Full text of "Final report of the Select Subcommittee to Investigate the United States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia ("the Iranian Green Light Subcommittee"), with minority views : report prepared for the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives"

Y 4, IN 8/16: IR 1/4

104th Congress
2d Session

INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

FINAL REPORT OF THE
SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE TO

INVESTIGATE

THE UNITED STATES ROLE

IN mANMN ARMS TRANSFERS TO

CROATS AND BOSNIA

("THE IRANIAN GREEN UGHT

SUB COMMITT EE")

REPORT

PREPARED FOR THE

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APPROVED: OCTOBER 10, 1996

WITH MINORITY VIEWS

SUBMITTED: OCTOBER 26, 1996

DECLASSIFIED PURSUANT TO LETTER DATED DECEMBER 20, 1996

FROM WILLIAM DANVERS, SPECIAL ASSISTANT

TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR DIRECTOR

FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS (NSC)

'*fr sv

m 1 g f997

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations of the

House of Representatives

^^^^^s^^ I INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

nNAL REPORT OF THE

SELECT SUBCOMMiniE TO INVESTIGATE

THE UNITED STATES ROLE

IN IRANIAN ARMS TRANSFERS

TO CROATIA AND BOSNIA

C^THE IRANIAN GREEN UGHT

SUBCOMMITTEE^')

WITH MINORITY VIEWS

HENRY J. HYDE, CHAIRMAN
LEE H. HAMILTON, RANKING DEMOCRATIC MEMBER

REPORT

PREPARED FOR THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OCTOBER 10, 1996
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
37-510 CC WASfflNGTON : 1997

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402

ISBN 0-16-054070-4

SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS

HENRY J. HYDE, minou. Chairman
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana, Ranking Democratic Member

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska HOWARD L. HERMAN, California

DAN BURTON, Indiana ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
JAN MEYERS ^ Kansas

Richard J. POCKER, Chief Coungel

John I. MILUS, Staff Director

Richard MELTZER, Minority Chief Counsel

Michelle Maynard, Minority Staff Director

^Representative Sam Brownback (RrKS) was initially chosen to serve on the Select Sob-
oonunittee. Congresmonal scheduling, however, truncated his service. Full Committee Chairman
Benjamin A. Oilman appointed Representative Jan Meyers (R-KS) to satisfy the Subcommittee's
complement of RepubUcan members.

(II)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, O.C. 20S04

December 20, 1996

(U) TKis letter responds to the Select Subconmiittee' s request,
contained in letters from Chairman Hyde of October 11, 1996, and
Mr. Hamilton of October 15, 1996, that the executive branch
review for classification the Subcommittee's majority and
minority reports. The final version of the majority report was
provided on October 23. The final version of the minority report
is dated October 25. Supplemental information to these reports
was provided subsequent to both final reports being received. On
November 6, the executive branch also received from Chairman Hyde
a request to review for classification a 26-page letter to the
Department of Justice signed by the Republican members of the
Select Subcommittee. As these letters correctly note the reports
are lenqthy (approximately 600 pages) and contain a great deal of
classified information.

(U) In response to these requests NSC staff distributed these
materials to designated representatives of the Departments of
State, Defense, including component elements, and the Central
Intelligence Agency. In order to maximize knowledge, save time,
and in the interest of the addressing the majority and minority
reports at the same time, the executive branch treated these
requests as a single request. Classification/Declassification
experts from each of these entities have now coii^>leted their
review by portion marking each paragraph and footnote.
Additionally, we have bracketed the specific portions of the text
that are classified within each marked paragraph or footnote.

(U) The executive branch reviewed the document for classified
infonnation only. The executive branch review did not address
the substantive content of these documents. Neither does this
letter. Further, this declassification review does not
constitute concurrence in the public release of any declassified
information enclosed.

__^_ Sue to the length

voluminous nature of the classified material contained in them.
Including sources and methods of intelligence that directly

(III)

Inform and provide for the safety of U.S. forces in Bosnia, the
executive branch is not in a position to offer substitute
language. _This would require rewriting th e majority of both
reports

(U) Executive branch review of the letter to the Department of
Justice referenced above, indicated that one sentence on page 18
could reveal an intelligence source or method. With the
inclusion of this sentence, the letter would be classified TOP
SECRET/GAMMA. With the deletion of this sentence, the letter
would be unclassified. The "classified attachment* to the letter
should be marked TOP SECRET/GAMMA.

(U) The text of this letter is also being sent to Mr. Van Dusen.

Sincerely,

William Danvers

Special Assistant to the President

and Senior Director for

Legislative Affairs

Mr. Patrick Murray

Professional Staff Member

Committee on International Relations

Room 2170 RHOB

Washington, D.C. 29515-6128

Enclosure: a/s

CONTENTS

SECTION ONE: BACKGROUND

Page

Chapter 1: Origins and Phirpose of the Select Subcommittee 1

The Uncovering of the Iranian Green Light Policy by the Press 2

The Congressional Response 11

The Genesis of the Select Subcommittee 15

Chapter 2: The Dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Early Years of the Balkans

War 18

Chapter 3: The Public Policy of the Clinton Administration on the Bosnian

Arms Embargo: Denial and Deception 23

The Administration's Sea Legs: The Idealism of Assertive Multi-
lateralism 23

International Political Reality: The Europeans Say "No" 25

Denial of the Iranian Green Light Policy 34

Chapter 4: The Public Policy of the Clinton Administration on Iran 40

Recognition of the Problem: Iran 40

The Policy Response to the Iranian Threat 41

SECTION TWO: THE INVESTIGATION AND ITS FINDINGS

Chapter 5: Conduct of the Subconmnittee Investigation 44

Testimony 44

Acquisition of Classified and Non-Classified Federal Government Docu-
ments 46

Chapter 6: Administration Record of Cooperating with the Select Subcommit-
tee 48

Agency Compliance 49

The Prospect of Subpoenas 62

The Adnunistration's Classification Game 63

Chapter 7: The Investigation by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board . 65

Origins of the lOB Investigation 65

Conduct of the lOB Investigation 67

Findings of th» lOB 69

Limitations of the lOB Report 71

Chapter 8: Evolution and Implementation of the Iranian Green Light Policy ... 75

No Question: "We Have a Policy" (1991-April 1994) 76

The Question is Orchestrated (July 1993-April 1994) 80

Getting Acquainted
Without Our Fingerprints

The Question is Posed 92

Fishing in Troubled Waters
The Home Office Fails to Distinguish Itself
"Exactly Where We Want to Be*^
"Mine Shaft Canary"
"Hunker Down"
"Walk it Back"

Chapter 9: Allegations of U.S. Officials Facilitating Iranian Arms Shipments . 137

[XXXXJOOOCX] Missile Episode 139

Tuzla Mysteiy Flights 145

Chapter 10: The Iranian Green Li^t and Covert Action 147

Introduction 147

Overview of the Legal Regime Governing Covert Action 147

Application of Covert Law 154

An Invitation to More Restrictions? 156

Noncooperation in Congressional Investigative Functions 158

Pag«

Chapter 11: Conflicting Testimony and Questions to Be Resolved 159

SECTION THREE: POLICY RAMIFICATIONS

Chapter 12: The Green Light and the Iranian Foothold in Europe: Part

I— Croatia 161

The Bush Administration's Refusal to Open the Door to Iranians 162

The Iranian Green Light and the Growth of Iranian Influence and the

Terrorist Threat in Croatia 164

Chapter 13: The Green Light and the Iranian Foothold in Europe: Part

n— Bosnia 172

Before the Green Lu^t 172

After the Green Light 174

The Green Light and the Dayton Accords: An Expedient Becomes an

Impediment 179

Chapter 14: The Legacy of the Green light in Bosnia, Today and Tomorrow ... 188

Diminishing Hopes 188

Izetbegovic and the Radicalization of the Muslim Political Leadership 189

The Iranian and Foreign Radical Islamic Presence and Influence Toaay ... 194

The Iranian Green Light and the Future of Bosnia: Worrying Signs 199

SECTION FOUR: CONCLUSIONS
Chapter 15: Conclusions 200

APPENDICES

A. Budget, Biographies, and Acknowledgments 211

B. Correspondence 219

C. Chart Detailing Detected Islamic Arms Donations and Purchases Flown
to Croatia for Transshipment to the Bosnian Muslims — May 1994 — Decem-
ber 1995 (SECRET)

— Ambassador Peter Galbraith's Memorandum to the File — May 6, 1994
(redacted)— (UNCLASSIFIED) 220

MINORITY VIEWS 223

IBKHJUnUeHh
' MO*AM>LiaMAH

Congress of the United States ^h*™**

House of Representatives
Committee on International Relations

&bc> SaksmmittM ea t&< Vtutti Sutta Role in
trMMum Ami Trausfen to Croatia atdBotnU

Washington, D.C 20515
Novembar 7, 1996

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman

Chairman

Committee on International Relations

21 70 Raybum House Office Building

Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with H.Res 41 6 (f). directing the Select Subcommittee to transmit
a report to the Committee on International Relations not later than six months after the
date of the Resolution, please find enclosed a copy of the Select Subcommittee's
Report, together with Minority Views. The Report was approved by the Select
Subcommittee during an executive session on October 10, 1996.

I urge the Committee to review the Report carefully for matters that the
Committee may wish to pursue further in the next Congress. I also believe the
Committee should continue the Subcommittee's efforts to get the Executive Branch
to declassify as much as much of the Report as possible without endangering
legitimately classified information. Assuming the Administration is reasortable in its
approach to declassification, it would be of particular value to the American people if
the Committee were able to work from the redacted classified version to prepare a
revised, unclassified version for public release.

Sincerely,

(UndasiKled when detached froni Classiflad Report)

SECTION ONE: BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 1

ORIGINS AND PURPOSES OF THE SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE

On April 5, 1996, the Los Angeles Times ran a front-page article by James Risen
and Doyle McManus that led with the sentence:

Presidfcnt Clinton secretly gave a green light to covert Iranian arms
shipments into Bosnia in 1994 despite a United Nations arms embargo that
the United States was pledged to uphold and the Administration's own policy
of isolating Tehran globally as a supporter of tenorism, according to senior
Administration officials and other sources/

This article was the first of several extraordinary articles that spelled out in detail, o.io with
what turned out to t>e excellent sourcing, a |x>licy decision that the Clinton Administration
had carefully guarded for two years - forbidding reference to it in writing, denying it to the
press, deflecting Cortgress, hoodwinking allies, and even trying to keep it secret from the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Secretary of Defense. The
decision came to be referred to by higher ranking Administratkin officials as the "wink and
nod,* the blind eye,* and other terms, but the one that seemed to have stuck was given
near the time of the decisnn's inceptnn by one of its intellectual authors: the 'green light.'^

The articles authoritatively spelled out the advantages Iran had reaped from the
green light policy, the confusion it had caused within the Executive Branch, and the other
policy options that had been overlooked or rejected by the Administratbn as being too
difficult

The congressksnal response was one of incredulity. Members were shocked to
learn that the Administration had chosen to give Iran an unprecedented foothokj in an
extremely unstable and vulnerable part of Europe. It was equally disturbing that for two
years the Administratkm had purposely hkJden from Congress, US allies, and the American
people its highly questionat)ie, major US poTicy shift

* James Risen and Doyle McManus. US. Qk'd Iranian Arms for Bosnia . QffirJals
Say. Los Angeles Times. Apr. 5. 1996. at 1 .

' First used in writing by US Ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith on May 12.
1994 in a Memorandum for the File (hereinafter 'Galbraith Memorandum*).

(1)

There had been occasional press reports before that might have exposed the policy,
earlier, however. Congress continued to believe the Administration's denials of the Iranian
green light policy. Congress found it unlikely that the Administration would adopt such a
policy that was inconsistent and incompatible with the Administration's well-known and
vigorously championed policies regarding the former Yugoslavia and Iran. Also, given the
long-settled US policy of isolating Iran both economically and politically, Congress refused
to believe that the Administration could have such bad judgment as to invite Iran, the
world's largest exporter of terrorism, into Europe, much less into an area so ripe for
fundamentalist exploitation as the Balkans.

The thought was that the Administration would surely inforni Congress if it intended
a major policy shift towards Iran and Bosnia. In retrospect. Congress cannot be blamed
for presuming to trust the Administration's trijthfulness, consistency, and strategic acumen.

In any case, when the story of the green light policy broke in April 1 996, there were
calls from both houses of Congress for an investigation; since then, several committees
have looked into the issue, emphasizing aspects relevant to their specific areas of
oversight. For example, both intelligence oversight committees - the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - have
examined the green light policy with an emphasis on its intelligence-related issues. Also,
on May 8, 1996, the House approved Resolution 416, establishing a select subcommittee
of the House Intemational Relations Committee and gave it a broad charter to investigate
all aspects of the policy and implenientation. This sutxnmmittee, the Select Subcommittee
to Investigate the United States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia (also
known as the 'Iranian Green Light* Sut)committee) conducted an extensive investigatren
of the green light policy over the ensuing months and presents its findings and
recommendations in this report.

The Uncovering of the Iranian Green Light Policy by the Press

As early as May 1994, allegations began to surface that Iran, with some sort of US
complicity, was covertly transferring weapons to Bosnia, despite a United Nations (UN)
amts embargo on the former Yugoslavia. Each time the Administration issued denials of
US complicity and managed to keep the story in the botUe.*

* The Administration's polk:y of denial and deceptk>n on this issue is outlined in
detail in Chapter 3.

Unfortunately for those seeking to maintain the cover-up. James Risen and Doyle
McManus of the Los Angeles Times became aware of these hidden policy missteps. From
April through July 1996, they wrote a series of thirteen investigative articles exposing the
missteps with incredible detail to large numbers of well-placed Administration officials who
were willing to speak to them on a 'not for attribution' basis/

Because the Risen/McManus articles played such an important role in uncovering
the green light policy and its consequences, their findings are summarized below.

Background

The Clinton White House was not the first Administration to face the question of
Iranian arms shipments into Bosnia through Croatia, but its response was the opposit<=> of

* The following is a chronological listing of the Los Angeles Times (hereinafter
"LAT") articles:

Risen and McManus. U S Qk'd Iranian Arms for Bosnia , LAT, Apr. 5, 1996, at 1.

Risen, Administration Defend s Its QK of Bosnian Arms, LAT, Apr. 6, 1996, at 1.

Risen, Gin grich Criticizes Clinton Over Bosnia , LAT, Apr. 11, 1996, at 12.

Risen and McManus, US Envoy May Have Aided Arms Convoy to Bosnia , LAT.
Apr. 17. 1996, at 1.

Risen and McManus, US Didn't Anticipate Wider Iran Bosnia Role . LAT. Apr. 23.
1996. at 1.

Risen, Administration Defends Bosnian Arms Policy . LAT, Apr. 24. 1996, at 17.

Risen and McManus. Study of Other Bosnian Amns Sources Told , LAT, Apr. 26.
1996. at 22.

Risen and McManus. Democrats Join Critics of Bosnia Amns Secrecy . LAT, May
2. 1996, at 1.

Risen and McManus. Terrorist Risk to Americans In Croatia is L inked to Iran .
May 21. 1996. at 1.

Risen. Ex-Envoy Says Iran-Bosni a 1 ink Was Worth Risk. LAT. May 22. 1996. at
1.

Risen. Clinton Defends Arms-to-Bosnia Policy , LAT. May 24. 1996, at 26.

Risen. US CquM Have Stifled Arms to Bosnia, Envoy Says . LAT. May 31. 1996.
atl.

Risen and McManus. US Had Opttons to Let Bosnia Get Amns. Avokl Iran . LAT.
July 14. 1996. atl.

the prior administration's. In September 1992, the Bush Administration discovered that
Iran was attempting to smuggle arms on board a 747 airplane to Bosnia through Croatia
in violation of the arms embargo and, according to former Secretary of State Lawrence
Eagleburger. "raised hell." The Administration acted decisively and had the 747 and the
weapons seized. According to Secretary Eagleburger, "We made it very clear that we were
adamantly opposed to this going on. There was no question in the Bush Administration
of where we were on this subject."*

Throughout the presidential campaign of 1992. Governor Clinton forcefully and
repeatedly criticized President Bush for his consistent enforcement of the arms embargo
and called for the United States to arm the Bosnians. The new Administration, upon taking
office in 1993, found itself hamstrung. Unfortunately for President Clinton, the same policy
constraints that faced President Bush ~ unwillingness on the part of the American public
to commit troops and allied opposition to lifting the embargo -- equally applied to him. By
the spring of 1994, Clinton's fmstrations were at a peak.*

While Clinton felt compelled by circumstances to follow President Bush's much-
criticized path, Iran was also chafing under the policies of containment consistently
followed by the Bush Administration and, until the green light policy, under President
Clinton. Iran's radical Islamic government was eager to increase its influence in the
Balkans and saw the West's refusal to provide weapons to the Bosnian government as an
opportunity. Though Iran had smuggled a small, insignificant amount of weapons to the
Bosnian government prior to the outbreak of hostilities between Bosnian Croats and
Muslims, 'A was their subsequent truce and creation of the Bosnian Federation that set the
stage for Clinton's green light policy decisions.

The Proposal

On April 27, 1994, Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic entered the US embassy
in Zagreb with a potentially exptosive request: Would Washington accede to Croatia's
plans to accept Iran's offer to open up a weapons pipeline from Iran into Bosnia? The
Croatians were split over the question, having yielded to the Bush Administration's
demands in 1992 that weapons shipments be stopped, and were seeking instnjctions.
Granic was giving the US advance notice that Croatian Presklent Franjo Tudjman planned
formally to ask US Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith how the United States would

• LAT. A|)f. 5. 1996.

• LAT. July 14. 1996.

respond to new arms shipnnents from Iran. Granic himself was against the idea, a minority
view in the Croatian government, but was following his orders to seek Washington's
reaction.

Ambassador Galbraith had been impatient with the Clinton Administration for not
doing nrK>re to aid the Bosnian cause, and was strongly in favor of the US allowing the new
arms shipments. Risen noted that Galbraith had earned his reputation as an activist as a
staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and had sometimes rankled the
career officials within the US government in his efforts to expand his role as the first US
Ambassador to Croatia. It is clear that Galbraith supported the pro-weapons pipeline
faction within the Croatian government, the most prominent member being Gojko Susak,
Croatia's Defense Minister and Tudjman's right-hand man.'

Though the Administration thought the green light decision "obvious" and
insignificant at the time, a senior US diplomat would later acknowledge that the pipeline
probably would not have been established if the United States had opposed it forcefully."
Peter Galbraith would later testify. * I can say that had we in a very, very forceful way made
it clear that we would not tolerate the flow of arms to the Bosnians, they probably would
not have done it When we did not object, they proceeded to go ahead and do it."*

The Decision

While most diplomatic exchanges require days, if not weeks or months, to
coordinate and yet, this request for instructions reached President Clinton in a matter of
hours. The first recipient of the cable was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alexander
Vershbow, who refen^ the question to Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, who were travelling with Clinton to Nixon's funeral
in Yorba Linda, California.

Talbott and Lake agreed on the solution: Do nothing. Galbraith was to give the
coded response of 'no instructions,' whk:h wouM tell the Croatians that the US would not
act to stop the shipments. Lake asked for 20 minutes of Preskient Clinton's time and was
ushered into Clinton's office atx>ard Air Force One. James Risen described the meeting

'Id.

•LAT. May 31. 1996.

•Id.

as follows: 'Lake ran [the President) through the pros and cons and said, This is our
recommendation . . . ." And he said 'yes' a senior ofTicial recounted. There was little
discussion and no serious debate. It seemed like 'an obvious choice.' the official said."^"

No other officials even at the highest levels of the US government were consulted
before the green light was given to the Iranian arms transfers. In addition, the Central
Intelligence Agency, whose purpose is to protect national security by evaluating information
on political and military developments abroad, was never offlcially notified of the policy."

As a result of this closed and truncated decision-making process, US offidals would
later admit they gave little thought back in 1994 to the chance that Iran's political and
military presence would grow in Bosnia as it did. A senior Administration official would
concede they did not focus on the problem until the prospect of US troops going in was
raised in 1995."

T he Alternati ves

For the first two weeks following the breaking of the story, the Administration spin
was that "there were no altematives" to allowing the Iranian arms transfers, and that the
decisk>n was "obvious." Further research showed, however, that far from being forced"
into approving the arms transfers, the White House had actively rejected multiple calls for
having nations friendly to the United States supply weapons to the Bosnians. The
Administration rejected these equally effective alternative means of arming the Bosnians
even though they would have negated the chance of increasing Iranian influence in
Bosnia."

The first such suggestion was made by Richard Holbrooke several nrtonths after the
green light decision. In the fall of 1994. Holbrooke sought a legal opinion from State
Department attorneys asking what diplomatic approaches to friendly nations coukj t>e
made without triggering US covert action laws requiring Congress to be notified.
Holbrooke thought that the unequal battlefield conditions feced by the Muslims in Bosnia

'• IJ^T. July 14. 1996.

''id.

" LAT. Apr. 23. 1996.

" LAT. July 14. 1996.

could be eased if friendly nations would covertly supply the weapons with American
encouragement.

When news of this proposal reached the upper levels of govemment, Holbrooke was
rebuffed. According to Risen, Anthony Lake thought the idea was "too risky,' and
Secretary of State Warren Christopher was also opposed." Indeed, Risen would write
that, 'senior administration officials opposed Holbrooke's plan because they feared that
covert smuggling by friendly nations woukl make it too obvious the United States was
encouraging the violation of a UN arms embargo against Bosnia.'**

In a July 1996 article. Risen and McManus would document other altematives to the
failed green light policy that were rejected by the Clinton Administration. They would note
that at least three times between 1993 and 1995, discussions were held about asking
friendly countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan to move weapons and
support to the Bosnians. The nxxjel for such aid existed before in the 1980s when Saudi
Arabia served as the conduit between the US and the anti-Soviet Afghan insurgency.

Galbraith hinj gelf had suggeste^^ using friendly intermediaries in late 1993. He
reportedly asked theMHHHBBiplin his embassy how much it would cost to begin
L covert o perqtipn to'aid the Bosnians, wondering if $250 million would be enough.*' The
jVwas surprised by the request, advis e^jGalbraith that §y ch an actkjn would
be illegal without formal authorization, and wamedf^WM^W Wp n Washington that
Galbraith was thinking along these lines, /^i^ ^' -

Th e Consequences

Among the negative consequences of the green light policy and how it was
implemented, as kientified by Risen arKl McManus. are the confusion it caused within the
US government, the resultant iiKrease in Irania.n influence in the former Yugoslavia, and
concerns that, beneath the Administratkxi's obfuscatk>n of the polk:y. there may have been
an Illegal covert actkm.

A. Policy ConfiiskMi

"Id.

" LAT. Apr. 26. 1996.

" LAT. July 14. 1996.

There was considerable confusion among Administration officials throughout the
whole process. Very little time elapsed and even less thought took place from the time the
original query was made to Galbraith until Lake met with the President on Air Force One.
Even after receiving the "no instructions' instruction, Galbraith himself was still unclear
what action to take. According to Risen, Galbraith called Jenonne Walker, the National
Security Council's chief European expert, who told him Lake had indicated he was to stick
to "no instructions," but she added, Tony was smiling when he said it.""

Not only were other appropriate agencies of the US government not consulted, they
were not advised of the decisk^n once it was made. N QJlber the CIA nor the Pentagon
were informed of the policy change. Accordingly, the j^PIHIBHIIB^in Zagreb
continued to be under the impressbn that the official policy of the United States was to
support the arms embargo, the same positk)n which Assistant Secretary of State Talt>ott
would also lead CIA Director James Woolsey to believe was still valkj. The CIA continued
to collect informatkjn on embargo busting and became increasingly mystified at the US
government's unwillingness to act on that intelligence. The CIA woukj never be informed,
and, as the evidence grew tfiat Oirecto^VV^plsey had been deliberately kept in the 6atk,
he resigned in December 1994.

B. Increased Iranian Influence

The most troubling consequence of the green light policy was the resultant
exponential expansion of Iranian influence in Bosnia. Risen's sources helped him paint
the folk>wing assessment of Iranian influence before and after the green light

Western intelligence agencies detected several hundred militant Muslim
guerillas from Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other countries in Bosnia as eariy as
1992. offictals sakl, including several "Afghanis," veterans of the CIA-funded
war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. But these were largely
ragtag volunteers, with no readRy apparent command and control from Iran
or anyone else.'*

In 1994. however, a different kind of Iranian was showing up in Bosnia, officials said:

. . . military and dvflian advisors who appeared to have been sent i>y the

"Id.

'• l-AT. Apr. 23. 1996.

Tehran government on well-defined missions. Some were military trainers
who taught the Bosnians how to use the wire-guided antitank missiles Iran
was shipping, one source said. Others helped with logistics and with
weapons factories, according to the Bosnian government.^*

Ambassador Galbraith himself noted that the difference was like night and day.
'Certainly what was being talked about in April 1 994 was something very substantially
greater"^ than what had been shipped by Iran previously. Risen would elat>orate:

From May 1994 to January 1996, the Iranians shipped more than 5,000 tons
of arms to Bosnia through the Croatian pipeline. They provided the largest
portion by far of Bosnia's military hardware - two thirds by official US
estimates. The Iranians delivered mostly small arms and equipment,
including rifles, ammunition, and uniforms but also antitank weapons and
shoulder launched surface-to-air missiles - weapons that could threaten
aircraft, including US aircraft

Other countries 6id supply weapons to Bosnia without US encouragement

But Iran was the largest supplier by far. By early 1995 the Iranian flights

were landing as often as three times a week. The arms pipeline was
managed largely by the Revolutionary Guards, Iran's militant Islamic shock
corps, operating out of the Iranian embassy in Zagreb. Other Revolutk>nary
Guard officers moved to Bosnia to serve as military advisors and trainers.
The Bosnian Government's intelligence servk:e and intemal security forces
soon had Iranian advisors too. To both secular Bosnians and US intelligence
analysts, this was a worrisome trend: creeping Iranian influence in what once
had been a multiethnic, secular state.^

The former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, who had himself worked in
the Balkans for several years as a US diplomat, declared the increase in radical Islamk:
support in Bosnia as a major bksw to the national security of the United States. He referred
to it as the height of insanity. We are inviting Bosnian-Islamic connections with a terrorist

'•Id.

"l-AT.May31.1996.
'^ LAT, July 14. 1996.

state that wishes us as much damage as they [sic] can possibly inflict upon us."'^

Of even nnore concern to the United States and the families of American servicemen
deployed in Bosnia is the terrorist threat that materialized in Bosnia under the green light
policy. Risen gave two examples in his articles of the increase in the terorist threat, but
alluded to having more information than he reported.

In February 1995, NATO troops raided a "ten-orist training school" at which they
arrested eight Bosnian and three Iranian "diplomats,' who quickly invoked diplomatic
immunity and flew back to Iran. Items seized in the raid included bomb devices within
shampoo bottles and children's toys and a training video showing how to ambush a car on
an open highway and to kill its occupants.^

In an even more ominous sign, American embassy officials in Zagreb and Croatia
became aware in 1995 of suspected Hizballah (Party of God) members stalking embassy
personnel and their families. Suspected Iranian terrorists were seen with video cameras
recording Americans as they came and went. Officials feared that an attack was imminent
and one official confirmed the terrorist threafwent right up the scale to levels you would
see in preparation for an attack."'*

C. Possible Illegal Covert Action

The final consequence of the Administration's giving the green light to the Iranian
arms pipeline was the chance that actions taken by US government officials crossed the
legal line from what the Administration terms as passive, i.e., 'no instructions,* to a
concrete act which might reasonably be constnjed by foreign officials as an invitation to
conduct covert action. Under US law, covert action is illegal unless it has been authorized
by the President and reported to Congress.

According to Risen's sources, there were two instances when Administratk>n officials
came objectively dose to the legal line. The first case occurred in May 1994 vAren Special
Envoy to the former Yugoslavia Charles Redman intervened with senior Croatian
government officials to expedite the movement into Bosnia of a blocked convoy that is

" LAT. Apr. 5. 1996.

** LAT. Apr. 23. 1996.

LAT. May 21. 1996.

believed to have carried arms to the Muslim government troops. Redman claims to have
never asked whether arms were being carried, but US officials now acknowledge that
questions could be raised whether the Administration had gone beyond passive support
for the Bosnian cause and taken on a more active role.^^

The second case occurred in September of 1 995 when a shipment of Iranianl
missiles bound for Bosnia was detained in Croatia because the Croatian govejg ment
nervous that the missiles were tipped with chemical warheads.'* Experts fror
the US Army rapidly moved to inspect the missiles, determined that they were not (
chemical or biological warheads, and then permitted them to be delivered into Bosnia.''
Some US officials wer^^ncemed that in this action the US had directly violated the UN
arms embargo.'^! '

The President's Intelligence Oversight Board (lOB) was secretly commissioned on
November 29, 1994 to investigate the green light policy and to determine if any covert
action laws were violated. The lOB's classified report sharply criticized the Administration
for excessive secrecy but determined that notification of Congress was not necessary. The
Administration's actions, according to the lOB. fell within the category of traditional
diplomatic activity." exempt from US covert action laws."

The lOB investigation had the potential to put the matter to rest, but raised
questions of its own. Moreover, the White House, even after receiving the report, failed
to advise Congress of the green light policy. What made the situation worse in the minds
of many in Congress was the decision by the Administration in April 1996, after the story
was out. to bar lOB Chairman Anthony Harrington from sharing the report with Congress
or testifying about it under oath." Suspicions were heightened.

The Congressional Response

*LAT,Apr. 17. 1996.

" LAT. July 14. 1996.

"LAT, May 21, 1996.

»ld.

* LAT. Apr. 17. 1996.

The congressional response to the revelations alx3ut the green light affair was
strong. Senior Democrats joined Republicans in denouncing the Clinton Administration's
failure to consult with or notify Congress of the important change in policy towards Iran and
the arms embargo. It was only this wellspring of bipartisan condemnation that prompted
the Administration to admit that it should have consulted Congress. Undersecretary of
State Peter Tamoff acknowledged that he was unaware of any congressional notification,
and an Administration ofTicial admitted that "there is a growing understanding in the
Administration that in terms of Congress, this could have been handled better.""

In the two years between when the green light policy went into effect and when it
was uncovered, there had been innumerable meetings between Members of Congress and
senior Administration officials discussing policy options on lifting the arms embargo on
Bosnia. The failure of the Administration to mention the green light policy in any of these
discussions can only be intentional.

A week after the green light decision was made, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott
responded to a lengthy list of specific questions on Bosnia that had been submitted by
Republican Senator John Warner. In his letter to Senator Warner, Talbott warned that
lifting the embargo, as many favored in Congress, could lead to an increased Iranian
presence in Bosnia. Taltx>tt did not mention that he had just taken part in a policy decision
that would bring Iranians streaming into the region."

In midsummer 1994. Democratic Senator and Chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, Sam Nunn met with Charles Redman, then chief US negotiator in the Balkans,
to discuss ways of aiding the Bosnian cause. Redman failed to mention the fact that the
Administration had already made the green light decision. "I don't ever recall anybody in
the Administration telling me anything attcut that," noted Nunn after the cover-up came to
light in 1996." Senator Nunn later reflected on the Administration's keeping Congress in
the dark, "It seems to me the question is whether Congress should have been informed.
not so much as a matter of taw but as a matter of comity." ^ In response. Ambassador

»'LAT. May2. 1996.

«ld.

»ld.

Redman could only say, "It never came up."'*

Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole, speaking on the floor of the Senate, observed:

While we read and heard reports that Iran was smuggling arms to the
Bosnians, we did not know the President and his advisers made a conscious
decision to give a green light for Iran to provide arms. Indeed, those of us
who advocated lifting the arms embargo ~ Republicans ana Democrats -
argued that if America did not provide Bosnia with assistance, Iran would be
Bosnia's only option. "

Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott offered another response in defense of the
Administration: Since the press was reporting on Iranian arms shipments. Congress was
properiy informed. Democratic Senator Robert Kerrey sharply rebutted the argument. "Do
you think. Mr. Secretary . . . that Congress getting its information through what really was
half a dozen newspaper accounts in 1994 constitutes knowing more or less what you
knew?"*^ Senator Ken^y also observed that for Congress to do its job properly, it must be
kept informed by the Executive Branch, particularly in the area of foreign policy. "Certainly.
you don't want us reaching a conclusion every time we pick up the newspaper or hear a
news account of something temble going on and knee jerk, particularly when its a foreign
policy question."''

Dde).

Id.

142 Cong. Rec. S 3445 (No. 49. Apr. 17. 1996) (Statement of Sen. Robert

'^ Hearing on US Actions Regarding Iranian Arms Shipments Into Bosnia Before
the Senate Selert Cnmmittee on Intelligence , 104th Cong. (May 28. 1996). Sen.
Kerrey also addressed this issue In the first SSCI Hearing on the Iranian Arms
Transfers: *. . . The Washington Times talks about a wink, that there were discussions
in the press, that we're aware as well as the consequences of our having changed the
law to say that we're not going to enforce that embargo, that doesn't mean that we were

informed, that the committee was informed of a change in policy * Hearing On

I ranian Arms Shi pments tr> Rnsnia Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ,
104th Cong. (May 21. 1996).

** Hearing n n Iranian Arms Shipments to Bosnia Before the Senate Select
Committee on IntalligenrA , 104th Cong. (May 21. 1996).

House Speaker Newt Gingrich described the chilling effect the cover-up of the green
light has had on trust between the executive and legislative branches of government:

Never did Clinton indicate the Administration had given a green light to
Iranian arms smuggling .... If you have been told face to face by the
President of the United States for three years that you can't help the
Bosnians and now you learn after all these face-to-face meetings that they
were encouraging the Iranians, giving the Iranian arms shipments a wink and
a fKxJ, then how do you walk into the next meeting and believe what you are
being told?^»

Throughout, the congressk^nal reactions to the uncovering of the green light policy
was outrage that the Administration had given Iran, the rogue state most actively hostile
to US interests around the world, a sanctioned foothold in Europe from which h could
launch terrorist campaigns against US personnel across Europe. Congressman Henry
Hyde, for example, warned that the policy had to be examined and could not remain
'buried behind classified documents.' He was of the view that "the introductbn of the most
radical nation in the worid . . . into the Balkans in force with weapons to give them a
foothold in that most volatile part of the worid is incredible folly.' He wondered, as many
have since, why the Administration had not chosen readily available and far nmre palatable
means of assisting the Bosnians, means that would not endanger the safety of the
American people. There were some dozen countries,' Hyde explained, that could
reasonably be asked to provide weapons for the Bosnians - not Iran."*"

A strong majority in Congress was also incredulous that the Administration would
violate its own declared policy of containing Iran in favor of inviting the radical terrorist
regime into the Balkans. Congressman Christopher Cox would speak for many when he
denounced the Administration's decision to give the green light. "This policy was
absolutely insane,* he noted. 'Giving Iran a foothold into Europe .... That's what this
policy is about. "^^ In particular, a great many Members of Congress would express their
concern over the increased terrorist threat to US and NATO troops resulting from the

"•LAT. Apr. 11. 1996. at 12.

*° Hearing on US Policy in Bosnia Before the House Internation al Relations
Committee. 104th Cong. (Apr. 23, 1996).

*' Risen. House Qk's Panel to Prohe Anms to Bosnia . Los Angeles Times. May 9.
1996. at 5.

expanded Iranian influence in Bosnia, a threat the Administration chose to overlook.

Yet, not all Members of Congress, particularly in the House, were upset by the
revelation of the green light policy. Congressman Alcee Hastings spoke for many of them
when he publicly thanked Ambassadors Galbraith and Redman for their efforts in putting
together the green light policy:

A central criticism of the "no instructions" policy that you two gentlertien have
testified here about allows that, according to some, it permitted the
dangerous military and intelligence penetration of Bosnia by Iran.

Yet we know just from using open, public sources, the United States
decisions in April of 1994 dk) not give Iran a beachhead in Bosnia; Iran and
other Muslim countries were already there. And I might add for historians
and the buffs of history, Islam has been involved in the Balkans since fights
with the Ottoman empire, if we just want to go back into K . . . . And any
Congressperson that did not know all of that, that serves on the Committee
on International Relations, was not doing his or her job."**

The Genesis and Charter of the Select Subcommittee

The controversy over the secret green light policy culminated in calls for legislative
investigations. The House of Representatives' Committees on International Relations.
National Security. Intelligence, and Judiciary began investigations probing the
Administration's green light policy in April and May of 1996. At the urging of his Senate
colleagues. Senate Majority Leader Dole called upon the Chairmen of the Senate Foreign
Relations. Intelligence. Armed Services, and Judiciary Committees for parallel
investigations.

During initial hearings hekj by the House Intemational Relatk>ns Committee, many
questions were raised that demarKJed further examination:

• Was the US government directly or indirectly involved in the executk)n of the

transfer of Iranian anms, and dkj any of the Administration's actions violate
US law?

" Hearing on US Policy in Bosnia Before the House International Relations
Committee , 104th Cong. (Apr. 23, 1996).

• Where did the idea of an Iranian pipeline originate and with whom?

• Why were Congress, the CIA and other government agencies. US allies, and
the American public not notified of this decision when it was made or in the
nearly two years until the policy was exposed by the press?

• And. why did the President allow the world's most dangerous terrorist state.
Iran, to provide arms and establish a foothold in Europe when other friendly
nations were willing to help?

In an effort to consolidate the investigations of the four House committees and to
further examine these questions, the House leadership and the International Relations
Committee Chairman Benjamin Gilman announced a proposal to establish a Select
Subcommittee to investigate the United States' role in the transfer of arms from Iran to
Bosnia and Croatia during the period when the international arms embargo was in effect.
On May 8. 1996. the House approved Resolution 416 which created the Select
Subcommittee within the International Relations Committee. The Subcommittee is
composed of five Republican Members and three Democrat Members, and is chaired by
Henry J. Hyde of Illinois, with Lee H. Hamilton as the Ranking Minority Member.

The Select Subcommittee was given the authority to investigate the following areas:

• The policy of the United States Government with respect to the transfer of
arms and other assistance from Iran or any other country to countries or
entities within the territory of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
during any period that an intemational arms embargo was in effect;

• The nature and extent of the transfer of arms or other assistance from Iran
or any other country to countries or entities within the territory of the former
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the period that an intemational arms
embargo of the former Yugoslavia was in effect;

• Any actions taken by the United States Government to fadlitate or to impede
such transfers;

• Any communication or representations made to the Congress of the United
States or the American people with respect to the intemational arms
emttargo or with efforts to modify or terminate United States participation in
that emt>argo;

• Any implications from the Iranian amis transfers for the safety of United
States armed forces deployed in or around Bosnia, for relations t>etween the
US and its allies and for United States efforts to isolate Iran;

• And all deliberations and communications between the United States
Government and other govemments, organizations or individuals relating to
such matters.

The Sut)Commrttee's charter ends on November 8. 1 996. by which time tt is to have
transmitted its report to the House Intemational Relations Committee. Given its short life-
span and limited resources, the Subcommittee has attempted to address as many of the
key questions as possible. What follows are the results of the Subcommittee's
investigations.

CHAPTER 2

THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA
AND THE EARLY YEARS OF THE BALKANS WAR

The events discussed in this report mainly occurred during and after April 1994. To
understand these events, hov/ever, it is necessary to have a basic familiarity with the
political developments in the former Yugoslavia prior to that date.

The autocratic aile of Yugoslav dictator Tito after World War II suppressed but did
not eliminate the strongly divergent and divisive ethnic and religious tensions that have
existed for hundreds of years between the various peoples living within the borders of what
was Yugoslavia. These rivalries reemerged after Tito's death in 1980, and the centrifugal
pull of ethnic identities led to inceasingly bitter arguments over the scope and powei$ o:
the central govemment. Unable to convince Sertiia and Montenegro that a loose
confederation was a viable alternative to the existing SertxJominated govemment,
Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed their independence on June 25, 1991. Further
complicating the situation, several Sertxiominated regions of Croatia declared
independence from the new republic.

The central Yugoslavian govemment based in Belgrade, Serbia promptly declared
the Slovenia and Croatia secessions 'illegal and illegitimate" and sent the Yugoslav
Peoples' Army (YPA) to restore control over the breakaway regions. Hostilities broke out
when the Croatian and Slovenian forces refused to lay down their arms. The fighting
continued until the Brioni agreennent was finalized in eariy July 1 991 .

The Brioni agreement called for the immediate cessation of hostilities in exchange
for a three-month suspension of the declarations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia.
The YPA soldiers began immediately to withdraw from Slovenia, where the Slovenian
irregulars had t)een able to hokj their own. Despite the agreement, however, the fighting
continued within Croatia t>etween the newly independent republic and the Krajina Serbs
backed by the YPA forces.

In September 1991. the UN Security Council, through Resolution 713. enacted a
general and complete arms embargo over the former Yugoslavia to try to temper the
conflict. In Octot>er 1991. the three-nfK>nth moratorium on secession elapsed, and the
govemments of Stovenia and Croatia formally separated from the former Yugoslavia.
Germany recognized both countries as sovereign nations in December 1991. The
European Community (EC) followed suit in January 1992.

As Slovenia and Croatia were leaving the former Yugoslavia, a more bitter and
protracted conflict was developing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On October 14, 1991, the
National Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina passed, by majority vote, a memorandum on
sovereignty and independence which stopped just short of declaring outright
independence. The following December 21st. the Bosnian Serbs held an unofficial
referendum declaring their opposition to withdrawing from the withering Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). and local Serbian leaders proclaimed their independence
from Bosnia.

Following the lead of Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia's Muslim and Croat citizens
voted for independence in a March 1992 referendum. The Serbs boycotted. On April 6, the
EC recognized the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The following day, the US
recognized the nations of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and lifted the
economic sanctions against the >hree republics.

The Bosnian Serb minority vigorously opposed the withdrawal of Bosnia-
Herzegovina from the mmp SFRY that was rapidly becoming a de facto Serbian state. The
Bosnian Serbs withdrew from Bosnia-Herzegovina into their self-proclaimed "Serbian
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.*

Fighting between the Serbs and the Muslinrvdominated Bosnian govemment
ensued. The Bosnian Serbs soon seized more than two-thirds of the Bosnian republic's
territory and began the siege of Sarajevo. The Serbs managed their successes despite
the fact that, according to a 1991 census, they comprised only 31 percent of the
population, with the Muslims and Croatians having 44 and 17 percent, respectively.^ Two
key reasons the Bosnian Serbs gained such an advantage over the Bosnian Muslims so
quickly were that the withdrawing YPA relinquished its large arsenal of weapons to the
Bosnian Serb forces as it withdrew and that the YPA soldiers with a Bosnian Serb
background stayed behind to become a formidable part of the new Bosnian Serb officer
corps.

While the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims were fighting, the Bosnian Croatians were

^ According to the Congressional Research Service, the eight percent of the
population unaccounted for in these percentages comprises various other ethnk:
groups, none of which number more than 1 percent of the total population. Additionally,
the 1991 census aflowed a "Yugoslavian' response for individuals of mixed parentage
(5.5%) and others who declined to identify themseh/es as belonging to only one ethnic
group.

working to consolidate their positions in western Bosnia in their desired mini-state, Herceg-
Bosnia, which they would proclaim in July 1992. The Bosnian Croatians, much like Croatia,
would change sides in the Bosnian conflict as the circumstances affected their interests,
supporting the Muslim government at this time, then later moving towards the Bosnian
Serbs, until shifting again towards the Muslim government when the 1994 Washington
Accords established the Bosnian Federation.

On May 30, 1992, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 757. The resolution
condemned the SFRY's defiance of UN demands that it cease its interference in the affairs
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and placed an economic embargo on the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia until it fulfilled rts obligations under Resolution 752. Resolution 752, which was
passed two weeks earlier on May 1 5. called for an end to the fighting in Bosnia, elimination
of influence and forces from both the YPA and Croatia, and respect for the territorial
integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Notwithstanding the UN's efforts, the war continued into the summer. In August
1992. representatives from over 30 countries and nongovemmental organizations met in
London at the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to bring about a
negotiated end to the fighting. The London Conference, co-sponsored by the EC and the
UN, named Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance co-chairmen of the EC-UN steering
committee. The Conference affirmed the principle that intemational boarders should be
changed only by mutual consent, and called for a cease fire, access to detention camps
(by intemational organizations such as UN High Commission on Refugees or the Red
Cross), and the protection of human and minority rights. Unfortunately, the London
Conference, like the resolution before it. had little effect on the violence on the ground.
Finally, on August 31. Cyrus Vance announced that all parties had already violated the
terms of the Conference, including the cease-fire, which they had approved just days
eariier.

The Geneva Peace Conference was held the following month, for the purpose of
developing means of implementing the ksfty principles declared by the LorxJon Conference.
The Geneva Conference, urxler the co-chairmanship of Vance and Owen, established six
working groups focusing on the nrx^st pressing issues confronting the former Yugoslavia:
Bosnia-Herzegovina, confidence-building measures, humanitarian issues, economic
problems, mirwrity rights and various othpr legal issues.

Croats, who shut it down. The Iranians wece forced to return to their small-scale arms

Croats, who shut it down. The iranign^wete
smuggling and training efforts. '^^OTT^^

In October 1992. negotiators Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen advanced their plan (the
"Vance-Owen" plan) to settle the conflict. Their plan was to establish a decentralized state
with seven to ten autonomous provinces defined by economic and geographic, rather than
ethnic, criteria. The Bosnian Serb leadership promptly rejected the plan the following day.

In response to the Bosnian Serbs, Vance and Owen reworked their plan several
times, and in January 1993 the Bosnian Croats approved the measure. The Bosnian
Muslims followed suit in March. On May 2, Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic
signed the plan under intense pressure by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Two
days later, the Bosnian Serb Parliament rejected the plan, and the Vance-Owen process
was finished.

There was no hiding the viciousness of the fighting. Genocide was frequently
alleged by the combatants and. as the worid discovered more and more about the
atrocities toeing inflicted by all sides, the Security Council passed Resolution 808 in
February 1 993. establishing the War Crimes Tribunal. In support of the Resolution, the EC.
the UN staff and the US State Department submitted reports documenting the crimes of
systematic rape, murder, mutilation, deportation, illegal imprisonment, and "ethnic
cleansing' by all parties.

All three sides committed a great many atrocities during this conflict upon
Innocents, but it appears the Bosnian Sert>s were the most egregious in their violations of
human rights. It was the Bosnian Serb leadership that set the war aim of creating an
ethnically "pure" and geographically contiguous greater Serbia by (seemingly) any means
necessary. Unfortunately, it will be future historians who will have to render a more
complete accounting of the genocide which occurred.

In May 1993, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic warned of a "new aggression' by
Bosnian Croatians, and relations between the Bosnian Muslims and Croatians steadily
worsened. As the fighting intensified around the city of Mostar and throughout central
Bosnia, both sides engaged in atrocities and 'ethnic cleansing' to solidify gains made on
the battjefield.

Also that May. the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 824, which
declared that Sarajevo, Bihac, Srebrenica, Tuzia, Gorazde. and Zepa should be treated
as 'safe areas* and that all Bosnian Serb military units should withdraw from those areas
at once. The Security Council foHowed up this declaration on June 4, 1993 with Resolution

836 extending the mandate of UN Protection Forces and authorized measures, including
use offeree, to protect these "safe areas.' By February of 1994, the situation on the ground
had become intolerable for the NATO leadership as the Bosnian Serbs oven-an Srebrenica
and Zepa and besieged and shelled the others, creating appalling humanitarian conditions.
Serbian actions had made a mockery of the term 'safe area.'

The catalyst for increased international action came when a mortar shell landed in
a crowded Sarajevo market on February 5. 1994, killing 68 and wounding over 200
civilians. The following day, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali lifted his
opposition to air strikes and asked NATO Secretary General Manfred W5emer to seek
permission from the North Atlantic Council to secure a heavy weapons exclusion zone
around Sarajevo. President Clinton supported the Secretary General's call for air strikes
should more vralence against civilians occur. On April 10, the NATO Alliance, in its first
offensive action since its founding, launched air strikes against Serb positions which had
been shelling Gorazde relentlessly. A second strike the following day helped bring the
Bosnian Serb advance to a halt, although the Sert)s maintained control over a large
percentage of the territory acquired in their advance.

The Serbs had also been put on less advantageous terms by the Washington
Accords reached the month before, in March, between the Bosnian Muslims and the
Croats. The Accords set up a Federation which, in addition to relieving military pressure
on the hard-pressed Muslims, put the Serbs in a difficult strategic situation. The Croats
were now freed up to begin preparatk>ns for a major offensive to retake the Krajina, and
the Muslims were able to shore up their defenses and keep other Bosnian Serb units
engaged elsewhere in Bosnia.

This was, in brief, the situatk>n in the regbn in April 1994, when Iran again sought
to interject itself into the war on a large scale.

CHAPTER 3

THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
ON THE BOSNIAN ARMS EMBARGO - DENIAL AND DECEPTION

This chapter will examine the Clinton Administration's public policy on the UN arms
embargo on Bosnia. Starting with the formulation of the Iranian green light policy in April
1994, the actual policy became very different from what the Administration represented it
to be in its statements to Congress, the press, and the American people. As is discussed
in Section II of this report, where the development and implementation of the Iranian green
light policy are discussed at length, the Administration went to extraordinary lengths to
keep Its diplomatic duplicity under wraps. Senior Administration officials were intent that
there should be no US fingerprints.' In the public realm, this went beyond the usual
practice of offering "no comment' on allegations of US covert activity; instead.
Administration officials from the President on down lied.

Some have criticized the Clinton Administration for a lack of consistency in foreign
policy. While this charge coukl be leveled at several aspects of its Balkans policy, it would
largely be unfair in describing the Administration's public record on the Bosnian arms
embargo.

Regarding the embargo, the Administration consistently expressed its opposition to
the embargo while also consistently stating its unwillingness to take unilateral action to lift
it. The concept of unQateral actk>n by the US was fundamentally inconsistent with the
'assertive multilateralism' that became the centerpiece of the Administration's foreign
policy. Assertive multilateralism rests on a high regard for the UN as an instrument of
foreign policy, a professton of the moral obligation to follow the spirit and letter of
international law. arHJ the imperative of multilateral cooperation. In its public statements
about the arms embargo, the Administration never deviated from the positk>ns necessitated
by these principles, despite the fact that the Administratk>n leamed within days of taking
office that assertive multilateralism effectively tied its hands in working to lift the embargo
it t>elieved to be against US interests. It was this quandary that would, in April 1994, lead
the Administration to subvert the embargo clandestinely through third parties, specifically
Iran and Croatia.

The Administration's Sea Legs: The Idealism of "Assertive Multilateralism"

Although foreign poikry was not a centerpiece of Bill Clinton's preskJential campaign.
Bosnia was an exception. Candklate Clinton condemned the Bush Administration's polk^
of nonintervention, "The continuing bkxxlshed in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia

demands urgent international action It is time for real leadership to stop the continuing

tragedy in the former Yugoslav republics.** He expressed confidence that, as president,
he could define a policy, working jointly with other countries and the UN, that would stop
the fighting and lead to a peace settlement. "We will make the United States the catalyst
for a collective stand against aggression, the action I have urged in response to Serbian
aggression in Bosnia.'^ He provided some specificity in the first presidential debate in
October 1992:

I agree that we cannot commit ground forces to become involved in the
quagmire of Bosnia or in the tribal wars of Somalia. But I think that it's
important to recognize that there are things that can be done short of that,
and that we do have an interest there .... I think we should stiffen the
embargo on the Belgrade govemment, and I think we have to consider
whether or not we should lift the arms embargo now on the Bosnians, since
they are in no way in a fair fight with a heavily armed opponent bent on
"ethnic cleansing.* We can't get involved in the quagmire, but we must do
what we can.^

And, as Governor Clinton would repeatedly stress, "what we can do" meant what we can
do in tandem with others, that is to say, within the framework of assertive multilateralism.

As might be expected, consklering her key role in implementing multilateral foreign
policy, US Ambassador to the UN and cabinet member Madeleine Albright became one
of the preeminent public advocates of assertive multilateralism. As she has explained it,
the US has three roles it can play internationally: "world cop," "ostrich," or "partner," and
the Clinton Administratk>n prefers the role of partner. As Ambassador Albright explained:

The fancy word is 'multilateral.' but the ordinary word is 'partner.' I fully
believe it is my job at the U.N. and the job of all of us within the foreign poficy
structure to put an adjective with the partrier - senk>r. managing, leading,
whatever way you want to phrase it So the tenn assertive multilateralism
comes from having a leadership role within a multilateral setting to deal with

* Clinton Campaign Statement on Crisis tn Bosnia. US Newswine. July 27. 1992.

' Governor Bill Clinton. Address at the Los Angeles Worid Affairs Council (Aug.
13. 1992).

' Governor Bill Clinton. Address in the Presklential Debate (Oct. 11. 1992).

the problems that we have to deal with/

Bosnia, for the Clinton Administration, is exactly such a problem; one of those many
occasions when, in the words of George Stephanopoulos, "we need to bring pressure to
bear on the belligerents of the post-Cold War period and use our influence to prevent
ethnic and other regional conflicts from erupting. But usually we will not want to act alone
— our stake will be limited and direct U.S. intervention unwise."'

The weeks leading up to the inauguration in January 1993 saw the start of new UN-
sponsored diplomatic talks on Bosnia in New York. These talks fed the hopes of the new
Clinton foreign policy team, anxious to exercise its policy of multilateralism, as well as the
hope of an American populace sickened by the viciousness of the fighting.

The heady days of transition brought forth within the new Administration
declarations of major reviews of Bosnian policy altematives and the strong desire for
"improved" options.' Nonetheless, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, these
deliberations inevitably led back to Clinton's policy as declared in the election campaign.
Secretary of State Warren Christopher, speaking in January 1993 said, "I would stress, as
President Clinton has, starting last August, that it [Bosnia] does seem to be a place where
the United States needs to be activist and internationalist in our outlook."'

