldom obeyed as it caused delay. Ships generally
went on and fired at any part of the target left
visible.

Every ship was supposed to carry out this prize
firing once a year, but a large percentage evaded
it, and there was no reliance on the results sent in
by the ships that actually carried it out. The
Admiralty return of the results of prize firing
was generally not issued until late in the following

298 WAR— BACK TO WORK

year, which was too late for any one to take an
interest in it, and the ships were not arranged in
order of merit.

In 1899, when in H.M.S. Scylla, I made an
attempt to rectify this state of affairs by modifying
the target, appointing independent umpires, and
introducing competition. The Commander-in-
Chief, Sir John Hopkins (as recorded in an earlier
chapter), approved of the suggestion, but there
was too much opposition to allow of any change
being made.

In 1901, in China, I made another attempt,
and it was warmly supported by the Commander-
in-Chief, Sir Edward Seymour, his flag-captain,
Captain Warrender,1 Captain Jellicoe, and many
other officers. The target was altered so as to
allow of a new sail being used for each gun, and
a second target was moored ready for use. Rules
were drawn out to insure uniformity. Independent
umpires were on board the firing ship, and com-
petition was instituted by awarding points per hit.
A return was made out showing all the ships on
the station in their order of merit of firing.

The firing of the ships on the China Station
immediately improved by leaps and bounds, and
the Commander-in-Chief sent a full report to the
Admiralty, with a suggestion that this method of
carrying out Prize Firing should be generally
adopted. The Admiralty, however, strongly
objected to the proposed alterations, declined to
introduce competition, and strenuously opposed
publishing the ships in order of merit.

In 1902, as I record elsewhere, I had the

1 The late Admiral Sir George Warrender, Bart.

KING EDWARD'S INTEREST 299

honour of an audience with H.M. King Edward
VII. His Majesty questioned me about the very
bad shooting of the Navy, and inquired the
reason for it. I explained that it was due to six
causes: -

(1) Lack of attention to the subject on the
part of the Admiralty, which produced lack of
interest in it on the part of the officers and men.

(2) That officers' promotion depended upon the
cleanliness of the paint work and not upon the
battle-worthiness of the ship.

(3) That the Admirals as a rule took no interest
in target practice ; their custom was to go on shore
when it took place.1

(4) That the Fleet was supplied with such bad
gun sights that it was impossible to make good
shooting with them ; the only ships that had made
good shooting had used gun sights of a non-
Admiralty pattern.

(5) That there was no competition, and without
competition the Englishman would do nothing. I
pointed out that, only a few years ago, if a man-of-
war got in forty tons of coal an hour it was con-
sidered very good, but that since Lord Walter

1 The attitude of many Admirals to gunnery — since a ship existed only
to hit first, hit hard, and keep on hitting — reminds me of a story which is
not inappropriate. I once heard of a bluejacket, wounded in the foot,
who asked a comrade to carry him to the sick bay. He picked him up
and carried him along on his back. On the way a splinter carried away
the head of the wounded bluejacket. The rescuer deposited the
injured man on the floor of the sick bay. The surprised doctor
exclaimed, ' ' What have you brought him here for ? he has no head ! "

" Well," was the astonished reply, " Old Bill was always a liar ;

he said it was his foot." If the war had come before the gunnery of
the Fleet was improved, the nation would have had reason to ask,
" What*is the good of a Navy which cannot shoot? "

X

300 WAR— BACK TO WORK

Kerr (the then First Lord of the Admiralty) had
introduced competition it had gone up to 200 tons
an hour.

(6) That the only reason why the Admiralty
wanted the results kept confidential was because
they were so bad.

His Majesty fully recognised the value of
introducing competition, and caused a letter to be
written to Lord Selborne pointing out that two
returns could be made out with the squadrons and
ships in order of merit, one being confidential,
giving the actual hits, and the other public, giving
points only. The returns for 1903 were made out
in this manner.

In 1903 new rules were proposed by the
Admiralty for the 1904 firing. They embraced an
increase in the range which precluded the layer
from seeing whether he was hitting the target. 1
respectfully protested, and pointed out that as hits
at the proposed range could not be seen it would
eliminate all skill and convert the competition into
a pure matter of luck.

The matter was so serious that I personally
interviewed Lord Selborne, Admiral Sir William
May, and the Director of Naval Ordnance, and
begged them not to spoil the heavy-gun firing as
they had spoiled the light-gun firing in 1902. I
failed to move them.

In this year, so fatal to gunnery progress, it
was also decided to give a medal to the best man
in each ship, provided he made over a certain
number of hits. I again protested and pointed
out that in accordance with the new rules two men
would fire at the same canvas, and that on inspec-

THE NEW REGIME 301

tion after firing the number of holes in the target
might show that one of the two men who fired had
earned the King's Medal, but it would be impossible
to say which of the two. My representations were
without effect. The range was increased and by
a stroke of irony the name was changed from Prize
Firing to the Gun Layers' Competition.

In 1904 the so-called Gun Layers' Competition
was carried out, with, of course, a disastrous result.
The officers and men realised that they could not
see whether they were hitting or not, and that the
only thing to do was to fire quickly and trust to
luck. With an increase in the expenditure of
ammunition the percentage of hits to rounds fired
was reduced. Forty-three ships evaded carrying
out the practice. Any excuse was accepted, and
the Admirals were generally the worst offenders.
Difficulties arose in awarding the King's Medal,
and in some cases it was tossed for — a most
undignified proceeding.

Fortunately for the country, Captain Jellicoe,
early in 1905, became Director of Naval Ordnance,
and steps were immediately taken to rescue naval
gunnery from the chaos into which it had fallen.
This appointment had a great deal to do with our
winning the war.

As regards the Gun Layers' Competition, the
rules drawn up in China were taken out of the
waste-paper basket and promulgated to the Fleet ;
the distance of the target was reduced so that the
men could see their hits ; and to meet the medal
difficulty one man fired instead of two.

The annual return was made out with all the
ships of the Fleet arranged in order of merit, and

302 WAR— BACK TO WORK

was published on the 31st December. No ships
in 1905 evaded the carrying out of their firing, and
the results in 1905, in comparison with 1904,
were : —

In 1904, 42 '9 per cent, of hits to rounds per gun.

In 1905, 56-6

This progress was fairly satisfactory, but there
were a great many ships that did badly, and atten-
tion was called to it by holding forty Courts of
Enquiry.

In 1906 the percentage of hits to rounds fired
went up to 71 '1 per cent., and in 1907 it rose to
79*1 per cent.

As a result of this improvement in the gunnery
of the Fleet, H.M. King Edward VII. invested
Captain Jellicoe (who, as stated, was then Director
of Naval Ordnance) and myself with the insignia
of Knight Commander of the Victorian Order.
Punch published a very good cartoon dealing with
this.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE DEFENCE OF LONDON AGAINST ZEPPELINS

A Providential Raid by a Zeppelin —London Undefended — My Recall
to the Admiralty — The Deficiency of Guns — Unsuitable Ammuni-
tion— Commander Rawlinson's Good Work — A Flying Visit to
Paris — Co-operation of the French — My Protest against Admiralty
Methods — Termination of my Command — The Anti- Aircraft Corps
— Target Practice in the Air.

MANY years ago I read an essay by Charles Lamb
in which he set out to prove that many proverbial
sayings were not true, but I still hope that experi-
ence does teach us something. It is that belief
which leads me to tell the story of the defenceless
state of London from air raids when the war came
late in the summer of 1914. There had been
mysterious stories of airships cruising over England
by night before Germany broke loose, but any one
who believed in them was denounced as an alarmist
without common sense. So the country went on
sleeping quietly at night and nobody worried, and
we were all comparatively happy until suddenly
hostilities began and the Germans settled down on
the Belgian coast, an event which no one could
have foreseen.

On Wednesday, 8th September, 1915, by the
mercy of Providence, a Zeppelin came over London
and dropped some bombs. I say that it was a
mercy of Providence, because it showed the futility

303

304 THE DEFENCE OF LONDON

of our system of defence and compelled the
authorities to take action. By some strange
anomaly, the Lords Commissioners for " executing
the office of High Admiral of the United Kingdom
and of the territories thereto belonging and of the
Colonies and other Dominions whatsoever" had
become responsible for protecting London against
air raids. This curious arrangement was due to
the fact that Mr. Winston Churchill, then First
Lord of the Admiralty, had had some perception
of London's danger, for he had become a flying man
himself, whereas the War Office was as certain that a
Zeppelin could not come to London, as the Ad-
miralty was that a submarine could not sink a ship.
But all that is by the way. On 8th Septem-
ber, 1915, a Zeppelin really came over London.
Although throughout my career in the Navy I
had been specially interested in gunnery matters,
I confess that I was surprised when, three days
later, I received a letter from Mr. Balfour, who
was then at the head of the Admiralty, asking me
if I would take over the gunnery defence of
London, as a temporary measure, since in due
course the War Office would assume control of
the work, which, as he pointed out, was really
theirs and not the Admiralty's. Mr. Balfour sug-
gested that the task would prove interesting, and
reminded me that it was certainly important ; but
at the same time he warned me, with characteristic
kindness, that the means of defence at that time
were very inadequate. He was good enough to
add that he thought no one was better qualified
than I was for the appointment, and he promised
that the defences would be improved as fast as the

A DEPLORABLE SITUATION 305

manufacture of new guns and war conditions
generally permitted.

I accepted the appointment, and had a look
round the so-called defences. After fourteen
months of war they consisted of: —

Eight 3 -inch high-angle guns,

Four 6-pounders, with bad gun sights, and

Six pom-poms and some Maxims, which would
not fire up as high as a Zeppelin, and were
consequently only a danger to the popula-
tion.

The ammunition supplied to the guns was
quite unsuitable, and was more dangerous to the
people in London than to the Zeppelins above.

In selecting the ammunition to fire at Zeppelins
the authorities should have known : first, that a
shell with a large bursting charge of a highly
explosive nature was required so that it would
damage a Zeppelin if it exploded near it ; second,
that all that went up in the air had to come down
again, and that, in order to minimise the danger to
the public from falling pieces, an explosive should
be used in the shell which would break it up into
small fragments.

The ammunition supplied was exactly the
opposite to what we wanted. The shells had so
small a bursting charge that they could do no
harm to a Zeppelin, and they returned to earth
almost as intact as when they were put into the
guns.

Serious as this state of affairs was, it was no
reflection upon my predecessor. In getting what
he did he had done wonders, for he received the
minimum of support, and had to contend against

306 THE DEFENCE OF LONDON

the maximum amount of apathy, red-tapism, and
opposition on the part of the authorities. I doubt
if many people, in or out of the Admiralty or War
Office, really believed, in the early days of the war,
in the danger of Zeppelin raids.

But after a considerable interval the citizens of
London realized that the German Zeppelins could
come and bomb them whenever they liked. On
their behalf, the Lord Mayor of London went to
the War Office and suggested that they should
take some steps to keep the Zeppelins away. The
War Office said that they could do nothing. The
Lord Mayor then applied to the Admiralty, and
their Lordships promised to form an A nti- Aircraft
Corps, and supply it with the necessary material to
defend London.

The Army, of course, ought to have done their
own work, but the military authorities were at the
moment overwhelmed with the urgent demands of
the Army. The Admiralty took the matter up,
because there was no other department to do it,
since the War Office was preoccupied. But as the
Admiralty decided to undertake it, they should have
realised the importance of their task and set about
it properly. Had they done so, London, by the end
of 1914, could have been defended by at least fifty
guns, with serviceable ammunition ; instead of
which, after fourteen months of war, London was
defended by twelve guns firing ammunition which
did more harm to the population than to the
Zeppelins. Of course, I see the matter in a
vacuum, so to speak, and at the time there was an
enormous pressure on the Naval authorities, who,
after all, were engaged in defending the whole

DEFENCE AGAINST ZEPPELINS 307

Empire by commanding the sea. London's air
defence was a kind of " extra turn."

General Galliene, who was in charge of the
defence of Paris, had for the protection of his
forty-nine square miles of city two hundred and
fifteen guns, and was gradually increasing this
number to three hundred. He had plenty of men
trained in night flying, and well-lighted-up aero-
dromes. I had eight guns to defend our seven
hundred square miles of the metropolitan area, no
trained airmen, and no lighted-up aerodromes.

This was the state of affairs when the Admiralty
handed the blunder over to me. To cheer me up
they informed me that they could not give me any
more guns at once, and that, although they had
been experimenting for ten years, they had no
time-fuse suitable for exploding high-explosive
shell ; the only guns they had mounted on mobile
mountings were Maxims, which were of no use
against Zeppelins ; they had no airmen who could
fly at night, and if they had had them they would
have been of no use, as there was no ammunition
suitable for attacking Zeppelins.

It was quite true that we had no bullets suit-
able for airmen to use in attacking Zeppelins, but
we might and ought to have had, for a suitable bullet
had been submitted in 1914. It was a new idea,
so it was turned down. Its history is worth re-
cording as a fair example of officialism. The
inventor was a Mr. Pomeroy, a New Zealander.
His bullet was first tried in 1908, with satisfactory
results ; in 1914 he submitted it to the War Office,
who rejected it. In June, 1915, another trial was
held and was successful, but the bullet was not

308 THE DEFENCE OF LONDON

accepted and brought into use until the autumn
of 1916. The country had to wait two years for
what was urgently wanted, and we were at war.1

Little or nothing having been done, it was
very easy to do something, and as Captain Stansfeld,
C.M.G., R.N., the head of the Anti-Aircraft
Department, was a most efficient officer, and had
under him a very capable staff, we quickly got to
business.

