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94th Congress
2d Session

] SENATE I ^. ^Z""^^-

GOVERMMENT DOCUMENTS

DEPARTMENT
BOSTON PUBUC LIBRARY

FOREIGN AND MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE

BOOK I

FINAL REPORT

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS

WITH RESPECT TO

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
UNITED STATES SENATE

TOGETHER WITH

ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND SEPARATE

VIEWS

April 26 ( legislative day, April 14 ) , 1976

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
-983 O WASHINGTON : 1976

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $5.36

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

FRANK CHURCH, Idaho, Chairman
JOHN G. TOWER, Texas, Vice Chairman
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee

WALTER F. MONDALE, Minnesota BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona

WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, Kentucliy CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr., Maryland

ROBERT MORGAN, North Carolina RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, Pennsylvania

GARY HART, Colorado

William G. Miller, Staff Director

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel

Curtis R. Smothers, Counsel to the Minority

Audrey Hatry, Clerk of the Committee

(n)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

(By Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations With Eespect to Intelligence
Activities)

On January 27, 1975, the Senate established a Select Committee to
conduct an investigation and study of the intelligence activities of the
United States. After 15 months of intensive work, I am pleased to
submit to the Senate this volume of the Final Report of the Com-
mittee relating to foreign and military intelligence. The inquiry arises
out of allegations of abuse and improper activities by the intelligence
agencies of the United States, and great public concern that the
Congress take action to bring the intelligence agencies under the
constitutional framework.

The members of the Select Committee have worked diligently and
in remarkable harmony. I want to express my gratitude to the Vice
Chairman, Senator John Tower of Texas, for his cooperation through-
out and the able assistance he has given me in directing this most
diificult task. While every member of the Committee has made im-
portant contributions, I especially want to thank Senator Walter D.
Huddleston of Kentucky for the work he has done as Chairman of
the Foreign and Military Subcommittee. His direction of the Sub-
committee, working with Senator Charles McC. Mathias of Mary-
land, Senator Gary Hart of Colorado and Senator Barry Goldw^ater
of Arizona, has been of immeasurable help to me in bringing this
enormous undertaking to a useful and responsible conclusion.

Finally, I wish to thank the staff for the great service they have
performed for the Committee and for the Senate in assisting the
members of the Committee to carry out the mandate levied by Senate
Resolution 21. The quality, integrity and devotion of the staff has
contributed in a significant way to the important analyses, findings
and recommendations of the Committee.

The volume which follows, the Report on the Foreign and Military
Intelligence Activities of the United States, is intended to provide to
the Senate the basic information about the intelligence agencies of
the TTnited States required to make the necessary judgments concern-
ing the role such agencies should play in the future. Despite security
considerations which have limited what can responsibly be printed for
public release the information which is presented in this report is a
reasonably complete picture of the intelligence activities under-
taken by the United States, and the problems that such activities pose
for constitutional government.

The Findings and Recommendations contained at the end of this
volume constitute an agenda for action which, if adopted, would go
a long way toward preventing the abuses that have occurred in the
past from occurring again, and would assure that the intelligence
activities of the United States will be conducted in accordance with
constitutional processes.

Frank Church.
(ni)

NOTE

The Committee's Final Keport has been reviewed and declassi-
fied by the appropriate executive agencies. These agencies submitted
comments to the Committee on security and factual aspects of each
chapter. On the basis of these comments, the Committee and staff
conferred with representatives of the agencies to determine which
parts of the report should remain classified to protect sensitive intel-
ligence sources and methods.

At the request of the agencies, the Committee deleted three chapters
from this report : "Cover," "Espionage," and "Budgetary Oversight."
In addition, two sections of the chapter "Covert Action of the CIA"
and one section of the chapter "Department of State" have been de-
leted at the request of the agencies. Particular passages which were
changed at the request of the agencies are denoted by italics and a
footnote. Complete versions of deleted or abridged materials are avail-
able to Members of the Senate in the Committee's classified report
under the provisions of S. Res. 21 and the Standing Rules of the
Senate.

Names of individuals were deleted when, in the Committee's judg-
ment, disclosure of their identities would either endanger their safety
or constitute a substantial invasion of privacy. Consequently, footnote
citations to testimony and documents occasionally contain only descrip-
tions of an individual's position.

Appendix Three, "Soviet Intelligence Collection and Intelligence
Against the United States," is derived solely from a classified CIA
report on the same subject which was edited for security considerations
by the Select Committee staff.

(IV)

CONTENTS

Page

I. INTRODUCTION 1

A. The Mandate of the Committee's Inquiry 2

B. The Purpose of the Committee's Findings and Recommenda-

tions 4

C. The Focus and Scope of the Committee's Inquiry and Ob-

stacles Encountered 5

D. The Historical Context of the Inquiry 8

E. The Dilemma of Secrecy and Open Constitutional Govern-

ment 11

II. THE FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OPERA-

TIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: AN OVERVIEW 15

A. The Basic Issues: Secrecy and Democracy 16

B. The Scope of the Select Committee Inquiry into Foreign and

Military Intelligence Operations 17

C. The Intelligence Process: Theory and Reality 17

D. Evolution cf the United States Intelligence Community 19

E. The Origins cf the Postwar Intelligence Community 20

F. The Response to the Soviet Threat 22

G. Korea: The Turning Point 23

H. The "Protracted Conflict" 24

I. Third World Competition and Nuclear Crisis 25

J. Technology and Tragedy 26

K. Thel970s 27

L. TheTaskAhead 28

III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLI-

GENCE ACTIVITIES 31

A. The Joint Responsibilities of the Legislative and Executive

Branches — Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances.- 31

B. The Historical Practice 33

C. The Constitutional Power of Congress to Regulate the Con-

duct of Foreign Intelligence Activity 38

IV. THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE 41

A. The National Security Council 42

B. Authorization and Control of Covert Activities 48

C. Providing the Intelligence Required by Policymakers 61

D. Advising the President on Intelligence Issues 62

E. Allocating Intelligence Resources 65

V. THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 71

A. The Producer of National Intelligence 73

B. Coordinator of Intelligence Activities 83

C. Director of the CIA 94

VI. HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.. 97

A. The Central Intelligence Group and the Central Intelligence

Agency: 1946-1952 99

B. The Dulles Era: 1953-1961 109

C. Change and Routinization: 1961-1970 115

D. The Recent Past: 1971-1975 121

E. Conclusion 124

VII. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: STATUTORY

AUTHORITY 127

A. Clandestine Collection of Intelligence 128

B. Covert Action 131

C. Domestic Activities 135

(V)

Page

VIII. COVERT ACTION 141

A. Evolution of Covert Action 143

B. Congressional Oversight 149

C. Findings and Conclusions 152

IX. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 163

A. Counterintelligence: An Introduction 163

B. Current Issues in Counterintelligence 171

C. Conclusions 177

X. THE DOMESTIC IMPACT OF FOREIGN CLANDESTINE

OPERATIONS: THE CIA AND ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS,

THE MEDIA, AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS 179

A. Covert Use of Academic and Voluntary Organizations 181

B. Covert Relationships with the United States Media 191

C. Covert Use of U.S. Religious Groups 201

XL PROPRIETARIES 205

A. Overview 206

B. Structure 207

C. Operation of Proprietaries 234

D. The Disposal of Proprietaries 236

E. Financial Aspects 247

F. Some General Considerations 251

XII. CIA PRODUCTION OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE 257

A. Evolution of the CIA's Intelligence Directorate 259

B. The Intelligence Directorate Today 265

C. The Relationship Between InteUigence and Policy 266

D. The Limits of Intelligence 268

E. The Personnel System 269

F. Recruitment and Training of Analysts 270

G. The Intelligence Culture and Analytical Bias 270

H. The Nature of the Production Process: Consensus Versus

Competition 271

I. The "Current Events" Syndrome 272

J. Innovation 273

K. Overload on Analysts and Consumers 274

L. Quality Control 276

M. Consumer Guidance and Evaluation 276

N. The Congressional Role 277

XIII. THE CIA's INTERNAL CONTROLS: THE INSPECTOR GEN-

ERAL AND THE OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL 279

A. The General Counsel 280

B. The Office of the Inspector General 289

C. Internal and External Review of the Office of the Inspector

General 303

XIV. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 305

A. Origins of the State Department Intelligence Function 305

B. Command and Control 308

C. Support Communications 315

D. Production of Intelligence 315

XV. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 319

A. Objectives and Organization of the Defense Intelligence Com-

munity 320

B. The Defense Intelligence Budget 328

C. Management Problems of the Defense Intelligence Com-

munity 341

D. Agencies and Activities of Special Interest 349

E. Military Counterintelligence and Investigative Agencies 355

F. Chemical and Biological Activities 359

G. Meeting Future Needs in Defense Intelligence 363

VII

XVI. DISCLOSURE OF BUDGET INFORMATION ON THE IN- Page

TELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 367

A. The Present Budgetary Process for Intelligence Community

Agencies and Its Consequences 367

B. The Constitutional Requirement 369

C. Alternatives to Concealing Intelligence Budgets from Congress

and the PubHc 374

D. The Effect Upon National Security of Varying Levels of

Budget Disclosure 376

E. The Argument that Publication of Any Information will

Inevitably Result in Demands for Further Information 381

F. The Argument that the United States Should Not Publish

Information on Its Intelligence Budget Because No Other

Government in the World Does 383

G. Summary and Conclusion 384

XVII. TESTING AND USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL

AGENTS BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 385

A. The Programs Investigated 387

B. CIA Drug Testing Programs 392

C. Covert Testing on Human Subjects by Military Intelligence

Groups 411

D. Cooperation and Competition Among the Intelligence Agen-

cies, and Between the Agencies and Other Individuals and

Institutions 420

XVIII. SUMMARY: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 423

A. Introduction 423

B. General Findings 424

C. The 1947 National Security Act and Related Legislation 426

D. The National Security Council and the Office of the President- 427

E. The Director of Central Intelligence 432

F. The Central Intelligence Agency 435

G. Reorganization of the Intelligence Community 449

H. CIA Relations with United States Institutions and Private

Citizens 451

I. Proprietaries and Cover 456

J. Intelligence Liaison 459

K. The General Counsel and the Inspector General 459

L. The Department of Defense 462

M. The Department of State and Ambassadors 466

N. Oversight and the Intelligence Budget 469

O. Chemical and Biological Agents and the Intelligence Com-
munity 471

P. General Recommendations 472

APPENDIX I: Congressional Authorization for the Central InteUigence

Agency to Conduct Covert Action 475

A. The National Security Act of 1947 476

B. The CIA Act of 1949 492

C. The Provision of Funds to the CIA by Congress 496

D. The Holtzman and Abourezk Amendments of 1974 502

E. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment 505

F. Conclusion 508

APPENDIX II: Additional Covert Action Recommendations 511

A. Statement of Clark M. Clifford 512

B. Statement of Cyrus Vance 516

C. Statement of David A. Phillips 518

D. Prepared Statement of Morton H. Halperin 520

E. Recommendations of the Harvard University Institute of

Politics, Study Group on Intelligence Activities 524

F. Recommendations of the House Select Committee on Intelli-

gence Concerning Covert Action ^^ 533

G. Article from Foreign Affairs by Harry Rositzke: America's

Secret Operations : A Perspective 534

H. Article from Saturday Review by Tom Braden: What's Wrong

with the CIA? _- 547

I. Recommendations of the Commission on the Organization of
the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (the

Murphy Commission) Concerning Covert Action 554

APPENDIX III: Soviet Intelligence Collection and Operations Against Page

the United States 557

A. Introduction 557

B. Organization and Structure 558

C. The GRU 560

D. The Scope and Methods of Anti-United States Operations by

the KGB and the GRU 561

E. Eastern European Security and Intelligence Services 561

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR FRANK CHURCH 563

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS WALTER F. MONDALE,

GARY HART, AND PHILIP HART 567

INTRODUCTION TO SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATORS JOHN

G. TOWER, HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. AND BARRY M.

GOLD WATER 571

SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATOR JOHN G. TOWER 573

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER 577

SEPARATE VIEWS OF HOWARD H. BAKER, JR 594

SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF SENATOR CHARLES McC.

MATHIAS, JR 609

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER_ 615
GLOSSARY OF SELECTED INTELLIGENCE TERMS AND LIST

OF ABBREVIATIONS 617

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CHARTS 634

SENATE RESOLUTION 21 636

STAFF LIST 649

I. INTRODUCTION

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities has con-
ducted a fifteen month long inquiry, the first major inquiry into intelli-
gence sinbe World War II. The inquiry arose out of allegations of
substantial, even massive wrong-doin^ within the "national intelli-
gence" system.^ This final report provides a history of the evolution
of intelligence, an evaluation of the intelligence system of the United
States, a critique of its problems, recommendations for legislative
action and recommendations to the executive branch. The Committee
believes that its recommendations will provide a sound framework for
conducting the vital intelligence activities of the United States in a
manner which meets the nation's intelligence requirements and pro-
tects the liberties of American citizens and the freedoms which our
Constitution guarantees.

The shortcomings of the intelligence system, the adverse effects of
secrecy, and the failure of congressional oversight to assure adequate
accountability for executive branch decisions concerning intelligence
activities were major subjects of the Committee's inquiry. Equally im-
portant to the obligation to investigate allegations of abuse was the
duty to review systematically the intelligence community's overall
activities since 1945, and to evaluate its present structure and
performance.

An extensive national intelligence system has been a vital part of
the United States government since 1941. Intelligence information
has had an important influence on the direction and development
of American foreign policy and has been essential to the maintenance
of our national security. The Committee is convinced that the United
States requires an intelligence system which will provide policy-
makers with accurate intelligence and analysis. We must have an early
warning system to monitor potential military threats by countries
hostile to United States interests. We need a strong intelligence system
to verify that treaties concerning arms limitation are being honored.
Information derived from the intelligence agencies is a necessary in-
gredient in making national defense and foreign policy decisions. Such
information is also necessary in countering the efforts of hostile intel-
ligence services, and in halting terrorists, international drug traffickers
and other international criminal activities. Within this country cer-
tain carefully controlled intelligence activities are essential for ef-
fective law enforcement.

The United States has devoted enormous resources to the creation
of a national intelligence system, and today there is an awareness on
the part of many citizens that a national intelligence system is a per-

^ National intelligence includes but is not limited ito the CIA, NSA, DIA, ele-
ments within the Department of Defense for the collection of intelligence through
reconnaissance programs, the Intelligence Division of the FBI, and the intel-
ligence elements of the State Department and the Treasury Department.

(1)

manent and necessary component of our government. The system's
value to the country has been proven and it will be needed for the
foreseeable future. But a major conclusion of this inquiry is that con-
gressional oversight is necessary to assure that in the future our
intelligence community functions effectively, within the framework
of the Constitution.

The Committee is of the view that many of the unlawful actions
taken by officials of the intelligence agencies were rationalized as
their public duty. It was necessary for the Committee to understand
how the pursuit of the public good could have the opposite effect.
As Justice Brandeis observed :

Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are benificent. Men
born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their
liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty
lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning
but without understanding.^

A. The Mandate of the Committee's Inquiry

On January 27, 1975, Senate Resolution 21 established a select com-
mittee "to conduct an investigation and study of governmental opera-
tions with respect to intelligence activities and of the extent, if any,
to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by
any agency of the Federal Government." Senate Resolution 21 lists
specific areas of inqury and study :

( 1 ) Whether the Central Intelligence Agency has conducted
an illegal domestic intelligence operation in the United States.

(2) The conduct of domestic intelligence or counterintelli-
gence operations against United States citizens by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation or any other Federal agency.

(3) The origin and disposition of the so-called Huston
Plan to apply United States intelligence agency capabilities
against individuals or organizations within the United
States.

(4) The extent to which the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other Federal law
enforcement or intelligence agencies coordinate their respec-
tive activities, any agreements which govern that coordina-
tion, and the extent to which a lack of coordination has con-
tributed to activities or actions which are illegal, improper,
inefficient, unethical, or contrary to the intent of Congress.

(5) The extent to which the operation of domestic intelli-
gence or counterintelligence activities and the operation of
any other activities within the United States by the Central
Intelligence Agency conforms to the legislative charter of
that Agency and the intent of the Congress.

(6) The past and present interpretation by the Director of
Central Intelligence of the responsibility to protect intelli-
gence sources and methods as it relates to that provision of
the National Security Act of 1947 which provides ". . .

''Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928).

that the agency shall have no police, subpena, law enforce-
ment powers, or internal security functions. . . ." ^

(7) The nature and extent of executive branch oversight
of all United States intelligence activities.

(8) The need for specific legislative authority to govern
the operations of any intelligence agencies of the Federal
Government now existing without that explicit statutory au-
thority, including but not limited to agencies such as the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security
Agency.

(9) The nature and extent to which Federal agencies co-
operate and exchange intelligence information and the ade-
quacy of any regulations or statutes which govern such
cooperation and exchange of intelligence information.

(10) The extent to which United States intelligence agen-
cies are governed by Executive Orders, rules, or regulations
either published or secret and the extent to which those
Executive Orders, rules, or regulations interpret, expand, or
are in conflict with specific legislative authority.

(11) The violation or suspected violation of any State
or Federal statute by any intelligence agency or by any per-
son by or on behalf of any intelligence agency of the Fed-
eral Government including but not limited to surreptitious
entries, surveillance, wiretaps, or eavesdropping, illegal open-
ing of the United States mail, or the monitoring of the United
States mail.

(12) The need for improved, strengthened, or consoli-
dated oversight of United States intelligence activities by the
Congress.

(13) Whether any of the existins: laws of the United States
are inadequate, either in their provisions or manner of en-
forcement, to safeguard the rights of American citizens, to
improve executive and legislative control of intelligence and
related activities, and to resolve uncertainties as to the au-
thoritv of United States intelligence and related agencies.

(14) Whether there is unnecessary duplication of expendi-
ture and effort in the collection and processing of intelligence
information by United States agencies.

(15) The extent and necessity of overt and covert intelli-
gence activities in the TTnited States and abroad.

In addressing these mandated areas of inquiry, the Committee has
focused on three broad questions :

1. Whether intelligence activities have functioned in ac-
cordance with the Constitution and the laws of the United
States.

2. Whether the structure, programs, past history, and
present policies of the American intelligence svstem have
served the national interests in a manner consistent with
declared national policies and purposes.

^50 U.S.r. 403rd) (3) : Appendix B, Senate Select Committee Hearings (here-
inafter cited as hearings), Vol 7, p. 210.

3. Whether the processes through which the intelligence
agencies have been directed and controlled have been ade-
quate to assure conformity with policy and the law.

Over the past vo}\r, the Committee and its sfaff have carefully
examined the intelligence structure of the United States. Consider-
able time and effort have been devoted in order to understand what
has been done by the United States Government in secrecy during the
thirty-year period since the end of World War II. It is clear to the
Committee that there are many necessary and proper governmental
activities that must be conducted in secrecy. Some of these activities
affect the security and the very existence of the nation.

It is also clear from the Committee's inquirv that intelligence
activities conducted outside the framework of the Constitution and
statutes can undermine the treasured values guaranteed in the Bill
of Rights. Further, if the intelligence agencies act in ways inimical
to declared national purnoses, they damage the reputation, power, and
influence of the United States abroad.

The Committee's investigation has documented that a number of
actions committed in the name of "national security" were inconsistent
with declared policy and the law. Hearings have been held and the
Committee has issued reports on alleged assassination plots, covert
action in Chile and the interception of domestic communications by
the National Security Agency (NSA). Regrettably, some of these
abuses cannot be regarded as aberrations.

B. The Purpose of the Committee's Findings and
Recommendations

It is clear that a primary task for any successor oversight committee,
and the Congress as a whole, will be to frame basic statutes necessary
under the Constitution within which the intelligence agencies of the
United States can function efficiently under clear guidelines. Charters
delineating the missions, authorities, and limitations for some of the
United States most important intelligence agencies do not exist. For
example, there is no statutory authority for the NSA's intelligence
activities. Where statutes do exist, as with the CIA, they are vague and
have failed to provide the necessary guidelines defining missions and
limitations.

The Committee's investigation has demonstrated, moreover, that the
lack of legislation has had the effect of limiting public debate upon
some important national issues.

The CIA's broad statutory charter, the 1947 National Security Act,
makes no specific mention of covert action. The CIA's former General
Counsel, Lawrence Houston, who was deeply involved in drafting the
1947 Act, wrote in September 1947, "we do not believe that there was
any thought in the minds of Congress that the CIA under [the
authority of the National Securitv Act] would take positive action
for subversion and sabotage." * Yet, a few months after enactment
of the 1947 legislation, the National Security Council authorized
the CIA to engage in covert action programs. The provision of the
Act often cited as authorizing CIA covert activities provides for the
Agency :

"Memorandum from CIA General Council Lawrence Houston to DCI Hillen-
koetter, 9/25/47.

... to perform such other functions and duties related to
intelligence affecting the national security as the National
Security Council may from time to time direct.'**

Secret Executive Orders issued by the NSC to carry out covert action
programs were not subject to congressional review. Indeed, until re-
cent years, except for a few members, Congress was not fully aware of
the existence of the so-called "secret charter for intelligence activities."
Those members who did know had no institutional means for dis-
cussing their knowledge of secret intelligence activities with their
colleagues. The problem of how the Congress can effectively us© secret
knowledge in its legislative processes remains to be resolved. It is the
Committee's view that a strong and effective oversight committee is
an essential first step that must be taken to resolve this fundamental
issue.

C. The Focus and Scope of the Committee's Inquiry and Obstacles

Encountered

The inquiry mandated in S. Res. 21 falls into two main categories.
The first concerns allegations of wrong-doing. The nature of the Com-
mittee's inquiry into these matters tends, quite properly, to be akin to
the investigations conducted by Senate and Congressional committees
in the past. We decided from the outset, however, that this committee
is neither a court, nor a law enforcement agency, and that while using
many traditional congressional investigative techniques, our inquiry
has served primarily to illustrate the problems before Congress and the
countiy. The Justice Department and the courts in turn have their
proper roles to play.

The second category of inquiry has been an examination of the
intelligence agencies themselves. The Committee wished to learn
enough about their past and present activities to make the legislative
judgments required to assure the American people that whatever
necessary secret intelligence activities were being undertaken were
subject to constitutional processes and were being conducted in as
effective, humane, and efficient a manner as possible.

The Committee focused on many issues affecting the intelligence
agencies which had not been seriously addressed since our peacetime
intelligence system was created in 1947. The most important questions
relating to intelligence, such as its value to national security purposes
and its cost and quality, have been carefully examined over the past
year. Although some of the Committee's findings can be reported to
the public only in outline, enough can be set forth to justify the rec-
ommendations. The Committee has necessarily been selective. A year
was not enough time to investigate everything relevant to intelligence
activities.

These considerations guided the Committee's choices:

(1) A limited number of programs and incidents were ex-
amined in depth rather than reviewing hundreds superficially.
The Committee's purpose was to understand the causes for
the particular performance or behavior of an agency.

(2) The specific cases examined were chosen because they
reflected generic problems.

50 U.S.C. 403(d)(5).

(3) Where broad programs were closely reviewed (for
example, the CIA's covert action programs) , the Committee
sought to examine successes as well as apparent failures.

(4) Programs were examined from Franklin Roosevelt's
administration to the present. This was done in order to
present the historical context within which intelligence ac-
tivities have developed and to assure that sensitive, funda-
mental issues would not be subject to possible partisan biases.

It is clear from the Committee's inquiry that problems arising from
the use of the national intelligence system at home and abroad are to
be found in every administration. Accordingly, the Committee chose
to emphasize particular parts of the national intelligence system and
to address particular cases in depth. The Committee has concentrated
its energies on the six executive branch groups that make up what
is called "National Intelligence".

(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.

(2) The counterintelligence activities of the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation.

(3) The National Security Agency.

(4) The national intelligence components of the Depart-
ment of Defense other than NSA.

(5) The National Security Council.

(6) The intelligence activities of the Department of State.

The investigation of these national intelligence groupings included
examining the degree of command and control exercised over them
by the President and other key Government officials or institutions.
The Committee also sought to evaluate the ability and effectiveness of
Congress to assert its oversight right and responsibilities. The agencies
the Committee has concentrated on have great powers and extensive
activities which must be understood in order to judge fairly whether
the United States intelligence system needs reform and change. The
Committee believes that many of its general recommendations can
and should be applied to the intelligence operations of all other
government agencies.

Based on its investigation, the Committee concludes that solutions
to the main problems can be developed by analyzing the broad patterns
emerging from the examination of particular cases. At the same time,
neither the dangers, nor the causes of abuses within the intelligence
system, nor their possible solutions can be fairly understood without
evaluating the historical context in which intelligence operations have
been conducted.

Individual cases and programs of government surveillance which the
Committee examined raise questions concerning the inherent conflict
between the government's perceived need to conduct surveillance and
the citizens' constitutionally protected rights of privacy and dissent. It
has become clear that if some lose their liberties unjustly, all may lose
their liberties. The protections and obligations of law must apply to all.
Only by looking at the broad scope of questionable activity over a
long period can we realistically assess the potential dangers of intru-
sive government. For example, only through an understanding of the

totality of government ejfforts against dissenters over the past thirty
years can one weigh the extent to which such an emphasis may "chill"
legitimate free expression and assembly.

The Select Committee has conducted the only thorough investigation
ever made of United States intelligence and its post World War II
emergence as a complex, sophisticated system of multiple agencies
and extensive activities. The Committee staff of 100, including 60 pro-
fessionals, has assisted the 11 members of the Committee in this in-
depth inquiry which involved more than 800 interviews, over 250
executive hearings, and documentation in excess of 110,000 pages.

The advice of former and current intelligence officials, Cabinet mem-
bers, State, Defense, and Justice Department experts, and citizens
from the private sector who have served in national security areas
has been sought throughout the Committee's inquiry. The Committee
has made a conscious effort to seek the views of all principal officials
who have served in the intelligence agencies since the end of World
War II. We also solicited the opinions of constitutional experts and
the wisdom of scientists knowledgeable about the technology used by
intelligence agencies. It was essential to learn the views of these sources
outside of the government to obtain as full and balanced an under-
standing of intelligence activities as possible.

The fact that government intelligence agencies resist any examina-
tion of their secret activities even by another part of the same govern-
ment should not be minimized. The intelligence agencies are a sector
of American government set apart. Employees' loyalties to their or-
ganizations have been conditioned by the closed, compaitmented and
secretive circumstances of their agencies' formation and operation. In
some respects, the intelligence profession resembles monastic life with
some of the disciplines and pereonal sacrifices reminiscent of medieval
orders. Intelligence work is a life of service, but one in which the
norms of American national life are sometimes distressingly distorted.

Despite its legal Senate mandate, and the issuance of subpoenas, in
no instance has the Committee been able to examine the agencies' files
on its own. In all the agencies, whether CIA, FBI, NSA, INK, DIA,
or the NSC, documents and evidence have been presented through
the filter of the agency itself.

Although the Senate inquiry was congressionally ordered and
although properly constituted committees under the Constitution have
the right of full inquiry, the Central Intelligence Agency and other
agencies of the executive branch have limited the Committee's access to
the full record. Several reasons have been given for this limitation. In
some instances, the so-called doctrine of executive privilege has been
asserted. Despite these assertions of executive privilege, there are no
classes of documents which the Committee has not obtained, whether
from the NSC, the personal papers of former Presidents and their
advisors, or, as in the case of the Committee's Report on Alleged Assas-
sination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, all classes of documents
available in the executive branch. The exception, of course, involves
the Nixon files which were not made available because of court order.

It should be noted that in some highly important areas of its in-

vestigation, the Committee has been refused access to files or docu-
ments. These involve, among others, the arrangements and agreements
made between the intelligence agencies and their informers and
sources, including other intelligence agencies and governments. The
Committee has agreed that in general, the names of agents, and their
methods of conducting certain intelligence activities should remain
in the custody of a few within the executive branch. But there
is a danger and an uncertainty which arises from accepting at face
value the assertions of the agencies and departments which in the past
have abused or exceeded their authority. If the occasion demands, a
duly authorized congressional committee must have the right to go
behind agency assertions, and review the full evidence on which agency
responses to committee inquiries have been based. There must be a
check: some means to ascertain whether the secrets being kept are,
in fact, valid national secrets. The Committee believes that the burden
of proof should be on those who ask that a secret program or policy
be kept secret.

The Committee's report consists of a number of case studies which
have been pursued to the best of the Committee's ability and which the
Committee believes illuminate the purposes, character, and usefulness
of the shielded world of intelligence activities. The inquiry conducted
over the past 15 months will probably provide the only broad insight
for some time into the now permanent role of the intelligence commu-
nity in our national government. Because of this, and because of the
need to assure that necessary secret activities remain under constitu-
tional control, the recommendations set forth by the Committee are
submitted with a sense of urgency and with the admonition that to
ignore the dangers posed by secret government action is to invite the
further weakening of our democracy.

D. The Historical Context of the Inquiry

The thirty years since the end of World War II have been marked
by continuing experimentation and change in the scope and methods
of the United States Government's activities abroad. From the all-out
World War between the Axis powers and the allies, to the Cold War
and fears of nuclear holocaust between the communist bloc and West-
ern democratic powers, to the period of "wars of liberation" in the
former colonial areas, the world has progressed to an era of negotia-
tions leading to some easing of tensions between the United States
and the Soviet Union. In addition, the People's Republic of China
has emerged as a world power which the United States and other
nations must consider. The recognizable distinctions between declared
war and credible peace have been blurred throughout these years
by a series of regional wars and uprisings in Asia, the Middle East,
Latin America, Europe, and Africa. The competing great powers
have participated directly or indirectly in almost all of these wars.

Of necessity, this country's intelligence agencies have played an
important role in the diplomacy and military activities of the Jnited
States during the last three decades. Intelligence infomiation has
helped shape policy, and intelligence resources nave been used to carry
out those policies.

The fear of war, and its attendant uncertainties and doubts, has
fostered a series of secret practices that have eroded the processes of
open democratic government. Secrecy, even what would be agreed by
reasonable men to be necessary secrecy, has, by a subtle and barely
perceptible accretive process, placed constraints upon the liberties of
the American people.

Shortly after World War II, the United States, based on its war-
time experience, created an intelligence system with the assigned mis-
sion at home and abroad of protecting to protect the national security,
primarily through the gathering and evaluation of intelligence about
individuals, groups, or governments perceived to threaten or poten-
tially threaten the United States. In general, these intelligence func-
tions were performed with distinction. However, both at home and
abroad, the new intelligence system involved more than merely ac-
quiring intelligence and evaluating information ; the system also un-
dertook activities to counter, combat, disrupt, and sometimes destroy
those who were perceived as enemies. The belief that there was a need
for such measures was widely held, as illustrated in the following re-
port related to the 1954 Hoover Commission Report on government
organization :

It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose
avowed objective is world domination by whatever means
and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game.
Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply.
If the U.S. is to survive, long-standing American concepts
of "fair play" must be reconsidered. We must develop ef-
fective espionage and counterespionage services. We must
learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more
clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than
those used against us. It may become necessary that the
American people w^ill be made acquainted with, understand
and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.

The gray, shadowy world between war and peace became the natural
haunt for covert action, espionage, propaganda, and other clandestine
intelligence activities. Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk described
it as the environment for the nasty wars "in the back alleys of the
world."

Although there had been many occasions requiring intelligence-
gathering and secret government action against foreign and domestic
national security threats prior to World War II, the intelligence com-
munity developed during and after that war is vastly different in
degree and kind from anything that had existed previously. The sig-

69-983 O - 76 - 2

nificant new facets of the post-war system are the great size, techno-
logical capacity and bureaucratic momentum of the intelligence ap-
paratus, and, more importantly, the public's acceptance of the necessity
for a substantial permanent intelligence system. This capability con-
trasts with the previous sporadic, ad hoc efforts which generally
occurred during wars and national emergencies. The extent and mag-
nitude of secret intelligence activities is alien to the previous American
experience.

Three other developments since Woi'ld War II haA^e contributed to
the power, influence and importance of the intelligence agencies.

First, the executive branch generally and the President in partic-
ular have become paramount within the federal system, primarily
through the retention of powers accrued during the emergency of
World War II. The intelligence agencies are generally responsible
directly to the President and because of their capabilities and because
they have usually operated out of the spotlight, and often in secret,
thev have also contributed to the /growth of executive power.

Second, the direct and indirect impact of federal programs on the
lives of individual citizens has increased tremendously since World
War II.

Third, in the thirty years since World War II, technology has made
unparalleled advances. New technological innovations have markedly
increased the agencies' intelligence collection capabilities, a circum-
stance which has greatly enlarged the potential for abuses of personal
liberties. To illustrate, the SALT negotiations and treaties have been
possible because technological advances make it possible to accuratelv
monitor arms limitations, but the very technology which permits such
precise weapons monitoring also enables the user to intrude on the
private conversations and activities of citizens.

The targets of our intelligence efforts after World War II — the
activities of hostile intelligence services, communists, and groups asso-
ciated with them both at home and abroad — were determined by
successive acbninistrations. In the 1960's, as the civil rights movement
grew in the countrv, some intelligence agencies directed attention to
civil rights organizations and groups hostile to them, such as the
Ku Klux Klan. From the mid-1960's until the end of the Vietnam war,
intelligence efforts were focused on antiwar groups.

Just as the nature of intelliflrence activitv has chansred as a result of
international and national developments, the public's attitude toward
intellifirence has also altered. During the last eight years, beginning
with Ramparts magazine's exposure of CIA covert relationships with
non-governmental organizations, there has been a series of allegations
in the press and Conoq-ess which have provoked serious questions about
the conduct of intelligence a<rencies at home and abroad. The Water-
gate disclosures raised additional questioTis concerninq: abuse of power
by the executive branch, misuse of intelligence agencies, and the need
to strenjirthen le.ofal restraints aoainst such abuses.

While the evidence in th^ Committee's Report emphasizes the mis-
guided or improper activities of a few individuals in the executive
branch, it is clear that the growth of intelligence abuses reflects a more
general failure of our basic institutions.

See the Select Committee's detailed report on "Intelligence and Technology."

Throughout its investigation, the Committee has carefully inquired
into the role of presidents and their advisors with respect to particular
intelligence programs. On occasion, intelligence agencies concealed
their programs from those in higher authority, more frequently it was
the senior officials themselves who, through pressure for results, created
the climate within which the abuses occurred. It is clear that greater
executive control and accountability is necessary.

The legislative branch has been remiss in exercising its control over
the intelligence agencies. For twenty-five years Congress has appropri-
ated funds for intelligence activities. The closeted and fragmentary
accounting which the intelligence community has given to a desig-
nated small group of legislators was accepted by the Congress as ade-
quate and in the best interest of national security. There were occa-
sions when the executive intentionally withheld information relating
to intelligence programs from the Congress, but there were also occa-
sions when the principal role of the Congress was to call for more intel-
ligence activity, including activity which infringed the rights of citi-
zens. In general, as with the executive, it is clear that Congress did not
carry out effective oversight.

The courts have also not confronted intelligence issues. As the Su-
preme Court noted in 1972 in commenting on warrantless electronic
surveillance, the practice had been permitted by successive presidents
for more than a quarter of a century without "guidance from the Con-
gress or a definitive decision of the Courts". Of course, courts only con-
sider the issues brought before them by litigants, and pervasive se-
crecy— coupled with tight judicially imposed rules of standing— have
contributed to the absence of judicial decisions on intelligence issues.
Nevertheless, the Committee's investigation has uncovered a host of
serious legal and constitutional issues relating to intelligence activity
and it is strong proof of the need for reform to note that scarcely any
of those issues have been addressed in the courts.

Throughout the period, the general public, while generally excluded
from debate on intelligence issues, nevertheless supported the known
and perceived activities of the intelligence agencies. In the few years
prior to the establishment of this Committee, however, the public's
awareness of the need to examine intelligence issues was heightened.
The series of allegations and partial exposures in the press and the
Congress provoked serious questions about the conduct of intelligence
activities at home and abroad. The Watergate affair increased the pub-
lic's concern about abuse of governmental power and caused greater
attention to be paid to the need to follow and to strengthen the role of
law to check such abuses.

Against this background, the Committee considered its main task
as making informed recommendations and judgments on the extent
to which intelligence activities are necessary and how such necessary
activities can be conducted within the framework of the Constitution.

E. The Dilemma or Secrecy and Open Constitutional
Government

Since World War II, with steadily escalatina: consequences, many
decisions of national importance have been made in secrecy, often by
the executive branch alone. These decisions are frequently based on

information obtained by clandestine means and available only to the
executive branch. Until very recently, the Congress has not shared
in this process. The cautions expressed by the Founding Fathers and
the constitutional checks designed to assure that policymaking not be-
come the province of one man or a few men have been avoided on nota-
ble recent occasions through the use of secrecy. John Adams expressed
his concern about the dangers of arbitrary power 200 years ago :

Whenever we leave principles and clear positive laws we are
soon lost in the wild regions of imagination and possibility
where arbitrary power sits upon her brazen throne and gov-
erns with an iron scepter.

Recent Presidents have justified this secrecy on the basis of "national
security," "the requirements of national defense," or "the confidential-
ity required by sensitive, ongoing negotiations or operations." These
justifications were generally accepted at face value. The Bay of Pigs
fiasco, the secret war in Laos, the secret bombing of Cambodia, the
anti-Allende activities in Chile, the Waterp-ate affair, were all instances
of the use of power cloaked in secrecy which, when revealed, provoked
widespread popular disapproval. This series of events has ended, for
the time being at least, passive and uncritical acceptance by the Con-
gress of executive decisions in the areas of foreign policy, national
security and intelligence activities. If Congress had met its oversight
responsibilities some of these activities might have been averted.

An examination of the scope of secret intelligence activities under-
taken in the past three decades reveals that they ranged from war to
conventional espionage. It annearsthat some United States intelligence
activities may have violated treaty and covenant obligations, but more
importantly, the rights of Uni<"ed States citizens have been infringed
upon. Despite citizen and congressional concern about these programs,
no processes or procedures have been developed bv either the Congress
or the executive branch which would assure Congress of access to secret
information which it must have to carry out its constitutional respon-
sibilities in authorizing and flfivinflf its advice and consent. The hind-
sight o^ historv suffo-ests that many secret operations were ill-advised
or might have been more beneficial to United States interests had they
been conducted onenly, rather than serretly.

What is a valid national secret? What can properly be concealed
from the scrutiny of the American people, from various segments of
the exeputive branch or from a duly constituted oversight body of
their elected representatives? Assassination plots? The overthrow of
an elected democratic government? Drua: testin,q- on unwitting Ameri-
can citizens? Obtaining millions of private cables? Massive domestic
spving bv the CIA and the military? The ille.qral opening of mail?
Attempts by an agency of the government to blackmail a civil rights
leader? These have occurred and each has been withheld from scrutiny
by the public and the Congress by the label "secret intelligence."

In the Committee's view, these illegal, improper or unwise acts are
not valid national secrets and most certainly should not be kept from
the scrutiny of a duly-constituted congressional oversight body.

The definition of a valid national secret is far more difficult to set
forth. It varies from time to time. There is presently general agree-

ment that details about military activities, technology, sources of
information and particular intelligence methods are secrets that should
be carefully protected. It is most important that a process be devised
for agreeing on what national secrets are, so that the reasons for nec-
essary secrecy are understood by all three branches of government and
the public, that they be under constant review, and that any changes
requiring the protection of new types of information can be addressed,
understood and agreed on within a framework of constitutional con-
sensus.

The Committee stresses that these questions remain to be decided by
the Congress and the executive jointly :

— What should be regarded as a national secret ?
— Who determines what is to be kept secret ?
• — How can decisions made in secret or programs secretly
approved be reviewed?

Two great problems have confronted the Committee in carrying
out its charge to address these issues :

The first is how our open democratic society, which has endured
and flourished for 200 years, can be adapted to overcome the threats
to liberty posed by the continuation of secret government activities.
The leaders of the United States must devise ways to meet their respec-
tive intelligence responsibilities, including informed and effective con-
gressional oversight, in a manner which brings secrecy and the power
that secrecy affords within constitutional bounds.

For the executive branch, the specific problem concerns instituting
effective control and accountability systems and improving efficiency.
Many aspects of these two problem areas which have been examined
during the Committee's inquiry of intelligence agencies are addressed
in the recommendations in Chapter XVIII. It is our hope that intelli-
gence oversight committees working with the executive branch will
develop legislation to remedy the problems exposed by our inquiry and
described in this report. The Committee has already recommended
the creation of an oversight committee with the necessary powers to
exercise legislative authority over the intelligence activities of the
United States.

It is clear that the Congress must exert its will and devise procedures
that will enable it to play its full constitutional role in making
policy decisions concerning intelligence activities. Failure to do so
would permit further erosion of constitutional government.

This Committee has endeavored to include in its final public report
enough information to validate its findings and recommendations.
Most of the inquiry and the documentation obtained by the Committee,
particularly that concerning foreign and military intelligence, is of
a highly classified nature. Determining what could and should be re-
vealed has been a major concern.

In a meeting with President Ford at the outset of our inquiry in
February 1975, the Committee agreed not to disclose any classified in-
formation provided by the executive branch without first consult-
ing the appropriate agencies, offices and departments. In the case of
objections, the Committee agreed to carefully consider the Executive's
reasons for maintaining secrecy, but the Committee determined that
final decisions on any disclosure would be up to the Committee.

The Select Committee has scrupulously adhered to this agreement.
The Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign
Leaders, the report on CIA activities in Chile, the report on illegal
NSA surveillances, and the disclosures of illegal activities on the part
of FBI COINTELPRO, the FBI's harassment of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., and other matters revealed in the Committee's public hear-
ings, were all carefully considered by the Committee and the executive
branch working together to determine what information could be de-
classified and revealed without damaging national security. In those
reports and hearings, virtually all differences between the Committee
and the Executive were resolved. The only significant exception con-
cerned the release to the public of the Assassination Report, which the
executive branch believed would harm national security. The Com-
mittee decided otherwise.

Some criteria for defining a valid national secret have been agreed
to over the past year. Both the Committee and the executive branch
now agree that generally the names of intelligence sources and the
details of sensitive methods used by the intelligence services should
remain secret. Wherever possible, the right of privacy of individuals
and groups should also be preserved. It was agreed, however, that the
details of illegal acts should be disclosed and that the broad scope of
United States intelligence activities should be sufficiently described
to give public reassurance that the intelligence agencies are operating
consistent w^ith the law and declared national policy.

The declassification working procedures developed between this
Committee, the CIA and other parts of the intelligence community
constitute the beginnings of agreed, sound and sensible methods and
criteria for making public matters that should be made public. This
disclosure process is an important step toward achieving the national
consensus required if our intelligence system is to enjoy essential public
support.

There is a clear necessity, after thirty years of substantial secret ac-
tivities, for public debate and legislative decisions about the future
course of our intelligence system. This report is intended to assist the
Senate, the Congress, and the country in making the vital decisions
that are required to be made in the coming years.

This section of the Final Report focuses on the departments and
agencies engaged in foreign and military intelligence. The Commit-
tee's findings, conclusions, and recommendations in these areas can
be found in Chapter XVIII.

II. THE FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES : AN OVERVIEW

Permanent institutions for the conduct of secret foreign and mili-
tary intelligence activities are a relatively new feature of American
government. Secure behind two oceans and preoccupied with the set-
tlement of a continent, America had no pennanent foreign intelligence
establishment for more than a century and a half. In times of crisis,
Americans improvised their intelligence operations. In times of peace,
such operations were not needed and were allowed to lie fallow.

Despite the experience of the First World War, Americans believed
they could continue this pattern well into the Twentieth Century. The
military services developed important technical intelligence capabil-
ities, such as the breaking of the Japanese code, but the American
public remained unaware of the importance of effective intelligence for
its security. As a world power, the United States came late to intelli-
gence. It came on December 7, 1941, when Japan attacked Pearl
Harbor.

That searing intelligence failure led to the Congress' first effort to
deal with the necessity and complexity of modem intelligence. The
Joint Committee on the Pearl Harbor Attack, after a sweeping in-
vestigation, recommended in 1946 a unified and permanent intelli-
gence effort by the United States — concepts ultimately embodied in
the basic charter for American intelligence. The National Security
Act adopted by the Congress in 1947. However, neither the Pearl
Harbor Committee, nor the National Security Act addressed some
of the fundamental problems secret intelligence operations pose for
our democratic and constitutional form of government and America's
unique system of checks and balances.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities represents
the second major effort by the Congress to come to grips with intelli-
gence problems, in particular the basic constitutional and structural
issues arising from a permanent secret intelligence establishment.
While these problems were the subject of the investigation and are
the focus of this report, the Select Committee wishes to emphasize that
it found much that was good and proper in America's intelligence
efforts. In particular, the capacity and dedication of the men and
women serving in our intelligence services is to be commended.

This inquiry was not brought forth by an individual event such as
a massive intelliafence failure threatening the nation's security. Rather
it is the result of a series of occurrences adversely affecting the liberties
of individual Americans and undermining the lonsr-term interests and
reputation of the I"''nited States. In effect, the Select Committee was
created to deal with the question of whether our democratic system has
effectively governed in the crucial area of secret intelligence.

(15)

Mr. Clark Clifford, one of the authors of the National Security
Act of 1947, told the Committee that :

The law that was drawn in 1947 was of a general nature
and properly so, because it was the first law of its kind. We
were blazing a new" trail. ^

It has been the responsibility of the Select Committee to consider
where this eecret trail has taken the nation, and with this as prologue,
to begin the task of charting the future.

A. The Basic Issues: Secrecy and Democracy

The task of democratic government is to reconcile conflicting values.
The fundamental question faced by the Select Committee is how to
reconcile the clash between secrecy and democratic government itself.
Secrecy is an essential part of most intelligence activities. However,
secrecy undermines the United States Government's capacity to deal
effectively with the principal issues of American intelligence addressed
by the Select Committee :

— The lack of clear legislation defining the authority for permis-
sible intelligence acti\'ities has been justified in part for reasons of
secrecy. Absent clear legal boundaries for intelligence activities, the
Constitution has been violated in secret and the power of the executive
branch has gone unchecked, unbalanced.

— Secrecy has shielded intelligence activities from full account-
ability and effective supervision both within the executive branch
and bv the Congress.

— Reliance on covert action has been excessive because it offers a
secret shortcut around the democratic process. This shortcut has led
to questionable foreign involvements and unacceptable acts.

— ^The important line between public and private action has become
blurred as the result of the secret use of private institutions and in-
dividuals by intelligence agencies. This clandestine relationship has
called into question their integrity and undermined the crucial
independent role of the private sector in the American system of
democracv.

— Duplication, waste, inertia and ineffectiveness in the intelligence
community has been one of the costs of insulating the intelligence
bureaucracy from the rigors of Congressional and public scrutiny.

— Finally, secrecy has been a tragic conceit. Inevitably, the truth
prevails, and policies pursued on the premise that they could be plaus-
ibly denied, in the end damage America's reputation and the faith
of her people in their government.

For three decades, these problems have grown more intense. The
United States Government responded to the challenge of secret intel-
ligence operations by resorting to procedures that were informal,
implicit, tacit. Such an approach could fit within the tolerances of
our democratic system so long as such activities were small or tem-
porary. Now, however, the permanence and scale of America's intelli-
gence effort and the persistence of its problems require a different
solution.

^ Clark Clifford testimony, 12/5/75, Hearings, vol. 7, p. 50.

B. The Scope of the Select Committee's Inquiry into Foreign and
MiiiiTAKY Intelligence Operations

The operations of the United States Government in the field of
intelligence involve the activities of hundreds of thousands of individ-
uals and the expenditure of billions of dollars. They are carried out
by a complex "community" of organizations whose functions interact
and overlap. Because of their scope, the Select Committee could not
deal in depth with all aspects of America's intelligence activities.
Instead the Committee focused on the principal organizations, their
key functions and the major issues confronting the United States in
the field of foreign and military intelligence. In doing so, the Com-
mittee sought to uncover the truth of alleged abuses by the intelligence
agencies and to ascertain the legitimate needs and requirements
of an effective future intelligence system for the United States that
can function within the boundaries established by the Constitution
and our democratic form of government.

The Select Committee focused on five institutions :

— The National Security Council (NSC), which on behalf of the
President, is supposed to direct the entire national security apparatus
of the United States Government, including the intelligence commu-
nity. As the senior policymaking body in the executive branch in the
field of national security, the NSC is also the ultimate consumer of the
nation's intelligence product.

— The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) , who is charged with
producing intelligence which reflects the judgments of all of the in-
telligence organizations in the executive branch. He is also supposed
to "coordinate" the activities of these organizations.

— The Central Intelligence Agency^ which houses the government's
central analytical staff for the production of intelligence, but which
devotes its major efforts to developing new means of technical collec-
tion and to operating America's clandestine intelligence service
throughout the world. In the latter capacity it carries out covert action,
paramilitary operations and espionage.

— The Department of State^ which is the primary source of intelli-
gence on foreign political and economic matters, and as such is both a
competitor in the collection and evaluation of intelligence and a po-
tential source of external control over clandestine intelligence activities
of the Central Intelligence Agency.

— The Department of Defense^ which is the major collector of in-
telligence, the largest consumer, as well as the principal manager of
the resources devoted to intelligence. It houses the largest intelligence
collection organization, the National Security Agency (NSA), and
the largest intelligence analysis organization, the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA).

C. The Intelligence Process : Theory and Reality

These organizations, and some of their offshoots, constitute the
United States intelligence community. In theory at least, their opera-
tions can be described in simple terms by the following cycle :

— Those who use intelligence, the "consumers," indicate the kind
of information needed.

— These needs are translated into concrete "requirements" by senior
intelligence managers.

— The requirements are used to allocate resources to the "collectors"
and serve to guide their efforts.

— The collectors obtain the required information or "raw
intelligence."

— The "raw intelligence" is collated and turned into "finished in-
telligence" by the "analysts."

—The finished intelligence is distributed to the consumer and the
intelligence managers who state new needs, define new requirements,
and make necessary adjustments in the intelligence programs to im-
prove effectiveness and efficiency.

In reality this pattern is barely recognizable.

There are many different consumers, from the President to the
weapons designer. Their needs can conflict. Consumers rarely take
the time to define their intelligence needs and even if they do so there
is no effective and systematic mechanism for translating them into
intelligence requirements.

Therefore, intelligence requirements reflect what intelligence man-
agers think the consumers need, and equally important, what they
think their organizations can produce. Since there are many managers
and little central control, each is relatively free to set his own
requirements.

Resources therefore tend to be allocated according to the priorities
and concerns of the various intelligence bureaucracies. Most intelli-
gence collection operations are part of other organizations — the De-
partment of Defense, the Department of State — and so their require-
ments and their consumers are often the first to be served.

Collecting intelligence is not an automatic process. There are many
different kinds of intelligence, from a radar return to an indiscreet re-
mark, and the problems in acquiring it vary greatly. Information that
is wanted may not be available, or years may be required to develop
an agency or a technical device to get it. Meanwhile intelligence agen-
cies collect what they can.

In the world of bureaucracy, budgets, programs, procurement,
and managers, the needs of the analyst can be lost in the shuffle. There
has been an explosion in the volume and quality of raw intelligence but
no equivalent increase in the capacity of analytical capabilities. As a
result, "raw" intelligence increasingly dominates "finished" intelli-
gence; analysts find themselves on a treadmill where it is difficult to
do more than summarize and put in context the intelligence flowing
in. There is little time or reward for the task of providing insight.

In the end the consumer, particularly at the highest levels of the
government, finds that his most important questions are not only
unanswered, but sometimes not even addressed.

To some extent, all this is in the nature of things. Many questions
cannot be answered. The world of intelligence is dominated by uncer-
tainty and chance, and those in the intelligence bureaucracy, as else-

where in the Government, try to defend themselves against uncer-
tainties in ways which militate against efficient management and
accountability.

Beyond this is the fact that the organizations of the intelligence
community must operate in peace but be prepared for war. This has
an enormous impact on the kind of intelligence that is sought, the way
resources are allocated, and the way the intelligence community is
organized and managed.

Equally important, the instruments of intelligence have been forged
into weapons of psychological, political, and paramilitary warfare.
This has had a profound effect on the perspective and preoccupa-
tions of the leadership of the intelligence community, downgrading
concerns for intelligence in relation to the effective execution of
operations.

These problems alone would undermine any rational scheme, but
it is also important to recognize that the U.S. intelligence community
is not the work of a single author. It has evolved from an interaction
of the above internal factors and the external forces that have shaped
America's history since the end of the Second World War.

D. Evolution of the TjNrrED States Intelligence Community

The evolution of the United States intelligence community since
World War II is part of the larger history of America's effort to
come to grips with the spread of communism and the growing power
of the Soviet Union. As the war ended, Americans were torn by hopes
for peace and fear for the future. The determination to return the
nation promptly to normal was reflected in demobilization of our
wartime military establishment. In the field of intelligence, it was
clear in President Truman's decision to dismantle the Office of Stra-
tegic Services, scattering its functions to the military departments and
the Department of State.

The Second World War saw the defeat of one brand of totalitarian-
ism. A new totalitarian challenge quickly arose. The Soviet Union, a
major ally in war, became America's principal adversary in peace. The
power of fascism was in ruin but the power of communism was mobil-
ized. Not only had the communist parties in France, Italy, and Greece
emerged politically strengthened by their roles in the Resistance, but
the armies of the Soviet Union stretched across the center of Europe.
And, within four years, America's nuclear monopoly would end.

American military intelligence officers were among the first to per-
ceive the changed situation. Almost immediately after the fall of Ber-
lin to the Red Army, U.S. military intelligence sought to determine
Soviet objectives. Harry Rositzke, later to become chief of the CIA's
Soviet Division, but at the time a military intelligence officer, was
despatched to Berlin by jeep. Although the Soviet Union was still an
ally, Rositzke was detained, interrogated, then ordered expelled by
the Soviet occupying forces. He managed, however, to escape his So-
viet "escort" and arrive in Berlin. He described his experience to the
Committee :

We got on the outskirts of Berlin and yelled out "Ameri-
kanski," and were highly welcomed. And as we went over the
Autobahn the first basic impression I got, since I had known

Germany well before the war, was a lon^ walking 2^oiip of
German males under 16 and over 60 who were being shep-
herded to the east by four-foot-ten, five-foot Mongolian sol-
diers with straw shoes.

The Russians also had been looting. With horses and farm
wagons they were taking away mattresses, wall fixtures,
plumbing fixtures, anything other than the frame of the
houses.

We then made our way throuofh the rubble of Berlin — most
were one-way streets — identifvinsr every shoulder patch we
could, and passed the Siemans-Halske works, in front of
which were 40 or 50 lend-lease trucks, on each of which was a
larjre shiny lathe, drill press, et cetera.

When we had seen enoucfh and were all three extremely
nervous, we headed straight west from Berlin to the British
Zone. When we arrived we had an enormous amount of ex-
uberance and a real sense of relief, for the entire 36 hours had
put us in another world. The words that came to my mind
then were, "Russia moves west." ^
At home, the Truman Administration was preoccupied by the tran-
sition from war to an uncertain peace. Though dispersed, and in some
cases disbanded, America's Dotential capabilities in the field of intelli-
gence were considerable. There were a large number of well-trained
former OSS operation officers ; the military had developed a remark-
able capacity for cry otologic intelli<Tence (the breaking of codes) and
communicntions intelligence (COMINT') ; there was also a cadre of
former OSS intelligence analysts both within the government and in
the academic community.

E. The Origins of the Postwar Intelligence Community *

With the experiences of World War II and particularly Pearl Har-
bor still vivid, there was a recognition within the government that,
notwithstandino- demobilization, it was essential to create a central-
ized body to collate and coordinate intelligence information. There
was also a need to eliminate frictions between competing military
intelligence services. Although there was disagreement about the struc-
ture and authoritv of the Dostwar i^telli.o-ence service. President Tru-
man and his senior advisers concluded that, unlike the OSS, this
centralized body should be civilian in character.

The military resisted this judgment. Virtually all of America's
competing intelligence assets were in the armed services. Then, as
now, the military considered an intelligence capability essential in
wartime and equally imnortant in time of peace to be prepared for
military crises. Thus, the services were strongly opposed to having
their authority over intellifrence diminished. In contrast, factions
within thp State Department were reluctant to accept any greater
responsibility or role in t^ho field of clandestine intellificence.

Six months after V-J Day, and three months after he hnd dis-
banded OSS, President Truman established the Central Intelligence

^ Harry Rozitzke testimonv, 10/31/75. p. 7.

* For an organizational history of the CIA, see Chapter "VI.

Group (CIG). CIG was the direct predecessor of the CIA. It re-
ported to the National Intelligence Authority, a body consisting of
the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and their representatives. CIG
had a brief existence. It never was able to overcome the constraints
and institutional resistances found in the Department of State and
the armed services.

The National Security Act of 1947 ' was passed on July 26, 1947. The
Act included, in large part, the recommendations of a report prepared
for Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal by New York investment
broker Ferdinand Eberstadt. Though largely concerned wnth the crea-
tion of the National Security Council (NSC) and the unification of the
military services within the Department of Defense, the Act also
created a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and a Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA). The powers of the DCI and the CIA
were an amalgam of careful limits on the DCI's authority over the
intelligence community and an open-ended mission for the CIA itself.
The power of the DCI over military and diplomatic intelligence was
confined to "coordination." At the same time, however, the Agency
was authorized to carry out unspecified "services of common concern"
and, more importantly, could "carry out such other functions and
duties" as the National Secui-ity Council might direct.

Nowhere in the 1947 Act was the CIA explicitly empowered to col-
lect intelligence or intervene secretly in the affairs of other nations.
But the elastic phrase, "such other functions," was used by successive
presidents to move the Agency into espionage, covert action, para-
military operations, and technical intelligence collection. Often con-
ceived as having granted significant peacetime power's and flexibility
to the CIA and the NSC, the National Security Act actually legislated
that authority to the President.

The 1947 Act provided no explicit charter for military intelligence.
The charter and mission of military intelligence activities was estab-
lished either by executive orders, such as the one creating the National
Security Agency in 1952, or various National Security Council di-
rectives. These National Security Council Intelligence Directives
(NSCID's) w^ere the principal means of establishing the roles and
functions of all the various entities in the intelligence connnunity.
They composed the so-called "secret charter" for the CIA. However,
most of them also permitted "departmental" intelligence activities,
and in this way also provided the executive charter for the intelligence
activities of the State Department and the Pentagon. However, the
intelligence activities of the Department of Defense remained with
the military rather than with the new Defense Dei^artment civilians.
At the end of the war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to continue
the inter-Service coordinating mechanism — the Joint Intelligence
Committee— which had been created in 1942. With the 1947 Act and
the establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a working level intelli-
gence operation was created in the Joint Staff, known as the Joint
Intelligence Group, or J-2.

The structure created by the 1947 Act and ensuing NSCID's was
highly decentralized. The task of the CIA and the Director of Central

See Chapter VII for an analysis of the 1M7 Act.

Intelligence was to "coordinate" the intelligence output of all the vari-
ous intelligence collection programs in the military and the Depart-
ment of State. The CIA and its Director had little power to act itself,
but the potential was there.

F. The Response to the Soviet Threat

Immediately after its establishment, the CIA and other elements
of the intelligence community responded to the external threats fac-
ing the United States.

— The threat of war in Europe. Following the Avar there was a dis-
tinct possibility of a Soviet assault on Western Europe. Communist
regimes had been established in Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bul-
garia. Czechoslovakia went Communist in 1948 through a coup sup-
ported by the Russian Army. There was a Russian-backed civil war in
Greece. And, above all, there was the presence of the Soviet Army in
Eastern Europe and the pressure on Berlin.

In light of these developments, IT.S. policvmakers came to the con-
clusion that outright war with the Soviet T^nion was possible. The U.S.
intelligence commuiiity responded accordinglv. The CIA assumed the
espionage task, running agents and organizing "stay-behind networks"
in the event the Soviets rolled west. Agents, mostly refu<Tees, were sent
into the East to report on Soviet forces and, in particular, any moves
that signalled war. The U.S. went so far as to establish contact with
Ukrainian guerrillas- — a relationship that was maintained until the
guerrillas were finally wiped out in the early 1950s bv Soviet security
forces. CIA activi^^ies. however, were outnumbered bv the clandestine
collection operations of the military, particularlv in Western Europe,
where the Army maintained a large covert intelligence and paramili-
tary capability.

— Turmoil in the West. Tl^e Soviets had poAverful political resources
in the West — the Communist parties and trade unions. Provided with
financial and advisory support from the Soviet Union, the Communist
parties sought to exploit and exacerbate the economic and political
turmoil in postwar Europe. As the elections in 1948 and 1949 in Italy
and France approached, the democratic parties were in disarray and
the possibilitv of a Communist takeover was real. Coordinated Com-
munist political unrest in western countries combined with extremist
pressure from the Soviet ITnion, confirmed the fears of many that
America faced an expansionist Communist monolith.

The ITnited States res^^onded with overt economic aid — the Truman
Doctrine and the Marshall Plan— and covert political assistance. This
latter task was assigned to the Office of '^pe'^ial Proiects, later renamed
the Office of Po^icv Coordination (OPC). The Office was housed in the
CIA but was directly responsible to the Departments of State and
Defense. Clandestine support from the TTnited States for European
democratic parties was rejrarderl as an essential response to the threat
of "international communism." OPC became the fastest growing ele-
ment in the CIA. To facilitate its onerations. as well as to finance CIA
espionage activities, the Con.q-ress passed the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949, which authorized the Director of CIA to spend
funds on his voucher without havine; to account for disbursements.

— Nuclear weapons. The advent of nu'clear weapons and the Soviet
potential in this field led to efforts to ascertain the status of the Soviet
Union's nuclear program. By the time of the Soviet's first atomic explo-
sion in 1949, the U.S. Air Force and Navy had begun a peripheral
reconnaissance program to monitor other aspects of Soviet nuclear
development and Soviet military capabilities. As the Soviet strategic
nuclear threat grew, Ainerica's efforts to contain it would grow in
scale and sophistication until it would overshadow the classic tools of
espionage.

. G. Korea : ttie Turning Point

The Communist attack, feared in Europe, took place in Asia. The
Korean War, following less than a year after the fall of China to the
Communists, marked a turning point for the CIA. The requirements
of that war, the involvement of China, the concern that war in Europe
might soon follow, led to a fourfold expansion of the CIA — ^particu-
larly in the paramilitary field. This period was characterized by efforts
to infiltrate agents into mainland China, which led to the shoot-
down and capture of a number of Americans.

The CIA's activities elsewhere in Asia also expanded. Instrumen-
tal in helping Ramon Magsaysay defeat the communist Hukbalahaps
in the Philippines, the CIA also assisted the French in their losing
struggle against the Viet Minh in Indochina.

The failure to anticipate the attack on Korea was regarded as a
major intelligence failure. The new Director of the CIA, General
Bedell Smith, was determined to improve CIA's estimating and fore-
casting capabilities. He called on William Langer, formerly chief of
the Research and Analysis section of the OSS, to come to Washington
from Harvard, in 1950, to head a small staff for analysis and the pro-
duction of intelligence. An Office of National Estimates (ONE) was
established to produce finished intelligence estimates. ONE drew on
the intelligence information resources of the entire U.S. intelligence
community and was aided by a Board of National Estimates composed
of leading statesmen and academic experts.

Bv the end of the Korean War and the naming of Allen Dulles as
DCI, the powers, responsibilities and basic structure of the CIA were
established. The Agency had assumed full responsibility for covert
operations in 1950, and by 1952 covert action had exceeded the money
and manpower allotted to the task of espionage — a situation that
would persist until the early 1970s.

Paramilitary actions were in disrepute because of a number of fail-
ures during the Korean War. However, the techniques of covert mili-
tary assistance in training had been developed, and the pattern of CIA
direction of Special Forces and other unconventional components of
the U.S. Armed Forces in clandestine operations had been estab-
lished.

In the field of espionage, the CIA had become the predominant, but
by no means the exclusive operator. Clandestine human collection of
intelligence bv the military services continued at a relatively high
rate. The militarv also had a large stake in clandestine technical
collection of intelligence.

Major structural changes in tlie intelligence community were
brouo^ht about by the consolidation of cryptanalysis and related func-
tions? Codebreaking is a vital part of tpchnical intelligence collection
and has had an important role in the history of U.S. intelligence
efforts The American "Black Chamber" responsible for breaking
German codes in WAVI was abolished in the 1920s. As WWII ap-
proached, cryptanalysis received increased attention in the military.
Both the Army and Navy had separate cryptologic services which had
combined to break the Japanese code. Known as ''the magic" this in-
formation signalled the impending attack on Pearl Harbor but the
intelligence and alert, system as a whole failed to respond.

In order to unify and coordinate defense cryptologic and communi-
cations security functions. President Truman created the National
Security Agency by Executive Order on November 4, 1952. Prior to
this tirrie, U.S. cryptological capabilities resided in the separate agen-
cies of the Army.Navy, and Air Force. The very existence of still the
most secret of all U.S. intelligence agencies, NSA, was not acknowl-
edged until 1957.

H. The "Protracted Conflict"

With the end of the Korean conflict and as the mid-1950s ap-
proached, the intelligence community turned from the desperate con-
cern over imminent war with the U.S.S.R. to the long-term task of
containing and competing with communism. In the "struggle for
men's minds," covert action developed into a large-scale clandestine
psychological and political program aimed at competing with Soviet
propaganda and front organizations in international labor and stu-
dent activities. Specific foreign governments considered antithetical
to the United States and its allies or too receptive to the influence of
the Soviet Union, such as Mosedegh in Iran in 1958 and Arbenz in
Guatemala in 1954, were toppled with the help of the CIA. Anti-
communist parties and groups were given aid and encouragement such
as the Sumatran leaders who, in 1958, sought the overthrow of Presi-
dent Sukarno of Indonesia.

At the same time, the CIA was moving into the field of technical
intelligence and reconnaissance in a major way. The U.S. military
had recognized the value of aerial reconnaissnnce within a few short
years after the Wright brothers' successful flight in 1903 and had
borne major responsibility for reconnaissance against Communist
bloc countries. But it was the CIA in 1959 thnt beo-an work on the U-2.

It proved to be a technical triumnh. The U-2 established that
the Soviet Union was not. as had been feared, about to turn the
tables of the strategic balance. It gained more information about
Soviet military developments tl^an had been acquired in the previous
decade of espionage operations. But there were risks in this oper-
ation. Despite the effort to minimize them with a special system of
high-level NSC review and apnroval, Francis Garv Powers was shot
down in a U-2 over the Soviet Union on the eve of the Paris summit
conference in 1960. President Eisenhower's acceptance of responsi-
bility and Nikita Khrushchev's reaction led to the collapse of the
conference before it be.fjan.

Nonetheless the U-2 proved the A^alue of exotic and advanced tech-
nical means of intelligence collection. It was followed by a transfor-

mation of the intelligence community. As the 1950s gave way to the
1960s, large budgets for the development and operation of technical
collection systems created intense competition among the military
services and the CIA and major problems in management and
condensation.

To support the Director of Central Intelligence's task of coordinat-
ing the activities of the intelligence community, the United States
Intelligence Board (USIB) was established in 1958. Made up of senior
representatives of the State Department, the Department of Defense,
the military services. Treasury (since 1973) and the FBI, USIB
was to coordinate the setting of requirements for intelligence, approve
National Intelligence Estimates and generally supervise the operations
of the intelligence agencies. However, the real power to set require-
ments and allocate resources to intelligence programs remained de-
centralized and in the hands of the principal collectors — the military
services, the Foreign Service and the clandestine service of the CIA.
As collection programs mushroomed, USIB proved unequal to the
task of providing centralized management and eliminating duplication.

I. Third World Competition and Nuclear Crisis

While the United States' technical, military and intelligence capa-
bilities advanced, concern intensified over the vulnerability of the
newly independent nations of Africa and Asia to communist sub-
version. And in the Western Hemisphere the establishment of a com-
munist Cuba by Fidel Castro was seen as presaging a major incursion
of revolutionary communism to the Western Hemisphere.

At his inauguration in January, 1961, President Kennedy pro-
claimed that America would "pay any price and bear any burden" so
that liberty might prevail in the world over the "forces of communist
totalitarianism." Despite the catastrophe of the CIA-sponsored Bay
of Pigs invasion only four months later, the covert action and para-
military operations staffs of the CIA were to shoulder a significant
part of that burden. In Latin America the Alliance for Progress, the
overt effort to help modernize the southern half of the hemisphere, was
accompanied by a significant expansion of covert action and internal
security operations aimed at blocking the spread of Castro's influence
or ideology. This was accompanied by an intense paramilitary cam-
paign of harassment, sabotage, propaganda against Cuba, and at-
tempted assassination against Castro.

Nearby, in the Dominican Republic, the United States had already
supported the assassins of Dictator Raphael Trujillo in order to pre-
empt a Castro-type takeover. In Africa, significant paramilitary aid
was given in support of anti-Soviet African leaders. In Asia, American
intelligence had been involved for a long time in the Indochina strug-
gle. The CIA, along with the rest of the United States government,
was drawn ever deeper into the Vietnamese conflict.

Early in the decade the United States faced its most serious post-
war crisis affecting its security — the Cuban Missile Crisis of October
1962. It illustrated a number of important facts concerning the nature
and structure of American intelligence.

During the summer of 1962 overhead reconnaissance confirmed agent
intelligence reports that some form of unusual military installation
was being placed in Cuba. By October 16 it was clear that these were

medium and intermediate-range ballistic missile sites capable of han-
dlino; nuclear weapons that could strike targets throughout significant
areas of tlie T^nited States.

As the United States moved towards a confrontation with the So-
viet Union, U.S. intelligence played a significant role at every turn.
Overhead reconnaissance of the Soviet strategic posture w^as vastly
superior to that of the Russians. Reports from Col. Oleg Penkovsky,
the U.S. agent in the Kremlin, kept the United States abreast of the
Soviet military response to the crisis. U.S. tactical reconnaissance of
Cuba not only prepared the United States for possible invasion but
signalled the earnestness of our intention to do so should the situation
deteriorate. Naval reconnaissance kept close tabs on Soviet ships bear-
ing ballistic missile components. As the crisis neared its showdown
with a quarantine, the President demanded and received the most de-
tailed tactical intelligence, including the distance in yards between
American naval vessels and the Soviet transport ships.

This crisis dramatized the importance of integrated intelligence
collection and production in times of crisis. It also clearly illustrated
the difficulty in distinguishing between national and so-called tactical
intelligence. This distinction has been a central feature of the struc-
ture of the American intelligence community with the military serv-
ices maintaining control over tactical intelligence and the so-called
national intelligence assets subject to varying degrees of control by
the Director of Central Intelligence or the Secrtary of Defense and
the National Security Council. Cuba proved that in time of crisis
these distinctions evaporate.

J. Technology xVNd Tragedy

During the 1960s the U.S. intelligence community was dominated
by two developments: First, the enormous exnlosion in the volume of
technical intelligence as the research and development efforts of the
previous period came to fruition; second, the ever-growing involve-
ment of the United States in the war in Vietnam.

The increase in the quantity and quality of technically acquired
information on Soviet military forces, in particular strategic forces,
made possible precise measurement of the existing level of Soviet
strategic deployments. However, it did not answer questions about
the ultimate scale of Soviet strateqic deployments, nor did it provide
fi]-m information on the quality of their forces. While it provided an
additional clue as to Soviet intentions, it did not offer any definitive
nnswers.

In the Pentaoon disparate estimates of future Soviet strateo'ic power
from each of the Armed Services led Secretary Robert McNamara to
establish the Defense Intelligence Agency. The Secretary of Defense
Avas in the ironic position of being responsible for the bulk of American
intelligence collection activity but lackino- the means to coordinate
either the collection programs or the intelligence produced. The DIA
was to fulfill this need, but in a compromise with the military services
the DI;V Mas made to renort to the Secretary of Defense through the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The DIA has never fulfilled its promise.

In the CIA the analysts confronted bv the new mass of technical
intelligence information underestimated the ultimate scale of Soviet

dployments wliile tending to overestimate the qualitative aspects of
Soviet weapons systems. Previously, intelligence analysts had to build
up their picture of Soviet capability from fragmentary information,
inference and speculation, particularly as to Soviet purposes. Con-
fronted with the challenge to exploit the new sources of intelligence on
Soviet programs, the analysts in the intelligence community turned
away from the more speculative task of understanding Soviet purposes
and intentions, even though insight into these questions was central to
a greater understanding of the technical information being acquired
in such quantity.

The war in Vietnam also ])Osed serious problems in the analysis and
production of intelligence. In effect, the analysts were continually in
the position of having to bring bad news to top policymakers. The re-
sult produced some serious anomalies in the nature of intelligence
estimates concerning the Vietnam conflict. For example, the CIA con-
tinually flew in the face of the Pentagon and the evident desires of
the White House by denigrating the effectiveness of the bombing cam-
i:)aig7is over North Vietnam, but as American involvement deepened
from 1965 onward, the CIA was unwilling to take on the larger and
more im]Dortant task of assessing the possiljility for the success of the
overall U.S. effort in Vietnam.

The increase in technical collection capabilities of the United States
were also brought to bear on that conflict, creating in its turn important
questions about the application of such resources to tactical situations.
As one intelligence officer ])ut it, local military commanders in Viet-
nam "were getting SIGINT (signals intelligence) with their orange
juice every morning and have now come to expect it eveiywhere." This
involves two problems : first, whether "national" intelligence re-
sources aimed at strategic ])roblems should be diverted to be used for
local combat application and, second, Avhether this might not lead to a
compromise of the technical collection systems and the elimination of
their effectiveness for broader strategic missions.

K. The 1970s

Together, the advent of increased technical capabilities and the Viet-
nam War brought to a climax concerns within the Government over
the centralized management of intelligence resources. This coincided
with increased dissatisfaction in tlie Nixon Administration over the
quality of intelligence produced on the war and on Soviet strategic
developments.

In the nation as a whole, the impact of the Vietnam War destroyed
the foreign policy consensus which had under])inned America's in-
telligence activities abroad. Starting with the disclosures of CIA in-
volvement with the National Student Association of 1967, there were
a series of advei-se revelations concerning the activities of the Central
Intelligence Agency and the military intelligence agencies.

Concern over the secret war in Laos, revulsion at the Phoenix pro-
gram which took at least 20,000 lives in South Vietnam, army spying
on IT.S. civilians, U.S. "destabilization" efforts in Chile, and finally
the rcA'elations concerning Operation CHAOS and the CIA's domestic
intelligence role created a climate for a thorough Congressional
investigation.

During this same period, the Executive moved to initiate certain
management reforms. Beginning as early as 1968, there were cutbacks
in the scale of the overall intelligence community. These cutbacks
deepened by 1970, both in the size of the overall intelligence budget in
real terms and in the manpower devoted to intelligence activities. CIA
covert acti\dties were sharply reduced with a few notable exceptions
such as Chile. The internal security mission in foreign countries was
dropped. There was a re-emphasis on collecting covert intelligence
on the Soviet Union. Terrorism and narcotics were added to the list
of intelligence requirements for our clandestine espionage services.

In 1971 James Schlesinger, then serving in the Office of Management
and Budget, was asked to do a sweeping analysis of the intelligence
community. That study led to an effort to increase the authority of the
Director of Central Intelligence over the management of the intel-
ligence community. However, President Nixon limited the scope of
reform to that which could be accomplished without legislation.

Congress also took an increased interest in the activities of the in-
telligence connnunity. The role of the CIA in the Watergate affair was
examined in the Senate Watergate Committee's investigation. At the
close of 1974 a rider, the Hughes-Ryan amendment, was added to the
Foreign Assistance Act which required the President to certify that
covert actions were important to the national interest and directed that
the Congress be fully informed of them. In this connevtion, the respon-
sibility to inform the Congress was broadened beyond the traditional
Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of the Congress to in-
clude the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign
Affairs Committee. However, the first real effort of the Congress to
come to grips with the challenge posed to the American democratic
form of government by necessarily secret foreign and militaiy intelli-
gence activities came with the establishment of the Senate Sekvt Com-
mittee on Intelligence in January of 1975. The results of its inquiry
are set forth in the following chapters of this report.

L. The Task Ahead

The American intelligence community has changed markedly from
the early postwar days, yet some of the major problems of that period
persist. The intelligence community is still highly decentralized; the
problem of maintaining careful command and control over risky
secret activities is still great. There is a continuing difficulty in draw-
ing a line between national intelligence activities, which should be
closely supervised by the highest levels of government, and tactical
intelligence, which are the province of the military services and the
departments.

The positive steps undertaken by President Ford in his recent Exe-
cutive Order have not diminished the need for a new statutory frame-
work for American intelligence activities. Only through the legisla-
tive })rocess can the broad political consensus be expressed which is
necessary for the continuing conduct of those intelligence activities
essential to the nation's security and diplomacy.

Clark M. Clifford, who was one of the authors of the 1947 National
Security Act that established the present legislative framework for
America's intelligence activities, made these comments in open session
before the Committee:

As one attempts to analyze the difficulty and hopefully offer
constructive suggestions for improvement, he finds much con-
fusion existing within the system. It is clear that lines of
autliority and responsibility have become blurred and indis-
tinct.

The National Security Council under the Act of 1947 is
given the responsibility of directing our country's intelligence
activities. My experience leads me to believe that this function
has not been effectively performed. . . .

The 1947 law creating the CIA should be substantially
amended and a new law should be written covering intelli-
gence functions. We have had almost thirty years of expe-
rience under tlie old law and have learned a great deal. I be-
lieve it has served us reasonably well but its defects have be-
come increasingly apparent. A clear, more definitive bill can
be prepared that can accomplish our purposes by creating
clear lines of authority and responsibility and by carefully
restricting certain activities we can hopefully prevent the
abuses of the past.

And Mr. Clifford concluded :

We have a big job to do in this country. Our people are
confused about our national goals and cynical about our in-
stitutions. Our national spirit seems to have been replaced by
a national malaise. It is my conviction that the efforts of this
committee will assist us in regaining confidence in our nation-
al integrity, and in helping to restore to our nation its repu-
tation in the world for decency, fair dealing, and moral lead-
ership.*^

That is the spirit in whicli the Select Committee sought to pursue
its inquiry and that is the spirit in which the Committee puts forward
the following analysis of the intelligence community and the operation
of its constituent parts.

Clifford, 12/5/75, Hearings, p. 53.

III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWOEK FOR
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

A. The Joint Responsibilities or the Legislative and Execu-
tive Branches — Separation of Powers and Checks and Bal-
ances

While the Constitution contains no provisions expressly allocating-
authority for intelligence activity, the Constitution's provisions re-
garding foreign atfairs and national defense are directly relevant.
From the 'beginning, U.S. foreign intelligence activity ^ has been con-
ducted in connection with our foreigii relations and national defense.
In these areas, as in all aspects of our Government, the Constitution
provides for a system of checks and balances under the separation of
powers doctrine. In foreign affairs and national defense. Congress and
the President were both given important powers. The Constitution, as
Madison explained in The Federal ist, established "a partial mixture of
powers.'' - Unless the branches of government, Madison said, "be so far
connected and blended as to give each a constitutional conti'ol over
the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as
essential to a free government, can never in practice be maintained." ^
The f ramers' underlying purpose, as Justice Brandeis pointed out, was
"to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power." "*

This pattern of checks and balances is reflected in the constitutional
j:)rovisions with res])ect to foreign affairs and national defense. In
foreign affairs, the President has the ])ower to make treaties and to
appoint Ambassadors and envoys, but this power is subject to the
"advice and consent" of the Senate."' While the President has the exclu-
sive power to receive ambassadors from foreign states," the Congress
has important powers of its own in foreign affairs, most notably the
power to regulate foreign commerce and to lay duties."

** A definition of the term "foreign intelligence activity" is necessary in order
to properly assess the constitutional aspects of foreign intelligence activity. For-
eign intelligence activity is now understood to include secret information gather-
ing and covert action. Covert action is defined by the CIA as secret action designed
to influence events abroad, including the use of political means or varying degrees
of force. The political means can range from the employment of propaganda to
large-scale efforts to finance foreign political parties or groups so as to influence
elections or overthrow governments ; covert action involving the use of force
may include U.S. paramilitary operations or the support of military operations
by foreign conventional or unconventional military organizations. (Memoran-
dum from Mitchell Rogovin, Special Counsel to the Director of Central Intel-
ligence, House Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearings, 12/9/7.5, p. 1730.)

^ The Federalist, No. 47 (J. Madison).

•'' The Federalist, No. 48 (J. Madison).

* Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52. 292 (1926).

^ United States Constitution, Article II, Section 2.

"Ibid., Sec. 3.

' Ibid., Art. I, Sec. 8.

(31)

In national defense, the President is made Commander-in-Chief,
thereby having the power to command the armed forces, to direct
military operations once Conoress has declared Avar, and to repel
sudden attacks.^ Cono^ress, however, has the exclusive power to declare
wai', to laise and support the armed forces, to make rules for their
government and reo;ulation, to call forth the militia, to provide for
the common defense, and to make appropriations for all national
defense activities.^

JSIoreover, under the Necessary and Proper clause, the Constitution
s})ecifies that Conjjress shall have the power "to make all laws necessary
and proper for carrying into execution'^ not only its own powers but
also "all other powers vested by [the] Constitution in tlie Government
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." ^°

This constitutional framework — animated by the checks and bal-
ances concei)t — makes clear that the Constitution contemplates that
the judgment of both the Congress and the President will be applied
to major decisions in foreign affairs and national defense. The Presi-
dent, the holder of "tlie executive power," conducts daily relations
witli otlier nations tlirough the State Department and other agencies.
The Senate, through its "advice and consent" powder and through the
work of its appropriate committees ])articipates in foreign affairs.
As Hamilton observed in The Fe(JeraH>it^ foreign affairs should not be
left to the "sole disposal" of the President :

The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted
opinion of human virtue which would make it wise to commit
interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which
concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the sole
disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would
be a President of the United States.^^

Similarly, in national defense, the constitutional framework is a
"partial mixture of powers," calling for collaboration between the
executive and the legislative branches. The Congress, through its ex-
clusive power to declare war, alone decides whether the nation shall
move from a state of peace to a state of war. "\Vliile as Commander-in-
Chief the President commands the armed forces. Congress is empow-
ered "to make rules" for their "government and regulation." ^^

INIoreover, in both the foreign affairs and defense fields, while the
President makes executive decisions, the Congress with its exclusive
power over the purse is charged with authority to determine whether,
or to what extent, government activities in these areas shall be
funded. ^^

Tlie Constitution, while containing no express authority for the con-
duct of foreign intelligence activitv, clearly endowed the Federal
Government (i.e.. Congress and the President jointlv) with all the
])ower necessary to conduct the nation's foreign affairs and national

' Ihid.. Art. IT, Sect. 2.

° ma.. Sect. 8.

" Ihid.

" The F^dprnlisf. No. 75 (A. Hamilton).

" TTnited S*-ate« Constitution. Article I. Section 8.

"76frt., Art. II, Sect. 8.

defense and to stand on an equal basis with other sovereign states. ^^
Inasmuch as foreign intelligence activity is a part of the conduct of
the United States' foreign affairs and national defense, as well as part
of the practice of sovereign states, the Federal Government has the
constitutional authority to undertake such activity in accordance with
applicable norms of international law.^^*

We discuss below the manner in which Congress and the Executive
branch have undertaken to exercise this federal power, and the con-
sistency of their action with the Constitution's framework and system
of checks and balances.

B. The Historical Practice

The National Security Act of 1947 "'' was a landmark in the
evolution of United States foreign intelligence. In the 1947 Act,
Congress created the National Security Council and the CIA, giving
both of these entities a statutory charter.

Prior to 1947, Congress, despite its substantial authority in foreign
affairs and national defense, did not legislate directly with respect to
foreign intelligence activity. Under the Necessary and Proper Clause,
and its power to make rules and regulations for the Armed Forces,
Congress might have elaborated specific statutes authorizing and regu-
lating the conduct of foreign intelligence. In the absence of such sta-
tutes. Presidents conducted foreign intelligence activity prior to the
1947 National Security Act on their own authority.

In wartime, the President's power as Commander-in-Chief provided
ample authority for both the secret gathering of information and
covert action. ^^ The authority to collect foreign intelligence informa-
tion before 1947 in peacetime can be viewed as implied from the Presi-

"As the Supreme Court has declared, "the United States, in their relation
to foreign countries . . . are invested with the powers which belong to independ-
ent nations " [Chinese Exclusion Case. 130 U.S. 581. 604 (1889).]

"a There are a number of international agreements which the United States
has entered into which prohibit certain forms of intervention in the domestic
affairs of foreign states. The Nations Charter in Article 2(4) obligates all U.N.
members to 'refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity of any state." The Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS) in Article 18 provides:

"No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.
The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form
of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against
its political, economic, and cultural elements."

Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution (Art. VI, Sec. 2). treaty
obligations of the United States are part of the law of the land. While the
general principles of such treaties have not been spelled out in specific rules of
application, and much depends on the facts of particular cases as well as other
principles of international law (including the right of self-preservation, and
the right to assist states against prior foreign intervention) it is clear that the
norms of international law are relevant in assessing the legal and constitutional
aspects of covert action.

"" .50 U.S.C. 430.

^In Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875). the Supreme Court iipheld the
authority of the Pre.sident to hire, without statutory authority, a secret agent for
intelligence purposes during the Civil War. Authority for wartime covert action
can be implied from the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief to conduct
military operations in a war declared by Congress. Compare, Totten v. United
States.

dent's power to conduct foreicrii affairs.^^ In addition to the more or
less discreet oratlierinff of information by the reoiilar diplomatic serv-
ice, the President sometimes used specially-appointed "executive
agents" to secretly gather information abroad.^' In addition, executive
agents were on occasion given secret political missions that were simi-
lar to modern day political covert action.^^ These, however, tended to
be in the form of relatively small-scale responses to paiticular con-
cerns, rather than the continuous, institutionalized activity that
marked the character of covert action in the period after the passage
of the 1947 National Security Act. There were no precedents for the
peacetime use of covert action involving the use of armed force of the
type conducted after 1947.

1. Foreign Intelligence and the Presidetifs Foreign Affairs Power

Although the Constitution provides that the President "sliall ap-
point ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls" only "by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate," beginning witli Washing-
ton Presidents have appointed special envoys to carry out both overt
diplomatic functions and foreign intelligence missions.^^ The great
majority of these envoys were sent on overt missions, such as to nego-
tiate treaties or to represent the United States at international con-
ferences. Some, however, were sent in secrecy to carry out the near
equivalent of modern-day intelligence collection and covert political
action. For example, in connection with IT.S. territorial designs on
central and western Canada in 1869, President Grant's Secretary of
State sent a private citizen to that area to investigate and promote
the possibilitv of annexation to the United States.^"

Presidential discretion as to the appointment of such executive
agents derived from the President's assumntion of the conduct of
foreign relations. From the beo:inning, the President represented the
United States to the world and had exclusive charge of the channels
and processes of communication. The President's role as "sole orrran"
of tlie nation in dealing with foreign states was recognized bv John
Marhall in 1816 ^^ and reflected the views expressed in The Federalist

"Compare, Unite<J States v. Bntcnko 494 F.2d 593 (3(1 Cir. 1974) : "Decisions
affecting the United States' relationship witli other sovereign states are more
likely to advance our national interests if the President is apprised of the inten-
tions, capabilities and possible responses of other countries."

"Henry Wriston, Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations, (1929,
1967).

" Tbid., pp. 693, et. seq.

^* The first such specially-appointed individual was Governeur Morris, sent by
President Washinst<^n in 1789 as a "private ag:ent" to Britain to explore the
possibilities for openins: normal diplomatic relations. Morris was appointed in
October 1789 because Washington's Secretary of State, .Jefferson, was not yet
functio'iing. The mission was not I'eported to the Cnneress nntii Fehninrv ]79l.
He'iry Wriston. "The Special Envoy," Foreign Affairs, 38 (1960), pp. 219, 220)

""Wriston. Extent ire Agents in American Foreinn Relations, p. 7.39.

"^ Marshall spoke, not as Chief Justice in an opinion of the Supreme Court,
but rather in a statement to the House of Representatives. The House of Reii-
resentatives was engaged in a debate as fo whether a dem-^nd bv the Briti';h
Government for the extradition of one Robbins was a matter for the courts
or for the President, acting unon an extradition treaty. Marshnll argued that
the case Involved "a national demand made upon the nation.'' Sinf^e the Presi-
dent is the "sole organ of the nation in its external relations " Mnrslmll snid.
"of consenuf^noe, the demand en only be made upon him." [10 Annals of Con-
gress 613 (1800), reprinted in 5 Wheat, Appendix, Note 1, at 26 (U.S. 1820).]

that the characteristics of the Presidency — unity, secrecy, decision,
dispatch — were especially suited to the conduct of diplomacy,^- As a
consequence, historical development saw the President take charge of
the daily conduct of foreign affairs, including the formulation of much
of the nation's for-eign policy. But "sole organ" as to communications
with foreign governments and historical practice did not amount to
"sole disposal" in a constitutional sense over foreign affaire; as Hamil-
ton declared, the Constitution did not grant that degree of power to
the President in foreign affairs.-"* Moreover, Marshall's reference to
the President as "sole organ" did not purport to mean that the Presi-
dent w^as not subject to congressional regulation, should Congress
wish to act. For Marshall, in addition to speaking of the President as
"sole organ," went on to point out that "Congress, unquestionably, may
prescribe the mode" by which such power to act was to be exercised.-*
Congress, with its own constitutional powers in foreign affairs, its
power over the purse, and under the authority contained in the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, had the option of regulating the practice of
using executive agents on foreign intelligence missions, as well as the
conduct of foreign intelligence activity by other means.-^

2. The Use of Force in Covert Action

Covert action may include the use of armed force. In modern times,
the President's authorization of the CIA-financed and directed in-
vasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs and paramilitary operations in
Laos are examples of this type of covert action.

^^ Nor did Marshall intend to say that "sole organ" meant the power of "sole
disposal." As the eminent constitutional expert Edward S. Corwin wrote,
"Clearly, what Marshall had foremost in mind was simply the President's role
as instrument of communication with other governments." (Edward S. Corwin,
The President's Control of Foreign Relations, p. 216.)

^ The Federalist, No. 75 (A. Hamilton).

'* Citing Marshall's expression, the Supreme Court has recognized the Presi-
dent as "sole organ" of communication and negotiation in foreign affairs. [United
States V. Curtiss-W right Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1952).] Although dicta of
.Justice Sutherland in the Curtiss-W right opinion put forward a broad view of
"inherent'' Presidential power in foreign affairs, the case and the holding of
the court involved, as .Justice .Jackson stated in his opinion in the Steel Seizure
case, "not the question of the President's power to act without congressional au-
thority, but the question of his right to act under and in accord with an Act
of Congress." [YonngHoiim Steel d Tube Co. v. Saicyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-636
( 1952 ) ( consurring opinion ) . ]

In Curtiss-W right a joint resolution of Congress had authorized the Presi-
dent to embargo weapons to countries at war in the Chaco, and imposed criminal
sanctions for any violation. After President Franklin D. Roosevelt proclaimed
an embargo, the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, indicted for violating the embargo,
challenged the congressional resolution and the President's proclamation,
claiming Congress had made an improper delegation of legislative power to
the President. Speaking for six justices, .Justice Sutherland sustained the in-
dictment, holding only, as .Ju.stice .Jackson later noted, "that the strict limita-
tion upon Congressional delegations of power to the President over internal
affairs does not apply with respect to delegations of power in external affairs."
(343 U.S. at 636.)

^ In 1798. for example, Congress established a procedure for the financing of
secret foreign affairs operations. It enacted a statute providing for expenses of
"intercourse or treaty" with foreign nations. The Act required the President to
report all such expenditures, but granted him the power to give a certificate in
lieu of a report for those payments the President deemed should be kept secret
(Act of February 9, 1973, 1 Stat. 300.

The executive branch relies in lar^e part on the President's own
constitutional powers for authority to conduct such covert action.-*^
After the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation in 1961, the CIA asked
the Justice Department for an analysis of the legal authority for
covert actions. In its response, the Justice Department's Office of
Legislative Council stated :

It woidd appear that the executive branch, under the direction
of the President, has been exercising without express statutory
authorization a function which is within the constitutional
jjowers of the President, and that the CIA was the agent
selected by the President to carry out these functions.^^

The Justice Department memorandum jiointed to the President's
foreign relations power and his responsibility for national security.-^
Ai'guing by analogy from the President's power as Commander-in-
Chief to conduct a declared war, the memorandum contended that
the President could conduct jieacetime covert actions involving armed
force without authority from Congress. The memorandum argued
that there was no limit to the means the President might employ in
exercising his foreign affairs i^ower :

Just as "the power to wage war is the power to wage war
successfully," so the power of the President to conduct foreign
relations should be deemed to be the power to conduct foreign
relations successfully, hy any means necessary to combat the
measures taken by the Communist bloc, including both open
and covert measures.'^ [Emphasis added.]

In view of the Constitution's grant of concurrent jurisdiction to the
Congress in foreigTi affairs and Congress' exclusive constitutional au-
thority to declare war. there is little to support such an extravagant
claim of Presidential power in peacetime. The case which prompted
the Justice Department's argument — the invasion of Cuba at the Bay

-"In September 19-17, the CIA General Counsel expressed the opinion that activ-
ity such as "black propaganda, ranger and commando raids, behind-the-llnes sabo-
tage, and support of guerrilla warfare" Avould constitute "an unwarranted ex-
tension of the functions authorized" by the 19-^7 Act. (Memorandum from the
CIA General Counsel to Director, 9/25/-17.) And. in 1969. the CIA General Coun-
sel wrote that the 1947 Act provided "rather doubtful statutory authority" for
at least those covert actions — such as paramilitary operations — which were not
related to intelligence gathering. (Memorandum from CIA General Counsel to
Director, 10/30/69.) Tlie Agency's General Counsel took the position that the
authority for covert action rested on the President's delegation of his own con-
stitutional authority to CIA through various National Security Council Direc-
tives. (Ibid.)

"• Memorandum, Office of Legislative Counsel, Department of Justice, 1/17/62,
p. 11.

"^ Ihi(J., p. 7. The memorandum stated :

"Under modern conditions of 'cold war,' the President can properly regard the
conduct of covert activities ... as necessary to the effective and successful con-
duct of foreign relations and the protection of the national security. When the
Ignited States is attacked from without or within, the President may 'meet force
with force" ... In wagering a worldwide contest to strengthen the free nations and
contnin the Communist nations, and thereby to preserve the existence of the
I'nited States, the President should be deemed to have comparable authority to
meet covert activities with covert activities if he deems such action necessary
and consistent with our national objectives."

^'^ Ibid.

of Pigs — illustrates the serious constitutional questions which arise. In
that operation, the President in effect authorized the CIA to secretly
direct and finance the military invasion of a foreign coinitry. This
action approaclied, and may have constituted, an act of war. At the
least, it seriously risked placing the United States in a state of war
vis-d-vis Cuba on the sole authority of the President. Absent the threat
of sudden attack or a grave and immediate threat to the security of
the country, only Congress, under the Constitution, has such authority.
As James Madison declared. Congress' power to declare war includes
the "power of judging the causes of war." ^^ Madison wrote:

Every just view that can be taken of the subject admonishes
the public of the necessity of a rigid adherence to the simple,
the received, and tlie fundamental doctrine of the constitution,
that the power to declare war, including the power of judging
the causes of war, is fullj^ and exclusively vested in the legis-
lature. . . ."31

This view was also affirmed by Hamilton who, although a principal
exponent of expansive Presidential power, wrote that it is the

exclusive province of Congress, when the nation is at peace, to
change that state into a state of war ... it belongs to Congress
only, to go to war.^^

Nor is there much support in historical practice prior to 1950 for the
use of ai'med force to achieve foreign policy objectives on the sole
authority of the President. The 1962 Justice Department memorandum
argued that the practice of Presidents in using force to protect Ameri-
can citizens and pi'operty abroad was authority for covert action
involving armed force. ^^ Before the post -World War II era, Presidents
on occasion asserted their own authority to use armed force short of
war, but as the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations noted in 19Y3,
these operations were for "limited, minor, or essentially non-political
purposes." As the Foreign Eelations Committee stated :

During the course of the nineteenth century it became ac-
cepted practice, if not strict constitutional doctrine, for Presi-
dents acting on their own authority to use the armed forces
for such limited purposes as the suppression of piracy and the
slave trade, for "hot pursuit" of criminals across borders, and
for the protection of American lives and property in places
abroad where local govei-nment was not functioning effec-
tively. An informal, operative distinction came to be accepted
between the use of the armed forces for limited, minor or
essentially nonpolitical purposes and the use of the armed
forces for "acts of war" in the sense of large-scale military
operations against sovereign states.^*

That these operations were, as the Committee on Foreign Relations
noted, for "limited, minor, or essentially non-political purposes" is also

""Letters of Helvidius (1793), Madison, Writinffs, Vol. 6, p. 174 (Hunt ed.).

'' It)i(I.

'^Hamilton, Works, Vol. 8, pp. 2-^9-250 (Lodge ed.)

'^ Ju.stice Department Memorandum, 1/17/62, p. 2.

'* Senate Report No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) .

affirmed by the eminent authority on constitutional law, Edward Cor-
win. Prior to the Korean AYar, the "vast majority" of such cases,
Corwin wrote, "involved fig^hts with pirates, landin<is of small naval
contino;ents on barbarous coasts [to protect American citizens], the
dispatch of small bodies of troops to chase bandits or cattle rustlers
across the ]\Iexican border." ^^

To stretch the President's foreign relations power so far as to au-
thorize the secret use of armed force against foreign states without
congressional autliorization or at least "advice and consent," appears
to go well beyond the proper scoi)e of the Executive's power in foreign
affaii's under the Constitution. Moreover, where Congress is not in-
formed prior to the initiation of such armed covert action — as it was
not, for example, in the Bay of Pigs operation — the constitutional sys-
tem of checks and balances can be frustrated. Without prior notice,
thei'e can be no effective check on the action of the executive branch.
Once covert actions involving armed force, such as the invasion of
Cuba at the Bay of Pigs or paramilitary operations, are begun, it may
be difficult if not impossible for practical reasons to stop them. In
such circumstances, covert action involving armed intervention in the
affairs of foreign states may be inconsistent with our constitutional
system and its principle of checks and balances.

C. The CoxsTrruTioxAL Power or Congress To Regulate the
CoxDUCT OF Foreign Ixtelligence Activity

Prior to the 1047 National Security Act, Congress did not seek to
ex])ressly authorize or regulate foreign intelligence activity by statute.

Congress' decision not to act, however, did not reduce or eliminate its
constitutional power to do so in the future. The Necessary and Proper
Clause and its power to "make rules for the government and regula-
tion" of the armed forces, along with Congress' general powers in
the fields of foreign affairs and national defense, were always available.

In this light, the question of the legal authority for the conduct of
foreign intelligence activity in the absence of express statutory au-
thorization can be viewed in the manner set forth by Justice Jackson
in the Steel Seizure case. He wrote :

When the President acts in abpence of either a congressional
grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which
he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which
its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia,
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a prac-
tical mattei", enable, if not invite, measures on independent
Presidential responsibility.^*^

Foreign intelligence activity, particularly political covert action not
involving the use of force, can be seen as Iving in such a "zone of twi-
light" in which both the Pres'dcnt and the Congress have concurrent
authority and responsibilities. (As discussed above, the use of covert

■^ Edward S. Corwin, "The President's Power," in Haight and Johnson, eds.
Thr Pre Slid cut's Role and Pmccm, (19fi5), p. 361.

"" Yotmgstnn-n Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (concurring opinion).

action involving armed force raises serious constitutional problems
where it is not authorized by statute, particularly if Congress is not
informed.) When Congress does not act, the President may in certain
circumstances exercise authority on the basis of his own constitutional
powers.

Congress can, however, choose to exercise its legislative authority
to regulate the exercise of that authority. In view of the President's
own constitutional powers, Congress may not deprive the President of
the function of foreign intelligence. But, as Chief Justice Marshall
stated. Congress can "prescribe the mode" by which the President car-
ries out that function. And the Congress may apply certain limits or
controls upon the President's discretion.

The Supreme Court has affirmed this constitutional power of Con-
gress. In Little v. Barreme,^'' Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the
Court, found the seizure by the U.S. Navy of a ship departing a French
port to be unlawful, even though the Nai^ acted pursuant to Presiden-
tial order. By prior statute. Congress had authorized the seizure of
ships by the Navy, but limited the types of seizures that could be
made. The President's orders to the Navy disregarded the limits set
out in the law. If Congress had been silent. Chief Justice Marshall
stated, the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief might have
been sufficient to permit the seizure. But, ISIarshall declai-ed, once Con-
gress had "prescribed . . . the manner in which this law shall lie carried
into execution," the President was bound to respect the limitations
imposed by Congress.^*

There have been at least as many conceptions of the range of the
President's own power as there have been holders of the office of the
President. In the case of foreign intelligence activity. Justice Jack-
son's statement that "comprehensive and undefined Presidential pow-
ers hold both practical advantages and grave dangers for the coun-
try" 39 is particularly i-elevant, especiallv in view of the tension be-
tween the need for secrecy and the constitutional principle of checks
and balances. Yet. as Justice Brandeis declared, "checks and balances
were established in order that this should be a government of laws and
not of men." •*°

The 1947 National Securitv Act represented the exercise of Congress'
constitutional power to order the conduct of foreign intelligence ac-
tivity under law. By placing the autliority for foreign intelligence
activity on a statutory base, Conq-ress soujrht to I'educe the reliance on
"comprehensive and undefined" Presidential power that had pre-
viously been the principal source of authority. However, tlie language
of the 1947 Act did not expresslv authorize the conduct of covert ac-
tion and, as discussed earlier. Congress apparently did not intend
to grant such authority. As a result, inherent Presidential DOwer has
continued to serve as the principal source of authority for covert
action.

Congress continued to exercise this constitutional power in sub-
sequent legislation. In the Central Intelligence Act of 1949,^^ Congress

^2Cranchl70 (1805).

=^2 Cranch 170. 178 (1805).

^^ Yottngfitown Co. v. Sau-yct\ 3^3 U.S. 579. 634 (1952) (concurring opinion).

^''Mijcrs V. United States. 272 U.S. 52, 292 (1926) (dissenting opinion).

"50U.S.C.403a-403j.

set out the administrative procedures governing CIA activities. The
1949 Act regulated the CIA's acquisition of material, the hiring of per-
sonnel and its accounting for funds expended.

In 1974, Congress imposed a reporting requirement for the conduct
of certain foreign intelligence activities. In an amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Act,*^ Congress provided that no funds may be
expended by or on behalf of the CIA for operations abroad "other
than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence"
unless two conditions were met : a) the President must make a finding
that "each such operation is important to the national security of the
United States", and b) the President must report "in a timely fashion"
a description of such operation and its scope to congressional
committees.*^

In short, the Constitution provides for a system of checks and bal-
ances and interdependent power as between the Congress and the ex-
ecutive branch with resj^ect to foreign intelligence activity. Congress,
with its responsibility for the purse and as the holder of the legisla-
tive power, has the constitutional authority to regulate the conduct
of foreign intelligence activity.

*^22U.S.C. 2422.

" Ibid.

IV. THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

Intelligence has been the province of the President. It has informed
his decisions and furthered his purposes. Intelligence information has
been seen as largely belonging to the President, as being his to classify
or declassify, his to withhold or share. The instruments of U.S. intel-
ligence have been the Presidents' to use and sometimes to abuse.

The President is the only elected official in the chain of command
over the United States intelligence community. It is to him the Con-
stitution and the Congress have granted authority to carry out intelli-
gence activities. It is the President who is ultimately accountable to
the Congress and the American people.

The Committee focused its investigation on the instruments avail-
able to the President to control, direct, and supervise the U.S. intelli-
gence community. As the result of controversy as to whether the intel-
ligence community has been "out of control," Senate Resolution 21
directed the Committee to determine the "nature and extent of execu-
tive branch oversight of all United States intelligence activities."

This involves three Presidential instrumentalities : ^

— The National Security Council ;

— The Office of Management and Budget ;

— The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

The Committee sought to establish whether these mechanisms, as
they have evolved, provide effective control over the entire range of
U.S. intelligence activities. Particular attention was given to the sub-
ject of covert action, in part because it has been a major object of
presidential-level review. In addition, the Committee considered
the adequacy of high-level supervision of espionage, counterintelli-
gence, and the overall management of the U.S. intelligence community.
For the first time in the history of congressional oversight, the Com-
mittee had access to records of the proceedings of the National Secu-
rity Council and its subcommittees. It reviewed the NSC directives
related to intellierence and the files of other agencies' participation in
the NSC's intelligence-related activities. The Committee conducted
extensive interviews with current and former White House, NSC, and
cabinet-level officials dealing with intellip-ence matters. It took sworn
testimony on these is<^ues from a number of them, including the present
Secretary of State. Officials of the Office of Management and Budget
and former members and staff of the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board were also interviewed.

This report presents the results of that investigation and the Com-
mittee's findings with respect to the central question of Presidential
accountability and control of the foreign intelligence activities of the
Ignited States Government.

^ A fourth instrumentality has been established as a result of President Ford's
February 17, ]{>76, reorsranization of the foreisrn intelligence community. Execu-
tive Order 11905 created the Intelligence Oversight Board.

(41)

A. The National Security Council

1. Overview

The National Security Council was created by the National Security
Act of 1947. According to the Act, the NSC is "to advise the President
with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military poli-
cies relating to national security" and "assess and appraise the objec-
tives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our
actual and potential military power." Over the years, the principal
functions of the NSC have been in the field of policy formulation and
the coordination and monitoring of overseas operations. Among its
responsibilities, the NSC has provided policy guidance and direction
for United States intelligence activities.

The National Security Council is an extremely flexible instrument.
It has only four statutory members : the President, the Vice President,
and the Secretaries of State and Defense. At the discretion of the
President, others may be added to the list of attendees ; NSC subcom-
mittees may be created or abolished, and the NSC staff given great
power or allowed to wither.

Thus, the operation of the NSC has reflected the personal style of
each President. The Council's role and responsibilities have varied ac-
cording to personalities, changing policies and special circumstances.
Presidents Truman, Kennedy and Johnson found a loose and informal
NSC structure to their liking. Others have set up more formal and
elaborate structures— President Eisenhower's NSC system is the best
example.^ At times, particularly during crises. Presidents have by-
passed the formal NSC mechanisms. President Kennedy set up an
Executive Committee (EXCOM) to deal with the Cuban Missile
Crisis; President Johnson had his Tuesday Lunch group to discuss
Viet Nam and other high level concerns. As a result, over the years the
NSC has undergone major changes, from the elaborate Planning
Board/Operations Coordination Board structure under Eisenhower to
its dismantlement by Kennedy and the creation of a centralized system
of NSC subcommittees under President Nixon and his Assistant
for National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger.

Today, in addition to the four statutory members, the National
Security Council is attended by the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as advisers.
From time to time, others, such as the Director of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, also attend.

Prior to President Ford's reorganization, the NSC was served by
seven principal committees: the Senior Review Group, the Under
Secretary's Committee, the Verification Panel, the Washington Spe-
cial Actions Group (WSAG), the Defense Program Eeview Commit-
tee, the 40 Committee, and the National Security Council Intelligence

^ For a full treatment of the evolu«^inn of the National Secnrity Council and its
place within the national security decisionmnking process, see Keith C'ark and
Laurence Legere. Tlie President and the Management of National Security
(1969) ; Stanley Falk and Theodore Bauer, National Serurity Managemeyit: The
NationM Security Structure (1972) ; and Inquiries of the Subcommittee on Na-
tional Policy Machinery for the Senate Committee on Government Operations,
Organizing for National Security (1961) .

Committee (NSCIC).^ The latter two committees had direct intelli-
gence responsibilities. The 40 Committee has now been replaced by the
Operations Advisory Group. No successor for NSCIC has been des-
ignated. The current NSC structure is shown below.

iMATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
• President •Vice President • Secretary of State • Secretary of Defense

• Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff • Director of Centrallntelligence

White Hous
Situation Ro(

Asst. to Pres, for Nat'l
Sec. Affairs

UNDER SECRETARIES
COMMITTEE

• n.'i

■i-r. „! Sut» ICh,..„l 1

• Asil ■■! Pr-,-, toi rjol 1
SfC Aff.i,rs

• Dm

S-.-C o( D.:f0Mit.

•Clij

-n:jn. JCS

•DCI

SENIOR REVIEW GROUP

• Asst to Prt?s for Ndt'l

Sue Atlairs IChn.nl

• Di'p Sue ol Stdle

• DupSucof Dofu.i'.D

• Clij.rmj... JCS
•DCI

■As;

to Pios fill Njl
Ch.i.

StfC Afto,
• Dep Sec of Sute
■ Dep Sec ol Defen
•Choirman. JCS

• Oh,

Coon
Econ Advisor

■ Director, 0MB
•DCI

;c of 0,-lrn

VERIFICATION PANEL

Sec Alljits ICh

• Dep Sec of Sl.ile

• Dep Sec ol Oe(.„s

WASHINGTON SPECIAL
ACTIONS GROUP

Pros for N.l
Alljirs (Chn

: of Sljle

:ol Defenst

dM. JCS

Sec AlljMs
• Sec of Stale

: of Defense
■DCI

.rmor.. JCS
3>ncv Geoer,

obser>

• Director, OMQ

Each of the current NSC subcommittees are "consumers" of the
intelligence community product. The DCI sits on all of them. In most
cases, the DCI briefs the subcommittees and the full NSC before
agenda items are considered. CIA representatives sit on working and
ad hoc groups of the various subcommittees. The CIA's Area Division
Chiefs are the Agency's representatives on the NSC Interdepartmental
Groups (IGs).* In all of these meetings there is a constant give and
take. Policymakers are briefed on current intelligence and they, in
turn, levy intelligence priorities on the CIA's representatives.

^The Senior Review Group, under the direction of the President's As-
sistant for National Security Affairs defines NSC issues; determines whether
alternatives, costs, and consequences have been fully considered ; and forwards
recommendations to the full Council and/or the President. The Under Secretaries
Committee seeks to ensure effective implementation of NSC decisions. The Veri-
fication Panel monitors arms control agreements and advises on SALT and
MBFR negotiations. WASG coordinates activities during times of crises, such as
the Middle East and Southeast Asia. The Defense Program Review Committee,
now nearly defunct, assesses the political, military and economic implications of
defense policies and programs.

*NSC Interdepartmental Groups (IGs) are made up of representatives from
State, Defense, CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council.
IGs are chaired by the State representative, an Assistant Secretary, aed they
prepare working papers for the Senior Review Group.

£: The NSO and Intelligence

The 1947 National Security Act established the CIA as well as the
NSC. The Act provided that the CIA was "established under the
National Security Council" and was to carry out its prescribed func-
tions "under the direction of the National Security Council." Five
broad functions were assi^ed to the CIA :

(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters
concerning such intelligence activities of the Government de-
partments and agencies as relate to national security.

(2) to make recommiendations to the National Security
Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of
the departments and agencies of the Government as relate
to the national security ;

(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the
national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemina-
tion of such intelligence within the Government using where
appropriate existing agencies and facilities.

(4) to perform., for the benefit of the existing intelligence
agencies, such additional services of coTnmon concern as the
National Security Council determines can be more efficiently
accomplished centrally.

(5) to perfoTTYh such other functions and duties related to
intelligence affecting the national security as the National
Security Council may from time to time direct.

The Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for seeing that
these functions are performed, and is to serve as the President's
principal foreign intelligence officer.

The NSC sets overall policy for the intelligence community. It does
not, however, involve itself in day-to-day management activities. The
task of coordinating intelligence community activities has been dele-
gated to the DCI, who, until President Ford's reorganization, sought
to accomplish it through the United States Intelligence Board
(USIB). USIB was served by 15 inter-agency committees and a vari-
ety of ad hoc groups. It provided guidance to the intelligence commu-
nity on requirements and priorities, coordinated community activities
and issued, through the DCI, National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) .
The DCI was also assisted by the Intelligence Resources Advisory
Committee (IRAC). IRAC assisted the DCI in the preparation of
a consolidated intelligence budget and sought to assure that intelligence
resources were being used efficiently.

As a result of President Ford's Executive Order, management of the
intelligence community will now be vested in the Committee on Foreign
Intelligence (CFI). USIB and IRAC are abolished. Membership on
the new committee will include the DCI, as Chairman, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs. Staff support will
be provided bv the DCI's Intelligence Community (IC) staff. The new
committee will reDoi-t directly to the NSC.

The CFI will have far-ranging responsibilities. It will oversea the
budget and resources, as well as establish management policies, for the
CIA, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency,

and United States reconnaissance programs. Further, it will establish
policy priorities for the collection and production of national intel-
ligence. The DCI will be responsible for producing national intelli-
gence, including NIEs. To assist him in this task, the DCI will set up
whatever boards and committees (similar to the now defunct USIB)
are necessary.

The President's Executive Order also directed the NSC to review,
on a semi-annual basis, certain foreign intelligence activities. Prepared
by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, these re-
views will focus on the quality, scope and timeliness of the intelligence
product; the responsiveness of the intelligence community to policy-
makers' needs; the allocation of intelligence collection resources; and
the continued appropriateness of ongoing covert operations and sensi-
tive intelligence collection missions.

One of the functions the NSC has assigned to the CIA is the con-
duct of foreign covert operations. These operations began in 1948 and
have continued to the present, uninterinipted. Authority to conduct
covert operations has usually been ascribed to the "such other functions
and duties" provision of the 1947 Act.^

The NSC uses National Security Council Intelligence Directives
(NSCIDs) to set policy for the CIA and the intelligence community.
NSCIDs are broad delegations of responsibility, issued under the au-
thority of the 1947 Act.' They may assign duties not explicitly stated
in the 1947 Act to the CIA or other intelligence departments or agen-
cies. NSCIDs, souietimes referred to by critics as the intelligence com-
munity's "secret charter," are executive directives and, therefore, not
subject to congfressional review. ITntil recently, Congress has not seen
the various NSCIDs issued by the NSC.

S. Overvieio: Jfi Committee and NSC 10

Prior to President Ford's reorganization, two NSC committees, the
40 Committee and the National Securitv Council Intelligence Com-
mittee, had special intelligence duties. Their functions and respon-
sibilities will be discussed in turn.

Throughout its history, the 40 Committee and its direct predeces-
sors—the 303 Committee, the 5412 or Special Group, the 10/5 and 10/2
Panels — have been charged by various NSC directives with exercising
political control over foreign covert operations.'^ Now this task will
be the responsibility of the Operations Advisory Group. The Com-
mittees have considered the objectives of any proposed activity,

^ Three iwssible legal bases for covert operations are most often cited : the
National Security Act of 1947, the "inherent powers" of the President in foreign
affairs and as Commander-in-Chief, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974. Con-
gressional acquiescence and ratification through the appropriations process is a
fourth possibility. See Aopendix I of this report for a full discussion.

' For example, NSCIDs are used to spell out the duties and responsibilities of
the DCI, the coordination of covert intelligence collectir>n activities, and the pro-
duction and dissemination of the intelligence commiinity product.

' Covert operations encompass a wide ransre of programs. These include politi-
cal and propaganda programs designed to influence or support foreign political
parties, groups, and specific political and military leaders ; economic action pro-
grams ; paramilitary operations ; and some coimterinsurgency programs. Human
intelligence collection, or spying, and counterespionage programs are not included
under the rubric of covert operations.

whether the activity Avould accomplish those aims, how likely it would
be to succeed, and in general whether the activity would be in the
American interest. In addition, the Committees have attempted to
insure that covert operations were framed in such a way that they
later could be "disavowed" or "plausibly denied" by the United States
Government. President Ford's Executive Order included the con-
cept of "plausible denial." Using the euphemism "special activities"
to describe covert operations, the Order stated :

Special activities in support of national foreign policy ob-
jectives [are those] activities . . . designed to further of-
ficial United States programs and policies abroad which
are planned and executed so that the role of the United States
Government is not apparent or publicly acknowledged.^'^

The concept of "plausible denial" is intended not only to hide the
hand of the United States Government, but to protect the President
from the embarrassment of a "blown" covert operation. In the words
of former CIA Director Richard Helms :

. . . [the] Special Group was the mechanism . . . set up . . .
to use as a circuit-breaker so that these things did not ex-
plode in the President's face and so that he was not held re-
sponsible for them.^''
In the past, it appears that one means of protecting the President
from embarrassment was not to tell him about certain covert opera-
tions, at least formally. According to Bromley Smith, an official who
served on the National Security Council staff from 1958 to 1969, the
concept of "plausible denial" was taken in an almost literal sense:
"The government was authorized to do certain things that the Presi-
dent was not advised of." ""^ According to Secretary of State Kissinger,
however, this practice was not followed during the Nixon Administra-
tion and he doubted it ever was. In an exchange with a member of
the House Select Committee on Intelligence, Secretary Kissinger
stated :

Mr. Kasten". Mr. Secretary, you said that the President
personally, directly approved all of the covert operations dur-
ing that period of time [1972 to 1974] and, in your knowl-
edge, during all periods of time. Is that correct ?

Secretary Kissinger. I can say with certainty during the
period of time that I have been in Washington and to my al-
most certain knowledge at every period of time, yes.^

Four senior officials who deal almost exclusively with foreign affairs
have been central to each of the sequence of committees charged w^ith
considering covert operations: The President's Assistant for National
Security Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secre-
tary of State for Political Affairs (formerly the Deputy Under Secre-
tary), and the Director of Central In'tellijxence. These four officials,
plus the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made up the 40 Com-

^^ Executive Order No. 11905, 2/18/76.
^'' Richard Helms testimony. 6/13/75, pp. 28-29.
""" Staff summary of Bromley Smith interview, .5/5/75.

* Henry Kissinger testimony, House Select Committee on Intelligence, Hear-
ings, 10/31/75, p. 3341.

mittee. At certain times the Attorney General also sait on the Commit-
tee. President Ford's reor^^fanization Avill si^nificantlv alter this mem-
bership. The new Opei-ations AdA^isoiy Gronp will consist of the
President's Assisifant for National Secni-itv Affairs, the Secretaries of
State and Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and the DCI. The
Attorney General and the Director of OMB will attend meetings as
observei-s. Tlie Chaii-man of tlie Group will be desifjnated by the
President. Staff supj)orl: will be provided by the NSC staff.

The formal composition of the Operations Gronp breaks with
tradition. The Secretai-ies of State and Defense will now be pait of
the approval process for covert opera^^ions, rather than the Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs and Deputy Secretary of
Defense. The Operations Advisory Group appears to be, therefore, an
up-(^raded 40 Committee. Whether this proves to be the case remains to
be seen. Presidenit Ford's Executive Order contained a provision,
Section 3(c) (3), wliich allows (rroup members to send a "designated
representative" to meetings in "unusual circumstances."

The National Security Council Intelligence Committee (NSCIC)
was established in November 1971 as pait of a far-reaching reorgani-
zation of the intelligence community ordered by President Nixon.^
The Presidential directive stated :

The Committee will give direction and guidance on national
intelligence needs and piT>vide for a continuing evaluation of
intelligence products from the viewpoint of the intelligence
user.

One reason cited for creating NSCIC was a desire to make the
intelligence community more i-esponsive to the needs of policy makers.
According to a news report at the time :

"The President and Henry [Kissinger] have felt that the
intelligence we were collectinji- wasn't alwavs responsive to
their needs," said one source. "They suspected that one reason
was because the intelligence community had no way of know-
ing day to day what the President and Kissinger needed.
This is a new link Ix^tween producers and consumers. We'll
have to wait and see if it works." ^°

Prior to NSCIC no formal structure existed for addressing the
major questions concerning intelligence priorities rather than specific
operations: Do "producers" in the intelligence community perform
analyses which are useful to "consumers" — the policymakers at var-
ious levels of government; are intelligence resources allocated wisely

® For over a year, the intelligence community had been under study by the
Office of Management and Budget, then headed by Tames Schlesinger. In addi-
tion to NSCIC. the President's reorganization included an enhanced leadership
role for the DCI, the establishment of a Net Assessment Group within the
NSC staff, the creation of an Intellisrence Resources Advisory Committee
(IRAC), and a reconstitution of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).
The Net Assessment Group was headed by a senior NSC staff member and was
responsible for reviewing and evaluating all intelligence products and for
producing net assessments. When .Tames STchlesinger was na'med Secretary of
Defense in Tune. 1973. the NSC Net Assessment Group was abolished. Its staff
member joined Schlesinger at the Defense Department and set up a similar office.

^'"Helms Told to Cut Global Expenses," New York Times, 11/7/71, p. 55.

among agencies and types of collection ? NSCIC was a structural re-
sponse to these issues as well as part of the general tendency at that
time to centralize a greater measure of control in the White House for
national security affairs.

NSCIC's mission was to give direction and policy guidance to the
intelligence community. It was not, and was not intended to be, a chan-
nel for transmitting substantive intelligence from the intelligence
community to policymakers nor for levying specific requirements in
the opposite direction. Neither was NSCIC involved in the process of
allocating intelligence resources. Its membership included the Assist-
ant to the President for National Security Affairs, who chaired the
Committee, the DCI, the Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense,
the Chairman of the JCS, and the Under Secretary of the Treasury
for Monetaiy Affairs.

NSCIC was abolished by Executive Order 11905. No successor body
was created. The task of providing policy guidance and direction to
the intelligence community now falls to the Committee on Foreign
Intelligence. According to the President's Executive Order, the CFI
will "establish policy priorities for the collection and production of
national intelligence." In addition, the full NSC is now required to
conduct policy reviews twice a year on the quality, scope and timeliness
of intelligence and on the responsiveness of the intelligence commu-
nity to the needs of policymakers.

B. Authorization and Control or Covert AcrnvrnES

1. The NSC and Covert Activities: History

President Ford's Operations Advisory Group is the most recent in a
long line of executive committees set up to oversee CIA covert activi-
ties. These committees and CIA covert activities can be traced back to
NSC-4-A, a National Security Council directive issued in December
1947.

In 1947 the United States was engaged in a new struggle, the Cold
War. To resist Communist-backed civil war in Greece, the Truman
Doctrine was proclaimed. The Marshall Plan was about to begin.
Within three years China would "fall," the Korean War would begin,
and the Soviet Union would acquire an atomic capability. The Cold
War was being fought on two fronts — one overt, the other covert.
The Soviet clandestine services, then known as the NKVD (now the
KGB), were engaged in espionage and subvereive activities through-
out the world. France and Italy were beleaguered by a wave of Com-
munist-inspired strikes. In Februai-y 1948, the Communists staged a
successful coup in Czechoslovakia. The Philippines government was
under attack by the Hukbalahaps, a Communist-led guerrilla group.
In that climate, and in response to it, a broad range of United States
covert activities were begun. They were intended to supplement not
replace, overt U.S. activities, such as the Marshall Plan.

In December 1947, the Department of State advised the National
Security Council that covert operations mounted by the Soviet Union
threatened the defeat of American objectives and recommended that
the United States supplement its own overt foreign policy activities
with covert operations. At the Council's first meeting, 021 December 19,
1947, it approved NSC-4, entitled "Coordination of Foreign Intelli-

gence Information Measures." This directive empowered the Secretary
of State to coordinate overseas information activities designed to
counter communism. A top secret annex to NSC-4 — NSC-4-A — in-
structed the Director of Central Intelligence to undertake covert psy-
chological activities in pursuit of the aims set forth in NSC-4. The
initial authority given the CIA for covert operations under NSC-4-A
did not establish formal procedures for either coordinating or approv-
ing these operations. It simply directed the DCI to undertake covert
action and to ensure, through liaison with State and Defense, that
the resulting operations were consistent with American policy. In
1948, an independent CIA office — the Office of Policy Coordination
(OPC) — was established to carry out the covert mission assigned by
the NSC. NSC-4— A was the President's first formal authorization
for covert operations in the postwar period," and it was used to un-
dertake covert attempts to influence the outcome of the 1948 Italian
national elections.

Over the next seven years, from June 1948 to March 1955, a series
of National Security Council directives was issued. Each was ad-
dressed, in part, to the review and control of CIA covert activities.
NSC 10/2 superseded NS'C-4-A on June 18, 1948, and a "10/2 Panel,"
the first predecessor of today's Operations Advisory Group, was es-
tablished. The panel was to review, but not approve, covert action
proposals. The 1948 directive was superseded by NSC 10/5 on Octo-
ber 23, 1951. This directive authorized an expansion of world-wide
covert operations ^^ and altered policy coordination procedures.^^

Throughout this period, NSC directives provided for consultation
with representatives of State and Defense, but these representatives
had no approval function. There was no formal procedure or com-
mittee to consider and approve projects. Nor was a representative of
the President consulted. From 1949 to 1952, the DCI approved CIA
covert action projects on his own authority;" from 1953 to March
1955 the DCI coordinated project approvals with the Psychological

" Covert operations were carried out by the OflBce of Strategic Services (OSS)
during the Second World War. OSS was disbanded on October 1, 1945. Three
months later, on January 22, 1946, President Truman issued an Executive Order
creating the Central Intelligence Group (CIG). CIG was the direct predecessor
of the CIA. It operated under an executive council, the National Intelligence
Agency (NIA). Although a psychological warfare capability existed within
CIG, it did not engage in any covert operations during its existence. CIG and
NIA were dissolved with the passage of the 1947 National Security Act.

^^ Prior to this time CIA covert operations were largely confined to psycho-
logical warfare, and almost all were media-related. These activities included the
use of false publications, "black" radio, and subsidies to publications. With the
issuance of NSC 10/2, three other categories of covert actixity were added to
the psychological warfare mission : political warfare, economic warfare and
preventive direct action (e.g., support for guerrillas, sabotage and front
organizations ) .

"At this same time, the OflSce of Policy Coordination (OPC) was merged
with the CIA's OflBce of Special Operations which was responsible for espionage.
The CIA's Clandestine Service was now in place.

" The DCI did, however, undertake external coordination of covert action
programs. Under NSC 10/2, the executive coordination group — the 10/2 Panel —
met regularly with the CIA's Assistant Director for Policy Coordination to plan
and review covert action programs. This procedure continued under the 10/5
Panel.

Strategy Board or the Operations Coordination Board.^^ Certain
covert activities were brought to the President's attention at the DCI's
initiative.

By the mid-1950s covert action operations were no longer an ad hoc
response to specific threats. They had become an institutional part of
the "protracted conflict" with the Soviet Union and Communism. In
September 1954, a Top Secret report on CIA covert activities, prepared
in connection with the second Hoover Commission, was submitted to
President Eisenhower. The introduction to that report is enlightening
for what it said about how covert operations were viewed at that time,
as well as the rationale for them.

As long as it remains national policy, another important
requirement is an aggressive covert psychological, political
and paramilitary organization more effective, more unique,
and if necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the
enemy. No one should be permitted to stand in the way of the
prompt, efficient, and secure accomplishment of this mission.

It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy
whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever
means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game.
Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply.
If the U.S. is to survive, longstanding American concepts of
"fair play" must be reconsidered. We must develop effective
espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to
subvert, sabotage, and destroy our enemies by more clever,
more sophisticated, and more effective methods than those
used against us. It may become necessary that the American
people be made acquainted with, understand and support this
fundamentally repugnant philosophy.

Two significant NSC directives on covert activities were issued in
1955. The first, NSC 5412/1, made the Planning and Coordination
Group (PCG), an OCB committee, the normal channel for policy
approval of covert operations.^^ Approval by an executive committee
was now the rule. The second NSC directive was issued later in
1955 and remained in force until NSDM 40, which created the 40
Committee, was issued in February, 1970. Because of the significance
of this second directive — it covered policy objectives as well as approval
and control procedures — and the fact that it stood as U.S. policy for
fifteen years, it deserves detailed consideration.

The directive reiterated previous NSC statements that the overt

'^The Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), an NSC subcommittee estab-
lised April 4, 1951. was charged with determining the "desirability and feasi-
bility" of proposed covert programs and major covert projects. A new and
expanded "10/5 Panel" was established, comprising the members from the earlier
10/2 Panel, but adding staff representation of the PSB. The 10/5 Panel func-
tioned much as the 10/2 Panel had, but the resulting procedures proved cumber-
some and potentially insecure. Accordingly, when the PSB was replaced by
the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) on September 2. 1953. coordination
of covert operations reverted to a smaller group identical to the former 10/2
Panel, without OCB staff participation. In March 1954, NSC 5412 was issued.
It required the DCI to consult with the OCB.

" NSC 5412/1 was issued March 12, 1955. That same month the DCI briefed
the PCG on all CIA covert operations previously approved under NSC^-A, 10/2,
10/5, and 5412.

foreign activities of the U.S. Government should be supplemented by
covert operations." It stated, in part, that the CIA was authorized to :

— ^Create and exploit problems for International Com-
munism.

— Discredit International Communism, and reduce the
strength of its parties and organization.

— Reduce International Communist control over any areas
of the world.

— Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of
the nations of the free world, accentuate, wherever possible,
the identity of interest between such nations and the United
States as well as favoring, where appropriate, those groups
genuinely advocating or believing in the advancement of such
mutual interests, and increase the capacity and will of such
peoples and nations to resist International Communism.

— In accordance with established policies, and to the extent
practicable in areas dominated or threatened by International
Communism, develop underground resistance and facilitate
covert and guerrilla operations. . . .

The directive dealt with means as well as ends :

— Specifiically, such [covert action] operations shall include
any covert activities related to : propaganda, political action,
economic warfare, preventive direct action, including sabo-
tage, anti-sabotage, demolition, escape and evasion and evac-
uation measures ; subversion against hostile states or groups
including assistance to underground resistance movements,
guerrillas and refugee liberation groups; support of indige-
nous and anti-communist elements in threatened countries of
the free world; deception plans and operations and all com-
patible activities necessary to accomplish the foregoing.

Control and approval procedures were significantly altered by this
directive. The OCB's functions were transferred to "designated repre-
sentatives" of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the President.
This was the first time a "designated representative" of the President
had been brought into the approval, or consultative, process. The
Special Group, as this committee came to be known, was charged with
reviewing and approving covert action programs initiated by the
CIA."

Even under the new directive, criteria oroverning the submission
of covert action projects to the Special Group were never clearly
defined.

As a 1967 CIA memorandum stated:

The procedures to be followed in determining which CA
[covert action] operations required approval by the Special

" Coordination procedures were slightly modified on March 26, 1957. The
Secretary of State was given sole approval authority for particul^irly sensitive
proiects that did not have military implications. Further, the CIA was now
required to keep the Departments of State and Defense advised on the progress
in implementing all approved covert action programs.

Group or by the Department of State and other arms of the
U.S. Government were, during the period 1955 to March 1963,
somewliat cloudy, and thus can probably best be described as
having been based on value judgments by the DCI.

In the beginning, meetings of the Special Group were infrequent.
This may be explained, in part, by the special relationship that
existed among CiA Director Allen Dulles, his brother John Foster
Dulles w4io was Secretary of State, and President Eisenhower. Early
in 1959, regular weekly meetings of the Special Group were instituted,
with one result that criteria for submission of projects to the Group
were, in practice, considerably broadened. It was not until March 1963,
however, that criteria for submission to the Special Group became
more formal and precise. These submission criteria are the same as
exist today. (See page 53.)

One other development during this period deserves mention. After
a shoot-down of an American KB 47 aircraft in the Baltic region in
June 1959, the Special Group adopted a new attitude toward recon-
naissance in sensitive cases. They decided that review required for
these missions had previously been inadequate, and established review
on a routine basis. The Joint Chiefs of Staff set up a Joint Recon-
naissance Center ( JRC) to present monthly peripheral reconnaissance
programs to the Special Group. The new procedures did not prevent
the U-2 incident in 1960.

With the inauguration of President Kennedy in January 1961,
Special Group meetings were transferred to the White House under
the chairmanship of the President's Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy. For a brief period. General Max-
well Taylor, President Kennedy's military adviser, chaired the group,
but this role was again assumed by Bundy when Taylor became Chair-
man of the JCS. Prior to 1961, the State Department member of the
Special Group had been the "informal" chairman.

As a result of the failure of the Bay of Pigs, control procedures
for covert operations were tightened. The Special Group continued
its once-a-week meeting format and President Kennedy was informed
more frequently of covert action proposals. At the same time, however,
the control mechanism for approving and monitoring covert operations
was fragmented. In addition to the Special Group, two new executive
bodies were created — the Special Group on Counter Insurgency (CI)
and the Special Group (Augmented) .

On January 18, 1963, NSAM 124 was issued. This directive estab-
lished the Special Group (CI) to help insure effective interagency
programs designed to prevent and resist insurgency in specified critical
areas, such as Laos. Paramilitary operations were a central focus of
this new group. NSAM 124 did not, however, supersede previous NSC
directives on covert operations. Nevertheless, a certain number of
operations that might have earlier been referred to the Special Group
went to the Special Group (CI). General Maxwell Taylor chaired
this group and McGeorge Bundy and Robert Kennedy served on it,
among others.

In 1962 a third NSC subcommittee was established, the Special
Group (Augmented). Its purpose was to oversee Operation MON-
GOOSE, a major new CIA covert action program designed to over-
throw Fidel Castro. Its membership included, in addition to the regu-
lar Special Group members. Attorney General Kennedy and General

Taylor. Secretary of State Kusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara
occasionally attended meetings.^*

During the Johnson Administration, the Special Group, which was
renamed the 303 Committee,^^ continued to be chaired by the Presi-
dent's Assistant for National Security Affairs, first McGeorge Bundy,
and, after 1966, Walt Rostow. The most important regular, high-level
meeting in the national security process during the Johnson years
was, however, the Tuesday Lunch group. The Tuesday Lunch began
as an informal meeting of President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk,
Secretary of Defense McNamara, and Bundy. Gradually, the meetings
became a regular occasion and participation was enlarged to include
the President's press secretary, the Director of Central Intelligence,
and the Chairman of the JCS. The agenda of the Tuesday Lunch was
devoted primarily to operational decisions — mostly on Vietnam. Al-
though the Tuesday Lunch was not meant to substitute for the 303
Committee, it probably did consider important matters involving
covert operations directed at North Vietnam.

2. The Jfi Committee and current procedures

On February 17, 1970, NSDM 40 was issued. It created the 40 Com-
mittee. The directive superseded and rescinded past NSC covert ac-
tion directives. It discussed both policy and procedure. With regard
to policy, NSDM 40 stated that it was essential to the defense and
security of the United States and its efforts for world peace that the
overt foreign activities of the United States Government continue to
be supplemented by covert action operations.

NSDM 40 assigned the DCI responsibility for coordinating and
controlling covert operations. The Director was instructed to plan and
conduct covert operations in a manner consistent with United States
foreign and military policies and to consult with and obtain appro-
priate coordination from any other interested agencies or officers on
a need-to-know basis.

The directive also spelled out the role of the 40 Committee. It stated
that the DCI was resnonsible for obtaining policy approval for all
major and/or politicallv sensitive covert action programs through the
40 Committee. In addition, NSDM 40 continued the Committee's
responsibility for reviewing and apnrovino- overhead reconnaissance
missions, a resnonsibility first acquired in 1959.

A new provision, not found in previous NSC directives, required the
Committee to finnually review covert operations nreviouslv approved,
and marip, the DCI responsible for insuring that the review took place.

Guidelines for the submission of covert nrtion pronos'ils to t^e 40
ComiTiittep were spelled out in an internnl CIA directive.^" The Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence decided whether an operational program

'^ For a detailed account of the workings of the Special Group (Augmented),
see the Committee's In+erim Report on "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving
Foreign Tveafiers." on. 139-148.

" In June 1964 NSAM 30!? was issued. NSAM 303 left the composition, func-
tions, and responsibilities of the Special Group unchanged. The effect of this
directive was. quite simply, to change the name of the Special Group to the 303
Committf^e. The purpose of NSAM 303 was .iwt as simple — the name of the
Special Group had become public as a result of the pnblication of the book The
Tnvi.Hhle Government and. therefore, it was felt that the name of the covert
action apnroval committee should be changed.

*" This directive will, at least initially, continue in effect for the new Operations
Advisory Group.

or activity should be submitted to the 40 Committee for policy ap-
proval. The paramount consideration was political sensitivity, but it
was also significant if a program involved large sums of money. In
the past, a "large" project was one costing over $25,000, but this guide-
line seems less clear today. As a general rule, the following types of
programs or activities required 40 Committee action: political and
propaganda action programs involving direct or indirect action to
influence or support political parties, groups or specific political or
militaiy leaders (this included governmental and opposition ele-
ments) ; economic action programs; paramilitary programs; and coun-
terinsurgency programs where CIA involvement is other than the
support and improvement of the intelligence collection capabilities of
the local services.

The internal CIA directive also stated that before proposals were
presented to the DCI for submission to the 40 Committee, they should
be coordinated with the Department of State. Further, paramilitary
action programs should be coordinated with the Department of De-
fense, and, ordinarily^ concurrence bv the v^mbassador to the country
concerned would be required. [Emphasis added.]

"Should" and "ordinarily" were underscored for an important rea-
son : major covert action proposals are not always coordinated among
the various departments. Nor, for that matter, were they always dis-
cussed or approved by the 40 Committee. For example, the CIA's 1970
effort to promote a military coup d'etat in Chile, undertaken at the
instruction of President Nixon, was never brought before the 40 Com-
mittee.

After a proposal was approved by the DCI, it was distributed in
memorandum form to the 40 Committee principals.^' Except in emer-
gencies, distribution to the principals was to occur at least 72 houre in
advance of a meeting. Normally, the written proposal, as contained in
the 40 Committee memorandum, was formallv considered folloAving
an oral presentation by the CIA. This presentation was usually given
by the Agency Division Chief having action responsibility. In addi-
tion to the principals, participants at 40 Committee meetings included,
on occasion, the CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, a representa-
tive from the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Re-
search, and the Assistant Secretary of State for the region involv^ed.

The 40 Committee could approve, modify, or reject any covert action
proposal. Proposals involving continuing action — for example, a sub-
sidy to a political group — were normally approved for a fixed period,
one year or less, at the end of which the project was again reviewed by
the Committee and either continued or eliminated. Reconnaissance
programs were rarely dealt with at these meetings. They were usually
cleared bv telenhone vote rather than at a formal meeting.

Prior to 1969 it does not appear that all 40 Committee approvals
were routinelv referred to the President. The President would become
involved, formally, only if there was disagreement within the Com-
mittee, or if the Chairman or another member thought a proposal was

^ The memorandiim described the proposal in summary form : what it was
expected to accomplish, its cost and the availability of funds, whether there were
alternative means for achipvins: the objectives sought, the risks involved, and
the possible consequences of disclosure.

sufficiently important, or sensitive, to warrant the President's attention.
However, as a result of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the 1974
Foreign xVssistance Act, the President is notified once a covert action
proposal has been approved by his executive committee. The Presi-
dent is then required to certify to Congress that the approved covert
action proposal is "important to the national security interests of the
Ignited States." The DCI then informs the Congress of this "Presiden-
tial Finding" in a "timely manner." In practice, informing Congress
means notifying six different committees — the Senate and House Com-
mittees on Armed Services, Foreign Relations and Appropriations.^-
The DCI does not, however, feel obligated to infonn the six commit-
tees of approved covert action operations prior to their implementa-
tion, although in some cases he has done so. Once the "Presidential
Finding" is in hand, the CIA's Directorate of Operations implements
the proposal.

During the early years of the Nixon Administration, 40 Conmiittee
meetings were held regularly although, on occasion, proposals were
approved by telephone vote. Over time, however, formal meetings be-
came fewer and fewer. This was due, in part, to a decline in covert ac-
tion projects. Most business was done by telephone after proposals had
been circulated in advance by couriers. Business became routine. "Tele-
phone concurrences," involving quick checks rather than intensive
discussion, was the rule. However, for major new departures, the Com-
mittee met in person. For example, the 40 Committee met nine times
between January 22 and December 11, 1975, to discuss Angola. The
National Security Council met once, on June 27, 1975. In addition, an
Interagency Working Group on Angola met 24 times between August
13, 1975, and January 14, 1976. The number and frequency of meetings
on Angola appears to reflect a need on the part of policymakers to sit
down and discuss the desirability and mechanics of undertaking a
major new covert operation. "Wlien a new departure is not being con-
sidered, when policy and interests are not shifting, 40 Committee busi-
ness remained routine, usually conducted by telephone.

Two additional points concerning 40 Committee procedures are im-
portant. First, covert action proposals were resubmitted by the DCI
to the 40 Committee when there was a need to reassess or reaffirm pre-
vious policy decisions. Resubmission would occur if new developments
warranted it, or if specifically required by the 40 Committee at the
time of approval.

Second, status reports on covert action programs and activities were
submitted when requested by the 40 Committee or at the discretion of
the DCI. Status reports were presented at least annually to the 40
Committee for each continuing activity approved by the Committee.
Apparently, however, these annual reviews were little more than pro
forma exercises carried out by the DCI. They were not thorough
examinations of on-going projects by the 40 Committee principals."

^ In addition, both the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence
Activities were briefed on current covert operations.

^ According to the CIA, prior to the review of these annual reports by the
40 Committee principals they were submitted in draft to the concerned agencies
for comment. Thus, the staff of 40 Committee principals had an opportunity to
examine on-going projects.

3. Covert Action Approvals

It is difficult to determine the number of covert operations approved
over the years by the 40 Committee or its predecessors. Records for
the early years are either not available or are incomplete. Also, there
has been a steady refinement of "programs" into individual "projects,"
thus making comparisons difficult. Despite this, a rough determination
can be made of projects approved for the period 1949 to 1967.^*

Between 1949 and 1952, 81 projects were approved by the DCI on
his own authority after coordination with either the 10/2 or 10/5
Panels. During the first two years of the Eisenhower administration,
1953-54, 66 projects were approved by the DCI in coordination with
the Operations Coordination Board or the Psychological Strategy
Board. Between March 1955 and February 1967, projects approved
or reconfirmed by the Operations Coordination Board, the Special
Group, or the 303 Committee were as follows :

Eisenhower administration — 104
Kennedy administration — 163
Johnson administration — 142

These totals reflect two things : first, an increase in the number of
projects approved and, second, a tightening up of approval proce-
dures. Regarding procedures, a CIA memorandum, dated February
25, 1967, stated :

As the sophistication of the policy approval process developed
so did the participation of the external approving authority.
Since establishment of the Special Group (later 303 Com-
mittee), the policy arbiters have questioned CIA presenta-
tions, amended them and, on occasion, denied them outright.
The record shows that the Group/Committee, in some in-
stances, has overridden objections from the DCI and in-
structed the Agency to carry out certain activities. . . .
Objections by State have resulted in amendment or rejection
of election proposals, suggestions for air proprietaries and
support plans for foreign governments. . . . The Committee
has suggested areas where covert action is needed, has decided
that another element of government should imdertake a pro-
posed action, imposed caveats and turned down specific pro-
posals for CIA action from Ambassadors in the field.

Whereas the "sophistication of the policy approval process" and
the "participation of the external approving authority" has increased
significantly since the establishment of the Special Group in 1955, this
has not meant that all, or even a majority, of covert action projects
have been approved by the "external approving authority." Low-risk,
low-cost covert action projects, such as a routine press placement or
the development of an "agent of influence," do not receive this atten-
tion. In this regard, an Agency memorandum, dated February 21,
1967, stated :

It is obvious that a compilation of Special Group approvals
in no way reflects the totality of significant CIA activities
carried on over the past 15 years. With respect to overall

' These numbers may include reapprovals of projects initiated earlier.

DDP activity, it does not include any mention of FI/CI
[Foreign Intelligence/Coimterintelligence] actions or, of
course, any decisions in the overt field. Even within the re-
stricted framework of covert action alone, a 1963 study pre-
pared by this office showed that of the 550 existing CIA proj-
ects of the DDP which were reviewed against the back-
ground of our own internal instruction on Special Group
submission, only 86 were separately approved (or reap-
pro ved) by the Special Group between 1 January and 1
December 1962.

Using the figures cited above, this would mean that 16 percent of
all covert action projects, large and small, received Special Group
approval between January 1 and December 1, 1962. The Select Com-
mittee's own review indicates that of the several thousand covert ac-
tion projects undertaken since 1961, only 14 percent Avere considered
on a case-by-case basis by the 40 Committee or its predecessors.^^ Those
not reviewed by the committee were the low-risk, low-cost type re-
ferred to above.

Another indication of the number of covert action proposals which
eventually reached the 40 Committee is contained in the CIA's 1972
Covert Action Manual. According to this document, "the 40 Commit-
tee actually looks at about one-fourth of our covert action projects."
The Manual continues :

. . . this proportion is a reflection on the nature of the proj-
ect system, not on any lack of policy approval for our covert
actions. For example, the Agency would have separate proj-
ects for each of a number of media assets that might be
brought to bear on an overall program of persuasion, but the
40 Committee would focus on the program with its descrip-
tions of the specific assets to be employed. . . . Thus, the i7n-
portant point on policy is that the lO Committee considers
individually all major and critical projects providing broader
pi'ogram guidelines for the remainder of our covert activity.
[Emphasis added.]

If.. The NjSC and- Covert Activities : Conclusions

Several points stand out in the history of the committees charged
with overseeing covert operations. The most obvious has less to do
with procedures than with the substance of the projects approved. The
justification for covert operations has changed sharply, from con-
taining International (and presumably monolithic) Communism in
the early 1950s to merely serving as an adjunct to American foreign
policy in the 1970s. It should be noted that early NSC directives framed
the purpose of covert operations entirely in terms of opposition to
International Communism. By contrast, NSDM 40 described covert
actions as those secret activities designed to further official United
States programs and policies abroad.

'^ According to the CIA. since the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the 1974 For-
eign Assistance Act. all covert action projects not submitted on a case-by-case
basis have been submitted to the President for approval and to the oversight
committees of Congress for its information in collective, omnibus fonn.

As stated, procedural arrangements for considering and approv-
ing covert operations have been formalized and tightened over the
years. NSC-4-A of 1947 established no formal procedures for co-
ordinating or approving operations; the DCI, in liaison with State
and Defense, was to ensure that operations were consistent with
United States policy. Over time, procedures were developed and guide-
lines established to indicate which covert action proposals required
40 Committee approval. The requirement of a "Presidential Finding"
in the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act not only requires the President
to certify to Congress that an approved covert operation is important
to the national security of the United States, but, in effect, compels
him to become aware of actions approved by the 40 Committee.^*' The
concept of plausible denial, at least as it applies to the President,
is dead. Major new covert operations cannot be undertaken without
the knowledge, and approval, of the Chief Executive. President
Ford's Executive Order takes this one step further. The new Opera-
tions Advisory Group will not be responsible for policy approval
of covert operations, as was the 40 Committee. According to the
Executive Order, the Group will "consider and develop any policy
recommendation, including any dissents, for the President prior to
his decision" on each covert operation. The approval of covert opera-
tions now rests solely with the President.

However, recognition that procedural arrangements for consider-
ing and approving covert operations have become tighter does not
necessarily imply that they are adequate. Significant issues regarding
the control of covert operations remain. First, the criteria for deter-
mining which covert operations are brought before the Executive are
still inadequate. Small covert action projects not deemed politically
risky can be approved within the CIA. Although many of these are
in support of projects already approved by the Executive, they never-
theless make up a majority of all CIA covert action projects. In
addition, some of the low-risk projects approved within the CIA, such
as the development of a foreign "asset," may prove to be extremely
sensitive and risky. One CIA "asset," given the cryptonym QJ/WIN,
was recruited to spot "individuals with criminal and underworld
connections in Europe for possible multi-purpose use." ^^ Later the
CIA contemplated using Q J/WIN for its ZK/KIFLE project, a "gen-
eral stand-by capability" to carry out assassination when required.
Other CIA individual project "assets" used in connection with plots
to assassinate foreign leaders were WI/ROGUE and AM/LiVSH.

^ President Ford has recommended that the "Presidential Finding" require-
ment be dropped. In his message to Congress outlining his intelligence reor-
ganization, the President recommended that the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act
(Public Law 93-559) be modified as proposed by the Commission on the Organi-
zation of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. That Commission,
charged by Robert Murphy, recommended :

"We propose that Public Law 93-559 be amended to require reporting of
covert actions to the proposed Joint Committee on National Security, and to
omit any requirement for the personal certification of the President as to their
necessity." (Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct
of Foreign Policy, 6/75. p. 101.)

^ Senate Select Committee, "Alleged Assassination Plots Involvine Foreign
Leaders," p. 182. See this report for a full discussion of QJ/WIN, ZR/RIFLE,
WI/ROGUE and AM/LASH.

Though none of these specific projects were apparently approved by
the ;NkSC, several ranking CIA officials testified that they were within
the general policy approved at the NSC level.

Second, there were gaps in 40 Committee supervision, notably in
the sensitive areas of human espionage and counterintelligence.
Whether intended or not, espionage and counterintelligence operations
may have the effect of political action, A former chairman of the
Special Group, McGeorge Bimdy, has testified that the distinction
among these operations needs re-examination. According to Bundy:

Intelligence collection is often separated from covert opera-
tions in the thinking of intelligence administrators and
other concerned officials. I think this distinction, like the
parallel distinction in the field of counterintelligence, de-
serves re-examination. Both intelligence collection and coun-
terintelligence have involved covert activity which goes well
beyond conventional espionage and counterespionage, and
such enlargements of activity often present many of the same
dangers as covert actions of other sorts.^*

Espionage operations can have the effect of political action. A pay-
ment to a dissident leader may be designed to collect intelligence on
the leader's group, but it may also be regarded as support for the
group's objectives. Counterintelligence operations can have a similar
impact. Counterintelligence measures used to enlist the support of
local intelligence and police, neutralize hostile intelligence services, and
discredit local CIA opponents are sometimes indistinguishable from
covert action. As such, the issue is whether these intelligence activities
can, or should, be made subject to effective executive branch and con-
gressional oversight. President Ford's Executive Order does not ad-
dress this issue. The Operations Advisory Group will be responsible
.for approving certain "sensitive intelligence collection operations," but
the Executive Order does not apparently include human as well as
technical collection. Nor is there any reference to Operations Group
review or approval of any counterintelligence activities.

Tliird, there is a basic conflict between sufficient consultation to en-
sure accountability and sound decisions on the one hand, and secure
operations on the other. 40 Committee approval procedures for covert
operations were, on occasion, by-passed by the President or his Na-
tional Security Affairs adviser. For highly sensitive proposals the
number of individuals or agencies consulted or informed is some-
times sharply limited on a "need to know" basis. Even the ambassador
in the country where the operation is to be conducted may not be in-
formed. Middle and lower level officials within the State Department
or the CIA with expertise may not be consulted. The risk of inadequate
consultation was aggravated by the informality of telephone clear-
ances. President Ford's Executive Order attempts to remedy this de-
ficiency, at least in part. The Executive Order states :

The Operations Group shall discharge the responsibilities
assigned . . . only after consultation in a formal meeting at-

''* McGeorge Bundy testimony, House Select Committee on Intelligence,
12/10/75.

tended by all members and observers ; or . . . when a designated
representative of the member or observer attends.^*^

Finally, the annual review of covert actions by the 40 Committee
dirl not appear to be searching or thorough. Annual reviews were
often handled in the same informal manner as approvals for new
covert action proposals — by telephone concurrence. Some ongoing
covert operations have been challenged over the years, most often by
the State Department. Some die a natural death. Some linger on for as
long as 20 to 25 years. It appears that some covert operations, such
as those in Italy, may come to an end only when they are exposed. Presi-
dent Ford's Executive Order contains two provisions to increase the
number of covert action reviews. First, the Operations Advisory Group
will he required to "conduct periodic reviews of programs previously
considered." There is no requirement, however, that these reviews must
take place at a formal meeting. Second, the Executive Order requires
the fnll National Security Council to review, twice a year, the "con-
tinued appropriateness" of ongoing covert operations.

5. Role of 0MB

In order to meet unanticipated needs, the CIA maintains a Con-
tingency Eeserve Fund. The fund is replenished bv annual appropria-
tions as well as unobligated funds from previous CIA appropriations.
More ofi-en than not, the unanticipated needs of the CIA relate to
covert operations.

The Director of Central Intelligence has the authority, under the
Central Intelligence As:ency Act of 1949, to spend reserve funds with-
out consulting 0MB. However, due to an arrangement among 0MB,
the CIA, and the Appropriations Committees of Congress, the CIA
has a.o-reed not to use reserve funds without 0MB approval. There is
no evidence that the DCI has ever violated this agreement. In prac-
tice. 0MB holds a double kev to this reserve fund : first. Tt approves
additions to the reserve fund and. second, it approves the amounts to
be released from the fund, upon CIA request and justification. 0MB
holds a careful review of each proposed release. Turndowns are rare,
but reductions in amounts requested occur often enough to prompt a
careful CIA presentation of its case.

Despite these levers of control. 0MB hns faced severpl handicaps
which render its control of the Contingencv Reserve Fund less effective
than it might be. First, OMB has not, in the past, been renresented on
the National Security Council or the 40 Committee. ^^ Much of the
dollar volume of reserve releases originates in 40 Committee action.
Thus, OMB resistance to reserve release requests were often in the face
of policv determinations already made. Second, although tbe chairmen
of the appropriations subcommittees of Congress are notified of draw-
downs from the fu7id, these notifications occur after the release action,
even though the release is conceptually the same as a supplemental ap-
propriation. Thus, OMB does not have the leverage in regard to

^^ Executive Order 1905. Sec. Sfc) (3).

^ Under President Ford's Executive Order, the Director of OMR will sit as
an observer on the Operations Arvisory Group, the successor to the 40 Committee.

Contingency Reserve Fund releases that it does in regard to supple-
mental appropriatitons requests (where 0MB is a party to recom-
mending supplemental to the President and Congress).

0MB suffers other limitations with respect to the use of CIA funds
for covert operations. First, CIA's budget submission to 0MB has,
in the past, neglected some aspects of clandestine spending, notably
proprietary activities. Second, current ground rules allow the repro-
gramming of CIA's regular appropriations to meet unanticipated
needs ; no 0MB approval is required for this reprogramming. To the
extent that the above funds are used for covert operations, 0MB has
no control over their use.

C. Providing the Intelligence Required by Policymakers

1. Work of NSCIC

The National Security Coimcil Intelligence Committ-ee was formed
in November 1971. At its first meeting, a Working Group, composed
primarily of officials from the intelligence community, was established.
That composition was soon seen as inappropriate for a committee
whose main purpose was to make intelligence more responsive to the
needs of policymaking "consumers." As a result, at its second — and
last — meeting, NSCIC changed the composition of the Working Group
to exactly parallel the parent body.^°

The various representatives who sat on the Working Group were
not the "intelligence" specialists from those agencies, but officials with
policymaking responsibilities. For example, the State Department was
represented by the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs,
not the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Repre-
sentatives were to seek the views of the operating bureaus of their
agencies on major intelligence questions.

An August 1974 meeting of NSCIC produced two direct results. In
response to a request for some mechanism to highlight critical intelli-
gence memoranda, the DCI now puts out "alert memoranda" — brief
notices in a form which cannot be overlooked. The meetinsf also resulted
in the production of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Soviet
perceptions of the United States.

Before it was abolished, NSCIC began reviewing the basic docu-
ments which levy requirements on the intelligence community — ^the
DCI's Perspectives on Intelligence, Substantive Obiectives, and espe-
cially, Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs). NSCIC also set up a
Working Group panel to conduct surA^eys of intelligence community
publications. There was also an NSCIC subcommittee which consid-
ered economic intelligence, chaired bv the Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for International Affairs. The subcommittee was inactive.

^The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chairman),
the DCI (Vice Chairman), the Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense, the
Chairman, JCS, and the Under Secretary of Treasury for Monetary Affairs.

^. Limitations on Effectiveness

NSCIC's work reflected the basic dilemma inherent in suiting intel-
ligence to the needs of policymakers. The intelligence community must
be close enough to policymakers to know what is desired, yet distant
enough to preserve its objectivity. Within this framework, the diflFer-
ing demands of many kinds of policymakers must be balanced. For
example, making the intelligence community more responsive to the
needs of Cabinet-level officials might diminish the quality of the intel-
ligence produced for middle-level officials.

The limited effectiveness of NSCIC was due to several factors :

— The apparent lack of interest of senior officials in making NSCIC
work.

— The demands of other business on the sub-cabinet level officials
who made up NSCIC.

— "Consumer" unfamiliarity with the intelligence community. Of
necessity, NSCIC spent most of its time educating policymakers about
the community and what it can do. Most officials in policymaking posi-
tions, especially those in senior positions, bring little intelligence ex-
perience to their jobs. One of NSCIC's first tasks was to produce a
manual about the community for policymakers.

— Diversity among "consumers." Cooperative arrangements and the
tradition of working together are matters of long standing within the
intelligence community. By contrast, NSCIC represented a first at-
tempt to bring "consumers" together. The newness of the endeavor
combined with the diversity of the "consumers" made it difficult for
NSCIC to function effectively.

3. Conclusions

The intelligence community has not- always been responsive to the
needs of policymakers. Some have argued that the intelligence product
is more a reflection of what "producers," rather than "consumers,"
deem important. This is debatable. What is not at issue, however, is
that "consumers" should drive the intelligence process. NSCIC was a
disappointment in this regard. To say this is not to imply that the in-
telligence commmiity has been unresponsive to the needs of policy-
makers. Just the opposite may be true. "Producers" and "consumers"
get together almost daily at NSC subcommittee meetings (e.g., the
Senior Review Group and the Washington Special Action Group.)
Intelligence requirements are levied, informally, at these meetings. It
can be assumed that the intelligence community has been responsive to
these informal requirements and hence the need for a more formal
NSC mechanism — NSCIC — was eliminated. The new Committee on
Foreign Intelligence vtdll now have the responsibility for seeing that
policymakers are provided the intelligence they need.

D. Advertising the President on Intelligence Issues

1. Overview

The President needs an independent bodv to assess the quality and
effectiveness of our foreign intelligence effort. Since 1956 the Presi-
dent's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) has served
this function. Numerous proposals have recently been made to make

PFIAB an executive "watchdog" over United States foreign intelli-
gence activities. Some have suggested that a joint presidential/
congressional intelligence board be established or, at the least, Senate
confirmation of members of the President's board be required. The
Rockefeller Commission recommended that the Board's functions be
expanded to include oversight of the CIA with responsibility for
assessing CIA compliance with its statutory authority. The Murphy
Commission commented favorably on the Rockefeller Commission
recommendations. Whether PFIAB should adopt this oversight or
"watchdog" function, or whether Congress should be involved in the
activities of the Board is open to question. President Ford, in his
Executive Order, decided against transforming the Board into a CIA
watchdog. Instead, he created a new three-member Intelligence Over-
sight Board to monitor the activities of the intelligence community.

2. History of PFIAB

On February 6, 1956, President Eisenhower created, by Executive
Order, the Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.
The Board was established in response to a recommendation by the
second Hoover Commission, calling for the President to appoint a
committee of private citizens who would report to him on United
States foreign intelligence activities. Creation of the Board was also
intended to preempt a move in Congress at the time, led by Senator
Mike Mansfield, to establish a Joint Congressional Committee on
Intelligence.

The Board ceased functioning when President Eisenhower left
office in 1961, but was reactivated by President Kennedy following
the Bay of Pigs failure. It was renamed the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) and has functioned, unin-
terrupted, since that time.

3. PFIAB Today

The Board currently operates under Executive Order 11460, issued
by President Nixon on March 20, 1969. The Board is responsible for
reviewing and assessing United States foreign intelligence activities.
It reports to the President periodically on its findings and recom-
mendations for improving the effectiveness of the nation's foreign
intelligence effort.

The Board presently has seventeen members, all drawn from private
life and all appointed by the President. It is chaired by Leo Cherne,
and holds formal meetings two days every other month. It has a staff
of two, headed by an executive secretary.

As its name indicates, the Board is advisory. Board reports and rec-
ommendations have contributed to the increased effectiveness and effi-
ciency of our foreign intelligence effort. For example, the Board played
a significant role in the development of our overhead reconnaissance
program. It has made recommendations on coordinating American
intelligence activities; reorganizing Defense intelligence; applying
science and technology to the National Security Agency, and rewriting
the National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs). The
Board has conducted post-mortems on alleged intelligence failures and,
since 1969, made a yearly, independent assessment of the Soviet stra-
tegic threat, thereby supplementing regular community intelligence

assessments. Most recently, it has reported to the President on economic
intelligence and human clandestine intelligence collection.

The Board has not served a "watchdog" function. As the Rockefeller
Commission noted, the Board does not exercise control over the CIA,
which is, in fact, the Board's only source of information about Agency
activities. When the Board has occasionally inquired into areas of
possible illegal or improper CIA activity, it has met resistance. For
example, when the Board became aware of the so-called Huston Plan
• and asked the FBI and the Attorney General for a copy, the request
was refused. The Board did not pursue the matter with the White
House. In 1970, the Board was asked by Henry Kissinger, then the
President's National Security Advisor, to examine Allende's election
victory in Chile to determine whether the CIA had failed to foresee,
and propose appropriate actions, to prevent Allende's taking office. The
Board requested 40 Committee and NSC minutes to determine the
facts. Its request was refused and its inquiry was dropped.

The President needs an independent body to assess the quality and
effectiveness of our foreign intelligence effort. In the words of its
Executive Secretary, the Board has "looked at intelligence through the
eyes of the President." PFIAB has served, in effect, as an intelligence
"Kitchen Cabinet." The Board has been useful, in part, because its
advice and recommendations have been for the President. As such, the
executive nature of this relationship should be maintained.

Over the years, many of PFIAB's recommendations have been
adopted, and others have served as a basis for later reform or reorga-
nization. The Board has not been an executive "watchdog" of the CIA.
To make it so would be to place the Board in an untenable position :
adviser to the President on the quality and effectiveness of intelligence
on the one hand and "policeman" of the intelligence community on
the other. These two roles conflict and should be performed separately.

J).. Intelligence Oversight Board

To assist the President, the NSC, and the Attorney General in over-
seeing the intelligence community. President Ford has created an
Intelligence Oversight Board. The Board will consist of three private
citizens appointed by the President. They will also serve on PFIAB.

The Board will be, in effect, a community-wide Inspector General of
last resort. It will review reports from the Inspectors General and
General Counsels of the intelligence community and report periodi-
cally to the Attorney General and the President on any activities which
appear to be illegal or improper. The Board will also review the prac-
tices, procedures, and internal guidelines of the various IGs and Gen-
eral Counsels to ensure that they are designed to bring questionable
activities to light. Finally, the Board will see to it that intelligence
community IGs and General Counsels have access to any information
they require.

The President's Intelligence Oversight Board should serve a useful
purpose. However, the ability of a small, part-time Board to monitor
the activities of the entire intelligence community is questionable.
Further, the Board is a creature of the Executive and, as such, may
be unable or, at times, unwilling to probe certain sensitive areas. A

body independent of the Executive must also be responsible for moni-
toring the activities of the intelligence community, including those
which may be either illegal or improper.

E. Allocating Intelligence Kesources

1. Role of 0MB

The Office of Management and Budget (0MB) is the principal staff
arm of the President for supervising the Federal budget. OMB is also
a staff arm for management — a tool the President occasionally uses to
reorganize or redirect the structure and activities of the Federal
Government.

In managing U.S. intelligence activities, the President has used
OMB to pull together his annual intelligence budget and also to moni-
tor the expenditure of intelligence funds. For example, OMB annually
reviews the intelligence community's appropriations requests and
makes its recommendations to the President for amounts to be included
in his budget. Further, OMB apportions ^^ CIA's appropriation and
has authority to approve releases from the CIA Contingency Reserve
Fund.

The fiscal management responsibility of OMB has been especially
critical in the field of intelligence. Intelligence activities comprise a
large part of that small and shrinking portion of the federal budget
which is "controllable." ^^ About 75 percent of federal spending for
fiscal 1976 was designated in the President's budget submission as
"uncontrollable." The Committee has found that the direct cost of na-
tional intelligence spending is currently [deleted] and total intelli-
gence spending is approximately twice that. Thus the total U.S. intel-
ligence budget is about [deleted] percent of federal spending, but is
[deleted] percent of controUable federal spending. Because the U.S.
intelligence budget is fragmented and concealed, the relationship be-
tween controllable intelligence program sand controllable federal
spending has never been shown to Congress in the President's budget.
OMB has been a principal point at which the President can identify
and exert management leverage over this aggregate of controllable
funds.

Over the years, OMB (and its predecessor, the Bureau of the
Budget) has had the greatest management impact when :

— It has been used as an instrument of presidential
reorganization ;

— It has identified major issues for the President, usually
involving bids by intelligence agencies to maintain or launch
duplicative or marginally useful programs.

For example, in 1960 President Eisenhower commissioned the Bud-
get Bureau to establish a Joint Study Group of the principal intel-

^ "Apportionment" of funds is described by bndgcetary statutes as the OMB
action, following congressional appropriations, whereby agencies receive formal
notification of amounts appropriated and the distribution of spending by time
period and program.

*° Defined as spending that is not predetermined by statute, such as Interest
on the federal debt, veterans benefits. Social payments, et cetera.

licence agencies to take a hard look at U.S. intelligence collection
requirements and other problems. In its report, the Joint Study Group
recommended to the President a variety of measures to strengthen
intelligence management, including a more assertive role for the DCI,
stronger control by NSA of the cryptologic agencies, and centralized
management of collection requirements.

A decade later. President Nixon commissioned OMB to probe the
management of the intelligence community, and to determine what
changes, short of legislation, might be made. An ensuing report by
Assistant OMB Director James Schlesinger concluded that the divi-
sion of labor envisaged by the National Security Act of 1947 had been
rendered obsolescent and meaningless by technology and the ambitions
of U.S. intelligence agencies. The Schlesinger Report recommended
nothing less than the basic reform of U.S. intelligence management,
centering upon a strong DCI who could bring intelligence costs under
control and bring intelligence production to an adequate level of qual-
ity and responsiveness. In addition, the OMB report pointed to nine
specific mergers or shifts of intelligence programs estimated to save
nearV one billion dollars annually.

OMB has also been an occasional lightning rod for the identification
of specific budget or management issues. In the mid-sixties the Bureau
of the Budget called the President's attention to the problems of better
coordinating the costs and benefits of overhead reconnaissance. Fur-
ther, the Bureau pressed hard for a reorganization of Defense map-
ping and charting activities emphasizing the issues of needless dupli-
cation of service mapping agencies. This was resolved following the
Schlesinger Report.

2. Recent Trends and Programs

OMB reportedly was given a major role in developing the recom-
mendations presented to President Ford for overhauling intelligence
budgeting and management. If this was the case, it would reverse a
recent trend. Since 1971, OMB's day-to-day influence upon intelligence
management has been at a low point. OMB has been confined to its
cyclical, institutional role in the budget process. The strengths and
weaknesses of this role will be discussed below.

3. OMB Role in Formulating the Budget

OMB can always get the President's attention in recommending
what should be included in his annual budget proposals to Congress.
Associated with OMB budget recommendations is the identification
of major resource allocation issues, with an analysis of options and
a recommended course of action. However, OMB recommendations on
intelligence have had less presidential acceptance than in other areas of
the federal budget. This has been due to the difficulty of carrying any
"military" budget issue opposed by the Secretary of Defense and the
relative ineffectiveness of DCI support. Further, OMB is excluded
from some of the early, formative stages of DOD program determina-
tions for intelligence which cover eighty percent of the intelligence
budget.

For the past three years, with OMB encoiirao;ement, the DCI has
provided the President with his own recommendations for the national
intelligence budget. Unfortunately, these have come too late in the
process to have much impact. These recommendations have followed,
not preceded, DOD submissions to OMB and OMB's own formative
stages of analysis.

The President's annual and five-year planning targets are an inte-
gral part of the federal budget process. Federal agencies are adjured
to fit their fiscal and staffing plans within the presidential targets, with
special emphasis upon the nearest or "budget" year. Presidential tar-
gets are especially important in their potential for strengthening cen-
tral management of the intelligence community. The DCI has
recognized this. These targets can assist the DCI in getting more value
for the intelligence dollar. However, OMB has issued the planning
targets too late in the planning process and without any in-depth
coordination of totals and major components with the DCI. By the
time the DCI and CIA have received their target figures in June or
July, most of the major decisions on budget request levels and future
year implications have already been agreed to within Defense and
CIA. This type of problem is widespread in the federal budget process
but, because of the insulation of intelligence from external checks and
balances, the problem is especially serious in intelligence budgeting.

The problem is exacerbated by OMB's issuance to the Department
of Defense of a planning target which has the effect of constituting an
alternative planning; base for intelligence. This target has not been
directly related to DOD's intelligence budget. The Secretary of De-
fense has been given, in effect, a choice between a level of intelligence
spending consistent with the DCI's planning target and one which
matches his own view of overall DOD priorities and claims. Not sur-
prisinglv, Secretaries of Defense have tended to opt for the latter. The
result, therefore, of the two planning targets has made the DCI's
management mandate all the harder to fulfill.

Jf,. Presidential Budget Decisionmaking

OMB's budaret recommendations to the President, which culminate
OMB's annual budget review, have been the only comprehensive pres-
entations of United States' intelligence spending. These serve to high-
light major issues and are done by analvsts independent of any intelli-
gence agency. In contrast with the DCI's national intelligence budget
presentation, which excludes future year figures and does not have
the Secretary of Defense's recommended amounts, the OMB presenta-
tion is complete and based upon each agency's final positions. More-
over, the OlSIB presentation offers specific solutions to the President's
problem of restraining intelligence spending without degrading
intelligence operations.

These presentations and those related to the DCI's National Foreign
Intelligence Budaret are not shared with Congress. Therefore, except
for selective briefings bv the DCI and individual program managers,
Congress has not been informed of the major options at stake in the
President's budget.

6. ApportionTnent and Budget Execution

0MB apportionment of appropriated funds is the source of much
of OMB's muscle in budget execution. By law (31 U.S.C. 665), federal
agencies cannot use appropriated funds in the absence of an 0MB
apportionment. The apportionment can convey the funds in lump sum,
distributed by quarter, or by major program. 0MB can impose set-
asides and can call special hearings. With regard to intelligence pro-
grams, however, OMB apportionment action is weak and f raarmented.
The only direct intelligence apportionment by OMB is to CIA — i.e.,
those earmarked amounts of the DOD appropriation which are trans-
ferred from Defense to CIA under authority of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency Act of 1949. This apportionment is done in lump sum.
The rest of the intelligence budget is scattered among, and apportioned
by, some 20 DOD appropriations and an appropriation to State with-
out a distinction made for intelligence funds. Thus, OMB apportion-
ment is procedurally applied to less than 20 percent of the annual
national intelligence budget and to less than 10 percent of total intel-
ligence spending.

Another weakness of OMB's ability to monitor budget execution is
its procedural blindness to advances, renrogramming, and managment
of intelligence proprietary activities. Other weaknesses include:

— A large proportion of funds spent for CIA covert action projects
have come from Defense Department advances, under authority of
the Economy Act, and therefore are outside OMB apportionment.

— OMB does not rontinelv receive notice of maior reprogramming of
CIA funds from activities shown and justified in the congressional
budget. The premium upon exploitation of unforeseen intelliflrence
opportunities puts a premium upon budgeting flexibilitv. Yet OMB
lacks a set of benchmarks to determine routinely when CIA or other
intelligence agencies have substantially departed from the approved
budget.

It appears that more than half oi nil larp-e-scale covprt action proj-
ects initiated in the period 1961-76 did not come to OMB for review.

6. Ahsence of GAO Audits

The absence of GAO audits in the intelliarence community affects
OMB's ability to monitor intelligence performance. In other federal
areas GAO audits often include an evaluation of iierformance effec-
tiveness and economy, as well as compliance. OMB has a standing
arrangement to follow up with aorencies on GAO audits. GAO audits
often provide launching points for OMB investigations or reinforce
OMB interests in broader problems. The absence of such independent
and critical GAO reports in the intelligence field weakens both OMB
and congressional oversight.

7. OMB Representation! 07i Excom **

The process of planning and budqfeting for overhead reconnaissance
is new enough to have escaped historic overlaps of jurisdiction afflict-

'' This EXCOM was abolished as a result of President Ford's recent Executive
Order. It is likelv that a similar body will be re-established under the direction
of the new Committee on Foreign Intelligence.

ing the rest of the intelligence community. An Executive Committee
(EXCOM) wiis established to coordinate reconnaissance develop-
ment and planning, chaired by the DCI with the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for intelligence as the other memlber. While 0MB was not a
member of EXCOM, it had a representative at EXCOM meetings.
EXCOM decisions often were a compromise between the DCI and the
Depar'tment of Defense which may or may not have represented the
most cost-effective solution. On occasion, the 0MB representative took
a role in defining options and insisting upon analysis of key points.
Here is one area of intelligence budgeting where 0MB was actively
represented and therefore in a position to help the President identify
and resolve large issues.

8. Net Assessment of 0MB Role in Intelligence Management

OMB's cyclical role in the budget process has the strengths and
weaknesses noted. Recognizing that 0MB has statutory authority in
budget preparation and ap])ortionment of funds, it is nevertheless
true that the key to 0MB influence for management improvement is
the extent to whic'h the Preident chooses to use and back 0MB for
specific projects. OMB's role ought to be at its strongest in the intelli-
gence community, given the absence of public scrutiny and checks and
balances which operate in other federal program areas.

The Committee notes several trends in intelligence budgeting
and management which indicate an increasing need for strong and
objective 0MB staff assitance to the President: first, intelligence
spending has increased significantly in the last decade. There are pres-
sures for further growth ; second, as already noted, intelligence is one
of the few "controllable" program areas of a federal budget; third,
the results of intelligence spendinsr do not seem to be commensurate
with the increases in outlavs. Inflation partly explains this. Since 1969
the real value of goods and services available to intelligence has been
reduced by an estimated twentv i">ercent. Inflation is not a full ex-
planation, however. Ris^idities in the intellip-ence budsret protect each
manager's share, at the cost of nerpe^^uatino: less nroductive or dunli-
cative programs. The result is that ceilino-s on the intelligence budget
are permitted to drive out long-term improvements in economy and
effectiveness. Fourth, there is a fragmentation of management au-
thoritv in the intelligence communitv. The DCI has had successive
nresidential mandates to mauporp. \^y^\^^ j^^s been handicapped by the
lark of co?itrol of intellijrence dollars.

In tbe face of such a challeno-e. t^^e nature of future presidential
maTidates to OAfB could be imno^tnut to both executive and conores-
sioual ovPT-qio-ht, In anv futurp detoi-minatimi to strenp-then Ol^TB's
role, it will be necessary to enlarge the staff of the six-person 0MB
intellifi-enceunit.

9. OMB^s Bole as Affected Tyti the Presidsnfs Recent Executiaie Order
In his Executive Order of February 18. President Ford strensfth-

ened OMB's role in intelli.frence management in two principal ways:
First. OMB has been mndp an observpr to the Onprations Advisory
Group, successor to the 40 Committee. This step will likely give OMB

a regular and timely scriitinv of all proposed covert action and other
sensitive intelligence projects. OMB's review will, therefore, no longer
be confined to a postdecision review of those projects requiring Con-
tingency Reserve Fund financing. Another likely effect is to strengthen
the substantive mandate of OMB's inquiry into CIA projects of all
kinds.

Second, the President has given the DCI a more direct influence
on the national intelligence budget by requiring that the new Com-
mittee on Foreign Intelligence ( CFI ) . which is headed by the DCI.
"shall control budget preparation and resource allocation for the Na-
tional Foreisn Intelligence Program." Further, the President requires
that the CFI ''shall, pri&r to suhmission to the Oifiee of Management
and Budget, review, and amend as it deems appropriate, the budget
for the National Foreign Intelligence Prosfram." [Emphasis added.]

The combined effect of these two changes would appear to
strengthen OMB's review role. The directive appears to tackle the prob-
lem of the weak and ill-timed impact of DCI review : it also puts 0MB
in the position of evaluating the analyses and proposals of both the
CFI and the intelligence agencies on the way to the President.

The managerial, faws in the President's Executive Order are these :

1. The President's directive that "neither the DCI nor the CFI shall
have responsibility for tactical intelligence'' exempts what may be one
of the largest and managerially vulnerable areas of intelligence from
national manasrement and beneficial tradeoffs. It gives Defense a dodsre
that could defeat future DCI and 0MB management efforts. By fail-
ing to make the distinction between operational control of intelligence
organic to military units and management overview (i.e.. maintenance
of DCI ''CFI data base, continuing overview, and occasional initia-
tives) . the President's directive may have undercut much of the DCI/
0MB managerial clout.^*

2. The silence of the Executive Order on execution of the intelli-
gence budget fails to mandate CFI and 0MB apportionment of fimds
appropriated for intelligence and GAO audit. The Order does give
the CFI authority to control "resource allocation.'" If this is inter-
preted to mean a svstem of centralized CFI apportionment via O^IB.
executive oversight of national intelligence programs could be
strengthened. The meaning of these words in the Executive Order
therefore deserves probing.

3. The actual authority of the DCI in the new Committee on Foreiqm
Intelligence mav not be very strong in practice because the Executive
Order does nothinor about the pattern of intelligence anpronrintions.
Defense still receives eighty percent of the national intelligence
bud.o^et. The Order recognizes the Secretary of Defense as responsible
for directinsr. funding, and operatinor "XSA and national, defense, and
military- intellisrence and reconnaissance activities as renuired." The
Secretary of Defense remains the "executive agent of the U.S. Govern-
ment"' for sififnals intelligence. In view of these formidable DOD pow-
ers, the CFI may be dominated by — or at least subject to the veto of —
the Department of Defense.

** See Coneressional study, Congressional Oversight of the Intelliegnce Budget,
Parts I and II.

V. THE DIRECTOK OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Issues

In Januarj^ 1946, President Truman established by Presidential
Directive the National Intellig:ence Authority under the direction of
the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The Directive authorized
the Director of Central Intelligence to plan, develop and coordinate
the foreign intelligence activities of the United States Government.^
That same year, the Joint Congressional Committee on the In-
vestigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack described how the military-
sen-ices in Washington had failed to bring all the intelligence to-
gether about Japanese plans and intentions and then concluded that
"operational and intelligence work requires centralization of authority
and clear-cut allocation of responsibility.'' ^

Subsequentlv, in 1947, Congress passed the National Security Act
giving the DCI responsibility for "coordinating the intelligence ac-
tivities of the several Government departments and agencies in the
interest of national security."' ^ Concurrently, the President designated
the Director of Central Intelligence as his principal foreign intelli-
gence adviser and established an Intelligence Ad"vison' Committee
(later reconstituted as the United States Intelligence Board) to "ad-
vise'' the DCI in carrv'ing out his responsibilities.*

The precise roles and responsibilities of the DCI. however, were not
clearly spelled out. For fear of distracting attention from the principal
objective of the 1947 National Security Act — to unify the armed
services — the TThite House did not delineate the DCI's functions in
anv detail.^ The Congressional debates also failed to address the extent

' Presidential Directive. 1/22/46. Federal Register. Vol. II. pp. 1337. 1339.

^ Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Report,
pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27. 7/20/46. 79th Cong.. 2nd Sess.. p. 254.

' Section 102. National Security Act of 1947. 61 Statutes-at-large 497-499. Pro-
visions of Section 102 are codified at 50 U.S.C. 403.

* National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) Xo. 1. 12/12/47.
The Intelligence Advisory Committee was chaired by the DCI. and was composed
of representatives from the Departments of State. Army, Navy, and Air Force,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission. In 1957, the Presi-
dent's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board recommended that the IntelUgenco
Advisory Committee be merged with the United States Communications Intelli-
gence Board to perform the overall intelligence coordinating function more ef-
fectively. Consequently, the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) was estab-
lishPd in 1958.

Under President Ford's Executive Order Xo. 11905, 2/18/76. USIB was dis-
solved, but the DCI was given responsibility to "establish such committees of col-
lectors, producers and users of intelligence to assist in his conduct of his respon-
sibilities."

^ Draft Legislative History of the CIA, prepared by the Ofl5ce of Legislative
Counsel, CIA. .July. 1967; and Organizational History of CIA, 1950-1953, pre-
pared by the CIA, p. 27.

(71)

of DCI authority over the intelligence community. Rather, congres-
sional committees were interested in whether the DCI's primary
responsibility would be to the military services or whether he would
report directly to the National Security Council (NSC) and the
President.*^ But the problems facing the DCI were obvious from the
beginning. According to a 1948 memorandum by the CIA's General
Counsel :

In its performance of the intelligence functions outlined
in the National Security Act, the primary difficulty exper-
ienced by CIA has been in certain weakness of language
in paragraph 102(d) concerning the meaning of coord-
ination of intelligence activities. Where the Act states "it
shall be the duty of the Agency ... to advise the National
Security Council . . . [and] to make recommendations to the
National Security Council for the coordination of such intel-
ligence activities," it has been strongly argued that this places
on the Director a responsibility merely to obtain cooperation
among the intelligence agencies. This weakness of language
and the ensuing controversy might have been eliminated by
the insertion after the phrase "it shall be the duty of the
Agency," the following words: "and the Director is hereby
empowered," or some other such phrase indicating the intent
of Congress that the Director was to have a controlling voice
in the coordination, subject to the direction of the National
Security Council.^

Under Senate Resolution 21, the Select Committee has undertaken
for the first time since 1947 a studv of the manner in which the
successive Directors of Central Intelligence have carried out their
responsibilities, in an effort to determine: (1) whether the DCI's
assigned responsibilities are proper and sufficient; (2) whether the
DCI has sufficient authority to carry out these responsibilities; (3)
whether the DCI should continue as Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, if he is to play a leadership role for the entire intelli-
gence comnnmity; and (4) whether Congress should enact more
explicit or different definitions of the DCI's responsibilities.

* Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee on S. 758, pp. 173-176,
and Hearing's before the House Clommittee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments on H.R. 2139 (1947). During the House hearings, Representative
Hale Boggs commented :

"I can see . . . even if this biU becomes law, as pre«entlv set up, a great deal of
room for confusion on intelligence matters. Here we have the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, responsible to the National Security Council, and
yet the Director is not a member of that Council, but he has to get all of his
information down through the chair of the Secretary of National Defense, and
all the other agencies of Government in addition to our national defense agencies.
. . . I juH cnnnot quite ace how the man is fioino to carry out his functions
there without a great deal of confusion, and really more opportunity to put the
blame on somebody else than there is now."

Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal replied :

"Well, if you have an organization. Mr. Boges, in which men have to rely
unon placing the blame, . . . you cannot run any orsranization. and it goes to
the root really of this whole question. This thing will work, and I have said
from the begmning it would only work, if the components tvant it to work."
[Emphasis added.]

■^ Memorandum from Lawrence R. Houston to the Director, 5/7/48.

Introduction

The Pearl Harbor intelligence failure was the primary motivation
for establi?hinor a Director of Central Intelligence. President Truman
desired a national intelligence organization which had access to all
information and would be headed by a Director who could speak au-
thoritatively for the whole community and could insure that the com-
munity's operation served the foreign policy needs of the President and
his senior advisers.* President Truman and subsequent Presidents have
not wanted to rely exclusively on the intelligence judgments of depart-
ments with vested interests in applying intelligence to support a partic-
ular foreign policy or to justify acquiring a new weapons system.

However, the DCI's responsibility to produce national intelligence
and to coordinate intelligence activities has often been at variance with
the particular interests and prerogatives of the other intelligence
community departments and agencies. During the Second World War,
the Department of 'State and the military services developed their own
intelligence operations. Despite establishment of the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence in 1946, they have not wanted to give up control over
their own intelligence capabilities. The military services particularly
have argued that they must exercise direct control over peacetime intel-
ligence activities in order to be prepared to conduct wartime military
operations. The State and Defense Departments have steadfastly op-
posed centralized management of the intelligence community under
the DCI.

However, over time the actual degree of conflict between the DCI's
responsibility to coordinate intelligence activities and the interests of
the other parts of the community has depended on how broadly each
DCI chose to interpret his coordination responsibilities and how he
allocated his time between his three major roles.^ The three roles the
DCI plays are: (1) the producer of national intelligence; (2) the
coordinator of intelligence activities; and (3) the Director of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency.

A. The Producer of National Intelligence

As the President's principal foreign intelligence adviser, the DCI's
major responsibility is to produce objective and independent national

^ Harry S. Truman, Mffmoirs, Vol. II, p. 58.

" Question : When you were DCI, did you ^'epl tbat institutionally or functionally
your position was bumping heads with the DOD intelligence apparatus in different
ways or not, and if not, why not, in view of the structufe?

Mr. Schlesinger: Well, historically there hav^ been intervening periods of
open warfare and detente . . . Prior to these, one of the problems of the intelligence
community has been the warfare that exists along jurisdictional boundaries, and
this tended to erupt in the period of the 1960's, in particular when they were
inti'oducing a whole set of new technical collection capabilities ; that open warfare
was succeeded by a period of true detente, but the problem w-ith such detente is
that it tends to be based on marriage contracts and the principle of good fences
make good neighbors, and that a mutual back-scratching and the like, so that
you do not get effective resource management under those circumstances. (James
Schlesinger, testimony, 2/2/76, pp. 29-30.)

69-983 O - 76 - 6

intelligence for senior policymakers.^" In so doing, he draws on a
variety of collection methods and on the resources of the departmental
intelligence organizations as well as CIA analysts." But the DCI
issues national intelligence and is alone responsible for its production.^^

The most important national intelligence which the DCI produces
is the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). An NIE presents the
intelligence community's current knowledge of the situation in a
particular country or on a specific topic and then tries to estimate what
is going to happen within a certain period of time. NIEs are prepared
for use by those in the highest policy levels of government and rep-
resent the considered judgment of the entire community.^^ Major
differences of opinion within the intelligence community are illumi-
nated in the text or in the footnotes. Wlien an NIE is released, however,
it is the DCI's own national intelligence judgment, in theory free from
departmental or agency biases."

