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Presented  to  the 

UNIVERSITY  OF  TORONTO 
LIBRARY 

by  the 

ONTARIO  LEGISLATIVE 
LIBRARY 

1980 


PUBLICATIONS 

OF   THE 

NAVY    RECORDS   SOCIETY 

VOL.  XXIX. 


FIGHTING  INSTRUCTIONS 

1530—1816 


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1530—1816 


EDITED 

WITH   ELUCIDATIONS   FROM   CONTEMPORARY  AUTHORITIES 

BY 

JULIAN    S.  CORBETT,  LL.M. 


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PRINTED   FOR  THE   NAVY   RECORDS  SOCIETY 
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THE  COUNCIL 

OF   THE 

NAVY    RECORDS    SOCIETY 

1904-1905 


PATRON 
H.R.H.  THE  PRINCE  OF  WALES,  K.G.,  K.T.,  K.P. 

PRESIDENT 
EARL  SPENCER,  K.G. 

VICE  PRESIDENTS 


BRIDGE,  ADMIRAL  SIR  CYPRIAN 

A.  G.,  G.C.B. 
HAWKESBURY,  LORD. 


PROTHERO,      G.     W.,     Litt.  D., 

LL.D. 
YORKE,  SIR  HENRY,  K.C.B. 


COUNCILLORS 


ATKINSON,  C.  T. 
BATTENBERG,  PRINCE  Louis  OK, 
G.C.B. 

BEAUMONT,  VICE-ADMIRAL   SIR 
LEWIS,  K.C.B.,  K.C.M.G. 

CLARKE,  COL.  SIR  GEORGE  S., 
K.C.M.G. 

CORBETT,  JULIAN  S. 

DESART,  THE  EARL  OF,  K.C.B. 

DRURY,    VICE-ADMIRAL    SIR 

CHARLES,  K.C.S.I. 
FIRTH,  PROFESSOR  C.  H.,  LL.D. 
GINSBURG,  B.  W.,  LL.D. 
GODLEY,  SIR  ARTHUR,  K.C.B. 
HAMILTON,    ADMIRAL    SIR    R. 

VESEY,  G.C.B. 


KIPLING,  RUDYARD. 

LORAINE,    REAR-ADMIRAL    SIR 
LAMBTON,  BART. 

LYALL,  SIR  ALFRED  C.,  G.C.I. E. 

MARKHAM,    SIR   CLEMENTS  R., 
K.C.B.,  F.R.S. 

MARSDEN,  R.  G. 

NEWBOLT,  HENRY. 

PARR,  REAR-ADMIRAL  A.  C. 

SLADE,  CAPTAIN  EDMOND  J.  W.t 
R.N. 

TANNER,  J.  R. 
THURSFIELD,  J.  R. 
TRACEY,  ADMIRAL  SIR  RICHARD, 
K.C.B. 

WATTS,  PHILIP,  D.Sc.,  F.R.S. 


SECRETARY 
PROFESSOR  J.  K.  LAUGHTON,  D.Litt.,  King's  College,  London,  W.C 

TREASURER 
W.  GRAHAM  GREENE,  C.B.,  Admiralty,  S.W. 


The  COUNCIL  of  the  NAVY  RECORDS  SOCIETY  wish 
it  to  be  distinctly  understood  that  they  are  not  answer- 
able for  any  opinions  or  observations  that  may  appear 
in  the  Society's  publications.  For  these  the  responsi- 
bility rests  entirely  with  the  Editors  of  the  several  works. 


PREFACE 


THE  inaccessibility  of  the  official  Fighting  Instruc- 
tions from  time  to  time  issued  to  the  fleet  has  long 
been  a  recognised  stumbling-block  to  students  of 
naval  history.  Only  a  few  copies  of  them  were 
generally  known  to  exist ;  fewer  still  could  readily 
be  consulted  by  the  public,  and  of  these  the  best 
known  had  been  wrongly  dated.  The  discovery 
therefore  of  a  number  of  seventeenth  century  Instruc- 
tions amongst  the  Earl  of  Dartmouth's  papers, 
which  he  had  generously  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Society,  seemed  to  encourage  an  attempt  to  make 
something  like  a  complete  collection.  The  result,  such 
as  it  is,  is  now  offered  to  the  Society.  It  is  by  no 
means  exhaustive.  Some  sets  of  Instructions  seem 
to  be  lost  beyond  recall ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  a 
good  deal  of  hitherto  barren  ground  has  been  filled, 
and  it  is  hoped  that  the  collection  may  be  of  some 
assistance  for  a  fresh  study  of  the  principles  which 
underlie  the  development  of  naval  tactics. 

It  is  of  course  as  documents  in  the  history  of 
tactics  that  the  Fighting  Instructions  have  the 
greatest  practical  value,  and  with  this  aspect  of  them 
in  view  I  have  done  my  best  to  illustrate  their 
genesis,  intention,  and  significance  by  extracts  from 


viii  PREFACE 

contemporary  authorities.  Without  such  illustration 
the  Instructions  would  be  but  barren  food,  neither 
nutritive  nor  easily  digested.  The  embodiment  of 
this  illustrative  matter  has  to  some  extent  involved 
a  departure  from  the  ordinary  form  of  the  Society's 
publications.  Instead  of  a  general  introduction,  a 
series  of  introductory  notes  to  each  group  of  In- 
structions has  been  adopted,  which  it  is  feared 
will  appear  to  bear  an  excessive  proportion  to  the 
Instructions  themselves.  There  seemed,  however, 
no  other  means  of  dealing  with  the  illustrative 
matter  in  a  consecutive  way.  The  extracts  from 
admirals'  despatches  and  contemporary  treatises, 
and  the  remarks  of  officers  and  officials  concerned 
with  the  preparation  or  the  execution  of  the  In- 
structions, were  for  the  most  part  too  fragmentary 
to  be  treated  as  separate  documents,  or  too  long 
or  otherwise  unsuitable  for  foot-notes.  The  only 
adequate  way  therefore  was  to  embody  them  in 
Introductory  Notes,  and  this  it  is  hoped  will  be 
found  to  justify  their  bulk. 

A  special  apology  is,  however,  due  for  the  Intro- 
ductory Note  on  Nelson's  memoranda.  For  this 
I  can  only  plead  their  great  importance,  and  the 
amount  of  illustrative  matter  that  exists  from  the 
pens  of  Nelson's  officers  and  opponents.  For  no 
other  naval  battle  have  we  so  much  invaluable  com- 
ment from  men  of  the  highest  capacity  who  were 
present.  The  living  interest  of  it  all  is  unsurpassed, 
and  I  have  therefore  been  tempted  to  include  all 
that  came  to  hand,  encouraged  by  the  belief  that 
the  fullest  material  for  the  study  of  Nelson's  tactics 
at  the  battle  of  Trafalgar  could  not  be  out  of  place 


PREFACE 


IX 


in  a  volume  issued  by  the  Society  in  the  centenary 
year. 

As  to  the  general  results,  perhaps  the  most  strik- 
ing feature  which  the  collection  brings  out  is  that 
sailing  tactics  was  a  purely  English  art.  The  idea 
that  we  borrowed  originally  from  the  Dutch  is  no 
longer  tenable.  The  Dutch  themselves  do  not 
even  claim  the  invention  of  the  line.  Indeed  in  no 
foreign  authority,  either  Dutch,  French  or  Spanish, 
have  I  been  able  to  discover  a  claim  to  the  inven- 
tion of  any  device  in  sailing  tactics  that  had  per- 
manent value.  Even  the  famous  tactical  school 
which  was  established  in  France  at  the  close  of  the 
Seven  Years'  War,  and  by  which  the  French  ser- 
vice so  brilliantly  profited  in  the  War  of  American 
Independence,  was  worked  on  the  old  lines  of 
Hoste's  treatise.  Morogues'  Tactique  Navale  was 
its  text-book,  and  his  own  teaching  was  but  a 
scientific  and  intelligent  elaboration  of  a  system 
from  which  the  British  service  under  the  impulse  of 
Anson,  Hawke,  and  Boscawen  was  already  shaking 
itself  free. 

Much  of  the  old  learning  which  the  volume  con- 
tains is  of  course  of  little  more  than  antiquarian 
interest,  but  the  bulk  of  it  in  the  opinion  of  those 
best  able  to  judge  should  be  found  of  living  value. 
All  systems  of  tactics  must  rest  ultimately  on  the 
dominant  weapon  in  use,  and  throughout  the  sailing 
period  the  dominant  weapon  was,  as  now,  the  gun. 
In  face  of  so  fundamental  a  resemblance  no  tactician 
can  afford  to  ignore  the  sailing  system  merely 
because  the  method  of  propulsion  and  the  nature  of 
the  material  have  changed.  It  is  not  the  principles 


X 


PREFACE 


of  tactics  that  such  changes  affect,   but  merely  the 
method  of  applying  them. 

Of  even  higher  present  value  is  the  process  of 
thought,  the  line  of  argument  by  which  the  old  tac- 
ticians arrived  at  their  conclusions  good  and  bad. 
In  studying  the  long  series  of  Instructions  we  are 
able  to  detach  certain  attitudes  of  mind  which  led  to 
the  atrophy  of  principles  essentially  good,  and  others 
which  pushed  the  system  forward  on  healthy  lines 
and  flung  off  obsolete  restraints.  In  an  art  so  shift- 
ing and  amorphous  as  naval  tactics,  the  difference 
between  health  and  disease  must  always  lie  in  a 
certain  vitality  of  mind  with  which  it  must  be 
approached  and  practised.  It  is  only  in  the  history 
of  tactics,  under  all  conditions  of  weapons,  movement 
and  material,  that  the  conditions  of  that  vitality  can 
be  studied. 

For  a  civilian  to  approach  the  elucidation  of 
such  points  without  professional  assistance  would  be 
the  height  of  temerity,  and  my  thanks  therefore 
are  particularly  due  for  advice  and  encouragement 
to  Admiral  Sir  Cyprian  Bridge,  Vice-Admiral  Sir 
Reginald  Custance,  Rear- Admiral  H.S.H.  Prince 
Louis  of  Battenberg,  and  to  Captain  Slade,  Captain 
of  the  Royal  Naval  College.  To  Sir  Reginald 
Custance  and  Professor  Laughton  I  am  under  a 
special  obligation,  for  not  only  have  they  been  kind 
enough  to  read  the  proofs  of  the  work,  but  they  have 
been  indefatigable  in  offering  suggestions,  the  one 
from  his  high  professional  knowledge  and  the  other 
from  his  unrivalled  learning  in  naval  history.  Any 
value  indeed  the  work  may  be  found  to  possess  must 
in  a  large  measure  be  attributed  to  them.  Nor  can 


PREFACE 


XI 


I  omit  to  mention  the  valuable  assistance  which  I 
have  received  from  Mr.  Ferdinand  Brand  and  Captain 
Garbett,  R.N.,  in  unearthing  forgotten  material 
in  the  Libraries  of  the  Admiralty  and  the  United 
Service  Institution. 

I  have  also  the  pleasure  of  expressing  my 
obligations  to  the  Earl  of  Dartmouth,  the  Earl  of 
St.  Germans, and  Vice- Admiral  Sir  Charles  Knowles, 
Bart.,  for  the  use  of  the  documents  in  their  posses- 
sion, as  well  as  to  many  others  whose  benefits  to 
the  Society  will  be  found  duly  noted  in  the  body 
of  the  work. 


CONTENTS 

PART  I.— EARLY  TUDOR   PERIOD 

PACK 

1.  INTRODUCTORY.     ALONSO     DE     CHAVES    ON    SAILING 

TACTICS 3 

Espejo  de  Navegantes,  circa  1530 6 

2.  INTRODUCTORY.    AUDLEY'S  FLEET  ORDERS,  circa  1530    .      14 

Orders  to  be  used  by  the  King's  Majesty's  Navy  by  the 
Sea 15 

3.  INTRODUCTORY.    THE  ADOPTION  OF  SPANISH   TACTICS 

BY  HENRY  VIII 18 

Lord  Lisle,  1545,  No.  i 20 

„        No.  2 23 

PART  II.— ELIZABETHAN   AND  JACOBEAN 

INTRODUCTORY.    THE  ELIZABETHAN  ORIGIN  OF  RALEGH'S 

INSTRUCTIONS 27 

Sir  Walter  Ralegh,  1617 36 

PART   III.— CAROLINGIAN 
i.  INTRODUCTORY.    THE  ATTEMPT  TO  APPLY  LAND  FORMA- 

TIONS  TO  THE  FLEET 49 

Lord  Wimbledon,  1625.     No.  i  .       52 

„        No.  2    .  .        ...      41 

No.  3 63 


xiv  CONTENTS 

PAGB 

2.  INTRODUCTORY.    THE  SHIP-MONEY  FLEETS,  circa  1635    .  73 

The  Earl  of  Lindsey,  1635 77 

PART  IV.— THE   FIRST   DUTCH   WAR 

1.  INTRODUCTORY.    ENGLISH  AND  DUTCH  ORDERS  ON  THE 

EVE  OF  THE  WAR,  1648-53 81 

Parliamentary  Orders,  1648 87 

Supplementary  Instructions,  circa  1650        .        ...  88 

Marten  Tromp,  1652  . 91 

2.  INTRODUCTORY.    ORDERS  ISSUED  DURING  THE  WAR,  1653 

and  1654 92 

Commonwealth  Orders,  1653 99 

PART  V.— THE   SECOND   DUTCH   WAR 

1.  INTRODUCTORY.    ORDERS  OF  THE  RESTORATION  .       .    .  107 

The  Earl  of  Sandwich,  1665 108 

2.  INTRODUCTORY.     MONCK,    PRINCE   RUPERT,    AND  THE 

DUKE  OF  YORK no 

The  Duke  of  York,  1665 122 

His  Additional  Instructions,  1665 126 

His  Supplementary  Order 128 

Prince  Rupert,  1666 129 

PART  VI.— THE   THIRD   DUTCH   WAR  TO 
THE   REVOLUTION 

i.  INTRODUCTORY.     PROGRESS   OF   TACTICS   DURING   THE 

WAR 133 

The  Duke  of  York,  1672 146 

His  Supplementary  Orders,  1672 148 

The  Duke  of  York,  1672-3 149 

Final  form  of  the  Duke  of  York's  Orders,  1673,  with  addi- 
tions and  observations  subsequently  made     .        .        .152 


CONTENTS  xv 


2.  INTRODUCTORY.    MEDITERRANEAN  ORDERS,  1678        .    .  164 

Sir  John  Narbrough,  1678         , 165 

3.  INTRODUCTORY.    THE  LAST  STUART  ORDERS      .       .    .  168 

Lord  Dartmouth,  1688 170 


PART  VII.— WILLIAM    III.   AND   ANNE 

1.  INTRODUCTORY.    LORD   TORRINGTON,  TOURVILLE,   AND 

HOSTE 175 

Admiral  Edward  Russell,  1691 188 

2.  INTRODUCTORY.    THE  PERMANENT  INSTRUCTIONS,  1703- 

1783 195 

Sir  George  Rooke,  1703 197 


PART  VIII.— ADDITIONAL   FIGHTING    INSTRUC- 
TIONS  OF  THE    EIGHTEENTH   CENTURY 

INTRODUCTORY.    ORIGIN  AND  GROWTH  OF  THE  ADDITIONAL 

INSTRUCTIONS 203 

Admiral  Vernon,  circa  1740 214 

Lord  Anson,  circa  1747 216 

Sir  Edward  Hawke,  1756 217 

Admiral  Boscawen,  1759 219 

Sir  George  Rodney,  1782 225 

Lord  Hood's  Additions,  1783 228 


PART  IX.— THE   LAST   PHASE 

1.  INTRODUCTORY.    THE  NEW  SIGNAL  BOOK  INSTRUCTIONS  233 

Lord  Howe,  1782 239 

2.  INTRODUCTORY.    THE  SIGNAL    BOOKS   OF   THE   GREAT 

WAR 252 

Lord  Howe's  Explanatory  Instructions,  1799    .        .        .  268 


xvi  CONTENTS 


PAGE 


3.  INTRODUCTORY.    NELSON'S  TACTICAL  MEMORANDA     .    .  280 

The  Toulon  Memorandum,  1803        .        .        .        .  313 

The  Trafalgar  Memorandum,  1805 316 

4.  INTRODUCTORY.    INSTRUCTIONS  AFTER  TRAFALGAR        .  321 

Admiral  Gambier,  1807 327 

Lord  Collingwood,  1808-1810 328 

Sir  Alexander  Cochrane,  1805-14 330 

5.  INTRODUCTORY.    THE  SIGNAL  BOOK  OF  1816  .       .       .  335 

The  Instructions  of  1816 342 

APPENDIX.    'FURTHER  PARTICULARS  OF  THE  TRAFALGAR 

FIGHT' 351 

INDEX .       .  359 


PART  I 
EARLY   TUDOR    PERIOD 

I.     ALONSO  DE  CRAVES,  circa  1530 
II.     SIR  THOMAS  AUDLEY,  1530 
III.     LORD  LISLE,  1545 


ALONSO   DE   CHAVES   ON    SAILING 
TACTICS 

INTRODUCTORY 

THE  following  extract  from  the  Espejo  de  Nave- 
gantes,  or  Seamen 's  Glass,  of  Alonso  de  Chaves 
serves  to  show  the  development  which  naval  tactics 
had  reached  at  the  dawn  of  the  sailing  epoch.  The 
treatise  was  apparently  never  pulished.  It  was 
discovered  by  Captain  Fernandez  Duro,  the  well- 
known  historian  of  the  Spanish  navy,  amongst  the 
manuscripts  in  the  library  of  the  Academy  of  His- 
tory at  Madrid.  The  exact  date  of  its  production 
is  not  known  ;  but  Alonso  de  Chaves  was  one  of  a 
group  of  naval  writers  and  experts  who  flourished 
at  the  court  of  the  Emperor  Charles  V  in  the  first 
half  of  the  sixteenth  century.1  He  was  known  to 
Hakluyt,  who  mentions  him  in  connection  with  his 
own  cherished  idea  of  getting  a  lectureship  in  navi- 
gation established  in  London.  '  And  that  it  may 
appear,'  he  writes  in  dedicating  the  second  edition 
of  his  Voyages  to  the  lord  admiral,  'that  this  is 
no  vain  fancy  nor  device  of  mine  it  may  please  your 
lordship  to  understand  that  the  late  Emperor 
Charles  the  Fifth  .  .  .  established  not  only  a  Pilot- 
Major  for  the  examination  of  such  as  sought  to 

1  Fernandez  Duro,  De  algunas  obras  desconocidas  de  Cos- 
mografia  y  de  Nccuegacion,  &c.  Reprinted  from  the  Revista  de 
Navegacion  y  Comercio.  Madrid,  1894-5. 

B  2 


4  EARLY   TUDOR  PERIOD 

take   charge  of  ships  in  that  voyage'  (i.e.   to  the 
Indies),  'but  also  founded  a  notable  lecture  of  the 
Art  of  Navigation  which  is  read  to  this  day  in  the 
Contractation  House   at  Seville.     The  Readers  of 
the   Lecture   have   not   only   carefully   taught   and 
instructed  the  Spanish  mariners  by  word  of  mouth, 
but  also  have  published  sundry  exact  and  worthy 
treatises  concerning  marine  causes  for  the  direction 
and    encouragement    of    posterity.      The    learned 
works  of  three  of  which  Readers,   namely  of  Alonso 
de    Chaves,    of   Hieronymus    de    Chaves,    and    of 
Roderigo  Zamorano,  came  long  ago  very  happily  to 
my  hands,  together  with  the   straight   and   severe 
examining   of  all    such   Masters  as  desire    to    take 
charge  for  the  West  Indies.'     Since  therefore  De 
Chaves  was  an  official  lecturer  to  the  Contractation 
House,  the  Admiralty  of  the  Indies,  we  may  take  it 
that  he  speaks   with    full  authority  of  the  current 
naval  thought  of  the  time.     That  he  represented  a 
somewhat   advanced   school   seems    clear  from  the 
pains  he  takes  in  his  treatise  to  defend  his  opinions 
against  the  old  idea  which  still  prevailed,  that  only 
galleys  and  oared  craft  could  be  marshalled  in  regular 
order.     '  Some  may  say,'  he  writes,  '  that  at  sea  it 
is  not  possible  to  order  ships  and  tactics  in  this  way, 
nor  to  arrange  beforehand  so  nicely  for  coming  to 
the  attack  or  bringing  succour  just  when   wanted, 
and  that  therefore  there  is  no  need  to  labour   an 
order  of  battle  since  order  cannot  be  kept.     To  such 
I  answer  that  the  same  objection  binds  the  enemy, 
and  that  with  equal  arms  he  who  has  taken  up  the 
best  formation  and  order  will  be  victor,  because  it 
is  not  possible  so  to  break  up  an  order  with  wind 
and  sea  as  that  he  who  is  more  without  order  shall 
not  be  worse  broken  up  and  the  sooner  defeated. 
For  ships  at  sea  are  as  war-horses  on  land,  since 
admitting  they  are  not  very  nimble  at  turning  at 


ALONSO  DE   CHAVES  5 

any  pace,  nevertheless  a  regular  formation  increases 
their  power.  Moreover,  at  sea,  so  long  as  there  be 
no  storm,  there  will  be  nothing  to  hinder  the  using 
of  any  of  the  orders  with  which  we  have  dealt,  and 
if  there  be  a  storm  the  same  terror  will  strike  the 
one  side  as  the  other  ;  for  the  storm  is  enough  for 
all  to  war  with,  and  in  fighting  it  they  will  have  peace 
with  one  another.' 

At  first  sight  it  would  seem  that  De  Chaves  in 
this  argument  takes  no  account  of  superiority  of 
seamanship — the  factor  which  was  destined  to  turn 
the  scale  against  Spain  upon  the  sea.  But  the 
following  passage  with  which  he  concludes  shows 
that  he  regarded  seamanship  as  the  controlling 
factor  in  every  case.  '  And  if,"  he  argues,  '  they 
say  that  the  enemy  will  take  the  same  thought  and 
care  as  I,  I  answer  that  when  both  be  equal  in 
numbers  and  arms,  then  in  such  case  he  who  shall 
be  more  dexterous  and  have  more  spirit  and  forti- 
tude he  will  conquer,  the  which  he  will  not  do, 
although  he  have  more  and  better  arms  and  as  much 
spirit  as  he  will,  if  he  be  wanting  in  good  order  and 
counsel.  Just  as  happens  in  fencing,  that  the  weaker 
man  if  he  be  more  dexterous  gives  more  and  better 
hits  than  the  other  who  does  not  understand  the 
beats  nor  knows  them,  although  he  be  the  stronger. 
And  the  same  holds  good  with  any  army  whatsoever 
on  land,  and  it  has  been  seen  that  the  smaller  by 
their  good  order  have  defeated  the  stronger.' 

From  the  work  in  question  Captain  Fernandez 
Duro  gives  four  sections  or  chapters  in  Appendix 
12  to  the  first  volume  of  his  history,1  namely, 
i.  'Of  war  or  battle  at  sea,'  relating  to  single  ship 
actions.  2.  '  The  form  of  a  battle  and  the  method 
of  fighting,'  relating  to  armament,  fire  discipline, 

1  Armada  Espafiola  desde  la  union  de  los  Reinos  de  Castilla 
y  de  Aragon. 


6  EARLY  TUDOR  PERIOD 

boarding  and  the  like.  3.  '  Of  a  battle  of  one  fleet 
against  another.'  4.  '  Battle.'  In  the  last  two 
sections  is  contained  the  earliest  known  attempt  to 
formulate  a  definite  fighting  formation  and  tactical 
system  for  sailing  fleets,  and  it  is  from  these  that  the 
following  extracts  have  been  translated. 

It  will  be  noted  that  in  the  root-idea  of  coming  as 
quickly  as  possible  to  close  quarters,  and  in  relying 
mainly  on  end-on  fire,  the  proposed  system  is  still 
quite  mediaeval  and  founded  mainly  upon  galley 
tactics.  But  a  new  and  advanced  note  is  struck  in 
the  author's  insistence  on  the  captain-general's 
keeping  out  of  action  as  long  as  possible,  instead  of 
leading  the  attack  in  the  time-honoured  way.  We 
should  also  remark  the  differentiation  of  types,  for 
all  of  which  a  duty  was  provided  in  action.  This 
was  also  a  survival  of  galley  warfare,  and  rapidly 
disappeared  with  the  advance  of  the  sailing  man-of- 
war,  never  to  be  revived,  unless  perhaps  it  be 
returning  in  the  immediate  future,  and  we  are  to 
see  torpedo  craft  of  the  latest  devising  taking  the 
place  and  function  of  the  barcas,  with  their  axes  and 
augers,  and  armoured  cruisers  those  of  the  naos  de 
snccurro. 


ESPEJO  DE  NA  VEG 'ANTES, 

circa  1530. 
[Fernandez  Euro,  Armada  Espanola  i.  App.  12.] 

Chapter  III. — Of  a  Battle  between  One  Fleet 
and  Another. 

[Extract.'] 

.  .  .  When  the  time  for  battle  is  at  hand  the 
captain-general  should  order  the  whole  fleet  to 
come  together  that  he  may  set  them  in  order>  since 


ALONSO  DE   CHAVES  7 

a  regular  order  is  no  less  necessary  in  a  fleet  of  ships 
for  giving  battle  to  another  fleet  than  it  is  in  an 
army  of  soldiers  for  giving  battle  to  another  army. 

Thus,  as  in  an  army,  the  men-at-arms  form  by 
themselves  in  one  quarter  to  make  and  meet  charges, 
and  the  light  horse  in  another  quarter  to  support, 
pursue,  and  harass ; l  so  in  a  fleet,  the  captain- 
general  ought  to  order  the  strongest  and  largest 
ships  to  form  in  one  quarter  to  attack,  grapple, 
board  and  break-up  the  enemy,  and  the  lesser  and 
weaker  ships  in  another  quarter  apart,  with  their 
artillery  and  munitions  to  harass,  pursue,  and  give 
chase  to  the  enemy  if  he  flies,  and  to  come  to  the 
rescue  wherever  there  is  most  need. 

The  captain-general  should  form  a  detachment 
of  his  smaller  and  lighter  vessels,  to  the  extent  of  one- 
fourth  part  of  his  whole  fleet,  and  order  them  to  take 
station  on  either  side  of  the  main  body.  I  mean 
that  they  should  always  keep  as  a  separate  body 
on  the  flanks  of  the  main  body,  so  that  they  can  see 
what  happens  on  one  side  and  on  the  other. 

He  should  admonish  and  direct  every  one  of  the 
ships  that  she  shall  endeavour  to  grapple  with  the 
enemy  in  such  a  way  that  she  shall  not  get  between 
two  of  them  so  as  to  be  boarded  and  engaged  on 
both  sides  at  once.2 

Having  directed  and  set  in  order  all  the  afore- 
said matters,  the  captain-general  should  then 
marshal  the  other  three-quarters  of  the  fleet  that 
remain  in  the  following  manner. 

1  Entrar  y  salir — lit.  '  to  go  in  and  come  out,'  a  technical 
military  expression  used  of  light  cavalry'.     It  seems  generally  to 
signify  short  sudden  attacks  on  weak  points. 

2  Here  follow  directions  for  telling  off  a  fourth  of  the  largest 
boats  in  the  fleet  for  certain  duties  which  are  sufficiently  explained 
in  the  section  on  '  Battle '  below. 


8  EARLY   TUDOR  PERIOD 

He  should  consider  his  position  and  the  direction 
of  the  wind,  and  how  to  get  the  advantage  of  it  with 
his  fleet. 

Then  he  should  consider  the  order  in  which  the 
enemy  is  formed,  whether  they  come  in  a  close 
body  or  in  line  ahead,1  and  whether  they  are  disposed 
in  square  bodies  or  in  a  single  line,2  and  whether  the 
great  ships  are  in  the  centre  or  on  the  flanks,  and  in 
what  station  is  the  flagship ;  and  all  the  other  con- 
siderations which  are  essential  to  the  case  he  should 
take  in  hand. 

By  all  means  he  should  do  his  best  that  his  fleet 
shall  have  the  weather-gage  ;  for  if  there  was  no  other 
advantage  he  will  always  keep  free  from  being  blinded 
by  the  smoke  of  the  guns,  so  as  to  be  able  to  see  one 
to  another  ;  and  for  the  enemy  it  will  be  the  contrary, 
because  the  smoke  and  fire  of  our  fleet  and  of  their 
own  will  keep  driving  upon  them,  and  blinding 
them  in  such  a  manner  that  they  will  not  be  able  to 
see  one  another,  and  they  will  fight  among  them- 
selves from  not  being  able  to  recognise  each  other. 

Everything  being  now  ready,  if  the  enemy  have 
made  squadrons  of  their  fleet  we  should  act  in  the 
same  manner  in  ours,  placing  always  the  greater 
ships  in  one  body  as  a  vanguard  to  grapple  first 
and  receive  the  first  shock  ;  and  the  captain-general 
should  be  stationed  in  the  centre  squadron,  so  that 
he  may  see  those  which  go  before  and  those  which 
follow. 

Each  of  the  squadrons  ought  to  sail  in  line 
abreast,3  so  that  all  can  see  the  enemy  and  use 

1  Unos  en  pos  de  otros  d  la  hila — lit.  one  behind  the  other  in 
file. 

2  En  escuadrones  6  en  ala.     In  military  diction  these  words 
meant  '  deep  formation  '  and  '  single  line.'     Here  probably  ala 
means  line  abreast.     See  next  note. 

3  Cado  uno  de  los  escuadrones  debe  ir  en  ala.     Here  escuadrone 
must  mean  '  squadron '  in  the  modern  sense  of  a  division,  and 


ALONSO  DE   CHAVES  9 

their  guns  without  getting  in  each  other's  way,  and 
they  must  not  sail  in  file  one  behind  the  other, 
because  thence  would  come  great  trouble,  as  only 
the  leading  ships  could  fight.  In  any  case  a  ship  is 
not  so  nimble  as  a  man  to  be  able  to  face  about  and 
do  what  is  best.1 

The  rearguard  should  be  the  ships  that  I  have 
called  the  supports,  which  are  to  be  the  fourth  part 
of  the  fleet,  and  the  lightest  and  best  sailers  ;  but 
they  must  not  move  in  rear  of  the  fleet,  because  they 
would  not  see  well  what  is  passing  so  as  to  give 
timely  succour,  and  therefore  they  ought  always  to 
keep  an  offing  on  that  side  or  flank  of  the  fleet  where 
the  flagship  is,  or  on  both  sides  if  they  are  many ; 
and  if  they  are  in  one  body  they  should  work  to 
station  themselves  to  windward  for  the  reasons 
aforesaid. 

And  if  the  fleet  of  the  enemy  shall  come  on  in 
one  body  in  line  abreast,2  ours  should  do  the  same, 
placing  the  largest  and  strongest  ships  in  the  centre 
and  the  lightest  on  the  flanks  of  the  battle,  seeing 
that  those  which  are  in  the  centre  always  receive 
greater  injury  because  necessarily  they  have  to  fight 
on  both  sides. 

And  if  the  enemy  bring  their  fleet  into  the  form 
of  a  lance-head  or  triangle,  then  ours  ought  to  form  in 
two  lines  [#/#/],  keeping  the  advanced  extremities 
furthest  apart  and  closing  in  the  rear,  so  as  to  take 
the  enemy  between  them  and  engage  them  on  both 
fronts,  placing  the  largest  ships  in  the  rear  and  the 

from  the  context  ala  can  mean  nothing  but  '  line  abreast,'  '  line 
ahead  '  being  strictly  forbidden. 

1  This,  of  course,  refers  to  fire  tactics  ashore.     The  meaning 
is  that  a  ship,  when  she  has  delivered  her  fire,  cannot  retire  by 
countermarch  and  leave  her  next  in  file  to  deliver  its  fire  in  turn. 
The  whole  system,  it  will  be  seen,  is  based  on  end-on  fire,  as  a 
preparation  for  boarding  and  small-arm  fighting. 

2  Viniere  toda  junta  puesta  in  ala. 


io  EARLY  TUDOR  PERIOD 

lightest  at  the  advanced  points,  seeing  that  they  can 
most  quickly  tack  in  upon  the  enemy  opposed  to 
them. 

And  if  the  enemy  approach  formed  in  two  lines 
[alas'],  ours  ought  to  do  the  same,  placing  always  the 
greatest  ships  over  against  the  greatest  of  the  enemy, 
and  being  always  on  the  look-out  to  take  the  enemy 
between  them  ;  and  on  no  account  must  ours  pene- 
trate into  the  midst  of  the  enemy's  formation  \batalla~\, 
because  arms  and  smoke  will  envelope  them  on 
every  side  and  there  will  be  no  way  of  relieving  them. 

The  captain-general  having  now  arrayed  his 
whole  fleet  in  one  of  the  aforesaid  orders  according 
as  it  seems  best  to  him  for  giving  battle,  and  every- 
thing being  ready  for  battle,  all  shall  bear  in  mind 
the  signals  he  shall  have  appointed  with  flag  or  shot 
or  topsail,  that  all  may  know  at  what  time  to  attack 
or  board  or  come  to  rescue  or  retreat,  or  give 
chase.  The  which  signals  all  must  understand  and 
remember  what  they  are  to  do  when  such  signals 
are  made,  and  likewise  the  armed  boats  shall  take 
the  same  care  and  remember  what  they  ought  to  do, 
and  perform  their  duty.1 

Chapter  IV.— Battle 

Then  the  flagship  shall  bid  a  trumpet  sound,  and 
at  that  signal  all  shall  move  in  their  aforesaid  order  ; 
and  as  they  come  into  range  they  shall  commence 
to  play  their  most  powerful  artillery,  taking  care 
that  the  first  shots  do  not  miss,  for,  as  I  have  said, 
when  the  first  shots  hit,  inasmuch  as  they  are  the 
largest,  they  strike  great  dread  and  terror  into  the 
enemy  ;  for  seeing  how  great  hurt  they  suffer,  they 

1  This  sentence  in  the  original  is  incomplete,  running  on  into 
the  next  chapter.  For  clearness  the  construction  has  been  altered 
in  the  translation. 


ALONSO  DE   CHAVES  n 

think  how  much  greater  it  will  be  at  close  range  and 
so  mayhap  they  will  not  want  to  fight,  but  strike  and 
surrender  or  fly,  so  as  not  to  come  to  close  quarters. 

Having  so  begun  firing,  they  shall  always  first 
play  the  largest  guns,  which  are  on  the  side  or  board 
towards  the  enemy,  and  likewise  they  shall  move  over 
from  the  other  side  those  guns  which  have  wheeled 
carriages  to  run  on  the  upper  part  of  the  deck  and 
poop.1  And  then  when  nearer  they  should  use  the 
smaller  ones,  and  by  no  means  should  they  fire  them 
at  first,  for  afar  off  they  will  do  no  hurt,  and  besides 
the  enemy  will  know  there  is  dearth  of  good  ar- 
tillery and  will  take  better  heart  to  make  or  abide 
an  attack.  And  after  having  come  to  closer  quar- 
ters then  they  ought  to  play  the  lighter  artillery. 
And  so  soon  as  they  come  to  board  or  grapple 
all  the  other  kinds  of  arms  shall  be  used,  of  which 
I  have  spoken  more  particularly :  first,  missiles, 
such  as  harpoons  \dardos\  and  stones,  hand-guns 
\escopetas\  and  cross-bows,  and  then  the  fire-balls 
aforesaid,  as  well  from  the  tops  as  from  the  castles, 
and  at  the  same  time  the  calthrops,  linstocks,  stink- 
balls [pildoras],  grenades,  and  the  scorpions  for  the 
sails  and  rigging.  At  this  moment  they  should  sound 
all  the  trumpets,  and  with  a  lusty  cheer  from  every 
ship  at  once  they  should  grapple  and  fight  with  every 
kind  of  weapon,  those  with  staffed  scythes  or  shear- 
hooks  cutting  the  enemy's  rigging,  and  the  others 
with  the  fire  instruments  \trompas  y  bocas  de  fuego\ 
raining  fire  down  on  the  enemy's  rigging  and  crew. 

The  captain-general  should  encourage  all  in 
the  battle,  and  because  he  cannot  be  heard  with  his 
voice  he  should  bid  the  signal  for  action  to  be  made 
with  his  trumpet  or  flag  or  with  his  topsail. 

1  This  remarkable  evolution  is  a  little  obscure.  The  Spanish 
has  fy  moviendo  asimismo  los  otros  del  otro  bordo,  aquellos  que 
tienen  sus  carretones  que  andan  per  cima  de  cubicrta  y  toldo? 


12  EARLY   TUDOR  PERIOD 

And  he  should  keep  a  look-out  in  every  direction 
in  readiness,  when  he  sees  any  of  his  ships  in  danger, 
to  order  the  ships  of  reserve  to  give  succour,  if  by 
chance  they  have  not  seen  it,  or  else  himself  to  bear 
in  with  his  own  ship. 

The  flagship  should  take  great  care  not  to 
grapple  another,  for  then  he  could  not  see  what  is 
passing  in  the  battle  nor  control  it.  And  besides 
his  own  side  in  coming  to  help  and  support  him 
might  find  themselves  out  of  action  ;  or  peradventure 
if  any  accident  befell  him,  the  rest  of  the  fleet  would 
be  left  without  guidance  and  would  not  have  care  to 
succour  one  another,  but  so  far  as  they  were  able 
would  fly  or  take  their  own  course.  Accordingly 
the  captain-general  should  never  be  of  the  first  who 
are  to  grapple  nor  should  he  enter  into  the  press, 
so  that  he  may  watch  the  fighting  and  bring  succour 
where  it  is  most  needed. 

The  ships  of  support  in  like  manner  should  have 
care  to  keep  somewhat  apart  and  not  to  grapple  till 
they  see  where  they  should  first  bring  succour.  The 
more  they  keep  clear  the  more  will  they  have  oppor- 
tunity of  either  standing  off  and  using  their  guns,  or 
of  coming  to  close  range  with  their  other  firearms. 
Moreover,  if  any  ship  of  the  enemy  takes  to  flight, 
they  will  be  able  to  give  chase  or  get  athwart  her 
hawse,  and  will  be  able  to  watch  and  give  succour 
wherever  the  captain-general  signals. 

The  boats  in  like  manner  should  not  close  in  till 
they  see  the  ships  grappled,  and  then  they  should 
come  up  on  the  opposite  side  in  the  manner  stated 
above,  and  carry  out  their  special  duties  as  occasion 
arises  either  with  their  bases,1  of  which  each  shall 
carry  its  own,  and  with  their  harquebuses,  or  else  by 

1  Versos,  breech-loading  pieces  of  the  secondary  armament  of 
ships,  and  for  arming  boats.  Bases  were  of  the  high  penetration 
or  '  culverin '  type. 


ALONSO  DE  CHAVES  13 

getting  close  in  and  wedging  up  the  rudders,  or  cut- 
ting them  and  their  gear  away,  or  by  leaping  in  upon 
the  enemy,  if  they  can  climb  in  without  being  seen, 
or  from  outside  by  setting  fire  to  them,  or  scuttling 
them  with  augers.1 

1  Dando  barrenos.  This  curious  duty  of  the  armed  boats  he 
has  more  fully  explained  in  the  section  on  single  ship  actions,  as 
follows :  '  The  ships  being  grappled,  the  boat  ready  equipped 
should  put  off  to  the  enemy's  ship  under  her  poop,  and  get  fast 
hold  of  her,  and  first  cut  away  her  rudder,  or  at  least  jam  it  with 
half  a  dozen  wedges  in  such  wise  that  it  cannot  steer  or  move, 
and  if  there  is  a  chance  for  more,  without  being  seen,  bore 
half  a  dozen  auger  holes  below  the  water-line,  so  that  the  ship 
founders.' 

The  rest  of  the  chapter  is  concerned  with  the  treatment  of  the 
dead  and  wounded,  pursuit  of  the  enemy  when  victory  is  won, 
and  the  refitting  of  the  fleet. 


i4  EARLY  TUDOR  PERIOD 


AUDLEY'S   FLEET   ORDERS, 

circa  1530 

INTRODUCTORY 

THE  instructions  drawn  up  by  Thomas  Audley  by 
order  of  Henry  VIII  may  be  taken  as  the  last  word 
in  England  of  the  purely  mediaeval  time,  before  the 
development  of  gunnery,  and  particularly  of  broad- 
side fire,  had  sown  the  seeds  of  more  modern  tactics. 
They  were  almost  certainly  drafted  from  long- 
established  precedents,  for  Audley  was  a  lawyer. 
The  document  is  undated,  but  since  Audley  is 
mentioned  without  any  rank  or  title,  it  was  probably 
before  November  1531,  when  he  became  ser- 
jeant-at-law and  king's  Serjeant,  and  certainly  before 
May  1632  when  he  was  knighted.  It  was  at  this 
time  that  Henry  VIII  was  plunging  into  his 
Reformation  policy,  and  had  every  reason  to  be 
prepared  for  complications  abroad,  and  particularly 
with  Spain,  which  was  then  the  leading  naval 
Power. 

The  last  two  articles,  increasing  the  authority  of 
the  council  of  war,  were  probably  insisted  on,  as  Mr. 
Oppenheim  has  pointed  out  in  view  of  Sir  Edward 
Howard's  attempts  on  French  ports  in  1512  and 
1513,  the  last  of  which  ended  in  disaster.1 

1  Administration  of  the  Royal  Navy>  p.  63. 


SSJZ    THOMAS  AUDLEY  15 


ORDERS  TO  BE  USED  B  Y  THE  KING'S  MAJESTY'S 
NAVY  BY  THE  SEA. 

[Brit.  Mus.  Harleian  MSS.  309,  fol.  42,  et  seq.1] 

[Extract.] 

If  they  meet  with  the  enemy  the  admiral  must 
apply  to  get  the  wind  of  the  enemy  by  all  the  means 
he  can,  for  that  is  the  advantage.  No  private 
captain  should  board  the  admiral  enemy  but  the 
admiral  of  the  English,  except  he  cannot  come  to 
the  enemy's,  as  the  matter  may  so  fall  out  without 
they  both  the  one  seek  the  other.  And  if  they 
chase  the  enemy  let  them  that  chase  shoot  no 
ordnance  till  he  be  ready  to  board  him,  for  that  will 
let 2  his  ship's  way. 

Let  every  ship  match  equally  as  near  as  they 
can,  and  leave  some  pinnaces  at  liberty  to  help  the 
overmatched.  And  one  small  ship  when  they  shall 
join  battle  [is]  to  be  attending  on  the  admiral  to  relieve 
him,  for  the  overcoming  of  the  admiral  is  a  great 
discouragement  of  the  rest  of  the  other  side. 

In  case  you  board  your  enemy  enter  not  till  you 
see  the  smoke  gone  and  then  shoot  off3  all  your  pieces, 
your  port-pieces,  the  pieces  of  hail-shot,  [and]  cross- 
bow shot  to  beat  his  cage  deck,  and  if  you  see  his  deck 
well  ridden 4  then  enter  with  your  best  men,  but  first 

1  A  Book  of  Orders  for  the    War  both  by  Land  and  Sea, 
•written  by  Tliomas  Audley  at  the  command  of  King  Henrv  VIII. 
1  I.e.  hinder. 

3  MS.  '  the  shot  of.'     The  whole  MS.  has  evidently  been  very 
carelessly  copied  and  is  full  of  small  blunders,  which  have  been 
corrected  in  the  text  above.     '  Board '  till  comparatively  recent 
times  meant  to  close  with  a  ship.    '  Enter '  was  our  modern  '  board. ' 

4  '  Ridden  '  =  '  cleared.' 


1 6  EARLY  TUDOR  PERIOD 

win  his  tops  in  any  wise  if  it  be  possible.  In  case 
you  see  there  come  rescue  bulge  1  the  enemy  ship 
[but]  first  take  heed  your  own  men  be  retired,  [and] 
take  the  captain  with  certain  of  the  best  with  him, 
the  rest  [to  be]  committed  to  the  sea,  for  else  they 
will  turn  upon  you  to  your  confusion. 

The  admiral    ought  to    have  this  order   before 
he  joins  battle  with  the  enemy,  that  all  his  ships 
shall    bear  a  flag  in  their  mizen-tops,  and   himself 
one    in    the    foremast    beside   the   mainmast,    that 
everyone   may  know  his  own  fleet  by  that  token. 
If  he  see  a  hard  match  with  the  enemy  and  be  to 
leeward,  then  to  gather  his  fleet  together  and  seem 
to  flee,  and  flee  indeed  for  this  purpose  till  the  enemy 
draw  within  gunshot.     And  when  the  enemy  doth 
shoot  then  [he  shall]  shoot  again,  and  make  all  the 
smoke  he  can  to  the  intent  the  enemy  shall  not  see  the 
ships,  and  [then]  suddenly  hale  up  his  tackle  aboard,2 
and  have  the  wind   of  the  enemy.     And  by  this 
policy  it  is  possible  to  win  the  weather-gage  of  the 
enemy,  and  then  he  hath  a  great  advantage,  and  this 
may  well  be  done  if  it  be  well  foreseen  beforehand, 
and   every  captain   and  master  made   privy  to   it 
beforehand   at  whatsoever  time  such  disadvantage 
shall  happen. 

The  admiral  shall  not  take  in  hand  any  exploit  to 
land  or  enter  into  any  harbour  enemy  with  the  king's 
ships,  but 3  he  call  a  council  and  make  the  captains 
privy  to  his  device  and  the  best  masters  in  the  fleet 
or  pilots,  known  to  be  skilful  men  on  that  coast  or 
place  where  he  intendeth  to  do  his  exploit,  and  by 

1  '  Bulge  '='  scuttle.'    A  ship  was  said  to  bulge  herself  when 
she  ran  aground  and  filled. 

2  The  passage  should  probably  read  '  hale  or  haul  his  tacks 
aboard.' 

3  I.e.  '  without,'  '  unless.' 


SIR    THOMAS  AUDLEY  17 

good  advice.  Otherwise  the  fault  ought  to  be  laid 
on  the  admiral  if  anything  should  happen  but  well.1 
And  if  he  did  an  exploit  without  assent  of  the 
captains  and  [it]  proved  well,  the  king  ought  to  put 
him  out  of  his  room  for  purposing  a  matter  of  such 
charge  of  his  own  brain,  whereby  the  whole  fleet 
might  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy  to  the 
destruction  of  the  king's  people.2 

1  It  was  under  this  old  rule  that  Boroughs  lodged  his  protest 
against  Drake's  entering  Cadiz  in  1587. 

2  The  rest  of  the  articles  relate  to  discipline,  internal  order 
of  ships,  and  securing  prize  cargoes. 


1 8  EARLY   TUDOR   PERIOD 


THE  ADOPTION  OF  SPANISH  TACTICS 
BY  HENRY  VIII 

INTRODUCTORY 

THESE  two  sets  of  orders  were  drawn  up  by  the 
lord  high  admiral  in  rapid  succession  in  August 
1545,  during  the  second  stage  of  Henry  VI IPs  last 
war  with  France.  In  the  previous  month  D'An- 
nibault,  the  French  admiral,  had  been  compelled 
to  abandon  his  attempt  on  Portsmouth  and  the 
Isle  of  Wight,  and  retire  to  recruit  upon  his  own 
coast ;  and  Lord  Lisle  was  about  to  go  out  and 
endeavour  to  bring  him  to  action. 

The  orders,  it  will  be  seen,  are  a  distinct 
advance  on  those  of  1530,  and  betray  strongly 
the  influence  of  Spanish  ideas  as  formulated  by 
De  Chaves.  So  striking  indeed  is  the  resemblance 
in  many  points,  that  we  perhaps  may  trace  it 
to  Henry's  recent  alliance  with  Charles  V.  The 
main  difference  was  that  Henry's  *  wings '  were 
composed  of  oared  craft,  and  to  form  them  of 
sufficient  strength  he  had  had  some  of  the  newest 
and  smartest  'galliasses,'  or  'galleys' — that  is,  his 
vessels  specially  built  for  men-of-war — fitted  with 
oars.  The  reason  for  this  was  that  the  French  fleet 
was  a  mixed  one,  the  sailing  division  having  been 
reinforced  by  a  squadron  of  galleys  from  the  Medi- 
terranean. The  elaborate  attempts  to  combine  the 
two  types  tactically — a  problem  which  the  Italian 
admirals  had  hitherto  found  insoluble — points  to 


LORD   LISLE,    1545  19 

an  advanced  study  of  the  naval  art  that  is  entirely 
characteristic  of  Henry  VIII. 

The  main  idea  of  the  first  order  is  of  a  van- 
guard in  three  ranks,  formed  of  the  most  powerful 
hired  merchant  ships  and  the  king's  own  galleons  and 
great  ships,  and  supported  by  a  strong  rearguard  of 
smaller  armed  merchantmen,  and  by  two  oared  wings 
on  either  flank  composed  of  royal  and  private  vessels 
combined.  The  vanguard  was  to  be  marshalled 
with  its  three  ranks  so  adjusted  that  its  general  form 
was  that  of  a  blunt  wedge.  In  the  first  rank  come 
eight  of  the  large  merchantmen,  mainly  Hanseatic 
vessels ;  in  the  second,  ten  of  the  royal  navy 
and  one  private  vessel  ;  in  the  third,  nineteen 
second-rate  merchantmen.  The  tactical  aim  is 
clearly  that  the  heavy  Hanseatic  ships  should,  as 
De  Chaves  says,  receive  the  first  shock  and  break 
up  the  enemy's  formation  for  the  royal  ships, 
while  the  third  rank  are  in  position  to  support. 
The  wings,  which  were  specially  told  off  to  keep 
the  galleys  in  check,  correspond  to  the  reserve  of 
De  Chaves,  and  the  importance  attached  to  them  is 
seen  in  the  fact  that  they  contained  all  the  king's 
galleons  of  the  latest  type. 

In  the  second  set  of  instructions,  issued  on 
August  10,  this  order  was  considerably  modified. 
The  fleet  had  been  increased  by  the  arrival  of  some 
of  the  west-country  ships,  and  a  new  order  of 
battle  was  drawn  up  which  is  printed  in  the  State 
Papers,  Henry  F///(Old  Series),  i.  810.  The  forma- 
tion, though  still  retaining  the  blunt  wedge  design, 
was  simplified.  We  have  now  a  vanguard  of  24  ships, 
a  '  battaill '  or  main  body  of  40  ships,  and  one  'wing ' 
of  40  oared  '  galliasses,  shallops  and  boats  of  war.' 
The  'wing,'  however,  was  still  capable  of  acting  in 
two  divisions,  for,  unlike  the  vanguard  and  'battaill,' 
it  had  a  vice-admiral  as  well  as  an  admiral. 

C2 


20  EARLY  TUDOR   PERIOD 

LORD  LISLE,  No.  i,  1545. 
[Le  Fleming  MSS.  No.  2.] » 

The  Order  of  Battle? 

THE   VANGUARD. 

These  be  the  ships  appointed  for  the  first  rank 
of  the  vanguard : 

In  primis : 

The  Great  Argosy. 
The  Samson  Lubeck. 
The  Johannes  Lubeck. 
The  Trinity  of  Dantzig. 
The  Mary  of  Hamburg. 
The  Pellican. 
The  Morion  [of  Dantzig]. 
The  '  Sepiar '  of  Dantzig. 
=  8. 

The  second  rank  of  the  vanguard  : 

The  Harry  Grace  a  Dieu. 
The  Venetian. 
The  Peter  Pomegranate. 
The  Mathew  Gonson. 
The  Pansy. 
The  Great  Galley. 
The  Sweepstake. 
The  Minion. 
The  Swallow. 
The  New  Bark. 
The  Saul  '  Argaly.' 
=  12  (sic). 

1  A  similar  list  of  ships  is  in  a  MS.  in  the  Cambridge  Uni- 
versity Library. 

2  This   paper   gives   the  order    of  the  wings   and  vanguard 
only.     The  fifty  west-country  ships  that  were  presumably  to  form 
the  rearguard  had  not  yet  joined. 


LORD  LISLE,    1545  21 

The  third  rank  of  the  vanguard  : 

The  '  Berste  Denar.' 
The  Falcon  Lively. 
The  Harry  Bristol. 
The  Trinity  Smith. 
The  Margaret  of  Bristol. 
The  Trinity  Reniger. 
The  Mary  James. 
The  Pilgrim  of  Dartmouth. 
The  Mary  Gorge  of  Rye. 
The  Thomas  Tipkins. 
The  Gorges  Brigges. 
The  Anne  Lively. 
=  12. 

The  John  Evangelist. 
The  Thomas  Modell. 
The  Lartycke  for  '  Lartigoe  ']• 

T-L       r-i.    •  in  &          J 

1  he  Christopher  Bennet. 
The  Mary  Fortune. 
The  Mary  Marten. 
The  Trinity  Bristol. 
=  7- 

THE    OARED    WINGS. 

Galleys  and  ships  of  the  right  wing  : 

The  Great  Mistress  of  England. 
The  Salamander. 
The  Jennet. 
The  Lion. 
The  Greyhound. 
The  Thomas  Greenwich. 
The  Lesser  Pinnace. 
The  Hind. 
The  Harry. 
The  Galley  Subtle. 
Two  boats  of  Rye. 
=  12. 


22  EARLY   TUDOR  PERIOD 

Galleys  and  ships  of  the  left  wing  : 

The  Anne  Gallant. 
The  Unicorn. 
The  Falcon. 
The  Dragon. 
The  Sacre. 
The  Merlin. 
The  Rae. 

The  Reniger  pinnace. 
The  Foyst. 
Two  boats  of  Rye. 
=  11. 

The  Fighting  Instructions. 

Item.  It  is  to  be  considered  that  the  ranks  must 
keep  such  order  in  sailing  that  none  impeach 
another.  Wherefore  it  is  requisite  that  every  of  the 
said  ranks  keep  right  way  with  another,  and  take 
such  regard  to  the  observing  of  the  same  that  no 
ship  pass  his  fellows  forward  nor  backward  nor 
slack  anything,  but  [keep]  as  they  were  in  one  line, 
and  that  there  may  be  half  a  cable  length  between 
every  of  the  ships. 

Item.  The  first  rank  shall  make  sail  straight  to 
the  front  of  the  battle  and  shall  pass  through  them, 
and  so  shall  make  a  short  return  to  the  midwards  as 
they  may,  and  they  [are]  to  have  a  special  regard 
to  the  course  of  the  second  rank  ;  which  two  ranks  is 
appointed  to  lay  aboard  the  principal  ships  of  the 
enemy,  every  man  choosing l  his  mate  as  they  may, 
reserving  the  admiral  for  my  lord  admiral. 

Item.  That  every  ship  of  the  first  rank  shall  bear 
a  flag  of  St.  George's  cross  upon  the  fore  topmast 
for  the  space  of  the  fight,  which  upon  the  king's 

1  MS.  'closing.' 


LORD  LISLE,    1545  23 

determination    shall    be   on   Monday,    the    loth    of 
August,  anno  I545-1 

And  every  ship  appointed  to  the  middle  rank 
shall  for  the  space  of  the  fight  bear  a  flag  of  St. 
George's  cross  upon  her  mainmast. 

And  every  ship  of  the  third  rank  shall  bear  a 
like  flag  upon  his  mizen  2  mast  top,  and  every  of  the 
said  wings  shall  have  in  their  tops  a  flag  of  St. 
George. 

Item.  The  victuallers  shall  follow  the  third  rank 
and  shall  bear  in  their  tops  their  flags.  Also  that 
neither  of  the  said  wings  shall  further  enter  into 
fight ;  but,  having  advantage  as  near  anigh  3  as  they 
can  of  the  wind,  shall  give  succour  as  they  shall  see 
occasion,  and  shall  not  give  care  to  any  of  the  small 
vessels  to  weaken  our  force.  There  be,  besides  the 
said  ships  mentioned,  to  be  joined  to  the  foresaid 
battle  fifty  sail  of  western  ships,  and  whereof  be  seven 
great  hulks  of  888  ton  apiece,  and  there  is  also  the 
number  of  1,200  of  soldiers  beside  mariners  in  all  the 
said  ships. 

LORD  LISLE,  No.  2. 
[Record  Office,  State  Papers,  Henry  VIII.] 

The  Order  for  the  said  Fleet  taken  by  the  Lord 
Admiral  the  \&th  day  of  August,  1545.* 

i.   First,  it  is  to  be  considered  that  every  of  the 
captains  with  the  said  ships  appointed  by  this  order 

1  The  fleets  did  not  get  contact  till  August  15. 
8  MS.  '  messel.' 

3  MS.    'a   snare  a   nye.'    The    passage   is   clearly   corrupt. 
Perhaps  it  should  read  '  neither  of  the  said  wings  shall  further 
enter  into  the  fight  but  as  nigh  as  they  can  keeping  advantage  of 
the  wind  [i.e.  without  losing  the  weather-gage  of  any  part  of  the 
enemy's  fleet]  but  shall  give  succour,1  &c. 

4  The  articles  are  preceded,  like  the  first  ones,  by  a  list  of 
ships  or  '  battle  order,'  showing  an  organisation  into  a  van  (van- 


24  EARLY  TUDOR   PERIOD 

to  the  vanward,  battle  and  wing  shall  ride  at 
anchor  according  as  they  be  appointed  to  sail  by 
the  said  order  ;  and  no  ship  of  any  of  the  said  wards 
or  wing  shall  presume  to  come  to  an  anchor  before 
the  admiral  of  the  said  ward. 

2.  Item,  that  every  captain  of  the  said  wards  or 
wing  shall  be  in  everything  ordered  by  the  admiral 
of  the  same. 

3.  Item,  when  we  shall  see  a  convenient  time  to 
fight  with  the  enemies  our  vanward  shall  make  with 
their  vanward  if  they  have  any ;  and  if  they  be  in 
one  company,  our  vanward,  taking  the  advantage  of 
the  wind,  shall  set  upon  their  foremost  rank,  bring- 
ing them  out  of  order  ;  and  our  vice-admiral  shall 
seek   to   board  their  vice-admiral,  and  every  cap- 
tain shall  choose  his  equal  as  near  as  he  may. 

4.  Item,  the  admiral  of  the  wing  shall  be  always 
in  the  wind  with  his  whole  company;  and  when  we 
shall  join  with  the  enemies  he  shall  keep  still  the 
advantage  of  the  wind,  to  the  intent  he  with  his 
company  may  the  better  beat  off  the  galleys  from 
the  great  ships.1 

ward),  main  body  (battle),  and  one  wing  of  oared  craft.  See 
Introductory  Note,  p.  19. 

1  Of  the  remaining  seven  articles,  five  relate  to  distinguishing 
squadronal  flags  and  lights  as  in  the  earlier  instructions,  and  the 
last  one  to  the  watchword  of  the  night.  It  is  to  be  '  God  save 
King  Henry,'  and  the  answer,  '  And  long  to  reign  over  us.' 


PART  II 
ELIZABETHAN  AND  JACOBEAN 

SIR  WALTER   RALEGH,  1617 


THE  ELIZABETHAN  ORIGIN  OF 
RALEGH'S  INSTRUCTIONS 

INTRODUCTORY 

No  fighting  instructions  known  to  have  been  issued 
in  the  reign  of  Elizabeth  have  been  found,  nor  is 
there  any  indication  that  a  regular  order  of  battle 
was  ever  laid  down  by  the  seamen-admirals  of  her 
time.1  Even  Howard's  great  fleet  of  1588  had 
twice  been  in  action  with  the  Armada  before  it  was 
so  much  as  organised  into  squadrons.  If  anything 
of  the  kind  was  introduced  later  in  her  reign  Captain 
Nathaniel  Boteler,  who  had  served  in  the  Jacobean 
navy  and  wrote  on  the  subject  early  in  the  reign 
of  Charles  I,  was  ignorant  of  it.  In  his  Dialogues 
about  Sea  Services,  he  devotes  the  sixth  to  '  Order- 
ing of  Fleets  in  Sailing,  Chases,  Boardings  and 
Battles/  but  although  he  suggests  a  battle  order 
which  we  know  was  never  put  in  practice,  he  is  un- 
able to  give  one  that  had  been  used  by  an  English 
fleet.2  It  is  not  surprising.  In  the  despatches  of 

1  Hakluyt  printed  several  sets  of  instructions  issued  to  armed 
fleets  intended  for  discovery,  viz.  :    i.  Those  drawn  by  Sebastian 
Cabota  for  Sir  Hugh  Willoughby's  voyage  in  1553.    2.  Those  for 
the  first  voyage  of  Anthony  Jenkinson,  1557,  which  refers  toother 
standing  orders.     3.  Those  issued  by  the  lords  of  the  Council 
for  Edward  Fenton  in  1582,  the  2oth  article  of  which  directs  him 
to  draw  up  orders  '  for  their  better  government  both  at  sea  and 
land.'     But  none  of  these  contain  any  fighting  instructions. 

2  Boteler's    MS.   was   not    published    till    1685,   when    the 
publisher  dedicated  it  to  Samuel  Pepys.     The  date  at  which  it 
was  written  can  only  be  inferred  from  internal  evidence.      At 


28     ELIZABETHAN  AND  JACOBEAN 

the  Elizabethan  admirals,  though  they  have  much 
to  say  on  strategy,  there  is  not  a  word  of  fleet- 
tactics,  as  we  understand  the  thing.  The  domina- 
tion of  the  seamen's  idea  of  naval  warfare,  the 
increasing  handiness  of  ships,  the  improved  design 
of  their  batteries,  the  special  progress  made  by 
Englishmen  in  guns  and  gunnery  led  rapidly  to  the 
preference  of  broadside  gunfire  over  boarding,  and 
to  an  exaggeration  of  the  value  of  individual 
mobility  ;  and  the  old  semi-military  formations  based 
on  small-arm  fighting  were  abandoned. 

At  the  same  time,  although  the  seamen-ad- 
mirals did  not  trouble  or  were  not  sufficiently 
advanced  to  devise  a  battle  order  to  suit  their  new 
weapon,  there  are  many  indications  that,  consciously 
or  unconsciously,  they  developed  a  tendency  inherent 
in  the  broadside  idea  to  fall  in  action  into  a  rough 
line  ahead  ;  that  is  to  say,  the  practice  was  usually 
to  break  up  into  groups  as  occasion  dictated,  and  for 
each  group  to  deliver  its  broadsides  in  succession  on 
an  exposed  point  of  the  enemy's  formation.  That 
the  armed  merchantmen  conformed  regularly  to  this 
idea  is  very  improbable.  The  faint  pictures  we  have 
of  their  well-meant  efforts  present  them  to  us  attack- 
ing in  a  loose  throng  and  masking  each  other's  fire. 
But  that  the  queen's  ships  did  not  attempt  to 
observe  any  order  is  not  so  clear.  When  the  com- 

p.  47  he  refers  to  'his  Majesty's  late  augmentation  of  seamen's 
pay  in  general.'  Such  an  augmentation  took  place  in  1625  and 
1626.  He  also  refers  to  the  'late  king'  and  to  the  colony  of 
St.  Christopher's,  which  was  settled  in  1623,  but  not  to  that  of 
New  Providence,  settled  in  1629.  He  served  in  the  Cadiz  Expe- 
dition of  1625,  but  does  not  mention  it  or  any  event  of  the  rest 
of  the  war.  The  battle  order,  however,  which  he  recommends 
closely  resembles  that  proposed  by  Sir  E.  Cecil  (post,  p.  65). 
The  probability  is,  then,  that  his  work  was  begun  at  the  end  of 
James  I's  reign,  and  was  part  of  the  large  output  of  military 
literature  to  which  the  imminent  prospect  of  war  with  Spain  gave 
rise  at  that  time. 


SJ7?  FRANCIS  DRAKE,    1588        29 

bined  fleet  of  Howard  and  Drake  was  first  sighted 
by  the  Armada,  it  is  said  by  two  Spanish  eye-wit- 
nesses to  have  been  in  ala,  and  'in  very  fine  order.' 
And  the  second  of  Adams's  charts,  upon  which  the 
famous  House  of  Lords'  tapestries  were  designed, 
actually  represents  the  queen's  ships  standing  out  of 
Plymouth  in  line  ahead,  and  coming  to  the  attack  in 
a  similar  but   already  disordered   formation.     Still 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that,  however  far  a  rudimentary 
form  of  line  ahead  was  carried  by  the  Elizabethans, 
it  was  a  matter  of  minor  tactics  and  not  of  a  battle 
order,  and  was  rather  instinctive  than  the  perfected 
result  of  a  serious  attempt  to  work  out  a  tactical 
system.     The  only  actual  account  of  a  fleet  formation 
which  we  have  is  still  on  the  old  lines,  and  it  was 
for  review  purposes  only.     Ubaldino,  in  his  second 
narrative,  which  he  says  was  inspired  by  Drake,1 
relates  that  when   Drake  put  out  of  Plymouth  to 
receive  Howard  '  he  sallied  from  port  to  meet  him 
with  his  thirty  ships  in  equal  ranks,  three  ships  deep, 
making   honourable    display    of    his    masterly   and 
diligent  handling,  with  the  pinnaces  and  small  craft 
thrown  forward  as  though  to  reconnoitre  the  ships  that 
were  approaching,  which  is  their  office.'     Nothing, 
however,  is  more  certain  in    the   unhappily  vague 
accounts  of  the   1588  campaign  than  that  no  such 
battle  order  as  this  was  used  in  action  against  the 
Armada. 

It  is  not  till  the  close  of  the  West  Indian 
Expedition  of  1596,  when,  after  Hawkins  and  Drake 
were  both  dead,  Colonel-General  Sir  Thomas 
Baskerville,  the  commander  of  the  landing  force,  was 
left  in  charge  of  the  retreating  fleet,  that  we  get  any 
trace  of  a  definite  battle  formation.  In  his  action 
off  the  Isla  de  Pinos  he  seems,  so  far  as  we  can  read 
the  obscure  description,  to  have  formed  his  fleet  into 
1  See  Drake  and  the  Tudor  Navy,  ii.  Appendix  B. 


30    ELIZABETHAN  AND  JACOBEAN 

two  divisions  abreast,  each  in  line  ahead.  The 
queen's  ships  are  described  at  least  as  engaging  in 
succession  according  to  previous  directions  till  all 
had  had  'their  course.'  Henry  Savile,  whose  in- 
temperate and  enthusiastic  defence  of  his  commander 
was  printed  by  Hakluyt,  further  says :  '  Our  general 
was  the  foremost  and  so  held  his  place  until,  by  order 
of  fight,  other  ships  were  to  have  their  turns  according 
to  his  former  direction,  who  wisely  and  politicly  had 
so  ordered  his  vanguard  and  rearward  ;  and  as  the 
manner  of  it  was  altogether  strange  to  the  Spaniard, 
so  might  they  have  been  without  hope  of  victory,  if 
their  general  had  been  a  man  of  judgment  in  sea- 
fights.' 

Here,  then,  if  we  may  trust  Savile,  a  definite 
battle  order  must  have  been  laid  down  beforehand 
on  the  new  lines,  and  it  is  possible  that  in  the  years 
which  had  elapsed  since  the  Armada  campaign  the 
seamen  had  been  giving  serious  attention  to  a  tac- 
tical system,  which  the  absence  of  naval  actions 
prevented  reaching  any  degree  of  development. 
Had  the  idea  been  Baskerville's  own  it  is  very, 
unlikely  that  the  veteran  sea-captains  on  his  council 
of  war  would  have  assented  to  its  adoption.  At 
any  rate  we  may  assert  that  the  idea  of  ships  attack- 
ing in  succession  so  as  to  support  one  another  with- 
out masking  each  other's  broadside  fire  (which  is  the 
essential  germ  of  the  true  line  ahead)  was  in  the  air, 
and  it  is  clearly  on  the  principle  that  underlay  Bas- 
kerville's tactics  that  Ralegh's  fighting  instructions 
were  based  twenty  years  later.1 

These  which  are  the  first  instructions  known  to 
have  been  issued  to  an  English  fleet  since  Henry 
VIII's  time  were  signed  by  Sir  Walter  Ralegh  on 
May  3,  1617,  at  Plymouth,  on  the  eve  of  his  sailing 
for  his  ill-fated  expedition  to  Guiana.  Most  of  the 

1  See  Article  i  of  the  Instructions  of  1816,  post,  p.  342. 


WALTER  RALEGH,    1617        31 

articles  are  in  the  nature  of  '  Articles  of  War '  and 
'  Sailing  Instructions '  rather  than  '  Fighting  Instruc- 
tions,' but  the  whole  are  printed  below  for  their 
general  interest.  A  contemporary  writer,  quoted  by 
Edwards  in  his  Life  of  Ralegh,  says  of  them  : 
'  There  is  no  precedent  of  so  godly,  severe,  and 
martial  government,  fit  to  be  written  and  engraven 
in  every  man's  soul  that  covets  to  do  honour  to  his 
king  and  country  in  this  or  like  attempts.'  But  this 
cannot  be  taken  quite  literally.  So  far  at  least  as 
they  relate  to  discipline,  some  of  Ralegh's  articles 
may  be  traced  back  in  the  Black  Book  of  the 
Admiralty  to  the  fourteenth  century,  while  the  il- 
logical arrangement  of  the  whole  points,  as  in  the 
case  of  the  Additional  Fighting  Instructions  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  to  a  gradual  growth  from  prece- 
dent to  precedent  by  the  accretion  of  expeditional 
orders  added  from  time  to  time  by  individual  admirals. 
The  process  of  formation  may  be  well  studied  in 
Lord  Wimbledon's  first  orders,  where  Ralegh's  special 
expeditional  additions  will  be  found  absorbed  and 
adapted  to  the  conditions  of  a  larger  fleet.  Moreover, 
there  is  evidence  that,  with  the  exception  of  those 
articles  which  were  designed  in  view  of  the  special 
destination  of  Ralegh's  voyage,  the  whole  of  them 
were  based  on  an  early  Elizabethan  precedent. 
For  the  history  of  English  tactics  the  point  is  of 
considerable  importance,  especially  in  view  of  his 
twenty-ninth  article,  which  lays  down  the  method 
of  attack  when  the  weather-gage  has  been  secured. 
This  has  hitherto  been  believed  to  be  new  and 
presumably  Ralegh's  own,  in  spite  of  the  difficulty 
of  believing  that  a  man  entirely  without  experience 
of  fleet  actions  at  sea  could  have  hit  upon  so 
original  and  effective  a  tactical  design.  The  evi- 
dence, however,  that  Ralegh  borrowed  it  from  an 
earlier  set  of  orders  is  fairly  clear. 


32     ELIZABETHAN  AND  JACOBEAN 

Amongst  the  Stowe  MSS.  in  the  British  Museum 
there  is  a  small  quarto  treatise  (No.  426)  entitled 
'  Observations  and  overtures  for  a  sea  fight  upon  our 
own  coasts,  and  what  kind  of  order  and  discipline  is 
fitted  to  be  used  in  martialling  and  directing  our 
navies  against  the  preparations  of  such  Spanish 
Armadas  or  others  as  shall  at  any  time  come  to 
assail  us.'  From  internal  evidence  and  directly 
from  another  copy  of  it  in  the  Lansdown  MSS. 
(No.  213),  we  know  it  to  be  the  work  of '  William 
Gorges,  gentleman.'  He  is  to  be  identified  as  a 
son  of  Sir  William  Gorges,  for  he  tells  us  he  was 
afloat  with  his  father  in  the  Dreadnought  as  early 
as  1578,  when  Sir  William  was  admiral  on  the 
Irish  station  with  a  squadron  ordered  to  intercept 
the  filibustering  expedition  which  Sir  Thomas 
Stucley  was  about  to  attempt  under  the  auspices 
of  Pope  Gregory  XIII.  Sir  William  was  a  cousin 
of  Ralegh's  and  brother  to  Sir  Arthur  Gorges, 
who  was  Ralegh's  captain  in  the  Azores  expedition 
of  1597,  and  who  in  Ralegh's  interest  wrote  the 
account  of  the  campaign  which  Purchas  printed. 
Though  William,  the  son,  freely  quotes  the  expe- 
riences of  the  Armada  campaign  of  1588,  he  is 
not  known  to  have  ever  held  a  naval  command,  and 
he  calls  himself  'unexperienced.'  We  may  take  it 
therefore  that  his  treatise  was  mainly  inspired  by 
Ralegh,  to  whom  indeed  a  large  part  of  it  is  some- 
times attributed.  This  question,  however,  is  of  small 
importance.  The  gist  of  the  matter  is  a  set  of  fleet 
orders  which  he  has  appended  as  a  precedent  at 
the  end  of  his  treatise,  and  it  is  on  these  orders 
that  Ralegh's  are  clearly  based.  They  com- 
mence with  fourteen  articles,  consisting  mainly  of 
sailing  instructions,  similar  to  those  which  occur 
later  in  Ralegh's  set.  The  fifteenth  deals  with 
fighting  and  bloodshed  among  the  crews,  and  the 


SIR    WILLIAM  GORGES,    1578        33 

sixteenth  enjoins  morning  and  evening  prayer,  with 
a  psalm  at  setting  the  watch,  and  further  provides 
that  any  man  absenting  himself  from  divine  service 
without  good  cause  shall  suffer  the  '  bilboes,'  with 
bread  and  water  for  twelve  hours.  The  whole  of 
this  drastic  provision  for  improving  the  seamen's 
morals  has  been  struck  out  by  a  hurried  and  less 
clerkly  hand,  and  in  the  margin  is  substituted 
another  article  practically  word  for  word  the  same 
as  that  which  Ralegh  adopted  as  his  first  article. 
The  same  hand  has  also  erased  the  whole  number- 
ing of  the  articles  up  to  No.  16,  and  has  noted  that 
the  new  article  on  prayers  is  to  come  first.1  The 
articles  which  follow  correspond  closely  both  in  order 
and  expression  to  Ralegh's,  ending  with  No.  36, 
where  Ralegh's  special  articles  relating  to  landing 
in  Guiana  begin.  Ralegh's  important  twenty-ninth 
article  dealing  with  the  method  of  attack  is  practically 
identical  with  that  of  Gorges.  Ralegh,  however, 
has  several  articles  which  are  not  in  Gorges's  set,  and 
wherever  the  two  sets  are  not  word  for  word  the 
same,  Ralegh's  is  the  fuller,  having  been  to  all  ap- 
pearances expanded  from  Gorges's  precedent.  This, 
coupled  with  the  fact  that  other  corrections  beside 
those  of  the  prayer  article  are  embodied  in  Ralegh's 
articles,  leaves  practically  no  doubt  that  Gorges's  set 
was  the  earlier  and  the  precedent  upon  which  Ralegh's 
was  based. 

An  apparent  difficulty  in  the  date  of  Gorges's 
treatise  need  not  detain  us.  It  was  dedicated  on 
March  16,  1618-9,  to  Buckingham,  the  new  lord 
high  admiral,  but  it  bears  indication  of  having 
been  written  earlier,  and  in  any  case  the  date  of  the 

1  In  all  previous  English  instructions  the  prayer  article  had 
come  towards  the  end.  In  the  Spanish  service  it  came  first,  and 
it  was  thence  probably  that  Ralegh  got  his  idea. 

D 


34    ELIZABETHAN  AND  JACOBEAN 

dedication  is  no  guide  to  the  date  of  the  orders  in 
the  Appendix. 

The  important  question  is,  how  much  earlier 
than  Ralegh's  are  these  orders  of  Gorges's  treatise  ? 
Can  we  approximately  fix  their  date  ?  Certainly 
not  with  any  degree  of  precision,  but  neverthe- 
less we  are  not  quite  without  light.  To  begin 
with  there  is  the  harsh  punishment  for  not  at- 
tending prayers,  which  is  thoroughly  characteristic 
of  Tudor  times.  Then  there  is  an  article,  which 
Ralegh  omits,  relating  to  the  use  of  '  musket-arrows.' 
Gorges's  article  runs  :  '  If  musket-arrows  be  used,  to 
have  great  regard  that  they  use  not  but  half  the  ordi- 
nary charge  of  powder,  otherwise  more  powder  will 
make  the  arrow  fly  double.'  Now  these  arrows  we 
know  to  have  been  in  high  favour  for  their  power  of 
penetrating  musket-proof  defences  about  the  time  of 
the  Armada.  They  were  a  purely  English  device, 
and  were  taken  by  Richard  Hawkins  upon  his 
voyage  to  the  South  Sea  in  1593.  He  highly 
commends  them,  but  nevertheless  they  appear  to 
have  fallen  out  of  fashion,  and  no  trace  of  their  use 
in  Jacobean  times  has  been  found.1 

A  still  more  suggestive  indication  exists  in  the 
heading  which  is  prefixed  to  Gorges's  Appendix.  It 
runs  as  follows  : — '  A  form  of  orders  and  directions 
to  be  given  by  an  admiral  in  conducting  a  fleet 
through  the  Narrow  Seas  for  the  better  keeping 
together  or  relieving  one  another  upon  any  occasion 
of  distress  or  separation  by  weather  or  by  giving 
chase.  For  the  understanding  whereof  suppose 
that  a  fleet  of  his  majesty's  consisting  of  twenty  or 
thirty  sail  were  bound  for  serving  on  the  west  part 
of  Ireland,  as  Kinsale  haven  for  example.'  The 

1  Laughton,  Defeat  of  the  Armada,  i.  126;  Account,  &c. 
(Exchequer,  Queen's  Remembrancer},  Ixiv.  9,  April  9,  1588  ; 
Hawkins's  Observations  (Hakl.  Soc.),  §  Ixvi. 


WILLIAM  GORGES,    1578        35 

words  '  his  majesty '  show  the  Appendix  was 
penned  under  James  I  ;  but  why  did  Gorges 
select  this  curious  example  for  explaining  his 
orders  ?  We  can  only  remember  that  it  was  exactly 
upon  such  an  occasion  that  he  had  served  with  his 
father  in  1578.  There  is  therefore  at  least  a  possi- 
bility that  the  orders  in  question  may  be  a  copy  or 
an  adaptation  of  some  which  Sir  William  Gorges 
had  issued  ten  years  before  the  Armada.  Certainly 
no  situation  had  arisen  since  Elizabeth's  death 
to  put  such  an  idea  into  the  writer's  head,  and  the 
points  of  rendezvous  mentioned  in  Gorges's  first 
article  are  exactly  those  which  Sir  William  would 
naturally  have  given. 

On  evidence  so  inconclusive  no  certainty  can  be 
attained.  All  we  can  say  is  that  Gorges's  Appendix 
points  to  a  possibility  that  Ralegh's  remarkable 
twenty- ninth  article  may  have  been  as  old  as  the 
middle  of  Elizabeth's  reign,  and  that  the  reason 
why  it  has  not  survived  in  the  writings  of  any 
of  the  great  Elizabethan  admirals  is  either  that 
the  tactics  it  enjoins  were  regarded  as  a  secret  of 
the  seamen's  '  mystery '  or  were  too  trite  or  com- 
monplace to  need  enunciation.  At  any  rate  in  the 
face  of  the  Gorges  precedent  it  cannot  be  said, 
without  reservation,  that  this  rudimentary  form  of 
line  ahead  or  attack  in  succession  was  invented  by 
Ralegh,  or  that  it  was  not  known  to  the  men  who 
fought  the  Armada. 

Amongst  other  articles  of  special  interest,  as 
showing  how  firmly  the  English  naval  tradition  was 
already  fixed,  should  be  noticed  the  twenty-fifth,  re- 
lating to  seamen  gunners,  the  twenty-sixth,  forbid- 
ding action  at  more  than  point-blank  range,  and 
above  all  the  fifth  and  sixth,  aimed  at  obliterating  all 
distinction  between  soldiers  and  sailors  aboard  ship, 
and  at  securing  that  unity  of  service  between  the 


36    ELIZABETHAN  AND  JACOBEAN 

land  and  sea  forces  which  has  been  the  peculiar  dis- 
tinction of  the  national  instinct  for  war. 

As  to  the  tactical  principle  upon  which  the 
Elizabethan  form  of  attack  was  based,  it  must  be 
noted  that  was  to  demoralise  the  enemy — to  drive 
him  into  '  utter  confusion.'  The  point  is  important, 
for  this  conception  of  tactics  held  its  place  till  it 
was  ultimately  supplanted  by  the  idea  of  concen- 
trating on  part  of  his  fleet. 

SIR    WALTER  RALEGH,   1617. l 
[State  Papers  Domestic  xcii.  f.  9.] 

Orders  to  be  observed  by  the  commanders  of  the  fleet 
and  land  companies  under  the  charge  and  conduct 
of  Sir  Walter  Ralegh,  Knight,  bound  for  the 
south  parts  of  America  or  elsewhere. 

Given  at  Plymouth  in  Devon,  the  ^rd  of  May,  1617. 

First.  Because  no  action  nor  enterprise  can 
prosper,  be  it  by  sea  or  by  land,  without  the  favour 
and  assistance  of  Almighty  God,  the  Lord  and 
strength  of  hosts  and  armies,  you  shall  not  fail  to 
cause  divine  service  to  be  read  in  your  ship  morn- 
ing and  evening,  in  the  morning  before  dinner, 
and  in  the  evening  before  supper,  or  at  least  (if 
there  be  interruption  by  foul  weather)  once  in  the 
day,  praising  God  every  night  with  the  singing  of  a 
psalm  at  the  setting  of  the  watch. 

2.  You  shall  take  especial  care  that  God  be  not 
blasphemed  in  your  ship,  but  that  after  admonition 
given,  if  the  offenders  do  not  reform  themselves,  you 
shall  cause  them  of  the  meaner  sort  to  be  ducked  at 
yard-arm ;  and  the  better  sort  to  be  fined  out  of 

1  The  articles  marked  with  an  asterisk  do  not  appear  in  the 
Gorges  set,  and  were  presumably  those  which  Ralegh  added  to 
suit  the  conditions  of  his  expedition  or  which  he  borrowed  from 
other  precedents. 


SSR    WALTER  RALEGH,    1617        37 

their  adventure.  By  which  course  if  no  amend- 
ment be  found,  you  shall  acquaint  me  withal,  deliver- 
ing me  the  names  of  the  offenders.  For  if  it  be 
threatened  in  the  Scriptures  that  the  curse  shall  not 
depart  from  the  house  of  the  swearer,  much  less 
shall  it  depart  from  the  ship  of  the  swearer. 

3.  Thirdly,    no   man   shall    refuse    to   obey  his 
officer  in  all  that  he  is  commanded  for  the  benefit  of 
the  journey.     No  man  being  in  health  shall  refuse 
to  watch  his  turn  as  he  shall  be  directed,  the  sailors 
by  the  master  and  boatswain,  the  landsmen  by  their 
captain,  lieutenant,  or  other  officers. 

4.  You  shall  make  in  every  ship  two  captains  of 
the  watch,  who  shall  make  choice  of  two  soldiers 
every  night  to  search  between  the  decks  that  no  fire 
or  candlelight  be  carried  about  the   ship  after  the 
watch  be  set,  nor  that  any  candle  be  burning  in  any 
cabin   without   a  lantern  ;    and    that    neither,    but 
whilst  they  are  to  make  themselves  unready.     For 
there  is  no  danger  so  inevitable  as  the  ship  firing, 
which  may  also  as  well  happen  by  taking  of  tobacco 
between  the  decks,  and  therefore  [it  is]  forbidden 
to  all  men  but  aloft  the  upper  deck. 

5.  You  shall  cause  all  your  landsmen  to  learn 
the  names  and  places  of  the  ropes,  that  they  may 
assist  the  sailors   in  their   labour  upon  the  decks, 
though  they  cannot  go  up  to  the  tops  and  yards. 

*6.  You  shall  train  and  instruct  your  sailors,  so 
many  as  shall  be  found  fit,  as  you  do  your  lands- 
men, and  register  their  names  in  the  list  of  your 
companies,  making  no  difference  of  professions,  but 
that  all  be  esteemed  sailors  and  all  soldiers,  for 
your  troops  will  be  very  weak  when  you  come  to 
land  without  the  assistance  of  your  seafaring  men. 

7.  You  shall  not  give  chase  nor  send  abroad  any 
ship  but  by  order  from  the  general,  and  if  you  come 
near  any  ship  in  your  course,  if  she  be  belonging  to 


38    ELIZABETHAN  AND  JACOBEAN 

any  prince  or  state  in  league  or  amity  with  his 
majesty,  you  shall  not  take  anything  from  them  by 
force,  upon  pain  to  be  punished  as  pirates  ;  although 
in  manifest  extremity  you  may  (agreeing  for  the 
price)  relieve  yourselves  with  things  necessary, 
giving  bonds  for  the  same.  Provided  that  it  be  not 
to  the  disfurnishing  of  any  such  ship,  whereby  the 
owner  or  merchant  be  endangered  for  the  ship  or 
goods. 

*8.  You  shall  every  night  fall  astern  the  general's 
ship,  and  follow  his  light,  receiving  instructions  in 
the  morning  what  course  to  hold.  And  if  you 
shall  at  any  time  be  separated  by  foul  weather,  you 
shall  receive  billets  sealed  up,  the  first  to  be  opened 
on  this  side  the  North  Cape,1  if  there  be  cause,  the 
second  to  be  opened  beyond  the  South  Cape,2  the 
third  after  you  shall  pass  23  degrees,  and  the  fourth 
from  the  height  of  Cape  Verd.3 

9.  If  you  discover  any  sail  at  sea,  either  to 
windward  or  to  leeward  of  the  admiral,  or  if  any 
two  or  three  of  our  fleet  shall  discover  any  such  like 
sail  which  the  admiral  cannot  discern,  if  she  be  a 
great  ship  and  but  one,  you  shall  strike  your  main 
topsail  and  hoist  it  again  so  often  as  you  judge  the 
ship  to  be  hundred  tons  of  burthen  ;  or  if  you  judge 
her  to  be  200  tons  to  strike  and  hoist  twice  ;  if 
300  tons  thrice,  and  answerable  to  your  opinion  of 
her  greatness. 

*io.  If  you  discover  a  small  ship,  you  shall  do 
the  like  with  your  fore  topsail ;  but  if  you  discover 
many  great  ships  you  shall  not  only  strike  your 
main  topsail  often,  but  put  out  your  ensign  in  the 
maintop.  And  if  such  fleet  or  ship  go  large  before 
the  wind,  you  shall  also  after  your  sign  given  go 
large  and  stand  as  any  of  the  fleet  doth :  I  mean 

1  Cape  Finisterre.  2  Cape  St.  Vincent. 

3  MS.  Cape  Devert 


SIR    WALTER  RALEGH,    1617        39 

no  longer  than  that  you  may  judge  that  the  admiral 
and  the  rest  have  seen  your  sign  and  you  so 
standing.  And  if  you  went  large  at  the  time  of  the 
discovery  you  shall  hale  of  your  sheets  for  a  little 
time,  and  then  go  large  again  that  the  rest  may 
know  that  you  go  large  to  show  us  that  the  ship  or 
fleet  discovered  keeps  that  course. 

*n.  So  shall  you  do  if  the  ship  or  fleet  dis- 
covered have  her  tacks  aboard,  namely,  if  you  had 
also  your  tacks  aboard  at  the  time  of  the  discovery, 
you  shall  bear  up  for  a  little  time,  and  after  hale 
your  sheets  again  to  show  us  what  course  the  ship 
or  fleet  holds. 

*I2.  If  you  discover  any  ship  or  fleet  by  night, 
if  the  ship  or  fleet  be  to  windward  of  you,  and  you 
to  windward  of  the  admiral,  you  shall  presently 
bear  up  to  give  us  knowledge.  But  if  you  think 
that  (did  you  not  bear  up)  you  might  speak  with 
her,  then  you  shall  keep  your  luff,1  and  shoot  off  a 
piece  of  ordnance  to  give  us  knowledge  thereby. 

1 3.  For  a  general  rule :  Let  none  presume  to 
shoot  off  a  piece  of  ordnance  but  in  discovery  of 
a  ship  or  fleet  by  night,  or  by  being  in  danger  of 
an  enemy,  or  in  danger  of  fire,  or  in  danger  of 
sinking,  that  it  may  be  unto  us  all  a  most  certain 
intelligence  of  some  matter  of  importance. 

*i4.  And  you  shall  make  us  know  the  differ- 
ence by  this  :  if  you  give  chase  and  being  near  a 
ship  you  shall  shoot  to  make  her  strike,  we  shall  all 
see  and  know  that  you  shoot  to  that  end  if  it  be  by 
day  ;  if  by  night,  we  shall  then  know  that  you  have 
seen  a  ship  or  fleet  none  of  our  company  ;  and  if  you 
suspect  we  do  not  hear  the  first  piece  then  you  may 
shoot  a  second,  but  not  otherwise,  and  you  must 
take  almost  a  quarter  of  an  hour  between  your  two 
pieces. 

1  MS.  '  loofe.1 


40    ELIZABETHAN  AND  JACOBEAN 

*i5-  If  you  be  in  danger  of  a  leak — I  mean  in 
present  danger — you  shall  shoot  off  two  pieces  pre- 
sently one  after  another,  and  if  in  danger  of  fire, 
three  pieces  presently  one  after  another ;  but  if 
there  be  time  between  we  will  know  by  your  second 
piece  that  you  doubt  that  we  do  not  hear  your  first 
piece,  and  therefore  you  shoot  a  second,  to  wit  by 
night,  and  give  time  between. 

1 6.  There  is  no  man  that  shall  strike  any  officer 
be  he  captain,  lieutenant,  ensign,  sergeant,  corporal 
of  the  field,1  quartermaster,  &c. 

17.  Nor  the  master  of  any  ship,  master's  mate, 
or  boatswain,  or  quartermaster.     I  say  no  man  shall 
strike  or   offer  violence   to   any  of  these   but   the 
supreme  officer  to  the  inferior,  in  time  of  service, 
upon  pain  of  death. 

1 8.  No  private  man  shall  strike  another,  upon 
pain    of  receiving    such    punishment  as   a    martial 
court 2  shall  think  him  worthy  of. 

19.  If  any  man   steal   any    victuals,  either   by 
breaking  into  the  hold  or  otherwise,  he  shall  receive 
the  punishment  as  of  athief  or  murderer  of  his  fellows. 

20.  No  man  shall  keep  any  feasting  or  drinking 
between   meals,  nor  drink  any  healths  upon  your 
ship's  provisions. 

21.  Every  captain  by  his  purser,   stewards,  or 
other  officers  shall  take  a  weekly  account  how  his 
victuals  waste. 

22.  The  steward  shall  not  deliver  any  candle  to 
any  private  man  nor  for  any  private  use. 

23.  Whosoever  shall  steal  from  his  fellows  either 
apparel  or  anything  else   shall    be    punished   as  a 
thief. 

1  Corporal  of  the  field  meant  the  equivalent  of  an  A.D.C. 
or  orderly. 

2  This  appears  to   be  the  first  known  mention  of  a  court- 
martial  being  provided  for  officially  at  sea. 


SSX    WALTER  RALEGH,    1617        41 

24.  In  foul  weather  every  man  shall  fit  his  sails 
to  keep  company  with  the  fleet,  and  not  run  so  far 
ahead  by  day  but  that  he  may  fall  astern  the  admiral 
by  night. 

25.  In  case  we  shall  be  set  upon  by  sea,  the  cap- 
tain shall  appoint  sufficient  company   to  assist  the 
gunners  ;   after  which,  if  the  fight  require  it,  in  the 
cabins  between  the  decks  shall  be  taken  down  [and] 
all  beds  and  sacks  employed  for  bulwarks.1 

*The  musketeers  of  every  ship  shall  be  divided 
under  captains  or  other  officers,  some  for  the  fore- 
castle, others  for  the  waist,  and  others  for  the  poop, 
where  they  shall  abide  if  they  be  not  otherwise 
directed.2 

26.  The    gunners    shall    not   shoot   any   great 
ordnance  at  other  distance  than  point  blank. 

27.  An  officer  or  two  shall  be  appointed  to  take 
care  that  no  loose  powder  be  carried  between  the 
decks,  or  near  any  linstock  or  match  in  hand.     You 
shall  saw  divers  hogsheads  in  two  parts,  and  filling 
them  with  water  set  them  aloft  the  decks.     You  shall 
divide  your  carpenters,   some   in  hold  if  any  shot 
come  between  wind  and  water,  and  the  rest  between 
the  decks,  with  plates  of  leads,  plugs,  and  all  things 
necessary  laid  by  them.     You  shall  also  lay  by  your 
tubs  of  water  certain  wet  blankets  to  cast  upon  and 
choke  any  fire.3 

28.  The  master  and  boatswain  shall  appoint  a 
certain  number  of  sailors  to  every  sail,  and  to  every 
such  company  a  master's  mate,  a  boatswain's  mate 
or  quartermaster  ;  so  as  when  every  man  knows  his 
charge  and  his  place  things  may  be  done  without 

1  This  passage  is  corrupt  in  the  MS.  and  is  restored  from 
Wimbledon's  Article  32,  post,  p.  58. 

2  This  was  the  Spanish  practice.     There  is  no  known  mention 
of  it  earlier  in  the  English  service. 

3  Gorges's  article  about  '  Musket-arrows '  is  here  omitted  by 
Ralegh. 


42    ELIZABETHAN  AND  JACOBEAN 

noise  or  confusion,  and  no  man  [is]  to  speak  but  the 
officers.  As,  for  example,  if  the  master  or  his  mate 
bid  heave  out  the  main  topsail,  the  master's  mate, 
boatswain's  mate  or  quartermaster  which  hath 
charge  of  that  sail  shall  with  his  company  perform 
it,  without  calling  out  to  others  and  without  rumour,1 
and  so  for  the  foresail,  fore  topsail,  spritsail  and 
the  rest ;  the  boatswain  himself  taking  no  parti- 
cular charge  of  any  sail,  but  overlooking  all  and  see- 
ing every  man  to  do  his  duty. 

29.  No  man  shall  board  his  enemy's  ship  with- 
out order,  because  the  loss  of  a  ship  to  us  is  of  more 
importance  than  the  loss  of  ten  ships  to  the  enemy, 
as  also  by  one  man's  boarding  all  our  fleet  may  be 
engaged ;  it  being  too  great  a  dishonour  to  lose  the 
least  of  our  fleet.  But  every  ship,  if  we  be  under 
the  lee  of  an  enemy,  shall  labour  to  recover  the  wind 
if  the  admiral  endeavours  it.  But  if  we  find  an 
enemy  to  be  leewards  of  us,  the  whole  fleet  shall 
follow  the  admiral,  vice-admiral,  or  other  leading 
ship  within  musket  shot  of  the  enemy ;  giving  so 
much  liberty  to  the  leading  ship  as  after  her  broad- 
side delivered  she  may  stay  and  trim  her  sails.  Then 
is  the  second  ship  to  tack  as  the  first  ship  and  give 
the  other  side,  keeping  the  enemy  under  a  perpetual 
shot.  This  you  must  do  upon  the  windermost  ship 
or  ships  of  an  enemy,  which  you  shall  either  batter 
in  pieces,  or  force  him  or  them  to  bear  up  and  so 
entangle  them,  and  drive  them  foul  one  of  another 
to  their  utter  confusion.2 

1  I.e.  '  noisy  confusion.'     Shakspeare  has  '  I  heard  a  bustling 
rumour  like  a  fray.' 

2  The  corresponding  article  in  Gorges's  set  (Stowe  MSS.  426) 
is  as  follows  :  — 

'  No  man  shall  board  any  enemy's  ship  but  by  order  from 
a  principal  commander,  as  the  admiral,  vice-admiral  or  rear- 
admiral,  for  that  by  one  ship's  boarding  all  the  fleet  may  be  en- 
gaged to  their  dishonour  or  loss.  But  every  ship  that  is  under 


WALTER  RALEGH,    1617         43 

30.  The  musketeers,  divided  into  quarters  of  the 
ship,  shall  not  deliver  their  shot  but  at  such  distance 
as  their  commanders  shall  direct  them. 

31.  If  the  admiral  give  chase  and  be  headmost 
man,  the  next  ship  shall  take  up  his  boat,  if  other 
order  be  not  given.     Or  if  any  other  ship  be  ap- 
pointed to  give  chase,  the  next  ship  (if  the  chasing 
ship  have  a  boat  at  her  stern)  shall  take  it. 

32.  If  any  make  a  ship  to  strike,  he  shall  not 
enter  her  until  the  admiral  come  up. 

33.  You  shall  take  especial  care  for  the  keeping 
of  your  ships  clean  between  the  decks,  [and]  to  have 
your  ordnance  ready  in  order,  and  not  cloyed  with 
chests  and  trunks. 

34.  Let   those   that   have   provision   of  victual 
deliver  it  to  the  steward,  and   every  man  put   his 
apparel    in   canvas   cloak   bags,    except   some   few 
chests  which  do  not  pester  the  ship. 