The first thing was to find a satisfactory fuse.
The Admiralty said that they had been ten years
trying to get one and had not succeeded. One of
my staff, Commander Rawlinson, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
solved the difficulty in ten minutes. The next
thing was to get a design of high explosive shell
which could be quickly manufactured. This was
produced, but now the difficulty came. Having
got the design, how were we to get the shell
made ? My proper course was to ask the Admiralty,
but their system of administration, which is very
sure, very slow, and very involved, would allow of
nothing being done quickly ; the paper work would
have taken at least a month to get through. The
Admiralty had to be avoided. So I took the
designs over to Paris, and placed the order with a
motor-car manufacturer, who executed the work
well and quickly. In a very short time I saw my
way to providing most of the guns used for the
defence of London with satisfactory time-fuses and
high-explosive shells.

1 In 1916 our airmen and aerodromes were ready, and when the
Zeppelins came over they got a very warm reception, numbers being
brought down. The Germans lost their opportunity. For 15 months
they could have come to London as often as they liked ; we were late
in preparing for them — they were late in coming. — P. S.

NEED FOR MORE GUNS 309

Admiral Vaughan Lee, C.B., of the Air Depart-
ment, realising the urgency of the matter, set to
work. He undertook to get lighted-up aerodromes
and trained men in night flying and we had a
bullet that would set a Zeppelin on fire.

The next thing was to get more guns. I knew
that the Navy had some they could spare and
which could be converted into anti-Zeppelin guns.
I applied to the Admirality for these guns, and
promptly got a very big " NO." I had anticipated
this reply by writing to Sir John Jellicoe, the
Commander-in- Chief of the Grand Fleet, and asking
him for them. He promptly wired back that I
could have twenty.

We extracted out of the Admiralty with diffi-
culty another fourteen guns ; Lord Kitchener very
promptly gave me some ; and with others that
we picked up I found that in a very short time we
had increased our number of guns from twelve to
one hundred and eighteen. But, unfortunately,
mountings had to be made for these? which took
a considerable time.

The few guns we had for the defence of
London were mounted permanently in positions
probably as well known to the Germans as to
ourselves. We had no efficient guns mounted
on mobile carriages which could be moved about
and brought into action where necessary.

The French, I knew, had some of their splendid
75 mm. guns mounted on automobile carriages.
I suggested to the Admiralty that they should ask
the French Government either to supply or loan
me one to copy. This they agreed to see about,
and I have no doubt that in a few months they

310 THE DEFENCE OF LONDON

would have got the necessary papers through.
However, I was determined not to work their way.
I wanted the gun, not papers, so I ordered Com-
mander Rawlinson, a very clever officer who spoke
French like a Frenchman, to go over to Paris at
once and either beg, borrow, or steal a gun.

I told him he was to have it on the Horse
Guards Parade, under Mr. Balfour's window, in less
than a week. He was in a motor-car at the time.
Looking at his watch, he said, " I can catch the
boat." I asked him if he did not want any clothes.
He said, " No. Please wire Folkestone to ship me
and the car over to France." Thus he left, going
at about fifty miles an hour down South Audley
Street. That is the sort of officer that is wanted
in war-time ! Twenty-four hours after leaving me
he wired : " Have got gun, two automobiles, and
ammunition."

What he did is best described in his letter to
me, which was as follows : —

" 22nd September, 1915.

" SIR,

" In obedience to your order that I should
endeavour to obtain from the French Govern-
ment a 75 mrn. anti-aircraft gun, mounted on
an automobile, on the 16th September I pro-
ceeded to Paris.

" I first interviewed General Galliene, who in
a most courteous and charming manner pointed
out that, much as he would like to help London,
he could not himself give me a gun, but he felt
sure that General Joffre would give full con-
sideration to anything that London wanted.

" I proceeded to Chantilly and saw General
Pellet, the Chief of General Joffre's Staff, and
without any delay a telephone message was

AN OFFICER'S PROMPTITUDE 311

sent to the Minister of War in Paris telling
him that I could have the gun complete with
two automobiles and ammunition.

" The gun in my presence was tested and fired
by a French crew, who also very kindly drove
it to Boulogne and shipped it to London, where
it arrived on the 21st.

" The whole transaction from the time of my
leaving London to my return with gun took
four days.

" I attach photographs of the gun and
caisson.

" I have the honour to be, Sir,

" Your obedient servant,

" A. RAWLINSON."

Owing to the promptitude of Commander
Rawlinson, we had this gun on the Horse Guards
Parade, under Mr. Balfour's window, before the
official letter asking for it was written.

Although this was only one gun, its acquisition
was very valuable, as it showed us what could be
done, and how to do it. The rapidity of the
French decision ought to have taught our deliberate
Admiralty a lesson, but it did not ; nothing could
put any life into their movements.

With the French gun as a guide we very soon
mounted up eight of our own three-pounders on
motor-lorries, which gave a start to the mobile
section of our defence.

There was an urgent need for mobile guns. I
should have liked to copy the French auto-car
mounting, which was a fine specimen of engineer-
ing, but our three-inch guns could not be adapted
to it. The problem, consequently, was to devise
a mobile contrivance which would carry a three-

312 THE DEFENCE OF LONDON

inch gun of the ordinary service pattern. It was
desirable to employ for the purpose only one
motor-lorry, instead of two, as in the case of the
French gun ; I realized, moreover, that the design
would have to be of such a character that the
manufacture could be undertaken by a firm not
making gun-mountings or other urgent war
material, as all such concerns were already fully
occupied with work.

By a stroke of good luck I happened to meet
Mr. R. E. L. Maunsell, chief engineer of the
South-Eastern Railway Company, whose works are
at Ashford. I spoke to him about the matter, and
found that he was a man of the type of Sir David
Hunter at Durban — ready to undertake anything.
He grasped the idea at once, although he had
never seen a gun or mounting before. Later on
we called in Commander Rawlinson and Mr.
Whale, a clever designer of Sir W. G. Armstrong,
Whitworth, and Co., and a drawing was soon
prepared. The design was based on the 4'7-in. gun
platforms that I improvised for use at Ladysmith,
but it was arranged that the mountings should be
made of steel instead of wood. It was decided to
have an axle-tree and a pair of wheels under it,
these being removable when the gun came into
action. A special feature of this mobile platform
was that its weight on the lorry could be altered
according to whether the gun was being conveyed
up or down hill. The experimental lorry was
given a severe trial, and we found out that it
could travel at the rate of thirty miles an hour,
and that it remained perfectly stable when the
gun was fired. The rapidity with which the work

THE DEFENCE OF LONDON AGAINST AIE ATTACK.

3-INCH ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN IN ACTION.

f" __ .: ;•'--

3-INCH ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN BEING TRANSPORTED.

(Commander A. Rawlinson in charge.)

[To face page 312.

ADMIRALTY INTERFERENCE 313

was done and the character of the work reflected
great credit on the staff of the South-Eastern
Railway Company at Ashford.

The housing of these guns and their crews
was momentarily a difficulty, but the Grand Duke
Michael of Russia came to the rescue and offered
to house the hundred men and guns in the grounds
of his beautiful house at Kenwood, Hampstead.
Mrs. Wrey kindly lent her house for the accom-
modation of the officers.

Although the Admiralty did not give me any
assistance as regards the defence of London,
they wanted me to comply with their slow and
unsatisfactory routine. But we were at war !
Had I submitted it would have taken me
fifteen months to get twelve guns, whereas I was
aiming at getting one hundred and fifty guns in
six months. So I did not agree, and wrote to Mr.
Balfour as follows : —

" 18th October, 1915.

" DEAR MR. BALFOUR,

" On the 10th September you asked me if I
I would take the gunnery defence of London
under my charge. I accepted, and in doing so,
considered that you intended me to procure
what was necessary for the gunnery defence of
London.

" Up to last week I was led to believe that
the Admiralty had ordered guns for the defence
of London.

"On Friday, the 15th, you informed me
that they had not done so. I at once ordered
some guns. The firms with whom I placed the
order wrote to the Admiralty for confirmation.
The Admiralty have not confirmed the order.

314 THE DEFENCE OF LONDON

" If I am to be responsible for the gunnery
defence of London, I must be allowed to do
things in my own way, and not be interfered
with by the Admiralty. If the Admiralty are
to settle what guns are to be used for the
defence of London, and how they are to be
obtained, then they become responsible for the
gunnery defence of London, and I resign.

" If I am to remain in charge of the

funnery defence of London I must have a
ee hand to procure what is wanted how and
best I can, and not to be handicapped by
Admiralty red-tapism.

"PERCY SCOTT,

"Admiral."

Mr. Balfour kindly arranged that my work
should not be hampered by the ordinary Admiralty
red-tapism, so I was able to go ahead, and the
defence of London, as far as guns were concerned,
advanced rapidly. But not rapidly enough, so I
went over to France to see if the French would
help me again. When I told General Galliene
the number of guns we had, he laughed and ex-
pressed surprise that the Zeppelins did not come
every day. He was a splendid officer and prompti-
tude itself. Five minutes' conversation and it was
decided that I should have thirty-four of the
famous French seventy-five millimetre guns and
twenty thousand shells, with fuses complete. This
brought our total up to one hundred and fifty- two.
They were rather a mixed lot — Mr. Asquith
referred to them as rather a menagerie — but 1
went on the principle that any guns were better
than no guns.

THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT CORPS 315

10 4'7 guns.

7 4-inch guns.

35 French 75 millimetre guns.

4 4-inch Greek guns.

20 15-pounder B.L.G.

12 2*95 Russian guns.

34 6-pounder guns.

19 3-inch guns.

11 3-pounder guns.

152

On the 27th November I received a letter from
Mr. Balfour in which he told me that the long-
drawn negotiations for the transfer of the defence
of London against aircraft to the War Office were
coming to an end, and with characteristic considera-
tion he proceeded to give me warning that the
change was imminent. It was a kindly act on the
part of the First Lord which I highly appreciated,
and when I read the paragraph of the letter in
which he referred to what I had been able to do, I
felt that perhaps 1 had after all rendered some
service to London.

I was proud to have been associated with the
Anti- Aircraft Corps. In my opinion, considering
its size and the circumstances in which it was
raised and trained, it was the most efficient as well
as the cheapest unit in the country's defence
organization. It was a voluntary corps d'elite,
composed of University men, barristers, artists,
and City men. They were men of brains who,
moved by patriotic motives, put on the uniform
of petty officer or able seaman and submitted
in a splendid spirit to the necessary conditions of
service. Before I took command of the corps, I
had read criticisms suggesting that it was of little
use and that the officers and men knew nothing

Y

316 THE DEFENCE OF LONDON

about gunnery. Those criticisms were ill-founded,
for the Corps included a number of members
peculiarly well qualified by mathematical or
mechanical training to pick up the rudiments of
gunnery. This they had done very quickly. The
members of the Anti- Aircraft Corps, in fact, laid
the foundations of the elaborate system of anti-
aircraft defences which eventually taught the
Germans that London was an unhealthy spot.

The First Lord himself, though he is not a man
of business training, did more for the defence of
London than any one when he cut me free from
the Admiralty red-tape methods. Without that I
could have done little.

At noon on the 16th February, 1916, the War
Office took over the gunnery defence of London,
and consequently I was no longer responsible for
it. I had commanded it for five months and six
days. As my scheme of defence was not complete,
it seemed a pity that new people with new ideas
should take it over, but we did many peculiar
things during the war.

On the evening of the day on which I had
turned over all responsibility for the " Defence of
London" to Viscount French, Mr. — now Sir —
Joynson Hicks, in the House of Commons, asked
the following question : —

" Has Sir Percy Scott now finished, has he no
longer anything to do with it ? "

Mr. Tennant, on behalf of the War Office,
replied : "I hope that the hon. gentleman will
not go away with any idea of that kind. Sir
Percy Scott is still in the position that he was in ;
in other words, there has been no change in his

"IN MID-AIR" 317

position. What may ultimately be agreed upon I
do not know."

As I was not in the position that I was in,
and as there had been a change, Mr. Tennant's
reply was not in accordance with fact, but it

Reproduced by kind permission from the " Daily Graphic.'
IN MID-AIR.

"Mr. Ellis Griffiths said he understood that Sir Percy Scott was in
a state of suspended animation. He had not quite left the Admiralty
or quite joined the War Office, but he was in the process of doing
both." — House of Commons Air Defence debate.

was characteristic of many statements made by
Ministers during the war.

Mr. Ellis Griffiths, M.P. for Anglesey, added
that he understood that I was in a state of
suspended animation, that I had not quite left

318 THE DEFENCE OF LONDON

the Admiralty nor quite joined the War Office,
but I was going to do both.

This statement gave rise to some comic sketches
and a cartoon in Punch.

On the following day 1 was asked if I would
accept the post of Adviser to Field-Marshal Vis-
count French on air defence questions. I
accepted ; so we two, who fifty years before joined
the Navy side by side, were working together again.

That really ended my association with the aerial
defence of London, for the new appointment
meant, really, nothing.

I have already mentioned the forebodings
which I had before the war as to the influence
which the submarine would have upon the course
of operations ; but before leaving the subject of
air raids on London, I may add that I also foresaw
that aviation was going to develop with great
rapidity. A few years before the outbreak of the
war, when the late Mr. F. T. Jane was pre-
paring a hand-book on Airships and Aeroplanes, he
asked me to write a few notes on the possibilities
of aerial warfare. As I thought I could perhaps
do some service in directing attention to this
matter, I wrote a short statement which was
published, with an admirable sketch.

" The progress recently made in aviation and
the existence of so many comparatively prac-
tical machines compel attention from every
thinking man. The performances of the Zep-
pelins are sufficiently satisfactory to indicate
that the time has arrived when the flying war-
ship is a factor to be seriously reckoned with,
but when I am asked to forecast the aerial

PUNCH, OR THE LONDON CHARIVARI.— FEBBUABY 23, 1916.