To carry out this responsibility to produce independent and objec-
tive national intelligence, DCI Walter Bedell Smith established the
Board of National Estimates in 1950. The Board was comprised of
senior government officials, academicians and intelligence officers and
had a small staff known as the Office of National Estimates (ONE).
One member of the Board would be responsible for supervising the
drafting of the estimates by the ONE staff, for reviewing these judg-
ments collectively for the DCI, and for adjudicating disputes within
the community. When the United States Intelligence Board reviewed
an NIE, the DCI could have confidence in the opinions expressed in
the estimate because each estimate reflected the collective judgment of
his own Board. According to the former chairman of the Board of
National Estimates, John Huizenga :

The Board of National Estimates in fact functioned as a kind
of buffer. It provided procedures by which the departmental
views could be given a full and fair hearing, while at the same
time ensuring that the DCI's responsibilities to produce in-
telligence from a national viewpoint could be upheld.^^

^"According to NSCID No. 1, 2/17/72. national intelligence is that intelligence
required for the formulation of national security policy and concerning more
than one department or agency. It is distinguished from departmental intel-
ligence, which is that intelligence in support of the mission of a particular
department.

"Prior to President Ford's Executive Order No. 11 90.^;, o/]s/7fi. the TTnited
States Intelligence Board, composed of representatives from the various agencies
and departments of the intelligence community, formally reviewed the DCI's
na^^ional intelligence judgments.

^ Under President Ford's Executive Order No. 11905. 2/18/76. the DCI will
have responsibility to "supervise production and dissemination of national intel-
ligence."

"At present, the DCI briefs the Congress on the judgments contained in his
NIEs. The Congress does not receive the DCI's NIEs on a regular basis.

" In his role as CIA Director, the DCI also produces current intelligence and
research studies for senior policymakers. These intelligence judgments are pre-
pared by CIA analysts who are supposed to be free from departmental prefer-
ences. Such current reporting is not formally reviewed by the other members of
the intelligence community, but is often informally coordinated.

^ John Huizenga testimony, 1/26/76, p. 11.

In 1973, Colby replaced the Board and the ONE staff with a new
system of eleven National Intelligence Officers (NIOs). Each NIO has
staff responsibility to the DCI for intelligence collection and produc-
tion activities in his geographical or functional specialty. The NIOs
coordinate the drafting of NIEs within the community. They do not,
however, collectively review the final product for the DCI.^*^ Director
Colby testified that he thought the Board of National Estimates tended
to fuzz over differences of opinion and to dilute the DCI'S final
intelligence judgments.^^

In the course of its investigation, the Committee concluded that the
most critical problem confronting the DCI in carrying out his respon-
sibility to produce national intelligence is making certain that Ms in-
telligence judgments are in fact objective and independent of depart-
mental and agency biases. However, this is often quite difficult. A most
delicate relationship exists between the DCI and senior policymakers.
According to John Huizenga :

There is a natural tension between intelligence and policy,
and the task of the former is to present as a basis for the de-
cisions of policymakers as realistic as possible a view of forces
and conditions in the external environment. Political leaders
often find the picture presented less than congenial. . . .
Thus, a DCI who does his job well will more often than not
be the bearer of bad news, or at least will make things seem
disagreeable, complicated, and uncertain. . . . Wlien intelli-
gence people are told, as happened in recent years, that they
were expected to get on the team, then a sound intelligence-
policy relationship has in effect broken down.^^

In addition, the DCI must provide intelligence for cabinet officers
who often have vested interests in receiving information which sup-
ports a particular foreign policy (State Department) or the acquisi-

^" Under the NIO system, the Defense Intelligence Agency fDIA) and the
military services have assumed greater responsibility for the initial drafting of
military estimates. Because NIOs have no separate staff, they must utilize experts
in the community to draft sections of the estimates. In 1975, DIA prepared the
first drafts of two chapters of the NIE on Soviet offensive and defensive strate-
gic forces. Colby contends that as a consequence, analysts throughout the com-
munity felt more involved. (William Colby testimony, 12/11/75.)

" According to Colby :

"A board? You say why don't you have a board also? I have some reservation
at the ivory tower kind of problem that you get out of a board which is too
separated from the rough and tumble of the real world. I think there is a tend-
ency for it to intellectualize and then write sermons and appreciations. . . .

"I think there is a tendency to become institutionally committed to an approach
and to an appraisal of a situation and to begin to interpret new events against
the light of a predetermined approach toward those events. I think that has been
a bother. I like the idea of an individual total responsibility, one man or woman
totally responsible, and then you don't get any fuzz about how there was a vote,
and therefore I really didn't like it but I went along and all that sort of thing,
one person totally responsible, I think, is a good way to do it. That can be the
Director or whatever you .set up. But I do like that idea of separating out and
making one individual totally re.spon.sible so there's nobody else to go to, and
there's no way of dumping the responsibility onto somebody else. That really
is my main problem with the board, that it diffuses resi)onsibility, that it does
get out of the main line of the movement of material. (Colby, 12/11/75, pp. 36-37.)

^ Huizenga, 1/26/76, pp. 13-14.

tion of a new weapon system (Department of Defense).^'' The
President and NSC staff want confirmation that their policies are suc-
ceeding. Moreover, each NIE has in the past been formally reviewed
by other members of the intelligence community. Although CIA
analysts have developed expertise on issues of critical importance to
national policymakers, such as Soviet strategic programs, most DCIs
have been reluctant to engage in a confrontation with members of the
USIB over substantive findings in national intelligence documents.^"
According to John Huizenga :

The truth is that the DCI, since his authority over the intel-
ligence process is at least ambiguous, has an uphill struggle
to make a sophisticated appreciation of a certain range of
issues prevail in the national intelligence product over against
the parochial views and interests of departments, and espe-
cially the military departments.^^

Finally, the DCI's own analysts in CIA are sometimes accused of
holding an "institutional" bias. According to James Schlesinger :

The intelligence directorate of the CIA has the most com-
petent, qualified people in it, just in terms of their raw intel-
lectual capabilities, but this does not mean that they are free
from error. In fact, the intelligence directorate tends to make
a particular type of error systematically in that the intelli-
gence directorate tends to be in close harmony with the pre-
vailing biases in the intellectual community, in the univer-
sity community, and as the prevailing view changes in that
community, it affects the output of the intelligence
directorate,^^

In particular, CIA analysts are sometimes viewed as being predis-
posed to provide intelligence support for the preferences of the arms
control community. According to Schlesinger :

For many years it was said, for example, that the Air
Force had an institutional bias to raise the level of the Soviet
threat, and one can argue that in many cases that it did and
that was a consequence.

" According to Huizenga :

"It should be recognized that the approach of an operating department to intel-
ligence issues is not invariably disinterested. The Department of State sometimes
has an interest in having intelligence take a certain view of a situation because
it has a heavy investment in an ongoing line of policy, or because the Secretary
has put himself on record as to how to think about a particular problem. In the
Defense Department, intelligence is often seen as the servant of desired policies
and programs. At a minimum there is a strong organizational interest in seeing
to it that the intelligence provides a vigorous appraisal of potential threats. It
is not unfair to say that because of the military leadership's understandable de-
sire to hedge against the unexpected, to provide capabilities for all conceivable
contingencies there is a natural thrust in military intelligence to maximize
threats and to oversimplify the intentions of potential adversaries. It is also
quite naturally true that military professionals tend to see military power as the
prime determinant of the behavior of states and of the movement of events in
international politics." (Huizenga, 1/26/76, pp. 11-12.)

'" Thid.. p. 11.

"^ IMd., p. 12.

^-Schlesinger, 2/2/76, pp. 24-25.

But there developed an institutional bias amongst the
analytic fraternity which ran in the opposite direction. There
was an assumption that the Soviets had the same kind of arms
control objectives that they wished to ascribe or persuade
American leaders to adopt, and as a result there was a steady
upswing of Soviet strategic capabilities, and the most serious
problem, it seems to me, or the most amusing problem devel-
oped at the close of the cycle when the Soviets had actually
deployed more than 1,000 ICBMs, and the NIEs, as I recall
it, were still saying that they would deploy no more than 1,000
ICBMs because of the prevailing belief in the intelligence
analytic fraternity that the Soviets would level off at 1,000
just as we had.

So one must be careful to balance what I will call the
academic biases amongst the analysts with the operational
biases amongst other elements of the intelligence community.^^

Consequently, on the occasions when the DCI does support his own
staff's recommendations over the objection of the other departments,
the objectivity of the national intelligence product may still be under-
mined by the bias of CIA analysts.

Recognizing all these difficulties, the Select Committee has investi-
gated two particularly difficult cases for Director Helms in an effort
to illustrate the problems the DCI confronts in carrying out his re-
sponsibility to produce objective and independent national intelligence.

During the summer and fall of 1969, the White House and then the
Secretary of Defense indirectly pressured the DCI to modify his
judgments on the capability of the new Soviet SS-9 strategic missile
system. The issues under debate were: (1) whether the SS-9 was a
MIRV (Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle) missile;
and (2) whether the Soviets were seeking to achieve a first strike ca-
pability. The intelligence judgments on these points would be critical
in decisions as to whether the ITnited States would deploy its own
MIRV missiles or try to negotiate MIRV limitations in SALT (the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), and whether the United States
would deploy an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system to protect the
United States Minuteman missile force against a Soviet first strike.

On the first issue, in June 1969, the President's Special Adviser for
National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, called Director Helms to
the AVliite House to discuss an estimate on Soviet strategic forces. Kis-
singer and the NSC staff made clear their view that the new Soviet mis-
sile was a MIRV and asked that Helm's draft be rewritten to provide
more evidence sup]Dorting the DCI's judgment that the SS-9 had not
demonstrated a MIRV capability. In response, the Chairman of the
Board of National Estimates rewrote the draft, but he did not change
the conclusion: All seven tests of the SS-9 were MRVs (Multiple Re-
entry Vehicles) ; they were certainly not independently guided after

^ Schlesinger, 2/2/76, pp. 26-27. CIA analysts are also sometimes accused of
being biased in favor of the clandestine intellieence collected by their own agency.
This charge is not, however, supported by a CIA study of what kinds of reporting
CIA analysts themselves find KEY in writing their intelligence memoranda. For
FY 1974. while CIA analysts considered clandestine reporting to be important,
overt State Department reporting on political and economic subjects was cited
more frequently as KEY. (Annual DDI Survey, FY 1974.)

separation from the launch vehicle.^* According to testimony by three
Board members, at the time they saw nothing improper in a White
House request to redraft the estimate to inchide more evidence. How-
ever, in this case, they interj^reted tlie White House request as a subtle
and indirect effort to alter the DCI's national intelligence judgment.^^
On the second issue, three months later, Helms decided to delete a
paragraph in the Board of National Estimates' draft on Soviet stra-
tegic forces after an assistant to Secretary of Defense Laird informed
Helms that the statement contradicted the public position of the
Secretary.^^
The deleted paragraph read :

We believe that the Soviets recognize the enormous diffi-
culties of any attempt to achieve strategic superiority of such
order as to significantly alter the strategic balance. Conse-
quently, we consider it highly unlikely that they %vill attempt
within the period of this estimate to achieve a first-strike
capability, i.e., a capability to launch a surprise attack against
the U.S. with assurance that the USSR would not itself receive
damage it would regard as unacceptable. For one thing, the
Soviets w^ould almost certainly conclude that the cost of
such an undertaking along with all their other military com-
mitments would be prohibitive. More important, they almost
certainly would consider it impossible to develop and deploy
the combination of offensive and defensive forces necessary
to counter successfully tlie various elements of U.S. strategic
attack forces. Finally, even if such a project were economically
and technically feasible the Soviets almost certainly would
calculate that the U.S. would detect and match or overmatch
their efforts.-^

Subsequently, the State Department representative on the United
States Intelligence Board inserted the deleted paragraph as a footnote.

^ In a memorandum to the US IB representatives, dated 6/16/69, the Director
of the Office of National Estimates, Abbot Smith, sitated :

"The Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-8-68, approved by USIB on 12 .Tune
was discussed at a meeting with Dr. Kissinger and others on Saturday. Out of
this meeting came requests for (a) some reordering of the paper; (b) clarifica-
tion of some points; and (c) additional argument pro and con about the
MRV-MIRV problem. We have accordingly redrafted the paper with these re-
quests in mind. No changes in estimates were asked, nor (we think) have been
made. But the details call for coordination."

See also, staff summary of Carl Duckett interview, 6/13/75.

-= Staff summaries of interviews with John Huizenga, 7/9/75 ; Abbot Smith,
8/2/75 ; Williard Mathias, 7/7/75.

^ Memorandum from Director Helms to USIB Members, 9/4/69, and staff sum-
mary of Abbot Smith interview, 8/2/75.

According to William Baroody, Secretary Laird's Special Assistant :

"I am fairly confident that I did not specifically bring pressures to bear on
the Director of Centrnl Intelligence to delete or change any particular paragraph.
We did discuss the differences at the time between, as these documents refresh
my memory, between the DTA concern of that narticular paragraph and the CIA
estimate." (William Baroody testimony, 2/27/76, p. 4.)

"^ Draft NIE 11-8-69. approved by the Board of National Estimates prior to
the USIB meeting on August 28, 1969.

These are stark, and perhaps exceptional, examples of White House
and Defense Department pressures on the DCI, but they illustrate the
kinds of buffeting with wliich the DCI must contend. Director Helms
testified :

A national intelligence estimate, at least when I was Di-
rector, was considered to be the Director's piece of paper.
USIB contributed to tlie process but anybody could contribute
to tlie process, the estimates staff', individuals in the White
House. And the fact that a paragraph or a sentence was
changed or amended after USIB consideration was not
extraordinary. . . .

So this question w^hich seems to have come up about some-
body influencing one aspect or influencing another aspect of
it, the w^liole process was one of influences back and forth,
some in favor of this and some in favor of that. . . .

So that was the system then. I dont know^ what is the sys-
tem now, but on this issue of the first strike capability one
of the things that occurred in connection with that was a
battle royale over whether it was the Agency's job to decide
definitively whether the Soviet Union had its first strike
capability or did not have a first strike capability. And this
became so contentious that it seemed almost impossible to
get it resolved.

I have forgotten just exactly what I decided to do about
the whole thing, but I don't know, I think it was back in '69.
There was a question about certain footprints and MRVs and
things of this kind, and some people felt that they were very
important footprints and other people thought they were
unimportant footprints, and there's no question there's a
battle royale about it.

However, it was resolved however. If you felt that there
was pressure to eliminate one thing, there was a manifold
pressure to put in something else.

But anyway, I don't really see an issue here.-®
Wliile Helms may not see an issue here, the Committee found that
constant tension exists between the DCI, whose responsibility it is to
produce independent and objective national intelligence, and the agen-
cies, who are required to cooperate in this effort.

A second case investigated by the Select Committee illustrates the
potential problems the DCI confronts in producing relevant national
intelligence for senior policymakers planning highly sensitive mili-
tary operations. In April 1970, following Prince Sihanouk's ouster,
United States policymakers decided to initiate a military incursion
into Cambodia to destroy North Vietnamese sanctuaries. In making
this decision, these policymakers had to rely on an earlier (February)
NIE and current reporting from the various dej)artments and agen-
cies. They never received a formal DCI national intelligence estimate
or memorandum on the political conditions inside Cambodia after
Sihanouk's departure or on the possible consequences of such an
American incursion. Why ? Because Director Helms decided in April
not to send such an estimate to the NSC.

Richard Helms testimony, 1/30/76, pp. 59-61.

In April 1970, analysts in the Office of National Estimates pre-
pared a long memorandum entitled "Stocktaking in Indochina : Longer
Term Prospects" which included discussion of the broad question of
future developments in Cambodia, and addressed briefly the question
of possible United States intervention : ^^

Nevertheless, the governments of Laos and Cambodia are both
fragile, and the collapse of either under Communist pressure
could have a significant adverse psychological and military
impact on the situation in South Vietnam. . . . Because the
events in Cambodia and their impact are harder to predict,
if Hanoi could be denied the use of base areas and sanctuaries
in Cambodia, its strategy and objectives in South Vietnam
would be endangered. Hanoi is clearly concerned over such a
prospect. Cambodia, however, has no chance of being able to
accomplish this by itself ; to deny base areas and sanctuaries
in Cambodia would require heavy and sustained bombing
and large numbers of foot soldiers which could only be sup-
plied by the U.S. and South Vietnam. Such an expanded
allied effort could seriously handicap the Communists and
raise the cost to them of prosecuting the war, but, however
successful, it probably would not prevent them from continu-
ing the struggle in some form.^°

Helms received this draft memorandum 13 days before the planned
United States incursion into Cambodia. Then the day before the in-
cursion began. Helms decided not to send the memorandum to the
White House. A handwritten note from Helms to the Chairman of
the Board of National Estimates stated : "Let's take a look at this on
June 1, and see if we w^ould keep it or make certain revisions."

The Committee has been unable to pinpoint exactly why Director
Helms made this decision.^^ One member of the Board of National
Estimates recalled that Helms would have judged it "most counter-
productive" to send such a negative assessment to the White House.^-
George Carver, Director Helms' Special Assistant for Vietnamese Af-
fairs in 1970, objected to this conclusion that Helms refrained from
sending the memorandum forward because he thought the message

^ DCI Helms encouraged the analysts to prepare such a memorandum for the
White House. On an early draft, Helms commented to Abbot Smith, Chairman
of the Board of National Estimates : "O.K. Let's develop the paper as you sug-
gest and do our best to coordinate it within the Agency. But in the end I want
a good paper on this subject, even if I have to make the controversial judgments
myself. We owe it to the policymakers I feel." (Richard Helms, 4/7/70.)

™ "Stocktaking in Indochina : Longer Term Prospects," ONE memorandum,
4/17/70, para. 69.

^ Helms told the Committee :

"Unfortunately my memory has become hazy about the reasons for decisions
on the papers you identify. ... In a more general way let me try to be help-
ful to you (I will assume that you have or will talk to [George] Carver and that
you win give rensonable weight to hi« comments. In the first p^ace, it is almost
impossible at this late date to recreate all the relevant circumstances and con-
siderations which went into decisions of the kind you are examining, made six
years ago. Secondly, it is dangerous to examine exhaustively one bead to the
exc^U'sinn of ^ther be^ds 'n the necklace." (Telegram from Richard Helms to the
Select Committee, 3/2.3/76.)

^Staff summary of James Graham interview, 2/5/76.

would be unpalatable or distressing to the White House.^^ Rather,
Carver argued tliat Helms judged that it would not be appropriate
to send forward a memorandum drafted by analysts who did not know
about the planned U.S. military operation.

According to Carver's testimony, Helms was told in advance about
the, planned incursion under the strict condition that he could not
inform other intelligence analysts, including the Chairman of the
Board of National Estimates and the CIA intelligence analysts work-
ing on Indochina questions. Then because the analysts were not in-
formed, Helms decided not to send forward their memorandum on
Indochina.

According to Carver :

He [Hehns] thought that it might be unhelpful, it might
indeed look a little fatuous, because the people who had pre-
pared it and drafted it were not aware that the U.S. was on
the verge of making a major move into Cambodia, hence their
commentary was based on the kind of unspoken assumption
that there was going to be no basic operational change in the
situation, as they projected over the weeks and months im-
mediately ahead.^^

Further, Carver speculated that Helms probably felt he would not
be listened to if it were immediately open to the counterattack that the
analysts did not know of the planned operations.^*"" In effect, Carver
argues that in carrying out the President's restriction on discussing
the planned operations. Helms denied his analysts the very informa-
tion he considered necessary for them to have to provide intelligence
judgments for senior policymakers. Helms took this decision even
though the memorandum in question included a judgment on the pos-
sible consequences of United States intervention in Cambodia.

Thus, for whatever combination of reasons, in the spring of 19Y0
prior to tlie Cambodia incursion, the DCI did not provide senior
policymakers formally with a national intelligence memorandum
which argued that the operation would not succeed in thwarting the
North Vietnamese effort to achieve control in Indochina,

Six weeks later, while the Cambodia incursion was still underway,
the State Department requested a Special NIE(SNIE) on North
Vietnamese intentions which would include a section on the impact of
the United States intervention in Cambodia. A draft estimate was
prepared and coordinated within the intelligence community, just as
the incursion was ending. The estimate began with a number of caveats
such as : "Considerable difficulties exist in undertaking this analysis at
this time. Operations in Cambodia are continuing and the data on re-
sults to date is, in the nature of things, incomplete and provisional."
The draft went on to say that assessing Hanoi's intentions is always a
difficult exercise but "even more complicated in a rapidly moving situ-

^' George Carver testimony, 3/5/76, p. 30.

" Ihid.. p. 10. Carver told the Committee that his overall judgments were "based
on what I am reasonably convinced is a recollection of a series of conversations,
although I cannot cite to you a specific conversation or give you a Memorandum
for the Record that says that." (Ibid., p. 15.)

"* Ibid., pp. 22-23.

at ion, in which there are a number of unknown elements, particularly
with respect to U.S. and Allied courses of action." With respect to the
situation in Cambodia, the estimate concluded :

Although careful analysis of these losses sujjsests that the
Communist situation is by no means critical, it is necessary to
retain a ^ood deal of caution in judging the lasting impact
of the Cambodian aifair on the Communist position in Indo-
china.^^

Despite all these qualifications, Helms again decided not to send the
estimate to the White House. While Helms does not recall the reasons
for his decision, he did tell the Committee :

In my opinion there is no way to insulate the DCI from un-
popularity at the hands of Presidents or policymakers if he
is making assessments which run counter to administrative
policy. That is a built-in hazard of the job. Sensible Presi-
dents understand this. On the other hand they are human
too, and in my experience they are not about to place their
fate in the hands of any single individual or group of indi-
viduals. In sum, make the intelligence estimates, be sure they
reach the President personally, and use keen judgment as to
the quantity of intelligence paper to which he should be sub-
jected. One does not want to lose one's audience, and this is
easy to do if one overloads the circuit. No power has yet been
found to force Presidents of the United States to pay atten-
tion on a continuing basis to people and papers when confi-
dence has been lost in the originator.^®

Nevertheless, as John Huizenga testified:

In times of political stress on intelligence, there is more a
question of invisible pressures that might cause people to feel
that they were being leaned upon, even though nobody asked
them to take out some words or add some words . . . When
intelligence producers have a general feeling that they are
working in a hostile climate, what really happens is not so
much that they tailor the product to please, although that's
not been unknown, but more likely, they avoid the treatment
of difficult issues.^^

In the end, the DCI must depend on his position as the President's
principal intelligence adviser or on liis personal relationship with the
President to produce objective and independent national intelligence.^^
Organizational arrangements such as the Board of National Esti-
mates may, nevertheless, help insulate the DCI from pressures; but

^ Draft SNIE 14-3-70.

'^ Telegram from Richard Helms to the Select Committee, 3/23/76.

=" Huizenga, 1/26/76, pp. 20-21.

^ John Huizenga testified that "there were very few instances of gross inter-
ference." While "it's fair to say [the Cambodia and SS-9 cases] were gross, par-
ticularly the SS-9 case," objectivity and independence are difficult to uphold
when political consensus breaks down over foreign policy issues. Huizenga
concluded, "the experience of these years persuade me that we have yet to prove
that we can have in times of deep political division over foreign policy a profes-
sional, independent, objective intelligence system." (Huizenga, 1/26/76, p. 9.)

only if tliey are used. In the cases of the SS-9 and Cambodia, Helms
took the decisions without consulting with the Board collectively.

B. Coordinator of Intelligence Activities
1. The Intelligence Process

In theory, the intelliafence process works as follows. The President
and members of the NSC — as the major consumers of forei^ intel-
ligence— define what kinds of information they need. The Director
of Central Intelligence with the advice of other members of the intel-
ligence community establishes requirements for the collection of dif-
ferent kinds of intelligence. (An intelligence requirement is defined
as a consumer statement of information need for which the informa-
tion is not already at hand.) Resources are allocated both to develop
new collection systems and to operate existing systems to fulfill the
intelligence requirements. The collection agencies — the National Se-
curity Agency (NSA), CIA, DIA, and the military services — manage
the actual collection of intelligence. Raw intelligence is then assembled
by analysts in CIA, DIA, the State Department, and the military
services and ^produced as finished intelligence for senior policymakers.

In practice, however, the process is much more complicated. The
following discussion treats the Committee's findings regarding the
means and methods the DCI has used to carry out his responsibility
for coordinating intelligence community activities.

'2. Managing Intelligence Collection

Although the responsibility of the DCI to coordinate the activities
of the intelligence community is most general, the DCIs have tended
to interpret their responsibility narrowly to avoid antagonizing the
other departments and agencies in the intelligence community. While
DCIs have sought to define the general intelligence needs of senior
United States policymakers, they have not actually established intel-
ligence collection requirements or chosen specific geographical targets.

The individual departments establish their own intelligence collec-
tion requirements to fulfill their perceived national and departmental
needs. For example, DIA compiles the Defense Intelligence Objectives
and Priorities document (DIOP) which is a single statement of intel-
ligence requirements for use by all DOD intelligence components, in
particular. Defense attaches, DIA production elements, the intelli-
gence groups of the military services, and the military commands. The
DIOP contains a listing by country of nearly 200 intelligence issues
and assigns a numerical priority from one to eight to each country and
topic. The State Department sends out ad hoc requests for informa-
tion from United States missions abroad. Although the Department
does not compile a formal requirements document, Foreign Service
Officer reporting responds to the information needs of the Secretary
of State.

In the absence of authority to establish intelligence requirements,
the DCI relies on issuing general collection guidance to carry out his
coordinating responsibilities. The DCI annually defines United States
substantive intelligence priorities for the coming year in a DCI Direc-
tive. This sets out an elaborate matrix arraying each of 120 countries
against 83 intelligence topics and assigning a numerical priority from

1 to 7 for each country and topic combination. Since 1973, the DCI
has also distributed a memorandum called the DCI's "Perspectives"
\Yhich defines the major intellio^ence problems policymakers will face
over the next five years; a memorandum known as the DCI's "Objec-
tives" which details the general resource management and substantive
intelligence problems the community will face in the upcoming year;
and the DCI's "Key Intelligence Questions" (KIQs) which identify
topics of particular importance to national policymakere.

All these documents have in the past been reviewed by members of
the intelligence community on USIB, but the DCI cannot compel the
departments and agencies to respond to this guidance. For example,
the Defense Intelligence Objectives and Priorities "express the
spectrum of Defense intelligence objectives and priorities geared
specifically to approved strategy" derived from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. But the DIOP does not include a large number of economic,
political and sociological questions which the Defense Department
considers inappropriate for it to cover. Consequently, Defense-con-
trolled intelligence assets do not give priority to non-military ques-
tions even though such questions are established as priorities in the
DCI's guidance.

In addition, through three intelligence collection committees of the
United States Intelligence Board, DCIs have tried in the past to rec-
oncile the different departmental requirements and to insure that the
interests of the entire community are brought to bear in the intelligence
collectors' operations.^^ The Committee on Imagery Requirements and
Exploitation (COMIREX) dealt with photographic reconnaissance.*"
The SIGINT Committee coordinated the collection of signals and
communications intelligence.*^ The Human Resources Committee dealt
with overt and clandestine human collection.*^

In the collection of overhead photography and signals intelligence,
the DCI through the COMIREX and SIGINT Committees provides
guidance as to targets and amounts of coverage. These Committees also
administer a complex accounting system designed to evaluate how
well, in technical terms, the specific missions have fulfilled the various
national and departmental requirements. Because of the nature of over-
head collection, the whole community can participate in selecting the
targets and in evaluating its success. The operating agency is respon-
sive solely to requirements and priorities established by the USIB
committees. At the same time, the DCI alone cannot direct which
photographs to take or when to alter the scope of coverage. The role
of the DCI is to make sure that the preferences of the entire commu-
nity are taken into account when targets are chosen.

'* Under President Ford's Executive Order No. 11905, these three collection
committees will probably continue under the DCI's responsibility to establish
"such committees of collectors, producers, and users to assist in his conduct of
his responsibilities."

^ In 1955, Richard Bissell. a Special Assistant to the DCI, set up an informal
Ad-Hoc Requirements Committee (ARC) to coordinate collection requirements
for the U-2 reconnaissance program. Membership initially included representa-
tives of CIA, the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Later representatives of NSA, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the State Department were added. In 1960. with the
development of a new overhead reconnaissance system, the ARC was supplanted
by a formal USIB Committee, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance or

For example, prior to the Middle East war in 1973, the USIB
SIGINT committee recommended that the Middle East be a priority
taro:et for intelligence collection if hostilities broke out, and asked
NSA to evaluate the intelligence collected and to determine appro-
priate targets. When the war broke out, NSA implemented this USIB
guidance. Later in the week, the same committee discussed and ap-
proved DIA's recommendation to change the primary target of one
collector. The DCI did not order the changes or direct what intelli-
gence to collect, but through the USIB mechanism he insured that
the community agreed to the retargeting of the system.

The DCI has been less successful in involving the entire intelligence
community in establishing collection guidance for NSA operations or
for the clandestine operations of CIA's Directorate of Operations.
These collection managers have substantial latitude in choosing which
activities to pursue ; and the DCI has not yet established a mechanism
to monitor how well these collectors are fulfilling the DCI's com-
munity guidance.

During 1975, USIB approved a new National SIGINT Kequire-
ments System, an essential feature of which requires USIB to initiate a
formal community review and approval of all SIGINT requirements.
In addition, each requirement must contain a cross reference to per-
tinent DCI priorities and specific KIQs. However, this system does

COMOR. COMOR's responsibilities included coordination of collection require-
ments for the development and operation of all overhead reconnaissance systems.
As these programs grew and the volume of photographs increased, serious prob-
lems of duplication in imagery exploitation prompted the DCI and the Secretary
of Defense to establish a special joint review group. Subsequently, it recom-
mended the establishment of the National Photographic Interpretation Center
(NPIC) and the creation of a new USIB Committee to coordinate both collection
and exploitation of national photographic intelligence. In 1967, COMIREX was
established.

*' During World War II, the military services controlled all communications
intelligence. After the war, a U.S. Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB)
was established to coordinate COMINT activities for the NSC and to advise the
DCI on COMINT issues. However, in 1949 the Secretary of Defense set up a
separate COMINT board under the Joint Chiefs of Staff to oversee the military's
COMINT activities, and this arrangement stood for three years, despite the
DCI's objections. In 1952, NSA was established with operational control over
COMINT resources and the Secretary of Defense was given executive authority
over all COMINT activities. At the same time, the USCIB was reconstituted
under the chairmanship of the DCI to advise the Director of NSA and the
Secretary of Defense. In 1958, the USCIB was merged with the Intelligence
Advisory Committee to form the United States Intelligence Board. The COMINT
Committee of the USIB was formed soon thereafter ; this became the SIGINT
Committee in 1962 when its responsibilities were extended to include ELINT.

"General Bennett, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, proposed in
1970 the establishment of a USIB subcommittee to provide a national-level forum
to coordinate the various human source collection programs, both overt and
clandestine. Following objections from the CIA's Directorate of Operations,
Director Helms decided instead to establish an ad hoc task force to study the
whole range of HUMINT problems. After a year's study, the task force recom-
mended the establishment of a USIB committee on a one-year trial basis. The
President's Fnre'gn Int^eilisence Advi'-ory Board (PFIAB), in a separate study,
also endorsed the idea. Subsequently, the Human Sources Committee was accord-
ed permanent status in June 1974 and in 1975 its name was changed to the
Human Resources Committee.

not vest in the DCI operational authority over NSA and its collection
systems.*^ The Director of NSA will still determine which specific
communications to monitor and which signals to intercept. In a crisis,
the Secretaries of State and Defense and tlie military commanders will
continue to be able to task NSA directly and inform the DCI and
the SIGINT Committee afterwards.

In contrast to technical intelligence collection where the DCI has
sought expanded community involvement in defining requirements,
DCIs have not been very receptive to Defense Department interests in
reviewing CIA's clandestine intelligence collection. In part, the DCIs
have recognized the difficulty of viewing human collection as a whole,
since it comprises many disparate kinds of collectors, some of which
are not even part of the intelligence comnninity. For example, Foreign
Service Officers do not view themselves as intelligence collectors,
despite the large and valuable contribution FSO reporting makes to the
overall national human intelligence effort. In addition, the CIA's
Clandestine Service (DDO) has lobbied against a USIB Human
Sources Committee, fearing that it would compromise the secrecy of
their very sensitive operations.^*

So DCIs, as Directors of the agency responsible for collecting
intelligence clandestinely, resisted establishment of a permanent
ITSIB committee to review human collection until 1974.*^ Wlien
established, the Committee was specifically not given responsibility
for reviewing the operational details or internal management of the
individual departments or agencies. In the case of "sensitive" infor-
mation, departments and agencies were authorized to withhold infor-
mation from the Committee and report directly to the DCI.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Human Resources Com-
mittee has only just begun to expand community influence over human
collection. The Committee issues a general guidance document called
the Current Intelligence Reporting List (CIRL). Although the mili-
tary makes some use of this document, the DDO instructs CIA
Stations that the CIRL is provided only for reference and does not
constitute collection requirements for CIA operations. The Human

*^ William Colby testified before the Committee :

"I think it is clear I do not have command authority over the [NSA]. That
is not my authority. On the other hand, the National Security Council Intelli-
gence Directives do say that I do have the job of telling them what these priori-
ties are and what the subjects they should be working on are." (William Colby
testimony, 9/29/75, pp. 20-21.)

** The DCI currently exercises some control over military clandestine opera-
tions. The Chief of Stntion in e^ch country is the DCI's "designated representa-
tive" and has responsibility for coordinating all military clandestine opera-
tions. In the past, the DDO has only objected if the projects were not worth the
risk or duplicated a DDO operation. The Chief of Station rarely undertook to
evaluate whether the military operations could be done openly or would be

Sliccossful.

^ While the DCI has final responsibility for the clandestine collection of
intelligence, he i^till faces problems in coordinating the clandestine and technical
collection programs in his own agency. Illustrative of this is the recent estab-
lishment of a National Intelligence OflScer (NIO) for Snecial Activities to help
the DCI focus DDO operations on three or four central intellisence gaps. Direc-
tor Colby determined that only through a special assistant could he break down
the separate cultures of DDO and technical intelligence collection and the barriers
between the intelligence analysts and DDO.

Resources Committee has initiated community-wide assessments of
human source reporting in individual countries which emphasize the
ambassador's key role in coordinating human collection activities in
the field. But the Committee has not defined a national system for
establishing formal collection requirements for the various human
intelligence agencies.

In summar}^, the DCI does not have authority to manage any collec-
tion programs outside his own agency. The DCI only issues general
guidance. The departments establish their own intelligence collection
requirements and the collection managers (NSA, DIA, CIA, and
the military services) retain responsibility for determining precisely
which intelligence targets should be covered. President Ford's Execu-
tive Order does not change the DCI role in the management of
intelligence collection activities.

3. Allocating Intelligence Resources

In a 1971 directive. President Nixon asked Director Helms to plan
and review all intelligence activities including tactical intelligence
and the allocation of all resources to rationalize intelligence priorities
within budgetary constraints.^^ Since 1971, the DCI has prepared
recommendations to the President for a consolidated national intelli-
gence program budget. Director Helms, in his first budget recommen-
dations, proposed a lid on intelligence spending, noting that "we
should rely on cross-program adjustments to assure that national
interests are adequately funded." *^ However, prior to President
Ford's Executive Order, the DCI has had no way to insure author-
itatively that such objectives were realized.

The DCI has independent budget authority over only his own
agency whi'^h represents only a small percentage of the overall
national intelligence budget. As chairman of an Executive Committee
or ExCom for special reconnaissance activities, the DCI has been
involved in the preparation of the program budget for the develop-
ment and management of the major United States technical collection
systems. However, differences of opinion between the DCI and the
other member of the ExCom. the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence, were referred to ih^ Secretary of Defense for resolu-
tion. The Secretary of Defense in his budget allocated the remaining
intelligence community resources.

The DCI's role in the Defense intelligence budget process was in
effect that of an adviser. The DCI's "Perspectives," which analyze
the political, economic, and military environment over the next five
years, have had little impact on the formulation of Defense intelli-
gence resource requirements. According to John Clarke, former Asso-

^ "Announcement Ontlinins Management Sfeps for Improvinc the Effectiveness
of the Intelligence Community," November 5, 1971, 7 Pres. Docs. p. 14S2. Nixon
sought to enhance the ro'e of the DCI as community leader and to give the DCI
responsibility to coordinate Defense Department technical collection operations
with other intellisrence programs. Nixon's directive followed a comprehensive
study of the intelligence community by the Office of Management and Budget
(known as the Schlesinger Report) which recommended a fundamental reform
in tho intelligence community's decisionmaking bodies and procedures.

" Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Program Memorandum,
FY 1974, p. 44.

ciate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelli-
gence Community, the "Perspectives" ''did not have any great bearing
on the formal guidances that the different departments naving intel-
ligence elements used in deciding how much they needed or how many
dollars they required for future years." *^ The military services and
DIA responded to the fiscal guidance issued by the Secretary of
Defense.

The DCI's small staff of seven professionals in the Resource Re-
view Office of the Intelligence Community Staff' kept a low profile
and spent most of its time gathering information on the various
Defense intelligence activities. They did not provide an independent
assessment of the various programs for the DCI. Consequently, the
DCI rarely had sufficient knowledge or confidence to challenge a
Defense Department recommendation. When the DCI did object, he
generally focused on programs where he thought the Defense Depart-
ment was not giving adequate priority to intelligence activities in
which the President had a particular interest.

For example, partly as a result of the intense concern by the NSC
staff, the DCI expended substantial effort to insure that two Air
Force ships, initially built to operate on the Atlantic missile range
monitoring Cape Canaveral hrings, continued to be available to
monitor foreign missile activities. When in 1970-1971, the number of
United States missile tests decreased substantially, the Air Force
proposed that both ships be retired. The DCI, in turn, requested an
intelligence community study which concluded that the ships were
essential for foreign intelligence purposes. Consequently, the DCI
brokered an arrangement for a sharing of the ships' cost within the
Department of Defense. Today, a little under 20 percent of the ship
program is devoted to intelligence needs. The DCI had neither the
authority to direct the retention of these Air Force ships nor sufficient
resources to take over their funding for intelligence purposes to insure
that they were not retired. Nevertheless, the DCI played a definite
role in working out an arrangement whereby at least one ship will
be available until the national intelligence requirement can be met
by another means.^®

In practice, the DCI only watched over the shoulder of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence as he reviewed the budget re-
quests of DIA, NSA, and the military services. If the DCI wished
to raise a particular issue, he had a number of possible forums. He could
set up an ad hoc interagency study group or discuss the question in
the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC).^° He could
highlight resource issues in the annual fall joint OMB-Defense
Department review^ of the Defense budget or in his December letter to
the President presenting the consolidated national intelligence budget.
However, the groups were only advisory to the DCI and had no
authority over the Secretary of Defense. The joint review^ and the

**John Clarke testimony, 2/5/76, pp. 15-16.

*' According to Carl Duckett, the CIA's Deputy Director of Science and
Technology, "frankly we had to fight very hard the last two years to keep the
ships active at all." (Carl Duckett testimony, 11/10/75, pp. 106-107.)

™ IRAC was established in 1971 to advise the DCI in preparing a consolidated
intelligence program budget for the President. Members included representatives
from the Departments of State and Defense, 0MB, and the CIA. IRAC was
abolished by President Ford's Executive Order of 2/18/76.

DCI's letter to the President occurred so late in the Defense Depart-
ment budget cycle that the DCI had little opportunity to effect any
sionificant changes.

Thus, the DCI's national budget recommendations were for the
most part the aggregate figures proposed by the vai-ious Defense
agencies. The DCI did not proAade an independent calculated evalua-
tion of the entire national intelligence budget. The DCI did not
present the President with broad alternative options for the alloca-
tion of national intelligence resources. The DCI was not able to effect
trade-offs among the different intelligence programs or to reconcile
differences over priorities. Finally, the President's decisions on the
intelligence budget levels were not based upon the recommendations
of the DCI. but rather upon Defense Department totals. According to
John Clarke:

I would have to submit that in my judgment I do not think
the Presidents have used the Director's recommendations
with respect to the intelligence budgets. There have been few
exceptions where they have solidified behind the Director's
appeal, but fundamentally he has looked to the Secretary of
Defense to decide what level of intelligence activities there
should be in the defense budget.^^

Because the Secretary of Defense had final authority to allocate
most of the intelligence budget, the DCI either had to "persuade" the
Secretary to allocate Defense intelligence resources according to the
Direx^tor's recommendations or take his case directly to the President.
According to James Schlesinger :

. . . the authority of whoever occupies this post, whatever
it is called comes from the President. . . . To the extent that
it is believed that he has the President's ear, he will find
that the agencies or departments will be responsive, and if it
is believed that he does not have the President's ear. they will
be unresponsive.^-

But because the DCI must expend substantial political capital in
taking a Defense budget issue to the President, he rarely has sought
Presidential resolution. Over the past five years, the DCI went directly
to the President only twice. Both these issues involved expensive
technical collection systems, and both times the DCI prevailed.

In summary, DCIs have not been able to define priorities for the
allocation of intelligence resources — either among the different sys-
tems of intelligence collection or among intelligence collection, anal-
ysis, and finished intelligence. Without authority to allocate intelli-
gence budget resources, DCIs have been unable to insure that un-
warranted duplication and waste are avoided.

4. Key Intelligence Questions

As described above, DCIs have confronted major problems in seek-
ing to cany out their coordinating responsibilities under the 1947
National Security Act. They have not had authority to establish re-
quirements for tile collection or production of national intelligence.

^Clarke, 2/5/76, p. 27.

=-' Schlesinger, 2/2/76, pp. 43, 45.

69-983 O - 76 - 7

They have not been able to institute an effective means to evahiate
liow well the community is carryino- out their guidance. They have
not had a mechanism to direct the allocation of intelligence resources
to insure that the intelligence needs of national policymakers are met.

To help solve these problems, Director Colby instituted a new in-
telligence management system known as the Key Intelligence
Questions (KIQs). Through formation of a limited number of KIQs,
Colby tried to focus collection and production efforts on critical policy-
maker needs and to provide a basis for reallocating resources toward
priority issues.^^ This section will briefly highlight the resistance which
Colby's new management scheme provoked and the difficulties experi-
enced in evaluating the overall community efforts.

The KIQ scheme had four stages. First the DCI issued the KIQs.
Then the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) with representatives
from the various collection and production agencies developed a
strategy to answer the individual KIQs. After surveying what in-
formation was currently available to answer the KIQs, the various
agencies made commitments to collect and produce intelligence
reports "against" the various KIQs. At the end of the year, the DCI
evaluated the intelligence community's perfoiTnance.

The KIQ management process has finished its first full year of
operation and a beginning has been made to provide intelligence con-
sumers with the opportunity to make known their priorities for intelli-
gence collection and production. Collection managers have been
brought together in developing a strategy to answer key questions and
analysts have received guidance as to the kinds of reports they should
produce. In addition, the DCI now has before him considerable in-
formation about how the intelligence community is focusing on
intelligence questions which are important to senior national policy-
makers. He should be in a better position to show collection and
production managers where they have failed to meet their commit-
ments to work against individual KIQs or to spend a high percentage
of their resources on KlO-related activities.

However, while the KIQ concept is imaginative, the management
tool has encountered serious problems. First, the KIQ system does not
solve the DCI's problem of trying to establish priorities in intelli-
gence collection and production. Few topics are not included under
one KIQ or another. The KIQs have not yet been meshed with the
existing requirements system. While the KIQs are supposed to estab-
lish collection and production requirements in lieu of the DCI's Di-
rective on priorities, both continue to exist today. The Defense Depart-
ment has not only continued to issue the DIOiP but has produced its
own Defense Key Intelligence Questions (DKIQs) which number over
] ,000. Instead of providing a means for the DCI to establish priorities
for the intelligence community, the KIQs to date have added another
layer of requirements.

^^ In FY 1975, there were 69 KIQs. drafted by the DCI's National Intelligence
Officers in consultation with the NSC Intelligence Committee working group.
Approximately one-third of the KIQs dealt with Soviet foreign policy motivations
and military technology. The other KIQs dealt with such issues as the negoti-
ating position of the Arabs and Israelis, the terrorist threat, etc.

Second, Colby's management scheme has met strong resistance
from the collection and the production agencies. After one year it is
difficult to identify many intelligence activities that have changed
because of tlie IviQs. llie IviQ, K^trategy Keports were issued nine
months after tlie IviQs and tended to list collection and production ac-
tivities already under way. The DCl was not in a position to direct
the various members of tlie intelligence community to undertake com-
mitments tor diuerent colieccion eirorts, and tiie Strategy Keports
rarely contained new commitments.

While all agencies participated, DIA and DDO have responded to
the KIQs only insofar as they were consistent with their respective
internal collection objectives. DlA's "IviQ Collection Performance
Keport" pointed out tliat "the Deiense Attache system primarily re-
sponds to the DKIQs and J SOP X Joint Strategic Objectives Plan]
objectives and therefore, responses to KIQs will have to maintain con-
sistency with the two aforementioned collection guidance vehicles." ^*
111 fact, DIA writes its "Intelligence Collection Requests" and "Con-
tinuing Intelligence Kequirements," and they are then keyed back to
the relevant KiQs, somewhat as an afterthought.^^

The Deputy JJirector of Operations for tlie CIA issues his "Ob-
jectives" for the collection of clandestine human intelligence. While
these are derived from the KIQs, these "Objectives" are in fact the
collection requirements of the Clandestine Service. Since it takes so
long to recruit agents, DDO considers it is not in a position to respond
to specific KIQs dealing with near-term intelligence gaps unless a
source is already in place. Moreover, DDO determined not to deflect
or divert its effort to satisfy KIQs unless the questions happened to
fall within DDO internal objectives.

DIA and DDO invoked the KIQs to justify thei?' operations and
budgets, however they did not appear to be shaping the programs to
meet KIQ objectives. Without authority to direct resources to answer
the specific Key Intelligence Questions, the DCI had little success in
compelling the major collectors and producers of intelligence to re-
spond to the KIQs, if they were unwilling. Only NSA has made a
serious effort to insure that their collection requirements are respon-
sive to the KIQs. In USIB meetings, NSA Director General Allen
argued that the KIQs should be viewed as requirements for the in-
telligence community and the KIQ Strategy Keports should provide
more detailed instructions to field elements for collection.^^

Colby's new management scheme also failed to establish a workable
evaluation process. NIOs provided subjective judgments as to how well
the community had answered each KIQ and an assessment of the rela-
tive contribution of each agency. Although NIOs discussed their assess-
ments with consumers, they had no staff to conduct a systematic and

^ DIA, "KIQ Collection Performance Report," 8/18/75.

°^ In FY 1975, only 7 percent of DIA's attache reports responded to
KIQs. Out of 2,111 attache reports against the KIQs only 34 of the 69 were
covered. According to DIA, military attaches have access to particular types of
information and it would be unfair to assume they had the capability to respond
to all the KIQs.

^Minutes of USIB meeting, 2/6/75. Approximately 70 percent of NSA's re-
quirements for FY 1975 were KIQ-related, and about 50 percent of its operations
and maintenance budget could be ascribed to the KIQs.

independent review of how well the community had answered the
questions. Furthermore, NIOs did not base their evaluations on any
specific kinds of information, such as all production reports or all raw
intelligence collected on a particular KIQ. They commented on how
well the agencies had carried out their commitments in the Strategy
Reports without asking the collectors for any information about what
activities they undertook or what amount of money had been spent.
They merely took the collector's word that something had or had not
been done. Finally, they did not develop a method to insure that the
judgments of the individual NIOs were consistent with each other.

In addition, the IC Staff aggregated the amount of resources ex-
pended by the various collection and production managers in answer-
ing each KIQ and determined what problems had been encountered.
However, collection and production managers prepared cost estimates
of the activities expended against individual KIQs according to an
imprecisely defined process. And although the IC Staff provided
guidance as to how to do the calculations, the decisions as to how best
to estimate costs were left to the individual agencies. Not surprisingly,
the agencies employed different methods.^^ Consequently, the cost es-
timates were not comparable across agencies, and the IC Staff had no
way of making them comparable, since they could not change the dif-
ferent accounting systems in the various intelligence agencies.'^

In summary, the evaluation process did not permit a comparison
of total efforts and results against the KIQs on a community- wide
basis. Colby lacked the necessary tools to use the KIQ management
system to effect resource allocation decisions. The DCI at best was in
a position to shame recalcitrants into action by pointing up stark fail-
ures in a particular agency's efforts against the KIQs. The KIQ process
was only a surrogate for DCI authority to allocate the intelligence
resources of the community.

Colby's frustrations in trying to direct intelligence community
efforts via the KIQ process are indicative of the DCI's limited au-
thority. Within the present intelligence structure, an effort to get the
DDO and DIA to respond to what the DCI has defined as key policy-
maker intelligence questions met considerable resistance. Thus, the
most important issue raised by the KIQ manasfement experience is not
how to refine the process but whether the DCI can really succeed in
directing collection and production activities in the intelligence com-
munity toward critical policymaker needs without greater authority
over the allocation of resources.

"For example, DIA begins with the assumption that 60 percent of the De-
fense attache budget goes for collection. This figure is then multiplied by the
percentage of attache reports which responded to KIQs and the total cost ex-
pended against the KIQs was calculated to be $1.3 million. In contrast, DDO
calculates cost according to the IC Staff's recommended formula, which esti-
mates the number of manhours devoted against the KIQs and multiplies the es-
timate by an average production manhour cost.

^ In addition, while the State Department provides cost estimates of INR's
intelligence production costs, it did not submit collection cost statistics, main-
taining that Foreign Service reports were not intelligence collection. So the
evaluation process did not provide a complete picture of intelligence collection on
individual KIQs.

5. President Ford? 8 Executive Order

On February 18, 1976, President Ford announced a reorganization
of the intellicrence community to "establish policies to improve the
quality of intelligence needed for national security, to clarify the au-
thority and responsibilities of the intelligence departments and agen-
cies. . . ." The major change introduced by the President is the
formation of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) chaired
by the DCI and reporting directly to the NSC. The CFI will have
responsibility to: (1) "control budget preparation and resource al-
location for the National Foreign Intelligence Program;" (2) "estab-
lish policy priorities for the collection and production of national
intelligence;" (3) "establish policy for the management of the Na-
tional Foreign Intelligence Program;" and (4) "provide guidance
on the relationship between tactical and national intelligence." ^^

It is still too soon to pass judgment as to whether the Executive
Order will aid the DCI in his efforts to coordinate the activities of the
intelligence community. By making the DCI chairman of the CFI,
the Executive Order appears to enhance the stature of the DCI by
expanding his role in \h^ allocation of national intelligence resources.
But, as in the case of the Nixon directive in 1971, the DCI appears to
have been given an expanded set of responsibilities without a real
reduction in the authority of other members of the intelligence com-
munity over their own operations. There exist many ambiguities in the
language of the Executive Order^ particularly with regard to the role
of the CFI.

The CFI is given responsibility to "control budget preparation and
resource allocation" for national intelligence programs, but the Sec-
retary of Defense retains responsibility to "direct, fund, and op-
erate NSA." The CFI is asked to "review and amend" the budget
prior to submission to 0MB, as if the CFI will not control the prep-
aration of the budget but rather would become involved only after the
agencies and departments independently put together their own
budget. Finally, the relationship is not clear between the DCI's re-
sponsibility to "ensure the development and submission of a budget"
and the CFI's responsibility to "control budget preparation."

Moreover, the specific prohibition against DCI and CFI responsi-
bility for tactical intelligence appears to be a step backward from the
1971 Nixon directive which asked the DCI to plan and review the
allocation of all intelligence resources. While DCIs since 1971 have
not become deeply involved in such tactical intelligence questions, they
have reserved the right to become involved; and on several occasions
they have supported efforts to transfer money from the national
Defense Department intelligence budget to the budgets of the military
services, or vice versa. There are, in addition, at least theoretical trade-
offs to be made between tactical and national intelligence, especially
since the dividing mark between all intelligence operations has become
increasingly blurred with the development of large and expensive
technical collection systems.

'* Executive Order No. 11905. Other members of the CFI will be the Deputy
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs.

C. Director of the CIA

At the same time the DCI has responsibility for coordinating the
activities of the entire community, he also has direct authority over
the intelligence operations of the CIA. As Director, the DCI runs
covert operations and manages the collection of clandestine human
intelligence (Directorate of Operations) ; manages the collection of
signals intelligence abroad and allocates resources for the development
and operation of certain technical collection systems (Directorate of
Science and Technology) ; and produces current intelligence and
finished intelligence memoranda (Directorate of Intelligence).

The fact that the DCIs have also directed the operations of the
CIA has had a variety of consequences. First, DCIs have tended to
focus most of their attention on CIA operations. The first Directors
were preoccupied with organizing and establishing CIA and with
defining the Agency's role in relation to the other intelligence orga-
nizations. While Allen Dulles and Richard Helms were DCI, each
spent considerable time running covert operations. John McCone
focused on improving the ClA's intelligence product and developing
new technical collection systems when he was Director. Admiral
Rabom emphasized refining the Agency's budgetary procedures.*'"

Second, by having their own capabilities to collect and produce
intelligence, DCIs have been able to assert their influence over the
intelligence activities of the other members of the intelligence com-
munity. John Clarke, former Associate Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community, testified that Helms objected to the sugges-
tion that CIA get rid of all its SIGINT activities because he needed
"something to keep [his] foot in the door" so he could "look at the
bigger problem." ^'^ According to Clarke :

... to some degree historically, the Director's involvement
has not only been based upon good, healthy competition
among systems, which I think is good, but the directors have
seen it as an opportunity to give them a voice at the table in
judgments which have importance to their higher role, a
larger role as Director of CI.^^

However, this ability to assert influence in turn has had another
consequence: DCIs have been accused of not being able to nlay an
objective role as community leader while they have responsibility for
directing one of the community's intelligence agencies. Potential con-
flict exists in decisions with respect to every CIA activity. For ex-
ample, on each of the two occasions that the DCI went directly to the
President to object to a Defense Department budget recommendation,
the DCI won Presidential support for a CIA-developed technical
collection system. Such DCI advocacy raises the fundamental ques-
tion of whether the DCI can indeed b© an objective community leader
if he is also Director of the CIA which undertakes research and devel-
opment on technical collection systems. According to James
Schlesinger :

There has always been concern and frequently there has
been the reality that the DCI does not overlook all these

*"• Colby, 12/11/75, pp. 4-5.
"^ Clarke, 2/5/76, p. 59.
" Ibid., pp. 59-60.

assets in a balanced way ... as long as the DCI has special
responsibility for the management of clandestine activities,
that it tends to affect and to some extent contaminate his
ability to be a spokesman of the commimity as a whole in-
volving intelligence operations which are regarded as reason-
ably innocent from the purview of American life.

Components of the intelligence community other than
the CIA have feared that the DCI would be tempted to
expand the authority of the CIA in the collection activities
relative to the other components of the intelligence com-
munity. And there has been some evidence that supports such
suspicion. . . .

What I believe is at the present time you have got incon-
sistent expectations of the DCI. He's supposed to be the fair
judge amongst the elements of the intelligence community
at the same time that CIA personnel expect him to be a
special advocate for the CIA. You cannot have both roles.^^

President Ford's Executive Order seeks in part to reduce the conflict
of interest problem by establishing two Deputies to the DCI, one for
intelligence community affairs and one for CIA operations. The DCI
and his Deputy for commimity affairs will have offices in downtown
Washington. Nevertheless, the DCI will continue to have an office at
CIA headquarters and to have legal responsibility for the operations
of the Agency and at the same time general responsibility for coordi-
nating the activities of the entire intelligence community.

"^ Schlesinger, 2/2/76, pp. 8, 49.

VI. HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Introduction ^

The current political climate and the mystique of secrecy surround-
ing the intelligence profession have created misperceptions about the
Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA has come to be viewed as an
unfettered monolith, defining and determining its activities independ-
ent of other elements of government and of the direction of American
foreign policy. This is a distortion. During its twenty-nine year his-
tory, the Agency has been shaped by the course of international events,
by pressures from other government agencies, and by its own internal
norms. An exhaustive history of the CIA would demand an equally
exhaustive history of American foreign policy, the role of Congress
and the Executive, the other components of the intelligence community,
and an examination of the interaction among all these forces. Given
the constraints of time and the need to pursue other areas of research,
this was an impossible task for the Committee. Nonetheless, recogniz-."
ing the multiple influences that have contributed to the Agency's de-
velopment, the Committee has attempted to broadly outline the CIA's
organizational evolution.

An historical study of this nature serves two important purposes.
First, it provides a means of understanding the Agency's present struc-
ture. Second, and more importantly, by analyzing the causal elements
in the CIA's patterns of activity, the study should illuminate the pos-
sibilities for and the obstacles to future reform in the U.S. foreign
intelligence system.

The concept of a peacetime central intelligence organization had
its origins in World War II with the Office of Strategic Services
(OSS). Through the driving initiative and single-minded determina-
tion of General William J. Donovan, sponsor and later first director
of OSS, the organization became the United States' first central in-
telligence body. Although OSS was disbanded in 1945 and its func-

^ This section is the summary version of a longer history to be published as an
Appendix to the Committee's Final Report. This section and the longer history
are based on four principal groups of sources. Since classification restrictions pre-
vent citing individual sources directly, the categories of sources are identified as
follows : ( 1 ) approximately seventy-five volumes from the series of internal CIA
histories, a rich if uneven collection of studies, which deal with individual com-
ponents of the CIA, the administrations of the Directors of Central Intelligence,
and specialized areas of intelligence analysis. The histories have been compiled
since the late 1940's and constitute a unique institutional memory. (2) approxi-
mately sixty interviews with present and retired Agency employees. These in-
terviews were invaluable in providing depth of insight and understanding to the
organization. (3) special studies and reports conducted both within and outside
the Agency. They comprise reviews of functional areas and of the overall admin-
istration of the CIA. (4) documents and statistics supplied to the Select Commit-
tee by the CIA in response to specific requests. They include internal communica-
tions, budgetary allocations, and information on grade levels and personnel
strengths.

(97)

tional components reassigned to other government agencies, the exist-
ence of OSS was important to the CIA, First, OSS provided an orga-
nizational precedent for the CIA ; like OSS, the CIA included clandes-
tine collection and operations and intelligence analysis. Second, many
OSS personnel later joined the CIA; in 1947, the year of the CIA's
establishment, approximately one-third of the CIA's personnel were
OSS veterans. Third, OSS suffered many of tiie same problems
later experienced by the CIA; both encountered resistance to the
execution of their mission from other government agencies, both ex-
perienced the difficulty of having their intelligence analysis "heard,"
and both were characterized by the dominance of their clandestine op-
erational components.

Despite the similarities in the two organizations, OSS was an in-
strument of war, and Donovan and his organization were regarded by
many as a group of adventurers, more concerned with derring-do op-
erations than with intelligence analysis. The post-war organization
emerged from different circumstances from those that had fostered
the development of OSS.

Following the War, American policymakers conceived the idea
of a peacetime central intelligence organization with a specific pur-
pose in mind — to provide senior government officials with high-quality,
objective intelligence analysis. At the time of the new agency's crea-
tion, the military services and the State Department had their own
independent intelligence capabilities. However, the value of their anal-
ysis was limited, since their respective policy objectives often skewed
their judgments. By reviewing and synthesizing the data collected by
the State Department and the military services, a centralized body was
intended to produce national intelligence estimates independent of
policy biases. "National" intelligence meant integrated interdepart-
mental intelligence that exceeded the perspective and competence of
individual departments and that covered the broad aspects of national
policy. "Estimates" meant predictive judgments on the policies and
motives of foreign governments rather than descriptive summaries
of daily events or "current intelligence."

Although policymakers agreed on the necessity for national intel-
ligence estimates, they did not anticipate or consider the constraints
that would impede achievement of their objective. As a result, the CIA
assumed functions very different from its principal mission, becoming
a competing producer of current intelligence and a covert operational
instrument in the American cold war offensive.

The establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency coincided
with the emergence of the Soviet Union as the antagonist of the United
States. This was the single most important external factor in shaping
the Agency's development. Of equal importance were the internal orga-
nizational arrangements that determined the patterns of influence
within the Agency. In exploring the Agency's complex development,
this summary will address the following questions : Wliat institutional
and jurisdictional obstacles prevented the Agency from fulfilling its
original mission? To what extent have these obstacles persisted? In
what ways have U.S. foreign policy objectives influenced priorities in
the Agency's activities ? Wliat internal arrangements have determined
the Agency's emphases in intelligence production and in clandestine

activities? What accounts for the continued dominance of the clan-
destine component within the Agency ? How have individual Directors
of Central Intelligence defined their roles and what impact have their
definitions had on the direction of the Agency? What impact did
technological developments have on the Agency and on the Agency's
relationship with the departmental intelligence services ?

This study is not intended to catalogue the CIA's covert operations
but to present an analytical framework within which the CIA's poli-
cies and practices may be understood. The following section summa-
rizes the Agency's evolution by dividing its history into four segments :
1946-1952; 1953-1961; 1962-1970; and 1971-1975. Each period con-
stitutes a distinct phase in the Agency's development.

A. The Central Intelligence Group and the Central Intelligence

Agency: 1946-1952

The years 1946 to 1952 were perhaps the most crucial in deter-
mining the functions of the central intelligence organization. The
period marked a dramatic transformation in the mission, size and
structure of the new entity. In 1946 the Central Intelligence Group
(CIG), the CIA's predecessor, was conceived and established as an
intelligence coordinating body to minimize the duplicative efforts of
the Departments and to provide objective intelligence analysis to senior
policymakers. By 1952 the Central Intelligence Agency was engaged
in independent intelligence production and covert operations. The CIG
was an extension of Executive departments ; its personnel and budget
were allocated from State, Army and Navy. By 1952 the CIA had
developed into an independent government agency commanding man-
power and budget far exceeding anything originally imagined.

1. The Origins of the Central Intelligence Group

As World War II ended, new patterns of decisionmaking emerged
within the United States Government. In the transition from war
to peace policymakers were redefining their organizational and in-
formational needs. As President, Franklin Roosevelt maintained a
highly personalized style of decisionmaking, relying primarily on in-
formal conversations with senior officials. Truman preferred to confer
with his cabinet officers as a collective body. This meant that officials
in the State, War and Navy departments were more consistent partici-
pants in Presidential decisions than they had been under Roosevelt.
From October through December 1945, U.S. Government agencies
engaged in a series of policy debates about the necessity for and the
nature of the future United States intelligence capability.

Three major factors dominated the discussions. The first was the
issue of postwar reorganization of the Executive branch. The debate
focussed around the question of an independent Air Force and the
unification of the services under a Department of Defense. Discussion
of a separate central intelligence agency and its structure, authority,
and accountability was closely linked to the larger problem of defense
reorganization.

Second, it was clear from the outset that no department was willing
to consider resigning its existing intelligence function and accompany-

100

ing personnel and budgetary allotments to a central agency. As
departmental representatives aired their preferences, maintenance of
independent capabilities was an accepted element in defining future
organization. Coordination, not centralization, was the maximum that
each Department was willing to concede.

Third, the functions under discussion were intelligence analysis and
the dissemination of intelligence. The shadow of the Pearl Harbor
disaster dominated policymakers' thinking about the purpose of a
central intelligence agency. They saw themselves rectifying the condi-
tions that allowed Pearl Harbor to happen — a fragmented military-
based intelligence apparatus which in current terminology could not
distinguish "signals" from "noise," let alone make its assessments
available to senior officials.

Formal discussion on the subject of the central intelligence func-
tion began in the fall of 1945. The Departments presented their sep-
arate views, while two independent studies also examined the issue.
Inherent in all of the recommendations was the assumption that the
Departments would control the intelligence product. None advocated
giving a central independent group sole responsibility for collection
and analysis. All favored making the central intelligence body re-
sponsible to the Departments themselves rather than to the President.
Each Department lobbied for an arrangement that would give itself
an advantage in intelligence coordination.

The Presidential directive establishing the Central Intelligence
Group reflected these preferences. The Departments retained autonomy
over their intelligence services, and the CIG's budget and staff were
to be drawn from the separate agencies. Issued on January 22, 1946,
the directive provided the CIG with a Director chosen by the Presi-
dent. The CIG was responsible for coordination, planning, evaluation,
and dissemination of intelligence. The National Intelligence Au-
thority (NIA), a group comprised of the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and a personal repre-
sentative of the President served as the Group's supervisory body.
The Intelligence Advisorv Board (lAB), which included the heads
of the militarv and civilian intelligence agencies, was an advisory
group to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).

Through budget, personnel, and oversight, the Departments had
assured control over the Central Intelligence Group. The CIG was
a creature of departments that were determined to maintain inde-
pendent capabilities as well as their direct advisory relationship to
the President. In Januarv 1946 they succeeded in doing both; by re-
taining autonomy over their intelligence operations, they established
the strone: institutional claims that would persist for the lifetime
of the Central Intelligence Agency.

^. The Directors of Central Intelligence^ 19^6-1952

At a time when the new agency was developing its mission, the role
of its senior official was crucial. The Director of Central Intelligence
was responsible for representing the agency's interests to the Depart-
ments and for pressing its jurisdictional claims. In large part the
strength of the agency relative to the Departments was dependent on
the stature that the DCI commanded as an individual. The four DCIs

101

from 1946 to 1952 rang^ed from providing only weak leadership to
firmly solidifying the new organization in the Washington bureauc-
racy. Three of the four men were career military officers. Their appoint-
ments were indicative of the degree of control the military services
managed to retain over the agency and the acceptance of the services'
primary role in the intelligence process.

Sidney Souers, the first DCI, served from January to June 1946.
Though a rear admiral, he was not a military careerist but a business
executive, who had spent his wartime service in naval intelligence.
He accepted the job with the understanding that he would remain
only long enough to establish an organization. Having participated
in the drafting of the directive which created CIG, Souers had a fixed
concept of the central intelligence function — one that did not chal-
lenge the position of the departmental intelligence components.

Under Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg, CIG moved beyond
production of coordinated intelligence to acquire a clandestine col-
lection capability as well as authority to conduct independent re-
search and analysis. Vandenberg was an aggressive, ambitious per-
sonality, and as the nephew of Arthur Vandenberg, Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, exerted considerable influence
on behalf of the CIG. In May 1947, Vandenberg was succeeded by
Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter. Two months after Hillenkoetter's
appointment, the CIG was reconstituted as the Central Intelligence
Agency. Hillenkoetter did not command the personal stature to suc-
cessfully assert the Agency's position relative to the Departments.
Nor did he possess the administrative ability to manage the Agency's
rapidly expanding functions.

It was precisely because of Hillenkoetter's weakness that General
Walter Bedell Smith was selected to succeed him in October 1950.
Nicknamed "the American Bulldog" by Winston Churchill, Smith was
a tough-minded, hard-driving, often intimidating career military of-
ficer who effected major organizational changes during his tenure.
Smith's temperament and his senior military status made him one of
the strongest DCIs in the Agency's history. He left the Agency in
February 1953.

3. The Evolution of the Central Intelligence Function^ 19Jt.6-1952

The CIG had been established to rectify the duplication among
the military intelligence services and to compensate for their biases.
The rather vaguely conceived notion was that a small staff in the CIG
would assemble and review the raw data collected by the departmental
intelligence services and produce objective national estimates for the
use of senior American policymakers. Although in theory the concept
was reasonable and derived from informational needs, institutional
resistance make implementation virtually impossible. The depart-
mental services jealously guarded both their information and what
they believed were their preroo:atives in providing policy guidance to
the President, making the CIG's primary mission an exercise in futil-
ity. Limited in the execution of its responsibility for coordinated esti-
mates, the CIG emerged within a year as a current intelligence
producer, generating its own summaries of daily events and thereby
competing with the Departments in the dissemination of information.

102

An important factor in the change was the CIG's authorization to
carry out independent research and analysis "not being presently per-
formed" by the other Departments. Under this authorization, granted
in the spring of 1946, the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE) was
established. ORE's functions were manifold — the production of na-
tional current intelligence, scientific, technical, and economic in-
telligence as well as interagency coordination for national estimates.
With its own research and analysis capability, the CIG could carry
out an independent intelligence function without having to rely on the
departments for data. The change made the CIG an intelligence pro-
ducer, while still assuming the continuation of its role as a coordina-
tor for estimates.

Yet acquisition of a research and analysis role meant that inde-
pendent production would outstrip coordinated intelligence as a
primary mission. Fundamentally, it would be far easier to assimilate
and analyze data than it had been or would be to engage the Depart-
ments in producing "coordinated" analysis.

The same 1946 directive which provided the CIG with an independ-
ent research and analysis capability also granted the CIG a clandestine
collection capability. Since the end of the war, the remnant of OSS's
clandestine collection capability rested with the Strategic Services
Unit (SSU) , then in the War Department. In the postwar dismantling
of OSS, SSU was never intended to be more than a temporary body,
and in the spring of 1946 SSU's duties, responsibilities and personnel
were transferred to CIG along with SSU's seven overseas field stations
and communications and logistical apparatus.

The transfer resulted in the establishment of the Office of Special
Operations (OSO). OSO was responsible for espionage and counter-
espionage. From the beginning the data collected by OSO was highly
compartmented. ORE did not draw on OSO for its raw information.
Instead, overt collection was ORE's major source of data.

Since its creation CIG had had two overt collection components.
The Domestic Contact Service (DCS) solicited domestic sources, in-
cluding travellers and businessmen for foreign intelligence informa-
tion on a voluntary basis. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service
(FBIS) an element of OSS, monitored overseas broadcasts. These
components together with foreign publications provided ORE with
most of its basic information.

The acquisition of a clandestine collection capability and authoriza-
tion to carry out independent research and analysis enlarged CIG's
personnel strength considerably. As of June 1946 the total CIG staff
numbered approximately 1,816. Proportionately, approximately one-
third were overseas with OSO. Of those stationed in Washington,
approximately half were devoted to administrative and support func-
tions, one-third were assigned to OSO, and the remainder to intelli-
gence production.

The passage of the National Security Act in July 1947 legislated
the changes in the Executive branch that had been under discussion
since 1945. The Act established an independent Air Force, provided
for coordination by a committee of service chiefs, the Joint Cliiefs of
Staff (JCS), and a Secretaiy of Defense, and created the National

103

Security Council (NSC). The CIG became an independent depart-
ment and was renamed the Central Intelligence Agency.

Under the Act, the CIA's mission was only loosely defined, since
efforts to thrash out the CIA's duties in specific terms would have con-
tributed to the tension surrounding the unification of the services. The
four general tasks assigned to the Agency were (1) to advise the NSC
on matters related to national security; (2) to make recommendations
to the NSC regarding the coordination of intelligence activities of the
Departments; (3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence and provide
for its appropriate dissemination and (4) "to perform such other
functions ... as the NSC will from time to time direct. ..."

The Act did not alter the functions of the CIG. Clandestine collec-
tion, overt collection, production of national current intelligence and
interagency coordination for national estimates continued, and the per-
sonnel and internal structure remained the same.

The Act affirmed the CIA's role in coordinating the intelligence
activities of the State Department and the military — determining
which activities would most appropriately and most efficiently be
conducted by which Departments to avoid duplication. In 1947 the
Intelligence Advisory Committee (lAC) was created to serve as a
coordinating body in establishing intelligence requirements ^ among
the Departments. Chaired by the DCI, the Committee included repre-
sentatives from the Departments of State, Army, Air Force, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission. Although the
DCI was to establish priorities for intelligence collection and analysis,
he did not have the budgetary or administrative authority to control
the departmental components. Moreover, no Department was willing
to compromise what it perceived as its own intelligence needs to
meet the collective needs of policymakers as defined by the DCI.

As the CIA evolved between 1947 and 1950, it never fulfilled its
estimates function but continued to expand its independent intelligence
production. In July 1949 an internal study conducted by a senior
ORE staff member stated that ORE's emphasis in production had
shifted "from the broad long-term type of problem to a narrowly
defined short-term type and from the predictive to the non-predictive
type." In 1949 ORE had eleven regular publications. Only one of
these addressed national intelligence questions and was published
with the concurrence or dissent of the other departments. Less than
one-tenth of ORE's products were serving the purpose for which the
CIG and the CIA had been created.

If.. The Reorganization of the Intelligence Function^ 1950

By the time Walter Bedell Smith became DCI in 1950, it was clear
that the CIA's record on the production of national intelligence esti-
mates had fallen far short of expectation. ORE had become a direc-
tionless service organization, attempting to answer requirements levied
by all agencies related to all manner of subjects — politics, economics,
science, and technology. The wholesale growth had only confused
ore's mission and led the organization into attempting analysis in
areas already adequately covered by other departments. Likewise, the

^ Requirements constitute the informational objectives of intelligence collec-
tion, e.g., in 1947 determining Soviet troop strengths in iJastern Europe.

104

obstacles posed by the Departments prevented the DCI and the
Agency from carrying out coordination of the activities of the depart-
mental intelligence components.

These problems appeared more stark following the outbreak of
the Korean War in June 1950. Officials in the Executive branch and
members of Congress criticized the Agency for its failure to predict
more specifically the timing of the North Korean invasion of South
Korea. Immediately after his appointment as DCI in October 1950,
Smith discovered that the Agency had no current coordinated esti-
mate of the situation in Korea. Under the pressure of war, demands
for information were proliferating, and it was apparent that ORE
could not meet those demands.

Smith embarked on a program of reorganization. His most signifi-
cant change was the creation of the Office of National Estimates
(ONE), whose sole purpose was to produce National Intelligence
Estimates (NIEs) . There were two components in ONE, a staff which
drafted the estimates and a senior body, known as the Board of Na-
tional Estimates, which reviewed the estimates, coordinated the judg-
ments with other agencies, and negotiated over their final form.

Smith also attempted to redefine the DCI's position in relation to
the departmental intelligence components. From 1947 to 1950 the DCIs
had functioned at the mercy of the Departments rather than exercising
direction over them. By formally stating his position as the senior
member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, Smith tried to as-
sume a degree of administrative control over departmental activities.
Nonetheless, the obstacles remained, and personal influence, rather
than recognized authority, determined the effectiveness of Smith and
his successors in interdepartmental relationships.

In January 1952, CIA's intelligence functions were grouped under
the Directorate for Intelligence (DDI), ORE was dissolved and
its personnel were reassigned. In addition to ONE, the DDI's
intelligence production components included : the Office of Research
and Reports (ORR), which handled economic and geographic intelli-
gence; the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), which engaged in
basic scientific research ; and the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) ,
which provided current political research. Collection of overt infor-
mation was the responsibility of the Office of Operations (00). The
Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD) engaged in the dis-
semination of intelligence as well as storage and retrieval of un-
evaluated intelligence.

The immediate pressures for information generated by the Korean
War resulted in continued escalation in size and intelligence produc-
tion. Government-wide demands for the Agency to provide informa-
tion on Communist intentions in the Far East and around the world
justified the increases. By the end of 1953 DDI personnel numbered
3,338. Despite the sweeping changes, the fundamental problem of
duplication among the Agency and the Departments remained. DDI's
major effort was independent intelligence production rather than co-
ordinated national estimates.

5. Clandestine Operations

The concept of a central intelligence agency developed out of a
concern for the quality of intelligence analysis available to policy-

105

makers. The 1945 discussion which surrounded the creation of the CIG
focussed exclusively on the problem of production of coordinated intel-
ligence judgments. Tavo years later, debates on the CIA in both the
Congress and the Executive assumed only a collection and analysis
role for the newly constituted Agency. Yet, within one year of the
passage of the National Security Act, the CIA was charged with the
conduct of covert psychological, political, paramilitary, and economic
activities.^ The acquisition of this mission had a profound impact on
the direction of the Agency and on its relative stature within the
government.

The suggestion for the initiation of covert operations did not origi-
nate in the CIA, but with senior U.S. officials, among them Secretary
of War James Patterson, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, Sec-
retary of State George Marshall, and George Kennan, Director of the
State Department's Policy Planning Staff. Between 1946 and 1948
policymakers proceeded from a discussion of the possibility of initiat-
ing covert psychological operations to the establishment of an organi-
zation to conduct a full range of covert activities. The decisions were
gradual but consistent, spurred on by the growing concern over Soviet
intentions.

By late 1946 cabinet officials were preoccupied with the Soviet
threat, and over the next year their fears intensified. For U.S. policy-
makers, international events seemed to be a sequence of Soviet incur-
sions. In March 1946 the Soviet Union refused to withdraw its troops
from the Iranian province of Azerbaijan; two months later civil war
involving Communist rebel forces erupted in Greece. In 1947 Com-
munists assumed power in Poland, Hungary and Rumania, and in the
Philippines the government was under attack by the Hukbalahaps, a
communist-led guerrilla group. In February 1948 Communists staged
a successful coup in Czechoslovakia. At the same time France and
Italy were beleaguered by a wave of Communist-inspired strikes. Poli-
cymakers could, and did, look at these developments as evidence of
the need for the United States to respond.

In March 1948 near hysteria gripped the U.S. Government with
the so-called "war scare." The crisis was precipitated by a cable from
General Lucius Clay, Commander in Chief, European Command, to
Lt. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, Army
General Staff, in which Clay said, "I have felt a subtle change in
Soviet attitude which I cannot define but which now gives me a feeling
that it [war] may come with dramatic suddenness." The war scare
launched a series of interdepartmental intelligence estimates on the
likelihood of a Soviet attack on Western Europe and the United
States. Although the estimates concluded that there was no evidence
the U.S.S.R. would start a war. Clay's cable had articulated the degree
of suspicion and outright fear of the Soviet Union that was shared
by policymakers in 1948.

For U.S. officials, the perception of the Soviet Union as a global
threat demanded new modes of conduct in foreign policy to supple-

* Psychological oi)erations were primarily media-related activities, including
unattributed publications, forgeries, and subsidization of publications ; jwlitical
action involved exploitation of dispossessed persons and defectors, and support to
political parties ; paramilitary activities included support to guerrillas and sabo-
tage ; economic activities consisted of monetary and fiscal operations.

3-983 O - 76 - 8

106

ment the traditional alternatives of diplomacy and war. Massive
economic aid represented one new method of achieving U.S. foreign
policy objectives. In 1947 the United States had embarked on an un-
precedented economic assistance program to Europe with the Truman
Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. By insuring economic stability, U.S.
officials hoped to limit Soviet encroachments. Covert operations rep-
resented another, more activist departure in the conduct of U.S. peace-
time foreign policy. Covert action was an option that was something
more than diplomacy but still short of war. As such, it held the
promise of frustrating Soviet ambitions without provoking open
conflict.

The organizational arrangements for the conduct of covert opera-
tions reflected both the concept of covert action as defined by U.S. offi-
cials and the perception of the CIA as an institution. Both the
activities and the institution were regarded as extensions of the State
Department and the military services. Covert action was to serve a
support function to foreign and military policy preferences, and the
CIA was to provide the vehicle for the execution of those preferences.

In June 1948, a CIA component, the Office of Special Projects, soon
renamed the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), was established
for the execution of covert operations. The specific activities included
psychological warfare, political warfare, economic warfare, and para-
military activities. OPC's budget and personnel were appropriated
within CIA allocations, but the DCI had no authority in determining
OPC's acti\'ities. Responsibility for the direction of OPC rested with
the Office's director, appointed by the Secretary of State. Policy guid-
ance— decisions on the need for specific activities — came to the OPC
director from State and Defense, bypassing the DCI.

In recommending the development of a covert action capability in
1948, policymakers intended to make available a small contingency
force with appropriate funding that could mount operations on a lim-
ited basis. Senior officials did not plan to develop large-scale con-
tinuing activities. Instead, they hoped to establish a small capability
that could be activated when and where the need occurred — at their
discretion.

6. The Office of Policy Coordination, 191^8-1952

OPC developed into a far different organization from that envi-
sioned by Forrestal, Marshall, and Kennan. By 1952, when it merged
with the Agency's clandestine collection component, the Office of Spe-
cial Operations, OPC had innumerable activities worldwide, and it
had achieved the institutional independence that was unimaginable
at the time of its inception.

The outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950 had a sig-
nificant effect on OPC. Following the North Korean invasion of South
Korea, the State Department as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff re-
quested the initiation of paramilitary activities in Korea and China.
OPC's participation in the war effort contributed to its transforma-
tion from an organization that was to provide the capability for a
limited number of ad hoc operations to an organization that conducted
continuing, ongoing activities on a massive scale. In concept, man-
power, budget, and scope of activities, OPC simply skyrocketed. The
comparative figures for 1949 and 1952 are staggering. In 1949 OPC's

107

total personnel strength was 302 ; in 1952 it was 2,812 plus 3,142 over-
seas contract personnel. In 1949 OPC's budget figure was $4,700,000 ;
in 1952 it was $82,000,000. In 1949 OPC had personnel assigned to
seven overseas stations; in 1952 OPC had personnel at forty-seven
stations.*

Apart from the impetus provided by the Korean War several other
factors converged to alter the nature and scale of OPC's activities.
First, policy direction took the form of condoning and fostering ac-
tivity without providing scrutiny and control. Officials throughout the
government regarded the Soviet Union as an aggressive force, and
OPC's activities were initiated and justified on the basis of this shared
perception. The series of NSC directives wliich authorized covert op-
erations laid out broad objectives and stated in bold terms the neces-
sity for meeting the Soviet challenge head on. After the first 1948
directive authorizing covert action, subsequent directives in 1950 and
1951 called for an intensification of these activities without establish-
ing firm guidelines for approval. State and Defense guidance to OPC
quickly became very general, couched in terms of overall goals rather
than specific activities. This allowed OPC maximum latitude for the
initiation of activities or "projects," the OPC term.

Second, OPC operations had to meet the very different policy needs
of the State and Defense Departments. The State Department encour-
aged political action and propaganda activities to support its diplo-
matic objectives, while the Defense Department requested paramili-
tary activities to support the Korean War effort and to counter Com-
munist-associated guerrillas. These distinct missions required OPC to
develop and maintain different capabilities, including manpower and
support material.

The third factor contributing to OPC's expansion was the organi-
zational arrangements that created an internal demand for projects.
To correlate the requirements of State and Defense with its operations,
OPC adopted a project system rather than a programmed financial
system. This meant that OPC activities were organized around proj-
ects rather than general programs or policy objectives and that OPC
budgeted in terms of anticipated numbers of projects. The project
system had important internal effects. An individual within OPC
judged his own performance, and was judged by others, on the im-
portance and number of projects he initiated and managed. The result
was competition among individuals and among the OPC divisions to
generate the maximum number of projects. Projects remained the
fundamental units around which covert activities were organized, and
two generations of Agency personnel have been conditioned by this
system.

7. OPC Integration and the OPC-OSO Merger

The creation of OPC and its ambiguous relationship to the Agency
precipitated two major administrative problems : the DCI's relation-
ship to OPC, and antagonism between OPC and the Agency's clandes-
tine collection component, the Office of Special Operations. DCI Wal-
ter Bedell Smith acted to rectify both problems.

* Congress in 1949 enacted legislation exempting the DCI from the necessity
of accounting for specific disbursements.

108

As OPC continued to grow, Smith's predecessor, Admiral Hillen-
koetter, resented the fact that he had no management authority over
OPC, although its budget and personnel were being allocated through
the CIA. Hillenkoetter's clashes with the State and Defense Depart-
ments as well as with Frank G. Wisner, the Director of OPC, were
frequent. Less than a week after taking office, Smith announced that as
DCI he would assume administrative control of OPC and that State
and Defense would channel their policy guidance through him rather
than through Wisner. On October 12, 1950, the representatives of
State, Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally accepted the
change. The ease with which the shift occurred was primarily a result
of Smith's own position of influence with the Departments.

OPC's anomalous position in the Agency revealed the difficulty of
maintaining two separate organizations for the execution of varying
but overlapping clandestine activities. The close "tradecraft" rela-
tionship between clandestine collection and covert action, and the
frequent necessity for one to support the other was totally distorted
with the separation of functions in OSO and OPC. Organizational
rivalry rather than interchange dominated the relationship between
the two components.

On the operating level the conflicts were vicious. Each component
had representatives conducting separate operations at each overseas
station. Given the related missions of the two, OPC and OSO person-
nel were often competing for the same agents and, not infrequently, at-
tempting to wrest agents from each other. In 1952 the outright hostility
between the two organizations in Bangkok required the direct interven-
tion of the Assistant Director for Special Operations, Lyman Kirk-
patrick. There an important local official was closely tied to OPC, and
OSO was trying to lure him into its employ.

Between 1950 and 1952 Smith took several interim steps to encour-
age coordination between the two components. In August 1952 OSO
and OPC were merged into the Directorate for Plans (DDP).
The lines between the OSO "collectors" and the OPC "operators"
blurred rapidly, particularly in the field, where individuals were called
upon to perform both functions.

The merger did not result in the dominance of one group over
another; it resulted in the maximum development of clandestine
operations over clandestine collection. For people in the field, rewards
came more quickly through visible operational accomplishments than
through the silent, long-term development of agents required for clan-
destine collection. In the words of one former high-ranking DDP
official, "Collection is the hardest thing of all; it's much easier to
plant an article in a local newspaper."

To consolidate the management functions required for the burgeon-
ing organization, Smith created the Directorate for Adminis-
tration (DDA). From the outset, much of the DDA's effort supported
field activities. The Directorate was responsible for personnel, budget,
security, and medical services Agency- wide. However, one quarter of
DDA's total personnel strength was assigned to logistical support for
overseas operations.

109

By 1953 the Agency had achieved the basic structure and scale it
retained for the next twenty years. The Korean War, United States
foreign policy objectives, and the Agency's internal organizational
arrangements had combined to produce an enormous impetus for
growth. The CIA was six times the size it had been in 1947.

Three Directorates had been established. The patterns of activity
within each Directorate and the Directorates' relationships to one
another had developed. The DDP commanded the major share of the
Agency's budget, personnel, and resources; in 1952 clandestine col-
lection and covert action accounted for 74 percent of the Agency's
total budget;^ its pereonnel constituted 60 percent of the CIA's per-
sonnel strength. While production rather than coordination dominated
the DDI, operational activities rather than collection dominated the
DDP. The DDI and the DDP emerged at different times out of dis-
parate policy needs. They were, in effect, separate organizations.
These fundamental distinctions and emphases were reinforced in the
next decade.

B. The Dulles Era: 1953-1961

Allen W. Dulles' impact on the Central Intelligence Agency was
perhaps greater than that of any other single individual. The source
of his influence extended well beyond his personal qualities and in-
clinations. The composition of the United States Government, inter-
national events, and senior policymakers' perception of the role the
Agency could play in United States foreign policy converged to make
Dulles' position and that of the Agency unique in the years 1953 to
1961.

The election of 1952 brought Dwight D, Eisenhower to the presi-
dency. Eisenhower had been elected on a strident anti-Communist plat-
form, advocating an aggressive worldwide stance against the Soviet
Union to replace what he described as the Truman Administration's
passive policy of containment. Eisenhower cited the Communist vic-
tory in China, the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, and the
Korean War as evidence of the passivity which had prevailed in the
United States Government following World War II. He was equally
passionate in his call for an elimination of government corruption and
for removal of Communist sympathizers from public office.

This was not simply election rhetoric. The extent to which the
urgency of the Communist threat had become a shared perception
is difficult to appreciate. By the close of the Korean War, a broad
consensus had developed about the nature of Soviet ambitions and
the need for the United States to respond. The earlier fear of United
States policymakers that the Soviet Union would provoke World
War III had subsided. Gradually, the Soviet Union was perceived
as posing a worldwide political threat. In the minds of government
officials, members of the press, and the informed public, the Soviets
would try to achieve their purposes by the penetration and subversion
of governments all over the world. The accepted role of the United
States was to prevent that expansion.

^This did not include DDA budgetary allocations in support of DDP opera-
tions.

Washington policymakers regarded the Central Intelligence Agency
as a primary means of defense against Communism. By 1953, the
Agency was an established element of government. Its contributions
in the areas of political action and paramilitary warfare were recog-
nized and respected. It alone could perform many of the kinds of
activities seemingly required to meet the Soviet threat. For senior
officials, covert operations had become a vital element in the pursuit
of United States foreign policy objectives.

At this time, the CIA attracted some of the most able lawyers,
academicians, and young, committed activists in the country. They
brought with them professional associations and friendships which
extended to the senior levels of government. The fact that Agency
employees often shared similar wartime experiences, comparable social
backgrounds, and then complementary positions with other govern-
ment officials, contributed significantly to the legitimacy of and con-
fidence in the Agency as an instrument of government. Moreover,
these informal ties created a tacit understanding among policymakers
about the role and direction of the Agency. At the working level,
these contacts were facilitated by the Agency's location in downtown
Washington. Housed in a sprawling set of buildings in the center of
the city. Agency personnel could easily meet and talk with State
and Defense officials throughout the day. The CIA's physical presence
in the city gave it the advantage of seeming an integral part of, rather
than a separate element of, the government.

A crucial factor in securing the Agency's place within the govern-
ment during this period was the fact that the Secretary of State, John
Foster Dulles, and the DCI were brothers. Whatever the formal rela-
tionships among the State Department, the NSC, and the Agency,
they were supereeded by the personal and working association between
the brothers. Most importantly, both had the absolute confidence of
President Eisenhower. In the day-to-day formulation of policy, these
relationships were crucial to the Executive's support for the Agency,
and more specifically, for Allen Dulles pereonally in the definition of
his own role and that of the Agency.

No one was more convinced that the Aarency could make a special
contribution to the advancement of Ignited States foreign policy goals
than Allen Dulles. Dulles came to the post of DCI in February 1953
with an extensive background in foreign affairs and foreign espionage,
dating back to World War I. By the time of his appontment,
his view of the CIA had been firmly established. Dulles' role
as DCI was rooted in his wartime experience with OSS. His interests
and expertise lay with the operational aspects of intelligence, and his
fascination with the details of operations persisted.

Perhaps the most important effect of Dulles' absorption with oper-
ations was tlie impact it had on the Agency's relationship to the intel-
ligence "community" — the intelligence components in State and De-
fense. As DCI Dulles did not assert his position or that of the Agency
in attempting to coordinate departmental intelligence activities.

This, after all, had been a major purpose for the Agency's creation.
Dulles' failure in this area constituted a lost opportunity. By the mid-

Ill

die of the decade the Agency was in the forefront of technological
innovation and had developed a strong record on military estimates.
Conceivably, Dulles could have used these advances as bureaucratic
leverage in exerting some control over the community. He did not.
Much of the reason was a matter of personal temperament. Jolly,
gregarious, and extroverted in the extreme, Dulles disliked and avoided
confrontations at every level. In doing so, he failed to provide even
minimal direction over the departmental intelligence components at
a time when intelligence capabilities were undergoing dramatic
changes.

1. The Clandestine Service ^^

It is both easy to exaggerate and difficult to appreciate the place
which the Clandestine Service secured in the CIA during the Dulles
administration and, to a large extent, retained thereafter. The number
and extent of the activities undertaken are far less important than the
impact which those activities had on the Agency's institutional iden-
tity— the way people within the DDP, the DDI, and the DDA per-
ceived the Agency's primary mission, and the way policymakers re-
garded its contribution to the process of government.

Covert action was at the core of this perception. The importance of
covert action to the internal and external evaluation of the Agency
was in large part derived from the fact that only the CIA could and
did perform this function. Moreover, in the international environ-
ment of the 1950's Agency operations were regarded as an essential
contribution to the attainment of United States foreign policy objec-
tives. Although by 1954 the Soviet threat was redefined from military
to political terms, the intensity of the conflict did not diminish. Politi-
cal action, sabotage, support to democratic governments, counterin-
telligence— all this the Clandestine Service could provide.

The Agency also benefited from what were regarded as its opera-
tional "successes" in this period. In 1953 and 1954 two of the Agency's
boldest, most spectacular covert operations took place — the overthrow
of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran and the coup against
President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman of Guatemala. Both were quick
and bloodless operations that removed two allegedly Communist-asso-
ciated leaders from power and replaced them with pro-Western offi-
cials. Out of these early achievements both the Agency and Washington
policymakers acquired a sense of confidence in the CIA's capacity for
operational success.

The DDP's major expansion in overseas stations and in the estab-
lishment of an infrastruture for clandestine activities had taken place
between 1950 and 1952. In the decade of the 1950's the existing struc-
ture made possible the development of continuous foreign intelligence,
counterintelligence, political action, and propaganda activities.

Policymakers' perception of covert action as the CIA's primary
mission was an accurate reflection of the Agency's internal dynamics.
Between 1953 and 1962, the Clandestine Service occupied a preeminent
position in the CIA. First, it had the consistent attention of the DCI.

"'* The term "Clandestine Service" is used synonymously with the Deputy
Directorate for Plans. Although Clandestine Service has never heen an official
desip^nation, it is common usage in the intelligence community and appears as
such in the Select Committee's hearings.

112

Second, the DDP commanded the major portion of resources in the
Agency. Between 1953 and 1961 clandestine collection and covert ac-
tion absorbed an average of 54 percent of the Agency's total annual
budget.*' Although this represented a reduction from the period of the
Korean War, DDP allocations still constituted the majority of the
Agency's expenditures. Likewise, from 1953 to 1961, the DDP gained
nearly 2,000 personnel. On its formal table of organization, the DDP
registered an increase of only 1,000. However, increases of nearly 1,000
in the logistics and communications components of the DDA rep-
resented growth in support to Clandestine Service operations.

Within the Agency the DDP was a Directorate apart. As the number
of covert action projects increased, elaborate requirements for secrecy
developed around operational activities. The DDP's self-imposed secu-
rity requirements left it exempt from many of the Agency's procedures
of accountability. Internally, the DDP became a highlv compart-
mented structure, where information was limited to small gi'oups of
individuals based primarily on a "need to know" principle.

The norms and position of the Clandestine Service had important
repercussions on the execution of the CIA's intelligence mission in the
1953 to 1962 period. Theoretically, the data collected by the DDP field
officers should have served as a major source for DDI analysis. How-
ever, strict compartmentation prevented open contact between DDP
personnel and DDI analysts. Despite efforts in the 1960's to break down
the barriers between the Directorates, the lack of real interchange and
interdependence persisted.

In sum, the DDP's preeminent position during the period was a
function of several factors, including policymakers' perception of the
Agency primarily in operational terms, the proportion of resources
which the Clandestine Service absorbed, and the time and attention
which the DCI devoted to operations. These patterns solidified under
Dulles and in large part account for the DDP's continued primacy
within the Agency.

2. Intelligence Production

In the decade of the 1950's the CIA was the major contributor to
technological advances in intelligence collection. At the same time
DDI analysts were responsible for methodological innovations in
strategic assessments. Despite these achievements, CIA's intelligence
was not serving the purpose for which the organization had been
created — informing and influencing policymaking.

By 1960 the Agencv had achieved significant advances in its strate-
gic intelligence capability. The development of overhead reconnais-
sance, beginning with the U-2 aircraft and growing in scale and
sophistication with follow-on systems, generated information in
greater quantity and accuracy than had ever before been contem-
plated. Basic data on the Soviet Union beyond the reach of human
collection, such as railroad routes, construction sites, and industrial
concentrations became readily available.

Analysts in the Office of National Estimates began reevaluating
assumptions regarding Soviet strategic capabilities. This reevaluation
resulted in reduced estimates of Soviet missile deployments at a time
when the armed services and members of Congress were publicly

* This did not include DDA budgetary allocations in support of DDP operations.

113

proclaiming a "missile gap" between the United States and the Soviet
Union.

A final element contributed to the Agency's estimative capaJbility :
material supplied by Oleg Penkovsky. Well-placed in Soviet military
circles, Penkovsky turned over a number of classified documents relat-
ing t/O Soviet strategic planning and capabilities. These three factors —
technological breakthrough, analytic innovation, and the single most
valuable Soviet agent in history — converged to make the Agency the
most reliable source of intelligence on Soviet strategic capabilities in
the government.

Yet the entrenched position of the military services and the Agency's
own limited charter in the area of military analysis made it difficult
for the Agency to challenge openly the intelligence estimates of the
services. The situation was exacerbated by Dulles' own disposition. As
DCI he did not associate himself in the first instance with intelligence
production and did not assume an advocacy role in extending the
Agency's claims to military intelligence.

Strategic intelligence, although a significant portion of the DDI's
production effort, constituted a particular problem. A broader prob-
lem involved the overall impact of intelligence on policy. The CIA
had been conceived to provide high-quality national intelligence esti-
mates to policymakers. However, the communication and exchange
necessary for analysts to calibrate, anticipate and respond to policy-
makers' needs never really developed.

The size of the Directorate for Intelligence constituted a major ob-
stacle to the attainment of consistent interchange between analysts and
their clients. In 1955 there were 466 analysts in ORE, 217 in OCI, and
207 in OSI. The process of drafting, reviewing and editing intel-
ligence publications involved large numbers of individuals each of
whom felt responsible for and entitled to make a contribution to the
final product. Yet without access to policymakers, analysts did not
have an ongoing accurate notion of how the form and substance of the
intelligence product might best serve the needs of senior officials. The
product itself — as defined and arbitrated among DDI analysts — be-
came the end rather than the satisfaction of specific policy needs.

The establishment of the Office of National Estimates was an at-
tempt to insure direct interaction between senior level officials and the
Agency. However, by the mid-1950's even its National Intelligence
Estimates showed signs of being submerged in the second-level paper
traffic that was engulfing the intelligence community. Between 1955
and 1956 a senior staff member in ONE surveyed the NIEs' reader-
ship by contacting executive assistants and special assistants of the
President and cabinet officers, asking if the NIEs were actually placed
on their superiors' desks. The survey revealed that senior policymak-
ers were not reading the NIEs. Instead, second and third-level offi-
cials used the estimates for background information in briefing senior
officials. The failure of the NIEs to serve their fundamental purpose
for senior officials was indicative of the overall failure of intelligence
to influence policy,

S. The Comirmnity CoordirMtionProhlem

Dulles' neglect of the community management or coordination as-
pect of his role as DCI was apparent to all who knew and worked with

114

him. His reluctance to assume an aggressive role in dealing with the
military on the issue of military estimates was closely tied to his lack
of initiative in community-related matters. Unlike Bedell Smith before
him and John McCone after him, Dulles was reluctant to take on the
military.

The development of the U-2 and follow-on systems had an enormous
impact on intelligence-collection capabilities and on the Agency's rela-
tive standing in the intelligence community. Specifically, it marked
the Agency's emergence as the intelligence community's leader in the
area of overhead reconnaissance.

At a time when the CIA was reaping the benefits of overhead recon-
naissance and when the DDI's estimates on Soviet missiles were taking
issue with the services' judgments, Dulles could have been far more
aggressive in asserting the Agency's position in the intelligence com-
munity and in advancing his own role as coordinator.

As the community became larger and as technical systems came to
require very large budgetary allocations, the institutional obstacles
to interdepartmental coordination increased. By not acting on the op-
portunity he had, Dulles allowed departmental procedures, specifical-
ly those in the military's technical collection programs, to become more
entrenched and routinized, making later attempts at coordination more
difficult.

The coordination problem did not go unnoticed during Dulles'
term, and there were several attempts within Congress and the
Executive to direct Dulles' attention to the DCI's community respon-
sibility. The efforts were unsuccessful both because of Dulles' personal
disposition and because of the inherent weakness of the mechanisms
established to strengthen the DCI's position in the community.

In January 1956, President Eisenhower created the President's
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA).
In May, 1961 it was renamed the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board (PFIAB). Composed of retired senior government
officials and members of the professions, the Board was to provide
the President with advice on intelligence matters. As a deliberative
body it had no authority over either the DCI or the community. Thus,
the Board had little impact on the administration of the CIA or on
the other intelligence services. The Board did identify the imbalance
in Dulles' role as DCI, and in December 1956 and again in December
1958 it recommended the appointment of a chief of staff for the DCI to
handle the Agency's internal administration. In 1960, the PBCFIA
suggested the possibility of separating the DCI from the Agency
to serve as the President's intelligence advisor and to coordinate
community activities. Nothing resulted from these recommendations.

In 1957, the Board recommended the merger of the United States
Communications Intelligence Board with the Intelligence Advisory
Committee.^ This proposal was intended to strengthen the DCI's

"^ The USCIB was established in 1946 to advise and make recommendations
on communications intelligence to the Secretary of Defense. USOIB's member-
ship included the Secretaries of State, Defense, the Director of the FBI, and
representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA. USCIB votes were
weighted. Representatives of State, Defense, the FBI. and CIA each had two
votes : other members had one. Although the DCI sat on the Committee, he had
no vote.

115

authority, and it resulted in the creation in the following year of the
United States Intelligence Board (USIB) with the DCI as chairman.
Like the lAC, howev^er, USIB was little more than a super-structure.
It had no budgetary authority; nor did it provide the DCI with any
direct control over the components of the intelligence community.
The separate elements of the community continued to function under
the impetus of their own internal drives and mission definitions.
Essentially, the problem that existed at the time of the creation of
the CIG remained.

From 1953 to 1961 a single Presidential administration and con-
sistent American policy objectives which had wide public and govern-
mental support contributed to a period of stability in the Agency's
history. The internal patterns that had begun to emerge at the close
of the Korean War solidified. The problems remained much the same.

The inherent institutional obstacles to management of the com-
munity's intelligence activities combined with Dulles' failure to assert
the Agency's and the DCI's coordination roles allowed the perpetua-
tion of a fragTiiented goveniment-wide intelligence effort. The CIA's
own intelligence production, though distinguished by advances in
technical collection and in analysis, had not achieved the consistent
policy support role that the Agency's creation had intended to provide.

Dulles' marked orientation toward clandestine activities, his broth-
er's position as Secretary of State, and cold war tensions combined to
maximize the Agency's operational capability. In tenns of policymak-
ers' reliance on the CIA, allocation of resources, and the attention of
the Agency's leadership, clandestine activities had overtaken intelli-
gence analysis as the CIA's primary mission.

C. Change and Rotjtinizatiox : 1961-1970

In 1961 cold war attitudes continued to dominate the foreign policy
assumptions of United States policymakers. In the early part of the
decade American confidence and conviction were manifested in an ex-
pansive foreign policy that included the abortive Bay of Pigs landing,
a dramatic confrontation with the Soviet Union over the installation
of Soviet missiles in Cuba, increased economic assistance to underde-
veloped countries in Latin America and Africa, and rapidly escalating
military activities in Southeast Asia.

Although the American presence in Vietnam symbolized LT.S. ad-
herence to the strictures of the Cold War, perceptions of the Soviet
Union began to change by the middle of the decade. The concept of an
international monolith broke down as differences between the U.S.S.R.
and China emerged. Moreover, the strategic arms competition assumed
increased importance in relations between the two coimtries.

The CIA was drawn into each major development in United States
policy. As in the previous decade, operations dominated policymakers'
perceptions of the Agency's role. The United States' intei-ventionist
policy fostered the CIA's utilization of its existing capabilities as well
as the development of paramilitary capabilities in support of Ameri-
can count erinsurgency and military programs. At the same time the
Agency's organizational arrangements continued to create an inde-
pendent dynamic for operations.

116

The most significant development for the Agency in this period
was the impact of technological capabilities on intelligence produc-
tion. These advances resulted in internal changes and forced increased
attention to coordination of the intelligence community. The costs,
quality of intelligence and competition for deployment generated by
technical collection systems necessitated a working relationship among
the departmental intelligence components to replace the undirected
evolution that had marked the previous decade. Despite the Agency's
internal adjustments and attempts to effect better management in
the community, the CIA's fundamental srtucture, personnel, and in-
centives remained rooted in the early 1950's.

1. The Directors of Central Intelligence^ 1961-1970

Jolin A. McCone came to the Central Intelligence Agency as an
outsider in November 1961. His background had been in private in-
dustry, where he had distinguished himself as a corporate manager. He
also held several government posts, including Under Secretary of the
Air Force and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. McCone
brought a quick, sharp intellect to his job as DCI, and his contribution
lay in attempting to assert his role and that of the Agency in coor-
dinating intelligence activities among the Departments. Much of his
strength in the intelligence community derived from the fact that
he was known to have ready access to President Kennedy. McCone
resigned from the Agency in April 1965, precisely because Lyndon
Johnson had not accorded him similar stature.

Admiral William F. Raborn served as DCI for only a year. He
left in June 1966, and his impact on the Agency was minimal.

Richard M. Helms came to the position of DCI after twenty years
in the Clandestine Service. Just as Allen Dulles had identified him-
self with the intelligence profession. Helms identified himself with
the Agency as an institution. Having served in a succession of senior
positions, Helms was a first-generation product of the Agency, and
he commanded the personal and professional respect of his contem-
poraries. Helms' orientation remained on the operations side, and
he did not actively pursue the DCI's role as a coordinator of intelli-
gence activities in the community.

2. The Effort at Management Reform

The Bay of Pigs fiasco had a major impact on President Kennedy's
thinking about the intelligence community. He felt he had been
poorly served by the experts and sought to establish procedures that
would better insure his own acquisition of intelligence. In short, Ken-
nedy defined a need for a senior intelligence officer and in so doing as-
sured John McCone an influential position in policymaking. Ken-
nedy's definition of the DCI's position emphasized two roles : coordi-
nator for the community, and principal intelligence adviser to the
President. At the same time, Kennedy directed McCone to delegate
the internal management of the Agency to a deputy director. Although
McCone agreed with Kennedy's concept of the DCI's job and vigor-
ously pursued the objectives, the results were uneven.

To carry out the management function in the Agency, McCone
created a senior staff. The principal officer was the Executive Director-
Comptroller, who was to assume responsibility for day-to-day ad-

117

ministraiton.^ The arrangement did not free the DCI from continuing
involvement in Agency-related matters, particularly those concerning
the Clandestine Service. The nature of clandestine operations, the fact
that they involved and continue to involve people in sensitive, com-
plicated situations, demanded that the Agency's senior officer assume
responsibility for decisions. A former member of McCone's staff esti-
mates that despite the DCI's community orientation, he spent 90 per-
cent of his total time on issues related to clandestine operations.

The establishment of the office of National Intelligence Programs
Evaluation (NIPE) in 1963 was the first major effort by a DCI to
insure consistent contact and coordination with the community. Yet,
from the outset McCone accepted the limitations on his authority;
although Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara agreed to provide
him with access to the Defense Department budget (which still consti-
tutes 80 percent of the intelligence conmiunity's overall budget) , Mc-
Cone could not direct or control the intelligence components of the
other departments. The NIPE staff directed most of its attention to
sorting out intelligence requirements through USIB and attempting to
develop a national inventory for the community, including budget, per-
sonnel and materials. Remarkably, this had never before been done.

The most pressing problem for the community was the adjustment to
the impact of technical collection capabilities. The large budgetary
resources involved, and the value of the data generated by overhead
reconnaissance systems precipitated a major bureaucratic battle over
their administration and control. From 1963 to 1965, much of McCone's
and the senior NIPE staff officer's community efforts were directed
toward working out an agreement with the Air Force on development,
production, and deployment of overhead reconnaissance systems.

In 1961 the Agency and the Air Force had established a working
relationship for overhead reconnaissance systems through a central ad-
ministrative office, whose director reported to the Secretary of Defense
but accepted intelligence requirements through USIB. By informal
agreement, the Air Force provided launchers, bases, and recovery ca-
pability for reconnaissance systems, while the Agency was responsible
for research, development, contracting, and security. Essentially, the
agreement allowed the Agency to decide which systems would be de-
ployed, and the Air Force challenged the CIA's jurisdiction.

A primary mission was at stake in these negotiations, and the
struggle was fierce on both sides. Control by one agency or another did
not involve only budgets and manpower. Since the Air Force and CIA
missions were very different, a decision would affect the nature of the
reconnaissance program itself — tactical or national intelligence pri-
orities, the frequency and location of overflights, and the use of data.

The agreement that emerged in 1965 attempted to balance the inter-
ests of both the Air Force and the CIA. A three-person Executive
Committee (EXCOM) for the administration of overhead reconnais-
sance was eef ablished. Its members included the DCI, an Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense, and the President's Scientific Advisor. The EX
COM reported to the Secretary of Defense, who was a&signed primai-y
administrative authority for overhead reconnaissance systems. The

' Other chaneres included placing the General Counsel's oflBce, the Audit Staff,
and the OflSce of Budget, Program Analysis and Manpower directly under the DCI.

118

arrano;ement recooriized the DCI's authority avs head of the commu-
nity to establish collection requirements in consultation with USIB;
it also gave him responsibility for processing and utilizing data gen-
erated by overhead reconnaissance. In the event that he did not agree
with a decision made by the Secretary of Defense, the DCI was given
the right to appeal to the President.

The agreement represented a compromise between Air Force and
CIA claims 'and provided substantive recognition of the DCI's na-
tional intelligence responsibilitv. As a structure for decisionmaking,
it has worked well. However, it has not rectified the inherent competi-
tion over technical collection systems that has come to motivate the
intelligence process. The development of these systems has created
intense rivalry, principally between the Air Force and the Agency,
over program deployments. With so much money and manpower at
stake with each new system, each organization is eager to gain the
benefits of successful contracting. As 'a result, the accepted solution
to problems with the intelligence product has come to be more collec-
tion rather than better analysis.

After 1965 efforts to impose some direction on the community did
not receive consistent attention from DCIs Raborn and Helms. The
DCIs' priorities, coupled with the inherent bureaucratic obstacles and
the burden of Vietnam, relegated the problem of coordination to a
low priority.

3. The Intelligence Function

Internally, the Agency was also 'adjusting to the impact of techni-
cal and scientific advances. In 1963, the Directorate for Science
and Technology (DDS&T) was created. Previously, scientific and tech-
nical intelligence production had been scattered among the other three
directorates. The process of organizing an independent directorate
meant wresting manpower and resources from the existing components.
Predictably, the resistance was considerable, and a year and a half
passed between the first attempts at creating the Directorate and its
actual establishment.

The new component included the Office of Scientific Intelligence
and the office of FLINT (electronic intercepts) from DDI, the Data
Processing Staff from DDA, the Development Projects Division (re-
sponsible for overhead reconnaissance) from the DDP, and a newly
created Office of Research and Development. Later in 1963, the For-
eign Missile and Space Analysis Center was added. The Directorate's
specific functions included, and continue to include, research, devel-
opment, operation, data reduction, analysis, and contributions to Na-
tional Intelligence Estimates.

The Directorate was organized on the premise that close coopera-
tion should exist between research and application on the one hand,
and technical collection and analysis on the other. This close coordina-
tion along with the staffing and career patterns in the Directorate
have contributed to the continuing vitality and quality of the
DDS&T's work.

The DDP began and remained a closed, self-contained component ;
the DDI evolved into a closed, self-contained component. However,
the DDS&T was created with the assumption that it would continue
to rely on expertise and advice from outside the Agency. A number of

119

arrangements insured constant interchanges between the Directorate
and the scientific and industrial communities. First, since all research
and development for technical systems was done through contracting,
the DDS&T could draw on and benefit from the most advanced tech-
nical systems nationwide. Second, to attract high-quality professionals
from the industiial and scientific communities, the Directorate estab-
lished a competitive salary scale. The result has been personnel mo-
bility between the DDS&T and private industry. It has not been
unusual for individuals to leave private industi-y, assume positions
with DDS&T for several years, then return to private industry. This
pattern has provided the Directorate with a constant infusion and
renewal of talent. Finally, the Directorate established the practice of
regularly employing advisory groups as well as fostering DDS&T
staff participation in conferences and seminars sponsored by profes-
sional associations.

The Agency's intelligence capabilities expanded in another direc-
tion. Although in the 1953-1961 period, the Agency had made some
contributions to military intelligence, it had not openly challenged the
Defense Department's prerogative in this area. In the early 1960's that
opportunity came. By 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's
dissatisfaction with the quality of military estimates led him to begin
tapping the Agency's analytic capabilities. Specifically, McNamara
requested special estimates from the Agency and included Agency
personnel in community-wide exercises in long-term Soviet force pro-
jections. McNamara's initiatives provided the CIA with leverage
against the military services' dominance in strategic intelligence. The
Secretary's actions, together with McCone's insistence on the DCI's
need for independent judgments on military matters, resulted in the
Agency's expanded analytic effort in strategic intelligence.

In 1962, the Office of Current Intelligence established a military
intelligence division, and five years later the militaiy intelligence units
of OCI and ORR were combined into a separate office, the Office of
Strategic Research (OSR).

During this period economic intelligence grew in importance. In
the decade of the 1950's economic research had concentrated on anal-
ysis related to the Soviet Union and its "satellites." With the emer-
gence of independent African nations in the early 1960's, and the
view that the U.S.S.R. would engage in political and economic pene^
tration of the fledgling governments, demands for information on the
economies of these countries developed. Likewise, the growing eco-
nomic strength of Japan and the countries of Western Europe pro-
duced a related decline in the U.S. competitive posture and reflected
the growing inadequacy of the dollar-dominated international mone-
tary system. Economic analysts found themselves called upon for
detailed research on these countries as trading partners and rivals
of the United States. In 1967 an independent Office of Economic Re-
search (OER) succeeded ORR.

.^. The Paramilitary Surge

The Clandestine Service continued to dominate the Agency's activ-
ities during this period. In budget, manpower, and degree of DCI
attention accorded the DDP, clnndestine operations remained the
CIA's most consuming mission. The policies and operational prefer-

120

ences of the Executive branch dictated the Agency's emphasis in
clandestine activities.

Evidence of Communist guerrilla activities in Southeast Asia and
Africa convinced Kennedy and his closest advisers of the need for
the United States to develop an unconventional warfare capability.
"Counterinsurgency," as the U. S. effort was designated, aimed at
preventing communist-supported military victories without precipi-
tating a major Soviet-American military confrontation.

As part of this effort, the Agency, under the direction of the Ken-
nedy Administration, initiated paramilitary operations in Cuba, Laos,
and Vietnam. Following the Bay of Pigs, attempts to undermine the
government of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro continued with Operation
MONGOOSE. Conducted between October 1961 and October 1962,
MONGOOSE consisted of paramilitary, sabotage, and political
propaganda activities. The Agency's large-scale involvement in South-
east Asia began in 1962 with programs in Laos and South Vietnam.
In Laos, the Agency implemented air supply and paramilitary train-
ing programs, which gradually developed into full-scale management
of a ground war. Between 1962 and 1965, the Agency worked with the
South Vietnamese government to organize police forces and para-
military units.

In the remainder of the decade, Vietnam dominated the CIA just
as it did other government agencies. In both the DDP and the DDI,
the CIA's resources were directed toward supporting and evaluating
the U.S. effort in Vietnam. For the Agency and the DCI, it was a
contradictory position, one which left the institution and the man
vulnerable to the pressures of conflicting purposes.

On the one hand, the DDP was supportins; a major paramilitary
operation, which, at its peak in 1970, involved 700 people, 600 of whom
were stationed in Vietnam, the rest at headquarters.^ Stated in other
terms, 12 percent of the DDP's manpower was devoted to Vietnam.
Clearly, the Agency's stake in the operational side of the war was
significant.

At the same time, the analysts were also drawn into the war. After
the initiation of the bombing campaign against North Vietnam in
1965, the Agency began receiving requests for assessments of the cam-
paign's impact. By 1966, both the Office of "Research and Reports and
the Office of Current Intelligence had established special staffs to deal
with Vietnam. In addition, the Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs
(SAVA) staff was created under the direction of the DCI. The total
number of DDI analysts involved was 69.

While the DDP effort was increasinq- in proportion to the American
military^ buildup, DDI estimates painted a pessimistic view of the
likelihood of U.S. success with successive escalations in the ground
and air wars.^° At no time was the institutional dichotomy between the
opprational and analvtical components more stark.

The Agency's involvement in Southeast Asia had long-term effects
on the institution. In particular, it determined the second-generation

*Bv 19f>5, the demands for personnpl were so great that each DDP component
was levied on a quota basis to contribute personnel.

^^ There were exceptions to this. The SAVA group produced some positive esti-
mates of the bombing.

121

leadership group within the Agency. By 1970, the first generation of
Agency careerists was beginning to reach retirement age and vacancies
were opening in senior-level positions. In poth the DDP and the DDI,
many of those positions were filled by individuals who had distin-
guished themselves in Southeast Asia-related activities. In the Clande-
stine Service, men who spent considerable time in the Far East have
gone on to become a former DCI, the present Deputy Director for
Operations,^ ^ the present Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division,
the Chief of the Counterintelligence Staif, and the present Deputy
Chief of the Soviet/East European Division. On the DDI side, the
present Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence and the Chief Na-
tional Intelligence Officer ^^ were all involved in Vietnam assessments
at the height of the war. Clearly, the rewards were considerable for
participation in a major operation.

The decade of the 1960's brought increased attention to the problem
of coordinating intelligence activities in the community but illustrated
the complex difficulties involved in effective management. Depart-
mental claims, the orientation of the DCI, the role accorded him by the
President, and the demands of clandestine operations all affected the
execution of the coordination role. Although policymakers were incon-
sisitent in their utilization of the Agency's intelligence analysis capa-
bility, all continued to rely heavily on the CIA's operational capability
in support of their policies. That fact established tlie Agency's own
priorities and reinforced the existing internal incentives. Despite the
Agency's growing sophistication and investment in technological
systems, clandestine activities continued to constitute the major share
of the Agency's budget and pei-sonnel. Between 1962 and 1970 the DDP
budget averaged 52 percent of the Agency's total amiual budget.^^
Likewise, in the same period, 55 percent of full-time Agency personnel
were assigned to DDP activities.^* Essentially, the pattern of acti\'ity
that had 'begun to emerge in the early 1950's and that became finiily
established under Dulles continued.

D. The Recent Past: 1971-1975

The years 1971 to 1975 were a period of transition and abrupt change
for the CIA. The scale of covert operations declined, and in the Execu-
tive branch and at the senior level of the Agency growing concern
developed over the quality of the intelligence product and the manage-
ment of the intelligence community's resources. However, external
pressures overshadowed initial attempts at reform.

" In 1973 DCI James Schlesinger changed the name of the Clandestine Service
from the Directorate for Plans to the Directorate for Operations (DDO).

" See page 123 of this section for discussion of National Intelligence Officers.

^' This does not include the proportion of the DDA budget that supported DDP
activities.

" This figure includes those individuals in the communications and logistics
components of the DDA, whose activities vrere in direct support of the DDP
mission.

9-983 O - 76 - 9

122

By the start of the decade broad changes had evolved in American
foreign policy. Dissension over Vietnam, the Congress' more assertive
role in foreign policy, and shifts in the international power structure
had eroded the assumptions on which U.S. foreign policy had been
based. The consensus that had existed among the press, the informed
public, the Congress, and the Executive branch and tliat had both sup-
ported and protected the CIA broke down. As conflicting policy pref-
erences emerged and as misconduct in the Executive branch was
revealed, the CIA, once exempt from public examination, became sub-
ject to close scrutiny.

/. The Directors of Central InteJligence^ 1973-1975

James E. Schlesii\<rer's tenure as DCI from February to July 1973
was brief but significant. An economist by training and long an ob-
server of the intelligence community through his extensive experience
in national security affairs, Schlesinger came to the CIA with definite
ideas on restructuring the management of the community and on im-
proving the quality of intelligence. During his six month term he em-
barked on changes that promised to alter the DCI's and the Agency's
existing priorities.

William E. Colby succeeded Schlesinger. An attorney, OSS veteran,
and career DDP officer, Colby's background made him seem of the
traditional operations school in the A.<rency. His overseas assi.""nments
included positions in Rome, Stockholm, and Saigon, where he was
Chief of Station. Yet Colby brought an Agency-wide and community
orientation to his term as DCI that was uncommon for DDP careerists.
Soon after his appointment the Agency became the focus of public and
Congressional inquiries, and most of Colby's time was absorbed in re-
sponding to these developments.

2. E-fforts at Change

Foreign affairs were a continuing priority in the Nixon Administra-
tion. Until 1971, Vietnam absorbed most of the time and attention of
the President and his Assistant for National Securitv Affairs. Henry
Kissinger. After 1971, both tunned to a redefinition of U.S. foreign pol-
icy. Sharing a global view of U.S. ]:)olicv, the two men sought to re-
structure relationships with the Soviet Union and with the People's
Republic of China. It was Kissinger rather than Richard Helms who
served as President Nixon's intelligence officer. Kissinger provided
Nixon with daily briefings and relied on the staff of the National Se-
curity Council for intelligence analysis.

Both men's preference for working with (and often independently
of) small, tightly managed staffs is well known. However, both were
genuinely interested in obtainins: more and better quality intelligence
from the CIA. In December 1970, Nixon requested a study of the in-
telligence community. Executed by James Schlesinger, then Assistant
Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the study resulted in the Presi-
dential directive of November 5, 1971, assigning the DCI responsibil-
ity for review of the intelligence community budget. The intention was
that the DCI would advise the President on community-wide budget-
ary allocations by serving in a last review capacity. The effort faltered
for two reasons. First, Nixon chose not to request Congressional enact-
ment of revised legislation extending the authority of the DCI. The

123

decision inherently limited the DCI's ability to exert control over the
intelligence components. Thus, the DCI was once again left to arbitrate
as one among equals. Second, the implementation of the directive was
less energetic and decisive than it might have been. Helms did not at-
tempt to make recommendations on budgetary allocations and instead,
presented the President with the agreed views of the representatives
of the departmental intelligence components. Furthemiore, within the
Agency, the mechanism for assisting the DCI in community matters
was weak. Early in 1972 Helms established the Intelligence Commun-
ity (IC) Staff as a replacement for the NIPE staff to assist in com-
munity matters. Between the time of the decision to create such a staff
and its actual organization, the number of personnel assigned was
halved.

It is likely that had James Schlesinger remained as DCI, he would
have assumed a vigorous role in the community, and would have at-
tempted to exercise the DCI's implied authority. Schlesinger altered
the composition of the IC staff by reducing the number of CIA per-
sonnel and increasing the number of non-Agency personnel to facili-
tate the staff's contacts with the community. Schlesinger's primary
concern was upgrading the quality of the Agency's intelligence analy-
sis, and he had begun to consider changes in the Office of National
Estimates. In addition, he made considerable reductions in personnel —
with most of the cuts occurring in the DDO.^^'^

ITnder Colby, attempts at innovation continued. Colby abolished
the Office of National Estimates and replaced it with a group of eleven
senioi" specialists in functional and geographical areas known as Na-
tional Intelligence Officers (NIOs). NIOs are responsible for intelli-
gence collection and production in their designated fields, and the
senior NIO is directly responsible to the DCI. The purpose of the
NIO system was to establish better communication and interchange
between policymakers and analysts than had been the case with the
Office of National Estimates.

These changes were accompanied by shifts in emphasis in the DDO
and the DDL In the Clandestine Service the scale of covert operations
was reduced, and by 1972 the Agency's paramilitary program in South-
east Asia was dissoh^ed. Yet, the overall reduction did not affect the
fundamental assumptions, organization, and incentives governing the
DDO. Indeed, in 1975 clandestine activities still constituted 37 per-
cent of the Agency's total budget. ^^ The rationale remains the same,
and the operational capability is intact— as CIA activities in Chile
illustrated. While Soviet strategic capabilities remain the first priority
for clandestine collection requirements, in response to recent inter-
national developments, the DDO has increased its collection activities
in the areas of terrorism and international narcotics traffic — with con-
siderable success.

In the DDI, economic intelligence has continued to assume increased
importance and taken on new dimensions. In sharp contrast to the
British intelligence service, which has for generations emphasized
international economics, the DDI onlv recently has begim developing
a capability in such areas as international finance, the gold market,

"* See footnote, p. 121.

" This does not include DDA budgetary allocations in support of DDO activi-

ties.

124

and international economic movements. The real impetus for this
change came in August 1971 with the U.S. balance of payments crisis.
Since that time, and with subsequent international energy problems,
the demands for international economic intelligence have escalated
dramatically.

The Agency's technological capabilities have made a sustained con-
tribution to policymaking. By providing the first effective means of
verification, CIA's reconnaissance systems facilitated the United
States' participation in arms control agreements with the Soviet
Union, beginning with the 1972 Interim Agreement limiting strategic
arms.

In December 1974 these developments and the impetus for change
begun under Schlesinger were overtaken by public revelajtions of
alleged CIA domestic activities. What had been a consensual accept-
ance of the CIA's right to secrecy in the interests of national security
was rejected. The Agency's vulnerability to these public revelations
was indicative of the degree to which American foreign policy and
the institutional framework that supported that policy were under-
going redefinition.

E. CONCLUSIOX

A brief history cannot catalogue the many shifts in the numerous
CIA subdivisions over a period of nearly thirty years. Instead, this
summary has attempted to capture the changes in the CIA's main
functional areas. Sharing characteristics common to most large, com-
plex organizations, the CIA has responded to, rather than anticipated,
the forces of change ; it has accumulated functions rather than redefin-
ing them ; its internal patterns were established early and have solidi-
fied ; success has come to those who have made visible contributions in
high-priority areas. These general characteristics have affected the
specifics of the Agency's development :

— The notion that the CIA could serve as a coordinating body and
that the DCI could orchestrate the process did not take into account
inherent institutional obstacles. Vested departmental interests and
the Departments' control over budget and management choices
frustrated the Agency's and the DCI's ability to execute the coordina-
tion function. These limitations exist today, when the resources and
complexities of administration have escalated dramatically.

— The DDO and the DDI evolved out of separate, independent or-
ganizations, serving different policy needs. Strict compartmentation
in the DDO reinforced the separation. The two components were not
mutually supportive elements in the collection and analysis functions.

— The activities of the Clandestine Service have reflected not what
the Agency can do well but what the demands of American foreign
policy have required at particular times. The nature of covert opera-
tions, the priority accorded them bv senior policymakers, and the
orientation and background of some DCIs have made the clandestine
mission the preeminent activity within the organization.

— The qualities demanded of individuals in the Clandestine Serv-
ice— essentially management of people, provide the basis for bureau-
cratic skills in the organization. These skills account for the fact that
those DCIs who have been Agency careerists have all come from the
DDO.

125

— Growth in the range of American foreicrn policy interests and
the DDI's response to additional requirements have resulted in an
increased scale of collection and analysis. Rather than rectifying the
problem of duplication the Agency has contributed to it by becoming
yet another source of intelligence production. The DDI's size and the
administrative process involved in the production of finished intelli-
gence precluded close association between policymakers and analysts,
between the intelligence product and policy informed by intelligence
analysis.

The relationship between intelligence analysis and policymaking is
a reciprocal one. The creation of the NIO system was in part a recog-
nition of the need for close interaction between analysts and their
clients. If intelligence is to influence policy and if policy needs are to
direct intelligence priorities, senior policymakers must actively utilize
the intelligence capabilities at their disposal. For policymakers not
to do so only wastes resources and encourages lack of direction in
intelligence production. Likewise, tlie Director of Central Intelligence
or his successor for management of the community must assign priority
attention to the roles of principal intelligence advisor to the President
and head of the intelligence community. History has demonstrated that
the job of the DCI as community manager and as senior official of the
Agency are competing, not complementary roles. In the future separa-
tion of the functions may prove a plausible alternative.

'Clandestine activities will remain an element of U.S. foreign policy,
and policymakers will directly affect the level of operations. The prom-
inence of the Clandestine Service within the Agency may moderate as
money for and high-level Executive interest in covert actions diminish.
However, DDO incentives which emphasize operations over collec-
tion and which create an internal demand for projects will continue
to foster covert action unless an internal conversion process forces a
change.

Over the past thirty years the United States has developed an in-
stitution and a corps of individuals who constitute the U.S. intelli-
gence profession. The question remains as to how both the institution
and the individuals will best be utilized.

VII. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY:
STATUTORY AUTHORITY

The National Security Act of 1947 provides the Central Intelligence
Agency with statutory authority for its activities. Section 102(d) of
that Act lists the following "powers and duties" for the Agency:

(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning
such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agen-
cies as relate to national security ;

(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for
the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments 'and
agencies of the Government as relate to the national security ;

(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national
security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intel-
ligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agen-
cies and facilities: Provided.. That the Agency shall have no police,
subpena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions : Pro-
vided further^ That the departments and other agencies of the Gov-
ernment shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate
departmental intelligence : And 'pTovid£,d, further. That the Director
of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure ;

(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies,
such additional services of common concern as the National Security
Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally ;

(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelli-
gence affecting the national security as the National Security Council
may from time to time direct.^

The CIA has engaged in the following three types of activities,
none of which is specifically mentioned in the 1947 legislation: (1)
direct clandestine collection of intelligence; (2) covert action; and
(3) direct collection of information regarding the activities of Ameri-
can nationals within the ITnited States. As the fact of CIA involve-
ment in these activities has become widely known, questions have been
raised regarding the statutory authority by which the Agency under-
took these responsibilities.

It is important to note at this point that the confusion which has
resulted from the lack of specific legislative guidelines with respect
to these three kinds of activities miist rest with Congress. The lan-
guan^e of the National Security Act, its legislative history, and the
post-enactment interpretation of the legislation by Congress itself
indicates that the Act can leg'itimatelv be constnied as authorizing
clandestine collection by the CIA. The Select Committee's record
shows that the legislating committees of the House and Senate in-
tended for the Act to authorize the Agency to engage in espionage.
This activity could and should have been specifically authorized in
the 1949 legislation.

'50 U.S.C. 403(d).

(127)

128

Authority for covert action cannot be found in the National Secu-
rity Act. The Committee finds that the executive branch should have
approached Congress for authority for the CIA to engage in such
activities, particularly where they involved the use of force. At the
same time, Congress should have acted in response to well-publicized
instances of covert action to clarify CIA authority in this area.

Finally, Congress did take decisive action in the National Security
Act of 1947 to prevent the CIA's assuming any police, law-enforce-
ment, or internal security function in the United States. Some of the
CIA's activities have been in clear violation of that principle. Congress
now has a responsibility, however, to clarify the Agency's authority
where CIA's domestic activities are directly linked to its foreign
intelligence responsibilities.

A. Clandestine Collection of Intelligence

While the National Security Act of 1947 authorizes correlation,
evaluation, and dissemination of national security intelligence by the
CIA, nowhere does it specify that the Agency is authorized to engage
in the direct collection of intelligence. As its authority to engage in
direct collection, the CIA has relied upon Section 102(d) (4) and (5)
of the Act,^^ which authorizes the Agency :

(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing agencies, such
additional services of common concern as the National Secu-
rity Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished
centrally ;

(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to
irttelligence affecting the national security as the National
Security Council may from time to time direct. 50 U.S.C.
403 (d) (4) and (5).

The legislative history of the 1947 Act does not indicate clearly that
the full Congress specifically intended by these provisions to authorize
direct clandestine collection by the CIA. The legislating committees
discussed the issue in some detail in executive session, but it was
mentioned only briefly in public hearings and floor debates. However,
the public record does suggest that the full Congress had access to
information which indicated that the Act could be construed as au-
thorizing direct collection. No action was taken to prohibit such activ-
ity. Moreover, the 1949 enactment of the Central Intelligence Agency
Act demonstrates congressional intent to facilitate clandestine activ-
ities, and thus congressional endorsement of the view that such activi-
ties were the legitimate function of the CIA.

The Committee has been able to locate full records for only one of the
closed committee meetings on the National Security Act. In a tran-
script of the June 27, 1947 meeting of the House Committee on Expen-
ditures in the Executive Departments, executive branch representa-
tives proposed centralization of clandestine collection in the CIA. The
Conunittee discussed the wisdom of this proposal with a number of

^* Memorandum from the CIA General Counsel to the Director. 5/7/48 : memo-
randum from the CIA General Counsel to the Deputy Chief for Foreign Intelli-
gence, 4/14/61.

129

witnesses.^ General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, then Director of Central
Intelligence, suggested centralized collection to the Senate Committee
on the Armed Services,^ and other executive branch personnel who
participated in the preparation of the Act have stated that the Senate
committee discussed the proposal.* In addition, a 1961 memorandum
by CIA General Counsel Lawrence Houston and recent interviews
with Houston and former CIA Legislative Counsel Walter Pforz-
heimer indicate that the possibility of including language in the Act
specifically to authorize espionage by the CIA was discussed.^ Accord-
ing to Houston and Pforzheimer, this proposal was rejected on the
grounds that it would be inappropriate for the United States to be
on record as a participant in this kind of activity.^

The House Committee was informed that the Central Intelligence
Group, the predecessor agency to the CIA, had engaged in clandestine
collection, and that it relied for its authority upon language in subsec-
tions 8 (c) and (d) of the Presidential Directive of January 22, 1946
establishing the CIG.'^ The Committee was therefore specifically on
notice that this language, which is almost identical to Section 102(d)
(4) and (5) of the National Security Act of 1947, had been considered
sufficiently broad to authorize direct clandestine collection. (The Presi-
dential Directive, like the 1947 Act, does not mention collection of
any kind.)

Committee re^Dorts on the National Security Act make no reference
to a collection role for the CIA. In open committee hearings very little
was said about the issue. Occasional remarks do indicate, however, that
the Agency would perform some kind of collection function. In testi-
mony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Vanden-
berg said that the CIA would collect "foreign intelligence information
of certain types." ^ Earlier in his testimony Genei'al Vandenberg had
referred to "certain . . . activities" which intelligence agencies such as
the CIA, military intelligence, and the FBI could not "expose ... to
the public gaze." ^ General Vandenberg had spoken with some specific-
ity of the need for centralizing clandestine collections in the CIA be-
fore both the House and Senate Committees in closed session. It can
be assumed that these additional remarks, which were released to the
public, referred to clandestine collection as well.

^ Transcript. House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments,
Hearings on H.R. 2319, 6/27/47 (liereinafter cited as House transcript), pp. 10-19,
53-55. 79^86. 111-112, 118-125, 134-135. 159-164.

"Testimony of General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence
(unsanitized, now declassitfied ) , Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearings on
S. 758, 4/29/47.

* Staff summary of Walter Pforzheimer, former CIA Legislative Counsel, inter-
view, 3/4/76.

^ Memorandum from the CIA General Counsel to the Deputy Chief for Foreign
Intelligence, 4/14/61 ; staff summary of Dawrence Houston interview, 6/4/75 ;
staff summary of Walter Pforzheimer interview, 5/20/75.

No discussion of such a proposal is reported in the public record, but the House
committee executive session transcript contains brief references to it. Allen Dulles
testimony. House transcript, p. 59.

'Houston (staff siunmary), 6/4/75.

' General Hoyt S. Vandenberg testimony, Peter Vischer testimony. House tran-
script, pp. 10, 76.

' Vandenberg. Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearings, 4/29/47, p. 496.

'/6i<f, (p. 492).

130

Little more was said in public. Diirino; the House floor debates. Rep.
Biisbey, a member of the Committee on Expenditures, expressed ob-
jection to clandestine collection bv the CIA and said he hoped the bill
would be amended to prohibit snch activity.^" No such amendment was
adopted, however, and Rep. Holifield, another member of the com-
mittee, later remarked :

I want to impress upon the minds of the Members that the
work of this Central Intellisfence A<rencv, as far as the collec--
tion of evidence is concerned, is strictly in the field of secret
forei^ intelligence — what is known as clandestine intelli-
gence."

The remarks of Representatives Bnsbey and Holifield indicate that
it was anticipated that the authority conveyed bv the bill extended to
clandestine collection by the CIA. Still later in the floor debate, how-
ever. Rep. Patterson stated that while he clearly wanted "an inde-
pendent intelligence agency, working without direction by our armed
services, with full authority in operational procedures," he knew that
it was "impossible to incorporate such broad authority in the bill
now before us." ^^ Rep. Patterson may have been expressing regret that
the National Security Act did not authorize the CIA to engage in
direct collection of intelligence ; he may have been expressing the view
that the Act would riot give the CIA full independence in its opera-
tions from the armed services ; or he may have been referring to what
we now describe as covert action.

Public references to collection are too obscure and in some cases too
ambiffuous for the inference to be drawn that the full Congress spe-
cifically intended to authorize direct collection by the CIA. It would
require an attentive legislator, alert to the full record, to be apprised
of the possibility of CIA participation in this activity throuo;h the
public hearings and debates. But the language of Section 102(d) (4)
and (5) indicates that the Congress intended some flexibility in the
operations of the CIA. These provisions are sufficientlv broad that
clandestine collection of infonnation could reasonablv fall within the
range of activities which thev describe. There is no substantial evidence
that Congress intended specifically to exclude clandestine collection
from the "services of common concern . . . for the benefit of existing
ao-encies" or from the "other functions and duties related to intelligence
afi'ecting the national security" which were authorized by the Act.

Two years after the enactment of the National Securitv Act. Con-
gress passed the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 IT.S.C.
403a-403i. The 1949 legislation was an enabling act; technically it
contributed nothing to the kinds of activities which the Agency was
authorized to carry out. Its enactment, however, sheds some light upon
what Congress thought it had authorized in 1947.

There is no doubt that the purpose of certain provisions of the 1949
Act was to protect clandestine activities of the CIA. The Act waives
the normal restrictions placed on government acquisition of materiel,
hiring, and accounting for funds expended. If Congress did not be-

'" 93 Cong. Ree. 9404 (1947) .
" lUd, p. 9430.
" TUd, p. 9447.

131

lieve that some type of clandestine activity had been authorized by
the National Security Act, these provisions would not have been
necessary.

Further, the Cono;ress had reason to believe that the CIA was al-
ready engaged in espionage. Prior to passage of the Act, there had
been discussion in the press of CIA involvement in direct clandestine
collection.^^ Clandestine collection was specifically discussed in closed
hearings on the Act,^* and finally, in floor debates Members of Con-
gress referred to the legislation as "an espionage bill." ^^ "VA^iile there
was much debate on the floor of both Houses as to the wisdom of spe-
cific provisions of the bill and the general need for secrecy in the en-
actment process, no one suggested that the provisions of the bill were
unwarranted because the operations which they were designed to
facilitate were not authorized by law.

The Central Intelligence Agency Act appears to represent congres-
sional endorsement of the view that the National Security Act had au-
thorized the CIA to engage in direct clandestine collection. That is a
view consistent with the language of the National Security Act and, to
the degree that the history addresses the issue, with its legislative
history.

B. Covert Action

Covert action is defined as clandestine activity designed to influence
foreign governments, events, organizations or persons in support of
U.S. foreign policy conducted in such a way that the involvement of
the U.S. Government is not apparent. In its attempts directly to
influence events it is distinguishable from clandestine intelligence
gathering — often referred to as espionage. It has been argued that
authority for the CIA to conduct covert action can be found in the
1947 National Security Act, the 1949 Central Intelligence Agency Act
and the post enactment interpretation of those acts by the Congress
and the Executive.

The National Security Act contains no reference to covert action.
Section 102(d) (5) of the Act has been cited, however, as the statutory
basis for covert action. That paragraph provides that the Agency shall
"perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affect-
ing the national security as the National Security Council may, from
time to time, direct." Paragraph 5 was cited by the National Security
Council in authorizing covert action by the CIA in NSC^— A and
NSC 10/2.

The language of 50 U.S.C. 403(d) (5) may in fact authorize abroad
ran2:e of activities not otherwise specified in the Act. An important
limitation on such authorization, however, is that the activities must
be "related to intelligence affecting the national security." Many covert
actions are "related to intelligence" in the sense that their perform-
ance is tied to clandestine intelligence operations, uses the same meth-

""The X at Bogrota," The Washington Post, 4/13/48; Hanson W. Baldwin,
"Intelligence — II," The New York Times, 7/22/48.

" Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg testimony, Honse Amied Services Committee
Hearing on H.R. 5871, 4/8/48. (The CIA Act was not passed by the 80th Con-
gress in 1948, but the same bill reported by the House Armed Services Committee
in 1948 was enacted by the 81st Congress in 1949. )

"95 Cong. Rec. 1946, 1947 (1949).

132

ods, and yields an intelligence product. It must be noted, however,
that the chief purpose of these operations is not to gather intelligence,
and that many covert actions, such as the invasion of the Bay of Pigs,
have only the most limited relationship to "intelligence affecting the
national security."

Given the fact that some of the actions which the CIA has taken to
influence events in other countries are arguably "related to intelligence
affecting the national security", again it may be useful to examine the
legislative history of the National Security Act to determine if these
forms of covert action were within the range of activities which Con-
gress intended to authorize. But there is little in the public record or
even in the House Committee's executive session transcript which sheds
any light on the intent of Congress with respect to covert action. Occa-
sional references were made to "operational activities",^^ "special oper-
ations,^' or "operational procedures," ^^ but the context of these re-
marks indicates that they were at least as likely to refer to the
clandestine collection of intelligence as to covert action. In any case,
these terms were never used in such a way as to indicate clearly that
the Congress intended to authorize the activities which they encom-
passed. A memorandum by the CIA's general counsel, written soon
after the passage of the Act, concedes that the legislative history con-
tains nothing to show that Congress intended to authorize covert action
bytheCIA.^^

Neither the 1947 Act nor its legislative history, however, indicates
congressional intent to prohibit covert actions by the Agency. As pre-
viously noted, the Executive had intended from the outset that the
CIA would engage in clandestine collection of intelligence. The
flexibility which 50 U.S.C. 403(d)(5) conveyed to the Agency,
together with the capacity to act in secret which was being developed
in connection with its clandestine collection function, made the CIA
an attractive candidate to carry out these additional senstitive opera-
tions. The executive branch was soon to seize upon this flexibility and
assign major covert operations to the Agency.

In December 1947 the National Security Council instructed the CIA
to undertake covert psychological operations.^" Six months later the
NSC vastly expanded the range of covert activities authorized to in-
clude :

propaganda ; economic warfare ; preventive direct action, in-
cluding sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation
measures; subversion against hostile states, including assist-
ance to guerrilla and refugee liberation groups, and support
of indigenous anti-Communist elements in the threatened
countries of the free world.^^

Under the authority of 50 U.S.C. 403 (d)(5), there was established an
Office of Special Projects to conduct covert actions. ^^

^* James Forrestal testimony, House Committee on Expenditures in the Execu-
tive Departments. Hearings on H.R. 2319, 1947, p. 120.

" Memorandum from Allen Dulles, 4/25/47, Senate Armed Services Committee.
Hearings on S. 758, p. 529.

" 93 Cong. Rec, 9447, 1947.

" Memorandum from the CIA General Counsel to the Director, 9/25/47.

"" NSC-4-A, 12/17/47.

"^ NSC Directive, 6/18/48.

133

All of this occurred prior to enactment of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act in 1949. As noted previously, the CIA Act included pro-
visions the clear purpose of which was to protect the security of secret
operations. What is not clear is whether these operations were meant
by the Congress to include covert action as we now understand the
term.

By 1948 the CIA was already engaged in a variety of covert actions.
In seeking passage of the Central Intelligence Agency Act the Execu-
tive anticipated that its provisions would facilitate these operations,
as well as covert collection. Remarks in executive session of the House
Committee on Armed Services indicate that such operations were used
to justify passage of the Act, and that this committee knew that plans
for coveit action were then pending, which the Act was necessary to
implement.-^

Tiiere is no evidence that the full Congress, on the other hand, knew
or understood the range of clandestine activities, including covert ac-
tion, which the Executive was undertaking. The Connnittee reports
on the bills that were to become the Central Intelligence Agency Act
include no reference to covert action, and the floor debates do not indi-
cate that the Congress knew that covert action, as opposed to clandes-
tine intelligence gathering, was being or would be undertaken by the
CIA.-* Thus, while the very nature of some of the provisions of the
1949 Act indicates that the Congress assumed that the CIA would en-
gage in some clandestine activities, and while the legislative histoi'y
of that Act indicates that these operations were expected to include
espionage, there is nothing in the legislation or its history to indicate
that the full Congress meant by the Act to facilitate covert action.

It has been suggested that congressional provision of funds to the
CIA indicates congressional approval of, or authorization for the
CIA's conduct of covert action. Such a premise was offered in a
1962 internal memorandum of the Agency's General Counsel -^ and
in a Justice Department memorandum dated two days later.^*^ In
December 1975 this argument was made publicly by the Special Coun-
sel to the Director of the CIA in testimony before the House Select
Committee on Intelligence. The Special Counsel said that given "CIA
reporting of its covert action programs to Congress, and congres-
sional appropriation of funds for such programs" the "law is clear
that, under these circumstances. Congress has effectively ratified the
authority of the CIA to plan and conduct covert action under the
direction of the President and the National Security Council." "

The principal problem with this analysis is that the CIA has not
reported its covert action programs to Congress as a whole, but only

'^ Vandenberg, House Armed Services Committee Hearings on H.R. 5871, 4/8/
48.

"* It was remarked in the House debates, however, in the context of a discus-
sion of intelligence gathering that "in spite of all our wealth and power and
might we have been extremely weak in psychological warfare, notwithstanding
the fact that an idea is perhaps the most powerful weapon on this earth."
95 Cong. Rec. 1947 (1949).

"Memorandum from the CIA General Counsel to the Director, 1/15/62, p. 2.

^ Memorandum, OflBce of Legislative Counsel, Department of Justice, 1/17/62,
pp. 12-13.

"Testimony of Mitchel Rogovin, Special Counsel to the Director of Central
Intelligence, House Select Intelligence Committee Hearings, 12/9/75, pp. 1735-
1736.

134

to a few members of a few committees of Congress. Small subcom-
mittees of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees in each
House were briefed to some extent on these activities until 1974, when
the Foreign Assistance Act was amended to require that six com-
mittees of Congress be informed with respect to those foreign activ-
ities of the CIA which are not intended solely for obtaining necessary
intelligence.

Other members of Congress may ultimately have become gener-
ally aware that the CIA engaged in some non-intelligence production
operations; the role of the CIA in the Bay of Pigs operation, for
example, was widely known. Still it cannot be said that Congress as
a whole, knowing that the Agency made a practice of covert actions,
ratified such operations by appropriating funds for them. The Con-
gress as a whole has never voted for appropriations for the CIA. The
funds provided to the CIA are concealed in the appropriations made
to other agencies, they are then transferred to the CIA, pursuant to
the provisions of the CIA Act of 1949, with the approval of the 0MB
and selected members of the Appropriations Committees. Congress
as a whole has known neither how much the CIA would receive nor
where the funds which would be transferred to the CIA were con-
cealed. A question has been raised as to whether the CIA is even
"appropriated" funds pursuant to constitutional requirements.^^

More convincing than the argument that Congress has ratified covert
action by appropriation is the suggestion that ratification has been
by acquiescence. Although the Congress as a whole has not made
appropriations for covert action, in recent years it has been
aware that funds for such operations were being channeled to the
CIA. Congress has had the power to put an end to these activities by
attaching conditions to the use of funds appropriated by it. The
failure to exercise this power may be interpreted as congressional
ratification of CIA authority.

In December 1974 the Congress passed a set of amendments to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Section 82 of these amendments,
which became Section 662 of the 1961 Act and is knowm as the Hughes-
Ryan Amendment, provides :

Limitations on intelligence activities. — (a) No funds appro-
priated under authority of this or any other act may be ex-
pended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency
for operations in foreign countries, other than activities in-
tended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and
until the President finds that each such operation is impor-
tant to the national security of the United States and reports,
in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation
to the appropriate committees of the Congress, including the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States
House of Representatives, (b) The provisions of subsection
(a) of this section shall not apply during military operations
initiated by the United States under a declaration of war ap-
proved by the Congress or an exercise of powers by the Presi-
dent under the War Powers Resolution. 22 U.S.C. 2422.

" Elliot Maxwell. "The CIA's Secret Funding and the Constitution," Yale Law
Jmmal, Vol. 84 (1975), pp. 608-636.

135

The Huo;]ies-Ryan Amendment was cited by the Special Counsel to
the Director of the Central Intelligence Ao^ency when he appeared
before the House Select Committee on Intelligence to argue that Con-
gress has "both acknowledged and ratified the authority of the CIA
to plan and conduct covert action." He said that the provision "clearly
implies that the CIA is authorized to plan and conduct covert
action." ^^

Section 32 does not explicitly authorize covert action by the Central
Intelligence Agency. On its face it contributes nothing to the CIA's
authority to do anything. It can be argued, however, that the amend-
ment represents recognition by the Congress that authority for the
CIA to engage in covert action does exist. This argument has consid-
erable merit. While certain restrictions were placed upon the conduct
of covert action, it was not foreclosed as it could have been. On the
other hand, it can be argued that the amendment merely represents
Congress' acknowledoement that the CIA does cany out non-intelli-
gence production activities. The purpose of Section 32 was to acquire
information about these operations so that a decision could be made
about their legitimacy. This argument is bolstered by the fact that a
number of the proponents of the amendment, including its sponsor
in the Senate, saw the amendment as a temporary measure. Senator
Hughes stated on the floor that the measure "provides a temporary
arrangement, not a pemianent one, recognizing that a permanent ar-
rangement is in the process of being developed." ^° Thus the amend-
ment might be seen not as congressional ratification of the CIA's au-
thority to conduct covert action, but as a temporarv measure to plaice
limits on what the CIA was doing anyway. At the same time, the
measure requires reporting so that Congress, traditionally deprived
of information about covert action, can determine what further action
to take with respect to this activity.

The significance of the events up to 1974 is that until that date
Congress could escape a full share of responsibility for the CIA's
covert actions. Enactment of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, howevei',
does represent formal acknowledgement by Congress that the CIA
engages in operations in foreign countries for purposes other than
obtaining intelligence. Since passage of that Act, six standing com-
mittees of Congress have received information on specific CIA covert
actions, and public hearings have been held on the subject by the
Select Committee. The full Congress now has information on covert
action, and it has the power to prohibit or further restrict this activity,
either directly or through limitations on the expenditure of funds. If
Congress takes no such action, a convincing argument can be made that
it has authorized covert action by acquiescence.

C. Domestic AcTI^^TIES

The record shows that the CIA has engaged in a variety of clandes-
tine collection programs directed at the activities of Americans within
the United States. Some of these activities have raised constitutional

Rogovin, House Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearings, 12/9/75, p. 1737.
' Cong. Rec. S18062, daily ed., 10/2/74.

136

questions related to the rights of Americans to engage in political
activity free from government surveillance. But they have also raised
questions about (1) the authority of the CIA, under its charter, to
collect and use information about Americans, and (2) the extent to
which the specific statutory prohibition on police and internal security
functions by the CIA restricts these domestic activities.

The National Security Act of 1947 defines the duties of the CIA in
terms of "intelligence"' or "intelligence relating to the national secur-
ity." The legislative history of the Act clearly shows that Congress
intended the activities authorized by this language to be related to
foreign intelligence.^^ This construction is aided by the statute's provi-
sion that "the Agency shall have no police, subpena, law enforcement
power, or internal-security functions," (50 U.S.C. 403(d) (3)). In re-
cent years, however, the executive branch has interpreted foreign intel-
ligence broadly to include intelligence programs the purpose of which
is to determine foreign influence on dissident domestic groups. These
programs have involved intelligence gathering within the ITnited
States directed at United States nationals. They have continued, under
Presidential orders, even when no significant foreign connections were
found. Even if these investigations had been, based at the outset upon
specific evidence of contact between domestic groups and hostile for-
eign governments or powers, however, and even if they liad been
terminated immediately when they revealed no foreign threat, a ques-
tion arises as to whether such investigations would be authorized by
the National Security Act.

The legislative history of the Act shows that in establishing the CIA
Congress contemplated an agency wliich not only would be limited
to foreign intelligence operations but one which would conduct very
few of its operations within the ITnited States. It was contemplated
that the Agency would have its headquarters here,^- and in House
Committee hearings in executive session the possibility of seeking for-
eign intelligence information from private American citizens who
traveled abroad was discussed with approval. ^^ But in public and in
private it was generally agreed among legislators and representatives
of the Executive that the CIA would be "confined out of the continen-
tal limits of the United States and in foreign fields," ^* that it should

^ The purpose of the CIA was to take over the functions of the CTG, which had
acted as a foreign intelligence agency. The assumption that the CIA would con-
tinue in the foreign intelligence tifld underlies much of the legislative delmtes
over Section 102 of the National Security Act. For example, in the House floor
dehates it was remarked that, "The Central Intelligence Agency deal.s with in-
telligence outside the United States," [93 Cong. Rec. 9494 (1947)]. that "the
Central Intelligence Agency is supposed to operate only abroad" (Ibid, p. 9448)
and that "the Central Intelligence Agency deals only with external security"
(TMd, p. 9447). It was frequently remarked that the Agency was not to be per-
mitted to act as a domestic police or "Gestapo." [Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee, Hearings on S. 758. (1947), p. 497: House Expenditures in the Executive
Departments Committee, Hearings on H.R. 2319 (1947), pp. 127. 438, 479-481;
93 Cong. Rec. 9413, 9422, 9443 (1947).] Specific care was taken to prevent the CIA
or the Director of Central Intelligence from interfering in any way with the
functions of the FBI [see 50 U.S.C. 403 (e) and 93 Cong. Rec. 9447-9448 (1947).]

^ Vandenberg testimony. House transcript, 6/27/47, p. 60.

^' Allen Dulles testimonv, Ihid., p. 52-53, 66.

^ Hid., p. 59.

137

have no "police power or anything else within the confines of this coun-
try," ^^ and that it was "supposed to operate only abroad." ^^

This view was reiterated in the legislative history of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. The following exchange took place
between Kep. Holifield and Rep. Sasscer of the House Committee on
the Armed Services, which had reported the 1949 bill :

Mr. Holifield. I would like to question the gentleman from Mis-
souri. On page 4 of the report, subsection 5(b), it is provided that an
employee while in this country on leave may be assigned to temporary
duty in the United States for special purposes or reorientation prior to
i-eturning to foreign service.

In the original unification bill passed through the Committee on
Expenditures, of which I am a member, we had the setting up of this
CIA. It was clearly brought out at that time that no internal security
work of any kind would be done by the CIA ; that all of its intelligence
work would be done in a foreign field. In vicAv of this particular para-
graph here I want to be assured at this time that such special duties as
are mentioned here, or reorientation, do not apply to security functions
in the United States.

Mr. Sasscer. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, I will say to
the gentleman that that is correct, that this bill is in no wise directed to
internal security. If they come back here it is purely a matter of Jeave,
and reorientation, and training to go back into their work in foreign
countries. 95 Cong. Rec. 1947-1948 ( 1949) .

The bill which had been submitted by the Executive to establish the
Agency in 1947 incorporated by reference the provisions of the Presi-
dential Directive of January 22, 1946, which established the CIG and
provided that it would have "no police, law enforcement or internal
security functions." " Partly in an eifort to ensure that the CIA did not
exceed the bounds which Congress contemplated foi- its activities, the
bill was amended to include this prohibition and other provisions of the
1946 Directive in its text. Members of Congress were concerned that
the Directive could be amended, without consulting Congress, to assign
to the CIA responsibilities which would affect the rights of the Ameri-
can people. ^^

=^ Ibid., p. GO.

*" 93 Cong. Rec. 9448 (1947) .

^ The Presidential Directive also specified at Section 9 that "Nothing contained
herein shall be construed to authorize the making of investigations inside the
continental limits of the United States and its possessions except as provided by
law and Presidential Directives." According to Lawrence Houston, this provision
had been added to the Directive at the request of the FBI, which was concerned
that the CIG should not become involved in investigating subversive groups in
the United States. It was not included in the statutory draft, however, because
of an agreement between the CIG and the FBI that CIG could gather foreign
intelligence within the United States from such sources as businessmen who
traveled abroad. (Lawrence Houston testimony, President's Commission on CIA
Activities, 3/17/75, pp. 1656-1657.)

^ Dulles testimony. House transcript. 6/27/47, pp. 57-58. ^V^len General Vanden-
berg was consulted about this possibility in executive session of the House Com-
mittee on Executive Expenditures, he responded, "No sir; I do not think there
is anything in the bill, since it is all foreign intelligence, that can possibly affect
any of the privileges of the i>eople of the United States." But Congress continued
to be concerned about the potential for a secret domestic police in the CIA. As
Rep. Brown responded to General Vandenberg, "There are a lot of things that
might affect the privileges and rights of the people of the United States that are
foreign, you know." (Vandenberg testimony Ibid., p. 32.)

69-983 O - 76 - 10

138

By codifying the prohibition against police and internal security
functions, Congress apparently felt that it had protected the American
people from the possibility that the CIA might act in any way that
would have an impact upon their rights.

The CIA, however, has interpreted the internal security prohibition
narrowly to exclude investigations of domestic activities of American
groups for the purpose of determining foreign associations. But his-
tory indicates that at the time of enactment of the National Security
Act, threats to "internal security" were widely understood to include
domestic groups with for-eign connections. Investigations by the FBI
of American groups w^ith no such connections, in fact, have been a
i^ecent phenomenon. The original order from President Roosevelt to
J. Edgar Hoover to begin internal security operations was to investi-
gate foreign communist and fascist influence within the United
States.^^ There is no evidence that by 1947 these investigations were
considered foreign intelligence.

The CIA's domestic intelligence programs have not relied for their
authority solely upon the premise that the agency's mandate to engage
in foreign intelligence activities includes information gathering on
foreign contacts of domestic groups. As authority for some of its
operations with the United States, the Agency has relied upon Sec-
tion 102(d) (3) of the National Security Act, Avhich charges the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence with responsibility to protect intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.'*"

The CIA has construed the sources and methods language broadly to
authorize investigation of domestic groups whose activities, including
demonstrations, have potential, however remote, for creating threats to
CIA installations, I'ecruiters or contractors. In the course of carrying
out tliese investigations the Agency has collected general information
about the leadership, funding, activities, and policies of targeted
groups.

These activities have raised serious questions as to (1) whether such
a broad interpretation of the sources and methods language is consist-
ent with the intent of Congress in enacting that provision, and (2)
again, whether such an interpretation is consistent with the statutory
prohibition against conduct by the CIA of internal security functions.

The sources and methods langiiaixe was discussed only briefly in the
recorded legislative history of the National Security Act. As originally
drafted, the proposed Act had charged the Director with "fully" pro-
tecting sources and methods. In the House Committee executive ses-
sion, however, General Vandenburg suggested that the Director could
not possibly "fully" protect sources and methods, and the word "fully"
was subsequently dropped.*^'' According to the former General Counsel
to the CIA, who was privv to many of the discussions and debates on
the legislation as it was being prepared, the purpose of the sources and
methods provision was essentially to allay concern in the military
services that the Agency would not operate with adequate safeguards
to protect the services' intelligence secrets.^^ Despite congressional

" See Domestic Intelligence Report, p. 25.
^^ See detailed report on CHAOS report.

*^ Houston. President's Commission on tbe CIA. 3/17/75, pp. 1654-1655 ; Staff
summary of Lawrence Houston interview, 6/11/75.
"° Vandenberg testimony House transcript, 6/27/47, p. 28.

139

concern, expressed again and again during hearings and floor de-
bates on the bill, that the CIA was to have no potential for in-
fringing upon the rights of American citizens and that it was to be
virtually excluded from acting within the United States, no one ques-
tioned whether the sources and methods language would raise prob-
lems in this area. The lack of interest in the provision suggests that it
was not viewed as conveying new authority to investigate; rather it
charged the Director of Central Intelligence Agency with responsibil-
ity to use the authority which he already had to protect sensitive mtel-
ligence information. This could mean implementing strict security
procedures within CIA facilities and conducting background investi-
gations of CIA personnel (although according to the former Agency
General Counsel, the CIA first requested that the FBI perform this
investigative function; J. Edgar Hoover refused to assume this re-
sponsibility on grounds of insufficient personnel within his own Bu-
reau*-). Given the prohibition against internal security functions, it
is unlikely that the provision was meant to include investigations of
private American nationals who had no contact with the CIA, on the
grounds that eventually their activities might threaten the Agency.

*'' Houston, President's Commission on CIA activities within the United States,
3/17/75, pp. 1655-1656.

VIII. COVERT ACTION

"o activity of the Central Intelligence Agency has engendered more
troversy and concern than "covert action," the secret use of power

No
controversy

and persuasion. The contemporary definition of covert action as used
by the CIA — "any clandestine operation or activity designed to influ-
ence foreign governments, organizations, persons or events in support
of United States foreign policy" — suggests an all-purpose policy tool.
By definition, covert action should be one of the CIA's least visible
activities, yet it has attracted more attention in recent yeai-s than any
other United States foreign intelligence activity. The CIA has been
accused of interfering in the internal political affairs of nations rang-
ing from Iran to Chile, from Tibet to Guatemala, from Libya to Laos,
from Greece to Indonesia. Assassinations, coups d'etat, vote buying,
economic warfare — all have been laid at the doorstep of the CIA. Few
political crises take place in the world today in which CIA involve-
ment is not alleged. x\s former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford
told the Committee :

The knowledge regarding such operations has become so
widespread that our country has been acrused of being re-
sponsible for practically every internal difficulty that has
occurred in every country in the world. ^
Senate Resohitioii 21 authorized the Conunittee to investigate

"the extent and necessity of overt and covert intelligence activities in
the LTnited States and abroad." - In conducting its inquiry into covert
action, the Committee addressed several sets of questions:

— First, what is the past and present scope of covert action ?
Has covert action been an exceptional or commonplace tool of
United States foreign policy? Do present covert operations
meet the standard — set in the Hughes-Ryan amendment to
the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act — of "important to the na-
tional security of the ITnited States ?"

— Second, what is the value of covert action as an instru-
ment of United States foreign policy ? How successful have
covert operations been over the years in achieving short-range
objectives and long-term goals ? What have been the effects of
these operations on the "targeted" nations? Have the costs of
these operations, in terms of our reputation throughout the
world and our capacity for ethical and moial leadership,
outweighed the benefits achieved?

^ Clark Clifford testimony. 12/5/75. Hearings. Vol. 7. p. 51.

' Senate Resolution 21, Section 2, Clause 14. The CIA conducts several kinds of
covert intelligence activities abroad : clandestine collection of positive foreign
intelligence, counterintelligence (or liaison with local services), and covert
action. Although there are a variety of covert action techniques, most can he
grouped into four broad categories: political action, propaganda, paramilitary,
and economic action.

(141)

142

— Third, have the techniques and methods of covert action
been antithetical to our principles and ideals as a nation?
United States officials have been involved in plots to assassi-
nate foreig;n leaders. In Chile, the ITnited States attempted
to overthrow a democratically elected orovemment. INIany
covert operations appear to violate our international treaty
obligations and commitments, such as the charters of the
United Nations and Organization of American States. Can
these actions be justified when our national security interests
are at stake ?

— Fourth, does the existence of a covert action capability
distort the decisionmaking process? Covert operations by
their nature cannot be debated openly in vrays required by
a constitutional system. However, has this meant that, on
occasion, the Executive has resorted to covert operations to
avoid bureaucratic. Congressional, and public debate? Has
this contributed to an erosion of trust between the executive
and legislative branches of government and between the
government and the people?

— Fifth, what are the implications of maintaining a
covert action capability, as presently housed in the CTA's
Directorate for Operations? Does the very existence of this
capability make it more likely that covert operations will be
presented as a policy alternative and be implemented? Has
the maintenance of this standing capability generated, in
itself, demands for more and more covert action? Conversely,
what are the implications of 7wt maintaining a covert action
capability? Will our national securitv be imperiled? Will our
policymakers he denied a valuable policv option ?

— ^Sixth, is it possible to accomplish many of our covert
objectives through overt means? Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty may be instructive in this regard. For years
RFE and RL were operated and subsidized, covertly, by the
CTA. Today they operate openlv. Could other CTA covert
activities be conducted in a similar manner?

— Finally, should the ITnited States continue to maintain a
covert action capability? If so, should there be restrictions
on certain kinds of activities? What processes of authoriza-
tion and review, both within the executive and legislative
branches, should be established?

Over the past year, the Committee investigated several major
covert action programs. These programs were selected to illustrate
(1) covert action techniques, ranging from propaganda to paramili-
tary activitie<-', from economic action to subsidizing and supporting for-
eign political parties, media, and labor organizations; (2) different
kinds of "target" countries, from developed Western nations to less
developed nations in Africa, Asia and Latin America; (B) a broad
time span, from 1947 to the present; and (4) a combination of cases
that the CIA considers to be representative of success and failure.
One of the Committee's case studies, Chile, was the subject of a
publicly released staff report.^ It served as background for the Com-

" Senate Select Committee. "Covert Action in Cliile."

143

mittee's public session on covert action.* During its covert action in-
quiry, the Connnittee took extensive testimony in executive session
and received l-i briefings from the CIA. The stall' interviewed over
120 persons, inckiding IJi former Ambassadors and 12 former CliV
Station Chiefs. The successor Senate intelligence oversight comniit-
tee(s) will inherit the Connnittee's chassified covert action case studies
as well as a rich documentary base for future consideration of covert
action.

In addition to the major covert action case studies, the Committee
spent five months investigating alleged plots to assassinate foreign
leaders. This inquiry led, inevitably, into covert action writ large.
Plots to assassinate Castro could not be understood unless seen in
the context of Operation MONGOOSE, a massive covert action
program designed to "get rid of Castro." The death of General Schnei-
der in Chile could not be understood unless seen in the context of what
was known as Track II — a covert action program, undertaken by the
CIA at the direction of President Nixon, to prevent Salvador Allende
from assuming the office of President of Chile. During the assassina-
tion inquiry, the Committee heard from over 75 witnesses during 60
days of hearings.

The Committee has chosen not to make public the details of all the
covert action case studies, with the exceptions noted above. The force
of the Committee's recommendations on covert action might be
istrengthened by using detailed illustrations of what the United
iStates did under what circumstances and with what results in country
i"X" or "Y." The purpose of the Committee in examining these cases,
however, was to understand the scope, techniques, utility, and pro-
priety of covert action in order to make recommendations for the
future. The Committee concluded that it was not essential to expose
past covert relationships of foreign political, labor and cultural leaders
with the United States Government nor to violate the confidentiality
of these relationships. Therefore, names of individuals and institu-
tions have been omitted.

In addition, the Committee decided, following objections raised by
the CIA, not to publicly release two sections of this Report — "Tech-
niques of Covert Action" and "Covert Action Projects: Initiation,
Review, and Approval." These two sections will be submitted to the
Members of the Senate in a classified form. However, for a discussion
of covert action techniques, as they were practiced in Chile, see the
Connnittee Staff Report, "Covert Action in Chile: 1963-1973" (pp.
6-10,14-40).

A. Evolution of Covert Action

Covert action was not included as one of the charter missions of the
CIA. The National Security Act of 1947 (which established the
Agency and the National Security Coimcil) does not specifically men-
tion or authorize secret operations of any kind, whether for intelligence
collection or covert action.^ The 1947 Act does, however, contain a
provision which directs the CIA to "perform such other functions and
duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the

* Senate Select Committee, Hearings, 12/4-5/75, Vol. 7.

^ See Appendix I, "Congressional Authority for the CIA to Conduct Covert
Actions."

144

National Security Council may from time to time direct." ^ One of the
drafters of the 1947 Act, former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford,
has referred to this provision as the "catch-all" clause. According to
Mr. Clifford:

Because those of us who were assigned to this task and had
the drafting responsibility were dealing with a new subject
with practically no precedents, it was decided that the Act
creating the Central Intelligence Agency should contain a
"catch-all" clause to provide for unforeseen contingencies.
Thus, it was written that the CIA should "perform such other
functions and duties related to intelligence aftecting the na-
tional security as the National Security Council may from
time to time direct." It was under this clause that, early in the
operation of the 1947 Act, covert activities were authorized.
I recall that such activities took place in 1948 and it is even
possible that some planning took place in late 1947. It was
the original concept that covert activities undei-taken under
the Act were to be carefully limited and controlled. You will
note that the language of the Act provides that this catch-
all clause is applicable only in the event that the national
security is affected. This was considered to be an important
limiting and restricting clause.'

Beginning in December 1947, the National Security Council issued
a series of classified directives specifying and expanding the CIA's
covert mission.^ The first of these directives, NSC-4-A, authorized the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to conduct coveit psycho-
logical operations consistent with United States policy and in coordi-
nation with the Departments of State and Defense.

A later directive, NSC 10/2, authorized the CIA to conduct covert
political and paramilitary operations. To organize and direct these
activities, a semi-independent Office of Policy Coordination (OPC)
was established within the CIA. OPC took policy direction from the
Departments of State and Defense.^ The directive establishing OPC
referred to the "vicious covert activities of the U.S.S.R." and author-
ized the OPC to plan and conduct covert operations, including covert
political, psychological, and economic warfare. These early activities
were directed against the Soviet threat. They included countering
Soviet propaganda and covert Soviet support of labor unions and
student groups in Western Europe, direct U.S. support of foreign
political pai'ties, "economic warfare," sabotage, assistance to refugee
liberation groups, and support of anti-Comnnniist groups in occupied
or threatened areas.

Until a reorganization in June, 1950, OPC's responsibilities for
paramilitary action were limited, at least in theory, to contingency
planning. Networks of agents Avere trained to assist the escape of re-

'50 U.S.C. 403(d)(5).

' Clifford, 12/5/75, Hearings, pp. 50-51.

*For a full discussion of tlie National Security Council and its direction of
intelligence activities, see Chapter IV. "The President's Office."

"The semi-independent status of OPC within the CIA created a rivalry with
the exi.sting CIA component responsible for clandestine intelligence, the Office of
►Strategic Operations.

145

sistance forces and carry out sabotage behind enemy lines in the event
of war. However, OPC did conduct some guerrilla-type operations in
this early period against Soviet bloc countries, using neighboring
countries as bases and employing a variety of "black" activities.^"

The size and activities of the OPC grew dramatically. Many covert
action programs initiated in the first few yeai"S as an adjunct to the
Unitetl States ix)licy of communist containment in Europe ev^entually
developed into large-scale and long-term operations, such as the
clandestine propaganda radios aimed at the So\'iet bloc — Radio Free
Eui'ope and Radio Liberty.

Many early OPC activities involved subsidies to European "counter-
front"' labor and political organizations. These were intended to serve
as alternatives to Soviet- or communist-inspired groups. Extensive
OPC lalx>r, media, and election operations in Western Europe in the
late 1940's, for insitance, were designed to luidercut debilitating strikes
by conmiiHiist trade unions and election advances by communist par-
ties. Support for "counterfront"' organizations, especially in the areas
of student, labor and cultural activities, was to become nuich more
prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s, although they later l^ecame inter-
national rather than European-oriented.

Communist aggression in the Far p]ast led the United States into
war in Korea in June 1950. At the same time, Defense Department
pressure shifted the focus of OPC activities toward more aggressive
responses to Soviet and Chinese Communist threats, particularly mili-
tary incursions. Large amounts of money were spent for guerrilla and
propaganda operations. These ojierations were designed to support
the ITnited States military mission in Korea. Most of these diversionary
paramilitaiy operations never came to fruition. For example, during
this period the CIA's Office of Procurement acquired some $152 million
worth of foreign weapons and ammunition for use by guerrilla forces
that never came into existence.

As a result of the upsurge of paramilitary action and contingency
l)lanning, OPC's manpower almost trebled during the first year of
the Korean War. A large part of this increase consisted of paramilitary
experts, who were later to be instrumental in CIA paramilitary opera-
tions in the Ray of Pigs, the Congo, and Laos, among others. In support
of paramilitary activities the CIA had bases and facilities in the
T 'nited States, Europe, the Mediterranean and the Pacific. OPC's in-
creased activity was not limited to paramilitary operations, however.
Py 1958, there were major covert o])erations in 48 countries, consist-
ing primarily of propaganda and ])olitical action.

Another event in 1950 affected the develoimient and organizational
framework for covert action. General Walter Bedell Smith became
CIA Director. He decided to merge OPC with the CIA's Office of
Special Operations." Although the merger was not completed until

^" "Black" activities are (hose intended to give tlie impression tliat tliey are
sponsored by an indigenous opposition force or a hostile power, rather than by
the United States.

" Tn order to accomplisli the merger. Smith first consolidated the OPC chain
of command by ordering the Director of OPC to report directly to the DCI instead
of through the Departments of State and Defense. Smith also appointed his own
senior representatives to field stations to coordinate the covert activities of the
OPC and the espionage operations of the OSO. The two offices were often com-
peting for the same potential a.ssetsin foreign countries.

146

1954, the most important organizational step took place in August
1952 — a single new directorate, entirely within the structure and con-
trol of the CIA, was established. Known as the Directorate for Plans
(DDP),^- this new directorate was headed by a Deputy Director and
was assigned responsibility for all CIA covert action and espionage
functions. The CIA's "Clandestine Service" was now in place.

By the time the DDP iwas organized, OPC had a large staff
and an annual budget of almost $20U million. It dominated the smaller
and bureaucratically weaker OSO in size, glamour, and attention. Yet,
one of the original purposes of the merger, according to General Smith,
was to protect the OSO function of clandestine intelligence collection
from becoming subordinate to the covert action function of OPC. In
1952, Smith wrote that the merger was :

designed to create a single overseas clandestine service, while
at the same time preserving the integrity of the long-range
espionage and counterespionage mission of the CIA from
amalgamation into those clandestine activities which are sub-
ject to short-term variations in the prosecution of the Cold
War.

Despite Smith's desires, the Cold War, and the "hot war" in Korea,
increased the standing, and influence, of the covert "operators" within
the CIA. This trend continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s.

The post-Korean War period did not see a reduction in CIA covert
activities. Indeed, the communist threat was now seen to be world-
wide, rather than concentrated on the borders of the Soviet Union
and mainland China. In response, the CIA, at the direction of the
National Security Council, expanded its European and crisis-oriented
approach into a world-wide effort to anticipate and meet communist
aggression, often with techniques equal to those of the Soviet clandes-
tine services. This new world-wide approach was reflected in a 1955
Xational Security Council Directive which authorized the CIA to :

— Create and exploit problems for International Commu-
nism;

— Discredit International Communism, and reduce the
strength of its parties and organization ;

— Reduce International Communist control over any areas
of the world.

The 1950s saw an expansion of communist interest in the Third
World. Attempts to anticipate and meet the communist threat there
proved to be an easier task than carrying out clandestine activities
in the closed Soviet and Chinese societies. Political action projects in
the Third World increased dramatically. Financial support was pro-
vided to parties, candidates, and incumbent leaders of almost every
political persuasion, except the extreme left and right. The immediate
purpose of these projects was to encourage political stability, and thus
jH-eyent Communist incursions; but another important objective of
political action was the acquisition of "agents of influence" who could
be used at a future date to provide intelligence or to carry out political
action. Through such projects, the (^lA developed a world-wide in-

"The name was changed to the Directorate for Operations (DDO) in 1073.

147

f rastructiire of individual agents, or networks of agents, engaged in a
variety of covert activities.

By 1955, the CIA's Clandestine Service bad gone through a number
of reorganizations. It emerged with a structure for the support of
covert action that remained essentially the same until the early 1960s.
The Clandestine Service consisted of seven geographic divisions and a
number of functional staffs — foreign intelligence, counterintelligence,
iechnical support for covert action, and planning and program co-
ordination. With the demise of paramilitary activities following the
Korean War, the Paramilitary Operations Staff had been abolished
and its functions merged with the staff responsible for ])sychologica]
action. An International Organizations Division, created in June 1954,
handled all programs in support of labor, youth, student, and cultural
counterfront organizations.

ITsing the covert action budget as one measure of activity, the scope
of political and ?:)sychological action during the 1950s was greatest
in the Far East, Western Europe, and the Middle East, with steadily
increasing activity in the Western Hemisphere. The inteniational
labor, student, and media projects of the International Organizations
Division constituted the greatest single concentration of covert political
and propaganda activities. Paramilitary action began to increase again
in the late 1950s with large-scale operations in two Asian countries
and increased covert military assistance to a third."

The Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961 prompted a reorganization of CIA
covert action and the procedures governing it. A new form of covert
action — counterinsurgency — was now emphasized. Tender the direction
of the National Security Council, the CIA rapidly expanded its coun-
terinsurgency capability, focusing on Latin America, Africa, and the
Far East. After the Geneva agreements of 1962, the CIA took oyer the
training and advising of the Meo army, previously a responsibility of
I^.S. military advisers. The Laos operation eventually became the larg-
est paramilitary effort in post-war history. In 1962 the Agency also
began a small paramilitary program in Vietnam. Even after the
Ignited States Military Assistance Command (MxVCV) took over
paramilitary programs in Vietnam at the end of 1963, the CIA con-
tinued to assist the U.S. military's covert activities against North
Vietnam.

The CIA's paramilitary effort continued to expand throughout the
decade. The paramilitary budget reached an all-time hich in 1970. It
probably Avould have continued to climb, had not the burden of the
Laos proirram been transferred to the Department of Defense in
1971.^*

" In 1062 a paramilitary office was reconstituterl in the CTA. Following the
Ray of Pies, a panel headed by Lvnian Kirkpatriek. then the CTA's Executive
Director-Comptroller, recommended that an office be created in the Clandestine
Sprvice to centralize and professionalize paramilitary action and contingency
i^'anning, dramng upon Agency-wide resources for larsre-scale operations. As a
result, a new paramilitary division was establishe<l. It was to operate under the
gnidonce of a new NSC approval jarrouip — the Snecial Groun (Counterinsurgency).

"Part of the Agency's interest in naramilitary activities stemmed from the
Agencv's view that these activities are interdenendent with intelligence collec-
tion functions. DCI .John McCone protested the transfer of paramilitary pro-
grams in Vietnam to MACV in 196.S-1964 because he thought that a third of the
intelligence reporting of the CIA's Vietnam station might be lost with such a re-
duction of CIA participation.

148

Paramilitary action was but one of the CIA's collection of tools
dnrino- the early and middle 1960s. Outside the Far East the CIA
mounted an increasino- number of political, ])ropa<janda, and economic
projects. This was the era of Operation MONGOOSE, a massive covert
assault on the Castro reoime in Cuba.^'> The need to combat the "export
of revolution" by connnunist powers stinndated a variety of new
covert techniques aimed at an increasinoly broad range of "targets."
Coveit action reached its peak in the years 1964 to 1967.

In contrast to the period 1964 to 1967, when expenditures for polit-
ical and propaganda action increased almost 60 percent, the period
1968 to the present has registered declines in every functional and geo-
graphic category of covert action — except for paramilitary operations
in the Far East which did not drop until 197^. The number of individ-
ual covert action projects dropped by 50 i:)ercent from fiscal year 1964
(when they reached an all-time high) to fiscal year 1968. The number
of projects by itself is not an adequate measure of the scope of covert
action. Projects can vary considerably in size, cost, duration, and effect.
Today, for example, one-fourth of the current covert action projects
are relatively high-cost (over $100,000 annually).

No matter which standards are used, covert activities have decreased
considerably since their peak period in the mid- and late 1960s. Re-
cent trends reflect this deciease in covert action. In one country, covert
activities began in the early years of the OPC and became so extensive
in the 1950s and 1960s that they affected almost every element of that
society. A retrenchment began in 1965; by 1974 there were only two
relatively small-scale political action projects. The only covert, expendi-
ture projected for fiscal year 1976 is a small sum for the development
of potential "assets" or local agents who may be used for covert action
in the future. In a second country, covert action expenditures in
1975 were less than one pei'cent of the total in 1971. A slight in-
crease was projected for fiscal yeai' 1976, also for the development of
potential assets for future use. The CIA lias thus curtailed its covert
action projects in these two countries, although its current investment
in potential assets indicates that the Agency does not want to preclude
the possibility of covert involvement in the future.

Some of the major reasons for the decline of covert activities since
the mid- and late 1960s include :

— a reduction of CIA labor, student, and media projects
following the 1967 Ramparfs disclosure and the subsequent
recommendations of the Katzenbach Committee;

— the transfer of covert military assistance in Laos from
the CIA budget to tlie Defense Department budget in 1971,
and the termination of many other covert activities in that
area with the end of the war in Indochina in 1975 ;

— reductions in overseas personnel of the Clandestine Serv-
ice as a result of studies and cuts made by James Schlesinger,
first when he was with the Office of Management and Budget
and later durinc: his brief tenure as Director of Central In-
telligence in 1978;

" Senate Select Committee, "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign
Leaders," p. 139 ff.

149

— sliiftin<r XLS. foreign jxilicy priorities in the 1970s,
which liave de-eniphasized sustained involvement in the in-
ternal affairs of other nations; and

— concern ainono- Aoency officials and U.S. policymakers
that publicity given to CIA covert activities would increase
the chances of disclosure and generally decrease the chances
of success of the kinds of large-scale, high-expenditure proj-
ects that developed in the 1060s.^'"^

B. CoXGRESSIOXAL OVERSIGHT

There is no reference to covert action in the 1947 National Security
Act, nor is there any evidence in the debates, connnittee reports, or
legislative history of the 1947 Act to show that Congress intended
specifically to authorize covert operations.^^ Since the CIA's wartime
predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services, had conducted covert
operations. Congress may have anticipated that these operations were
envisioned.

AVhether specifically authorized by Congress or not, CIA covert op-
erations were soon underway. Citing the "such other functions and
duties" clause of the 1947 Act as authority, the National Security
Council authorized the CIA to undertake covert operations at its first
meeting in Deceuiber 1947. At that point Congress became responsible
for overseeing these activities.

ShoKly after the passage of the 1947 Act, the Armed Services and
Appropriations Committees of the House and the Senate assumed
jurisdiction for CIA activities and appropriations. In the Senate, fol-
lowing an infoimal arrangement worked out with Senators Vanden-
berg and Russell, small CIA subcommittees were created within
Armed Ser\'ices and Appropriations. Over time, the relations between
the subconnnittees and the CIA came to be dominated by two prin-
ciples: "need to know" and "want to know." ^' The "want to know"
principle was best expressed in a statement made in 1956 by a con-
gressional overseer of the CIA, Senator Leverett Saltonstall :

It is not a question of reluctance on the part of CIA officials
to speak to us. Instead, it is a questicm of our reluctance, if
you will, to seek information and knowledge on subjects
which I personally, as a member of Congress and as a citizen,
would rather not have, unless I believed it to be my responsi-
bility to have it because it might involve the lives of Ameri-
can citizens.^®

^'^ The next two sections of this report "Covert Action Techniqnes" and "Covert
Action Projects : Initiation, Review, and Approval." remain classified after con-
sultation between the Committee and the executive branch. See p. 143.

^^ For a full discussion of the statutory authority for CIA activities, and con-
.Jiressional authorizition of covert action, see Chapter A' II and Appendix I.

" The Rockefeller Commission made a similar point in its Report :

"In sum, congressional oversight of the CIA has been curtailed by the secrecy
shrouding its activities and budget. At least until quite recently, Congress has not
sought substantial amounts of information. Correspondingly, the CIA has not
generally volunteered additional information." (Report of the Commission on CIA
Activities Within the United States, 6/6/75, p. 77.)

" Congressional Record— April 9. 1956, p. S..'>292.

150

From tlie beginning, the House and the Senate subcommittees were
relatively inactive. According to information available to the Select
Committee, the Senate Armed Services subcommittee met 26 times be-
tween January 1966 and December 1975. The subcommittee met five
times in 1975, twice in 1974, once in 1978 and 1972, and not at all in
1971.

Relations between the CIA and the subcommittees came to be de-
termined, in large part, by the personal relationship between the chair-
men and the CIA Director, often to the exclusion of other subcom-
mittee members. Staff assistance was minimal, usually consisting of no
more than one professional stalf mend)er.

The two Senate subcommittees had somewhat different responsibili-
ties.^'* The Appropriations subconmiittee was to concentrate on the
budgetary aspects of CIA activities. The Armed Services subcommit-
tee had the narrower responsibility of determining the legislative
needs of the Agency and recommending additional or corrective leg-
islation. It did not authorize the CIA's annual budget.

The CIA subcommittees received general information about some
covert operations. Prior to the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the 1974
Foreign Assistance Act, hoAvever, the subcommittees were not notified
of these operations on any regular l)asis. Notifications occurred on the
basis of informal agreements between the CIA and the subcommittee
chairmen.^° CIA covert action briefings did not include detailed de-
scriptions of the methods and cost of individual covert action projects.
Rather, projects were grouped into broad, general programs, either on
a country-wide basis or by type of activity, for presentation to the sub-
committees.

Chile can serve as an example of how oversight of covert action was
conducted. According to CIA records, there was a total of 58 congres-
sional briefings on Chile by the CIA between April 1964 and Decem-
ber 1974. At 88 of these meetings there was some discussion of covert
action; special releases of funds for covert action from the Contin-
gency Reserve were discussed at 28 of them. Of the 88 covert action
briefings. 20 took place prior to 1978, and 18 took place after.-^

Of the 38 covert action projects undertaken in Chile between 1963
and 1974 with 40 Committee approval. Congress was briefed in some
fashion on eight. Presumably the 25 others were undertaken without
congressional consultation.^^ Of the more than $18 million spent
in Chile on covert action projects between 1963 and 1974, Congress

" Initially the Armed Services and Appropriations subcommittees met separ-
ately. However, in the 1960s, because of overlapping membership tlie two com-
mittees met jointly. For several years Senator Richard Russell was chairman
of both subcommittees.

-°In 1967, the House and Senate CIA appropriations subcommittees began
receiving notifications of withdrawals from tlie CIA's Contingency Reserve Fund
within 48 hours of the release. In 1975 the two Armed Service subcommittees
began receiving tlie same notifications, at the initiative of Director Colby.

"^The 13 J)riefings which occurred after 1978 (March 1973 to December 1974)
included meetings with the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multi-
national Corporations and the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Inter-
American Affairs. All these meetings were concerned with past CIA covert action
in Chile.

- Among the 2.5 projects were a .$1.2 million authorization in 1971. half of
which was spent to purchase radio stations and newspapers while the other half
went to support municipal candidates in anti-Allende political parties : and an
additional expenditure of $815,000 in late 1971 to provide support to opposition
political parties in Chile.

151

received briefings (sometimes before and sometimes after the fact) on
projects totaling about $9.3 million. Further, congressional oversight
committees were not consulted about projects which were not reviewed
by the full 40 Connnittee. One of these was the Track II attempt by
the CIA, at the instruction of President Nixon, to prevent Salvador
Allende from taking office in 1970."^

Congressional oversight of CIA covert operations was altered as
a result of the Hughes-Eyan amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assist-
ance Act. That amendment stated :

Sec. 662. Limitation on Intelligence Activities. — (a) No
funds appropriated under the authority of this or any other
Act may be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency for operations in foreign countries, other than
activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence,
unless and until the President finds that each such operation
is important to the national security of the United States and
reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such
operation to the appropriate committees of the Congress, in-
cluding the Committee on P'oreign Relations of the United
States Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
United States House of Representatives.^*

The Hughes-Ryan amendment had two results. First, it established
hy statute a reporting requirement to Congress on covert action. Sec-
ond, the amendment increased the nmiiber of connnittees that would be
informed of approved covert operations. The inclusion of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations
Connnittee was in recognition of the significant foreign policy impli-
cations of covert operations.