35.  Everyone  that  useth  any  weapon  of  fire,  be 
it  musket  or  other  piece,  shall  keep  it  clean,  and  if 
he  be  not  able  to  amend  it  being  out  of  order,  he 
shall  presently  acquaint  his  officer  therewith,  who 
shall  command  the  armourer  to  mend  it. 

36.  No  man  shall  play  at  cards  or  dice  either 

the  lee  of  an  enemy  shall  labour  to  recover  the  wind  if  the 
admiral  endeavour  it.  But  if  we  find  an  enemy  to  leeward  of 
us  the  whole  fleet  shall  follow  the  admiral,  vice-admiral  or  other 
leading  ship  within  musket-shot  of  the  enemy,  giving  so  much 
liberty  to  the  leading  ship,  as  after  her  broadside  is  delivered  she 
may  stay  and  trim  her  sails.  Then  is  the  second  ship  to  give  her 
side  and  the  third,  fourth,  and  rest,  which  done  they  shall  all  tack 
as  the  first  ship  and  give  the  other  side,  keeping  the  enemy  under 
a  perpetual  volley.  This  you  must  do  upon  the  windermost 
ship  or  ships  of  the  enemy,  which  you  shall  either  batter  in 
pieces,  or  force  him  or  them  to  bear  up  and  so  entangle  them,  and 
drive  them  foul  one  of  another  to  their  utter  confusion.'  For  the 
evidence  that  this  may  have  been  drawn  up  and  used  as  early  as 
1578,  and  consequently  in  the  Armada  campaign,  see  Introductory 
Note,  supra,  pp.  34-5. 


44    ELIZABETHAN  AND  JACOBEAN 

for  his  apparel  or  arms  upon  pain  of  being  disarmed 
and  made  a  swabber  of  the  ship. 

*37-  Whosoever  shall  show  himself  a  coward 
upon  any  landing  or  otherwise,  he  shall  be  disarmed 
and  made  a  labourer  or  carrier  of  victuals  for  the 
rest. 

*38.  No  man  shall  land  any  man  in  any  foreign 
ports  without  order  from  the  general,  by  the 
sergeant-major l  or  other  officer,  upon  pain  of  death. 

*39.  You  shall  take  especial  care  when  God  shall 
send  us  to  land  in  the  Indies,  not  to  eat  of  any  fruit 
unknown,  which  fruit  you  do  not  find  eaten  with 
worms  or  beasts  under  the  tree. 

*4O.  You  shall  avoid  sleeping  on  the  ground,  and 
eating  of  new  fish  until  it  be  salted  two  or  three 
hours,  which  will  otherwise  breed  a  most  dangerous 
flux ;  so  will  the  eating  of  over-fat  hogs  or  fat 
turtles. 

*4i.  You  shall  take  care  that  you  swim  not  in 
any  rivers  but  where  you  see  the  Indians  swim, 
because  most  rivers  are  full  of  alligators. 

*42.  You  shall  not  take  anything  from  any 
Indian  by  force,  for  if  you  do  it  we  shall  never  from 
thenceforth  be  relieved  by  them,  but  you  must  use 
them  with  all  courtesy.  But  for  trading  and  ex- 
changing with  them,  it  must  be  done  by  one  or  two 
of  every  ship  for  all  the  rest,  and  those  to  be  directed 

1  '  Sergeant-major '  at  this  time  was  the  equivalent  to  our 
'chief  of  the  staff'  or  'adjutant-general.'  In  the  fleet  orders 
issued  by  the  Earl  of  Essex  for  the  Azores  expedition  in  1597 
there  was  a  similar  article,  which  Ralegh  was  accused  of  violating 
by  landing  at  Fayal  without  authority ;  it  ran  as  follows  :  — '  No 
captain  of  any  ship  nor  captain  of  any  company  if  he  be  severed 
from  the  fleet  shall  land  without  direction  from  the  general  or 
some  other  principal  commander  upon  pain  of  death,'  &c. 
Ralegh  met  the  charge  by  pleading  he  was  himself  a  '  principal 
commander.' — Purchas,  iv.  1941. 


SIX    WALTER  RALEGH,    1617       45 

by  the  cape  merchant 1  of  the  ship,  otherwise  all  our 
commodities  will  become  of  vile  price,  greatly  to  our 
hindrance. 

*43-  For  other  orders  on  the  land  we  will 
establish  them  (when  God  shall  send  us  thither)  by 
general  consent.  In  the  meantime  I  shall  value  every 
man,  honour  the  better  sort,  and  reward  the  meaner 
according  to  their  sobriety  and  taking  care  for  the 
service  of  God  and  prosperity  of  our  enterprise. 

*44.  When  the  admiral  shall  hang  out  a  flag  in 
the  main  shrouds,  you  shall  know  it  to  be  a  flag  of 
council.  Then  come  aboard  him. 

*45.  And  wheresoever  we  shall  find  cause  to 
land,  no  man  shall  force  any  woman  be  she  Christian 
or  heathen,  upon  pain  of  death. 

1  This  expression  has  not  been  found  elsewhere.  It  may  stand 
for  '  chap  merchant,'  i.e.  '  barter-merchant.' 


PART  III 
CAROLINGIAN 

I.     VISCOUNT  WIMBLEDON,    1625 
II.    THE   EARL   OF   LINDSEY,    1635 


I 

THE   ATTEMPT   TO   APPLY    LAND 
FORMATIONS   TO   THE    FLEET,    1625 

INTRODUCTORY 

FROM  the  point  of  view  of  command  perhaps  the 
most  extraordinary  naval  expedition  that  ever  left 
our  shores  was  that  of  Sir  Edward  Cecil,  Viscount 
Wimbledon,  against  Cadiz  in  1625.  Every  flag 
officer  both  of  the  fleet  and  of  the  squadrons  was  a 
soldier.  Cecil  himself  and  the  Earl  of  Essex, 
his  vice-admiral,  were  Low  Country  colonels  of 
no  great  experience  in  command  even  ashore,  and 
Lord  Denbigh,  the  rear-admiral,  was  a  nobleman 
of  next  to  none  at  all.  Even  Cecil's  captain,  who 
was  in  effect  'captain  of  the  fleet,' was  Sir  Thomas 
Love,  a  sailor  of  whose  service  nothing  is  recorded, 
and  the  only  seaman  of  tried  capacity  who  held 
a  staff  appointment  was  Essex's  captain,  Sir  Samuel 
Argall.  It  was  probably  due  to  this  recrudescence 
of  military  influence  in  the  navy  that  we  owe  the 
first  attempt  to  establish  a  regular  order  of  battle 
since  the  days  of  Henry  VIII. 

These  remarkable  orders  appear  to  have  been 
an  after-thought,  for  they  were  not  proposed  until 
a  day  or  two  after  the  fleet  had  sailed.  The  first 
orders  issued  were  a  set  of  general  instructions, 
'  for  the  better  government  of  the  fleet '  dated 
October  3,  when  the  fleet  was  still  at  Plymouth. 


50  CAROLINGIAN 

They  were,  it  will  be  seen,  on  the  traditional  lines. 
Those  used  by  Ralegh  are  clearly  the  precedent 
upon  which  they  were  drawn,  and  in  particular  the 
article  relating  to  engaging  an  enemy's  fleet  follows 
closely  that  recommended  by  Gorges,  with  such 
modifications  as  the  squadronal  organisation  of  a 
large  fleet  demanded.  On  October  9,  the  day  the 
fleet  got  to  sea,  a  second  and  more  condensed  set 
of  '  Fighting  Instructions '  was  issued,  which  is 
remarkable  for  the  modification  it  contains  of  the 
method  of  attack  from  windward.1  For  instead  of 
an  attack  by  squadrons  it  seems  to  contemplate 
the  whole  fleet  going  into  action  in  succession  after 
the  leading  ship,  an  order  which  has  the  appearance 
of  another  advance  towards  the  perfected  line. 

Two  days  later  however  the  fleet  was  becalmed, 
and  Cecil  took  the  opportunity  of  calling  a  council  to 
consider  a  wholly  new  set  of  '  Fighting  Instructions  ' 
which  had  been  drafted  by  Sir  Thomas  Love. 
This  step  we  are  told  was  taken  because  Cecil  con- 
sidered the  original  articles  provided  no  adequate 
order  of  battle  such  as  he  had  been  accustomed  to 
ashore.  The  fleet  had  already  been  divided  into 
three  squadrons,  the  Dutch  contingent  forming  a 
fourth,  but  beyond  this,  we  are  told,  nothing  had 
been  done  'about  the  form  of  a  sea  fight.'  Under 
the  new  system  it  will  be  seen  each  of  the  English 
squadrons  was  to  be  further  divided  into  three 
sub-squadrons  of  nine  ships,  and  these  apparently 
were  to  sail  three  deep,  as  in  Drake's  parade  forma- 
tion of  1588,  and  were  to  'discharge  and  fall  off 
three  and  three  as  they  were  filed  in  the  list,'  or 
order  of  battle.  That  is,  instead  of  the  ships  of 
each  squadron  attacking  in  succession  as  the  previous 

1  '  Journal  of  the  Vanguard '  (Essex's  flagship),  and  Cecil  to 
Essex,  S.  P.  Dom.  Car.  /,  xi. 


LORD    WIMBLEDON,    1625  51 

orders  had  enjoined,  they  were  to  act  in  groups  of 
three,  with  a  reserve  in  support.  The  Dutch,  it  was 
expressly  provided,  were  not  to  be  bound  by  these 
orders,  but  were  to  be  free  '  to  observe  their  own 
order  and  method  of  fighting.'  What  this  was  is 
not  stated,  but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the 
reference  is  to  the  boarding  tactics  which  the  Dutch, 
in  common  with  all  continental  navies,  continued  to 
prefer  to  the  English  method  of  first  overpowering 
the  enemy  with  the  guns.  This  proviso,  in  view  of 
the  question  as  to  what  country  it  was  that  first  per- 
fected a  single  line  ahead,  should  be  borne  in  mind. 
As  appears  from  the  minutes  of  the  council  of 
war,  printed  below,  Love's  revolutionary  orders  met 
with  strong  opposition.  Still,  so  earnest  was  Cecil 
in  pressing  them,  and  so  well  conceived  were  many 
of  the  articles  that  they  were  not  entirely  rejected, 
but  were  recognised  as  a  counsel  of  perfection, 
which,  though  not  binding,  was  to  be  followed  as 
near  as  might  be.  Their  effect  upon  the  officers,  or 
some  of  them,  was  that  they  understood  the  '  order 
of  fight '  to  be  as  follows  : — '  The  several  admirals 
to  be  in  square  bodies '  (that  is,  each  flag  officer 
would  command  a  division  or  sub-squadron  formed 
in  three  ranks  of  three  files),  '  and  to  give  their 
broadsides  by  threes  and  so  fall  off.  The  rear- 
admiral  to  stand  for  a  general  reserve,  and  not  to 
engage  himself  without  great  cause.' 1  The  con- 
fusion, however,  must  have  been  considerable  and 
the  difference  of  opinion  great  as  to  how  far  the 
new  orders  were  binding  ;  for  the  '  Journal  of  the 
Vanguard '  merely  notes  that  a  council  was  called 
on  the  nth  'wherein  some  things  were  debated 
touching  the  well  ordering  of  the  fleet,'  and  with  this 
somewhat  contemptuous  entry  the  subject  is  dis- 
missed. 

1  '  Journal  of  the  Expedition,'  5.  P.  Dom.  Car.  /,  x.  67. 

K  2 


52  CAROLINGIAN 

Still  it  must  be  said  that  on  the  whole  these 
orders  are  a  great  advance  over  anything  we  know 
of  in  Elizabethan  times,  and  particularly  in  the  care- 
ful provisions  for  mutual  support  they  point  to  a 
happy  reversion  to  the  ideas  which  De  Chaves  had 
formulated,  and  which  the  Elizabethans  had  too 
drastically  abandoned. 


LORD   WIMBLEDON,  1625,  No.  i,  Oct.  3. 
[State  Papers  Domestic,  Car.  I,  ix.] 

A  copy  of  those  instructions  which  were  sent  unto  the 
Earl  of  Essex  and  given  by  Sir  Edward  Cecil, 
Knight,  admiral  of  the  fleet,  lieutenant-general 
and  marshal  of  his  majesty's  land  force  now  at 
sea,  to  be  duly  performed  by  all  commanders,  and 
their  captains  and  masters,  and  other  inferior 
officers,  both  by  sea  and  land,  for  the  better  govern- 
ment of  his  majesty  s  fleet.  Dated  in  the  Sound  of 
Plymouth,  aboard  his  majesty  s  good  ship  the 
Anne  Royal,  the  third  of  October,  1625. 

1.  First  above  all  things  you  shall  provide  that 
God  be  duly  served  twice  every  day  by  all  the  land 
and  sea  companies  in  your  ship,  according  to  the 
usual  prayers  and  liturgy  of  the  Church  of  England, 
and  shall  set  and  discharge  every  watch  with  the 
singing  of  a  psalm  and  prayer  usual  at  sea. 

2.  You  shall  keep  the  company  from  swearing, 
blaspheming,  drunkenness,  dicing,  carding,  cheating, 
picking  and  stealing,  and  the  like  disorders. 

3.  You  shall  take  care  to  have  all  your  company 
live  orderly  and  peaceable,  and  shall  charge  your 
officers  faithfully  to  perform  their  office  and  duty  of 
his  and  their  places.     And  if  any  seaman  or  soldier 
shall  raise  tumult,  mutiny  or  conspiracy,  or  commit 


LORD    WIMBLEDON,    1625  53 

murder,  quarrel,  fight  or  draw  weapon  to  that  end, 
or  be  a  sleeper  at  his  watch,  or  make  noise,  or  not 
betake  himself  to  his  place  of  rest  after  his  watch 
is  out,  or  shall  not  keep  his  cabin  cleanly,  or  be  dis- 
contented with  the  proportion  of  victuals  assigned 
unto  him,  or  shall  spoil  or  waste  them  or  any  other 
necessary  provisions  in  the  ships,  or  shall  not  keep 
clean  his  arms,  or  shall  go  ashore  without  leave,  or 
shall  be  found  guilty  of  any  other  'crime  or  offence, 
you  shall  use  due  severity  in  the  punishment  or 
reformation  thereof  according  to  the  known  orders 
of  the  sea. 

4.  For  any  capital  or  heinous  offence  that  shall 
be  committed  in  your  ship  by  the  land  or  sea  men, 
the  land  and  sea  commanders  shall  join  together  to 
take  a  due  examination  thereof  in  writing,  and  shall 
acquaint  me  therewith,  to  the  end  that   I  may  pro- 
ceed in  judgment  according  to  the  quality  of  the 
offence. 

5.  No  sea  captain  shall  meddle  with  the  punish- 
ing of  any  land  soldiers,  but  shall  leave  them  to  their 
commanders ;    neither  shall    the  land   commanders 
meddle  with  the  punishing  of  the  seamen. 

6.  You  shall  with  the  master  take  a  particular 
account  of  the  stores  of  the  boatswain  and  carpenters 
of  the  ship,  examining  their  receipts,  expenses  and 
remains,  not  suffering  any  unnecessary  waste  to  be 
made  of  their  provisions,  or  any  work  to  be  done 
which  shall  not  be  needful  for  the  service. 

7.  You  shall  every  week  take  the  like  account  of 
the  purser  and  steward  of  the  quantity  and  quality  of 
victuals  that  are  spent,  and  provide  for  the  preserva- 
tion thereof  without  any  superfluous  expense.     And 
if  any  person  be  in  that  office  suspected  1  for  the 
wasting  and  consuming  of  victuals,  you  shall  remove 
him  and  acquaint  me  thereof,  and  shall  give  me  a 

1  MS.  '  if  any  suspected  persons  be  in  that  office,'  &c. 


0 


54  CAROLINGIAN 

particular  account  from  time  to  time  of  the  expense, 
goodness,  quantity  and  quality  of  your  victuals. 

8.  You  shall  likewise  take  a  particular  account  of 
the  master  gunner  for  the  shot,   powder,  munition 
and   all   other   manner   of  stores   contained  in  his 
indenture,  and  shall  not  suffer  any  part  thereof  to  be 
sold,  embezzled  or  wasted,  nor  any  piece  of  ordnance 
to  be  shot  off  without  directions,  keeping  also  an 
account  of  every  several  piece  shot  off  in  your  ship, 
to  the  end  I  may  know  how  the  powder  is  spent. 

9.  You  shall  suffer  no  boat  to  go  from  your  ship 
without  special  leave  and  upon  necessary  causes,  to 
fetch  water  or  some  other  needful  thing,  and  then 
you  shall  send  some  of  your  officers  or  men  of  trust, 
for  whose  good  carriage  and  speedy  return  you  will 
answer. 

10.  You  shall  have  a  special  care  to  prevent  the 
dreadful  accident  of  fire,  and  let  no  candles  be  used 
without   lanterns,   nor  any  at  all  in   or  about  the 
powder  room.     Let  no  tobacco  be  taken  between  the 
decks,   or  in  the  cabins  or  in  any  part  of  the  ship, 
but  upon  the  forecastle  or  upper  deck,  where  shall 
stand  tubs  of  water  for  them  to  throw  their  ashes 
into  and  empty  their  pipes. 

11.  Let  no  man  give  offence  to  his  officer,  or 
strike  his  equal  or  inferior  on  board,  and  let  mutinous 
persons  be  punished  in  most  severe  manner. 

1 2.  Let  no  man  depart  out  of  his  ship  in  which 
he  is  first  entered  without  leave  of  his  commander, 
and  let  no  captain  give  him  entertainment  after  he 
is  listed,  upon  pain  of  severity  of  the  law  in  that 
case. 

13.  If  any  fire  should  happen  in  your  ship,  not- 
withstanding your  care  (which  God  forbid  !),  then  you 
shall  shoot  off  two  pieces  of  ordnance,  one  presently 
after  the  other,  and  if  it  be  in  the  night  you  shall 
hang  out  four  lanterns  with  lights  upon  the  yards, 


LORD    WIMBLEDON,    1625  55 

that  the  next  ships  to  you  may  speed    to  succour 
you. 

14.  If  the  ship  should  happen  to  spend  a  mast, 
or  spring  a  leak,  which  by  increasing  upon  you  may 
grow  to  present  danger,  then  you  shall  shoot  off  two 
pieces  of  ordnance,  the  one  a  good  while  after  the 
other,  and  hang  out  two  lights  on  the  main  shrouds, 
the  one  a  man's  height  over  the  other,  so  as  they 
may  be  discernible. 

15.  If  the  ship  should  happen  to  run  on  ground 
upon  any  danger  (which  God  forbid  !)  then  you  shall 
shoot   off  four  pieces  of  ordnance   distinctly,   one 
after  the  other ;  if  in  the  night,  hang  out  as  many 
lights  as  you  can,  to  the  end  the  fleet  may  take 
notice  thereof. 

1 6.  You   shall   favour   your  topmasts   and    the 
head  of  your  mainmast  by  bearing  indifferent  sail, 
especially  in    foul  weather  and  in  a  head  sea  and 
when  your  ship  goeth  by  the  wind  ;  lest,  by  the  loss 
of  a  mast  upon  a  needless  adventure,  the  service  is 
deprived  of  your  help  when  there  is  greatest  cause 
to  use  it. 

1 7.  The  whole  fleet  is  to  be  divided  into  three 
squadrons  :  the  admiral's  squadron  to  wear  red  flags 
and  red  pennants  on   the  main  topmast-head ;  the 
vice-admiral's  squadron  to  wear  blue  flags  and  blue 
pennants    on    the    fore    topmast-heads ;    the    rear- 
admiral's  squadron  to  wear  white  flags  and  white 
pennants  on  the  mizen  topmast-heads.1 

1 8.  The  admirals  and  officers  are  to  speak  with 
me  twice  a  day,  morning  and  evening,  to  receive  my 
directions  and  commands,  which  the  rest  of  the  ships 
are  duly  to  perform.     If  I  be  ahead  I  will  stay  for 

1  This  is  the  first  known  occasion  of  red,  blue  and  white  flags 
being  used  to  distinguish  squadrons,  though  the  idea  was 
apparently  suggested  in  Elizabeth's  time.  See  Navy  Records 
Society,  Miscellany,  i.  p.  30. 


5  6  CAROLINGIAN 

them,  if  to  leeward  I  will  bear  up  to  them.  If  foul 
weather  should  happen,  you  are  not  to  come  too  near 
me  or  any  other  ship  to  hazard  any  danger  at  all. 
And  when  I  have  hailed  you,  you  are  to  fall  astern, 
that  the  rest  of  the  ships  in  like  manner  may  come 
up  to  receive  my  commands. 

19.  You  shall  make  in  every  ship  two  captains 
of  the  watch,  or  more  (if  need  be),  who  shall  make 
choice  of  soldiers  or  seamen  to  them  to  search  every 
watch  in  the  night  between  the  decks,  that  no  fire 
or  candle  be  carried  about  the  ship  after  the  watch  is 
set,  nor  that  no  candle  be  burning  in  any  cabin 
without  a  lantern,  nor  that  neither  but  whilst  they 
are  making  themselves  ready,  and  to  see  the   fire 
put  out  in  the  cook's  room,  for  there  is  no  danger  so 
inevitable  as  the  ship's  firing. 

20.  You  shall  cause  the  landmen    to  learn  the 
names  and  places  of  the  ropes  that  they  may  assist 
the  sailors  in  their  labours  upon  the  decks,  though 
they  cannot  go  up  to  the  tops  and  yards. 

21.  You  shall  train  and  instruct  such  sailors  and 
mariners   as  shall  be    found  fit  to  the  use  of  the 
musket,  as  you  do  your  landmen,  and  register  their 
names  in  a  list  by  themselves,  making  no  difference 
for  matter   of  discipline   between   the   sailors   and 
soldiers  aboard  you. 

22.  You  shall  not  give  chase  nor  send  aboard 
any  ship  but  by  order  from  me,  or  my  vice-admiral 
or  rear-admiral ;   and  if  you  come  near  any  ship  in 
your  course  belonging  to  any  prince  or  state  you 
shall  only  make  stay  of  her,  and  bring  her  to  me  or 
the  next  officer,  without  taking  anything  from  them 
or  their  companies  by  force,  but  shall  charge  all 
your   company   from    pillaging   between   decks   or 
breaking  up  any  hold,  or  embezzling  any  goods  so 
seized  and  taken,  upon  pain  of  severity  of  the  law  in 
that  case. 


LORD    WIMBLEDON,    1625  57 

23.  You  shall  fall  astern  of  me  and  the  admirals 
of  your  several  squadrons  unto  the  places  assigned 
unto  you,  and  follow  their  lights  as  aforesaid,   re- 
ceiving such  instructions  from  me  or  them  in   the 
morning  what  course  to  hold.     And  if  you  shall  at 
any  time  be  separated  from  the  fleet  by  foul  weather, 
chase  or  otherwise,  you  shall  shape  your  course  for 
the  southward  cape  upon  the  coast  of  Spain  in  the 
latitude  of  37,  one  of  the  places  of  rendezvous  ;  if 
you  miss  me  there,  then  sail  directly  for  the  Bay  of 
Gales  or  St.  Lucar,  which  is  the  other  place  assigned 
for  rendezvous. 

24.  You  must  have  a  special  care  in  times  of 
calms  and  foggy  weather  to  give  such  a  berth  one 
unto  the  other  as  to  keep  your  ships  clear,  and  not 
come  foul  one  of  another.     Especially  in  fogs  and 
mists  you   shall  sound    with  drum    or   trumpet,  or 
make  a  noise  with  your  men,  or  shoot  off  muskets, 
to  give  warning  to  other  ships  to  avoid  the  danger 
of  boarding  or  coming  foul  one  of  another. 

25.  If  you  or  any  other  two  or  three  of  the 
fleet  discover  any  sail  at  sea  to  the  windward  or 
leeward  of  the  admiral,  which  the  admiral    cannot 
discern,  if  she  be  a  great  ship  you  shall  signify  the 
same  by  striking  or  hoisting  of  your  main  topsail 
so   often  as  you  conceive  the  ship  to  be  hundred 
tons  of  burthen  ;  and  if  you  discover  a  small  ship 
you  shall  give  the  like  signs  by  striking  your  fore 
topsail ;   but  if  you  discover  many  ships  you  shall 
strike  your  main  topsail  often  and  put  out  your  en- 
sign in  the  maintop  ;  and  if  such  ship  or  fleet  go 
large  before  the  wind,   you  shall   after  your   sign 
given  do  the  like,  till  you  perceive  that  the  admiral 
and  the  rest  of  the  squadrons  have  seen  your  sign 
and  your  so  standing  ;    and  if  you  went    large  at 
the  time  of  discovery  of  such  ship  or  fleet,  you  shall 
for  a  little  time  hale  aft  your  sheets  and  then  go 


58  CAROLINGIAN 

large  again,  that  the  rest  of  the  fleet  and  squadrons 
may  know  that  you  go  large  to  show  that  the  ship 
or  fleet  discovered  keeps  that  course. 

26.  If  the  ship  or  fleet  discovered   have  their 
tacks  aboard  and  stand  upon  a  wind,  then  if  you 
had  your  tack  aboard  at  the  time  of  the  discovery 
you  shall  bear  up  for  a  little  time,  and  after  hale 
aft  your  sheets  again  to  show  us  what  course  the 
ship  or  fleet  holdeth, 

27.  If  you  discover  any  ship  or  fleet  by  night,  and 
they  be  [to]  windward  of  you,  the  general  or  admirals, 
you  shall  presently  bear  up  to  give  us  knowledge  if 
you  can  speak  with  her  ;  if  not,  you  may  keep  your 
luff  and   shoot   off  a  piece  of  ordnance  by  which 
we  shall  know  you  give  chase,  to  the  end  that  the 
rest  may  follow  accordingly. 

28.  For  a  general  rule  let  no  man  presume  to 
shoot  off  any  pieces  of  ordnance  but  in  discovery  of 
ships  or  fleet  by  night,  or  being  in  danger  of  the 
enemy,  or  of  fire,  or  of  sinking,  that  it  may  be  unto 
us  a  most  certain    intelligence  of  some  matter  of 
importance. 

29.  If  any  man  shall  steal  any  victuals  by  break- 
ing into  the  hold  or  otherwise,  he  shall  receive  the 
punishment  of  a  thief  and  murderer  of  his  fellows. 

30.  No  man  shall  keep  any  feasting  or  drinking 
between  meals,  or  drink  any  health  upon  the  ship's 
provisions  ;    neither   shall  the  steward  deliver  any 
candle  to  any  private  man  or  for  any  private  use. 

31.  In  foul  weather  every  man  shall  set  his  sail 
to  keep  company  with   the  rest  of  the  fleet,  and  not 
run  too  far  ahead  by  day  but  that  he  may  fall  astern 
the  admiral  before  night. 

32.  In  case  the  fleet  or  any  part  of  us  should  be 
set  upon,  the  sea-captain  shall  appoint  sufficient  com- 
pany  to  assist  the  gunners,  after  which  (if  the  fight 
require  it)  the  cabins  between  the  decks  shall  be 


LORD    WIMBLEDON,    1625  59 

taken  down,  [and]  all  beds  and  sacks  employed  for 
bulwarks.  The  musketeers  of  every  ship  shall  be 
divided  under  captains  or  other  officers,  some  for 
the  forecastle,  some  for  the  waist,  and  others  for  the 
poop,  where  they  shall  abide  if  they  be  not  other- 
wise directed. 

33.  An  officer  or  two  shall  be  appointed  to  take 
care  that  no  loose  powder  be  carried  between  [the 
decks]  nor  near  any  linstock  or  match  in  hand.     You 
shall  saw  divers  hogsheads  in  two  parts,  and,  filling 
them  with  water,  set  them  aloft  the  decks.    You  shall 
divide  your  carpenters,  some  in  hold,  if  any  shot 
come  between  wind  and  water,  and  the  rest  between 
the  decks,  with  plates  of  lead,  plugs  and  all  things 
necessary  laid  by  them.     You  shall  also  lay  by  your 
tubs  of  water  certain  wet  blankets,  to  cast  upon  and 
cloak  any  fire. 

34.  The  master  and  boatswain  shall  appoint  a 
convenient  number  of  sailors  to  every  sail,  and  to 
every  such  company  a  master's  mate  or  a  quarter- 
master, so  as  when  every  man  knows  his  charge  and 
his  place,  things  may  be  done  without  noise  or  con- 
fusion ;  and  no  man  [is]  to  speak  but  the  officers. 

35.  No   man   shall    board    any    enemy's   ship, 
especially  such  as  command  the  king's  ships,  with- 
out special  order  from  me.     The  loss  of  one  of  our 
ships  will  be  an  encouragement  to   the  enemy,  and 
by  that  means  our  fleet  may  be  engaged,  it  being  a 
great  dishonour  to  lose  the  least  of  our  fleet.     If  we 
be  under  the  lee  of  an  enemy,  every  squadron  and 
ship  shall  labour  to  recover  the  wind  (if  the  admiral 
endeavour  it).     But  if  we  find  an  enemy  to  leeward  of 
us  the  whole  fleet  shall  follow  in  their  several  places, 
the  admirals  with  the  head  of  the  enemy,  the  vice- 
admirals  with  the  body,  and  the  rear-admirals  with  the 
sternmost  ships  of  the  chase,  (or  other  leading  ships 
which  shall  be  appointed)  within  musket-shot  of  the 


6o  CAROLINGIAN 

enemy,  giving  so  much  liberty  to  the  leading  ship 
as  after  her  broadside  l  delivered  she  may  stay  and 
trim  her  sails  ;  then  is  the  second  ship  to  give  her 
side,  and  the  third  and  fourth,  with  the  rest  of  that 
division ;  which  done  they  shall  all  tack  as  the  first 
ship  and  give  their  other  sides,  keeping  the  enemy 
under  perpetual  volley.  This  you  must  do  upon  the 
windermost  ship  or  ships  of  an  enemy,  which  you 
shall  either  batter  in  pieces,  or  force  him  or  them  to 
bear  up,  and  so  entangle  them  or  drive  them  foul  one 
of  another  to  their  utter  confusion. 

36.  Your  musketeers,  divided  into  quarters  of 
the  ship,  shall  not  discharge  their  shot  but  at  such  a 
distance  as  their  commanders  shall  direct  them. 

37.  If  the  admiral  or  admirals  give  chase,  and  be 
the  headmost  man,  the  next  ship  shall  take  up  his 
boat  if  other  order  be  not  given,  or  if  any  other  ship 
be  appointed  to  give   chase,  the  next  ship  (if  the  2 
chasing  ship  have  3  a  boat  at  her  stern)  shall  take  it. 

38.  Whosoever  shall  show  himself  a  coward  upon 
any  landing  or  otherwise,  he  shall  be  disarmed  and 
made  a  labourer  or  carrier  of  victuals  for  the  army. 

39.  No  man  shall  land  anywhere  in  any  foreign 
parts  without  order  from  me,  or  by  the    sergeant- 
major  or  other  officer  upon  pain  of  death. 

40.  Wheresoever   we   shall   land  no   man  shall 
force  any  woman  upon  pain  of  death. 

41.  You  shall  avoid  sleeping  upon  the  ground 
and  the  drinking  of  new   wines,    and   eating   new 
fruits,  and  fresh  fish  until  it  has  been  salted  three 
hours,  and  also  forbear  sleeping  upon  the  deck  in 
the  night  time,  for  fear  of  the  serene  4  that  falls,  all 
which  will  breed  dangerous  fluxes  and  diseases. 

42.  When  the  admiral  shall  hang  out  the  arms 

1  MS.  has  '  to  the  leading  ships  as  after  their  broadside,'  &c. 

2  MS,  'a.'  3  MS.  'with.' 
4  Spanish  'serene,'  the  cold  evening  air. 


LORD   WIMBLEDON,    1625  6i 

of  England  in  the  mizen  shrouds,  then  shall  the 
council  of  war  come  aboard  ;  and  when  that  shall  be 
taken  in  and  the  St.  George  hung  in  the  main 
shrouds,  that  is  for  a  general  council.1 

For  any  orders  upon  the  land  (if  God  send  us 
thither)  we  shall  establish  them.  For  matter  of 
sailing  or  discipline  at  sea  if  there  be  cause  you 
shall  receive  other  directions,  to  which  I  refer  you. 

Likewise  it  is  ordered  between  the  seamen  and  the 
landmen  that  after  the  captain  of  the  ship  is  cabined, 
he  shall  if  possible  lodge  the  captain  of  the  foot 
in  the  same  cabin,  after  the  master  of  the  ship  is 
cabined  the  lieutenant,  and  after  the  master's  mates 
the  ensign. 


LORD    WIMBLEDON,   1625,   No.   2, 
October   n. 

[State  Papers  Domestic,  Charles  I,  xi.] 

Instructions  when  we  come  to  fight  with  an  enemy, 
sent  by  the  Lieutenant-General  unto  the  Earl  of 
Essex. 

1.  That  you  shall  see  the  admiral  make  way  to 
the  admiral  enemy,  so  likewise  the  vice-admiral  and 
the  rear-admiral,  and  then  every  ship  [is]  to  set  upon 
the  next  according  to  his  order,  yet  to  have  such  a 
care   that  those  that  come  after  may  be  ready  to 
second  one  another  after  the  manner  here  following. 

2.  If  we  happen  to  be  encountered  by  an  enemy 

1  The  '  council  of  war '  was  composed  of  the  flag  officers  and 
the  colonels  of  regiments .  Sir  Thos.  Love  was  also  a  member  of 
it,  but  probably  as  treasurer  of  the  expedition  and  not  as  flag 
captain.  The  '  general  council '  included  besides  all  captains  of 
ships  and  the  masters. 


62  CAROLING/AN 

at  sea,  you  shall  then  appoint  a  sufficient  company 
to  assist  the  gunners.  You  shall  pull  down  all  the 
cabins  betwixt  the  decks  and  use  the  beds  and  sacks 
for  bulwarks,  and  shall  appoint  your  muskets  to 
several  officers,  some  to  make  good  the  forecastle, 
some  the  waist,  and  others  abaft  the  mast,  from 
whence  they  shall  not  stir  till  they  be  otherwise 
directed,  neither  shall  they  or  the  gunners  shoot  a 
shot  till  they  be  commanded  by  the  captain. 

3.  You    shall    appoint   a   certain    number    of 
mariners  to  stand  by  sails  and  maintops,  that  every 
of  them  knowing  his  place   and  duty  there  be  no 
confusion  or   disorder  in  the  command  ;  and  shall 
divide   carpenters  some  in  hold,  some  betwixt  the 
decks,  with  plates  of  lead,  plugs  and  other  things 
necessary  for  stopping  up  breaches  made  with  great 
shot ;  and  saw  divers  hogsheads  in  halves  and  set 
them  upon  the  deck  full  of  water,  with  wet  blankets 
by  them  to  cloak  and  quench  any   fire  that    shall 
happen  in  the  fight. 

4.  No  man  shall  board  any  enemy's  ships  without 
special  order,  but  every  ship  if  we  be  to  leeward 
shall  labour  to  recover  the  wind.     If  we  be  to  wind- 
ward of  them,  then  shall  the  whole  fleet,  or  so  many 
of  them  as  shall  be  appointed,  follow  the  leading 
ship    within  musket-shot  of  the  enemy,    and   give 
them  first   the   chase   pieces,    then    the  broadside, 
afterwards  a  volley  of  small  shot ;    and    when  the 
headmost    ship    hath    done,    the    next    ship   shall 
observe  the  same  course,  and  so  every  ship  in  order, 
that  the  headmost  may  be  ready  to  renew  the  fight 
against  such  time  as  the   sternmost  hath  made  an 
end  ;  by  that  means    keeping   the   weather  of  the 
enemy  and  in  continual  fight  till  they  be  sunk  in  the 
sea,  or  forced  by  bearing  up  to  entangle  themselves, 
and  to  come  [foul]  one  of  another  to  their  utter  con- 
fusion. 


LORD    WIMBLEDON,    1625  63 


LORD    WIMBLEDON,   1625,   No.   3. 
[The  Earl  of  St.  Germans's  MS.   Extract.1] 

At  a  Council  of  War  holden  aboard  the  Anne 
Royal,  Tuesday,  tke  \\th  of  October,  1625. 

The  council,  being  assembled,  entered  into  con- 
sultation touching  the  form  of  a  sea-fight  performed 
against  any  fleet  or  ships  of  the  King  of  Spain  or 
other  enemy,  and  touching  some  directions  to  be 
observed  for  better  preparation  to  be  made  for  such 
a  fight  and  the  better  managing  thereof  when  we 
should  come  to  action. 

The  particulars  for  this  purpose  considerable 
were  many  ;  insomuch  that  no  pertinent  consultation 
could  well  be  had  concerning  the  same  without  some 
principles  in  writing,  whereby  to  direct  and  bound 
the  discourse.  And  therefore,  by  the  special  com- 
mand of  my  lord  lieutenant-general,  a  form  of 
articles  for  this  service  (drawn  originally  by  Sir 
Thomas  Love,  Kt. ,  treasurer  for  this  action,  captain 
of  the  Anne  Royal  and  one  of  the  council  of  war) 
was  presented  to  the  assembly,  and  several  times 
read  over  to  them. 

After  the  reading,  all  the  parts  thereof  were  well 
weighed  and  examined,  whereby  it  was  observed 
that  it  intended  to  enjoin  our  fleet  to  advance  and 
fight  at  sea,  much  after  the  manner  of  an  army  at 
land,  assigning  every  ship  to  a  particular  division, 
rank,  file,  and  station  ;  which  order  and  regularity 

1  A  Relation  Touching  the  Fleet  and  Army  of  the  Kings 
most  excellent  majesty  King  Charles,  set  forth  in  the  first  year  of 
his  highnesses  reign,  and  touching  the  order,  proceedings,  and 
actions  of  the  same  fleet  and  army,  by  Sir  John  Glanville,  the 
younger,  serjeant-at-law,  and  secretary  to  the  council  of  war. 
[Printed  for  the  Camden  Society,  1883,  N.S.  vol.  xxxii.] 


64  CAROLINGIAN 

was  not  only  improbable  but  almost  impossible  to 
be  observed  by  so  great  a  fleet  in  so  uncertain  a 
place  as  the  sea.  Hereupon  some  little  doubt  arose 
whether  or  no  this  form  of  articles  should  be 
confirmed ;  but  then  it  was  alleged  that  the  same 
articles  had  in  them  many  other  points  of  direc- 
tion, preparation,  and  caution  for  a  sea-fight,  which 
were  agreed  by  all  men  to  be  most  reasonable 
and  necessary.  And  if  so  strict  a  form  of  pro- 
ceeding to  fight  were  not  or  could  not  be  punctually 
observed,  yet  might  these  articles  beget  in  our 
commanders  and  officers  a  right  understanding  of 
the  conception  and  intent  thereof;  which  with  an 
endeavour  to  come  as  near  as  could  be  to  perform, 
the  particulars  might  be  of  great  use  to  keep  us 
from  confusion  in  the  general.  Neither  could  the 
limiting  of  every  several  ship  to  such  a  rank  or  file 
[and]  to  such  certain  place  in  the  same,  bring  upon 
the  fleet  intricacy  and  difficulty  of  proceeding,  so  [long] 
as  (if  the  proper  ships  were  absent  or  not  ready) 
those  in  the  next  place  were  left  at  liberty,  or  rather 
commanded,  to  supply  their  rooms  and  maintain  the 
instructions,  if  not  absolutely,  yet  as  near  as  they 
could.  In  conclusion  therefore  the  form  of  articles 
which  was  so  presented,  read,  and  considered  of, 
was  with  some  few  alterations  and  additions  ratified 
by  my  lord  lieutenant-general  and  by  the  whole 
council  as  act  of  theirs  passed  and  confirmed,  and 
to  be  duly  observed  and  put  in  execution  by  all 
captains,  mariners,  gunners,  and  officers  in  every 
ship,  and  all  others  to  whom  it  might  appertain,  at 
their  perils,  leaving  only  to  my  lord  lieutenant  the 
naming  and  ranking  of  the  ships  of  every  division  in 
order  as  they  should  proceed  for  the  execution  of 
the  same  articles  ;  which  in  conclusion  were  these, 
touching  the  whole  fleet  in  general  and  the  admiral's 
squadron  in  particular,  namely  : — 


LORD    WIMBLEDON,   1625  65 

i.  That  when  the  fleet  or  ships  of  the  enemy 
should  be  discovered  the  admiral  of  our  fleet  with 
the  ships  of  his  squadron  should  put  themselves 
into  the  form  undermentioned  and  described,  namely, 
that  the  same  squadron  should  be  separated  into 
three  divisions  of  nine  ships  in  a  division,  and  so 
should  advance,  set  forward,  and  charge  upon  the 
enemy  as  hereafter  more  particularly  is  directed. 

That  these  nine  ships  should  discharge  and  fall 
off  three  and  three,  as  they  are  filed  in  this  list. 

Anne  Royal    .         .         .     Admiral 
Prudence         .         .         .     Captain  Vaughan 
Royal  Defence        .         .     Captain  Ellis. 

Barbara  Constance          .     Captain  Hatch 
Talbot    ....     Captain  Burdon 
Abraham          .         .         .     Captain  Downes. 

Golden  Cock  .         .         .     Captain  Beaumont 
Amity     ....     Captain  Malyn 
Anthony          .         .         .     Captain  Blague. 

That  these  nine  ships  should  second  the  admiral 
of  this  squadron  three  and  three,  as  they  are  filed  in 
this  list. 

St.  George      .         .         .     Vice-admiral 
Lesser  Sapphire      .         .     Captain  Bond 
Sea  Venture   .         .         .     Captain  KneveL 
Assurance        .         .         .     Captain  Osborne 
Camelion         .         .         .     Captain  Seymour 
Return  .         .         .     Captain  Bonithon. 

Jonathan          .         .         .     Captain  Butler l 
William  ....     Captain  White 
Hopewell         .         .         .     Captain 

1  Elsewhere  in  the  MS.  spelt  '  Boteler.'    Probably  Nathaniel 
Boteler,  author  of  the  Dialogues  about  Sea  Services. 

F 


66 


CAROLINGIAN 


That  these  nine  ships  should  second  the  vice- 
admiral  of  this  squadron  three  and  three,  as  they  are 
filed  in  this  list. 


Convertine 

Globe 

Assurance  of  Dover 

Great  Sapphire 

Anne 

Jacob 

George  . 
Hermit  . 
Mary  Magdalen 


Rear-admiral 
Captain  Stokes 
Captain  Bargey. 

Captain  Raymond 
Captain  Wollaston 
Captain  Gosse. 

Captain  Stevens 
Captain  Turner 
Captain  Cooper. 


These  three  ships  should  fall  into  the  rear  of 
the  three  former  divisions,  to  charge  where  and  when 
there  should  be  occasion,  or  to  help  the  engaged,  or 
supply  the  place  of  any  that  should  be  unservice- 
able. 


Hellen    . 
Amity  of  Hull 
Anne  Speedwell 


Captain  Mason 
Captain  Frisby 
Captain  Polkenhorne. 


2.  That   the   admiral    of    the    Dutch   and    his 
squadron  should  take  place  on  the  starboard  side  of 
our   admiral,    and    observe   their    own    order    and 
method  in  fighting. 

3.  That   the  vice-admiral  of  our  fleet  and   his 
squadron  should  make  the  like  division,  and  observe 
the  same  order  and  form  as  the  admiral's  squadron 
was  to  observe,  and  so  should  keep  themselves  in 
their  several  divisions  on  the  larboard  side  of  the 
admiral,  and  there  advance  and  charge  if  occasion 
were  when  the  admiral  did. 

4.  That  the  rear-admiral  of  the   fleet   and  his 
squadron  should  also  put  themselves  into  the  like 
order  of  the  admiral's  squadron  as  near  as  it  might 


LORD    WIMBLEDON,   1625  67 

be,  and  in  that  form  should  attend  for  a  reserve  or 
supply.  And  if  any  squadron,  ship  or  ships  of  ours 
should  happen  to  be  engaged  by  over-charge  of 
the  enemies,  loss  of  masts  or  yards,  or  other  main 
distress  needing  special  succour,  that  then  the  rear- 
admiral  with  all  his  force,  or  one  of  his  divisions 
proportionable  to  the  occasion,  should  come  to  their 
rescue ;  which  being  accomplished  they  should 
return  to  their  first  order  and  place  assigned. 

5.  That  the  distance  between  ship  and  ship  in 
every   squadron   should   be   such   as    none    might 
hinder  one  another  in  advancing  or  falling  off. 

6.  That    the    distance    between   squadron   and 
squadron  should  be  more  or  less  as  the  order  of  the 
enemy's  fleet  or  ships  should  require,  whereof  the 
captains  and  commanders  of  our  fleet  were  to  be 
very  considerate. 

7.  That  if  the  enemy's  approach  happened  to  be 
in  such  sort  as  the  admiral  of  the  Dutch  and  his 
squadron,  or  the  vice-admiral  of  our  fleet  [and]  his 
squadron,  might  have  opportunity  to  begin  the  fight, 
it   should    be   lawful  for  them  to  do   so  until  the 
admiral  could  come  up,  using  the  form,  method,  and 
care  prescribed. 

8.  That  if  the  enemy  should  be  forced  to  bear 
up,  or  to  be  entangled  among  themselves,  whereby 
an  advantage  might  be  had,  then  our  rear-admiral 
and  his  squadron  with  all  his  divisions  should  lay 
hold  thereof  and  prosecute  it  to  effect. 

9.  That  the  rear-admiral's  squadron  should  keep 
most  strict  and  special  watch  to  see  what  squadrons 
or  ships  distressed  of  our  fleet  should  need  extra- 
ordinary relief,  and  what  advantage  might  be  had 
upon  the  enemy,  that  a  speedy  and  present  course 
might  be  taken  to  perform  the  service  enjoined. 

10.  That   if  any  ship   or  ships  of  the   enemy 
should  break  out  or  fly,  the  admiral  of  any  squadron 

F  2 


68  CAROLINGIAN 

which  should  happen  to  be  in  the  next  and  most 
convenient  place  for  that  purpose  should  send 
out  a  competent  number  of  the  fittest  ships  of  his 
squadron  to  chase,  assault,  or  take  such  ship  or 
ships  so  breaking  out ;  but  no  ship  should  undertake 
such  a  chase  without  the  command  of  the  admiral,  or 
at  leastwise  the  admiral  of  his  squadron. 

1 1.  That  no  man  should  shoot  any  small  or  great 
shot  at  the  enemy  till  he  came  at  the  distance  of 
caliver  or  pistol  shot,  whereby  no  shot  might  be 
made  fruitless  or  in  vain  ;  whereof  the  captains  and 
officers  in  every  ship  should  have  an  especial  care. 

12.  That  no  man  should  presume  or  attempt  to 
board  any  ship  of  the  enemy  without  special  order 
and  direction  from  the  admiral,  or  at  leastwise  the 
admiral  of  his  squadron. 

1 3.  That  if  any  of  our  fleet  happened  to  be  [to] 
leeward  of  the  enemy,   every  of  our  ships  should 
labour  and  endeavour  what  they  might  to  take  all 
opportunity  to  get  to  windward  of  them,  and  to  hold 
that  advantage  having  once  obtained  it. 

14.  That  the  captains  and  officers  of  every  ship 
should  have  an  especial  care  as  much  as  in  them 
lay  to  keep  the  enemies  in  continual  fight  without 
any   respite   or  intermission   to   be   offered   them ; 
which,  with  the  advantage  of  the  wind  if  it  might  be 
had,  was  thought  the  likeliest  way  to  enforce  them 
to   bear  up  and  entangle  themselves,  or  fall  foul 
one  of  another  in  disorder  and  confusion. 

1 5.  That  an  especial  care  should  be  had  in  every 
ship   that  the   gunners   should  load  some  of  their 
pieces  with  case  shot,  handspikes,  nails,  bars  of  iron, 
or  with  what  else  might  do  most  mischief  to  the 
enemy's   men,  upon  every  fit  opportunity,  and  to 
come  near  and  lay  the  ordnance  well  to  pass   for 
that  purpose,  which  would  be  apt  to  do  great  spoil 
to  the  enemy. 


LORD    WIMBLEDON,    1625  69 

1 6.  That   the   cabins  in   every  ship  should  be 
broken  down  so  far  as  was  requisite  to  clear  the 
way  of  the  ordnance. 

1 7.  That  all  beds  and  sacks  in  every  ship  should 
be  disposed  and  used  as  bulwarks  for  defence  against 
the  shot  of  the  enemy. 

1 8.  That  there  should  be  ten,  eight,  six,  or  four 
men    to   attend   every   piece   of  ordnance   as   the 
master  gunner  should  choose  out  and  assign  them 
to  their  several    places  of  service,  that  every   one 
of  them  might  know  what  belonged  properly  to  him 
to  do.     And  that  this  choice  and  assignation  should 
be  made  with  speed  so  as  we  might  not  be  taken 
unprovided. 

1 9.  That  there  should  be  one,  two,  or  three  men 
of  good  understanding  and  diligence,  according  to 
the  burden  of  every  ship,  forthwith  appointed  to  fill 
cartouches  l  of  powder,  and  to  carry  them  in  cases  or 
barrels  covered  to  their  places  assigned. 

20.  That   the   hold    in    every   ship   should   be 
rummaged    and    made    predy,2   especially   by   the 
ship's   sides,    and  a   carpenter  with   some  man   of 
trust  appointed  to  go  fore  and  after  in  hold  to  seek 
for  shot  that  may  come  in  under  water ;  and  that 
there  should  be  provided  in  readiness  plugs,  pieces 
of  sheet  lead,  and  pieces  of  elm  board  to  stop  all 
leaks  that  might  be  found  within  board  or  without 

21.  That  in  every  ship  where  any  soldiers  were 
aboard  the  men  should  be  divided  into  two  or  three 
parts,  whereof  only  one  part  should  fight  at  once  and 
the  rest  should  be  in  hold,  to  be  drawn  up  upon 
occasion  to  relieve  and  rescue  the  former. 

22.  That  the  men  in  every  ship  should  be  kept 
1  MS.  '  carthouses.' 

•  MS.  '  pridie  '= Boteler's  '  predy.'  '  To  make  the  ship  predy,' 
he  says,  is  to  clear  for  action.  '  And  likewise  to  make  the  hold 
predy  is  to  bestow  everything  handsomely  there  and  to  remove 
anything  that  may  be  troublesome.' — Dialogues,  283. 


70  CAROL1NGIAN 

as  close  as  reasonably  might   be  till  the   enemy's 
first  volley  of  small  shot  should  be  past. 

23.  That  the  mariners  in  every  ship  should  be 
divided  and  separated  into  three  or  four  parts  or 
divisions,  so  as  every  one  might  know  the   place 
where  he  was  to  perform  his  duty  for  the  avoiding 
of  confusion. 

24.  That  the  master  or  boatswain  of  every  ship, 
by  command  of  the  captain,  should   appoint  a  suffi- 
cient and  select  number  of  seamen  to  stand  by  and 
attend  the  sails. 

25.  That  more   especially  they  should    by  like 
command  appoint  sufficient  helmsmen  to  steer  the 
ship. 

26.  That  the  sailors  and  helmsmen  should  in  no 
sort  presume  to  depart  or  stir  from  their  charge. 

27.  That   the   mainyard,   foreyard,    and    topsail 
sheets  in  every  ship  should   be  slung,  and  the  top- 
sail yards  if  the  wind  were  not  too  high ;  hereby  to 
avoid  the  shooting  down  of  sails. 

28.  That   there  should  be  butts   or   hogsheads 
sawn  into  two  parts  filled  with  salt  water,  set  upon 
the  upper  and  lower  decks   in  several  places  con- 
venient  in    every  ship,   with  buckets,    gowns,  and 
blankets  to  quench  and  put  out  wild-fire  or  other 
fire  if  need  be. 

29.  That  if  a  fight  began  by  day  and  continued 
till  night,  every  ship  should  be  careful  to  observe 
the  admiral  of  her  squadron  ;  that  if  the  admiral  fell 
off"  and  forbore  the  fight  for  the  present  every  other 
ship  might  do  the  like,   repairing   under   her  own 
squadron  to  amend  anything  amiss,  and  be  ready  to 
charge  again  when  the  admiral  should  begin. 

30.  That  if  any  of  the  ships  belonging  to  any 
squadron  or  division  happened  to  be  absent  or  not 
ready  in  convenient  time  and  place  to  keep  and  make 
good  the  order  herein  prescribed,  then  every  squad- 


LORD    WIMBLEDON,   1625 


ron  and  division  should  maintain  these  directions  as 
near  as  they  could,  although  the  number  of  ships  in 
every  division  were  the  less,  without  attending  the 
coming  in  of  all  the  ships  of  every  division. 

31.  And  that  these  ten  ships,  in  regard  of  the 
munition  and  materials  for  the  army  and  the  horses 
which  were  carried  in  them,  should  attend  the  rear- 
admiral  and  not  engage  themselves  without  order, 
but  should  remain  and  expect  such  directions  as 
might  come  from  our  admiral  or  rear-admiral. 


Peter  Bonaventure  . 

Sarah  Bonaventure. 

Christian 

Susan  and  Ellen 

William  of  London . 

Hope 

Chestnut 

Fortune 

Fox 

Truelove 


Captain  Johnson 
Captain  Carew 
Captain  Wharey 
Captain  Levett 
Captain  Amadas 
Sir  Thomas  Pigott, 
[Km. 


There  was  no  difference  between  the  articles  for 
the  admiral's  squadron  and  those  for  the  vice-admiral's 
and  rear-admiral's,  save  in  the  names  of  the  ships 
of  every  division,  and  that  their  squadrons  had  not 
any  particular  reserve,  nor  above  five  or  six  ships 
apiece  in  the  third  division,  for  want  of  ships  to  make 
up  the  number  of  nine  ;  the  munition  and  horse 
ships  which  belonged  to  their  squadrons  being  unapt 
to  fight,  and  therefore  disposed  into  a  special  division 
of  ten  ships  by  themselves  to  attend  the  general 


reserve. 


At  the  rising  of  the  council  a  motion  was  made 
to  have  some  of  the  best  sailers  of  our  fleet  chosen 
out  and  assigned  to  lie  off  from  the  main  body  of  the 
fleet,  some  to  sea  and  some  to  shoreward,  the  better 


72  CAROLINGIAN 

to  discover,  chase,  and  take  some  ships  or  boats  of 
the  enemy's ;  which  might  give  us  intelligence 
touching  the  Plate  Fleet,  whether  it  were  come  home 
or  no,  or  when  it  would  be  expected  and  in  what 
place,  and  touching  such  other  matters  whereof  we 
might  make  our  best  advantage.  But  nothing 
herein  was  now  resolved,  it  being  conceived,  as 
it  seemed,  that  we  might  soon  enough  and  more 
opportunely  consider  of  this  proposition  and  settle 
an  order  therein  when  we  came  nearer  to  the 
enemy's  coasts  ;  so  the  council  was  dissolved. 


II 

THE   SHIP-MONEY   FLEETS, 
circa  1635 

INTRODUCTORY 

THAT  Cecil's  unconfirmed  orders  produced  some 
impression  beyond  the  circle  of  the  military  flag- 
officers  is  clear.  Captain  Nathaniel  Boteler,  in  the 
work  already  cited,1  quotes  the  system  they  enjoined 
as  the  one  he  would  himself  adopt  if  he  were  to 
command  a  large  fleet  in  action.  In  his  sixth 
dialogue  on  the  '  Ordering  of  Fleets,'  after  recom- 
mending the  division  of  all  fleets  of  eighty  sail 
and  upwards  into  five  squadrons,  an  organisation  that 
was  subsequently  adopted  by  the  Dutch,  he  pro- 
ceeds to  explain  his  system  of  signals,  and  the 
advantages  of  scout  vessels  being  attached  to  every 
squadron,  especially,  he  says,  the  '  van  and  wings,' 
which  looks  as  though  the  ideas  of  De  Chaves  were 
still  alive.  Boteler's  work  is  cast  in  the  form  of  a 
conversation  between  a  landsman  admiral  and  an 
experienced  sea  captain,  who  is  supposed  to  be  in- 
structing him.  In  reply  to  the  admiral's  query  about 
battle  formations,  the  captain  says  that  'neither 
the  whole  present  age  [i.e.  century]  with  the  half  of 
the  last  have  afforded  any  one  thorough  example  of 
this  kind.'  In  the  few  actions  between  sailing  fleets 
that  had  taken  place  in  the  previous  seventy-five 

1  Ante,  p.  27. 


74  CAROLINGIAN 

years  he  says  '  we  find  little  or  nothing  as  touching 
the  form  of  these  fights.'  Being  pressed  for  his  own 
ideas  on  the  subject,  he  consents  to  give  them  as 
follows  :  '  I  say,  then,  that  wheresoever  a  fleet  is 
either  to  give  or  take  a  battle  with  another  every 
way  equal  with  it,  every  squadron  of  such  fleet, 
whether  they  be  three  in  number  as  generally  they 
are,  or  five  (as  we  prescribed  in  the  beginning  of 
the  dialogue)  shall  do  well  to  order  and  subdivide 
itself  into  three  equal  divisions,  with  a  reserve  of 
certain  ships  out  of  every  squadron  to  bring  up 
their  rears,  the  which  may  amount  in  number  to  the 
third  part  of  every  one  of  those  divisions.  And 
every  one  of  these  (observing  a  due  berth  and 
distance)  are  in  the  fight  to  second  one  another,  and 
(the  better  to  avoid  confusion,  and  the  falling  foul 
one  upon  another)  to  charge,  discharge  and  fall  off 
by  threes  or  fives,  more  or  less,  as  the  fleet  in  gross 
is  greater  or  smaller ;  the  ships  of  reserve  being 
to  be  instructed  either  to  succour  and  relieve  any 
that  shall  be  anyway  engaged  and  in  danger,  or  to 
supply  and  put  themselves  in  the  place  of  those  that 
shall  be  made  unserviceable ;  and  this  order  and 
course  to  be  constantly  kept  and  observed  during 
the  whole  time. of  the  battle.' 

Asked  if  there  are  no  other  forms  he  says  :  '  Some 
forms  besides,  and  different  from  this  (I  know  well), 
have  been  found  prescribed  and  practised  ;  as  for  a 
fleet  which  consisteth  but  of  a  few  ships  and  being  in 
fight  in  an  open  sea,  that  it  should  be  brought  up  to 
the  battle  in  one  only  front,  with  the  chief  admiral  in 
the  midst  of  them,  and  on  each  side  of  him  the 
strongest  and  best  provided  ships  of  the  fleet,  who, 
keeping  themselves  in  as  convenient  a  distance  as 
they  shall  be  able,  are  to  have  a  eye  and  regard  in 
the  fight  to  all  the  weaker  and  worser  ships  of  the 
party,  and  to  relieve  and  succour  them  upon  all 


BOTELER 'S    TREATISE,    1625         75 

occasions,  and  withal  being  near  the  admiral  may 
both  guard  him  and  aptly  receive  his  instructions. 
And  for  a  numerous  fleet  they  propound  that  it 
should  be  ordered  also  (when  there  is  sea-room 
sufficient)  into  one  only  front,  but  that  the  ablest 
arid  most  warlike  ships  should  be  so  stationed 
as  that  the  agility  of  the  smaller  ships  and  the 
strength  of  the  other  may  be  communicated  l  to  a 
mutual  relief,  and  for  the  better  serving  in  all 
occasions  either  of  chase  or  charge  ;  to  which  end 
they  order  that  all  the  files  of  the  front  that  are  to 
the  windwards  should  be  made  up  of  the  strongest 
and  best  ships,  that  so  they  may  the  surer  and 
speedier  relieve  all  such  of  the  weaker  ships,  being  to 
leewards  of  them,  as  shall  be  endangered  or  any 
way  oppressed  by  any  of  the  enemy.'  All  this  is  a 
clear  echo  of  De  Chaves  and  the  system  which  still 
obtained  in  all  continental  navies.  For  a  large  fleet 
at  least  Boteler  evidently  disapproved  all  tactics 
based  on  the  line  abreast,  and  preferred  a  system  of 
small  groups  attacking  in  line  ahead,  on  Cecil's  pro- 
posed system.  Asked  about  the  campaign  of  1588, 
he  has  nothing  to  tell  of  any  English  formation.  Of 
the  crescent  order  of  the  Armada  he  says — and 
modern  research  has  fully  confirmed  his  statement 
—that  it  was  not  a  battle  order  at  all,  but  only 
a  defensive  sailing  formation  'to  keep  them- 
selves together  and  in  company  until  they  might 
get  up  to  be  athwart  Gravelines,  which  was  the 
rendezvous  for  their  meeting  with  the  Prince  of 
Parma;  and  in  this  regard  this  their  order  was 
commendable.' 

How  far  these  ideas  really  represented  current 
naval  opinion  we  'cannot  precisely  tell,  but  we  know 
that  Boteler  was  an  officer  held  in  high  enough  esteem 

1  The  obsolete  meaning  of  'communicate'  is  to  'share'  or 
'  participate,'  to  '  enjoy  in  common.' 


;6  CAROLINGIAN 

to  receive  the  command  of  the  landing  flotilla  at  Cadiz, 
and  to  be  described  as  '  an  able  and  experienced 
sea  captain.'  But  whatever  tendency  there  may 
have  been  to  tactical  progress  under  Buckingham's 
inspiring  personality,  it  must  have  been  smothered 
by  the  lamentable  conduct  of  his  war.  Later  on  in 
the  reign,  in  the  period  of  the  '  Ship-money '  fleets, 
when  Charles  was  endeavouring  to  establish  a  real 
standing  navy  on  modern  lines,  we  find  in  the  Earl 
of  Lindsey's  orders  of  1635,  which  Monson  selected 
for  publication  in  his  Tracts,  no  sign  of  anything 
but  tactical  stagnation.  The  early  Tudor  tradition 
seems  to  have  completely  re-established  itself,  and 
Monson,  who  represents  that  tradition  better  than 
anyone,  though  he  approved  the  threefold  sub- 
division of  squadrons,  thought  all  battle  formations 
for  sailing  ships  a  mistake.  Writing  not  long  after 
Boteler,  he  says  :  '  Ships  which  must  be  carried  by 
wind  and  sails,  and  the  sea  affording  no  firm  or  stead- 
fast footing,  cannot  be  commanded  to  take  their  ranks 
like  soldiers  in  a  battle  by  land.  The  weather  at 
sea  is  never  certain,  the  winds  variable,  ships 
unequal  in  sailing ;  and  when  they  strictly  keep 
their  order,  commonly  they  fall  foul  one  of  another, 
and  in  such  cases  they  are  more  careful  to  observe 
their  directions  than  to  offend  the  enemy,  whereby 
they  will  be  brought  into  disorder  amongst  them- 
selves.' 

Of  Lindsey's  orders  only  Article  1 8  is  given  here 
out  of  the  thirty-four  which  Monson  prints  in  full.  It 
is  the  only  one  relating  to  tactics.  The  rest,  which 
follow  the  old  pattern,  are  the  usual  medley  of  articles 
of  war,  sailing  instructions,  and  general  directions 
for  the  conduct  of  the  fleet  at  sea.  We  cannot 
therefore  safely  assume  that  Article  18  fairly  re- 
presents the  tactical  thought  of  the  time.  It  may 
be  that  Lindsey's  orders  were  merely  in  the  nature 


EARL    OF  LINDSEY,    1635  77 

of  'General  Instructions,'  to  be  supplemented  by 
more  particular  '  Fighting  Instructions,'  as  was  the 
practice  later. 


THE  EARL   OF  LINDSEY,  1635. 

Suck  instructions  as  were  given  in  the  Voyage  in 
1635  by  the  Right  Honourable  Robert,  Earl  of 
Lino's  ey.1 

|  Monson's  Naval  Tracts,  Book  III.    Extract.] 

Art.  1 8.  If  we  happen  to  descry  any  fleet  at 
sea  which  we  may  probably  know  or  conjecture 
designs  to  oppose,  encounter  or  affront  us,  I  will 
first  strive  to  get  the  wind  (if  I  be  to  leeward),  and 
so  shall  the  whole  fleet  in  due  order  do  the  like.  And 
when  we  shall  join  battle  no  ship  shall  presume  to 
assault  the  admiral,  vice-admiral  or  rear-admiral, 
but  only  myself,  my  vice-admiral  or  rear-admiral, 
if  we  be  able  to  reach  them  ;  and  the  other  ships 
are  to  match  themselves  accordingly  as  they  can, 
and  to  secure  one  another  as  cause  shall  require, 
not  wasting  their  powder  at  small  vessels  or  vic- 
tuallers, nor  firing  till  they  come  side  to  side. 

1  This  was  a  fleet  of  forty  sail,  designed,  under  colour  of 
securing  the  sovereignty  of  the  Seas  and  protecting  commerce 
against  pirates,  to  assist  Spain  as  far  as  possible  against  the  French 
and  Dutch.  It  never  fought. 


PART  IV 
THE    FIRST    DUTCH    WAR 


I.    ENGLISH    AND    DUTCH    ORDERS    ON   THE 
EVE   OF  THE  WAR,    1648-52 

II.     ORDERS  ISSUED  DURING  THE  WAR,  1653-54 


I 

ENGLISH    AND    DUTCH     ORDERS     ON 
THE    EVE    OF   THE    WAR,    1648-53 

INTRODUCTORY 

FROM  the  foregoing  examples  it  will  be  seen  that  at 
the  advent  of  the  Commonwealth,  which  was  to  set 
on  foot  so  sweeping  a  revolution  in  the  naval  art,  all 
attempts  to  formulate  a  tactical  system  had  been 
abandoned.     This   is   confirmed    by   the   following 
extract  from  the  orders  issued  by  the  Long  Parlia- 
ment in  1648.      It  was  the  time  when  the  revolt  of 
a  part  of  the  fleet  and  a  rising  in  the  South  East- 
ern counties  led  the  government   to   apprehend    a 
naval  coalition  of  certain  foreign  powers  in  favour 
of  Charles.      It  is  printed  by  Granville  Penn  in  his 
Memorials  of  Sir    William  Penn  as  having  been 
issued  in   1647,  but  the  original  copy  of  the  orders 
amongst  the  Penn  Tracts  (Sloane  MSS.  1709,  f.  55) 
is    marked   as   having   been  delivered   on  May   2, 
1648,  to  'Captain    William    Penn,    captain   of  the 
Assurance    frigate    and    rear-admiral    of  the    Irish 
Squadron.'     They  are  clearly  based  on  the    later 
precedents  of  Charles  I,  but  it  must  be  noted  that 
Penn  is  told  '  to  expect  more  particular  instructions  ' 
in  regard  to  the  fighting  article.     We  may  assume 
therefore  that  the  admiralty  authorities  already  re- 
cognised the  inadequacy  of  the  established  fighting 


82  THE  FIRST  DUTCH   WAR 

instructions,  and   so   soon  as  the   pressure  of  that 
critical  time  permitted  intended  to  amplify  them. 

Amongst  those  responsible  for  the  orders  how- 
ever there  is  no  name  that  can  be  credited  with 
advanced  views.  They  were  signed  by  five 
members  of  the  Navy  Committee,  and  at  their  head 
is  Colonel  Edward  Mountagu,  afterwards  Earl  of 
Sandwich,  but  then  only  twenty-two  years  old.1 
Whether  anything  further  was  done  is  uncertain. 
No  supplementary  orders  have  been  found  bear- 
ing date  previous  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Dutch 
war.  But  there  exists  an  undated  set  which 
it  seems  impossible  not  to  attribute  to  this  period. 
It  exists  in  the  Harleian  MSS.  (1247,  ff.  43b), 
amongst  a  number  of  others  which  appear  to  have 
been  used  by  the  Duke  of  York  as  precedents  in 
drawing  up  his  famous  instructions  of  1665.  To 
begin  with  it  is  clearly  later  than  the  orders  of  1648, 
upon  which  it  is  an  obvious  advance.  Then  the  use 
of  the  word  '  general '  for  admiral,  and  of  the  word 
'  sign '  for  '  signal '  fixes  it  to  the  Commonwealth  or 
very  early  Restoration.  Finally,  internal  evidence 
shows  it  is  previous  to  the  orders  of  1653,  for  those 
orders  will  be  seen  to  be  an  expansion  of  the 
undated  set  so  far  as  they  go,  and  further,  while  these 
undated  orders  have  no  mention  of  the  line,  those  of 
1653  enjoin  it.  They  must  therefore  lie  between 
1648  and  1653,  and  it  seems  worth  while  to  give 
them  here  conjecturally  as  being  possibly  the 
supplementary,  or  '  more  particular  instructions,' 
which  the  government  contemplated ;  particularly 

1  The  others  were  John  Rolle,  member  for  Truro,  a  merchant 
and  politician,  who  died  in  November  1648,  and  who  as  early  as 
1645  had  been  proposed,  though  unsuccessfully,  for  the  Navy 
Committee  ;  and  three  less  conspicuous  members  of  Parliament  : 
Sir  Walter  Earle  (of  the  Presbyterian  party),  Giles  Greene,  and 
Alexander  Bence.  They  were  all  superseded  the  following  year 
by  the  new  Admiralty  Committee  of  the  Council  of  State. 


ORIGIN  OF  LINE  AHEAD         83 

as  this  hypothesis  gains  colour  from  the  unusual 
form  of  the  heading  '  Instructions  for  the  better 
ordering.'  Though  this  form  became  fixed  from 
this  time  forward,  there  is,  so  far  as  is  known,  no 
previous  example  of  it  except  in  the  orders  which 
Lord  Wimbledon  propounded  to  his  council  of 
war  in  1625,  and  those  were  also  supplementary 
articles.1 

Be  this  as  it  may,  the  orders  in  question  do  not 
affect  the  position  that  up  to  the  outbreak  of  the 
First  Dutch  War  we  have  no  orders  enjoining  the 
line  ahead  as  a  battle  formation.  Still  we  cannot 
entirely  ignore  the  fact  that,  in  spite  of  the  lack 
of  orders  on  the  subject,  traces  of  a  line  ahead 
are  to  be  detected  in  the  earliest  action  of  the 
war.  Gibson,  for  instance,  in  his  Reminiscences 
has  the  following  passage  relating  to  Blake's  brush 
with  Tromp  over  the  honour  of  the  flag  on  May  9, 
1652,  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war  :~  '  When  the 
general  had  got  half  Channel  over  he  could  see  the 
Dutch  fleet  with  their  starboard  tacks  aboard  stand- 
ing towards  him,  having  the  weather-gage.  Upon 
which  the  general  made  a  sign  for  the  fleet  to  tack. 
After  which,  having  their  starboard  tacks  aboard 
(the  general's  ship,  the  Old  James,  being  the 
southernmost  and  sternmost  ship  in  the  fleet),  the 
rest  of  his  fleet  tacking,  first  placed  themselves  in  a 
line  ahead  of  the  general,  who  after  tacking  hauled 
up  his  mainsail  in  the  brails,  fitted  his  ship  to  fight, 
slung  his  yards,  and  run  out  his  lower  tier  of  guns  and 
clapt  his  fore  topsail  upon  the  mast.'  If  Gibson  could 
be  implicitly  trusted  this  passage  would  be  conclusive 

1  Supra,  p.  63.  It  may  also  be  noted  that  these  articles  are 
intended  for  a  fleet  not  large  enough  to  be  divided  into  squadrons 
—just  such  a  fleet  in  fact  as  that  in  which  Penn  was  flying  his  flag. 
The  units  contemplated,  e.g.  in  Articles  2-4,  are  '  ships,'  whereas  in 
the  corresponding  articles  of  1653  the  units  are  'squadrons.' 

-  Gardiner,  Dutch  War,  i.  9. 

C  2 


84  THE   FIRST  DUTCH    WAR 

on  the  existence  of  the  line  formation  earlier  than  any 
of  the  known  Fighting  Instructions  which  enjoined  it ; 
but  unfortunately,  as  Dr.  Gardiner  pointed  out,  Gibson 
did  not  write  his  account  till  1702,  when  he  was  67. 
He  is  however  to  some  extent  corroborated  by  Blake 
himself,  who  in  his  official  despatch  of  May  20, 
relating  the  incident,  says  that  on  seeing  Tromp 
bearing  down  on  him  '  we  lay  by  and  put  ourselves 
into  a  fighting  posture  ' — i.e.  battle  order— but  what 
the  '  posture '  was  he  does  not  say.  If  however  this 
posture  was  actually  the  one  Gibson  describes,  we 
have  the  important  fact  that  in  the  first  recorded 
instance  of  the  complete  line,  it  was  taken  as  a 
defensive  formation  to  await  an  attack  from  wind- 
ward. 

The  only  other  description  we  have  of  Eng- 
lish tactics  at  this  time  occurs  in  a  despatch  of  the 
Dutch  commander-in-chief  in  the  Mediterranean, 
Van  Galen,  in  which  he  describes  how  Captain 
Richard  Badiley,  then  commanding  a  squadron  on 
the  station,  engaged  him  with  an  inferior  force  and 
covered  his  convoy  off  Monte  Christo  in  August 
1652.  When  the  fleets  were  in  contact,  he  says,  as 
though  he  were  speaking  of  something  that  was 
quite  unfamiliar  to  him,  '  then  every  captain  bore  up 
from  leeward  close  to  us  to  get  into  range,  and  so  all 
gave  their  broadsides  first  of  the  one  side  and  then 
again  of  the  other,  and  then  bore  away  with  their 
ships  before  the  wind  till  they  were  ready  again  ;  and 
then  as  before  with  the  guns  of  the  whole  broadside 
they  fired  into  my  flagship,  one  after  the  other, 
meaning  to  shoot  my  masts  overboard.' 1  From  this 

1  This  at  least  is  what  Van  Galen's  crabbed  old  Dutch  seems 
to  mean.  '  Alsoo  naer  bij  quam  dat  se  couden  toe  schieter  dragen, 
de  elcken  heer  onder  den  windt,  gaven  so  elck  hare  laghe  dan 
vinjt  d'  eene  sijde,  dan  veer  van  d'  anden  sijde,  hielden  alsdan  met 
haer  schepen  voor  den  vindt  tal  dat  se  weer  claer  waren,  dan  wast 
alsvooren  met  cannoneren  van  de  heele  lagh  en  in  sonderheijt  op 


ORIGIN  OF  LINE  AHEAD          85 

it  would  seem  that  Badiley  attacked  in  succession  in 
the  time-honoured  way,  and  that  the  old  rudimentary 
form  of  the  line  ahead  was  still  the  ordinary  practice. 
The  evidence  however  is  far  from  strong,  but  really 
little  is  needed.  Experience  teaches  us  that  the 
line  ahead  formation  would  never  have  been  adopted 
as  a  standing  order  unless  there  had  been  some 
previous  practice  in  the  service  to  justify  it  or  unless 
the  idea  was  borrowed  from  abroad.  But,  as  we 
shall  see,  the  oft-repeated  assertion  that  it  was 
imitated  from  the  Dutch  is  contrary  to  all  the 
evidence  and  quite  untenable.  The  only  experi- 
ence the  framers  of  the  order  of  1653  can  have  had 
of  a  line  ahead  formation  must  have  been  in  our  own 
service. 

The  clearest  proof  of  this  lies  in  the  annexed 
orders  which  Tromp  issued  on  June  20,  1652, 
immediately  before  the  declaration  of  war,  and  after 
he  had  had  his  brush  with  Blake,  in  which,  if  Gibson 
is  to  be  trusted,  Tromp  had  seen  Blake's  line. 
From  these  orders  it  is  clear  that  the  Dutch  concep- 
tion of  a  naval  action  was  still  practically  identical 
with  that  of  Lindsey's  instructions  of  1635,  that  is, 
mutual  support  of  squadrons  or  groups,  with  no  trace 
of  a  regular  battle  formation.  In  the  detailed  'or- 
ganisation '  of  the  fleet  each  of  the  three  squadrons 
has  its  own  three  flag  officers — that  is  to  say,  it  was 
organised,  like  that  of  Lord  Wimbledon  in  1625,  in 
three  squadrons  and  nine  sub-squadrons,  and  was 
therefore  clearly  designed  for  group  tactics.  It  is 
on  this  point  alone,  if  at  all,  that  it  can  be.  said  to 
show  any  advance  on  the  tactics  which  had  obtained 
throughout  the  century,  or  on  those  which  Tromp 
himself  had  adopted  against  Oquendo  in  1639. 

mijn  onderhebbende  schip  vier  gaven  van  meeninge  masten  aft 
stengen  overboort  to  schieten.'  A  copy  of  Van  Galen's  despatch 
is  amongst  Dr.  Gardiner's  Dutch  War  transcripts. 


- 


86  THE  FIRST  DUTCH   WAR 

Yet  further  proof  is  to  be  found  in  the  orders 
issued  by  Witte  Corneliszoon  de  With  to  his 
captains  in  October  1652,  as  commander-in-chief  of 
the  Dutch  fleet.  In  these  he  very  strictly  enjoins, 
as  a  matter  of  real  importance,  '  that  they  shall  all 
keep  close  up  by  the  others  and  as  near  together  as 
possible,  to  the  end  that  thereby  they  may  act  with 
united  force  .  .  .  and  prevent  any  isolation  or 
cutting  off  of  ships  occurring  in  time  of  fight ; ' 
adding  'that  it  behoved  them  to  stand  by  and 
relieve  one  another  loyally,  and  rescue  such  as  might 
be  hotly  attacked.'  This  is  clearly  no  more  than  an 
amplification  of  Tromp's  order  of  the  previous  June. 
It  introduces  no  new  principle,  and  is  obviously 
based  on  the  time-honoured  idea  of  group  tactics 
and  mutual  support.  It  is  true  that  De  Jonghe,  the 
learned  historian  of  the  Dutch  navy,  regards  it  as 
conclusive  that  the  line  was  then  in  use  by  the 
Dutch,  because,  as  he  says,  several  Dutch  captains, 
after  the  next  action,  were  found  guilty  and  con- 
demned for  not  having  observed  their  instructions. 
But  really  there  is  nothing  in  it  from  which  a  line 
can  be  inferred.  It  is  all  explained  on  the  theory  of 
groups.  And  in  spite  of  De  Jonghe's  deep  research 
and  his  anxiety  to  show  that  the  line  was  practised 
by  his  countrymen  as  well  as  by  the  English  in  the 
first  Dutch  War,  he  is  quite  unable  to  produce 
any  orders  like  the  English  instructions  of  1653,  in 
which  a  line  formation  is  clearly  laid  down. 

But  whether  or  not  we  can  accept  De  Jonghe's 
conclusions  as  to  the  time  the  line  was  introduced 
into  the  Dutch  service,  one  thing  is  clear  enough — 
that  he  never  ventured  to  suggest  that  the  English 
copied  the  idea  from  his  own  countrymen.  It  is 
evident  that  he  found  nothing  either  in  the  Dutch 
archives  or  elsewhere  even  to  raise  such  an  idea  in 
his  mind.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  his  conspicuous 


LONG  PARLIAMENT,    1648          87 

impartiality  leads  him  to  give  abundant  testimony 
that  throughout  these  wars  thoughtful  Dutch  officers 
were  continually  praising  the  order  and  precision  of 
the  English  tactics,  and  lamenting  the  blundering 
and  confusion  of  their  own.  It  may  be  added  that 
Dr.  Gardiner's  recent  researches  in  the  same  field 
equally  failed  to  produce  any  document  upon  which 
we  can  credit  the  Dutch  admirals  with  serious 
tactical  reforms.  Even  De  Ruyter's  improvements 
in  squadronal  organisation  consisted  mainly  in  super- 
seding a  multiplicity  of  small  squadrons  by  a  system 
of  two  or  three  large  squadrons,  divided  into  sub- 
squadrons,  a  system  which  was  already  in  use  with 
the  English,  and  was  presumably  imitated  by  De 
Ruyter,  if  it  was  indeed  he  who  introduced  it  and  not 
Tromp,  from  the  well-established  Commonwealth 
practice.1 

PARLIAMENTARY  ORDERS,   1648. 
[Sloane  MSS.  1709,  f.  55.    Extract] 

Instructions  given  by  the  Right  Honourable  the 
Committee  of  the  Lords  and  Commons  for  the 
Admiralty  and  Cinque  Ports,  to  be  duly  observed 
by  all  captains  and  officers  whatsoever  and 
common  men  respectively  in  their  fleet,  provided 
to  the  glory  of  God,  the  honour  and  service  of 
Parliament,  and  the  safety  of  the  Kingdom  of 
England.  [Fol.  59.] 
If  any  fleet  shall  be  discovered  at  sea  which 

may  probably  be  conjectured  to  have  a  purpose  to 

1  See  De  Jonghe's  introduction  to  his  Third  Book  on  '  The 
Condition  of  the  British  and  Dutch  Navies  at  the  outbreak  of  and 
during  the  Second  English  War,'  Geschiedenis  van  het  Neder- 
landsche  Zeauesen,  vol.  ii.  part  ii.  pp.  132-141,  and  his  digression 
on  Tactics,  pp.  290  et  seq.,  and  p.  182  note.  De  Witte's  order  is 
p.  311. 


88  THE  FIRST  DUTCH   WAR 

encounter,  oppose,  or  affront  the  fleet  in  the  Parlia- 
ment's service,  you  may  in  that  case  expect  more 
particular  directions.  But  for  the  present  you  are 
to  take  notice,  that  in  case  of  joining  battle  you  are 
to  leave  it  to  the  vice-admiral  to  assail  the  enemy's 
admiral,  and  to  match  yourself  as  equally  as  you  can, 
to  succour  the  rest  of  the  fleet  as  cause  shall  require, 
not  wasting  your  powder  nor  shooting  afar  off,  nor 
till  you  come  side  to  side. 


SUPPLEMENTARY  INSTRUCTIONS, 
circa  1650. 

[Harleian  MSS.  1247,  43b.    Draft  unsigned.] 

Instructions  for  the  better  ordering  and  managing 
the  fleet  in  fighting. 

1.  Upon  discovery  of  a  fleet,  receiving  a  sign 
from  the  general's  ship,  which  is  putting  abroad  the 
sign  made  for  each  ship  or  frigate,  they  are  to  make 
sail  and  stand  with   them  so  nigh  as  to  gain  know- 
ledge what  they  are  and  of  what  quality,  how  many 
fireships  and  others,  and  what  order  the  fleet  is  in  ; 
which  being  done  the  frigates  or  vessels  are  to  speak 
together  and  conclude  on  the  report  they  are  to  give, 
and  accordingly  report  to  the  general  or  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  squadron,  and  not  to  engage  if  the 
enemy's  ships  exceed   them   in   number   except   it 
shall  appear  to  them  on  the  place  that  they  have  the 
advantage. 

2.  At  sight  of  the  said  fleet  the  vice-admiral  or 
he  that  commands  in  the  second  place,  and  the  rear- 
admiral  or  he  that  commands  in  the  third  place,  are 
to  make  what  sail  they  can  to  come  up  with  the 
admiral  on  each  wing,  as  also  each  ship  according  to 
her  quality,  giving  a  competent  distance  from  each 
other  if  there  be  sea-room  enough. 


COMMONWEALTH,    CIRCA   1650      89 

3.  As  soon  as  they  shall  [see]  the  general  engage, 
or  [he]  shall  make  a  sign  by  shooting  off  two  guns 
and  putting   a  red  flag  on  the  fore  topmast-head, 
that  each  ship  shall  take  the  best  advantage  they 
can  to  engage  with  the  enemy  next  unto  him. 

4.  If  any  ship  shall  happen  to  be  over-charged 
and  distressed  the  next  ship  or  ships  are  immediately 
to  make  towards  their  relief  and  assistance   upon 
signal  given ;  which  signal  shall  be,  if  the  admiral, 
then  a  pennant  in  the  fore  topmast-head  ;  the  vice- 
admiral  or  commander  in  the  second  place,  a  pen- 
nant in  the  main  topmast-head  ;  and  the  rear-admiral 
the  like. 

5.  In  case  any  ship  shall  be  distressed  or  dis- 
abled by  loss  of  masts,  shot  under  water,   or  other- 
wise so  as  she  is  in  danger  of  sinking  or  taking,  he 
or  they  are  to  give  a  signal  thereof  so  as,  the  fleet 
having  knowledge,  they  may  be  ready  to  be  relieved. 
Therefore  the  flagships  are  to  have  a  special  care  to 
them,  that  such  provisions  may  be  made  that  they 
may  not  be  left   in  distress   to   the  mercy   of  the 
enemy  ;  and  the  signal  is  to  be  a  weft T  of  the  ensign 
of  the  ship  so  distressed. 

6.  That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  commanders  and 
masters  of  all  the  small  frigates,  ketches  and  smacks 
belonging  to  the  fleet  to   know  the   fireships    that 
belong  to  the  enemy,  and  accordingly  by  observing 
their  motion  to  do  their  utmost  to  cut  off  their  boats 
(if  possible),  or  if  opportunity  serve  that  they  lay 
them  on  board,  fire  and  destroy  them  ;  and  to  this 
purpose  they  are  to  keep  to  windward  of  the  fleet 
in  time  of  service.     But  in  case  they  cannot  prevent 
the  fireships  from  coming  on  board  us  by  coming 
between  us  and  them,  which  by  all  means  possible 
they  are  to  endeavour,   that  then,  in  such  a  case, 

1  See  note,  p.  99. 


90  THE  FIRST  DUTCH   WAR 

they  show  themselves  men  in  such  an  exigent,1  and 
shear  aboard  them,  and  with  their  boats,  grapnels, 
and  other  means  clear  them  from  us  and  destroy 
them  ;  which  service,  if  honourably  done,  according 
to  its  merit  shall  be  rewarded,  and  the  neglect 
thereof  strictly  and  severely  called  to  account. 

7.  That  the  fireships  belonging  to  the  fleet  endea- 
vour to   keep   the   wind,  and  they  with  the  small 
frigates  to  be  as  near  the  great  ships  as  they  can, 
and  to  attend  the  signal  from  the  commander-in- 
chief  and  to  act  accordingly. 

8.  If  any  engagement  shall  happen  to  continue 
until  night  and  the  general  please  to  anchor,  that 
upon  signal  given  they  all  anchor  in  as  good  order  as 
may  be,  the  signal   being  as  in  the  instructions  for 
sailing  ;  and  if  the  general  please  to  retreat  without 
anchoring,  then  the  signal  to  be  firing  two  guns  so 
nigh  one  the  other  as  the  report  may  be  distinguished, 
and  within  three  minutes  after  to  do  the  like  with  two 
guns  more.     And  the  commander  of  this  ship  is  to 
sign  copies  of  these  instructions   to  all  ships  and 
other  vessels  of  this  fleet.     Given  on  board  the 

1  '  Exigent  '=exigence,  emergency.     Shakespeare  has  '  Why 
do  you  cross  me  in  this  exigent  ? ' — Jut.  Cces.  v.  i. 


TROMP,    1652  91 


MARTEN  TROMP,  June    20,    1652. 
[Dr.  Gardiner's  First  Dutch  War,  vol.  i.  p.  321.    Extract.] 

June  f£,  1652.  The  resolution  of  Admiral  Tromp 
on  the  distribution  of  the  fleet  in  case  of  its  being 
attacked. 

Each  captain  is  expressly  ordered,  on  penalty  of 
300  guilders,  to  keep  near1  the  flag  officer  under 
whom  he  serves.  Also  he  is  to  have  his  guns  in  a 
serviceable  condition.  The  squadron  under  Vice- 
Admiral  Jan  Evertsen  is  to  lie  or  sail  immediately 
ahead  of  the  admiral.  Further  Captain  Pieter  Floris- 
zoon  (who  provisionally  carries  the  flag  at  the  mizen 
as  rear-admiral)  is  always  to  remain  with  his  squad- 
ron close  astern  of  the  admiral ;  and  the  Admiral 
Tromp  is  to  take  his  station  between  both  with  his 
squadron.  The  said  superior  officers  and  captains 
are  to  stand  by  one  another  with  all  fidelity  ;  and 
each  squadron  when  another  is  vigorously  attacked 
shall  second  and  free  the  other,  using  therein  all 
the  qualities  of  a  soldier  and  seaman. 

1  The  Dutch  has  '  troppen '  =  to  gather  round  (cf.  our 
'  trooping  the  colour ').  De  With's  corresponding  order  has 
'dat  zij  alien  bij  den  anderen  .  .  .  gesloten  zou  den  blijven.' 
Supra,  p.  86. 


92  THE  FIRST  DUTCH   WAR 


II 
ORDERS    ISSUED    DURING    THE   WAR 

1653  AND   1654 

INTRODUCTORY 

THE  earliest  known  '  Fighting  Instructions'  in  any 
language  which  aimed  at  a  single  line  ahead  as  a 
battle  formation,  were  issued  by  the  Commonwealth's 
'  generals-at-sea '  on  March  29,  1653,  in  the  midst  of 
the  Dutch  War.  This  is  placed  beyond  doubt  by  an 
office  copy  amongst  the  Duke  of  Portland's  MSS.  at 
Welbeck  Abbey.1  It  is  of  high  importance  for  the 
history  of  naval  tactics  that  we  are  at  last  able  to  fix 
the  date  of  these  memorable  orders.  Endless  misap- 
prehension on  the  subject  of  our  battle  formations 
during  the  First  Dutch  War  has  been  caused  by  a 
chronological  error  into  which  Mr.  Granville  Penn 
was  led  in  his  Memorials  of  Penn  (Appendix  L). 
Sir  William  Penn's  copy  of  these  Instructions 
is  merely  dated  '  March  1653, '2  and  his  biographer 
hazarded  the  very  natural  conjecture  that,  as 
this  is  an  '  old  style '  date,  it  meant  '  March 
1654  '  This  would  have  been  true  of  any  day 

1  Hist.  MSS.  Com.  XIII.  ii.  85.     It  is  from  a  transcript  of 
this  copy  made  for  Dr.  Gardiner  that  I  have  been  permitted  to 
take  the  text  below.     A  set  of  '  Instructions  for  the  better  order- 
ing of  the  fleet  in  Sailing  '  accompanies  them. 

2  ^British  Museum^  Sloane  MSS.  3232,  f.  81. 


THE   GENERALS  AT  SEA  93 

in  March  before  the  25th,  but  as  we  now  can 
fix  the  date  as  the  29th,  we  know  the  year  is  really 
1653  and  not  i654.1  There  was  perhaps  some 
anxiety  on  Mr.  Penn's  part  to  get  his  hero  some 
share  in  the  orders,  and  as  William  Penn  was  not 
appointed  one  of  the  '  generals-at-sea '  till  December 
2,  1653,  he  could  not  officially  have  had  the  credit  of 
orders  issued  in  the  previous  March.  This  point 
however  is  also  set  at  rest  by  the  Welbeck  copy, 
which  besides  the  date  has  the  signatures  of  the 
generals,  and  they  are  those  of  Blake,  Deane  and 
Monck.  Penn  did  not  sign  them  at  all,  but  this 
really  in  no  way  affects  his  claim  as  a  tactical  re- 
former. For  as  he  was  vice-admiral  of  the  fleet 
and  an  officer  of  high  reputation,  his  share  in  the 
orders  was  probably  as  great  as  that  of  anyone  else. 
The  winter  of  1652-3  was  the  turning  point  of 
the  war.  The  summer  campaign  had  shown  how 
serious  the  struggle  was  to  be,  and  no  terms  for 
ending  it  could  be  arranged.  Large  reinforcements 
consequently  had  been  ordered,  and  Monck  and 
Deane  nominated  to  assist  Blake  as  joint  generals- 
at-sea  for  the  next  campaign.  Four  days  later,  on 
November  30,  1652,  Blake  had  been  defeated  by 
Tromp  off  Dungeness,  and  several  of  his  captains 
were  reported  to  have  behaved  badly.  An  inquiry 
was  ordered,  and  the  famous  '  Laws  of  War  and  Ordi- 
nances of  the  Sea/  prepared  by  Sir  Harry  Vane  by 
order  of  Parliament  for  the  better  enforcement  of 
discipline,  were  put  in  force.  Notwithstanding  these 
vigorous  efforts  to  increase  the  strength  and  effi- 
ciency of  the  sea  service,  it  was  not  till  after  the  first 
action  of  the  new  campaign  that  an  attempt  was 

1  The  Sloane  copy  is  not  quite  identical  with  that  in  the 
Portland  MSS.  The  variations,  however,  are  merely  verbal  and 
in  a  few  signals,  and  are  of  such  a  nature  as  to  be  accounted  for 
by  careless  transcription. 


94  THE  FIRST  DUTCH   WAR 

made  to  improve  the  fleet  tactics.  The  action  off 
Portland  on  February  18,  1653,  and  the  ensuing 
chase  of  Tromp,  marked  the  first  real  success  of  the 
war  ;  but  though  the  generals  succeeded  in  delivering 
a  severe  blow  to  the  Dutch  admiral  and  his  convoy, 
it  must  have  been  clear  to  everyone  that  they 
narrowly  escaped  defeat  through  a  want  of  cohesion 
between  their  squadrons.  On  the  iQth  and  2oth 
Tromp  executed  a  masterly  retreat,  with  his  fleet  in 
a  crescent  or  obtuse-angle  formation  and  his  convoy 
in  its  arms,  but  nowhere  is  there  any  hint  that  either 
side  fought  in  line  ahead.1  On  the  25th  the  fleet 
had  put  into  Stokes  Bay  to  refit,  and  between  this 
time  and  March  29  the  new  orders  were  produced.2 
The  first  two  articles  it  will  be  seen  are  practi- 

1  Hoste,  the  author  of  the  first  great  treatise  on  Naval  Tactics, 
quotes  Tromp's  formation  as  a  typical  method  of  retreat ;  but  his 
account  is  vitiated  by  what  seems  a  curious  mistake.     He  says  : 
'  II  rangea  son  armee  en  demi-lune  et  il  mit  son  convoi  au  milieu  : 
c'est  a  dire  que  son  vaisseau  faisait  au  vent  Tangle  obtus  de  la 
demi-lune,  et  les  autres  s'etendoient  de  part  (sic)  et  d'autre  sur 
les  deux  lignes  du  plus-pres  pour  former  les  faces  de  la  demi-lune 
qui  couvroient  le  convoi.      Ce  fut  en  cet   ordre  qu'il  fit  vent, 
arriere,  foudroiant  a  droite  et  a  gauche   tous   les   anglois   qui 
s'approchent.'     But  if  with  the  wind  aft  his  two  quarter  lines  bore 
from  the  flagship  seven  points  from  the  wind,  the  formation  would 
have  been  concave  to  the  enemy  and  the  convoy  could  not  have 
been  au  milieu.     (Evolutions  Navales,  pp.  90,  95,  and  plate  29, 
p.  91.)    The  passage  is  in  any  case  interesting,  as  showing  that  what 
was  then  called  the  crescent  or  half-moon  formation  was  nothing 
but  our  own  '  order  of  retreat,'  or  '  order  of  retreat  reverted,'  of 
Rodney's  time.     As  defined  by  Sir  Charles  Knowles  in  1780,  the 
order  of  retreat  reverted  was  formed  on  two  lines  of  bearing,  i.e. 
by  the  seconds  of  the  centre  ship  keeping  two  points  abaft  her 
starboard  and  larboard  beams  respectively.     In  the  simple  order 
of  retreat  they  kept  two  points  before  the  beam. 

2  No  reference  to  these  orders  appears  in  the  correspondence 
of  the  generals  at  this  time,  unless  it  be  in  a  letter  of  John  Poort- 
mans,  deputy-treasurer  of  the  fleet,  to  Robert  Blackbourne,  in 
which  he  writes  on  March  9  :  '  The  generals  want  500  copies  of 
the  instructions  for  commanders  of  the  state's  ships  printed  and 
sent  down.'     (S.  P.  Dom.  48,  f.  65.) 


ADOPTION  OF   THE  LINE          95 

cally  the  same  as  the  '  Supplementary  Instructions  ' 
on  p.  99,  but  in  the  third,  relating  to  '  general 
action,'  instead  of  the  ships  engaging  '  according  to 
the  order  presented,'  as  was  enjoined  in  the  previous 
set,  '  they  are  to  endeavour  to  keep  in  a  line  with 
the  chief,'  as  the  order  which  will  enable  them  'to 
take  the  best  advantage  they  can  to  engage  with 
the  enemy.'  Article  6  directs  that  where  a  flagship 
is  distressed  captains  are  to  endeavour  to  form  line 
between  it  and  the  enemy.  Article  7  however  goes 
still  further,  and  enjoins  that  where  the  windward 
station  has  been  gained  the  line  ahead  is  to  be 
formed  '  upon  severest  punishment,'  and  a  special 
signal  is  given  for  the  manoeuvre.  Article  9 
provides  a  similar  signal  for  flagships. 