DUAL CONTROL.

"A KIND OF A GIDDY HARUMFilODITE— SOLDIER AN' SAILOR TOO."

liUDYAXD KlP Lisa

[" Sir Ptncv Sti/rr has not quite left the Admiralty and has not. quite joined the War Office."— 3fr. ELLIS CMFFIIH, in the Vans,
Binpe this remark Lord KITCHENZB has announced that the Admiral is to act as expert adviser to Field-Marshal Lord FaEKCH, who i
taking over the responsibility for home defence against aircraft.]

Reproduced by kind permission of the proprietors of " Punch."

[To face page BIS.

A PRE-WAR PROPHECY 319

warfare of the future, I am confronted by a
double difficulty. In the first place, I cannot
claim sufficient technical acquaintance with the
subject of flying to warrant discussing the matter
closely. And in the second place, the details
of any ideas that we may have on the subject
of destroying airships are naturally confidential.

" As an adjunct to H.M. Navy, the useful
function of an airship or aeroplane would
appear to be in gaming information of the
locality, strength, and disposition of the enemy's
fleet, and so possibly unmasking his strategy. In
this direction an airship's services would be in-
valuable, for it might not be possible to obtain
the information in any other way.

" If it be allowed that an airship is of value
as a scout to acquire information, then airships
or aeroplanes we must have, but as the enemy
will use similar appliances to watch our strategical
operations, secrecy can only be arrived at by the
destruction of his observers, and the method of
aerial warfare becomes a subject for serious con-
sideration.

" The heretofore only traversers of the air
use beak and talon to destroy one another. The
human aviator, having neither beak nor talon,
must be provided with some means of offence,
it may be a gun ; if it is, then the aviator will
realise that his safety depends upon whether the
projectile out of his gun hits the mark aimed
at or not, and accurate gunnery, that is quick-
hitting, will in the air be as important as it is
on land or on the sea in deciding a final issue.
Whatever the weapons used are, practice with
them will be necessary, and we may live to see
two airships each towing a suitable target
carrying out a test of their efficiency in quick-
hitting"

320 THE DEFENCE OF LONDON

My forecast has at least some personal interest
for me, in that in 1915, after the war had been in
progress for several months, I saw target practice
being carried out somewhat on the lines which I
had suggested, a small airship towing a target and
an aeroplane firing at it. The whole idea was
thought to be rather far-fetched at the time when
I wrote, but events were to show that those who
had confidence in the development of aviation for
warlike purposes were not far wrong.

CHAPTER XIX

WAR REFLECTIONS— 1915-1917

Guns for the Army — Visit to the Front — Inferior Elevation of the
9 '2-inch Gun— The Mounting improved after Official Delay —
Naval Searchlights — A Primitive Method — My Improved Design
— A New System ultimately adopted — A Letter from the Ad-
miralty— The Dardanelles Commission — A Question of Gunnery
— The Essence of the Problem — A Criticism of the Report.

I WAS sent for by Mr. Balfour on the 9th July, 1915,
to be informed that the Army was terribly in want
of guns, and had approached him as to whether the
Navy could give them some 6-inch. He asked if
I could design a mounting for them which could
be quickly constructed, and not necessarily by a
gun-making firm, as they were all too busy. I
explained to Mr. Balfour that this was just what
1 had offered to do nearly a year ago, that the Army
had then declined the offer ; but as they now wanted
the mountings, I could easily and quickly get them
made, provided there was no red-tape about it and
I had a free hand to order Chatham Dockyard to
make them. To this Mr. Balfour agreed ; so I
went to the War Office to inquire what they
wanted. I found that they did not know what
they wanted — rather a handicap to speedy con-
struction— and it took a week for them to make
up their minds.

On the 17th they decided that they wanted

321

322 WAR REFLECTIONS— 1915-1917

eight 6-inch guns, mounted on carriages which
would allow of 25 degrees of elevation being used.
I pointed out that they ought to have at least 35
degrees of elevation ; but my remonstrance was
in vain, for they would have only 25 degrees.

I got out a design — there was nothing in it, as
it was practically the same as the one I made for
General Buller in South Africa. On the 19th July
Chatham Dockyard commenced the job. So
splendidly did they work that by the 27th July most
of the eight mountings were nearly completed, and
one had been tested by firing a large number of
rounds at different elevations.

On the 28th July the War Office altered their
minds and wanted 35 degrees of elevation. I
put the eight mountings that we had made on
the scrap-heap, got out another design, and two
days later Chatham Dockyard commenced again.
The officers and men were rather annoyed at
their ten days' work being wasted, but they went
ahead with their former energy and in ten days
one mounting was tested and the other seven were
nearly completed. These guns turned out to be
very useful at the front. They were the only
long-range guns that they had.

On the 20th January, 1918, 1 paid a visit to the
front and noted that the 9 -2-inch guns had only
20 degrees of elevation. I pointed out to General
Sir Henry Rawlinson that by putting a piece on
top of the mounting, 35 degrees of elevation could
be obtained, which would increase the range from
13,000 to 17,000 yards. Sir Henry considered it
most important that the alteration should be
carried out. On my return to England I wrote

VALUE OF TIME IN WAR 323

to Sir Wm. Armstrong, Whitworth and Co. for
a drawing ; they only took two days to complete
it, and I forwarded it to Sir Henry Rawlinson.
On the 28th March, 1916, Sir Wm. Armstrong,
Whitworth and Co. were asked to fit four guns
in this manner; that is to say, sixty-two days
elapsed between that firm's dispatch of the drawing
to me and their receipt of the order from the War
Office to start the work. The j ob was, comparatively
speaking, a small one, and it took only a short time
to complete.

Here is a case where a bad mistake was made
in the beginning, at the time the gun mount-
ing was ordered, and, when the mistake had
been pointed out, the authorities took longer to
make up their minds whether or not to rectify it
than the gun-makers did to alter the mounting.
It is one of the thousands of such instances that
occurred during the war, indicating that neither
the Admiralty nor the War Office had any
appreciation of the value of time and that even
when at war they could not leave the beaten path
of peace-time red-tapism.

In January, 1917, I paid a visit to H.M.S.
Centaur, a new light cruiser flying the broad
pennant of Commodore Tyrwhitt.1 In the course
of conversation the Commodore mentioned to me
how hopelessly his squadrons were handicapped in
any night action, as they were not supplied with
any star shells which would illuminate the enemy,
and their searchlights could not be effectively
used. It was a strange thing that although we
had used searchlights in the Navy for so many

1 Afterwards Rear- Admiral Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt.

324 WAR REFLECTIONS— 1915-1917

years, we had continued a system which was so
unscientific that the operator at the searchlight
could not get his light on to the target because the
glare made it invisible. It was a method, as I have
already remarked, which necessitated the employ-
ment of another man as an observer who, with his
eyes on the object, would shout out " go right "
or " left " or " up " or " down."

Lord Jellicoe points out in his book1 that we
were inferior to the Germans in the power of our
searchlights, and the control of them, and that our
guns forming the secondary armament were not
fitted for director firing, whereas the Germans
had a good system. It was for these reasons
that he did not seek a night action in the Battle
of Jutland. The question is why had the

1 ' * The possibility of a night action was, of course, present to my
mind, but for several reasons it was not my intention to seek such an
action between the heavy ships. It is sufficient to mention the prin-
cipal arguments against it. In the first place, such a course must
have inevitably led to our Battle Fleet being the object of attack by a
very large destroyer force throughout the night. No senior officer
would willingly court such an attack, even if our battleships were
equipped with the best searchlights and the best arrangements for the
control of the searchlights and the gunfire at night. It was, however,
known to me that neither our searchlights nor their control arrange-
ments were at this time of the best type. The fitting of director-
firing gear for the guns of the secondary armament of our battleships
(a very important factor for firing at night) had also only just been
begun, although repeatedly applied for. The delay was due to manu-
facturing and labour difficulties. Without these adjuncts I knew well
that the maximum effect of our fire at night could not be obtained,,
and that we could place no dependence on beating off destroyer attacks
by gunfire. Therefore, if destroyers got into touch with the heavy
ships, we were bound to suffer serious losses with no corresponding
advantage. Our own destroyers were no effective antidote at night,
since, if they were disposed with this sole object in view, they would
certainly be taken for enemy destroyers and be fired on by our own
ships."—" The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916," pp. 373-374.

CONTROL OF SEARCHLIGHTS 325

Germans this superiority? They ought not to
have had it and they would not have had it if
suggestions put forward by British naval officers
had been accepted.

On my way up to London from Chatham after
my visit to H.M.S. Centaur, I thought out an idea,
and took it to Sir John Jellicoe (then First Sea
Lord). He made up his mind at once, and with
characteristic promptitude, he ordered it to be
proceeded with, but unfortunately after this he left
the Admiralty and the invention took the ordinary
course, that is to say, its adoption was delayed
because the departmental officials wished as usual
to introduce my idea in some other form which
they could call their own. In this they partially
succeeded, so at length the Royal Navy secured a
method of controlling their searchlights which had
been badly needed for forty years.

After the departure of Sir John Jellicoe from
Whitehall, I had nothing to do. I was supposed
to be adviser to the Admiralty on gunnery matters,
but they did not keep me well enough informed to
advise them, and when I gave them advice they
did not take it. That the country should in these
circumstances be paying me annually £1200, the
difference between my full pay and retired pay,
seemed to me indefensible, and early in 1918, I
pointed out to the authorities that as they would
not give me anything to do I would do what I
could without robbing the country of £1200 a
year.

There remains one of the choicest of my collec-
tion of Admiralty communications to be mentioned.
In August, 1916, I received a letter from the

326 WAR REFLECTIONS— 1915-1917

Admiralty in which they informed me that they
had received " with much satisfaction a report
from the Commander-in- Chief, Home Fleets,
representing the admirable manner in which the
ships of the Home Fleets have been fitted with
director-firing gear." The letter conveyed to me
" their high appreciation " of the valuable services
which I had rendered in connection with the design
and manufacture of this gear and their thanks for
" the diligence and care with which I had carried
out the arduous work which devolved on me
both before and during the War and which had
resulted in this system being completed in all the
capital ships of the Home Fleets."

The Commissioners for executing the office of
Lord High Admiral have often written absurd
letters to me. One would like to know what was
in the brain of the writer of this particular com-
munication. Was it thought that I should show
it to the Germans in order to convince them that
all our capital ships were fitted with director
firing? To attempt to camouflage the facts for
my benefit was useless, since I knew very well
which of our capital ships were so fitted, and I
knew that at the rate their Lordships were pro-
ceeding all our capital ships would not be completed
before the War was over, as, in fact, they were not.1

While on the subject of gunnery, I cannot
forbear mentioning another war matter which
greatly interested and afterwards amused me.
Under the Special Commissions (Dardanelles and
Mesopotamia) Act, 1914, Royal Commissioners
were appointed to inquire into the origin, inception

1 Cf. "The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916. "

THE DARDANELLES MISTAKE 327

and conduct of the operations in the Dardanelles.
Lord Cromer was the President, the Army was
represented by Field-Marshal Lord Nicholson, and
the Navy by Admiral of the Fleet Sir William
May.

I must comment on their report1 because it
reveals some very strange facts in connection with
a subject that I have studied nearly all my life —
Gunnery.

The idea that the battleships of the Mediter-
ranean Squadron could reduce the forts and guns
protecting the Dardanelles sprang from a sad want
of knowledge. The authorities responsible for the
mistaken idea were impressed by the success with
which the German guns had reduced the Belgian
forts, and concluded that in the same way ships'
guns could reduce the Dardanelles forts. This
deduction was due to a failure to realise the
difference between firing on land and firing from
a ship.

Referring to the reduction of the Belgian forts,
Lord Grey said,2 " The experience of this war was
supposed to have changed the prospect of success-
ful attack upon forts and made successful attack
upon forts a practical operation where it had not
been a practical operation before." As to that, I
would observe that the war had not changed the
prospect of successfully attacking forts or land guns
by naval guns ; all recent wars have demonstrated
that on land you can successfully attack forts or
guns if you can locate them, and during the war
new methods were in use for locating them.

1 The Report cost the country £4850.

2 " Dardanelles Commission Report," p. 24.

328 WAR REFLECTIONS— 1915-1917

Mr. Winston Churchill, in the course of his
evidence, said, " This war had brought about many
surprises. We had seen fortresses reputed through-
out Europe to be impregnable collapsing after a
few days' attack by field armies." I do not
think that the war brought surprises to those who
knew anything about artillery fire. If the state-
ment that all Europe thought the Belgian forts
impregnable is correct, then all Europe was very
ignorant. I cannot agree with Mr. Winston
Churchill, for I am quite sure that no officer with
any knowledge of artillery fire would consider any
fort impregnable from guns on land. Here we
had a very wrong supposition and an even more
erroneous idea, and these two wrongs were the
basis for the authorities' decision that the obso-
lescent battleships in the Mediterranean could
successfully attack the Dardanelles.

For the destruction of the Namur and other
Belgian forts, the Germans could place their guns
where they liked, and by camouflage conceal them
from even the eyes of an aeroplane; they could
obtain the range to a yard and could employ
balloons to observe and direct their fire ; the
destruction of the forts was therefore not a
difficult task. The forts were helpless ; they were
shelled by weapons they could not see, and they
had no target to fire on. A parallel case to this
existed later on, when a number of obsolescent
ships of the Allies in the Mediterranean were
ordered to attack the shore guns of the Turks.
The shore guns could hide themselves and, by
means of scientific methods, fire at the ships,
although unable to see them. The ships could

GUNNERY BY SEA AND LAND 329

not hide themselves and could not fire at the shore
guns because they could not see them.