International Political Reality: The Europeans Say "No"

Yet, once in office. President Clinton found the Bosnian problem much more
complex and intractable than he anticipated as a candidate. Despite the rhetorical
flourishes and talk of change, practical changes in the policy from that of the Bush

* Hearing on US Participation In United Nations Peacekeeping Activities Before
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs . 103d Cong. (June 24,1993).

* Thomas W. LIppman, African Crises Test Limited US Governmen t; Pressure
Builds for More Direct American Intervention as Five Nations Suffer Strife , Washington
Post. June 13, 1993. at A33.

* Carol Giacomo. Clinton to Review Bosnia Policy. Including Lifting the Arms
Ban. The Reuter Library Report. Jan. 22, 1993.

^ Alan Eisner. US Looking at Option of Bombing Bosnian Serb Airfields , The
Reuter Library Report. Jan. 27. 1993.

Administration were difficult to discern. Leaving the new Administration's first Bosnia policy
review. Secretary Christopher counseled the press to "lower expectations," particulariy "in
terms of timing."' Where candidate Clinton had been calling for "urgent" international
action, President Clinton was now urging caution:

The thing I have not been willing to do is to immediately take action, the end
of which I could not see. I want to do - whatever I want to do, I want to do
it with vigor and wholeheartedly. I want it to have a reasonable prospect of
success, and I have done the best I could with the cards that I found on the
table when I became President.'

Given the President's desire to act "w\\h vigor and wholeheartedly," it was still not
clear what he wanted to do. Yet. it was also clear that he did not know what it was he
wanted to do. Some criticized the Clinton Administration for lacking the political will to
enact a policy change. Democratic Congressman Frank McCioskey accused the
Administration of being an accomplice in genocide in Bosnia, stating that "when it comes
to real action to get the arms embargo lifted from the Bosnian Government, the
administration opts out."'" It is probably rrwre accurate to say, however, that the lowering
of Presidential sights came at)Out as the Administration realized that rt had painted itself
into a comer by advocating an end to the arms embargo but surrendering the only vehicle
by which the embargo could be lifted - namely, unilateral action by the US. Simply put.
neither the UN (the Clinton Administration's preferred multilateral mechanism) nor other
intemational bodies were willing to go along with lifting the embargo. That left the
Administration without a vehicle it thought acceptable to implement the changes in Bosnian
foreign policy it believed to be in the national interest.

In the first few months of the Administration, the UN, in particular, turned out to be
an unlikely forum for a fresh approach. In addition to the UN Security Council being the
body that put the embargo in place, the new Clinton Administration found itself in the
uncomfortable position of being unwilling to subscribe fully to the ongoing UN-sponsored

' Carol Giacomo. Naw Secreta ry Fypftrts No Quick Dftdsion on Bosnia. The
Reuter Library Report. Jan. 28. 1993.

• President Bill Clinton, Questk>n and Answer Session With the Natkjnal
Associatk>n of Newspaper Editors (Apr. 1, 1993).

'* 139 Cong. Rec. H4262 (No. 93. June 29, 1993) (Statement of Rep. Frank
McCioskey).

Vance-Owen plan it felt would have effectively partitioned Bosnia. For an administration
that placed heavy emphasis on the UN and multilateralism in foreign policy, this was not
a comfortable situation. Secretary Christopher tried to step around the problem during a
trip to the UN in February 1993. saying that the US supported the "process" without
necessarily supporting the results." Two days later, using locution that would later
become the hallmark of the Iran green light policy. White House spokesman George
Stephanopoulos said President Clinton "does not have any specific support or rejection"
oftheUNplan.'^

Some commentators have strongly attacked the tenets of the Clinton
Administration's policy of assertive multilateralism. Steven Ertanger. in the New York
Times, called it "a formula for action that seemed to make the UN the only source of
legitimacy for the use of force to keep the world secure," and Peter W. Rodman of the
Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, declared that for multilateralists "Ameri'^an
unilateralism was the principal sin to be avoided, as if to atone for a shameful past."'' It
was former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, however, who most astutely identified the
inherent weakness of assertive multilateralism. The policy, he said, resigns the US to a
belief that "the national interest is on the whole defined by the attainable global
consensus."" This tumed out to be the reef on which the Bosnia policy foundered.
Although the Administration wanted to lift the arms embargo as it applied to the Bosnian
Muslims, it was unable to lead its global "partners" into a consensus to do so - and to act
unilaterally would require the Administratk>n to violate the philosophical cornerstone of its
foreign policy.

The Administration quickly leamed that the Europeans, in particular, were unwilling
to yield on the fundamental question of lifting the arms embargo. Fighting in eastem
Bosnia intensified, and in April 1993, the Serbs, in a much-reported offensive, moved to

^* Donald M. Rothberg, Clinton's Biggest Headache is in Europe . The Associated
Press, Feb. 3, 1993.

Id.

" Stephen Erianger, The US and the UN; Now, Who Needs Whom More? , The
New York Times, July 7, 1 996.

" Hearing on US National Goals and Objectives in International Relations in the
Year ?00Q and Beyond Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations , 104th
Congress (July 13,1995) (emphasis added).

capture the town of Srebrenica. President Clinton spoke of his outrage at the fighting. "I
condemn it and I have condemned it repeatedly and thoroughly. And I have done
everything I could to increase the pressure of the international community on the outrages
perpetuated in Bosnia by the aggressors and to get people to stand up against ethnic
cleansing."'* The Europeans, however, had refused to go along, and, without their
support, the US simply did not have the votes in the Security Council to overturn the
embargo. More importantly, though, as President Clinton would repeatedly point out in the
years to come, even "if we did. it would endanger the humanitarian mission there carried
on by the French and British who oppose lifting the embargo."" Despite the Presidents
outrage, he steadfastly refused to permit unilateral US actions. Behind this all there
continued the dnjm-beat of keeping US policy within the boundaries acceptable to the UN.
As Secretary Christopher declared, "whatever we would do, we would do multilaterally and
we would want to do it with the full concun-ence of the UN. We would not try to take any
shortcuts in the matter."^^

President Clinton's press conference on April 23, 1993, illustrated the in-econcilable
tension between US national interests and the Administration's allegiance to assertive
multilateralism. On the one hand, the President stated vigorously about Bosnia. "I think
we should act. We should lead - the United States should lead." Yet. a few minutes later,
in response to a pointed question about multilateralism "hamstringing" US foreign policy,
he conceded his Administration's abdication of policy-making to the UN. The United
States, even as the last remaining superpower, has to act consistent with international law
and under some mandate of the United Nations.""

On May 6. 1993, the Bosnian Serb Assembly rejected the Vance-Owen peace plan,
which the Administration had finally come to support. The Administration renewed its call
for multilateral lifting of the embargo against Bosnia. Then Secretary Christopher traveled
to Europe on an ill-fated mission to win the support of Britain and France. His charter.
evidenUy. was not broad enough to allow him to negotiate the issue forcefully. Later,

" President Bill Clinton. Question and Answer Session With the National
Association of Newspaper Editors (Apr. 1, 1993).

' Alan Eisner. Clinton Has Fbw Options on Yugoslav ia. The Reuter Library
Report. Apr. 22, 1993 (emphasis added).

'• President BHI Clinton. Press Conference (Apr. 23. 1993).

Secretary Chrisopher would admit that ttie effort had been a mistake. "The way that I
made the trip to Europe in May 1993 was not consistent with global leadership."" After
that, the Administration more openly acknowledged its political impotence. President
Clinton explained:

Let me tell you something about Bosnia. On Bosnia, I made a decision. The
United Nations controls what happens in Bosnia. I cannot unilaterally lift the
arms embargo. I didn't change my mind. Our allies decided that they weren't
prepared to go that far at this time. They asked me to wait, and they said
they would not support it. I didn't change my mind.'"

It was also at about this time that Undersecretary of State Peter Tamoff indicated
the US had to rethink its intemational role and realistically reappraise the degree to which
it could hope to act and influence intemational events unilaterally. This doctrine, the so-
called Tamoff Doctrine," was eventually disavowed by President Clinton. A Congressional
Research Service report noted, however, 'US policy on Bosnia appeared to confirm Mr.
Tamoff s views rather than contradict them. Liifting the arms embargo, while in principle
favored by the Administration, was not viewed as a viable option without the participation
of other allies."*'

On June 30, the Administration suffered yet another defeat in changing US policy,
ft was the only other Security Council member to back a resolution put forth by five non-
aligned member countries to lift the embargo. Even though President Clinton had
previously asserted that the US should take the lead in formulating intemational policy
towards Bosnia, the US "dkl not push strongly for its adoption,"^ and Russia, France, and
Britain joined other Council members in handily defeating the measure. The result was
that a policy change the Administration deemed to be in the national interest was

'* Elaine Sciolino, The Clinto n Record: Foreign Policy; Bosnia Policy Shaped By
US Military Role . The New York Times. July 29, 1996. at A15.

^ President Bill Clinton, Press Conference (June 15. 1993).

'^ Julie Kim and Dianne E. Rennack, Bosnia-Hercegovina Conflict and the 1Q3d
Congress: Po lic y Debates and Summary of Major Legislation , Congressional Research
Service (CRS), Report for Congress 94-1008 F, at 7.

^ Steven Woehrel. Bosnia-Hercagovina: Summary of the Dehata On a Unilateral
Lifting of the Arms Embarg o, CRS, Report for Congress 95-477 F, at 5.

squelched yet again by the UN.

In July, the President was again put on the defensive in a press conference when
a questioner referred to the Administration as being "indecisive' in formulating a Bosnia
policy. He replied.

Let me. first of all, point out what the United States has done just since I've
been President. We spent a great deal of money on humanitarian aid; we
have pushed hard for strengthening the embargo against Serbia; we have
pushed for a number of other things to try to help resolve the situation that
we have all agreed on.

I did not back away from my position, sir. Britain and France and
Russia said they would not support that position within the United Nations.
The United States cannot act alone under international law in this instance."

In July, as Serb forces stepped up their assault on Sarajevo and threatened to
overrun the Bosnian capital, the Administration finally was moved to act. It announced
that, while it hoped to work with the allied states. A was prepared to act unilaterally with
air strikes to break the siege of Sarajevo. It is hard to know how serious the Administration
was in making this statement. No military action was ever taken, although the threat did
motivate NATO to meet in August to consider joint action. Even then. NATO ceded its
authority to the UN Secretary-General to determine if military action was wan-anted and to
call for air strikes.

The President's subsequent statements squarely contradicted his professed
willingness to take unilateral action and reaffirmed his commitment to multilateralism, no
nnatter what the consequences for US national interests. Seven months later, on February
6, 1994, the day after a rocket attack on a crowded marttet in Sarajevo killed 68 people,
PreskJent Clinton made his mosi categorical statement yet on his interpretatkMi of the limits
on US sovereignty in using its military. The United States, I will say again, under
intematnnal law, in the absence of an attack on our people, does not have the authority
to unilaterally undertake air strikes."^

" Presklent Bill Clinton, Press Interview (July 2. 1993).

** The Late Edition: US Responds to Attack in Sarajevo. CNN Television
Broadcast (Feb. 6, 1994) (emphasis added).

In the same month. Febmary 1994, arguing against Senator Dole's legislative
proposal to lift the embargo, Madeleine Albright advanced another argument that the
Administration would frequently use ~ lifting the embargo would set a precedent allowing
states to pick and choose which of the internationally sanctioned embargoes and sanctions
they will enforce:

Frankly, what will happen is, if we decide to lift the embargo unilaterally
against - on this particular issue, then there will be those who will decide
that we can just not abide by the intemational embargo against Iraq or
against Libya. This is an intemational system, whereby we deal with rogue
states, Iraq and Libya, through an intemational embargo. We depend on the
intemational community to abide by it. And, even though we do not think it
is appropriate for the Bosnian Muslims to be embargoed at the nviment, it is
an intemational decision that we cannot change unilaterally.^

A few months later, in April, with renewed and increasingly bipartisan criticism of the
Administration's refusal to lift the embargo, PreskJent Clinton made a similar argument, 'If
we ignore a United Natk>ns embargo t>ecause we think it has no moral basis or even any
legal validity, but everyone else feels contrary, then what is to stop our United Nations
allies from ignoring the embargoes that we like, such as the embargo against Saddam
Hussein? How can we ever say again to all of the other people in the UnKed Natk>ns, you
must follow other embargoes?'*

By mkl-1994 there was bipartisan consensus in Congress that the US should lift the
Bosnian arms embargo unilaterally. This opinion was shared by many of those who
supported a more active US role in stopping the fighting, as well as by many who still
believed the US shoukJ be cautk)us in any action that could commit it to a role on the
ground in the regfon. On May 25, Representatives Newt Gingrich, Dick Armey, and Henry
Hyde urged the PreskJent to 'act in our natk>nal interest and not rely on the UN to
determine our polk:y.*"

In late summer, with peace talks stalled, Congress began working on several

'*'ld.

* PreskJent Bill Clinton, Press Conference (Apr. 20, 1994).

" Letter from Reps. Newt Gingrich. Richard Armey and Henry Hyde to PreskJent
Bill Clinton (May 25, 1994) (emphasis in original). See Appendix B.

options to remove the embargo. This eventually led to Section 1404 of the fiscal year 1995
National Defense Authorization Act ." According to that legislation, if the Bosnian Serbs
did not accept the Contact Group peace plan by October 15. the President v»/as to
introduce a resolution at the Security Council to lift the arms embargo muttilaterally no later
than December 1 . Moreover, should such a resolution fail to pass, no US funds were to
be expended after November 15 to enforce the continued embargo. This provision is
commonly referred to as "Nunn-Mitchell," after its Senate sponsors. Since it was clear the
Security Council would defeat a resolution to lift the embargo, the Administration halted the
use of US funds effective November 12, 1994. It also ended the deployment of American
ships in the Adriatic Sea for embargo enforcement and ended the sharing of intelligence
on embargo violations with other countries.

In all other respects, the Administration's policy remained unchanged, particulariy
its opposition to unilaterally lifting the embargo. Although the Administration consulted with
Congress on possible plans to aid the Bosnians unilaterally (as was also required in the
legislation), the Administration made it clear it would not accept any form of unilateral
action by the US. Indeed, on January 8, 1995. Vice President Al Gore wamed that the
President would veto any bill requiring a unilateral lifting." This actually came to pass on
August 11. 1995. when the President vetoed S.21. a bill calling for the unilateral lifting of
the embargo after the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers from Bosnia or 12 weeks after the
government of Bosnia-Herzegovina requested that UN peacekeepers leave, whichever
came first.

Another concem expressed repeatedly by the Administration during its debates with
Congress in 1995 about the unilateral lifting of the embargo was that it could lead to one
of two possible situations, both of wrfiich were worse than the status quo. The first was the
•Americanization" of the war. The second (and this is brazen in light of the Administration's
ongoing secret Iranian green light policy) was the introduction of Iranians into the war.

The logic t»ehind the fear of "Americanization" was that the natran that lifts the
embargo unilaterally will be held responsible for what follows. White House Press
Secretary Mike McCurry explained that the Administration "strenuously" opposed a
unHatera! lifting of the embargo because it would "give the US unilateral responsiblity for

" US Publk: Law 103-337.

* Ron Foumier. c^rtk- liS Stil l Rarks Yaltsln Dftsptte Apparent Lack of Control .
The Associated Press. Jan. 8, 1995.

the devastating consequences.'^ Consequently, if the Bosnian military were to begin to
falter after the lift, the US would have to step in to train, arm. and possibly defend its new
dependents. American intervention, the argument went, became all the more likely
because a unilateral lifting by the US would likely have led UN peacekeepers to withdraw
from the region.Thus. not only would US intervention be required to prop up Bosnian
forces, it would also be required to aid the withdrawal of UN forces.^'

The most disingenuous of the Administration's arguments was that lifting the arms
embargo could allow the Iranians a foothold in Europe. The argument was that if the US
were to lift the embargo, without itself arming the Muslims, Iran would fill the vacuum and
thereby 'establish a presence' in Bosnia and the Balkans.'' (As shown in Section III of this
report, the Administration had already secretly acquiesced in Iran's filling the existing
vacuum.) It was against such an argument that Senator Dote spoke on June 5, 1995,

[W]hen those of us who advocate lifting the arms embargo . . . point out that
other countries would also participate in arming the Bosnians, we are told
that this would allow Iran to arm the Bosnians. The fact is the arms embargo
has guaranteed that Iran is a key supplier of arms to Bosnia and
administration officials have actually used that fact to argue that there is no
need to lift the arms embargo .... From statements made by State
Department officials to the press, one gets the impression that Iran is the
Clinton Administration's preferred provider of weapons to the Bosnians. If
the Administration has a problem with Iran arming Bosnia, it should t>e
prepared to do something about it"

* Mike McCurry, White House Press Briefing (July 18, 1995).

'* There is no question that unilaterally lifting the arms embargo, if the United
States took that action, would lead U.N. troop-contributing nations to quickly withdraw
their troops. That would then trigger, as you all know, a commitment we have to our
allies to help extract them. So it is almost a dead-certain t>et that lifting the arms
emt>argo would mean U.S. ground troops would have to be present in Bosnia very
shortly.' Mike McCurry, White House Press Briefing (July 12, 1995).

" Mike McCurry, White House Press Briefing (June 9, 1995).

"^ 141 Cong. Rec. S7880 (No. 92. June 5. 1995) (Statement of Sen. Robert
Dole) (emphasis added).

Senator Dole had no idea at the time how taie his words were about Iran being the
Administration's "preferred provider' of weapons. His mistake, like that of his colleagues
in Congress, was in believing the Administration's denials of complicity and thinking no
administration would be so foolish as to pemiit Iran - the world's leading sponsor of state-
sanctioned terrorism - to establish a foothold in Europe.

It would seem that the Administration would not want to revisit this particular
argument, knowing how it would look when the truth finally emerged. Yet a month later,
in July 1995. White House spokesman McCuny could not resist speculating sarcastically
that Senator Dole, in his calls for lifting the embargo, was presumably ready to surrender
Bosnia to Iran.** It would not be until spring 1996 that Congress and the American people
would leam the truth and appreciate the irony behind McCurry's statement: A year before
he accused Senator Dole of being willing to give the Iranians a free ride into Bosnia, the
Clinton Administration had already laid out the welcome mat for Iran.

Denial of the Iranian Green Light Policy

As is discussed elsewhere in this report, the Administration's public
pronouncements about its policy on the embargo significantly diverged from actual practice
starting in April 1994. It was then that President Clinton authorized the giving of a secret
"wink and a nod" or "green light" for the covert transshipment of Iranian amis to the
Balkans. The development of that covert policy is treated at length in Section II of this
report. In this chapter, treating the puWkdy acknowledged policy, we will only discuss the
official denials that were made as elements of the policy began to leak to the press.

The flow of Iranian arms through Croatia was difficult to disguise, and the openirvg
of the so-called amis pipeline to Bosnia was reported in the US and European press within
weeks.^ An obvious question for the press and our allies with troops on the ground in the

** "Our view has been it is highly questtonaWe morally for the United States
Congress to say that we are unilaterally lifting the amis embargo so that Muslims can
have a fair fight and then not do anything to provWe them exactly those armaments
that we've been talking about. There's some vague notion on Capitol Hill that perhaps
they coukj get them from inventories of the fbnuer Soviet Unfon stocks. Perhaps they
could get them from Iran. I guess Ser}atorDole is saying.' Mike McCuny. Press
Conference (July 18. 1995) (emphasis added).

* E4J. Bill Gertz. Iranian Weapons Sftnt Vi a Croatia. Washington Times. June
24. 1994; Robert Block, i is Tiim.«t a R iinri Fya to Iran Arms for Bosnia. The

region concerned whether the US was involved in either setting up or sanctioning the
operation.

On May 13, 1994, two weeks after the Administration gave the green light. State
Department spokesman David Johnson commented on reports of Iranian shipments
through Zagreb, "It is the policy of the United States to respect the UN arms embargo on
the nations that formerly comprised Yugoslavia." He quickly added that the US believes
*if s important that UN Security Council resolutions be fully observed," a broader statement
that suggested that the US expected other nations to respect the embargo as well.^

On June 3, the British newspaper. The Independent, reported that Iranian sources
"close to the government and opposition in Tehran, claim that elements in President Bill
Clinton's administration have made it clear that America would not interfere with Iran's
attempts to circumvent the international arms embargo on Bosnia."" The same article
contained official US denials. Nonetheless, the issue would not die. and the press
continued to pursue the story.

Later in June, the Administration once again was faced with a press story that
threatened to uncover the green light policy. An article by Bill Gertz of the Washington
Times led with the sentence. 'Croatia has become a major transit point for covert Iranian
arms shipments to Bosnia with the tacit approval of the Clinton administration, which
publidy rennains opposed to a unilateral lifting of the intemational arms embargo against
the fractured Balka.n states." But in the same article a 'senior U.S. official" sakj that the US
government opposed the Iranian arms shipments because they undercut UN sanctions.
"There is no U.S. support for what Iran is doing," the official said."'* That same day press
guidance issued by the State Department explicitly denied active complicity and any sort
of acquiescence, "It is the policy of the United States to respect the UN arms embargo on
the nations that formerly comprised Yugoslavia. We strongly believe that UN Security

Independent, June 3, 1994.

" US Mum on Report of Iran Arms to Bosnia . Reuters World Service, May 13,
1994.

»^ Robert Block, US Tums a Blind gye to Iran Anms for Bosnia . The Independent,
June 3, 1994, at 14.

^ Bill Gertz. Iranian Weapons Sent Via Croatia , Washington Times. June 24,
1994, at A1.

Council resolutions must be fully respected."" This guidance would be sent out repeatedly
in the following months.*"

Subsequent press guidances and public statements from the State Department.
National Security Council and the White House consistently denied any US role in the
Iranian arms pipeline. At the State Department's daily press briefing on November 7, for
example, spokesman Christine Shelley was asked directly if the US was contributing to,
or turning a blind eye to, the violations of the arms embargo. The response was clear and
categorical. "We're certainly not contributing to it, and we certainly are not turning a blind
eye. We have been a major participant, as you know, in the enforcement of ail the different
UN Security Council resolutions which have been passed in the past."^'

Congress took the Administration at its word, yet the press and intelligence reporting
indicated the Iranian arms kept flowing and, in the wake of such reports, the growth of
Iranian influence in the region became increasingly a matter of concern. While the
Administration still denies the linkage, at least for Congress it was obvious from the
beginning that there was a direct connection between the provision of Iranian weapons and
assistance and the growth of Iranian influence. Senator Dole in January 1995 argued that
S.21 , his legislation lifting the embargo, \vould reduce the potential influence and role of
radical extremist states like Iran" in the Balkans.*' The Administration nevertheless vetoed
the legislation. As on many other occasions, it chose not to advise Congress that the
actual Administration policy was that "at the highest level we do not wish to interpose
ourselves' between the Iranians and the Balkans - that is, to permit Iran to use arms
transfers to solidify its influence in the reg'ion.*'

In April 1 995, a year after the green light policy went into effect, a Washington Post
story reopened the question of the US's tacit approval of Iranian arms transfers.
Department of State press guidance on Apnl 14 posed the following hypothetical question
and guidance on its answer

^ Department of State, Daily Press Guidance, June 24, 1994.

** E-8-. Department of State, Daily Press Guidance, June 27 and Aug. 3. 1994.

*' DOS cable. State 300842. Nov. 7, 1994 (emphasis added).

** 141 Cong. Rec. S21 1 (No.1 . Jan. 4. 1995) (Statement of Sen. Robert Dole).

*' Peter Galbraith, MenrK>randum for the File. May 6. 1994.

Q: Is Iran delivering arms to the Bosnians? Does the US tacitly approve of
this activity? What are we doing about it? How do we reconcile this policy
with our more general concern atx>ut Iranian arms sales?

A: Contrary to the impression left by this morning's Washington Post story,

- /77he US neither 'allows' nor taatly accepts" the provision of Iranian
arms to Bosnia or to any other country.

- It is the policy of the United States to respect the UN arms embargo
on the nations that formerly comprised Yugoslavia

- The United States has on many occasions made known its strong
objection to the behavior of the Government of Iran. We are actively
involved in international efforts to isolate Iran and prevent it from engaging
in illegal and dangerous weapons transfers.**

In July of 1995, the President and Secretary of State confirmed the press guidance
set forth above as the Administration's 'declared' policy. In a CNN interview on July 28,
1995, President Clinton was asked if the US was 'orchestrating the transfer of arn« to the
Bosnian Muslims through Arab or Middle-Eastern countries or anywhere else.* The
answer was a curt *rK>.* On the same program. Secretary Christopher stated, "We are not,
as I repeat myself, covertly supplying arms [to Bosnia] or taking steps to support arms.***
The next day. Secretary Christopher was quoted in the press as saying. The United States
is not, underiine not, covertly supplying arms or supporting the supply of arms to the
Bosnian govemment."**

Perhaps the nx>st categorical false denial of the green light came in the National
Security Council's press guidance of February 2. 1996, only two months t)efore the
Administratk>n finally admitted its true policy towards Iranian arms transfers. This time, the
Administration was concerned with allaying suspicior^ raised by another Washirtgton Post

** DOS cable, State 092370. Apr. 14. 1995 (emphasis added).

** The Late Edition: US Denies Funneling Arms to Bosnian Muslims, CNN
Television Broadcast (July 28. 1995).

^ Bill Gertz. Peny Threatens 'Massive Air'; Christopher Denies Report of Covert
Anms Shipments . The Washington Times, July 29. 1995. at A9.

story, this one alleging US involvement with a Saudi program to arm the Bosnians. Again,
the guidance is given in hypothetical questions and answers. They are quoted at length
below. This is necessary to document the degree to which the Clinton Administration was
willing to misrepresent the truth In order to cover up their policy to allow Iran to develop a
foothold in Europe through Bosnia.

[Q:] Response to allegations in the Washington Post that the United States

cooperated with Saudi Arabia in a program to arm the Bosnians over the

past three years.

[A:] We categorically deny the allegations in the Post story that the US was

in any way involved with the purported Saudi program to arm the Bosnian

Government, in violation of the UN amis embargo. While this Administration

consistently argued that the arms embargo unfairly punished the victim of

aggression during the Bosnian conflict, it was always our policy to abide by

the terms of the arms embargo. We opposed a unilateral lifting of the

embargo because it would undermine respect for other binding UNSC

resolutions, including economic sanctions against Serbia, Iraq and Libya.

The US did not cooperate, coordinate or consult with any other government

regarding the provision of arms to the Bosnians.

[Q:] But weren't you aware of covert arms assistance to the Bosnians by the

Saudis and other countries, such as Iran?

[A:] No such shipments were fa/cen in consultation or coordination with the

US government.

[Q:] If you were aware of these shipments, why didn't you stop them?

[A:) We have always made dear that we were abiding by the arms embargo

and that we expected other countries to do so as well.*^

" National Security Council. Daily Guidance Update. Feb. 2. 1996 (emphasis
added).

The Clinton Administration's consistent assertion of the need for assertive
multilateralism was matched in effort and practice only by its consistence in falsely denying
its 'Iranian green light' policy. The truth finally came to light with the publication of the
series of highly detailed and well-infomned Los Angeles Times articles starting on April 6,
1996/* It was only then that the Administration ceased its denials and deceptions and
admitted what its true policy was - to allow Iran to purchase influence in the Balkans by
supplying arms.

' The articles have been discussed at length in Chapter One.

CHAPTER 4

THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION ON IRAN

In the preceding chapter, we have discussed at length the Clinton Administration's
public policy of duplicity and denial regarding its green light to the Iranians' breaking the
UN arms embargo in the former Yugoslavia. What makes the green light policy scandalous
is that the Administration chose to use Iran, of all countries, to carry out a policy that the
Administration was legally able, but unwilling to carry out Itself. The green light decision
allowed Iran to expand economic and diplomatic relations in a volatile and unstable part
of the world and, worse, to establish programs of military, security, and intelligence
assistance and cooperation of unprecedented scope in Europe. This decision was made
despite the US's firmly entrenched policy of isolating and containing Iran. The threat from
Iran has been as clear as has been the US policy response to the threat, at least prior to
the Administration's green light policy. For this reason the green light is not only an
inexplicable reversal of long-standing US policy, H is a case of appallingly bad judgment
in which US national interests were sacrificed out of the Administration's policy-based
objections to unilateral actions by the US to protect American interests.

In later chapters, we will demonstrate how such an indefensible decision was made
and the effect it has had in radicalizing certain elements in Bosnia, as well as buying Iran
influence in the region. In this chapter, we will simply establish the fact that, in its public
pronouncements, the Administration has advocated an Iranian policy that is totally
incompatible with its actions in Croatia and Bosnia.

Recognizing the Problem: Iran

The Clinton Administration deserves credit for its public statements recognizing
Iran's preeminent role as a state sponsor of terrorism. According to the annual State
Department report on intemational terrorism issued on April 1996,^ Iran is the premier
state sponsor of intemational terrorism and is deeply involved in the planning and
execution of terrorist acts both by its own agents and by surrogate groups.* The report
goes on to rK>te that Iran continues to view the United States as its principal foreign
adversary, supporting groups such as Hizballah that pose a threat to US citizens. Because
of Tehran's and Hizballah's deep antipathy towards the United States, US missions and

' Department of State. Pattems of Global Tefmrism: 1995 , Apr. 1996, at 24.

personnel abroad continue to be at risk.'' Two years earlier, the annual report reached
much the same conclusion:

Iran again was the most active state sponsor of terrorism and was
implicated in terrorist attacks in Italy, Turkey and Pakistan. Its intelligence
services support terrorist acts - either directly or thre>ugh extremists groups
.... Iran still surveys US missions and personnel. Tehran's policymakers
view terrorism as a valid tool to accomplish their political objectives, and acts
of terrorism are approved at the highest levels of the Iranian govemment.'

In this document, which, ironically, was published the very month of the Administration's
green light decision, the Administration provided information that would lead one to believe
the Administration would be making efforts to crack down on Iran's involvement in Bosnia
and Croatia rather than "wink and nod" at it:

Bosnian Vice PreskJent Ejup Ganic warned in June [1993] that Bosnians
living in EuroF>e were likely to resort to terrorism if the West did not come to
Bosnia's aid. and outskje terrorist groups are reported providing support to
the Bosnian Muslims. In August. Croatian authorities confiscated weapons,
explosives and false documents from a lerrorisf networi^ that had been
aiding Bosnia. Hizballah and Iran have provided training to the Bosnian
Muslim army.*

Sectk>n III of this report further documents the extensive infonnation available to the
Administration on Iran and its surrogates' activities in the former Yugoslavia prior to the
green light as well as after.

The Policy Response to the Iranian Threat

Not only has the Clinton Administration been dear in acknowledging Iran's threat
to US national interests and world stability, the Administratk>n has also been consistent
(other than in the fonner Yugoslavia ) in articulating and adhering to a policy that was
noeant to isolate Iran politically, eooriomrcally, and militanly. Such isolation, K was hoped,

' Id. at 25.

' Department of State, Pattems of Global Tentirism: 1993 , Apr. 1994, at 22.

•Id. at 11.

would lead to the regime's moderation.'

Secretary Christopher encapsulated the Iran policy and its rationale in May 1994 in
a speech before the American Jewish Committee Conference:

Well, Iran is an outlaw country in my judgment and deserves to t>e
treated with containment and isolation. It is not only their weapons of mass
destruction program that concerns us, but their resort to terrorism around the
world. Their ugly hand can t>e seen not only in the Middle East but in Africa
and some places in Europe. Their determined opposition to the peace
process in the Middle East is only one of the reasons why I think that they do
not deserve the approbation of the intemational community.

We cannot expect to end all trade with them, but I think what we can
urge our allies is to not give them concessions and not welcome them into
the family of nations and accord the advantages of that kind of status. The
United States will be working hard in this vein, feeling it's necessary to try to
isolate them, to try to contain them until there is a change in their attitudes
toward their neighbors and toward the rest of the worid.

.... Iran is a country that I think deserves our very close watching,
and until they make a major change in their policy, I think the United States'
present policy of isolation and containment is the correct one.*

' The Clinton Administratkin has attempted to link its Iran policy with its policy
vis-a-vis Iraq in a regional strategic polkry it has termed 'dual containment.* This policy
was outlined by Martin Indyk, Special Assistant to the President for Near East and
South Asian Affairs at the National Security Council (NSC), in May 1993, and makes up
a significant portion of National Security Advisor Anthony Lake's Foreign Affairs article
Confronting Backlash States (Vd. 73. No. 2. MariApr. 1994, at 45-55). The dual
containment polk^ has receivxi significant criticism by MkJdIe Eastern foreign policy
experts as being ilk)gical and a. .terproductive in implementation. However, for our
purposes it is not necessary to review the Iran^policy in this larger regional strategic
context It is sufficient to note that there is a dear and unambiguous policy of isolatir^
and containing Iran so as to nxxjerate its policies.

* Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Remarks at tiie Anr)erican Jewish
Committee Conferer>ce (May 5. 1994).

More than just keeping up the rhetorical drum-beat of calls to isolate Iran, the
President has also taken action to further that objective and increase the pressure on its
leadership to moderate its many objectionable policies. In May 1995 the President signed
an executive order banning, in effect, all US trade and investment in Iran/ In August
1996, the President signed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act,' a bill that had passed the
House without a single dissenting vote, imposing sanctions on foreign companies exporting
petroleunvrelated technology to Iran. In regard to this bill, the President said, "You cannot
do business with countries that practice commerce with you by day while funding or
protecting the terrorists who kill you and your innocent civilians by night. That is wrong.
I hope and expect that before long, our allies will come around to accepting this
fundamental tmth."* As National Security Advisor Anthony Lake has noted, those countries
that believe positive inducements will woric with Iran are wrong and improvement in
relations must come about only as a reward for Iran's moderating its objectionable
behavKjr. The most effective message is a consistent one: no normal relations until these
[objectionable] actions end.'^"

The Administratk)n tumed its back on this established principle of American foreign
policy in making the green light decisbn. Instead of 'isolating' and 'containing* Iran, as
Secretary Christopher had promised, the Administration's policy in the Balkans was 'at the
highest level we do not wish to interpose ourselves between the Iranians and the
Croatians."^^ In allowing Iranian arms transfers to Bosnia, the Administration essentially
forced the Bosnians into a position of dependence on, and subservience to, Iran. This
would soon come back to hurt the Administratk>n.

^ Executive Order No. 12959. 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757 (1995).

•Public Law 104-172.

* President Bill Clinton, Address at George Washington University (Aug. 5,
1996).

^^ Anthony Lake, Confronting Backlash States , supca at 5.

" Ambassador Peter Galbraith quoting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State Alexander Vershbow in a May 5, 1994 telephone conversatk>n. Recounted in a
Memorandum for the File by Galbraith. dated May 6, 1994.

SECTION TWO:
THE INVESTIGATION AND ITS FINDINGS

CHAPTER 5

CONDUCT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE INVESTIGATION

Testimony

The Select Subcommittee sought to take depositions from all significant participants
in the events under investigation. In some instances, interviews, rather than depositions,
were conducted by special investigators, who were detailed as a joint resource to the
Subcommittee staff.' Both the majority and minority staff were represented at every
deposition and interview. The deposition testimony was transcribed by a certified court
reporter who is provided by the Office of Official Reporters to Committees of the House of
Representatives. Depositions were conducted under oath in a question and '^nswer
format. Interviews were conducted by the Select Subcommittee staff and by the special
investigators. Interview witnesses were not put under oath.

The Select Subcommittee took the depositions of 27 witnesses and interviewed
approximately 55 others.

The following individuals (listed in alphabetical order) appeared for depositions:
Janet S. Andres - former Executive Assistant to Director of Central Intelligence; Reginald
Bartholomew - former Special Envoy to the former Yugoslavia; General Wesley Clark -
former Director of Strategic Plans & Policy (J-5) on the Joint Staff; Thomas Doniion -
Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Chief of Staff to the Secretary of State;
Ambassador Peter W. Galbraith - Ambassador to Croatia; Colonel Richard C. Henick -
Defense & Army Attache, Embassy Zagreb; Ambassador Richard Holbrooke - former
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs; Richard A. Holtzapple -
former Political Officer/Second Secretary, Embassy Zagreb; Susan C. Hovanec - fomier
Public Affairs Officer. Embassy Zagreb; Ambassador Robert Hunter - Pemnanent US
Representative to the Nj^rth Atian tic Counc il: Ambassador Victor L. Jackovich - for

Ambassador to Bosnia£_

Douglas MacEachin - former Deputy Director for intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA); Thomas D. Mittnacht - former Economic/Commercial Officer. Embassy Zagreb;
Rorukl J. Neitzke • former Deputy Chief of Missnn, Embassy Zagreb; Rudolf V. Perina -
Chief of Mission. Embassy Belgrade; Charles E. Redman • former Special Envoy to the
fermer Yug oslavia ; Lt. Colonel Robert J. gadl er - Defense Attache. Embassy Zagreb;

[Lt Colonel John E. Sray - former G-2

* See Appendix A.

Intelligence Chief for Bosnia/Herzegovina Command, UNPROFOR; Chariotte Stottman
former secretary to Ambassador Galbraith; Strobe Talbott - Deputy Secretary of State;
Peter Tarnoff - Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs;!^

/Alexander R. Vershbow - former Deputy Assistant Secretary

of State for European an?Canadian Affairs; James Woolsey - former Director of the CIA;
Kathryn Zabetakis - former Secretary to Deputy Chief of Mission Neitzk^^^|^0B^

The Select Subcommitte staff, including staff investigators, also conducted
interviews, not taken under oath, of the following individuals: Mark E. Anderson; Terri Lee
Baker; Richard C. Barkley; Frederick Baron; Maria Barton; Samuel "Sandy" Bergen Robert
L. Burkhart; Ambassador Lawrence Butler (telephonically); Robert Caudle; Peter Comfort;
Robert Davis; former Senator Dennis DeConcini; Dushka Djuric; Robert P. Finn; former
Speaker of the House Thomas S. Foley; Philip S. Goldberg; Jane Green; Anthon> G.
Harrington; Christopher R. Hill; Christopher J. Hoh; Swanee Hunt; Stephen H. Klemp;
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake; former Republican Leader of the House of
Representatives Robert Michel: John Monjo; Imam Sevko Omerbasic; Ronna Pazdrai;
Shane Pitzer. Susan Ray; John Rizzo; William G. Root; James W. Swigert; Mildred
Tangney; Alexander "Sandy' Vershbow; Paul Vogel; Ambassador Jenonne Walker;
Thomas G. Weston; Philip C. Wilcox. Jr.; and John S. Wolf.

Briefirtgs of Subcommittee staff and special investigators at C|^
given by the following CIA analysts of the Directorate of Intelligent

Headquarters were

Under advisement of their agency of for other reasons, several of the above
individuals declined to testify under oath. The National Security Council (NSC) declined
to have its employees testify under oath, including National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake
and his deputy Samuel 'Sandy* Berger. Chairman of the President's Intelligence
Oversight Board, Anthony Harrington, at the instniction of the White House Counsel, also
declined to testify urwier oath. Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Secretary of
Defense William Perry, and Leon Feurth. Assistant to the Vice President for National
Security Affairs, all declined to sit for a staff deposition.

In addition, the Select Subcommittee acquired copies of relevant testinxjny given
by several indivkluals in dosed hearings conducted by the House Permanent Select
Committee on IntelligerKe (HPSCI). HPSCI was most generous in sharing these and other
resources for review by the Select SutKommittee. The Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (SSCI) also provided the Select Subcommittee access to transcripts of its

relevant closed hearings. In addition, SSCI offered the services of their special
investigators who shared their research and information they obtained during their
investigation of this issue.

Acquisition of Classified and Non-Classified Federal Government Documents

Throughout the Subcommittee's investigation, documents were obtained from
several Federal agencies. Documents were processed, each identified with a bate stamp
number and stored in a Sensitive Compartmented Infonmation Facility (SCIF).

The Select Subcommittee sought relevant documents from numerous federal
agencies. These agencies included the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department
of Defense (DOD), the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Security Council
(NSC),the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Intelligence Oversight Board (lOB). the US
Information Agency (USIA), and the Department of State (DOS). The Select
Subcommittee initially submitted written requests to Federal agencies based on infonnation
available in the public record. The agencies identified responsive documents and, with
some exceptions, made them available for review. Security an-angements were made for
the review of classified documents, in accordance with proper security procedures. The
Conference Room, within the Select Subcommittee offices, was examined for surveillance
devices whenever deposition testimony was given or classified documents reviewed.

Some agencies permitted the Select Subcommittee to retain copies of pertinent
documents, and others provided documents which were to be returned following this
investigation. Review of highly classified documents was conducted in a secure facility at
the various agencies, and only notes were permitted to be removed by the staff.

Central intelligence Agency (CIA)

Two staff members from both the Majority and Minority staff were given unrestricted
access at CIA headquarters, to a wide variety of requested materials, including over a
1.000 documents and cables related to our inquiry. The Select Subcommittee, also
received over 1,000 pages of CIA finished intelligence products for review at the
Subcommittee.

department of Defense (DOD)

Both the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
offered their cooperation in providing the Select Subcommittee with documents relating to
the Balkans crisis. Several hundred NSA documents were reviewed by staff at NSA

headquarters, and approximately 1 50 pages of materials were made available for review
at the Select Subcommittee offices. DIA also compiled several hundred documents for
review at DIA headquarters and provided approximately 250 for use at the Select
Subcommittee.

National Security Council (NSC)

The National Security Council (NSC) provided fewerthan 30 documents for use at
the Select Subcommittee. The staff was briefed on an additional 52 documents at the
NSC. In addition, the Subcommittee was provided with a Bosnian Document List,
however, no actual documents were attached.

White House • Intelligence Oversight Board (lOB)

The President's Intelligence Oversight Board (iOB) provided the Select
Subcommittee with a list of individuals it reviewed in the course of its own investigation.^

United States Information Agency (USIA)

The United States Information Agency (USIA) provided the Select Subcommittee
with copies of official calendars kept by Susan Hovanec, the Public Affairs Officer at the
US Embassy in Zagreb, for 1994 and 1995. These calendars documented dates of
important meetings between Hovanec and officials in the region, relevant to our
investigation.

* See Chapter 7.

CHAPTER 6

ADMINISTRATION RECORD OF COOPERATION
WITH THE SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE

During the first days of it's existence and throughout the investigation, the Select
Subcommittee continuously sought the cooperation of various federal government
agencies. In an effort to obtain all classified and unclassified information related to the
United States role in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia and Bosnia, the Subcommittee
requested the assistance of the White House, National Security Council, Intelligence
Oversight Board, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of State. Department of
Defense, Department of Justice, and Federal Bureau of Investigation. The rate and scope
of administration cooperation, however, varied from full compliance from some agencies
to almost complete non-compliance from others.

In April 1996, before the establishment of the Select Subcommittee, document
requests relating to the Iranian "green light" policy had already been submitted to the
Administration. Chairman Arlen Specter and Vice Chairman RotJert Kerrey of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence contacted the President's Intelligence Oversight Board,
the National Security Council, and the Department of State requesting "any unpublished
material bearing on this subject, such as cables, electronic correspondence, intemal
memoranda, minutes of meetings, letters, and memoranda to other agencies or talking
points for briefings.'^ Additionally, Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee requested the President turn over ". . . all documents related to the role that
your Administration may have played in proposing, organizing, assisting, consulting,
arranging, or agreeing to the transfer of arms by any govemment or private organization
into the former Yugoslavia during the period in which the United Nations arms embargo
was in effect."* Chairman Benjamin Oilman of the House International Relations

^ Letter from Arlen Specter. Chairman, and Robert Kerrey, Vice Chairman,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, to Warren Christopher (hereinafter
'Christopher*), Secretary of State (Apr. 9, 1996). See Appendix B.

' Letter from Jesse Helms (hereinafter "Helms') Chairman. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, to President Bill Clinton (hereinafter 'Clinton') (Apr. 16. 1996).
Sfifi Appendix B.

Committee, and Chaimian Floyd Spence of the House Committee on National Security
also submitted requests at this time, for similar information.'

President Clinton on May 15, 1996, insisted that the Administration would cooperate
with Congress:

I have asked the relevant agencies ... to work with you to ensure that the
Committee obtains the information it needs on this matter.

I welcome this opportunity to present the policy my Administration has
pursued to help bring peace to Bosnia. Let me assure you that my
Administration will cooperate fully with the Committee and with other
Congressional bodies in their examination of this matter*

Because Congressional requests were made, and because the President directed
his agencies to meet these requests, it is presumed that the Administration would have
compiled all infomiation relevant to the Iranian arms issue. When the Select
Subcommittee later requested this infomiation. however, the Administration needed until
the end of September, five months after the original Congressional request, to gather all
related materials. The Subcommittee notes, in particular, that the materials made available
on September 27 by the Department of State were important documents, critical to the
investigation of the US role in Iranian arms transfers. The Department was aware that it
was providing access to documents only a week before the Subcommittee planned to
finalize its report.

Agency Compiiance
Central Intelligence Agency

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was the most cooperative and willing of the
Administration agencies in their efforts to provide the Select Subcommittee with requested

' Letter from Benjamin Gilnrian (hereinafter "Giiman*), Chairman, House
Intemational Relations Committee, to Christopher (May 2. 1996); Giiman to Anthony
Lake (hereinafter "Lake"), National Security Advisor, (May 21, 1996); Ftoyd Spence.
Chairman, National Security Committee, to William Perry. Secretary of Defense, (Apr.
15,1996). See Appendix B.

* Letter from Clinton to Helms (May 15. 1996). See Appendix B.

documents and other related material. Within days of the Subcommittee's inception,
thousands of pages of cable traffic were made available at the CIA headquarters for review
by a limited number of Select Subcommittee staff. The CIA also accommodated the
Sut>committee in making their staff, including former Director of Central Intelligence James
Woolsey, available for depositions and interviews, as requested.

In addition, the Agency also played a pivotal role in expediting the security clearance
process for Select Subcommittee staff, which enabled the Subcommittee to complete its
investigation during its six-month charter.

Department of Defense

The Department of Defense (DOD) was generally helpful in the production of
requested documents. It was consistently effective in making Defense personnel available
for depositions, as requested. The only exception to this remains an outstanding request
for Secretary William Perry's appearance to provide information to the Select
Subcommittee.

In addition, the Defense Department's Investigative Service and Security Directorate
understood the Subcommittee's critical and immediate need to obtain security clearances,
and were instrumental in expediting the processing of background investigations of the
Subcommittee staff.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

On May 13, 1996, Chairman Hyde requested special agents be detailed from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to the Select Subcommittee to assist with its
investigation of the US role in Iranian arms transfers.* The "October Surprise Task Force",
in 1992, employed the services of seven agents detailed from three federal govemment
investigative agencies, while the Select Subcommittee requested only three agents from
the FBI. Additionally, unlike 'October Surprise*, the Select Subcommittee pakl the salary
and benefits of these agents, not the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

' Letter from Henry J. Hyde (hereinafter 'Hyde'), Chairman, Select
Subcommittee to Investigate the United States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to
Croatia and Bosnia (hereinafter 'Select Subcommittee*), to Louis Freeh. Director.
Federal Bureau of Investigation (May 13. 1996). See Appendix B.

The Subcommittee worked jointly with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FBI
to make the appropriate arrangements to secure their assistance.* Both agencies were
reluctant at first to provkje investigators to the Sub committee. Part of the FBI's hesitancy
could rightfully be attributed to the political fervor, at the time of the Subcommittee's
request, surrounding the White House/FBI "Filegate" affair.' Nonetheless, on July 23,
1996. the Deputy Attorney General, Jamie Gorelick, approved the detailing of three FBI
agents to work as shared resources between the Majority and Minority staffs of the Select
Subcommittee.

In an effort to ensure that the inquiry would be conducted in a bipartisan manner,
Chief Counsel and Chief Minority Counsel agreed to a memorandum of understanding with
respect to the utilization of the agents detailed to the Select Subcommittee.' The
memorandum provided that the investigators assigned would be a joint resource between
the Majority and the Minority staffs, it was also agreed that, upon conducting an interview,
the investigators would provide an interview report to both the Majority and Minority staffs.

Department of Justice

In addition to the Department of Justice's assistance in obtaining FBI agents for the
Select Sutxx>mmittee, DOJ p>ersonnel were also helpful in securing space for depositions.
The Office of Legislative Affairs, in particular, Alan Hoffman, was able to arrange secured
areas to conduct depositions of Ambassadors Charles Redman and Richard Holbrooke in
Chicago and New York, respectively. Likewise, the US Attorney's office was most
accommodating in these requests.'

' Memorandum of Understanding from Richard J. Pocker (hereinafter "Pocker"),
Chief Counsel, Select Subcommittee and Richard Meltzer (hereinafter "Meltzer").
Minority Chief Counsel, Select Subcommittee, to Howard Shapiro, General Counsel,
Federal Bureau of lnvestigatk>n (Aug. 9, 1996). See Appendix B.

' It was disclosed that the FBI was inappropriately used by political operatives in
the White House. Over 700 files - including background investigation materials - were
turned over to the Administratkin for no objective reason.

* MenK>randum of Understanding from Pocker to Meltzer (July 24. 1996). See
Appendix B.

* Deputy Chief of Chicago's Criminal Division, Sergb E. Acosta, and Chief of the
Civil Divisk>n in New York. Jane Booth, were very cooperative and willing to assist the

Department of State

The Department of State (DOS) was generally slow to respond to the Select
Subcommittee's document requests and reluctant to facilitate requested depositions and
interviews. At the outset of the Subcommittee's investigation, the Department stated that
it 'remains committed to cooperating fully with the Select Subcommittee, with a view
toward concluding this inquiry promptly."^*' The State Department's actual performance fell
well short of Ks assurances. Only days prior to the Sut>committee's drafting deadline and
after the Subcommittee had met with all witnesses, did the Department of State provide
important documents which were requested within the first month of the Subcommittee's
existence.

The Select Subcommittee, on July 26, 1996, made an initial request to the
Department of State for Ambassador Galbraith's compilation of memos which he
maintained in his office in Zagreb as his "record' of the issues and events that he
encountered as US Ambassador to Croatia. Also requested were the Ambassador's
calendars, phone records, and travel vouchers. The Department at first characterized the
record as being Ambassador Galbraith's personal document despite it having been typed
by a government secretary, on a government computer, on govemment time."

On August 22, 1996, the State Department made available only selected (by State
Department officials) portions of the record. Even then, the Subcommittee was not given
copies of these materials, as requested, but rather was only allowed to review selected
portions at the State Department, where no photocopying or verbatim note taking was
permitted.^' Not until September 18, 1996, were Chaimnan Hyde and Mr. Hamilton advised
that Ambassador Galbraith's 'record* would be made available, in its entirety, at the State
Department. It was made available for review, however, solely to the chief counsels who
could not rennove any notes from the Department, nor discuss the contents of the over 1 50

Select Subcommittee staff.

" Letter from Barbara Larkin (hereinafter tarkin*). Assistant Secretary,
Legislative Affairs, Department of State, to HydS (July 30, 1996). See Appendix B.

" Letter from Hyde and Lee Hamilton (hereinafter 'Hamilton*), Ranking Minority
Member, Select Subcommittee, to Christopher (July 26, 1996). See Appendix B.

" Letter from Larkin to Hyde (Aug. 22. 1996). See Appendix B.

page document with anyone other than Chairman Hyde and Mr. Hamilton."

Based on testinxjny received by various witnesses, the Select Subcommittee, on
August 14, 1996. requested access to additional documents during staff travel to Embassy
Zagreb. The requested documents included the chronological cable file of all cables sent
to the State Department by Embassy Zagreb, as well as notes taken by Political Officer
Richard Hoitzapple during Gaibraith's meetings. To alleviate costs and the burdens of
production upon the State Department, Select Subcommittee staff offered to review the
previously requested phone records and travel voucher information while at Embassy
Zagreb, and to simply make copies of only those portions the Subcommittee staff
determined to be relevant to their inquiry. This offer would have saved the Department
from making photocopies of the entire set of documents, and shipping those same items
to the Select Subcommittee offices." Upon arrival in Zagreb, however, the Subcommittee
staff was not permitted to view any documents and were told that it would be provided
access to them only in Washington. Some of the documents were finally provided on
September 18, 1996.'*

As part of the staff delegation's inquiries, the Select Subcommittee asked the State
Department to request, on its behalf, meetings with specified Croatian and Bosnian
govemment officials and community leaders to discuss their knowledge of the United
States' role in Iranian arms transfers.'* Due to the late notice from the State Department,
Embassy Zagreb was only able to arrange one meeting. One hour prior to the staffs
departure, the Subcommittee staff met with Croatian Muslim cleric Imam Sevko Omerfoasic.
Despite a renewed request," the State Department has never shared a copy of a
diplomatic note or other Departmental correspondence showing Department efforts to
arrange the requested meetings with foreign officials.

^' Letter from Larkin to Hyde (Sept 17, 1996). See Appendix B.

** Letter from Hyde and Hamitton to Christopher (Aug. 14, 1996). See Appendix

" Letter from Larkin to Hyde (Sept 17, 1996). See Appendix B.

'* Letter from Hyde to Christopher (Aug. 12, 1996); letter from Hyde and
Hamitton to Christopher (Sept. 5. 1996). See Appendix B.

" Letter from Hyde and Hamilton to Christopher (September 5, 1996). See
Appendix B.

Subsequent document requests, made in early and mid-August, were also not
responded to until September, including requests to turn over the approximately 30 spiral
notebooks that former Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Alexander
Vershbow kept during his tenure with the State Department. The morning of Vershbow's
deposition, the Select Subcommittee staff was informed that Vershbow made available
some of his handwritten notes, which were taken contemporaneously with events being
investigated by the Subcommittee. That same day. Chairman Hyde submitted a document
request to the State Department requesting production of all of Vershbow's notes, not just
those the State Department decided the Subcommittee should review." More than one
month later, the State Department provided only portions of the materials to Hyde and
Hamilton, and even fewer sections for review by Subcommittee staff.