Compared  with  preceding  orders,  these  new 
ones  appear  nothing  less  than  revolutionary.  But 
it  is  by  no  means  certain  that  they  were  so.  Here 
again  it  must  be  remarked  that  it  is  beyond  all 
experience  for  such  sweeping  reforms  to  be  so 
rigorously  adopted,  and  particularly  in  the  middle 
of  a  war,  without  their  having  been  in  the  air  for 
some  time  previously,  and  without  their  supporters 
having  some  evidence  to  cite  of  their  having  been 
tried  and  tried  successfully,  at  least  on  a  small  scale. 
The  natural  presumption  therefore  is  that  the  new 
orders  only  crystallised  into  a  definite  system,  and 
perhaps  somewhat  extended,  a  practice  which  had 
long  been  familiar  though  not  universal  in  the 
service.  A  consideration  of  the  men  who  were 
responsible  for  the  change  points  to  the  same  con- 
clusion. Blake,  the  only  one  of  the  three  generals 
who  had  had  experience  of  naval  actions,  was  ashore 
disabled  by  a  severe  wound,  but  still  able  to  take 
part,  at  least  formally,  in  the  business  of  the  fleet. 
Deane,  another  soldier  like  Blake,  though  he  had 
commanded  fleets,  had  never  before  seen  an  action, 


96  THE  FIRST  DUTCH   WAR 

but  had  done  much  to  improve  the  organisation  of 
the  service,  and  at  this  time,  as  his  letters  show,  was 
more  active  and  ardent  in  the  work  than  ever. 
Monck  before  the  late  cruise  had  never  been  to  sea 
at  all,  since  as  a  boy  he  sailed  in  the  disastrous 
Cadiz  expedition  of  1625  ;  but  he  was  the  typical 
and  leading  scientific  soldier  of  his  time,  with  an 
unmatched  power  of  organisation  and  an  infallible 
eye  for  both  tactics  and  strategy,  at  least  so  far  as  it 
had  then  been  tried.  Penn,  the  vice-admiral  of 
the  fleet,  was  a  professional  naval  officer  of  consider- 
able experience,  and  it  was  he  who  by  a  bold  and 
skilful  movement  had  saved  the  action  off  Portland 
from  being  a  severe  defeat  for  Blake  and  Deane. 
Monck's  therefore  was  the  only  new  mind  that  was 
brought  to  bear  on  the  subject.  Yet  it  is  impossible 
to  credit  him  with  introducing  a  revolution  in  naval 
tactics.  All  that  can  be  said  is  that  possibly  his 
genius  for  war  and  his  scientific  and  well-drilled 
spirit  revealed  to  him  in  the  traditional  minor  tactics 
of  the  seamen  the  germ  of  a  true  tactical  system,  and 
caused  him  to  urge  its  reduction  into  a  definite  set  of 
fighting  instructions  which  would  be  binding  on  all; 
and  would  co-ordinate  the  fleet  into  the  same  kind  of 
homogeneous  and  handy  fighting  machine  that  he 
and  the  rest  of  the  Low  Country  officers  had  made  of 
the  New  Model  Army.  In  any  case  he  could  not 
have  carried  the  thing  through  unless  it  had  com- 
mended itself  to  the  experience  of  such  men  as 
Penn  and  the  majority  of  the  naval  officers  of  the 
council  of  war.  And  they  would  hardly  have  been 
induced  to  agree  had  they  not  felt  that  the  new 
instructions  were  calculated  to  bring  out  the  best  of 
the  methods  which  they  had  empirically  practised. 

How  far  the  new  orders  were  carried  out  during 
the  rest  of  the  war  is  difficult  to  say.  In  both 
official  and  unofficial  reports  of  the  actions  of  this 


FOREIGN  CRITICS  97 

time  an  almost  superstitious  reverence  is  shown  in 
avoiding  tactical  details.  Nevertheless  that  a  sub- 
stantial improvement  was  the  result  seems  clear, 
and  further  the  new  tactics  appear  to  have  made  a 
marked  impression  upon  the  Dutch.  Of  the  very 
next  action,  that  off  the  Gabbard  on  June  2,  when 
Monck  was  left  in  sole  command,  we  have  a  report 
from  the  Hague  that  the  English  '  having  the  wind, 
they  stayed  on  a  tack  for  half  an  hour  until  they  put 
themselves  into  the  order  in  which  they  meant  to 
fight,  which  was  in  file  at  half  cannon-shot,'  and  the 
suggestion  is  that  this  was  something  new  to  the 
Dutch.  '  Our  fleet,'  says  an  English  report  by  an 
eye-witness,  '  did  work  together  in  better  order  than 
before  and  seconded  one  another.'  Then  there  is 
the  important  testimony  of  a  Royalist  intelligencer 
who  got  his  information  at  the  Hague  on  June  9, 
from  the  man  who  had  brought  ashore  the  des- 
patches from  the  defeated  Dutch  fleet.  After 
relating  the  consternation  which  the  English  caused 
in  the  Dutch  ranks  as  well  by  their  gunnery  as  their 
refusal  to  board,  he  goes  on  to  say,  '  It  is  certain 
that  the  Dutch  in  this  fight  (by  the  relation  and 
acknowledgment  of  Tromp's  own  express  sent 
hither,  with  whom  I  spoke)  showed  very  great  fear 
and  were  in  very  great  confusion,  and  the  English 
he  says  fought  in  excellent  order.' l 

Again,  for  the  next  battle — that  of  the  Texel — 
fought  on  July  31  in  the  same  year,  we  have  the 
statement  of  Hoste's  informant,  who  was  present  as 
a  spectator,  that  at  the  opening  of  the  action  the 
English,  but  not  the  Dutch,  were  formed  in  a  single 
line  close-hauled.  '  Le  7  Aoust '  [i.e.  N.S.],  the 
French  gentleman  says,  'je  decouvris  1'armee  de 
I'amiral  composed  de  plus  de  cent  vaisseaux  de 
guerre.  Elle  6tait  rangee  en  trois  escadrons  et  elle 
1  Clarendon  MSS.  45,  f.  470. 

H 


98  THE  FIRST  DUTCH   WAR 

faisoit  vent-arriere  pour  aller  tomber  sur  les  Anglois, 
qu'elle  rencontra  le  meme  jour  a  peu  pres  en  pareil 
nombre  rangez  \sic\  sur  une  ligne  qui  tenoit  plus  de 
quatre  lieues  Nord-Nord-Est  et  Sud-Sud-Ouest,  le 
vent  6tant  Nord-Ouest.  Le  8  et  le  9  se  passerent 
en  des  escarmouches,  mais  le  10  on  en  [sic]  vint  a 
une  bataille  decisive.  Les  Anglois  avoient  essaie 
de  gagner  le  vent :  mais  1'amiral  Tromp  en  aiant 
toujours  conserv6  1'avantage,  et  1'etant  range  sur 
une  ligne  parallele  a  celle  des  Anglois  arriva  sur 
eux,'  &c.  This  is  the  first  known  instance  of  a 
Dutch  fleet  forming  in  single  line,  and,  so  far  as  it 
goes,  would  tend  to  show  they  adopted  it  in  imita- 
tion of  the  English  formation.1  At  any  rate,  so  far 
as  we  have  gone,  the  evidence  tends  to  show  that 
the  English  finally  adopted  the  regular  line-ahead 
formation  in  consequence  of  the  orders  of  March 
29,  1653,  and  there  is  no  indication  of  the  current 
belief  that  they  borrowed  it  from  the  Dutch. 

By  the  English  admirals  the  new  system  must 
have  been  regarded  as  a  success.  For  the  Fighting 
Instructions  of  1653  were  reissued  with  nothing  but 
a  few  alterations  of  signals  and  verbal  changes 
by  Blake,  Monck,  Disbrowe,  and  Penn,  the  new 
'  admirals  and  generals  of  the  fleet  of  the  Common- 
wealth of  England,'  appointed  in  December  1653, 
when  the  war  was  practically  over.  They  are 
printed  by  Granville  Penn  (Memorials  of  Penn,  ii. 
76),  under  date  March  31,  1655,  Dut  tnat  cannot  be 
the  actual  date  of  their  issue,  for  Blake  was  then  in 
the  Mediterranean,  Penn  in  the  West  Indies,  and 

1  Hoste,  Evolutions  Navales,  p.  78.  Dr.  Gardiner  declared 
himself  sceptical  as  to  the  genuineness  of  the  French  gentle- 
man's narrative,  mainly  on  the  ground  of  certain  inaccuracies 
of  date  and  detail ;  but,  as  Hoste  certainly  believed  in  it,  it 
cannot  well  be  rejected  as  evidence  of  the  main  features  of  the 
action  for  which  he  used  it. 


COMMONWEALTH,    1653  99 

Monck  busy  with  his  pacification  of  the  Highlands. 
We  must  suspect  here  then  another  confusion 
between  old  and  new  styles,  and  conjecture  the  true 
date  to  be  March  31,  1654,  that  is  just  before  Monck 
left  for  Scotland,  and  a  few  days  before  the  peace 
was  signed.  So  that  these  would  be  the  orders 
under  which  Blake  conducted  his  famous  campaign 
in  the  Mediterranean,  Penn  and  Venables  captured 
Jamaica,  and  the  whole  of  Cromwell's  Spanish  war 
was  fought. 


COMMONWEALTH  ORDERS,    1653.' 
[Duke  of  Portland's  MSS.] 

By  the  Right  Honourable  the  Generals  and  Admirals 

of  the  Fleet. 

Instructions  for  the  better  ordering  of  the  fleet  in 
fighting. 

First.  Upon  the  discovery  of  a  fleet,  receiving 
a  sign  from  the  general,  which  is  to  be  striking  the 
general's  ensign,  and  making  a  weft,2  two  frigates 3 
appointed  out  of  each  squadron  are  to  make  sail, 
and  stand  with  them  so  nigh  as  they  may  conveni- 
ently, the  better  to  gain  a  knowledge  of  them  what 
they  are,  and  of  what  quality,  and  how  many  fire- 

1  Re-issued   in   March    1654,  by  Blake,    Monck,  Disbrowe, 
and  Penn,  with  some  amendments  and  verbal  alterations.     As  re- 
issued they  are  in  Sloane  MSS.  3232,  f.  81,  and  printed  in  Gran- 
ville  Penn's  Memorials  of  Sir    William  Penn,  ii.  76.     All  the 
important  amendments  in  the  new  edition,  apart  from  mere  verbal 
alterations,  are  given  below  in  notes  to  the  articles  in  which  they 
occur. 

2  '  Waft  (more  correctly  written  wheft}.      It  is  any  flag  or 
ensign  stopped  together  at  the  head  and  middle  portion,  slightly 
rolled  up  lengthwise,  and  hoisted  at  different  positions  at  the  after- 
part  of  a  ship.' — Admiral  Smyth  (Sailors'  Word-Book). 

3  The  orders  of  1654  have  'one  frigate.' 

H  2 


ioo         THE  FIRST  DUTCH   WAR 

ships  and  others,  and  in  what  posture l  the  fleet  is  ; 
which  being  done  the  frigates  are  to  speak  together 
and  conclude  in  that  report  they  are  to  give,  and 
accordingly  repair  to  their  respective  squadrons 
and  commanders-in-chief,  and  not  to  engage  if 
the  enemy2  exceed  them  in  number,  except  it  shall 
appear  to  them  on  the  place  they  have  the  advan- 
tage. 

Ins.  2nd.  At  sight  of  the  said  fleet  the  vice- 
admiral,  or  he  that  commands  in  chief  in  the  2nd 
place,  and  his  squadron,  as  also  the  rear-admiral,  or 
he  that  commandeth  in  chief  in  the  3rd  place,  and 
his  squadron,  are  to  make  what  sail  they  can  to  come 
up  with  the  admiral  on  each  wing,  the  vice-admiral 
on  the  right  wing,  and  the  rear-admiral  on  the  left 
wing,  leaving  a  competent  distance  for  the  admiral's 
squadron  if  the  wind  will  permit  and  there  be  sea- 
room  enough. 

Ins.  3rd.  As  soon  as  they  shall  see  the  general 
engage,  or  make  a  signal  by  shooting  off  two  guns 
and  putting  a  red  flag  over  the  fore  topmast-head, 
that  then  each  squadron  shall  take  the  best  advantage 
they  can  to  engage  with  the  enemy  next  unto  them  ; 
and  in  order  thereunto  all  the  ships  of  every 
squadron  shall  endeavour  to  keep  in  a  line  with  the 
chief  unless  the  chief  be  maimed  or  otherwise 
disabled  (which  God  forbid !),  whereby  the  said  ship 
that  wears  the  flag  should  not  come  in  to  do  the 
service  which  is  requisite.  Then  every  ship  of  the 
said  squadron  shall  endeavour  to  keep3  in  a  line 
with  the  admiral,  or  he  that  commands  in  chief  ^  next 
unto  him,  and  nearest  the  enemy. 

Inst.  4th.  If  any  squadron  shall  happen  to  be 
overcharged  or  distressed,  the  next  squadron  or  ships 

1  I.e.  'formation.'  2  1654,  ' enemy's  ships.' 

3  1654,  'get.'  4  1654,  'or  the  commander-in-chief.' 


COMMONWEALTH,    1653  101 

are  speedily^  to  make  towards  their  relief  and 
assistance  upon  a  signal  given  them ;  which  signal 
shall  be,  in  the  admiral's  squadron  a  pennant  on 
the  fore  topmast-head,  the  vice-admiral  or  he  that 
commands  in  chief  in  the  second  place  a  pennant  on 
the  main  topmast-head,  [and]  the  rear-admiral's 
squadron  the  like. 

Inst.  5th.  If  in  case  any  ship  shall  be  distressed 
or  disabled  for  lack  of  masts,  shot  under  water,  or 
otherwise  in  danger  of  sinking  or  taking,  he  or  they? 
thus  distressed  shall  make  a  sign  by  the  weft  of 
his  jack  or  ensign,  and  those  next  him  are  strictly 
required  to  relieve  him. 

Inst.  6th.  That  if  any  ship  shall  be  necessitated 
to  bear  away  from  the  enemy  to  stop  a  leak  or  mend 
what  else  is  amiss,  which  cannot  be  otherwise 
repaired,  he  is  to  put  out  a  pennant  on  the  mizen 
yard-arm  or  ensign  staff,  whereby  the  rest  of  the 
ships  may  have  notice  what  it  is  for  ;  and  if  it  should 
be  that  the  admiral  or  any  flagship  should  do  so,  the 
ships  of  the  fleet  or  the  respective  squadrons  are  to 
endeavour  to  keep  up  in  a  line  as  close2'  as  they  can 
betwixt  him  and  the  enemy,  having  always  one  eye 
to  defend  him  in  case  the  enemy  should  come  to 
annoy  him  in  that  condition. 

Inst.  7th.  In  case  the  admiral  should  have  the 
wind  of  the  enemy,  and  that  other  ships  of  the  fleet 
are  to  windward  of  the  admiral,  then  upon  hoisting 
up  a  blue  flag  at  the  mizen  yard,  or  the  mizen  top- 
mast,4 every  such  ship  then  is  to  bear  up  into  his 
wake,  and  grain  upon  severest  punishment?  In 

1  1654,  'immediately.' 

2  1654,  'so  as  she  is  in  danger  of  being  sunk  or  taken,  then 
they.' 

3  1654,  'to  keep  on  close  in  a  line.' 

4  1654, 'mizen  topmast-head.' 

5  1654,  'or  grain  upon  pain  of  severe  punishment.'    Nothing 
is  more  curious  in   naval  phraseology   than  the  loss    of   this 


102         THE  FIRST  DUTCH   WAR 

case  the  admiral  be  to  leeward  of  the  enemy,  and 
his  fleet  or  any  part  thereof  to  leeward  of  him,  to  the 
end  such  ships  to  leeward  may  come  up  into  the 
line  with  their  admiral,  if  he  shall  put  abroad  a  flag 
as  before  and  bear  up,  none  that  are  to  leeward  are 
to  bear  up,  but  to  keep  his  or  their  luff  to  gain  the 
wake  or  grain. 

Inst.  8th.  If  the  admiral  will  have  any  of  the 
ships  to  endeavour 1  by  tacking  or  otherwise  to  gain 
the  wind  of  the  enemy,  he  will  put  abroad  a  red  flag 
at  his  spritsail,  topmast  shrouds,  forestay  or  main 
topmast 2  stay.  He  that  first  discovers  the  signal 
shall  make  sail  and  hoist  and  lower  his  sail 3  or 
ensign,  that  the  rest  of  the  ships  may  take  notice 
of  it  and  follow. 

Inst.  9th.  If  we  put  out  a  red  flag  on  the  mizen 
shrouds,  or  mizen  yard-arm,  we  will  have  all  the 
flagships  to  come  up  in  the  grain  and  wake4  of  us. 

excellent  word  'grain,'  or  'grayne,'  to  express  the  opposite  ot 
'  wake.'  To  come  into  a  ship's  grain  meant  to  take  station  ahead 
of  her.  There  is  nothing  now  which  exactly  supplies  its  place, 
and  yet  it  has  long  fallen  into  oblivion,  so  long,  indeed,  that  its 
existence  was  unknown  to  the  learned  editors  of  the  new  Oxford 
Dictionary.  This  is  to  be  the  more  regretted  as  its  etymology  is 
very  obscure.  It  may,  however,  be  traced  with  little  doubt  to  the 
old  Norse  'grein,'  a  branch  or  prong,  surviving  in  the  word 
'  grains,'  a  pronged  harpoon  or  fish  spear.  From  its  meaning, 
'  branch,'  it  might  seem  to  be  akin  to  '  stem '  and  to  '  bow,'  which 
is  only  another  spelling  of  '  bough.'  But  this  is  not  likely.  The 
older  meaning  of  '  bows '  was  '  shoulders,'  and  this,  it  is  agreed, 
is  how  it  became  applied  to  the  head  of  a  ship.  There  is,  how- 
ever, a  secondary  and  more  widely  used  sense  of  '  grain,'  which 
means  the  space  between  forking  boughs,  and  so  almost  any 
angular  space,  like  a  meadow  where  two  rivers  converge.  Thus 
'  grain,'  in  the  naval  sense,  might  easily  mean  the  space  en- 
closed by  the  planks  of  a  ship  where  they  spring  from  the  stem, 
or  if  it  is  not  actually  the  equivalent  of  '  bows,'  it  may  mean  the 
diverging  waves  thrown  up  by  a  ship  advancing  through  the  water, 
and  thus  be  the  exact  analogue  of  '  wake.' 

1  1654,  'to  make  sail  and  endeavour.' 

2  1654,  '  Fore  topmast.'  3  1654,  'jack.' 
4  1654,  'wake  or  grain.' 


COMMONWEALTH,    1653  103 

Inst.  loth.  If  in  time  of  fight  God  shall  deliver 
any  of  the  enemy's  ships  into  our  hands,  special  care 
is  to  be  taken  to  save  their  men  as  the  present  state 
of  our  condition  will  permit  in  such  a  case,  but  that 
the  ships  be  immediately  destroyed,  by  sinking  or 
burning  the  same,  so  that  our  own  ships  be  not 
disabled  or  any  work  interrupted  by  the  departing 
of  men  or  boats  from  the  ships  ;  and  this  we  require 
all  commanders  to  be  more  than  mindful  of.1 

Inst.  nth.  None  shall  fire  upon  any  ship  of  the 
enemy  that  is  laid  aboard  by  any  of  our  own  ships, 
but  so  that  he  may  be  sure  he  endamage  not  his 
friend. 

Inst.  1 2th.  That  it  is  the  duty  of  commanders 
and  masters  of  all  small  frigates,2  ketches,  and  smacks 
belonging  to  the  several  squadrons  to  know  the 
fireships  belonging  to  the  enemy,  and  accordingly 
by  observing  their  motions  to  do  their  utmost  to  cut 
off  their  boats  if  possible,  or,  if  opportunity  be,  that 
they  lay  them  aboard,  seize  or  destroy  them.  And 
to  this  purpose  they  are  to  keep  to  windward  of 
their  squadrons  in  time  of  service.  But  in  case  they 
cannot  prevent  the  fireships  [coming]  3  on  board  by 
clapping  between  us  and  them  (which  by  all  means 
possible  they  are  to  endeavour),  that  then  in  such 
cases  they  show  themselves  men  in  such  an  exigent 
and  steer  on  board  them,  and  with  their  boats, 
grapnels,  and  other  means  clear  them  from  us  and 
destroy  them  ;  which  service  (if  honourably  done) 
according  to  its  merit  shall  be  rewarded,  but  the 
neglect  severely  to  be  called  to  accompt. 

Inst.   1 3th.  That   the    fireships   in    the   several 

1  1654,  '  more  than  ordinarily  careful  of.' 

2  It  should  be  remembered  that  '  frigate '  at  this  time  meant 
a 'frigate-built  ship.'    The  larger  ones  were  'capital  ships 'and 
lay  in  the  line,  while  the  smaller  ones  were  used  as  cruisers. 

3  Inserted  from  1654  copy. 


104         THE  FIRST  DUTCH   WAR 

squadrons  endeavour  to  keep  the  wind ;  and  they 
with  the  small  frigates  to  be  as  near  the  great 
ships  as  they  can,  to  attend  the  signal  from  the 
general  or  commander-in-chief,  and  to  act  accord- 
ingly. If  the  general  hoist  up  a  white  flag  on  the 
mizen  yard-arm  or  topmast-head,  all  small  frigates 
in  his  squadron  are  to  come  under  his  stern  for 
orders. 

Inst.  1 4th.  That  if  any  engagement  by  day  shall 
continue  till  night  and  the  general  shall  please  to 
anchor,  then  upon  signal  given  they  all  anchor  in  as 
good  order  as  may  be,  the  signal  being  as  in  the 
'Instructions  for  Sailing';  and  if  the  general 
please  to  retreat  without  anchoring,  the  signal  to 
be  firing  two  guns,  the  one  so  nigh  the  other  as 
the  report  may  be  distinguished,  and  within  three 
minutes  after  to  do  the  like  with  two  guns  more. 

Given  under  our  hands  at  Portsmouth,  this 
March  29th,  1653. 

ROBERT  BLAKE. 
RICHARD  DEANE. 
GEORGE  MONCK. 


PART  V 
THE  SECOND  DUTCH  WAR 

I.     THE  EARL  OF  SANDWICH,  1665 

II.     THE  DUKE  OF  YORK  AND  PRINCE  RUPERT, 

1665-6 


ORDERS   OF   THE    RESTORATION 

INTRODUCTORY 

THOUGH  several  fleets  were  fitted  out  in  the  first 
years  of  the  Restoration,  the  earliest  orders  of 
Charles  II  's  reign  that  have  come  down  to  us  are 
those  which  the  Earl  of  Sandwich  issued  on  the  eve 
of  the  Second  Dutch  War.  Early  in  the  year  1665, 
when  hostilities  were  known  to  be  inevitable,  he  had 
sailed  from  Portsmouth  with  a  squadron  of  fifteen 
sail  for  the  North  Sea.  On  January  27th  he  arrived 
in  the  Downs,  and  on  February  gth  sailed  for  the 
coast  of  Holland.1  War  was  declared  on  March  4th 
following.  The  orders  in  question  are  only  known  by 
a  copy  given  to  one  of  his  frigate  captains,  which 
has  survived  amongst  the  manuscripts  of  the  Duke 
of  Somerset.  So  far  as  is  known  no  fresh  complete 
set  of  Fighting  Instructions  was  issued  before  the 
outbreak  of  the  war,  and  as  Monck  and  Sandwich 
were  still  among  the  leading  figures  at  the  admiralty 
it  is  probable  that  those  used  in  the  last  Dutch  and 
Spanish  Wars  were  continued.  The  four  orders 
here  given  are  supplementary  to  them,  providing 
for  the  formation  of  line  abreast,  and  for  forming  from 
that  order  a  line  ahead  to  port  or  starboard.  It  is 

1  Domestic  Calendar ;  1664-5,  PP-  J8i,  183. 


io8       THE  SECOND   DUTCH   WAR 

possible  however  that  no  other  orders  had  yet  been 
officially  issued,  and  that  these  simple  directions 
were  regarded  by  Sandwich  as  all  that  were  neces- 
sary for  so  small  a  squadron. 


THE  EARL   OF  SANDWICH,  Feb.  z,   1665. 

[Duke  of  Somerset's    MSS.,  printed  by    the  Historical  MSS. 
Commission.    Rep.  XV.  part  vii.  p.  100.] 

Orders  given  by  direction  of  the  Earl  of  Sandwich 
to  Captain  Hugh  Seymour^  of  the  Pearl  frigate. 

1665,  February  i.  On  board  the  London  in  the 
Downs. 

If  we  shall  bear  up,  putting  abroad  the  standard 
on  the  ancient 2  staff,  every  ship  of  this  squadron  is 
to  draw  up  abreast  with  the  flag,  on  either  side,  in 
such  berth  as  opportunity  shall  present  most  con- 
venient, but  if  there  be  time  they  are  to  'sail  in  the 
foresaid  posture.3 

If  the  admiral  put  up  a  jack4-flag  on  the  flagstaff 

1  Son  of  Colonel  Sir  Edward  Seymour,  3rd  baronet,  Governor 
of  Dartmouth. 

2  I.e.  ensign. 

3  I.e.  in  the  '  order  of  battle '  already  given. 

4  The  earliest  known  use  of  the  word  '  jack '  for  a  flag  in  an 
official  document  occurs  in  an  order  issued  by  Sir  John  Penning- 
ton  to  his  pinnace  captains  in  1633.     He  was  in  command  of  the 
Channel  guard  in  search  of  pirates,  particularly  'The  Seahorse 
lately  commanded  by  Captain  Quaile  '  and  '  Christopher  Megges, 
who  had  lately  committed  some  outrage  upon  the  Isle  of  Lundy, 
and   other   places.'     The  pinnaces  were  to  work  inshore  of  the 
admiral  and  to  endeavour  to  entrap  the  piratical  ships,  and  to  this 
end  he  said,  'You  are  also  for  this  present  service  to  keep  in 
your   Jack  at  your  boultsprit  end  and  your  pendant  and   your 
ordnance.'     (Sloane  MSS.  2682,  f.  51.)     The  object  of  the  order 
evidently  was  that  they  should  conceal  their  character  from  the 
pirates,  and  at  this  time  therefore  the  '  jack  '  carried  at  the  end  of 
the  bowsprit  and  the  pennant  must  have  been  the  sign  of  a  navy 


LORD   SANDWICH,    1665  109 

on  the  mizen  topmast-head  and  fire  a  gun,  then  the 
outwardmost  ship  on  the  starboard  side  is  to  clap 
upon  a  wind  with  his  starboard  tacks  aboard,  and 
all  the  squadron  as  they  lie  above  or  as  they  have 
ranked  themselves  are  presently  to  clap  upon  a  wind 
and  stand  after  him  in  a  line. 

And  if  the  admiral  make  a  weft  with  his  jack- 
flag  upon  the  flagstaff  on  the  mizen  topmast-head 
and  fire  a  gun,  then  the  outwardmost  ship  on  the 
larboard  side  is  to  clap  upon  a  wind  with  his  larboard 
tacks  aboard,  and  all  the  squadrons  as  they  have 
ranked  themselves  are  presently  to  clap  upon  a  wind 
and  stand  after  him  in  a  line. 

All  the  fifth  and  sixth  rates  l  are  to  lie  on  that 
broadside  of  the  admiral  which  is  away  from  the 
enemy,  looking  out  well  when  any  sign  is  made  for 
them.  Then  they  are  to  endeavour  to  come  up 
under  the  admiral's  stern  for  to  receive  orders. 

If  we  shall  give  the  signal  of  hanging  a  pennant 
under  the  flag  at  the  main  topmast-head,  then  all 
the  ships  of  this  squadron  are,  with  what  speed  they 
can,  to  fall  into  this  posture,  every  ship  in  the  place 
and  order  here  assigned,  and  sail  and  anchor  so  that 
they  may  with  the  most  readiness  fall  into  the  above 
said  posture.2 

ship.  Boteler  however,  who  wrote  his  Sea  Dialogues  about  1625, 
does  not  mention  the  jack  in  his  remarks  about  flags  (pp.  327- 
334).  The  etymology  is  uncertain.  The  new  Oxford  Dictionary 
inclines  to  the  simple  explanation  that  'jack' was  used  in  this 
case  in  its  common  diminutive  sense,  and  that  '  jack-flag '  was 
merely  a  small  flag. 

1  I.e.  his  cruisers. 

2  In  the  Report  of  the  Historical  MSS.  Commission  it  is  stated 
that  the  position  of  the  ships  is  shown  in  a  diagram,  but  I  have 
been  unable  to  obtain  access  to  the  document. 


i io      THE  SECOND  DUTCH   WAR 


II 

MONCK,    PRINCE    RUPERT   AND   THE 
DUKE    OF   YORK 

INTRODUCTORY 

IT  has  hitherto  been  universally  supposed  that  the 
Dutch  Wars  of  the  Restoration  were  fought  under 
the  set  of  orders  printed  as  an  appendix  to 
Granville  Penn's  Memorials  of  Penn.  Mr.  Penn 
believed  them  to  belong  to  the  year  1665,  but  recent 
research  shows  conclusively  that  these  often-quoted 
orders,  which  have  been  the  source  of  so  much  mis- 
apprehension, are  really  much  later  and  represent 
not  the  ideas  under  which  those  wars  were  fought, 
but  the  experience  that  was  gained  from  them. 

This  new  light  is  mainly  derived  from  a  hitherto 
unknown  collection  of  naval  manuscripts  belonging 
to  the  Earl  of  Dartmouth,  which  he  has  generously 
placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Society.  The  invalu- 
able material  they  contain  enables  us  to  say  with 
certainty  that  the  orders  which  the  Duke  of  York 
issued  as  lord  high  admiral  and  commander-in-chief 
at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  were  nothing  but  a  slight 
modification  of  those  of  1654,  with  a  few  but  not 
unimportant  additions.  Amongst  the  manuscripts, 
most  of  which  relate  to  the  first  Lord  Dartmouth's 
cousin  and  first  commander,  Sir  Edward  Spragge, 
is  a  '  Sea  Book '  that  must  have  once  belonged  to 
that  admiral.  It  is  a  kind  of  commonplace  book,  the 


SPRAGGE'S  SEA   BOOK  in 

greater  part  unused,  in  which  Spragge  appears  to 
have  begun  to  enter  various  important  orders  and 
other  matter  of  naval  interest  with  which  he  had 
been  officially  concerned,  by  way  of  forming  a 
collection  of  precedents.1  Amongst  these  is  a  copy 
of  the  orders  set  out  below,  dated  from  the  Royal 
Charles,  the  Duke  of  York's  flagship,  'the  loth  of 
April,  1665,'  by  command  of  his  royal  highness,  and 
signed  '  Wm.  Coventry.'  This  was  the  well-known 
politician  Sir  William  Coventry,  the  model,  if  not 
the  author,  of  the  Character  of  a  Trimmer,  who 
had  been  made  private  secretary  to  the  duke  on  the 
eve  of  the  Restoration,  and  was  now  a  commissioner 
of  the  navy  and  acting  as  secretary  on  the  duke's 
staff.  So  closely  it  will  be  seen  do  they  follow  the 
Commonwealth  orders  of  1653,  as  modified  in  the 
following  year,  that  it  would  be  scarcely  worth 
while  setting  them  out  in  full,  but  for  the  importance 
of  finally  establishing  their  true  origin.  The 
scarcely  concealed  doubts  which  many  writers  have 
felt  as  to  whether  the  new  system  of  tactics  can  have 
been  due  to  the  Duke  of  York  may  now  be  laid  at 
rest,  and  henceforth  the  great  reform  must  be 
credited  not  to  him,  but  to  Cromwell's  '  generals-at- 
sea.' 

Nevertheless  the  credit  of  certain  developments 
which  were  introduced  at  this  time  must  still  remain 
with  the  duke  and  his  advisers  :  Rupert,  Sandwich, 

1  It  is  a  folio  parchment-bound  volume,  labelled  c  Royal 
Charles  Sea  Book,'  but  this  is  clearly  an  error,  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  first  order  copied  into  it  is  dated  from  the  Royal  Charles, 
April  24,  1666.  The  first  entry,  however,  is  the  list  of  a  ship's 
company  which  Spragge  commanded  in  1661-2,  as  appears  from 
his  noting  the  deaths  and  desertions  which  took  place  amongst 
the  crew  in  those  years.  At  this  time  he  is  known  to  have  com- 
f  manded  the  Portland.  For  some  years  the  book  was  evidently 
laid  aside,  and  apparently  resumed  when  in  1665  he  commissioned 
the  Triumph  for  the  Dutch  War. 


ii2       THE  SECOND  DUTCH   WAR 

Lawson,  and  probably  above  all  Penn,  his  flag 
captain.  For  instance,  differences  will  be  found  in 
Articles  2  and  3,  where,  instead  of  merely  enjoining 
the  line,  the  duke  refers  to  a  regular  '  order  of 
battle,'  which  has  not  come  down  to  us,  but  which 
no  doubt  gave  every  ship  her  station  in  the  line,  like 
those  which  Sandwich  had  prepared  for  his  squadron 
a  few  months  earlier,  and  which  Monck  and  Rupert 
certainly  drew  up  in-  the  following  year.1  Then 
again  the  truculent  Article  10  of  1653  and  1654 
ordering  the  immediate  destruction  of  disabled  ships 
of  the  enemy  after  saving  the  crews  if  possible, 
which  contemporary  authorities  put  down  to  Monck, 
is  reversed.  At  the  end,  moreover,  two  articles  are 
added;  one,  numbered  15,  embodying  numbers  2  and 
3  of  Sandwich's  orders  of  the  previous  year,  with  such 
modifications  as  were  necessary  to  adapt  them  to  a 
large  fleet,  and  another  numbered  1 6  enjoining l  close 
action.'  Nor  is  this  all.  Spragge's  'Sea  Book'  con- 
tains also  a  set  of  ten  '  additional  instructions '  all  of 
which  are  new.  They  are  undated,  but  from  another 
copy  in  Capt.  Robert  Moulton's  'Sea  Book'  we  can 
fix  them  to  April  i8th,  i66$.2  Their  whole  tenour 
suggests  that  they  were  the  outcome  of  prolonged  . 

1  See  notes  supra,  pp.  108-9,  and  in  the  Dartmouth  MSS., 
Hist.  MSS.  Com.  Rep.  XI.  v.  15. 

2  Harkian  MSS.    1247.     It   contains   orders   addressed   to 
Moulton  and  returns  for  the  Centurion,  Vanguard  and  Anne,  the 
ships  he  commanded  in  1664-6.     At  p.  52  it  has  a  copy  of  the 
above  'Additional  Instructions,'  but  numbered   i  to  6,  articles 
i  to  5  of  the  Dartmouth  copy  being  in  one  long  article.     At  p.  50 
it  has  the  original  articles  as  far  as  No.  6.     Then  come  two  articles 
numbered  as  7  and  8,  giving  signals  for  a  squadron  '  to  draw  up 
in  line'  and  to  come  near  the  admiral.     They  are  subscribed 
'  Royal  James,  Admiral.'     The  Royal  James  was   Rupert's  flag- 
ship in  1665,  and  the  two  articles  may  be  squadronal  orders  of 
his.    Then,  numbered  9  to  12,  come  four 'additional  instructions  for 
sailing '  by  the  Duke  of  York,  relating  to   chasing,  and  dated 
April  24,  1665. 


ADDITIONAL  INSTRUCTIONS,   1665    113 

discussions  in  the  council  of  war  ;  and  in  the  variously 
dated  copies  which  exist  of  sections  of  the  orders  we 
have  evidence  that  between  the  last  week  in  March, 
when  the  duke  hoisted  his  flag,  and  April  2ist,  when 
he  put  to  sea,  much  time  must  have  been  spent 
upon  the  consideration  of  the  tactical  problem.1 

The  result  was  a  marked  advance.  In  these  ten 
1  additional  instructions,'  for  instance,  we  have  for 
the  first  time  a  clear  distinction  drawn  between 
attacks  from  windward  and  attacks  from  leeward. 
We  have  also  the  first  appearance  of  the  close- 
hauled  line  ahead,  and  it  is  enjoined  as  a  defensive 
formation  when  the  enemy  attacks  from  windward. 
A  method  of  attack  from  windward  is  also  provided 
for  the  case  where  the  enemy  stays  to  receive  it. 
Amongst  less  important  developments  we  have  an 
article  making  the  half-cable's  length,  originally 
enjoined  under  the  Commonwealth,  the  regular 
interval  between  ships,  and  others  to  prevent  the 
line  being  broken  for  the  sake  of  chasing  or  taking 
possession  of  beaten  ships.  Finally  there  are  sig- 
nals for  tacking  in  succession  either  from  the  van  or 
the  rear,  which  must  have  given  the  fleet  a  quite 
unprecedented  increase  of  tactical  mobility.  Nor 
are  we  without  evidence  that  increased  mobility 
was  actually  exhibited  when  the  new  instructions 
were  put  to  a  practical  test. 

It  was  under  the  old  Commonwealth  orders 
as  supplemented  and  modified  by  these  noteworthy 
articles  of  April  1665,  that  was  fought  the 
memorable  action  of  June  3rd,  variously  known 
as  the  battle  of  Lowestoft  or  the  Second  Battle 
of  the  Texel.  It  is  this  action  that  Hoste 
cites  as  the  first  in  which  two  fleets  engaged  in 
close  hauled  line  ahead,  and  kept  their  formation 

1  Some  of  these  articles  are  dated  even  as  late  as  April  27. 
See  in  the  Penn  Tracts,  Shane  MSS.  3232,  f.  33,  infra,  p.  128. 

I 


T i4       THE  SECOND  DUTCH   WAR 

throughout  the  day.  After  two  days'  manoeuvring 
the  English  gained  the  wind,  and  kept  it  in  spite  of 
all  their  enemy  could  do,  and  the  various  accounts 
of  the  action  certainly  give  the  impression  that  the 
evolutions  of  the  English  were  smarter  and  more 
complex  than  those  of  the  Dutch.  It  is  true  that 
about  the  middle  of  the  action  one  of  the  new 
signals,  that  for  the  rear  to  tack  first,  threw  the 
fleet  into  some  confusion,  and  that  later  the  van  and 
centre  changed  places  ;  still,  till  almost  the  end,  the 
duke,  or  rather  Penn,  his  flag  captain,  kept  at  least 
some  control  of  the  fleet.  Granville  Penn  indeed 
claims  that  the  duke  finally  routed  the  Dutch  by 
breaking  their  line,  and  that  he  did  it  intentionally. 
But  this  movement  is  only  mentioned  in  a  hasty 
letter  to  the  press  written  immediately  after  the 
battle.  If  the  enemy's  line  was  actually  cut,  it  must 
have  been  an  accident  or  a  mere  instance  of  the 
time-honoured  practice  of  trying  to  concentrate  on  or 
'  overcharge  '  a  part  of  the  enemy's  fleet.  Coventry 
in  his  official  despatch  to  Monck,  who  was  ashore  in 
charge  of  the  admiralty,  says  nothing  of  it,  nor  does 
Hoste,  while  the  duke  himself  tells  us  the  object  of 
his  movement  was  merely  to  have  '  a  bout  with 
Opdam.'  Granville  Penn  was  naturally  inclined  to 
credit  the  statement  in  the  Newsletter  because  he 
believed  the  action  was  fought  under  Fighting 
Instructions  which  contained  an  article  about  divid- 
ing the  enemy's  fleet.  But  even  if  this  article  had 
been  in  force  at  the  time — and  we  now  know  that 
it  was  not — it  would  still  have  been  inapplicable, 
for  it  was  only  designed  in  view  of  an  attack  from 
leeward,  a  most  important  point  which  modern 
writers  appear  unaccountably  to  have  overlooked.1 

1  See  post,  p.  177.  For  the  despatches,  &c.,  see  G.  Penn, 
Memorials  of  Penn,  II.  322-333,  344-350.  He  also  quotes  a 
work  published  at  Amsterdam  in  1668  which  says :  '  Le  Comte 


THE  REACTION  OF  1666  115 

But   although   we   can    no   longer    receive    this 
questionable  movement  of  the  Duke  of  York  as  an 
instance  of  '  breaking  the  line '  in  the  modern  sense, 
it  is  certain   that  the  English  manoeuvres  in  this 
action  were  more  scientific  and  elaborate  than  ever 
before     so  much  so  indeed  that  a  reaction  set  in, 
and  it  is  this  reaction  which  gave  rise  to  the  idea  in 
later  times  that  the  order  in  line  ahead  had  not  been 
used  in  Commonwealth  or  Restoration  times.     We 
gather  that  in  spite  of  the  victory  there  was  a  wide- 
spread conviction  that  it  ought  to  have  been  more 
decisive.       It  was  felt  that  there  had  been  perhaps 
too  much  manoeuvring  and  not  enough  hard  fight- 
ing.    In  the  end  the  Duke  of  York  and  Sandwich 
were  both  tenderly  relieved  of  their  command,  and 
superseded  by  Monck.    He  and  Rupert  then  became 
joint  admirals  for  the  ensuing  campaign.     They  had 
the  reputation  of  being  two  of  the  hardest  fighters 
alive,  and  both  were  convinced  of  their  power  of 
sweeping  the   Dutch    from  the  sea  by  sheer  hard 
hitting,  a  belief  which  so  far  at  least  as  Monck  was 
concerned  the  country  enthusiastically  shared.     The 
spirit  in  which  the  two  soldier-admirals  put  to  sea  in 
May  1666  we  see  reflected  in  the  hitherto  unknown 
'Additional   Instructions  for  Fighting' given  below. 
For   the    knowledge   of  these    remarkable    orders, 
which  go  far  to  solve  the  mystery  that  has  clouded 
the  subject,  we  are  again  indebted  to  Lord  Dart- 
mouth.      They  are  entered    like  the  others  in  Sir 
Edward  Spragge's  '  Sea  Book.'    They  bear  no  date, 
but  as  they  are  signed  '  Rupert '  and  addressed  to 

de  Sandwich  separa  la  flotte  Hollandaise  en  deux  vers  1'une  heure 
du  midi.'  He  explains  that  by  the  order  for  the  rear  to  tack  first, 
Sandwich  was  leading,  forgetting  Coventry's  despatch  (ibid.  p.  328), 
which  tells  how  by  that  time  the  duke  had  taken  Sandwich's 
place  and  was  leading  the  line  himself,  and  that  it  was  he,  not 
Sandwich,  who  led  the  movement  upon  Opdam's  ship  in  the 
centre  of  the  Dutch  line. 

I  2 


n6       THE  SECOND   DUTCH    WAR 

1  Sir  Edward  Spragge,  Knt,  Vice-Admiral  of  the 
Blue,'  we  can  with  certainty  fix  them  to  this  time. 
For  we  know  that  Spragge  sailed  in  Rupert's 
squadron,  and  on  the  fourth  day  of  the  famous  June 
battle  was  raised  to  the  rank  here  given  him  in 
place  of  Sir  William  Berkley,  who  had  been  killed 
in  the  first  day's  action.1  What  share  Monck  had 
in  the  orders  we  cannot  tell,  but  Rupert,  being  only 
joint  admiral  with  him,  could  hardly  have  taken  the 
step  without  his  concurrence,  and  the  probability 
is  that  Rupert,  who  had  been  detached  on  special 
service,  was  issuing  a  general  fleet  order  to  his  own 
squadron  which  may  have  been  communicated  to 
the  rest  of  the  fleet  before  he  rejoined.  It  must  at 
any  rate  have  been  after  he  rejoined,  for  it  was  not 
till  then  that  Spragge  received  his  promotion.  Both 
Monck  and  Rupert  must  therefore  receive  the  credit 
of  foreseeing  the  danger  that  lay  in  the  new  system, 
the  danger  of  tactical  pedantry  that  was  destined  to 
hamper  the  action  of  our  fleets  for  the  next  half  cen- 
tury, and  of  being  the  first  to  declare,  long  before 
Anson  or  Hawke,  and  longer  still  before  Nelson, 
that  line  or  no  line,  signals  or  no  signals,  '  the 
destruction  of  the  enemy  is  always  to  be  made  the 
chiefest  care.' 

In  the  light  of  this  discovery  we  can  at  last 
explain  the  curious  conversation  recorded  by  Pepys, 
which,  wrongly  interpreted,  has  done  so  much  to 
distort  the  early  history  of  tactics.  The  circum- 
stances of  Monck's  great  action  must  first  be 
recalled.  At  the  end  of  May,  he  and  Rupert,  with 
a  fleet  of  about  eighty  sail,  had  put  to  sea  to  seek 
the  Dutch,  when  a  sudden  order  reached  them  from 
the  court  that  the  French  Mediterranean  fleet  was 
coming  up  channel  to  join  hands  with  the  enemy, 
and  that  Rupert  with  his  squadron  of  twenty  sail 
1  Charnock,  Biographia  Navalis,  i.  65. 


THE  FOUR   DAYS'   BATTLE       117 

was  to  go  westward  to  stop  it.  The  result  of  this 
foolish  order  was  that  on  June  i  Monck  found  him- 
self in  presence  of  the  whole  Dutch  fleet  of  nearly  a 
hundred  sail,  with  no  more  than  fifty-nine  of  his  own.1 
Seeing  an  advantage,  however,  he  attacked  them 
furiously,  throwing  his  whole  weight  upon  their  van. 
Though  at  first  successful  shoals  forced  him  to  tack, 
and  his  rear  fell  foul  of  the  Dutch  centre  and  rear, 
so  that  he  came  off  severely  handled.  The  next 
day  he  renewed  the  fight  with  forty-four  sail  against 
about  eighty,  and  with  so  much  skill  that  he  was 
able  that  night  to  make  an  orderly  retreat,  covering 
his  disabled  ships  with  those  least  injured  '  in  a  line 
abreadth.'-  On  the  3rd  the  retreat  was  continued. 
So  well  was  it  managed  that  the  Dutch  could  not 
touch  him,  and  towards  evening  he  was  able  near 
the  Galloper  Sand  to  form  a  junction  with  Rupert, 
who  had  been  recalled.  Together  on  the  4th  day 
they  returned  to  the  fight  with  as  fierce  a  determina- 
tion as  ever.  Though  to  leeward,  they  succeeded 
in  breaking  through  the  enemy's  line,  such  as  it 
was.  Being  in  too  great  an  inferiority  of  numbers, 
however,  they  could  not  reap  the  advantage  of  their 
manoeuvre.3  It  only  resulted  in  their  being  doubled 

1  Pepys,  it  must  be  said,  persuaded  himself  that  this  order 
was  suggested  and  approved  by  the  admirals.      He  traced  it  to 
Spragge's  desire  to  get  away  with  his  chief  on  a  separate  command. 
Pepys  however   was   clearly  not   sure  about  it,  and  he  almost 
certainly  would  have  been  if  the  Duke  of  York  was  really  inno- 
cent of  the  blunder.     The  truth  probably  can  never  be  known. 

2  Vice-Admiral  Jordan  to  Penn,  June  5,  Memorials  of  Penn, 
II.  389.     This  is  the  first  known  instance  of  the  use  of  the  term 
'  line  abreast.'     In  the  published  account  a  different  term  is  used. 
'  By  3  or  4  in  the  morning,'  it  says,  '  a  small  breeze  sprang  up 
at  N.E.    and   at  a  council  of  flag  officers,  his  grace  the  lord 
general  resolved  to  draw  the  fleet  into  a  "  rear  line  of  battle " 
and  make  a  fair  retreat  of  it.'     (Brit.  Museum,  816,  m.  23(13), 
p.  5,  and  S.P.  Dom.  Car.  77,  vol.  158.)     The  French  and  Dutch 
called  it  the  '  crescent '  formation.     See  note,  p.  94. 

/,  pp.  136-7. 


« 


n8       THE  SECOND  DUTCH   WAR 

on,  and  the  two  fleets  were  soon  mingled  in  a 
raging  mass  without  order  or  control  ;  and  when  in 
the  end  they  parted  after  a  four  days'  fight,  without 
example  for  endurance  and  carnage  in  naval  history, 
the  English  had  suffered  a  reverse  at  least  as  great 
as  that  they  had  inflicted  on  the  Dutch  in  the  last 
year's  action. 

Such  a  terrific  object  lesson  could  not  be  with- 
out its  effects  on  the  great  tactical  question.  But  let 
us  see  how  it  looked  in  the  eyes  of  a  French  eye- 
witness, who  was  naturally  inclined  to  a  favourable 
view  of  his  Dutch  allies.  Of  the  second  day's 
fight  he  says  :  '  Sur  les  six  heures  du  matin  nous 
apper9umes  la  flotte  des  Anglais  qui  revenoit  dans 
une  ordre  admirable.  Car  ils  marchent  par  le  front 
comme  seroit  une  armee  de  terre,  et  quand  ils 
approchent  ils  s'etendent  et  tournent  leurs  bords 
pour  combattre  :  parce  que  le  front  a  la  mer  se  fait 
par  le  bord  des  vaisseaux ' :  that  is,  of  course, 
the  English  bore  down  on  the  Dutch  all  together  in 
line  abreast,  and  then  hauled  their  wind  into  line 
ahead  to  engage.  Again,  in  describing  the  danger 
Tromp  was  in  by  having  weathered  the  English 
fleet  with  his  own  squadron,  while  the  rest 
of  the  Dutch  were  to  leeward,  he  says  :  '  J'ai  deja 
dit  que  rien  n'egale  le  bel  ordre  et  la  discipline  des 
Anglais,  que  jamais  ligne  n'a  etc"  tiree  plus  droite  que 
celle  que  leurs  vaisseaux  forment,  qu'on  peut  etre 
certain  que  lorsqu'on  en  approche  il  les  faux  \sic\  tous 
essuier.'  The  very  precision  of  the  English  formation 
however,  as  he  points  out,  was  what  saved  Tromp 
from  destruction,  because  having  weathered  their 
van-ship,  he  had  the  wind  of  them  all  and  could  not 
be  enveloped.  On  the  other  hand,  he  says,  when- 
ever an  English  ship  penetrated  the  Dutch  forma- 
tion it  fared  badly  because  the  Dutch  kept  them- 
selves '  redoublez  ' — that  is,  not  in  a  single  line.  As 


DE   GUI  CHE'S   CRITICISM         119 

a  general  principle,  then,  he  declares  that  it  is  safer 
to  '  entrer  dans  une  flotte  d'Angleterre  que  de  passer 
aupres '  (i.e.  stand  along  it),  '  et  bien  mieux  de  passer 
aupres  d'une  flotte  Hollandaise  que  se  meler  au 
travers,  si  elle  combat  toujours  comme  elle  fit  pour 
lors.'  But  on  the  whole  he  condemns  the  loose 
formation  of  the  Dutch,  and  says  it  is  really  due  not 
to  a  tactical  idea,  but  to  individual  captains  shirking 
their  duty.  It  is  clear,  then,  that  whatever  was 
De  Ruyter's  intention,  the  Dutch  did  not  fight  in  a 
true  line.  Later  on  in  the  same  action  he  says  : 
'  Ruyter  de  son  cote*  appliqua  toute  son  industrie 
pour  donner  une  meilleure  forme  a  sa  ligne  .  .  . 
enfin  par  ce  moyen  nous  nous  remismes  sur  une  ligne 
parallele  a  celle  des  Anglais.'  Finally,  in  summing 
up  the  tactical  lesson  of  the  stupendous  battle,  he 
concludes  :  '  A  la  ve'rite'  1'ordre  admirable  de  leur  [the 
English]  armee  doit  toujours  etre  imite',  et  pour  moi 
je  sais  bien  que  si  j'e"tais  dans  le  service  de  mer,  et 
que  je  commandasse  des  vaisseaux  du  Roi  je 
songerois  a  battre  les  Anglois  par  leur  propre 
maniere  et  non  par  ceile  des  Hollandoises,  et  de 
nous  autres,  qui  est  de  vouloir  aborder'  In 
defence  of  his  view  he  cites  a  military  analogy, 
instancing  a  line  of  cavalry,  which  being  controlled 
'  avec  regie '  devotes  itself  solely  to  making  the 
opposing  force  give  way,  and  keeps  as  close  an  eye 
on  itself  as  on  the  enemy.  Supposing  such  a  line 
engaged  against  another  body  of  horse  in  which  the 
squadrons  break  their  ranks  and  advance  unevenly 
to  the  charge,  such  a  condition,  he  says,  would  not 
promise  success  to  the  latter,  and  the  parallel  he 
contends  is  exact.1 

From  this  account  by  an  accomplished  student 

1  Mlmoires  d'Armand  de  Gramont,  Comte  de  Guichc,  concer- 
nant  les  Provinces  Unis  des  Pays-Bas  servant  de  supplement  et  de 
confirmation  a  ceux  d' Aubrey  du  Maurier  et  du  Comte  d'Estrades. 


120       THE  SECOND  DUTCH   WAR 

of  tactics  we  may  deduce  three  indisputable  con- 
clusions, i.  That  the  formation  in  line  ahead 
was  aimed  at  the  development  of  gun  power  as 
opposed  to  boarding.  2.  That  it  was  purely 
English,  and  that,  however  far  Dutch  tacticians  had 
sought  to  imitate  it,  they  had  not  yet  succeeded  in 
forcing  it  on  their  seamen.  3.  That  the  English 
certainly  fought  in  line,  and  had  reached  a  perfection 
in  handling  the  formation  which  could  only  have 
been  the  result  of  constant  practice  in  fleet  tactics. 

It  remains  to  consider  the  precisely  opposite 
impression  we  get  from  English  authority.  To 
begin  with,  we  find  on  close  examination  that  the 
whole  of  it,  or  nearly  so,  is  to  be  traced  to  Pepys  or 
Penn.  The  locus  classicus  is  as  follows  from 
Pepys's  Diary  of  July  4th.  '  In  the  evening  Sir  W. 
Penn  came  to  me,  and  we  walked  together  and 
talked  of  the  late  fight.  I  find  him  very  plain,  that 
the  whole  conduct  of  the  late  fight  was  ill.  .  .  He 
says  three  things  must  be  remedied,  or  else  we 
shall  be  undone  by  their  fleet,  i.  That  we  must 
fight  in  line,  whereas  we  fight  promiscuously,  to  our 
utter  demonstrable  ruin :  the  Dutch  fighting  other- 
wise, and  we  whenever  we  beat  them.  2.  We 
must  not  desert  ships  of  our  own  in  distress,  as  we 
did,  for  that  makes  a  captain  desperate,  and  he  will 
fling  away  his  ship  when  there  are  no  hopes  left  him 
of  succour.  3.  That  ships  when  they  are  a  little 
shattered  must  not  take  the  liberty  to  come  in  of 
themselves,  but  refit  themselves  the  best  they  can  and 
stay  out,  many  of  our  ships  coming  in  with  very 
little  disableness.  He  told  me  that  our  very  com- 
manders, nay,  our  very  flag  officers,  do  stand  in  need 
of  exercising  amongst  themselves  and  discoursing 

Londres,  chez  Philippe  Changuion,  1 744.  (The  italics  are  not  in 
the  original.)  Cf.  the  similar  French  account  quoted  by  Mahan, 
Sea  Power,  1 1 7  et  seq. 


PEPYS  AND  PENN  121 

the  business  of  commanding  a  fleet,  he  telling  me 
that  even  one  of  our  flag  men  in  the  fleet  did  not 
know  which  tack  lost  the  wind  or  kept  it  in  the 
last  engagement.  ...  He  did  talk  very  rationally 
to  me,  insomuch  that  I  took  more  pleasure  this 
night  in  hearing  him  discourse  than  I  ever  did  in 
my  life  in  anything  that  he  said.' 

Pepys's  enjoyment  is  easily  understood.  He 
disliked  Penn — thought  him  a  '  mean  rogue/  a 
'  coxcomb,'  and  a  '  false  rascal,'  but  he  was  very  sore 
over  the  supersession  of  his  patron,  Sandwich,  and 
so  long  as  Penn  abused  Monck,  Pepys  was  glad 
enough  to  listen  to  him,  and  ready  to  believe  any- 
thing he  said  in  disparagement  of  the  late  battle. 
Penn  was  no  less  bitter  against  Monck,  and  when 
his  chief,  the  Duke  of  York,  was  retired  he  had 
sulkily  refused  to  serve  under  the  new  commander- 
in-chief.  For  this  reason  Penn  had  not  been  present 
at  the  action,  but  he  was  as  ready  as  Pepys  to 
believe  anything  he  was  told  against  Monck,  and  we 
may  be  sure  the  stories  of  grumbling  officers  lost 
nothing  when  he  repeated  them  into  willing  ears. 
That  Penn  really  told  Pepys  the  English  had  not 
fought  in  line  is  quite  incredible,  even  if  he  was,  as 
Sir  George  Carteret,  treasurer  of  the  navy,  called 
him,  '  the  falsest  rascal  that  ever  was  in  the  world.' 
The  fleet  orders  and  the  French  testimony  make 
this  practically  impossible.  But  he  may  well  have  ex- 
pressed himself  very  hotly  about  the  new  instruction 
issued  by  Monck  and  Rupert  which  modified  his 
own,  and  placed  the  destruction  of  the  enemy 
above  a  pedantic  adherence  to  the  line.  Pepys 
must  clearly  have  forgotten  or  misunderstood  what 
Penn  said  on  this  point,  and  in  any  case  both 
men  were  far  too  much  prejudiced  for  the  passage 
to  have  any  historical  value.  Abuse  of  Monck  by 
Penn  can  have  little  weight  enough,  but  the  same 


122       THE  SECOND  DUTCH   WAR 

abuse  filtered  through  Pepys's  acrid  and  irresponsible 
pen  can  have  no  weight  at  all.1 


THE  DUKE  OF  YORK,  April  10,  1665. 
[Sir  Edward  Spragge's  Sea  Eook.    The  Earl  of  Dartmouth  MSS. ] 

James,  Duke  of  York  and  Albany,  Earl  of  Ulster, 
Lord  High  Admiral  of  England  and  Ireland, 
&c.,  Constable  of  Dover  Castle,  Lord  Warden  of 
the  Cinque  Ports,  and  Governor  of  Portsmouth. 

Instructions  for  the  better  ordering  his  majesty  s  fleet 
in  time  of  fighting. 

Upon  discovery  of  a  fleet  receiving  a  sign  from 
the  admiral,  which  is  to  be  striking  of  the  admiral's 
ensign,  and  making  a  weft,  one  frigate  appointed  out 
of  each  squadron  are  to  make  sail  and  stand  in  with 
them  so  nigh  as  conveniently  they  may,  the  better 
to  gain  a  knowledge  of  what  they  are  and  what 
quality,  how  many  fireships  and  others,  and  in  what 
posture  the  fleet  is  ;  which  being  done  the  frigates 
are  to  meet  together  and  conclude  on  the  report 
they  are  to  give,  and  accordingly  to  repair  to  their 
respective  squadrons  and  commanders-in-chief,  and 
not  engage  if  the  enemy's  ships  exceed  them  in 

1  Cf.  a  similar  conversation  that  Pepys  had  on  October  28 
with  a  certain  Captain  Guy,  who  had  been  in  command  of  a 
small  fourth-rate  of  thirty- eight  guns  in  Holmes's  attack  on  the 
shipping  at  Vlie  and  Shelling  after  the  '  St.  James's  Fight '  and 
of  a  company  of  the  force  that  landed  to  destroy  Bandaris.  The 
prejudice  of  both  Pepys  and  Penn  comes  out  still  more  strongly 
in  their  remarks  on  Monck's  and  Rupert's  great  victory  of  July  25, 
and  their  efforts  to  make  out  it  was  no  victory  at  all.  The  some- 
what meagre  accounts  we  have  of  this  action  all  point  as  before 
to  the  superiority  of  the  English  manoeuvring,  and  to  the  inability 
or  unwillingness  of  the  Dutch,  and  especially  of  Tromp,  to  pre- 
serve the  line. 


DUKE    OF   YORK,    1665  123 

number,  except  it  shall  appear  to  them  on  the  place 
that  they  have  an  advantage. 

2.  At  the  sight  of  the  said  fleet  the  vice-admiral, 
or  he  that  commands  in  chief  in  the  second  place, 
and  his  squadron,  and  the  rear-admiral,  or  he  that 
commands    in    chief    in   the   third    place,    and    his 
squadron  are  to  make  what  sail  they  can  to  come  up 
and  put  themselves  into  the  place  and  order  which 
shall  have  been  directed  them  before  in  the  order  of 
battle. 

3.  As  soon  as  they  shall  see  the  admiral  engage 
or  shall  make  a  signal  by  shooting  off  two  guns  and 
putting  out  a  red  flag  on  the  fore  topmast-head,  that 
then  each  squadron  shall  take  the  best  advantage 
they  can  to  engage  with  the  enemy  according  to  the 
order  prescribed. 

4.  If  any  squadron   shall  happen    to    be   over- 
charged and  distressed,  the  next  squadron  or  ships 
are  immediately  to  make  towards  their  relief  and 
assistance  upon  a  signal  given  them  :  which  signal 
shall  be  in  the  admiral's  squadron  a  pennant  on  the 
fore  topmast-head  ;  if  any  ship  in  the  vice-admiral's 
squadron,    or   he   that   commands   in   chief  in  the 
second  place,  a  pennant  on  the  main  topmast-head  ; 
and  the  rear-admiral's  squadron  the  like.1 

5.  If  any  ship  shall  be  disabled  or  distressed  by 
loss  of  masts,  shot  under  water  or  the  like,  so  as  she 
is  in  danger  of  sinking  or  taking,  he  or  the  [ship] 
thus  distressed  shall  make  a  sign  by  the  weft  of  his 
jack  and  ensign,  and  those  next  to  them  are  strictly 
required  to  relieve  them.1 

6.  That  if  any  ship  shall  be  necessitated  to  bear 
away  from  the  enemy  to  stop  a  leak  or  mend  what 
else  is  amiss,  which  cannot  otherwise  be  repaired,  he 
is  to  put  out  a  pennant  on  the  mizen  yard-arm  or  on 

1  Modified  by  Article  8  of  the  'Additional  Instructions, 'post, 
p.  127. 


124       THE  SECOND   DUTCH   WAR 

the  ensign  staff,  whereby  the  rest  of  the  ship's 
squadron  may  have  notice  what  it  is  for — and  if  it 
should  be  that  the  admiral  or  any  flagships  should 
do  so,  the  ships  of  the  fleet  or  of  the  respective 
squadrons  are  to  endeavour  to  get  up  as  close  in  a 
line  between  him  and  the  enemy  as  they  can,  having 
always  an  eye  to  defend  him  in  case  the  enemy 
should  come  to  annoy  him  in  that  condition. 

7.  If  the  admiral  should  have  the  wind  of  the 
enemy  and  that  other  ships  of  the  fleet  are  in  the 
wind  of  the  admiral,  then  upon  hoisting  up  a  blue 
flag  at  the  mizen  yard  or  mizen  topmast,  every  such 
ship  is  then  to  bear  up  into  his  wake  or  grain  upon 
pain  of  severe  punishment.     If  the  admiral  be  to 
leeward  of  the  enemy,  and  his  fleet  or  any  part  there- 
of to  leeward  of  him,  to  the  end  such  ships  may  come 
up   into   a   line    with    the  admiral,  if  he  shall  put 
abroad  a  flag  as  before  and  bear  up,  none  that  are  to 
leeward  are  to  bear  up,  but  to  keep  his  or  their  ship 
or  ships  luff,  thereby  to  gain  his  wake  or  grain. 

8.  If  the  admiral  would  have  any  of  the  ships  to 
make  sail  or  endeavour  by  tacking  or  otherwise  to 
gain  the  wind  of  the  enemy,  he  will  put  up  a  red  flag 
upon    the    spritsail,    topmast   shrouds,  forestay,    or 
fore  topmast-stay.     He  that  first  discovers  this  signal 
shall  make  sail,  and  hoist  and  lower  his  jack  and 
ensign,  that  the  rest  of  the  ships  may  take  notice 
thereof  and  follow. 

9.  If  we  put  a  red  flag  on  the  mizen  shrouds  or 
the  mizen  yard-arm,  we  would  have  all  the  flagships 
to  come  up  in  the  wake  or  grain  of  us. 

10.  If  in  time  of  fight  God  shall  deliver  any  of 
the  enemy's  ships  into  our  power  by  their  being 
disabled,  the  commanders  of  his  majesty's  ships  in 
condition  of  pursuing   the    enemy  are    not  during 
fight  to  stay,  take,  possess,   or  burn  any  of  them, 
lest  by  so  doing  the  opportunity  of  more  important 


DUKE   OF   YORK,    1665  125 

service  be  lost,  but  shall  expect  command  from  the 
flag  officers  for  doing  thereof  when  they  shall  see  fit 
to  command  it. 

11.  None  shall  fire  upon  ships   of  the   enemy 
that  is  laid  on  board  by  any  of  our  own  ships  but  so 
as  he  may  be  sure  he  doth  not  endamage  his  friends. 

12.  That  it  is  the  duty  of  all  commanders  and 
masters   of  the  small  frigates,  ketches  and  smacks 
belonging  to  the    several    squadrons  to    know    the 
fireships   belonging  to   the  enemy,  and  accordingly 
by  observing  their  motion  do  their  utmost  to  cut  off 
their  boats  if  possible,  or  if  opportunity  be  that  they 
lay  them  on  board,  seize  and  destroy  them,  and  for 
this  purpose  they  are  to  keep  to  wind[ward]  of  the 
squadron  in  time  of  service.      But  in  case  they  cannot 
prevent  the  fireships  from  coming  aboard  of  us  by 
clapping  between  them  and  us,  which  by  all  means 
possible  they  are  to  endeavour,  that  then  in  such  case 
they  show  themselves  men  in  such  an  exigent  and 
steer  on  board  them,  and  with  their  boats,  grapnels, 
and  other  means  clear  them  from  us,  and  destroy 
them  ;  which  service  if  honourably  done  to  its  merit 
shall  be  rewarded,  and  the  neglect  thereof  strictly 
and  severely  called  to  an  account. 

13.  That  the  fireships  in  every  squadron  endea- 
vour to   keep  the  wind,  and  they,  with  the  small 
frigates,  to  be  as  near  the  great  ships  as  they  can,  to 
attend  the  signal   from  the  admiral  and  to  act  ac- 
cordingly.     If  the  admiral  hoist  up  a  white  flag  at 
the  mizen  yard-arm  or  topmast-head  all  the  small 
frigates  of  his  squadron  are  to  come  under  his  stern 
for  orders. 

14.  If  an   engagement   by  day  shall    continue 
till  night,  and  the  admiral   shall   please  to  anchor, 
that  upon  signal  given  they  all  anchor  in  as  good 
order  as  may  be,  the  signal  being  as  in  the  Instruc- 
tions for  Sailing  ;  and  if  the  admiral  please  to  retreat 


126       THE  SECOND  DUTCH   WAR 

without  anchoring,  then  the  sign  to  be  by  firing  of  two 
guns,  so  near  one  to  the  other  as  the  report  may  be 
distinguished,  and  within  three  minutes  after  to  do 
the  like  with  two  guns  more. 

15.  If,    the    fleet    going   before   the   wind,    the 
admiral  would  have  the  vice-admiral  and  the  ships 
of  the  starboard  quarter  to  clap  by  the  wind  and 
come  to  their   starboard    tack,   then   he  will  hoist 
upon  the  mizen  topmast-head  a  red  flag,  and  in  case 
he  would  have  the  rear-admiral  and  the  ships   on 
the  larboard  quarter  to  come  to  their  larboard  tack 
then  he  will  hoist  up  a  blue  flag  in  the  same  place. 

1 6.  That     the      commander     of    any     of    his 
majesty's  ships  suffer  not  his  guns  to  be  fired  until 
the  ship  be  within  distance  to  [do]  good  execution  ; 
the  contrary  to  be  examined  and  severely  punished 
by  the  court-martial. 

THE  DUKE  OF  YORK,  April  10  or  18,  1665. 
[Sir  Edward  Spragge's  Sea  Book.1] 

Additional  Instructions  for  Fighting. 

1.  In   all    cases   of  fight   with    the   enemy  the 
commanders    of   his    majesty's   ships    are    to    en- 
deavour to  keep  the  fleet  in  one  line,  and  as  much 
as  may  be  to  preserve  the  order  of  battle  which  shall 
have  been  directed  before  the  time  of  fight.2 

2.  If  the  enemy  stay  to  fight  us,  we  having  the 
wind,  the  headmost  squadron  of  his  majesty's  fleets 
shall  steer  for  the  headmost  of  the  enemy's  ships. 

3.  If  the  enemy  have  the  wind  of  us  and  come 
to  fight  us,  the  commanders  of  his  majesty's  fleet 

1  Also  in  Moulton's  Sea  Book,  Han.  MSS.  1247,  f-  52>  but  are 
there  dated  April  18,  differently  numbered,  and  signed  'James.' 

2  This  is  Article  17  of  the  complete  set,  which  was  modified 
by  Rupert's  subsequent  order  of  1666.     See  p.  130. 


ADDITIONAL,    1665  127 

shall  endeavour  to  put  themselves  in  one  line  close 
upon  a  wind, 

4.  In   the  time  of  fight  in    reasonable  weather, 
the  commanders  of  his  majesty's  fleet  shall  endea- 
vour  to  keep   about  the  distance  of  half  a  cable's 
length  one  from  the  other,1  but  so  as  that  accord- 
ing to  the  discretion  of  the  commanders  they  vary 
that   distance    according   as  the  weather  shall  be, 
and  the  occasion  of  succouring  our  own  or  assaulting 
the  enemy's  ships  shall  require. 

5.  The  flag  officers  shall  place  themselves   ac- 
cording to  such  order  of  battle  as  shall  be  given. 

6.  None   of  the   ships    of  his    majesty's    fleet 
shall    pursue   any   small    number   of  ships   of  the 
enemy  before  the  main  [body]  of  the  enemy's  fleet 
shall  be  disabled  or  shall  run. 

7.  In  case  of  chase  none  of  his  majesty's  fleet 
or  ships  shall  chase  beyond  sight  of  the  flag,  and  at 
night  all  chasing  ships  are  to  return  to  the  flag. 

8.  In  case  it  shall   please  God  that  any   of  his 
majesty's  ships  be  lamed  in  fight,  not  being  in  pro- 
bability of  sinking  nor  encompassed  by  the  enemy, 
the  following  ships  shall  not  stay  under  pretence  of 
securing   them,  but   shall    follow  their  leaders  and 
endeavour  to  do  what  service  they  can  upon  the 
enemy,  leaving  the  securing  of  the  lame  ships  to  the 
sternmost  of  our  ships,  being  [assured]  that  nothing 
but    beating   the   body   of  the   enemy's   fleet    can 
effectually  secure  the  lame  ships.     This  article  is  to 
be  observed  notwithstanding  any  seeming  contradic- 
tion in  the  fourth  or  fifth  articles  of  the  [fighting] 
instructions  formerly  given. 

9.  When  the  admiral  would  have  the  van  of  his 
fleet  to  tack  first,  the  admiral  will   put  abroad   the 

1  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  distance  adopted  by 
D'Estre"es  and  Tourville  for  the  French  service  was  a  full  cable. 
See  Hoste,  p.  65. 


128       THE  SECOND  DUTCH   WAR 

union  flag  at  the  staff  of  the  fore  topmast-head  if  the 
red  flag  be  not  abroad  ;  but  if  the  red  flag  be  abroad 
then  the  fore  topsail  shall  be  lowered  a  little,  and  the 
union  flag  shall  be  spread  from  the  cap  of  the  fore 
topmast  downwards. 

10.  When  the  admiral  would  have  the  rear  of 
the  fleet  to  tack  first,  the  union  flag  shall  be  put 
abroad  on  the  flagstaff  of  the  mizen  topmast-head  ; 
and  for  the  better  notice  of  these  signals  through  the 
fleet,  each  flagship  is  upon  sight  of  either  of  the 
said  signals  to  make  the  said  signals,  that  so  every 
ship  may  know  what  they  are  to  do,  and  they  are  to 
continue  out  the  said  signals  until  they  be  answered. 
Given  under  my  hand  the  loth  of  April,  1665,  from 
on  board  the  Royal  Charles. 

By  command  of  his  royal  highness. 

WM.  COVENTRY. 


THE  DUKE   OF   YORK'S  SUPPLEMENTARY 
ORDER,   April  27,  1665. 

[Penn's  Tracts,  Sloane  MSS.  3232,  f.  83.] 

Additional  Instructions  for  Fighting  1 

[i.]  When  the  admiral  would  have  all  the  ships 
to  fall  into  the  order  of  'Battailia'  prescribed,  the 
union  flag  shall  be  put  into  the  mizen  peak  of 
the  admiral  ship  ;  at  sight  whereof  the  admirals 
of  [the]  other  squadrons  are  to  answer  it  by  doing 
the  like. 

[2.]  When  the  admiral  would  have  the  other 
squadrons  to  make  more  sail,  though  he  himself 
shorten  sail,  a  white  ensign  shall  be  put  on  the 
ensign  staff  of  the  admiral  ship. 

1  This  is  preceded  by  an  additional  '  Sailing  Instruction,'  with 
signals  for  cutting  and  slipping  by  day  or  night. 


PRINCE  RUPERT,    1666  129 

For  Chasing \l 

[i.]  When  the  admiral  shall  put  a  flag  striped 
with  white  and  red  upon  the  fore  topmast-head,  the 
admiral  of  the  white  squadron  shall  send  out  ships 
to  chase ;  when  on  the  mizen  topmast-head  the 
admiral  of  the  blue  squadron  shall  send  out  ships 
to  chase. 

[2.]  If  the  admiral  shall  put  out  a  flag  striped 
with  white  and  red  upon  any  other  place,  that  ship 
of  the  admiral's  own  division  whose  signal  for  call 
is  a  pennant  in  that  place  shall  chase,  excepting 
the  vice-admiral  and  rear-admiral  of  the  admiral's 
squadron. 

[3.]  If  a  flag  striped  red  and  white  upon  the 
main  topmast  shrouds  under  the  standard,  the  vice- 
admiral  of  the  red  is  to  send  ships  to  chase. 

If  the  flag  striped  red  and  white  be  hoisted  on 
the  ensign  staff  the  rear-admiral  of  the  red  is  to 
send  ships  to  chase. 

On  board  the  Royal  Charles,  27  April,  1665. 

PRINCE  RUPERT,   1666. 
[Sir  Edward  Spragge's  Sea  Book.] 

Additional  Instructions  for  Fighting. 

i st.  In  case  of  an  engagement  the  commander 
of  every  ship  is  to  have  a  special  regard  to  the 
common  good,  and  if  any  flagship  shall,  by  any 
accident  whatsoever,  stay  behind  or  [be]  likely  to 
lose  company,  or  be  out  of  his  place,  then  all  and 
every  ship  or  ships  belonging  to  such  flag  is  to 

1  Also  in  Capt.  Moulton's  Sea  Book  (Hart.  MSS.  1 247,  p.  5 1^), 
headed  'James  Duke  of  York  &c.  Additional  Instructions  for 
Sailing.'  At  foot  it  has  'given  under  my  hand  on  board  the 
Royal  Charles  this  24  of  April,  1665.  James,'  and  the  articles  are 
numbered  9  to  12,  No.  3  above  forming  n  and  12. 

K 


1 30       THE  SECOND  DUTCH   WAR 

make  all  the  way  possible  to  keep  up  with  the 
admiral  of  the  fleet  and  to  endeavour  the  utmost 
that  may  be  the  destruction  of  the  enemy,  which  is 
always  to  be  made  the  chiefest  care. 

This  instruction  is  strictly  to  be  observed,  not- 
withstanding the  seventeenth  article  in  the  Fighting 
Instructions  formerly  given  out.1 

2ndly.  When  the  admiral  of  the  fleet  makes  a 
weft  with  his  flag,  the  rest  of  the  flag  officers  are  to 
do  the  like,  and  then  all  the  best  sailing  ships  are  to 
make  what  way  they  can  to  engage  the  enemy,  that 
so  the  rear  of  our  fleet  may  the  better  come  up  ; 
and  so  soon  as  the  enemy  makes  a  stand  then  they 
are  to  endeavour  to  fall  into  the  best  order  they 
can.2 

3rdly.  If  any  flagship  shall  be  so  disabled  as  not 
to  be  fit  for  service,  the  flag  officer  or  commander  of 
such  ship  shall  remove  himself  into  any  other  ship 
of  his  division  at  his  discretion,  and  shall  there 
command  and  wear  the  flag  as  he  did  in  his  own. 

RUPERT. 

For  Sir  Edward  Spragge,  Knt.,  vice-admiral  of 
the  blue  squadron. 

1  Meaning,  of  course,  Article  i  of  the  '  Additional  Instructions' 
of  April  18,  1665,  which  would  be  No.  17  when  the  orders  were 
collected  and  reissued  as  a  complete  set.      No  copy  of  the  com- 
plete set  to  which  Rupert  refers  is  known  to  be  extant. 

2  It  should  be  noted  that  this   instruction  anticipates  by  a 
century  the  favourite  English  signals  of  the  Nelson  period  for 
bringing  an  unwilling  enemy  to  action,  i.e.  for  general  chase,  and 
for  ships  to  take  suitable  station  for  neutral  support  and  engage 
as  they  get  up. 


PART  VI 

THE   THIRD    DUTCH    WAR 
TO   THE    REVOLUTION 

I.     THE   DUKE   OF   YORK,   1672-3 
II.     SIR   JOHN    NARBROUGH,  1678 
III.     THE   EARL  OF   DARTMOUTH,  1688 


K  2 


I 

PROGRESS   OF  TACTICS    DURING  THE 
THIRD    DUTCH   WAR 

INTRODUCTORY 

FOR  the  articles  issued  by  the  Duke  of  York  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  Third  Dutch  War  in  March  1672 
we  are  again  indebted  to  Lord  Dartmouth's  naval 
manuscripts.  They  exist  there,  copied  into  the 
beginning  of  an  '  Order  Book '  which  by  internal 
evidence  is  shown  to  have  belonged  to  Sir  Edward 
Spragge.  It  is  similar  to  the  so-called  '  Royal 
Charles  Sea  Book,'  and  is  nearly  all  blank,  but  con- 
tains two  orders  addressed  by  Rupert  to  Spragge, 
April  29  and  May  22,  1673,  and  a  resolution  of  the 
council  of  war  held  on  board  the  Royal  Charles  on 
May  27,  deciding  to  attack  the  Dutch  fleet  in  the 
Schoonveldt  and  to  take  their  anchorage  if  they 
retired  into  Flushing. 

The  orders  are  not  dated,  but,  as  they  are 
signed  '  James  '  and  countersigned  '  M.  Wren,'  their 
date  can  be  fixed  to  a  time  not  later  than  the 
spring  of  1672,  for  Dr.  Matthew  Wren,  F.R.S., 
died  on  June  14  in  that  year,  having  served  as  the 
lord  admiral's  secretary  since  1667,  when  Coventry 
resigned  his  commissionership  of  the  navy.  They 
consist  of  twenty-six  articles,  which  follow  those  ot 
the  late  war  so  closely  that  it  has  not  been  thought 
worth  while  to  print  them  except  in  the  few  cases 
where  they  vary  from  the  older  ones. 


1 34         THE    THIRD  DUTCH   WAR 

They  are  accompanied  however  in  the  '  Sea 
Book '  by  three  '  Further  Instructions,'  which  do 
not  appear  in  any  previous  set.  They  are  of  the 
highest  importance  and  mark  a  great  stride  in  naval 
tactics,  a  stride  which  owing  to  Granville  Penn's 
error  is  usually  supposed  to  have  been  taken  in  the 
previous  war.  For  the  first  time  they  introduced 
rules  for  engaging  when  the  two  fleets  get  contact  on 
opposite  tacks,  and  establish  the  much-abused  system 
of  stretching  the  length  of  the  enemy's  line  and  then 
bearing  down  together.  But  it  must  be  noted  that 
this  rule  only  applies  to  the  case  where  the  fleets  are 
approaching  on  opposite  tacks  and  the  enemy  is  to 
leeward.  There  is  also  a  peremptory  re-enunciation 
of  the  duty  of  keeping  the  line  and  the  order  enforced 
by  the  penalty  of  death  for  firing  '  over  any  of  our 
own  ships.'  Here  then  we  have  apparently  a  return 
to  the  Duke  of  York's  belief  in  formal  tactics,  and 
it  is  highly  significant  that,  although  the  twenty-six 
original  articles  incorporate  and  codify  all  the  other 
scattered  additional  orders  of  the  last  war,  they 
entirely  ignore  those  issued  by  Monck  and  Rupert 
during  the  Four  Days'  Battle. 

We  have  pretty  clear  evidence  of  the  existence 
at  this  period  of  two  schools  of  tactical  opinion, 
which  after  all  is  no  more  than  experience  would 
lead  us  to  suspect,  and  which  Pepys's  remarks  have 
already  indicated.  As  usual  there  was  the  school, 
represented  by  the  Duke  of  York  and  Penn,  which 
inclined  to  formality,  and  by  pedantic  insistence  on 
well-meant  principles  tended  inevitably  to  confuse 
the  means  with  the  end.  On  the  other  hand  we 
have  the  school  of  Monck  and  Rupert,  which  was 
inclined  anarchically  to  submit  all  rules  to  the 
solvent  of  hard  fighting,  and  to  take  tactical  risks  and 
unfetter  individual  initiative  to  almost  any  extent 
rather  than  miss  a  chance  of  overpowering  the 


THE    TWO   SCHOOLS  135 

enemy  by  a  sudden  well-timed  blow.  Knowing  as 
we  do  the  extent  to  which  the  principles  of  the  Duke 
of  York's  school  hampered  the  development  of 
fleet  tactics  till  men  like  Hawke  and  Nelson  broke 
them  down,  we  cannot  but  sympathise  with  their 
opponents.  Nor  can  we  help  noting  as  curiously 
significant  that  whereas  it  was  the  soldier-admirals 
who  first  introduced  formal  tactics,  it  was  a  sea- 
man's school  that  forced  them  to  pedantry  in  the 
face  of  the  last  of  the  soldier-school,  who  tried  to 
preserve  their  flexibility,  and  keep  the  end  clear  in 
view  above  the  means  they  had  invented. 

Still  it  would  be  wrong  to  claim  that  either 
school  was  right.  In  almost  every  department  of 
life  two  such  schools  must  always  exist,  and  nowhere 
is  such  conflict  less  inevitable  than  in  the  art  of 
war,  whether  by  sea  or  land.  Yet  just  as  our  com- 
paratively high  degree  of  success  in  politics  is  the 
outcome  of  the  perpetual  conflict  of  the  two  great 
parties  in  the  state,  so  it  is  probably  only  by  the 
conflict  of  the  two  normal  schools  of  naval  thought 
that  we  can  hope  to  work  out  the  best  adjusted 
compromise  between  free  initiative  and  concentrated 
order. 

It  was  the  school  of  Penn  and  the  Duke  of 
York  that  triumphed  at  the  close  of  these  great 
naval  wars.  The  attempt  of  Monck  and  Rupert  to 
preserve  individual  initiative  and  freedom  to  seize 
opportunities  was  discarded,  and  for  nearly  a  century- 
formality  had  the  upper  hand.  Yet  the  Duke  of 
York  must  not  be  regarded  as  wholly  hostile  to  ini- 
tiative or  unwilling  to  learn  from  his  rivals.  The 
second  and  most  remarkable  of  the  new  instructions 
acquits  him.  This  is  the  famous  article  in  which  was 
first  laid  down  the  principle  of  cutting  off  a  part  of 
the  enemy's  fleet  and  '  containing'  the  rest. 

Though  always  attributed  to  the  Duke  of  York 


136         THE    THIRD  DUTCH    WAR 

it  seems  almost  certainly  to  have  been  suggested 
by  the  tactics  of  Monck  and  Rupert  on  the  last  day 
of  the  Four  Days'  Battle,  June  4,  1666.  According 
to  the  official  account,  they  sighted  the  Dutch  early 
in  the  morning  about  five  leagues  on  their  weather- 
bow,  with  the  wind  at  SSW.  '  At  eight  o'clock,'  it  con- 
tinues, '  we  came  up  with  them,  and  they  having  the 
weather-gage  put  themselves  in  a  line  to  windward 
of  us.  Our  ships  then  which  were  ahead  of  Sir 
Christopher  Myngs  [who  was  to  lead  the  fleet] 
made  an  easy  sail,  and  when  they  came  within  a 
convenient  distance  lay  by  ;  and  the  Dutch  fleet 
having  put  themselves  in  order  we  did  the  like. 
Sir  Christopher  Myngs,  vice-admiral  of  the  prince's 
fleet,  with  his  division  led  the  van.  Next  his 
highness  with  his  own  division  followed,  and  then 
Sir  Edward  Spragge,  his  rear-admiral ;  and  so 
stayed  for  the  rest  of  the  fleet,  which  came  up  in 
very  good  order.  By  such  time  as  our  whole  fleet 
was  come  up  we  held  close  upon  a  wind,  our  star- 
board tacks  aboard,  the  wind  SW  and  the  enemy 
bearing  up  to  fall  into  the  middle  of  our  line  with 
part  of  their  fleet.  At  which,  as  soon  as  Sir  Chris- 
topher Myngs  had  their  wake,  he  tacked  and  stood 
in,  and  then  the  whole  line  tacked  in  the  wake  of 
him  and  stood  in.  But  Sir  C.  Myngs  in  fighting 
being  put  to  the  leeward,  the  prince  thought  fit  to 
keep  the  wind,  and  so  led  the  whole  line  through 
the  middle  of  the  enemy,  the  general  [Monck]  with 
the  rest  of  the  fleet  following  in  good  order.' 

The  account  then  relates  how  brilliantly  Rupert 
fought  his  way  through,  and  proceeds,  '  After  this 
pass,  the  prince  being  come  to  the  other  side  and 
standing  out,  so  that  he  could  weather  the  end  of 
their  fleet,  part  of  the  enemy  bearing  up  and  the 
rest  tacking,  he  tacked  also,  and  his  grace  [Monck] 
tacking  at  the  same  time  bore  up  to  the  ships  to  the 


DIVIDING  MANOEUVRE  137 

leeward,  the  prince  following  him ;  and  so  we 
stood  along  backward  and  forward,  the  enemy 
being  some  to  windward  and  some  to  leeward  of  us  ; 
which  course  we  four  times  repeated,  the  enemy 
always  keeping  the  greatest  part  of  their  fleet  to 
windward,  but  still  at  so  much  distance  as  to  be 
able  to  reach  our  sails  and  rigging  with  their  shot 
and  to  keep  themselves  out  of  reach  of  our  guns,  the 
only  advantage  they  thought  fit  to  take  upon  us 
at  this  time.  But  the  fourth  time  we  plying  them 
very  sharply  with  our  leeward  guns  in  passing,  their 
windward  ships  bore  up  to  relieve  their  leeward 
party  ;  upon  which  his  highness  tacked  a  fifth  time 
and  with  eight  or  ten  frigates  got  to  the  windward 
of  the  enemy's  whole  fleet,  and  thinking  to  bear  in 
upon  them,  his  mainstay  and  main  topmast  being 
terribly  shaken,  came  all  by  the  board.'  Monck 
not  being  able  to  tack  for  wounded  masts  '  made  up 
to  the  prince,'  and  then  the  Dutch,  after  a  threat  to 
get  between  the  two  admirals,  suddenly  bore  away 
before  the  wind  for  Flushing.1 

The  manoeuvre  by  which  Myngs  attempted 
from  to  windward  to  divide  the  enemy's  fleet  and 
so  gain  the  wind  of  part  of  it  seems  to  be  exactly 
what  the  new  instruction  contemplated,  while  its 
remarkable  provision  for  a  containing  movement 
seems  designed  to  prevent  the  disastrous  confusion 
that  ensued  after  the  Dutch  line  had  been  broken. 
This  undoubtedly  is  the  great  merit  of  the  new  in- 
struction, and  it  is  the  first  time,  so  far  as  is  known, 
that  the  principle  of  containing  was  ever  enunciated. 
In  this  it  compares  favourably  with  everything  we 
know  of  until  Nelson's  famous  memorandum.  Its 
relations  to  Rodney's  and  Howe's  manoeuvres  for 
breaking  the  line  must  be  considered  later.  For 

1  The  original  draft  corrected  by  Lord  Addington,  principal 
secretary  of  state,  is  in  S.P.  Domestic,  Car.  II,  158. 


138         THE    THIRD  DUTCH   WAR 

the  present  it  will  suffice  to  note  that  it  seems 
designed  rather  as  a  method  of  gaining  the  wind 
than  as  a  method  of  concentration,  and  that  the 
initiation  of  the  manoeuvre  is  left  to  the  discretion 
of  the  leading  flag  officer,  and  cannot  be  signalled 
by  the  commander-in-chief. 

As  to  the  date  at  which  these  three  '  Further 
Instructions '  were  first  drawn  up  there  is  some 
difficulty.  It  is  possible  that  they  were  not  entirely 
new  in  1672,  but  that  their  origin,  at  least  in  design, 
went  back  to  the  close  of  the  Second  War.  In 
Spragge's  first  '  Sea  Book '  there  is  another  copy  of 
them  identical  except  for  a  few  verbal  differences 
with  those  in  the  second  '  Sea  Book.'  In  the  first 
'  Sea  Book  '  they  appear  on  the  back  of  a  leaf  con- 
taining some  '  Sailing  Instructions  by  the  Duke  of 
York,'  which  are  dated  November  16,  1666,  and  this 
is  the  latest  date  in  the  book.  Moreover  in  this 
copy  they  are  headed  'Additional  Instructions  to  be 
observed  in  the  next  engagement,'  as  though  they 
were  the  outcome  of  a  previous  action.  Now,  as 
Wren  died  on  June  10  (o.s.),  and  the  battle  of  Sole- 
bay,  the  first  action  of  the  Third  War,  was  fought 
on  May  28  (o.s.),  it  is  pretty  clear  that  it  must  have 
been  the  Second  War  and  not  the  Third  that  was 
in  Spragge's  mind  at  the  time.  Still  if  we  have  to 
put  them  as  early  as  November  1666  it  leaves  the 
question  much  where  it  was.  Besides  the  idea  of 
containing  the  main  body  of  the  enemy  after  cutting 
off  part  of  his  fleet,  the  death  penalty  for  firing 
over  the  line  is  obviously  designed  to  meet  certain 
regrettable  incidents  known  to  have  occurred  in  the 
Four  Days'  Battle.  Nor  is  there  any  evidence  that 
they  were  used  in  the  St.  James's  fight  of  July  25, 
and  as  this  was  the  last  action  in  the  war  fought, 
the  '  next  engagement '  did  not  take  place  till 
the  Third  War.  It  is  fairly  clear  therefore  that  we 


DUKE   OF   YORK,    1673  '39 

must  regard  these  remarkable  orders  as  resulting 
from  the  experience  of  the  Second  War,  and  as 
having  been  first  put  in  force  during  the  Third  one. 

After  the  battle  of  Solebay  these  supplementary 
articles  were  incorporated  into  the  regular  instruc- 
tions as  Articles  27  to  29.  This  appears  from  a 
MS.  book  belonging  to  Lord  Dartmouth  entitled 
'  Copies  of  instructions  and  other  papers  relating  to 
the  fleets.  Anno  1672.'  It  contains  a  complete  copy 
of  both  Sailing  and  Fighting  Instructions,  with  a 
detailed  '  order  of  sailing '  for  the  combined  Anglo- 
French  fleet,  dated  July  2,  1672,  and  a  correspond- 
ing '  order  of  battle '  dated  August  1672.  It  also 
contains  the  flag  officers'  reports  made  to  the  Duke 
of  York  after  the  battle. 

Instructions  for  the  '  Encouragement  for  the  cap- 
tains and  companies  of  fireships,  small  frigates,  and 
ketches,'  now  appear  for  the  first  time,  and  were 
repeated  in  some  form  or  other  in  all  subsequent 
orders. 

Finally,  it  has  been  thought  well  to  reprint  from 
Granville  Penn's  Memorials  of  Penn  the  complete 
set  of  articles  which  he  gives  in  Appendix  L.  No 
date  is  attached  to  them  ;  Granville  Penn  merely  says 
they  were  subsequent  to  1665,  and  has  thereby  left 
an  unfortunate  impression,  adopted  by  himself  and 
almost  every  naval  historian,  both  British  and 
foreign,  that  followed  him,  that  they  were  used  in 
the  campaign  of  1666,  that  is,  in  the  Second  Dutch 
War.  From  the  fact  however  that  they  incorporate 
the  'Further  Instructions  for  Fighting'  counter- 
signed by  Wren,  we  know  that  they  cannot  have 
been  earlier  than  1667,  while  the  newly  discovered 
MS.  of  Lord  Dartmouth  makes  it  practically  certain 
they  must  have  been  later  than  August  1672.  We 
may  even  go  further. 

For  curiously  enough  there  is  no  evidence  that 


140 

these  orders,  on  which  so  much  doubtful  reasoning 
has  been  based,  were  ever  in  force  at  all  as  they 
stand.  No  signed  copy  of  them  is  known  to  exist. 
The  copy  amongst  the  Penn  papers  in  the  British 
Museum  which  Granville  Penn  followed  is  a  draft 
with  no  signature  whatever.  It  is  possible  therefore 
that  they  were  never  signed.  In  all  probability  they 
were  completed  by  James  early  in  1673  for  the  coming 
campaign,  but  had  not  actually  been  issued  when, 
in  March  of  that  year,  the  Test  Act  deprived  him 
of  his  office  of  lord  high  admiral,  and  brought  his 
career  as  a  seaman  to  an  end.  What  orders  were 
used  by  his  successor  and  rival  Rupert  is  unknown. 
Of  even  higher  interest  than  this  last  known  set 
of  the  Duke  of  York's  orders  are  certain  additions 
and  observations  which  were  subsequently  appended 
to  them  by  an  unknown  hand.  As  it  has  been 
found  impossible  to  fix  with  certainty  either  their 
date  or  author,  I  have  given  them  by  way  of  notes 
to  the  text.  They  are  to  be  found  in  a  beautifully 
written  and  richly  bound  manuscript  in  the  Admiralty 
Library.  At  the  end  of  the  volume,  following  the 
Instructions,  are  diagrammatic  representations  of 
certain  actions  in  the  Third  Dutch  War,  finely 
executed  in  water-colour  to  illustrate  the  formation 
for  attack,  and  to  every  plan  are  appended  tactical 
notes  relating  to  the  actions  represented,  and  to  others 
which  were  fought  in  the  same  way.  The  first 
one  dealt  with  is  the  '  St.  James's  Fight,'  fought 
on  July  25,  1666,  and  the  dates  in  the  tactical  notes, 
as  well  as  in  the  '  Observations '  appended  to  the 
articles,  range  as  far  as  the  last  action  fought  in 
1673.  The  whole  manuscript  is  clearly  intended  as 
a  commentary  on  the  latest  form  of  the  duke's  orders, 
and  it  may  safely  be  taken  as  an  expression  of  some 
tactician's  view  of  the  lessons  that  were  to  be  drawn 
from  his  experience  of  the  Dutch  Wars. 


THE  ADMIRALTY  MS.  141 

As  to  the  authorship,  the  princely  form  in  which 
the  manuscript  has  been  preserved  might  suggest 
they  were  James's  own  meditations  after  the  war  ; 
but  the  tone  of  the  '  Observations,'  and  the  curious 
revival  of  the  word  '  general '  for  '  commander-in- 
chief,'  are  enough  to  negative  such  an  attribution. 
Other  indications  that  exist  would  point  to  George 
Legge,  Lord  Dartmouth.  His  first  experience  of 
naval  warfare  was  as  a  volunteer  and  lieutenant 
under  his  cousin,  Sir  Edward  Spragge,  in  1665. 
Spragge  was  in  fact  his  '  sea-daddy,'  and  with  one 
exception  all  the  examples  in  the  '  Observations '  are 
taken  from  incidents  and  movements  in  which 
Spragge  was  the  chief  actor.  One  long  observation 
is  directed  to  precautions  to  be  taken  by  flag  officers 
in  shifting  their  flags  in  action,  so  as  to  prevent  a 
recurrence  of  the  catastrophe  which  cost  Spragge 
his  life.  Indeed,  with  the  exception  of  Jordan, 
Spragge  is  the  only  English  admiral  mentioned. 
Dartmouth  was  present  at  all  the  actions  quoted, 
and  succeeded  in  constituting  himself  a  sufficient 
authority  on  naval  affairs  to  be  appointed  in  1683 
to  command  the  first  important  fleet  that  was  sent 
out  after  the  termination  of  the  war.  These  indi- 
cations however  are  far  too  slight  to  fix  him  with 
the  authorship,  and  his  own  orders  issued  in  1688 
go  far  to  rebut  the  presumption.1 

Another  possible  author  is  Arthur  Herbert, 
afterwards  Lord  Torrington.  He  too  had  served 
a  good  deal  under  Spragge,  and  had  been  present 
at  all  the  battles  named.  This  conjecture  would 
explain  the  curious  expression  used  in  the  observa- 
tion to  the  seventh  instruction,  '  The  battle  fought  in 
1666.'  There  was  of  course  more  than  one  battle 
fought  in  1666,  but  Herbert  was  only  present  in 
that  of  July  25th,  the  '  St.  James's  Fight,'  represented 
1  See/ew/,  p.  170. 