The main difference between sea and land
gunnery as exhibited at the time of the Dardanelles
operations was that in the ships the gunners, in
order to fire effectively, had to be able to see the
object they were firing at, whereas on the land
this necessity did not exist ; a hill could be between
the land gun and the target, but it would not
affect the accuracy of fire. This is so important
a point that I wish to make it quite clear to my
readers. In order that a shot from a gun may
reach an object, the distance of the object must be
known, and the gun pointed up into the air at an
angle which varies with the distance. This angle
is called the angle of elevation, and can be applied
to the gun in two different ways :

(a) By clinometer.

(b) By direct observation.

A clinometer is practically a pair of nutcrackers
with an ordinary level attached to one handle.
You separate the handles of the nutcrackers to
the angle that the range requires, then put the
nutcrackers on to the gun, and when the bubble
of the level is in the middle you know that the gun
is at the correct angle of elevation. This is what
is called pointing the gun by clinometer and is
the system generally used by guns on shore. This
method cannot be used on board a ship, as the
bubble of the level would never be steady on
account of the vessel's motion, so the ship gunner
looks along the top of the nutcracker handle and,
when he sees it in line with the object to be hit,
he knows that the gun has the correct elevation.

330 WAR REFLECTIONS— 1915-1917

Hence when firing from a ship the gunner must be
able to see the object that he is firing at.

The fact that the gunners on board the ships
could not fire unless they were able to see the
object they wished to hit is another very important
detail. Let me try and make it quite clear.

Here we have a gun on shore with a hill inter-
vening between it and the ship at sea. It is
obvious that the gunners on shore cannot see the
ship, and the gunners on board the ship cannot
see the gun on shore. Notwithstanding that
neither opponent can see the other, the gun on
shore can fire at the ship, because it can be given
the correct elevation by a clinometer or level ; on
the other hand, the ship cannot fire, because the
gunners on board cannot use a clinometer. Herein
lies the difference between ship and shore gunnery.

Whether the obsolescent ships in the Mediter-
ranean, unsupported by the Army, could be ex-
pected successfully to attack guns on shore, was
purely an artillery question ; it was to be a duel,
and before deciding on the duel, the authorities
should have carefully investigated the case to see
which side was likely to win. Had they done so,
they would have found that the chances of hitting

SHIPS VERSUS FORTS 331

were decidedly in favour of the shore guns, for the
following reasons : —

(1) A concealed battery can fire at a ship, but
the ship cannot return the fire.

(2) The shore guns can use a clinometer;
ships cannot.

(3) The shore gun fires from a steady platform ;
the ship gun fires from a rolling platform.

(4) From the shore the range of the ship can
be accurately obtained, as a long base can be used
for range finding, while the ship can only use a
short-base range-finder.

(5) Even if the shore gun is visible from the
ship, it is a very small target to aim at, whereas
the ship is a very large target.

(6) The shore gun, when visible, is not easy to
locate from its surroundings, whereas the ship
stands out on the sea like a black bull's-eye on a
white background.

(7) Observation of fire is much easier to judge
accurately when the projectiles are falling in the
sea than when they fall on land.

(8) The ships that were told off to carry out
the bombardment (with the one exception of the
Queen Elizabeth] were unable to fire at a long
range because their guns could not be given
sufficient elevation ; they were not efficiently fitted
for firing their guns by broadsides ; and they could
not fire their guns from aloft, which is essential
when using them at long range.

With all these advantages on the side of the
shore guns, it is obvious that the ships alone could
not defeat them, and the authorities should not
have made the attempt.

332 WAR REFLECTIONS— 1915-1917

In 1916 it was decided, as I have recalled, to
have a Commission of Inquiry into the origin,
inception, and conduct of the operations in the
Dardanelles. With regard to the " inception," or
to put the matter in plainer English, whether the
obsolescent ships selected for the operation could
defeat the Dardanelles guns or not, the Commis-
sion 1 state, " The arguments involved in the con-
sideration of this subject are of so highly technical a
character that none but specialists can express a
very confident opinion on them.'" The reasons given
by me as to why the inception was wrong do not
embrace a very high technical knowledge.

I have seen the Royal Navy change from sails
to steam, from fighting on the water to fighting
under the water and over the water. What is the
future Navy to be ? Some officers say that the battle-
ship is more alive than ever ; others declare that the
battleship is dead. I regarded the surface battle-
ship as dead before the War, and I think her
more dead now, if that is possible. The battleship
of to-day costs roughly £8,000,000 ; she carries about
1000 shells containing about 100,000 Ibs. of high ex-
plosives ; her effective range is, say, 15 miles, she is
vulnerable to aircraft with bombs and ariel torpedoes,
and to submarines, the latter possibly carrying a
15-in. or 18 -in. gun ; and the ordinary automobile
torpedo is still in process of development, and may,
in the future, carry a ton of high explosives, which
would probably sink any battleship.

For £8,000,000 we could build many aeroplane-
carrying ships, equipped with aeroplanes carrying
over 100,000 Ibs. of high explosives. If these
aeroplanes carried fuel sufficient for five hours, their

1 " Dardanelles Commission Report," p. 24.

THE FUTURE NAVY 333

range would be about 150 miles out and 150 miles
home.

In the battleship we put all our eggs into one
basket. In peace-time the aeroplane- carrying
ships could be used as passenger ships, and the
aeroplanes for carrying passengers instead of bombs.

As to relative cost of upkeep, the single battle-
ship would require in peace-time about —

Pay

40 officers ^8,000

800 men 60,000

Provisions and stores ... 30,000

Coal 10,000

£108,000

Say J£120,000 a year. The aeroplane- carrying ships
and the aeroplanes would cost nothing ; they would
be earning money. The officers and men to form
the crews of the ships would belong to the Mer-
chant Navy. Aeroplane pilots will be as numerous
as taxi drivers and get about the same pay. The
battleship waddles along at twenty miles an hour,
and cannot waddle very far, and in comparison
with an aeroplane has a very low rate of speed.

The object in war is to introduce high explosive
materials into your enemy's ships or country ; trans-
mitting this high explosive by guns is expensive as
the container of the high explosive has to be very
strong, and consequently very heavy, to withstand
the shock of discharge. It takes a battleship weighing
30,000 tons to carry 100,000 Ibs. of this explosive.
Ten aeroplanes weighing about three tons each
would carry the same amount, so the relative
weights of the carriers is as 30 tons to 30,000 tons.

When the battleship nears the end of her coal
or ammunition, she must waddle home at about
the same speed as a South Eastern Railway train
(I am told that this is the slowest line on earth), and

334 WAR REFLECTIONS— 1915-1917

it takes her several hours to fill up even if she uses
oil fuel. The aeroplane does not waddle home, but
comes back at 100 miles an hour, and it takes three
minutes to fill her up with fuel and ammunition.
The future is with the aeroplane, which is going to
develop rapidly in the next few years. Probably we
shall also have submersible battleships of 10,000
tons. What chance will the surface battleship, pre-
resenting a huge target, have against such a vessel ?

My task is completed, for from the summer of
1916 to the end of the war neither the Admiralty
nor the War Office had further need of any services
I could render. As I had retired in the year pre-
ceding the beginning of hostilities, I was fortunate
in being able to take some part, however small, in
the prosecution of the War on the water, under
the water, on the land, and in the air.

This war work rounded off my career, and as I
lay down my pen my thoughts turn to the old
Britannia which I entered as a boy. The ship
has disappeared and my companions of those
early days have had varied fortunes in life. Of
the sixty-four little boys who embarked on
board H.M.S. Britannia in 1866, two only rose
to the rank of Admiral, while another left the
Navy for the Army and became a Field-Marshal
and a peer. Looking backwards, thoughts and
incidents crowd one's mind, and I have felt
inclined, in reading through this manuscript, to
make additions here and deletions there. But,
after all I set out merely to write down the more
or less random recollections of my fifty years in
the Royal Navy, and it must go forth with whatever
faults the reader may notice.

APPENDIX I

PROGRESS OF GUNNERY

THE following statement, based on the returns of gun-
layers' competitions, indicates the progress in gunnery,
1897-1907 :—

1898, 69

100

J»

1899, 69

„ 100

»

1900, 68

100

1901, 64

100

1902, 59

100

1903, 54

100

1904, 58

100

1905, 44

100

1906, 29

100

1907, 19

100

—

1897.

1898.

1899.

1900.

1901.

Number of ships that fired
Number of guns
Number of hits
Number of misses
Excess of hits over misses
Excess of misses over hits
Percentage of hits to rounds fired

109

139

136

121

127

846

1,010

1,121

1,031

1,137

2,052

2,527

2,831

2,732

3,562

4,389

5,436

6,249

5,709

6,244

Nil.

Nil.

Nil.

Nil.

Nil.

2,337
31-86

2,109

3,418

2,977

2,682

31-63

31-1

32-3

36-3

335

336

APPENDIX I

—

1902.

1903.

1904.

1905.

1906.

1907.

121

Number of ships that fired
Number of guns ...
Number of hits
Number of misses
Excess of hits over misses

Excess of misses over hits

Percentage of hits to rounds'!
fired /

139

134

108

100

89

1,241

1,296

1,171

1,096

1,073

1,365

4,789

5,996

5,748

4,374

5,733

7,547

6,863

7,028

7,664

3,357

2,328

1,991

Nil.

Nil.

Nil.

1,017

3,405

5,556

2,074

1,032

1,916

Nil.

Nil.

Nil.

41-1

46-04

42-86

56-58

71-12

79-13

APPENDIX II

APPENDED are several communications with reference to my
period as Commandant at Durban, to which are added the
remarks of Earl Spencer in the House of Lords, when he
referred to the part which the Navy was privileged to take
in assisting in the defence of Ladysmith and in administer-
ing martial law in Durban during the critical period.

On the 10th March I received the following from H.E.
the Governor —

Natal, Government House,

No. 44. Pietermaritzburg, Natal,

9th March, 1900.

SIR,

I have received from the Admiral a telegram,
informing me that H.M.S. Terrible, under your Command,
is to sail shortly for the China Station, and requesting me
to make provision for the appointment of an officer to take
your place as Commandant of Durban.

2. I have been in communication with the General
Officer Commanding on the subject, and I believe an officer
will shortly be appointed. In the meanwhile I desire to
express my sincere regret that our pleasant official relations
are about to be severed ; and my high appreciation of the
firmness, judgment and tact with which you have discharged
your difficult and responsible duties as Commandant of
Durban throughout the four critical months during which
you have held the appointment.

3. I desire also to express to you, on behalf of the
Government and people of Natal, the thanks of the Colony
for the effectual aid which was rendered by you and by the
officers and men of the Royal Navy under your command in
the matter of the defence of the Colony from the inroads of

337

338 APPENDIX II

the Boers. Your services in that regard will always be
remembered in Natal with feelings of warm appreciation
and heartfelt gratitude.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,
(Signed) WALTER HELY HUTCHINSON.

Captain Percy Scott, R.N.,
H.M.S. Terrible,

Senior Naval Officer, Durban.

On the 14th I sent in a dispatch which was as follows : —

Commandant's Office,
Durban,

14th March, 1900.
YOUR EXCELLENCY,

I have the honour to report that I have this day
been relieved of my duties as Commandant of Durban,
which I assumed on the 7th November, 1899.

2. Spies. — During this term of office my department has
had to deal with all matters of spies and suspected persons,
of whom there are at present several still under detention
in the gaol at Durban, numbers of others having been
examined and dealt with, or sent on to Pietermaritzburg
or elsewhere. There are still a large number of suspects
detained in Durban on parole or under supervision.

3. Passengers. — There has also been the supervision of
all passenger traffic up and down the coast, and the dealing
with applicants for leave to go to Delagoa Bay and East
Coast ports. In this I have been very ably assisted by the
local officials of the Criminal Investigation Department,
under the control of Sergeant Brooke of the Natal Police,
who has carried out very difficult and troublesome work to
my entire satisfaction.

4. Martial Law. — This department has also, in con-
junction with the Censor, had to deal with the examination
and dispatch of letters opened under Martial Law and
telegrams of a suspicious nature. Mr. T. O. Eraser, the*
Censor, has rendered very valuable assistance.

5. Customs. — The question of detaining goods intended

MARTIAL LAW AT DURBAN 339

for the enemy, and preventing trade with the enemy from
being carried on, has been a matter of considerable import-
ance, and in connection with it I wish to bring to your
notice the good services rendered by Mr. Mayston, the
Collector of Customs.

6. Police. — With regard to the administration of Martial
Law, in addition to the special matters mentioned above,
there has been the general supervision and maintenance of
order in the town to deal with. Superintendent Alexander
of the Borough Police has co-operated with me so success-
fully that no difficulties have arisen. A system of night
passes after 11 p.m. was introduced to enable the police,
who are limited in number, to keep the streets clear at
night of all suspicious persons ; and so generally to protect
the .burgesses and their property in a way which they could
not otherwise have done, owing to the fact that there are,
and have been for a long time past, many of the worst of
the Transvaal and Free State criminals at large in and about
Durban.

7. Banks. — I have had to deal also with the banks, in
connection with the carrying out of his Excellency the High
Commissioner's regulations with regard to financial arrange-
ments, and am glad to be able to say that all the banks
have given me every assistance, and Mr. Harrison, Govern-
ment Inspector of the National Bank of the South African
Republic, has proved himself of great value in carrying out
the regulations.

8. Recruiting. — A Recruiting Depot for Colonial Forces
has been established at my office, and has sent forward a
large number of men.

9. The Port. — All work in connection with the Port has
been made very light in consequence of the ready way in
which Captain Ballard, the Port Captain, has always re-
sponded to any request from my office, and always done
everything in his power to assist the men-on-war and trans-
ports.