The integrity of the Subcommittee's investigation and report rests upon the
assurance that all materials it has determined relevant, have been turned over. The
Subcommittee could not entrust the truth-seeking process to the Department and
indivkJuals who have a stake in the outcome. As with any oversight investigation, it should
be the oversight body that makes the determination of relevant material, not the agency
at the heart of the investigation.

With respect to requests for depositions, on August 1, 1996. the Select
Subcommittee sent letters requesting the State Department make Deputy Secretary of
State Strot)e Talbott and Undersecretary for Political Affairs Peter Tamoff available for staff
depositions." Subcommittee Staff was advised that the Department's legal section was
reviewing the resolution creating the Subcommittee to detemnine if the Select
Subcommittee had the authority to take staff depositions of "principals.* It was asserted
that the "principals' were Seaetary of State Warren Christopher. Deputy Secretary of State
Talbott, and Undersecretary for Political Affairs Tamoff. Moreover, it was also asserted
that the issue of whether the State Department would even allow 'principals' to sit for staff
depositions was at the same time separate from whether the Select Subcommittee enjoyed
the authority to conduct such proceedings.^

^* Letter from Hyde to Christopher (Aug. 12, 1996). See Appendix B.

'• Letters from Pocker and Meltzer to Christopher (Aug. 1. 1996). See Appendix

" Letter from Hyde to Christopher (Aug. 26, 1996); letter from Patrick B. Mun^y
(hereinafter 'Murray'). Deputy Chief Counsel, Select Subcommittee, to Michael
Klosson. Deputy Assistant Secretary. Legislative Affairs, US Department of State (Aug.

The State Department's refusal of the Select Subcommittee's request to have
Talbott and Tarnoff sit for the requested depositions could not be based upon any legal
principle. House Resolution 416 unambiguously authorized such depositions and
authorized the Chairman to issue a subpoena compelling the appearance of any individual
for such depositions. In the interest of time, the Subcommittee agreed to the State
Department's August 28 proposal that Taltxjtt and Tarnoff meet with Chairman Hyde. Mr.
Hamilton, and Select Sutx»mmittee staff for a one hour informal unsworn interview.'' At
the interview both Talbott artd Tarnoff agreed to provide their testimony under oath and did
so.

Additionally, the State Department did not honor the Subcommittee's request" to
meet with Secretary Christopher. On Septemt>er 26, the Department informed the Select
Subcommittee that the Secretary's schedule did not permit him to accommodate the
request.**

The White House - National Security Council

The National Security Council (NSC) made only 22 documents available to the
Select Subcommittee staff out of approximately 63,000 pages of documents that turned
up in response to its initial search request and review. Many of these documents are
classified as Top Secret." There were another 75 documents that the NSC agreed to brief
only Memtjers. with staff present. Those documents could neither be copied, nor read by
Sut>committee staff.

The Select Subcommittee also requested the NSC make available its personnel for
depositions. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and US Ambassador to the Czech
Republic Jenonne Walker (who had been on the NSC during the green light decision),
were asked to testify due to their direct role in provkiing instructk)ns to US Ambassador to
Croatia Peter Gaibraith regarding the US response to Croatian PreskJent Franjo Tudjman's
request for a US position on Iranian arms transfers. Deputy Natk)nal Security Advisor

6. 1996). See Appendix B.

*' Letter from Larkin to Hyde (Aug. 29, 1996). See Appendix B.

" Letter from Hyde and Hamilton to Christopher (SepL 24. 1996). See Appendix
B.

" Letter from Larkin to Hyde (SepL 26. 1996). See Appendix B.

Samuel Berger's deposition was requested because of statements attributed to him by
Alexander Vershbow. former Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. With
respect to Vershbow. he was integral to the fonnuiatlon of the policy change while he was
at the State Department in late April and early May of 1994. In June 1994. he moved to
the NSC. where he continued to follow this issue. Based on NSC documents there was
also reason to interview him regarding his actions and knowledge after the "no instructions"
policy had been articulated to the Croatian government.'*

The NSC witnesses from whom depositions were requested were determined based
on a number of factors, including how centra! his or her role was in the conveyance of the
Iranian green light decision. Disturbing questions of credibility needed to be resolved, as
well as issues of whether the President was fully infomned of the intelligence on this matter
or on the risks Inherent in making the decision to let Iran send weapons into Croatia and
Bosnia. These issues were particularly difficult to ascertain, due to the 'deliberative
process" veil of executive privilege the Administration cast over this information.

On August 14, 1996. the Counsel to the President. Jack Quinn. responded to the
Select Subcommittee's request to take the depositions of Lake. Berger. Walker, and
Vershbow. The White House asserted the position that neither cun-ent nor fomier NSC
staff vrould be allowed to sit for staff depositrons. because to do so would intmde upon the
President's 'deliberative process."*

The White House described the Presklent's "deliberative process" on July 23. 1996.
as matters pertaining to confidential communications to and from the President.
Presidential meetings with foreign heads of state, and the content and deliberations of
Principals* and Deputies' Committee meetings. The Select Subcommittee made it clear
that their questioning would not intrude upon these areas. The Subcommittees interest
was to establish facts regarding these individuals' actions implementing and transmitting
the policy, not to delve into their deliberative discussions with the President The
Subcommittee understands the necessity of preserving the Presklent's ability to seek frank
arKJ honest discusskin of views from his staff, in order for him to undertake his obligations

** Letter from Hyde to Christopher (Aug. 15. 1996); letters from Pocker to Lake
(July 31. 1996). See Appendix B.

** Letter from Jack Quinn (hereinafter "Quinn"), Counsel to the President, to
Hyde (Aug. 14. 1996). See Appendix 8.

appropriately.^

Due tc the NSC's lack of cooperation, the Select Subcommittee began preparation
of subpoenas to compel the production of sworn depositions of Lake, Berger, and
Vershtiow. To avoid issuance of the subpoenas, the White House Counsel met with
Chairman Hyde and Subcommittee staff on September 17, 1996. The Counsel explained
that "executive privilege is as much a process as it is a privilege.' Thus, there was no
difficulty for the NSC and the White House to produce these senior government officials
for an interview to discuss their role in the execution of the Iranian arms pipeline policy
decision so long as it was merely an "interview" format. The Counsel argued that, in the
view of the White House, an oath and a transcript alter the nature of a meeting, because
those items are 'indicia of a hearing.' He admitted, however, that there is a well-
recognized exception to executive privilege whenever there are "credible allegations of
criminal wrongdoing." Additionally, the White House required the presence of a Member
of Congress during the interviews with "principals" Lake and Berger.^'

The White House continued to refuse, however, to permit Leon Fuerth. Assistant to
the Vice President for National Security Affairs, to appear for a deposition, as requested
by the Select Sut)committee". Rather. Fuerth was made available to brief only Chairman
Hyde and Mr. Hamilton on issues not touching upon the deliberative process.*

To resolve the impasse, and to facilitate the fact-gathering process within the Select
Subcommittee's very limited time frame, Chairman Hyde accommodated the White
House's prerogative on this issue and agreed to non-sworn inten/iews. For the record, it
was nnade dear that if the Select Subcommittee was dissatisfied with the conduct of these
interviews, it had not waived its prerogative to issue and serve subpoenas compelling the
public servants' appearance for sworn depositions.

The Subcommittee is adamant, however, that there is no basis in taw for staff of the
NSC to refuse to appear before authorized Congressional subcommittees and give sworn
testimony demanded by a valid subpoena on matters pertinent to the legislative inquiry.

" Mun^y notes from NSC meeting (July 23,1996).

" Mun^y notes from Hyde-Quinn meeting (Sept. 17. 1996).

" Letter from Pocker and Meltzer to Quinn (Aug. 2, 1996). See Appendix B.

" Letter from Quinn to Hyde (Aug. 14. 1996). See Appendix B.

Congress "is entitled to have" a witness under subpoena give nonprivileged "testimony
pertinent to the inquiry. . . before the (authorized] committee."" The interest of the
Executive Branch in preserving the confidentiality of privileged material is fully protected
by appearing in response to the subpoena but asserting privilege in the event the witness
is asked questions which call for privileged material." To the extent NSC staff believe that
questions or document requests propounded by the Subcommittee through its staff call for
privileged material, the NSC may invoke such privileges through the proper procedural
mechanism. Short of making a specific claim of privilege, however, NSC staff cannot lay
claim to any immunity from the obligation to give sworn testimony in response to a valid
subpoena for pertinent information. Such refusal to appear and be placed under oath in
response to such a subpoena would be grounds for a citation for contempt of Congress."

The NSC staff cannot claim or be granted immunity from answering subpoenas.
First, the White House's assertion that this policy of not appearing for depositions has been
a long-standing tradition of the NSC is incon-ect. Former NSC aide Oliver North
involuntarily testified before Congress." NSC aide David Wigg testified before a federal
grand jury.^ National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and two former NSC staff
members were called as witnesses before a Senate investigative subcommittee,** and the
House Ethics Committee subpoenaed Lawrence Eagleburger, Brent Scowcroft and Robert
Hyland. all of whom were NSC staff."

* McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135. 180 (1927) (hereinafter "McQrain!).

'' 2 Opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel 197 (Sept. 6. 1978). 1978 OLC Lexis
50. at 205.

.»McGmioat180.

» United States v. Notlh. 901 F.2d 843. 851 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), qd
tBheaonq. 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. CIr. 1990) (per curiam), cftft. denied. 500 U.S. 541
(1991).

" G. Lardner. Wallarh Soupht $1 Million; Meese Ally Asked Client to Su DDOrt
•Washington Presence' on Pipeline . Washington Post. Mar. 6. 1988.

* G. Lardner. Bill y Probers to Question A Carter Aide . Washington Post, Sept.
16. 1980.atA12.

* C. Babcock & S. Armstrong. Fthirs Cnmmittee to Call 4 Officials: Committee to
Call 4 in S- Korean Probe; Subpoenas Voted In Investigation of S. Korean Gifts .

The Administration's argument that these precedents are distinguishable in that they
involved investigations into violations of federal criminal laws whereas the Select
Subcommittee's investigation is essentially a matter of oversight, is spurious. The
Supreme Court has not limited the power of investigation to cases involving allegations
of criminal misconduct, nor has the Court accorded less weight to the congressional
interest in oversight as compared to investigating crimes. To the contrary, the Supreme
Court has held that the congressional investigatory power 'encompasses inquiries
concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed
statutes.' in addition to 'probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose
corruption, inefficiency or waste."^'

Second, no official within the Executive Branch of government - not even the
President himself - enjoys blanket immunity from the obligation to comply with valid
subpoenas. If the President lacks blanket immunity from the subpoena power, it follows,
a fortiod, that NSC staff lack such immunity.** There is an obligation to testify in
appropriate instances that applies equally to all federal officials and that derives specifically
from the right of Congress to oversee the faithful execution of the laws by the President
and his administration."" Although a number of recognized privileges, such as executive
privilege "may shield an official from answering some or all congressional questions if they
fail to meet the standard of 'right to know,' there is no basis for a constitutional doctrine that
some officials need not even appear to hear the legislators' questions because they are
wrapped in privilege as to every aspect of their knowledge or activity."*^

Moreover, according to the Supreme Court:

A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information . . . and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite informatton - whk:h not infrequently is true - recourse must be had

Washington Post, June 9. 1977. at A1.

^ Watkins v. United States , 354 U.S. 178. 187 (1957).

» Cf. tJixon V. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731. 750 (1982) ("The President's unique
statuS'under the Constitution distinguishes him from other executive officials.*)

** Franck. Comment: The Constitutional and Legal Position of the Nationa!
Security Advisor and Deputy Advisor , 74 Am. J. Int'l L. 634, 637 (1980).

^ Id. at 638 (citing t Inited States y. Nuqd, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).

to others who do possess it. Experience has taught that mere requests for
such information which is volunteered is not always accurate and complete;
so some means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed.*'

In short, the Supreme Court, has ruled that "[t]he power of inquiry - with process
to enforce it - is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function."*^ and "is
inherent in the power to make laws."*'

The President's Intelligence Oversight Board

In order to do as thorough a job as possible investigating the Iranian green light, the
Subcommittee attempted to review previous efforts. Principal among them was the
investigation undertaken by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (lOB) in 1995.
The lOB investigation had been undertaken at the direction of White House Counsel Abner
Mikva, and rt was upon its findings that the White House Counsel reached his legal
conclusions. Accordingly, on July 26, 1996, Chairman Hyde requested a copy of the lOB's
report to the President on the Iranian arms matter. The Subcommittee also requested a
list of names of the individuals interviewed by the lOB during the course of its investigation
and any memoranda of those interviews.**

On August 5, 1996. Anthony Hamngton, Chaimnan of the lOB rejected the request
for these documents.** In their discussrans with the Subcommittee, the White House and
lOB never asserted privilege, either executive or attorney-client. Their argument was
simply that disclosure of the report and the underlying documents would "do violence" to
the lOB's ability to obtain a truthful and complete accounting of events from government
officials. The lOB was unable to answer the Subcommittee's question of why the lOB's
public release, a few months eariier, of its findings on its investigation of intelligence
activities in Guatemala under the Reagan and Bush Administrations, had not done more

*' McGrata at 175.

** Id. at 174.

*» Eastland v. l InHftd Statas Servicemen's Fund . 421 U.S. 491 , 504 (1975).

** Letters from Hyde to Anthony S. Harrington (hereinafter "Harrington"),
Chairman. Intelligence Oversight Board (July 26, 1996 and Aug. 13, 1996); letter from
Hyde and Hamilton to Lake (July 26, 1996). See Appendix B.

** Letter from Harrington to Hyde (Aug. 5. 1996). Sfifi Appendix B.

'damage* than sharing the Iranian green light findings with Congress behind closed doors.
The lOB did argue that the public release of the Guatemala findings was necessary due
to the confused state of the record on the matter.** That may very well have been the
case, but the Subcommittee notes that the same confusion reigns in the Iranian green light
issue.

After much negotiation the White House did eventually relent to providing the
Subcommittee with a written list of the individuals the lOB interviewed in the preparation
of its Iranian green light report.*'

On the issue of testifying before the Subcommittee under oath and on the record,
Harrington, similar to the NSC staff, also refused, on advisement from the White House.
The information he provided to the Sut>committee was through an unswom interview,
without a court reporter present to make a verbatim transcript.

The Subcommittee strongly believes that, in this case, the Administration's refusal
to give Congress access to the lOB report has actually done real damage to the integrity
of the lOB's investigatory process. Based upon the infomnation the White House has
provided from the report, the Subcommittee concludes that at least two individuals
interviewed by the lOB withheld relevant documentary information and some may have
provided contradictory statements to the lOB and Congress. These individuals are,
however, now safe in the knovi^edge that it is impossible to document these actions
because of the lOB's claim of 'privilege.'

Finally, the Select Subcommittee is concerned that the Administration has publicly
cited this lOB report to exonerate the Administration of wrong doing in the Iranian green
light policy, but refuses to allow Congress to examine the report or to allow its author to
testify under oath about it so as to allow the Subcommittee to verify its accuracy or
authority. Democratic Senator Rot)ert Kerrey has expressed similar concerns:

I think this entity ... is veiy badly named as an oversight board, and cannot,
under any circumstances. vindKate the Presklent If there is a daim of oversight -
if there is a daim of Executive Privilege and a daim of vindk^ation simultaneously,
one of those two has to fall.

** Select Subcommittee Interview with Anthony Harrington (hereinafter
■Harrington InL"), July 25,1996, at 7.

*^ Letter from Harrington to IHyde (Sept 20. 1996). See Appendix B.

Let me isolate two mistakes. One is in implying because it has a
name - Oversight Board ~ that it is an oversight board. It's not.

Plhere's been some references that the President w^as vindicated by
an oversight board, and that leaves an impression with the citizen that this
is different than what I think this organization is.

The second mistake was sending Mr. Hamngton to the Hill at all. I
mean. I really think he should not have been sent up to Capitol Hill to srt
before this Committee with a report that he would read but not be able to
leave with the Committee.**

Subpoena

Unlike some of the other Congressional examinations of the Iranian green light, the
Select Subcommittee enjoys a broad mandate as charted out in House Resolution 416. In
order to conduct an authentic oversight investigation. H.Res. 416 bestowed upon the
Chairman of the Select Subcommittee, "upon consultation with the ranking minority party
member of the Select Subcommittee." the authority to take "affidavits and depositions
pursuant to notice or subpoena.* Authorized subpoenas may be signed by the Chairman
of the Select Subcommittee. Furthermore, the resolution provided that such depositions
and affidavits could be conducted by staff as "designated by the chairman of the Select
Subcommittee."**

The Subcommittee conskjered the issuance of subpoenas on several occasions,
sometimes to the extent of having them prepared for service: once to get the White House
to comply with requests for NSC documents and depositions; twice to get the White House
to produce lOB materials; and twice to compel the Secretary of State to produce requested
documents. On eanh occasion the issuance was avoided by either the capitulation of the
Executive Branch or by Chairman Hyde's negotiating a compromise whereby the Select
Sutxxxnmittee couk) get access to cntk:ally required information without urKJermining either
the Select Subcommittee's rights to do legitimate oversight or the Executive Branch's
asserted privileges. Throughout this process, considering the very limited time made

** Hearing on US Actions Regarding Iranian Arms Shipments into Bosnia before
the Senate Setact Committee on Intelligence . 104th Cong. (May 28. 1996) (statement
of Vice Chairman Robert Kerrey).

** House Resolution 416. 104th Cong. (1995). Sea Appendix B.

available for it to do its work, the Subcommittee has preferred to compromise in order to
do as complete a job as possible rather than join in divisive and counterproductive public
battles with the Administration.

Classification

The Select Subcommittee on July 26, 1996.^ asked the State Department to
declassify Ambassador Galbraith's two reporting cables (Zagreb 1683 and Zagreb 1721 ),
dated April 27 and 29, 1994, as well as a memorandum to the file he prepared, dated May
6. 1994.'* These documents are absolutely key to any coherent discussion of the genesis
and implementation of the green light policy. They were prepared contemporaneously with
key developments and can be used in verifying the accuracy of testimony. The matters
discussed in these documents, excepting a few brief phrases, are not diplomatically
sensitive and their public disclosure would not compromise national security or intelligence
information or technk]ues. Additk>nally the substance of large portions of these documents
has t>een testified to in public testimony t>efore various Congressional committees by
Ambassadors Galbraith and Rednrtan, Undersecretary Tamoff, and Deputy Secretary
Talt>ott, with noticeable elisions of inconvenient facts and with a 'spin' not substantiated
in the documents. Nonetheless, after over one month of delit)erations and several missed
deadlines, the Department of State finally decided not to declassify any part of the two
cables and only declassified approximately one-half of the memorandum to the file.''

Clearly demonstrating the Administration's efforts to hkie its actions t)ehind the
shroud of dassificatnn is the feet that several sentences and phrases were redacted from
the nnenfK>randum that were dearty undassified, tHJt which would have been embarrassing
to the Administratk^n if they were known. For example, charaderizations by a senior
Department of State offk;ial of Washington's inept and confused handling of the initial
request from the Croatians about Iranian arms transshipments.

Based upon this highly unsatisfactory response. Chairman Hyde wrote letters to the

'° Letter from Hyde, Hamilton and Gilman to Christopher (July 26, 1996). See
Appendbc B.

'^ These are some of the documents that the State Department refused to altow
the Subcommittee to have in its possesson. Accordingly, they are currently availat>le
only at the Department arid cannot be induded in this report's appendices.

A copy of the redaded document is induded in Appendix B.

Information Security Oversight Office and the Interagency Security Classification Appeals
Panel on September 26. 1996" reporting the Department of State's apparent violation of
the Clinton Administration's own Executive Order 12958. in which are laid out the proper
uses of classification. Specifically, the Department appears to be in violation of the Order's
forbidding the classification of information to "prevent embarrassment to a person,
organization, or agency.*** Chairman Hyde advised the House of his action in a floor
statement on September 26, 1996.** The Subcommittee heard telephonically from the
Information Security Oversight on October 2, that an investigation is undenway.**

More recently, the Department of State refused the Subcommittee's request that it
declassify portions of the contemporaneous notes kept by fomier State Department official
Alexander Vershbow. The Subcommittee agrees that those portions that reference
confidential discussions with foreign heads of state are legitimately classified. It is.
however, unconscionable to refuse, as the Administration has. to declassify those portions
of the notes that detail conversations between US govemment officials on the execution
of what is now a publicly revealed policy.

" Letter from Hyde to Steven GarfinKel (hereinafter 'Garfinke!'). Director.
Infbnfnation Security Oversight. Natfonal Archives (Sept 26. 1996); letter from Hyde to
Rostyn Mazer, Chair. Interagency Security Classificatnn Appeals Panel. US
Department of Justice (Sept. 26, 1996). See Appendix B.

^ Executive Order 12958. Sectnn 1.8 (2).

»• 142 Cong. Record H1 1360 (No. 135 Sept 26. 1996) (Statements of Hyde).

*• Letter from Garfinke! to Hyde (Oct 1. 1996). Sea Appendix B.

CHAPTER 7

INVESTIGATION BY THE INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (lOB)

Origins of the lOB Investigation

In the fall of 1994, based upon a variety of intejijg ence reports from several sources, ^^^
and operational messages fromWBMIMWBBJyand elsewhere. Director of Central ^^y
Intelligence (DC!) James Woolsey, became alarmed that members of the Clinton ^^'
Administration may have been involved in an illegal covert action. He was concemed that
an improper and unauthorized diplomatic activity was qccuning, which was helping Iran
circumvent the UN arms embargo in the Balkans.'^J^^

As Woolsey examined the information that had been compiled for him.' he realized
the situation under review was related to a matter he had first become aware of in early
May 1994. In the ainent case, as before, there were strong indications that something
was askew in the implementation of the US policy enforcing the Bosnian amns embargo
as interpreted in the US Embassy in Zagreb, Croatia. Woolsey quickly decided to seek
guidance and advice from National Security Advisor Anthony Lake. That meeting
occurred on October 5, 1994.*

During that meeting, Woolsey shared with Lake the information he had indicating
a possible US role in facilitating or acquiescing in the Iranian shipment of weapons to
Bosnia by way of Croatia.' As a result of that meeting, on October 14, National Security
Council (NSC) officials, including Senior Director of Intelligence Programs George Tenet

' Select Subcommittee Deposition of James Woolsey. SepL 13. 1996. at 29.
(hereinafter "Woolsey Dep.*).

' CIA Memorandum by^HHHiv4'T3"^"9 Points for the DCI's Weekly
Meetings" (Sept 30. 1994).^^

' NSC document. 30, Nov. 16. 1994; CIA Memorandum by0BBVHBs
Talking Poinjg f or the DCI 's jl^eekly Meetings* (Segt. 30, 1994); CIA Memorandum for
the RecordMBHBBBHOcL 14. 1994)..

* CIA Memorandum for the RecordJVHIBBaif(OcL 14. 1994): Woolsey
Dep. at 53-54^

and Deputy Legal Advisor James Baker.' met with officials from the CIA to undertake a
preliminary investigation and to obtain copies of relevant documents.*

On November 1, 1994, NSC Legal Advisor Alan Kreczko met with White House
Counsel Abner Mikva to discuss the issues raised at the Woolsey-Lake meeting.' At about
the same time. Mikva met with Lake and White House Chief of Staff Leon Panetta for the
same reason."

In response to some of the legal issues raised in its preliminary investigation, Baker
wrote a legal memorandum analyzing the issues presented. That memorandum for the
record was dated November 7, 1994. According to oral, unswom statements by NSC staff,
that memo attempts to clarify the distinction between covert activities and diplomatic
activities.'

On November 29. Mikva met with Anthony Hanington, Chairman of the President's
Intelligence Oversight Board.'" The two men discussed the question of US complicity in

Not to be confused with former Secretary of State James A. Baker. III.

• Handwritten list of attendees at October 14. 1994, meeting with George Tenet
at CIA headquarters, CIA document label 94-339. Oct. 14. 1994; CIA Menvsrandum by

jrandum ogj * assage of Operational File to NSC Q^rge
^Tenet/jCIA CaETe.lPMiflHHOct. 15. 1994; CIA Memorandum byflpM
MBB^Telephone Call to Georgeienet' (Oct. 17. 1994); CIA Memorandum for the
Record "Meeting with George Tenet from NSC re Croatian Issues" (Oct. 14. 1994).

^ NSC document. 29. Nov. 16. 1994.

* Select Subcommittee Interview of Anthony S. Hanington. July 25, 1996, at 1
(hereinafter 'Harrington Int').

NSC document. 34. Nov. 16. 1994.

*" The lOB was first established by President Ford in 1976. Since then, the lOB
has had specific White House oversight responsibilities for intelligence activities.

President Clinton established the current lOB in 1993, pursuant to Executive
Order 12863. Under that Executive Order, the lOB is charged with preparing reports of
intelligence activities the lOB t>elieves may be unlawful or contrary to executive order or
presidential directive. See Executive Order 12863. The lOB is directed to refer reports
to the Attorney General if wrongdoing is believed to have occurred.

the Iranian circumvention of the UN arms embargo. During this meeting, the lOB was
assigned the task of investigating the arms embargo violations issues presented by the US
actions in the Ball^ans.

The lOB's investigative mandate was framed very narrowly by White House Counsel
Mikva. The lOB's directive was nanower in scope than the Select Subcommittee's charter.
as found in H.Res. 416. The issues before the lOB were:

1 . Whether Ambassador Galbrarth or Ambassador Redman was directly
involved in assisting an arms shipment pass through Croatia to
Bosnia in May 1994, in violation of the UN Arms Embargo;

2. Whether the "no instmctions" message to Croatian President Franjo
Tudjman by Ambassadors Galbraith and Redman constituted illegal
covert activity; and

3. Whether Ambassador Galbraith and Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs. Richard Holbrooke, made any offers
to provide amns or funds to the Bosnian or Croatian Govemments?"

Conduct of the lOB Investigation

The lOB conducted its investigatton by reviewing the intelligence and operational
infomnation underlying the initial concerns of the DCl. The IDS also reviewed additional
intelligence that was made available from other non-CIA sources. Several current and
former US government officials were inten/iewed by the lOB. Captain David Wesley
(USAF) of the lOB staff was assigned to work with the lOB members in the investigation
and the preparation of the report

Anthony S. Harrington is the current Chairman of the lOB. He is a senfor partner
at the Washington. D.C. law finn of Hogan and Hartson. Prior to his service with the
lOB. Mr. Harrington sensed as General Counsel to the Clinton-Gore 1992 presklential
campaign.

Mr. Harrington's felkw Board members included former Deputy Director of the
Natk)nal Security Agency Ann Caracristi and Philadelphia businessman Harold W.
Pote.

" Harrington Int at 1-3.

The individuals interviewed by the lOB were:

Department of State

Warren Christopher, Secretary
Peter Tamoff. Under Secretary/Policy
Richard Holbrooke. Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Charles Redman, Special Envoy to the former Yugoslavia
Peter Galbraith, Ambassador to the Republic of Croatia
Ronald Neitzke. Deputy Chief of Mission. Zagreb, Croatia
Jenonne Walker, Ambassador to the Czech Republic (former Senior Director
for European Affairs at the NSC)

National Security Council

Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor

Alexander Vershbow. Senior Director for European Affairs (former

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs)

Department of Defense

Walter Slocombe. Undersecretary for Policy

General Wesley Clark, Commander in Chief, US Southem Command (former

Director of the Office for Strategic Policy and Planning. Joint Chiefs)
Major General Ed Hanion, US Marine Corps HQ

Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hemck. former Defense Attache. Zagreb, Croatia
Colonel John Sadler, current Defense Attache. Zagreb, Croatia
Colonel Clifton Schroeder. US Marine Corps Reserve, European Command

LNO, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina
Colonel Davkl Hunt. US Army. Sarajevo. Bosnia-Herzegovina

Central Intelligence Agency

R. James Woolsey. former Director of Central tntefligence
Jmiral WPIiam Studeman, former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Tchief of Interagency Balkan Task Force

Theodore Price, former Dsputy Director of Operatkms
Douglas MacEachin. former Deputy Director for Intelligence

Harrington stated that the interview process was very infomnal. The lOB interviews
were not conducted under oath. None of the individuals interviewed were informed of the
applicability of Title 18, United States Code. § 1001, which makes it a crime to provide a
material false statement during the course of an investigation conducted by an agency of
the Executive branch. Harrington also stated that no verbatim text of any of the interviews
exist. The only memorialization of the interviews would be the notes taken by the
interviewer."

The lOB concluded its investigation by mid-May 1995. White House Counsel Mikva,
presented the lOB's report to the President on May 17, 1995."

Findings of the iOB Investigation

The IOB reached the foltowing factual conclusions, which are addressed, seriatim.

The IOB review found that Ambassador Galbraith did not take any action to facilitate
or direct the release of a Bosnia-txsund convoy that had been stopped in Croatia in eariy
May 1994. The IOB did find, however, that it had been provided conflicting information
regarding the role of Amt>assador Redman with respect to this particular convoy. CIA
officials stated that the Bosnians asked Redman to help obtain the release of the convoy
during negotiations in Vienna on the future of the Bosnian Federation. The IOB, however,
deenned Ambassador Redman's conduct as 'diplomatic discusstons,' insofar as he simply
removed a njpiog diment to negotiations that had arisen due to the stoppage of the
convoy." AMMsfficial woridng with Ambassador Redman in Vienna stated that Redman
had been advised of the problem by the Bosnians and may have taken steps to get it
released because the issue was not raised again in the negotiations. Ambassador
Redman stated, however, that he had taken no action obtaining the release of this
particular convoy. The IOB further found that even if Redman had taken action, the IOB

J^ List of IOB Interviewees. Select Subcommittee Doc. 000003, Sept. 20, 1996.
" Harrir^on Int. at 6.
'* NSC document. 39, July 28. 1995.

IS I

Hanir>gton Int at 2.

did not believe he was aware that the convoy contained weapons/*

For this issue, based on the factual conclusions made by the lOB, White House
Counsel decided that Ambassador Galbraith's and Ambassador Redman's actions did not
fall within the definition of covert activity.

With respect to the secorMJ issue, the lOB concluded that Ambassador Galbraith's
and Redman's statements to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman were consistent with the
"no instructions' policy approved by Washington. Additionally, the lOB found that Galbraith
had t}een instmcted not to report back, in writing, the result of his communications with the
Croatian President." The decision not to document the communication between the
Ambassadors and the Croatian Government was beyond the scope of the lOB's
investigative mandate."

The White House Counsel reached the legal conclusion on this issue that in
delivering the "no instructions* message, Galbraith and Redman were following their
instnjctions property and had not engaged in covert action.^'

With respect to the third issue, the lOB was unable to reach a conclusion as to
exactly what had been discussed by Ambassadors Galbraith and Holbrooke with Bosnian
jnd Croatian g ovemment officiaj gjn thejg ll of 1994. The lOB was unable to disprove
^JM^BP^M^eporting thatypB|Ahe two Ambassadors had discussed SF>ecific
covert action proposals with foreign offlcials. However, the panel believed these
discussions probably involved little more than 'contingency plans in the event the embargo
was lifted.'^ The lOB found no evkj^n^ that actual promises of funds or weapons were
made by the US officialSj^

Mikva concluded that legally these conversations were nothing more than

'•Id.

"Id.

at 3.

"Id.

at 3.

" Id. at 2.

»ld.

at 4-5.

'^Id.

at 5.

hypothetical discussions or items under consideration among the parties to the
negotiations. Because nothing concrete was promised, White House Counsel found that
no covert action occurred as a result of these discussions.^'

Limitations of ttie iOB Report

Despite the generally favorable findings set forth above, the White House, as
discussed in Chapter 6, refused to noake the IOB report available to the Subcommittee for
its review. The White House insisted that it only provide an oral briefing on the report
without a verbatim transcript The White House also refused the Subcommittee's request
to review the documentation compiled in the preparation of the IOB report, such as the
notes of interviews. Accordingly, the Sut>committee can judge the IOB report based only
on the information it has been provided.

That said, it is evident that the IOB investigation cannot be looked to for authoritative
answers to many of the questions relating to the Iranian green light policy that have been
put before the Subcommittee. In addition to the tOB's scope of inquiry being extremely
narrow, the report was prepared without benefit of interviews of key participants in the
events in question. Similarly, some of the indivkJuals interviewed did not provide the IOB
with access to relevant materials and, it appears, some of those interviewed did not
respond truthfully or completely. The IOB investigation appears to have been less than
thorough and insufficient to support the conclusk>ns reached.

First, the Subcommittee notes that the IOB never interviewed Deputy Secretary of
State Strobe Talbott rK>r IDeputy National Security Advisor Samuel ("Sandy*) Berger^ about
their participation in the implementation of the President's Iranian green light decision.

in Chapter 8, we explain how these two individuals were in key positions during the
period in question. It is sufficient here to note that Talbott, the second highest State
Departnrtent official in the Administration, and the highest ranking State Department official
in the United States at ttie tune tfie decision was made.^ was traveling with the President

' See IOB List of Witnesses, supca note 12. Cf. Select Subcommittee List of
Depositions and Interviews, See Chapter 5.

" Select Subcommittee Deposition of Thomas Donilon. Sept. 12, 1996, at 8-15.
Secretary Christopher was traveling in Egypt

when the green light issue was forwarded to the President." Meanwhile, Berger had been
in charge of the NSC; National Security Advisor Lake was traveling with the President.

Harrington has explained that the lOB was not concerned with how the policy was
formulated, but rather with the narrow questions of whether the policy was properly
implemented and whether the actions of any US government officials violated US law.*
Key to the first question, however, is understanding what exactly the policy was that
Ambassador Galbraith and other US diplomats were to have earned out. To do that, it is
necessary to determine Talbott's and Berger's understanding of that policy as given to
them by the President and how they expected it to be implemented. The lOB's failure to
interview these two key participants in the policy process seriously limits the value of the
JOB investigation.

Second, the Select Subcommittee questions the degree to which individuals
interviewed by the lOB were honest and forthcoming. Although the White House refuses
to disclose any statements of the JOB witnesses to the Select Subcommittee for review,
the lOB Chairman has stated that the lOB found no reason to make any criminal referrals
to the Justice Department based upon probable false statements made during the course
of the lOB's investigation. This leads the Subcommittee to surmise that the witnesses to
the lOB investigation gave statements, which contradict their testimony before the Select
Subcommittee, or the lOB is somehow unaware of significant factual inconsistencies in
various wKnesses' statements that have emerged in the Select Sut)committee's
investigation. One example, of many, which are developed in the following chapters,
p>ertains to the clear and material contradictions of several witnesses in the purported
transmittal of the 'no instructions* policy from Anthony Lake *with a raised eyebrow and
a smile.* The differences in the testimonies allows one to interpret the Administration's
policy as being strictly "No instructions. Period,"" as Anthony Lake put it, or "a wink and
a nod' as stated by Ambassador Galbraith.

" Select Subcommittee DeposKion of Strobe Talbott, SepL 5, 1996. at 30; Select
Subcommittee Interview of Samuel Berger, Sept. 26. 1996. at 1.

" Harrington Int. at 1 (scope of lOB inquiry narrower than Select
Subcommittee's). 2 (". . . [t]he lOB review was primarily concemed with determining if
the actions involving US officials would have fallen within the definition of 'covert
activity."). 6 (*. . . [t]he lOB does not investigate policy.*).

" Select Subcommittee Interview of Anthony Lake, SepL 26. 1996. at 2.

Finally, it has emerged Oiat some of the individuals whom the lOB interviewed, did
not provide the lOB with highly relevant and contemporaneous records of events under
investigation which they had in their possession. Specifically, Ambassador Galbraith and
former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alexander ("Sandy") Vershtxjw t>oth
made contemporaneous records of events involved in the lOB's inquiry. That they did not
share these documents with the lOB, despite the lOB's request for such materials, is
disturbing.

In the case of Ambassador Galbraitn, he kept a daily "Record' of his activities - as
Ambassador to Croatia - in which he documented several highly relevant meetings that
are key to understanding whether or not he had acted consistently with the instmctions
provided him by the Department of State. The head of the lOB, Hanington. only leamed
of the 'Record' in the course of his interview with the Select Subcommittee. The
Subcommittee, itself, learned of the "Record's" existence from Galbraith's former secretory,
Chariotte Stottman, to whom the "Record" was dictated.*

Similarly, H also appears the lOB was never told that Vershbow," who participated
in many of the telegraphic and telephone communk:ations between the embassy in Croatia
and the State Department, kept contemporaneous handwritten notes of those
communications.^ The Subcommittee has found those documents invaluable to its efforts
to reconstruct the events, especially since the Administration saw to it that the events being
scrutinized by the Subcommittee are largely otherwise undocumented. The descriptions

" See Select Subcommittee Deposition of Chariotte Stottman, Aug. 10, 1996, at
15-20. ("Q: Can you tell us what the Record is? A: Well , the Record started in - the
Record ended in November of 1995. It started - I think it started and lasted for atx)ut
10 days in 1993 and then it picked back up - it picked back up. I think, late '93. The
first one picked up and erKJed in atxHit 10 days around September, I think of. 1993. and
then in November of 1993 he started a second one. and it went until I went on honrie
leave on February Ist. and ttien he didn't dk:tate it while I was gone. He picked tt back
up when I retumed to post in May. Q: When you came back May 1 , 1994, you had
been gone a good two-and-a-half, three months? A: Three months. Q: At that tinoe dkl
Ambassador Galbraith need to catch up on the Record? A: He dM some catching up.*)

^ Mr. Vershbow currently serves as the Senk>r Deputy in the Directorate for
European Affairs at the NSC.

* Notes of Alexander Vefshbow, fonner Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State: Select Subcommittee Depositton of Alexander Vershbow, Aug. 8. 1996. at 5-12.

of events found in Vershbow's notes, tend to be at odds with the public gloss the Clinton
Administration has put on the Iranian green light. Mis notes display the lack of serious
discussion leading up to the President's decision, which led ultimately to the Iranians
establishing their strategic beachhead in the heart of Europe. Had the lOB been aware of
the notes, it might not have played such a prominent role in the application of that gloss.

CHAPTER 8

THE EVOLUTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE IRANIAN GREEN LIGHT POLICY

The decision by the Clinton Administration to give the Iranians and Croatians a
'green light' to throw the door open to Iranian weaponry, personnel and influence in the
Balkans was reached and implemented hastily in an uninformed haze of confusion. In
exploring the origins of the decision, which reflected a major departure from this country's
prior policy toward both Iran and the UN arms embargo, the Select Subcommittee
encountered staricly conflicting testinrx>ny from individuals involved in the process, as well
as significant discrepancies between contemporaneous documentation and the
Administration's after-the-fact rationalizations of its conduct. Those inconsistencies and
discrepancies represented a significant challenge to our ability to set forth with certair.ly
the factual record necessary to explain the origin of the decision to acquiesce in the
establishment of the Iranian arms pipeline. Nevertheless, this chapter will review the
relevant facts and contentions as revealed in the course of the investigation with a view
toward answering as best we can how such a decision came to be made and implemented.

This chapter is, for purposes of organizational clarity, divided into three sections.
In the first section, we have set forth the denranstrated US policy and reaction to Iranian
efforts to establish an arms pipeline through Croatia from August 1992, through the
summer of 1993. This section provides the background essential for understanding the
radical departure reflected by the April 1994 Iranian green light decision.

The second section describes the relevant events between Ambassador Peter
Galbraith's July 1993 arrival at his post in Croatia and April 1994, with a view toward
describing how Galbraith, Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak, US Special Envoy
Charles Redman, various Iranian surrogates and others orchestrated a situation in which
a radicat departure from established US policy toward Iran was not only contemplated but
approved at the highest levels of the US government

The third section provides a detailed expositk>n of what the Select Subcommittee
has t>een able to determine regarding the operatwnal details attendant to the new polic/s
genesis, implementatksn and immediate aftermath in 1994. It is, of necessity, intensely
detailed and inherently complicated, but has been presented in this fulsome manner to
allow the reader to reach his own judgment about the Clinton Administratton's corxJuct and
Its consequences.

No Question — "We Have A Policy"

In order to minimize the gravity of its decision not to inform Congress of the Iranian
green light decision, the Administration has attempted to argue throughout the Select
Subcommittee's investigation that the decision did not constitute a change in policy/
Although some of the witnesses from the Department of State have testified that, in their
opinion, US policy toward the amis embargo did not change in April 1994, no one has ever
been so disingenuous as to suggest that the decision was consistent with the US policy
of isolating Iran diplomatically, economically and politically. Moreover, numerous witnesses
testified that, as they understood it, US policy toward the UN arms embargo in the spring
of 1994 was exactly as Ambassador Galbraith described it in late April of 1994: the US
respects the arms embargo and expects other nations to do so, as well.^

The significant departure from prior policy represented by the Clinton
Administration's Iranian green light decision can only be appreciated when contrasted with
the response of the Bush Administration to the efforts of the Iranians and Croatians to
transship arms through Croatia to Bosnia in September 1992.* By swiftly and conclusively
informing the Croatian govemment that the United States did not approve of the Iranians
violating the UN arms embargo, bringing weapons and soldiers to Croatia, and using
Croatia as a transshipment point for arming Bosnian Muslims, the Bush Administration left
no doubt in the minds of the Croatians or the Iranians about American opposition to Iranian
involvement in the Balkan crisis. Although the Bush Administration knew that some
leakage of the arms embargo was occurring, it would not countenance an Iranian arms
pipeline and demanded, through a demarche, that the Croatians shut it down.

The Bush Administratton let the Croatis
Iranian arms pipeline was not to t>e condoned.i

Lknow by words as well as deeds that the

^Eg.. See Hearing On US Actions Regarding Iranian Arms Transfers Into Bosnia
Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence . 104 Cong. 65 (May 23, 1996)
(Testimony of Strobe Talbott).

' E4).. See Select Subcommittee Deposition of Robert l-iunter. Sept 20, 1996. at
8. 1 1-14. 41-42 (hereinafter "Hunter Dep.'): Select Subcommittee Deposition of General
Wesley Clark. Sept 4. 1996. at 7-13 (hereinafter 'Clark Dep.*).

* See Chapter 13.

Despite this "worry," tfie Croatian Government tested the US with the Iranian arms
shipment in September of 1992 and provided the senior official with a chance to convey
the US objections strongly. On Labor Day weekend 1992, he was sent to Croatia to
engage his Croatian contacts on the issue of the impounded Iranian arms shipment. He
met with Zuzul and advised him, in no uncertain terms, to send the arms back to Iran.'
Coupled with a United States demarche, a demand by the United States that the amns
delivery be reported to the UN and a request by Charge Ronald Neitzke of US Embassy
Zagreb to UNPROFOR to seize the arms, the CIA official's message as to the United
States' view on Iranian arms could not have been clearer.'

ifthe Central Intelligence Agency has been able to

deterfirrrie, the attempted Iranian arms pipeline was shut down in September 1992 and
remained djised until the Clinton Administration's Iranian Green Light decision in the spring
of 1994 Jp

On January 20, 1993 Bill Clinton was inaugurated PreskJent As noted earlier in this

* Select
11 (hereinafter

imittee Deposition ol

ug. 15. 1996. at 6-

• Select Subcommittee Depositfon of Ronald Neitzke. Aug. 7. 1996, at 13-23
(hereinafter 'Neitzke Dep.*).

Dep. at8-11.

|Dep. at 11-13.^^^

report, the Clinton Adnninistration expressed its intention to honor the UN arms embargo
as long as it was in effect.* The Clinton Administration also expressed strongly its policy
of isolating Iran diplomatically, economically and militarily.^° There was certainly nothing
in its public discussion of arms embargo policy or the policy toward Iran that would lead
foreign governments in the spring of 1993 to conclude that the United States would react
differently to the establishment of an Iranian arms pipeline through Croatia than it had in
September of 1992. The US had made a clear decision that UN Security Council
Resolution 713 applied to all of the former Yugoslavia and that "all arms embargo violations
should be investigated and where appropriate prosecuted.""

Events confirm that the Iranians ai
policy on Iranian arms transshipments

he Croatians understood the US no-nonsense

In February of 1993, the Turks and Iranians separately approaj
Govemment about the transshipment of arms to the Bosnian Muslims.

the Croatian

* See Chapter 3.
'"See Chapter 4.

Departmeot of State Cable, 82580, Mar. 22, 1993

The Croatian Government was clearly not willing to risk the ire of the United States.

-J^

In April 1993, Susak asked the US Special Envoy for the Former Yugoslavia,
Reginald Bartholomew, for the US view on Croatia's facilitation of Iranian arms shipments
to Bosnia. Bartholomew urged Susak to t>e careful in dealing with iran.^'' Bartholomew told
him that the United States could not be placed in the position of supporting Croatia in
transshipping Iranian arms and that it was Croatia's decision to make. Bartholomew went
on to say that the US could not be put in the positk>n of advising the Government of Croatia
to supply Iranian arms to the Bosnian Government.^ Ron Neitzke, serving as the
American Charge in Croatia in these pre-ambassadorial times, was informed by
Bartholomew of the Susak question and his response.^' Subsequent events in the next
few months revealed that Susak dk) not perceive Bartholomew's response as American
approval for such transshipments.

Around May 7, 1993. Presklent Tudjnnan discussed with Charge Neitzke the

^* Department of State Cable. Zagreb 1479. Apr. 27. 1993.

" Although depositton testimony was ot5lained from Mr. Bartholomew, his failure
to remember the words he spoke or the detafls of the conversation, plus his strained
efforts to fit his recollectk>ns into the current State Department Iheory" makes the
testimony of Ron Neitzke a t)etter source of evidence conceming this exchange.

^ Neitzke Dep. at 23-30.

increasing pressure the Croatian Government was receiving from Iran on the arms pipeline
issue. Tudjman characterized Iran as knocking at the door, and asked Neitzke what the
United States wanted Croatia to do. Neitzke. upon instructions from Washington, told
Tudjman that the United States did not want Croatia to enj^opto a relatkjnship with ]ran."
The Croatians followed Neitzke's advice a few days I

Although the Croatians would continue to flirt with greater ties to Iran in 1993. they
saw no need to ask the United States about its attitude toward the Iranian arms pipeline.
Charge Neitzke. the^jjMIBBofficial. and other US offlciais had nDade it abundantly clear.
Iranian arms in the Balkans was an unacceptable poison. As Ambassador Galbraith noted
in April 1994, "We do have a policy. We^obi^ the embargo and expect other countries to
obey Security Council resolutions.'^

The Question Is Orchestrated

The evidence that Peter Galbraith was involved in the planning of the Iranian arms
pipeline, or at the very least was knowledgeable of the details of its origin and operation
well before the last week in April 1994, is substantial. In his public testimony before the
House International Relations Committee in May of 1996, Galbraith assured Congressman
Henry Hyde that the kJea of establishing an Iranian arms pipeline to Bosnia originated with
the Croatians. and not w«thin the US government.* Moreover. Congressman Ballenger
questk)ned Galbraith regarding wrfiether Galbraith or "anyone else in our govemment ever
went to the Croatians. the Bosnians or the Iranians to suggest that they consider

" Neitzke Dep. at 32-34

23;

^ Department of State Cable. Zagreb 1721, Apr. 29. 1994.

" Hearing On US Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Bosnia and Croatia Before
the House Committft** On International Relations 104th Cong. 54 (May 30, 1996}

(Testimony of Ambassador Galbraith) (hereinafter 'Galbraith HIRC testinrwny').

establishing an arms pipeline from Iran, or to tell them that we would not object if such a
thing were to happen" Galbraith replied that he was not involved in any such conduct, and
'to the best of his knowledge' he did not 'inspire' this suggestion.^ In response to
Congressman Oilman's question about whether Galbraith was ever asked by anyone to
help implement the Iranian arms pipeline or help facilitate any dealing of Iranian arms to
Cnsatia or Bosnia, Galbraith answered "no.'^ The facts and testimony elicited during the
course of the investigation call the truthfulness of these responses into question.

An understanding of the background, activities and motivations of the principal
participants in the Croatian events leading to the opening of the Iranian arms pipeline is
essential to demonstrating Galbraith's knowledge and involvement.

Getting Acquainted

Peter W. Galbraith assumed his duties as the United States Ambassador to Croatia
in July of 1993. Upon Galbraith's arrival, Charge Ron Neitzke became the Deputy Chief
of Mission. A man with a penchant for action. Ambassador Galbraith brought to his new
position his lengthy experience as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Staff. As the President's emissary to a natk>n in what was perhaps one of the most volatile
parts of the worid, he faced a myriad of challenges and opportunities. Without delay, he
immersed himself in the politics and issues of the Balkan region with a self-confidence
amply displayed throughout his public life.^

Early in his tenure Galbraith made it dear that he was sympathetic to the plight of
the Bosnian Muslims, as they battled Serbs arKl Bosnian Croats in the complicated and
seemingly intractable conflict in Bosnia. Within two months of his arrival in Zagreb,
Galbraith met with Imam Sevko Omert>asic, a prominent Muslim spiritual leader in Croatia
arKJ a key contact of anyone hoping to follow the Bosnian Muslim issue from Croatia. He
was also a linch-pin figure in the establishment and operation of the Iranian arms pipeline.
In the late summer of 1993. Omeft>ask: was a sufHctently prominent leader in the Croatian

" Id. at 84-86.

" Id. at 149.

^ See Peter W. Galbraith. L ast Stand: A Report from Kurdistan , The New
Republic. Apr. 29, 1991; Peter W. Galbraith. Diplonriacy Helps Contain the Bosnian
Conflict. SAIS Review, Volume 15. SumnidSaBKf995.

Muslim convnunKy to merit a visit from the United States Ambassador.

The meeting occurred in Omerbasic's office. Gatbraith was accompanied by the
Embassy Zagreb Public Affairs Officer Susan Hovanec and another individual was present
as a translator, l-lovanec believes Ouska pjuric, a Foreign Service National worWrtg at the
Embassy, ananged the meeting.^ The evidence is conflicting, but it is possible that
Embassy Economic/Commercial Officer Tom Mittnatht accompaniisd Ambassador
Gaibralth to the meeting, as weli.'^ The meeting was a courtesy cafl which evotved Irito an
hour long dlsojssion of Muslim suffering and dying.** Galbraitf) expressed his sympathy
for the Bosnian MusBms arul informed Omerbasic that the US did not fear Islam or believe
everythir>g it heard about tfie dangers of increasing Islamic fundamentalism.** AltHough
Omerbasic daims never to have had any further meetings with Galbraith. the credMe
evidence available as a resuR of this investigation suggesb that Galbraith and Omerbasic
met a number of times between August 1 993 and April 29, 1 994."

The significance of this contact and relationship between GaB>raith and Omefba»c
arises from the rote Omerbasic played as thfikey tadlltator and operator of the Iranian
arms pipeline^throggh Croatia to Bosnia.* j

* Select Subcommittee Deposition of Susan Hovanec Aug. 14. 1996. at 31-33
(hereinafter *Hovanec Oep."). ,

"U. at 31^2, 76-78.

"Id.at34.

*" Select Subcommittee Interview of Sevto Omerbasic Aug. 21. 1996. at 2.

** Select Subcommittae Deposition of Charlotte Stottman. Aug. 10. 1996, aiSS
(hereinafter 'Stottman Dep."); Memorandum of Inten/lew of Terrl Lee Baker by Julia
Gaines and Janine Ooherty.

By the end of 1993, Peter Galbraith was firmly convinced that the Bosnian Muslims
were desperately in need of weaponry or they would not survive." He had mobilized his
staff to study and alleviate the Muslim refugee situation in Croatia. Embassy personnel
were communicating regularly with UN officials and Muslim community leaders, seeking
information and doing what they could on the problems." Anyone truly interested in the
Bosnian Muslim situation would have t>een acquainted with the Muslim leaders, including
Omerbasic.

Galbraith had no aversion to Islamic fundamentalism. As noted earlier, he told
Omerbasic as much in their first meeting. Moreover, Galbraith was not as concerned about
Iran or its influence, as were other Embassy Zagreb officials. As Neitzke has characterized
the situation, he and Galbraith had different views on Iran.^ Neitzke described his own
view toward dealings with Iran as 'don't do it, don't do anything with Iran."*" He became
very much aware of Galbraith's different view when, after the Iranian arms pipeline opened
up, Galbraith proved reluctant to do anything to end the Croatian-Iran cooperation for fear
that the arms flow would t>e interrupted. Galbraith dismissed Neitzke's fear of Iranian
terrorism by proclaiming that it was not in Iran's interest to attack the US.*^ With his mind
open with respect to Iranian intentions and set upon finding a solution for arming the
Bosnian Muslims. Galbraith was poised to act at the beginning of 1994 and receptive to
kleas.

Shortly after his arrival in Croatia, Ambassador Galbraith developed another
important relationship for purposes of this investigation, a long and close woridng
relationship with Croatian Defense Minister Susak.*^ The two men met and dined
frequently, establishing an alliance of professk>nal convenience and mutual benefit which

'^ Galbraith HIRC testimony at 21-22.

" Select Subcommittee Depositkm of Peter W. Galbraith, Aug. 19. 1996. at 77-
85 (hereinafter "Galbraith Dap.'); Neitzke Dep. at 41-42; Select Subcommittee
Deposition of Tom Mittnacht. Aug. 14. 1996, at 14-15. 44-52, 69-72; Select
Subcommittee Deposition of Richard HoKzapple, Aug. 20, 1996. 8-12.

" Neitzke dep. at 53-59.

*• Id. at 156-158.

*' Id. at 113-115.

'^ Galbraith Dep. at 147-46. 158-9.

bore, as part of its fruit, the Iranian green light decision. Gojko Susak, although a Croat
by birth, spent much of his adult life in Canada, amassing a fortune through his pizza
business. Born in a small town in Bosnia in the hills between Mostar and Split, after his
return to the Balkans as Croatian Defense Minister he became intensely focused on
regaining the region of his birth, known as the Krajina." As Defense Minister. Susak set
about building a military capable of retaking the U nited Nations protected area s in the
Krajina, Sectors North. South. East and West.