142         THE    THIRD   DUTCH   WAR 

in  the  manuscript — and  it  was  his  first  action.  But 
here  again  all  is  too  vague  for  more  than  a  mere 
guess. 

But  whoever  was  the  author,  the  manuscript  is 
certainly  inspired  by  someone  of  position  who  had 
served  in  the  last  two  Dutch  Wars,  and  its  unde- 
niable importance  is  that  it  gives  us  clearly  the 
development  of  tactical  thought  which  led  to  the 
final  form  of  Fighting  Instructions  adopted  under 
William  III,  and  continued  till  the  end  of  the 
eighteenth  century.  The  developments  which  it 
foreshadows  will  therefore  be  best  dealt  with  when 
we  come  to  consider  those  instructions.  For  the 
present  it  will  be  sufficient  to  note  the  changes 
suggested.  In  the  first  place  we  have  a  desire  to 
simplify  signals  and  to  establish  repeating  ships. 
Secondly,  for  the  sake  of  clearness  the  numbering  of 
the  articles  is  changed,  every  paragraph  to  which  a 
separate  signal  is  attached  being  made  a  separate 
instruction,  so  that  with  new  instructions  we  have 
thirty-three  articles  instead  of  James's  twenty -four. 
Thirdly,  we  have  three  new  instructions  proposed  : 
viz.,  No.  5,  removing  from  flag  officers  the  right 
to  divide  the  enemy's  fleet  at  their  discretion 
without,  signal  from  the  admiral ;  No.  8,  giving  a 
signal  for  any  squadron  that  has  weathered  part  of 
the  enemy  by  dividing  or  otherwise  to  bear  down 
and  come  to  close  action  ;  and  No.  17,  for  such  a 
squadron  to  bear  down  through  the  enemy's  line 
and  rejoin  the  admiral.  All  of  these  rules  are 
obviouslv  the  outcome  of  known  incidents  in  the 

j 

late  war.  There  are  also  suggested  additions  or 
alterations  to  the  old  articles  to  the  following 
effect :  ( i )  When  commanders  are  in  doubt  or 
out  of  sight  of  the  admiral,  they  are  to  press  the 
headmost  ships  of  the  enemy  all  they  can  ;  (2) 
When  the  enemy  '  stays  to  fight '  they  are  to  con- 


CONCENTRATION  ON   THE    VAN   143 

centrate  on  his  weathermost  ships,  instead  of  his 
headmost,  as  under  the  old  rule  ;  (3)  Finally,  while 
preserving  the  line,  they  are  to  remember  that  their 
first  duty  is  '  to  press  the  weathermost  ships  and 
relieve  such  as  are  in  distress.' 

It  is  this  last  addition  to  the  Duke  of  York's 
sixteenth  article  that  contains  the  pith  of  the  author's 
ideas.  All  his  examples  are  chosen  to  show  that 
the  system  of  bearing  down  together  from  wind- 
ward in  a  line  parallel  to  that  of  the  enemy  is 
radically  defective,  even  if  all  the  advantages  of 
position  and  superior  force  are  with  you,  and  for  this 
reason — that  if  you  succeed  in  defeating  part  of  the 
enemy's  line  you  cannot  follow  up  your  success  with 
the  victorious  part  of  your  own  without  sacrificing 
your  advantage  of  position,  and  giving  the  enemy 
a  chance  of  turning  the  tables  on  you.  Thus,  if  your 
rear  defeats  the  enemy's  rear  and  follows  it  up, 
your  own  line  will  be  broken,  and  as  your  rear  in 
pressing  its  beaten  opponents  falls  to  leeward  of  the 
enemy's  centre  and  van  it  will  expose  itself  to  a  fatal 
concentration.  His  own  view  of  the  proper  form  of 
attack  from  windward  is  to  bear  down  upon  the  van 
or  weathermost  ships  of  the  enemy  in  line  ahead  on 
a  course  oblique  to  the  enemy's  line.  In  this  way,  he 
points  out,  you  can  concentrate  on  the  ships  attacked, 
and  as  they  are  beaten  you  can  deal  with  the  next 
in  order.  For  so  long  as  you  keep  your  own  line 
intact  and  in  good  order,  regardless  of  your  rear  being 
at  first  too  distant  to  engage,  you  will  always  have 
fresh  ships  coming  into  action  at  the  vital  point,  and 
will  thus  be  able  gradually  to  roll  up  the  enemy's 
line  without  ever  disturbing  your  own  order. 
Fortifying  himself  with  the  reflection  that  '  there 
can  be  no  greater  justification  than  matter  of  fact,' 
he  proceeds  to  instance  various  battles  in  the  late 
wars  to  show  that  this  oblique  form  of  attack  always 


i44         THE   THIRD  DUTCH   WAR 

led  to  a  real  victory,  whereas  whenever  the  parallel 
form  was  adopted,  though  in  some  cases  we  had 
everything  in  our  favour  and  had  fairly  beaten  the 
Dutch,  yet  no  decisive  result  was  obtained. 

From  several  points  of  view  these  observations 
are  of  high  interest.  Not  only  do  they  contain  the 
earliest  known  attempt  to  get  away  from  the  un- 
satisfactory method  of  engaging  in  parallel  lines 
ship  to  ship,  but  in  seeking  a  substitute  for  it  they 
seem  to  foreshadow  the  transition  from  the  Eliza- 
bethan idea  of  throwing  the  enemy  into  confusion 
to  the  eighteenth  century  idea  of  concentration  on 
his  most  vulnerable  part.  In  so  far  as  the  author 
recommends  a  concentration  on  the  weathermost 
ships  his  idea  is  sound,  as  they  were  the  most 
difficult  for  the  enemy  to  support ;  but  since  the 
close-hauled  line  had  come  in,  they  were  also  the 
van,  and  a  concentration  on  the  van  is  theoretically 
unsound,  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  centre  and  rear 
came  up  naturally  to  its  relief.  To  this  objection  he 
appears  to  attach  no  weight,  partly  because  no 
doubt  he  was  still  influenced  by  the  old  intention  of 
throwing  the  enemy  into  confusion.1  For  since  the 
line  ahead  had  taken  the  place  of  the  old  close  for- 
mations it  seemed  that  to  disable  the  leading  ships 
came  to  the  same  thing  as  disabling  the  weather- 
most.  The  solution  eventually  arrived  at  was  of 
course  a  concentration  on  the  rear,  but  to  this  at 
the  time  there  were  insuperable  objections.  The 
rear  was  normally  the  most  leewardly  end  of  the 
line,  and  an  oblique  attack  on  it  could  be  parried  by 
wearing  together.  The  rear  then  became  the  van, 
and  the  attack  if  persisted  in  would  fall  on  the  lead- 
ing squadron  with  the  rest  of  the  fleet  to  windward— 
the  worst  of  all  forms  of  attack.  The  only  possible 
way  therefore  of  concentrating  on  the  rear  was  to 
1  Cf.  Hoste's  second  Remark,  post.,  p.  180. 


CONCENTRATION  ON   THE    VAN    145 

isolate  it  and  contain  the  van  by  cutting  the  line. 
But  in  the  eyes  of  our  author  and  his  school  cutting 
the  line  stood  condemned  by  the  experience  of 
war.1 

In  his  '  Observations '  he  clearly  indicates  the 
reasons.  He  would  indeed  forbid  the  manoeuvre 
altogether  except  when  your  own  line  outstretches 
that  of  the  enemy,  or  when  you  are  forced  to  pass 
through  the  enemy's  fleet  to  save  yourself  from 
being  pressed  on  a  lee  shore.  The  reasons  given 
are  the  disorder  it  generally  causes,  the  ease  with 
which  it  is  parried,  and  the  danger  of  your  own 
ships  firing  on  each  other  when  as  the  natural  con- 
sequence of  the  manoeuvre  they  proceed  to  double 
on  the  enemy.  The  fact  is  that  fleet  evolutions 
were  still  in  too  immature  a  condition  for  so  diffi- 
cult a  manoeuvre  to  be  admissible.  Presumably 
therefore  our  author  chose  the  attack  on  the 
weathermost  ships,  although  they  were  also  the 
van,  as  the  lesser  evil  in  spite  of  its  serious  draw- 
backs. 

The  whole  question  of  the  principles  involved  in 
his  suggestion  is  worthy  of  the  closest  consideration. 
For  the  difficulty  it  reveals  of  effecting  a  sound  form 
of  concentration  without  breaking  the  line  as  well  as 
of  adopting  any  form  that  involved  breaking  the  line 
gives  us  the  key  of  that  alleged  reaction  of  tactics 
in  the  eighteenth  century  which  has  been  so  widely 
ridiculed. 

1  In  the  Instructions  which  Sir  Chas.  H.  Knowles  drew  up 
about  1780,  for  submission  to  the  Admiralty  he  has  at  p.  16  a 
remark  upon  rear  concentration  which  helps  us  to  see  what  was 
in  the  author's  mind.  It  is  as  follows  :  '  N.B. — In  open  sea  the 
enemy  (if  of  equal  force)  will  never  suffer  you  to  attack  their  rear, 
but  will  pass  you  on  opposite  tacks  to  prevent  your  doing  it :  there- 
for the  attempt  is  useless  and  only  losing  time.' 


146         THE    THIRD  DUTCH   WAR 

THE  DUKE   OF   YORK,  1672. l 
[Spragge's  Second  Sea  Book.    Dartmouth  MSS.] 

Instructions  for  the  better  ordering  of  his  majesty's 
fleet  in  fighting. 

1.  Discovery  of  a  fleet,  striking  the  admiral's 
flag  and  making  a  weft.2 

2.  To  come  into  the  order  of  battle.2 

3.  A   red   flag   on    the    fore    topmast-head,  to 
engage.2 

4.  If  overcharged  or  distressed,  a  pennant.2 

5.  Ditto,  a  weft  with  his  jack  and  ensign.2 

6.  A  pennant  on  the  mizen  peak  or  ensign  staff 
if  any  ship  bear  away  from  the  enemy  to  stop  a  leak. 

If  any  ship  shall  be  necessitated  to  bear  away 
from  the  enemy  to  stop  a  leak  or  mend  what  is 
amiss  which  cannot  otherwise  be  repaired,  he  is  to 
put  out  a  pennant  on  the  mizen  peak  or  ensign 
staff,  whereby  the  rest  of  that  ship's  squadron  may 
have  notice  what  it  is  for  ;  and  if  the  admiral  or  any 
flagship  should  be  so,  the  ships  of  the  fleet  or  of  the 
respective  squadrons  are  to  endeavour  to  get  up  as 
close  in  line  between  him  and  the  enemy  as  they 
can,  having  always  an  eye  to  defend  him  in  case  the 
enemy  should  come  to  annoy  him  in  that  condition  ; 
and  in  case  any  flagship  or  any  other  ship  in  the 
fleet  shall  be  forced  to  go  out  of  the  line  for  stopping 
of  leaks  or  repairing  any  other  defects  in  the  ships, 
then  the  next  immediate  ships  are  forthwith  to 
endeavour  to  close  the  line  either  by  making  or 
shortening  sail,  or  by  such  other  ways  and  means 

1  This  set  of  orders  has  marginal  rubrics  indicating  the  con- 
tents of  each  article,  and  where  the  article  does  not  differ  from 
the  orders  of  1665  I  have  given  the  rubric  only  in  the  text. 

2  Identical  with  corresponding  article  of  April  10,  1665. 


DUKE  OF   YORK,    1672  147 

as  they  shall  find  most  convenient  for  doing  of  it  ; 
and  if  any  ship,  be  it  flagship  or  other  that  shall 
happen  to  be  disabled  and  go  out  of  the  line,  then 
all  the  small  craft  shall  come  in  to  that  ship's  assist- 
ance, upon  signal  made  of  her  being  disabled.  If 
any  of  the  chief  flagships  or  other  flagships  shall 
happen  to  be  so  much  disabled  as  that  thereby  they 
shall  be  rendered  unable  for  present  service,  in  such 
case  any  chief  flag  officer  may  get  on  board  any 
other  ship  which  he  may  judge  most  convenient  in 
his  own  squadron,  and  any  other  flag  officer  in  that 
case  may  go  on  board  any  ship  in  his  division. 

7.  A  blue  flag  on  the  mizen  yard  or  topmast.1 

8.  To  make  sail,    a   red   flag  on    the   spritsail, 
topmast  shrouds,  &C.1 

9.  A  red  flag  on  the  mizen  shrouds,  to  come  into 
the  wake  or  grain  of  us.1 

10.  Not  to  endanger  one  another.2 

11.  The  small  craft  to  attend  the  motion  of  the 
enemy's  fireships.2 

12.  A    white   flag   on    the   mizen   yard-arm  or 
topmast-head,  all  the  small  frigates  of  the  admiral's 
squadron.2 

13.  To  retreat,  four  guns.2 

14.  None  to  fire  guns  till  within  distance.3 

15.  For  the  larboard  and  starboard  tacks.4 

1 6.  To  keep  the  line.5 

17.  If  we  have  the  wind  of  the  enemy.5 

1 8.  If  the  enemy  have  the  wind  of  us.5 

1  Same  as  corresponding  article  of  April  10,  1665.     Article  10 
of  those  instructions  relating  to  '  not  staying  to  take  possession 
of  disabled  ships '  is  here  omitted. 

2  These  four  articles  are  identical  with  n,  12,  13  and  14  of 
April  10,  1665. 

3  Same  as  Article  16  of  April  10,  1665. 

4  Same  as  Article  15  of  April  10,  1665. 

5  These  three  articles  are  the  same  as  i,    2,  and  3,  of  '  Ad- 
ditional Instructions'  of  April  18,  1665.     The  complete  set  used 

L  2 


148         THE    THIRD   DUTCH   WAR 

19.  The  distance  of  each  ship  in  time  of  fight.1 

20.  Not   to   pursue   any   small   number  of  the 
enemy's  ships.2 

21.  For  leaving  chase.2 

22.  If  any  ship  be  disabled  in  fight.2 

23.  The  van  of  the  fleet  to  tack  first.2 

24.  The  rear  of  the  fleet  to  tack  first.2 

25.  To  fall  into  the  order  of  battle.3 

26.  To  make  sail.3 

JAMES. 
By  command  of  his  royal  highness. 

M.  WREN. 


THE  DUKE  OF  YORK'S  SUPPLEMENTARY 
ORDERS,  1672. 

[Spragge's  Second  Sea  Book.    Dartmouth  MSS.j 

Further  Instructions  for  Fighting. 

i.  To  keep  the  enemy  to  leeward. 

In  case  we  have  the  wind  of  the  enemy,  and  that 
the  enemy  stands  towards  us  and  we  towards  them, 
then  the  van  of  our  fleet  shall  keep  the  wind,  and 
when  the  rear  comes4"  to  a  convenient  distance  of  the 
enemy's  rear  shall  stay  until  our  whole  line  is  come 
up  within  the  same  distance  of  the  enemy's  van, 
and  then  our  whole  line  is  to  stand  along  with  them 
the  same  tacks  on  board,  still  keeping  the  enemy  to 
leeward,  and  not  suffering  them  to  tack  in  the  van, 

by  Monck  and  Rupert  in   1666  must  have  been  numbered  as 
above. 

1  Same  as  4  and  5  of  '  Additional  Instructions,'  April  18,  1665. 

2  These  five  articles  are  the  same  as  6  to  10  of  the  'Additional 
Instructions,'  April  18,  1665. 

3  These  two  articles  are  the  same  as   the  two  '  Additional 
Instructions'  of  April  27,  1665. 

4  This  must  be  a  copyist's  error.     In  Lord  Dartmouth's  MS. 
book  (see  ante,  p.  139)  it  reads  '  when  they  are  come.' 


DUKE   OF   YORK,    1672  149 

and  in  case  the  enemy  tack  in  the  rear  first,  then  he 
that  leads  the  van  of  our  fleet  is  to  tack  first,  and 
the  whole  line  is  to  follow,  standing  all  along  with 
the  same  tacks  on  board  as  the  enemy  does. 

2.  To  divide  the  enemy's  fleet. 

In  case  the  enemy  have  the  wind  of  us  and  we 
have  sea-room  enough,  then  we  are  to  keep  the 
wind  as  close  as  we  can  lie  until  such  time  as  we 
see  an  opportunity  by  gaining  their  wakes  to  divide 
their  fleet ;  and  if  the  van  of  our  fleet  find  that  they 
have  the  wake  of  any  part  of  them,  they  are  to  tack 
and  to  stand  in,  and  strive  to  divide  the  enemy's 
body,  and  that  squadron  which  shall  pass  first  being 
come  to  the  other  side  is  to  tack  again,  and  the 
middle  squadron  is  to  bear  up  upon  that  part  of  the 
enemy  so  divided,  which  the  last  is  to  second,  either 
by  bearing  down  to  the  enemy  or  by  endeavouring 
to  keep  off  those  that  are  to  windward,  as  shall  be 
best  for  service. 

3.  To  keep  the  line. 

The  several  commanders  of  the  fleet  are  to  take 
special  care  that  they  keep  their  line,  and  upon  pain 
of  death  that  they  fire  not  over  any  of  our  own 
ships. 

(Signed)     JAMES. 
By  command  of  his  royal  highness. 

(Signed)     M.  WREN. 


THE  DUKE   OF  YORK,   1672-3. 
[Spragge's  Second  Sea  Book.    Dartmouth  MSS.] 

Encouragement  for  the  captains  and  companies 
of fireships,  small  frigates  and  ketches. 

Although  it  is  the  duty  of  all  persons  employed 
in  his  majesty's  fleet  even  to  the  utmost  hazard  of 


ISO         THE    THIRD  DUTCH   WAR 

their  lives  to  endeavour  as  well  the  destroying 
of  his  majesty's  enemies,  as  the  succouring  of  his 
majesty's  subjects,  and  in  most  especial  manner  to 
preserve  and  defend  his  majesty's  ships  of  war  (the 
neglect  whereof  shall  be  at  all  times  strictly  and 
severely  punished),  nevertheless,  that  no  inducement 
may  be  wanting  which  may  oblige  all  persons 
serving  in  his  majesty's  service  valiantly  and  honour- 
ably to  acquit  themselves  in  their  several  stations, 
we  have  thought  fit  to  publish  and  declare,  and  do 
hereby  promise  on  his  majesty's  behalf: 

That  if  any  of  his  majesty's  fireships  perform  the 
service  expected  of  them  in  such  manner  that  any 
of  the  enemy's  ships  of  war  of  forty  guns  or  more 
shall  be  burnt  by  them,  every  person  remaining  in 
the  fireship  till  the  service  be  performed  shall 
receive  on  board  the  admiral,  immediately  after  the 
service  done,  ten  pounds  as  a  reward  for  that 
service  over  and  above  his  pay  due  to  him  ;  and  in 
case  any  of  them  shall  be  killed  in  that  service  it 
shall  be  paid  to  his  executors  or  next  relation  over 
and  above  the  ordinary  provision  made  for  the. 
relations  of  such  as  are  slain  in  his  majesty's  service  ; 
and  the  captains  of  such  fireships  shall  receive  a 
medal  of  gold  to  remain  as  a  token  of  honour  to 
him  and  his  posterity,  and  shall  receive  such  other 
encouragement  by  preferment  and  command  as 
shall  be  fit  to  reward  him,  and  induce  others  to 
perform  the  like  service.  The  inferior  officers  shall 
receive  each  ten  pounds  in  money  and  be  taken  care 
of,  and  placed  in  other  ships  before  any  persons 
whatsoever. 

In  case  any  of  the  enemy's  flagships  shall  be 
so  fired,  the  recompense  shall  be  double  to  each 
man  performing  it,  and  the  medal  to  the  com- 
mander shall  be  such  as  shall  particularly  express 
the  eminence  of  the  service,  and  his  and  the  other 


DUKE   OF  YORK,    1672-3  151 

officers'  preferments  shall  be  suitable  to  the  merit 
of  it. 

If  any  of  his  majesty's  fifth  or  sixth  rate  frigates,  or 
any  ketches,  smacks  or  hoys  in  his  majesty's  service, 
shall  board  or  destroy  any  fireships  of  the  enemy, 
and  so  prevent  any  of  them  from  going  on  board 
any  of  his  majesty's  ships,  above  the  fifth  rate, 
besides  the  preferment  which  shall  be  given  to  the 
commanders  and  officers  of  such  ships  performing 
such  service  answerable  to  the  merit,  the  companies 
of  such  ships  or  vessels,  or  in  case  they  shall  be 
killed  in  that  service,  their  executors  or  nearest 
relations,  shall  receive  to  every  man  forty  shillings 
as  a  reward,  and  such  persons  who  shall  by  the 
testimony  of  the  commanders  appear  to  have  been 
eminently  instrumental  in  such  service  shall  receive 
a  further  reward  according  to  their  merit. 

If  the  masters  of  any  ketches,  hoys,  smacks,  and 
other  vessels  hired  for  his  majesty's  service  shall 
endeavour  to  perform  any  of  the  services  aforesaid, 
and  shall  by  such  his  attempt  lose  his  vessel  or 
ship,  the  full  reward  thereof  shall  be  paid  by  the 
treasurer  of  his  majesty's  navy,  upon  certificate  of 
the  service  done  by  the  council  of  war,  and  the  said 
commanders  and  men  serving  in  her  shall  receive  the 
same  recompense  with  those  serving  in  his  majesty's 
ships  or  vessels. 

JAMES.1 

By  command  of  his  royal  highness. 

1  In  Capt.  Moulton's  Sea  Book  (Harkian  MSS.  1247,  f.  53) 
is  another  copy  of  these  articles  which  concludes,  'given  on 
board  the  Royal  Charles  the  2oth  of  April  1665.  James.'  And  at 
foot  is  written  '  a  copy  of  His  Royal  Highness's  command  received 
from  his  Excellency  the  Earl  of  Sandwich.'  They  probably  there- 
fore originated  in  the  Second  War  and  were  reissued  in  the 
Third. 


152         THE    THIRD  DUTCH    WAR 


FINAL  FORM  OF  THE  DUKE   OF   YORK'S 
ORDERS,  1673. 

With  the  additions  and  observations  subsequently  made.1 
[G.  Penn,  Memorials  of  Penn.] 

James,  Duke  of  York  and  Albany,  Earl  of  Ulster, 
Lord  High  Admiral  of  England,  Scotland,  and 
Ireland,  Constable  of  Dover  Castle,  Lord  War- 
den of  the  Cinque  Ports,  and  Governor  of  Ports- 
mouth, &c. 

Instructions  for  the  better  ordering  his  majesty  s 
fleet  in  fighting. 

Instruction  I.  Upon  discovery  of  a  fleet,  and 
receiving  of  a  signal  from  the  admiral  (which  is  to 
be  the  striking  of  the  admiral's  ensign,  and  making 
a  weft),  such  frigates  as  are  appointed  (that  is  to 
say,  one  out  of  each  squadron)  are  to  make  sail, 
and  to  stand  with  them,  so  nigh  as  they  can  con- 
veniently, the  better  to  gain  knowledge  what  they 
are,  and  of  what  quality ;  how  many  fireships,  and 
others ;  and  what  posture  their  fleet  is  in ;  which 
being  done,  the  frigates  are  to  speak  together, 

1  The  later  Admiralty  MS.  is  prefaced  by  the  following 
Observation  :  '  There  have  happened  several  misfortunes  and  dis- 
putes for  want  of  a  sufficient  number  of  signals  to  explain  the 
general's  pleasure,  without  which  it  is  not  to  be  avoided ;  and 
whereas  it  hath  often  happened  for  want  of  a  ready  putting  forth 
and  apprehending  to  what  intent  the  signals  are  made,  they  are 
contracted  into  a  shorter  method  so  that  no  time  might  be  lost. 
It  is  most  certain  that  in  all  sea  battles  the  flags  or  admiral- 
generals  are  equally  concerned  in  any  conflict,  and  no  manner  of 
knowledge  can  be  gained  how  the  rest  of  the  battle  goes  till  such 
time  as  it  is  past  recovery.  To  prevent  this  let  a  person  fitly 
qualified  command  the  reserve,  who  shall  by  signals  make  known 
to  the  general  in  what  condition  or  posture  the  other  parts  of  the 
fleet  are  in,  he  having  his  station  where  the  whole  can  best  be 
discovered,  and  his  signals,  answering  the  general's,  may  also  be 
discerned  by  the  rest  of  the  fleet.' 


DUKE   OF   YORK,    1673  153 

and  conclude  on  the  report  they  are  to  give  ;  and, 
accordingly,  to  repair  to  their  respective  squadrons 
and  commanders-in-chief ;  and  not  to  engage  (if  the 
enemy's  ships  exceed  them  in  number),  unless  it 
shall  appear  to  them  on  the  place  that  they  have  an 
advantage. 

Instruction  II.  At  sight  of  the  said  fleet,  the 
vice-admiral  (or  he  who  commands  in  chief  in  the 
second  place),  with  his  squadron ;  and  the  rear- 
admiral  (or  he  who  commands  in  chief  in  the  third 
squadron),  with  his  squadron  ;  are  to  make  what 
sail  they  can  to  come  up,  and  to  put  themselves  into 
that  order  of  battle  which  shall  be  given  them  ;  for 
which  the  signal  shall  be  the  union  flag  put  on  the 
mizen  peak  of  the  admiral's  ship  ;  at  sight  whereof, 
as  well  the  vice-  and  rear-admirals  of  the  red 
squadron,  as  the  admirals,  vice-admirals,  and  rear- 
admirals  of  the  other  squadrons,  are  to  answer  it  by 
doing  the  like. 

Instruction  III.  In  case  the  enemy  have  the 
wind  of  the  admiral  and  fleet,  and  they  have  sea- 
room  enough,  then  they  are  to  keep  the  wind  as 
close  as  they  can  lie,  until  such  time  as  they  see  an 
opportunity  by  gaining  their  wakes  to  divide  the 
enemy's  fleet ;  and  if  the  van  of  his  majesty's  fleet 
find  that  they  have  the  wake  of  any  considerable 
part  of  them,  they  are  to  tack  and  stand  in,  and 
strive  to  divide  the  enemy's  body  ;  and  that  squadron 
that  shall  pass  first,  being  got  to  windward,  is  to 
bear  down  on  those  ships  to  leeward  of  them  ;  and 
the  middle  squadron  is  to  keep  her  wind,  and  to 
observe  the  motion  of  the  enemy's  van,  which  the 
last  squadron  is  to  second  ;  and  both  of  these 
squadrons  are  to  do  their  utmost  to  assist  or  relieve 
the  first  squadron  that  divided  the  enemy's  fleet.1 

1  The  Admiralty  MS.  has  this  Observation  :  '  Unless  you  can 
outstretch   their   headmost    ships   there   is   hazard   in    breaking 


154        THE    THIRD  DUTCH   WAR 

Instruction  IV.  If  the  enemy  have  the  wind  of 
his  majesty's  fleet,  and  come  to  fight  them,  the 
commanders  of  his  majesty's  ships  shall  endeavour 
to  put  themselves  in  one  line,  close  upon  a  wind, 
according  to  the  order  of  battle.1 

Instruction  V.  If  the  admiral  would  have  any  of 
the  fleet  to  make  sail,  or  endeavour,  by  tacking  or 
otherwise,  to  gain  the  wind  of  the  enemy,  he  will  put 
a  red  flag  upon  the  spritsail  [sic],  topmast  shrouds, 
fore-stay,  fore  topmast-stay  ;  and  he  who  first  dis- 
covers this  signal  shall  make  sail,  and  hoist  and 
lower  his  jack  and  ensign,  that  the  rest  of  the  fleet 
may  take  notice  thereof  and  follow.2 

through  the  enemy's  line,  and  [it]  commonly  brings  such  dis- 
orders in  the  line  of  battle  that  it  may  be  rather  omitted  unless 
an  enemy  press  you  near  a  lee  shore.  For  if,  according  to  this 
instruction,  when  you  have  got  the  wind  you  are  to  press  the 
enemy,  then  those  ships  which  are  on  each  side  of  them  shall 
receive  more  than  equal  damages  from  each  other's  shot  if  near, 
and  in  case  the  enemy  but  observed  the  seventh  instruction — that 
is,  to  tack  with  equal  numbers  with  you — then  is  your  fleet  divided 
and  not  the  enemy's. 

1  The  Admiralty  MS.  here  inserts  an  additional  instruction, 
numbered  5,   as   follows  :    '  If  in  time  of  fight  any  flagship  or 
squadron  ahead  of  the  fleet  hath  an  opportunity  of  weathering 
any  of  the  enemy's  ships,  they  shall  put  abroad  the  same  signal 
the  general  makes  them  for  tacking,  which,  if  the  general  would 
have  them  go  about,  he  will  answer  by  giving  the  same  again, 
otherwise  they  are  to  continue  on  the  same  line  or  station.' 

Observation. — '  For  it  may  prove  not  convenient  in  some  cases 
to  break  the  line.' 

2  The  Admiralty  MS.  adds,  c  And  as  soon  as  they  have  the 
wind  to  observe  what  other  signals  the  general  makes ;  and  in  case 
they  lose  sight  of  the  general,  they  are  to  endeavour  to  press  the 
headmost  ships  of  the  enemy  all  they  can,  or  assist  any  of  ours 
that  are  annoyed  by  them.'    The  whole  makes  Instruction  VI. 
of  the  Admiralty  MS.     An   Observation  is  attached  to  the  old 
instruction  as  follows: — 'This  signal  was  wanting  in  the  battle 
fought  irth  August,  1673.     The  fourth  squadron  followed  this 
instruction  and  got  the  wind  of  the  enemy  about  four  in  the  after- 
noon, and  kept  the  wind  for  want  of  another  signal  to  bear  down 
upon  the  enemy,  as  Monsieur  d'Estrees  alleged  at  the  council  of 


DUKE   OF   YORK,    1673  155 

Instruction  VI.1  If  the  admiral  should  have  the 
wind  of  the  enemy  when  other  ships  of  the  fleet  are 
in  the  wind  of  the  admiral,  then,  upon  hoisting  up 
a  blue  flag  at  the  mizen  yard,  or  mizen  topmast, 
every  ship  is  to  bear  up  into  his  wake  or  grain, 
upon  pain  of  severe  punishment. 

If  the  admiral  be  to  leeward  of  the  enemy,  and 
his  fleet  or  any  part  thereof  be  to  leeward  of  him,  to 
the  end  such  ships  that  are  to  leeward  may  come  up 
in  a  line  with  the  admiral  (if  he  shall  put  a  flag  as 
before  and  bear  up)  ;  none  that  are  to  leeward  are 
to  bear  up,  but  to  keep  his  or  their  ship's  luff, 
thereby  to  give  his  ship  wake  or  grain. 

If  it  shall  please  God  that  the  enemy  shall  be 
put  to  run,  all  the  frigates  are  to  make  all  the  sail 
that  possibly  they  can  after  them,  and  to  run 
directly  up  their  broadsides,  and  to  take  the  best 
opportunity  they  can  of  laying  them  on  board  ;  and 
some  ships  which  are  the  heavy  sailers  (with  some 
persons  appointed  to  command  them)  are  to  keep 
in  a  body  in  the  rear  of  the  fleet,  that  so  they  may 

war  the  next  day.  For  want  of  this  the  enemy  left  only  five  or 
six  ships  to  attend  their  motion,  and  pressed  the  other  squadrons 
of  ours  to  such  a  degree  they  were  forced  to  give  way.'  Cf.  note, 
p.  181. 

1  The  Admiralty  MS.  makes  of  the  three  paragraphs  of  this 
instruction  three  separate  instructions,  numbered  7,  9,  and  10, 
and  inserts  after  the  first  paragraph  a  new  instruction  numbered 
8,  with  an  Observation  appended.  It  is  as  follows  :  Additional 
Instruction,  No.  VIII. :  '  When  any  of  his  majesty's  ships  that 
have  gained  the  wind  of  the  enemy,  and  that  the  general  or 
admiral  would  have  them  bear  down  and  come  to  a  close  fight, 
he  will  put  abroad  the  same  signal  as  for  their  tacking,  and  hoist 
and  lower  the  same  till  it  be  discerned ;  at  which,  they  that  are 
to  windward  shall  answer  by  bearing  down  upon  the  enemy. 
Observation. — The  same  in  the  battle  of  Solebay,  Sir  Joseph 
Jordan  got  the  wind  and  kept  it  for  want  of  a  signal  or  fireships.' 
This  Observation  appears  to  be  intended  as  a  continuation  of  the 
previous  one,  the  new  inscruction  supplies  the  missing  signal  there 
referred  to. 


156        THE   THIRD  DUTCH   WAR 

take  care  of  the  enemy's  ships  which  have  yielded, 
and  look  after  the  manning  of  the  prizes.1 

Instruction  VII.2  In  case  his  majesty's  fleet 
have  the  wind  of  the  enemy,  and  that  the  enemy 
stand  towards  them,  and  they  towards  the  enemy, 
then  the  van  of  his  majesty's  fleet  shall  keep  the 
wind  ;  and  when  they  are  come  within  a  convenient 
distance  from  the  enemy's  rear,  they  shall  stay  until 
their  whole  line  is  come  up  within  the  same  distance 
from  the  enemy's  van ;  and  then  their  whole  line  is 
to  tack  (every  ship  in  his  own  place),  and  to  bear 
down  upon  them  so  nigh  as  they  can  (without  endan- 
gering their  loss  of  wind) ;  and  to  stand  along  with 
them,  the  same  tacks  aboard,  still  keeping  the  enemy 
to  leeward,  and  not  suffering  them  to  tack  in  their 
van  ;  and  in  case  the  enemy  tack  in  the  rear  first,  he 
who  is  in  the  rear  of  his  majesty's  is  to  tack  first,  with 
as  many  ships,  divisions,  or  squadrons  as  are  those 
of  the  enemy's  ;  and  if  all  the  enemy's  ships  tack, 


1  The  Admiralty  MS.  has  this  Observation :  «  The  2  8th  May, 
'73,   the  battle  fought  in  the  Schooneveld,  the  rear-admiral  of 
their  fleet  commanded  by  Bankart  (?  Adriaen  Banckers)  upon  a 
signal   from   De   Ruyter   gave   way  for  some  time,  and   being 
immediately  followed  by  Spragge  and  his  division,  it  proved  only 
a  design  to  draw  us  to  leeward,  and  that  De  Ruyter  might  have 
the   advantage  of  weathering  us.     So  that  for  any  small  number 
giving  way  it  is  not  safe  for  the  like  number  to  go  after  them,  but 
to  press  the  others  which  still  maintain  the  fight  according  to  the 
article  following.' 

2  No.  1 1  in  the  Admiralty  MS.  with  the  following  Observation  : 
'  In  bearing  down  upon  an  enemy  when  you  have  the  wind,  or 
standing  towards  them  .and  they  towards  you,  if  it  is  in  your 
power  to  fall  upon  any  part  of  their  ships,  those  to  windward  will 
be   the   most   exposed;    therefore   you   must   use   your   utmost 
endeavour  to  ruin  that  part.      The  battle   fought  in    1666,  the 
headmost  or  winderly  ships  were  beaten  in  three  hours  and  put  to 
run  before  half  the  rest  of  the  fleet  were  engaged.     We  suffered 
the  like  on  the  4th  of  June,  for  Tromp  and  De  Ruyter  never  bore 
down  to  engage  the  body  of  our  fleet,  but  pressed  the  leading  ships 
where  Spragge  and  his  squadron  had  like  to  have  been  ruined.' 


DUKE   OF   YORK,    1673  157 

their  whole  line  is  to  follow,  standing  along  with  the 
same  tacks  aboard  as  the  enemy  doth. 

Instruction  VIII.1  If  the  enemy  stay  to  fight 
(his  majesty's  fleet  having  the  wind),  the  head- 
most squadron  of  his  majesty's  fleet  shall  steer  for 
the  headmost  of  the  enemy's  ships.2 

Instruction  IX.3  If,  when  his  majesty's  fleet  is 
going  before  the  wind,  the  admiral  would  have  the 
vice-admiral  and  the  ships  of  the  starboard  quarter 
to  clap  by  the  wind  and  come  to  their  starboard 
tack,  then  he  will  hoist  upon  the  mizen  topmast-head 
a  red  flag. 

And  in  case  he  would  have  the  rear-admiral  and 
the  ships  of  the  larboard  quarter  to  come  to  their 
larboard  tack,  then  he  will  hoist  up  a  blue  flag  in 
the  same  place. 

Instruction  X.4  If  the  admiral  would  have  the  van 
of  the  fleet  to  tack  first,  he  will  put  abroad  the  union 
flag  at  the  staff  on  the  fore  topmast-head,  if  the  red 
flag  be  not  abroad  ;  but  if  the  red  flag  be  abroad,  then 
the  fore  topsail  shall  be  lowered  a  little,  and  the 
union  flag  shall  be  spread  from  the  cap  of  the  fore 
topmast  downwards. 

1  Admiralty  MS.  No.  12. 

2  For  '  headmost  of  the  enemy's  ships '  the  Admiralty  MS. 
has  '  windmost  ships  of  the  enemy's  fleet,  and  endeavour  all  that 
can  be  to  force  them  to  leeward.'    Also  this  Observation  :    '  It 
may  happen  that  the  headmost  of  their  fleet  may  be  the  most 
leewardly,  then  in  such  case  you  are  to  follow  this  instruction, 
whereas  before  it  was  said  to  stand  with  the  headmost  ships  of  the 
enemy.' 

3  Admiralty  MS.  Nos.  13  and  14.     It  has  the  Observation  : 
'  This  ought  to  be  for  each  squadron  apart.' 

4  Admiralty  MS.  Nos.  15  and  16.     To  the  first  paragraph,  or 
No.  1 5,  it  has  the   Observation  :    '  It  may  happen   that  by  the 
winds    shifting  there  may  be   neither   van   nor   rear;    then    in 
that  case  a  signal  for  each  squadron  would  be  better  understood, 
so  that  you  are  to   follow  the    i4th   and  i5th  of  the  "Sailing 
Instructions."     For  in  the  battle  of  August  '73  the  wind  shifted 
and  put  the  whole  line  out  of  order.' 


158        THE    THIRD  DUTCH   WAR 

When  the  admiral  would  have  the  rear  of  the 
fleet  to  tack  first,  the  union  flag  shall  be  put  abroad 
on  the  flagstaff  of  the  mizen  topmast-head ;  and  for 
the  better  notice  of  these  two  signals  through  the 
fleet,  each  flagship  is,  upon  sight  of  either  of  the  said 
signals,  to  make  the  same  signals,  that  so  every  ship 
may  know  what  they  are  to  do  ;  and  they  are  to  con- 
tinue out  the  same  signals  until  they  be  answered.1 

Instruction  XL2  If  the  admiral  put  a  red  flag 
on  the  mizen  shrouds,  or  the  mizen  peak,  all  the 
flagships  are  to  come  up  into  his  wake  or  grain. 

Instruction  XII.2  When  the  admiral  would  have 
the  other  squadrons  to  make  more  sail,  though  him- 
self shorten  sail,  a  white  ensign  shall  be  put  on  the 
ensign  staff  of  the  admiral's  ships. 

Instruction  XIII.2  As  soon  as  the  fleet  shall  see 
the  admiral  engage,  or  make  a  signal,  by  putting 
out  a  red  flag  on  the  fore  topmast-head,  each 
squadron  shall  take  the  best  advantage  to  engage 
the  enemy,  according  to  such  order  of  battle  as  shall 
be  given  them. 

Instruction  XIV.2  In  time  of  fight,  if  the  weather 
be  reasonable,  the  commanders  of  his  majesty's 
fleet  shall  endeavour  to  keep  about  the  distance  of 
half  a  cable  one  from  another  ;  but  so  as  they  may 
also  (according  to  the  direction  of  their  commanders) 
vary  that  distance,  as  the  weather  shall  prove,  and 
as  the  occasion  of  succouring  any  of  his  majesty's 
ships  or  of  assaulting  those  of  the  enemy  shall 
require. 

And  as  for   the    flag  officers,    they  shall  place 

1  The  Admiralty  MS.  here  inserts  a  new  article,  No.  17:  'If  the 
general  would  have  those  ships  to  windward  of  the  enemy  to  bear 
down  through  their  line  to  join  the  body  of  the  fleet,  he  will  put 
abroad  a  white  flag  with  a  cross  from  corner  to  corner  where  it 
can  best  be  discovered.' 

2  Admiralty  MS.  Nos.  1 8  to  23. 


DUKE   OF   YORK,    1673  159 

themselves  according  to  such  order  of  battle  as 
shall  be  given. 

Instruction  XV.1  No  commander  of  any  of  his 
majesty's  ships  shall  suffer  his  guns  to  be  fired  until 
the  ship  be  within  distance  to  do  good  execution  ; 
and  whoever  shall  do  the  contrary  shall  be  strictly 
examined,  and  severely  punished,  by  a  court-martial. 

Instruction  XVI.1  In  all  cases  of  fight  with  the 
enemy,  the  commanders  of  his  majesty's  ships  are 
to  keep  the  fleet  in  one  line,  and  (as  much  as  may  be) 
to  preserve  the  order  of  battle  which  they  have 
been  directed  to  keep  before  the  time  of  fight.2 

Instruction  XVII.3  None  of  the  ships  of  his 
majesty's  fleet  shall  pursue  any  small  number  of  the 
enemy's  ships  before  the  main  body  of  their  fleet 
shall  be  disabled,  or  run. 

Instruction  XVIII.3  None  shall  fire  upon  the 
ships  of  the  enemy's  that  are  laid  on  board  by  any 
of  his  majesty's  ships,  but  so  as  he  may  be  sure  he 
do  not  endamage  his  friend. 

Instruction  XIX.3  The  several  commanders  in 
the  fleet  are  to  take  special  care,  upon  pain  of 
death,  that  they  fire  not  over  any  of  their  own 
ships. 

Instruction  XX.4  It  is  the  duty  of  all  com- 
manders of  the  small  frigates,  ketches,  and  smacks, 


1  Admiralty  MS.  Nos.  18  to  23. 

2  Admiralty  MS.  adds  :  '  having  regard  to  press  the  weather- 
most  ships  and  relieve  such  as  are  in  distress.'      It    is  worth 
noting  that  this  important  relaxation  of  strict  line  tactics  practi- 
cally embodies  the  idea  of  Rupert's  Additional  Instruction  of  1666. 
Supra,  p.  129. 

3  Admiralty  MS.  Nos.  24  to  26. 

4  Admiralty  MS.  No.  27.     It  adds  this  Observation:  'When 
the   fleet  is  to  leeward  of  the  enemy  you  to  take  care  to  put 
yourself  in  such  a  station  as  that  you  may  (when  any  signal  is 
given)  without  loss  of  time  tack  and  stand  in  to  the  line.     And 
when  any  part  of  the  fleet  or  ships  wherein  you  are  concerned  are 


160         THE    THIRD   DUTCH   WAR 

belonging  to  the  several  squadrons  (who  are  not 
otherwise  appointed  by  the  admiral),  to  know  the 
fireships  belonging  to  the  enemies,  and  accordingly 
observing  their  motion,  to  do  their  utmost  to  cut 
off  their  boats  (if  possible)  ;  or,  if  they  have 
an  opportunity,  to  lay  them  on  board,  seize,  and 
destroy  them  ;  and,  to  this  purpose,  they  are  to 
keep  to  windward  of  their  squadron,  in  time  of 
service.  But  in  case  they  cannot  prevent  the  fire- 
ships  from  coming  on  board  of  his  majesty's  ships, 
by  clapping  between  them  (which  by  all  possible 
means  they  are  to  endeavour),  they  are  in  such  an 
exigent  to  show  themselves  men,  by  steering  on 
board  them  with  their  boats,  and,  with  grapnels  and 
other  means,  to  clear  his  majesty's  ships  from  them, 
and  to  destroy  them.  Which  service,  if  honourably 
performed,  shall  be  rewarded  according  to  its  merit ; 
but  if  neglected,  shall  be  strictly  examined,  and 
severely  punished.1 

Instruction  XXI.2  The  fireships  in  the  several 
squadrons  are  to  endeavour  to  keep  the  wind  ;  and 
they  (with  their  small  frigates)  to  be  as  near  the 
great  ships  as  they  can,  attending  the  signal  from 
the  admiral,  and  acting  accordingly. 

If  the  admiral  hoist  up  a  white  flag  at  the  mizen 
yard-arm  or  topmast-head,  all  the  small  frigates  in 
his  squadron  are  to  come  under  his  stern  for  orders. 

Instruction  XXII.3  In  case  it  should  please 
God  that  any  ships  of  his  majesty's  fleet  be  lamed 
in  fight,  and  yet  be  in  no  danger  of  sinking,  nor 
encompassed  by  the  enemy,  the  following  ships 

ordered  to  tack  and  gain  the  wind  of  the  enemy,  you  are  to  make 
all  the  sail  you  can  and  keep  up  with  the  headmost  ships  that 
first  tack.' 

1  Admiralty  MS.  '  Observation  :  The  reward  of  saving  a  friend 
to  be  equal  to  that  of  destroying  an  enemy.' 

2  Admiralty  MS.  Nos.  28  and  29. 

3  Admiralty  MS.  No.  30. 


DUKE   OF   YORK,    1673  161 

shall  not  stay,  under  pretence  of  succouring  them, 
but  shall  follow  their  leaders,  and  endeavour  to  do 
what  service  they  can  against  the  enemy ;  leaving 
the  succouring  of  the  lame  ships  to  the  sternmost  of 
the  fleet ;  being  assured  that  nothing  but  beating 
the  body  of  the  enemy's  fleet  can  effectually  secure 
the  lame  ships. 

Nevertheless,  if  any  ship  or  ships  shall  be  dis- 
tressed or  disabled,  by  loss  of  mast,  shot  under 
water,  or  the  like,  so  that  it  is  really  in  danger  of 
sinking  or  taking  ;  that  or  those  ship  or  ships  thus 
distressed  shall  make  a  sign  by  the  weft  of  his  or 
their  jack  or  ensign,  and  those  next  to  them  are 
strictly  required  to  relieve  them. 

And  if  any  ships  or  squadron  shall  happen  to 
be  overcharged  or  distressed,  the  next  squadron,  or 
ships,  are  immediately  to  make  towards  their  relief 
and  assistance. 

And  if  any  ship  shall  be  necessitated  to  bear 
away  from  the  enemy,  to  stop  a  leak,  or  mend  what 
is  amiss  (which  cannot  otherwise  be  repaired),  he 
is  to  put  a  pennant  on  the  mizen  peak,  or  ensign 
staff,  whereby  the  rest  of  that  ship's  squadron  may 
have  notice  what  it  is  for. 

If  the  admiral  or  any  flagship  should  be  so, 
then  the  ships  of  the  fleet,  or  of  the  respective 
squadrons,  are  to  endeavour  to  get  up  as  close  into 
a  line  between  him  and  the  enemy  as  they  can  ; 
having  always  an  eye  to  defend  him  in  case  the 
enemy  should  come  to  annoy  him  in  that  con- 
dition. 

And  in  case  any  flagship,  or  any  other  ship  in 
the  fleet,  shall  be  forced  to  go  out  of  the  line,  for 
stopping  of  leaks,  or  repairing  of  any  other  defect, 
then  the  next  immediate  ships  are  forthwith  to 
endeavour  to  close  the  line  again,  either  by  making 
or  shortening  sail,  or  by  such  other  ways  and  means 

M 


1 62         THE    THIRD  DUTCH   WAR 

as  they  shall  find  most  convenient  for  doing  of  it  ; 
and  all  the  small  craft  shall  come  in  to  that  ship's 
assistance,  upon  a  signal  made  of  her  being  dis- 
abled. 

And  if  any  of  the  chief  flagships,  or  other  flag- 
ships shall  happen  to  be  so  much  disabled  as  that 
they  shall  be  unfit  for  present  service,  in  such  a 
case  any  chief  flag  officer  may  go  on  board  any 
other  ship  of  his  own  squadron,  as  he  shall  judge 
most  convenient ;  and  any  other  flag  officer,  in 
that  case,  may  go  on  board  any  ship  in  his  divi- 
sion.1 

Instruction  XXIII.2  In  case  of  fight,  none  of 
his  majesty's  ships  shall  chase  beyond  sight  of  the 
admiral ;  and  at  night  all  chasing  ships  are  to  return 
to  the  fleet. 

Instruction  XXIV.3  If  any  engagement  by  day 
shall  continue  till  night,  and  the  admiral  shall  please 
to  anchor,  all  the  fleet  are,  upon  a  signal,  to  anchor, 
in  as  good  order  as  may  be,  which  signal  will  be  the 
same  as  in  the  '  Instructions  for  Sailing'  (vid.  Instr. 
XVIII.) ;  that  is  to  say,  the  admiral  fires  two  guns, 
a  small  distance  one  from  another,  &c. 

1  The  Admiralty  MS.  has  the  Observation  :  '  In  changing 
ships  be  as  careful  as  you  can  not  to  give  the  enemy  any 
advantage  or  knowledge  thereof  by  striking  the  flag.  In  case  of 
the  death  of  any  flag  officer,  the  flag  to  be  continued  aloft  till  the 
fight  be  over,  notice  to  be  given  to  the  next  commander-in-chief, 
and  not  to  bear  out  of  the  line  unless  in  very  great  danger.  It 
hath  been  observed  what  very  great  encouragement  the  bare 
shooting  of  an  admiral's  flag  gives  the  enemy,  but  this  may  be 
prevented  by  taking  in  all  the  flags  before  going  to  engage.  It 
was  the  ruin  of  Spragge  in  the  battle  of  August  '73  by  taking  his 
flag  in  his  boat,  which  gave  the  enemy  an  opportunity  to  discover 
his  motion,  when  at  the  same  [time]  we  saw  three  flags  flying  on 
board  the  main  topmast-head  of  three  ships  which  Tromp  had 
quitted.' 

z  Admiralty  MS.  No.  31. 

3  Admiralty  MS.  Nos.  32  and  33. 


DUKE   OF   YORK,    1673  163 

And  if  the  admiral  please  to  retreat  without 
anchoring,  then  he  will  fire  four  guns,  one  after 
another,  so  as  the  report  may  only  be  distinguished  ; 
and  about  three  minutes  after  he  will  do  the  like 
with  four  guns  more.1 

1  The  Admiralty  MS.  has  the  Observation  :  f  By  reason  that 
guns  are  not  so  well  to  be  distinguished  at  the  latter  end  of  a 
battle  from  those  of  the  enemy,  sky-rockets  would  be  proper 
signals.'  This  appears  to  be  the  earliest  recorded  suggestion  for 
the  use  of  rockets  for  naval  signalling. 


M  2 


1 64        THE    THIRD  DUTCH   WAR 


II 
MEDITERRANEAN    ORDERS,    1678 

INTRODUCTORY 

IN  1677  Narbrough  had  been  sent  for  the 
second  time  as  commander-in-chief  to  the  Medi- 
terranean, to  deal  with  the  Barbary  corsairs.  To 
enable  him  to  operate  more  effectively  against 
Tripoli,  arrangements  were  on  foot  to  establish  a 
base  for  him  at  Malta,  and  meanwhile  he  had  been 
using  the  Venetian  port  of  Zante.  It  was  at  this 
time  that  Charles  II,  in  a  last  effort  to  throw  off  the 
yoke  of  Louis  XIV,  had  married  his  eldest  niece,  the 
Princess  Mary,  to  the  French  king's  arch-enemy 
William  of  Orange,  and  relations  between  France 
and  England  were  at  the  highest  tension.  Pre- 
parations were  set  on  foot  in  the  British  dockyards 
for  equipping  a  '  grand  fleet '  of  eighty  sail  ;  on 
February  15  was  issued  a  new  and  enlarged  com- 
mission to  Narbrough  making  him  '  admiral  of  his 
majesty's  fleet  in  the  Straits ' ;  Sicily,  which  the 
French  had  occupied,  was  hurriedly  evacuated  ; 
Duquesne,  who  commanded  the  Toulon  squadron, 
was  expecting  to  be  attacked  at  any  moment,  and 
Colbert  gave  him  strict  orders  to  keep  out  of  the 
British  admiral's  way.1 

1  Corbett,  England  in  the  Mediterranean,  ii.  97-104.  The 
official  correspondence  will  be  found  in  Mr.  Tanner's  Calendar  of 
the  Pepys  MSS.,  vol.  i.,  and  in  the  Lettres  de  Colbert,  vol.  iii. 


NARBROUGH,    1678  165 

It  will  be  seen  that  it  was  in  virtue  of  his  new 
commission,  and  in  expectation  of  encountering  a 
superior  French  force,  that  Narbrough  issued  his 
orders,  and  they  may  be  profitably  compared  with 
those  of  Lord  Sandwich  on  the  eve  of  the  Second 
Dutch  War  as  the  typical  Fighting  Instructions  for 
a  small  British  fleet.  No  collision  however  occurred  ; 
for  Louis  could  not  face  the  threatened  coalition 
between  Spain,  Holland,  and  England,  and  was 
forced  to  assent  to  a  general  peace,  which  was  signed 
at  Nymwegen  in  the  following  September. 


SIR  JOHN  NARBROUGH,    1678. 
[Egerton  MSS.  2543,  f.  239.] 

Sir  John  Narbrougk,  Knight,  admiral  of  his 
majesty's  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean  seas  for 
this  expedition. 

Instructions  for  all  commanders  to  place  their  ships 
for  their  better  fighting  and  securing  the  whole 
fleet  if  a  powerful  enemy  sets  upon  us. 

When  I  hoist  my  union  flag  at  the  mizen  peak, 
I  would  have  every  commander  in  this  fleet  place 
himself  in  order  of  sailing  and  battle  as  prescribed, 
observing  his  starboard  and  larboard  ship  and  leader, 
either  sailing  before  or  by  the  wind,  and  so  continue 
sailing  in  order  so  long  as  the  signal  is  abroad. 

In  case  a  powerful  squadron  of  ships  falls  with 
our  fleet,  and  will  fight  us,  and  we  see  it  most 
convenient  to  fight  before  the  wind,  and  the  enemy 
follow  us,  I  would  have  every  commander  place  his 
ships  in  this  order  of  sailing  prescribed  as  followeth, 
and  so  continue  sailing  and  fighting,  doing  his 
utmost  to  annoy  the  enemy,  so  long  as  shall  be 
required  for  defence  of  himself  and  whole  fleet. 


- 

o  .  ^ 

, 


1 66        THE    THIRD  DUTCH   WAR 

Larboard  side.     Portsmouth  frigate. 
Newcastle  frigate. 

Samuel  and  Henry         ...  30 

Advice  ......  20 

Diamond. 

Friendship     .         .         .         .         .  12 

Lion       ......  20 

Bonaventure  .         .         .         .         .  1 1 

John  and  Joseph  io 

Pearl  frigate. 

Return  ......  io 

Benjamin  and  Elizabeth         .         .  14 

Concord         .....  26 

Fountain        .....  8 

Leopard                  ....  20 

Boneto  sloop,  Baltam'.1 

Plymouth,  Admiral. 

Spragge  frigate,  Batchelor.1 

St.  Lucar  Merchant       ...  20 

Prosperous     .....  30 

Sapphire  frigate. 

Mary  and  Martha ....  30 

Delight          .....  9 

Olive  Branch          .         .         .         .  io 

Italian  Merchant    ....  30 

Tiger 30 

James  galley. 

Dragon          .         .         .         .         .  18 

Samuel  and  Mary  ....  24 

Mediterranean       .         .         .         .  16 

James  Merchant    ....  20 
King-fisher  frigate. 

Starboard  side.     Portland  frigate. 

1  Neither  Baltimore  nor  Batchelor  nor  any  similar  names  of 
commissioned  officers  occur  in  Pepys's  Navy  List,  1660-88. 
Tanner,  op.  cit. 


NARBROUGH,    1678  167 

In  case  the  enemy  be  to  leeward  of  us,  and 
force  us  to  fight  by  the  wind,  then  I  would  have 
each  ship  in  this  fleet  to  follow  each  other  in  a  line 
as  afore  prescribed,  either  wing  leading  the  van  as 
the  occasion  shall  require. 

In  case  I  would  have  the  van  to  tack  first  (in 
time  of  service)  I  will  spread  the  union  flag  at  the 
flagstaff  at  the  fore  topmast-head,  and  if  I  would 
have  the  rear  of  the  fleet  to  tack  first  I  will  spread 
the  union  flag  at  the  flagstaff  at  the  mizen  topmast- 
head,  each  commander  being  [ready]  to  take  notice 
of  the  said  signals,  and  to  act  accordingly,  following 
each  other  as  prescribed,  and  be  careful  to  assist 
and  relieve  any  that  is  in  necessity. 

In  case  of  separation  by  foul  weather,  or  by 
any  inevitable  accident,  and  the  wind  blows  hard 
westerly,  then  Zante  Road  is  the  place  appointed  for 
rendezvous. 

Given  under  my  hand  and  on  board  his 
majesty's  ship  Plymouth,  at  an  anchor  in  Zante 
Road. 

This  4th  of  May,  1678. 

JOHN  NARBROUGH. 


1 68        THE    THIRD  DUTCH   WAR 


III 
THE    LAST   STUART   ORDERS 

INTRODUCTORY 

THE  next  set  of  orders  we  have  are  those  drawn 
up  by  George  Legge,  first  Lord  Dartmouth,  for 
the  fleet  with  which  he  was  entrusted  by  James  II, 
to  prevent  the  landing  of  William  of  Orange  in 
1688.  The  only  known  copy  of  them  is  in  the 
Sloane  MSS.  3650.  It  is  unfortunately  not  com- 
plete, the  last  few  articles  with  the  date  and  signa- 
ture being  missing,  so  that  there  is  no  direct 
evidence  that  it  related  to  this  fleet.  There  can 
however  be  no  doubt  about  the  matter.  For  it  is 
followed  by  the  battle  order  of  a  fleet  in  which  both 
ships  and  captains  correspond  exactly  with  that 
which  Dartmouth  commanded  in  1688.  The  only 
other  fleet  which  he  commanded  was  that  which  in 
1683  proceeded  to  the  Straits  to  carry  out  the 
evacuation  of  Tangier,  and  it  was  not  large  enough 
to  require  such  a  set  of  instructions. 

We  know  moreover  that  in  this  year  he  did 
actually  draw  up  some  Fighting  Instructions,  shortly 
after  September  24,  the  day  his  commission  was 
signed,  and  that  he  submitted  them  to  King  James 
for  approval.  On  October  14  Pepys,  in  the  course 
of  a  long  official  letter  to  him  from  the  admiralty, 
writes  :  '  His  majesty,  upon  a  very  deliberate  perusal 
of  your  two  papers,  one  of  the  divisions  of  your  fleet 
and  the  other  touching  your  line  of  battle,  does 


LORD   DARTMOUTH,    1688          169 

extremely  approve  the  same,  commanding  me  to 
tell  you  so.'1 

Lord  Dartmouth's  articles  follow  those  which 
James  had  last  drawn  up  in  1673  almost  word  for 
word,  and  the  only  alterations  of  any  importance  all 
refer  to  the  handling  of  the  line  in  action.  There 
can  be  practically  no  doubt  therefore  that  we  here 
have  the  instructions  which  Pepys  refers  to,  and 
that  the  new  matter  relating  to  the  line  of  battle 
originated  with  Dartmouth,  as  the  result  of  a 
considerable  experience  of  naval  warfare.  After 
leaving  Cambridge  he  joined,  at  the  age  of  17,  the 
ship  of  his  cousin,  Sir  Edward  Spragge,  and  served 
with  him  as  a  volunteer  and  lieutenant  throughout 
the  Second  Dutch  War.  In  1667,  before  he  was  20, 
he  commanded  the  Pembroke,  and  in  1671  the  Fair- 
fax, in  Sir  Robert  Holmes's  action  with  the  Dutch 
Smyrna  fleet,  and  in  the  battle  of  Solebay.  In 
1673  he  commanded  the  Royal  Catherine  (84),  and 
served  throughout  Rupert's  campaign  with  distinc- 
tion. Since  then,  as  has  been  said,  he  had  success- 
fully conducted  the  evacuation  of  Tangier.  If  on 
this  occasion  he  needed  advice  he  had  at  hand  some 
of  the  best,  in  the  person  of  his  flag  officers,  Sir 
Roger  Strickland  and  Sir  John  Berry,  two  of  the 
most  seasoned  old  '  tarpaulins '  in  the  service,  and 
both  in  high  estimation  as  naval  experts  with 
James. 

The  amendments  introduced  into  these  instruc- 
tions, although  not  extensive,  point  to  a  continued 
development.  We  note  first  that  James's  Articles 
3  and  4  are  combined  in  Dartmouth's  Article  3, 
so  as  to  ensure  the  close-hauled  line  being  formed 
before  any  attempt  is  made  to  divide  the  enemy's 
fleet.  No  such  provision  existed  in  the  previous 

1  Dartmouth  MSS.    (Historical  MSS.  Commission,    XI.   v. 
1 60.) 


1 70        THE   THIRD  DUTCH   WAR 

instructions.  Another  noteworthy  change  under 
the  new  article  is  that,  whether  by  intention  or  not, 
any  commander  of  a  ship  is  given  the  initiative  in 
weathering  a  part  of  the  enemy's  fleet  if  he  sees 
an  opportunity.  If  this  was  seriously  intended  it 
seems  to  point  to  a  reaction  to  the  school  of  Monck 
and  Rupert,  perhaps  under  Spragge's  influence. 
Dartmouth's  next  new  article,  No.  5,  for  reforming 
line  of  battle  as  convenient,  regardless  of  the 
prescribed  order  of  battle,  points  in  the  same 
direction. 

The  only  other  change  of  importance  is  the  note 
inserted  in  the  sixth  article,  in  which  Dartmouth  lays 
his  finger  on  one  of  the  weak  points  in  James's 
method  of  attack  from  windward  by  bearing  down 
all  together,  and  suggests  a  means  by  which  the 
danger  of  being  raked  as  the  ships  come  down  may 
be  minimised. 


LORD  DARTMOUTH,  Oct.  1688. 
[Sloane  MSS.  3650,  ff.  7-11.] 

George,  Lord  Dartmouth,  admiral  of  his  majesty's 
fleet  for  the  present  expedition. 

Instructions  for  the  better  ordering  his  majesty  s fleet 
in  flghting. 

i  and  2.  [Same  as  in  Duke  of  York's,  1673.] 
3.  If  the  enemy  have  the  wind  of  his  majesty's 
fleet,  and  come  to  fight  them,  the  commanders  of 
his  majesty's  ships  shall  endeavour  to  put  them- 
selves into  one  line  as  close  upon  a  wind  as  they 
can  lie,  according  to  the  order  of  battle  given,  until 
such  time  as  they  shall  see  an  opportunity  by  gain- 
ing their  wakes  to  divide  the  enemy's  fleet,  &c. 
\rest  as  in  Article  3  of  1673]. 


LORD  DARTMOUTH,    1688          171 

4.  [Same  as  5  of  1673.]  l 

5.  If  the  admiral  should  have  the  wind  of  the 
enemy,  when  other  ships  of  the  fleet  are  in  the  wind 
of  the  admiral,  then  upon  hoisting  up  a  blue  flag  at 
the  mizen  yard  or  mizen  topmast,  every  such  ship  is 
to    bear   up  into  his  wake  or  grain  upon  pain  of 
severe  punishment.     In  this  case,  whether  the  line 
hath  been  broke  or  disordered  by  the  shifting  of  the 
wind,  or  otherwise,  each  ship  or  division  are  not 
unreasonably  to  strive  for  their  proper  places  in  the 
first  line  of  battle  given,  but  they  are  to  form  a  line, 
the  best  that  may  be  with  the  admiral,  and  with   all 
the   expedition    that  can    be,    not    regarding  what 
place  or  division  they  fall  into  or  between. 

.  If  the  admiral  be  to  leeward  of  the  enemy,  &c. 
[rest  as  in  6  of  1673]. 

6.  In  case  his  majesty's  fleet  have  the  wind  of 
the  enemy,  and  that  the  enemy  stands  towards  them 
and  they  towards  the  enemy,  then  the  van  of  his 
majesty's  fleet  shall  keep  the  wind,  and  when  they  are 
come  at  a  convenient  distance  from  the  enemy's  rear 
they  shall  stay  until  their  own  whole  line  is  come  up 
within  the  same  distance  from  the  enemy's  van  ;  and 
then  the  whole  line  is  to  tack,  every  ship  in  his  own 
place,  and  to  bear  down  upon  them  so  nigh  as  they 
can  without  endangering  the  loss  of  the  wind — [Note 
that  they  are  not  to  bear  down  all  at  once,  but  to 
observe  the  working  of  the  admiral  and  to  bring  to 
as  often  as  he  thinks  fit,  the  better  to  bring  his  fleet 
to   fight  in  good  order ;  and   at  last  only  to  lask 
away 2  when  they  come  near  within  shot  towards  the 
enemy  as  much  as  may  be,  and  not  bringing  their 
heads  to  bear  against  the  enemy's  broadsides] — and 
to  stand  along  with  them  the  same  tacks  on  board, 

1  Article  4  of  1673  is  omitted,  being  included  in  Article  3  above. 

2  To  sail  with  a  quartering  wind.     Morogues  urged  this  pre- 
caution a  century  later  (Tactique  Navale,  p.  209). 


172        THE    THIRD  DUTCH    WAR 

still  keeping  the  enemy  to  leeward,  and  not  suffering 
them  to  tack  in  their  van.  And  in  case  the  enemy 
tack  in  the  rear  first,  he  who  is  in  the  rear  of  his 
majesty's  fleet  is  to  tack  first  with  as  many  ships  or 
divisions  as  are  those  of  the  enemy's,  and  if  all  the 
enemy's  ships  tack,  their  whole  line  is  to  follow, 
standing  along  with  the  same  tacks  aboard  as  the 
enemy  doth. 

7  to  9.  [Same  as  8  to  10  of  1673.] 

10.  [Same  as  n  of  1673,  but  with  yellow  flag 
instead  of  red.~\ 

11.  When    the  admiral  would   have   the  other 
divisions  to  make  more  sail,  though  himself  shorten 
sail,  a  white  ensign  shall  be  put  on  the  ensign  staff 
for  the  vice-admiral,  a  blue  for  the  rear,  and  for  both 
a  striped. 

12.  As  soon  as  the  fleet  shall  see  the  admiral 
engage  or  make  a  signal  by  putting  out  a  red  flag 
on  the  fore  topmast-head,  each  division  shall  take 
the  best  advantage  they  can  to  engage  the  enemy, 
according  to  such  order  of  battle  as  shall  be  given 
them,  and  no  ship  or  division  whatsoever  is  upon 
any  pretence  to  lie  by  to  fight  or  engage  the  enem'y 
whereby  to  endanger  parting  the  main  body  of  the 
fleet  till  such  time  as  the  whole  line  be  brought  to 
fight  by  this  signal. 

13  to  18.  [Same  as  14  to  19  of  1673.] 

1 8.  The  several  commanders  in  the  fleet  are  to 
take  special  care,  upon  pain  of  severe  punishment, 
that  they  fire  not  over  any  of  their  own  ships. 

19.  [Same  as  20  0/1673.] 

20.  The  fireships  in  their  several  divisions  are 
to  endeavour  to  keep  the  wind,  and  they  with  the 
small  frigates  to  be  as  near  the  great  ships  as  they 
can,  attending  the  signal  and  acting  accordingly. 

21.  [_Same  as  22  of  1673. J1 

1  The  MS.  ends  abruptly  in  the  middle  of  this  article. 


PART  VII 
WILLIAM    III  AND  ANNE 

I.     RUSSELL,  1691 
II.     ROOKE,  1703 


LORD   TORRINGTON,   TOURVILLE 
AND    HOSTE 

INTRODUCTORY 

No  one  document  probably  possesses  so  much 
importance  for  the  history  of  naval  tactics  as  the 
instructions  issued  by  Admiral  Russell  in  1691. 
Yet  it  is  a  remarkable  thing  that  their  tenour  was 
unknown — indeed  their  existence  was  wholly  unsus- 
pected— until  a  copy  of  them  was  happily  discovered 
in  Holland  by  Sir  William  Laird  Clowes.  By  him 
it  was  presented  to  the  United  Service  Institution, 
and  the  thanks  of  the  Society  are  due  to  him  and  the 
Institution  that  these  instructions  are  now  at  last 
available  for  publication. 

They  form  part  of  a  complete  printed  set  of 
Fleet  Instructions,  entitled  '  Instructions  made  by  the 
Right  Honourable  Edward  Russell,  admiral,  in  the 
year  1691,  for  the  better  ordering  of  the  fleet  in 
sailing  by  day  and  night,  and  in  fighting.'  Besides 
the  Fighting  Instructions  we  have  a  full  set  of  signals 
both  for  day  and  night  properly  indexed,  instructions 
for  sailing  in  a  fog,  instructions  to  be  observed  by 
younger  captains  to  the  elder,  instructions  for 
masters,  pilots,  ketches,  hoys,  and  smacks  attend- 
ing the  fleet,  and  the  usual  instructions  for  the 
encouragement  of  captains  and  companies  of  fire- 
ships,  small  frigates  and  ketches.  Now  this  is  the 
precise  form  in  which  all  fleet  instructions  were 
issued,  with  scarcely  any  alteration,  up  to  the  con- 
clusion of  the  War  of  American  Independence,1  and 
1  See  Introductory  Note  to  Rooke's  Instructions  of  1703,  p.  197. 


176        WILLIAM  III  AND  ANNE 

the  peculiar  importance  of  this  set  of  articles  there- 
fore is,  that  in  them  we  have  the  first  known 
example  of  those  stereotyped  Fighting  Instructions 
to  which,  as  all  modern  writers  seem  agreed,  was 
due  the  alleged  decadence  of  naval  tactics  in  the 
eighteenth  century. 

This  being  so,  they  clearly  demand  the  most 
careful  consideration.  '  The  English,'  says  Captain 
Mahan  in  his  latest  discussion  of  the  subject,  '  in 
the  period  of  reaction  which  succeeded  the  Dutch 
Wars  produced  their  own  caricature  of  systematised 
tactics,' l  and  this  may  be  taken  as  well  representing 
the  current  judgment.  But  when  we  come  to  study 
minutely  these  orders  of  Russell,  and  to  study  them 
in  the  light  of  the  last  of  the  Duke  of  York's  and  the 
observations  thereon  in  the  Admiralty  Manuscript, 
as  well  as  of  the  views  of  the  great  French  admirals 
of  the  time,  we  may  well  doubt  whether  the  judg- 
ment does  not  require  modification.  We  may  doubt, 
that  is,  whether  Russell's  orders,  so  far  from  being 
a  caricature  of  what  had  gone  before,  were  not 
rather  a  sagacious  attempt  to  secure  that  increase 
of  manoeuvring  power  and  squadronal  control 
which  had  been  found  essential  to  any  real  advance 
in  tactics. 

In  the  first  place,  after  noting  that  these 
instructions  begin  logically  with  two  articles  for  the 
formation  of  line  ahead  and  abreast,  we  are  struck 
by  this  disappearance  of  the  Duke  of  York's  article 
relating  to  'dividing  the  enemy's  fleet.'  It  is 
certainly  to  this  disappearance  that  is  mainly  due  the 
belief  that  the  new  instructions  were  retrograde. 
The  somewhat  hasty  conclusion  is  generally  drawn 
that  the  manoeuvre  of  '  breaking  the  line '  had  been 
introduced  during  the  Dutch  Wars,  and  forgotten 
immediately  afterwards.  But,  as  we  have  already 
1  Types  of  Naval  Officer s>  p.  15. 


CAUSE   OF  THE  REACTION       177 

seen,  the  Duke  of  York's  article  can  hardly  be  con- 
strued as  embodying  the  principle  of  concentration 
by  '  breaking  the  line,'  and  '  containing.'  As  we 
know,  it  only  applied  to  an  attack  from  the  leeward 
which  the  English,  and  indeed  every  power  up  to 
that  time,  did  all  they  knew  to  avoid,  and  it  cannot 
safely  be  assumed  to  mean  anything  more  than  a 
device  for  gaining  the  wind  of  part  of  the  enemy 
when  you  cannot  weather  his  whole  fleet ;  while  the 
4  containing '  was  intended  to  prevent  the  enemy's 
concentrating  on  the  squadron  that  performed  the 
manoeuvre.  Now,  although  Russell's  instructions 
lay  down  no  rule  for  isolating  and  containing,  they 
do  provide  three  new  and  distinct  articles  by  which 
the  admiral  can  do  so  if  he  sees  fit.  Under  the 
Duke  of  York's  instructions,  it  will  be  remembered, 
it  was  left  to  the  van  commander  to  execute  the 
manoeuvre  of  dividing  the  enemy's  fleet  as  he  saw 
his  opportunity,  and  under  those  of  Lord  Dart- 
mouth it  was  left  apparently  to  '  any  commander.' 
With  all  that  can  be  said  for  leaving  the  greatest 
possible  amount  of  initiative  to  individual  officers, 
such  a  system  can  hardly  be  called  satisfactory,  and 
in  any  case  so  important  a  movement  ought  cer- 
tainly to  be  as  far  as  possible  under  the  control  of 
the  commander-in-chief.  But  under  the  previous 
instructions  he  could  not  even  initiate  it  by  signal. 
The  defect  had  already  been  seen,  and  it  will  be 
remembered  that  the  additions  and  observations 
to  this  and  the  following  articles  which  the 
Admiralty  Manuscript  contains  are  all  directed  to 
remedying  the  omission.  It  is  to  exactly  the  same 
end  that  Russell's  orders  seem  designed,  and  if,  as 
we  shall  see  to  be  most  probable,  they  were  really 
drawn  up  by  Lord  Torrington,  we  know  that  they 
were  used  in  this  way  at  Beachy  Head.  Whether 
the  idea  of  concentration  and  containing  was  in  the 

N 


1 78         WILLIAM  III  AND  ANNE 

mind  of  their  author  we  cannot  tell  for  certain,  but 
at  any  rate  the  new  instructions  provide  signals  by 
which  the  admiral  can  order  such  movements  not 
only  by  any  squadron,  but  even  by  any  subdivision 
he  pleases.  The  freedom  of  individual  initiative  it 
is  true  is  gone,  but  this,  as  the  Admiralty  MS. 
indicates,  was  done  deliberately,  not  as  a  piece  of 
reactionary  pedantry,  but  as  the  result  of  experience 
in  battle.  I  nail  other  respects  the  tactical  flexibility 
that  was  gained  is  obvious,  and  was  fully  displayed 
in  the  first  engagements  in  which  the  instructions 
were  used. 

So  far  as  we  can  judge,  the  current  view  at  this 
time  was  that  where  fleets  were  equal,  every  known 
form  of  concentration  was  unadvisable  upon  an 
unshaken  enemy.  The  methods  of  the  Duke  of 
York's  school  were  regarded  as  having  failed,  and 
the  result  appears  to  have  been  to  convince 
tacticians  that  with  the  means  at  their  disposal  a 
strict  preservation  of  the  line  gave  a  sure  advantage 
against  an  enemy  who  attempted  an  attack  by  con- 
centration. Tactics,  in  fact,  in  accordance  with  a 
sound  and  inevitable  law,  having  tended  to  become 
too  recklessly  offensive,  were  exhibiting  a  reaction 
to  the  defensive.  If  the  enemy  had  succeeded  in 
forming  his  line,  it  had  come  to  be  regarded  as  too 
hazardous  to  attempt  to  divide  his  fleet  unless  you 
had  first  forced  a  gap  by  driving  ships  out  of  the  line. 
This  idea  we  see  reflected  in  the  6th  paragraph  of  the 
Duke  of  York's  twenty-second  article  (1673)  and  in 
Russell's  new  twenty-third  article,  enjoining  ships 
to  close  up  any  gap  that  may  have  been  caused  by  the 
next  ahead  or  astern  having  been  forced  out  of  the 
line  Briefly  stated,  it  may  be  said  that  the  pre- 
occupation of  naval  tactics  was  now  not  so  much  to 
break  the  enemy's  line,  as  to  prevent  your  own  being 
broken. 


HOSTE'S    TREATISE  179 

But  the  matter  did  not  end  here.  It  was  seen 
that  when  your  own  fleet  was  superior,  concentra- 
tion was  still  practicable  in  various  ways,  and 
particularly  by  doubling.  Tacticians  were  now 
mainly  absorbed  in  working  out  this  form  of  attack 
and  the  methods  of  meeting  it,  and  Russell's 
elaborate  articles  for  handling  squadrons  and  sub- 
divisions independently  may  well  have  had  this 
intention. 

The  new  phase  of  tactical  opinion  is  that  which 
we  find  expounded  in  Pere  Hoste's  famous  work, 
U  Art  des  armies  navales,  ou  Traitt  des  Evolutions 
navales,  published  in  1697  at  the  instigation  of  the 
Comte  de  Tourville.  The  author  was  a  Jesuit,  but 
claims  that  he  is  merely  giving  the  result  of  his 
experience  while  serving  with  the  great  French 
admirals  of  that  time,  who  had  learned  all  they 
knew  either  as  allies  or  enemies  of  the  English. 
1  For  twelve  years,'  he  says  in  his  apology  for 
touching  naval  subjects,  '  I  have  had  the  honour  of 
serving  with  Monsieur  le  Marechal  d'Estrees,  Mon- 
sieur le  Due  de  Mortemart,  and  Monsieur  le 
Marechal  de  Tourville  in  all  the  expeditions  they 
made  in  command  of  naval  fleets  ;  and  Monsieur  le 
Marechal  de  Tourville  has  been  kind  enough  to 
communicate  to  me  his  lights,  bidding  me  write  on 
a  matter  which  I  think  has  never  before  been  the 
subject  of  a  treatise.' 

The  whole  system  of  tactics  that  he  develops  is 
based,  like  Russell's,  on  the  single  line  ahead  and 
the  independent  action  of  squadrons.  The  passages 
in  which  he  elaborates  the  central  battle  idea  of 
concentration  by  doubling  are  as  follows :  '  The 
fleet  which  is  the  more  numerous  will  try  to  extend 
on  the  enemy  in  such  a  manner  as  to  leave  its 
rearmost  ships  astern,  which  will  immediately  turn 
[se  repliera]  upon  the  enemy  to  double  him,  and 


180        WILLIAM  III  AND  ANNE 

put  him  between  two  fires.  Remark  L — If  the 
more  numerous  fleet  has  the  wind  it  will  be  able 
more  easily  to  turn  its  rear  upon  that  of  the  enemy, 
and  put  him  between  two  fires.  But  if  the  more 
numerous  fleet  is  to  leeward  it  ought  none  the  less 
to  leave  its  rear  astern,  because  the  wind  may  shift 
in  the  fight.  Besides,  the  fleet  that  is  to  leeward 
can  edge  away  insensibly  in  fighting  to  give  its 
rearmost  ships  a  chance  of  doubling  on  the  enemy 
by  hugging  the  wind.  Remark  II. — I  know  that 
many  skilful  people  are  persuaded  that  you  ought 
to  double  the  enemy  ahead  ;  because,  if  the  van  of 
the  enemy  is  once  in  disorder  it  falls  on  the  rest  of 
the  fleet  and  throws  it  infallibly  into  confusion.' 
And  by  the  aid  of  diagrams  he  proceeds  to  show 
that  this  view  is  unsound,  because  the  van  can 
easily  avoid  the  danger  while  the  rear  cannot  To 
support  his  view  he  instances  the  entire  success 
with  which  at  the  battle  of  La  Hogue,  Russell, 
having  the  superior  fleet,  doubled  on  Tourville's  rear. 
'  To  prevent  being  doubled,'  he  proceeds,  '  you 
must  absolutely  prevent  the  enemy  from  leaving 
ships  astern  of  you,  and  to  that  end  you  may  adopt 
several  devices  when  you  are  much  inferior  in 
number. 

'I.  If  we  have  the  wind  we  may  leave  some  of 
the  enemy's  leading  ships  alone,  and  cause  our  van 
to  fall  on  their  second  division.  In  this  manner 
their  first  division  will  be  practically  useless,  and  if 
it  forces  sail  to  tack  upon  us  it  will  lose  much  time, 
and  will  put  itself  in  danger  of  being  isolated  by  the 
calm  which  generally  befalls  in  this  sort  of  action  by 
reason  of  the  great  noise  of  the  guns.  We  may 
also  leave  a  great  gap  in  the  centre  of  our  fleet, 
provided  the  necessary  precautions  be  taken  to 
prevent  our  van  being  cut  off.  By  these  means, 
however  inferior  we  be  in  numbers,  we  may  prevent 


HOSTRS   TREATISE  181 

the  enemy  leaving  ships  astern  of  us.  Example. — 
Everyone  did  not  disapprove  the  manner  in  which 
Admiral  Herbert  disposed  his  fleet  when  he  engaged 
the  French  in  the  action  of  Bevesier  [i.e.  Beachy 
Head]  in  the  year  1690.  He  had  some  ships  fewer 
than  ours,  and  he  had  determined  to  make  his  chief 
effort  against  our  rear.  That  is  why  he  ordered  the 
Dutch  leading  division  to  fall  on  our  second  division. 
Then  he  opened  his  fleet  in  the  centre,  leaving  a 
great  gap  opposite  our  centre.  After  which,  having 
closed  up  the  English  to  very  short  intervals,  he 
opposed  them  to  our  rear,  and  held  off  somewhat 
with  his  own  division  so  as  to  prevent  the  French 
profiting  by  the  gap  which  he  had  left  in  his  fleet  to 
double  the  Dutch.  This  order  rendered  our  first 
division  nearly  useless,  because  it  had  to  make  a  very 
long  board  to  tack  on  the  enemy's  van,  and  the 
wind  having  fallen,  it  was  put  to  it  to  be  in  time  to 
share  the  glory  of  the  action.1 

4  II.  If  the  less  numerous  fleet  is  to  leeward,  the 
gap  may  be  left  more  in  the  centre  and  less  in  the 
van,  but  it  is  necessary  to  have  a  small  detach- 
ment of  men-of-war  and  fireships  so  as  to  prevent 
the  enemy  profiting  by  the  gaps  in  the  fleet  to 
divide  it. 

'III.  Others  prefer  to  give  as  a  general  rule, 
that  the  flag  officers  of  the  less  numerous  fleet 
attack  the  flag  officers  of  the  enemy's  fleet ; 2  for 

1  This  plan  of  attack  bears  a  strong  resemblance  to  that  which 
Nelson  intended  to  adopt  at  Trafalgar.     '  Nelson,'  says  Captain 
Mahan,  '  doubtless  had  in  mind  the  dispositions  of  Tourville  and 
De  Ruyter.' — Life  of  Nelson,  ii.  351.      Hoste,  however,  it  would 
seem,  though  a  devout  admirer  of  both  Tourville  and  De  Ruyter, 
gives  the  credit  to   Lord   Torrington.      It  was  not  introduced 
officially  into  the  British  tactical  system  until  Lord  Howe  adopted 
it  in  1792.     It  was  retained  in  the  subsequent  Signal  Books  and 
Instructions. 

2  This  proviso  was  added  to  the  signal  in  the  edition  of  1799, 


1 82         WILLIAM  III  AND  ANNE 

by  this  means  several  of  the  enemy's  ships  remain 
useless  in  the  intervals,  and  the  enemy  cannot 
double  you. 

'  IV.  Others  prefer  that  the  three  squadrons  of 
the  less  numerous  fleet  each  attack  a  squadron 
of  the  more  numerous  fleet,  taking  care  that  each 
squadron  ranges  up  to  the  enemy  in  such  a  manner 
as  not  to  leave  any  of  his  ships  astern,  but  rather 
leaving  several  vessels  ahead. 

'  V.  Finally,  there  are  those  who  would  have  the 
less  numerous  fleet  put  so  great  an  interval  between 
the  ships  as  to  equalise  their  line  with  that  of  the 
enemy.  But  this  last  method  is,  without  doubt,  the 
least  good,  because  it  permits  the  enemy  to  employ 
the  whole  of  its  strength  against  the  less  numerous 
fleet.  I  agree,  however,  that  this  method  might  be 
preferred  to  others  in  certain  circumstances ;  as 
when  the  enemy's  ships  are  considerably  less  power- 
ful than  those  of  the  less  numerous  fleet." 

Having  thus  explained  the  system  of  doubling, 
he  proceeds  to  give  the  latest  ideas  of  his  chief  on 
breaking  the  enemy's  line,  or,  as  it  was  then  called, 
passing  through  his  fleet.  '  We  find,'  he  says,  '  that 
in  the  relations  of  the  fights  in  the  Channel  between 
the  English  and  the  Dutch  that  their  fleets  passed 
through  one  another.  ...  In  this  manner  the  two 
fleets  passed  through  one  another  several  times, 
which  exposed  them  to  be  cut  off,  taken,  and  mutu- 
ally to  lose  several  ships.  Remark. — This  manoeuvre 
is  as  bold  as  it  is  delicate,  and  consummate  technical 
skill  is  necessary  for  it  to  succeed  as  happily  as  it 
did  with  the  Comte  d'Estrees  ...  in  the  battle 
of  the  Texel,  in  the  year  1673,  for  he  passed 
through  the  Zealand  squadron,  weathered  it,  broke 


and  a  corresponding  explanatory  instruction  (No.  24)  was  provided. 
/,  p.  262. 


HOSTES   TREATISE  183 

it  up,  and  put  the  enemy  into  so  great  a  disorder 
that  it  settled  the  victory  which  was  still  in  the 
balance.' l 

After  pointing  out  by  diagrams  various  methods 
of  parrying  the  manoeuvre,  he  proceeds :  '  I  do  not 
see,  then,  that  we  need  greatly  fear  the  enemy's 
passing  through  us  ;  and  I  do  not  even  think  that 
this  manoeuvre  ought  ever  to  be  performed  except 
under  one  of  the  three  following  conditions  :  (i)  If 
you  are  compelled  to  do  it  in  order  to  avoid  a 
greater  evil ;  (2)  If  the  enemy  by  leaving  a  great 
gap  in  the  midst  of  his  squadrons  renders  a  part  of 
his  fleet  useless ;  (3)  If  several  of  his  ships  are 
disabled.  .  .  . 

'  Sometimes  you  are  compelled  to  pass  through 
the  enemy's  fleet  to  rescue  ships  that  the  enemy  has 
cut  off,  and  in  this  case  you  must  risk  something, 
but  you  should  observe  several  precautions  :  ( i )  You 
should  close  up  to  the  utmost ;  (2)  You  should  carry 
a  press  of  sail  without  troubling  to  fight  in  passing 
through  the  enemy  ;  (3)  The  ships  that  have  passed 
ought  to  tack  the  moment  they  can  to  prevent  the 
enemy  standing  off  on  the  same  tack  as  the  fleet 
that  passes  through  them.' 

It  is  clear,  then,  that  in  the  eyes  of  perhaps  the 
finest  fleet  leader  of  his  time,  and  one  of  the  finest 
France  ever  had,  a  man  who  thoroughly  understood 
the  value  of  concentration,  the  method  of  securing 
it  by  breaking  the  line  was  dangerous  and  unsound. 
In  this  he  thoroughly  endorses  the  views  contained 
in  the  4  Observations '  of  the  Admiralty  MS.  and 
the  modifications  of  the  standing  order  which  they 
suggest.  Indeed,  Hoste's  remarks  on  breaking  the 

1  It  should  be  remembered  that  neither  the  Dutch  nor  the 
English  accounts  of  the  action  at  all  endorse  this  view  of 
D'Estre'es's  behaviour.  See  also  the  Admiralty  MS.,  p.  153, 
note  i. 


1 84        WILLIAM  III  AND  ANNE 

line  are,  in  effect,  little  more  than  a  logical  elabora- 
tion of  those  ideas  and  suggestions.  In  the  '  Obser- 
vations '  we  have  the  monition  not  to  attempt  the 
manoeuvre  'unless  an  enemy  press  you  on  a  lee 
shore.'  We  have  the  signal  for  a  squadron  breaking 
the  enemy's  line,  but  only  in  order  to  rejoin  the 
main  body,  and  we  have  the  simple  method  of 
parrying  the  move  by  tacking  with  an  equal  number 
of  ships.  The  fundamental  principles  of  the  pro- 
blem in  both  the  English  and  the  French  author  are 
the  same,  and  a  comparison  of  the  two  enables  us 
to  assert,  with  no  hesitation,  that  the  manoeuvre  of 
breaking  the  line  was  abandoned  by  the  tacticians 
of  that  era,  not  from  ignorance  nor  from  lack  of 
enterprise,  but  from  a  deliberate  tactical  convic- 
tion gained  by  experience  in  war.  In  judging  the 
apparent  want  of  enterprise  which  our  own  ad- 
mirals began  to  display  in  action  at  this  time,  we 
should  probably  be  careful  to  refrain  from  joining  in 
the  unmitigated  contempt  with  which  modern  his- 
torians have  so  freely  covered  them.  In  the  typical 
battle  of  Malaga,  for  instance,  Rooke  did  nothing 
but  carry  out  the  principles  which  were  the  last 
word  of  Tourville's  brilliant  career.  Nor  must  it  be 
forgotten  that,  although  Rodney  executed  the  man- 
oeuvre in  1782,  and  Hood  provided  a  signal  for  its 
revival  which  Howe  at  first  adopted,  it  was  never 
in  much  favour  in  the  British  service,  seeing  that 
it  was  only  adapted  for  an  attack  from  to  leeward. 
The  manoeuvre  of  breaking  the  line  which  Howe 
eventually  introduced  was  something  wholly  dif- 
ferent both  in  form  and  intention  from  what  Rodney 
executed  and  from  what  was  understood  by 
'  dividing  the  fleet '  in  the  seventeenth  century.1 

How  far  the  system  of  doubling  was  approved 
by  English  admirals  is   doubtful.     We   have  seen 
1  Seeflosf,  pp.  245-9. 


DOUBLING  185 

that  an  '  Observation  '  in  the  Admiralty  Manuscript 
distrusts  it,1  but  I  have  been  able  to  find  no  other 
expression  of  opinion  on  the  point  earlier  than  1780, 
and  that  entirely  condemns  it.  It  occurs  in  a 
set  of  fleet  instructions  drawn  up  for  submission  to 
the  admiralty  by  Admiral  Sir  Charles  H.  Knowles, 
Bart.  As  Knowles  was  a  pupil  and  protegt  of 
Rodney's,  we  may  assume  he  was  in  possession  of 
the  great  tactician's  ideas  on  the  point ;  and  in  these 
Fighting  and  Sailing  Instructions  the  following 
article  occurs  :  '  To  double  the  enemy's  line — that 
is,  to  send  a  few  unengaged  ships  on  one  side  to 
engage,  while  the  rest  are  fighting  on  the  other — 
is  rendering  those  ships  useless.  Every  ship  which 
is  between  two,  has  not  only  her  two  broadsides 
opposed  to  theirs,  but  has  likewise  their  shot  which 
cross  in  her  favour.'2  No  signal  was  provided  for 
'doubling'  in  Lord  Howe's  or  the  later  signal 
books,  though  Nelson  certainly  executed  the  man- 
oeuvre at  the  Nile.  It  survived  however  in  the 
French  service,  and  the  English  books  provided 
a  signal  for  preventing  its  execution  by  a  numeri- 
cally superior  enemy.  Sir  Alexander  Cochrane  also 
revived  it  after  Trafalgar. 

Knowles's  objection  to  the  manoeuvre  makes  it 
easy  to  understand  that,  however  well  it  suited  the 
French  tactics  of  long  bowls  or  boarding,  it  was  not 
well  adapted  to  the  English  method  of  close  action 
with  the  guns.  With  the  French  service  it  cer- 
tainly continued  in  favour,  and  the  whole  of  Hoste's 
rules  were  reproduced  by  the  famous  naval  expert 
S^bastien-Frangois  Bigot,  Vicomte  de  Morogues — 
in  his  elaborate  Tactique  navale,  ou  traitt  des 

1  Ante,  p.  152,  note  i. 

2  Printed  in  1798.     A  MS.  note  says  'These  instructions  were 
written  in  1780  and  afterwards  very  much  curtailed,  though  the 
general  plan  is  the  same.' 


1 86        WILLIAM  III  AND  ANNE 

Evolutions  et  des  signaux,  which  appeared  in  1763, 
and  was  republished  at  Amsterdam  in  1779.  Not 
only  was  he  the  highest  French  authority  on  naval 
science  of  his  time,  but  a  fine  seaman  as  well,  as  he 
proved  when  in  command  of  the  Magnifique  on  the 
disastrous  day  at  Quiberon.1 

The  remainder  of  the  new  instructions,  though 
less  important  than  the  expansion  of  the  Duke  of 
York's  third  article,  all  tend  in  the  same  direction. 
So  far  from  insisting  on  a  rigid  observance  of  the 
single  line  ahead  in  all  circumstances,  the  new  system 
seems  to  aim  at  securing  flexibility,  and  the  power  of 
concentration  by  independent  action  of  squadrons. 
This  is  to  be  specially  noted  in  the  new  article, 
No.  30,  in  which  signals  are  provided  for  particular 
squadrons  and  particular  divisions  forming  line  of 
battle  abreast.  It  is  true  that  the  old  rigid  form 
of  an  attack  from  windward  is  retained,  but,  in- 
effective as  the  system  proved,  it  was  certainly  not 
inspired,  as  is  so  often  said,  by  a  mediaeval  concep- 
tion of  naval  battle  as  a  series  of  single  ship  actions. 
From  what  has  been  already  said,  the  well-consi- 
dered tactical  idea  that  underlay  it  is  obvious.  The 
injunction  to  range  the  length  of  the  enemy's  line 
van  to  van,  and  rear  to  rear,  or  vice  versa,  was  aimed 
at  avoiding  being  doubled  at  either  end  of  the  line  ; 
while  the  injunction  to  bear  down  together  was 
obviously  the  quickest  mode  of  bringing  the  whole 
fleet  into  action  without  giving  the  enemy  a  chance 
of  weathering  any  part  of  it  by  '  gaining  its  wake.' 
That  it  was  inadequate  for  this  purpose  is  well 
known.  It  would  only  work  when  the  two  fleets 
were  exactly  parallel  at  the  moment  of  bearing 
down — as  was  made  apparent  at  the  battle  of 
Malaga,  where  the  French  from  leeward  almost 

1  Lacour  Gayet,  La  marine  ntilitaire  de  la  France  sous  Louis 
XV,  1902,  pp.  214-5. 


AUTHOR   OF  THE  INSTRUCTIONS  187 

succeeded  in  dividing  Rooke's  fleet  as  it  bore  down. 
Still  the  idea  was  sound  enough.  The  trouble  was 
that  it  did  not  make  sufficient  allowance  for  the  un- 
handiness of  ships  of  the  line  in  those  days,  and 
their  difficulty  in  taking  up  or  preserving  exact 
formations. 

As  to  the  authorship  of  the  articles,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  the  mere  fact  that  they  were 
issued  by  Russell  is  not  enough  to  attribute  them 
to  him.  He  had  had  practically  no  previous  ex- 
perience as  a  flag  officer,  and  in  all  probability  they 
followed  more  or  less  closely  those  used  by  Lord 
Torrington  in  the  previous  year.  Torrington  was 
first  lord  of  the  admiralty  in  1689,  and  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  main  fleet  in  1690.  It  was  not  till 
after  his  acquittal  in  December  of  that  year  that 
he  was  superseded  by  Russell.  The  instructions 
moreover  seem  generally  to  be  designed  in  close 
accordance  with  all  we  know  of  Torrington's  tactical 
practice,  and  it  is  scarcely  doubtful  that  they  are 
due  to  his  ripe  experience  and  not  to  Russell. 

That  the  point  cannot  be  settled  with  absolute 
certainty  is  to  be  the  more  lamented  because  hence- 
forth this  set  of  Fighting  Instructions,  and  not  those 
of  Rooke  in  1 703,  must  be  taken  as  the  dominat- 
ing factor  of  eighteenth-century  tactics.  Rooke's 
instructions,  except  for  the  modification  of  a  few 
articles,  are  the  same  as  Russell's,  and  consequently 
it  has  not  been  thought  necessary  to  print  them  in 
full.  For  a  similar  reason  it  has  been  found  con- 
venient to  print  such  slight  changes  as  are  known 
to  have  been  made  in  the  standing  form  after  1703 
as  notes  to  the  corresponding  articles  of  Russell's 
instructions. 


1 88         WILLIAM  III  AND  ANNE 


ADMIRAL  EDWARD  RUSSELL,   1691. 