Despite these changes, the oversight role of Congress with respect to
covert operations is still limited. The law does not require notification
of Congress before covert operations are implemented. The DCI has
not felt obligated to inform the subcommittees of approved covert
action operations prior to their implementation, although in some cases
he has done so. Problems thus arise if members of Congress object to a
decision by the President to undertake a covert operation.

The recent case of Angola is a good example of the weaknesses of
the Hughes-Ryan amendment. In this case, the Executive fully com-
plied with the requirements of the amendment. In January 1975 the
administration decided to provide substantial covert political sup-
port to the FNLA faction in Angola.^^ In early February, senior mem-

'^ With respect to congressional oversight of CIA activities in Chile, the Com-
mittee's Staff report on "Covert Action in Chile" concluded :

"Between April 1964 and December 1974, CIA's consultation with its congres-
sional oversight committees — and thus Congress' exercise of its oversight func-
tion— was inadequate. The CIA did not volunteer detailed information; Congress
most often did not seek it." (Senate Select Committee, "Covert Action in Chile,"
p. 49.)

=^22 use 2422.

"'^ There were three factions involved in the Angolan conflict : the National
Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), led by Holden Roberto ; the National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), led by .Jonas Savimbi ;
and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, (MPLA) led by Agos-
tinho Neto. The latter group received military and political support fnmi the
Soviet Union and Cuba.

152

bers of the six congressional committees received notification of this
decision.

In late July the 40 Committee and President Ford approved
an additional expenditure to pi'ovide covert military assistance to
the FNLA and a second Angolan faction, UNITA. Again senior
members of the six committees were notified. The Chairman, the
ranking minority member, and Chief of Staff of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee were briefed in late Jnly. Under procedures es-
tablished within that connnittee, a notice of the CIA briefing w\as cir-
culated to all conmiittee members. When Senator Dick Clark, Chair-
man of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Afi^airs,
learned that the covert action program was in Africa, he requested
further details. On July 28, Clark's subcouunittee was briefed on the
paramilitary assistance progi-am to tlie FNLA and, apparently, some
meml)ers of the subcommittee objected.

In early September the Administration decided to increase its covert
military assistance to Angola by $10.7 million, bringing the total
amount to $25 million. Again, the required notifications were carried
out.2«

In early November, Senator Clark raised his objections to the
Angola operation before the full Senate Foreign Relations Connnittee.
The Committee in turn asked Director Colby and Secretary Kissinger
to testify, in closed session, on U.S. involvement in Angola. At this
meeting, several members of the Committee expressed their concern
for the program to Director Colby and Undersecretary Joseph Sisco,
who represented the State Department in Secretary Kissinger's
absence. Despite tliis concern, in mid-November President Foi'd and
the 40 Conmiittee authorized the expenditure of another $7 million for
covert military assistance to Angola. In early December, the con-
gressional committees were notified of this new infusion of military
assistance.

Finding opposition within the briefing mechanism ineffective. Sena-
tor Clark proposed an amendment to a pending military and security
assistance bill. In January 197(^ after a conq:)licated series of legislative
actions, additional covert military assistance to Angola was prohibited
by (^ongress by an amendment to the Defense appropriations bill.

The dispute over Angola illustrates the dilemma Congress faces with
respect to covert operations. The Hughes-Ryan amendment guar-
anteed information about covert action in Angola, but not any control
over this controversial instrument of foreign policy. Congress had to
resort to the power of the purse to express its judgment and will.

C. Findings anu Conclusions ''''''

Coveit action has been a tool of United States foreign policy
for the past 28 yeai's. Thousands of covert action projects

■■"' On September 2.5, 1975 the New York TlmcH first reported tlie fact of U.S.
covert assistance to the FNLA and UNITA. The article stated that Director Colby
had notified Congress of the Angola operation in accordance with the Hughes-
Ryan amendment, but "no serious objections were raised." There was little
reaction to the Times article, either in Congress or by the public.

''"' See Appendix II which presents summaries of recommendations regarding
covert action made to the Senate Select Committee during the course of its
investigation.

153

have been undertaken. An extensive record has been established on
which to base judgments o,f whether covert action should have a
role in the foreign policy of a democratic society and, if so, under
Avhat restraints of accountability and control. The Committee's ex-
amination of covert action has led to the following findings and
conclusions.

1. The Use of Covert Action

Although not a specific charter mission of the Central Intelligence
Agency, covert action quickly became a primary activity. Covert
action projects were first designed to counter the Soviet threat in
P^urope and were, at least initially, a limited and ad hoc response
to an exceptional threat to American security. Covert action soon
became a routine program of influencing governments and covertly ex-
ercising power — involving literally hundreds of projects each year.
By 1953 there were major covert operations underway in 48 coun-
tries, consisting of propaganda, paramilitary and political action
projects. By the 1960s, covert action had come to mean "any clandes-
tine activity designed to influence foreign governments, events, orga-
nizations or persons in support of Ignited States forpign policy." Sev-
eral thousand individual covert action projects have been undertaken
since 1961, although the majority of these have been low-risk, low-cost
projects, such as a routine press placement or the development of an
"agent of influence."

That covert action was not intended to become a pervasive foreign
policy tool is evident in the testimony of those who were involved in
the drafting of the 1947 National Security Act. One of these drafters,
Clark Clifford, had this to say about the transition of covert action
from an ad hoc response to a frequently used foreign policy tool:

It was the original concept that covert activities under-
taken under the Act were to be carefully limited and con-
trolled. You will note that the language of the Act provides
that this catch-all clause is applicable only in the event that
national security is affected.^* This was considered to be an
important limiting and restricting clause.

However, as the Cold War continued and Communist ag-
gi-ession became the major problem of the day, our Govern-
ment felt that it was necessary to increase our country's re-
sponsibilities in protecting freedom in various parts of the
world. It seems apparent now that we also greatly increased
our covert activities. I have read somewhere that as time
progi-essed we had literally hundreds of such operations
going on simultaneously. It seems clear that these operations
have ffotten out of hand.-^^

^The CIA, under the 1947 Act, is directed "to perform such other functions
and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National
Security Council may from time to time direct."

=^ Clifford, 12/5/7.5, Hearings, p. .51.

154

"Z. Covert Action ^''JSuccess'^'' and '"' F ailuTe^''

The record of covert action reviewed by the Coimnittee suggests that
net judgments as to "'success" or "failure" are difficult to draw.^*^ The
Conunittee has found that when covert operations have been consistent
with, and in tactical support of, policies which have emerged from a
national debate and the established processes of government, these op-
erations liave tended to be a success. Covert support to beleaguered
democrats in Western Europe in the late ID-lUs was in support of an
established policy based on a strong national consensus. On the other
hand, the public has neither miderstood nor accepted the coveit harass-
ment of the democratically elected Allende government. Kecent covert
intervention in Angola preceded, and indeed preempted, public and
congressional debate on America's foreign policy interest in the fu-
ture of Angola. The intervention in Angola was conducted in the
absence of etforts on the part of the executive branch to develop a
national consensus on America's interests in Southei'n Africa,

The Conunittee has received extensive testimony that coveit action
can be a success when the objective of the project is to support an indi-
vidual, a party, or a government in doing what that individual, party,
or govermnent wants to do — and when it has the will and capacity to
do it. Covert action cannot build political institutions where there is
no local political will to have them. Where this has been attempted,
success has been problematical at best, and the risks of exposure
enormously high.

The Committee's findings on paiamilitary activities suggest that
these operations are an anomaly, if not an aberration, of covert
action.^^ Pai'amilitary operations are among the most costly and
controversial forms of covert action. They are difficult, if not impos-
sible, to conceal. They lie in the critical gray area between limited
influence, short of the use of force, and overt military intervention.
As such, paramilitary activities are especially significant. In Viet-
nam, paramilitary strategy formed a bridge between the two levels
of involvement. Paramilitary operations have great potential for
escalating into major military commitments.

Covert U.S. paramilitaiy programs have generally been designed to
accomplish one of the following objectives: (1) subversion of a hos-
tile government (e.g., Cuba) ; {'!) support to friendly governments

^Former Attorney General and Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzen-
baeh had this to say about covert action "success" and "failure" :

"I start from the premise that some of our covert activities abroad have been
successful, valuable in support of a foreign policy which was understood and
approved by the electorate and Congress ... I also start from a premise that
some of our activities abroad have not been successful, and have been wrong and
wrongheaded. In some cases we have grossly over-estimated our capacity to
bring about a desired result and have created situations unintended and un-
desirable." (Nicholas Katzenl)ach testimony. House Select Committee on In-
telligence, 12/10/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 1797.)

31 The Committee studied, in detail, covert military operations in five coun-
tries, including Laos, Vietnam, and Angola. The Committee analyzetl paramili-
tary programs in terms of (1) executive command and control; (2) secrecy and
deniability; (3) effectiveness; (4) propriety; and (5) legislative oversight. The
latter issue is vital because paramilitary oi)erations are directly related to, and
pose special problems for. Congress' authority and responsibilities in making
war.

155

(Laos) ; (3) unconventional adjunot support to a larger war eli'oit
(Korea, Vietnam, Laos after the middle 19608).

There are two principal criteria which determine tlie minimum suc-
cess of paramilitary operations: (1) achievement of the policy goal;
and (2) maintenance of deniability. if the hrst is not accomplished, the
operation is a failure in any case ; if the second is not accomplished, the
paramilitary option otiei-s few if any advantages over the option of
overt military intervention. On balance, in these terms, the evidence
points toward the failure of paramilitary activity as a technique of
covert action.-^-

Of the hve paramilitary activities studied by the Committee, only
one appears to have achieved its objectives. The goal of supporting a
central govermnent was achieved — ^the same government is still in
power many years later. There were a few sporadic reports of the
operation in the press, but it was never fully revealed nor confirmed.

In no paramilitary case studied by the Coimnittee was complete
secrecy successfully presei-ved. All of the operations wei'e reported in
the Amei-ican press to varying extents, while they were going on. They
remained deniable oidy to the extent that such reports were tentative,
sketchy, and unconfirmed, and hence were not necessarily considered
accurate.

3. The Itnpact of Covert Action

Assessing the "success" or "failure" of covert action is necessary.
Just as important, however, is an assessment of the impact of covert
action on "targeted" nations and the reputation of the United States
abroad.

The impact of a large-scale covert operation, such as Operation
MONGOOSE in Cuba, is apparent. Less apparent is the impact of
small covert projects on "targeted" countries. The Committee has
found that these small projects can, in the aggregate, have a powerful
effect upon vulnerable societies.

In some cases, covert support has encouraged a debilitating de-
pendence on the United States. In one Western nation the covert
investment was so heavy and so persistent that, according to a former
CIA Station Chief in that country :

Any aspiring politician almost automatically would come
to CIA to see if we could help him get elected . . . They were
the wards of the United States, and that whatever happened
for good or bad was the fault of the United States.

Cyrus Vance, a former Deputy Secretary of Defense, cited another
such example:

Paramilitary operations are perhaps unique in that it is more
difficult to withdraw from them, once started, than covert

32 For example, the covert paramilitary program in Laos certainly ceased to
be plausibly deniable as soon as it was revealed officially in the 1969 Symington
hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (it was revealed unoffi-
cially even earlier). If U.S. policy was the preservation of a non-communist
Laotian government, the program obviously failed. Some administration wit-
nesses, nevertheless, including DCI Colby, cite<l the war in Laos as a great
success. Their reasoning was l)ased on the view that the limited effort in Laos
served to put pressure on North Vietnamese supply lines, and therefore was a
helpful adjunct of the larger U.S. effort in Vietnam.

156

operations. This is well illustrated by the case of the Conoo,
where a decision was taken to withdraw in early 1966, and it
'took about a year and a half before the operation was tenni-
naited. Once a paramilitary operation is commenced, the re-
cipient of the paramilitary aid tends to become dependent
upon it and inevitably advances the aro^ument that to cut back
or terminate the aid would do the recipient o;reat damatje.
This makes it especially difficult to diseno:age.^^

In other cases, covert support, to forei^ political leadere, parties,
labor unions, or the media has made them vulnerable to repudiation in
their own society when their covert ties are exposed. In Chile,
several of the Chilean nationals who had been involved in the CIA's
anti-Allende "spoilino^" operation had to leave the country when he
was confirmed as President,

In addition, the history of covert action indicates that the cumula-
tive effect, of hidden intervention in the society and institutions of a
foreign nation has oft.en not only transcended the actual tlireat, but
it has also limited the foreign policy options available to the United
States Government by creating ties to gix)ups and causes that the
United States cannot renounce without revealing the earlier covert
action.

The Committee also found that the cumulative effects of covert
action are rarely noted by the operational divisions of the CIA in the
presentation of new projects or taken into account by the responsible
National Security Council review levels.

The Committee has found that certain covei-t operations have been
incompatible with American principles and ideals and, when exposed,
have resulted in damaging this nation's ability to exercise moral and
ethical leadership throughout the world. The U.S. involvement in
assassination plots against foreign leaders and the attempt to foment
a military coup in Chile in 1970 against a democratically elected gov-
ernment were two examples of such failures in purposes and ideals.
Further, because of widespread exposure of covert, operations and
suspicion that others are taking place, the CIA is blamed for virtually
every foreign internal crisis.

4. The Executive''s Use of Covert Action

In its consideration of covert action, the Committee was struck by
the basic tension — if not incompatibility — of covert operations and
the demands of a cons'titutional svstem. Secrecy is essential to covert
operations; secrecy can, however, become a source of power, a l>arrier
to serious policy debate within government, and a means of circum-
venting the established checks and procedures of government. The
Committee found that secrecy and compartmentation contributed to
a temptation on the part of the Executive to resort, to covert o]:)erations
in order to avoid bureaucratic, congressional, and public debate. In
addition, the Committee found that the major successes of covert ac-
tion tended to encourage the Executive to press for the use of covert
action as the easy way to do things and to task the CIA with difficult
requirements, such as running a lai-ge-scale "secret" war in Laos or

' Cyrus Vance testimony, 12/5/75, Hearings, Vol. 7. p. 85, footnote.

157

attempting to overturn the results of a national election in Chile —
within a five-week period.

The Connnittee found that the Executiv^e Iras used the CIA to con-
duct covert operations because it is less 'accountable than other gov-
ernment agencies. In this regard, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
told the Committee :

I do not believe in retrospect that it was good national policy
to have the CIA conduct the war in L/aos. I think we should
have found some other way of doing it. And to use the CIA
simply because it is less accountable for very visible major
operations is poor national policy. And the covert activities
should be confined to those matters that clearly fall into a
gray area between overt military action and diplomatic activi-
ties, and not to be used siinply for the convenience of the
executive branch and its acooimtability.^^

Under questioning, Secretary Kissinger went on to say that in Laos
there were two basic reasons why the CIA was used to fight that war :
"one, to avoid a formal avowal of American participation there for
diplomatic reasons, and tlie second, I suspect, because it was less
accountable.*' ^"^

The Committee has found that the temptation of the Executive to
use covert action as a "convenience" and as a substitute for publicly
accountable policies has been strengthened by the hesitancy of the
Congress to use its powers to oversee covert action by the CIA. Much
of this hesitancy flowed from the legitimate desire on the part of con-
gressional oversight committees to maintain the security of covert
action projects. But it also resulted from a reluctance on the part of
the appropriate committees to challenge the President or to become
directly involved in projects perceived to be necessary foi- the national
security. Congressional hesitancy also flowed from the fact that con-
gressional oversight coinmittees are almost totally dependent on the
Executive for information on covert operations. The secrecy needed
for these operations allows the Executive to justify the limited provi-
sion of information to the Congress.

5. Maintaining a Covert Gayability

Former senior government officials have testified to their concern
that the use and control of covert action is made more difficult by a
strong activism on the part of CIA operational officers. McGeorge
Bundy, a former Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, has Stated :

While in principle it has always been the understanding of
senior government officials outside the CIA that no covert
operations would be undertakeii without the explicit approval
of "higher authority,"' there has also been a general expecta-
tion within the Agency that it was its proper business to gen-
erate atti-active proposals and to stretch them, in operation,
to the furthest limit of any authorization actually received.^'

^^ Henry Kissinger tesitimony, 11/21/75, p. 54.
'"/birf., p. 56.

^' McGeorge Bundy testimony, House Select Committee on Intelligence,
12/10/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, pp. 1794-1795.

158

Clark Clifford, in testimony before the Select Committee, reinforced
this view :

On a number of occasions a plan for covert action has been
presented to the NSC and authority requested for the CIA to
proceed from point A to point B. The authority will be given
and the action will be launched. When point B is reached,
the persons in charge feel that it is necessary to go to point C
and they assume that the oiiginal authorization gives them
such a right. From point C, they go to D, and possibly E, and
even further. This led to some bizarre results, and, when
investigation is started, the excuse blandly presented that
the authority was obtained from the NSC before the project
was launched. ^^

The activism referred to by Bundy and Clifford is reflected in part,
in the maintenance of a standing covert action capability and a world-
wide "infrastructure." The Committee found that one of the most
troublesome and controversial issues it confronted in evaluating covert
action was the question of the utility and propriety of the CIA's main-
taining a worldwide "infrastructure" (e.g., agents of influence, assets,
and media contacts). Are these "assets" essential to the success of a
major covert action program ? Or does this standby capability generate
a temptation to intervene covertly as an alternative to diplomacy ?

There is no question that the CIA attaches great importance to the
maintenance of a worldwide clandestine infrastructure — the so-called
"plumbing"^ — in place. During the 1960s the Agency developed a
worldwide system o,f standby covert action "assets," ranging from
media personnel to individuals said to influence the behavior of gov-
ernments.^^ In recent yeai'S, however, the Agency has substantially re-
duced its overseas covert action infrastructure even to the point of
closing bases and stations. A limited infrastructure is still maintained,
however. For example, although the United States has no substantial
covert action program in the Western Hemisphere today, the CIA does
continue to maintain a modest co\ert action infrastructure consisting
of agents of influence and media contacts.

The CIA's infrastructure is constructed in response to annual Oper-
ating Directives. These directives set station priorities for both clan-
destine collection and covert action.'*° The Operating Directives are
developed and issued by the CIA and informally coordinated with
concerned CIA geographic bureaus and the Department of State.
Therefore, the infrastructure that is in place at any given time is
there at the direction of the CIA.

The Committee finds several troublesome problems with the CIA's
development and maintenance of covert action infrastructures

■'"Clark M. Clifford testimony 12/5/75, Hearings. Vol. 7, pp. 51-.52.

'"' During its assassination in(iuiry, the Committee found that certain CIA
assets, with the cryptonyms QJ/WIN, AVI/ROGUE and AM/LASH were in-
volved, or contemplated for use in, plots to assassinate foreign leaders.

^'' For example, the Chilean Operating Directive for FY 1972 directed the
Santiago Station to : "Sponsor a program which will enable the Chilean armed
forces to retain their integrity and independent political power. I'rovide direct
financial support to key military figures who can he expected to develop a mean-
ingful following in their respective services to restrain and, perhaps, topple the
Allende government." The Select Committee found no evidence to indicate that
this "direct financial support" was provided.

159

throughout the world: (1) The operating decisions are made by the
CIA, althougli infrastructure guidelines are cleared with the State
Department; the Agency's Operating Directives are rarely seen out-
side the CIA and (2) the actual covert action projects which build
and maintain these infrastructures rarely, if ever, go to the NSC for
approval.

The Connnittee finds that the independent issuance of Operating
Directives, and the fact that most covert action projects which estab-
lish and maintain the CIA's infrastructure around the world do not
go to the NSC, combine to shield this important clandestine system
from effective policy control and guidance. The Committee believes
that all small so-called "non-sensitive" projects which do not now go
to the NSC level for approval should, at a minimiun, be aggregated
into appropriate country or regional programs, and then brought to
the NSC level for approval.

Covert action should be the servant of policy. Secretary Kissinger
made this point before the Connnittee when he testified :

If the diplomatic track cannot succeed without the covert
track, then the covert track was imnecessary and should not
have been engaged in. So hopefully, if one wants to draw a
general conclusion, one would have to say that only those co-
vert actions can be justified that support a diplomatic track.^^

6. Conclusions

Given the open and democratic assumptions on which our govern-
ment is based, the Committee gave serious consideration to proposing
a total ban on all forms of covert action. The Committee has con-
cluded, however, that the ITnited States should maintain the option
of reacting in the future to a grave, unforeseen threat to United
States national security through covert means.

The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act
restricts the CIA fix>m undertaking "operations in foreign countries,
other than activities intended for obtaining necessary intelligence,
unless and until the President finds that each such operation is impor-
tant to the national security of the United States." *^ The Committee
has concluded that an even stricter standard for the use of covert action
is required than the injunction that such operations be "important to
the national security of the United States."

The Committee's review of covert action has underscored the neces-
sity for a thoroughgoing strengthening of the Executive's internal
review process for covert action and for the establishment of a realistic
system of accountability, both within the Executive, and to the Con-
gress and to the American people. The requirement for a rigorous and
credible system of control and accountability is complicated, however,
by the shield of secrecy which must necessarily be imposed on any
coveit activity if it is to remain covert. The challenge is to find a sub-
stitute for the public scrutiny thi'ough congressional debate and press
attention that normally attends government decisions. In its considera-
tion of the present processes of authorization and review, the Commit-
tee has found the following :

Henry Kissinger tesftimony, 11/21/75. p. 38.

See p. 1.51, for full text of Hughes-Ryan amendment.

160

(1) The most basic conclusion reached by the Committee is that
covert action must be seen as an exceptional act, to be undertaken only
when the national security requires it and when overt means will not
suffice. The Committee concludes that the policy and procedural bar-
riers are presently inadequate to insure that any covert operation is
absolutely essential to the national security. These barriers must be
tightened and raised or covert action should be abandoned as an in-
strument of foreign policy.

(2) On the basis of the record, the Committee has concluded that
covert action must in no case be a vehicle for clandestinely undertaking
actions incompatible with American principles. The Committee has
already moved to condemn assassinations and to recommend a statute
to forbid such activit3\ It is the Committee's view that the standards
to acceptable covert activity should also exclude covert operations in
an attempt to subvert democratic governments or provide support for
police or other internal security forces which engage in the systematic
violation of human rights.

(3) Covert operations must be based on a careful and systematic
analysis of a given situation, possible alternative outcome, the threat
to American interests of these possible outcomes, and above all, the
likely consequences of an attempt to intervene. A former senior intelli-
gence analyst told the Committee :

Clearly actions were taken on the basis of some premises, but
they seem not to have been arrived at by any sober and sys-
tematic analysis, and tended often, it appeared, to be sim-
plistic and passionate. In fact, thei-e was often little or no
relationship between the view of world politics as a whole, or
of particular situations of threat held by operatoi's on the
one hand, and analysts on the other. The latter were rarely
consulted by the former, and then only in partial disingenious
and even misleading ways.

It says something strange about successive DCIs that they
allowed this bifurcation, even contradiction, to obtain.*^

The Committee has concluded that bringing the analysts directly
into the forinal decision process would be a partial remedy to the prob-
lem of relating analysis to operations. More important would be the
insistence of the Director of (Central Intelligence that the political
premises of any proposed covert operation be rigorously analyzed.

(4) The Committee also concludes that the appropriate NSC com-
mittee (e.g., the Operations Advisory Group) should review every
covert action proposal. The Committee also hold,s strongly to the view

" .John Huizenga testimony, 1/26/76, pp. 6-7. The Committee found, in its
case study of Chile, that there was little or no coordination between the intelli-
gence analysts and the covert operators, e.specially in politically sensitive proj-
ects, which were often restricted within the Clandestine Service and the 40
Committee. The project files for Chile gave no indication of consultation with the
Intelligence Directorate from 1964 to 1973. The exclusion of expert analytic
advice extended to the DCI's staff responsible for preparing National Intelligence
Estimates. Today, however, the Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) is in-
formed by the DDO of new covert activities. The DDI has an opportunity to
comment on them and offer recommendations to the DCI, but he is not in the
formal approval process.

161

that the small nonsensitive covert action proposals which, in the aggre-
gate, establish and maintain the Agency's covert infrastructure around
tlie world should he considered and analyzed by the appropriate NSC
committee. The Connnittee also l)elieves that many of the small covert
action proposals for projects would fall away when forced to meet the
test of being part of a larger covert action operation in support of the
openly avoAved policies of the United States.

(5) With respect to congressional oversight of covert action, the
Committee believes that the appropriate oversight committee should
be informed of all significant covert operations prior to their initia-
tion and that all covert action projects should be reviewed by the com-
mittee on a semi-annual basis. Further, the oversight committee should
require that the annual budget submission for covert action programs
be specific and detailed as to the activity recommended. Unforeseen
covert action projects should be funded only from the Contingency
Reserve Fund which could be replenished only after the concurrence
of the oversight and any other appropriate congressional committees.
The legislative intelligence oversight committee should be notified
prior to any withdrawal from the Contingency Reserve Fund.

IX. CIA COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

A. Counterintelligence: an Introduction

1. Definition of C ounterintelligence

Counterintelligence (CI) is a special form of intelligence activity,
separate and distinct from other disciplines. Its purpose is to discover
hostile foreign intelligence operations and destroy their effectiveness.
This objective involves the protection of the United State Govern-
ment against infiltration by foreign agents, as well as the control and
manipulation of adversary intelligence operations. An effort is made
to both discern and decive the plans and intentions of enemy intel-
ligence services. Defined more formally, counterintelligence is an in-
telligence activity dedicated to undermining the effectiveness of hostile
intelligence services. Its purpose is to guard the nation againt espion-
age, other modern forms of spying, and sabotage directed against the
United States, its citizens, information, and installations, at home
and abroad, by infiltrating groups engaged in these practices and by
gathering, storing, and analyzing information on inimical clandestine
activity.^

In short, counterintelligence specialists wage nothing less than a
secret war against antagonistic intelligence services. "In the absence
of an effective LT.S. counterintelligence program," notes a counterin-
telligence specialist, "[adversaries of democracy] function in what is
largely a benign environment." ^

^. Tlie Threat

The adversaries of democracy are numerous and widespread. In the
Ignited States alone, 1,079 Soviet officials were on permanent assign-
ment in February 1975, according to FBI figures.^ Among these, over
40 percent have Ijeen positively identified as members of the KGB or
GRI^, the Soviet civilian and military intelligence units. Conservative
estimates for the number of imidentified intelligence officers raise the
figures to over 60 percent of the Soviet representation ; some defector
sources have estimated that 70 percent to 80 percent of Soviet officials
have some intelligence connection.*

Furthermore, the number of Soviets in the United States has triplea
since 1960, and is still increasing.'^ The opening of American deep-
water ports to Russian ships in 1972 has given Soviet intelligence

^ Counterintelligence may also be thought of as the knowledge needed for the
protection and preservation of the military, economic, and productive strength
of the United States, including the security of the Government in domestic and
foreign affairs against or from espionage, sabotage, and all other similar
clandestine activities designed to weaken or destroy the United States. (Report
of the Commission on Government Security Washington, D.C., 19.57. pp. 4.S-49. )

" Staff summary of interview, FBI counterintelligence specialist, 5/8/7.5.

^ Staff summary of interview, FBI counterintelligence specialist. 3/10/75.

* FBI counterintelligence specialist (staff summary), 3/10/75.

"'' FBI counterintelligence specialist (staff summary), 5/8/75.

(163)

164

services "virtually complete geographic access to the United States,"
observes a counterintelligence specialist.*' In 1974, for example, over 200
Soviet ships with a total crew complement of 13,000 officers and men
called at 40 deep-water ports in this country.

Various exchange groups provide additional opportunities for Soviet
intelligence gathering within the United States. Some 4,000 Soviets
entered the United States as commercial or exchange visitors in 1974.
During the past decade, the FBI identified over 100 intelligence officers
among the approximately 400 Soviet students who attended American
•universities during this period as part of an East- West student
exchange program.' Also, in the 14-year history of this program, more
than 100 American students were the target of Soviet recruitment
approaches in the USSR.

Other areas of counterintelligence concern include the sharp increase
in the number of Soviet immigrants to the United States (less than 500
in 1972 compared to 4,000 in 1974) ; the rise in East- West commercial
exchange visitors (from 641 in 1972 to 1,500 in 1974) ; and the growing
number of Soviet bloc officials in this country (from 416 in 1960 to 798
in 1975 ).«

Foreign intelligence agents have attempted to recruit not only execu-
tive branch personnel, but also Congressional staff members. The FBI
has advised the Committee that there have been instances in the past
where hostile foreign intelligence officers have used the opportunity
presented by overt contacts to attempt to recruit members of Congres-
sional staffs who might have access to secret information.^*

The most serious threat is from "illegal" agents who have no easily
detectable contacts with their intelligence service. The problem of
"illegals" is summarized by the FBI as follows :

The illegal is a highly trained specialist in espionage trade-
craft. He may be a [foreign] national and/or a professional
intelligence officer dispatched to the United States under a
false identity. Some illegals [may be] trained in the scientific
and technical field to permit easy access to sensitive areas of
employment.

The detection of . . . illegals presents a most serious problem
to the FBI, Once they enter the United States with either
fraudulent or true documentation, their presence is obscured
among the thousands of legitimate emigres entering the
United States annually. Relatively undetected, they are able
to maintain contact with [the foreign control] by means of
secret writing, microdots, and open signals in conventional
communications which are not susceptible to discovery
through conventional investigative measures.^*"

• IMd.

' IMd, 3/10/75.

* IMd.

** FBI Memorandum for the Record, 10/30/75. Such recruitment approaches
have heen reported to the FBI by Congressional staff members. If the FBI other-
wise learns of such recruitments, its policy is to report the facts to the appro-
priate Members of Congress.

^^ FBI memorandum, "Intelligence Activities Within the United States by
Foreign Governments," 3/20/75.

165

In several instances the FBI accomplished this most difl3.cult assign-
ment by carefully designed and limited mail opening programs which,
if they had ben authorized by a judicial warrant, might have been en-
tirely proper. It is most unfortunate that the FBI did not choose to seek
lawful authorization for such methods.^'^

This brief summary of the threat facing the American counterintel-
ligence corps in this country is troubling enough, yet it does not take
into accomit the worldwide scope of the problem. As an FBI counter-
intelligence expert states, hostile foreign intelligence services

are alert for operational opportunities against the United
States whether they occur within this country, abroad (in
other countries) or in the home country itself. An operation
might begin in the home country with recruitment of an
American visitor; transfer to the United States with his
return ; and again, even later, might be transferred to a third
country where the American agent may be met outside the
normal reach of United States counterintelligence coverage.
Regardless of the geographical location, the operation is still
directed against the United States and can cause just as much
damage from abroad as within our own borders.®

The espionage activities of the Soviet Union and other communist
nations directed against the United States are extensive and
relentless.®^

To combat this threat, American counterintelligence officers have
developed various sophisticated investigative techniques to (1) obtain
information about foreign intelligence services, (2) protect our
intelligence service, and (3) control the outcome of this subterranean
struggle for intelligence supremacy. The task is difficult technically,
and raises sensitive legal and ethical questions. As the CIA Deputy
Director for Operations has testified, the

U.S. counterintelligence program to be both effective and in
line with traditional American freedoms must steer a middle
course between blanket, illegal, frivolous and unsubstanti-
ated inquiries into the private lives of U.S. citizens and exces-
sive restrictions which will render the Government's counter-
intelligence arms impotent to protect the nation from foreign
penetration and covert manipulation.^"

3. CI as Product: Information about '"''The Etiermf'

Counterintelligence is both an activity and its product. The product
is reliable information about all the hostile foreign intelligence serv-
ices who attack the United States by stealth. To guard against hostile
intelligence operations aimed at this nation, a vast amount of infor-
mation is required. It is necessaiy to laiow the organizational structure
of the enemy service, the key personnel, the methods of recruitment
and training, and the specific operations.

This information must be gathered within the United States and in
all the foreign areas to which U.S. interests extend. Within the intelli-

*" Testimony of W. R. Wannall, Assistant Director, FBI, 10/21/75, p. 5; see
Report on CIA and FBI Mail Opening.

" FBI Counterintelligence specialist ( staff summary ) , 3/10/75.

*'' See Appendix III, Soviet Intelligence Collection and Operations Against the
United States.

'^ "William Nelson testimony, 1/28/76, p. 5.

166

gence service, this acquisitive activity is referred to as intelligence
collection. The resulting product — pertinent information on the enemy
intelligence service — is often called "raw" intelligence data. The efforts
of intelligence services through the world to conceal such information
from one another, through various security devices and elaborate de-
ceptions, creates the counterintelligence specialist what James Angle-
ton, former Chief of CIA Counterintelligence, calls a kind of "wilder-
ness of mirrors."

!).. CI as Activity : Security and C ounteres'pionage

As an activity, CI consists of two matching halves: security and
counterespionage. Security is the passive or defensive, side of counter-
intelligence. It consists basically of establishing static defenses against
all hostile and concealed acts, regardless of who carries them out.

C ounteresfionage (CE) is the offensive, or aggressive, side of coun-
terintelligence. It involves the identification of a specific adversary and
a knowledge of the specific operation he is conducting. Counterespion-
age personnel must then attempt to counter these operations by infil-
trating the hostile service (called penetration) and through various
forms of manipulation. Ideally, the thrust of the hostile operation is
turned back against the enemy.

The security side of counterintelligence includes the screening and
clearance of personnel and the development of programs to safeguard
sensitive intelligence information (that is, the proper administration
of security controls). The intelligence services try to defend three
things: (1) their personnel, (2) their installations, and (3) their
operations.

At the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of Security is respon-
sible for protection of pei'sonnel and installations, while actual oper-
ations are largely the preserve of the CI staff and the operating divi-
sions. Among the defensive devices used for information control by
intelligence agencies throughout the world are: security clearances,
polygraphs, locking containers, security education, document ac-
coimtability, censorship, camouflage, and codes. Devices for physical
security include fences, lighting, general systems, alarms, badges and
passes, and watchdogs. Area control relies on curfews, checkpoints, re-
stricted areas, and border-frontier control.^- Thus the security side of
counterintelligence "is all that concerns perimeter defense, badges,
knowing eveiything you have to know about your own people;" the
counterespionage side "involves knowing all about intelligence serv-
ices— foreign intelligence services — theii- people, their installations,
their methods, and their operations. So that you have a completely
different level of , interest." ^^ However, the Office of Security and the
CI staff exchange information to assure adequate security systems.

5. The Penetration and the Double Agent

Several kinds of operations exist w^ithin the rubric of counterespion-
age. One, however, transcends all the others in importance: the pene-
tration. A primary goal of counterintelligence is to contain the intel-
ligence service of the enemy. To do so, it is eminently desirable to

'■ staff summary of interview, CIA security specialist, 8/20/75.
" Raymond Rocca deposition, 11/25/75, p. 19.

167

know his plans in advance and in detail. This admirable, but difficult
objective may be achieved through a high-level infiltration of the op-
position service. As a Director of the CIA has written, "Experience has
shown penetration to be the most effective response to Soviet and Bloc
Lmtelligence] services." "

Moreover, a well-placed infiltrator in a hostile intelligence service
may be better able than anyone else to determine whether one's own
service has been penetrated. A former Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) has observed that the three principal pro-
grams used by the United States to meet, neutralize, and defeat hos-
tile intelligence penetrations are: (1) our own penetrations; (2) se-
curity screening and clearance of personnel; and (3) our efforts for
safeguarding sensitive intelligence information.^^ The importance of
the penetration is emphasized by an experienced CIA counter-
espionage operative, with mixed but expressive similes: "Conduct-
ing counterespionage with penetration can be like shooting fish in a
barrel;" in contrast, "conducting counterespionage without the act
of penetration is like fighting in the dark." >^

Methods of infiltrating the opposition service take several forms.
Usually the most effective and desirable penetration is the recruit-
ment of an agent-in-place.^^ He is a citizen of an enemy nation and
is already in the employ of its intelligence service. Ideally, he
will be both highly placed and venal. The individual, say a KGB
officer in Bonn, is approached and asked to work for the intelligence
service of the United States. Various inducements — including ideol-
ogy— may be used to recruit him against his own service. If the
recruitment is successful, the operation may be especially worthwhile
since the agent is presumably already trusted within his organiza-
tion and his access to documents may be unquestioned. Jack E. Dun-
lap, who worked at and spied on the National Security Agency
(NSA) in the 1960s, is a well-known example of a Soviet agent-in-
place within the U.S. intelligence service. His handler was a Soviet
Air Force attache at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Of course,
a single penetration can be worth an intelligence gold mine, as were
Kim Philby for the Soviet Union and Col. Oleg Penkovsky for the
United States.

Another method of infiltration is the double agent. Double agents,
however, are costly and time-consuming, and they are risky. Human
lives are at stake. Double agents also normally involve pure
drudgery, with few dramatic results, as new information is checked
against existing files. On top of this comes the difficulty of assuring
against a doublecross.

Moreover, passing credible documents can be a major problem.
The operations must be made interesting to the opposition. To make
fake papers plausible, the genuine article must be provided now and
again. Classified documents must be cleared, and this process can be

"Memorandum from John McCone to Chairman, President's Foreign Intel-
ligence Advisory Board. 10/8/63.

" The Carroll Report on the Dunlap Case, 2/12/64.
'" CIA/CI specialist, staff summary, 11/1/75.
" CIA/CI specialist, staff summary, 10/17/75.

168

painstakingly slow. Also, "this means letting a lot of good stuff go to
the enemy without much in return," complains a CI officer with con-
siderable experience.^^

To accomplish each of these tasks, hard work, careful planning, and
considerable manpower are necessary. The extraordinary manpower
requirements of the double agent operation restricted the abilities
of the British to run cases during the Second World War^ — approxi-
mately 150 double agents for the entire period of the war and no more
than about 25 at any one time.^^ Moreover, their mission was eased
greatly by the ability of the British to read the German cipher
throughout most of the conflict.

6. The Defector

Almost as good as the agent-in-place and less troublesome than the
whole range of double agents is the "defector with knowledge.'' Here
the procedure consists of interrogation and validation of bona fides, as
usual, but without the worrisome, ongoing requirements for a skillful
mix of false and genuine documents and other logistical support.
Though an agent-in-place is preferable because of the continuing use-
ful information he can provide, often a man does not want to risk his
life by staying in-place, especially where the security is sophisticated;
his preference is to defect to safety. In other words, agents-in-place are
harder to come by in systems like the Soviet bloc countries; defection
is more likely. ^° In contrast, agents-in-place are more easily recruited
in so-called Third World areas.

Within the United States, the interrogation of intelligence service
defectors who have defected in the U.S. is primarily the responsibility
of the FBI, though the CIA may have a folloAv-up session with the
individual. Sometimes the bona fides of a defector remain disputed for
many years.

CIA-recruited defectoi-s abroad are occasionally brought to the
United States and resettled. The FBI is notified and, after the CIA
completes its interrogation, FBI may interrogate. CIA does not bring
all defectors to the United States; only those expected to make a sig-
nificant contribution. CIA generally handles resettlement not only of
defectors from abroad, but also (at the request of the FBI) of de-
fectors in the United States.

7. The Deception

The penetration or double agent is closely related to another impor-
tant CE technique: the deception. Simply stated, the deception is an
attempt to give the enemy a false impression about something, caus-
ing him to take action contrary to his own interests. Fooling the Ger-
mans into the belief that D Day landings were to be in the Pas de Calais
rather than in Normandy is a classic example of a successful deception
operation in World War II.^^

'* Rocca deposition, 11/25/75, pp. 33-.34.

^* Sir .Tohn Masterman, Double Cross System of the War of 1939-Jf5 (New
Haven : Yale University Press, 1972) .
■" Bruce Solie, deposition, 11/25/75, pp. 26-27.
"' Masterman, Double Cross System.

169

Deception is related to penetration because our agents operating
within foreign intelligence agencies can serve as excellent cliaimels
through which misleading information can How to the enemy. So
double agents serve both as collectors of positive intelligence and
channels for deception. However, there are opportunities for deception
other than our own agents; in fact, "an infinite variety'' exists, accord-
ing to an experienced practitioner.^^ One example: the U.S. can
allow penetration of its own intelligence service, and then feed false
information through him.

8. Other CI Techniques

Other counterespionage operations include surreptitious surveil-
lance of various kinds (for instance, audio, mail, physical, and "opti-
cal"— that is, photography), interrogation (sometimes incommuni-
cado as in the case of one defector) , and provocation. Decoding clandes-
tine radio transmission and letters with messages written in secret
ink between the visible lines is part and parcel of the CE trade, as is
trailing suspected agents, observing "dead droj)s" (the exchange of
material, like documents or instructions, between a spy and his han-
dler), and photographing individuals entering opposition embassies
or at other locations. At the recent funeral of CIA agent Kichard
Welch, two Eastern European diplomats were discovered among the
press corps snapping photographs of CIA intelligence officers attend-
ing the burial ceremony.^* Since the focus of offensive counterintelli-
gence is disruption of the enemy service, provocation can be an im-
portant element of CE, too. It amounts, in essence, to harassment of
the opiX)sition, such as publishing the names of his agents or sending
a defector into his midst who is in reality a double agent.

9. CI as Organization

Security at CIA is the responsibility of the Office of Security, a
division of the Dejjuty Director for Administration. Counterespionage
policy is guided by the Counterintelligence Staff of the Operations
Directorate (Clandestine Service). Besides setting policy, the CI Staff
sometimes conducts its own operations, though most CI operations
emanate directly from the various geographic divisions as the CI field
personnel — through the practice of the counterintelligence discipline —
attempt to guard against enemy manipulation of espionage and covert
action operations.

Structurally, counterintelligence services are usually composed of
two additional sections which support Security and Operations. They
are the Research and the Liaison sections. Good research is critical
to a good counterintelligence effort, and it may take several forms. It
can involve the amassing of encyclopedic intelligence on individuals,
including American citizens associated — wittingly or unwitttingly —
with hostile intelligence services. Specialists say that the hallmark of
a sophisticated CI service is its collection of accurate records.^"^ CI
research personnel also produce reports on topics of interest to the
specialty, including guidelines for the interrogation of defectors and
current analyses on such subjects as proprietary companies used by

^" CTA counterintelligence specialist (staff summary). 11/1/75.
^* CIA counterintelligence specialist (staff summary), 1/15/76.
^ 6/27/75.
"= Ihid, 6/27/75.

69-983 O - 7fi - 12

170

foreign intelligence services and the structure of Soviet bloc intel-
ligence services. CI researchers also analyze defector briefs and, in the
case of compromised documents, help ascertain who had access and
what damage was inflicted.

Liaison with other counterintelligence services, 'at home and abroad,
is also vital since no effective counterintelligence organization can do
its job alone. The various CI units at home are particularly impor-
tant, as counterintelligence — ^with all its intricacies and deceptions —
requires coordination among agencies and sharing of records. Unlike
the totally unified KGB organization, the American intelligence serv-
ice is fragmented and depends upon liaison to make operations more
effective. Coordination between CIA and FBI counterintelligence
units is esipecially critical since, in theory at least, the former has for-
eign jurisdiction and the latter domestic, yet they must monitor the
movements of foreign spies in and out of these two jurisdictions. Some-
times this coordination fails dramatically. In 1970, for example, J.
Edgar Hoover of the FBI terminated formal liaison with the CIA
and all the other intelligence units in the Government because of a
disagreement with the CIA on a question of source disclosure (the
Thomas Riha case).^^

Liaison with foreign intelligence services overseas can undergo
strain, too. As one CI specialist has said : "There are no friendly serv-
ices; there are services of friendly foreign powers." ^^ Each service
fears the other has been infiltrated by hostile agents and is reluctant
to see national secrets go outside its own vaults. Nonetheless, coopera-
tion does take place, since all intelligence services seek information and,
with precautions, will take it Avhere they can get it if it is useful.

The CIA will work with friendly services to uncover hostile intel-
ligence operations, including illegals, directed at the government of
the friendly service. For example, a CIA-recruited defector may re-
veal Soviet agents in a friendly foi-eign government. This information
is shared with the friendly government, if there is proper protection
of the source. Protection of the CIA source is paramount.

FBI counterespionage activities within the United States are super-
vised by the Counterintelligence l^ranch of the FBI Intelligence Di-
vision. The Branch is made up of four Sections, three of which direct
field operations conducted by the Bureau's field offices. The fouith
handles liaison with other agencies and supervises the FBI's Legal
Attaches assigned to serve in the embassies in several foreign countries.

The formal structure foi' counterespionage coordination between the
FBI and the military intelligence agencies was established in 1939
and embodied most recently in a "charter" for the Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference in 1964.^"'' This formal body, chaired by the
FBI Director and including the heads of the military intelligence
agencies, has not played a significant decisionmaking role in recent
years.

-* Staff summary of interview, former FBI liaison person with CIA, 8/22/75.

" Rocea deposition, 11/25/75, p. 43.

'"" Confidential memorandum from President Roosevelt to Department Heads,
6/26/39; memorandum from Attorney General Kennedy to .7. Edgar Hoover,
Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, 3/5/64.

171

As late as 1974, some FBI officials took the position that the Bu-
reau's counterespionage activities were not under the authority of
the Attorney General, since the FBI was accountable in this area
directly to the United States Intelligence Board and the National
Security Council. A Justice Department committee chaired by As-
sistant Attorney General Henry Petersen sharply rejected this view
and declared :

There can be no doubt that in the area of foreign counter-
intelligence, as in all its other functions, the FBI is subject
to the power and authority of the Attorney General.-^"

In recent years the FBI has taken steps to upgrade its counter-
espionage effort, which had been neglected because of the higher
priority given to domestic intelligence in the late 60s and early 70s.^'*^
New career development and mid-career training programs have been
instituted. FBI agents specializing in counterespionage begin their
careers as criminal investigators and not as analysts; and Bureau
officials stress that their role is accurate fact-finding, rather than
evaluation. Nevertheless, counterespionage supervisory personnel have
recently attended high-level training courses in foreign affairs and area
studies outside the Bureau.^""^

Here, then, are the key elements of counterintelligence. Together
they combine into a discipline of great importance, for the rock bottom
obligation of an intelligence service is to defend the country ; meeting
this obligation is the very raison dJ'etre of counterintelligence. The
discipline also represents the most secret of secret intelligence ac-
tivities— the heart of the onion. Its great importance and its ultra
secrecy make counterintelligence an area of concern that cannot be
ignored by policymakers and by those responsible for legislative over-
sight. As a review of current issues in CI attests, the discipline has
several problems which demand the attention of those charged with
the defense of the country and the reform of the intelligence
community.

B. Current Issues in Counterintelligence

1. Two Philosophies

December 1974 marked the end of an era in CIA counterintelli-
gence. James Angleton, the Chief of Counterintelligence at the Central
Intelligence Agency since 1954, retired over differences of opinion with
Director William Colby on the proper approach to the practice of
counterintelligence.

The new regime proved to be considerably different in its approach
to counterintelligence, emphasizing a diffusion of CI responsibili-

^" Report of the Petersen Committee on COINTELPRO, pp. 34-35. The com-
mittee was especially concerned that the ad hoc equivalent of the U.S. Intelli-
gence Board had approved the discredited "Huston Plan" in 1970. However, the
committee complied with the FBI's request that it exclude from it.? review of
domestic COINTELPRO activities the Bureau's "extremely sensitive foreign
intelligence collection techniques." (Memorandum from FBI Director Kelley to
Acting Attorney General Robert Bork, 12/11/73.)

^' C. D. Brennan testimony, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 117.

""^ W. R. Wannall testimony, 1/21/76, pp. 18-22.

172

ties throughout the Operations Directorate. Presumably, this has
led to an increased flow of counterintelligence information within the
Agency but, at the same time, has raised questions concerning com-
partmentation and security.

The new Chief of CIA Counterintelligence has instituted a series
of specific changes which have been studied closely by the Select
Committee. The findings are of an extremely sensitive character and
have been reported to the Senate and to the President in a classified
form. It should be noted here that CIA counterintelligence is now em-
phasizing different factors than heretofore, which reflect a some-
what different philosophy than that espoused by Angleton. These dif-
erences in viewpoint raise several important questions concerning how
best to protect the United States, including the proper degree of com-
partmentation of CI information, methods of operation, approaches
to security, research priorities, extent of liaison cooperation, and
emphasis on deception activities, among other things.

A high-level executive branch review of the classified issues which
have surfaced in this disagreement is of considerable importance. In-
cluded in this review should be an examination of the approval proc-
ess for certain counterespionage operations.

2. Interagency Relations

Equally as troubling as these issues is the problem of CIA/CI rela-
tions with other counterintelligence units in the Government. Partic-
ularly vexing have been the on-again off-again liaison ties between the
Agency and the FBI.^^ This histoiy has been marked by turbulence,
though a strong undercurrent of cooperation has usually existed at
the staff level since 1952 (when the Bureau began sending a liaison
man to the CIA on a regular basis). The sources of friction between
the CIA and the FBI in the early days revolved around such matters
as the frequent unwillingness of the Bureau to assist the CIA within
the United States or to help recruit foreign officials in this country.
Pressure from the CIA on the Bureau to increase microphone coverage
of foreign targets within the United States was also a "red flag" to
Hoover.^^

A series of such disagreements punctuated the relations between
the two agencies throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Several flaps arose,
for example, when the CIA Domestic Operations Division attempted
to recruit foreign officials within the United States and failed to ad-
vise the Bureau.^°

In 1966 an infoiTnal agreement w^as negotiated between the FBI and
the CIA to regularize their "coordination." This agreement had as its
"heart" that the CIA would "seek concurrence and coordination of the
FBI" before engaging in clandestine activity in the United States, and
that the FBI would "concur and coordinate if the proposed action does
not conflict with any operation, current or planned, including active
investigation [by] the FBI." Moreover, when an agent recmited by
the CIA abroad arrived in the United States, the FBI would "be
advised" and the two agencies would "confer regarding the handling

* Former FBI liaison person with CIA (staff summary), 8/22/75.
Ihid.
' Ihid.

173

of the agent in the United States," The CIA could "continue" its "han-
dling" of the agent for "foreign intelligence" purposes ; and the FBI
would also become involved where there were "internal security fac-
tors," although it was recognized that CIA might continue to "handle"
the agent in the United States and provide the Bureau with "informa-
tion" bearing on "internal security matters." ^°^'

Eventually, the much heralded (though actually minor) Riha inci-
dent in 1970 became "the straw that broke the camel's back." ^^ Hoover
ordered the discontinuation of FBI liaison with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. Though informal means of communication continued
between CIA and FBI staff personnel, Hoover's decision was a set-
back to the coordination of counterintelligence activities in the Gov-
ernment, Not until Hoover was gone from the Bureau did formal
liaison relations begin to improve.^^

Today, most counterintelligence officers in both agencies say that
coordination and communication linkages are good, though a recently
retired CIA/CI officer points to "a vital need for closer integi-ation
of the CI efforts of the CIA and the FBI." ^^ The most salient criti-
cisms of FBI counterintelligence voiced at the CIA concern (1) the
lack of sufficient CI manpower in the FBI; (2) occasional disputes
over the bona fides of defectors: and, (3) differences of opinion on
the possibility of hostile penetrations within the Government. Each
of these matters also requires immediate review by the executive
branch. In particular, the occasional interagency disputes over de-
fector bona fides and differences of opinion on suspected hostile pene-
trations cry out for a higher level of authority in the executive branch
to settle these sometimes divisive disagreements.

•5. The jScope and Bams of FBI Counterintelligence

In the imperfect contemporary Avorld where other nations have
interests which conflict with those of the United States, foreign-
directed clandestine intelligence activities in this country must be of
constant concern to the American people. One of the original reasons
for the FBI's domestic intelligence mission was that the United States
needed in the late 1930s a coordinated program for investigating "per-
sons engaged in espionage, counter-espionage or sabotage." ^^ By mid-
1939 the FBI and military intelligence had gathered a "reservoir of
information concerning foreign agencies operating in the United
States" with efficient "channels for the exchange of information." ^^
There is no question that during this prewar period, foreign espionage
constituted a serious threat to the security of the United States and
thus supported the basic decision to conduct investigations of activities
which were "not within the specific provisions of prevailing statutes" ^®

^"^ Testimony of former FBI liaison person with CIA, 9/22/75, pp. 52-55.

^ .Tames Angleton testimony, 9/24/75, Hearings, pp. 657-58.

^ Scott Miller testimony, the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United
States, 3/19/75, p. 938.

*• Statement from Scott Miler to the Senate Select Committee, 1/28/76, pp.
32^33.

^ Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Murphy, 3/16/39.

^ Ijetter from Attorney General Murphy to President Roosevelt, 6/17/39.

** Memorandum from Hoover to Murphy, 3/16/39.

174

but which involved "potential" espionage, counterespionage, or sabo-
tage.^"

One of the major difficulties in any attempt to base investigations
of foreign espionage on the criminal statutes has been, from the outset,
the restricted and sometimes contradictory scope of the laws. A recent
legal analysis has observed that "the legislation is in many ways in-
comprehensible." ^* Most notably, the espionage statutes do not make
it a crime simply to engage in the knowing and unauthorized transfer
of classified information to foreign agents.^^ Moreover, the statutes
do not extend to a range of privately held information, especially on
scientific and technical matters, which would be valuable to a foreign
power.

Hostile foreign intelligence activities include more than just look-
ing for classified information or espionage recruits. Information of a
highly technical and strategic nature (though unclassified), which is
normally restricted or unavailable in other societies, is openly
procurable in the United States through academic institutions, trade
associations, and government offices. Intelligence officers may seek out
persons who have defected to the United States, to induce them to
redefect back to their home country .^° Foreign intelligence targets in
this country may include information possessed by third nations and
their representatives in the United States.

Moreover, the type of activity w^hicli is most easy to detect and which
may indicate possible espionage does not always satisfy the normal
standard of "reasonable suspicion." As a study prepared by the Fund
for the Republic stated twenty years ago :

The problems of crime detection in combatting espionage are
not ordinary ones. Espionage is a crime which succeeds only
b}^ secrecy. Moreover-, spies work not for themselves or
privately organized crime "syndicates," but as agents of na-
tional states. Their activities are therefore likely to be care-
fully planned, highly organized, and carried on by techniques
skillfully designed to prevent detection.*^

Consequently, espionage investigations must be initiated on the basis
of fragments of information, especially where there may be only an
indication of a suspicious contact with a foreign agent and limited
data as to the specific purposes of the contact.

In addition, prosecution is frequently not the objective of an espi-
onage investigation. For one thing, the government may desire "to

''' Directive of President Roosevelt, 6/26/39. While the FBI's responsibilities
were also described at times as extending to "subversion," and the lack of outside
guidance allowed for overly broad FBI investigations, the problem of spying
was always paramount. See the orders of President Roosevelt and Attorney
General Biddle regarding warrantless wiretapping, discussed in report on war-
rantless FBI Electronic Surveillance.

^ Harold Edgar and Benno C. Schmidt, "The Espionage Statutes and Publica-
tion of Defense Information." Coliimhia Law Review, Vol. .53, (Mav. 1{>73) pp.
929. 9.34.

^^ Ibid., p. 1084.

*" FBI Memorandum, "Intelligence Activities Within the United States by For-
eign Governments," 3/20/75.

" Fund for the Republic, Digest of the Puhlic Record of Communism in the
United States (New York, 1955) , p. 29.

175

avoid exposino: its own coiinterespiona;gre practices and informa-
tion." *^ In addition, the purpose of the investigation may be to find
out what a known foreign agent is looking for, both as an indication
of the espionage interest of the foreign country and as a means of
insuring that the agent is not on the track of vital information. Since
foreign agents are replaceable, it may be a better defense not to expel
them from the country or otherwise halt their activities, but rather to
maintain a constant watch on their operations. This also means in-
vestigating in a more limited fashion many of the Americans with
whom the foreign agent associates, in order to determine what the
agent may be interested in learning from them.

In the 19-^Os and 1940s, another argument for going beyond the
criminal statutes was that there were significant ideological and na-
tionality factors which motivated persons to engage in espionage. As
Attorney General Jackson put it in 1940, individuals were a "likely
source" of law violation because they w^ere "sympathetic with the sys-
tems or designs of foreign dictators." ^^ The 1946 Report of the Cana-
dian Royal Commission made similar findings. This was the most
pereuasive rationale for continuing FBI intelligence investigations
of Communists and Fascists, as well as German and other nationality
groups, before World War II. It continued to be a substantial basis
for such investigations of Commimists after the war.**

By the mid-fifties, however, the characteristics of foreign espionage
had changed substantially. The decline of the Communist Party caused
a shrinkage in possible recruits, with the result that Soviet in-
telligence reverted "more and more ... to the old type of conven-
tional spy." *^ A report prepared by the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York observed that it was "vital" to adjust the govern-
ment's security programs to "new conditions," one of which w^as the
"decline of the appeal of Communism." The report added :

In the 1930s and 1940s the Soviet Union could rely on the
support, of a small but substantial group in this country who
were sympathetic with its asserted aims. Now this has largely
changed. . . . This has made a radical change in the type and
number of persons who might be lured into Communist
espionage.*''

The FBI itself believed that the Community Party had become a
"potential" rather than an actual espionage danger.*^ While that

*^ Ibid.

*^ Proceedings of the Federal-State Conference on Law Enforcement Problems
of National Defense, 8/.5-6/40.

** "A characteristic of most of the cases in which espionage for the Soviet
Union has been prosecuted is that the participants seem to have been motivated
by ideology. . . ." Fund for the Republic, Digest of the Public Record of Com-
munism in the Ignited States, p. 29.

*° Alexander Dallin, Soviet Espionage ( New Haven : Yale University Press,
1955), p. 510. This authoritative study of Communist espionage added that "the
traditional type of nonpolitical spy has advantages over a Communist : his past
evokes no suspicion."

"Report of the Special Committee on the Federal Loyalty-Security Program
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York ( New York : Dodd, Mead
&Co., 1956), pp. 35-36.

*''FBI Monograph, "The Communist Menace in the United States Today,"
(19.55), p. (iv-v.)

176

potential threat was still significant, in view of the Party's subser-
vience to the Soviet Union, the counterespionage justification for
sweeping investigations of persons one or two steps removed from
the Party (e.g., "sympathizers" or "infiltrated" groups) lost much of
its force.

Nevertheless, there continue to be hostile foreign intelligence ac-
tivities which the FBI characterizes as "efforts to penetrate the Ameri-
can political system" or attempts "to develop an agent of influence in
American politics" or efforts "to influence the U.S. policy-making
structure." "^^

Therefore, the monitoring of contacts between U.S. government of-
ficials and foreign officials who are likely to be carrying out the direc-
tions of a hostile foreign intelligence service is a necessary part of
the FBI's investigative duties. The subject of investigation is the for-
eign official, and any inquiry directed towards the American official
can be limited to determining the nature of the foreign official's in-
terests. Frequently it is desirable that the American official be in-
formed by the Bureau, especially when the contact is overt rather
than furtive or clandestine. (The same is also true with respect to
overt contacts with American private citizens.) ^'■'

There lare two areas of special difficulty in prescribing the FBI's
proper responsibility. The first involves contacts between Members of
Congress or high-level executive officials and equally high-level for-
eign officials. There have been ins^tances where the FBI has had reason
to believe that such contacts might involve the unauthorized disclosure
of confidential information to a foreign government. Except in such
rare circumstances, however, contacts of this nature need not be the
subject of FBI investigation or dissemination. ^°

The second difficulty involves the concept "foreign subversion," used
most recently in President Ford's Executive Order defining the coun-
terintelligence duties of the U.S. intelligence community, including
the FBI.^^ As noted above, the Bureau characterizes certain hostile
foreign intelligence activities as attempts to develop "agents of influ-
ence in American politics." The" FBI considered one of Dr. Martin
Luther King's advisors to be such an "agent of influence." In this case,
as with the massive investigations to uncover jwssible foreign "influ-
ence" on domestic protest activities, the concern for "foreign subver-
sion" was distorted so far beyond reasonable definition that the term
"subversion" should be abandoned completely. Even with the qualifier
"foreign," the concept is so elastic as to be susceptible to future misuse.

Nevertheless, there remains a compelling need to investigate aJJ the
activities of hostile foreign intelligence services, including their efforts
to recniit "agents of influence." This can be accomplished by continu-
ing investigation of the foreign agents themselves. Where a foreign

'^ FBI Memorandum, "Intelligence Activities Within the United States by
Foreign Governments," 3/20/75.

^* Contacts made secretly or with the apparent intent to avoid detection justify
more extensive iuAestigation.

™ Where the FBI discovers such contacts as a by-product of its investigations
for other purjKXses, they can be notetl without reference to the identity of the U.S.
official in order to compile a quantitative measure of foreign activity.

"^ Executive Order 11905, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," Sec.
2(a)(2) : Sec. 4(b)(4) ; Sec. 4(g) (1), 2/18/76.

177

agent makes an overt contact with an American, a limited inquiry
regarding the American is appropriaite to deter-mine the rrature of the
foreigrr agent's interests. This applies whether the agent's interest is
infor-mation or "influence," and the Bureau cair frequently make its
inquiry known to the Airrerican. But the Bureau's objectives should be
c-onfined solely to learrring more about the overall mission of the hostile
ser*vice and tire par-ticular assigmnents of its officers, as opposed to
investigatiirg "influerrce" by foreign officials or agerrts who do rrot have
irrtelligeirce duties and the lawful activities of Americarrs who are not
foreigrr agerrts. There is rro compellirrg reasorr for irrterrsive irrvestiga-
tions of U.S. officials (or private citizerrs) simply becarrse they are
targets of foreigrr "'influerrce." The lirre must be tightly dr'awn so that
FBI courrter-intelligerrce irrvestigatiorrs do rrot therrrselves once agairr
irrtrrrde irrto the Airrericarr political process, with corrsequerrces darrrag-
ing not oirly to the rights of Americarrs, but also to public confiderrce
irr the Burearr. Citizerr cooperation with the FBI is esserrtial to its suc-
cess in detectirrg arrd corrntering the threat of hostile foreigrr intelli-
gence operutiorrs to the defense of the nation.

To achieve this end, the federal criminal statutes dealing with
espiorrage should be substarrtially revised to take accourrt of the con-
temporary counterintelligence responsibilities of the FBI. A realistic
defirrition of foreign-directed clandestine intelligerrce activity would
make it possible for the FBI to base its couirterirrtelligence mvestiga-
tiorrs orr the firm foundation of the criminal law, rather than the shift-
irrg interpretatiorrs of terms like "subversiorr" in executive orders. The
Conrmittee agrees with Attorney General Edward H. Levi that:

the fact that the FBI has criminal investigative responsi-
bilities, which must be conducted within the confines of con-
stitutiorral protections strictly errforced by the courts, gives
the organization an awareness of the interests of individual
liberties that might be missing in an agerrcy devoted solely to
intelligence work.^^

C. Conclusions

1. A Subcommittee on Counterintelligence should be established
within the framework of the National Security Council (NSC). Its
prrrpose would be to monitor CI activities, authorize important
courrterespionage operations, and adjudicate interagerrcy disagree-
ments over CI policies, coordination, defector bona fides, suspected
hostile penetrations, and related matters.

2. The President of the United States, in consultation with the
oversight committee (s) of Congress, should undertake a top secret
review of current issues iir the realm of counterintelligence. This re-
view, which should form the basis for an internal Presidential state-
merrt on rrational counterintelligence policy arrd objectives, should
iirclude close attention to the followirrg issrres: compartmerrtation,
operations, security, research, accountability, trairrirrg, interrral review,
deceptiorr, liaisorr and coordination, and mairpower.

8. Corrgressional oversight should devote more atterrtiorr to this

"" Levi testimony, 12/10/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 314-315.

178

area to help preserve the liberties of American citizens and to prod
the intelligence community toward a more effective defense of the
nation.

(Additional recommendations on counterintelligence, including
reform of the espionage laws and legislation setting standards for
activities affecting the rights of Americans, are made in the Commit-
tee's Report on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans.)

X. THE DOMESTIC IMPACT OF FOREIGN CLANDESTINE
OPERATIONS: THE CIA AND ACADEMIC INSTITU-
TIONS, THE MEDIA, AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS

Although its operational arena is outside the United States, CIA
clandestine operations make use of American citizens as individuals
or through American institutions. Clandestine activities that touch
American institutions and individuals have taken many forms and are
effected through a wide variety of means : university officials and pro-
fessors -provide leads and make introductions for intelJigence pur-
poses; ^ scholars and journalists collect intelligence; journalists devise
and place propaganda; United States publications provide cover for
CIA agents overseas.

These forms of clandestine cooperation had tlieir origins in the early
Cold War period when most Americans perceived a real threat of a
communist imperium and were prepared to assist their government
to counter that threat. As the communists pressed to influence and to
control international organizations and movements, mass communica-
tions, and cultural institutions, the United States responded by in-
volving American private institutions and individuals in the secret
struggle over minds, institutions and ideas. Over time national per-
ceptions would change as to the nature and seriousness of the com-
munist ideological and institutional threat. Time and experience would
also give increasing currency to doubts as to whether it made sense for
■a democracy to resort to practices such as the clandestine use of free
American institutions and individuals — practices that tended to blur
the very difference 'bet^veen "our" system and "theirs" that these
covert programs were designed to preserve.

These covert relationsliips have attracted public concern and the
attention of this Committee because of the importance Americans
attach to the independence of private institutions. Americans recognize
that insofar as univereities, newspapei-s, and religious groups help
mold the beliefs of the i:)ulblic and the policymakers, their divei"sity
and legitimacy must be rigorously protected. It is through them that
a society informs and criticizes itself, educates its yomig, interprets
its history, and sets new goals.

At the same time, Americans also recognize the legitimacy and
necessity of certain clandestine operations, particularly the collection
of foreign intelligence. To conclude that certain sectore of American
life must be placed "off limits" to clandestine operations inevitably
raises questions not only on possible intelligence loSvSes which would
result from such a prohibition, but on whether the United States can

^The material italicized in this report has been substantially abridge at the
request of the executive agencies. The classified version of this material is avail-
able to members of the Senate under the provisions of Senate Resolution 21 and
the Standing Rules of the Senate. See also p. IX.

(179)

180

afford to foreoo the clandestine use of our universities, our media, and
our religious groups in competing- with our adversaries.

In exploring this problem the Committee has given special atten-
tion to the CIA's past clandestine relationships with American institu-
tions. The Committee has examined the past to illuminate the attitudes
and perceptions that shaped these clandestine programs using Amer-
ican institutions and to determine whether tJie internal CIA regula-
tions established in 1967 are sufficient to prevent the large scale pro-
grams of the past from being reinstated in the future.

Some of these concerns were addressed almost a decade ago during
an investigation that proved to 'be a watershed in the Central Intelli-
gence Agency's relationship to Amencan institutions. President
Lyndon Johnson, moved by public and congressional uproar over the
1967 disclosure of the CIA's covert funding of the National Student
Association (NSA) and other domestic, private institutions, estiablished
the Katzenbach Committee. The Committee, chaired by the then Under
Secretai-y of State, Nicholas Katzenbach, directed its investigation
primarily at the CIA's covert funding of American educational and
private voluntary organizations. The recommendations of the Katzen-
bach Committee, although they had great impact on the CIA's opera-
tions, spoke only to the issue of tlie covert funding of institutions.

In its investigation the Committee has looked not only at the impact
of foreign clandestine operations on American institutions but has
focused particular attention on the covert, use of individuals. It should
be emphasized from the outset that the integrity of these institutions
or individuals is not jeopardized by open contact or cooperation
with Government intelligence institutions. United States Govern-
ment support and cooperation, openly acknowledged, plays an essen-
tial role in American education. Equally important. Government pol-
icymakers draw on the technical expertise and advice available fi*om
academic consultants and university-relaJted research organizations.
Open and regular contact with Government agencies is a necessary
part of the journalist's responsibility, as well.

A secret or a covert relationship with any of these institutions, how-
ever, is another matter, and requires careful evaluation, given the
critical role these institutions play in maintaining the freedom of our
society. In approaching the subject the Committee has inquired : Are
the independence and integrity of American institutions in any way
endangered by clandestine relationships with the Central Intelligence
Agency? Should clandestine use of institutions or individuals within
those ins'titutions be pennitted? If not, should there be explicit guide-
lines laid down to regidate Government clandestine support or opera-
tional use of such institutions or individuals ? Should such giiidelines
be in the form of executive directives or by statute?

In addressing these issues, the Committee's access to CIA documents
and files varied with the subject matter. In reviewing the clandestine
activities that proceeded the Katzenbach Committee inquiry of 1967.
the Select Committee had full and unfettered access to most files and
documentation, with the single exception of records on media rela-
tionships. In addition, the Committee took extensive sworn testimony
from virtually all of those involved in the management and review^ of
the pre-1967 projects. Access to post-1967 material was far more re-

181

stricted: certain of die titles and names of authors of propaganda
books published after 1967 were denied the Committee ; access to files
on the oontempoiury clandestine use of the American academic com-
munity was restricted 'to infonnation which would provide the num-
bers of institutions and individuals involved and a description of the
role of the individuals. As for the media and relationships with re-
ligious groups, the Committee inspected precis or summaries of all
operational relationships since 1951 and then selected over 20 cases for
closer inspection. The documents fix)m these some 20 files were selected
and screened by the Agency and, by mutual agreement, names of indi-
viduals and institutions were removed.

Therefore, the CcMnmittee has far from the full picture of the nature
and exifent of these relationships and the domestic impact of foreign
clandestine operations. Nevertheless, it has enough to outline the
dimensions of the problem and to underscore its serious nature. The
conclusions and reconmiendations must necessarily be considered
tentative and subject to careful review by the successor intelligence
oversight committee (s) of the Congress.

In presenting the facts and issues associated with CIA covert rela-
tions with TTnited St)ates private institutions, this report is organized
as follows : I. Covert Use of Academic and Voluntary Organizations.
11. Covert Relationships with the United States Media. III. Covert
ITse of United States Religious Groups.

A. Covert Use of Academic and Voluntary Organizations

The Central Intelligence Agency has long- developed clandestine
relationships with the American academic community, which range
from, academics making introducti(y)\8 for intelligence purfoses - to
intelligence collection while abroad, to academic research and writing
where CIA sponsorship is hidden. The Agency has funded the activi-
ties of American private organizations around the world when those
activities suppoi^ted — or could be convinced to suppoit — American
foreign policy objectives. Until 1967 the Agency also maintained
covert ties to iVmerican foundations in order to pass funds secretly to
private groups ^vhose work the CIA supported.

The relationships have varied according to whether made with an
institution or an individual, whether the relationship is paid or un-
paid, or whether the individuals are "witting" — i.e. aware — of CIA
involvement. In some cases, covert involvement provided the CIA with
little or no operational control of the institutions involved ; funding
was primarily a way to enable people 'to do things they wanted to do.
In other cases, influence was exerted. Nor was the nature of these re-
lationships necessarily static ; in the case of some individuals support
turned into influence, and finally even to operational use.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the CIA turned increasingly to covert
action in the area of student and labor matters, cultural affairs, and
community developments. The struggle with communism was seen to
be, at center, a struggle between our institutions and theirs. The CIA
subsidized, advised, and even helped develop "private" organizations
that would compete with the communists around the world. Some of

- For explanation of italics, see footnote, p. 179.

182

these organizations were foreign ; others were international ; yet others
were U.S.-based student, labor, cultural, or philanthropic organiza-
tions whose international activities the CIA subsidized.

The CIA's interest in the areas of situdent and labor matters, cul-
tural affairs, and community development reached a peak in the mid-
1960's. By 1967, when public disclosure of NSA's funding and the sub-
sequent report of the Katzenbach Committee caused a major curtail-
ment of these activities, interest in the major covert action efforts in
these areas was already waning.

There appear to be two reasons for this. First, there was considerable
skepticism within the CIA as to the effectiveness of this approach. It
differed from classical CIA "tradecraft" in that the organizations
funded were basically independent from CIA control, Richard Helms
expressed this skepticism when he remarked in testimony before tliis
committee.

The clandestine operator ... is trained to believe that you
really can't count on the honesty of your- agent to do exactly
what you want or to report accurately unless you own him
body and soul.^''

Mr. Helms contended that "the clandestine oj)erator sneered at tlie
other kind of operation" — the aiding and abetting of people or orga-
nizations who are your "friends" or "have the same point of view that
you do."

Skepticism of the clandestine operators was directed particularly
at the Covert Action Staff/International Organizations Division, the
CIA units which conducted the programs in the area of student and
cultural exchange. Second, it became increasingly difficult to conceal
the CIA funds that supported these activities as the scale of the opera-
tions grew. By fiscal year 1967, for example, over $3 million was
budgeted for youth and student programs and $6 million for labor.
Most of the funds were transmitted through legitimate or "devised"
foundations — that is, fictitious entities established by the CIA.

1. CIA Use of Private Foundations^ Pre-1967

The use of pliilanthropic organizations was a convenient way to
pass funds, in that large amounts could be transferred rapidly, and
in a form that need not alert unwitting officers of the recipient organi-
zations to their source. In addition, foundation grants bestowed upon
the recipient the apparent "blessing" of the foundation. The funding
pattern involved a mixture of bona fide charitable foundations, devised
foundations and funds, "front men" drawn from a list of America's
most prominent citizens, and lawyers representing undisclosed clients.

The CIA's intrusion into the foundation field in the 1960s can only
be described as massive. Excluding grants from the "Big Three" —
Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie — of tlie 700 grants over $10,000 given
by 164 other foundations during the period 1963-1966, at least 108
involved partial or complete CIA funding. More importantly, CIA
funding was involved in nearly half the grants the non-"Big Three"
foundations made during this period in the field of international
activities. In the same period more than one-third of the grants
awarded by non-"Big Three" in the physical, life and social sciences
also involved CIA funds.

"" Richard Helms testimony, 9/12/75, p. 2.")-26.

183

Bona fide foundations, rather than those controlled by the CIA,
were considered the best and most plausible kind of funding cover for
certain kinds of operations. A 1966 CIA study explained the use of
legitimate foundations was the most effective way of concealing the
CIA's hand as well as reassuring members of funded organizations
that the organization was in fact supported by private funds. The
Agency study contended that this technique was "particularly effec-
tiv^e for democratically-run membership organizations, which need to
assure their own unwitting members and collaborators, as well as their
hostile critics, that they have genuine, respectable, private sources of
income."

2. The C/A^s Fourtdation- funded Covert Activity, Pre-1967

The philanthropic fix)nts used prior to 1967 funded a seemingly
limitless range of covert action programs affecting youth groups, labor
unions, univei-sities, publishing houses, and other private institutions
in the United States and abroad. The following list illustrates the
divei-sity of these operations :

(1) The CIA assisted in the establishment in 1951 and the funding
for over a decade of a research institute at a major American univer-
sity. This assistance came as the result of a request from Under-secre-
tary of State James Webb to General Bedell Smith, then Director of
the CIA. Mr. Webb proposed that the center, which was to research
worldwide political, economic, and social changes, be supported by the
CIA in the interest of the entire intelligence community.

(2) A project toas undertaken in collaboration ivith a i^ationally
prominent Arnerican husin^ss association. The object of the project was
to promote a favorable image of America in a foreign country unfavor-
ably disposed to America and to protnote citizen-to-citizen contacts
between Americans and influential segments of that country'' s society?

(3) The cooperation of an American labor organization in selected
overseas labor activities.

(I) Support of an international organization of veterans and an
international foundation for developing countries.

(5) Support of an organiziation of journalists and an international
women's association.

(6) Partial support for an international educational exchange pro-
gram run by a group of United States universities.

(7) Funding of a legitimate U.S. association of farm organiza-
tions. Agency funds were used to host foreign visitoi-s, provide scholar-
ships to an international cooperative training center at a United States
university, and to reimburse the organization for various of its activi-
ties abroad. A CIx\. document prepared in 1967 notes that although
the organization received some overt government funds from AID, the
CIA should continue its covert funding because "programs funded
by AID cannot address themselves to the same political goals toward
which Agency operations are targeted because AID programs are
part of official government-to-government programs and are designed
for economic — not political — results."

For explanation of italics, see footnote, p. 179.

184

The Best Known Case: Covert Funding of the National Student
Association
CIA funding of the National Student Association (NSA) from 1952
to 1967 is a particularly good example of how the United States Gov-
ernment entered the field of covertly supporting "friends," of the
vulnerabilities felt by the CIA in undertaking to support organizations
and individuals that cannot be controlled, and of the operational temp-
tation to move from support to "control."

The reason the CIA decided to help NSA is clear. In the yeai-s
immediately after World War II the Soviet Union took the lead in
trying to organize and propagandize the world student movement.
The first Soviet Vice President of the International Union of Stu-
dents, for example, was Alexander N, Shelepin, wdio later became
Chairman of the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB). The
American students who sought to compete with these communist-
managed and directed student group were hampered by a lack of
funds, while the communist groups had enough money to put on
world youth festivals, conferences and forums, and regional confer-
ences. In seeking funds at home, the American students found they
were considered too far to the left in the general climate of Mc-
Carthyism and anti-intellectualism of the 1950s. Against this back-
ground, NSA officials, after being refused by the State Department
and rebuffed by the Congress, were finally directed by the State
Department in i952 to the CIA.^

The CIA maintains that its funding efforts were based on shared in-
terests, not on manipulation. CIA funding of the National Student
Association appears to have been intended primarily to permit United
States students to represent their own ideas, in their own way, in the
international forums of the day. Nevertheless, the Committee has
found instances in which the CIA moved from blank-check support to
operational use of individual students."^

For example, over 250 U.S. students were sponsored by the CIA to
attend youth festivals in INIoscow, Vienna, and Helsinki and were used
for missions such as reporting on Soviet and Third World personalities
or observing Soviet security practices. A United States student, for
example, was recruited in 1957 to serve as a CIA "asset" at the Sixth
AVorld Youth Festival in Moscow. According to CIA documents, he
was instructed to report on Soviet counterintelligence measures and
to purchase a piece of Soviet-manufactured equipment.

* Under the agreed arrangement, CIA funds would support only the interna-
tional division of the National Student Association ; only the NSA President and
the International Affairs Vice President would be Avitting of the CIA connection.
Each year, after the election of new student leaders, the CIA held a secret
briefing for tlie new officers, and elicited from them a secrecy agreement.
During the 1960s however, witting National Student A.ssociation leaders be-
came increasingly restive about the CIA sponsorship, until finally in 1967 one
of them revealed the relation.ship to Ramparts magazine.

" "Operational use" of individuals as used in this report means recruitment, use,
or training, on either a witting or unwitting basis, for intelligence purposes.
That is. the individual is directed or "tasked" to do something for the CIA — as
opposed to volunteering information. Such purposes include covert action, clan-
destine intelligence collection (espionage) and various kinds of support
functions.

185

Altliou^h the CIA's involvement with the National Student As-
sociation was limited to the oro;;anization's international activities,
CIA influence was felt to some extent in its domestic programs as well.
T)ie mo?t direct way in which such influence may have been felt was in
the selection process for NSA officers. The Summer International
Seminars conducted for NSA leaders and potential leaders in the
United States during- the 1950's and 1960's were a vehicle for the
Agency to identify new leaders and to promote their candidacy for
elective positions in the National Student Association.

The Central Intelligence Agency's experience with the NSA under-
lines the basic problem of an action-oriented clandestine organization
entering into a coved f imding relationship witli private organizations :
support of friends turns into the control of their actions and ulti-
mately to creation of new "friends."

3. Cover is Blown: The Patman and Ramparts '"''Flaps''''

In a public hearing in 1964, Congressman Wright Patman, Chair-
man of the Subcommittee on Foundations of the House Committee
on Problems of Small Businesses, revealed the names of eight of the
CIA's funding instruments — ^the so-called "Patman Eight." These dis-
closures sharply jarred the Agency's confidence in the seciirity of these
pliilanthropic funding mechanisms.

The Patman disclosures led the CIA to take a hard look at this
technique of funding, but not to reconsider the propriety of bringing
the independence of America's foundations into question by using
them as conduits for the funding of coveit action projects. According
to the Chief of the Covert Action Staff's Program and Evaluation
Group :

The real lesson of the Patman Flap is not that we need to get
out of the business of using fomidation cover for funding, but
that we need to get at it more professionally and extensively.

Despite the best efforts of the Agency throughout 1966 to shore up
its vuhierable funding mechanisms, it became increasingly clear that
Ramparts magazine, the Nein York Times, and the Washington Post
were moving ever closer to unraveling not only the CIA's system of
clandestine funding but to exposing the source of the support for the
National Student Association. In an effort to determine whether there
was foreign influence on funds behind the Ramparts expose, the CIA,
in coordination with the FBI, undertook through its own counterintel-
ligence staff to prepare extensive reports on the Ramparts officers and
staff' members.*^

At a press briefing on February 14, 1967, the State Department
publicly confirmed a statement by leaders of NSA that their organiza-
tion had i-eceived covert support from the CIA since the early 1950s.
The NSA statement and disclosures in Ramparts magazine brought on
a storm of public and congressional criticism. In response. President

"The Agency appointed a special assistant to the Deputy Director for Plans,
who was charged with "pulling together information on Ramparts, includ-
ing any evidence of .subversion [and] devising proposals for counteraction." In
pursuing the "Communist ties" of Ramparts magazine, the "case" of managing
editor, Robert Scheer, was one of the first to be developed and a report was sent
on Scheer to Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to President Johnson.

69-983 O - 76 - 13

186

Johnson org-anized a committee conn)osed of lindersecretary of State
Nicholas Katzenbacli, Secretary of HEW John Gardner, and CIA
Director Richai'd Hehns to review government activities that may
"endanger the integrity and independence of the edncational comnui-
nity." The connnittee's life was short — i3 days — but its recommenda-
tions, accepted by President Johnson on March '2d, 1967, Avere to have
a profound effect on the CIA's clandestine operations, both in the
ITnited States and abroad.

4. The Katzetibach Committee

President Johnson's concern for the integrity and independence of
American institutions could have resulted in the Katzenbacli Commit-
tee being charged with general review of the domestic impact of
clandestine activities and their effect on American institutions ; includ-
ing consideration of iwhether all coveit relationships should be
prohibited, and, if not, what guidelines should be imposed on the use
of institutions and individuals.

Instead, the Johnson Administration carefully and consciously
limited the mandate of the Katzenbacli Committee's investigation to
the relationship between the CIA and "U.S. educational and private
voluntary organizations which operate abroad." In a February 24
memorandum to Grardner and Helms, Katzenbacli cited the narrow-
ness of the mandate in listing problems faced by the Committee :

1. The narrow scope of this mandate, as compared with the
demands, by Senator IMansfield, et al, that this flap be used
as a springboard for a review of all clandestine financing by
CIA.

2. More specifically, the exclusion in this mandate of rela-
tionships between CIA and American businesses abroad.

3. Focusing the mandate on CIA, rather than on all private
organization relationships with government agencies.

In testimony before this Committee, JNIr. Katzenbacli said that his
committee w^as designed by President Johnson not only to deal with
the relationship of the CIA to educational and voluntary organizations,
but to head off a full-scale congressional investigation.'^

All other covert relationships were to be excluded from the investiga-
tion. In a memo to his colleagues, the Deputy Chief of the Covert
Action Staff reported :

It is stated that the country operations funded by black bag
[sterilized or laundered funds] were not to be included in the
CIA's response to the Katzenbacli Commission and empha-
sized that the focus of this paper was to be on organizations.

In addition the Katzenbacli Committee did not undertake investi-
gation of CIA domestic commercial operations, specifically those de-
signed to provide cover for clandestine intelligence operations which

'' Nicholas Katzenbacli testimony, 10/11/75, p. 5. Katzenbacli also said of the
President's decision on membership :

". . . he [the President] wanted John Gardner on it becanse he thonsht that
would help politically in getting acceptance of whatever the recommendations
turned out to be because he thought Helms would defend everything and wanted
to continue everything. Gardner would want to stop everything. It was my job to
come out with something in the middle." {Ibid).

187

the U.S. directed at such taro-ets as foreig'ii students, foi'eign business-
men, foreign diplomatic and consular officials travelling or residing
in the United States.

Despite the narrowness of its mandate, the actual investigation of
the Katzenbach Committee was vigorous and thorough. After delib-
eration, the Committee issued the basic recommendation that :

It should be the policy of the United States Government that
no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assist-
ance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's
educational or private voluntary organizations.

In May 1967 the Deputy Director for Plans Desmond FitzGerald
interpreted the post-Katzenbach ground rules in a circular to the field.
He stated :

Several operational guidelines emerge:

a. Covert relations with commercial U.S. organizations are
not, repeat, not barred.

b. Covert funding overseas of foreign-based international
organizations is permitted.

He indicated that greatei- care would be needed in the conduct of
clandestine operations, in order to prevent disclosures :

a. The care required under the Katzenbach Report, with
respect to the recruitment and use of U.S. students, and U.S.
university professors, applies equally to the recruitment and
use of foreign students. . . .

In simple terms, we are now in a different ballgame. Some
of the basic ground rules have changed. When in doubt, ask
HQs.

5. A Different Ball game: CIA Response to Katzenhach

The policy guidelines established in the Katzenbach Report and
supplemental guidelines with w^hich the CIA interpreted the Report
brought major adjustments in covert action programs and methods.
Some 77 projects were examined at high levels within the CIA, and
lists were drawn up of projects to be terminated, projects to be trans-
ferred to other sources of funding, projects to continue, and projects
whose future required higher level decisions. The 303 Committee met
frequently throughout 1967 and 1968 to deal with difficult questions,
such as how to provide for continued funding of Radio Fi'ee Europe
and Radio Liberty.

At the same time the Agency was withdrawing fi'om support of
a large number of domestically-based organizations, it moved rapidly
to shelter certain high-priority oj)erations from the Katzenbach pro-
hibitions and to devise more secure funding mechanisms. This process
was facilitated by wdiat was termed "surge funding." The Katzen-
bach guidelines called for termination of CIA funding of domesti-
cally based U.S. organizations by December 31, 1967. With 303 Com-
mittee approval for the largest grants, the Agency "surge funded" a
number of organizations, giving them advances before the December
deadline which carried them in some cases for up to two years of op-
erations. Radio Free P^urope and Radio Liberty were so funded.

In adjusting to the "new ballgame," the appearance of contraven-
ing the Katzenbach guidelines, rather than specific regulations, was

188

seen as a reason not to continue relationships with certain institutions.
At the same time, at least one case suggests that even a clean termina-
tion of fundino- with a private oro-anization did not necessarily end
the CIA's support of the policies and programs of the oroanization, A
CIA report on termination plans for a large project in the Far East
indicated that, with surge funding, the organization could continue
into fiscal year 1969, and that thereafter "[the organization's] Board
of Trustees will assume full responsibility for the organization and
has pledged to continue its policies and range of activities."

Tile following are examples of the score of projects which the CIA
reviewed in 1967 and decided to contimie to fund :

(1) A publications and press institute that maintained a worldwide
network of stringers and correspondents. A CIA report on the project
asserted that it "exerts virtually no domestic influence in any quainter,
although its publications are read bv U.S. students."

(2) Several international trade union organizations.
(o) A foreigni-based news feature service.

(4) A foreign-based research and publishing institute.

In reviewing the CIA's adjustments to the Katzenbach Committee's
recommendations, the Committee found no violations of the policy
the i-eport sets foi'th. However, it is important to recognize how
narrow the focus of the Katzenbach Committee's concern was. The
problem was a):)proached by the committee and by the CIA essentially
as one of security: how to limit the dauiage caused by the revelations
of CIA relationships with private I^.S. institutions. Many of the
restrictions developed by the CIA in response to the events of 1967
appear to be security measures aimed at preventing furthei- public
disclosures which could jeopardize sensitive CIA operations. They did
not represent significant rethinking of where boundaries ought to be
drawn in a fi-ee society. Moreover, although President Johnson adopted
the Katzenbach report as policy, it was not issued as an executive order
or enacted as a statute. Thus, it has no firm legal status,

0. Post 1967 Relations with the TLS. Acadernic Oommunity

In analyzing the adequacy of the Katzenbach regulations
and of the CIA's compliance with them, the Select Committee concen-
trated much of its attention on contemporai-y relationships between the
CIA and the IT.S. academic conununity. The Committee interprets
"academic community" to include more than the Katzenbach Com-
mittee undoubtedly had in mind when it recommended prohibition of
"covert financial assistance or support . . . to any of the nation's edu-
cational . . . organizations." "Academic conununity'' has been inter-
preted by this Committee to include universities, university-related
research centers, and the full range of individual scholars and school
administrators, ranging from department heads to career counselors
and to Ph.D. candidates engaged in teaching. The Committee has
approached this inquiry with three principal questions:

(1) What is the extent and nature of CIA relationships with U.S.
academic institutions and with individual American academics^

('2) What are the guidelines and ground rules governing CIA post-
Katzenbach relations with the academic community ?

(;>) What issues are at stake; what threats, if any, do current rela-
tions pose for the independence of this influential sector of society?

189

The CIA relationships with the academic community are extensive
and serve many purposes, inchiding providino; leads and makiiig- intro-
ductions for intellioence purposes, collaboration in research and anal-
ysis, intellioence collection abroad, and preparation of books and other
propaganda materials.

The Select Committee's concentration has been on the area of clan-
destine relationships untouched by the Katzenbach Committee —
individuals.

7. Covert Relations with Individuals in the Academic Community
As already noted, from the first days of the Katzenbach Commit-
tee, the CIA proceeded on the operating assumption that the inquiry
was directed squarely at institutional relationships — not individuals in
or affiliated with those private institutions. After the Katzenbach
report, the Agency issued a basic instruction entitled "Restrictions on
Operational Use of Certain Categories of Individuals." This instruc-
tion remains in force today. The instruction states that the "basic rule"'
for the use of human agents by the Operations Directorate is that
"any consenting adult'' may be used.

While all members of the American academic community, including
students, certainly qualify as "consenting adults,'' the CIA since 1967
has been particularly sensitive to the risks associated with their use.
In order to control and confine contacts with American academics, the
handling of relationships with individuals associated with universities
is largely confined to tM^o CIA divisions of the Directorate of Opera-
tions— ^the Domestic Collection Division and the Foreign Resources
Division. The Domestic Collection Division is the point of contact
with lai'ge numbers of American academics who travel abroad or who
are otherwise consulted on the subject of their expertise. The
Foreign Resources Division, on the other hand, is the purely opera-
tional arm of the CIA in dealing with American academics. Alto-
gether, DCD and FRD are currently in contact — ranging from the
occasional debriefing to a continuing operational relationship — with
many thousands of United States academics at hundreds of U.S.
academic institutions.

It is imperative to underline that the majority of these relationships
are purely for the purpose of asking an academic about his travels
abroad or open informal consulting on subjects of the academic's ex-
pertise. The Committee sees no danger to the integrity of American
private institutions in continuing such contacts; indeed, there are
benefits to both the government and the universities in such contacts.

The CIA's Office of Personnel also maintains relationships with
university administrators, sometimes in the placement office. These
relationships, which are usually contractual, enable the CIA to ap-
proach suitable Ignited States students for CIA employment.

The "operational use" of academics is another matter. It raises trou-
bling questions as to preservation of the integrity of American aca-
demic institutions.

8. Covert Use of the U.S. AcadeTnic Co7nm/u/nity

The Central Intelligence Agency is noiv using several hundred
American academics '^'^., who in addition to ^providing leads and., on

" "Academics" includes administrators, faculty members and graduate students
engaged in teaching.

190

occasion^ rruiking introductions for intelligence purposes^ occasionally
write hooks mid other material to he used for propaganda purposes
abroad. Beyond these., an additional few score are used in an unwitting
manner for minor activities.

These academics are located in over 100 American colleges., univer-
sities., and related institutes. At the majority of institutions^ no one
other than the individual concerned is aware of the CIA link. At
tJie others, at least one university official is aioare of the operational use
made of academics on his campus. In addition., there are several Amer-
ican academics ahroad loho serve operational purposes.; primarily the
collection of intelligence.^'^

The CIA considers these operational relationships with the United
States academic community as perhaps its most sensitive domestic area
and has strict controls governing these operations. According to the
Agency's internal directives, the following distinctions govern the
operational use of individuals : the CIA's directives prohibit the opera-
tional use of individuals who are receiving support under the Mutual
Education and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, commonly known as
the Fulbright-Hays Act. Falling under this ])articular prohibition are
teachers, research scholars, lecturers, and students who have been
selected to receive scholarships or grants by the Board of Foreign
Scholarships. This prohibition specifically does not apply to the several
other categories of grantees supported by other pr-ovisions of the Ful-
bright-Hays Act, such as artists, athletes, leaders, specialists, or par-
ticipants in international trade fairs or expositions, who do not come
under the aegis of the President's Board of Foreign Scholarships. As
far as the three major foundations — Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie — -
are concerned, the prohibition extends to "persons actively participat-
ing in programs which are wholly sponsored and controlled by any of
these foundations. Additionally, there Avill be no operational use made
of the officials or employees of the.se organizations." (These large foun-
dations were cited by a CIA official in 1960 before the 30.'^ Committee
as "a trouble area in New York City — reluctant to cooperate on joint
ventures.")

0. Covert Relationships toith Acadameic and Voluntary Organizations :
Conclusions
With respect to CIA covert relationships with private institutions
and voluntary organizations, the Committee concludes:

(1) The CIA has adhered to the 1967 Katzenbach guidelines govern-
ing relation^jhips with domestic private and voluntary institutions. The
guidelines are so narrowly focused, however, that the covert use of
American individuals from these institutions has continued.

(2) American academics are now beiuir used for such operational
l)ur))oses as making introductions for intelligence purposes ^^^ and
working for the Agency abroad. Although the numbers are not as great
today as in 1966, there are no prohibitions to prevent an increase in the
operational use of academics. The size of these operations is determined
by the CIA.

(8) With the exception of those teachei's. scholars and students
who receive scholarships or grants from the Board of Foreign Scholar-

" For explanation of italics, see footnote, p. 170.

191

ships, the CIA is not prohibited from the operational use of all other
categories of grantee support under the Fulbright-Hays Act (artists,
athletes, leadere, specialists, etc.). Nor is there any prohibition on the
operational use of individuals participating in any other exchange
program funded by the Ignited States Government.

In addressing the issues of the CIA's relationship to the American
academic community the Committee is keenly aware that if the CIA
is to serve the intelligence needs of the nation, it nnist have unfettered
access to the best advice and judgment our universities can produce.
But this advice and expertise can and should be openly sought — and
openly given. Suspicion that such openness of intellectual encounter
and exchange is complemented by covert operational exploitation of
academics and students can only prejudice, if not destroy, the pos-
sibility of a full and fruitful exchange between the nation's best minds
and the nation's most critical intelligence needs. To put these intel-
lects in the service of the nation, tnist and confidence must be main-
tained between our intelligence agencies and the academic community.

The Committee is disturbed both by the present practice of opera-
tionally using American academics and by the awareness that the
restraints on expanding this practice are primarily those of sensitivity
to the risks of disclosure and not an appreciation of dangers to the
integrity of individuals a;id institutions. Nevertheless, the Commit-
tee does not recommend a legislative prohibition on the operational
exploitation of individuals in private institutions by the intelligence
agencies. The Conmiittee views such legislation as both unenforceable
and in itself an intrusion on the pri^'acy and integrity of the American
academic community. The Committee believes that it is the respon-
sibility of private institutions and particularly the American academic
community to set the professional and ethical standards of its mem-
bers. This report on the nature and extent of covert individual rela-
tions with the CIA is intended to alert these institutions that there is
a problem.

xVt the same time, the Committee recommends that the CIA amend
its internal directives to require that individual academics used for
operational purposes by the CIA, together with the President or equiv-
alent official of the relevant academic institutions, be informed of the
clandestine CIA relationship.

The Committee also feels strongly that there should be no opera-
tional use made of professors, lecturers, students, artists, and the like
who are funded under Ignited States Government-sponsored programs.
The prohibition on the operational use of Fulbright grantees must be
extended to other government-sponsored programs; and in this case
the prohibition should be confirmed by law. given the direct responsi-
bility of the Congress for these programs. It is unacceptable that
Americans would go overseas under a cultural or academic exchange
program funded openly by the United States Congress and at the
same time serve an operational purpose directed by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.

B. Covert Relationships With the United States Media

In pursuing its foreign intelligence mission the Central Intelligence
Agency has used the U.S. media for both the collection of intelligence

192

and for cover. Until February 1976, when it announced a new policy
toward U.S. media personnel, the CIA maintained covert relation-
ships with about 50 American journalists or employees of U.S. media
organizations. They are part of a network of several hundred foreign
individuals around the world who provide intelligence for the CIA and
at times atteinpt to influence foreign opinion through the use of
covert propaganda. These individuals provide the CIA ivith direct
access to a large number of foreign neiospapers and periodicals., scores
of press services and n£ws agencies, radio and television stations, com-
mercial book publishers, and other foreign media outlets}'^

The CIA has been particularly sensitive to the charge that CIA
covert relationships with the American media jeopardize the credibil-
ity of the American press and risk the possibility of propagandizing
the U.S. public. Former Director William Colby expressed this con-
cern in recent testimony before the House Select Committee on
Intelligence :

We have taken particular caution to ensure that our opera-
tions are focused abroad and not at the United States in order
to influence the opinion of the American people about things
from a CIA point of view.

As early as 1967, the CIA, in the wake of the National Student
Association disclosure, moved to flatly prohibit the publication of
books, magazines, or newspapers in the United States. iNlore recently,
George Bush, the new Director, undertook as one of his first actions to
recognize the "special status alt'orded the American media under our
Constitution'' and therefore pledged that "CIA will not enter into
any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time
news correspondent accredited by any United States news service,
newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station." ^^

In approaching the subject of the CIA's relationship with the United
States media, the Select Committee has been guided by several broad
concerns. It has inquired into the covert publication of propaganda
in order to assess its domestic impact; it has investigated the nature
and purpose of the covert relationships that the CIA maintains with
bona fide U.S. journalists; it has examined the use of journalistic
"cover" by CIA agents; it has pursued the difficult issue of domestic
"fallout" from CIA's foreign press placements and other propaganda
activities. Throughout, it lias compared current practice to the regula-
tions restricting activities in this area, in order both to establish
whether the CIA has complied with existing regulations, and, more
important, in order to evaluate the adequacy of the regulations
themselves.

1. Books and Publishing Hoioses

Covert propaganda is the hidden exercise of the power of pei-sua-
sion. In the world of covert propaganda, book publishing activities
have a special place. In 1961 the Chief of the CIA's Covert Action

' For explanation of footnotes, see p. 179.
George Bush statement, 2/11/76.

193

Staff, who had responsibility for the covert propaganda program,

wrote :

Books differ from all other propaganda media, primarily
because one single book can sigiiifieantly change the reader's
attitude and action to an extent unmatched by the impact of
any other single mediujii . . . this is, of couree, not true of all
books at all times and with all readers — but it is true signifi-
cantly often enough to make books the most important
weapon of strategic (long-range) propaganda.

According to The Chief of the Covert Action Staff, the CIA's clan-
destine handling of book publishing and distribution could :

(a) Get books published or distributed abroad \yithout
revealing any U.S. influence, by covertly subsidizing foreign
publications or booksellers.

(b) Get books published which should not be "contam-
inated'' by any overt tie-in with the U.S. government, espe-
cially if the position of the author is "delicate.'"

(d) Initiate and subsidize indigenous national or inter-
national organizations for book publishing or distributing-
purposes.

(e) Stimulate the writing of politically significant books
by unknown foreign authors — either by directly subsidizing
the author, if covert contact is feasible, or indirectly, through
literary agents or publishers.

Well over a thousand books were produced, subsidized or spon-
sored by the CIA before the end of 1967. Approximately 25 percent of
them were written in English. ^lany of them were published by cul-
tural organizations which the CIA backed, and more often than not the
author was unaware of CIA subsidization. Some books, llo^yever, in-
volved direct collaboration between the CIA and the writer. The
Chief of the Agency's propaganda unit wrote in 1961 :

The advantage of our direct contact with the author is
that we can acquaint him in great detail with our intentions;
that we can provide him with whatever material we want him
to include and that we can check the manuscript at every
stage. Our control over the writer will have to be enforced
usually by paying him for the time he works on the manu-
script, or at least advancing him sums which he might have
to repay . . . [the Agency] must make sure the actual manu-
script will correspond with our operational and propagandis-
tic intention. . . .

The Committee has i-eviewed a few examples of what the Chief of
the Covei-t. Action Staff' termed "books published for operational rea-
sons regardless of commercial viability." Examples inchided :

(1) A book about the conflict in Indochina was pi'oduced in 1954
at the initiation of the CIA's Far East Division. A major I^.S. publish-
ing house under contract to the CIA published the book in French and
English. Copies of both editions were distributed to foreign embassies

194 '

in the United States, and to selected newspapers and magazine editors
both in the United States and abroad.

(2) A book about a student from a developing country who had
studied in a communist country "was developed by [two area divisions
of the CIA] and produced by the Domestic Operations Division . . .
and has had a high impact in the U.S. as well as the [foreign area]
market." The book, which was published by the European outlet of a
U.S. publishing house, was published in condensed form in two major
U.S. magazines. Eric Severeid, the CBS political commentator, in
reviewing this book, spoke a larger truth than he knew when he sug-
gested that "our propaganda services could do worse than to flood
[foreign] university towns with this volume."

(3) Another CIA book, the Penkovskiy Papers^ was published in
the United States in 1965 "for operational reasons", but actually
became commercially viable. The book was prepared and written
by witting Agency assets who drew on actual case materials. Publi-
cation rights to the manuscript were sold to a publisher through a
trust fund which was established for the purpose. The publisher was
unaware of any U.S. Government interest.

The publishing program in the period before the National Student
Association disclosures was large in volume and varied in taste. In
1967 alone the CIA published or subsidized well over 200 books, rang-
ing from books on wildlife and safaris to translations of Machiavelli's
The Prince into Swahili and works of T. S. Eliot into Russian, to a
parody of the famous little red book of quotations from Mao entitled
Quotations from Chairman Liu.

The publicity which in 1967 surrounded several CIA sponsored or-
ganizations and threatened to expose others caused the CIA to act
quickly to limit its use of U.S. publishers. In direct response to the
Katzenbach report, Deputy Director for Plans Desmond FitzGerald
ordered, "We will, mider no circumstances, publish books, magazines
or newspapers in the United States."

With this order, the CIA suspended direct publication and subsi-
dization within the United States not only of books, but also of jour-
nals and newsletters, including: a magazine published by a United
States-based proprietary for cultural and artistic exchange; a news-
letter mailed to foreign students studying in North American univer-
sities under the sponsorship of a CIA proprietary foundation ; and a
publication on Latin American affairs published in the United States.

Thus since 1967 the CIA's publishing activities have almost entirely
been confined to books and other materials published abroad. During
the past few years, some 250 books have been published abroad, most
of them in foreign languages.

As previously noted, the CIA has denied to the Committee a number
of the titles and names of authors of the propaganda books published
since 1967. Brief descriptions provided by ih^& Agency indicate the
breadth of subject matter, which includes the following topics, aniong
many others :

(1) Commercial ventures and commercial law in South
Vietnam ;

(2) Indochina representation at the U.N. ;

(3) A memoir of the Korean War ;

195

(4) The prospects for European union;

(5) Chile under Allende.

2. Covert Use of U.S. Journalists and Media Institutions

On February 11, 1976, the CIA announced new guidelines governing
its relationship with U.S. media organizations:

Effective immediately, CIA will not enter into any paid or
contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time news
correspondent accredited by any U.S. newsservice, newspaper,
periodical, radio or television network or station.^^

Of the approximately 50 U.S. journalises or personnel of U.S. media
organizations who were employed by the CIA or maintained some other
covert relationsliip with the CIA at the time of the announcement,
fewer than one-half will be terminated under the new CIA guidelines.

About half of the some 50 CIA relationships with the U.S. media
were paid relationships, ranging from salaried operatives working
under journalistic cover, to U.S. journalists serving as "independent
contractors" for the CIA and being ])aid regularly for their services, to
those who receive only occasional gifts and reimbursements from the
CIA."

More than a dozen United States neics organizaHons and coimnercial
jmMishing houses formerly 'provided cover for CIA agents abroad. A
few of these organizations ivere unaware that they provided this
cover.^^

Although the variety of the CIA relationships with the U.S. media
makes a svstematic breakdown of them almost impossible, former CIA
Director Colby has distinguished among four types of relationships.^^
These are:

(1) Staff of general circulation, I".S. news organizations;

(2) Staff of small, or limited circulation, U.S. publications ;

(3) Free-lance, stringers, propaganda writers, and employees of
U.S. publishing houses ;

(4) Journalists with whom CIA maintains unpaid, occasional,
covert contact.

Wliile the CIA did not provide the names of its media agents or the
names of the media organizations with which tliey are connected, the
Committee reviewed summaries of their relationships and work with
the CIA. Through this review the Committee found that as of Febru-
ary 1976:

(1) The first category, which would include any staff member of a
general circulation U.S. news organization who functions as a paid
undercover contact of the CIA, appears to be virtually phased out. The

^'According to the CIA, "accredited" applies to individuals who are "formally
authorized by contract or issuance of press credentials to represent themselves
as correspondents."

" Drawn from "operational case studies" provided to the Committee 12/16/75
and 10/21/75.

" For explanation of footnotes, see p. 179.

"On November 30, 1973, the Wnshinnfon Star-New<> reported that Director
Colby had ordered a review of CIA media relationships in September of that
year, and reported that Colby would phase out the first category but maintain
.iournalists in each of the other three categories. In his testimony to the House
Select Committee on Intelligence on November 6, 1975, Colby made a general
reference to these categories.

196

Committee has found only two current relationships that fit this cate-
gory, both of which are being terminated under the CIA's Febru-
ary 11, 1976 stated policy.

The Committee has also found a small number of past relationships
that fit this category. In some cases the cover arrangement consisted of
reimbursing the U.S. newspaper for any articles by the CIA agent
which the paper used. In at least one case the journalistic functions
assumed by a CIA staff officer for cover purposes grew to a point where
the officer concluded that he could not satisfactorily serve the require-
ments of both his (unwitting) U.S. media employers and the CIA, and
therefore resigned from the CIA. He maintained contact, how^ever,
with the CIA and continued, very occasionally, to report to the CIA
from the countries in w*hich he worked.

(2) Of the less than ten relationships with writers for small, or
limited circulation, U.S. publications, such as trade journals or news-
letters, most are for cover purposes.

(3) The third, and largest, category of CIA relationships with the
U.S. media includes free-lance journalists; "stringers" for newspapers,
news magazines and news services; itinerant authors; propaganda
writers; and agents working under cover as employees of U.S. pub-
lishing houses abroad. With the exception of the last group, the
majority of the individuals in this category are bona fide writei-s or
journalists or photographers. Most are paid by the CIA, and virtually
all are witting; few, however, of the news organizations to which they
contribute are aware of their CIA relationships.

(4) The fourth category of covert relationships resembles the kind
of contact that journalists have with any other department of the U.S.
Government in the routine performance of their journftlistic duties. No
money changes hands. The relationships are usually limited to occa-
sional lunches, interviews, or telephone conversations during which
information would be exchanged or verified. The difference, of course,
is that the relationships are covert. The joun^alist either volunteers or
is requested by the CIA to provide some sort of information about peo-
ple with whom he is in contact. In several cases, the relationship began
when the journalist approached a U.S. embassy officer to report that
he was approached by a foreign intelligence officer ; in others, the CIA
initiated the relationship.

The first major step to impose restrictions on the use of U.S. journal-
ists was taken by former Director Colby in the fall of 1973. According
to Mr. Colby's letter to the Committee : "

(a) CIA will undertake no activity in which there is a risk
of influencing domestic public opinion, either directly or in-
directly. The Agency will continue its prohibition against
placement of material in the American media. In certain in-
stances, usually where the initiative is on the part of the
media, CIA will occasionally provide factual non-attributable
briefings to various elements of the media, but only in cases
where we are sure that the senior editorial staff is aware of
the source of the information provided.

Letter from William Colby to the Select Committee, 10/21/75.

197

(b) As a general policy, the Agency will not make any
clandestine use of staff employees of U.S. publications which
have a substantial impact or influence on public opinion. This
limitation includes cover use and any other activities which
might be directed by CIA.

(c) A thorough review should be made of CIA use of non-
staff journalists ; i.e., stringers and free-lancers, and also those
individuals involved in journalistic activities who are in non-
sensitive journalist-related positions, primarily for cover
backstopping. Our goal in this exercise is to reduce such usage
to a minimum.

Mr. Colby's letter specified that operational use of staff — that is, full-
time correspondents and other employees of major U.S. news maga-
zines, newspapers, wire services, or television networks — was to be
avoided. Use would be less restricted for "stringers" or occasional
correspondents for these news organizations, as well as for corre-
spondents working for smaller, technical, or specialized publications.

The public statement that the CIA issued on February 11, 1976, ex-
pressed a policy of even greater restraint :

— Effective immediately, CIA will not enter into any paid
or contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time
news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service,
newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station.

— As soon as feasible, the Agency will bring existing rela-
tionships with individuals in these groups into conformity
with this new policy.

— CIA recognizes that members of these groups (U.S.
media and religious personnel) may wish to provide infor-
mation to the CIA on matters of foreign intelligence of
interest to the U.S. Government, The CIA will continue to
welcome information volunteered by such individuals.^^

From CIA testimony later that month, the Committee learned that
this prohibition extends to non- Americans accredited to U.S. media
organizations. Nevertheless, this prohibition does not cover "unaccred-
ited" Americans serving in U.S. media organizations, or free-lance
writers. As previously noted, the CIA has informed the Committee
that, of the approximately 50 CIA relationships with U.S. journalists
or employees of U.S. media organizations, fewer than one-half will be
terminated under the new guidelines.^^

3. Two Issues : ^^FalJout^'' and the Integrity of a Free Press

In examining the CIA's past and present use of the U.S. media, the
Committee finds two reasons for concern. The first is the potential, in-
herent in covert media operations, for manipulating or incidentally

'^ CIA instructions interpreting the new policy explain that "the term 'con-
tractual' applies to any written or oral agreement obligating the Agency to
provide financial remuneration including regular salaries, spot payments, or
reimbursement of, out-of-pocket operational expenses or the provision of other
material benefits that are clearly intended as a reward for services rendered
the Agency."

'" CIA response of March 17, 1976 (76-0315/1).

198

misleading the American public. The second is the damage to the
credibility and independence of a free press which may be caused by
covert relationships with U.S. journalists and media organizations.
In his 1967 order prohibiting CIA publication in this country, then
Deputy Director for plans Desmond FitzGrerald raised the first issue.
He stated:

Fallout in the United States from a foreign publication
which we support is inevitable and consequently permis-
sible.

In extensive testimony, CIA employees both past and present have
conceded that there is no way to shield the American public from such
"fallout." As a former senior official of the Agency put it in testimony :

There is no way in this increasingly small world of ours of
insulating information that one puts out overseas and con-
fining it to the area to where one puts it out. . . . When Brit-
ish intelligence was operating in the last century, they could
plant an outrageous story in some local publication and feel
fairly confident that no one else would ever hear about it,
that would be the end of it. . . . That is no longer the
case. Whether or not this type of overseas activity should be
allowed to continue is subject to differing views and judg-
ments. My own would be that we would be fools to relinquish
it because it serves a very useful purpose.^^

The same former CIA official continued :

If you plant an article in some paper overseas, and it is
a hard-hittina; article, or a revelation, there is no way of frnar-
anteeing that it is not going to be picked up and published
by the Associated Press in this country. ^^*

The domestic fallout of covert propaganda comes from many
sources; books intended primarily for an English-speaking foreign
audience, press placements that are picked up by international wire
services, press services controlled by the CIA, and direct funding of
foreign institutions that attempt to propagandize the United States
public and Congress.

In the case of books, substantial fallout in the U.S. may be a neces-
sary part of the propaganda process. For example, CIA records for
1967 state that certain books about China subsidized or even pro-
duced by the Agency "circulate principally in the U.S. as a prelude to
later distribution abroad." Several of these books on China were
widely reviewed in the United States, often in juxtaposition to the
sympathetic view of the emerging China as presented by Edgar Snow.
At least once, a book review for an Agency book which appeared in
the Neio York Times was written by a CIA writer under contract.
E. Howard Hunt, who had been in charge of contacts with U.S. pub-
lishers in the late 1960s, acknowledged in testimony before this Com-
mittee that CIA books circulated in the U.S., and suggested that such
fallout may not have been unintentional.

^ Thomas H. KaramesSines testimony of a former Deputy Director for plans,
10/22/75, p. 46.

*®' Former Deputy Director for plans testimony, 10/2S/75, p. 36.

199

Question. But, with anything that was publisi ed in Eng-
lish, the United States citizenry would become a likely audi-
ence for publication?

Mr. Hunt. A likely audience, definitely.

Question. Did you take some sort of steps to make sure that
things that were published in English were kept out of or
away from the American reading public ?

Mr. Hunt. It was impossible because Praeger was a com-
mercial U.S. publisher. His books had to be seen, had to be
reviewed, had to be bought here, had to be read.

Hunt, If your targets are foreign, then where are they?
They don't all necessarily read English, and we had a bilateral
agreement with the British that we wouldn't propagandize
their people. So unless the book goes into a lot of lan.quaijes
or it is published in India, for example, where English is a
lingua franca, then you have some basic problems. And I
think the way this was rationalized by the project review
board . . . was'that the ultimate target was foreign, which was
true, but how much of the Praeger output actually got abroad
for any impact I think is highly arguable.^^

An American who reads one of these books which purportedly is
authored by a Chinese defector would not know that his thoughts
and opinions about China are possibly being shaped by an agency
of the United States Government. Given the paucity of information
and the inaccessibility of China in the 1960s, the CIA'may have helped
shape American attitudes toward the emerging China. The CIA con-
siders such "fallout" inevitable.

Another example of the damages of "fallout" involved two propri-
etary news services that the CIA maintained in Europe. Inevitably
these news services had U.S. subscribers. The larger of the two was
subscribed to by over 30 U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the
problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the major U.S.
dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two press services.

A serious problem arises from the possible use of U.S. publications
for press placements. Materials furnished to the Committee describe
a relationship which po«es this problem. It began in August 1967 —
after the Katzenbach Committee recommendations — and continued
until May 1974. In this case, a U.S. -based executive of a major U.S.
newspaper was contacted by the CIA "on a confidential basis in view
of his access to information of intelligence and operational interests."
The news executive sers^ed as a witting, unpaid collaborator for intel-
ligence collection, and received briefings from the CIA which "were of
porfessional benefit" to him. The CIA materials state that :

It was visualized that . . . propaganda (if agreeable to
him) might be initially inserted in his paper and then be
available for reprinting by Latin American news outlets. . . .
There is no indication in the file that Subject agreed ... or
that he did place propaganda in his newspaper.^'^

"• E. Howard Hunt testimony, 1/10/76 pp. 73, 74.
•' CIA Operational case study #14.

200

The danger of CIA propaganda contaminating U.S. media — "fall-
out"— occurs in viilually any instance of propaganda use. The pos-
sibility is quite real even when the CIA does not use any U.S. journal-
ist or publication in carrying out the propaganda project. Where a
CIA propaganda campaign causes stories to appear in many pres-
tigious news outlets around the world, as occurred at the time of the
Chilean elections in 1970, it is truly impossible to insulate the United
States from propaganda fallout.

Indeed, CIA records for the September-October 1970 propaganda
effort in Chile indicate that "replay" of propaganda in the U.S. was
not unexpected. A cable summary for September 25, 1970 reports :

Sao Paulo, Tegucigalpa, Buenos Aires, Lima, Monte\ddeo,
Bogota, Mexico City report continued replay of Chile theme
materials. Items also cai-ried in New York Times^ Washington
Post. Propaganda activities continue to generate good cover-
age of Chile developments along our theme guidance. . . .^^

The fallout problem is probably most serious when the U.S. public
is dependent on the "polluted" media channel for its information
on a particular subject. When news events have occurred in relatively
isolated parts of the world, few major news organizations may have
been able to cover them initially, and world-wide coverage reflects
whatever propaganda predominates in the media of the area.

Another situation in which the effects of "fallout" in the United
States may be significant is that in which specialized audiences in the
United States — area study specialists, for example — may unknowingly
rely heavily on materials produced by, or subsidized by, the CIA. The
danger of this form of dependence is less now than it had been prior
to the freer flow of Western travelers to the Soviet Union, Eastern
Europe and China.

In its inquiry into the activities of a Vietnamese institution the
Committee discovered a particularly unfortunate example of domestic
fall-out of covert propaganda activities. The institution was a CIA-
inspired creation. The intention of the CIA, according to its own
records, was not to undertake propaganda against the United States.
Whatever the design, the propaganda effort had an impnct on the
American public and congressional opinion. The CIA provided $170,-
000 per year in 1974 and 1975 for the sunport of this institution's pub-
lications. The embassy in the United States distributed the magazine
to American readers, including the offices of all United States Con-
gressmen and Senators. The institution on at least one occasion invited
a group of American Congressmen to Vietnam and sponsored their
activities on at least part of their trip. Through this institution the
CIA — however inadventently — engaged in propagandizing the Amer-
ican public, including its Congress, on the controversial issue of U.S.
involvement in Vietnam.

One particular kind of possible "fallout" has aroused official concern.
That is fallout upon the IT.S. Government of the CIA's "black nror.a-
gnada" — propaganda that appears to originate from an unfriendly
source. Because the source of black propaganda is so fully concealed,
the CIA recognizes that it risks seriously misleading tJ.S. policy-

^ Chile Task Force Log (R597) .

201

makers. An Agency regulation specifies that the Directorate of Opera-
tions should notify appropriate elements of the DDI and the In-
telligence Community if the results of a black operation might in-
fluence the thinking of senior U.S. officials or affect U.S. intelligence
estimates. Regular coordination between the CIA and the State De-
partment's INR has been instituted to prevent the self-deception of
"senior U.S. officials" through black propaganda. It should be noted
that this procedure applies only to black propaganda and only to
"senior U.S. officials." No mechanism exists to protect the U.S. public
and the Congress from fallout from black propaganda or any other
propaganda.

The Committee recognizes that other countries make extensive use
of the international media for their propaganda purposes. The United
States public is not insulated from this propaganda either. It is clear,
however, that the strongest defense a free country has from propaganda
of any kind is a free and vigorous press that expresses diverse points of
view. Similarly, the most effective way for this country to respond to
the use of propaganda abroad is to permit American journalists and
news organizations to pureue their work without jeopardizing their
credibility in the eyes of the world through covert use of them.

C. Covert Use of U.S. Religious Groups

The Committee considers religious groups — like academia and the
press — to be among the most important of our society's institutions.
As such, any covert relationship that might either influence them or
jeopardize their reputation is extremely sensitive. Moreover, opera-
tional use of U.S. religious organizations differs from the use of other
elements of U.S. society. It is a special case, in that virtually all re-
ligions are inherently supra-national. Making operational use of U.S.
religious groups for national purposes both violates their nature and
undermines their bonds with kindred groups around the world.

In its examination of CIA relationships with domestic institutions,
the Committee has focused exclusively on the use of U.S. religious or-
ganizations.

1. RestHcticms on the Use of Religious Personnel

The CIA guidelines issued in the wake of the Katzenbach Com-
mittee report required prior approval bv the DDO for operational use
of any employee, staff member, or official of a U.S. educational or pri-
vate organization. This restriction applied to operational use of these
individuals who were affiliated with American religious organizations.
The CIA has provided the Committee with no other regulations that
apply specifically to the use of religious groups. In a letter to this Com-
mittee, however, Mr. Colby stated that the CIA used religious groups
with great caution, and that their use required special approval within
the Agency :

Denutv Director for Operations regulations require the
Denuty Director for Operations' annroval for the u«e of re-
ligious groups. He has the resnonsibilitv of ensuring that
such operational use avoids infringement or damage to the
individual religious personnel involved in their group. Such

9-983 O - 76 - 14

202

use is carefully weighed and approvals in recent years have
been relatively few in number.^^

On February 11, 1976, the CIA announced :

CIA has no secret paid or contractual relationship with any
American clergyman or missionary. This practice will be
continued as a matter of policy.

The CIA has assured the Committee that the prohibition against "all
paid or contractual relationships" is in fact a prohibition against any
operational use of Americans following a religious vocation.

£. Scope of Relationships

The number of American clergy or misionaries used by the CIA has
been small. The CIA has informed the Committee of a total of 14
covert arrangements which involved direct operational use of 21
individuals.

Only four of these relationships were current in August 1975, and
according to the CIA, they were used only for intelligence collection,
or, in one case, for a minor role in preserving the cover of another
asset.

The other ten relationships with U.S. religious personnel had been
terminated before August 1975; four of them ended within the last
five years. In six or seven cases, the CIA paid salaries, bonuses, or ex-
penses to the religious personnel, or helped to fund projects run by
them.

Most of the individuals were used for covert action purposes. Sev-
eral were involved in large covert action projects of the mid-sixties,
which were directed at "competing" with communism in the Third
World.

3. Issites : '''' Fallout^'' Violation of Trust

As several of the relationships — all terminated — involved the reli-
gious personnel in media activity, some of the same concerns must be
voiced as when U. S. journalists are used covertly. The danger of
U.S. "fallout" of CIA propaganda existed in three or four of the
relationships with U.S. religious personnel.

The more serious issue, however, is the question of the confiden-
tiality of the relationships among members of the clergy and their
congregations.

Of the recent relationships, the most damaging would appear to be
that of a U.S. priest serving the CIA as an informant on student and
religious dissidence.

Of the earlier cases, one exemplifies the extent to which the CIA
used confidential pastoral relationships. The CIA used the pastor
of a church in a Third World country as a "principal agent" to carry
out covert action projects, and as a spotter, assessor, asset developer,
and recruiter. He collected information on political developments
and on personalities. He passed CIA propaganda to the local press.
According to the CIA's description of the case, the pastor's analyses
were based on his lon<r-term friendships with the personalities, and
the agents under him were "well known to him in his professional life."
At first the CIA provided only occasional gifts to the pastor in return

=® Letter from William Colby to the Select Committee, 10/21/75.

203

for his services ; later, for over ten years, the CIA paid him a salary
that reached $11,414 annually.

4. The CIA aid U.S. Religious Organizations and Personnel: Conclu-
sions and Recom/mendations

The Committee welcomes the policy, announced by the CIA on
February 11, 1976, that prohibits any operational use of Americans
followino; a religious vocation.

The fact that relatively few American clergy or missionaries have
been used by the CIA suggests that neither this country's capacity to
collect intelligence nor its covert action capability would be seriously
affected by a total ban on their operational use. Therefore, the Com-
mittee recommends that the CIA's recent prohibition on covert paid or
contractual relationships between the Central Intelligence Agency
and any American clergyman or missionary should be established by
law.

XI. PROPRIETARIES

Proprietaries are business entities, wholly owned by the Central
Intelligence Agency, which either actually do business as private
firms, or appear to do business under commercial guise. They are part
of the "arsenal of tools" the CIA believes it must have to be an effec-
tive intelligence component.^ In recent years, particularly during the
Vietnam War, serious questions were raised about this proprietary
capability.

Much of the accompanying criticism stemmed from a lack of un-
derstanding of the role of proprietaries in both United States foreign
policy and the intelligence operations. Some of the criticism arose from
the suspected entrance of proprietaries into areas where they would be
in competition with legitimate business interests, such as the airline
industry. It has been feared that their profits were used to provide
secret funding for covert operations, thus avoiding scrutiny by the Ex-
ecutive and the Con.qrress through a "back door" funding process.

In addition, there have been allegations that the domestic impact of
these entities has effectively violated the Agency's charter, which gen-
erally proscribes domestic activity of a police or internal security
nature. Concerns have been expressed that favored treatment has been
given these proprietaries by other Government agencies, such as the
Internal Revenue Service and the Civil Aeronautics Board. The fact
that the size and number of these mechanisms is unknown has caused
concern about potentially pervasive influence on the free enterprise
system. Questions have arisen about whether Agency policy included
using these entities to engage in illegal activities to make profits which
could be used to fund clandestine operations. Most notably, the latter
charges have involved allegations that the Agency's air proprietaries
were involved in drug trafficking.^

Concern has been expressed about the Agency's financial and man-
agement control over proprietaries and about the treatment of funds
related to such entities,^ It is understandable that there would be mis-
givings and suspicion, since much that would have explained the role
of these proprietaries has remamed classified. The Committee has,
nonetheless, been able to conduct broad review of these operations.
This review has included examination of documents at the CIA, and
testimony from present and former Agency employees.

In general, these mechanisms have operated with a proper concern
for legality, propriety and ethical standards at the headquarters level.
The deviations that have occurred were in the field and generally in

'Testimony of Chief of Cover and Commercial Staff (CCS), 1/27/76, p. 20.

* The Committee found no substance to these charges.

' A careful review has revealed that the CIA's proprietaries are appropriately
limited and controlled with careful considered given to restrict their use within
the spirit and letter of the law by headquarters-level personnel.

(205)

206

the area of operators, rather than management personnel. More-
over, the use and past expansion of the proprietaries was a direct
result of demands placed upon the Agency by Presidents, Secretaries
of State and the policy mechanisms of government. This is particu-
larly true of the large air proprietary complex used to support para-
military operations in Southeast Asia. The only exception to this
pattern is the insurance complex, which was partially established on
Agency initiatives to fill a pressing need.

A conceptual problem which continually confronts the intelligence
community, applies with full force in the proprietary area. As certain
kinds of covert action were developed to deal with the perceived com-
munist threat, the use of certain mechanisms had to be limited. In a
totalitarian society for example, governmental and "private" enter-
prises are essentially one. The government can and does use these en-
tities for intelligence and other official purposes. In our society, how-
ever, that which is governmental is generally distinct from that which
is private. Traditionally, problems have developed when the govern-
ment has crossed into the private sector. Proprietaries are no exception
to this dilemma. They are, in fact, the embodiment of it.

Thus, the fundamental question presented in this portion of the Com-
mittee's inquiry is : can a free and open society tolerate such a conflu-
ence of conflicting roles? The Committee concludes that it can, pro-
vided that the Congress plays a role in the supervision of these mech-
anisms to ensure that the delicate balance struck in our society between
governmental and private actions is maintained. Wliile there may have
been a temptation to view proprietaries as "abusive" /;er se^ this atti-
tude was eschewed by the Committee. Although there are potential
problems with proprietaries, the Committee feels that aggressive over-
sight can protect the rights of American citizens and institutions with-
out the need for a ban on the use of proprietaries which serve a
legitimate intelligence function.

A. Overview

Acting under broad authority granted them by the National Secu-
rity Act of 1947 and Central Intelligence Act of 1949, the various
Directors of Central Intelligence have established proprietaries (Gov-
ernment-owned business enterprises, foundations and quasi-business
enterprises) to serve a variety of intelligence and covert action pur-
poses. Chief among those purposes have been :

1. Provision of Cover for Intelligence CoUectimi and Action Projects
Commercial firms established in foreign countries provide plausible

reasons for the presence of CIA case officers. Agency-funded founda-
tions serve as conduits of funds for a variety of purposes, including
clandestine activities and contributions to scholars conducting research
which supports United States foreign policy positions.

2. Extension of Agency Influence and Information Network in Over-

seas Business Community
The very act of establishing a proiirietary firm requires banking,
insurance, and other services. Acquiring these services entails support,
communications, and intimate business relationships with bona fide

207 /

commercial entities here and abroad. At a minimum, these relation-
ships require the clearance of those in top management positions for
access to CIA business. On occasion this relationship includes the
Agency using commercial contacts for information or assistance.

3. ProTision of Sufportinq Services for Co^^ert Operations

In paramilitary operations, airlift and sealift bv Agency-owned
carriers has many advantages : flexibility, security, ability to implant
technical collection devices, etc. CIA agents, wlio engage in haz-
ardous activities which would ordinarily make them uninsurable, can
obtain commercial insurance at standard or subsidized rates via a con-
glomerate of CIA-ownod insurance companies. In foreign locations
where actual contact with the nearest CIA station is not operationally
discreet, proprietaries provide payroll channels and other administra-
tive services for Agencv personnel. Firms based in locations with per-
missive corporate laws and regulations can also engage in many
activities unrelated to their charters. For example, insurance firms can
acquire real estate for operational purposes on a non-attributed basis.

li. Operation of Propaganda Mechanisms

In establishing the clandestine radios (Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty) in the 1950s, the CIA acquired a means of directly
influencing populations behind the Iron Curtain. These proprietaries
were eventually disposed of and placed under the aegis of the Depart-
ment of State.

5. Management of Private Investments

The Agency would denv that private investment is a purpose of
proprietaries. Agency officials state that standing policy prohibits the
investment of CIA operational funds in the private sector without ex-
plicit authorization by the DCI. Actually, the existence of proprietary
enterprises which occasionallv returned sizable profits, indicates that
private investment may indeed have been a widespread Agency policy.
Moreover, the Agencv has specifically authorized its insurance com-
plex to act as an institutional investor for its own funds and those of
other proprietaries. Thus, the extent of private investment by the
Agency is actually a question of definition and shading.

B. Structure

Proprietaries fall into two broad categories :

(1) Operating companies which actually do business as
private firms ; and

(2) Non-operating companies which appear to do business
under commercial guise.

These entities mav be le.crally constituted as corporations, partner-
ships, or sole proprietorships ; or they may have no such legal standing,
i.e., they may be "notional" entities financed by the Agency. Corporate
proprietaries are incorporated in accordance with the statutory pro-
visions of the jurisdiction of incorporation, are subject to the same
review as any corporate entity within that jurisdiction, file applicable
state and Federal tax returns, and obtain the necessary licenses to
conduct business.

208

Both operating and non-operating companies serve two purposes:

(1) they provide cover, attribution for funding, and administrative
assistance to agents and clandestine activities; and (2) they provide
services not available through normal commercial facilities. Because
these instrumentalities are established as private organizations, they
must be organized and managed in accordance with normal business
practices and requirements for the types of enterprises they appear
to be.

The Agency has generally employed proprietaries when they have
been the only way, or clearly the best way, to achieve an approved ob-
jective. Under Agency rules proprietaries are established or allowed
to continue only so long as they contribute to accomplishment of the
CIA's mission, and remain the most effective means to achieve
Agency objectives. While current policy does limit the use of oper-
ating proprietary mechanisms, the Agency does retain its capability
to use these mechanisms, although it limits the size of the actual en-
tities being maintained.

A review of Agency files shows that the number of operating pro-
prietaries has been consciousl}^ pared by about 50 percent since the
mid-1960s. These reductions were the result of both the Katzenbach
guidelines associated with the National Student Association disclosures
in 1967, and a survey conducted by the CIA Inspector General in that
same year. In addition, the need for proprietaries has declined as a
result of: (1) a general shift in emphasis away from covert action;

(2) the transfer of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty to the Board
of International Broadcasting with funding through State Depart-
ment; (8) the liquidation of the. assets of the Air America complex
as requirements for CIA support in Southeast Asia diminished ; (4)
the sale of Southern Air Transport and the liquidation of assets of
Intermountain Aviation with their exposure in the press; and (5) a
change in the Agency's approach to contingency requirements.

The evidence received by the committee indicates that the activities
of all agency proprietaries support the CIA's foreign intelligence
collection or covert action missions. Some proprietaries are located
within the I"^nited States for reasons of oi^erational or administrative
necessitv. thus there is a domestic infrastructure, but their ultimate
impact is overseas. Some of the questionable domestic uses of these en-
tities are detailed in the sections of this Report on "MERRIMAC"
and related i^rograms.* In one area, the insurance complex, serious
questions remain as to the propriety of using such a mechanism to
provide insurance and retirement benefits for agency employees.

1. Operating Proprietaries

Operating proprietaries conduct business in t^-<e commercial sphere.
"WHiile they may compete directly with privately-owned corporations
such competition is limited by tlie agency so that private companies
will not be deprived of substantial income. The Agency has been
careful to limit the amount of commercial business ensraeed in by
these proprietaries to that necessarv to support the viability of the
commercial cover. Revenues have been used to partially offset operat-
ing costs, and aggi-egate profits over the yeare have been relatively

* See the Select Committee's detailed feport on CHAOS.

209

small. Only two proprietaries have shown significant profits : the Air
America complex, primarily by fulfilling Government contracts in
Southeast Asia ; and the insurance company, by handling trust funds
and insurance.

Depending upon the functions they perform, operating proprietaries
vary in terms of capitalization and total assets. When the commercial
pur-pose of an operating proprietary is incidental to its CIA mission
(such as an export-import firm which engages in commercial opera-
tions only to the extent necessary to provide cover for a CIA officer
in a foreign country) a minimum capitalization, usually in the neigh-
borhood of $25,000 or less, is all that is required.

Operating proprietaries whose commercial purposes are in them-
selves essential to the CIA mission require much larger capitalization
and investment. They are staffed by Agency personnel and cleared
commercial employees. Among the Agency's operating proprietaries
of this type are a few management companies and non-operating
proprietaries with substantial assets. The Agency's largest operating
proprietaries have been Air America, the insurance complex, and
Intermountain Aviation, Inc.

Air America, the Agency's largest proprietary, provided air sup-
port for CIA operations in Southeast Asia. This support was under
cover of a commercial flying service fulfilling I"''nited States Govern-
ment contracts. Corporate headquarters were in Washington, D.C.,
with field headquarters in Taipei, Taiwan.

■ The insurance complex provides a mechanism for both the payment
of annuities and other benefits to sensitive agents, and self -insurance
of risks involved in covert operations. The complex was formed in
1962 as a clandestine commercial support mechanism to provide death
and disability benefits to agents or their beneficiaries when security
considerations precluded payments which might be attributable to
the United States Government. This function wns broadened to in-
clude assumption of many risks incurred by operational activities. The
complex has administered agents' escrow accounts and life insurance,
and provided annuity and pension programs for selected agent per-
sonnel employed by the Agency. These programs are solely for the
purpose of meeting the Agency's obligations to personnel who have
rendered services over a substantial period of time, and who are not
eligible for normal United States Government retirement programs.

Individuals who qualify for the CIA Retirement Svstem or the Civil
Service System are not handled through the proprietary system. The
complex has also been used to pro\ade a limited amount of support
to covert operations — specifically, for the acquisition of operational
real estate and as a conduit for the funding of selected covert
activities.

Intermountain Aviation, Inc. provided a variety of nonattributable
air support capabilities which were available for quick deployment
overseas in support of Agency activities. The assets of Intermountain
have been sold, with operations ceasing February 28, 1975, and the
corporation is in the process of being dissolved.

The combined net worth (assets minus liabilities) of the operating
proprietary companies is approximately $57.3 million. Although some

210

are commercially self-supporting, such as those in the insurance com-
plex, most of these companies usually require budgetary support.

Three of these operating proprietaries will be described in the
following pages to indicate: why they came into existence; what they
did; the management, operations and control environment in which
they operated; and what impact they may have had on the private
sector. In addition, this discussion will supply the necessary factual
rerercprf^ for the Committee's recommendations. ThCvSe recommenda-
tions reflect the considered judgments of the Committee, which were
fonnulated after hearing the views of current and former CIA em-
ployees, and those of other knowledgeable individuals.

The tiecurity froject

In 1958, at the time construction of the new CIA headquarters
building in Langley was initiated, a small counterintelligence opera-
tion was established to maintain surveillance of the site to prevent
hostile penetration and sabotage. It was successful in its objectives
and, upon occupancy of the building in 1962, the Security Project
was established.

From a single office in Virginia the project expanded to four field
offices and grew from a single firm into three separate corporations.
The parent organization operated in the greater Washington area.
This operating proprietary was a commercial corporation which per-
formed security services on a competitive basis. The firm also con-
ducted operations for the CIA's Office of Security, This operation was
successful, with customers utilizing the proprietary for document
destruction, consultation, guard work, and security clearance investi-
gations.

This company developed business contracts with agencies of the
Federal Government and commercial firms. Because the provisions
of the "Anti-Pinkerton Act" ^ prohibit a company engaged in investi-
gative work from contracting with the Federal Government, the
Agency formed a separate company to manage commercial firms as
funding mechanisms for investigative work levied by the Office of
Security. The new company was headquartered in California. As
activity expanded and work increased, a third corporation was orga-
nized and headnnartered in California.

In early 1966, the original company merged with the third
firm, which remained incorporated in the state of California. The
con^orate officers and the board of directors of all three companies
consisted of the same persons. Subsequently, the merged corporation
was sold and new legal straw men were introduced as officers, directors
and shareholders. In March 1966, a new home office was established
in Virginia to enhance administrative efficiency, monetary controls,
and cover viability. This "home office," with its investigative charter,
has been used to conduct covert investigations.

In addition to conducting investigations, the project was used in
the following activities :

(1) Covert monitoring of construction of CIA headquarters
building;

(2) Monitoring of construction of buildings which were to be
occupied by Agency components ;

'5U.S.C. 3108. \

211

(3) Covert monitoring of construction of CIA printing services
building;

(4) Surveillance of Department of Defense civilian employees
suspected of being potential defectors to the Soviet Union ;

(5) Testing security effectiveness at domestic Directorate of Science
and Technology sites and contractor facilities;

(6) MERRIMAC — monitoring of dissident groups in Washington,
D.C.;«

(7) Hiring and paying contract guards ;

(8) Contracting with a civilian firm for the guard force at an
installation ;

(9) An operation to recruit, process and train undercover internal
security agents for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs ;

(10) Security support for Directorate of Science and Technology
proie-'ts consisting mainly of badging and entry controls, background
investigations, and escort of sensitive material — this is the only such
activity currently being serviced by the project;

(11) Physical surveillance of an Agency courier suspected of living
beyond his means including a surreptitious entry into his apartment ;

(12) Physical surveillance of an Agency employee "who maintained
contact with people of questionable loyalty" including an audio
penetration of the employee's apartment and a mail cover.

Only one office is currently in operation as part of the project. Over
the past years, its commercial projects have included badging opera-
tions for private companies, i.e., airlines, schools, etc. The company
has never made a true profit. To maintain its image among its competi-
tors, however, its books reflect a small profit on which Federal and
state taxes are paid. The office presently employs four staff agents,
five contract agents and fourteen proprietary employees. During fiscal
year 1974, the project expended 2.9 percent of the Office of Security
budget.

As noted, this security project has provided the Office of Security
and Agency operators support on sensitive covert operations and
investigative matters, counterintelligence and counterespionage sup-
port for Agency components, custodial support, technical and physical
support in surveillances, and Agency proprietary support. The project
has also conducted soecial nongovernmental and sensitive inquiries.
Its commercial activities have included : internal security management,
security surveys, counteraudio measures and inspection, management
of security protective equipment and devices, classified material stor-
age, secure destruction of classified waste, incinerator equipment sales,
personnel investifrations, and industrial undercover activities.

A unique example of its Agency security function was a project
which utilized both security "probes" and security "penetrations," A
security probe is a test of the current effectiveness of a security svstem
within an Agency installation. A security penetration is an internal
investigation and search which attempts to locate subversive elements
at a facility. Such a penetration seeks to detect those who may be en-

"This particular proiert and other aspects of the project's domestic activities
are treated in greater detail in the Committee's Staff Report on CHAOS.

212

gaged in foreign intelligence or sabotage, and those who, by lack of
security discipline or gross malfeasance, may be weakening the secu-
rity structure of the facility. In essence, penetrations are counterintel-
ligence against a domestic installation.

In one instance, an agent was sent under the natural cover of a
union construction man to an Agency contractor to gain employment
as a pipefitter.^ He succeeded in gaining access to the target, and de-
veloped information on the installation and its personnel. Similar
probes were also conducted against other companies contracting with
the Federal Government. The proprietaries which are part of the se-
curity project have helped maintain the security required by sensitive
Agency operations. Their utility, however, as in the case of nearly all
proprietaries is relative to policy demands and "flap" potential. As one
Agency commentator phrased it when Newsweek revealed the relation-
ship of two Boston lawyers with the CIA in setting up proprietaries :

Proprietaries have been and will continue to be an important
tool to achieve selected operational objectives. Their use, how-
ever, has been drastically cut back, more because of changes
in the international scene and in operational priorities, than
as a result of embarrassing exposures.^

As has been the case with nearly all other proprietaries, not
everyone within the Agency has been satisfied with the existing mech-
anisms of the security project. There has been constant review, criti-
cism, and internal restraint due to a fear and suspicion that entities
which are "out there" may not readily respond to the leash. For exam-
ple, in June of 1964, the Chief of the Operational Support Division
wrote to the Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Oper-
ational Support) concerning project policy and procedures. In terms
of operational objectives, he noted that they had "created an opera-
tional support entity of dubious capability and with ill-defined ob-
jectives or purpose." He suggested that they "look this ugly duckling
in the face" and see if it could be terminated gracefully or "see if we
can nurture it into a productive and responsible bird of acceptable
countenance." ^°

The Chief of the Operations Division wrote that he "received the
definite impression that there may be some grev area with regard to the
internal channels of command and administrative direction." He
noted that there was confusion resulting from lack of a clear-cut dis-
tinction "at just what level policy matters may be decided . . . ," Man-
agement procedures for the project were such that "under the current

* He was, in fact, a legitimate tradesman.

' Newsweek, 5/19/75, pp. 25-28.

" Memorandum from Chief, Operational Support Division to Deputy Director of
Security, 6/64.

In many cases these concerns dealt with the inability of the entity to provide
adequate cover for itself in order to more adequately fulfill its role. In one in-
stance, the physical backstopping of this project was inadequate. After this was
rectified, one official noted :

"It is felt that this step has strengthened the [Corporation's] cover, [in two
East coast cities] so that now the company would withstand any inquiries, ex-
cept that of an official Government investigation."

213

status everyone may take credit but no one could be blamed." With
regard to operational capability he noted :

Quite candidly, I am somewhat concerned about the opera-
tional capability of [the] Project. It seems, as a result of its
Topsy-like growth, to be oriented toward the military and
the building trades. Quite candidly, it is felt that the base
must be broadened. Further, I am far from convinced that we
have yet developed anywhere near the professional status
necessary to "sell" this Project as one having unique opera-
tional capabilities sufficient to justify its existence. In other
words, I am not impressed with the capability as it now exists
nor am I sure that we can sell this product and then be assured
that it can perform in a satisfactory manner."

His comments concerning the attitude of Agency personnel were not
unique to this proprietary. They are included here to illustrate the spe-
cial problems posed by these entities. His remarks also show the dan-
gers inherent in some areas of this activity.

It would seem that this Agency, particularly operating com-
ponents, are insistent upon pursuing an "ostrich policy" when
it comes to their operational security procedures. I have per-
sonally witnessed almost hysterical reactions to criticisms as
well as total rejections of practical sugpestions with regard to
operational security procedures. Now it seems to me that we
are going about this in a verv awkward and embarrassing
manner. WE ARE, IN EFFECT, ALLOWING THE
WRITERS OF SENSATIONAL BOOKS SUCH AS
THE "INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT" TO PROVIDE
THE NECESSARY INFORMATION AND PRES-
SURE ON TOP AGENCY INIANAGEMENT TO COR-
RECT GLARING AND STUPID COURSES OF
ACTION BEING PURSUED AT THE WORKING
LEVEL. I have been the object of considerable personal ridi-
cule due to my stand in opposition to the unrealistic cover and
operational security procedures as they relate to certain
aspects of [CIA Operational Base] for example. IF we had
the authority and capahility to have made an objective probe
of this sensitive activity we may have been able to have sur-
faced these obviously ridiculous procedures in such a manner
that corrective action would have been taken. Now is the time
to present the case in light of the abiding fear of publicity cur-
rently permeating the Agency. I recommend that we go after
the authority to make independent (unilateral) probes and/or
probes requested and known only at the very highest levels of
the Agency with the results discreetly channeled where they
will do the most good. There necessariW follows the unpleas-
ant subject of money. As distasteful as it may be, it is no good
to have the authority without a sufficiently large confidential

214

fund set aside and earmarked for independently initiated

activities.^- [Emphasis in the original]
He emphasized that if the Agency did not take the above kind of
action to monitor its "image" at the operational level, it would "con-
tinue to be plagued with the unsolicited and uncontrolled critique
through the newspapers, periodicals and books." He critically con-
cluded :

Further, I challenge anyone to deny that such exposes to date
are largely true and usually the result of our own "ostrich
policy" and refusal to face the fact that we have operated in
some relatively amateurish manners over the years.^^

Such concerns have extended beyond these operational levels to
general issues of propriety and legality. As noted earlier, the so-
called "Anti-Pinkerton Act" prohibited the Office's continued con-
tractual relationship with private companies or their employees for
purposes of conducting investigations or providing cover. The Gen-
eral Counsel responded as follows :

I am aware that in fulfilling the responsibilities placed
upon your office in support of the Agency's mission, many
investigations must be conducted without revealing Govern-
ment interest. Absent the relationships you question, you
could not discharge your responsibilities. It is this inability
to accomplish your tasks which causes recourse to the Agen-
cy's rather broad statutory authority to expend funds as
contained in Section 8 of the CIA Act of 1949, as amended.
This authority provides

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, sums
made available to the Agency by appropriation or other-
wise may be expended for purposes necessary to carry out its
functions, including —

(1) personal services, including personal services without
regard to limitations on types of persons to be employed, . . .

(b) The sums made available to the Agency may be ex-
pended without regard to the provisions of law and regu-
lations relating to the expenditure of Government funds;
and for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emer-
gency nature, such expenditures to be accounted for solely on
the certificate of the Director and every such certificate shall
be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified.

It is my opinion that this authority permits the Agency to
continue the two practices as set out above without fear of
violation of the Anti-Pinkerton Statute."^

He closed, however, with the following admonitions :

There are, of course, other dimensions of the question you
raise. As a matter of policy I believe the practices should be
reviewed at the highest levels within the Agency and, per-

" Ibid.

"•Memorandum from General Counsel to Director of Security, 6/64.

215

haps, cleared with the Afrencv's oversiofht committees. In
addition, if one of these rehitionships became public, it must
be recoirnized that there will be allegations that the law has
been violated. On balance, it is my view that these considera-
tions are not so significant as to warrant a termination of the
two practices with the three companies. It is siigorested, how-
ever, that any subsequent projected association with a detec-
tive company or private investigative company beyond the
three present companies be reviewed with this Office prior to
its initiation.^*

The Insurance CoTnplex

This proprietary is a complex of insurance companies, most of
which are located abroad, operated by the Agency to provide the fol-
lowing services :

(i) Handling of risks ostensibly covered under commerci-
ally issued policies;

(ii) extending term life insurance, annuities, trusts and
workmen's compensation to Agency employees who are not
entitled to United States Government benefits;

(iii) handling escrow accounts for agents ; and,

(iv) limited operational support and investment activi-
ties.^^

Origin. — Prompted by the Bay of Pigs losses, the complex was
created in 1962 to provide death and disability benefits to agents and
beneficiaries when security considerations preclude attribution to the
United States Government. Lawrence Houston, retired General Coun-
sel of the Agency, testified that his office established the insurance-
investment complex, because his staff Avas responsible for all problems
related to the death or disability of employees during the course of
their Agency work. These problems were all handled in what Houston
called a very "sketchy way" which he felt was undesirable from all
points of view. Wlien the Agency went into air proprietaries on a large
scale, additional risks arose which simply could not be underwritten
commercially.

So somewhere in the late 1950s or around 1960, 1 think I was
the one that posed that we might organize our own insurance
entities.^®

A single event served as the catalyst for the establishment of the
complex. Houston recalled in latter testimony that

the event that brought it into focus was the death of four
airmen in the Bay of Pigs. These men were not supposed
to have engaged in the fighting and were training on the
mainland, but when the Cubans were either exhausted or
unable to fly anymore, they pitched in, went over the beach,
and were shot down.

"/bid.

^^ Escrow accounts are established when an agent cannot receive his full pay-
ment from the CIA without attracting suspicion. The funds not paid to the agent
go into escrow accounts and are invested under the complex.

" Lawrence Houston testimony, 1/15/76, p. 61.

216

We heard of this for the first time the next morning and
Allen Dulles called me over and said, you'll have to make
some provision for the families of those four fliers ....

Through [an ad hoc] mechanism we paid benefits to the
family for a considerable length of time until we were able
to turn it over to the Bureau of Employees Compensation.

This was a very makeshift arrangement, and so based on
that I came to the conclusion that we needed a much more
formal and flexible instrument. And so after long considera-
tion within the Agency we acquired the first two insurance
entities which had been in being before and then we flushed
them out a little bit.^^

Thus, the formation of this entity represented the "culmination of
experience" in tliis support area, according to Houston. Although
the complex originally operated under the Domestic Operations Divi-
sion, a special board of directors later assumed control of the pro-
prietaries and their investments. In July 1973 control of the complex
was transferred to the Commercial and Cover Staff.

The Current Status. — All of the clients of the project are Agency
employees.^^^ The complex was originally capitalized in 1962 with $4
million. Most of the assets are held outside the United States and the
companies do not write insurance in the United States. Each of the
United States companies pays little tax and is audited by a proprietary
firm. This method of self-insurance enables the Agency to funnel money
where needed in any of its project categories. Currently, 60 percent of
the investments are in long-term interest bearing securities abroad, 20
percent in off-shore time deposits in United States banks, and the bal-
ance is in common stocks, debentures and commercial paper of various
types. In the past twelve years the sale of stocks has resulted in profits
in excess of $500,000 accruing to the CIA. The combined total assets
of the complex are in excess of $30 million, including its retained net
earnings of approximately $9 million.

In 1970 the Inspector General examined the insurance complex. His
report raised questions about briefing congressional oversight sub-
committees which indicate that Congress had never been informed of
the existence or extent of the insurance complex w^hich had grown to
an organization with assets of $30 million without oversight, knowl-
edge, or approval. While annual audits of the complex were conducted,
there was no annual allotment and no annual operational review
within the CIA, because the insurance activity was no longer a true
project after its removal from the Domestic Operations Division.

" Houston. 1/27/76, p. 8.

"" The complex itself is only for covert non-staff oflScers of the CIA. In essence,
it only works for what would broadly be described as "agents", those not en-
titled to participate in the CIA retirement plan or in the Civil Service Retire-
ment Plan. They are primarily foreigners, and usually work for DDO. In the
case of most agents, the CIA contributes 7 percent and the agent contributes 7
percent, in keeping with CIA practice for regular employees. In cases where
the agent is well along in years and contributions from the Agency and the
agent would not provide enough funds to capitalize an annuity, the Agency pro-
vides the initial capitalization ; however, such an arrangement must be approved
by the DDO.

217

Houston indicated that the complex had been operating "for some
time" before

we told our committees any detail. I think it was men-
tioned as a problem that we had to make arrangements to
cope with insurance problems fairly early on. But the fact
that it was a business and a business of this substance was
not done for some time. My recollection is there was not delib-
erate avoidance; we just didn't get to it.^^

With regard to buying and selling securities, the Committee sought
to discover whether the CIA has any method of preventing personal
profit-taking by Intelligence Directorate analysts who have access of
clandestinely collected economic intelligence. The CIA has indicated
that such an analyst would be in the same conflict of interest posi-
tion as a staff member of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Department of Agriculture, or any other Government agency for mis-
use of confidential material. Moreover, financial reporting requirements
are imposed upon CIA employees.

Similarly, the Committee attempted to determine whether financial
transactions were made by the complex to influence foreign stock mar-
kets or currencies. The 1970 review by the Inspector General found no
evidence of such influence. Neither did the Committee. All witnesses
and documentary evidence indicated that the complex was never so
used. Indeed, all agreed that the amounts involved in the fund were in-
sufficient to destabilize any currency or market, even if such an effort
had been made.

The complex was subject to an audit in 1974 which concluded that
it "continued to be administered in an efficient and effective manner,
and in compliance with applicable Agency regulations and direc-
tives." Prior audit reports had commented on the need for a revised
administrative plan. In accordance with earlier reports, the 1974 audit
noted, a "new plan was approved in March 1975." In addition,
"minor administrative and financial problems surfaced during
the audit were discussed with [project] officials and resolved." The
audit noted that total income for that year (from interest, premiums,
gain or loss on sale of securities, dividends, rentals, professional fees,
gain on foreign exchange, gain on sale of property and from miscel-
laneous transactions) was in excess of $4 million. The total ex'penses
for that year (allocation of premium income to reserve for claims,
interest, salaries, rent, accounting fees, taxes, loss on property write-
off, legal aiid other fees, communications, depreciation and amortiza-
tion, travel, equipment rent, real estate expenses, pensions, due and
subscriptions, directors fees, entertainment and miscellaneous) were
nearly $2.5 million. These combined for a net income in excess of
$1.5 million.19

The current Chief of the Cover and Commercial Staff has focused
on the insurance-investment project in a number of interviews with
both the Rockefeller Commission and the Committee. He has sug-
gested that the real question for the complex is what its role and shape
should be after the termination of many of the Agency's proprie-

"' Houston. 1/15/76. p. 81.

" 1974 Audit of Insurance Complex.

69-983 O - 76 - 15

218

taries. With their liquidation, he believes a reorganization and re-
definition of the insurance-investment complex is needed.

As to the issue of a safeguard against misuse of project funds or
"insider" information by the Agency, the Chief of CCS has told the
Committee that the guarantees against such abuse are (1) com-
partmentation ; (2) the integrity of the Chief of CCS; and (3) dis-
play of portfolios to appropriate congressional committees.^"

Houston agreed with the three safeguards outlined by the CCS
Chief. However, he added a fourth :

When we were investing in stock, I would have the list of
stock, the portfolio, reviewed by our contract people, and if I
found we had any contract relationship with any of the com-
panies involved, we'd either refuse to — ^AVell, a couple of times
our investment advisor recommended a stock which I knew
w^e had big contracts with, and I told the board no, this in-
volves a conflict of interest. We won't touch it. And if we had
anj'thing from the Agency contract office that indicated a
relationship, we would either sell the stock or wouldn't buy
it.^^

Houston believes that the complex should continue in some form
and that the current method, while not perfect, is the best that can
be devised. The problem is that the generation of funds for these
companies must be demonstrably legitimate and nongovernmental if
beneficiaries are to be protected; i.e., the absence of investment by an
insurance corporation could well indicate to outsiders that its funding
is actually coming from the Federal Government.

Beyond '"'"Doing Business''': Peak Non-Government Security
Investments hy Proprietaries Active as of Dec. 31, 197Jf. — The insur-
ance and pension complex has sizable investments in both domestic
and foreign securities markets. Its portfolio runs the gamut of notes,
bonds, debentures, etc. But other proprietaries have also used this
investment route as a method of increasing capital and insuring ade-
quate cover.

For example, a domestic corporation purchases general merchandise
in a manner which cannot be traced to the ITnited States Government.
It provides covert procurement for the CIA Office of Logistics.

"\^niile this corporation has no outside commercial business and only
five employees, as of December 31, 1974, it had invested over $100,000
in time deposits. A second domestic corporation ]Durchases anus, am-
munition, and police-related equipment for the Office of Ivogistics. This
company has no employees and is managed by Headquarters officials
under alias. As of December 31, 1974, this corporation had iuA-ested
more than $30,000 in a certificate of deposit.

A travel service proprietary was recently sold to an Agency em-
ployee at the time of his retirement. This employee had ostensibly
owned the firm, but had in fact managed it for the Agency. As of

'" Chief. CCS. 1/27/76, pp. 15-16.

^ Houston. 1/1.V76. p. 80.

The current charter for the insurance complex and the administrative plan
forhid further acquisition of U.S. stocks and require the divesture of American
equity investments in the immediate future.

219

December 31, 1974, this corporation had invested more than $30,000
in a certificate of deposit." An investment proprietary, which was later
dissolved, had invested about $100,000 in Mexico as of March 31, 1973.
A Delaware corporation, which has provided secure air support for
Agency employees and classified pouclies between Headquarters and
other Agency facilities in the United States, has nearly $150,000 in-
vested in a certificate of deposit.

A former youth activity proprietary, in which the Agency no
longer retains an interest, had approximately $50,000 invested in time
deposits as of March 31, 1972. Another proprietary is part of a com-
plex managed by the Cover and Commercial Staff which provides
operational support for foreign operations. It is a Delaware cor-
poration used to collect proceeds from the sale of Agency pro]:)rietary
entities and to refund such proceeds to tl^e Agency. Its total assets
were nearly three-quarters of a million dollars and its total stock-
holders equity was in excess of $15,000 as of December 31, 1973. It
has no emnloyees. As of December 31, 1974, it had invested almost
half a million dollars in a convertible subordinated debenture from
the sale of a company and almost $50,000 in notes receivable.

Another company in this complex is a foreign company which has
been used as an investment vehicle for funds earmarked for new com-
mercial operations requiring Agency investment^. This investment
project has been terminated and all funds were returned to the Agency.
The company has no employees. As of December 31, 1973, it had in-
vested nearly a quarter of a million dollars in a Security Note of a
private domestic corporation.

A proprietary which was part of the air support complex had in-
vested over $200,000 in a certificate of deposit as of December 31, 1974.
This entity was later sold. Another is part of the management and
accounting complex. As of December 31, 1974, it had nearly half a
million dollai-s invested in time deposits.

The Air Proprietaries

History. — Lawrence R. Houston, fomrer CIA General Counsel,
was involved in the establishment of the first set of Agency proprie-
taries, and has concluded that they should be a mechanism of last
resort. Houston maintains that the Agency learned this "the hard
way and almost all of the lessons involved probably came out one way
or the other in connection with a major aviation proprietary in the
Far East. Others had their own special problems, but I think the Air
America complex had pretty near everything." ^*

The Agency acquired Air America in 1949 ostensibly to deny the
assets of this company to the Communist Chirece. The CIA first ar-
ranged cash advances to the company in 1949. These advances were
eventually credited to the Agency's ]:)urchase of the corporation. At
that time, Houston described the airline as follows :

This normal aviation organization, this would have no mean-
ing at all, was completely at all, it would have no standing

^' The Agency today uses this firm for the purchase of airline tickets for travel
in support of sensitive projects. It is estimated hy the Agency that CTA business
represents about 30 percent of the gross airline ticket sales of the entity on an
annual basis.

** Houston, 1/15/76, p. 5.

220

in international law, aviation rights, or any of that. But it
worked for what they wanted, which was to take supplies up-
coimtiy into inland China and then to bring back whatever
cargo they could get commercially : tallow, hides, bristles, all
that sort of trade, and then they traded that off for their own
account. And for awhile the operation was fairly successful,
the C-47's and C^G's.^^

To finance this activity the lawyer for the airline organized a com-
pany. Civil Air Transport, which was funded by a Panamanian cor-
poration. The two owners of Air America approached the Agency in
connection with a foreign operation in the spring of 1959, and in-
dicated that unless they received financial assistance, the airline would
go out of business.

A series of meetings were held subsequently in which it was deter-
mined that the Agency needed to contract for air transport in some of
its operations, particularly those involving arms and ammunition.

And so we entered into an arrangement, I think in about Sep-
tember of 1949 whereby we would advance them, the figure of
$750,000 sticks in my mind, against which we could draw for
actual use of the planes at an agreed on rate. . . . And we did
draw down, I think, all the flying time and expended the
$750,000 between September and about January, at which
time we suspended any further payments or draw-downs.
I think the money was exhausted.^^

The owners came to Washington in early 1950 for a series of discus-
sions with the CIA. As a result of these negotiations, the Agency agreed
to advance more funds, and received an option to purchase the assets
of Civil Air Transport. Any imused portion of the advances was to
be credited toward the purchase price. Air America operated under
this arrangement until the owners "came in in the summer of 1950
and said again they were in desperate straits for funds." ^^ An-
other series of meetings was held at the Agency in which it was con-
cluded that the operations in the Far East would have a continuing
need for secure airlift. There was also a general estimate that the loss
of this airlift to the Chinese Communists would substantially assist
them. Thus "the Agency then made the decision that they would ex-
ercise the option given there was no objection otherwise." ^*

The Agency felt that it was necessary to obtain approval from the
Department of State, so the head of the CIA's Office of Policy Coordi-
nation (who was responsible for conduct of covert actions) and Mr.
Houston visited the Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East :

He and I went to see [the Assistant Secretary] and explained
the situation. And [he] reminded us that it was basic U.S.
policy not to get the government in competition with U.S.
private industry. But under the particular circumstances, in
particular as there was really no U.S. private industry in-

=== Ibid., p. 6.
* Ibid., pp. 7-8.
"Ibid., p. 8.
'^ Ibid., p. 9.

221

volv'ed in the area, and they agreed it was important to deny
the assets to the Red Chinese. State would go along on the
iniderstanding that we would divest ourselves of the private
enterprise as soon as such a divestment was feasible, and
all of the circumstances that might obtain.^^

The divestiture of these air proprietaries was not initiated until
1975, and some of the entities have not yet been fully divested. Mr.
Houston noted, however, that :

We did not disregard that guidance because after very con-
siderable use of this asset during the early '50's, there was a
question of whether to continue it, and the matter was taken
up in the National Security Council. And Allen Dulles, as
Director, proposed that Ave continue the ownership and con-
trol of the assets of Air America, as it then was known includ-
ing the subsidy as needed. And there was a subsidy at that
time. ... It was about $1,200,000 per year.^"

The National Security Council considered whether this asset should
be retained in 1956 and, on Dulles' recommendation, decided to con-
tinue the subsidy to Air America.

The air proprietary's business consisted almost entirely of Agency
cargo carriage under contracts carrying military designations. The
company was not organized, according to Houston, to fly common
carriage and had no status in the international air business. The evi-
dence mdicates that during the early 1950s, there were two internal
struggles: one was where control should lie in the Agency, and the
other was what policies shoirid apply to the operation of the company
itself :

The struggle within the Agency ranged all the way from
sort of quiet management discussions as to what was good
management, to sometimes rather vociferous argun^nts of
who's in charge here. And the operators always said, "Well,
we need to call the shots because it's our operation. . . . And
this is what we were running into all the time, of red hot
operators opposed to what we would consider good man-
agement.^^

The air proprietary was managed by elements of the Office of Policy
Coordination. From the very outset there were problems in this man-
agement structure. One such example is the acquisition of Air Amer-
ica in Aup-ust 1950. Houston was participatincr in the negotiations at
the invitation of the Head of the Office of Policy Coordination.

OPC was a curious organization, determined as being
attached to the Agency for quarters and rationing with policy

=* Thid., pp. 9-10.

'^ Thid.. p. 10.

Houston indicated that there had hepn a subsidy running to the entities since
1949. ".$1.2 million represented about the maximum subsidy given until. I believe,
about 19.58 was the tumins point, and from 1958 on, there was no subsidy as such
that went into it." The reason for that, of course, was that the air complex had
become "money-making."

^ IMd., pp. 12-13.

222

guidance from State, which was an impossible situation.
Very nice fellows were doing the negotiating with
[OPC] . . . quite unknown to me, when they made the agree-
ment to purchase carrying out the option, they gave the
vendors the right to repurchase at any time within two years.
And I thought this was really inconsistent with our whole
position. And during the next two years they negotiated
out that repurchase agreement and in its place substituted
an agreement to give them a first refusal, if we were to dispose
of the airline. That first refusal plagued us for years. They
used to make all sorts of extraordinary claims under it and it
was never exercised and eventually it was sort of forgotten
when [the owners] died. It ran to them personally, whether
it ran to them and two others personally, and they all are dead
now. But this shows a part of the learning curve, which was
the thing we were going through.^-

In the summer of 1954, Houston and a consultant traveled to the Far
East to observe the operation. The consultant went "specifically to
look at the organization of the airline." At the time of the airline's
purchase, the Agency had formed a Delaware corporation to buy it.
The corporate counsel and the consultant were both very concerned
about the technical organization, or lack of it, in the operation. Accord-
ing to Houston, they demonstrated :

to my satisfaction that it was an absolute situation and that
no one out there had the slightest understanding of the
problem or what they were up against, or wanted to do any-
thing about it [in terms of airline management] .^^

Following this review, a new organization, designed to be more
responsive to the Operations Directorate, was created.

Pacific Corporation held title to 40 percent of the equity in Air
America, while the remainder was ostensibly owned by Chinese, who
gave deeds of trust to the Agency for their shares. For purposes of
international law this overt arrangement demonstrated that the com-
pany was majority-owned and controlled by Chinese.

Air America originally had several DC-4's and began modest opera-
tions between Hong Kong, Taipei and Tokyo. The corporation soon
acquired DC-6's, and it was at this time that the question of competi-
tion with private corporations first arose. Northwest Orient Airlines
was then flying to Tokyo, Seoul, and Manila. A Northwest executive
had noted the Agency's interest in this area when he was Chairman of
the Civil Aeronautics Board in the late 1.940s and early 1950s. Houston
told the Committee :

He became head of Northwest, a very tight manager, a very
capable fellow, and he used to complain that we were inter-
ferring, we were taking passengers off his airline, and we
would go to him and say, we have to keep the airline in this
business because the Chinese say they need an international
airline. They're not ready to start their own yet. And it is

*'7&7(f.,pp 13-14.
'»/6id.,p. 17.

223

necessary to its overall cover status as a going commercial
concern.^*

By 1959 the executive had decided to ask the Civil Aeronautics
Board for a decision. A meeting was held with the entire Board, where
the executive maintained "that he was a private industry, he should
not be interferred with by government competition." ^^ The Agency
explained its situation, the need for cover, and their efforts to restrict
carriage to the minimum necessary to retain their cover.

And it ended up by one of the members of the Board turning
to [the executive] and saying, "You ought to be glad that
you don't have a really good, reliable competitor in there."
He said, "If you were being competed with by private busi-
ness, you'd have real headaches. You ought to be real glad
that it's not worse than it is." ^^

In these proceedings, Houston conceded that some passengers were
traveling on CIA aircraft rather than Northwest planes, but main-
tained that the impact was minimal and unavoidable. The CAB par-
ticipated in discussions with both the Agency and Northwest. After
hearing both sides, the CAB "came down on the side of the Agency
after making a reasoned judgment." ^^

By 1960 the airline's international commercial business was not mak-
ing money. Maintenance work in Taiwan, however, was "normally a
money-maker, and this was [contracted] primarily, although not
exclusively, with the U.S. Air Force." ^^

There were management problems in the maintenance operation,
which originally stemmed from the fact that field personnel were not
particularly astute in setting costs for their contracts. Houston cited
one instance when the Agency consultant replaced a corporation comp-
troller who was very able, but "had his own ideas of bookkeeping and
controls." The consultant insisted that the corporation implement
bookkeeping practices and controls consistent with CAB and FAA
regulations. The military maintenance contracts were constantly
audited by on-site teams.^''

In the early 1960s, the CIA received an exemption from the Con-
tract Renegotiation Board on the grounds that renegotiation personnel
might recognize that Air America was not a commercial operation
and discover that the CIA was involved. The Agency went to the head
of the Contract Renegotiation Board with a letter from the Depart-
ment of Defense requesting an exemption on what it considered "per-
fectly legitimate grounds." *° There was indeed a basis for exemption
under the Renegotiation Act as the business was conducted entirely
overseas, and the exemption was granted. The Agency was concerned
that it had made a type of profit (over 40 percent on the Air Force
maintenance contracts), which may well have been the subject of rene-

" ma. p. 21.
*" ma., p. 22.

"^ Ibid. pp. 22-23.
" Ibid., p. 24.
" Ibid., p. 25.
'" Ibid., p. 26.
* Ibid.

224

gotiation, had it not been subject to the exemption. "So the question
was what to do about it. And finally, we made a voluntary repa3rment
against part of the profit on that contract to the Air Force." *^

As noted previously, the commercial airline aspect of the operation
operated mostly at a loss. While there were periods when Air America
cargo carriers were very busy on CIA contracts, the Korean War,
Diem Bien Phu, and other paramilitary operations; there were also
periods between these activities when there was nothing for the air-
lines to do. During these periods of inactivity, the airline was still
saddled with expenses such as crews' salaries and the maintenance of
grounded aircraft. To alleviate this problem,

... we finally organized the stand-by contract, which was an
apparent military entity on Okinawa. It was our entity, but
it had a military designation. I can't remember the name for
it. And that entity contracted with Air America for so many
hours of cargo stand-by to be available any time on call, and
that they would pay so much for that caDability being main-
tained ... so that is how we kept the subsidy going to main-
tain them during periods when there was not profitable
flying.*'

Another area of concern was the proprietary's relationship with the
Internal Revenue Service. From the outset, the company's manage-
ment was informed that they would be required to pay appropriate
taxes. While there were the usual arguments about whether certain
items were appropriate for taxation and whether certain deductions
should have been granted, the relationship maintained with the IRS
was basically a normal one.

Houston recalled that in the mid-1950s Air America received notice
of an upcoming; audit by the IRS. Company officials came to the
Agency and indicated that this might pose a security problem. The
CIA went to the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service and
indicated that thev wished to have the audit conducted by an IRS
team on an unwitting basis to see what they could learn. "We thought
it would be a good test of the security of our arrangements." ^^ Later,
the IRS personnel would be notified that thev had begun to audit an
Agency proprietary, and the audit would be discontinued :

They put a very bright young fellow on and he went into
it. Thev came up with discrepancies and things that would
be settled in the normal tax argument, corporate-IRS argu-
ment, and all of these were worked eventually, and then we
went to this fellow and said, "Now, this was owned and
backed bv the CIA, the U.S. Government. What was your
guess as to what was haDpening?"

And he said, "Well, I knew there was somethina: there, and
I thought, what a wonderful asset it would be for the Rus-
sians to have, but I came to the conclusion that it was Rocke-
feller money." **

*^ Thid., p. 27.
*" lUd., p. 29.
'*Ihid., p. 30.
** IMd.

225

As the operations of Air America developed, problems arose in-
volving large cargo carriers. In the early days of its operation the
airline used C-54's, which had an extremely limited range, but were
able to perform under demanding circumstances. Discussions pro-
ceeded during that period about modernizing the equipment and the
Agency, through Air America, bought DC-6AB's. These aircraft were
a conversion of the DC-6 with large cargo doors installed. Air
America did not maintain any jet equipment at that point.

In the early 1950's Air America became deeply involved in a mili-
tary Air Transport System. This system was originally known as
MATS, and later as MAC.

They got MATS contracts, and Air America got these, and
these were very good to keep a constant utilization at a good
rate, the MATS rates were usually good, because the policy
was not to do competitive bidding for the lowest bidder be-
cause then you got the poorest service, but give good rates to
the carriers, and then require the carrier belong to the Civil
Reserve Air Fleet.*^

In 1956 MATS changed its policy and required that bidders on their
contracts be certified. Because Air America could not become certif-
icated, the Agency decided to purchase Southern Air Transport.
While this corporation was technically a separate entity, not involved
with Air America, it was actually an integral part of the complex
from a management perspective. All management decisions for South-
ern Air Transport were made by the same CIA consultant and ad-
visory team that established Air America policy.

Eventually, MAC decided to require that bidders not only be certif-
icated, but that they also have equipment qualified for the Civil
Reserve Air Fleet, i.e., jet aircraft. As a result, the Agency acquired
Boeino- 727's and convinced Boeing to modify the 727 by enlarging the
ventral exit, enhancing its airdrop capability.

So the theory was that the 727's would be used on MAC con-
tracts to be available on an overriding basis if needed for
major national seciirity operation. The^' were u-^ed, usu-
allv when thev had spare time. To my recollection, they were
only called off once, off the actual contract time, and this was
for a possible use which didn't .<ro through. But the White
House asked if we had the capabilitv to move something from
here to there, I think from the Philippines to somewhere
in Southeast As^a, I don't recall, and so thev sent word to
manaq-ement that thev wanted a plane available at the earliest
onnortunitv at Clark Field. T>«ev nulled one of them off the
MAC contract and had it available. I think readv to go, in
twelve hours, all set for the ope^^ation. And the operation
was never called. But it showed wliat the canabilitv was. And
what thev had to do was get substitute service for the MAC
contract.*^

During the late 1960s several Chinese airlines beoran operations on
a limited scale. With the establishment of these indigenous airlines

« ThifT.. 3R.
*"/6i<f.,p.39.

226

flying Far East routes, the CIA considered reducing its international
carriage work. The Agency decided to retain the MAC contracts be-
cause they did not compete with the native enterprises, but plans to
reduce Air America's international common carriage were initiated.

Another CIA proprietary. Civil Air Transport Company, Ltd.,
which had been organized in 1954, had been the first Agency entity
to engage in common carriage. Later, Air America did the American
contracting, followed by Southern Air Transport which also per-
formed MAC and MATS contracts with planes leased from Air
America.^''

Houston noted that in the late 1960s an internal decision was made
that :

... we probably couldn't justify this major airlift, with the
big jets, and so we started getting rid of them. See, they had
no utilization to speak of down in Southeast Asia. A couple
of supply flights went into [another area] and I think we used
prop planes for that, to my recollection.*^*

So the Agency began to phase out the 727s, which contributed to the
decision to divest itself of Southern Air Transport and Air America.
Internal management was streamlined in 1963 by the establishment
of an executive committee consisting of the boards of directors of the
Pacific Company, Air America and Air Asia. The overt board of
directors in New York City passed a resolution organizing an overt
executive committee, which consisted of the CIA consultant and
two other directors. Covertly, the Agency added its own representa-
tives to this committee, which allowed representatives of manage-
ment. Agency and the operators to meet, consider policies, and give
guidance to the company. Houston indicated that this mechanism
was extremely effective in controlling the company :

So I think for the last, oh, fifteen, eighteen years, the pro-
prietary management system was on the whole pretty effec-
tive from the Agency point of view. I think we knew what
was going on. I think we were able to get things up for de-
cisions, and if we couldn't resolve them at the staff level,
we would take them up to the Director for decisions; quite
different from the early days in the early 50's that I de-
scribed, and the operators at least made the claim that they
had the right to call the tune.*^

During this period of time Operations Directorate personnel

were getting themselves involved in the acquisition of air-
craft and which were getting awfully damned expensive at
this time, and separate projects were going after some of this
expensive equipment without consideration of what might
be available elsewhere to the Agency by contract or old air-
craft. And so the Director of Central Intelligence set up
EXCOMAIR, of which I was Chairman, and had repre-
sentation from both the operation and management and fi-

" SAT actually owned one 727 and leased two from Air America.
"" Ibid., p. 42.
*^ Ibid., pp. 46-47.

227

nance out of the Agency, to try and coordinate the overall
control and acquisition and disposition of aircraf t.^^

A February 5, 1963 memorandum entitled "Establishment of Execu-
tive Committee for Air Proprietary Operations," noted that the com-
mittee was "to provide general policy guidance for the management of
air proprietary projects, and review and final recommendations for
approval of air proprietary proiect actions." Houston indicated that
this committee, dubbed EXCOMAIR, "was ... an amorphous
group" which worked on a very informal basis. He indicated that
EXCOMAIR was an effective metliod of achieving overall coordina-
tion ; it was responsible for conducting a thorough inventory of all the
equipment that the Agency had in the aviation field and was generally
able to keep track of who needed what.^°

According to Houston, a general shift in thinking at the Agency
occurred between 1968 and 1972 as to the desirability of maintaining
a substantial airlift capability. The records appear to indicate that
Houston convinced the Director in the early 1970s that such a capacity
was no longer necessary to retain. Houston commented on this assess-
ment as follows :

Through what knowledge I had of the utilization of the vari-
ous assets, it seemed to me that utilization, particularly
of large assets, that is, heavy flight equipment, was going
down to the point where there was very little of it. Con-
sequently, we couldn't forecast a specific requirement. Such
requirements as you could forecast were highly contingent.
But I also remember a couple of times putting the caveat into
the Director that with a changing world and with the com-
plications in the aviation field, once you liquidate it, you could
not rebuild, and so you ought to think very, very carefully
before getting rid of an asset that did have a contingent
capability.^^

Allegation of Drug TraiflcMng. — Persistent questions have been
raised whether Agency policy has included using proprietaries to
engage in illegal activities or to make profits which could be used to
fund operations. Most notably, these charges inchided allegations that
the CIA used air proprietaries to engage in drug trafficking. The
Committee investigated this area to determine whether there is any
evidence to snbstantiate these charges. On the basis of its examination,
the Committee has concluded that the CIA air proprietaries did not
participate in illicit drug trafficking.

As allegations of illegal drug trafficking by Air America personnel
grew in the spring and summer of 1972, the CIA launched a full-
scale inquiry. The Inspector General interviewed a score of officers at
CIA headquarters who had served in Asia and were familiar with the
problems related to drug trafficking. After this initial step, the Office
of the Inspector General dispatched investigators to the field. From
August 24 to September 10, 1972, this group travelled the Far East

** Ihid., p. 51.
" lUd., p. 52.
° /Bid., p. 57.

228

in search of the facts. They first visited Hong Kong, then eleven
Agency facilities in Southeast Asia. During this period they inter-
viewed more than 100 representatives of the CIA, the Department of
State, the Agency for International Development, the Bureau of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs, the U.S. Customs Service, the Army, Air
America, and a cooperating air transport company.

This inspection culminated in an Inspector General's report in Sep-
tember 1972, which concluded that there was

no evidence that the Agency, or any senior officer of the
Agency, has ever sanctioned or supported drug trafficking
as a matter of policy. Also, we found not the slightest suspi-
cion, much less evidence, that any Agency officer, staff or
contract, has ever been involved in the drug business. With
respect to Air America, we found that it has always
forbidden, as a matter of policy, the transportation of contra-
band goods aboard its aircraft. We believe that its Security
Inspection Service, which is used by the cooperating air
transport company as well, is now serving as an added deter-
rent to drug traffickers.^^

But there were aspects of the situation in Southeast Asia which were
cause for concern :

The one area of our activities in Southeast Asia that gives
us some concern has to do with the agents and local officials
with whom we are in contact who have been or may be still
involved in one way or another in the drug business. We are
not referring here to those agents who are run as penetrations
of the narcotics industry for collection of intelligence on the
industry but, rather, to those with whom we are in touch in
our other operations. What to do about these people is a par-
ticularly troublesome problem, in view of its implications
for some of our operations, particularly in Laos.^^

The Inspector General noted that there was a need for better intelli-
gence not only to support American efforts to suppress drug traffic in
Southeast Asia, but also to provide continuing assurance that Agency
personnel and facilities were not involved in the drug business.

His report began by placing the allegations against the CIA in his-
torical perspective. It allowed that when the United States arrived
in Southeast Asia "opium was as much a part of the agricultural infra-
structure of this area as was rice, one suitable for the hills, the other
for the valleys." ^^

The record before the Inspector General clearly established that offi-
cial United States policy deplored the use of opium as a narcotic in
Southeast Asia, but regarded it as a problem for local governments.
It was equally clear that Agency personnel in the area recognized its
dangers to U.S. paramilitary operations and "took steps to discourage

^''CIA Inspector General's Report, "Investigation of the Drug Situation in
Southeast Asia." 9/72, p. 2.
^ Ibid., pp. 2-3.
« IMd., p. 5.

229

its use by indigenous paramilitary troops." ^^ For example, Meo troops
were ejected from various camps when they were caught using the
drug. But, the I. G. noted :

We did not, however, attempt to prevent its use among the
civilian population in those areas where we exercised military
control, believing that such intervention would have been re-
sisted by the tribals with whom we were working and might
have even resulted in their refusal to cooperate.^®

Nor did the Agency interfere with the movement of the opium from
the hills to market in the cities farther south. In this regard, the I.G.
remarked candidly :

The war has clearly been our overriding priority in Southeast
Asia and all other issues have taken second place in the scheme
of things. It would be foolish to deny this, and we see no
reason to do so.^^

Although it maintained this posture, the CIA was reporting in-
formation on opium trafficking long before any formal requrements
were levied upon it. As far back as the mid-i960s, when CIA case
officers began to get a picture of the opium traffic out of Burma as a
by-product of cross-border operations, they chronicled this informa-
tion in their operational reporting. As more information came to light
in Laos and Thailand, this information began to appear in intelligence
reporting. Indeed, the Agency "had substantial assets [in two South-
east Asian countries, which] could be specifically directed against this
target when it assmiied top priority in 1971." ^^

Air America

As early as 1957, Air America's regulations contained an injunction
against smuggling. This regulation later came to include opium. The
Report indicated that the airline's effort at this time was concen-
trated on preventing the smuggling of opium out of Laos on its air-
craft. Although still not a. crime in Laos, shipment of opium on
international flights was clearly illegal and was grounds for dismissal
of any pilot or crew member involved. The Inspector General stated
that:'

Air America has had a few cases of this kind (all of which
are documented in the files in the Agency) and has, in each
case, taken prompt and decisive action upon their discovery .^^

Air America was less able to control drug traffic involving its aircraft
within Laos. Although it had a rule that opium could not be carried
aboard its planes, the only thing that could be done if the rule was
violated was to put the opium and its owner off at the nearest airstrip.

^ Ibid., p. 6.

^ Ibid.

" Ibid.

The report related a statement of a case oflBeer which typified the CIA position
in the matter during the period 1966-1968. The oflScer said that he "was under
orders not to get too deeply involved in opium matters since his primary mission
was to get on with the war and not risk souring relations with his indigenous
military counterparts by investigation of opium matters."

"* Ibid, p. 7.

"^Jbid.

230

Moreover, as a charter carrier, Air America did not have full control
over its traffic. It hauled what its customers put on the aircraft. Air
operations officers, in the case of Agency traffic, were responsible for
authenticating the passengers and cargo they washed to put on the
plane. In some locations, the air operations officers had to rely on
indigenous assistants for much of the actual details of preparing mani-
fests, checking cargo, and supervising the loading of the aircraft. In
areas where active military operations were in progress, this process
could become cursory if not actually chaotic. In such circumstances, the
Inspector General concluded that : "^ —

it was hardly fair to blame Air America if opium happened
to get aboard its aircraft. There is no question that it did on
occasion.^"

With the realization that drug abuse among American troops in
Vietnam was growing and that Southeast Asian heroin was finding
its way to U.S. markets, the CIA's early attitude toward the opium
problem began to change. The Agency joined the effort that began in
1971 to halt the flow of opium and heroin from Burma, Laos, and
Thailand, and pursued a vigorous intelligence program against these
targets.

In terms of staff and contract personnel, the Inspector General was
impressed that "to a man, our officers overseas find the drug business
as distasteful as those at headquarters." ^^ Indeed, many of the CIA's
officers were restive about having to deal with Laotian officials who
were involved in the drug business :

One young officer even let his zeal get the better of his judg-
ment and destroyed a refinery in northwest Laos in 1971 be-
fore the anti-narcotics law was passed, thus risking being
charged with destruction of private property.''^

But, the I.G. reported, CIA officers generally tolerated the opium
problem, regarding it as just another of the frustrations one encoun-
ters in the area.

From what the Inspector General contingent was able to observe in
the field, "the pilots in the employ of Air America and the cooperating
air transport company merit a clean bill of health." ^^ While it was
true that narcotics had been found aboard some of their aircraft, in
almost every case the small quantity involved could only have been
for the personal use of the possessor. The Inspector General felt that

Given the strict anti-contraband regulations under which
these two airlines have been operating for years, it is highly
unlikely that any pilot would knowingly have permitted nar-
cotics or any other contraband aboard his aircraft.^*

Although they noted, "if it is a truism to say that they're in the
business for the money," the investigators concluded that these pilots

*" Ibid, p. 8.
** Ibid. p. 11.
" Ibid.
*" Ibid. p. 12.
^Ibid.

231

were deeply committed to their job, and that the subject of dnisfs was
as much an anathema to them as it is "to any decent, respectable citi-
zen in the United States." ^^

The Inspector General indicated how one pilot felt about the sub-
ject. He stated :

You ofet me a contract to defoliate the poppy fields in Burma,
and I'll take off ri^ht now and destroy them. I have a friend
whose son is hooked on dru^s, and I too have teenage chil-
dren. It scares the hell out of me as much as it does you and
the rest of the people in the States.^^

The report also established that the pilots were well paid, averaging
close to $45,000 a year. Almost half of their salaiy was tax-free. In
this context the I.G. concluded that

Although the temptation for big money offered by drugs can-
not be dismissed out of hand, it helps to know that the pilots
are making good money. Further, an American living in
Vientiane can bank a substantial part of his salary without
much difficulty, and a common topic of conversation among
pilots is how and where to invest their fairly substantial
savings.^^

The milieu in w'hicJh these pilots found themselves did serve to evoke
images of them as mercenaries or soldiers of fortune. The Inspector
General indicated that a "number of them do like their wine and
women, but on the job they are all business and very much like the
average American." ^^

The investigators, however, could not be as sanguine about the
behavior of the numerous other individuals who worked for Air
America and the cooperating air transport company as mechanics or
baggage handlers. The nature of their work allowed these employees
easy access to the airplanes, and created real opportunities for con-
cealing packages of narcotics in the airframes. The records indicated
that there were several instances where employees had been fired be-
cause they were suspected of handling drugs. The Inspector General
advisd that :

Despite the introduction of tighter security measures, it
would be foolish to assume that there will not be any further
attempts by mechanics and baggage handlers to conceal nar-
cotics on airplanes.^^

In a startling revelation concerning indigenous officials in Southeast
Asia, the I.G. bitterly reported that

In recent testimony to Agency officers in Vientiane, Laotian
officials who had been involved in the drug business stated
that there was no need for drug traffickers to use Air Amer-
ica facilities because they had their own. We certainly found

* Ihid.

* lUd. p. 13.
" lUd.

" lUd. p. 14.
" lUd.

232

this to be true. In addition to the Royal Lao Air Force
(RLAF), there are several commercial airlines in Laos, in-
cluding Royal Air Lines, Lao Air Development, Air Laos,
and perhaps others, all of which evidently have ties with
high Laotian government officials. It is highly problematical
whether these airlines have a full platter of legitimate busi-
ness.^°

Another factor which had the effect of making Air America a less
desirable target for the drug trafficker was that there were virtually
no regular, pre-arranged flight schedules for the pilots. Ordinarily,
the pilot did not know until he reported for duty which airplane he
would be flying or what his flight schedule would be for the day.