Susak ran the Croatian military with a hands-on approach, functioning more like a
commanding general than an American Secretary of Defense." As his primary focus was
Croatian natkjnalism. he was hostile toward the interests of the Bosnian Muslims and. even
when playing a critical role in the Iranian arms pipeline, he was not eager to see the
Bosnian Muslims armed with artillery or missiles.'* Susak was a powerful man in Croatia,
fluent in English from his Canadian years and a man of action for whom Galbraith
developed a strong affinity.

In the fall of 1993, the UN arms embargo posed an obstacle to Susak's efforts to
augment his army. Embroiled in fighting_with Bosnian Muslims and Serbs. Susak
ennbarked on a shopping trip for weapons j

with Galbraith in one of the first of many one-on-one meetir
next three years.*'!

Upon Susak's retum, he met
s the two would have over the

** Select Subcommittee Deposition of Richard Holbrooke. Sept 27. 1996. at 25-
31 (hereinafter 'Holbrooke Dep.*).

**ld.

«ld.

^'Neitzke Dep. at 46-52.

^ _^ As Susak

declined to make himself available for an inten/iew with the Select Subcommittee, it is
impossible to conclude with certainty whether or not parts otan Iranian-Croatian amns deal
were already well along as early as November 1993.j^^yr"

Besides the arms shopping trip to Iran. Susak attempted to cury favor with US
officials and learn what he could of US attitudes and policy toward the Balkans. In a
November 1 993 meeting with Undersecretary of State Peter Tamoff and US Special Envoy
Charies Redman, he learned that it was very important to these US officials that Croatia
cooperate in the process of getting humanitarian aid to the Bosnians* At that time and
on throughout 1994, the humanitarian aid flow to Bosnia consisted primarily of convoys,
organized by Muslim humanitarian organizations that later played a significant role in the
Iranian arms pipeline to Bosnia.

Ambassador Galbraith was irritated by the fact that his frjend Susak had not been
viewed as important eiKHigh to warrant a meeting with Woolseyi

* CIA Cable. State 343310. Nov."l 1 . 1993.

__^ This did fwt deter Galbralth from his efforts to

cultivate an exclusive relationship with Susak. As previously mentioned, the two began
working dosely together, and Galbraith would frequently meet with Susak through 1995,
often without reporting such meetings to Washington.** Both men began to reaHze that
they could achieve important goals working in tanderrror by using each oth^

As 1993 canrte to an er>d, Susak was still mulling over the possible arms deal with
Iran, although not excited about the prospects of sharing firepower with the Muslims with
whom the Croatians were stOI at war. The US was discouraging his military aspiratnns and
apparently had little interest in taking Croatia's side In the ongoing Balkan dispute.
Moreover, If he decided to go forward with an amis deal with Iran, he could anticipate
opposition from many within the Croatian government, who greatly feared the spread of
Iranian Influence In the area, as wed as fierce objections from the US about Iranian
flirtations." Susak's friendship and working relationship witii Galbraith offered a solution
to his problems.

The Bosnian Muslims were more than ready to be rescued, armed or ottwnwise
assisted in a war they were dearty not winning. The US Ambassador to Bosnia in 1993
and 1994. Victor Jackovich. was constantiy importuned by both Bosnian oftteials and
dtizens as to the need for weapons or a RflHig of the arms embargo." The anns embargo
was the most important issue for the Bosnian government and Bosnian ofRdals discussed
its Wling with .Ambassador Jackovich. Redman, congress tonal delegations and any US
offictai who woukj Hsten."

In late 1993 or the early months of 1994 Ambassador Jackovfch received a request
that was different from the generalized Importuning mentioned earlier. Bosnian Prime
Minister Siajdzic approached Jackovk:h and toM him that Bosnian Vtoe PreskJent Ejup
Gante. during a trip to MusSm countries, was Wbnned by the Libyan Foreign Minister ttiat

**Ne(tzkeDep. at 50-52.

" See pages 75-60.

" Select Sut>oommitt»e Deposilton of Vtetor Jackovteh. Aug. 20. 1996. at 6-12,
48-53 (hereinaAer 'JadaMOi Dep.").

Libya would be willing to send arms to Bosnia if the US was agreeable. Jackovic made no
comment on the proposal, Injt agreed to pass it on to Washington. Jackovich reported by
cable to the European Bureau of the Department of State. He never received a response
from the Department of State on the Libyan arms proposal, and does not recall any follow-
up with Bosnian officials. ^

Thus, it was no surprise that after Jackovich failed to respond favorably to the
Libyan arms deal, the Iranian arms pipeline proposal was never suggested or broached
with him.** In fact, altfK)ugh he knew that the Iranian and Bosnian government were having
continuous contact throughout March and April of 1994. Jackovich was not surprised that
the Bosnians did not discuss these contacts with him, in light of the US attitude toward
Iran.*" Cleariy, although sympathetic to the Bosnian Muslim concerns, the US Ambassador
to Bosnia was not a good prospect for assisting the Iranians in securing their arms dealing
franchise in the Balkans. The prospects were better in Zagreb.

Without Our Fingerprints

On the eve of the Clinton Administration's Iranian green light decision in late April
1994, Ambassador Galbraith assured the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs Sandy Vershbow that he could handle giving the US
gukjance to the Croatians on the Iranian arms issue "without our fingerprints."^ Although
this remarit is discussed in detail later in this report in the context of explaining the manner
in which the US conveyed the Iranian green light, it was a telling remark regarding
Galbraith's state of mind in the Spring of 1994 and the extent to whk:h he was familiar with
the planned Iranian arms pipeline.

Try as he might as the Iranian arms pipeline was established in the spring of 1994,
Ambassador Galbraith was unable to keep his own proverbial fingerprint from appearing
on the evidence. A mere comparison of how the Iranian pipeline was operated with

. " Id. at 54-57.

* Id. at 29-36.

* Id. at 16-20.

*' Select Subcommittee Deposition of Alexander Vershbow, Aug. 8, 1996, at 48-
56 (hereinafter "Vershbow Dep.*): Notes of Alexander Vershbow (hereinafter "Vershbow
Notes').

Ambassador Galbraith's words and deeds in the winter and spring of 1994 reveals starkly
his knowledge and role.

In late F ebmary or eariy March of 1994. Ambassador Galbraith approache«i^H
^^■■■■^to discus s a proposal he. was exploring to arm the Bosnian Muslims.
Galbraith requested that the^WWM^jUbegin a covert action proposal. The proposal,
as described by Galbraith /would involve the US communicating to the Croatians that it
would look the other way if the Croatians would allow amns for the Bosnian Muslims to
transit Croatian tenitory on whatever terms could be worked out between the Cnjatians
and the other parties. Galbraith further suggested that the Iranians could be the supplier
of the arms. He further proposed that the Turks be used as "cut-outs" in the plan. The
^appalled at the klea. replied that the plan was not a good idea as it would
give Iran a firmer foothold in the Balkans, would violate US law under the UN arms
embargo regime, would be unsustainable in an operational sense (UNPROFOR or NATO
would notice or the Iranians would leak knowledge of its existence) and it would result in
the Serbs viewing the US as a co-belligerent in the war." "

As additional downsides to Galbraith's plan, the^f^flffBlQidentified the risk
of encouraging Croatian military aspirattons. the lack of deniability given the need to let
ships or planes sneak by and the substantial risk to intelligence "&3^ties|posed^such
an "Iran-Contra" type plan without clear pdrcy-level gukJance. Th^^^B^B^Hended
his remartcs by informing the Ambassador that such a proposal would have to come down^
from theiiSP or the White House, and he would not initiate such an action proposal r^^

Despite thefipHHIfli^Bbleak assessment of the wisdom or prospects for his
Iranian 'IggK the other waV" plan. Galbraith appeared undeter^ed in his enthusiasm. He
told theSMBilMM^at he might raise the plan with National Security Advisor
Anthony Lake. Th ^^^M^1 ^>elieved that he had suffi piec«y dis couraged Galbraith
such that his Iranian plan wouW "die a deserved death."tifafip^^

Galbraitti thought differently. He was no stranger to creative thinking about actions
to arm the Bosnian Musfims. In November of 1992. while stifl a Senate Foreign Relations

Committee staffer, he accompanied Senator Daniel Moynihan to Bosnia. In a meeting with
the UN Commander, Genera! Morilion. he aslced the General what he thought atx)ut the
US arming the Bosnian Muslims. Morilion replied, "Just give me five days to get the heli
out of here ^d you can do what you wani'^ I n December 1993, shortly_ aftef!!MBMMi
MniH^H^Ibraith had approached|JMMBBHMHBW^6Bnd asked him
whetheif^ g^ip as conducting a covert action to arm the Bosnian Muslims. He openly
advocatedlha* such an action would t>e a good thing, but cautioned that a friendly Muslim
country such as Saudi Arabia should be the p^ jvider of the wea pons to alleviat6 -,'the
political blowback.'tSflHHHSHBHBchecked with the^HHBPj^nd
learned that no such plan was in effect, and there was no Presidential finding authonzir;
such a program." Galbraith expressed further interest in proposing such a plan.j^

As noted, by the spring of 1994, the Iranians figured prominently in hit new
proposal. This was no accident. Galbraith's proposal was a virtual blueprint for the Iranian
arms pipeline that was put into effect by Susak, Omerbasic and Hasan Cengic in May
1994. This telltale similarity between the Galbraith plan and the Iranian pipeline is not the
only evidence that he had advance knowledge of the Iranian-Croatian plan. In another of
his frequent telephone conversations with Alexander Vershbow during the last week of
April 1994, Galbraith told Vershtxsw details about the Iranian arms flights, such as the fact
that they would arrive in unmarked 747 aircraft and the fact that the Croatians and the
Muslims would split the arms, fifty-fifty, which he could not have known had he not had
knowledge of the plan before Presklent Tudjman's question."

Vy/hether Galbraith authored the arms pipeline plan and brought the Croatians and
Iranians to agreement, or whether the plan was designed by the Croatians and Iranians,
who then told Galbraith of the details and secured his help, no one may ever be able to
determine. Susak refused to make himself available for an interview with the Select
Subcommittee staff during its investigative visit to Zagreb. And although Omert)asic
consented to a brief meeting during that Zagreb trip, his answers to the staffs questk>ns

*^ John Pomfret and David B. Ottaway, US Envoy's Batkan Role Criticized on
Capitol Hill . Washington Post, May 21 , 1996 at A1 2.

' Vershbow Dep. at 11-17; Vershbow Notes.

were denronstrably false on most of the issues critical to the investigation, and thus of little
help. Nevertheless. Galbraith's own words reveal his central importance to the evolution
of the pipeline.

shared this information writh Ambassador Galbraith, who admitted that he
was one of the US officials who met with Omerbasic, but that the meeting was in a mosque
at a public religious event and that there was no discussion with Omerbasic on the subject
of arming the Bosnian Musl yns. Galbraith iden^ ed the other 'official" mentioned in the
report as Tom Mittnacht.'° ^J^BBBM^^Byhared with Galbraith in th9 r;^xt few
weeks the intelligence infonnation regarding Omerbasic's activities.^

^LThe import

of this distancing was not lost on Omert>asic, who was still angry at US officials two years
later when then Deputy Chief of Mission Patrick Finn of the Embassy Zagreb paid him a
courtesy call. Omerbasic pointedly observed to Finn that no US Embassy official had paki
him a visit since spring of 1994.^^ This distancing activity is strongly indicative of a
consciousness on Galbraith's part that being linked to Omerbasic, in light of the other
evkJence of his advance krK>vtlledge of or possible participatktn in the planning of the

Galbraith Dep. at 268
ug. 9. 1996, at 23-24

'^ S ejggt Sq^ mmittee Degosition ol

" Select Subcommittee Interview of Patrick Finn, August 18, 1996;
Memorandum of Finn Interview by Julia Gaines and Janine Ooherty.

Iranian arms pipeline, would contradict his denials of any role in encouraging the Croatians
and Iranians to establish the pipeline or in orchestrating the posing of the question to the
US government In sworn testimony twfore a congressional committee, he has attempted
to minimize his contacts with Omert>asic to a single very fleeting, public meeting."
Testimony elicited and evidence obtained in the Select Subcommittee's investigation has
revealed that Galbraith had other meetings with Omerbasic, some of them in the US
Embassy, and that the buslra^ card of Omertjasic was in the Ambassador's Roiodex as
late as August 199€'l^^p

The evidence is also dear that during the spring of 1994. as Galbraith sho pped his
Iraniarvlicok the other way* solution to the crisis of the Bosnian Muslims with the^^BP
ifliH^Omert>asic and Susak were working with the Iranians to make that sokrtion a
reality. The Washington Accords, resulting in the MusTimOoat Federation, by hatting the
fighting betweer i^rcats jnd Bosnian Muslims, softened Sus ak's resistance to the Iranian
arms proposal. ^^^''tNSHMHHHHMMMHHi

with the wishes of the US, the Croatians co«j)d 4^ give the Iranians any guarantees without
assuring that the US wouM not objecL'^Hf^'
»
The key to getting the favorable US response necessary for the Iranians, Croatians
and Bosnians to feel secure in cementing this "win-win-win° arrar^gement was Ambassador

» Maaring On Rnsnifl R«fcw» tha Mmifto Pafmanont Ridtttt nnmmitt#m nn

intAHigAnra , 104th Cong. 30 (May 30. 1996} (Testimony of Peter Galbraith} (hereinafter
-GalbraRh HPSO testimon/).

^* Select Subcommmee Doc., Bate Stamp #000001 (Aug. 21. 1996).

-mji^

75-80.

Galbraith. In light of his sympathy for the Bosnian Muslims, his open-minded view towards
Iran, his friendship and close working relationship with Susak. his desire to make the
Federation work and his natural tendency toward action. Galbraith was willing to
orchestrate a dipkjmatic exchange which wouW meet the needs of all parties. Confident
in his ability to sway the opinions of his superiors, he set to work to assure that ttie
Croatian government asked the right ques tton. a nd re ceived the answer it needed."/<^

^BSi^^^^^a^n April 29 that Peter G^raith recited ttie worts which gave the"
Iranians arxj Croatians the green ''flWj^j^JW''''^

The Question is Posed

By mkl-April 1994. Croatian Defiense Minister Susak. had apparently prevailed upon
President Tudjman to accept weapons from Iran and allow the Iranian amis pipeline to
Bosnia to pass through Croatia. In Bght of virtiat he knew of the mutual antipathy between
Iran and the US. as well as past reactkjns by Oie US to arms embargo vWatkjns, Tudjman
proceeded cautknjsly to seek the US position with regard to such a move. Whether Susak
discussed with Tudjman the efforts and willingness of Ambassador Galbraith to arrange
for a positive US response on the Iranian amis pipeline is a matter of mere speculation,
given the rBfusal of PresWent Tudjman and Susak to nrake themselves available to the
Select Sutx»mmlttee for inten/lews. Nevertheless, despite a division within his own
government regarding the wisdom of woriong with Iran, Presklent Tudjman decided to pose
the questkxi. How that questksn was asked, how the US dev^oped a response, and how
Ambassador Galbraith conveyed that response, as well as the consequences and the
confusion that flowed from the dedston are discussed in the pages that follow.

The Croatians Test the Waters

In n»d-ApriI of 1 994. the Croatian ofltetote began again to exphJTB whe«har or not the

US Government wouW toleratB or approve the shipment of Iranian arms to Croatia and

snia. On Aprt 1 8. 1994. duri ng a meeting with Special Envoy Charles Redman.

^imBH|||dJHBI0il9|nfonned Redman that the gpsnjaqs ha d come to the

5oatian Government earlier that day. asking for weapons.^Jjgjpated that Croatia

** Sea^ages 92-111

remained 'oriented toward peace,' and that Croatia hoped for US support for that position.
To the USJ^utv Chief of Mission (DCM) Ronald Neitzke, who was in attendance at the
meeting. Spl^^remarks evidenced that the Croatians had little appetite for
reestablishing ^pipeline for anns to Bosnia. He also formed the impression that the
Croatians might soon seek more specific guidance from the US on this issue. On Aprij,
1994, Neitzke reported on this conversation to the Department of State by cable.*' ^

April l£^^

On April 20, 1994, the f^B BJ^B^^BB^reported to his headquarters that, in
the wake of Redman's April 18. 1994 visit, the qtle^ion of Croatian circumvention of the
arms embargo had resurfaced. He recounted Ambassador Galbraith's conversations with
him in March 1994 about developing a covert action to let the Croats know the US would
look the other way if arms were to transit their territory, stressing that, although he believed
Galbraith's plan had "died a deserved death," that belief was apparently premature. He
reported that he had been informed by Neitzke that Ambassadors Redman and Galbraith
were among those discussing "doing an Afghanistan' i gjosnia.to arm, the Muslims.
Although uncertain about the seriousness of such talk, th^MpBfjpii^'eported it out
of an abundance of caution to keep headquarters informedT

f^ The following jjg y, April 21, 1994, thejjflUCBHHS^as approached by a
^BUjMJMWWIynd was asked what the US position was with respect to the arms
embargo and the franshipment of arms through Croatia. The contact expressed his
opinton that allowing such transshipments would be a b gd^idea, posat> ly leading to
renewed fighting between Bosnian Muslims a^ Croats. Thj^ plMM MJiy urther offered
to help interdict such arms shipments if the ^BM BM MBIfc ould provideinformation on
them.i

Thq2I^BiBMfl|y^ware of the US position to date and having watched President
Clinton declare publicly ($n television the previous evening that the US honored the arms
emtiargo, responde <jJp the^uestig p by stating that compliance with the arms embargo
was US policy. The^^flHflH^BnforrriedNei^ke^whowas Charge in the absence of
Ambassador Galbraith, ofttie^u^yfrom thefifc— BBjB? Neitzke sent the Department
of State a message ontti is development in which he referfiS to a refa testPOQ^e rsation that
fH^BBim^H^had with Redman on April 18. He opined thaj^ippiad perhaps
^een too subtle^in fiisapproach with Redman, and may have wanted to ask the US more
formally to stand with Croatia in rejecting -^e Bosnian approaches. The Croatians. in his

*' Department of State Cable, Zagreb 1567, Apr. 19, 1994.

view, clearly intended to stonewall the Bosnians until they received formal clarification of
United States support for their inclination to refuse. The cable also informed the
Department of State that Iran still loomed raQst^omlnently as the likely source of arms."
Neitzke sought guidance on the issuey^'^>7^

Croatian govemment officials continued to test the waters on the Iranian pipeline
issue. On April 22. 1994. Lieutenant Colonel Richard Herrick, the Defense Attache to the
US Embassy Zagreb, met with Croatian Defense Minister Susak regarding a number of
military issues. The meeting was one in a reflular series of meetings that the two held to
discuss matters of mutual military interest.

Department of State Cable. Zagreb 1597. Apr, 21, 1994.

On his return to the Embassy, Herrick reported this conversation to Neitzke. Neitzke
told him to report the discussion back to Washington, which Herrick promptly did by cable
on Monday. April 25. 1994.** Herrick showed the cable to Ambassador Galbraith upon the
tatter's return to Zagreb on April 25 or 26.

Shortly thereafter. Galbraith, Neitzke, Herrick and thepJBMMpjynet to discuss
the various Croatian approaches. Galbraith questioned Herrick as to Wiy he responded
to Susak as he had. Herrick replied that his response was the US ofTicially stated policy.
The Ambassador asked Herrick to set up a meeting between the Ambassador and Susak
at which time the same question coul dj^e posed. Iru jther words, he told Herrick to get
Susak to ask tiim the question. The^BBH^HHWexpressed his opinion during the
meeting that anything having to do with Iran wasTTraught with danger and^hould be
avoided. He urged the Ambassador not to support the Croatian proposal.|"

On April 27, 1994, Neitzke, Special Envoy Redman and Croatian Foreign Minister
Cranio met in Zagreb to discuss the WashingtonAccprds and Federation issues. When
the discussion on these subjects ended,^H^0^appealed to Neitzke for help in
withstanding Iranian pressure to allow the transshipment of Iranian arms to the Bosnian
Muslims. Neitzke was also informed that Croatian President Franjo Tudjman would ask
Galbraith about the US position on this issue at a meeting the following moming^pQl 28.
1994. Neitzke remembers Redman being present during this conversation Witt^jgfg^nd
believes that he shoukl have heard what was sakJ.*^ Nonetheless, Redman has stated in
swom testimony that he was unaware of the Croatian request regarding the transshipment
of Iranian anms until his return to Zagreb on April 29. 1994." On hi&re^ to the Embassy.
Neitzke informed Ambassador Galbraith of his conversation wiUjfl^B Galbraith seemed

*" Department of Defense Cable
* Herrick Dep. at 12-24
" Neitzke Dep. at 60-66.

Apr. 25. 1994

Apr. 28. 19947

** Select Subcommittee Depositk>n of Charies Redman. August 27, 1996. at 29-
37 (hereinafter 'Redman Dep.').

unaware that the question was to be posed to him the next morning, and he acted quickly
to contact Washington for instructions. Although Galb^aitbwanted a "nonobjection"
instnjction. Neitzke made it clear that he did not agree^J^gw^

_Atjhe dose of business on April 27. 1994, Ambassador Galbraith asked his
~ to meet with him in the conference room. During that meeting, Galbraith
described a recent meeting with Susak, in which Susak had made the case in favor of the
Uni tgd States' suppor ting th ^jgansshipmentj^ f Iranian arms through Croatia. Galbraith told
the^lHHHHP^that if^Bm^BJ^pHshould raise the arms transshipment issue
again, the US position on the arms embargo ^ not firm." ^ ce that statement was not
consistent with publicly stated US policy, th^^lBBI^^asked Galbraith if he had
received instnjctions to that effect. The Ambassador responded that the matter was under
review and that 'Washington doesn't know what policy i yxxants anyway." Without some
sort of confirmation of a policy£hi^r reconsideratk}n, th^^HBB^Mcleclined, so the
Ambassador told him to d^^^^^o ask the question of the Ambassador instead.*"

The Home Office Fails to Distinguish Itself

As this preliminary sounding out of the US policy was underway in Croatia,
Ambassador Galbraith was actively lobbying the Department of State for a response that
would signal to the Croatians that the United States had no objection to the proposed
Iranian arms pipeline. According to contemporaneous notes taken by Alexander "Sandy"
Vershbow, then serving as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European
and Canadian Affairs, Ambassador Galbraith spoke with him by telephone at the
Department of State on either April 25 or April 26 to argue his position. Galbraith told
Vershtx}w that President Tudjman of Croatia would t>e requesting the United States view
on such shipments at an upcoming meeting, that it was an important matter and thathe
needed instoictions from senior levels in Washington. Galbraith explained that theHpV
IBBpl^and Defense Attache Herrick had told Croatian officials that US policy was to
uphold the UN Security Coundl resolutions and to oppose their violation. Ambassador
Galbraith stated that he needed dear gukjance on the Presklent's policy and wanted
instructions vetted at a high level, such as by the Acting Secretary of State m^ National
Security Advisor Anthony Lake. He wanted those instructions by cable ji^'

•• Neitzke Dep. at 60-66.
''^■■■■IViHHMApril 28. 1994,
*^ Vershbow Dep. at 11-17; Vershbow Notes.

In that same telephone conversation, Ambassador Galbraith discussed what he
believed to be the pros and cons of the different responses available to the question
anticipated from President Tudjman. He warned that UNPROFOR would most likely detect
the arms shipment traffic. He also betrayed a strikingly detailed and prophetic knowledge
of the details of the Iranian/Croatian plan, remarking that the arms would arrive in
unmarked 747 airplanes, the Croatians would take half of the arms for themselves and the
other half would go on to the Bosnians." Galbraith characterized the United States'
response he advocated as a "wink and nod."" He was insistent that he must have
Departmental guidance prior to his scheduled meeting with President Tudjman on the
nfK>ming of April 28.

Vershl)ow, accepting this deadline, began to regard the issue as "urgent.""
Acconjingly, immediately after this conversation with Galbraith, Vershbow bro":;^ the
issue to the decision makers on the Seventh Floor" of the Department, in particular
Undersecretary for Political Affairs Peter Tamoff. Mr. Tamoff was the Senior Department
official responsible for policy with respect to Bosnia. Tamoff was also the Acting Secretary
of State, as Secretary Christopher was traveling in the Middle East and Deputy Secretary
Strobe Tallxjtt was travelir>g with President Clinton's entourage to the funeral of former
President Richard Nixon in California. On April 27, 1994 Vershbov/s notes indicate that
he attended a meeting on Bosnian-related issues with Tamoff. During the course of that
meeting, Vershbow received a message from Tom Donilon, the Chief of Staff to the
Secretary of State advising him not to let too much time elapse before responding to
PreskJent Tudjnr«in and that there should be "no funny business."" Vershbow recollects
no further discusskan of the Tudjman question during the April 27 meeting.

At the time of the meeting, Donilon was traveling with Secretary Christopher in the
Middle East On the evening of President Richard Nixon's funeral, April 27, 1994, Mr.
Donilon was at the Semiramis Hotel in Cairo, Egypt. He had several telephone
conversatk>ns with tamoff that night, serving as Secretary Christopher's "link" back to the
State Department Although Donik>n has no present recollection of the "no funny business'

"^ As it turns out. once the pipeline was operational the Croatians' portion usually
turned out to be about one-third.

•* Vershbow Dep. at 1 1-17; Vershbow Notes.

•* Vershbow Dep. at 19.

*^ Versht>ow Dep. at 26-30; Vershbow Notes.

remark, he does not question the accuracy of Vershbow's notes indicating that he made
It.** Tamoff advised Donilon that the issue raised by Ambassador Galbraith was under
consideration, and that there were differing opinions in Washington as to what the
response should be. Tamoff also indicated that he was in contact with Taltx)tt, who was
with the President on Air Force One. Donilon informed Secretary Christopher that the
issue was being discussed back in the United States, and Secretary Christopher exhibited
no memorable response beyond acknowledgment of the information.*' -

Later in the day on April 27, as the discussions continued in Washington, Galbraith
called Vershbow, informing him that the meeting with President Tudjman the next morning
would t^egin at 1 1 :30 a.m. Galbraith said something atxsut having or having had lunch wKh
Defense Minister Susak, and Vershfc>ow surmised that Galbraith may have learned of
President Tudjman's planned question during such a lunch. Galbraith also reported in the
conversatksn that he had heard from the Croatians that Croatian Prime Minister Valentic
was scheduled to depart for Iran on April 29. ^6iP— — — ^p B^— PMJ

WB He expressed

concern to Vershbow that using the "no instructions" policy may not hpv^he right effect,
and that the Croatians might back off from the arms pipeline idea.^S^^^^™^

Besides speaking with Vershbow, Galbraith made other efforts to advocate his
position. He placed a telephone call directly to Undersecretary Tamoff, which was not
returned.** He also composed and transmitted a cable to the attention of Secretary
Christopher on April 27.'°*

In this April 27 cable. Ambassador Galbraith recommended that President Tudjman
be given a "non-responsive" answer that indirectly signaled that the United States wouldn't
object to the arms shipments. While acknowledging that the major supplier of arms would
be Iran, he argued that a non-response would be better than *no instructions.* He argued

•e

Select Subcommittee Depositk>n of Thomas Donilon, Sep. 12, 1996, at 12-16.

•^ Id. at 12-14.

** Vershbow Dep. at 30-33; Vershbow Notes.

•* Select Subcommittee Depositk>n of Peter Tamoff. Sep. 13, 1996, at 29
(hereinafter "Tamoff Dep.").

'°° Department of State Cable, Zagreb 1683, Apr. 27, 1994.

forcefully that 'if we do not object to Croatia's role as a conduit, it is better to signal that
now." He repeated his concerns that the Valentic visit to Iran would be hindered, as he
believed that the only thing the Iranians wished to discuss with Valentic were the
arrangements for the transhipnnents of arms. Ironically, he suggested that he should also
'caution' the Croatians on developing too close of a relationship with lran.'°^

Ambassador Galbraith also discussed in this cable his understanding of Croatian
govemment views on the Iranian arms issue. He judged that Croatia wanted to act with
US approval, and it also wanted to be sure that the US would not act or speak against
Croatia if it undertook the role of arms conduit. He acknowledged the differences of
opinion within the Croatian government.]

He also argued that stopping the arms pipeline ns''ci

repeating a mistake of the' past. He specifically argued that the US demarche to Croatia

in September 1992 over Iranian arms transhipment had led to the outbreak of war between ^_S _

Bosnians and Croats that fall. His cable once again stressed the urgency of his request. 'j2fe!X/ ""

On the morning of April 28. 1994, Vershbow called Ambassador Galbraith on an
open (that is, non-secure) phone line to tell him to convey to President Tudjman in their
meeting that he (Galbraith) "really had no instructions.""^ Galbraith was left with the
understanding that the issue was still being reviewed and that a decision had not yet been
made. He continued to press his arguments with Vershbow. again advocating a
'nonresponsive response" that would give President Tudjman a go ahead to cooperate
with Iran. Galbraith ventured a political argument for his position, opining that those in
Congress who favored lifting the arms embargo would be pleased with his proposed
course of action, since it would help the Bosnians. Vershbow's notes also reflect that
Ambassador Galbraith said such members of Congress would 'be less hot on the issue.""^
Vershbow, during this telephone conversation or another one later that day. indicated his
belief that 'no instructions' would have the same effect as a non-responsive response.
Galbraith argued once again Susak's view that if the Croatians did not cooperate with the
pipeline, the Bosnian Muslims wouM lose their commitment to the Federatfon. He repeated

'•'Id.

"»ld.

'" Vershbow Dep. at 33-36.

"* Vershbow Dep. at 41-47; Vershbow Notes.

100

that cutting off arms flows in 1993 had led to war.^"'

In his telephone conversation with Vershbow. Galbraith expressed his impatience
that Washington had not yet made a decision. He was adamant that he did not want to
attend a meeting with Tudjman without guidance. Galbraith stated to Vershbow that the
United States could handle the matter and provide guidance to the Croatians "without our
fingerprints" and that he could say what he wanted to say "less directly."'"

Later on April 28, 1994 Galbraith attended the much-anticipated meeting with
President Tudjman in Zagreb. At the meeting. Galbraith stuck to the guidance he had.
such as it was. He informed Tudjman that the United States honors the arms embargo.
He further stated that, although his eml)assy had been aware that the amns issue might be
raised and he had sought his instructions from Washington, he had not yet received any.
in sum. he told President Tudjman he could not give a direct reply to the question.""

President Tudjman advised that he sought US guidance because the Croatian
government wanted to act in accordance with US policy, especially in light of the
Washington Accords. He was well aware of the West's attitude toward Iran, but described
the request as a test of Croatia's good will toward Bosnia. '°*

Following this meeting with President Tudjman, Ambassador Galbraith urgently
cabled the Department of State, reporting his conversations and once again advocating
a nxxJification of US policy. He reminded Washington of his understanding of US policy
(*We have a policy. We obey the embargo and expect other countries to obey Security
Council resolutions.') and urged that it be modified to signal to the Croatians that we would
not object if they were to serve as the arms conduit to the Muslims. In his desperation, the
Ambassador stressed that the Croatians had repeatedly signaled Tudjman's intent to ask
the question and the State Department had known so for over a week."*

While Galbraith agonized over his feilure to receive instnjctions, Vershbow. Tamoff

'" Vershbow Dep. at 41-47.

^<* Vershbow Dep. at 48-56; Vershbow Notes.

"" Department of State Cable. Zagreb 1721. Apr. 29. 1994.

'"•id.

'"Id.

101

and other officials in Washington had not yet reached a decision. Vershbow testified that
he and Tamoff considered only two options available for Galbraith's response: 1 ) a clear
statement that the United States abides by the arms embargo and expects others to do so,
or 2) an indication that the US neither endorses nor approves by continuing to say "no
instructions.' Although they were concerned that Iran would be the principal arms supplier,
they felt that having a 'neutral stance' was justifted in that it opened the arms flow.""
There was no consideration of an option that might have closed the door on Iranian arms,
but left it open regarding nmre palatable and less dangerous sources.

During these discussions. Vershbow did not share with Tamoff all of the information
he learned from Galbraith. He neglected to mention that Galbraith had advance
knowledge of the Iranian intent to ship the arms in unmarked 747 aircraft. He also did not
convey that the Croatians would be keeping half of the weapons for themselves."^

In the midst of this process. Special Envoy Charies Redman telephoned Vershbow
fronri Bosnia. Vershbow's contemporaneous notes indicate that Redman told him that he
(Redman), at the request of President Tudjman, was on his way to Croatia to discuss arms,
Iran arxl other subjects. Redman added that, if he had instructbns, he would use them."'
In dosed and public testimony. Redman denied that he knew anything about the Tudjman
question regarding the Iranian arms issue prior to his anival in Zagreb on April 29, 1994."'
Vershbow's contemporaneous notes cast doubt on the truthfulness of those jjfinials.
Versh bow wa s also tottLJQ that April 28 telephone conversation vrith Redman that fiJB—

stated that pending contracts with Iran were being held up by

'Bosnia-Iran connjy^ce.' Vershbow recalled no greater detail at>out that portion of the
conversation."* /

The Washington Decision

As Redman traveled to Zagreb, offlctats in Washington and en route from the Nixon
funeral apparently arrived at a decisk>n on how to respond to the Tudjman question.

^^ Vershbow Dep. at 36-40.

"' Tarrwff Oep. at 39. <.

"' Vershbow Dep. at 70-72; Vershbow Notes.

"* Redman Dep. at 39-42.

^^* Vershbow Dep. at 70-72; Vershbow Notes.

102

Despite the fact that the Administration has characterized the "no instructions" decision as
a 'brilliant* stroke of diplomacy."* the least "lousy" of all available options and a judgment
call which ted to the Dayton Peace Accords,"* the Select Subcommittee's investigation
has revealed that those consulted in the decision making process have displayed a curious
tendency to minimize their own involvement in the decision, while readily extolling its
virtues. To the extent facts and circumstances concerning the decision's genesis have
been made available, they can be summarized as follows.

As the Acting Secretary of State, ^eter Tamoff made efforts to keep in touch with
Chief of Staff Donilon in Secretary Christopher's party in the Middle East. In addition to
talking to Donilon, he also had at least one discussion with Secretary Christopher himself
on the issue. During that discussnn, Tamoff and Christopher spoke about three options
which Mr. Tamoff believed were tjeing contemplated on Air Force One by the Presidential
advisors: responding with no objection, objecting, on responding with "no instructions.'
Tamoff informed Secretary Christopher of a consensus developing among those involved
in the process toward "no instructions," and the Secretary seemed comfortable with that
development.'" In addition to Secretary Christopher, Tamoff discussed the issue with
Alexander Vershbow, Tom Donilon and Sandy Berger, the President's Deputy National
Security Advisor.'"

Berger told Tamoff that the President had made the decision that Ambassador
Galbraith was to have no instructions."* Tamoff called Tom Donilon to inform him of the
President's decision, and Donilon, in turn, informed Secretary Christopher, who
acknowledged Donilon's message and expressed no objection to K.'^ Tamoff has no

"' Select Subcommittee Deposition of Strobe Talbott, September 5, 1996, at 45
(hereinafter Talbott Dep.').

"* Hearing On US Actions Regarding Iranian Arms Shipments Into Bosnia
Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence , 104th Cong. 48 (May 23, 1996)
(Testimony of Richard Holbrooke).

"_^ Tamoff Dep. at 8.

"• Tamoff Dep. at 8-10.

"• Tamoff Dep. at 5.

'* Tamoff Dep. at 6-9.

103

recollection of telling Vershlx)w of the President's decision.'" Moreover. Tamoff does not
recall how the "no instructions" guidance was conveyed to Galbraith.'" Vershbow recalls,
however, that between April 28 and April 30 he gave Galbraith the "no instmctions' position
three times, and believes that Tamoff probably directed him to make these calls/''

The decision was purportedly taken to President Clinton while he was aboard Air
Force One retuming from the Nixon funeral in California. Deputy Secretary Talbott and
National Security Advisor Lake, who were accompanying the President, first discussed the
options privately. Talbott also recalls t>eing in touch with Tamoff by telephone from the
plane. It is his recollection that he and Lake concluded that the 'no instmctions' response
was the best option and should be the recommendation to the President. Talbott did not
speak with the President about this matter. Lake then went to the President's
compartment to discuss the ntatter. He retumed shortly and advised Talbott that the
Presklent approved the 'no instructions" option.'^*

President Clinton has not pubiidy acknowledged or claimed that he personally made
the decision to issue the 'no instructions' guidance to Ambassador Galbraith. In a letter
dated May 15, 1996 to Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, the President characterized
the decision by saying 'we chose not to take a position with respect to Croatia's pemriitting
arms shipments to Bosnia across its territory. I believe that my Administration made the
correct decisfon at the time . . ."'* The Select Subcommittee's ability to determine
precisely what was presented to the President during his discussion with Lake (and his
responses to such information) has been hindered by the refusal of the White House
Counsel to permit Lake to respond to questions regarding his conversations with the
PreskJent. as well as. the refusal of White House counsel to perniit Lake's testimony to be
taken under oath.

The evkJence available with respect to the decision making process reveals that the
Presklent was almost certainly not provkjed with relevant, highly sensitive, and

'** Tamoff Dep. at 5. .

'^ Tamoff Dep. at 32.

"* Vershbow Dep. at 28-30.

'^Talbott Dep. at 31.

'" Letter from President ainton to Senator Jesse Helms (May 15. 1996)
(emphasis added).

104

controversial information important to the decision he was being asked to make. The
details of the arms delivery plans known to Ambassador Galbraith and conveyed to
Vershbow were not passed on to Tamoff, and consequently not to Lake, Berger or the
President. Tamoff. Talbott, Berger and Lake were unaware, at that time, of the
discussions Galbraith had prior to April 1994 regarding his proposed plan to signal the
Croatians that the United States would look the other way if it acted as an arms conduit,
or that Galbraith had suggested that the Iranians might be used as a source of the
smuggled arms.'*

Determining precisely what information and arguments were considered in the
decision-making process has, of necessity, been dependent upon the recollections of the
US officials involved, many of whom were reluctant or outright refused to share the details
of the statements by and between officials. Moreover, no written position papers, decision
memoranda or other written analysis were prepared for the President or, his advisors.
Nonetheless, a few conclusk}ns about the discussk>ns are dear. Tamoff has testified that
the 'consensus' reached in the process was that the Iranians already had a presence in
the Balkans and that the 'no instructbns' message would not lead to a significant increase
in Iranian presence or influence.'" This consensus prediction proved to be woefully
inaccurate.'* Galbraith and Vershbow shared the hope that Croatia would accede to the
pressure to allow the pipeline even though the NATO allies would discover the arms flow,
and despite the fact that some members of the Croatian govemment opposed it'^
Whether other relevant United States officials felt the same way or were advised at all of
the split in the Croatian Govemment is unknown, given the information made available.
Lake and Berger were unaware of that split'*

Vershbow and Tamoff never discussed with Galbraith the type of arms whteh the
Iranians anticipated shipping through the pipeline, nor dkJ they discuss with him how such
an arms flow couM be controlled, so as to prevent chemical weapons or other undesirable

'* Talbott Dep. at 7; Tamoff Dep. at 22; Select Subcommittee Interview of
Anthony Lake, Sep. 26. 1996, at 1 (hereinafter take Int'): Select Subcommittee
Interview of Samuel Berger (hereinafter 'Berger Int'), Sep. 25. 1996, at 2.

'*^ Tamoff Dep. at 31.

'* See Chapters 12. 13 and 14.

'^ Vershbow Dep. at 48-56.

'*> Lake Int at 1; Berger Int at 2.

105

arms from entering the Bosnian theatre."' There is no evidence that this aspect of the
decision was discussed with or between higher level officials.

Undersecretary TamofTs recollection indicates that, during the decision-making
process, there was no discussion by officials of the impact of the "no instructions" solution
upon the United States policy toward Iran,'^ and there was no consideration that the 'no
instructions' guidance coukJ send Iran the wrong message about US attKudes or policy.'"
Vershbow was aware at the time he participated in the discussions that the Iranian agenda
was to gain greater influence, promote Islamic fundamentalism and support anti-Westem
aims. The US policy widely utKJerstood in the Administration at that time, was to isolate
Iran, economically, militarily, and politically.'^

Exactly Where We Want to Be

On April 29, 1994, Special Envoy Charies Redman anived in Zagreb, Croatia to find
Ambassador Galbraith still imp>atiently awaiting a response from the Department of State
which he would feel comfortable conveying to President Tudjman. Redman has testified
that he traveled to Zagreb on that date to brief President Tudjman on Contact Group
issues, and had been advised by Galbraith by telephone that he (Redman) needed to be
briefed on something prior to the meetir>g with President Tudjman. Ambassador Galbraith
provided no details as to the subject matter, out of concem that the telephone call may
have been monitored by the Croatians.''^

Redman and Galbraith nr>et at the Ambassador's residence. Redman recalls being
briefed on the Tudjman question and has testified that he could not see how the
appropriate answer could be anything other than 'no instructions.' It was dear to him.
however, that Ambassador Galbraith wanted further instructions from Washington.'^
Ambassador Galbraith asked Defense Attache Richard Herrick. who was present at the

"' Vershbow Dep. at 48-56.

""TamoffDep. at43.

"»Id.

"* Vershbow Dep. at 123-131; Tamoff Dep. at 41; Talbott Dep. 27-28.

'** Redman Dep. at 37-46.

'"Id.

106

Ambassador's residence that evening, to place a telephone call to Jenonne Walker of the
National Security Council (NSC) ostensibly to discuss the Councils assistance in getting
a demolition team to Croatia to assist with an ordinance issue. After placing the call.
Hemck tumed the telephone over to Ambassador Galbraith Hemck's recollection of the
remainder of the telephone call is that Ambassador Galbraith spoke with Jenonne Walker
regarding the military demolition team issue and the Iranian arms question. Herrick recalls
that Redman then spoke with Walker, although he did not overhear that conversation.'"

Redman, in his deposition testimony before the Select Subcommittee stated that
Galbraith spoke with Walker during that telephone conversation regarding the Tudjman
question and received the "no instructions" instruction. Redman acknowledges that he
then got on the line to speak with Walker, but only about Contact Group issues.'^

At the time of the above referenced telephone discussion. Jenonne Walker served
on the staff of the National Security Council as the Senior Director for Europe. In the
Spring of 1994. the countries which had constituted the fonner Yugoslavia (including
Croatia and Bosnia) were the responsibility of the European Directorate.'" In that
capacity, her duties included a coordinating role, such as chairing interagency committees.
as well as the preparation of papers on various subjects for the President, reflecting the
positions of the involved agencies.'** Prior to her service in that position. Walker had
sen/ed as a CIA analyst, an assistant to CIA Director William Colby, an assistant to
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a member of the Policy Planning Staff during the
Carter Administration and as Director of the Office of UN and Eunspean Arms Control
during the second terni of the Reagan Administration.'*' She left the NSC at the Ijeginning
of July, 1 994, to prepare for her current positron as US Ambassador to the Czech Republto.

Galbraith, Redman and Walker have given conflicting statements or testimony as
to the content of the April 29, 1994 telephone conversatkjn. As noted eartier, Redman has
testified he did not dipcuss the Tudjman questton with Walker. When Galbraith was talking

'" Herrick Dep. at 24-31.

'" Redman Dep. at 37^*6.

"* Select Subcommittee Interview of Jenonne Walker, Aug. 21 . 1996, at 4
(hereinafter "Walker Int*).

107

to Walker, Redman could not hear Walker's side of the telephone discussion. Galbraith told
Redman, after the call's completnn, that Walker said that Anthony Lake had given the "no
instructions" instructk)n with a smile and raised eyebrows/'^

Galbraith, in describing the content of the telephone conversation, has also stated
that Walker advised him that Lake's instructk>ns to him were to say that he had no
instructions, but that Lake had sakJ this "Vrith raised eyebrows and a smile."^

Walker's recollection of the telephone conversation with Galbraith and Redman is
that it occurred after she became aware that Galbraith had received the "no instructions"
guidance, and after President Tudjman had first posed the question. She also recalls her
discussion of the Tudjman question to be an 'add-on' to a conversation she had in a
regular series of conversations with Redman regarding Bosnian issues. Typically in ♦'^C3 -
calls, Redman woukl discuss his thoughts and observations regarding the Bosnian Civil
War negotiations and check the "mood music' in Washington, that is, what the policy
makers in Washington were thinking.^**

Walker recollects that Redman informed her during the call from Zagreb that
Galbraith had received instructions from the Department of State which both 'surprised and
trout>led' Redman and Galbraith. Redman then put Galbraith on the telephone. Galbraith
told her that State had instructed him to respornj to Presklent Tudjman's question about
the US position on the transshipment of Iranian arms to Bosnia through Croatia by saying
that the US was going to comply with the arms embargo on Bosnia and that the United
State assunr>ed Croatia wouM also comply. Galbraith expressed his belief that such a
response woukl reflect a change in US policy, and that the response would cause
problems related to the newly created Federation.^**

Walker toM Galbraith that it was her understanding at Uie time that Galbraith was
to respond to the Tudjman question by advising that the US would comply with the

'*' Redman Oep. at 46-50.

'** MenrKirandum to the FBe. from Ambassador Peter Galbraith, May 6. 1994
(hereinafter 'Galbraith Memorandum*).

'** Walker Int at 1.

108

embargo, but that Galbraith had no instructions as to Croatia.'** Given the discrepancy,
she took up the matter with Anthony Lake. Lake told Walker to tell Ambassador Galbraith
that he would be receiving the 'no instructions' instruction. Although she has no specific
recollection of passing this information on to Galbraith. Walker doubts that she said that
Lake had smiled and raised his eyebrows when conveying the "no instructions'message
to her. as that is not something Lake would do or something that she would say. She also
believes she did not indicate in that convensatwn that the no instructions matter had been
decided in a meeting with the President, as she was never a party to any presidential
discussions on the issue.'*' She also does not recall discussing ordinance demolition
issues with either Redman or Galbraith.

Following the telephone conversation with Walker, Galbraith's mood and approach
changed as he and Redman prepared for the dinner meeting scheduled for that evening
with President Tudjman. Ambassador Galbraith rehearsed a number of embellishments
of the simple "no instructions," and he decided that he would try to explain the response
to Tudjman by saying, "Pay attention to what I don't say as well as what I do say. I arn not
saying yes or no." Redman and Galbraith believed that they could not say "no" because
that response would hurt the Federatwn, and that they could not say "yes" because of the
embargo. Galbraith was satisfied with his guidance from Walker and his planned
embellishment as the two of them departed for the Tudjman dinner.'**

The dinner meeting on the evening of April 29, 1994 was held at the PreskJential
Palace in Zagreb. As expected. President Tudjman asked the US positi^on the
transhipment of Iranian and other amis to Bosnia. According to Galbraith,^

■■■i^ly Galbraith has stated that
in reply to Tudjman's question and remarks, he stated that his statement from the day
before still stood. Galbraith sakj he had no instructions from Washington on the issue, and
urged Presklent Tudjman to focus not only on what he had said, but also on what he had

'*«ld.

"' Walker Int. at 2.

'*• Redman Dep. at 46-50.

109

not said

President Tudjman was apparently still, confused. He pulled Redman aside and
asked again. Redman responded by telling President Tudjman, 'It's your decision. We
don't want to be in a position of saying no.""" Following this exchange. President Tudjman
seemed satisfied with the answer and as later events confirm, the Croatian Govemment
concluded that the United States had given its approval to the Iranian arms conduit.
Redman fully expected that, after hearing what he and Gaibraith had said, the Croatians
would go ahead with the arms pipeline.^''

After the meefr>g and dinner at the Presidential Palace, Gaibraith and Redman
discussed whether to report on the conversation by cable. Redman suggested that,
because he was traveling back to Washington the following day, he could convey the
events orally, in person, to Natk>nal Security Advisor Lake.'" One of Redman's objectives
in reporting back to the Natkjnal Security Council on the events was to make sure that
officials back in Washir>gton understood that the arms pipeline would most probat>ly open.

On his arrival in Washington, Redman met with Lake and brought him up to date on
the Contact Group and the April 29 Tudjman meeting. According to testimony provkled to
the Select Subcommittee by Redman, Lake was not surprised about the meeting and
indicated that he understood the results of the exchange. He expressed no reservations
about what had been said, and posed no questions to Redman about K. Lake nfiade it
clear to Redman that the PreskJent had been involved in the deciston and had himself
personally deckled on the response to Tudjman. Lake also informed Redman that there
was no need to report in writing on the April 29 conversatkan with Tudjman.'" Anthony
Lake, when interviewed by the Select Sulxommittee, stated that he vaguely recollected
meeting with Redman on this matter. Although Redman has testified that Lake showed
no surprise when told what Gaibraith and Redman saki to Tudjman, Lake opined that he
has a nrtemory of vigorously stating to all within earshot within a week of the Nixon funeral
that 'no instructk^ns meaos rx) instructkjns.' He offered during his interview that the

*** Gaibraith Memorandum.
^" Redman Dep. at 50-56.

'*»ld.

response may have been made after Redman told him about the comments to Tudjman.'**
On or about May 2. 1994. Redman told Ambassador Galbraith by telephone of Lake's
direction not to report in writing on the issue.'**

On April 30, 1994. the day after the dinner meeting with President Tudjman, press
reports indicated that Croatian Prime Minister Valentic and the BQS Pian Deputy Prime
Minister B ukvic had arrived in Iran separately on April 29. 1994.|^|i9BHII^M

Galbraith had known in advance of the Valentic trip and was
concerned tharlTthe US did not cleariy get its "non-objection" across to the Croatians
regarding the Iranian arms pipeline, the trip could be canceled/'T^

On May 1 . the Secretary's Morning Summary mentioned the press reports of more
economic cooperation between Croatia. Iran and Bosnia, commenting that this cooperation
would strengt hen the Federation, but also give Iran a grea ter foothold in the fonn er
Yugoslavia.'** /J^T^"^"^

By this time, it was becoming obvious that the response to the Tudjman question
had avoided Galbraith's fears of derailing the Croatia-Iran arms pipeline and the economic

'** Lake Int. at 2.

'*" Galbraith Menrtorandum.

^*^ Vershbow Dep. at 30-33; Vershbow Notes.
'*• Department of State "Morning Summary." Apr. 30. 1994.
"• Department of State "Moming Summary." May 1 . 1994.
'** Departnrtent of State "Moming Summary." May 2. 1994.

Ill

deal between those countries. The pipeline was open. In the words of Alexander
Vershbow to Ambassador Galbraith on May 5, 1994, "You and Chuck have taken it exactly
where we want to t)e."'*'

Mine Shaft Canary

A period of confusion, second thoughts and miscommunication regarding the
wisdom and execution of the "no instructions" instructksns began on Monday, May 2, 1994.
As noted earlier, it was on May 2 that Redman informed Ambassador Galbraith that he had
spoken with National Security Advisor Lake and that Lake had said that there was no need
to report in writing on the AJarii 29 meeting with President Tudjman. Both Redman and
Galbraith have stated they believe that Lake was satisfied with the manner in which the "no
instructions' message was conveyed. Ambassador Galbraith expressed through his
actions and words in the next few days no reluctance to assure that the Iranian arms
pipeline would k>ecome operatkmai.