[From  a  printed  copy  in  the  Library  of  the  United  Service 
Institution.] 

Fighting  Instructions. 

I.  When  the  admiral  would  have  the  fleet  draw 
into   a  line  of  battle,    one  ship   ahead   of  another 
(according  to  the  method  given  to  each  captain),  he 
will  hoist  a  union  flag  at  the  mizen  peak,  and  fire  a 
gun  ;  and  every  flagship  in  the  fleet  is  to  make  the 
same  signal.1 

II.  When  the  admiral  would  have  the  fleet  draw 
into  a   line  of  battle,  one  ship  abreast  of  another 
(according   to  the  method  given  to  each  captain), 
he  will  hoist   a  union  flag  and  a  pennant   at   the 
mizen-peak,  and  fire  a  gun  ;  and  every  flagship  in 
the  fleet  is  to  do  the  same. 

III.  When  the  admiral  would  have  the  admiral 
of  the  white  and  his  whole  squadron  to  tack,  and 
endeavour  to  gain  the  wind  of  the  enemy,  he  will 
spread  a  white  flag  under  the  flag  at  the  main  top- 
mast-head, and  fire  a  gun,  which  is  to  be  answered 
by  the  flagships  in  the  fleet ;  and  when  he  would 
have  the  admiral  of  the  blue  do  the  same,  he  will 
spread  a  blue  flag  on  that  place. 

1  The  instructions  under  which  Mathews  fought  his  action  off 
Toulon  in  1744  add  here  the  words  '  and  every  ship  is  to  observe 
and  keep  the  same  distance  those  ships  do  which  are  next  the 
admiral,  always  taking  it  from  the  centre.'  They  were  a  MS. 

addition  made  by  Mathews  himself.      See  'V.  A 1   L k's 

Rejoinder  to  A 1  M ws's  Replies  '  in  a  pamphlet  entitled 

Original  Letters  and  Papers  between  Adm /  M ws  and  V. 

Adm IL k.     London,  1744,  p.  31.    From  an  undated  copy 

of  Fighting  Instructions  in  the  Admiralty  Library  we  know  that 
this  addition  was  subsequently  incorporated  into  the  standing 
form. 


RUSSELL,    1691  189 

IV.  When    the  admiral   would  have    the   vice- 
admiral    of  the    red,    and   his    division,    tack    and 
endeavour  to  gain  the  wind  of  the  enemy,  he  will 
spread  a  red  flag  from  the  cap  at  the  fore  topmast- 
head  downward  on  the  backstay.     If  he  would  have 
the  vice-admiral  of  the  white  do  the  same,  a  white 
flag ;  if  the  vice-admiral  of  the  blue,  a  blue  flag  at 
the  same  place. 

V.  When    the   admiral    would   have    the   rear- 
admiral  of  the  red  and  his  division  tack  and  endea- 
vour to  gain  the  wind  of  the  enemy,  he  will  hoist 
a  red  flag  at  the    flagstaff  at    the  mizen  topmast- 
head  ;    if  the   rear-admiral   of  the    white,    a  white 
flag ;  if  the  rear-admiral  of  the  blue,  a  blue  flag  at 
the  same  place,  and  under  the  flag  a  pennant  of  the 
same  colour. 

VI.  If  the  admiral  be  to  leeward  of  the  fleet,  or 
any  part  of  the  fleet,  and  he  would  have  them  bear 
down  into  his  wake  or  grain,  he  will  hoist  a  blue 
flag  at  the  mizen  peak. 

VII.  If  the  admiral  be  to  leeward  of  the  enemy, 
and  his  fleet,  or  any  part  of  them,  to  leeward  of  him, 
that  he  may  bring  those  ships  into  a  line,  he  will 
bear  up  with  a  blue  flag  at  the  mizen  peak  under  the 
union  flag,  which  is  the  signal  for  the  line  of  battle ; 
and  then  those  ships    to   leeward  are  to  use  their 
utmost   endeavour   to   get  into  his  wake  or  grain, 
according  to  their  stations  in  the  line  of  battle. 

VIII.  If  the  fleet  be  sailing  before  the  wind,  and 
the   admiral  would   have  the  vice-admiral  and  the 
ships  of  the  starboard  quarter  to  clap  by  the  wind, 
and  come  to  the  starboard  tack,  then  he  will  hoist 
upon  the  mizen  topmast-head  a  red   flag.     And  in 
case  he  would  have  the  rear-admiral  and  the  ships 
of  the  larboard  quarter  to  come  to  their  larboard  tack, 
then  he  will  hoist  up  a  blue  flag  at  the  same  place. 

IX.  When  the  admiral  would  have  the  van  of  the 


1 90        WILLIAM  III  AND   ANNE 

fleet  to  tack  first,  he  will  put  abroad  the  union  flag 
at  the  flagstaff  on  the  fore  topmast-head,  and  fire  a 
gun,  if  the  red  flag  be  not  abroad  ;  but  if  the  red 
flag  be  abroad,  then  the  fore  topsails  shall  be  lowered 
a  little,  and  the  union  flag  shall  be  spread  from  the 
cap  of  the  fore  topmast  downwards,  and  every  flag- 
ship in  the  fleet  is  to  do  the  same. 

X.  When   the   admiral    would   have   the    rear- 
admiral  of  the  fleet  tack  first,  he  will  hoist  the  union 
flag  on  the  flagstaff  at  the  mizen  topmast-head,  and 
fire  a  gun,  which  is  to  be  answered  by  every  flag- 
ship in  the  fleet. 

XI.  When  the  admiral  would  have  all  the  flag- 
ships in  the  fleet  come  into  his  wake  or  grain,  he 
will  hoist  a  red  flag  at  the  mizen  peak,  and  fire  a 
gun  ;  and  the  flagships  in  the  fleet  are  to  make  the 
same  signal. 

XII.  When  the  admiral  would  have  the  admiral 
of  the  white   and   his   squadron   make   more   sail, 
though  himself  shorten  sail,  he  will  hoist  a  white 
flag  on  the  ensign  staff ;  if  the  admiral  of  the  blue, 
or  he  that  commands  in  the  third  post,  a  blue  flag 
at  the  same  place  ;  and  every  flagship  in  the  fleet 
is  to  make  the  same  signal. 

XIII.  As  soon  as  the  admiral  shall  hoist  a  red 
flag  on  the  flagstaff  at  the  fore  topmast-head,  every 
ship  in  the  fleet  is  to  use  their  utmost  endeavour 
to  engage  the  enemy,  in  the  order  the  admiral  has 
prescribed  unto  them.1 

XIV.  When  the  admiral  hoisteth  a  white  flag  at 

1  The  instructions  of  1744,  as  quoted  in  the  Mathews-Lestock 
controversy,  add  here  the  words  '  and  strictly  to  take  care  not  to 
fire  before  the  signal  be  given  by  the  admiral.'  This  appears  also 
to  have  been  an  addition  made  by  Mathews  in  1744.  It  was 
clumsily  incorporated  in  the  subsequent  standing  form  thus  :  '  to 
engage  the  enemy  and  on  no  account  to  fire  before  the  admiral 
shall  make  the  signal,  in  the  order  the  admiral  has  prescribed 
unto  them.'  See  note  to  Article  I.,  supra. 


RUSSELL,    1691  191 

the  mizen  peak,  then  all  the  small  frigates  of  his 
squadron  that  are  not  in  the  line  of  battle  are  to 
come  under  his  stern. 

XV.  If  the  fleet  is  sailing  by  a  wind  in  a  line 
of  battle,  and  the  admiral  would  have  them  brace 
their  headsails  to  the  mast,  he  will  hoist  a  yellow 
flag  on  the  flagstaff  at  the  mizen  topmast-head,  and 
fire  a  gun  ;  which  the  flagships  in  the  fleet  are  to 
answer.     Then  the  ships  in  the  rear  are  to  brace  to 
first. 

XVI.  The  fleet  lying  in  aline  of  battle,  with  their 
headsails  to  the  mast,  and  if  the  admiral  would  have 
them  fill  and  stand  on,  he  will  hoist  a  yellow  flag  on 
the    flagstaff  at  the  fore  topmast-head,   and  fire  a 
gun  ;  which  the  flagships  in  the  fleet  are  to  answer. 
Then  the  ships  in  the  van  are  to  fill  first,  and  to 
stand  on.     If  it  happen,  when  this  signal  is  to  be 
made,  that  the  red  flag  is  abroad  on  the  flagstaff  at 
the  fore  topmast-head,  the  admiral  will  spread  the 
yellow  flag  under  the  red. 

XVI  I,  If  the  admiral  see  the  enemy's  fleet  stand- 
ing towards  him,  and  he  has  the  wind  of  them,  the  van 
of  the  fleet  is  make  sail  till  they  come  the  length  of 
the  enemy's  rear,  and  our  rear  abreast  of  the  enemy's 
van  ;  then  he  that  is  in  the  rear  of  our  fleet  is  to 
tack  first,  and  every  ship  one  after  another,  as  fast 
as  they  can,  throughout  the  line,  that  they  may 
engage  on  the  same  tack  with  the  enemy.  But  in 
case  the  enemy's  fleet  should  tack  in  their  rear,  our 
fleet  is  to  do  the  same  with  an  equal  number  of 
ships  ;  and  whilst  they  are  in  fight  with  the  enemy, 
to  keep  within  half  a  cable's  length  one  of  another, 
or  if  the  weather  be  bad,  according  to  the  direction 
of  the  commanders. 

When  the  admiral  would  have  the  ship  that 
leads  the  van  of  the  fleet  (or  the  headmost  ship  in 
the  fleet)  when  they  are  in  a  line  of  battle,  hoist, 


1 92         WILLIAM  III  AND   ANNE 

lower,  set  or  haul  up  any  of  his  sails,  the  admiral 
will  spread  a  yellow  flag  under  that  at  the  main  top- 
mast-head, and  fire  a  gun  ;  which  the  flagships  that 
have  flags  at  the  main  topmast-head  are  to  answer  ; 
and  those  flagships  that  have  not,  are  to  hoist  the 
yellow  flag  on  the  flagstaff  at  the  main  topmast- 
head,  and  fire  a  gun.  Then  the  admiral  will  hoist, 
lower,  set  or  haul  up  the  sail  he  would  have  the 
ship  that  leads  the  van  do. 

XVIII.  If  the  admiral  and  his  fleet  have  the  wind 
of  the  enemy,  and  they  have  stretched  themselves  in 
a  line  of  battle,  the  van  of  the  admiral's  fleet  is  to 
steer  with   the  van  of  the  enemy's   and   there   to 
engage  them. 

XIX.  Every  commander  is  to  take  care  that  his 
guns  are  not  fired  till  he  is  sure  he  can  reach  the 
enemy  upon  a  point-blank  ;  and   by  no  means    to 
suffer  his  guns  to  be  fired  over  by  any  of  our  own 
ships. 

XX.  None  of  the  ships  in  the  fleet  shall  pursue 
any  small  number  of  the  enemy's  ships  till  the  main 
body  be  disabled  or  run. 

XXI.  If  any   of  the   ships  in  the  fleet  are  in 
distress,  and  make  the  signal,  which  is  a  weft  with  the 
jack  or  ensign,  the   next  ship  to   them  is  strictly 
required  to  relieve  them. 

XXII.  If  the  admiral,  or  any  flagship,  should  be 
in  distress,  and  make  the  usual  signal,  the  ships  in  the 
fleet  are  to  endeavour  to  get  up  as  close  into  a  line, 
between  him  and  the  enemy,  as  they  can  ;  having 
always  an  eye  to  defend  him,  if  the  enemy  should 
come  to  annoy  him  in  that  condition. 

XXIII.  In  case  any  ship  in  the  fleet  should  be 
forced  to  go  out  of  the  line  to  repair  damages  she  has 
received  in  battle  the  next  ships  are  to  close  up  the 
line. 

XXIV.  If  any  flagship  be  disabled,  the  flag  may 


RUSSELL,    1691  193 

go    on    board  any   ship   of  his    own    squadron   or 
division. 

XXV.  If  the  enemy  be  put  to  the  run,  and  the 
admiral  thinks  it  convenient  the  whole  fleet  shall 
follow  them,  he  will  make  all  the  sail  he  can  himself 
after  the  enemy,  and  fire  two  guns  out  of  his  fore- 
chase  ;  then  every  ship  in  the    fleet  is  to  use   his 
best  endeavour  to  come  up  with  the  enemy,   and 
lay  them  on  board. 

XXVI.  If  the  admiral  would  have  any  particular 
flagship,  and  his  squadron,  or  division,  give  chase 
to  the  enemy,  he  will  make  the  same  signal  that  is 
appointed     for    that    flagship's    tacking    with    his 
squadron  or  division,  and  weathering  the  enemy. 

XXVII.  When   the   admiral  would  have  them 
give  over  chase,  he  will  hoist  a  white  flag  at  the  fore 
topmast-head  and  fire  a  gun. 

XXVIII.  In  case  any  ship  in  the  line  of  battle 
should  be  disabled  in  her  masts,  rigging  or  hull,  the 
ship  that  leads  ahead  of  her  shall  take  her  a-tow  and 
the  division  she  is  in  shall  make  good  the  line  with  her. 
But  the  commander  of  the  ship  so  disabled  is  not  on 
any  pretence  whatever  to  leave  his  station  till  he  has 
acquainted   his    flag   or   the  next  flag  officer  with 
the  condition  of  his  ship,  and  received  his  directions 
therein.     And  in  case  any  commander  shall  be  want- 
ing in  his  duty,  his  flag  or  the  next  flag  officer  to  him 
is  immediately  to  send  for  the  said  commander  from 
his  ship  and  appoint  another  in  his  room. 

XXIX.  If  the  admiral  would  have  any  flag  in  his 
division  or  squadron  cut  or  slip  in  the  daytime,  he 
will  make  the  same  signals  that  are  appointed  for 
those  flagships,  and  their  division  or  squadron,  to 
tack  and  weather  the  enemy,  as  is  expressed  in  the 
third,  fourth,  fifth,  and  sixth  articles  before  going. 

XXX.  When  the  admiral  would  have  the  red 
squadron  draw  into  a  line  of  battle,  abreast  of  one 

o 


194        WILLIAM  III  AND  ANNE 

another,  he  will  put  abroad  a  flag  striped  red  and 
white  on  the  flagstaff  at  the  main  topmast-head, 
with  a  pennant  under  it,  and  fire  a  gun.  If  he 
would  have  the  white  squadron,  or  those  that  have 
the  second  post  in  the  fleet,  to  do  the  like,  the  signal 
shall  be  a  flag  striped  red,  white,  and  blue,  with  a 
pennant  under  it,  at  the  aforesaid  place.  And  if  he 
would  have  the  blue  squadron  to  do  the  like  he  will 
put  on  the  said  place  a  Genoese  ensign,  together 
with  a  pennant.  But  when  he  would  have  either  of 
the  said  squadrons  to  draw  into  a  line  of  battle, 
ahead  of  one  another,  he  will  make  the  aforesaid 
signals,  without  a  pennant ;  which  signals  are  to  be 
answered  by  the  flagships  only  of  the  said  squadrons, 
and  to  be  kept  out  till  I  take  in  mine.  And  if  the 
admiral  would  have  any  vice-admiral  of  the  fleet 
and  his  division  draw  into  a  line  of  battle  as  afore- 
said, he  will  make  the  same  signals  at  the  fore  top- 
mast-head that  he  makes  for  that  squadron  at  the 
main  topmast-head.  And  for  any  rear-admiral  in 
the  fleet  and  his  division,  the  same  signals  at  the 
mizen  topmast-head ;  which  signals  are  to  be 
answered  by  the  vice-  or  rear-admiral. 


THE    PERMANENT    INSTRUCTIONS, 

1703-1783 

INTRODUCTORY 

THESE  like  Russell's  are  extracted  from  a  complete 
printed  set,  also  presented  to  the  United  Service 
Institution  by  Sir  W.  Laird  Clowes,  and  entitled, 
'  Instructions  for  the  directing  and  governing  her 
majesty's  fleet  in  sailing  and  fighting,  by  the  Right 
Honourable  Sir  George  Rooke,  Knight,  Vice- 
Admiral  of  England,  and  admiral  and  commander- 
in-chief  of  her  majesty's  fleet.  In  the  year  1703.' 
They  also  contain  all  the  other  matter  as  in 
Russell's,  while  another  copy  has  bound  with  it  all 
the  fleet  articles  of  war  under  the  hand  of  Prince 
George  of  Denmark,  then  lord  high  admiral. 

As  they  were  not  issued  till  1703,  the  second 
year  of  the  war,  in  which  Rooke  did  nothing  but 
carry  out  a  barren  cruise  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay,  we 
may  assume  that  the  Cadiz  expedition  of  1702 
proceeded  under  Russell's  old  instructions  of  the 
previous  war.  It  was  under  Rooke's  new  instruc- 
tions, however,  that  the  battle  of  Malaga  was 
fought  in  1704.  They  were  certainly  in  force  in 
1705,  for  a  copy  of  them  exists  in  the  log  book  of 
the  Britannia  for  that  year  {British  Museum,  Add. 
MSS.  28126,  ff.  21-27).  They  were  also  used  by 
Sir  Clowdisley  Shovell  during  his  last  command  ;  as 

02 


i96        WILLIAM  III  AND  ANNE 

we  know  by  a  printed  copy  with  certain  manuscript 
additions  of  his  own,  relating  ,to  chasing  and 
armed  boats,  which  he  issued  to  his  junior  flag 
officer,  Sir  John  Norris,  in  the  Mediterranean,  on 
April  25,  1707  (British  Museum,  Add.  MSS. 
28140).  Nor  is  there  any  trace  of  their  having 
been  changed  during  the  remainder  of  the  war. 
At  the  battle  of  Malaga  they  were  very  strictly 
observed,  and  in  the  opinion  of  the  time  with  an 
entirely  satisfactory  result ;  that  is  to  say  that, 
although  Rooke's  ships  were  foul  and  very  short  of 
ammunition,  he  was  able  to  prevent  Toulouse  break- 
ing his  line  and  so  to  fight  a  defensive  action,  which 
saved  Gibraltar  from  recapture,  and  discredited  the 
French  navy  to  such  an  extent  that  thenceforth  it 
was  entirely  neglected  by  Louis  XIV's  government, 
and  gave  little  more  trouble  to  our  fleets. 

Though  no  copy  of  these  Fighting  Instructions 
has  been  found  with  a  later  date  than  1707,  we 
know  that  with  very  slight  modifications  they 
continued  in  use  down  to  the  peace  of  1783.  The 
evidence  is  to  be  found  scattered  in  proceedings  of 
courts-martial,  in  chance  references  in  admirals 
despatches,  and  in  signal  books.  For  instance,  in 
the  '  Mathews  and  Lestock  Tracts'  (British  Museum, 
518,  g),  which  deal  with  the  courts-martial  that 
followed  the  ill-fought  action  off  Toulon  in  1744, 
eight  of  the  articles  then  in  force  are  printed.  All 
of  them  have  the  same  numbering  as  the  corre- 
sponding articles  of  1703,  six  are  identical  in  word- 
ing, and  two,  Numbers  I.  and  XIII.,  have  only  the 
slight  modifications  which  Admiral  Mathews  made, 
and  which  have  been  given  above  in  notes  to  the 
similar  articles  in  Russell's  set.  These  modifica- 
tions, as  we  have  seen,  were  subsequently  incor- 
porated into  the  standing  form,  and  appear  in  the 
undated  copy  of  the  complete  Fighting  Instructions 


ROOKE,    1703  197 

in  the  Admiralty  Library.  Again,  Article  XIV.  of 
1703  is  referred  to  in  the  Additional  Fighting 
Instructions  issued  by  Boscawen  in  1759.*  Accord- 
ing to  a  MS.  note  by  Sir  C.  H.  Knowles  they  were 
re-issued  in  1772  and  1778,  and  Keppel  in  1778  was 
charged  under  Article  XXXI.  of  1703.  Finally, 
there  is  in  the  Admiralty  Library  a  manuscript 
signal  book  prepared  by  an  officer,  who  was  present 
at  Rodney's  great  action  of  April  12,  1782.  In  this 
book,  in  which  1783  is  the  last  date  mentioned, 
there  is  inserted  beside  each  signal  the  number  of 
the  article  in  the  printed  Fighting  Instructions  to 
which  it  related.  In  this  way  we  are  able  to  fix  the 
purport  of  some  twenty  articles,  and  all  of  these 
correspond  exactly  both  in  intention  and  number 
with  those  of  1703. 


SIR   GEORGE  ROOKE,   1703. 

[From  a  printed  copy  in  the  Library  of  the  United  Service 
Institution.] 

Articles  I.  to  XVI. — \The  same  as  Russell's  of 
1691,  except  for  slight  modifications  of  wording  and 
signals^2 

Art.  XVII. — If  the  admiral  see  the  enemy's 
fleet  standing  towards  him  and  he  has  the  wind  of 
them,  the  van  of  the  fleet  is  to  make  sail  till  they 
come  the  length  of  the  enemy's  rear  and  our  rear 
abreast  of  the  enemy's  van ;  then  he  that  is  in  the 
rear  of  our  fleet  is  to  tack  first,  every  ship  one  after 
another  as  fast  as  they  can,  throughout  the  line. 
And  if  the  admiral  would  have  the  whole  fleet  tack 
together,  the  sooner  to  put  them  in  a  posture  of 

1  See  below,  p.  224. 

*  The  modifications  consist  mainly  in  adding  a  gun  to  several 
of  the  flag  signals,  and  enjoining  the  flagships  to  repeat  them. 


198         WILLIAM  III  AND  ANNE 

engaging  the  enemy,  then  he  will  hoist  the  union 
flag  on  the  flagstaffs  1  at  the  fore  and  mizen  mast- 
heads and  fire  a  gun  ;  and  all  the  flagships  in  the 
fleet  are  to  do  the  same.  But  in  case  the  enemy's 
fleet  should  tack  in  their  rear,  our  fleet  is  to  do  the 
same  with  an  equal  number  of  ships,  and  whilst  they 
are  in  fight  with  the  enemy  to  keep  within  half  a 
cable's  length  one  of  another,  or  if  the  weather  be 
bad,  according  to  the  direction  of  the  commander. 

Art.    XVIII.  —  [Same    as    the    remainder    of 
Russell's  XVIIJ]     When  the  admiral  would  have 
the  ship  that  leads  the  van  ....  by  the  flagships 
of  the  fleet. 

Arts.  XIX.  to  XXIII.— [Same  as  Russell's 
XV II 7.  to  XXI I ^ 

Art.  XXIV.— {Replacing  Russell's  XXIII.  and 
XXVIII.'}  No  ship  in  the  fleet  shall  leave  his 
station  upon  any  pretence  whatsoever  till  he  has 
acquainted  his  flag  or  the  next  flag  officer  to  him 
with  the  condition  of  his  ship  and  received  his 
direction  herein.  But  in  case  any  ship  shall  do  so, 
the  next  ships  are  to  close  up  the  line.2  And  if  any 
commander  shall  be  wanting  in  doing  his  duty,  his 
flag  or  the  next  flag  officer  to  him  is  immediately  to 
send  for  the  said  commander  from  his  ship  and 
appoint  another  in  his  room.3 

Arts.  XXV.  to  XXVI I.,  XXIX.  and  XXX.— 
[Same  as  Russell's.] 

Art.  XXXI. — When  the  admiral  would  have 
the  fleet  draw  into  a  line  of  battle  one  astern  of  the 
other  with  a  large  wind,  and  if  he  would  have  those 

1  The  undated  admiralty  copy  (post  1744)  has  'flagstaves.' 

2  This  manoeuvre  was  finely  executed  by  Sir  Clowdisley  Shovell 
with  the  van  squadron  at  the  battle  of  Malaga. 

3  Burchett,  the  secretary  of  the   navy,  in  his  Naval  History 
censures  Benbow  for  not  having  acted  on  this  instruction  in  1702 
or  rather  on  No.  28  of  1691. 


ROOKE,    1703  199 

lead  who  are  to  lead  with  their  starboard  tacks 
aboard  by  a  wind,  he  will  hoist  a  red  and  white  flag 
at  the  mizen  peak  and  fire  a  gun  ;  and  if  he  would 
have  those  lead  who  are  to  lead  with  their  larboard 
tacks  aboard  by  a  wind,  he  will  hoist  a  Genoese  flag 
at  the  same  place  and  fire  a  gun ;  which  is  to  be 
answered  by  the  flagships  of  the  fleet. 

Art.  XXXII. — When  the  fleet  is  in  the  line  of 
battle,  the  signals  that  are  made  by  the  admiral 
for  any  squadron  or  particular  division  are  to  be 
repeated  by  all  the  flags  that  are  between  the 
admiral  and  that  squadron  or  division  to  whom  the 
signal  is  made. 


PART  VIII 

ADDITIONAL  FIGHTING  INSTRUCTIONS 
OF  THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY 

I.  ADMIRAL  VERNON,  circa  1740 

II.  LORD  ANSON,  circa  1747 

III.  SIR  EDWARD  HAWKE,  1756 

IV.  ADMIRAL  BOSCAWEN,  1759 
V.  SIR  GEORGE  RODNEY,  1782 

VI.     LORD  HOOD,  1783 


ORIGIN    AND   GROWTH    OF   THE 
ADDITIONAL   INSTRUCTIONS 

INTRODUCTORY 

ALTHOUGH,  as  we  have  seen,  the  '  Fighting  Instruc- 
tions 'of  1 69 1  continued  in  force  with  no  material 
alteration  till  the  end  of  the  next  century,  it  must 
not  be  assumed  that  no  advance  in  tactics  was 
made.  From  time  to  time  important  changes  were 
introduced,  but  instead  of  a  fresh  set  of  '  Fighting 
Instructions '  being  drawn  up  according  to  the 
earlier  practice,  the  new  ideas  were  embodied  in 
what  were  called  'Additional  Fighting  Instructions.1 
They  did  not  supersede  the  old  standing  form,  but 
were  intended  to  be  read  with  and  be  subsidiary  to 
it.  It  is  to  these  '  Additional  Instructions,'  there- 
fore, that  we  have  to  look  for  the  progress  of  tactics 
during  the  eighteenth  century.  By  one  of  those 
strange  chances,  however,  which  are  the  despair  of 
historians  in  almost  every  branch  and  period  of 
their  subject,  these  Additional  Instructions  have 
almost  entirely  disappeared.  Although  it  is  known 
in  the  usual  way — that  is,  from  chance  references  in 
despatches  and  at  courts-martial — that  many  such 
sets  of  Additional  Instructions  were  issued,  only 
one  complete  set  actually  in  force  is  known  to  exist. 
They  are  those  signed  by  Admiral  Boscawen  on 
April  27,  1759,  in  Gibraltar  Bay,  and  are  printed 
below. 

After  his  capture  of  Louisbourg  in  the  previous 


204      ADDITIONAL   INSTRUCTIONS 

year,  Boscawen  had 'been  chosen  for  the  command 
of  the  Mediterranean  fleet,  charged  with  the  im- 
portant duty  of  preventing  the  Toulon  squadron 
getting  round  to  Brest,  and  so  effecting  the  concen- 
tration which  the  French  had  planned  as  the  essential 
feature  of  their  desperate  plan  of  invasion.  He 
sailed  with  the  reinforcement  he  was  taking  out  on 
April  14,  and  must  therefore  have  issued  these 
orders  so  soon  as  he  reached  his  station.  There 
is  every  reason  to  believe,  however,  that  he  was 
not  their  author  ;  that  they  were,  in  fact,  a  common 
form  which  had  been  settled  by  Lord  Anson  at 
the  admiralty.  In  the  shape  in  which  they  have 
come  down  to  us  they  are  a  set  of  eighteen  printed 
articles,  to  which  have  been  added  in  manuscript 
two  comparatively  unimportant  articles  relating  to 
captured  chases  and  the  call  for  lieutenants.  These 
may  have  been  either  mere  '  expeditional '  orders, 
as  they  were  called,  issued  by  Boscawen  in  virtue  of 
his  general  authority  as  commander-in-chief  on  the 
station,  or  possibly  recent  official  additions.  More 
probably  they  were  Boscawen's  own,  for,  strictly 
speaking,  they  should  not  appear  as  '  Additional 
Fighting  Instructions'  at  all.  From  the  series  of 
signal  books  and  other  sources  we  know  there 
already  existed  a  special  set  of  '  Chasing  Instruc- 
tions,' and  yet  another  set  in  which  officers'  calls 
and  the  like  were  dealt  with,  and  both  of  Boscawen's 
articles  were  subsequently  incorporated  into  these 
sets.  The  printed  articles  to  which  Boscawen 
attached  them  were  certainly  not  new.  Either 
wholly  or  in  part  they  had  been  used  by  Byng  in 
1756,  for  at  his  court-martial  he  referred  to  the 
'  First  article  of  the  Additional  Fighting  Instruc- 
tions as  given  to  the  fleet  by  me  at  the  beginning 
of  the  expedition,'  and  this  article  is  identical  with 
No.  i  of  Boscawen's  set. 


THEIR   ORIGIN  205 

How  much  older  the  articles  were,  or,  indeed, 
whether  any  were  issued  before  the  Seven  Years' 
War,  has  never  yet  been  determined.  From  the 
illogical  order  in  which  they  succeed  one  another  it 
would  appear  that  they  were  the  result  of  a  gradual 
development,  during  which  one  or  more  orders  were 
added  from  time  to  time  by  the  incorporation  of 
1  expeditional '  orders  of  various  admirals,  as  expe- 
rience suggested  their  desirability.  Thus  Article  I. 
provides,  in  the  case  of  the  enemy  being  inferior  in 
number,  for  our  superfluous  ships  to  fall  out  of  the 
line  and  form  a  reserve,  but  it  is  not  till  Article  VII  I. 
that  we  have  a  scientific  rule  laid  down  for  the 
method  in  which  the  reserve  is  to  employ  itself. 
Still,  whatever  may  have  been  the  exact  process  by 
which  these  Additional  Instructions  grew  up,  evi- 
dence is  in  existence  which  enables  us  to  trace  the 
system  to  its  source  with  exactitude,  and  there  is  no 
room  for  doubt  that  it  originated  in  certain  expe- 
ditional orders  issued  by  Admiral  Vernon  when  he 
was  in  command  of  the  expedition  against  the 
Spanish  Main  in  1739-40.  Amongst  the  'Mathews 
and  Lestock  '  pamphlets  is  one  sometimes  attributed 
to  Lestock  himself,  but  perhaps  more  probably 
inspired  by  him.  It  is  dedicated  to  the  first  lord 
of  the  admiralty,  and  entitled  A  Narrative  of  the 
Proceedings  of  his  majesty  s  fleet  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, 1741-4,  including,  amongst  other  matter 
relating  to  Mathews's  action,  '  some  signals  greatly 
wanted  on  the  late  occasion.'  At  p.  108  are  some 
1  Additional  signals  made  use  of  by  our  fleet  in  the 
West  Indies,'  meaning  that  of  Admiral  Vernon, 
which  Lestock  had  recently  left.  These  signals 
relate  to  sailing  directions  by  day  and  by  night,  to 
'  seeing  ships  in  the  night '  and  to  '  engaging  an 
enemy  in  the  night,'  and  immediately  following  them 
are  two  'Additional  Instructions  to  be  added  to  the 


206      ADDITIONAL   INSTRUCTIONS 

Fighting  Instructions.'  The  inference  is  that  these 
two  '  Additional  Instructions'  were  something  quite 
new  and  local,  since  they  were  used  by  Vernon  and 
not  by  Mathews.  They  are  given  below,  and  will 
be  found  to  correspond  closely  to  Articles  I.  and  III. 
of  the  set  used  by  Boscawen  in  the  next  war.  Since, 
therefore,  in  all  the  literature  and  proceedings  relat- 
ing to  Mathews  and  Lestock  there  is  no  reference 
to  any  'Additional  Instructions,'  we  may  conclude 
with  fair  safety  that  these  two  articles  used  by 
Vernon  in  the  West  Indies  were  the  origin  and  germ 
of  the  new  system. 

Nor  is  it  a  mere  matter  of  inference  only,  for 
it  is  confirmed  by  a  direct  statement  by  the  author 
of  the  pamphlet.  At  p.  74  he  has  this  interesting 
passage  which  practically  clears  up  the  history  of  the 
whole  matter.  'Men  in  the  highest  stations  at  sea 
will  not  deny  but  what  our  sailing  and  fighting 
instructions  might  be  amended,  and  many  added  to 
them,  which  by  every  day's  experience  are  found  to 
be  absolutely  necessary.  Though  this  truth  is 
universally  acknowledged  and  the  necessity  of  the 
royal  navy  very  urgent,  yet  since  the  institution  of 
these  signals  nothing  has  been  added  to  them 
excepting  the  chasing  signals,  excellent  in  their  kind, 

by  the  Right  Honourable  Sir  J N -1     Not 

but  that  every  admiral  has  authority  to  make  any 
additions  or  give  such  signals  to  the  captains  under 
his  command  as  he  shall  judge  proper,  which  are 
only  expeditional.  Upon  many  emergencies  our 
signals  at  this  juncture  \i.e.  in  the  action  before 

1  Admiral  Sir  John  Norris  had  been  commander-in-chief  in 
the  Mediterranean  1710-1,  in  the  Baltic  1715-21  and  1727,  in 
the  Downs  in  1734,  and  the  Channel  1739  and  following  years. 
Professor  Laughton  tells  me  that  Norris's  papers  and  orders 
for  1720-1  contain  no  such  signals.  He  must  therefore  have 
issued  them  later. 


ADMIRAL    VERNON  207 

Toulon]  proved  to  be  very  barren.  There  was  no 
such  signal  in  the  book,  expressing  an  order  when 
the  admiral  would  have  the  ships  to  come  to  a 
closer  engagement  than  when  they  begun.  After 
what  has  been  observed,  it  is  unnecessary  now  to 
repeat  the  great  necessity  and  occasion  there  was 
for  it ;  and  boats  in  many  cases,  besides  their  delay 
and  hindrance,  could  not  always  perform  that  duty. 

'  Mr.  V[ernon],  that  provident,  great  admiral, 
who  never  suffered  any  useful  precaution  to  escape 
him,  concerted  some  signals  for  so  good  a  purpose, 
wisely  foreseeing  their  use  and  necessity,  giving 
them  to  the  captains  of  the  squadron  under  his 
command.  And  lest  his  vigilance  should  be  some 
time  or  other  surprised  by  an  enemy,  or  the  exigencies 
of  his  master's  service  should  require  him  to  attack 
or  repulse  by  night,  he  appointed  signals  for  the 
line  of  battle,  engaging,  chasing,  leaving  off  chase, 
with  many  others  altogether  new,  excellent  and 
serviceable,  which  show  his  judgment,  abilities,  and 
zeal.  The  author  takes  the  liberty  to  print  them 
for  the  improvement  of  his  brethren,  who,  if  they 
take  the  pains  to  peruse  them,  will  receive  benefit 
and  instruction.' 

Here,  then,  we  have  indisputable  evidence  that 
the  system  which  gave  elasticity  to  the  old  rigid 
Fighting  Instructions  began  with  Admiral  Vernon, 
who  as  a  naval  reformer  is  now  only  remembered 
as  the  inventor  of  grog.  The  high  reputation  he 
justly  held  as  a  seaman  and  commander  amongst 
his  contemporaries  has  long  been  buried  under  his 
undeserved  failure  at  Cartagena ;  but  trained  in  the 
flagships  of  Rooke  and  Shovell,  and  afterwards  as  a 
captain  under  Sir  John  Norris  in  the  Baltic,  there 
was  no  one  till  the  day  of  his  death  in  1757,  at  the 
age  of  73,  who  held  so  high  a  place  as  a  naval 
authority,  and  from  no  one  was  a  pregnant  tactical 


208      ADDITIONAL   INSTRUCTIONS 

reform  more  likely  to  come.  The  Lestock  pam- 
phlet, moreover,  makes  it  clear  that  through  all 
the  time  of  his  service — the  dead  time  of  tactics  as 
we  regard  it  now — tacticians  so  far  from  slumbering 
had  been  striving  to  release  themselves  from  the 
bonds  in  which  the  old  instructions  tied  them. 

This  is  confirmed  by  two  manuscript  authorities 
which  have  fortunately  survived,  and  which  give  us 
a  clear  insight  into  the  new  system  as  it  was  actually 
set  on  foot.  The  first  is  a  MS.  copy  of  some  Addi- 
tional Instructions  in  the  Admiralty  Library,  They 
are  less  full  and  clearly  earlier  than  those  used  by 
Boscawen  in  1759,  and  are  bound  up  with  a  printed 
copy  of  the  regular  Fighting  Instructions  already- 
referred  to,  which  contain  in  manuscript  the  addi- 
tions made  by  Mathews  during  his  Mediterranean 
command.1  In  so  far  as  they  differ  from  Boscawen's 
they  will  be  found  below  as  notes  to  his  set. 

The  second  is  a  highly  interesting  MS.  copy 
of  a  signal  book  dated  1756,  in  which  the  above 
instructions  are  referred  to.  It  is  in  the  United 
Service  Institution  {Register  No.  234).  At  the  end 
it  contains  a  memorandum  of  a  new  article  by  which 
Hawke  modified  the  established  method  of  attack, 
and  for  the  first  time  introduced  the  principle  of 
each  ship  steering  for  her  opposite  in  the  enemy's 
line.  It  is  printed  below,  and  as  will  be  seen  was 
to  be  substituted  for  'Articles  V.  and  VI.  of  the 
Additional  Fighting  Instructions  by  Day '  then  in 
force,  which  correspond  to  Articles  XV.  and  XVI. 
of  Boscawen's  set.  It  does  not  appear  in  the 
Boscawen  set,  and  how  soon  it  was  regularly 

1  Catalogue,  252/24.  The  reason  this  interesting  set  has  been 
overlooked  is  that  the  volume  in  which  they  are  bound  bears  by 
error  the  label  'Sailing  and  Fighting  Instructions  for  H.M.  Fleet, 
1670.  Record  Office  Copy.'  The  Instructions  of  1670  were  of 
course  quite  different. 


THEIR   GROWTH  209 

incorporated  we  do  not  know.  No  reference  has 
been  found  to  it  till  that  by  Rodney,  in  his  despatch 
of  April  1780  referred  to  below. 

Of  even  higher  interest  for  our  purpose  is  another 
entry  in  the  same  place  of  an  article  also  issued  by 
Hawke  for  forming  '  line  of  bearing.'  Here  again 
the  older  form  of  the  Additional  Fighting  Instructions 
is  referred  to,  and  the  new  article  is  to  be  inserted 
after  Article  IV.,  which  was  for  forming  the  line 
ahead  or  abreast.  The  important  point  however  is 
that  the  new  article  is  expressly  attributed  to  Lord 
Anson.  Now  it  is  known  that  when  Anson  in 
April  1747  was  cruising  off  Finisterre  for  De  la 
Jonquiere  he  kept  his  fleet  continually  exercising 
'  in  forming  line  and  in  manoeuvres  of  battle  till 
then  absolutely  unknown.'  l 

The  '  line  of  bearing '  or  '  quarter  line  '  must 
have  been  one  of  these,  and  we  therefore  reach  two 
important  conclusions  :  (i)  that  this  great  tactical 
advance  was  introduced  by  Anson  during  the  War 
of  the  Austrian  Succession,  and  (2)  that  the  older 
set  of  Additional  Fighting  Instructions  was  then  in 
existence.  Another  improvement  probably  assign- 
able to  this  time  was  Article  IV.  (of  Boscawen's  set) 
for  battle  order  in  two  separate  lines.  Articles  V., 
VI.,  VII.,  for  extended  cruising  formations  cer- 
tainly were  then  issued,  for  in  his  despatch  after 
his  defeat  of  De  la  Jonquiere  Anson  says :  '  At 
daybreak  I  made  the  signal  for  the  fleet  to  spread  in 
a  line  abreast,  each  ship  keeping  at  the  distance 
of  a  mile  from  the  other  [Article  V.]  that  there 
might  not  remain  the  least  probability  for  the  enemy 
to  pass  by  us  undiscovered.' 2 

Then  we  have  the  notable  Article  XVIII.,  not 
in  the  earlier  sets,  enjoining  captains  to  pursue  any 

1  Diet.  Nat.  Biog.  vol.  ii.  p.  33. 

2  Barrow,  Life  of  Anson,  p.  162 


2io      ADDITIONAL    INSTRUCTIONS 

ship  they  force  out  of  the  line,  regardless  of  the 
contrary  order  contained  in  Article  XXI.  of  the 
regular  Fighting  Instructions.  We  have  seen  the 
point  discussed  already  in  the  anonymous  commen- 
tary on  the  Duke  of  York's  final  instructions,  and  it 
remained  a  bone  of  contention  till  the  end.  Men 
like  Sir  Charles  H.  Knowles  were  as  strongly  in 
favour  of  immediately  following  a  beaten  adversary 
as  the  anonymous  commentator  was  in  favour  of 
maintaining  the  line.  Knowles's  idea  was  that  it 
was  folly  to  check  the  ardour  of  a  ship's  company  at 
the  moment  of  victory,  and  he  tells  us  he  tried  to 
persuade  Howe  to  discard  the  old  instruction  when 
he  was  drawing  up  his  new  ones.1 

As  to  the  further  tactical  progress  which  the 
Boscawen  instructions  disclose,  and  which  nearly  all 
appear  closely  related  to  the  events  of  the  War  of  the 
Austrian  Succession,  when  Anson  was  supreme,  we 
may  particularly  note  Article  I.,  for  equalising  the 
lines  and  using  superfluous  ships  to  form  a  reserve  ; 
Article  III.  for  closer  action  ;  Article  VIII.  for  the 
reserve  to  endeavour  to  '  Cross  the  T,'  instead  of 
doubling ;  and  Articles  IX.  and  X.  for  bringing  -a 
flying  enemy  to  action. 

With  these  internal  inferences  to  corroborate  the 
direct  evidence  of  our  documents  the  conclusion  is 
clear — that  during  the  War  of  the  Austrian  Suc- 
cession the  new  system  initiated  by  Vernon  was 
developed  by  Anson  as  a  consequence  of  Mathews's 
miserable  action  off  Toulon  in  1 744,  and  that  its  first 
fruits  were  gathered  in  the  brilliant  successes  of 
Hawke  and  Anson  himself  in  1747. 

Though  no  complete  set  later  than  those  used 

by  Boscawen  is  known  to  exist,  we  may  be  certain 

from  various  indications  that  they  continued  to  be 

issued  as  affording  a  means  of  giving  elasticity  to 

1   Observations  on  Naval  Tactics,  &£.,  p.  27. 


LATER  FORMS  211 

tactics,  and  that  they  were  constantly  issued  in 
changing  form.  Thus  Rodney,  in  his  report  after 
the  action  off  Martinique  in  April  1780,  says,  'I 
made  the  signal  for  every  ship  to  bear  down  and 
steer  for  her  opposite  in  the  enemy's  line,  agreeable 
to  the  twenty-first  article  of  the  Additional  Instruc- 
tions.' Again  in  a  MS.  signal  book  in  the  Admi- 
ralty Library,  which  was  used  in  Rodney's  great 
action  of  April  12,  1782,  and  drawn  up  by  an  offi- 
cer who  was  present,  a  similar  article  is  referred  to. 
But  there  it  appears  as  No.  XVII.  of  the  Additional 
Instructions,  and  its  effect  is  given  in  a  form  which 
closely  resembles  the  original  article  of  Hawke  :— 
'  When  in  a  line  of  battle  ahead  and  to  windward 
of  the  enemy,  to  alter  the  course  to  lead  down  to 
them  ;  whereupon  every  ship  is  to  steer  for  the  ship 
of  the  enemy,  which  from  the  disposition  of  the  two 
squadrons  it  may  be  her  lot  to  engage,  notwith- 
standing the  signal  for  the  line  ahead  will  be  kept 
flying.'  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  between  1780 
and  1782  Rodney  or  the  admiralty  had  issued  a 
new  set  of  'Additional  Instructions.'  The  amended 
article  was  obviously  designed  to  prevent  a  recur- 
rence of  the  mistake  that  spoiled  the  action  of  1780. 
In  the  same  volume  is  a  signal  which  carries  the  idea 
further.  It  has  been  entered  subsequently  to  the 
rest,  having  been  issued  by  Lord  Hood  for  the 
detached  squadron  he  commanded  in  March  1783. 
There  is  no  reference  to  a  corresponding  instruction, 
but  it  is  '  for  ships  to  steer  for  (independent  of  each 
other)  and  engage  respectively  the  ships  opposed  to 
them.'  In  Lord  Howe's  second  signal  book,  issued 
in  I79O,1  the  signal  reappears  in  MS.  as  'each 

1  In  the  Admiralty  Library.  It  is  undated,  but  assigned  to 
1792-3.  For  the  reasons  for  identifying  it  as  Howe's  second  code 
see  postt  pp.  234-7.  In  his  first  code  Howe  adopted  Hood's 
wording  almost  exactly;  see  post,  p.  236. 

p  2 


212      ADDITIONAL   INSTRUCTIONS 

ship  of  the  fleet  to  steer  for,  independently  of  each 
other,  and  engage  respectively  the  ship  opposed  in 
situation  to  them  in  the  enemy's  line.'  And  in  this 
case  there  is  a  reference  to  an  '  Additional  Instruc- 
tion, No.  8,'  indicating  that  Hood,  who  had  mean- 
while become  first  sea  lord,  had  incorporated  his 
idea  into  the  regular  'Additional  Fighting  Instruc- 
tions.' 

Take,  again,  the  case  of  the  manoeuvre  of 
'  breaking  the  line '  in  line  ahead.  This  was  first 
practised  after  its  long  abandonment  by  a  sudden 
inspiration  in  Rodney's  action  of  April  12,  1782.  In 
the  MS.  signal  book  as  used  by  Rodney  in  that  year 
there  is  no  corresponding  signal  or  instruction. 
But  it  does  contain  one  by  Hood  which  he  must  have 
added  soon  after  the  battle.  It  is  as  follows  :— 
'  When  fetching  up  with  the  enemy  to  leeward  and 
on  the  contrary  tack  to  break  through  their  line  and 
endeavour  to  cut  off  part  of  their  van  or  rear.'  It 
also  contains  another  attributed  to  Admiral  Pigot 
which  he  probably  added  at  Hood's  suggestion  when 
he  succeeded  to  the  command  in  July  1782.  It. is 
for  a  particular  ship  '  to  cut  through  the  enemy's  line 
of  battle,  and  for  all  the  other  ships  to  follow  her  in 
close  order  to  support  each  other.'  But  in  both  cases 
there  is  no  corresponding  instruction,  so  that  the 
new  signals  must  have  been  based  on  '  expeditional ' 
orders  issued  by  Pigot  and  Hood.  The  same  book 
has  yet  another  additional  signal  '  for  the  leading 
ship  to  cut  through  the  enemy's  line  of  battle,'  ap- 
parently the  latest  of  the  three,  but  not  specifically 
attributed  either  to  Pigot  or  Hood. 

With  the  Additional  Instructions  used  by  Rodney 
the  system  culminated.  For  officers  with  any  real 
feeling  for  tactics  its  work  was  adequate.  The 
criticisms  of  Hood  and  Rodney  on  Graves's  heart- 
breaking action  off  the  Chesapeake  in  1781  show 


CONCENTRATION  213 

this  clearly  enough.  '  When  the  enemy's  van  was 
out,'  wrote  Hood,  '  it  was  greatly  extended  beyond 
the  centre  and  rear,  and  might  have  been  attacked 
with  the  whole  force  of  the  British  fleet.'  And  again, 
'  Had  the  centre  gone  to  the  support  of  the  van  and 
the  signal  for  the  line  been  hauled  down  .  .  .  the 
van  of  the  enemy  must  have  been  cut  to  pieces  and 
the  rear  division  of  the  British  fleet  would  have  been 
opposed  to  .  .  .  the  centre  division.'  Here,  besides 
the  vital  principle  of  concentration,  we  have  a  germ 
even  of  the  idea  of  containing,  and  Rodney  is 
equally  emphatic.  '  His  mode  of  fighting  I  will 
never  follow.  He  tells  me  that  his  line  did  not 
extend  so  far  as  the  enemy's  rear.  I  should  have 
been  sorry  if  it  had,  and  a  general  battle  ensued. 
It  would  have  given  the  advantage  they  wished  and 
brought  their  whole  twenty-four  ships  of  the  line 
against  the  English  nineteen,  whereas  by  watching 
his  opportunity  ...  by  contracting  his  own  line  he 
might  have  brought  his  nineteen  against  the  enemy's 
fourteen  or  fifteen,  and  by  a  close  action  have  dis- 
abled them  before  they  could  have  received  succour 
from  the  remainder.' l 

Read  with  such  remarks  as  these  the  latest 
Additional  Fighting  Instructions  will  reveal  to  us 
how  ripe  and  sound  a  system  of  tactics  had  been 
reached.  The  idea  of  crushing  part  of  the  enemy 
by  concentration  had  replaced  the  primitive  intention 
of  crowding  him  into  a  confusion ;  a  swift  and 
vigorous  attack  had  replaced  the  watchful  defensive, 
and  above  all  the  true  method  of  concentration  had 
been  established  ;  for  although  a  concentration  on 
the  van  was  still  permissible  in  exceptional  circum- 
stances, the  chief  of  the  new  articles  are  devoted  to 
concentrating  on  the  rear.  Thus  our  tacticians  had 
worked  out  the  fundamental  principles  on  which 
1  Letters  of  Sir  Samuel  Hood,  p.  46 ;  and  cf.  post,  p.  228  n. 


2i4      ADDITIONAL   INSTRUCTIONS 

<q 

Nelson's  system  rested,  even  to  breaking  up  the 
line  into  two  divisions.  '  Containing '  alone  was 
not  yet  clearly  enunciated,  but  by  Hood's  signals 
for  breaking  the  line,  the  best  method  of  effecting 
it  was  made  possible.  Everything  indeed  lay  ready 
for  the  hands  of  Howe  and  Nelson  to  strike  into 
life. 


ADMIRAL    VERNON,  circa  1740. 
[Mathews-Lestock  Pamphlets.1] 

An  Additional  Instruction  to  be  added  to  the 
Fighting  Instructions. 

In  case  of  meeting  any  squadron  of  the  enemy's 
ships,  whose  number  may  be  less  than  those  of  the 
squadron  of  his  majesty's  ships  under  my  command, 
and  that  I  would  have  any  of  the  smaller  ships  quit 
the  line,  I  will  in  such  case  make  the  signal  for 
speaking  with  the  captain  of  that  ship  I  would  have 
quit  the  line  ;  and  at  the  same  time  I  will  put  a  flag, 
striped  yellow  and  white,  at  the  flagstaff  at  the  main 
topmast-head,  upon  which  the  said  ship  or  ships 
are  to  quit  the  line  and  the  next  ships  are  to  close 
the  line,  for  having  our  ships  of  greatest  force  to 
form  a  line  just  equal  to  the  enemy's.  And  as, 
upon  the  squadrons  engaging,  it  is  not  to  be  ex- 
pected that  the  ships  withdrawn  out  of  the  line  can 
see  or  distinguish  signals  at  such  a  juncture,  it  is 
therefore  strictly  enjoined  and  required  of  such 
captain  or  captains,  who,  shall  have  their  signal 
or  signals  made  to  withdraw  out  of  the  line,  to 
demean  themselves  as  a  corps  de  reserve  to  the 
main  squadron,  and  to  place  themselves  in  the  best 

1  '  A  Narrative  of  the  Proceedings  of  his  Majesty's  Fleet 
in  the  Mediterranean,  &c.  By  a  Sea  Officer  '  London,  1744,  pp. 


1 1 1-2. 


VERNON,    1740  215 

situation  for  giving  relief  to  any  ship  of  the 
squadron  that  may  be  disabled  or  hardest  pressed  by 
the  enemy,  having  in  the  first  place  regard  to  the 
ship  I  shall  have  my  flag  on  board,  as  where  the 
honour  of  his  majesty's  flag  is  principally  concerned. 
And  as  it  is  morally  impossible  to  fix  any  general 
rule  to  occurrences  that  must  be  regulated  from  the 
weather  and  the  enemy's  disposition,  this  is  left 
to  the  respective  captain's  judgment  that  shall  be 
ordered  out  of  the  line  to  govern  himself  by  as 
becomes  an  officer  of  prudence,  and  as  he  will 
answer  the  contrary  at  his  peril. 

Memorandum* — That  whereas  all  signals  for  the 
respective  captains  of  the  squadron  are  at  some  one 
of  the  mast-heads,  and  as  when  we  are  in  line  of 
battle  or  in  other  situations  it  may  be  difficult  for  the 
ships  to  distinguish  their  signal,  in  such  case  you  are 
to  take  notice  that  your  signal  will  be  made  by  fixing 
the  pennant  higher  upon  the  topgallant  shrouds,  so 
as  it  may  be  most  conspicuous  to  be  seen  by  the 
respective  ship  it  is  made  for. 

A  second  Additional  Instruction  to  the  Fighting 
Instructions. 

If,  at  any  time  after  our  ships  being  engaged 
with  any  squadron  of  the  enemy's  ships,  the  admiral 
shall  judge  it  proper  to  come  to  a  closer  engage- 
ment with  the  enemy  than  at  the  distance  we  first 
began  to  engage,  the  admiral  will  hoist  a  union  flag  at 
the  main  topmast-head  and  fire  a  gun  on  the  opposite 
side  to  which  he  is  engaged  with  the  enemy,  when 
every  ship  is  to  obey  the  signal,  taking  the  dis- 
tance from  the  centre ;  and  if  the  admiral  would 
have  any  particular  ship  do  so  he  will  make  the 
same  signal  with  the  signal  for  the  captain  of  that 
ship. 


216      ADDITIONAL   INSTRUCTIONS 

And  in  case  of  being  to  leeward  of  the  enemy, 
the  admiral  will  at  the  same  time  he  makes  this 
signal  hoist  the  yellow  flag  at  the  fore  topmast-head 
for  filling  and  making  sail  to  windward. 

And  during  the  time  of  engagement,  every  ship 
is  to  appoint  a  proper  person  to  keep  an  eye  upon 
the  admiral  and  to  observe  signals. 


LORD  AN  SON,  circa  1747. 
[MS.  Signal  Book,  1756,  United  Service  Institution.] 

Lord  Ansoris  Additional  Fighting  Instruction,  to 
be  inserted  after  Article  the  ^th  in  the  Additional 
Fighting  Instructions  by  Day. 

Whereas  it  may  often  be  necessary  for  ships 
in  line  of  battle  to  regulate  themselves  by  bearing 
on  some  particular  point  of  the  compass  from  each 
other  without  having  any  regard  to  their  bearing 
abreast  or  ahead  of  one  another ; 

You  are  therefore  hereby  required  and  directed 
to  strictly  observe  the  following  instructions  : 

When  the  signal  is  made  for  the  squadron  to 
draw  into  a  line  of  battle  at  any  particular  distance, 
and  I  would  have  them  keep  north  and  south  of 
each  other,  I  will  hoist  a  red  flag  with  a  white 
cross  in  the  mizen  topmast  shrouds  to  show  the 
quarter  of  the  compass,  and  for  the  intermediate 
points  I  will  hoist  on  the  flagstaff  at  the  mizen  top- 
mast-head, when  they  are  to  bear 

N  by  E  and  S  by  W,  one  common  pennant 

NNE        „     SSW,  two  common  pennants 

NEbyN,,    SW  by  S,  three    „ 

NE  „    SW,  a  Dutch  jack. 


ANSON,    1747  217 

And  I  will  hoist  under  the  Dutch  jack  when  I  would 
have  them  bear 

NE  by  E  and  SW  by  W,  one  common  pennant 
ENE  ,,     WSW,  two  common  pennants 

E  by  N       „     W  by  S,  three     „ 
and  fire  a  gun  with  each  signal. 

When  I  would  have  them  bear  from  each  other 
on  any  of  the  points  on  the  NW  and  SE  quarters 
I  will  hoist  a  blue  and  white  flag  on  the  mizen 
topmast  shrouds,  to  show  the  quarter  of  the  com- 
pass and  distinguish  the  intermediate  points  they 
are  to  form  on  from  the  N  and  S  in  the  same 
manner  as  in  the  NE  and  SW  quarter.1 

ED.  HAWKE. 


SIR  ED  WARD  HA  WKE,  1756. 
[MS.  Signal  Book,  United  Service  Institution.] 

Memorandum. 

In  room  of  Articles  V.  and  VI.  of  the  'Addi- 
tional Fighting  Instructions  by  Day'2  it  is  in  my 
discretion  that  this  be  observed,  viz. : 

When  sailing  in  a  line  of  battle,  one  ship  ahead 
of  another,  and  I  would  have  the  ship  that  leads 
with  either  the  starboard  or  larboard  tacks  aboard 
to  alter  her  course  in  order  to  lead  down  to  the 
enemy,  I  will  hoist  a  Dutch  jack  under  my  flag  at 

1  From  this  article  it  would  appear  that  the  correct  expression 
for  '  line  of  bearing '  is  '  quarter  line  ' — i.e.  a  line  formed  in  a  quarter 
of  the  compass,  and  that  '  bow  and  quarter  line '  is  due  to  false 
etymology.     Though  Hawke  approved  the  formation,  it  does  not 
appear  in  the  Additional  Instructions  used  by  Boscawen  in  1759. 
It  was  however  regularly  incorporated  in  those  used  in  the  War  of 
American  Independence.     See/<?^,  p.  225,  Art.  III. 

2  I.e.  the  older  set.     They  were  Articles  XV.  and  XVI.  of  the 
remodelled  set  used  by  Boscawen  in  1759. 


218      ADDITIONAL   INSTRUCTIONS 

the  mizen  topmast-head  and  fire  two  guns.  Then 
every  ship  of  the  squadron  is  to  steer  for  the  ship 
of  the  enemy  that  from  the  disposition  of  the  two 
squadrons  must  be  her  lot  to  engage,  notwith- 
standing I  shall  keep  the  signal  for  the  line  ahead 
flying,  making  or  shortening  sail  in  such  proportion 
as  to  preserve  the  distance  assigned  by  the  signal 
for  the  line,  in  order  that  the  whole  squadron  as 
soon  as  possible  may  come  to  action  at  the  same 
time.1 

ED.  HAWKE. 

Additional  Signals. 

If  upon  seeing  an  enemy  I  should  think  it 
necessary  to  alter  the  disposition  of  the  ships  in  the 
line  of  battle,  and  would  have  any  ships  change 
station  with  each  other,  I  will  make  the  signal  to 
speak  with  the  captains  of  such  ships,  and  hoist  the 
flag  chequered  red  and  blue  on  the  flagstaff  at  the 
mizen  topmast-head.2 

1  This  article  was  presumably  issued  by  Hawke  when  in  July 
1756   he   superseded   Byng   in    the    Mediterranean.     It    seems' 
designed  to  prevent  a  recurrence  of  the  errors   which   lost  the 
battle  of  Minorca,  where  the  British  van  was  crushed  by  coming 
into   action  long  before  the  centre  and  rear.     It  is  not  in  the 
Additional  Instructions  of  1759,  but  reappears  in  a  modified  form 
in  those  of  1780. 

2  This  article  is  entered  in  the  same  signal  book,  but  has  no 
signature.     It  may  therefore  have  been  one  of  Anson's  innova- 
tions. 


BOSCAWEN,    1759  219 


ADMIRAL  BOSCAWEN,   1759. l 
[From  the  original  in  the  Admiralty  Library,  252/29.] 

I.  In  case  of  meeting  with  a  squadron  of  the 
enemy's  ships  that  may  be  less  in  number  than  the 
squadron  under  my  command,  if  I  would  have  any 
of  the  smaller  ships  quit  the  line,  that  those  of  the 
greatest  force  may  be  opposed  to  the  enemy,   I  will 
put  abroad  the  signal  for  speaking  with  the  captains 
of  such  ships  as  I  would  have  leave  the  line,  and 
hoist  a  flag,  striped  yellow  and  white,  at  the  flag- 
staff at  the  main  topmast-head  ;  then  the  next  ships 
are  to  close  the  line,  and  those  that  have  quitted  it 
are   to  hold  themselves  in  readiness  to  assist  any 
ship  that  may  be  disabled,  or  hard  pressed,  or  to  take 
her  station,  if  she  is  obliged  to  go  out  of  the  line : 
in  which  case,  the  strongest  ship  that  is  withdrawn 
from  the  line  is  strictly  enjoined  to  supply  her  place, 
and  fill  up  the  vacancy. 

II.  And  in  case  of  meeting  with  any  squadron, 
or  ships  of  war  of  the  enemy  that  have  merchant- 
men under  their  convoy,  though  the  signal  for  the 
line  of  battle  should  be  out,  if  I  would  have  any  of 
the  frigates  that  are  out  of  the  line,  or  any  ship  of 
the  line  fall  upon  the  convoy,  whilst  the  others  are 
engaged,  I  will  put  abroad  the  pennant  for  speaking 
with  the  captain  of  such  ship  or  ships,  and  hoist  the 
flag  above  mentioned  for  quitting  the  line,  with  a 
pennant  under  it ;  upon  which  signal,  such  ship  or 
ships  are  to  use  their  utmost  endeavours  to  take  or 
destroy  the  enemy. 

III.  If  at  any  time  while  we  are  engaged  with 

1  The  articles  marked  with  an  asterisk  are  additions  subsequent 
to  and  not  appearing  in  the  earlier  Admiralty  MS.  252/24,  'Addi- 
tional Fighting  Instructions  by  Day  '  (see  p.  108). 


220      ADDITIONAL   INSTRUCTIONS 

the  enemy,  the  admiral  shall  judge  it  proper  to  come 
to  a  closer  engagement  than  at  the  distance  we 
then  are,  he  will  hoist  a  red  and  white  flag  on  the 
flagstaff  at  the  main  topmast-head,  and  fire  a  gun. 
Then  every  ship  is  to  engage  the  enemy  at  the  same 
distance  the  admiral  does  ;  and  if  the  admiral  would 
have  any  particular  ship  do  so,  he  will  make  the  same 
signal,  and  the  signal  for  speaking  with  the  captain. 
IV.1  When  I  would  have  the  two  divisions  of 
the  fleet  form  themselves  into  a  separate  line  of 
battle,  one  ship  ahead  of  another  at  the  distance  of 
a  cable's  length  asunder,  and  each  division  to  be 
abreast  of  the  other,  when  formed  at  the  distance  of 
one  cable's  length  and  a  half,  I  will  hoist  a  flag 
chequered  blue  and  yellow  at  the  mizen  peak,  and 
fire  a  gun,  and  then  every  ship  is  to  get  into  her 
station  accordingly, 

*V.2  When  I  would  have  the  fleet  spread  in  a  line 
abreast,  each  ship  keeping  at  the  distance  of  one 
mile  from  the  other,  I  will  hoist  a  flag  chequered 
blue  and  yellow,  on  the  flagstaff  at  the  mizen  top- 
mast-head, and  fire  a  gun. 

*VI.  When  I  would  have  the  ships  spread  in  a 
line  directly  ahead  of  each  other,  and  keep  at  the 
distance  of  a  mile  asunder,  I  will  hoist  a  flag 
chequered  red  and  white  at  the  mizen  peak,  and  fire 
a  gun. 

*VII.  And  when  the  signal  is  made  for  the 
ships  to  spread  either  abreast  or  ahead  of  one 
another,  and  I  would  have  them  keep  at  the  dis- 
tance of  two  miles  asunder,  I  will  hoist  a  pennant 
under  the  fore-mentioned  flags  :  then  every  ship  is 
to  make  sail,  and  get  into  her  station  accordingly. 

1  In  the  earlier  Admiralty  MS.  this  article  is  numbered  VII. 
and  begins  '  If  the  fleet  should  happen  to  be  in  two  divisions 
and  I  would  have  them  form,'  &c. 

3  Used  by  Lord  Anson  in  1747.     See  stipra,  p.  209. 


BOSCAWEN,    1759  221 

VIII.  If  I  should  meet  with  a  squadron  of  the 
enemy's  ships  of  war  inferior  in  number  to  the  ships 
under  my  command,  those  ships   of  my  squadron 
(above  the  number  of  the  enemy)  that  happen  to 
fall  in  either  ahead  of  the  enemy's  van  or  astern  of 
his  rear,  while  the  rest  of  the  ships  are  engaged,  are 
hereby    required,    and    directed    to    quit    the   line 
without  waiting  for  the  signal,  and  to  distress  the 
enemy  by    raking  the  ships  in   the  van  and  rear, 
notwithstanding  the  first  part  of  the  twenty-fourth 
article    of  the    Fighting    Instructions    to    the    con- 
trary. 

IX.  And  if  I  should  chase  with  the  whole  squa- 
dron, and  would  have  a  certain  number  of  the  ships 
that  are  nearest  the  enemy  draw  into  a  line  of  battle 
ahead  of  me,  in  order  to  engage  till  the  rest  of  the 
ships  of  the  squadron  can  come  up  with  them,  I  will 
hoist  a  white  flag  with  a  red  cross  on  the  flagstaff 
at  the  main  topmast-head,  and  fire  the  number  of 
guns  as  follows  : — 

/five  ships    \  draw  into  a  line  /one  gun. 
When  I  I  of  battle,  ahead  ] 

would  have  1  of  each  other,  I  j 

(seven  ships!  will  fire  \ three  guns. 

X.  Then    those  ships  are  immediately  to  form 
the   line    without   any    regard    to   seniority  or   the 
general    form    delivered,    but    according    to    their 
distances  from  the  enemy,  viz.,  The  headmost  and 
nearest  ship  to  the  enemy  is  to  lead,  and  the  stern- 
most  to  bring  up  the  rear,  that  no  time  may  be  lost 
in  the  pursuit  ;  and  all  the  rest  of  the  ships  are  to 
form  and  strengthen  that  line,  as  soon  as  they  can 
come   up   with    them,   without   any    regard    to    my 
general  form  of  the  order  of  battle. 

XI.  Whereas    every    ship    is    directed    (when 
sailing  in  a  line  of  battle)  to  keep  the  same  distances 
those  ships  do  who  are  nearest  the  admiral,  always 


222      ADDITIONAL   INSTRUCTIONS 

« 

taking  it  from  the  centre :  if  at  any  time  I  think  the 
ship  ahead  of  me  is  [at]  too  great  a  distance,  I  will 
make  it  known  to  him  by  putting  abroad  a  pennant 
at  the  jib-boom  end,  and  keep  it  flying  till  he  is  in 
his  proper  station  :  and  if  he  finds  the  ship  ahead  of 
him  is  at  a  greater  distance  from  him  than  he  is 

from   the  l -  (or  such  ship  as  my  flag  shall  be 

flying  on  board  of),  he  shall  make  the  same  signal  at 
his  jib-boom  end,  and  keep  it  flying  till  he  thinks 
that  ship  is  at  a  proper  distance,  and  so  on  to  the 
van  of  the  line. 

XII.  And  when  I  think  the  ship  astern  of  me 
is  at  too  great  a  distance,  I  will  make  it  known  to 
him  by  putting  abroad  a  pennant  at  the  cross-jack 
yard-arm,  and  keep  it  flying  till  he  is  in  his  station  : 
and  if  he  finds  the  ship  astern  of  him  is  at  a  greater 

-distance  than  he  is  from  the  (or  such  ship 

as  my  flag  shall  be  flying  aboard  of)  he  shall  make 
the  same  signal  at  the  cross-jack  yard-arm,  and  keep 
it  flying  till  he  thinks  that  the  ship  is  at  a  proper 
distance,  and  so  on  to  the  rear  of  the  line. 

XIII.  And   if  at  any  time  the  captain   of  any 
particular  ship  in  the  line  thinks  the  ship  without 
him  is  at  a  greater  distance  than  those  ships  who 
are  next  the  centre,  he  shall  make  the  above  signal : 
and  then  that  ship  is  immediately  to  close,  and  get 
into  his  proper  station. 

XIV.2  When  the  signal  is  made  for  the  squa- 
dron to  draw  into  a  line  of  battle,  one  ship  ahead  of 
another,  by  hoisting  a  union  flag  at  the  mizen  peak 
and  firing  a  gun,  every  ship  is  to  make  all  the  sail 
he  can  into  his  station,  and  keep  at  the  distance  of 

1  The  earlier  Admiralty  MS.  has  simply  'the  ship  my  flag 
shall  be  aboard  of.' 

2  Article  IV.  in  the  earlier  Admiralty  MS.    It  is  practically 
identical  except  that  it  has  '  she '  and  '  her '  throughout  where  ships 
are  spoken  of,  and  a  few  other  verbal  differences. 


BOSCAWEN,    1759  223 

half  a  cable's  length  from  each  other  :  If  I  would 
have  them  to  be  a  cable's  length  asunder,  I  will 
hoist  a  blue  flag,  with  a  red  cross  under  the  union 
flag  at  the  mizen  peak  and  fire  a  gun  :  and  if  two 
cables'  length  asunder,  a  white  and  blue  flag  under 
the  union  flag  at  the  mizen  peak,  and  fire  a  gun  : 
but  when  I  would  have  the  squadron  draw  into  a 
line  of  battle,  one  ship  abreast  of  another,  and 
keep  at  those  distances  as  above  directed,  I  will 
hoist  a  pennant  under  the  said  flags  at  the  mizen 
peak. 

XV.1  When  sailing  in  a  line  of  battle,  one  ship 
ahead  of  another,  and  I  would  have  the  ship  who 
leads  to  alter  her  course  and  lead  more  to  star- 
board, I  will  hoist  a  flag  striped  white  and  blue  at 
the  fore  topmast-head,  and  fire  a  gun  for  every 
point  of  the  compass  I  would  have  the  course 
altered. 

XVI.1  And  if  I  would  have  the  ship  that  leads 
to  alter  her  course  and  lead  more  to  port,  I  will 
hoist  a  flag  striped  blue  and  white  on  the  flagstaff 
at  the  mizen  topmast-head,  and  fire  a  gun  for  every 
point  of  the  compass  I  would  have  the  course 
altered,  and  every  ship  in  the  squadron  is  to  get 
into  her  wake  as  fast  as  possible. 

XVII.2  When  I  would  have  all  the  fireships  to 

1  Articles  V.  and  VI.  in  the  earlier  Admiralty  MS. 

'2  The  equivalent  of  Article  XIV.  in  the  earlier  Admiralty  MS. 
which  reads  thus,  '  When  I  would  have  the  fireships  to  prime  I  will 
hoist  a  pennant  striped  red  and  white  on  the  flagstaff  at  the  fore 
topmast-head  and  fire  a  gun,  but  in  case  we  are  at  any  time  in 
chase  of  the  enemy's  fleet,  the  fireships  are  to  prime  as  fast  as 
possible  whether  the  signal  be  made  or  not.'  The  Admiralty  ATS. 
ends  here  with  another  article  relating  to  fireships  (No.  XV.) :  'You 
are  to  hold  his  majesty's  ship  under  your  command  in  a  constant 
readiness  for  action,  and  in  case  of  coming  to  an  engagement  with 
the  enemy,  if  they  have  the  wind  of  us,  to  keep  your  barge 
manned  and  armed  with  hand  and  fire-chain  grapnels  on  the 


224      ADDITIONAL   INSTRUCTIONS 

* 

prime,  I  will  hoist  a  chequered  blue  and  yellow 
pennant  at  the  mizen  topmast-head. 

*XVIII.1  Notwithstanding  the  general  printed 
Fighting  Instructions,  if  at  any  time,  when  engaged 
with  an  equal  number  of  the  enemy's  ships,  and  the 
ship  opposed  to  any  of  his  majesty's  ships  is  forced 
out  of  the  line,  you  are  hereby  required  and 
directed  to  pursue  her,  and  endeavour  to  take  and 
destroy  her. 

Memorandum. — When  the  squadron  is  in  a  line 
of  battle  ahead,  and  the  signal  is  made  for  the 
headmost  and  weathermost  to  tack,  the  ship  that 
leads  on  the  former  tack  is  to  continue  to  lead  after 
tacking.2 

*XIX.3  When  I  would  have  the  ship  or  ships 
that  chase  bring  down  their  chase  to  me,  I  will 
hoist  a  blue  flag  pierced  with  white  on  the  fore  top- 
gallant mast,  not  on  the  flagstaff. 

*XX.3  When  I  find  it  necessary  to  have  the 
state  and  condition  of  the  ships  in  the  squadron 
sent  on  board  me,  I  will  make  the  signal  for  all 
lieutenants,  and  hoist  a  blue  and  white  flag  at  the 
mizen  peak  and  fire  a  gun.  If  for  the  state  and  con- 
dition of  a  particular  ship,  I  make  the  signal  for  the 
lieutenant  of  that  ship,  with  the  flag  at  the  mizen  peak. 

offside  from  them,  to  be  ready  to  assist  as  well  any  ship  that  may- 
be attempted  by  the  fireships  of  the  enemy,  as  our  own  fireships 
when  they  shall  be  ordered  upon  service.'  This  article  disappears 
from  subsequent  sets,  and  was  perhaps  incorporated  into  the 
'  General  Instructions  to  Captains '  to  which  it  more  properly 
belongs.  The  MS.  also  contains  '  Night  Signals '  and  private 
signals  for  knowing  detached  ships  rejoining  at  night. 

1  Whoever  was  the  author  of  this  article,    it   was  generally 
regarded  as  too  risky  and  subsequently  disappeared.     The  article 
of  the  '  printed  Fighting  Instructions '  referred  to  is  No.  XXI. 

2  This  memorandum,  which  concludes  the  printed   portion, 
must  have   been   added   in   view  of  the   misconception  which 
occurred  in  Knowles's  action  of  1 748. 

3  MS.  additions  by  Boscawen. 


RODNEY,    1782  225 

Given   under  my  hand  on  board  his  majesty's 
ship  Namur,  in  Gibraltar  Bay,  this  27  April,  1759. 

E.  BOSCAWEN 

To  Capt.  Medows,  (autograph), 

of  his  majesty's  ship  Shannon. 
By  command  of  the  admiral 

ALEX.  MACPHERSON 
(autograph). 


SIR    GEORGE  RODNEY,   1782.' 
[MS.  Signal  Book  in  the  Admiralty  Library.] 

1.  Line  ahead  at  one  cable. 

2.  Line  abreast  at  one  cable. 

3.  Quarter  lines  on  various  compass  bearings. 

4.  When  in  line  ahead  to  alter  course  to  star- 
board or  port  together — one  gun  for  every  point.2 

5.  The  same  when  in  line  abreast.2 

6.  To  form  order  of  sailing.3 

'  The  actual  Additional  Fighting  Instructions  used  by 
Rodney  for  his  famous  campaign  of  1782  are  lost ;  what  follows 
are  merely  the  drift  of  those  instructions  so  far  as  they  can  be 
determined  from  the  references  to  them  in  his  signal  book.  It 
should  be  noted  that  by  this  time  those  used  in  the  Seven  Years' 
War  had  been  entirely  recast  in  a  more  logical  form. 

2  Cf.  Boscawen's  Nos.  15  and  16. 

3  According  to  Sir  Chas.  H.  Knowles  the  regular  sailing  forma- 
tion at  this  time  for  a  large  fleet  was  in  three  squadrons  abreast, 
each  formed  in  bow  and  quarter  line  to  starboard  and  port  of  its 
flag.    He  says  it  was  his  father's  treatise  on  Tactics  which  induced 
Howe  to  revert  to  Hoste's  method,  and  adopt  the  formation  of 
squadrons  abreast  in  line  ahead.    This,  he  adds,  Howe  used  for 
the  first  time  when  sailing  to  relieve  Gibraltar  in  1782.     Thence- 
forth it  became  the  rule  of  the  service,  and  the  subsequent  signal 
books  contain  signals  for  forming  line  of  battle  from  two,  three,  and 
six  columns  of  sailing  respectively.    This  Knowles  regards  as  the 
great  reform  on  which  modern  tactics  were  founded.     See  his 
Observations  on  Tactics,  1830. 

Q 


226      ADDITIONAL  INSTRUCTIONS 

* 

7.  When  in  line  of  battle  for  the  whole  fleet  to 
tack  together. 

8.  When   in   line  of  battle   for   the   next   ship 
ahead  or  on  the  starboard  beam,  which    is  at  too 
great  a  distance,  to  close. 

9.  The   same   for  the   next   astern   or  on   the 
larboard  beam. 

10.  (Undetermined.) 

11.  The    fleet   to   form   in   two   separate   lines 
ahead  at  one  cable's  distance,  each  division  abreast 
of  the  other  at  two  cables'  distance.1 

12.  (?)    Particular   ships    to    come    under    the 
admiral's  stern  without  hail.2 

1 3.  Ships  to  change  stations  in  the  line  of  battle. 

14.  When  in  chase  for  the   headmost   ship   to 
engage  the  sternmost  of  the  enemy,  and  the  next 
ship  to  pass,  under  cover  of  her  fire,  and  take  the 
ship  next  ahead,  and  so  on  in  succession,  without 
respect  to  seniority  or  the  prescribed  order  of  battle. 
To  engage  to  windward  or  leeward  as  directed  by 
signal.^ 

15.  The  whole  fleet  being  in  chase,    for  some 
of  the  headmost  ships  to  draw  into  line  of  battle 
and  engage   the  enemy's  rear,    at  the   same   time 
endeavouring   to   get  up  with  their  van.     Note. — 
These  ships  to  form  without  any  regard  to  seniority 
or   the    order    of    battle.      The   ship   nearest   the 
enemy  is  to  lead  and  the  sternmost  to  bring  up  the 
rear.     Signal. — Red  flag  with  white  cross  at  main 
topmast-head  with  one  gun  for  five  ships,  and  three 
for  seven.4 

1  Cf.  Boscawen's  No.  4. 

2  This  may  be  an  Additional  Sailing  Instruction,  the  various 
sets  of  Additional  Instructions   not   being  distinguished  in  the 
signal  book. 

3  This  article  may  well  have  been  the  outcome  of  Hawke's 
defeat  of  L'Etenduere  in   1747,  when  he  chased  and  engaged 
practically  as  the  instruction  directs,  and  with  complete  success. 

4  Cf.  Boscawen's  Nos.  9  and  10. 


RODNEY,    1782  227 

1 6.  When  turning  to  windward  in  line  of  battle 
for   the   leading  ship    to    make    known    when  she 
can    weather   the   enemy.      To   be    repeated   from 
ship  to    ship   to    the    commander-in-chief.       If  he 
should  stand  on  till  the  sternmost  ship  can  weather 
them,    she   is   to   make   it    known   by   hoisting    a 
common  pennant  at  the  fore  topgallant  mast-head  ; 
to  be  repeated  as  before.     The  sternmost   ship  is 
likewise  to  do  so  whenever  the  squadron  shall  be  to 
windward  of  the  enemy,  and  her  commander  shall 
judge  himself  far  enough  astern  of  their  rear  to  lead 
down  out  of  their  line  of  fire. 

17.  When  in  line  of  battle  ahead  and  to  wind- 
ward of  the  enemy,  to  alter  course  to  lead  down  to 
them  :  whereupon   every  ship  is   to   steer   for  the 
ship  of  the  enemy  which  from  the  disposition  of  the 
two  squadrons  it  may  be  her  lot  to   engage,  not- 
withstanding the  signal  for  the  line  ahead  will  be 
kept  flying.1 

1 8.  When  to  windward  of  the  enemy  or  in  any 
other  position  that  will  admit,  for  the  headmost  ship 
to  lead  down  out  of  their  line  of  fire  and  attack  their 
rear,  the  second  from  the  leader  to  pass  under  her 
fire,  and  take  the  second  ship  of  the  enemy,  and  so 
on  in  succession.     To  engage  to  starboard  or  lar- 
board according  to  signal. 

19.  To  come  to  a  closer  engagement.2 

20.  For  particular  ships  to  quit  the  line. 

21.  For  particular  ships  to  attack  the  enemy's 
convoy.3 

22.  For  all  fireships  to  prime.4 

23.  On  discovering  a  superior  force. 

1  This  appears  to  correspond  to  Article  XXI.  of  the  Additional 
Fighting  Instructions  in  use  in  1780,  to  which  Rodney  referred  in 
his  report  on  the  action  of  April  1 7  in  that  year. 

2  Cf.  Boscawen's  No.  3.  3  Cf.  Boscawen's  No.  2. 
4  Cf.  Boscawen's  No.  17. 

Q2 


228      ADDITIONAL  INSTRUCTIONS 

24.  For  three-decked  and  heavy  ships  to  draw 
out  of  their  places  in  the  line  of  battle,  and  form  in 
the  van  or  rear  of  the  fleet. 

25.  To  attack  the  enemy's  centre.1 

26.  To  attack  the  enemy's  rear.1 

27.  To  attack  the  enemy's  van.1 

28.  To  make  sail  ahead  on  a  bearing  from  the 
admiral.2 

29.  In  cruising  to  form  line  ahead  or  abreast  at 
one  or  two  miles'  distance.3 

LORD  HOOUS  ADDITIONS,  1783.* 
[MS.  Signal  Book  in  the  Admiralty  Library.] 

1.  For  the  ships  to  steer   for  (independent   of 
each    other)    and    engage    respectively   the    ships 
opposed  to  them. 

2.  When  in  line  of  battle,  for  the  leading  ship  to 
carry  as  much  sail  as  her  commander  judges   the 
worst  sailing  ship  can  preserve  her  station  with  all 
her  plain  sail  set. 

3.  To  prepare  to  reef  topsails  together. 

1  In  connection  with  these  three  articles  the  following  dictum 
attributed    to   Rodney   should   be   recalled :     '  During    all    the 
commands  Lord  Rodney  has  been  entrusted  with  he  made  it  a 
rule  to  bring  his  whole  force  against  a  part  of  the  enemy's,  and 
never  was  so  absurd  as  to  bring  ship  to  ship  when  the  enemy 
gave  him  an  opportunity  of  acting  otherwise.'  And  cf.  supra^  p.  213. 

2  This  may  be  an  Additional  Sailing  Instruction. 

3  Cf.  Boscawen's   Nos.    5,    6   and   7.     A   number   of  other 
Additional  Instructions  are  referred  to,  but  they  seem  to  relate 
to  Sailing,  Chasing  or  General  Instructions.     No  more  Fighting 
Instructions  can  be  identified. 

4  See  pp.  2 1 1-2.     These  additional  signals  are  all  added  in 
paler  ink,  with  those  made  by  Admiral  Pigot.     In  the  original 
they  occur  on  various  pages  without  numbers.     In  the  text  above 
they  have  merely  been  numbered  consecutively  for  convenience 
of  reference.     Hood  was  made  a  viscount  September  12,  1782, 
and  began  to  issue  these  orders  on  March  u,  1783,  when  he  had 
a  squadron  placed  under  his  command. 


HOOD,    1783  229 

4.  When  in  line  of  battle  or  otherwise  for  the 
men  to  go  to  dinner. 

5.  After   an    action   for    the    ships    to    signify 
whether  they  are  in  a  condition  to  renew  it.1 

6.  For  ships  in  chase  or  looking  out   to   alter 
course  to  port  or  starboard. 

7.  To  stay   by   or   repair   to  the  protection  of 
prizes  or  ships  under  convoy. 

8.  When  fetching  up   with   the   enemy  and  to 
leeward,  or  on  a  contrary  tack,  to  break   through 
their  line,  and  to  endeavour  to  cut  off  part  of  their 
van  or  rear. 

9.  For   the   leading   ship   to   cut    through    the 
enemy's  line  of  battle. 

10.  To    signify    that    the    admiral    will    carry 
neither  top  nor  stern  lights.    Note. — The  fleet  imme- 
diately to  close. 

1 1.  For    particular    ships    to    reconnoitre    the 
enemy  in  view,  and  to  return  to  make  known  their 
number  and  force. 

12.  For  a  particular  ship  to  keep  between  the 
fleet  and  that  of  the  enemy  during  the  night,   to 
communicate  intelligence.2 

13.  To  signify  to  a  ship  that  she  mistakes  the 
signal  that  was  made  to  her. 

14.  To   prepare    to   hoist    French   or    Spanish 
colours. 

15.  For  a  particular  ship  to  open  her  fire  on  the 
ship  opposed  to  her. 

1 6.  When  a  ship  is  in  distress  in  battle. 

17.  Signal  to  call  attention  of  larboard  or  star- 
board line  of  the  division  only.3 

1  Ascribed  also  to  Pigot. 

2  Also  ascribed  to  Pigot. 

3  The  MS.  has  also  an  additional  signal  ascribed  to  Pigot  for 
a  particular  ship  to  cut  through  the  enemy's  line  of  battle,  and  for 
the  other  ships  to  follow  her  in  close  order  to  support  each  other. 


PART  IX 
THE   LAST   PHASE 

I.  LORD  HOWE'S  FIRST  SIGNAL  BOOK 

II.  SIGNAL  BOOKS  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

III.  NELSON'S  TACTICAL  MEMORANDA 

IV.  ADMIRAL  GAMBIER,  1807 

V.     LORD  COLLINGWOOD,  1808-1810 

VI.    SIR  ALEXANDER   COCHRANE'S   INSTRUC- 
TIONS 

VII.     THE  SIGNAL  BOOK  OF  1816 


THE    NEW   SIGNAL   BOOK 
INSTRUCTIONS 

INTRODUCTORY 

THE  time-worn  Fighting  Instructions  of  Russell 
and  Rooke  with  their  accretion  of  Additional 
Instructions  did  not  survive  the  American  War. 
Some  time  in  that  fruitful  decade  of  naval  reform 
which  elapsed  between  the  peace  of  1783  and  the 
outbreak  of  the  Great  War  they  were  superseded. 
It  was  the  indefatigable  hand  of  Lord  Howe  that 
dealt  them  the  long-needed  blow,  and  when  the 
change  came  it  was  sweeping.  It  was  no  mere 
substitution  of  a  new  set  of  Instructions,  but  a 
complete  revolution  of  method.  The  basis  of  the 
new  tactical  code  was  no  longer  the  Fighting 
Instructions,  but  the  Signal  Book.  Signals  were  no 
longer  included  in  the  Instructions,  and  the  Instruc- 
tions sank  to  the  secondary  place  of  being  '  explana- 
tory '  to  the  Signal  Book.1 

1  The  first  attempt  to  provide  a  convenient  Signal  Book 
separate  from  the  Instructions  was  made  privately  by  one 
Jonathan  Greenwood  about  1715.  He  produced  a  small  12 mo. 
volume  dedicated  to  Admiral  Edward  Russell,  Earl  of  Orford, 
and  the  other  lords  of  the  admiralty  who  were  then  serving  with 
him.  It  consists  of  a  whole  series  of  well-engraved  plates  of 
ships  flying  the  various  signals  contained  in  the  Sailing  and  Fight- 
ing Instructions,  each  properly  coloured  with  its  signification 


234  THE  LAST  PHASE 

• 

The  earliest  form  in  which  these  new  '  Explana- 
tory Instructions'  are  known  is  a  printed  volume  in 
the  Admiralty  Library  containing  a  complete  set  of 
Fleet  Instructions,  and  entitled  '  Instructions  for  the 
conduct  of  ships  of  war  explanatory  of  and  relative 
to  the  Signals  contained  in  the  Signal  Book  here- 
with delivered.'  The  Signal  Book  is  with  it.1 
Neither  volume  bears  any  date,  but  both  are  in  the 
old  folio  form  which  had  been  traditional  since  the 
seventeenth  century.  They  are  therefore  presum- 
ably earlier  than  1790  when  the  well-known  quarto 
form  first  came  into  use,  and  as  we  shall  see  from 
internal  evidence  they  cannot  have  been  earlier 
than  1782.  Nor  is  there  any  direct  evidence  that 
they  are  the  work  of  Lord  Howe,  but  the  'signifi- 
cations '  of  the  signals  bear  unmistakable  marks  of 
his  involved  and  cumbrous  style,  and  the  code  itself 
closely  resembles  that  he  used  during  the  Great 
War.  With  these  indications  to  guide  us  there  is 
little  difficulty  in  fixing  with  practical  certainty  both 
date  and  authorship  from  external  sources.2 

added  beneath.  The  author  says  he  designed  the  work  as  a 
pocket  companion  to  the  Printed  Instructions  and  for  the  use  of 
inferior  officers  who  had  not  access  to  them.  Copies  are  in  the 
British  Museum  and  the  R.U.S.I.  Library. 

1  Catalogue,  Nos.  252/27  and  252/26. 

2  A  still  earlier  Signal  Book  attributed  to  Lord  Howe  is  in 
the  United  Service  Institution,  but  it  is  no  more  than  a  condensed 
and  amended  form  of  the  established  one.    Its  nature  and  intention 
are  explained  by  No.  10  of  the  '  explanatory  observations  '  which  he 
attached  to  it.     It  is  as  follows :    '  All  the  signals  contained  in 
the  general  printed  Signal  Book  which  are  likely  to  be  needful  on 
the   present  occasion   being  provided   for  in  this   Signal   Book, 
the  signals  as  appointed  in  the  general  Signal  Book  will  only  be 
made  either  in  conformity  to  the  practice  of  some  senior  officer 
present,  or  when  in  company  for  the  time  being  with  other  ships 
not  of  the  fleet  under  the  admiral's  command,  and  unprovided 
with  these  particular  signals.'     It  was  therefore  probably  issued 
experimentally,  but  what  the  '  present  occasion '  was  is  not  indi- 
cated.    It  contains  none  of  the  additional  signals  of  1782-3. 


CHARLES  H.   KNOWLES     235 

In  a  pamphlet  published  by  Admiral  Sir  Charles 
Henry  Knowles  in  1830,  when  he  was  a  very  old 
man,  he  claims  to  have  invented  the  new  code  of 
numerical  signals  which  Howe  adopted.  The  pam- 
phlet is  entitled  '  Observations  on  Naval  Tactics 
and  on  the  Claims  of  Clerk  of  Eldin,'  and  in  the 
course  of  it  he  says  that  about  1777  he  devised  this 
new  system  of  signals,  and  gave  it  to  Howe  on  his 
arrival  in  the  summer  of  that  year  at  Newport,  in 
Rhode  Island,  'and  his  lordship,'  he  says,  'after- 
wards introduced  them  into  the  Channel  Fleet.' 
Further,  he  says,  he  soon  after  invented  the  tabular 
system  of  flags  suggested  by  the  chess-board,  and 
published  them  in  the  summer  of  1778.  To  this 
work  he  prefixed  as  a  preface  the  observations  of 
his  father,  Sir  Charles  Knowles,  condemning  the 
existing  form  of  sailing  order,  and  recommending 
Pere  Hoste's  old  form  in  three  columns,  and  this 
order,  he  says,  Howe  adopted  for  the  relief  of 
Gibraltar  in  September  1782.  He  also  infers  that 
the  alleged  adoption  of  his  signals  in  the  Channel 
Fleet  was  when  Lord  Howe  commanded  it  before 
he  became  first  lord  of  the  admiralty  for  the 
second  time — that  is,  before  he  succeeded  Keppel  in 
December  1 783.  For  during  the  peace  Knowles  tells 
us  he  made  a  second  communication  to  Howe  on 
tactics,  of  which  more  must  be  said  later  on.  The 
inference  therefore  is  that  when  Knowles  says  that 
Howe  adopted  his  code  in  the  Channel  Fleet  it 
must  have  been  the  first  time  he  took  command  of 
it — that  is,  on  April  2,  1782^ 

1  Knowles  was  of  course  too  old  in  1830  for  his  memory  to  be 
trusted  as  to  details.  A  note  in  his  handwriting  upon  a  copy 
of  his  code  in  possession  of  the  present  baronet  gives  its  story 
simply  as  follows:  'These  signals  were  written  in  1778,  as  an 
idea — altered  and  published— then  altered  again  in  1 780 — after- 
wards arranged  differently  in  1787,  and  finally  in  1794;  but  not 
printed  at  Sir  C.  H.  Knowles's  expense  until  1798,  when  they 


236  THE  LAST  PHASE 

Now  if,  as  Knowles  relates — and  there  is  no 
reason  to  doubt  this  part  of  his  story — Howe  did 
issue  a  new  code  of  signals  some  time  before  sailing 
for  Gibraltar  in  1782,  and  if  at  the  time,  as  Knowles 
also  says,  he  had  been  studying  Hoste,  internal  evi- 
dence shows  almost  conclusively  that  these  folios 
must  be  the  Signal  Book  in  question.  From  end 
to  end  the  influence  of  Hoste's  Treatise  and  of 
Rodney's  tactics  in  1782  is  unmistakable.1 

From  Hoste  it  takes  not  only  the  sailing  forma- 
tion in  three  columns,  but  re-introduces  into  the 
British  service  the  long-discarded  manoeuvre  of 
'doubling.'  For  this  there  are  three  signals,  Nos. 
222-4,  f°r  doubling  the  van,  doubling  the  rear, 
and  for  the  rear  to  double  the  rear.  From  Hoste 
also  it  borrows  the  method  of  giving  battle  to  a 
superior  force,  which  the  French  writer  apparently 
borrowed  from  Torrington.  The  signification  of 
the  signal  is  as  follows  :  '  No.  232.  When  inferior 
in  number  to  the  enemy,  and  to  prevent  being 
doubled  upon  in  the  van  or  rear,  for  the  van 
squadron  to  engage  the  headmost  ships  of  the 
enemy's  line,  the  rear  their  sternmost,  and  the 
centre  that  of  the  enemy,  whose  surplus  ships  will 
then  be  left  out  of  action  in  the  vacant  spaces 
between  our  squadrons.' 

The  author's  obligations  to  the  recent  campaigns 
of  Rodney  and  Hood  are  equally  clear.  Signal  236 
is,  *  For  ships  to  steer  for  independent  of  each  other 
and  engage  respectively  the  ships  opposed  to  them  in 
the  enemy's  line,'  and  this  was  a  new  form  of  the  signal, 
which,  according  to  the  MS.  Signal  Book  of  1782, 

were  sent  to  the  admiralty,  but  they  were  not  published,  although 
copies  have  been  given  to  sea  officers.' 

1  A  partial  translation  of  Hoste  had  been  published  by  Lieu- 
tenant Christopher  O'Bryen,  R.N.,  in  1762.  Captain  BoswalPs 
complete  translation  was  not  issued  till  1834. 


HOWE'S  FIRST  CODE  237 

was  introduced  by  Hood.1  Still  more  significant  is 
Signal  235,  '  when  fetching  up  with  the  enemy  to 
leeward,  and  on  the  contrary  tack,  to  break  through 
their  line  and  endeavour  to  cut  off  part  of  their 
van  or  rear.'  This  is  clearly  the  outcome  of 
Rodney's  famous  manoeuvre,  and  is  adopted  word 
for  word  from  the  signification  of  the  signal  that 
Hood  added.  Pigot,  it  will  be  remembered,  on 
succeeding  Rodney,  added  two  more  on  the  same 
subject,  viz.  ( i )  '  For  the  leading  ship  to  cut  through 
the  enemy's  line  of  battle,'  and  (2)  '  For  a  parti- 
cular ship  specified  to  cut  through  the  enemy's 
line  of  battle,  and  for  all  the  other  ships  to  follow 
her  in  close  order  to  support  each  other.'  Neither 
of  these  later  signals  is  in  the  code  we  are  con- 
sidering, and  the  presumption  is  that  it  was  drawn 
up  very  soon  after  Rodney's  victory  and  before 
Pigot's  signals  were  known  at  home. 

Finally  there  is  a  MS.  note  added  by  Sir  Charles 
H.  Knowles  to  his  '  Fighting  and  Sailing  Instruc- 
tions,' to  the  effect  that  in  the  instructions  issued 
by  Howe  in  1782  he  modified  Article  XXI.  of  the 
old  Fighting  Instructions  (i.e.  Article  XX.  of  Rus- 
sell's). '  His  lordship  in  1782,'  it  says,  'directed  by 
his  instructions  that  the  line  [i.e.  his  own  line] 
should  not  be  broken  until  all  the  enemy's  ships 
gave  way  and  were  beaten.'  And  this  is  practically 
the  effect  of  Article  XIV.  of  the  set  we  are  consi- 
dering. In  the  absence  of  contrary  evidence,  there- 
fore, there  seems  good  ground  for  calling  these  folio 
volumes  'Howe's  First  Signal  Book,  1782,'  and 
with  this  tentative  attribution  the  Explanatory 
Instructions  are  printed  below. 

1  Note  that  the  signal  differs  from  that  which  Rodney  made 
under  Article  17  of  the  Additional  Fighting  Instructions  in  his 
action  of  April  17,  1780,  and  which  being  misunderstood  spoilt  his 
whole  attack. 