Air America's Security Inspection Service, which was established
early in 1972, also had five inspection units in Laos. Similar units
were eventually established elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Each unit
consisted of an American chief and three or four indigenous personel.
The basrgage of the pilot and all passengers traveling in CIA-owned
aircraft was inspected in the presence of an American official before
anyone was permitted to board. All cargo was inspected unless it had
been exempted under established procedures. The very existence of
the system was considered a deterrent to drug smuggling on Air
America aircraft and did result in several discoveries of drugs among
the baggage of passengers, although only one or two of these involved
quantities of sufficient size to be as commercial.

Agents and Assets

This is one area where the CIA is particularly vulnerable to criti-
cism. Relationships with indigenous assets and contacts are always
broad. In Laos, clandestine relationships were maintained in every
aspect of the Agency's operational program — whether paramilitary,
political action, or intelligence collection. These relationships included
people who either were known to be, or were suspected of being, in-
volved in narcotics trafficking. Although these individuals were of con-
siderable importance to the Agency, it had doubts in some instances.
For example, the investigators were troubled by a foreign official who
was alleflfed to have been involved in one instance of transporting
opium. He was evidently considered "worth the damage that his ex-
posure as an Agency asset would bring, although the Station insists
(a) that he is of value to the Station as an asrent of influence [deleted]
and (b) that his complicity in the [deleted] incident has never been
proved." "

Among liaason contacts, which in the military arena included vir-
tually every high-ranking Laotian officer, the Inspector General
warned that the Agency was "in a particular dilemma."

The past involvement of many of these officers in drugs is
well-known, and the continued participation of many is sus-
pected; yet their goodwill, if not actual cooperation, con-
siderably facilitates the military activities of the Agency-
supported irregulars.^2

■" lUd.

" lUd, p. 18.

233

The Inspector General concluded, that

The fact remains . . . that our continued support to these peo-
ple can be construed by them, and by others who might become
aware of the association, as evidence that the Agency is not as
concerned about the drug problem as other elements of the
U.S. mission in Laos. The Station has recently submitted, at
headquarters' request, an assessment of the possible adverse
repercussions for the Agency, if its relationship to certain as-
sets were exposed. We think that, on the whole, that assess-
ment was unduly sanguine. We believe the Station should
take a new look at this problem, using somewhat more strin-
gent criteria in assesshig the cost-benefit ratio of these rela-
tionships. We realize that it is impossible to lay down any but
the most general kind of rules in judging whether to con-
tinue, or to initiate, a clandestine relationship with Laotians.
Each case has to be decided on its own merits, but within a
framework that attaches appropriate importance to its pos-
sible effect on the U.S. Government's anti-narcotics efforts in
Laos. It is possible that the Station will need additional
guidance from headquarters as to current priorities among
our objectives in Laos.^^

2. Nonoperating Proprietaries

Nonoperating proprietaries vary in complexity according to their
Agency task. They are generally corporate shells which facilitate for-
eign operations and clearly pose no competitive threat to legitimate
businesses. The most elaborate are legally licensed and established to
conduct bona fide business.

All nonoperating proprietaries do have nominee stockholders,
directors, and officers and are generally directed by one of the Agency's
proprietary management companies. The company address may be a
Post Office box, a legitimate address provided by a cleared and witting
company official or private individual or the address of a proprietary
management company. The nonoperating proprietaries maintain bank
accounts, generate business correspondence, keep books of account
which can withstand commercial and tax audit, file State and Federal
tax returns, and perform normal business reporting to regulatory
authorities. They are moderately capitalized, generally at around
$5,000, and their net worth at any one time varies according to the
Agency task they are performing. As of December 31, 1973, more than
60 percent of the combined net worth of these proprietaries was operat-
ing capital for companies which provide cover to agency personnel.

Legally incorporated companies require less elaborate commercial
administration due to the nature of the tasks they perform for the
CIA. This kind of proprietary is directly managed by headquarters
specialists operating in alias. No commercial book or accounts are kept,
and in the event of a tax audit the Agency has to brief the auditing au-
thority.

Depending on use, administration may be as simple as maintain-
ing bank accounts and filing annual franchise taxes, or as extensive

■" Ibid, p. 19.

69-983 O - 76 - 16

234

as that required to obtain Employee Identification numbers, to pay
personnel taxes, and to file tax returns.

There are also sole-proprietorships^ which are proprietaries in the
sense of bein^ Agency-owned and administered. The Agency estab-
lishes and registers these sole-proprietorships. Arrangements are made
to provide an address for these entities. Like the proprietary corpora-
tions administered by Agency Headquarters specialists, these com-
panies provide cover, salaries, and tax attribution for Agency
personnel.

Another type of entity used by the Agency is a proprietary only
in the sense of being Agency-owned and administered. These are
the notional companies which are not legally registered, but have
names and bank accounts controlled by the Agency. The Agency
arranges domiciliary addresses and any queries are referred to the
Agency specialists concerned. These notional entities are used to pro-
vide status and operational cover for Agency personnel involved in
all types of high-risk intelligence operations.

C. Operation or Proprietaries

7. Statutory Authority

The Agency's statutory authority to spend money for proprietary
corporations in support of Agencv operations is derived from Section
8(b) of the CIA Act of 1949. This act states:

The sums made available to the Agency may be expended
without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relat-
ing to the expenditure of Government funds; and for objects
of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, such
expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate of
the Director and every such certificate shall be deemed a suf-
ficient voucher for the amount therein certified.^^

The language contained in Section 8(b) is adequate authority to
exclude the operation of these proprietary corporations from the law
governing Government corporations in 31 U.S.C. 841 et seq. How-
ever, the CIA General Counsel ruled in 1958 that the CIA should
comply with the principles in that act to the extent possible, and this
has been done. A classified Memorandum of Law by the CIA General
Counsel on the Agency's authority to acquire and dispose of a
proprietary without regard to provisions of the Federal Property
and Administrative Services Act, outlines the CIA's position. This
position was upheld by the U.S. District Court in the Southern
District of Florida in dismissing the suit Fanner v. Southern Air
Transport on July 17, 1974.^^ That result was not appealed and
remains the law.

2. Specific Controls

The formation and activities of proprietaries are controlled through
various mechanisms to assure their proper use. These include internal

'* 50 use 403(b).
'' See p. 246.

235

Agency regulations which establish the administrative procedures to
be followed in the formation, operation, and liquidation of proprietar-
ies. An Administrative Plan (specifying the operational purpose, ad-
ministrative and management procedures, and cost) and a Liquidation
Plan (specifying details of liquidation and disposition of funds when
liquidation is contemplated) must be coordinated among the effected
CIA components and approved at appropriate management levels.
This regulatory control along with policy memoranda are intended to
assure proper conduct by proprietaries. Each Agency component in-
volved in the operation of a proprietary enterprise is responsible for
compliance. The Chief of the Cover and Commercial Staff, the Direc-
tor of Finance, and the Comptroller are assigned particular responsi-
bilities.

The controls and procedures applicable to each operating pro-
prietary specify that a project outline and an administrative plan must
be approved at the Deputy Director level. Routine control and admin-
istration is executed by a project officer at Headquarters. The Agency
conducts semi-annual reviews to determine whether operational needs
still exist, and performs regular audits to assure proper management
and financial accountability. Proprietaries are liquidated as their use-
fulness ends and new ones are formed as needed.

3. Treaf7nent of Profits

The CIA General Counsel ruled in January 1958 that "income of
proprietaries, including profits, need not be considered miscellaneous
receipts to be covered into the Treasury but may be used for proper
corporate or company purposes." ^® This subject was reviewed and the
opinion reaffirmed by the General Counsel in July 1965. The policy of
retaining profits has continued, although onlv a very few Agency pro-
prietaries have ever been profitable. The CIA's legal basis for retaining
profits for the use of the operating corporate entities is discussed below.

Section 104 of the Government Corporations Control Act provides
that Congress shall enact legislation necessary to make funds or other
financial resources available for expenditure and limit the use thereof
as the Congress may determine. It is further provided that "this sec-
tion shall not be construed as preventing the Government corporations
from carrying out and financing their activities as authorized by
existing law . . ." ^^ The legislative history explaining this section
of the act states that "in cases where no other law required a congres-
sional authorization of expenditures, the corporation, if it had means
of financing other than annual appropriations, could continue to oper-
ate in the absence of any action by Congress on its budget program." '^^
The statute creating a particular Government corporation may provide
specifically how that corporation may use its profits in the conduct of
its business.

The Government Corporations Control Act clearly did not contem-
plate Government corporations of the type that the CIA has estab-
lished. Furthermore, it is not feasible for Agency proprietaries to be
created by act of Congress or overseen precisely as provided for normal

" CIA General Counsel Memorandum of Law, 1/6/58.

"31 U.S.C. 8^9.

^^ Senate Banking and Currency Committee Report 694, 11/2/45.

236

Grovernment corporations in the Act. Nevertheless, the Agency has
felt that the appropriate and reasonable policy would be to treat and
control proprietaries in accordance with the terms of the law. The
Agency maintains that there is no need to have more restrictive rules
applied to its corporations in the use of funds, including profits, than
are applied to government corporations under existing statute. Thus,
the Agency considers the use 'by a proprietary of its earnings to carry
on its corporate affairs without an offset against Agency appropria-
tions to be a legitimate practice which does not constitute an illegal
augmentation of appropriations.

With rare exception, operating proprietaries have not been self-
sustaining from real income. Income, including profits, is retained by
the proprietaries consistent with the usual operating practices of busi-
ness enterprises.

The use of proprietaries' profits is controlled by annual CIA reviews
and audits of the total capital, investment and profits situations in the
context of operational objectives and cover needs of the corporations.
The CIA maintains that, in effect, the annual project review is based
upon an audit as searching as that required for statutory government
corporations. While this may be technically true, such audits do not
raise broad questions of program duration and effectiveness.
There is no broad management audit in program terms, but rather only
a financial audit to determine essential security and integrity. More-
over, there have been no outside audits of any kind, especially those to
determine performance and effectiveness. One former CIA employee
intimately involved with this process suggested strongly that these
provisions were inadequate. This needs to be rectified, and the Commit-
tee recommends that such audits be reported to the new legislative over-
sight committee.'*

4. Disposition of Funds

Any proprietary with funds in excess of its current or foreseeable
needs is required to return such funds to the Agency. Funds generated
by the liquidation or termination of a proprietary are returned to the
Agency, except in a limited number of situations when they are trans-
ferred to another proprietarv for "similar use." On the basis of a CIA
General Counsel opinion of February 3, 1975, the Agency has revised
its policy on the treatment of all returns of funds from proprietaries.
All such returns are to be remitted to the United States Treasury as
"Miscellaneous Receipts." Prior to this change in policy, returns were
treated as refunds of the previously recorded expenses, up to the
amount of such expense for a particular proprietary with any excess
amounts returned to the Treasury as "Miscellaneous Receipts." ®°

D. The Disposal of Proprietaries
1. Overview

The Agency has emphasized the degree to which the extensive pro-
prietary system it has maintained in the past has been disposed of in
recent years. According to the current Chief of the Cover and Com-

■" See Recommendation 50.
^ See Recommendation 52.

237

mercial Staff, at least as far as large proprietaries are concerned,
"because of multitudinous reasons they will be viewed as the solution
of last resort.^^ Size was a problem and made it "inevitable that cover
Vv'ould not last." Moreover, there simply is not a need, according to the
Agency, for the kind of capabilities supplied by an Air America either
now or in the foreseeable future. In this regard, the Agency has also
indicated that no "real proprietaries" are in planning because there
are no such operational i-equirements before the Cover and Commer-
cial Staff.

The Committee has learned from its study that the Agency retains
the capability "in being" to create large proprietaries.*^ More-
over, numerous "shelf" corporations are kept available to provide
cover. These entities are generally of the notional variety which do
not compete with legitimate enterprises. Nonetheless, the Agency has
emphasized the need to maintain this general vehicle for at least one
purpose : to retain assets. Notionals are a very effective cover mecha-
nism when they are small, and can be very effective in securely pro-
viding various support items. In addition, the Chief of the Cover and
Commercial Staff told the Committee that, in order to carry out opera-
tional functions, the CIA needs a variety of tools :

We need a variety of mechanisms. We need a variety of
cooperating personnel and organizations in the private
sector.

Proprietaries, in the largest sense as we have used it
throughout these investigations, are part of this arsenal of
tools that the Agency must have in order to fulfill its job.
I said earlier on this morning that on the basis of our ex-
perience with proprietaries we have come to the conclusion
that wherever possible w^e try to use other means of pro-
viding cover and hiding the CIA hand than proprietaries.
But where there is no other way, or where it is the best way
in order to achieve the operational objective, we have used
proprietaries in the past and we propose to continue to use
proprietaries. So we are not getting out of the proprietary

^' Chief, CCS, 1/27/76, np. 15-16.

The Deputy Director of Operations noted recently in testimony :

"I think by and large that the day of the big proprietary is over. We have
attempted over the past few years to try to squeeze down on" those kinds of pro-
prietaries and I think we have really gone now to a fairly small number, and
a fairly tightly controlled group of proprietaries who are doing legitimate opera-
tional jobs, particularly in the media field.

"Our experience with proprietaries in the past has been if left by themselves,
they tend to absorb larger and larger amounts of government money and are not
particularly for a business. They are not very viable in the business sense and
quickly become suspect as not having any commercial validity. And we have,
I think in the past ten years, we have in this past ten years gotten rid of an
enormous number of proprietaries in this field. I don't foresee us getting in the
immediate future into any expansion of that proprietary record. I think we are
about right in terms of where we are now."

^ The DDO clospd hi<! recent testimony with a caveat :

"I can visualize, however, depending on what happens to the Agency in the
future, the po.ssibility that we might want to use more proprietaries, par-
ticularly in the field of cover if this gets terribly tight or terribly diflicult. But
the average operational purpose, except for some of these media operations, all
we need is cover and I think that most of the proprietaries that we have fall
into that category."

238

business as such. But it is true that the proprietaries that
we are using at the present time and what I can foresee for
the immediate future is going to be of a smallish variety,*^

The former General Counsel of the CIA, Lawrence K. Houston, con-
curred in this judgment. It should, he said, be used only as a "last
resort." ^* The Chief of CCS noted that these operations are run for
specific purposes unrelated to profit and that, "I am not in the business
to make money." ®^

Only two proprietaries, the insurance complex and Air America,
returned continuing profits or did large volumes of business. For
this reason, the Committee sought to discover if the CIA would ever
again seek to establish a large proprietary conglomerate such as the
Air America complex. The Chief, CCS responded in this manner :

These kind of facilities, any kind of facilities of this
kind get established and are used because they are needed in
the pursuit of an existing operational requirement.

If such an operational requirement should again arise, I
would assume that the Agency would consider setting up a
large-scale air proprietary with one proviso — that we have a
chance at keeping it secret that it is CIA.^

Mr. Houston noted that he did not believe it was possible to keep such
an activity secret :

I'll answer to that. I don't believe it's possible. The avia-
tion industry, everybody knows what everybody is doing and
something new coming along is immediately the focus of
thousands of eyes and prying questions, and that combined
with the intricacies of a corporate administration these days,
and the checks and balances, I think make a large aviation
proprietary probably impossible .... I don't think you can do
a real cover operation, is my personal assessment.®^

The Committee reviewed those proprietaries which had been sold
or otherwise disposed of during the period from 1965 to 1975. It sought
to discover which of those proprietaries disposed of in the last ten
years maintained a significant relationship with the Agency by con-
tract or informal understanding. More specifically, the Committee
sought answers to the following questions :

(1) How have proprietaries been disposed of by the
Agency ?

(2) Have proprietaries or their assets been sold to per-
sons who had previously served as directors, officers or em-
ployees of the proprietaries ?

(3) How often were proprietaries sold pursuant to an
agreement or understanding that the purchased proprietary
would provide the Agency with goods, services or other
assistance ?

«^ Chief, CCS, 1/27/76, pp. 1^20.

^ Houston, 1/15/76, p. 5.

* Chief, CCS, 1/27/76, p. 80.

^ Ibid., p. 21.

" Houston, 1/27/76, p. 21.

239

Our study revealed that during the mdicated period, a large num-
ber- of proprietaries were dissolved, sold, or otherwise disposed of,
thus substantiating the Agency's claim that it had moved decisively to
extricate itself from this area of activity. In a very real sense, it is
nearly impossible to evaluate w^hether a ''link" still exists between the
Agency and a former asset related to a proprietaiy. In some cases,
even though formal and informal Agency ties are discontinued, social
and interpersonal relationships remain. The impact of such liaisons is
difficult to assess.

At its peak, Air America, the Agency's largest proprietary, had
total assets of some $50 million and directly employed more than 5,600
individuals (the total number of employees for the Air America com-
plex was in excess of 8,000). The company is in the process of being
liquidated because it is no longer required. The Air America complex
included a number of other companies with the Pacific Corporation
as the holding company. The general plan for liquidation of Air
America is for the Pacific Corporation to sell off Air America, Inc.,
and its affiliates. A private New York firm was engaged to estimate
a fair market value for the complex. Although the Agency con-
ducted an intensive search for competitive bidders, it was able to
find buyers for only one of the affiliated companies. The sale of this
company was closed on January 31, 1975. The remaining parts of
Air America are being liquidated by sale of individual assets upon
completion of existing contracts. Funds realized from the sales could be
as much as $25 million and will be returned to the Treasury.

Agency financial support for Radio Liberty and Radio Free
Europe, both sizeable proprietaries, was terminated in FY 1971 and
responsibility for their funding and operation Avas assumed by the
Department of State.

Southern Air Transport was sold on December 31, 1973 because
its contingency capability was no longer needed. The Agency realized
$6,470,000 from this sale, of which $3,345,000 was in cash (including
a $1.2 million award in arbitration of a dispute over the proceeds of
the sale of an aircraft by Southern Air Transport after the sale of
the company by the Agency). The purchaser paid the balance to Air
America to retire a debt owed by Southern Air Transport. A group
of employees of Southern Air Transport filed a civil action disputing
the propriety of the sale of the company by the Agency, but the case
was dismissed with prejudice on July 17, 1974 by a Federal court.

Most of the entities of which the Agency has divested itself were
either sold or given to witting individuals (former officers, em-
ployees, managers, contractors, etc.). A handful were sold or given
to witting individuals who had no formal relationship with the pro-
prietary. In several cases, transfer of the entity was conditioned as an
agreement that the proprietary would continue to provide goods or
services to the CIA. Other methods which have occasionally been used
to dispose of entities include: merger with another Agency pro-
prietary; transfer or sale of a proprietary to another Government
department; and liquidation, with the remaining assets of the pro-
prietary being given to previouslv uncompensated participants in the
venture, or to other Agency proprietaries.

240

2. The Sale of Southern Air Transport, Inc.

Southern Air Transport Incorporated (SAT) is an American air
carrier, incorporated in the State of Florida on October 31, 1949.
From its inception until its purchase in 1960 by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, it was privately owned. It was purchased by the CIA
on August 5, 1960, and owned by the CIA through December 31,
1973 when the Agency sold the ifirm back to one of its original owners.

The decision to acquire Southern Air Transport was triggered by
a change in the regulations governing the award of Military Air
Transport Service (MATS) contracts. On April 1, 1960, Air America
had begun flying a seven month MATS contract operating out of
Tachikawa Air Force Base in Japan, to other Pacific locations. In
June of 1960, the Department of Defense and the Civil Aeronautics
Board changed the regulations governing the awarding of MATS
contracts to require that bidders hold at least a Supplemental Certifi-
cate of Convenience and Necessity for an air carrier and that they
participate in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet Program. Air America
did not meet either of these new criteria and could not obtain appro-
priate waivers.

The Air America heavy airlift capability represented an American
asset for use in future operational contingencies throughout the Far
East area. Loss of the INLETS contract would result in underutiliza-
tion of aircraft and air crews, and the revenues were needed to
sustain these assets. Therefore, the CIA proposed that either Air
America should obtain the necessary certification, or that the Agency
should buy another commercial firm that already held these certifi-
cations. The October 1, 1960 contract date, the need for public hear-
ings, and lengthy proceedings militated against Air America apply-
ing for the certificate. In order to avoid lengthy public hearings,
which would be time-consuming and generate public exposure, it was
decided that the ownership of the company to be acquired must be
kept completely separate from Air America. This solution was con-
curred in by the CAB, DOD, the CIA, and Air America management.

It was anticipated that if the new company were awarded an on-
going MATS contract, it would actually perform the flying service
but would use equipment under conditional sale from Air America
and would employ personnel transferred from Air America. Under
inter-company agreements Air America would provide all mainte-
nance work, ground handling, and other services for which it would
be reimbursed by the new company. In this wav, Air America would
share in the revenues generated by the MATS contracts. The pro-
posal to purchase a supplemental carrier and operate it under the
above arrangement was approved by Director of Central Intelligence
Allen Dulles on July 15, 1960. Funds from the Clandestine Services
budfi-et for FY 1962 were made available for the purchase.

After World War II there had been over 200 supplemental carriers
in existence. By 1960 only 18 were still operating. Air America man-
agement made a survev of the 18 and determined that Southern Air
Transnort in Miami, Florida, was the most attractive as a purchase
possibility. It operated two C-46s — one owned, one leased — between

241

Miami and points in the Caribbean and South America. Its associated
company owned the four acre property on which SAT was located.
Moreover, it operated at a modest profit and had no long term debts.

Negotiations for the purchase of SAT were successful and on Au-
gust 5, 1960, the CIA exchanged $307,506.10 for all outstanding shares
of capital stock of SAT and its real property owning affiliate. The
Agency owned these shares in the name of a former board member of
Air America.

Under CIA management Southern Air Transport operated with
two semi-autonomous sections : the Pacific and Atlantic Divisions. The
Pacific Division performed the MATS contract and supported Agency
"heavylift" requirements in East Asia. The Atlantic Division con-
tinued to operate in the Caribbean and South America; doing the
same sort of flying SAT had done prior to Agency acquisition. The
Atlantic Division was also able to furnish support for certain sensitive
operations. At the peak of its activities, the SAT fleet, comprised of
both owned and leased aircraft, included Douglas DC-6, Boeing 727,
and Lockheed L-lOO Hercules aircraft.

The Sale

In 1972 it became apparent that the Agency's air capabilities ex-
ceeded its needs, and that political realities and future operational re-
quirements in the post-war era of Southeast Asia would not require
large air proprietary assets. On April 21, 1972, the Director of Central
Intelligence authorized the divestiture of CIA ownership and control
of the Air America complex and Southern Air Transport. He approved
recommendations calling for: Air America to be retained until the
end of the war in Southeast Asia ; the immediate elimination of the
Pacific Division of SAT ; the sale of two 727 aircraft leased to SAT
by Air America; and subsequent divestiture of Agency ownership
and control of the remainder of SAT.®^ Specific note was made that
conflict of interest should be avoided and that no employee should
receive a windfall benefit as a result of these transactions.^^

In May 1972, two Agency officials met with the Chairman of the
Civil Aeronautics Board and his Administrative Assistant to seek
informal advice as to the best way to disengage from SAT. Three
alternatives were discussed: (1) dissolve the company and sell the
assets; (2) sell the assets to the current operators of the company;
(3) sell SAT to, or merge SAT into, one of the other supplemental
carriers.

The CAB chairman discouraged option (3) because it would in-
volve public hearings and would be subject to criticism by the other
supplementals : Option (1), although least troublesome from the legal

^ The Director determined that "we no longer should retain air proprietaries
purely for contingent requirements and that on the record, therefore, the Agency
should divest itself of the Southern Air Transport complex entirely." He stated
that the desirable course of action would be dissolution, although he realized
that the problems were many and complex. Also, he did not rule out other solutions
which might achieve the end and yet better satisfy the interests of all concerned.

^ A condition imposed by the DCI was that "in the disposition of any of the
assets involved nothing inure to the benefit of Agency employees or former em-
ployees or persons whose relationship with the Agency has been or is of such
a nature as might raise a question of conflict of interest."

242

and security standpoints, would further reduce the shrinking num-
ber of U.S. supplementals (by 1972, there were only eleven supple-
mental carriers left) and would be unfair to SAT employees. The CAB
officials had no objections to option (2).

On May 5, 1972 the DCI was presented with the results of the meet-
ing with the CxVB chairman. He approved the recommendation to ex-
plore the sale of the equity in SAT to the current management. It
was noted that SAT had been operating as a supplemental carrier for
25 years, that none of the employees of SAT had ever been an em-
ployee of the Agency, and that both the Department of Defense and
the chairman of the CAB considered it in their best interests to keep
SAT as a viable carrier. The rationale behind selling SAT intact to
its management was :

(1) Liquidation would deprive the United States of a useful air
carrier and would be unfair to the employees.

(2) Sale of SAT on the open market would generate an unaccept-
able level of public interest and scrutiny. A publicly advertised disposi-
tion would run contrary to the Director's statutory mandate to protect
intelligence sources and methods.

(3) Although a potential for conflict of interest and windfall profit
existed, the sale of SAT to its management would best satisfy the
requirements of everyone involved.

The DCI was, apparentlv, allowed this flexibility in method of dis-
posal by statute. 40 U.S.C. §474(17) provides that nothing in the
regulations relating to disposal of surplus government property shall
affect any authority of the CIA. In addition, 50 U.S.C. § 403(d) (5)
provides that the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for
protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized dis-
closure. It was determined that sale of SAT stock to one of its former
owners in a confidential manner would prevent damage which could
result from disclosure of CIA ownership.

Agency officials began exploring ways in which SAT could be sold to
its management, without permitting a windfall to accrue to the buyer,
and in a way that could not be construed as a conflict of interest. To
establish a reasonable selling price, the Agency asked a Certified
Public Accounting firm to perform a valuation study. The accounting
firm in turn engaged an aviation consultant firm to conduct an eval-
uation of the aircraft. The following values were established :

Millions

(1) Book value of SAT $3. 900

(2) Estimated total value of SAT capital stock on open market- 2.645

(3) Disposal as going concern 2. 100

(4) Liquidation value 1.250

(5) Agency investment 1. 500

Based on these figures, the Executive Director-Comptroller on August
17, 1972, approved an asking price of $2.7 million. Sale at this price to
the management would require simultaneous payment in full of the
$3.2 million note payable to Air America through an associated land
holding compan3\ and would not include any equity in the lease pur-
chase agreement between SAT and Air America for a Lockheed L
100-30 Hercules aircraft. Although this $2.7 million price was less
than the $3.9 million book value, it did exceed the fair market value
of the company as calculated by professional appraisers. The ap-
praisals were based not on depreciated purchase prices for assets, as

243

reflected in book values, but on the earning power of the assets adjusted
to "present vakie"' and the current resale value for all assets.

On August 23, 1972, the former owner was advised that the asking
price for SAT was $5.9 million; $2.7 million for the acquisition of
stock and $3.2 million for payment of debt to Air America. A deadline
date of October 1, 1972 was established; otherwise the firm would be
dissolved and the assets liquidated. Although the former owner con-
tended the asking price should be reduced because the outstanding loan
to Air America had been reduced since the date of the study, he stated
that he would attempt to work out financing within the deadline date
of October 1, 1972. This deadline was extended by the Agency to
December 4, 1972.

On December 5, 1972, the former owner submitted an offer to buv
SAT for $5 million : $1,875 million for the acquisition of SAT and
$3,125 million to pay off the debt to Air America. On December 26,
1972, the Executive Director-Comptroller approved the recommenda-
tion that the offer be rejected and that if the former owner was unable
to raise by January 20, 1973, the additional funds required for the
original purchase price of $5.9 million, including the Air America
debt, that the Agency proceed with liquidation plans and the dis-
missal of SAT employees not later than February 1, 1973.

On January 11, 1973, a new proposal was submitted to purchase
SAT for a total price of $5,605,000. The former owner cited a tenta-
tive commitment for a loan of $4.0 million and his offer was con-
tingent upon an additional loan. The offer called for a total payment
of $5,605,000 broken down as follows :

In millions

Acquisition of SAT stock $2. 145

Payment of debt to Air America 3. 125

Credit for payments to Air America since 10 June 1972 in liquida-
tion of long term debt . 335

Total payment 5.605

Prior to accepting the offer, CIA officers again discussed the sale
of SAT with a CAB representative, who indicated that the board
would be interested in seeing SAT continued. The CAB representa-
tive stated that it would not be necessary to surface tlie Agency's name
as the true owner of SAT in the CAB proceedings, and that he did not
anticipate any problems with other supplemental carriers as a result
of the sale.

On January 19, 1973, the DCI approved the sale of SAT. It was
noted that the offer was within 5 percent of the original asking price,
was above the independent evaluation for sale as a going concern, and
was at a figure which would not seem to give the buyer windfall profit.
The sale would constitute a clean break-away of SAT from the
Agency with the exception of a one year extension on the lease/pur-
chase agreement with Air America for an L 100-30 aircraft. This
agreement for sale between the former owner and the Agency in-
cluded a provision that any profit derived from the sale of assets
within one year would constitute a windfall and would be added to
the total sale price.

On FelH-uary 28, 1973, the Board of Directors of SAT executed
corporate action on the Agreement for Sale of SAT to the former
owner. Closing date was established at not later than 30 days after
CAB approval. On March 1, 1973 application for approval of acquisi-

244

tion of control of SAT by the former owner was filed with the CAB
under Docket No. 252-64. It was anticipated that CAB approval would
be forthcoming within 60 days.

Subsequent to the agreement for sale and application to CAB, sev-
eral supplemental carriers generated a great deal of pressure to pre-
-vent SAT from being sold to the former owner and to prevent SAT
from operating as a supplemental carrier. This pressure was applied
through Congressional representatives, the General Accounting Office,
and the General Services Administration. The various supplemental
carriers objected to the sale of SAT for a variety of reasons. Basically
each supplemental objected to the portions of SAT's operating author-
ity which would allow SAT to compete with it. Specifically, repre-
sentatives of one competitor indicated that it would not oppose the
sale if the new owner would voluntarily renounce his rights to Trans-
Pacific routes.

Two other companies objected to SAT operating any aircraft as
large or larger than a 727 in the Far East. Another objected to SAT
bidding on any domestic MAC contracts. Restricting SAT to satisfy
all potential competitors could make SAT sufficiently unattractive as
a profitable investment that financing would be unobtainable. With
this in mind the Agency took the position that agreement for sale of
SAT had been executed, subject to CAB. approval. If the CAB ruled
against the sale and ownership reverted to the Agency, the Agency
would cease any bids or service under MAC contracts and dissolve
SAT.

Two supplemental expressed interest in bujdng SAT. One did not
make a cash offer, but on June 29, 1973, the other made a cash offer
of about $2 million in excess of what the former owner liad offered.
According to the Agency, there were compelling reasons not to pur-
sue these offers. Agency officers had reason to believe tliat the supple-
mentals were not interested in actually buying SAT as they were
attempting to secure a commitment from the Agency which could be
used to compromise the CIA's position in future CAB hearings. Three
reasons for not accepting either offer were :

(1) Any merger with another supplemental carrier would
necessitate a very difficult series of CAB hearings during
which all other major supplementals would certainly voice
loud and strenuous objections.

(2) To sell the firm on a sole source basis to either outside
buyer without soliciting public bids would be contrary to
sound business practice, and would attract even more adverse
publicity.

(3) Both offers were made directly to officials of the CIA
and not to the stockholders of record. Although the relation-
ship between the CIA and SAT was the subject of much
public speculation, the relationship was still classified and an
acceptance of either offer would be a violation of security
and cover.

Dissolution 6i the firm, or sale to the former owner, continued as the
most acceptable method of divestiture, subject to CAB approval.
In view of the objections by other supplemental carriere to the sale
of SAT to its former owner, and the award by the Air Force of a
Logistics Air contract to SAT, the DCI directed on July 31, 1973,

245

that SAT be dissolved, that it withdraw from the LOGAIR contract
and withdraAV its application for renewal of supplemental certificate.
The former owner was advised of this decision and made a counter
offer to purchase the company under his previous offer. He also pro-
posed that SAT return its supplemental certificate, withdraw applica-
tion for acquisition for sale from CAB, and operate as a commercial
carrier under Federal Aviation Regulation Part 121 authoi'ity. Such
action would remove SAT from direct competition with the supple-
mentals, but retain a worthwhile market in which to operate. Addi-
tionally, no CAB hearing would be necessary to obtain this type of
operating authority. On October 1, 1973, the DCI agreed to entertain
the proposal to continue the sale of SAT as a Part 121 operator, on
the condition that the former owner obtain prompt financing. Other-
Avise, the firm would be dissolved.

On October 5, 1973, the SAT Board of Directors approved and
executed a new agreement for sale including the following provisions :

(1) The former owner to acquire stock of SAT and Actus
for $2,145,000.

(2) The former owner to pay off $3,125,000 owed to Air
America.

(3) Agreement subject to the former owner obtaining
$4 million loan.

(4) Agreement to be subject to SAT withdrawing applica-
tion for renewal of its Certificate of Necessity and Con-
venience for an Air Carrier (Supplemental Certificate).

(5) Lease/purchase agreement for L-lOO between AAM
and SAT to be extended one year.

(6) Anti- windfall provision to be effective for one year
from date of sale.

On November 29, 1973, the former owner received a commitment
from The First National Bank of Chicago for a loan of $4.5 million
thereby making the October 5, 1973 agreement operative. On Novem-
ber 30, 1973, the DCI approved the sale of SAT in accordance with
the October 5 agreement for sale. On the same day, the application to
the CAB for acquisition of SAT under Docket No. 252-64 was with-
drawn and petition for cancellation of certificate and termination of
exemption authority was filed with an effective date of December 30,
1973. On December 31, 1973 the sale was closed, the note to Air
America was paid off, and the former owner became the sole owner
of SAT.

In early January 1974, CIA officials learned from Air America
management that SAT had exercised the purchase option of the lease/
purchase agreement between SAT and Air America for the Lockheed
L 100-30 Hercules aircraft. The option sale price from Air America
was $3,150,000. SAT immediately resold the aircraft to Saturn Air-
ways for $4,350,000, for a profit of $1.2 million. The Agency inter-
preted this sale as a violation of the anti-windfall provisions of its
agreement with the owner. On January 25, 1974, Air America executed
an Escrow and Arbitration Agreement on behalf of the CIA with
SAT on the disputed $1.2 million profit. The agreement called for
$750,000 to be placed in escrow with the American Security and
Trust Company of Washington, D.C. The escrow funds were to be
held as a Certificate of Deposit purchased at the prevailing market

\ 246

rate. It was further agreed that SAT would also place in escrow a
Promissory Note to Air America for the remaining $450,000 of the
disputed amount. The note was to bear interest at the same rate cur-
rently being earned on the Certificate of Deposit in escrow. It was
arranged that the escrow deposits plus accrued interest would be paid
to the party deemed in favor by an arbitrator with each party to pay
one-half of the costs of arbitration. On September 5, 1974 the arbi-
trator ruled in favor of Air America. This decision caused an addi-
tional $1,304,243 to accrue to the Agency from the SAT sale. This
was the sum of the $1.2 million under arbitration plus accrued interest,
less the Agency's share of arbitration costs.

3. Declassification of RelationsMqj With CIA

In March 1974 the employees of SAT retained an attorney and
brought a class action suit in U.S. District Court for Southern Flor-
ida against Southern Air Transport, Inc. and the Central Intelligence
Agency. The employees as plaintiffs sued for injunctive relief and
damages. In this suit the employees alleged :

(1) That the CIA sold the stock of SAT to the former
owner illegally,

(2) That SAT had embarked on a program to sell off its
assets, depriving the plaintiffs of employment,

(3) That the plaintiffs were entitled to the benefits of the
CIA Retirement and Disability System, and

(4) That their civil rights had been violated.

In view of the publicity arising from the allegations made by the
other supplemental carriers during the CAB proceedings and the
publicity arising from this suit, it was determined that no useful
purpose would be served by continuing to deny the true ownership
relationship of SAT by CIA. The operational activities performed
by SAT on behalf of CIA were and remain classified. As a part of the
Agency's defense in this suit, an affidavit of the Deputy Director for
Management and Services of the CIA was presented in court.

In the affidavit he delineated the relationship between the CIA and
SAT and the authorities for purchasing and later selling the capital
stock of SAT. He also defined the employment status of the plaintiffs
as not being government employees and not being CIA employees,
and therefore not being eligible for participation in the CIA Retire-
ment and Disability System.

In the Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment, the court
found that the sale of SAT capital stock was not in violation of law ;
that the plaintiffs' claim to be U.S. Government employees and en-
titled to CIA retirement benefits was invalid ; and that the SAT em-
ployees were not deprived of any civil right under any state law.
As a result, the action was dismissed with prejudice as to the plaintiff.
Although this suit did cause the relationship between the Agency and
SAT to be officially disclosed, it did establish, in a court of law, two
points favorable to the Agency :

a. The sale of SAT violated no laws and was within the
authority of the DCI ; and

b. The directly hired employees of CIA owned proprietary
firms such as SAT do not necessarily enjoy the status of Fed-
eral Government employees.

247

If. Possible Confyict of Interest

In the SAT divestiture, the Agency took precautions to avoid con-
flict of interest. A retired staff agent who had been the IVIanaging
Director of Air America, Inc., made several offers to acquire SAT.
In early 1972 he and some other members of Air America management
made an informal offer to buy SAT. On August 7, 1972, the retired
staff agent told the Agency official responsible for the management
of SAT and Air America, that he, in association with two supple-
mentals, wanted to offer "book value" for SAT. He stated that they
were not interested in SAT's certificate, but rather in the equipment
and that if allowed to make an offer, it would be one that would not
require CAB hearings. In both cases, the CIA General Counsel deter-
mined that due to the offeror's close association with the Agency, the
offer was miacceptable. In later discussions, the retired staff agent
asked to be allowed to bid on SAT in open bidding. The General
Counsel's position on this request was that open bids would not solve
the conflict of interest problems. In any transaction this complex,
selecting the bid is only a preliminary to the negotiated flnal sale.

Another potential conflict of interest involved another supplemental
air carrier. From the time the Agency first decided to divest until the
sale was consummated, this company expressed continuing interest in
merging with SAT. Their representative was a former Director of
Central Intelligence, who made literally dozens of phone calls to
Agency officials and arranged many meetings ; all for the purpose of
pressing this company's case to purchase SAT. The company also
proposed to arrange "shadow financing*' for the former owner of SAT
if he would agi^ee to merge at some later time. These offers were all
rejected because merger with another supplemental was not an accept-
able solution and the apparent conflict of interest was too great.

The sale of SAT to its former owner was another area of possible
conflict of interest. "While the f onner OAvner was not an employee of the
Federal Government during any period of association with SAT or
CIA, he had been the owner prior to CIA acquisition, and had been
nominal president of SAT during Agency ownership. This potential
area of conflict had been recognized at the outset of sale proceedings,
and the Agency obtained third party professional evaluation and
restricted windfall profits to prevent such conflicts. The underlying
philosophy for sale back to the former owner was to restore the status
quo ante^ i.e. return of the corporation to its previous ownei'ship once
the need for a Government-controlled entity had terminated.

E. Financial Aspects

1. Relations with Other U.S. Government Agencies

Management and control of proprietaries often requires "coopera-
tive interface" with outside agencies to gain beneficial working rela-
tionships and appropriate authorizations. These relationships are de-
scribed briefly below.

For those proprietaries which maintain commercial books and other
financial records, commercial managers prepare United States and
State tax returns annually, based on the corporation's financial rec-

248

ords. For other entities where only internal Agency records are main-
tained, Agency specialists prepare tax returns which reflect normal
operations of a legitimate commercial business. The Agency maintains
close coordination with the Internal Kevenue Service, which is aware
of the CIA's use of proprietary commercial entities but not of specific
proprietaries' identities. In the event the IRS singles out an Agency
proprietary for an audit, the Office of General Counsel notifies IRS
of CIA ownership. The IRS then cancels the audit to conserve
manpower.

Operation of the air proprietaries has resulted in contact with the
Civil Aeronautics Board, the Federal Aviation Agency and the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board. Specific problems have been dis-
cussed, usually between the Office of General Counsel of the agency
concerned and the CIA General Coun^l.

The air proprietaries have dealt with State Department and the
Agency for International Development, generally on a contractor/
customer basis, although senior personnel of those agencies have
been advised by the Agency of its ownership of the companies.

Those proprietaries engaged in the shipment of weapons or other
items on the Munitions Control list have required CIA assistance in
obtaining the necessary export licenses. The ownership of the com-
panies has been discussed with the State Department Office of Muni-
tions Control, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.
While the radio proprietaries were funded by the CIA, they received
policy guidance from the Department of State to ensure that their
broadcasts conformed to United States foreign policy. The Agency
has intervened with the Department of Labor on behalf of survivors
of employees of the proprietaries in order to assist them in receiving
the available benefits under the applicable Workmen's Compensation
Acts. The Agency has also interceded with the Defense Department
to have proprietaries' contracts exempted from the Renegotiation
Board.

The CIA has requested that the Air Force consider the interests
of the Agency in awarding com.mercial contracts to proprietaries.
Initially this was done in the mid-1950s on the basis of a policy deci-
sion by the Operations Coordination Board that Air America was an
instrument of value to national security. Air America was then oper-
ating at a deficit, and the Agency was able to maintain a standby capa-
bility without budget subsidies if it could obtain enough business to
support large commercial aircraft. Finally, the United States Forest
Service was advised of the ownership of a proprietary and asked to
award contracts to the proprietary to assist the development of a
commercial posture.

2. Magnitiide of United States Financial Stokes

Most proprietaries are small-scale operations. In many cases (the
notionals), the overseas proprietary actually conducts no business at
all ; it simply has a commercial charter, staff, and cover arrangements
for Agency collection and action projects.

Proprietary income consists of a mixture of CIA subsidy and in-
come. In some cases, the outside income is from sources outside the
United States Government income, e.g.. Air America received income

249

for aircraft maintenance of foreign airlines in Southeast Asia. For
the most part, proprietary income is in the form of "cross-orders" from
CIA and otliei- Government agencies. For example, a CIx^ paramilitaiy
project placed orders for aircraft engines and pilot services with
the Agency proprietary, Intermountain Aviation, Inc., and AID
contracted with Air America to carry rice shipments in Laos. In this
sense, many proprietaries are analogous to what are traditionally
termed "intragovernmental funds" or "industrial funds" in United
States Government budget and accounting manuals.

Compared with earlier years, the current size of proprietary ex-
penditures has markedly declined. The potential for future expansion
is nevertheless present. Indeed, new proprietaries have been formed
within the last several years.

In terms of United States budgetary impact, proprietaries do not
add significant new capital to CIA available resources, i.e., while
they have a very large expenditure level and momentum over the
years, most of these expenditures originated in the CIA and other
United States Government appropriations, and the net profits gen-
erated by outside business and investment have been relatively small.
Another way of interpreting the figures is to observe that nearly half
the $1.6 billion gross income of CIA proprietaries has been supplied
by sources outside the CIA.

The Committee reviewed the pattern of income, expense, and net
United States investment for the twenty largest proprietaries now
active, including their financial experience in the twelve months pre-
ceding June 30, 1975. The two largest proprietaries. Air America and
the insurance complex, dwarf the rest. While Air America will be
phased out by June 30, 1976, ending the CIA-owned airlift capability
and returning an estimated $20 million to the United States Treasury,
the insurance complex will continue.

In programmatic terms, the contrast between the current low levels
of proprietary activity and the high levels of five years ago reflects
the decline of paramilitary operations in Southeast Asia. Large vol-
umes of outside orders by Defense and AID, along with sizable levies
by CIA components, and maintenance and passenger income from
commercial operations, were generated by a covert war.

Looking toward the future, will new air proprietaries be estab-
lished? The CIA thinks not, but the matter is not resolved. The ulti-
mate question is whether there will be future United States involve-
ment in covert wars — and if so, can some substitute for CIA-owned
air support meet the operational requirements of secure, well-main-
tained local aircraft ? The Chief of CSS suggested that third-country
assets could be used instead. Another possibility is the use of United
States military aircraft, overtly or "sanitized."

One thing is clear: CIA sees itself as entering a different era of
proprietaries. It has rejected the long-held doctrine of "standby" capa-
bility, i.e., the notion that it is worth investing considerable capital
and operating resources in airlift, sealift, and other assets primarily
targeted toward contingency requirements. Agency representatives
maintain that the CIA is keeping proprietaries focused on current
operational tasks. The test of retention is the utility of a proprietary
in executing assigned tasks instrumental to approved Agency projects.

69-983 O - 76 - 17

250

Generally, the notionals have increased by about 30 percent since
1967, This reflects a policy of increasing the number of cutout arrange-
ments to increase security, i.e., to reduce one likelihood of outside
discovery of agents or case officers working under cover of the end-
point notional by introducing intermediate notionals for payments or
identity backstops.

What are the basic distinctions of one type of proprietary from
another? First, extemal registration divides the total in half. Those
which have some form of legal standing with domestic and foreign
corporate regulatory and tax authorities are subject to external gov-
ernmental scrutiny. This occasions additional expenses and manpower
to assure that in all respects this group of proprietaries operates in
accordance with local law and commercial expectations. The second
group, the notionals, exist only as names on doors, in phone director-
ies, and on stationary. Backstopping for identification of these pro-
prietaries is provided by Agency switchboards, mailstops, and check
issuance.

The next level of distinction is within the class of legally I'egistered
proprietaries: those which carry on a commercial income-producing
operation as contrasted to those which are simply cover arrangements.
Within the class of commercial proprietaries which produce income,
there is a distinction between those which are wholly dependent upon
CIA for income (in the form of orders placed and subsidies) and
those which have mixed outside and inside income. Even for those
with mixed income, it is possible to distinguish those which have out-
side income wholly within the United States Government (i.e., a mix
of CIA-derived income and income from other Government agencies)
from those which have botli United States Government income and
income from private contracts.

3. Vwihility in the Budget

Budgetary accountability to the President and Congress depends
upon the extent to which the Federal agencies' budget requests pro^dde
information to facilitate evaluation. Circular A-11, issued by the
Office of Management and Budget, prescribes the financial schedules
and explanatory data which all Federal agencies must provide in their
budget submissions. These provisions are consistent with the Budget
and Accounting Acts of 1920 and 1950. The Central Intelligence
Agency regards itself as subject to these prescriptions. The Agency
limits the application of this principle to providing only the A-11
materials which 0MB and the Congress specifically request. This
policy has resulted in near invisibility of proprietaries in the CIA
iDudget submission.

Circular A-11 requires agencies to provide schedules and narratives
for each public enterprise or intragovernmental fund. This data is
to include all sources of funding purposes and levels of expenditure,
and approximate indications of performance through comparisons of
past and proposed funding by activity. Under these regidations, it
appears that the CIA should have been providing a complete set of
schedules for the proprietaries which actually do business, i.e., exclud-
ing notionals.

The question of the programmatic impact of proprietaries should
also be considered. While proprietaries have been heavily involved

2151

in CIA intelligence collection and covert action, these activities have
not been reflected in the CIA budget submission. A policy review
of the budget requires programmatic judgments of the necessity and
appropriate use of proprietaries in overseas areas. The Contingency
Reserve Fund is an example of why such clear budgetary information
is necessary. Recent debate concerning U.S. involvement in Angola
has brought into sharp focus the role of this fund. All United States
aid to forces in Angola came from the Contingency Reserve.

The only place in the budgets of the CIA where proprietaries have
assumed even a limited visibility is in the years when supplemental
financing was needed to establish or strengthen a proprietary. When
such financing is necessary, the budget shows, tersely, that Con-
tingency Reserve drawdowns have been made. For example, one past
budget showed a certain amount to subsidize Radio Free Europe, but
provided no justifying materials. This practice reflects the unwritten,
2)ost hoc nature of the Contingency Reserve financing process. In ef-
fect, these practices allow executive branch "supplementals" in which
Congress is informed after the 0MB has acted.

The budget does not normally indicate Agency intentions to create
a proprietary in the budget year ahead. For any other Federal agency,
establishing a new publicly owned enterprise without advance notice
to the Appropriations and substantive committees of Congress would
be proscribed. Proprietaries which require only small subsidies to get
under way are funded by the CIA without supplemental financing,
i.e., within its regular budget. Therefore, these proprietaries are com-
pletely invisible in the Agency budget submission.

F. Some General Considerations

1. The Relaticmship of Utility to Size

The Committee's review revealed a dilemma faced by CIA planners.
Proprietaries can sometimes be most effective in operations when they
are large ; indeed, as in Laos, they may be impelled toward enormity
by the very nature of the operation. Yet large size conflicts with deni-
ability. In areas of the world where there are few operating firms,
and in types of activity which have only limited commercial appeal,
where would large-scale enterprises get financing but from the United
States Government ? Operations in Laos simply could not be concealed
in the end. This experience suggests that proprietaries may have only
limited utility in future paramilitary operations.

2. The Factor of Competition with Private Enterprises

Do CIA proprietaries which produce income compete unfairly with
private United States businesses ? Is their utility to the Government of
such magnitude that CIA proprietaries should be retained regardless
of their competitive impact ? Generally, the Agency believes that op-
erating proprietaries do not compete with United States private enter-
prise because they tend to do things which private companies are not
equipped, motivated, or staffed to perform.

For example, CIA proprietaries purchase weapons, foreign arma-
ments, and technical devices; conduct security investigations; purchase
real estate ; insure uninsurable risks ; train foreign police forces ; and

252

run airlines in remote areas or on commercially unattractive routes.
Would private enterprise do any or all of these things ? It is true that
private contracts with the Government include highly sensitive con-
tracts with the CIA for technical intelligence collection, research, and
development. Would the abandonment of CIA proprietaries and the
cooperation of private firms be more desirable in terms of policy,
economy or flexibility ?

3. Relative Scarcity of Corrvmercial and Official Cover

The continuing CIA desire for more notionals reflects the scarcity
of United States Government official cover in many areas of the world,
and the developing desire of some United States companies not to
cooperate with the Agency.

4. Profits

Some questions concerning profits have been raised. Does proprie-
tary profit constitute a significant addition to the resources available
to CIA ? How is such profit treated in the budget ? How is it controlled ?
How can the Congress (or the President, for that matter) be sure that
proprietary profits are not diverted to projects not included in the
regular CIA budget ?

First, profits (defined as net income to a proprietary after deduc-
tion of operating expenses) are relatively small. Even in the days
when the most profitable air proprietaries were operating at peak
capacity, the most that any single firm netted was less than $4 million.
Over the entire period 1947-1975, total profits have been $50 million,
an average of about $1.6 million annually, for the 16 biggest CIA
proprietaries. And in these years, a net loss was sustained three times —
$2.5 million in 1971 ; $0.5 million in 1973 ; and $0.3 million in 1975.

Looking to the future, after liquidation of the air proprietaries has
been completed, there is forecast to be only one profitable proprietary :
the complex of insurance companies which derives most of its profit
from investment portfolios. This entity's net income in 1974 was less
than $2 million and a profit of this general magnitude is expected in
the foreseeable future. These profits are to be used only for the in-
surance, escrow, annuity and related complex functions. Neither the
complex, nor profits accruing to it, are used for operational support of
any other projects or activities. Nevertheless profits from all proprie-
taries may be reprogrammed into CIA operations due to a "change in
policy" reflected in the General Counsel's decision of February 3,
1975.^° Thus proprietaries do not presently provide a mechanism for
"back door" funding of covert operations ; nor are they currently in-
tended to do so.^^

The current Chief of CCS noted that :

It may be the questions that have been raised by the staffs
of this Committee and of the House Committee, have kind of
energized certain action as far as our Comptroller is con-
cerned, as far as the Office of Management and Budget is
concerned, and a methodology is being developed at the pres-
ent time that the balance sheets of the salient information of

*° Chief, CCS, 1/27/76, pp. 80-81.
"" IU6,., p. 79.

253

the operation of proprietaries, particularly those that are
having earnings, are annexed to the budgetary presentation
process and review process, so that this information is avail-
able to the Office of Management and Budget, and I assume
to Congress, so that this can be taken into consideration.

And you would then have, it seems to me, a degree of safe-
guard that money cannot be taken out of there and used as
an add-on to appropriated funds.''^

According to the testimony, from 1973 to 1975, before the opinion
was rendered by the General Counsel of the CIA concerning profits
and their treatment, the Appropriations Committees were advised
that such profits existed, and "it was taken into consideration at the
time of appropriations."

In the future, I would think that any oversight committee
could very promptly bring to the attention of the DCI their
interest in this question of profit, and ask for an accounting,
and certainly could be assured that there Avas no use of funds
derived from a proprietary for an operational purpose un-
related to such activity.

I would think . . . the DCI would be under the same
prohibition using funds that were appropriated for the in-
telligence directorate for operational purposes or any other
comparable redesignation of f unds.^^

When asked whether funds built up in a complex such as the in-
surance proprietary should be used for purposes beyond those in-
cluded in an annual authorization, an Agency representatiA^e replied :

I would xiew them as segregated funds to the extent that
there was a profit, unnecessary for the purposes of the propri-
etary, that the profit would have to be turned over to the
Treasury and it could not be used for other Agency
programs.''*

As for the treatment in the budget, there are both policy and pro-
cedural aspects. The policy of CIA was changed by the February 1975
General Counsel ruling that profits of proprietaries and proceeds of
liquidation must be returned to the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts,
and cannot be used to augment the Contingency Reserve or otherwise
be applied to operations. This ruling overturned the practice of the
past which on occasion included the transfer of proprietaries' net
proceeds to the Contingency Reserve for later release to operations.

The budgetary presentation and review procedures only partially
focus upon proprietary profits. The insurance complex's profits are
invisible in the Agency budget; they are taken into account and subject
to scrutiny only within CIA. Operationally, the Directorate of Opera-
tion's annual review has the most detailed grasp of these monies at the
Agency review levels. A standard set of public enterprise fund sched-
ules, as prescribed by OMB Circular A-11, would be appropriate for
making this complex visible in the Agency budget. Other commercial
proprietaries should show these schedules as well. The Agency has in-

'- Ibid. pp. 82-83.

"" IMd. p. 84.

" lUd. pp. 84-85.

" 254

dicated that the Comptroller is working with the Directorates of Op-
erations and Administration to develop more comprehensive budget-
ary presentation and review procedures for CIA proprietaries.

To what extent can these new procedures prevent abuses of pro-
prietary profits ? To what extent do they preclude the need for legisla-
tion in this area? What form of Congressional oversight is needed
here ; at what point should Congress exert control.

Improvement of visibility in the budget of proprietary resources
and provision for review of the major proprietaries as a regular part
of budget review by CIA, OMB, and Congressional Committees would
seem to preclude most of the dangers of abuse. On the other hand, there
is one type of abuse for which additional Congressional scrutiny and
safeguards may be needed : the possibility of a small-scale, high-risk
covert project directed by the President or DCI which is not covered
by the regular appropriation but financed by proprietary profits.
While no foolproof preventives can be designed by law or regulation,
the possibility of such abuse, or the avoidance of congressional review,
can be minimized by requiring that all CIA proprietaries report opera-
tional activities to the congressional oversight committee.^'^

5. Private Investment hy CIA

Two types of general issues are raised by investments made by the
Agency :

( 1 ) Should the CIA engage in investments which could accumulate
funds outside the budget process and thus be available for operations
that have no public scrutiny outside CIA ?

(2) Is CIA investment policy too restrictive in regard to bank de-
posits ? Specifically, should the CIA place large amounts of money in
commercial banks without drawing interest ?

A sizable percentage of the Agency's annual appropriated and
advanced funds are deposited here and abroad in commercial accounts
on an incremental basis to fund operational needs. If accounts are
maintained at levels above the minimum balance necessary for offset
costs to the bank, the banks selected earn an interest or investment
bonus. The selection of these institutions is non-competitive, rooted in
historic circumstance, albeit in institutions that have shown them-
selves flexible and responsive in providing the Agency services. Fur-
ther investigation of this area is needed, and we encourage the new
oversight committee to study this issue in greater detail than we have
been able. This is one area where the exclusion of the General Ac-
counting Office from CIA audits has had an unfortunate effect: there
is no outside reviewer of a complex set of financial records and, con-
sequently, confidence in the Agency's role in this area may have been
eroded.

6. What is the Future for Proprietaries?

No new proprietaries are in formation or planned. This past fiscal
year, 1975, one new proprietary was created which rented office space
for an East Coast CIA base and provided cover for Agency employees.
The main provision for new growth is the plan of some years standing
for establishment in the insurance complex of several corporate

* See Recommendation 50.

256

"sliells" i.e., legally constituted and registered companies that do
very little commercial business but which can be adapted to various
new CIA missions. To adapt to these new missions, as noted, would
require CIA to amend the insurance complex Administrative Plan.
But this could be done quickly ; the existence of the shells avoids the
leadtime of creating new corporate entities, with all the complications
of local laws and risk of exposure.

While CIA proprietaries are now smaller than previously, they are
so largely for administrative reasons, i.e., response to executive branch
directions. Although the CIA may never find proprietary expansion
to be operationally desirable, there is currently no statutory constraint
on such expansion. Congress should be a partner in the process of
reviewing any such expansion by providing for changes in the charter
process. Another approach is establishing substantive guidelines for
proprietary operation. This approach is typified by the post-Katzen-
bach guidelines that prohibit CIA operation of tax-exempt foun-
dations.

Lawrence R. Houston, the former General Counsel of the Agency,
was intimately involved with all of the proprietaries for his entire
tenure with CIA. Consequently, his views have been invaluable to
the Committee in reviewing and evaluating the history and the role
of these mechanisms. In the coui'se of far-ranging testimony with the
Committee on several occasions Houston concluded that proprietaries
"should be the last resort for use to backstop Agency activities." He
grounded his opinion on the fact that :

they are cumbersome. To be properly run they take many,
many man-hours of many, many different parts of the
Agency, so they are expensive in man-hours. There are built-
in difficulties in running what appears to be a normal busi-
ness for operational purposes. There's really a built-in dichot-
omy there that leads to a continual conflict with policies. And
due to the number of people involved, there is a security prob-
lem on the old grounds that security doesn't go by the mathe-
matical increase in the number of people. It goes geometri-
cally as to the number of people, the security risk.^''

This assessment appears to be correct based on the evidence reviewed
by the committee.

The current Director of Central Intelligence has insisted on stream-
lining such operations and is keenly aware of the potential for abuse.
It is, for example, the current written policy of the Agency that "to
the degree that domestic proprietary or cover companies are required,
?. clear justification will be developed as to the relationship of their
support of our overseas operations." ^'

In the one area of continuing large-scale activity, the investment
complex, the Agency has moved to insure propriety even in an area
where there is no evidence that any illegal conduct has occurred. The
current policy, established as of June 1975 is :

[The project] will be operated in conformance with appro-
priate legal i-estrictions. Arrangements are being made for the

■^ Houston. 1/1.5/76. p. 4.

^ Memorandum of the DCI, 6/75.

256

briefing of the appropriate Congressional committees. Par-
ticular attention will be given to avoiding any possible con-
flict of interest situations with firms with which the Agency
has contracts. Particular concern will also be exhibited over
possible improper influence on the stock market or stock deal-
ings through the investments involved in [the project] .^^

The Committee is mindful of the potential danger inherent in such
operations. Therefore, it recommends that the review of this and other
similar projects by the appropriate overeight Committees be most
stringent.

The disposal of proprietaries has also generally proceeded along
legal and ethical lines with more than due concern for conflicts of
interest. Most notable in this spectrum of actions was the degree to
which the Agency avoided conflicts of interest in the sale of Southern
Air Transport. Such internal vigilance no doubt should and will con-
tinue. Moreover, with the establishment of a permanent oversight com-
mittee, the CIA's reporting will be made easier because it will be able
to report on its dealings on a regular basis to informed Members of
Congress.

XII. CIA PRODUCTION OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE

The main purpose of the intelligence system of the United States is
to provide the President, his chief advisers, and the Congress in appro-
priate ways with the best information about activities abroad that can
be obtained. It is not surprising, therefore, that the quality of finished
intelligence produced by the intelligence agencies has been a source
of continuing concern and controversy. Policymakers are understand-
ably seldom satisfied with the intelligence they receive, for they want
and need intelligence which eliminates uncertainties and ensures suc-
cessful policy decisions. Since such perfection is unattainable, how-
ever, the realistic question is how to evaluate and improve the quality
of our finished intelligence. This is an extremely complicated and
difficult areia. The simple answer is that there are no objective criteria
or standards that can be universally applied. In the end, the assessment
by policymakei-s of the value and quality of our finished intelligence
is necessarily subjective. There is a record of steadily improved quality
over the years, but the need for a higher level of performance is ac-
cepted, 'both at the policy level and among the intelligence agencies of
the LT.S. Government.

The Committee's examination of the production of finished in-
telligence focused on the CIA and within it, the Directorate of In-
telligence (DDI). This is by no means the whole of national intelli-
gence, but it is the core element in the production of finished national
intelligence. The CIA's Directorate of Intelligence is by far the best
analytical organization for the production of finished intelligence
within the Government, but it does have shortcomings. The CIA for
its part has, in the view of the Committee, made creditable efforts to
improve the quality of flushed intelligence, although much remains to
be done.

Because the provision of the best possible fact and predictive anal-
ysis to our policymakers is the most important mission of our intelli-
gence system, the problems of the production of finished intelligence
will require the most searching and systematic examination by a future
oversight committee. The preliminary work of the Select Committee
in this area is based on interviews and hearings, as well as dociunents
from the Intelligence Community Staff concerning their post-mortems
of past intelligence failures. Because of the complexity and difficulty
of the subject matter, the examination of the Select Committee can only
be regarded as a beginning, onlv broadly indicative of the problems
involved, and suggestive of the areas which will require more thorough
and comprehensive attention in the future.

Although the provision of intelligence analysis to policymakers is
the major purpose of the intelligence m.ission, the production of in-
telligence has been referred to as the "stepchild of the community." ^
It is an area which has been overshadowed by the glamour of clande-
stine activities and the lure of exotic technical collection systems. Yet

(257)

2S8

the basic rationale for intelligence operations is the provision of in-
formation to the people who need it in order to do their jobs — the
President and other senior officials responsible for the formulation
and implementation of foreign policy.

The Pearl Harbor experience, which so heavily influenced the es-
tablishment of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, pointed to
the need for the collection, coordination, and analysis of all national
intelligence in a centralized fashion, so that policymakers could be
assured of receiving all the information they needed, when they
needed it. Finished intelligence represents the "payoif" of investment
in the plethora of collection activities.

The CIA and its predecessor body, the Central Intelligence Group,
were established to rectify the duplication and biases that existed in
the intelligence production of the State Department and the military
services. By reviewing and analyzing the data collected by these de-
partments, the CIA was to provide senior government officials with
high-quality, objective intelligence. In practice, however, the CIA
has given precedence to independent collection and production, be-
coming a competing department in the dissemination of information.

Historically, the departments resisted providing their data to the
Agency and thereby prevented the CIA from fulfilling its designated
role in the production of "coordinated" intelligence. Moreover, in-
dividual Directore of Central Intelligence have not been consistent
advocates of the Agency's intelligence production function. For the
DCIs, the demands of administering an organization with thousands
of employees and in particular, the requirements of supervising
clandestine operations encroached on the intended priority of intel-
ligence production. Only three DCIs attempted to address their pri-
mary attention to the quality of intelligence production : Walter
Bedell Smith, John McCone, and James Schlesinger. In each case, the
DCI's attitude was a function of his background, his relative strength
as Director, and the particular demands of his time in office.

In recent years, however, and particularly with the introduction of
advanced technical collection systems, the requirement for bringing
together the vast quantities of information into useable analytic forms
has become the primary concern of the intelligence community.

In the course of its investigation, certain problems and issues in the
area of the production of finished intelligence in the CIA have come
to the attention of the Committee. The Committee believes these prob-
lems deserve immediate attention by both the executive branch and
future congressional oversight bodies. These problems bear directly on
the priority given to finished intelligence by policymakers. Other issues
raised here, such as the personnel system of the DDI and the orga-
nizational structure of intelligence production, are really functions of
the larger issue of priorities.

Briefly defined, the production of intelligence is the process whereby
the data collected by the intelligence community is transformed into
mtelligence reports and studies that are relevant to the concerns of
senior policymakers. Intelligence production involves many tasks. It
begins with the collation and evaluation of incoming "raw" intelli-
gence reporting— direct from the collectors, whether from open
sources, the clandestine service, or signals intercepts and other means

^ Office of Management and Budget, "A Review of the Intelligence Community,"
3/10/71, (hereinafter cited as the Schlesinger Report) , p. 11.

259

of technical collection. The significance of new reporting is analyzed,
often in relation to intelligence already available on the subject. The
preparation of "finished" intelligence reports — the outcome of the pro-
duction process — thus entails the evaluation and analysis of the full
range of raw reporting from a variety of collection means.

Production of finished intelligence is done within the intelligence
community by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency (DIA), and the State Department's Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research (INR). Within the CIA (which is responsible
for the production of "national intelligence"), both the Intelligence
Directorate and the Directorate of Science and Technology (DDS&T)
produce finished intelligence. The Select Committee has focused on the
DDI, although the issues and problems cited are applicable in varying
degrees to the other production elements as well.

A. Evolution of the CIA's Intelligence Directorate

The scope of the DDI mission is global. It covers the affairs of any
foreign country from the standpoint of politics, economics, defense,
geography, cartography and biography. Scientific reporting is largely
the responsibility of the Directorate of Science and Technology.

The Directorate of Intelligence was formally established on Jan-
uary 2, 1952. Specifically, the intelligence activities which the DDI
originally administered were :

a. Production of finished intelligence by the Offices of Na-
tional Estimates (ONE), Current Intelligence (OCI), Re-
search and Reports (ORR), and Scientific Intelligence
(OSI).

b. Collection of essentially overt information by the Divi-
sions of the Office of Operations (00) : Foreign Broadcast
Information (FBID), Foreign Documents (FDD), and
Contacts (CD).

c. Dissemination, storage and retrieval of unevaluated in-
telligence information and basic reference documentation
by the Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD).

d. Coordination of intelligence collection by the Office of
Intelligence Coordination (OIC).

In the twenty-three years since its founding, the Intelligence Di-
rectorate has gone through a number of reorganizations stimulated
by advice from external panels, changing international circumstances,
shifting requirements for finished intelligence production, and re-
duced resources with which to perform its mission.^ Changes in the
first few years were fairly rare. In 1954, the OIC was abolished, and
in 1963 the Office of Scientific Intelligence was transferred to a new
Directorate for Science and Technology.

/. Intelligence Production

Estimative Intelliqence. — Producing National Intelligence Esti-
mates (NIEs) was the function of the Office of National Estimates

" The information contained in this section on the evolution of the DDI is de-
rived primarilv from a CIA paper prepared for the Select Committee by the
OflBce of the DDI, "The Directorate of Intelligence : A Brief Description". (Here-
inafter cited as "The Directorate of Intelligence.") December 1975.

260

which was in the Intelligence Directorate until 1966, when it became
a staff under the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence.
This move was made, in part, to emphasize that the NIEs were the
product of the entire intelligence community rather than a single
agency. ONE was abolished in 1973 and its responsibilities were trans-
ferred to the newly formed National Intelligence Officers attached to
the Office of the DCI. With this move, much of the work of producing
draft estimates reverted to the production offices of the Intelligence
Directorate.

Current Intelligence. — Primary responsibilities for producing cur-
rent intelligence remains where it has been since the Directorate was
established — in the Office of Current Intelligence. Originally, OCI
was responsible for all current intelligence reporting except economic.
At present, however, it concentrates on current political reporting,
leaving the preparation of reports on economic, military, geographic
and scientific developments to the research offices responsible for these
matters. OCI coordinates and consolidates this specialized reporting
on all subjects for presentation in its daily intelligence publications.

Basic InteUigenee. — Production of basic intelligence was stimulated
primarily by the realization in World AVar II that the U.S. Govern-
ment had too little information about many of the foreign countries
with which it was required to deal. The Basic Intelligence Division
(BID) or ORR was charged with responsibility for coordinating the
production of "factual intelligence ... of a fundamental and more
or less permanent nature on all foreign countries." Because of the scope
of the subject matter, the production of this type of intelligence
required a cooperative effort involving the resources and capabilities
of several departments and agencies of the Federal Government. The
product of this government-wide effort was known as the National
Intelligence Surveys (NIS).

In 1955, BID became a separate office, the Office of Basic Intelligence
(OBI). This was in line with recommendations made in May 1955 by
the Task Force on Intelligence Activities.^ The elevation of Basic
Intelligence to Office status was an acknowledgment of the importance
that the Agency and the rest of the national security apparatus
attached to the NIS Program.

The early years of OBI were devoted mostly to the coordination
of this program. Many of the chapters Avere written by other elements
of CIA or by other government agencies on a contractual basis. In
1961, OBI took over responsibility for the production of the political
sections of the NIS from the State Department's Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research when State claimed that it no longer had the re-
sources to do this work. OBI delegated the task of producing these sec-
tions to OCI in 1962. In 1965, the geographic research function was
transferred from the Office of Research and Reports, creating the Office
of Basic and Geographic Intelligence (OBGI) . The NISs continued to
be published until 1974 when the program was terminated because of
lack of resources. At this time, OBGI became the Office of Geographic
and Cartographic Research.

Military InteUigence. — Until the mid 1950's, the production of in-
telligence on military matters had been considered the primary respon-

^ The Clark Task Force, headed by Gen. Mark Clark, of the Hoover Commission.
For members of the task force, see Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 112-13.

261

sibility of the Department of Defense. But the "bomber gap" and later
the "missile gap" controvereies gave CIA a role in foreign military
research, an involvement which has continued and expanded. In 1960
the DDI created an ad hoc Guided Missiles Task Force to foster the
collection of information on Soviet guided missiles and to produce in-
telligence on their manufacture and deployment. The Task Force was
abolished in 1961 and a Military Research Area was established in
ORR. As a result of increasing demands for CIA analysis of militaiy
developments, a new Office of Strategic Research was established in
1967 by consolidating the Military-Economic Research Area of ORR
and the Military Division of OCI. The scope and focus of responsibili-
ties of OSR have increased over the years and in 1973 a new component
for research in Soviet and Chinese strategic policy and military
doctrine was added.

Oeographic Intelligence. — The Geographic Research Area (GRA)
of the Office of Research and Reports (ORR) originally had the re-
sponsibility for geographic intelligence production. The GRA was
transferred in 1965 to the Office of Basic Intelligence changing its title
to the Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence (OBGI). In 1974,
OBGI became the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research
when the National Intelligence Survey (NIS) Program was
abandoned.

Economic Intelligence. — Activity in this area remains the responsi-
bility of the organization that succeeded the Office of Research and
Reports in 1967 : the Office of Economic Research. In earlier yeai-s, the
Agency concentrated its economic research lai'gely on the Communist
states. In recent yeai-s, however, the Department of State has dropped
much of its intelligence production on the non-Communist areas, leav-
ing this job to the Agency. OER has also expanded its research into
such subject areas as interaational energy supplies and international
trade. Today it is the largest research office in the Intelligence
Directorate.

Biographic Intelligence. — The Hoover Commission Report of 1949
recommended dividing the responsibility for biographic intelligence
production within the Community to prevent costly duplicaton. As a
result, the foreign political personality files maintained by OCD
were transferred to State. In 1961, however, the Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research claimed it no longer had the resources to provide
this service and the responsibility for reporting on foreign political
personalities and, subsequently, for all non-military biographic intelli-
gence reporting was transferred to CIA. Tlie task was taken over by
OCD's successor organization, now the Central Reference Service,

In-Deyth Political Research. — In-depth foreign political intelli-
gence reporting has not been, until recently, represented in the Office
structure of the Intelligence Directorate. Originally, whatever efforts
were made in this field were concentrated in OCI. In 1962, a modest
step toward increased foreign political research was taken with the
establishment of a Special Research Staff (SRS) in the Office of the
Deputy Director for Intelligence. In recent years, however, the dimin-
ished role of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research in intelli-
gence community affairs, a perceived need for more sophisticated work
in this field by CIA, and the appearance of new methods of political re-

262

search, including computer applications, encouraged the Directorate to
invest more resources in this area. Accordingly, an Office of Political
Research (OPR) was established in 1974. It incorporated the Special
Research Staff, some people from OCI and the then disbanding Office
of National Estimates.

Round-the-Clock Watch/ Alert. — The Cuban Missile Crisis of the
fall of 1962 clearly spotlighted the need for a single Directorate fa-
cility for round-the-clock receipt of intelligence information and for
a center in which the expertise of all its offices could be rallied in
crisis situations. In March 1963, the DDI set up a Special Study
Group on DDI Organizational Tasks to study this and other problems.
One of the results of its work was the establishment of an operations
center under the administrative direction of the Office of Current Intel-
ligence (OCI) . Over the next ten years, the Operations Center grew in
size and capability, largely as a result of the Vietnam War. In 1974, it
was separated from OCI and renamed the CIA Operations Center, a
title warranted by the fact that all Directorates of the Agency now
maintain permanent duty officers within the Center. Today, the CIA
Operations Center provides the mechanism and facilities with which
the full information resources of CIA can be mobilized to work in
concert with the community in foreign crisis situations.

^. Intelligence Collection

At its founding in 1952, the Intelligence Directorate inherited the
Office of Operations (00) from the then Directorate of Plans — today's
Oj^erations Directorate. OO was composed of tliree main elements : the
Contact Division, the Foreign Broadcast Information Division, and
the Foreign Documents Division. The rationale for including these
components in the Intelligence Directorate was that their work was
essentially overt and thus inappropriately situated within the Clandes-
tine Service.

The Domestic Contact Service originated in the Central Intelli-
gence Group in 1946 as an outgrowth of the World War II effort to
insure that all domestic sources of information on foreign activities
were contacted by the Govei-nment. It was initially placed in OO to
kee]:) its essentially overt work separate from the clandestine activity
of the other major collection organizations. It maintained this sep-
arate status after the founding of CIA, but in 1951 joined the Di-
rectorate of PUms. This arrangement lasted for only one year, how-
ever, as the 00 and its Contact Division (CD) was moved to the In-
telligence Directorate in 1952. By 1958, CD was a network of offices
in 15 major cities and several smaller residencies established across
the U.S. With the abolition of OO in 1965, CD became an independent
office known as the Domestic Contact Service (DCS) and continued
in tliat status until the appointment of William Colby as DCI. In
1978, he decided that maintaining the separation of overtand covert
collection elements was less imj^ortant than the goal of consolidation
of all human collection capabilities in the Operations Directorate. Ac-
cordingly, the DCS was transferred to the Clandestine Service and
renamed the Domestic Collection Division.

Tlie Foreign Broadcast Information Division (FBID) had been
founded by the Federal Communications Commission in 1940. With
the advent of World War II, it was absorbed by the Office of War

263

Information n.nd, slioitly thereafter, became one of tlie original ele-
ments of the OSS. At the end of the war, it was briefly administered
by the Department of the Army liefore joining the Central Intelli-
gence Gronp in 1946. It was formally inclnded in the Agency's Direc-
torate of Plans at its fonnding in December 1950 and remained there
as part of OO until its transfer to the Intelligence Directorate in 1952.
By then it had established the worldwide network of broadcast moni-
toring bureaus which — with some alterations in location — it operates
today. FBI!) received the status of an independent office and was re-
named the Foreign Broadcast Information Service with the dissolu-
tion of the Office of Operations in 1965.

3. Infoj'mation Processing

Between the collection and production phases of the intelligence
process there is an activity known as "information processing." In-
formation processing involves special skills or equipment to convert
certain kinds of raw information into a form usable by intelligence
analysts who are producing finished intelligence. It includes things
like photointerpretation and translations of foreign documents as
well as the receipt, dissemination, indexing, storage, and retrieval of
the great volumes of data which must be available to the production
offices if they are to do their analytical work.

Information Dissemination^ Storage and Retrieval. — One of the
original offices of the Central Intelligence Group, the Office of Collec-
tion & Dissemination (OCD), began this work in 1948 when it in-
troduced business machines to improve reference, liaison and document
security services. Ultimately, this Office became CIA's own depart-
mental library and centralized document service. Its steady growth in
size and capabilities was given a boost in 1954, when responsibility
for the procurement of foreign documents was transferred to OCD
from the Department of State. Other specialized collections also
became a part of the holdings of that office, including those of motion
picture film and ]:)hotography. The systems of storage and retrieval
developed by OCD were unusually effective for that time and the Of-
fice began to gain recognition throughout the intelligence commu-
nity. In 1955, OCD was renamed the Office of Central Eeference to
more accurately reflect its Agency- wide responsibilities. In 1967, OCR
was renamed the Central Reference Service (CRS). Today, CRS can
offer intelligence analysts throughout the community some of the most
sophisticated information storage and retrieval systems to be found
anywhere in the world.

Photographic Intervretation. — CIA's work with photographic in-
terpretation began in 1952 and was initially centered in the Geographic
Research Area, ORR. In 1958, a new Photographic Intelligence Cen-
ter (PIC) Avas created by fusing the Photo Intelligence Division of
ORR with the Statistical' Branch of OCR. The new Center was given
office-level status and the responsibility for producing ])hotographic
intelligence and i)rovi(ling related services for CIA and the rest of the
Intelligence (\)ininunity. In 1961 PTC was further elevated to become
the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). This Cen-
ter was staffed by former members of PIC and DIA personnel detailed
to NPIC. All personnel were functionally under the Director, NPIC,
who continued to report to the DDL

2164

An interagency study conducted in 1967 concluded that NPIC's
national intelligence responsibilities had grown so substantially that
departmental imagery analysis requirements were not being ade-
quately served. Accordingly, the DDI established an Imagery Analysis
Service (IAS) as a separate office of the Directorate to deal exclusively
with the photo intelligence requirements of CIA. In 1973, it was
decided that NPIC would be more appropriately placed in the Direc-
torate of Science and Technology with other elements dealing with
reconnaissance at the national level.

Translation Services. — The Foreign Documents Division (FDD) of
the Office of Operations (OO) had its origin in the Army and Navy's
Washington Document Center. Founded in 1944, it was a repository
for captured Japanese and German records. It was absorbed by the
Central Intelligence Group in 1946 and, during the late forties, evolved
from a repository into an exploiter of all foreign language documents
coming into the community. It joined the Central Intelligence Agency
as part of OO in the Directorate of Plans. With the transfer of OO
to the Intelligence Directorate in 1952, FDD continued to expand its
work into the field of document exploitation, concentrating increas-
ingly on materials received from the communist countries. In 1964,
it w^as separated from OO to l)ecome part of the Office of Central
Reference (OCR). This arrangement lasted only three years, however,
as FDD was transferred again to become part of FBIS in 1967. The
intent of this move was to combine the Directorate's efforts to exploit
foreign media — radio and press — in a single service and to concen-
trate its major assets in terms of foreign language capabilities. FDD
remains in FBIS to this day, providing translation services for the
Agency, the community, and to a lesser degree, for the Government
and the general public.

DIRECTORATE 0.f= INTELLIGENCE

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE

CIA Operations COMIREX

Center Stall

Coileclion Giiidancc Executive

.ind and

AsscsDmenis Slalf Management Stalls

HOwi Oll.ceol Olf.ccof Otliceol Oll.cc ot OfflCOOf

^ Gcogrjiphic and

Political _,. v.- Current

Rcsc.trch «etca)ch'" InlcUiganco

Porcign
Brcadccist
Informaltor*

Service

265

B. The Intelligence Directorate Today

In FY 1976, the DDI had a rehitively small share of the Agency's
budget and pei-sonnel. Resources allocated to intelligence produc-
tion have represented a relatively steady percentage of the intelli-
gence budget over the years. Intelligence production is a people-inten-
sive activity, requiring relatively little in the way of supplies, equip-
ment, structures, and operational funding. The Intelligence Director
spends approximately 75 percent of its budget on salaries. Of the posi-
tions in the DDI, 74 percent are classified as professional and 2'6
percent as clerical. Of the total, 54 percent are directly involved in
"intelligence production" (researching data, analyzing information
and writing repoits), 28 percent are tasked with "intelligence proc-
essing" (performing reference and retrieval functions, preparing
pu})lications, or providing other support services), and 18% are in-
volved in "intelligence collection" (monitoring overt foreign radio
broadcasts and publications).^

The most important group of DDI products consists of the daily
intelligence publications, designed "to alert the foreign affairs com-
munity to significant developments abroad and to analyze specific
problems or broadly-based trends in the international arena." ^ Tliese
include the Presidenfs Daily Brief; the National Intelligence Daily ^
prepared for Cabinet and sub-Cabinet level consumers; and the Na-
tional Intelligence Bulletin^ distributed more broadly to the defense
and foreign affairs communities. The DDI issues a number of weekly
periodicals on specialized subjects, prepared in the research offices of
the directorate.

The DDI also produces in-depth and analytical studies on a periodic
or one-time basis. These are monographs on particular problems; some
are DDI-initiated, others respond to specific requests of the policy-
makers or their staffs. In addition, DDI analysts usually provide the
bulk of the staff work for the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) ,
which are prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence
Officers (NIOs).«

The Intelligence Directorate also performs a variety of coordinating
and analytical services in providing intelligence support to policy-
making. Most National Security Council (NSC) meetings begin with
an assessment of the current situation given by the DCI, and prepared
by DDI analysts. The DCI, similarly supported by DDI personnel,
also participates in an array of interagency policy groups (e.g., the 40
Committee, the Senior Review Group, the Washington Special Action
Group, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] Verifica-
tion Panel). The DCI's representatives are involved in lower-level
interdepartmental groups, including geographic area groups, func-
tional area groups, and ad hoc groups.

Analysts from DDI frequently contribute to the preparation of
National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs), which are usually

* "The Directorate of Intelligence," p. 4.
' lUd., p. 2.
« ima., p. 2.

69-983 O - 76 - 18

266

drafted by interagency groups under tlie direction of the NSC staff.
Often a NSSM will include an intelligence assessment of the problem
at hand as an annex to the memo itself ; this might also be summarized
in the text.

Three examples illustrate how the DDI contributes such intelligence
support. A SALT support staff has been assembled in CIA to coordi-
nate SALT-related activities of production offices in the DDI and
DDS&T. The staff serves as the point of contact to respond to intel-
ligence requirements generated by the NSC staff, the Verification
Panel, and the U.S. SALT delegation. The staff relies on the analytical
offices of the CIA for substantive intelligence.

In another case, after the 1973 Middle East war, the DDI was asked
to examine all aspects of possible Sinai withdrawal lines on the basis
of political, military, geographic, and ethnic considerations. Eight
alternative lines wei-e prepared for the Sinai, a number of which Secre-
tary of State Henry Kissinger used in mediating the negotiations
between Egypt and Israel.

Finally, the DDI provided assessments to the policy groups who
prepared U.S. positions for the Law of the Sea Conference in 1975,
including descriptions of the strategic straits under discussion, anal-
ysis of each country's undersea mineral resources, and information
about political positions the paiticipating countries would be likely
to take.^

The Issues

The Select Committee began its examination of intelligence produc-
tion by considei"ing the relationship between intelligence and policy,
and the limits of intelligence. These considerations served to highlight
certain problems in pi'oduction which the Committee feels deserve fur-
ther attention by both the executive branch and congressional over-
sight bodies. These problems bear on the key issues of quality, timeli-
ness and relevance of finished intelligence. They derive in large part
from the nature of presidential leadership and the particular emphasis
and preoccupations of successive Directors of Central Intelligence. In
the past, the national leadership has used the CIA more for operational
l)urposes than for its analytic capabilities. Other concerns derive from
the structure of the analytical personnel system, the intelligence cul-
ture and the nature of the intelligence process, the overload of the sys-
tem, the preoccupation with current events, and the lack of sufficient
quality control and consumer guidance and evaluation.

C. The Relationship Between Intelligence and Policy

The relationship between intelligence and policy is a delicate and
carefully balanced one. One witness told the Select Committee that
there is a "natural tension" between the two and that

if the policy-intelligence relationship is to work, there must
be mutual respect, trust, civility, and also a certain distance.
Intelligence people must proWde honest and best judgments
and avoid intrusion on decisionmaking or attempts to influ-
ence it. Policymakers must assume the integrity of the intelli-

^ Staff summary of briefing given by Edward Proctor (DDI), 4/24/7.5.

267

gence provided and avoid attempts to get materials suited to
their tastes.*
In recent years there has been a tendency on the part of high officials,
including Presidents and Secretaries of State, to call for both raw
reporting and finished intelligence to flow upwards through separate
channels, rather than through a centralized analytical component. This
has resulted in many cases in consumers doing the work of intelligence
analysts. Presidents and Secretaries of State have all too often relished
the role of "crisis managers", moving from one serious issue to another
and sacrificing analysis and considered judgment in the pressure of
events. In between crises, their attention is turned to other pressing-
matters, and careful long-range analysis tends to be set aside.

By circumventing the avaihible analytical process, the consumers
of intelligence may not only be depriving themselves of the skills of
intelligence professionals; they may also be sacrificing necessary time
and useful objectivity. In making his own intelligence judgment based
on the large volume of often conflicting reports and undigested raw
intelligence instead of on a well-considered finished piece of in-
telligence analysis, a high official may be seeking conclusions more
favorable to his policy preferences than the situation may in fact
warrant.

The essential questions about the intelligence product concern its
usefulness to the policymakers for whom it is intended. Does intelli-
gence address the right questions? Does it deliver the kinds of infor-
mation and insights policymakers need in order to make foreign policy
decisions? Is it timely ? Is it presented and disseminated in the manner
and format most useful to the consumers? Will they read it in other
than crisis situations? The answers to these questions are by no means
simple. Still, the Select Committee believes they are deserving of
examination — and periodic reexamination — in the interests of main-
taining an effective intelligence service.

While intelligence analysts have a very good record in the area
of technical assessment (e.g., hard data on foreign military hard-
ware), the record is weaker in qualitative judgments, trend fore-
casting, and political estimating. While analysts may be able to
furnish fairly complete and reliable reporting on tangible factors
such as numbers and make-up of Soviet strategic missile forces, they
are not as good at assessing such intangibles as Avhy the Soviets are
building such a force. The problem pertains to other issues, too, for
example, in analyzing the likely negotiating stance of a particular
country in economic negotiation's of intei-est to the ITnited States.

In particular, some policymakers feel that intelligence analysts
have not been especially helpful to jwlicvmakers on the more subtle
questions of political, economic, and militarv intentions of foreign
groups and leaders. The view from the top is, of course, very different
from tlie view held by analysts in the departments and agencies or
in the field. Too often analysts are not willing to address such questions
directly. Analvsts tend to believe that policymakers want answers
instead of insights. Some consumers arcfne that intelligence analysts
lack sufficient awareness of the real natuie of the national security

* .Tohn Huizenga testimony. 1/26/76, p. 14.

268

decisionmaking process — how it really works, where and how intelli-
gence fits in, and what kinds of information are important.^

On the other hand, the Select Committee is concerned that analysts
are not always kept sufficiently informed, in a timely fashion, of U.S.
policies and activities which affect their analyses and estimates. The
Connnittee is concerned that the secrecy and compartmentation sur-
rounding security policy decisionmaking affects the relevance and
quality of intelligence analysis. The analysts in the DDI may not
always be aware of what a key foreign leader has told high-level
American policymakers in private, and so they may be missing crucial
information on a particular nation's intentions in a given situation.

The Select Committee's study of covert action has revealed that on
a number of occasions in the past intelligence analysts were not told
what U.S. covert operators were doing abroad, an omission which could
seriously affect the accuracy of intelligence assessments. Likewise,
because of security compartmentation, DDI analysts sometimes did
not know about particular U.S. strategic weapons R&D programs,
and so w^ere not able to assess completely the reasons for counter-
measures that were being taken in the development of Soviet strategic
forces.

D. The Limits of Intelligence

Clearly what is needed is a realistic understanding by both pro-
ducers and consumers about the limits of intelligence : what it can
and cannot do. As a former senior analyst explained to the Select
Committee,^° what intelligence can do is to follow^ the behavior of
foreign leaders and groups over a long period of time in order to get
a sense of the parameters within which their policies move, American
policymakers are not then likely to be greatly surprised by foreign
behavior even though intelligence analysts might not be able to predict
precise intentions at any given moment with respect to a given situa-
tion. Nor can analysts be ex]:)ected to predict human events when often
the actors themselves do not know in advance what they will do. As
the Schlesinger Report said :

In a world of perfect information, there would be no un-
certainties abo\it the present and future intentions, capa-
bilities, and activities of foreign powers. Information, how-
ever, is bound to be imperfect for the most pai't. Consequently,
the intelligence community can at best reduce the uncer-
tainties and construct plausible hypotheses about these
factors on the basis of what continues to be partial and often
conflicting evidence.'^

To expect more may be to court disappointment. Des]:)ite this recoi^ni-
tion on the part of many policvmakers, if analysis is not con-ect, there
is often the charge of an "intolligonco failure." Good intelligence or ac-
curate predictions cannot insure against bad policy, in any case. For
example, as the current Deputy Director for Intelligence maintains,
the pessimistic CIA estimates on Vietnam had little oi- no effect on
U.S. policy decisions there. Vietnam may have been a policy failure.

"Staff summary of Andrew Marshall interview. 2/10/76.
'" Huizenga, 1/26/76, p. 24.
" Schlesinger Report, p. 10a.

269

It was not an intelligence failure.^- Similarly, the United States had
intelligence on the possibility of a Turkish invasion of Cyprus in
1974. The problem of taking effective action to prevent such an in-
vasion was a policy (question and not an intelligence failure.

E. The Personnel System

To some extent, problems in the quality of the analytical perform-
ance of the intelligence community are simply in the nature of things.
The collection function lends itself to technical and managerial ap-
proaches, while the analytical job is more dependent on the intangibles
of brainpower. In the final analysis, the intelligence product can only
be as good as the people who produce it.

The CIA prides itself on the c{ualifications of its analysts. The
Agency's exemption from Civil Service constraints — unlike the DIA,
for example — has enabled the DDI to attract tlie best analysts in the
connnunity. Nevertheless, those in the highest positions in the CIA
have traditionally come froui the operations side of the Agency.

The Agency's promotion system is structured in such a way that the
most outstanding lower-level people are singled out for advancement
into managerial jjositions. Such a system works well for the purposes
of the Directorate of Operations (DDO), where the skills necessary
for good management ai-e essentially the same as those required of a
good case officer. But when applied to the DDI, that system encourages
the best analysts to assume supervisory positions, reducing thfr time
available to utilize their analytical skills.

Although the CIA has several hundred "supergrade" positions " —
and very few government agencies are permitted so high a number —
there are virtually no "supergrade"' slots which involve only, or even
primarily, analytic responsibilities. The Agency maintains that DDI
supervisors are indeed analysts, since they review and critique the
work of junior analysts. In this vieAv, supervisory positions amplify
the analytical capabilities of senior personnel. Thus, there is not
"supervision" in the usual sense by DDI supervisors ; they are viewed
as participants in the analytical process.^^

The Office of National Estimates was the only place where a regu-
lar arrangement for high-level analysts existed, but that office was
abolished in 1973. Today oidy the DDI's Office of Political Research
(OPR) has been able to i-etain several supergrade staffers who do only
analysis (out of a staff of about 40 to 50 analysts.) The OPR, created
only in 1974, is treated by the DDI as an elite group. Much of its work
is interdisciplinary in nature. The emphasis is placed on keeping
OPR analysts out of the everyday routine of requests for current
intelligence woik which can be performed by other offices in the
directorate.^^

Some analysts complain that the personnel system has fostered too
much bureaucratic "layering," and that there are too many people
writing re])orts ahovt reports. The effects are ])redictable. In the words
of former DCI and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, "If you've

" staff summary of Edward Proctor interview, .5/16/75.
" John Clarke testimony, 2/4/76. p. .37.
"Proctor (Staff summary), 3/1/76.

270

got too much specialization aiul pigeonholing of people, you get the
kind of people m the intelligence game who don't mind being pigeon-
holed, and the entire U.8. intelligence establishment is t<)o much
bureauciatized." ^'^ The Intelligence Community (IC) stall', in its
post-mortems of major U.S. intelligence failures, has pointed in all
cases to the shortage of talented personnel. As the former deputy head
of the IC stall' pointed out to the Select Committee in his testimony,
"giving people more flexibility in pay scale and so forth doesn't always
guarantee that they hire the right people.*' ^"

F. Recruitment and Traixixg of Analysts

The Agency tends to bring analysts in early in their professional
life, emphasizing lifetime careers in intelligence work and the devel-
opment of institutional commitment. There has traditionally been
minimal lateral entry of established analysts and experts into the
profession at middle and upper levels (more in DDS&T than in
DDI.)^* This might be characterized as the "craft guild"' approach
to intelligence, where recruits are brought in to serve their apprentice-
ships within the ranks of the profession.^"

Specialized analytical training for intelligence analysts is quite
limited. The CIA~s Office of Training (OTR) has a program in
methodology and research techniques and a variety of mid-career
courses and senior seminars. About 25% of the DDI personnel Avho
receive in-house training are in management and executive develop-
ment courses. Various DDI offices sponsor couises on specific skills
such as computei'S and statist ics.^° For the most pait in the past the
Agency-run courses available were oriented tow^ard developing skills
necessary for clandestine activity. According to Dr. Schlesinger:

Within the CIA, most of the training effort in the past has
gone into training operators rather than training analysts.-^

The Agency maintains there is now an increased emphasis on the
development of sophisticated analytical skills and understanding.

JSIost of the substantive training for intelligence analysts takes place
outside the Agency, both in academic institutions and in other govern-
ment departments. Of the total number of DDI personnel participat-
ing in such external training in FY 1975, al)out one quarter were
involved in training courses longer than 6 weeks in duration.

G. The Intelligence Culture and Analytical Bias

There is a set of problems stemming from what might be called
the intelligence "culture" — ^^a particular outlook sometimes attributed
to the analysts wdiich tends to affect the overall quality of judgment
reflected in their w^ork. Although the problem of preconce]>tions is
one of the most intractable in intelligence analysis, it clearly is one

" .Tames Schlesinger testimony, 2/2/76. p. 72.
" Clarke. 2/5/76, p. 38.

" In FY 1975, 18 analysts out of 105 hired from outside the CIA h\ the DDI
were at aS-12 to 15.

"• Marsliall (Stnflf summary). 2/i^/7fi
-" Prootor (Staff summary) . 3/1/76.
^' Schlesinger, 2/2/76, p. 27.

2f71

of the most critical, and has l^een a focal point of the IC staff post-
mortems. As one former senior official told the Select Committee, '^By
and large, good intelligence production should be as free as possible
from ideological biases, and the higher the degree of ideological bias,
the greater will be the blind spots." ^^

Among the examples of analytical/intellectual bias and preconcep-
tions are the following: In 1962, some CIA analysts judged that the
Soviets would not put missiles into Cuba because such a move would
be "aberrational." ^-^ In 1973 most of the intelligence connnunity was
disposed to believe that the Arabs were unlikely to resort to war
against Israel because to do so would be "irrational," in light of
relative Arab-Israeli militaiy capabilities.^'*

The same mechanism operated — the inability to foresee critical
eveniis, in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary — during the
Cyprus crisis in the summer of 1974. According to the IC Staff' post-
mortem of that episode, the CIA analysts were again pi'cy to :

the perhaps subconscious conviction (and hope) that, ulti-
mately, reason and rationality will prevail, that apparently
iri-ational moves (the Arab attack, the Greek-sponsored coup)
will not be made by essentially rational men.^^

The charge is frequently made that intelligence estimates issued by
the Defense Department and the military ser-vices are not wholly ob-
jective, since those gr-oups have particular departmental inter-ests and
pr-ograms to advT>cate. By contr-ast, the CIA is supposed to be free
from such bias. But although the DDI is not in the position of liaving
to defend budgetary items or particular weapons systems, in the view
of ciMier parts of the intelligence community, ther-e has been a tendency
for a CIA institutional bias to develop over time. The Committee notes
that some observers have pointed to a CIA "line" on certain issues.^^*

H. The Nature of TirE Production Process : Consensus Versus

Competition

The nature of the production process can itself under^mine the
quality of tlie product. Tluit process is consensus-oriented, Aarying in
degree frx>m the formal United States Intelligence Board (USIB)
coordination involved in producing a National Intelligence Estimate ~''
to the less structured daily analyst-to-analyst coordination, which
takes place at the woi-king level. For the monographs pr'oduced on an
iri-egular basis by the Intelligence Dir-ectorate's research offices, the
bulk of the coordination effort is between these offices, although oc-
casionally sirch coordination will cix>ss dir-ector-ate lines, and less fre-
quently it will involve going outside the Agency. An analyst from the
DDI may meet with his opposite numbers in State or DIA prior to

"^Ihid.

'^ HuizenRa, 1/26/76, p. 25.

^MC Staff post-mortem on 197.3 Middle East war (January 1974), p. 14.

^' lO Staff post-mortem on 1974 CypriLS crisis, p. iv.

^""^ See Chapter V, pp. 76-77.

*" Prior to the President's February 1976 reorganization of the intelligence
community, the USIB approved all National Intelligence Estimates. See the chap-
ter of this report on "The Director of Central Intelligence" (pp. 74 ff. ) for a
fuller discussion of the estimates coordination process.

272

publishing an articie in their mutual field.^" The coordination process,
however necessary and desirable, may tend to produce a "r-einforcing
consensus," whereby divergent views of individual analysts can be-
come "submerged in a sea of conventional collective wisdom," and
doubts or disagreements can simply disappear in the face of mutually
reinforcing agreements.^^

Although the purpose of coordination is "to assure that the facts
and judgments presented therein are as comprehensive, objective, and
accurate as possible," -^ it sometimes has the unfortunate side-etfect
of blurring both the form and content of the product. The NIEs
have been criticized, on occasion, for this. The estimates undergo the
most formal coordination process, one which is integral to policy con-
sensus-building. Some consumers complain that finished intelligence
frequently lacks clarity, especially clarity of judgment, and that it is
often presentecl in watfly or "delphic" forms, without attribution of
views. Opposing views are not always clearly articulated. Judgments
on difficult subjects are sometimes hedged, or rej)resent the outcome of
compromise, and are couched in fuzzy, imprecise terms. Yet intelli-
gence consumers increasingly maintain that they want a more clearly
spelled out distinction between different interpretations, with judg-
ments as to relative probabilities.

In fact, the issue of consensus versus competition in analysis repre-
sents a persistent conceptual dilemma for the intelligence comnuniity.
Policymakers tend to want one "answer" to an intelligence question,
but at the same time they do not want anything to be hidden from
them. Consumer needs can change drastically in a short period of time,
and the same policymakers may need different kinds of intelligence for
different kinds of situations.

Some members of the intelligence and foreign policy communities
today argue that the consensus approach to intelligence production
has improperly come to substitute for competing centers of analysis
which could deliver more and different interpretations on the critical
questions on which only partial data is available. This conceptual con-
flict should be closely examined by the successor oversight committee.

I. The "Current Events" Syndrome

The task of producing current intelligence — analyzing day-to-day
events for quick dissemination — today occupies much of the resources
of the DDT. Responding to the growing demands for information of
current concern by polic^ymakers for more coverage of more topics, the
DDI has of necessity resorted to a "current events" approach to much
of its research. There is less interest in and fewer resources have been
devoted to in-depth analysis of problems with long-range importance
to policymakers. The Directorate has had to devote considerable re-
sources in order to keep up on a dav-to-day basis with events as they
happen. To some extent, analysts feel they must compete for time-
liness wnth the considerable amount of raw reporting which reaches
consumers.

"The Directorate of Intelligence." Annex A. p. 2.
IC Staff post-mortem on tlie 1073 Midd'e-East "War. p. 18.
' "The Directorate of Intelligence." Annex A, p. 1.

273

Accorclino; to some observers, this syndrome has had an unfavorable
impact on the quality of crisis warning and the recognition of longer
term trends. The "current events" approach has fostered the problem
of "incremental analysis," the tendency to focus myopically on the
latest piece of information without systematic consideration of an
accumulated body of integrated evidence. Analysts in their haste to
compile the day's traffic, tend to lose sight of underlying factors and
relationships.^"

For example, the lUBG Cunningham Report points out that the
CIA's sinologists were so immersed in the large volume of daily
FBIS ^^ and other source reports on Comnumist China in the early
1960s that they failed to consider adequately the broader question of
the slowly developing Sino-Soviet dispute.^^

The Intelligence Directorate is now turning more attention to
such increasingly important long-term (and inter-disciplinary) prob-
lems as world food balances, raw material supplies, population pres-
sures and pollution of the environment. Nevertheless, the DDI itself
feels that an even greater effort should be made in these areas. "Such
mattei-s have not ])een the focus of national security interest in the
past, but they clearly will be within the next ten years and this Direc-
torate should be building its capacity to analyze and report in these
fields." ^^

J. Innovation

The CIA is thought by many observers to be technologically one
of the most innovative research centers in the country, and it allocates
considerable funds to continue the search for new technology. But
despite recent increases, the in.telligence community still expends rela-
tively little effort on R&D in the analytical field — in contrast to in-
tensive effort in new and costly collection methods.

The analytic community has suffered from the secrecy that sur-
rounds the work of the intelligence community as a whole. This
insulation is recognized to have had a detrimental effect on the quality
of analysis. The Agency recognizes the need for conducting a free
exchange with academics, contractors, and consultants. For example,
in FY 1976, 17 analysts were on leave at private institutions with
an additional 14 people in various Government pr-ograms (e.g., the
State Department senior seminar, or the Congressional Fellows
program).^*

Some DDI offices have panels of consultants (outsiders) to review
major papers, and outside speakers are on occasion brought in for
special seminars. There have been efforts like the one made by OPR
to arrange for one-year sabbaticals for visiting academics during
which the visitor could produce both government and public papers.
Such efforts have been only partially successful.

^ See IC Staff post-mortems on Middle East war and Cypras crisis.

^The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, run by the Intelligence Direc-
torate, monitors foreign media and open source material and pul)li,shes daily
surveys by area.

^ CIA Inspector General. "Foreign Intelligence Collection Requirements,"
December 1060 (The Cunningham Report), pp. VII-13, 14.

^ "The Directorate of Intelligence," p. 12.

** Proctor (Staff summary), 3/1/76.

274

The question of CIA relations with academics and private groups
like foundations and research organizations is a controversial one.^^
The Committee notes the desirability of a more open attitude on both
sides, one which both i-ecognizes the legitimacy of the analytic work
of the intelligence community and refrains from the secret use of
academics and others for operational purposes.

K. Overload on Analysts and Consumers

Few observers would dispute the fact that as consumer demands
have grown and the amount of data collected has burgeoned, the
analysts' work load has become a serious problem. But ten years ago
the Cunningham Report expressed the concern that :

In the long run it is not the crude question of work load which
matters most, nor even the point that each item uses up cus-
tomers' time and attention which cannot be given to any other
item, so that each of our products must receive steadily less.
What matters most is the question whether this quantity of
information is degrading the quality of all our work.^'^

And the 1971 Schlesinger Report said that it was "not at all clear that
our hypotheses about foreign intentions, capabilities, and activities
have improved commensurately in scope and quality as more data
comes in from modern collection methods." ^^

Yet today tlie intelligence establishment remains structured in such
a way that collection guides production, rather than vice versa; avail-
able data and "the impetus of technology'' tend to govern what is
produced. ''^ To be sure, much of the proliferation in data collected has
l^roven invaluable to the analytic effort. Technical collection systems
have provided "hard" data, e.g., on missile silos which have con-
tributed to the generally acknowledged high quality of CIA assess-
ments of Soviet and Chinese strategic forces.

In 1971, the Schlesinger Report said, "It has become commonplace
to translate product criticism into demands for enlarged collection
efforts. Seldom does anyone ask if a further reduction in uncertainty,
however small, is woi-th its cost." '*" The community's heavy emphasis
on collection is itself detrimental to correcting product problems, said
the report,, for each department or agency sees the maintenance and
expansion of collection capabilities as the route to survival and strength
within the community. Thei'e is a "strong presumption" that additional
data collection rather than impi'oved analysis will pr-ovide answers to
particular intelli.<ience problems.*"

Analysts naturally attempt to read all the relevant raw dota reports
on the subjects they are working on, for fear of missinf? an important
piece of information. The Cunningham Report referred to this as the

^' Sep Chantpr X of tliif=! report on the CTA's relations with these groups in sup-
port of intellip:ence collection and covert action.
^^ runningham Report, p. VITT-13.
^^ Schlesintrer Report, p. 10a.
=" Ihid., p. 10a.
'*/ft(V7..p. 11.
'" Ihi(h, p. 11.

275

"jigsaw theory" of intelligence — that one little scrap might be the
missing piece.*^ The present trend within the DDI is to reduce the
amount of raw data coming to analysts by more effective screening
processes.

In the opinion of one intelligence community official, analysts in
the future are going to have to rely to a greater extent than here-
tofore on others' judgments. The collectors themselves may have to
present their output in summary form, with some means of highlight-
ing important information,*^ despite the community's sensitivity to
the distinction between "raw" and "finished" intelligence reporting.

On the other hand, consumers tend to treat the intelligence product
as a free good. Instead of articulating priorities, they demand infor-
mation about everything, and the demand exceeds the supply. And
analysts, perhaps for fear of being accused of an "intelligence fail-
ure," feel that they hai^e to cover every possible topic, with little re-
gard for its relevance to U.S. foreign policy interests. The community
must part with the notion tliat it has to i3eat the newspapers in re-
porting coups in remote areas of the world if what happens in those
areas is only of marginal interest to U.S. policymakers. In this regard,
there are serious efforts being made by DDI to focus analysis on major
areas of importance to the United States.

The community has looked increasingly to the advent of auto-
mated information-handling systems to solve the problems of systems
overload, but the impact of computerization is not yet clear. In 1966
the Cunningham Report warned that "great technological advances
in storage and retrieval" of information can do more harm than good
if "drastically higher standards" for what is to be stored and re-
trieved are not instituted.^^

It has often been pointed out that not only are analysts swamped
with information, but the consumers also are inundated with intelli-
gence reporting, both "finished" and "raw." The volume of paper
degrades the overall effectiveness of the product, since there is simply
too much to read, from too many sources. In addition to the daily DDI
publications and the A"arious DDI Offices' specialized weeklies and
other memoi-anda, a variety of other intelligence publications, regu-
larly cross the desks of senior Government officials. As former DCI
Richard Helms has told the Select Committee :

It seems to me that one of the things thafs tended to happen
is that almost every agency has got to have its national pub-
lication. In other words, it's got to have a publication that
arrives in the White House every morning.^*

Policymakers receive DIA's Defense Intelligence Notices (DINs),
produced on particular subjects as the occasion demands — sometimes
several per day on a given topic. NSA sends out a daily SIGINT Siun-
mary, whicli is not classed as finished intelligence. And a consid-

" Cunningham Report, p. VIT-19.

*^ Staff summarv of Rioliard Shryock interview, 2/10/76.

" rnnnineham Report, p. VTI-12 (footnote).

'* Richard Helms testimony, 1/30/76, p. 29.

276

erable amount of raw reporting of clandestine human source intelli-
gence is routinely distributed to consumers on tlie NSC staif, at the
Departments of State and Defense, and in the military services.

This glut of paper raises a number of issues which the Select Com-
mittee feels deserve further attention. The proliferation of depart-
mental publications tends to undermine the centralized natui'e of the
system for the production of national intelligence. It contributes to
confusion rather than clarity in the decisionmaking process, since
different publications often present different conclusions. Often the
reasons for the differences are only clear to a sophisticated intelligence
analyst. And direct reporting from the collectors usually arrives be-
fore the analytical reporting can, preempting the analysts' work in
evaluating the data.

L. Quality Control

In 1972 a "Product Review Division" (PRD) was established
within the IC Staff. It has the task of regularly appraising intelligence
articles and studies, "testing them for objectivity, balance, and respon-
siveness." *^ The Intelligence Directorate has no formal or independent
system for quality control, depending instead upon its regidar review
and coordination process.*^

Most of PRD's attention to date has been directed to the conduct of
communitywide post-moi-tems on particular crises — for example, the
1973 Middle East war, the Cyprus crisis in 1974, the Indian nuclear
detonation, and the Mayaguez incident. The Division was involved in
changing the old daily Central InteJJigence BuUetin from a CIA pub-
lication into a commmiity publication (now called the National Intel-
ligence Bulletin). PRD participated in discussions leading to the
transformation of the old Watch Committee into the DCI's Special
Assistant for Warning, with a Strategic Warning Staff.

PRD has not yet been significantly involved in the development of
new analytical methods, in resource allocation for production elements,
or in training or recruitment issues. Contact with the consumers of
the intelligence product has been on an irregular basis (mostly for
post-mortems) , although PRD is currently at work, through the NIOs,
collecting consumer reactions on particular papers of concern to the
USIB.

The Division has no authority to order changes in the management
of production which might affect the quality of the product; rather,
it has been in the position of making recommendations to the USIB
and encouraging their implementation.

M. Consumer Guidance and Evaluation

The DDI manages its production planning by compiling a Quar-
tei-ly Production and a Quarterly Research Schedule, outlining those
finished intelligence studies slated for publication in the following
tliree months as well as projects which support other intelligence
efforts, but which may not be published. The quarterly schedules are
prepared by DDI's Executive Staff based on inputs received from

*" Shryock (staff summary), 2/10/76.
"^ Proctor (staff summary), 3/1/76.

277

eacli office witliin the Intelliaence DiT-ectorate, and the Associate DDI
reviews them to ensure tliat the i)laiined projects are responsive to
consumer needs.'''

While there is no formal or institutionalized review by consumers of
the quarterly schedules, there are frequent Directorate-level contacts
with policymakers Avho expi'ess an interest in intelligence information
and assessments on {)articular foreign policy issues.

Evaluation of the intel licence product by the consumers themselves
is virtually nonexistent. The NSC Intelligence Committee, which was
supposed to perform that function, was laroely inactive and has now
been abolished in the President's reorganization plan. Rarely, if ever,
do high officials take the time to review the product carefully with the
analysts and explain to them how the product could be improved and
made moi-e useful to policymakers. The intelligence community, then,
by default, evaluates its own })erformance without the benefit of any
real feedback. One former senior analyst told the Select Committee :

I believe there ought to be requirements on the policy side to
respond by connnent or otherwise to major intellioence prod-
ucts, obviously not the whole (low of stuif, and I think that
there ought to be a responsibility at an appropriate level, say
at an Assistant Secretary level, to do this, and at the NSC
level. This kind of recognition, the sense of participation in a
serious process is, I think, the best thing that can be done for
analysts.*®

N. The Congressional Role

Congi'ess does not at present receive National Intelligence Esti-
mates, although some of the estimative material is presented to the
Congress in occasional briefings bv intelligence officials. In the past,
the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees re-
ceived the National Intelligence Daily ^ which could be cut off at exec-
utive will, and has been on some occasions, most recently in January
1976.^^ In 1975, the DDI began publishing a daily Intelliaence Chech-
list specifically tailored to what it perceived to be the intelligence needs
of the Congress.

With the resurgence of an active congressional role in the foreign
and national security policymaking process comes the need for mem-
bers to receive high quality, I'eliable, and timely information on wdiich
to base congressional decisions and actions. Access to the best avail-
able intelligence product should be insisted upon by the legislative
branch. Precisely wdiat kinds of intelligence the Congress requires to
better perform its constitutional responsibilities remains to be worked
out between the two branches of government, but the Select Commit-
tee believes that the need for information and the ricjht to it is clear.

*^ "The Directorate of Intelligence," p. 8.
"Huizenga, 1/26/76. p. 23.

*" Laurence Stern, "CIA Stops Sending Daily Report to Hill," Washington
Post, 2/4/76.

XIII. THE CIA'S INTP:RNAL controls : THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL AND THE OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL

Both the General Counsel and the Inspector General have played,
and will continue to play, vital roles in the internal management of
the Central Intelligence Agency. Both report directly to, and provide
guidance to, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. As the
principal legal officer of the Agency, the General Comisel provides
legal advice to the Director of Central Intelligence ; he also provides
counsel and guidance to employees at all levels within the Agency on
legal issues connected with the conduct of the CIA's mission. The In-
spector General serves as the investigative arm of the Director and,
when necessary, of the General Counsel, as well as assisting the Director
and Deputy Directors in improving the performance of CIA offices
and personnel.

Under the mandate of Senate Resolution 21, the Senate Select Com-
mittee studied both offices with particular attention given to the role of
each in assuring that CIA activities are consistent with the Con-
stitution and lav\^s of the United States,^ A number of current and
former officials of the Central Intelligence Agency were interviewed or
deposed. A far greater number were asked to, and did, respond in writ-
ing to a detailed questionnaire on the work of these offices.^ On the
basis of this investigation, the Committee is convinced of the im-
portance of these offices and the need to maintain and strengthen them.

^ Several provisions in the Resolution seem particularly applicable to a review
of the Offices of the General Coinisel and the Inspector General. Among them are :
1) Section Four which mandates examination of the extent to which Federal law
enforcement or intelligence agencies coordinate their activities and the extent
to which a lack of coordination has contributed to illegal, improper, or ineffi-
cient actions; 2) Section Five which mandates examination of the extent to
which the operation of any activities in the United States by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency conforms to the legislative charter of that agency and to the
intent of Congress; 3) Section Six which mandates an examination of the
relationship l)etween the Director of Central Intelligence's responsibility to pro-
tect "intelligence sources and methods" and the prohibition on the Agency's
exercise of police, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security func-
tions; 4) Section Eight which mandates an examination of the nature and extent
to which Federal agencies cooperate in exchanging intelligence information and
the adequacy of any regulations or statutes which govern such cooperation; 5)
Section Nine which mandates an examination of the extent to which the
intelligence agencies are governed by executive orders, rules or regulations, and
the extent to which tliese regulations contradict the intent of Congress; 6)
Section Ten which mandates an examination of the violation or suspected viola-
tion of state or Federal statutes; 7) Section Eleven which mandates an examina-
tion of the need for improved, strengthened or consolidated oversight of the
United States intelligence activities by the Congress; and 8) Section Twelve
which mandates an examination of whether any of the existing laws of the
United States are inadequate either in their provisions or in enforcement to
safeguard the rights of American citizens.

" Some 24 questionnaires were sent out. There were 15 responses ranging from
3 pages to 14 pages.

(279)

280

A. The General Couksel

The General CounseFs work and responsibilities have changed over
time, reflecting changes in CIA activities and the needs and desires of
different Directors. The Geneial Counsel's Office had originally, a staff
of ten to twelve attorneys whicli was concerned with enactment of the
Agency charter and enabling legislation, and with creation of regula-
tions and administrative and financial procedures under which the
Agency would operate. In the 1950s and 1060s, the Office was largely
directed toward assisting clandestine activities overseas, (^urrently the
Office of the General C^ounsel, with a staff of roughlv oO attorneys, is
primarily concerned Avith "proposals for legislation, executive orders
and other directives governing Agency activities; legal input into
planning and approval of operations, stricter management and finan-
cial controls; litigation. Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act
matters; and response to requirements of Select and standing com-
mittees of the Congress." ^^

1. The Organization of the Ofjice of General Counsel

Between January 19, 1951, and April 1, 1962, the General Counsel
was technically a part of the Directorate of Administration, but
in fact the General Counsel reported directly to the Director of Central
Intelligence on most matters. In 1962 the Office was moved to the
Office of the Director.^

The organization of the Office of General Counsel remained basically
unchanged from the inception of the Agency until October 1975.
The Office was then reorganized internally into four specialized divi-
sions in order to permit more effective handling of the legal problems
of the Agency. The four divisions are : General Law division, Opera-
tions and Management Law division, Freedom of Information and
Privacy Law division, and Procurement and Contracts Law division.

Two attorneys are presently assigned as Special Assistants to the
General Counsel. One of these has been assigned to the Deputy Direc-
tor for Operations to provide more timely and effective counsel in
the earliest stages of sensitive operational matters. The other has been
assigned to the Office of Logistics, which requires continuous legal
assistance in its responsibility for managing most CIA contracts.
The Agency is considering assigning attorneys to the other direc-
torates and independent offices.

Until this year most of the lawyers in the Office of General Counsel
had been recruited from within the Agency. Although some of these
attorneys had had legal experience outside the CIA, the Rockefeller
Commission recommended, and the CIA has spent considerable effort
in recruitiuff lawyers from outside the Agencv.^

Lawrence Houston, the General Counsel of the Central Intelli-

"""The Role and Functions of the General Counsel," CIA papei* prepared for
the Senate Select Committee, 12/7,'^. p. 2.

^Ihid. 12/75. p. 2. With the exception of one year in the lOnOs. the General
Counsel was also responsible for sunervision of the CIA's liaison with Congress.
In IDGfi, a separate Office of Leisrslative Counsel was created. Tlie Leigslative
Counsel is responsible for the CIA's liaison with Congress, and reports to the
Director of Central Intelligence.

^According to the CIA, as of April 1976. over half of the attorneys employed in
the Office of General Counsel will have come from outside the CIA.

281

gence Agency from 1947 until 1974, agreed with the Rockefeller Com-
mission recommendation, noting that legal experience, particularly in
private practice, would help Agency attorneys exercise index^endent
judgment.

Mr. Jiouston also recommended that attorneys be rotated from the
Office of (ieneral Counsel to other government agencies.*^ Such rota-
tion would lessen the possibility that these attorneys would become
part of a culture which assumes that, for reasons of national security,
the CIA is not governed by the normal processes of the law.

Just prior to his leaving the CIx4., then Director Colby elevated the
Inspector General to an executive rank equal to that of the Deputy
Directors of the CIA. He agreed that the General Counsel should be
similarly promoted but no action was taken, leaving the General Coun-
sel below the Deputy Directors and the Inspector General in rank.

2. The Functions of the O'ffice of General Counsel

The General Counsel has a wide range of responsibilities. As noted
above, his primary responsibility is to advise the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, although he also provides legal advice
and guidance to employees at all levels. Under CIA regula-
tions, he is also responsible for reviewing all new projects and activi-
ties unless they are clearly established as legal ; insuring the legality
of the expenditure of confidential funds;" reported possible violations
of the U.S. criminal code by CIA employees to the Department of Jus-
tice; passing upon all regulatory issuances; coordinating legal issues
involved in CIA relations with non- Agency individuals and institu-
tions; determining legal standards for all requests made to the CIA by,
or made by the CIA to, other government agencies; and establishing
proprietaries and cover mechanisms for operations. Under Executive
Order 11905 he is also required to report to the Intelligence Oversight-
Board any activities which raise questions of legality or propriety.

3. The General CounseVs Role in Determining the Legality or Pro-

priety of CIA Activities
As the Director's chief legal adviser, the General Counsel is respon-
sible for determining the legality or propriety of CIA activities. CIA
regulations recognize this and provide that "to ensure that CIA ac-
tivities are in compliance with the law. Deputy Directors and Heads of

' The CIA has endorsed the idea but has told the Committee that organiza-
tionally it would be difficult to implement. (Letter from AVilliam Colby to the
Select Committee. 1/27/76. p. 7.)

"Section R(b) of the CIA Act of 1049. as amended, .50 U.S.C. 403j(b) pro-
vides : "The sums made available to the Agency may be expended without regard
to the provisions of law and reeulations relating to the exjienditure of Govern-
ment funds ; and for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency na-
ture, such expenditures to l)e accounted for .solely on the certificate of the Di-
rector and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the
amount therein certified." Normally the General Counsel of the General Ac-
counting Office would rule on the legality of the expenditure of government
funds, but given 50 U.S.C. 403.1(b) and the decision by the General Accounting
Office to cea.se even the partial audits of CIA expenditures which he had con-
ducted UD until the early 1060s. the CIA's General Counsel has the responsibility
for determining the legality of unvouchered expenditures. "The Role and Func-
tions of the General Counsel," 12/75, pp. 3-4.

69-983 O - 76 - 19

282

Independent Offices shall consult with the Office of General Counsel
on all activities whose legality is not clearly established." ^

While responsible for making determinations about the legality or
propriety of CIA activities, the General Counsel also has an obliga-
tion to assist in the accomplishment of the Agency's missions. As the
Rockefeller Commission Eeport put it, "he is subject to pressures to
find legal techniques to facilitate proposed activities." ^ This dual
responsibility with its potential for conflict is not in itself unique —
almost any "inside" counsel is in a similar position — but the secret and
often sensitive nature of CIA activities doe« make protection of the in-
dependence of his judgment particularly important.

As can be seen from the regulation, the role of the Office of the Gen-
eral Counsel is essentially passive.^" He does not initiate inquiries, but
rather consults upon request.

In the past, the General Counsel has not been asked for his opinion
on certain sensitive Agency programs. During the 20-year course of
the CIA's mail opening program, the General Counsel was never
asked for an opinion on its legality or propriety. When the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence had doubts about whether Operation
CHAOS violated the Agency charter, he did not turn to the General
Counsel. As former DCI Helms stated, "Sometimes we did [consult
the General Counsel] ; sometimes we did not. I think the record on
that is rather spotty, quite frankly." ^^

Wlien the General Counsel was asked for an opinion about CIA
activities which were "questionable" his advice was heeded. For exam-
ple, when the CIA participated in an NSA program to monitor tele-
phone calls to and from Latin America, the General Counsel was asked
for an opinion. The opinion he issued described the telephone intercept
program as illegal, with the result that the program was immediately
terminated.^^*

The principle reason for tlie lack of consultation was that a review
by the General Counsel was not required for the initiation of Agency
activities. As James Angleton has testified, ". . . [I]t is my impres-
sion that one of our weaknesses is that we did not have the General
Counsel work into the ])lanning phases of operations. I^sually we went
to the General Counsel when something was going wrong, but not in
the inception of operations." ^^

* CIA Headquarters Regrilation, "Restrictions on CIA Activities Within the
Tlniterl States or Related to U.S. Citizens and Organizations," 11/2S/75, 7-la(3).
p. 1.

* Report of the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, 6/6/75,
p. 87.

^^ As Lawrenre Houston wrote. "[t]he role could he almost completely i)assive
hut as a matter of practice it is and should he active in the sense of keeping in-
formed as far as possihle and feeling free to raise possihle prohlems at what-
ever level seems appropriate." (Letter from Lawrence Houston to the Senate
Select Committee, 1/76, p. 1.)

The present Deputy General Coun.sel has noted that given the General Coun-
•sel's new responsihilities imder Executive Order 11905 and changes in attitudes
at the Agency the role will he anything hut passive.

" Richard Helms testimony. 9/10/75, p. 50.
"" See the Committee's detailed report on NSA Monitoring for a detailed dis-
cussion of this activity and its termination.

^^ .Tames Angleton testimony, 9/17/75, p. 48.

283

The CIA has explained that :

Because of the infinite variety of matters arising which
would be susceptible to or might benefit from legal advice,
there has been no established mechanism requiring or per-
mitting the General Counsel to advise or rule in all cases.
Some of his responsibilities are set forth in regulations or
other procedures or are well known, whereas others depend on
the initiative of the individual office seeking advice. Each Di-
rector of Central Intelligence has had his own preferences
in methods of operating the Agency and seeking advice from
the various components of the Agency. Because of the ex-
tremely sensitive nature of some activities^ there' have been
times lohen Directors have chosen to carry them out directly
rather than through the noiinally responsible components of
the Agency., in order to involve as feio people as possible. In
some cases a Director may not think to seek legal advice or
Tnay choose not to do so. In choosing to operate in this man-
ner^ the Director is carrying out to a degree he deems neces-
sary his charter responsibility to protect intelligence sources
and methods froin unauthorized disclosure. On the other
hand., he must then make his oion determination as to whether
this respon.nhility justifies some aspect of the operation which
might otherioise be questionable under law. [Emphasis
added.] "

Under this view, the Director can still withhold from his counsel the
very existence of a particular activity. The DCI could be in the posi-
tion of deciding, without advice from his counsel, whether the DCI's
legal responsibility to "protect intelligence sources" justified activities
which would be "questionable under law."

Even under the present regulation requiring consultation with the
General Counsel "on all activities whose legality is not clearly estab-
lished" it is possible that the General Counsel would not be asked for
an opinion about the legality or propriety of a major CIA activity. The
Director could waive the regulation and instruct the appropriate offi-
cial not to consult with the General Counsel. In addition, the stand-
ards in the regulation itself may cause cei+ain difficulties.

The regulation leaves the determination of whether an activity has
been clearly established as legal to the deputy directors and the heads
of independent offices. Thus, these officers must interpret past deci-
sions by the General Counsel and decide their applicability to new
activities. They must interpret the regulation itself and in particular
the phrase which reads "whose legality is not clearly established" in
order to detennine whether consultation is required. Because the regu-
lations are prospective, activities which were legal in the past, but
which have become illegal due to changes in the law, might not be the
subject of consultation.

" "The Role and Frinctions of the General Coinisel. 12/7.">. p. 6.

284

It would certainly be possible to require consultation with the Gen-
eral Counsel on all "significant" activities.^* The General Counsel
would be given a description of the activity. The referring office's
reasons for believing the activity is legal might be included to enable
the General Counsel to avoid a de novo review.

Certain acts undertaken by the CIA which may not appear signifi-
cant because they do not require the expenditure of a great deal of
money or the efforts of large numbers of personnel are nonetheless
"significant" due to their potential for abuse. Consultation with the
General Counsel should be required before the initiation of any such
act.

For instance, under present regulations, the Director may approve
investigations of allegations of unauthorized disclosure of classified
information by individuals presently or formerly affiliated with the
CIA, if he determines that intelligence sources and methods may be
jeopardized by the disclosure.^^

There have been a number of such investigations in the past which
resulted in the extensive surveillance of newsmen, as well as a "break-
ing and entering" by CIA with the assistance of local police officials.
Thus even though the CIA recognized that such investigations re-
quired special procedures there is no requirement that the chief legal
officer of the Agency be consultecl.^*^

The CIA has taken the position that the General Counsel's approval
is not required for each such act. The General Counsel's approval of
the regulations governing such acts is considered sufficient. This under-
estimates the difficulties deputy directors or heads of independent
offices might have in interpreting regulations, and creates the possi-
bility that actions not consonant with regulations could be approved
and undertaken.

Requests for assistance made by the CIA to other governmental
agencies and requests to the CIA from other agencies raise similar

" While the Deputy Directors and lieads of independent offices would have to
interpret the meaning of "significant," they are in a better jwsition to do this
than to make judgments about the applicability of past opinions of the General
Counsel. Some threshold is required in order that the General Counsel's Office
not be swamped by a requirement to review every action by every employee.

" The investigation must be coordinated with the FBI, when substantial evi-
dence suggests espionage or other violation of a federal statute. CIA
T-lc(2) (b)(1).

" As the CIA's former General Counsel has noted, the Office of General Counsel
"should be eonsulte<l in connection with investigations of disclosure of classified
information, or for any surveillance within the U.S." (Houston letter. 1/76, p. 1.)

Present regulations provide that the Office of General Counsel must be con-
sulted when equipment for monitoring conversations is being tested in the
United States. (CIA Headquarters Regulation, 11/28/7."). H.R. 7-ld5.) As that
testing raises many of the same issues as does an investigation of unauthorized
disclosure of cla.^sifled information, there seems to be no reaon for excluding the
Office of General Counsel from the approval process for an investigation.

285

issiies.^^ While the General Counsel must eoncnr with the Deputy
Director for Operations on the provision of technical equipment to
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) for overseas opera-
tions,^^ and must approve CIA requests for federal income tax infor-
mation,^^ he is not involved in the approval process for seekino- assist-
ance from state and local police org^anizations.-" It should be remem-
bered that such assistance has been provided in circumstances which
were highly questionable.^^ The General Counsel is not involved in
the approval process for providing technical guidance, training,
equipment, ancl other assistance to the Department of Defense for
intelligence activities within the United States.^^ Such equipment
might be used by the Defense Department for illegal surveillance of
citizens. In each of these situations, the Central Intelligence Agency
has established special procedures for approval and monitoring; where
such procedures vvere imposed because of the sensitivity of the opera-
tions, the procedures should specifically include consultation with the
General Counsel.

4. The General CounseVs Role m'fh Regard to Repo7'fs of Activities
that Raise Questions of Legality or Propriety
a. The General Counsel's Responsibilities. — Present regulations
provide that ". . . any activities or ))roposed activities that may raise
questions of compliance with tlie law or CIA regulations or that
otherwise appear improper will be brought directly to the attention
of the Director by any of the command or staff components or by
the IG and will be subject to the Director's decision." ^^ In the past,
questionable activities which came to the attention of the Director
or the Inspector General were not always referred to the General
Counsel. For example, during a survey of the Technical Services

" Under present regulations, the Inspector General is required to obtain a
written opinion from the General Counsel on requests for "continuation or
initiation of activities in support of or in cooi>eration with state, local, or other
federal agencies whose legality and propriety have not been previously estab-
lished." (CIA Headquarters Kegultion, ll/28/7.">. 7-lb(l).) Tliis language has
the same shortcomings noted above : the deputy director or the head of the
independent ofiice must interpret the regiilation and previous decisions of the
Office of General Counsel ; the regulation ignores the possibility of a change in
legal standards.

Written opinions of the General Counsel are generally not required by regu-
lation or .statute. The absence of a written opinion does not mean that the
General Counsel did not provide advice. In many situations oral opinions
have l>een offered. Given proi>er security restrictions, however, an increase in
the number of situations in which written opinions are required might be
desirable, as it might tend to increase the level of scrutiny by the Office of
General Counsel.

" CIA Headquarters Regulation, 11/28/75, 7-lb(5) (c).

"CIA Head(iuartcrs Regulation, 11/28/75, 7-lc(0).

^ CIA Headquarters Regulation, 11/28/75, 7-lb(3) (b).

^ In one instance, local police assisted the CIA in a "breaking and entering."

"CIA Headquarters Regulation, 11/28/75, 7-lb(4).

='CIA Headquarters Regulation. 11/28/75. 7-la(4).

Similar regulations require that any employee "who has knowledge of past,
current or proposed CIA activities that might be construed to be illegal, im-
proper, or outside CIA's legislative charter, or who believes that he or she has
received instructions that in any way apiiear illegal, improper, or outside CIA's
legislative charter, is instructed to inform the Director or Inspector General
immediately." (CIA Headquarters Regulation, 11/28/75, 7-la(6).)

286

Division in 1957, the Inspector General discovered activities which
he labeled "unethical and illicit," but he did not notify the General
Counsel. Nor was the General Counsel informed about the surrep-
titious administration of LSD to unwitting human subjects, discovered
by the Inspector General in 19(53.^*

Under the recently issued Executive Order =^, the General Counsel
is personally responsible for reporting to the Intelligence Ov^ersight
Board any activities that raise questions of legality or ]:)ropriety.-®
However, CIA regulations do not explicitly require the Director or
the Inspector General to notify the General Counsel of question-
able activities reported to them. Tlie Director may waive the regula-
tion and may instruct tlie Inspector General not to infoim the Gen-
eral Counsel.-' While the Inspector General is required by regula-
tion to refer to the General Counsel "all matters involving legal
questions that come to the attention of the Inspector General'' -® an
additional, more specific, regidation onlv requires that the Inspector
General refer to the General Counsel "information, allegations, or
complaints of violations of the criminal provisions of the ITnited
States Code by CIA officers and employees, or relating to CIA af-
fairs "

h. Investigation 8 hy the Oifice of the General Counsel. — If the
General Counsel does learn of questionable activities, he must rely
on the Office of the Inspector General to investigate. Unlike the
Inspector General who, as the DCI's investigative arm. is authorized
to review^ all CIA activities, the General Counsel does not have
general investigatory authority.

The Office of General Counsel can initiate an iuAestigation, with the
specific authorization of the Director. This requirement might pre-
vent the General Counsel investigation of an activity about which the
Director sought to restrict knowledge.

If the Director refused to authorize an investigation by the General
Counsel, the General Counsel could resign and notify the "appropri-
ate authorities." ^^ Alternately the Director could be required to pro-
vide an immediate explanation in writing to the appropriate commit-

^*A former IG explained that his reason for withholding from the Agency's
Oeneral Connsel information on CIA's mail opening, which he believed to he
"illegal," was that the General Counsel has already been excluded by other
senior officials.

"An operation of this sort in the CIA is riin — if it is closely held, it is run
by those people immediately concerned, and to the extent that it is really
possible, according to the practices that we had in the fifties and sixties, those
persons not immediately concerned were supposed to be ignorant of it." (Gordon
Stewart deposition, 9/.30/7r), p. 29. )

^^' Executive Order 11905.

™The Inspector General has an identical responsi))ility to that of the Gen-
eral Counsel, under the terms of the Executive Order.

^The Inspector General would still have to report the questionable activity
to the Intelligence Oversight Board. If the Director instructs him not to, he
must inform the lOB of that instruction.

™ CIA Headquarters Regulation, "Office of the Inspector General," l-3a.

™ These could include the lOB or its successor and the appropriate congres-
sional committees.

287

tees of tlie Con<iross and tlie Executive ])i'anch of tlie reasons for denial
of invest ip:atorv authority.''''

The General Counsel could be provided by regulation with jjeneral
invest i<>atorv authority within the CIA, but this Avould have certain
drawbacks. It could strain tlie General Counsel's i-elationship with the
DCI. Lawrence Houston aroued that "to o-ive OGC investio-ative au-
thority similar to that of the IG would . . . pervert its counsel-
inof role and therebv inhibit or destroy its ])rinie usefulness." ^^
Houston noted that even if the General Counsel has tlie support of
the DCI he will not be aware of everythino; ooino; on at the Aoency.
"Investigative authoi'ity would not oive him much more and would
. . . iidiibit his relations with his clients." ^^

Provision of <reneral investigative authority to tlie Office of General
Counsel miolit also involve duplication of work now done by the In-
spector General. Duplication of etfort in detectino- and preventino;
abuses mi<jht be helpful rafher than hai-mful. In all lilcelihood. how-
over, in the usual course of events the General Counsel would ask the
Inspector General to investioate i-ather than relyino- on his own
resources.

c. The Gei^eraJ CounHeVf^ AecesH fo Informafwn. — Even if the Gen-
eral Counsel is consulted about all sionificant activities and if he is
notified of all rejiorts of questionable activities, it remains to ensure
that the Genei-al Counsel will have access to necessary information.

The foi-mer General Counsel does not recall ever being- denied infor-
matirii. The record, however, is clear that a good deal of information
bearing directly on the legality or propriety of Agency operations was
never given him.

According to the Central Intelligence Agency, "If an Office should
'question' the request of the General Counsel foi- access to any particu-
lar information, any limitations would be im])osed by the Director."
Thus, even today, the Director remains able to deny information to
the General Counsel bearing on the legality or propriety of CIA ac-
tivities. Executive Order 11905, howeA^er, requires that the Director
ensure that the General Counsel has "access to any information neces-
sary" to perform his duties under the Order.

Lawrence Houston has suggested that the General Counsel could
resign if denied acces'^^ to information. The Director might be required
to provide an immediate explanation, to the appropriate bodies of
the reasons for such a denial. '''*

(1. Reporting Poft.si^^le y/olafion.H of the TLS. CpJmrval Code to the
Attorvev General. — Finally, it should be noted that in the past the
General Counsel did not alwavs report nossible violations of the IT.S.
Criminal Code to the Denartment of Justice. lender the terms of a
1954 agreement with the Department of Justice, the Central Intelli-

^^ A report to the Tntpllieencp Oversight Board may already be reonired.
Execntive Order 1100.5 requires the General Counsel to report to the TOB any
oooasion f)n which he was directed by the DPI not to report any activity to the
TOR.

^ Houston letter. 1/76, p. 1.

^ /?))>/., p. 1.

"'^ Thid.. p. 2. The Oeneral Counsel mieht he required under the terms of Exeou-
time Order 11005 to report the refusal of access to the lOB.

288

gency Agency was essentially delegated the Department of Justice's
power to determine whether criminal prosecution should be initiated
against individuals who violated federal law. This delegation was
and is unacceptable. The agreement has now been terminated.

Under present regulations, the Inspector General must inform the
General Counsel of "information, allegations, or complaints of vio-
lations of the criminal provisions of the United States Code by CIA
officers and employees, or relating to CIA affairs . . ." ^* The Inspector
General must also report to the General Counsel results of the Inspec-
tor General's investigation which is aimed at developing "sufficient
facts to determine if a crime has been committed, and whether prose-
cution may compromise international relations, national security, or
foreign intelligence sources and methods." ^^ The General Counsel
will refer those cases where sufficient information has been developed
to determine that a crime has been committed, as well as the Inspector
General's report on the effect of prosecution, to the Department of
Justice.^^

Under Executive Order 11905, the General Counsel is not required
to report to the Attorney General, but rather must report to the Intel-
ligence Oversight Board.^^

Because of the suspicions aroused by the disclosure of the CIA-
Department of Justice agreement and the need to renew public con-
fidence, it may be necessary to require that the appropriate congres-
sional committees be given notice of CIA referrals of possible criminal
violations to the Department of Justice. If this were to be done, great
care would have to be taken to avoid any possibility of prejudicing
the investigation or prosecution.

5. Oiiersightof the Ofpce of General Counsel

Because the General Counsel's principal duty is to provide legal ad-
vice and guidance to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director
must be primarily responsible for evaluating his work. Unlike other
CIA offices, however, the Office of the General Counsel has never been
the subject of inspection by the Office of the Inspector General.

The General Counsel's work has not gone totally unreviewed. In
1951 a New York law firm conducted a brief review of the Office of
General Counsel. Within the last year the Department of Justice
conducted a management survey of the Office at the request of the
Director. Given the importance of the General Counsel's Office, the
absence of regular formal reviews is to be regretted.

6. Executwe Branch Oversight of the Office of General Counsel

At present the General Counsel is required to "transmit to the
Oversight Board reports of anv activities that come to [his] atten-
tion that raise questions of legality or propriety." ^^ He is also re-

'* CIA Headquarters Regulation, 11/28/7.5. 7-la (7), p. 1.

'"CIA Headquarters Regulation, 11/28/7.5, l-,Sa(2) (e).

* Jh\({. The regulations further provide that "reporting of the fact of a crime
will not he delayed for an evaluation of whether the prosecution will raise ques-
tions of national security."

'''The General Counsel may already be required to report to the Attorney Gen-
eral under provisions of the U.S. Code.

'' Executive Order 11905.

289

quired to report to the Department of Justice all incidents involving
possible violations of the U.S. Criminal Code as well as the results
of investigations by the Inspector General. There are no requirements,
hovrever, that he provide General Counsel opinions or regular reports
on the work of the Office to anyone outside the CIA.

According to the Central Intelligence Agency, regular provision of
General Counsel opinions outside the Agency might raise serious
problems. "To place such requirement would be violative of command
relationships and lawyer-client privilege . . . [T]he Director, at his
option, could make such reports available as he deemed necessary," ^^
It has also been argued that because many of the opinions are on
technical matters, regularly supplying them to those outside the CIA
Avould not be useful.

Walter Pforzheimer, formerly the Legislative Counsel of the CIA,
suggested that "a general report, oral or in writing, on major legal
problems facing the Agency, or the need for additional statutory
support" ^° could be provided to such groups as the National Security
Council. The lOB or other such groups could be supplied legal
opinions in especially sensitive areas, such as those dealing with activi-
ties that might infringe on the right of Americans.

7. Congressional Oversight of the Office of General Counsel

The same chain of command and lawyer-client privilege problems
might arise if General CounseFs opinions were regularly provided to
congressional oversight committees. Yet similar solutions which
would greatly aid congressional oversight — regular, more general re-
ports," and the provision of particular opinions or all opinions in
specific sensitive areas — -could be devised.*^

The Senate has another means by which to oversee the General
Counsel, the confirmation process. Congress could require that the
General Counsel be nominated by the President subject to confirma-
tion by the Senate. This might increase the independence and
stature ^^ of the General Counsel ; it would parallel provisions for
Presidential nomination and senatorial confirmation of the General
Counsels of executiA^e branch departments and independent regu-
latory bodies. But eliminating appointment by the DCI might reduce
the confidence which the Director has in his chief legal advisor.

B. The Office of the Inspector General

The Inspector General reports to the Director and assists him in
his attempts to assure that CIA activities are consistent with
the Agency's charter regulations and the Constitution and laws of

'* Letter from William Colby to the Senate Select Committee, 1/27/76, p. 7.

'"Letter from Walter Pforzheimer to the Senate Select Committee, 1/26/76,
p. 9.

" In order not to short-circuit the chain of command, such reports could be
made to Congress by the DCI.

*^ The properly eliarged congressional oversight committees must have access
to the decisions of the General Counsel, but it may be that not all the General
Counsel's opinions neetl he sent to them.

*'At present the General Counsel ranks below the Inspector General and the
Agency's Deputy Directors.

290

the United States. In addition, the Office of the Inspector General has
a wide range of res^^onsibilities designed to improve the performance
of CIA offices and personnel. The Inspector General now holds rank
equal to that of the Deputy Directors of the CIA.

1. Organizational History

.The Office of the Inspector General had its origin in the establish-
ment of an Executive for Inspections and Security (EIS) in the
Central Intelligence Group (CIG) on July 1, 1947. EIS was charged
to provide "overall inspection, audit, and security for CIG." By 1951,
audit and inspection functions had been separated; an Audit Office
was established under the Deputy Director for Administration.

In November 1951, a Special Assistant to the Director assumed the
inspection function. He was appointed to the newly established posi-
tion of Inspector General on January 1, 1952. In March 1953, the mis-
sion and functions of the Inspector General were formally defined.^*

In 1953, the DCI appointed Lyman B. Kirkpatrick as Inspector
General.**^ Mr. Kirkpatrick obtained appix)val from the Director in
April 1953 for an inspection program which included planned, pe-
riodic inspection of Agency components (component inspections) . Sev-
eral inspectors were added to the IG's staff to perf oi-m this function ;
however, the Inspection and Keview Staff in the Directorate of Plans
retained responsibility for reviewing DDP components. By mid-1954,
the IG s staff had expanded to fifteen, and a program of component
inspections was under way. In January 1955, the DCI authorized the
IG to conduct independent inspections of DDP components, separate
from the DDP's Inspection and Review Staff inspections. By Decem-
ber 1959, the Office of the Inspector General had completed the first
cycle of component inspections.

On April 1, 1962, the Audit Staff was transferred from the Direc-
torate of Support (DDS) to the Office of the Inspector General, and

" The issuance read :

"Mission :

"The Inspector General is charged with conducting investigations throughout
the Agency on behalf of the Director and with inspecting throughout the Agency
the performance of missions and exercise of functions of all CIA offices and
personnel.

"Functions :

"The Inspector General shall :

"a. Make recommendations with resi)ect to the missions prescribed for the
several Offices of the Agency and with respect to such procedures and methods
as may assist the Offices of the Agency more fully to perform their respective
functions.

"b. Make recommendations with respect to the proper assignment of missions
and functions in the overall interests of the Agency.

"c. Provide a forum where Agency personnel may, on a highly confidential
basis, confide suggestions or complaints which have not received satisfactory
considerations through regular channels of command or through the procedures
provided for in CIA Regulation No. 20-8.

"d. Perform such other functions as may be determined by the Director."

^ In December of 1961, upon Kirkpatrick's transfer, Deputy Inspector General
David R. McLean was named Acting Inspector General ; John Earman was
appointed Inspector General in May 1962. In March 1968, John Earman retired
and Gordon M. Stewart was appointed Inspector General. He, in turn, retired
in January 1972, and was replaced by William V. Broe. In June 1973, on William
Broe's retirement, Donald F. Chamberlain, the incumbent, was appointed
Inspector General.

291

the Inspector General was given responsibility for coordinating and
directing the activities of the Audit Staff. The Audit Staff then had
about 40 positions — its present authorized strength.

In May of 1962, the positions of Chief of the Inspection Staff
and Chief of the Audit Staff were established within the Office of
the Inspector General. At the same time the DCI approved an increase
in the Inspection Staff from 15 to 29 positions so that all Agency
components could be inspected on a two to three year cycle, and all
foreign field installations could be visited at least once a year. In De-
cember 1963, in response to a call for economy measures, the Inspector
General reduced inspector positions from 18 to 14.

In 1964, the Inspector General became concerned that the office
lacked continuity because inspector positions were always filled by
rotational assignment. He obtained approval from the Executive Di-
rector to establish two Executive Career Service permanent positions
in the Office.

In June 1973, the Director abolished the component inspection pro-
gram *^ and reduced the Inspection Staff to five positions, includ-
ing two positions to work on Equal Employment Opportunity
matters. The Inspector General's role was limited to conduct-
ing special investigations and studies, investigating charges of mis-
feasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance, and handling grievance cases.
In November 1974, the Audit Staff's functions were expanded to in-
clude independent program audits *~ of Agency operations which in-
cluded "some of the same things that the inspection staff had done
previously . . ." **

In July 1975, following the Rockefeller Commission recommenda-
tions, the component inspection program was reinstituted. The EEO
function positions were transferred to a new staff in the Office of the
Director. As of April 1976, the staff of the Inspector General was au-
thorized to include approximately twenty inspectors and a new series
of component inspections had been initiated.

2. The Functions of the Office of the Inspector General

The responsibilities of the Office of the Inspector General are quite
broad. Under CIA regulations the Inspector General is charged with :

— [djirecting and coordinating the activities of the Inspec-
tion Staff and the Audit Staff in conducting special investiga-

** According to the present Deputy Inspector General, the program was ended
because Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Colby believed '^that a good deal of the kind of
information that we had produced in the preceding years was not recurrent, that
we had had most of the serious problems in the Agency and that Mr. Colby
more sx)ecifically felt that he had new management approaches that he felt
would match what the inspection staff had provided in the past." (Scott Breckin-
ridge testimony, 3/1/76, pp. 4-5. )

*'' This function, as published in Agency regulations on May 30, 1975, is
described as follows :

"Conduct supplementary, independent program audits of Agency operations
pursuant to the audit standards established by the Comptroller General. Such
audits will cover Agency-wide subject matter selected in coordination ^ith the
Comptroller or directorate programs selected in coordination with the Deputy
Director concerned. For purposes of coordinating independent program audits,
substantially qualified officers will be detailed to the Audit Staff." (CIA mem-
orandum. "Organizational History of the Office of Inspector General, 12/75,
p. 3.)

** Breckinridge. 3/1/76, p. 5.

292

tions, inspections of organizational components, and audits on
behalf of the Director throughout the Agency, both at head-
quarters and in the field, and performing such other functions
as may be prescribed by the Director.

Under the same regulations, the Chief of the Inspection Staff will :

— Conduct periodic inspections of all CIA offices for com-
pliance with CIA authority and regulations, as well as for
effectiveness of their programs in implementing policy objec-
tives ; conduct unannounced inspections of any organizational
component of CIA when it appears necessary.
— Survey and evaluate any problem area or subject called
to his attention . . . reporting his findings and conclusions as
appropriate.

— Provide a forum wherein CIA personnel may, on a highly
confidential basis, confide grievances or complaints tliat have
not received satisfactory consideration through normal chan-
nels of command. . . .

— Investigate all reports from employees or other sources
of possible violations of CIA's statutory authority.
— Investigate charges and reports of fraud, misuse of funds,
conflicts of interest, and other matters involving misfeasance,
malfeasance, nonfeasance, or violation of trust. In all cases
involving possible violations of the U.S. criminal code, the
investigation will be limited to developing sufficient facts to
determine if a crime has been committed, and whether pro-
secution may compromise international relations, national
security, or foreign intelligence sources and methods. The re-
sults of such investigations will be reported to the General
Counsel for further reporting to the Department of
Justice. . . .

— Kefer to the General Counsel all matters involving legal
questions that come to the attention of the Inspector General.
— Coordinate with the CIA Director of Equal Employment
Opportunity concerning grievance cases. . . .
— Review with the General Counsel proposals for support of
other government departments or agencies. . . .^^

Over the years, the principal activities of the Inspector General's
Office have remained relatively constant. They have been component
inspections, investigations into activities wliich might be construed as
"illegal, improper, or outside CIA's legislative charter," ^^ and the
review of employee grievances.

Component Inspections

Component inspections are studies conducted by the Inspector Gen-
eral's staff' of offices within the Agency. They have ranged from
specific surveys focusing, for example, on the Technical Services Divi-
sion in the Deputy Directorate of Plans, to broader surveys such as
those conducted on the Agency's major proprietaries. They include

^^CIA Headquarters Regulation.

^ CIA Headquarters Regulation, 11/28/75, 7-la(6).

293

examinations of documents located at Headquarters, field visits over-
seas by members of the Inspector General's staff, and interviews of
personnel within the component.^^

As one former member of the Inspector General's staff noted, a com-
ponent survey should include :

a review of existing policy, effectiveness and economy of
operations, security, compliance Avith regulations and proce-
dures, adequacy of personnel as to qualifications and numbers,
morale, and any specific problem areas identified by the com-
ponent itself, individuals within it, or . . . external sources.^^

According to the CIA, the present schedule of component inspec-
tions "will cover both field and headquarters activities . . . [TJhey
should cover all Agency components every two to four years with more
frequent attention given to sensitive activities.^^

The precise schedule for the component surveys is determined by
the Inspector General in consultation with the Director.^^ According
to Lawrence Houston, even the scheduling of the inspection is "salu-
tary." ^^ As one former Inspector noted :

what the component does in anticipation of the survey and
during the course of the survey as problems are surfaced is
often (if not usually) of more significance than are the actions
taken in response to the report's recommendations. In fact,

" In the past all, or almost all, of the personnel in the component were inter-
viewed. According to the Deputy Inspector General, this was because "there were
a lot of unresolved problems in the Agency that were hangovers from its early
days of growth and development . . . and the feeling then was that a very detailed
review of everything was required." (Breckinridge, 3/1/76, p. 6.) Although
several former Inspectors remarked on the usefulness of this technique, par-
ticularly as it improved the morale of lower ranking employees (see e.g., Letter
from John O. Lawrence to the Senate Select Committee, 2/18/76, p. 1 ) it has now
been halted because of the "tremendous amount of repetitiveness," and because
the interviews were no longer finding things that were "startling," but rather
"the sort of problems that would probably turn up" anyway. (Breckenridge,
3/1/76, p. 6.)

During future component insjxections, there will be selective interviews focus-
ing on "management and policy issues" ; larger numbers of personnel will be
sampled in overseas stations because the Inspectors will be "looking not only
for "management and policy questions", but also "for operational conduct."
(Ibid., p. 7.)

In the past the Inspector General also interviewed randomly selected return-
ing field personnel. According to one former Inspector, this "was useful in alert-
ing the Inspector General to routine problems." (Lawrence letter, 2/18/76, p. 2.)
The Deputy Inspector General told the Committee that the Agency had dropped
this program but was now reinstituting it. He noted that it had provided useful
information but the information had to be used as "leads," as one person usually
did not have the whole story, (Breckinridge, 3/1/76, p. 47.)

^ Letter from Christian Freer to the Senate Select Committee, 1/22/76, p. 2.

^^ If this schedule were maintained, it would compare favorably to the pre-1973
schedule under which the CIA attempted, unsuccessfully, to review each compo-
nent every three to five years.

•■* One former Inspector has suggested that the schedule be fixed by the Inspector
General, an Executive Branch oversight committee such as PFIAB, and the con-
gressional oversight committees, after consultation with the Director of the CIA.
(Letter from Thomas Holmes to the Select Committee, 1/19/76, p. 3.) Another
former Inspector noted that the tendency was to follow a fixed schedule
"slavishly" instead of keeping "generally informed" of developments in all
components on a continuing basis." (Lawrence letter, 2/18/76, p. 1.)

^ Letter from Lawrence Houston to the Senate Select Committee, 1/76, p. 1.

294

if the inspectors do their work properly, and if the component
is cooperative, there should be little to put into the report
of survey.^®

On the whole it appears that past component surveys increased the
effectiveness of the Agency. A former Inspector described their re-
sults as follows :

Close scrutiny of any element of the Agency by the Office of
the Inspector General, preceded by anticipatory review and
self-examination Avithin that element, stimulated useful recon-
sideration of goals, objectives, and procedures. By providing
occasions for all employees in the component to talk freely
and in confidence with one or more inspectors, and thus to
voice securely any comments, criticism or complaints they
might have, these surveys constituted a valuable morale fac-
tor, while accomplishing the primary task of bringing to the
Director's attention the overall performance and possible de-
ficiencies of a given component as well as chronic or develop-
ing problem areas within or related to it.^'^

However, the Senate Select Committee's investigation of the Office
of the Inspector General found several problems. They include :

a. Access to Info7vnation. — On certain occasions in the past, the
Office of the Inspector General was denied access to material about par-
ticularly sensitive Agency activities. In the most striking example, the
Inspector General was precluded from even reviewing Operation
CHAOS files.^«

At present, CIA regulations provide that the Inspector General
"shall have access to any information in CIA necessary to perform his
assigned duties." ^^ The CIA has informed the Senate Select Com-
mittee that only the Director can refuse the Inspector General access
and such refusal must be in writing.^"

Thus, even under present regulations, particular Agency activities
could be exempted from IG review by the Director.

If denied access to information, the Inspector General could, of

*■ Letter from Kenneth Greer to the Senate Select Committee, 1/20/76, p. 1.

One former Deputy DCI, however, has suggested that the office to be inspected
should not be informed. (Letter from Vice Admiral Rufus C. Taylor to the Sen-
ate Select Committee, 1/13/76, p. 1.) This would however, eliminate any "antici-
patory" changes due simply to the scheduling. A former Inspector has written
suggesting consultation with the Deputy Director involved as he would know of
factors "relevant to the timing of the inspection, not known to the Inspector
General." (Lawrence letter, 2/18/76, p. 1.)

^' Freer letter, 1/22/76, p. 1.

^ The substance of the program, gleaned from overseas inspections by the
Office, was the subject of a paper by the Inspector General : consequently
Operation CHAOS was reviewed by the Agency's Executive Director-Comptroller.

A second exclusion noted by Scott Breckinridge involved access to mate-
rials on an Agency proprietary. (Letter from Scott Breckinridge to the Senate
Select Committee, 1/12/76, p. 4.)

®'HR 1-3. Executive Order 11905 requires the Director to ensure that the
Inspector General will have access to material needed to perform his duties
under the Order.

*' CIA memorandum, "Comments on the Office of Inspector General in the CIA",
3/25/76. p. 2. One former Inspector suggested that if the Director did choose to
deny access to the Inspector General, it should be communicated by the DCI
to the Inspector General in person. (Freer Letter, 1/22/76, p. 4.)

295

course, resign. The Director should be required, however, to notify the
appropriate congressional and Executive branch committees of the
denial immediately and to provide a written explanation for it.°^

h. Pvohlenns of Emphasis. — In the past, as the Rockefeller Com-
mission noted, "the focus of the Inspector General component reviews
was on operational effectiveness. Examination of the legality or pro-
priety of CIA activities was not normally a primary concern." ®-

According to the current Inspector General, more attention is now
being paid to possible improper or illegal activities as well as to the
legal authority for any given activity. This change in emphasis should
be reinforced by the provisions of Executive Order 11905 which
place personal responsibility on the Inspector General for reporting
to the Intelligence Oversight Board any activities that raise questions
of legality or propriety.''^

c. Discovering Potential Prohlem Areas. — As the Rockefeller
Commission noted, "even with complete access, not all aspects of an
office's activities could be examined".*** While this is clearly true given
the scale and complexity of CIA's activities, the Committee found that
certain questionable practices which should have been uncovered did
not come to the Inspector General's attention during past inspections.
For instance, the CIA's project of surreptitious administration of
LSD to non- voluntary unwitting human subjects continued from the
early 1950s until 1963, but escaped the notice of the Inspector General
in 1957, when a broad survey of the Division responsible was con-
ducted. The project was discovered by the Inspector General in 1963 ;
the discovery led to its termination.

d. Referring Improper or Illegal Activities to the OGC and the
DC I. — Even when improper or illegal activities were discovered in
the course of a component inspection, these activities were not always
referred to the Office of General Counsel.

During a survey which included a review of the CIA's research pro-
gram to develop agents which could be used to control human behavior,
the Inspector General discovered activities which he labeled "unethical
and illicit." *'^ Although this language was in his report, he failed to
notify the Office of General Counsel and failed to call for the elimina-
tion of the questionable practices. In surveys of the CIA's New York
mail opening program, the Inspector General reported on issues of
management and security, but failed to raise any question about the
program's legality with either the General Counsel or the Director,
even though the Inspector General "knew" the program was
"illegal." <*«

'^ Under Executive Order 11905 the Inspector General is required to report to
tlie Intelligence Oversight Board on any occasion when the Director instructs
him not to report to the lOB on an activity.

^^ Report of the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, 6/6/75,
p. 89.

•^ Executive Order No. 11905. Under the Order a similar responsibility is laid
upon the General Counsel.

** Report of the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States,
6/6/75, p. 89.

^ CIA Inspector General's Report on the Technical Services Division, 1957.

*" The IG under whose auspices the survey was conducted believed it was "un-
necessary" to raise the matter of illegality with the Director "since everybody
knew that it was [illegal]. . . . and it didn't seem . . . that I would be telling Mr.
Helms anything that he didn't know." (Gordon Stewart deposition, 9/30/75, p.
32.)

296

The present Inspector General told the Select Committee that "the
Inspector General does have to be certain that he leans over backward
to assure that all reports which might interest the General Counsel
are brought to his attention ... it is also important that . . . legal
advice is sought before a report goes to the DC I or Deputy Director,
so that any legal advice becomes part of the Report." *"'^ Under present
CIA regulations, the Inspector General must refer to the General
Counsel all matters involving legal questions that come to the atten-
tion of the Inspector General."^

e. Folloio-up and hnplementation of Recommendations hy the
Office of Inspector General. — ^A former Inspector noted one phase of
the inspection process which he believed needed improvement. This
involved :

getting a decision when the component head noncon-
curred in a recommendation about which the Inspector
General felt strongly. If the recommendation was of
major importance, there was no problem, because the Di-
rector w^ould decide. However, on recommendations of lesser
importance — those not worth bringing to the attention of
the Director — there was no really effective mechanism for
deciding which view was to prevail.^^

The present Deputy Director for Operations has suggested to the
Committee that the DCI should be required to infonn the Inspector
General as to what action has been taken on his recommendations.^"
Problems apparently have existed not only in obtaining a decision
but in obtaining one consistent with the Inspector General's recom-
mendation. As a former Inspector General wrote :

. . . [i]t is necessary that the DCI fully back the Inspector
General in his recommendations unless there are overwhelm-
ing reasons to the contrary.^^

•^Letter from Donald Chamberlain to the Senate Select Committee, 1/13/76,
p. 4. The CIA has written the Committee that "when there are legal issues in-
volved in an IG investigation, the formal opinion of the General Counsel is sought
and made part of the Inspector General's report to the Director. Comments on
the Office of the Inspector General of the CIA, 1/25/76, p. 4.

It would be possible to require that all IG reports go to the Office of General
Counsel. As many of these reports deal with poor management, reorganization,
or grievances, this might prove more of a burden than a boon. (See e.g., letters
to the Senate Select Committee of Lyman Kirkpatrick, 1/13/76, p. 5 and Thomas
Holmes, 1/19/76, p. 7.)

^ CIA Headquarters Regulation 1-3. Under Executive Order 11905, the Inspec-
tor General has a personal responsibility to report to the Intelligence Oversight
Board any activities that come to his attention that raise questions of legality
or propriety.

®* Greer letter, 1/20/76, p. 2. The IG's Office has now established new proce-
dures "designed to reinforce the final effect of the inspection report." (CIA
Memorandum, "CIA Inspector General FoUow-Up Procedures," 1/29/76.)

'° Letter from William Nelson to the Senate Select Committee, 1/13/76, p. 2.

" Kirkpatrick letter, 1/13/76, p. 2.

207

Yet another former Inspector General wrote :

I did not feel that the recommendations made in I.G.'s sur-
veys commanded the attention and support at the Director's
level that they merited."^

A former Inspector wrote :

Too often have IG recommendations been either brushed
aside or emasculated as the result of negotiations or plead-
ings. More unfortunate has been the growing tendency of IG
reports to adjust their recommendations to the IG's estimate
of what might be acceptable under the circumstances."

The IG has now be^n promoted to the same rank as the Deputy Di-
rectors, which may help the Inspector General obtain support for his
recommendations. The present Deputy Director for Operations has
suggested that if the DC I does not acxiept a recommendation by the
IG, the IG be empowered to inform the Attorney General of the
United States on matters concerning U.S. law, and the Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs on all other matters.^*

Even where the recommendations of the Inspector General are
accepted, compliance has on occasion been an issue. The present Dep-
uty Inspector General told the Committee about "two inspection
reports in which the recommendations appear to have been accepted,
but the compliance was below expectation. In the first case the IG
subsequently headed a general investigation in the area, which had
substantial results. In the second, the results of the fii*st inspection

" Letter from Gordon Stewart to the Senate Select Committee, 1/20/76, p. 1.
A former Inspector described the principal defect of the Inspector Gteneral's
Office as "the absence of IG clout." (Holmes letter, 1/19/76, p. 13.) Another
former Inspector wrote that if a survey were "controversial (i.e. if it encountered
oiyposition from the Deputy Director [s] affected) as a rule nothing: came of the
survey report's recommendations." (Lawrence letter, 2/18/76, p. 2.) The present
Deputy Inspector General noted that after recommendations are drawn up, the
Directorates may come back with "new information or additional considerations
that will modify our understanding of the problem . . . They may persuade us in
their reply that they are right . . ." (Breckinridge, 3/1/76, pp. 30-31.)
He also noted that the "IG raises the isisue . . . and hopes he explains it ac-
curately and clearly, but there may be other considerations that we are not
aw^are of that make it impractical at least at that time." (Ibid., p. 38.)

"Letter from Peter Heimann to the Senate Select Committee, 3/18/76, p. 4.
The Rockefeller Commission noted :

"The Inspector General frequently was aware of many of the CIA's activities
discussed in this report, and brought them to the attention of the Director or
other top management. The only program which was terminated as a result
was one in 1963 — involving experiments with behavior-modifying drugs on un-
knowing persons." (Rockefeller Commission Report, p. 89.)

It should be recalled that the Rockefeller Commission dealt only with abuses ;
many IG recommendations have been accepted by the Director. Moreover, the
termination of programs is not the only measure which can be taken. Programs
can be changed, and controls tightened.

■'^ Nelson letter, 1/13/76, p. 2. The Rockefeller Commission recommended that
the IG have the authority "when he deems it appropriate, after notifying the
Director of Central Intelligence, to consult with the executive oversight body on
any CIA activity." (Rockefeller Commission Report, p. 94.) Under Executive
Order 11905, the Inspector General has a personal responsibility to report to the
Intelligence Overight Board "any activities that come to [his] attention that
raise [s] questions of legality or propriety."

-983 O - 76 - 20

298

were minimal and the staff which had been reviewed eventually was
totally reorganized."

/. I'he Scope of the Cotivponent Inspection. — In the past component
inspections have, in general, been directed at organizational units
within the CIA, with much less time and attention being focused on
programs or issues that cut across organizational boundaries. For
example, the CIA's mail opening program was analyzed in part dur-
ing the Inspector General's survey of the Office of Security, and in
part during the Inspector General's survey of the Counterintelligence
Staff, but it was never reviewed as a program. Consequently, the
issues which the program raised were never fully explored and
presented to the Agency's management.^^

There are other programs cutting across component lines as well as
issues which affect the Agency as a whole. These deserve attention from
the IG. Although surveys of these have been done in the past, the
surveys have not been done on a "systematic basis as were component
inspections." "

g. Detailed Reporting Versus Issue Highlighting. — Past compo-
nent inspections have been detailed and quite thorough. However, the
very breadth of the surveys might have made them less useful than
more selective reporting. The present Deputy Director for Intel-
ligence, Edward Proctor, noted that :

In the past IG component surveys have been extremely
detailed and involved every aspect of the component being
surveyed and interviews with almost every person assigned
to the component. As a result the repoits resulting from these
surveys contained a lot of detailed information which was of
only marginal utility to the managers of the component or
the Director. If IG component surveys of the future are to
be focused on the important issues and activities of the more
sensitive components, I would endorse them fully because they
have surfaced some problems for management attention . . .^^

h. The Compositimi of the IG Sm^^ey Team. — The bulk of the
Inspector General's staff has always been rotated to that Office from
the various CIA Directorates for two or three year tours. In order
to have the most qualified personnel, it was, and is, necessary to ensure
that the stint with the Inspector General did not damage the individ-

''^ Breckinridge letters, 3/1/76, pp. 23-25. In order to measure compliance the
IG now requires the comjwnent to report on its progress in implementing agreed-
upon recommendations.

^' Domestic Report on Mail Opening.

^ Lawrence Letter, 2/18/76, p. 2.

^* Letter from Edward Proctor to the Senate Select Committee, 1/15/76, p. 1.
One former Inspector noted that "Some surveys, especially surveys of DDO
components, have tended to deteriorate into recitations of unit-by-unit organiza-
tional and administrative detail instead of providing programmatic overviews
and evaluations and giving incisive descriptions of problem areas with specific
recommendations." (Heimann letter, 1/18/76, p. 6.)

290

ual's chance for promotion.'^ It is also important that the survey team
be unprejudiced. As a response to these needs, according to one former
Inspector, there was :

an unwritten rule that if you came from a particular Direc-
torate, you would not be asked to work on a team that was
doing a survey of any component in that Directorate . . .
[a]nd that was a hell of a good rule . . . so that if you w^ere a
youngster — or not a youngster but somewhere in the middle of
your career, with a clear intention that you were going back
to your parent Directorate after your two-year tour of duty
or your three-year tour of duty, what the hell do you care if
you come from the DDI [Directorate for Intelligence] and
you call them as you see them in CI [Counterintelligence]
Staff.««

This rule was apparently not always followed. The same Inspector
said that he believed that an agreement had been worked out between
the Inspector General and the Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff,
under which every member of the team inspecting the CI Staff had
a background in the then Directorate for Plans before coming to the
Inspector General's office.^^ One member of that team had actually
served as Deputy Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff.

Another way to preserve the impartiality of the Inspector General's
staff would be to, as one fonner Inspector suggested, make appoint-
ments to the Inspector General's staff "career culminations" with no
officer assigned to the Inspector General's staff being permitted to
return to another Agency post.^^ While the need for "career culminat-
ing" appointments and more permanent positions in the Inspector
General's office were repeatedly suggested,^^ eliminating the rota-
tion system would bar talented younger officers from serving in the
Office.^*

Another former Inspector has suggested that in some cases the com-
position of the teams did not reflect the expertise needed to analyze

'" One former Inspector has written that the IG had "insufficient authority
in staff selection and promotion" and suggested that he should "have the author-
ity to eoopt, subject to approval by the Deputy Director concerned, any officer"
for assignment to the IG Staff. (Lawrence letter, 2/18/76, pp. 6-7.) The present
Deputy Inspector General argued against this "shopping around the building"
stating that "rather than using my subjective and personal preferences, which
are subject to some errors, I would prefer to have people nominated that I can
reject forcing the Deputy Director to put up new people." (Breckinridge letter,
3/1/76, p. 16.)

^ Staff summary of Joseph Seltzer interview, 1/75, pp. 14-15, Sec also letter
from Thomas Holmes at 10.

^ Seltzer (staff summary), 1/75, p. 14. Present Agency policy would not allow
an individual to take part in an inspection of his parent office because his
"objectivity" might be affected by his being "imbued with its practices," but
would allow him to be used in insi>ections of other offices within his parent
Directorate. (Breckinridge, 3/1/76, pp. 18-19.)

*^ Heimann letter, 1/18/76, p. 2. Since Lyman Kirkpatrick, all the Inspectors
General have taken that office as their last post with the CIA.

** See e.g.. Letters from Gordon Stewart 1/20/76, p. 2, and John O. Lawrence
2/18/76, p. 6.

^A permanent staff might also mean, as the Deputy Inspector General noted,
that the IG's staff would have "less and less firsthand experience with what is
current in the Agency." (Breckinridge, 3/1/76, p. 12.)

300

potential problem areas. As an example, he noted that inspection teams
in the Deputy Directorate for Science and Technology were composed
of engineers and general scientists, and thus might not be qualified
to deal with certain questions, such as those involving conflict of
interest, which might arise.^'^

3. Investigations into Activities That Raise Questions of Legality or
Propriety

The Office of Inspector General has traditionally examined allega-
tions of questionable activities. Under the terms of Executive Order
11905, the Inspector General shall :

(1) Transmit to the Oversight Board reports of any activi-
ties that come to their attention that raise questions of legality
or propriety.

(2) Report periodically, at least quarterly, to the Oversight
Board on its findings concerning questionable activities, if

(3) Provide to the Oversight Board all information re-
quested about activities within [the CIA].

(4) Report to the Oversight Board any occasion on which
[he was] directed not to report any activity to the Oversight
Board by [the Director].

(5) Formulate practices and procedures designed to dis-
cover and report to the Oversight Board activities that raise
questions of legality or propriety.

At present CIA regulations provide that :

any employee who has knowledge of past, current or proposed
CIA activities that might be construed to be illegal, improper,
or outside CIA's legislative charter, or who believes that he or
she has received instructions that in any way appear illegal,
improper, or outside CIA's legislative charter, is instructed to
inform the Director or Inspector General immediately.^^

Thus, all CIA employees are now on notice that they are required to
provide either to the Director or to the Inspector General any informa-
tion which they possess about questionable activities.*^

^ Holmes letter, 1/19/76, p. 2. However the inspection teams are presently con-
stituted, the Inspector General can also request assistance from the Audit Staff,
which reports through him to the Director. As the auditors check components,
including overseas installations, much more frequently than does the inspection
staff, they can be asked to assist the inspection staff in the course of their audits.
(Letter from William Broe to the Senate Select Committee, 1/17/76, p. 4.)

*®CIA Headquarter Regulation, 1/28/75, l-7a(b). In the past, employees were
only asked to provide information about activities in which they were directly
involved which might be construed to be illegal, improper, or outside the CIA's
legislative charter.

^ Under Executive Order 11905 activities which raise questions of legality or
propriety must be reported to the Intelligence Oversight Board. In March 1976,
George Bush, Director of the CIA, called on CIA employees to report questionable
activities directly to him or to the IG.

One former Inspector suggested that the reporting of such acts would be fa-
cilitated by having a particular Inspector designated as a contact point for each
major element in the Agency. (Freer letter, 1/22/76, p. 12.) The Deputy Inspector
General told the Committee that at one time Inspectors were assigned to "dif-
ferent components, and this didn't work. They got no business. . . ." (Breckin-
ridge, 3/1/76, p. 56.)

301

As previously noted, the Inspector General's discovery of question-
able activities has not always led to their referral to the Office of Gen-
eral Counsel. There can be little disagreement with the recommenda-
tion of Lawrence Houston that any question of violation of law or le-
gal authority should be referred immediately by the Inspector Gen-
eral to the Office of General Comisel.®^ CIA regulations now pro-
vide that all matters involving legal questions that come to the atten-
tion of the Inspector General shall be referred to the General
Counsel.^^

There is one aspect of the Inspector General's role in investigating
questionable activities which may cause controversy. The present reg-
ulations provide that the Inspector General is authorized to :

Investigate charges and reports of fraud, misuse of funds,
conflicts of interest, and other matters involving misfeasance,
malfeasance, nonfeasance, or violation of trust. In all cases in-
volving possible violations of the U.S. criminal code, the in-
vestigation will be limited to developing sufficient facts to de-
termine if a crime has been committed, and whether prosecu-
tion may compromise international relations, national
security, or foreign intelligence sources and methods. The
results of such investigations will be reported to the General
Counsel for further reporting to the Department of Justice.
Reporting of the fact of a crime will not be delayed for an
evaluation of whether prosecution will raise questions of na-
tional security, as outlined above. If both reports can be made
at the same time without delay, they may be so reported.^"

There is an obvious need to insure that a prosecution does not jeopar-
dize important United States interests. The IG appears to be well-
suited to evaluate its effect. It should be remembered that confidence
in the judicial system is important and it can be undermined if people
believe that individuals are exempted from prosecution solely
because of their connection with the intelligence community.

Conducting preliminary investigations to determine if a crime has
been committed may however, raise difficult issues. Great care must be
taken so that later and fuller investigations will not be hampered. The
level of care must be such that there can be no suspicion that Agency
officials have failed to impartially investigate allegations of wrong-

^ Houston letter, 1/76, p. 2.

®* CIA Headquarters Regulation, 1/28/75, 7-la(7), p. 1. The Agency regulations
dealing with the reporting of questionable activities only require the IG to refer
such reports to the General Counsel when allegations of violations of Title 18 of
the U.S. Code are received. While the regulations may reflec't a desire not to have
to refer disciplinary matters to the General Counsel (e.g., see Breckinridge,
3/1/76, p. 43), the importance of preventing future violations of the law by the
CIA comi)els General Counsel participation in the process of reviewing reports
of questionable activities.

®* CIA Headquarters Regulation, 1-3. In certain instances in the past, the
Office of Security has investigated individual allegations. (Breckinridge letter,
1/12/76, p. 3.)

Prior to the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) tiie Inspector
General conducted complete investigations of alleged violations of law by Agency
employees. After the decision in order to protect individual rights and to avoid
compromising future prosecution the Inspector General limited his investigations
to the determination of whether a crime had been committed.

302

doing by their coUeagues.^^ To prevent suspicion it might be desirable
for the Inspector General to maintain a list of allegations and the re-
sults of the IG's preliminary investigations for periodic inspection by
the Department of Justice and the appropriate congressional com-
mittees.

If.. Investigation of Grlevarhces

CIA regulations provide for the airing of grievances through the
normal chain of command to the Director of Personnel and finally to
the Director of Central Intelligence Agency through the Inspector
General. In addition, the regulations direct the Inspector General to
provide a forum for grievances which have not received satisfactory
consideration through the normal channels and empower him to accept
direct appeals when appropriate.^^ In certain circumstances this griev-
ance machinery may facilitate the detection of illegal or improper
activities by Agency officials.^*

It is Agency policy that "relief first be sought in the chain of com-
mand," ^^ but direct recourse to the Inspector General is available
"where an employee feels he cannot go through normal channels with-
out jeopardy to his career, or other rare exceptional circumstances." ^®

This direct channel for the airing of grievances should be main-
tained with the IG being provided the "authority to counter the pos-
sibility of reprisal against the employee." ^^ The mechanism might be
more heavily publicized.^^ Because of the importance of having a
mechanism outside the CIA, employees should be aware that they can
go to the appropriate congressional oversight committees.

* It would be possible for any "information, allegations, or complaints of vio-
lations" to be referred to the Department of Justice immediately, without a pre-
liminary investigation by the OflSce of the Inspector General. This might, how-
ever, result in a substantial number of unfounded complaints being referred to
the Department of Justice. As the present Deputy Director for Operations wrote
the Committee:

"[t]here are in any organization individuals who are quick to allege miscon-
dU'Ct or imjwroper adtivity on the par't of their sui)eriors or peers. The question as
to whether these allegations have any substance can best be initially determined
by the Inspector General. Immediate referral to another body will result in
harassment-type invesitigations, will in certain cases broaden the security dam-
age and even eventually result in i>oor follow-up on real charges When enough
other cases have proven to be unsubstantiated." (Nelson letter, 1/13/76, p. 1.)

** CIA Headquarters Regulation, 20-7.

" CIA Headquarters Regulation, 1-3.

^ Holmes letter, 1/19/76, p. 11.

*" Memorandum from Scott Breckinridge to Chief, Review Staff, 3/17/76, p. 2.

" Holmes letter, 1/19/76, p. 11.

®* The present Deputy Director for Intelligence has recommended that the
normal chain of command grievance procedures be publicized, and the Inspector
General instructed to "resist the temptation to get involved prematurely in
grievances." (Proctor letter, 1/15/76, p. 7.)

One former Inspector has noted that :

"[w]henever an employee challenges the Agency itself, as contrasted to a com-
ponent or an Agency official, he is also challenging the Inspector General, since
the latter is necessarily a representative of the Agency. Thus, the Inspector Gen-
eral can not be an impartial arbiter between the Agency and the employee. This
was a source of frustration to employees who brought such cases to the Inspector
General. Such employees should have an external administrative appeal avail-
able either in addition to or as a bypass of the Office of Inspector General." (Law-
rence letter, 2/18/76, p. 7.)

303

C. Internal and External Review of the Office of the Inspector

General

The Inspector General reports to the Director of the Central In-
telligence Agency, and the Director has the primary responsibility for
evaluating this office. The Office has not, however, been regularly or
formally reviewed. Some mechanism for internal inspection of the
Office of the Inspector General should be devised.

The Inspector General was aware of questionable activities, some of
which continued for many years with the approval of the Agency's
top management. This underscores the importance of outside reviews
of the Agency. To be effective, the reviewing bodies must have access
to the Inspector General's work.

A number of individuals familiar with the work of the Office of the
Inspector General have argued against the Inspector General's having
a direct reporting responsibility outside of the CIA. Lawrence Hous-
ton noted that if the Inspector General reported directly to anyone
other than the Director, two crucial elements would be lost: "first
the absolute candor that should exist in his relations with the Director
and second the ability to protect the integrity of his files and the con-
fidentiality of his findings and recommendations." ^^ The Committee
has also been told that "any arrangement which would separate the
Inspector General from his present relationship to Agency manage-
ment would tend to result in a lack of candor and a resistance to reveal-
ing sensitive details in investigations and this would inevitably result
in diluting the authority and effectiveness of the Inspector General.^""

A start in outside reporting has been made. Under Executive Order
11905 the Inspector General must report to the Intelligence Oversight
Board any activities that raise questions of legality or propriety. ^°^

But Executive Branch oversight of the CIA or the CIA's Inspector
General is not sufficient. The Inspector General should be available
to the appropriate congressional oversight committees.^"^ And some
form of reporting on the work of the Office of the Inspector General
should be made, with appropriate safeguards, to the appropriate
congressional committees.

The present Inspector General believes that :

[t]he I.G. could and perhaps should provide our oversight
committees with the following: (1) a summary of our find-
ings on each component survey, one which would reveal prob-

^ Houston letter, 1/76, p. 1.

^"° Comments on the Office of the Inspector General, 1/2.5/76, pp. 2-3. However,
Scott Breckinridge wrot« that "If so directed by the DCI, elements 'being in-
spected will continue to be as forthcoming as in the past. There is no reason to
expect that this will not be the case." (Breckinridge letter, 1/12/76, p. 5.) Mr.
Breckinridge noted, however, that if reports wei'e to be made available to outside
bodies, less detail might be provided "in support of conclusions and recommen-
dations."

^^ Ibid. Prior to the issuance of the Executive Order, CIA regulations, amended
to conform to the recommendations of the Rockefeller Commission, required
reports to be sent to the NSC and PFIAB.

"^Letter from John McCone to the Senate Select Committee, 1/30/76, p. 2.
Former DCI McCone wrote that the IG should not report to anyone outside the
Agency such as the PFIAB. the NSC or congressional oversight committees. The
IG, should be however, "available to all of these groups." (Ibid., p. 2.)

304

lems and recommended solutions but not give operational
details; (2) a semi-annual summary of all other cases, em-
phasizing trends, general problems, etc., but not giving names
of individuals or sensitive details which might identify
■ individuals.^°^

Such reports, coupled with access, where necessary, to the results
of particular inspections or reviews by the Inspector General, would
greatly aid congressional oversight of the CIA.^°^ Congressional
evaluation of the work of the Office of the Inspector General might be
facilitated by requiring the Inspector General to provide the over-
sight committee with a plan of action setting out "priority surveys to
be done and why, the schedule to be followed, the dates reports would
be completed, [and] the actions taken on reports (or the non-actions)
and why." "^

A second means for Congress to oversee the work of the Inspector
General would be to make the Inspector General subject to presidential
nomination and senatorial confirmation. Presidential appointment,
however, might inadevertently give position of Inspector General a
political coloration which would diminish the effectiveness of the
Office.

^•"^ Chamberlain letter, 1/13/76, p. 4. In order to reinforce the chain of command
such reporting could be done A'ia DOI's reports to the oversight committees.

^°* One former Inspector argued against congressional access without the DCI's
concurrence as leading to "congressional involvement in Agency minutiae," the
erosion of security, and the reduction of the candor of Agency employees vis a
vis the IG. (Heimann letter, 1/18/76, p. 2.) Another former Inspector wrote that
if ail IG's reports were to be sent to Ck>ngress they would "become less candid
and more conservative." (Lawrence letter, 2/18/76, p. 5.) Another former In-
spector suggested that "an active and strong congressional oversight committee
would be my first choice" as an "outside authority" which would correct problems
that the IG discovers. (Holmes letter, 1/19/76, p. 6.)

^°^ Holmes letter, 1/19/76, p. 12. The submission of such a plan would allow the
IG to be evaluated on the basis of his own plan, which would be approved by
the IG and the committees. The committee "would be assured that the IG was
planning to do what the committee expected them to do." Ibid.

The IG is required, under Executive Order 11905 to report to the Intelligence
Oversight Board the "practices and procedures" formulated to discover ques-
tionable activities by the CIA.

XIV. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

In addition to strengthening our defense, the purpose of U.S. intel-
ligence activities is more effective foreign policy. Intelligence informs
foreign policy decisions and in the role of covert action seeks to attain
foreign policy objectives. In sum, intelligence is a service, a support
function, indeed it is so designated and structured by the military
services. However, in the field of foreign policy, intelligence activities
have sometimes become an end in themselves, dominating or divorced
from policy considerations and insulated in important respects from
effective policy oversight.

The Department of State is responsible for the formulation and
execution of foreign policy. Yet unlike the Department of Defense, the
State Department has no command over intelligence activities essential
to its mission except the Foreign Service.

The Department of State and the American Foreign Service are the
chief producers and consumers of political and economic intelligence
in the United States Government. The Department participates
actively in the interagency mechanisms concerned with collection and
production of intelligence. However, it has been unable or unwilling to
assume responsibility over clandestine intelligence activities.

The Foreign Service competes with the Clandestine Service in the
production of human source intelligence, but operates openly and does
not pay its sources. The State Department, as well as American ambas-
sadors abroad, is called upon, at least in theory, to exert a measure of
control over certain aspects of CIA's secret overseas activities. Indeed,
the State Department through U.S. embassies and consulates offers the
only external check upon CIA's overseas activities ; they are the only
means abroad that can help assure that America's clandestine activi-
ties are being carried out in accord with the decisions made at the
highest level in Washington.

The primary purpose of the Select Committee's inquiry was to exam-
ine the effectiveness of the Department of State and the Foreign Serv-
ice in this role. The Committee also examined the Foreign Service
intelligence collection efforts.

To this end, the Select Committee visited several overseas missions,
embassies and consulates and conducted extensive interviews with
a.mbassadors, Foreign Service officers and State Department person-
nel as well as taking sworn testimony. From this investigation it is
evident that the role of the Department of State is central to funda-
mental reform and improvement in America's intelligence operations
overseas.

A. Origin's of the State Department Intelligence Function
It has been the traditional function of the Department of State and
the Foreign Service to gather, report and analyze information on for-
eign political, military, economic and cultural developments. That

(305)

306

intelligence function, like most of the responsibilities of the Depart-
ment, IS not established by statute. The basic statement of the duties
and responsibilities of the Secretary of State is contained in an Act of
Congress of July 27, 1789, as follows :

The Secretary of State shall perform such duties as shall from
time to time be enjoined on or intrusted to him by the Presi-
dent relative to correspondences, commissions, or instructions
with public ministers from foreign states or princes, or to me-
morials or other applications from foreign public ministers
or other foreigners, or to such other matter respecting for-
eign affairs as the President of the United States shall assign
to the department and he shall conduct the business of the
department in such manner as the President shall direct.^

The statutes are no more precise about the functions of the Foreign
Service, and the members which

shall under the direction of the Secretary [of State], repre-
sent abroad the interests of the United States and shall per-
form the duties and comply with the obligations resulting
from the nature of their appointments or assignments or im-
posed on them by the terms of any law or by any order or
regulation issued pursuant to law or by any international
agreement in which the United States is a party.^

Most Presidents have chosen to use the Secretary of State as their
principal advisor and agent in foreign affairs; foreign intelligence
activities of the Department and Foreign Service have developed in
a logical pattern from that practice.

Today the President's Executive Order assigns to State responsi-
bility for collecting overtly "foreign political, political-military, socio-
logical, economic, scientific, technical and associated biographic in-
formation." 2^ The reporting of the Foreign Service, together with that
of the military attache system, based on firsthand c^bservation and
especially on official dealings with governments, makes up the most
useful element of our foreign intelligence information. Clandestine
and technical sources provide supplementary information, the rela-
tive importance of which varies with the nature and accessibility of
the information sought.

While clandestine and technical sources of information are today
the responsibility of the CIA and other agencies. State is not without
past experience in such matters. The Department operated one or more
clandestine intelligence networks during and after World War II
and closed them down, at CIA insistence, only in the 1950s. The De-
partment engaged in such activities in earlier 'times. On the technical
side, the State Department operated a cryptanalytic unit called the
Black Chamber during the inter-war years. It was abolished by Sec-
retary Stimson in 1929 on the ground that "gentlemen do not read
each other's mail."

^R.S. §202, 22 U.S. 2556.

'22 U.S. 841.

'" Executive Order No. 11905, 2/18/76.

307

Although foreign intelligence has always been a major function
of the State Department, the Department had no separate — and ac-
knowledged— intelligence unit prior to World War II. At the end of
the war, the researcli and analysis branch of the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS) , numbering over 1,500, was transferred to the Depart-
ment, and the position of Special Assistant to the Secretary for Re-
search and Intelligence was established to head the new organization
into which was incorporated as well certain existing State units.

President Truman initially contemplated a much more significant
intelligence role for State and directed Secretary Byrnes to

take the lead in developing a comprehensive and coordinated
foreign intelligence program for all Federal agencies con-
cerned with that type of activity. This should be done through
the creation of an inter-departmental group, heading up
under the State Department, which should formulate plans
for my approval.""