Also on May 2. ^rpbassador Ga lbraith met with the his^^Hi^HH||and
instructed him to use h\^0^KKK^Ro advise the Croatians that it was US policy to
h^ve no position as to the enforcemSnfof the UN arms embargo. He explained to the
lat he and Redman had already conveyed the ' no ijistnjctions" nag ssage
to PresidenrTudjman on instructions from Washington. ThefiBMWBWy asked
Ambassador Galbraith if the response given woukj not send the message to the Croatians
that they could go forward with bringing Iranian weaponry into the area. Galbraith said that
Washington was aware of this and that he had done all that he could to let the Croatians^
know that the United States would look the other way, without actually saying so.^'^'^^

Disturt>ed by this unusual and potentially dangerous shift in policy, the^
|asked to see the Amt>assador's instructions. When Ambassador Galbraith sakJ his^
instructions canr^ telephonically from the Natk>nal Security Council, the
replied tha t he wquM r>eed guidance from his headquarters before he a>ukj use the
jto convey such a message to the Croatians, since such enaction
I a covert action. Galbra 'ittiJ?ecame angry and 'ordered* thefljI^B
[ to convey the message. Again, thejHHHHBM'efused to act as directed,

**^ Galbraith Memorandum.

112

stressing the need for guidance given the legal and oversight issues

The agitated Ambassad QC-questioned ^ at right thejWiWWyhad to block
the policy of the President. ThqaHHH99|presponded that he vt/as hSTattempting to
block policy, but that he needed to see some sort of written instmctions from the Pre sident
or at least consult his headquarters first. Galbraith continued his argugQen^iththaSpH
■■■flby declaring that Tony La kglhad wanted ta .know why th^JpHHHB^nd
DefenSeAttache Herrick had told the^^D9HIIII|^nd^ys^uespectj^ly thiat the US
policy was still to enforce the UN arms embargo. Th^^^HHMHreplied with a
number of reasons, among them the fact that President Clinton had reaf fipped that polic
in a statement on April 20, 1994. Frustrated by his inability to change the
mind, Galbraith ended the conversationJ^lMjJ^ **

Shortly after this discussion, Deputy Chief of Mission Neitzke informed theJ
J that Galbraith had never actually spoken to Anthony Lake, and that he (Fjeitzke)
had advised Galbraith not to push the "policy line." Neitzke also characterized the
Ambassador as being in a "Capitol Hiil mode," making policy, cutting deals and maybe
getting out ahead of Waghington on J b'S policy issue.'** Subsequent discussions with
Neitzke revealed to theflPBBHH^het, as of May 4, 1994, the Embassy had still not
received any written guidance on !he Iranian arms issue. Neitzke also expressed his
understanding that the failure tqissue written instructbns had been deliberate for reasons
of establishing deniabilitv^^^^^

ht decision, and

sought guidance

with the

On May 4, 1994. disturtjed by the dangers of the J
concerned as to whether it truly was the US policy, th^
from his headquarters in a cable which summarized his cxtnversati
Ambassador. With the memory of the Iran-Contra scandal still fresh

fwise ly and fortunately b egagto funcE

fas a "mine shaft canary,"
assuring that activities and events were carefully documented in this sensitive area of

^'^ Ambassador Galbraith had served for over a decade on the staff of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

113

quasi-covert activity/** On May 5. 19&4. the JjpBjj^^^Mtvas advised that he should
continue to refrain from using his^PMBMByo influence Croatian policy towards
embargo busting unless he was specifically instructed otherwise. He was further
commended with a "well^ oqg" an d advised that perhaps a telephone call from Woolsey
to Lake was in order. ^,22^^^^

raised with Ambassador

and invited him to send a

mbassador indicated that the

no longer be necessary, as the "ball is

i2!ling." He also stated 'that he saw m) ne edjpr him to send a message on the matter to

K^ The^HIHHIri^also met with Neitzke on that

On that same date, May 5, 1994, tj]
Galbraith, ths, issue of his request
message toi
communication through

day, and Neitzke filled him in on his understanding of the events of April 2P at the
Presidential Palace. He related that Galbraith had been told to tell Tudjman that he had
no instmctions regarding the enforcement of Croatian compliance with the arms embargo
and to "smile when he said it."'*' Neitzke added that after the Ambassador conveyed this
remark. President Tudjman still missed the point and went for a walk with Redman.
Redman then told Tudjman that the Untied States did not want to be put in the position of
having to say 'No" on the issue. According to Neitzke's version, all concerned understood
that the arms shipments were to come from Middle Eastem countries, principally Iran "^

During that same discussion, Neitzke informed theJfplH^HMtfthat it was his
further understanding that Galbraith had been told by the National Secunty Council that
reports of the Tudjman discussion were not to be put on paper and that the Ambassador's
job would be imperilled or forfeit if it was. Sensing the irregularity of the situatbn, Neitzke
had urged the Ajnbassador to write a memorandum on the incident for the Ambassador's
pro tesltion. To Ngj^ ke's knowledge, the Ambassador had not yet done so as of May 5.
The|fl|^HII|0asked Neitzke why, if the policy was defensible as a means of helping
the Bosnian Musl'ms, it shoukl not be put in writing. Neitzke's understanding, based on

114

his conversations with the Ambassador, was that either those involved in the decision had
failed to fully coordinate with their superiors or did not wish for the incident to be the subject
of coordination with the Department of Defense or CIA. Throughout this May 5 discussion,
Neitzke was very concerned and anxious thai if any of this information got out to the
national security community, the "White Mouse' would "have their heads." [WB ^^^BI
^Bi^jf^xpressed support for Neitzke's plan to push Galbraith to write a memorandum.
Despite Neitzke's mis gi^ngs about sharir\g. these events and concerns with other
government agencies,JBBBBBBIiHHyrepoi^d on his May 5 discussions with
Galbraith and Neitzke to his headquarterC

J^ mbassador Galbraith began to share the concerns of Neitzke and ]_
^■H^He spoke by telephone with Sandy Vershbow at least once, maybe twice on May
5. 1S94. Although Vershbow and Galbraith denied during the course of the Select
Subcommittee's investigation that Vershbow rebuked, reprimanded or criticized Galbraith
for his conduct in the "no instruction" exchange, evidence of Galbraith's contemporary
reaction to his discussions with Vershbow and other State officials establishes that he was
verbally chastised for his conduct.'" As late as July of 1994. Galbraith was still angry over
having had his "knuckles rapped" by State and having been called on the carpet for his
conduct in giving the "no instructions" message.'" Galbraith claims that on May 5. he
informed Vershbow of the content of his and Redman's statements to Tudjman, and that
Vershbow told him that "you and Chuck have taken it exactly where we want to be." adding
that "at the highest level we do not wish to interpose ourselves between the Iranians and
the Croatians.""* Galbraith's later actions reveal that the conversation with Vershbow was
not as reassuring as he now portrays it?

Later that evening on May 5. 1994, after a meeting at his residence with Defense
Attache Herrick, Neitzke and General George Joulwan (Commander-in-Chief of the US
European Command), Ambassador Galbraith asked Henick to take him back to the
Embassy for purposes of making a secure phone call. Galbraith got through to
Washington shortly after midnight. Zagreb time. The available evidence suggests that he

^^* Galbraith Memorandum.

115

spoke with Jenonne Walker at the NSC. Herrick overheard him asking whether his
response to Tudjman was proper policy. He mentioned the rebuke he received from
Vershbow and commented that, as an Ambassador, he worked for the President, not the
Department of State. Galbraith repeated that he had given the Croatians a wink and a nod
at the direction of the NSC and that Redman had done a good deal more than that. He
asked whether the US was ready to bac k him and Croa||a on this issue. Hem'ck also heard
Galbraith state during the call that thefi^^HBHwand Hemckhad reported on the
issue, and there was rK> guarantee thatit would nofgit out^^^p^^

aving been advised of the prevbus month's unusual events in Zagreb. officialsMf
were not at all certain that Ambassador Galbraith's activities had been properly

coordinated or^g fe talking the United Statesj
May 5, 1994^P^Headquarters ^

^ised the

jywhere pe ar it wa nted or ought to be. On

*^ Jto continu e to resist

Galbraith's request to the use th^MWMII^^tf^* yfc||pofficialsMBBpjarrariged
to have R. James Woolsey, Director of Central Inl^ligence. raise the event^in^agreb with
Secretary of State Warren Christopher at a meeting on May 5, 199^ ^

The conversation at the May 5 meeting has been the subject of slightly conflicting
testimony, as have been the recollections of the participants as to the reasons for the
meeting, and the impressions it left. It is undisputed, however, that Woolsey and Deputy
Director for Intelligence Doug MacEachin were present at the meeting for the CIA, and that
Secretary Christopher, Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott and Ambassador Phil Wilcox of
the Department of State also attended. The recollection of the CIA participants, assisted
by a menrorandum for the record the CIA notetaker prepared immediately aftgr the
meeti ng,'" is tha t Woolsey raised the issue by describing the repoi^Jrom the
tat Ambassador Galbraith was urging him to usq

fto the Croatian government that the US would look the
other way from Croatian transshipments of arms from Iran to Bosnia. Woolsey informed
the attendees that he had also given this information to National Security Adviser Lak^

Secretary Christopher said nothing in response. Talbott replied that he had been
called by Deputy National Security Advisor Samuel Berger after Woolsey's call to Lake.
He then infbnned Woolsey of the situation in Zagreb from the perspective of the

'^ Herrick Dep. 32-39:j^BVBHVHHHI(May 9, 1994.

'^^I^HiHM^mi^iHyMayS, 1994.

^" CIA Document. Memo for the Record by Douglas MacEachin. May 5. 1994.

116

Department of State. Taltx)tt said that Galbraith had been told twice (once before his
meeting with Tudjman and once after) that he had "no instructions" as to Tudjman's
question. After his first meeting with Tudjman, Galbraith contacted the Department of State
and requested more in the way of instructions, seeking something on the order of an
"amber light." Talbott indicated to the attendees that Galbraith had been told "rather tartly"
that he should stick to his 'no instructions" statement with nothing more. He had been told
that he was not to hint at having any "wiggle room." Talbott further commented that
Galbraith was apparently not absorbing the message and would be informed again so he
could not misunderstand. Woolsey was not informed of any change in United States policy
during the meeting, and left with the impression that no such policy change had
occurred.'"

Talbott recalls the conversation essentially as does Woolsey, and has testified
publicly that, in his view, the "no instructions" message to Ambassador Galbraith had not
been a 'change in policy," hence there was no discussion of such a change at the meeting.
He did not at the time appreciate the "disconnect" in his communications with Woolsey."'

Doug MacEachin, who served as the CIA notetaker at the meeting described the
discussion in these terms:

[0]ur Ambassador is asking our Ji^Bimpyo take an active step to
permit an arms shipment that we - that I go to meetings on, that we are
supposed to be against. What's going on here? ... and that's the way I
heard Woolsey present it, saying you know, is your ambassador being too
ambitious, or has there been a change? And Talbott said . . . I've checked
everything that he has been told and it's unambiguous. He has been tokj "no

instmctions," he is not to indicate any wiggle room He apparently hasrTt

gotten the message and we are going to give him the message again/"

ld.:MBIHHS|BHBI|BlB/^ay 6. 1996; House Permanent "Vf^S,
Select ComrMee on Intelligence Depos'rtion of R. James Woolsey. June 6. 1996. at lO.s^J

'" Hearing On t IS Artinns Regarding Iranian Arms Shipments Into Bosnia
Rftfnre the Senate Select rommJHPft On Intelligence . 104th Cong. 86-89 (May 23.
1996) (Testimony of Strobe Talbott).

'*• Select Subcommittee Deposition of Douglas MacEachin, Sept 6. 1996. at 66.

117

When leaving the meeting, Ambassador Wilcox stated that Ambassador Galbraith was (or
was going to be) in trouble with his "boss."'"

The events atj^he May 5. 1994 Woolsey-Taibott meeting were conveyed to the
Dy cable on M ay 6. 1994 . Hej^as further advisedlhat there had.
been no change in l7§ policy, and thaMtl^HBm^would advise the£_^
if and when, any such jbange occurr^ !^ The cable by which he received this information
also commended thqflB^I^HBV^^'^ ^'^ excellent judgment^^nder intense pressure
and for having kept headquarters well-advised of events.'.

dgment^jnder

In Zagreb, the Woolsey-Taibott meeting had an unsettling impact on Ambassador
Galbraith and Deputy Chief of Mission Neitzke. On May 6, 1994. Deputy Secretary Talbott
spoke with Galbraith by telephone. Three versions of this telephone conversation have
been given during the course of this investigation. Galbraith set forth one version of the
conversation in an alnxsst contemporaneous written memorandum he prepared on May 6,
1994."* Talt)Ott testified regarding the conversation, both publicly and in closed session.
Moreover, contemporaneous notes taken by Sandy Vershtiow of a conversation between
Taltxstt and Vershbow contain another version of the Talbott-Galbraith discussion.'*' From
the aforementioned sources, it appears that the substance of the conversation between
Talbott and Galbraith was as follows.

Mr. Talbott, after his meeting with Woolsey, had a concern that "something more
than and other than no instructions was being transmitted."'" As a result of the uncertainty
over the policy, he had a concem that the right signal had not been sent to the Croatians.
He telephoned Ambassador Galbraith on May 6 to try to address that concem. During the
discussion, Galbraith informed Taltx>tt of the instructions he had received from Jenonne
Walker, and the remark about Tony Lake smiling and raising his eyebrow. Talbott informed
him that his instnjctions on the Tudjman question had been "no instnjctions" and that the

'•' Id. at 19.

Dep.41-42

^** Galbraith Memorandum.

'" Vershbow Dep. at 73-81; Vershbow Notes.

'••Talbott Dep. at 14.

118

Administration did not want word to get out that the US had given "a green or amber light"
to the Croatians. Galbraith recounted exactly what he and Redman had said to President
Tudjman on the issue, and explained that anything short of a statement that the Croatians
should not facilitate the Iranian arms flow would be understood as a "green light" from the
United States.'" He informed Talbott that the Croatians. if cornered, would put out the
word that we had given a green light, especially since the arms traffic would be picked up
by NATO and UNPROFOR. Galbraith also noted that the Croatians would view this new
statement of position in the context of the interception of the 1992 Iran Air shipment and
the seizure of a Croatian vessel smuggling arms just a few weeks earlier.'"

Ambassador Galbraith recalls Talbott stating in the telephone conversation that the
United States wanted to do nothing that would undermine the "fragile" Muslim-Croat
Federation, but it also did not want to be seen as undermining the arms embargo. Talt>ott
told Galbraith that he was doing an excellent job, and that he had earned the messages
on the issue with great skill given the confusion in Washington. Talbott opined that the
"home office had not distinguished itself." Talljott was also curious as to whether the
United States could "walk this situation back." By this statement. Talbott now claims that
he meant "walking it back would mean make sure that the Croatians aren't reading more
into this than we are saying."'*' Galbraith replied that to do so would be almost impossible
unless the US wanted to cut off the flow of arms. When Galbraith said that he had been
tokJ not to report on the Tudjman exchange and asked if Talbott wanted a written report.
Tallxjtt sakj. "Yes." but he should not send one unless contacted by Vershbow or Assistant
Secretary Oxman."°

Ambass ador Galbraith, troubled by his telephone conversatio p_yvith TalbotI
approached thejJBBBMHB jPIJfcn that sam e date. He asked the
what "exactly" he had shared withH^HIHHHlfion the Iranian arms i
"ireplied that he had reported Galbraith's request that he use the

"^ The notes and testinnony of Sandy Vershbow indicate that when Mr. Talbott
recounted his conversation with Galbraith to Mr. Vershbow, he described Galbraith's
renr^rk to Presklent Tudjman as 'no instructtons. yet we don't want to interpose
ourselves, so call attention to what I dkJn't say." Vershbow Dep. at 73-81 .

'•• Galbraith Memorandum.

*" Talbott Dep. at 25-30; Galbraith Memorandum.

^*" Galbraith Memorandum.

119

to convey the "no instnjctions" message. Ambas sador Galbraith j ^as very curious about
the language used and any knowledge that the MBMHHH^had about the May 5
meeting between Talbott and Woolsey. Galbraithstated t ha^^TaJbott had Qg ntacted him
to tell him that Woolsey stated that he thought, based on the^JH|HHH[»nfomiation,
jt the 'high ^ n" for the Iranian arms pipeline was given by Galbraith and Redman. The
(replied that he told his headquarters about the "no instructions' message
and how, in^mbination with intelligence availablQ^it anx)unted to a "go-ahead." Galbraith
acknowledged the truth of this statement J'^^

The j^B^^^Mf reminded Ambassador Galbraith that this confusion was part
of the danger^jjushmg an uncoordinated policy line and the consequence of not
informing the^JBof what was going on. He brought to the attention of the Ambassador
a recent tasking request from the Department of Defense on May 5 seeking information
on Iranian arms shipments into Bosnia and what could be done to stop them.'" The
Ambassador characterized thi s/equest as the department of Defense just trying to find out
what was going on. and tha^^HB||pi^rea^ agreed, noting that the Defense
officials ought to be informeoasto this issue.

Wreaj^iiyagr

The two discussed the fact that foreign apd allied intellig ence sources were taking
an interest in the Iranian-Croat deal, and the^^BHHH|y predicted that any decent
foreign intelligence service would t>e able to "walk this issue back," given the unreliability
of the players. Ambassador Galbraith ventu rgd his opiniortJ^ at this issue was not as
serious a matter politically as Iran-Contra. Th^|2pH|^|P|^nswered that, if this were
so. why had no written instructions been provided? He fOrther urged Galbraith to creat
a memorandum of his conversations about his instructbns, for his own protection J|

Ambassador Galbraith took to heart the advice of Neitzke and the
On May 6, 1994 he created a written memorandum for record, setting firth his version of
the discussions with Presklent Tudjman, NSC officials, State Department officials and
Redman. His secretary, Charlotte Stottman, typed the memorandum, and it was signed

120

and dated by Galbraith. and by Neitzke. as a witness/*' After the document was signed
in front of Stottman. she sealed it in an envelope and locked it in the Ambassador's safe.
The Ambassador told Stottman that the memorandum was for his own protection because
of events which had taken place where he had received instructions over the telephone
from Washington. The memorandum would serve as his proof of the events which
occurred. The menx)randum remained in the safe until Captain David Wesley, working for
the President's IrU^lligence Oversight Board, asked to have it read to him in the winter of
1 994-1 995.!!^

"Hunker Down"

May 6, 1994 was also a day of worry and second thoughts about the Iranian green
light in Washington. D.C. Deputy Secretary Talbott and Vershbow discussed Talbott's
conversation with Ambassador Galbraith. Talbott recounted his directive to Galbraith to
'walk it back " if he could to 'no instructions" only. He pointed out that Galbraith had
received mixed signals, hearing both that Washington had not made a decision and that
he had no instructions. Talbott worried that the US needed to "get the right signal on the
record," but that it might be too difficult to do so. In evaluating the available courses of
action. Talbott stated that perhaps they would have to "hunker down" and let things stay
as they were. Talbott told Vershbow that he had decided that, if anything were put in
writing, there should be only one copy. Talbott feared that public disclosure of what had
happened would create serious difficulty with the United States' allies."'

On May 6 or May 7. Taltxjtt and Vershbow discussed the rapidly growing concerns
at the National Security Council atxjut the "no instructions" events. Talbott reported that
he had met with Deputy National Security Advisor Berger. Berger, on the subject of the
'no instructions" events, stated that he thought it would be "dynamite to do a record."
meaning that there should be no paper trail."* In his remarks to Vershbow. Talbott also

'"^ Galbraith Memorandum.

'•" Stottman Dep. at 26.

"^ Vershbow Dep. at 73-81; Vershbow Notes.

"• Vershbow Dep. at 92-94; Vershbow Notes. When interviewed by the Select
Subcommittee Staff. Mr. Berger did not specifically recall making this remari<. but
speculated that if he said it, it may have been in reference to potential damage to
relations with our allies. Berger InL at 2.

121

made reference to Jenonne Walker's being disciplined."* Although Walker, when
inten/iewed by the Select Subcommittee Staff, denied having been disciplined or criticized
by any of her superiors at the NSC, she did reveal that when she approached Berger with
a request from Ambassador Galbraith that he receive his instnjctions in writing, Berger
replied with words to the effect of "Dammit. Jenonnel Shut up! He is not going to get his
Instruction In writing, he has his instnjctions."'"' Contrary to later public and private
contentions that the, Iranian green light policy was a sound and well executed, the doubts
and near panic regarding its wisdom and impact v/ere very much in evidence in May 1994.

Thei

janic was also growing in Zagreb. On May 6 or May 7, Neitzktspoke with th?

zk ggpoke wrth the ,
Jabout his concerns over recent events. Neitzke told thqSHHBHjw
'that Galbraith had talked to Talbott on May 6 and that the Washington officials were rtoj^
denying that they ever intended to indicate acquiescence to the Iranian-Croatian dealings.
They also reportedly could not t>elieve that the Croatians so indiscreetly allowed so many
Iranian deliveries so qurckly. Neitzke felt that the Ambassador was worried about being
made a scapegoat for the green light decision. Galbrai^ s^ent a good portion of May 6
on the secure phone with Redman and Washington^^^l^^^^

Witbin the next wee Js^rtM ay 12. 1994, Ambassador Galbraith sought th^

view on the ^Hfir understanding of the US pojigy on Iraniac

transhipfnents. He was espeaally interested in anything that th^

krK)w atXMjt the discussnns between Wodsey and Lake on the issue. The

advised Galbraith that he had heard nothing new. Galbraith also stated that he had

received a phone call from a reporter regarding Iranian arms on May 11,^ that he had_

responded with a "no comment*** On that same day, Neitzke told the _

that Galt)raith had received an apology from the NSC for being left out on a limb, and that

policy was. indeed, the wink and nod approach.*" Defense Attache Herrick also advised

'•• Vershbow Dep. at 92-94; Vershbow Notes. In his deposition testimony.
Vershbow irnJicated that perhaps Jenonne Walker had been disciplined for conveying
the position to Galt>raith and her remarks about the smile and raised eyet>rows. Walker
denied ever being disdpfined.

aoo

Walker Int at 3.

122

f hat he was receiving numerous calls from the Department of Defense

on the Iranian arffis issue, and that the Department of Defense was in the dark, wondering
what was going on.*** From the vantage point of Zagreb, there appeared to be confusion
among the departments in Washington on this new policy, and a lingeHQg fear in the
Embassy that Washington might disavow the Ambassador's activitv ^ii^L O

The Iranians and Croatians had wasted little time in turning on the arms pipeline.
As the Embassy Zagreb Public Affairs officer would later t estify, the sudden and open
presence of Iranian arms flights was quite "provocative.""'

Western journalists noted the sudden appearance of Iranian aircraft in Croatia.^'^
On May 25, after seeing one newspaper story in the Washington Post conceming Iranian
arms shipment to Croatia, Fred Baron, a US Representative to the UN Security Council
Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 724 (1991) Conceming Yugoslavia,
suggested at a meeting of the Committee that the Committee should look into the alleged

Hovanec Dep. at 22.

123

violations of the arms embargo by Iran.*'* Clearly the US representatives serving on
various UN bodies concerned with arms embargo issues were not advised of the Iranian
green light policy. Fortunately in light of the potential for embarrassment. Secretary Ngobi
of the Committee advised that he had already sent letters to the Governments of Croatia
and Bosnia asking them to investigate the story, as well as a letter requesting a response
from Iran. The US was spared the ordeal of being exposed as a hypocrite.*"

A UN Sanctions Committee team traveled to Zagreb in May 1994 to investigate the
delivery of Iranian arms through Croatia. The British had expressed concern about Ujese
arms embgrgo violations. In late May of 1994. Ambassador Galbraith informed th^^iB
that the investigation had been inconclusive.*'* It is readily appar^t that
GalbrdRh had not gone out of his way to assist the visiting UN investigatore^^^^T*

In addition to the CIA and the United Nations, the Department of Defense, then
involved in the interdiction of arms embargo violators, was not infonned of the US tolerance
or complicity in the Iranian arms pipeline, let alone the Iranian green light policy decision.
As of May 5, 1994. the Secretary of Defense had requested that the CIA provide
information relative to the clandestine arms shipments to the Bosnian Muslims.*" As noted
earlier, as of May 12. 1994. Defense Attache Henick was also receiving inquiries from the
Department of Defense Iranian arms shipments.*'*

Department of Defense interest in the issue reached a crescendo on approximately
May 13, 1994. On the eve of a "Principals Meeting"*'^ in Washington, the Defense

*'* ProvisionaLSumma ry R ecord of the 1 Q4th Closed M eeting of . the Security
C ouncil Committ ee Established Pursuant to Resoluti on 724 Concerning Yu goslavia
(1991). at 11-12.

"^ A meeting of cabinet level national security officials, usually consisting of at
least the Secretaries of State and Defense, the National Security Advisor and,
frequently, the DCI.

124

Attache's Office in Zagreb was contacted with frantic calls from the Pentagon seeking
information on the Iranian arms flow for use in briefing Secretary William Perry. As Herrick
was abs gptfrom the Emb assy atjbe time, his ass istant sought advice on how to respond
from theplpBBBI^Q The^P^HMMj^Hj^vised h inaJo wait for Heq ick's return.
Ambassador Galbraith asked th ^Bp ^^B^pwhat t hj^BWil ^instructions
were on responding to the requestslor information. Thq^B|^B BBB|^ es£pnded that
he was not to get involved in the matter or raise it irihi^|k|riBSHBF Galbraith
commented that the Department of Defense should get "on board, and add6?nhat he was
covered on the issue, as he was following instaictions from the White House.*" Neitzke,
upon teaming of the Pentagon inquiries, expressed his desire to talk to Herrick before he
communicated anything back to the Pentagon.*" Evidence further suggests that upon
Herrick's return to the Embassy. Galbraith told him not to respond to inquiries from
Washington on the Irarugn arms issue beyond references to press or intelligence reports
already availabl^^J^H^

The suspicions of the Ambassador, the/i^— M^ and Neitzke that the
Department of Defense had not been advised of the Iranian green light policy, provoked
anxious discussion on July 21 . 1994 reg ar^ng an immig gnt visit to Croatia by Secretary
Perry. Ambassador Galbraith asked the^BBHHMpwhether or not Croatian Prime
Minister Valentic (a significant figure ir ytb'eTran-Croat^ Telationship) should be invited to
have lunch with Secretary Perry. TheMB— ^^entured his opinion that to do so
couW create an awkward situation if. asTFey all suspeaed. Secretary Perry had not been
informed of the Iranian green light/no instructions decision. The Ambassador wanted to
discuss the matter further in the Secure Conference room at the Embassy. In that
discussion, Galbraith stated that he was tired of the CIA and Department of Defense
running a separate foreign policy from that of the DepartmeriL of State, the NSC and
'probably* that of the President on the Iranian amns issue. The^|iHHiH|^isagreed
with Galbraith and pointed out that the Director of Central Intelligence had beenpejsonally
told by the Department of State that the "wink and nod" was not US policy^*'

Galbraith asked

wrhether he thought Secretary Perry might raise

125

the Iranian arms issue. The^Spi^HB^^said that he could not speak for the Secretary
of Defense and opined that Galbraith was probably better placed to guess what might have
been happening back in Washington. Galbraith responded that he thought he knew what
went on, and that he, in any event, had acted on instructions. The discussion then turned
to the subject of the Ambassador's concem that Croatian Defense Minister Susak might
raise the issue with Secretary Perry, and how Sysakmightreact if the Secretary told him
that the arms embargo remained in force. Th^/MIMB HBBf replied that although Susak
would t>e confused, he would probably continuethe Iranian shipments. Defense Attache
Herrick had the final vwjrd on the issue, when asked if there was "angst" at the Department
of Defense over the issue and whether Galbraith should raise it with Secretary Perry.
Herrick replied that the level of concem at the Department vaned. Herrick also advised
against Galbraith rajsingthe issue with Secretary Perry, warning that it might open up
"Pandora's I In ^"ijjQ'^

Unt>eknownst to the participants in this meeting. Secretary Perry had already flipped
open the proverbial lid on Pandora's Box. only to have it slammed shut by Anthony Lake.
In June of 1994. Secretary Perry met with Lake, asking for clarification regarding why the
US had not taken action to block the Iranian arms shipments to Croatia. According to a
Department of Defense official. Lake replied that he was tired of hearing about the issue
and that the shipments would be permitted to continue. Secretary Perry was upset about
the situation and Lake's response.*^

Others in high positions at the Department of Defense were also in the dark abtout
the green light. From April 1994 to June 1996, General Wesley Clark served as the J-5,
that is, as Director of Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. As the
J-5, General Claris was the staff officer who advised the Chaimian of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on US military policies woridwide. In April and May of 1994, General Claris was
neither consulted nor informed of the Iranian green light decision. Although aware in May
of 1994 that there was an influx of arms into Bosnia, he did not know the reason for it or
that the US was involved with it His understanding was that US policy was to enforce the
UN arnts embargo, and he regularly saw reports indicating that the embargo was, in fact,
being enforced.***

*** Select Subcommittee Deposition of General Wesley Clark. Sept. 4. 1996, at
3-8.

126

As the summer of 1 994 ^pte on. it becaip e more and more apparent to Ambassador
Galbraith, Mr. Neitzke and theifl[|0iilBBthat the list of those unaware of the Iranian
green light was lengthy and troubling. Through all of Galbraith's display of bravado, he and
Neitzke became increasingly dismayed at the prospect of being hung out to dry if and
when the misguided decision was exposed. Throughout the summer. Galbraith probed
visitors and officials for information on the issue.

On a June
a regent meeting

mbassador
ad with the.

QaU)

raith quizzed th

egarding

_ Galbraith tried, without success, to get an acknowledgment of CjAinvolvemerit in the
Iranian arms situation.^ On that same date. Neitzke spoke with the^^BB^^about
his perception that Galbraith was sitting on "the horns of a dilemma." Neitzke was
concerned that, because Galbraith was without written instmctions. Washington would
hang him out to dry. He speculated tnat Charle s_Bedman and ^e ponne Walker would be
in the same unpleasant predicament.^ The^i^BlHBI^^speculated it appeared
possible that the instmctions had been an NSC directive without the Departme]^LUi([^tate's
knowledge and that no one at State was willing to stand up for Galbraith^^*

Ambassador Galbraith's search for clues about the Washington scene continued on

_ I Galbraith questioned a visiting team of intelligence analysts from the Balkan

""Task Force regarding their knowledge of the Iranian arms issue. He specifically asked if

they had seen anything to indicate that there was a US govemment connection to the

Iranian arms flow. The analysts responded that they had not seen anything definrtive on

aUSrole.^"

Later in July of 1 994. Deputy Chief of Missksn Neitzke visit ejljyVashington. A fter his
return to Zagreb, he met with Ambassador Galbraith and the^BHHH|^for the
purpose of receiving an intelligence report on the latest Iranian arms deliveries loXroatia.
Neitzke shared his observations on what various Washington officials knew about the
decision to look the other way with regard to the Iranian arms shipments. Neitzke
expressed his clear impressk>n that the Department of Defense and the CIA had no

127

knowledge of the policy on the Iranian arms. He was even doubtful whether the State
Department was on board, declaring, "You could not find two people at State who have the
same idea as to our policy in the region much less on Iranian arms."^

Neitzke continued in this vein, stating that it was his understanding that the issue
of whether Iranian weapons deliveries to Croatia should be tacitly allowed had been raised
by Secretary Christopher with Anthony Lake. Neitzke had heard that Christopher was
equivocal on the issue and told Lake that he might go along if nothing was put in writing.
Upon hearing this, Galbraith remarked that the scenario didn't explain why he had his
'knuckles rapped' by the State Department on this issue. Neitzke responded that there
was inconsistent knowledge of the policy at the State Department and that Deputy
Secretary Talbott is clearly not completely "in the loop.' Galbraith continued to obsess
about the reprimand he received in May. He maintained that despite Neitzke's analysis he
couldn't understand being called on the carpet. Neitzke agreed that the reprimand was
difTicult to explain since Jenonne Walker had told Galbraith and Neitzke that Lake had
cleared the policy with the PreskJenL Neitzke further commented that Charies Redman's
"key" role in the Iranian arms issue was not widely recognized in Washington.^

By August 2, 1994. Neitzke's thinking on the Iranian Green Light events ai;
implicatkjns thereof had evolved to a sense of dread. He sought information from th^'
fl^lM^as to the terrorist threat to Americans citizens posed by the aftermath
decisk5n. His disillusk>n with the frightening growth of Iranian presence in Croatia and the
strange lack of appreciation for the consequences of the decision in Washington led him
to seriously conskler sending a "dissent cable' on the issue."' He was, in many respects,
a worried man. As events woukJ ha^e i y he w as not alone. He soon had plenty of
company in Washington and abroa^

■n/Valk it Back"

There is substantial evklence indk:ating that beginning within weeks. If not days, of
Galbraith's response to PreskJent Tudjman US government officials began to have second
thoughts about the decision to signal a green light to the Iranian arms shipments. Other
officials, unaware of Galbraith's response or that the US had been consulted on the issue,

128

noticed the flow of Iranian aims and personnel, and were ready to shut it down. Between
early May 1994 and the effective date of the Nunn-Mitchell legislation in November 1994.
the Administration had several opportunities to halt or mitigate the Iranian arms flow and
failed to take advantage of them. By September 1994, some leaders of the Bosnian
Muslims, the very people that the Clinton Administration hoped to assist through the Iranian
arms pipeline, asked US officials to find a way to arm them that dW not involve the Iranians.
The Administration dkj nothing, though, to staunch the growth of Iranian influence.

Information regarding the Iranian arms shipments and the consequences of those
shipments was frequently included in the Secretary's Moming Summary prepared by the
Bureau of Intelligence and Analysis (INR) at the Department of State. When the pipeline
opened, the Moming Summary for May 14, 1994 commented that. "Though there seems
little doubt that regular arms-supply flights to Croatia are under way. it is not clear how long
they can be kept from becoming public knowledge or prompting reacti on from th e
international community.""^

^____^__^__^_^^_ JOn the eve of an important Principals Meeting on May

), the Secretary's Moming Summary reported that:

The Croatians are serving as hustling middlemen in a long-tenn arms-supply
operation that gives Croatia a stake in the ongoing Bosnian conflict,
encourages ctoser Croatian-Iranian ties, and provides an incentive to sneer
at sanctions.^

Against this backdrop, a Principals' Meeting was conducted on or about May 20,

^ Secretary's Moming Summary, May 14, 1994.
*" Secretary's Moming Summary, May 19. 1994.
»« Secretary's Moming Summary, May 20. 1994.

129

1994. A "pre-brier meeting was held beforehand, attended by Secretary Christopher.
Charles Redman, and Tom Donllon. Christopher expressed concern about the "winking
and nodding" that had gone on (or was going on) regarding the flow of arms from Iran to
Bosnia, and the participants discussed the pros and cons of the matter.^ The issue of the
Iranian arms shipments to Croatia and Bosnia did come up at the Principals' Meeting.
Some participants argued that the US should go to the Croatian government and tell them
to stop the 'ranian shipments."' To the recollection of Anthony Lake, present at the
meeting, no one discussed the "no instaictions' dedsion."* The contemporaneous notes
of Jenonne Walker reflect that someone (the NSC has refused to disclose to the
Sut)committee the person's identity) sakJ that the President knew that the arms flow was
happening and that the US was not taking any position with respect to it.'™ Lake recalls
informing the other participants that to take action on the Iranian arms shipments would
require taking the issue to the President No one suggested that the matter be >•«>• Jewed
with President Clinton.'^

As of May 24. 1994, the interest of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in shutting down the
Iranian arms flights was strong. Colonel Donakj K. Herrick, assigned to the NSC. reported
to Jenonne Walker on that date that during a "Bosnia teleconference" the Joint Staff
suggested that something be done about the Iranian arms flights taking place. He
informed Walker that he told the Joint Chiefs that the US would probably not push the
issue at the time.'*^

^ Notes of Pre-Brief Session for the Secretary of State Regarding the May 20,
1994 PC Meeting on Bosnia, prepared by John Hannah and maintained by the NSC.
The NSC refuses to permit the Select Subcommittee staff to view the aforementkaned
document and others cited in this paragraph, and this cursory information was obtained
from an oral *brief"g" by a low level NSC staffer to Chairman Hyde and Congressman
Hastings.

**' Notes of Nancy Soderberg. May 20. 1994. maintained by NSC.

'*'Lakelntat4.

*" Notes of Jenonne Walker. May 20. 1994. maintained at NSC (hereinafter
Walker Notes).

'*° Lake Int at 4; Walker Notes.

**' Memo for Jenonne Walker from Don Kerrick. May 24. 1994.

130

Great Britain was alarmed about the Iranian arms shipments in May 1994 and was
willing to join the US in taking action to intercept or halt such shipments. The British
concern with the Iranian arms deliveries was entirely reasonable, given the significant
number of British soldiers on the ground in war-torn Bosnia as part of UNPROFOR.'*' The
British were very interested in keeping even small arms from reaching the waning factions
in Bosnia, as those weapons were the source of numerous British and French casualties.'^'
An American sokJier serving with UNPROFOR. Lieutenant Colonel John Sray, shared the
British alarm. As the S-2 (intelligence) officer assigned to UNPROFOR Commander
General Michael Rose's staff. Colonel Sray was well placed to observe the effects of the
Iranian anms pipeline in increasing the fighting.^

On May 27. 1994 the British embassy in Washington sent a letter to Secretaf
Christopher, care of the F^ecutive Assistant to the Secretary of State. In that lettec

_ _ _ _ _r/ She

recounted the fact that before the Croatians agreed to allow the Iranian shipment several

*** Select Subconmnfttee Deposition of LTC. John Sray. August 29, 1996. at 7.

***ld.at4-5.

*** Letter from the British Embassy, to the Executive Assistant to the Secretary of
State, May 27. 1994.

** Information Memorandum, from INR Toby J. Gati. to Secretary Waoen
Christopher. May 31. 1994.

131

of their officials asked for the US reaction to the proposal, and observed that "the Croats
surely now think we approved of the arms deal as long as it remained plausibly
deniable."**!^'

On June 3, 1994. James Bevan, the First Secretary at the British Embassy in
Washington, also informed Colonel Kerrick of the NSC of Foreign Minister Hurd's intention
to raise the issue of the Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia with Secretary Christopher.
Bevan expressed concem because the British did not want to see Iran gain the influence
arxj access in Bosnia which would create a hostile Muslim nation, and because the Iranian
arms placed British soldiers in danger. Moreover, the British worried that the West and the
US would lose credibility as far as enforcement of UN Security Council resolutions was
concerned if the arms were allowed to flow. He alerted Kerrick to the fact that the British
intended to ask the US to join with them in pressing Croatia to stop the shipment".
Significantly, Bevan indicated that the British were willing to consider the lifting of the anms
embargo (a lifting which the British has previously opposed) if the peace process was
unsuccessful.^^ General Kerrick's memorandum reflects that it was intended to be passed
on to Anthony Lake and Sandy Berger.'**

The Select Subcommittee has been provkJed with no information regarding whether
or not Secretary Christopher discussed tfSe Iranian arms flow with Foreign Secretary Hurd.
K can be inferred from subsequent events that the Clinton Administration was not candid
with the British on this issue, as the British continued to press the United States to take
actkin regarding the Iranian arms pipeline. In eariy July of 1994, Kerrick received a cable
which emphasized the British fear' of "creeping fundamentalism' in Bosnia stemming from
the Iranian influence. Kerrick passed this cable on to Vershbow, who had left the
Department of State at the end of June 1994 and assumed Jenonne Walker's position at
the NSC. Vershbow recalls taking no actk>n as to the British concerns and doesn't believe
the British complained at a high enough level for the US to consider reacting to their
concerns.^

Id.

*** Menwrandum from Don Kerrick regarding "British to raise Iranian arms
shipments to Bosnia," June 3, 1994.

"" Memorar>dum from Colonel Don Kerrick to Alexander Vershbow. July 6. 1994
regarding 'Iran's arms in Bosnia*; Select Sut>committee Interview of Alexander

132

In addition to the risks to intelligence activity, the Clinton Administrations efforts to
keep the green light policy secret resulted in US government officials in the region, who
had and overriding "need to know,' being kept ignorant The US Ambassador to Serbia
was not infonried of the decision, nor vras the US Ambassador to Bosnia, the very country
to which the arms were being funneled.^ Moreover, the US Ambassador to NATO was

Vershbow. September 24. 1996.

^ Select Subcommittee Depositk>n of Rudolf V. Perina, Aug. 26. 1996. at 6-
Jackovich Dep. at 20-24.

133

unaware of the Iranian Green Light, and was under the impression throughout 1994 that
the US policy was to respect the UN arms embargo and expect other countries to do so
as well.^ Given the potential for Serb retaliation against American interests or personnel
If the Serbs regarded the US as co-belligerents with the Croatians or Bosnians, this
secrecy, bom of fear of embarrassment or detection was reckless.

Opportunities to "walk it back," that is. to dilute or eliminate Iranian influence
continued to present themselves to US officials. The Croatians and the Bosnians both
expressed concerns and reserva tjat^ about the do minant role played by the Iranians as
the main supplier Qf weaponry^AgpBH '~

In August of 1994, General Wesley Clark visited Bosnia on behalf of the US Joint
Chiefe of Staff to determine Bosnian military needs if the UN arms embargo were lifted.
During the course of a series of discusskins with Bosnian offscials, General Claris met with
Bosnian President Izetbegovic and Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic. Izetbegovic asked
Clark whether the US would "covertly assist' the Bosnians by authorizing Slovenia to
release two thousand tons of weaponry the Slovenians were detaining. General Clark
stated that he would pass on the Bosnian request to his superiors. He did so, informing
General Shalikashvilli. Shalikashvilli directed General Clartt to take the matter to Deputy
National Security Advisor Berger at the White House. General Clark met wrtth Berger
persor^jly and put nothing in writing about the request. Although General Claric was never
specifically advised of the US response, he later saw a letter from Sven Alkalai, the
Bosnian Ambassador to the Unit^ States whkii led him to believe that the US had denied

Hunter Dep. at 5-8.

3S7i

134

the Bosnian request.** Berger, when questioned by the Select Subcommittee staff
regarding the Bosnian request for Slovenian arms, had no recollection of the request or Ks
ultimate disposition.*"

Bosnian and Croatian interest in obtaining weapons from sources other than Iran
and stemming the growth of Iranian influence in the region continued into the fall of 1994.
According to Ambassador Galbratth, Defense Minister Susak infomed him at lunch on
September 5. 1994 that he preferred a covert program for providing arms to Croatia and
Bosnia to a lifting of the UN arms embargo. Moreover, Susak contended that he knew of
other countries that were willing to help if the US would provide "a signal." Galbraith claims
to have pointed out that the US could neither violate the arms embargo nor actively
cooperate in its violation. At the same time he believed Susak understood the US would
not actively stop others from violating it.*'

Richard Holbrooke became the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs in
September of 1994. A firm believer in taking action, he plunged into the nx>rass of Balkan
politics with a vengeance. During an earty fact-finding trip to Croatia, he teamed of the
Iranian green light inckJent from Ambassador Galbraith.** Holbrooke, in his previous
position as Ambassador to Germany, had been aware that Iranian and other arms were
fk)wing into Croatia and Bosnia, so he asked Galbraith what the US knew and was doing
about it. Galbraith toW Holbrooke that in April of 1994 that either Tudjman or Susak
(Holbrooke's present memory is uncertain) called him in and told him Iran wanted to ship
arms through Croatia to the Bosnians and asked wrtiat US policy was on this issue.
Galbraith said he had called the White House (Holbnx)ke understood him to say that he
had talked with Tony Lake), and was told to say he had no instmctions. no position.
Galbraith sakJ he dkl exactly that and that someone at the NSC told him not to report back
by normal channels.*'

After hearing Galbraith's account, Holbrooke was highly concemed about the role

*• Claris Dep. at 28-34.
**• Berger Int at 3.

^ Galbraith Memcon for September 5, 1994, from the "Record' maintained by
Peter Galbraith.

** Holbrooke Dep. at 6-13.

*'ld.

135

of Iran in Bosnia and the Balkans. TTiis reniained the case through the time of negotiating
the Dayton Accords when he was adamant in seeking assurances that the Iranians would
be required to leave Bosnia.^

To Holbrooke's credit he began working on kieas to eliminate or dilute the Iranian
dominance of the arms fk)w to Bosnia in September 1994. Bosnian Prime Minister
Silajdzic, for all his earlier willingness to accept arms from any country that would provide
them, had changed his tune by the fell of 1994. According to Holbrooke, Silajdzic made
a point of telling American policy-nekers at every opportunity that the Iranian anms pipeline
was a "very risky thing because it woukJ increase Iranian influence."** In September of
1994, Holbrooke met with Silajdzk; in New York City where Silaj dzjp fl oated a plan that
would diminish the Bosnian Government's deperxjence on \r^n.^i

slbrooke liked the kJea and supported it. in no small
measure because it reduced the Bosnians dependency on Iran. Holbrooke discussed it
with Secretary Chris^pt]^r, who Holbrooke believes, Christopher obtained a legal opinion
on the proposal.*^-'

A few days following the meeting in New York, Silajdzic met in Washington with
Holbrooke, and Lake. Holbrooke believes that Lake heard part, but not all, of Silajdzic's
proposal before Lake was called out to a meeting with President Clinton. The proposal
went nowhere in Washington and despite Holbrooke's advocacy, it was rejected for policy
rather than legal reasons.^

The Bosnians remained interested in alternatives to the Iranian arms pipeline even
after Novemt)er 1994 aruJ the Nunn-Mitchell Amendment. Ambassador Galbraith's
assistance was sought on Novemt>er 23, 1994 in yet another effort to secure the release
of Bosnian-bound weapons that had been seized by the Slovenes. Although asked to

"* Id. at 50.
»* Id. at 51.
*• Id. 41-45.
*'ld.
"•id.

136

intervene with the Slovenes, Galbraith said nothing to the Bosnians, noting in his memoirs
that "any comment would be seen as us working to undermine the embargo' and could
jeopardize the way in which the Bosnians received "real quantities" of weaponry,
presumably from the Iranians.**

As 1994 was coming to a dose, the Iranian arms pipeline continued to flow, and
Iranian influence continued to incr ease. A disillusioned Prime Min iste*- Silajdzic dined with
Galbraith on December 16, 1994.

^As Holbrooke never tokJ Silajdzic that his proposal for reducing Iranian influence
had been rejected by the Administration, Silajdzic was unaware that his lunch partner on
that December day.was truly far more to blame for Iran's mnning arrwk in Bosnia than was
Holbrooke."' '

** Memcon of Peter Galbraith, November 23, 1994, from the 'Record*
maintained by Peter Galbraith.

"• Memcon of Peter Galbraith. December 16, 1994, from the "Record"
maintained by Peter Galbraith.

''' Holbrooke Dep. at 44.

137

CHAPTER 9

ALLEGATIONS OF US OFFICIALS FACILITATING
IRANIAN ARMS SHIPMENTS

Assistance to Arms Convoy

Among the issues which the Select Subcommittee examined in the course of its
investigation was the question of whether or not US officials knowingly assisted the
passage of convoys containing weapons from Croatia to Bosnia in violation of the UN amns
embargo. Press reports had identified one specific allegation of such assistance,
purportedly involving intervention by US Special Envoy Charles Redman to secure the
release of a convoy containing Iranian weapons detained by the Croatians on or about May
13. 1994/ Information developed in several depositions, the interview of Anthony
Harrington of the President's intelligence Oversight Board, and from relevant written
records, allowed the Subcommittee to determine the facts as follows.

US officials at the embassy in Zagreb were actively involved in efforts to expedite
and facilitate the passage of humanitarian aid to the Bosnian Muslims from Croatia
throughout 1993 and 1994.* In 1994, although many of the gsp voys traveling from Croatia
to Bosnia legitimately carried nothing but humanitarian aid j

* Risen and McManus. US Envoy May Have Aided Arms Cnnvny to Bosnia , Los
Angeles Times. Apr. 17, 1996. at A1.

' Select Subcommittee Deposition of Ron Neitzke. Aug. 7. 1996. at 126-128
(hereinafter "Neitzke Dep.*): Select Subcommittee DepositkMi of Peter Galbraith. Aug.
19. 1996, at 69-70. 74-78 (heieinafter -Galbraith Dep.").

138

f Ambassador

Turkovic attempted to convince the US Ambassador to Bosnia, Victor JacKo^ich. to join her
in the convoy. Ambassador Jackovich declined the invitation, determining that it was^n
oddrequestand also a matter occurring outside his jurisdiction as Ambassador/^

On May 13. 1994, Turkovic placed a telephone call to Ambassador Galbraith,
seeking his assistance in getting the Croatians to release the convoy.' Galbraith ga^e her
a noncommittal response t}ecause he believed that the convoy contained weaponry and
he did not want to be involved in fecilitating its passage.'" Galbraith's belief that the
convoy contained arms was based either upon conversations he had with news reporters
or upon intelligence information."

Unsuccessful in obtaining Galbraith's assistance. Turkovic called Special Envoy
Redman for his help. He was, at the time, in Vienna negotiating with Bosnian and Croatian
officials regarding vartous issues. Redman often intervened in order to help relief convoys
cross the border, but when questioned during the investigation regarding the Turkovic

' Select Subcommittee Depositton of Victor Jackovich, Aug. 20. 1996, at 57-61.

* Sel^Suboommittee D^DOsition ofJaHHII^Aug. 9. 1996. at 65-66
(hereinaflerH|S^P')-^^9^

"> Galbraith Oep. at 69-72.
" Id. at 74-78.

139

convoy he had no r^y llection of assisting in securing its release.'* According tc
^(^■■■■Mi^Htraveling with Redman at the time, the detained convoy was a
sticking point in the negotiations between the Muslia^aod the Croatians. Redman acted
as if he were interested in resolving th e^isput g, buJ^Bv^as no firsthand knowledge that
Redman acted to free the convoy.'^ ftflj^owever. had no knowledge tji^t^eapons
were in the convoy, nor any indicatron thaTRedman had such knowledg^^sS^^

The Turkovic convoy was released by the Croatians and the circumstantial, but
logical corKJuskw i^that the release wa^ e result of intercessnn by Redman.'* Although
Galbraith and thqflBIMII^^IHHMcieariy had suspicions that armgJ^ere probably

in the Turkovk: convoy, there is no eViclehce to suggest t t)qt Redman oi/Swi^ ad such
suspicions. In fact, while the convoy was detained, the^^MW ^BE Bi<rnof contact
Ctfifito inform her of the convoy's suspicious content.'^ The Select Subcommittee also

eh^untered no proof that Galbrait h infon Qed Redman of his knowledge or suspicion thjt

arms were contained in the convo^^S^^^

Apparently. Redman unkrK}wingly intervened in a transaction which violated the UN
arms embargo. His intervention was not atypk:al, however, because Clinton Administratk)n
ofTicials regularly intervened to facilitate the passage of convoys to Bosnia which they
believed contained humanitarian akj without consistently making efforts to ascertain
whether those convoys also contained weaponry. Hence, after May 1 , 1994, US offidals
may have routinely (albeit unwittingly) facilitated the Iranian arms flow to Bosnia."

issile Episode

During the course of the investigation of the evolution and implementation of the
Qinton Administratk>n's Iranian green light policy, the Select Subcommittee examined in
detail a trout)ling inckjent in 1995 which casts doubt on the Administration's contentions

" Select Subcommittee Deposition of Charles E. Redman, Aug. 27. 1996, at 64-
70 (hereinafter *Redman Dep.*).

" Select Subcommittee Interview oJjI^HMf Aug. 21 . 1996, at f!

^ The same condusk>n was reached by the lOB. See Chapter 7.

'g^l^^Dep. at 68-71.

^* Neitzke Dep. at 126-128; Redman Dep. at 64-70; Select Subcommittee
Deposition of Tom Mittnacht. Aug. 14. 1996, at 8-11. 42-44. 55-60.

140

that the "no instructions" instruction involved nothing more than a failure to object to
violations of the UN arms embargo. The incident suggests that in this instance, and
perhaps in others as w/ell, Ambassador Galbraith may have gone beyond standing mute
in the face of embargo violations, and may have actually secretly played a direct role in
violating the embargo.

In September 1995, Croatian officials intercepted six crates oigl^g/nvssWes from
Iran that, after being dropped off by an unmarked airplane that was said to carry only
humanitarian aid, were en route to Bosnia across Croatian territory." The land-to-land
missiles earned one warhead each (but not, it was later learned, chemical weapons), and
were designed to be fired from a stand-alone missile launcher.'* The weaponry, like the
aircraft that delivered it, did not bear any markings that wouldsjdentify their source, but that
type of missile is known to be of Iranian manufacture.'^fj^^

Croatian officials informed US officials of the suspicious missiles' capture and
requested guidance from the United States."* In particular, the Croatians were concerned
that the missiles might carry chemical wea pons. US officials inspected the arms, which
were being detained at Pula/

Dep. at 100-104.

'* Select Subcommittee Deposition of Lt. Colonel John Robert Sadler, August
21. 1996. at 15 (hereinafter "Sadler Dep.").

Dep. at 102.
» Sadler Dep. at 26-27.
^iPMiDep. at 102, 1057

141

This much is certain. What is less clear is. among other things, why the Croatians.
knowing that the United States did not "want to t}e in a position of saying no' as to arms
shipments to the Bosnian Muslims from other nations,^' sought US guidance in the first
place, and why the Croatian government ultimately decided to release the shipment of
missiles. On these important matters, the testimony of the US officials involved is in
conflict.

According to General Wesley Clark, who was serving with the Joint Chiefs of Staff
as Director of Strategic Plans and Policy, the interception of the missiles was brought to
the attention of the US in a meeting in Zagreb between Croatian President Tudjman and
Special Envoy Holbrooke.* At that meeting. Foreign Minister Susak informed Holbrooke
that the Iranian weapons had t)een captured and were being detained by the Croatian
government. Susak asked Holbrooke to send a team of US experts to inspect the missiles.
Holbrooke tasked Clark, w/ho wab in attendance at the meeting, with handling the matter.
Clark, in turn, asked Lieutenant Colonel John Sadler, the Defense Attache for the US
Embassy in Zagreb, to examine the missiles, at which point Clark's involvement ended.
Clark stated that the only purpose for the Croatian request was to determine whether or
not the missiles were carryir>g chemical weapons, and specifically denied that Susak was
asking the United States whether or not the government should allow the missiles to
pass.*

Clark's testimony as to the purpose of the Croatian request was contradij;

Sadler. Sadler indicated that Susak contacted Ambassador Galbrarth about the

missiles and asked Galbraith to have the missiles investigated.^' Galbraith told Sadler to
examine the missiles. Sadler complied and reported his findings to the Department of
Defense for analysis.* V^en the expgrt s were unable to klentify the missiles based on
Sadler's description. th^P^fimH^Hasked Sadler to make a second trip to Pula, this

'* Galbraith Dep. at 39 (attributing this statement to Special Envoy Charles
Redman).

^ Select Subcommittee Deposition of General Wesley Clark. Sept. 4. 1 996,
at 50-51.

" Id. at 53.

" Sadler Dep. at 26-27.

"id. at 12-16.

142

time with aflHP&eapons expert Galbraith approved the secorxl inspection, and it was
conducted sb^ays after the initial examination. The results of the secopd. examination
were forwarded to the Department of Defense a couple of days iater^

I six day

Later in the nwnth of Septemt>er, during a meeting with Sadler, Susaic asked
questions about the missile shipment that suggests that the Croatians were holding the
missiles pending instructions from the US as to what to do with them. Sadler testified that
Susak said. 'I'm getting a lot of pressure from the Bosnians to let these missiles into the
country, into Bosnia.** Susak then pointedly asked. "What should I <I6?" Sadler
responded that he could not comment on that issue.

Ambassador Galbraith gave a similar account He stated that although Susak was
concerned that the missiles might contain chemical weapons, he was asking more of the
United States than simply to determine Vno nature of the missiles. Galbraith understood
that Susak was asking the US government for permisston to let the convoy of missiles
proceed into Bosnia." Consistent with the green light policy he had championed to his
superiors, Galbraith testified that the amis shipment "was a Croatian and Bosnian
operatton' and "wasn't one for us to monitor or control."*

* Id. at 17-23.

" Sadler Dep. at 27.

« Id.

Galbraith Dep. at 75.

" Id. at 76.

••^"^■■^Oep. at 108.

143

These facts, taken as a whole, suggest that Ambassador Galbraith was doing more
than simply saying he had 'no Instnjctions' concerning Iranian arms shipments through
Croatia in violation of the Bosnian arms embargo. The picture that emerges, instead, is
that Galbraith may have played an active role in managing and controlling the
transshipment of amis. The CroaUan government was formally instnjcted two years earlier,
in April 1994, that the US did not "want to t>e in a position of saying no" to such arms
shipments.^' During the two years that had since elapsed, Iranian arms had steadily
poured across Croatia and into Bosnia, without any protest by the Administration.