10. The Staff.— With regard to the officers of my Staff,
I wish to bring to your particular notice the eminently good
service which has been rendered me by Major Bousfield, a

340 APPENDIX II

Reserve Officer of the Natal Volunteer Force. He was
appointed by Your Excellency at the beginning of my term
of office, and has been my right-hand man throughout. His
local knowledge was of great assistance to me in the dis-
position of the guns for the defence of Durban, and his
legal knowledge has been invaluable to me in dealing with
many of the intricate matters which have come before me.
I hope that Major Bousfield will receive some mark of
appreciation of the good services he has rendered. Mr.
Cullinan, Assistant Paymaster of H.M.S. Terrible, has acted
as my secretary. With telegrams coming in all day and all
night, and all the correspondence, both naval and military?
having to be dealt with, his work has been continuous, but
always carried out in a most satisfactory manner.

11. Defence — Commander Limpus. — 1 attach a detailed
account of the defence of Durban, and in connection with it
wish to bring to your favourable notice the great assistance
I received from Commander A. H. Limpus, of H.M.S.
Terrible. It was owing to this officer's hard work and un-
tiring energy night and day that I was enabled to get the
mountings ready in time.

I have the honour to be,

Your Excellency's obedient servant,
(Signed) PERCY SCOTT,

Captain R.N. and Commandant.
To his Excellency

Sir Walter Hely Hutchinson, K.C.M.G.,
Governor of Natal,
Pietermaritzburg.

DEFENCE OF DURBAN, 1899.

SIR,

In obedience to orders, I arrived in H.M.S. Terrible
at Durban on the 6th of November, and took over the
defence of the town.

On the 7th the positions were surveyed, and on the 8th
the Defence was placed.

Herewith I have the honour to forward details of the

OFFICIAL DISPATCH 341

Defence and other information in connection with the sub-
sequent use to which the guns were put.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,
Your obedient servant,

(Signed) PERCY SCOTT,

Captain R.N.

To the General
Commanding the Forces
in Natal.

DEFENCE OF DURBAN.

A. Position of Guns, and Precautions against attack.

B. Protection of Water Supply.

C. Withdrawal of Bullion from Banks.

D. Care of Confidential Records from Government
House, Pietermaritzburg.

DEFENCE OF DURBAN.

To the Northward.

One 4'7-inch and six 12-pounders are in positions on the
Berea Ridge, commanding all the main roads and approaches
from the northward.

To the Eastward.

Six 12-pounders are in positions to command the Umgeni
Bridge and Valley. This valley is also commanded by guns
at the entrance to the Umgeni River.

To the Westward.

Six 12-pounders are in position to sweep the open
country west of Claremont.

Two 6-inch guns in the Bluff Fort are manned and can
command both the eastern and western approaches to the
town.

Two armoured trains are on the line with 3-pounders
mounted on them ; one train works to Claremont, the other
to Umgeni, so as to be able to rapidly reinforce any section
of defence which requires it.

H.M. ships Terrible, Forte and Thetis are anchored in a
position to command the Umgeni Valley. H.M. ships

342 APPENDIX II

Philomel and Tartar are in readiness to move round and
operate against any movement on the Bluff side.

The necessary scouting and patrolling has been under-
taken by Colonel Bethune with his locally raised Mounted
Infantry, the Rifle Associations of the outlying districts
assisting.

It is anticipated that nothing could pass through this
cordon. Should it, however, be forced, a further detachment
of 300 Marines with Maxims and rifles are in readiness to
land, and assisted by the two Town Rifle Associations,
dispute the streets at the barricades which have been
arranged.

PROTECTION OF THE WATER SUPPLY.

After consultation with his Worship the Mayor and the
Right Honourable Harry Escombe (an officer of the Natal
Volunteer Force), it was decided only to hold the Umlaas
Main Works, and the conduits therefrom.

To meet this two 12-pounder guns were mounted on the
summit of a hill which commands the Water Works and
the main road from Richmond. The position was strongly
entrenched and held by a party of seamen and Marines.

The Right Honourable Harry Escombe made arrange-
ments for patrolling the conduits and surrounding country
with a force organised by him, augmented if necessary by
the Rifle Association of the Coast Districts, which H.E. the
Governor had called out for active service.

WITHDRAWAL OF BULLION FROM BANKS.

Arrangements were made that, in the event of the
necessity arising, H.M.S. Philomel should send up guards to
the various banks to escort their bullion down to the point
of embarkation from whence it would have been transferred
to H.M.S. Terrible according to detailed arrangements
previously made with the bank authorities.

GENERAL BULLER'S THANKS 343

SAFE CUSTODY OF H.E THE GOVERNOR'S CONFIDENTIAL
RECORDS.

On arrival these were to be met by a Guard and trans-
ferred to H.M.S. Terrible.

From the General Commanding the Forces in Natal,
To Captain Percy Scott, C.B., B.N.,
H.M.S. Terrible, Durban,

The Convent, Ladysmith,

21st March, 1900.
SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of
your Report of the 14th March on the completion of your
duties as Commandant of Durban.

I shall have great pleasure in forwarding to the proper
authorities the names of the officers you bring specially to
my notice. I have already written semi-officially to the
First Lord of the Admiralty, requesting him to bring to
the notice of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty the
name of Commander A. H. Limpus, with a view to his pro-
motion in recognition of the excellent work he has done
since he has been under my Command.

I take this opportunity of expressing to you my high
appreciation of the very efficient and successful manner in
which you have carried out the arduous and important duties
of Commandant of Durban, and of the excellent arrangements
you made for the defence of that town.

I also wish to express to you my thanks for the very
valuable assistance you have rendered in forwarding, and
adapting for field service, the Naval guns which the Admiral
Commander-in-Chief placed at the disposal of the military.
The guns, mounted under your directions and designs, have
answered every expectation, and have largely contributed
both to the successful defence and the relief of Ladysmith.
I have the honour to be,

Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) REDVERS BULLER,

General.

344 APPENDIX II

Town Hall, Durban,

17th March, 1900.
Captain Percy Scott, R.N., O.B.,
Durban.

MY DEAR SIR,

It affords me great pleasure on the eve of your
departure to forward you herewith the enclosed resolution
unanimously passed by the Town Council in acknowledgment
of your valued services under the operation of Martial Law
in this borough.

The tact and ability displayed by you in your arduous
duties during the period you have held office as Commandant
has been in a marked degree appreciated and to this must
be ascribed the good order maintained in the borough
during the last few eventful months.

It becomes my duty to also convey to you my hearty
thanks for the promptitude with which you placed the
borough in a state of defence at a most trying time.

The operations so successfully carried out were only
equalled by your readiness in sending out a guard to the
Umlaas to protect our Water Supply, a matter of such
moment to one and all.

I take this opportunity of informing you how much the
townspeople appreciated the very orderly behaviour of your
men forming the town guard during their presence in the
Camp on the Market Square.

In bidding you farewell I wish you continued prosperity
in your future career, and I am convinced that in doing so
it is only echoing the wishes of the many with whom you
have been brought in contact.
I am,

My dear Sir,

Very faithfully yours,

(Signed) JOHN NICOL,

Mayor.

DURBAN'S APPRECIATION 345

Town Hall, Durban, Natal,
15th March 1900.

Resolution passed at Meeting of the Durban Town
Council, held the 15th March, 1900.

RESOLVED : —

" That this Council desires to place on record its deep
sense and acknowledgment of the very valuable services
rendered to the Borough by Captain Percy Scott, R.N., C.B.,
who has held the responsible position of Commandant of
this Borough under the proclamation of Martial Law for a
period of over four months.

"Under his Command the disabilities of Martial Law
have hardly been noticeable, whilst the general good order
prevailing throughout the Borough, where large numbers of
aliens and many undesirables were thronging our streets,
fully demonstrates his great administrative abilities and his
sterling worth as a Commander.

" JOHN NICOL,
(Seal). Mayor."

Earl Spencer, speaking on the South African War, in the
House of Lords, said : —

" When His Majesty's ship Powerful was returning
home, nothing was known of what was going on in South
Africa ; but when the gallant captain who commanded her
heard that war was declared, he at once put into port and%
placed himself at the disposal of the General Commanding.
He at once, although he had no orders from home, took
action, which was no doubt highly appreciated at home.
He proceeded to the Cape, and placed his forces at the
disposal of the General Commanding. His colleague, a very
gallant officer, Captain Scott, of the Terrible, was also there,
and he did very signal service by enabling the heavy gum of
the Navy — heavier, I believe, than any of those sent out
with the Army from England — to be put at once into the
field. The efforts of those two gallant men enabled a most
powerful force to be added to the Army, and in all the
earlier battles that took place you will find prominent in

346 APPENDIX II

action the sailors and marines. With regard to Lady-
smith, I would venture to say that the propitious and
fortunate arrival there of Captain Lambton and the ship
guns had an enormous and predominant effect on the possi-
bility of resisting the great attack of the Boers on that
place. The Navy on that occasion proved, as they always
have done, their valour, their desire to come to the front in
war or whenever their services are required, and their power
of adapting themselves to circumstances.

" The officer responsible at this time for the administra-
tion of martial law in Durban was Captain Scott, R.N., . . .
who has left behind him a reputation for spotless integrity,
practical common sense, tact, and inflexible justice, of which
the Service he so worthily represents may well be proud. . . ."

INDEX

Aboukir, H.M.S., sunk, 283
Active, H.M.S., 14, 18
Admiralty, dilatory methods of ad-
ministration, vii-ix, 27, 41, 155,
185, 269, 292, 295, 308, 323 ; method
of dealing with inventions, 78, 89,
142, 207, 259, 287, 288, 325 ; decline
to adopt the sub- calibre rifle, 84;
the towing target, 85 ; the regula-
tions for prize firing, 154 ; instruc-
tions on shooting, 159, 186 ; state
of confusion in time of war,
200; blunders, 264-267 ; opposition
to Sir P. Scott's system of director
firing, 265; letters to him, 272,
325; views on the submarine
menace, 274, 283; new rules for
firing, 300; measures for the air
defence of London, 306.

Aerial warfare, forecast on, 318

Aeroplanes, 332-334

African, South, War, 93

Agadir scare in 1911, 255

Air defence, debate in the House of
Commons, 316

Ajaccio, 80

Akado, 21, 22

Albany, 39

Albert Victor, H.B.H. Prince, mid-
shipman in H.M.S. Bacchante, 35;
at Monte Video, 37 ; joins H.M.S.
Inconstant, 39

Aldershot, review at, 3

Alexander, Captain John Hobhouse,
Captain of H.M.S. Forte, 7

Alexandria, 46

Alison, Sir Archibald, at Ramleh,
50; letter to Sir E. Wood on the
work of Sir P. Scott, 54

Allan, Sir William, on the design of
the gun carriages used in Lady-
smith, 98, note

American War of 1812, 25

Anti-Aircraft Corps, members, 315

Antrim, H.M.S., 211

Arabi Pasha, at Kafr Dowar, 46, 50

Arabia, East Coast of, 9

Aranchi Bay, 251

Ardagh, Major J. C., report on the

work of Sir P. Scott, 55
Argyll, H.M.S., 198
Ariel, the, 18, 21, 22
Armstrong, Whitworth& Co., Messrs.,

294, 323
Army, British, guns for the, 321 ;

mountings, 322
Ascension Island, 16; fortification

of, 16

Ashantee War, 14
Asquith, Et. Hon. H. H., letter to

Sir P. Scott, 269; opinion of the

guns for London, 314
Astrcea, H.M.S., report of the inspec-
tion, 28

Atalanta, H.M.S., sunk, 37
Australia, 39

Austria, war with Prussia, 3
Authors' Club entertains Sir P.

Scott, 242

Bacchante, H.M.S., 35; puts into
Albany for repairs, 39

Bachini, Dr., 231

Bacon, Admiral Sir R, criticism of
Sir P. Scott's letter on the sub-
marine menace, 276, 277

Baden Baden, 2

Badger, H.M.S., rams a submarine,
287

Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J., offers Sir P.
Scott the gunnery defence of
London, 304; letter from him,
313; letter to him, 315; on the
want of guns for the Army, 321

Ballard, Captain, 339

Balmoral, 174

Barfleur, H.M.S.,, system of instruc-
tion in gunnery, 157

Barton, General, 120

Bate, William, 168

Battenberg, H.S.H. Prince Louis of,
at Alexandria, 47 ; First Sea Lord,
283 ; resignation, 284. See Milford
Haven

Battleship, 332 ; cost, 332 ; upkeep,
333 ; rate of speed, 333

347

2 A

848

INDEX

Battleships, fitted with the system of
director firing, 254; design of
dummy, 284 ; cost, 285

Bearcroft, Captain, 102

Beira, 118

Belfast News, extract from, 278

Belgian forts, destruction of, 327, 328

Bellerophon, H.M.S., 263

Beresford, Admiral Lord Charles,
Commander - in - Chief of the
Channel Fleet, 184, 197, 202; on
the inefficient gun sights, 184 ;
grievance against the Admiralty,
202; peerage conferred, 202 note ;
relations with Sir P. Scott, 203 ;
"The Betrayal," 204; on sub-
marines, 276, 278, 279, 280

Bethune, Colonel, 113, 342

Black Prince, H.M.S., 198, 292 ; sunk,
293

Blanche1 Maria, collision with H.M.S.
Forte, 5 . ,

Bluejacket, a wounded, story of, 299
note

Boer War, 37, 93

Bomb, design of a, 287

Bombay, 6, 8

Botha, Chris, Mayor of Bloemfontein,
220

Botha, General, 107 ; at the National
Convention at Durban, 216

Botha, the destroyer-leader, 220 note

Bousfield, Major, at Durban, 106,
114; C.M.G. conferred, 115;
tributes to, 173, 339, 340

Bowles, Mr. Gibson, on the duties of
the Inspector of Target Practice,
190

Boxer rising, 132

Boyes, Captain H., member of the
committee on naval uniforms, 70

Bradshaw, Sub - Lieutenant, death
from fever, 15

Bridge, Admiral Sir Cyprian, " Some
Recollections," 27, 28 ; Commander-
in-Chief of the China station, 158 ;
on the advantages of Sir P. Scott's
system of shooting, 158; letter
from him, 166 ; on the inefficient
gun sights, 184 ; criticism of Sir P.
Scott's letter on the submarine
menace, 275

Bridgeman, Admiral Sir Francis,
Commander-in-Chief of the Home
Fleet, 251 ; opposition to director
firing, 251 ; on submarines, 276 ;
criticisms of Sir P. Scott's letter
on the submarine menace, 279

Bristol, H.M.S., 5

Britannia, H.M.S., 3, 4, 334

British Review, "Reply to Lord
Charles Beresford," 204

Broke, Captain, gunnery practice, 25

Brooke, E. H., 114, 116

Brownrigg, Sir Douglas, 28

Bruce, Sir Charles, Governor of
Mauritius, 128

Bruce, Admiral Sir James, at Taku,
133 ; refuses offer of guns, 133, 135

Bruce, Lady, 128

Buenos Ayres, 235

Buller, General Sir Redvers, at Dur-
ban, 109; consideration, 110; use
of the long-range guns, 111, 120,
121 ; at Spion Kop, 120 ; letters to
Sir P. Scott on his work, 125, 343*;
tribute to, 127

" Bully beef," 7

Bundesrath, examination of her
cargo, 119

Bygdo Bay, 209

Calcutta, the, 33 ; turret drill, 33

Cambridge, H.M.S., 58

Cameron, Commander Verney Lovett,

walk across Africa, 20
Candia, 82
Canterbury, Archbishop of, Hon.