Although Dean Acheson, as Under Secretary, moved promptly in the
fall of 1945 to develop such plans, he soon

encountered heavy flak. It came from three sources : congres-
sional opposition to professional intelligence work, civil dis-
obedience in the State Department [i.e. the geographic divi-
sions opposed "intelligence work not in their organizations
and under their control''] and indecision in high places
brought on by military opposition to both unification of the
services and civilian control of intelligence.^

In the end Secretary Byrnes bowed to this opposition and joined in
recommending to the President what Acheson calls "an odd plan for
a National Intelligence Authority and a Central Intelligence Group,
. . . thus moving primacy in intelligence from the State Department
to the Executive Office of the President." *

Byrnes also adopted the recommendations of the Department's
geographic di\'isions and broke up the OSS research and analysis
unit which State had inherited, dispersing its personnel to those divi-
sions. However, this decision Avas reversed by General Marshall shortly
after he became Secretary of State in January 1947 and State has
since then had a central intelligence unit, now generally known as
INK (Bureau of Intelligence and Research). INR's stature and
influence in the Department have gradually increased, though its size
has been greatly reduced, numbering today some 325 with a budget of
less than $10 million. The reduction has resulted in part from budget-
ary pressures, in part from the transfer of certain functions (e.g., con-
tributions to the now-defunct National Intelligence Survey, biographic
reporting) to the CIA.

The organization is made up of two directorates reflecting the two
basic responsibilities of the organization. The Directorate for Research
produces finished intelligence (reports and estimates) to meet the
operating and planning requirements of the Department. The Direc-

'"Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W. W. Norton and Co.,
1969), p. 158.
^IMd., p. 159.
* Ibid., pp. 160-161.

308

torate also participates in the production of National Intelligence
Estimates. The Directorate for Coordination is concerned with
the Department's relations with the other intelligence agencies
on matters other than the production of substantive intelligence. This
includes (a) the provision of Departmental guidance on operational
intelligence questions, including staff support for State participation
on the 40 Committee; (b) management of assignment of Defense
Attache personnel; and (c) development of positions on intelligence
requirements and the allocation of intelligence resources.

However, INE has no personnel abroad and is not responsible for
the collection of intelligence overseas. The substantive direction of
the U.S. embassies and consulates, which are the intelligence collec-
tors, is the responsibility of the geographic bureaus.

B. Command and Control

In viewing the role of the Department of State in command and
control of intelligence operations, it is necessary to distinguish between
Washington and the embassies abroad. The authority and responsi-
bility of the Secretary of State in this area differs markedly from
that of the Ambassador. Secondly, a distinction must be made between
covert operations, where the influence of the Department and the
Ambassador is normally substantial, and clandestine intelligence and
counterintelligence operations (espionage and counterespionage),
where the role of the Department, and sometimes but not always
that of the Ambassador, is minimal.

1. Role of the State Department in Washington

The duties and responsibilities of the Secretary of State, in general,
and for the direction and supervision of U.S. foreign intelligence oper-
ations in particular, have not been defined by statute. Proposals after
World War II to put the Secretary of State in overall control of U.S.
foreign intelligence activities were rejected. The role of the Secretary
appears to be further downgraded in the President's Executive Order
of February 1976. The State Department is not represented on the
new Committee on Foreign Intelligence and the Secretary is only
authorized to "coordinate with" the DCI to ensure that United States
intelligence activities and programs are useful for and consistent with
United States foreign policy.

Nevertheless, the Secretary is the senior Cabinet member, his pri-
macy within the executive branch in foreign relations has usually been
accepted, and his Department is the only one with knowledge, person-
nel and facilities abroad to exercise effective control over foreign
operations. A Secretary who is disposed to assert his potential influence
and who has the support of the President can exercise considerable con-
trol over CIA activities. This is clearly the situation today. It is
equally clear that it was not the situation under the previous Secretary
of State, William Rogers, who not only did not play an active role in
the intelligence area but on at least one occasion, the Committee found,
was systematically and deliberately kept in the dark regarding im-
portant CIA operations.^

^Senate Select Committee, "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign
Leaders," p. 231.

309

Apart from his relationship with the President, however, the Secre-
tary of State has had only limited influence upon the CIA. The Sec-
retary of State does not have access to CIA communications, except as
prescribed by the DCI. This privileged position, it is contended, is sanc-
tioned by the provision of the National Security Act of 1947 making
the DCI responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure. The Secretary of State knows only as
much about CIA operations as CIA elects to tell him. Secondly, except
for covert action operations considered by the 40 Committee, he has
had no voice in the expenditure of CIA funds abroad. This is in con-
trast to the role the Secretary of State has with regard to expenditure
of Military Assistance Program funds.

The Secretary of State's influence or control over CIA operations
varies greatly, depending upon the nature of the activity. It has been
greatest in the area of covert action, least in the area of espionage. In
the setting of intelligence requirements and the allocation of intelli-
gence resources, the Secretary of State has a voice but it is only one
voice out of many.

Authority for State influence over covert operations derives from
NSC directives and is exercised through membership on the 40 Com-
mittee (now the Operations Advisory Group — OAG), which reviews
and recommends approval of such operations and certain sensitive
reconnaissance programs. Until the Kennedy administration. State
chaired the Committee. During the Kennedy and Johnson adminis-
trations, even without the chairmanship, State often had a virtually
controlling voice, through its veto power. Covert action and sensitive
reconnaissance operations are normally not presented to the Commit-
tee unless cleared in advance with (or originated by) State and, where
this is not the case, a negative State position has rarely been over-
ridden. There have, however, been important exceptions, notably dur-
ing the first Nixon term when State influence declined markedly. On
one occasion the 40 Committee itself was bypassed.''

The leading role which State has normally plaj^ed in the 40 Com-
mittee stems from the fact that covert actions are designed to further
foreign policy objectives. But operations clearly have driven policy
in many instances. It is the CIA, not State, which is called on, in the
first instance, to explain and justify these programs to Congress. In
part this has been due to a desire to preserve State's "deniability."
However, that has apparently ended with President Ford's Executive
Order which formally requires Secretary of State attendance at OAG
meetings.

In contrast to the 40 Committee mechanism for covert action opera-
tions, there is no systematic procedure for Washington review and
approval of clandestine intelligence and counterintelligence (espion-
age and counterespionage) operations outside CIA. The distinction
was made by former DCI Richard Helms in this way :

Mr. Helms. Exactly. Now this was one kind of approval for
the so-called political action projects. They had to be
approved not only once a year, but as they came forward
each time. And thus they had to be sent to the Approval Com-

" Ibid., p. 225.

310

mittee, you know, it has been variously known as 303 and
Forty and Special Group and so forth. So there was a special
mechanism to have those projects cleared in the Special
Group.

The intelligence projects had a different kind of clearance
mechanism, because they could be done under the Director's
own authority. As you recall, NSCID Number 5 gives the
Director the authority to do foreign intelligence [checks?]
and counterespionage on his own recognizance, he doesn't
have to check it out with anybody as to whether he did this
or that or something else.

Q. Is that a good system ? When you were Director you had
a sensitive collection program or counterintelligence program.
Did you often or sometimes check with the President or some-
body in the White House or the Secretary of State about the
advisability or risks? Did you regard that as really basic to
your job?

]\Ir. Helms. It was left to my judgment when I was Direc-
tor as to whether I cleared it with anybody or not.

Q. Did you very often ?

Mr. Helms. From time to time I did. I was involved with
that Berlin Tunnel, for example, and I remember, we did
check that out before we went ahead with it.

Q. You did or did not ?

Mr. Helms. We did. And there were certain others that
we checked out before we went ahead with them. I don't
rememl^er what they all were now. But there was a rule of
reason that was permitted to prevail here. And I think most
directors were sensitive enough fellows that if yoii w^ere really
going to run a serious risk to our diplomatic life or our
foreign policy life, you might want to go to see the Secretary
of State or somebody to hold hands on those things."

Thus State is effectively excluded from the decision to carry out
espionage operations unless CIA elects to consult. Because in practice
State is rarely consulted,^ it does not have institutional arrangements
to develop advice and guidance in this area — as it does for covert
action operations.

The Committee is strongly of the view that these informal arrange-
ments, which leave consultation to the discretion of the DCI and which
do not fix any responsibility on the Secretary of State, have proved
to be harmful. Two areas of concern can be cited : First, some espionage
operations, e.g., the attempted recruitment as an agent or an official of
a friendly government, can have major adverse foreign policy
repercussions. Second, certain types of espionage operations have
had the effect of covert political action. For example, a subsidy to the'
leader of a dissident group to facilitate the collection of information
about the group, has been taken by the leader (and the government in
power) as support for his dissidence. Thus a DCI cannot be subject to

■^ staff summary of Richard Helms interview. 9/11/75, p. 62.
®Out of hundreds of agent recruitment efforts last year the Secretary of State
was consulted on less than five.

311

40 Committee or other controls by defining an oj)eration with signifi-
cant political impact as espionage. State Department review of espion-
age operations is needed to provide support and advice to ambassadors
in field supervision of CIA activities.

2. Coimnanid and Control in the Field

In contrast to the uncertain authority of the Secretary of State, the
authority of the Ambassador with respect to U.S. intelligence activi-
ties in his country of assignment is clear, and, since 1974, has had a
statutory basis.

In 1961, President Kennedy addressed a letter to each Ambassador
stating that he expected him "to oversee and coordinate all activities of
the United States Government" in his country of assignment.^

That letter appears to have remained in force until it was super-
seded, in December 1969, by a similar letter from President Nixon
which included the following :

As Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission, you
have full responsibility to direct and coordinate the activi-
ties and operations of all of its elements. You will exercise
this mandate not only by providing policy leadership and
guidance, but also by assuring positive program direction to
the end that all United States activities in (the host country)
are relevant to current realities, are efficiently and econom-
ically administered, and are effectively interrelated so that
they will make a maximum contribution to United States
interests in that country as well as to our regional and inter-
national objectives.^°

This letter was supplemented by a classified State Department
instruction," concurred in by the Director of Central Intelligence,
which advised the Ambassador how the President's letter should be
interpreted with regard to CIA. The effect of this instruction is to
make the Ambassador's access to information on intelligence sources
and methods and his authority to approve or disapprove CIA opera-
tions subject to the agreement of the Chief of Station and, in the
event of disagreement, to Washington for decision. It may well also
have had the effect of inhibiting ambassadors in seeking to inform
themselves fully in this area.

In 1974, the authority of the Ambassador was given a statutory
basis. The following new section was added to "An Act to provide
certain basic authority for the Department of State," approved Au-
gust 1, 1956, as amended : ^-

Authority and Responsibility of Ambassadors. Under the
Direction of the President — •

(1) the United States Ambassador to a foreign country
sliall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination,

® "Tlie Ambassador and the Problem of Coordination, A Study Submitted by
the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations (Pursuant to S.
Res. 13, S8th Cong. ) to the Committee on Government Operations, United States
Senate."

^" State Department Foreign Affairs Manual, 1 FAM 011.2, 1/27/70.

"CA-6693, 12/17/69.

"22 U.S. 2680a.

312

and supervision of all United States Government officers and
employees in that country, except for personnel under the
command of a United States area military commander ;

(2) the Ambassador shall keep himself fully and currently
informed with respect to all activities and operations of the
United States Government within that country, and shall in-
sure that all government officers and employees in that coun-
try, except for personnel under the command of a United
States area military commandei', comply fully with his direc-
tives; and

(3) any department or agency having officers or employees
in a country shall keep the United States Ambassador to that
country fully and currently informed with respect to all ac-
tivities and operations of its officers and employees in that
country, and shall insure that all of its officers and employees,
excei)t for i)ersonnel under the command of a United States
area military commander, comply fully with all applicable
directives of the Ambassador.

The legislative history indicates that this statute was intended to
give statutory force to existing directives. However, under any rea-
sonable construction, it goes well beyond the Nixon letter, i)articularly
as interpreted by the State Department instruction cited above.
Xevertheless, more than a year after its enactment, no new regulation
or directives have been issued by the executive branch in implemen-
tation of the statute, nor does it appear that it necessarily plans to
take any action to modify present guidelines. In response to the
(Committee's inquiry, the White House has advised the Chairman as
follows :

As you know, the issues addressed by this legislation were
encompassed in President Kennedy's letter of INIay 29, 1961,
President Nixon's similar letter of December 9, 1969, and the
Department of State Circular Airgram 6693 of December 17,
1969. In addition, the Department of State in July 1975 sent
the relevant section of Public Law 93-475 ^^ to all major em-
bassies in confirmation and reinforcement of existing guide-
lines. The President is considering further steps and we Avill
keep you informed of any additional action that is taken.^*

So far as the Committee knows, no Ambassador has sought to in-
voke the statute in seekino- information on CIA operations. One
senior Ambassador testified that the statute is not really in effect Avitli-
out implementing regidations in the executive branch :

Ambassador Porter. Yes, but when you get the legislation
but you don't get the regu'lation based on it, vou're not much
better off. That '74, yes, sir, that '74 addition to the basic
State Depai-tment Authorization Act, that really isn't in force
because the implementin<T regulations have not been issued.

Senator Mondalk. Well, Mr. Ambassador, when a law is
passed, that is the law, is it not ?

" Ibid.

" Letter from Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President, to Senator Chiircli,
12/22/75.

313

Ambassador Porter. Yes, sir.

Senator Mondale. Can a law be repealed by failing to issue
regulations?

Ambassador Porter. Repealed ?

Senator Mondale. Suspended.

Ambassador Porter. Suspended ? I would say yes.

Senator Mondale. I think the word is "inoperative." ^^

The statute is apparently also "inoperative" so far as the CIA is con-
cerned, as indicated by the following CIA written responses to Com-
mittee questions :

— // the ATnbassador asked to see every o])erational repoy't
(as opposed to intelUge^ice report) ivhat loould the Chief of
Station say ?

The Chief of Station would inform the Ambassador that
he is referring the Ambassador's request immediately to his
headquarters for guidance.

— Is there any place lohere agent recruitments are cleared
hy the Ambassador or the Secretary of State^ including real
nanmjes%

Individual agent recruitments are not cleared with either
the Ambassadoi-s or the Secretary of State.^"

The Committee staff has learned that there are divergent views
within the executive branch regarding implementation of the new
statute. It is clear from the testimony that CIA opposes giving the
Ambassador the unrestricted access to its communications and other
operational information that the law would appear to authorize. In
the past, the Agency has argued that this would conflict with the pro-
vision of the National Security Act making the Director of Central
Intelligence responsible "for pi'otecting intelligence sources and meth-
ods from unauthorized disclosure." However, the statute resolves any
doubts as to whether disclosure to the Ambassador is authorized.

There are also other problems, of a practical nature, in implement-
ing the statute. Can an Ambassador, without additional support from
Washington, effectively direct and supervise the work of CIA per-
sonnel? The basic responsibility of the Ambassador is for United
States relations with the country to which he is accredited. The Am-
bassador is expected to be highly knowledgeable about the country to
which he is assigned. For CIA operations conducted within his coun-
try of assignment, the Ambassador should be a good judge of the risks
of such operations, and of their possible usefulness to the U.S. It is
often the case, however, that CIA espionage operations mounted from
his embassy are directed against a tMrd country, more often than not
a denied area country .^^ There is no assurance that the Ambassador is
qualified to assess fully the risks or benefits of such operations. Nor, if
he perceives that an operation directed from his embassy in Country
X against the denied area country poses a risk to U.S. relations with
Country X, is he able to weigh that risk against the potential benefits
of the intelligence to be gained. Such judgments often can only be

^^ William .T. Porter testimony, 11/11/75, pp. 45-46.
'* William Nelson testimony, 12/10/75, Attachment B.
" Essentially the communist countries.

69-983 O - 76 - 21

314

made in Washington. AVashington is where the problem arises. No
one outside the CIA, unless it be the President liimself, is responsible
for directing and supervising CIA clandestine intelligence operations
or is autliorized access to t]ie information necessary to do so.

A logical corollary to 22 U.S. 2680a would, thus, be to assign to a
Washington authority responsibility for control and supervision of
clandestine intelligence collection paralleling that assigned to the
ambassadors. The responsibility might be assigned to the Secretary
of State or to the 40 Committee. Either Avay, the Department of State
would have to have access to operational and source information to
which it is not privy today, if meaningful supervision and control is
to be exercised.

Ambassadors interWewed by the Committee all recognize some
degree of responsibility for supervision of CIA activities and cite
President Nixon's letter of 1969 as the governing document. Most ex-
press misgivings about their ability to do so with confidence of sup-
port from Washington. The lack of access to CIA communications
leaves a residue of doubt that the Ambassador really knows what is
going on. Vigor and initiative on the part of Ambassadors seems lack-
ing. Most Ambassadors the Committee has talked with have not ap-
peai'ed inclined to request detailed information, paiticularly regard-
ing espionage operations.

Supervision of intelligence activities by Ambassadors is in fact un-
even and, when exercised, the methods used differ widely. Much de-
pends on the knowledge and experience of the Ambassador, and the
suj)port lie has or believes he has in Washington. Further, the Com-
mittee's inquiries have turned up no evidence that the State Depart-
ment today attaches more than routine importance to this ambassa-
dorial function.

In the absence of detailed guidance or indication of support from
Washington, ambassadorial performance varies widely. One Ambas-
sador, who generally is known to "I'un a tight ship," exercises detailed
supervision and control over the CIA Station. Foi' example, he insists
on knowing source identities and on approving any sensitive espionage
operation in advance and CIxV, or at least the Station Chief, has ac-
cepted such control. This Ambassador, a career Foreign Service Offi-
cer, tends to attribute his good working relationship with the CIA
Station in large measure to the fact that he has had a great deal of
prior experience with CIA in Washington and in the field. Such ex-
perience is clearly required by Ambassadors assigned to important
countries, though in practice, the assignment of Ambassadors has not
considerably reflected this requirement.

For whatever reason, this degree of detailed supervision ajjpears to
be unusual, if not unique. Our inquir-ies suggest that Ambassadors
rarely seek to learn source identities. In this area they seem to be
affected by what one Ambassador has called "self-inflicted intimida-
tion." In one post — where there is a serious terrorist problem — the
Ambassador explained that he preferred not to know source identities
because of the possibility of being kidnapped. However, the same
Ambassador has taken a very strong stand that control of communi-
cations is essential if the Ambassador is to exercise effective super-
vision over CIA. Still another senior Ambassador does not consider
that control of communications would really ensure that the Ambassa-

315

dor knows everythins^ that is going on. This Ambassador controls by
what amonnte to a threat; he informs each Chief of Station that he
expects to be consulted in advance about any operation which could
cause embarrassment. If any CIA operation about which he has not
been consulted causes difficulties, the Station Chief can expect no sup-
port from the Ambassador. This would appear to be a more typical
procedure.

It should be noted that these are techniques designed to forestall
surprise and embarrassment. There is no body of doctrine or stand-
ards against which judgments can be made on whether to approve a
given operation, nor are Ambassadors given any basic instruction on
espionage techniques and risks. It is hardly surprising, therefore, if
there is a wide variation in practice and that judgments tend to be
ad hoc and subjective. This is not likely to change so long as the matter
is left to individual Ambassadors.^"*

C. Support: Communications

In the early 1960s, responsibility for most U.S. diplomatic com-
munications was assigned to CIA. This came about as the result of a
decision to bring about radical (and costly) improvements in existing
facilities. It was judged that CIA could obtain the necessary funds
more easily and quickly than State. Furthermore, CIA already had
its own communication facilities, and, as it was accepted that the
Agency would have to have such facilities in the future, it also seemed
more efficient to give CIA responsibility for a single network serving
both agencies. To permit some privacy in State communications, the
new system provided for a State superencipherment capability.

The situation today is that State has access to CIA communi-
cations only as determined by CIA, whereas CIA has access to all
State communications, except in those cases where State takes the
initiative (and the trouble) to encipher the message giving it to CIA
for further encipherment and transmission. Control of communication
is a key element of command ; the existing arrangements are not com-
patible with the role of \\\q. Ambassador prescril3ed in 22 U.S. 2680a.
The Ambassador cannot be sure that he knows the full extent and
nature of CIA operations for which he is held responsible by law.

D. Production of Intelligence

Surveys carried out by the Director of Central Intelligence make
clear the importance of Foreign Service reporting in the production
of national intelligence. In these surveys analysts are asked which
collection sources had most often made a key contribution to the Na-
tional Intelligence Bulletin and national intelligence memoranda and
reports. The ranking reflects intelligence inputs regarded by the ana-
lysts as so essential that basic conclusions and findings could not have

"° At the request of the CIA, the Committee has deleted a section of this report
entitled "Support : Cover" to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods. A
classified version of this section is available to Members of the Senate under the
provisions of S. Res. 21 and the Rules of the Senate.

316

been reached without them. The State Department's collection inputs
have consistently led the ratings.^^

Of course, collection of overt intelligence is only one function of the
Foreign Service Officer, who is charged also with representation of
IT.S. interests, negotiations, etc. It is, in fact, the latter functions,
which put him in contact with responsible and knowledgeable officials
and politicians of the local government and with other diplomats,
that give him access to the most important information. Foreign Serv-
ice reporting generally includes analysis pointing up the significance
of particular events. These factors probably account in large measure
for the high ranking accorded FSO reports by the intelligence analysts.

In any event, the Committee has found no evidence of any correla-
tion between the importance attached by the intelligence community
to the Foreign Service collection operation and the application of
resources in men and money to that operation. Indeed, political and
economic reporting positions abroad have been steadily reduced for
some years. In one major European country crucial to America's
security there is only one Foreign Service political reporting officer
located outside the capital due to such cutbacks. The Ambassador said
that if he had additional resources, the first move would be to re-
establish political reporting officers in the several consulates in the
country. The Ambassador explained that by law the Foreign Service
must carry out a number of consular functions and that with ever-
tightening resources the political reporting function has been squeezed
out. The Committee determined, however, that the CIA has sufficient
resources to consider a major new clandestine collection program in
that same country.

For the past thirty years, the Department of State has been short of
resources. Its reporting functions have been taken up by the rela-
tively more prosperous CIA. Within State or in the intelligence com-
munity, there is no systematic or clear allocation of resources for the
reporting task — except for commercial information. Overseas posts
get a "representation allowance," generally meager, which is used in
part to cultivate reporting sources and contacts but which also must
be shared with other sections of the post, including the administrative
and consular sections. When there is a choice between paying for the
costs of a visiting distinguished official, such as a Congressman, or
supporting the work of a junior political officer, the only source for
this outlay is the so-called "representation fund."

The State Department's "representation allowance" is a favorite
target for Congressional reduction in part because it has become
synonymous with diplomatic "cocktail parties." As a result, the CIA
with its "operational funds" and even the Military Attaches have a
mucli greater degree of funding and flexibility. In one post, for ex-
ample, the allowance of the Defense Attache nearly equaled that of
fl^e Ambassador and the political and economic sections combined.
There is no separate fund to facilitate overt collection of political and
economic information. The Department of State budget contains no
line items for such purposes and continues to show only salaries and
expenses with no indication of their objectives. The Department has

" "Key Sources of Selected CIA Publications," Annual Survey done by Direc-
torate of Intelligence of CIA (197,5).

317

been unwilling to press the Congress for more funding, particularly
for expansion of the so-called "representation allowance." As a result,
the largest, most important, and least risky source of political and
economic intelligence for the United States Government is neglected
in the Federal budget and severely underfunded.

Secondly, the Department itself seems to have made little effort to
direct the Foreign Service collection effort in a systematic way. The
Department itself levies no overall requirements. Most regional bureau
Assistant Secretaries send periodic letters to field posts indicating sub-
jects of priority interest and these letters are supplemented by "official-
informal"' communications from the Country Director (desk officer).
In addition the Department participates in the development of inter-
agency intelligence requirement lists, and those lists are transmitted
to the embassies and consulates abroad. The Department believes that
these procedures suffice, and does not favor the development of a more
elaborate requirement mechanism for the Foreign Service.

The Department has made no significant effort to train junior For-
eign Service Officers in the techniques of political reporting. The record
is somewhat better for economic reporting. A recent report of the
Department's Inspector General concluded that the Department has
generally been remiss in setting and maintaining professional stand-
ards through systematic training, assignment, and promotion policies.
These judgments go well beyond the mandate of the Select Committee,
but the Committee would strongly endorse measures designed to maxi-
mize the usefulness of this key collection source.

XV. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The Department of Defense is the nation's primary consumer of
intelligence information. It controls nearly 90 percent of the nation's
spending on intelligence programs, and most technical collection sys-
tems are developed, targeted, and opefated by DOD personnel. The
sheer size and complexity of the Defense intelligence establishment
make it difficult to comprehend the problems and issues which con-
front policymakers and intelligence managers. Overall security needs
and bureaucratic interests, as well as differing intelligence needs, fur-
ther complicate the quest for solutions to the community's substan-
tive problems and impede efforts aimed at implementing management
reform.

This section of the report summarizes the Committee's investiga-
tion into the intelligence activities of the Department of Defense.
It is limited in content to information that can be released publicly.
Although many significant factual details about the national intelli-
gence apparatus are thus not included, the Committee does not believe
that such omissions seriously detract from a clear presentation of the
central findings of its work.

The Committee focused on national intelligence activities, i.e., those
which produce information primarily of interest to national decision-
makers. Tactical intelligence activities, which are organic to or in
direct support of operational units, received less attention. This area
could not be ignored, however, because new collection and processing
technology has significantly affected the relationship between the na-
tional intelligence systems and the operational commands.

After an initial review of the entire defense intelligence program,
based on documents, briefings, and studies provided by the executive
branch, the Committee investigated the following issues of particular
interest :

— The resource manajjjement and organizational dimensions
of the Defense national intelligence community.
—The role of the Defense Intelligence Agency in relation to
the CIA and intelligence functions of the military depart-
ments.

— The monitoring and reporting activities of the National
Security Agency.

— Military counterintelligence and investigative activities of
the Department of Defense.

— The chemical and biological research of the Department
of Defense as it relates to intelligence missions.

The investisration revealed abuses of authoritv in all these subject
areas, some of which were alreadv known to the intellijrence com-
munity. Congress, or the public. After a brief review of the relation

(319)

320

of intelligence to the major objectives of U.S. military forces, and
the history and evolution of intelligence organizations, this report
addresses these specific Defense intelligence issues in turn. The con-
cluding section assesses the future requirements for Defense intelli-
gence, particularly as they are affected by technological developments.

A. Objectives and Organization or the Defense Intelligence

Community

The mission of the Department of Defense intelligence apparatus
is to provide the defense establishment with accurate and timely in-
formation on the military capabilities or political intents of foreign
states to assure that U.S. policymakers are forewarned of, and U.S.
military forces prepared for, any event which threatens the national
security.

There are several important consumers of Defense intelligence.
National security policymakers are interested in three areas of national
importance: crisis management, which calls for not only advance
warning of possible military, economic, or political disruption, but
also continued, detailed tracing of developments once they are under-
way; long-range trends in foreign military, economic, and scientific
capabilities, and political attitudes which might warrant a major
U.S. response; and the monitoring or verification of specific inter-
national agreements which are either in force, such as the SALT
agreement or the Middle East ceasefire, or contemplated, such as
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks in Europe.

Defense planners, responsible for designing the structure of U.S.
military forces, constitute a second important group of intelligence
consumers. Although their interests are less far- ranging than those of
the policymakers, their demands for insights into the capabilities of
opposing military forces are generally phrased in broader terms than
other DOD intelligence consumers, if only because the macroscopic
analysis which supports major force structure decisions is seldom
sensitive to detailed intelligence inputs.

In contrast to the estimative character of the intelligence products
most required by policymakers and defense planners, two other con-
sumer groups, the developers of weapon systems and the operating
field forces, have greater interest in detailed, factual information.
Satisfaction of these demands is generally more a matter of col-
lection and compilation than analysis and inference. The major
distinction between the two groups lies in their subject interests.
The weapon systems developers emphasize scientific and technical
detail regarding the operating characteristics and performance
parameters of foreign weapon systems (knowledge of which can
be useful in optimizing the design of U.S. systems). The military
field commands emphasize "order of battle" data, or the unit identities
and the strength, equipage, and disposition of opposing field forces.

The sequence of operations in meeting the intelligence demands of
these disparate groups of consumers involves three (or, in the case of
signals intelligence, four) basic steps: (1) collection — the gather-
ing of potentially relevant data; (2) production — the translation of

321

these data into finished intelligence products through screening,
analysis, and drawing of inferences; and (3) dissemination — delivery
of the finished products to the right consumers at the right time.
If the collected data are in the form of electronic signals, another
step, "processing," between the first and the second, is required to
refine the raw signals before they are submitted for human evaluation
during the production phase.

A brief review of the major objectives of U.S. military forces may
help to place the intelligence contribution in perspective.

1. Ohjectives of U.S. Military Forces

The paramount objective of U.S. forces is to deter nuclear attacks
upon the United States and its allies by maintaining an unambiguous
capability to inflict massive damage on the attacker, even after absorb-
ing a first strike by the aggressor's nuclear forces. The defense intel-
ligence conununity supports this objective by monitoring the technical
developments and force deployments of potential enemies, especially
those which might attempt to gain the capability for a disarming first
strike. U.S. technical collection systems are able to alert leaders to an
imminent attack by detecting movement or changes in the status of the
Soviet Union's strategic forces. Thus warned, the United States can
counter and react to such changes. This so-called strategic warning
may be essential to the survival of some components of the U.S. retalia-
tory force.

Tactical warning, based on indications that a nuclear attack has
actually commenced, is the primary responsibility of the alert and
warning networks of the operational military commands. Although
U.S. intelligence collection systems are not designed specifically to
provide such warning, they have some inherent ability to do so.
It is generally agreed that no measures would prevent a nuclear
exchange from devastating all the participants; thus, relatively
little attention has been devoted to developing intelligence systems
designed to improve the outcome of an all-out nuclear war for the
United States or its allies.

The second purpose of U.S. forces is to deter conventional (i.e., non-
nuclear) military attacks on its allies. Although U.S. nuclear forces,
both strategic and theater, contribute to this objective by introducing
the threat of escalation into a potential aggressor's calculation, the
general purpose forces (land combat, naval, and tactical air) of the
United States and its allies are considered the prime deterrent to con-
ventional military attack. Planning for the general purpose forces
focuses on being able to defend Western Europe, while at the same
time being able to conduct a lesser war in the Pacific theater. Again
intelligence plays an important role in following the technical and
force-level changes of potential enemies, and in predicting future
trends. Current intelligence is also relied, upon to provide adequate
warning of the massive redeployment of men and materiel that would
precede a conventional attack.

In the event of war, it will be critical to adapt the missions of
the national intelligence-gathering systems to the needs of opera-
tional commanders. The planning for such contingencies poses a major
challenge for leaders of the defense intelligence community.

322

The ongoing arms limitations negotiations on strategic and
theater forces in Europe are guided by the principle of rough equality
between opposing capabilities. Asymmetries in such factors as geog-
raphy, technology, and manpower must be accommodated so that both
sides believe there is an overall balance. Intelligence systems play a
critical part in monitoring this balance since they are the only reliable
means available for verifying the status of forces of potential adver-
saries. In fact, advances in technical intelligence collection systems
have made the current arms limitation agreements feasible. Establish-
ing compliance with the strategic arms agreements in force, as well as
providing assistance in current negotiations, is now among the most
vital missions of the national intelligence apparatus.

The technical capabilities of U.S. intelligence systems are prob-
ably now adequate to meet the demands of present agreements. Whether
they can meet the needs of future agreements is unclear and de-
pendent upon the specific terms negotiated. Some of the proposals
advanced in connection with the Vladivostok Agreement and the
Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks would test
the abilities of current or envisioned intelligence systems to detect
or verify with high confidence. Three of the most difficult enforce-
ment areas which could arise under future agreements and which
pose major problems for the intelligence community are :

— MIRV missiles w^hich are concealed in silos or submarines;
— Cruise missiles whose launchers are easily concealed in
bombers and submarines, and which may carry either conven-
tional or nuclear warheads ;

— Mobile forces and weapons (particularly nuclear systems)
in Europe which can be transferred quickly to and from the
theater, and are also readily concealed.

2. Evolution of Defense Intelligence Organizations

The complexities of modern defense have burdened the intelligence
community wnth issues and responsibilities which could hardly have
been anticipated when the United States emerged as the world's fore-
most militaiy power three decades ago. In endeavoring to fill its ex-
panding role in support of the nation's security interests, the defense
intelligence apparatus has undergone periodic reorganization, gen-
erally leading toward more centralized management control. The
desire to make the defense intelligence community more responsive
to the needs of policymakers has motivated this trend.

At present, the most likely near-term prognosis is for a continua-
tion of the general peace, interrupted at times bv regional conflict and
crisis, but not erupting into a major war or likely to involve direct
U.S. military participation. The problem has been that in order to
avert the big war, the U.S. has had to project a credible appearance of
being able to win it, or, at least, not lose it decisively. This means
it could not permit its war-fighting capacity, for which the military
services hold the final responsibility, to erode unilaterally. Since the
defense intelligence apparatus is a major contributor to that capacity,
and since most of the important intellip-ence assets are operated by the
armed forces, it is not surprising that the services have resisted efforts
to channel these resources in different directions.

323

The existing organization of the defense intelligence community
will be discussed in the following section. It is important to appreciate
that it was not designed expressly to serve today's intelligence re-
quirements or to manage today's intelligence functions. Rather, it
should be perceived as basically a service to the military, adjusted
through several decades of institutional compromise.

3. Early Beginnings

The first traces of U.S. military intelligence activities appeared in
the Revolutionary War, when General George Washington, as com-
mander of the colonial Army, recruited and trained a corps of intel-
ligence agents to report on British activities. This effort, which in-
cluded the use of codes, secret ink, and disguises, was short-lived,
and the agents were mustered out of service with the rest of the
Continental Army. Following Washington's precedent, commanders
of U.S. military forces in later conflicts created ad hoc intelligence
units on their own authority to serve tlieir individual needs. Andrew
Jackson had an intelligence operation in the War of 1812, and Win-
field Scott had an intelligence unit in his command in the Mexican
War. A niunber of the military commanders in the Civil War
organized their own intelligence networks, and two autonomous
organizations, both named the United States Secret Service, engaged
in intelligence activities for the Union, although neither had any legal
authority to operate.

In 1882, the Secretary of the Navy established an Office of Naval
Intelligence to collect and record "such naval information as may
be useful to the department in the time of war, as well as in peace." ^
This office developed a naval attache system to overtly collect informa-
tion on foreign naval activities. It initiated a series of publications
summarizing the information it had collected to keep the Navy abreast
of foreign naval developments, and specifically provided the Naval
War Board with information during the Spanish-American AVar.

The first comparable Army unit was the Military Intelliafence Di-
vision of the Office of Adjutant General, established in 1885 to gather
information on forei.qm armies. It, too, was active during the Spanish-
American War, but by the outbreak of World War I the entire Di-
vision had shrunk to two officers and two clerks.

Both the Armv and Navy greatly expanded their intelligence com-
plements durino- World War I. The Army alone had more than 300
officers and 1,000 civilians engasred in intelligence work. In 1917,
a War Department Cipher Bureau was created by administrative di-
rective. This unit, sometimes referred to as the "American Black
Chamber," solved more than 45.000 crvptograms (including one from
the Sundav Times) and broke the codes of more than twentv nnfions.
It was dissolved at the specific direction of Secretary of State Henry
L. Stimson in 1929. wlio reportedly said : "Gentlemen do not read each
other's mail." ^ This and similar measures left the service intelligence
arms poorly prepared for World War 11.

^ A. P. Nibla^k, The Hi'-fory nvd Aiwi nf the Oflice of Naval Infelliperice,
Division of Opera^^ions. United States Navy Department (Washington, D.C. :
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1920).

* Herbert O. Yardley, The American Black Chamher (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1931) , pp. 332, 348.

324

One of the first steps taken by President Roosevelt in the aftermath
of Pearl Harbor was to order the creation of the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS) in June 1942 under the direction of General William
Donovan. During World War II, OSS, together with tlie Army and
Navy intelligence organizations, was coordinated by the Joint Intelli-
gence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A list of the functions of the principal OSS branches demonstrates
the scope of its activity. The Research and Analysis section produced
economic, military, social, and political studies, and estimates for stra-
tegic areas from Europe to the Far East; the Secret Intelligence group
gathered information from within neutral and enemy territory ; Spe-
cial Operations conducted sabotage and worked with the various re-
sistance groups; Counterespionage protected United States and al-
lied intelligence oj^erations; Morale Operations created and spread
"black propaganda" ; Operational Groups trained, supplied, and some-
times led guerrilla groups in enemy territory ; the Maritime Unit con-
ducted marine sabotage ; and Schools and Training was in charge of
the overall training and assessment of personnel, both in the United
States and abroad. In addition, OSS was directed to plan and con-
duct such "special services as may be directed by the United States
Joint Chiefs of Staff." Only Latin America, the FBI's bailiwick, and
the Pacific Theater, General MacArthur's, were outside the OSS
sphere of operations.

Jurisdiction over subjects of tactical military interest, such as order
of battle data and enemy weaponry estimates, was left with the
traditional service arms. OSS alpo did not prevail completely over
other intelligence operations of the services, which achieved a number
of notable wartime successes. Army Intelligence, for example, cap-
tured a high-level Nazi plamiing group in North Africa, obtained a
map of all enemy minefields in Sicily, and captured the entire Japa-
nese secret police foix^e on Okinawa. Naval Intelligence, soon after
United States' entiy into the war, deduced the impending appearance
of German guided missiles, such as the HS 293, the V-bomTbs, and
homing torpedoes.

After World War II, President Truman issued an Executive Order
abolishing the OSS on September 20, 1945. The Department of War
absorbed some of its functions, such as the work of its Secret Intelli-
gence group and of its Counterespionage program. The State Depart-
ment assumed others.

The demise of tlie OSS did not, however, end the concept of a
central intelligence organization. On January 22, 1946, President
Truman established a National Intelligence Authority to advise him,
and created a Central Intelligence Group to assist the NIA in coordi-
nating national intelligence matters. These two organizations evolved,
through the National Security Act of 1947, into the National Security
Council and Central Intelligence Agency.

The rapid demobilization of the armed forces after the war, the crea-
tion of the first peacetime central intelligence organization, and Presi-
dent Truman's conviction that the military must be suboi-dinated to
civilian conti'ol were all factors which seemed to portend a diminished
role for the armed forces within the post-war intelligence community.

325

The National Security Act of 1947, which created the CIA and NSC,
also strengthened civilian authority over military services by drawing
the War and Navy Departments together under a single Secretary of
Defense. The new Secretary was given authority ovei- all facets of the
administration of the defense establishment. The identities of the
Army and the Navy were preserved, however, under separate civilian
secretaries w^ho now^ reported to the Secretary of Defense rather than
directly to the President. At the same time, the air elements of the
Army were reformed under a new Department of the Air Force, with
the same status as the two older service departments.

The broad powers granted the Secretary of Defense permit him
to effect major organizational changes within the Defense Department
by the simple expedient of issuing a directive. The Defense Intelligence
Agency was created by such a directive in 1961. The Eisenhower
administration had concluded in the late 1950s that a consolidation
of the services' general (defined rather awkwardly as all non-SIGINT,
nonoverhead, nonorganic intelligence activities) was needed, an idea
which the Secretary of Defense in the new Kemiedy administration,
Robert F. ISIcNamara, quickly endorsed.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary McNamara disagreed on
the form the new agency should take. The JCS were concerned with
presei"ving the responsiveness of the service efforts to the militaiy's
tactical intelligence requirements. They therefore wanted a joint
Military Intelligence Agency subordinate to them, within which the
independence of the several military components, and hence their
sensitivity to the needs of the parent service, Avould be retained.^
McNamara Avanted a much stronger bond. He was determined to
utilize better the service assets to support policymakers and force
structure planners, and to achieve management economies.

The Defense Intelligence Agency which emerged was a compromise.
It reports to the Secretary of Defense, but does so through the JCS.
The Joint Staff Director for Intelligence (the J-2) was abolished
and replaced by the Director of the new DIA. The functions of the
Office of Special Operations — the Small intelligence arm of the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) — were absorbed by DIA.^ There
has been continuing controversy among the services due to their
reluctance to cede responsibilities to DIA because they feared down-
grading wartime combat capabilities. Moreover, the OSD level of the
Defense Department has pressed continuously for greater centraliza-
tion; both of these controversies have hampered DIA throughout its
existence.

ITnlike the DIA, the National Security Agency (NSA) is a presi-
dential creation. Established in response to a Top Secret directive

" Memoranda, from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to Chief, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Lyman Lemnitzer, 2/8/61 ; from Lemnitzer to McNamara, 3/2/61 ;
from McNamara to Lemnitzer, 4/3/61 ; from Lemnitzer to McNamara, 4/13/61.

* Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to Secre-
taries of the Military Departments; Director of Defense Research and Engineer-
ing ; Chief, Joint Chiefs of Staff ; Assistant Secretaries of Defense ; General Coun-
sel : Special Assistant ; and Assistants to the Secretary, 7/5/61 ; DOD Directive
5105.21, 8/1/61.

326

issued by President Truman in October 1952, NSA assumed the respon-
sibilities of its predecessor, the Armed Forces Security Agency
(AFSA), which had been created after World War II to integrate
the national cryptologic effoit. NSA was established as a separate
agency within DOD reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense.
In addition, it was granted SIGINT operational control over the three
Service Cryptologic (collection) Agencies (SCAs) : the Army Se-
curity Agency, Naval Security Group Command, and Air Force
Security Service. Under this arrangement NSA encountered many of
the same jurisdictional difficulties which were to plague DIA. In an
effort to strengthen the influence of the Director of the National Secu-
rity Agency (DIRNSA) ov^er their activities, the SCAs Avere confed-
erated in 1971 under a Central Security Service (CSS) with the
DIRNSA as its chief. The mission of NSA/CSS is to provide cen-
tralized coordination, direction, and control for the United States
Government's Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Communications
Security (COMSEC) activities.

Jf.. Current Organization

Describing the management structure of the Defense intelligence
commmiity would be a difficult task under the best of circumstances.
Authority and influence within any big organization are often deter-
mined as much by personalities and working relationships as by formal
chains of commands or job descriptions. For the sprawling and
complex Defense intelligence network, the task is particularly
chiallenging. Moreover, the community is in the midst of an executive
branch-directed transition which may alter second-level management
relationships throughout the Department of Defense. The executive
branch has not yet revealed exactly wdiat kind of structure it intends,
if indeed its full reorganization plan has been decided.

Of necessity, the description which follows applies to the organiza-
tion of the Defense intelligence community as it existed during most
of 1975.^

As the Defense intelligence community is presently organized, the
Secretary of Defense has three groups of assets : (1) the Defense agen-
cies reporting directly to him, of which the National Security Agency,
the Central Security Service, and classified national programs are the
most significant (but also including the Defense Mapping Agency and
the Defense Investigative Service) ; (2) the Defense Intelligence
Agency, which reports to him through his principal military advisers,

" The most significant change apparently now being considered would affect
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (ASD/I). This
position is currently (as of April 1976) vacant. Reportedly, the duties of the
ASD/I will be assumed by a new Deputy Secretary who will also have executive
jurisdiction over the related fields of telecommiinications and net threat assess-
ment. In this case, the ASD/I position could be abolished. The possibility cannot
be ruled out. however, that thf executive envisions the new Deputy Secretary
as an additional oversight position, in which case a new ASD/I reporting to him
could be appointed. This is along the lines suggested by the Report to the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of Defence bv the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, .luly 1,
1970, on National Command and Control Capability and Defense Intelligence
(hereinafter cited as the Fitzhugh Report, after its chairman, Gilbert W.
Fitzhugh).

327

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and is responsible for preparing Defense
intelligence reports and estimates drawing upon the data collected by
other arms of the intelligence apparatus; and (3) the intelligence arms
of the individual military services under the immediate operational
control of the service chiefs, which encompass the military's general
intelligence collection agencies, their counterintelligence and investi-
gative arms, and activities of tactical interest.

One of the largest organizations in the Defense intelligence com-
munity is the National Securit}^ Agency. Military persomiel, facilities,
and equipment play a predominant role in carrying out the mission
described by NSA Director, General Lew Allen, Jr., in public session :

This mission of NSA is directed to foreign intelligence,
obtained from foreign electrical communications and also
from other foreign signals such as radars. Signals are inter-
cepted by many techniques and processed, sorted and analyzed
by procedures which reject inappropriate or unnecessary
signals. The foreign intelligence derived from these signals is
then reported to various agencies of the government in re-
sponse to their approved requirements for foreign intelli-
gence.^

Other agencies reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense are
concerned with more sf)ecialized subject areas than the cryptologic
group and make smaller demands on resources. The Defense Mapping
Agency is responsible for all defense mapping, charting, and geodetic
activities. Although a substantial percentage of this Agency's activities
are of vital intelligence interest, others are related only marginally to
intelligence, and some have no defense connotation at all. Similarly,
the Defense Investigative Service, responsible for carrying out back-
ground investigations, is generally not considered in the mainstream
of the national intelligence effort.

Aside from the Defense Investigative Service, each of the military
services retains independent investigative arms responsible for both
counterintelligence and criminal matters. These agencies fall within
the ordinary military chain of command, and report to the Chief of
Staff for each service. Other intelligence activities of national impor-
tance conducted under the uniformed services include the reconnais-
sance operations of Air Force aircraft and drones, and the general
intelligence collection and analysis work of the U.S. Army Intelli-
gence Agency, the Naval Intelligence Command, and the Air Force
Intelligence Service. The service intelligence agencies are primarily
oriented to supporting the tactical missions of the senices, but they
also collect information used by DIA in producing finished intelli-
gence. The service agencies also continue to engage in activities related
to national intelligence, and participate in the national estimates
process as observers on the U.S. Intelligence Board.*^''

A simplified diagram of the DOD-funded intelligence organiza-
tion is presented on page 328. As is clear from the diagram,
the organizational structure is extremely complicated, with several key
individuals serving in more than one capacity, and disparate and dif-
fuse chains of responsibility, both for deciding what is to be done and
allocating the resources to do it.

* General Lew Allen. .Tr., testimony, 10/29/75, Hearings. Vol. 5, p. 17.
"^ USIB was abolished by Executive Order No. 11905, 2/18/76.

328

ORiANlltTlOvl OP TUE b0b.FulJ6E'i M.JTEl.l.lGEVjCt CONVMUVJVty

~=h

h--.ll , li I

fDHQiiiSM]

Perhaps the most significant feature of the above chart however,
is what it does not show : a clear-cut line of authority extending from
the highest councils of the executive branch to the operating arms
of the intelligence apparatus. This is not surprising since this
structure is the product of many years of bureaucratic evolution.
Whether one views this arrangement as a crazy-quilt pattern, pro-
duced piecemeal over time in response to internal pressures, or as a
finely balanced mechanism developed to meet needs as they arose, is
largely a matter of perspective. It is hard to avoid observing, however,
that if the apparatus has functioned even half as efficiently in allocat-
ing intelligence resources as its proponents maintain, it is because its
participants have come to understand it well enough to make the sys-
tem work in spite of itself. On the brighter side, the profusion of checks
and balances inherent in the system may serve to reassure those who
fear the potential evils of concentrating too much power in the hands
of a single intelligence leader.

B. The Defense Intelligence Budget

/. Probleins of Definition

The magnitude of national resources devoted to intelligence activi-
ties has recently been subject to considerable public speculation. Esti-
mates of U.S. military intelligence spending have ranged from $3-^
billion annually to $15 billion, with most settling around the $6.2
billion figure cited in a recent book.^

' Victor Marehetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
(New York : Dell, 1974) , p. 95.

329

Much of the controvei^y stems from definitions. What constitutes
an intelHgence activity? Which Government entities are intelligence
organizations? Unfortunately, the budgeting practices of the intel-
ligence community, and particularly the Department of Defense which
controls the overwhelming bulk of intelligence resources, were not de-
signed with much attention to functional clarity. Within DOD, in-
stitutional pressures to lower the "fiscal profile" of intelligence activi-
ties and rivalries over control of organizational assets have led to such
discrepancies as placing the SR-71 program in the strategic forces
account (Program I, a totally different section of the Defense budget) .*
Other examples of current budget practices are the exclusion of all
communications security, counterintelligence, and mapping and chart-
ing activities from the Consolidated Defense Intelligence Budget
(CDIB).

Although a case can be made that DOD's narrow definition of
intelligence activities offers certain management expediencies in per-
mitting the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
(ASD/I) to concentrate its attention on the central elements of the
Defense intelligence effort, it produces such functional anomalies as
the exclusion of important intelligence activities from the ASD/I's
fiscal purview. Certainly, whatever degree of budgeting oversight the
Congress elects to assume should address a fiscal presentation assembled
on the basis of a more comprehensive definition of national intelligence
activities than DOD uses at present.

Furthermore, a congressional oversight committee, in attempting to
monitor DOD's counterintelligence budget, may want to group it with
the counterintelligence budgets of all other intelligence agencies to
provide management visibility to the national counterintelligence ef-
fort tliat is now lacking, even within the executive branch. Practical
difficulties in distinguishing counterintelligence activities from ordi-
nary criminal investigations (which, though totally different in pur-
pose, are quite similar in method and often share common assets)
should not be permitted to preclude an effort to establish a cross-agency
grouping of the counterintelligence budget.®

The same problem of distinguishing intelligence and nonintel-
ligence-related functions exists in the budgets for mapping and
geodetic activities, most of which are the responsibility of the Defense
Mapping Agency. Many of DMA's missions are only marginally
related to the intelligence function, but others are of vital importance
to all segments of tlie intelligence community's market. At a tactical
military level, what intelligence commodity is of greater importance
to a field commander than accurate maps of his area of operations?
As with counterintelligence, the difficulties inherent in trying to
separate the budgets of those facets of the mapping, charting, and
geodetic effort which serve a national intelligence purpose from those

*The SR-Tls were recently transferred from this category to the Strategic
Forces (Program I in the Planning, Programing, and Budgeting System).

" The investigations for security clearances, previously a hodgepodge of dis-
parate standards for uncoordinated, redundant efforts, were recently consolidated
under a newly formed Defense Investigative Service (DIS). Nearly two-thirds
of the budget for Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities (CI&IA)
remains vested with the service agencies.

69-983 O - 76 - 22

330

which do not should not be solved by the simple expedient of ignoring
all such activities.

Still more difficult definitional problems arise when one probes more
deeply the budgets of the armed forces in search of "tactical" as
opposed to "national" intelligence functions. The difference between
these two categories of intelligence lies in the eye of the consumer, not
in the intelligence-collection activity itself. Increasingly, intelligence
data-collection systems have grown capable of serving both the broad
interests of the policymakers and defense planners and the more
specific technical interests of the weapons developers and field com-
manders. In fact, a given set of collected data may often be of interest
to all these groups, although the analytical slant with which it is
presented is likely to differ markedly in response to consumer
preferences.

There is an extensive gray area encountered in attempting to define
military intelligence activities at the tactical or field command level.
Many components of the military forces make a definite con-
tribution to our intelligence effort during peacetime, but have other
important missions as well, particularly during war. A prime example
is the Navy's long-ran^e, shore-based patrol planes, w'hich play an
important ocean surveillance role in peacetime, but would be an active
part of U.S. antisubmarine warfare (ASW) combat forces during
war. Although tactical military intelligence and related activities
are included in the comprehensive cost estimates presented in the
following section, the Committee believes the budgets of such activities
should be excluded from the jurisdiction of a congressional intelligence
oversight committee, with those committees in which it is currently
vested retaining fiscal review authority.

The problem of reflecting costs of activities which are onlv partly
intelligence-related in cost reporting is not confined to DOD. The
di])^omatic missions of the Department of State are responsible for
political, economic, and commercial reporting, as well as normal rep-
resentational and diplomatic responsibilities. The Department's Bu-
reau of Intelligence and Research, which is both a consumer of
intelligence and a producer of finished analyses, was budgeted for
$9.5 million in FY 1976, of which 84 percent was spent on salaries.
However, much more is spent each year to support State's embassies
and consulates which, in addition to other duties, function in their
political reporting activities as a human intelligence collection system.
As with tactical military intelligence acti\'ities, the difficulties of try-
ing to segregate the intelligence portion of the budget costs of these
dual-purpose assets appear to outweigh the benefits.

2. The Size of the Defense Intelligence Budget in FY 1976

The Committee's aiialysis indicated that [deletedl billion ^° consti-
tutes the direct costs to the U.S. for its national intelligence proo^ram
for FY 1976. This includes the total approved budwts of CIA, DIA,
NSA, and national reconnaissance programs.^"'' If the costs of tactical

" Dpleted pending further Committee consideration.

"" Direct costs of tlip intelligence activities of the ERDA, FBI, and State De-
partment are contained in their respective budgets.

331

intelligence by the armed services and indirect support costs "'^ which
may be attributed to intelligence and intelligence-related activities are
added in, the total cost of intelligence activities by the U.S. Govern-
ment would be twice that amount. This represents about [deleted] per-
cent of the federal budget, and [deleted] percent of controllable fed-
eral spending."''

It should be stressed that this larger estimate represents a full cost
and includes activities which also fulfill other purposes. Thus the entire
amount could not be "saved" if there were no intelligence activities
funded by or through the Defense. Department.

A breakdown of the DOD intelligence budget divided by activity
is shown in the table below. These estimates are based on a broader in-
terpretation of what constitutes an intelligence activity than that used
by DOD. The Department manages its national intelligence effort
through the Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program (CDIP), and
makes no formal effort to attribute indirect support costs. The sum-
mary includes only those activities funded through the Defense Ap-
propriation Bill.

The costs of intelligence functions performed by the Departments of
State (Bureau of Intelligence and Research), Treasury, Justice (Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation), and the Energy Research and Devel-
opment Administration (which has assimilated the intelligence divi-
sion formerly operated by the Atomic Energy Commission) total
about $0.2 billion.

Full Costs of Intelligence and Related Activities Within the DOD Budget:

Fiscal Year 1976

(In millions)
Direct costs :

Cryptology

Communications security

Reconnaissance programs

Aircraft and drones

Special naval activities

Counterintelligence and investigation

General intelligence

Mapping, charting, and geodesy

Central Intelligence Agency

Subtotal, national intelligence effort [deleted] "''

Strategic warning

Ocean surveillance

Tactical intelligence

Weather reconnaissance

Reserve intelligence components

Subtotal, military intelligence effort [deleted]

Total, direct costs [deleted]

Indirect support costs :

Basic research and exploratory development

Logistics

Training, medical and other personnel activities

Administration

Total, indirect support costs [deleted]

Total, intelligence costs (budgeted by DOD) 1 [deleted]

^°^ Indirect support costs include costs for personnel, operations and mainte-
nance which support intelligence activities. Examples are the operation of train-
ing facilities, supply bases, and commissaries.

^"^ Deleted pending further Committee consideration.

^"^ lUd.

332

[DELETED]

3. Who Controls the Intellige'tice Budget?

Tlie nominal head of the intelligence community is the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI), who is also the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency; these two roles, however, are to be viewed as
distinct. A cornerstone of President Nixon's 1971 directive, designed

333

to foster the intelligence comnmnity's responsiveness to policymakers
and promote management efficiency, was "an enhanced leadership role"
for the DCI. Yet the DCI was not given direct authority over the
community's budget, nor granted the means by which to control the
shape of that budget until the announcement of President Ford's
Executive Order of February 18, 1976.

As Director of the CIA, the DCI controls less than 10 percent of the
combined national and tactical intelligence efforts. His chairman-
ship of the Executive Committees (ExComs), which overeee the man-
agement of certain reconnaissance programs (wherein he serves in
what amounts to a partnership with the ASD/I), also affords him
some influence over the funds budgeted for these efforts. The remain-
der spent directly by the Department of Defense on intelligence activi-
ties in FY 1976 was outside of his fiscal authority. The DCI's influence
over how these funds are allocated was limited, in effect, to that of
an interested critic.

By persuasion, he could have some minor influence, but the budgets
themselves were prepared entirely within the Department of Defense.
The small staff of the DCI may have been consulted in the process,
but by the time it sees the defense portion of the national intelligence
budget, the budgetary cycle .has been well advanced, and hence the
budget has been largely fixed. Problems of timing also influence the
role of the Office of Management and Budget, which sets broad fiscal
guidelines in budget ceilings, but plays an otherwise minor role in
shaping the Defense intelligence budget.

The real executive authority over at least four-fifths of the total
resources spent on intelligence activities has resided with the Secre-
tary of Defense. Over the past few years, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense has shown a particular interest in the intelligence portion
of the DOD budget, in effect representing the Secretary on many is-
sues arising in this area. However, the major responsibility for man-
agement of intelligence programs will lie with the newlv created
position of Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Mr. Robert
Ellsworth).

The Assistant Secretarv of Defense for Program Analysis and
Evaluation (ASD/PA&E) holds general review authority over the
so-called mission forces, the operational forces which include much
of the tactical intelligence assets of the military services, A third ASD,
the Comptroller, is responsible for reviewing the budgets of the agen-
cies concerned with counterintelligence investigations, and the newly
formed Defense IMapping Agency. As explained earlier, DOD con-
siders these activities peripheral to the intelliwnce effort, and their
costs account for only about 5 percent of the overall intelligence
budofet.

The managers of the various intelligence programs collectively wield
the greatest influence on day-to-day intelligence operations. By the

334

budget yardstick, the most influential individual is the Director of
NSA (DIRNSA) who, including his dual role as Chief of the Central
Security Service, manages the largest single progi'am contained in
the national intelligence budget, less than half of which is actually
in the NSA budget.

Close behind the DIRNSA, and also directly related to the collec-
tion of signals intelligence data, is the United States Air I'orce in
its role of managing certain recoimaissance pi'ograms. Decisions made
regarding the introduction and development of reconnaissance sys-
tems have the greatest impact on the overall size of the intelligence
budget, not only because of the direct costs of perfecting and procuring
the hardware involved — as expensive as this technically complex equip-
ment has become — but also because of the continuing effect that the
choice of a collection system has on processing and other operating
costs long after it has been made.

A third grouping of defense intelligence activities is the General
Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP). In effect an "all other" cate-
gory, the GDIP budget is ordinarily one-fourth Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) costs, and three-fourths service costs (including those
of the Air Force Intelligence Service, Naval Intelligence Command,
and a part of the U.S. Army Intelligence Agency). The GDIP en-
compasses all of DOD's non-SIGINT, nonoverhead intelligence col-
lection and production activities deemed by the Department to be of
national importance. It does not include activities related to the mili-
tary field commands.

Although the general intelligence budget managed by the Director
of DIA (DIRDIA) has never been more than a fraction the size of the
DIRNSA's cryptologic budget, his problems, though similar, are
more formidable. Whereas opinion is divided on the DIRNSA's grip
over the service agencies that participate in the Consolidated Cryp-
tologic Program (through the Central Security Service) , there is little
disagreement on the DIRDIA's inability to exert significant influence
over the priorities and activities of the service components of the
GDIP.

As a consequence, the program management responsibilities for the
service general intelligence agencies i)reviously held by the DIRDIA
were recently transferred to the ASD/I. The result is that the
DIRDIA, who purportedly still speaks for the Secretary of Defense
on "substantive" matters within the intelligence community, exerts
direct control over only 4 percent of the Secretary's intelligence
budget.

The span of authority at each managerial tier— from executive
oversight through fiscal review to program management — is sum-
marized in the table on page 335.

335

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336

Defense agencies each draw on resources funded within the service
appropriations in addition to their own agency appropriations. These
resources generally take the form of pay and allowances for military
personnel who are serving tours outside their j)arent service with
intelligence agencies. DIA's appropriation is supplemented by $39
million in this way; NSA's by $34 million; DIS by $16 million; and
the Defense Mapping Agency's by $12 million. The Defense Depart-
ment makes accounting corrections for these service-incurred costs
in its Fiscal Year Defense Pla^n (FYDP), and the amounts are in-
cluded in presenting the agency budgets. The important point to be
recognized is that the budgets of the Defense intelligence agencies
are not fully covered by the funds appropriated to them.

Slightly over a third of the overall DOD-funded intelligence effort
is managed directly by the military services. The bulk of these funds
support the tactical military requirements of the field commands and
include many force components for which the intelligence mission is
secondary or of shared importance with other activities. How^ever,
activities under service management are of national importance and
interest in two areas: peripheral reconnaissance (carried out both
by piloted aircraft, such as the SR-71, and unmanned drones), and
counterintelligence and investigation (conducted by the Air Force
Office of Special Investigations, the Naval Investigative Service, and
a number of decentralized Army military intelligence groups).

J). Budget Trends

The preceding section defined a [deleted] billion "package'' of DOD-
funded activities as a reasonable, comprehensive estimate with the
addition of selected non-defense activities of a national intelligence
budget subjected to separate congressional authorization. This section
focuses on budget trends for this grouping of national activities.

In terms of simple dollar amounts, the FY 1976 DOD budget sub-
mission for national intelligence activities is the higliest ever — over
twice the amount appropriated in FY 1962. During periods of rapid
inflation, however, "current dollars" are totally misleading as a meas-
ure of time trends in the consumption of real resources. Some allow-
ance must be made for the year-to-year diminution in the purchasing
power of a dollar that is brought about by rising prices. The method
for doing so employs "price deflators" in an effort to express the worth
of a series of heterogeneous "current-year" dollars in terms of the pur-
chasing power of a dollar in some specific "constant" base year. The
fact that these adjustments can seldom be achieved with precision does
not negate their usefulness.

The chart on page 337 indicates the trends in the DOD-funded na-
tional intelligence budget (which includes the CIA as well as Defense
agencies and the national activities of the military services) from fiscal
year 1962 through fiscal year 1976. The upper, climbing curve plots
current dollar amounts as appropriated by the Congress except for fis-
cal year 1976, which is the amount requested by DOD. The lower, grad-
ually descending curve shows the equivalent trend in the national in-
telligence budget after correcting, insofar as possible, for the effects of
inflation by expressing each of the historical budgets in terms of the
number of FY 1962 dollars it would take to purchase the same level
of effort.

337

Trepdjin the National Intelligence Budget:
FY 1962-1976 a,'

1962

1964

1966

1963 1970
FISCAL YEAR

1972

1974

1976

Includes CIA budget. Does not include costs of tactical military
intelligence activities.

After climbing rapidly during the first half of the 1960s, largely as
a result of major program initiatives to acquire sophisticated recon-
naissance systems (including the $1 billion SR-71 development pro-
gram), the real "baseline" intelligence budget peaked at mid-decade
at about [deleted] billion. Although outlay continued to grow moder-
ately for several more years, the extra cost of supporting activities
directly related to the war effort in Southeast Asia grew even more
quickly, so that the amount available to support nonwar-related, or
baseline, activities began to diminish. Since the mid-1960s, the budget
has declined steadily, in terms of the resources that could be bought
with the dollars provided, to the FY 1976 level of [deleted] billion,
about equal in buying power to the budgets of the late 1950s.

338

A review of DOD planning documents indicates that every effort
will be made by Defense leaders to avoid further erosion in the
intelligence effort below the FY 1976 level Conversely, it is not
anticipated that significant increases in funding (above those neces-
sary to compensate for continued inflation, now expected to average
5-7 percent annually over the next five years) will be requested. If
the Congress accej)ts these plans, a roughly constant level of real
spending with gradually increasing annual appropriations to offset
inflation can be expected.

Measured in today's prices, the budget request for Defense intelli-
gence programs is also well below past funding levels : oft' $0.5 billion,
or about 10 percent, from the FY 1962 level, and down nearly
30 percent from the pre-Vietnam peak of [deleted] billion. Compared
to FY 1962, the largest reductions have taken place in the resources
dedicated to some activities under NSA's management, which declined
by 31 percent in real terms; and the development, procurement, and
operation of reconnaissance systems, which went down 15 percent.
Spending in support of aircraft and drone operations, although far
below the peaks associated with the introduction of the SR-71, stands
well above the level of 1962. Spending for communications security is
also considerably higher today. Reflecting efficiencies achieved through
the consolidation of independent service programs within the Defense
Mapping Agency, real spending for mapping, charting, and geodetic
activities is about $100 million less in FY 1976 than it was in FY 1962.
Consolidation has also achieved economies in the field of counterin-
telligence and investigation, although on a far smaller scale. The $125
million requested for these activities stands about 15 percent below the
pre-Vietnam level of effort.^^

During the Committee's inquiry, informed managers within the
Defense intelligence communit}^ fre^juently expressed the judgment
that the downward trend in the resources dedicated to their pro-
grams has gone as far as it should. While acknowledging that no one
has succeeded in devising a sound method by which to relate the
value of the community's output to the quantity of resources used, they
argue that most of the savings from the elimination of duplication and
other forms of nonproductive effort have already been realized, and
that further reductions can only be achieved at the risk of curtailing
essential intelligence services.

S. How Much is Enough?

Because of the difficulties inherent in trying to quantify the intelli-
gence community's output, no one has vet developed a rigorous method
by which to relate the amount of intelligence produced to the amount
of resources consumed in the intelligence effort. For this reason, it
is not possible to state w'ith confidence the effect that changes in the
level of resources allocated to the intelligence mission could have on
U.S. national security. In other words, no one really knows what comes,
out of the intelligence apparatus as a function of what ^es into it.

The twin peacetime purposes for maintaining a national intelli-
gence organization are to reduce the probability of key decisionmakers

"An estimated 20-40 percent of this amount will be spent for criminal, as
opposed to counterintelligence, investigations.

339

making a wrong decision, either by taking inappropriate adtion in
some maitter important to U.S. interests or by failing to act at all, and
to aid in assuring that U.S. Armed Forces are adequately prepared to
execute decisions requiring military force. The intelligence apparatus
is supposed to pi-omote good policy and military readmess by making
the policymakers and generals better informed than they might
overwise be. However, the relationship between the quality of the
infomiation supplied to a national leader and the quality of the deci-
sions made is obviously extremely complex and ill-defined.
Although good intelligence may create a bias in favor of policymak-
ers making good policy, it can offer no guarantees that such will tran-
spire in every instance. All too easily, a bad policy judgment may be
attributed to "intelligence failures."

If the level of effort were increased substantially, the quality of
intelligence and national security would be enhanced. Conversely,
substantial reductions could pose additional security risks. What can-
not be ascertained with precision is whether the benefits would be
worth the additional costs, or the savings the additional risks. At pres-
ent, the issue can only be evaluated suojectively, taking into accomit
those few factual statements that are at hand and the judgments of
intelligence experts (recognizing, of course, the institutional biases
the judgments may reflect).

On the one hand, the way in which the peacetime national intelli-
gence budget has been shrinking has been duly documented. Appar-
ently, these reductions have not significantly deitracted from the overall
performance of the national intelligence apparatus or seriously jeop-
ardized U.S. security. Community managers interviewed during the
Committee's investigation generally felt that present funding was
adequate to provide all consuming groups with essential intelligence
support. On the other hand, the same individuals were unanimous
in their opposition to any further cuts in the budget — a view endorsed
by the 1975 report of the Defense Panel on Intelligence, which stated :
"We consider that the widely held concern over the inflated size of the
intelligence effort is no longer valid." The report maintained that fur-
ther "substantial" reductions should be contingent on one or more of
the following :

— ^A conscious decision to modify intelligence priorities and

coverage.

— The introduction of labor-saving devices (i.e., automation

of the intelligence process) .

— Reorganization of other management efficiencies.

In making the case against further i-eductions in the level of the
na;tional intelligence effoit, it is commonly argued that the intelligence
is labor-intensive (meaning that people, not machines, con-
tribute the most to the community's product and account for the
greatest share of its costs) , and that the number of intelligence workers
has declined sharply over the past several years. The community's
managers contend that further personnel cuts should be made only as
new equipment is introduced which can do more efficiently some of the
tasks now performed by people.

340

The trend in defense intelligence manpower has been sharply
downward : the fiscal year-end streng'th of 89,900 persons (civilian and
military, U.S. citizens and foreign nationals) planned for 1976 is
one-fifth less than that of fiscal year 1962, and 42 percent below the
1968 peak of 153,800 persons (some of whom were, of course, engaged
in support of the Southeast Asia war effort). At the end of fiscal year
1975, 101,500 pei-sons were engaged in defense national intelligence
activities.

It is not true that the defense national intelligence effort is labor-
intensive. Quite the opposite. Intelligence is highly capital-intensive;
the defense intelligence community annually invests more per employee
than the DOD-wide average. ^^ As shown in Table 5, invest-
ment per man-year for the national intelligence sector of the Defense
budget will average $16,700, about 11 percent less than was spent in
1962 despite the manpower reductions that have taken place, but still
$2,800 more than will be invested bv the general purpose forces at large,
and only $1,800 less than the highly capital-intensive strategic forces.
The doAvnward trend in the investment rate for the intelligence com-
ponents does not suggest a vigorous effort on the part of community
managers to achieve the gains in efficiency through automation that
they contend offer the best opportunity to realize further savings.

DEFENSE INVESTMENT RATES: FISCAL YEARS 1962-76
(Thousands of constant fiscal year 1976 dollars per man-yearp

Percent-

age

change,

fiscal year

1962

1964

1%8

1972

1974

1975

1976

1962

Defense national intelligence

components

18.7

22.0

15.3

14.8

16.3

16.7

-10.7

Strategic military forces

37.1

26.2

23.1

25.5

18.0

17.8

18.5

-50.1

General purpose military

forces

12.1

12.4

U5.9

'13.1

12.1

10.0

13.9

-1-14.9

• Investment defined as sum of total ob'iga'ioial a I'hirj'yfor associated "^OT & E orocureTisnt and military construc-
tion. Average psrsomel strengths computed to include all military, U.S. civiliin, and foreign national employees.
2 These figures reflect Increased Investment in support of combat operations in Southeast Asia.

Lacking a sound methodology by which to relate outputs to inputs,
management of the intelligence community must remain as subjective
as the product in which it deals. The Committee did not receive the
impression that the intelligence community was in fact striving to
develop such a methodology, if indeed that is possible. The words of
foi-mer Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Froehlke sum up the
existing situation lucidly : "The intelligence community does not know
the minimum level of resources that will satisfy an intelligence require-
ment. There is no upper boundary set by requirements, only by the
resources that are made available."

"The Department of Defense has reque.sted $37.6 hillion for investment
(RDT&E, Procurement and Military Construction) in FY 1976 and will con-
sume about 3.1 million man-.vears of labor for an average investment per man-
year of $12,000. This compares favorably with the most capital-intensive sectors
of U.S. manufacturing, such as petroletmi and chemicals, and is many times
greater than the investment spending of such truly labor-intensive industries as
textiles.

341

C. Management Problems of the Defense Intelligence Community

1. Previmis Studies

Senate Resolution 21's instructions that the Select Committee under-
take a "complete investigation and study" to determine "whether
there is unnecessary duplication of expenditure and effort in the col-
lection and processing of intelligence information by United States
agencies" strikes a familiar chord. Over the past decade, no fewer than
six major studies have been commissioned within the executive branch
to probe precisely the same question. Coinciding with the Congress'
inquiry, another executive study of the community's organization
was conducted, culminating in the actions taken by the President on
February 18, 1976.

Earlier studies have not always agreed on details, but all have con-
cluded that the defense intelligence community has performed neither
as effectively nor as efficiently as possible, due largely to its frag-
mented organization. More centralized management control is needed
if there is to be improvement in the cost-effectiveness of the commu-
nity's efforts. Notwithstanding this view, the community's organiza-
tional structure has changed little over many years. Since many of the
past studies of the community's organization have tapped greater
resources than have been available to the Select Committee, the dis-
cussion which follows draws heavily upon their findings.

Writing in 1971 from his vantage point in the Office of Management
and Budget (0MB) , James R. Schlesinger compared the structure and
management methods of the intelligence community to those of the
Department of Defense prior to the Defense Reorganization Act of
1958. Obviously, this Act did not eradicate all of DOD's management
problems. Similarly, reorganization of the intelligence apparatus could
not in itself guarantee improved performance nor lowered costs.
But reorganization could, in Schlesinger's view, create the conditions
for inspired intelligence leadership. In his 1971 paper, Schlesinger
concluded : "the main hope for improving cost-effectiveness did in fact
lie in a fundamental reform of the intelligence community's decision-
making bodies and procedures." "

In its letter of transmittal to the President, the 1970 Blue Ribbon
Panel on Defense (the Fitzhugh Report), summed up its appraisal
of the community's performance with the following criticisms :

— Intelligence activities are spread throughout the Depart-
ment of Defense Avith little or no effective coordination.
— Redundance in intelligence, within reason, is desirable, and
it is particularly important that decision-makers have more
than one independent source of intelligence.
— There is, as has often been charged, evidence of duplication
between the various organizations.

— There is a tendency within the intelligence community to
produce intelligence for the intelligence community and to
remain remote from and not give sufficient attention to the
requirements of others who have valid needs for intelligence.

" OflBce of Management and Budget, "A Review of the Intelligence Community"
(Schesinger Report), 3/10/71.

342

— There is a large imbalance in the allocation of resources,
which causes more information to be collected than can ever
be processed or used.

— Collection efforts are driven by advances in sensor tech-
nology, not by requirements filtering down from consumers
of the community's products.^^

The Blue Ribbon panel also cited the following allegations made by
"responsible witnesses" during the course of its investigation, noting
that there was no way to confirm or disprove any of the charges
because there was no existing procedure to evaluate systematically
the efficiency of the intelligence process or the substantive value of its
output :

— The human collection activities (HUMINT) of the services

add little or nothing to the national capability.

— Defense attaches do more harm than good.

— The intelligence production analysts are not competent to

produce a sound, useful product.

— Once produced, the product seldom reaches the individuals

who need it.

Each of these issues is discussed below.
2. Centralizing Management Controls

On this issue, the views of those who wish to avoid repetitions of
past abuses by the community and those stressing the importance of
improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the community's opera-
tions may not be compatible. Critics of centralization feel that reforms
aimed at improving cost-effectiveness by concentrating budget and
operational authority within the community might, at the same time,
concentrate the power to undertake improper activities in the future.
Centralization proponents counter that the diffusion of authority is as
apt to encourage improper conduct as its concentration. A streamlined
management structure would, they argue, promote the visibility and
accountability of controversial programs.

If the Defense intelligence community were reorganized to promote
more effective, centralized controls, what form might it take?

The office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
(ASD/I) has been the single most influential office in the preparation
of the national intelligence budget under recent organizational ar-
rangements. Although the ASD/I's authority is not absolute, he has
more to say about how and where the national intelligence community
invests its resources than any other individual by virtue of his fiscal
review authority over the Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program
(CDIP).

ASD/I was established largely as a result of a recommendation by
the 1970 Blue Ribbon Defense (Fitzhugh) Panel, but it was not ac-
corded the full authority the Panel proposed, and certain other com-
plementary reforms were also not adopted. A classified supplement to
the Fitzhugh Report called for creation of an ASD/I who would
also serve as a new Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI).

' Fitzhugh Report, 7/1/70.

343

Under this arrangement, the same individual would have direct line
authority over the operations of the DOD intelligence apparatus (via
his position as Director of Defense Intelligence) and responsibility for
review of resources allocated to it as Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence.

The Blue Ribbon Panel further envisioned a reorganization of the
DOD intelligence community along functional lines, separating collec-
tion and production activities into two new agencies, the heads of
which would report to the ASD/I in his dual role as DDL

Complementing its objective of creating a clear chain of command
from the operating aims of the Defense intelligence establishment to
the Department's top policymakers, the Panel also recommended the
establishment of a Deputy Secretary of Defense for Operations who
would represent the Secretary in all intelligence-related matters, and,
to whom the ASD/I-DDI would report directly. Although the recom-
mendation to establish a second Deputy Secretary of Defense was not
accepted in 1970, it is part of the 1976 executive reorganization plan.

3. Too Mioch Collection f

Numerous studies since the mid-1960s have concluded that a serious
imbalance exists between the amount of data collected by the technical
sensor and surveillance systems and the ability of the processors and
analysts to digest and translate these data into useful intelligence in-
formation. These studies recommend that greater attention be given to
producing better insights from the information and less to stockpiling
data.

Analyzing the steep rise in the cost of intelligence activities during
the 1950s and early 1960s, Schlesinger was among the first to blame
the movement to employ ever more sophisticated technical collection
systems, which he believed had led to "gross redundancies" within
community operations. He concluded that the rapid growth in the
collection of raw intelligence data was not a substitute for sorely
needed improvements in analysis, inference, and estimation. The scope
and quality of intelligence output, he concluded, had not kept pace
with increases in its cost.

The Committee did not find any studies suggesting that more col-
lection capacity is needed, although deficiencies in the responsiveness
of existing collection systems have been frequently noted. Examples of
general observations on overcollection are :

— Like the rest of the intelligence community, it (the CIA)
makes up for not collecting enough of the right kind of infor-
mation on the most important targets by flooding the system
with secondary matter.

— The inforrnation explosion h?s already p-ptten out of hand,
yet the CIA and the community are developing ways to in-
tensify it. Its deleterious effects will certainly intensify as
well, unless it is brought under control.

— The quantity of information is degrading the quality of fin-
ished intelligence."

" "Foreign Intelligence Collection Requirements : The Inspector General's Sur-
vey." (hereinafter cited as the Cunningham Report) . December 1966.

344

— Production resources can make use of only a fraction of the
information that is being collected. There exists no effective
mechanism for balancing collection, processing and produc-
tion resources.^''

The period of rapid growth in intelligence costs that undoubtedly
motivated much of the concern about overcollection has passed. Al-
though the level of total real spending has now returned to what it was
during the late 1950s, the efficiency with which intelligence resources
are being apportioned among the collection, processing, and produc-
tion functions remains an issue.

An examination of the distribution of the national intelligence
budget dollar in FY 1975 indicates that most of the community's re-
sources support collection activities. The community is still spending
72 percent of its funds for collection, 19 percent for processing raw
technical data, and less than 9 percent for the production of the
finished intelligence products (bulletins, reports, etc.) which the con-
sumer sees as the community's output. There has been no significant
change in the allocation over the past several years, nor is any
anticipated.

The collection of unused information results in greater inefficiencies
than merely the effort wasted on collection. Backlogs in processing
and analysis lead to duplicative efforts across the board, since the re-
sults of preceding collection missions are not always available to plan
and manage current missions. Moreover, the rush to keep pace with
the data disgorged by the technical collection systems encourages super-
ficial scanning, increasing the probability that potentially important
pieces of information will be overlooked.

If.. Alternative Mearis of Collection

There are major disagreements within the community between pro-
ponents of traditional collection methods employing undercover agents
(human intelligence, or HUMINT) and advocates and operators of the
vast system of technical sensors. Approximately 87 percent of the
resources devoted to collection is spent on technical sensors, compared
to only 13 percent for HUMINT (overt and clandestine operations).

Most of the intelligence experts inter\'iewed during the Commit-
tee's inquiry tended to endorse the existing seven-to-one distribution
of resources in favor of technical collection, but the efficacy of the tech-
nical sensors was not unanimously acclaimed. Deputy Secretarv of De-
fense William P. Clements, Jr. commissioned the Defense Panel on
Intelligence (1975)^^ largely because of his concern with the failure
of the analytical community to alert national leadership to the October
1973 Middle East war.

The Defense Panel Report stressed the importance of upgrading
HUMINT, noting : "We are not getting [as of 1975] the level or quality
of information we need from this source." ^^ The Report credited tbe
CIA's Clandestine Service as the most competent U.S. HUMINT
collectors, but held this arm was not very responsibe to DOD needs. It

Fitzhugh Report, 7/1/70.
' Report of the Defense Panel on Intelligence, 1/75.

345

was concluded that the principal Defense HUMINT collectors, the
Defense Attache System (DAS) managed by DIA, were yielding
valuable returns at small cost, but greatlv needed a personnel upgrad-
ing. Other critics have been less charitable to the attaches.

The problem of measuring intelligence output prevents accurate
assessment of the contribution of different collection methods. Shifts
in the uses of intelligence systems among peacetime, crisis, and war-
time situations further complicate appraisals, as does the divergent
interests of the national and tactical consumer groups. Civilian policy-
makers tend to plan for peacetime situations, whereas military com-
manders envision quite different wartime demands on the intelligence
apparatus. The shifts of importance between peacetime and wartime
are illustrated by the fact that much of the economic intelligence col-
lected today would be accorded a much lower priority during a major
war. Similarly, the verification of arms control agreements, now a
major intelligence task, would be moot after the outbreak of hostili-
ties between the major powers.

Against this backdrop, only an approximate evaluation of the com-
parative worth of the various methods of intelligence collection has
been possible for the Committee. The results of such an evaluation are
simimarized as follows :

Performance was judged against two criteria: the ability of the
method to accomplish specified intelligence objectives, and character-
istics deemed desirable in intelligence systems.^^

The analysis indicated that reconnaissance programs and SIGINT
systems rank high in characteristics and performance. Not surpris-
ingly, their costs are also the highest of all the competing systems.

HUMINT did not score as highly as might be expected, based on
the emphasis and funds accorded to this activity. Still, overall, the
evaluation indicated that a fairly good correlation exists between the
benefits achieved by collection activities and their costs.

The priorities for spending among different collection systems ap-
pear to be appropriate. This does not mean that there is no need for
adjustment in the pattern of resource allocation for collection meth-
ods. A major analytic effort on the part of the community offers the
only means for achieving such efficiencies.

Although the issue of proper balance between collection, processing,
and production is usually phrased in terms of overcollection, it might
also be described as a problem of underproduction. Deputy Secretary
of Defense Clements stated: "In every instance I know about where
there was a horrendous failure of intelligence, the information was
in fact available to have averted the problem. But the analysts and
the system didn't allow the raw data to surface." ^'°

"The following intelligence objectives are considered: strategic warning;
crisis indication ; foreign weapons development ; foreign military deployments ;
political and military intent ; economic information ; political information ; tacti-
cal military information.

The following characteristics were considered : ability to penetrate denied
areas ; accuracy and reliability of data ; responsiveness ; wartime survivability ;
peacetime risks of incident.

*° Quoted by William Beecher in Report of the Defense Panel on Intelligence,
1/75.

69-983 O - 76 - 23

346

Similarly, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the arm of the Defense
Department charged with the prime responsibility for intelligence
analysis and production, concluded in a 1973 report :

The great disparity in the relative national investment in
collection systems versus intelligence processing, exploita-
tion, production and support systems has now reached a plati-
tude [sic] where the anticipated payoff of a high cost collec-
tion system is limited by the DIA's capability to exploit them
[sic] fully.

If production is the limiting step in the intelligence sequence, im-
proved overall efficiency might be achieved by enhancing this capacity
as well as by cutting back on collection. It is not clear, however, that
the DIA's suggestion to spend more on production, implied in the
above passage, would solve the largely qualitative shortcomings now
limiting the performance of some intelligence producers.

5. Setting Intelligence Priorities

Intertwined with the issue of how much should be spent on intelli-
gence activities is the question of how best to spend it. This poses a
whole series of complex, interrelated choices ranging from subject
matter to "line balance" (i.e., synchronizing the collection, processing,
production, and dissemin'ation among methods and means of collec-
tion) .

The most critical resource allocation choices concern the subjects
and geographic areas against which the community should target its
energies. Logically this choice would reflect the changing interests of
intelligence consumers, weighted according to national importance.
Lower-order choices, such as the design and selection of a new tech-
nical collection system, would be made in order to meet consumer
demands.

Unfortunately, the system does not work this way. Although ex-
pressed with varying degrees of forcefulness, almost every previous
study of the management problems of the national intelligence com-
munity has agreed that the formal mechanism for establishing prior-
ities to guide the community's allocation of resources (i.e., the so-
called requirements process) works poorly, if at all. In his 1968 report
to the Director of CIA regarding the actions taken in response to the
recommendations of the Cunningham Report, Vice Admiral Rufus
Taylor put the problem this way :

After a year's work on intelligence reauirements, we have
come to realize that they are not the driving force behind the
flow of information. Rather, the real push comes from the col-
lectors themselves — particularly the operations of large, in-
discriminating technical collection systems — who use national
intelligence requirements to justify what they want to under-
take for other reasons, e.g., military readiness, redundancy,
technical continuity and the like.

The Schlesinger and Fitzhugh reports concluded that the focus of the
community's efforts is determined by the program managers and oper-
ators of the highly complex technical collection systems that dominate
the community's budget, rather than by the priorities of the intelli-

347

gence consumers, Schlesinger called the formal requirements "aggre-
gated wish lists" that could be interpreted as meaning "all things to
all people," thereby creating a vacuum which left the individual intelli-
gence entities free to pursue their own interests. The Blue Ribbon Panel
noted that no effective mechanism existed for consumers, either na-
tional or tactical, to communicate their most important needs.^^ Re-
quirements, concluded the Panel, "appear to be generated within the
intelligence community itself."

In 1960, before major developments in data collection, a joint study
group criticized the requirements process and recommended sweeping
changes in the system. Six years later, the Cunningham Report de-
scribed the principal instrument in the reauirements process, the
Priority National Intelligence Objectives (PNIOs), as a "lamentably
defective document which amounts to a ritual justification of every
kind of activity anybody believes to be desirable," wryly adding, "We
found no evidence that an intelligence failure could be attributed to
a lack of requirements."

Poor communication between the producers of intelligence and the
consumers continues to be the greatest obstacle to improved efficiency
in the use of the community's resources.

6. Resource Allocation

Without judging the appropriateness of the community's subject
or geopolitical emphases, a brief description of the way in which
resources have been allocated follows.

In FY 1975, more than half the community's effort, about 54 cents
of each dollar, was targeted against military subjects such as doctrine,
dispositions, force levels, and capabilities. Twelve times more effort
went into collecting and processing information of this kind than
toward analyzing it. For technical and scientific subjects, the effort
was divided in the ratio of six parts collecting and processing to one
part analysis. Only about six cents on the dollar was focused on either
political or economic subiects. Resource allocation by subject and
function is shown in the table below.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRIORITIES
DISTRIBUTION OF THE FISCAL YEAR 1975 INTELLIGENCE DOLLAR BY SUBJECT i

Collection Processing Production Total

Subject area:

Military

Scientific and technical

Political

Economic

General

Total, fiscal year 1975

Total, fiscal year 1974

Total, fiscal year 1976 (requested).

1 Based on the budgets of the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
and that portion of the Defense Department's budget included within the Consolidated Defense Intelligence Progiam
(CDIP). This does not include mission support costs.

41.4

8.3

4.1

53.8

11.4

1.8

2.3

15.5

2.5

3.4

2.2

3.2

14.9

8.3

24.1

72.4

19.0

8.6

100.0

71.8

19.5

8.7

103.0

72.4

19.1

8.5

100.0

^ Two separate consumer priority polls, one undertaken by the staff of the
DCI, the other by the DIA, were explained to the Committee. In neither instance
was there evidence that the study had produced a significant or lasting impact
on management practices.

348

A second important way in which the existing priorities of the
national intelligence community are revealed is through the distribu-
tion of spending across the geopolitical spectrum. There is little
doubt that the most formidable potential threat to the United States
is posed by the Soviet Union, with the second most dangerous poten-
tial military antagonist being the People's Republic of China. Most
analysts would also hold that the nation's foremost commitment over-
seas is to the defense of its NATO allies. Vital interests in Asia include
the security and pro-Western orientation of Japan and the defense of
the Republic of Korea, to which the United States has had long-
standing treaty commitments. Instability in the Middle East, to a
lesser degree South America, and for the moment in Africa, would
seem to argue for special attention to these areas as well.

The attributable portion of the FY 1975 intelligence effort was
distributed among different target areas as follows : nearly two-thirds
of the resources consumed, 65 cents of each dollar, were directed
toward the Soviet Union and U.S. commitments to NATO ; 25 cents
of each dollar were spent to support U.S. interests in Asia, with most
of this targeted against China ; the Arab-Israeli confrontation in the
Middle East claimed seven cents ; Latin America, less than two cents ;
and the rest of the world, about a penny.

7. Management Efjiciency versus Security

In addition to the issues of balance in meeting the demands of both
national and tactical consumers, and in the distribution of resources
among the collection, processing, production, and dissemination func-
tions in the intelligence sequence, there is also an issue of balance in
the flow of information. Here the opposing considerations are secu-
rity and management efficiency. There is a legitimate need to protect
both what is known about a potential adversary's capabilities and the
way in which the knowledge was acquired.

The Committee's investigation surfaced considerable sentiment
that the community's preoccupation with compartmented security
may have reached a point where communications are so restricted
that effective analysis and dissemination of intelligence is impaired.
The Cunningham Report observed : "Some [intelligence] tasks require
piecing together many bits of information to arrive at an answer.
Compartmentalization hinders cross-discipline cooperation."

Supporters of the community's existing security arrangements
counter that few analysts with a proven "need to know" are denied the
clearances necessary to gain access to the information they require.
Yet the problem is more subtle than this. Merely allowing the diligent
analyst to acquire information is not enough. Kept in ignorance of
certain subject areas by the compartmentalization system, it is diffi-
cult to determine which particular security barriers to storm in search
of that last, missing fact that could unlock the puzzle with which the
analyst is grappling.

The Cunningham Report also noted a "real need to make compari-
sons and tradeoffs between intelligence activities and programs to
select the most efficient systems," a need which the Committee be-
lieves to be unmet today, despite organizational changes. The man-
ager constrained to a narrow view by the blinders of compartmentali-
zation is hardly in the best position to make such tradeoffs.

349

D. Agencies and Activities or Special Interest

1. The Defense Intelligence Agency

Formally established in August 1961 by Department of Defense
Directive 5105.21, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was en-
visioned by its civilian proponents as a means of achieving more cen-
tralized management control, thereby leading to a "more efficient
allocation of critical intelligence resources and the elimination of
duplicating facilities and organizations," ^^ The Agency was granted
full authority for assembling, integrating, and validating all intel-
ligence requirements originating with the Department of Defense,
setting the policy and procedures for collecting data, and developing
and producing all finished defense intelligence products.

Currently, the Agency is organized into five directorates, each headed
by a Deputy Director. The Directorate for Estimates produces all
DOD intelligence estimates, including DOD contributions to National
Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) for the National Security Council, as
well as forecasts in the areas of foreign force structures, weapon sys-
tems, deployments, and doctrine. The Deputy Director for Estimates
is also responsible for coordinating with CIA, State, and NSA on
intelligence estimates, and assisting these agencies with information
on military capabilities and strategies.

Intelligence assessments of special interest to military forces in
the field are the responsibility of the Directorate for Production. Other
directorates specialize in determining foreign technological progress
and the performance of foreign weapon systems (the Directorate for
Science and Technology) ; coordinating service requests for intelli-
gence information (the Collection Directorate) ; and administering
the Defense Attache System (the Directorate for Attaches and Human
Kesources) .

The national leaders who established the DIA were alert to the
danger that it might evolve into simply another layer in the intelli-
gence bureaucracy, and cautioned against thinking of it as no more
than a confederation of service intelligence activities.^* Nonetheless, a
decade later executive branch reviews criticized DIA for perpetuat-
ing the very faults it had been designed to avoid — duplication and
layering.^^ By 1970, each service actually had a larger general in-
telligence arm than it had had before DIA was created. At that time,
the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel reported :

Each [military] departmental staff is still engaged in activ-
ities clearly assigned to DIA such as intelligence production
including the preparation of current intelligence. The Mili-
tary Departments justify these activities on the basis that
DIA does not have the capability to provide intelligence they
need. It is interesting that DIA cannot develop a capa-
bility to peform its assigned functions, while the Military

^ Press release accompanying the creation of DIA, cited in the Froehlke
Report. 7/69.

="* Gilpatric memorandum to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 7/1/69.

^Fitzhug:h Report, Appendix: "National Command and Control Capability and
Defense Intelligence," 1970, pp. 33-34 ; William Beecher, Report of the Defense
Panel on Intelligence, 1/75.

350

Departments, which provide a large proportion of DIA per-
sonnel, maintain the required capability and continue to per-
form the functions.^ ^^

In trying to integrate massive and disparate defense intelligence
requirements, DIA had become increasingly bogged down in man-
agement problems, notwithstanding a number of internal reorgani-
zations in search of the right mechanisms of coordination. At the
root of the DIA's difficulties lie the opposing pulls from Washington-
level civilian policymakers, who demand broad insights of a largely
political character, and military planners and field commanders, who
require narrower and more specific factual data. DIA has never really
known which of these groups of consumers comes first. As the Fitz-
hugh Report stated: "The principal problems of the DIA can be
summarized as too many jobs and too many masters."

In retrospect, a strong case can be made that the DIA has never
really had a chance. Strongly resisted by the military services, the
Agency has been a creature of compromise from the outset. For
example, the Director of the DIA was placed in a position of
subordination to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) by designat-
ing him to serve as the JCS director for intelligence (replacing the
J-2 on the Joint Staff). Drawing again from the Fitzhugh Report,
this arrangement put the Director of DIA in the "impossible posi-
tion" of providing staff assistance on intelligence matters to both the
Secretary of Defense and the JCS, whose respective stances on a given
issue "often are diverse."

DIA was also reliant on the military for much of its manpower
which was initially drawn almost entirely from the intelligence arms of
the various services. The argument for manning the new DIA with
these personnel was to minimize the disruptive effects of organizational
change on the flow of intelligence information. This same case was
made for starting the DIA slowly. As a consequence, the Agency never
had the impetus which many other newborn government entities have
enjoyed and profited from. Dominated and staffed in large part by
the professional military, it is not surprising that DIA has come to
concentrate on the tactical intelligence demands of the services and
their field commands.

Since DIA has always been heavily staffed with professional mili-
tary officers on short tours, who are dependent on their parent services
for future assignments and promotions, the perspective of Agency
analyses has often been biased to reflect the views of the services. When
evidence is doubtful, the services have incentives to tilt an intel-
ligence appraisal in a direction to support their own budgetary re-
quests to justify existing operations and proposed new ones.^^ Intel-
ligence issues in the Vietnam war reflected this problem.

On the budget side of the problem, the Agency has been limited in
its ability to control the activities of the services by the lack of f ollow-

'^^ Fitzhugh Report, pp. 23, 31-32.

^^ Harry Howe Ransom, The Intelligence EstaUishment (Cambridge, Mass.,
Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 103; Department of Defense, The Senator
Gravel Edition: The Pentagon Papers, "Vol. IV (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971) ;
Patriclc J. McGarvey, CIA : The Myth and, the Madness, pp. 149, 134 ; Pentagon
Paners, passim; Chester Cooper, "The C.I.A. and Decision Making," Foreign
Affairs, January 1972.

351

up authority over intelligence activities : "Once money to support the
approved program is allocated to the services, they may or may not use
it for its intended purposes." ^^ In an effort to remedy this, program
management responsibilities over service components of the General
Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) were recently transferred
from the Director of DIA to the ASD/I.

The services' concern with autonomy and preservation of wartime
capabilities may make the achievement of any appreciable reduction
in duplicative effort an impossible goal, at least for general intelligence
activities. The problem is not simply one of bureaucratic pettiness;
there exist unavoidable trade-offs between tactical and national intel-
ligence interests. The issue of which set of needs should dominate
Defense intelligence is a difficult one, with past disagreements on this
point having played a major part in the dissatisfaction with DIA that
has been expressed by the services, policymakers, and OSD staff.

The jurisdictional dilemma was recognized by Schlesinger in his
1971 report : "If the services retain control over the assets for 'tactical'
intelligence, they can probably weaken efforts to improve the efficiency
of the community. At the same time there is little question about their
need to have access to the output of specified assets in both peace and
war." He cited service resistance to the National Security Act of 1947,
and to the 1961 DOD Directive establishing the DIA, concluding:
"Powerful interests in the military opposed, and continue to oppose,
more centralized management of intelligence activities."

A second factor contributing to the dissatisfaction frequently ex-
pressed by DIA's customers has been the quality of the Agency's
analysis. Most often, this is perceived as a problem of professional
competence.

Illustrating the deficiencies in intelligence production as viewed
by policymakers, Beecher has quoted former Secretary of Defense
Schlesinger: "when you have good analysis, it's more valuable
than the facts on a ratio of ten to one. But all decisionmakers get are
factual 'snipets.' " Such tidbits, while often interesting in content, are
of limited worth if not woven into context. The "analyst" who serves
as no more than a conduit for transmitting facts is not providing anal-
ysis. Yet, the job of the national intelligence analyst is to sort facts,
discarding those which do not appear relevant, and piecing together
what remains in a way that yields the broad insights policymakers
find most useful.

Besides a thorough understanding of his subject, the competent ana-
lyst must possess the qualities of perception, initiative, and imagina-
tion. Equally important, the analyst must be kept highly motivated and
must be permitted, on occasion, to be wrong. (This is the basis of the
argument for maintaining more than one source of key intelligence
estimates.)

Critics have often commented harshly on the quality of both civilian
and military personnel in DIA.^° There are two facets to the problem
of obtaining first-rate analysts: On the military side, capable and
ambitious officers have traditionally avoided intelligence assignments.

^ Fitzhuffh Report, p. 23.

'° e.g.. Ibid., p. 29 ; "Defense Panel on Intelligence," p. 6 ; McGarvey, CIA : The
Myth and the Madness, passim.

352

deeming such positions not conducive to career advancement. Of the
officers who have gone into intelligence, many of the best qualified
have tended to serve with their individual service agency rather than
joining DIA. DIA's leadership maintains, however, that gains have
been made in correcting service biases in the intelligence career field.
Since 1974, promotion prospects for officers in the service intelligence
agencies have become equal to or better than the service- wide averages.
This offers scant consolation for DIA, however, since the promotion
rates for attaches and Navy and Air Force officers serving with the
Agency have not improved proportionately, and remain less favorable
than the service averages. There are, in fact, some indications that
promotion prospects for officers at DIA may be deteriorating.^^

On the civilian side of the personnel problem (about 55 percent of
the DIA's 2,700 professional-level employees are civilian), it is fre-
quently argued that a predominance of military officers in middle-
management positions limits advancement opportunities within the
Agency for civilian professionals. In addition, a significant portion
of those "civilian" personnel who have reached management ranks are
in fact retired military officers.

Many experts who have studied the DIA's personnel problems have
concluded that improvement in the competence of the Agency's civilian
analvsts is contingent upon a relaxation of the constraints imposed by
Civil Service regulations. The 1975 Report of the Defense Panel on
Intelligence commissioned by Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements,
asserted : "The professionalism of the intelligence production process
must be improved substantially," and it strongly recommended ex-
empting DIA's analysts from the Civil Service.

Whether exempting civilian professionals from the Civil Service
and increasing their management presence would bring about the
changes required to transform the DIA into an effective competitor to
the CIA in producing national intelligence estimates remains ques-
tionable. The DIA has a problem of image. It is a problem that calls
for fundamental reform of its management attitudes and orientation,
as well as in its professional staffing. In the absence of the comple-
mentary reforms,^- it would seem doubtful that the provision of great-
er incentives for its civilian analysts, and greater management lati-
tude for the hiring and firing of these analysts by removing Civil
Service constraints would in itself suffice to bring about the needed
degree of improvement in performance.

Moreover, data on the civilian grade structure of DIA. compared to
that of the CIA, suggest that far too much emphasis may be
placed on the need to raise the salaries of DIA's civilian analysts. Con-
ventional wisdom holds that the CIA has outperformed the DIA be-
cause its superior grade structure permits it to attract and retain more
capable analysts. In fact, however, there is no significant difference in
the professional grade structure (defined here as GS-9, or equivalent,
and above) of the two agencies.

^ Memorandum from Vice Admiral DePoix to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger,
3/4/74. Memorandum from Lt. Gen. Graham to Schlesinger, 11/19/74.

^^ Such as a new headquarters facility — a request that has been repeatedly
denied by the Congress, but is an essential first step if a revitalized DIA within
the existing organizational structure is decided upon as the preferred course of
action.

353

About one-third of the upper management positions at DIA are
filled by military general officers, a much larger proportion than at the
CIA, where fewer military personnel serve.

Criticism of the professional standards of DIA's personnel has not
been restricted to the Agency's managers and production analysts. The
Defense attaches, who serve under the Agency's direction as the De-
fense Department's human intelligence (HUMINT) collection arm,
liav^e also been a topic of considerable concern. One 1970 study of the
Defense Attache System warned that the representational and protocol
responsibilities of attaches were assuming precedence over intelligence
functions which should constitute the principal purpose of the at-
taches.^^ This preoccupation with nonintelligence activities remains
strong today.

The qualifications of the officers assigned to attache duty have been
questioned. The chances for promotion have usually been low in DAS
and tlie tendency has been to draw a high proportion of attaches from
among officers on their last tours before retirement. Former DIA
Director Donald Bennett dismissed 38 attaches outright for incompe-
tence when he took over the Agency in 1969.^*

The arguments cited above suggest two basic alternatives for the De-
fense general intelligence apparatus: either retain the current cen-
tralized arrangement under the Defense Intelligence Agency, giving
its Director the authority he needs to fulfill his original mandate to
manage all of DOD's intelligence collection and production activities,
or disband the Agency, returning its resources to the military services
from which they were originally requisitioned, leaving the coordina-
tion of the tactical military aspects of these activities to the JCS, and
forming a staff close to the Secretary of Defense to produce the na-
tional intelligence estimates he requires.^^

There should either be a major role for DIA, or for the service agen-
cies, but not for both, unless they genuinely serve different functions.
Duplication of intelligence analyses can be valuable if it promotes
diversity and motivates through competition. This assumes that the
separate analysts have different perspectives on the issues. In this
sense, competition between CIA analysts and Defense Department ana-
lysts for strategic estimates, is very useful. By arguing different points
of view in forums in the intelligence community they force disagree-
ments to the surface and expose evaluations to closer scrutiny. DIA
now has had little incentive to serve as a CIA-type foil to the services,
since DIA has been primarily a military organization.

Specific measures which might improve the performance of DIA
within the existing organizational structure include the following :

a. Enhance frrofessional campetence. — Exempt DIA from Civil
Service regulations in the same manner as CIA and NSA. Open more
top-level jobs within DIA to civilian staffers. Increase incentives for
the military services to send better qualified officers to DIA. Waive
senioritv requirements for Defense Attaches. Rotate DIA and CIA
strategic analysts through each agency on temporary tours.

^ Report of the DIA Defense Attache System Review Committee, 5/30/70,
pp. II-1. II-2.

'* Staff summary of Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, USA (ret.) interview. 7/23/75.
^ A nucleus for which already exists in the Office of Net Threat Assessment.

354

h. Increase the responsiveness of the Agency to the Secretary of
Defense and his staff. — Give ASD/I (or the new Deputy Secretary)
authority to deal with the substance of intelligence programs as well
as the allocation of resources. Have the Director of DIA report direct-
ly to the Secretary of Defense, rather than through the JCS, as under
the present arrangement. Appoint a civilian as either the Director or
Deputy Director and make the Director subject to Senate confirma-
tion.

c. Increase DIA''s managerrient authority to match its management
responsibility. — Allow DIA to establish more requirements for the
service intelligence agencies, and to eliminate intelligence products of
the military services which are unnecessarily duplicative.

d. Increase lateral communication hetioeen DIA and other compo-
nents of the defense intelligence apparatus. — To integrate better the
work of the operators, analysts, and planners, encourage communica-
tion among DIA regional analysts and desk men in CIA, ISA, and
other policy staff offices in DOD and State.

2. The National Security Agency

The National Security Agency /Central Security Service (NSA/
CSS) provides centralized coordination, direction, and control of the
Government's Sismals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Communications
Security (COMSEC) activities.

The SIGINT or foreign intelligence mission of NSA/CSS involves
the interception, processing, analysis, and dissemination of informa-
tion derived from foreign electrical communications and other signals.
SIGINT itself is composed of three elements : Communications Intelli-
gence (COMINT), Electronics Intelligence (ELINT), and Telemetry
Intelligence (TELINT). COMINT is intelligence information de-
rived from the interception and analysis of foreign communications.
ELINT is technical and intelligence information derived from elec-
tromagnetic radiations, such as radars. TELINT is technical and
intelligence information derived from the interception, processing,
and analysis of foreign telemetry. Most SIGINT is collected by person-
nel of the Service Cryptologic Agencies located around the world. The
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS has authority for SIGINT missions.

The COMSEC mission protects United States telecommunications
and certain other communications from exploitation by foreign intelli-
gence services and from unauthorized disclosure. COMSEC systems
are provided by NSA to 18 Government departments and agencies,
including Defense, State, CIA, and FBI. The predominant user, how-
ever, is the Department of Defense. COMSEC is a mission separate
from SIGINT, yet the dual SIGINT and COMSEC missions
of NS A/CSS do have a symbiotic relationship, and enhance the per-
formance of the other.

A specific National Security Council Intelligence Directive
(NSCID) defines NSA's functions. It is augmented by Director of
Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs) and internal Department of
Defense and NSA regulations.

NSA responds to requests by other members of the intelligence com-
munity, such as CIA, DIA, and FBI, to provide "signals"
intelligence on topics of interest. An annual list of SIGINT require-
ments is given to NSA and is intended to provide the NSA Director

355

and the Secretary of Defense with guidance for the coming year's
activities. These requirements are usually stated in terms of general
areas of intelligence interest, but are supplemented by "amplifying
requirements," which are time-sensitive and are expressed directly to
NSA by the requesting agency. NSA exercises discretion in respond-
ing to these requirements ; it also accepts requests from the executive
branch agencies. NSA does not generate its own requirements.

All requirements levied on NSA must be for foreign intelligence-
Yet, the precise definition of foreign intelligence is unclear. NSA
limits its collection of intelligence to foreign communications and
confines its activities to communications links having at least one for-
eign terminal. Nevertheless, this is based upon an internal regulation
and is not supported by law or executive branch directive.

Although NSA limits itself to collecting communications with at
least one foreign terminal, it may still pick up communications be-
tween two Americans when international communications are involved.
Whenever NSA chooses particular circuits or "links" known to carry
foreign communications necessary for the production of f orei^ intelli-
gence, it collects all transmissions that go over those circuits. Given
current technology, the only way for NSA to prevent the processing
of communications of U.S. citizens would be to control the selection,
analysis, or dissemination phases of the process.

Communications intelligence has been an integral element of United
States intelligence activities. Foreism communications have been inter-
cepted, analyzed, and decoded by the United States since the Revolu-
tionary War. During the 1930s, elements of the Army and Navy col-
lected and processed foreign intelligence from radio transmissions.
Much of their work involved decryption, as well as enciphering United
States transmissions. Throughout World War II, their work con-
tributed greatly to the national war effort.

Since President Truman authorized NSA's establishment in 195ii
to coordinate United States cryptologic and communications activi-
ties, tremendous advances have been made in the technology of com-
munications intelligence. These advances have contributed to an
expansion in demands for a wider variety of foreign intelligence and of
requirements placed upon NSA/CSS SIGINT personnel and re-
sources. As new priorities arise in the requirements process, greater
demands will be placed upon NSA.

It is also necessary to face the problem of integrating intelligence
requirements for foreign policy and national security with Constitu-
tional constraints and safeguarding of domestic civil liberties. NSA's
intercept programs and possible violation of Fourth Amendment
rights are discussed in the section, "National Security Agency Sur-
veillance Affecting Americans," in the Committee's Domestic Intelli-
gence Report.

E. Military Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities

/. Background

The Department of Defense defines "military counterintelligence
and investigative activity" as all investigative activity apart from
foreign intelligence-gathering. Although this nomenclature is rela-

356

lively recent, the military services have always conducted investiga-
tions. None of these investigative activities are expressly authorized by
statute; rather, they have been justified as necessary to the military
mission. On occasion, investigative activity by the military has ex-
ceeded measures necessary to protect or support military operations.

In 1917, for example. Colonel Ralph Van Deman of the Army in-
telligence bureau recruited civilians in the Army Reserve and used
volunteer investigators to report on "unpatriotic" conduct. Van De-
man's men were soon dispersed throughout the country, infiltrating
such organizations as the Industrial Workers of the World, mingling
with enemy aliens in major cities, and reporting on all types of dis-
senters and radicals. Much of this civilian surveillance continued after
World War I, particularly in the area of labor unrest. In the 1920s
the Army had "War Plans White" to deal with anticipated uprisings
of labor and radicals. In 1932 the Chief of Army Intelligence col-
lected information on the "bonus marchers" arriving in Washington,
D.C.

Similarly the activities of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)
have not always been restricted to military affairs. Traditionally, ONI
has provided security for naval contractors, guarded ships, searched
crews, detected illegal radio stations, and investigated naval person-
nel, enemy sympathizers, and civilians whose activities were "inimi-
cable to the interests of the Navy."

Then, in the late 1960s during a period of considerable civil unrest
in the United States, the three services — particularly the Army — were
called upon to provide extensive information on the political activities
of private individuals and organizations throughout the country.^^

2. Areas of Investigation

DOD's counterintelligence and investigative activities are conducted
for many purposes, both within the United States and abroad.^^

a. Violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. — The UCMJ
is a code of criminal laws which applies to all military personnel of
the Department of Defense. The Secretary of each military depart-
ment is responsible for enforcement of its provisions within his de-
partment. Investigations of UCMJ violations take place within the
United States and in foreign locations where military personnel are
stationed.

h. Security Clearances. — The Department of Defense conducts back-
ground investigations to determine whether to award security clear-
ances to its military and civilian personnel or to the personnel of civil-
ian contractors. These investigations are done both in the U.S. and
abroad.

'' For a detailed description of this and other improper military investigative
activities, see the Select Committee's report entitled "Improper Surveillance of
Private Citizens by the Military."

" Examples include investigations of security leaks, investigations in support
of the Secret Service, investigations of theft at the facilities of Government
contractors, and investigations — once military forces have been called in — to
suppress domestic violence. None of these activities, however, currently repre-
sents a significant expenditure of investigative effort.

Military intelligence units also have certain counterintelligence functions to
perform which relate to a unit's combat responsibilities.

357

<?. Counterespionage.^^ — Under an agreement with the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation,^^ each of the military departments conducts
counterespionage investigations on military and civilian members of
tlieir respective military departments, although all such operations
are controlled by the FBI. In overseas jurisdictions where military
commanders have control over occupying forces, the military depart-
ments are given more latitude to conduct counterespionage investiga-
tions, but these are coordinated with the Central Intelligence Agency.

Counterespionage investigations may be offensive or defensive in
nature. Offensive investigations seek to obtain information on the
purposes or activities of a hostile intelligence service. Defensive coun-
terespionage investigations involve the identification of military per-
sonnel who are working for agents of a hostile intelligence service.
Counterespionage operations are undertaken in both domestic and
foreign settings.

d. Threats to DOD Personnel., Property., and Operations. — ^This type
of investigation is distinguished from a counterespionage investiga-
tion because no hostile intelligence agency is involved. Rather, the
"threat" typically arises from civilian groups and individuals whose
activities might subvert, disrupt, or endanger the personnel, property,
or operations of DOD. While "threat" information is normally ob-
tained from local law enforcement authorities, the military has tradi-
tionally reserved the right to conduct its own investigations of such
matters both in the U.S. and abroad.

In summary, one should remember that "military counterintelli-
gence and investigative activity" is not a static category. It includes
investigations undertaken for any reason apart from foreign intelli-
gence collection. These range from investigations of lost property to
investigations of fraud at servicemen's clubs. Moreover, the four gen-
eral categories cited above expand and contract to meet changing mili-
tary needs and demands from the Executive,

3. Supervisory Structure

The Secretary of Defense is ultimately responsible for all counter-
intelligence and investigative activity conducted by the Department of
Defense. However, the Secretary has delegated management respon-
sibility for this activity to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comp-
troller) .4° He, in turn, has delegated this responsibility to the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), who was assigned re-
sponsibility for the Defense Investigative Program Office (DIPO).

DIPO apportions counterintelligence and investigative resources
within the Department of Defense. The Office has budgetary control
of funds allocated for these activities, and provides policy guidance.
However, although DIPO stays informed of activities of the investi-
gative agencies, it does not exercise formal operational control over
them. In fact, no element at the OSD level exerts centralized opera-

^The counterespionage investigations of the Denartment of Defense are
described in detail in a classified staff report of the Committee.

'' The Delimitations Agreement of l&i9. Each of the military departments has
promulgated the agreement as a departmental regulation.

" DOD Directive 5118.3.

358

tional control over counterintelligence and investigative activities.*^
The one Defense Department agency engaged in such activity, the
Defense Investigative Service (DIS), and the three military depart-
ments largely retain independent operational control of their own
activities.

4. The Defense Investigative Service (DIS)

DIS is the only Defense agency established specifically to carry out
counterintelligence and investigative activities.^^ Created in 1972, its
chief function is performance of all security clearance investigations
for civilian and military members of the Department of Defense as
well as for all employees of Defense contractors. DIS also has been as-
signed responsibility for conducting "such other investigations as the
Secretary of Defense may direct," thus making it a special investiga-
tive arm of the Secretary.*^

DIS performs the special function of operating a computer index
known as the Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCH).
This is a computerized index which contains not only references to pre-
vious security clearance investigations, but also references to virtually
every DOD investigation conducted in the past.** According to recent
congressional testimony, the DCII now contains references to DOD
files on approximately 15 million Americans.*'^ DIS does not maintain
the files, but indicates to requesters which DOD counterintelligence and
investigative agency holds the file.

DIS has 280 offices across the United States, staffed by 2,620 mili-
tary and civilian employees. DIS does not have personnel located over-
seas, but is responsible for security clearance investigations that may
require tracking down leads overseas. Normally, an overseas element
of one of the services would support DIS in such cases.

5. The Military Departments

In the Navy and Air Force, all counterintelligence and investigative
activity, in both domestic and foreign contexts, is centralized in one
element. In the Army, such activity is dispersed.

a. Navy. — All foreign and domestic counterintelligence and other
investigative activity in the Navy is carried out by the Naval Investi-
gative Service (NIS). The Director of NIS reports to the Director of
Naval Intelligence, who has responsibility for foreign intelligence
gathering by the Navy. He, in turn, reports to the Chief of Naval
Operations. In 1975, 169 military and 744 civilian personnel *^ were
assigned to NIS.

" The Defense Intelligence Agency made an unsuccessful effort to gain control
of these activities in the late 1960s.

*^ The National Security Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency also have
small elements with counterintelligence and investigative functions. These ele-
ments exist solely to protect the activities of the agencies of which they are a
part.

« DOD Directive 5105.42.

" The DCII is routinely purged of references to files which have been destroyed
because of their age, files on deceased subjects, or files which DOD directives have
stipulated may not be retained.

^ Testimony of David O. Cooke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense ( Comi)-
troller), House Subcommittee on Government Operations, 1975 (unpublished).

** NIS agents are all civilian employees.

359

h. Air Force. — All Air Force investigative activity is carried out
by the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). In con-
trast to NIS, the Director of AFOSI reports to the Air Force
Inspector General. In 1975, AFOSI had 1,537 militaiy and 384 civilian
personnel assigned to it.

c. Anny. — In the Army, criminal investigations are separated from
other types of counterintelligence and investigative activity. They
are carried out worldwide by the United States Army Criminal In-
vestigation Command, the Director of which reports directly to the
Army Chief of Staff.

Remaining comiterintelligence and investigative activities are
apportioned between the United States Army Intelligence Agency
(USAINTA) and the military intelligence units located overseas.
USAINTA has responsibility for all activities within the United
States and in overseas locations where military intelligence units are
not located. Where military intelligence units are part of Army forces
stationed overseas (e.g., West Germany and Korea), they ordinarily
carry out comiterintelligence and investigative activity in their re-
spective locations. Where an investigation proves to be beyond their
capacity, USAINTA elements may be called upon.

Both the commanding office of USAINTA and the commanders of
military intelligence groups overseas report to the Army Assistant
Chief of Staff for Intelligence, who is responsible for the foreign in-
telligence-gathering activities of the Army. In 1975, the Army had as-
signed 2,822 military and 1,346 civilian personnel to counterintelli-
gence and other investigative activities.

6. ResvUs of Select Committee Inquiry

The Select Committee carried out an extensive investigation of the
counterintelligence and investigative activities of DOD insofar as they
have resulted in illegal and unwarranted intrusions into the political
affairs of civilians. The results of the investigation are published in
detail in the Committee Report entitled "Improper Surveillance of
Private Citizens by the Military."

The Committee found that while certain of DOD's past counter-
intelligence and investigative functions resulted in the collection of in-
formation on the political activities of private citizens, DOD has effec-
tively brought its counterintelligence and investigative activities un-
der control since 1971. The Committee found that DOD currently
maintains little information on unaffiliated individuals ; that which it
does maintain arguably falls within the terms of the Department's
internal restrictions. Similarly, the Committee found that operations
against civilians had been authorized in accordance with departmental
directives.

Despite the success of the Department's internal directives to limit
intrusions into the civilian community, the Committee nevertheless
finds them inadequate protection for the future and recommends that
more stringent legislative controls be enacted.

F. Chemical and Biological Activities

The terrible wounds inflicted by chemical weapons, such as chlorine
and mustard gas, in World War I spawned international attempts to
ban their use in warfare. The 1925 Geneva Convention succeeded

360

only in banning first use in war of chemical and biological weapons.
The United States signed this Convention but Congress failed to
ratify it; thus, the United States was not bound by its prohibitions.
Nevertheless, there was a widespread belief that the United States
would comply with the Convention.

Since the ban applied only to a country's first use of these agents,
both the Allied and the Axis powers in World War II researched
and stockpiled chemical and biological weapons in order to retaliate
against first use by an enemy. Ironically, as the first President pub-
licly to commit the United States to the policy of the Geneva Conven-
tion, President Roosevelt announced in June 1943, with the intent of
warning Japan against the use of such weapons : "I state categorically
that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons
[poisons or noxious gases] unless they are first used by our enemies."
As he spoke, however, he knew the United States had intensified its
biological research effort three months earlier with the construction of
a facility for drug research at Fort Detrick, Maryland.

The threat of retaliation against a countr}'^ using such weapons was
effective. Although Germany was thought to have a stockpile, it did
not touch it, even in the last desperate months of World War II. After
the War, the United States program of research and development on
such agents continued in order to maintain a weapons capability suf-
ficient to deter first use by hostile powers. The Army's facility at Fort
Detrick remained the center of biological weapons research and de-
velopment.

1. Chemical and Biological Activities *^^

Against this background, the Central Intelligence Agency entered
into a spe<2ial asfreement with the Army on a proiect which the CIA
codenamed MKNAOMI. The original purpose of MKNAOMI is dif-
ficult to determine. Few written records were prepared during its 18-
year existence; most of the documents relating to it have been de-
stroyed; and persons with knowledge of its early years have either
died or have been unable to recall much about their association with
the project. However, it is fair to conclude from the types of weapons
developed for the CIA, and from the extreme sc'^urity associated with
MKNAOMI, that the possibility of first use of biological weapons by
the CIA was contemplated.

The Army agreed that the Special Operations Division (SOD) at
Fort. Detrick would assist the CIA in developing, testing, and main-
taining bioloofical agents and delivery systems. By this agreement,
CIA acquired the knowledge, skill, and facilities of the Army to de-
velop biological weapons suited for CIA use. In 1967, tfie CIA sum-
marized MKNAOMI objectives:

a. To provide for a covert support base to meet clandestine
operational requirements.

b. To stockpile severely incapacitating and lethal materials
for the specific use of TSD [Technical Services Division].

c. To maintain in operational readiness special and unique
items for the dissemination of biological and chemical mate-
rials.

See Chapter XVI.

361

d. To provide for the required surveillance, testing;, up-
grading, and evaluation of materials and items in order to
assure absence of defects and complete predictability of results
to be expected under operational conditions.*^

In reviewing the records and testimony of SOD personnel, it is easy,
for the most part, to distinguish SOD's work for the Army from its
work for the CIA, even tliough very few SOD scientists knew of the
CIA connection. For example, the CIA personnel who worked with
SOD were identified as military officers from the fictitious S'aflf Sup-
port Group, whose interest in SOD was markedly different from the
Army's. The CIA was careful to ensure that its moneys were trans-
ferred to SOD to cover the cost of CIA projects and the few existing
SOD records indicate which projects were to be charged a<Tainst the
funds received from "P-600," the accounting designation for CIA
funds.

SOD's work for the Army from 1952 until the early 1960s was
primarily to assess the vulnerability of sensitive installations, such as
the Pentagon, air bases, and subway systems, to biological sabotage by
an enemy. In order to conduct these tests, SOD personnel would de-
velop small, easily disguised devices — such as spray cannisters and
spray pens — containing harmless biological agents. SOD personnel
would surreptitiously gain access to the installation, leaving the devices
to release the biological agent. SOD personnel would then monitor its
spread throuofhout the installation. In this way, SOD could determine
how vulnerable the installation was to sabotage of this kind and could
advise those charged with security of the installation on counter-
measures.

Although the CIA was interested in the kinds of delivery devices
which SOD could make for delivery of the biological agents, CIA
projects were distinct because they involved the mating of delivery
systems to lethal or incapacitating biological agents, instead of harm-
less agents used in vulnerability tests. The CIA would a'^k SOD to pro-
duce a delivery system and a compatible biological agent — a request
not made by the Armv until the early 1960s.

SOD developed pills containing several different biological agents
which couVl remain potent for week^ or months, and dart guns and
darts coated with biological agents. SOD also developed a special gun
for firing darts coated with a chemical that could incapacitate a guard
dog in order to allow CIA agents to knock out the guard dog
silently, enter an installation, and return the dog to consciousness when
leaving. SOD scientists were unable to develop a similar incapacitant
for humans.

SOD on occasion physically transferred biological agents in "bulk"
form, various delivery devices, and most importantlv, delivery devices
containing biological agents, to CIA personnel. Although none of the
witnesses before the Select Committee could recall any transfer of
such materials for actual use by the CIA, evidence available to the
Committee indir^ates that the CIA attempted to use the material. It is
fair to conclude that biological agents and delivery devices prepared at
Fort Detrick and transferred to the Staff Support Group were carried

^'^ Memorandum from Chipf, TSD/Biologrfcal Branch to Chief, TSD,
"MKNAOMI : Funding, Objectives, and Accomplishments," 10/18/67, p. 1.

69-983 0-76-24

362

by CIA agents in attempted assassinations of foreign leaders. How-
ever, the Committee found no evidence that such material was ever in
fact used against a person by the CIA.

By the early 1960s, the Army also became interested in the type of
work SOD was doing for the CIA. The Army apparently decided that
this type of surreptitious delivery device might be useful to Special
Forces units in guerrilla warfare. SOD developed special bullets con-
taining poison darts which could be fired, with little noise, from stand-
ard military weapons and small portable devices capable of spraying
biological agents into the air which would form lethal clouds. Ulti-
mately, the Army stockpiled a quantity of these bullets, but never
transferred them to field units.

SOD developed another capability according to existing records
which, so far as the Committee could determine, was never tapped by
Army or by the CIA. Whereas most SOD work was devoted to biologi-
cal weapons which would kill one individual noiselessly and with al-
most no trace of which would kill or incapacitate a small group. SOD
did research the possibilities of large-scale covert use of biological
weapons. SOD scientists prepared memoranda, which were passed to
the CIA, detailing what diseases were common in what areas of the
world so that covert use of biological weapons containing these diseases
could easily go undetected. SOD researched special delivery devices
for these biological agents, but it never mated such delivery devices
with biological agents.

In addition to CIA interest in biological weapons for use against
humans, it also asked SOD to study use of biological agents against
crops and animals. In its 1967 memorandum, the CIA stated :

Three methods and systems for carrying out a covert at-
tack against crops and causing severe crop loss have been
developed and evaluated under field conditions. This was ac-
complished in anticipation of a requirement which was later
developed but was subsequently scrubbed just prior to putting
into action.

^. Termination

All the biological work ended in 1969. Shortly after taking office.
President Nixon ordered the staff of the National Security Council to
review the chemical and biological weapons program of the United
States. On November 25, 1969, he stated that the United States re-
nounced the use of any form of biological weapons that kill or inca-
pacitate. He further ordered the disposal of existing stocks of bac-
teriolos:ical weapons.

On February 14, 1970, the President clarified the extent of his earlier
order and indicated that toxins — chemicals that are not living orga-
nisms but are produced by living organisms — were considered biologi-
cal weapons subject to his previous directive. The Defense Department
duly carried out the Presidential directive according to the instruc-
tions and supervision of the National Security Council staff. However,
a CIA scientist acquired from SOD personnel at Fort Detrick approx-
imately 11 grams of shellfish toxin, a quantity which was approxi-
mately one-third of the total world production and which was suffi-
cient to prepare tens of thousands of darts. This toxin, a known danger

363

if inhaled, swallowed, or injected, was then stored in a little-iifeed
laboratory at the CIA where its presence went undetected for five
years.

The transfer from SOD to the CIA resulted in a major quantity of
the toxin being retained by an agency in a manner which clearly vio-
lated the President's order. The evidence to the Committee established
that the decision to transfer and to retain the shellfish toxin was not
made by, or known to, high-level ojfficials of either the Defense Depart-
ment or the CIA. The Director of the CIA was told of the possibility of
retaining the toxin, but he rejected that course of action. The Commit-
tee found that the decision to keep the toxin, in direct and unmistak-
able contradiction of a widely announced Presidential decision, was
made by a few individuals in the CIA and SOD.

Nevertheless, the history of MKNAOMI and the atmosphere sur-
rounding it undoubtedly contributed to the mistaken belief of these
individuals that they were not directly affected by the President's
decision. The MKNAOMI project itself was contrary to United States
policy since 1925 and to Presidential announcement since 1943, for it
contemplated a first use of biological weapons by the CIA — albeit
in the context of small covert operations. Moreover, because of
the sensitive nature of MKNAOMI, these scientists gave their
superiors little written record of their work and received little or no
written guidance. The National Security Council staff, charged by the
President with determining what U.S. policy should be, did not dis-
cover MKNAOMI in the course of its study and did not, therefore, con-
sider the possibility that the CIA had biological weapons or biological
agents. The CIA employee who claims to have made the decision, on
his own, to retain the toxin received no written instructions to destroy
them. Kept outside the National Security Council's studv, the em-
ployee had to rely only on the newspaper account of the President's
announcement and on his own interpretation of it.

G. Meeting Future Needs in Defense Intelligence

The defense intelligence establishment poses two fundamental prob-
lems for future national policv. The first is how to improve the qual-
ity of intelligence and ensure that intelligence collection and produc-
tion are responsive to the needs of both the executive and legislative
branches; the second is how Congress can exercise responsible over-
sight of the intelligence agencies. These goals require not only execu-
tive-legislative cooperation in control of the intelligence establish-
ment, but also the desiqrn of a managerial and consultative system
which is conducive to efficiency in routine activities, and adaptive to
new priorities.

1. Anticipating New Requirements

It is a truism that generals should not plan for the next war by
preparing for the last one: so too the intelligence community should
not simply prepare to predict the last crisis. Ideally, allocation of
intelligence resources should precede crises, not follow them. For ex-
ample, concentration of a larger proportion of intelligence assets on
economic issues should have begun before the 1973 oil embargo and
energy crisis, not subsequently. In order to anticipate threats, which
is the essential function of peacetime defense intelligence, the agencies

364

must strengthen their ability to anticipate the proper targets for col-
lection and analysis.

The fundamental task of military intelligence will always be to
detect the numbers, characteristics, and locations of enemy weapons,
personnel, communications, and intelligence systems. As the world
changes, however, the identities of enemies and the relative impor-
tance of different security threats change. The allocation of intelli-
gence resources which was appropriate in a bipolar world, where the
most likely threats were strategic nuclear war or large-scale conven-
tional military engagements in the third world, is less appropriate in
a world where power is becoming more diffused. For example, al-
though the energy crisis (which is increasing the spread of nuclear
power reactors and eroding the technical and economic barriers to
acquiring nuclear weapons) and the growth of regional power rivalries
(which increases incentives to acquire such weapons) are combining
to make nuclear proliferation an imminent threat, the Air Force unit
responsible for nuclear intelligence still directs virtually all of its
assigned technical collection resources against the USSR and China.*^

In the short range, it is obvious that problems such as nuclear
proliferation and international terrorism will be given increasingly
high priorities in national intelligence. Since DOD has the vast
majority of collection assets, it should be increasingly involved in these
problem areas. In doing so, a new balance may have to be struck
between the national/peacetime intelligence priorities of the Depart-
ment of Defense and the intelligence community as a whole, and the
tactical/wartime requirements of the military. The critical problem
for improving intelligence in the long-range, however, is to identify
the mechanisms which are conducive to adaptation, re-evaluation of
priorities, and flexible distribution of collection and analysis assets.
Feedback from consumers of national intelligence — such policv and
research agencies as ISA, DDR&E, State, NSC, ERDA, and ACDA—
should be regularized, and DOD should also be responsive to the com-
munity-wide committees (such as IRAC, NSCIC, USIB, or IC Staff)
which consider the interface between issue urgency and collection
capabilities.

'2i. Ejfects of New Technology

Technological change produces both new capabilities and new bar-
riers in intelligence collection. Unless the U.S. loses its wide lead in
capacity for technological innovation, however, scientific advances are
likply to be a net benefit.*^^

In the near future, expanded computer capabilities can be expected
to improve the integration and availability of processed information
by use of a central bank with data, pictures, and reports digitized for
quick retrievability according to title or substance. This would offer
the efficiency and thoroughness of a full text search, but it also raises
the issue of the proper extent of compartmentation.

Improved technology also offers hedges against vulnerability and
political sensitivity. Development of unmanned mobile sensors for
dangerous peripheral reconnaissance missions can eliminate most of
the risks in current collection programs, or the potential for crises

^ Air Force briefing for Select Committee staff, July 1975.

*" See the Committee's detailed report on Intelligence and Technology.

365

and embarrassments which followed the North Korean seizure of the
Pueblo and downing of the EC-121. Both a reduction in risk and an
increase in cost-effectiveness could be possible if improved technology
results in substantial manpower reductions.

Technology is interactive. Availability of new techniques for moni-
toring or verification may provoke enemy countermeasures, and enemy
development of new weapons systems can produce the need for new
techniques of verification. (Heavy deployment of cruise missiles or
development of mobile land-based ICBMs by either the U.S. or
U.S.S.R., given current detection capabilities, would create virtually
insoluble problems of verification of strategic arms limitation agree-
ments. Development by either side of certain technical innovations, on
the other hand, could be undesirable. A breakthrough in ability to
detect and fix the location of submarines, for example, would de-
stabilize mutual nuclear deterrence by increasing the vulnerability of
the other side's second-strike capability.) The complex dynamics of
these interactions require substantial attention to coordinating R&D
for intelligence with policy considerations. The expense which goes
with technical sophistication also suggests the need for rigorous cost-
benefit analysis in intelligence R&D, to judge the relative utility of
new capabilities.

S. Restructuring Defense Intelligence Organizations

The pattern of DOD intelligence organization is obviously impor-
tant for the division of authority and responsibility within the depart-
ments, but it also has ramifications for the control and direction of
the intelligence community as a whole. Internally, there are divergent
interests and needs, particularly between the civilian leadership in
OSD and the military leadership in the JCS and unified commands.
Externally, there is an imbalance between the responsibility of the
DCI to direct the collection and production of national intelligence,
and the predominance of DOD in control of actual assets.

Within the defense establishment there has traditionally been a
trade-off in the view of many observers, between the peacetime needs
of the Secretary of Defense for "national" intelligence on general
politico-military developments and trends, and the wartime needs of
the professional military for "tactical" intelligence on enemy forces
and operations. This distinction may be eroding since central national
sensors can have important tactical applications.

Nevertheless, the Secretary of Defense and JCS have diff^^^ent re-
SDonsibilities, and thus different intelligence priorities. Dissatis-
faction with fragmentation and duplication of service intelligence
support to the Secretary led to the formation of the Defense Intelli-
genoe Asfencv 15 years a.(To. The DIA was supposed to integrate
military intelligence activities, and to serve the needs of both OSD
and the services. There has been widespread criticism of DIA's per-
formance since it was created.

The new Deputy Secretary of Defense position is designed to assert
greater control of DOD intelligence from the OSD level. If OSD staff
resources for intelligence are increased, and DIA's role is decreased,
the trade-off between service needs and the needs of national leader-
ship may be recognized, accepted, and dealt with, in contrast to the
earlier attempt to "cure" the problem by combining managerial f unc-

366

tions in DIA, There has been a similar potential problem in NSA,
although it has provoked far less concern than DIA since NSA must
also serve national and tactical needs. In 1961 the JCS attempted to
gain control of that agency ,^^ and in recent years some critics at the
other extreme have suggested taking NSA out of DOD, since it serves
many non-military needs. The entire problem of dealing with the
mutual relations of national and tactical intelligence may be clarified
as the DCI assumes the additional authority granted to him by the
President's Executive Order of February 18, 1976.

While establishment of a Pentagon intelligence czar in the form of
the new Deputy Secretary may reduce fragmentation within the de-
partment and improve the coherence of military intelligence, it will
probably have a major impact on the coordinating role of the DCI.
Given that the overwhelming volume of total U.S. intelligence col-
lection and production occurs within DOD, the Deputy Secretary
could become, in effect, a second DCI. The definition of the relation
between these two officials will be the single most critical factor in top-
level organization for management of national intelligence.

If.. Requirements for Congressional Oversight

If Congress attempts to exercise more comprehensive and detailed
oversight of intelligence agencies, the biggest issue is likely to be what
information the executive branch should make available. On defense
intelligence there is likely to be less of a problem if Congress concen-
trates on issues of intelligence process rather than substance. There is,
of course, a limit as to how far it is possible to evaluate the former with-
out considering the latter. Therefore, norms will have to be established
about what kinds of material (for example, finished intelligence) will
be subject to scrutiny by Congress on a routine basis. Provision should
also be made to keep basic information on budgets and resource allo-
cation in a clear and available form in the Pentagon, obtainable by
the oversight committee on demand. More consistent and thorough
documentation of the chain of command could also be required in
internal correspondence (thus avoiding the problem of "unattribut-
able" records of controversial decisions turning up in the files, i.e.,
unsigned directives or cables which cannot clearly be traced to an au-
thoritative source) .

If independent ongoing oversight of the substance of defense intel-
ligence is the goal, an oversight committee should have staff expertise
in several areas: (1) Political, to weigh the risks and gains of certain
programs and targets; (2) Scientific and Technical, to evaluate sen-
sors; (3) Economic, to judge cost-effectiveness; (4) Military, to con-
sider non-national strategic and tactical requirements of DOD
intelligence.

^* Memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lemnitzer to
Secretary of Defense McNamara, 3/2/61.

XVI. DISCLOSURE OF BUDGET INFORMATION ON THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

At the present time the aggregate amount spent for the intelligence
activities of the United States Government is classified. The individual
budgets for the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and certain other units within the Department of Defense
which gather national intelligence are likewise classified.

The budgets for these agencies — which spend billions of dollars
annually — are kept not only from the American people but also from
most Members of Congress. This secrecy prevents the public and most
Members of Congress from knowing how much is spent on national
intelligence and from determining whether that amount is consistent
with other national needs and priorities. It prevents the public and
most Members of Congress from knowing how much is spent by each
of the national intelligence agencies and from determining whether
that allocation among agencies is appropriate. Because funds for
these agencies are concealed in the budgets of other agencies, the public
and most Members of Congress cannot be certain that funds in the open
appropriations are used for the purposes for which they were ap-
propriated. No item in the overall federal budget is above suspicion
as a hiding place for intelligence agency funds.^ Finally, and most
seriously, the present system of secrecy is inconsistent with the con-
stitutional provision which states :

No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in Conse-
quence of Appropriations made by Law ; and a regular State-
ment and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all
public Money shall be published from time to time.^

* During the recent debate in the House of Representatives on the publication
of the CIA's budget Congressman Koch described an encounter with DCI Helms,
in which Congressman Koch asked about the size of the CIA budget and the num-
ber of CIA employees, questions that DCI Helms told Congressman Koch "we don't
answer." As Congressman Koch described it, he then asked Mr. Helms "Are you
telling me that I, a Member of Congress, do not have the right to know what the
budget is, so that when I vote, I do not know what I am voting on?" DCI Helms
said, "Yes . . . The item is placed in some other larger item, and you do not
know." Congressman Koch then asked, "Do you mean that it might be included
under Social Security?", to which DCI Helms replied, "We have not used that one
yet, but that is not a bad idea." Cong. Rec. H9359, daily ed., 10/1/75, remarks
of Rep. Koch. )

^ U.S. Const, Art. I, Sec. 9, CI. 7. For a fuller discussion of the constitutional
and policy issues involved, see "The CIA's Secret Funding and the Constitution,"
84 Yale Law Journal 608 (1975), "Fiscal Oversight of the Central Intelligence
Agency : Can Accountability and Confidentiality Coexist?" 7 'Slew York University
Journal of International Law and Politics 493 (1974), and "Cloak and Ledger:
Is CIA Funding Constitutional?" 2 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 717
(1975).

(367)

368

A. The Present Budgetary Process for Intelligence
Community Agencies and Its Consequences

At present, the Director of Central Intelligence submits to the
President recommendations for a consolidated national intelligence
program budget. The consolidated national intelligence budget, as
well as the budget requests from the various agencies within the
intelligence community, are reviewed by the Office of Management
and Budget (0MB) in the "same detail that [0MB] reviews the
budget requests of any other executive branch agency." ^ As former
0MB Director Koy Ash described it:

The specific amounts of the CIA's approved appropriations
request and the identification of the appropriation estimates
in the President's annual Budget, within which these amounts
are included, are formally provided by the Director of OMB
to the chairmen of the Senate and House Appropriations
Committees.*

In the past, special subcommittees of the House and Senate Appro-
priations Committees have considered the CIA budget in closed
session ; the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee noted
that his subcommittee "tried and tried and tried to hold the secrecy
of these matters as closely as we could." ^

These practices have been changing. The entire House Defense
Appropriation Subcommittee now scrutinizes the CIA budget. In
September of 1975 the Chairman of the House Appropriations Com-
mittee invited all the Members of the House of Repi-esentatives to
review the executive session hearings of the Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee on the CIA's budget, although Members had to agree
not to remove any documents from the room, not to take notes, and
not to reveal the classified information to "unauthorized persons."
While the Chairman invited this review by the Members, the full
House Appropriations Committee voted not to receive figl^res on the
CIA's budget from the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.

Neither the Senate Anpronriations Committee as a whole nor the
Senate as a whole is informed, even in secret session, of the budget
figures for the CIA, NSA ot- certain other intelliflrence units.

Once the subcommittees of the Appropriations Committee, agree
upon the level of funding for the intelligence agencies, these funds
are concealed in appropriation requests for other agencies on which
the full Appropriations Committees and Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives vote.

After congressional approval of these appropriations, the chair-
men of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees notify the
Office of Management and Bud.<Tet of the size and true location of
intelligence agency funds. Funds for the CIA are then transferred

^Letter from Roy Ash to Senator Proxmire, 4/29/74, quoted in Cong. Rec.
S9604, daily ed., 6/4/74, remarks of Sen. Proxmire. It might be argued that
the intelligence budgets should be reviewed in even greater detail by OMB as
neither the Congress as a vphole nor the public can presently participate in
the process of reviewing and debating the budget requests in this area.

* Ash letter 4/29/74.

^Cong. Rec. H9363, daily ed., 10/1/75, remarks of Rep. Mahon. Until 1974,
even the names of members of these special subcommittees were withheld from
the public.

369

to the CIA from these appropriations.*' Former 0MB Director Ash
noted :

The transfer of funds to CIA ... is accomplished by the
issuance of Treasury documents routinely used for the trans-
fer of funds from one government agency to another. The
amount and timing of these transfers, . . . are approved by
OMB.^

This whole process treats the CIA and other intelligence agencies
in a manner radically different from other highly sensitive agencies
of the United States Government, such as the Atomic Energy Com-
mission and the Department of Defense. Wliile intelligence agency
budgets may require somewhat different handling, it is important that
any special approach reflect real needs justifying departure from
the careful processes which Congress has developed over the years
for maintaining its power over the purse.

B. The Constitutional Requirement

The present budgetary process apparently violates Article 1, Sec-
tion 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution, which reads:

No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Conse-
quence of Appropriations, made by Law ; and a regular State-
ment and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all
public Money shall be published from time to time.

This constitutional provision was intended to insure that Congress
would control the governmental purse and that the public would be
informed of how Congress and the Executive spend public funds.^

In keeping with this constitutional mandate. Congress enacted 31
U.S.C. 66b (a), which provides that:

the Secretary of the Treasury shall prepare such reports for
the information of the President, the Congress, and the pub-
lic, as will present the results of the financial operations of
the Government.

" This is done pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 403f which authorizes the CIA to transfer
to and receive from other government agencies funds as approved by the OMB.

^Ash letter, 4/29/74. Under established procedures, funds approved by OMB
for transfer to the CIA are limited to the amounts which the chairmen of the
Senate and House Appropriations Committees specified to OMB.

8 See D. Robertson, Debates and Other Proceedings of the Convention of Vir-
ginia, 1788 (Richmond, 1805), p. 326. The Chancellor of New York asked if
the public were more anxious about any thing under heaven than the expenditure
of their monev?" 2 J. Elliot, Debates in the Several States' Conventions on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution, (Philadelphia : J. B. Lippencott, 1836),
p. 347.

The clause was implemented during the tirst Congress. The act creating the
Treasury Department required the Treasurer to annually present each House
of Congress with "fair and accurate copies of all accounts" and a "true and
perfect account of the state of the Treasury." Act of Sept. 2, 1789, Chapter 12,
Section I, I Statute 65.

This Act was replaced by 31 U.S.C. 1029, which provides, "It shall be the
duty of the Secretary of the Treasury annually to lay before Congress ... an
accurate, combined statement of the receipts and expenditures during the last
preceding fiscal year of all public monies." The receipts, wherever practicable,
wp'-e to bo dlvifipd by ports, districts, and states, and the expenditures by each
separate head of appropriation.

370

Fulfilling its charge, the Treasury Department publishes a Combined
Statement of Receipts^ Expenditures^ and Balances of the United
States Government^ which

is recognized as the official publication of the details of re-
ceipt and outlay data with which all other reports containing
similar data must be in agreement. In addition to serving the
needs of Congress, [^the report is used 6y] the general public
in its continuing review of the operations of Government.
[Emphasis added.] ^

The Connbined Statement., however, contains no entry for the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency or certain
other intelligence units within the Department of Defense. While the
figure for total funds received and expended by the United States
Government is accurate, some funds listed as expended by particular
agencies are, in fact, merely transferred from them to the Central
Intelligence Agency.

William Colby, former Director of the CIA, has argued that the
present practice is constitutional, maintaining that the Constitution
permits concealment of funds for agencies such as the CIA. Not only
does this position ignore the plain text of the Clause, but it is not sup-
ported by the debates, either at the Constitutional Convention or in the
ratifying conventions in the various States.

Mr. Colby's argument relies chiefly on the fact that when the State
ment and Account Clause was introduced it provided for annual pub-
lication of the account, but it was subsequently amended to allow
congressional discretion over timing.^°

The amendment was intended, however, not to permit concealment
of expenditures from the full Congress and the American people, but
rather to insure that the information would be made available in a
fashion permitting its thorough comprehension.^^ Neither pro-
ponents nor opponents of the amendment argued against the assertion

9 U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Combined Statement of Receipts, Expenditures and
Balance of the United States Government (1973), p. 1.

^^ William E. Colby testimony. House Select Committee on Intelligence Hear-
ings, 8/4/75, p. 120. Mr. Colby argued as follows :

"The so-called 'Statement and Account' clause . . . was not part of the initial
draft [of the Constitution]. The language first suggested by George Mason would
have required an annual account of public expenditures. James Madison, how-
ever, argued for making a change to require reporting 'from time to time,' Madi-
son explained that the intent of his amendment was to 'leave enough to the dis-
cretion of the Legislature.' Patrick Henry opposed the Madison language because
it made concealment possible. But when the debate was over, it was the Madison
view that prevailed."'

Mr. Colby also argued that the provision allowing Congress to keep their pro-
ceedings) secret demonstrated the intent of the Framers to provide for conceal-
ment. That provision, unlike the Statement and Account Clause explicitly pro-
vides for secrecy ; moreover, the Statement and Account Clause guarantees an
accounting for all public money. For a fuller treatment of thi.s argument, see
"The CIA's Secret Funding and the Constitution," Yale L.J. 608 (1975).

It could be argued that the constitutional requirement is not violated as the
Combined Statement provides an accurate total for receipts and expenditures.
Under this theory all government funds could be appropriated to one government
agency and secretly transferred to the other agencies. As long as the total apnro-
priated and expended were published, the constitutional requirement would be
fulfilled.

" 2 M. Farrand, Recorcis of the Federal Convention of 1181 New Haven : Yale
University Press, 1966), pp. 618-19.

371

that the people had a "right to know" how their funds were being
spent.^^

It should also be noted that the proponents of congressional dis-
cretion did not argue that secrecy was needed. Rather they contended
that leaving the interval of publication to be fixed by Congress would
result in fuller disclosure, since no agency would be forced to publish
an incomplete report to meet an inflexible and unrealistic deadline.^^
A fixed schedule would result in statements that would be "incom-
plete" ^* or "too general to be satisfactory." ^^ The proponents of the
amendment ridiculed the possibility that granting Congress discretion
would mean that information would be concealed forever; Congress
would publish the reports at regular, frequent inter\^als.^^

It has been implied that the constitutional requirement has been met,
at least in the House of Representatives, in that all Members can
examine the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee's executive session
hearings on the CIA buclget.^^ As one Member of the House noted :

Secrecy in Government is distasteful to a free society, but
preservation of our free society demands that we maintain a
prudent cloak over vital intelligence operations, so long as the
Representatives of the people have the right to examine what
is covered — as they do in this situation.^^

Knowledge on the part of all of Congress, would satisfy part of the
constitutional requirement. As Justice Story noted, one of the pur-
poses of the constitutional requirements is :

to secure regularity, punctuality and fidelity in the disburse-
ments of the public money ... it is highly proper, that
Congress should possess the power to decide how and when
any money should be applied for these purposes. If it were
otherwise, the executive would possess an unbounded power
over the public purse of the nation. . . . The power to control
and direct the appropriations constitutes a most useful and
salutary check upon profusion and extravagance, as well as
upon corrupt influence and public speculation. ... It is wise
to interpose in a renublic, every restraint, bv which the public
treasure, the common fund of all, should be applied with
unshrinking honesty to such objects as legitimately belong to
the common defense and the general welfare."

But even if all of Congress had the information now held by the
subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees, the Constitution
would still be violated. The Constitution requires that the puhlic know
how its funds are being spent. The Constitution requires that the
statement and account be made public "from time to time." ^° This re-

" D. Robertson, p. 326. See generally 3 M. Farrand, pp. 149-150.
" 2 M. Farrand, pp. 618-619.
" I hid., p. 618.

" See D. Robertson, p. 326.

" As was noted above at p. 368 this is not the case in the Senate.

^* Cong. Rec., H9360, daily ed., 10/1/75, remarks of Rep. Robinson.

"2 .T. Storv, Commevtaries on the Constitution of the United States, Sec. 1348,
pp. 222-223 (5th ed., 1891).

^ Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 provides for publication in contrast to Article 2,
Section 3, which provides that the President "shall from time to time give to the
Congress Information on the State of the Union."

372

quirement was imposed to make congressional responsibility "more
perfect" ^^ by allowing the people to check Congress and the executive
through the publication of information on what "money is expended,
for what purposes, and by what authority." ^^ As Chancellor Living-
ston pointed out :

You will give up to your state legislature everything dear
and valuable ; but you will give no power to Congress, because
it may be abused; you will give them no revenue, because
the public treasures may be squandered. But do you not see
here a capital check? Congress are to publish, from time to
time, an account of their receipts and expenditures. These may
be compared together; and if the former, year after year, ex-
ceed the latter, the corruption aaIII be detected, and the people
may use the constitutional mode of redress. ^^

The debates and later commentary indicate that the constitutional
requirement was designed to allow citizens to chart the course of policy
through an examination of governmental expenditures — to determine,
for example, whether too much money is spent on defense and too little
on education, or whether funds spent on bombere should be allocated
to submarines. Publication of this information would also enable the
people, with Congress, to determine whether expenditures by the exec-
utive conform to the intent of the appropriation. Publication of appro-
priations and expenditures would also provide an opportunity for the
people to ascertain if both appropriations and expenditures were for
constitutional purposes.^^

It is, however, unclear how much information on appropriations
and expenditures is required by the Constitution to be published. No
one at the Constitutional Convention disagreed with the assertion
that it would be impossible to account for "every minute shilling."
Even in the present disclosures of appropriations and expenditures
of nonsensitive governmental agencies, there is a limit to the amount
of detail which can be published.'"

The Supreme Court in United States v. Robel^^^ suggested a stand-
ard which might be used to fix the constitutional requirement particu-
larly when claims that publication of the budget would damage na-
tional security are raised against the Government's duty to its citizens
to publish from time to time a regular statement and account of re-

^ 2 J. story, Sec. 1348, pp. 222-223.

^ lua.

** 2 J. Elliot, p. 345.

^* Rs David Ramsey, one of the early commentators on the Constitution wrote

If Congress applied any funds for purposes other than those set forth
in the Constitution, they would have exceeded their powers. The Clause provides
information so that "[t]he people of the United States who pay, are to be
judges how far their money is pronerly applied."

"An address to the Freemen of South Carolina on the subject of the Federal
Constitution," in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States, p. 374
(P. Ford, ed., 1888). See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).

^ Of course, a good deal more information, although not published,.is available
under the Freedom of Information Act.

=""389 U.S. 258 (1967).

373

ceipts and expenditures of all public money. The Court held that
"when legitimate concerns are expressed in a statute which imposes a
substantial burden on First Amendment activities, Congress must
achieve its goal by means which have the least drastic impact on the
continued vitality of First Amendment freedoms." ^^

Under this test the constitutionality of a level of disclosure of infor-
mation on expenditures depends on whether there is another system
of greater disclosure which, without endangering national security,
would have a "less drastic" impact on the public's right to know
how its funds are being spent. It is clear, however, that the present
secrecy surrounding the appropriations and expenditures for intel-
ligence— particularly the inflation of unspecified appropriations in
which funds for intelligence are concealed — vitiates the constitutional
guarantee.^^ Under the present system neither the public nor the Con-
gress as a whole knows how much is being spent on national intel-
ligence or by each intelligence agency. In addition, both Congress as a
whole and the public are "deceived", as one Senator put it,^^ about the
"true" size of other agency budgets. As certain unspecified general
appropriations contain funds which are secretly transferred to the
CIA, it is impossible for most Members of Congress or the public
to know the exact amount of money which actually is destined for
any government agency.'^ Congress is thus unable to set priorities
through the allocation of funds,^" or to determine if expenditures by
the executive conform to congressional intent and are being spent
wisely and well. Members of the public cannot determine with any
confidence whether they agree with Congress' allocation of resources
and cannot monitor expenditures by the executive branch.

"'SSQ U.S. 258, 268. While the public's right to information on governmental
expenditures has not been accorded the "preeminent" status of the First Amend-
ment, the test is an appropriate place to begin an analysis.

^ As Justice Black wrote, "The guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at
the expense of informed representative government provides no real security for
our republic." Neiv York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 at 719 (1971). In
th'e same case, Justice Stewart wrote, "In the absence of the governmental checks
and balances present in other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint
upon executive policy and power in the area of national defense and international
affairs may be in an enlightened citizenry." Id. at 728. Justice Stewart's remarks
apply equally well to the exercises of power by the Congress.

'' Cong. Rec. S9602, daily ed., 6/4/74, remarks of Sen. Proxmire.

-' Cong. Rec, H9361, daily ed., 10/1/75, remarks of Rep. Evans. As Congress-
man Evans recently noted, the secrecy surrounding th'ese funds for the intel-
ligence community is infectious : "When we are tucking it away in another pocket
in the budget, we are also making a secret of something else that should not be
a secr'et."

^ Sec e.g., Cong. Rec, H9372, daily ed., 10/1/75, remarks of Rep. Leggett. Con-
gressman Leggett noted, "How can we 'oversee' in any fashion if we have no
knowledge of the Agency's command on our resources? How can we set budgetary
priorities in a meaningful fashion, if we have no basis for comparing intelligence
with unemployment, health, or other competing program areas?"

374

C. Alternatives to Concealing Intelligence Budgets From Con-
gress AND THE Public

Within certain limits, Congress has the power to determine how
information about the receipts and expenditures of public moneys is
made available to the public.^^

Congress could choose to publish CIA or NSA budgets and ex-
penditures, for example, in detail equal to those of nonsensitive agen-
cies. This approach, however, might threaten the security of intel-
ligence operations or agents. Congress has available another model
for budget disclosure to protect the security of certain activities.

Since 1793, certain agencies, such as the AEC, the FBI, and the
Department of State have been appropriated funds specifically for
"confidential purposes," which for security reasons, are exempt from
normal accounting procedures.^^ In each instance, however. Congress
appropriates funds to the agency directly and publicly specifies the
small percentage of the appropriation which is for "confidential pur-
poses" and thus exempt from normal accounting procedures. Drawing
on this practice. Congress obviously could publish detailed budgets for
the intelligence agencies while providing a lump sum to each for "con-
fidential purposes."

Congress could also devise other models. Congress could publish
only the total appropriated to each intelligence agency.^^ As the Spe-
cial Senate Committee To Study Questions Related to Secret and Con-
fidential Documents ^* suggested in 1973, the publication

of such funds should provide members with the minimal
information they should have about our intelligence opera-
tions. Such information would also end the practice of in-
flating certain budget figures for use to hide intelligence costs
and would insure that all Members would know the true cost
of each budget item they must vote upon.

^Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308 (1936). In fixing the
level of detail revealed, however, a congressional decision cannot override a
constitutional requirement such as that of Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7, partic-
ularly as one purpose of that requirement was to serve as a check on Congress.

'^The first such statute authorized special procedures for sums relating to
foreign "intercourse or treaty." By the Act of February 9, 1793, Congress pro-
vided: "that in all cases, where any sum or sums of money have issued, or
shall hereafter is'suf^, from the treasury, for the purposes of intercourse or
treaty, the President shall be, and he hereby is authorized to cause the same
to be duly settled annually with the accounting ofiicers of the Treasury in the
manner following, that is to say ; by causing the same to be accounted for, spe-
cifically in all ins'tanees wherein the expenditures thereof may, in his judgment
be made public ; and by making a certificate or certificates, or causing the Secre-
tary of State to make a certificate or certificates of the amount of such expendi-
tures as he may think it advisable not to specify ; and every such certificate
shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the sum or sums therein expressed
to have been expended." [Act of Feb. 9, 1793, ch. 4, sec. 2, 1 Stat. 300, codified
as 31 U.S.C. 107 (1970).]

^ When the AEC was first established only a one line entry in the weapons
account was included in the 1947 budget, p. 382.

^ S. Res. 93-466, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 10/12/73, p. 16.

376

The Special Committee recommended that the Appropriations Com-
mittee itemize the Defense Department appropriations bill in order
that the "total sums proposed to be appropriated for intelligence ac-
tivities by each of the following agencies : Central Intelligence Agency,
Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National
Reconnaissance Office, and any separate intelligence units within the
Army, Navy, and Air JB'orce" could be revealed.^^

Finally, the Congress could decide that only the total budget
figure for national intelligence be published. This would be the ag-
gregate of fmids provided to CIA, NSA, DIA, and the national in-
telligence components in the Departments of Defense, State, and
Treasury. Although there may be problems defining Avhat constitutes
"national intelligence," the Director of Central Intelligence already
prepares a national intelligence budget. The Director could, with the
appropriate congressional committees determine what agencies or de-
partments would be included.^^

The secrecy presently surrounding intelligence expenditures vitiates
the constitutional guarantee. Even publishing one figure — the total ap-
propriations and expenses for national intelligence — would have a
salutory effect. It would eliminate the inflation of figures presently in
the Budget and in the Combined Statement resulting from the con-
cealment of intelligence agency funds in other agency appropriations
and expenditures. Congress would be able to establish its priorities by
placing the amount appropriated for national intelligence activities
against other claims on the public purse ; the public could make its own
independent judgment about priorities.^^

As Senator Proxmire noted, publication of the aggregate budget for
national intelligence might also have the effect of deterring potential
adversaries by showing that the United States Government continues
to spend sizeable amounts on intelligence.^^ As former DCI and Secre-
tary of Defense Schlesinger noted, publication of this figure might also

^The Committee specifically did not request that any line items be revealed,
although they did recommend the publication of the total number of personnel em-
ployed by each agency.

^^ The Senate Select Committee has proposed an oversight committee which
would have jurisdiction over authorization for national intelligence activities of
the United States Government, S. 93-2893.

^'' Former Director Colby has argued that publication of the CIA budget would
not aid the public in any way. As he put it, "Knowledge of the Agency budget
would not enable the public to make a judgment on the appropriateness of the
amount without the knowledge of the product and the ways it is obtained."
(William Colby testimony. House Select Committee on Intelligence, 8/4/75,
p. 123.)

^ Cong. Rec. S9603, daily ed., 6/4/74, Remarks of Senator Proxmire. However,
as Senator Pastore noted, if the public figure declined "then the Russians and
the Chinese Communists know that we are doing less, and that might let them
become more audacious." Id. at S9605.

376

decrease speculation about the budget and focus the debate on intel-
ligence on more significant issues.^^

Finally, the disclosure of any figures on intelligence expenditures
might well increase the effectiveness of oversight of the intelligence
agencies by both individual members of Congress and by the ap-
propriately charged congressional committees. Members of the House
might be encouraged to inspect executive session hearings on intelli-
gence agency budgets ; ^° members of the oversight committees of both
houses might be spurred to review the proposed budgets more closely,
in anticipation of a possible debate on the figures.^ ^

D. The Effect Upon National Security of Varying Levels of

Budget Disclosure

Even given the constitutional requirement, any disclosure of budg-
etary information on agencies in the Intelligence Community has been
strongly resisted. In responding to a proposal for the publication of
the total sum budgeted for the national intelligence community.
Senator Stennis noted that :

[I]f it becomes law and is carried out, [it] would, as its practi-
cal effect, virtually destroy 80 to 90 percent of the effectiveness
of much of our most important work in the field of intelli-
gence.^2

And Congressman Burlison told the House that if an amendment
which provided for publication of the total figure budgeted for the
CIA were adopted, "i[t] will totally paralyze the intelligence com-
munity." *^

An examination of the effect on national security of publication of
any data on the intelligence community budgets is difficult, in part
because the examination itself must not be allowed to jeopardize the
national security. Given the constitutional guarantee, however, the bur-
den of proof must fall on those who would deny this information to

®* During testimony before the Senate Select Committee, Mr. Sehlesinger was
asked whether there was a good reason for actually publishing a budget figure,
He replied : "Only in that the public debate at the present time covers so wide a
range that if you had an official number, the debate would tend to die down and
focus on something more significant than whether we're spending $11 billion on
intelligence." (James Sehlesinger testimony, 2/2/76, p. 54.)

Mr. Sehlesinger was later asked whether he thought there was any chance of
convincing the American people or the enemy of the truthfulness of any figure
■that is published, to which Mr. Sehlesinger replied : "I do not believe that you
could persuade the Soviets that that is a truthful figure, but I am not sure that
that is our objective. Whether or not you could persuade the American public, I
think there is a large segment of the American public that would be per-
suaded. . . ." Sehlesinger, 2/2/76, p. 56.)

"^ See e.g., Cong. Rec, H9361, daily ed., 10/1/75, remarks of Rep. Obey.

^ See e.g., Cong. Rec, S9603, daily ed., 6/4/74, remarks of Sen. Proxmire.

^ Cong. Rec. S9610-11, daily ed., 6/4/74, remarks of Sen. Stennis.

" Cong. Rec. H9366, daily ed., 10/1/75, remarks of Rep. Burlison.

377

the public. The possible effects on the national security of certain levels
of budget disclosure are examined below.**

1. The Ejfect on National Security of Publication of the National In-
telligence Community Budget

Many individuals familiar with the intelligence community agree
that publication of a gross figure for national intelligence would not,
in itself, damage the national security.

During his confirmation hearings as Director of Central Intelli-
gence, James Schlesinger, fonner Secretary of Defense and past head
of the 0MB, told Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., in regard to the pub-
lication of the gross figure for national intelligence: "I think that
the security concerns are minimal. The component figures, I would be
more concerned about but for the gross national intelligence program
figures, I think we could live with that on a security basis, yes." *^

Former DCI Helms told the Senate Select Committee that because
it was so large, publication of a single figure for national intelligence
might be "satisfactory." **^

While it has been suggested that the publication of even a total
for the national intelligence budget would aid our enemies,*^ Mr.
Schlesinger told the Senate Select Committee that our enemies
"already know in the first place and it's broadly published. All that
you would have is a confirmed official figure for information. That is

^ There are many possible variants of budget disclosure running from the full
disclosure policy governing such government agencies as the Department of Agri-
culture, through the budget disclosure utilized by the FBI and AEG which pro-
vides for a specific appropriation of funds for "confidential" purposes which are
exempted from normal accounting requirements, to the possible disclosure of an
aggregate figure for each national intelligence agency or for national intelligence
as a whole. The Committee has not attempted to analyze the constitutional im-
plications and effect on national security of each, but has focused on the disclosure
of the global sum for national intelligence and the aggregate budgets of each
intelligence agency.

^ Quoted in Cong. Rec, S9603, daily ed., 6/4/74, remarks of Sen. Proxmire.

^^ Richard Helms testimony, 1/30/76, pp. 36, 37. Because the figure is so large,
the introduction of expensive collection systems would not result in a "conspic-
uous bump" in the budget which would alert hostile powers to new activities by
the United States. For a fuller discussion of this argument and its relationship
to the publication of the CIA's aggregate budget, see pp. 378-381.

John Clarke, a former Coinptroller of the CIA and an advisor to DCI Colby,
was asked about the effects of publication of the total national intelligence budget
and specifically whether publication of the figure would disclose the existence
of, or the start of, a high-cost technical collection system. Mr. Clarke responded,
"I have not run the studies on this, but I would be very hard pressed to find a
case that I could support. The budget figures don't reflect that. They are down.
Historically, at least they have been down inside of a larger figure and it doesn't
really pop out in a big way. And it can be explained away." (John Clarke testi-
mony, 2/5/76, p. 47. )

" See e.g. p. 376.

69-983 O - 76 - 25

378

more or less in the public domain anyhow without public confirmation,
without official confirmation." *^

Mr. Schlesinger described for the Select Committee the impact of
publishing the total national intelligence budget :

I am not so concerned about that from the security aspect
as some people are. I'm not sure I recommend it, but I'm not
so concerned about it from the security aspect.

It could do some good in that there are some inflated no-
tions around about how much the United States Government
is actually spending on intelligence, and if you had an official
statement, I think that would put the total amount of ex-
penditures in better context for the public.*^'*

2. The Ejfect on National Security of Disclosure of the Total Ap'pro-
priated to or Expended by Each National Intelligence Agency
Publication of the total of the CIA's budget or of the other agencies'
budgets has also been opposed. In a Freedom of Information Act suit,
DCI Colby argued against publication of the Agency's budget total, as
follows :

Publication of either the CIA budget or the expenditures
made by CIA for any given year would show the amounts
planned to be expended or in fact expended for objects of a
confidential, extraordinary or emergency nature. This infor-
mation would be of considerable value to a potentially hostile
foreign government. For example, if the total expenditures
made by the Agency for any particular year were publicized,
these disclosures, when taken with other infonnation publicly
available . . . would enable such governments to refine their
estimates of the activities of a major component of the United
States intelligence community, including specifically the per-
sonnel strength, technological capabilities, clandestine opera-
tional activities, and the extent of the United States Govern-
ment intelligence analysis and dissemination machinery. . . .
The subsequent publication of similar data for other fiscal
years . . . would enable a potentially hostile power to refine
its estimates of trends in the United States Government intel-
ligence efforts.

He continued :

The business of intelligence is to a large extent a painstaking
collection of data and the formation of conclusions utilizing
a multitude of bits and pieces of information. The revelation
of one such piece, which might not appear to be of significance
to anyone not familiar with the process of intelligence analy-

^ Schlesinger. 2/2/76. p. 52. Mr. Schlesinger noted that, as the Intelligence
Community has "no constituency," it tends to be "blamed for one thing or an-
other," and "if you had an openly published figure . . . there would be pressure
within the Congress at budget mark-up time to take a 15 percent or 20 percent
whack at it just for good measure and . . . there is no way of having a public
debate about the merits of intellieence." /<?. at 51-52. Mr. Schlesinger's argument
implies that Congress as a whole should not be given information because it
should not be allowed to exercise its control over the purse.

379

sis (and which, therefore, might not arguably be said to be
damaging to the national security) would, when combined
with other similar data, make available . . . information of
great use and which would result in significant damage to
the national security of the United States.

He provided the following example of the impact on the nation's
security of publication of the CIA's budget :

If it were learned that CIA expenditures have inci-eased
significantly in any one given year, but that there has been
no increase in Agency personnel (apparent from traffic, cars
in the parking lots, etc.) it would be possible to make some
reasonable estimates and conclusions to the effect that, for
example, CIA had developed a costly intelligence collection
system which is technological rather than manpower inten-
sive ; and that such system is operational. Knowledge readily
available at the time about reconnaissance aircraft, photog-
raphy, and other technology, can result in a more accurate
analysis about a new collection system which would enable a
potentially hostile power to take steps to counter its effective-
ness . . . the development of the U-2 aircraft as an effective
collection device would not have been possible if the CIA
budget had been a matter of public knowledge. Our budget
inci-eased significantly during the development phase of that
aircraft. TliaJt fact, if public, would have at-tracted atten-
tion. ... If it had been supplemented by knowledge (available
perhaps from technical magazines, industry rumor, or ad-
vanced espionage techniques) that funds were being commit-
ted to a major aircraft manufacturer and to a manufacturer
of sophisticated miapping cameras, the correct conclusion
would have been simple to draw. The U.S. manufacturers in
question . . . would have become high priority intelligence
targets. . . . And I'm sure that the Soviets would have taken
steps earlier to acquire a capability to destroy veiy-high-
altitude aircraft. They did indeed take these steps, with
eventual success, but only sometime after the aircraft began
operating over their territory — that is, once they had knowl-
edge of a U.S. intelligence project.*^

A close examination of Mr. Colby's statement raises a number of
questions as to the effect of publication of the CIA's aggregate budget.
Although ;Mr. Colby notes that the CIA's total budget figure would
allow governments to "refine their estimates of the activities of a
major component of the United States intelligence community," he
provides no evidence of how the publication of this one figure would
increase the other government's knowledge of, for example, the clan-

*^ Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories, Halperin v. Colby, Civil
Action No. 75-0676, United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
pp. 3-5. Other knowledgeable figures have reached different conclusions about
the effect of publishing the CIA's budget. For example, EUiot Richardson,
presentlv Secretary of Commerce and formerly Secretary of Defense, h^s stated
that publication of the amount of the CIA's expenditures would not be damaging
to the national security.

380

destine operational activities of the CIA.^" There would, of course,
be some "refinement" if it were known that the CIA's budget was
$X millions rather than $X + 1 millions. Such refinement goes on at
all times, but the question is whether such a gain by hostile powers is
sufficient to justify overriding the constitutional requirement that the
American people be t-old how their funds are spent. Having an officially
acknowledged budget total does not signal to a hostile power manpower
levels in the Clandestine Service, let alone the number of deep cover
agents. Having an officially acknowledged aggregate figure does not
reveal the cost of a reconnaissance vehicle, let alone its technical capa-
bility.

Mr. Colby has maintained that one-time publication of the total
amount budgeted for tlie CIA would set a precedent and that informa-
tion revealed through successive publication would provide hostile
powere with insights into United States intelligence activities.

Of particular importance is Mr. Colby's claim that successive dis-
closures of the CIA's aggregate budget would eliminate the effective-
ness of maior technical collection SA^stems like the U-2. A change in the
CIA's total budget from one year to the next mav be due to a nmnber
of factors: inflation, cutbacks in activities, a major reorganization, or
long term gains in efficiency, for example. Assuming that an increase
in the CIA's budget alerted hostile powers to some change in the
Agency's activities, it would not in itself reveal what the new activity
was — a new covert action ])roiect, more material procurement, or an
increase in analytical capability through mechanization. For Mr.
Colby's argument to be valid not onlv must the hostile power be able
accurately to determine what the activity is — for instance, a new
reconnaissance system — but that power would hn ve to gam, covertly, an
enormous amount of tightly guarded information, such as the techno-
logical capabilities of the vehicle and the surveillance systems which it
contained.^^ It would seem that a hostile power able to gain that
information would be able to discover the total of the CIA's budget,
a much more widely known figure. The possibility that a hos-
tile power mav pierce all the barriers designed to limit dissemination
of closely held information cannot be used to justify denyin.qr the
American people information which the Constitution guarantees them,
and which is widely published, and which must be assumed to be within
the grasp of hostile powers.

It is far from clear, moreover, that the development and introduc-
tion of a major new system will be announced by a change in the
Agency's total budget.

The CIA budget may be large enough not to change substantially
when a new system comes on line. A preliminary analysis of past CIA
budgets has indicated that major new activities have not always re-
sulted in "bumps" and that some "bumps" in the budget still are not

" Mr. Colby's statement ignores the fact that figures for the CIA budget are
already widely publicized, although not officially confirmed. In this regard, it is
interesting to note that the Central Intelligence Agency withdrew its obieetion to
the far more detailed budget disclosure in The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks.

^ Beyond that, a hostile power would also have to have both a capability and
an inclination to take those steps necessary to counter the system.

381

fjenerally imderstood.^^ Becanse of the importance of expensive tech-
nical collection svstems, however, the Select Committee believes that
the "conspicuous bump" arofument deserves fuller study bv the future
oversight committees,^^ particularly in light of the results of the publi-
cation of the aggregate figure for national intelligence recommended
by the Committee.

Finally, the claims about damage to the national security resulting
from publication of the aggregate figure for each intelligence agency
must be viewed in the light of far more detailed, and continuing, ex-
posure of the budgets of other agencies vital to the national security.
Enormous amounts of information have been provided to the public,
for instance, about the work of the Department of Defense and the
Atomic Energy Commission. Yet disclosure of funds appropriated
and expended by these agencies did not and does not reveal vital na-
tional secrets. As Senator Symington noted, "There's nothing secret
about the . . . cost of a nuclear aircraft carrier or the cost of the
C-5A." But "knowledge of the cost does not equal k)iowled.q;e of how
the weapons operate or how they would be utilized." Similarly, knowl-
edge "of the overall cost of intelligence does not in any way entail the
release of information about how the various intelligence groups
function, or plan to function." ^*

E. The Argument That Publication of Any Information Will
Inevitably Result in Demands for Further Information

Some opponents of budget disclosure, while admitting that pub-
lishing aggregate figures for the intelligence community or intelli-
gence agencies will not harm national security, have argued that pub-
lication of such figures will inevitably lead to demands for ever more
detail. As Director Colby told the House Select Committee on Intelli-
gence :

Moreover, once the budget total is revealed, the demand for
details probably would grow. What does it include? What
does it exclude ? Why did it go up ? Why did it go down ? Is
it worth it ? How does it work ?

^^ One series of activities which did cause a bump in the CIA's budget was the
Agency's activities in Laos, which were clearly known to powers hostile to the
U.S. but were kept secret from the American people for many years.

^ If new systems would be revealed by "bumps" in the CIA's budget a solu-
tion other than denying all information on CIA expenditures to the American
people might be found. James Schlesinger has suggested that the published
figure could be based on actual dollars spent by the CIA rather than on the
dollars which could be spent ; while obligations may fluctuate dramatically over
the years, actual outlays "tend to move smoothly over a period of years."
(Schlesinger, 2/2/76, p. 5.5.)

" 117 Cong. Rec, p. S42925, remarks of Sen. Symington. As Congressman Leg-
gett of the House Armed Services Committee noted : "We have a book here, the
Committee Report of about 4000 secrets of the Department of Defense in which
they talk about the money for the SAM-D but yet do we know how the SAM-D
works? The answer is : no.

"We have the details of the money for Thailand, and it is spelled out. But do
we know what the money is actually used for? No.

"We can go through the FBI budget. Does that tell us what they are doing?
The answer is: no." (Cong. Rec., H9371, daily ed., 10/1/75, remarks of Rep.
Leggett.)

382

There would be revelations . , . which would gradually

reduce the unknown to a smaller and smaller part of the

total, permitting foreign intelligence services to concentrate

their efforts in the areas where we would least like to attract

' their attention.

We — and I specifically mean in this instance both intelli-
gence professionals and Members of Congress — would have an
acute problem when the matter of our budget arose in the
floor of the House or Senate. Those who knew the facts would
have two unpleasant choices — to remain silent in the face of
all questions and allegations, however inaccurate, or to at-
tempt to keep the debate on accurate grounds by at least
hinting at the full story.

My concern that one revelation will lead to another is based
on more than a "feeling." The atomic weapons budget was
considered very sensitive, and the Manhattan Project was
concealed completely during World War II. With the estab-
lishment of the AEC, however, the decision was made to in-
clude in the 1947 budget a one-line item for the weapons ac-
count. That limitation was short-lived. By 1974, a 15-page
breakout and discussion of the Atomic Weapons Program was
being published. Were the intelligence budget to undergo
a similar experience, major aspects of our intelligence
strategy, capabilities and successes would be revealed.^^

^^ William Colby testimony, House Select Committee on Intelligence, 8/4/75,
p. 122.

Senator McClellan described the consequences of publishing the total budget
for national intelligence. "That is when you intend to put the camel's nose under
the tent. That is the beginning. That is the wedge. You say you do not want to
know all the details and how the money is spent. But, if you get the overall figures
of one billion dollars or half-a-billion dollars or five billion, or whatever, then how
are you going to know, how can you evaluate, how can you judge or make an
intelligent judgment on whether that is too much or too little, whether it is being
expended wisely or unwisely, except when you can get the details?

"How? You cannot know. And, if you receive these figures and if you end this
ignorance as to the total amount, next you will want to end the ignorance as to
the different agencies and how it is spent, and through whom it is spent. Next
will want to end the ignorance of what it is spent for. Next you want
to end the ignorance of how that intelligence is procured. There is no end to
it." (Cong Rec. S9609, daily ed., 6/4/74, remarks of Sen. McClellan.)

During the same debate Senator Humphrey noted that while he did not
oppose the purpose of the disclosure of the total budget for national intelligence,
"the problem is it is sort of like loose string or a ball of twine, so to speak,
that starts to unravel." {Id. at S9606, remarks of Sen. Humphrey.) During a more
recent House debate on the publication of the CIA's budget. Congressman Young
described such public^ition as "the first baby step." (Cong. Rec. H9376, daily ed.,
10/1/75, remarks of Rep. Young.)

As .Tames Schlesinger told the Select Committee, "But one of the problems
here is the camel's nose under the edge of the tent, and I think that that is the
fundamental problem in the area. There are very few people who can articulately
argue that the publication of those figures in and of themselves, if it stopped
there, would be harmful. The argument is that then the pressure would build
up to do something else, that once you have published for example the . . .
budget, that the pressures would build up to reveal the kinds of systems that are
being bought for that money, and it is regarded as the first steo down a slinpery
slope for those who worry about those kinds of things." (Schlesinger, 2/2/76,
p. 53.)

383

There are several problems with this argument. While there obvi-
ously will be pressure, the problem as Mr, Helms agreed "is not insu-
perable." ^*^ For many years Congress has refused to reveal the figures
for the national intelligence budget and the aggregate budgets of the
intelligence agencies. It seems unlikely that given this past history,
Congress will suddenly reverse itself and fail to protect information
whose disclosure would harm the national security. Much more likel}^
is that Congress will, as Senator Church proposed, "establish very
stringent rules when it came to handling the money figures." ^^

More importantly, as Congressman Koch noted :

The real fear on both sides of the aisle that some have ex-
pressed is, "Gee, if we do that, that is the first step."

Maybe it is, but, whatever the second step is, it is what this
House wants it to be, and if this House decides that this is the
last step, so be it. If the House decides that it wants to have
more information it will have to have a vote on it.

What is wrong with that ? That is what is called the demo-
cratic system. We are sent here to be part of that system.^^

It is instructive to note in this context the amount of budgetary
information provided on the Atomic Energy Commission. That in-
formation has constantly increased. Yet each step of the way, Con-
gress has had the opportunity to limit disclosure and chose not to. This
experience confirms congressional control over the process. More im-
portantly the national security was not harmed by disclosure of a
substantial amount of budgetary information about an agency and a
weapons program cnicial to the defense of the United States.

Finally, the argument is without limits. It could be used to justify
much greater secrecy. It could be used to justify the withholding of
all information on the Defense Department because information which
the Congress wishes to protect would be threatened by pressures
caused by the publication of any information on that Department.

F. The Argument That the United States Should Not Publish
Information of Its Intelligence Budget Since No Other Govern-
ment IN THE World Does

It has also been argued that the United States should not publish
its intelligence budget when no other government in the world does.^''
Yet as Congressman Moss noted :

I point out to those Members who do not know the differ-
ence between this country and others, and the fact that we
become unique in disclosing this that, thank God, we do
become unique. We have grown great and maintained our
strength as an open society and we should continue to be an
open society to the maximum consistent with our true se-
curity requirements.

=" Helms, 1/30/76, p. 39.
'^" Ibid.

^ Cong. Rec. H9359, daily ed., 10/1/75, remarks of Rep. Koch.
®' William Colby testimony. House Select Committee on Intelligence, 8/4/75,
p. 120.

384

I do not want us to emulate the Russians or the Chinese
or even our British brethren in the operation of the various
agencies of their governments under their official secrets
acts and other areas. I want us to realize the strength that we
gain from an alert electorate and informed electorate.^"

G. Summary and Conclusion

The budget procedures which presently govern the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and other agencies of the intelligence community pre-
vent most Members of Congress as well as the jDublic from knowing
how much money is spent by any of these agencies or even how much
is spent on intelligence as a whole. In addition, most Members of
Congi'ess and the public are deceived about the appropriations and
expenditures of other government agencies whose budgets are inflated
to conceal funds for the intelligence community. The failure to pro-
vide this infonnation to the public and to the Congress prevents
either from effectively ordering priorities and violates Article 1, Sec-
tion 9, Clause 7, which provides that :

The Committee finds that publication of the aggregate figure for
national intelligence would begin to satisfy the constitutional require-
ment and would not damage the national security. While substantial
questions remain about the relationship between the constitutional re-
quirement and the national security, the Committee recommends the
annual publication of the aggregate figure. The Committee also rec-
ommends that any successor committees study the effects of publishing
more detailed information on the budgets of the intelligence agencies.

Cong. Rec. H9363, daily ed., 10/1/75, remarks of Rep. Moss.

XVII. TESTING AND USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGI-
CAL AGENTS BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Under its mandate ^ the Select Committee has studied the testing and
use of chemical and biological agents by intelligence agencies. Detailed
descriptions of the programs conducted by intelligence agencies in-
volving chemical and biological agents Avill be included in a separately
published appendix to the Senate Select Committee's report. This sec-
tion of the report will discuss the rationale for the programs, their
monitoring and control, and what the Committee's investigation has
revealed about the relationships among the intelligence agencies and
about their relations with other government agencies and private in-
stitutions and individuals.-

Fears that countries hostile to the United States would use chemi-
cal and biological agents against Americans or America's allies led
to the development of a defensive program designed to discover tech-
niques for American intelligence agencies to detect and coimteract
chemical and biological agents. The defensive orientation soon became
secondar}^ as the possible use of these agents to obtain information
from, or gain control over, enemy agents became apparent.

Kesearch and development programs to find materials which could
be used to alter human behavior were initiated in the late 1940s and
early 1950s. These experimental programs originally included testing
of drugs involving witting human subjects, and culminated in tests
using unwitting, non volunteer human subjects. These tests were de-
signed to determine the potential effects of chemical or biological
agents when used operationally against individuals unaware that they
had received a drug.

The testing programs were considered highly sensitive by the in-
telligence agencies administering them. Few people, even within the
agencies, knew of the programs and there is no evidence that either
the executive branch or Congress were ever informed of them. The
highly compartmented nature of these programs may be explained in
part by an observation made by the CIA Inspector General that, "the
knowledge that the Agency is engaging in unethical and illicit activi-

^ Senate Resolution 21 directs the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Activities to investigate a number of issues :

"(a) Whether agencies within the intelligence community conducted illegal
domestic activities (Section 2(1) and (2)) ;

"(b) The extent to which agencies within the intelligence community cooper-
ate (Section 2(4) and (8)) ;

"(c) The adequacy of executive branch and congressional oversight of intel-
ligence activities (Section 2(7) and (11)) ;

"(d) The adequacy of existing laws to safeguard the rights of American citi-
zens (Section 2(13))."

^ The details of these programs may never be known. The programs were highly
compartmented. Few records were kept. What little documentation existed for
the CIA's principal program was destroyed early in 1973.

(385)

386

ties would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic circles
and would be detrimental to the accomplishment of its missions." ^

The research and development program, and particularly the co-
vert testing pi'ograms, resulted in massive abridgments of the rights
of American citizens, sometimes with tragic consequences. The deaths
of two Americans ^^ can be attributed to these programs; other partici-
pants in the testing programs may still suiter from the residual ef-
fects. While some controlled testing of these substances might be de-
fended, the nature of the tests, their scale, and the fact that they were
continued for years after the danger of surreptitious administration
of LSD to unwitting individuals was known, demonstrate a funda-
mental disregard for the value of human life.

The Select Committee's investigation of the testing and use of chem-
ical and biological agents also raise serious questions about the ade-
quacy of command and control procedures within the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and military intelligence, and about the relationships
among the intelligence agencies, other governmental agencies, and
private institutions and individuals. The CIA's normal administrative
controls were waived for programs involving chemical and biological
agents to protect their security. According to the head of the Audit
Branch of the CIA, these waivers produced "gross administrative
failures." They prevented the CIA's internal review mechanisms (the
Office of General Counsel, the Inspector General, and the Audit Staff)
from adequately supervising the programs. In general, the waivers had
the paradoxical effect of providing less restrictive administrative con-
trols and less effective internal review for controversial and highly
sensitive projects than those governing normal Agency activities.

The security of the programs was protected not only by waivers
of normal administrative controls, but also by a high degree of com-
partmentation within the CIA. This compartmentation excluded the
CIA's Medical Staff from the principal research and testing program
employing chemical and biological agents.

It also may have led to agency policymakers receiving differing
and inconsistent responses when they posed questions to the CIA
component involved.

Jurisdictional uncertainty within the CIA was matched by juris-
dictional conflict among the various intelligence agencies. A spirit of
cooperation and reciprocal exchanges of information which initially
characterized the programs disappeared. Military testers withheld in-
formation from the CIA, ignoring suggestions for coordination from
their superiors. The CIA similarly failed to provide information to
the military on the CIA's testing program. This failure to cooperate
was conspicuously manifested in an attempt by the Army to conceal

^ CIA Inspector General's Survey of TSD, 1957, p. 217.

^^ On January 8, 1953. Mr. Harold Blauer died of circulatory collapse and heart
failure following an intravenous injection of a synthetic mescaline derivative
while a subject of tests conducted by New York State Psychiatric Institute under
a contract let by the U.S. Army Chemical Corps. The Committee's investigation
into drug testing by U.S. intelligence agencies focused on the testing of LSD, how-
ever, the committee did receive a copy of the U.S. Army Inspector General's
Report, issued on October 1975, on the events and circumstances of Mr. Blauer's
death. His death was directly atributable to the administration of the synthetic
mescaline derivative.

387

their overseas testing program, which included surreptitious admin-
istration of LSD, from the CIA. Learning of the Army's program,
the Agency surreptitiously attempted to obtain details of it.

The decision to institute one of the Army's LSD field testing projects
had been based, at least in part, on the finding that no long-term resid-
ual effects had ever resulted from the drug's administration. The
CIA's failure to inform the Army of a death which resulted from the
surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting Americans, may well
have resulted in the institution of an unnecessary and potentially lethal
program.

The development, testing, and use of chemical and biological agents
by intelligence agencies raises serious questions about the relationship
between the intelligence community and foreign governments, other
agencies of the Federal Government, and other institutions and in-
dividuals. The questions raised range from the legitimacy of American
complicity in actions abroad which violate American and foreign laws
to the possible compromise of the integrity of public and private insti-
tutions used as cover by intelligence agencies.

A. The Programs Investigated

1. Project CHATTER

Project CHATTER was a Navy program that began in the fall of
1947. Responding to reports of "amazing results" achieved by the
Soviets in using "truth drugs," the program focused on the identifica-
tion and testing of such drugs for use in interrogations and in the
recruitment of agents. The research included laboratory experiments
on animals and human subjects involving Anabasis aphylJa^ scopola-
mine, and mescaline in order to determine their speech-inducing quali-
ties. Overseas experiments were conducted as part of the project.

The project expanded substantially during the Korean War, and
ended shortly after the war, in 1953.

2. Project BLUEBIRD/ ARTICHOKE

The earliest of the CIA's major programs involving the use of
chemical and biological agents, Project BLUEBIRD, was approved by
the Director in 1950. Its objectives were :

(a) discovering means of conditioning personnel to prevent
unauthorized extraction of information from them by known
means, (b) investigating the possibility of control of an in-
dividual by application of special interrogation techniques,
(c) memory enhancement, and (d) establishing defensive
means for preventing hostile control of Agency personnel.*

As a result of interrogations conducted overseas during the project,
another goal was added — the evaluation of offensive uses of miconven-
tional interrogation techniques, including hypnosis and drugs. In
August 1951, the project was renamed ARTICHOKE. Project ARTI-
CHOKE included in-house experiments on interrogation techniques,
conducted "under medical and security controls which would ensure

* CIA memorandum to the Select Committee, "Behavioral Drugs and Testing,"
2/11/75.

388

that no damage was done to individuals who volunteer for the experi-
ments." ^ Overseas interrogations utilizing a combination of sodium
pentothal and hypnosis after physical and psychiatric examinations of
the subjects were also part of ARTICHOKE.

The Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), which studied scientific
advances by hostile powers, initially led BLUEBIED/ ARTICHOKE
efforts. In 1952, overall responsibility for ARTICHOKE was trans-
ferred from OSI to the Inspection and Security Office (I&SO), pre-
decessor to the present Office of Security. The CIA's Technical Serv-
ices and Medical Staffs were to be called upon as needed; OSI would
retain liaison function with other government agencies.'^ The change
in leadership from an intelligence unit to an operating unit appar-
ently reflected a change in emphasis; from the study of actions by
hostile powers to the use, both for offensive and defensive purposes,
of special interrogation techniques — primarily hypnosis and truth
serums.

Representatives from each Agency unit involved in ARTICHOKE
met almost monthly to discuss their progress. These discussions in-
cluded the planning of overseas interrogations^ as well as further
experimentation in the U.S.

Information about project ARTICHOKE after the fall of 1953
is scarce. The CIA maintains that the project ended in 1956, but evi-
dence suggests that Office of Security and Office of Medical Services
use of "special interrogation" techniques continued for several years
thereafter.

3. MKNAOMI

MKNAOMI was another major CIA prosrram in this area. In 1967,
the CIA summarized the purposes of MKNAOMI :

(a) To provide for a covert support base to meet clandes-
tine operational requirements.

(b) To stockpile severely incapacitating and lethal ma-
terials for the specific use of TSD [Technical Services Di-
vision] .

(c) To maintain in operational readiness special and unique
items for the dissemination of biological and chemical ma-
terials.

(d) To provide for the required surveillance, testing, up-
grading, and evaluation of materials and items in order to
assure absence of defects and complete predictability of re-
sults to be expected under operational conditions.^

Under an agreement reached with the Army in 1952, the Special
Operations Division (SOD) at Fort Detrick was to assist CIA in
developing, testing, and maintaining biological agents and delivery

^Memorandum from Robprt Tavlor, 0/DD/P to the Assistant Deputy (In-
spection and Security) and Chief of the Medical Staff, 3/22/52.

* Memorandum from H. MarshaU Chadwell. Assistant Director, Scientific Intel-
ligence, to the Deputy Director/Plans CDDPt "Pmi-eet ARTICHOKE," 8/29/52.

^ "Progress Report, Project ARTICHOKE." 1/12/53.

' Memorandum from Chief. TSD/Biological Branch to Chief. TSD "MKNAOMI :
Funding. Obiectives. f»nd Accompli eh Tr.pn<-°." iO/i8/fi7. p. 1. Fnr a fuller descrip-
tion of MKNAOMI and the relationship between CIA and SOD. see p. 360 ff.

389

systems. By this agreement, CIA acquired the knowledge, skill, and
facilities of the Army to develop biological weapons suited for CIA
use.

SOD developed darts coated with biological agents and pills con-
taining several different biological agents which could remain potent
for weeks or months. SOD also developed a special gim for firing
darts coated with a chemical which could allow CIA agents to incapaci-
tate a guard dog, enter an installation secretly, and return the dog to
consciousness when leaving. SOD scientists were unable to develop
a similar incapacitant for humans. SOD also physically transferred
to CIA personnel biological agents in "bulk" form, and delivery
devices, including some containing biological agents.

In addition to the CIA's interest in biological weapons for use
against humans, it also asked SOD to study use of biological agents
against crops and animals. In its 1967 memorandum, the CIA stated :

Three methods and systems for carrying out a covert attack
against crops and causing severe crop loss have been devel-
oped and evaluated under field conditions. This was accom-
plished in anticipation of a requirement which was later
developed but was subsequently scrubbed just prior to put-
ting into action.^*

MKNAOMI was terminated in 1970. On November 25, 1969, Presi-
dent Nixon renounced the use of any form of biological weapons that
kill or incapacitate and ordered the disposal of existing stocks of bac-
teriological weapons. On February 14, 1970, the President clarified the
extent of his earlier order and indicated that toxins — chemicals that
are not living organisms but are produced by living organisms — were
considered biological weapons subject to his previous directive and
were to be destroyed. Although instructed to relinquish control of
material held for the CIA by SOD, a CIA scientist acquired approxi-
mately 11 grams of shellfish toxin from SOD personnel at Fort De-
trick which were stored in a little-used CIA laboratory where it went
undetected for five years.^°

Jf. MKULTRA

MKULTEA was the principal CIA program involving the research
and development of chemical and biological agents. It was "con-
cerned with the research and development of chemical, biological, and
radiological materials capable of employment in clandestine oper-
ations to control human behavior." "

In January 1973, MKULTRA records were destroyed by Technical
Services Division personnel acting on the verbal orders of Dr. Sidney
Gottlieb, Chief of TSD. Dr. Gottlieb has testified, and former Direc-
tor Helms has confirmed, that in ordering the records destroved, Dr.
Gottlieb was carrying out the verbal order of then DCI Helms.

MKULTRA began with a proposal from the Assistant Deputy
Director for Plans, Richard Helms, to the DCI, outlining a special

"" lUd. p. 2.

" Senate Select Committee, 9/16/75, Hearings, Vo. 1.

" Memorandum from tlie CIA Inspector General to the Director, 7/26/63.

390

funding mechanism for highly sensitive CIA research and develop-
ment projects that studied the use of biological and chemical materials
in altering human behavior. The projects involved :

Eesearch to develop a capability in the covert use of bio-
logical and chemical materials. This area involves the produc-
tion of various physiological conditions which could support
present or future clandestine operations. Aside from the of-
fensive potential, the development of a comprehensive capa-
bility in this field of covert chemical and biological warfare
gives us a thorough knowledge of the enemy's theoretical
potential, thus enabling us to defend ourselves against a foe
who might not be as restrained in the use of these tech-
niques as we are.^^

MKULTRA was approved by the DCI on April 13, 1953 along the
lines proposed by ADDP Helms.

Part of the rationale for the establishment of this special fund-
ing mechanism was its extreme sensitivit}-. The Inspector General's
survey of MKULTRA in 1963 noted the following reasons for this
sensitivity :

a. Research in the manipulation of human behavior is con-
sidered by many authorities in medicine and related fields
to be professionally unethical, therefore the reputation of
professional participants in the MKULTRA program are on
occasion in jeopardy.

b. Some MKITLTRA activities raise questions of legality
implicit in the original charter.

c. A final phase of the testing of MKULTRA products
places the rights and interests of U.S. citi/ens in jeopardy.

d. Public disclosure of some aspects of MKULTRA activ-
ity could induce serious adverse reaction in U.S. public
opinion, as well as stimulate offensive and defensive action
in this field on the part of foreign intelligence services."

Over the ten-year life of the program, many "additional avenues to
the control of human behavior" were designated as appropriate for
investigation under the MKULTRA charter. These include "radiation,
electroshock, various fields of psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and
anthropology, graphology, harassment substances, and paramilitary
devices and materials." "

The i-esearch and development of materials to be used for altering
human behavior consisted of three phases: first, the search for ma-
terials suitable for study; second, laboratory testing on voluntary
humnn snbiects in various types of institutions ; third, the application
of MKULTRA materials in normal life settings.

The search for suitable materials was conducted throug-h standing
arran.qrements with specialists in universities, phannaceutical houses,
hospitals, state and federal institutions, and private research organi-

" Memorandum from ADDP Helms to DCI Dulles, 4/3/53, Tab A, pp. 1-2.

" T.G. Report on MKULTRA, 1963, pp. 1-2.

"/6«2,p.4.

391

zations. The annual gjrants of funds to these specialists were made
under ositensible research foundation auspices, thereby concealing the
CIA's interest froiii the specialist's institution.

The next phase of the MKITLTRA proofram involved physicians,
toxicologists, and other specialists in mental, narcotics, and general
hospitals, and in prisons. Utilizing the products and findings of the
basic research phase, they conducted intensive tests on human subjects.
One of the first studies was conducted by the National Institute of
Mental Health. This study was intended to test various drugs, includ-
ing hallucinogenics, at the NIMH Addiction Eesearch Center in Lex-
ington, Kentucky. The "Lexington Rehabilitation Center," as it was
then called, was a prison for drug addicts serving sentences for drug
violations.

The test subjects were volunteer prisoners who, after taking a brief
physical examination and signing a general consent form, were admin-
istered hallucinogenic drugs. As a reward for participation in the
program, the addicts were provided with the druar of their addiction.

LSD was one of the materials tested in the MKULTRA program.
The final phase of LSD testing involved surreptitious administration
to unwitting nonvolunteer subjects in normal life settings by under-
cover officers of the Bureau of Narcotics acting for the CIA.

The rationale for such testing was "that testing of materials under
accepted scientific procedures fails to disclose the full pattern of reac-
tions and attributions that may occur in operational situations." ^^

According: to the CIA, the advantage of the relationship with the
Bureau was that

test subjects could be sought and cultivated within the setting
of narcotics control. Some subjects have been informers or
members of suspect criminal elements from whom the [Bu-
reau of Narcotics! has obtained res'dts of onerational value
through the tests. On the other hand^ the effectiveness of the
substances on individuals at all social levels^ high and low^
native Amei^can and foreign^ is of great signiftcanee and
testing has been performed o?i a variety of individuals within
these categories. [Emphasis added.] ^^

A special procedure, designated MKDELTA, was established to
govern the use of INIKULTRA materials abroad. S^ch materials were
used on a number of occasions. Because MKULTRA records were
des^roved, it is impossible to reconstruct the operational use of
INIKULTRA materials by the CIA overseas; it has been determined
that the use of these materials abroad began in 1953, and possibly as
early as 1950.

DnuTS were used primarily as an aid to interrogations, but
MKULTRA /MKDELTA materials were also used for harassment,
discrediting, or disabling purposes. According to an Inspector General
Survey of the Technical Services Divisio7i of the CIA in 1957— an
inspection which did not discover the MKULTRA project involving
the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting, nonvolunteer

' IWd, p. 21.
'/6id., pp. 11-12.

392

subjects — ^the CIA had developed six drugs for operational use and
they had been used in six different operations on a total of thirty-three
subjects/^ By 1963 the number of operations and subjects had in-
creased substantially.

In the spring of 1963, during a wide-ranging Inspector General
surV'Cy of the Technical Services Division, a member of the Inspector
General's staff, John Vance, learned about JNIKULTRxA. a.nd about
the project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to un-
witting, nonvoluntary himian subjects. As a result of the discovery
and the Inspector General's subsequent report, this testing was halted
and much tighter administrative controls were imposed on the pro-
gram. According to the CIA, the project was decreased significantly
each budget year until its complete termination in the late 1960s.

5. The Testing of LSD hy the Army

There were three major phases in the Army's testing of LSD. In the
first, LSD was administered to more than 1,000 American soldiers who
volunteered to be subjects in chemical warfare experiments. In the
second phase, Material Testing Program EA 1729, 95 volunteei-s re-
ceived LSD in clinical experiments designed to evaluate potential
intelligence uses of the dnig. In the third phase, Projects THIRD
CHANCE and DERBY HAT, 16 unwitting nonvolunteer subjects
were interrogated after receiving LSD as part of operational field
tests.

B. CIA Drug Testing Programs

1. The Rationale for the Testing Programs

The late 1940s and early 1950s were marked by concern over
the threat posed by the activities of the Soviet LTnion, the People's
Republic of China, and other Communist bloc countries. United States
concern over the use of chemical and biological agents by these powers
was acute. The belief that hostile powers had used chemical and bio-
logical agents in interrogations, brainwashing, and in attacks designed
to harass, disable, or kill Allied personnel created considerable pres-
sure for a "defensive" program to investigate chemical and biological
agents so that the intelligence community could understand the mech-
anisms by which these substances work^ and how their effects could
be defeated.^^

Of particular concern was the drug LSD. The CIA had received
reports that the Soviet Union was engaged in intensive efforts to pro-
duce LSD ; and that the Soviet Union had attempted to purchase the
world's supply of the chemical. As one CIA officer who was deeply
involved in work with this drug described the climate of the times:
"[It] is awfully hard in this day and age to reproduce how frightening
all of this was to us at the time, particularly after the drug scene has
become as widespread and as knowledgeable in this country as it did.
But we were literally terrified, because this was the one material that we

"/bid, 1957, p. 201.

" Thus an ofl3eer in the OflBce of Security of the CIA stressed the "urgency of
the discovery of techniques and method that would permit our personnel, in the
event of their capture by the enemy, to resist or defeat enemy interrogation."
( Minutes of the ARTICHOKE conference of 10/22/53. )

393

had ever been able to locate that really had potential fantastic possi-
bilities if used wrongly," ^^

But the defensive orientation soon became secondary. Chemical and
biological agents were to be studied in order "to perfect techniques . . .
for the abstraction of information from individuals whether willing or
not" and in order to "develop means for the control of the activities and
mental capacities of individuals whether willing or not." ^° One
Agency official noted that drugs would be useful in order to "gain con-
trol of bodies whether they were willing or not" in the process of re-
moving personnel from Europe in the event of a Soviet attack.^ ^ In
other programs, the CIA began to develop, produce, stockpile, and
maintain in operational readiness materials which could be used to
harass, disable, or kill specific targets.^^

Eeports of research and development in the Soviet Union, the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, and the Communist Bloc countries provided
the basis for the transmutation of American programs from a defen-
sive to an offensive orientation. As the Chief of the Medical Staff of
the Central Intelligence Agency wrote in 1952 :

There is ample evidence in the reports of innumerable inter-
rogations that the Communists were utilizing drugs, physical
duress, electric shock, and possibly hypnosis against their ene-
mies. With such evidence it is difficult not to keep from be-
coming rabid about our apparent laxity. We are forced by this
mounting evidence to assume a more aggressive role in the
development of these techniques, but must be cautious to
maintain strict inviolable control because of the havoc that
could be wrought by such techniques in unscrupulous hands.^^

In order to meet the perceived threat to the national security, sub-
stantial programs for the testing and use of chemical and biological
agents — including projects involving the surreptitious administra-
tion of LSD to unwitting nonvolunteer subjects "at all social levels,
high and low, native American and foreign" — were conceived, and
implemented. These programs resulted in substantial violations of the
rights of individuals within the United States.

" Testimony of CIA officer, 11/21/75, p. 33.

^ Memorandum from the Director of Security to ARTICHOKE representa-
tives, Subject : "ARTICHOKE Restatement of Program."

'"■ ARTICHOKE memorandum, 7/30/53.

^^ The Inspector General's Report of 1957 on the Technical Services Division
noted that "Six specific products have been developed and are available for oper-
ational use. Three of them are discrediting and disabling materials which can be
administered unwittingly and permit the exercise of a measure of control over the
actions of the subject."

A memorandum for the Chief, TSD, Biological Branch to the Chief, TSD,
10/18/67, described two of the objectives of the CIA's Project MKNAOMI as :
"to stockpile severely incapacitating and lethal materials for the specific use of
TSD" and "to maintain in operational readiness special and unique items for
the dissemination of biological and chemical materals."

''Memorandum from the Chief of the Medical Staff, 1/25/52.

69-983 O - 76 - 26

394

Although the CIA recognized these effects of LSD to unwitting in-
dividuals within the United States, the project continued." As the
Deputy Director for Plans, Kichard Helms, wrote the Deputy Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence during discussions which led to the cessa-
tion of unwitting testing :

While I share your uneasiness and distaste for any pro-
gram which tends to intrude upon an individual's private
and legal prerogatives, I believe it is necessary that the
Agency maintain a central role in this activity, keep current
on enemy capabilities the manipulation of human behavior,
and maintain an offensive capability .^^

There were no attempts to secure approval for the most controversial
aspects of these programs from the executive branch or Congress.
The nature and extent of the programs were closely held secrets; even
DCI McCone was not briefed on all the details of the program in-
volving the surreptitious administration of LSD until 1963. It was
deemed imperative that these programs be concealed from the Ameri-
can people. As the CIA's Inspector General wrote in 1957 :

Precautions must be taken not only to protect operations
from exposure to enemy forces but also to conceal these ac-
tivities from the American public in general. The knowledge
that the Agency is engaging in unethical and illicit activities
would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic
circles and would be detrimental to the accomplishment
of its mission.^^

2. The Death of Dr. Frank Olson

The most tragic result of the testing of LSD by the CIA was the
death of Dr. Frank Olson, a civilian employee of the Army, w^ho died
on November 27, 1953. His death followed his participation in a CIA
experiment with LSD. As part of this experiment, Olson unwittingly
received approximately 70 micrograms of LSD in a glass of Cointreau
he drank on November 19, 1953. The drug had been placed in the bottle
by a CIA officer. Dr. Robert Lashbrook, as part of an experiment
he and Dr. Sidney Gottlieb performed at a meeting of Army and
CIA scientists.

Shortly after this experiment, Olson exhibited symptoms of para-
noia and scliizophrenia. Accompanied by Dr. Lashbrook, Olson sought
psychiatric assistance in New York City from a physician. Dr. Harold
Abramson, whose research on LSD had been funded indirectly by
the CIA. While in New York for treatment, Olson fell to his death
from a tenth story window in the Statler Hotel.

^ Even during the discussions which led to the termination of the unwitting
testing, the DDP turned down the option of halting such tests within the U.S.
and continuing them abroad despite the fact that the Technical Services Divi-
sion had conducted numerous operations abroad making use of LSD. The DDP
made this decision on the basis of security noting that the past efforts overseas
had resulted in "making an inordinate number of foreign nationals witting of
our role in the very sensitive activity." (Memorandum for the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence from the Deputy Director for Plans, 12/17/6.3, p. 2.)

^ IMd., pp. 2-3.

"« I.G. survey of TSD, 1957, p. 217.

395

a. Backgrou7id. — Olson, an expert in aerobiology who was assigned
to the Special Operations Division (SOD) of the U.S. Army Biolog-
ical Center at Camp Detrick, Maryland. This Division had three
primary functions :

(1) assessing the vulnerability of American installations
to biological attack ;

(2) developing techniques for offensive use of biological
weapons ; and

(3) biological research for the ClA..^'

Professionally, Olson was well respected by his colleagues in both
the Army and the CIA. Colonel Vincent RuAvet, Olson's immediate
superior at the time of his death, was in almost daily contact with
Olson. According to Colonel Ruwet : "As a professional man . . . his
ability . . . was outstanding," ^® Colonel Ruwet stated that "during
the period jDrior to the experiment ... I noticed nothing which
would lead me to believe that he was of unsound mind." ^^ Dr. Lash-
brook, who had monthly contacts with Olson from early 1952 until
the time of his death, stated publicly that before Olson received LSD,
"as far as I know, he was perfectly normal." ^° This assessment is in
direct contradiction to certain statements evaluating Olson's emo-
tional stability made in CIA internal memoranda written after
Olson's death.

h. The Experiment. — On November 18, 1953, a group of ten scien-
tists from the CIA and Camp Detrick attended a semi-annual review
and analysis conference at a cabin located at Deep Creek Lake, Mary-
land. Three of the participants were from the CIA's Technical Serv-
ices Staff. The Detrick representatives were all from the Special
Operations Division.

According to one CIA official, the Special Operations Division
participants "agreed that an unwitting experiment would be
desirable." ^^ This account directly contradicts Vincent Ruwet's recol-
lection. Ruwet recalls no such discussion, and has asserted that he
would remember any such discussion because the SOD participants
would have strenuously objected to testing on unwitting subjects.^^

In May, 1953, Richard Helms, Assistant DDP, held a staff meeting
which the Chief of Technical Services Staff attended. At this meeting
Helms "indicated that the drug [LSD] was dynamite and that he
should be advised at all times when it was intended to use it." ^^ In
addition, the then DDP, Frank Wisner, sent a memorandum to TSS
stating the requirement that the DDP personally approve the use of
LSD. Gottlieb went ahead with the experiment,^* securing the ap-

" Staff summary of Vincent Ruwet Interview, 8/13/75, p. 3.

^Memorandum of Col. Vincent Ruwet, To Whom It May Concern, no date,
p. 2.

^ Ruwet Memorandum, p. 3.

^" Joseph B. Treaster, l^ew York Times, 7/19/75, p. 1.

^ Memorandum for the Record from Lyman Kirkpatrick, 12/1/53, p. 1.

^ Ruwet (staff summary) , 8/13/75, p. 6.

® Inspector General Diary, 12/2/53.

** Ihid. Dr. Gottleib has testified that he does not remember either the meeting
with Helms nor the Wisner memorandum. (Gottlieib, 10/18/75, p. 16.)

396

proval of his immediate supervisor. Neither the Chief of TSS nor
the DDP specifically authorized the experiment in which Dr. Olson
participated.^^

According to Gottlieb.^^ a "very small dose" of LSD was placed in
a bottle of Cointreau which was served after dinner on Thursday,
November 19. The drug was placed in the liqueur by Robert Lash-
brook. All but two of the SOD participants received LSD. One did
not drink; the other had a heart condition.^' About twenty minutes
after they finished their Cointreau, Gottlieb informed the other par-
ticipants that they had received LSD.

Dr. Gottlieb stated that "up to the time of the experiment," he
observed nothing unusual in Olson's behavior.^'^ Once the experiment
was underway, Gottlieb recalled that "the drug had a definite effect on
the group to the point that they were boisterous and laughing and they
could not continue the meeting or engage in sensible conversation."
The meeting continued until about 1 : 00 a.m., when the participants
retired for the evening. Gottlieb recalled that Olson, among others,
complained of "wakefulness" during the night.^* According to Gottlieb
on Friday morning "aside from some evidence of fatigue, I observed
nothing unusual in [Olson's] actions, conversation, or general be-
havior." ^^ Euwet recalls that Olson "appeared to be agitated" at
breakfast, but that he "did not consider this to be abnormal under the
circumstances." ^°

c. The Treatment. — The following Monday, November 23, Olson
was waiting for Ruwet when he came in to work at 7 :30 a.m. For the
next two days Olson's friends and family attempted to reassure him'
and help him "snap out" of what appeared to be a serious depression.
On Tuesday, Olson again came to Ruwet and, after an hour long con-

* Dr. Gottlieb testified tliat "given the information we linew up to this time,
and based on a lot of our own self-administration, we thought it was a fairly
benign substance in terms of potential harm." This is in conflict not only with Mr.
Helms' statement but also with material which had been supplied to the Technical
Services Staff. In one long memorandum on current research with LSD which
was supplied to TSD, Henry Beecher described the dangers involved with such
research in a prophetic manner. "The second reason to doubt Professor Rothland
came when I raised the question as to any accidents which had arisen from
the use of LSD-25. He said in a very positive way, 'none.' As it turned out
this answer could be called overly positive, for later on in the evening I was
discussing the matter with Dr. W. A. Stohl, Jr., a psychiatrist in Bleulera's
Clinic in Zurich where I had gone at Rothland's insistence. Stohl, when asked
the same question, replied, 'yes,' and added spontaneously, 'there is a case
Professor Rothland knows about. In Geneva a woman physician who had been
subject to depression to some extent took LSD-25 in an experiment and became
severely and suddenly depressed and committed suicide three weeks later.
While the connection is not definite, common knowledge of this could hardly
have allowed the positive statement Rothland permitted himself. This case is
a warning to us to avoid engaging subjects who are depressed, or who have been
subject to depression.' " Dr. Gottlieb testified that he had no recollection of
either the report or that particular section of it. (Sidney Gottlieb testimony,
10/19/75, p. 78. )

^ Memorandum of Sheffield Edwards for the record, 11/28/53, p. 2.

^ Lashbrook (staff summary), 7/19/75, p. 3.

''* Gottlieb Memorandum, 12/7/53. p. 2.

^ Edwards memorandum, 11/28/53, p. 3.

^ Gottlieb memorandum, 12/7/53, p. 3.

*° Ruwet memorandum, p. 3.

397

versation, it was decided that medical assistance for Dr. Olson was
desirable.^^

Ruwet then called Lashbrook and informed him that "Dr. Olson
was in serious trouble and needed immediate professional attention." *^
Lashbrook agreed to make appropriate arrangements and told Ruwet
to bring Olson to Washington, D.C. Ruwet and Olson proceeded to
Washington to meet with Lashbrook, and the three left for New York
at about 2 : 30 p.m. to meet with Dr. Harold Abramson.

At that time Dr. Abramson was an allergist and immunologist
practicing medicine in New York City. He held no degree in psychia-
try, but was associated with research projects supported indirectly
by the CIA. Gottlieb and Dr. Lashbrook both followed his work closely
in the early 1950s.*^ Since Olson needed medical help, they turned to
Dr. Abramson as the doctor closest to Washington who was experi-
enced with LSD and cleared by the CIA.

Ruwet, Lashbrook, and Olson remained in New York for two days of
consultations with Abramson. On Thursday, November 26, 1953, the
three flew back to Washington so that Olson could spend Thanksgiving
with his family. En route from the airport Olson told Ruwet that he
was afraid to face his family. After a lengthy discussion, it was de-
cided that Olson and Lashbrook would return to New York, and that
Ruwet would go to Frederick to explain these events to Mrs. Olson.**

Lashbrook and Olson flew back to New York the same day, again
for consultations with Abramson. They spent Thursday night in a
Long Island hotel and the next morning returned to the city with
Abramson. In further discussions with Abramson, it was agreed
that Olson should be placed under regular psychiatric care at an
institution closer to his home.*^

d. The Death. — Because they could not obtain air transportation for
a return trip on Friday night, Lashbrook and Olson made reservations
for Saturday morning and checked into the Statler Hotel. Between
the time they checked in and 10:00 p.m.; they watched television,
visited the cocktail lounge, where each had two martinis, and dinner.
According to Lashbrook, Olson "was cheerful and appeared to enjoy
the entertainment." He "appeared no longer particulary depressed,
and almost the Dr. Olson I knew prior to the experiment." *^

After dinner Lashbrook and Olson watched television for about
an hour, and at 11 :00, Olson suggested that they go to bed, saying that
"he felt more relaxed and contented than he had since [they] came
to New York." *^ Olson then left a call with the hotel operator to wake
them in the morning. At approximately 2 :30 a.m. Saturday, Novem-
ber 28, Lashbrook was awakened by a loud "crash of glass." In his
report on the incident, he stated only that Olson "had crashed through
the closed window blind and the closed window and he fell to his death
from the window of our room on the 10th floor." *^

"7&td., p. 4.

*^ Lashbrook memorandum, 12/7/53, p. 1.

** Staff summary of Dr. Harold Abramson interview, 7/29/75, p. 2.

" Lashbrook memorandum, 12/7/53, p. 3.

^ Abramson memorandum, 12/4/53.

^' Lashbrook memorandum, 12/7/53, p. 3.

" Ibid., p. 4.

« IMd.

398

Immediately after finding that Olson had leapt to his death, Lash-
brook telephoned Gottlieb at his home and informed him of the in-
cident.*^ Gottlieb called Kmvet and informed him of Olson's death
at approximately 2 :45 a.m.^° Lashbrook then called the hotel desk
and reported the incident to the operator there. Lashbrook called
Abramson and informed him of the occurrence. Abramson told Lash-
brook he "wanted to be kept out of the thing completely," but later
changed his mind and agreed to assist Lashbrook.^^

Shortly thereafter, uniformed police officers and some hotel em-
ployees came to Lashbrook's room. Lashbrook told the police he didn't
know why Olson had committed suicide, but he did know that Olson
"suffered from ulcers." ^^

e. The Aftermath. — Following Dr. Olson's death, the CIA made
a substantial effort to ensure that his family received death benefits,
but did not notify the Olsons of the circumstances surrounding his
demise. The Agency also made considerable efforts to prevent the
death being connected with the CIA, and supplied complete cover for
Lashbrook so that his association with the CIA would remain a secret.

After Dr. Olson's death the CIA conducted an internal investiga-
tion of the incident. As part of his responsibilities in this investiga-
tion, the General Counsel wrote the Inspector General, stating:

I'm not happy with what seems to be a very casual attitude
on the part of TSS representatives to the way this experi-
ment was conducted and the remarks that this is just one of
the risks running with scientific experimentation. I do not
eliminate the need for taking risks, but I do believe, espe-
cially when human health or life is at stake, that at least the
prudent, reasonable measures which can be taken to mini-
mize the risk must be taken and failure to do so was culpable
negligence. The actions of the various individuals concerned
after effects of the experiment on Dr. Olson became manifest
also revealed the failure to observe normal and reasonable
precautions.^^

As a result of the investigation DCI Allen Dulles sent a personal
letter to the Chief of Technical Operations of the Technical Services
Staff who had approved the experiment criticizing him for "poor
judgment ... in authorizing the use of this drug on such an unwitting
basis and without proximate medical safeguards." ^* Dulles also sent
a letter to Dr. Gottlieb, Chief of the Chemical Division of the Tech-
nical Services Staff, criticizing him for recommending the "unwitting
application of the drug" in that the proposal "did not give sufficient
emphasis for medical collaboration and for the proper consideration
of the rights of the individual to whom it was being administered." ^^

** CIA Field Office Report, 12/3/53, p. 3.

" Ruwet Memorandum, p. 11.

^ OIA Field Office Report, 12/3/53, p. 3.

" ma.

^ Memorandum from the General Counsel to the Inspector General, 1/4/54.
" Memorandum from DOI to Chief, Technical Operations, TSS, 2/12/54.
* Memorandum from DCI to Sidney Gottlieb, 2/12/54.

399

The letters were hand carried to the individuals to be read and
returned. Although the letters were critical, a note from the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence to Mr. Helms instructed him to in-
form the individuals that : "These are not reprimands and no person-
nel hie notation are being made." ^"^

Thus, although the Rockefeller Commission has characterized them
as such, these notes were explicitly not reprimands. Nor did participa-
tion in the events which led to Dr. Olson's death have any apparent
effect on the advancement within the CIA of the individuals involved.

3. The Surreptitious Administration of LSD to Unwitting Non-
Volunteer Human Subjects hy the CIA After the Death of Dr.
Olson

The death of Dr. Olson could be viewed, as some argued at the time,
as a tragic accident, one of the risks inherent in the testing of new sub-
stances. It might be argued that LSD was thought to be benign.
After the death of Dr. Olson the dangers of the surreptitious admin-
istration of LSD were clear, yet the CIA continued or initiated ^^ a
project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to non-
volunteer human subjects. This j^rogram exposed numerous individuals
in the United States to the risk of death or serious injury without their
informed consent, without medical supervision, and without necessary
follow-up to determine any long-term effects.

Prior to the Olson experiment, the Director of Central Intelligence
had approved MKULTRA, a research program designed to develop
a "capability in the covert use of biological and chemical agent
materials." In the proposal describing MKULTRA Mr. Helms, then
ADDP, wrote the Director that :

we intend to investigate the development of a chemical mate-
rial which causes a reversible non-toxic aberrant mental state,
the specific nature of which can be reasonably well predicted
for each individual. This material could potentially aid in
discrediting individuals, eliciting information, and implant-
ing suggestions and other forms of mental control.^*

On February 12, 1954, the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency wrote TSS officials criticizing them for "poor judgment" in
administering LSD on "an unwitting basis and without proximate
medical safeguards" to Dr. Olson and for the lack of "proper consid-
eration of the rights of the individual to whom it was being admin-
istered." ^^ On the same day, the Inspector General reviewed a report
on Subproject Number 3 of MKULTRA, in which the same TSS
officers who had just received letters from the Director were quoted
as stating that one of the purposes of Subproject Number 3 was to

"" Note from DDCI to Richard Helms, 2/13/54.

*' The 1963 IG Report, which described the project involving the surreptitious
administration of LSD, placed the project beginning in 1955. Other CIA docu-
ments reveal that it was in existence as early as February 1954. The CIA has
told the Committee that the project began in 1953 and that the experiment which
led to Dr. Olson's death was part of the project.

^ Memorandum from ADDP items to DCI Dulles, 4/3/53, tab A, p. 2.

^ Memorandum from DCI to Sidney Gottlieb, 2/12/54 ; and memorandum from
DCI to Chief of Operations, TSS, 2/12/54.

400

"observe the behavior of unwitting persons being questioned after
having been given a drug." ^° There is no evidence that Subproject
Number 3 was terminated even though these officers were unequivo-
cally aware of the dangers of the surreptitious administration of LSD
and the necessity of obtaining informed consent and providing medical
safeguards. Subproject Number 3, in fact, used methods which showed
even less concern than did the OLSON experiment for the safety and
security of the participants. Yet the evidence indicates the project
continued until 1963.^^

In the project, the individual conducting the test might make
initial contact with a prospective subject selected at random in a bar.
He would then invite the person to a "safehouse" where the test drug
was administered to the subject through drink or in food. CIA per-
sonnel might debrief the individual conducting the test, or observe
the test by using a one-way mirror and tape recorder in an adjoining
room.

Prior consent was obviously not obtained from any of the subjects.
There was also, obviously, no medical prescreening. In addition, the
tests were conducted by individuals who were not qualified scientific
observers. There were no medical persomiel on hand either to admin-
ister the drugs or to observe their effects, and no follow-up was con-
ducted on the test subjects.

As the Inspector General noted in 1963 :

A significant limitation on the effectiveness of such tesiting is
the infeasibility of performing scientific observation of re-
sults. The [indi\aduals conducting the test] are not qualified
scientific observers. Their subjects are seldom accessible be-
yond the first hours of the test. The testing may be useful in
perfecting delivery techniques, and in identifying surface
characteristics of onset, reaction, attribution, and side-effect.''-

This was particularly troublesome as in a

number of instances, . . . the test subject has become ill for
hours or days, including hospitalization in at least one case,
and the agent could only follow up by guarded inquiry
after the test subject's return to noimal life. Possible sickness
and attendant economic loss are inherent contingent effects
of the testing. "^^

Paradoxically, greater care seems to have been taken for the safety
of foreign nationals against whom LSD was used abroad. In several
cases medical examinations were performed prior to the use of LSD.^*

'"Memorandum to Inspector General from Chief, Inspection and Review, on
Subproject #3 of MKULTRA, 2/10/54.

'^ IG Report on MKULTRA, 1963.

''■Ibid., p. 12.

'^ Ibid. According to the IG's survey in 1968, physicians associated with
MKULTRA could be made available in an emergency.

" The Technical Services Division which was responsible for the operational
use of LSD abroad took the position that "no physical examination of the subject
is required prior to administration of [LSD] by TSS trained personnel. A physi-

401

Moreover, the administration abroad was marked by constant obser-
vation made possible because the material was being used against
prisoners of foreign intelligence or security organizations. Finally,
during certain of the LSD interrogations abix>ad5 local physicians
were on call, though these physicians had had no experience with LSD
and would not be told that hallucinogens had been administered.^^

The CIA's project involving the surreptitious administration of
LSD to unwitting human subjects in the United States was finally
halted in 1963, as a result of its discovery during the course of an
Inspector General survey of the Technical Services Division. "Wlien
the Inspector General learned of the project, he spoke to the Deputy
Director for Plans, who agreed that the Director should be briefed.
The DDP made it clear that the DCI and his Deputy w^ere generally
familiar with MKULTRA. He indicated, however, that he was not
sure it was necessary to brief the DDCI at that point.

On May 24, 1963, the DDP advised the Inspector General that he had
briefed the Director on the MKULTRA program and in particular
had covered the question of the surreptitious administration of LSD
to unwitting human subjects. According to the Inspector General, the
DDP said that "the Director indicated no disagreement and therefore
the 'testing' will continue." ®®

One copy of an "Eyes Only" draft report on MKULTRA was
prepared by the Inspector General who recommended the termination
of the surreptitious administration project. The project was suspended
following the Inspector General's report.

On December 17, 1963, Deputy Director for Plans Helms wrote a
memo to the DDCI, who with the Inspector General and the Executive
Director-Comptroller had opposed the covert testing. He noted two
aspects of the problem: (1) "for over a decade the Clandestine Serv-
ices has had the mission of maintaining a capability for influencing
human behavior;" and (2) "testing arrangements in furtherance of
this mission should be as operationally realistic and yet as controllable
as possible." Helms argued that the individuals must be "unwitting"
as this was "the only realistic method of maintaining the capability,
considering the intended operational use of materials to influence
human behavior as the operational targets will certainly be unwitting.
Should the subjects of the testing not be unwitting, the program would
only be "pro forma" resulting in a "false sense of accomplishment and
readiness." ^'' Helms continued :

cian need not be present. There is no danger medically in the use of this material
as handled by TSS trained i)ersonnel." The OflBce of Medical Services had taken
the position that LSD was "medically dangerous." Both the Office of Security
and the Office of Medical Services argued that LSD "should not be administered
unless preceded by a medical examination . . . and should be administered only
by or in the presence of a physician who had studied it and its effect." (Memo-
randum from James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff to Chief of Oper-
ations, 12/12/57, pp. 1-2.

•^ Physicians might be called with the hope that they would make a diagnosis
of mental breakdown which would be useful in discrediting the individual who
was the subject of the CIA interest.

'* Memorandum for the Record prepared by the Inspector General, 5/15/63, p. 1.

'^ Ibid., p. 2.

402

If one grants the validity of the mission of maintaining this
unusual capability and the necessity for unwitting testing,
there is only then the question of how best to do it. Obviously,
the testing should be conducted in such a manner as to permit
the opportunity to observe the results of the administration
on the target. It also goes without saying that whatever test-
ing arrangement we adopt must afford maximum safeguards
for the protection of the Agency's role in this activity, as
well as minimizing the possibility of physical or emotional
damage to the individual tested.^®

In another memo to the Director of Central Intelligence in June,
1964, Helms again raised the issue of unwitting testing. At that time
General Carter, then acting DCI, approved several changes in the
MKULTRA program proposed by Mr. Helms as a result of negotia-
tions between the Inspector General and the DDP. In a handwritten
note, however, Director Carter added that "unwitting testing will be
subject to a separate decision." ^^

No specific decision was made then or soon after. The testing had
been halted and, according to Walter Elder, Executive Assistant to
DCI McCone, the DCI was not inclined to take the positive step of
authorizing a resumption of the testing. At least through the summer,
the DDP did not press the issue. On November 9, 1964, the DDP
raised the issue again in a memo to the DCI, calling the Director's
attention to what he described as "several other indications during
the past year of an apparent Soviet aggressiveness in the field of
covertly administered chemicals which are, to say the least, inexplic-
able and disturbing." ^°

Helms noted that because of the suspension of covert testing, the
Agency's "positive operational capability to use drugs is diminishing,
owing to a lack of realistic testing. With increasing knowledge of the
state of the art, we are less capable of staying up with Soviet advances
in this field. This in turn results in a waning capability on our part
to restrain others in the intelligence community (such as the Depart-
ment of Defense) from pursuing operations in this area." ^^

Helms attributed the cessation of the unwitting testing to the high
risk of embarrassment to the Agency as well as the "moral problem."
He noted that no better covert situation had been devised than that
which had been used, and that "we have no answer to the moral
issue." '2

Helms asked for either resumption of the testing project or its defini-
tive cancellation. He argued that the status quo of a research and de-
velopment program without a realistic testing program was causing
the Agency to live "with the illusion of a capability which is becoming
minimal and furthermore is expensive." " Once again no formal action
was taken in response to the Helms' request.

' Memorandum from DDP Helms to DDCI Carter, 12/17/63.

Memorandum from DDP Helms to DCI, 6/9/64, p. 3.
' IMd., 11/9/64, p. 1.

Ibid., pp. 1-2.
' Ibid., p. 2.
' Ibid.

403

From its beginning in the early 1950's until its termination in 1963,
the program of surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting non-
volunteer human subjects demonstrates a failure of the CIA's leader-
ship to pay adequate attention to the rights of individuals and to pro-
vide effective guidance to CIA employees. Though it was known that
the testing was dangerous, the lives of subjects were placed in jeop-
ardy and their rights were ignored during the ten years of testing
which followed Dr. Olson's death. Although it was clear that the laws
of the United States were being violated, the testing continued. While
the individuals involved in the Olson experiment were admonished
by the Director, at the same time they were also told that they were
not being reprimanded and that their "bad judgment" would not be
made part of their personnel records. When the covert testing project
was terminated in 1963, none of the individuals involved were subject
to any disciplinary action.

If.. Monitoring and Control of the Testing and Use of Chemical and
Biological Agents hy the CIA

The Select Committee found numerous failures in the monitoring
and control of the testing and use of chemical and 'biological agents
within the CIA.'^^ An analysis of the failures can be divided into four
sections: (a) the waiver of normal regulations or requirements; (b)
the problems in authorization procedures; (c) the failure of internal
review mechanisms such as the Office of General Counsel, the Inspector
General, and the Audit Staff; and (d) the effect of compartmentation
and competition within the CIA.

a. The Waiver of Administrative Controls. — The internal controls
within any agency rest on: (1) clear and coherent regulations; (2)
clear lines of authority; and (3) clear rewards for those who conduct
themselves in accord with agency regulations and understandable and
immediate sanctions against those who do not. In the case of the test-
ing and use of chemical and biological agents, normal CIA adminis-
trative controls were waived. The destruction of the documents on the
largest CIA program in this area constituted a prominent example of
the waiver of normal Agency procedures by the Director.

These documents were destroyed in early 1973 at the order of then
DCI Richard Helms. According to Helms, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, then
Director of TSD :

. . . came to me and said that he was retiring and that I was
retiring and he thought it would be a good idea if these files
were destroyed. And I also believe part of the reason for
our thinking this was advisable was there had been relation-
ships with outsiders in government agencies and other orga-
nizations and that these would be sensitive in this kind of a
thing but that since the program was over and finished and
done with, we thought we would just get rid of the files as

""■ Section 2(9) of S. Res. 21 instructs the Committee to examine: the "extent
to which United States intelligence agencies are governed by Executive Orders,
rules, or regulations either published or secret."

404

well, so that anybody who assisted us in the past would not
be subject to follow-up or questions, embarrassment, if you
will."

The destruction was based on a waiver of an internal CIA regula-
tion, CSI 70-10, which regulated the "retirement of inactive records."
As Thomas Karamessines, then Deputy Director of Plans, wrote in
regulation CSI-70-10 : "Ketirement is not a matter of convenience or
of storage but of conscious judgment in the application of the rules
modified by knowledge of individual component needs. The heart of
this judgment is to ensure that the complete story can be reconstructed
in later years and by people who may be unfamiliar with the events." '^^

The destruction of the MKULTRA documents made it impossible
for the Select Committee to determine the full range and extent of the
largest CIA research program involving chemical and biological
agents. The destruction also prevented the CIA from locating and pro-
viding medical assistance to the individuals who were subjects in the
program. Finally, it prevented the Committee from determining the
full extent of the operations which made use of materials developed in
the MKULTRA program."

From the inception of MKULTRA normal Agency procedures were
waived. In 1953, Mr. Helms, then Assistant Deputy Director for Plans,
proposed the establishment of MKULTRA. Under the proposal six
percent of the research and development budget of TSD would be
expended "without the establishment of formal contractual relations"
because contracts would reveal government interest. Helms also voted
that qualified individuals in the field "are most reluctant to enter into
signed agreements of any sort which connect them with this activity
since such a connection would jeopardize their professional reputa-

^" Richard Helms testimony, 9/11/75, p. 5.

Many Agency documents recording confidential relationships with individuals
and organizations are retained without public disclosure. Moreover, in the case of
MKULTRA the CIA had spent millions of dollars developing both materials and
delivery systems which could be used by the Clandestine Services ; the reconstruc-
tion of the research and development program would be difficult if not impos-
sible, without the documents, and at least one assistant to Dr. Gottlieb protested
against the document destruction on those grounds.

™ Clandestine Services Institution (CSI) 70-10. When asked by the Select
Committee about the regularity of the procedure by which he authorized Dr.
Gottlieb to destroy the MKULTRA records. Helms responded :

"Well, that's hard to say whether it would be part of the regular procedure or
not, because the record destruction program is conducted according to a certain
pattern. There's a regular record destruction pattern in the Agency monitored by
certain people and done a certain way. So that anything outside of that, I suppose,
would have been unusual. In other words, there were documents being destroyed
because somebody had raised this specific issue rather than because they were
encompassed in the regular records destruction program. So I think the answer
to your question is probably yes." (Helms testimony, 9/11/75, p. 6.)

■" Even prior to the destruction of documents, the MKULTRA records were far
from complete. As the Inspector General noted in 1963 :

"Files are notably incomplete, poorly organized, and lacking in evaluative state-
ments that might give perspective to management policies over time. A substan-
tial portion of the MKULTRA record appears to rest in the memories of the prin-
cipal officers and is therefore almost certain to be lost with their departures."
(IG Report on MKULTRA, p. 23.)

405

tions".'^^ Other Agency procedures, i.e., the forwarding of documents
in support of invoices and the provision for regular audit procedures,
were also to be waived. On April 13, 1953, then DCI Allen Dulles
approved MKULTRA, noting that security considerations precluded
handling the project through usual contractual agreements.

Ten years later investigations of MKULTRA by both the Inspector
General and the Audit Staff noted substantial deficiencies which re-
sulted from the waivers. Because TSD had not reserved the right to
audit the books of contractors in MKULTRA, the CIA had been
unable to verify the use of Agency grants by a contractor. Another
firm had failed to establish controls and safeguards which would as-
sure "proper accountability" in use of government funds with the
result that "funds have been used for purposes not contemplated by
grants or allowable under usual contract relationship." ^^ The entire
MKULTRA arrangement was condemned for having administrative
lines which were unclear, overly permissive controls, and irrespon-
sible supervision.

The head of the Audit Branch noted that inspections and audits:
led us to see MKULTRA as frequently having provided a
device to escape normal administrative controls for research
that is not especially sensitive, as having allowed practices
that produce gross administrative failures, as having per-
mitted the establishment of special relationships with unreli-
able organizations on an unacceptable basis, and as having
produced, on at least one occasion, a cavalier treatment of a
bona fide contracting organization.

While admitting that there may be a need for special mechanisms
for handling sensitive projects, the Chief of the Audit Branch wrote
that "both the terms of reference and the ground rules for handling
such special projects should be spelled out in advance so that diver-
sion from normal channels does not mean abandonment of controls.
Special procedures may be necessary to ensure the security of highlj
sensitive operations. To prevent the erosion of normal internal con-
trol mechanisms, such waivers should not be extended to less sensitive
operations. Moreover, only those regulations which would endanger
security should be waived; to waive regulations generally would
result in highly sensitive and controversial projects having looser
rather than stricter administrative controls. MKNAOMI, the Fort
Detrick CIA project for research and development of chemical and
biological agents, provides another example where efforts to protect
the security of agency activties overwhelmed administrative controls.
No written records of the transfer of agents such as anthrax or shell-
fish toxin were kept, "because of the sensitivity of the area and the
desire to keep any possible use of materials like this recordless." ^^ The

■^ Memorandum from ADDP Helms to DCI Dulles, 4/3/53, Tab. A, p. 2.

™ Memorandum from IG to Chief, TSD, 11/8/63, as quoted in memorandum
from Chief. Audit Branch.

^"The memorandum suggested that administrative exclusions, because of the
importance of such decisions, should require the personal approval of the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence on an individual case basis. Present CIA policy
is that only the DCI can authorize certain exemptions from regulations.

" Sidney Gottlieb testimony, 10/18/75, Hearings, Vol. 1, p. 51.

406

result was that the Agency had no way of determining what mate-
rials were on hand, and could not be certain whether delivery systems
such as dart guns, or deadly substances such as cobra venom had been
issued to the field.

6. Authorization. — The destruction of the documents regarding
MKULTEA made it difficult to determine at what level specific proj-
ects in the program were authorized. This problem is not solely a re-
sult of the document destruction, however. Even at the height of
MKULTKA the IG noted that, at least with respect to the surrepti-
tious administration of LSD, the "present practice is to maintain no
records of the planning and approval of test programs." ^"

While it is clear that Allen Dulles authorized MKULTRA, the rec-
ord is unclear as to who authorized specific projects such as that in-
volving the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting non-
volunteer human subjects. Even given the sensitive and controversial
nature of the project, there is no evidence that when John McCone
replaced Allen Dulles as the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency he was briefed on the details of this project and asked whether
it should be continued.^^ Even during the 1963 discussions on the pro-
priety of unwitting testing, the DDP questioned whether it was "neces-
sai-y to brief General Carter," the Deputy Director of Central Intelli-
gence and the Director's "alter ago," because CIA officers felt it neces-
sary to keep details of the project restricted to an absolute minimum
number of people.®^

In May of 1963, DDP Helms told the Inspector General that the
covert testing program was authorized because he had gone to the
Director, briefed him on it and "the Director indicated no disagree-
ment and therefore the testing will continue." ^' Such authorization
even for noncontroversial matters is clearly less desirable than ex-
plicit authorization ; in areas such as the surreptitious administration
of drugs, it is particularly undesirable. Yet according to testimony

«" IG Report on MKULTRA, 1963, p. 14.

^ According to an assistant to Dr. Gottlieb, there were annual briefings of the
DCI and the DDP on MKULTRA by the Chief of TSD or his deputy. However, a
May 15, 1963 Memorandum for the Record from the Inspector General noted that
Mr. McCone had not been briefed in detail about the program. Mr. McCone's Exec-
utive OflScer, Walter Elder, testified that it was "perfectly apparent to me" that
neither Mr. McCone nor General Carter, then the DDCI, was aware of the sur-
reptitious administration project "or if they had been briefed they had not under-
stood it." (Elder, 12/18/75, p. 13.) Mr. McCone testified that he "did not know"
whether he talked to anyone about the project but that no one had told him about
ir in a way that "would have turned on all the lights." (John MeCone testimony,
2/3/76, p. 10. )

** According to Elder's testimony, "no Deputy Director, to my knowledge,
has ever been briefed or was it ever thought necessary to brief them to the extent
to which you would brief the Director."

'" IG Memorandum for the Record. 5/15/63.

On the question of authorization of the covert testing program. Elder testified
as follows :

"But my reasonable judgment is that this was considered to be in the area of
continuing approval, having once been apiiroved by the Director."

The theory of authorization carrying over from one administration to the next
seems particularly inappropriate for less visible, highly sensitive operations
which, unless brought to his attention by subordinates, would not come to the
attention of the Director.

407

before the Committee, authorization through lack of agreement is
even more prevalent in sensitive situations.**^

The unauthorized retention of shellfish toxin by Dr. Nathan Gordon
and his subordinates, in violation of a Presidential Directive, may have
resulted from the failure of the Director to issue written instructions to
Agency officials. The retention was not authorized by senior officials in
the Agency. The Director, Mr. Helms, had instructed Mr. Karames-
sines, the Deputy Director of Plans, and Dr. Gottlieb, the Chief of
Teclmical Services Division, to relinquish control to the Army of any
chemical or biological agents being retained for the CIA at Fort De-
trick. Dr. Gottlieb passed this instruction on to Dr. Gordon. While
orders may be disregarded in any organization, one of the reasons that
Dr. Gordon used to defend the retention was the fact that he had not
received written instructions forbidding it.*"

In some situations the existence of written instructions did not pre-
vent unauthorized actions. According to an investigation by the CIA's
Inspector General TSD officer had been informed orally tliat Mr.
Hehns was to be "advised at all times" when LSD was to be used. In
addition TSD had received a memo advising the staff that LSD was
not to be used without the permission of the DDP, Frank AVisner. The
experiment involving Dr. Olson went ahead without notification of
either Mr. Wisner or Mr. Helms. The absence of clear and immediate
punishment for that act must undercut the force of other internal in-
structions and regulations.

One last issue must be raised about authorization procedures within
the Agency. Chemical agents were used abroad until 1959 for dis-
crediting or disabling operations, or for the purpose of interrogations
with the approval of the Chief of Operations of the DDP. Later the
approval of the Deputy Director for Plans was required for such
operations. Although iho, medical staff sought to be part of the ap-
proval process for these operations, they were excluded because, as the
Inspector General wrote in 1957 :

Operational determinations are the responsibility of the
DD/P and it is he who should advise the DCI in these
respects, just as it is he who is responsible for the results. It
is completely unrealistic to consider assigning to the Chief,
Medical Staff, (what, in effect, would be authority over clan-
destine operations.)**

Given the expertise and training of physicians, participation of the
Medical Staff might well have been useful.

Questions about authorization also exist in regard to those agencies
which assisted the CIA. For instance, the project involving the sur-
reptitious administration of LSD to unwitting non-volunteer human
subjects was conducted in coordination with the Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs. There is some question as to the Commissioner
of Narcotics' knowledge about the project.

* Mr. Elder was asked whether the process of bringing forward a description of
actions by the Agency in getting approval through the absence of disagreement
was a common one. He responded, "It was not uncommon. . . . The more sensitive
the project the more likely it would lean toward being a common practice, based
on the need to keep the written record to a minimum."

" Nathan Gordan testimony, 9/16/75, Hearings, Vol. 1.

•* 1957 IG Report.

408

In 1963, the Inspector General noted that the head of the BNDD
had been briefed about the project, but the IG's report did not indi-
cate the level of detail provided to him. Dr. Gottlieb testified that "I
remember meeting Mr. Anslinger and had the general feeling that he
was aware." ^^ Another CIA officer did not recall any discussion of
testing on unwitting subjects when he and Dr. Gottlieb met with Com-
missioner Anslinger.

In a memorandum for the record in 1967 Dr. Gottlieb stated that
Harry Giordano, who replaced Mr. Anslinger, told Dr. Gottlieb that
when he became Commissioner he was "only generally briefed on the
arrangements, gave it his general blessing, and said he didn't want to
know the details." The same memorandum states, however, that there
were several connnents which indicated to Dr. Gottlieb that Mr. Gior-
dano was aware of the substance of the project. It is possible that
the Commissioner provided a general authorization for the arrange-
ment without understanding what it entailed or considering its pro-
priety. A reluctance to seek detailed information from the CIA, and
the CIA's hesitancy to volunteer it, has been found in a number of
instances during the Select Committee's investigations. This problem
is not confined to the executive branch but has also marked congres-
sional relationships with the Agency.

G. Intet'nal Review. — The waiver of regulations and the absence of
documentation make it difficult to determine now who authorized
which activities. More importantly, they made internal Agency review
mechanisms much less effective.^" Controversial and highly sensitive
projects which should have been subject to the most rigorous inspection
lacked effective internal review.

Given the role of the General Counsel and his reaction to the sur-
reptitious administration of LSD to Dr. Olson, it would have seemed
likely that he would be asked about the legality or propriety of any
subsequent projects involving such administration. This was not done.
He did not learn about this testing until the 1970's. Nor was the Gen-
eral Counsel's opinion sought on other MKULTRA projects, though
these had been characterized by the Inspector General in the 1957
Report on TSD as "unethical and illicit." ^^

There is no mention in the report of the 1957 Inspector General's
survey of TSD of the project involving the surreptitious administra-
tion of LSD. That project was apparently not brought to the attention
of the survey team. Tlie Inspector who discovered it during the IG's
1963 survey of TSD recalls coming upon evidence of it inadvertently,

'« Gottlieb, 10/18/75, p. 28.

^ The IG's report on MKULTRA in 1963 stated :

"The original charter documents specified that TSD maintain exacting con-
trol of MKULTRA activities. In so doing, however, TSD has pursued a phi-
losophy of minimiim documentation in keeping with the high sensitivity of some
of the projects. Some files were found to present a reasonably complete record,
including most sensitive matters, while others with parallel objectives contained
little or no data at all. The lack of consistent records precluded use of routine
inspection procedures and raised a variety of questions concerning manage-
ment and fiscal controls."

*^ GIA, Inspector General's report on TSD, 1957, p. 217.

409

rather than its having been called to his attention as an especially
sensitive project. ^^

Thus both the General Counsel and the Inspector General, the j)rin-
cipal internal mechanisms for the control of possibly improper actions,
were excluded from regular reviews of the project. When the project
was discovered the Executive Director-Comptroller voiced strong oj)-
position to it; it is possible that the project would have been termi-
nated in 1957 if it had been called to his attention when he then served
as Inspector General.

The Audit Staff, which also serves an internal review function
through the examination of Agency expenditures, also encountered
substantial difficulty with MKULTRA. When INIKULTKA was fii-st
proposed the Audit Staff was to be excluded from any function. This
was soon changed. However, the waiver of normal "contractual pro-
cedures'' in MKULTRA increased the likelihood of ''irregularities''
as well as the difficulty in detecting them. The head of the Audit
Branch characterized the JSIKULTRA procedures as "having allowed
practices that produced gross administrative failures," including a
lack of controls within outside contractors which would "assure proper
accountability in use of government funds." It also diminished the
CIA's capacity to verify the accountings provided by outside firms.

d. GompartTnentation aiid Jurisdictional Corufiict Within the
Agency. — As has been noted, the testing and use of chemical and
biological agents was treated as a highly sensitive activity wdthin the
CIA, This resulted in a high degree of compartmentation. At the same
time substantial jurisdictional conflict existed within the Agency be-
tween the Technical Services Division, and the Office of Medical Serv-
ices and the Office of Security.

This compartmentation and jurisdictional conflict may well have
led to duplication of effort within the CIA and to Agency policy-
makers being deprived of useful information.

During the early 1950's first the BLUEBIRD Committee and then
the ARTICHOKE Committee were instituted to bring together rep-
resentatives of the Agency components which had a legitimate inter-
est in the area of the alteration of human behavior. By 1957 both these
committees had fallen into disuse. No information went to the Tech-
nical Services Division (a component supposedly represented on the
ARTICHOKE Committee) about ARTICHOKE operations being
conducted by the Office of Security and the Office of Medical Services.
The Technical Services Division which was providing support to the
Clandestine Services in the use of chemical and biological agents, but
provided little or no information to either the Office of Security or the
Office of Medical Services. As one TSD officer involved in these pro-
grams testified : "Although we were acquainted, we certainly didn't
share experiences." ®^

^^ Even after the Inspector came upon it the IG did not perform a complete
investigation of it. It was discovered at the end of an extensive survey of TSD
and the Inspector was in the process of being transferred to another post vsdthin
the Agency.

'^^ Testimony of CIA officer, 11/21/75, p. 14.

69-983 0-76-27

410

QKHILLTOP, another group designed to coordinate research in
this area also had little success. The group met infrequently — onl}^
twice a year — and little specific information was exchanged.''*

Concern over security obviously played some role in the failure to
share information,'-*^ but this appears not to be the only reason. A TSD
officer stated that the Office of Medical Services simply wasn't "par-
ticularly interested in what we were doing" and never sought such
information.^*^ On the other hand, a representative of the Office of
Medical Services consistently sought to have medical persomiel par-
ticipate in the use of chemical and biological agents suggested that
TSD did not inform the Office of Medical Services in order to pre-
vent their involvement.

Jurisdictional conflict was constant in this area. The Office of
Security, Avhich had been assigned responsibility for direction of
ARTICHOIvE, consistently sought to bring TSD operations in-
volving psychochemicals under the ARTICHOKE umbrella. The
Office of Medical Services sought to have OMS physicians advise and
participate in the operational use of drugs. As the Inspector Gen-
eral described it in 1957, "the basic issue is concerned with the extent
of authority that should be exercised by the Chief, Medical Staff, over
the activities of TSD which encroach upon or enter into the medical
field,-' and which are conducted by TSD "without seeking the prior
approval of the Chief, Medical Staff, and often without informing
him of their nature and extent." ^^

As was noted previously, because the projects and programs of
TSD stemmed directly from operational needs controlled by the
DDP, the IG recommended no further supervision of these activi-
ties by the Medical Staff :

It is completely unrealistic to consider assigning to the
Chief, Medical Staff, w^hat, in effect, would be authority over
clandestine operations. Furthermore^ some of the activities
of Chemical Division are not only unorthodox hut unethical
and sometimes illegal. The DDP is in a. better position to
evaluate the justificatio-n for siiah operations than the Chief,
Medical Staff. ^^ [Emphasis added.]

Because the advice of the Director of Security w^as needed for
"evaluating the risks involved" in the programs and because the
knowledge that the CIA was "engaging in unethical and illicit activi-
ties would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic
circles," the IG recommended that the Director of Security be fully
advised of TSD's activities in these areas.

Even after the Ins^^ector General's Report of 1957, the compartmen-
tation and jurisdictional conflict continued. They may have had a sub-

" The one set of minutes from a QKHILLTOP meeting indicated tliat individ-
uals in the OflSee of Medical Services stressed the need for more contact.

"■'' When asked why information on the surreptitious administration of LSI)
was not presented to the ARTICHOKE committee, Dr. Gottlieb responded : "I
imagine the only reason would have been a concern for broadening the aware-
ness of its existence."

'^('lA officer, 11/21/75. p. 14.

'" IG Survev of TSD. 1957, p. 217.

"' Ibid.

411

stantial negative impact on policymaking in the Agency. As the Dep-
uty Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff noted in 1958, due to the
different positions taken by TSS, the Office of Security, and the Office
of Medical Services on the use of chemical or biological agents, it was
possible that the individual who authorized the use of a chemical or
biological agent could be presented with "incomplete facts upon which
to make a decision relevant to its use." Even a committee set up by the
DDP in 1958 to attempt to rationalize Agency policy did not have ac-
cess to records of testing and use. This was due, in part, to excessive
compartmentation, and jurisdictional conflict.

C. Covert Testing on Human Subjects by Military Intelligence
Groups: Material Testing Program EA 1729, Project THIRD
CHANGE, AND Project DERBY HAT

EA 1729 is the designator used in the Army drug testing program
for lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). Interest in LSD was originally
aroused at the Army's Chemical Warfare Laboratories by open litera-
ture on the unusual effects of the compound.^^ The positive intelli-
gence and counterintelligence potential envisioned for compounds like
LSD, and suspected Soviet interest in such materials,^"" supported the
development of an American military capability and resulted in ex-
periments conducted jointly by the IT.S. Army Intelligence Board and
the Chemical Warfare Laboratories.

Tliese experiments, designed to evaluate potential intelligence uses
of LSD, were known collectively as "Material Testing Program EA
1729." Two projects of particular interest conducted as part of these
exi:»eriments, "THIRD CHANCE" and "DERBY HAT", involved
the administration of LSD to unwitting subjects in Europe and the
Far p:ast.

In many respects, the AiTny's testing programs duplicated research
which had already been conducted by the CIA. They certainly involved
the risks inherent in the early phases of drug testing. In the Army's
tests, as with those of the CIA, individual rights were also subordi-
nated to national security considerations ; informed consent and follow-
up examinations of subjects were neglected in efforts to maintain the
secrecy of the tests. Finally, the command and control problems which
weie a])parent in the CIA's programs are paralleled by a lack of clear
authorization and supervision in the Army's programs.

°' USAINTC staff study, "Material Testing Program, EA 1729," 10/15/59, p. 4.

^""This same USAIXTC study cited "A 1952 (several years prior to initial U.S.
interest in LSD-25) report that the Soviets purchased a large quantity of LSD-25
from the Sandoz Company in 1951, reputed to be sufficient for 50 million doses."
{Ibid., p. 16.)

Generally accepted Soviet methods and counterintelligence concerns were also
strong motivating factors in the initiation of this research :

"A primary justification for field experimentation in intelligence with EA 1729
is the counter-intelligence or defense implication. We know that the enemy phi-
losophy condones any kind of coercion or violence for intelligence purposes. There
is proof that his intelligence service has used drugs in the past. There is strong
evidence of keen interest in EA 1729 by him. If for no other purpose than to know
what to expect from enemy intelligence use of the material and to, thus, be pre-
pared to counter it, field experimentation is justified." {Ibid, p. .34)

412

1. Scope of Testing

Between 1955 and 1958 research was initiated by the Army Chemical
Corps to evaluate the ix)tential for LSD as a chemical warfare inca-
pacitating agent. In the course of this research, LSD was administered
to moi-e than 1,000 American volunteers who then participated in a
series of tests designed to ascertain the effects of the drug on their
ability to function as soldiers. With the exccj^tion of one set of tests
at Fort Bragg, these and subsequent laboratoiy experiments to evalu-
ate chemical warfare potential were conducted at the Army Chemical
Warfare Laboratories, Edgewood, Mainland.

In 1958 a new series of laboratory tests were initiated at Edgewood.
These experiments were conducted as the initial phase of Material
Testing Program EA 1729 to evaluate the intelligence potential of
LSD, and included LSD tests on 95 volunteers."^ As part of these
tests, three structured experiments were conducted :

1. LSD was administered surreptitiously at a simulated
social reception to volunteer subjects Avho were unaware of
the purpose or nature of the tests in which they were
participating ;

2. LSD w^as administered to volunteers who were subse-
quently polygraphed ; and

3. LSD was administered to volunteers who were then
confined to "isolation chambers".

These structured experiments were designed to evaluate the validity
of the traditional security training all subjects had undergone in the
face of unconventional, drug enhanced, interrogations.

At the conclusion of the laboratoiy test phase of Material Testing
Program EA 1729 in 1960, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence (ACSI) authorized operational field testing of LSD. Tlie
first field tests were conducted in Europe by an Army Special Pur-
pose Team (SPT) during the period from May to August of 1901.
These tests were known as Project THIRD CHANCE and involved
eleven separate interrogations of ten subjects. None of the subjects
were volunteers and none were aware that they were to receive
LSD. All but one subject, a U.S. soldier implicated in the theft of
classified documents, were alleged to be foreign intelligence sources
or agents. While interrogations of these individuals were only moder-
ately successful, at least one subject (the U.S. soldier) exhibited
symptoms of severe paranoia while under the influence of the drug.

The second series of field tests, Project DERBY HAT, were con-
ducted by an Army SPT in the Far East during the period
from August to November of 1902. Seven subjects were interrogated
under DERBY HAT, all of Avhom were foreign nationals either sus-
pected of dealing in narcotics or implicated in foreign intelligence
operations. The purpose of this second set of experiments was to col-
lect additional data on the utility of LSD in field interrogations, and
to evaluate any different effects the drug might have on "Orientals."

"^ Insi>ector General of the Army Report, "Use of Volunteers in Cliemioal Agent
Research," .V10/7(>. p. 138.

413

2. Inadequate Coordination Among Intelligence Agencies

On October 15, 1959, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center prepared
lengthy staff study on Material Testing Program EA 1729. The stated
purpose of the staff study was: "to determine the desirability of EA
1729 on non-US subjects in selected actual operations under controlled
conditions.^°^ It was on the basis of this study that operational field
tests were later conducted.

After noting that the Chemical Warfare Laboratories began experi-
ments with LSD on humans in 1955 and had administered the drug
to over 1,000 volunteers, the "background" section of the study
concluded :

There has not been a single case of residual ill effect. Study
of the prolific scientific literature on LSD-25 and personal
communication betw^een US Army Chemical Corps person-
nel and other researchers in this field have failed to disclose
an authenticated instance of irreversible change being pro-
duced in normal humans by the drug.^°^

This conclusion was reached despite an awareness that there were
inherent medical dangers in such experimentation. In the body of this
same study it is noted that :

The view has been expressed that EA 1729 is a potentially
dangerous drug, whose pharmaceutical actions are not fully
understood and there has been cited the possibility of the
continuance of a chemically induced psychosis in chronic-
form, particularly if a latent schizophrenic were a subject,
with consequent claim or representation against the U.S.
Government."*

An attempt was made to minimize potential medical hazards by care-
ful selection of subjects prior to field tests. Rejecting evidence that
the drug might be hazardous, the study continued:

The claim of possible permanent damage caused by EA 1729
is an unproven hypothesis based on the characteristic effect
of the material. While the added stress of a real situation
may increase the probability of permanent adverse effect,
the resulting risk is deemed to he slight hy the medical re-
search personnel of the Chemical Warfare Laboratories. To
prevent even such a slight risk, the proposed plan for field
experimentation calls for overt, if possible, or contrived-
through-ruse, if necessary, physical and mental examination
of any real situation subject prior to employment of the
subject."^

This conclusion was drawn six years after one death had occurred
Avhich could be attributed, at least in part, to the effects of the
veiy drug the Army was proposing to field test. The I^SATNTC staff,
however, was apparently unaware of the circumstances surround-
ing Dr. Olson's death. This lack of knowledge is indicative of the

''"TTS.\INTr staff stiKlv. "Material Tpsting Program EA 1729." 10/15/59, p. 4.
^"^ /6(V?., p. 4.
'"* Jhid., p. 25.
'"• IhUh

414

<>-eiieral lack of intera^ieiicy coinmiinicatioii on druo- related research.
As the October 1050 study noted, "there has been no coordination
with other intelli<>ence agencies up to the present." ^°*^

On December 7, 1950, the Army Assistant Chief of Staif for Intelli-
o-ence (ACSI, appaiently a Oeneral Willems) was briefed on the
proposed operational use of LSI) by USAINTC Project Officer Jacob-
son, in preparation for Project THIRD CHANCE.' General Willems
expressed concern that the project had not been coordinated with the
FBI and the CIA. He is quoted as sayin«>- "that if this project is ^oino-
to be worth anythino- it [LSD] should be used on higher types of
non-I".S. subjects" in other words "starters." He indicated this could
be accomplished if the CIA were brought in. The sunmiary of the
briefino- prepared by a Major ]Mehovsky continues : "Of particular note
is that ACSI did not direct coordination with CIA and the FBI but
only mentioned it for consideration by the planners."^"'

After the briefino-, four colonels, two lieutenant colonels and Major
^Nlehovsky met to discuss intei'a«>ency cooperation with CIA and FBI.
The group consensus was to jDostpone efforts toward coordination:

Lt. Col. Jacobson commented that before we coordinate with
CIA we should have more factual findings from field experi-
mentation with counterintelligence cases that will strengthen
our position and proposal for cooperation. This approach
was agreed to by the conferees.^"®

Had such coordination been achieved, the safety of these experiments
might have been viewed difterently and the tests themselves might
have been seen as unnecessary.

3. Suh ordination of Indiridual Rights to National Security Consid-
erations

Just as many of these experiments may have been unnecessary, the
nature of the operational tests (polygraph-assisted interrogations of
drugged suspects) reflects a basic disregard for the fundamental
human rights of the subjects. The interrogation of an American
soldier as part of the THIRD CHANCE 1961 tests is an example of
this disregard.

The "trip report" for Project TPIIRD CHANCE, dated Septem-
ber 6, 1061, recounts the circumstances surrounding and the results of
the tests as follows :

[The subject] was a IT.S. soldier who had confessed to theft
of classified documents. Conventional methods had failed to
ascertain whether espionage intent was involved. A significant
new admission by subject that he told a fellow soldier of the
theft while he still had the documents in his possession was
obtained during the EA 1720 interrogation along with other
variations of Subject's previous account. The interrogation
results were deemed by the local opei'ational authority satis-
factoiy evidence of Subject's claim of innocence in regard to
espionage intent. ^"^

' Thid., p. 6.

Mehovsky Fact Sheet, 12/9/60, p. 1.
' Ihid., p. 2.

SPT Trip Report. Operation THIRD CHANCE, 9/6/61, p. 5.

415

The subject apparently reacted very strongly to the drug, and the
interrogation, wliile productive, was difficult. The trip report
concluded :

(1) This case demonstrated the ability to interrogate a
subject profitably throughout a highly sustained and almost
incapacitating reaction to EA 1729.

(2) The apparent value of bringing a subject into the EA
1729 situation in a highly stressed state was indicated.

(3) The usefulness of employing as a duress factor the de-
vice of inviting the subject's attention to his EA 1729-
influenced state and threatening to extend this state in-
definitely even to a permanent condition of insanity, or to
bring it to an end at the discretion of the interrogators was
shown to be eft'ective.

(4) The need for preplanned precautions against extreme
paranoiac reaction to EA 1729 was indicated.

(5) It was brought to attention by this case that where sub-
ject has undergone extended intensive interrogation prior to
the EA 1729 episode and has persisted in a version repeatedly
during conventional interrogation, adherence to the same ver-
sion while under EA 1729 influence, however extreme the reac-
tion, may not necessarily be evidence of truth but merely the
ability to adhere to a well rehearsed story.^^°

This strong reaction to the drug and the accompanying discomfort
this individual suffered were exploited by the use of traditional inter-
rogation techniques. While there is no evidence that physical violence
or torture were employed in connection with this interrogation, physi-
cal and psychological techniques were used in the THIRD CHANCE
experiments to exploit the subjects'' altered mental state, and to maxi-
mize the stress situation. Jacobson described these methods in his trip
report :

Stressing techniques employed included silent treatment be-
fore or after EA 1729 administration, sustained conventional
interrogation prior to EA 1729 interrogation, deprivation of
food, drink, sleep or bodily evacuation, sustained isolation
prior to EA 1729 administration, hot-cold switches in ap-
proach, duress "pitches", verbal degradation and bodily dis-
comfort, or dramatized threats to subject's life or mental
health."!

Another gross violation of an individual's fundamental rights oc-
curred in Sept^^mber 1962 as part of the Army's DERBY HAT tests
in the Far East. A suspected Asian espionage agent was given 6
micrograms of LSD per kilogram of bodyweight. The administration
of the drug was completed at 1035 that morning :

At 1120, sweating became evident, his pulse became thready.
He was placed in a supine position. He began groaning with
expiration and became semicomatose.^!^

"°/b(fZ., pp. 17-18.
"^7&u7., p. 13.

'"^ "DERBY HAT" Medical and Pharmacological Report: Case #1, 9/20/62,
p. DlO-2.

416

For the next 28 minutes, the subject remained semicomatose.

At 1148, responses to painful stimuli were slightly improved.

At 1155, he was helped to a sittino; position.

At 1200, he became shocky again and was returned to supine
position.

At 1212, he was more alert and able to sit up with help.

At 1220, Subject was assisted to the interrogation table.

At 1230, he began moaning he wanted to die and usually
ignored questions. Rarely he stated "he didn't know."

At 1250, his phasic alertness persisted. He frequently re-
focused his eyes with eyelid assistance. He frequently threw
his head back with eyes closed.

At 1830. he was slightly more alert. He was forced- walked for
5 minutes. He physically would cooperate until he became
shocky again (sweating, thready pulse, pale) ."'^

For the next three hours the subject remained in about the same con-
dition. Continued attempts at interrogation yielded no relevant
answers. Six hours after receiving the drug, the subject began giving
relevant answers to questions. Eight and one-half hours after the
initial dosage, the subject was polygraphed. The interrogation con-
tinued for seventeen and one-half hours after the drug was ad-
ministered.

There was some psychological and medical screening of the in-
dividuals tested within the United States, in Europe, and in
Asia. The ))roposal for the field experimentation in fact called for
sucli examinations. The fact of prescreening did not eliminate the
risk of injury; the availability of medical staff did, however, limit
injury and may well have prevented the death of one or more of the
subjects. As the medical corps member of the team which surrepti-
tiously administered the LSD noted, "one subject . . . did collapse after
the interrogation and the presence of the medical officer was not only
of value to the subject but to the interrogation team who were thus
assured that an umiecessary untoward result would not occur." "'^

In the October 15, 1959,'TTSATNTC staff study, moral and legal
ramifications of covert administration of LSD in field conditions were
considered.

It was always a tenet of Ai-my Intelligence that the basic
American principle of the dignity and welfare of the in-
dividual will not be violated. ... A more meticulous regard
for the prohibition against violence or duress is taken in
practice when the suspect is a US citizen or ally as against
an actual or potential enemy, in peace as against war, and in
respect to the nature of the crime. ... In intelligence, the
stakes involved and the interests of national security may
permit a more tolerant interpretation of moral-ethical values,
but not legal limits, through necessity. . . . Any claim

' Ihid., p. DlO-3.

in j^prp rpj.jj^ Report, Operation THIRD CHAN'CE. 7/2.5/61. p. 1.

417

ao;ainst the US Government for alleged injury due to EA
1729 must be legally shown to have been due to the material.
Proper security and appropriate operational techniques
can protect the fact of employment of EA 1729.""

On the basis of this evaluation, the study concluded that in view of
"the stakes involved and the interests of national security," the pro-
posed plan for field testing should be approved.

The surreptitious administration of drugs to unwitting subjects by
the Army raises serious constitutional and legal issues. Tlie considera-
tion given these issues by the Army was wholly insufficient. The char-
acter of the Army's volunteer testing program and the possibility that
drugs were simply substituted for other forms of violence or duress in
field interrogations raises serious doubts as to whether national se-
curity imperatives were properly interpreted. The "consent" forms
which each American volunteer signed prior to the administration of
LSD are a case in point. These forms contained no mention of the
medical and psychological risks inherent in such testing, nor do they
mention the nature of the psychotrophic drug to be administered :

The general nature of the experiments in which I have
volunteered have been explained to me from the standpoint
of possible hazards to my health. It in Tuiy understanding that
the experiments are so designed, based on the results of
animals and previous human experimentation, that the antic-
ipated residts iviJl justify the performance of the experi-
ment. I understand further that experiments will be so con-
ducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and medical
suffering and injury, and that / will he at liherty to request
that the experiments he terminated at any tiine if in my opin-
ion I have reached the physical or mental state where con-
tinuation of the experiments becomes undesirable.

/ recognize that in the pursuit of certain experiments
transitory discomfort may occur. I recognize, also, that under
these circumstances, / must rely upon the skill and wisdom
of the- physician supervising the experiment to institute what-
ever medical or surgical measures are indicated. [Emphasis
added.] "^

The exclusion of any specific discussion of the nature of LSD in
these forms raises serious doubts as to their validity. An "understand-
ing . . . that the anticipated results will justify the performance of
the experiment"' without full knowledge of the nature of the experi-
ment is an incomplete "understanding." Similarly, the nature of the
experiment limited the ability of both the subject to request its re-
quest its termination and the experimenter to implement such a request.
Finally, the euphemistic characterization of "transitory discomfort"
and the agreement to "rely on the skill and wisdom of the physician"
combine to conceal inherent risks in the experimentation and may be
viewed as disolving the experimenter of personal responsibility for
damaging aftereffects. In summary, a "volunteer" program in which
subjects are not fully informed of potential hazards to their persons
is "volunteer" in name only.

USAINTC staff study, "Material Testing Program EA 1729," 10/15/59, p. 26.
Sample volunteer consent form.

418

This problem was compounded by the security statements signed
by each volunteer before he participated in the testing. As part of
this statement, potential subjects agreed that they would:

. . . not divulge or make available any information related
to U.S. Army Intelligence Center interest or participation in
the Dej)artment of the Army Medical Research Volunteer
Program to any individual, nation, organization, business,
association, or other group or entity, not officially authorized
to receive such information.

I understand that any action contrary to the provisions of
this statement will render me liable to punishment under the
provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.^^^

Under these provisions, a volunteer experiencing af tei"effects of the t«st
might have been unable to seek immediate medical assistance.

This disregard for the well-being of subjects drug testing is in-
excusable. Further, the absence of any comprehensive long-term
medical assistance for the subjects of these experiments is not only
unscientific ; it is also unprofessional.

Jf.. Lack of NoTTnaZ Authorization and Supervision

It is apparent from documents supplied to the Committee that the
Army's testing programs often operated under informal and nonrou-
tine authorization. Potentially dangerous operations such as these
testing programs are the very projects which ought to be subject to
the closest internal scrutiny at the highest levels of the military com-
mand structure. There are numerous examples of inadequate review,
partial consideration, and incomplete approval in the administration
of these programs.

When the first Army progi*am to use LSD on American soldiers in
"field stations" was authorized in May 1955, the Army violated its
own procedures in obtaining approval. Under Army Chief of Staff
Memorandum 385, such proposals were to be personally approved by
the Secretary of the Army. Although the plan was submitted to him
on April 26, 1956, the Secretary issued no written authorization for
the project, and there is no evidence that he either reviewed or ap-
proved the plan. Less than a month later, the Army Chief of Staff
issued a memorandum authorizing the tests.^^°

Subsequent testing of LSD under Material Testing Program EA
1729 operated generally under this authorization. When the plans for
this testing were originally discussed in early 1958 by officials of the
Army Intelligence Center at Fort Holabird and representatives of
the Chemical Warfare Center- at Edgewood Arsenal, an informal pro-
posal was formulated. This proposal was submitted to the Medical
Research Directorate at Edgewood by the President of the Army In-
telligence Board on June 3, 1958. There is no evidence that the plan
was approved at any level higher than the President of the Intelli-
gence Board or the Commanding General of Edgewood. The approval
at Edgewoo'd appears to have been issued by the Commander's Adju-
tant. The Medical Research Laboratories did not submit the plan to
the Surgeon General for approval (a standard procedure) because

"' Sample Volunteer Security Statement.

^ Inspector General of the Army Report, "Use of Volunteers in Chemical
Agent Reseai-ch," 3/10/76, p. 109.

419

the new program was ostensibly covered by the authorizations granted
in May 1956.i2i

The two projects involving the operational use of LSD (THIKD
CHANCE and DERBY HAT) were apparently approved by the
Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (General Willems) on
December 7, 1960.^2^ This verbal approval came in the course of a
briefing on previous drug programs and on the planned field experi-
mentation. There is no record of written approval being issued by the
ACSI to authorize these specific projects until January 1961, and
there is no record of any specific knowledge or approval by the Secre-
tary of the Army.

On February 4, 1963, Major General C. F. Leonard, Army ACSI,
forwarded a copy of the THIRD CHANCE Trip Report to Army
Chief of Staff, General Earl Wheeler, ^^s Wheeler had apparently
requested a copy on February 2. The report was routed through a Gen-
eral Hamlett. While this report included background on the origins
of the LSD tests, it appears that General Wheeler may only have read
the conclusion and recommendations.^^* The office memorandum
accompanying the Trip Report bears Wheeler's initials.^^^

5. Termination of Testing

On April 10, 1963, a briefing was held in the ACSI's office on the
results of Projects THIRD CHANCE and DERBY HAT. Both
SPT's concluded that more field testing was required before LSD
could be utilized as an integral aid to counterintelligence interroga-
tions. During the presentation of the DERBY HAT results, General
Leonard (Deputy ACSI) directed that no further field testing be
undertaken.^^*^ After this meeting the ACSI sent a letter to the Com-
manding General of the Army Combat Developments Conunand
(CDC) requesting that he review THIRD CHANCE and DERBY
HAT and "make a net evaluation concerning the adoption of E A 1729
for future use as an effective and profitable aid in counterintelligence
interrogations." ^" On the same day the ACSI requested that the CDC
Commander revise regulation FM 30-17 to read in part :

... in no instance will drugs be used as an aid to interro-
gations in counterintelligence or security operations without
prior permission of the Department of the Army. Requests
to use drugs as an investigative aid will be forwarded through
intelligence channels to the OACSI, DA, for approval. . . .

Medical research has established that information obtained
through the use of these drugs is unreliable and invalid. . . .

It is considered that DA [Army] approval must be a pre-
I'equisite for use of such drugs because of the moral, legal,
medical and political problems inherent in their use for intel-
ligence purposes.^^^

^' IMd., pp. 135, 137, 138.

'- Mehovsky Fact Sheet, 12/9/60.

^" Memorandum from Leonard to Wheeler, 2/4/63.

'"* SGS memorandum to Wheeler through Hamlett, 2/5/63.

'^ Maj. F. Barnett, memorandum for the record, 8/12/63.
"^ Yamaki memorandum for the record, 7/16/63.

^=* ma.

420

The subsequent adoption of this regulation marked the effective ter-
mination of field testing of LSD by the Army.

The official termination date of these testing programs is rather
unclear, but a later ACSI memo indicates that it may have occurred
in September of 1963. On the 19th of that month a meeting was held
between Dr. Van Sims (Edgewood Arsenal), Major Clovis (Chemi-
cal Research Laboratory), and ACSI representatives (General
Deholm and Colonel Schmidt) . "As a result of this conference a deter-
mination was made to suspend the program and any further activity
pending a more profitable and suitable use." ^^*

D. Cooperation and Competition Among the Intelligence Com-
munity Agencies and Betaveen These Agencies and Other
Individuals and Institutions

/. Relationships Among Agencies Within the Intelligence Community
Relationships among intelligence community agencies in this area
varied considerably over time, ranging from full cooperation to intense
and wasteful competition. The early period was marked by a high
degree of cooperation among the agencies of the intelligence commu-
nity. Although the military dominated research involving chemical
and biological agents, the information developed was shared with the
FBI and the CIA. But the spirit of cooperation did not continue. The
failure by the military to share information apparently breached the
sj)irit, if not the letter, of commands from above.

As noted above, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
was briefed on the proposed operational testing of LSD under Project
THIRD CHANCE, and expressed concern that the project had not
been coordinated with FBI and CIA. Despite this request, no coordi-
nation was achieved between the Army and either of these agencies.
Had such cooperation been forthcoming, this project may have been
evaluated in a different light.

The competition betAveen the agencies in this area reached bizarre
levels. A military officer told a CIA representative in confidence about
the military's field testing of LSD in Europe under Project THIRD
CHANCE, and the CIA j^romptly attempted to learn surreptitiously
the nature and extent of the program. At roughly the same time Mr.
Helms argued to the DDCI that the unwitting testing program should
be continued, as it contributed to the CIA's capability in the area and
thus allowed the CIA "to restrain others in the intelligence community
(such as the Department of Defense) from pursuing operations.*' "°
The MKNAOMI program Avas also marked by a failure to share
information. The Army Special Forces (the principal customer of the
Special Operations Division at Fort Diet rick) and the CIA rather
than attempting to coordinate their efforts promulgated different re-
(juirements Avhich varied only slightly. This apparently resulted in
some duplication of effort. In order to insure the security of CIA
operations, the Agency Avould request nuiterials from SOD for opera-
tional use Avithout fully or accurately describing the operational
requirements. This resulted in limitations on SOD's ability to assist
the CIA.

"* Undated ASCI memor'andum, p. 2.

■•■" Memorandum from the DDP to the DCI, 11/9/64, p. 2.

421

2. Relationships Between the Intelligence Community Agencies and

Foreign Liaison Servi-ces

The subjects of the CIA's operational testing of chemical and bio-
logical agents abroad were generally being held for interrogation by
foreign intelligence or security organizations. Although information
about tlie use of drugs was generally withheld from these organiza-
tions, cooperation with them necessarily jeopardized the security of
CIA interest in these materials. Cooperation also placed the American
Government in a position of complicity in actions which violated the
rights of the subjects, and which may have violated the laws of the
country in which the experiments took place.

Cooperation between the intelligence agencies and organizations in
foreign countries was not limited to relationships with the intelligence
or internal security organizations. Some MKULTRA research was
conducted abroad. While this is, in itself, not a questionable practice,
it is important that such research abroad not be undertaken to evade
American laws. That this was a possibility is suggested by an ARTI-
CHOKE memorandum in wdiicli it is noted that working with the
scientists of a foreign country "might be very advantageous" since
that government "permitted certain activities which were not per-
mitted by the United States government (i.e., experiments on anthrax,
etc.)." 13^

3. Tlie Relationships Between the Intelligence Community Agencies

and Other Agencies of the U.S. Government

Certain U.S. government agencies actively assisted the efforts of
intelligence agencies in this area. One form of assistance was to pro-
vide "cover" for research contracts let by intelligence agencies, in
order to disguise intelligence community interest in chemical and
biological agents.

Other forms of assistance raise more serious questions. Although
the CIA's project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD
was conducted by Bureau of Narcotics personnel, there was no open
connection between the Bureau personnel and the Agency. The Bureau
was serving as a "cut-out" in order to make it difficult to trace Agency
participation. The cut-out arrangement, however, reduced the CIA's
ability to control the program. The Agency could not control the
process by which subjects were selected and cultivated, and could not
regulate follow-up after the testing. Moreover, as the CIA's Inspector
General noted : "the handling of test subjects in the last analysis rests
with the [Bureau of Narcotics] agent working alone. Suppression of
knowledge of critical results from the top CIA management is an
inherent risk in these operations." "^ The arrangement also made it
impossible for the Agency to be certain that the decision to end the
surreptitious administration of LSD would be honored by the Bureau
personnel.

The arrangement with the Bureau of Narcotics was described as
"informal." ^^^ The informality of the arrangement compounded the
problem is aggravated by the fact that the 40 Committee has had vir-

'^ ARTICHOKE Memorandum, 6/13/52.
'=° IG Report on MKULTRA, 1963, p. 14.

^^ Tbi(f. This was taken by one Agency official to mean that there would be no
written contract and no formal mechanism for payment. (Elder, 12/18/75, p. 31.)

422

apparent unwillingness on the part of the Bureau's leadership to ask
for details, and the CIA's hesitation in volunteering information.
These problems raise serious questions of command and control within
the Bureau.

4. ReJafionship.s Between the hitelligence Community Agencies and
Other Institutions and Individuals^ Public and Private

The Inspector General's 1963 Purvey of MKULTRA noted
that "the research and development" phase was conducted through
standing arrangements with "specialists in universities, pharmaceu-
tical houses, hospitals, state and federal institutions, and private re-
search organizations" in a manner which concealed "from the institu-
tion the interests of the CIA." Only a few "key individuals" in each
institution were "made witting of Agency sponsorship." The research
and development phase was succeeded by a phase involving "phy-
sicians, toxicologists, and other specialists in mental, narcotics, and
general hospitals and prisons, who are provided the products and
findings of the basic research projects and proceed with intensive test-
ing on human subjects." ^^^

According to the Inspector General, the MKITLTRA testing pro-
grams were "conducted under accepted scientific procedures . . .
where health permits, test subjects are voluntary participants in the
programs." "^ This was clearly not true in the project involving the
surreptitious administration of LSD, which was marked by a com-
])lete lack of screening, medical supervision, opportunity to observe, or
medical or psychological follow-up.

The intelligence agencies allowed individual researchers to design
their project. Experiments sponsored by these researchers (which in-
cluded one where narcotics addicts were sent to Lexington, Kentucky,
who were rewarded with the drug of their addiction in return for
participation in experiments with LSD) call into question the deci-
sion by the agencies not to fix guidelines for the experiments.

The INIKITLTRA research and development program raises other
questions, as well. It is not clear whether individuals in prisons, mental,
narcotics and general hospitals can provide "informed consent" to
participation in experiments such as these. There is doubt as to whether
institutions should be unwitting of the ultimate sponsor of research
being done in their facilities. The nature of the arrangements also
made it impossible for the individuals who were not aware of the
sponsor of the research to exercise any choice about their participa-
tion based on the sponsoring organization.

Although greater precautions are now being taken in research con-
ducted on behalf of the intelligence community agencies, the dilemma
of classification remains. These agencies obviously wished to conceal
their interest in certain forms of research in order to avoid stimulating
interest in the same areas by hostile governments. In some cases today
contractors or researchers wish to conceal their connection with these
agencies. Yet the fact of classification ]:)revents open discussion and
debate upon which scholarly work depends.

"* Ibid. p. 9.
"' Ihid. p. 10.

XVIII. SUMMARY: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Introduction

The purpose of the Senate Select Committee's inquiry into the in-
telligence activities of the United States has been to determine what
secret governmental activities are necessary and how they best can be
conducted under the rule of law. There is unquestioned need to build a
new consensus between the executive and legislative branches concern-
ing the proper scope and purpose of foreign and military intelligence
activities. Allegations of abuse, revelations in the press, and the i-esults
of the Committee's 15 month inquiry have underlined the necessity to
restore confidence in the integrity of our nation's intelligence agencies.

The findings and recommendations which follow are presented in
that spirit. They are, in essence, an agenda for remedial action by both
the legislative and executive branches of the United States Govern-
ment. There is an urgency to completing this schedule of action. This
task is no less important to safeguarding America's future than are
intelligence activities themselves.

The Committee's investigation and the body of its report seek, with-
in the limits of prudence, to perform the crucial task of informing the
American people concerning the nature and scope of their Govern-
ment's foreign intelligence activities. The fundamental issue faced by
the Committee in its investigation was how the requirements of Ameri-
can democracy can be properly balanced in intelligence matters against
the need for secrecy. Secrecy is essential for the success of many im-
portant intelligence activities. At the same time, secrecy contributed
to many of the abuses, excesses and inefficiencies uncovered by the Com-
mittee. Secrecy also makes it difficult to establish a public consensus
for the future conduct of certain intelligence operations.

Because of secrecy, the Committee initially had difficulty gain-
ing access to executive branch information required to carry out the
investigation. It was not until the Committee became responsible for
investigating allegations of assassination plots that many of the ob-
stacles were cleared away. The resulting access by the Committee was
in some cases unprecedented. But the Committee's access to documents
and records was hampered nonetheless in a number of other instances
either because the materials did not exist or because the executive
branch was unwilling to make them available.

Secrecy was also a major issue in preparing this report. In order to
safeguard what are now agreed to be necessary intelligence activities,
the Committee decided not to reveal publicly the full and complete pic-
ture of the intelligence operations of the United States Govermnent.
The recommendations as a whole have not been materially affected by
the requirements of secrecy, but some important findings of the Com-
mittee must remain classified in accordance with the Committee's
policy of protecting valid secrets. In this connection it should be noted

(423)

424

that some information which in the Committee's opinion the Ameri-
can public should know remains classified and has been excluded from
the report at the request of the intelligence community agencies. Only
the Senate will receive the full version of the Committee's Final Re-
port in accordance with the standing rules of the Senate.

In trying to reconcile the requirements of secrecy and open demo-
cratic processes, the Committee found itself with a difficult dilemma.
As an investigating committee, it cannot take affirmative legislative
action respecting some of the matters that came to its attention. On the
other hand, because of necessary secrecy, the Committee cannot public-
ly present the full case as to w4iy its recommendations are essential.

This experience underscores the need for an effective legislative
oversight committee which has sufficient power to resolve such funda-
mental conflicts between secrecy and democracy. As stated previously,
it is the Committee's view^ that effective congressional oversight re-
quires the power to authorize the budgets of the national intelligence
agencies. Without such authority, an ovei'sight committee may find
itself in possession of important secret information but unable to act
effectively to protect the principles, integrity, and reputation of the
United States.

The findings and recommendations which follow are organized
principally by agency. There are, however, common themes in the rec-
ommendations which cut across agency lines. Some of these themes are :
guarding against abuse of America's institutions and reputation;
ensuring clear accountability for clandestine activities; establishing
effective management of intelligence activities ; and creating a frame-
work of statutory law and congressional oversight for the agencies
and activities of the United States intelligence community.

The Committee's recommendations fall into three categories: (1)
recommendations that the Committee believes should be embodied in
law; (2) recommendations to the executive branch concerning prin-
ciples, practices, and policies which the Committee believes should be
pui-sued within the executive's sphere of responsibilities; and (3)
recommendations which should be taken into account by the executive
branch in its relations with the intelligence oversight committee (s)
of Congress.

B. Gkxkral Fixdixgs

The Committee finds that Ignited States foreign and military intelli-
gence agencies have made important contributions to the nation's secu-
rity, and generallv have performed their missions with dedication and
distinction. The Committee further finds that the individual men and
women serving America in difficult and dangerous intelligence assign-
ments deserve the respect and gratitude of the nation.

The Committee finds that tliere is a continuinsf need, for an effec-
tive system of foreign and military intelligence. TTnited States inter-
ests and responsibilities in the world will be challenged, for the fore-
seeable future, by strong and potentiallv hostile powers. This requires
the maintenance of an effective American intelligence system. The
Committee has found that the Soviet KGR and other hostile intelli-
<>-ence services maintain extensi\-e foroiofn intelligence operations, for
both intelligence collection ajid covert o]ierational jiurposes. These

425

activities pose a threat to the intelligence activities and interests of
tlie Unitea States and its allies.

The Committee hnds that Congress has failed to provide the neces-
sary statutory guidelines to ensure that intelligence agencies carry
out their missions in accord with constitutional processes. Mechanisms
for, and the practice of, congressional oversignt have not been ade-
quate. Further, Congress has not devised appropriate means to elfec-
tively use the valuable information developed by the intelligence
agencies. Intelligence information and analysis that exist within
the executive branch clearly would contribute to sound judgments and
more eti'ective legislation m the areas of foreign policy and national
security.

The Coimnittee finds that covert action operations have not been
an exceptional instrument used only in rare instances when the vital
interests of the United States have been at stake. On the contrary,
presidents and administrations have made excessive, and at times
self-defeating, use of covert action. In addition, covert action has
become a routine program with a bureaucratic momentum of its own.
The long-term impact, at home and abroad, of repeated disclosure of
U.S. covert action never appears to have been assessed. The cumula-
tive eti'ect of covert actions lias been increasingly costly to America's
interests and reputation. The Committee believes that covert action
must be employed only in the most extraordinary circumstances.

Although there is a question concerning the extent to which the
Constitution requires publication of intelligence expenditures infor-
mation, the Committee finds that the Constitution at least requires
public disclosure and public authorization of an amiual aggregate
figure for United States national intelligence activities. Congress'
failure as a whole to monitor the intelligence agencies' expenditures
has been a major element in the ineti'ective legislative oversight of
tlie intelligence community. The permanent intelligence oversight
committee (s) of Congress should give further consideration to the
question of the extent to which further public disclosure of intelli-
gence budget information is prudent and constitutionally necessary.

At the same time, the Committee finds that the operation of an ex-
tensive and necessarily secret intelligence system places severe strains
on the nation's constitutional government. The Committee is con-
vinced, however, that the competing demands of secrecy and the re-
quirements of the democratic process — our Constitution and our
law^s — can be reconciled. The need to protect secrets must be balanced
with the assurance that secrecy is not used as a means to hide the abuse
of power or the failures and mistakes of policy. Means must and can be
provided for lawful disclosure of unneeded or unlawful secrets.

TheuX^ommittee finds that intelligeiige_actiYities_shouM-notJbe re-
gardfidLasjends in themseLves^Rather, the nation's intelligence func-
tions should be organized and directed to assure that they serve the
needs of those in the executive and legislative branches who have re-
sponsibility for formulating or carrying out foreign and national
security policy.

The Committee finds that Congress has failed to provide the neces-
sary statutory guidelines to ensure that intelligence agencies carry
out their necessary missions in accord with constitutional processes.

69-983 O - 76 - 28

426

In order to provide firm direction for the intelligence agencies, the
Committee finds that new statutory charters for these agencies must be
written that take account of the experience of the past three and a
half decades. Further, the Committee finds that the relationship among
the various intelligence agencies and between them and the Director
of Central Intelligence should be restructured in order to achieve better
accountability, coordination, and more efficient use of resources.

These tasks are urgent. They should be undertaken by the Congress
in consultation with the executive branch in the coming year. The
recent proposals and executive actions by the Pi-esident are most wel-
come.^ However, further action by Congress is necessary.

C. The 1947 National Security Act and Related Legislation

The National Security Act of 1947 ^ is no longer an adequate frame-
work for the conduct of America's intelligence activities. The 1947
Act, preoccupied as it was with the question of military unification,
failed to provide an adequate statement of the broad policy and pur-
poses to be served by America's intelligence effort. The Committee
found that the 1947 Act constitutes a vague and open-ended state-
ment of authority for the President through the National Security
Council. Neither espionage, covert action, nor paramilitary warfare
is explicitly authorized by the 1947 Act. Nonetheless, these have
come to be major activities conducted by the Central Intelligence
Agency, operating at the direction of the President through the
National Security Council. In contrast, the 1947 Act's specific charge
to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to coordinate national
intelligence has not been effectively realized.

In addition to this broad concern, the Committee found that the
1947 Act does not provide an adequate charter for the Central In-
telligence Agency. Moreover, no statutory charter exists for other
key intelligence agencies : the National Security Agency and the
Defense Intelligence Agencv. Nor does the Act create an overall
structure for intelligence which ensures effective accountability, man-
agement control, and legislative and executive oversight.

Finally, the 1947 Act fails to establish clear and specific limits on
the operation of America's intelligence organizations which will help
ensure the protection of the rights and liberties of Americans under
the Constitution and the preservation of Amei'ica's honor and reputa-
tion abroad. The need for such limits is a need for legislation. The need
is not satisfied by the President's recent proposals and Executive Order.

Recommendations ^

1. The National Security Act should be recast by omnibus legislation
which would set forth the basic purposes of national intelligence
activities, and define the relationship between the Congress and
the intelligence agencies of the executive branch. This revision should
be given the highest priority by the intelligence oversight commit-
tee's) of Congress, acting in consultation Avith the executive branch.

' Executive Order 11905. 2/18/76.
= 'yO T^.S.C. 401 rt scq.

^ See recommendations on this subject in the Committee's Report on Intelli-
gence Activities and Rights of Americans.

427

2. The new legislation should define the charter of the organizations
and entities in the United States intelligence community. It should
establish charters for the National Security Council, the Director of
Central Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the national
intelligence components of the Department of Defense, including the
National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, and
all other elements of the intelligence community, including joint orga-
nizations of two or more agencies.

3. This legislation should set forth the general structure and proce-
dures of the intelligence community, and the roles and responsibilities
of the agencies which comprise it.

4. The legislation should contain specific and clearly defined prohibi-
tions or limitations on various activities carried out by the respective
components of the intelligence community.

D. The National, SECURirr Council and the Office of the

President

The National Security Council (NSC) is an instrument of the Presi-
dent and not a corporate entity with authority of its own. The Com-
mittee found that in general the President has had, through the Na-
tional Security Council, effective means for exerting broad policy
control over at least two major clandestine activities — covert action ^
and sensitive technical collection. The covert American involvement in
Angola and the operations of the Glomar Explorer are examples of
that control in quite ditierent circumstances, w^hatever conclusions one
draws about the merits of the activities. The Central Intelligence
Agency, in broad terms, is not "out of control.*'

The Committee found, however, that there were significant limits
to this control :

1. Clandestine Activities

— The degree of control and accountability exercised regarding co-
vert action and sensitive collection has been a function of each partic-
ular President's willingness to use these techniques.

— The principal NSC vehicle for dealing with clandestine activities,
the 40 Connnittee and its predecessors, was the mechanism for review-
ing and making recommendations regarding the approval of major
covert action projects. However, this body also served generally to in-
sulate the President from official involvement and accountability in
the approval process until 1974.^

— As high-level government officials, 40 Committee membei-s have
had neither the time nor inclination to adequately review and pass
judgment on all of the literally hundreds of covert, action projects. In-
deed, only a small fraction of such projects (those which the CIA re-
gards as major or sensitive) are so approved and/or reviewed. This

* See definition, p. 141.

' Appendix D. Senate Select Committee Hearings, Vol. 7, p. 230.

In 1974 the Hughes-Ryan Amendment (22 USC, 2422, section 662) was enacted.
It provides that no funds appropriated under the Foreign Assistance Act or any
other act may be expended by or on behalf of CIA foreign operations other
than for obtaining necessary intelligence "unless and until the President finds
that each .such operation is important to the national security of the United
States and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation
to the appropriate committees of the Congress . . ."

428

pr(>blem is aggravated by the fact that the 40 Committee has had vir-
tually no staff, with only a single officer from the Clandestine Services
acting as executive secretary.

— The process of review and approval has been, at times, only gen-
eral in nature. It sometimes has become 'pro forma^ conducted over the
telephone by subordinates.

— The President, without consulting any NSC mechanism, can ex-
ercise personal direction of clandestine activities as he did in the case of
Chile in 1970.

— There is no systematic White House-level review of either sensi-
tive foreign espionage or counterintelligence activities. Yet these op-
erations may also have a potential for embarrassing the United States
and sometimes may be difficult to distinguish from covert action opera-
tions. For example, a proposal to recruit a high foreign govern-
ment official as an intelligence "asset" would not necessarily be
reviewed outside the Central Intelligence Agency at the NSC level,
despite the implications that recruitment might pose in conducting
American foreign relations. Similarly, foreign counterintelligence op-
erations might be conducted without any prior review at the highest
government levels. The Committee found instances in the case of Chile
when counterintelligence operations were related to, and even hard to
distinguish from, the program of covert action.

— The President's proposals to upgrade the 40 Committee into the
Operations Advisory Group and to give explicit recognition to its role
in advising the President on covert activities are desirable. That up-
grading, however, will strain further the Group's ability to conduct a
systematic review of sensitive clandestine operations. Under the new
structure, the Group members are cabinet officers who have even less
time than their principal deputies, who previously conducted the 40
Committee's work. The Group's procedures must be carefully struc-
tured, so that the perspective of Cabinet officers can in fact be brouglit
to bear.

'2. Counterintelligence

— There is no NSC-level mechanism for coordinating, reviewing or
approving counterintelligence activities in the United States, even
those directed at ITnited States citizens, despite the demonstrated po-
tential for abuse. Both the FBI and the CIA are engaged in counter-
intelligence, with tlie CIA oper-ating primarily abroad. The Com-
mittee found frictions between the two agencies over the last thirty-
five years. The so-called Huston Plan, discredited because of its
excessive scope and patent illegalities, was justified in part as a re-
sponse to the need for improved CIA-FBI coordination. At the same
time, the Huston Plan episode illustrates the questions of propriety
and legality which may arise in counterintelligence operations con-
ducted in the United States or involving American citizens.

S. Coordination and Resource Allocation

— The Director of Central Intelligence has been assigned the func-
tion of coordinating the activities of the intelligence community, en-
suring its responsiveness to the requirements for national intelligence,
and for assembling a consolidated national intelligence budget. Until
the recent establishment of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence
(CFI), there was no effective NSC-level mechanism for any of these
purposes. The Committee believes that the CFI is a step in the right
direction and is to be commended. However, the language of the Presi-

429

dential Order is such that much will depend on how the order is in fact
implemented. "Manag^e" and "coordinate" are terms that are general
in nature and have proven to be so in matters of intelligence. Because
the CFI was formed only recently, questions remain about its operation
and its relation to the DCI's current responsibilities and to the existing
authority of the Secretary of Defense.

Moreover, the Committee notes that a major collector and consumer
of intelligence infonnation, the Depaitment of State, is not repre-
sented on the CFI. It should be. Other agencies with an important
stake in intelligence, such as the Department of the Treasury, the En-
ergy Resources Development Administration, and the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency should play an appropriate role in the CFI
on an ad hoc basis.

Jj. Executive OverHlglit

— The Committee finds that Presidents have not established specific
instruments of overeight to prevent abuses by the intelligence com-
munity. In essence, Presidents have not exercised effective oversight.

—The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)
has served Presidents as a useful "Kitchen Cabinet" for intelligence
and related matters. It has carried out studies that have resulted in
useful changes in procedure and emphasis within the intelligence
community, as well as in the adoption of new technologies and tech-
niques. At the same time, the Committee has found that any expecta-
tions that PFIAB would serve as an independent watchdog have been
mistaken. The PFIAB has been given neither statutory nor Presi-
dential authority to serve such a function. For instance, when the
Board became aware of the Huston Plan, it asked the Attorney Gen-
eral and the Director of the FBI for a copy of the plan. That request
was refused, and the Board did not pursue the matter with the Wliite
House.

— The Committee finds the President's recent establishment of the
Intelligence Ovei*sight Board to be long overdue. In the Committee's
opinion, however, this does not eliminate the need for vigoi'ous con-
gressional oversight. Moreover, the Order is broadly phrased and at
some points ambiguous. The effectiveness of the Overeight Board, as
well as the rest of the President's reforms, will depend in large meas-
ure on the details of their implementation.

The Committee makes the follow^ing recommendations concerning
the National Security Council and the Office of the President. These
recommendations are designed to support and extend the measures
taken recently by the President.

Recommeiidations

5. By statute, the National Security Council should be explicitly em-
powered to direct and provide policy guidance for the intelligence
activities of the United States, including intelligence collection,
counterintelligence, and the conduct of covert action.

6. By statute, the Attorney General should be made an advisor to
the National Security Council in order to facilitate discharging his
responsibility to ensure that actions taken to protect American na-
tional security in the field of intelligence are also consistent with the
Constitution and the laws of the United States.

7. By statute, the existing power of the Director of Central In-
telligence to coordinate the activities of the intelligrence community

430

should be reaffirmed. At the same time, the NSC should establish an
appropriate committee — such as the new Committee on Foreign In-
telligence— with responsibility for allocating intelligence resources
to ensure efficient and effective operation of the national intelli-
gence community. This committee should be chaired by the DCI and
should include representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs.*'

8. By statute, an NSC committee (like tlie Operations Advisory
Group) should be established to advise the President on covert action.
It would also be emj^owered, at the President's discretion, to approve
all types of sensitive intelligence collection activities. If an OAG mem-
ber dissented from an approval, the particular collection activity would
be refei'red to the President for decision. The Group should consist of
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central In-
telligence, the Attorney General, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the Director of 0MB, as an observer. The President would
designate a chairman from among the Group's members.

9. The chairman of the Group Avould be confirmed by the Senate for
that position if he were an official not already subject to confirmation.
In the execution of covert action and sensitive intelligence collection
activities specifically approved by the President, the chairman would
enter the chain of command below the President.

10. The Group should be provided with adequate staff to assist in
conducting thorough reviews of covert action and sensitive collection
projects. That staff should not be drawn exclusively from the Clandes-
tine Service of the CIA.

11. Each covert action project should be reviewed and passed on by
the Group. In addition, the Group should review all on-going projects
at least once a year.

12. By statute, the Secretary of State should be designated as the
principal administration spokesman to the Congress on the policy and
purpose underlying covert action projects.

13. By statute, the Director of Central Intelligence should be re-
quired to fully inform the intelligence oversight committee (s) of Con-
gress of each covert action ' prior to its initiation. No funds should be
expended on any covert action unless and until the President certifies
and provides to the congressional intelligence oversight committee (s)
the reasons that a covert acton is required by extraordinary cir-
cumstances to deal with grsive tlireats to the national security of the
United States. The congressional intelligence oversight committee (s)
should be kept fully and currently informed on all covert action
projects, and the DCI should submit a semi-annual report on all such
projects to the committee (s) .

14. The Committee recoimiiends tliat when the Senate establishes an
intelligence oversight committee with authority to authorize the na-

' In effect, this recommendation would establish the President's proposed
Committee on Foreign Intelligence in law but would include a representative of
the Secretary of State. It would also empower the DCI to establish intelligence
requirements. See Recommendation #16, p. 434.

' A covert action would consist of either a major project, or an aggregation of
smaller projects meeting the standards of this paragraph.

431

tional intelligence biidg:et, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment (22 USC,
2422) should be amended so that the foregoing notifications and
presidential certifications to the Senate are provided only to that
committee.

15. By statute, a new NSC counterintelligence committee should be
established, consisting of the Attorney General as chairman, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the
Director of the FBI, and the Assistant to the President for National
Security Aifaii*s. Its purpose would be to coordinate and review for-
eign counterintelligence activities conducted within the Ignited States
and the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence within the United
States, by both the FBI and the CIA. The goal would be to ensure
strict conformity with statutory and constitutional requirements and
to enhance coordination between the CIA and FBI.^ This committee
should review the standards and guidelines for all recruitments of
agents within the United States for counterintelligence or positive
foreign intelligence purposes, as well as for the recruitment of
U.S. citizens abroad. This committee would consider differences be-
tween the agencies concerning the recruitment of agents, the handling
of foreign assets who come to the United States, and the establish-
ment of the bona fides of defectors. It should also treat any other for-
eign intelligence or counterintelligence activity of the FBI and CIA
which either agency brings to that forum for presidential level
consideration.

EXECUTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL/ INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Intelligence

Oversight

Board

National Security Council
•Pres Sec State

•Vice Pres. -Sec Def
•AG*

Operations Advisory Group

■Sec State

■Sec Def

•Asst to President for

Nat'l Scoirity Affairs
•DCT
•Chairman/JCS

ctor/OMB (obser

Conmittee on Foreign Intelligence
■DCI (chair)
•Deputy Sec Def (I)
■Deputy Asst to Pres for
Nat ' 1 Security Affairs
■Designated Representative/
Sec State'*

Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board

NSC Counterintelligence

Caimittee*

•Attorney General (chairi

■CIA Director

•Director/FBI

•Asst to President for

Nat'l Security Affaira
•Dep Sec Defense

*Caiinittee Recamiendations

' See related legislative proposals in the Committee's Report on Intelligence
Activities and the rights of Americans.

432

E. The Director of Central Intelligence

The 1947 National Security Act gave the DCI responsibility for
"coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government de-
partments and agencies in the interest of national security."" In addi-
tion, the DCI as the President's principal foreign intelligence adviser
was given responsibility for coordinating and producing national intel-
ligence for senior policymakers. However, the Committee found that
these DCI responsibilities have often confiicted with the particular
interests and prerogatives of the other intelligence community de-
partments and agencies. They have not given up control over their own
intelligence operations, and in particular the Department of Defense
and the militaiy services, which allocate 80 percent of the direct costs
for national intelligence, have insisted that they must exercise direct
control over peacetime intelligence activities to prepare for war. Thus,
while the DCI was given responsibility under the 1947 act for intelli-
gence community activities, he was not authorized to centrally coordi-
nate or manage the overall operations of the community.

1. Coordinator of the InteJligen-ce Community

The Committee has found that the DCI in his coordinator role has
been unable to ensure that waste and unnecessary duplication are
avoided. Because the DCI only provides guidance for intelligence
collection and production, and does not establish requirements, he is not
in a position to command the intelligence community to respond to the
intelligence needs of national policymakers. Wliere the DCI has been
able to define priorities, he has lacked authority to allocate intelligence
resources — either among different systems of intelligence collection or
among intelligence collection, analysis and finished intelligence
production.

The Committee supports President Ford's objectives of enhancing
the stature of the DCI and establishing a mechanism such as the Com-
mittee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) with the DCI as chairman to
control the allocation of national intelligence programs resources. The
Committee questions, however, whether the CFI can be effective with-
out some appropriate modification of the peacetime authority of the
Secretary of Defense. In order to strike an appropriate balance be-
tween the requirements of national and tactical intelligence, the intelli-
gence collected by national means should be readily available to the
military commanders and vice versa, and the Secretary of Defense
and the military services should retain direct control over the opera-
tions of tactical military intelligence. Nonetheless, the DCI needs
the right to review tactical military intelligence operations in
order to make budget choices between tactical and national intelligence
activities. Moreover, to carry out his coordinating role, the DCI needs
to retain control over major technical intelligence collection systems
which service both tactical and national intelligence requirements.

2. Producer of National Intelligence

In the area of providing finished intelligence, the Committee dis-
covered that the DCI, in his role as intelligence adviser, has faced
obstacles in ensuring that his national intelligence judgments are objec-
tive and independent of department and agency biases. The Committee

433

has been particularly concerned with pressures from both the Wliite
House and the Defense Department on the DCI to alter his intelligence
judgments. One example of such pressure investigated by the Com-
mittee occurred in the fall of 1969 when the DCI modified his judg-
ment on the capability of the Soviet SS-9 system when it conflicted
with the public position of Secretary of Defense Laird. After a meeting
Avith start' of the Ofiice of the Secretary of Defense, Director Helms
deleted a paragraph from the draft of the National Intelligence Es-
timate on Soviet strategic forces which stated that within the next five
years it was "highly unlikely" that the Soviets would attempt to
achieve "a first strike capability, i.e., a capability to launch a surprise
attack against the United States with assurance that the U.S.S.R.
would not itself receive damage it Avould regard as unacceptable.''

The Committee believes that over the past five years the DCI's
ability to produce objective national intelligence and resist outside
pressure has been reduced with the dissolution of the independent
Board of National P^stimates and the subsequent delegation of its
staff to the departments with responsibility for drafting the DCI's
national intelligence judgments.

In the end, the DCI must depend on his position as the President's
principal intelligence ad\aser or on his personal relationship with the
President to carry out his various responsibilities and to withstand
pressures to compromise his intelligence judgments. Consequently, the
Committee has been concerned that the DCI's proximity and access
to the President has diminished over the yeai-s. Since 1969, at least
until the confirmation of Mr. Rush, the DCI has rarely seen the
President except at NSC meetings. The influence a DCI could have
from a close relationship with the President has generally been
lacking.

Wliile President Ford's Executive Order is a step in the right
direction, the Committee believes that the DCI's responsibility over
intelligence community activities should be enhanced and spelled out
clearly and in detail in statute. The Executive should not continue
defining these responsibilities alone as it has done since 1947 through
Executive Orders and National Security Council Intelligence Direc-
tives (NSCIDs).

The Committee believes that the Congress, in carrying out its re-
sponsibilities in the area of national security policy, should have access
to the full range of intelligence produced by the United States intelli-
gence commimity. The Committee further believes that it should be
possible to work out a means of ensuring that the DCI's national
intelligence judgments are available to the appropriate Congressional
committees on a regular basis without compromising the DCI's role
as personal adviser to the President.

Finally, the Committee has found concern that the function of the
DCI in iiis roles as intelligence community leader and principal in-
telligence adviser to the President is inconsistent with his responsibil-
ity to manage one of the intelligence community agencies — the CIA.
Potential problems exist in a number of areas. Because the DCI as
head of the CIA is responsible for human clandestine collection over-
seas, interception of signals communication overseas, the development

434

and interception of technical collection systems, there is concern that
the DCI as community leader is in "a conflict of interest" situation
when ruling on the activities of the overall intelligence community.
The Committee is also concerned that the DCI's new span of con-
trol— both the entire intelligence community and the entire CIA —
may be too great for him to exercise effective detailed supervision
of clandestine activities.

RecoTmnendations

16. By statute, the DCI should be established as the President's
principal foreign intelligence adviser, with exclusive responsibility
for producing national intelligence for the President and the Con-
gress. For this purpose, the DCI should be empowered to establish a
staff directly responsible to him to help prepare his national intelli-
gence judgments and to coordinate the views of the other members of
the intelligence community. The Committee recommends that the Di-
rector establish a board to include senior outside advisers to review
intelligence products as necessary, thus helping to insulate the DCI
from pressures to alter or modify his national intelligence judgments.
To advise and assist the DCI in producing national intelligence, the
DCI would also be empowered to draw on other elements of the
intelligence community.

17. By statute, the DCI should be given responsibility and authority
for establishing national intelligence requirements, preparing the na-
tional intelligence budget, and providing guidance for United
States national intelligence progi'am operations. In this capacity he
should l>e designated as chaii'man of the appropriate NSC committee,
such as the CFI, and should liave the following powers and respon-
sibilities :

a. The DCI should establish national intelligence requirements for
the entire intelligence community. He should be empowered to draw
on intelligence community representatives and others whom he may
designate to assist him in establish'ing national intelligence require-
ments and determining the success of the various agencies in fulfilling
them. The DCI should provide general guidance to the various intel-
ligence agency directors for the management of intelligence operations.

b. The DCI should have responsibility for preparing the national
intelligence program budget foi- presentation to the President and the
Congress." The definition of what is to be included within that national

intelligence program should be established by Congress in consultation
with the Executive. In this capacity, the Director of Central Intelli-
gence should be involved early in the budget cycle in preparing the
budgets of the respective intelligence community agencies. The Direc-
tor should have specific responsibility for choosing among the pro-
grams of the different collection and production agencies and depart-
ments and to insure against waste and unnecessary duplication. The
DCI should also have responsibility for issuing fiscal guidance for the
allocation of all national intelligence resources. The authority of the

® [The DCI] shall : Ensure the flevelopment and submission of a budget for the
National Foreign Intelligence Program to the CFI. (Executive Order 11905,
Sec. 3(d)iii.)

435

DCI to reprogram funds witliin the intelligence budget should be
defined by statute.^"

c. In order to carry out his national intelligence responsibilities
the DCI should have the authority to review all foreign and military
intelligence acti\dties and intelligence resource allocations, including
tactical military intelligence which is the responsibility of the armed
forces.^^

d. The DCI should be authorized to establish an intelligence com-
munity staff to support him in carrying out his managerial respon-
sibilities. This stall' should be drawn from the best available talent
within and outside the intelligence community.

e. In addition to these provisions concerning DCI control over na-
tional intelligence operations in peacetime, the statute should require
establishment of a procedure to insure that in time of war the relevant
national intelligence operations come under the control of the Sec-
retary of Defense.

18. By statute, the position of Deputy Director of Central Intelli-
gence for the intelligence community should be established as recom-
mended in Executive Order 11905. This Deputy Director should
be subject to Senate confirmation and would assume the DCI's intel-
ligence community functions in the DCI's absence. Current provisions
regarding the status of the DCI and his single deputy should be ex-
tended to cover the DCI and both dei^uties. Civilian control of the na-
tion's intelligence is important ; only one of the three could be a career
military officer, active or retired.

19. The Committee recommends that the intelligence oversight com-
mittee (s) of Congress consider whether the Congress should appro-
priate the funds for the national intelligence budget to the DCI,
rather than to the directore of the various intelligence agencies and
departments.

20. By statute, the Director of Central Intelligence should serve at
the pleasure of the President but for no more than ten years.

21. The Committee also recommends consideration of separating the
DCI from direct responsibility over the CIA.^^

F. The Central Intelligence Agency

1. The Charter for Intelligence Activities: Espionage^ Counterin-
telligence and Covert Action
The Committee finds that the CIA's present charter, embodied
in the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA Act of 1949, and the
1974 Hughes-Ryan amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act, is in-
adequate in a number of respects.

^" "Reprogrammiug" means shifting money previously approved for one purpose
to anotlier use ; for instance, from clandestine human collection to technical col-
lection or covert action.

" In contrast to President Nixon's 1971 letter to Director Helms which asked
the DCI to plan and review ". . . all intelligence activities including tactical in-
telligence and the allocation of all imtelligence resources," President Ford's Execu-
tive Order 111905 states that ". . . neither the DCI nor the CFI shall have
responsibility for tactical intelligence."

" See discussion on pp. 449-450.

436

While the legislative history of the 1947 Act makes clear that the
CIA's mandate would be limited to "foreign intelligence," the Act it-
self does not so specify. Covert action, in the past a major CIA activ-
ity, is not mentioned in the 1947 Act, although the Act contains a vague
and open-ended authorization for the National Security Council to di-
rect the CIA to undertake "such other functions and duties related to
the intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC may from
time to time direct." ^^ No explicit authority even to collect intelligence
is provided the Agency.

The restrictions on domestic activities in the 1947 Act were not
clearly defined, nor was the potential conflict between these limits and
the Director's authority to protect "sources and methods" of intelli-
gence gathering resolved. Neither did the 1947 Act set forth the
Agency's role in conducting counterintelligence and in collecting
foreign intelligence.

The Congress' confusing and ill-defined charge to the Agency in
these areas resulted in conflicts of jurisdiction with other govern-
ment agencies. The lack of legislative specificity also opened the way
to domestic activities such as Operation CHAOS " which clearly went
beyond Congiess' intent in enacting and amending the National
Security Act. In sum, the Committee finds that a clear statutory basis
is needed for the Agency's conduct abroad of covert action, espionage,
counterintelligence and foreign intelligence collection and for such
counterespionage operations within the United States as the Agency
may have to undertake as a result of the activities abroad.^^

Foreign Espionage

Espionage is often equated with the slightly broader category of
"clandestine human collection." Although "clandestine human collec-
tion" may include collection of public information by a covert source,
espionage centers on recruiting and handling agents to acquire "pro-
tected" or "denied'' information.

Espionage on behalf of the Ignited States Government is primarily
the responsibility of the Centi-al Intelligence Agency's Clandestine
Service Avhich operates on a world-wide basis. The Clandestine Serv-
ice— officially, the Directorate of Operations — is responsible for CIA
clandestine human collection, espionage, covert action, paramilitary
operations and counterintelligence. The CIA also has special respon-
sibilities for coordinating the military services' limited espionage ac-
tivities abroad.

By CIA doctrine, espionage should be aimed at securing informa-
tion others wish to conceal and not at collecting information available
through diplomatic channels or from public sources, such as the press,
television and radio.

The Clandestine Service regards espionage, rather than covert ac-
tion and other such activities, as the essence of its mission. Indeed,
the Committee foimd that clandestine human intelligence collection
is often considered a prerequisite as well as a pi'ecursor of successful
covert action, paramilitary activity, and counterintelligence.

" Appendix B. Hearings, Vol. 7. p. 210.
" See the Committee's detailed report on Project CHADS.

'" See tlie Committee's Rei)ort on Domestic Intelliffenoe. Part IV. for recom-
mended limitations on such activit.v.

437

Espionage targets vary, covering political, military and. economic
information wherever we perceive a national interest. Espionage in-
volves a variety of techniques, ranging from technical surveillance,
break-ins and theft, to human reporting by controlled agents, paid and
unpaid of protected information. It is generally illegal m the countries
against which it is aimed, but its widespread practice by nation states
makes the status of espionage under international law ambiguous.

Covert action, which is designed to have an impact, diti'ers from
clandestine collection and classic espionage, which are designed to ob-
tain intelligence without affecting the source or revealing the fact that
the information has been collected. In practice, however, covert action
and espionage overlap, since they rely on the same CIA officers, for-
eign intermediaries, and sources of information.^*^

The Committee believes that the United States cannot forego clan-
destine human collection and expect to maintain the same quality of
intelligence on matters of the highest importance to our national secu-
rity. Technical collection systems do not eliminate the usefulness of
espionage in denied areas (essentially the communist countries).
Agent intelligence can help provide valuable insight concerning the
motivations for activities or policies of potential adversaries, as well
as their future intentions.

Nevertheless, the Committee found that there are certain inherent
limitations to the value of clandestine sources. Espionage information
tends to be fragmentary, and there is always some question as to the
trustworthiness and reliability of the source.

The Committee found that over the last decade, the size of the Clan-
destine Service has been reduced significantly, particularly in the field.
However, there remains the question of whether the complements
abroad and at headquarterei have been reduced sufficiently.

The Committee found that the CIA's clandestine collection effort
has been reoriented towards denied areas and away from internal po-
litical and security developments in the Third World. The Committee
believes that this changed emphasis is desirable and welcomes it.

The Committee found that while internal supervision of espionage
within the CIA appears sufficient, there is inadequate external review
and control over CIA espionage activities. There is no effective ma-
chinery to ensure that the Secretaries of States and Defense and the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who are
knowledgeable about the value and limitations of espionage, systemat-
ically participate directly in decisions concerning such issues as how
large our espionage effort should be. the relative priorities, risk assess-
ments, and possible duplication of effort between overt and clandestine
human collection.

The Committee notes that the duplication between the CIA's Clan-
destine Service and the State Department's overt Foreign Service
reporting appears to have diminished in recent years. However, Wil-
liam Colby when he was DCI voiced concern that the problem had
not been solved. The Committee notes that increased collection efforts
regarding economic issues may aggravate the overlap problem.

'* Senate Select Committee, "Covert Action in Chile," p. 6ff.

438

Foreign Intelligence Collection in the United States

The CIA engages in both overt and clandestine activity within the
United States for the purpose of foreign intelligence collection. The
Domestic Collection Division (DCD) is responsible primarily for
overt collection, while the Foreign Resources Division (FED) man-
ages clandestine collection of foreign intelligence. Both divisions are
currently within the Directorate of Operations. Formerly run and
staffed by the Directorate of Intelligence, the DCD was moved to
Operations in 1973 and now has many clandestine services officers
assigned to it.

The Domestic Collection Division openly collects foreign intelligence
information from American citizens on a wide variety of subjects,
primarily of an economic and technological nature. The Domestic
Collection Division currently maintains contact with tens of thousands
of American citizens who, on a confidential basis, volunteer informa-
tion of intelligence value to the United States. The Committee notes
that the Central Intelligence Agency is overtly in contact with many
members of the American academic community to consult with them
on the subjects of their expertise. On occasion, at the request of the
academic concerned, these contacts are confidential.

The Committee believes there are significant benefits to both the
government and the universities in such contacts and that they should
not be discouraged. The Committee sees no danger to the integrity of
American academic institutions in continuing such overt contacts.

The Domestic Collection Division operates from 38 offices around the
United States and lists itself in local telephone directories, although
it conducts its business as discretely as possible.

The Foreign Resources Division {FRD) performs its functions in a
more traditional operational manner much as it is done overseas; for-
eign nationals of special interests located in the ZJnited States, are en-
listed, to cooperate secretly with the CIA abroad. FRD''s activity,
vliich takes place throughout the Ignited States, is carried out hy some
of CIA\s very best personnel. In the performance of its job., FRD main-
tains contact with a large number of Americans who are witting of its
mission and imlling to be cooperative. There are also a number of
Americans who are not a'toare that they are participating in such CIA
activities.'^''

The Committee believes that the activities of the Foreign Resources
Division and the Domestic Collection Division make an important
and useful contribution to the overall intelligence effort; however,
there are significant problems.

The Committee found that the Domestic Collection Division., sub-
sidiary to its overt role, supports the clandestine coTuponents of the
CIA. It provides such services as re -settling defectors, and, by drawing
on. DCD''s extensive contacts in the TLS., reports leads regarding for-
eign nationals mho could prove useful abroad or U.S. firms whose
offices abroad could help the CIA.

The Committee is concerned that this kind of assistance provided
by the Domestic Collection Division, if not closely watched, could
lead to an exploitation of cooperating Americans beyond that lohich

For explanation of italics, see footnote, p. 179.

439

they^ themselves^ envisicmed or beyond these limited CIA ohjectives.^^
The Committee notes that due to the recent revelations about CIA
activities, some foreign intelligence sources are shying away from co-
operation with the Domestic Collection Division, thus impeding this
division's most important function, namely, the overt collection of
foreign intelligence.

The Committee also questions the recruiting, for foreign espionage
purposes, if immigrants desiring American citizenship, because it
might be construed as coercive.

Foreign C ounterintelligence ^^

Counterintelligence is defined quite broadly by the CIA. It includes
the knowledge needed for the protection and preservation of the mili-
tary, economic, and productive strength of the United States, as well
as the government's security in domestic and foreign affairs, against
or from espionage, sabotage, and subversion designed to weaken or
destroy the I'-nited States.

Counterintelligence (CI) is a special form of intelligence activity,
aimed at discovering hostile foreign intelligence operations and de-
stroying their effectiveness. It involves protecting the United States
Government against infiltration by foreign agents, as well as control-
ling and manipulating adversary intelligence operations. An effort
is made to discern the plans and intentions of enemy intelligence serv-
ices and to deceive them about our own.

The Committee finds that the threat from hostile intelligence services
is real. In the United States alone, well over a thousand Soviet officials
are on permanent assignment. Among these, over 40 percent have been
identified as members of the KGB or GRU, the Soviet civilian and
military intelligence units, respectively. Estimates for the number of
unidentified Soviet intelligence officers raise this figure to over 60 per-
cent and some defector sources have estimated that TO percent to 80
percent of Soviet officials in the United States have some intelligence
connection.

Furthermore, the number of Soviets with access to the United
States his tripled since 1960, and is still increasing. In 1974, for ex-
ample, over 200 Soviet ships with a total crew complement of 13,000
officers and men visited this country. Some 4,000 Soviets entered the
United States as commercial or exchange visitors in 1974. In 1972-
1973, for example, approximately one third of the Soviet exchange
students here for the academic 'year under the East- West student
exchange program were cooperating with the KGB, according to
the Central Intelligence Agency.

Other areas of counterintelligence concern include the sharp in-
crease in the number of Soviet immigrants to the Ignited States (4,000
in 1974 compared to feAver than 500 in 1972) ; the rise in East-West
commercial exchange visitors (from 641 in 1972 to 1,500 in 1974);
and the growing number of officials in this country from other Com-
munist bloc nations ( from 416 in 1960 to 798 in 1975) .

Both the FBI and the CIA are engaged in counterintelligence work.
The CIA operates primarilv abroad. Within the United States the

'" Ibid.

'" See also the Select Committee Report on CHAOS and the counterintelligence
recommendations in the committee's Report on Domestic Intelligence Activities
and the Rights of Americans, Part IV.

440

counterintelligence mission is conducted by the FBI, except when
the CIA, in consultation with the FBI, continues activities begun
abroad.

Defectors are an important source of counterintelligence. Within
the United States, the interrogation of defectors is primarily the re-
sponsibility of the FBI, though the CIA may also participate. Some-
times, however, the bona fides of a defector are disputed between
the CIA and the FBI and there is no established interagency mecha-
nism for settling such disputes — which may last for years. An in-
cident in which a defector was held in so-called "incommunicado
interrogation" for two years was, in part, a result of the lack of such
a mechanism.^"

Liaison among the various U.S. Government counterintelligence
units at home is particularly important, because counterintelligence —
with all its intricacies and deceptions — requires coordination among
agencies and sharing of records. Unlike the totally unified KGB
organization, the American intelligence service is fragmented and
depends upon liaison to make operations more effective.

Coordination between CIA and FBI counterintelligence units is
especially critical. The history of CIA-FBI liaison has been turbu-
lent, though a strong undercurrent of cooperation has usually existed
at the staff level since 1952 when the Bureau began sending a liaison
person to the CIA on a regular basis. The sources of friction between
the CIA and FBI in the early days revolved around such matters
as the frequent unwillingness of the Bureau to collect positive intel-
ligence for the CIA within the United States or to help recruit
foreign officials in this country.

In 1970 an essentially minor incident resulted in an order from
FBI Director Hoover to discontinue FBI liaison with the Central
Intelligence Agency. Altliough informal communications between
CIA and FBI staff personnel continued, it was not until the post-
Hoover era that formal liaison relations were reestablished. Today,
there is still a need for closer coordination of FBI and CIA counter-
intelligence efforts.

The Committee believes that counterintelligence requires the direct
attention of Congress and the executive for three reasons: (1) two
distinct and partly incompatible approaches to counterintelligence
have emerged and demand reconciliation; (2) recent evidence sug-
gests that FBI counterespionage results have been less than satis-
factory; and (3) counterintelligence has infringed on the rights and
liberties of Americans.

Disagreement over the approach to counterintelligence affects all
aspects of this activity — compartmentation, method of operation, se-
curity, research priorities, deception activities, and liaison. The Com-
mittee found that there has been no high-level executive branch review
of the classified issues surfaced in this important disagreement.

The Committee also found that there is no system of clearance
outside the CIA or FBI for sensitive counterespionage operations,

** Recommendation 14 is based, in part, on these findings.

441

despite the difficulty of distinguishing some of these operations from
covert action.

On the FBI contribution to counterintelligence, testimony before
the Committee reveals that the Bureau has given insufficient priority
to discovering and controlling foreign agents within the United States.
Insufficient manpower in the counterintelligence field, especially highly
trained analysts, appears to be part of the problem.

Recommendations

22. By statute, a charter should be established for the Central Intel-
ligence Agency which makes clear that its activities must be related
to foreign intelligence. The Agency should be given the following
missions :

— The collection of denied or protected foreign intelligence

information.^^
— The conduct of foreign counterintelligence.^*
— The conduct of foreign covert action operations.
— The production of finished national intelligence.

23. The CIA, in carrying out foreign intelligence missions, would
be permitted to engage in relevant activities within the United
States so long as these activities do not violate the Constitution nor
any federal, state, or local laws within the United States.^^ The Com-
mittee has set forth in its Domestic Recommendations proposed re-
strictions on such activities to supplement restrictions already con-
tained in the 1947 National Security Act. In addition, the Committee
recommends that by statute the intelligence oversight committee (s)
of Congress and the proposed counterintelligence committee of the
National Security Council be required to review, at least annually,
CIA foreign intelligence activities conducted within the United
States.26

24. Bv statute, the Attorney General should be required to report
to the President and to the intelligence oversight committee (s) of
Congress any intelligence activities which, in his opinion, violate the
Constitutional rights of American citizens or any other provision of
law and the actions he has taken in response. Pursuant to the Com-
mittee's Domestic Recommendations, the Attorney General should be
made responsible for ensuring that intelligence activities do not violate
the Constitution or any other provision of law.

25. The Committee recommends the establishment of a special com-
mittee of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence to review all foreign
human intelligence collection activities. It would make recommenda-
tion activities. (See the committee's Report on Domestic Intelligence Activities
and the Rights of Americans. Part IV.)

ILS. clandestine human collection operations and choices between
overt and clandestine human collection. This committee would be

^ This would not preclude the NSC from assigning appropriate overt collection
functions to the CIA.

" The CIA would be excluded from any law enforcement or criminal investiga-
tion activities. (See the Committee's Report on Domestic Intelligence Activities
and the Rights of Americans, Parit IV. )

^ lUd.

^ For recommended review requirements for covert action operations, see
p. 26 ff.

69-983 O - 76 - 29

442

composed of a representative of the Secretary of State as chairman,
the other statutory members of the CFI, and others whom the Presi-
dent may designate.

26. The intelligence oversight committee (s) of Congress should care-
fully examine intelligence collection activities of the Clandestine Serv-
ice to assure that clandestine means are used only when the information
is sufficiently important and when such means are necessary to obtain
the information.

27. The intelligence oversight committee (s) should consider
whether :

— the Domestic Collection Division (overt collection opera-
tions) should be removed from the Directorate of Opera-
tions (the Clandestine Service), and returned to the Direc-
torate of Intelligence ;

— the CIA's regulations should require that the DCD's overt
contacts be informed when they are to be used for opera-
tional support of clandestine activities ;

— the CIA's regulations should prohibit recruiting as agents
immigrants who have applied for American citizenship.

28. The President of the United States, in consultation with the
intelligence oversight committee (s) of Congress, should undertake a
classified review of current issues regarding counterintelligence. This
review should form the basis for a classified Presidential statement
on national counterintelligence policy and objectives, and should
closely examine the following issues: compartmentation, operations,
security, research, accountability, training, internal review, decep-
tion, liaison and coordination, and manpower.

2. CIA Production of Finished Intelligence

Intelligence production refers to the process (coordination, collation,
evaluation, analysis, research, and writing) by which "raw" intelli-
gence is transformed into "finished" intelligence for senior policy-
makers. The finished intelligence product includes a daily report and
summaries, as well as longer analytical studies and monographs on
particular topics of policy interest. In the CIA, finished intelligence
is produced by the Directorate of Intelligence and the Directorate of
Science and Technology.

Certain problems and issues in the area of CIA intelligence produc-
tion have come to the Committee's attention. The Committee believes
thees problems deserve immediate attention by both the executive
branch and future congressional intelligence oversight bodies. These
problems bear directly on the resources allocated to the production of
finished intelligence, the personnel system, and the organizational
structure of intelligence production.

The Committee recognizes that it is not the primary purpose of
intelligence to predict every world event. Rather, the principal func-
tion of intellijrence is to anticipate major foreign developments and
changes in policies which bear on United States interests. Intelligence
should also provide a deeper understanding of the behavior, processes,
and long-term trends which may underlie sudden military and political
developments.

443

The Committee wishes to emphasize that there is an important dif-
ference between an intelligence failure and a policy failure. The
United States had intelligence on the possibility of a Turkish invasion
of Cyprus in 1974. The problem of taking effective action to prevent
such an invasion was a policy question and not an intelligence failure.

The Committee has received evidence that on some subjects, such
as the current capability of the strategic and conventional forces of
potential adversaries, U.S. intelligence is considered excellent. But
in other areas, U.S. finished intelligence is viewed by policymakers
as far from satisfactory in light of the total resources devoted to
intelligence. On balance, the Committee fomid that the quality, time-
liness, and utility of our finished intelligence is generally considered
adequate, but that major improvement is both desirable and possible.

One issue examined by the Committee is whether intelligence com-
munity elements responsible for producing finished intelligence re-
ceive adequate attention and support. Production is, in the words of one
observer, "the stepchild of the intelligence commmiity." Since finished
intelligence is a principal purpose of all United States intelligence
activities, the Committee finds that this neglect of finished intelligence
is unacceptable for the future.

Intelligence resources are overwhelmingly devoted to intelligence
collection. The system is inundated with raw intelligence. The individ-
ual analysts responsible for producing finished intelligence has diffi-
culty dealing with the sheer volume of information. Policymakers
want the latest reports, and producers of finished intelligence often
have to compete with the producers of raw intelligence for policy-
makers' attention. In a crisis situation, analysts tend to focus on the
latest piece of evidence at the expense of a longer and broader view.
Intelligence Community staff saw this tendency as one reason why the
Cyprus coup in July 1974 was not foreseen.

The Intelligence Community staff in its post-mortem on the 1974
Cyprus crisis noted another general analytical problem which was
involved in the failure to anticipate the Cyprus coup and the Arab
attack on Israeli forces in October of 1973 : "the perhaps subconscious
conviction (and hope) that, ultimately, reason and rationality will
prevail, that apparently irrational moves (the Arab attack, the Greek
sponsored coup) will not be made by essentially rational men."

An additional area of the Committee's concern is that analysts are
often not informed in a timely way of national policies and programs
which affect their analyses and estimates. In its examination of cases
involving Cambodia and Chile in the 1970s, the Committee encount-
ered evidence that the analysts were so deprived.

Another issue uncovered by the Committee is whether the highest
quality personnel are recruited into the CIA analytical staff. Among
the problems raised:

— Analysts tend to be hired early in their careers, and stay
in the Agency throughout their careers. The nature of
their work tends to insulate them from other useful
experiences.

— The analysts career pattern rewards most analyst by
promoting them to supervisory positions thereby reducing
the time available to utilize their analytical skills!

444

— Some analysts complain that there are too many steps in
the process for reviewing finished intelligence — too much
bureaucratic "layering" in the analytical components. With
each successive level of review, the analysis and commentary
tend to become increasingly derivative.

— There has been little lateral entry of established analysts
and intelligence experts into CIA ranks to leaven the out-
look, interests and skills of the Agency's intelligence
analysts.^^

A final issue raised by the Committee's investigation of intelligence
production is whether the new organizational structure proposed by
the President will assure the appropriate stature for the Directorate
of Intelligence to help overcome existing problems in the production of
finished intelligence. Instead of reporting directly to the DCI (who
is still to be the President's chief intelligence adviser) , CIA analysts
may well report through the Deputy for the CIA. Experience indi-
cates that the new Deputy will need to devote the bulk of his time to
managing the Clandestine Services and the Directorate for Science
and Technology. At the same time, the DCI may be preoccupied with
greater community-wide management responsibilities. Without some
further restructuring, the Committee believes that the production of
finished intelligence may be lost in the shuffle.

RecomTYieTidations

29. By statute, the Director of the Directorate of Intelligence (DDI)
should be authorized to continue to report directly to the Director of
Central Intelligence.

30. The Committee recommends that a system be devised to ensure
that intelligence analysts are better and more promptly informed
about United States policies and programs affecting their respective
areas of responsibility.

31. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence oversight
committee (s) of Congress should reexamine the personnel system of
the Directorate of Intelligence with a view to providing a more
flexible, less hierarchical personnel system. Super-grade positions
should be available on the basis of an individual's analytical
capabilities.

32. The Directorate for Intelligence should seek to bring more
established analysts into the CIA at middle and upper grade levels for
both career positions and temporary assignments.

33. Greater emphasis should be placed on stimulating develop-
ment of new tools and methods of analysis.

34. Agency policy should continue to encourage intelligence analysts
to assume substantive tours of duty on an open basis in other agencies
(State, Defense, NSC staff) or in academic institutions to broaden
both their analytical outlook and their appreciation for the relevance
of their analysis to policymakers and operators within the
Government.

^' In FY 1975, only 18 out of 105 analysts hired by the DDI from outside the
CIA were at grades GS-12 to GS-15.

445

3. Covert Action aiid Paramilitary Oferations

Covert action is the attempt to influence the internal affairs of other
nations in support of United States foreign policy in a manner that
conceals the participation of the United States Government. Covert
action includes political and economic action, propaganda and para-
military activities.

The basic unit of covert action is the project. Covert action "proj-
ects" can range from single assets, such as a journalist placing propa-
ganda, through a network of assets working in the media, to major
covert and military intervention such as in Laos. The Agency
also maintains what it terms an "operational infrastructure" of
"stand-by" assets (agents of influence or media assets) who can be
used in major operations — such as in Chile. These "stand-by" assets
are also part of on-going, most often routine, projects. There are no
inactive assets.

Covert Action

The Committee has found that the CIA has conducted some 900
major or sensitive covert action projects plus several thousand smaller
projects since 1961. The need to maintain secrecy shields covert action
projects from the rigorous public scrutiny and debate necessary to
determine their compatibility with established American foreign
)>olicy goals. Recently, a large-scale covert paramilitary operation
in Angola was initiated without any effort on the part of the execu-
tive branch to articulate, and win public support for, its overall policy
in Africa. Only public disclosure has allowed the nation to apply its
standards of success or failure to covert action projects and then only
in retrospect, often without the benefit of the details prompting the
original choice of covert rather than overt action.

The secrecy covert action requires means that the public cannot
detei'mine whether such actions are consistent with established foreign
policy goals. This secrecy also has allowed covert actions to take place
which are inconsistent with our basic traditions and values.

Some covert operations have passed restrospective public judgments,
such as the support given Western European democratic parties facing
strong communist opposition in the late 1940s and 1950s. Others have
not. In the view of the Committee, the covert harassment of the
democratically elected government of Salvador Allende in Chile did
not command U.S. public approval.

Even if the short-term consequences of covert action are consistent
with staJted policy and acceptecf standards, the Committee has found
that the continued use of covert action techniques within or against
a foreign society can have unintended consequences that sometimes sub-
vert long-tei'm goals. For instance, extended covert support to foreign
political leaders, parties, labor unions, or the media has not always
accomplished the intended objective of strengthening them against
the communist challenge. In some cases, it has both encouraged a de-
bilitating dependence on United States covert support, and made
those receiving such support vulnerable to repudiation in their own
society when their covert ties are exposed. Furthermore, prolonged
covert relations and the resulting dependence of recipients on con-

446

tinued CIA support seem to encourage the CIA to extend its ties
to means of controlling the recipients in other respects. Covert ac-
tions also have, over time, developed a bureaucratic momentum of
their own that often surpasses the original need for covert action.

Paramilitary Operations

Covert paramilitary operations are a special, extreme form of covert
action. These operations most often consist of coveit military assist-
ance and training, but occasionally have involved actual combat activi-
ties by American advisers.

Because military assistance involves foreign policy commitments, it
is, Vith one exception, authorized by the Congress. That exception is
covert military assistance which is channeled through the CIA with-
out being authorized or approved by the Congress as a iwhole.

Covert U.S. paramilitary combat operations frequently amount to
making war, but they do not come under the War Powers Act since
they usually do not involve uniformed U.S. military officers. American
military officers engaged in CIA-sponsored paramilitary operations
are "sheep-dipped" for paramilitary duty — that is, they appear to
resign from the military yet preserve their place for reactivation once
their tour as civilian in paramilitary operations has ended.

The Committee finds that major jDaramilitary operations have often
failed to achieve their intended objective. Most have eventually been
exposed. Operations, as in Angola, recently, and Indonesia in the late
1950s are examples of such paramilitary failures. Others, such as Laos,
are judged successes by the CIA and officials within the executive
branch. The "success" in Laos, however, must be seen against the larger
American involvement in Indochina which failed.

Paramilitary operations often have evolved into large-scale pro-
grams with a high risk of exposure (and thus embarrassment and/or
failure). In some cases, the CIA has been used to undertake paramili-
tary operations simply because the Agency is less accountable to the
public for highly visible "secret" military operations. In all cases
considered by the Committee, command and control within the execu-
tive branch was rigorous. However, all such operations have been
conducted without direct congressional authority or public debate.
In recent years, some have been continued in the face of strong con-
gressional disapproval.

Eecently, however — apart from Angola — United States paramili-
tary activities have been at a very low level. The capability for these
actions, residing jointly in the CIA and the Department of Defense,
consists of a cadre of trained officers, stockpiles of militai-y equip-
ment, logistic networks and small collections of air and maritime
assets.

Revieio and Approval of Covert Actimi

Given the open and democratic assumptions on which our govern-
ment is based, the Committee has given serious consideration to the
option of proposing a total ban on all forms of covert activity. The
Committee has concluded, however, that the United States should
maintain the capability to react through covert action when no other
means will suffice to meet extraordinary circumstances involving grave

447

threats to U.S. national security. Nevertheless, covert action should be
considered as an exception to the normal process of government action
a^broad, rather than a parallel but invisible system in which covert
operations are routine.

Absent some means of assuring public participation in assessing
each covert action, the mechanisms of executive branch review and
control and of legislative intelligence oversight must serve as the
restricted arenas in which such standards are applied to covert action.
The Committee's examination of the covert action record over the last
25 years has underscored the necessity for legislative reinforcement
of the executive branch's internal review process. This is necessary to
assure that all covert action projects are reviewed, and to establish a
system of formal accountability within the executive accessible to
congressional intelligence oversight bodies.

The CIA has not been free, however, to carry out covert action as
it sees fit. The Committee's investigation revealed that on the whole,
the Agency has been responsive to internal and external review and
authorization requirements. Most of the significant covert operations
liave been approved by the appropriate NSC committee. At the same
time, the Committee notes that approval outside the Agency does not
solve all problems since the NSC committees have approved (and in
some cases initiated) projects that involved highly improper practices
or were inconsistent with declared foreign policies.

Approximately three-fourths of all covert action projects are never
reviewed or approved by a high level body outside the CIA.^^ These
projects which are not brought before the NSC for review are so-
called "non-sensitive" projects, or part of what the CIA calls its
"operational infrastructure."' The Committee found that a single small
project, though not reviewed by the NSC, still can be of great impor-
tance (e.g. QJWIN, the CIA "executive action" assassination capa-
bility, and AMLASH, the Cuban officer being groomed to kill Fidel
Castro). Moreover, a cluster of small projects can be aggregated to
form a program of significance (e.g., Chile).

Until recently, Congi'ess, through its committees, has failed to effec-
tively oversee CIA covert action. Much of this flowed from the
legitimate desire of the congressional oversight committees to main-
tain the security of coA'ert action projects, but it also resulted from
a hesitancy to challenge the President or to become directly involved
in projects he deemed necessary. Covert paramilitary operations
pose a special problem, since they cut across several functions (and
committee jurisdictions) of Congress — namely, granting military
assistance and making war.

]Members of the congressional oversight committees are almost
totally dependent on the executive branch for information on covert
operations. The secrecy needed for these covert operations allows the
executive to limit the information provided to the Congress and to use
covert actions to avoid the open scrutiny and debate of the normal
foreign policy pi'ocedures. While the Connnittee believes that the

-" Since 1974, the President has had to certify all covert actions as important
to the national security — treating smaller projects by certain broad categories.

448

executive should continue to have the initiative in formulating covert
action, it also strongly believes that the appropriate overeight bodies
of Congress should be fully informed prior to the initiation of such
actions.

Congressional power over the purse can serve as the most effective
congressional oversight tool if there is the courage and the will to exer-
cise it. In addition to the regular budget for covert action, the Agency
draws on a Contingency Reserve Fund for unanticipated projects. Any
withdrawals from this fund require approval from the Office of
Management and Budget and notification, within 48 hours, to the
appropriate congressional committees. The Committee believes that
the Contingency Fund can also provide one of the mechanisms by
which Congress can effectively control covert action.

RecoTnmendations

35. The legislation establishing the charter for the Central In-
telligence Agency should specify that the CIA is the only U.S. Gov-
ernment agency authorized to conduct covert actions. The purpose of
covert actions should be to deal with grave threats to American
security. Covert actions should be consistent w^ith publicly-defined
United States foreign policy goals, and should be reserved for extraor-
dinary circumstances when no other means will suffice. The legislation
governing covert action should require executive branch procedures
w^hich will ensure careful and thorough consideration of both the
general policies governing covert action and particular covert action
projects ; such procedures should require the participation and account-
ability of highest level policymakers.

36. The Committee has already recommended, following its in-
vestigation of alleged assassination attempts directed at foreign lead-
ers, a statute to forbid such activities. The Committee reaffirms its
support for such a statute and further recommends prohibiting the
following covert activities by statute :

— All political assassinations.^^

— Efforts to subvert democratic governments.

— Support for police or other internal security forces which
engage in the systematic violation of human rights.

37. By statute, the appropriate NSC committee (e.g., the Opera-
tions Advisory Group) should review every covert action proposal.^"

The Committee recommends that the Operations Advisory Group
revieW' include :

— A careful and systematic analysis of the political premises
underlying the recommended actions, as well as the nature,
extent, purpose, risks, likelihood of success, and costs of
the operation. Reasons explaining why the objective can-

^The Committee endorses Executive Order 11905, of February IS, 1976,
whicli states : "No employee of the United States Goverment shall engage in, or
conspire to engage in, political assassination."

*' Executive Order 1190o, 2/18/76, established the Operations Advisory
Group and directed it to "consider and develop a policy recommendation, includ-
ing any dissents, for the President prior to his decision on each si)ecial activity
[e.g., covert operations] in support of national foreign policy objectives."

449

not be achieved by overt means should also be considered.
— Each covert action project should be formally considered
at a meeting of the OAG, and if approved, forwarded to the
President for final decision. The views and positions of the
participants would be fully recorded. For the purpose of
OAG, presidential, and congressional considerations, all
so-called non-sensitive projects should be aggregated ac-
cording to the extraordinary circumstances or contingency
against which the project is directed.

38. By statute, the intelligence oversight committee (s) of Congress
shoidd require that the annual budget submission for covert action
programs be specified and detailed as to the activity recommended.
Unforeseen covert action projects should be funded from the
Contingency Reserve Fund which could be replenished only after the
concurrence of the oversight and any other appropriate congressional
committees. The congressional intelligence oversight committees
should be notified prior to any withdrawal from the Contingency
Reserve Fund.

39. By statute, any covert use by the U.S. Government of American
citizens as combatants should be preceded by the notification required
for all covert actions. The statute should provide that within 60 days
of such notification such use shall be terminated unless the Congress
has specifically authorized such use. The Congress should be empow-
ered to terminate such use at any time.^^

40. By statute, the executive branch should be prevented from con-
ducting any covert military assistance program (including the in-
direct or direct provision of military material, military or logistics
advice and training, and funds for mercenaries) without the explicit
prior consent of the intelligence oversight committee (s) of Congress.

G. Reorganization of the Intelligence Community

1. The Position of the DC I

The Committee recommendations regarding the Director of Central
Intelligence (pages 43-45) would, if implemented, increase his author-
ity over the entire intelligence community. Given such increased au-
thority, the Committee believes that both the executive branch and the
intelligence oversight committee (s) of Congress should give careful
consideration to removing the DCI from direct management responsi-
bility for the Central Intelligence Agency. This would free the DCI
to concentrate on his responsibilities with regard to the entire intelli-
gence community and would remove him from any conflict of interest
in performing that task. It might also increase the aceount ability of
the Central Intelligence Agency by establishing a new and separate
senior position — a Director of the Central Intelligence Agency —
responsible for only the CIA.

2. The Structures of the CIA

The Committee believes that several important problems uncovered
in the course of this inquiry suggest that serious consideration also
be given to major structural change in the CIA — in particular, sepa-

^ This recommendation parallels the current provisions of the War Powers
Resolution which could be so amended. (Appendix C, Hearings, Vol. 7, p. 226.)

450

rating national intelligence production and analysis from the clandes-
tine service and other collection functions. Intelligence production
could be placed directly under the DCI, while clandestine collection of
foreign intelligence from human and technical sources and covert
operations would remain in the CIA.
The advantages of such a step are several:

—The DCI would be removed from the conflict of interest
situation of managing the intelligence community as a
whole while also directing a collection agency.

—The concern that the DCI's national intelligence judg-
ments are compromised by the impulse to justify certain
covert action operations or by the close association of the
analysts with the clandestine service would be remedied.

— The problem, seen by some in the intelligence community,
of bias on the part of CIA analysts toward the collection
resources of the CIA would be lessened.

— It would facilitate providing the intelligence production
unit with greater priority and increased resources neces-
sary for improving the quality of its finished intelligence.

— Tighter policy control of the Clandestine Service by the
National Security Council and the Department of State
would be possible.

— The Director would be able to focus increased attention
on monitoring Clandestine Services.

— Internal reorganization of the Directorate for Intelligence
and the remainder of the CIA could be facilitated.

There are potential drawbacks as well :

— The Director of Central Intelligence might lose the influ-
ence that is part of having command responsibility for the
clandestine services.

— The increasing:, though still not extensive, contact between
national intelligence analysts and the Clandestine Service
for the purpose of improving the espionage effort might be
inhibited.

— The DCI would have managerial responsibility over the
former CIA analysts which might place him in a conflict-
of-interest situation in regard to the production of intelli-
gence.

— The increased number of independent agencies w^ould in-
crease the DCI's coordination problems.

— If the clandestine services did not report to the DCI, there
would be the problem of establishing an alternative chain
of command to the President.

— The Clandestine Service might be downgraded and fail to
secure adequate support.

Nonetheless, on balance, the Committee believes such a separation
of functions and consequent possible realignments in authority within
the intelligence community medit serious consideration. •

451

RecommendatioTis

41. The intelligence oversight committee (s) of Congress in the
course of developing a new charter for the intelligence community
should give consideration to separating the functions of the DCI and
the Director of the CIA and to dividing the intelligence analysis and
production functions from the clandestine collection and covert action
functions of the present CIA.

H. Relations with United States Institutions and Private

Citizens

In the immediate postwar period, as the communists pressed to
influence and to control international organizations and movements,
mass communications, and cultural institutions, the United States
responded by involving American private institutions and individuals
in the secret struggle over mind^, institutions, and ideals. In the
process, the CIA subsidized, and even helped develop "private" or
non-government organizations that were designed to compete with
communists around the world. The CIA supported not only foreign
organizations, but also the international activities of United States
student, labor, cultural, and philanthropic organizations.

These covert relationships have attracted public concern and this
Committee's attention because of the importance that Americans
attach to the independence of these institutions.

The Committee found that in the past the scale and diversity of
these covert actions has been extensive. For operational purposes, the
CIA has:

— Funded a special program of a major American business

association ;
— Collaborated with an American trade union federation ;
— Helped to establish a research center at a major United

States university ;
— Supported an international exchange progi'am sponsored

by a group of United States universities;
— Made widespread use of philanthropic organizations to

fund such covert action programs.

The Committee's concern about these relationships is heightened by
the Agency's tendency to move from support to use of both
institutions and individuals. For example, the initial purpose of the
Agency's funding of the National Student Association was to permit
United States situdents to represent their own ideas, in their own way.
in the international fonims of the day. Nevertheless, the Committee
has foimd instances in which the CIA moved from general support to
the "operational use" of individual students.^^ Contrary to the public's
understanding, over 250 United States students were sponsored by the
CIA to attend youth festivals in Moscow, Vienna and Helsinki and

^^ Operational use, according to CIA directives, means performing services in
support of the CIA Operations Directorate, and may include the recruitment,
utilization, or training of any individual for such purposes as providing cover and
collecting intelligence.

452

used for missions such as reporting on Soviet and Third World person-
alities or observing Soviet security practices. The CIA also used
National Student Association Summer International Seminars in the
United States in the 1950s and 1960s to identify and screen new leaders
whom they would eventually support at the national NSA Convention.

When the CIA's relationship to NSA was publicly revealed in 1967,
the Johnson Administration established the Katzenbach Committee,
with a limited mandate to investigate the relationship of the CIA to
"U.S. educational and private voluntary organizations which operate
abroad." The Katzenbach Committee recommended that it should be
the policy of the United States Government not to provide any "covert
financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's
educational or private voluntary organizations."

The Committee found that the CIA not only carried out this Katzen-
bach recommendation but also terminated support for a number of
other U.S. -based organizations such as publishing houses. Neverthe-
less, the CIA, with the approval of the appropriate NSC committee,
insured the continuation of a number of high priority operations by
either moving them overseas or encouraging private and non-CIA
government support of domestically-based operations. More imp>or-
tantly, however, the CIA shifted its operational interest from insti-
tutional relationships to individuals in, or affiliated with, private
institutions.

The CorriTYiittee inquiry has been particularly concerned about the
current operational use of United States citizens as individuals. Some
acadeinics now help the CIA by providing leads and^ on occasion^ mak-
ing introductioTis to potential sources of foreign intelligence. American
acadeinics and freelance writers are occasionally u^ed abroad to assist
the CIA^s clandestine mission.

1. Covert Use of the U.S. Academic Community

The Central Intelligence Agency is now using several hundred
Ameiican academics,^^ who in addition to providing leads and some-
times inaking introductions for intelligence purposes., occasionally
lorite books and other material to be used for propaganda purposes
abroad. Beyond these., an additional few more are used in an unwit-
ting manner for mi7ior activities.

These academics are located in over 100 American colleges., universi-
ties., and related institutes. At the majority of institutions., no one other
than the individual academic concerned is aware of the CIA link. At
the others., at least one university official is atoare of the operational
use made of academics on his campus. In addition., there are several
American acadeinics abroad loho serve operational purposes^ primarily
the collection of intelligence.

Tlie CIA gives a high prioHty to obtaining leads on potential foreign
intelligence sources especially those from communist countries. This
Agency'' s emphasis reflects the fact that many foreign nationals in the
United, States are in this category. The Committee notes that American
academics provide valuahle assistance in this activity.^^^

^"Academics" includes administrators, faculty members, and graduate stu-
dents engaged in teaching.
^^ For explanation of italics, see footnote, p. 79.

453

The Committee is concerned^ however^ that American ocademAcs
involved in such activities may undermine public confidence that those
who train our youth are upholding the ideals^ independence^ and integ-
rity of American universities.

Government Grantees
CIA regulations adopted in 1967 prohibit the '"''operational'''' use of
certain narroio categories of individuals. The CIA is prohibited from
using teachers^ lecturers., and students receiving grants from the Board
of Foreign Felloioships under the Fulhright-H ayes Act.^* There is no
prohibiti&)i on the tise of individuals participat'ing in any other
federally funded exchange programs. For example., the CIA may use
those grantees — artists., specialists., athletes., leaders., etc. — loho do not
receive their grants from the Board of Foreign Scholarships. The
Committee is concerned that there is no jrrohibition against exploiting
such oj>en federal programs for claivdestine purposes.^^

2. The Covert Use of Books and Publishing Houses

The Committee has found that the Central Intelligence Agency
attaches a particular importance to book publishing activities as a
form of covert propaganda. A former officer in the Clandestine Service
stated that books are "the most important weapon of strategic (long-
range) propaganda." Prior to 1967, the Central Intelligence Agency
sponsored, subsidized, or produced over 1,000 books; approximately 25
percent of them in English. In 1967 alone, the CIA published or subsi-
dized over 200 books, ranging from books on African safaris and wild-
life to translations of Machiavelli's The Pnnce into Swahili and works
of T. S. Eliot into Russian, to a competitor to Mao's little red book,
which was entitled Quotations from Chairman Liu.

The Committee found that an important number of the books actu-
ally produced by the Central Intelligence Agency were reviewed and
marketed in the United States :

— A book about a young student from a developing country
who had studied in a communist country was described by
the CIA as "developed by [two areas divisions] and pro-
duced by the Domestic Operations Division. . . and has
had a high impact in the United States as well as in the
[foreign area] market." This book, which was produced
by the European outlet of a United States publishing house
Avas published in condensed form in two major U.S.
magazines.^^

— Another CIA book, The Penkovsky Papers., was published
in United States in 1965. The book was prepared
and written by witting agency assets who drew on
actual case materials and publication rights to the manu-

^CIA regulations also prohibit the operational use of members of ACTION
and officials, employees, and grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie
Foundations.

^ For explanation of italics, see footnote, p. 79.

^ CBS commentator Eric Sevareid, in reviewing this book, spoke a larger
truth than he knew when he suggested that "our propaganda services could
do worse than flood [foreign] university towns with this volume."

454

script were sold to the publisher through a trust fund which
was established for the purpose. The publisher was unaware
of any U.S. Government interest.

In 1967, the CIA stopped publishing within the United States.
Since then, the Agency has published some 250 books abroad, most of
them in foreign languages. The CIA has given special attention to
publication and circulation abroad of books about conditions in the
Soviet Bloc. Of those targeted at audiences outside the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe, a large number has also been available in
English.

3. Domestic '"'■Fallout''''

The Committee finds that covert media operations can result in
manipulating or incidentally misleading the American public. Despite
efforts to minimize it, CIA employees, past and present, have conceded
that there is no way to shield the American public completely from
"fallout" in the United States from Agency propaganda or place-
ments overseas. Indeed, following the Katzenbach inquiry, the Deputy
Director for Operations issued a directive stating: "Fallout in the
United States from a foreign publication which we support is inevi-
table and consequently permissible."

The domestic fallout of covert propaganda comes from many sources :
books intended primarily for an English-speaking foreign audience;
CIA press placements that are picked up by an international wire
service ; and publications resulting from direct CIA funding of foreign
institutes. For example, a book written for an English-speaking
foreign audience by one CIA operative was reviewed favorably by
another CIA agent in the Neio York Times. The CoTnmittee also found
that the CIA hel\ped create and swpport various Vietnamese periodicals
a7id pubUcatiotis. In at least one instance., a CIA supported Vietnamese
publication was used to propagarulize tlie American public and the
members and staff of both houses of Congress. So effective loas this
propaganda that some nnembers quoted from, the publication in de-
bating the controversial question of United States irwolvement in
Vietnam.

The Convmittee found that this inevitable domestic fallout was com-
pounded ichen the Agency circulated its subsidized books in the United
States prior to their distribution abroad in order to induce a favorahle
reception overseas.

The Covert Use of U.S. Jouimalists and Media Institutions on Feb-
ruary 11.^ 1976^ CIA Director George Bush announced new guidelines
governing the Agency^s realtionship with United States media orga-
nizations :

Effective immediately.^ CIA ivill not enter into any paid or
contractual relationship loitJk any full-time or part-time news
corresporhdent accredited by any U.S. neios service., nexos-
paper., \periodical, radio or television netioork or station.^^

^^ According to the CIA, "accredited" applies to individuals who are "formally
authorized by contract or issuance of press credentials to represent themselves
as correspondents." (For explanation of italics, see footnote, p. 179.)

455

Agency officials who testified after the February 11, 1976, announce-
ment told the Committee that the prohibition extends to non-Ameri-
cans accredited to specific United States media organizations.

The CIA currently maintains a network of several hundred foreign
individuals around the loorld loho provide intelligence for the CIA
and at times attempt to influence opinion through the use of covert
propaganda. These individuals provide tlie CIA icith direct access to
a large number of newspapers and periodicals.^ scores of press services
and neivs agencies., radio and television stations.^ commercial hook
publishers., and other foreign media outlets.

Approximately 50 of the assets are individual American jouimalists
or employees of U.S. media organizations. Of these, fewer thaii half
are ''^ accredited''^ by U.S. media organizations and thereby affected by
the new pi^ohibitions on the use of accredited news?nen. The 7'emaining
individuals are non-accredited freelance contributors and media rep-
resentatives abroad., and thus are not affected by the new CIA
prohibition.

More than a dozen United States news organizations and commer-
cial publishing houses formerly provided cover for CIA agents abroad.
A few of these organizations tuere unaioare that they provided this
cover.

The Convmittee notes that the new CIA prohibitions do not apply
to ^''unaccredited^'' Americans serving m media, organizations such as
representatives of U.S. media organizations abroad or freelance
writers. Of the more than 50 CIA relationships ivith United States
journalists, or employees in Americom media organizations, fewer
than one half will be terminated under the new CIA guidelines.

The Ccmwnittee is concerned that the use of American journalists
and media orga,nizations for clandestine operations is a threat to the
integrity of the press. All American journalists, whetlier accredited
to a United States news organization or just a stringer, may be suspects
tohen any are engaged in covert activities.^^

Jf. Covert Use of Aonerican Religious Personnel

The Committee has found that over the years the CIA has used very
few religious personnel for operational purposes. The CIA infonned
the Committee that only 21 such individuals have ever participated in
either covert action projects or the clandestine collection of intelligence.
(3n February 11, 1976, the CIA announced :

CIA has no secret paid or contractual relationships with any
American clergyman or missionary. This practice will be con-
tinued as a matter of policy.

The Committee welcomes this policy with the understanding that
the prohibition against all "paid or contractual relationships" is in
fact a prohibition against any operational use of all Americans follow-
ing a religious vocation.

Recommendations

In its consideration of the recommendations that follow, the Com-
mittee noted the Central Intelligence Agency's concern that further
restriction on the use of Americans for operational purposes will con-

^For explanation of italics, see footnote, p. 179.

456

strain current operating programs. The Committee recognizes that
there may be at least some short-term operational losses if the Com-
mittee recommendations are effected. At the same time, the Committee
believes that there are certain American institutions whose integrity
is critical to the maintenance of a free society and which should there-
fore be free of any unwitting role in the clandestine service of the
United States Government.

42. The Committee is concerned about the integrity of American
academic institutions and the use of individuals affiliated with such
institutions for clandestine purposes. Accordingly, the Committee
recommends that the CIA amend its internal directives to require
that individual academics used for operational purposes by the CIA,
together with the President or equivalent official of the relevant
academic institutions, be informed of the clandestine CIA
relationship.*^

43. The Committee further recommends that, as soon as possible, the
permanent intelligence oversight committee (s) of Congress examine
whether further steps are needed to insure the integrity of American
academic institutions.

44. By statute, the CIA should be prohibited from the operational
use of grantees who are receiving funds through educational and/or
cultural programs which are sponsored by the United States
Government.

45. By statute, the CIA should be prohibited from subsidizing the
writing, or production for distribution within the United States or
its territories, of any book, magazine, article, publication, film, or
video or audio tape unless publicly attributed to the CIA. Nor should
the CIA be permitted to undertake any activity to accomplish indi-
rectly such distribution within the United States or its territories.

46. The Committee supports the recently adopted CIA prohibi-
tions against any paid or contractual relationship between the
Agency and U.S. and foreign journalists accredited to U.S. media or-
ganizations. The CIA prohibitions should, however, be established in
law.

47. The Committee recommends that the CIA prohibitions be ex-
tended by law to include the operational use of any person who regu-
larly contributes material to, or is regularly involved directly or in-
directly in the editing of material, or regularly acts to set policy or
provide direction to the activities of U.S. media organizations.

48. The Committee recommends that the Agency's recent prohibi-
tion on covert paid or contractual relationship between the Agency
and any American clergyman or missionary should be established by
law.

I. Proprietaries and Cover
1. Proprietary Organizations

CIA proprietaries are business entities wholly-owned by the
Agency which do business, or only appear to do business, under com-
mercial guise. They are part of the "arsenal of tools" of the CIA's

^This recommendation is consistent with and would extend section 4(b)(9)
of E.O.. 11905 which states that CIA spon.sorship of classified or unclassified
research must be "known to appropriate senior officials of the academic institu-
tions and to senior project oflficials."

457

Clandestine Services. They have been used for espionage as well as
covert action. Most of the larger proprietaries have been used for para-
military purposes. The Committee finds that too often large proprie-
taries have created unwarranted risks of unfair competition with
private business and of compromising their cover as clandestine opera-
tions. For example, Air America, which at one time had as many as
8,000 employees, ran into both difficulties.

While internal CIA financial controls have been regular and sys-
tematic, the Committee found a need for even greater accountability
both internally and externally. Generally, those auditing the CIA
have been denied access to operational information, making manage-
ment-oriented audits impossible. Instead, audits have been concerned
only with financial security and integrity.

The Committee found that the CIA's Inspector General has, on
occasion, been denied access to certain information regarding pro-
prietaries. This has sometimes inliibited the ability of the Insi^ector
General's office to serve the function for which it was estabished. More-
over, the General Accounting Office has not audited these operations.
The lack of review, by either the GAO or the CIA Inspector General's
office, means that, in essence, there has been no outside review of
proprietaries.

One of the largest current proprietaries is an insurance-investment
complex established in 1962 to provide pension annuities, insurance
and escrow management for those who, for security reasons, could not
receive them directly from the U.S. Government. The Committee de-
termined that the Congress was not informed of the existence of this
proprietary until "sometime" after it had been made operational and
had invested heavily in the domestic stock markets — a practice the
CIA has discontinued. Moreover, once this proprietary was removed
from the Domestic Operations Division and placed under the General
Counsel's office it received no annual CIA project review.

The record establishes that on occasion the insurance-investment
complex had been used to provide operational support to various covert
action projects. The Inspector General, in 1970, criticized this use of
the complex because it threatened to compromise the security of the
complex's primary insurance objectives.

In general, the Committee found that when the CIA sought to dis-
pose of or dissolve a proprietary, considerable effort was made to
avoid conflicts of interest. However, pressures were sometimes unsuc-
cessfully brought to bear on the CIA from without, and on one or
more occasions from high level Agency officials to do a favor by dis-
posing of an entity in a manner that would benefit a particular party.
In this connection, the Committee notes that the CIA is not subject
to the provisions of the Federal Disposal of Property Act which or-
dinarily guards against such pressures.

Management and control of proprietaries frequently required, and
still do, what is termed "cooperative interface" with other goverment
agencies, such as the SEC and the IRS. The Committee found no evi-
dence that these relationships involved circumventing statutory or
regulatory requirements. Their purpose appears to be to enable the
Agency to comply with other agencies' requirements in a secure
manner. However, the nature and extent of such "interfacing" has not
always been completely recorded in the CIA, making it difficult to
ensure the propriety of such relationships.

69-983 O - 76 - 30

458

2. Cover

The Committee examined cover because it is an important aspect of
all CIA clandestine activities. Its im,portance is underscored, hy the
tragic trvurder of a CIA Station Chief in Greece., coupled with continu-
ing disclosures of CIA agents'' na^nes. The Comnnittee sought to deter-
mine what^ if anything., has heen done in the past to strengthen cover.,
and uliat should he done in the future.

The Committee found conflicting vieivs about what constitutes cover.,
lohat it can do., and loliat should be done to improve it. A 1970 CIA
Inspector General report termed the Agency- s concept and use of cover
to.be lax. arbitrary^ uneven.^ confused., and loose. The present cover
staff in the CIA considered the 1970 assessment to be simplistic and
overly haTsh. There is no question., however, that some improvements
and changes are needed.

The Committee finds th-at there is a basic tension between maintain-
ing adequate cover and effectively engaging in overseas intelligence
activities. Almost every operational act by a CIA officer under cover in
the field — from uwrking ivith local intelligence and police to attempt-
ing to recruit agents — reveals his true purpose and chips away at his
cover. Some forms of cover do not provide conceahnent but offer a
certain degree of deniahility. Others are so elaborate that they limit
the amount of work an officer can do for the CIA. In carrying out their
responsibilities, CIA officers generally regard the maintenance of cover
as a ^^nuisance.^^

The situation of the Athens Station Chief, Richard Welch, illus-
trates the problem of striking the right baia7ice between cover and
operations, and also the transparency of cover. As the Chief of the
CIA''s Cover Staff stated, by the time a person becomes Chief of
Station, '•'•there is not a great deal of cover left.*- The Chief of the
Cover Staff identified terrorism as a, further security problem for
officers overseas, one that is aggravated by the erosion of cover.'^'^

Recommendations

49. By statute, the CIA should be permi'toted to use proprietaries
subject to external and internal controls.

50. The Committee recommends that the intelligence oversight com-
mittee (s) of Congress require at least an annual rej^ort on all propri-
etaries. The report should include a statement of each proprietary's
nature and function, the results of internal annual CIA audits, a list
of all CIA intercessions on behalf of its proprietaries with any other
United States Government departments, agencies or bureaus, and such
other information as the oversight committee deems appropriate.

51. The intelligence oversight committee (s) of Congress should
require that the fiscal impact of proprietaries on the CIA's budget be
made clear in the DCI's annual report to the oversight committee. The
Commitee should also establish guidelines for creating large pro-
prietaries, should these become necessary.

" For example, the CIA was concerned about the fact that the home that Mr.
Welch moved into had been previously publicly identified as belonging to the
former Station Chief. CIA officials have testified that the Agency has no evidence
that the recent congressional inquiries into intelligence activities had any ad-
verse impact on Mr. Welch's cover or any relationship to his tragic death.
(George Bush testimony, 4/8/76, p. 41.)

*^ For explanation of italics, see footnote, p. 179.

459

52. By statute, all returns of funds from proprietaries not needed for
its operational purposes or because of liquidation or termination of a
proprietary, should be remitted to the United States Treasury as Mis-
cellaneous Receipts.

The Department of Justice should be consulted during the process
of the sale or disposition of any CIA proprietary.

53. By statute, former senior govermnent officials should be pro-
hibited from negotiating with the CIA or any other agency regarding
the disposal of proprietaries. The intelligence oversight committee (s)
of Congress should consider whether other activities among agencies
of the intelligence community, the CIA, and former officials and em-
ployees, such as selling to or negotiating contracts with the CIA,
should also be prohibitied as is the case regarding military officials
under 18 U.S.C. 207.

J. Intelligence Liaison

Throughout the entire period of the CIA's history, the Agency
has entered into liaison agreements with the intelligence services of
foreign powers. Such arrangements are an extremely important and
delicate source of intelligence and operational support. Intelligence
channels can also be used to negotiate agreement outside the field of
intelligence. The Committee notes that all treaties require the advice
and consent of the Senate, and executive agreements must be reported
to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. Because of the im-
portance of intelligence liaison agreements to national security, the
Committee is concerned that such agreements have not been systemat-
ically reviewed by the Congress in any fashion.

Recorrhmendations

54. By statute, the CIA should be prohibited from causing, funding,
or encouraging actions by liaison services which are forbidden to the
CIA. Furthermore, the fact that a particular project, action, or activity
of the CIA is carried out through or by a foreign liaison service should
not relieve the Agency of its responsibilities for clearance within the
Agency, within the executive branch, or with the Congress.

55. The intelligence oversight committee (s) of Congress should be
kept fully informed of agreements negotiated with other governments
through intelligence channels.

K. The General Counsel and Inspector General

The General Counsel, as chief legal officer of the Central Intelligence
Agency, has a special role in insuring that CIA activities are con-
sistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. The Com-
mittee found that, in the past, the participation of the General Counsel
in determining the legality or propriety of CIA activities was limited ;
in many instances the General Counsel was not consulted about sensi-
tive projects. In some cases the Director's investigative arm, the In-
spector General, discovered questionable activities that often were not
referred to the General Counsel for a legal opinion. Moreover, the
General Counsel never had general investigatory authority.

460

The Inspector General not only serves as the Director's investigative
arm, but he also aids the Director in attempts to increase the efficiency
of Agency activities. Inspector General investigations of various
Agency offices (component surveys) have been an important manage-
ment tool often leading to the discovery of questionable practices.
These component surveys were halted in 1973 but have recently been
reinstituted.

The Committee found that there were problems with the component
surveys. In some situations the Inspector General was denied access
to essential information. The surveys often failed to effectively cover
sensitive programs cutting across component boundaries or raising
issues which affected the Agency as a whole. Finally, the Inspector
General's recommendations were often disregarded particularly when
the directorate being investigated opposed their implementation.

Under the President's recently issued Executive Order, the Inspector
General and the General Counsel are required to report to the Intel-
ligence Oversight Board any activities that come to their attention
which raise questions of legality or propriety. The Director of the CIA
is charged with assuring that those officials will have access to the in-
formation necessary to fulfill their duties under the Executive Order.

The Committee also found that while both the General Counsel and
Inspector General provided valuable assistance to the Director, neither
had authority to provide assistance to the congressional oversight
bodies.

The Committee believes that the intelligence oversight committee (s)
of Congress should examine the internal review mechanisms of foreign
and military intelligence agencies and consider the feasibility of ap-
plying recommendations such as those suggested for the CIA.

Recomnnendations

56. Any CIA employee having information about activities which
appear illegal, improper, outside the Agency's legislative charter, or in
violation of Agency regulations, should be required to inform the
Director, the General Counsel, or the Inspector General of the Agency.
If the General Counsel is not informed, he should be notified by the
other officials of such reports. The General Counsel and the Inspector
General shall, except where they deem it inappropriate, be required to
provide such information to the head of the Agency.^*

57. The DCI should be required to report any information regard-
ing employee violations of law related to their duties and the results
of any internal Agency investigation to the Attorney General.^^

" The General Counsel and Inspector General should have authority to pass
the information to the Attorney General without informing the head of the
Agrency in extraordinary circumstances, if tlie employee providing the informa-
tion so requests and if the General Counsel or the Inspector General deems it
necessary.

The Inspector General should also regularly inform Agency employees about
grievance procedures.

'" See 28 U.S.C. 535.

461

58. By statute, the Director of the CIA should be required to notify
the appropriate committees of the Congress of any referrals made to
the Attorney General pursuant to the previous recommendation.**'

59. The Director of the CIA should periodically require employees
having any information on past, current, or proposed Agency activi-
ties which appear illegal, improper, outside the Agency's legislative
charter, or in violation of the Agency's regulations, to report such
information.

60. By statute, the General Counsel and the Inspector General should
have unrestricted access to all Agency information and should have the
authority to review all of the Agency activities.

61. All significant proposed CIA activities should be reviewed by the
General Counsel for legality and constitutionality.

62. The program of component inspections conducted by the Inspec-
tor General should be increased, as should the program of surveys of
sensitive programs and issues which cut across component lines in the
Agency.*'

63. The Director shall, at least annually, report to the appropriate
committees of the Congress on the activities of the Office of the General
Counsel and the Office of the Inspector General."*^

64. By statute, the General Counsel should be nominated by the
President and confirmed by the Senate.

65. The Agency's efforts to expand and strengthen the staffs of the
General Counsel and Inspector General should be continued.*^

66. The General Counsel should be promoted to, and the Inspector
General should continue to hold executive rank equal to that of the
Deputy Directors of the CIA.

^° Should the General Counsel or Inspector General determine that it would
be inappropriate to notify the Director of an activity that appeared illegal,
improper, outside the Agency's legislative charter, or in violation of Agency
regulations, the General Counsel or Inspector General would be required to
notify the appropriate committees of the Congress.

" The Inspector General's component surveys should consider not only the effec-
tiveness of the component but should also examine the component's compliance
with the legislative charter of the Agency, Agency regulations, and the law. The
Director should be required to inform the Inspector General as to what actions
have been taken on the recommendations made by the Inspector General.

^^The report should include: (a) a summary of all Agency activities that raise
questions of legality or propriety and the General Counsel's findings concerning
these activities; (b) a summary of the Inspector General's investigations con-
cerning any of these activities; (c) a summary of the practices and procedures
developed to discover activities that raise questions of legality or propriety ; (d) a
summary of each component, program or issue survey, including the Inspector
General's recommendations and the Director's decisions; (e) a summary of all
other matters handled by the Inspector General.

The report should also include discussion of (a) ma jor_ legal problems facing
the Agency; (b) the need for additional statutes; (c) any cases referred to the
Department of Justice.

*^ Efforts to recruit lawyers for the Office of General Counsel from outside the
CIA should be increased. Efforts should also be made to provide for rotation of
the attorneys in the General Counsel's OflSce to other governmental positions.

The Inspector General's Office should be staffed by outstanding,* experienced
ofiicers drawn from inside and outside the Agency. Consideration should be given
to establishing a greater number of permanent positions within the OflBce. Indi-
viduals rotated into the Inspector General's Office from another Agency office
should not be involved in surveys of offices to which they might return.

The work of both offices would benefit from regular inspections from outside.

462

L. The Department of Defense

The intelligence agencies of the Department of Defense make a
major contribution to the development, management, and operation of
intelligence systems and to the production of military and technical
intelligence information. Additionally, the Department, with its
major responsibility for the nation's defense is a major user of fin-
ished intelligence. The Committee's inquiry into the Department of
Defense intelligence agencies focused on the Department's intelligence
budget which comprises over 80 percent of the direct national United
States intelligence budget.

The Committee also examined the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the intelligence
activities of the military services. That portion of the investigation of
NSA which centered on potential abuses is presented in detail in the
Domestic Section of the Committee's report.

1. General Findings and Conclusions

The Committee finds that despite the magnitude of the tasks and
the complexity of the relationships, most of the important collection
activities conducted by the Defense Department (the reconnaissance
and SIGINT systems) are managed relatively efficiently and are
generally responsive to the needs of the military services as well as
to the policymakers on the national level.

Defense intelligence must respond to a range of consumers — policy-
makers in Washington, defense and technical analysts, and opera-
tional commanders in the field — yet the primary mission of defense
intelligence is to supply the armed services with the intelligence nec-
essary for their operations. This overriding departmental require-
ment creates a major problem in the overall allocation of intelligence
resources throughout the intelligence community. In promulgating
Executive Order 11905, the Administration has decided on a greater
centralization of authority in the Director of Central Intelligence.
The Committee notes that this will require some changes in the Sec-
retary of Defense's authority over allocating defense intelligence
resources. With regard to intelligence resources management within
the Department of Defense, the Committee found that the establish-
ment of a Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence should enable
more effective management of defense intelligence resources and help
the Defense Department play an appropriate role in the new central-
ized interagency structure under the Director of Central Intelligence.

Increasingly, technological intelligence systems have grown capable
of serving both the interests of national policymakei'S and planners
and of field commanders. Thus, it is often difficult to distinguish
between "national" and "tactical" intelligence assets, collection, or
production. It is the Committee's view that while the effect of the
President's Executive Order giving the DCI more authority will be to
bring national intelligence assets and budgets under the DCI's con-
trol and guidance, the defense intelligence programs which are tactical

463

in nature and integral to the military's operational commands should
remain under the control of the Secretary of Defense. The precise
line drawn between the tactical and military intelligence at any given
time will have a significant impact on the definition of national
intelligence and on the purview of any oversight committee (s) of
Congress.

2. The Defense Intelligence Agency

Even though the Defense Intelligence Agency has been the prin-
cipal agency for the production of intelligence in the Defense Depart-
ment, Secretaries of Defense and other key DOD officials have
frequently looked to other intelligence sources rather than to DIA.
For example, Robert McNamara relied heavily on the CIA; Melvin
Laird sought analyses from the Defense Department's Directorate of
Defense Research and Engineering; and James Schlesinger used a
special Net Assessment Group. This tendency of Secretaries of Defense
to rely on analytic resources outside of DIA is partly but not entirely,
related to dissatisfaction with DIA's performance (see the detailed
report on DIA). Another factor is the obvious difference between the
role of the Defense Department as manager of military intelligence
collection systems and the role of the Secretary of Defense as a
consumer of intelligence products. For example, the Secretary's re-
quirements for political and economic intelligence are considerably
different from the intelligence needs of the operating forces and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are the primary military customers of DIA.

Historically, DOD has managed the bulk of all technical intelligence
collection systems, but the CIA has managed many important national
technical collection systems and has been in charge of much of the
analytic function and is the primary producer of national intelligence.
The largest proportion of intelligence needed by the military estab-
lishment, however, is tactical. Therefore, national intelligence is a sec-
ondary mission of DIA. Much of DIA's effort is directed toward pro-
ducing intelligence needed by the JCS, the Unified and Specified
Commands, and force planners and technical analysts in the services.
The Secretary of Defense, on the other hand, is equally or more con-
cerned with national intelligence. In this context, it is not surprising
that DOD's civilian leadership has complemented DIA's product with
analyses from sources in other agencies.