In light of these facts, it is somewhat surprising that Croatian cfficials asked the US
government in the fail of 1995 whether they should permit the missiles to continue into
Bosnia. If Galbraith is to be believed, they shoukJ have known that the answer they would
have gotten would have been "I have no instructkins. pay attention to wtiat I'm not saying'
- that is, a "wink and a nod.' - and the Croatians would be left to decide for them^elvei^
what to do. Of course, all agree that the Croatians were concerned that theqWWW
missiles might carry chemkal weapons and that they wanted US weapons experts to see
whether they had chemical capabilities. Even so. the dear preponderance of the evidence,
including testimony from Galbraith himself, shows that tiie Croatians wanted more than
simple advice on whether the missiles carried chemical weapons. What they ultimately
wanted to kpow, as Susak asked Sadler, was what they should do with the Iranian
missiles^Jj^^fl^^

TheMHM^BWtestimony provides a ready and plausible explanation for why.

" Galbraith Dep. at 39 (attributing this statement to Special Envoy Charles
Redman).

Id.

144

after two years of the green light, the Croatians would ask the question: They were looking
for US permission to turn back the missiles. Even though the Croatians were receiving a
share of the arms transferred to Bosnia, it clearly was not in their self-interest to allow
Bosnia to develop military capabilities that rivaled Croatia's. The Federation might not last
forever, and the Croatians had good reason to think that they might someday be at war
with Bosnia. The Croatians thus were reluctant to allow the sophisticated Iranian missiles
to pass into Bosnia n hands. They ultimately did so, however, because "Galbraith told us
to release" them.J|^5|*J^

Tudjman's statement that Galbraith had directed the release of the missiles was
jnfirmed by a statement of Susak from the p revious year, which was memorialized in a

The

clear suggestion was that US involvement consisted of more,th^ mere passive
acquiescence in the release of thej^HMyriissiles into Bosniaf^

There is additksnal evidence supporting the inference that Galbraith did more than
simply manage the fk>w of arms through the Iranian-Bosnia pipeline;jy^ould appear that
he took affirmative steps to ensure that the pipeline remained open.

Jii

I Galbrarth's response was not that it was for Croatia to decide for itself whether
to accept ftjrther transshipments of Iranian arms. To the contrary, his response was that
Croatia could not shut dow rithe pipe line to which the Administration had given the green
light.)

145

The Croatians. Galbrarth explained, "are
on the hook for it," megQjng that they are commit ted to act as a conduit for Irania n arms
shipments to Bosnia.*' i

These facts, t^ken as a whole, suggest that, on these occasions, Galbraith may well
have overstepped the tK>unds of the no instructions policy. Instead of remaining neutral
in third-party violations of the arms embargo, albeit with the expectation that Croatia would
transship arms, Galbraith apparently exerted pressure on Croatian officials to violate the
embargo. To be sure, it is perhaps possible to reach a different factual conclusion, and
there may be facts that are presently unknown which might support a conclusion other than
the one the Subcommittee has reached. Nevertheless, based on the facts known to it. it
is the conclusion of this Subcommittee that the totality of the evj^en^ suggests that
G^lbt^^ may have played an active role in the release of th^^|K^missiles. The
jj^pWgmissile episode also provkjes at least some reason to beltSve that, on other
occasK>ns as well, Galbraith may have more or less actively managed the flow of Iranian
arms and quashed any possibility that Croatia would shut down the Jr aaiarLa nns pipeline
before Bosnia became totally co-opted - and corrupted - by Ir^

Tuzla Mystery Flights

The Select Subcommittee encountered in the course of its investigatnn, allegattons
in press accounts that United States military personnel and equipment participated in the
delivery of weapons and supplies to Bosnian Muslim forces in the vicinity of Tuzla, Bosnia
during February of 1995. According to newspaper stories. UN observers claimed to have
observed C-130 military transport aircraft operating wrtiat they believed to be low-level
parachute drops in the Tuzla area on Febmary 10, 12, 17, and 23 of 1995. News reports
also indk:ated Danish and Norwegian troops serving with UNPROFOR in the area dainted
to have "heard* C-130 aircraft, seen American mflitary weaponry and packaging, and been
fired upon when they attempted to investigate the mysterious flights. In light of NATO
denials that any such US or NATO flights were occurring, tensions devek)ped between the

146

UN observers and NATO commanders on the issue."

The Select Subcommittee has attempted to determine the accuracy of these stories
and based upon the information made available, has concluded that there is no reliable
evidence to support the contention that the US military and US intelligence agencies were
involved in what have become colloquially known as the Tuzia Mystery Flights." The
Department of Defense. National Security Agency, and Central Intelligence Agency have
all independently and exhaustively investigated the allegations. Having reviewed materials
obtained from these agencies, the Select Subcommittee agrees with their conclusions that
there is no evidence of US government involvement in the incidents. Deposition testinnony
from other individuals who conducted investigations or inquiries regarding the matter have
also supported the results of the aforementioned agency investigations.^

** Eagan, Invisible Anriy Gets Arms . Europeans Say , The Observer, Nov. 5.
1995; Drozdial and Ottoway, US Helps Bosnian Army Get Arms. Europeans Say ,
Washington Post. July 28. 1995; Dowden. N ATO Angers UN in Bosnia Army Mystery ,
The Independent. Feb. 27. 1995; Wovldstream. Report: US Turns Blind Eye to Arms
Drop in Bosnia . Associated Press, Oct. 30, 1995.

^^_^_^Dep. at 54-60; Jackovich Dep. at 67-70jAMpfDep. at 64-69; Select
Subcommittee Depositton of Richard Herrick. August 20rt9S6, at 64-65.

147

CHAPTER 10

THE IRANIAN GREEN LIGHT AND COVERT ACTION

Introduction

Any discussion of the legal constraints on the President's use of covert action must
start with the realization that covert action is a legitimate instalment of foreign policy.
Covert action, wisely conceived and judiciously executed, can aid the United States in the
achievement of its legitimate foreign policy goals and objectives. It is occasionally an
indispensable tod. the use of which can effectively advance US interests. Thus, we should
not. and do not, start with the proposition that covert action is to be avoided at all costs or
should be restricted in ways that make its employment impossible.

At the same time, covert activities, by their very nature, must not be publicly
disclosed, at least for some period of time. The planning and execution of these activities
are not open for the public to see, to debate, to criticize, or to protest, as are most other
governmental activities in this free society. For these and other reasons, the political
processes that normally constrain and control exercises of governmental authority do not
easily or effectively operate in this sphere. This lack of traditional political and legal
oversight is compounded by the wide discretion the Executive Branch enjoys under US
law in the foreign policy arena. This decision, coupled with diminished polKical
accountability, leaves an overzealous administration with the ability to pursue (xslicies that
are unwise or outright illegal.

Against this backdrop, it is the purpose of this section to address one principal
question: DkJ US ofHcials formulating or executing the green light decision violate any of
the laws or circumvent any of the procedures established by Congress and the Executive
Branch? In the event US laws were violated, the next question is what action, if any, ought
to be taken. If there were no violatktns of law, we must still consider whether, in light of the
facts as they have t>een uncovered through this investigation, cunent laws and procedures
are adequate to provide sufficient oversight and control of covert activities.

Overview of the Legal Regime Governing Covert Action

A detailed history of ttie various laws and executive orders goveming covert actk)n
is not essential to the purpose of this report and, in any event, is readily available

148

elsewhere/ At the same time, to detemfiine whether the various actors in the green light
affair have complied with both the letter and spirit of applicable laws, it is important to
highlight the Congressional concerns that have generated the various legal and procedural
restrictions over the years.

A review of the legislative activities in this area reveals that Congress has been
most concerned about three particular aspects of covert action. First^Congress has
sought to ensure that covert action is not carried out by subordinate officials within the
Executive Branch operating without adequate coordination among relevant agencies and
officials and without supervision by the President and his most senior foreign policy and
national security advisers. To eliminate such possibly renegade and generally highly ill-
conceived operations. Congress, in cooperation with the Executive Branch, has taken
steps to ensure that any possible covert action will be carefully considered at the highest
levels of the Executive Branch. Congress has worked closely with the Executive Bran^^h
to rationalize the functions and responsibilities of the different intelligence agencies, again
for the purpose of ensuring a process of high-level review, analysis and advice to the
President regarding any proposed covert activity, and to guarantee advance Presidential
approval of any such activities.

Second. Congress has t>een concerned about the appropriate bounds of such
activities. In that regard, it has successfully solicited representations from successive
Presidents that certain types of covert activities will not be undertaken as a general rule.
The Executive Order generally restricting attempts to assassinate foreign leaders is an
example of this kind of undertaking. Congress has also occasionally expressed its
concems in this regard more forTr.ally through the legislative process, as. for example,
when it prohibited the Executive Branch from using any federal monies to supply arms to
the Contras.

Third. Congress has also frequently wondered about the wisdom of proposed covert
activities, especially how such activities relate to other stated foreign policy goals and
objectives and how such activities advance the national interests of the United States.

^ See, eug., Report of the Congresskinal Committees Investigating the iran-
Contra Affair. H. Rept. 100-433; S. Rept No. 100-216, Nov. 13, 1987. at 457-479.
Appendix A (Minority Report, Chapters 2-4); Treverton. Controlling Covert Action , in
Controtling Intellig anrft, at 113-133 (Hastedt, ed.. 1991); Koh. The National Security
Co nstitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra Affair , at 57-64 (1990); Reisman &
Baker. Re gulating Covert Action: Practices, Contexts, and Policies of Covert Coercion
Abroad in Intematinn al and American Law , at 116-135 (1992).

149

Accordingly. Congress has provided by statute that "[t]he President shall ensure that any
finding approved pursuant to [the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991] shall be
reported to the intelligence conDmittees as soon as possible after such approval and before
the initiation of the covert action authorized by the finding. . .,' except in certain cases.^
The statutory exception is rather broad and open ended, to allow the President adequate
discretion to conduct foreign affairs within the scope of his constitutional powers. But, at
the same time, the statute continues that in those cases in which the President does not
give prior notice, he then 'shall fully inform the intelligence committees in timely fashion
and shall provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice."' Whatever may
constitute "timely" notification, the congressional concem is clear Congress wants its
leadership infomied about clandestine US adventures abnaad - before the fact, whenever
possible, and shortly thereafter in the few remaining cases. Such notification permits a
much more informed, candid dialogue between these two branches of government and
significantly increases the ability of Congress to carry out effectively its constitutional
responsibilities with respect to these activities.

It is against this backdrop that we must examine the legal requirements in this area.
Of particular relevance to the instant inquiry is a single broad inquiry: Did any of the
individuals invoked in the green light affair engage in unauthorized "covert action?" Under
current law. the President cannot authorize a covert action unless: (1 ) the President has
made, in advance, a written finding that the action "is necessary to support identifiable
foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to the national security of the
United States.* and (2) the President has notified Congress, if at all possible, in advance
of the covert activity or. in exceptional cases, soon thereafter.* Of course, to determine
whether there is covert action, we must examine the legal definition of "covert action."

The current definition of covert action has not been arrived at easily. Interestingly.
what is often thought to be the initial legislative authorization for broad-scale covert
activities - the National Security Act of 1947 - does not even use the term "covert" in its
relevant sections. Instead, the statute merely indicates that it shall be the duty of the
'Agency, under the direction of the National Security Coundl ... (5) to perfbmi such other
functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National

* Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991. § 503(cX1). Public Law 102-
88. Aug. 14. 1991. 105 Stat 443 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 413b) (emphasis added).

* 50 U.S.C. § 413b(cK3) (emphasis added).
*50U.S.C.§413b(cX1).

150

Security Council may from time to time direct."* The National Security Council directive
issued in relation to the 1947 Act does refer to covert action in the course of assigning
responsibility for coordinating and executing such activity, but provides no dear definition
of the phrase.'

Definitions did gradually begin to creep into official documents, however. For
example, by 1976, Executive Order 11905 contained the following definition of 'special
activities,* a then-convenient euphemism for covert action:

Special activities in support of national foreign policy objectives means activities,
other than the collection and production of intelligence and related support
functions, designed to further official United States programs and policies atsroad
which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government
is not apparent or publicly acknowledged.^

Executive Order 12333, issued five years later by President Ronald Reagan, embellishes
that definition by enumerating activities that are not to be considered special activities or
covert action. These include "diplomatic activities," as well as the "collection and production
of intelligence or related support functions."*

The exclusion for traditional diplomatic activities is particularly relevant here because
some of the participants in the green light affair claim to have done nothing nrwre than
engage in the routine conduct of foreign diplonnacy. Routine diplomatic activities often
occur under some cloak of confidentiality, if not secrecy. Indeed, one of the t)edrocks of
foreign diplomacy is the belief, often vindicated in practice, that foreign government officials
are often more candid than they might otherwise be when they can expect that their
conversations with US govemment officials will be held in confidence.

It was on precisely this point that in 1990 President Bush pocket vetoed the
proposed Intelligence Authorization Act. Fiscal Year 1991 (S. 2834). In Section 602 of that
proposed act. Congress attempted its first legislative definition of covert action.

* National Security Act of 1947. as amended. 50 U.S.C. § 403 (1982).
' National Security Council Directive 10/2, June 18. 1948.

' Executive Order 11905. § 2(c). Feb.18. 1976.

• Executive Order 12333. § 3.4(h). Dec. 4. 1981.

151

Covert action was defined under the bill to include, among other things, any
"request" by the US that a foreign government or a private citizen take action that would
constitute "covert action" if performed by the United States.' The Joint Explanatory
Statement which accompanied S. 2834 explained that the provision was designed, "to
prevent the conduct of a covert action at the specific request of the United States that
bypasses the requirement for Administration review. Presidential approval, and
consultation with the intelligence committees.""

In his MenrK>randum of Disapproval, the President indicated his belief that the
provision "purports to regulate diplomacy by the President and other members of the
Executive Branch by forbidding the expression of certain views to foreign governments and
private citizens absent compliance with specified procedures."" He opined that this
provision "could require, in most instances, prior reporting to the Congress of the intent to
express those views." This was unacceptable, in his view, because:

. . . the vagueness of this provision could seriously impair the effective
conduct of our Nation's foreign relations. It is unclear exactly what sort of
discussions with foreign governments would constitute a reportable "request"
under this provision, and the very possibility of a broad construction of this
term could have a chilling effect on the ability of our diplomats to conduct
highly sensitive discussions concerning projects that are vital to our natbnal
security. Furthermore, the mere existence of this provision could deter
foreign govemments from discussing certain topics with the United States at
all. Such a provision could result in frequent and divisive disputes on
whether an activity is covered by the definition and whether individuals in the
executive branch have complied with a statutory requirement/^

" The proposed legislation read, in pertinent parts, that any "request by any
department. agerKry. or entity of the US to a foreign government or private citizen to
corKJuct a covert action on behalf of the United States shall be deemed to be a covert
action.' § 602(eKa). S. 2834. H. RepL 101-928. 101st Cong. (1990).

"Id.

*' MemorarxJum of Disapproval for the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year
1991. Nov. 30. 1990. Public Papers of the Presidents of the US: George Bush 1990,
Book II - July 1 to Dec. 31. 1990. at 1729.

"Id. at 1729-30.

152

As the President made dear in that sanie Menvjrandum, however, his disagreement
with Congress was largely over the vagueness of the definition, not the substance of the
provision. He went on to note:

. . . [0]bjections to this provision should not be misinterpreted to mean that
executive branch officials can somehow conduct activities otherwise
prohibited by law or Executive order. Quite the contrary. It remains
Administration policy that our intelligence services will not ask third parties
to carry out activities that they are themselves forbidden to undertake under
Executive Order No. 12333 on U.S. intelligence activities."

To allay Congressional concerns, moreover, he explicitly indicated that he had "directed
that the notice to the Congress of covert actions indicate whether a foreign govemment will
participate significantly.'

That the President and Congress were in basic agreement regarding prior policy
and practice was also made dear by a letter to the President from the chairmen of both the
Senate and the House intelligence committees, dated November 29. 1990. In the letter,
they explained to the President that the provision was not intended as a departure from
prior practice, but rather as an attempt to codify what they believed was a pre-existing
mutual understanding regarding the requirements that might entail use of foreign
governments and norv-govemmental entities to take covert adion on behalf of the US In
that letter, the chairmen stated:

Findings have never been required to authorize contads made by the
Govemment to determine the feasibility of. and to plan for. a covert action
prior to seeking the approval of the President. Indeed, it is not the intent of
this provision to preclude the informal contacts and consultations which
would be required prior to the United States officialiy requesting a third
country or private citizen to undertake such activities on its t>ehalf. Only
once R had been determined that such assistance was feasible and is made
the subjed of an official request by the United States Govemment woukj the
requirement for a finding and reporting to the intelligence committees come
into play. That is, irxleed, consistent with the understandings that have long
existed between the Administration and two committees.*^

"Id. at 1730.

"* See Cong. Rec.. H.6161. July 31, 1991.

153

Thus, both chairmen confirmed the intent of Congress merely to codify existing practice,
not to create new standards or obligations.

Subsequent negotiations did not bring the two sides any closer to agreement on
appropriate language. As the House Report on the subsequent version of the Intelligence
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991 , noted: "Efforts to resolve the President's concem with
the definKlon of covert action in S.2834, and related issues conceming the notification to
Congress of covert actions, in a manner satisfactory to the Committee, were
unsuccessful."" Accordingly, that part of the definition of covert action was dropped from
the next version of the bill.

Congress" expectation that it would continue to receive timely notification of any
covert activity that the US government requested a third party to execute was in no way
diminished by failure to include explicitly this requirement in the definition of covert action.
After all. Congress had the President's explicit assurance in this regard." Congress was
not content ro rely entirely on the good will of the President, however. Congress included
in the new law a requirement that any time the US uses a third party to take covert action,
the President must make a specific finding to that effect. The law also makes clear that
no finding of the Preskjent could 'authorize any action that would violate the Constitution
or any statute of the United States.""

Under pre-existing understandings and dear Presidential representations nrade
during the course of the legislative process, it is clear that some requests to foreign
governments or third parties to undertake certain actions fall within the purview of the
regulations on covert actions, while other discussions with foreign governments
presunr^bly do not The trick, of course, is to decide which is which. At the extremes, it
is easy to draw the line between traditk>nal diplomatic activities and covert action. If US
government offk^ials are simply told that some government intends to take a certain action
and the US has played, or plays in the future, absolutely no further role in the matter, it has
not engaged in covert actbn. If, on the other hand, US govemment officials instigate,
facilitate arKJ otherwise play a significant executory role in the action, even though it is
carried out by entities other than the US government, their conduct approaches, if not
crosses, the line into covert action.

" H.RepL 102-37. 102d Cong.. 1st Sess.. Apr. 22. 1991, at 2-3.
'• Cong. Rec., H 6161. July 31. 1991.

"50U.S.C.§413b(aK5).

154

Application of the Covert Action Law

Successful delineation of this dividing line is no abstract matter in the case at hand
because it is precisely the role of US Government officials in their discussions with foreign
governments that is at issue. This is made all the more difficult because, on some cnjcial
issues, the evidence in this case conflicts. Depending on the inferences one draws from
the evidence, the role of US Government officials may draw closer to. or farther away from,
the line.

Some of the conduct in the Iranian green light matter clearly does not constitute
covert action. Although Ambassador Galbraith may properly be criticized for being
somewhat overzealous in his advocacy of the green light policy, and although he may be
criticized for pushing the foreign policymal<ing apparatus to an unduly hurried and ill-
considered conclusion, the formulation of the policy does not constitute covert action.
Ambassadors are not expected to be mere passive conduits for flows of communications
and information between foreign governments and domestic policymakers. It is perfectly
legitimate for, and part of the traditional functions of, a diplomat to make recommendations
anrong altemative courses of actkjn. His zeal in advocating giving Iran the green light does
not detract from the legitimacy of his championing a particular cause within the corridors
of the Executive Branch. Such conduct simply does not fall within the definition of covert
action.

Similariy, diplomatic efforts to implement the green light policy do not constitute
covert action. Again, the traditional function of a diplomat comes into play. Diplomats
traditionally have been responsible for communicating the policies of their governments to
representatives of foreign nations, either on their own initiative or upon request from a
foreign representative. Even tfiough the policy in this case was. as Ambassador Galbraith
described it. to give "a wink and a nod" to Iranian arms transfers in violation of the UN arms
erribargo.'* the fact that a communication of policy (as opposed to a request to take actk>n)
might be intended or expected to produce action on the part of a third party does not
subject the diplomat's activity to scrutiny under US covert action laws. Consequently,
tellirtg Croatian officials that US officials had been given no instructions on whether to
object to Iranian arms shipments to the Bosnian Muslims does not constitute covert action.

The Subcommittee's investigation dkJ. however, indude allegations that US officials
had taken action in support of the Iranian arms pipeline that, in theory at least, could
constitute covert action. The allegation is that in May 1994 Special Envoy Redman, at the

'• Select Subcommittee Deposition of Peter Galbraith. Aug. 19. 1996. at 13.

155

request of the Bosnian Ambassador to Croatia, pressured the Croatians into releasing a
convoy that purportedly carried only humanitarian supplies but that, in actuality, carried
some anx>unts of arms." We find that this activity could constitute covert action if Redman
knew that the convoy contained arms, but we find no basis for believing that he had such
knowledge. The second allegation of potential covert action was that US officials had air-
lifted weapons and supplies to Bosnian Muslim forces in Tuzia, Bosnia in Febmary 1995."
Like the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, the Subcommittee
found no evidence that US officials had any involvement In the so-called TuzIa Mystery
Flights.' On each of these allegations, we find no grounds for concluding that US officials
engaged in any covert action.

Unfortunately, we are constrained to reach a different conclusion on certain other
allegations pertaining to Ambassador Galbraith, based on evidence revealed during this
investigation. These allegations relate to the Nazeat missile shipment capt'jred by
Croatian officials in September 1995.*' At the request of Croatian officials, US weapons
experts analyzed the Iranian missiles to determine whether they earned chemical weapons.
Those missiles were released by Croatia, and the Subcommittee's inquiry on this issue
focused primarily on who authorized the missiles to be released. The totality of the
available evidence suggests that it may have been Galbraith who instmcted the Croatians
to release the missiles.

^" See Chapter 9.

"Id.

''Id.

**Seli
(hereinafter!

Aug. 9. 1996, at 108

156

/Galbraith argued that Susak and the rest of the
Croatians were "on the hook" and, therefore, simply could not discontinue serving as a
conduitforarms shiprnents fronn Iran to Bosnia.^' In Galbraith's view^j^|iflBiPIB
^B^B — |»r it_ [\\as] the intent of [US] policy to facilitate the delivery of [Iranian arms
to Bosnia]."''

Taken as a whole, these facts provide reason to believe that Galbraith may have
engaged in an unauthorized covert action with respect to this shipment of missiles. To the
extent he affirmatively and knowingly intervened in the shipment of arms to Bosnia,
Galbraith may well have crossed the line from merely canying out the no instmctions policy
and taken active part in a clear violation of the UN arms embargo. This conduct —
managing the flow of arms - appears to exceed the bounds of traditional diplomatic
activity, a phrase that, as a matter of plain meaning, does not exempt any and all cond'ict
undertaken by a diplomat. If, as it seems, Galbraith funneled theffw^jynissiles into
Bosnia, his conduct would appear to fulfill the definition of covert action. That is so
because the shipment was done secretly, in a manner that saved the US role from being
'apparent" or 'publicly acknowledged," and was intended to prop up the Bosnian
government and military (thereby influencing "political, economic or military conditions
abroad').* Such conduct would be lawful only upon a prior presidential finding and prompt
notification of Congress, neither of which occurred hereJ^^Jv^^

In light of these conclusions, the Subcommittee is compelled to recommend to the
House Intemational Relations Committee (HIRC) that this Report and the evidentiary
materials amassed in the course of this investigation t>e referred to the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence for further investigation and action within that
Committee's jurisdiction.

Additional Concerns

An Invitation to More Restrictions?

«ipgDep.a.103.T§L

-^k

* 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e).
"50U.S.C.§413b.

157

Even if they were lawful under covert action laws, the Administration's actions in the
green light affair are inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation in the formation and
execution of US policy that should exist, and has previously existed, between the Congress
and the Executive Branch. Before the Administration gave Iran the green light. Congress
had expressed strong concems both about the plight of the Bosnian Muslims and about
the need to contain Iranian influence around the world. In taking steps that directly
exacerbated both these legislative concems, it is inexcusable that the Administration not
only failed to consult with Congress about its major shift in US policy, but affirmatively
concealed its misguided green light policy through outright deception of the American
people and their representatives in Congress. This was a matter that, either as a matter
of law or as a matter of comity, clearly should have been promptly brought to the attention
of Congress.

It also appears that the green light policy occurred as a result of a complete
breakdown of normal Executive Branch delik>erative processes. The policy was hastily
adopted without adequate consideration of alternatives due to undocumented, behind-the-
scenes machinations of senior diplomatic personnel, activities that circumvented the
normal foreign policy decision making process. It, therefore, is open to serious question
whether the President enjoyed the benefit of adequate reflection and consideration of this
policy and its potential consequences by his senior foreign policy and national security
personnel. It is precisely to avoid these kinds of problems in areas such as this, with such
potentially explosive consequences, that well-defined processes and procedures have
been worked out. Whether or not a legal line was crossed in the haphazard, if not
reckless, manner in which the policy was implemented, the American people, to say the
least, were not well served in this instance of gross foreign policy mismanagement.

Finally, the wisdom of the Administration's procedures and processes is open to
serious question. While it is dear that many in the Congress wanted more arms to flow to
the Bosnian Muslims, the Administration repeatedly tokl Congress and the American publk:
that the Administration coukJ not unilaterally arm the Muslims in the fece of the UN Security
Courtdi arms embargo and oppositnn from US allies. To play at least some role in
encouraging and facilitating, however oblk)ueiy. violations of precisely the standards of
international law that the Administration declared itself bound to obey is an exercise in
duplicity that, to say the least, cannot be expected to inspire confidence that the
Administration is complying with the legal strictures that supposedly govern Administratnn
behavior.

Even more problematically in this case, the supplying country was known to be Iran.
US policy to deny Iran the opportunity to expand its economic, military, and political

158

influence in any way could not have been clearer. To find that the Administration was not
only tolerating such expansions of Iran's pernicious influence, t)ut, at a minimum, "winking"
and "nodding" assent, if not doing more, certainly must give Congress second thoughts
atjout the extent to which the representations of this Administration can be relied upon by
lawmakers.

In addition to being ill-advised as a policy matter, the sum of the Administration's
actions in this matter seem certain to invite Congress to consider whether more formal
restrictions and procedures on the scope of Presidential discretion are warranted. History
is a good guide in this respect. When Presidents, in the development and execution for
F>olk::y, even policy related to America's foreign interests, treat Congress as the adversary,
the usual result is ever-increasing restrictions on the procedures and processes by which
that policy is formed and executed. An Administration that deals with congressional
concerns in such a cavalier and dismissive way leaves Congress little choice but to
consider enacting further limitations and restrictions on the discretion of the Executive
Branch. Such limitations can be avoided only if Presidents effectively nrxsnitor their
advisers and themselves engage congressk^nal leadership in an open and frank dialogue
on issues that implicate our fundamental national security concems, such as the US policy
to isolate Iran.

Noncooperation in Congressional Investigative Functions

It is worth noting that the problems mentioned above have been exacert>ated by the
manner in which the Administration has obstructed congressional investigations of its
green light policy. We have highlighted at various points in this report actions by the
Administration that seem designed not to protect the integrity of the decision-making
process or protect confidential communications between US and foreign government
officials, but rather merely to discourage the revelation of emban-assing details about a
foreign policy process gone amuck. Administration officials, at all levels, seemed less
interested in serving the put>lic good than in thwarting it, especially with respect to
Congress' attempt to fulfill its constitutksnally mandated oversight and investigating
responsitMiities. Needless to say. such otjstructk^nist tactics by the Administration cannot
be condoned.

159

CHAPTER 11

CONFLICTING TESTIMONY AND QUESTIONS TO BE RESOLVED

In the course of Ks investigation, the Select Sutxx)mmittee obtained testimony and
information from numerous individuals regarding the matters under investigation. While
recognizing that the recollections of witnesses to the same incidents or events may vary
on occasion as a result of failure of memory, or differing perceptions, the Select
Subcommittee encountered a number of troubling instances where testinrvsny or statements
of witnesses was directly contradictory on important matters under investigation. Those
contradictions, in some instances, raise the possibility that perjured testimony was provided
by witnesses.

The integrity of Congressional investigative authority is adversely affected by
perjury, and Congress will encounter tremendous difficulty in carrying out its legislative
mandate if false testirrx^ny or statements are permitted to obstruct the inquiry. As a result,
the Select Subcommittee will set forth the principal instances of conflicting testimony in this
chapter, with a view toward identifying with specificity, matters which require investigation
by the United States Department of Justice or Independent Counsel.

Conflicting Testimony as to the Content
of the Instructions Given to Ambassador Galbraith

A significant factual issue addressed by the Select Subcommittee in its investigation
involved the determination as to what instnictions were conveyed to Ambassador Galbraith
for use in his diplomatic response to Presid&nt Tudjman's question regarding the
transshipment of Iranian arms. The sworn testimony of Ambassadors Galbraith and
Charles Redman varies from the swom testimony of Deputy Secretary Strot)e Talbott.
former Deputy Assistant Secretary Alexarxler Vershbow. arid Undersecretary Peter Tamoff
and the unsworn statements of National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, Deputy National
Security Advisor Samuel Berger, ar>d former National Security Council official Jenonne
Walker on the subject of the content of Galbraith's instructtons.

The conflict pertains to a material matter under investigation, and is not easily
resolved in light of the fact that the NSC staff declined to provkle testimony under oath.
The matter would t>e nrK>st appropriately addressed by refenxil to the US Department of
Justice for further investigation.

160

Conflicting Testimony and Evidence as to Whether Congress
was Informed of the Administration's Iranian Green Light Decision

In the course of its investigation the Select Subcommittee interviewed chaimien and
ranking members of various congressional committees with an interest in the subject
matter of the Iranian green light decision to determine whether such members were
advised by the Administration of Ambassador Galbraith's exchange with President
Tudjman and the Administration's decision to give the green light to Iranian arms
shipments. With the exception of former Senator Dennis DeConcini, all Members of
Congress who responded indicated that they were unaware of the Galbraith exchange or
the green light. Moreover, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Ambassador
Richard Holbrooke testified under oath that the Administration made a conscious decision
not to inform Congress of these matters, and, hence, did not do so. As Senator
DeConcini's statement to the Select Subcommittee staff are in conflict with both sworn
testimony and the vast majority of information available to the Select Subcommittee, further
investigation by the Department of Justice of the matter is necessary to determine if any
laws have been violated.

Conflicting Testimony and Evidence as to the Availability
of the "Record" Maintained by Peter Galbraith

Ambassador Galbraith made available to the Select Subcommittee, for its review,
portions of the written "record* he maintains of his recollections and thoughts on the events
of his ambassadorial tour. Charlotte Stottman. his former secretary (who typed the record
from his dtetatron), and Ronald Neitzke. his former Deputy Chief of Misskjn (who frequently
saw him dictating the record), have informed the Subcommittee staff that Galbraith began
creating the record in 1993, shortly after his arrival in Croatia. Galbraith has testified that
he dkl not begin to keep the record until November 1994. This conflict must be resolved
through an investigatnn, so as to assure that the Select Subcommittee has been provided
with access to all of the document maintained by Galbraith. The withholding of portions
coukJ constitute offenses against both the Congress and the Department of State.

161

SECTION THREE: POLICY RAMIFICATIONS

CHAPTER 12

THE GREEN LIGHT AND THE IRANIAN FOOTHOLD IN EUROPE
PART I - CROATIA

The decision 'at the highest levels' of the Clinton Administration in April 1994 not
to interpose ourselves between the Iranians and Croatians'^ removed the only effective
external impediment to Iran's hopes to interject itself into the Bosnian conflict and gain its
long-sought foothold in Europe. Before then, Iran had achieved limited success in
ingratiating itself with the Bosnian government and almost no success in Croatia. With the
US giving the green light, however, Iran has had an unprecedented opportunity to
advance its influence in the region and develop a European-based infrastmcture - overt
and covert - to spread further its radical political and religious message. As bad as the
strategic implications are of nefaiious and hostile Iranian activities in Europe, Iran's
success at co-opting the Bosnian political leadership and developing agents and
mechanisms of political influence has also been a disaster for Bosnia itself. It has
comjpted the Bosnian Muslim body politic to a degree that, as yet. is not well understood
in the West. Moreover, it has immensely complicated, if not doomed, the process that was
to have led to the developnnent of a multi-ethnic, secular Bosnia.

The public statements of Administration officials paint exactly the opposite picture,
however.

• Ambassador Galbraith testified before the House International Relations
Committee that the Iranian presence in Croatia after April 1994 increased
•slightly, but not significantly."* In the same session, he stated that the
Clinton Administration's green light policy 'contributed to peace and to the
very significant reduction of the Iranian influence.'^

• Natural Security Advisor Anthony Lake advised the Subcommittee that the

' MenK)randum to the File from Peter Galbraith. May 6. 1994 (hereinafter
'Galbraith Memorandum*).

' Hearing on US Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Bosnia and Crnatia Be fore the
House Committee on Intpmatinnal Relations . 104th Cong. 151 (1996) (Testimony of
Peter Galbraith).

* Id. at 145.

162

Iranian push in the Balkans preceded the green light. "We have no evidence
after the 'no instructions' decision that there was a further significant build up
of Iran in the area."*

• Undersecretary of State Peter Tamoff characterized the April 1 994 decision
as one that would allow "the possibility that Iranian influence or Iranian
personnel might marginally increase.*^

• Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott assured the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence that the issue in April 1994 was not "to open a
door that had been closed to the Iranians. That door was already open."*

Volumes of raw and finished intelligence product, reams of diplomatic cable traffic,
and Department of State documentation show these statements to be, at best, uninformed.
At worst, they are disingenuous. Moreover, with the passage of each day, the newspapers
carry more and more information making it appear that the Administration's expectations
for the success of the Dayton Peace Process were unrealistic and that the peace process
is unraveling. As the peace process falters, the threat of resurgent Iranian influence in
Bosnia — direct and through ideological surrogates — grows.

The Bush Administration's Refusal
to Open the Door to the Iranians

What the Iranians accomplished on the watch of the Clinton State Department had
been tried before, but was rebuffed by the US in 1992.

* Select Suljcommittee Interview of Anthony Lake, SepL.26, 1996, at 4
(hereinafter 'Lake InL").

' Hearing on US Policy on Bosnia Before the House Committee on International
Relations . 104th Cong. 24 (1996) (Testimony of Peter Tamoff); Select Subcommittee
Deposition of Peter Tamoff, SepL 13, 1996, at 21 (hereinafter Tamoff Dep."). In his
deposition t>efore the Subcommittee, Tamoff expanded on this judgment, stating that
*we had no evidence following the dedsnn in late April of 1994 that tfle Iranian military
or the Iranian forces' preserKe had, as a result of that decision, increased significantiy.*

' Hearing on US Actions Regarriing Iranian Arms Shipments Into Bosnia Before
Senate Select Committee on Intelliqenre . 104th Cong. 57 (1996) (Testimony of Strobe
Talbott).

163

In September 1992. almost two years before the Clinton Administration signaled
its green light, the Iranians tried for the first time to set themselves up as the Bosnians'
most important ally, using Croatia as the middleman. The UN-imposed arms embargo
(UN Security Council Resolution 713). which passed in September 1991 , had achieved the
unintended effect of giving the Bosnian Serbs a military advantage over the Muslims and
Croatians. Despite a significant numerical advantage, the Muslim forces were left without
a significant source of weaponry and supplies, whereas the Bosnian Serbs were able to
get supplies from the neighboring Serts-dominated Yugoslav Arniy. The Iranians saw this
as their opportunity. They could exploit the desperation of the Bosnian Muslims so as to
become their main t>enefactor and buy influence and a friendly beachhead in Europe. The
plan would, however, require the cooperation of the Croatian government because Croatia
controlled the only safe land routes into Bosnia.

The Bush Administration became aware of the Iranian scheme in August 1992 and
put the Croatian govemment on notice that the US would find such an anangement highly
objectionable. Thus, in Septemt>er when an Iranian 747 arrived at Zagreb airport, loaded
v^h military equipment and mujahedin from Iran and other Muslim countries, the Croatian
govemment notified the US and worked closely and cooperatively to bring the UN in, seize
the weapons, and send the plane and its passengers back to Iran. This decisive action -
this clear "red light" policy - stymied Iranian plans until the Clinton Administration flashed
the green light in April 1994. In the meantime, the Iranians put their designs for a
beachhead back on the shelf arKi contented themselves with small-scafe arms smuggling
and the incremental expansion of its presence and influence in the region.

Interestingly. Ambassador Galbraith has argued that the Bush Administration's
demarche to the Croatian govemment to stop the establishment of the arms pipeline was
a principal cause of the outbreak of the Croat-Muslim war in earty 1 993.' Based on that
interpretation, he argued that the Clinton .Administration dkj not want in April 1994 to repeat
this error of the past. The premise of the argument - that the seizure led to Croat-Muslim
fighting - is highly questnnable. Ronald Neitzke, Ambassador Galbraith's deputy in 1994
and the US Charge to Zagreb in 1992, when the first inckjent took place, disagrees with
Galbraith's analysis and dk) so even when Galbraith was citing 'it in 1994 in an effort to
convince Washington of the wisdom of giving the green fight ' JDiere is also no jitf eHigence
Unking the demarche and the outbreak of hostilities in 1993. ^■HHBHHthe head

' See, &.g.. Galbraith in Department of State Cable, Zagreb 1683. Apr. 27. 1994.

* Select Subcommittee Deposition of Ronak) Neitzke, Aug. 7. 1996, at 36
(hereinafter "Neitzke Dep.*).

164

of the Interagency Balkans Task Force and the US Intelligence Community's senior
analyst of the former Yugoslavia, forcefully dissents from Ambassador Galbraith's view.
'I have not seen anything that would support that as a rationale for the start of that war. j

The Iranian Green Light and the Growth of Iranian Influence
and the Terrorist Threat in Croatia

President Clinton's green light decision threw open the door of Croatia to the
Iranians. After the Bush Administration's demarche of September 1992 and into early
1994 the Iranian presence in Croatia was limited and its influence insignificant. It had a
■rnodest"'" embassy and maintained a small but active intelligence presence. Relations
with the Croatians were proper but by no means warm. The Croatians were suspicious of
Iran's objectives in the region and were troubled by its efforts to radicalize the local Muslim
population and the Bosnian Muslims wrth whom, for most of this period, the Croatiems were
fighting.

The green light decision changed the situation in late April 1994 when the US
authorized Iran to use Croatia as its fonward staging area and depot in the arms supply
line into Bosnia.

Within days of the green light. Croatian Prime Minister Nikica Valentic made a
highly publicized and friendly visit to Tehran. The US had known of this trip in advance,
and it was cited as the basis for the urgency of Ambassador,. GalbraitK's cables to
Washington seeking issuance of a green light instruction. In his message to Secretary
Christopher on April 27, 1994. Ambassador Galbraith expressed concern that "if we frown
on their [the Croatians] role in supplying the Muslims, this trip may be canceled."' The
green light was given despite the US's often-stated and steadfastly defended policy of
isolating Iran diplomatically, economically, and politically.'^ As a result. Valentic traveled
to Tehran where the press reported his joint pronouncements of cooperation with Iranian
President Rafsanjani and the successful negotiation of several wide-ranging bilateral

" Select Subcommittee Intennew of CIA analysts. Aug. 21 . 1996. at 5 (hereinafter
*CiA analysts InL').

" Neitzke Dep. at 57.

" Department of State Cable, Zagreb 1683, Apr. 27, 1994.

'^ See Chapter 4.

economic agreements, j

Additionally, the two countries set u.
agenda for concluding three-way economic agreements including Bosnia

'Apparently, the green

light from the US was all they were waiting for. A few days lateCTranian Foreign Minister
Ali Akbar Velayati reciprocated Valentic's visit by going to Zagreb. There, they agreed to
expand areas of cooperation and. as reported i n Jlhep ress. consulted on establishing
tripartite cooperation anangements with Bosnia!T^y^^|S!^JB^^

In subsequent years, the trade between Croatia and Iran would work sig ni ficantly
to Iran' s advantage , pa rticularly be ca use of its hard currency p roblems

mmmmmm

The significance of the Zagret>-Tehran agreements in opening up the Balkans to
Iran was not missed by political arx) intelligence analysts within the Department of State.
The Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence arxj Research (INR), on May 1 , 1 994, just
four days after the PreskJenf s green light decision, wrote that the agreements "will g'lve

Department of State Cable. Zagreb 1683. Apr. 27. 1994.

166

Iran a greater foothold in the former Yugoslavia."" Thirty days later, another State
Department analysis concluded. 'Iran sees this as an opportunity to win converts for
Islamic fundamentalism and establish a foothold for a base of operations in Europe.*^* And
just two nxjnths after the green light decision, the Secretary of State's "Moming Summary"
included the assessment that Croatian and Iranian bilateral relations had "retwunded" and
noted, as an aside, that the Croatian foreign ministry believed the US "tacitly approves'
of Croatia's role as a centerpiece of the Iranian pipeline. The Summary concluded that
under the circumstances the "lure of close relations with Iran will be hard to resist."^' On
the ground in Croatia, the effect was also clear. US Deputy Chief of Mission Neitzke noted:

In the summer of 1993 .... the Iranian presence in Zagreb had been
extremely limited .... It grew rather dynamically in the aftermath of Croatia's
agreeing to transship lots of arms to Bosnia in April [1994] such that by the
late fall of '94 relations vere clearly t>ooming between Croatia and Iran. We
had to drive by their Embassy all the time. We could see the antennas
sprouting, nnore Mercedes plates, and from "inter sources we were aware
that they were a great deal more active. They had more diplomats around
town."

This did not include Iranian flight crews.
•passengers." and others who traveled in and out of Croatia as they were need^ "

Considering the influx of IRGC into the Balkans, it is important to remember that the

^' Department of State, Intelligence Research Bureau (INR), Secretary's Morning
Summary . May 1 . 1994.

^* information MenrK>randum from Toby T. Gati. Assistant Secretary of State, to
Warren Christopher. Secretary of State. May 31 , 1994 .

^* INR. Secretary's Moming Summary . June 22, 1994.

^ Neitzke Dep. at 104.

^J^

167

IRGC is much more than simply an elite fighting force. It is also Iran's "primary instrument
in exporting its Islamic Revolution,' with contingents in Lebanon and Sudan. It also
supports radical Islamic forces in Afghanistan, Algeria. Egypt, and in the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip. Moreover, it has dose ties with several temsrist organizations, particularly
and most noteworthy Hizballah, which it helped establish in the early 1980's." Similarly,
in Croatia the IRGC was involved in all these activities, in addition to those of a traditional
military nature.

Iranian intelligence activities were also growing exponentially. In 1994, the Iranians
began developing an intelligence network that soon spanned Croatia. In 1995, the Iranians
built on this success and began developing another independent network of agents and
contacts.

The Croatians knew the dangers of dealing with a rogue state such as Iran. They
had rK>t lost their fear that the Iranians wouM radicalize the neighboring Bosnian Muslims.
There were, however, some 'reafpolitik* advantages to the Croatians' new bilateral ties.
In additk}n to the commercial t>enefits descrit)ed above. Croatia received a commission of
at least thirty (and in some cases fifty) percent of all Iranian arms being transshipped
across its territory. Additk>na!ly. regnnal commarKiers and officials in parts of Croatia and
in the Croat-held areas of Bosnia were in a positkin to demand further payments in arms
and cash to fadlitate the fkiw. Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak, who controlled the
military apparatus in Croatia, as well as in Herceg-Bosna. saw the most gain from this
arrangement.

Inevitably, these beneficial aspects of this leiattonship influenced the Croatians and
made it easy for them to overtook the dear dangers of dealing with Iran. The adual
destabilizing consequences of the IraniarvCroatian relationship in the regk}n and its
fadlitatnn of Iran's terrorist designs and capabilities - particutariy those directed against
the US - are appalling. Unfortunately, it is entirely too easy to document these hannful
consequences caused by the green light poficy. Two inddents - one from the summer of
1993 and the other from the summer of 1995 - dramatically illustrate Iranian influence In
Croatia which came at the cost of endangering the safety of US citizens in the regton and
the US's ability to wortc with Croatia to counter Iran's terrorist designs.

In the summer of 1993 - one year before the green light decision - based on

" Alfred Prados. Julie Kim, and Kenneth Katzman. Bosnia-Hercegovina: Foreign
Islamic Fighters fMujahideen') , Congressfonal Research Sennce Report. Jan. 29.
1996, at 3.

168

extremely fragmentary ir^ telligence info rmation about a terrorist threat,!

The Croatian response was inimediate and totally responsive to
US concerns over fResafety of its citizens. At the time the Iranian presence in Croatia
was extremely limited, and the Croatians showed no concern about possibly harming
bilateral relations with Iran by acting vigorously against the trrrrri't^ C^S^

A mere two years and a green light later, in the summer of 1995, the situation was
very different. By that time, supporting the massive military assistance program that had
been given the green light and enjoying the resultant privileged relationship it had with
Croatia, the Iranian embassy in Zagreb had become its largest in Europe. For months
(starting in the fall of 1994), the US had been gathering evidence of Iranian ten'orist
planning agains^US officials presen ce in Zagreb. The indications were many and
unambiguous^

threat was so serious that the US embassy instituted more rigorous s ecuri ty measljrS
evacuated individuals who were believed to be most at risk^^j^^^^^

At the strong urging of his Deputy Chief of Mission Ronald Neitzke, Ambassador
Galbralth approved using the Embassy's various contacts within the Cnsatian govemment
to urge that they act against the terrorists. These diplomatic efforts were fruitless,
however, and the security situation continued to deteriorate. The Iranian terrorist activities
soon accelerated to the point that the US embassy was certain a terrorist act was
imminent. Accordingly, in April, while the Ambassador was traveling outside Croatia,
Neitzke drafted a strongly worded message to Washington. In it he stated that the time of
gentle pressure had passed, and he asked that Washington approve a demarche to the
Croatian govemment to take immediate and decisive action to neutralize the terrorist
threat

In his message, Neitzke linked the threat of Iranian terrorism to the President's

" The 1995 terrorist threat is docunoented in a large number of CIA and
Department of State cables and reports made available to the Select Subcommittee.
See also, Neitzke Dep. at 104-1 15. The most comprehensive putMic account can be
found in Janrws Risen and Doyle McManus, Terrorist Risk to Americans In Croatia is
Linked tn Iran, Los Angeles Times, May 21. 1996.

169

green light policy and pointed out the diplomatic comer the US had painted itself into by
giving the Croatians an "all clear" signal to cozy up to the Iranians. The message wan-ants
quoting at length:

Neitzke concluded his message by stating that the only other option available was to
authorize an evacuation of American officials and their families.

The message had its intended effect the Department of State approved the first
of a series of strong demarches to the Croatians. Even then, the Croatians refused to
expel the Iranians involved in the terrorist planning. Nonessential US offidais and their
femilies were evacuated from Zagreb in early May due to Serbian missile attacks on the
city. This resulted in the terrorists having a less target rich' environment and may have
foilecTtheir plans for attack, partKulariy against the families of US officials. But even so,
hostile Iranian activities - iriduding surveillance of Americans - continued at an alarming

Department of State Cable, Zagreb 001608. Apr. 19, 1995 (emphasis added).

170

pace into August when the US again issued a demarche. The Croatians responded that
they were "not in favor" of the Iranians' activities but were "afraid that taking action would
involve Iranian retribution against Croatia.'^' As this was happening, the Croatians
continued to profit economically and militarily from their flowering relationship with Iran.
The Iranians plotting the terrorist actions were never asked to leave Croatia and hostile
activities continued. Fortunately, these actions have not culminated in a terrorist attack, but
that option remains available to Iran when and if it believes the time is right to strike.

Interestingly, the difference in the Croatian attitude between 1993 and 1995 was
mirrored somewhat in the leadership of the US mission in Zagreb. In 1993, the US
Embass/s action was unhesitating. In 1995, however, there was a difference of opinion
within the US Embassy leadership conceming the will of the Iranians to engage in terrorist
acts in Zagreb. Although he does rK)t questton Ambassador Galbraith's resolve to counter
legitimate terrorist threats, Deputy Chief of Mission Neitzke has indicated that he and
Galbraith had a recurring difference of opinion about the Iranian threat. Galbraith was of
the t>elief "that K was not in Iran's strategic interest to sanction an attack against the United
States.*^ Neitzke says he "Yound the logic of that Impeccable; with one exception:
terrorists don't think like that; and terrorists hatch subplots or there are revenge killings or
people are executed to embarrass somebody else, or Zagreb is a sideshow in the overall
Iranian-U.S. terrorist relationship for any number of reasons." Neitzke particulariy did not
find the kx:al strategic argument compelling when Iranians were targeting specific vehicles
and apparently specific people.* Neitzke also was unconvinced by the Ambassador's
argument that the US dare not tweak* the Iranians by asking the Croatians to move
against their terrorists. In Neitzke's words, "What had we degenerated to if that was our
point?* Similarty, Neitzke took exceptk>n to the reluctance he sensed in Washington to the
taking of action that might save Arnerican lives out of fear that it could also tead to the
interruption of the arms pipeline.*

In retrospect, it is hard to hoM the Croatian government solely responsible for its
reluctance to respond forcefully to the anti-US tert)rist threat in 1995. To be sure, Croatia's
refusal to take action to prevent an imminent terrorist attack against American citizens
within its borders is deplorable. Even so. however, this end result was foreseeable by the
Administration when H debated the green fight policy. Nevertheless, the Administratkm
accepted the known risk of increased terrorism and it decided *at the highest levels not to

" Department of State Cable. Zagreb 3247, Aug. 25. 1995.

^ Neitzke Dep. at 112. (This and the folk>wing quotes in this paragraph.)

171

interpose ourselves between the Iranians and the Croatians."^' The Select Subcommittee
finds it even more amazing that, even as the terrorist danger was making itself known on
a daily basis in credible reports from Embassy employees, some Administration officials
were inclined to question the threat or. worse, ignore it in order to keep the Iranian arms
pipeline open.

" Galbraith Memorandum.

172

CHAPTER 13

THE GREEN LIGHT AND THE IRANIAN FOOTHOLD IN EUROPE
PART II • BOSNIA

Even more than in Croatia, the US green light to the Iranian arms pipeline allowed
Iran to fulfill its most ambitious designs in Bosnia - for Bosnia, not Croatia, was and
remains the European centerpiece of Iranian hopes and plans for the future. The green
light and other Clinton Administration decisions that denied or rejected the possibility of
allowing other more moderate countries a role in aiding the Bosnian Muslims, in effect,
gave the Iranians what amounted to an exclusive license to assist the Bosnian Muslims.
Through that assistance, the Iranians successfully ingratiated and insinuated themselves
with the political and military leadership of Bosnia to a degree that the US has been
extremely hard pressed in its efforts to extricate them. The entrenched Iranian influence
within Bosnia, particulariy its clandestine influence, is a serious challenge to US interests
in the region and to the hopes of the Bosnian people for a peaceful, democratic, and
Western-oriented future.

_ je gravity of th e situa tio n was captured well in a Select Subco mmittee deposition ^
with i ~

There is no question that the policy of getting arms into Bosnia was of great
assistance in allowing the Iranians to dig in and create good relations with
the Bosnian Government And it is a thing we will live to regret, because
when they l>low up some .Americans, as they no doubt will t)efore this
goddamn thing is over, it will be in part because the Iranians were able to
have the time and the contacts to establish themselves welt in Bosnia.'

Before the Green Light

Iran was quick to recognize that the ethnic strife in the former Yugoslavia - in
particular, the tritnjiations of a beleaguered Muslim community - could give it an
opportunity to entrerKh itself in a European nation. Iran was among the first nations to
recognize Bosnia after it declared itself independent in March 1992. For a few months in
the later half of 1992, Iran, along with several other Muslim states, was able to smuggle
small amounts of weaponry to the Bosnian Muslims, sometimes by ad hoc arrangements

' SelesI Subpommittee Qgcpsition ofJMSHHHBMIjAug. 15. 1996. at 29
(hereinafter^ ^*

ileci Subcommittee p^{x>sitio

173

with Croat officials who would allow the weapons to pass through their territory for a ten
to twenty five percent payment in kind. However, the Croatians closed down this small
scale operation by February 1993 due to deteriorating Croat-Muslim relations and, once
again, the Bosnians were for the most part left to their own devices.' The State
Department in April 1993 characterized the Iranian contribution to the Bosnian war-effort
as having been "relatively small."'

In August 1992. Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati. head of the radical Islamic Propagation
Organization and newly named director of the Iranian "Bosnia-Herzegovina Support
Headquarters' vigjted Bosnia as a personal representative o f th e Iranian s upreme leadej^
All Khamene'i.

1^/ By April 1993 there were estimates that their
numbers had reached up to 150 soldiers.' On the international front, in addition to
numerous public statements of support to the Bosnian Muslims, Iran was instrumental in
December 1992 in getting the Organization of the Islamic Qj^nference to pass a resolution
calling for the lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia^ '

Iran's support, even if more rhetorical and moral than substantive, did not go
unappreciated by the Bosnian Muslim government, which was in desperate need of
assistance. Neither were the Iranians hesitant to try to capitalize on this appreciation.
Iran was already hard at work trying to insinuate itself into every element of Bosnian life
through propaganda, the setting up and exploitation of clandestine intelligence
mechanisms, and cultural and political overtures. In comparison with the heyday that
followed the green light, however, Iran's ability to exploit the situation was limited. Iran did
not, for example, even have an embassy in Bosnia. It was only after the US gave the

' MenrK>randum from Ambassador PhDip Wilcox to Secretaiy WanBn Christopher,
Apr. 8. 1993 (hereinafter 7/Viloox Memorandum').