238  THE  LAST  PHASE 

As  has  been  already  said,  these  instructions, 
divorced  as  they  now  were  from  the  signals,  give 
but  a  very  inadequate  idea  of  the  tactics  in  vogue. 
For  this  we  must  go  to  the  tactical  signals  themselves. 
In  the  present  case  the  more  important  ones  (besides 
those  given  above)  are  as  follows  : 

'No.  218.  To  attack  the  enemy's  rear  in  suc- 
cession by  ranging  up  with  and  opening  upon  the 
sternmost  of  their  ships  ;  then  to  tack  or  veer,  as 
being  to  windward  or  to  leeward  of  the  enemy,  and 
form  again  in  the  rear.'  This  signal,  which  at  first 
sight  looks  like  a  curious  reversion  to  the  primitive 
Elizabethan  method  of  attack,  immediately  follows 
the  signals  for  engaging  at  anchor,  and  may  have 
been  the  outcome  of  Hood's  experience  with  De 
Grasse  in  1782. 

'  No.  232.  In  working  to  gain  the  wind  of  the 
enemy,  for  the  headmost  and  sternmost  ships  to 
signify  when  they  can  weather  them  by  Signal  17, 
p.  66  ;  or  if  to  windward  of  the  enemy  and  on  the 
contrary  tack,  for  the  sternmost  ship  to  signify  when 
she  is  far  enough  astern  of  their  rear  to  be  able  to 
lead  down  out  of  their  line  of  fire.' 

'  No.  234.  When  coming  up  astern  and  to 
windward  of  the  enemy  to  engage  by  inverting  the 
line ' — that  is,  for  the  ship  leading  the  van  to  engage 
the  sternmost  of  the  enemy,  the  next  ship  to  pass 
on  under  cover  of  her  fire  and  engage  the  second 
from  the  enemy's  rear,  and  so  on. 


HOWE'S  FIRST  CODE  239 


LORD  HOWE,   1782. 
[Admiralty  Library  252/27.] 

Instructions  respecting  the  Order  of  Battle  and  con- 
duct of  the  fleet,  preparative  to  and  in  action 
with  the  enemy. 

Article  I.  When  the  signal  is  made  for  the  fleet 
to  form  in  order  of  battle,  each  captain  or  commander 
is  to  get  most  speedily  into  his  station,  and  keep 
the  prescribed  distance  from  his  seconds  ahead  and 
astern  upon  the  course  steered,  and  under  a  propor- 
tion of  sail  suited  to  that  carried  by  the  admiral. 

But  when  the  signal  is  made  for  tacking,  or  on 
any  similar  occasion,  care  is  to  be  taken  to  open,  in 
succession,  to  a  sufficient  distance  for  performing  the 
intended  evolution.  And  the  ships  are  to  close  back 
to  their  former  distance  respectively  as  soon  as  it 
has  been  executed. 

II.  In  line  of  battle,  the  flag  of  the  admiral  com- 
manding in  chief  is  always  to  be  considered  as  the 
point  of  direction  to  the  whole  fleet,  for  forming  and 
preserving  the  line. 

III.  The  squadron  of  the  second  in  command  is 
to  lead  when  forming  the  line  ahead,  and  to  take 
the  starboard  side  of  the  centre  when  forming  the 
line  abreast,  unless  signal  is  made  to  the  contrary ; 
these  positions  however  are  only  restrained  to  the 
first  forming  of  the  lines  from  the  order  of  sailing. 

For  when  the  fleet  is  formed  upon  a  line,  then  in 
all  subsequent  evolutions  the  squadrons  are  not  to 
change  their  places,  but  preserve  the  same  situation 
in  the  line  whatever  position  it  may  bring  them  into 
with  the  centre,  with  respect  to  being  in  the  van  or 
the  rear,  on  the  starboard  or  larboard  side,  unless 
directed  so  to  do  by  signal. 


24o  THE  LAST  PHASE 

Suppose  the  fleet  sailing  in  line  ahead  on  the 
larboard  tack,  the  second  in  command  leading,  and 
signal  is  made  to  form  a  line  abreast  to  sail  large  or 
before  the  wind,  the  second  squadron  in  that  case  is 
to  form  on  the  larboard  side  of  the  centre. 

Again,  suppose  in  this  last  situation  signal  is 
made  to  haul  to  the  wind,  and  form  a  line  ahead  on 
the  starboard  tack,  in  this  case  the  squadron  of  the 
third  in  command  is  to  lead,  that  of  the  second  in 
command  forming  the  rear. 

And  when  from  a  line  ahead,  the  squadron  of  the 
second  in  command  leading,  the  admiral  would 
immediately  form  the  line  on  the  contrary  tack  by 
tacking  or  veering  together,  the  squadron  of  the 
third  in  command  will  then  become  the  van. 

These  evolutions  could  not  otherwise  be  per- 
formed with  regularity  and  expedition. 

When  forming  the  line  from  the  order  of  sailing, 
the  ships  of  each  squadron  are  to  be  ranged  with 
respect  to  each  other  in  the  line  in  the  same  manner 
as  when  in  order  of  sailing  each  squadron  in  one 
line ;  and,  as  when  the  second  in  command  is  in  the 
van,  the  headmost  ship  of  his  squadron  (in  sailing 
order)  becomes  the  leading  ship  of  the  line,  so  like- 
wise the  headmost  ship  of  the  third  squadron  (in 
sailing  order)  becomes  the  leading  ship  of  the  line, 
when  the  third  in  command  takes  the  van,  except 
when  the  signal  is  made  to  form  the  line  reversed. 

Ships  happening  to  have  been  previously  de- 
tached on  any  service,  separate  from  the  body  of 
the  fleet,  when  the  signal  for  forming  in  order  of 
battle  is  made,  are  not  meant  to  be  comprehended 
in  the  intention  of  it,  until  they  shall  first  have  been 
called  back  to  the  fleet  by  the  proper  signal. 

IV.  When  the  fleet  is  sailing  in  line  of  battle 
ahead,  the  course  is  to  be  taken  from  the  ship 
leading  the  van  upon  that  occasion  ;  the  others  in 


HOWE,    1782  241 

succession  being  to  steer  with  their  seconds  ahead 
respectively,  whilst  they  continue  to  be  regulated  by 
the  example  of  the  leading  ship.1 

V.  The  ships,  which  from  the  inequality  of  their 
rates  of  sailing  cannot  readily  keep  their  stations  in 
the  line,  are  not  to  obstruct  the  compliance  with  the 
intent  of  the  signal  in  others  ;  nor  to  hazard  throwing 
the  fleet  into  disorder  by  persisting  too  long  in  their 
endeavours  to  preserve  their  stations  under  such 
circumstances ;  but  they  are  to  fall  astern  and  form 
in  succession  in  the  rear  of  the  line. 

The  captains  of  such  ships  will  not  be  thereby 
left  in  a  situation  less  at  liberty  to  distinguish  them- 
selves ;  as  they  will  have  an  opportunity  to  render 
essential  service,  by  placing  their  ships  to  advantage 
when  arrived  up  with  the  enemy  already  engaged 
with  the  other  part  of  the  fleet. 

The  ships  next  in  succession  in  order  of  battle 
are  to  occupy  in  turn,  on  this  and  every  other 
similar  occasion,  the  vacant  spaces  that  would  be 
otherwise  left  in  the  line  ;  so  that  it  may  be  always 
kept  perfect  at  the  appointed  intervals  of  distance. 

And  when  the  fleet  is  sailing  large,  or  before 
the  wind,  in  order  of  battle,  and  the  admiral  makes 
the  signal  for  coming  to  the  wind  on  either  tack,  the 
ship  stationed  to  lead  the  line  on  that  tack,  first,  and 
the  others  in  succession,  as  they  arrive  in  the  wake 
of  that  ship  and  of  their  seconds  ahead  respectively, 
are  to  haul  to  the  wind  without  loss  of  time  accord- 
ing1^. 

And  all  the  signals  for  regulating  the  course  and 

motions  of  the  fleet  by  day  or  night,  after  the  signal 
for  forming  in  order  of  battle  has  been  made,  are  to 
be  understood  with  reference  to  the  continuance  of 
the  fleet  in  such  order,  until  the  general  signal  to 

1  This  and  Article  II.  appear  to  be  the  first  mention  of  work- 
ing the  fleet  by  '  guides.' 


242  THE  LAST  PHASE 

chase,  or  to  form  again  in  order  of  sailing,  is  put 
abroad. 

VI.  When   the    fleet    is    formed   on    any   line 
pointed   out   by   the   compass   signal,  the   relative 
bearing  of  the  ships  from  each  other  is  to  be  pre- 
served through  every  change  of  course   made,  as 
often  as  any  alteration  thereof  together  shall  be  by 
signal  directed.1 

When,  on  the  contrary,  the  signal  to  alter  the 
course  in  succession  has  been  put  abroad,  the 
relative  bearing  of  the  ships  from  each  other  will 
be  then  consequently  changed ;  and  any  alteration 
of  the  course  subsequently  directed  to  be  made  by 
the  ships  together  will  thereafter  have  reference  to 
the  relative  bearing  last  established.  The  same 
distinction  will  take  place  so  often  as  the  altera- 
tion of  course  in  succession,  as  aforesaid,  shall  in 
future  recur. 

VII.  If  the   admiral   should   observe   that    the 
enemy  has  altered  his  course,  and  the  disposition  of 
his  order  of  battle,  one,  two,  three,  or  any  greater 
number  of  points  (in  which  case  it  will  be  necessary 
to  make  a  suitable  change  in   the  bearing  of  the 
ships  from  each  other  in  the  British  fleet,  supposed 
to  be  formed  in  such  respects  correspondently  to  the 
first  position  of  the  enemy),  he  will  make  the  signal 
for  altering  course  in  succession,  according  to  the 
nature   of  the  occasion.     The  leading  ship  of  the 
line  is  thereupon  immediately  to  alter  to  the  course 
pointed  out ;   and    (the  others  taking  their   places 
astern  of  her  in  succession,  as  they  arrive  in  the 
wake    of  that    ship    and   of    their   seconds   ahead 
respectively)  she  is  to  lead  the  fleet  in  line  of  battle 

1  The  original  has  here  the  following  erasure  :  '  The  same  is 
to  be  understood  of  the  bearing  indicated,  though  the  admiral 
should  shape  his  course  from  the  wind  originally  when  the  signal 
for  forming  upon  a  line  of  bearing  is  made.' 


HOWE,    1782  243 

ahead    on   the    course    so    denoted,  until    farther 
order. 

VIII.  When  it  is  necessary  to  shorten  or  make 
more  sail  whilst  the  fleet  is  in  order  of  battle,  and 
the  proper  signal  in  either  case  has  been  made,  the 
fleet  is  to  be  regulated  by  the  example  of  the  frigate 
appointed  to  repeat  signals ;  which  frigate  is  to  set 
or  take  in  the  sail  the  admiral  is  observed  to  do. 

The  ship  referred  to  is  thereupon  to  suit  her  sail 
to  the  known  comparative  rate  of  sailing  between 
her  and  the  admiral's  ship. 

Hence  it  will  be  necessary  that  the  captains  of 
the  fleet  be  very  attentive  to  acquire  a  perfect 
knowledge  of  the  comparative  rate  of  sailing 
between  their  own  and  the  admiral's  ship,  so  as 
under  whatever  sail  the  admiral  may  be,  they  may 
know  what  proportion  to  carry,  to  go  at  an  equal 
rate  with  him. 

IX.  When,  the  ships  of  the  fleet  being  more  in 
number  than  the  enemy,  the  admiral  sees  proper  to 
order  any  particular  ships  to  withdraw  from  the  line, 
they  are  to  be  placed  in  a  proper  situation,  in 
readiness  to  be  employed  occasionally  as  circum- 
stances may  thereafter  require — to  windward  of  the 
fleet,  if  then  having  the  weather-gage  of  the  enemy, 
or  towards  the  van  and  ahead,  if  the  contrary — to 
relieve,  or  go  to  the  assistance  of  any  disabled  ship, 
or  otherwise  act,  as  by  signal  directed. 

The  captains  of  ships,  stationed  next  astern  of 
those  so  withdrawn,  are  directly  to  close  to  the  van, 
and  fill  up  the  vacant  spaces  thereby  made  in  the 
line. 

When,  in  presence  of  an  enemy,  the  admiral 
or  commander  of  any  division  of  the  fleet  finds  it 
necessary  to  change  his  station  in  the  line,  in  order 
to  oppose  himself  against  the  admiral  or  com- 
mander in  a  similar  part  of  the  enemy's  line,  he  will 

R  2 


244  THE  LAST  PHASE 

make  the  signal  for  that  purpose  ;  and  the  ships 
referred  to  on  this  occasion  are  to  place  themselves 
forthwith  against  the  ships  of  the  enemy,  that 
would  otherwise  by  such  alteration  remain  unop- 
posed. 

X.  When  the  fleet  is  sailing  in  a  line  of  battle 
ahead,  or  upon  any  other  bearing,  and  the  signal  is 
made  for  the  ships  to  keep  in  more  open  order,  it 
will  be  generally  meant  that  they  should  keep  from 
one  to  two  cables'  length  asunder,  according  as  the 
milder  or  rougher  state  of  the  weather  may  require  ; 
also  that  they  should  close  to  the  distance  of  half  a 
cable,  or  at  least  a  cable's  length,  in  similar  circum- 
stances, when  the  signal  for  that  purpose  is  put 
abroad. 

But  in  both  cases,  the  distance  pointed  out  to 
the  admiral's  second  ahead  and  astern,  by  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  flag  abroad,  as  intimated  in  the 
Signal  Book,  is  to  be  signified  from  them  respec- 
tively to  the  ships  succeeding  them  on  either  part, 
by  signals. 

These  signals  are  to  be  continued  either  way, 
onward,  throughout  the  line  if  necessary. 

Notice  is  to  be  taken,  in  the  same  manner,  of 
any  continued  deviation  from  the  limited  distance  ; 
and  to  commence  between  the  several  commanders 
of  private  ships  respectively,  independent  of  the 
admiral's  previous  example,  when  they  observe 
their  seconds  ahead  or  astern  to  be  at  any  time 
separated  from  them,  further  than  the  regulated 
distance  kept  by  the  ships  next  to  the  admiral,  or 
that  which  was  last  appointed. 

When  the  admiral,  being  before  withdrawn 
from  the  line,  means  to  resume  his  station  therein, 
he  will  make  the  signal  for  the  particular  ships,  be- 
tween which  he  means  to  place  himself,  to  open  to 
a  greater  distance,  whether  it  be  in  his  former  station, 


HOWE,    1782  245 

or  in  any  other  part  of  the  line,  better  suited  for  his 
future  purpose. 

XI.  When  any  number  of  ships  is  occasionally 
detached  from  the  fleet  for  the  same  purpose,  they 
are,  during  their  separation  from  the  body  of  the 
fleet,   to  comply  with  all  such  signals  as  shall  be 
made  at  any  time,  whilst  the  signal  flag  appropriated 
for  that  occasion  remains  abroad. 

But  the  signals  made  to  all  ships  so  appointed, 
having  the  commander  of  a  squadron  or  division 
with  them,  will  be  under  the  flag  descriptive  of  such 
commander's  squadron  or  division,  whose  signals 
and  instructions  they  are  to  obey. 

XII.  Great  care  is  to  be  taken  at  all  times  when 
coming  to  action  not  to  fire  upon  the  enemy  either 
over   or  near  any  ships  of  the  fleet,  liable  to  be 
injured  thereby  ;  nor,  when  in  order  of  battle,  until 
the  proper  signal  is  made,  and  that  the  ships  are 
properly  placed  in  respect  to  situation  and  distance, 
although    the    signal    may   have    been    before   put 
abroad. 

And  if,  when  the  signal  for  battle  is  made,  the 
ships  are  then  steering  down  for  the  enemy  in  an 
oblique  direction  from  each  other,  they  are  to  haul 
to  the  wind,  or  to  any  order  parallel  with  the  enemy, 
to  engage  them  as  they  arrive  in  a  proper  situation 
and  distance,  without  waiting  for  any  more  particular 
signal  or  order  for  that  purpose  :  regard  being  only 
had  by  the  several  commanders  in  these  circum- 
stances to  the  motions  of  the  ships  preceding  them 
on  the  tack  whereunto  the  course  more  inclines,  and 
upon  and  towards  which  the  enemy  is  formed  for 
action,  that  they  may  have  convenient  space  for 
hauling  up  clear  of  each  other. 

When  our  fleet  is  upon  the  contrary  tack  to  that 
of  the  enemy,  and  standing  towards  them,  and  the 
admiral  makes  the  signal  to  engage,  the  van  ship 


246  THE  LAST  PHASE 

is  then  to  lead  close  along  their  line,  with  a  moderate 
sail,  and  engage ;  the  rest  of  the  fleet  doing  the 
same,  passing  to  windward  or  to  leeward  of  the 
enemy,  as  the  admiral  may  direct. 

XIII.  When  weathering   the  enemy  upon  the 
contrary  tack,  and  signal  is  made  to  engage  their 
van,  the  leading  ship  is  then  to  bear  down  to  the 
van  ship  of  the  enemy,  and  engage,  passing  along 
their  line  to  windward  to  the  sternmost  ship  of  their 
van  squadron,  then  to  haul  off  close  to  the  wind,  the 
rest  of  the  fleet  doing  the  same  in  succession.1 

XIV.  No  ship  is  to  separate  in  time  of  action 
from  the  body  of  the  fleet,  in  pursuit  of  any  small 
number  of  the  enemy's  ships  beaten  out  of  the  line  ; 
nor  until  their  main  body  be  also  disabled  or  broken  : 
but  the  captains,  who  have  disabled  or  forced  their 
opponents  out   of  the  line,  are   to   use   their  best 
endeavours  to  assist  any  ship  of  the  fleet  appearing 
to  be  much  pressed,  or  the  ships  nearest  to  them,  to 
hasten  the  defeat  of  the  enemy,  unless  otherwise  by 
signal,  or  particular  instruction,  directed.2 

XV.  When   any   ship   in  the  fleet  is  so  much 
disabled  as  to  be  in  the  utmost  danger  and  hazard 
of  being  taken  by  the  enemy,  or  destroyed,  and 
makes  the  signal  expressive  of  such  extremity  ;  the 
Captains  of  the  nearest  ships,  most  at  liberty  with 
respect  to  the  state  of  their  opponents  in  the  enemy's 
line,  are  strictly  enjoined  to  give  all  possible  aid 
and  protection  to  such  disabled  ship,  as  they  are 
best  able.     And  the  captain  of  any  frigate  (or  fire- 
ship)  happening  to  be  at  that  time  in  a  situation 
convenient  for  the  purpose,  is  equally  required  to 

1  It  was  Nelson's  improvement  on  this  unscientific  method  of 
attack  that  is  the  conspicuous  feature  of  his  Memorandum,  1803, 
but  it  must  be  remembered  that  Howe  had  not  yet  devised  the 
manreuvre  of  breaking  the  line  in  all  parts  on  which  Nelson's 
improvement  was  founded. 

8  Cf.  note  i,  p.  224. 


HOWE,    1782  247 

use  his  utmost  endeavours  for  the  relief  of  such 
disabled  ship,  by  joining  in  the  attack  of  the  ship  of 
the  enemy  opposed  to  the  disabled  ship,  if  he  sees 
opportunity  to  place  his  ship  to  advantage,  by 
favouring  the  attempt  of  the  fireship  to  lay  the 
enemy  on  board,  or  by  taking  out  any  of  the  crew 
of  the  disabled  ship,  if  practicable  and  necessary,  as 
may  be  most  expedient. 

XVI.  No    captain,    though    much    pressed    by 
the  enemy,  is  to  quit  his  station  in  time  of  battle,  if 
possible   to   be   avoided,    without   permission   first 
obtained  from  the  commanding  officer  of  his  divi- 
sion, or  other  nearest  flag  officer,  for  that  purpose  ; 
but,   when    compelled    thereto  by  extreme   neces- 
sity before  any  adequate  assistance  is  furnished,  or 
that  he  is  ordered  out  of  the  line  on  that  account, 
the   nearest  ships  and   those  on  each  part  of  the 
disabled   ship's   station   are  timely   to  occupy   the 
vacant  space  occasioned  by  her  absence,  before  the 
enemy  can  take  advantage  thereof. 

And  if  any  captain  shall  be  wanting  in  the  due 
performance  of  his  duty  in  time  of  battle,  the 
commander  of  the  division,  or  other  flag  officer 
nearest  to  him,  is  immediately  to  remove  such 
deficient  captain  from  his  post,  and  appoint  another 
commander  to  take  the  charge  and  conduct  of  the 
ship  on  that  occasion. 

XVII.  When,  from  the  advantage  obtained  by 
the   enemy  over  the  fleet,   or   from  bad   weather, 
or  otherwise,  the  admiral  hath  by  signal  signified 
his  intention  to  leave  the  captains  and  other  com- 
manders at  liberty  to  proceed  at  their  discretion  ; 
they  are  then  permitted  to   act   as  they  see  best 
under   such    circumstances,    for    the   good    of  the 
king's  service  and  the  preservation  of  their  ships, 
without    regard   to   his   example.       But    they   are, 
nevertheless,  to  endeavour  at  all  times  to  gain  the 


248  THE  LAST  PHASE 

appointed  rendezvous  in  preference,  if  it  can  be  done 
with  safety. 

XVIII.  The  ships  are  to  be  kept  at  all  times 
prepared  in  readiness  for  action.     And  in  case  of 
coming  to  an   engagement  with  the   enemy,  their 
boats  are  to  be  kept  manned  and  armed,  and  pre- 
pared with  hand  and  fire-chain  grapnels,  and  other 
requisites,  on  the  off-side  from  the  enemy,  for  the 
purpose  of  assisting  any  ship  of  the  fleet  attempted 
by  the  fireships  of  the   enemy  ;  or  for  supporting 
the  fireships  of  the  fleet  when  they  are  to  proceed 
on  service. 

The  ships  appointed  to  protect  and  cover  these 
last,  or  which  may  be  otherwise  in  a  situation  to 
countenance  their  operations,  are  to  take  on  board 
their  crews  occasionally,  and  proceed  before  them 
down,  as  near  as  possible,  to  the  ships  of  the 
enemy  they  are  destined  to  attempt. 

The  captains  of  such  ships  are  likewise  to  be 
particularly  attentive  to  employ  the  boats  they  are 
provided  with,  as  well  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the 
fireship's  boat,  as  to  prevent  the  endeavours  to  be 
expected  from  the  boats  of  the  enemy  to  intercept 
the  fireship,  or  in  any  other  manner  to  frustrate  the 
execution  of  the  proposed  undertaking.1 

XIX.  If  the   ship   of  any  flag   officer   be  dis- 
abled in   battle,   the  flag   officer    may  embark    on 
board  any  private   ship  that  he  sees  fit,  for  carry- 
ing on    the   service  :    but  it  is    to  be  of  his    own 


1  Howe's  insistence  on  these  points  both  here  and  in  Articles 
XXII. -XXV.  is  curious  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  use  of  fireships 
in  action  had  gone  out  of  fashion.  From  1714  to  1763  only  one 
English  fireship  is  known  to  have  been  '  expended,'  and  that  was 
by  Commander  Callis  when  he  destroyed  the  Spanish  galleys  at 
St.  Tropez  in  17/12.  At  the  peace  of  1783  the  Navy  List  contained 
only  1 7  fireships  out  of  a  total  of  468  sail.  Howe  had  two  fire- 
ships on  the  First  of  June,  1794,  but  did  not  use  them. 


HOWE,    1782  249 

squadron   or   division    in    preference  when  equally 
suitable  for  his  purpose. 

XX.  The  flag  officers,  or  commanders  of  divi- 
sions, are  on  all  occasions  to  repeat  generally,  as 
well  as  with  reference  to  their  respective  divisions, 
the   signals  from   the  admiral,  that   they   may   be 
thereby  more  speedily  communicated  correspondent 
to  his  intentions. 

And  the  purpose  of  all  signals  for  the  conduct 
of  particular  divisions  is  then  only  meant  to  be  carried 
into  execution  when  the  signal  has  been  repeated, 
or  made  by  the  commanders  of  such  particular 
divisions  respectively.  In  which  circumstances  they 
are  to  be  always  regarded  and  complied  with  by 
the  ships  or  divisions  referred  to,  in  the  same 
manner  as  if  such  signals  had  been  made  by  the 
admiral  commanding  in  chief. 

XXI.  When  ships  have  been  detached  to  attack 
the  enemy's  rear,  the  headmost  ship  of  such  detach- 
ment, and  the  rest  in  succession,  after  having  ranged 
up  their  line  as  far  is  judged  proper,  is  then  to  fall 
astern ;    and  (the   ship   that   next   follows   passing 
between  her  and  the  enemy)  is  to  tack  or  wear  as 
engaged  to  windward  or  leeward,  and  form  in  the 
rear  of  the  detachment. 

XXII.  When  the  fleet  is  to  tack  in  succession, 
the   ship  immediately  following  the  one  going  in 
stays  should  observe  to  bear  up  a  little,  to  give  her 
room  ;  and  the  moment  for  putting  in  stays  is  that 
when  a  ship  discovers  the  weather  quarter  of  her 
second   ahead,    and   which   has  just  tacked  before 
her. 

On  this  and  every  other  occasion,  when  the  fleet 
is  in  order  of  battle,  it  should  be  the  attention  of 
each  ship  strictly  to  regulate  her  motions  by  those 
of  the  one  preceding  her  ;  a  due  regard  to  such  a 
conduct  being  the  only  means  of  maintaining  the 


250  THE  LAST  PHASE 

prescribed  distance  between  the  ships,  and  of  pre- 
serving a  regular  order  throughout  the  line. 

XXIII.  As   soon    as    the    signal    is    made   to 
prepare  for  battle,   the    fireships   are  to  get    their 
boarding  grapnels  fixed  ;  and  when   in  presence  of 
an  enemy,  and  that  they  perceive  the  fleet  is  likely 
to  come  to  action,  they  are  to  prime  although  the 
signal  for  that  purpose  should  not  have  been  made  ; 
being   likewise  to  signify  when   they  are  ready  to 
proceed  on  service,  by  putting  abroad  the  appointed 
signal. 

They  are  to  place  themselves  abreast  of  the 
ships  of  the  line,  and  not  in  the  openings  between 
them,  the  better  to  be  sheltered  from  the  enemy's 
fire,  keeping  a  watchful  eye  upon  the  admiral, 
so  as  to  be  prepared  to  put  themselves  in  motion 
the  moment  their  signal  is  made,  which  they  are 
to  answer  as  soon  as  observed. 

A  fireship  ordered  to  proceed  on  service  is  to 
keep  a  little  ahead  and  to  windward  of  the  ship 
that  is  to  escort  her,  to  be  the  more  ready  to  bear 
down  on  the  vessel  she  is  to  board,  and  to  board 
if  possible  in  the  fore  shrouds.  By  proceeding  in 
this  manner  she  will  not  be  in  the  way  of  prevent- 
ing the  ship  appointed  to  escort  her  from  firing 
upon  the  enemy,  and  will  run  less  risk  of  being 
disabled  herself;  and  the  ship  so  appointed  and 
the  two  other  nearest  ships  are  to  assist  her  with 
their  boats  manned  and  armed. 

She  is  to  keep  her  yards  braced  up,  that  when 
she  goes  down  to  board,  and  has  approached  the 
ship  she  is  to  attempt,  she  may  have  nothing  to  do 
but  to  spring  her  luff. 

Captains  of  fireships  are  not  to  quit  them  till 
they  have  grappled  the  enemy,  and  have  set  fire  to 
the  train. 

XXIV.  Frigates  have  it  in  particular  charge  to 


HOWE,    1782  251 

frustrate  the  attempts  of  the  enemy's  fireships,  and 
to  favour  those  of  our  own.  When  a  fireship  of 
the  enemy  therefore  attempts  to  board  a  ship  of 
the  line,  they  are  to  endeavour  to  cut  off  the  boats 
that  attend  her,  and  even  to  board  her,  if  necessary. 

XXV.  The    boats  of  a  ship   attempted    by  an 
enemy's  fireship,  with  those  of  her  seconds   ahead 
and  astern,  are  to  use  their  utmost  efforts  to  tow 
her  off,   the  ships  at  the  same  time  firing  to  sink 
her. 

XXVI.  In  action,  all  the  ships  in  the  fleet  are 
to  wear  red  ensigns. 


252       THE  LAST  PHASE 


THE  SIGNAL  BOOKS  OF  THE  GREAT 

WAR 

INTRODUCTORY 

THE  second  form  in  which  the  new  Fighting 
Instructions,  originated  by  Lord  Howe,  have  come 
down  to  us,  is  that  which  became  fixed  in  the 
service  after  1 790 ;  that  is,  instead  of  two  folio 
volumes  with  the  Signals  in  one  and  the  Explana- 
tory Instructions  in  the  other,  we  have,  at  least  after 
1799,  one  small  quarto  containing  both,  and  entitled 
'  Signal  Book  for  Ships  of  War.'  The  earliest 
known  example,  however,  of  the  new  quarto  form 
is  a  Signal  Book  only,  which  refers  to  a  set  of 
Instructions  apparently  similar  to  those  of  1799. 
These  have  not  been  found,  but  presumably  they, 
were  in  a  separate  volume.  The  Signal  Book  is 
in  the  Admiralty  Library  labelled  in  manuscript 
'  1792-3  (?),'  but,  as  before,  no  date  or  signature 
appears  in  the  body  of  it.  From  internal  evidence, 
however,  as  well  as  from  collateral  testimony,  there 
is  little  difficulty  in  identifying  it  as  Lord  Howe's 
second  code  issued  in  1790. 

The  feature  of  the  book  that  first  strikes  us  is 
that,  though  the  bulk  of  it  is  printed,  all  the  most 
important  battle  signals,  as  well  as  many  others, 
have  been  added  in  MS.,  while  at  the  end  are  the 
words,  '  Given  on  board  the  Queen  Charlotte,  to 

Capt. ,  commander   of  his  majesty's  ship    the 

,  by  command   of  the   admiral.'      It   is   thus 


SIGNAL   BOOKS,    1790-1816  253 

obvious  that  the  original  printed  form,  which  con- 
tains many  further  unfilled  blanks  for  additional 
signals,  was  used  as  a  draft  for  a  later  edition. 
No  such  edition  is  known  to  exist  in  print,  but 
both  the  original  signals  and  the  additions  corre- 
spond exactly  with  the  MS.  code  which  was  used  by 
Lord  Howe  in  his  campaign  of  1794.  In  editing 
this  code  for  the  Society  in  his  Logs  of  the  Great  Sea 
Fights,  Admiral  Sturges  Jackson  hazarded  the  con- 
jecture that  it  had  not  then  been  printed,  but  was 
supplied  to  each  ship  in  the  fleet  in  MS.  The 
admiralty  volume  goes  far  to  support  his  conjecture, 
and  it  is  quite  possible  that  we  have  here  the  final 
draft  from  which  the  MS.  copies  were  made. 

As  to  the  actual  date  at  which  the  code  was 
completed  there  is  not  much  difficulty.  The  Queen 
Charlotte  was  Howe's  flagship  in  the  Channel  fleet 
from  1792-4,  but  it  was  also  his  flagship  in  1790  at 
the  time  of  the  '  Spanish  Armament,'  when  he  put 
to  sea  in  immediate  expectation  of  war  with  Spain. 
While  the  tension  lasted  he  is  known  to  have  used  the 
critical  period  in  exercising  his  fleet  in  tactical  evolu- 
tions, in  order  to  perfect  it  in  a  new  code  of  signals 
which  he  had  been  elaborating  for  several  years.1  It 
is  probable  therefore  that  this  Signal  Book  belongs 
to  that  year,  and  that  it  is  one  of  several  copies 
which  Howe  had  printed  with  the  battle  signals 
blank  for  his  own  use  while  he  was  elaborating  his 
system  by  practical  experiment.  This  conjecture  is 
brought  to  practical  certainty  by  a  rough  and  much- 
worn  copy  of  it  in  the  United  Service  Institution. 
It  was  made  by  Lieut.  John  Walsh,  of  H. M.S.  Marl- 
borough,  one  of  Howe's  fleet,  and  inside  the  cover 
he  has  written  '  Earl  Howe's  signals  by  which  the 
Grand  Fleet  was  governed  1790,  1791,  and  1/94.' 

It  was   upon  the   tactical  system   contained    in 
1  Dictionary  of  National  Biography,  sub  voce  'Howe,'  p.  97. 


254  THE  LAST  PHASE 

this  book  that  all  the  great  actions  of  the  Nelson 
period  were  fought.  The  alterations  which  took 
place  during  the  war  were  slight.  The  codes  used 
by  Howe  himself  in  1 794,  and  by  Duncan  at  Cam- 
perdown  in  1797,  follow  it  exactly.  A  slightly 
modified  form  was  issued  by  Jervis  to  the  Mediter- 
ranean fleet,  and  was  used  by  him  at  St.  Vincent  in 
1797.  No  copy  of  this  is  known  to  exist,  but  from 
the  logs  of  the  ships  there  engaged  it  would  appear 
that,  though  the  numbering  of  the  code  had  been 
changed,  the  principal  battle  signals  remained  the 
same.  In  1799  a  new  edition  was  printed  in  the 
small  quarto  form.  In  this  the  Signal  Book  and  the 
Instructions  were  bound  together,  and  were  issued  to 
the  whole  navy,  but  here  again,  though  the  numbers 
were  changed,  the  alterations  were  of  no  great  im- 
portance.1 Reprints  appeared  in  1806  and  1808, 
but  the  code  itself  continued  in  use  till  1816.  In 
that  year  an  entirely  new  Signal  Book  based  on  Sir 
Home  Popham's  code  was  issued  with  a  fresh  set 
of  Explanatory  Instructions,  or,  as  they  had  come  to 
be  called,  '  Instructions  relating  to  the  line  of  battle 
and  the  conduct  of  the  fleet  preparatory  to  their 
engaging  and  when  engaged  with  an  enemy.' 2  Both 
these  sets  of  '  Explanatory  Instructions'  are  printed 

1  A  copy   of   this   is   in   the   Admiralty   Library   issued   to 
'  Thomas  Lenox  Frederick  esq.,  Rear- Admiral  of  the  Blue,'  and 
attested  by  the  autographs  of  Vice- Admiral  James  Gambier,  Vice- 
Admiral  James  Young,  and  another  lord  of  the  admiralty,  and 
countersigned  by  William  Marsden,  the  famous  numismatist  and 
Oriental  scholar,  who  was  'second  secretary'  from  1795  to  1804. 
Another  copy,  also  in  the  Admiralty  Library,  is  attested  by  Gam- 
bier,  Sir  John  Colpoys  and  Admiral  Philip  Patton,  and  counter- 
signed by  the  new  second  secretary,  John  Barrow,  all  of  whom 
came  to  the  admiralty  under  Lord  Melville  on  Pitt's  return  to  office 
in  1804.     Two  other  copies  are  in  the  United  Service  Institution. 

2  Sir  Home  Popham's  code  had  been  in  use  for  many  years 
for  '  telegraphing.'     It  was  by  this  code  Nelson's  famous  signal 
was  made  at  Trafalgar. 


HOWE'S  MANCEUVRE  255 

below,  but,  as  we  have  seen,  they  throw  but  little  light 
by  themselves  on  the  progress  of  tactical  thought 
during  the  great  period  they  covered.  They  were 
no  longer  '  Fighting  Instructions  '  in  the  old  sense, 
unless  read  with  the  principal  battle  signals,  and  to 
these  we  have  to  go  to  get  at  the  ideas  that  under- 
lay the  tactics  of  Nelson  and  his  contemporaries. 

Now  the  most  remarkable  feature  of  Howe's 
Second  Signal  Book,  1790,  is  the  apparent  dis- 
appearance from  it  of  the  signal  for  breaking  the 
line  which  in  his  first  code,  1782,  he  had  borrowed 
from  Hood  in  consequence  of  Rodney's  manoeuvre. 
The  other  two  signals  introduced  by  Hood  and 
Pigot  for  breaking  the  line  on  Rodney's  plan  are 
equally  absent.  In  their  stead  appears  a  signal  for 
an  entirely  new  manoeuvre,  never  before  practised 
or  even  suggested,  so  far  as  is  known,  by  anyone. 
The  '  signification '  runs  as  follows :  'If,  when 
having  the  weather-gage  of  the  enemy,  the 
admiral  means  to  pass  between  the  ships  of  their 
line  for  engaging  them  to  leeward  or,  being  to 
leeward,  to  pass  between  them  for  obtaining  the 
weather-gage.  N.B. — The  different  captains  and 
commanders  not  being  able  to  effect  the  specified 
intention  in  either  case  are  at  liberty  to  act  as 
circumstances  require.'  In  the  Signal  Book  of 
1 799  the  wording  is  changed.  It  there  runs  'To 
break  through  the  enemy's  line  in  all  parts  where 
practicable,  and  engage  on  the  other  side,'  and 
in  the  admiralty  copy  delivered  to  Rear-Admiral 
Frederick  there  is  added  this  MS.  note,  '  If  a  blue 
pennant  is  hoisted  at  the  fore  topmast-head,  to  break 
through  the  van ;  if  at  the  main  topmast-head,  to 
break  through  the  centre  ;  if  at  the  mizen  topmast- 
head,  to  break  through  the  rear.' l 

1  In  one  of  the  United  Service  Institution  copies  the  signal 
has  been  added  in  MS.  and  the  note  is  on  a  slip  pasted  in.     In 


256  THE  LAST  PHASE 

This  form  of  the  signification  shows  that  the 
intention  of  the  signal  was  something  different 
from  what  is  usually  understood  in  naval  literature 
by  '  breaking  the  line.'  By  that  we  generally  under- 
stand the  manoeuvre  practised  by  Lord  Rodney  in 
1782,  a  manoeuvre  which  was  founded  on  the  con- 
ception of  '  leading  through '  the  enemy's  line  in 
line  ahead,  and  all  the  ships  indicated  passing 
through  in  succession  at  the  same  point.  Whereas 
in  Lord  Howe's  signal  the  tactical  idea  is  wholly 
different.  In  his  manoeuvre  the  conception  is  of  an 
attack  by  bearing  down  all  together  in  line  abreast 
or  line  of  bearing,  and  each  ship  passing  through 
the  enemy's  line  at  any  interval  it  found  practicable  ; 
and  this  was  actually  the  method  of  attack  which  he 
adopted  on  June  i,  1794.  In  intention  the  two 
signals  are  as  wide  as  the  poles  asunder.  In 
Rodney's  case  the  idea  was  to  sever  the  enemy's 
line  and  cut  off  part  of  it  from  the  rest.  In 
Howe's  case  the  idea  of  severing  the  line  is  sub- 
ordinate to  the  intention  of  securing  an  advantage 
by  engaging  on  the  opposite  side  from  which  the 
attack  is  made.  The  whole  of  the  attacking  fleet 
might  in  principle  pass  through  the  intervals  in  the 
enemy's  line  without  cutting  off  any  part  of  it.  In 
principle,  moreover,  the  new  attack  was  a  parallel 
attack  in  line  abreast  or  in  line  of  bearing,  whereas 
the  old  attack  was  a  perpendicular  or  oblique  attack 
in  line  ahead. 

Nothing  perhaps  in  naval  literature  is  more 
remarkable  than  the  fact  that  this  fundamental 
difference  is  never  insisted  on,  or  even,  it  may  be 
said,  so  much  as  recognised.  Whenever  we  read 
of  a  movement  for  breaking  the  line  in  this 
period  it  is  almost  always  accompanied  with  remarks 

the  other  both  signal  and  note  are  printed  with  blanks  in  which 
the  distinguishing  pennants  have  been  written  in. 


HOWES  MANCEUVRE  257 

which  assume  that  Rodney's  manoeuvre  is  intended 
and  not  Howe's.  Probably  it  is  Nelson  who  is  to 
blame.  At  Trafalgar,  after  carefully  elaborating  an 
attack  based  on  Howe's  method  of  line  abreast,  he 
delivered  it  in  line  ahead,  as  though  he  had  in- 
tended to  use  Rodney's  method.  His  reasons  were 
sound  enough,  as  will  be  seen  later.  But  as  a  piece 
of  scientific  tactics  it  was  as  though  an  engineer 
besieging  a  fortress,  instead  of  drawing  his  lines  of 
approach  diagonally,  were  to  make  them  at  right 
angles  to  the  ditch.  When  the  greatest  of  the 
admirals  apparently  (but  only  apparently)  confused 
the  two  antagonistic  conceptions  of  breaking  the 
line,  there  is  much  excuse  for  civilian  writers  being 
confused  in  fact. 

The  real  interest  of  the  matter,  however,  is  to 
inquire,  firstly,  by  what  process  of  thought  Howe 
in  his  second  code  discarded  Rodney's  manoeuvre 
as  the  primary  meaning  of  his  signal  after  having 
adopted  it  in  his  first,  and,  secondly,  how  and  to 
what  end  did  he  arrive  at  his  own  method. 

On  the  first  point  there  can  be  little  doubt.  Sir 
Charles  H.  Knowles  gives  us  to  understand  that 
Howe  still  had  Hoste's  Treatise  at  his  elbow,  and 
with  Hoste  for  his  mentor  we  may  be  sure  that,  in 
common  with  other  tactical  students  of  his  time,  he 
soon  convinced  himself  that  Rodney's  manoeuvre  was 
usually  dangerous  and  always  imperfect.  Knowles 
himself  in  his  old  age,  though  a  devout  admirer  of 
Rodney,  denounced  it  in  language  of  characteristic 
violence,  and  maintained  to  the  last  that  Rodney 
never  intended  it,  as  every  one  now  agrees  was  the 
truth.  Nelson  presumably  also  approved  Howe's 
cardinal  improvement,  or  even  in  his  most  impulsive 
mood  he  would  hardly  have  called  him  '  the  first  and 
greatest  sea  officer  the  world  has  ever  produced.' l 

1  Nelson  to  Howe,  January  8,  1799.     Nicolas^  Hi.  230. 

S 


258  THE  LAST  PHASE 

As  to  the  second  point — the  fundamental  in- 
tention of  the  new  manoeuvre — we  get  again  a 
valuable  hint  from  Knowles.  Upon  his  second 
visit  to  the  admiralty,  after  Howe  had  succeeded 
Keppel  at  the  end  of  1783,  Knowles  brought  with 
him  by  request  a  tactical  treatise  written  by  his 
father,  as  well  as  certain  of  his  own  tactical  studies, 
and  discussed  with  Howe  a  certain  manoeuvre 
which  he  believed  the  French  employed  for  avoid- 
ing decisive  actions.  He  showed  that  when 
engaged  to  leeward  they  fell  off  by  alternate  ships 
as  soon  as  they  were  hard  pressed,  and  kept  reform- 
ing their  line  to  leeward,  so  that  the  British  had 
continually  to  bear  up,  and  expose  themselves  to  be 
raked  aloft  in  order  to  close  again.  In  this  way, 
as  he  pointed  out,  the  French  were  always  able  to 
clip  the  British  wings  without  receiving  any  deci- 
sive injury  themselves.  In  a  MS.  note  to  his 
'Fighting  and  Sailing  Instructions,'  he  puts  the 
matter  quite  clearly.  '  In  the  battle  off  Granada,' 
he  says,  'in  the  year  1779  the  French  ships  par- 
tially executed  this  manoeuvre,  and  Sir  Charles  [H.] 
Knowles  (then  5th  lieutenant  of  the  Prince  of  Wales 
of  74  guns,  the  flagship  of  the  Hon.  Admiral  Bar- 
rington)  drew  this  manoeuvre,  and  which  he  showed 
Admiral  Lord  Howe,  when  first  lord  of  the  ad- 
miralty, during  the  peace.  His  lordship  established 
a  signal  to  break  through  the  enemy's  line  and 
engage  on  the  other  side  to  leeward,  and  which  he 
executed  himself  in  the  battle  of  the  ist  of  June, 
1794.'  The  note  adds  that  before  Knowles  drew 
Howe's  attention  to  the  supposed  French  manoeuvre 
he  had  been  content  with  his  original  Article  XIV., 
modifying  Article  XXI.  of  the  old  Fighting  In- 
structions as  already  explained.  Whether  therefore 
Knowles's  account  is  precisely  accurate  or  not,  we 
may  take  it  as  certain  that  it  was  to  baffle  the 


BREAKING    THE  LINE  259 

French  practice  of  avoiding  close  action  by  falling 
away  to  leeward  that  Howe  hit  on  his  brilliant  con- 
ception of  breaking  through  their  line  in  all  parts. 

No  finer  manoeuvre  was  ever  designed.  In  the 
first  place  it  developed  the  utmost  fire-face  by  bring- 
ing both  broadsides  into  play.  Secondly,  by  break- 
ing up  the  enemy's  line  into  fragments  it  deprived 
their  admiral  of  any  shadow  of  control  over  the 
part  attacked.  Thirdly,  by  seizing  the  leeward 
position  (the  essential  postulate  of  the  French  method 
of  fighting)  it  prevented  individual  captains  making 
good  their  escape  independently  to  leeward  and 
ensured  a  decisive  mHe'e,  such  as  Nelson  aimed  at. 
And,  fourthly,  it  permitted  a  concentration  on  any 
part  of  the  enemy's  line,  since  it  actually  severed 
it  at  any  desired  point  quite  as  effectually  as  did 
Rodney's  method.  Whether  Howe  ever  appre- 
ciated the  importance  of  concentration  to  the  extent 
it  was  felt  by  Nelson,  Hood  and  Rodney  is  doubt- 
ful. Yet  his  invention  did  provide  the  best  pos- 
sible form  of  concentrated  attack.  It  had  over 
Rodney's  imperfect  manoeuvre  this  inestimable  ad- 
vantage, that  by  the  very  act  of  breaking  the  line 
you  threw  upon  the  severed  portion  an  overwhelm- 
ing attack  of  the  most  violent  kind,  and  with  the 
utmost  development  of  fire-surface.  Finally  it 
could  not  be  parried  as  Rodney's  usually  could  in 
Hoste's  orthodox  way  by  the  enemy's  standing  away 
together  upon  the  same  tack.  By  superior  gunnery 
Howe's  attack  might  be  stopped,  but  by  no  possibility 
could  it  be  avoided  except  by  flight.  It  was  no 
wonder  then  that  Howe's  invention  was  received 
with  enthusiasm  by  such  men  as  Nelson. 

Still  it  is  clear  that  in  certain  cases,  and 
especially  in  making  an  attack  from  the  leeward, 
as  Clerk  of  Eldin  had  pointed  out,  and  where  it 
was  desirable  to  preserve  your  own  line  intact, 

s  2 


26o  THE  LAST  PHASE 

Rodney's  manoeuvre  might  still  be  the  best.  Howe's 
manoeuvre  moreover  supplied  its  chief  imperfec- 
tion, for  it  provided  a  method  of  dealing  drastically 
with  the  portion  of  the  enemy's  line  that  had  been 
cut  off.  Thus,  although  it  is  not  traceable  in  the 
Signal  Book,  it  was  really  reintroduced  in  Howe's 
third  code.  This  is  clear  from  the  last  article  of 
the  Explanatory  Instructions  of  1799  which  distin- 
guishes between  the  two  manoeuvres  ;  but  whether 
or  not  this  article  was  in  the  Instructions  of  1790 
we  cannot  tell.  The  probability  is  that  it  was  not, 
for  in  the  Signal  Book  of  1790  there  is  no  reference 
to  a  modifying  instruction.  Further,  we  know  that 
in  the  code  proposed  by  Sir  Charles  H.  Knowles 
the  only  signal  for  breaking  the  line  was  word  for 
word  the  same  as  Howe's.  This  code  he  drew  up 
in  its  final  form  in  1794,  but  it  was  not  printed  till 
1798.  The  presumption  is  therefore  that  until  the 
code  of  1799  was  issued -Howe's  method  of  break- 
ing the  line  was  the  only  one  recognised.  In  that 
code  the  primary  intention  of  Signal  27  'for  break- 
ing through  the  enemy's  line  in  all  parts '  is  still  for 
Howe's  manoeuvre,  but  the  instruction  provides 
that  it  could  be  modified  by  a  red  pennant  over, 
and  in  that  case  it  meant  '  that  the  fleet  is  to 
preserve  the  line  of  battle  as  it  passes  through 
the  enemy's  line,  and  to  preserve  it  in  very  close 
order,  that  such  of  the  enemy's  ships  as  are  cut  off 
may  not  find  an  opportunity  of  passing  through  it 
to  rejoin  their  fleet.'  This  was  precisely  Rodney's 
manoeuvre  with  the  proviso  for  close  order  in- 
troduced by  Pigot.  The  instruction  also  provided 
for  the  combining  of  a  numeral  to  indicate  at 
which  number  in  the  enemy's  line  the  attempt  was 
to  be  made.  No  doubt  the  distinction  between 
manoeuvres  so  essentially  different  might  have  been 


DOUBLING  261 

more  logically  made  by  entirely  different  signals.1 
But  in  practice  it  was  all  that  was  wanted.  It  is 
only  posterity  that  suffers,  for  in  studying  the 
actions  of  that  time  it  is  generally  impossible  to  tell 
from  the  signal  logs  or  the  tactical  memoranda 
which  movement  the  admiral  had  in  mind.  Not 
only  do  we  never  find  it  specified  whether  the 
signal  was  made  simply  or  with  the  pennant  over, 
but  admirals  seem  to  have  used  the  expressions 
'  breaking '  and  '  cutting '  the  line,  and  '  breaking 
through,'  '  cutting  through,'  '  passing  through,'  and 
4  leading  through,'  as  well  as  others,  quite  indiscri- 
minately of  both  forms  of  the  manoeuvre.  Thus  in 
Nelson's  first,  or  Toulon,  memorandum  he  speaks 
of  '  passing  through  the  line '  from  to-windward, 
meaning  presumably  Howe's  manoeuvre,  and  of 
1  cutting  through '  their  fleet  from  to-leeward  when 
presumably  he  means  Rodney's.  In  the  Trafalgar 
memorandum  he  speaks  of  '  leading  through '  and 
'  cutting '  the  line  from  to-leeward,  and  of  '  cutting 
through '  from  to-windward,  when  he  certainly 
meant  to  perform  Howe's  manoeuvre.  Whereas 
Howe,  in  his  Instruction  XXXI.  of  1799,  uses 
1  breaking  the  line  '  and  '  passing  through  it '  in- 
differently of  both  forms. 

All  we  can  do  is  generally  to  assume  that  when 
the  attack  was  to  be  made  from  to-windward  Howe's 
manoeuvre  was  intended,  and  Rodney's  when  it  was 
made  from  to-leeward.  Yet  this  is  far  from  being 
safe  ground.  For  the  signification  of  the  plain 

1  Sir  Charles  H.  Knowles  did  modify  his  code  in  this  way 
some  time  after  1798.  For  his  original  signal  he  substituted  two 
in  MS.  with  the  following  neatly  worded  significations  :  '  No.  32. 
To  break  through  the  enemy's  line  together  and  engage  on  the 
opposite  side.  No.  33.  To  break  through  the  enemy's  line  in 
succession  and  engage  on  the  other  side.'  Had  these  two  lucid 
significations  been  adopted  by  Howe  there  would  have  been  no 
possible  ambiguity  as  to  what  was  meant. 


262  THE  LAST  PHASE 

signal  without  the  red  pennant  over — i.e.  '  to  break 
through  .  .  .  and  engage  on  the  other  side ' — seems 
to  contemplate  Howe's  manoeuvre  being  made  both 
from  to-leeward  and  from  to-windward. 

The  only  notable  disappearances  in  Howe's 
second  code  (1790)  are  the  signals  for  'doubling,' 
probably  as  a  corollary  of  the  new  manoeuvre.  For, 
until  this  device  was  hit  upon,  Rodney's  method 
of  breaking  the  line  apparently  could  only  be  made 
effective  as  a  means  of  concentration  by  doubling  on 
the  part  cut  off  in  accordance  with  Hoste's  method. 
This  at  least  is  what  Clerk  of  Eldin  seems  to  imply 
in  some  of  his  diagrams,  in  so  far  as  he  suggests 
any  method  of  dealing  with  the  part  cut  off.  Yet 
in  spite  of  this  disappearance  Nelson  certainly 
doubled  at  the  Nile,  and  according  to  Captain 
Edward  Berry,  who  was  captain  of  his  flagship, 
he  did  it  deliberately.  'It  is  almost  unnecessary,' 
he  wrote  in  his  narrative,  '  to  explain  his  projected 
mode  of  attack  at  anchor,  as  that  was  minutely  and 
precisely  executed  in  the  action.  .  .  These  plans 
however  were  formed  two  months  before,  .  .  .  and 
the  advantage  now  was  that  they  were  familiar  to 
the  understanding  of  every  captain  in  the  fleet.' 
Nelson  probably  felt  that  the  dangers  attending 
doubling  in  an  action  under  sail  are  scarcely 
appreciable  in  an  action  at  anchor  with  captains 
whose  steadiness  he  could  trust.  Still  Saumarez, 
his  second  in  command,  regarded  it  as  a  mistake, 
and  there  was  a  good  deal  of  complaint  of  our  ships 
having  suffered  from  each  other's  fire.1 

Amongst  the  more  important  retentions  of 
tactical  signals  we  find  that  for  Hoste's  method 
of  giving  battle  to  a  numerically  superior  force  by 
leaving  gaps  in  your  own  line  between  van,  centre 

1  Laughton,  Nelsoris  Letters  and  Despatches ;  p.  151.  Ross, 
Memoir  of  Lord  de  Saumarez,  vol.  i. 


ACTION  AT  ANCHOR  263 

and  rear.  The  wording  however  is  changed.  It  is 
no  longer  enjoined  as  a  means  of  avoiding  being 
doubled.  As  Howe  inserted  it  in  MS.  the  signifi- 
cation now  ran  '  for  the  van  or  particular  divisions 
to  engage  the  headmost  of  the  enemy's  van,  the 
rear  the  sternmost  of  the  enemy's  rear,  and  the 
centre  the  centre  of  the  enemy.  But  with  excep- 
tion of  the  flag  officers  of  the  fleet  who  should 
engage  those  of  the  enemy  respectively  in  prefer- 
ence.' l  This  signification  again  is  considerably 
modified  by  the  Explanatory  Instructions.  Article 
XXIV.,  it  will  be  seen,  says  nothing  of  engaging 
the  centre  or  of  leaving  regular  gaps.  The  leading 
ship  is  to  engage  the  enemy's  leading  ship,  and  the 
rearmost  the  rearmost,  while  the  rest  are  to  select  the 
largest  ships  they  can  get  at,  and  leave  the  weaker 
ones  alone  till  the  stronger  are  disabled.  It  was  in 
effect  the  adoption  of  Hoste's  fifth  rule  for  engaging 
a  numerically  superior  fleet  instead  of  his  first,  and 
it  is  a  plan  which  he  condemns  except  in  the  case 
of  your  being  individually  superior  to  your  enemy, 
as  indeed  the  English  gunnery  usually  made  them. 

The  curious  signal  No.  218  of  1782  for  attack- 
ing the  enemy's  rear  in  succession  by  '  defiling  '  on 
the  Elizabethan  plan  was  also  retained.  In  the 
Signal  Book  of  1 799  it  ran,  '  to  fire  in  succession 
upon  the  sternmost  ships  of  the  enemy,  then  tack  or 
wear  and  take  station  in  rear  of  the  squadron  or 
division  specified  (if  a  part  of  the  fleet  is  so  ap- 
pointed) until  otherwise  directed.' 

It  has  been  already  said  that  the  alterations  in 
the  edition  of  1799  were  not  of  great  importance, 
but  one  or  two  additions  must  be  noticed.  The 
most  noteworthy  is  a  new  signal  for  carrying  out 
the  important  rule  of  Article  IX.  of  the  Instruc- 

1  This  last  mediaeval  proviso  was  omitted  in  the  later  editions. 
It  is  not  found  in  Hoste. 


264  THE  LAST  PHASE 

tions  of  1782  (Article  X.  of  1799),  providing  for  the 
formation  of  a  corps  de  reserve  when  you  are 
numerically  superior  to  the  enemy,  as  was  done  by 
Villeneuve  on  Gravina's  advice  in  1805,  although 
fortunately  for  Nelson  it  was  not  put  in  practice 
at  Trafalgar. 

The  other  addition  appears  in  MS.  at  the  end 
of  the  printed  signals.  It  runs  as  follows  :  'When  at 
anchor  in  line  of  battle  to  let  go  a  bower  anchor 
under  foot,  and  pass  a  stout  hawser  from  one  ship 
to  another,  beginning  at  the  weathermost  ship,' 
an  addition  which  would  seem  to  have  been  sug- 
gested by  what  had  recently  occurred  at  the  Nile. 
Nelson's  own  order  was  as  follows  :  '  General  Memor- 
andum.— As  the  wind  will  probably  blow  along  shore, 
when  it  is  deemed  necessary  to  anchor  and  engage 
the  enemy  at  their  anchorage  it  is  recommended  to 
each  line-of-battle  ship  of  the  squadron  to  prepare 
to  anchor  with  the  sheet  cable  in  abaft  and  springs, 
&c.'  V  Another  copy  of  the  signal  book  has  a  similar 
MS.  addition  to  the  signal  '  Prepare  for  battle  and 
for  anchoring  with  springs,  &c.' 2  It  runs  thus  :  '  A 
bower  is  to  be  unbent,  and  passed  through  the  stern 
port  and  bent  to  the  anchor,  leaving  that  anchor 
hanging  by  the  stopper  only. — Lord  Nelson,  St. 
George,  26  March,  1801.  If  with  a  red  pennant 
over  with  a  spring  only. — Commander-in-ehiefs 
Order  Book,  27  March,  1801.'  These  therefore 
were  additions  made  immediately  before  the  attack 
on  the  Danish  fleet  at  Copenhagen. 

No  other  change  was  made,  and  it  may  be  said 
that  Howe's  new  method  of  breaking  the  line  was 
the  last  word  on  the  form  of  attack  for  a  sailing 

1  Ross, Memoir  of  Saumarez,  i.  212.    Nelson  refers  to  'Signal 
54,  Art.  XXXVII.  of  the  Instructions,'  which  must  have  been  a 
special  and  amplified  set  issued  by  Jervis.      There   is   no  Art. 
XXXVII.  in  Howe's  set. 

2  In  the  United  Service  Institution. 


ST.  VINCENT  AND  CAMPERDOWN   265 

fleet.  How  far  its  full  intention  and  possibilities 
were  understood  at  first  is  doubtful.  The  accounts 
of  the  naval  actions  that  followed  show  no  lively 
appreciation  on  the  part  of  the  bulk  of  British  cap- 
tains. On  the  First  of  June  the  new  signal  for 
breaking  through  the  line  at  all  points  was  the  first 
Howe  made,  and  it  was  followed  as  soon  as  the 
moment  for  action  arrived  by  that  '  for  each  ship  to 
steer  for,  independently  of  each  other,  and  engage 
respectively  the  ship  opposed  in  situation  to  them 
in  the  enemy's  line.'  The  result  was  an  action 
along  the  whole  line,  during  which  Howe  himself 
at  the  earliest  opportunity  passed  through  the 
enemy's  line  and  engaged  on  the  other  side,  though 
as  a  whole  the  fleet  neglected  to  follow  either  his 
signal  or  his  example. 

In  the  next  great  action,  that  of  St.  Vincent,  the 
circumstances  were  not  suitable  for  the  new  man- 
oeuvre, seeing  that  the  Spaniards  had  not  formed 
line.  Jervis  had  surprised  the  enemy  in  disorder 
on  a  hazy  morning  after  a  change  of  wind,  and  this 
was  precisely  the  '  not  very  probable  case '  which 
Clerk  of  Eldin  had  instanced  as  justifying  a  perpen- 
dicular attack.  Whether  or  not  Jervis  had  Clerk's 
instance  in  his  mind,  he  certainly  did  deliver  a 
perpendicular  attack.  The  signal  with  which  he 
opened,  according  to  the  signification  as  given  in 
the  flagship's  log,  was  '  The  admiral  intends  to 
pass  through  the  enemy's  line.' l  There  is  nothing 
to  show  whether  this  meant  Howe's  manoeuvre  or 
Rodney's,  for  we  do  not  know  whether  at  this  time 
the  instruction  existed  which  enabled  the  two 
movements  to  be  distinguished  by  a  pennant  over. 

1  Logs  of  the  Great  Sea  Fights,  i.  210.  The  log  probably  only 
gives  an  abbreviation  of  the  signification.  Unless  Jervis  had 
changed  it,  its  exact  wording  was  '  The  admiral  means  to  pass 
between  the  ships  of  their  line  for  engaging  them  to  leeward,'  &c. 
See  supra,  p.  255. 


266  THE  LAST  PHASE 

What  followed  however  was  that  the  fleet  passed 
between  the  two  separated  Spanish  squadrons  in 
line  ahead  as  Clerk  advised.  The  next  thing  to  do, 
according  to  Clerk,  was  for  the  British  fleet  to  wear 
or  tack  together,  but  instead  of  doing  so  Jervis 
signalled  to  tack  in  succession,  and  then  repeated 
the  signal  to  pass  through  the  enemy's  line  although 
it  was  still  unformed.  It  was  at  this  moment  that 
Nelson  made  his  famous  independent  movement 
that  saved  the  situation,  and  what  he  did  was  in 
effect  as  though  Jervis  had  made  the  signal  to 
tack  together  as  Clerk  enjoined.  Thereupon  Jervis, 
with  the  intention  apparently  of  annulling  his  last 
order  to  pass  through  the  line,  made  the  signal, 
which  seems  to  have  been  the  only  one  which  the 
captains  of  those  days  believed  in — viz.  to  take 
suitable  stations  for  mutual  support  and  engage  the 
enemy  on  arriving  up  with  them  in  succession.  In 
practice  it  was  little  more  than  a  frank  relapse  to 
the  methods  of  the  early  Commonwealth,  and  it  was 
this  signal  and  not  that  for  breaking  the  line  which 
made  the  action  general. 

Again,  at  the  battle  of  Camperdown,  Duncan, 
while  trying  to  form  single  line  from  two  columns 
of  sailing,  began  with  the  signal  for  each  ship  to 
steer  independently  for  her  opponent.  This  was 
followed — the  fleet  having  failed  to  form  line  parallel 
to  the  enemy,  and  being  still  in  two  disordered 
columns — by  signals  for  the  lee  or  van  division  to 
engage  the  enemy's  rear,  and  as  some  thought  the 
weather  division  his  centre  ;  and  ten  minutes  later 
came  the  new  signal  for  passing  through  the  line. 
The  result  was  an  action  almost  exactly  like  that 
of  Nelson  at  Trafalgar — that  is,  though  the  leading 
ships  duly  acted  on  the  combination  of  the  two 
signals  for  engaging  their  opposites  and  for  break- 
ing the  line,  each  at  its  opposite  interval,  the  rest 


THE  GOLDEN  RULE  267 

was  a  m§lde  ;  for,  since  what  was  fundamentally 
a  parallel  attack  was  attempted  as  a  perpendicular 
one,  it  could  be  nothing  but  a  scramble  for  the  rear 
ships. 

In  none  of  these  actions  therefore  is  there  any 
evidence  that  Howe's  attempt  to  impress  the  ser- 
vice with  a  serious  scientific  view  of  tactics  had 
been  successful,  and  the  impression  which  they 
made  upon  our  enemies  suggests  that  the  real  spirit 
that  inspired  British  officers  at  this  time  was  some- 
thing very  different  from  that  which  Howe  had 
tried  to  instil.  Writing  of  the  battle  of  St.  Vincent, 
Don  Domingo  Perez  de  Grandallana,  whose  masterly 
studies  of  the  French  and  English  naval  systems 
and  tactics  raised  him  to  the  highest  offices  of 
state,  has  the  following  passage  :  '  An  Englishman 
enters  a  naval  action  with  the  firm  conviction  that 
his  duty  is  to  hurt  his  enemies  and  help  his  friends 
and  allies  without  looking  out  for  directions  in  the 
midst  of  the  fight ;  and  while  he  thus  clears  his 
mind  of  all  subsidiary  distractions,  he  rests  in  con- 
fidence on  the  certainty  that  his  comrades,  actuated 
by  the  same  principles  as  himself,  will  be  bound 
by  the  sacred  and  priceless  law  of  mutual  support. 
Accordingly,  both  he  and  all  his  fellows  fix  their 
minds  on  acting  with  zeal  and  judgment  upon  the 
spur  of  the  moment,  and  with  the  certainty  that 
they  will  not  be  deserted.  Experience  shows,  on 
the  contrary,  that  a  Frenchman  or  a  Spaniard, 
working  under  a  system  which  leans  to  formality 
and  strict  order  being  maintained  in  battle,  has 
no  feeling  for  mutual  support,  and  goes  into  action 
with  hesitation,  preoccupied  with  the  anxiety  of  see- 
ing or  hearing  the  commander-in-chief's  signals 
for  such  and  such  manoeuvres.  .  .  .  Thus  they  can 
never  make  up  their  minds  to  seize  any  favourable 
opportunity  that  may  present  itself.  They  are 


268  THE  LAST  PHASE 

fettered  by  the  strict  rule  to  keep  station,  which  is 
enforced  upon  them  in  both  navies,  and  the  usual 
result  is  that  in  one  place  ten  of  their  ships  may 
be  firing  on  four,  while  in  another  four  of  their 
comrades  may  be  receiving  the  fire  of  ten  of  the 
enemy.  Worst  of  all,  they  are  denied  the  con- 
fidence inspired  by  mutual  support,  which  is  as 
surely  maintained  by  the  English  as  it  is  neglected 
by  us,  who  will  not  learn  from  them. ' : 

This  was  probably  the  broad  truth  of  the  matter  ; 
it  is  summed  up  in  the  golden  signal  which  was  the 
panacea  of  British  admirals  when  in  doubt :  '  Ships  to 
take  station  for  mutual  support  and  engage  as  they 
come  up ; '  and  it  fully  explains  why,  with  all  the 
scientific  appreciation  of  tactics  that  existed  in  the 
leading  admirals  of  this  time,  their  battles  were 
usually  so  confused  and  haphazard.  The  truth  is 
that  in  the  British  service  formal  tactics  had  come 
to  be  regarded  as  a  means  of  getting  at  your  enemy, 
and  not  as  a  substitute  for  initiative  in  fighting  him. 


LORD  HOWE'S  EXPLANATORY  INSTRUCTIONS. 
[Signal  Book,  1799.2] 

Instructions  for  the  conduct  of  the  fleet  preparatory 
to  their  engaging,  and  when  engaged,  with  an 
enemy. 

I.  When  the  signal  is  made  for  the  fleet  to  form 
the  line  of  battle,  each  flag  officer  and  captain  is  to 
get  into  his  station  as  expeditiously  as  possible,  and 
to  keep  in  close  order,  if  not  otherwise  directed,  and 

1  Fernandez  Duro,  Armada  Espanola,  viii.  1 1 1. 

2  Similar  but  not  identical  instructions  are  referred  to  in  the 
Signal   Book  of  1790.     The  above  were  reproduced  in  all  sub- 
sequent editions  till  the  end  of  the  war. 


HOWE,    1799  269 

under  a  proportion  of  sail  suited  to  that  carried  by 
the  admiral,  or  by  the  senior  flag  officer  remaining 
in  the  line  when  the  admiral  has  signified  his 
intention  to  quit  it. 

II.  The   chief  purposes   for   which   a   fleet   is 
formed  in  line  of  battle  are  :  that  the  ships  may  be 
able  to  assist  and  support  each  other  in  action  ;  that 
they  may  not  be  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  enemy's 
ships  greater  in  number  than  themselves  ;  and  that 
every  ship  may  be  able  to  fire  on  the  enemy  with- 
out risk  of  firing  into  the  ships  of  her  own  fleet. 

III.  If,  after  having  made  a  signal  to  prepare  to 
form  the  line  of  battle  on  either  line  of  bearing,  the 
admiral,  keeping  the  preparative  flag  flying,  should 
make  several  signals  in  succession,  to  point  out  the 
manner  in  which  the  line  is  to  be  formed,  those 
signals  are  to  be  carefully  written  down,  that  they 
may  be  carried  into  execution,  when  the  signal  for 
the  line  is  hoisted  again  ;  they  are  to  be  executed  in 
the  order  in  which  they  were  made,  excepting  such 
as  the  admiral  may  annul  previously  to  his  hoisting 
again  the  signal  for  the  line. 

IV.  If  any  part  of  the  fleet  should  be  so  far  to 
leeward,  when  the  signal  is  made  for  the  line  of 
battle,  that  the  admiral  should  think  it  necessary  to 
bear  up  and  stand  towards  them,  he  will  do  it  with 
the  signal  No.  105  hoisted.1     The  ships  to  leeward 
are   thereupon  to  exert   themselves  to  get   as  ex- 
peditiously  as  possible  into  their  stations  in  the  line. 

V.  Ships  which    have  been  detached  from  the 
body  of  the  fleet,  on  any  separate  service,  are  not 
to  obey  the    signal  for  forming  the  line  of  battle, 
unless  they  have  been  previously  called  back  to  the 
fleet  by  signal. 

VI.  Ships  which  cannot  keep  their  stations  are 
to   quit   the   line,  as  directed    in  Article  9    of  the 

1  'Ships  to  leeward  to  get  in  the  admiral's  wake.' 


270  THE  LAST  PHASE 

General  Instructions,  though  in  the  presence  of  an 
enemy.1  The  captains  of  such  ships  will  not  thereby 
be  prevented  from  distinguishing  themselves,  as 
they  will  have  opportunities  of  rendering  essential 
service,  by  placing  their  ships  advantageously  when 
they  get  up  with  the  enemy  already  engaged  with 
the  other  part  of  the  fleet. 

VII.  When  the  signal  to  form  a  line  of  bearing 
for  either  tack  is  made,  the  ships  (whatever  course 
they  may  be  directed  to  steer)  are  to  place  them- 
selves in  such  a  manner  that  if  they  were  to  haul 
to  the  wind  together  on  the  tack  for  which  the 
line  of  bearing  is  formed,  they  would  immediately 
form  a  line  of  battle  on  that  tack.  To  do  this, 
every  ship  must  bring  the  ship  which  would  be 
her  second  ahead,  if  the  line  of  battle  were  formed, 
to  bear  on  that  point  of  the  compass  on  which 
the  line  of  battle  would  sail,  viz.,  on  that  point  of 
the  compass  which  is  seven  points  from  the  direc- 
tion of  the  wind,  or  six  points  if  the  signal  is  made 
to  keep  close  to  the  wind. 

As  the  intention  of  a  line  of  bearing  is  to  keep 
the  fleet  ready  to  form  suddenly  a  line  of  battle, 
the  position  of  the  division  or  squadron  flags,  shown 
with  the  signal  for  such  a  line,  will  refer  to  the 
forming  of  the  line  of  battle  ;  that  division  or  squa- 
dron whose  flag  is  uppermost  (without  considering 
whether  it  do  or  do  not  form  the  van  of  the  line 
of  bearing)  is  to  place  itself  in  that  station  which 

1  The  instructions  referred  to  are  the  'General  Instructions 
for  the  conduct  of  the  fleet.'  They  are  the  first  of  the  various 
sets  which  the  Signal  Book  contained,  and  relate  to  books  to  be 
kept,  boats,  keeping  station,  evolutions  and  the  like.  Article  IX. 
is  '  If  from  any  cause  whatever  a  ship  should  find  it  impossible  to 
keep  her  station  in  any  line  or  order  of  sailing,  she  is  not  to 
break  the  line  or  order  by  persisting  too  long  in  endeavouring  to 
preserve  it ;  but  she  is  to  quit  the  line  and  form  in  the  rear, 
doing  everything  she  can  to  keep  up  with  the  fleet.' 


HOWE,    1799  271 

would  become  the  van  if  the  fleet  should  haul  to 
the  wind  and  form  the  line  of  battle  ;  and  the  divi- 
sion whose  flag  is  undermost  is  to  place  itself  in  that 
station  in  which  it  would  become  the  rear  if  by 
hauling  to  the  wind  the  line  of  battle  should  be 
formed.1 

VIII.  When  a  line  of  bearing  has  been  formed, 
the  ships  are  to  preserve  that  relative  bearing  from 
each  other,  whenever    they  are    directed    to    alter 
the  course    together  ;    but    if  they  are    directed  to 
alter  the  course  in  succession,  as  the  line  of  bear- 
ing will    by  that  be    destroyed,    it  is  no  longer  to 
be  attended  to. 

IX.  If  the  signal  to  make  more  or  less  sail  is 
made  when  the  fleet  is  in  line  of  battle,  the  frigate 
appointed  to  repeat  signals  will  set  the  same  sails 
as   are   carried    by  the    admiral's    ship ;    the  ships 
are  then  in  succession  (from  the  rear  if  to  shorten, 
or  the  van  if  to  make  more,  sail)  to  put  themselves 
under  a   proportion  of  sail    correspondent  to  their 
comparative    rate    of    sailing    with    the    admiral's 
ship. 

To  enable  captains  to  do  this  it  will  be  necessary 
that  they  acquire  a  perfect  knowledge  of  the  pro- 
portion of  sail    required    for    suiting    their    rate  of 
sailing  to  that    of  the  admiral,  under    the  various 
changes    in  the    quantity  of  sail,  and   state  of  the 
weather ;  which  will  enable  them,  not  only  to  keep 
their  stations  in  the  line  of  battle,  but  also  to  keep 
company  with  the  fleet  on  all  other  occasions. 
When    the    signal    to    make 
more  sail  is    made,    if  the 
admiral  is    under  his   top- 
sails, he  will  probably   set 
the    .....     Foresail. 

1  See  at  p.  235,  as  to  the  new  sailing  formation  in  three 
columns. 


272  THE  LAST  PHASE 

If  the  signal  is  repeated,  or  if 
the  foresail  is   set  he  will 
probably  set      .         .         .Jib  and  staysails. 
If  the  foresail,  jib,  and  stay- 
sails are  set,  he  will  set  the     Topgallant-sails. 
Or  in   squally  weather         .     Mainsail. 
When  the  signal  to  shorten  sail  is  made,  he  will 
probably  take  in  sail  in  a  gradation  the  reverse  of 
the  preceding. 

X.  Ships  which  are  ordered  by  signal  to  with- 
draw from  the  line  are  to  place  themselves  to  wind- 
ward of  the  fleet  if  it  has  the  weather-gage  of  the 
enemy,  or  to  leeward  and  ahead  if  the  contrary  ; 
and  are  to  be  ready  to  assist  any  ship  which  may 
want  their  assistance,  or  to  act  in  any  other  manner 
as  directed  by  signal. 

If  the  ships  so  withdrawn,  or  any  others  which 
may  have  been  detached,  should  be  unable  to 
resume  their  stations  in  the  line  when  ordered  by 
signal  to  do  so,  they  are  to  attack  the  enemy's 
ships  in  any  part  of  the  line  on  which  they  may  hope 
to  make  the  greatest  impression.1 

XI.  If  the  fleet  should  engage  an  enemy  inferior 
to  it  in  number,  or  which,   by  the  flight   of  some 
of  their  ships,  becomes  inferior,  the  ships  which,  at 
either  extremity  of  the  line,  are  thereby  left  without 
opponents  may,  after  the  action  is  begun,  quit  the 
line  without  waiting  for  a  signal  to  do  so  ;  and  they 
are  to   distress   the   enemy,  or  assist  the  ships  of 
the  fleet,  in  the  best  manner  that  circumstances  will 
allow. 

XII.  When  any  number  of  ships,  not  having  a 
flag  officer  with  them,  are  detached  from  the  fleet  to 

1  It  should  be  noted  that  this  is  an  important  advance  on  the 
corresponding  Article  IX.  of  the  previous  instructions,  and  that  it 
contains  a  germ  of  the  organisation  of  Nelson's  Trafalgar  memo- 
randum. 


HOWE,    1799  273 

act  together,  they  are  to  obey  all  signals  which  are 
accompanied  by  the  flag  appropriated  to  detach- 
ments, and  are  not  to  attend  to  any  made  without 
that  flag.  But  if  a  flag  officer,  commanding  a 
squadron,  or  division,  be  with  such  detachment,  all 
the  ships  of  it  are  to  consider  themselves,  for  the 
time,  as  forming  part  of  the  division,  or  squadron, 
of  such  flag  officer ;  and  they  are  to  obey  those 
signals,  and  only  those,  which  are  accompanied  by 
his  distinguishing  flag. 

XIII.  Great  care  is  at  all  times  to  be  taken  not 
to  fire  at  the  enemy,  either  over,  or  very  near  to, 
any  ships  of  the  fleet ;  nor,  though  the  signal  for 
battle  should  be  flying,  is  any  ship  to  fire  till  she  is 
placed  in  a  proper  situation,  and  at  a  proper  distance 
from  the  enemy. 

XIV.  If,  when  the  signal  for  battle  is  made,  the 
ships  are  steering  down  for  the  enemy,  they  are  to 
haul  to  the  wind,  or  to  any  course  parallel  to  the 
enemy,   and   are  to   engage   them    when   properly 
placed,    without   waiting  for  any  particular  signal  ; 
but  every  ship  must  be  attentive  to  the  motions  of 
that  ship  which   will   be   her  second  ahead,  when 
formed  parallel  to  the  enemy,  that  she  may  have 
room  to  haul  up  without  running  on  board  of  her. 
The  distance  of  the  ships  from  each  other  during 
the  action  must  be  governed   by  that  of  their  re- 
spective opponents  on  the  enemy's  line. 

XV.  No  ship  is  to  separate  from  the  body  of  the 
fleet,  in  time  of  action,  to  pursue  any  small  number 
of  the  enemy's  ships  which  have  been  beaten  out  of 
the   line,   unless  the  commander-in-chief,  or  some 
other  flag  officer,   be  among  them ;  but  the  ships 
which  have  disabled  their  opponents,  or  forced  them 
to  quit  the  line,  are  to  assist  any  ship  of  the  fleet 
appearing  to  be  much  pressed,  and  to  continue  their 
attack  till  the  main  body  of  the  enemy  be  broken 


274  THE  LAST  PHASE 

or  disabled  ;  unless  by  signal,  or  particular  instruc- 
tion, they  should  be  directed  to  act  otherwise. 

XVI.  If  any  ship  should  be  so  disabled  as  to  be 
in  great  danger  of  being  destroyed,  or  taken  by  the 
enemy,   and   should   make   a  signal,  expressive  of 
such  extremity,  the  ships  nearest  to  her,  and  which 
are  the  least  engaged  with  the  enemy,  are  strictly 
enjoined   to  give  her  immediately  all  possible  aid 
and   protection  ;    and   any   fireship,    in  a  situation 
which  admits  of  its  being  done,  is  to  endeavour  to 
burn  the   enemy's  ship  opposed   to  her  ;    and  any 
frigate,  that  may  be  near,  is  to  use  every  possible 
exertion  for  her  relief,  either  by  towing  her  off,  or 
by  joining  in  the  attack  of  the  enemy,  or  by  covering 
the  fireship ;  or,   if  necessity  require  it,  by  taking 
out  the  crew  of  the  disabled  ship  ;  or  by  any  other 
means    which     circumstances    at     the     time     will 
admit.1 

XVII.  Though    a   ship  be  disabled,  and   hard 
pressed  by  the  enemy  in  battle,  she   is  not  to  quit 
her  station  in  the  line,  if  it  can  possibly  be  avoided, 
till  the  captain  shall  have  obtained  permission  so  to 
do  from  the  commander  of  the  squadron,  or  division, 
to  which  he  belongs,  or  from  some  other  flag  officer. 
But  if  he  should  be  ordered  out  of  the  line,  or  should 
be  obliged  to  quit  it,  before  assistance  can  be  sent 
to  him,  the  nearest  ships  are  immediately  to  occupy 
the   space   become    vacant,  to  prevent  the  enemy 
from  taking  advantage  of  it. 

XVIII.  If  there  should  be  found  a  captain  so 
lost  to  all  sense  of  honour  and  the  great  duty  he 
owes   his   country,  as  not   to  exert  himself  to  the 
utmost  to  get  into  action  with  the  enemy,  or  to  take 

1  The  continued  insistence  on  fireship  tactics  in  this  and 
Articles  XX.  and  XXI.  should  again  be  noted,  although  from  1793 
to  1802  the  number  of  fireships  on  the  Navy  List  averaged  under 
four  out  of  a  total  that  increased  from  304  to  5 1 7. 


HOWE,    1799  275 

or  destroy  them  when  engaged  ;  the  commander 
of  the  squadron,  or  division,  to  which  he  belongs, 
or  the  nearest  flag  officer,  is  to  suspend  him  from 
his  command,  and  is  to  appoint  some  other  officer 
to  command  the  ship,  till  the  admiral's  pleasure 
shall  be  known. 

XIX.  When,  from  the  advantage  obtained  by 
the  enemy  over  the  fleet,  or  from  bad  weather,  or 
from  any  other  cause,  the  admiral  makes  the  signal 
for  the  fleet  to  disperse,  every  captain  will  be  left  to 
act  as  he  shall  judge  most  proper  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  ship  he  commands,   and    the  good   of 
the  king's  service  ;  but  he  is  to  endeavour  to  go  to 
the  appointed  rendezvous,  if  it  may  be  done  with 
safety. 

XX.  The  ships  are  to  be  kept  at  all  times  as 
much    prepared   for    battle   as   circumstances    will 
admit ;  and  if  the  fleet  come  to  action  with  an  enemy 
which  has  the  weather-gage,  boats,  well  armed,  are 
to  be  held  in   readiness,  with  hand  and  fire-chain 
grapnels  in  them  ;    and  if  the  weather  will  admit, 
they  are  to  be  hoisted    out,  and    kept  on  the  off- 
side from  the  enemy,  for  the  purpose  of  assisting 
any  ships   against  which    fireships    shall    be   sent ; 
or  for  supporting  the  fireships  of  the  fleet,  if  they 
should  be  sent  against  the  enemy.1 

XXI.  The  ships  appointed  to  protect  and  cover 
fireships,  when  ordered  on  service,  or  which,  with- 
out being  appointed,  are  in  a  situation  to  cover  and 
protect  them,  are  to  receive  on  board  their  crews, 
and,  keeping  between  them  and  the  enemy,  to  go 
with  them  as  near  as  possible  to  the  ships  they  are 
directed  to  destroy.     All  the  boats  of  those  ships  are 
to  be  well  armed,  and  to  be  employed  in  covering 
the  retreat  of  the  fireship's  boats,  and  in  defending 

1  It  should  be  remembered  that  at  this  time  there  were  no 
davits  and  no  boats  hoisted  up.     They  were  all  carried  in-board. 

T  2 


276  THE  LAST  PHASE 

the  ship  from  any  attempts  that  may  be  made  on 
her  by  the  boats  of  the  enemy. 

XXII.  If  the  ship  of  any  flag  officer  be  disabled 
in  battle,  the  flag  officer  may  repair  on  board,  and 
hoist  his  flag  in  any  other  ship  (not  already  carrying 
a  flag)  that  he  shall  think   proper ;    but   he   is   to 
hoist  it  in  one  of  his  own  squadron  or  division  if 
there  be  one  near,  and  fit  for  the  purpose. 

XXIII.  If  a  squadron  or  any  detachment    be 
directed  by  signal  to  gain  or  keep  the  wind  of  the 
enemy,  the  officer  commanding  it  is  to  act  in  such 
manner  as  shall  in  his  judgment  be  the  most  effectual 
for  the  total  defeat  of  the  enemy ;  either  by  rein- 
forcing those  parts  of  the  fleet  which  are  opposed 
to  superior  force,  or  by  attacking  such  parts  of  the 
enemy's   line   as,    by   their   weakness,    may   afford 
reasonable  hopes  of  their  being  easily  broken, 

XXIV.  When    the    signal    (30)    is    made    to 
extend  the  line  from  one  extremity  of  the  enemy's 
line  to  the  other,  though  the  enemy  have  a  greater 
number  of  ships,  the  leading  ship  is  to  engage  the 
leading  ship,  and  the  sternmost  ship  the  sternmost 
of  the  enemy ;  and  the  other  ships  are,  as  far  as 
their  situation  will  admit,  to   engage  the  ships  of 
greatest  force,  leaving  the  weaker  ships  unattacked 
till  the  stronger  shall  have  been  disabled.1 

XXV.  If  the  admiral,  or  any  commander  of  a 
squadron  or  division,  shall  think  fit  to  change  his 
station  in  the  line,  in  order  to  place  himself  opposite 
to  the    admiral   or    the    commander  of  a   similar 
squadron  or  division   in  the  enemy's  line,  he  will 
make  the  Signal  47  for  quitting  the  line  in  his  own 
ship,  without  showing  to  what  other  part  of  the  line 
he  means  to  go  ;    the   ships   ahead    or  astern  (as 
circumstances  may  require)  of  the  station  opposed 

1  This  is  a  considerable  modification  of  the  signification  of  the 
signal ;  see  supra,  p.  263. 


HOWE,    1799  277 

to  the  commander  in  the  enemy's  line  are  then  to 
close  and  make  room  for  him  to  get  into  it.  But  if 
the  admiral,  being  withdrawn  from  the  line,  should 
think  fit  to  return  to  any  particular  place  in  it,  he 
will  make  the  signal  No.  269  with  the  distinguish- 
ing signal  of  his  own  ship,  and  soon  after  he  will 
hoist  the  distinguishing  signal  of  the  ship  astern  of 
which  he  means  to  take  his  station.  And  if  he  should 
direct  by  signal  any  other  ship  to  take  a  station  in 
the  line,  he  will  also  hoist  the  distinguishing  signal 
of  the  ship  astern  of  which  he  would  have  her  placed, 
if  she  is  not  to  take  the  station  assigned  her  in  the 
line  of  battle  given  out. 

XXVI.  When  the  Signal  29  is  made  for  each 
ship  to  steer  for  her  opponent  in  the  enemy's  line, 
the  ships  are  to  endeavour,  by  making  or  shortening 
sail,  to  close  with  their  opponents  and  bring  them 
to  action    at   the   same  time  ;    but    they  must    be 
extremely  careful  not  to  pass  too  near  each  other, 
nor    to    do  anything    which   may  risk    their    run- 
ning on   board   each   other :  they  may  engage   as 
soon  as  they  are  well  closed  with  their  opponents, 
and  properly  placed  for  that  purpose. 

XXVII.  When  the  Signal  28  is  made,  for  ships 
to  form  as  most  convenient,  and  attack  the  enemy 
as  they  get  up  with  them  ;  the  ships  are  to  engage  to 
windward  or  to  leeward,  as  from  the  situation  of  the 
enemy  they  shall  find  most  advantageous ;  but  the 
leading  ships  must  be  very  cautious  not  to  suffer 
themselves  to  be  drawn  away  so  far  from  the  body 
of  the   fleet  as  to  risk  the  being  surrounded  and 
cut  off. 

XXVIII.  When  Signal   14  is  made  to  prepare 
for  battle  and  for  anchoring,  the  ships  are  to  have 
springs  on  their  bower  anchors,  and  the  end  of  the 
sheet  cable  taken  in  at  the  stern  port,  with  springs 
on  the  anchor  to  be  prepared  for  anchoring  without 


278  THE  LAST  PHASE 

winding  if  they  should  go  to  the  attack  with  the 
wind  aft.  The  boats  should  be  hoisted  out  and 
hawsers  coiled  in  the  launches,  with  the  stream 
anchor  ready  to  warp  them  into  their  stations,  or  to 
assist  other  ships  which  may  be  in  want  of  assis- 
tance. Their  spare  yards  and  topmasts,  if  they 
cannot  be  left  in  charge  of  some  vessel,  should  in 
moderate  weather  be  lashed  alongside,  near  the 
water,  on  the  off-side  from  the  battery  or  ship  to  be 
attacked.  The  men  should  be  directed  to  lie  down 
on  the  off  side  of  the  deck  from  the  enemy,  when- 
ever they  are  not  wanted,  if  the  ship  should  be  fired 
at  as  they  advance  to  the  attack. 

XXIX.  When    the    line    of  battle    has    been 
formed  as  most  convenient,  without  regard  to  the 
prescribed  form,    the  ships   which    happen    to    be 
ahead  of  the  centre  are  to  be  considered,  for  the  time, 
as  the  starboard  division,  and  those  astern  of  the 
centre  as  the  larboard  division  of  the  fleet ;  and  if 
the  triangular  flag,  white  with  a  red  fly,  be  hoisted, 
the  line  is  to  be  considered  as  being  divided  into  the 
same  number  of  squadrons  and   divisions  as  in  the 
established  line  of  battle.     The  ship  which  happens 
at  the  time  to  lead  the  fleet  is  to  be  considered  as 
the  leader  of  the  van  squadron,  and  every  other 
ship   which  happens  to  be  in    the    station   of  the 
leader  of  the  squadron  or  division    is    to  be   con- 
sidered  as   being   the   leader  of  that  squadron    or 
division,    and   the  intermediate   ships  are    to   form 
the  squadrons  or  divisions  of  such  leaders,  and  to 
follow  them  as  long  as  the  triangular  flag  is  flying, 
and  every   flag  officer  is  to   be   considered  as  the 
commander  of  the   squadron  or  division  in  which 
he  may  be  accidentally  placed. 

XXX.  If  the  wind  should  come  forward  when 
the  fleet  is  formed  in  line  of  battle,  or  is  sailing  by 
the  wind  in  a  line  of  bearing,  the  leading  ship  is  to 


HOWE,    1799  279 

continue  steering  seven  points  from  the  wind,  and 
every  other  ship  is  to  haul  as  close  to  the  wind  as 
possible,  till  she  has  got  into  the  wake  of  the  leading 
ship,  or  till  she  shall  have  brought  it  on  the  proper 
point  of  bearing  ;  but  if  the  wind  should  come  aft, 
the  sternmost  ship  is  to  continue  steering  seven 
points  from  the  wind,  and  the  other  ships  are  to  haul 
close  to  the  wind  till  they  have  brought  the  stern- 
most  ship  into  their  wake,  or  on  the  proper  point 
of  bearing. 

XXXI.  If  Signal  27,  to  break  through  the 
enemy's  line,  be  made  without  a  '  red  pennant '  being 
hoisted,  it  is  evident  that  to  obey  it  the  line  of  battle 
must  be  entirely  broken  ;  but  if  a  '  red  pennant '  be 
hoisted  at  either  mast-head,  that  fleet  is  to  preserve 
the  line  of  battle  as  it  passes  through  the  enemy's 
line,  and  to  preserve  it  in  very  close  order,  that  such 
of  the  enemy's  ships  as  are  cut  off  may  not  find  an 
opportunity  of  passing  through  it  to  rejoin  their 
fleet. 

If  a  signal  of  number  be  made  immediately  after 
this  signal,  it  will  show  the  number  of  ships  of  the 
enemy's  van  or  rear  which  the  fleet  is  to  endeavour 
to  cut  off.  If  the  closing  of  the  enemy's  line  should 
prevent  the  ships  passing  through  the  part  pointed 
out,  they  are  to  pass  through  as  near  to  it  as  they 
can. 

If  any  of  the  ships  should  find  it  impracticable, 
in  either  of  the  above  cases,  to  pass  through  the 
enemy's  line,  they  are  to  act  in  the  best  manner 
that  circumstances  will  admit  of  for  the  destruction 
of  the  enemy. 


280  THE  LAST  PHASE 


NELSON'S   TACTICAL   MEMORANDA 

INTRODUCTORY 

THE  first  of  these  often  quoted  memoranda  is  the 
*  Plan  of  Attack,'  usually  assigned  to  May  1805,  when 
Nelson  was  in  pursuit  of  Villeneuve,  and  it  is  gene- 
rally accompanied  by  two  erroneous  diagrams  based 
on  the  number  of  ships  which  he  then  had  under 
his  command.  But,  as  Professor  Laughton  has  inge- 
niously conjectured,  it  must  really  belong  to  a  time 
two  years  earlier,  when  Nelson  was  off  Toulon  in 
constant  hope  of  the  French  coming  out  to  engage 
him.1  The  strength  and  organisation  of  Nelson's 
fleet  at  that  time,  as  well  as  the  numbers  of  the 
French  fleet,-  exactly  correspond  to  the  data  of  the 
memorandum.  To  Professor  Laugh  ton's  argument 
may  be  added  another,  which  goes  far  actually  to 
fix  the  date.  The  principal  signal  which  Nelson's 
second  method  of  attack  required  was  '  to  engage  to 
leeward.'  Now  this  signal  as  it  stood  in  the  Signal 
Book  of  1799  was  to  some  extent  ambiguous.  It 
was  No.  37,  and  the  signification  was  '  to  engage  the 
enemy  on  their  larboard  side,  or  to  leeward  if  by  the 
wind,'  while  No.  36  was  '  to  engage  the  enemy  on 
their  starboard  side  if  going  before  the  wind,  or 
to  windward  if  by  the  wind.'  Accordingly  we  find 
Nelson  issuing  a  general  order,  with  the  object 
apparently  of  removing  the  ambiguity,  and  of  render- 

1  Nelson's  Letters  and  Despatches,  p.  382. 


THE    TOULON  MEMORANDUM     281 

ing  any  confusion  between  starboard  and  larboard 
and  leeward  and  windward  impossible.  It  is  in 
Nelson's  order  book,  under  date  November  22,  1803, 
and  runs  as  follows  : 

'  If  a  pennant  is  shown  over  signal  No.  36,  it 
signifies  that  ships  are  to  engage  on  the  enemy's 
starboard  side,  whether  going  large  or  upon  a  wind. 

'  If  a  pennant  is  shown  in  like  manner  over 
No.  37,  it  signifies  that  ships  are  to  engage  on  the 
enemy's  larboard  side,  whether  going  large  or  upon 
a  wind. 

'  These  additions  to  be  noted  in  the  Signal  Book 
in  pencil  only.'  1 

The  effect  of  this  memorandum  was,  of  course, 
that  Nelson  had  it  in  his  power  to  let  every  captain 
know,  without  a  shadqw  of  doubt,  under  all  condi- 
tions of  wind,  on  which  side  he  meant  to  engage 
the  enemy. 

To  the  evidence  of  the  Signal  Book  may  be 
added  a  passage  in  Nelson's  letter  to  Admiral  Sir  A. 
Ball  from  the  Magdalena  Islands,  November  7,  1803. 
He  there  writes  :  '  Our  last  two  reconnoiterings  : 
Toulon  has  eight  sail  of  the  line  apparently  ready 
for  sea  ...  a  seventy-four  repairing.  Whether  they 
intend  waiting  for  her  I  can't  tell,  but  I  expect  them 
every  hour  to  put  to  sea.'2  He  was  thus  expecting 
to  have  to  deal  with  eight  or  nine  of  the  line,  which 
is  the  precise  contingency  for  which  the  memoran- 
dum provides.  There  can  be  little  doubt  therefore 
that  it  was  issued  while  Nelson  lay  at  Magdalena, 
the  first  week  in  November 


1  Nicolas,  Nelson's  Despatches,  v.  287,  note.     It  is  also  given 
in  vol.  vii.  p.  ccxvi,  apparently  from  a  captain's  copy  which  is 
undated. 

2  Ibid.  v.  283. 

3  Professor  Laughton  pointed  out  (pp.  «'/.)  that  the  conditions 
will  fit  June  to  August  1804,  but  that  it  might  have  been  '  earlier, 
certainly  not  later.' 


282  THE  LAST  PHASE 

The  second  memorandum,  which  Nelson  com- 
municated to  his  fleet,  soon  after  he  joined  it  off 
Cadiz,  is  regarded  by  universal  agreement  as  the 
high-water  mark  of  sailing  tactics.  Its  interpretation 
however,  and  the  dominant  ideas  that  inspired  it, 
no  less  than  the  degree  to  which  it  influenced  the 
battle  and  was  in  the  mind  of  Nelson  and  his  officers 
at  the  time,  are  questions  of  considerable  uncertainty. 
Some  of  the  most  capable  of  his  captains,  as  we 
shall  see  presently,  even  disagreed  as  to  whether 
Trafalgar  was  fought  under  the  memorandum  at  all. 
From  the  method  in  which  the  attack  was  actually 
made,  so  different  apparently  from  the  method  of 
the  memorandum,  some  thought  Nelson  had  cast 
it  aside,  while  others  saw  that  it  still  applied.  A 
careful  consideration  of  all  that  was  said  and  done 
at  the  time  gives  a  fairly  clear  explanation  of  the 
divergence  of  opinion,  and  it  will  probably  be  agreed 
that  those  officers  who  had  a  real  feeling  for  tactics 
saw  that  Nelson  was  making  his  attack  on  what 
were  the  essential  principles  of  the  memorandum, 
while  some  on  the  other  hand  who  were  possessed 
of  less  tactical  insight  did  not  distinguish  between 
what  was  essential  and  what  was  accidental  in 
Nelson's  great  conception,  and,  mistaking  the  shadow 
for  the  substance,  believed  that  he  had  abandoned 
his  carefully  prepared  project. 