The Committee is of the view that the Secretary of Defense has a
continuing need for a strong analytical intelligence capability within
the Department of Defense. The Committee found that DIA has met
this need better than the service intelligence organizations which
preceded it, but that DIA has not fulfilled expectations that it would
provide a coordinating mechanism for all defense intelligence activi-
ties and information.

The essential problem of the Defense Intelligence Agency was
summed \\\i in one study commissioned by the executive branch as
"too many jobs and too many masters." ^° These problems have not

^ The Report to the President and Secretary of Defense on the Department of
Defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (Pitzhugh Report), 7/1/70.

464

been solved by the reorganizations undertaken thus far, nor has the
DIA's existence led to a diminution in the size of the separate military
intelligence services that was hoped for.

The Committee finds that the Defense Intelligence Agency faces
serious impediments to improving the quality of, and opportunities
for, its civilian and military staff. The Agency's personnel and com-
mand structure, its lack of high-level grades, and the relatively short
tours for military officers are factors which make it difficult for DIA
to develop and retain the high-quality analytic personnel essential for
a high-quality finished product.

3. The National Security Agency

The National Security Agency is one of the largest and most tech-
nically oriented components of the United States intelligence com-
munity. Its basic function is collecting and processing foreign com-
munications and signals for intelligence purposes. NSA is also respon-
sible for creating and supervising the cryptography of all United
States Government agencies, and has a special responsibility for
supervising the military services' cryptologic agencies. Another
major responsibility is protecting the security of American com-
munications.

The Committee regards these functions as vital to American secu-
rity. NSA's capability to perform these functions must be preserved.
The Committee notes that despite the fact that NSA has been in exist-
ence for several decades, NSA still lacks a legislative charter. More-
over, in its extensive investigation, the Committee has identified
intelligence community abuses in levying requirements on NSA and
abuses by NSA itself in carrying out its functions. These abuses are
detailed in the domestic portion of the Committee report. The Com-
mittee finds that there is a compelling need for an NSA charter to
spell out limitations which will protect individual constitutional rights
without impairing NSA's necessary foreign intelligence mission.

4. Civilian or Military Leadership

DIA and NSA have always been headed by professional military
officers. In the case of DIA, Deputy Directors have also been mili-
tary. This past practice should not stand in the way of appointment
of any individuals, whether civilian or military, best qualified to
administer these sensitive agencies.

5. Special Issues

Several important issues concerning NSA have been revealed during
the course of the Committ's investigation which require regular re-
views by both the intelligence oversight committee (s) of Congress
and by the executive branch.

— How can the risks involved in the operations of collection
systems be balanced against the value of positive intel-
ligence information acquired through those operations?

— How far in the research/development process of collection
systems should the competition between agencies continue

465

before it leads to unwarranted duplication ? Should those
who develop a system also manage its acquisition and sub-
sequent operation, or should all operations be consolidated,
for example, under the Department of Defense?
— How can the technology of advanced intelligence collection
systems be better utilized to assist the civilian and
domestic agencies of the Government without compromis-
ing the principal mission or security of these intelligence
systems, or the open character of these portions of American
government ?

Recommendations

67. In order to implement the Committee's and the President's rec-
ommendations for expanding the DCI's resource-allocation responsi-
bility appropriate adjustments should be made in the Secretary of
Defense's general authority regarding Defense intelligence activities
and in the Department's internal budgeting procedures. At the same
time, there should be provision for the transfer to the Secretary of
Defense of responsibilities, particularly tasking intelligence agencies,
in the event of war.

68. By statute, the intelligence oversight committee (s) of Congress,
in consultation with the Executive, should establish a charter for the
Defense Intelligence Agency which would clearly define its mission
and relationship to other intelligence agencies. The Committee recom-
mends that the charter include the following provisions :

A. In order to encourage close coordination between consumers and
producers of national intelligence, DIA should be a part of the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, and should report directly to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. A small J-2 staff should be
reconstituted to provide intelligence support, primarily of an opera-
tional nature, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Secretary of Defense
should ensure full coordination and free access to information between
the two groups.

B. The Director of the DIA should be appointed by the President
and subject to Senate confirmation. Either the Director or Deputy
Director of the Agency should be a civilian.

C. The Congress must relieve DIA from certain Civil Service regu-
lations in order to enable the quality of DIA personnel to be upgraded.
In addition, more supergrade positions must be provided for civilians
in DIA.

69. By statute, a character for the National Security Agency should
be established which, in addition to setting limitations on the Agency's
operations (see Domestic Subcommittee Recommendations), would
provide that the Director of NSA would be nominated by the Presi-
dent and subject to confirmation by the Senate. The Director should
serve at the pleasure of the President but not for more than ten years.
Either the Director or the Deputy Director should be a civilian.

70. The Department of Defense should centralize the service
counterintelligence and investigative activities within the United
States in the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) in order to reduce
wasteful duplication.

466

M. The Department or State axd Ambassadors

The Department of State and the Foreign Service have an important
role in the intelligence operations of the United States Government.
Because of its I'esponsibilities in formulating and conducting U.S.
foreign policy, the State Department is a principal customer for in-
telligence. Abroad, the Foreign Service, operating overtly, is the prin-
cipal collector of political intelligence and is a major collector of eco-
nomic inteligence.^^

Because of its foreign policy responsibilities and its worldwide com-
plex of diplomatic and consular installations, the Department of State
is the only Washington agency potentially able to oversee other U.S.
Government activities abroad — including those of the CIA. In the
field, this responsibility clearly falls on the Ambassador by law. In-
deed, Ambassadors are the sole mechanism available outside of the
CIA itself to assure that NSC decisions are appro]:)riatelv carried out
by the Clandestine Service. The Committee found that the role of the
Department of State and the Ambassadors constitute a central ele-
ment in the control and improvement in America's intelligence
operations overseas. However, the Committee also found that Am-
bassadors are often reluctant to exercise their authority in intelli-
gence matters. The Department has not encouraged them to do so, and
the administration has not issued directives to implement existing law
covering the authority of Ambassadors.

The Committee found that in general the Department of State exer-
cised substantial high-level influence over decisions to undertake major
covert action programs. In the field, Ambassadors are generally
knowledgeable and often involved in significant covert activities proj-
ects. There were, however, notable exceptions, such as the effort to
prevent Salvadoi- Allende from cominsf to power in Chile by means of
a military coup which was concealed from the Department, the Sec-
retary of State and the American Ambassador to Chile.

In contrast to covert action, the Committee found that neither the
State Department nor U.S. Ambassadors are substantially informed
about espionage or counterintelligence activities directed at foreign
governments. Such coordination as exists in this respect is at the
initiative of the Central Intelligence Agency and is infrequent. The
Committee found that there is no systematic assessment outside the
CIA of the risks of foreign espionage and counterespionage operations
and the extent to which those operations conform with overall foreign
policy.

In general, Ambassadors in the field are uninformed about specific
espionage activities within their countries of assignment. ITnlike
the case of covert action. Ambassadors are not asked to appraise the
risks of espionage activities, nor to assess their benefits. Often Am-
bassadors do not want to know the specifics of such operations,
and what coordination as exists in their cases is based on a general
injunction from them to the Station Chiefs that they not be con-
fronted with any "surprises."

" The Department has often indicated in hndeet documents relating to intel-
lig-enee as having a budget of $10 million, particularly for the Bureau of Intel-
ligence and Research. However, the intelligence community staff estimates the
costs attributable to the function of overt intelligence collection by the Foreign
Service at $80 million.

467

That is not always enough if an Ambassador wishes to participate
in policy decisions. For example, a shift of resources toward recruit-
ment of internal targets in a Western country was under consideration
between Washington and the field, and the U.S. Ambassador had not
been informed. In this connection, the Committee believes it would be
unrealistic to use clandestine recruitment to try to establish the kind
of intimate relationship with political elites in friendly countries
which we have enjoyed as a result of the shared experience of WWII
and its aftermath.

The Committee finds that more than a year after enactment of a
statute making Ambassadors responsible for directing, coordinating,
and supervising all U.S. Government employees within their country
of assignment,^^ instructions implementing this law have still not been
issued by any quarter of the executive branch. A former Under Secre-
tary of State told the Committee that the law, in effect, had been
"suspended" in view of Presidential inaction. Moreover, the CIA has
not modified its practices pursuant to this law. The Committee finds
this thwarting of the United States law unacceptable.

The Committee finds that Ambassadors cannot effectively exercise
tlieir legal responsibilities for a wide variety of intelligence activities
within their jurisdiction without State Department assistance on the
Washington aspects of the activities. Such support is particularly im-
portant in the case of intelligence operations aimed at a third coun-
try. An Ambassador may be able to judge the local risks of an espio-
nage effort, but if it is directed toward a third country the Ambassador
may not be able to assess the importance or value of the effort without
Washington support.

In the past, the Department of State, at least, has not had a parallel
responsibility nor the right of access to information necessary to
enable it to provide support to an Ambassador seeking to exercise
his statutory responsibility over CIA espionage and counterespionage
operations. The Committee notes section 4 in Executive Order No.
11905 of Febi-uary 18, 1976 which may be intended to provide such
State Department back-up for Ambassadors.

At present, the CIA handles both State Department and its own
communications with overseas posts. Under this arrangement, the Am-
bassador's access to CIA communications is at the discretion of the
CIA. The Coimiiittee finds that this is not compatible with the role
assigned to the Ambassador by law ; the Ambassador cannot be sure
that he knows the full extent and nature of CIA operations for which
he may be held accountable.

The Committee finds that Ambassadors' policies governing intelli-
gence activities have sometimes been interpreted in a manner which
vitiated their intent. For example, one Ambassador prohibited any
electronic surveillance by his Embassy's CIA component. The head of
the CIA component interpreted this to proscribe only CIA electronic
surveillance and believed that such surveillance could be conducted
in cooperation with local security services.

^^22 U.S.C. 2680a. The instnictions prepiared by the State Department and for-
warded to the NSC have been opposed by the CIA on the grounds that the CIA
stiU has a responsibility to protect sources and methods from unauthorized dis-
closure. The NSC has not acted on the proposed instructions.

468

The Committee found evidence that CIA Station Chiefs abroad do
not always coordinate their intelligence reporting on local develop-
ments with their Ambassadors. The Committee does not believe that
Ambassadors should be able to block CIA field reports. However, it
found that there was no standard practice for Ambassadors to review
and comment on intelligence reporting from the field.

The Committee finds that the Foreign Service is the foremost pro-
ducer in the United States Government of intelligence on foreign
political and economic matters. The Committee believes, however, that
the State Department does not adequately train Foreign Service
personnel, particularly in political reporting. Nor does the Depart-
ment fund their collection operations, nor manage their activities so as
to take full advantage of this extremely important intelligence ca-
pability. In effect, the Department, despite being a major source of
intelligence, considers this function secondary to its principal task of
diplomatic representation and negotiations.

From discussions in nearly a dozen foreign service posts, the Com-
mittee established that there is inadequate funding for Foreign Service
reporting officers to carry out their responsibilities. The funds avail-
able are considered "representation funds" and must be shared with the
administration and consular sections of most embassies. Such represen-
tation funds have been a favorite target for congressional cuts in the
State Department budget.

Recommendations

71. The National Security Council, the Department of State, and the
Central Intelligence Agency should promptly issue instructions imple-
menting Public Law 93-475 (22 U.S.C. 2680a). These instmctions
should make clear that Ambassadors are authorized recipients of
sources and methods information concerning all intelligence activities,
including espionage and counterintelligence operations. Parallel in-
structions from other components of the intelligence community
should be issued to their respective field organizations and operatives.
Copies of all these instructions should be made available to the intelli-
gence oversight committee (s) of Congress.

72. In the exercise of their statutory responsibilities, Ambassadore
should have the personal right, which may not be delegated, of access
to the operational communications of the CIA's Clandestine Service
in the country to which they are assigned. Any exceptions should have
jPresidential approval and should be brought to the attention of the
intelligence oversight committee (s) of Congress.

73. By statute, the Department of State should be authorized to take
the necessary steps to assure its ability to provide effective guidance and
support to Ambassadors in the execution of their responsibilities under
Public Law 93-475 (22 U.S.C. Sect. 2680a) .

74. Consideration should be given to increasing and earmarking
funds for Foreign Service ovei-t collection of foreign political and
economic information. These funds might be administered jointly by
the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the
Bureau of Economic Affairs.

75. The NSC should review the question of which U.S. Govern-
ment agency should control and operate communications with over-

469

seas diplomatic and consular posts, including the CIA, and other
civilian agencies operating abroad.

76. The Department of State should establish specific training pro-
grams for political reporting within the Foreign Service Institute,
and place greater emj)hasis on economic reporting.

N. Oversight and the Intelligence Budget

The Committee finds that a full understanding of the budget of
the intelligence community is required for effective oversight. The
secrecy surrounding the budget, however, makes it impossible for
Congress as a whole to make use of this valuable oversight tool.

Congress as a body has never explicitly voted on a "budget" for
national intelligence activities. Congress has never voted funds specif-
ically for CIA, NSA, and other national intelligence instrumentalities
of the Department of Defense.^^

The funding levels for these intelligence agencies are fixed by sub-
committees of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees
of both Houses. Funds for these agencies are then concealed in the
budget of the Department of Defense. Since this Departmental budget
is the one Congress approves, Congress as a whole, and the public,
have never known how much the intelligence agencies are spending
or how much is spent on intelligence activities generally. Neither Con-
gress as a whole, nor the public can determine whether the amount
spent on intelligence, or by the intelligence agencies individually, is
appropriate, given the priorities.

Because the funds for intelligence are concealed in Defense appro-
priations, those appropriations are thereby inflated. Most members
of Congress and the public can neither determine which categories
are inflated nor the extent to which funds in the inflated categories are
being used for purposes for which they are approved.

Finally, the Committee believes there is serious question as to
whether the present system of complete secrecy violates the constitu-
tional provision that :

No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in Conse-
quence of Appropriations made by Law ; and a regular State-
ment and Account of the Receipts and Exx)enditures of all
public Money shall be published from time to time.^^
The Committee believes that the overall figure for national intelli-
gence activities can be made public annually without endangering
national security or revealing sensitive programs.^** The Committee
carefully examined the possible impact of such disclosure on the
sources and methods of intelligence gathering and believes it to be
minimal. The Committee found that the primary concern about this

^ Funds for the intelligence activities of the Department of State, ERDA, and
the FBI are reviewed by the appropriate congressional committees and are voted
upon by Congress as a whole, when Congress appropriates funds for these
agencies.

" United States Constitution, Art. I. Sec. 9 Cls. 7.

^ The Committee noted that the Special Senate Committee to Study Questions
Related to Secret and Confidential Government Documents, chaired by Senators
Mansfield and Scott concluded that the aggregate figure for each intelligence
agency should be made public.

470

level of disclosure was that it would lead to pressure for even more
detailed revelation which would compromise vital intelligence
programs.

The Committee believes that disclosure of an aggregate figure for
national intelligence is as far as it is prudent to go at this stage m recon-
ciling the nation's constitutional and national security requirements.
Public speculation about overall intelligence costs would be elimi-
nated, the public would be assured that funds appropriated to particu-
lar government agencies were in fact intended for those agencies, and
botli Congress and the public would be able to assess overall priorities
in govermnental spending.

The Committee's analysis indicated that billion consti-
tutes the direct costs to the United States for its national intelligence
program for FY 1976. This includes the total approved budgets of
CIA, DIA, NSA and the national reconnaissance program.^' If the
cost of tactical intelligence by the armed services and indirect support
costs ^* which may be attributed to intelligence and intelligence- related
activities is added, the total cost of U.S. Government intelligence ac-
tivities would be twice that amount. This represents about tliree per-
cent of the total federal budget, and about eight percent of controllable
federal spending.

The CIA's budget for the fiscal year is contained in the Defense
Department budget. The Committee found that the CIA spends
approximately 70 percent more than it is appropriated, with the addi-
tional funds coming from advances and transfers from other agencies.
These transfers and advances are made with the knowledge and ap-
proval of OMB and the appropriate congressional committees. The use
of advances and transfers between agencies is a common governmental
practice. In this case the CIA receives funds as the contracting agent
for agencies in the Defense Department as well as other intelligence
community agencies.

Recommendations

11. The intelligence oversight committee (s) of Congress should
authorize on an annual basis a "National Intelligence Budget," the
total amount of which would be made public. The Committee recom-
mends that the oversight committee consider whether it is necessary,
given the Constitutional requirement and the national security de-
mands, to publish more detailed budgets.

78. The intelligence oversight committee (s) of Congress should
monitor the tactical and indirect support accounts as well as the na-
tional activities of intelligence agencies in order to assure that they are
kept in proper perspective and balance.

" The direct costs of the Intelligence activities of the ERDA, FBI. and State
Department are contained in their respective budgets.

■^ Indirect support costs include costs for personnel, operations and maintenance
which support intelligence activities. Examples are the operation of training facil-
ities, supply bases, and commissaries.

471

79. At the request of the intelligence oversight committee (s) of Con-
gress and as its agent, staff members of the General Accounting Office
should conduct full audits, both for compliance and for management
of all components of the intelligence community. The GAO should
establish such procedures, compartmentation and clearances as are
necessary in order to conduct these audits on a secure basis. In con-
ducting such audits, the GAO should be authorized to have full access
to all necessary intelligence community files and records.

O. Chemical and Biological Agents and the Intelligence

Community

The Committee investigated the testing and use of chemical and
biological agents by agencies within the intelligence community. The
testing programs originated in response to fears that countries hostile
to the United States would use chemical and biological agents against
Americans or our allies. Initially, this fear led to defensive programs.
Soon this defensive orientation became secondary as the possibility of
using these chemical and biological agents to obtain information from,
or to gain control of, enemy agents, became apparent.

The Committee found that United States intelligence agencies en-
gaged in research and development programs to discover materials
which could be used to alter human behavior. As part of this effort, test-
ing programs were instituted, fii'st involving witting human subjects.
Later, drugs were surreptitiously administered to unwitting human
subjects.

The Agency considered the testing programs highly sensitive. The
Committee found that few people within the agencies knew about
them; there is no evidence that Congress was informed about them.
These programs were kept from the American public because, as the
Inspector General of the CIA wrote, "the knowledge that the Agency
is engaging in unethical and illicit activities would have serious reper-
cussions in political and diplomatic circles and would be detrimental
to the accomplishment of its [CIA's] mission."

The research and development program and particularly the test-
ing program involving unwitting human subjects involved massive
abridgements of the rights of individuals, sometimes with tragic con-
sequences. The deaths of two Americans resulted from these programs ;
other participants in the testing programs still suffer residual
effects. While some controlled testing for defensive purposes might be
defended, the nature of the tests, their scale, and the fact that they
were continued for years after it was known that the surreptitious
administration of LSD to unwitting subjects was dangerous, indicate
a disregard for human life and liberty.

The Committee's investigation of the testing and use of chemical
and biological agents also raised serious questions about the adequacy
of command and control procedures within the CIA. The Committee
found that the Director waived the CIA's normal administrative con-
trols for this development and testing program in order to assure its
security. According to the head of the CIA's Audit Branch, the
waiver produced "gross administrative failures." The waiver pre-
vented the internal review mechanisms of the Agency — the Office

472

of the General Counsel, the Inspector General, and the Audit Staff —
from exercising adequate supervision of the program. The waiver had
the paradoxical effect of providing looser administrative controls and
less effective internal review of this controversial and highly sensitive
project than existed for normal Agency activities.

The Committee found that the security of the program was pro-
tected not only by the waiver but also by a high degree of compart-
mentation within the CIA. This resulted in excluding the CIA's
Medical Staff from the principal research and testing program, involv-
ing the effect of chemical and biological agents on human subjects.

The Committee also foiuid that within the intelligence community
there were destructive jurisdictional conflicts over drug testing. Mili-
tary testers withheld information from the CIA, ignoring their supe-
riors' suggestions for coordination. The CIA similarly failed to pro-
vide information on its programs to the military. In one case the
military attempted to conceal its overseas operational testing of LSD
from the CIA and the CIA attempted surreptitiously to discover the
details of the military's program.

Recoimnendations

80. The CIA and other foreign and foreign military intelligence
agencies should not engage in experimentation on human subjects
utilizing any drug, device or procedure which is designed, in-
tended, or is reasonably likely to harm the physical or mental health
of the human subject, except with the informed consent in writing,
witnessed by a disinterested third party, of each human subject, and
in accordance with the guidelines issued by the National Commission
for the Protection of Human Subjects for Biomedical and Behavioral
Research. Further, the jurisdiction of the Commission should be
amended to include the Central Intelligence Agency and the other in-
telligence agencies of the United States Government.

81. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secre-
tary of Defense should continue to make determined efforts to locate
those individuals involved in human testing of chemical and biologi-
cal agents and to provide follow-up examinations and treatment, if
necessary.

P. General Recommendations

82. Internal Regulations — Internal CIA directives or regulations
regarding significant Agency policies and procedures should be
waived only with the explicit written approval of the Director of
Central Intelligence. Waiver of any such regulation or directive
should in no way violate any law or infringe on the constitutional
right and freedom of any citizen. If the DCI approves the waiver or
amendment of any significant regulation or directive, the NSC and
the appropriate congressional oversight committee (s) should be no-
tified immediately. Such notification should be accompanied by a
statement explaining the reasons for the w^aiver or amendment.

83. Security Clearances — In the course of its investigation, the
Committee found that because of the many intelligence agencies par-
ticipating in security clearance investigations, current security clear-
ance procedures involve duplication of effort, waste of money,
and inconsistent patterns of investigation and standards. The intelli-

473

gence oversight committee (s) of Congress, in consultation with the
intelligence community, should consider framing standard security
clearance procedures for all civilian intelligence agencies and back-
groimd checks for congressional committees when security clearances
are required.

84. Personnel Practices — The Committee found that intelligence
agency training programs fail to instruct personnel adequately on the
legal limitations and prohibitions applicable to intelligence activities.
The Connnittee recommends that these training programs should be
expanded to include review of constitutional, statutory, and regida-
tory provisions in an effort to heighten awareness among all intelli-
gence personnel concerning the potential effects intelligence activities
may have on citizens' legal rights.

85. Security Functions of the Intelligence Agencies — The Commit-
tee found that the security components of intelligence agencies some-
times engaged in law enforcement activities. Some of these activities
may have been unlawful. Intelligence agencies' security functions
should be limited to protecting the agencies' personnel and facilities
and lawful activities and to assuring that intelligence personnel fol-
low proper security practices. (See the Committee's Final Report on
Domestic Intelligence, section on Intelligence Activities and the Rights
of American Citizens, p. 304. )

86. Secrecy and Authonzed Disclosure — The Committee has re-
ceived various administration proposals that would require persons
having access to classified and sensitive infonnation to maintain the
secrecy of that information. The Connnittee recommends that the is-
sues raised by these proposals be considered by the new legislative in-
telligence oversight committee (s) of Congress and that, in recasting
the 1947 National Security Act and in consultation with the executive
branch, the oversight conmiittee(s) consider the wisdom of new se-
crecy and disclosure legislation. In the view of the Committee any such
consideration should include carefully defining the following terms :

— national secret;

- — sources and methods ;

— lawful and unlawful classification ;

— lawful and unlawful disclosure.

The new legislation should provide civil and/or criminal penalties for
unlawful classification and unlawful disclosure. The statute should
also provide for internal departmental and agency procedures for
employees who believe that classification ancl/or disclosure procedures
are being improperly or illegally used to report such belief. There
should also be a statutory procedure whereby an employee who has
used the Agency channel to no avail can report such belief without
impunity to an "authorized" institutional group outside the agency.
The new Intelligence Oversight Board is one such group. The intelli-
gence oversight committee (s) of Congress would be another. The
statute should specify that revealing classified information in the
course of reporting information to an authorized group would not
constitute unlawful disclosure of classified information.

87. Federal Register for Classi-jied Executive Orders — In the course
of its investigation, the Committee often had difficulty locating classi-

69-983 O - 76 - 31

474

fied orders, directives, instructions, and regulations issued by various
elements of the executive branch. Access to these orders by the intelli-
gence oversight committee (s) of Congress is essential to informed
oversight of the intelligence community.

The Committee recommends that a Federal Register for classified
executive orders be established, by statute. The statute should require
the registry, under appropriate security procedures, of all executive
orders — however they are labeled — concerning the intelligence activi-
ties of the United States. Among the documents for which registry in
the Classified Federal Register should be required are all National
Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs), and all Director
of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs). Provision should be
made for access to classified executive orders by the intel-
ligence oversight committee (s) of Congress. Classified executive or-
ders would not be lawful until filed with the registry, although there
should be provision for immediate implementation in emergency situa-
tions with prompt subsequent registry required.

APPENDIX I

Congressional Authorization for the Central Intelligence
Agency to Conduct Covert Action

In recent years the CIA has spent millions of dollars in countries
all over the world for "covert action." Covert action, as the Central
Intelligence Agency has defined it, is any "clandestine activity de-
signed to influence foreign governments, events, organizations, or
persons in support of the United States foreign policy conducted in
such a manner that the involvement of the U.S. Government is not
apparent." ^ In its purpose to influence events, covert action is distin-
guished from clandestine intelligence gathering — often referred to as
espionage.^

In the last several years controversy has surrounded the conduct of
covert action by the Central Intelligence Agency. Since covert action
is not listed as a mission of the CIA in either its basic charter, the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947, or in the Central Intelligence Agency Act
of 1919, questions arise regarding the authority by which the Agency
undertook it. This report addresses the question of congressional
authorization for covert action. It does not attempt to analyze the
inherent power of the President to make covert action the respon-
sibility of one of the executive branch agencies.

At the outset, it should be noted that Congress is, in part, responsible
for the ambiguity which clouds the CIA's authority. The National
Security Act was designed to provide flexibility to the newly created
CIA so that it could meet unforeseen challenges. Flexibility was
provided throug'h an undefined and apparently open-ended grant of
authority to the National Security Council, and through it, to the CIA.
Witliout any indication in the Act's history that the Congress antici-
pated covert action or intended to authorize it, and without any execu-
tive branch attempt to obtain from Congress specific authority for the
conduct of covert actions such as sabotage or paramilitary activities,
the NSC directed CIA to undertake these activities. Until 1974, Con-
gress did not attempt to clarify the Agency's authority in this area,
even after learning about such well-publicized covert actions as the
invasion of the Bay of Pigs.

An analysis of congressional authorization for the conduct of covert
action goes far beyond the study of 30-year-old legislative debates. It
provides evidence of changes in the roles of the President and the Con-
gress in the formulation, implementation, and review of foreign policy.

^ Testimony of Mitchell Rogovin, Special Counsel to the Director of Central
Intelligence. House Select Intelligence Committee, 12/9/7.5, p- 1730. Covert ac-
tion was originally defined by the National Security Council as "secret action to
influence events in foreign countries which is so designed that, if discovered,
oflScial U.S. Government participation can be plausibly denied."

- Covert action also differs from clandestine collection and espionage in that
the latter are designed to obtain intelligence without affecting the source or
revealing the fact that the information has been collected.

(475)

476

It examines the procedures by which tlie President and the Congress
have delegated power to the NSC and the CIA and the effect of those
procedures. It illuminates the way the executive branch has inter-
preted undefined provisions of law. It raises questions about congres-
sional oversight of covert action and particularly the ability of Con-
gress, in the interest of security, to deny itself information. The result
of the denial has been to allow^ small numbers of senior members to
exercise the oversight function and to determine how much money the
CIA was to leceive and for what purposes.

Hopefully, this report wnll not only be useful to those interested in
the past. An examination of the question of congressional authoriza-
tion for the conduct of covert action may contribute to a better under-
standing of the relationship between the need for secrecy and the
processes of constitutional government. Such an understanding is
necessary as the United States moves into its third century.

Before turning to the National Security Act of 1947, two caveats
are in order. The first and most important is that any attempt to under-
stand the relationship between Congress and the executive branch
in this area must be based on the evidence available, which is often
quite sparse. For example, the Select Committee was able to locate
the transcript of only one executive session of a congressional commit-
tee considering the National Security Act of 1947, although weeks of
such sessions were held on this important legislation.

Covert action is now a well-defined and understood term. The
second caveat is for the reader to remember that although the U.S. did
undertake what would now be called covert action during World
War II, the term, and its possible scope, were not clearly understood
in the late 1940's.

A. The National Security Act or 1947

Although it has been cited as authority for the CIA to engage in
covert action, the National Security Act of 1947 does not specifically
mention covert action. A review of the hearings, committee reports and
floor debates on the Act reveals no substantial evidence that Congress
intended by passage of the Act to authorize covert action by the CIA.
In addition, a contemporaneous analysis of the Act by the General
Counsel of the CIA concluded that Congress had no idea that, under
the authority of the National Security Act, the CIA would undertake
covert action such as subversion or sabotage.

Congress did intend to provide the newly created CIA with sufficient
flexibility so that it would be able to respond to changing circum-
stances. There is no evidence, however, that that flexibility was in-
tended to allow the creation of a peacetime agency engaged in activities
such as paramilitary action or attempted assassination.

Although the evidence strongly suggests that the executive branch
did not intend through the language of the National Security Act to
obtain authorization from Congress for the conduct of covert action,
the record is not absolutely clear. Whether it did or did not so intend,
the executive branch soon seized upon the broad language of the Na-

477

tional Security Act. Facing what was perceived as an extraordinary
threat from the Soviet Union and her allies, coming to believe that the
only possible course of action for the United States was to respond
to covert action with covert action, the NSC authorized the CIA to
conduct covei't action.

1. Textual Analysis

Nowhere in the National Security Act is covert action specifically
authorized. Section 102(d) (5) of the Act, however, has been cited as
authority for covert action.^ That clause authorizes the CIA to "per-
form such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting
the national security as the National Security Council may from time
to time direct." ^

This clause was cited in NSC — i — A and NSC 10/2, the early direc-
tives from the National Security Council to the Central Intelligence
Agency which directed the CIA to conduct covert action.*^ The Director
of the CIA has cited the same section in claiming authorization for
covert paramilitary activitJ^"

On its face, the clause might be taken to authorize an enormous
range of activities not otherwise specified in the National Security
Act.^ An important limitation on the authorization, however, is that

^ Section 102(d) (4), which autliorizes the CIA to "perform for the benefit of
existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the
National Security Council determines can be more eflSciently accomplished cen-
trally," appears on its face to be applicable to covert action to the same extent
as Section 102(d) (5). Both represent an effoi-t to provide the Agency with some
flexibility in intelligence matters. Section 102(d) (4), however, has not been cited
by either the NSC or the CIA as authorizing covert action.

A provision similar to Section 102(d) (4) in the Presidential Directive estab-
lishing the Central Intelligence Group, the CIA's predecessor agency, was cited
as the CiG's authority to engage in clandestine collection of intelligence;
Section 102(d)(4) was cited by the National Security Council in directing
the CIA to engage in the same activity.

= 50U.S.C. 403(d)(5).

*■ While the CIA has consistently invoked the President's power to authorize
covert action, neither NSC 4-A or NSC 10/2 mentioned that power ; both re-
ferred to the authority conveyed by the National Security Act.

'The General Counsel of the CIA wrote the DCI commenting on his testi-
mony before the Subcommittee on Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations as follows :

"As for the authority of this Agency to engage in [covert paramilitary activity],
I think you were probably exactly right to stick to the language of the National
Security Act of 1947, as amended, particularly that portion which says that the
Agency shall 'perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence
affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to
time fiirect.' i^ctually. from 1947 on mv position has been that this is a rather
doubtful statutory authority on which to hang our paramilitary activities."
( .»ic.o.:auiuui xiom the CiA GeTieral Council to the Director, Subject: Syming-
ton Subcommittee Hearings, 10/30/69.)

* One of the witnesses appearing before the executive session of the House
Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments on June 27, 1947,
described the function of section (d)(5) as being to allow the CIA to go beyond
its enumerated functions during an emergency. (Peter Vischer testimony. House
Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, Hearings on H.R.
2319,6/27/47, p. 78.)

478

the activities must be "related to intelligence affecting the national
security." As Clark Clifford told the Senate Select Committee :

You will note that the language of the Act provides that
this catch-ail phrase is applicable only in the event that the
national security is affected. This was considered to be an
important and restricting clause.^

Some covert actions are at least arguably "related to intelligence af-
fecting the national security." As an individual in the CIA's Office of
the General Counsel noted in a memorandum to the General Counsel :

... it can be argued that many covert activities assigned
to the Agency by the National Security Council are at least
"related" to intelligence affecting the national security . . .
in the sense that their performance often is intimately dove-
tailed with clandestine intelligence operations, use the same
operations and methods and yield important intelligence
results.^"

Not all covert actions, however, have the characteristics suggested
in the above quotation. Many covert operations, such as the invasion
of the Bay of Pigs, have, at best, only the most limited relationship
to intelligence affecting the national security.^ ^ As the General
Counsel of the CIA wrote in 1947 :

Taken out of context and without knowledge of its history,
these Sections [102(d)(4) and (5)] could bear almost un-
limited interpretation, provided that the services performed
could be shown to be of benefit to an intelligence agency or
related to national intelligence.

Thus black propaganda, primarily designed for subver-
sion, confusion, and political effect, can be shown incidentally
to benefit positive intelligence as a means of checking
reliability of informants, effectiveness of penetration, and so
forth. Even certain forms of S.O. [special operations]
work could be held to l^enefit intelligence by establishment
of W/T [wireless telegraph] teams in accessible areas, and by
opening penetration points in confusion following sabotage
or riot. In our opinion.^ hoivereyr, either activity would be an
umoarranted extension of the functions authorized in l^ec-
tio7is 102{d) {Jf.) and (5). This is based on our understanding
of the intent of Congress at the time these provisions were
enacted.^^ [Emphasis added.]

The General Counsel concluded again in 1962 that certain forms of
covert action are not "related to intelligence." In a memorandum to the
DCI he wrote, "some of the covert cold war operations are related to
intelligence within a broad interpretation of Section 102(d)(5). It

" Clark Clifeord testimony, 12/4/75, Hearings, Vol. VII. p. 51.

^^ Memorandum from the CIA Office of the General Counsel to the General
Counsel. 2/(5/74, p. 1.

" The secrecy which surrounded the invasion of the Bay of Piss may well
have interferred with the CIA's mission to correlate and evaluate intelligence
related to the national security. Analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence were
neither informed about, nor asked to evaluate, the invasion plans.

^ Memorandum from the CIA General Counsel to the Director, 9/25/47, p. 1.

479

would be stretching that section too far to include a Guatemala or a
Cuba even though intelligence and counterintelligence are essential to
such activities." ^^ In this same memorandum, the General Counsel
suggested that, in order for the National Security Act to provide
authority for the conduct of the wide range of covert action engaged in
by the CIA, Section 102(d) (5) would have to read, "perform such
otiier functions and duties related to the national security" as the
NSC might from time to time direct, and not "perform such other
functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national secu-
rity." ^* After this interpretation w{,is given by the General Counsel, no
attempt was made by the executive branch to have the National
Security Act amended.^^

Only the most strained interpretation of "intelligence affecting the
national security" would allow certain covert actions by the CIA such
as paramilitary activities or the attempted assassination of foreign
leaders to come under Section 102(d) (5). As some covert actions are
more directly "'related to intelligence affecting the national security,"
however, it is important to examine the legislative history ^^ of the Na-

" Memorandum from the CIA General Counsel to the Director, 1/15/62, p. 2.
While the CIA has recently stated that "intelligence" was intended to have a
broader interpretation than the General Counsel indicated in the memorandum,
(See Rogovin, HSIC 12/9/75, p. 175) there is no evidence that Congress intended
the phrase "related to intelligence" to cover such activities as the attempted
assassination of foreign leaders. Under the CIA's expansive interpretation even
this would be authorized as the agents involved in the assassination attempt
might have previously provided intelligence to the CIA.

" General Counsel memorandum, 1/15/62, p. 2.

^^ In the same memorandum the General Counsel argued that the CIA was
authorized by Congress to conduct covert action as "Congress as a whole knows
that money is appropriated to CIA and knows that generally a portion of it
goes for clandestine activities." Given iiresidential direction and congressional
appropriation he advised that additional statutory authority is "unnecessary and,
in view of the clandestine nature of the activities, undesirable." {Ibid. p. 3.)

^° Legislative history includes review of the pre-enactment history, includ-
ing a history of the predecessor agencies, the history of the enactment, and sub-
sequent interpretation of the act. Legislative history is used as an aid to statutory
construction whei-e the language of the statute is unclear [Vnitcd States v. Don-
rus Co., 393 U.S. 297 (1965) ; United States v. Publie Utilities Commission
California, 345 U.S. 295 (1953)], where placing the "plain language" of a par-
ticular provision in the context of the whole statute creates an ambiguity
[Ma.stro Pla.^tic Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 350 U.S. 270 (1956) ;
Riehards v. United States', 369 U.S. 1 (1962)], or where it can be shown that an
application of the literal words would bring about a result plainly at variance
with their purpose {.Johansen v. Ignited States, 343 U.S. 427 (1952) ; United
States V. Diekerson, 310 U.S. 554 (1940)]. It is pei'tinent only to show legislative
intent and, thus, the various kinds of legislative history — hearings, reports, floor
debates — are considered significant according to the likelihood that they indicate
the purpose of the legislature as a whole. For instance, if Congress as a whole
is not, or cannot be, aware of the evidence that a bill would have a particular
effect, or remedy a particular evil, it cannot be assumed that Congress intended
the statute to have that effect. In construing statutes courts will, therefore, con-
sider whether the historv manifested in the bearings, reports and floor debates
was made available to the legislators, whether they were actually aware of it,
and the credence which the let'islntors them'^elves mav have given to it.

In certain instances, an examination of executive sessions may illuminate
the intent of individual members of Congress. Such testimony might also clarify
the Executive's interpretation of a particular piece of legislation.

480

tional Security Act to determine if these forms of covert action were
within the range of activities which Congress intended to authorize or
whether they represent what the CIA's former General Counsel called
"an unwarranted extension of the functions authorized in Sections 102
(d) (4) and (5) ." Congressional intent is particularly important in this
instance as Congress required the language of Section 102 to be written
into law rather than incorporating an earlier Presidential Directive
by reference. This was done because several Members of Congress
believed that if the CIA's missions were not set out in the statute,
the President could change them at any time simply by amending the
Directive.^^

Before turning to the legislative history of the National Security
Act, however it is important to note that Section 102(d) (5) sets out a
second condition — the CIA must be directed by the NSC to perform the
"other functions and duties." The authority of NSC to direct the CIA
to undertake activities has recently come under attack.^^ The question
of whether the NSC must specifically approve each covert action or
whether it can delegate its authority or provide approval in advance
for whole categories — or programs — of covert action has also been
raised. General Vandenberg, who headed the Central Intelligence
Group, the CIA's predecessor body, expressed to the drafters of the
National Security Act his belief that the CIA should not have to come
continually to the NSC for approval for action. According to a CIA
legislative history of the Act, Vandenberg was told that the CIA
would need to come to the NSC only on such specific matters as the NSC
required.^^

Over time the practice developed that all politically risky or costly
covert action projects would be brought before the 40 Committee of
the National Security Council, or its predecessors, for approval. How-
ever, low-risk projects could be approved within the CIA. During
some periods of time only a quarter of all covert action projects under-
taken by the CIA — the high-risk, high-cost covert actions — were ap-
proved by the NSC 40 Committee.^° In at least one instance, the 40

" Hearings before the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive De-
partment on H.R. 2319, National Security Act of 1947 April-July, 1947, p. 171.
See also Transcript, House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Depart-
ments, Hearings on H.R. 2319, 6/27/47, pp. 57-58. Another reason given for enu-
merating the CIA's purpose was that the public would not have access to the
Federal Register and thus would be ignorant of the Agency's missions.

^* See Committee on Civil Rights and the Committee on International Rights of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, "Central Intelligence Agency :
Oversight and Accountability," p. 13 ; and Central Intelligence Agency response
to "Central Intelligence Agency : Oversight and Accountability." p. 21.

For a discus.sion of the President's authority to direct the CIA to undertake
various forms of covert action in the absence of congressional authorization, or
when Congress has spoken, see chapt. III.

" See CIA Legislative Counsel memorandum, "Legislative History of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency : the National Security Act of 1947," 5/25/67, p. 30 (here-
inafter cited as "CIA's Legislative History".)

^^ A 1963 study showed that of the 550 existing covert action projects of the
CIA, which according to the CIA's own internal instruction should have been
submitted to the Special Group (the 40 Committee's predecessor), only S6 were
separately approved (or reapproved) by the Special Group between .January 1
and December 1, 1962. Memorandum for the Record, C/CA/PEG, Subject : "Policy
Coordination of CIA's Covert Action Operations," 2/21/67.

481

Committee was not informed about a major covert action — the Track
II attempt in Chile to foment a coiip.^^

If Confjressional authorization is claimed then the procedures es-
tablislied by Congress must be honored. If Congress intended covert
actions to be undertaken on an ad hoc basis as specifically directed by
the NSC then that procedure must be followed. As Chief Justice Mar-
shall wrote, once Congress has "prescribed . . . the manner in which
the law shall be carried into execution" the President is bound to re-
spect the limitation.^2

2. PreeTiactment History "^^ of the National. Security Act of 197 Ji.:

The CIA's Predecessor Agencies

Some of the langTiage of the National Security Act, in particular
Section 102(d)(5), closely resembles provisions of the Presidential
Directive which established the CIA's predecessor agency, the Cen-
tral Intelligence Group, in 1946. The CIG in turn grew out of the war-
time experience with the Office of Strategic Services and its predeces-
sor, the Office of Coordinator of Information.

The evolution from the Office of the Coordinator of Information
to the Central Intelligence Agency may indicate what the Executive
intended to accomplish through submission of the Central Intelligence
Agency section of the National Security Act of 1947. To the extent to
which Congress was familiar with this evolution, and with the roles
played by the Coordinator of Information, the OSS, and the CIG, it
could be said that Congress understood tlie meaning of the legislation
which the Executive proposed and shared in the Executive's expecta-
tion of what the legislation would accomplish.

The Office of the Coordinator of Information was established by
a Presidential Directive of July 11, 1941. The Directive was preceded
by a memorandum to the President by William J. Donovan on
June 10, 1941, proposing a centralized intelligence organization with
psychological warfare among its functions.^* The Directive did not

^ See Senate Select Committee, "Alleged Assassination Attempts Against For-
eign Leaders."

^ lAtile V. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170, 178 (1805). If it is Presidential power which
i'; delegated, then the procedures established for the delegation cannot be
disregarded.

^ Preenactment history is the term given to events occurring prior to the intro-
duction of legislation. Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 48.03 (4th ed. 1973).
It encompasses events to which the legislation in question was apparently a
response.

Preenactment history is considered by the courts, in some cases, to be sig-
nificant in determining legislative intent. The challenge is to determine the mis-
chief which particular legislation is meant to remedy. Generally, the courts look
to events or patterns of abuse which were well publicized and which Congress-
men would most likely know about and have in mind when they enacted a
particular law: See e.g. Clnrk v. Ucbcrsec Fianz-Koi'p., 322 U.S. 4.59 (1947).

Thus the relaitonship between poor coordination of intelligence and the suc-
cessful bombing of Pearl Harbor by the .Tapanese could be considered as extrin.sic
evidi^nce of Congressional intent in passing the National Securitv Act of 1947.

^* Memorandum from William .T. Donovan to the President. 6/10/41. Physical
subversion and guerrila warfare were not mentioned in Donovan's memorandum,
but thpy were discussed with Cabinet officers involved and were felt by
Donovan to be implicit with his plan.

482

mention psychological warfare, but authorized the Coordinator of In-
formation to "collect and analyze all information and data which may
bear upon national security" and to "carry out when requested by the
President such supplementary activities as may facilitate securing
of information important for national security." Like the National
Security Act of 1947, the 1941 Directive was designed for flexibility.
The Presidential Directive establishing the COI made no distinc-
tion betwen overt and clandestine collection. Within the month, the
COI established a unit to collect intelligence from overt sources, and
by October the COI had begun the collection of information by un-
dercover agents outside the Western Hemisphere. ^'^ On October 10,

1941, the "Special Activities" unit was established in COI to take
charge of sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla warfare. Thus a Di-
rective which authorized the collection and analvsis of information,
together with sujiplementary activities "to facilitate securing of in-
formation important for national security" was interpreted within
the executive branch as authorizing what is now known as covert
action.

All of these events preceded the outbreak of World War II. Fol-
lowing the outbreak of hostilities. President Roosevelt established the
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) by military order dated June 13,

1942. Among the functions assigned to the OSS was to "collect and
analyze such strategic information as may be required by the United
States Joint Chiefs of Staff" and to perform "such special services as
may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Pursuant to this order,
the OSS undertook both clandestine collection of intelligence and
covert action.2^ The assignment of both these functions to the OSS was
opposed by various branches of the Armed Services.

In 1944, William Donovan, then head of OSS, wrote to the Presi-
dent proposing a permanent peacetime intelligence service. He sug-
gested that the service should collect, analyze, and disseminate "in-
telligence on the policy or strategy level," and that it should be re-
sponsible for "secret activities," such as "clandestine subversive opera-
tions." ^^ At roughly the same time that General Donovan made his
recommendations, General Doolittle proposed an intelligence agency
which would collect intelligence either directly or through existing
agencies and perform subversive operations abroad. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State eventually responded to
the Donovan proposal .^° The debate focused on the extent of the new
agency's independence, to whom it should report, and its responsi-
bility for clandestine collection of intelligence.

In September 1945, OSS was disbanded amid the struggle over the
future shape of American intelligence activities. By an Executive
Order dated September 20, 1945, the responsibility for the clandestine

^The FBI was responsible for information collected by overt and covert
means in the Western Hemisphere.

^See generally R. Harris Smith. 088 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1972).

'^ Memorandum from William Donovan to the President, October 1944, as cited
in CIA Legislative History, pp. 12-13.

'" CIA Legislative History, pp. 14-17.

483

collection of intelligence was transferred to the War Department,
where the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) was established.^^

Also transferred to SSU were the OSS sections responsible for
covert psychological and paramilitary activities. In a significant break
with wartime operations, however, these latter sections were to be
liquidated, leaving only such assets as were necessary for peacetime
intelligence.^^

In the absence of agreement among his advisers, President Truman
directed Admiral Sidney Souers to prepare a plan for the establish-
ment of a central intelligence organization. On January 22, 1946,
President Truman issued a Presidential Directive ^^ which established
the National Intelligence Authority under the direction of the
Director of Central Intelligence. The NIA was to include the Secre-
tary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and
the personal representative of the President. Under the Directive, the
NIA was to be "assisted by" the Central Intelligence Group, a coordi-
nating body ^Vhich drew funds and personnel from other agencies of
the executive. The CIG was to collect, evaluate, and disseminate in-
telligence relating to the national security, plan for the coordination
of intelligence agencies, and perform "such services of common con-
cern" as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more
efficiently accomplished centrally.^* The CIG was also to perform "such
other fimctions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national
security as the President and the National Intelligence Authority may
from time to time direct."

Although the House Select Intelligence Committee was told in 1975
that the CIG was assigned the "fimction of conducting covert ac-
tion" ^^ the former General Counsel of the CIA noted that at the time
of the CIG draft directive "there was really ... no contemplation
whatsoever of a program of What might be called covert action." ^®
In fact, the CIG does not appear to have been engaged in any covert
action abroad. ^^ The covert action capability of the government which
had been lodged in OSS and then transferred to SSU in the War
Department had been, in early 1946, almost totally liquidated.^^ The
absence of a covert action program and the decline of the capability

*^For the following nine months, until the clandestine intelligence function
was transferred to the Central Intelligence Group, SSU was responsible for
clandestine intelligence gathering.

^^ Testimony of Lawrence Houston, former CIA General Counsel, 6/17/75, p. 6.

^ Presidential Directive. 1/26/46 ; 11 Fed Reg. 1337, 2/5/46.

^ The Presidential Directive made no explicit mention of clandestine collection
of intelligence. It has been suggested that this function was omitted solely to
avoid mention of intelligence collection in a published document. (See CIA's
Legislative History, 7/25/67, p. 19.)

On July 8, 1946, the NIA issued NIA-5 authorizing the CIG to conduct
clandestine intelligence collection outside the United States under the authority
of the CIG to perform ".services of common concern." NIA-5 resulted in the
transfer of SSU to the CIG and the establishment within the CIG of the Office of
Special Operations (OSO) to conduct espionage abroad.

^ Rogovin, HSIC Hearings, 12/9/75, p. 1733.

'" Houston, 6/17/75, p. 7.

^ See interviews with Arthur Macy Cox and Lawrence Houston on file at the
Center for National Security Studies.

"* Houston, 6/17/75, p. 8.

484

suggests that a covert action mission for the CIA was not clearly an-
ticipated by either the executive or the Congress.

3. The Enactment of the National Security Act of 191^7

Efforts to draft legislation for a central intelligence organization
began almost immediately after the Presidential Directive of Janu-
ary 22, 1946. Statutory authorization was required by the Independ-
ent Offices Appropriation Act of 1944, which provided that no office
could receive funding for more than one year without specific author-
ization and appropriation by Congress. A June 7, 1946 report to
the NIA by Admiral Souers, who drafted the 1946 Presidential Di-
rective and who was the first Director of Central Intelligence, indi-
cated the CIG's need for its own budget and personnel as well as for
the authority to make certain kinds of contracts.

Lawrence Houston and John Warner,^^ both then with the CIG,
began to work on a draft which would have established an organiza-
tion far removed from the coordinating group concept of the CIG.
The draft included provisions for an independent budget, direct hir-
ing of personnel, and other administrative authorities which would
allow the new agency to be autonomous and flexible. The provisions
were drawn up after Houston and Warner had analysed the problems
encountered by the OSS during the war, and were designed to avoid
these difficulties.''" As Houston noted, there was "no specific [covert
action] program" under consideration at that time " but the aim of
the draft was to "provide the Agency with the maximum flexibility for
whatever it would be asked to do." *^

In January 1947, another drafting group consisting of Clark Clif-
ford, Charles Murphy, Vice Admiral Forest Sherman, and Major
General Lauris Xorstad, began to consider proposals for an agency to
supercede the CIG, this time in the context of a proposal which would
unify the Armed Services. On February 26, 1947, President Truman
submitted to the Congress a draft entitled, "The National Security
Act of 1947." Title 2 of Section 202 provided for a Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), which would report to a National Security Council
(NSC). The NSC was to take over the duties of the NIA while the
CIA was to have the functions, personnel, property, and records of
the CIG.

The section in the draft legislation dealing with the CIA did not
spell out, in any detail, its relationship to the rest of the executive
branch or its functional responsibilities. As the framers were pri-
marily concerned with the unification of the armed services,*^ the
draft legislation, according to a memorandum from General Vanden-
berg to Clark Clifford, eliminated "any and all controversial material
insofar as it referred to central intelligence which might in any way

'* Both individuals later served as General Counsel to the CIA. Mr. Houston
occupied that post from 1947 until 1974, and Mr. Warner has occupied it since.
*° Houston, 6/17/75, p. 9.
"■ Ibid., p. 10.
*' Ibid.
" CIA's Legislative History, p. 25.

485

hamper the successful passage of the Act." "** The legislation incor-
porated by reference the functions of the CIG as set out in the Presi-
dential Directive of January 22, 1946.*^

S. 758, the Senate version of the draft legislation was referred to the
Armed Services Committee, while H.R. 42i4 was referred to the House
Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department. The Senate
Committee heJd liearmgs tor ten weeks, went into executive session
on May 20, 1947, and reported out an amended version which was
approved by voice vote. The House Committee held hearings from
early April until July 1. On July 19, the House approved the amended
bill and upon receipt of S. 758, amended it in accordance with the
language of H.R. 4214. S. 758 emerged from Conference Committee
witli the functions of the CIA spelled out rather than incorporated
by reference ; the bill was approved by the Senate on July 24, 1947, and
by the House on July 25, 1947.

There is little in the public record of this process to indicate con-
gressional intent with respect to the CIA's authority to engage in
covert action. The records of public hearings and floor debates on the
National Security Act, as well as the proceedings of a committee
meeting in executive session, support the view that Congress as a
whole did not anticipate that the CIA would engage in such activities.

The record is ambiguous, however, in part because the legislators
and witnesses were concerned that United States security might be
compromised by too full and frank a discussion of American intelli-
gence needs on the floor of Congress. As Representative Manasco
stated :

Many witnesses appeared before our Committee. They were
sworn to secrecy. I hesitate to even discuss this section, as I
am afraid that I might say something because the Congres-
sional Record is a public record, divulge something here that
we received in that Committee that would give aid and com-
fort to any potential enemy we have.*^

Related to this point is the possibility that ambiguous language was
expressly chosen in order not to offend world opinion. The former
General Counsel of the CIA recalled that some Members of Congress
sought to put in the statutory language the authorization to con-
duct espionage and counterespionage. But this we defeated, in "light

** Memorandum from General Vandenberg to Clark Clifford, cited in CIA's
Legislative History, p. 27.

Administrative provisions for the CIA were omitted from the proposed legis-
lation in order that unification of the armed services would not be stalled and
because there was some concern that the drafting of these could not be completed
in time. {Ibid., pp. 26, 32. )

According to the CIA's Legislative History, "There was a general feeling that
any unnecessary enlargement of the CIA provision would lead to controversy"
and would affect the legislative processing of the National Security Act of 1947.
(Ibid., p. 32.)

^ These functions had been expanded by NIA-5 to include the clandestine
collection of intelligence.

*" 93 Cong. Rec. 9605 (1947).

486

of the argument that they didn't want it advertised that this country
was going to engage in such activities." ^^

An additional problem in interpreting the available evidence is that
in 1947 no term was clearly understood to mean covert action as the
term is used today. Members of Congress and witnesses used terms
such as "operational activities," "special operations," or and "direct
activities," but these remarks were as likely to have meant clandestine
collection of intelligence as covert action. The following exchange be-
tween Representative Busbey and Secretary Forrestal in public hear-
ings before the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments illustrates this problem :

Mr. Busbey. Mr. Secretary, this Central Intelligence Group,
as I understand it under the bill, is merely for the purpose of
gathering, disseminating, and evaluating information to the
National Security Council, is that correct ?

Secretary Forrestal. That is a general statement of their
activity.

Mr. Busbey. I wonder if there is any foundation in the ru-
mors that have come to me to the effect that through the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, they are contemplating operational
activities?

Secretary Forrestal. I would not be able to go into the de-
tails of their operations, Mr. Busbey. The major part of
what they do, their major function, as you say, is the collec-
tion and collation and evaluation of information from Army
Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, the Treasury, Department of
Commerce, and most other intelligence, really. Most intelli-
gence work is not of a mystical or mysterious character ; it is
simply the intelligence gathering of available data through-
out this Government. ... As to the nature and extent of any
direct operational activities, I think I should rather have
General Vandenberg respond to that question.*^ [Emphasis
added.]

Another example is contained in a letter, printed in the hearing rec-
ord, from Allen Dulles, then a private citizen but later Director of
Central Intelligence, to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Dulles
recommended that the CIA have its own appropriations, but be able
to supplement these with funds from other agencies, "in order
to carry on special operations which may, from time to time, be
deemed necessary by the President, the Secretary of State, and the
Secretary of National Defense." [Emphasis added.] *^

" Houston. 6/17/7.^, p. 17. See also, memorandum from the CIA General Coun-
sel to the Director, 5/7/48. In 1974, an individual in the CIA's Offir-e of General
Counsel wrote that additional statutory authority for covert action was "un-
necessary and in view of the delicate nature of the activities, undesirable,"
(Memorandum from Stephen Hale to the General Counsel, 2/6/74.)

*® .Tames Forrestal testimony. Hous!^ Expenditures in the Executive Depart-
ments Committee Hearines on H.R. 2.S19, 1947, p. 120. There is no record of any
later statement by General Vandenberg on the subject.

** Letter from Allen Dulles to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senate
Armed Services Committee, Hearings on S. 758, 1947, p. 521.

487

Finally, Kepresentative Patterson stated during the floor debates
that while he clearly wanted "an independent intelligence agency
working without direction by our armed services, with full authority
in operation procedures," he knew that it was "impossible to incor-
porate such broad autnority in the bill now before us. . . ." ^°

These exhaust the statements in open session — in hearings or on the
floor — which arguably deal with covert action — although as was pre-
viously noted, they may also be read to refer to clandestine intelligence
gathering. There is no clear explanation of or proposal for covert
action. JNo justihcation for covert action was presented by the Execu-
tive.^^ It would be difficult, based upon these statements, to argue that
Congress intended to authorize covert action by the CIA.

The legislating committees met extensively in executive session to
consider the bill and to discuss the Central intelligence Agency por-
tions of it. The Select Committee has been able to locate a transcript
for only one of these sessions, a June 27, 1947 meeting of the House
Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. At that
meeting the wisdom of centralizing the clandestine intelligence collec-
tion function in the CIA was discussed in some detail. Although the
Members and witnesses could put aside the security constraints which
might have inhibited them in open session, this record too is am-
biguous. It does, however, tend to support the proposition that Con-
gress did not intend to authorize covert action by the CIA.

The CIA has cited two exchanges at this executive session for the
proposition that the House Committee on Expenditures "had full
knowledge of the broad implications" of the Presidential Directive
and understood it to authorize the CIG to engage in covert action.
Therefore, according to the CIA, by adopting the National Security
Act, which contained the same broad language as the Directive, Con-
gress was authorizing the CIA to conduct covert action.^^

The first exchange quoted was between Representative Clarence
Brown and General Hoyt S. Vanderberg, Director of Central Intel-
ligence. The full context of the remarks w^hich the Agency quoted,
however, clearly indicates that the broad language of the 1946 Direc-
tive had been read to authorize clandestine collection of intelligence.'^^

'"93 Cong. Rec, H9447 (1947).

^^ "111 none of the formal . . . explanations or justifications did we, so far
as I can recall, set forth any program for covert action." (Houston, 6/17/75,
p. 10.)

°" Rogovin, HSIC, 12/9/75, p. 1734^5.

^ The exchange quoted by the CIA's Special Counsel is italicized in the follow-
ing quote :

"General Vandenberg. In 'd' of the President's letter (the Presidential Direc-
tive of January 22, 1946) , which you read, is the following :

'Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the
national security as the President and the National Intelligence Authority may
from time to time direct.'

That was the basis. The Intelligence Advisory Board, which consists of the
Chief of the three departmental intelligence organizations. State, War and
Navy, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, made an ex-
haustive study of the best way to centralize, both from the point of view of ef-
ficiency of operations and cost, certain phases of the national intelligence.

Continued

488

The CIA also cited the executive session testimony of Peter Vischer,
who opposed the "other functions and, duties" clause. He urged its
defeat, calling it a loophole "because it enabled the President to direct
the CIG to perform almost any operations." ^^ The CIA notes this
opposition, implies that Vischer opposed the clause as it authorized
covert action, and claims congressional authorization for covert action
because the clause was included in the National Security Act.^^ The
full record shows, however, that Vischer spoke specifically in opposi-
tion to centralizing clandestine collection in the CIA. He objected to
the "other functions and duties" language as it would authorize such
collection.^*^ His objection might have alerted the Committee to "broad
implications" in the language, but not to its potential as authorization
for covert action.

The only clear reference to the activities which are now referred to
as covert action took place in the executive session during an exchange
between Representative Rich and General Vandenberg. Representa-
tive Rich asked, "Is this agency [the CIG] used in anyway as a prop-
aganda agency?" General Vandenberg responded, "No, sir." ^^

Continued

They all felt, together with myself, who was Director at that time, that a
very small portion, but a very important portion, of the collection of intelli-
gence should be centralized in one place. Now, the discussion went on within
the Intelligence Advisory Board as to where that place should be.

Mr. Beown. May I interrupt just a moment there? In other words, you pro-
ceeded under the theory that this Central Intelligence Agency was authorized
to collect this information and not simply to evaluate it?

General Vandenberg. We went under the assumption that we should inform
the National Intelligence Authority, with the setting up of the Central Intelli-
gence Group, on an efficient basis, as was required from us from time to time to
advise, because we were the Advisory Board for the National Intelligence Author-
ity ; and that part that says that we should "perform such other functions and
duties as the President and the National Intelligence Authority may from time to
time direct" and "recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the estab-
lishment of such overall policies and objectives as will assure the most effective
accomplishment of the National Intelligence mission" gave us that right.

Mr. Brown. Then, you did not consider that the word "evaluate" was a limita-
tion on your duty, but this other section was so broad that you could do about
anything that you decided was either advantageous or beneficial, in your mind?

General Vandenberg. Yes, sir.

Mr. Brown. In other words, if you decided you wanted to go into direct activi-
ties of any nature, almost, why, that would be done?

General Vandenberg. Within the Foreign Intelligence field, if it was agreed
upon by all the three agencies concerned.

Mr. Brown. And that you were not limited to evaluation?

General Vandenberg. That is right, sir.

(Transcript, House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department,
Hearings on H.R. 2319, 6/27/47, pp. 9-11.)

Walter Pforzheimer has told one interviewer that General Vandenberg testi-
fied in the executive session about intelligence collection because Army Intelli-
gence opposed any intelligence gathering by the CIA. Covert action, according to
Pforzheimer, was not mentioned. Interview on file at the Center for National
Security Studies.

In addition, as was noted earlier, there is no evidence that the Central Intelli-
gence Group did engage in covert action.

" Rogovin, HSIC, 12/9/75, p. 1735.

* Ibid.

^ Transcript,. House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments,
Hearings on H.R. 2319, 6/27/47, p. 37.

" Ibid., p. 37.

489

These statements and the discussions in the executive session about
the CIA's role in clandestine intelligence gathering suggest that the
ambiguous references in the public hearings referred to clandestine
collection operations.

Because the Select Committee has been unable to locate transcripts
of the other executive sessions, it is impossible to state conclusively
that covert action was not explicitly mentioned during these meetings.
However, none of the participants queried recalled any such discus-
sions and none of the committee reports contain any references to
covert action.

A memorandmn by the CIA's General Counsel, written soon after
the passage of the Act, noted that ''We do not believe that there was
any thought in the minds of Congress that the Central Intelligence
Agency, under this authority, would take positive action for subversion
and sabotage." In that September 25, 1947 memorandum to the Direc-
tor, the General Counsel wrote :

A review of debates indicates that Congress was primarily
interested in an agency for coordinating intelligence and
originally did not propose any overseas collection activities
for CIA. The strong move to provide specifically for such
collection overseas was defeated, and, as a compromise, Sec-
tions 102(d) (4) and (5) were enacted, which permitted the
National Security Council to determine the extent of the
collection work to be performed by CIA. We do not believe
that there was any thought in the minds of Congress that the
Central Intelligence Agency under this authority would take
positive action for subversion and sabotage. A bitter debate at
about the same time on the State Department's foreign broad-
cast service tends to confirm our opinion. Further confirma-
tion is found in the brief and off-the-record hearings on ap-
propriations for CIA. ... It is our conclusion, therefore, that
neither M.O. [morale operations] nor S.O. [special opera-
tions] should be undertaken by CIA without previously in-
forming Congress and obtaining its approval of the func-
tions and the expenditure of funds for those purposes.^®

All of this is not to suggest that Congress or any Members of Con-
gress specifically intended that covert action should be excluded from
the authorized missions of the CIA. The issue of covert action simply
was not raised in the course of the legislation's enactment. As the
CIA's former General Counsel told the Senate Select Committee,
there is "no specific legislative history supporting covert action as
part of the functions assigned" to the CIA.^" Rather than authorizing
covert action, the broad language of 102(d)(5) appears to have

* Memorandum from the CIA General Counsel to the Director, 9/25/47.

This memo may have been the result of an inquiry by Admiral Hillenkoetter,
who had been asked by Secretary Forrestal if the CIA would be able to conduct
covert and cold war activities such as black propaganda and sabotage in support
of guerrilla warfare. Admiral Hillenkoetter, who had doubts about the CIA's
authority to undertake such activities, asked his General Counsel for his
opinion. (Houston, 6/17/75, p. 13-15.)

"* Houston, 6/17/75, p. 10.

69-983 O - 76 - 32

490

been intended to authorize clandestine collection of intelligence ^° and
to provide the CIA with the "maximum flexibility" ''^ necessary to deal
with problems which, due to America's inexperience with a peacetime
intelligence agency, might not be foreseen.

D. Post Enactment History

As previously noted, the executive branch presented no justification
to the Congress for the conduct of covert action by the CIA. Yet even
while the National Security Act of 1947 was being drafted, introduced,
debated, and passed the Coordinating Committee of the Departments
of State, War, and the Navy (SWNCC) prepared a paper establishing
procedures for psychological warfare during peacetime as well as war-
time. On April 30, 1947, SWNCC established a Subcommittee on
Psychological Warfare to plan and execute psychological war.

These plans took on new importance as the United States became
concerned over the course of events in Western Europe and the Near
East. Tension soon became so high that in December of 1947, the
Department of State advised the NSC that covert operations mounted
by the Soviet Union and her allies threatened the defeat of American
foreign policy objectives. The Department recommended that the
U.S. supplement its own foreign policy activity with covert
action.

At its first meeting in December, 1947, the National Security Coun-
cil approved NSC-4, which empowered the Secretary of State to
coordinate information activities designed to counter communism.
A top secret annex took cognizance of the "vicious psychological
efforts of the USSR, its satellite countries, and Communist groups to
discredit and defeat the activities of the U.S. and other Western
powers." The NSC determined that "in the interests of world peace
and U.S. national security the foreign information activities of the
U.S. government must be supplemented by covert psychological
operations."

The CIA was already engaged in clandestine collection of intel-
ligence and, as the NSC put it, "The similarity of operational meth-
ods involved in covert psychological and intelligence activities and
the need to ensure their secrecy and obviate costly duplication renders
the CIA the logical agency to conduct such operations." Therefore,
acting under the authority of section 102(d) (5) of the National Secu-
rity Act of 1947, the NSC instructed the Director of Central Intel-
ligence to initiate and conduct covert psychological operations that
would counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired covert actions and which
would be consistent with U.S. foreign policy and overt foreign
information activities.^^

In the following months the CIA was involved in a number of covert
actions. As the Soviet threat loomed larger and larger, the need for
covert action, beyond psvchological operations, seemed more pressing.
On June 18, 1948, the NSC issued NSC-10/2 which superseded NSC-
4-A, and vastly expanded the range of covert activities. The CIA was

*" Memorandum from the CIA General Counsel to the Director, 5/7/48.

*^ Houston, 6/17/75, p. 10.

^ Pursuant to the NSC's instruction, the Special Procedures Group was estab-
lished in the Office of Special Operations (OSO) of the CIA to conduct covert
psychological operations.

491

authorized to undertake economic warfare, sabotage, subversion
against hostile states (including assistance to guerrilla and refugee
liberation groups), and support of indigenous anti- communist ele-
ments in threatened countries.

The NSC noted that CIA was already charged with espionage and
counterespionage abroad.*'^ Because of this, according to the NSC, it
was "desirable" for "operational reasons" to assign covert action au-
thority to the CIA rather than to create a new unit. Therefore, under
the authority of 50 U.S.C 403(d) (5), the NSC ordered the establish-
ment in CIA of the Office of Special Projects (OSP) , to conduct covert
action. The Chief of OSP was to receive policy guidance from the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. OSP (later, OPC)
was to operate independently of all components of the CIA to the
maximum degree consistent with efficiency.^*

Thus even though the CIA's General Counsel could find no author-
ity in the legislative history of the National Security Act, the NSC
relied upon the Act to direct the CIA to initiate covert actions. Lan-
guage intended to authorize clandestine intelligence gathering and to
provide flexibility for unforeseen circumstances was broadened by
the executive to cover sabotage, subversion and paramilitary ac-
tivities. The executive branch did not heed the advice offered by the
CIA's General Counsel in 1947 that congressional authorization was
still "necessary." "^ This may well have been due to a belief in the power
of the President to direct such activities.''^

It is impossible to prove conclusively that Congress intended or did
not intend to authorize covert action by the CIA through the passage
of the National Security Act of 1947. It is possible, however, after
reviewing the hearings, committee reports, and floor debates, to say that
there is no substantial evidence supporting the existence of Congres-
sional intent to authorize covert action by the CIA through the enact-
ment of the National Security Act.

This conclusion is supported by the following :

(1) The absence of any explicit provision in the Act itself.

(2) The absence of any reference to covert action in the
committee reports.

(3) The absence of any clear statement by a Member of
Congress, in the hearings or debates, which demonstrates

the intent to authorize covert action.

(4) The absence of any reference to a program of covert
action in the justifications and explanations by the executive
branch of the Act.

* The CIA had also been charged with conducting covert psychological opera-
tions under the authority of NSC 4-A.

"Both NSC-^-A and NSC 10/2 cited 50 U.S.C. (d) (5) ; neither invoked the
President's authority, if any, to order covert action in the absence of congres-
sional authorization.

*^ Memorandum from the CIA General Counsel to the Director, 9/25/47, p. 2.

"The General Counsel of the CIA noted his belief that "if [the CIA got]
the proper directive from the executive branch and the funds from the Congress
to carry out that directive, these two together are the true authorization."
(Memorandum from the General Counsel of the CIA to the Director, 10/30/69,
at p. 2.)

492

(5) The absence of any discussion in the hearings or de-
bates of the threats which would suggest the need for a
covert action capability.

(6) The conclusion of the CIA's General Counsel, im-
mediately following the Act's passage, that the CIA lacked
statutory authority for covert action and that sections (d) (4)
and (5) were intended by Congress to authorize clandestine
intelligence gathering by the CIA.

B. The CIA Act of 1949

Passage of the CIA Act of 1949 has also been cited as support for
the view that Congress has authorized covert action by the CIA. A
careful analysis of the Act's legislative history does not support this
view.

Two years after the enactment of the National Security Act and
after the NSC had directed the CIA to engage in various covert activi-
ties, Congress passed the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.^*
The 1949 legislation was an enabling act containing administrative
provisions necessary for the conduct of the Agency's mission.^^ As
such, it did not add to the missions of the Agency. The events sur-
rounding its passage, however, may shed light upon what Congress
believed it had authorized in the National Security Act of 1947.

The Act included a number of administrative provisions which
clearly were designed to assure the security of some sort of clandestine
activity by the CIA. These included the waiver of normal restrictions
placed on governmental acquisition of materiel, hiring and, perhaps
more important, accounting for funds expended. The General Counsel
of the Central Intelligence Agency wrote that :

Provision of unvouchered funds and the inviolatability of
such funds from outside inspection is the heart and soul of
covert operation.^" '

The Central Intelligence Agency has argued that passage of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 "clearly reflects Congress'
determination that the Agency be able to conduct activities such as
covert action, similar to those conducted by the OSS." "^ Although
members of the House Armed Services Committees were aware that
the Central Intelligence Agency was conducting covert operations and
that the administrative provisions would be "essential to the flexibility

""SOIJ.S.C. 403a-403j.

"^ The administrative provisions had been included in a draft of the National
Security Act of 1947 shown to Members of the Hous'e of Representatives. In
order to avoid having to detail administrative provisions for a\\ of the orga-
nizations set up under the National Security Act, these provisions were removed
from the draft to be presented later as a separate act.

™ Memorandum from the CIA General Counsel to the Director, 5/25/49, p. 2.

" Rogovin, HSIC, 12/9/75, p. 1735.

493

and security" ^^ of these operations, there is no evidence that Congress
as a whole knew the range of clandestine activities, including covert
action, which was being undertaken by the CIA. The committee re-
ports on the Central Intelligence Agency Act include no reference to
covert action. The floor debates contain only one reference to
covert action, and strongly suggest that the Congress knew only that
clandestine intelligence gathering was going on.

In addition, the provisions of the 1949 Act are not uniquely designed
to facilitate covert action. They would serve the needs of an organiza-
tion performing espionage equally well ; Members of Congress, in fact,
described the Act as an "espionage bill." ^^ Thus even a careful reader
of the Act would not infer from its provisions that the Agency was
conducting covert action.

Given these facts, it is difficult to find in the Act's passage congres-
sional intent to authorize covert action or a congressional belief that
the National Security Act of 1947 had authorized it.

The bill which was to become the Central Intelligence Agency Act
of 1949 was first introduced in Congress in 1948. The Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence appeared before the House Armed Services Commit-
tee on April 8, 1948, to discuss the bill. The Director noted :

It was thought when we started back in 1946, that at least
we would have time to develop this mature service over a
period of years — after all, the British, who possess the finest
intelligence in the world, have been developing their system
since the time of Queen Elizabeth. Unfortunately, the inter-
national situation has not allowed us the breathing space we
might have liked, and so, as we present this bill, we find our-

" The CIA General Counsel described the provisions of the Central Intelligenc'e
Agency Act of 1949 as follows :

"Administrative authorities of the Agency are contained in the Central In-
telligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended. This has provided us with all th'e
authorities and exemptions needed to carry out the wide variety of functions
assigned to the Agency during the past twenty years. It enables us to have an
effective and a flexible personnel program, ranging from the normal desk oflBcer
in headquarters to persons in a relationship so remote that they do not know they
are working for the Agency. It enables us to exercise all the techniques required
for clandestine activities, from traditional agent operations through proprietary
and other more sophisticated types of machinery. It has enabled us to undertake
major unforeseen projects, such as the U-2 operation.

"Two provisions of the Act are particularly important. The unique authority
in Section 5 to transfer to and receive from other government agencies sums as
may be approved by the Bureau of the Budget. This has given us great flexibility
and security in our funding. The other, Section 8, with its wide authority for
utilization of sums made available to the Agency, particularly subsection (b)
thereof which allows us to make any 'expenditures required for confidential,
extraordinary, or emergency purposes, and these expenditures will be accounted
for solely on the certificate of the Director. This has been essential to the flexi-
bility and security of our covert activities." (Memorandum from the CIA General
Counsel to the Deputy Director for National Intelligenc'e Programs Evaluation
10/9/68, p. 3. )

"95 Cong Rec. 1946 (1949).

494

selves in operations up to our necks, and we need the author-
ities contained herein as a matter of urgency.'^*

It is clear that the operations that the Director referred to were
understood by the executive branch to include covert action. In de-
scribing the provision of the bill which would eliminate the nomial
government advertising requirements, the Director stated that there
were urgent requests from overseas which required immediate opera-
tional response. As an example, he provided : "Any possible action in
connection with the Italian election." ^^ In later remarks on the same
section,'** the Director cited the need to avoid advertising for contracts
for the production of certain materiel, listing among his examples
explosives and silencers.'^^ Such materiel was clearly not for the pur-
poses of clandestine intelligence gathering and reporting.

In his 100-page statement, the Director also explained the provision
for unvouchered funds, the provision which the General Counsel of
the Central Intelligence Agency described as the "heart and soul of
covert operations." The Director stated :

In view of the nature of the work which must be conducted
by the CIA under the National Security Act and applicable
directives of the National Security Council, it is necessary to
use funds for various covert or semi-covert operations and
other purposes where it is either impossible to conform with
existing government procedures and regulations or conform-
ance therewith would materially injure the national security.
It is not practicable, and in some cases impossible, from either
a record or security viewpoint to maintain the information
and data which would be required under usual government
procedures and regulations. In many instances, it is necessary
to make specific payments or reimbursements on a project
basis where the background information is of such a sensitive
nature from a security viewpoint that only a general certifi-
cate, signed by the Director of CIA, should be processed
through even restricted channels. To do otherwise would ob-
viously increase the possibilities of penetration with respect
to any specific activity or general project. The nature of the
activities of CIA are such that items of this nature are re-
curring and, while in some instances the confidential or secret
aspects as such may not be of primary importance, the extraor-
dinary situations or the exigencies of the particular transac-
tion involved warrant the avoidance of all normal channels
and procedures.'^^
On the basis of this presentation, it can be concluded that at least
the House Armed Services Committee, one of the committees which had
jurisdiction over the CIA, knew that the CIA was conducting or would
in the future conduct covert action. The Committee also knew that

'* Statement of Adm. Roscoe Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence,
House Armed Services Committee, 4/8/48, pp. 6-7 (statement on file at the CIA).

'^Ihid., p. 21.

■' Sect. 3 (s) of H.R. 5871, 80th Cong., 2d Session.

" Hillenkoetter, 4/8/48, p. 27. These examples were drawn by the Director from
the history of the OSS.

" IMd. pp. 111-113.

495

the administrative provisions would enhance the Agency's covert
action capabilityJ^

The evidence, however, is not entirely clear. While the present day
reader may interpret "covert or semicovert operations" to mean covert
action, the Members had had little exposure to these terms. Covert
or semicovert operations could easily have been interpreted to mean
clandestine intelligence gathering operations ; the CIA's role in cland-
estine intelligence gathering had been discussed in a hearing before
the same committee,*" as well as in the press.^^

Even if it were assumed, moreover, that the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees fully understood that the CIA was engaging in
covert action, there is no evidence that the Congress as a whole knew
that the CIA was engaged in covert action or that the administrative
provisions were intended to facilitate it. The hearings on the CIA Act
of 1949 were held almost entirely in executive session. The committee
reports on the Act did not mention covert action at all. They were bland
and uninformative — the provision to provide the secret funding of the
CIA through transfers from appropriations to other government agen-
cies was described as providing "for tlie aimual financing of Agency
operations without impairing security." *- They were strikingly incom-
plete. As the House Armed Services Committee report itself noted,
the report :

does not contain a full and detailed explanation of all of the
provisions of the proposed legislation in view of the fact that
much of such information is of a highly confidential nature.^^

The floor debates contain only one indication that covert action, as
opposed to clandestine intelligence gathering, was being, or would be
undertaken by the CIA.** The debates strongly suggest that rather
than approving covert action by the CIA, Congress was attempting
to facilitate clandestine intelligence gathering by the Agency.

Prior to the passage of the Act there had been discussion in the press
of CIA involvement in clandestine intelligence gathering. Clandestine
intelligence gathering was mentioned on the floor; as noted previous-
ly. Members referred to the CIA Act of 1949 as an "espionage bill." *^
Senator Tydings, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee, stated, "The bill does not provide for new activity, but what
it does particularly is to seek to safeguard information procured by

■" It is quite likely that the Senate Armed Services Committee was presented
with a similar statement from the Director, although the Senate Select Com-
mittee has been unable to locate any transcripts of executive sessions held by the
Senate Armed Services Committee.

*" Testimony of Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg before House Armed Services Com-
mittee Hearing on H.R. 5871, 4/8/48 (statement on file at the CIA).

^"The X at Bogata," The Washington Post, 4/13/48; Hanson W. Baldwin,
"Intelligence— II," The New York Times, 7/22/48.

*^ S. Rep. No. 725, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1949).

"^H. Rep. No. 160, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949). See also 95 Cong. Rec. 1946
(1949), remarks of Rep. Marcantonio.

^ It was remarked in the House debates, in the context of a discussion of intel-
ligence gathering that "in spite of all our wealth and power and might we have
been extremely weak in psychological warfare, notwithstanding the fact that
an idea is perhaps the most powerful weapon on this earth." (95 Cong. Rec. 1047
(1949).)

^ 95 Cong. Rec, 1946 (1949).

496

agents of tlie government so that it will not fall into the hands of
enemy countries or potential enemy countries who would use the in-
formation to discover who the agents were and kill them." ^<^ Thus
there is ample evidence to suggest that the full legislature knew that
the fimctions of the CIA included espionage ; but there is no evidence
to suggest that more than a few Members of Congress knew that the
CIA was engaged in covert action. Without such knowledge Congress
could hardly be said to have authorized it.®"

Another factor undercutting the theorj^ that passage of the CIA
Act constituted congressional authorization for covert action is that
the argument confuses implementing authority with statutory author-
ity. Congress had set out the CIA's statutory authority in the National
Security Act of 1947. The CIA Act of 1949 did not provide any addi-
tional non-administrative or non-fiscal powers to the CIA.^® It simply
provided the means for the CIA to implement the authorities already
granted it.

C. The Provision of Funds to the CIA by Congress

There is no evidence that Congress intended, by the passage of the
National Security Act of 1947, to authorize covert action by the CIA.
Passage of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 did not add
the covert action mission to those already authorized by the National
Security Act. Nevertheless, the National Security Council had in 1947
directed the CIA to engage in covert activities ; by the early 1950s the
Central Intelligence Agency was involved in covert action around the
world.

In 1962 the General Counsel summarized the early developments in
the CIA's undertaking of covert action : ^^

The National Security Council did develop a Directive (NSC
10/2) setting forth a program of covert cold- war activities
and assigned it to the Office of Policy Coordination under
the Director of Central Intelligence with policy guidance
from the Department of State. The Congress was asked for
and did appropriate funds to support this program, although,
of course, only a small number of Congressmen in the Ap-

*95 Cong. Rec. GG'SS (3949). This quote, indicating Chairman Tydings' inter-
pretation of the Act, seems to undercut the argument that he and the Senate
Armed Services Committee understood that the CIA was conducting covert action
and that the provisions of the CIA Act of 1949 were designed to facilitate this.

*■' Without such l<nowledge a Member reading the Act would not be likely to
infer that it was designed to facilitate covert action. As the provisions of the Act
were not uniquely designed for covert action but were equally applicable to
clandestine intelligence gathering, an activity which Congress knew about and
approved, Members would be unlikely to realize from reading the Act that tJie
CIA conducted covert action.

^ S. Rep. No. 106, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1949).

" In a September 25, 1947 memorandum to the Director, the General Counsel
advised that no covert action "should be undertaken by CIA without previously
informing Congress and obtaining its approval of the functions and expenditure
of funds for those purposes." He further noted that even if the NSC were to as-
sign the covert action function to the CIA it would still be necessary for the
CIA to "go to Congress for authority and funds." (Memorandum from the CIA
General Counsel to the Director, 9/25/47 ) .

497

propriations Committees knew the amount and purpose of
the appropriations.^^

The Office of Legislative Counsel of the Department of Justice
argued in 1962 that this provision of funds for covert action, even
though known only to a few members of Congress, constituted con-
gressional ratification of the CIA's conduct of covert action.

Congress has continued over the years since 1947 to appro-
priate funds for the conduct of such covert activities. We
understand that the existence of such covert activities has
been reported on a number of occasions to the leadership of
both houses, and to members of the subcommittees of the
Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of both
houses. It can be said that Congress as a whole knows that
money is appropriated to CIA and knows generally that a
portion of it goes for clandestine activities, although knowl-
edge of specific activities is restricted to the group specified
above and occasional other members of Congress briefed for
specific purposes. In effect, therefore. CIA has for many years
had general funds approval from the Congress to carry on
covert cold-war activities, which the Executive Branch has
the authority and responsibility to direct.

It is well-established that appropriations for administrative
action of which Congress has been infonned amount to a rati-
fication of or acquiescence in such action. Brooks v. Dewar^ 313
U.S. 354, 361 ; Fleming v. Mohawk Co., 331 U.S. Ill, 116 ; see
also Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCrajcken, 357 U.S. 275, 293-294 ;
Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians., 367 U.S. 396, 409. Since
the circumstances effectively prevent the Congress from mak-
ing an express and detailed appropriation for the activities of
the CIA, the general knowledge of the Congress, and specific
knowledge of responsible committee members, outlined above,
are sufficient to render this principle applicable. [Citations
omitted.] ^^
And in December 1975 the House Select Committee on Intelli-
gence was told by the CIA that given "CIA reporting of its covert
action programs to Congress, and congressional appropriation of funds
for such programs" the "law is clear that, under these circumstances.

^ Memorandum from the CIA General Counsel to the Director, 1/15/62, p. 2.

®* Memorandum re : "Constitutional and I^egal Basis for So-Called Covert Ac-
tivities of the Central Intelligence Agency," prepared by the Office of Legisla-
tive Counsel, Department of Justice, 1/17/62, pp. 12-13.

The Office of Legislative Counsel apparently placed considerable weight on
the knowledge of the subcommittee members of the committees having juris-
diction over the CIA (Ibid., p. 12 n. 4) and implied "close contact" between the
CIA and "its committees," (Ibid., p. 13 n. 5) For example, the memorandum cited
a letter dated May 2, 1»57, from Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director, CIA, to Sen.
Hennings, in Freedom of Information and Secrecy in Government, Hearing be-
fore the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee of the
.ludiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 376, 377 :

"Xhe Director of the Central Intelligence Agency appears regularly before
established subcommittees of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees
of the Senate and of the House, and makes available to these subcommittees
complete information on Agency activities, personnel and expenditures. No
information has ever been denied to their subcommittees."

498

Congress has effectively ratified the authority of the CIA to plan and
conduct covert action under the direction of the President and the
National Security Council." ^^

In order to analyze the claim that congressional provision of funds
to the CIA constitutes congressional ratification of the CIA's authority
to conduct covert action, the general question of congressional ratifica-
tion by appropriation must be examined. The general rule has been
stated as follows : "Ratification by appropriation is not favored and
will not be accepted where prior knowledge of the specific disputed
action cannot be demonstrated clearly."^*' In the same opinion the Court
noted that :

ratification by appropriation, no less than ratification by
acquiescence, requires affirmative evidence that Congress
actually knew of the administrative policy. . . . Moreover,
to constitute ratification, an appropriation must plainly show
a purpose to bestow the precise authority which is claimed."
[Citations omitted.]

Appropriations do not convey authority or ratify agency acts with-
out proof that Congress knew what the agency was doing. For in-
stance, in Green v. McElroy^ 360 U.S. 474, the Supreme Court held
that an appropriation to the Department of Defense for its security
program did not constitute ratification of a procedure which denied
the light of an individual to confront the witnesses against him.
On the other hand, if appropriations are enacted after objections
have been made to the appropriations committees that no legal author-
ity exists to carry out a particular project, congressional acknowledge-
ment or ratification of the authority to perform the specified act can
be inferred.^^

In sum, general appropriations for an agency cannot be deemed to
be ratification of a specific activity of that agency in the absence of
congressional knowledge of the specific activity and congres-
sional intent that the specific activity be funded from the general
appropriation.^*

The argument that through the provision of funds to the CIA
Congress has effectively ratified the authority of the CIA to conduct
covert action rests on the assumption that since the founding of the
Agency, Congress has known that CIA was engaged in covert action
and has provided funds to the CIA with the knowledge and intent that
some of the funds would be used for covert action.

The CIA's conduct of covert action was not known by Congress as a
whole during the early years of the CIA. In the interest of security,
few Members were informed about covert actions — a situation which

"' Rogovin, HSIC, 12/9/75, p. 1736.

^D.C. Federation of Civic Associations v. Airis, 391 F.2d 478, 482 (D.C. Giro.
1968).

" United States ex rel Tennessee Valley Authority v. Two Tracts of Land,
456 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1972). Appropriations for the Vietnam War, in combination
with other congressional actions, were held by most courts to constitute congres-
sional authorization for the war. See e.g., Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.
N.Y. 1970). But see, Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F. 2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

"' Thompson v. Clifford, 408 F.2d 154 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ; Sutherland, Statutory
Construction (Sands ed. 1974) sec. 49.10.

499

continued until Congress mandated disclosure to six congressional
committees of CIA activities not intended solely for intelligence gath-
ering.^^ Even prior to this mandate, many Members of Congress not
briefed on covert action by the executive branch probably knew that
the CIA had engaged in covert actions such as the Bay of Pigs ; this
knowledge was not official being based neither on declarations of offi-
cial U.S. policy nor on briefings of the Congress as a whole, but rather
on information gained from other sources.^™ One of the reasons
offered for the 1974 Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act was
that it would ensure that Congress would have sufficient information
about covert action to determine if such activities should continue.^^^

It is difficult to fix a point in time in the past when it could be
said with assurance that Congress as a whole "clearly" had the knowl-
edge of covert action required for congressional ratification.^"^ Con-
gress certainly has that knowledge today.

The first requirement, congressional knowledge of covert action by
the CIA, is, at least now, met. In the future appropriation to the CIA
without any provision prohibiting the use of funds for covert action
would ratify the CIA's authority. But did the provision of funds
to the CIA in the past, or will the provision of funds in the future
under present arrangements constitute "appropriations" which
"plainly show a purpose to bestow the precise authority w^hich is
claimed" ?

The answer would be a clear yes if the funding had been or were to
be by open appropriations to the CIA. The answer would be yes if
Congress as a whole had voted the appropriations to the CIA in
executive session. This has not been the case.

The funds provided to the CIA are concealed in appropriations
made to other agencies. They are then transferred to the CIA, pur-
suant to the provisions of the CIA Act of 1949,^°^ with the approval of

''22U.S.C. 2422.

^"^ Under the system of plausible denial the U.S. Government would not oflB-
cially confirm that it engaged in covert action and would seek to avoid acknowl-
edging a U.S. Government role in any particular covert action. Therefore, the
knowledge imputed to Members of Congress not officially briefed on the CIA's
covert actions would have to be based on other sources.

^""Cong. Rec., S18065, daily ed., 10/2/74 (remarks of Senators Baker and
Symington).

^■^ It might be argued that Congress chose to limit knowledge of covert action to
selected Members and that their knowledge, combined with that congressional
decision, would be sufficient. J. Edwin Dietel, of the Office of General Counsel of
the CIA, in a 11/20/73 memorandum for the record, in fact wrote : "We would
also note that, while the specific activities that the Agency's appropriations are
used for is limited to only a few Members of Congress, the whole Congress chose
to adopt that procedure for reviewing the Agency's activities and appropriations."

First, it must be noted that until Congress "knew" about covert action. Con-
gress could not delegate to a small group of Members the responsibility for over-
seeing it. When Congress reached that point of knowledge — and as noted it is
impossible to say wh*^n that was — it arguably could delegate although there
may be limits to that delegation.

Given the presumption against ratification by appropriation, the difficulty
in fi'xing a time when Congress "knew," as well as the small number of knowl-
edgeable Members, and the question of whether Congress could delegate to these
Members the congressional knowledge required for ratification, it cannot be
concluded that the knowledge of these few Members met the test cited for
ratification by appropriation.

"» 50 U.S.C. 403 f.

500

the 0MB and selected members of the Appropriations Committee.
Cong:ress, as a whole, never specifically votes on funds for the CIA.
Congress, as a whole, does not know how much money the CIA will
receive in a given year.^°* This secret funding undercuts the argument
that the Congress has notified the CIA's conduct of covert action by
knowingly appropriating funds to be used for covert action. In fact,
there is some doubt that the CIA is even "appropriated" funds pur-
suant to the constitutional requireemnt.^"^

Even if the provision of funds is constitutionally valid, in the ab-
sence of a vote by Congress on the funding, it can hardly be said to
"plainly" demonstrate a congressional intent to ratify the CIA's au-
thority to conduct covert action.

The CIA ignored the questionable nature of Congress' knowledge of
covei't action and the secret funding of the CIA in claiming that "the
law is clear that, under these circumstances, Congress has effectively
ratified the authority of the CIA to plan and conduct covert action
under the direction of the President and the National Security Coun-
cil." ^°*' In support of its position, the Central Intelligence Agency
cited what was described as "the leading case on this point," Brooks
V. Dewar^ 313 U.S. 354 (1941). According to the Central Intelligence
Agency, "the Brooks case requires the conclusion that Congress has
ratified the CIA's authority to plan and conduct covert action." ^°^

Brooks involved a challenge to a licensing scheme established by
the Secretary of the Interior under a statute providing him with
broad responsibility for the administration of livestock grazing dis-
tricts. Although the act in question did not explicitly authorize him to
require persons wishing to utilize the land to purchase licenses, the
Court found congressional ratification of his actions. The Court, in up-
holding the Secretary's argument that Congress had ratified his action
wrote, "The information in the possession of Congress was plentiful
and from various sources." "^ The Court cited annual reports of the

'"'*■ For a fuller discussion of the funding of the CIA, see Chap. XVI, p. 367.

^•^ Article I, Sec. 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution provides that "No Money shall
be drawn from the Treasury but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."
Appropriations are, by definition, specific amounts of money set aside for desig-
nated purposes [GecUcs v. Vnited States, 39 Ct. Claims, 428. 444 (1903)] It is
not required to particularize each item in order for an appropriation to be valid
[United States v. State Bridge Commission, 109 F. Supp. 690 (B. D. Mich. 1953) J
but the appropriation must be sufficiently identifiable to make clear the intent of
Congress. [IMd.l As Congress votes on appropriations for other agencies from
which CIA funds are secretly transferred rather than setting aside a specific
sum of money for the CIA for a specific purpose, it can be argued that there
is no constitutionally valid appropriation to the Agency. If the public accounting
required by Article 1, Sec. 9. Clause 7 is a neces.sary condition for a constitu-
tionally valid appropriation, it would be even harder to argue the validity of
the present funding scheme as the statement published pursuant to the con-
stitutional requirements do not reflect receipts and expenditures of the CIA.

The argument might be made that congressional establishment of the transfer
provisions of the CIA Act of 19'^9 manifested a congressional purpose to authorize
the CIA to conduct covert action. However, nothing in the debates supports thi.<!
argument. Moreover, the transfer provision was equally applicable to any clan-
destine activitv, including the clandestine collection of intelligence.

"' Rogovin, HSIC, Hearings, 12/9/75, p. 1736.

""" Ibid.

"' 313 U.S. at 360.

501

Secretary, testimony at Appropriation Committee hearings, and state-
ments on the floor of Congress. The Court found that the "re-
peated appropriations of the fees thus covered and to be covered
into the Treasury . . . constitutes a ratification of the action. . ." ^°^

Given the special treatment of the CIA, the relevance of Brooks
seems questionable. "Plentiful" infonnation is not available. No an-
nual reports are issued by the Director of Central Intelligence. Until
recently there have been few open hearings or floor debates on the
activities of the CIA. Congress as a whole has never voted on appro-
priations for the CIA, nor designated funds for covert action.

Brooks and several other cases are also cited by a Justice Depart-
ment memorandum written in 1962 and presented to the House Select
Committee on Intelligence in 1975. The memorandum argues that:

Since the circumstances effectively prevent the Congress from
making an express and detailed appropriation for the activi-
ties of the CIA, the general knowledge of the Congress, and
specific knowledge of responsible committee members . . . are
sufficient to render this principal [ratification] applicable.^^"

Given the presumption against ratification by appropriation, the
small number of knowledgeable Members, the uncertainty as to
whether congressional knowledge required for ratification could be
imputed from the knowledge of these few Members, and the question
of whether a congressional appropriation can be imputed from the
approval of secret transfers of funds to the CIA by subcommittees
of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, there is sub-
stantial doubt as to the validity of this position.

As was previously noted, the actual state of congressional knowl-
edge about covert action prior to the 1970s is unclear. Congress, how-
ever, now knows that the CIA conducts covert action. Congress also
knows that the Executive claims Congress has authorized the Agency
to do so.^^^ Finally, Congress knows that the CIA receives its funds
through secret transfers of funds appropriated to the Department of
Defense ^^^ and that some of the transferred funds are used to finance
cover action. In the future the failure by Congress to prohibit funds
from being used for covert action by the CIA would clearly constitute
congressional ratification of the CIA's authority, eliminating any
am'biguity.^^^

^»« lUd.

"• Rogovin, HSIC, 12/9/75, p. 1736.

"^ Congressional acquiescence, with notice, of long-standing executive policy,
creates a presumption in favor of that policy's validity (United States v. Mid-
toest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915). See also, Sihaoh v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S.
1 (1941).]

^ Cong. Rec., H9359-76, daily ed., 10/1/75.

*^ Congress clearly has the authority to attach conditions to the use of the
funds appropriated by it. {Ohio v. United States Civil Service Commission, 65
P. Supp. 776 (S.D. Ohio 19^6) ; Spalding v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 60 F. Supp.
985, 988 (1945) atTd 154 F. 2d 419 (9th Cir. 1946) .]

502

Such ratification, however, like ratification by acquiescense,^^^ would
would still be disfavored. ^^'^ As the Supreme Court has cautioned,
"it is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the
adopting of a controlling rule of law." "*' It would seem that important
activities of the United States Government deserve direct and specific
authorization from Congress.

D. The Holtzman and Abourezk Amendment op 1974

In 1974 Congress directly addressed the issue of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency's conduct of covert action. In September, the House of
Representatives defeated an amendment which would have forbidden
the Central Intelligence Agency to spend funds "for the purpose of
undermining or destabilizing the government of any foreign coun-
try." In October, the Senate defeated an amendment to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1974, which would have forbidden any agency of
the United States Government to carry out "any activity within any
foreign country which violates or is intended to encourage the viola-
tion of, the laws of the United States or of such countries," except
for activities "necessary" to the security of the United States and
intended "solely" to gather intelligence,.

While both amendments would have limited the ability of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency to conduct covert action, the failure of Con-
gress to adopt them does not clearly constitute congressional ratifica-
tion of the CIA'S authority to conduct covert action."^ Neither dealt
with covert action in general. Strong opposition to even their consid-
eration prior to hearings and committee reports was voiced. The
amendments, however, did signal an increasing congressional concern
over covert action and marked the beginning of attempts by Congress
as a whole to regulate and obtain information on covert action.

In September 1974, Representative Holtzman proposed a joint
resolution which would have amended the Supplemental Defense Ap-
propriations Act as follows :

After September 30, 1974, none of the funds appropriated
under this joint resolution may be expended by the Central
Intelligence Agency for the purpose of undermining or de-
stabilizing the government of any foreign country.

"* The theory that congressional acquiescence constitutes ratification that
can be easily stretched. J. Edwin Dietel, Assitant General Counsel of the Agency,
wrote a memorandum for the record dated May 7, 1974. In it he described a
question submitted by Senator Proxmire to Director Colby during Mr. Colby's
nomination hearing which concerned the Agency's secret financing of political
parties. Mr. Dietel wrote that in a classified response Mr. Colby stated that the
CIA has, over the last twenty-five years of its existence, provided secret financial
assistance to political parties in a number of foreign countries. "As there have
been no reverberations from this statement, there is, at least, tacit approval
for this type of activity."

'^^Thomaft v. Clifford, 408 F. 2d 134, 166, (D.C. Cir. 1968). See also, Norman
Dorsen testimony, House Select Intelligence Committee, Hearings, 12/9/75, p.
1741.

"« Girouard v. United States, 328 U.W. 61. 69 (1946) .

"' For a contrary view See Rogovin, HSIC, 12/9/75, pp. 1736-1737.

503

Ms. Holtzman introduced the amendment in response to revelations
about the efforts of the CIA to "destabilize and undennine the govern-
ment in Chile" and as a "beginning" in "restoring congressional pre-
rogatives over the activities of the Government of this country." "*
Ms. Holtzman stressed her opposition to such activities directed against
foreign governments with whom the United States was not at war
"especially in an atmosphere of virtually complete secrecy, without ap-
proval by the Congress, or approval by the people of this country." ^"

The amendment was supported by Representative Giaimo, who
noted :

Since we have been informed of the improper activities of the
CIA in Chile, and perhaps in other countries — and we have
certainly been informed of its wrongful activities in Chile —
this is the first opportunity which we have had in Congress to
voice either approval or disapproval of the actions of our
Government as they relate to the CIA. This is the first bill be-
fore us which presents us that opportunity. It is too late for
us as a practical matter to do anything in the defense appro-
priation bill, but it is not too late now for us to approve this
amendment, and to show to the world that the U.S. Congress
will not sanction these nefarious and covert activities of the
CIA, that the people of the United States will not approve
and ratify the improper and wrongful acts of the CIA in
Chile." 120

The amendment was opposed by Representative Mahon who argued
that the bill was "irrelevant" because the defense appropriation bill
would be signed into law within a few days.^^^ and because the legisla-
tion contained no proposal to undermine or destabilize any govern-
ment.122 He described as "indefensible" the presentation of the amend-
ment as there had not been sufficient hearing by any of the committees
of the House.i^^ He was joined in his opposition by Representative
Cederberg, a member of one of the CIA oversight subcommittees in the
House, who indicated his belief that U.S. activities in Chile were taken
"in the best interest of the United States," ^^* and by Representative
Conlan who argued that the amendment would lead to the identifica-
tion of all our intelligence agents throughout the world and the de-
struction of the "basic defenses" of the United States. A vote for the
amendment. Representative Conlan cautioned, would "cut off our
covert intelligence operations" and "would be a vote for national
suicide." ^^^

The proposal was defeated by the House of Representatives on
September 30, 1974, by a vote of 291-108.

Given this debate the defeat of the amendment cannot be read as
congressional ratification of the CIA's authority to conduct covert ac-

Cong. Rec. H9492-9493, daily ed., 9/24/74. (remarks of Rep. Holtzman).

Cong. Reo. H9492, daily ed., 9/24/74.

Ibid., p. H9493 (remarks of Rep. Giaimo).

Ibid., (Remarks of Rep. Mahon) .
' Ibid.
' Ibid.

Ibid., p. H9494 (remarks of Mr. Cederberg).

Ibid., (remarks of Rep. Conlan).

504

tion. The absence of hearings, the possible "irrelevance" of the amend-
ment noted by both supporters and opponents of the bill, and the fact
that the amendment only dealt with activities the purpose of which
was the "undermining or destabilizing the government of any foreign
country," all undercut an expansive reading of Congress' failure to
adopt it.

On October 2, 1974 Senator Abourezk introduced an amendment
( #1922) to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 which read as follows :

Illegal activities in foreign countries, — (a) no funds made
available under this or any other law may be used by any
agency of the United States Government to carry out any ac-
tivity within any foreign country which violates or is in-
tended to encourage the violation of, the laws of the United
States or of such countries.

(b) The provision of this section should not be construed
to prohibit the use of such funds to carry out any activity nec-
essary to the security of the United States which is intended
solely to gather intelligence information.

The amendment triggered a more extended floor debate than that
generated by the Holtzman amendment.^^*^ During the debate Senator
Abourezk asserted that his amendment would "abolish all clandestine
or covert operations by the Central Intelligence Agency." ^" He argued
that even the Director of the CIA had indicated that the national
security would not be endangered if covert action were abolished.^^^
Some of the opponents of the amendment argued that improved con-
gressional oversight would be preferable to banning covert action.
Senator Church noted that he could envision situations where threats
to the national security would require covert activities.^^^

The amendment failed of passage. It might be argued that this fail-
ure, like that of the Holtzman amendment, constituted congressional
ratification for the CIA's conduct of covert action.

The logic of this is undercut by a number of factors. One is that
the amendment was not directed to all covert action, although the
comments of some of the members implied that it was.^^° It was di-
rected to activity abroad "which violates or is intended to encourage
the violation of, laws of the United States or of such country." Thus,
if failure to pass the amendment is to be read as congressional ratifica-
tion of the actions which the amendment sought to prohibit, the
Congress would have ratified only those foreign activities by the CIA
which are illegal or intended to encourage the violation of law.

^^ See Cong. Ree. S18051-18056, daily ed., 10/2/74.

^ Hid., p. 18051 (remarks of Sen. Abourezk).

^ lUd.

^ Thid., (remarks of Sen. Church).

"° Senator Abourezk stated that the amendment would "abolish all clandestine
or covert operations," while Senator Church argrued that increased oversight
would be better than a complete prohibition. On the other hand, Senator Hat-
field opposed the amendment as it did not go far enough in merely prohibiting the
use of funds to carry out illegal foreign covert action ; he argued that the
capacity for any covert action should be taken away from the CIA. Senator
Metzenbaum argued for the amendment's passage precisely because it was aimed
only at illegal activities abroad by the CIA.

505

Whether the amendment passed or failed, it left unchanged whatever
authority, if any, the CIA then had to conduct covert actions abroad
which were illegal neither at home nor overseas.

Finally, the question of whether the amendment's failure should
be read as congressional ratification of the CIA's authority to con-
duct such activities as would have been banned must be viewed in the
light of other, and telling, arguments raised by those opposed to the
amendment. Several Senators including Senators Humphrey, Sten-
nis, and Goldwater objected to the fact that the amendment had not
had the benefit of analysis by the committees with proper jurisdiction.
Without the benefit of consideration by the Armed Services Commit-
tee, the amendment would be, according to Senator Stennis, "a shot
in the dark." "^

Using a different argument in opposition, Senator Baker stated
that there existed "an insufficient state of information" by which
to judge whether covert operations were or were not properly con-
ducted. In place of the amendment he suggested that a proposed joint
committee on intelligence oversight be established; Congress could
then be supplied with suflficient information on covert action to make
a judgment as to whether it should be banned or controlled by some
other de^dce.^^^

Given the fact that the amendment would prohibit only those for-
eign activities by the CIA which were illegal, the lack of explicit
authorization for the CIA to conduct any covert action, the opposition
of a substantial number of Senators to the amendment's consideration
before it was examined by the committees with appropriate jurisdic-
tion, and the statements by certain Senators that not enough was
known about covert action to take a position on its continuance, the
amendment's failure can hardly be given much weight in determining
whether Congress has ratified the CIA's authority to conduct covert
action.

E. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment

In 1974 Congress passed a significant amendment to the Foreign
Assistance Act. The amendment provided that no funds might be ex-
pended by the CIA for operations not intended solely for obtaining
necessary intelligence, in the absence of a Presidential finding that the
operation is important to the national security of the United States,
and a timely report to the appropriate committees of the Congress.

The amendment does not specifically authorize covert action by
the CIA or unambiguously demonstrate congressional intent to pro-
vide such authorization. It does provide support for the position
that Congress has authorized the CIA to conduct covert action or,
more specifically, activities that are not intended solely for intelli-
gence gathering. The debates indicate, however, a desire on the part
of some Senators to withhold a decision on whether to authorize
covert action until the reporting requirement provided Congress with
more information.

See Conff. Rec. S-18052, daily ed., 10/2/74 (remarks of Sen. Stennis).
Ibid., p. S18065 (remarks of Sen. Baker).

69-983 O - 76 - 33

506

In December 1974, the Congress passed a set of amendments
to the Foreign Assistance Act. The amendments provided inter alia :

Limitations on intelligence activities — (a) no funds appro-
priated under authority of this or any other Act may be ex-
pended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for
operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended
solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until
the President finds that each such operation is important to
the national security of the United States and reports, in a
timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation to
the appropriate committees of Congress, including the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House
of Representatives (b) the provisions of subsection (a) of
this section shall not apply during military operations initi-
ated by the United States under a declaration of war ap-
proved by the Congress or an exercise of powers by the Presi-
dent under the War Powers Resolution.^^^

The statute does not explicitly authorize covert action by the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency. On its face it leaves the question of con-
gressional authorization for covert action by the Central Intelligence
Agency in the same position as existed prior to its passage, with two
exceptions :

( 1 ) For the first time a statute passed by Congress and signed by the
President acknowledges that the Central Intelligence Agency might,
in fact, conduct operations which were not intended solely for intel-
ligence-.o-athering purposes ; and

(2) The statute required that if such operations were to be carried
out the President must first find that they are important to the na-
tional security of the United States. If such a finding is made, the
operations must then be reported in a "timely fashion'* to the appropri-
ate committees of Congress.^^*

The amendment does not on its face provide any new authority
for the President or the CIA. Nowhere in the public record is there
any suggestion that the amendment might, in itself, serve as a new
delegation by Congress of authority to the President to order any
action by the CIA. If the amendment were read as a new delegation
of poAvers to the President, the delegation would cover an enormously
wide range of activities — all those activities not intended solely for
intelligence gathering.^^^

While there is no evidence in the public record that Congress in-
tended to delegate new powers to the President or the CIA, it might

^ Appendix D, Hearings, Vol. 7, p. 230.

^ There is some question as to the meaning of a "timely fashion." It is not
clear whether it means prior to, at the same time as, or within a reasonable time
after, the initiation of such an operation. The Central Intelligence Agency has,
on occasion, notified the appropriate congressional committees before initia-
tion of a project. The Senate Select Committee has recommended that the
appropriate congressional committees be notified prior to the initiation of any
significant covert action projects.

^^ This would be limited, to some extent, by the requirement of a presidential
finding.

507

be argued that passage of the amendment constitutes congressional
acknowledgment that the CIA did have authority to conduct those
covert actions consonant with the Presidential finding. The CIA has,
in fact, taken the position that passage of the amendment "clearly
implies that the CIA is authorized to plan and conduct covert
action." ""^ Two committees of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York concluded that passage of the amendment serves as a "clear
congressional authorization for the CIA to conduct covert activi-
ties." ^^^ This argument has considerable merit.

While certain restrictions were placed on the conduct of covert
action, it was not prohibited as it might have been. The amendment
was described in the floor debates as permitting the CIA to engage
in many activities and "authorizing" even covert activities such as
those designed to "subvert or undermine foreign governments." ^^®

Congressional ratification or authorization, however, as demon-
strated by the floor debates, was hardly unambiguous. A substantial
number of the proponents of the amendment saw it as a temporary
measure. As Senator Hughes, its sponsor, stated:

. . . the amendment I offer should be regarded as only a
beginning toward the imperative of imposing some order and
structure to the means by which the American people, through
their elected representatives, can exercise a measure of con-
trol over the cloak-and-dagger operations of the intelligence
agencies of the U.S. government."^

He went on to say that the amendment "provides a temporary ar-
rangement, not a permanent one, recognizing that a permanent
arrangement is in the process of being developed." ^^°

The development of this "permanent arrangement" depended on
the effectiveness of the reporting requirement. Senator Baker, who
had opposed the Abourezk amendment because there existed "an
insufficient state of information" by which to judge covert operations,
and Senator Symington both described the Hughes amendment as an
important step in providing Congress with much-needed information
about the activities of the intelligence agencies."^ Thus the amend-
ment might be seen not as congressional authorization for the CIA to
conduct covert action but as a temporary measure placing limits on
what the CIA would do anyway, while at the same time requiring
reporting to Congress so that Congress as a whole, traditionally
deprived of knowledge about covert action, could determine what
action to take with respect to this activity."^

"" Rogovin, HSIC, 12/9/75, p. 1737.

137 ..rpj^g Central Intelligence Agency : Oversight and Accountability," prepared
by the Committee on Civil Rights and the Committee on International Human
Relations, of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (1975) p. 15.

'"^Cong. Rec. H11627, daily ed., 12/11/74. (remarks of Rep. Holtzman.)

"' Cong. Rec, S18062, daily ed., 10/2/74. (remarks of Sen. Hughes.)

^*» Ibid.

"^ Ibid., p. S18065 (remarks of Sen. Baker and Sen. Symington).

"2 iTjjgj.g jg jjQ evidence to support the view that Congress intended the amend-
ment to serve as a post hoc ratification for all previous CIA activities not intended
solely for intelligence gathering.

508

Proponents of this interpretation of the amendment can argue that
a measure designed to gather infoiTnation about an activity camiot be
construed as congressional ratification of that activity. If it were. Con-
gress would be powerless to seek regular reports about a controversial
subject on which it had been ill-informed without such action being
cited as congressional ratification for the subject of the reports.

The amendment did not directly address the question of congres-
sional authorization for the CIA to conduct covert action. Its passage
did not unambiguously demonstrate a congressional intent to author-
ize covert action. However, its passage supports the position that Con-
gress has either provided the CIA with implied authority or ratified
whatever authority the CIA possessed.

Congress clearly could have eliminated covert action. It chose, in-
stead, to place certain limits on the CIA and to require reporting on
covert actions to Congress. The reports to Congress should facilitate
an informed legislative response to the issues raised by covert action.
They also have the effect of preventing Congress from plausibly deny-
ing its own knowledge of covert action by the United States if ques-
tions of congressional authorization of covert action arise in the future.

Given the passage of the amendment and subsequent developments,
particularly the hearings and reports of the House Select Connnittee
on Intelligence, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, thera
is little doubt that Congress is now on notice that the CIA claims to
have the authority to conduct, and does engage in, covert action. Given
that knowledge, congressional failure to prohibit covert action in the
future can be interpreted as congressional authorization for it.

F. CONCLUSION

There is no explicit statutory authority for the CIA to conduct
covert action. There is no substantial evidence that Congress intended
by the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 to authorize covert
action by the CIA or that Congress even anticipated that the CIA
would engage in such activities. The legislative history of the CIA Act
of 1949 similarly provides no indication of congressional intent to
authorize covert action by the CIA.

The 1974 Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act recognizes
that the CIA does engage in activities other than those solely for the
purpose of intelligence-gathering, i.e. covert action. Enacted following
disclosures of CIA covert action in Chile, the amendment does provide
support to the argument that Congi^ess has authorized covert action
by the Agency or has ratified the Agency's authority. (One of the
purposes of the amendment, however, was to assure Congress the infor-
mation about covert action necessary to decide what to do about it.)

Additional support for the argument that Congress has ratified the
CIA's authority to conduct covert action would be provided by the
continuing provision of funds to the CIA when it is clear that such
funds will be used, in part, for covert action. Some support for the
position may also be found in the continuing acquiscence of Congress
in the executive branch's claim that court action has congressional au-
thorization. While neither ratification by appropriation nor ratifica-
tion by acquiescence are favored by the courts, they cannot be disre-

509

garded. In the past such claims were weak. A few individual members
of Congress were kept informed about covert action but there were
doubts about the knowledge of Congress as a whole. The claims are
now more powerful because of the notoriety of the executive branch's
claim of authorization by Congress and because Congress, in part due
to the reports required since 1974 and House and Senate investigations,
can no longer claim ignorance of covert action.

Given the present state of congressional knowledge any remaining
ambiguity will be resolved — whether Congress acts directly or not.

Views of the inherent power of the President and the rightful role
for Congress in the formulation, initiation, and review of U.S. actions
abroad have changed since the establishment of the CIA and the en-
actment of the National Security Act in 1947. These changes are re-
flected in such legislation as the 1974 amendment to the For-
eign Assistance Act, Whatever role evolves for the Congress in the
future it must now take responsibility for the CIA's conduct of covert
action, and for its results.

APPENDIX II

Additional Covert Action Recommendations

Throughout its inquiry, the Committee received numerous recom-
mendations concerning covert action from many individuals and
groups, inchiding :

(a) Clark Clifford, former Counsel to President Truman, former
Member and Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advi-
sory Board, former Secretary of Defense ;

(b) Cyrus Vance, former General Counsel, Department of Defense;
former Secretary of the Army; former Deputy Secretary of Defense;
former Special Representative of the President; former Member of
U.S. Delegation to Paris Peace Negotiations;

(c) Morton Halperin, Director, Project on National Security and
Civil Liberties; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Affairs; former Assistant for Planning, National Secu-
rity Council Staff; former Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution;

(d) David Phillips, former Central Intelligence Agency employee;
President, Association of Retired Intelligence Officers;

(e) Harvard University Institute of Politics, Study Group on Intel-
ligence Activities. This group was established in September 1975, on
the basis of an understanding between the Institute of Politics and the
staff of the Select Committee to examine aspects of the National
intelligence community's mission and structure. Its endeavor was
an entirely voluntary one, with neither party having any former obli-
gations to the other. The group met approximately 11 times between
October 1975 and January 1976, and included Graham Allison, Philip
Areeda, Francis Bator, Robert Bowie, John Bross, Morton Halperin,
Philip Heyman, Ernest May, Jonathan Moore, Robert Pursley, Walter
Slocombe, J. T. Smith, and Franklin Lindsay.

(f) The House Select Committee on Intelligence Activities;

(g) The Commission on the Organization of the Government for the
Conduct of Foreign Policy (tlie Murphy Commission).

The Committee also considered suggestions made in numerous jour-
nal and magazine articles.

Selected statements, suggestions and recommendations from these
sources follow.

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A. Statement of Clark M. Clifford

I welcome your invitation to appear here today to discuss with your
committee the problems surroundincr the conduct of covert activities.
The public has given much attention to this subject and a national
dialogue has ensued. Some contend that it is necessary in the preserva-
tion of our democratic form of government to have a full disclosure of
operations in this delicate area to ascertain if abuses have occurred.
Others contend, with equal sincerity, that such an inquiry damages
our country's image in the world and adversely affects the ability of
our intelligence services to perform their tasks.

It is my opinion that the inquiry being conducted by this commit-
tee became absolutely necessary as the result of certain disclosures
which demonstrated that gross abuses had occurred. Our country may
sustain some temporary reduction in the effectiveness of its intelli-
gence operations, but I consider this temporary in nature, and an ap-
propriate price to pay in presenting the facts to the American people
and in making progress toward the goal of preventing repetition of
such abuses in the future. With the right kind of machinery, our coun-
try can take those actions which it believes necessary to help maintain
freedom in the world and, at the same time, avoid the opprobium that
has been directed toward us as the result of improper activities in the
field of clandestine and covert operations.

In 1946, President Truman stated that we must have a formalized
intelligence agency. The lessons learned as the result of Pearl Harbor
and increased tensions following World War II convinced him that
we needed an institutionalized peacetime intelligence agency. As a re-
sult, the Central Intelligence Agency was created in the National
Security Act of 1947.^

Because those of us who were assigned to this task and had the
drafting responsibility were dealing with a new subject with prac-
tically no precedents, it was decided that the act creating the Central
Intelligence Agencv should contain a "catch-all" clause to pro\nde
for unforeseen contingencies. Thus, it was written that the CIA should
"perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence af-
fecting the national security as the National Security Council may
from time to time direct." It was under this clause that, early in the
operation of the 1947 Act, covert activities were authorized. I recall
that such activities took place in 1948 and it is even possible that some
planning took place in late 1947. It was the original concept that
covert activities undertaken under the act were to be carefully limited
and controlled. You will note that the language of the act provides
that this catch-all clause is applicable onlv in the event that the
national security is affected. This was considered to be an important
limiting and restricting clause.

^ Appendix B, Hearing, Vol. 7, p. 210.

(512)

513

However, as the cold war continued and Communist aggression
became the major problem of the day, our Government felt that it
was necessary to increase our country's responsibilities in protecting
freedom in various parts of the world. It seems apparent now that
we also greatly increased our covert activities. I have read some-
where that as time progressed we had literally hundreds of such
operations going on simultaneously.

It seems clear that these operations have gotten out of hand. The
knowledge regarding such operations has become so widespread that
our country has been accused of being responsible for practically
every internal difficulty that has occurred in every country in the
world. Our reputation has been damaged and our capacity for ethical
and moral world leadership has been impaired. The need to correct
this unfortunate development is long past due.

As one attempts to analyze the difficulty, and hopefully offer con-
structive suggestions for improvement, he finds much confusion exist-
ing within the system. It is clear that lines of authority and respon-
sibility have become blurred and indistinct.

The National Security Council, under the Act of 1947, is given the
responsibility of directing our country's intelligence activities. My
experience leads me to believe that this function has not been effec-
tively performed. The members of the NSC already have full-time jobs
and do not have the time to oversee meticulously the actions of the
intelligence community. Even though special committees have been
set up from time to time to perform this task, we learn that many
covert activities are undertaken without the knowledge of the Na-
tional Security Council or its special committee. In the staff report
on covert action in Chile,^ the startling statement is made that only one-
fourth of all covert action projects are considered by the 40 Committee.

Another condition exists that helps explain the unfortunate predica-
ment in which we find ourselves. I believe, on a number of occasions,
a plan for covert action has been presented to the NSC and authority
is requested for the CIA to proceed from point A to point B. The
authority will be given and the action will be launched. When point B
is reached, the persons in charge feel that it is necessary to go to
point C, and they assume that the original authorization gives them
such a right. From point C, they go to D and possibly E, and even
further, this has led to some bizarre results, and, when an investi-
gation is started, the excuse is blandly presented that authority was
obtained from the NSC before the project was launched.

I believe that the present system is no longer adequate to meet the
task. The lack of proper controls has resulted in a freewheeling course
of conduct on the part of persons within the intelligence community
that has led to spectacular failures and much unfortunate publicity.
A new approach is obviously needed for it is unthinkable that we
can continue to commit the egregious errors that have caused such
consternation to our friends and such delight to our enemies.

This inquiry today is part of the broad investigation conducted by
this committee to ascertain the facts. This is a preliminary phase
whic>i lionefully will lead to recommendations that will help elimi-

Appendix A, Hearings, Vol. 7, p. 144.

514

nate the errors of the past, and provide the country with the ex-
pectation that we can operate successfully in the future in this sensi-
tive area with dignity and effectiveness. I know^ that this committee
will be considering the means by which we can attain the improvement
that is so necessary and is so desired by our people.

In this connection, permit me to present to the committee a brief
five-point plan that I believe would make progress toward achieving
our goal.

First, the 1947 law creating the CIA should be substantially
amended and a new law should be written covering intelligence func-
tions. We have had almost 30 years of experience under the old law
and have learned a great deal. I believe it has served us reasonably
well, but its defects have become increasingly apparent. A clearer,
more definitive bill can be prepared that can accomplish our purposes.
By creating clearer lines of authority and responsibility and by care-
fully restricting certain activities, we can hopefully prevent the abuses
of the past.

Second, the creation of an effective joint House-Senate Committee
to oversee intelligence operations. I consider this the most important
function of a new law\ Proper congressional oversight has been sadly
lacking. I would hope that a small oversight committee of possibly
five members of each chamber might be created. It should be consid-
ered an assignment of outstanding importance and the members should
be willing to give the necessary time to it. By keeping the committee
small, security can be maintained and the possibility of disclosures
can be minimized.

With reference to covert activities, I believe it would be appropri-
ate for this committee to be informed in advance by the executive
branch of the Government before a covert project is launched. The
committee should be briefed and, if it approves, then the activity can
go forward. If the committee disapproves, it should inform the Presi-
dent of its disapproval so that he will have the benefit of the joint
committee's reaction. If necessary, the President and the committee
can confer, after which the President may decide to abandon the
project or possibly modify it. If he persists in going ahead despite the
committee's disapproval, then the committee might choose to with-
hold funds necessary to finance the activity in question. It is my feel-
ing that the importance of the decisionmaking process in this very
delicate field is such that there should be a joint effort by the executive
and legislative branches.

I would assume that this committee will have questions in that
regard, and I'm sure it will be valuable for us to discuss it.

Third, a new position of Director General of Intelligence should
be created. This man would be the chief intelligence officer of the
Ignited States. It would be his responsibility to correlate and syn-
chronize the activities of the various agencies within the intelligence
community. Under this concept there would still be a director of the
CIA, but his duties would be confined to the day-by-day operation of
that agency. The Director General would be responsible for the prod-
uct that would be produced by the intelligence community, and he
would be the chief adviser to the President on intelligence matters.

515

The Director General would also be charged with the duty of seeing
that the various agencies operated effectively and complied with the
law. In this connection, he would have under him a number of in-
spectors who would assist him in carrying out this function.

Fourth, the decision regarding the undertaking of covert projects
should be made by the Director General of Intelligence and the Na-
tional Security Council, and he would have the responsibility of seeing
that such covert projects were properly carried out by the CIA and
other members of the intelligence community.

In the beginning, there was a separation betAveen the CIA and the
group charged with covert activities. In the early 1950's, they were
consolidated. I believe that there should be much stricter control over
the launching of covert projects, but that after the basic decision is
made, then all the assets possessed by the CIA and other agencies
should be utilized.

The close supervision provided for in this concept will inescapably
diminish the number of covert operations. In my opinion, this is a
highly desirable result. Many of the plans launched in the past should
have been vetoed at their inception. I am sure that decisions have been
made in the field that never would have been made in higher levels
of our government. The guiding criterion should be the test as to
whether or not a certain covert project truly affects our national
security.

Fifth, the new intelligence agency should be forbidden to undertake
any domestic operations except to police its own employees. There
should not be any type of catch-all provision in the new law which
would permit the intelligence agency to spy on American citizens. All
domestic operations of this nature should be handled by the FBI. It
is equipped to do it and a close cooperation between the CIA and the
FBI is desirable and necessary. Certainly one agency charged with the
responsibility of domestic surveillance activities is enough.

We have a big job to do in this country. Our people are confused
about our national goals and cynical about our institutions. Our na-
tional spirit seems to have been re])laced by a national malaise. It is
my conviction that the efforts of this committee will assist us in re-
gaining confidence in our national integrity, and in helping to restore
to our Nation its reputation in the world for decency, fair dealing and
moral leadership.

B. Statement of Cyrus Vance

Mr. Vance. I would like to speak briefly to what I believe is the
central thrust of this committee's investigation : should there be any
covert action ? If so, what kinds and under what restraints ?

At the outset, I think it is important to underscore the distinction
between covert collection of intelligence and covert actions other than
collection. I believe that with respect to covert collection of intel-
ligence, the continuation of such collection should be permitted as I be-
lieve it is essential to the national security.

With respect to covert actions, I would not recommend that all
covert actions be prohibited by law. I believe it is too difficult to see
that clearly into the future. I believe it would be wise to enact legis-
lation prohibiting involvement in assassinations, as has been suggested
by this committee. In addition, I would be in favor of legislation pro-
hibiting interference with the electoral processes in other countries. I
would note that the drafting of such legislation is a complex business,
and it would have to be so drafted as not to block covert intelligence
collection.

Now, with respect to other covert actions, I believe it should be the
policy of the United States to engage in covert actions only when they
are absolutely essential to the national security.

The statutes, as now drafted, use the words "affect" or "are im-
portant to." ^ I think those words are inadeqaute. I think covert ac-
tions should be authorized only when they are essential to the national
security. Under such a test, I believe that the number of covert actions
would be very, very small.

As to procedures to insure that such a policy would be carried out,
I would suggest the following, and in the connection I might note that
I agree with most of the recommendations that Mr. Clifford has made.

First, I believe that any proposal for a covert action should first go
to the National Security Council, not a sub-Cabinet level committee.
The highest level of the Government should focus upon the question,
and therefore it should go before the National Security Council.

I would further suggest that the Attorney General of the United
States be made a member of the National Security Council. This would
insure that the chief legal officer of the United States would be one
of those who would be passing upon the recommendation that goes
to the President if it is in the affirmative.

I would also recommend that the President be required to give his
approval in writing, certifying that he believes the proposed action is
essential to the national security. After the President's approval, I
would suggest that a full and complete description of the proposed
action be communicated immediately to a ioint Congressional oversight
committee along the lines which Mr. Clifford has suggested. I believe
that such a step would then put the committee or any of its members

' Appendix B Hearings, Vol. 7, p. 210

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517

in a position to express their disapproval or concerns about the pro-
posed action, and to communicate them to the President of the United
States.

I am not suggesting that the committee should have a veto. I do not
believe that is necessary. I am suggesting that the committee or its in-
dividual members would be able to communicate with the President,
thus giving him the benefit of the committee's advice or of the advice
of individual members.

I believe this is and would be important to Presidents. I do not be-
lieve there would be inevitable leaks from such a committee. I know
that the Congress can safeguard security matters which are essential
to our national security.

Finally, I believe it's necessary that a monitoring system be set up
which would require frequent reports. I would suggest at least
monthly to the highest level ; namely, the National Security Council
and the Congress and to the joint oversight committee as to the prog-
ress of any action which has been authorized to go forward. I think
this would tend to help in meeting the problem that Mr. Clifford sug-
gested with respect to a covert operation moving from A to B and then
from B to C and so on.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I would stress that I believe such actions
should and would be very rare and that under such a set of procedures
there would be adequate oversight to control such activities.

C. Statement of David A. Phillips

Mr. Phillips. Mr. Chairman and Senators, for the record I would
like to make it clear that any viewpoints that I express today are per-
sonal ones. They do not represent the Association of Retired Intelli-
2;ence Officers, an organization of intelligence people from all services,
of which I happen to be President.

I would like to discuss covert action and covert activity. There's
nothing new about covert action, the term which describes a variety
of hugger-mugger gambits which can be taken to influence another
nation's actions, attitudes, or public opinion.

What is new is the current controversy as to whether our country
should engage in covert action. This is a valid subject for debate. Even
though covert operations have been drastically reduced, American in-
telligence personnel realize that many of the problems which beset the
intelligence community result from historical slips on the banana
peels of covert action. The biggest banana peel of all is that vague
phrase in the charter of CIA which reads "and other such functions
and duties ..." an ambiguous instruction which should be omitted
from future legislation.

There are two dimensions to covert operations. The first is the major
political or paramilitary endeavor, such as an attempt to change a
government — Guatemala, for instance — or to finance a secret army in
Southeast Asia. You might call this covert action with a capital "C,"
capital "A." King-size.

There is a second level of covert action, in the lower case; covert
action with a small "c," small "a." I call this "covert activity." Little
money, sometimes none, is spent on covert activity, where cooperative
friends are persuaded to influence a foreign government or some ele-
ment of it. The friend might be a government official responsive to
an ambassador's off-the-record request, that the local government
tighten up its laws concerning illegal narcotics traffic to the United
States. When the friend is met clandestinely by CIA, he is called an
"agent of influence." He might be a radio commentator or a local Ber-
nard Baruch whose park bench opinions carry political weight. The
agent of influence might be the foreign minister's mistress. Most cov-
ert activities utilizing the agent of influence are useful to American
ambassadors in achieving low-key but important objectives of U.S.
foreigTi policy. These activities are known in intelligence jargon as
"motherhood," and revelations concerning them would not shock or
disturb the American public. To proscribe CIA operations in covert
activities would be imprudent.

Covert action, capital "C," capital "A", is another matter. In 25
years as a practitioner of covert action and covert activity in seven
countries I have found that most of our mistakes occur when we at-
tempt to persuade foreigners to do something which the United States
wants more than they do.

The most successful operations have been those in which we were
requested to intervene — the percentage of such operations, when a

(518)

519

foreign leader has asked for secret assistance, has been quite high.
Some aspects of covert operations are anachronistic. Dirty tricks,
such as besmirching the reputation of an individual, have been aban-
doned and should not be revived. The expensive accessories of covert
action in the past, such as airlines and paramilitary units, should not
and need not be maintained as secret capabilities.

There is a basic question to be answered : Given the distemper of
the times, and the lack of credibility in government following Water-
gate, can covert operations remain covert? If not, they should be
terminated. Macy's window is not the place for secret operations.

Some sort of compromise seems to be in order. If American intelli-
gence operators demand secrecy as essential in covert operations, ex-
ecutive and congressional ovei*seers have the even more important
duty of knowing what intelligence agencies are doing.

I am convinced that the CIA is the organization best suited to
carry out covert action operations. Despite this, I have reluctantly
come to the conclusion that the charter for covert action should rest
elsewhere. I say this more in sorrow than anything else. Effective and
responsible accountability override practical operational considera-
tions. This will be best achieved in the conduct of covert action by the
creation of a new, very small bureau or office. By statute this organiza-
tion would be staffed by no more than 100 persons.

Some 60 would be in a support role ; perhaps 40 officers would be en-
gaged in the planning for and, on request, the execution of covert ac-
tion operations. All U.S. covert action eggs then, would be in one small
basket, a basket which could be watched very carefully. Even if not
utilized, such an office would be justifiable in terms of money and effort
as a war plans unit, expandable in case of international conflict. A
joint congressional committee should find such a unit easy to monitor,
and the intelligence personnel working in it could then expect a re-
duced number of congressional overseers, as opposed to the six com-
mittees now observing covert operations.

The office I propose would call on expertise derived from experience.
It would not employ airlines or mercenaries or exotic paraphernalia,
but would need the capability to provide friends wdth imaginative
advice and what British intelligence officers have sometimes called
"King George's cavalry" — money.

Covert action is a stimulating business, a headv experience for those
who sponsor it and for its practitioners. If not used in moderation it is
as dangerous as anv stimulant. But to suggest that covert action be
abandoned as a political option in tlie future is, in my opinion, inju-
dicious, if not frivolous. Some sav that covert action should be abol-
ished because of past mistakes. This would be as foolish as abolishing
the Office of the President because it has been once abused, or to disband
our armv in peace time would be.

The committee is aware of the 2-vear studv recently conducted by
the Murphy commission.* A conclusion of this review that :

Covert action should not be abandoned but should be employed only
where such action is olearlv essential to vital U.S. purposes, and then
only after careful high level review.

* Report of the Commission on tlie Organization of the Government for the Con-
duct of Foreign Policy, June 1975.

D. Prepared Statement of Morton H. Halperin

Mr. Chairman, I consider it an honor and a privilege to be invited
to testify before this committee on the question of covert operations.
From this committee's unprecedented review of the activities of our
intelligence agencies must come a new definition of w^hat the American
people will permit to be done in their name abroad and allow to be
done to them at home. No problem is more difficult and contentious
than that of covert operations.

It appears that I have been cast in the role of the spokesman on the
left on this issue. It is an miaccustomed position and one that I accept
with some discomfort. It should be clear to the committee that there
are a great many thoughtful and articulate Americans whose views on
this question are considerably to the left of mine, at least as these
terms are normally used. I would not presume to speak for them. Nor,
Mr. Chairman, am I speaking for the organizations with which I am
now affiliated. I appear, as you requested, as an individual to present
mj^ own views.

I believe that the United States should no longer maintain a career
service for the purpose of conducting covert operations and covert
intelligence collection by human means.

I believe also that the United States should eschew as a matter of
national policy the conduct of covert operations. The prohibition
should be embodied in a law with the same basic structure as
the statute on assassinations which the Committee has already
recommended.

These proposals are not put forward because I believe that no covert
operation could ever be in the American interest or because I could
not conceive of circumstances where the capability to conduct a covert
operation might seem to be important to the security of the United
States. I can in fact envision such circumstances. However, I believe
that the potential for covert operation has been greatly overrated and
in my view the possible benefits of a few conceivable operations are
far outweighed by the costs to our society of maintaining a capability
for covert operations and permitting the executive branch to conduct
such operations.

The relevations made by this Committee in its report on assassina-
tions are in themselves sufficient to make my case. I will rely on these
illustrations not because there are not many others of which we are
all aware but rather to avoid any dispute over facts.

The case against covert operations is really vei-y simple. Such oper-
ations are incompatible with our democratic institutions, with Con-
gressional and public control over foreign policy decisions, with our
constitutional rights, and with the principles and ideals that this
Republic stands for in the world.

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521

Let me begin with the last point. The CIA operations described in
this Committee's assassination report are disturbing not only because
murder was planned and attempted, but also because the operations
went against the very principles we claim to stand for in the world.
In Cuba, the Congo and Chile we intervened in the internal atfaii-s of
other comitries on our own initiative and in the belief that we had the
right to determine for others what kind of government their countiy
needed and who posed a threat to their welfare. We acted not because
we believed those that we opposed were the tools of foreign powers
kept in office by outside intervention; rather we acted in the face of
assertions by the intelligence commmiity that the leader's we opposed
were popular in their own lands.

In the Congo our efforts were directed at keeping Lumumba from
speaking and keeping the parliament from meeting because we be-
lieved that allowing him to speak or allowing the parliament to meet
would have meant that Lumumba would be back in office. In Chile
we preached to the military the need to ignore the constitution and to
overthrow a democratically elected government. We warned that the
alternative was deprivation and poverty for the Chilean people.

All of these things were undertaken in the name of the United
States but without the knowledge or consent of the Congress or the
public. Nor could such consent have been obtained. Can you imagine
a President asking the Congress to approve a program of seeking to
reduce the people of Chile to poverty unless their military, in viola-
tion of the constitution, seized power ; or the President seeking funds
to be used to keep the Congolese Parliament out of session so that it
could not vote Lumumba back into office ; or the authority to promise
leniency to Mafia leaders if they would help to assassinate Castro.
These programs were kept covert not only because we would be em-
barrassed abroad, but also because they would not be approved if they
were subjected to the same Congressional and public scrutiny as other
programs. That is one major evil of having a covert capability and
allowing our Presidents to order such operations. The assassinations
themselves may have been an aberration ; the means and purposes of
our interventions were not.

Another inevitable consequence of conducting covert operations
is that it distorts our democratic system in ways that we are only be-
ginning to understand. Covert operations by their nature cannot be
debated openly in ways required by our constitutional system. More-
over, they require efforts to avoid the structures that normally govern
the conduct of our officials. One obvious area is lying to the public
and the Consrress.

We should not forget that the erosion of trust between the govern-
ment and the people in this Republic began with the U-2 affair and
has continued through a series of covert operations including Chile.
Whether or not perjury was committed — and T see little doubt that it
was — it is surelv the case that the Cono;ress and the public were
svstematicallv deceived about the American intervention in Chile.
Such deception must stop if we are to regain the trust needed in this
nation ; it cannot stop as long as we are conducting covert operations.
Given the current absence of consensus on foreign policy aroals. such
operations will not be accorded the deference thev were given in the

69-983 O - 76 - 34

522

past. Critics will press as they do now on Angola and Portugal. And
administrations will feel the need and the right to lie.

Surely at this point in time it is not necessary to remind ourselves of
the certainty that the techniques that we apply to others will inevitably
be turned on the American people by our own intelligence services.
Whether that extends to assassination has sadly become an open ques-
tion but little else is.

The existence of a capability for covert operations inevitably distorts
the decision making process. Presidents confronted with hard choices
in foreign policy have to face a variety of audiences in framing a pol-
icy. This is in my view all to the good. It keeps us from straying
far from our principles, from what a majority of our citizens are pre-
pared to support, from a policy out of touch with reality. The overt
policies of the American government ultimately come under public
scrutiny and Congressional debate long before that they have been
subject to bureaucratic struggles in which the opposition of the policy
have their day in court.

Our intelligence analysts are free to explain why the policy will not
work. With covert policies none of this happens. Intelligence commu-
nity analysts were not told of the plans to assassinate Castro and so
they did not do the careful analysis necessary to support their view
that it would make no difference. The Assistant Secretary of State for
Latin America was kept in the dark about Track II in Chile so he was
not able to argue against it and inadvertently deceived the public.

In fact, I would argue that the route of covert operations is often
chosen precisely to avoid the bureaucratic and public debate which our
Presidents and their closest advisers come to despise. That is precisely
what is wrong with them. Our Presidents should not be able to con-
duct in secret operations which violate our principles, jeopardize our
rights, and have not been subject to the checks and balances which
normally keep policies in line.

You will hear, I am sure, various proposals to cure these evils by
better forms of control. Such proposals are important, well-inten-
tioned and certainly far better than the status quo, but I have come
to believe that they cannot succeed in curing the evils inherent in hav-
ing a covert capability. The only weapon that opponents of a Presi-
dential policy, inside or outside the executive branch, have is public
debate. If a policy can be debated openly, then Congress may be per-
suaded to constrain the President and public pressure may force a
change in policy. But if secrecy is accepted as the norm and as legiti-
mate, then the checks put on covert operations can easily be ignored.

Let me conclude by violating my self-imposed rule to draw only on
cases in the assassination report and discuss some rumored current
covert operations. I ask you to assume (since I assume that the Com-
mittee is not prepared to confirm) that the United States now has
underway a major program of intervention in Angola and a plan to
create an independent Azores Republic should that prove "necessary".
I ask you to consider how the Congress and the public would treat these
proposals if they were presented openly for public debate. Congress
could, in principle, vote publicly to send aid to one side in the Angolan
civil war as other nations are doing and Ave could publicly invite the
people of the Azores to choose independence and gain our support.

523

But because we maintain a covert operations capability and because
such operations are permitted, the President can avoid debate in the
bureaucracy and with the Congress and the public. We can be drawn
deeply into commitments without our consent and have actions taken
on our behalf that we have no opportunity to stop by public pressure
or to punish at the polls.

Mr. Chairman, in response to the position I have outlined briefly
this morning, one is confronted with a parade of hypothetical hor-
ribles— the terrorists with the nuclear weapons, a permanent oil em-
bargo and the like. To these I would reply in part that such scenarios
seem implausible and should they occur the likelihood that covert
capabilities could make an important difference also seems remote.
As to the consequences of legislating a total prohibition in light of
the possible unexpected catastrophe, I am content to call your atten-
tion back to the committee's excellent treatment of this issue in your
assassination report.

This country is not, in my view, in such dangerous peril that it need
continue to violate its own principles and ignore its own constitutional
system to perpetuate a capability which has led to assassination at-
tempts, to perjury, and to the subversion of all that we stand for at
home and abroad. We are secure and we are free. Covert operations
have no place in that world.

E. Recommendations of the Harvard University Institute of
Politics, Study Group on Intelligence Activities, for Eeform
IN the Conduct of Covert Operations and Secret Intelligence
to Protect the Basic Interest and International Standing of
THE United States

Additional safeguards are needed to govern intelligence collection
and covert operations in respect to activities that can discredit (1) the
United States' objectives, principles and interests; (2) private in-
dividuals and institutions within the United States (in addition to
constitutional protections) ; and (3) foreign and international insti-
tutions and persons important to the United States. Because of the
secret character of these activities, a "surrogate" system of safeguards
must be established for the normal safeguards of public scrutiny and
open debate accompanying overt government activities. These surro-
gate procedures include the promulgation of basic guidelines, the
strengthening of review and approval procedures within the executive
branch, and the proper functioning of the congressional oversight
function.

We believe that some capacity for covert operations needs to be
preserved and available in suitable circumstances.^ Thus, such opera-
tions should not be abolished or prohibited completely, but should be
better regulated and supervised. It is not easy to prescribe rigid rules
regarding covert operations. Within limits what is suitable or even
permissible will vary with circumstances. Measures which should not
be undertaken in peace time or against a democratic state might be
permissible during actual or threatened hostilities or against a totali-
tarian regime. Thus, it would be unwise to freeze safeguards by the
rigidity of legislative prohibitions. There is need for some flexibility
to adjust to circumstances and to modify rules and procedures ac-
cording to changes in conditions and experience. Guidelines to govern
covert operations should thus be incorporated into executive orders
in preference to legislation. The Congress should direct the executive
branch to promulgate such orders and might propose the areas they
should cover.

1. Principles to Govern Covert Operations^ and to Govern- Secret In-
telligence and Countenntelligence to tlie Extent That the Prin-
ciples Are Applicable

a. Covert operations must be consistent with, and in support of,
openly announced policies and objectives which have been established
by the normal processes of government.

b. At best, covert operations can provide tactical support for long-
term national policies openly arrived at and openly executed.

^ Morton Halperin believes that no clandestine operations should be permitted.

(524)

525

c. Covert operations must not be used as a convenient escape from
public review, nor to circumvent overt procedures for policy approval
where it is possible to accomplish the objective by overt means.

d. Covert operations in peace time should ordinarily be directed
to actions w^hich will basically contribute to the strengthening of open
societies and to the resolution of international conflicts.

e. Some covert operations can only be justified in war or near-war
situations where the security of the United States is directly involved,
and where both the probability of exposure and the price of exposure
are much less than in peace time.

f . In the present situation, large-scale operations, such as the support
of guerrilla forces, which can neither be kept secret nor plausibly
denied, should not be undertaken covertly.

g. No covert operations shall be undertaken with the objective of
assassination, murder, terrorism or mass destruction (such as creating
epidemics or causing food shortages). No clandestine support shall be
given knowingly to political or other groups for such purposes, and
positive efforts shall be made to prevent any support provided by the
United States from being used by others for such purposes. No covert
support, advice or assistance will be given to police or other forces
used for internal security purposes that systematically use torture,
concentration camps, etc. On the other hand, covert relationships have
in the past been used to moderate the activities of foreign security
forces, and this should not be prohibited. The receipt of information
from foreign security forces would not, of course, be barred, but the
provision of information to them about their "targets" would be. There
is not a consensus on this point ; some believe that it is too narrow in
application (since funds given covertly or overtly for other purposes
would free resources for the tortures) ; others believe it is impractical,
given the need to exchange information and contacts with foreign
services regardless of their unsavory domestic practices.

h. Covert operations shall not be used to subvert the results of the
democratic processes of other countries. (1) This principle would not,
in itself, bar covert funding of open political parties or organizations
where the opposition is receiving foreign funds. However, in countries
with democratic processes, covert operations should be restricted to
backing organizations with genuine prior existence and support within
the country ; they shall not be used to create groups which would not
exist on any significant scale without U.S. backing. (2) This principle
will not, in itself, bar covert operations where the government in
power — though initially democratically installed — is clearly engaged
in destroying those processes. However, the other limitations on covert
activities would remain in force.

i. Covert acts of war (coup-staging, guerrilla support, terrorism,
training of mercenaries, aerial bombing) should not be undertaken
except with congressional approval exercised through the Oversight
Committee or Committees (since War Powers Act requires Congres-
sional approval of overt acts of war) .

j. Members or employees of private organizations whose integrity
can be regarded as major independent national assets should not be
used to provide cover for covert agents ; nor should such organizations

526

themselves be used as vehicles for covert operations. The losses, through
compromise, in the public acceptance of these groups as independent
private activities or as overt government activities, is almost always
far greater than the gain from using them as cover for intelligence
agents. The types of organizations which should be included in such
prohibition are :

— religious organizations ;
— ^the press ;

— charitable and educational foundations ;
— universities and colleges ;

— the Peace Corps and similar government agencies; and,
— any person who is abroad as a scholar, teacher or adviser with
overt U.S. Government support.

This prohibition should not exclude such organizations or individuals
from transmitting information to overt or covert agencies of the
government when it is gained through the normal activities of these^
organizations.

2. Procedures for Apjrroval of Covert Operations hy the Executive
Branch

The procedures of the executive branch for review and approval
of covert activities must be strengthened. Since it is recognized that
in the world in which we live, not all activities of the government can
or should be conducted in the full light of public disclosure, a "surro-
gate" must be established for the normal public scrutiny and open
debate accompanying over government actions.

Tho surrogate procedures must be rigorously defined and followed,
and must be equivalent to the impaftial scrutiny and judgment that
is applied to overt policies through executive branch review and
public consideration, congressional debate and legislative action. We
recommend that no clandestine action (including not only covert op-
erations but also major secret intelligence projects) should be under-
taken except pursuant to the following :

a. The President should appoint a permanent Special Committee
to examine and advise on all clandestine activities. The members of
the committee should be publicly identified and the Chairman should
be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. It should
have a small, independent staff.

b. This Special Committee should be composed of persons of broad
international or public policy judgment and experience, or both. They
should have the freedom from personal political commitments and
ambitions and should have sufficient time available to examine any
proposed action with whatever degree of time and attention is required
to evaluate both the likelihood and the long-term and short-term
implications of either success or failure. Further, they should be 'able
to review in whatever depth necessary the intelligence estimates un-
derlying the proposed action and independently assess the likelihood
of success and the likelihood of exposure. They need not be full time
but they should not have other government responsibilities.

527

^c. All proposals for covert operations should be submitted to the
Special Committee in writing and should :

(1) state the objectives and the specific actions planned;

(2) show the conformity to the executive order guidelines
and overt U.S. policies ;

(3) assess alternative overt means available;

(4) appraise the prospects for success and the consequences
of either success or failure.

d. Any such proposal should be submitted to the Special Commit-
tee for appraisal before submission to the President. He should not
authorize any such action before he receives the report from the Special
Committee showing those approving, those dissenting, and those
absent. The Report should make specific findings as to compliance with
the guidelines. No proposed action should be undertaken until spe-
cifically approved by the President in writing. If he decides to approve
the proposal, despite the objection of the majority of a Special Com-
mittee, he should set forth his reasons for acting contrary to their
advice.

e. The Special Committee shall periodically review all on-going
covert operations and major secret intelligence activities to ensure that
the original justifications remain valid and that the activities shall
conform to the executive order guidelines and should report their
findings to the President. The committee should be required to approve
continuation, at each review, failing which approval, the President
would be required to re-authorize the operation, and should advise the
Special Committee of his reasons.

f . Exceptions : When the United States is engaged in hostilities, or
is endangered by imminent hostilities or other major threats to its
security, the President may approve of specific covert operations di-
rected against the enemy, potential enemy, or other source of threat
contrary to the guidelines if he makes explicit findings in writing
regarding the conditions justifying the action and files them both with
the Special Committee and Oversight Committee of Congress.

r3. The Role and Fimctions of Congressional Oversight Committee

a. The function of Congressional Oversight should ideally be cen-
tralized in a single joint committee of Congress, but at most in one
committee in each branch of the Consrress, in order to minimize
duplicating or overlapping responsibilities with present standing
committees.

b. Our studv group believes that, in principle, the Oversight Com-
mittee should be informed of any proposed covert operation before it
is undertaken and should be provided with the evaluation of the opera-
tion and recommendations of the Special Committee in the executive
branch which is recommended above. However, the viability of the
principle of advance notification will depend in the long run on the
rules for secrecv the Congress imposes on itself and on the effectiveness
of these rules in preventing unauthorized disclosure of secret and
sensitive information.

528

Note by Robert Piirsley: The Oversight Committee should attempt
to ensure that the intelligence community is (1) doing the job
effectively; (2) performing efficiently, i.e., costs and benefits are
balanced; and (3) acting consistently with foreign policy.

Comment by the Chairman :

I believe all members of the study group would agree with this.
However, since there was not tune to consult them, the statement
is included as a note rather than in the text.

4. Organizational Alternatives for the Clandestine Services

a. Alternatives. — There are four alternatives for location of the
clandestine services (CS) of the CIA (in this outline the term clan-
destine services is used in preference to either DDO or DDP in order
to avoid confusion) :

1. State Department — The CS could be moved to the State
Department and either be consolidated with State Depart-
ment functions or be organized as a quasi-independent agency
under a State Department umbrella (the ACDA model).

2. Department of Defense — The CS could be made a civilian
operating agency of the Department of Defense reporting to
the Secretary of Defense.

3. Independent Agency— The CS could be established as an
entirely independent agency of Government reporting to the
President through the National Security Council.

4. Status Quo — The CS could be maintained as part of a
central intelligence function. Presumably its size and mission
would be reduced.

b. Assumptio7,s. — To discuss the above options rationally, one must
make certain assumptions about the future need of the United States
for CS. This outline assumes that we will want to maintain : a clan-
detsine collection capacity ; an international counterintelligence capa-
bility; and an ability to engage in some traditional covert action func-
tions, but that the actual level of covert action will be drastically
reduced. It also assumes that we will want our clandestine collection,
counterintelligence and covert action capacities to be targeted as
efficiently as possible and controlled as tightly as possible. Further, it
is assumed that such functions will benefit from improved cover and
other safeguards to clandestinity.

c. A Note on the Clandestine Services. —

1. General public opinion stimulated by the Agee book,
etc., seems to be that the CIA has engaged in practically
wanton intervention in the domestic political affairs of other
countries and that this intervention has been a self-sustain-
ing goal of our foreign policy. For the most part, American
"intervention" has been motivated by a desire to thwart
real or predicted intervention by others — the Soviet Union,
China, Cuba. Arguably our policy has been as much or more
"counter-interventionist," as "interventionist."

2. It is often forgotten that tlie CS is not organized solely
on geographic lines. A Soviet Bloc division has traditionally
stationed case officers in any country there is a Soviet

529

"presence." The chief purpose of these "specialists" has been
to monitor the activities of their KGB counterparts. Informed
(though not necessarily unbiased) sources report that
"detente" has brought no abatement of KGB activity in
Europe, Japan or the less developed countries. This "KGB
matching and monitoring" function should probably be at
the core of any future CS.

3. Other appropriate roles for the CS include monitoring
the activities of mternationally operating terrorist groups
and exploring third world political intentions regarding eco-
nomic controls of scarce natural resources.

4. The above functions cannot readily or completely be
carried out by overt United States representatives abroad.
Such representatives are constrained, as a general propo-
sition, to relations with established elements in the host coun-
try. Clandestine representatives can more readily explore the
plans of opposition elements. Further, CS officers have car-
ried out important liaison functions with intelligence services

•of host countries. It is assumed that such liaison should be
continued through the CS.

d. A Note ahouti Organization. — The CIA is frequently discussed
as though it has two component parts — a CS and a directorate of
intelligence, which does analysis, estimating and intelligence pro-
duction (DDP/DDO and DDI). In point of fact, the Agency tradi-
tionally has operated with four directorates. In addition to the DDI
and the CS, there have been a support directorate (DDS) and a di-
rectorate chiefly concerned with science and technology (DDS&T).
The DDS contains a very substantial communications component
which not only handles communications for the CIA but also, in
many parts of the world, for the State Department. The DDI has
contained two major "collection" functions — the Foreign Broadcast
Information System (FBIS) and the Domestic Contact Service
(DCS). The latter, which overtly contacts Americans who travel
abroad in order to pick their brains regarding foreign technical and
economic developments has been an important source of intelli-
gence. Any rational plan for "divorcing" the CS and the DDI must
perforce include consideration of disposition or re-creation of the
functions and capacities which reside in the other two directorates
(the DDS and the DDS&T), as well as the DDI collection functions
(FBIS and DCS).

e. Goals or Principles. — Any scheme of organization for the CS
sliould be based upon certain rational goals or principles, though it
is impossible to define principles that are entirely consistent with
one another. Some suggested principles are set forth below :

1. A responsive and effective intelligence analytic function
is vital to the United States — ^the effectiveness and objectivity
of this function should not be compromised by operational
considerations; nor should its ability to gain the widest pos-
sible input be jeopardized by stigmatization which may result
from proximity to covert activities.

2. The requirements of the analytic function should be read-
ily communicated to the clandestine collector. Likewise, the

530

product of the clandestine collection system should be readily
communicated to the intelligence analyst.

3. When appropriate, the President and other policymakers
should receive raw clandestine intelligence from an agency
that is as disinterested a conduit as possible.

4. The CS should be insulated from political misuse or from
Presidential zeal, real or apparent.

5. Clandestine functions should be made as accountable as
possible to public representatives, recognizing that secrecy can
be a legitimate operational imperative.

6. The "cover" under which clandestine collectors operate
should be preserved or improved.

7. The location of the CS should enable continuing evalua-
tion of the relative merit of human intelligence as opposed to
technical intelligence.

/. The following is an evaluation of the pros and cons of various
alternative locations for the CS in light of the assumptions, organiza-
tional considerations and goals discussed above.

1. The State Department Option —

a. Pro''s

(i) Might create better unity of foreign service and clandestine
reporting, reducing redundancy of effort.

(ii) Might enable better integration of intelligence and foreign
policy requirements in general.

(iii) Would enable establishment of independent intelligence ana-
lytic function without overlay of operational concerns.

(iv) Would involve placing State's communications back in the
State Department.

b. Con''s

(i) Traditional jealously or suspicion of foreign service officers to-
ward their CS counterparts might cause substantial bureaucratic
friction.

(ii) Insulation from political aberration {e.g.^ the McCarthy pe-
riod) which in the past had not existed for the State Department
might no longer exist for the CS.

(iii) To the extent the CS is called on to perform "covert" func-
tions, the "taint" which these functions are said to place upon the
intelligence analytic function could, in effect, be transferred to the
entire foreign affairs establishment of the United States Government.

(iv) There may be a penalty in terms of responsiveness of collec-
tion to intelligence requirements if clandestine collectors and intelli-
gence analysts are "divorced."

(v) To the extent the CS collects important intelligence informa-
tion which contradicts DOD perceptions, DOD might claim CS is
infected with a "State Department" bias.

2. The Defense Department Option —

a. Pro''s

(i) In terms of size, the DOD could easily envelop the CS.

(ii) A considerable portion of CS cover is already military in
nature. Thus there might be some marginal improvement in cover.

(iii) Location in the DOD would not result in a "tainting" of the
DOD since it already engages in intelligence and counterintelligence
functions.

531

(iv) Support and R&D functions for CS could readily be merged
with DOD components.

b. Con's

(i) A Secretary of Defense's span of control is already very wide —
query whether he would have the capacity to give adequate direction
totheCS.

(ii) Might result in an increasing focus on military-to-military in-
telligence liaison as opposed to civilian lines of liaison. Such a change
in focus may cause problems for command and control, and potentially
can affect intelligence production.

(iii) Insulation from political zeal might very w^ell be imperfect
because of the traditional military attitude of "can do."

(iv) Civilian control at DOD of military functions is surprisingly
"thin." Presumably the CS, if placed in the Pentagon, would be sub-
ject to civilian rather than military control and would tax an already
overextended group of civilians.

( v) The intelligence reporting of the CS might become tainted by a
military bias, real or perceived.

(vi) Because of the size of the DOD^ the thinness of civilian con-
trol over DOD functions, etc., the net result of placing the CS in the
Defense Department might well be to reduce, rather than enhance, CS
accountability to the public and Congress.

3. The iTvdependent Agency Option —

a. Pro's

(i) If it is deemed imperative tosplit^^he CS from the intelligence
analytic functions of Government, the independent agency model
would seem preferable to the State Department or Defense Depart-
ment models in light of the "cons" outlined above.

(ii) The independent agency would presumably not be a large
agency, at least in relative terms. It might give public assurance that
the national policy is not 'being dominated by a clandestine intelli-
gence colossus.

(iii) Tasking of this agency by the NSC directly might avoid the
bias or inefficiency which might result m tasking it through the State
Department on the one hand or the Defense Department on the other.

b. Con's

(i) Cover problems would result. Stateside cover would be difficult
without a broader institutional envelop. The small size of the Agency
might reduce "clout" in seeking cover slots from other Departments.
This fact in turn could create incentives to use of commercial or even
"media" cover with attendant societal costs.

(ii) The new agency would be less insulated from Presidential zeal.

(iii) An entire support mechanism would have to be created for this
new agency.

(iv) Relationships of such an agency to the science and technology
of intelligence collection would be unclear unless it were to have its
own costly R&D function.

(v)It might require its own independent communications function.

4. The Status Quo —
a. Pro's

532

(i) Current location can assure closest tailoring of clandestine activ-
ities to intelligence analytic requirements assuming adequate direction
and control.

(ii) The status quo is an evolutionary product which may reflect
the wisdom of time.

(iii) It is hard to find a better location.

(iv) Present location is efficient from the point of view of using
extant support, communications and R&D functions.

(v) Present location preserves independence of the clandestine
function from potential military bias.

b. Con^s

(i) The CS has been the dominant directorate in the agency and
without a "divorce" this domination cannot be terminated.

(ii) History demonstrates that the present location inadequately
insulates from the possibility of Presidential zeal.

(iii) Location of clandestine operations in the same agency charged
with analytic and estimative functions may have warped and may
continue to warp the intelligence product.

(iv) The status quo may be intolerable in light of the disclosures of
the Senate Intelligence Committee. One can argue that a shake-up is
needed for the sake of a shake-up.

g. Conclusions

1. On balance it seems that the status quo, however imperfect, is
preferable than any of the three identified options for change. // the
status quo is maintained, there nonetheless need to be serious changes
within the current organizational arrangement :

a. By executive directive or by legislation, a career CS officer should
be precluded from appointment as the principal intelligence officer of
the U.S. Government.

b. Covert action should be dramatically circumscribed (if it has not
already been as a practical result of the House and Senate intelligence
committees' hearings and other recent disclosures and legislation).

c. The CS should be substantially reduced in size — the CS should be
a more tightly focused operation, focusing on Soviet and Chinese tar-
gets and possible other targets of clear and continuing significance
to the United States national security, such as resource cartels, and
international terrorist activities.

d. To these ends, the CS must be given more rigorous intra- and
inter-agency budget and planning scrutiny. Closer evaluation of the
CS intelligence product needs to be made. DDI and DDS&T analysts
should be required on a quarterly basis, to estimate the usefulness of
CS reporting in terms of its percentage contribution to finished in-
telligence product.

F. Recommendation of the House Select Committee on
Intelligence Concerning Covert Action

1. The Select Committee recommends that all activities involving
direct or indirect attempts to assassinate any individual and all para-
military activities shall be prohibited except in time of war.

2. The Select Committee recommends that as to other covert action
by any U.S. intelligence component, the following shall be required
within 48 hours of initial approval.

a. The Director of Central Intelligence shall notify the Committee
in writing, stating in detail the nature, extent, purpose, risks, like-
lihood of success, and costvS of the operation.

b. The President shall certify in writing to the Committee that
such covert action operation is required to protect the national security
of the United States.

c. The Committee shall be provided with duplicate originals of the
written recommendations of each member of the 40 Committee or
its successor.

3. All covert action operations shall be terminated no later than
12 months from the date of affirmative recommendation by the 40
Committee or its successor.

(533)

G. America's Secret Operations: A Perspective

By Harry Rositzke
[From Foreign Affairs Magazine, January, 1975]

Thirty-three years after William J. Donovan set up the first genuine
American secret service, and as the firet generation of American secret
operations officers fades away into unclassified retirement, the Ameri-
can Intelligence Service, or AIS,^ faces a new Administration, new
tasks in a new non-confrontation world, and new, as well as old, sus-
picions. Its belated establishment led initially to a certain amount of
hostility both within the foreign affairs establishment and vis-a-vis the
internal security organization that had come into being after World
War I, and these feelings have never wholly died out. And American
secret operations have developed in their brief career an unenviable
public image as well, both domestically and abroad.

Designed to cope with the Nazi, then the Stalinist, menace, the AIS
has come to be regarded by liberal opinion at home as a haven for
reactionaries and stunted cold warriors, as a sinister secret arm of our
foreign policy, as a rapist of American civil rights and academic
freedom, as co-conspirator with the White House in political skull-
duggery. Abroad, "CIA" has become a symbol of American imperial-
ism, the protector of dictators, the enemy of the Left, the mastermind
of coups and counter-coups in the developing world. It is a strange and
remarkable record for an official institution in a democratic society.

What is the action record of American secret intelligence? Where
does it stand today ? What lies ahead ?

During World War II the Donovan organization attained, on the
whole, a remarkable reputation. Kept out of the Southwest Pacific by
a jealous General MacArthur, yielding Latin American responsibilities
for the time being to the FBI, occasionally flawed by the high degree
of individualism Donovan encouraged, the Office of Strategic Services
(OSS) nonetheless rendered signal service in a host of situations. It
left a large legacy not only of trained men but of senior officials con-
vinced that such operations could be of great importance in support-
ing American foreign policy.

For two years after the war the survivors of OSS fought for their
official lives. The former Research and Analysis Unit, essentially overt,

^ I choose this simple term to disitinguish the Service sharply from the Central
Intelligence Agency (of which it is a lesser part) and to avoid the glut of titles by
which it has been designated : Special Operations, Policy Coordination, Plans,
Clandestine Services, Operations.

(534)

535

wound up briefly in the State Department, while the secret operations
fended for themselves. In 1947 the two were brought back together
under the umbrella of the Central Intelligence Agency, established by
law in the summer of 1947, a marriage of covert and overt that persists
to this day.

Those engaged in secret espionage operations found their main tar-
get within months of the end of the European war : Soviet military
capabilities and intentions. By 1948, as the Berlin blockade signaled
the intensification of the cold war, the overriding purpose of the AIS
was to provide the White House with early warning of Soviet hostil-
ities, both by strategic bombere and by ground troops through Poland.

In 1946 Washington knew virtually nothing about the U.S.S.R.
Four years of concentration on the Germans and Japanese had left
the Soviet files empty. Air Force researchers combed the Library of
Congress to flesh out the bare outlines of bombing target dossiers. Tens
of thousands of Eastern emigi-es in Europe were interrogated for the
simplest items of basic intelligence : roads, factories, city plans. Intel-
ligence peddlers sprang up by the dozen to satisfy the American mar-
ket. Any ship that visited a Soviet port was a gold mine.

Almost nothing came out of Moscow. A beleaguered embassy and
a few sequestered Western journalists passed on official handouts, read
the press, went nowhere, talked to no one. The Soviet Union, like Hit-
ler's Fortress Europe, had become a "denied area." Only secret agent
operations carried out by "illegal" entry could penetrate the target area
to provide early warning of an attack and, later, information on Soviet
progress in its atomic program.

For almost ten years, until the mid-1950s, the AIS dispatched agents
into the Soviet Union by air, land and sea from almost every point on
its outer periphery between Scandinavia and Japan. Most were
equipped with radios and sent in by air, some to make contact with
resistance groups in the Baltic States and in the Ukraine (where they
survived until the mid-fifties), others to become observers at selected
transportation points to give notice of unusual movement, or to collect
or measure earth and water samples near suspect uranium-processing
plants. A few tried to legalize themselves for permanent residence in
urban areas. Agents without radios went on brief in-and-out missions
on foot to observe, photograph, and exfiltrate.

At the same time hundreds of agents were being sent in to cover
military targets in Eastern Europe from bases in adjacent areas.
Border-crossing became the order of the day, easiest from Berlin, more
and more dangerous elsewhere as the barbed wire, plowed strips, and
alarm systems made the Iron Curtain more dense. Agents were sent
in to observe specific airfields or factories, to make contact with old
friends and recruit likely prospects, to establish themselves in strategic
locations, to act as couriers, to service dead drops, etc.

These cross-border operations involved enormous resources of tech-
nical and documentation support, hundreds of training officers, thou-
sands of safe-houses, and, above all, hundreds of courageous men who
preferred to fight the Russians or the Communists rather than linger
in the DP camps or emigrate to Brazil. Scores of agents paid with their
lives for our concern. All this effort, however wasteful in retrospect,
was demanded by the requirements of the Pentagon and the field com-

536

manders in Europe. Their demands reflected the almost frantic fear
of a Soviet military move into Western Europe, especially after Korea.

With Stalin's death in 1953 and the easing of legal travel into the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the lessening urgency of ground
military requirements, and the increased focus on Soviet political in-
tentions, the emphasis in AIS operations shifted to the "legal" ap-
proach, the classic form of peacetime penetration. The Soviet official
stationed abroad Tbeicame one target, as his connection with Moscow
and eventual reassignment to his headquarters made him a source of
the greatest potential value : an in-place agent in or near the corridors
of central power in the Party-government. The main agent source on
Soviet matters during the fifties was a Soviet military officer whose
reporting from 1953 to 1958 provided the U.S. government with
detailed documentary information on strategic as well as tactical mili-
tary matters, including the Berlin crisis. He was succeeded in the
crucial years 1961-63 by Colonel Penkovsky, whose coverage of Soviet
missile development was of vital strategic value.

From the late 1950s on, agent coverage of military-industrial targets
within the Soviet Union was gradually superseded by both photo-
graphic and electronic coverage, which in terms of importance and
volume far exceeded reporting through human sources.

American operations against Communist parties during the early
years of the cold war were mainly designed to uncover their sources of
secret funds, to ferret out their underground apparatus, and to estab-
lish their paramilitary capabilities and plans. On the political side,
an occasionally valuable insight into the councils of Party leaders
in Moscow came from their contacts with senior and respected Com-
munist party leaders abroad.

After the 20th Party Congress in 1956, with the shift from direc-
tion to persuasion in Moscow's relations with foreign parties, more
and more serious political discussions with foreign party leaders took
place in Moscow. Senior party officials from Europe, Asia and Latin
America became a useful source for the political views and regional
intentions of the Soviet leadership. In the past 15 years the penetra-
tion of parties in these areas has served, for example, to supply details
of the Sino-Soviet rift long before it became public, to record the
underlying rationale of Soviet policy toward the Asian subcontinent,
and to monitor the advice given the Arab parties during the various
Near East crises.

From the late fifties the requirements for intelligence coverage
broadened rapidly. Mideast tensions, troubles on the Indian subcon-
tinent, heady events in Africa, the spurt of Chinese activity abroad
in the mid-sixties, Castro's overseas programs, coups and counter-
coups on four continents, the evolving situation in Indochina — all be-
came grist for Washington's intelligence analysts and targets for
agents' coverage.

The U.S. intelligence community soon became a global city desk
to support the role of global policeman. The policv-makers wanted to
know what was going on everywhere. The intelli.q-ence analysts set
reouirements and priorities that justified the collection of almost any
information. Good researchers are omnivorous, and the man on "Para-
guayan political" wants to know as much about goinjrs-on in Asuncion
as the Czech specialist about affairs in Prague. In the intelligence

537

sector, as in the public media, the information explosion brought fast
communication of more information with lesser interest.

Washington intelligence became an all-source glut: millions of
words daily from foreign radio broadcasts, thovisands of embassy and
attache reports, a stream of communications intercepts, cartons of
photographs, miles of recorded electronic transmissions — and a hand-
ful of agent reports. More and more, intelligence collection became
devoted to current intelligence, to the minutiae of history that fill the
daily and weekly bulletins to keep the policy-makers informed.

The AIS has not been immune to the pressures for such day-to-day
coverage. More and more of its assets have been devoted to reporting
from behind the scenes on current events, and a great deal of its
effort has been expended on the coverage of internal affairs in coun-
tries of the most marginal importance to the U.S. interest. As the
Service became more tactical, and monthly production the yardstick
of accomplishment, it has naturally devoted less time to the strategic
operations that normally take years to develop.

Ill

Counterespionage operations are the hard core and essential re-
source of any intelligence service, for their primary purpose is to
assist in guarding the nation's diplomatic and military secrets, includ-
ing its own intelligence operations.

In 1946 AIS knowledge of the wartime Soviet intelligence services
was confined to a scattering of names and operations culled from
captured German and Japanese documents, a brief British organiza-
tional study, and a handful of wartime domestic spy cases. The coun-
terespionage files were rapidly filled in the next ten years with the
names of tens of thousands of Soviet "agents" that poured in from
emigres, intelligence mills, friendlv security services, and AIS con-
tacts. Anyone a "source" did not like became a Soviet agent : Soviet
officials, Communist partv members, hostile emigre leaders, leftist
politicians, liberal journalists and labor leaders, etc. Most of this
reporting was trash and treated as such.

During the 1950s hard information on the Soviet services and their
operations was gradually built up from direct surveillance, arrested
agents, intelligence defectors, and double-agent operations. Defectors
were the richest source, and in the early sixties served not only to
provide detailed information on Soviet intelligence personnel both
at home and abroad and on the organization of the Soviet intelli-
gence agencies and their methods of operation, but to identify hun-
dreds of Soviet asfents, mainly in Europe, many in NATO, w'ho were
arrested or monitored for further leads. The impressive list of ex-
posures of Soviet penetrations of European intelligence services in
the 1960s is directly traceable to leads, sometimes explicit, often vague,
from both Polish and Soviet intelligence defectors.

The main counterespionage purpose of the AIS, however, is to
detect and neutralize Soviet operations directed against strategic
U.S. targets. Soviet intelligence has made, and continues to make,
a determined effort to plant or recruit agents in the policy levels of
State and Defense, and in such intelliarence ors-anizations as the Na-
tional Security Agency, the CIA and the FBI. Virtually all their

538

operations against American targets originate abroad (they recognize
the security and psychological hazards of recruiting an American
official at home) , and it has been the task of the AIS to uncover over-
seas leads and transmit them to the FBI for follow-up once a recruited
or potential agent returns to the States.

For some years now the KGB, the Soviet civilian service, has car-
ried on a systematic program to recruit Americans attached to official
installations abroad. It is mainly interested in younger personnel,
both file clerks and secretaries with access to classified information
(code clerks are, of course, top priority) and Marine guards who can
be most useful in safe-opening operations or installing concealed micro-
phones. Some two to three hundred cases of direct approach by a
Soviet officer are reported each year. Upon occasion an American who
is approached may be encouraged to continue the contract if he is
agreeable.

To what extent the KGB has been successful in penetrating federal
agencies is bound to be a matter of conjecture. Unfortunately, in
counterespionage operations what one can be sure about, what one
knows about, may be insignificant compared to what one doesnt know
about: the parameters of ignorance are limitless. Only if the AIS
should secure the cooperation of the American desk chief of the KGB
in Moscow could we say with assurance that there is not a Soviet
agent in X or Y installation in Washington.

If there is such an agent, it is most unlikely that he is being handled
out of the Soviet Embassy in Washington. The principal operational
resource of the Soviet services abroad is not their official residents
under diplomatic cover, but the "illegals" who have been dispatched
to the West in increasing numbers during the past 15 years. These
illegals, normally well-trained So^det citizens with false Western
documents and a carefully build-up legendary past, live and act as
normal citizens in their country of residence, and have their own
separate communications with Moscow. Tliey are almost impossible
to uncover by the usual investigative methods. Unless they make a
mistake, or give themselves up (as his assistant resident did to impli-
cate Colonel Abel), they are as safe as any secret agent in an open
democratic society can be. The search for illegals continues to be a
frustrating priority for both the European and American services.

Meanwhile, the role of some Soviet intelligence officers under diplo-
matic cover ("lesfals") is changing. The highly touted percentages of
intelligence officials in any overseas Soviet installation — 50 percent,
60 percent, 70 percent — can no longer be equated with the volume of
Soviet espionage or other clandestine activities. More and more, ex-
perienced KGB officials have been assigned in recent years to duties
other than running spies and working secretly with student and labor
leaders.

Soviet diplomatic requirements in political, economic, trade and
propaganda matters have grown dramatically since Khrushchev's dayv
and have outstripped the capacity of the Soviet Foreign Office. Ex-
perienced KGB officers are now often assigned to work as diplomats
devoted to making friends in the Soviet interest without breaking the
law. They are now, both in New York and in the great cities of Europe,
hard at work developing friendly contacts with persons of influence

539

across the spectrum of public and private elites: politicians of the
Center and the Right as well as the Left, labor leaders of all political
complexions, key editors and journalists of all hues, and prominent
members of the business and banking communities.

These Soviet contacts can be loosely called agents, but not spies.
They are "agents of influence," persons who can sway national de-
cisions on truck-assembly plants, loan terms, or Siberian investment
projects in the Soviet interest. The new Soviet "diplomats," knowl-
edgeable, sophisticated, linguistically competent, are earning their
keep far better than by running a handful of spies in military estab-
lishments that have few secrets left. The KGB has become for Wash-
ington a diplomatic service to compete with as well as an espionage
service to counter.

The Soviet services remain a formidable adversary on the espionage
front. Their overall investment in secret work abroad has not declined
since the days of "capitalist encirclement," and even today their opera-
tional personnel, both legals and illegals, number at least five times
those of the American and European services combined. Ironically, as
more and more military, technical and industrial information in the
Western world has become freely available to Moscow, Soviet recruit-
ment efforts against American and European targets have increased.

No chapter in the history of the CIA is as public or controversial
as its covert action program. When, in 1948, spurred by the Com-
munist takeover in Czechoslovakia and the Italian political crisis, the
National Security Council gave the CIA the responsibility for "politi-
cal, psychological, economic, and unconventional warfare operations,"
the straightforward espionage mission of the AIS was enormously
broadened, if not distorted. Known within the Service as "the PP
mission," and originally carried out by a separate operating compo-
nent within the CIA (the Office of Policy Coordination), these action
operations and the new personnel responsible for them were soon inte-
grated into the espionage and counterespionage service. This merger
had a significant and enduring effect on the conduct and public image
of American secret operations.

The cold war rationale for the covert action mission was simple:
help stop the Russians. With Soviet troops poised to overrun Western
Europe and "international communism" threatening the "free world"
in France and Italy, Greece, Iran, Vietnam and China, with the mili-
tarv establishment severely reduced and State's diplomatic initiative
stalemated, the "\^Tiite House gave its own new "secret arm" the offen-
sive mission to figfht the Russians with their own weapons.

If the size of Soviet intelligence operations can be estimated as
roughly five times the size of their Western counterparts, the com-
parative scale of Soviet clandestine political operations has been even
more disproportionate. The use for front organizations, an old Soviet
staple, rose to new heights in the late Stalin period, and through
them, as well as by direct subsidies to Communist parties and labor
unions, the Soviets poured vast resources into the attempt to install
Communist or friendly leftist governments in Europe, in Asia and in
Latin America. An important adjunct was the use of wider prop-

540

aganda-type organization to sell the Soviet line and to denounce
the West, especially the United States. The danger posed by these ac-
tivities in the 1950s was not an illusion, and "covert action" became a
popular expedient for taking American initiatives in the cold war
without obvious official involvement. Presidents from Truman to
Nixon were not reluctant to use it.

The secret offensive was three-pronged :

(1) To attack the enemy of his own terrain by supporting internal
resistance movements (in the Ukraine, the Baltic States, Poland, and
Albania) ; by supporting anti-Soviet or anti-Russian emigres abroad,
especially in Europe ; by weakening the morale of the Soviet citizenry
through propaganda delivered over the air (Radio Free Europe, Radio
Liberty) , by balloons, or through rumor campaigns.

(2) To contain, or roll back, "communism" in the "free world" by
subverting Communist, crypto-Communist, or radical leftist govern-
ments (the labels were attached by the National Security Council)
in Iran, in Guatemala, and, finally, in Cuba; by supporting non-
Communist governments threatened by Communists in the Third
World, culminating in Laos and South Vietnam ; and by supporting
"democratic" parties, labor unions, and intellectuals mainly in Europe
during the shaky 1950s, and in Latin America during the 1960s. The
case of Chile exemplifies the full range of political action operations
from all-out support of a "friendly" Frei government to covert, as well
as overt, actions designed to weaken an "unfriendly" Allende regime.

(3) To counter Soviet propaganda and international Communist
fronts on the global scene by founding and funding publications, sup-
porting anti-Communist editors and journalists, and orchestrating in-
ternational propaganda campaigns; by building up "democratic"
front organizations to counter the Communist fronts among students,
youth, teachers, labor, etc. ; by subsidizing; American student and labor
organizations to fight the Communist fronts abroad; by penetratinsf
and upstaqfing Communist-organized World Peace meetings, youth
rallies, and assemblies.

This broad assortment of propaganda, political and paramilitary
operations was assigned to the secret intelligence service in order to
hide their official sponsorship. The operations themselves, of courpe,
from radios to invasions, were public events. The task was to cut the
line from sponsor to actor, or at least to obscure it enough to place
Washington in a position to deny official participation with a straight
face.

("Plausible denial" was an oft-used phrase in the 1950s, and much
ingenuity went into the planning of cover-stories or alternate ex-
planations for proposed operations. Yet it was, even then, a hollow
phrase, for it was impossible to dpuy operations that were exposed.
In some, mainly large-scale paramilitary operations (thp Guatemalan
and Cuban invasions) , denial was incredible. In others (the fiinding of
Radio Free Europe), denial was implausible or pointless. Still others
(support of the National Student Association) were undeniable when
blown by particinants. It is difficult to sav in each case for whose
benefit the operations were to be denied. The Russians? Our allies?
The American public ? World opinion ?

It is simple enonp-li to sav now that what was worth doing in the
1950s (and early 1960s) should have been done openly — we could

541

have invaded Cuba as we did the Dominican Republic, subsidized anti-
Communist radios and publications openly as we do now, and so on.
Yet tJie arguments against such a course at the time were not trivial
or without merit. With the Soviets managing to conceal their hand on
many occasions, a public American response would have led to the
application, to America's grave disadvantage, of the double standard
that many in the world have all along been inclined to apply to So-
viet and American actions. And, for a time, the anti- Communist
sentiment of the Congress and public was so undiscriminating that
would have been impossible to conduct, under the open eye of both,
the kind of reasonably sophisticated operations needed to appeal to
important forces abroad that would not accept the full range of
American views or practices, yet were determined to resist being taken
over by Communist forces.

As the years passed, these initial reasons largely lost their force,
and it was a cardinal mistake not to have reacted to the change in
circumstances before exposure finally forced the government's hand in
the mid-sixties. Thus, the NSC assignment of the charter for covert
action operations to the CIA has served to bring both the AIS and
the CIA as a whole into the public disrepute it now enjoys. There is
little point in arguing whether the Wliite House was right or wrong
in usino; the CIA as the "third leg" of our foreign policy mechanism.
The cold war Presidents who allowed the Departments of State and
Defense to shunt distasteful operations off on the "secret arm"— and
the CIA Directors who, eagerly or reluctantly, accepted these incom-
patible tasks — felt the stakes requiring action were high. As time
went by, however, they ignored not only the need for change but the
drastic impact of lumping "noisy" action missions with secret intel-
ligence operations. What was always an uneasy pairing became in
time a self-defeating amalgam of disparate missions, and the damage
not only to the reputation of the CIA but to the conduct of secret
intelligence became progressively more serious.

In assessing the present and future state of the AIS, its action
responsibilities provide the crucial matter for debate and decision.
Covert action operations have declined steadily since the early 1960s
outside of Indochina. Under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, the
use of covert methods to support particular candidates for office, or
aspirants for power, in nations abroad became the rare exception, and
today the practice has virtuallv died out — so that the ratio of charge
to reality, in- this area at least, is now extremely high. Yet the CIA
charter remains in force and AIS action capabilities still exist. It
is covert action psychological, paramilitary and political — that raises
not only pragmatic but political and moral issues.

Psvchological warfare operations not only do not belonsr in a secret
service, but they are an anachronism in today's world. They should
be discontinued.

Paramilitary operations pose a more serious question. That the
United States must keep a paramilitarv capibility in being for war-
time use will probably not be questioned by most observers. What has

542

become clear, however, is that a secret intelligence service is not the
most suitable vehicle for running paramilitary operations. With the
special privileges granted it by Congress, the CIA has been able to
develop a highly efficient logistics machinery for moving personnel,
equipment and funds rapidly and secretly around the world. It has
therefore been called upon to carry out even large-scale paramilitary
programs that would more logically fall to the Department of Defense.

There is little reason why the paramilitary charter should not be
transferred to Defense, where all three services have appropriate
specialized persciinel, equipment and training facilities in being. All
that is needed to make Defense effective in covert operations is to
convert a small section of its command structure into a special operat-
ing unit which can be given congressional authority to move funds,
personnel and equipment outside the bureaucratic system. This re-
assignment of responsibility would also bring future paramilitary
operations under established congressional oversight and review.

If the AIS were to be stripped of its psychological and paramilitary
operations, it could again become a truly secret service even if it
retained a modified responsibility for political action.

Here, in the sphere of secret political action, the moral-political
question appears to outweigh the pragmatic. How far should one
nation interfere in the internal affairs of another nation?

In practice every major nation interferes daily in the affairs of
other nations: by military and economic aid (or its denial), diplo-
matic arguments, short-wave broadcasts, fellowships and travel grants,
etc. In short, Washington, like INIoscow, is in this broad sense inter-
fering all over the world all the time.

The more realistic way to phrase the issue is perhaps: to interfere
secretly. And here no clear line can be drawn, for much of our official
interference is secret: for example, the Ambassador's or military
attache's private conversation with a local politician, labor leader,
or general. Perhaps the issue should be even more narrowly phrased :
to interfere with money. Yet money is involved in many acceptable
forms of international dealings — travel grants, say, or American fel-
lowships. Perhaps the issue finally becomes: to interfere with secret
money. Put in its most loaded form : should Washington bribe a for-
eign politician or labor leader to act in the American interest ?

Here the line between "ri<rht" and "wrong" becomes cloudy indeed.
Wlien do private understandings with a chief of state become sinister ?
When does the passage of money or air tickets become bribery ? It is
at this level that the moral issue has to be settled if it ever will be — for
noninterference is one of the vaguer terms in the vocabulary of co-
existence.

It was proposed in a recent issue of this journal that the govern-
ment "should abandon publiclv all covert operations designed to in-
fluence political results in foreign countries" and restore the American
Service to its original intelligence mission.- I would assent to this
proposition with one exception and with one caveat.

The caveat first. If the President announces publiclv that the CIA
will no longer carry out secret political operations, no one will be-

^ Nicholas deB. Katzenbach. "Foreign Policy, Public Opinion and Secrecy,"
Foreign Affairs, October 1973.

543

lieve him — not the Russians, not our friends and foes around the globe,
not the American public or press. "CIA" has become as much a symbol
of American imperialism abroad and of secret government at home
as the KGB has become, with American assistance, the symbol of
Soviet imperialism and domestic repression. It is far too useful a sym-
bol for anyone to give up, and no one will. A public statement that the
U.S. government has now returned to the path of pristine democratic
practices would be a quixotic, if not a slightly humiliating, gesture.

The exception is more controversial. Propaganda and paramilitary
operations do not belong in a secret service — even if they are worth
doing — nor, under today's conditions, do secret operations designed to
sway elections or to overturn governments. Yet the kind of clandestine
contacts that are still required, simply to keep on top of complex and
important situations, cannot on occasion avoid having political over-
tones. The justification is, as it has been, to combat what remains the
very large political activity of the Soviets and their allies. Their large-
scale support for political elements in many countries of the world
often leaves opposing non-Communist political figures naked and with-
out adequate support. For the United States to stay in close touch with
such elements is an elementary precaution, and there will continue to
be occasions when support of a few individuals for intelligence pur-
poses cannot (and should not) be separated from a measure of support
for their political ends. There is little reason to rob the President — or
the local Ambassador — of the chance to provide confidential support
to a politician or labor leader who cannot afford to accept American
largesse publicly.

Nor can we avoid the occasional political implications of intelligence
liaison relationships with the secret services of other countries, the
great bulk of which are with friendly nations whose services are under
proper democratic control. In some cases such liaison has been con-
ducted with governments whose independence has seemed, as a matter
of national policy, to outweigh their failure to live up to democratic
norms. It is inevitable that on occasion such governments will turn, by
our standards, very sour indeed, as in the case of the Greek colonels,
and it is a regrettable fact that an intelligence liaison aimed at external
targets can then place the United States in the position of being at-
tacked for an unintended degree of support for the local government.
The key point here, however, is that intelligence liaison, like military
or economic aid, is part of overall national policy, and reflects that
policy: it does not normally operate in a vacuum. Indeed, in a few
cases this service-to-service relationship has become the sole channel
of communication with Washington for a government that has cut
off diplomatic relations.

Two fundamental questions face the AIS today: can it remain
a professional service and can it become a truly secret service? Neither
question can be isolated from a consideration of its structure and
its mission.

Relatively modest and independent in its beginnings (as the Office
of Special Operations), the AIS doubled, then tripled in size with
the creation of a parallel action office (Policy Coordination) and in
the overall post-Korean expansion. It went the way of the entire in-
telligence community : a large bureaucracy with large staffs, intermin-
able coordination, and countless echelons of decision-making.

544

The lethargy and timidity normal to a civil service bureaucracy
exact a particularly heavy cost in an intelligence service where taking
chances based on personal judgment is its main business. A Service
is as good as its agents, and its agents are as good as the competence and
initiative of the case-officer on the spot. Faced with a hypercautious,
if not anxious, headquarters, the case-officer soon learns not to take
chances. He plays it safe by keeping the bread-and-butter agents he
has and not invading dangerous new ground — like the local foreign
office or security service. The Service suffers.

As the AIS grew in size, it also became more and more closelv inte-
grated into the large-scale civil service bureaucracy that is the Central
Intelligence Agency. Eelatively independent at its inception, with
its own administrative support structure, the AIS gradually became
dependent on the CIA for its logistics, staff recruitment and training,
personnel and accounting procedures, etc. Its integration into the
Agency was capped by the move of all CIA components into a single
headquarters building in Langley, Virginia, a move strongly opposed
by many senior AIS personnel on security grounds. This objection was
overruled with the assurance that the larger overt Agency elements
would provide useful cover for the secret operators. Too many people
inevitably came to know more than they needed to know about agent
sources as compartmentalization broke down in the togetherness of
researchers, administrators, and operators.