' Wilcox Memorandum.

' Kenneth Katzman. Julie Kim and Richard Best, Bosnia and Iranian Arms
Shipments: Issues of US Policy and Involvement, Congressional Research Sennce
(CRS) Report, Apr. 24. 1996. at 2 (hereinafter *Katzman et al.*).

174

green light that Iran was able to develop a massive, multi-faceted program that would, on
a public level, burnish its image as Bosnia's savior and, on a hidden level, give it political
influence and the reach to build a formidable, well-entrenched clandestine capability to
carry out its anti-Western designs.

Deputy Secretary Talbott observed in a statement cited at the beginning of the
previous chapter that the green light did not open the door to Bosnia for Iran. He is
technically correct: what the green light did was to throw the door wider open and put out
a welcome mat.

After the Green Light

Although the weapons provided after the green light via the Iranian pipeline did not
turn the war around and probably dio little more than help the Muslims better defend
themselves, there is no denying the magnitude of Ir an's effort in comparison with its
marginal involvement in the war before April 1994. ^r~'~~

' DCI's Balkap T^k Force (BTF)^
May 24. 1996. at 2.< '

* Select Subcommittee Deposition of LTC John E. Sray, Aug. 29. 1996, at 63
(Hereirufter 'Sray Dep.").

175

With the weapons came an Iranian military assistance infrastnjcture, an expansion
of the Iranian presence, and a commensurate expansion of Iranian activity and influence

Within months the Iranian influence in the military was pervasive. Iranians were
training, advising, and indoctrinating Muslim fighters in facilities throughout Bosnia. By
1996 thousands of Bosnian military personnel, not including police and security forces, had

176

gone through IRGC training courses in Bosnia

[Also, as in Croatia, the IRGC continued to cany out
its *other duties" in trying to export the U-aniao revolution and support terrorist
organizations, including '^'2'33l'3l^-''^MP9HHpVliK

Iranian intelligence activities also increased exponentially. The Ministry of
Intelligence and Security (MOIS) expanded its assistance, training, and cooperation with
the Bosnian intelligence service, and - niore ominously - it accelerated its clandestine
efforts not known even to the Bosnians. Specifically, Iran moved quickly recruiting well-
placed agents of influence and setting up secret networks throughout Bosnia. The MOIS
also, like the IRGC, worked closely with Hizballah elements in the region and sought to
organize small groups of Bosnians who could form native Bosnian Hizballah-type cells
ultimately loyal to Tehran. The Iranian intelligence service was also working to recruit
individual Bosnians to act as its future terrorists.'^'

On the political and diptomatk: level the Iranians were also much more active in the
months following the green light, although they did not advertise all their activities to the
West Within ten days of the green light, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati made
a highly publicized visit to Sarajevo where he presented Bosnian President Izetbegovic
with a check for one million dollars, and promised to deliver 10,000 tons of diesel fuel.
President lzett)egovic profusely thanked Velayati by saying "While we cannot tell all the
details now. we must understand that our fight for freedom . . . would be less successful

''* Alfred Prados. Julie Kim, and Kenneth Katzman. Bosnia-Hercegovina: Foreig n
<uj ahideen') . CRS Report. Jan. 29. 1996, at 3 (hereinafter 'Prados et

id.

177

without Iran and its aid.'"

Also within ten days of the green light. Iran appointed its first ambassador to Bosnia,
Mohammed Taherian. Taherian's main responsibility was to manage the Iranian program
of aid to cultivate, wield and influence on behalf of Tehran. Taherian was eminently
qualified for the task by his experiences as Iran's ambassador to Afghanistan in the 1980s,
where he proved himself adept at funneling aid to the Afghan Shiite mujahedin}* The
Iranian embassy quickly became the largest in Sarajevo. For instance, the street on which
their diplomats lived was blocked off by the Bosnian police, and even UNPROFOR forces,
who were supposed to be able to travel freely on their peace-keeping mission, were not
allowed to get close enough to observe the Iranians' comings and goings.^ The embassy
conducted aggressive activities to popularize radical Iranian political and Shi'a religious
thought. This public diplomacy complemented Iran's inauguration on May 10 of pro-
Iranian, anti-Western propaganda radio broadcasts in the region in Serbo-Croatian.

With the backing of Iran and the green light from the Clinton Administration, the
Bosnian government increasingly t>ecame more fundamentalist in its orientation. This
occurred even though the Bosnian people are largely secular. The government installed
loudspeakers on street comers to broadcast the call to prayer in the mosques. Foreign
mujahedin and Bosnian fundamentalists coerced Bosnian Muslims to be more strict in
observing 'proper' Islamic customs. That summer, for example, Bosnian women wearing
bathing suits were beaten and some were even shot for their perceived immodesty. ^■

iais appear to have made

" John Pomfret. Iran Ships Explosives to Bosnian Muslims , Washington Post.
May 13. 1994. at 1 . (The Velayati quote, including the ellipsis. Is given as cited in the
original article.)

^ Katzman et al.. sufHa note 6 at 2.

^ John E. Sray. LTC. Sellin g the BQsnian M yth to America: Buyer Beware ,
United States Army Foreign Military Studies Office, Oct. 1995. at 6.

" Sray Dep. at 48.

178

In 1995 the Iranians would consolidate and expand their influence and activities
throughout Bosnia and Bosnian society. The IRGC presence remained in the range of
400 personnel in country. The mujahedin presence was, by the end of the year. 1000 or
niore. A UN source estimated 1,000 in October, various press accounts in December
placed the number between 2.000 and 4.000; and the Washington Post on December 9
reported UN figures of 1 ,500 foreign mujahedin and 1 ,500 Bosnian recruits." Although the
mujahedin are not necessarily urtder the direct control of Iran, they share Iran's fanatical
anti-Western beliefs and, consequently, appear to act as tactical allies on the ground in
Bosnia.

Iranian intelligence and terrorist related activities were particulariy noteworthy in
1995. The MOIS developed an extraordinarily dose woridng relationship v^ the Bosnian
intelligence service which it largely set up. In addition to training, the Iranians provided
operational direction aQdLfinanci al support This assistance was repaid by Bosnian
assistance to the MOIS.i

By eaij^1996, the Iranians would have som e sort of ' special' relations witi
nior Bosnian officials an<f^|

Prados et al., supia note 21 aft 3.

** Department of State. Intelligence arnf Research Bureau ONR), jran/Bosnia!

Frfenri In hlt>^ July 22. 1995.

" Memorandum from Daniel C. Kurzer. Acting Director of INR. to Acting
Secretary. Aug. 30. 1995.

179

[Even though senior Bosnian government officials, such as

Prime Ministerflaris Snajdzic, were becoming increasingly distressed at Iran's burgeoning
influence, the prevaBing sentiment was U)^t the Iranians had demonstrated themselves to
be the Bosnia's only "true friends.""'^'

While the long-term effects of Iran's pervasive influence throughout Bosnia will not
nfuinifest themseh/es for some time, the Iranian presence clearly does not bode well for the
US. Based on past experience. Iran can be expected to continue to target US citizens and
installations for terrorist attacks. Iran's continued efforts to radicalize the govemment and
people of Bosnia and to turn them against the US and the West will drive a wedge between
the free worid and Bosnia. As for Iran itself, the new economic ties with Bosnia will bring
Tehran much-needed foreign capital, undermining the effectiveness of US and UN
economic sanctions against Iran. The ovemding goal for which the Administration accepted
these ominous and substantial threats to US interests - achievement of peace in the
former Yugoslavia - is now jeopardized by the Iranian influence. As the next section
demonstrates. Iran's influence has already presented the Clinton Administration with a
substantial - and pertiaps intractable - problem implementing the Dayton Peace Accords.

The Green Light and the Dayton Accords:
An Expedient Becomes an Impediment

As this report is t>eing written, the Dayton Accords are coming unraveled and are,
on a day-by-day t>asts, being amerxled and modified in perhaps the vain hope of keeping
them alive. If we assume that the accords were rrat flawed in their inception and thus coukJ
have led to peace. ti>en the effects of the green light are even more tragic. President
Clinton and others in the administration argued that the green light decision made the
Dayton accords possit>le.* In reality, the policy expedient of the green light - letting

*" Galbraith's l^ecoid,* May 26, 1995 (Describes meeting between Galbraith and
Haris SHajdzic. Bosnian Prime Minister).

^ E^. President Clinton at the Presidential News Conference with German
Chancellor Helmut KoN (May 23. 1 996).

180

malevolent Iran become the unchallenged benefactor of Bosnia - has undemiined the
Dayton peace Accords.

The facts show that the residual effects of the green light - the well-entrenched
Iranian presence and its pervasive and pernicious influence in Bosnia in effect delayed key
elements of the plan for over six nrranths. It also critically hampered efforts to build a multi-
ethnic, militarily defensible, and economically viable Bosnia during the scheduled one-year
IFOR plan. If IFOR is unable to complete its work within the one year period and the US
extends the deployment of its forces in Bosnia (as appears almost certain), the green light
policy will have been a major K not principal cause.

According to Article III of Annex 1A of the Dayton Accords, all foreign forces,
including freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers, and advisors were to have been expelled
from Bosnia and Herzegovina rx) later than January 13. 1996, that is, thirty days after the
agreement went into effect. Certification of the withdrawal would allow the US to go ahead
with some of its nmre significant efforts to retHiild Bosnia economically and military so as
to give the national entities recognized by Dayton a reasonable chance of surviving past
the one year IFOR-supervised implementatksn plan. Among these US initiatives is the
release of $100 million of surplus US military equipment and $70 million in economic
reconstruction assistance.

Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration, either oblivious to or dismissive of
intelligence reporting on the subject, seriously underestimated the degree to which the
Iranians had managed to ingratiate themselves with the Bosnian Muslim govemment and
infiltrate the Bosnian military, intelligence apparatus, and other govemment and public
organizations. In the months after the Accords were signed, the Administration repeatedly
found itself stymied in its efforts to convince the Bosnian Muslims that Iran, who became
their nrtost reliable ally under the green fight policy, now had to be unceremoniously
removed.

Within a week of the signing of the Accords,

181

This defiance of the Dayton Accords and the US became a front-page story on
February 15, 1996 when NATO forces raided the joint Iranian-Bosnian terrorist training
center on a mountaintop near Fojnica. Bosnia. NATO forces seized sixty weapons,
explosives, manuals and booby-trapped objects, including toys and household items. The
NATO forces also confiscated instruction manuals for laying land mines. Pictures of the
Ayatollah Khomeini were prominently displayed on the walls, and the bocl'.r'ielves
contained Iranian and other radical Muslim literature. Admiral Leighton W. Smith. Jr., the
American commander of NATO forces in Bosnia said. "It doesn't take a genius to figure out
what we found here is an abomination. No one can escape the obvious, that there is
terrorist training activity going on in this building and it has direct association with people
in the [Bosnian] govemnrient."" A US intelligence official on the scene noted that "what

is bothersome is the presence of Iranians on the ground There is no complaint that

an intelligence school was run. but methods of ten-orism and kidnaping which obviously
violate intemational accords are our great concerns. And it appears the students were
Bosnians and the instructors were Iranian."*^

On television that night. PreskJent Izetbegovic. was unapologetic. "We have more
places like that [Fojnica] for training people to hunt war criminals We will continue that

** Kit R. Roane. NATO Links Bosnian Government to Training Center for
TefTOrists. New York Times, Feb. 17, 1996, at 1.

Id.

182

Having had so little success in its direct dealings with the Bosnian Muslim
government, the Clinton Administration in late Febmary approached over fifty foreign
governments, principally in Europe and the Middle East, ast^ing them to lobby the Bosnians
to cut their ties with Iran. The talking points provided to the ambassadors, taken from
much more specific and damning intelligence reports, actually described the extent of the
US's impatience in Bosnia in the wake of the green light.

- Iran has developed a security relationship with Bosnia as part of its long-
term effort to promote militant Islam and establish a strategic presence in the
Balkans. To achieve these goals, Tehran has followed a multi-pronged
program which includes providing arms, dispatching intelligence personnel
and military trainers and conducting high profile diplomatic efforts attached
to limited economic assistance. Iran's long term goals could undermine
Bosnia's future.

— Over the year, several hundred Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps (IRGC) troops have worked closely with the Bosnian army. IRGC
personnel also are attempting to indoctrinate susceptible Bosnian military
personnel with the k>ng-term aim of creating a religiously motivated Bosnian
military sympathetic to Tehran's interest.

— The intelligence training center near Fojnica, which IFOR raided on

^ Christine Spolar. NATO Says It Raided T ftrmrist Training' School, Washington
Post, Feb. 17. 1996. at A31.

183

February 15, shows dramatically the dangers of the Iranian intelligence
presence.

— We are concerned, however, that Bosnian government officials do not
seem to view the Iranians as a threat to IFOR. US officials had cited the
Fojnica training area to Mr. Silajdzic during his visit to Washington in early
December 1995 as one element of our understanding of the Iranian's
presence.

— Iran continues to have the largest diplomatic mission is Sarajevo including
a large number of intelligence officers.

— Given Iranian experience in providing intelligence training to countries as
well as radical Islamic groups, we are concerned that Iranian intelligence
personnel will try to establish an intelligence training mission with the
Bosnian government circumventing the Dayton requirement that they be
withdrawn.

- islamic donCre - especially Iran - have supplied more the [sic] 10,000
tons of war material to Bosnia, since mid-1 994. Heavy transport aircraft have
delivered arms and other military supplies to Pula airfield in Croatia where
they are moved to Bosnia over land or by air. I^i\has used other third
countries as conduits for its amis shipments.

The talking points went on to note that several Islamic terrorist organizations, including
Hamas, Hizballah, and the Egyptian Al-Gama'at A!-lslamiyyah - which claimed
responsibility for the Octot>er car bombing in Rijeka, Croatia - and extremists from Algeria
and Sudan established a presence in Bosnia eariy in the war.**

Despite this global diplonnatic effort, the Bosnians did little to comply with the Dayton
Accords. In late March, three months after the accords were signed, Bosnia still had not
expelled the Iranians. This, according to several Department of Defense analyses,
revealed that the Bosnian government was unwilling to turn its back on Iran, the country
that had been its best supporter. A US Army report characterized the US as being put
t>etween 'a rock and a hard place.* It noted that in response to a Clinton Administration
threat to withhold nearly $400 millk>n in military training funds unless the Iranians were
expelled, the Iranians offered to train and arm the Bosnians unilaterally. Moreover, the

Department of State Cable, State 038237, Feb. 27, 1996.

184

US's "strong-arm" tactics, combined with the lack of enthusiasm of the Europeans to re-
arm Bosnia, had "convinced most of the Muslim leadership that future support from the
West may be ephemeral." The report concludes that these factors plus the fragile nature
of the Muslim-Croatian federation means the Bosnian Muslims are even more likely to
maintain ties »/ith Iran and the Organization of the Islamic Conference." This assessment
mirrors . a Defense Intelligence Agency judgment: "The Muslims appreciate Iran's
assistance during the conflict .... [They] are unlikely to cut their ties to Iran even if a
Western equipment and training program were in place."" Similarly, a Department of
Defense report frankly concluded that "because Iran has steadfastly helped Bosnia through
times of grave crisis, Bosnia considers it necessary to maintain ties to Iran as a future
source of assistance after IFOR's withdrawal."^' The Defense Intelligence Agency warned
that strenuous US efforts to force the Iranians out could result in Iranian ten-orist reprisals.""

In the period from March through June 1996. the US continued regulariy to
demarche the Bosnian government, which appears to be slowly bringing it closer to
compliance, in May. a State Department spokesman admitted that there were still "a lot"
of Iranians in Bosnia in a "big embassy" and that they make up a large percentage of the
foreign mujahedin who remain.*' Finally, on June 26, 1996 - over five months behind
schedule - President Clinton certified to Congress that the Bosnian government had
fulfilled its obligation to reduce its relations with Iran. The careful wording of the press
statement and its admission of the sccpe and seriousness of the Iranian problem make it
worth quoting at length:

Since the signing of the Dayton Accords, the Bosnian govemment has
made major progress in meeting our demands on foreign forces and in
erKling its military and intelligence relationship with Iran. Although some
irKJividuals have assimilated into Bosnian society and assumed civilian roles.

" US Army Special Operations Command, intellige nce Summary (10-96) . Mar.
25. 1996.

1996).

Nicholas Bums, Department of State Spokesman, Press Briefing (May 24.

185

there is no evidence of any remaining organized Mujahedin units.

With respect to the Iranians, the Bosnian government has assured
that all IRGC personnel we identified to them have left Bosnia. We have no
evidence that those IRGC remain ....

Although we have never demanded that all Iranian nationals depart
Bosnia or that Bosnia terminate diplomatic or economic relations with
Tehran, we have insisted that the Bosnian government end bilateral
intelligence cooperation in such operational areas as training and
investigations, and end all military ties. The Bosnian government has moved
to end the operational military and intelligence relationship with Iran. It has
renrvsved from positions of authority key officials that were heavily engaged
in intelligence cooperation with Iran, including the former head of the Bosnian
intelligence agency.

Congress conditioned appropriation of the final $70 million for
economic reconstnjction assistance in FY 1996 on the President certifying
Bosnian compliance with these requirements. With this certification, these
funds will now be available to meet the needs of the Bosnian people and to
begin the long process of rebuilding the war-shattered Bosnian economy.
The President's certification also removes a major stumbling block to
commencing the US-led program to train and equip Bosnian Federation
armed forces and to strengthening Bosnia's self-defense capability. We are
eager to move ahead with this program and will do so as soon as final
defense arrangements between Bosnians and Croatians have been
completed."

Missing from this statement is an admission that this foreign policy problem was largely,
if not entirely, self-inflicted. Moreover, the certification is itself highly questionable. Indeed,
intelligence information and a great number of press reports that appeared after the
certification show that only by the most iawyeriy of interpretation can the certification t>e
termed anything but an outright fetsehood.

Within two weeks of the certification, US Ambassador to Bosnia John Menzies arxl
Central Intelligence Agency Director John Deutch voiced concern to President lzett>egovic

" Mike McCurry. WhKe House Press Secretary, Statement by the Press
Secretary , June 26. 1996.

186

over the continued presence in Bosnia of Iranians and other foreign Islamic militants."
According to press reporting the State Department estimated their number "as less than
100."** However. NATO reports from the period estimated that as many as a hundred
Iranian fighters remained and as many as "several hundred' foreign Islamic militants
remained of all nationalities.**

The Boston Globe noted that the President's certification was wrong - instead of
leaving Bosnia, "several hundred of the Islamic militants simply moved over to the Bosnian
police, with the encouragement of Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic's Party of
Democratic Action." The Globe went on to discuss the forced marriage of Bosnian girls
to foreigners in order to make the foreigners eligible for citizenship and Izetbegovic's use
of the mujahedin to harass and intimidate political opponents. The newspaper's editors
called upon the Administration to 'make every effort to force Izetbegovic and his henchmen
to disgorge foreign fighters who threaten peace and democracy in Bosnia."**

At about the same time, in early July, the Washington Post printed a lengthy piece
on the open presence of armed, officially-sanctioned, and frequently Iranian mujahedin in
Bosnia. According to the Post, despite the Clinton Administration's public assurances to
the contrary. 'Bosnian officials said they think several hundred Islamic fighters are still
here, and U.S. officials still think they pose a threat to U.S. forces." The article also
referred to the movement of large numbers of mujahedin out of the military and into the
police. The article went on to say that the remaining foreign fighters, who 'are establishing
themselves in a broad swatch of central Bosnia." are principally Iranian and that they are
supported by President Alija Izetbegovic's Party of Democratic Action. The party uses
them as a "kind of paramilitary guard' to terrorize potential political opponents.' In Zenica.
the mujahedin are amed and are free to do as they please. They are supported by the

"^ Barry Schwekj. CIA Director, tl S Ambassador Query Ize tbegovic about
Iranian Fighters , Associated Press Wire Service. July 8. 1996 (hereinafter "Schweid
artk^ie"). See also. ClA Director Deutch Visits Bosnia , Associated Press Wire Service.
July 8. 1996.

^ SchwekJ artide.

'*' Kurt Schori^, preftsiirft ftrnvvs on Karadzk:. Islamk: Warrio rs. Reuters. July 8.
1996: See also Refet Kaplan. Bosnia Passes Test Is I n L i n e t o Receive M i llions from
US. Washington Times. June 27. 1996. at A13.

*• EdHorial, Bosnia's Enamias Within , Boston Globe, July 10, 1996. at 18.

187

Islamic Center of Zenica, which is controlled by Bosnian officials who are loyal to
Izetbegovic. The Center seeks to establish an Islamic state and. throughout the war, had
helped fund the Iranian trained Seventh Muslim Brigade. The Center protects the Islamic
militants 'because the men could play an important role in any Muslim state that might
emerge should the Dayton accord collapse."'^

In early August, six weeks after the certification, the Washin0on Times ran an
article by its correspondent in Zenica describing the continued presence and influence of
the mujahedin in organizing "a broad pattern of intimidation." The author observed that,
despite the Clinton Administration's assurances that remaining mujahedin are not in
organized fighting units or 'acting in threatening ways," Bosnians and NATO officers
dispute these assertions. One American officer recounted. "They [the foreign fighters]
stand around us waving their big knives in the air and drawing them across their neck (sic)
saying, 'I'll kill you after the elections, you Jewish pig."** There were also reports in mid-
August that "despite intense US pressure on the Bosnian Muslims to cut their links to Iran
and other radical Islamic states. Bosnian President Alija Izettsegovic continues to cultivate
such connections." ** He was also reported as having recently traveled to meet with
prominent officials in the radical Islamic govemment of Sudan.*°

Cleariy, the Clinton Administration's green light policy has effectively given the
Iranians the persistent foothold they desperately wanted in Europe. That, in turn, has
given the US a serious, unanticipated strategic problem. The US is now virtually impotent
in its dealings with Bosnia, and prospects for peace in the region now appear as bleak as
ever.

" John Pomfret, Mujahedin Remaining in Bosnia; Islamic Militants Strong arm
Civilians . Defy Dayton Plan . Washington Post, July 8. 1996, at 1.

"* Philip Smucker. Bosnia Terropzed by Foreign Soldiers Who Aided Muslims,
Washington Times. Aug. 8. 1996. at A13. .

** John Pomfret, Gemnan Policeman's Departure Boosts Crime in Bosnian City .
Washington Post, Aug. 1 8, 1 996, at A29.

•"Id.

188

CHAPTER 14

THE LEGACY OF THE GREEN LIGHT IN BOSNIA,
TODAY AND TOMORROW

Diminishing Hopes

As this report is t)eing written - at the beginning of Octot)er 1 996 - fewer and fewer
observers of the polKical sKuation in Bosnia expect the Dayton peace process will lead to
its objective: a multi-ethnic, democratic Bosnia. It is already certain that the process, as
originally defined by the Administration, will fail in that quest. We are in the last few months
of what the Clinton Administration pledged was to have been a one-year commitment of
US troops. The process is hopelessly t>ehind schedule, in large part, as we have shown,
due to the lingering Iranian presence in Bosnia. Recently, the Administration has begun
to talk of the "follow-on" commitment of US troops as part of an indeterminant, long-temi
multinational force. Virtually all agree that without such a multinational force, the factions
will resume fighting, and, rested and resupplied, the human carnage and destruction will
be greater than ever.

Of course, the hope now is that a multi-national force will remain and supervise
elections that will populate the democratic political structure envisioned by the Dayton
Accords. The elections, however, are in serious trout)le. They were to have taken place
on Septemt>er 14, but campaign intimidation, voter fraud, and rampant disregard of the
Dayton Accord rules and procedures led the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) on August 27 to postpone the municipal elections. OSCE's American
director in Bosnia, former US diplonrtat Rottert Frowick, cited "across the board" and
"pervasive" irregularities and stated. "We're trying to do too much in too short a time."^
Although the same problems applied to the presidential and parliamentary elections, the
US succeeded in pressuring the OSCE to proceed with thern. reportedly out of fear that
any backtracking in Bosnia couki affect Clinton's re-electk)n campaign.*^

Under existing circumstances, elections are highly unlikely to advance Bosnia
towards the Ueal of a denxx;ratic, multi-ethnk: state. Although the Bosnian populatton is

^ Chris Hedges. Municipal Elections in Bosnia Postponed, Raising Doubt About
Troop PullQut , New Yorit Times, Aug. 28, 1996, at 6.

' John Pomfret. US Diptomat Delays Local Voting in Bosnia , Washington Post,
Aug. 28, 1996, at 1.

189

anxious to find a political solution that will allow all Bosnians to live in peace, the
Septennber 14 elections showed that the political leadership of the three communities -
Serb. Croat, and Muslim - succeeded in stacking the decks to make sure their supporters,
that is the most revanchist and nationalistic elements, will dominate within their zones of
influence. In this way, elections are simply providing window-dressing for the ethnic
partition of Bosnia, hanjening the lines of division rather than dismantling them. As the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees in Bosnia had predicted, elections in Bosnia "will produce
hard-line winners and xenophobic nationalists committed to the maintenance of hostile,
homogeneous statelets."'

The behavior of the Serb and Croat political factions in this deteriorating process
has been predictable. From the beginning they have sought separation from what they
b.lieve could be a Muslim-dominated, united Bosnia. Indeed, despite a superficial
commitment in Dayton to a unified Bosnia, most Bosnian Sert> and Croat political and
military leaders have as their ill-disguised true objective an alliance with, if not outright
integration, into Serbia and Croatia, respectively. True to fomn, the Serbs have been the
most visible in their flaunting of the OSCE mies. The Croatians, too, as has been shown
in their brinkmanship with the OSCE over the governance of Mostar, are reluctant
participants in the building of secular political institutions. The only remaining hope for the
Dayton Accords, therefore, is that they will provide a framework in which the three factions
will be able to move peacefully towards some form of political partition; the prospect of a
unified Bosnia is all but hopeless.

Izetbegovic and the Radicalization the Muslim Political Leadership

It is the abandonment of secular and democratic principles by the Bosnian Muslim
political leadership, particularly by President Izetbegovic and his Party of Democratic
Action (SDA), that is the most surprising and disappointing failure of the Bosnian political
elite to rise to the challenge of the electoral process mandated by the Dayton Accords.
Under the leadership of President Izetbegovic, the Muslims have, in the years since the
dissolution of Yugoslavia, frequently tried to calm the fears and suspicions of the Serb and
Croat minorities by emphasizing a commitment to secularism and the protedion of minority
denfKx:ratic rights. Increasingly, though, the radicalized SDA has taken refuge in
nationalism and a divisive emphasis on the Islamic identity of Bosnia. The SDA rK>w.
controlling a plurality of the Bosnian population (some forty percent are Muslim), appears
single-rnindedly intent that only Bosnia be unified under its domination.

Id.

190

The behavior of President Izetbegovic and the SDA since the Dayton Accords were
signed - mirroring the worst behavior of the nationalist Croat and Serb parties* - belies
any professed democratic objectives. This unwelcome development is of grave concem
not only to the Croatians and Serbs, but also to the West and to the US. If the events of
this last year are indicative, a Bosnia under the leadership of President Izetbegovic, the
SDA, and allied parties may very well be authoritarian. Islamic, and a refuge for anti-
Western, anti-American radicals.

Who exactly is Izetbegovic and what role will he play in shaping the future of
Bosnia? A senior Western diplomat with long experience in the region has been quoted
as saying, "If you read President Izetbegovic's writings, as I have, there is no doubt that
he is an Islamic fundamentalist .... He is a very nice fundamentalist, but he is still a
fundamentalist. This has not changed. His goal is to establish a Muslim state in Bosnia,
and the Serbs and the Croatians understand this better than the rest of us."*

izetbegovic was trained as an Islamic scholar and a lawyer, and in his writings he
shows a deep knowledge not only of Islamic political and religious thought, but also of the
development of Western political philosophy. Nonetheless, over the decades he has been
a constant and strong Islamic political activist and was twice arrested during the Tito era
for his calls for 'Islamization' of the Yugoslavian Muslims.

Two of Izetbegovic's txx>ks are available in the West, Islam between East and West
and The Islamic Declaration. Islam Between East and West is a scholariy work treating
a variety of theological and philosophical issues. The Islamic Declaration, is more
revealing of Izetbegovic's practical political beliefs since it was written to be, as it is
subtitled, 'a programme of the Islamization of Moslems and Moslem peoples."* It was
written in 1970 and illegally copied and circulated among Muslims in Yugoslavia as a
roadmap for the development of a resurgent, politically powerful Islam and the building of
an Islamic state. It is, therefore, of specific interest in seeing what Izetbegovic's leadership
portends for the future of Bosnia.

* John Pomfret, Bosnia's Muslim Leadership Acc iisad nf IntimidatJon,
Washington Post, Aug. 25, 1996, at 22 (hereinafter 'Pomfret. Bosnia's Muslim . . .").

' Chris Hedges, Bosnian Leader Hails Islam at Election Rallies . NY Times, Sept.
2, 1996. at 7.

* Alija Izetbegovic. The islamic Dedaration , (1970) (hereinafter The Islamic
Dedaration ')-

191

The book's first page gives the goal "Islamization of Moslems' and the motto
"Believe and Fight." It then condemns the East and West "for injecting their ideas and
capital, and by this new form of influence ... to ensure their presence and keep Moslem
nations spiritually weak and materially and politically dependent.'' Izetbegovic professes
that there is a fundamental "incompatibility of Islam and non-Islamic systems. There can
be no peace nor coexistence between the 'Islamic faith' and 'non-Islamic' social and
political institutions."* He rejects the Western concept of private property and believes the
islamic state must control natural resources and "all major sources of -30cial wealth."*
Moreover, "the upbringing of the people, in particular via the mass media - the press,
radio, television and film - should be controlled by people of unquestionable Islamic moral
intellectual authority."" He counsels that, through religious revival. Muslims can develop
themselves to a point where they can assume political authority, but that "the choice of the
right moment is always a specific question and depends on a numt>er of factors.
Nonetheless, there is c ^eneral rule: Islamic order should and can approach the
overtaking of mie as soon as it is morally and numerically strong enough not oniy to
overthrow the non-Islamic rule but develop new Islamic rule."" Izetbegovic also believes
that eventually there is nothing more 'natural' and 'realistic' than for the Islamic states to
join in "supranational structures - economic, cultural and polKical - for coordinated and
concerted action.'^^ Indeed, he t)elieves Muslims must 'struggle to create a large Islamic
federatksn stretching from Morocco to Indonesia, and from tropical Africa to Central Asia.'^^

These views of President Izetbegovic are not particularly radical in the context of
current fundamentalist Islamic political thought; they are, however, completely antithetical
to Western, denrK)cratic values. They are also the kjeological gunpowder present in the
Balkans that the Clinton y^dgiinistration ignored when it added the Iranian spark in the form
of its green light policy.

'Iri.atl.
'Id. at 23.
* Id. at 28.
'• Id. at 38.
"Id. at 45.
'' Id. at 49.
"Id.

192

Since the political process in Bosnia has been open, even if it has not been fair, the
international press has been free to document the radicalization of the Muslim political elite
up to and in the aftermath of. the September 14 elections." During the campaigning.
NATO officials and intennational monitors in Bosnia described an officially sanctioned
campaign to terrorize the political opposition - Muslim and non-Muslim - of P'esident
Izetbegovic. The campaign, orchestrated by the intelligence service, (BAID). regularly
used hundreds of garment agents, police officers, and thugs to disrupt the political rallies
of the opposition.'* These thugs illegally detained and interrogated the opposition, even
resorting to physical abuse and violence. Political parties that were not as stridently
nationalistic and Islamic as the SDA were particulariy targeted for attack.''

This campaign of intimidation was particulariy fierce in its harassment of President
Izetbegovic's most prominent Muslim opponent, former Bosnian Prime Minister Maris
Silajdzic. Silajdzic established a reputation during the war as being more secular in his
orientation than Izetbegovic and concemed about Iranian influence and the radicalization
of Bosnia. Accordingly, he campaigned against the increasing stridency of the Islamic and
exdusivist message of President Izettjegovic and the SDA. Silajdzic rejected Izetbegovic's
belief that in order to unify Bosnia, the Muslims must build a strongly nationalist Islamic
party to counter the Croat and Serb nationalists who want to partition the country."

*' There is also a great deal of intelligence information providing details at a
greater specificity than needed in this report. In this section, the Subcommittee has
drawn upon intelligence reporting only to the degree necessary to complement open
source reporting.

'• Mike O'Connor. The Opposition in Bosnia Faces Terror Tactics . NY Times.
Aug. 19. 1996. at 1 (hereinafter "O'Connor. The Opposition . . .•).

" Pomfret. Bosnia's Muslim . . . supra note 4 at 22.

'• O'Connor. The Opposition . . . supra note 16 at 1.

193

Silajdzic believed the only way to prevent partition is to build secular parties and institutions
open to all Bosnians. For this heresy, SDA youth activists with the help of the local police
and SDA attacked Silajdzic in June 1996, hitting him on the head with a metal pipe."
Because of this outrage, the OSCE stmck seven SDA candidates from the local slate. The
result, however, was an increase in SDA harassment and more illegal police arrests of
opposition party members.^

As observed by Michael Steiner. the second in command of the intemational civilian
effort to oversee the peace agreement, Bosnian Muslim leaders "just don't want the
American and European concept of the free flow of ideas; they want to control ideas.""

The degree to which President Izetbegovic's party has aligned itself with Iran and
abandoned any pretense at secularism was captured in a report from New York Times
correspondent Chris Hedges in September." He reported on a campaign rally held in a
remote mountainous region of Bosnia. Such rallies. Hedges reports, were "not designed
to alleviate the fears of those who believe he [Izetbegovic] wants to set up a Muslim state."
The rally began with religious music, followed by Koranic prayers. Speeches were
drowned out by cries of "God is gresfT in Arabic. White-clad Muslim soldiers wearing green
head-bands inscribed with Koranic verses signaling their willingness to die for Islam, were
in attendance. And, President Izetbegovic himself issued "a call to arms filled with
promises never to forget the sacrifice of the "martyrs.""

Alongside Izetbegovic on the dias was the Iranian ambassador and his Iranian
bodyguards. The ambassador was the only foreign diplomat, indeed the only foreigner,
traveling with the President on the campaign swing. The Ambassador's presence. Hedges
noted "lent a silent Islamic imprimatur to the event, one that many American and European

'" Id.; Pomfret, Bosnia's Muslim . . . supra, note 4 at 22; Mike O'Connor, As
Intimidation Persiists . Doubts Grow on Bosnia Vote . NY Times. Sept. 4, 1996, at 14
(hereinafter *0'Connor. As Intimidation Persist s. ■•).

** O'Connor, As Intimidation Pe rsists . . .. supca note 19 at 14.

*' Mike O'Connor. Surprising West. Bosnia Hampers Independent TV , NY Times.
Aug. 28, 1996. ate.

^ Chris Hedges, Bosnian Leader Hails Islam at Election Ra llies, NY Times. Sept.
2. 1996, at 7.

194

supporters of the Bosnian Government are trying hard to ignore or dismiss.""

In the weeks that followed. Izetbegovic kept up his close contact with the Iranians,
purged his party of supporters "not considered Islamic enough." and continued to
marginalize Serbs and Croatians in the government.'*

The SDA campaign seeks to achieve more than just political objectives. According
to NATO sources, foreign Islamic militants, including Iranian-backed terrorist cells, with the
connivance of Izetbegovic. work jointly with the BAID to fon^gol the "long-term goal" of
setting up a "base for European-wide terrorist operations.""'^

^■ iQinqife " j»

Desprte our inclination to overlook the transgressions of the Bosnian Muslim political
leadership because of the temble tragedies the Muslim people suffered in the war. the
leadership's repressive conduct in the recent elections clearly indicates that it has become
the hostage of an ideology the US would normally oppose, particularly in a volatile part of
Europe. It has become increasingly fundamentalist in pushing a radical agenda of political
Islam that has developed out of Bosnia's friendship with Iran. The tragedy is that the
Administration did not pursue a policy in Bosnia to minimize radicalization rather than
throwing the Bosnians into the arms of Iran's ayatollahs.

The Iranian and Foreign Radical Islamic
Presence and Influence Today

A number of press reports in September indicate that the situation regarding the
presence of Iranians and foreign Islamic radicals continues without improvement:

*» See also. Mark M. Nelson. Electmns. Far From Ushering In Peace, Could Be
Prelude to Brflakup of Bosnia. Wall Street Journal. SepL 13. 1996. at 6 (for descriptkins
of Islamic rallies "rife with the sounds and symbols of Islam").

** Chris Hedges. Three L eaders 6f New Bosnia: Pulling in Three Directions , NY
Times. Sept. 18. 1996. at 6.

** Washington Whispers. U.S. News and Worid Report. Sept. 9. 1996. at 16
(hereinafter "Washin gton Whispers ")

195

NATO officials and Western diplomats report that the Iranian-backed Hannas.
Hizballah, and Islamic Jihad organizations still have training camps
throughout Muslinrvcontrolled areas, with many of their members managing
to stay in Bosnia with false documents or else because of forced marriages
to Bosnian women and girls.**

NATO officials estimate that throughout Bosnia as many as a "couple of
hundred' Iranian and other foreign militants remain, particularly in central
Bosnia. The town of Bakotici alone has as many as 50 to 100.*'

President Izetbegovic has shnjgged off requests that he expel a group of
Middle Eastern fighters who threatened to kill US troops and civilians. The
threat was so intolerable that on September 12, the US had lodged a formal
demand that the fighters be expelled."

A senior NATO official stated that there were large numbers of foreign
mercenaries present in Bosnia who are trained as fighters and terrorists.
These mercenaries, who are closely allied with Iranian intelligence, are
awaiting orders to set off car bombs and carry out assassinations and are
"poised" to strike.**

As recently as the fourth week of September, US entreaties to President
Izetbegovic to turn out foreign Islamic militants were "ignored." Nonetheless,
the US again approached the Bosnians with a request that they expel senior
Iranian intelligence operatives.'"

Fundamentalist activities in Bosnia continue to be covertly funded by Iran
and are supported by President Izetbegovic and his close colleague. Deputy

^ Chris Hedges. Outsiders Bring islamic Fervor to th e Balkans. NY Times. Sept
23, 1996, at 1 (hereinafter "Hedges, Outsiders../).

*• John Pomfret, llLS_Protps ts Mideast Fighters in Bos nia, Washington Post .
Sept. T3, 1996, at A34 (hereinafter "Pomfret, US Protests . . .").

* Hedges, Outsiders . . ., supia note 27 at 1.

196

Defense Minister Hasan Cengic."

In these circumstances, it is no wonder that the cun-ent situation in Bosnia has been
characterized as a "time bomb waiting to go off.""

Cengic. a Muslim cleric, is an important player in Bosnian political and governmental
affairs and has obstructed US efforts to reduce Iranian influence in Bosnia. As the senior
Muslim in the Defense Ministry, he is its effectual head. His is a long-time friend of
Izetbegovic, and the two were co-defendants in a 1983 trial for fomenting Muslim
nationalism in what was then Yugoslavia. Cengic. who has lived in Iran, was responsible
for the logistical and financial operations of the Iranian ajjns pjgeline. In addition to beinc
avowedly anti-secular and open in his admiration of Irar "

The British have expressed their concern to the US that someone with this
background and affinity for Iran should be the principal Bosnian administrator of the over
$100 million US program to train and equip the Bosnians.** Interestingly, a senior US
official has also identified Cengic as being "the biggest obstacle" to the snrKX)th operation
of the program.** Difficulties encountered have included Bosnian efforts to shake down the
US assistance program with "taxes" and charging exortjitant prices for simple logistic
services. Even if one were not to know Cengic's background and clandestine affiliation
with Iran, his actions cleariy indicate his objective is to presen/e Iranian and militant Islamk:
influences in the Bosnian military and to keep the US influence to a minimum.

A second individual who is working actively to counter US efforts at minimizing the
mfluence and activities of Iran in Bosnia is Irfan Ljevakovic. Ljevakovic is known for his
"strong ties" to Iran and his wori< in getting the Middle Easterners into Bosnia to help wage

'* Washington Whiis pftrs. supia note 25.

" Hedges. Outsidfirs . .. supra note 27 at 1.

*• Pomfret. US Protests . supra note 28 at A34.

" John Pomfret. First Ametican Arms S hipment Arrivfts in Bosnia , Washington
Post. Aug. 30. 1996. at A28.

197

the war.^ Interestingly, Ljevakovic, who was a co-founder of the SDA with Izetbegovic,
now also serves as a senior officer in the BAID secret police.^' At this point it should come
as no surprise that he is the very individual Izetbegovic has made the principal interlocutor
with the US in discussing Iranian and mujahedin issues.

Intelligence ij
frightening detail

rmation confirms much of the above and amplifies it. sometimes in

While the Iranians have lowered their political profiles somewhat, and while their
numbers decreased through early 1996, the US intelligence community has concluded
that, notwithstanding President Clinton's certification, th g^t the Iran ian presence in Bosnia
has actually begun to increase again since June 1996.]^

** Pomfret. US Protests , . . , supca note 28 at A34.

198

Moreover, the Administration's asserljj
Iranians have been removed is incorrect.

lat the Bosnians who were closest to the

A US intelligence assessment prepared in September 1996 concluded ti(at the
MOIS actively carries on in Bosnia a variety of activities inimicable to US interests:

199

The Iranian Green Light and the Future of Bosnia:
Worrying Signs

in contemplating the ramifications of the Administration's green light policy on the
future, we cannot speculate on each of the possible permutations of the polKlcal future of
Bosnia. It is sufficient here to note that it appears increasingly unlil<ely that Bosnia will
emerge as a stable, multi-ethnic democracy. Either peacefully or through war, there will
likely be a de facto or de jure partition of Bosnia into factions ethnically dominated
autonomous regions or states, possibly followed by annexations of the irredentist areas
into Croatia and Serbia.

Assuming a Bosni9~ Muslim state survives this process, it will be the indelible mark
of Iran as a result of the green light. The Bosnia government uses Iranians and utner
foreign mujahedin as political. Geological, and religious storm-troopers, beating and
terrorizing those who do not subscribe to a nationalist and Islamic agenda. The Bosnian
government has t)een transformed from secularism to a brand of repressive political Islam.
Iran and Bosnia just this year coordinate d intelligence and tenorist activities, some of which
were directed against the US. ^ BMM^B^^^^BB BBBBBIMWBBBi
^igimi[im|MHBM^aHBHi|^^^^HBBBJThere is little hope that the
B^nianMuslimleaaerehi^varp^^^ ties to Iran and re-embrace

denfK)cratic values.i)WyB|4iSjg^^^^^

This is the grim legacy of the Administration's Iranian green light polk:y, and it must
be acknowledged if we as a natk)n are to work to neutralize it

200
SECTION FOUR: CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER 15

CONCLUSIONS

Much of this report is classified and must undergo a declassification process before
K can t>e shared with the public. That process is, by law, in the hands of the Executive
Branch. Due to difficulties the Select Subcommittee has had with the Clinton
Administration's hidirig behind classification statutes so as to avoid declassifying
embarrassing information — and there is a great deal here highly emt>arrassing to the
Administration - we are not hopeful that this process can be completed successfully,
particularly in the near future.

The Subcommittee feels, however, the need to share with the American people, as
besX it can, the results of the investigation. For this reason we have crafted the following
conclusions in a way that they do not reference property or improperly 'classified'
information. They are, therefore, less precise and comprehensive - and less pointed -
than they would otherwise be, but they may, at least, be shared publicly.

It is our hope that the Administration will relent in its efforts to conceal the history of
this foreign policy fiasco so that the American public will eventually see a reasonably
complete version of the full report which fully documents the conclusions summarized
below - and much, nrtuch more.

1. The Administration's Iranian green light policy gave Iran an unprecedented
foothold in Europe and has recldessly endangered American lives and US
strategic Interests.

The Clinton Administration, unat>le to convince tfie United Nations to follow its lead
in lifting the Bosnian arms embargo and unwilling to abandon its foreign policy philosophy
of assertive multilateralism (which denied the US the authority to act unilaterally), found
itself in 1994 without a vehicle it found acceptable to implement a change in foreign policy
it t>elieved to be in the national interest - the lifting of the Bosnian arms emtiargo.
Accordirtgly, the Administration was receptive when its ambassador to Croatia, Peter
Galbraith - a man rwted by his colleagues for his passionate pursuK of causes, free-
wheeling style, and an open attitude towards Iran - pressed policy-makers to consider a
scheme whereby Iran would be allowed to act as the US surrogate in providing militarily
assistance to the Bosnians.

The President's decision to give Iran a green light in the Balkans altowed Iran to
expand its ecor)omic and dipfomatic relations, as well as establish a military, security, and

201

intelligence presence so expansive it became the largest concentration of official Iranians
outside the Middle East. The consequences have t}een far-reaching and pernicious. They
persist to this day.

In Croatia, a government that had t>efore the green light t>een a consistent ally in
the US's fight against Iranian-sponsored terrorism, was co-opted by the weapons it
received in exchange for being a staging point for the shipment of Iranian arms into Bosnia.
As a result, after the green light, there was a serious deterioration of cooperation with the
US in countering very real arxj imminent Iranian-Jinked terrorist threats. The US even now
must cope with ttie consequences of Croatia's developing what has t>een referred to as an
"all-but-out-of-control' relationship with Iran in the wake of the green light.

The consequences of the green light policy have been much, much worse in Bosnia.
After the Administration gave the green light. Iran virtually ovemight t>ecame the unrivaled
foreign benefactor of the Bosnian government. As a result, the Bosnian government
became less secular and denrH3cratic and more open in its embrace of a radical Islamk:
political agenda acc gp^able to Iran but inimicable to US natbnal security interes ts and
democratic values.

These disturt>ir)g yet deariy foreseeable devek^pments leave no room for doubt that
the Administration's green light to Iran - of all countries - may have doomed the only real
hope for Bosnia: the devek^pment of social and political institutkjns founded on respect
for human rights arxl denxxvatk: principles. Somehow the Administratnn failed to see ttie
short-term expediency of its Iranian green light was a long-term curse on the Bosnian
people.

Even now, the Administratk>n is having to cope with the fallout from its policy. Iran's
pernicious influence and the Bosnian politteal leadership's private thralldom to Iran are

202

giving the Clinton Administration its nwst intractable, behind-the-scenes problenis in
Bosnia. Despite the Administration's put)lic assurances to the American people and
Congress to the contrary, Iranian influence in the highest Bosnian ruling circles remains
pervasive and Iranian terrorist and intelligence capabilities in Bosnia remain great cause
for US ooncem. The Iranians are biding their time, and the radicalized Bosnian Muslim
political leadership (in contrast to a largely secular population), may yet succeed in tuming
Bosnia into a radical and authoritarian state. There appears to be little hope that the
situation will improve since the Bosnian govemment is fighting tooth-and-nail US efforts to
cut its ties to Iran. The probability that the green light will end up costing American lives
is an too great given Iran's trade record.

What is even more disturbing to the Sut)committee than the disastrous
consequences of this ill-conceived policy is that even after its folly became apparent, the
Administration rejected other specific and readily available options that could have
lessened, if not reversed, the damage that had been done. Instead, it took actions that
exacert>ated the problem and further enhanced Iran's grip on Bosnia.

2. The President and the American people were poorly served by the
Administration officials who rushed the green light decision without due
deiit}eration, full information and an adequate consideration of the
consequences.

The Administration's decision to issue the green light was reached hurriedly and
without a full knowledge of the relevant facts. Tradittonal consultative mechanisms were
drcumvented. The dedskxi arxJ delit)eFative processes were intentnnally undocumented.
Key information was not passed up to tfie Presklent's advisors, and even less information
was made available to the Preskient himself. Moreover, senior NSC and Department of
State officials alkiwed themselves to be forced to rush the decisk)n-making process to
meet an artificially short deadline that discouraged, their conskJeratk>n of other less
dangerous policy optk>ns. As a result, the deciston was made without full conskJeratk>n
of the strategic consequences of giving Iran - the rogue state most hostile to the US - an
effective exdusive franchise to buy influence and peddle terrorism in a voiatile part of
Europe highly vulnerable to fundamentafist agitatnn. hiad the PreskJent and his senk>r
advisors inquired deeper, it is possit>ie that the hazards of the Iranian green light policy
would have been appreciated and. perhaps. avokJed.

3. The Iranian green light policy was Inconsistent with - Indeed antithetical to —
the established policy to Isolate and contain Iran.

The Clinton AdministratkNi has shown an admirable consistency in advocating and

203

enforcing the long-held and bipartisan-supported policy of isolating and containing Iran,
politically, militarily, and economicalty. When presented with the question in the spring of
1994 about Iran's proposal to come into the Balkans and Europe in a big way, the policy
was dear and the answer should have been obvious: 'Just say 'no." That is exactly what
the Bush Administration did two years earlier when presented with almost the identical
situation. It is bafflirig, therefore, that the Administration decided instead to give the
Iranians a green light and held open the door to Europe for them. The Administration, in
an amazing lapse of judgment scuttled its own policy of isolating Iran and instead helped
it develop an extensive and uniquely valuable set of political, military, and economic
relationships in Europe.

It is impossible to reconcile the Administration's much-ballyhooed public policy of
isolating Iran with its secret efforts to help Iran expand and normalize its foreign relations.

4. The Administration's efforts to l(eep even senior US officials from seeing its
"^ngerprints" on the green light policy ied to confusion and disarray within
the government

From the beginning, the Administration realized the green light policy was
'dynamite' and so worked to implement it 'without fingerprints.' Within the Administration,
this meant that only a handful of senior officials were officially aware of it - basically, the
President and a few individuals in the National Security Council and the Department of
State. The CIA, which was responsible for collecting intelligence on emt>argo busting and
Iran, as well as working to support the policy of isolating Iran, and the Department of
Defense, whk;h was responsible for enforcing the amis embargo, were not advised even
at the most senior levels. Moreover, important State Department officials working with key
allies, the UN, and in relevant policy areas continued to work with the understanding that
it remained US policy to oppose violations of the arms embargo. In effect, while the CIA,
Defense Department and most State Department officials were working to counter the
green light policy, a few senior policy makers were secretly working to implement it. This
complete lack of coordination between relevant US agencies on matters of important
natnnal policy was such that, were the consequences not so serious, it would be worthy
fodder for a Shakespearean, if not a Marx Brothers comedy.

5. The Administration's duplicity has seriously damaged US credibility with its
allies.

It is ironic that this Administration - one that has placed such an emphasis on
multilateralism - has in its duplicitous, if not outright deceptive, Iranian green light policy,
given other countries serious reason to doubt the US's good bith in any of its assurances

204

and commitments.

On numerous occasions, senior Administiation officials, including the President,
defended their unwillingness to arm the Bosnian Muslims unless the UN arms embargo
was lifted. Two reasons were emphasized. First the Administration professed an
unbreakable fidelity to the letter and spirit of UN Security Council resolutions, even when
inconvenient for the US, because a strong UN represented the very best possibility of
creating a stable, more just and responsit>le world order. Second, the Administration
repeatedly counseled Congress and other countries that we must keep faith with our allies
in the Contact Group. Any move by the US to break the embargo, they argued, would
endanger allied soldiers on the ground in Bosnia as part of UNPROFOR and. therefore,
lead to the evacuatk)n of European troops.

At the same time the Administration was making these high-minded arguments
about the need to respect both intematbnally agreed upon mles and US allies, it was
working assiduously behind the scenes to undermine them. The message this sends is
dear. 1) so long as you publicly support intematranal law, you may privately do virtually
anything you want, and 2) it would be a foolish ally, indeed, that trusted this Administratton
to act in concert and in accordance with its agreements.

It is no wonder that our allies have been less willing to follow the US lead during the
past nwnths in any number of international arenas.

In the Iranian green light matter the Administratk>n has squandered our allies' good
will and trust in us. Moreover, it dki so in pursuit of a short-sighted and eventually self-
destructive policy.

6. The Administration repeatedly deceived the American people about its Iranian
green light policy.

Rather than follow the traditk>nal practk» of deflecting questions and refusing to
comment on allegatrans of particularly sensitive foreign activities of the US government,
Clinton Administration officials, including Vne PreskJent, directiy and through press
spokesnDen and press statements, repeatedly deceived the American people in an effort
to coverup its secret polk:y of giving Iran a green light to expand its presence and influence
In the Balkans.

These are just a few of many examples:

• The United States is not, underiine not covertiy supplying arms or supporting the

205

supply of arms to the Bosnian government.* (Secretary of State Warren
Christopher)^

• The US did not cooperate, coordinate or consult with any other government

regarding the provision of arms to the Bosnians We have always made clear

that we were abiding by the arms embargo and that we expected other countries
to do so as well.* (National Security Council)^

• "We are certainly not contributing to it, and we certainly are not tuming a blind eye.*
(Department of State, in response to a question about the US role in getting Iranian
arms to Bosnia.)^

• *No.* (President Clinton in response to a question if the US was involved in
'orchestrating the transfer of arms to the Bosnian Muslims')*

7. The Administration deliberately concealed the truth from Congress regarding
the President's Iranian green light decision.

Despite protests to the contrary in the eariy months of this investigation. Deputy
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott recently admitted to the Subcommittee that the
Administration had intentionally not told Congress of the green light it gave Iran in the
Balkans. The Administration's deliberate efforts to keep Congress in the dari( was
inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation in the fonmatton and executk>n of US foreign
poik:y that various legislative mandates and executive orders have been designed to
foster. It is Congress' constitutional right to insist that the Executive Branch's activities stay
within the bounds lawfully mandated by Congress and that Congress be consulted on
important foreign policy matters. Consultation with Congress is especially important when
the PreskJent has adopted policies that directly impinge on matters about which Congress
has expressed strong views. Two such matters are dearty the Bosnian amris embargo and

^ Bill Gertz. Perry Threatens 'Massive Air"; Christopher Denies Report nf Cnvt*tt
Arms Shipmantg The Washington Times, July 28, 1995.