For  those  who  did  not  entirely  grasp  Nelson's 
meaning  there  is  much  excuse.  We  who  are  able 
to  follow  step  by  step  the  progress  of  tactical  thought 
from  the  dawn  of  the  sailing  period  can  appreciate 
without  much  difficulty  the  radical  revolution  which 
he  was  setting  on  foot.  It  was  a  revolution,  as  we 
can  plainly  see,  that  was  tending  to  bring  the  long- 
drawn  curve  of  tactical  development  round  to  the 
point  at  which  the  Elizabethans  had  started.  Sur- 
prise is  sometimes  expressed  that,  having  once 


NELSON  AND  DRAKE  283 

established  the  art  of  warfare  under  sail  in  broad- 
side ships,  our  seamen  were  so  long  in  finding  the 
tactical  system  it  demanded.  Should  not  the 
wonder  be  the  converse :  that  the  Elizabethan 
seamen  so  quickly  came  so  near  the  perfected 
method  of  the  greatest  master  of  the  art  ?  The 
attack  at  Gravelines  in  1588  with  four  mutually 
supporting  squadrons  in  echelon  bears  strong  ele- 
mentary resemblance  to  that  at  Trafalgar  in  1805. 
It  was  in  dexterity  and  precision  of  detail  far  more 
than  in  principle  that  the  difference  lay.  The  first 
and  the  last  great  victory  of  the  British  navy  had 
certainly  more  in  common  with  each  other  than 
either  had  with  Malaga  or  the  First  of  June.  In  the 
zenith  of  their  careers  Nelson  and  Drake  came  very 
near  to  joining  hands.  Little  wonder  then  if  many 
of  Nelson's  captains  failed  to  fathom  the  full  depth 
of  his  profound  idea.  Naval  officers  in  those  days 
were  left  entirely  without  theoretical  instruction  on 
the  higher  lines  of  their  profession,  and  Nelson,  if 
we  may  judge  by  the  style  of  his  memoranda, 
can  hardly  have  been  a  very  lucid  expositor.  He 
thought  they  all  understood  what  with  pardonable 
pride  he  called  the  '  Nelson  touch.'  The  most 
sagacious  and  best  educated  of  them  probably  did, 
but  there  were  clearly  some — and  Collingwood,  as 
we  shall  see,  was  amongst  them — who  only  grasped 
some  of  the  complex  principles  which  were  com- 
bined in  his  brilliant  conception. 

An  analysis  of  the  memorandum  will  show  how 
complex  it  was.  In  the  first  and  foremost  place 
there  is  a  clear  note  of  denunciation  against  the 
long-established  fallacy  of  the  old  order  of  battle  in 
single  line.  Secondly,  there  is  in  its  stead  the  re- 
establishment  of  the  primitive  system  of  mutually 
supporting  squadrons  in  line  ahead.  Thirdly,  there 
is  the  principle  of  throwing  one  squadron  in  superior 


284  THE  LAST  PHASE 

force  upon  one  end  of  the  enemy's  formation,  and 
using  the  other  squadrons  to  cover  the  attack  or 
support  it  if  need  arose.  Fourthly,  there  is  the 
principle  of  concealment — that  is,  disposing  the 
squadrons  in  such  a  manner  that  even  after  the  real 
attack  has  been  delivered  the  enemy  cannot  tell 
what  the  containing  squadrons  mean  to  do,  and  in 
consequence  are  forced  to  hold  their  parrying  move 
in  suspense.  The  memorandum  also  included  the 
idea  of  concentration,  and  this  is  often  spoken  of  as 
its  conspicuous  merit.  But  in  the  idea  of  concentra- 
tion there  was  nothing  new,  even  if  we  go  back  no 
further  than  Rodney.  It  was  only  the  method  of 
concentration,  woven  out  of  his  four  fundamental 
innovations,  that  was  new.  Moreover,  as  Nelson 
delivered  the  attack,  he  threw  away  the  simple  idea 
of  concentration.  For  a  suddenly  conceived  strate- 
gical object  he  deliberately  exposed  the  heads  of 
his  columns  to  what  with  almost  any  other  enemy 
would  have  been  an  overwhelming  superiority.  On 
the  other  hand,  by  making,  as  he  did,  a  perpendi- 
cular instead  of  a  parallel  attack,  as  he  had  intended, 
he  accentuated — it  is  true  at  enormous  risk — the 
cardinal  points  of  his  design ;  that  is,  he  departed 
still  further  from  the  old  order  of  battle,  and  he  still 
further  concealed  from  the  enemy  what  the  real 
attack  was  to  be,  and  after  it  was  developed  what 
the  containing  squadron  was  going  to  do.  Concen- 
tration in  fact  was  only  the  crude  and  ordinary  raw 
material  of  a  design  of  unmatched  subtlety  and 
invention. 

The  keynote  of  his  conception,  then,  was  his 
revolutionary  substitution  of  the  primitive  Eliza- 
bethan and  early  seventeenth  century  method  for 
the  fetish  of  the  single  line.  For  some  time  it  is 
true  the  established  battle  order  had  been  blown 
upon  from  various  quarters,  but  no  one  as  yet  had 


REACTION  AGAINST   THE  LINE     285 

been  able  to  devise  any  system  convincing  enough 
to  dethrone  it.  It  will  be  remembered  that  at  least 
as  early  as  1759  an  Additional  Instruction  had  pro- 
vided for  a  battle  order  in  two  lines,  but  it  does  not 
appear  ever  to  have  been  used.1  Rodney's  manoeuvre 
again  had  foreshadowed  the  use  of  parts  of  the  line 
independently  for  the  purpose  of  concentration  and 
containing.  In  1782  Clerk  of  Eldin  had  privately 
printed  his  Essay,  which  contained  suggestions  for 
an  attack  from  to-windward,  with  the  line  broken 
up  into  echeloned  divisions  in  close  resemblance 
to  the  disposition  laid  down  in  Nelson's  memo- 
randum. In  1 790  this  part  of  his  work  was  pub- 
lished. Meanwhile  an  even  more  elaborate  and 
well-reasoned  assault  on  the  whole  principle  of  the 
single  line  had  appeared  in  France.  In  1787  the 
Vicomte  de  Grenier,  a  French  flag  officer,  had  pro- 
duced his  L'  Art  de  la  Guerre  sur  Mer,  in  which  he 
boldly  attacked  the  law  laid  down  by  De  Grasse, 
that  so  long  as  men-of-war  carried  their  main 
armament  in  broadside  batteries  there  could  never 
be  any  battle  order  but  the  single  line  ahead.  In 
Grenier's  view  the  English  had  already  begun  to 
discard  it,  and  he  insists  that,  in  all  the  actions  he 
had  seen  in  the  last  two  wars,  the  English,  knowing 
the  weakness  of  the  single  line,  had  almost  always 
concentrated  on  part  of  it  without  regular  order. 
The  radical  defects  of  the  line  he  points  out  are  : 
that  it  is  easily  thrown  into  disorder  and  easily 
broken,  that  it  is  inflexible,  and  too  extended  a 
formation  to  be  readily  controlled  by  signals.  He 

1  It  is  very  doubtful  whether  this  formation  was  ever  intended 
for  anything  but  tactical  exercises.  Morogues  has  a  similar 
signal  and  instruction  (Tactique  Navale,  p.  294,  ed.  1779),  '  Partager 
I'arme'e  en  deux  corps,  ou  mettre  1'armee  sur  deux  colonnes  ;  et 
representation  d'un  combat.'  Anson  certainly  used  it  for  man- 
oeuvring one  half  of  his  fleet  against  the  other  during  his  tactical 
exercises  in  1747.  Warren  to  Anson,  Add.  MSS.  15957,  p.  172. 


286  THE  LAST  PHASE 

then  proceeds  to  lay  down  the  principle  on  which  a 
sound  battle  order  should  be  framed,  and  the  funda- 
mental objects  at  which  it  should  aim.  His  postu- 
lates are  thus  stated  : 

'  i.  De  rendre  nulle  une  partie  des  forces  de 
1'ennemi  arm  de  reunir  toutes  les  siennes  centre 
celles  qui  Ton  attaque,  ou  qui  attaquent  ;  et  de 
vaincre  ensuite  le  reste  avec  plus  de  facilite  et  de 
certitude. 

'  2.  De  ne  presenter  a  1'ennemi  aucune  partie  de 
son  armee  qui  ne  soit  flanquee  et  ou  il  ne  put  com- 
battre  et  vaincre  s'il  vouloit  se  porter  sur  les  parties 
de  cette  arme'e  reconnues  faibles  jusqu'a  present.' 

Never  had  the  fundamental  intention  of  naval 
tactics  been  stated  with  so  much  penetration,  sim- 
plicity, and  completeness.  The  order,  however, 
which  Grenier  worked  out — that  of  three  lines  of 
bearing  disposed  on  three  sides  of  a  lozenge — was 
somewhat  fantastic  and  cumbrous,  and  it  seems  to 
have  been  enough  to  secure  for  his  clever  treatise 
complete  neglect.  It  had  even  less  effect  on  French 
tactics  than  had  Nelson's  memorandum  on  our  own. 
This  is  all  the  more  curious,  for  so  thoroughly  was 
the  change  that  was  coming  over  English  tactics 
understood  in  France  that  Villeneuve  knew  quite 
well  the  kind  of  attack  Nelson  would  be  likely  to 
make.  In  his  General  Instructions,  issued  in  antici- 
pation of  the  battle,  he  says  :  '  The  enemy  will  not 
confine  themselves  to  forming  a  line  parallel  to  ours. 
.  .  .  They  will  try  to  envelope  our  rear,  to  break 
our  line,  and  to  throw  upon  those  of  our  ships  that 
they  cut  off,  groups  of  their  own  to  surround  and 
crush  them.'  Yet  he  could  not  get  away  from  the 
dictum  of  De  Grasse,  and  was  able  to  think  of  no 
better  way  of  meeting  such  an  attack  than  awaiting 
it  '  in  a  single  line  of  battle  well  closed  up.' 

1  Mathieu-Dumas,  Precis  des  Evtnements  Militaires^  xiii.  193. 


GROWTH  OF  THE  NELSON  TOUCH    287 

In  England  things  were  little  better.  In  spite 
of  the  fact  that  at  Camperdown  Duncan  had  actu- 
ally found  a  sudden  advantage  by  attacking  in  two 
divisions,  no  one  had  been  found  equal  to  the  task 
of  working  out  a  tactical  system  to  meet  the  inarti- 
culate demands  of  the  tendency  which  Grenier  had 
noticed.  The  possibilities  even  of  Rodney's  man- 
oeuvre had  not  been  followed  up,  and  Howe  had 
contented  himself  with  his  brilliant  invention  for  in- 
creasing the  impact  and  decision  of  the  single  line. 
It  was  reserved  for  Nelson's  genius  to  bring  a  suffi- 
ciently powerful  solvent  to  bear  on  the  crystallised 
opinion  of  the  service,  and  to  find  a  formula  which 
would  shed  all  that  was  bad  and  combine  all  that 
was  good  in  previous  systems.1 

The  dominating  ideas  that  were  in  his  mind 
become  clearer,  if  we  follow  step  by  step  all  the 
evidence  that  has  survived  as  to  the  genesis  and 
history  of  his  memorandum.  As  early  as  1798, 
when  he  was  hoping  to  intercept  Bonaparte's  expedi- 
tion to  Egypt,  he  had  adopted  a  system  which  was 
not  based  on  the  single  line,  and  so  far  as  is  known 
this  was  the  first  tactical  order  he  ever  framed  as 
a  fleet  commander.  It  is  contained  in  a  general 
order  issued  from  the  Vanguard  on  June  8  of  that 
year,  and  runs  as  follows,  as  though  hot  from  the 
lesson  of  St.  Vincent :  '  As  it  is  very  probable  the 
enemy  will  not  be  formed  in  regular  order  on  the 
approach  of  the  squadron  under  my  command,  I 
may  in  that  case  deem  it  most  expedient  to  attack 
them  by  separate  divisions.  In  which  case  the  com- 
manders of  divisions  are  strictly  enjoined  to  keep 
their  ships  in  the  closest  possible  order,  and  on  no 

1  Captain  Boswall,  in  the  preface  to  his  translation  of  Hoste, 
says  Grenier's  work  was  translated  in  1790.  If  this  was  so  Nelson 
may  well  have  read  it,  but  I  have  not  been  able  to  find  a  copy  of 
the  translation  either  in  the  British  Museum  or  elsewhere. 


288  THE  LAST  PHASE 

account  whatever  to  risk  the  separation  of  one  of 
their  ships.' l  The  divisional  organisation  follows, 
being  his  own  division  of  six  sail  and  two  others 
of  four  each.  '  Had  he  fallen  in  with  the  French 
fleet  at  sea,'  wrote  Captain  Berry,  who  was  sent 
home  with  despatches  after  the  Nile,  '  that  he 
might  make  the  best  impression  upon  any  part 
of  it  that  should  appear  the  most  vulnerable  or 
the  most  eligible  for  attack,  he  divided  his  force 
into  three  sub-squadrons  [one  of  six  sail  and  two 
of  four  each].  Two  of  these  sub-squadrons  were  to 
attack  the  ships  of  war,  while  the  third  was  to 
pursue  the  transports  and  to  sink  and  destroy  as 
many  as  it  could.'2  The  exact  manner  in  which  he 
intended  to  use  this  organisation  he  had  explained 
constantly  by  word  of  mouth  to  his  captains,  but 
no  further  record  of  his  design  has  been  found.  Still 
there  is  an  alteration  which  he  made  in  his  signal 
book  at  the  same  time  that  gives  us  the  needed 
light.  We  cannot  fail  to  notice  the  striking 
resemblance  between  his  method  of  attack  by 
separate  divisions  on  a  disordered  enemy,  and  that 
made  by  the  Elizabethan  admirals  at  Gravelines 
upon  the  Armada  after  its  formation  had  been 
broken  up  by  the  fireships.  That  attack  was  made 
intuitively  by  divisions  independently  handled  as 
occasion  should  dictate,  and  Nelson's  new  signal 
leaves  little  doubt  that  this  was  the  plan  which  he 
too  intended.  The  alteration  he  ordered  was  to 
change  the  signification  of  Signal  16,  so  that  it 
meant  that  each  of  his  flag  officers,  from  the  moment 
it  was  made,  should  have  control  of  his  own 
division  and  make  any  signals  he  thought  proper. 

But   this    was    not   all.      By  the   same  general 
order  he  made  two  other  alterations  in  the  signal 

1  Ross,  Memoir  of  Saumarez,  i.  212. 

2  Laughton,  Nehoris  Letters  and  Despatches,  150. 


NELSON'S  NEW  SIGNALS,    1798      289 

book  in  view  of  encountering  the  French  in  order 
of  battle.  They  too  are  of  the  highest  interest  and 
run  as  follows :  '  To  be  inserted  in  pencil  in  the 
signal  book.  At  No.  182.  Being  to  windward  of 
the  enemy,  to  denote  I  mean  to  attack  the  enemy's 
line  from  the  rear  towards  the  van  as  far  as  thirteen 
ships,  or  whatsoever  number  of  the  British  ships  of 
the  line  may  be  present,  that  each  ship  may  know  his 
opponent  in  the  enemy's  line.'  No.  183.  'I  mean  to 
press  hard  with  the  whole  force  on  the  enemy's  rear.' ] 

Thus  we  see  that  at  the  very  first  opportunity 
Nelson  had  of  enforcing  his  own  tactical  ideas  he 
enunciated  three  of  the  principles  upon  which  his 
great  memorandum  was  based,  viz.  breaking  up  his 
line  of  battle  into  three  divisional  lines,  indepen- 
dent control  by  divisional  leaders,  and  concentration 
on  the  enemy's  rear.  All  that  is  wanting  are  the 
elements  of  surprise  and  containing. 

These,  however,  we  see  germinating  in  the 
memorandum  he  issued  five  years  later  off  Toulon. 
In  that  case  he  expected  to  meet  the  French  fleet 
on  an  opposite  course,  and  being  mainly  concerned 
in  stopping  it  and  having  a  slightly  superior  force 
he  is  content  to  concentrate  on  the  van.  But,  in 
view  of  the  strategical  necessity  of  making  the 
attack  in  this  way,  he  takes  extra  precautions  which 
are  not  found  in  the  general  order  of  1798.  He  pro- 
vides for  preventing  the  enemy's  knowing  on  which 
side  his  attack  is  to  fall ;  instead  of  engaging  an 
equal  number  of  their  ships  he  provides  for  break- 
ing their  line,  and  engaging  the  bulk  of  their  fleet 
with  a  superior  number  of  his  own  ;  and  finally 
he  looks  to  being  ready  to  contain  the  enemy's  rear 
before  it  can  do  him  any  damage. 

1  No.  182  as  it  stood  in  the  signal  book  meant,  Ships  before  in 
tow  to  proceed  to  port.  No.  183.  When  at  anchor  to  veer  to  twice 
the  length  of  cable.  No.  16.  Secret  instructions  to  be  opened. 

U 


29o  THE  LAST  PHASE 

Thus,  taking  together  the  general  order  of  1798 
and  the  Toulon  memorandum  of  1803,  we  can  see 
all  the  tactical  ideas  that  were  involved  at  Trafalgar 
already  in  his  mind,  and  we  are  in  a  position  to 
appreciate  the  process  of  thought  by  which  he 
gradually  evolved  the  sublimely  simple  attack 
that  welded  them  together,  and  brought  them  all 
into  play  without  complication  or  risk  of  mistake. 
This  process,  which  crowns  Nelson's  reputation  as 
the  greatest  naval  tactician  of  all  time,  we  must 
now  follow  in  detail. 

Shortly  before  he  left  England  for  the  last  time, 
he  communicated  to  Keats,  of  the  Superb,  a  full 
explanation  of  his  views  as  they  then  existed  in  his 
mind,  and  Keats  has  preserved  it  in  the  following 
paper  which  Nicolas  printed. 

'  Memorandum  of  a  conversation  between  Lord 
Nelson  and  Admiral  Sir  Richard  Keats,  the  last  time 
he  was  in  England  before  the  battle  of  Trafalgar.1 

'  One  morning,  walking  with  Lord  Nelson  in  the 
grounds  of  Merton,  talking  on  naval  matters,  he  said 
to  me,  "No  day  can  be  long  enough  to  arrange  a 
couple  of  fleets  and  fight  a  decisive  battle  according 
to  the  old  system.  When  we  meet  them  "  (I  was  to 
have  been  with  him),  "  for  meet  them  we  shall,  I'll  tell 
you  how  I  shall  fight  them.  I  shall  form  the  fleet  into 
three  divisions  in  three  lines  ;  one  division  shall  be 
composed  of  twelve  or  fourteen  of  the  fastest  two- 
decked  ships,  which  I  shall  keep  always  to  windward 
or  in  a  situation  of  advantage,  and  I  shall  put  them 
under  an  officer  who,  I  am  sure,  will  employ  them  in 
the  manner  I  wish,  if  possible.  I  consider  it  will 
always  be  in  my  power  to  throw  them  into  battle  in 

1  It  was  in  the  handwriting,  Nicolas  says,  of  Edward  Hawke 
Locker,  Esq.,  the  naval  biographer  and  originator  of  the  naval 
picture  gallery  at  Greenwich.  He  endorsed  it,  '  Copy  of  a  paper 
communicated  to  me  by  Sir  Richard  Keats,  and  allowed  by  him 
to  be  transcribed  by  me,  ist  October,  1829.' 


I 


NELSONS    TALK  WITH   KEATS    291 

any  part  I  choose  ;  but  if  circumstances  prevent  their 
being  carried  against  the  enemy  where  I  desire,  I 
shall  feel  certain  he  will  employ  them  effectually  and 
perhaps  in  a  more  advantageous  manner  than  if  he 
could  have  followed  my  orders  "  (he  never  mentioned 
or  gave  any  hint  by  which  I  could  understand  who 
it  was  he  intended  for  this  distinguished  service).1 
He  continued,  "  With  the  remaining  part  of  the  fleet, 
formed  in  two  lines,  I  shall  go  at  them  at  once  if  I 
can,  about  one  third  of  their  line  from  their  leading 
ship."  He  then  said,  "  What  do  you  think  of  it  ?  "  Such 
a  question  I  felt  required  consideration.  I  paused. 
Seeing  it  he  said,  "  But  I  will  tell  you  what  /  think  of 
it.  I  think  it  will  surprise  and  confound  the  enemy. 
They  won't  know  what  I  am  about.  It  will  bring 
forward  a  pell-mell  battle,  and  that  is  what  I  want." 

Here  we  have  something  roughly  on  all-fours 
with  the  methods  of  the  First  Dutch  War.  There 
are  the  three  squadrons,  the  headlong  '  charge  '  and 
the  metie.  The  reserve  squadron  to  windward 
goes  even  further  back,  to  the  treatise  of  De  Chaves 
and  the  Instructions  of  Lord  Lisle  in  1545.  It 
was  no  wonder  it  took  away  Keats's  breath.  The 
return  to  primitive  methods  was  probably  uncon- 
scious, but  what  was  obviously  uppermost  in 
Nelson's  mind  was  the  breaking  up  of  the  established 
order  in  single  line,  leading  by  surprise  and  con- 
cealment to  a  decisive  me  tee.  He  seems  to  insist 
not  so  much  upon  defeating  the  enemy  by  concen- 
tration as  by  throwing  him  into  confusion,  upsetting 
his  mental  equilibrium  in  accordance  with  the  primi- 
tive idea.  The  notion  of  concentration  is  at  any 

1  It  was  certainly  not  Keats  himself,  though  afterwards  Nelson- 
meant  to  offer  him  command  of  the  squadron  he  intended  to  detach 
into  the  Mediterranean.     In  the  expected  battle  Keats,  had  he 
arrived  in  time,  was  to  have  been  Nelson's  '  second '  in  the  line. 
Nelson  to  Sir  Alexander  Ball,  October  15,  1805. 

2  Nelson's  Despatches,  vii.  241,  note. 

U  2 


292  THE  LAST  PHASE 

rate  secondary,  while  the  subtle  scheme  for  'con- 
taining '  as  perfected  in  the  memorandum  is  not  yet 
developed.  As  he  explained  his  plan  to  Keats,  he 
meant  to  attack  at  once  with  both  his  main  divi- 
sions, using  the  reserve  squadron  as  a  general  sup- 
port. There  is  no  clear  statement  that  he  meant  it 
as  a  '  containing  '  force,  though  possibly  it  was  in  his 
mind.1 

There  is  one  more  piece  of  evidence  relating  to 
this  time  when  he  was  still  in  England.  According 
to  this  story  Lord  Hill,  about  1840,  when  still  Com- 
mander-in-Chief,  was  paying  a  visit  to  Lord  Sid- 
mouth.  His  host,  who,  better  known  as  Addington, 
had  been  prime  minister  till  1804,  and  was  in  Pitt's 
new  cabinet  till  July  1  805,  showed  him  a  table  bearing 
a  Nelson  inscription.  He  told  him  that  shortly 
before  leaving  England  to  join  the  fleet  Nelson  had 
drawn  upon  it  after  dinner  a  plan  of  his  intended 
attack,  and  had  explained  it  as  follows  :  '  I  shall 
attack  in  two  lines,  led  by  myself  and  Collingwood, 
and  I  am  confident  I  shall  capture  their  van  and 
centre  or  their  centre  and  rear.'  '  Those,'  concluded 
Sidmouth,  '  were  his  very  words,'  and  remarked  how 
wonderfully  they  had  been  fulfilled.2  Hill  and  Sid- 
mouth  at  the  time  were  both  old  men  and  the 
authority  is  not  high,  but  so  far  as  it  goes  it  would 
tend  to  show  that  an  attack  in  two  lines  instead  of 
one  was  still  Nelson's  dominant  idea.  It  cannot 
however  safely  be  taken  as  evidence  that  he  ever 
intended  a  concentration  on  the  van,  though  in  view 
of  the  memorandum  of  1803  tn^s  ^s  quite  possible. 


1  Nelson's  '  advance  squadron  '  must  not  be  confused  with  the 
idea  of  a  reserve  squadron  which  Gravina  pressed  on  Villeneuve 
at  the  famous  Cadiz  council  of  war  before  Trafalgar.  Gravina's 
idea  was  nothing  but  the  old  one  of  a  reserve  of  superfluous  ships 
after  equalising  the  line,  as  provided  by  the  old  English  Fighting 
Instructions  and  recommended  by  Morogues. 

3  Sidney,  Life  of  Lord  Hill>  p.  368. 


THE  NELSON   TOUCH  293 

Finally,  there  is  the  statement  of  Clarke  and 
Me  Arthur  that  Nelson  before  leaving  England 
deposited  a  copy  of  his  plan  with  Lord  Barham,  the 
new  first  lord  of  the  admiralty.  This  however  is 
very  doubtful.  The  Barham  papers  have  recently 
been  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Society,  in  the 
hands  of  Professor  Laughton,  and  the  only  copy  of 
the  memorandum  he  has  been  able  to  find  is  an 
incomplete  one  containing  several  errors  of  tran- 
scription, and  dated  the  Victory,  October  n,  1805. 
In  the  absence  of  further  evidence  therefore  no 
weight  can  be  attached  to  the  oft-repeated  assertion 
that  Nelson  had  actually  drawn  up  his  memorandum 
before  he  left  England. 

Coming  now  to  the  time  when  he  had  joined  the 
fleet  off  Cadiz,  the  first  light  we  have  is  the  well- 
known  letter  of  October  i  to  Lady  Hamilton.  In 
this  letter,  after  telling  her  that  he  had  joined  on  Sep- 
tember 28,  but  had  not  been  able  to  communicate 
with  the  fleet  till  the  29th,  he  says,  '  When  I  came  to 
explain  to  them  the  Nelson  touch  it  was  like  an 
electric  shock.  Some  shed  tears  and  all  approved. 
It  was  new — it  was  singular — it  was  simple.' 
What  he  meant  exactly  by  the  '  Nelson  touch  '  has 
never  been  clearly  explained,  but  he  could  not 
possibly  have  meant  either  concentration  or  the 
attack  on  the  enemy's  rear,  for  neither  of  these  ideas 
was  either  new  or  singular. 

On  October  3  he  writes  to  her  again  :  '  The  re- 
ception I  met  with  on  joining  the  fleet  caused  the 
sweetest  sensation  of  my  life.  .  .  As  soon  as  these 
emotions  were  past  I  laid  before  them  the  plan  I 
had  previously  arranged  for  attacking  the  enemy, 
and  it  was  not  only  my  pleasure  to  find  it  generally 
approved,  but  clearly  perceived  and  understood.' 1 

1  Clarke  and  McArthur  say  the  letter  was  to  Lady  Hamilton. 


294  THE  LAST  PHASE 

The  next  point  to  notice  is  the  '  Order  of  Battle 
and  Sailing'  given  by  Nicolas.  It  is  without 
date,  but  almost  certainly  must  have  been  drawn 
up  before  Nelson  joined.  It  does  not  contain  the 
Belleisle,  which  Nelson  knew  on  October  4  was 
to  join  him.1  It  also  does  include  the  name  of 
Sir  Robert  Calder  and  his  flagship,  and  on  Septem- 
ber 30  Nelson  had  decided  to  send  both  him  and 
his  ship  home.2 

The  order  is  for  a  fleet  of  forty  sail,  but  the  names 
of  only  thirty-three  are  given,  which  were  all  Nelson 
really  expected  to  get  in  time.  The  remarkable 
feature  of  this  order  is  that  it  contains  no  trace  of 
the  triple  organisation  of  the  memorandum.  The 
'  advanced  squadron '  is  absent,  and  the  order  is 
based  on  two  equal  divisions  only. 

Then  on  October  9,  after  Calder  had  gone,  there 
is  this  entry  in  Nelson's  private  diary:  '  Sent  Admiral 
Collingwood  the  Nelson  touch.'  It  was  enclosed  in 
a  letter  in  which  Nelson  says  :  '  I  send  you  my  Plan 
of  Attack,  as  far  as  a  man  dare  venture  to  guess 
at  the  very  uncertain  position  the  enemy  may  be 
found  in.  But,  my  dear  friend,  it  is  to  place  you 
perfectly  at  your  ease  respecting  my  intentions  and 
to  give  full  scope  to  your  judgment  for  carrying 
them  into  effect.'  The  same  day  Collingwood 
replies,  '  I  have  a  just  sense  of  your  lordship's  kind- 
ness to  me,  and  the  full  confidence  you  have  reposed 
in  me  inspires  me  with  the  most  lively  gratitude.  I 
hope  it  will  not  be  long  before  there  is  an  oppor- 
tunity of  showing  your  lordship  that  it  has  not  been 
misplaced.'  On  these  two  letters  there  can  be  little 

Nicolas,  reprinting  from  the  Naval  Chronicle,  has  the  addressee's 
name  blank. 

1  Nelson  to  Captain  Duff,  October  4.     The  order  to  take  her 
under  his  command  was  despatched  on  September  20.     Same  to 
Marsden,  October  10. 

2  Same  to  Lord  Barham,  September  30. 


ITS  FINAL   FORM  295 

doubt  that  the  '  Plan  of  Attack '  which  Nelson  en- 
closed was  that  of  the  memorandum.  The  draft  from 
which  Nicolas  printed  appears  to  have  been  dated 
October  9,  and  originally  had  in  one  passage  '  you  ' 
and  '  your '  for  the  '  second  in  command,'  showing 
that  Nelson  in  his  mind  was  addressing  his  remarks 
to  Collingwood,  though  subsequently  he  altered 
the  sentence  into  the  third  person.  Only  one 
other  copy  was  known  to  Nicolas,  and  that  was 
issued  in  the  altered  form  to  Captain  Hope,  of  the 
Defence,  a  ship  which  in  the  order  of  battle  was 
in  Ccllingwood's  squadron,  but  Codrington  tells  us 
it  was  certainly  issued  to  all  the  captains.1 

So  far,  then,  we  have  the  case  thus — that  what- 
ever Nelson  may  have  really  told  Lord  Sidmouth, 
and  whatever  may  have  been  in  his  mind  when  he 
drew  up  the  dual  order  of  battle  and  sailing,  he  had 
by  October  9  reverted  to  the  triple  idea  which 
he  had  explained  to  Keats.  Meanwhile,  however, 
his  conception  had  ripened.  There  are  marked 
changes  in  organisation,  method  and  intention. 
In  organisation  the  reserve  squadron  is  reduced 
from  the  original  twelve  or  fourteen  to  eight,  or 
one  fifth  of  his  hypothetical  fleet  instead  of  about 
one  third — reduced,  that  is,  to  a  strength  at  which 
it  was  much  less  capable  of  important  independent 
action.  In  method  we  have,  instead  of  an  attack 
with  the  two  main  divisions,  an  attack  with  one  only, 
with  the  other  covering  it.  In  intention  we  have 
as  the  primary  function  of  the  reserve  squadron, 
its  attachment  to  one  or  other  of  the  other  two  main 
divisions  as  circumstances  may  dictate. 

The  natural  inference  from  these  important 
changes  is  that  Nelson's  conception  was  now  an 
attack  in  two  divisions  of  different  strength,  the 

1  See  the  note  on  Trafalgar  dictated  by  him  in  Memoirs  of  Sir 
Edward  Codrington,  edited  by  Lady  Bourchier,  1873. 


296  THE  LAST  PHASE 

stronger  of  which,  as  the  memorandum  subse- 
quently explains,  was  to  be  used  as  a  containing 
force  to  cover  the  attack  of  the  other,  and  except 
that  the  balance  of  the  two  divisions  was  reversed, 
this  is  practically  just  what  Clerk  of  Eldin  had  re- 
commended and  what  actually  happened  in  the 
battle.  It  is  a  clear  advance  upon  the  original  idea 
as  explained  to  Keats,  in  which  the  third  squadron 
was  to  be  used  on  the  primitive  and  indefinite  plan 
of  De  Chaves  and  Lord  Lisle  as  a  general  reserve. 
It  also  explains  Nelson's  covering  letter  to  Ceiling- 
wood,  in  which  he  seems  to  convey  to  his  colleague 
that  the  pith  of  his  plan  was  an  attack  in  two 
divisions,  and,  within  the  general  lines  of  the  design, 
complete  freedom  of  action  for  the  second  in  com- 
mand. How  largely  this  idea  of  independent  control 
entered  into  the  '  Nelson  touch '  we  may  judge  from 
the  fact  that  it  is  emphasised  in  no  less  than  three 
distinct  paragraphs  of  the  memorandum. 

Such,  then,  is  the  fundamental  principle  of  the 
memorandum  as  enunciated  in  its  opening  para- 
graphs. He  then  proceeds  to  elaborate  it  in  two 
detailed  plans  of  attack — one  from  to-leeward  and 
the  other  from  to-windward.  It  was  the  latter  he 
meant  to  make  if  possible.  He  calls  it  '  the 
intended  attack,'  and  it  accords  with  the  opening 
enunciation.  The  organisation  is  triple,  but  no 
special  function  is  assigned  to  the  reserve  squadron. 
The  actual  attack  on  the  enemy's  rear  is  to  be  made 
by  Collingwood,  while  Nelson  with  his  own  division 
and  the  reserve  is  to  cover  him.  In  the  event  of  an 
attack  having  to  be  made  from  to-leeward,  the  idea 
is  different.  Here  the  containing  movement  practi- 
cally disappears.  The  fleet  is  still  to  attack  the 
rear  and  part  of  the  centre  of  the  enemy,  but  now 
in  three  independent  divisions  simultaneously,  in 
such  a  way  as  to  cut  his  line  at  three  points,  and  to 


THE  TWO  PLANS  OF  ATTACK  297 

concentrate  a  superior  force  on  each  section  of  the 
severed  line.  To  none  of  the  divisions  is  assigned 
the  duty  of  containing  the  rest  of  the  enemy's 
fleet  from  the  outset.  It  is  to  be  dealt  with  at  a 
second  stage  of  the  action  by  all  ships  that  are  still 
capable  of  renewing  the  engagement  after  the  first 
stage.  '  The  whole  impression,'  as  Nelson  put  it, 
in  case  he  was  forced  to  attack  from  to-leeward,  was 
to  overpower  the  enemy's  line  from  a  little  ahead  of 
the  centre  to  the  rearmost  ship.  He  does  not  say, 
however,  that  this  was  to  be  '  the  whole  impression ' 
of  the  intended  attack  from  to-windward.  '  The 
whole  impression  '  there  appears  to  be  for  Colling- 
wood  to  overpower  the  rear  while  Nelson  with  the 
other  two  divisions  made  play  with  the  enemy's  van 
and  centre ;  but  the  particular  manner  in  which  he 
would  carry  out  this  part  of  the  design  is  left  undeter- 
mined. 

The  important  point,  then,  in  considering  the 
relation  between  the  actual  battle  and  the  memo- 
randum, is  to  remember  that  it  provided  for  two 
different  methods  of  attacking  the  rear  according  to 
whether  the  enemy  were  encountered  to  windward 
or  to  leeward.  The  somewhat  illogical  arrangement 
of  the  memorandum  tends  to  conceal  this  highly 
important  distinction.  For  Nelson  interpolates  be- 
tween his  explanation  of  the  windward  attack  and  his 
opening  enunciation  of  principle  his  explanation  of 
the  leeward  attack,  to  which  the  enunciation  did 
not  apply.  That  some  confusion  was  caused  in  the 
minds  of  some  even  of  his  best  officers  is  certain, 
but  let  them  speak  for  themselves. 

After  the  battle  Captain  Harvey,  of  the  T£me"- 
raire,  whom  Nelson  had  intended  to  lead  his  line, 
wrote  to  his  wife,  '  It  was  noon  before  the  action 
commenced,  which  was  done  according  to  the  in- 
structions given  us  by  Lord  Nelson  .  .  .  Lord 


298  THE  LAST  PHASE 

Nelson  had  given  me  leave  to  lead  and  break  through 
the  line  about  the  fourteenth  ship/  i.e.  two  or 
three  ships  ahead  of  the  centre,  as  explained  in  the 
memorandum  for  the  leeward  attack  but  not  for  the 
windward. 

On  the  other  hand  we  have  Captain  Moorsom,  of 
the  Revenge,  who  was  in  Collingwood's  division, 
saying  exactly  the  opposite.  Writing  to  his  father 
on  December  4,  he  says,  '  I  have  seen  several  plans 
of  the  action,  but  none  to  answer  my  ideas  of  it. 
A  regular  plan  was  laid  down  by  Lord  Nelson  some 
time  before  the  action  but  not  acted  on.  His  great 
anxiety  seemed  to  be  to  get  to  leeward  of  them  lest 
they  should  make  off  to  Cadiz  before  he  could  get 
near  them.'  And  on  November  i,  to  the  same 
correspondent  he  had  written,  '  I  am  not  certain 
that  our  mode  of  attack  was  the  best :  however,  it 
succeeded.'  Here  then  we  have  two  of  Nelson's 
most  able  captains  entirely  disagreeing  as  to  whether 
or  not  the  attack  was  carried  out  in  accordance 
with  any  plan  which  Nelson  laid  down. 

Captain  Moorsom's  view  may  be  further  followed 
in  a  tactical  study  written  by  his  son,  Vice-Admiral 
Constantine  Moorsom.1  His  remarks  on  Trafalgar 
were  presumably  largely  inspired  by  his  father,  who 
lived  till  1835.  I*1  ms  view  there  was  '  an  entire 
alteration  both  of  the  scientific  principle  and  of  the 
tactical  movements,'  both  of  which  he  thinks  were 
due  to  what  he  calls  the  morale  of  the  enemy's 
attitude — that  is,  that  Nelson  was  afraid  they  were 
going  to  slip  through  his  fingers  into  Cadiz.  The 
change  of  plan — meaning  presumably  the  change 
from  the  triple  to  the  dual  organisation — he  thinks 
was  not  due  to  the  reduced  numbers  which  Nelson 
actually  had  under  his  flag,  for  the  ratio  between  the 

1  On  the  Principles  of  Naval  Tactics,  1846. 


VIEWS  OF  NELSON'S   OFFICERS    299 

two  fleets  remained  much  about  the  same  as  that  of 
his  hypothesis. 

The  interesting  testimony  of  Lieutenant  G.  L. 
Browne,  who,  as  Admiral  Jackson  informs  us,  was 
assistant  flag-lieutenant  in  the  Victory  and  had  every 
means  of  knowing,  endorses  the  view  of  the  Moorsoms.1 
After  explaining  to  his  parents  the  delay  caused  by 
the  established  method  of  forming  the  fleets  in  two 
parallel  lines  so  that  each  had  an  opposite  number, 
as  set  forth  in  the  opening  words  of  the  memoran- 
dum, he  says,  '  but  by  his  lordship's  mode  of  attack 
you  will  clearly  perceive  not  an  instant  of  time  could 
be  lost.  The  frequent  communications  he  had  with 
his  admirals  and  captains  put  them  in  possession  of 
all  his  plans,  so  that  his  mode  of  attack  was  well 
known  to  every  officer  of  the  fleet.  Some  will  not 
fail  to  attribute  rashness  to  the  conduct  of  Lord 
Nelson.  But  he  well  considered  the  importance  of 
a  decisive  naval  victory  at  this  time,  and  has  fre- 
quently said  since  we  left  England  that,  should  he  be 
so  fortunate  as  to  fall  in  with  the  enemy,  a  total  defeat 
should  be  the  result  on  the  one  side  or  the  other.' 

Next  we  have  what  is  probably  the  most  acute 
and  illuminating  criticism  of  the  battle  that  exists, 
from  the  pen  of  '  an  officer  who  was  present.'  Sir 
Charles  Ekin  quotes  it  anonymously ;  but  from  in- 
ternal evidence  there  is  little  difficulty  in  assigning  it 
to  an  officer  of  the  Conqueror,  though  clearly  not 
her  captain,  Israel  Pellew,  in  whose  justification  the 
concluding  part  was  written.  Whoever  he  was 
the  writer  thoroughly  appreciated  and  understood 
the  tactical  basis  of  Nelson's  plan,  as  laid  down 
in  the  memorandum,  and  he  frankly  condemns 
his  chief  for  having  exposed  his  fleet  unnecessarily 
by  permitting  himself  to  be  hurried  out  of  deliver- 
ing his  attack  in  line  abreast  as  he  intended.  It 
1  Great  Sea  Fights,  ii.  196,  note. 


300  THE  LAST  PHASE 

might  well  have  been  done,  so  far  as  he  could 
see,  without  any  more  loss  of  time  than  actually 
occurred  in  getting  the  bulk  of  the  fleet  into 
action.  Loss  of  time  was  the  only  excuse  for  at- 
tacking in  line  ahead,  and  the  only  reason  he  could 
suppose  for  the  change  of  plan.  If  they  had  all 
gone  down  together  in  line  abreast,  he  is  sure  the 
victory  would  have  been  more  quickly  decided  and 
the  brunt  of  the  fight  more  equally  borne.  Nothing, 
he  thinks,  could  have  been  better  than  the  plan  of 
the  memorandum  if  it  had  only  been  properly 
executed.  An  attack  in  two  great  divisions  with  a 
squadron  of  observation — so  he  summarises  the 
'  Nelson  touch ' — seemed  to  him  to  combine  every 
precaution  under  all  circumstances.  It  allows  of 
concentration  and  containing.  Each  ship  can  use 
her  full  speed  without  fear  of  being  isolated.  The 
fastest  ships  will  break  through  the  line  first,  and 
they  are  just  those  which  from  their  speed  in  pass- 
ing are  liable  to  the  least  damage,  while  having 
passed  through,  they  cause  a  diversion  for  the  attack 
of  their  slower  comrades.  Finally,  if  the  enemy  tries 
to  make  off  and  avoid  action,  the  fleet  is  well  col- 
lected for  a  general  chase.  But  as  Nelson  actually 
made  the  attack  in  his  hurry  to  close,  he  threw  away 
most  of  these  advantages,  and  against  an  enemy  of 
equal  spirit  each  ship  must  have  been  crushed  as 
she  came  into  action.  Instead  of  doubling  ourselves, 
he  says,  we  were  doubled  and  even  trebled  on. 
Nelson  in  fact  presented  the  enemy's  fleet  with 
precisely  the  position  which  the  memorandum  aimed 
at  securing  for  ourselves — that  is  to  say,  he  suffered  a 
portion  of  his  fleet,  comprising  the  Victory,  Teme- 
raire,  Royal  Sovereign,  Belleisle,  Mars,  Colossus, 
and  Bellerophon,  to  be  cut  off  and  doubled  on.1 

1  See/^/,  p.  357  Appendix,  where  this  interesting  paper  is  set 
out  in  full. 


THE  ADVANCED   SQUADRON     301 

The  last  important  witness  is  Captain  Codrington, 
of  the  Orion.  No  one  seems  to  have  kept  his  head 
so  well  in  the  action,  and  this  fact,  coupled  with  the 
high  reputation  he  subsequently  acquired,  gives 
peculiar  weight  to  his  testimony.  It  is  on  the  ques- 
tion of  the  advanced  or  reserve  squadron  that  he 
is  specially  interesting.  On  October  19  at  8  P.M., 
just  after  they  had  been  surprised  and  rejoiced  by 
Nelson's  signal  for  a  general  chase,  and  were  steer- 
ing for  the  enemy,  as  he  says,  '  under  every  stitch  of 
sail  we  can  set,'  he  sat  down  to  write  to  his  wife. 
In  the  course  of  the  letter  he  tells  her,  '  Defence  and 
Agamemnon  are  upon  the  look  out  nearest  to  Cadiz  ; 
.  .  .  Colossus  and  Mars  are  stationed  next.  The 
above  four  and  as  many  more  of  us  are  now  to  form 
an  advanced  squadron  ;  and  I  trust  by  the  morning 
we  shall  all  be  united  and  in  sight  of  the  enemy.' 
Clearly  then  Nelson  must  have  issued  some  modi- 
fication of  the  dual  '  order  of  battle  and  sailing.' 
Many  years  later  in  a  note  upon  the  battle  which 
Codrington  dictated  to  his  daughter,  Lady  Bourchier, 
he  says  that  on  the  2Oth,  in  spite  of  Collingwood's 
advice  to  attack  at  once,  Nelson  '  continued  waiting 
upon  them  in  two  columns  according  to  the  order 
of  sailing  and  the  memorable  written  instruction 
which  was  given  out  to  all  the  captains.'1  Later 
still,  when  a  veteran  of  seventy-six  years,  he  gave  to 
Sir  Harris  Nicolas  another  note  which  shows  how 
in  his  own  mind  he  reconciled  the  apparent  discre- 
pancy between  the  dual  and  the  triple  organisation. 
It  runs  as  follows  :  'In  Lord  Nelson's  memoran- 
dum of  October  9,  1805,  he  refers  to  "an  advanced 
squadron  of  eight  of  the  fastest  sailing  two-decked 
ships  "  to  be  added  to  either  of  the  two  lines  of  the 
order  of  sailing  as  may  be  required  ;  and  says  that 
this  advanced  squadron  would  probably  have  to  cut 
1  Life  of  Codrington,  ii.  57-8. 


302  THE  LAST  PHASE 

through  "two,  three  or  four  ships  of  the  enemy's 
centre  so  as  to  ensure  getting  at  their  commander- 
in-chief,    on    whom    every  effort  must  be  made  to 
capture  " ; *  and  he  afterwards  twice  speaks  of  the 
enemy's  van  coming  to  succour  their  rear.     Now  I 
am    under    the   impression   that    I    was    expressly 
instructed  by  Lord  Nelson  (referring  to  the  proba- 
bility of  the  enemy's  van  coming  down  upon  us), 
being  in  the  Orion,  one  of  the  eight  ships  named, 
that   he   himself  would   probably  make   a  feint  of 
attacking  their  van  in  order  to  prevent  or  retard  it.' 
Here   then  would   seem   to    be   still    further   con- 
fusion, due  to  a  failure  to  distinguish  between  the 
leeward   and  windward   form  of  attack.     Accord- 
ing to  this  statement  Codrington  believed  the  ad- 
vanced squadron  was  in  either  case  to  attack  the 
centre,   while    Nelson   with  his  division  contained 
the  van.     But  curiously  enough  in  a  similar  note, 
printed  by  Lady  Bourchier  on  Nicolas's  authority, 
there  is  a  difference  in  the  wording  which,  though 
difficult  to  account   for,  seems   to   give   the   truer 
version  of  what  Codrington  really  said.     It  is  there 
stated  that  Codrington  told  Nicolas  he  was  strongly 
impressed  with  the  belief  '  that  Lord    Nelson   di- 
rected eight  of  the   smaller  and  handier   ships,  of 
which  the  Orion  was  one,  to  be  ready  to  haul  out 
of  the  line  in  case  the  enemy's  van  should  appear 
to  go  down  to  the  assistance  of  the  ships  engaged 
to   meet    and    resist   them :   that   to   prevent   this 
manoeuvre  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  Lord  Nelson 
intimated  his  intention  of  making  a  feint  of  hauling 
out  towards  their  van,'  &c.     There  is  little  doubt 
that  we   have  here  the  true   distribution  of  duties 
which  Nelson  intended  for  the  windward  attack— 

1  It  should  be  noted  that  the  memorandum  only  enjoins  this 
for  an  attack  from  to-leeward,  and  not  for  the  '  intended  attack  ' 
from  to-windward. 


THE  ADVANCED   SQUADRON     303 

that  is,  the  advanced  squadron  was  to  be  the  real 
containing  force,  but  he  intended  to  assist  it  by 
himself  making  a  feint  on  the  enemy's  van  before 
delivering  his  true  attack  on  the  centre.1 

From  Codrington's  evidence  it  is  at  any  rate 
clear  that  some  time  before  the  iQth  Nelson  had 
told  off  an  '  advanced  squadron '  as  provided  for  in 
his  memorandum,  and  that  the  ships  that  were 
forming  the  connection  between  the  fleet  and  the 
frigates  before  Cadiz  formed  part  of  it.  Now 
Nelson  had  begun  to  tell  off  these  ships  as  early  as 
the  4th.  On  that  day  he  wrote  to  Captain  Duff, 
of  the  Mars,  '  I  have  to  desire  you  will  keep  with 
the  Mars,  Defence  and  Colossus  from  three  to  four 
leagues  between  the  fleet  and  Cadiz  in  order  that 
I  may  get  information  from  the  frigates  stationed 
off  that  port  as  expeditiously  as  possible.'  On  the 
nth,  writing  to  Sir  Alexander  Ball  at  Malta,  he 
speaks  of  having  '  an  advanced  squadron  of  fast  sail- 
ing ships  between  me  and  the  frigates.'  The  Aga- 
memnon (64)  was  added  on  the  I4th,  the  day  after 
she  joined.  On  that  day  Nelson  entered  in  his  pri- 
vate diary,  '  Placed  Defence  and  Agamemnon  from 
seven  to  ten  leagues  west  of  Cadiz,  and  Mars  and 
Colossus  four  leagues  east  of  the  fleet,'  &c.2  On 
the  1 5th  he  wrote  to  Captain  Hope,  of  the  Defence  : 
1  You  will  with  the  Agamemnon  take  station  west 
from  Cadiz  from  seven  to  ten  leagues,  by  which 
means  if  the  enemy  should  move  I  hope  to  have 
constant  information,  as  two  or  three  ships  will  be 
kept  as  at  present  between  the  fleet  and  your  two 
ships.'  3 

On  the    1 2th  he  writes  to  Collingwood,  of  the 

1  See  Nelson's  Despatches,  vii.  154  ;  Life  of  Codrington,  ii.  77. 

2  Nicolas,   vii.    122.      Before  this   Mars  and  Colossus  had 
had  the  inside  station.     See  Nelson  to  Collingwood,  October  12. 

3  Ibid,,  vii.  122. 


304  THE  LAST  PHASE 

Belleisle,  the  fastest  two-decker  in  the  fleet,  as 
though  she  too  were  an  advanced  ship,  and  on  the 
morning  of  the  igth  he  tells  him  the  Leviathan 
was  to  relieve  the  Defence,  whose  water  had  got  low. 
Later  in  the  day,  when  Mars  and  Colossus  had  passed 
on  the  signal  that  the  enemy  was  out,  he  ordered 
'  Mars,  Orion,  Belleisle,  Leviathan,  Bellerophon 
and  Polyphemus  to  go  ahead  during  the  night. ' l 
On  the  eve  of  the  battle  therefore  these  six  ships, 
with  Colossus  and  Agamemnon,  made  up  the  squa- 
dron of  eight  specified  on  the  memorandum. 

The  conclusion  then  is  that,  though  some  of  the 
ships  destined  to  form  the  advanced  squadron  had 
not  arrived  by  the  Qth  when  the  memorandum  was 
issued,  Nelson  had  already  taken  steps  to  organise 
it,  and  that  on  the  evening  of  the  i9th,  the  first 
moment  he  had  active  contact  with  the  enemy,  it 
was  detached  from  the  fleet  as  a  separate  unit.  Up 
to  this  moment  it  would  look  as  though  he  had 
intended  to  use  it  as  his  memorandum  directed. 
Since  with  the  exception  of  the  Agamemnon  and 
the  Leviathan,  which  had  only  temporarily  replaced 
the  Defence  while  she  watered,  the  whole  of  the 
ships  named  belonged  to  Collingwood's  division,  the 
resulting  organisation  would  have  been,  lee-line 
nine  ships,  weather-line  eight  ships,  and  eight  for 
the  advanced  squadron — an  organisation  which  in 
relative  proportion  was  almost  exactly  that  which  he 
had  explained  to  Keats.  It  would  therefore  still  have 
rendered  Nelson's  original  plan  of  attack  possible, 
although  it  did  not  preserve  the  balance  of  the 
divisions  prescribed  in  the  memorandum. 

There  can  be  little  doubt,  however,  that  Nelson 

on   the    morning  of  the    battle   did    abandon   the 

idea  of  the  advanced  squadron  altogether.     Early 

on  the  2oth  it  was  broken  up  again.     At  8  o'clock  in 

1  Nicolas,  vii.  115,  129,  133. 


THE  ADVANCED   SQUADRON    305 

the  morning  of  that  day  the  captains  of  the  Mars, 
Colossus  and  Defence  (which  apparently  was  by 
this  time  ready  again  for  service)  were  called  on 
board  the  Victory  and  ordered  out  to  form  a  chain 
as  before  between  the  admiral  and  his  frigates.1 
The  rest  presumably  resumed  their  stations  in  the 
fleet.  E*  i  if  he  had  not  actually  abandoned  this 
part  of  his  plan,  it  is  clear  that  in  his  hurry  to 
attack  Nelson  would  not  spend  time  in  reforming 
the  squadron  as  a  separate  unit,  but  chose  rather  to 
carry  out  his  design,  so  far  as  was  possible,  with  two 
divisions  only.  So  soon  as  he  sighted  the  enemy's 
fleet  at  daylight  on  the  2ist,  he  made  the  signal 
to  form  the  line  of  battle  in  two  columns,  and  with 
one  exception  the  whole  of  the  advanced  ships  took 
station  in  their  respective  divisions  according  to 
the  original  order  of  battle  and  sailing.'2  The  ex- 
ception was  Codrington's  ship,  the  Orion.  No 
importance  however  need  be  attached  to  this,  for 
although  he  was  originally  in  Collingwood's  division 
he  may  well  have  been  transferred  to  Nelson's 
some  time  before.  It  is  only  worthy  of  remark 
because  Codrington,  of  all  the  advanced  squadron 
captains,  was  the  only  one,  so  far  as  we  know,  who- 
still  considered  the  squadron  a  potential  factor  in 

1  Memorandum  and  Private  Diary,  Nicolas,  pp.  136-7. 

2  Some  doubt  has  been  expressed  as  to  the  signals  with 
which  Nelson  opened  at  daybreak  on  the  2ist.     But  their  actual 
numbers  are  recorded  in  the  logs  of  the  Mars,  Defiance,  Con- 
queror and  Bellerophon,  and  all  but  the  first  in  the  log  of  the 
Euryalus    repeating    frigate.      They  were   No.    72:    'To  form 
order  of  sailing  in  two  columns  or  divisions  of  the  fleet,'  which 
by  the  memorandum  was  also  to  be  the  order  of  battle ;  No.  76, 
with  compass  signal  ENE,  '  when  lying  by  or  sailing  by  the  wind1 
to  bear  up  and  sail  large  on  the  course  pointed  out ' ;  No.  13, 
Prepare  for  battle.     Collingwood  has  in  his  journal :  'At  6.30  the 
commander-in-chief  made  the  signal  to  form  order  of  sailing  in 
two  columns,  and  at  7.0  to  prepare  for  battle.     At  7.40  to  bear 
up  east.' 


3o6  THE  LAST  PHASE 

the  fleet  and  acted  accordingly.  While  Belleisle, 
Mars,  Bellerophon  and  Colossus  rushed  into  the 
fight  in  the  van  of  Collingwood's  line,  Orion  in  the 
rear  of  Nelson's  held  her  fire  even  when  she  got 
into  action,  and  cruised  about  the  m$tie,  carefully 
seeking  points  where  she  could  do  most  damage  to 
an  enemy,  or  best  help  an  overmatched  friend— 
a  well-judged  piece  of  service,  on  which  he  dwells 
in  his  correspondence  over  and  over  again  with 
pardonable  complacency.  He  was  thus  able  un- 
doubtedly to  do  admirable  service  in  the  crisis  of 
the  action. 

That  the  bulk  of  his  colleagues  thought  all  idea 
of  a  reserve  squadron  had  been  abandoned  by 
Nelson  is  clear,  and  the  resulting  change  was 
certainly  great  enough  to  explain  why  some  of  the 
captains  thought  the  plan  of  the  memorandum  had 
been  abandoned  altogether.  For  not  only  was  the 
attack  made  in  two  divisions  instead  of  one,  and  in 
line  ahead  instead  of  line  abreast,  but  its  prescribed 
balance  was  entirely  upset.  Instead  of  Nelson 
having  the  larger  portion  of  the  fleet  for  contain- 
ing the  van  and  centre,  Collingwood  had  the  larger 
portion  for  the  attack  on  the  rear.  In  other  words, 
instead  of  the  advanced  squadron  being  under 
Nelson's  direction,  the  bulk  of  it  was  attached  to 
Collingwood.  If  some  heads — even  as  clear  as 
Codrington's — were  puzzled,  it  is  little  wonder. 

As  to  the  way  in  which  this  impulsive  change 
of  plan  was  brought  about,  Codrington  says,  '  They 
[the  enemy]  suddenly  wore  round  so  as  to  have  Cadiz 
under  their  lee,  with  every  appearance  of  a  deter- 
mination to  go  into  that  port.  Lord  Nelson  there- 
fore took  advantage  of  their  confusion  in  wearing, 
and  bore  down  to  attack  them  with  the  fleet  in  two 
columns.'  This  was  in  the  note  dictated  to  Lady 
Bourchier,  and  in  a  letter  of  October  28,  1805,  to 


FEINT  ON   THE    VAN  307 

Lord  Garlics  he  says,  '  We  all  scrambled  into  battle 
as  soon  as  we  could.' l 

Codrington's  allusion  to  Nelson's  alleged  feint 
on  the  enemy's  van  brings  us  to  the  last  point ;  the 
question,  that  is,  as  to  whether,  apart  from  the  sub- 
stitution of  the  perpendicular  for  the  parallel  attack, 
and  in  spite  of  the  change  of  balance,  the  two  lines 
were  actually  handled  in  the  action  according  to 
the  principles  of  the  memorandum  for  the  intended 
attack  from  to-windward. 

Lady  Bourchier's  note  continues,  after  referring 
to  Nelson's  intention  to  make  a  feint  on  the  van, 
1  The  Victory  did  accordingly  haul  to  port :  and 
though  she  took  in  her  larboard  and  weather 
studding  sails,  she  kept  her  starboard  studding  sails 
set  (notwithstanding  they  had  become  the  lee  ones 
and  were  shaking),  thus  proving  that  he  proposed 
to  resume  his  course,  as  those  sails  would  be  im- 
mediately wanted  to  get  the  Victory  into  her  former 
station.'  The  note  in  Nicolas  is  to  the  same 
effect,  but  adds  that  Codrington  had  no  doubt  that 
having  taken  in  his  weather  studding  sails  he  kept 
the  lee  ones  '  set  and  shaking  in  order  to  make  it 
clear  to  the  fleet  that  his  movement  was  merely  a 
feint,  and  that  the  Victory  would  speedily  resume 
her  course  and  fulfil  his  intention  of  cutting  through 
the  centre.'  And  in  admiration  of  the  movement 
Codrington  called  his  first  lieutenant  and  said,  '  How 
beautifully  the  admiral  is  carrying  his  design  into 
effect ! '  Though  all  this  was  written  long  after,  when 
his  memory  perhaps  was  fading,  it  is  confirmed  by  a 
contemporary  entry  in  his  log :  '  The  Victory,  after 
making  a  feint  as  of  attacking  the  enemy's  van, 
hauled  to  starboard  so  as  to  reach  their  centre.' 2 

This  is  all  clear  enough  so  far,  but  now  we  have 

1  Life  of  Codrington,  ii.  59,  60. 

2  Great  Sea  Fights,  ii.  278. 

X  2 


3o8  THE  LAST  PHASE 

to  face  a  signal  mentioned  in  the  log  of  the  Euryalus 
which,  as  she  was  Nelson's  repeating  frigate,  can- 
not be  ignored.  According  to  this  high  authority 
Nelson,  about  a  quarter  of  an  hour  before  making 
his  immortal  signal,  telegraphed  '  I  intend  to  push 
or  go  through  the  end  of  the  enemy's  line  to  prevent 
them  from  getting  into  Cadiz.'  It  is  doubtful  how 
far  this  signal  was  taken  in,  but  those  who  saw  it 
must  have  thought  that  Nelson  meant  to  execute 
Howe's  manoeuvre  upon  the  enemy's  leading  ships. 
At  this  time,  according  to  the  master  of  the  Victory, 
he  was  standing  for  the  enemy's  van.  Nelson  also 
signalled  to  certain  ships  to  keep  away  a  point  to 
port.  The  Victory's  log  has  this  entry :  '  At  4 
minutes  past  1 2  opened  our  fire  on  the  enemy's  van, 
in  passing  down  their  line.'  At  30  minutes  past 
12  the  Victory  got  up  with  Villeneuve's  flagship 
and  then  broke  through  the  line.  Now  at  first 
sight  it  might  appear  that  Nelson  really  intended  to 
attack  the  van  and  not  the  centre,  on  the  principle 
of  Hoste's  old  manoeuvre  which  Howe  had  reintro- 
duced  into  the  Signal  Book  for  attacking  a  numeri- 
cally superior  fleet — that  is,  van  to  van  and  rear  to 
rear,  leaving  the  enemy's  centre  unoccupied.1  For 
the  old  signal  provided  that  when  this  was  done 
'  the  flag  officers  are,  if  circumstances  permit,  to 
engage  the  flag  officers  of  the  enemy,'  which  was 
exactly  what  Nelson  was  doing.  On  this  supposi- 
tion his  idea  would  be  that  his  ships  should  attack 
the  enemy  ahead  of  Villeneuve  as  they  came  up. 
And  this  his  second,  the  Temeraire,  actually  did. 
But,  as  we  have  seen  by  Instruction  XXIV.  of  1799, 

1  A  veteran  French  officer  of  the  old  wars  took  this  view  of 
Nelson's  threat  in  a  study  of  the  battle  which  he  wrote.  '  Nelson,' 
he  says,  '  a  d'abord  feint  de  vouloir  attaquer  la  tete  et  la  queue 
de  1'armee.  Ensuite  il  a  rassemble  ses  forces  sur  son  centre,  et  a 
abandonne  le  sort  de  la  bataille  a  1'intelligence  de  sescapitaines.' 
Mathieu-Dumas,  Precis  des  Evtnements  Militaires^  xiv.  408. 


FEINT  ON   THE    VAN  309 

the  old  rule  of  1790  had  been  altered,  and  if  Nelson 
intended  to  execute  Hoste's  plan  of  attack  he,  as 
'leading  ship,'  would  or  should  have  engaged  the 
enemy's  'leading  ship,'  leaving  the  rest  as  they 
could  to  engage  the  enemy  of 'greatest  force.'  The 
only  explanation  is  that,  if  he  really  intended  to 
attack  the  van,  he  again  changed  his  mind  when  he 
fetched  up  with  Villeneuve,  and  could  not  resist 
engaging  him.  More  probably,  however,  the  signal 
was  wrongly  repeated  by  the  Euryalus,  and  as  made 
by  Nelson  it  was  really  an  intimation  to  Collingwood 
that  he  meant  to  cover  the  attack  on  the  rear  and 
centre  by  a  feint  on  the  van.1 

However  this  may  be,  the  French  appear  to 
have  regarded  Nelson's  movement  to  port  as  a  real 
attack.  Their  best  account  (which  is  also  perhaps 
the  best  account  that  exists)  says  that  just  before 
coming  into  gun-shot  the  two  British  columns 
began  to  separate.  The  leading  vessels  of  Nelson's 
column,  it  says,  passed  through  the  same  interval 
astern  of  the  Bucentaure,  and  then  it  tells  how  '  les 
vaisseaux  de  queue  de  cette  colonne,  au  contraire, 
serrerent  un  peu  le  vent,  comme  pour  s'approcher 
des  vaisseaux  de  1 'avant-garde  de  la  flotte  com- 
bine"e :  mais  apres  avoir  re9u  quelques  borders  de 
ces  vaisseaux  ils  abandonnerent  ce  dessein  et  se 
porterent  vers  les  vaisseaux  place's  entre  le  Redou- 
table  et  la  Santa  Anna  ou  vinrent  unir  leurs  efforts 
a  ceux  des  vaisseaux  anglais  qui  combattaient  deja  le 
Bucentaure  et  la  Santisima  Trinidad.' '  This  is  to 

1  The  only  trace  of  notice  having  been  taken  by  anyone  of  a 
signal  from  Nelson  at  the  time  stated  was  Collingwood's  impa- 
tient remark  when  Nelson  began  to  telegraph  '  England  expects,' 
&c.     '  I  wish  Nelson  would  stop  signalling,'  he  is  reported  to  have 
said.     '  We  all  know  well  enough  what  we  have  to  do,'  as  though 
Nelson  had  been  signalling  something  just  before. 

2  Monuments  des    Victoires  et  Conqtiltes  des  franfais  from 
Nicolas,  vii.  271.     It  was  also  adopted  by  Mathieu-Dumas  (op.  cit. 


310  THE  LAST  PHASE 

some  extent  confirmed  by  Dumanoir  himself,  who 
commanded  the  allied  van,  in  his  official  memoran- 
dum addressed  to  Decres,  December  30,  1809.  In  de- 
fending his  failure  to  tack  sooner  to  Villeneuve's  relief, 
he  says,  '  Au  commencement  du  combat,  la  colonne 
du  Nord  [i.e.  Nelson's]  se  dirigea  sur  1' avant-garde 
qui  engagea  avec  elle  pendant  quarante  minutes.' 1 
In  partial  corroboration  of  this  there  is  the  statement 
in  the  log  of  the  Temeraire,  the  ship  that  was  im- 
mediately behind  Nelson,  that  she  opened  her  fire 
on  the  Santisima  Trinidad  and  the  two  ships  ahead 
of  her ;  that  is,  she  engaged  the  ships  ahead  of 
where  Nelson  broke  the  line,  so  that  Captain 
Harvey  as  well  as  Dumanoir  may  have  believed 
that  Nelson  intended  his  real  attack  to  be  on  '  the 
end  of  the  line.' 

In  the  face  of  these  facts  it  is  impossible  to  say 
categorically  that  Nelson  intended  nothing  but  a 
feint  on  the  van.  It  is  equally  impossible  to  say 
he  intended  a  real  attack.  The  point  perhaps  can 
never  be  decided  with  absolute  certainty,  but  it  is 
this  very  uncertainty  that  brings  out  the  true  merit 
and  the  real  lesson  of  Nelson's  attack.  As  we  now 
may  gather  from  his  captains'  opinions,  its  true 
merit  was  not  that  he  threw  his  whole  fleet  on  part 
of  a  superior  enemy — that  was  a  commonplace  in 
tactics.  It  was  not  concentration  on  the  rear,  for 
that  also  was  old  ;  and  what  is  more,  as  the  attack 
was  delivered,  so  far  from  Nelson  concentrating,  he 
boldly,  almost  recklessly,  exposed  himself  for  a 
strategical  object  to  what  should  have  been  an 
overwhelming  concentration  on  the  leading  ships  of 
his  two  columns.  The  true  merit  of  it  above  all 
previous  methods  of  concentration  and  containing 

xiii.  p.  178)  as  the  best  and  most  impartial  account.  He  says  it 
was  written  by  a  French  naval  officer  called  Parisot. 

1  Jurien  de  la  Graviere,  Guerres  Maritime*,  ii.  220,  note. 


COLLINGWOODS  SIGNAL         311 

was  that,  whether,  as  planned  or  as  delivered,  it 
prevented  the  enemy  from  knowing  on  which  part 
of  their  line  Nelson  intended  to  throw  his  squadron, 
just  as  we  are  prevented  from  knowing  to  this  day. 
'  They  won't  know  what  I  am  about '  were  his  words 
to  Keats. 

The  point  is  clearer  still  when  we  compare  the 
different  ways  in  which  Nelson  and  Collingwood 
brought  their  respective  columns  into  action.  Col- 
lingwood in  his  Journal  says  that  shortly  before 
1 1  o'clock,  that  is,  an  hour  before  getting  into  action, 
he  signalled  '  for  the  lee  division  to  form  the  lar- 
board line  of  bearing.'  The  effect  and  intention  of 
this  would  be  that  each  ship  in  his  division  would 
head  on  the  shortest  course  to  break  the  enemy's  line 
in  all  parts.  It  was  the  necessary  signal  for  enabling 
him  to  carry  out  regularly  Howe's  manoeuvre  upon 
the  enemy's  rear,  and  his  object  was  declared  for 
all  to  see.1  Nelson,  on  the  other  hand,  made  no 
such  signal,  but  held  on  in  line  ahead,  giving  no 
indication  of  whether  he  intended  to  perform  the 
manoeuvre  on  the  van  or  the  centre,  or  whether  he 
meant  to  cut  the  line  in  line  ahead.  Until  they 

1  This  highly  important  signal  appears  to  have  been  generally 
overlooked  in  accounts  of  the  action.  Yet  Collingwood's 
journal  is  so  precise  about  signals  that  there  can  be  no  doubt 
he  made  it.  Agamemnon  in  Nelson's  column  answered  it  under 
the  impression  it  was  general.  Her  log  says,  '  Answered  signal 
No.  50 ' — that  is, '  To  keep  on  the  larboard  line  of  bearing  though 
then  on  the  starboard  tack.  Ditto  starboard  bearing  if  on  larboard 
tack.'  Captain  Moorsom  also  says,  '  My  station  was  sixth  ship- 
in  the  rear  of  the  lee  column ;  but  as  the  Revenge  sailed  well 
Admiral  Collingwood  made  my  signal  to  keep  a  line  of  bearing 
from  him  which  made  me  one  of  the  leading  ships  through  the 
enemy's  line.'  No  other  ship  records  the  signal.  Probably  few 
saw  it,  for  in  the  memorandum  which  Collingwood  issued  two 
years  later  he  lays  stress  on  the  importance  of  captains  being 
particularly  watchful  for  the  signals  of  their  divisional  commander. 
See /0s/,  pp.  324  and  329. 


312  THE  LAST  PHASE 

knew  which  it  was  to  be,  it  was  impossible  for  the 
enemy  to  take  any  step  to  concentrate  with  either 
division,  and  thus  Nelson  held  them  both  immobile 
while  Collingwood  flung  himself  on  his  declared 
objective. 

Nothing  could  be  finer  as  a  piece  of  subtle 
tactics.  Nothing  could  be  more  daring  as  a  well- 
judged  risk.  The  risk  was  indeed  enormous,  perhaps 
the  greatest  ever  taken  at  sea.  Hawke  risked  much 
at  Quiberon,  and  much  was  risked  at  the  Nile.  But 
both  were  sea-risks  of  the  class  to  which  our  seamen 
were  enured.  At  Trafalgar  it  was  a  pure  battle- 
risk — a  mad,  perpendicular  attack  in  which  every 
recognised  tactical  card  was  in  the  enemy's  hand. 
But  Nelson's  judgment  was  right.  He  knew  his 
opponent's  lack  of  decision,  he  knew  the  individual 
shortcomings  of  the  allied  ships,  and  he  knew  he 
had  only  to  throw  dust,  as  he  did,  in  their  eyes  for 
the  wild  scheme  to  succeed.  As  Jurien  de  la 
Graviere  has  most  wisely  said  '  Le  g6nie  de  Nelson 
c'est  d'avoir  compris  notre  faiblesse.' 

Yet  when  all  is  said,  when  even  full  weight  is 
given  to  the  strategical  pressure  of  the  hour  and  the 
uncertainty  of  the  weather,  there  still  remains  the 
unanswerable  criticism  of  the  officer  of  the  Con- 
queror :  that  by  an  error  of  judgment  Nelson  spoilt 
his  attack  by  unnecessary  haste.  The  moral  advan- 
tage of  pushing  home  a  bold  attack  before  an 
enemy  is  formed  is  of  course  very  great ;  but  in 
this  case  the  enemy  had  no  intention  of  avoiding 
him,  as  they  showed,  and  he  acknowledged,  when 
they  boldly  lay-to  to  accept  action.  The  confusion 
of  their  line  was  tactically  no  weakness :  it  only 
resulted  in  a  duplication  which  was  so  nicely  adapted 
for  meeting  Howe's  manoeuvre  that  there  was  a 
widespread  belief  in  the  British  fleet,  which  Colling- 
wood himself  shared,  that  Villeneuve  had  adopted 


NELSON,    1803  313 

it  deliberately.1  Seeing  what  the  enemy's  acci- 
dental formation  was,  every  ship  that  pierced  it 
must  be  almost  inevitably  doubled  or  trebled  on. 
It  was,  we  know,  the  old  Dutch  manner  of  meeting 
the  English  method  of  attack  in  the  earliest  days 
of  the  line.2  Had  he  given  Villeneuve  time  for 
forming  his  line  properly  the  enemy's  battle  order 
would  have  been  only  the  weaker.  Had  he  taken 
time  to  form  his  own  order  the  mass  of  the  attack 
would  have  been  delivered  little  later  than  it  was, 
its  impact  would  have  been  intensified,  and  the 
victory  might  well  have  been  even  more  decisive 
than  it  was,  while  the  sacrifice  it  cost  would  cer- 
tainly have  been  less,  incalculably  less,  if  we  think 
that  the  sacrifice  included  Nelson  himself. 


LORD  NELSON,  1803. 
[Clarke  and  McArthur,  Life  of  Nelson,  ii.  427.3] 

Plan  of  Attack. 

The  business  of  a  commander-in-chief  being 
first  to  bring  an  enemy's  fleet  to  battle  on  the  most 
advantageous  terms  to  himself  (I  mean  that  of  laying 
his  ships  close  on  board  the  enemy,  as  expeditiously 

1  Collingwood  to  Marsden,  October  22.     Same  to  Parker, 
November  i.     Same  to  Pasley,  December  16,  1805. 

2  See  supra,  p.  119.     Villeneuve  saw  this.     In  his  official  des- 
patch from  the  Euryalus,  November  5,  he  says  '  Notre  formation 
s'effectuait  avec  beaucoup  de  peine  ;  mais  dans  le  genre  d'attaque 
que  je  prevoyais  que  1'ennemi  allait  nous  faire,  cette  irregularite 
meme  dans  notre  ligne  ne  me  paraissait  pas  un  inconvenient.' — 
Jurien  de  la  Graviere,  Guerres  Maritime*,  ii.  384. 

3  From  the  original  in  the  St.  Vincent  Papers.    Also  in  Nicolas, 
Despatches  and  Letters,  vi.  443.     Obvious  mistakes  in  punctuation 
have  been  corrected  in  the  text. 


314  THE  LAST  PHASE 

as  possible,  and  secondly,  to  continue  them  there 
without  separating  until  the  business  is  decided),  I 
am  sensible  beyond  this  object  it  is  not  necessary 
that  I  should  say  a  word,  being  fully  assured  that 
the  admirals  and  captains  of  the  fleet  I  have  the 
honour  to  command  will,  knowing  my  precise  object, 
that  of  a  close  and  decisive  battle,  supply  any  de- 
ficiency in  my  not  making  signals,  which  may,  if 
extended  beyond  those  objects,  either  be  misunder- 
stood, or  if  waited  for  very  probably  from  various 
causes  be  impossible  for  the  commander-in-chief  to 
make.  Therefore  it  will  only  be  requisite  for  me 
to  state  in  as  few  words  as  possible  the  various 
modes  in  which  it  may  be  necessary  for  me  to  obtain 
my  object ;  on  which  depends  not  only  the  honour 
and  glory  of  our  country,  but  possibly  its  safety, 
and  with  it  that  of  all  Europe,  from  French  tyranny 
and  oppression. 

If  the  two  fleets  are  both  willing  to  fight,  but 
little  manoeuvring  is  necessary,  the  less  the  better. 
A  day  is  soon  lost  in  that  business.  Therefore 
I  will  only  suppose  that  the  enemy's  fleet  being  to 
leeward  standing  close  upon  a  wind,  and  that  I  am 
nearly  ahead  of  them  standing  on  the  larboard  tack. 
Of  course  I  should  weather  them.  The  weather  must 
be  supposed  to  be  moderate ;  for  if  it  be  a  gale  of 
wind  the  manoeuvring  of  both  fleets  is  but  of  little 
avail,  and  probably  no  decisive  action  would  take 
place  with  the  whole  fleet.1 

Two  modes  present  themselves  :  one  to  stand 
on  just  out  of  gun-shot,  until  the  van  ship  of  my  line 
would  be  about  the  centre  ship  of  the  enemy  ;  then 
make  the  signal  to  wear  together  ;  then  bear  up 
[and]  engage  with  all  our  force  the  six  or  five  van 
ships  of  the  enemy,  passing,  certainly  if  opportunity 
offered,  through  their  line.  This  would  prevent 
1  Cf.  the  similar  remark  of  Ue  Chaves,  supra,  p.  5. 


NELSON,    1803  315 

their  bearing  up,  and  the  action,  from  the  known 
bravery  and  conduct  of  the  admirals  and  captains, 
would  certainly  be  decisive.  The  second  or  third 
rear  ships  of  the  enemy  would  act  as  they  please, 
and  our  ships  would  give  a  good  account  of  them, 
should  they  persist  in  mixing  with  our  ships. 

The  other  mode  would  be  to  stand  under  an 
easy  but  commanding  sail  directly  for  their  headmost 
ship,  so  as  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  knowing 
whether  I  should  pass  to  leeward  or  to  windward  of 
him.  In  that  situation  I  would  make  the  signal  to 
engage  the  enemy  to  leeward,  and  cut  through  their 
fleet  about  the  sixth  ship  from  the  van,  passing  very 
close.  They  being  on  a  wind  and  you  going  large 
could  cut  their  line  when  you  please.  The  van 
ships  of  the  enemy  would,  by  the  time  our  rear  came 
abreast  of  the  van  ship,  be  severely  cut  up,  and  our 
van  could  not  expect  to  escape  damage.  I  would 
then  have  our  rear  ship  and  every  ship  in  succes- 
sion wear  [and]  continue  the  action  with  either  the 
van  ship  or  the  second  as  it  might  appear  most 
eligible  from  her  crippled  state  ;  and  this  mode 
pursued  I  see  nothing  to  prevent  the  capture  of  the 
five  or  six  ships  of  the  enemy's  van.  The  two  or 
three  ships  of  the  enemy's  rear  must  either  bear  up  or 
wear  ;  and  in  either  case,  although  they  would  be  in  a 
better  plight  probably  than  our  two  van  ships  (now 
the  rear),  yet  they  would  be  separated  and  at  a  dis- 
tance to  leeward,  so  as  to  give  our  ships  time  to 
refit.  And  by  that  time  I  believe  the  battle  would, 
from  the  judgment  of  the  admiral  and  captains,  be 
over  with  the  rest  of  them.  Signals  from  these 
moments  are  useless  when  every  man  is  disposed  to 
do  his  duty.  The  great  object  is  for  us  to  support 
each  other,  and  to  keep  close  to  the  enemy  and  to 
leeward  of  him. 

If  the  enemy  are  running  away,  then  the  only 


316  THE  LAST  PHASE 

signals  necessary  will  be  to  engage  the  enemy  on 
arriving  up  with  them  ;  and  the  other  ships  to  pass 
on  for  the  second,  third,  &c.,  giving  if  possible  a 
close  fire  into  the  enemy  on  passing,  taking  care  to 
give  our  ships  engaged  notice  of  your  intention. 


LORD  NELSON,  1805. 
[Nicolas,  Despatches  and  Letters,  vii.1] 

Memorandum. 
Secret.  Victory,  off  Cadiz,  gth  October,  1805. 

Thinking  it  almost  impossible  to  bring  a  fleet  of 
forty  sail  of  the  line  into  line  of  battle  in  variable 
winds,  thick  weather,  and  other  circumstances 
which  must  occur,  without  such  a  loss  of  time  that 
the  opportunity  would  probably  be  lost  of  bringing 
the  enemy  to  battle  in  such  a  manner  as  to  make 
the  business  decisive  ;  I  have  therefore  made  up 
my  mind  to  keep  the  fleet  in  that  position  of  sailing 
(with  the  exception  of  the  first  and  second  in  com- 
mand), that  the  order  of  sailing  is  to  be  the  order  of 
battle  ;  placing  the  fleet  in  two  lines  of  sixteen  ships 
each,  with  an  advance  squadron  of  eight  of  the 
fastest  sailing  two-decked  ships,  which  will  always 
make,  if  wanted,  a  line  of  twenty-four  sail  on  which- 
ever line  the  commander-in-chief  may  direct. 

The  second  in  command  will,2  after  my  inten- 

1  Sir  Harris  Nicolas  states  that  he  took  his  text  from  an 
'  Autograph  [he  means  holograph]  draught  in  the  possession  of 
Vice- Admiral  Sir  George  Mundy,  K.C.B.,  except  the  words  in 
italics  which  were  added  by  Mr.  Scott,  Lord  Nelson's  secretary : 
and  from  the  original  issued  to  Captain  Hope  of  the  Defence, 
now  in  possession  of  his  son,  Captain  Hope,  R.N.' 

2  Lord  Nelson  originally  wrote  here  but  deleted  '  in  fact  com- 
mand his  line  and.' — Nicolas. 


NELSON,    1805 

tions  are  made  known  to  him,  have  the  entire 
direction  of  his  line  ;  to  make  the  attack  upon  the 
enemy,  and  to  follow  up  the  blow  until  they  are 
captured  or  destroyed. 

If  the  enemy's  fleet  should  be  seen  to  wind- 
ward in  line  of  battle,  and  that  the  two  lines  and 
the  advanced  squadron  can  fetch  them,1  they  will 
probably  be  so  extended  that  their  van  could  not 
succour  their  rear. 

I  should  therefore  probably  make  the  second  in 
command's  2  signal,  to  lead  through  about  the  twelfth 
ship  from  the  rear  (or  wherever  he 3  could  fetch,  if 
not  able  to  get  as  far  advanced).  My  line  would 
lead  through  about  their  centre ;  and  the  advanced 
squadron  to  cut  two,  three,  or  four  ships  ahead  of 
their  centre,  so  far  as  to  ensure  getting  at  their 
commander-in-chief  on  whom  every  effort  must  be 
made  to  capture. 

The  whole  impression  of  the  British  fleet  must 
be  to  overpower  from  two  to  three  ships  ahead  of 
their  commander-in-chief,  supposed  to  be  in  the 
centre,  to  the  rear  of  their  fleet.  I  will  suppose 
twenty  sail  of  the  enemy's  line  to  be  untouched  ;  it 
must  be  some  time  before  they  could  perform  a 
manoeuvre  to  bring  their  force  compact  to  attack 
any  part  of  the  British  fleet  engaged,  or  to  succour 
their  own  ships  ;  which  indeed  would  be  impossible, 
without  mixing  with  the  ships  engaged.4 

1  Lord  Nelson  originally  wrote  here  but  deleted  '  I  shall  sup- 
pose them  forty-six  sail  in  the  line  of  battle.' — Nicolas. 

2  Originally  '  your '  but  deleted. — Ibid. 

3  Originally  'you'  but  deleted. — Ibid. 

4  In  the  upper  margin  of  the  paper  Lord  Nelson  wrote  and 
Mr.  Scott  added  to  it  a  reference,  as  marked  in  the  text — '  the 
enemy's  fleet  is  supposed  to  consist  of  46  sail  of  the  line,  British 
fleet  40.    If  either  be  less,  only  a  proportionate  number  of  enemy's 
ships  are  to  be  cut  off:  B.  to  be  \  superior  to  the  E.  cut  off. — 
Ibid. 


318  THE  LAST  PHASE 

Something  must  be  left  to  chance  ;  nothing  is 
sure  in  a  sea  fight  beyond  all  others.  Shots  will 
carry  away  the  masts  1  and  yards  of  friends  as  well 
as  foes  ;  but  I  look  with  confidence  to  a  victory 
before  the  van  of  the  enemy  could  succour  their 
rear  ; 2  and  then  the  British  fleet  would  most  of 
them  be  ready  to  receive  their  twenty  sail  of  the 
line,  or  to  pursue  them,  should  they  endeavour  to 
make  off. 

If  the  van  of  the  enemy  tacks,  the  captured 
ships  must  run  to  leeward  of  the  British  fleet ;  if 
the  enemy  wears,  the  British  must  place  themselves 
between  the  enemy  and  the  captured  and  disabled 
British  ships  ;  and  should  the  enemy  close,  I  have 
no  fears  as  to  the  result. 

The  second  in  command  will,  in  all  possible 
things,  direct  the  movements  of  his  line,  by  keeping 
them  as  compact  as  the  nature  of  the  circumstances 
will  admit.  Captains  are  to  look  to  their  particular 
line  as  their  rallying  point.  But  in  case  signals 
can  neither  be  seen  nor  perfectly  understood,  no 
captain  can  do  very  wrong  if  he  places  his  ship 
alongside  that  of  an  enemy. 

Of  the  intended  attack  from  to-windward,  the 
enemy  in  the  line  of  battle  ready  to  attack. 


1  The  Barham  copy  reads  '  a  mast' 

2  Originally  'friends.' — Nicolas. 

3  This  is  the  only  diagram  found  in  either  of  Nelson's  memo- 
randa.    It  is  not  in  the  Barham  copy. 


NELSON,    1805  319 

The  divisions  of  the  British  fleet  *  will  be 
brought  nearly  within  gunshot  of  the  enemy's 
centre.  The  signal  will  most  probably  be  made 
for  the  lee  line  to  bear  up  together,  to  set  all  their 
sails,  even  steering  sails  "  in  order  to  get  as  quickly 
as  possible  to  the  enemy's  line  and  to  cut  through, 
beginning  from  the  twelfth  ship  from  the  enemy's 
rear.3  Some  ships  may  not  get  through  their  exact 
place  ;  but  they  will  always  be  at  hand  to  assist 
their  friends  ;  and  if  any  are  thrown  round  the  rear 
of  the  enemy,  they  will  effectually  complete  the  busi- 
ness of  twelve  sail  of  the  enemy.4 

Should  the  enemy  wear  together,  or  bear  up 
and  sail  large,  still  the  twelve  ships,  composing  in 
the  first  position  the  enemy's  rear,  are  to  be  the 
object  of  attack  of  the  lee  line,  unless  otherwise 
directed  by  the  commander-in-chief ;  which  is 
scarcely  to  be  expected,  as  the  entire  management 
of  the  lee  line,  after  the  intention  of  the  com- 
mander-in-chief is  signified,  is  intended  to  be  left 
to  the  judgment  of  the  admiral  commanding  that 
line. 

The  remainder  of  the  enemy's  fleet,  thirty-four 

1  Nelson  presumably  means  the  two  main  divisions  as  distin- 
guished  from  the   'advanced  squadron.'      This    distinction  is 
general  in  the  correspondence  of  his  officers  and  accords  with  the 
arrangement  as  shown  in  the  diagram.     The  Barham  copy  has 
1  division  '  in  the  singular,  as  though  Nelson  intended  to  specify 
one  division  only.     It  is  probably  a  copyist's  error. 

2  In  the  upper  margin  of  the  paper,  and  referred  to  by  Lord 
Nelson  as  in  the  text  '  Vide  instructions  for  signal  yellow  with 
blue  fly.     Page  1 7,  Eighth  Flag,  Signal  Book,  with  reference  to 
Appendix.' — Nicolas.     Steering-sail,  according  to  Admiral  Smyth 
(Sailors'  Word- Book,  p.  654),  was  '  an  incorrect  name  for  a  stud- 
ding sail,'  but  it  seems  to  have  been  in  common  use  in  Nelson's 
time. 

3  The  Barham  copy  reads  'their  rear.' 

4  The  Barham  copy  ends  here.     The  second  sheet  has  not 
been  found. 


320  THE  LAST  PHASE 

sail,  are  to  be  left  to  the  management  of  the  com- 
mander-in-chief,  who  will  endeavour  K  take  care 
that  the  movements  of  the  second  in  command 
are  as  little  interrupted  as  possible. 

NELSON  AND  BRONTE".1 

1  The  signature  does  not  occur  to  the  draught,  but  was  affixed 
to  the  originals  issued  to  the  admirals  and  captains  of  the  fleet. 
To  the  copy  signed  by  Lord  Nelson,  and  delivered  to  Captain 
George  Hope,  of  the  Defence,  was  added  :  '  N.B. — When  the 
Defence  quits  the  fleet  for  England  you  are  to  return  this  secret 
memorandum  to  the  Victory '  Captain  Hope  wrote  on  that 
paper :  '  It  was  agreeable  to  these  instructions  that  Lord  Nelson 
attacked  the  combined  fleets  of  France  and  Spain  off  Cape  Tra- 
falgar on  the  aist  of  October,  1805,  they  having  thirty-three  of  the 
line  and  we  twenty-seven.' — Nicolas. 

The  injunction  to  return  the  memorandum  may  well  have 
been  added  to  all  copies  issued,  and  this  may  account  for  their 
general  disappearance. 


INSTRUCTIONS   AFTER   TRAFALGAR 

INTRODUCTORY 

THE  various  tactical  memoranda  issued  after 
Trafalgar  by  flag  officers  in  command  of  fleets  are 
amongst  the  most  interesting  of  the  whole  series. 
The  unsettled  state  of  opinion  which  they  display  as 
the  result  of  Nelson's  memorandum  is  very  remark- 
able ;  for  with  one  exception  they  seem  to  show 
that  the  great  tactical  principles  it  contained  had 
been  generally  misunderstood  to  a  surprising  extent. 
The  failure  to  fathom  its  meaning  is  to  be  accounted 
for  largely  by  the  lack  of  theoretical  training,  which 
made  the  science  of  tactics,  as  distinguished  from 
its  practice,  a  sealed  book  to  the  majority  of  British 
officers.  But  the  trouble  was  certainly  intensified 
by  the  fact — as  contemporary  naval  literature  shows 
— that  by  Nelson's  success  and  death  the  memo- 
randum became  consecrated  into  a  kind  of  sacred 
document,  which  it  was  almost  sacrilege  to  discuss. 
The  violent  polemics  of  such  men  as  James,  the 
naval  chronicler,  made  it  appear  profanity  so  much 
as  to  consider  whether  Nelson's  attack  differed  in 
the  least  from  his  intended  plan,  and  anyone  who 
ventured  to  examine  the  question  in  the  light  of 
general  principles  was  likely  to  be  shouted  down  as 
a  presumptuous  heretic.  Venial  as  was  this  attitude 
of  adulation  under  all  the  circumstances,  it  had  a 
most  evil  influence  on  the  service.  The  last  word 
seemed  to  have  been  said  on  tactics  ;  and  oblivious 


322  THE  LAST  PHASE 

of  the  fact  that  it  is  a  subject  on  which  the  last  word 
can  never  be  spoken,  and  that  the  enemy  was  certain 
to  learn  from  Nelson's  practice  as  well  as  ourselves, 
admirals  were  content  to  produce  a  colourable 
imitation  of  his  memorandum,  and  everyone  was 
satisfied  not  to  look  ahead  any  further.  To  no  one 
did  it  occur  to  consider  how  the  new  method  of 
attack  was  to  be  applied  if  the  enemy  adopted 
Nelson's  formation.  They  simply  assumed  an  end- 
less succession  of  Trafalgars. 

The  first  outcome  of  this  attitude  of  mind  is  an 
'  Order  of  Battle  and  Sailing,'  accompanied  by  certain 
instructions,  issued  by  Admiral  Gambier  from  the 
Prince  of  Wales  in  Yarmouth  Roads,  on  July  23, 
1807,  when  he  was  about  to  sail  to  seize  the  Danish 
fleet.1  His  force  consisted  of  thirty  of  the  line,  and 
its  organisation  and  stations  of  flag  officers  were  as 
follows : 

VAN    SQUADRON 

Division  i.     Commodore  Hood  (No.  i  in  line). 
Division  2.     Vice-Admiral  Stanhope  (No.  6). 

CENTRE   DIVISION 

Division  i.)    Admiral  Gambier  (No.  15). 
Division  2.) 

REAR    SQUADRON 

Division  i.     Rear- Admiral  Essington  (No.  25). 
Division  2.     Commodore  Keats  (No.  30). 

Gambier's  fleet  was  thus  organised  in  three 
equal  squadrons  (the  centre  one  called  '  the  centre 
division')  and  six  equal  subdivisions.  The  com- 
mander-in-chief  was  in  the  centre  and  had  no  other 

1  For  this  document  the  Society  is  indebted  to  Commander 
G.  P.  W.  Hope,  R.N.,  who  has  kindly  placed  it  at  my  disposal. 


BALTIC  FLEET,    1807  323 

flag  in  his  division.  Similarly  each  junior  flag 
officer  was  in  the  centre  of  his  squadron  and  led 
his  subdivision,  but  he  had  a  commodore  to  lead 
his  other  subdivision.  These  two  commodores  also 
led  the  fleet  on  either  tack.  So  far  all  is  plain,  but 
when  we  endeavour  to  understand  by  the  appended 
instruction  what  battle  formation  Gambier  intended 
by  his  elaborate  organisation  it  is  very  baffling. 
Possibly  we  have  not  got  the  instruction  exactly  as 
Gambier  wrote  it ;  but  as  it  stands  it  is  confused 
past  all  understanding,  and  no  conceivable  battle 
formation  can  be  constructed  from  it.  All  we  can 
say  for  certain  is  that  he  evidently  believed  he  was 
adopting  the  principles  of  Trafalgar,  and  perhaps 
going  beyond  them.  The  sailing  order  is  to  be  also 
the  battle  order,  but  whether  in  two  columns  or 
three  is  not  clear.  Independent  control  of  divisions 
and  squadrons  is  also  there,  and  even  the  commo- 
dores are  to  control  their  own  subdivisions  '  subject 
to  the  general  direction '  of  their  squadronal  com- 
manders, but  whether  the  formation  was  intended  to 
follow  that  of  Nelson  the  instruction  entirely  fails 
to  disclose. 

The  next  is  a  tactical  memorandum  or  general 
order,  issued  by  Lord  Collingwood  for  the  Mediter- 
ranean fleet  in  1808,  printed  in  Mr.  Newnham 
Collingwood's  Correspondence  of  Lord  Collingwood. 
No  order  of  battle  is  given  ;  but  two  years  later,  in 
issuing  an  additional  instruction,  he  refers  to  his 
general  order  as  still  in  force.  In  this  case  we 
have  the  battle  order,  and  it  consists  of  twenty  of 
the  line  in  two  equal  columns,  with  the  commander- 
in-chief  and  his  second  in  command,  second  in  their 
respective  divisions.  There  were  no  other  flag 
officers  in  the  fleet.1  The  memorandum  which  is 

1  For  this  document  the  Society  is  again  indebted  to  Com- 
mander Hope,  R.N. 

Y  2 


324  THE  LAST  PHASE 

printed  below  will  be  seen  to  be  an  obvious 
imitation  of  Nelson's,  and  nothing  can  impress  us 
more  deeply  with  the  merit  of  Nelson's  work  than 
to  compare  it  with  Collingwood's.  Like  Nelson, 
Collingwood  begins  with  introductory  remarks 
emphasising  the  importance  of  '  a  prompt  and 
immediate  attack '  and  independent  divisional  con- 
trol ;  and  in  order  to  remedy  certain  errors  of 
Trafalgar,  he  insists  in  addition  on  close  order  being 
kept  throughout  the  night  and  the  strictest  attention 
being  paid  to  divisional  signals,  thinking  no  doubt 
how  slowly  the  rear  ships  at  Trafalgar  had  struggled 
into  action,  and  how  his  signal  for  line  of  bearing 
had  been  practically  ignored.  Then,  after  stating 
broadly  that  he  means  with  the  van  or  weather 
division  to  attack  the  van  of  the  enemy,  while 
the  lee  or  larboard  division  simultaneously  attacks 
the  rear,  he  differentiates  like  Nelson  between  a 
weather  and  a  lee  attack.  For  the  attack  from  to- 
windward  he  directs  the  two  divisions  to  run  down 
in  line  abreast  in  such  a  way  that  they  will  come 
into  action  together  in  a  line  parallel  to  the  enemy  ; 
but,  whatever  he  intended,  nothing  is  said  about 
concentrating  on  any  part  of  the  enemy,  or  about 
breaking  the  line  in  all  parts  or  otherwise. 

The  attack  from  to-leeward  is  to  be  made  per- 
pendicularly in  line  ahead.  In  this  formation  his 
own  (the  weather  column)  is  to  break  the  line, 
so  as  to  cut  off  the  van  quarter  of  the  enemy's  line 
from  the  other  three  quarters,  and  the  lee  column  is 
to  sever  this  part  of  the  enemy's  line  a  few  ships  in 
rear  of  their  centre.  So  soon  as  the  leading  ships 
have  passed  through  and  so  weathered  the  enemy, 
they  are  to  keep  away  and  lead  down  his  line  so 
as  to  engage  the  rear  three  fourths  to  windward. 
This  is  of  course  practically  identical  with  the 
lee  attack  of  Nelson's  memorandum.  The  only 


MEDITERRANEAN  FLEET,   1808    325 

addition  is  the  course  that  is  to  be  taken  after 
breaking  the  line.  One  cannot  help  wondering  how 
far  the  leading  ships  after  passing  the  line  would 
have  been  able  to  lead  down  it  before  they  were 
disabled,  but  the  addition  is  interesting  as  the  first 
known  direction  as  to  what  was  to  be  done  after 
breaking  the  line  in  line  ahead  after  Rodney's 
method.  Seeing  the  grave  and  obvious  dangers  of 
the  movement  it  is  natural  that,  like  Nelson, 
Collingwood  hoped  not  to  be  forced  to  make  it; 
what  he  desired  was  a  simple  engagement  on  similar 
tacks.  His  '  intended  attack '  as  in  Nelson's  case 
is  clearly  that  from  to-windward. 