LL.D. of Cambridge, 187
Canton River blown over, 145 ; opera-
tion to right her, 145-149
Cape Coast Castle, 15
Cape Town, 41, 123
Captain, H.M.S., sunk, 37
Carnarvon, H.M.S., 211
Carrington, Sir John, address to Sir

P. Scott, 130
Casement, Sub-Lieut. John, promoted

Lieutenant, 23
Centaur, H.M.S. , 323
Centurion, H.M.S., 149; defective

gun sights, 184
Chambon, M., method of raising the

Sultan, 63
Channel Fleet, gunnery scores, 143 ;

gunlayers' tests results, 205
Chatham Dockyard, work on the

mountings for long-range guns,

322

Cheefoo, 134, 135
Cheetham, Sir Milne, acting Charg6

d' Affairs in Rio Janeiro, 227 ; baft,

228

Chievely, 120, 122
China, 39

Christian, H.R.H. Princess, presenta-
tion to H.M.S. Good Hope, 211
Christian Victor, H.R.H. Prince, at

INDEX

349

Gape Town, 105 ; Durban, 106, 109 ;
Pietermaritzburg, 107; letter to
Sir P. Scott, 107; joins his staff,
109 ; death from enteric fever, 125,
211 ; grave at Pretoria, 218

Christiania, 209

Churchill, Lady Randolph, 120; on
board the Maine, 122 ; at Durban,
123

Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston, at
Pietermaritzburg, 122 ; Durban,
123 ; gallantry, 123 ; taken prisoner,
124 ; escape, 124 ; reception at Dur-
ban, 124 ; on a machine for cipher
messages, 207 ; interest in the trials
of director firing, 252 ; decision on
fitting Dreadnoughts with director
firing, 261 ; order to change position
of funnel and mast, 265 ; appoint-
ment of Sir P. Scott at the Ad-
miralty, 284 ; conference with him,
291; offers him the command of
the Dardanelles expedition, 295;
measures for the protection of
London against air raids, 304 ; on
destruction of forts, 328

Cipher messages, system of, 207

Clanwilliam, Admiral the Earl of,
35,38

Clary, General, 108

Clinometer, use of, 329

"Cobbed," punishment of, 13

Cochrane, Admiral Lord, first Admiral
of the Brazilian Navy, 228

Colenso, battle of, 112 ; bombardment,
120

Collingwood, H.M.S., 263

Colomb, Captain P. H., 287

Colomb's flashing lamp, 76

Colombo, 128

Com-el-Dic, Fort, 47

Comino Channel, 62

Condor, H.M.S., sunk, 37

Congo River, punitive expedition,
17

Connaught, Duke of, Hon. LL.D.
of Cambridge, 187

" Conned," meaning of the word, 239

Convicts, work on Whale Island, 34,
68,69

Coomassie entered, 15

Corcovado, picnic to, 228

Cowes, 23

Cradock, Admiral, 257

Cressy, H.M.S., sunk, 283

Crete, 81

Crimean War, 24

Cromer, Lord, President of the
Dardanelles Commission, 327

j Crosbie, Lieut. A."- B., 19 ; wounded,

15 ; Brevet-Major, 16
Cullinan, Assistant Paymaster W. F.,

secretary to Sir P. Scott, 114,

340
Custance, Admiral Sir Reginald,

committee on long-range firing, 181
Cygnet, H.M.S., 22
Cyprus, 46

DAHOMEY, King of, punitive expedi-
tion against, 20

Daily Graphic, extracts from, 278,
279

Daily Mail, extracts from, 279

Dardanelles, the, 295; casualties,
296; operations, 329; Commision,
Report, 326, 332 ; cost, 327 note

Dartmouth, 4

Deer drive at Invercauld, 175

Defence, H.M.S., 292 ; sunk, 293

" Deflection Teacher," 139

Delarey, General, at the National
Convention, Durban, 216

" Depth charge " for submarines, 287

Deutschland, the, 196

Devonport, School of Gunnery at,
58

Devonshire, Duke of, Chancellor of
Cambridge University, 187; con-
fers degrees, 187

Devonshire, H.M.S., 212

De Wet, General, at the National
Convention, Durban, 216

Diamond, H.M.S., 35

Diaz, General Porfirio, President of
Mexico, 248 ; character of his rule,
248, 250 ; appearance, 249 ; retires,
250 ; death, 251

" Director firing," 197, 240

Dorward, Brig. -General, 137

" Dotter," introduction of, 87

Dover, 208

Dowell, Admiral Sir William, 53

Drake, H.M.S., 179; inefficient gun
sights, 181

Dreadnoughts, 260; fitted with di-
rector firing, 261 ; design of the
first, 262 ; place of the mast, 263

Dresden, the, 283

Drummond, Lieutenant, 137

Du/erin, the, 222

Duke of Edinburgh, H.M.S., 59, 198

Dummy battleships, design of, 284 ;
cost, 285

Dungeness, 13

Dupree, Col. Sir W., Mayor of Ports-
mouth, 171

Durban, 99, 106, 215; defence of,

350

INDEX

107 ; martial law proclaimed, 113 ;
National Convention at, 216

EASTMAN'^ Naval Academy, at Ports-
mouth, 3

Edinburgh, Duke of, Commander-
in-Chief of the Mediterranean
Meet, 61 ; interest in gunnery, 61 ;
use of a signalling lamp, 61 ; patron
of the Naval Exhibition, 70 ; mem-
ber of the committee on naval
uniforms, 70

Edward VII., King, review at Alder-
shot, 3 ; Coronation, 169 ; receives
Sir P. Scott, 174, 242 ; interest in
gunnery, 176, 299; at Whale
Island, 185

Egerton, Admiral Sir George, 122

Egypt, disturbances in, 46

Electrical range transmitter, 40

Encounter, H.M.S., 18

Engineer, extract from, 279

Escombe, Rt. Hon. Harry, 342

Estcourt, 107

Eurydice, H.M.S., sunk, 37

Ewing, Prof. Sir Alfred, 188

Excellent, H.M.S., 14, 26, 29, 58, 67 ;
target practice, 30-33; school of
gunnery, 178

FALKLAND Islands, 37, 38

Fallieres, M., President of the French
Republic, crosses to Dover, 208

" Fanny Adams," 7

Farquhar, Captain R. B., 88

Farrer, Sir George, at the National
Convention, Durban, 216

Fegan, Staff-Surgeon Henry, C.B.
conferred, 16

Ficklin, Sub-Lieut., death from
fever, 15

Fiji Islands, 39

Fisher of Kilverstone, Admiral of the
Fleet, Lord, vi; work at the
Admiralty, ix, 58; on the "Fool-
ometer,"32; in command of H.M.S.
Excellent, 59; orders long-range
firing in the Mediterranean, 161 ;
First Sea Lord of the Admiralty,
194, 202, 284; on Sir P. Scott's
system of routine training, 241 ;
design of H.M.S. Dreadnought,
262 ; reaignation, 286 ; conference
with Sir P. Scott, 291; result of
his resignation, 292

Fitzgerald, Captain C. P., Captain of
H.M.S. Inconstant, 39 ; report on
the use of the Service smoke-cap in
a fire, 43

FitzPatrick, Sir Percy, at the
National Convention, Durban, 216

Flattery, Cape, 37

Fleet, character of the shooting, 48 ;
condition of gunnery, 177, 182 ;
long-range firing, 178, investigation
into, 181 ; scheme of reform of
gunnery, 179-181 ; defective gun
sights, 182-185; battle practice,
191-194 ; improvement, 192 ; man-
oeuvres, 206; system of cipher
messages, 207

Fleet, the Grand, at Scapa Flow,
288-290; unequipped for fighting
at night, 290; ships to be fitted
with director firing, 291

Flogging, punishment of, 4, 8

Foam, H.M.S., 18

" Foolometer " machine, 33

Foote, Admiral Randolf, Senior
Lieutenant of H.M.S. Excellent, 59

Forcy, Mr., Director of Stores, 291

Forster, Rt. Hon. Arnold, 157; on
the fortification of Wei-hai-wei,
168

Fort Pharos, 50

Forte, H.M.S., 5, 341; collision with
the Blanche Maria, 5

Frazer, Captain, Press Censor, 114,
115

Fremantle, Admiral Sir E. B., " The
Navy as I have known it, " 12 ;
criticism of Sir P. Scott's letter on
the submarine menace, 275

French, Field-Marshal Viscount, 3 ;
Hon. LL.D. of Cambridge, 187;
air defence of London, 316

GALLIENE, General, in charge of the
defence of Paris, 307, 310 ; on the
defence of London, 314

Gallwey,Lieut.- Colonel Henry Lionel,
Governor of St. Helena, 226

George V., King, midshipman in
H.M.S. Bacchante, 35; at Monte
Video, 37; joins H.M.S. Incon-
stant, 39; H.M.S. Excellent, 59;
patron of the Royal Naval Fund,
71

Geraldine, the, gutted by pirates, 17

Germany, 3; the Navy, 194-196;
defects, 196, 290 ; ships fitted with
a director system of firing, 255,
261 ; improvement in the system,
269 ; submarines, 270, 283 ; system
of searchlights, 324 ; War declared,
281

Gibraltar, 46, 239, 251

INDEX

351

Gibson, Cecil, wounded, 22

Glasgow, H.M.S., 13, 283

Globe, the, extract from, 278

Glover, G. H., 74

Gneisenau, the, 256, 283

Goliath, H.M.S., sunk, 296

Good Hope, Cape of, 6, 23, 38, 41

Good Hope, H.M.S., 198; record of
shooting, 202, 205, 206, 208 ; balls,
210, 216, 225; presentation to,
211 ; system of night-firing prac-
tice, 240; director firing gear
removed, 246; sunk by Germans,
256, 283

Goschen, Viscount, First Lord of the
Admiralty, 90 ; on. the value of
Wei-hai-wei as a military base,
167

Graf ton, Captain E. H., Commander
of H.M.S. Good Hope, 206

" Gravity lamp," 62

Great Britain, war declared against
Germany, 281

Green Mountain, 16

Grenfell, Lord, Hon. LL.D. of
Cambridge, 187

Grey, Lord, on destruction of Dar-
danelles forts, 327

Griffiths, Sir Ellis, 317

Grounds, P.O., record of shooting,
157, 169 ; death, 169

Gun sights, defective, 182-185

Gun-layers' competition, 301, 335

Gunnery practice, condition of, 25,
73, 282 ; instruction in, 29-33, 59,
60, 81-88, 239, 296-302; practical
and theoretical course, 30; im-
provement, 192 ; meaning of naval
gunnery, 242-246; difference be-
tween firing on sea and land, 329-
331 ; progress of, 335

Guns, long-range, mounting, 50-53,
94, 98-101, 110, 121, 282, 322;
defects of the sub-calibre, 82 ; the
sight-setter, 85; parallel firing,
257-259 ; elevation of, 293-295 ; for
the Army, 321

HAAKON, King, of Norway, steams
round the Channel Fleet, 209

Haddock, Captain, Commodore of
the S. 0. Squadron, 285

Hamilton, Bear-Admiral, in com-
mand of the Second Cruiser Squad-
ron, 227, 240

Hampshire, H.M.S., 198

Hampshire Telegraph, extract from,
277

Handy, the destroyer, 148

Hannay, Mr. David, opinion of sub-
marines, 278

Hannibal, H.M.S. , 143

Hannon, Mr. P. J., on Sir P. Scott's
views of the submarine menace,
278

Harland and Wolff, Messrs., valuable
work of the firm, 285

Harmsworth, Mr. Cecil, 156

Harris, Admiral Sir Robert, Com-
mander-in-Chief at the Cape of
Good Hope Station, 95; "From
Naval Cadet to Admiral," 95 ; orders
for the mountings of the long-range
guns, 100; instructions to Sir P.
Scott, 105