' Nattonal Security Coundl, Daily Gukjance Update. Feb. 2, 1996.

' Department of State Cable. State 092370. Apr. 14. 1995.

* The Late Edition: US Denies Funneling Arms to Bosnian Muslims (CNN
televisnn broadcast, July 28. 1995).

206

the US policy to isolate Iran. In taking nrteasures that circumvented the embargo and
fnjstrated the bipartisan Congressional policy of isolating Iran, it is highly disturbing that the
Administration not only did not take any steps to consult with or even inform Congress, but
said things that, in retrospect, can only be viewed as intentionally misleading.

8. Several Administration ofncials gave false testimony to Congress on the
development and implementation of the Iranian green light policy.

The Select Subcommittee, in additton to reviewing reams of documents in its
investigation, took swom deposittons from 27 individuals who were in key posittons of
particular importance for understanding the events under examinatk>n. The Subcommittee
interviewed another 50 or more people less central to the investigatran or who were
directed by the White House not to provkje swom testimony on the basis of executive
privilege. Comparing the statements of several individuals, it is apparent that there are
serious nnaterial discrepancies over several matters central to the Subcommitieu's
investigations.

The Select Subcommittee is truly disturt>ed that it received testimony and
statements from the Natkjnal Security Advisor Anthony Lake. Deputy Natranal Security
Advisor Samuel ("Sandy*) Berger, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, and
Ambassador Jenonne Walker that directly contradicts Ambassador Peter Galbraith's swom
testinfK}ny with respect to material issues before the Subcommittee and Congress.

Moreover, the Select Subcommittee is further dismayed that swom testimony
provkled by Ambassadors Peter Galbraith and Charies Redman, both before the House
International Relattons Committee and the Select Subcommittee, is not supported by
evidence uncovered through this investigatton.

Accordingly, the Subcommittee is referring this matter to the Department of Justice
for further criminal 'nvestigatmn.

9. There is evidence that Ambassador Peter Galbraith may have engaged in
activities that could l>e characterized as unauthorized covert action. The
evidence is sufficient to warrant referral to the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence for further investigation and action within its
Jurisdiction.

There is evklence that Ambassador Galbraith played a signifk:ant supervisory role
with respect to at least one Iranian weapons transshipments through Croatia. Galbraith's
goal in facilitating this transshipment was to affect political and military conditions in

207

Bosnia.

There is also evidence that he had input into or advance knowledge of the planning
and operation of the Iranian weapons pipeline that Iran used to ship arms and gain
influence in the embattled Balkans. There is uncontroverted evidence that he was privy
to operational detaDs concerning the pipeline that woukj ordinanly be known only by active
partidpants in the planning or operation of the pipeline.

To the extent he actively participated in the formation and execution of the Iranian
arms pipeline, there is a high probability that he overstepped the bounds of traditional
diplomatic activities and engaged in an unlawful covert action undertaken in the absence
of a Presidential finding and without timely notification of Congress.

In light of these conduskins we are recommending to the House Intemational
Relatkwis Committee that this Report and the results of this investigation be refen-ed to tlie
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for further investigation and action
within that Committee's jurisdiction.

10. The Central Intelligence Agency exercised sound Judgment in its refusal to
participate in activities that might have otherwise led to an inadvertent and
illegal covert action.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did not partidpate in the development of the
green light policy. CIA officers at several levels correctly refused to participate in its
implementation without assurances that A was being conducted within the parameters of
legal support to dipkxnatic activities or a presklential finding. Because CIA officials rightly
insisted on proper legal authorization for the change in US policy to the green light policy
(and, if required, a notificatnn of Congress), the Administration side-stepped the CIA and
dkJ not keep it adequately informed.

K is also ourfirxling that CIA officers acted appropriately in monitoring and reporting
to their superiors what were, to them, apparently rogue activities by senior US State
Department officials. Moreover, senk>r CIA offidals property reported this infonnation to
the appropriate authorities with the Department of State and the National Security Coundl
for their actkm. CIA was put in this awkward situation solely t>ecause of the unnecessary
and unjustifiable secrecy within the Administration concerning its green light policy.

11. The Administration is hiding its embarrassment l>ehind the veil of
classification.

208

Despite the President's assurance to Congress that his Administration would
'cooperate full/ in^its examination of the Iranian green light poTicy, the Administration has
repeatedly placed serious, unnecessary obstacles in the Select Subcommittee's way.
including the withholding of documents and the refusal to allow some officials to sit for
sworn depositions. In addition to its efforts to harriper the investigation, the Administi^tion
is also atxising its authority to classify information so as to avoid letting the Subcommittee
share with the American public what It has teamed.

In July the Subcommittee tested the Administration's commitment to cooperate by
asking the Department of State to review three documents for declassification that are
essential to telling the story of how the green light policy was actually Implemented, as
opposed to how it has been pubfidy portrayed by the AdminlstiBtion. After over one rrwnth
of deliberation and several missed deadlines, the Department finally responded by refusing
to declassify any part of two of the documents and declassifying only approxinrately a half
of the third document. This was despite the fact that a substantial portion of these
documents pertained to events that have been testified about publicly (with "spin") by
several Administration officials.

What most clearly demonsti^ted the Administration's efforts to hide its actions
behind the shroud of classification Is that several sentences and phrases were redacted
from the third document that were clearly unclassified but which would have embarrassed
the AdminisbBtion. This includes, for example, a senior State Department official's
negative characterization of the policy-making community In Washirigton. Follow-up
discussons with the State Department dkl not result in a reconskleration of their obviously
improper action. Accordingly, at the request of Chairman Hyde, the Information Security
Oversight Office has launched an investigation of the Department's behavtor in Uiis case.

209

APPENDICES

A. Budget, Biographies, and Acknowledgments

SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE BUDGET AND STAFF

A. BUDGET

House Resolution 416 authorized the establishment of a Select Subcommittee on
the United States Role In Iranian Amfis Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia of the Committee
on International Relations. The budget was approved with the passage of House
Resolution 417 on May 8, 1996. authorizing the expenditure of funds to establish and
cofKluct an investigation. The Majority and Minority Counsel conducted the investigation
in the nxtst economical manner possible. The Congress budgeted $995,000.00 for a
period not to exceed six months.

B. MAJORITY STAFF

Chief Counsel Richard J. Pecker

Richard J. Pocket is presently a partner in the Nevada law firm of Oickerson,
Dk:kerson, Consul and Pocker, engaged primarily in civil litigatk)n. Prk>r to entering private
practice, he served with the United States Attorney's Office in Las Vegas, Nevada as an
Assistant United States Attorney, the Chief Assistant United States Attorney and as the
interim United States Attorney for the Distrk:t of Nevada, appointed to the latter position by
U.S. Attorney General Richard Thomburgh.

During his career as a Federal prosecutor, Mr. Pocker successfully prosecuted
William Potter Gale and other anti-govemment. anti-Semitic tax protestors in the celebrated
'Committee of the States* trail in 1987. a prosecution that set the stage for later efforts
against gnsups such as the Freemen of Montana. In the late 1980's, Mr. Pecker's
significant series of court room vk:tories over fraudulent telemari<eting companies resulted
in his receiving the Directors' Special Commendation Award from the U.S. Department of
Justice and the Chief Postal Inspector's Special Award for Excellence of Performance in
the Administration of Justk». He is a 1980 graduate of the University of Virginia School
of Law. and a veteran of the United States Army Judge Advocate General's Corps.

Staff Director John I. Millis

John Millis previously worthed for the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence (HPSCI) as Staff Director of the Subcommittee on Human Intelligence.
Analysis, and Counterintelligence, the subcommittee responsit>le for, atTX>ng other things,
oversight of most CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and FBI intelligence activities.

Prior to his worit on Capitol Hill, Mr. Millis served for 12 years in the CIA's

(211)

212

Directorate of Operations as ar» operations officer and manager in a variety of overseas
posts in Asia and Africa. In 1991-92 he also served as the Director of Central Intelligence's
liaison officer to the National Security Agency (NSA) and Executive Assistant to the Deputy
Director of NSA. Mr. Millis graduated from Wake Forest University in 1975 and attended
graduate school at the University of Chicago and Banaras Hindu University. India. He
received an M.A. and Ph.D. (with distinction) from Chicago.

Deputy Chief Counsel Patrick B. Murray

Patricic B. Murray served as full committee Counsel with the House Judiciary
Committee from January 1995 through May 1996. His primary responsibilities involved
crime issues pending before the Committee. He assisted Chainnan Hyde in the drafting
arvj ultimate enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which
was signed into law on April 24. 1996 (P.L. 104-132).

Before rrxjving to Washington in 1995, Mr. Murray was an Assistant United States
Attorney for the Northem District of Illinois, in Chicago, Illinois. He served the United
States Justice Department in that capacity since 1990. He was involved in prosecuting
major narcotics offenses, and white cdlar crimes, including mail and wire fraud and public
corruption cases. Prior to joining the Justice Department, Mr. Muoay was engaged in the
private practice of law as an Associate with the firm of Clausen, Miller, Gorman, Caffrey,
& Witous P.C. also in Chicago.

Mr. Murray is a graduate of the DePaul University College of Law (J.D.) and
received his undergraduate degree from Creighton University {B.A.).

Associate Counsel Michael K. Young

Michael K. Young, is a Fuyo Professor of Japanese Law and Legal Institutions:
Director. Center for Japanese Legal Studies and Center for Korean Legal Studies at
Columbia University. Mr. Young was a law deric to Justice Benjamin Kaplan of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 1976-77. and to Justice William H. Rehnquist
of the United States Supreme Court. 1977-78. He joined the Columbia faculty in 1978.
Mr. Young has been a visiting scholar at tt>e Faculty of Law of the University of Tokyo.
1978-80. 1983. a Japan Foundation Feltow, 1979-80 and a visiting professor at Nihon
University. 1985 and Waseda University. 1989. He also served as Ambassador for Trade
and Eroflronmental Affairs. 1992-93; Deputy Undersecretary for Economfe and Agricultural
Affairs. 1991-93; and Deputy Legal Adviser to the US Department of State. 1989-91.

Mr. Young has tieen the Chairman of the Advisory Committee to the Japan Sodet/s
Publk; Affairs Program; a POSCO Research Institute Fellovr. and member of the Coundl
on Foreign Relatfons. He graduated in 1973 with a B.A. from Brigham Young University
and received a J.D. from Harvard University in 1976, where he sensed as note editor of the

213

Harvard Law Review.

Associate Counsel Stephen F. Smith

Stephen F. Smith is an associate with the Washington, D.C., office of Sidley &
Austin, where his practice focuses on litigation t>efore the U.S. Supreme Court and other
federal and state appellate courts. Before joining Sidley & Austin. Mr. Smith served as law
clerk to Associate Justice Clarence Thomas, of the U.S. Supreme Court, and to Judge
David B. Sentelle, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Mr.
Smith graduated with horrars in 1992 from the University of Virginia School of Law, where
he served as Articles Editor of the Virginia Law Review, and received his undergraduate
degree from Dartmouth College in 1988.

Executive Assistant Julia W. Gaines

Julia Gaines, prior to joining the Select Subcommittee, served as the Legal
Research Assistant fbr the Office of Independent Counsel Joseph E. diGenova from
January 1992 through June 1996. From May 1991 through January 1992, she was the
Minority Staff Assistant fbr the U.S. House of Representative's "October Surprise" Task
Force.

Prior to her government service, Ms. Gaines was the Administrative Assistant for
Menill Lynch and a Senbr Sales Assistant/Insurance Coordinator's Assistant for Kkider,
Peabody & Co.. Inc. In additkin. she was the Senior Sales Assistant/New Accounts
Administrator for Prudential-Bache Securities. She graduated with a Bachelor of Science
degree in Psychology from the University of Florida in 1982.

Senior Staff Associate Janlne E. Doherty

Janine Doherty. prior to joining the Select Subcommittee on June 17, 1996 as
Senior Staff Associate, sen/ed in the office of Congressman Peter T. King (R-NY). During
her year with Representative King, she handled legislative research and constituent
corr^ponder>ce. Ms. Doherty received a B A. in lntematk>nal Politics from the American
University in 1994. and next year plans to pursue a law degree.

Staff Associate Douglas 0. Austin

Douglas Austin joined the Select Subcommittee on July 15. 1996. Prior to his
current position he woiked as a researcher for the Republican National Committee and
prevKMJSly as an intern for the IHouse Republican Polk:y Committee. Mr. Austin graduated
with Honors in 1 992 from the University of Rediands with a B A in Govemment and History
and received a Masters Degree in Intematkinal Studies fix}m Claremont Graduate School
in 1994.

214

Full Commlttes SuppoiLStaff

We would like to acknowledge the valuable assistance provkled from Full
Committee Staff Memt>ers. Christopher A. Baugh, Caroline G. Cooper, Barbara J.
Scantiebury. and Allison K. Kieman. wtK>se tireless work and dedication were
indispensat>le to the completion of this project.

We wouM also like to acknowledge John Mackey for his insights and suggesttons
offered as Liaison to the Select Subcommittee. In addition, the Selec* Subcommittee coukJ
not have succeeded without the valuable expertise of Senior Staff Associate Jo Weber and
Budget/Fiscal Affoirs OffKer Shelly Livingston.

We wouki also like to acknowledge the extensive help in travel arrangements and
security measures provkled by the Security Officer Willie Lobo. In addition, the Select
Subcommittee coukl not have completed any of its wortc without the continued support and
help from Systems Administrator Cheryl Eamshaw in establishing a computer system
whk:h enabled the Sutxnmmittee to not only write its report, but also, through the use of
refTK)vat)le hard-drives. enat>le it to draft a report while maintaining the security of classified
infonrnatun.

C. MIMQRITY STAFF

Minority Chief Counsel Richard Meitzer

Richard Meitzer is a partner in the Washington, D.C. law firm of Washington
Counsel. P.C. In July 1996. he was appointed Minority Chief Counsel to the Select
Subcommittee. Mr. Meitzer served for three years as the Chief Counsel to the US House
Committee on Interior and Insular Afbirs. Mr. Meitzer also served as Legislative Director
to US Representative Abner J. Mikva. Mr. Meitzer has conducted numerous investigative,
legislative, and oversight hearings. He is a native of Chicago. Illinois, and received his
undergraduate degree from the University of Rochester and his law degree from
Northwestem University School of Law.

Minority Staff Director Michelle Maynard

Prior to being appointed Minority Staff Director of the Subcommittee, Michelle
Maynard served from 1989-1996 as Professnnal Democratic Staff Member for the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, with lead staff responsibility for the Newly Independent
States and Europe, including Bosnia. Croatia and the former Yugoslavia.

Before joining the Senate Foreign Relatuns Committee in 1989, Ms. Maynard
served for two years with the US Department of State's Public Affairs Bureau. She hokJs
a Masters Degree in Foreign Service from Georgetown University, and a Bachetor of

215

Science Degree in Political Science from the College of Holy Cross.

Deputy Minority Chief Counsel Charles Tiefer

Charles Tiefer. in addition to his position with the Select Subcommittee, is an
Associate Professor at the University of Baltinx>re Law School. Mr. Tiefer was the Deputy
General Counsel and Solicitor of the US House of Representatives from 1984-1995. In
1987. he was the Special Deputy Chief Counsel for the US House of Representatives
Select Committee Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair. Mr. Tiefer has published the Ibe
SB mi-Sovereign Prasident (Westview Press, 1994). and Congressional Practice a nd
Procedure (Greenwood Press 1989).

Deputy Minority Chief Counsel Charies Rothfeld

Prior to joining the Select Subcommittee, Charies Rothfeld served as a Special
Associate Independent Counsel on the tran-Contra inquiry and a consultant to the HUD
Independent Counsel inquiry. Since 1991, Mr. Rothfeld has been special counsel at
Mayer. Brown and Piatt He served as assistant to the Solicitor General of the United
States from 1984-1988 and as Counsel to the State and Local Legal Center from 1989-
1990.

Mr. Rothfeld was the law derk to Justice Harry Blackmun of the Supreme Court and
to Chief Judge Spottswood Robinson of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit He is a graduate of Cornell University and received a J.D. from the
University of Chicago Law School.

Minority Staff Associate Carrie Y. Moore

Prior to joining the Select Subcommittee, Canie Moore served as the Legislative
Assistant to the Minority Chief Counsel for the US House of Representatives Committee
on Resources, from 1991-1996. Ms. Moore's duties included researching and drafting
legislation. Committee Reports, floor speeches and amendments. Ms. Moore received her
Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from the University of California, Los Angeles,
in June 1991.

Minority Staff Associate Usa A. Rich

Prior to her appointment to the Select Subcommittee. Ms. Rich served as the legal
research analyst for both Independent Counsel Daniel S. Pearson in his investigation of
former Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown and Independent Counsel Joseph E.
diGenova in his investigation of former White House official Janet Mullins. Ms. Rich also
wor1(ed as a legal research assistant for an investigative law firm. In 1992, Ms. Rich was
a majority staff assistant on the US House of Representatives "October Surprise' Task

216

Force. Ms. Rich has worked under grant for the Marine Corps Historical Center and served
as an intern to Representative Charles Range! (D-NY). Ms. Rich completed her
undergraduate degree in Beijing. China and cunently is pursuing her J.D. degree from
American University.

D. Special Investigators

The Federal Bureau of Investigation detailed three agents to the Select
Sut>committee for the purpose of conduting interviews and conducting analysis of
documents. They were detailed as a source to be shared by both the Majority and Minority
Staff.

Dave F. Olson, Supervisory Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Special Agent Olson joined the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1970 He
has been assigned to FBI Field Offices located in Philadelphia, Boston, Dallas and
Milwaukee where he heM the position of Supervisor. In additk^n, he has had two tours of
duty at FBI Headquarters, in Washington, O.C, and is currently assigned there.

Peter A. Gulotta, Jr., Special Agent
Federal Bureau of investigation

Special Agent Gulotta joined the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1969. He
has t>een assigned to the Detroit Division, Washington Metropolitan Fiekl Offk:e, FBI
Headquarters, and the Baltimore Oivisk>n. In addition to his assignments as a SA in ttte
field woridng criminal, foreign counterintelligence and applicant matters, SA Gulotta has
served in management as a Field Supervisor, a FBI Headquarters Supervisor, and
Assistant Inspector, and Unit Chief in charge of FBI hiring. Prior to reporting to the Select
Sutxx>mmittee he was assigned to drug investigations in the Baltimore Diviston of the FBI.

Daniel F. Bradley, Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Special Agent Bradley joined the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1986. He
has t>een assigned to Phoenix, Arizona and Washington, D.C. He is currentiy a primary
relief supervisory assigned to the Washington Field Office.

217

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Select Subcommittee would like to express its appreciation to several
Individuals who assisted our efforts during this investigation.

At the CIA Sandy Chaloner of the Office of Congressional Affairs particularly
deserves warm thanks for her hurdling of bureaucratic obstacles to get security clearances
for Subcommittee staff in record time. Laurie Goodwin of the CIA's Directorate of
Operations also deserves commendation for her cheerful accommodation of staff reaue?*s
for access to CIA materials, frequently on short notice and at odd hours.

Several indivkjuals at the Department of Defense also went well beyond the nomnal
call of duty in helping with the staff clearance process. In particular, we thank Larry
Shockley of the Office of Legislative Affairs and Gigi Blakes and Stephen OToole of the
Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Select Subcommittee also expresses appreciation for the diligent work of the
Capitol Hill Police, specifically Joseph W. Simpson and Penny Womack, who were
instrumental in the processing of security requests. Also, the Police staff responsible for
physKal and technk:al security were always immediately responsive to the Subcommittee's
sometimes unpredictable needs for their services.

The Subcommittee also wishes to thank the exceptk>nal job performed by the US
House of Representatives Office of Offrcial Reporters. Not only dkJ they execute complete
arKJ accurate transcripts, but they dkJ so in an extraordinarily timely fashion. The court
reporters displayed a tremendous dedteatk>n to their wori(. a willingness to travel, and we
are most grateftjl for their persistent efforts. The reporters were: Ray A. Boyum (chief
reporter), Julie C. Bryan, Pamela L. Garland, Marcia D. Stein, and Joseph W. Strickland.
The transcribers were: Angela F. Gallacher, Kathleen A Magmer, Jeanne S. Mayer,
Bemita A. Partner, and Joyce A. Quintero. The Subcommittee also appreciates the
patience and outstanding assistance exhibited by the reporters' chief cleric Jo Ann Hooks,
who accommodated our ever-changing schedule with aplomb.

The Select Subcommittee expresses its appreciatton to the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (SSCI) for generously sharing their information and materials with our staff
during the course of our investigation.

218

In the course of our investigation, the Select Subcommittee found it necessary to
corxluct depositions and further investigation overseas. The Subcommittee especially
thanks Roderick W. Moore, First Secretary, Embassy Zagreb, for his exceptk)nal
assistance during the STAFFDEL to the US Embassy in Zagreb, Croatia. Likewise, the
Sut)committee thanks John H. Winant, Second Secretary, Emt>assy Prague, for his
assistance upon our arrival at the US Embassy in Prague, Czech Republic.

Finally, the Select Subcommittee expresses enormous gratitude to the Chaimian
Benjamin A. Oilman and the staff of the Committee on International Relatk^ns for their
support and assistarK^e in conducting our investigatksn. We have prevk)usly mentk>ned
those indivkluals most ctosely associated with our work but woukl also like to mentkjn
Chief of Staff Rk:h Garon, Chief Counsel Stephen Rademaker, Professnnal Staff Members
John Mackey, OavkJ Jung, Hillel Weinberg, and Administrative Director Nancy Bloomer.

B. Correspondence

^^^H %linttdj5taccB Senate

lOMWiuuaiia

i^til 9. 1996

SSa# 96-U92-C

Tbe Hooorable Wanes M Chris tnp hBf
SecreUry of State
Depanmeni of Slate
Washington. D.C. 20S20

Dear Mr. Secretaiy:

On Aprils. 1996. Ite£0»liv<fa7im«iepertcd that "President ainioa secretly gave a
gieeo Ught to covert Iruiaii armi sh^OKflU i«o Bosnia in 1994 despite a United Nations aims
embargo that the United States was pledged 10 t^bold and the adiainistration's own policy of
isolating Tehran globally as a sumncr of tenonsm." This leoer is to infonn you that the Senate
Select ConuniBee on Inielligeaoe is '•""""^■'g today an inquity into alleged U^. suppoit for
Iranian arms shipmeois to Bosnia. A list of quenioos of particular inierest to the cofluninee is
attached for your information.

The committee would appieciaftB receiving, by April 12. 1996. copies of all published
intelligence since Januaiy 1. 1994. dealing with arms Oows into Bosnia and of all other statements
on this matter that have been provided by an element of the U^. intelligence community under
your jurisdiction u> any OMinber or commiitee of die United States Senate. We also request thai
each element of the U..S. inMfligeocccommiiBiiy provide - by April IS. 1996. to the extent

possible - any "-— Vuhrri "Mrn*' '"•"■ g on tto subject, such u cables, electrewk

conesDondentx. internal mem oranda, minu fa 61 fl MiMi. leHeis, ana memoranoa to omcr
— WMlM tu lalM B U pihnh Im hn eliflts thai flM y w^ «. W nu hiU aca jnteiujencr unauy. we
requdtt ytMU g6upcratioo in maldag pehdhneravailaDle tor such uuervRwsroEpMRioos and
lesiiinony as the committee may requite.

Any questions regarding ds oomrainee's inquiry may be addressed to the committee's Staff
Directors, its General Counsel or Mr. Edwatd Levine of the committee staff, who is leading the
staff group handling this inquiry.

Sincerely.

Arkn Spectd^ I. Robert Kerrey

rtiaiwMii Vice Chairman

Anachmem

(219)

Ambassador Peter Galbraith Memo

HCISE

^ X

II.LO* »tMt s(Fi^:/coi> ^ O.U. ^ItMO

nctCAK I I occuiss»T
C>OSC 04 OCCiASSiPIr

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SnCTC NM-IUacMMM M»

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CO &!»«. igf.i.*vc- /-i-thj/dj

Hay 6, 199«

. TS auOnniv «D

I ICLASSFT M I I S ar

I I 0OWHea«gE TS Is t ) S or 1

MeBorandua To tbc File

During an April 29 eveninq aceting with ^, .-)

and Ambassador VunOman, sought for the second / 1» C«

ti»c U.S. advice as to whether Croatia should facilitate arms
transfers fro» Islamic countries, principally Iran, to the
COBH.

'Lhp)

In reply. 1 told that what 1 said the day before
still stood, that I had no instructions froa Washington on how , 'Ml
to advise on this issue. I urged to focus not '
only on what 1 had said yesterday, but on what I had not said.

Ambassador Redman told "It is your
decision to make. He don't want to be in the position of
saying no."

/•\

-(')

response to several requests for guidance, I was told by Sandy -.

Vershbow / I (J J

that I was to tell I did not

have instructions at this time. On April 29, at 9:30 P.M.. in
a conversation with Jennone Walker, Jennone conveyed a message
from Tony Lake that my instructions were to say "I had no
instructions" but that Tony had said this "with raised eyebrows
and a smile." On April 30, Sandy-Vershbow again Cold me to ^ ^ij\

relay a no- instructions message to clearly drawing his ^'"/

attention to the idea we were not saying no. Finally, in a May
2 telephone conversation. Ambassador Redman conveyed to me an
instruction from Tony Lake that 1 not report the conversation "/i''

with In a May S conversation, Vershbow said, after I '■'> c.

recounted Redman and »v conversation with that "you and

000382

(220)

221

Chuck have t«ken if exactly where we want to be"

'■>

■u)

In a Hay 6 conversation with Deputy Secretary Talbott.
Talbott said the instructions were no instructions

I . 'hO

explained that anything
short of a SLoteaent that the Croats should not facilitate the
Clow of Iranian arms to the Bosnians would be understood as a
U.S. green light

i\ye

embargo .

Talbott said we
did not vant to be seen as undermining the / > (i^ ^

■V

I told him of the order
itot to report the April 29 conversation and asked if be
wanted it reported. He said the answer is almost certainly
yes, but Steve OMMn or Sandy Vershbow would be in tjTUCh.

L'i.

VPeter W. Galbraith
Ambassador
Hay 6. 1994

Tc the best of my knowledge, the facts in this statement
**■• accurate. The conversations described herein were ,. 'f ^

recounted to me by Ambassador Galbraith, and in the case of the ' * -

meeting by the notetaker shortly after

they tcok olacc.

* ..yj^^ y^^—

rti

Minority Views

Select Subcommittee to Investigate

the United States Role in

Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia

October 25, 1996

Submitted by:

Rq>. Lee Hamilton
Rep. Howard Bennan
Rep. Alcee Hastings

CM MIUtHA IKMM. IBATKM0

(223)

FOOTNOTE ERRATA SHEET

to acconpany Minority Views, Select Subcommittee to Investigate

the U^. Role In Iranian Arms Transfcn to Croatia and Bosnia

NOTE: The following changes to cites are made to the Octoba 25, 1996 version of the Minority
Views. The corrections are strictly technical in nature to conform to standard Bluebook format
and in no wav alter the information already contained within the cite. The relevant foomote
number is on the left; the corrected format follows.

Chapter One, Section Two: The Umited States Policy Tofvard Bosnia

1 U.S. Security Council Resolution 713, Sept 25, 1991.

37 Hearing iwi Forrit.i Policy Overvi^-w hefore the .Senate Co-nmitt^ nn Foreign Rglahnns,

103d Cong. 1 1-12 (June 30. 1994) (statement of Secretary of State Warren Christopher).

41 Hearing nn 1 1 S Arrinnc Regarding Iranian Ann< Shiprntrntt into Rosnia hefnre the

Senate Select romminef nn Intelligence 104th Cong. 21 (May 23, 1996) (sUtement of
Deputy Secretary Strobe T albott) (hereinafter Talbot SSCI Statement").

43 Talbott SSCI Statement, at 30.

46 Talbott SSCI Statement, at 36-37.

SS Hearing on H S Action * Ri>gar»tin£ Iranian Arms Shipments into Rftsnia before the

Swiate <if\f fA rnmmitte<> on Intelligence 104th CoQg. 48 (May 21, 1996) (sUtement of

Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke) (hereinafter 'Holbrooke SSCI Statement").

75 Holbrooke SSC Statement, at 26.

80 Talbott SSCI Statement, at 22.

Chapter One, Section Four: PubUe and Congressional Knowtedge of Anns Flows

32 Hearing on 1 1 S Action* B<»garrting Iranian Ann< Shipments into Romia before the

Ronate Seliirt Pominiwi^ on Intelligence. I04di Coog. 37 (May 23. 1996) (statement of
Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott) (bereinafter Talbott SSCI Statement'^.

Cn^spler Ttt^a, Stction One: the No Instruedons Responu of April 1994

6 Heanng nn Roml. h>.for^ rtte Hoii«^ P^rmanont Selert rnmmittee on Intelligence 104th

Cong. 24 (May 30. 1996) (statement of Ambassador Peter Galbraith) (hereinafter
"Ga»lb".-4ith HPSCI StatemenfO-

1 V Hear-ng nn Iranian Arm* to Ro<nia before th^ Hnii*^ Pwmanent Select Committee on

InieUigencc I04tb Cong. IS (June 6. 1996) (statement of Former Director. Central
LntfiUigence R. James Wools^r) (hereinafter "Woolsey HPSCI Statement*0.

(224)

225

Chapter Two, Section Two: Commueiieatioiis and M'acommunications at the CIA

5 (In place of Woolsey HPSCI DqWSition at 1 5] Hearin g on Iranian Kmi to Rnt fiia.

before the Hoiiw Permanent Select Coinmitt«^ nn tnt>||igfnrf i04th Cong. IS (June 6,
1 996) (sUtement of Former Director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey)
(hereinafter "Woolsey HPSCI Statement").

Chapter Two, Section Four: The May 1994 Convoy

7 Testimony to suffof the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 104th Cong (May

31,1 996) (SUtement of Jane Green).

Chapter Two, Section Six: Mystery Flights into Tuzla

25 Testimony to suffof the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 104th Cong. 27-28
(statement of Col. Richard Herricic) (hereinaAer "Henick SSCI SUtement").

Chapter Two, Section Seven: Thefam^pfissile Incident

33 Hearing on Actions Regarding Iranian Arms .Shipm^ft into Bn«mia h<-fnrf th>; Sm atr

Select Comminrf! nn Intf.lligence. 104th Cong. 80 (May 21. 1996) (sutement of Assistant
Secretary Richard Holbrooke) (hoeinafler "Holbrooke SSCI SUtement").

41 Holbrooke SSCI Statement at 84; Clark Subcommittee Dep. at S3; Clark SSCI Dep at
27.

48 Clark Subcommittee Dep. at S6; Holbrooke SSCI Sutement at 86.

SO Clark Subcommittee Dep. at S8-S9; Holbrooke SSCI Sutement at 87, 88.

53 Holbrooke SSCI Statement at 87; etc.

55 Hearing on Romia hefnrp rti*; HmKy PiTmangnt S^l«-rt rommitti^^ nn Tntglligfnr^ 1 04th

Cong. 22 (May 30, 1996) (statement of Ambassador Peter Galbraith) (hereinafter
"Galbraith HPSCI StatemenO-

36 Galbraith HPSCI Statement tf 22.

82 Galbraith HPSCI Statement at 22; Kehon Dep. at 105.

102 Galbraith Select Subcommittee Dep. at 187-I88:GaIbraidi HPSCI Statement at 22.

Chapter Two, Section Eight: The FaO 1994 IniSatne

2 Hearing nn I I.S. Action.< Regarding Iranian Aims Shipmmts into Rnc n ia h^fniy th^

Senate Selmt Cnrnmiltee rni Intelligeace. 104th Cong. 35 (May 21. 1996) (sutement of
Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrodce) (hereinafter "Holbrooke SSCI Statement").

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMAR Y

Select Subcomminee Organization and Structure i

Legislative History
Legislative Mandate

Treatment of Confidential and Classified Information

Summary of Key Findings and Conclusions

Summary of the Investigation

The Situation on the Ground in the Spring of 1994

The International Political Situation in the Spring of 1994

The United States Policy in the Spring of 1994

The April 28 and 29 Meetings

The Actions of the U.S. Ambassador to Zagreb with respect to Senior

Government of Croatia Officials
The Summer of 1994
The Fall of 1994
Communications between the Ambassador Galbraith and the Embassy

Zagreb InteUigence Station Prior to April 28, 1994
The Lines of Conununication between the Senior Intelligence Official at

Embassy Zagreb and Headquarters
The Consequences of FaiUng to Inform Adequately the Senior Intelligence

Officer in Embassy Zagreb
The Role of the Deputy Chief of Mission
The Conununications between the Ambassador and the Senior Intelligence

Officer in Embassy Zagreb
The Communications in May 1994 between the Senior Officials of the

Department of State, the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence

Agency
Consultations in Fall 1994 between the Senior Officials of the Department

of State, the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency
Congressional Action
Specific Shipments of Arms

CHAPTER ONE - BACKGROUND ON EVENTS RELA TING TO THE
INVESTIGATION OF THE SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE

Section One

Setting the Stage, The Balkan War 1

1991-1992: War Erupts and the International Reaction

(226)

227

1992-1993: Bosnia Enters the War

1993-1994; Clinton's Bosnian Policy and the Muslim-Croat War

Negotiating the Federation Agreement

The Effects of the Strategic Military Imbalance Between the Waning Factions

1995: The Road to Dayton

Section Two

The United States Policy Toward Bosnia 30

The Bush Administration's Approach

President Clinton's Push to Lifl the Embargo ~ 1993

The Croatian Question — 1993

A Call to Action in Bosnia

Securing the Federation Agreement

Pressure to Lift the Embargo

The Croatian Question ~ 1994

The Downside ~ Iran

The Allies

Additional British Concerns

Reaction to Unilateral Lift and to Nunn-Mitchell

Results of United States Policy

Why the Policy Worked

Section Three

The Role of Congress 60

Congressional action on the arms embargo

The Nunn-Mitchell Amendment

A Continuing Push to Lift the Embargo - 1995

Section Four

Public and Congressional Knowledge of Arms Flows 69

Public Statements by the Administration

Public information

Intelligence information

Briefings

Congressional Delegation Trips/Staff Delegation Trips to Croatia and Bosnia

Congressional Knowledge of the Diplomatic Exchange

Section Five

A Legal Discussion of Covert Action 84

The Executive Branch Did Not Violate the Law

History of Covert Action Requirements.

The No Instructions Respo nse did n ot Constitute Covert Action.

Neither the Convoy Nor th jHBVMissile Incident Constituted Covert Action

The Executive Branch was not Un3er a Legal Duty to Report the "No Instructions"

228

Response

Executive Branch OfTicials Should Have Disclosed the "No Instnictions" Response to

Congress

The "No Instructions" Response did not Violate International Law

CHAPTER TWO - ISSUES INVESTIGA TED BY
THE SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE

Section One

No Instructions Policy of April 1994. 106

Weeks Preceding President Tudjman's Question Presentation of the Question to
Ambassador Galbraith

The Question is Posed to Embassy Zagreb Personnel
Contacts with the United States Defense Attache
Events of April 27 and April 28, 1994

Deputy Assistant Secretary Vershbow Discusses the Matter with the

Undersecretary
Ambassador Galbraith Consults with his
Policy Makers Debate and Formulate a Response to the Croatian Inquiry: Air

Force One Discussions
Ambassador Galbraith Receives "No Instructions" and Responds to the Croatian
President
Events of April 29, 1994: The Question is Posed Again

Ambassador Galbraith Contacts the NSC for Final Guidance
The April 29. 1994 Tudjman Meeting
The Decision to Report Orally to Washington

Other Events of April 30, 1994
Events of Early May 1994: The Days Following the "No Instructions" Response

Section Two

Communications and Miscommunications at the CIA 155

Discoimects at the CIA Leading up to and Subsequent to the May 5, 1994 Meeting

Ambassador Galbraith's Request to theglHHIHVP

Central Intelligence Agency Concern about Covert Activity

The May 5, 1994 Meeting between DCI Woolsey and Secretary Christopher:

Clarification is Sought

May 5, 1994 in Zagreb

Deputy Secretary Talbott Contacts Ambassador Galbraith to Reiterate the "No

Instructions" Response

Ambassador Galbraith Memorializes the Croatian Inquiry

A Pattern of Disconnects at the CIA

Disconnect Between the DiMMarfof Central Intelligence and the Deputy Secretary of

State
Disconnect Between the Director of Central Intelligence and His Subordinates

iii

229

Disconnect at the CIA and the Af\ermath of the May S Meeting
Disconnects Relating to the Law of Covert Action
Leaving thefPHMlBlipin the Dark
Summer 1994 at the CL\

Section Three

Department of Defense and the April 29 Response 184

Information Available to the Department of Defense

The Department of Defense Learns of the April Inquiries

After the No Instructions Response: The Department of Defense Changes Nothing

ThefChief of StatioillReports Department of Defense "Concern"

Rumors that the Umted States was Involved in Covert Action

Section Four

The May 1994 Convoy Incident. 194

Convoys to Bosnia.

The May 1994 Convoy and Embassy Zagreb.

Special Envoy Redman's Contacnvith the May Convoy.

Reporting by the

Section Five

Alleged Meetings between Ambassador Galbraith and the Muslim Cleric Omerbasic . . 206

Vis its with the Imam

The^HHBBI^Tries to Identify the United States Officials, but Jumps to

Conclusions
A Case of Mistaken Identification

Section Six

Mystery Flights into Tuzia 216

The NATO Investigation

Attempts by United States and Other Officials to Investigate Flights

Section Seyen

The§fKt§MissUe Incident 223

Media Reports of the Missile Inspection and Informal Investigation by the Intelligence

Oversight Board
Intelligence During the Sprin g and Summer 1995
Initial Shipments of|m||pMissiles
The Third Shipment and United States Involvement

Assistant Secretary Holbrooke and General Clark are Approached About the Missiles
Defense Minister Susak Requests Assistance from Ambassador Galbraith
The Initial Missile Inspectio n by the Defense^ ttache
The Second Inspection at thelHHHUlS Request
The Croatians Arrange to Release the Missiles

230

There is No Evidence to Suggest that Ambassador Galbraith Influenced the Release of

the Missiles
The Lack of Impact Made by thel

Section Eight

The Fall 1994 Initiative 245

Sus picions Within the CIA
HH^HBConcems
The CIA Ceadership's Response
The Directorate of Operation's Concerns

Section Nine

Intelligence Oversight Board 271

Purpose of the Intelligence Oversight Board
Intelligence Oversight Board Investigation

CHAPTER THREE - THE IRANIAN PRESENCE AND THE UNITED
STA TES POLICY TO MITIGA TE IRANIAN INFLUENCE

Section One

Iranian Involvement in Bosnia and Croatia 1991-1996 275

Origins of Iranian Military Involvement

Military Arms

Military Personnel Deployment

Humanitarian Aid

Diplomatic Activities

Intelligence Activities

Economic Support Activities

Iranian Influence Following the Dayton Agreement

Iranian Failure to Achieve its Objectives in Bosnia

Section Two

The Threat of Terrorism to Embassy Zagreb Personnel 294

Iranian Terrorist Presence in Bosnia
. Iranian Tenorist Presence in Croatia

1993 Terrorist Incident

1995 Terrorist Threat

Embassy Zagreb Response

Current Status of Iranian Terrorist Threat

231

Section Three

IFOR Deployment and Potential Risks to United States Troops and Personnel. 308

Mission of IFOR

Clinton Administration Support for United States Troops in IFOR

Congressional Action on Troop Deployment

Information to Congress on Troop Deployment

Dayton Agreement Provisions to Protect IFOR

CHAPTER FOUR - RESPONSE TO THE MAJORITY REPORT

CONCLUSIONS REGARDING FALSE TESTIMONY,

CLASSIFICA TIONAND EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

Section One

Response to the Majority Report 317

Referrals to the Department of Justice
The Rules of Classified Information
The Rules of Executive Privilege

APPENDICES

Appendix A : Key Names
Appendix B: Acronyms

Appendix C: Depositions and Interviews Conducted by the Select Subcommittee
Appendix D: Selected Congressional Action Relating to the United Nations Arms Embargo
Appendix E: National Intelligence Daily Articles

Appendix F: Selected List of Major Press Articles Regarding Leaks in the U.N. Aims Embargo
Appendix G: Foreign Broadcast Information Services Reporu of Increasing Ties between the
Organization of the Islamic Conference and Bosnia

232

EXECVTIX E SUMMARY

On May 8, 1996. the United States House of Representatives voted to establish and fund

the Select Subcommittee on the United States Role in Iranian Anns Transfers to Croatia and
Bosnia (the ""Select Subcommittee"). The Select Subcommittee was authorized to investigate
and report on all aspects of United States government policy regarding shipments of arms and
other assistance from Iran to the countries of the former Yugoslavia from September 21, 1991
until June 1996. the period in which an international arms embargo was in effect for the region.
The scope of the investigation included the impact, if any, of such policy upon the safety and
presence of United States troops stationed in and around Bosnia, the relations between the United
States and its allies, and upon United States efforts to isolate Iran.

In addition, the Select Subcommittee was authorized to investigate and report on
communications and representations to the people and the Congress of the United States
regarding such policy, the international arms embargo and United States participation in the
international aims embargo. Finally, the Select Subconmiiitee was authorized to determine what
actions were taken to review any of these matters or. conversely, to cover up such matters. In
order to rqx>rt its findings, the Select Subcommittee was empowered to review all relevant
deliberatioiis, discussions, and/or conununications within die United States Govenunent as well
as all conununications between the United States Government and other governments,
organizations, or individuals.

The following Miitority Views to the report of the Select Subcomminee are based upon a
thorough review of thousands of pages of classified and unclassified materials made available by
the Departments of State and Defense (including the National Security Agency), the Central

233

Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council as well as press reports, materials
prepared by Congressional Research Service, and other material in the public domain. In
addition, the staff of the Select Subcommittee interviewed and deposed approximately seventy
current or former employees of these agencies as w :!! as two foreign nationals. The Minority
wishes to thank the individuals who were deposed and interviewed as well as the many
employees of the United States Government agencies who spent countless hour: identifying and
making available relevant documents. In addition, the Minority w ishes to thank the investigators
detailed to the Select Subcommittee by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their invaluable
assistance. ' : -

Select Subcommittee Organization and Structure.

Legislative History.

On May 2, 1996, the Committee on International Relations (the "Committee") reported
House Resolution 416 creating the Select Subcommittee of the Comminee on International
Relations to Investigate the United States Role in Iranian Aims Transfers to Bosnia and Croatia.
The Committee also reported House Resolution 416 which, as amended, esublished a budget of
S99S,000 to be used cither until the Select Subcommittee ceased to exist or immediately before
noon on Januaiy 3, 1997, whichever first occurs.'

Legislative Mandate.

House Resolution 416 charged the Select Subcomminee with investigating the following:

•H. Res. 417. May 2, 1996.

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( 1 ) The policy of the United States Government with respect to the transfer of arms
and other assistance from Iran or any other country to countries or entities within the territory of
the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the "FRY") during any period that an international
arms embargo of the former Yugoslavia was in effect.

(2) The nature and extent of the transfer of arms or other assistance from Iran or any
other country to countries or entities within the territory of the FRY during the period that an
intemational arms embargo was in effect

(3) .\ny actions taken by the United States Government to facilitate or impede
transfers described in the preceding paragraphs.

(4) Any conununications or representations made to the Congress of the United States
or the American people with respect to the matters described in the preceding paragraphs w ith
respect to the intemational arms embargo of the FRY, or with respect to efforts to modify or
terminate United States participation in that embargo.

(5) Any implication of the maners described in the first three paragraphs for the
safety of United States Armed Forces deployed in and around Bosnia, for the prompt withdrawal
of United States Armed Forces from Bosnia, for relations between the United States and its
allies, and for United Sutes efforts to isolate Iran.

(6) Any actions taken to review, analyze, or investigate any of the matters described
in the preceding paragraphs, or to keep such matters from being revealed.

(7) All deliberations, discussions, or communications within the United States
Government relating to matters described in the preceding paragraphs, and all conununications
between the United States Government (or any of its officers or employees) and other

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governments, organizations, or individuals relating to such matters.*

House Resolution 416 contains a sunset provision providing for the conclusion of the
Select Subcommittee investigation and submission of its flnal report within six months of the
passage of the resolution, or November 8. 1996.

Treatment of Confidential and Oassified Infitrmation.

The Select Subcommittee investigation of United States policy and actions in the FRY
includes fact-finding vtith respect to policy deliberations, intelligence gathering (including
sources and methods), highly sensitive confidential communications between the United States
Government and the governments of other nations, and equally privileged communications
among United Sutes Government officials. The Minority believes the utmost care must be taken
to avoid disclosure of confidential communications between United States and foreign
government officials, policy deliberations within the United States government involving senior
officials in communication with the President, and the sources and methods of intelligeiKe
gathering. For this reason, the Minority has prepared this Executive Summary in a non-classified
format which will be supplemented by extended Minority Views in a classified fonnat The
Miitority also has rejected the view, espoused by some, dut disclosure of highly confidential or
classified information in the media and/or in Congressional hearings places such information in
the public domaiiL Advancing such a view provides leakers of sensitive and classified
informiition with the key to imlock such information at their own discretioru and robs the United
States Government of its legitimate interest in protecting such information. Notwithstanding the

-H. Res. 416, May 2, 1996. at 2-4.

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need lo protect material which is desening of protection, the Minonty expects the Lnited Slates
Government to exercise the classified application only in cases where the laws and executive
orders clearly apply and to refrain from keeping material classified which is merely
embarrassing.

SUMMAR Y OF KE Y FINDINGS AND CONCLLSIO.\'S

The central issues of the Select Subcommittee investigation include whether the United
States Government ordered, organized or otherw ise encouraged Iran or any other country to ship
arms to Bosnia; whether the United States Go\ emment provided a foothold for Iranian
operations in Europe; whether the United States Government engaged in coven action without
meeting the legal requirement to inform Congress; and how United States policy regarding the
anns embargo affected United States relations with the NATO allies.

The consequences of United States policy are not in dispute. In 1994. Bosnia was
embroiled in a brutal war that threatened to spill over to other parts of Europe. United States
leadership helped bring an end to the fighting among the Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs, to
the rape and torture, to the mass executions, and to the sniper attacks on civilians; it has helped
create the conditions to build a new Bosiuan state, and stopped the war from spreading. In early
1994, hundreds of Iranians were present in Bosnia and Croatia. Today, the Iranian fighters have
been forced out.

Based upon the Select Subconunittee investigation, the Minority finds that:

/. From the outset of the Clinton Administration, it was United Slates policy neither lo
oppose nor support third party arms transfers to Bosnia-Herzegovina. This policy tvas
embodied In the "no instructions" response to the Croatian Government's question on the

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United Stales view on the transshipment of arms. It served several important United Slates
interests, and helped establish conditions on the ground that pointed the way to peace.

• During the entire period in which the United Nations amis embargo against the former
Yugoslavia was in effect (September 1991 tt June 1996). United States policy was to
refrain fix>m supplying arms to any party in the former Yugoslavia.

• Pursuant to U.N. Security Council resolutions, the United States agreed i" 1992 to
participate with its allies in Operation Sharp Guard for the primary purpose of
interdicting contraband destined for Serbia.

• Beginning in Januar.- 'WT, following the inauguration of President Clinton, United - *
States policy was neither to oppose nor support the shipment of arms to the Government
of Bosnia-Herzegovina from other countries, including Iran.

• In November 1994, following enactment of the Nunn-Mitchell amendment. United States
ofTicials informed United States allies that the United States would participate in
Operation Sharp Guard for the sole purpose of interdicting contraband destined for
Serbia. In compliance with the Nunn-Mitchell amendmenu the United States would take
no action to interdict arms destined for Bosnia or Croatia.

• The "no instuM-tions'' policy served important United Sutes interests: the outgunned
Bosnian Muslims received anns that helped them survive until such time as the
circumstances were ripe for a negotiated peace; the United States avoided a confrontation
with NATO; the peacekeeping force and humanitarian aid workers remained in Bosnia;
no United States ground troops were forced into a combat situation; and the conditions
were established that paved the way to the Dayton Peace Accords in November 1995.

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//. Throughout the period of the Vnited Sations arms embargo, Iran and other Islamic
countries supplied arms to the Bosnians.

• During the entire period of the United Nations arms embargo against the former
Yugoslav ii all parties to the conflict in Bosnia received arms shipments in violation of
the embargo.

• During the entire period of the United Nations arms embargo, the Bosnian Serb military
arsenal dwarfed that of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats.

• Beginning in 1991. several Islamic countries, including Iran, began supplying arms to the
Bosnian Muslim forces

• The supph of arms to the Bosnian Muslims declined from summer 1993 to spring 1994
due to the war between the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croat forces.

• The suppl\ of arms to the Bosnian Muslims increased in spring 1994 due to the
Federation .Agreement to end the war between the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat
forces, and the delivery of the "no instructions" response.

• The number of Iranians in Bosnia peaked before the spring of 1 994. remained constant
until the Dayton Peace Accords, and subsequently declined to the handful that is present
today.

///. The L'nited States took no action to aid arms transfers to the former Yugoslavia.

• At no time did any United States government official take any action to supply arms to
any countr\- or entity covered by the U.N. arms embargo.

• At no time did any United States government official undertake any covert action to
supply arms to any country or entity covered by the embargo, or to ericourage, aid or

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assist in the shipment or transfer of arms to any country in the former Yugoslavia.

• The proposal to expand the pipeline of arms destined for Bosnia through Croatia
originated with Bosnian and Croatian Government officials in the wake of signing the
Federation Agreement in March 1994.

• No United States Government official coordinated, cooperated, conspired with or
suggested to the Bosnian Muslims, the Govenunent of Croatia, or the Bosnian Croats that
the United States be asked to state its view of the transshipment of arms.

• United States Government officials directed Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith to
respond that he had "no instructions" when asked for the reaction of the United States
government to the transshipment of arms through Croatia to Bosnia by the government of
Croatia.

• Ambassador Galbraith carried out his directions correctly and promptly.

• The "no instructions" response achieved United States objectives and was consistent with
United States policy: the shipment of arms to Bosnia was not obstructed, the U.N.
Security Council Resolution was not violated, and serious conflict with the allies was
avoided.

IV. The United States Government did not engage in any covert action and was not
legatty required to inform Congress of its diplomatic exchanges with governments in the
region. However, Congress should have been better informed about the "no instructions"
exchange.

• Information about the shipment ofanns by Iran and other Islamic countries through
Croatia to Bosnia was made available to Members of Congress on dozens of occasions

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through press reports, intelligence reports, briefings, and in connection with stafTand
Congressional travel to Croatia.

• The Administration responded accurately to every question from Congress about the
shipment of arms to Bosnia from Iran and did not set out to mislead Members of
Congress.

• As a policy matter, however, the Administration chose not to inform Congress about the
delivery of the "no instructions" response.'

• The "no instructions" response to the question posed by the Government of Croatia was a
traditional diplomatic exchange.

• The Administration does not routinely disclose to Congress sensitive diplomatic
exchanges between ambassadors and foreign governments.

• The failure of the Administration to inform Congress formally about the exchange among
Ambassador Galbraith and Special Envoy Redman and a senior official of the
Government of Croatia is not a violation of United States law.

• As a matter of policy, the Administration should have considered informing selected
Members of Congress about the delivery of the "no instructions" response.

V. The Impact of the Iranian arms shipments on the security of United States military
anil civiiian personnel was minimal

' The Select Subcommittee was told by one former Member of Congress that he was
informed about the "no instructions" response at a routine intelligence briefing. It appears that
the briefer was acting independently. The relevant intelligence agency has no record that such a
briefing occurred. Senior Administration policy makers were not aware of this particular
briefing or that information regarding the "no instructions" response had been shared with any
Member of Congress.

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• Any threat to United Sutes militar> and civilian personnel in the region arose from the
presence of Iranians and not the shipment of arms, and Iranians had been present in
Bosnia since 1991.

• The United States did not commit ground forces to Bosnia in any significant numbers
until afier the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed in November 1995.

• The Da>ion Peace Agreement required the removal of alt foreign forces from Bosnia,
including organizations and individuals associated with Iran and other terrorist states, and
made the United States commitment to "equip and train" the Bosnians conditional upon
compliance with the "foreign force removal" requirement. .

• The President has certified that Bosnia is in compliance with this requirement, and that
Iranian and other foreign forces are present in insignificant numbers only.

• The United States continues to pursue all other avenues to isolate Iran from the world
commimity.

• With respect to the safety of United Sutes military and civilian personnel in Croatia
during the period in which the arms embargo was in effect, the United States and
Embassy Zagreb maintained a high degree of awareness of terrorist threats through
regular Emergency Action Comminee (**EACr) meetings, demarches to the Government
of Croatia to expel terrorists and otherwise assure the safety of United States personnel,
and intense monitoring of possible teirorist activity.

VI. The impact of the Iratiian anms shipments oh United States-Allied Relations

• United States allies were aware that the United States bad been looking the other way
regarding arms shipments from third countries to Bosnia; therefore, the "no instructions**

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response was a continuation of policies that already were tolerated.

• The allies were particularly concerned that hea\7 weapons and artiller>' not be transferred
to Bosnia and the United States Government was confident that Croatia would not permit
heavy weapons to be transshipped.

• United States, NATO, and other allied forces are serving side by side in IFOR and
working together to implement the civilian aspects of the Dayton Accords.

Vll. The Executive Branch has acted properly in reviewing actions by United States officials
and in responding to inquiries froir Congress concerning the arms transfers.

• At the request of the White House Counsel, the Intelligence Oversight Board (the "lOB")
investigated concems raised by the Central Intelligence Agency about possible covert
action and reported to the President that no United States official had participated in
covert action.

The