Turning  then  again  to  the  windward  attack,  we 
see  at  once  its  superficial  resemblance  to  Nelson's, 
but  so  entirely  superficial  is  it  that  it  is  impossible  to 
believe  Collingwood  ever  penetrated  the  subtleties 
of  his  great  chiefs  design.  The  dual  organisation  is 
there  and  the  independent  divisional  control,  but 
nothing  else.  The  advance  squadron  has  gone,  and 
with  it  all  trace  of  a  containing  movement.  There 
is  not  even  the  feint — the  mystification  of  the  van. 
Concentration  too  has  gone,  and  instead  of  the  sound 
main  attack  on  the  rear,  he  is  most  concerned  with 
attacking  the  van.  True,  he  may  have  meant  what 
Nelson  meant,  but  if  he  had  really  grasped  his  fine 
intention  he  surely  must  have  let  some  hint  of  it 
escape  him  in  his  memorandum.  But  for  the  wind- 
ward attack  at  least  there  is  no  trace  of  these  things, 
and  Nelson's  masterly  conception  sinks  in  Col- 
lingwood's  hands  into  a  mere  device  for  expediting 
the  old  parallel  attack  in  single  line — that  is  to  say, 
the  line  is  to  be  formed  in  bearing  down  instead  of 
waiting  to  bear  down  till  the  line  was  complete. 
We  can  only  conclude,  then,  that  both  Collingwood 
and  Gambier  could  see  nothing  in  the  '  Nelson 
touch  '  but  the  swift  attack,  the  dual  organisation, 
and  independent  divisional  control. 


326  THE  LAST  PHASE 

There  is  a  third  document,  however,  which  con- 
firms us  in  the  impression  already  formed  that  there 
were  officers  who  saw  more  deeply.  It  is  a  tactical 
memorandum  issued  by  Admiral  the  Hon.  Sir 
Alexander  Forrester  Inglis  Cochrane,  Bart,  G.C.B., 
uncle  of  the  more  famous  Earl  of  Dundonald. 
It  is  printed  by  Sir  Charles  Ekin,  in  his  Naval 
Battles,  from  a  paper  which  he  found  at  the  end  of 
a  book  in  his  possession  containing  '  Additional 
Signals,  Instructions,  &c.,' issued  by  Sir  A.  I.  Coch- 
rane to  the  squadron  under  his  command  upon  the 
Leeward  Islands  station.'  He  commanded  in  chief 
on  this  station  from  1 805  to  1814,  but  appears  never 
to  have  been  directly  under  Nelson's  influence 
except  for  a  few  weeks,  when  Nelson  came  out 
in  pursuit  of  Villeneuve  and  attached  him  to  his 
squadron.  He  was  rather  one  of  Rodney's  men, 
under  whom  he  had  served  in  his  last  campaigns, 
and  this  may  explain  the  special  note  of  his  tactical 
system.  His  partiality  for  Rodney's  manoeuvre 
is  obvious,  and  the  interesting  feature  of  his  plan 
of  attack  is  the  manner  in  which  he  grafts  it  on 
Nelson's  system  of  mutually  supporting  squadrons. 
He  does  not  even  shrink  from  a  very  free  use 
of  doubling  which  his  old  chiefs  system  entailed, 
and  he  provides  a  special  signal  of  his  own  for 
directing  the  execution  of  the  discarded  manoeuvre. 
The  '  explanation '  of  another  of  his  new  signals 
for  running  aboard  an  enemy  '  so  as  to  disable 
her  from  getting  away '  is  also  worthy  of  remark, 
as  a  recognition  of  Nelson's  favourite  practice  dis- 
approved by  Collingwood. 

Yet,  although  we  see  throughout  the  marks  of 
the  true  '  Nelson  touch,'  Cochrane's  memorandum 
bears  signs  of  having  been  largely  founded  on  an  inde- 
pendent study  of  tactical  theory..  His  obligations  to 
Clerk  of  Eldin  are  obvious.  There  are  passages  in 


WEST  INDIES,    1805-14  327 

the  document  which  seem  as  though  they  must  have 
been  written  with  the  Essay  on  Naval  Tactics  at  his 
elbow,  while  his  expression  '  an  attack  by  forcing 
the  fleet  from  to-leeward '  is  directly  borrowed  from 
Morogues'  '  Forcer  1'ennemi  au  combat  e"tant  sous 
le  vent.'  On  the  other  hand  certain  movements  are 
entirely  his  own,  such  as  his  excellent  device  of 
inverting  the  line  after  passing  through  the  enemy's 
fleet,  a  great  improvement  on  Collingwood's  method 
of  leading  down  it  in  normal  order. 

The  point  is  of  some  interest,  for  although 
Cochrane's  memorandum  is  over-elaborate  and 
smells  of  the  lamp,  yet  it  seems  clear  that  his 
theoretical  knowledge  made  him  understand  Nelson's 
principles  far  better  than  most  of  the  men  who  had 
actually  fought  at  Trafalgar  and  had  had  the  ad- 
vantage of  Nelson's  own  explanations.  All  indeed 
that  Cochrane's  memorandum  seems  to  lack  is  that 
rare  simplicity  and  abstraction  which  only  the  highest 
genius  can  achieve. 


ADMIRAL   GAMBIER,   1807. 
[MS.  of  Commander  Hope,  R.N.    Copy.] 

Order  q/  Battle  and  Sailing^ 

The  respective  flag  officers  will  have  the 
immediate  direction  of  the  division  in  which  their 
ships  are  placed,  subject  to  the  general  direction 
of  the  admiral  commanding  the  squadron  to  which 
they  belong. 

The  ships  in  order  of  battle  and  sailing  are  to 
keep  at  the  distance  of  two  cables'  length  from  and 

1  For  the  actual  order  to  which  the  instructions  are  appended 
see  Introductory  Note,  supra,  p.  322. 


328  THE  LAST  PHASE 

in  the  wake  of  each  other,  increasing  that  distance 
according  to  the  state  of  the  weather.1 

The  leading  ship  of  the  starboard  division  is  to 
keep  the  admiral  two  points  on  her  weather  bow. 
The  leading  ship  of  the  lee  division  is  when  sailing 
on  a  wind  to  keep  the  leader  of  the  weather  column 
two  points  before  her  beam  ;  when  sailing  large, 
abreast  of  her. 

(Signed)     J.  GAMBIER. 
Prince  of  Wales,  Yarmouth  Roads  : 
23  July,  1807. 


LORD  COLLING  WOOD,  i8o8-IO. 
[Correspondence  of  Colling  wood,  p.  359.] 

From  every  account  received  of  the  enemy  it  is 
expected  they  may  very  soon  be  met  with  on  their 
way  from  Corfu  and  Tarentum,  and  success  depends 
on  a  prompt  and  immediate  attack  upon  them.  In 
order  to  which  it  will  be  necessary  that  the  greatest 
care  be  taken  to  keep  the  closest  order  in  the  respec- 
tive columns  during  the  night  which  the  state  of  the 
weather  will  allow,  and  that  the  columns  be  kept  at 
such  a  sufficient  distance  apart  as  will  leave  room 
for  tacking  or  other  movements,  so  that  in  the 
event  of  calm  or  shift  of  wind  no  embarrassment 
may  be  caused. 

Should  the  enemy  be  found  formed  in  order  of 
battle  with  his  whole  force,  I  shall  notwithstanding 
probably  not  make  the  signal  to  form  the  line  of 
battle  ;  but,  keeping  in  the  closest  order,  with  the 
van  squadron  attack  the  van  of  the  enemy,  while 
the  commander  of  the  lee  division  takes  the  proper 
measures,  and  makes  to  the  ships  of  his  division  the 

1  The  normal  distance  was  then  a  cable  and  a  half.     See  post, 
p.  330  note. 


COLLINGWOOD,    1808  329 

necessary  signals  for  commencing  the  action  with 
the  enemy's  rear,  as  nearly  as  possible  at  the  same 
time  that  the  van  begins.  Of  his  signals  therefore 
the  captains  of  that  division  will  be  particularly 
watchful. 

If  the  squadron  has  to  run  to  leeward  to  close 
with  the  enemy,  the  signal  will  be  made  to  alter  the 
course  together,  the  van  division  keeping  a  point  or 
two  more  away  than  the  lee,  the  latter  carrying  less 
sail ;  and  when  the  fleet  draws  near  the  enemy  both 
columns  are  to  preserve  a  line  as  nearly  parallel  to 
the  hostile  fleet  as  they  can. 

In  standing  up  to  the  enemy  from  the  leeward 
upon  a  contrary  tack  the  lee  line  is  to  press  sail,  so 
that  the  leading  ship  of  that  line  may  be  two  or 
three  points  before  the  beam  of  the  leading  ship 
of  the  weather  line,  which  will  bring  them  to  action 
nearly  at  the  same  period. 

The  leading  ship  of  the  weather  column  will  en- 
deavour to  pass  through  the  enemy's  line,  should 
the  weather  be  such  as  to  make  that  practicable,  at 
one  fourth  from  the  van,  whatever  number  of  ships 
their  line  may  be  composed  of.  The  lee  division  will 
pass  through  at  a  ship  or  two  astern  of  their  centre, 
and  whenever  a  ship  has  weathered  the  enemy  it 
will  be  found  necessary  to  shorten  sail  as  much  as 
possible  for  her  second  astern  to  close  with  her,  and 
to  keep  away,  steering  in  a  line  parallel  to  the 
enemy's  and  engaging  them  on  their  weather  side. 

A  movement  of  this  kind  may  be  necessary,  but, 
considering  the  difficulty  of  altering  the  position 
of  the  fleet  during  the  time  of  combat,  every  en- 
deavour will  be  made  to  commence  battle  with  the 
enemy  on  the  same  tack  they  are  ;  and  I  have  only 
to  recommend  and  direct  that  they  be  fought 
with  at  the  nearest  distance  possible,  in  which 
getting  on  board  of  them  may  be  avoided,  which  is 


330  THE  LAST  PHASE 

alway  disadvantageous  to  us,  except  when  they  are 
flying.1 

•  ••••• 

Additional  Instruction? 

When  the  signal  No.  43  or  44  3  is  made  to  form 
the  order,  the  fleet  is  to  form  in  one  line,  the  rear 
shortening  sail  to  allow  the  van  to  take  their  station 
ahead.  If  such  signal  should  not  be  made  the  cap- 
tains are  referred  to  the  general  order  of  23  March, 
1808. 

COLLINGWOOD. 

Villede  Paris,  4th  January,  1810. 


SIR  ALEXANDER   COCHRANE,    1805-1814. 
[Printed  in  Ekin's  Naval  Battles,  pp.  394  seq.    (First  edit.)] 

Modes  of  Attack  from  the  Windward,  &c. 

When  an  attack  is  intended  to  be  made  upon 
the  enemy's  rear,  so  as  to  endeavour  to  cut  off  a 
certain  number  of  ships  from  that  part  of  their  fleet, 
the  same  will  be  made  known  by  signal  No.  27,  and 
the  numeral  signal  which  accompanies  it  will  point 
out  the  headmost  of  the  enemy's  ships  that  is  to  be 
attacked,  counting  always  from  the  van,  as  stated  in 

1  The  remaining  clauses  of  the  memorandum  do  not  relate  to 
tactics. 

2  From  the  original  in  the  possession  of  Commander  Hope, 
R.N.     It  is  attached  to  an  order  of  battle  in  two  columns.     See 
supra,  p.  323. 

3  Sig.  43 :  '  Form  line  of  battle  in  open  order.'    Sig.   44 : 
1  Form  line  of  battle  in  close  order  at  about  a  cable  and  a  half 
distant' ;  with  a  white  pennant,  '  form  on  weather  column ' ;  with  a 
blue  pennant,  '  form  on  lee  column.' 


A.    COCHRANE  331 

page  1 60,  Article  31  (Instructions).1  The  signal 
will  afterwards  be  made  for  the  division  intended  to 
make  the  attack,  or  the  same  will  be  signified  by  the 
ship's  pennants,  and  the  pennants  of  the  ship  in 
that  division  which  is  to  begin  the  attack,  with 
the  number  of  the  ship  to  be  first  attacked  in  the 
enemy's  line.  Should  it  be  intended  that  the 
leading  ship  in  the  division  is  to  attack  the  rear  ship 
of  the  enemy,  she  must  bear  up,  so  as  to  get  upon 
the  weather  quarter  of  that  ship  ;  the  ships  following 
her  in  the  line  will  pass  in  succession  on  her  weather 
quarter,  giving  their  fire  to  the  ship  she  is  engaged 
with  ;  and  so  on  in  succession  until  they  have  closed 
with  the  headmost  ship  intended  to  be  attacked. 

The  ships  in  reserve,  who  have  no  opponents, 
will  break  through  the  enemy's  line  ahead  of  this 
ship,  so  as  to  cut  off  the  ships  engaged  from  the  rest 
of  the  enemy's  fleet. 

When  it  is  intended  that  the  rear  ship  of  the 
division  shall  attack  the  rear  ship  of  the  enemy's 
line,  that  ship's  pennants  will  be  shown  ;  the  rest  of 
the  ships  in  the  division  will  invert  their  order, 
shortening  sail  until  they  can  in  succession  follow 
the  rear  ship,  giving  their  fire  to  the  enemy's  ships 
in  like  manner  as  above  stated  ;  and  the  reserve 
ships  will  cut  through  the  enemy's  line  as  already 
mentioned. 

When  this  mode  of  attack  is  intended  to  be  put 
in  force,  the  other  divisions  of  the  fleet,  whether  in 
order  of  sailing  or  battle,  will  keep  to  windward  just 
out  of  gun-shot,  so  as  to  be  ready  to  support  the 
rear,  and  prevent  the  van  and  centre  of  the  enemy 
from  doubling  upon  them.  This  manoeuvre,  if 
properly  executed,  may  force  the  enemy  to  abandon 
the  ships  on  his  rear,  or  submit  to  be  brought  to 

1  I.e.  the  Instructions  of  1799,  supra,  p.  278.     For  Signal  27 
see  p.  255. 


332  THE  LAST  PHASE 

action  on  equal  terms,  which  is  difficult  to  be 
obtained  when  the  attack  is  made  from  to-wind- 
ward. 

When  the  fleet  is  to  leeward,  and  the  command- 
ing officer  intends  to  cut  through  the  enemy's  line, 
the  number  of  the  ship  in  their  line  where  the 
attempt  is  to  be  made  will  be  shown  as  already 
stated. 

If  the  ships  after  passing  the  enemy's  line  are 
to  tack,  and  double  upon  the  enemy's  ships  ahead, 
the  same  will  be  made  known  by  a  blue  pennant 
over  the  Signal  27  ;  if  not  they  are  to  bear  up  and 
run  to  the  enemy's  line  to  windward,  engaging 
the  ship  they  first  meet  with  ;  each  succeeding 
ship  giving  her  fire,  and  passing  on  to  the  next 
in  the  rear.  The  ships  destined  to  attack  the 
enemy's  rear  will  be  pointed  out  by  the  number 
of  the  last  ship  in  the  line  that  is  to  make  this 
movement,  or  the  pennants  of  that  ship  will  be 
shown  ;  but,  should  no  signal  be  made,  it  is  to  be 
understood  that  the  number  of  ships  to  bear  up  is 
equal  in  number  to  the  enemy's  ships  that  have 
been  cut  off;  the  succeeding  ships  will  attack  and 
pursue  the  van  of  the  enemy,  or  form,  should  it  be 
necessary  to  prevent  the  enemy's  van  from  passing 
round  the  rear  of  the  fleet  to  relieve  or  join  their 
cut-off  ships. 

If  it  is  intended  that  the  ships  following  those 
destined  to  engage  the  enemy's  rear  to  windward 
shall  bear  up,  and  prevent  the  part  of  their  rear 
which  has  been  cut  off  from  escaping  to  leeward, 
the  same  will  be  made  known  by  a  red  pennant 
being  hoisted  over  the  Signal  2I,1  and  the  number 
of  ships  so  ordered  will  be  shown  by  numeral 
signals  or  pennants.  If  from  the  centre  division, 
a  white  pennant  will  be  hoisted  over  the  signal. 
1  '  To  attack, on  bearing  indicated.' 


SIR  A.    COCHRANE  333 

If  the  rear  ships  are  to  perform  this  service  by 
bearing  up,  the  same  will  be  made  known  by  a  red 
pennant  under.  The  numeral  signal  or  pennants, 
counting  always  from  the  van,  will  show  the  head- 
most ship  to  proceed  on  this  service.1  The  ships 
not  directed  by  those  signals  are  to  form  in  close 
order,  to  cover  the  ships  engaged  from  the  rest  of 
the  enemy's  fleet. 

When  the  enemy's  ships  are  to  be  engaged 
by  both  van  and  centre,  the  rear  will  keep  their 
wind,  to  cover  the  ships  engaged  from  the  enemy 
to  windward,  as  circumstances  may  require. 

When  the  signal  shall  be  made  to  cut  through 
the  enemy's  van  from  to-leeward,  the  same  will  be 
made  known  by  Signal  27,  &c.  In  this  case,  if  the 
headmost  ships  are  to  tack  and  double  upon  the 
enemy's  van,  engaging  their  ships  in  succession  as 
they  get  up,  the  blue  pennant  will  be  shown  as 
already  stated,  and  the  numeral  signal  pointing 
out  the  last  ship  from  the  van  which  is  to  tack, 
which  in  general  will  be  equal  in  number  to  the 
enemy's  ships  cut  through.  The  rest  of  the  ships 
will  be  prepared  to  act  as  the  occasion  may  require, 
either  by  bearing  up  and  attacking  the  enemy's 
centre  and  rear,  or  tacking  or  wearing  to  cut  off 
the  van  of  the  enemy  from  passing  round  the  rear 
of  the  fleet  to  rejoin  their  centre.  And  on  this 
service,  it  is  probable,  should  the  enemy's  ships  bear 
up,  that  some  of  the  rear  ships  will  be  employed 
—the  signal  No.  21  will  be  made  accompanied  with 
the  number  or  pennants  of  the  headmost  ship — 
upon  which  she,  with  the  ships  in  her  rear,  will 
proceed  to  the  attack  of  the  enemy. 

When    an   attack  is  likely  to  be    made  by  an 

1  In  Ekin's  text  the  punctuation  of  this  sentence  is  obviously 
wrong  and  destroys  the  sense.  It  should  accord,  as  I  have  ven- 
tured to  amend  it,  with  that  of  the  previous  paragraph. 


334  THE  LAST  PHASE 

enemy's  squadron,  by  forcing  the  fleet  from  to- 
leeward,  Signal  109  will  be  made  with  a  blue  pen- 
nant where  best  seen ; 1  upon  which  each  ship  will 
luff  up  upon  the  weather  quarter  of  her  second 
ahead,  so  as  to  leave  no  opening  for  the  leading 
ship  of  the  enemy  to  pass  through  :  this  movement 
will  expose  them  to  the  collected  fire  of  all  that 
part  of  the  fleet  they  intended  to  force.2 

1  Signal  109,  'To  close  nearer  the  ship  or  ships  indicated.' 

2  Sir  Charles  Ekin  adds,  '  In  the  same  work  he  has  also  a 
signal  (No.  785)  under  the  head  "  Enemy  "  to  "  Lay  on  board," 
with  the  following  observation : — 

'  "  N.B. — This  signal  is  not  meant  that  your  people  should 
board  the  enemy  unless  you  should  find  advantage  by  so  doing  ; 
but  it  is  that  you  should  run  your  ship  on  board  the  enemy,  so 
as  to  disable  her  from  getting  away." ' 


THE   SIGNAL   BOOK   OF    1816 

IT  has  been  often  remarked  that  Nelson  founded 
no  school  of  tactics,  and  the  instructions  which 
were  issued  with  the  new  Signal  Book  immediately 
after  the  war  entirely  endorse  the  remark.  They 
can  be  called  nothing  else  but  reactionary.  Nelson's 
drastic  attempt  to  break  up  the  old  rigid  forma- 
tion into  active  divisions  independently  commanded 
seems  to  have  come  to  nothing,  and  the  new 
instructions  are  based  with  almost  all  the  old 
pedantry  on  the  single  line  of  battle.  Of  anything 
like  mutually  supporting  movements  there  is  only  a 
single  trace.  It  is  in  Article  XIV.,  and  that  is  only 
a  resurrection  of  the  time-honoured  corps  de  reserve, 
formed  of  superfluous  ships  after  your  line  has  been 
equalised  with  that  of  a  numerically  inferior  enemy. 
The  whole  document,  in  fact,  is  a  consecration  of 
the  fetters  which  had  been  forged  in  the  worst  days 
of  the  seventeenth  century,  and  which  Nelson  had 
so  resolutely  set  himself  to  break. 

The  new  Signal  Book  in  which  the  instructions 
appear  was  founded  on  the  code  elaborated  by 
Sir  Home  Riggs  Popham,  but  there  is  nothing 
to  show  whether  or  not  he  was  the  author  of  the 
instructions.  He  was  an  officer  of  high  scientific 
attainments,  but  although  he  had  won  considerable 
distinction  during  the  war,  his  service  had  been 
entirely  of  an  amphibious  character  in  connection 
with  military  operations  ashore,  and  he  had  never 


336  THE  LAST  PHASE 

seen  a  fleet  action  at  sea.  He  reached  flag  rank  in 
1814,  and  was  one  of  the  men  who  received  a 
K.C.B.  on  the  reconstitution  of  the  order  in  1815. 
Of  the  naval  lords  serving  with  Lord  Melville  at 
the  time  none  can  show  a  career  or  a  reputation 
which  would  lead  us  to  expect  from  them  anything 
but  the  colourless  instructions  they  produced.  The 
controlling  influence  was  undoubtedly  Lord  Keith. 
The  doyen  of  the  active  list,  and  in  command  of  the 
Channel  Fleet  till  he  retired  after  the  peace  of  1815, 
he  was  all-powerful  as  a  naval  authority,  and  his 
flag  captain,  Sir  Graham  Moore,  had  just  been  given 
a  seat  on  the  board.  A  devout  pupil  of  St.  Vincent 
and  Howe,  correct  rather  than  brilliant,  Keith 
represented  the  old  tradition,  and  notwithstanding 
the  patience  with  which  he  had  borne  Nelson's  va- 
garies and  insubordination,  the  antipathy  between 
the  two  men  was  never  disguised.  However 
generously  Keith  appreciated  Nelson's  genius,  he 
can  only  have  regarded  his  methods  as  an  evil 
influence  in  the  service  for  ordinary  men,  nor  can 
there  be  much  doubt  that  his  apprehensions  had  a 
good  deal  to  justify  them. 

The  general  failure  to  grasp  the  whole  of 
Nelson's  tactical  principles  was  not  the  only  trouble. 
There  are  signs  that  during  the  later  years  of  the 
war  a  very  dangerous  misunderstanding  of  his 
teaching  had  been  growing  up  in  the  service.  In 
days  when  there  was  practically  no  higher  instruc- 
tion in  the  theory  of  tactics,  it  was  easy  for  officers 
to  forget  how  much  prolonged  and  patient  study 
had  enabled  Nelson  to  handle  his  fleets  with  the 
freedom  he  did  ;  and  the  tendency  was  to  believe 
that  his  successes  could  be  indefinitely  repeated 
by  mere  daring  and  vehemence  of  attack.  The 
seed  was  sown  immediately  after  the  battle  and 
by  Collingwood  himself.  '  It  was  a  severe  action,' 


THE   'GO  AT  'EM'  HERESY      337 

he  wrote  to  Admiral  Parker  on  November  i,  'no 
dodging  or  manoeuvring.'  And  again  on  Decem- 
ber 1 6,  to  Admiral  Pasley,  '  Lord  Nelson  determined 
to  substitute  for  exact  order  an  impetuous  attack  in 
two  distinct  bodies.'  Collingwood  of  course  with  all 
his  limitations  knew  well  enough  it  was  not  a  mere 
absence  of  manoeuvring  that  had  won  the  victory. 
In  the  same  letter  he  had  said  that  although  Nelson 
succeeded,  as  it  were,  by  enchantment,  it  was  all  the 
effect  of  system  and  nice  combination.'  Yet  such 
phrases  as  he  and  others  employed  to  describe  the 
headlong  attack,  taken  from  their  context  and  re- 
peated from  mouth  to  mouth,  would  soon  have  raised 
a  false  impression  that  many  men  were  only  too 
ready  to  receive.  So  the  seed  must  have  grown,  till 
we  find  the  fruit  in  Lord  Dundonald's  oft-quoted 
phrase,  '  Never  mind  manoeuvres :  always  go  at 
them.'  So  it  was  that  Nelson's  teaching  had  crystal- 
lised in  his  mind  and  in  the  mind  perhaps  of  half  the 
service.  The  phrase  is  obviously  a  degradation  of 
the  opening  enunciations  in  Nelson's  memoranda,  a 
degradation  due  to  time,  to  superficial  study,  and 
the  contemptuous  confidence  of  years  of  undisputed 
mastery  at  sea. 

The  conditions  which  brought  about  this  attitude 
to  tactics  are  clearly  seen  in  the  way  others  saw  us. 
Shortly  after  Trafalgar  a  veteran  French  officer  of 
the  war  of  American  Independence  wrote  some 
Reflections  on  the  battle,  which  contain  much  to  the 
point.  '  It  is  a  noteworthy  thing,'  he  says  in  deal- 
ing with  the  defects  of  the  single-line  formation,  '  that 
the  English,  who  formerly  used  to  employ  all  the 
resources  of  tactics  against  our  fleets,  now  hardly  use 
them  at  all,  since  our  scientific  tacticians  have  dis- 
appeared. It  may  almost  be  said  that  they  no  longer 
have  any  regular  order  of  sailing  or  battle ;  they 
attack  our  ships  of  the  line  just  as  they  used  to 

z 


( 


338  THE  LAST  PHASE 

attack  a  convoy.' *  But  here  the  old  tactician  was 
not  holding  up  English  methods  as  an  example. 
He  was  citing  them  to  show  to  what  easy  victories 
a  navy  exposed  itself  in  which,  by  neglect  of  scientific 
study  and  alert  observation,  tactics  had  sunk  into  a 
mere  senile  formula.  'They  know,'  he  continues, 
'  that  we  are  in  no  state  to  oppose  them  with  well- 
combined  movements  so  as  to  profit  by  the  kind  of 
disorder  which  is  the  natural  result  of  this  kind  of 
attack.  They  know  if  they  throw  their  attack  on 
one  part  of  a  much  extended  line,  that  part  is  soon 
destroyed.'  Thus  he  arrives  at  two  fundamental 
laws  :  *  I,  That  our  system  of  a  long  line  of  battle  is 
worthless  in  face  of  an  enemy  who  attacks  with  his 
ships  formed  in  groups  (rtunis  en  pelotons),  and  told 
off  to  engage  a  small  number  of  ships  at  different 
points  in  our  line.  2.  That  the  only  tactical  system 
to  oppose  to  theirs  is  to  have  at  least  a  double  line, 
with  reserve  squadrons  on  the  wings  stationed  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  bear  down  most  easily  upon  the 
points  too  vigorously  attacked.'  The  whole  of  his 
far-sighted  paper  is  in  fact  an  admirable  study  of  the 
conditions  under  which  impetuous  attacks  and  elabo- 
rate combinations  are  respectively  called  for.  But 
from  both  points  of  view  the  single  line  for  a  large 
fleet  is  emphatically  condemned,  while  in  our  instruc- 
tions of  1816  not  a  hint  of  its  weakness  appears. 
They  resume  practically  the  same  standpoint  which 
the  Duke  of  York  had  reached  a  century  and  a  half 
before. 

Spanish  tacticians  seem  also  to  have  shared  the 
opinion  that  Trafalgar  had  really  done  nothing  to 
dethrone  the  line.  One  of  the  highest  reputation,  on 
December  17,  1805,  had  sent  to  his  government  a 
thoughtful  criticism  of  the  action,  and  his  view  of 

1  Mathieu-Dumas,    Precis  des  Evtnements  Militaires :   Pieces 
Justificative*,  vol.  xiv.  p.  408. 


TACTICAL   DECADENCE          339 

Nelson's  attack  was  this:  'Nothing/  he  says,  'is 
more  seamanlike  or  better  tactics  than  for  a  fleet 
which  is  well  to  windward  of  another  to  bear  down 
upon  it  in  separate  columns,  and  deploy  at  gun-shot 
from  the  enemy  into  a  line  which,  as  it  comes  into 
action,  will  inflict  at  least  as  much  damage  upon 
them  as  it  is  likely  to  suffer.  But  Admiral  Nelson 
did  not  deploy  his  columns  at  gun-shot  from  our 
line,  but  ran  up  within  pistol-shot  and  broke  through 
it,  so  as  to  reduce  the  battle  to  a  series  of  single- 
ship  actions.  It  was  a  manoeuvre  in  which  I  do  not 
think  he  will  find  many  imitators.  Where  two 
fleets  are  equally  well  trained,  that  which  attacks 
in  this  manner  must  be  defeated.' 1 

So  it  was  our  enemies  rightly  read  the  lesson 
of  Trafalgar.  The  false  deductions  therefore  which 
grew  up  in  our  own  service  are  all  the  more  extra- 
ordinary, even  as  we  find  them  in  the  new  instruc- 
tions and  the  current  talk  of  the  quarter-deck.  But 
this  is  not  the  worst.  It  is  not  till  we  turn  to  the 
Signal  Book  itself  that  we  get  a  full  impression  of 
the  extent  to  which  tactical  thought  had  degenerated 
and  Nelson's  seed  had  been  choked.  The  move- 
ments and  formations  for  which  signals  are  provided 
are  stubbornly  on  the  old  lines  of  1799.  The  in- 
fluence of  Nelson,  however,  is  seen  in  two  places. 
The  first  is  a  group  of  signals  for  '  attacking  the 
enemy  at  anchor  by  passing  either  outside  them  or 
between  them  and  the  land,'  and  for  '  anchoring  and 
engaging  either  within  or  outside  the  enemy.' 
Here  we  have  a  rational  embodiment  of  the 
experience  of  the  Nile.  The  second  is  a  similar 
attempt  to  embody  the  teaching  of  Trafalgar,  and 
the  way  it  is  done  finally  confirms  the  failure  to 
understand  what  Nelson  meant.  So  extraordinary 

1  Fernandez  Duro,  Armada  Espanola,  viii.  353. 

z  2 


340  THE  LAST  PHASE 

is  the  signification  of  the  signal  and  its  explanatory 
note  that  it  must  be  given  in  full. 

'  Signal. — Cut  the  enemy's  line  in  the  order  of 
sailing  in  two  columns. 

'  Explanatory  Note. — The  admiral  will  make 
known  what  number  of  ships  from  the  van  ship  of 
the  enemy  the  weather  division  is  to  break  through 
the  enemy's  line,  and  the  same  from  the  rear  at 
which  the  lee  division  is  to  break  through  their 
line. 

'  To  execute  this  signal  the  fleet  is  to  form  in  the 
order  of  sailing  in  two  columns,  should  it  not  be  so 
formed  already ;  the  leader  of  each  column  steering 
down  for  the  position  pointed  out  where  he  is  to  cut 
through  the  enemy's  line. 

'  If  the  admiral  wishes  any  particular  conduct  to 
be  pursued  by  the  leader  of  the  division,  in  which 
he  happens  not  to  be,  after  the  line  is  broken,  he 
will  of  course  point  it  out.  If  he  does  not  it  is  to 
be  considered  that  the  lee  division  after  breaking 
through  the  line  is  left  to  its  commander. 

'  In  performing  this  evolution  the  second  astern 
of  the  leader  in  each  column  is  to  pass  through  the 
line  astern  of  the  ship  next  ahead  [sic]  of  where  her 
leader  broke  through,  and  so  on  in  succession,  break- 
ing through  all  parts  of  the  enemy's  line  ahead  [sic] 
of  their  leaders  as  described  in  the  plate.' 

The  plate  represents  the  two  columns  bearing 
down  to  attack  in  a  strictly  formed  line  ahead,  and  the 
ships,  after  the  leaders  have  cut  through,  altering 
course  each  for  its  proper  interval  in  the  enemy's 
line,  and  the  whole  then  engaging  from  to-leeward. 
The  note  proceeds  : 

'  By  this  arrangement  no  ship  will  have  to  pass 
the  whole  of  the  enemy's  line.  If  however,  in  con- 
sequence of  any  circumstance,  the  rear  ships  should 
not  be  able  to  cut  through  in  their  assigned  places, 


THE    TRAFALGAR  SIGNAL,    1816     341 

the  captains  of  those  ships,  as  well  as  of  the  ships 
that  are  deprived  of  opponents  in  the  enemy's  line 
by  this  mode  of  attack,  are  to  act  to  the  best  of  their 
judgment  for  the  destruction  of  the  enemy,  unless 
a  disposition  to  the  contrary  has  been  previously 
made. 

1  It  will  be  seen  that  by  breaking  the  line  in  this 
order  the  enemy's  van  ships  will  not  be  able  to  assist 
either  their  centre  or  rear  without  tacking  or  wear- 
ing for  that  purpose/ 

This  from  cover  to  cover  of  the  Signal  Book  is 
the  sole  trace  to  be  found  of  the  great  principles 
for  which  Nelson  had  lived  and  died.  That  Lord 
Keith  or  anyone  else  could  have  believed  that  it 
adequately  represented  the  teaching  of  Trafalgar  is 
almost  incredible. 

To  begin  with,  the  wording  of  the  note  contains 
an  inexplicable  blunder.  The  last  paragraph  shows 
clearly  that  the  idea  of  the  signal  is  an  attack  on  the 
rear  and  centre,  as  at  Trafalgar  ;  yet  the  ships  of  each 
column  as  they  come  successively  into  action  are 
told  to  engage  the  enemy's  ship  ahead  Q{  the  point 
where  their  leaders  broke  through,  a  movement 
which  would  resolve  itself  into  an  attack  on  their 
centre  and  van,  and  leave  the  rear  free  to  come  into 
immediate  action  with  an  overwhelming  concentra- 
tion on  the  lee  division. 

That  so  grave  an  error  should  have  been  per- 
mitted to  pass  into  the  Signal  Book  is  bad  enough, 
but  that  such  a  signal  even  if  it  had  been  correctly 
worded  should  stand  for  Nelson's  last  word  to  the 
service  is  almost  beyond  belief.  The  final  out- 
come of  Nelson's  genius  for  tactics  lay  of  course  in 
his  memorandum,  and  not  in  the  form  of  attack 
he  actually  adopted.  Yet  this  remarkable  signal 
ignores  the  whole  principle  of  the  memorandum. 
The  fundamental  ideas  of  concentration  and  con- 


342  THE  LAST  PHASE 

taining  by  independent  squadrons  are  wholly  missed  ; 
and  not  only  this.  It  distorts  Nelson's  lee  attack 
into  a  weather  attack,  and  holds  up  for  imitation 
every  vice  of  the  reckless  movement  in  spite  of  which 
Nelson  had  triumphed.  Not  a  word  is  said  of  its 
dangers,  not  a  word  of  the  exceptional  circumstances 
that  alone  could  justify  it,  not  a  word  of  how  easily 
the  tables  could  be  turned  upon  a  man  who  a  second 
time  dared  to  fling  to  the  winds  every  principle  of 
his  art.  It  is  the  last  word  of  British  sailing  tactics, 
and  surely  nothing  in  their  whole  history,  not  even 
in  the  worst  days  of  the  old  Fighting  Instructions, 
so  staggers  us  with  its  lack  of  tactical  sense.1 


THE  INSTRUCTIONS  OF  1816. 
[Signal  Book,   United  Service  Institution.] 

Instructions  relating  to  the  Line  of  Battle  and  the 
Conduct  of  the  Fleet  preparatory  to  their  engaging 
and  when  engaged  with  an  enemy. 

I .  The  chief  purposes  for  which  a  fleet  is  formed 
in  line  of  battle  are,  that  the  ships  may  be  able  to 
assist  and  support  each  other  in  action  ;  that  they 
may  not  be  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  ships 
greater  in  number  than  themselves,  and  that  every 
ship  may  be  able  to  fire  on  the  enemy  without  risk 
of  firing  into  the  ships  of  her  own  fleet. 

1  The  anonymous  veteran  of  the  old  French  navy,  cited  by 
Mathieu-Dumas,  explains  exactly  how  Villeneuve  might  have 
turned  the  tables  on  Nelson  by  forming  two  lines  himself.  '  There 
is,'  he  concludes,  '  no  known  precedent  of  a  defensive  formation 
in  two  lines ;  but  I  will  venture  to  assert  that  if  Admiral  Villeneuve 
had  doubled  his  line  at  the  moment  he  saw  Nelson  meant  to 
attack  him  in  two  lines,  that  admiral  would  never  have  had  the 
imprudence  of  making  such  an  attack.' — Evdnements  Militaires, 
xiv.  411. 


INSTRUCTIONS  OF  1816  343 

II.  On  whichever  tack  the  fleet  may  be  sailing, 
when  the  line  of  battle  is  formed,  the  van  squadron 
is  to  form  the  van,  the  centre  squadron  the  centre, 
and  the  rear  squadron  the  rear  of  the  line,  unless 
some  other  arrangement  be  pointed  out  by  signal. 
But  if  a  change  of  wind,  or  tacking,  or  wearing,  or 
any  other  circumstance,  should   alter  the  order  in 
which  the  line  of  battle  was  formed,  the  squadrons 
are  to  remain  in  the  stations  in  which  they  may  so 
happen    to   be  placed,  till  the  admiral  shall  direct 
them  to  take  others. 

III.  When  the  signal  is  made  for  the  fleet  to 
form  the  line  of  battle,  each  flag  officer  and  captain 
is  to  get  into  his  station  as  expeditiously  as  possible  ; 
and  to  keep  in  close  order,  if  not  otherwise  directed, 
and  under  a  proportion  of  sail  suited  to  that  carried 
by  the  admiral,  or  by  the  senior  flag  officer  remain- 
ing in  the  line,  when  the  admiral  has  signified  his 
intention  to  quit  it. 

IV.  In   forming  the   line   of  battle,   each  ship 
should  haul  up  a  little  to  windward  rather  than  to 
leeward  of  her  second  ahead,  as  a  ship  a  little  to 
leeward  will  find  great  difficulty  in  getting  into  her 
station,  if  it  should  be  necessary  to  keep  the  line 
quite  close  to  the  wind  ;  and  it  may  also  be  better 
to  form  at  a  distance  a  little  greater,  rather  than 
smaller,  than  the  prescribed  distance,  as  it  is  easier 
to  close  the  line  than  to  extend  it. 

V.  If  the  admiral  should  haul  out  of  the  line, 
the  ships  astern  of  him  are  to  close  up  to  fill  the 
vacancy  he  has  made,  and  the  line  is  to  continue  on 
its  course,  and  to  act  in  the  same  manner  as  if  the 
admiral   had   no*  left   it.     All  signals  made  to  the 
centre  will  be  addressed  to  the  senior  officer  remain- 
ing in  it,  who,  during  the  absence  of  the  admiral,   is 
to  be  considered  as  the  commander  of  the  centre 
squadron. 


344  THE  LAST  PHASE 

VI.  The  repeating  frigates  are  to  be  abreast  of 
the    commanders    of  the  squadrons  to  which  they 
belong,  and  the  fireships  and  frigates  to   windward 
of  their  squadrons,   if  no  particular  station    be   as- 
signed to  them. 

VII.  When  the  signal  to  form  a  line  of  bearing 
for  either  tack  is  made,  the  ships  (whatever  course 
they  may  be  directed   to  steer)  are  to  place  them- 
selves in  such  a  manner  that,  if  they  were  to  haul  to 
the  wind  together  on  the  tack  for  which  the  line  of 
bearing  is  formed,  they  would  immediately  form  a 
line  of  battle  on  that  tack.     To  do  this,  every  ship 
must   bring   the   ship    which  would  be  her  second 
ahead,  if  the  line  of  battle  were  formed,  to  bear  on 
that  point  of  the  compass  on  which  the  line  of  battle 
would  sail,  viz.   on  that  point  of  the  compass  which 
is  six  points  from  the  direction  of  the  wind. 

As  the  intention  of  a  line  of  bearing  is  to  keep 
the  fleet  ready  to  form  suddenly  a  line  of  battle,  the 
position  of  the  division  or  squadron  flags,  shown, 
with  the  signals  for  such  a  line,  will  refer  to  the 
forming  the  line  of  battle  ;  that  division  or  squadron 
whose  flag  is  ^lppermosl  (without  considering  whether 
it  do  or  do  not  form  the  van  of  the  line  of  bearing) 
is  to  place  itself  in  that  station  which  would  become 
the  van  if  the  fleet  should  haul  to  the  wind,  and 
form  the  line  of  battle  ;  and  the  division  whose  flag 
is  undermost  is  to  place  itself  in  that  station  in  which 
it  would  become  the  rear  if  by  hauling  to  the  wind 
the  line  of  battle  should  be  formed. 

VIII.  When  a  line  of  bearing  has  been  formed 
the  ships  are  to  preserve  their  relative  bearing  from 
each  other,  whenever  they  are  directed  to  alter  their 
course  together  ;  but  if  they  are  directed  to  alter  their 
course  in  succession,  as  the  line  of  bearing  would 
by  that  circumstance  be  destroyed,  it  is  to  be  no 
longer  attended  to. 


INSTRUCTIONS  OF  1816  345 

IX.  If  after  having  made  the  signal  to  prepare  to 
form  the  line  of  battle,  or  either  line  of  bearing,  the 
admiral,  keeping  the  preparative  flag  flying,  should 
make  several  signals  in  succession  to  point  out  the 
manner  in  which  the  line  is  to  be  formed,  those  sig- 
nals are  to  be  carefully  written  down,  that  they  may 
be  carried  into  execution,  when  the  signal  for  the 
line  is  hoisted  again.     They  are  to  be  executed  in 
the  order  in  which  they  are  made,  excepting  such 
as  the  admiral   may  annul  previously  to  his  again 
hoisting  the  signal  for  the  line. 

X.  If  the  wind  should  come  forward  when  the 
fleet  is  formed  in  line  of  battle,  or  is  sailing  by  the 
wind  on  a  line  of  bearing,  the    leading  ship  is  to 
steer  seven  points  from  the  wind,  and  every  ship  is 
to  haul  as  close  to  the  wind  as  possible  till  she  has 
got  into  the  wake  of  the  leading  ship,  or  till  she 
shall  have  brought  it  on  the  proper  point  of  bearing  ; 
but  if  the  wind  should  come  #/?,  the  ships  are  to 
bear   up  until    they  get  into   the  wake,  or  on  the 
proper  point  of  bearing  from  the  leading  ship. 

XI.  Ships  which  have  been  detached  from  the 
body  of  the  fleet  on  any  separate  service  are  not  to 
obey  the  signal  for  forming  the  line  of  battle  unless 
they  have  been  previously  called  back  to  the  fleet 
by  signal. 

XII.  Ships  which  cannot  keep  their  stations  are 
to  quit  the  line,  as  directed  in  Article  XIX.  in  the 
General  Instructions,   though   in  the  presence  of  an 
enemy.     The  captains  of  such  ships  will  not  thereby 
be   prevented    from    distinguishing   themselves,    as 
they  will  have  the  opportunities  of  rendering  essen- 
tial  service  by  placing  their  ships  advantageously 
when  they  get  up  with  the  enemy  already  engaged 
with  the  other  part  of  the  fleet. 

XIII.  If  the  ship  of  any  flag  officer  be  disabled 
in  battle,  the  flag  officer  may  repair  on  board,  and 


346  THE  LAST  PHASE 

hoist  his  flag  in  any  other  ship  (not  already  carrying 
a  flag)  that  he  shall  think  proper,  but  he  is  to  hoist 
it  in  one  of  his  own  squadron  or  division,  if  there  be 
one  near  and  fit  for  the  purpose. 

XIV.  If  the   fleet   should    engage    an    enemy 
inferior  to  it  in  number,  or  which,  by  the  flight  of 
some  of  their   ships,  becomes   inferior,  the   ships, 
which  at  either   extremity  of  the  line  are  thereby 
left   without    opponents,   may,  after   the   action    is 
begun,  quit  the   line,  without  waiting  for  a  signal 
to  do  so  ;  and  they  are  to  distress  the  enemy,  or 
assist  the  ships  of  the  fleet  in  the  best  manner  that 
circumstances  will  allow. 

XV.  Great  care  is  at  all  times  to  be  taken  not 
to  fire  at  the  enemy  either  over  or  very  near  to  any 
ships  of  the  fleet,  nor,  though  the  signal  for  battle 
should  be  flying,  is  any  ship  to  fire  till  she  is  placed 
in  a  proper  situation,  and  at  a  proper  distance  from 
the  enemy. 

XVI.  No  ship  is  to  separate  from  the  body  of 
the  fleet  in   time   of  action   to   pursue   any  small 
number   of  the   enemy's    ships   which    have   been 
beaten  out  of  the  line,  unless   the  commander-in- 
chief,  or  some  other  flag  officer,  be  among  them  ; 
but  the  ships  which  have  disabled  their  opponents, 
or  forced   them  to  quit  the  line,  are  to  assist  any 
ship  of  the  fleet  appearing  to  be  much  pressed,  and 
to  continue  their  attack  till  the  main  body  of  the 
enemy  be  broken  or  disabled,  unless  by  signal,  or 
particular  instruction,  they  should  be  directed  to  act 
otherwise. 

XVII.  If  any  ship  should  be  so  disabled  as  to 
be  in  great  danger  of  being  destroyed  or  taken  by 
the  enemy,  and  should  make  a  signal  expressive  of 
such  extremity,  the  ships  nearest  to  her,  and  which 
are  the  least  engaged  with  the  enemy,  are  strictly 
enjoined  to  give  her  immediately  all  possible  aid 


INSTRUCTIONS   OF  1816  347 

and  protection ;  and  any  fireship,  in  a  situation 
which  admits  of  its  being  done,  is  to  endeavour 
to  burn  the  enemy's  ship  opposed  to  her ;  and  any 
frigate  that  may  be  near  is  to  use  every  possible 
exertion  for  her  relief,  either  by  towing  her  off,  or 
by  joining  in  the  attack  on  the  enemy,  or  by  cover- 
ing the  fireship,  or,  if  necessity  requires  it,  by  taking 
out  the  crew  of  the  disabled  ship,  or  by  any  other 
means  which  circumstances  at  the  time  will  admit. 

XVIII.  Though  a  ship  be  disabled  and  hard 
pressed  by  the  enemy  in   battle,  she  is  not  to  quit 
her  station  in  the  line  if  it  can  possibly  be  avoided, 
till  the  captain  shall  have  obtained  permission  so  to 
do  from  the  commander  of  the  division  or  squadron 
to  which  he  belongs,  or  from  some  other  flag  officer. 
But  if  he  should  be  ordered  out  of  the  line,  or  should 
be  obliged  to  quit  it  before  assistance  can  be  sent  to 
him,  the  nearest  ships  are  immediately  to  occupy 
the  space  become  vacant  to  prevent  the  enemy  from 
taking  advantage  of  it. 

XIX.  If  there  should  be  a  captain  so  lost  to  all 
sense  of  honour  and  the  great  duty  he  owes  his 
country  as  not  to  exert  himself  to  the  utmost  to  get 
into  action  with   the  enemy,  or  to  take  or  destroy 
them    when     engaged,     the     commander    of   the 
squadron  or  division  to  which  he  belongs,  or  the 
nearest    flag   officer,  is  to   suspend  him    from   the 
command,  and  is  to  appoint  some  other  officer  to 
command  the  ship  till  the  admiral's  pleasure  shall 
be  known. 


APPENDIX 


FURTHER  PARTICULARS   OF   THE 
TRAFALGAR  FIGHT 

[Sir  Charles  Ekin's  Naval  Battles,  pp.  271  et  seq.    Extract.] 

THE  intelligent  officer  to  whom  the  writer  is 
indebted  for  this  important  manuscript  was  an  eye- 
witness of  what  he  has  so  ably  related,  and  upon 
which  he  has  reasoned  with  so  much  judgment.1 

'  The  combined  fleet,  after  veering  from  the 
starboard  to  the  larboard  tack,  gradually  fell  into 
the  form  of  an  irregular  crescent ;  in  which  they 
remained  to  the  moment  of  attack.  Many  have 
considered  that  the  French  admiral  intended  this 
formation  of  the  line  of  battle ;  but  from  the 
information  I  obtained  after  the  action,  connected 
with  some  documents  found  on  board  the  Bucentaur, 
I  believe  it  was  the  intention  to  have  formed  a  line 
ahead,  consisting  of  twenty-one  sail — the  supposed 

1  The  concluding  part  of  the  MS.  is  devoted  to  a  detailed 
account  of  the  part  played  in  the  action  by  the  Conqueror  and 
her  two  seconds,  Neptune  and  Leviathan,  with  the  special  purpose 
of  showing  that  Villeneuve  really  struck  to  the  Conqueror.  In  a 
note  the  author  says,  '  I  have  been  thus  particular,  as  the  capture 
of  the  French  admiral  has  been  unblushingly  attributed  to  others 
without  any  mention  being  made  of  the  ship  that  actually  was 
the  principal  in  engaging  her,  wishing  to  do  justice  to  a  gallant 
officer  who  on  i that  day  considered  his  task  not  complete  until 
every  ship  was  either  captured  or  beyond  distance  of  pursuit.' 
The  inference  is  that  the  author  was  an  officer  of  the  Conqueror, 
defending  his  captain,  Israel  Pellew,  younger  brother  of  the  more 
famous  Edward,  Lord  Exmouth.  It  is  possible  therefore,  and 
even  probable,  that  this  criticism  of  Trafalgar  represents  the  ideas 
of  the  Pellews. 


352  APPENDIX 

force  of  the  British  fleet — and  a  squadron  of 
observation  composed  of  twelve  sail  of  the  line, 
under  Admiral  Gravina,  intended  to  act  according 
to  circumstances  after  the  British  fleet  were  en- 
gaged. By  wearing  together,  the  enemy's  line 
became  inverted,  and  the  light  squadron  which  had 
been  advanced  in  the  van  on  the  starboard  tack, 
was  left  in  the  rear  after  wearing ;  and  the  ships 
were  subsequently  mingled  with  the  rear  of  the 
main  body.  The  wind  being  light,  with  a  heavy 
swell,  and  the  fleet  lying  with  their  main  topsails 
to  the  mast,  it  was  impossible  for  the  ships  to  pre- 
serve their  exact  station  in  the  line ;  consequently 
scarce  any  ship  was  immediately  ahead  or  astern 
of  her  second.  The  fleet  had  then  the  appearance, 
generally,  of  having  formed  in  two  lines,  thus : 

( o   °   o    °   o   °)  so  that  the  ship  to  leeward 

seemed  to  be  opposite  the  space  left  between  two  in 
the  weather-line. 

'  In  the  rear,  the  line  was  in  some  places 
trebled  ;  and  this  particularly  happened  where  the 
Colossus  was,  who,  after  passing  the  stern  of  the 
French  Swiftsure,  and  luffing  up  under  the  lee  of 
the  Bahama,  supposing  herself  to  leeward  of  the 
enemy's  line,  unexpectedly  ran  alongside  of  the 
French  Achille  under  cover  of  the  smoke.  The 
Colossus  was  then  placed  between  the  Achille 
and  the  Bahama,  being  on  board  of  the  latter; 
and  was  also  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  Swift- 
sure's  after-guns.  All  these  positions  I  believe 
to  have  been  merely  accidental ;  and  to  accident 
alone  I  attribute  the  concave  circle  of  the  fleet,  or 
crescent  line  of  battle.  The  wind  shifted  to  the 
westward  as  the  morning  advanced  ;  and  of  course 
the  enemy's  ships  came  up  with  the  wind,  forming 
a  bow  and  quarter  line.  The  ships  were  therefore 


TACTICS  AT  TRAFALGAR        353 

obliged  to  edge  away,  to  keep  in  the  wake  of  their 
leaders ;  and  this  manoeuvre,  from  the  lightness  of 
the  wind,  the  unmanageable  state  of  the  ships  in  a 
heavy  swell,  and,  we  may  add,  the  inexperience  of 
the  enemy,  not  being  performed  with  facility  and 
celerity,  undesignedly  threw  the  combined  fleets 
into  a  position,  perhaps  the  best  that  could  have 
been  planned,  had  it  been  supported  by  the  skilful 
manoeuvring  of  individual  ships,  and  with  efficient 
practice  in  gunnery. 

1  Of  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  the 
mode  of  attack  adopted  by  the  British  fleet,  it  may 
be  considered  presumptuous  to  speak,  as  the  event 
was  so  completely  successful  ;  but  as  the  necessity 
of  any  particular  experiment  frequently  depends  upon 
contingent  circumstances,  not  originally  calculated 
upon,  there  can  be  no  impropriety  in  questioning 
whether  the  same  plan  be  likely  to  succeed  under 
all  circumstances,  and  on  all  occasions. 

4  The  original  plan  of  attack,  directed  by  the 
comprehensive  mind  of  our  great  commander,  was 
suggested  on  a  supposition  that  the  enemy's  fleet 
consisted  of  forty-six  sail  of  the  line  and  the  British 
forty  ;  and  the  attack,  as  designed  from  to-windward, 
was  to  be  made  under  the  following  circumstances  : 

'  Under  a  supposition  that  the  hostile  fleet  would 
be  in  a  line  ahead  of  forty-six  sail,  the  British  fleet 
was  to  be  brought  within  gun-shot  of  the  enemy's 
centre,  in  two  divisions  of  sixteen  sail  each,  and  a 
division  of  observation  consisting  of  the  remaining 
eight. 

'  The  lee  division  was  by  signal  to  make  a  rapid 
attack  under  all  possible  sail  on  the  twelve  rear 
ships  of  the  enemy.  The  ships  were  to  break 
through  the  enemy's  line  ;  and  such  ships  as  were 
thrown  out  of  their  stations  were  to  assist  their 
friends  that  were  hard  pressed.  The  remainder  of 

A  A 


354  APPENDIX 

the  enemy's  fleet,  of  thirty-four  sail,  were  to  be  left 
to  the  management  of  the  commander-in-chief.' 

This  able  officer  then  proceeds  to  describe,  by  a 
figure,  the  plan  of  attack  as  originally  intended ; 
bearing  a  very  close  resemblance  to  that  already 
given  in  Plate  XXVIII.  fig.  i  ;  but  making  the 
enemy's  fleet,  as  arranged  in  a  regular  line  ahead, 
to  extend  the  distance  of  five  miles ;  and  the  van, 
consisting  of  sixteen  ships,  left  unoccupied  ;  the 
whole  comprising  a  fleet  of  forty-six  sail  of  the  line. 
He  then  observes : 

1  If  the  regulated  plan  of  attack  had  been 
adhered  to,  the  English  fleet  should  have  borne  up 
together,  and  have  sailed  in  a  line  abreast  in  their 
respective  divisions  until  they  arrived  up  with  the 
enemy.  Thus  the  plan  which  consideration  had 
matured  would  have  been  executed,  than  which 
perhaps  nothing  could  be  better ;  the  victory  would 
have  been  more  speedily  decided,  and  the  brunt  of 
the  action  would  have  been  more  equally  felt,  &c. 

'  With  the  exception  of  the  Britannia,  Dread- 
nought, and  Prince,  the  body  of  the  fleet  sailed  very 
equally  ;  and  I  have  no  doubt  could  have  been 
brought  into  action  simultaneously  with  their  leaders. 
This  being  granted,  there  was  no  time  gained  by 
attacking  in  a  line  ahead,  the  only  reason,  I  could 
suppose,  that  occasioned  the  change. 

'  The  advantages  of  an  attack  made  in  two  great 
divisions,  with  a  squadron  of  observation,  seem  to 
combine  every  necessary  precaution  under  all  circum- 
stances. 

'  The  power  of  bringing  an  overwhelming  force 
against  a  particular  point  of  an  enemy's  fleet,  so  as 
to  ensure  the  certain  capture  of  the  ships  attacked, 
and  the  power  of  condensing  such  a  force  afterwards 
[so]  as  not  only  to  protect  the  attacking  ships  from 
any  offensive  attempt  that  may  be  made  by  the  un- 


TACTICS  AT   TRAFALGAR       355 

occupied  vessels  of  the  hostile  fleet,  but  also  to  secure 
the  prizes  already  made,  will  most  probably  lead  to 
a  victory ;  and  if  followed  up  according  to  circum- 
stances, may  ultimately  tend  to  the  annihilation  of 
the  whole,  or  the  greater  part  of  the  mutilated 
fleet. 

'  Each  ship  may  use  her  superiority  of  sailing, 
without  being  so  far  removed  from  the  inferior 
sailing  ships  as  to  lose  their  support. 

'  The  swifter  ships,  passing  rapidly  through  the 
enemy's  fire,  are  less  liable  to  be  disabled  ;  and,  after 
closing  with  their  opponents,  divert  their  attention 
from  the  inferior  sailers,  who  are  advancing  to  com- 
plete what  their  leaders  had  begun.  The  weather 
division,  from  being  more  distant,  remain  spectators 
of  the  first  attack  for  some  little  time,  according  to 
the  rate  of  the  sailing ;  and  may  direct  their  attack 
as  they  observe  the  failure  or  success  of  the  first 
onset,  either  to  support  the  lee  division,  if  required, 
or  to  extend  the  success  they  may  appear  to  have 
gained,  &c. 

'  If  the  enemy  bear  up  to  elude  the  attack,  the 
attacking  fleet  is  well  collected  for  the  commence- 
ment of  a  chase,  and  for  mutual  support  in  pursuit. 

*  The  mode  of  attack,  adopted  with  such  success 
in  the  Trafalgar  action,  appears  to  me  to  have 
succeeded  from  the  enthusiasm  inspired  throughout 
the  British  fleet  from  their  being  commanded  by 
their  beloved  Nelson  ;  from  the  gallant  conduct  of 
the  leaders  of  the  two  divisions  ;  from  the  individual 
exertions  of  each  ship  after  the  attack  commenced, 
and  the  superior  practice  of  the  guns  in  the  English 
fleet. 

'  It  was  successful  also  from  the  consternation 
spread  through  the  combined  fleet  on  finding  the 
British  so  much  stronger  than  was  expected ;  from 
the  astonishing  and  rapid  destruction  which  followed 

A  A  2 


356  APPENDIX 

the  attack  of  the  leaders,  witnessed  by  the  whole  of 
the  hostile  fleets,  inspiring  the  one  and  dispiriting 
the  other  and  from  the  loss  of  the  admiral's  ship 
early  in  the  action. 

'  The  disadvantages  of  this  mode  of  attack 
appear  to  consist  in  bringing  forward  the  attacking 
force  in  a  manner  so  leisurely  and  alternately,  that 
an  enemy  of  equal  spirit  and  equal  ability  in 
seamanship  and  gunnery  would  have  annihilated 
the  ships  one  after  another  in  detail,  carried  slowly 
on  as  they  were  by  a  heavy  swell  and  light  airs. 

'  At  the  distance  of  one  mile  five  ships,  at  half  a 
cable's  length  apart,  might  direct  their  broadsides 
effectively  against  the  head  of  the  division  for  seven 
minutes,  supposing  the  rate  of  sailing  to  have  been 
four  miles  an  hour  ;  and  within  the  distance  of  half 
a  mile  three  ships  would  do  the  same  for  seven 
minutes  more,  before  the  attacking  ship  could  fire 
a  gun  in  her  defence. 

'  It  is  to  be  observed  that,  although  the  hull  of 
the  headmost  ship  does  certainly  in  a  great  measure 
cover  the  hulls  of  those  astern,  yet  great  injury  is 
done  to  the  masts  and  yards  of  the  whole  by  the 
fire  directed  against  the  leader ;  and  that,  if  these 
ships  are  foiled  in  their  attempt  to  cut  through  the 
enemy's  line,  or  to  run  on  board  of  them,  they  are 
placed,  for  the  most  part,  hors  de  combat  for  the 
rest  of  the  action. 

'  Or  should  it  fall  calm,  or  the  wind  materially 
decrease  about  the  moment  of  attack,  the  van  ships 
must  be  sacrificed  before  the  rear  could  possibly 
come  to  their  assistance. 

'  In  proceeding  to  the  attack  of  October  21,  the 
weather  was  exactly  such  as  might  have  caused  this 
dilemma,  as  the  sternmost  ships  of  the  British  were 
six  or  seven  miles  distant.  By  the  mode  of  attack- 
ing in  detail,  and  the  manner  in  which  the  combined 


TACTICS  AT  TRAFALGAR        357 

fleet  was  drawn  up  to  receive  it,  instead  of  doubling 
on  the  enemy,  the  British  were,  on  that  day,  them- 
selves doubled  and  trebled  on ;  and  the  advantage 
of  applying  an  overwhelming  force  collectively,  it 
would  seem,  was  totally  lost. 

1  The  Victory,  Temeraire,  Sovereign,  Belleisle, 
Mars,  Colossus  and  Bellerophon  were  placed  in  such 
situations  in  the  onset,  that  nothing  but  the  most 
heroic  gallantry  and  practical  skill  at  their  guns 
could  have  extricated  them.  If  the  enemy's  vessels 
had  closed  up  as  they  ought  to  have  done,  from 
van  to  rear,  and  had  possessed  a  nearer  equality 
in  active  courage,  it  is  my  opinion  that  even  British 
skill  and  British  gallantry  could  not  have  availed. 
The  position  of  the  combined  fleet  at  one  time  was 
precisely  that  in  which  the  British  were  desirous  of 
being  placed  ;  namely,  to  have  part  of  an  opposing 
fleet  doubled  on,  and  separated  from  the  main 
body. 

'  The  French  admiral,  with  his  fleet,  showed  the 
greatest  passive  gallantry  ;  and  certainly  the  French 
Intrepide,  with  some  others,  evinced  active  courage 
equal  to  the  British  ;  but  there  was  no  nautical 
management,  no  skilful  manoeuvring. 

'  It  may  appear  presumptuous  thus  to  have 
questioned  the  propriety  of  the  Trafalgar  attack ; 
but  it  is  only  just,  to  point  out  the  advantages  and 
disadvantages  of  every  means  that  may  be  used  for 
the  attainment  of  great  results,  that  the  probabilities 
and  existing  circumstances  may  be  well  weighed 
before  such  means  are  applied.  A  plan,  to  be 
entirely  correct,  must  be  suited  to  all  cases.  If  its 
infallibility  is  not  thus  established,  there  can  be  no 
impropriety  in  pointing  out  the  errors  and  dangers 
to  which  it  is  exposed,  for  the  benefit  of  others. 

'  Our  heroic  and  lamented  chief  knew  his  means, 
and  the  power  he  had  to  deal  with  ;  he  also  knew 


358  APPENDIX 

the    means    he    adopted    were    sufficient   for   the 
occasion  ;  and  that  sufficed. 

1  The  Trafalgar  attack  might  be  followed  under 
different  circumstances,  and  have  a  different  result : 
it  is  right,  therefore,  to  discuss  its  merits  and 
demerits.  It  cannot  take  one  atom  from  the  fame 
of  the  departed  hero,  whose  life  was  one  continued 
scene  of  original  ability,  and  of  superior  action.' 


INDEX 


ADDITIONAL 

ADDITIONAL    Instructions,    113, 

115,  126-8,  203-229 
Admiral,  station  of,  in  line,  12,  15, 

16,  22,  24,61,  77,  88,91,  100, 

123,  127,  1 66,  243-5,  276,  317. 

See  also  Flag,  and  Flagship 
Advanced     squadron,    Nelson's, 

294,  300-6,  316-7,  319  «.,  325 
Ammunition,  supply  of,  69 
Anchor,   engaging  at,  264,    277, 

339 

d'Annibault,  Admiral,  18 
Anson,   Lord,    116,   204,  209-10, 

216,  218  «.,  285  n. 
Argall,  Sir  Samuel,  49 
Armada,  27-9,  32-5,  75,  283,  288 
Attack,  from     to- wind  ward,    31, 
33-5,  42,  59,  95,  113    126, 
153,155-6,  170-1,227,246, 
330-3.       See    also     Line, 
breaking  the 
Oblique,  143-5 
Parallel,     143,    148,     155-6, 
170-1,     186,     191-2,    197, 
218  »., ,245,  266,  273,  324-5 
Perpendicular,  265,  307,  324 
On  contrary  tacks,  245  ;  on 
opposite    number,    211-2, 
217-8,  227-8,  265,  277  ;  in 
coming  up,  277 
By  defiling,  42-3,  51,  59,65 
On  superior  fleet,  180-2,  236, 

262-3,  276,  308,  346 
Audley,  Sir  Thomas,  14-17 
Augers,  for  scuttling,  13 


BATTLES 

BADILEY,  Captain  Richard,  84 
Ball,  Admiral  Sir  Alexander,  303 
Banckers,      Admiral       Adriaen, 

156  n. 

Barham,  Admiral  Lord,  293 
Barrington,  Admiral    the    Hon. 

Samuel,  258 
Baskerville,  Sir  Thomas,  his  battle 

order,  29 
Battle     orders,     see     Order    of 

Battle 
Battles.     Gravelines    (1588),  75, 

283,  288 

Isla  de  Pinos  (1596),  29 
Oquendo  and  Tromp  (1639), 

85 

Monte  Christo  (1652),  84 
Dungeness  (1652),  93 
Portland  (Feb.  1653),  94 
The  Gabbard  (June  1653^97 
Lowestoft  or    Texel,  No.    2 

(1665X113-4 
Four    Days'    Batt.e   (1666), 

116-9,  134,  136-7 
St.    James's  Fight     (1666), 

122  «.,  138,  I4O-I 

Holmes's  action  (1672),  169 
Solebay  (1672),  138-9,  155  «., 

169 

Schoonveldt  (1673)  133,  156 
Texel,  No.  3  (1673),  154  «., 

157/7.,  162  n.,  182 
Beachy  Head    or    Bevesier 

(1690),  177,  181 
La  Hogue  (1692),  180 


360 


INDEX 


BATTLES 
Battles — continued 

Malaga   (1704),    184,     186, 

195-6,  198  n. 
Toulon  (1744),  1 88   ».,    196, 

205,  210 
Finisterre  (Anson  and  De  la 

Jonquiere,  1747),  209 
Finisterre        (Hawke      and 

L'Etenduere,  1747),  226  n. 
Havana  (1748),  224  n. 
Minorca  (1756),  218  n. 
Quiberon  (1759),  186,  312 
Granada  (1779),  258 
Martinique  (1780),  211,  227  n. 
Chesapeake  (1781),  212 
LesSaintes     (1782),    211-2, 

237 
First    of  June    (1794),  256, 

265,  283 

St.  Vincent  (i797),  254,  265, 

267 
Camperdown      (1797),    254, 

266,  287 

The  Nile  (1798),  262,  312 
Copenhagen  (1801),  264 
Trafalgar    (1805),    257,  264, 
266,  282  etseq.,  321-7,  335- 
42,351-8 
Berkley,    Admiral     Sir  William, 

116 

Berry,  Sir  John,  169 
Berry,  Captain  Edward,  262,  288 
Bilboes,  33 
Blake,    Admiral    Robert,     83-5, 

92-9  ;  orders  of,  99-104 
Boarding,  7,  13,  15,  42,  51,  59,  62, 

68,97,  ii9,  326 
Boats  in  action,  10-13,  r5»  89-90, 

248,  275-6 
Boscawen,  Admiral  Edward,  197, 

203-4,  208,  210  ;  his  Additional 

Instructions,  219-25 
Boswall,  Captain,  his  translation 

of  Hoste,  236  «.,  287  n. 
Boteler,    Captain    Nathaniel,   on 

tactics,  27,  73-6 
Breaking  the  line,  see  Line 
Browne,  Lieutenant  G.L.,  299 
Buckingham,     George     Villiers, 

Duke  of,  33,  76 
Byng,  Admiral   Sir  George,  204, 

218  n. 


COVENTRY 
CABINS,  61 
Calder,      Admiral     Sir    Robert 

Bart.,  294 
Calthrops,  n 
Captains,  lists  of,  65-6,  71 
Captains,   removal  of,  in  action, 

247,  274-5,  347 

Carteret,  Admiral  Sir  George,  121 
Cartouches,  69 
Cavalry  tactics  at  sea,  7,  119 
Cecil,     Sir     Edward,     Viscount 

Wimbledon,  31,  49,  51-72,73, 

75,  83,  85 

Changing  station,  see  Station 
Charles  V,  Emperor,  i,  18 
Chasing,  43,  56,  60,   127-9,   155, 

162,    204.     See   also    General 

chase 
Chaves,  Alonso  de,  i  et  seq.  18-9, 

52,  73,  75,  291,  296 
Chaves,  Hieronymus  de,  2 
Clearing  for  action,   41,    58,  62, 

69 
Clerk  of  Eldin,  235,  262,  265,  285, 

326 
Close  action,  41,68,  112, 159,  215, 

220 
Cochrane,  Admiral  Sir  Alexander, 

185,  326-7,  330-4 
Codrington,  Admiral  Sir  Edward, 

295,  301-7 

Collingwood,  Admiral  Lord,  283, 
292,  295,  et  seq.  ;  his  memoran- 
dum, 323-30,  336-7 
'  Commander-in-chief,'  100  n. 
Concentration,  142-5,  154  n.,  177, 
213,  228, and;*.,  259,  284,  330-4 
By  doubling,  see  Doubling  ; 
On  rear,  see  Rear-concentra- 
tion 

On  van,  143-4,  213,  314-5 
Confusing,  36,  144,  213,  284,  291, 

315 
Containing,  135-8,  214,  284,  297, 

318-20,  325 

By  feinting,  see  Feints 
Convoy,     method    of   attacking, 

219,  227,  288  ;  of  protecting,  94 
Corporal  of  the  field,  40 
Corps  de  reserve,  see  Reserve 
Coventry,  Sir  William,  in,   114, 

128,  133 


INDEX 


COWARDICE 

Cowardice,  see  Captains,  removal 

of 

Cross-bows,  n 
Crossing  the  T,  210,  221 
Cruisers,  29, 71-3, 88-90, 99, 103-4, 

109,  122,  125,  152  ;  duties  of,  in 

action,  151,  219,  251 
Cruising  formations,  209,  220,  228 


DARTMOUTH,  Admiral  George 
Legge,  first  lord,  141  ;  his 
instructions,  168-172,  177 

Dartmouth  MSS.  no,  133,  139 

Deane,  Admiral  Richard,  93,  95 

Decres,  310 

Defeat,  247 

Denbigh,  William  Fielding,  First 
Earl  of,  49 

Detached  ships,  240,  244,  249, 
269,  272-3,  276,  345 

Disabled  ships,  101,  103,  112-3, 
123-4,  127,  146,  161-2,  192-3, 
246-7,  274,  346-7 ;  question 
of  following  up,  224,  246,  273, 
346 

Disbrowe,  Colonel  John,  general 
at  sea,  98  ;  orders  of,  99-104 

Discipline,    40,   43-5,   52-4,   58, 

93 
Dispersing,  instructions  for,  247, 

275 
Divisions,     independent    control 

of,   287-9,    294-6,   316-9,  323, 

327.     See  also  Subsquadrons  ; 

Order  of  battle 
Doubling,  117,  179-85,  210,  236, 

262,  326,  331-3 
Drake,  Sir  Francis,   17   «.,  283  ; 

his  sailing  order,  29,  50 
Duff,  Captain  George,  303 
Dumanoir,  Vice- Admiral,  310 
Duncan,  Admiral   Viscount,  254, 

266,  287 
Dundonald,  Admiral  the  Earl  of, 

337 
Duquesne,  Admiral  Abraham,  164 


ENGAGING,  see  Attack 
Equalising  speed,  228,  241,  243, 
269,  271,  273 


GORGES 
Essex,  Robert  Devereux,  Earl  of, 

49 

Essington,  Rear-Admiral,  322 
d'Estrees,  Mare*chal,  154^.,  179, 

182 
Etenduere,  Admiral  des  Herbiers 

de  P,  226  n. 
Exmouth,       Admiral       Edward 

Pellew,  Lord,  351  n. 
Expeditional  orders,  204-6 


FEINTS,  302,  307-12 

Fire  discipline,  41-3,  51,  54,  60, 
62,  68,  70,  103,  125,  159,  172, 
.245.  273,  346 

Fire,  precautions  against,  37,  41, 
54,  5.8-9,  7o 

Fireships,  89,  90,  103-4  ;  instruc- 
tions for,  139,  149,  159-60,  172, 
223-4,  227,  248  and  /;.,  250-1, 

274-5 

Flag,  shifting  the,  130, 141, 162  »., 
248-9,  276,  345-6 

Flags,  squadronal,  16,  22-3,  55  ; 
abolished,  251 

Flagship  as  objective,  12,  15, 
273,  3!7,  346.  See  also  Ad- 
miral, station  of 

Forcing,  227,  334 

Foreign  views  of  British  tactics, 
97-8,  118-9,337-9 

Frederick,  Rear-Admiral,  254  «., 

255 
Frigates,  see  Cruisers 


GALEN,  Admiral  Johann  van,  84 
Galleys,  tactics  of,  6  ;  used  with 

sailing  ships,  18-24 
Gambier,   Admiral    Lord,  322-3, 

325  ;  his  instructions,  327-8 
Gambling,  43-4,  52 
General    chase,    130,    193,    221, 

226 
'  General '  for  naval  commander- 

in-chief,  82,  93, 99 
General  Instructions,  268,  342 
George  of  Denmark,  Prince,  195 
Gibraltar,  196,  225,  235-6 
Glanville,  Sir  John,  63  n 
Gorges,  Sir  William,  32-5,  50 


362 


INDEX 


GRAIN 


Grain,  101  and  n. 
Grappling,  7,  12,  248,  250 
Grasse,  Vice-Admiral  Comte  de, 

238,  285-6 

Graves,  Admiral  Lord,  212 
Gravina,  Admiral,  264 
Greenwood,  Jonathan,  his  signal 

book,  233  n. 
Grenades,  n 
Grenier,  Vicomte  de,  his  tactical 

treatise,  285 

Group  tactics,  50-1,  74,  85-7,  338 
Guiche,    Comte   de,   on   English 

and  Dutch  tactics,  118-9 
Guides,  239,  240-1,  278-9 
Gunfire  as  basis  of  tactics,  120 
Gunners  and  gun  crews,  35,  62, 

69.     See  also  Seamen  gunners 
Gunnery,  69,   97,  263.     See  also 

Close   action,  and   Fire  disci- 
pline 


HAND-GUNS,  11 

Harpoons,  n 

Harvey,  Captain  Eliab,  297,  310 

Hawke,  Lord,  1 16,  209,  210-1 ;  his 
Additional  Instructions,  217-8, 
312 

Hawkins,  Sir  Richard,  34 

Henry  VIII,  14,  18 

Herbert,  Admiral,  Sec  Torrington 

Hill,  General  Lord,  292 

Holmes,  Admiral  Sir  Robert, 
122  n. 

Hood,  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Samuel, 
322 

Hood,  Viscount,  211-4  ;  his  addi- 
tional signals,  228-9,  236-8,  255 

Hope,  Captain  George,  295,  303, 
320  n. 

Hoste,  Pere  Paul,  his  Evolutions 
Navales,  97-8,  113-4,  179-83, 
225  n.,  235-6,  257,  262-3,  3o8 

Howard  of  Effingham,  Lord,  27, 29 

Howard,  Sir  Edward,  14 

Howe,  Earl,  184-5,  225  n-  >  as 
first  lord,  233-8,  252  et  seg., 
262-5,  2^7  ;  his  great  manoeuvre, 
255-62,  265,  267,287,  308,  311, 
336 

Hygiene,  44,  60 


LINE 

INITIATIVE,  267-8,  279,  314.  See 
also  Divisions,  independent 
control  of 

Intervals,  67,  113,  127,  158,  191, 
220,  222-3,  244,  327-8,  330  »• 

JACK-FLAG,  108  and  n. 

James  II,  168.      See  also  York, 

Duke  of 
Jervis,  Admiral  Sir  John,  Earl  of 

St.  Vincent,  254,  265-6 
Jonquiere,  Admiral  de  la,  209 
Jordan,  Admiral  Sir  Joseph,  141, 

155  «. 

KEATS,  Admiral  Sir  Richard 
Goodwin,  290-2,  295-6,  304, 
311,  322 

Keith,  Admiral  Lord,  336,  341 

Keppel,  Admiral  Augustus,  Vis- 
count, 235,  258 

Knowles,  Admiral  Sir  Charles, 
ist  bart.  (ot>.  1777),  224  «.,  235, 
258 

Knowles,  Admiral  Sir  Charles 
Henry,  2nd  bart.  (1754-1831), 
185,  210,  225  «.,  235-7,  257-8, 
260-1 


LANDING,  16 

Lasking,  171 

Lawson,  Admiral  Sir  John,  112 

Lestock,  Admiral,  188  ».,  205-8 

Lindsey,  Robert  Bertie,  Earl  of, 

76-7,  85 

Line.     See  also  Orders  of  battle. 
Abreast,    75,    107-9,    165-6, 

220 

Ahead,  origin  of,  28-36,  42, 
59,  62,  82-7 ;  first  in- 
structions for,  92,  95-9, 
100-2,  108-9,  124-6;  in- 
sistence on,  134-5,  149, 
155,  159,  335-95  close 
hauled,  first  use  of,  113  ; 
invented  by  English,  118- 
21 

of  bearing,  see  Quarter  line 

Breaking    the,    114,    136-7, 

142,  149,  153,  158*.,  169- 


INDEX 


363 


LINE 

Line — continued 

70,  176-8,  182,  212,     229, 

237,  289,  314-5,  324-5 ; 

early  objections  to,  145, 
153  n.,  183-4,  256;  the 
two  methods  of,  255-62, 
264-6,  279,  326-7,  33«>-3  5 
synonyms  for,  261 
Closing  up,  192,  198,  241, 

243 
Equalising,    205,    219,    221, 

227,  346.  See  also  Reserve, 

corps  de 
Forming,      as      convenient, 

170-1,  221,  226,  277 
Inverting,  226-7,  238,  331-2 
Position  of  squadrons  in,  239 

-40 

Principles  of,  stated,  269,  342 
Quitting  the,  161,   193,  198, 

247,     273-4.       See     also 

Equalising 
Early  Spanish  use  of,  8-10 ; 

early  English,   28-36,  42, 

59,62 
Reactions     against,     1 1 5-6, 

J59«.,  1 86,  283-9,  335-9 
Reduplication      of,      118-9, 

312-3,  338,  342  ».,  352 
Linstocks,  n 
Lisle,  John  Dudley,  Lord,  18-24, 

291,  296 
Louisbourg,  203 
Love,  Sir  Thomas,  49-51,  61  n. 


MACPHERSON,  Alexander,  225 

Malta,  164 

Mathews,  Admiral,  i88w.,  190  w., 

196,  205-8,  210 

Medows,  Captain  Charles,  225 
Mette,  259,  267,  291 
Monck,  George,   Duke  of  Albe- 

marle,   93-9  ;     orders  of,   99- 

104,  107,  1 1 1-5,  134-6 
Monson,  Sir  William,  on  tactics, 

76 

Moore,  Admiral  Sir  Graham,  336 
Moorsom,  Vice-Admiral  Constan- 

tine,  298-9 
Moorsom,  Captain  Robert,  298-9, 

311  n. 


PELLEW 

Morogues,  Bigot  de,  his  Tactique 

na-vale^  171  «.,  185,  285  n.,  327 
Mortemart,  Due  de,  179 
Moulton,  Captain  Robert,  his  sea 

book,  112,  126  «.,  129  «.,  151  n. 
Musket-arrows,  34 
Mutual  support,  61,  67,74,85-6, 

89,   91,    ico-i,    123,    129,   172, 

266-7,  283 
Myngs,  Admiral  Sir  Christopher, 

136-7 


NARBRQUGH,  Admiral  Sir  John, 

164-7 

Nelson,  Admiral  Lord,  116,  185, 
214,    257,    259,    261,   266, 
321-7,  335-42 
His   general    orders    (1798- 

1801),  264,  287-9 
His  memorandum  (1803)  261, 

280-1,  289-90,  313-6 
His  memorandum  (1805),  272 
«.,  282-313,  316-20,  353-4 
'  Nelson    touch,'    the,    283,    293, 

296,  299-313,  326 
Norris,   Admiral   Sir  John,   196, 
206-7 


OAR  propulsion,  18-24 

O'Bryen,  Lieutenant  Christopher, 
his  translation  of  Hoste,  236  «. 

Order  of  battle,  forming,  as  con- 
venient, 70-1 

Orders  of  battle.  Early  Spanish, 
8-10 ;  English,  19-24,  50-1, 
65  et  seq.,  74-5  ;  wedge-shaped, 
9, 19 ;  Baskerville's,  30;  Boteler 
on,  73-6;  crescent,  75,  94,  351  ; 
in  two  lines,  209,  214,  220,  226, 
229,  285,  294-300,  305,  323  ;  in 
three  lines,  286,  289-296,  354 

Order  of  sailing,  29,  50,  225  »., 
235  ;  as  order  of  battle,  316, 
322,  327,  340 


PARISOT,  his  account  of  Trafalgar, 

310  n. 
Pellew,  Captain  Israel,  299, 351 «. 


364 


INDEX 


PENN 

Penn,  Admiral  Sir  William,  81, 
92,  96,  98,  135  ;  orders  of,  99- 
104,  114;  his  talk  with  Pepys, 

1 20- 1 

Pepys,   Samuel,    117   ».,    120-1, 

168-9 
Perez     de     Grandallana,     Don 

Domingo,  267 
Pigot,  Admiral  Hugh,  212,  228-9 

*.,  237,  255,  260 
Popham,  Admiral  Sir  Home,  254, 

335-6 

Prayers,  33,  36,  52 
Preparative  signals,  269 
Prizes,  treatment  of,  103,  112 


QUARTER  line,  209,  216-7,  225, 
242,  269-71,  344  ;  at  Trafalgar, 
311-2 

Quarters,  41-2,  58-9,  62,  69-70 


RAKING,  170,  221 

Ralegh,   Sir  Walter,   27  et  seg., 

5° 
Rear-concentration,  143-4, 145  #., 

180,   221,   226,   238,   249,  263, 

289,    293,    310,   313-9,   330-3, 

339-41 
Repeating   ships,    142,   199,  243, 

271,  305  «.,  308,  344 
Reserve,  Corps  de,  205,  214,  219, 

221,   227,   241,   243,   269,  272, 

2?6,   33  i,   335>   345-     See  also 

Equalising  and  Quitting  the  line 
Reserve   squadrons,  7,  12,  50-1, 

67,  71 
Retreat,    order    of,  94    and     «., 

165.     See  also  Dispersing 
Rockets  as  signals,  163  n. 
Rodney,  Lord,  184-5,  209,  211-3  ; 

Additional  Instructions  used  by, 

225,  227  «.,  228  «.,  236-7,  255- 

62,  284-5,  287 
Rooke,  Admiral  Sir  George,  187, 

195-9,  207 
Rupert,    Prince,     111-2,   115-7; 

Instructions  of,  129-30,   133-6, 

159;?.,  169 


SHIPS 
Russell,  Admiral  Edward,  Earl  of 

Orford,  175  etseg.,  187-96, 233  n. 
Ruyter,  Admiral  Michiel  de,  87, 

119,  156  n. 


SAILING    order,    see    Order     of 

sailing 

Sailors  serving  ashore,  37,  56 
Sandwich,     Edward    Mountagu, 

Earl  of,  82, 107-9,  1 1 1-2|  165 
Saumarez,  Admiral  Lord  de,  262 
Scouts,  see  Cruisers 
Sealed  orders,  38 
Seamen  gunners,  35,  41 
Ship-money  fleets,  76-7 
Ships,  lists  of,   20-2,    65-6,   71, 
166 

Achille,  352 

Agamemnon,     301,      303-4 
311  n. 

Anne  Royal,  63,  65 

Assurance,  81 

Bahama,  352 

Belleisle,  294,  300,  304,  357 

Bellerophon,  300,  304,  305  «., 

357 

Britannia,  195,  354 
Bucentaure,  309,  351 
Colossus,  300-1,  303-6,  352, 

357 

Conqueror,  299,  305  ».,  35 1  n. 
Defence,  295,  301,  303-4 
Defiance,  305  «. 
Dreadnought     (1578),     65  ; 

(1805),  354 

Euryalus,  305  n.,  308-9 
Leviathan,  304,  351  «.  , 
Marlborough,  253 
Mars,  300-1,  303-6,  357 
Neptune,  351  n. 
Orion,  301-2,  304-5 
Pembroke,  169 
Polyphemus,  304 
Prince,  354 
Prince  of  Wales,  322 
Queen  Charlotte,  252 
Redoutable,  309 
Revenge,  298,  311  n. 
Royal  Catherine,  169 
Royal  Charles,  in,  128-9 
Royal  James, 


INDEX 


365 


SHIPS 
S  h  ips — continued 

Royal  Sovereign,  300,  357 

St.  George,  264 

Santa  Ana,  309 

Santfsima  Trinidad,  309-10 

Shannon,  225 

Superb,  290 

Swiftsure,  352 

Te^meraire,    300,    308,     310, 

357 

Vanguard,  287 
Victory,  293,  299,  300,    305, 

307-8,  357 
Shot-holes,  62,  69 
Shovell,  Admiral  Sir  Clowdisley, 

195,  198  n. 

Sidmouth,  Lord,  292,  295 
Sign  (for  signal),  82 
Signal   books,    introduction     of, 

233  and  n,  234  and  «. 
Signal  officers,  216,  299 
Signals,  early  forms  of,   10,    38, 
54-8,    73 ;     improvements    in, 
142,    152    n.,    155   ».,    163  »., 
233,  et  seg.,  254  n. ;  numerical, 

235 

Slinging  yards,  70 
Smoke,  tactical  value  of,  8,  10, 15, 

16 
Soldiers  at  sea,  35,  37,  41,   53, 

56,  59,  69  ;  as  admirals,  29-30, 

49.  73-6,  96 
Spain,  orders  adopted  from,  18, 

33».,  4i»- 
Spanish  Armament,  the   (1790), 

253 
Squadronal    organisation,    50-1, 

55,   65-7,    73-4,    85-7,    186-9, 

193-4,  322 

Stanhope,  Vice-Admiral,  322 
Station,  changing,  218,  226,  243, 

276  ;   keeping,   222,   224,   228, 

See  also  Line,  quitting  the 
Stinkballs,  11 
Strickland,    Admiral   Sir   Roger, 

169 
Sub-squadrons,  50-1,  65-7,  85,  87, 

322-3.     See  also  Divisions 


TACKING     in    succession, 
signal  for,  113,  127-8 


first 


WEATHER- GAGE 

Tactical     exercises,     209,     253, 

285  ». 

Tactics,  principles  of,  283-4,  286. 
See     also     Concentration, 
Confusing,  Containing,  Mu- 
tual support 
Oscillations  in,  178,  213 
Dutch,  50,   66-7,   73,   85-7, 

97-8,  114,  118-20,313 
French,    185,   258-9,   267-8, 

285-6 
Spanish,    267-8.      See   also 

Chaves,  Alonso  de 
Treatises     on,    see     Hoste, 
Morogues,  Clerk,  Grenier, 
Knowles 
Tangier,  168 
Telegraphing,  254  n. 
Tobacco  smoking,  37 
Torrington,  Admiral  Arthur  Her- 
bert,   Earl  of,   141,   177,   181, 
187,  236 

Toulouse,  Comte  de,  196 
Tourville,  Marshal  de,  179-181 
Transports,  71 

Tromp,  Admiral  Marten  Har- 
pertszoon,  83-7,  93-4  ;  orders 
of,  91 

Tromp,  Admiral  Cornells  Mar- 
ten szoon,  1 1 8,  156  n. 


VAN,    concentration    on,   142-5, 

154  n. 

Vane,  Sir  Harry,  93 
Vernon,  Admiral,  205-7,  210;  his 

Additional    Instructions,   214- 

216 
Villeneuve,    Admiral,    264,    286, 

308-9,  312-3,  342  «. 


WALSH,    Lieutenant    John,    his 

signal  book,  253 
Warren,  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Peter, 

285  n. 
Weapons  for  close  quarters,  n, 

15 

Weather-gage,  8,  15, 16,  23-4,  62, 
68,  102,  114,  154,  238 


366 


INDEX 


WEFT 

waft      or      wheft, 


89, 


Weft 

99 

Wimbledon,  see  Cecil 
Wing  squadrons,  18-24,  73 
With,      Admiral       Witte       de, 

86 
Wren,  Ur.  Mathew,  F.R.S.,  133, 

138-9 


ZANTE 

YORK,  James,  Duke  of,  82  ;  his 
instructions,  110-28,  133-63, 
177  ;  his  school,  134-5,  178, 
338  ;  end  of  his  career,  140 


ZAMORANO,  Roderigo,  4 
Zante,  164,  167 


THE  NAVY  RECORDS  SOCIETY 


PATRON 
H.R.H.  THE  PRINCE  OF  WALES,  K.G.,  K.T.,  K.P. 

PRESIDENT 
EARL  SPENCER,  K.G. 


THE  NAVY  RECORDS  SOCIETY,  which  has  been  estab- 
lished for  the  purpose  of  printing  rare  or  unpublished 
works  of  naval  interest,  aims  at  rendering  accessible  the 
sources  of  our  naval  history,  and  at  elucidating  questions 
of  naval  archaeology,  construction,  administration,  organi- 
sation and  social  life. 

The  Society  has  already  issued  : — 

In  1894  :  Vols.  I.  and  II.  State  Papers  relating  to  the 
Defeat  of  tJie  Spanish  Armada,  Anno  1588.  Edited  by 
Professor  J.  K.  Laughton.  (30^.) 

In  1895  :  Vol.  III.  Letters  of  Lord  Hood,  1781-82. 
Edited  by  Mr.  David  Hannay.  (None  available?) 

Vol.  IV.  Index  to  James's  Naval  History ',  by  Mr.  C.  G. 
Toogood.  Edited  by  the  Hon.  T.  A.  Brassey.  (\2s.  6d.} 

Vol.  V.  Life  of  Captain  StepJien  Martin,  1666-1740. 
Edited  by  Sir  Clements  R.  Markham.  (None  available.} 

In  1896:  Vol.  V\.  Journal  of  Rear- Admiral  Bartholomew 
James,  1752-1828.  Edited  by  Professor  J.  K.  Laughton 
and  Commander  J.  Y.  F.  Sulivan.  (IQJ.  6d.} 

Vol.  VII.  Hollond's  Discourses  of  tlie  Navy,  1638  and 
1658.  Edited  by  Mr.  J.  R.  Tanner.  (12*.  6d.) 


Vol.  VIII.  Naval  Accounts  and  Inventories  in  the  Reign 
of  Henry  VII.  Edited  by  Mr.  M.  Oppenheim.  (los.  6d.} 

In  1897:  Vol.  IX.  Journal  of  Sir  George  Rooke. 
Edited  by  Mr.  Oscar  Browning,  (los.  6d.} 

Vol.  X.  Letters  and  Papers  relating  to  the  War  with 
France,  1512-13.  Edited  by  M.  Alfred  Spont.  (los.  6d.} 

Vol.  XI.  Papers  relating  to  the  Spanish  War,  1585-87. 
Edited  by  Mr.  Julian  Corbett.  (los.  6d.} 

In  1898  :  Vol.  XII.  Journals  and  Letters  of  Admiral 
of  the  Fleet  Sir  Thomas  Byam  Martin,  1773-1854  (Vol.  II.). 
Edited  by  Admiral  Sir  R.  Vesey  Hamilton.  (See  XXIV.) 

Vol.  XIII.  Papers  relating  to  the  First  DutcJi  War, 
1652-54  (Vol.  I.).  Edited  by  Mr.  S.  R.  Gardiner,  (icw.  6d.} 

Vol.  XIV.  Papers  relating  to  the  Blockade  of  Brest, 
1803-5  (Vol.  I.).  Edited  by  Mr.  J.  Leyland.  (See  XXI.) 

In  1899  :  Vol.  XV.  History  of  the  Russian  Fleet  during 
the  Reign  of  Peter  the  Great.  By  a  Contemporary  English- 
man. Edited  by  Admiral  Sir  Cyprian  Bridge.  (IQJ.  6d.} 

Vol.  XVI.  Logs  of  the  Great  Sea  Fights,  1794-1805 
(Vol.  I.).  Edited  by  Vice- Admiral  Sir  T.  Sturges  Jackson. 
(See  XVIII.) 

Vol.  XVII.  Papers  relating  to  the  First  Dutch  War; 
1652-54  (Vol.  II.).  Edited  by  Mr.  S.  R.  Gardiner.  (IQJ.  6d.} 

In  1900:  Vol.  XVIII.  Logs  of  the  Great  Sea  Fights 
(Vol.  II.).  Edited  by  Sir  T.  S.  Jackson.  (Two  vols.  255.) 

Vol.  XIX.  Journals  and  Letters  of  Sir  T.  By  am 
Martin  (Vol.  III.).  Edited  by  Sir  R.  Vesey  Hamilton. 
(See  XXIV.) 

In  1901  :  Vol.  XX.  The  Naval  Miscellany  (Vol.  I.). 
Edited  by  the  Secretary.  (15^.) 

Vol.  XXI.  Papers  relating  to  the  Blockade  of  Brest, 
1803-5  (Vol.  II.).  Edited  by  Mr.  John  Leyland.  (Two 
vols. 


In  1902:  Vols.  XXII.  and  XXIII.  The  Naval  Tracts 
of  Sir  William  Monson  (Vols.  I.  and  II.).  Edited  by 
Mr.  M.  Oppenheim.  (Two  vols.  25^.) 

Vol  XXIV.  Journals  and  Letters  of  Sir  T.  By  am 
Martin  (Vol.  I.).  Edited  by  Sir  R.  Vesey  Hamilton. 
{Three  vols.  3U.  6d.) 

In  1903  :  Vol.  XXV.  Nelson  and  the  Neapolitan 
Jacobins.  Edited  by  Mr.  H.  C.  Gutteridge.  (\2s.  6d.) 

Vol.  XXVI.  A  Descriptive  Catalogue  of  the  Naval 
MSS.  in  the  Pepysian  Library  (Vol.  I.).  Edited  by  Mr. 
J.  R.  Tanner.  (15*.) 

In  1904  :  Vol.  XXVII.  A  Descriptive  Catalogue  of  the 
Naval  MSS.  in  the  Pepysian  Library  (Vol.  II.).  Edited 
by  Mr.  J.  R.  Tanner.  (i2s.  6d.} 

Vol.  XXVIII.  The  Correspondence  of  Admiral  John 
Markham,  1801-7.  Edited  by  Sir  Clements  R.  Markham. 


In  1905:  Vol.  XXIX.  Fighting  Instructions,  1530- 
1816.  Edited  by  Mr.  Julian  Corbett. 

To  follow  : 

Vol.  XXX.  Papers  relating  to  the  First  Dutch  War, 
1652-54  (Vol.  III.).  Edited  by  Mr.  C.  T.  Atkinson. 

Other  works  in  preparation,  in  addition  to  further 
volumes  of  Mr.  Tanner's  Descriptive  Catalogue,  of  Sir 
William  Monson  's  Tracts,  of  The  First  Dutch  War,  which 
will  be  edited  by  Mr.  C.  T.  Atkinson,  and  of  The  Naval 
Miscellany,  are  The  Journal  of  Captain  (afterwards  Sir 
John)  Narbrough,  1672-73,  to  be  edited  by  Professor  J.  K. 
Laughton  ;  Official  Documents  illustrating  the  Social  Life 
and  Internal  Discipline  of  the  Navy  in  the  XVIIIth 
Century,  to  be  edited  by  Professor  J.  K.  Laughton  ; 
Select  Correspondence  of  the  great  Earl  of  Chatham  and 
his  Sons,  to  be  edited  by  Professor  J.  K.  Laughton  ; 
Select  Correspondence  of  Sir  Charles  Middleton,  after- 
wards Lord  Barliam,  1778-1806,  to  be  edited  by 

B   B 


Professor  J.  K.  Laughton  ;  Reminiscences  of  Commander 
James  Anthony  Gardner,  1775-1806,  to  be  edited  by  Sir 
R.  Vesey  Hamilton  ;  and  a  Collection  of  Naval  Songs  and 
Ballads,  to  be  edited  by  Professor  C.  H.  Firth  and  Mr. 
Henry  Newbolt. 

Any  person  wishing  to  become  a  Member  of  the 
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May  1905. 


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