Hart, General Sir Eeginald, at Cape
Town, 224

Hawke, H.M.S., sunk, 283

Heath, Commodore Sir Leopold, 8

Hely Hutchinson, Sir Walter, Gover-
nor of Natal, 95, 107 ; illness, 223 ;
testimony to the work of Sir P.
Scott, 337; dispatch from, 333-
340

Kenwood, Mr. C., Mayor of Durban,
215

Hercules, H.M.S., 14 ; coUision with
the Northumberland, 14

Hewett, Sir William Nathan Wright,
14 ; K.C.B. conferred, 15 ; punitive
expedition up the Congo river, 17 ;
destruction of native villages, 18 ;
ovation at Portsmouth, 23 ; recom-
mendations for improving the
dockyard at Simon's Bay, 41

Hicks, Sir Joynson, 316

Hildyard, General, 108

Hofmeyr, Mr., 224

Hoguef H.M.S., sunk, 283

Hong Kong, 130, 149, 169 ; typhoon,
145

Hopkins, Admiral Sir John 0., in
command of the Mediterranean
Fleet, 74, 298; advice to Sir P.
Scott, 78 ; offers to present a cup
for competition, 88

Howe, Earl, takes part in a deer
drive, 175

Hunter, Sir David, General Manager
of the Natal Government Railways,
110 ; tribute to, 173

Hutchinson, E. B., awarded the Con-
spicuous Service Cross, 112

Hutchinson, Lieut. R., 159

Hyde, the brothers, story of, 24

Hydroplane motor boat, design,
288

352

INDEX

Illustrious, H.M.S., 88
Inconstant, H.M.S., 35; at Alex-
andria, 46 ; on fire, 41
Inflexible, H.M.S., 47
Invercauld, deer drive at, 175
Ireland, condition of, 273
Ironside, Bax, 228
Irresistible, H.M.S., sunk, 296

JANE, Mr. F. T., handbook on airships
and aeroplanes, 318

Japan, 39, 145, 164

Jelliooe of Scapa, Admiral of the
Fleet, Viscount, vi ; First Sea Lord
of the Admiralty, reorganisation of
the Fleet for war, ix; member of
the committee on improving the
regulations for prize firing, 154;
acts as umpire, 157 ; wounded at
Taku, 166 ; in command of H.M.S.
Drake, 179 ; knowledge of gunnery,
179; Director of Naval Ordnance,
189, 190, 194, 301 ; in command of
the Atlantic Squadron, 197, 251 ;
"The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916,"
197 note, 324 note, 326 note ; on the
receipt of a signal, 208; member
of the Admiralty Board, 247;
instals director firing in H.M.S.
Neptune, 247; advises the Ad-
miralty to fit director firing to all
ships, 251; on the value of the
system, 253-255 ; Commander-in-
Chief of the Grand Fleet, 288;
reasons for avoiding an action at
night, 290, 324 note; reform of
naval gunnery, 301 ; invested with
the insignia of Knight Com-
mander of the Victorian Order,
302; on guns for the defence of
London, 309 ; inferiority of Grand
Fleet's searchlights, 324; leaves
the Admiralty, 325

Joffre, General, 310

Johannesburg, 219

Johns, Mr., 94

Jones, Captain, 173

Joubert, General, 96

Jutland, Battle of, 197, 254, 292, 324
note

KAFR DOWAB, 47, 50

Kennedy, Sir R. J., at Monte Video,

231

Kentucky, the, 149
Kerr, Vice- Admiral Mark E. F., at

Fort Com-el-Dic, 50
Kerr, Lord Walter, First Lord of the

Admiralty, introduction of com-
petition in shooting, 300
Kiao-chau, 165
Kiel, 194, 293
Kimberley invested, 95
King Eward VIL, H M.S., mixed

armaments, 262
Kirkness, Lieut. J. L. S., gunnery

officer in H.M.S. Good Hope, 206
Kitchener, Field - Marshal, Earl,

Secretary of War, reply to Sir P.

Scott, 281 ; guns for the defence of

London, 309
Kleczkowski, M., at Monte Video,

235
Kruger, Paul, house at Pretoria, 217

LADYSMITH, siege of, 95, 105; long-
range guns at, 99 ; attack on, 108 ;
method of communicating by
pigeon, 110 ; by searchlight, 111 ;
relieved, 125

Lagos, 20

Laings Neck, reverse at, 38

Lamb, Charles, on proverbial sayings,
303

Lambton, Admiral Sir Hedworth,
95 ; in command of H.M.S. Power-
ful, 97 ; wires for ammunition, 103 ;
guns in the siege of Ladysmith,
104, 346; limited supply of am-
munition, 104 ; committee on long-
range firing, 181. See Meux

Lamp, a signalling, invention of, 61 ;
the truck, 75 ; Colomb's flashing,
76

Lancaster, H.M.S., defects of the
gun sights, 183

Lang, Rev. Francis, wounded, 22

Las Palmas, 91

Lee, Admiral Vaughan, 309

Leipzig, the, 283

Leon Gambetta, the, 208

Lewen, Cape, 39

Limpus, Commander A. H., at Dur-
ban, 106 ; march to Umgeni, 109 ;
tributes to, 127, 340, 343

Lion, H.M.S., alteration, 265, 266

Little, Mr. A. W. A. Knox, Managing
Director of the Leopoldina Rail-
way, 228

Livingstone, Dr., 20

Lloyd, Pennant, First Lieutenant in
H.M.S. Scylla, 80

London, defenceless state from air
raids, 303 ; Zeppelin raids on, 303,
304 ; character of the ammunition
supplied, 305 ; protective measures,

INDEX

353

308-315 ; number of guns, 309-314 ;

taken over by the War Office, 316
Lorenzo Marques, 116
Ly-ce-mun Pass, 130

MADDEN, Admiral Sir Charles, 287

Maf eking invested, 95 1

Magnificent, H.M.S., 143

Maine, the, hospital ship, 122

Majestic, H.M.S., sunk, 296

Majuba, reverse at, 38

Malacca, Straits of, 129

Malta, 46, 66, 80

Maltby, Sub-Lieut. Gerald, wounded,

15
Manchester Courier, extract from,

277
Manchester Guardian, extract from,

277

Mariotis, Lake, 52
Marks, Mr., suspect, 116
Mars, H.M.S., 143
Marshall, Sir James, Director of

Dockyard Work, 291
Masts and sails, training in the use

of, 35, 36 ; abolition, 37
MaunseU, Mr. B. E. L.JChief Engi-
neer of the South Eastern Railway

Co., 312

Mauritius, Island of, 128
Maurity, Admiral, 228
May, Admiral of the Fleet Sir

William, 300; member of the

Dardanelles Commission, 327
McKenna, Bt. Hon. B., First Lord of

the Admiralty, interview with Sir

P. Scott, 210; on director firing,

251 ; design of a ship, 264
Mediterranean Fleet, anchored off

Alexandria, 46
Melbourne, 39
Merchant ships, use of, 286; loss,

286

Mers Bay, 168
Methuen, Lord, Acting Governor of

the Transvaal, at the banquet at

Johannesburg, 219
Meux, Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Hed-

worth, 181. See Lambton
Mex dam, 52 ; blown up, 53
Mexico, history of, 248-251
Middlemas, Sub-Lieut. A. C., pro-
moted Lieutenant, 20
Milford Haven, Marq. of, 47. See

Battenberg
Milner, Viscount, 117
Minnesota, the, 153
Molteno, Mr. J. T., 224
Monitors, elevation of the guns, 294

Monmouth, H.M.S., sunk, 256, 283

Monte Video, 37, 230, 238

Morris, Colonel, Commandant of

Durban, 126
Morrison, Dr., 164
" Mud Island," 33-35, 67
Munday, Sub-Lieut. Bobert, killed,

15
Murren, 269

NAPOLEON, Emperor, on the meaning
of strategy, ix ; birthplace, 80

Napoleon, Mdme., statue of her five
sons, 80

Natal, loyalty of, 113

Nathan, Sir Matthew, 222

Naval, administration, vi ; war, the
test of, ix. ; College, Portsmouth,
3, 14 ; Exhibition Fund in aid of,
66, 71 ; gunnery, meaning of, 242-
246

Naval and Military Record, extracts
from, 28, 278

Navy, rule of the Service, 198-200;
unpreparedness for war, 200-202;
future of the, 332

Navy, punishments, 4, 8, 13 ; uni-
form, 12, 69 ; gunnery, 26, 192, 282,
296-302 ; ships, inspection of, 26 ;
committee on, 70 ; officers, qn half-
pay, 89 ; parallel firing, 258 ; Esti-
mates, 274 ; target practice, 297 ;
prize firing, 297, 298 ; searchlights,
system of, 324

Navy League, address to Sir P. Scott,
170

Neptune, H.M.S., director firing in-
stalled, 240, 247 ; trials, 251

Nesham, Lieut. -Commander, 23

Neumann, Mr., 175

Newport, Naval College at, 153

Nicholson, Field-Marshal Lord, mem-
ber of the Dardanelles Commission,
327

Nicol, Mr. John, Mayor of Durban,
letter to Sir P. Scott, 344

Niger, river, 21 ; punitive expedition,
21-23

Night signalling, 74 ; firing practice,
239

Northumberland, the, collision with
H.M.S. Hercules, 14

Nymphe, H.M.S. , 88

Observer, extracts from, 280

Ocean, H.M.S., sunk, 296

Ogilvy, Lieut. F. A., hunt for a

dynamo, 111
Ogilvy, Commander F. C., 159, 173

354

INDEX

Onslow, Lieut. Hughes, temporary
Captain of H.M.S. Terrible, 127

Orion, H.M.S. , competitions with
H.M.S. Thunderer, 252, 268

Orkneys, the, 288

Osborne, 23

Otranto, the, 283

Outlook, extract from, 279

Pall Mall Gazette, extracts from, 277,
279

Paris, 308 ; defence of, 307

Pathfinder, H.M.S., sunk, 283

Patras, 66

Pearson, Captain, 67

Peiho, river, 133, 135

Peirse, Admiral Sir Richard H., 60;
design of a director, 258

Pekin, besieged by Boxers, 132 ;
relieved, 137

Pellet, General, 310

Pelorus, H.M.S., 235 ; gun mount-
ings in, 27

Petropolis, picnic to, 227

Philomel, H.M.S., 120,342

Pietermaritzburg, 107

Pomeroy, Mr., invention of a bullet,
307

Port Arthur, 165

Port Elizabeth, 222

Port Said, 91

Portsmouth, 6, 23, 37, 53, 169, 208,
210; Royal Naval College, 3, 14;
Gunnery School at, 26, 58

Portsmouth Times, extract from, 277

Powerful, H.M.S., 90, 99, 345

Pretoria, 116, 217

Prussia, Prince Henry of, in com-
mand of the High Sea Fleet, 194 ;
letter to Sir P. Scott, 268

Prussia, war with Austria, 3

Punch, cartoons, 177, 302, 317

Punta-da-Lenha, 18

Queen Elizabeth, H.M.S., ordered to
the DardaneUes, 295; bombard-
ment, 331

RAMLEH, 47

Rasaltin, Fort, 50

Rawlinson, Commander A., 308 ;

promptitude in obtaining a French

gun, 310 ; design of a motor lorry,

312
Rawlinson, General Sir Henry, on

the alteration in the elevation of

the guns, 322
Rawson, Sub-Lieut. Wyatt, wounded,

15

Referee, extract from, 280
Reynolds, Sub-Lieut. Harry, pro-
moted Lieutenant, 23
Rice, Lieut. Charles, 204
Rio Janeiro, 227
Roberts, Field-Marshal Earl, 116 ; on

the shortage of long-range guns at

the front, 281; on their value,

282
Rodd, Sir James Rennell, British

Ambassador at Rome, presides at

the Authors' Club, 242
Roosevelt, President, interest in the

Fleet, 150 ; report from Lieut.

Sims, 151
Roscrude, Assistant Engineer, 98

note
Rosebery, Lord, on the value of Wei-

hai-wei, 167
Rose-Innes, Chief Justice Sir James,

at Pretoria, 218; speech on the

Navy, 218

Roxburgh, H.M.S., 198
Russia, Grand Duke Michael, houses

the guns and crews, for the defence

of London, 313
Ryder, Admiral A. P., 55

SABOGREGA, punitive expedition
against, 22

Sailors, hatred of Sunday, 11 ; furling
a sail on a jack-yard, 36 ; quaint
sayings, 49

Sails and masts, training in the use
of, 35, 36 ; abolition, 37

St. George, Council of the Society of,
telegram to Sir P. Scott, 170

St. Helena, 46, 91,226

St. Vincent, 46, 214

St. Vincent, H.M.S., 263

Saldanha Bay, 214

Sandiman, Captain H. G., report on
the appliances for signalling at
night, 75-78

Santa Cruz, 239

Scapa Flow, 288; Grand Fleet at,
288-290

Scharnhorst, the, 256, 283

Scott, Admiral Sir Percy, grand-
parents, 1 ; father, 2 ; education,
2; at Eastman's Naval Academy,
3 ; gazetted^ a Naval Cadet, 3 ;
at Wiesbaden, 3 ; joins H.M.S.
Britannia, 4 ; H.M.S. Bristol, 5 ;
H.M.S. Forte,\5 ; voyage to Bombay,
6 ; rations, 7 ; A.D.C. to Commo-
dore Sir L. Heath, 8 ; joins H.M.S.
Hercules, 14 ; gazetted Sub-Lieu-
tenant, 14 ; joins H.M.S. Active,

INDEX

355

14 ; breaks his leg, 16 ; at Ascension
Island, 16 ; takes part in punitive
expeditions, 17-23; promoted
Lieutenant, 20; on board the
guardship at Cowes, 23 ; received
by Queen Victoria, 24; joins H.M.S.
Excellent, 29, 58; instruction in
gunnery, 29 ; plan for the con-
version of Whale Island into a
Gunnery School, 35, 58, 67 ; Gun-
nery Lieutenant of H.M.S. Incon-
stant, 35 , cruise round the world,
37 ; at Monte Video, 37, 230-235,
238 ; at the Cape, 38, 93 ; at Simon's
Bay, 38, 41, 222; voyage to Aus-
tralia, 39 ; invention of an elec-
trical range transmitter, 40 ; method
of extinguishing the fire in H.M.S.
Inconstant, 42 ; modification of
diver's dress, 43; ordered to Alex-
andria, 46; at Fort Com-el-Dic,
47 ; method of bringing up 7-ton
guns, 50-53 ; blows up Mex Dam,
53 ; at Portsmouth, 53, 169 ; testi-
monies to his service, 53-55, 337,
343-346 ; receives a medal from
Queen Victoria, 57; promoted
Commander, 59 ; joins H.M.S.
Duke of Edinburgh, 59 ; invention
of a signalling lamp, 61, 75 ; Com-
mander of H.M.S. Excellent at
Whale Island, 67 ; member of the
committee on naval uniforms, 70 ;
exhibition in aid of the Royal
Naval Fund, 71 ; promoted Captain,
72 ; Captain of H.M.S. Scylla, 73 ;
in the Mediterranean, 73 ; system
of instruction in signalling, 74 ;
various inventions, 77-79, 85, 207 ;
at Ajaccio, 80 ; instruction in gun-
nery, 81-88, 128, 138; sub-calibre
rifle, 85 ; towing targets, 85 ; in-
vention of the "Dotter," 87; on
half -pay, 89; in command of
H.M.S. Terrible, 90; ordered to
proceed to China, 91 ; design for
the mounting of long-range guns,
94, 98-101, 120, 121, (282, 332 ; at
Durban, 102, 215 ; appointed Mili-
tary Commandant of Durban, 105-
119, 337; measures for the de-
fence, 107, 340-342; arrested by
a policeman, 114 ; examination
of vessels, 119; equips hospital
ships, 122 ; voyage to China, 127 ;
reception at Mauritius, 128 ; Hong
Kong, 130-132, 145, 169; address
from Sir J. Carrington, 130 ; C.B.
conferred, 131, 174 ; at Taku, 132 ;

Chef oo, 135 ; " deflection teacher,"
139 ; on the operation of righting
the Canton Biver, 145-149; presi-
dent of a committee for improving
the regulations for prize firing,
154 ; at Wei-hai-wei, 165 ; addresses
of welcome, 170 ; speech at a public
banquet, 171-174 ; at Balmoral,
174-177 ; invested with the insignia
of Knight Commander, of the
Victorian Order, 174, 302; takes
part in a deer drive, 175, 176;
Captain of H.M.S. Excellent, 178 ;
efforts to improve gunnery, 179-
181, 191-194, 298 ; incurs the dis-
approval of the Admiralty, 181,
183; report on the defective gun
sights of H.M.S. Lancaster, 183 ; of
H.M.S. Centurion, 184; letters to
the Admiralty, 184, 255, 256 ; Hon.
LL.D. of Cambridge, 187; In-
spector of Target Practice, 189 ;
duties, 190; at Kiel, 194-196, 293;
in command of the Second Cruiser
Squadron, 197, 198 ; relations with
Lord Charles Beresford, 203, 210 ;
invention for cipher messages, 207 ;
cruise round Ireland and Scotland,
208 ; at Christiania, 209 ; in com-
mand of a squadron of cruisers in
South Africa, 210 ; system of rou-
tine training, 212, 241 ; at Pretoria,
217; Johannesburg, 219; Bloem-
fontein, 220 ; Cape Town, 223-225 ;
farewell messages, 225, 229 ; at St.
Helena, 226 ; Rio Janeiro, 227-229 ;
promoted Vice-Admiral, 227 ; reply
to the Minister of War, 234; at
Buenos Ayres, 335 ; speech at the
farewell dinner, 236-238 ; at Tene-
riffe, 238; Gibraltar, 239; system
of night-firing, 239; in London,
241; audience with King Edward
VII., 242, 291; speech at the
Authors' Club, 242-246 ; work on
director firing, 247, 259; visit to
Mexico, 248-251 ; presented to Gen.
P. Diaz, 249 ; joins H.M.S. Neptune
to superintend trials with director
firing, 251 ; points out the blunders
of the Admiralty, 264-267; at
Murren, 269; created a Baronet
and promoted Admiral, 270 ; retire-
ment, 270; on the submarine
menace, 270, 286 ; letters from the
Admiralty, 271, 325 ; letter to the
Times on the submarine menace,
274 ; criticisms on his warnings,
275-281 ; appointed Adviser to the

356

INDEX

Admiralty on gunnery, 284, 325;
improvisation of dummy battle-
ships, 284-286 ; design of a bomb,
287; interview with Sir J. Jel-
licoe at Scapa Mow, 288 ; measures
for fitting ships with director
firing, 291; loss of his son, 293;
on the elevation of guns, 293-
295; refuses offer of command of
the expedition to the Dardanelles,
296 ; report on the inefficiency of
the shooting, 299 ; appointed to the
gunnery defence of London, 304;
measures, 308-315 ; at Paris, 308,
314; letter to Mr. Balfour, 313;
appointed adviser to Viscount
French on air defence questions,
318 ; forecast on aerial warfare,
318; visit to the front, 322; to
H.M.S. Centaur, 323; on the
difference between sea and land
gunnery, 329-331 ; the future of the
Navy, 332; dispatch to Sir W.
Hely Hutchinson, 338-340; letter
from General Sir K. Buller, 343 ;
from J. Nicol, 344

Scylla, H.M.S., 73 ; boat washed away,
80; gunnery practice, 81-88, 298;
record of shooting, 88, 191

Searchlight, flashing) arrangements
for, 77

Searchlights, system in the Navy, 324

Sea-sickness, cure for, 5

Selborne, Earl of, 167, 300; First
Lord of the Admiralty, 177; cha-
racter of his administration, 186,
191 ; at the National Convention,
Durban, 216

Seymour, Admiral of the Fleet, Sir
Edward, "My Naval Career and
Travels," 26; in command of the
expedition to Pekin, 132 ; approval
of the regulations on prize firing,
154, 156; presents a shield, 156;
order countermanded, 156 ; report
on prize firing, 198

Seymour, Admiral Sir Michael Culme,
Commander-in-Chief of the Medi-
terranean Fleet, 73

Shannon, H.M.S, 25

Sheerness, 5, 13

Shells, unexploded, difficulty of col-
lecting, 47-49 ; burial, 48

Shen-Hai-Quon, 164

Shimura, Admiral, 164

Ships, inspection of, 26, 144 ; training
in the use of masts and sails, 35,
36 ; abolition, 36 ; decoration of,
60; prize firing, 144; long-range

shooting, 160-163; system of rou-
tine training, 212 ; fitted with
director firing, 282, 326

Signalling, condition of, 73; system
of instruction, 74 ; inadequate ap-
pliances, 75-78

Signalling lamp, invention of a, 61

Simon's Bay, 38, 41, 222

Simonstown, 105

Sims, Admiral William S., ix ; Lieut,
in the Kentucky, 149; at Hong
Kong, 149 ; interest in gunnery,
149; suggestions for reform, 150;
report to Pres. Roosevelt, 151 ;
appointed Naval Aide-de-Camp, 151,
153; indiscretion, 152; in command
of naval forces in European waters,
152, 154 ; Director of Target Prac-
tice, 153, 189 ; in command of the
battleship Minnesota, 153 ; at the
Naval College, Newport, 153; in
command of the Atlantic Torpedo
Flotilla, 154

Singapore, 39, 128, 169

Slave dhows, 9

Smith, Mr. F. A., Mayor of Cape
Town, 224

Smoke-cap, the Loeb, use of the,
45

Spectator, extract from, 278

Spencer, Earl, on the work of,LSir
P. Scott in South Africa, 345

Spion Kop, 120

Spiteful, H.M.S., 18, 21

Spithead, 5

" Spotting drill," 141

Squadron, the " Special Coastal " or
" Scarecrow," 285

Stansfeld, Captain, head of the Anti-
Aircraft Department, 308

Steevens, G. W., on the Royal Navy,
131

Stossel, General, 133

Strategy, meaning of, ix

Submarine menace, 270, 274

Submarines, " depth charge," 287

Suez Canal, 39

Sultan, H.M.S., strikes on a rock,
62; salvage operations, 63; sinks
again, 64 ; towed into Malta Har-
bour, 64

Sultan of Sokato, 22

Sunday on board ship, 11

Sunday Times, extract from, 280

Superb, H.M.S., 263

Surface boats, shortage of, 287

Swallow, H.M.S., 37

Swettenham, Sir Alexander, Governor
of Singapore, 129

INDEX

357

Swettenham, Sir Frank, Kesident
General of the Malay States, at
Singapore, 129 ; on the use of Wei-
hai-wei, 166

Sydenham, Lord, on Sir P. Scott's
views of the submarine menace,
277 ; on submarines, 280

TABLE Bay, 123

Taku, 132

Tanks, development of, 186

Target, practice, 30-33, 297 ; a towing,
85 ; colour of the, 140 ; remodelled,
142

Tartar, H.M.S., 342

Tel-el-Kebir, battle of, 46; fall of,
53

Temeraire, H.M.S., 49, 263

Teneriffe, 238

Tennant, Bt. Hon. H. J., 316.

Terrible, H.M.S., 90, 105 ; instruction
in gunnery, 92, 138-143 ; defective
gun sights, 92 ; at Durban, 105, 340 ;
Hong Kong, 130 ; ordered to Wei-
hai-wei, 135 ; record of shooting,
157, 168; at Wei-hai-wei, 165;
dismantled, 177

Tetuan, battle practice at, 240

Thetis, H.M.S., 34L

Thomas, Sub-Lieut. Prank, promoted
Lieutenant, 23

Thomson, Mr. J., Mayor of Johannes-
burg, 219 ; on the behaviour of the
men of Sir P. Scott's squadron,
221

Thunderer, H.M.S., fitted with
director firing, 251; competitions
with H.M.S. Orion, 252, 268

Tientsin, besieged by Boxers, 132;
relief column, 133 ; bombardment,
135 ; captured, 136

Times, the, extracts from, 278, 279,

t 280; on ^the bombardment of
Tientsin, 136; letter from Sir P.
Scott on the submarine menace,
274

Tokyo, 164 »

Tongku, 134

Topase, H.M.S., 35

Torpedo boats, rams on, 287

Transvaal Republic, 91, 217

Triggs, Sub-Lieut. Bowden, promoted
Lieutenant, 23

Trincomalee, 13

Triumph, H.M.S., sunk, 296

Truck lamp, 75

Tugela, 105, 107

Turret drill, 33

Tyrwhitt, Bear- Admiral Sir Reginald,
Commodore, 323

UMGBNI, march with a 4*7 gun to,

109
United States Navy, gunnery reform

in the, 150-153
Uruguay, relations with England, 238

VANDELEUR, Colonel, 47

Vanguard, H.M.S., 263

Venerable, H.M S., 181

Venetian blind shutter, use in sig-
nalling, 74

Vernon, H.M.S., 32, 71

Vicente Casaras, 237

Victoria, Queen, at Osborne, 23; re-
ceives Sir P. Scott, 24 ; receives
officers and men after the Egyptian
War, 55-57

Victorious, H.M.S. , 181

Villiers, Sir Henry de, President of
the National Convention, Durban,
216

WAAL, N. F. de, 223, 224

War, the test of a naval administra-
tion, ix

War Office, takes over the gunnery
defence of London, 316 ; system of
administration, 323

Warrender, Admiral Sir George, 298 ;
member of the committee on im-
proving the regulations for prize
firing, 154 ; acts as umpire, 157 ;
encouragement of shooting, 158

Warrior, H.M.S., 23, 292 ; sunk, 293

Wei-hai-wei, 135, 145, 164, 165 ; cost
of the fortifications, 166; work
stopped, 167, 168

Wells, Lieut. Lionel, 71

Whale, Mr., design of a motor lorry,
312

Whale Island, 33-35; plan of con-
version into a Gunnery School,
35, 58, 67 ; process of construction,
67; cricket-pitch, 67; sham fight
at, 185

White, Mr. Arnold, interest in gun-
nery, 143; on Dreadnoughts in
war, 280

White, General Sir George, retreat to
Ladysmith, 95; request for long-
range guns, 95-97

Whitehead torpedo, 79

Whydah, 20 ; blockade of, 21

Wiesbaden, 3

358

INDEX

Williman, Dr., President of Uruguay,
at Monte Video, 231, 238

Willoughby, Sir John, takes part in a
deer drive, 175

Wilson, Capt. Gordon, takes part in a
deer drive, 175

Wilson, Mr. H. W., opinion of sub-
marines, 279

Windham, Captain, 157

Windsor, 56

Wise, Captain, of U.S.A. Navy, 134

Wolseley, General Sir Garnet, in com-
mand of the Ashantee campaign, 15

Wood, General Sir Evelyn, 38; on

the valuable work of Sir P. Scott,

53 ; letter from Major-General Sir

A. Alison, 54

Wrey, Sir Bourchier, at Eamleh, 47
Wrey, Mrs., 313
Wright, J., awarded the Conspicuous

Service Cross, 112
Wright, Mr., 173

" X.," Mr., case of, 116 ; extracts
from his letters, 117

ZANZIBAR, 9, 20 ; slave-market, 10
Zeppelin raids on London, 303, 304

THE END

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