These and other considerations have led some AIS officers over the
years to raise the notion of a separate truly secret intelligence service.
The aim is a small elite professional service devoted exclusivelv to re-
cruiting high-level agents against carefully selected long-term strategic
targets. There would be no pressures for current production, no whole-
sale reporting requirements, no leaks to analys*^s, journalists or Soviet
officials, no bureaucracy to hold up recruitment, no vast intelligence
community to "service." Its foreign operatives would live under pri-
vate, mainly commercial cover, reporting by unofficial communications
to a small head office in, say. New York, whose anonymous chief would
be directly responsible to the Director of Central Intelligence in his
capacity as the President's head of the intelligence community.

The present Operations Directorate of the CIA would remain the
integral part of the intelligence community it has become. It cannot
be extracted from its present structure — as, for example, it would
be administratively simple to extract the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion from the Department of Justice. Nor should it be. Although the
Operations Directorate would no longer be depended upon to pro-
vide agent coverage of strategic intelligence targets, it would continue
to function abroad on a reduced scale and with a more innocuous mis-
sion : to maintain liaison with local security and intelligence services,
to protect the Embassy from hostile penetration, to handle a.orent or
defector walk-ins. It would also serve as a channel for confidential
communications between the Ambassador and the President or between
the host government and the State Department, and supplv looal sup-
port for other elements of the intelligence community, including the
National Security Asrency, the military services and the FBI. A^Hier-
ever feasible, and with deference to the sensitivities of the local situa-
tion, the CIA station chief might be overtly accredited as the CIA rep-

545

resentative. He would, in any event, act as the Ambassador's overall
assistant for intelligence matters.

However quixotic on the surface, a small American secret service
separate from the federal bureaucracy is not at all impractical —
given the will in high places. The concept of such a service is not too
far removed from the Soviet system of illegals: carefully selected
personnel, hand-tailored communications, small-scale operations, se-
lect priority targets. It would remain professional and secret.

(The present Central Intelligence Agency, shorn of its strategic
espionage mission, would not be affected in its structure or main
functions. It would continue to carry out its overt and technical col-
lection operations, to provide its extensive services of common concern
to the entire intelligence community, and to do current and in-depth
analysis and research. It would, above all, continue to focus on its
main central function — to give the White House intelligence estimates
on situations and trends abroad that are as objective as men can make
them. Only an agency exclusively concerned with intelligence can
avoid the intrusion of bias into honest judgments that comes from
the pressure in the Departments of State or Defense to support a spe-
cific diplomatic tack or a larger military budget.)

This proposal would simplify the vexing issue of congressional
oversight. With overt and unexceptionable covert activities more
clearly separted from truly covert ones, the supervision of the CIA
itself would be substantially freed of the fear of exposing those op-
erations that almost all members of Congress agree should remain
secret. Present committees could thus operate more eifectively. The
truly secret operations of the AIS might best be reviewed by an ad
hoc group of the top majority and minority members of the key com-
mittees who would weigh the policy implications, not the operating
details, of the secret program.

Setting up a separate espionage service is only one side, and the
simpler side, of the problem. What would be its mission ? What targets
would it be directed to cover that would justify its cost?

Sensibly limiting information requirements could halve the size of
the intelligence community devoted to collection. Only against a clear-
cut yardstick of essential information can a congressional oversight
group or a presidential advisory group measure the effectiveness of
our intelligence effort. (With covert psychological warfare a relic of
the past, with paramilitary operations (if any) handled by the Penta-
gon and subject to the usual congressional scrutiny, with secret polit-
ical actions carried out onlv at the express direction of the National
Security Council, there would remain only the espionage and counter-
espionage operations of the new AIS for the Conarress to "oversee."
And here the task should be to test performance by the product : raw
agent reports measured against the government's requirements.)

Requirements properly come from outside the intelligence com-
munity. Intelliarence exists to serve the decision-makers, and agent
reports (ideally) fill the jraps in other coverage. For a small strategic
AIS to carry out operations of real value requires that the policy-
makers project with some concreteness their foreign policy objectives
well into the eighties. Only then can they articulate, by countries or
categories of information, their priority intelligence targets. As the

546

simple confrontations of the cold war ^ve way to the more complex
alignments of today, as economic and jfisoal questions replace military
hardware as topics of major interest, the intellig-ence needs of the
White House are bound to shift. Is the Tokyo-Moscow axis a top
priority? Are the Swiss bankers — or the German industrialists — a
more important target than the Chinese General Staff?

Who will answer these questions ?

It is possible, in a sanguine moment, to see a select joint congres-
sional committee sitting down with the National Security Council and
talking about the problems America faces in the decades ahead. They
should confer until they come up with a clear statement in simple
English of our long-term national objectives and a concrete list of
specific areas and countries vital to our nation's interest.

In an even more sanguine moment one can envisage a broader, more
representative body sitting down every two or three years and ex-
amining the performance of our foreign affairs and intelligence activ-
ities abroad. Such a group, chaired by the Vice President and sup-
ported by the National Security Council's administrative machinery,
would ideally include not only Congressmen, but security-cleared
citizens from business, labor, the media, academia. Their report to the
American people might add a welcome breath of fresh air to the stale
words from Washington.

Any decisions on our purposes in this faltering world can come
only from the top and not out of the bowels of our foreign affairs
bureaucracies. And those decisions cannot come by two-year or four-
year executive fiat. They should be reached with the widest possible
participation. The new President with his close ties to Congress is
the ideal man to broaden the base for executive decisions in foreign
policy. He should take the initiative in inviting the Congress to share
his "awesome" responsibility for foreign affairs — perhaps even go so
far as to first invite a systematic national debate. He can raise the
level of that debate by being more open with the public on now-
classified intelligence available within the executive branch. There
is much to be gained, and — properly screened — little to be lost by
publishing some of our excellent satellite photographs, or select na-
tional estimates on strategic situations as they arise, or current in-
telligence reports on significant events abroad.

Tlie system of American democracy need not be exhausted by its
present institutions, nor should the citizen sit on his hands as the com-
plex pressures of an industrial societv force the cancerous growth of
the executive. No President in the future should be allowed to say
on his own that the Dominican Eepublic or Cuba or Vietnam is vital
to the American interest.

Once set. and amended, lone-term national objectives lead to stra-
tegic intelligence as well as diplomatic targets, to a clean-cut mission
for the new AIS. It is likely that these targets may lie in Zurich and
Tokyo as well as Moscow or Bucharest or Cairo and concern them-
selves as much with goods and currencies as with war and politics. It
is even possible that the AIS might on occasion, like the KGB in the
recent Soviet grain deal, pay for its own budget by saving the tax-
payer money.

H. What's Wrong With The CIA?
By Tom Braden

[From Saturday Review, Apr. 5, 1975]

We are gathered, four of us CIA division chiefs and deputies, in the
office of our agency's director, an urbane and charming man. He is
seated at his desk, puffing nervously on his pipe and asking us ques-
tions.

Allen W. Dulles is fretting on this morning in the early fifties, as,
indeed, he has fretted most mornings. You can't be in the middle of
building an enormous spy house, running agents into Russia and else-
where, worrying about Joseph McCarthy, planning to overthrow a
government in Guatemala, and helping to elect another in Italy, with-
out fretting.

But on this particular morning, Dulles is due for an appearance be-
fore Sen. Richard B. Russell's Armed Services Committee, and the
question he is pondering as he puffs on his pipe is whether to tell the
senators what is making him fret. He has just spent a lot of money on
buying an intelligence network, and the network has turned out to be
worthless. In fact, it's a little worse than worthless. All that money,
Dulles now suspects, went to the KGB.

Therefore, the questions are somber, and so are the answers. At
last, Dulles rises. "Well," he says, "I guess I'll have to fudge the truth
a little."

His eyes twinkle at the word fudge^ then suddenly turn serious. He
twists his slightly stooped shoulders into the old tweed topcoat and
heads for the door. But he turns back. "I'll tell the truth to Dick [Rus-
sell]," he says. "I always do." Then the twinkle returns, and he adds,
with a chuckle, "That is, if Dick wants to know."

The reason I recall the above scene in detail is that lately I have been
asking myself what's wrong with the CIA. Two committees of Con-
gress and one from the executive branch are asking the question, too.
But they are asking out of a concern for national policy. I am asking
for a different reason. I once worked for the CIA. I regard the time
I spent there as worthwhile duty. I look back upon the men with whom
I worked as able and honorable. So for me, the question "What's wrong
with the CIA ?" is both personal and poignant.

Old friends of mine have been caught in evasions or worse. People
I worked with have violated the law. Men whose ability I respected
have planned operations that ended in embarrassment or disaster.
T^^iat's wrong with these people ? What's wrong with the CIA ?

Ask yourself a question often enough, and sometimes the mind will
respond with a memory. The memory my mind reported back is that
scene in Allen Dulles' office. It seemed, at first blush, a commonplace,
inconsequential episode. But the more it fixed itself in my mind, the
more it seemed to me that it helped to answer my question about what's
wrong with the agency. Let me explain.

(547)

548

The first thing this scene reveals is the sheer power that Dulles and
his agency had. Only a man with extraordinary power could make a
mistake involving a great many of the taxpayers' dollars and not have
to explain it. Allen Dulles had extraordinary power.

Power flowed to him and, through him, to the CIA, partly because
his brother was Secretary of State, partly because his reputation as
the master spy of World War II hung over him like a mysterious
halo, partly because his senior partnership in the prestigious New
York law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell impressed the small-town
lawyers of Congress.

Moreover, events helped keep power flowing. The country was
fighting a shooting war in Korea and a Cold War in Western Europe,
and the CIA was sole authority on the plans and potential of the real
enemy. To argue against the CIA was to argue against knowledge.
Only Joseph McCarthy would run such a risk.

Indeed, McCarthy unwittingly added to the power of the CIA. He
attacked the agency and when, in the showdown, Dulles w^on, his
victory vastly increased the respectability of what people then called
"the cause" of anti-communism. "Don't join the book burners," Eisen-
hower had said. That was the bad way to fight communism. The good
way was the CIA.

Power was the first thing that went wrong with the CIA. There
was too much of it, and it was too easy to bring to bear — on the State
Department, on other government agencies, on the patriotic business-
men of New York, and on the foundations whose directorships they
occupied. The agency's power overwhelmed the Congress, the press,
and therefore the people.

I'm not saying that this power didn't help to win the Cold War,
and I believe the Cold War was a good war to win. But the power
enabled the CIA to continue Cold War operations 10 and 15 years
after the Cold War was won. Under Allen Dulles the power was un-
questioned, and after he left, the habit of not questioning remained.

I remember the time I walked over to the State Department to get
formal approval for some CIA project involving a few hundred
thousand dollars and a publication in Europe. The desk man at the
State Department balked. Imagine. He balked- — and at an operation
designed to combat what I knew for certain was a similar Soviet oper-
ation. I was astonished. But I didn't argue. I knew what would hap-
pen. I would report to the director, who would get his brother on the
phone : "Foster, one of your people seems to be a little less than cooper-
ative." That is power.

The second thing that's wrong with the CIA is arrogance, and the
scene I've mentioned above shows that, too. Allen Dulles's private joke
about "fudging" was arrogant, and so was the suggestion that "Dick"
might not want to know. An organization that does not have to answer
for mistakes is certain to become arrogant.

It is not a cardinal sin, this fault, and sometimes it squints toward
virtue. It might be argued, for example, that only arrogant men would
insist on building the U-2 spv plane within a time frame which mili-
tary experts said could not be met. Yet in the days before satellite
surveillance, the U-2 spy plane was the most useful means of keeping
the peace. It assured this country's leaders that Russia w^as not plan-

549

ning an attack. But if arrogance built the plane quickly, it also de-
stroyed it. For surely it Avas arrogant to keep it flying through Soviet
airspa.ce after it was suspected that the Russians were literally zero-
ing in on overflying U-2s.

I wonder whether the arrogance of the CIA may not have been
battlefield-related — a holdover from World War II machismo and
derring-do. The leaders of the agency were, almost to a man, veterans
of OSS, the CIA's wartime predecessor. Take, for example, the men
whose faces I now recall, standing there in the director's office.

One had run a spy-and-operations network into Germany from
German-occupied territory. Another had volunteered to parachute
into Field Marshall Kesselring's headquarters grounds with terms
for his surrender. A third had crash-landed in Norway and, having lost
half his men, came up, nevertheless, blowing up bridges.

OSS men who became CIA men were unusual people who had vol-
unteered to carry out unusual orders and to take unusual risks. More-
over, they were impressed, more than most soldiers can be impressed,
with the absolute necessity for secrecy and the certain penalty that
awaited the breach of it.

But they had another quality that set them apart. For some reason
that psychologists could perhaps explain, a man who volunteers to go
on an extremely dangerous mission, alone or with one or two helpers,
is likely to be not only brave and resourceful but also somewhat vain.
Relatively few men volunteered to jump into German or Japanese
territory during World War II. Those who did volunteer were con-
scious that they were, in a word, "different."

Once these men had landed behind the lines, the difference took on
outward symbols. They were alone, Americans in a country full of
French or Greek or Italians or Chinese. Often they were treated with
great respect. Sometimes, as mere lieutenants, they commanded thou-
sands of men. At a word from them, American or British planes came
over to drop supplies to these men. They earned the love and respect
that conquered people felt for the great democracy called America.
Inevitably, they began to think of themselves individually and col-
lectively as representing the national honor.

Is it not possible that men who have learned to do everything in
secrecy, who are accustomed to strange assignments, and who think of
themselves as embodying their country, are peculiarly susceptible to
imperial Presidencies such as those of Lyndon Johnson and Richard
Nixon ? Have they not in fact trained themselves to behave as a power
elite ?

To power and to arrogance add the mystique of the inside-outside
syndrome. That scene in the director's office defines the problem.
Dulles was leveling w-ith his assistants, and they were leveling with
him. An agent or a station chief or an official of the CIA w^ho didn't
level — who departed in the slightest degree from a faithful account
of what he knew or what he had done — was a danger to operations and
to lives. Such a man couldn't last a day in the CIA.

But truth was reserved for the inside. To the outsider, CIA men
learned to lie, to lie consciously and deliberately without the slightest
twinge of the guilt that most men feel when they tell a deliberate lie.

The inside-outside syndrome is unavoidable in a secret intelligence

550

agency. You bring a group of people together, bind them with an
oath, test their loyalty periodically with machines, spy on them to
make sure they're not meeting secretly with someone from the Czech
Embassy, cushion them from the rest of the world with a false cover
story, teach them to lie because lying is in the national interest, and
they do not behave like other men.

They do not come home from work and answer truthfully the ques-
tion, "What did you do today, darling?" When they chat with their
neighbors, they lie about their jobs. In their compartmentalized, need-
to-know jobs, it is perfectly excusable for one CIA man to lie to another
if the other doesn't need to know.

Thus it was ritual for Allen Dulles to "fudge," and often he didn't
have to. Senator Russell might say, "The chairman has conferred with
the director about this question, which touches a very sensitive matter."
The question would be withdrawn.

Another technique for dealing with an outsider was the truthful
non-response. Consider the following exchange between Sen. Claiborne
Pell (D., R.I.) and Richard Helms. (The exchange was concerned
with spying on Americans, an illegal act under the terms of the law
that created the CIA.)

Senator Pell (referring to spying on antiwar demonstrations) :
"But these all occurred within the continental shores of the United
States and for that reason you had the justifiable reason to decline [to]
move in there because the events were outside your ambit."

Mr. Helms: "Absolutely, and I have never been lacking in clarity
in my mind since I have been director, that this is simplv not accept-
able not only to Congress but to the public of the United States."

No doubt that answer was truthful. No doubt Helms did think that
domestic spying was not acceptable. But he was doing it, and he didn't
say he wasn't.

Finally, of course, there is the direct lie. Here is another excerpt
from 1973 testimony by Helms :

Senator Symington (D., Mo.) : "Did you try, in the Central In-
telligence Agency, to overthrow the government of Chile?"

^eZw^.-"No,Sir."

Syndnqton: "Did you have any money passed to the opponents of
Allende?"

i7eZ7n5;"No,Sir."

Helms was under oath. Therefore, he must have considered his
answer carefully. Obviously, he came to the insider's conclusion : that
his duty to protect the inside outweighed his outsider's oath. Or to
put it another way, the law of the inside comes first.

Allen Dulles once remarked that if necessary, he would lie to any-
bodv about the CIA except the President. "I never had the slightest
qualms about lying to an outsider," a CIA veteran remarked recently.
"Wliy does an outsider need to know ?"

So much for the lessons of memory. Power, arrogfance, and the
inside-outside syndrome are what's wrong with the CIA, and to some
extent, the faults are occupational and even necessary tools for the job.

But the events of the Cold War and the coincidence of Allen Dulles'
having such enormous discretionary powers enlarged occupational
risks until they became faults, and the faults created a monstrosity.

551

Power built a vast bureaucracy and a ridiculous monument in Lang-
ley, Va. Arrogance fostered the belief that a few hundred exiles could
land on a beach and hold off Castro's army.

The inside-outside syndrome withheld the truth from Adlai Steven-
son so that he was forced to make a spectacle of himself on the floor
of the United Nations by denying that the United States had anything
to do with the invasion of Cuba. The same syndrome has made a sad
and worried man of Richard Helms.

It's a shame what happened to the CIA. It could have consisted of
a few hundred scholars to analyze intelligence, a few hundred spies in
key positions, and a few hundred operators ready to carry out rare
tasks of derring-do.

Instead, it became a gargantuan monster, owning property all over
the world, running airplanes and newspapers and radio stations and
banks and armies and navies, offering temptation to successive Secre-
taries of State, and giving at least one President a brilliant idea: Since
the machinery for deceit existed, why not use it ?

Richard Helms should have said no to Richard Nixon. But as a vic-
tim of the inside-outside syndrome, Helms could only ask Watergate's
most plaintive question : "Who would have thought that it would some-
day be judged a crime to carry out the orders of the President of the
United States?"

A shame — and a peculiarly American shame. For this is the only
country in the world which doesn't recognize the fact that some things
are better if they are small.

We'll need intelligence in the future. And once in a Avhile, once in a
great while, we may need covert action, too. But, at the moment, we
have nothing. The revelations of Watergate and the investigations that
have followed have done their work. The CIA's power is gone. Its
arrogance has turned to fear. The inside-outside syndrome has been
broken. Former agents write books naming other agents. Director
William Colby goes to the Justice Department with evidence that his
predecessor violated the law. The house that Allen Dulles built is
divided and torn.

The end is not in sight. Various committees now investigating the
agency will doubtless find error. They will recommend change, they
will reshuffle, they will adjust. But they will leave the monster intact,
and even if the monster never makes another mistake, never again over-
reaches itself — even, indeed, if like some other government agencies, it
never does anything at all — it will, by existing, go right on creating
and perpetuating the myths that always accompanied the presence of
the monster.

We know the myths. They circulate throughout the land wherever
there are bars and bowling alleys : that the CIA killed John Kennedy ;
that the CIA crippled George Wallace ; that an unexplained airplane
crash, a big gold heist, were all the work of the CIA.

These myths are ridiculous, but they will exist as long as the monster
exists. The fact that millions believe the myths raises once again the
old question which OSS men used to argue after the war: Can a free
and open society engage in covert operations ?

After nearly 30 years of trial, the evidence ought to be in. The evi-
dence demonstrates, it seems to me, that a free and open society cannot

552

engage in covert operations — not, at any rate, in the kind of large,
intricate covert operations of which the CIA has been capable.

I don't argue solely from the box score. But let's look at the box
score. It reveals many famous failures. Too easily, they prove the point.
Consider what the CIA deems its known successes : Does anybody re-
member Arbenz in Guatemala ? What good was achieved by the over-
throw of Arbenz ? Would it really have made any difference to this
country if we hadn't overthrown Arbenz ?

And Allende? How much good did it do the American people to
overthrow Allende ? How much bad ?

Was it essential — even granted the sticky question of succession — to
keep those Greek colonels in power for so long ?

We used to think that it was a great triumph that the CIA kept
the Shah of Iran on his throne against the onslaught of Mossadegh.
Are we grateful still ?

The uprisings during the last phase of the Cold War, and those dead
bodies in the streets of Poland, East Germany, and Hungary : to what
avail ?

But the box score does not tell the whole story. We paid a high price
for that box score. Shame and embarrassment is a high price ? Doubt,
mistrust, and fear is a high price. The public myths are a high price,
and so is the guilty knowledge that we own an establishment devoted
to opposing the ideals we profess.

In our midst, we have maintained a secret instrument erected in
contradiction to James Madison's injunction : "A popular government
without the means to popular information is a farce or a tragedy,
perhaps both."

As I say, the investigating committees will prop the monster up. I
would suggest more radical action. I would shut it down. I would turn
the overt intelligence function over to the State Department. Scholars
and scientists and people who understand how the railroads run in
Sri Lanka don't need to belong to the CIA in order to do their valuable
work well.

I would turn the paratroopers over to the army. If, at some time, it
becomes essential to our survival to mount a secret attack upon a foe,
the army is capable of doing it, and, with some changes in command
structure in order to bypass bureaucracy, the army could do it as
swiftly and secretly as the CIA. Under the command structure of the
Department of Defense, congressional oversight would be possible.
Then, if the army got caught fielding a secret division in Laos, and
if the American people did not want a secret division in Laos, the
American people would know where to turn.

I would turn the psychological warriors and propagandists over to
the Voice of America. Psychological warriors and propagandists
probably never did belong in a secret agency.

And, last, I would choose a very few men to run spies and such
covert operations as the passage of money to those in other lands who
cannot afford to accept American support openly. But I would limit
covert operations to passing money to "friendlies."

I would house these spy masters and money-passers in some obscure
tool shed, and I would forbid, by law, any of them from ever calling

553

hiiAself "director." They would not work for the CIA. Because I would
abolish the name CIA.

As their chief, the President should choose for a term of six years
some civilian who has demonstrated staunchness of character and
independence of mind. I would make him responsible to a joint com-
mittee of Congress, as well as to the President, and I would not permit
him to serve more than one term.

Thus, we might get rid of power. Without power, arrogance would
not be dangerous. Thus, too, we could prcA^ent the inside-outside syn-
drome, so essential to secrecy, from making a mockery of representa-
tive government.

As for the house that Allen Dulles built at Langley, we might leave it
standing empty, our only national monument to the value that demo-
cracy places upon the recognition and correction of a mistake.

69-983 O - 76 - 36

I. Recommendations of the Commission on the Organization of
THE Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (The
Murphy Commission ) Concerning Covert Action

Covert Action: A Special Prohlem. To this point we have addressed
only the intelligence activities of the intelligence community. But, in
addition to those endeavors, the community — specifically CIA — has
also been responsible for another activity which poses special problems
of oversight and control. This is covert action, activity abroad
intended not to gather information but to influence events, an activity
midway between diplomacy and war. It has taken many forms, from
the financial support of friendly publications to the mounting of sig-
ificant paramilitary efforts.

The Commission has considered whether covert action should any
longer be authorized at all. It recognizes that there are many risks and
dangers associated with covert action. Partly for these reasons the
use of covert action in recent years has markedly declined.

But we must live in the w^orld we find, not the world we might wish.
Our adversaries deny themselves no forms of action which might
advance their interests or undercut ours, as quite recent as well as past
events demonstrate. In many parts of the world a prohibition on our
use of covert action would put the U.S. and those who rely on it at a
dangerous disadvantage. We conclude, therefore, that

covert action cannot he abandoned^ hut that it should he em-
ployed only where clearly essential to vital U.S. purposes and
then only after a careful process of high level review.

The current process for approval of covert action involves the sub-
mission of proposals to the 40 Committee. The Committee approves
or disapproves, and its chairman, the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, issues appropriate instructions. In recent
years, however, as authorizations have decreased in number, the pro-
cedures of the Committee have become quite informal, and it has met
infrequently.

We believe present practices are inadequate. The sensitivity and
risks of covert action require appropriate review and consultation
The Committee therefore proposes that :

— Covert action should only he authorized after collective con-
sideration of its heneflts and risks hy all available Jfi Com-
mittee members, and that

— Besides granting initial approvals, the Jfi Committee should
regularly review the continuing appropriations of activities
still being pursued.

In addition to requiring careful review within the executive branch,
the Commission believes that covert action should be reported to the

(554)

555

Joint Committee of the Congress on National Security proposed in
Chapter 14. We also believe that the current requirement of law that
the President personally certify to the Congress the necessity for all
covert actions (the Hughes Amendment to the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1974, P.L. 93-559) is harmful in associating the head of State
so formally A\'ith such activities. We propose, therefore, that :

P.L. 93-559 he amended to require reporting of covert actions
to he 'proposed Joint Commiittee on National Security.^ and to
omit any requirement for the personal certification of the
President as to their necessity.

APPENDIX III.

Soviet Intelligence Collection and Operations Against the

United States

a. introduction

The U.S.S.R. conducts espionage and "active measures" or covert
action operations on a large scale against its main enemy — the United
States.^ These activities are carried out in the U.S. and abroad by the
Soviet intelligence and security services — the KGB and the GRU — and
by the intelligence and security services of Soviet-influenced Eastern
European countries, via their officers and agents in the United States
and in other countries.

The main targets are U.S. Government officials, members of the busi-
ness, scientific and political communities with access to the U.S. Gov-
ernment, and other influential entities such as youth, journalist and
trade organizations.

According to the CIA, the United States is still the major target
of the Soviet Union, Soviet intelligence and security services regard
the greater degree of contact between the United States and the
U.S.S.R. resulting from detente both as an increased counter-
intelligence threat and as an opportunity for recruitment of more
intelligence sources.

1. General Structure and Command

The intelligence and security structure of the Soviet Union today
consists of two main elements. The first is the Committee of State Se-
curity— known in the U.S.S.R. and abroad by its initials — KGB. The
second element is the lesser-known military intelligence organization —
the Chief Directorate of Intelligence of the General Staff — whose ini-
tials are GRU. Both of these organizations operate on a world-wide
basis. There is no Soviet embassy abroad which does not have its contin-
gent of KGB officers, and it is doubtful whether there are more than one
or two without GRIT officers. Furthermore, the diplomatically-ac-
credited personnel in Soviet Embassies are generally from 40 percent
to 60 percent GRU and KGB officers. However, while there are many
similarities between the operations of these two organizations overseas,
there is one basic difference between them. The GRU engages only in
foreign intelligence collection and has no domestic functions. The
KGB, however, exists to safeguard national security. It interprets this
mandate in the broadest sense, and therefore both its foreign activities
and its domestic mission are multi-f a(^eted.

The KGB and GRU are nominally controlled by the Soviet Govern-
ment but are actually commanded by the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU). Officially, both intelligence services report to
the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Government : the KGB reports

^The People's Republic of China is now almost as important a target to the
Soviet Union as is the United States.

(557)

558

directly and the GRU through the General Staff of the Ministry of
Defense. It appears that the role of the Council of Ministers in over-
seeing these organizations is limited to administrative control, while
the actual control of operations is a Party function. Both organizations
report indirectly and directly to the CPSU leadership through their
respective chiefs : lurii Vladimirovich Andropov, Chairman of the
KGB ; and Marshal Andrei Antonovich Grechko, Minister of Defense.
Both are full voting members of the Politburo, the highest ruling body
of the CPSU.

2. Budget

Accurate estimates of Soviet expenditures on intelligence are diffi-
cult to arrive at, because of rigid security and because of the peculiari-
ties of Soviet accounting practices. The available evidence indicates
that both the KGB and GRU receive high priority in the allocation of
funds and other resources.

3. The Soviet Intelligence and Security Services — The KGB

As noted above, the KGB has both domestic and foreign func-
tions. Abroad, the KGB is responsible for the collection of foreign
intelligence; for the control of all official Soviet installations and
personnel ; for the penetration of all hostile intelligence and security
services ; and for conducting covert and "executive action" programs.
However, it concentrates a far greater share of its attention on its
internal functions, which include: uncovering espionage, subversion
and dissidence; censorship of all international, and selected internal
communications; investigating crimes against the state and pre-
senting evidence for prosecution ; protecting the borders of the coun-
try; providing physical protection for the leaders and important
installations of the Party and state, and for visiting foreign dignitar-
ies; disrupting and neutralizing the activity of hostile intelligence
services and emigre organizations by aggressive counterintelligence
operations; supervising the development and installation of secure
communications systems, and providing maintenance and security for
those systems.

The number of KGB personnel engaged in clandestine activity di-
rected against foreign countries is estimated by the CIA at 10,000 Avhile
the counterintelligence and security components operating inside the
Soviet Union are much larger. With the inclusion of a sizeable admin-
istrative and support apparatus, the total number of all-Union or
national-level personnel has been estimated at a total of 410,000. Of this
total, the Border Troops have been credited with over 175,000
employees; the Kremlin Guards and possibly other uniformed com-
ponents, while not individually reported, may number over 65,000.

In addition to the 410,000 national-level personnel estimate, each
Republic and autonomous region has its own KGB structure, and there
are KGB offices, in every town of any size across the entire Soviet
Union.

B. Organization and Structure

1. Executive Level

The Chairman of the KGB, lurii Vladimirovich Andropov, is as-
sisted at the executive level by several deputies and by a senior policy-

559

making board known as the "collegium." This body meets at least
once a month to discuss KGB activities. Other officials such as various
specialists and the chairmen of the Republic-level KGB organizations
participate in collegium discussions when specific problems are dis-
cussed.

2. Chief Directorate Level

The KGB has a highly-complex organizational structure, but it is
generally correct to say that the First Chief Directorate is concerned
with foreign operations and that the Second Chief Directorate has
primary responsibility for internal security and counterintelligence.

a. The First Chief Directorate — The First Chief Directorate of the
KGB is organized on both geographical and functional lines. The geo-
graphic departments are numbered, and the First Department operates
against the United States and Canada. Traditionally, the numerical
designation. "First" has been assigned to the department that operates
against the "main enemy" of the U.S.S.R. The United States has
been that enemy since World War II ; but the People's Republic of
China has since been elevated almost to this status by current attitudes
if not by formal organization.

The Second Department is responsible for Latin America, including
Mexico. The Third Department concentrates on the United Kingdom,
Australia, New Zealand and Scandinavia; the Fourth Department
on West Germany, Austria and Switzerland, and so on for the thirteen
additional departments.

The functional or specialized components of the KGB First Chief
Directorate concern themselves with particular nongeographical tar-
gets, types of operations and types of information on a world-wide
basis. There are several important components in this category :

— The Counterintelligence Directorate works directly against for-
eign intelligence and security services.

— The Scientific and Technical Directorate runs clandestine opera-
tions to collect information on technological advances and analyzes
their application to military and industrial uses.

— Department "J." (Covert Action and Deception) plans, coordi-
nates and supports those activities which are known as "active meas-
ures"— a name which approximates "covert action." [This group was
formerly called Department "D" — disinformation and received exten-
sive publicity in the West in the 1960s under that name.]

— Department "F", formerly known as the Thirteenth Department,
conducts assassinations, abduction, and other types of "executive ac-
tion." It is known to have carried out assassinations abroad. Currently,
this Department is primarily concerned with contingency planning
for sabotage and partisan warfare operations.

— The Intelligence Liaison Department maintains liaison with the
state security or intelligence services of the East European Commu-
nist countries and of other pro-Soviet states. It serves as a channel for
levying requirements on those services and for coordinating their
activities. While in recent years increased efficiency and diplomatic
considerations have led to variations in the degree of Soviet control
of the East European intelligence and security services, the CIA
considers the services of these countries to be an effective extension

560

of the KGB. The CIA also considers the Cuban intelligence service
(the DGI) to be effectively controlled by the KGB.

b. The Second, Chief Directorate. — The primary responsibility of
this group is internal security and counterintelligence, including pene-
tration, detection and frustration of externally and internally sup-
ported anti-Soviet activities. All Soviet citizens, all foreign embassies
and consulates, and the growing number of foreigners who visit and
live in the U.S.S.R. each year are under its purview.

'Tlie Second Chief Directorate is broken down into several func-
tional departments, including :

— The American Department, which conducts all operational
activity directed at the official representatives of the United States,
Canadian and Latin American governments in the Soviet Union. Its
mission is two-fold : first, to minimize associations between diplomats
and the Soviet citizenry and to monitor contacts that do take place;
second, to attempt recruitment of American officials. One department is
responsible for identifying, investigating, questioning and maintain-
ing records on all Soviet citizens in authorized and unauthorized con-
tact with United States officials in the U.S.S.R., including any Soviet
citizen who wants to visit the U.S. Embassy for any reason. Another
section arranges controlled contacts for U.S. Embassy officers during
trips outside Moscow.

— The Foreign Tourists Department controls and attempts recruit-
ment of tourists who visit the U.S.S.R. through a large informant
network within all tourist services, including hotels, restaurants,
campsites, service stations, etc.

C. The GRU

The GRU has a significantly smaller number of personnel in Mos-
cow than the KGB since it has only one function — the collection
of foreign strategic intelligence. Its headquarters is reported to have
2,000 officers.

The GRU Chief, General of the Army Petr Ivashutin, is assisted
by several deputies, as is the Chief of the KGB. Also, like the KGB,
the GRU has a collegium which examines current problems and pro-
posed activities. The GRU is broken down into geographic com-
ponents, although fewer than the KGB. Of the four geographical
components, one is responsible for collection of strategic information
about the United States, the United Kingdom and Latin America.

Of the GRU's functional components, two deserve mention. One
directorate is responsible for signals intelligence (SIGINT) collec-
tion. The primary intercept targets of this directorate are the strategic
air and ground forces of the United States, Western European coun-
tries, Japan, and the People's Republic of China. SIGINT units in the
U.S.S.R., East European countries, and covert units in Soviet em-
bassies and trade missions abroad intercept and analyze all types of
electronic communications, including encrypted and clear-text official
messages, and telephone calls.

Another fuctional directorate trains Africans, Arabs, Asians and
Latin Americans in organizing underground nets and insurgent move-
ments in their countries. The training is done at camps and bases in

561

the U.S.S.R., and this directorate works closely with the CPSU
Central Committee which is responsible for selecting the individual
students or political groups to be trained.

D. The Scope and Methods of Anti-United States Operations
BY the KGB and GRU

KGB and GRU officers total approximately one-third of the 10,000
Soviets currently assigned to official Soviet installations abroad (ex-
cluding military and economic aid missions). Government control of
all Soviet trade, business and media services provides an additional
type of cover for KGB and GRU officers. Additionally, Soviet intelli-
gence officers occupy many posts in the United Nations administrative
structure and in the U.N.'s auxiliary organizations, such as the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency and the International Telecommuni-
cations Union.

The number of Soviet intelligence and operations officers is a mis-
leading indicator of the scope of Soviet operations. Many Soviet officers
are responsible for many informants or assets who provide intelligence,
or carry out operations for the KGB and GRU.

A main objective of Soviet intelligence officers both in the United
States and in countries in which U.S. installations exist and U.S.
citizens live, is recruitment of Americans as intelligence assets. A 1959
Soviet directive which was reaffirmed as recently as 1975 states that
"great attention" should be giveai to the recruitment of U.S. agents
who have "access to encrypted and other secret correspondence, such
as code clerks, secretaries and typists."

Another objective is the recruitment and cultivation of "agents of
influence," or agents who can influence political events or decisions.

Soviet intelligence also mounts technical operations against U.S.
installations and personnel. Planting of microphones and installa-
tion of telephone "taps" is done on a massive scale in the U.S.S.R. and
Soviet-oriented countries. The Soviets are more selective in the West
but they do conduct such operations. The primary targets are the of-
ficers and residences of U.S. ambassadors, senior foreign service per-
sonnel, CIA officers, and defense attaches.

E. Eastern European Security and Intelligence Services

According to the CIA, counterparts of the KGB and GRU in East-
ern European countries serve in varying degrees as extensions of
Soviet anti-United States intelligence collection and covert action
operations.

Of the eight Communist countries in Eastern Europe, five (Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the German Democratic Re-
public) adhere closely to the Soviet line and their intelligence and se-
curity services are strongly influenced and, to a large extent, con-
trolled by the KGB and the GRU. Soviet intelligence advisors are per-
manently assigned to their headquarters and the advisors liave total
access to all information collected by these services as well as to their
"sources and methods" data. The U.S.S.R. is able to impose collection
requirements on these Eastern European services for information not

562

needed by the country itself. The CIA knows of operations against
U.S. citizens and installations carried out by Eastern European intel-
ligence services under Soviet guidance.

The other three Communist countries in Eastern Europe (Ro-
mania, Yugoslavia, and Albania) have attained varying degrees of
independence from the U.S.S.R., as is reflected by the absence of any
significant liaison relationship between their security services and the
KGBandGRU.

All Eastern European intelligence services concentrate heavily on
the American target at home and abroad, frequently under direct
Soviet guidance. While these services, by American or Soviet stand-
ards, are not large, in aggregate the number of officers they have
assigned abroad approaches that of the Soviet intelligence services
and they thus represent a significant enhancement of the already for-
midable capabilities of the KGB and GRU. They continue to ex-
ercise tight political control within their borders.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR FRANK CHURCH
CONCERNING COVERT ACTION

I believe this committee has produced a remarkably thorough report
on the difficult subject of covert action. However, it is my own personal
view that the covert action capability of the U.S. intelligence commu-
nity ought to be circumscribed more sharply than a majority of the full
committee was willing to recommend. I include these additional re-
marks to explain my point of view.

We live in a dangerous world. Soviet submarines silently traverse
the ocean floors carrying transcontinental missiles with the capacity
to strike at our heartland. The nuclear arms race threatens to continue
its deadly spiral toward Armageddon.

In this perilous setting, it is imperative for the United States to
maintain a strong and effective intelligence service. On this proposition
we can ill afford to be of two minds. We have no choice other than to
gather, analyze, and assess — to the best of our abilities — vital informa-
tion on the intent and prowess of foreign adversaries, present or
potential.

Without an adequate intelligence-gathering apparatus we would be
unable to gauge with confidence our defense requirements ; unable to
conduct an informed foreign policy ; unable to control, through satel-
lite surveillance, a runaway nuclear arms race. "The winds and waves
are always on the side of the ablest navigators," wrote Gibbon. Those
nations without a skillful intelligence service must navigate beneath
a clouded sky.

While one may debate the quality of the Agency's performance,
there has never been any question about the propriety and necessity
of its evolvement in the process of gathering and evaluating foreign
intelligence. Nor have serious questions been raised about the means
used to acquire such information, whether from the overt sources,
technical devices, or bv clandestine methods.

What has become controvereial is quite unrelated to intelligence,
but has to do, instead, with the so-called covert operations of the CIA,
those secret efforts to manipulate events within foreign countries in
ways presumed to serve the interests of the United States. Nowhere
are such activities vouchsafed in the statutory language which created
the Agency in 1947. "No indication was given in the statute that the
CIA would become a vehicle for foreign political action or clandestine
political warfare," notes Harry HoAve Ransome, a scholar who has
written Avidely and thought deeply about the problems of intelligence
in modern society. Mr. Ransome concludes that "probably no other
organization of the Federal Government has taken such liberties in
interpreting its legally assigned functions as has the CIA."

The legal basis for this political action arm of the CIA is very
much open to question. Certainly the legislative history of the 1947
Act fails to indicate that Congress anticipated the CIA would ever
engage in covert political warfare abroad.

(563)

564

The CIA points to a catch-all phrase contained in the 1947 Act as a
rationalization for its operational prerogatives. A clause in the statute
permits the Agency "to perform such other functions and duties related
to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security
Council may, from time to time, direct." These vague and seeming-
ly innocuous words have been seized upon as the green light for the
CIA intervention around the world.

Moreover, these interventions into the political affairs of foreign
countries soon came to overshadow the Agencv's original purpose of
gathering and evaluating information. The United States came to
adopt the methods and accept the value system of the "enemy." In the
secret world of covert action, we threw off all restraints. Not content
merely to discreetly subsidize foreign political parties, labor unions,
and newspapers, the Central Intelligence Agency soon began to directly
manipulate the internal politics of other countries. Spending many
millions of dollars annually, the CIA filled its bag with dirty tricks —
ranging from bribery and false propaganda to schemes to "alter the
health" of unfriendly foreign leaders and undermine their regimes.

The United States must acquire a longer view of history. We need
not be so frightened by each Russian intervention. We need not feel so
compelled to react in kind to each Russian move. We have gained
little, and lost a great deal by our past policy of compulsive inter ven-
tionism. Above all, we have lost — or grievously impaired — the good
name and reputation of the United States from which we once drew
a unique capacity to exercise matchless moral leadership. Where once
we were admired, now we are resented. Where once we were welcome,
now we are tolerated, at best. In the eyes of millions of once friendly
foreign people, the United States is today regarded with grave sus-
picion and distrust.

I must lay the blame, in large measure, to the fantasy that it lay
within our power to control other countries through the covert manip-
ulation of their affairs. It formed part of a greater illusion that en-
trapped and enthralled our Presidents — the illusion of American
omnipotence.

Nevertheless, I do not draw the conclusion of those who now argue
that all American covert operations must be banned in the future. I
can conceive of a dire emergency when timely clandestine action on
our part might avert a nuclear holocaust and save an entire civilization.

But for such extraordinary events, certainly we do not need a regi-
ment of cloak-and-dagger men, earning their campaign ribbons — and,
indeed, their promotions — by planning new exploits throughout the
world. Theirs is a self-generating enterprise. Once the capability for
covert activity is established, the pressures brought to bear on the
President to use it are immense.

I, myself, believe that all covert activity unrelated to the gather-
ing of essential intelligence should be severed entirely from the CIA.
If some circumstance in the future should require a secret operation in
a foreign land, let it be done under the direct aegis of the States
Department.

And if the covert activity is not impelled by the imperative of sur-
vival, itself, then let it be directly connected with legitimate security
interests of the United States in a way that conforms with our tradi-

565

tional belief in freedom. Then, if our hand were exposed, we could
scorn the cynical doctrine of "plausible denial," and say openly, "Yes,
we were there — and proud of it!"

We were there in Western Europe, helping to restore democratic
governments in the aftermath of the Second World War. It was only
after our faith gave way to fear that we 'began to act as a self-appointed
sentinel of the status quo.

Then it was that all the dark arts of secret intervention — bribery,
blackmail, abduction, assassination — were put to the service of reac-
tionary and repressive regimes that can never, for long, escape or
withstand the volcanic forces of change.

And the United States, as a result, became even more identified with
the claims of the old order, instead of the aspirations of the new.

The remedy is clear. American foreign policy, must be made to
conform once more to our historic ideals, the same fundamental belief
in freedom and popular government that once made us a beacon of
hope for the downtrodden and oppressed throughout the world.

Frank Church

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS WALTER F. MON-
DALE, GARY HART, AND PHILIP HART

We fully support the analysis, findings, and recommendations of
this Report. If implemented, the recommendations will go far toward
providing our nation with an intelligence community that is more ef-
fective in protecting this country, more accountable to the American
public, and more responsive to our Constitution and our laws. The
key to effective implementation of these recommendations is a new
intelligence oversight committee with legislative authority.

Committees of Congress have only two sources of power: control
over the purse and public disclosure. The Select Committee had no
authority of any kind over the purse strings of the intelligence com-
munity, only the power of disclosure. The preparation of this volume
of the Final Report was a case study in the shortcomings of disclosure
as the sole instrument of oversight. Our experience as a Committee
graphically demonstrates why legislative authority — in particular
the power to authorize appropriations — is essential if a new oversight
committee is to handle classified intelligence matters securely and
effectively.

In preparing the Report, the Select Committee bent over back-
wards to ensure that there were no intelligence sources, methods, or
other classified material in the text. As a result, important portions of
the Report have been excised or significantly abridged. In some cases
the changes were clearly justified on security grounds. But in other
cases, the CIA, in our view, used the classification stamp not for se-
curity, but to censor material that would be embarrassing, inconven-
ient, or likely to provoke an adverse public reaction to CIA activities.

Some of the so-called security objections of the CIA were so out-
landish they were dismissed out of hand. The CIA wanted to delete
reference to the Bay of Pigs as a paramilitary operation, they wanted
to eliminate any reference to CIA activities in Laos, and they wanted
the Committee to excise testimony given in public before the television
cameras. But on other more complex issues, the Committee's necessary
and proper concern for caution enabled the CIA to use the clearance
process to alter the Report to the point where some of its most im-
portant implications are either lost, or obscured in vague language.
We shall abide by the Committee's agreement on the facts which are
to remain classified. We did what we had to do under the circum-
stances and the full texts are available to the Senate in classified form.
Within those limits, however, we believe it is important to point out
those areas in the Final Report which no longer fully reflect the work
of the Committee.

For example :

— Because of editing for classification reasons, the italicized
passages in the Findings and Recommendations obscure the

(567)

568

significant policy issues involved. The discussion of the role
of U.S. academics in the CIA's clandestine activities has been
so diluted that its scope and impact on the American academic
institutions is no longer clear. The description of the CIA's
clandestine activities within the United States, as well as the
extent to which CIA uses its ostensibly overt Domestic Con-
tact Division for such activities, has been modified to the
point where the Committee's concern about the CIA's blurr-
ing of the line between overt and covert, foreign and domestic
activities, has been lost.

— Important sections which deal with the problems of
"cover" were eliminated. They made clear that for many years
the CIA has known and been concerned about its poor cover
abroad, and that the Agency's cover problems are not the
result of recent congressional investigations of intelligence
activities. The deletion of one important passage makes it im-
possible to explain why unwitting Senate collaboration may
be necessary to make effective certain aspects of clandestine
activities.

— The CIA insisted upon eliminating the actual name of
the Vietnamese institute mentioned on page 454, thereby
suppressing the extent to which the CIA was able to use that
organization to manipulate public and congressional opinion
in the United States to support the Viet Nam War.

— Although the Committee recommends a much higher
standard for undertaking covert actions and a tighter con-
trol system, we are unable to report the facts from our in-
depth covert action case studies in depth which paint a pic-
ture of the high political costs and generally meager benefits
of covert programs. The final cost of these secret operations
is the inability of the American people to debate and decide
on the future scope of covert action in a fully informed way.

The fact that the Committee cannot present its complete case to
the public on these specific policy issues illustrates the dilemma sec-
recy poses for our democratic system of checks and balances. If the
Select Committee, after due consideration, decided to disclose more
information on these issues by itself, the ensuing public debate might
well focus on that disclosure rather than on the Committee's recom-
mendations. If the Select Committee asked the full Senate to endorse
such disclosure, we would be unfairly asking our colleagues to make
judgments on matters unfamiliar to them and which are the Commit-
tee's responsibility.

In the field of intelligence, secrecy has eroded the system of checks
and balances on which our Constitutional government rests. In our
view, the only way this system can be restored is by creating a legis-
lative intelligence oversight committee with the power to authorize
appropriations. The experience of this Committee has been that such
authority is crucial if the new committee is to be able to find out what
the intelligence agencies are doing, and to take action to stop things
when necessary without public disclosure. It is the only way to protect
legitimate intelligence secrets, yet effectively represent the public and

569

the Oono-ress in intelligence decisions affecting America's international
repSfon and basic "values. A legislative oversight committee with
hfpower to authorize appropriations for ^-'-^^fZ:'LZlM
America is to govern its intelligence agencies with the system ot checks
and balances mandated by the Constitution. ^^^^^^ ^^^^

Walter F. Mondale
Gary Hart

69-983 O - 76 - 37

INTRODUCTION TO SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATORS
JOHN G. TOWER, HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., AND BARRY
M. GOLDWATER

Our mutual concern that certain remedial measures proposed by
this Committee threaten to impose undue restrictions upon vital and
legitimate intelligence functions prevents us, in varying degrees, from
rendering an unqualified endorsement to this Committee's Findings
and Recommendations in their entirety. We also perceive a need to
emphasize areas of common agreement such as our unanimous endorse-
ment of intelligence reforms heretofore outlined by the President.

Therefore, we have elected to articulate our common concerns and
observations, as viewed from our individual perspectives, in separate
views which follow.

John Tower, Vice Chairman.

Howard H. Baker, Jr.

Barry M. Goldwater.

(571)

SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATOR JOHN G. TOWER,
VICE CHAIRMAN

When the Senate mandated this Committee to conduct an investiga-
tion and study of activities of our Nation's intelligence community,
it recognized the need for congressional participation in decisions
which impact virtually every aspect of American life. The gravamen
of our charge was to examine the Nation's intelligence needs and the
performance of agencies charged with intelligence responsibilities,
and to make such assessments and recommendations as in our judg-
ment are necessary to maintain the delicate balance between individual
liberties and national security. I do not believe the Committee's reports
and accompanying staff studies comply fully with the charge to main-
tain that balance. The Committee's recommendations make significant
departures from an overriding lesson of the American experience —
the right of American citizens to be free is inextricably bound to their
right to be secure.

I do not question the existence of intelligence excesses — the abuses
of power, both foreign and domestic, are well documented in the
Committee's report.

Nor do I question the need for expanded legislative, executive, and
judicial involvement in intelligence policy and practices — the "uncer-
tainties as to the authority of United States intelligence and related
agencies" were explicitly recognized by Senate Resolution 21.

Nevertheless, I question, and take exception to, the Committee's re-
port to the extent that its recommendations are either unsupported by
the factual record or unduly restrict attainment of valid intelligence
objectives.

I believe that the 183 separate recommendations proposing new de-
tailed statutes and reporting procedures not only exceed the number
and scope of documented abuses, but represent over-reaction. If
adopted in their totality, they would unnecessarily limit the effective-
ness of the Nation's intelligence community.

In the area of foreign intelligence, the Committee was specifically
mandated to prevent ". . . disclosure, outside the Select Committee, of
any information which would adversely affect the intelligence activi-
ties ... of the Federal Government." In his separate view Senator
Barry Goldwater clearly points up the damage to our efforts in Latin
America occasioned by release of the "staff report" on covert action in
Chile. I objected to releasing the Chile report and fully support Sen-
ator Goldwater's assessment of the adverse impact of this "ironic"
and ill-advised disclosure.

Another unfortunate aspect of the Committee's foreign report is its
response to incidents of lack of accountability and control by recom-
mending the imposition of a layering of Executive Branch reviews
at operational levels and needless bifurcation of the decisionmaking
process. The President's reorganization which centralizes foreign in-

(573)

574

telligence operations and provides for constant review and oversight,
is termed "ambiguous." Yet the Committee's recommended statutory
changes would [in addition to duplication and multiplication of deci-
sions] , add little except to insure that the existing functions set up by
the President's program were "explicitly empowered," "reaffirmed" or
provided with "adequate staff," By concentration upon such details
as which cabinet officer should chair the various review groups or
speak for the President, the Committee's approach unnecessarily re-
stricts Presidential discretion, without enhancing efficiency, control,
or accountability. The President's reorganization is a thorough, com-
prehensive response to a long-standing problem. It should be sup-
ported, not pilloried with statutory amendments amounting to little
more than alternative management techniques. It is far more appro-
priate for the Congress to place primary legislative emphasis on estab-
lishing a structure for Congressional Oversight which is compatible
with the Executive reorganization while eliminating the present pro-
liferation of committees and subcommittee's asserting jurisdiction over
intelligence activities.

Another area in which I am unable to agree with the Committee's
approach is covert action. It would be a mistake to attempt to require
that the Congress receive prior notification of all covert activities.
Senator Howard Baker repeatedly urged the Committee to adopt the
more realistic approach of obligating the Executive to keep the Con-
gress "fully and currently informed." I believe any attempt by the
legislative branch to impose a strict prior notification requirement
upon the Executive's foreign policy initiatives is neither feasible nor
consistent with our constitutionally mandated separation of powers.

On the domestic front the Committee has documented flagrant
abuses. Of particular concern were the political misuses of such agen-
cies as the Fedei'al Bureau of Investigation and the Internal Revenue
Service. However, while thoroughly probing these reprehensible ac-
tivities and recommending needed changes in accountability mecha-
nisms, the Committee's "corrective" focus is almost exclusively on pro-
hibitions or limitations of agency practices. I hope this approach to
remedial action will not be read as broad criticism of the overall per-
formance of the intelligence community or a minimization of the
Committee's own finding that "... a fair assessment must place a
major part of the blame upon the failures of senior executive officials
and Congress." In fact, I am persuaded that the failure of high officials
to investigate these abuses or to terminate them when they learned of
them was almost as reprehensible as the abuses themselves.

A further objectionable aspect of the Committee's approach is the
scope of the proposed limitations on the use of electronic surveillance
and informants as investigative techniques. With respect to electronic
surveillance of Americans suspected of intelligence activities inimical
to the national interest, the Committee would limit authority for such
probes to violations of specific criminal statutes. This proposal fails to
address the real problem of utilizing electronic surveillance against
myriad forms of espionage. A majority of the Committee recom-
mended this narrow standard while acknowledging that existing stat-
utes offer inadequate coverage of "modern forms of espionage." The
Committee took no testimony on revision of the espionage laws and

575

simply proposed that another committee "explore the necessity for
amendments." To prohibit electronic surveillance in these cases pend-
ing such revision is to sanction an unnecessary risk to the national
security. In adopting this position the Committee not only ignores the
fact that ap23ellate courts in two federal circuits have upheld the Ex-
ecutives inherent authority to conduct such surveillance, but also fails
to endorse the Attorney General's comprehensive proposal to remedy
objection to current practices. The proposed safeguards, which include
requirements for the Attorney General's certification of hostile foreign
intelligence involvement and issuance of a judicial warrant as a condi-
tion precedent to electronic surveillance, represent a significant ex-
pansion of civil liberties protections. The proposal enjoys bi-partisan
support in Congress and I join those members urging prompt en-
actment.

I am also opposed to the methods and means proposed by the Com-
mittee to regulate the use of informants. Informants have been in the
past and will remain in the future a vital tool of law^ enforcement. To
adopt the Committee's position and impose stringent, mechanical time
limits on the use of informants — particularly regarding their use
against terrorist or hostile foreign intelligence activities in the United
States — would be to place our faith in standards which are not only
illusory, but unworkable.

In its overly broad approach to eliminating intelligence abuses, the
Committee report urges departure from the Congress' role as a part-
ner in national security policy and comes dangerously close to being a
blueprint for authorizing Congressional management of the day-to-
day affairs of the intelligence community. Whether this management
is attempted through prior notification or a shopping list of prohibi-
tive statutes and regulations, it is a task for which the legislative
branch of government is ill-suited. I believe the adverse impact which
would be occasioned by enactment of all the Committee recommenda-
tions would be substantial.

Substantial segments of the Committee's work product will assist
this Congress in proceeding with the task of insuring the conduct of
necessary intelligence activities in a manner consistent with our obli-
gation to safeguard the rights of American citizens. However, we must
now step back from the klieg lights and abuse-dominated atmosphere,
and balance our findings and recommendations with a recognition that
our intelligence agencies and the men and women who serve therein
have been and will always be essential to the existence of our nation.
This Committee w^as asked to provide a constitutionally acceptable
framework for Congress to assist in that mission. We were not man-
dated to render our intelligence systems so constrained as to be fit for
employment only in an ideal world.

In addition to the above remarks I generally endorse the positions
set forth in Senator Baker's individual views.
I specifically endorse :

His views stating the need for legislation making it a crini-
inal offense to publish the name of a United States intelli-
gence officer stationed abroad under cover.

576

His position that there must be a system of greater account-
ability by our intelJigence operations to the United States
Congress and the American people.

His concern that the Congress exercise caution to insure
that a proper predicate exists before any recommendations for
permanent reforms are enacted into law.

His view that there be careful study before endorsing the
• Committee's far reaching recommendations calling for an
alteration of the intelligence community structure. I also sup-
port the individual views of Senator Gold water.

Further, I specifically endorse :

His assessment that only a small segment of the American
public has ever doubted the integrity of our Nation's intelli-
gence agencies.

His opinion that an intelligence system, however secret,
does not place undue strain on our nation's constitutional
government.

His excellent statement concerning covert action as an es-
sential tool of the President's foreign policy arsenal.

His opposition to the publication of an annual aggregate
figure for United States intelligence and his reasons therefor.

His views and comments on the Committee's recommenda-
tions regarding the National Security Council and the Office
of the President. Specifically, comments number 12, 13 and 14.

His views challenging the proposed limitation concerning
the recruitment of foreigners by the Central Intelligence
Agency.

His views and general comments concerning the right of
every American, including academics, clergymen, business-
men and others, to cooperate with his government in its law-
ful pursuits.

For the reasons stated above, I regret that I am unable to sign the
final report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Opera-
tions With Respect to Intelligence Activities.

John G. Tower,

Vice Chairman.

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF SENATOK BARRY GOLDWATER

This final report of the Select Committee on Intelligence
Activities must be read with care. Historically, the work of the Com-
mittee and its report are an outgrowth of a period in which disillusion-
ment, dismay, and disaffection were all too prevalent in America.

Failure in Vietnam and the Watergate scandals were prime contrib-
utors to the foregoing and helped produce a feeling that the ship of
state was rudderless.

Under these circumstances of confusion, the basic premises of our
foreign policy came into question, with some taking refuge in isolation-
ism as the only way out. Others reacted as though some demon needed
to be exorcized and launched a kind of guerilla attack upon our foreign
policy.

Pressure from the new isolationists and the demonologists forced a
skittish Congress into asserting a greater influence over the conduct of
our foreign policy.

The results were mostly bad:

— Two good allies, Greece and Turkey, were alienated.

— Jewish emigration from Russia was reduced.

— The hands of our President were tied in the day-to-day

conduct of foreign policy.
— U.S. intelligence was demoralized and its effctiveness

greatly diminished.
— Our allies came to seriously question America's reliability,

if not our collective sanity.
— Our adversaries took comfort in watching us tear ourselves

apart.

In the field of intelligence activities, the worst of it all occurred
in the Senate on October 2, 1974 when the Hughes Amendment (ulti-
mately the Hughes-Ryan Amendment) was included in the foreign aid
bill. Under its provisions, six committees of the Congress are required
to be informed of any covert action conducted abroad. This means that
approximately 50 Senators and over 120 Congressmen may receive
highly sensitive information on a covert action program. It also means
that public disclosure is almost inevitable, as proved to be the case in
Angola.

As the Soviet Union moved decisively in Africa, pushing its Cuban
mercenaries in the vanguard, and as the word "detente" came more and
more to be understood as a game played under rules favorable to Mos-
cow, a new appraisal seemed to be arising among our fellow citizens :

The pendulum had swung too far and much damage was being
done to the Nation's foreign policy and the organizations
necessary to its conduct.

The foregoing was largely in the past tense, because it is my hope and
belief that the period of self-criticism, if not self-flagellation, is coming

(577)

578

to an end. If not, our once proud and strong Nation is headed for very
hard times.

Covert Action in Chile — 1963-1973

Throughout the "Foreign and Military Intelligence" section of the
Committee's final report, there are references to covert action in Chile
which are based on a staff report of the Committee entitled, "Covert
Action in Chile — 1963-1973." Because the report was a "staff report,"
Senators on the Commitee were not entitled to submit opposing views.
In my opinion, the staff repK>rt is a, distortion of history and will not
stand the test of time. The folloAving is what I believe to be a fair
representation of events in Chile from 1963 to 1973 and any U.S.
involvement.

On December 4, 1973, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Activities held public hearings on covert action in Chile covering
the years 1963 to 1973. In his opening statement, Chairman Church
stated that, "The nature and extent of the American role in the over-
throw of a democratically-elected Chilean government are mattei-s for
deep and continuing public concern."

The Chairman then introduced the staff director, who with other
members of the staff, summarized a staff report entitled, ^^Covert
Action in Chile 1963-1973.'''' The staff conclusion was even more
specific: "In the period 1970 through 1973, in order to prevent a
Marxist leader from coming to power by democratic means, the

U.S. worked through covert action to subvert democratic processes

this interference in the internal affairs of another country served to
weaken the party we sought to assist and created internal dissen-
sions which, over time, led to the weakening and, for the present time
at least, an end to constitutional government in Chile."

These assertions, and the Committee report on which they are based,
are misleading because they make it appear that the United States was
responsible for the downfall of a respectable and truly democratic
government. The real character of Allende and his coalition was ig-
nored by excluding both public statements of philosophy and intent
as well as the public record of highly illegal actions while in office.

Omitting publicly available information (not to mention the ex-
clusion of voluminous classified intelligence dealing with Chilean sup-
port of Soviet and Cuban international subversion) makes it difficult
for the American public to undersitand why anti-Allende operations
were undertaken by three successive U.S. adminisitrations. Moreover,
the report concludes that "fears, often badly exaggerated or distorted,
appear to have activated officials in Washington."

Thus, Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973 leaves the impression of
U.S. bunglinsf in Chilean affairs induced by a corrosive fear of com-
munism and Marxism.

While there may have 'been some mistakes made in the conduct of
our affairs in Chile, the threat of a communist dictatorship under
Allende was very real. To set the record straight, here are facts that
should be taken into account :

1. Salvador Allende and the Unidad Popular

An avowed Marxist-Leninist, Allende participated in the creation
of the Chilean Socialist Party in 1933, the year he graduated from
medical school. He was elected a Federal Deputy in 1937, and was

579

named Secretary-General of the Socialist Party in 1943. Since its incep-
tion, the Chilean Socialist Party has been an extreme interpreter of
Marxist-Leninist dogma, espousing violent revolution for Chile and
the rest of Latin America.

Castro's Cuba became the Socialist model, and many young Social-
ists were trained in Cuba in guerilla warfare as well as in political
action. Allende personally headed the Chilean delegation to the 1966
Tricontinental Conference in Havana and was a key figure in the cre-
ation of the Cuban-sponsored Latin America Solidarity Organization
called LASO — created specifically to foment guerilla warfare in Latin
America. It was the guiding force for the "Che" Guevara Guerrilla
adventure in Bolivia in 1967.

In January 1970, Allende was listed as a director of the Chilean
Committee of Support for the Bolivian People and the National Lib-
eration Army, known as ELN.

Meanwhile the stronger, but less violent, Chilean Communist Party
had joined the Socialist Party in a coalition which backed Allende as
its presidential candidate in four presidential elections (1952, 1958,
1964 and 1970.) Allende was an active member of many Communist
front organizations, particularly the World Peace Council, of which
he was Vice-President during his first visit to the USSR in 1954.

Intelligence gathered over a period of many years has provided
what Ambassador Korry calls "certain knowledge that the Soviet Un-
ion and other Communist governments and organizations provided
substantial sums for covert political action to the Communist Party,
to the Socialist Party, and to Allende himself."

The significance of Allende's election as President of Chile was thus
readily apparent or should have been. Allende affirmed publicly in his
1970 campaign, as he had in previous campaigns for the presidency,
that his intention was to bring about an irreversible Marxist revolu-
tion in Chile. He viewed himself as the man who would do what Castro
failed to do : destroy America's leadership in Latin America. Allende
minced no pre-election words. Prior to his election, he stated flat out
that the United States was to be treated as "public enemy number
one" in the western hemisphere.

Allende's tactics centered on using constitutional tools to fashion
a socialist revolution, but he never pretended to expouse traditional
parliamentary democracy. A minority president who received only
36.5% of the popular vote, he declared three months after taking
office :

I am the President of the Unidad Popular. I am not the
President of all the Chileans.

He and Castro chose to follow different roads, but Allende's inten-
tions were never really masked. To quote again from his 1970 presi-
dential campaign:

Cuba in the Caribbean and a Socialist Chile in the Southern
Cone will make the revolution in Latin America.

Was this empty campaign rhetoric ?

Soon after the 1970 election, Allende met secretly with Latin Amer-
ican revolutionaries and pledged covert support to them. Ambassador
Korry has written : "In 1970, as in 1963, we know beyond a shadow

580

of a reasonable doubt that an Allende government intended to use
the processes and laws of what it called formal democracy to elim-
inate and replace it with what it called popular democracy. (From
1961 to 1970, the Embassy, like the majority of Congress, agreed that
such a development would do serious harm to U.S. interests and in-
fluence-for-good in the world.)"

2. Efforts of the Allende Govemment to Destroy Democratic Insti-
tutions

Communist Party leaders were largely in charge of the economic
program of the Allende government. The communists intended grad-
ually to replace private enterprise by State enterprise, thus enabling
the government to assume complete social and economic power.

The government, therefore, drew up a list of all Chilean corpora-
tions whose capital reserves exceeded $500,000. These companies, repre-
senting 82% of the capital holdings of all companies incorporated in
Chile, were earmarked for nationalization. Congress atempted to block
this government program by passing legislation defining the economic
areas subject to government ownership, but the government continued
to take over Chilean firms, using methods which became progressively
more illegal.

These methods ranged from expropriations (declared unconstitu-
tional by the Chilean Supreme Court) , to requisitions (many of which
were declared illegal by the Chilean Office of the Comptroller General) ,
to "decrees of insistence" (a rarely used judicial tool created to resolve
differences of legal interpretations between the judiciary and the
executive).

In agriculture, all farms exceeding 80 hectares of irrigated land
were made subject to legal expropriation. These "legal" expropria-
tions were supplemented by those of roving armed bands who took
possession of agricultural properties by force without any intervention
by the Chilean police.

Similarly, a series of economic pressures was exerted to silence the
independent media, including coercion, bribery, the manipulation of
government control over credit, imports and prices, and the incitement
of strikes.

As an adjunct to economic pressures, the Allende government began
to develop the concept of "popular power", creating parallel revolu-
tionary organizations which duplicated the functions of existing legal
organizations. For example, special communal commands, known as
JAPS, were established to control the distribution of essential articles,
mainly food. Government supplies were channeled through these new
organizations rather than through established retailed outlets. Of
Soviet origin, the communal commands had the dual function of
displacing "bourgeois" organizations and of training their members
for armed revolution.

Prior to the Allende regime, Chile had a strong democratic tradition
and a firm commitment to constitutional processes. Under the Allende
regime, its institutions fought long and tenaciously to save themselves
from destruction by legal, constitutional means. When the government
violated Chilean law, protests were filed with the courts and
"contraloria." ^

^ (Comptroller-General of the Republic, who supervised the legality of the
government's actions. )

581

When the courts and the Contraloria objected to these violations,
however, the government either paid no heed to these decisions or over-
ruled them through "decrees of insistence", which were themselves
illegal.

The National Congress also tried to check these violations of the law
by impeaching the ministers responsible for them, but Allende merely
moved the ousted ministers from one post to another, thus thwarting
the purpose of Congressional sanctions.

Finally, when all the protests of the Congress, the courts and the
Contraloria had been repeatedly ignored, these bodies solemnly de-
clared that the Allende government had placed itself outside both the
law and the Constitution. These declarations were made by the Su-
preme Court on May 26, 1973, by the Contraloria on July 2, 1973, and
by the Chamber of Deputies on August 22, 1973. The full text of the
Chamber of Deputies resolution, and that of a subsequent August 29,
1973 Report of the Bar Association are appended in full, because they
record many of the abuses and illegalities of the Allende government
and also illustrate the inability of true democratic institutions to co-
exist with a Marxist government. The Chamber's declaration was, in
fact, a notice to the armed forces that the legal and constitutional order
of the country had broken down.

The military coup of September 11, 1973 was the tragic climax
of a long process of political polarization, exacerbated by the worst
economic crisis in Chile's history :

—Inflation exceeded 300% in 1973 ;

— the trade balance deficit in the same year exceeded $450

million ;
— the foreign debt increased 60% in three years.

As the economic situation deteriorated, strikes proliferated, crip-
pling the country. It was not U.S. "interference," but rather a minor-
ity's attempt to impose doctrinaire Marxism on a democratic frame-
work, which led to the establishment of the present military govern-
ment.

3. Chile : a Base for Soviet and Cuban Subversion

Within the Allende government, the Communist Party was largely
responsible for running the economic program, counting heavily on
Soviet support. There were 1,300-odd Soviets in Chile as of March
1972. Soviet Bloc credits of some $200 million had been extended. More-
over, the Soviets were dangling an offer of $300 million to the Chilean
military for the purchase of military equipment. The Soviets, how-
ever, left to the Cubans most of the revolutionary guidance and support
provided to the Allende coalition.

TTnder Allende. Chile became the center for Cuban operations in the
southern cone of Latin America. Juan Carretero Ibanez, alias "Ariel",
former chief of the Cuban Liberation Directorate (LD) for Latin
America (the Cuban intelligence and executive action agency) arrived
in Chile in October 1970 just prior to Allende's inausfuration. He was
soon followed by Luis Fernandez Ona, a senior intellicrence officer of
the DGI who became Allende's son-in-law. Chile re-established diplo-
matic relations with Cuba and the Cuban Embassy rapidly reached a

582

strength of 54 (later nearly 100) officers. Cuban visitors to Chile aver-
aged 100 per month.

Cuban support to the Chilean government was primarily in the se-
curity field. The Cubans trained and armed the Presidential security
guard, and also helped to develop an intelligence organization which
functioned independently of established government ser^dces. Chilean
police were trained in repressive security tactics, such as setting up
neighborhood informant systems. The Cubans also provided arms,
funds, and guerrilla training to hundreds of members of the Socialist
Party and other far leftist Chilean militia groups.

Dozens of crates of arms^ mostly of Soviet and Czech origin^ were
found stored in AlJenAe''s Santiago home and mountain retreat after he
was overthrown. These crates had been flown in as "gifts" by Cuban
airlines.

The Cuban intelligence effort in Chile, concentrated on exporting
revolution to other Latin American countries, primarily Bolivia but
also Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Some ten to fifteen thousand for-
eign revolutionaries flocked into Chile, where the Cuban LD center
conducted a thriving business. The Center had a unit for providing
false documents and training, and its operatives met revolutionaries in
exile and visitors from other countries to receive their reports, pass
money, arrange travel to Cuba and direct their activities.

In November 1971 Bolivian exiles in Chile announced formation of
the Anti-Imperialist Revolutionary Front, known as FRA, which in-
cluded the ELN. Its mission was to replace the Banzer Government
with a government of the "proletariat". A number of FRA leaders in
Chile travelled to and from Cuba. A massing of FRA exiles on the
Chilean border drew official protests from the Bolivian government
in April 1972.

Chile also served as a support base for the Argentine terrorist orga-
nization PRT/ERP. (Subsequently the PRT/ERP was responsible
for such actions as the abduction and shooting of a State Department
official and for extracting ransom in excess of $20,000,000 from U.S.
firms in Argentina.)

^. Actions of Allende^s Coalition Subsequent to the March 1973
Elections

Like the other Unidad Popular parties, the Communist Party,
known as the PCCH, began almost immediately after Allende's elec-
tion to arm and train its membership in paramilitary tactics. Prior to
March 1973, however, the Communist Party publicly and privately
advocated policies designed to lull the political opposition and mili-
tary into believing that the government would not resort to flagrant
violations of the Chilean constitution. The PCCH believed that time
was on the side of the government, and that the political opposition
would be effectively stifled by progressively increasing government
control of the economy.

This posture changed with the March 1973 congressional elections,
which showed that the Christian Democrats and other parties in the
political opposition were gaining rather than losing ground. The Com-
munists, realizing that force was the only way to guarantee the con-
tinuance of the Marxist government, then joined the Socialist Party
in pressing Allende to take harsher measures against the opposition.

583

After the September 1, 1973 coup, the junta government charged
that the Unidad Popular had been planning a terrorist action, which
wasfeiown as "Plan Z" and called for the assassination of military and
opposition leaders as part of a move to secure total control of the
country. A reliable leftist military source, who was in Chile prior to
and during the military rebellion, confirmed that the leftist forces had
indeed planned a pre-emptive move against the military, to have taken
place during the independence celebrations of September 17-18, 1973.
The documents and large arms caches discovered by military authori-
ties after the coup suggest that Plan Z may indeed have existed.

A complete and fair assessment of the U.S. role in Chile can only be
made if the following are taken into account :

1. The character of the Allende regime as revealed by public state-
ments and by the nature of the political parties from which he drew
support ;

2. Efforts of the Allende regime to manipulate and ultimately
destroy constitutional democracy ;

3. Soviet and Cuban use of Chile as a base for international
subversion ;

4. The possibility that the Marxists were planning a pre-emptive
and bloody coup to seize power totally.

The Senate Select Committee Staff Report on Chile concludes that
"fears, often badly exaggerated and distored, appear to have activated
officials in "Washington." But even the National Intelligence Estimate
cited as endorsing this conclusion was published on June 14, 1973 and
was written before Allende's violations of civil liberties were intensi-
fied. In the months after the Estimate the country's democratic
processes were reduced to chaos and provoked the solemn declarations
by the Supreme Court, Comptroller-General and Chamber of Deputies
mentioned earlier.

U.S. policy toward Chile from 1962 to 1970 was consistent in
attempting to prevent the take-over of the Government of Chile by
Allende and his totalitarian Communist and Socialist supporters. The
actions of the Allende regime after 1970 proves the wisdom of that
policy.

In Chile, the U.S. was acting within the broad mainstream of tradi-
tional U.S. policy in Latin America, which has been to resist en-
croachment by powers outside the Western Hempishere. The USSR
dealt with the Allende government (and with the Chilean Communist
Party, before and after Allende's election) at the very highest level.
For example, the Soviet Ambassador to Allende's Chile, Alexander
Vasilvevich Basov, was one of only three members of the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Partv to be stationed in non-Communist cap-
itals. The other two being in Washintgon and Paris.

The Allende experiment in Chile was seen by the Soviets as a model
for other strategic countries. It is worth noting that both the Soviets
and the Cubans considered the overthrow of the Allende govern-
ment in Chile as a disaster to their interests. In their comments on
Chile, the Soviets emphasize that Chile proves the thesis that "socialist
revolution" should never be attempted without political control of
the military forces.

There can be honest differences of oninion about the wisdom of
American policy toward Chile over the last decade. What is missing

584

in the Staff report is the acknowledgement of a viewpoint contrary
to its own conception : that Washington opinionmakers were activated
by badly exaggerated and distorted fears. History has proved that
minority Communist and radical Marxist parties ultimately destroy
the elements of democracy and diversity which enable them to gain
power, Allende clearly stated his intent to bring about an irreversible
Marxist revolution in Chile.

Had the facts presented here been made available to the reader of
the Staff Report, that reader might have concluded that U.S. Govern-
ment fears were not "exaggerated or distorted", and might have con-
cluded that the U.S. was essentially correct in its Chilean policy. This
policy, prior to 1970, was to prevent a convinced Marxist from taking
power and after 1970 strove to support and sustain until the 1976
elections a democratic opposition to a government which, by 1973,
was clearly operating outside the laws and Constitution of Chile.

The results of the disclosures of sensitive classified data which were
made during open hearings and in the published report on Chile will
not be evident for some time to come, but two recent developments may
be of interest.

First, the conclusion to the Staff Report states that "it would be the
final irony of a decade of covert action in Chile if that action destroyed
the credibility of the Chilean Christian Democrats."

According to an official report received by this Government, "Ex-
President Frei feels completely shattered as a result of the release of
the Senate report . . . and has confided to friends that it has brought
his political career to a close . . . The source commented that it is ironic
that U.S. congressional distaste for the role of the U.S. Government
against the Allende Government may have succeeded in destroying the
onlv viable alternative to the present Chilean government."

Second, data taken from the Report are being used to give credi-
bility to false allegations about the Agency. An example is the Wash-
iriQton Post article of January 16, 1976 by Walter Pincus entitled
"CIA Funding Journalistic Network Abroad." After quoting data
taken from the Chile Report, the author quotes "a former intelligence
agent" as claiming that the CIA subsidized the Latin American news
service LATIN in much the same manner as it gave money to "El
Mercurio." The true fact is that the CIA never gave any help, financial
or otherwise, to LATIN, but this false allegation has been tied in
with facts published in the Staff Report in such a way as to make it
appear to have the Senate stamp of approval.

As of this writing Angola has fallen into the hands of a revolu-
tionary group backed by the Soviet TTnion. The winning element was
thousands of Cuban soldiers supplied with Russian weaponry. In
other words, the Soviet ITnion used Cuban soldiers in Anjrola much
the same wav as Hessians were employed by the British during our
own Revolutionarv War.

To the world, the Soviet Union is boasting of its victory and the
defeat of the U.S.

There is an ironical, if not tragic, postlude to the report Covert
Action in, Chile 196S-1973. On December 17, 1975 Fidel Castro made

585

a speech which quoted several paragraphs of the Keport. Here is Fidel
Castro's accolade :

. . . We consider the revelation of the report a positive move
by the Senate committee despite the opposition of the Presi-
dent of the United States, even when much information was
omitted because of pressure from the CIA itself and from the
President's office

Foreign and MiLrrARY Findings and Recommendations

Turning to the report entitled "Findings and Recommendations of
the Committee : Foreign and Military," two general observations can
be made :

1. Much of the supporting evidence or information for this section
of the report is drawn from a series of staff studies which have not
been considered by the full committee in their final form as of this
writing. Moreover, the staff reports are wider in scope than the testi-
mony taken by the full committee.

2. Recommendations for reorganization of the intelligence commu-
nity are not backed up by sufficient testimony or analysis.

Below are some detailed comments on the report. They follow the
heading given on the "Contents" page.

/. Historical Note

The Select Committee on Intelligence Activities spent nearly $3
million and over 15 months investigating the intelligence commu-
nity, and it had a peak staff of over 120 professionals, consultants,
and clerical personnel. I believe these facts should be a matter of
record, because no excuses can be made for the final report based on
a lack of time, money, or personnel. In fact, the Senate was more
than generous in providing repeated extensions of time and money
to the Select Committee. The results speak for themselves.

The truth of the matter is that approximately 6 months was spent
in a fruitless investigation into alleged assassination attempts. During
the course of the investigation of assassination attempts, not one bona
fide assassination ordered by the U.S. Government was discovered.
Wliat did emerjje were attempts on the life of Fidel Castro during
the early 60's when our relations with Cuba were very close to being
a state of war. In any event, much time and effort was frittered away
in this unproductive exercise.

A. Introduction and General Findings

Committee Report:

. . . Alleffations of abuse, revelations in the press, and the
results of the Committee's 15 month inquiry have underlined
the necessitv to restore confidence \v the in^^o^-T-ity of our
Nation's intelligence agencies. . . . (See p. 423.)

586

CoTnment:

Only a small segment of American public opinion has ever had
any doubts in the integrity of our Nation's intelligence agencies. In
general, the American people fully support our intelligence services
and recognize them as the Nation's front line of defense. Accordingly,
the use of the word "restore" is misleading.

Committee Report:

... At the same time, the Committee finds that the operation
of an extensive and necessarily secret intelligence system
places severe strains on the nation's constitutional govern-
ment. . . . (Seep. 425.)

Comm.ent :

It is not the operation of an intelligence system that strains our
nation's constitutional government. Any strains that exist are the
direct result of Presidential misuse, misunderstanding, or abuse of the
nation's intelligence capabilities. It should be noted that the report
correctly salutes the men and women of the intelligence community,
and also correctly points out that the Soviet KGB and other hostile
intelligence services conduct spying and covert operations — (not to
mention assassinations) .

Committee Report :

. . . The Committee finds that covert action operations have
not been an exceptional instrument used only in rare in-
stances when the vital interests of the United States have been
at stake. On the contrary, presidents and administrations
have made excessive, and at times self-defeating, use of covert
action. In addition, covert action has become a routine pro-
gram with a bureaucratic momentum of its own. The long-
term impact, at home and abroad, of repeated disclosure of
U.S. covert action never appears to have been assesed. The
cumulative effect of covert actions has been increasingly
costly to American interests and reputation. The Committee
believes that covert action must be employed only in the
most extraordinaiy circumstances.

Comment :

Covert action is intended to provide the President of the U.S.
and the nation with a range of actions short of war to preserve the
free world and to thwart the global ambitions of Communist im-
perialism. Covert operations can and should be used in circumstances
which might not be described as "vital" but are nevertheless neces-
sary to prevent a crisis from occurring. One of the purposes of covert
action is to prevent the occui'rence of "most extraordinary circum-
stances." Those who support the above-mentioned quotation are in
effect saying : "Don't put out the fire while it is small ; wait until it
becomes a conflagration."

Com,mAttee Report :

. . . Although there is a question as to the extent to which
the Constitution requires publication of intelligence expen-

587

ditures information, the Committee finds that the Constitution
at least requires public disclosure and authorization of an
annual aggregate figure for United States national intelli-
gence activities. . . . (Seep. 425.)

Comment :

Publication of an annual aggregate figure for U.S. intelligence
may appear to be innocent especially because estimates, with varying
degrees of accuracy, have appeared in the press. Wliether or not the
Constitution requires such a disclosure is open to question. Tradition-
ally, nations have kept their intelligence budgets secret for at least
two reasons: First, they did not want to officially acknowledge the
fact of these activities. Second, the publication of a figure might
give potential adversaries some indication of the magnitude of their
intelligence efforts. Both of these arguments may be somewhat obso-
lete in a world where little, if anything, is considered private.

There is still another objection which I submit cannot be dis-
counted: Disclosing an annual aggregate figure will inevitably lead
to demands for a breakdown of that figure. If these demands cannot
be resisted, ultimately we would hand our adversaries very important
indicators concerning the magnitude and thrust of our intelligence
activities. In addition, our allies would be inclined to view such a
step as one more signal that America is unable to protect its secrets
leading to a possible further erosion of cooperative intelligence ef-
forts. In any event, this matter should be decided by a vote of the
entire Senate.

D. The National Security Couxcil and the Office of the

President

Committee Report :

. . . The Central Intelligence Agency, in broad terms, is not
"out of control."' . . . (See p. 27.)

Comment :

After having heard the CIA described as a "rogue elephant run
rampant", it is gratifying that the Committee now finds the CIA is
not "out of control."

Committee Report:

... 12. By statute, the Secretary of State should be desig-
nated as the principal administration spokesman to the Con-
gress on the policy and purpose underlying covert action
projects. . . . (See p. 430.)

Comment:

Making the Secretarv of State the spokesman for covert action
could place him in a diplomatically untenable position. ^^Hiat is meant
by "the Congress" in this context? This recommendation is vague
and if enacted into the statutes could overburden the Secretary of
State, who has more than enough work to do.

588

Com/miUee Report:

... 13. By statute, the Director of Central Intelligence should
be required to fully inform the intelligence ovei"sight com-
mittee (s) of the Congress of each covert action prior to its
initiation. No funds should be expended on any covert action
unless and until the President certifies and provides to the
congressional intelligence oversight committee (s) the reasons
that a covert action is required by extraordinary cir-
cumstances to deal with grave threats to the national security
of the United States. The congressional intelligence over-
sight committee (s) should be kept fully and currently in-
formed of all covert action projects, and the DCI should
submit a semi-annual report on all such projects to the com-
mittee (s). (See p. 430.)

CoTn/ment:

As mentioned in the introduction, the operation of the Hughes-
Ryan Amendment requires 6 committees to be informed of any covert
action. This recommendation would merely add another layer to the
cake in the absence of a repeal of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment. If
the Congress could agree that only a joint committee on intelligence
or preferably the House and Senate Armed Services Committees were
to be informed, I might be able to support the concept of prior noti-
fication. Prior notification raises an important point that shoidd be
carefully considered by the Congress: Does the Congress intend to
share responsibility with the President for covert actions? In other
words, will the Congress be content to accept our successes as well as
our failures as secrets ?

Committee Report:

... 14. The Committee recommends that when the Senate
establishes an intelligence oversight committee with author-
ity to authorize the national intelligence budget, the Huarhes-
Ryan Amendment (22 U.S.C., Section 2422) should be
amended so that the foregoing notifications and Presidential
certifications to the Senate are provided only to that commit-
tee. . . . (See p. 431.)

Comment:

This recommendation presupposes that the House of Representa-
tives would be willing to accept the creation of a Senate committee
as a sufficient reason to repeal the Hughes-Ryan Amendment. In the
absence of an agreement with the House on repeal, this recommenda-
tion is meaningless.

F. The Central Intelligence Agency

CommriHtee Report:

. . . The Committee also questions the recruiting, for foreign
espionage purposes, of immigrants desiring American citizen-
ship because it might be construed as coercive. . . . (See
p. 439.)

589

Comment:

Why should any cateo;ory of foreigner be exchided from recruitment
by the CIA? Does the Committee have any valid reason why it "ques-
tions" that any such recruitments "might be construed as coercive?"
I submit it doesn't. Finally, if the Committee believes that coercion
should not be used in the handling of immigrants, then it should say so.

Committee Report:

... 27. The congressional intelligence oversight committee
should consider whether :

— the Domestic Collection Service (overt collection opera-
tions) should be removed from the Directorate of Operations
(the Clandestine Service), and returned to the Directorate of
Intelligence ;

— The CIA regulations should require that DCD's overt
contacts be informed when they are to be used for operational
support of clandestine activities;

— The CIA regulations should prohibit recruiting as agents
immigrants who have applied for American citizenship. . . .
(See p. 442.)

Com/ment:

Until 1973 the Domestic Contact Service was part of the Directorate
of Intelligence. It was placed under the Directorate of Operations to
enable the CIA to provide better support for the Foreign Resources
Division. Because the Domestic Contact Service has contacts with
leaders in all walks of life, it possesses a unique capability to open the
door for the clandestine services. Requiring that the Domestic Con-
tact Seridce inform overt contacts that they are to be used for opera-
tional support of clandestine activities violates the important rule of
compartmentalization. As previously noted, there is no valid reason
for excluding immigrants unless coercion is part of the process.

Committee Report:

. . . Some covert operations have passed retrospect public
judgments, such as the support given Western European
democratic parties facing strong communist opposition in
the late 1940s and 1950s. Others have not. In the view of the
Committee, the covert harassment of the democratically
elected government of Salvador Allende in Chile did not
command U.S. public approval. (See page 445.)

Comment :

Here as in other parts of the report the story of what happened in
Chile under Salvador Allende is distorted. While the Allende regime
may have l^een "democratically elected", it gi-adually evolved into an
abusive left-wing dictatoi-ship. (See the preceding part of these in-
dividual views entitled Corert Action in Chile 1963-1973 as well as
the comments of Senator James L. Bucklev in the C ongressional
Record of February 26, 1976. )

590

Coimnittee Report:

... 36. The Committee has already recommended, follow-
ing its investigation of alleged assassination attempts directed
at foreign leaders, a statute to forbid such activities. The
Committee reaffirms its support for such a statute and further
recommends prohibition by statute of the following covert
activities :
• — All political assassinations.

— Efforts to subvert democratic governments.

— ^Support for police or other internal security forces which
engage in the systematic violation of hiunan rights. . . .
(See p. 448.)

Comment:

Prohibiting "efforts to subvert democratic governments" is a vague
phrase, because there is no standard set as to what constitutes "demo-
cratic" governments. It also raises the problem of what the U.S. may
do when a democratic government is headed inexorably towards dic-
tatorship of the right or the left, and that this process may lead to a
government which is hostile to America. Here again, we are con-
fronted with the problem of putting out a fire while it is small as op-
posed to waiting until it becomes a conflagration. In some instances it
is necessary for U.S. intelligence services to cooperate with the internal
security forces of nations where there is systematic violation of human
rights. The purpose of such cooperation is to gain foreign intelligence
on vital targets. In order to gain the cooperation of the internal se-
curity forces in these countries, support is sometimes a condition for
cooperation. In a world iwhere the number of authoritarian regimes
far outnumbers the number of democratic governments, such a pro-
hibition limits the flexibility of our intelligence services in defending
America.

Committee Report:

... 39. By statute, any covert use by the U.S. Government
of American citizens as combatants should be preceded by
notification required for all covert actions. The statute should
provide that within 60 days of such notification such use shall
be terminated unless the Congress has specifically authorized
such use. The Congress should be empowered to terminate

such use at any time ( See p. 449. )

Comment:

If such a statute is enacted, the intelligence services will have to
place greater reliance on foreign mercenaries for covert action. While
I have no objection to the use of foreigners for this purpose, Ameri-
cans are much more likely to serve loyally and courageously.

Committee Report:

... 42. The Committee is concerned about the integrity of
American academic institutions for clandestine purposes.
Accordingly, the Committee recommends that the CIA amend
its internal directives to require that — individual academies

591

used for operational purposes by the CIA, together with the
President or equivalent official of the relevant academic insti-
tutions, be informed of the clandestine CliV. relationship. (See
page 456.)

Comment:

While I believe that any institution or organization has the right
to take positions on domestic or foreign policy issues, I also believe
each individual American has the right to cooperate with his govern-
ment in its lawful pursuits. I submit this right should apply to
academics, clergymen, businessmen, union members, newsmen, etc. The
more groups we exclude from assisting the intelligence community,
the poorer our intelligence will be. Surely, our values have been turned
upside down, when cooperating with the CIA is viewed as unseemly
or degrading.

CoTnmittee Report:

... 54. By statute, the CIA should be prohibited from caus-
ing, funding, or encouraging actions by liaison services which
are forbidden to the CIA.

Furthermore, the fact that a particular project, action or
activity of the CIA is carried out through or by a foreign liai-
son service should not relieve the Agency of its responsibili-
ties for clearance within the Agency, within the executive
branch, or with the Congress (See p. 459.)

Com.m£,nt :

In order to gain foreign intelligence the CIA sometimes enters
into liaison operations with foreign services who may engage in activi-
ties that would be unacceptable within the United States. Some of
these services are creatures of governments whose policies both do-
mestic and foreign are unpalatable to American public opinion. The
problem with Recommendation 54 is the use of the word "funding."
It may not always be possible for the CIA to fully determine how
funds to foreign services have in fact been used.

CoTYumittee Report:

. . . 55. The intelliofence oversight committee (s) of Congress
should be kept fully informed of agreements negotiated with
other governments through intelligence channels. . . . (See
p. 459.)

Comment :

If this requirement comes into effect, foreign intelligence services
are going to be reluctant to enter into liaison arrangements with the
CIA. Public disclosure of CIA activities over the past few years has
already had a chilling effect on liaison operations. Let's not com-
pound the felony.

Committee Report:

... 64. By statute, the General Counsel should be nominated
by the President and confirmed by the Senate (See p. 461.)

592

Com/ment :

It is contrary to precedent to have the General Counsels of agencies
and bureaus nominated by the President and subject to Senate con-
firmation. The General Counsel of any agency should be the choice of
its chief executive officer.

Committee Report:

... 68. B. The Director of the CIA should be appointed by
the President and subject to confirmation by the United
States Senate. Either the Director or Deputy Director should
be a civilian. . . . (See p. 465.)

Com,ment :

Why should the Director or Deputy Director of the CIA be a
civilian ? First, this implies a lack of integrity or ability among our
uniformed services. Second, the CIA was created to provide a civilian
organization that, among other things, would offset any bias in the
military intelligence services.

Com^mittee Report:

... 69. By statute, a charter for the NSA should be estab-
lished which, in addition to setting limitations on the opera-
tion of the Agency (see Domestic Subcommittee Recommen-
d'ations) , would provide that the Director of NSA would be
nominated by the President and subject to confimiation by
the Senate. Tlie Director should serve at the pleasure of the
President but for not more than ten years. Either the Direc-
tor or Deputy Director should be a civilian. . . . (See p. 465.)

Comment :

I agree that a charter for the NSA is desirable. Because the NSA
is a service organization under the Department of Defense, I fail
to see why the Director should be nominated by the President and
confirmed by the Senate. NSA has a large proportion of civilians, and
I can see no valid reason for prohibiting one of them rising to Direc-
tor or Deputy Director. Nevertheless, Recommendation 69 repeats the
implied insult mentioned above in connection with the DIA.

L. The Department of State axd Ambassadors

Cormnittee Report:

... 71. The National Security Council, the Department of
State, and the Central Intelligence Agency should promptly
issue instructions implementing Public Law 93-475 (22
U.S.C. 2680a). These instructions should make clear that Am-
bassadors are authorized recipients of sources and methods of
information concerning all intelligence activities, including
espionage and counterintelligence operations. Parallel in-
structions from other components of the intelligence commu-
nity should be issued to their respective field organizations

593

and operatives. Copies of all these instructions should be
made available to the intelligence oversight committee (s) of
Congress. (Seep. 468.)

72. In the exercise of their statutory responsibilities, Ambas-
sadors should have the personal right, which may not be dele-
gated, of access to the operational communications of the
CIA's Clandestine Service in the country to which they are
assigned. Any exceptions should have the approval of the
President and be brought to the attention of the oversight
committee. . . . (See p. 468.)

Comment:

As a general statement, I cannot take exception to the concept that
Ambassadors should be privy to all of the activities within their mis-
sions. There may be instances where the Chief of Station believes that
the identity of a particular intelligence source should not be made
known to the Ambassador. Rather than giving the Ambassador the
final say under these circumstances, I believe both the Ambassador
and the Chief of Station should have the right to appeal to the Secre-
tary of State and the DCI.

Recomjnendation 72 is closely related to Recommendation 71 in that
it extends the Ambassador's authority over the CIA Chief of Station.
Here again, I believe the general statement is correct but that provi-
sion should be made for exceptional cases as previously stated. I believe
exceptions in some cases should be worked out between the Secretary
of State and the DCI rather than having to be submitted directly
to the President.

I have refused to sign the final report of the Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities in the belief that it will cause severe em-
barrassment, if not grave harm, to the Nation's foreign policy. A
lengthy report of this nature, produced under heavy deadline pressure,
further increases the possibility of embarrassment and unintentional
security violations. Finally, the majority report tends to blacken the
reputation of agencies and persons who have served America well.
Senate Resolution 21 that created the Select Committee held the prom-
ise of a calm and deliberate investigation. That promise was not ful-
filled, and this is a report that probably should never have been written.

Barry Goldwater.

Separate Views of Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr.

At the close of the Senate Watergate Committee, I felt that there
was a compelling need to conduct a thorough examination of our in-
telligence agencies, particularly the CIA and the FBI. Congress
never had taken a close look at the structure or programs of either
the CIA or the FBI, since their inception in 1947 and 1924, respec-
tively.^

Moreover, there never had been a congressional review of the
intelligence community as a whole. Therefore, I felt strongly that
this Committee's investigation was necessary. Its time had come. Like
the Watergate investigation, however, for me it was not a pleasant
assignment. I say that because our investigation uncovered many
actions by agents of the FBI and of the CIA that I would previously
have not thought possible {e.g.^ crude FBI letters to break up mar-
riages or cause strife between Black groups and the CIA assassination
plots) in our excellent intelligence and law enforcement institutions.
Despite these unsavory actions, however, I do not view either the FBI
or CIA as evil or even basically bad. Both agencies have a long and
distinguished record of excellent service to our government. With the
exception of the worst of the abuses, the agents involved truly believed
they were acting in the best interest of the country. Nevertheless, the
abuses uncovered can not be condoned and should have been investi-
gated long ago.

I am hopeful, now that all these abuses have been fully aired to the
American people through the Committee's Hearings and Report, that
this investigation will have had a cathartic effect : that the FBI and
CIA will now be able to grow rather than decline. Such growth with a
healthy respect for the rule of law should be our goal ; a goal which
I am confident can be attained. It is important for the future of this
country that the FBI and CIA not be cast as destroyers of our con-
stitutional rights but rather as protectors of those rights. With the
abuses behind us this can be accomplished.

Long-Term Improvement of Intelligence Community

On balance, I think the Committee carried out its task responsibly
and thoroughly. The Committee's report on both the Foreign and
Domestic areas are the result of extensive study and deliberation, as
well as bipartisan cooperation in its drafting. The Report identifies
many of the problems in the intelligence field and contains positive sug-
gestions for reform. I support many of the proposed reforms, while
differing, at times, with the means we should adopt to attain those
reforms. In all candor, however, one must recognize that an investiga-
tion such as this one, of necessity, will cause some short-term damage
to our intelligence apparatus. A responsible inquiry, as this has been,
will in the long run result in a stronger and more efficient intelligence
community. As my colleague Senator Morgan recently noted at a Com-
mittee meeting, such short-term injury will be outweighed by long-
term benefits gained from the re-structuring of the intelligence com-

^ Upon the expiration of the Watergate Ckwnmittee in September 1974, I had
the privilege to consponsor with Senator Weicker, S. 4019, which would have
created a joint committee on Congress to oversee all intelligence activities.

(594)

595

munity with more efficient utilization of our intelligence resources.
Former Director William Colby captured this sentiment recently
in a New York Times article :

Intelligence has traditionally existed in a shadowy field
outside the law. This year's excitement has made clear that
the rule of law applies to all parts of the American Govern-
ment, including intelligence. In fact, this will strengthen
American intelligence. Its secrets will be understood to be
necessary ones for the protection of our democracy in tomor-
row's world, not covers for mistake or misdeed. Tlie guide-
lines within which it should and should not operate will be
clarified for those in intelligence and those concerned about
it. Improved supervision will ensure that the intelligence
agencies will remain within the new guidelines.

The American people will understand and support their
intelligence services and press their representatives to give
intelligence and its officers better protection from irrespon-
sible exposure and harassment. The costs of the past year
were high, but they will be exceeded by the value of this
strengthening of what was already the best intelligence serv-
ice in the world.^

The Committee's investigation, as former Director Colby points
out, has probed areas in which reforms are needed not to prevent
abuses, but to better protect and strengthen the intelligence services.
For example, it is now clear that legislation is needed to make it a
criminal offense to publish the name of a ITnited States intelligence
officer stationed abroad.^ Moreover, the Committee's investigation
convinced me that the State Department should revise its publication
of lists from which intelligence officers overseas predictably and often
easily can be identified.

Yet we have not been able, in a year's time, to examine carefully all
facets of the United States' incredibly important and complex intel-
ligence community.* We have established that in some areas problems
exist which need intensive long-term study. Often these most im-
portant and complex problems are not ones which lend themselves to
quick or easv solutions. As Ambassador Helms noted in his testimony
during the Committee's public hearings :

... I would certainly agree that in view of the statements
made by all of you distinguished gentlemen, that some result
from this has got to bring about a system of accountability
that is going to be satisfactory to the U.S. Congress and to
the American people.

' New York Times, Jan. 26, 1976.

^ I intend to propose an amendment to S. 400 to malie it a criminal offense to
publish the name of a United States intelligence officer who is oi)erating in a
cover capacity overseas.

* For many months, the Committee thoroughly and exhaustively investigated
the so-called "assassination plots" which culminated with the filing of our report
on November 18. 197.5. This investigation was vitally important in order to clear
the air and set the record straight. And. it was instructive as to how "sensitive"
operations are conducted within our Intelligence structure. But, it neces-
sarily shortened the time available to the Committee to investigate the intelli-
gence community as a whole.

596

Now, exactly how you work out that accountability in a
secret intelligence organization, I think, is obviously going to
take a good deal of thought and a good deal of work and I
do not have any easy ready answer to it because I assure you
it is not an easy answer. In other words, there is no quick fix.
(Hearings, Vol. I, 9/17/75, p. 124).

Thorough Study Necessary in Several Areas

The areas which concern me the most are those on which we as a Com-
mittee have been able to spend only a limited amount of time,^ i.e.,
espionage, counterintelligence, covert action, use of informants, and
electronic surveillance. It is in these areas that I am concerned that
the Committee be extremely careful to ensure that the proper thorough
investigatory predicate exist before any permanent reform recom-
mendations be enacted into law.

Our investigation, however, has provided a solid base of evidence
from which a permanent oversight committee can and should launch
a lengthy and thorough inquiry into the best way to achieve permanent
restructuring in these particularly sensitive areas. It is my view that
such a study is necessary before I am able to endorse some of the Com-
mittee's recommendations which suggest a far reaching alteration of
the structure of some of the most important facets of our intelligence
system.

Therefore, while I support many of the Committee's major recom-
mendations, I find myself unable to agree with all the Committee's
findings and recommendations in both the foreign and domestic areas.
Nor am I able to endorse every inference, suggestion, or nuance con-
tained in the findings and supporting individual reports which to-
gether total in the thousands of pages. I do, however, fully support
all of the factual revelations which our report contains concerning
the many abuses in the intelligence field. It is important to disclose
to the American people all of the instances of wrongdoing we dis-
covered. With such full disclosure, it is my hope that we can turn the
corner and devote our attention in the future to improving our intelli-
gence gathering capability. We must have reform, but we must accom-
plish it by improving, not limiting, our intelligence productivity. I
am confident this can be done.

Cumulative Effect of Recommendations

With regard to the totality of the Committee's recommendations, I
am afraid that the cumulative ejffect of the numerous restrictions
which the report proposes to place on our intelligence community may
be damaging to our intelligence effort. I am troubled by the fact
that some of the Committee's recommendations dip too deeply into
many of the operational areas of our intelligence agencies. To do so,
Tarn afraid, will cause practical problems. The totality of the proposals
may decrease instead of increase our intelligence product. And, there

^ The Committee's mandate from Congress dictated that the abuses at home
and abroad be given detailed attention. And, there are only a finite number of
important problems which can be examined and answered conclusively in a
year's time.

597

may be serious ramifications of some proposals which will, I fear,
spawn problems which are as yet unknown. I am unconvinced that the
lancertain world of intelligence can be regulated with the use of rigid
or inflexible standards.

Specifically, I am not convinced that the answers to all our problems
are found by establishing myriad Executive Branch boards, commit-
tees, and subcommittees to manage the day-to-day operations of the
intelligence community. We must take care to avoid creating a Rube
Goldberg maze of review procedures which might result in a bureau-
cratic morass which would further increase the burden on our
already heavily overburdened tax dollar.

We should not over-reform in response to the abuses uncovered.
This is not to say that we do not need new controls, because we do.
But, it is to say that the controls we impose should be well reasoned
and add to, not detract from the efficiency of our intelligence gather-
ering system.

Increased Executive Branch controls are only one-half of the solu-
tion. Congress for too long has neglected its role in monitoring the
intelligence community. That role should be significant but not all-
encompassing. Congress has a great many powers which in the past
it has not exercised. We must now do our share but, at the same time,
We must be careful, in reacting to the abuses uncovered, that we not
swing the pendulum back too far in the direction of Congress. Both
wisdom and the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers dictate
that Congress not place itself in the position of trying to manage
and control the day-to-day business of the intelligence operations of
the Executive Branch. Vigorous oversight is needed, but should be
carefully structured in a new powerful oversight committee. I be-
lieve this can be achieved if we work together to attain it.

In moving toward improving our intelligence capability, we must
also streamline it. It is in this approach that my thoughts are some-
what conceptually different from the approach the Committee is rec-
ommending. I am concerned that we not overreact to the past by
creating a plethora of rigid "thou shalt not" statutes, which, while
prohibiting the specific hypothetical abuse postured in the Report,
cast a wide net which Avill catch and eliminate many valuable intel-
ligence programs as well.

The Committee Report recommends the passage of a large number
of new statutes to define the functions of and further regulate the
intelligence community. I am troubled by how much detail should be
used in spelling out the functions and limitations of our intelligence
agencies for all the world to see. Do we want to outline for our adver-
saries just how far our intelligence agencies can go? Do we want to
define publicly down to the last detail what they can and cannot do ?
I am not sure we do. I rather think the answer is found in establishing
carefully structured charters for the intelligence agencies with ac-
countability and responsibility in the Executive Branch and vigilant
oversight within the Legislative Branch.

598

President's Program

It is my view that we need to take both a moderate and efficient course
in reforming our intelligence gathering system. In that regard, I think
President Ford's recent restructuring of the intelligence community
was an extraordinarily good response to the problems of the past. The
President's program effected a massive reorganization of our entire
intelligence community. It was a massive reaction to a massive prob-
lem which did not lend itself to easy solution. I am pleased that many
of the Committee's recommendations for intelligence reform mirror
the President's program in format. Centralizing the command and
control of the intelligence community, as the President's program does,
is the best way to ensure total accountability and yet not compromise
our intelligence gathering capability.

Therefore, I endorse the basic framework of intelligence reform,
outlined by President Ford, as embodying: (1) a single permanent
oversight committee in Congress, with strong and aggressive staff, to
oversee the intelligence community;® (2) the Committee on Foreign
Intelligence to manage the day-to-day operation of the intelligence
community; (3) the re-constituted Operations Advisory Group to re-
view and pass upon all significant covert actions projects;^ and (4)
the Intelligence Oversight Board to monitor any possible abuses in the
future, coordinating the activities and reports of what I am confident
will be the considerably strengthened offices of General Counsel and
Inspector General. This framework will accomplish the accountability
and responsibility we seek in the intelligence community with both
thoroughness and efficiency. Within this framework. Attorney General
Levi's new guidelines in the Domestic Security area will drastically
alter this previously sparsely supervised field. These guidelines will
centralize responsibility for domestic intelligence within the Depart-
ment of Justice and will preclude abuses such as COINTELPRO from
ever reoccurring.®

Specific Reforms

Within this basic framework, we must look to how we are going to
devise a system that can both effectively oversee the intelligence com-
munity and yet not impose strictures which will eliminate its produc-
tivity. It is to this end that I suggest we move in the following
direction :

* My original support for a single joint committee of (Congress has evolved,
somewhat as affected by the events of this past year's House Intelligence Com-
mittee investigation, to support for a single Senate committee. However, I also
favor the mandate of the new committee including, as does the present S. 400, a
charge to consider the future option of merging into a permanent joint committee
upon consultation with and action by the House of Representatives. The moment
for meaningful reform is now and we must not lose it by waiting for a joint com-
mittee to be approved by both Houses of Congress.

'' I think a rule of reason should apply here. All significant projects certainly
should receive careful attention from the Group. On the other hand, I would not
require a formal meeting with a written record to authorize the payment of 2
sources in X country at $50 per month to be changed to the payment of 3 sources
in X country at $40 per month.

* I applaud the detailed guidelines issued by the Attorney General to reform the
Department's entire domestic intelligence program. I think he is moving in the
right direction by requiring the FBI to meet a specific and stringent standard for
opening an intelligence Investigation, i.e., the Terry v. Ohio standard.

599

(1) Demand responsibility and accountability from the Executive
Branch by requiring all major policy decisions and all major intelli-
gence action decisions be in writing, and therefore retrievable.^

(2) I recommend, as I have previously, that Congress enact a varia-
tion of S. 400, which I had the privilege to cosponsor. S. 400 is the
Government Operations Committee bill which would create a perma-
nent oversight committee to review the intelligence community.
The existing Congressional oversight system has provided infrequent
and ineffectual review. And, many of the abuses revealed might have
been prevented had Congress been doing its job. The jurisdiction of the
new committee should include both the CIA and the FBI, and the com-
mittee should be required to review and report periodically to the
Senate on all aspects of the intelligence community's operations. In
particular, I recommend that the Committee give specific careful
attention to how we might improve as well as control our intelligence
capability in the counterintelligence and espionage areas.

(3) Simultaneously with the creation of a permanent oversight
committee, Congress should amend the Hughes-Ryan Amendment
to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act, § 662, which now requires the
intelligence community to brief 6 committees of the Congress on
each and every major intelligence action. Former Director Colby
strikes a responsive chord when he complains that the present system
will lead to leaking of vital intelligence information. We must put a
stop to this. This can be done by allowing the intelligence community
to report only to a single secure committee.

(4) Concomitantly with improved oversight, we in Congress must
adopt stringent procedures to prevent leaks of intelligence informa-
tion. In this regard, I recommend we create a regular remedy to pre-
vent the extraordinary remedy of a single member of Congress dis-
closing the existence of a covert intelligence operation with which he
does not agree. Such a remedy could take the form of an appeal proce-
dure within the Congress so that a single member, not satisfied with a
Committee's determination that a particular program is in the na-
tional interest, will be provided with an avenue of relief. This proce-
dure, however, must be coupled with stringent penalties for any mem-
ber of Con.o-ress who disreflrards it and discloses classified infoT^mation
anyway. I intend to offer an amendment to institute such a remedy
when S. 400 reaches the Senate floor. ^°

(5) The positions of General Counsel and Inspector General in the
intelli.o-ence asrencies should be elevated in importf^nce and given in-
creased powers. I feel that it is extraordinarily important that these

' Never again should we be faced with the dilemma we faced in the assassina-
tion invpstigation. We climbed the ladder of authority only to reach a point
where there were no more written rungs. Responsibility ceased ; accountability
ceased ; and. in the end, we could not say whether some of the most drastic
actions our intelligence community or certain components of it had ever taken
aeainst a foreign country or foreign leader were approved of or even known
of by the President who was in office at the time.

" I would favor a procedure, within the Congress, which would in effect create
an avenue of appeal for a member dissatisfied with a Committee determination
on a classification issue. Perhaps an appeal committee made up of the Majority
and Minority leaders and other appointed members would be appropriate. Leaving
the mechanics aside, however. I believe the concept is important and can be
Implemented.

600

positions, particularly that of General Counsel, be upgraded. For that
reason, I think that it is a good idea to have the General Counsel, to
both the FBI and the CIA, subject to Senate confirmation. This adds
another check and balance which will result in an overall improvement
of the system.^2 Additionally, I feel that it is equally important to pro-
vide both the General Counsel and Inspector General with unrestricted
access to all raw files within their respective agencies.^^^ This was not
always done in the past and will be a healthy addition to the intra-
agency system of checks and balances.

(6) I am in favor of making public the aggregate figure for the
budget of the entire intelligence community. I believe the people of
the United States have the right to know that figure.^^ The citizens of
this country have a right to know how much of their money we are
spending on intelligence production. But, they also want to get their
money's worth out of that tax dollar. They do not want to spend that
money for intelligence production which is going to be handicapped ;
which is going to produce poor or inaccurate intelligence. Therefore, I
am opposed to any further specific delineation of the intelligence com-
munity budget. Specifically, I am opposed to the publication of the
CIA's budget or the NSA's budget. It seems to me we are dealing with
the world of the unknown in predicting what a foreign intelligence
service can or cannot extrapolate from these budget figures. We re-
ceived no testimony which guaranteed that, if Congress were to publish
the budget figure for the CIA itself, a hostile intelligence organization
could not extrapolate from that figure and determine much more ac-
curately what the CIA capabilities are in any number of vital areas.
Without such testimony, I am not prepared to go that far. The public's
right to know must be balanced with the efficiency and integrity of
our intelligence operations. I think we can accomplish both by taking
the middle road ; publishing the aggregate figure for the entire intelli-
gence community. It is this proposal that I have voted in favor of.

There are a number of other specific findings and recommendations,
supported by a majority of the Committee, which require additional
brief comment.

" I differ with the Committee in that I would not have the General Counsel and
Inspector General file reports and/or complaints concerning possible abuses with
the Attorney General. Rather, I think the more appropriate interface in a new
oversight system would be for both to take complaints to the Intelligence Over-
sight Board and the new congressional oversight committee. The Attorney Gen-
eral would remain the recipient of any and all complaints regarding possible
violations of law.

"' I support the Committee's recommendation that agency employees report
any irregularities directly to the Inspector General without going through the
ch-'in of command, i.e. through the particular division chief involved.

"I do not feel that, despite my personal view that the aggregate budget
figure shoiild be disclosed to the public, only six to eleven members of the Senate
have the right to release unilaterally the actual budget figures. A majority of
both Houses of Congress should be necessary to release such information. And,
while I would cast my vote in favor of the release of the aggregate budget figure,
I am troubled that there mav be no such vote. I am not sure the "right" result,
justifies the "wrong" procedures, because the next time the wrong procedure
can just as easily be utilized to reach the wrong result.

601

Foreign Intelligence Recommendations
(1) covert action

I believe the covert action capability of our intelligence community
is vital to the United States. We must maintain our strength
in this capacity, but, we must also control it. The key and difficult
question, of course, is how we can control it without destroying or
damaging its effectiveness. In my view, the best way to both maintain
strength and yet insure accountability is to have strict control of the
covert action programs through the Operations Advisory Group, with
parallel control and supervision by the proposed permanent congres-
sional oversight committee.

Covert action is a complex United States intelligence capability.
Covert action provides the United States with the ability to react to
changing situations. It is built up over a long period of time. Potential
assets are painstakingly recruited all over the world. Having reviewed
the history of covert action since its inception, I do not look upon the
intelligence agents involved in covert action as a modern day group of
bandits who travel the world murdering and kidnapping people.
Rather, a vast majority of covert action programs are not only valu-
able but well thought approaches through media placement and agents
of influence which produce positive results.

Covert action programs cannot be mounted instantly upon a crisis. It
is naive to think that our intelligence community will be able to ad-
dress a crisis without working years in advance to establish sources
in the various countries in which a crisis might occur. These sources
provide what is referred to as the "infrastructure," which must neces-
sarily be in place throughout the world so that the United States can
predict and preve/nt actions abroad which are inimical to our national
interest," I believe that, were we to completely abolish covert action or
attempt to remove it from the CIA and place it in a new separate
agency, these sources would dry up ; and, wheh a crisis did come, our
intelligence community would not be able to meet it effectively. Not
only do I question the effectiveness a new separate agency for covert
action would have, but such a re-structuring would unnecessarily in-
crease our already burgeoning bureaucracy.

I think that it is important to realize that covert action cannot be
conducted in public. We cannot take a Gallup Poll to determine
whether we should secretly aid the democratic forces in a particular
country. I do not defend some of the covert action which has taken place
in Chile. But, the fact remains that we cannot discuss publicly the
many successes, both major and minor, which the United States has
achieved through the careful use of covert action programs. Many in-
dividuals occupy positions of power in the world today as a direct re-
sult of aid given through a covert action program. Unfortunately, we
cannot boast of or even mention these significant achievements. In
short, we cannot approach covert action from a public relations point
of view. We should not forget that we must deal with the world as
it is today — with our adversaries employing their equivalent of covert

" For example, testimony before the Committee estabUslied that the CIA's
failure to act more positively in Portugal was a direct result of an absence of suf-
ficient clandestine infrastructure. William E. Colby testimony, 10/23/75 ; William
Nelson testimony, 11/7/75.

69-983 O - 76 - 39

602

action. We must either say that the intelligence community should
have the power to address world problems in this manner, under the
strict control of the President and Congress, or we should take away
that power completley. I cannot subscribe to the latter.

Finally, the issue remains as to how we can best control covert ac-
tion through statutory reform. First, I believe the Executive Branch
can and should carefully review each significant covert action pro-
posal. This will be accomplished through the Operations Advisory
Group under the program outlined by President Ford.

Second, Congress can control covert action by passing legislation
requiring that the new oversight committee be kept "fully and cur-
rently informed." This, I believe, is the appropriate statutory language
to apply to covert action . I do not agree with the Committee's recom-
mendation that "prior notice" be given to Congress for each and every
covert action project. As a matter of practice, the important and signif-
cant covert action programs will be discussed with the oversight com-
mittee in a form of partnership ; and this is the way it should be. "Fully
and currently informed" is language which has served us well in the
atomic energy area. It has an already existing body of precedent that
may be used as a guide for the future. It is flexible, like the Constitution,
and provides a strong, broad base to work from. I am not prepared to
say, however, that in the years ahead there may not be some vitally sen-
sitive situation of which Congress and the oversight committee should
not be told in advance. While the likelihood of this occurring is not
great, we should never foreclose with rigid statutory language possi-
bilities which cannot be foreseen today. Our statutory language must
be flexible enough to encompass a variety of problems and potential
problems, yet rigid enough to ensure total accountability. "Fully and
currently informed" accomplishes both purposes.

(2) CIA PUBLISHING RESTRICTIONS

In the area of restrictions on the CIA's publishing of various mate-
rials, I am in complete agreement that anything published in the
United States by the CIA, or even sponsored indirectly by the CIA
through a proprietary, front, or any other means, must be identified
as coming from the CIA. Publications overseas are another matter.
We should allow the Agency the flexibility, as we have in our recom-
mendations, to publish whatever they want to overseas and to publish
under whatever subterfuge is necessary and thought advisable.^^

Domestic Intelligence Recommendations

While the Committee's Domestic Intelligence Report represents an
excellent discussion of the problems attendant to that field of intel-
ligence, I feel several of the recommendations may present practical
problems. Although our objective of achieving domestic intelligence
reforms is the same, I differ with the majority of the Committee in
how best to approach the achievement of this goal.

^^ I do not view the "domestic fallout" as a real problem. To be sure, some
publications by the CIA abroad will find their way back to the United States.
However, to try to impose severe restrictions to prevent such fallout would cause
unnecessary damage to the CIA's valid production of propaganda and other
publications abroad.

603

(1) INVESTIGATIVE STANDARDS

Scope of Domestic Security Investigations

At the outset, I note that most of my concern with the standards
for investigations in the domestic security area stem from the fact
that "domestic security" is defined by the Committee to include both
the "terrorism" and "espionage" areas of investigation. Severe limita-
tions, proscribing the investigation of student groups, are more readily
acceptable when they do not also apply to terrorist groups and foreign
and domestic agents involved in espionage against the United States.
To include these disparate elements within the same "domestic secu-
rity" rubric, it seems to me, will create unnecessary problems when it
comes to the practical application of the theoretical principles enun-
ciated in the Committee's recommendations.

(a) Preventive intelligence investigations — The Committee's rec-
ommendations limit the FBI's permissible investigations in these
critical areas of terrorism and espionage under standards for
what the Committee delineates as preventive intelligence investiga-
tions. Under these standards the FBI can only investigate where :

it has a specific allegation or specific or substantiated informa-
tion that (an) American or foreigner will soon engage in
terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity
[emphasis added.] ^^

In am not convinced that this is the best way to approach the real
problem of limiting domestic intelligence investigations. While in
theoretical terms the standards of the recommendations may seem
appropri'ate, I fear the inherent practical consequences of their
application to the cold, real world of terrorism and espionage. The
establishment of an imminency requirement by not permitting any
investigation by the FBI unless the allegation or information received
establishes that the person or group will "soon engage" in certain
activity might prohibit any number of legitimate and necessary FBI
investigations. For example, an allegation of an assassination attempt
on a public figure at an unspecified date in the future could be pre-
cluded from investigation; or, vague information received by the
FBI that there was a plan to obtain some nuclear components, but no
indication of when or how, could also be prohibited from investigation.
Surely, matters such as these should be the valid subjects of investiga-
tion— no matter how vague or piecemeal the information is.^^

(b) Time limits — The Committee's recommendations would limit
any preliminary FBI investigation of an allegation of wrongdoing
in the Domestic Security area to 30 days from the receipt of the infor-
mation, unless the Attorney General "finds" ^^ that the investigation
need be extended for an additional 60 davs. The FBI investigation may
continue beyond 90 days only if the investigatory efforts establish
"reasonable suspicion" that the person or group "will soon engage in"

" Committee Domestic Report, p. 320.

" My experience dictates that many investigations are begun with very limited
or slfetchy information. FBI agents and investigators in general are not always
or even oft*n immediately presented with information which constitutes probahle
cause of a crime. Probahle cause is often established only through painstaking
investigation ; putting bits and pieces together. I think we must take this into
consideration when formulating threshold investigatory standards.

■^ It is unclear what standard is to be the predicate for any such finding.

604

terrorist or foreign espionage activities.^^ And, even a full preventive
intelligence investigation is not permitted to continue beyond "one
year," except upon a finding by the Attorney General of "compelling
circumstances." ^°

While well-intentioned, I am not persuaded that these are workable
standards. I just don't think we can categorize all investigations into
these rigid time frames. Investigations just are not conducted that way.
Thirty days, for example, is probably not even enough time to obtain a
license check return from some states. Moreover, limiting an investiga-
tion to one year may not be realistic when it applies to investigating a
violence prone group like the SLA or a Soviet Union espionage ring.
These investigations are not easily or quickly accomplished. I do not
believe that the creation of artificial time limits is the best way to ap-
proach the real concern of the Committee, which is that we establish
institutional controls on domestic security investigations. I would
prefer approaching the control and accountability problems by pro-
viding periodic Department of Justice reviews of all categories of
domestic intelligence investigations; not by imposing specific time
limits upon all investigations.

(2) INFORMANTS

The Committee recommends broad new restrictions on the use of
informants by the FBI. While our investigation has established that,
in the domestic intelligence field, there have been numerous abuses
in the use of informants, I do not think that the proposed recommen*-
dations are the best vehicles to achieve the needed reform. I cannot
subscribe to recommendaitons limiting the use of informants to
stringent time standards.^^ To limit use of informants to periods of "90
days" ^^ unless the Attorney General finds "probable cause" that an
American will "soon" engage in terrorist or hostile foreign intelligence
activity is impractical and unworkable. When groups such as the SLA
attempt to rob, kill, or blow up buildings, it is clearly necessary to
cultivate informants who may provide some advance warning. I am
concerned that the Committee's recommendations will preclude thi?
vital function of the FBI. Moreover, specific time limits, it seems to
me, will prove to be impractical. For example, at the end of the pre-
scribed time, with not enough evidence for arrests, will informant X
be terminated and replaced by informant Y who starts anew, or are
informants thereafter banned from penetrating the particular group — '
even if violence prone or involved in espionage ?

It should be remembered that informants are the single most im-
portant tool of the FBI, and local police for that matter, in the fight
against terrorism and espionage, as well as organized crime, nar-
cotics, and even the ever pervasive street crimes of murder, rape, and
robbery. Indeed, they are the very lifeblood of such investigations.
Moreover, informants are involved in a wide spectrum of activities

" Committee Domestic Report, pp. 320-323.

^° Compelling circumstances is not further defined, so it is unclear what stand-
ards should be applied in making such a determination.

"■ My concerns here parallel those I have with respect to the general investi-
gatory standards recommended.

^The Committee allows an additional 60 days if the Attorney General finds
"compelling circumstances."

605

from attending public meetings to actual penetration attempts. I am
concerned that theoretical and abstract restrictions designed only for
"domestic intelligence", if enacted, would soon limit our legitimate
law enforcement efforts in many other fields as well. People and actions
do not always fit nicely in neat little boxes labeled "domestic intelli-
gence," particularly in the terrorist and espionage areas to which the
proposed restrictions on informants would apply. Congress should
carefully consider the scope and ramifications of any recommendations
with respect to informants.

It is my view that the better way to approach the problems en-
countered in the use of informants is to put their use imder strict
supervision of the Department of Justice. Creation of a special staff or
committee for this purpose, centralized in the Department of Justice,
would provide effective controls over the potential abuses in the use
of informants, yet not hamstring their legitimate and valuable use.-^

(3) ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

I wholeheartedly support S. 3197, the new electronic surveillance
bill sent to the Congress by President Ford.^* It needs consolidated bi-
partisan support because it represents a significant advance from
existing practice. For the first time, it will bring all governmental
electronic surveillance under the scrutiny of judicial warrant pro-
cedures. I commend the efforts of President Ford in taking this ex-
traordinary step forward in the regulation of electronic surveillance.

In supporting S. 3197, I do not regard the existing wiretaps pres-
ently maintained under the direction and control of Attorney General
Levi as being in violation of the Constitution. The present practice
of electronic surveillance authorization and implementation rests upon
a long-standing body of precedent which provides a firm constitutional
base for their continued maintenance. The President's approach is to
move from the present practice toward better practices and procedures
for authorization. The abuses of electronic surveillance of the past
clearly dictate a need for a system of judicial warrant approval. Under
the President's proposal the American people will be able to rest easy —
assured that electronic surveillance will be employed carefully, yet
when needed to combat serious criminal and espionage activity.

I differ with a majority of the Committee insofar as they recommend
that before a judge can issue a warrant for electronic surveillance he
must find more than that an American is a conscious agent of a foreign
power engaged in clandestine intelligence activities. The Committee
would require that probable cause be established for "criminal ac-
tivity" before a wiretap can be authorized. I think this departure
from the S. 3197 standard would be a dangerous one because it would
eliminate certain areas of espionage, particularly industrial espionage,

** Attorney General T^evi is in the process of establishing guidelines to regu-
late the use of informants. I recommend, however, that these guidelines be en-
forced through some appropriate form of Department of Justice review of the
FBI's use of informants.

^ The bill enjoyed a bipartisan co-sponsorship of Senators.

606

from electronic surveillance. Many areas of espionage do not involve
clearly criminal activity. Indeed, forms of espionage may not con-
stitute a criminal offense, but should be the valid target of an espionage
investigation. For example, a situation such as American oil company
executives providing unclassified but important oil reserve informa-
tion to a Soviet agent might not be a permissible subject of electronic
surveillance if "criminal activity," rather than hostile foreign intelli-
gence, were the standard.^^ I think the Committee proposed standard
would harm the FBI's espionage efforts and would therefore be a
mistake.

(4) CIVIL REMEDIES STATUTE

I oppose any broad new civil remedies statute in the field of domestic
intelligence as both dangerous and unnecessary. It is dangerous be-
cause it could easily open the flood gates for numerous lawsuits filed
seeking injunctive relief in the courts to thwart legitimate investiga-
tions. It is unnecessary because any substantial actions are already per-
mitted under present Supreme Court decisions, such as Bivens v.
United States^ for violation of constitutional rights. There is simply
no valid reason to carve out a broad new category of lawsuits for those
not only injured by domestic intelligence methods but "threatened with
injury." ^^ No such statutory provisions are available for "victims" in
any other specific category of activity. The present avenues of relief
provided by law today are clearly sufficient to address any future
abuses in the domestic intelligence field. I note that we have not had the
benefit of any sworn testimony from the many constitutional and crim-
inal law experts in the country, either pro or con such a proposal. With-
out the benefit of an adequate record and with my concern about the
practical results of such a statute, I cannot support its enactment.

(5) CIVIL DISORDERS

A final recommendation which requires brief comment in the Comr
mittee's proposed standards permitting the FBI to assist "federal,
state, and local officials in connection with a civil disorder." The Com-
mittee's recommendation will not allow any investigation by the F.B.I.,
not even preliminary in nature, unless the Attorney General finds in
writing that "there is a clear and immediate threat of domestic
violence" which will require the use of Federal troops.

My reservation about this recommendation is that I think it deprives
the Attorney General of the necessary flexibility in dealing with

'^ Those involved in the obtaining of information about our industrial proc-
esses, vital to our national security, for our adversaries should be the legitimate
subject of electronic surveillance, notwithstanding that no criminal statute is
violated. I do not think we can afford to wait for exhaustive reform of our
espionage laws. I note that the section of the proposed S.l dealing with espion-
age reform has presented great difficulty to the drafters. Indeed, drafting espion-
age into a criminal statute presents some of the same overbreadth problems
that the Committee has been concerned with in the domestic intelligence area.

^ For example, would a cause of action exist simply because X notices a federal
agent following him in an automobile, notwithstanding the nature or status of
the particular investigation?

607

these delicate matters (i.e., civil disturbances) and might tend to
exacerbate a possibly explosive situation. If the Attorney General is
not allowed to dispatch FBI agents to the scene of disorders it seems
to me that we deprive him of the very means he needs to make the
extraordinarily important decision as to whether Federal troops are
likely to be used.

I believe the better practice would be to permit preliminary investi-
gation by the FBI of potentially volatile situations so that the Attor-
ney General might make tlie most reasoned decision possible with
respect to what I consider the drastic step of deploying Federal troops
to quell a civil disorder in one of our cities.

WATERGATE-RELATED INQUIRY

Finally, I wish to address briefly an area of the Committee's
investigation which I pursued for the most part independently. At
the close of the Senate Watergate investigation I filed a report as part
of my individual views ^^ which outlined remaining areas of investiga-
tion with respect to the relationships between the Central Intelligence
Agency and the former CIA employees who participated in the Water-
gate break-in. ^^ By virtue of my membership on this Select Committee,
I have been able to pursue a further inquiry into these matters, and
wish to thank the Chairman and the Vice Chairman for the staff
assistance and latitude provided me to pursue this area of investigation.

Many of the concerns raised in the Watergate Committee investiga-
tion have been overtaken by time and events. For example, the reported
references to illegal CIA domestic activities have now been confirmed,
as described in detail in the Committee's Report. The reference to the
CIA maintaining a file on Jack Anderson ^^ proved to be part of a
lengthy investigation and physical surveillance of Anderson by the
CIA during a "leak" inquiry. Similarly, the detailing of Howard
Hunt's post-retirement contacts with the CIA has been supplemented
with still more such contacts.^" Since July 1974, we have witnessed a
variety of other disclosures relative to the CIA's domestic activities;
indeed, the creation of our Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Activities was due in part to the continuing public concern about these
matters.

Unlike the Watergate Committee investigation of CIA activities,
which was terminated because of the refusal of the CIA to turn over
documents,^^ this investigation was conducted in an atmosphere of
cooperation. After some initial difficulties, which the Committee en-

" Senate Watergate Committee Final Report, S. Res. 93-981, pp. 110.5-1165.

28 rpjjg "Action Required" section of the report, at pages ll.W-1157. enumerated
unresolved matters and identified materials not provided to the Watergate
Committee bv the CIA.

" Senate Watergate Committee Finial Report, p. 1128.

^ For example this disclosure of x>ersonal correspondence (detailing certain
of Hunt's activities in 1971 and 1972) between Hunt and the CIA secretary sta-
tioned in Paris whom Hunt sought to have reassigned to work for him at the
White Hou.se.

^ By letter of March 7, 1974. former Director Colby informed the Senate Water-
gate Committee that certain items of requested information would not be made
available to that committee. Such a withholding of timely information, including
tliat which was totally exculpatory, unnecessarily focused an aura of suspicion
and guilt.

608

countered in a variety of areas, the cooperation afforded by the CIA
was exemplary. In particular, I especially want to express my appre-
ciation to former Director William Colby and present Director George
Bush for cooperating to the fullest extent in this investigation. I also
want to thank Ambassador Richard Helms and former Counter-
intelligence Chief James Angleton for their patience and extensive
assistance in in numerous conferences, in trying to reconstruct the
elusive details of this significant period.

In pursuing this area of inquiry, the Committee staff examined a
great volume of highly sensitive material, much of 'which contained
speculative matters and a multitude of information of marginal rele-
vance. This information, which had not been made available in large
part to the Separate Watergate Committee, was examined in raw form
and without sanitization deletions. Because of the sensitivity of the
material, it was reviewed on the Central Intelligence Agency premises.
Thus, it was in a spirit of cooperation that this examination was ac-
commodated ; and, this experience indicates that the Congress and the
intelligence community can cooperate in an investigation without in-
curring unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information.^^

At the close of this Committee's examination of the available record,
I wish to state my belief that the sum total of the evidence does not
substantiate a conclusion that the CIA per se was involved in the ran^e
of events and circumstances known as Watergate.^^ However, there was
considerable evidence that for much of the post-Watergate period the
CIA itself was uncertain of the ramifications of the various involve-
ments, witting or otherwise, between members of the Watergate
burglary team and members of components of the Agency. Indeed,
the CIA was apparently, at times as perplexed as Congressional inves-
tigators.^* It should be noted that the Agency undertook an extensive
internal inquiry in an effort to resolve these uncertainties. The investi-
gation of Watergate and the possible relationship of the Central In-
telligence Agency thereto, produced a panoply of puzzlement. While
the available information leaves nagging qustions and contains bits
and pieces of intriguing evidence, fairness dictates that an assessment
be rendered on the basis of the present record. An impartial evaluation
of that record compels the conclusion that the CIA, as an institution,
was not involved in the Watergate break-in.

Howard H. Bakedr, Jr.

**For example, the staff was given access to the Martinez contact reports (to
which access was refused during the Watergate Committee investigation) in their
entirety. This review was accomplished in secure facilities at the CIA, and no
notes were taken of sensitive information contained in the reports not related
to Hunt or in some other way relevant to the Committee's inquiry. I cite this as
an example of how a Congressional investigation can be thorough and yet not
threaten the integrity of CIA secret documentation, containing names of oflBcers
and other highly classified information.

^ 1 am filing with the Committee the detailed results of tlhis investigation in
the form of classified memoranda. These memoranda will be turned over to the
successor permanent oversight committee to be kept in its secure files. No useful
purpose would be served in further publicizing the contents, because much of it
is fragmentary and its sum total reinforces the findings stated herein.

"• Colby to Helms letter of 28 .January, 1974, references seven to nine commu-
nications from Hunt while he was at the White House to Helms' secretary, with
the query : "Can you give us some idea as to what they were about?"

SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF SENATOE CHAKLES McC.

MATHIAS, JK.

I fully support the Final Report and Findings and Recommenda-
tions of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities.

When the Majority Leader, Senator Mike Mansfield and I first pro-
posed the creation of a Select Committee on Intelligence Activities on
October 4, 1974, in the aftermath of Watergate and charges of domes-
tic spying and the misuse of the CIA and the FBI, confidence of the
people in our vital government intelligence system was severely
strained. It was the Majority Leader's and my view that in order to
restore confidence and legitimacy to the intelligence activities of the
United States, there was a need to examine in depth to what extent
secret activities are required by the United States. In December 1974,
in testimony in support of my resolution to create a Senate Select
Committee to Study the intelligence activities of the United States,
I stated :

One of the most important tasks facing the United States and
particularly the Congress is determining the proper role of
intelligence agencies in our constitutional system of govern-
ment and drawing new guidelines for the future intelligence
activities of the executive branch. It is quite clear that our
foreign and domestic intelligence agencies, including such
valued agencies as the CIA, the FBI, and other departments
and agencies, have in the course of their activities, violated
the constitutional guarantees of citizens and have operated
outside of normal constitutional processes. The instances of
abuses of power by intelligence agencies and the abridgement
of constitutional rights of individual citizens by these agen-
cies revealed by Watergate are sufficient cause to warrant a
thorough systematic examination of not only the present intel-
ligence activities ; but more importantly, in my view, there is
an urgent need to determine what our intelligence needs now
are and how they can most effectively function under firm con-
stitutional guidelines, providing for rigorous oversight and
accountability.

The Select Committee has just completed this task. Its recommenda-
tions represent an agenda of essential legislative and executive
branch action.

The history of United States intelligence activities since the end of
World War II is a record of remarkable intellectual and organiza-
tional achievement. It is also a record of the exercise of subtle violence
and brutal warfare. The latter is not a pretty picture, but given the
attitudes of major powers since the end of World War II, our national
leadership regarded such measures as necessary and unavoidable. The
history of the past three decades raises the important issue of whether
the United States must adopt all the methods of our potential adver-

(609)

610

saries, or is able to exercise some restraints. I share the view of the
Committee that if we become "more ruthless than the enemy," as one
important policy document of the 1950's urged, the U.S. will lose those
qualities which distinguish a free society from a totalitarian regime.
It is my belief that restraints are possible and can be exercised in ways
that are both consistent with the needs of national security and with
our constitutional processes.

The information obtained through intelligence activities is impor-
tant to government at all policy and operational levels. The U.S. spends
many billions of dollars a year on this effort. After over a year of
study and investigation, there remain, however, many unanswered
questions as to the value of some intelligence colle<jtion activities. More
work needs to be done by a fully empowered permanent oversight
committee. For example, in neither the Committee's investigations, nor
in internal executive branch studies, has it been possible to determine
exactly how much and what kind of intelligence is needed. There are
very few solid indicators of the usefulness of the massive amount of
intelligence available to the U.S. Government. There are, however,
many tangible positive benefits ; the ABM Treaty, for example, would
not have been possible without reliable intelligence to assure that its
provisions were being adhered to.

The magnitude of the intelligence effort parallels the patterns of our
military and diplomatic policies against potential enemies. In the early
1950's, the intent of United States policy was to counter and roll back
Soviet activities worldwide. In recent years there has been a lessening
of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the
world of intelligence similar patterns can be obsen^ed.

The intelligence activities of the U.S. are largely shaped by the
activities of our potential enemies. We do what they do. What is it
that we both do ?

First^ we spy on one another. The legal term is espionage ; the euphe-
mism is "clandestine collection;" the direct word is spying.

Second, we make great efforts to know what it is they are doing
in order to counter, stop, or destroy what they are doing against us.
Response to potential enemies has tended to set the pace for our intel-
ligence efforts.

Third, we both engage in covert action. Covert action, plainly stated,
is the secret exercise of influence. The means used range the gamut of
technique between waging war and peaceful intercourse among nations.
This includes "little" wars — paramilitary activity, subversion of other
governments through propaganda, the use of money, agents of in-
fluence, economic warfare, and other less directly hostile means. All
this is done to support policy interests.

Fourth, we both collect vast amounts of information through open
means, technological collection and spying. This information is ana-
lyzed and organized into finished intelligence available to the policy-
makers of the country in making national decisions.

Upon systematic review, I share the view of the Committee that the
U.S. must continue to undertake some secret intelligence activities.
They are vital to our national security. Certain activities, however,
should be prohibited. In the past, some intelligence activities have had
the effect of eroding our processes of government, have violated our

611

principles, ideals and reputation, and have damaged our ability to
exercise moral and ethical leadership throughout the world. The fun-
damental issue facing the Congress and the issue that particularly
confronts the Committee is to decide how secret activities which are
agreed to be necessary are to be governed by our democratic institu-
tions. This issue has three aspects :

First, how do we decide which activities should be undertaken^ The
answer the Committee has come to and that I fully support is that it
must be the executive and legislative branches jointly: The legisla-
ture through appropriate legislative intelligence oversight commit-
tee (s) and the executive through its NSC and other management and
oversight structures.

/Second, what system of accoum,tdbility is necessary in order to assure
that intelligence activities are prudent and appropriate? The Commit-
tee's decision is that there must be a rigorous recorded approval process
within the executive branch and a searching oversight process within
the legislative branch. All proposals and approvals for intelligence
activities must be recorded in writing and placed in a central classified
registry ; the record of activities should be available to the legislative
oversight committee (s) in accordance with their needs.

Third, who can make use of intelligence information? The Com-
mittee's view is that both the legislature and the executive should
have full access to the intelligence analyses produced by the intelli-
gence community. The availability of sound intelligence will enable
the legislature to become a partner with the executive branch as
intended by the Constitution in this vital area of national policy. A
better informed legislature can only benefit the nation.

These three questions and their answers are at the heart of the
Committee's recommended solutions to the problem of how secret in-
telligence activities can be governed within an open democratic society.
These are solutions which I fully support. But for these solutions to
work, a strong oversight committee must be created with power of the
purse and full access to information. Without a strong oversight com-
mittee, the failures of the past will recur.

Inherent contradictions are created when secret activities are per-
mitted within a democratic society. The U.S. is a government of laws,
yet laws have not been passed which accurately describe the nature
and extent of intelligence activities. This dilemma has raised a num-
ber of important questions for the Committee. Although the Commit-
tee has come to conclusions about these issues, they are problems that
require constant reexamination.

In this regard, a key question before the Committee was whether the
U.S. should be the first nation to say through its laws what it is in
fact doing in the world of intelligence activities. Should it pass laws
specifically authorizing and governing covert action, including the
explicit right to make warfare, to practice subversion and propaganda ?

Should these intelligence methods — which have never been publicly
acknowledged by any other nation — be put into law? Should the
United States Government do so directly and explicitly, rather than
through euphemisms and vague imprecise language, and not disguise
from its own people what it is actually doing? Is it naive or innocent
to express what the U.S. and all other nations in fact are doing? Or

612

would there be advantages to expressing directly what we and all other
nations do, expressing also the hope that through negotiation be-
tween nations many activities could be stopped on a mutually accepta-
ble basis ?

In response to the question of whether we should express openly
what we now do secretly in the world of intelligence, many have an-
swered that to reveal the missions of the intelligence agencies with any
precision and to set limitations on them by law would, at a minimum
have severe diplomatic repercussions. Further, it is argued, disclosure
would, as a practical matter, result in effective countermeasures by the
intelligence services of other nations, particularly those nations hos-
tile to the United States.

In the past, all nations have disavowed acts of their intelligence
agents abroad when they have been revealed. But as the scale of intel-
ligence activities has grown, "plausible denial," once an accepted doc-
trine for the U.S. Government, has become implausible. It is my belief
that the failure to assure accountability through constitutional proc-
esses has jeopardized the integrity of our democratic institutions.
Many of the practices and techniques exercised by our nation's intel-
ligence agencies have also become obsolete in this age of nuclear weap-
ons and other advanced technology. For example, there is now recog-
nition, at least for the present, among the great powers that so-called
"national teclinical means," that is, satellite reconnaissance, should not
be interfered with. There are a number of intelligence missions which,
through tacit international acceptance and widespread press discus-
sion, have, over time and through common usage, become "overt" in
fact. In such cases, public discussion and approval of these kinds of
intelligence missions, such as technical collection systems, is essential,
even if the details are not revealed.

Shall the U.S. Government through laws exempt certain sectors of
its society — such as the press, religious institutions, foundations, and
the academic world — from any use by the intelligence agencies of the

How can the executive and legislative branches of government con-
trol necessary but hazardous activities? How can the third branch,
the judiciary, safeguard liberties without an adequate statutory
foundation ? The answers lie, the Committee has concluded in its report,
and I fully share this conclusion, in a combination of precise statutory
charters and an informed interaction between the oversight committees
of the Congress and the appropriate policy groups within the execu-
tive branch. If the oversight committees of the Congress are to be
effective they must reflect the full spectrum of views of the legislature,
they require not only the power of the purse and full access to infor-
mation, including presentation of proposals before the initiation of
significant intelligence activities.

The requirement that the legislature through its oversight commit-
tees be fully informed, very quickly raises the question of how fully ?
What "advice" given to Presidents qualifies as "personal" — therefore
privileged — communication as opposed to "decisions" or "facts and
analysis" which all agree should be made available to the Congress?
The experience of the Select Committee will be a good guide to the
problems that oversight committees will face in the future. The execu-

613

tive branch made the entire record available in some cases. In only a
few cases was adequate information not forthcoming. On the one hand,
executive privilege was never formally asserted; on the other hand,
the Committee insisted upon complete access only when absolutely
necessary.

I continue to be deeply troubled by the dilemma created by the ne-
cessity for Congress to work through an oversight committee to exact
adherence to standards through secret consultations. On the one hand,
the agreed-upon needs for secrecy argues for regulation through over-
sight, rather than through explicit legislation ; yet, such a process must
be supported by statutes embodying the broad principles of declared
policy.

Both the Committee and the executive branch agree that clearly
defined statutory charters and a new strong and effe-ctive oversight
committee for the intelligence agencies are necessary. If the proposed
new legislative and executive branch oversight procedures prove in-
sufficient, additional statutory controls can be instituted. But the first
and present requirement is full executive and legislative support of
the governance of intelligence activities through the newly-cast joint
oversight mechanisms of the legislative and the executive branches.

This is a time of testing. After 200 years of open democratic gov-
ernment the U.S. now has the burden of a permanent secret intelli-
gence system. If secret intelligence activities are to continue — and
there is present agreement between the branches that they are
necessary — ^then the secret procedures required must have built-in
checks and especially stringent provisions for accountability. Intel-
ligence agencies have expressed the concern that some of the Commit-
tee's proposals will create excessive layers of approval through which
actions must be approved, and that such layering will introduce new
elements of caution into the approval process which are inconsistent
with the view, held by many in the intelligence agencies, that to be
effective risks must be taken. But in view of the dangers involved, and
the past record of instances of recklessness harmful to the nation
there is clearly a need for more caution through more accountability
and fixed responsibility in the decisionmaking process governing the
initiation and carrying out of intelligence activities.

If such high-risk activities are to continue, and if the decisions con-
cerning secret activities are to remain secret, a thorough and rigorous
paper trail must be constructed so that accountability can be fixed
among all those involved in any secret intelligence activity approved.
The possible drawbacks of a monitoring system of extensive checks and
balances are far outweighed by the dangers of unchecked secret activi-
ties. The record of abuses in the past is sufficient warning.

In time of peace a rigorously enforced system of checks and ac-
countability is necessary for the preservation of a free society.

In my view, the purposes of our intelligence system are many. The
major purpose, however, is the prevention of war. The recommenda-
tions made by the Committee for legislative charters and an informed
interaction between the legislative and executive branches are
designed to assure that our intelligence system operates effectively,
accountably, and under the governance of constitutional processes.

Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOK RICHAED S.
SCHWEIKEE,

The Senate Select Committee has engaged in an extensive investiga-
tion of the intelligence activities of the United States. The investiga-
tion did not cover all alleged abuses or study in depth all the major
issues. It was, however — and this is more a matter of concern than a
matter of pride — the first thorough investigation of the United States
intelligence community in almost thirty years.

The Committee discovered the real strengths of American intelli-
gence activities — dedicated personnel, broad expertise, and impressive
technological achievements. But we also found real weaknesses. Among
these is the absence of statutory authority for many intelligence ac-
tivities. Combined with this lack of explicit authorization were two
noteworthy beliefs. First, that a claim of national security, however,
defined or understood, could supersede the laws or regulations tliat
govern other activities. Second, that if our enemies were engaging in
certain activities we could, and should, do the same.

The coming to maturity of the American intelligence community
will help eliminate these pernicious beliefs. The recommendations
which the Committee made, which I strongly support, will help to
bring intelligence activities under law. Crucial to the success of the
Committee's recommendations — and here I join with my colleagues.
Senators Philip Hart, Walter Mondale and Gary Hart — is the estab-
lishment of a new intelligence oversight committee with legislative
authority.

Our Committee did not have such authority. As a select committee
we have had a limited mandate and a limited life. Thus we have had
only one tool with which to accomplish reform — public disclosure,
leading to public concern.

The Committee has been in a constant dilemma. Should it use the
one tool available — public disclosure of certain intelligence activities —
even though it was claimed that almost any disclosure would damage
the "national security" ? For example, the Central Intelligence Agency
argued that references to the invasion of the Bay of Pigs should be
eliminated on such grounds. Or should.it withhold information such as
the fact that NSA was given access to millions of messages and risk
well-deserved cover-up charges? I think, in general, the Committee
chose the right balance.

But an oversight committee with power to bring legislation to the
floor and power to authorize the budget for national intelligence will
not have to face this dilemma. Such a committee could and should dis-
close enough information to enable the public to understand how the
intelligence community works or fails to work. Such a committee can
and will protect vital secrets. And it can, in executive session, continue
the intensive scrutiny of intelligence activities which was absent in the
past and which is necessary because these activities cannot be com-
pletely open to public examination.

Richard S. Schweiker.

(615)

~^.

GLOSSAEY

Ad Hoc Requirements Committee : An interagency group established
in 1955 by the Special Assistant to the DCI to coordinate collec-
tion requirements for the U-2 reconnaissance program.

Agent : An individual who acts under the direction of an intelligence
agency or security service to obtain, or assist in obtaining, infor-
mation for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes.

Agent of Influence: An individual who can be used to influence co-
vertly foreign officials, opinion moiders, organizations, or pressure
groups in a way which will generally advance United States Gov-
ernment objectives, or to undertake specific action in support of
United States Government objectives.

Analysis : A stage in the intelligence processing cycle whereby collected
information is reviewed to identify significant facts ; the informa-
tion is compared with and collated with other data, and conclu-
sions, which also incorporate the memory and judgment of the
intelligence analyst, are derived from it.

Armed Forces Security AgeTicy {AFSA) : The predecessor to NSA;
it was created in 1949 to consolidate the crytologic effort.

Army Security Agency {ASA ) : One of the Service Cryptologic Agen-
cies ; its collection activities are under the authority of the Director
of NSA (DIKNSA) in his dual role as Chief of the Central Secu-
rity Service (CSS).

Asset: Any resource — a person, group, relationship, instrument, instal-
lation, or supply — at the disposition of an intelligence agency for
use in an operational or support role. The term is normally applied
to a person who is contributing to a CIA clandestine mission, but
is not a fully controlled agent of CIA.

Assessment : Part of the intelligence process whereby an analyst deter-
mines the reliability or validity of a piece of information. An
assessment could also be a statement resulting from this process.

Bdckstopping : A CIA term for providing appropriate verification and
support of cover arrangements for an agent or asset in anticipation
of inquiries or other actions which might test the credibility of his
or its cover.

Basic Intelligence : Factual, fundamental, and generally permanent
information about all aspects of a nation — physical, social, eco-
nomic, political, biographical, and cultural — which is used as a
base for intelligence products in support of planning, policymak-
ing, and military operations.

Bigot Lists : Using the term bigot in the sense of "narrow," this is a
restrictive list of persons who have access to a particular, and
highly sensitive class of information.

Biological Agent: A micro-organism which causes disease in humans,
plants, or animals, or causes a deterioration of materiel.

(617)

618

Biological Operations: Employment of biological agents to produce
casualties in humans or animals, and damage to plants or material ;
or a defense against such an attack.

Biological Warfare : Use of living organisms, toxic biological prod-
ucts, or plant growth regulators to cause death or injury to
humans, animals, or plants; or a defense against such action.

Biological Weapon: A weapon which projects, disperses, or dis-
seminates a biologial agent.
Black : A term used to indicate reliance on illegal concealment of an
activity rather than on cover.

Blach Bag J oh : Warrantless surreptitious entry, especially an entry
conducted for purposes other than microphone installation, such
as physical search and seizure or photographing of documents.

BloAih List : An official counterintelligence listing of actual or potential
hostile collaborators, sympathizers, intelligence suspects, or other
persons viewed as threatening to the security of friendly military
forces.

Black Propaganda: Propaganda which purports to emanate from a
source other than the true one.

Blow: To expose — often unintentionally — personnel, installations, or
other elements of a clandestine activity or organization.

Board of National Estimates (BNE) : Established in 1950 by DCI
Walter Bedell Smith. The Board was composed of individuals
who had responsibility for receiving National Intelligence Esti-
mates for the Director of Central Intelligence. The Board was
dissolved in 1973.

Bug : A concealed listening device or microphone, or other audiosur-
veillance device; also, to install the means for audiosurveillance
of a subject or target.

Bugged: A room or object which contains a concealed listening device.

Case: An intelligence operation in its entirety; the term also refers
to a record of the development of an intelligence operation, how
it will operate, and the objectives of the operation.

Case Oiflcer : A staff employee of the CIA who is responsible for han-
dling agents.

Central Intelligence Group {CIG) : The direct predecessor to CIA;
President Truman established it by executive order on January 22,
1946. It operated under the National Intelligence Authority
(NIA) , which was created at the same time.

Chemical Agent: A chemical compound which, when disseminated,
causes incapacitating, lethal, or damaging effects on humans,
animals, plants, or materials.

Cehmical Operations: Using chemical agents — excludihg riot control
agents — to kill, or incapacitate for a significant period, humans
or animals, or to deny the use of facilities, materials, or areas.

Cipher: Any cryptographic system in which arbitrary symbols or
groups of symbols represent units of plain text.

Clandestine Intelligence : Intelligence information collected by clan-
destine sources.

Clandestine Operations : Intellisfence, counterintellisrence, or other
information collection activities and covert political, economic,
propaganda and paramilitary activities, conducted so as to assure
the secrecy of the operation.

619

Code : A system of commimication in which arbitrary groups of sym-
bols represent units of plain text. Codes may be used for brevity
or for security.
Code word : A word which has been assigned a classification and a
classified meaning to safeguard intentions and information re-
garding a planned operation.
Collation : The assembly of facts to determine the relationships among
them in order to derive intelligence and facilitate further proc-
essing of intelligence information.

Collection: The acquisition of information by any means and its
delivery to the proper int-elligence processing unit for use in the
production of intelligence.

Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation {COMI-
REX) : One of three intelligence collection committees formerly
under the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), dealing
with photographic intelligence.

Communications : A method or means of conveying information from
one person or place to another ; this term does not include direct,
unassisted conversion or correspondence through nonmilitary
postal agencies.

Communication's Center: A facility responsible for receiving trans-
mitting and delivering messages ; it normally contains a message
center section, a cryptographic section, and a sending and receiv-
ing section, using electronic communications devices.

Communications Intelligence {COMINT) : Technical and intelligence
information derived from foreign communications by someone
other than the intended recipient. It does not include foreign
press, propaganda, or public broadcasts. The term is sometimes
used interchangeably with SIGINT.

Communications Security {COMSEC) : The protection of United
States telecommunications and other communications from ex-
ploitation by foreign intelligence services and from unauthorized
disclosure. COMSEC is one of the mission responsibilities of NSA.
It includes cryptosecurity, transmission security, emission secu-
rity, and physical security of classified equipment, material, and
documents.

C ompartmentation: The practice of establishing specials channels for
handling sensitive intelligence information. The channels are
limited to individuals with a specific need for such information
and who are therefore given special security clearances in order
to have access to it.

Compromise : A known or suspected exposure of clandestine personnel,
installations, or other assets, or of classified information or mate-
rial, to an unauthorized person.

Concealment: The provision of protection from observation only.

Confusion Agent: An individual dispatched by his sponsor to con-
found the intelligence or counterintelligence apparatus of another
country rather than to collect and transmit information.

Consumer: A person or agency that uses information or intelligence
produced by either its own staff or other agencies.

Continental United States (CON US) : A military term which refers
to United States territory, including adjacent territorial waters,

620

located within the North American continent between Canada
and Mexico.

Control: Physical or psychological pressure exerted on an agent or
group to ensure that the agent or group responds to the direction
from an intelligence agency or service.

Counterespionage : Those aspects of counterintelligence concerned with
aggresesive operations against another intelligence service to
reduce its effectiveness, or to detect and neutralize foreign
espionage. This is done by identification, penetration, manipula-
tion, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organi-
zations conducting or suspected of conducting espionage activities
in order to destroy, neutralize, exploit, or prevent such espionage
activities.

C ounterguerrilla Warfare: Operations and activities conducted by
armed forces, paramilitary forces, or nonmilitary agencies of a
government against guerrillas.

Counterinsurgency : Military, paramilitary, political, economic, psy-
chological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat
subversive insurgency within a country.

Counterintelligence: Activities conducted to destroy the effectiveness
of foreign intelligence operations and to protect information
against espionage, individuals against subversion, and installa-
tions against sabotage. The term also refers to information de-
veloped by or used in counterintelligence operations. See also
counterespionage, countersabotage, and countersubversion.

Counterreconnaissance: Measures taken to prevent observation by a
hostile foreign service of an area, place, or military force.

C ountersdbotage : That aspect of counterintelligence designed to de-
tect, destroy, neutralize, or prevent sabotage activities through
identification, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repres-
sion of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or
suspected of conducting sabotage activities.

Countersubversion: That part of counterintelligence designed to de-
stroy the effectiveness of subversive activities through the detec-
tion, identification, exploitation, penetration, manipulation, de-
ception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations
conducting or capable of conducting such activities.

Courier: A messenger responsible for the secure physical transmission
and delivery of documents and material.

Cover: A protective guise used by a person, organization, or installa-
tion to prevent identification with clandestine activities and to
conceal the true affiliation of personel and the true sponsorship of
their activities.

Covert Action: Any clandestine activity designed to influence foreign
governments, events, organizations, or persons in support of
United States foreign policy. Covert action may include political
and economic action, propaganda and paramilitary activities.

Covert Operations : Operations planned and executed against foreign
governments, installations, and individuals so as to conceal the
identity of the sponsor or else to permit the sponsor's plausible
denial of the operation. The terms covert action, covert operation.

621

clandestive operation and clandestine activity are sometimes used
interchangeably.

Critical Intelligence: Information or intelligence of such urgent im-
portance to the security of the United States that it is transmitted
at the highest priority to the President and other national deci-
sionmaking officials before passing through regular evaluative
channels.

Oryptanalysis : The breaking of codes and ciphers into plain text with-
out initial knowledge of the key employed in the encryption.

Cryptography : The enciphering of plain text so that it will be unin-
telligible to an unauthorized recipient.

Crytology : The science that includes cryptoanalysis and cryptogra-
phy, and embraces communications intelligence and communica-
tions security.

CryptomMerial: All material — including documents, devices, equip-
ment, and apparatus — essential to the encryption, decryption, or
authentication of telecommunications.

Cryptosecurity : That component of communications security which
results from the provision of technically sound cryptosystems and
their proper use.

Cryptosystems : The associated items of cryptomaterial which are used
as a unit and provide a single means of encryption and
decryption.

Current Intelligence : Summaries and analyses of recent events.

Cut-out: A CIA term referring to a person who is used to conceal con-
tact between members of a clandestine activity or organization.

Deception: Measures designed to mislead a hostile person or entity
by manipulating, distorting, or falsifying evidence to induce a
reaction prejudicial to his or its interests.

Decrypt: To convert encrypted text into plain text by use of
a cryptosystem.

Defector: A person who, for political or other reasons, has repudiated
his country and may be in possession of information of interest
to the United States Government.

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) : Department of Defense agency
for producing military intelligence, created by directive of the
Secretary of Defense in 1961.

Defense Intelligence Objectives and Priorities {DIOP) : A single
statement of intelligence requirements compiled by DIA for use
by all DOD intelligence components.

Departmental Intelligence: The intelligence which government de-
partments and agencies generate in support of their own
activities.

Directive : Basically any executive branch communication which initi-
ates or governs departmental or agency action, conduct, or
procedure.

Director of Central Intelligence Directive {DCID) : A directive is-
sued by the DCI which outlines general policies and procedures
to be followed by intelligence ag^encies under his direction; it is
generally more specific than an NSCID.

Dissemination: The distribution of information or intelligence prod-
ucts (in oral, written, or graphic form) to departmental and
agency intelligence consumers.

622

Domestic Emergencies: Emergencies occurring within the United
States, its territories, or possessions, which affect the public wel-
fare. Such emergencies may arise from an enemy attack, insur-
rection, civil disturbances, natural disasters (earthquakes,
floods), fire, or other comparable emergencies which endanger
life and property or disrupt the normal processess of govern-
ment.

Domestic Intelligence: Intelligence relating to activities or condi-
tions within the United States which threaten internal security
(in general or to a governmental department, agency, or official)
and which might require the employment of troops.

Double Agent: A person engaging in clandestine activity for two or
more intelligence or security services who provides information
to one service about the other, or about each service to the other,
and who is wittingly or unwittingly manipulated by one service
against the other.

Economic Intelligence: Intelligence regarding foreign economic
resources, activities, and policies.

ElectroTnagnetic Spectrum: The frequencies (or wave lengths) pres-
ent in a given electromagnetic radiation (radiation made up of
oscillating electric and magnetic fields and propagated with the
speed of light — such as radar or radio waves). A particular
spectrum could include a single frequency, or a broad range
of frequencies.

Electronic Intelligence {ELI NT) : Technical and intelligence infor-
mation derived from the collection (or interception) and proc-
essing of foreign electromagnetic radiations (noncommunica-
tions) emanating from sources such as radar. ELINT is part of
the NSA/CSS Signals Intelligence mission.

Electronic Line of Sight: The path traveled by electromagnetifc
waves which is not subject to reflection or refraction by the
atmosphere.

Electronics Security: The detection, identification, evaluation, and
location of foreign electromagnetic radiations.

Electronic Surveillance : Surveillance conducted on a person, group,
or other entitly by electronic equipment which is often highly
sophisticated and extremely sensitive.

Elicitation: The acquisition of intelligence from a person or group
which does not disclose the intent of the interview or conversa-
tion. This is a HUMINT collection technique, generally of an
overt nature, unless the collector is other than what he or she
purports to be.

Emission Security: That component of communications security which
results from all measures taken to deny unauthorized persons
any information of value which might be derived from the inter-
ception and analysis of compromising emanations from crypty-
equipment or telecommunications systems.

Encipher: To convert a plain text message into unintelligible form
by the use of a cipher system.

Encrypt: To convert a plain text message into unintelligible form
by means of a cryptosystem ; this term covers the meanings of
encipher and encode.

623

Entity: A company, form, corporation, institution, bank, or founda-
tion.

Espionage: Clandestine intelligence collection activity. This term is
often interchanged with "clandestine collection."

Estimating : An effort to appraise and analyze the future possibilities
or courses of action in a situation under study and the various
results or consequences of foreign or United States actions relat-
ing to that situation. This analysis of such a foreign situation
would consider its development and trends to identify its major
elements, interpret the significance of the situation, and evaluate
the future possibilities and prospective results of various actions
which might be taken, including clandestine operations.

Evaluation: The process of determining the value, credibility, relia-
bility, pertinency, accuracy, and use of an item of information,
an intelligence product, or the performance of an intelligence
system.

Executive Action: This term is generally an euphemism for assassi-
nation, and was used by the CIA to describe a program aimed
at overthrowing certain foreign leaders, by assassinating them if
necessary.

Exploitation: The process of getting information from any source
and taking full advantage of it for strategic or tactical purposes.

Eoreign Intelligence: Intelligence concerning areas outside the
United States.

Grey Propaganda: Propaganda which does not specifically identify
a source.

Guerrilla: A combat participant in guerrilla warfare.

Guerrilla Warfare: Military and paramilitary operations conducted
in hostile or enemy-held territory by irregular, generally indigen-
ous forces.

Guidance: The general direction of an intelligence effort, particu-
larly in the area of collection.

Imagery : Representations of objects reproduced electronically or by
optical means on film, electronic display devices, or other media.

Indications Intelligence : Intelligence in various degrees of evaluation
which bears on foreign intentions regarding a course of action.

Infiltration: The placing of an agent or other person in a target area
within hostile territory or within targeted groups or organiza-
tions.

Informant: A person who wittingly or unwittingly provides infor-
mation to an agent, a clandestine service, or police. In reporting
such information, this person will often be cited as the source.

Information: Raw, unevaluated data at all levels of reliability and
from all kinds of sources, such as observation, rumors, reports,
and photographs, which, when processed, may produce intelli-
gence.

Informer: One who intentionally discloses information about other
persons or activities to police or a security service (such as the
FBI), usually for a financial reward.

Insurgency : A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection
against a constituted government which falls short of civil war.

624

Intelligence: The product resulting from the collection, collation,
evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all col-
lected information.
Intelligence Collection Plan: A plan for gathering information from

all available sources to meet an intelligence requirement.
Intelligence Contingency Funds: Appropriated funds to be used for
intelligence activities which are unforseen at the time of the
budget and when the use of other funds is not applicable or would
jeopardize or impede the task of an intelligence unit. Such funds
are almost invariably used for covert activities.
Intelligence Cycle : The steps by which information is assembled, con-
verted into intelligence, and made available to consumers. The
cycle is composed of four basic phases: (1) direction: the deter-
mination of intelligence requirements, preparation of a collection
plan, tasking of collection agencies, and a continuous check on
the productivity of these agencies; (2) collection: the exploita-
tion of information sources and the delivery of the collected in-
formation to the proper intelligence processing unit for use in
the production of intelligence; (3) processing : the steps whereby
information becomes intelligence through evaluation, analysis,
integration, and interpretation; and (4) dissemination: the dis-
tribution of information or intelligence products (in oral, written,
or graphic form) to departmental and agency intelligence
consumers.
Intelligence Data Base : All holdings of intelligence data and finished

intelligence products at a given department or agency.
Information Data Handling Systems: Information systems that proc-
ess and manipulate raw information and intelligence data. The
systems are characterized by application of general-purpose com-
puters, peripheral data processing equipment, and automated
storage and retrieval equipment for documents and photographs.
Intelligence Estimate: An appraisal of intelligence elements relating
to a specific situation or condition to determine the courses of
action open to an enemy or potential enemy and the probable
order of their adoption.
Intelligence Process: Those steps by which information is collected,

converted into intelligence, and disseminated.
Intelligence Requirement: A consumer statement of information

needed which is not already at hand.
Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC) : Established
in 1971 to advise the DCI in preparing a consolidated intelligence
program budget for the President. It was abolished by President
Ford's Executive Order, No. 11905, 2/18/76.
Interception: This term generally refers to the collection of electro-
magnetic signals (such as radio communications) by sophisti-
cated collection equipment without the knowledge of the com-
municants for the production of certain forms of signals intel-
ligence.

Interdepartmental Intelligence: The synthesis of departmental intel-
ligence which is required by departments and agencies of the
United States Government for performance of their missions;
such intelliirence is viewed as transcending the exclusive produc-
tion competence of a single department or agency.

625

International Lines of Communicati<m {ILC) : Commercial telecom-
munications links. . , J- .

Interrogation: A systematic effort to procure mformation by direct
questioning of a person under the control of the questioner.

Interview: The gathering of information from a person who knows
that he or she is giving information, although not often with
awareness of the true connection or purposes of the interviewer.
This is generally an overt collection technique, unless the inter-
viewer is not what he or she purports to be.

Joint Intelligence: Intelligence produced by elements of more than
one military service.

Joint Intelligence EstiTnate for Planning {JIEP): A worldwide
series of strategic estimates prepared annually by DIA for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff ; it is intended to be used as a base for devel-
oping intelligence annexes for JCS plans.

Key Intelligence Question {KIQ) : Topics of particular importance
to national policymakers, as defined by the DCI.

Link Encryftion: The application of on-line crypto-operations to a
communications system link so that all information passing over
it is totally encrypted.

Links of Communication: "Links" is a general term used to indicate
the existence of a communications facility between two points.

Microwave Relay: A process for propagating telecommunications
over long distances by using radio signals relayed by several sta-
tions within "line of sight" from one another.

Monitoring : The observing, listening to, or recording of foreign or
domestic communications for intelligence collection or intelli-
gence security (e.g., COMSEC) purposes.

Multiplexing : A technique which allows one signal to carry several
communications (e.g., conversations, messages) simultaneously.

National Intelligence : Intelligence produced by the CIA which bears
on the broad aspects of United States national policy and na-
tional security. It is of concern to more than one department or
agency.

National Intelligence Authority {NIA) : An executive council created
by President Truman's executive order of January 22, 1946, which
had authority over tlie simultaneously created Central Intelli-
gence Group (CIG). The NIA was a predecessor to the National
Security Council.

National. Intelligence Estimate (NIE) : An estimate authorized by
the DCI of the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses
of action of foreign nations. It represents the composite views of
the intelligence community.

National Security Agency (NSA) : Established by President Truman,
October 24, 1952, to replace the Armed Forces Security Agency
(AFSA).

National Security Council Intelligence Directive {NSC ID) : Intelli-
gence guidelines issued by the NSC to intelligence agencies.
NSCIDs are often augmented by more specific DCIDs and by in-
ternal departmental or agency regulations.

Net Assessment Group: The group within the NSC staff that was
responsible for reviewing and evaluating all intelligence products
and producing net assessments. It was abolished in June 1973.

69-983 O - 76 - 40

626

NotioTials : Fictious, private commercial entities which exist on paper
only. They serve as the ostensible employer of intelligence per-
sonnel, or as the ostensible sponsor of certain activities in support
of clandestine operations.

Office of Policy Coordination ( OPC) : An office in CIA, established in
1948, to carry out covert action missions assigned to CIA by the
National Security Council.

Office of Special Operations (OSO): Prior to 1952, OSO was a CIA
component responsible for espionage and counterespionage. It
merged with CIA's Office of Policy Coordination to form the
Directorate for Plans.

0;fflce of Strategic Services (OSS) : The United States Intelligence
service active during World War II. It was established by Presi-
dent Roosevelt in June 1942, and disbanded October 1, 1945.

Operational Intelligence : Intelligence produced to support the plan-
ning and execution of operations.

Operational Use : This term refers to using a person, group, organiza-
tion, information, etc. in a clandestine operation or in support of a
clandestine activity.

Operations Coordinating Board {OCB) : This replaced the Psycho-
logical Strategy Board of the NSC on September 2, 1953.

Order of Battle : This term refers to information regarding the iden-
tity, strength, command structure, and disposition of personnel,
units, and equipment of any military force.

Overt Intelligence : Information collected openly from public or open
sources.

Paramilitary Forces: Forces or groups which are distinct from the
regular 'armed forces of a nation, although they may resemble
regular forces in organization, equipment, training, or mission.

Paramilitary Operation: An operation undertaken by a paramilitary
force.

Penetration: The recruitment of agents within, or the planting of
agents or technical monitoring devices' within, a target organiza-
tion to gain access to its secrets or to influence its activities.

Photographic Intelligence {PHOTINT) : Information or intelligence
derived from photography through photographic interpretation.

Plain Text: Unencrypted communications; specifically, the original
message of a cryptogram, expressed in ordinary language.

Planning and Coordination Group (PCG) : A committee of the Op-
erations Coordinating Board of the National Security Coimcil.
PCG became the normal channel for policy approval of covert
operations under NSC directive 5412/1 in 1965.

Plausible Denial:

Plumbing: A term referring to the development of assets or services
supporting the clandestine operations of CIA field stations — such
as safehouses, unaccountable funds, investigative persons, sur-
veillance teams.

Political Intelligence : Originally, arranging, coordinating and con-
ducting covert operations so as to "plausibly" permit official de-
nial of United States involvement, sponsorship or support. Later
this concept evolved so that it was employed by high officials and
their subordinates to communicate without using precise language

627

which wxDuld reveal authorization and involvement in certain
activities and would be embarrassing and politically damaging
if publicly revealed.

Processing : The manipulation of collected raw information to make
it usable in analysis or to prepare it for data storage or retrieval.

Product: Finished intelligence reports disseminated by intelligence
agencies to appropriate consumers.

Production: The preparation of reports based on an analysis of in-
formation to meet the needs of intelligence users (consumers)
within and outside the intelligence community.

Propaganda: Any communication supporting national objectives
which is designed to influence opinions, emotions, attitudes, or
behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either
directly or indirectly.

Proprietaries: A term used by CIA to designate ostensibly private
commercial entities capable of doing business which are estab-
lished and controlled by intelligence services to conceal govern-
mental affiliation of intelligence personnel and/or governmental
sponsorship of certain activities in support of clandestine
operations.

Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) : An NSC subcommittee estab-
lished in 1951 to determine the desirability of proposed covert
action programs and major covert action projects.

Psychological Warfare: The planned use of propaganda and other
psychological actions to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes,
and behavior of hostile foreign groups so as to support the achieve-
ment of national policy objectives.

Reconnaissance: A mission undertaken to obtain, by observation or
other detection methods, information about the activities and
resources of foreign states.

Requirement : A general or specific request for intelligence information
made by a member of the intelligence community.

Safe House : An innocent-appearing house or premises established by
an intelligence organization for conducting clandestine or covert
activity in relative security.

Sanitize : The deletion or revision of a report or document so as to pre-
vent identification of the intelligence sources and methods that
contributed to or are dealt with in the report.

Scan: In electromagnetic or acoustical contexts, a scan is one com-
plete rotation of an antenna. With regard to ELINT, it refers
to the motion of an electronic beam through space which is search-
ing for a target.

Scientific and Technical Intelligence: Information or intelligence
concerning foreign progress in basic and applied scientific or tech-
nical research and development, including engineering R&D, new
technology, and weapons systems.

Security Measures: taken by the government and intelligence de-
partments and agencies, among others, for protection from espion-
age, observation, sabotage, annoyance, or surprise. With respect
to classified materials, it is the condition which prevents unau-
thorized persons from having access to official information which
is safeguarded in the interests of national defense.

628

Sensitive: Something which requires special protection from disclo-
sure, which could cause embarrassment, compromise, or threat to
the security of the sponsoring power.

Service Cryptologic Agencies {SCAs) : These are the Army Security
Agency, Naval Security Group Command, and Air Force Se-
curity Service. Their signals intelligence-collection functions were
brought under the operational control of the Director of NSA
when the SCAs were confederated into the Central Security Serv-
ice in 1971, and the Director of NSA was given extra responsibil-
ity as Chief of the CSS.

Sheep Dipping: The utilization of a military instrument (e.g., an
airplane) or officer in clandestine operations, usually in a civilian
capacity or under civilian cover, although the instrument or offi-
cer will covertly retain its or his military ownership or standing.
The term is also applied to the placement of individuals in or-
ganizations or groups in which they can become active in order
to establish credentials so that they can be used to collect informa-
tion of intelligence interest on similar groups.

Signal: As applied to electronics, any transmitted electrical impulse.

Signals Intelligence {SIGINT) : The general term for the foreign in-
telligence mission of the NSA/CSS ; SIGINT involves the inter
ception, processing, analysis, and dissemination of information
derived from foreign electrical communications and other signals.
It is composed of three elements: Communications Intelligence
(COMINT), Electronics Intelligence (ELINT), and Telemetry
Intelligence (TELINT). Most SIGINT is collected by personnel
of the Service Cryptologic Agencies.

Source: A person, thing, or activity which provides intelligence in-
formation. In clandestine activities, the term applies to an agent
or asset, normally a foreign national, being used in an intelligence
activity for intelligence purposes. In interrogations, it refers to a
person who furnishes intelligence information with or without
knowledge that the information is being used for intelligence
purposes.

Special Agent: A United States military or civilian who is a specialist
in military security or in the collection of intelligence or counter-
intelligence information.

Special Group {Augmented) : A NSC subcommittee established in
1962 to oversee Operation MONGOOSE, a major CIA covert
action program designed to overthrow Fidel Castro.

Special Group {CI) : The Special Group on Counter Insurgency, es-
tablished by NSAM 124 on 1/18/63 to ensure the design of effec-
tive interagency programs to prevent and resist insurgency. Para-
military operations were a prime focus.

5 Jf.12/ Special Group : An NSC subcommittee that was the predecessor
to the 40 Committee.

Special Operations Division {SOD) : A facility at Fort Detrick,
Maryland that was the site for research and some testing and
storage of biological and chemical agents and toxins.

Sterilize : To remove from material to be used in covert and clandestine
actions any marks or devices which can identify it as originating
with the sponsoring organization or nation.

629

Strategic Intelligence: Intelligence required for the formation of
policy and military plans and operations at the national and in-
ternational levels.

Subversion: Actions designed to undermine the military, economic,
political, psychological, or moral strength of a nation or entity.
It can also apply to an undermining of a person's loyalty to a
government or entity.

Surreptitious Entry :

Surveillance : Systematic observation of a target.

Tactical Intelligence : Intelligence supporting military plans and oper-
ations at the military unit level. Tactical intelligence and strategic
intelligence differ only in scope, point of view, and level of em-
ployment.

Target: A person, agency, facility, area, or country against which in-
telligence operations are directed.

Targeting: In regard to COMINT, the intentional selection and/or
collection of telecommunications for intelligence purpose.

Target of Opportunity : A term describing an entity (e.g., govern-
mental entity, installation, political organization, or individual)
that becomes availaJble to an intelligence agency or service by
chance, and provides the opportunity for the collection of needed
information.

Ta^h : A term connoting the assignment or direction of an intelligence
unit to perform a specified function.

Telecommunications: Any transmission, emission, or reception of
signals, signs, writing, images, and sounds or information of any
na;ture by wire, radio, visual, or other electromagnetic systems.

10/6 Panel: A predecessor to the 40 Committee of the NSC.

303 Committee : A predecessor to the 40 Committee of the NSC.

Toxin: Chemicals which are not living organisms, but which are pro-
duced by living organisms and are lethal.

Traffic: Messages carried over a telecommunications network.

United States Country Team: The senior, in-country. United States
coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the
United States diplomatic mission (usually an ambassador) and
composed of the senior meniber of each represented United States
department or agency.

United States Intelligence Board {USIB) : Until it was abolished by
Executive Order No. 11905 2/18/76, USIB was the NSC's central
coordinating committee for the intelligence community.

Watch List: A list of words — such as names, entities, or phrases —
which can be employed by a computer to select out required in-
formation from a mass of data.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abhreviations

ACDA — Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

ACS (I) — Army Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

AFOSI — Air Force Office of Special Investigations.

AFSA — Armed Forces Security Agency.

ARC — Ad Hoc Requirements Committee.

ASA — Army Security Agency.

ASD/I — Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

ASD/PA&E — Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis
and Evaluation.

ASW — Antisubmarine Investigation.

BI — Background Investigation.

BNDD — Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.

BNE — Board of National Estimates.

CDIB — Consolidated Defense Intelligence Budget.

CDIP — Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program.

CFI — Committee on Foreign Intelligence.

CIA — Central Intelligence Agency.

CI&IA — Counterintelligence and Investigative Activity.

CIG — Central Intelligence Group.

CIRL — Current Intelligence Reporting List.

CJCS — Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

COMINT — Communications Intelligence.

COMIREX — Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation.

COMOR — Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance.

COMSEC — Communications Security.

CONUS— Continental United States.

CSS — Central Security Service.

DAS — Defense Attache System.

DCI — Director of Central Intelligence.

DCID — Director of Central Intelligence Directive.

DCII — Defense Central Index of Investigations.

DDA — Deputy Director for Administration, CIA, or Directorate for
Administration.

DDCI — Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

DDI — Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA, or Directorate for
Intelligence.

DDO — Deputy Director for Operations, CIA, or Directorate for
Operations.

DDP — Deputy Director for Plans, CIA, or Directorate for Plans.

DDR — Deputy Director for Research, CIA.

DDS&T — Deputy Director of Science and Technology, CIA, or Direc-
torate for Science and Technology.

DDS — Deputy Director for Support, CIA.

(631)

632

DIA — Defense Intelligence Agency.

DIOP — Defense Intelligence Objectives and Priorities.

DIPO — Defense Investigative Program Office.

DIEC — Defense Investigative Keview Council.

DIRDIA — Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

DIENSA — Director of the National Security Agency.

DIS — Defense Investigative Service.

KKIQs — Defense Key Intelligence Questions.

DMA — Defense Mapping Agency.

DOD — Department of Defense.

DOJ — Department of Justice.

ELINT — Electronic Intelligence.

ERDA — Energy Research and Development Administration.

EXCOM — Executive Committee.

FBI — Federal Bureau of Investigation.

FBIS — Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

FSO — Foreign Service Officer.

FYDP— Fiscal Year Defense Plan.

GDIP — General Defense Intelligence Program.

GRU — Soviet Military Intelligence Service.

HUMINT— Human Intelligence.

ICS — Intelligence Community Staff.

INR — State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

IRAC — Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee.

IR&DC — Intelligence Research and Development Council.

IRS — Internal Revenue Service.

ISA — International Security Affiairs, DOD.

J-2 — Joint Staff Director for Intelligence, DOD.

JCS— Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JRC — Joint Reconnaissance Center.

JSOP — Joint Strategic Objectives Plan.

KGB — Soviet National Intelligence Organization.

KIQ — Key Intelligence Question.

MBFR — Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction.

NFIP — National Foreign Intelligence Program.

NIA — National Intelligence Agency.

NIB — National Intelligence Bulletin.

NID — National Intelligence Daily.

NIE — National Intelligence Estimate.

NIO — National Intelligence Officer.

NIS — Naval Investigative Service.

NKVD— Predecessor to the the KGB.

NPIC — National Photographic Interpretation Center.

NSA — National Security Agency.

NSA/CSS — National Security Agency/Central Security Service.

NSAM — National Security Action Memorandum.

NSC — National Security Council.

NSCIC — National Security Council Intelligence Committee.

NSCID — National Security Council Intelligence Directive.

NSDM — National Security Decision Memorandum.

NSSM — National Security Study Memorandum.

OCB — Operations Coordinating Board.

633

OMB — Office of Management and Budget.

ONE — Office of National Estimates.

ONI — Office of Naval Intelligence.

OPC — Office of Policy Coordination.

OSD — Office of the Secretary of Defense.

OSO — Office of Special Operations, CIA.

OSO— Office of Special Operations, DOD.

OSS — Office of Strategic Services.

PCG — Planning and Coordination Group, NSC.

PFIAB — President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

PNIOs — Priority National Intelligence Objectives.

PSB— Psychological Strategy Board, NSC.

R.&D. — Research and Development.

R.D.T.&E. — Research, Development, Test & Evaluation.

SALT — Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

SCAs — Service Cryptologic Agencies (collection)

SIGINT— Signals Intelligence.

SNIE — Special National Intelligence Estimate.

SOD — Special Operations Division, Fort Detrick, Maryland.

TELINT— Telemetry Intelligence.

TO A— Total Obligational Authority.

TSD — Technical Services Division, CIA.

USAINTA — United States Army Intelligence Agency.

USIB — United States Intelligence Board.

WSAG — Washington Special Action Group.

634

Confrol and Direction of U.S. Foreign Intelligence
within the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL Sv.^tem

[After Executive Order 11905. February 18, 1976]
THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF

MANAGEMENT

& BUDGET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

e President
« V.Presidenl

« Sec Slale
s Sec Defense

COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN IHIELL (CFI)

eDCI 8D/S£CDEF eOAP/IISA

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN IHTEll
ADVISORY BD. (PFIAB)

INTELL OVERSIGHT BOARD
(OVERSIGHT BOARD)

HSC STAFF

DIRECTOR OF

CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE

INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY STAFF

(10

OPERATIONS ADVISORY GROUP

(OPERATIONS GROUP)
eAP/HSA oStC STATE
oSEC DEF oC/JCS o DCI

..J

USIB r-i"uSIB committee]

NIO STRUCTURE

f"'

•-"--

"■"-■

U.a>a

•"•

"-r--

M tm

"i —

•"

--I

•

SERVICE INTELL
COMPOHEIITS

NSA
(CSS)

DIA

CIA

STATE
(INR)

TREAS

FBI

ERDA

USA

(Acsn

USH

(DKll

USAf
(ACS!)

(DIRECTOR)

(DC

(DIRECTOR)

(5P A55T
TO SEC)

(ASST DIR)

(D/A&)

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STRUCTURE

[Prior to Executive Order 11905, February 18, 1976 J

PRESIDENT

HATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

••«■• COMMITTEE

UNITED STATES
IHlEltlGENCE BOARD

NSC INTElllGENCE COMMITTEE

DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELIICENCE

USIB COMMITTEES

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
OFFICERS

NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY

INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES
ADVISORY COMMITTEE

INTELLIGENCE R&D COUNCII

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
STAFF

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY

STATE
DEPARTMENT

TREASURY
DEPARTMENT

FNLRGY RtSFARCH &

DLVELOPMENl

ADMINISTRAIIOH

ARMY

NAVY

AIR FORCE

FEDERAL BUREAU
OF IKVESIIGATIOK

■- RECOMMtNDATION/
GUIDANCE/ ADVICt

635

Intelligence Community Staff Organization
[After Executive Order 11905, February 18, 1976]

Office of Folic/
and Planning

—

Policy and Plans
Division

—

Information Handling
Division

—

Security
Committee

OFFICE OF COMMUNITY DEPUTY

Deputy/DCI/IC

Assoc Deputy/DCI/IC

Executive Officer

Executive Staff

CFI/USIB Executive Secretariat

Support Staff

Registry

Office of Program &
Budget Development

Data Support Group

Program & Budget
Development Div,

Program Analysis
Division

Office of Performance,
Evaluation Si Improvement

Integration Staff

SIGINT
Division

Imagery
Division

Human Resources
Division

Production,Assessment|
& Improvement Div. •

Intelligence Community Staff Organization

[Prior to Executive Order 11905, February 18, 1976]

USIB^'IRAC Secretatiat

Principal Deputy
fof Planning

Colleciion &

Processing

Assessment Division

fCPADI

Deputy to Director of

Central IntelJigence/

Intelligence Community

Management,

Planning & Resource

Review Division

fMPRRD^

USIB Committee Chairmen

Coordination Staff

Product Review
Division

(PRD =

636

94TII coxgkp:ss

l8T Session

S. RES. 21

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

I January 21,1975

Mr. Pastore submitted the following resolution ; which was ordered to be placed
j on the calendar (under general orders)
I • ■

! January 27, 1975

Considered, amended, and agreed to

j RESOLUTION

To establish a select committee of the Senate to conduct an in-
vestigation and study with respect to intelligence activities
carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

1 Resolved, To establish a select committee of the Senate

2 to conduct an investigation and study of governmental op-

3 erations with respect to intelligence activities and of the

4 extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activ-

5 ities were engaged in by any agency of the Federal Govem-

6 ment or by any persons, acting individually or in combination

7 with others, with respect to any intelligence activity carried

8 out by or on behalf of the Federal Government; be it further

9 Besolved, Tlmt (a) there is hereby established a select
10 committee of the Senate which may. be called, for con-

637

1 venicncc of expression, tlic Selec-t Committee To Study

2 Govermiiental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Ac-

3 tivities to conduct an investigation and sUidy of tlie extent, if

4 any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were

5 engaged in hy any agency or hy any jx'rsons, acting either

6 individually or in combination with others, in carrying out

7 any intelligence or surveillance activities hy or on behalf

8 of any agency of the Federal Government.

9 (b) The select committee created by this resolution

10 shall consist of eleven Members of the Senate, six to l)e

11 appomted by the President of the Senate from the majority

12 Members of the Senate upon the recommendation of the

13 majority leader of the Senate, and five minority Members of

14 the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate

15 upon the recommendation of the minority leader of the

16 Senate. For the pui'poses of paragraph 6 of iiile XXV of the

17 Standing Eules of the Senate, service of a Senator as a

18 member, chairlnan, or vice chaimian of the select conmiittee

19 shall not be taken into account.

20 (c) The majority mem'bers of the committee shall select

21 a chairman and the minority members shall select a vice

22 chairman and the committee shall adopt rules and procedures

23 to govern its proceedings. The vice chairman shall preside

24 over meetings of the select committee during the absence

25 of the chairman, and discharge such other responsibilities

638

1 as may be assigned to liim by the select committee or tlie

2 chairman. Vacancies in the membership of the select com-

3 mittee shall not affect the authority of the remaining mem-

4 hers to execute the functions of the select committee and

5 shall be filled in the same manner as original appointments

6 to it are made.

7 (d) A majority of the members of the select committee

8 shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, but

9 the select committee may affix a lesser number as a quorum

10 for the purpose of taking testimony or depositions.

11 Sec. 2. The select committee is authorized and directed

12 to do everything necessary or appropriate to make the in-

13 vestigations and study specified in subsection (a) of the
^"^ first section. Without abridging in any way the authority
^^ conferred upon the select committee by the preceding

sentence, the Senate further expressly authorizes and directs

the select conunittee to make a complete investigation and

study of the activities of any agency or of any and all persons

^^ or groups of persons or organizations of any kind which

^^ have any tendency to reveal the full facts with respect to

^^ the following matters or questions :

22 |i) Whether the Central Intelligence Agency has

^^ conducted an illegal domestic mtelligence operation in

^ the United States.

639

1 (2) The oondnrt of domestic' iulolHg('iK*e or eoiin-

2 teriiitclligcneo (►pora.lioiis against United States citizens

3 by the Eedeml Bureau of Investigation or any other

4 Federal agency.

5 (3) The origin and disposition of the so-called Hus-
g ton Plan to apply United States intelligence agency

7 capaibdlities against individuals or organizations within

8 the United States.

9 (4) The extent to which the Federal Bureau of In-

10 vestigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other

11 Federal law enforcement or intelhgence agencies coordi-

12 nate their respective activities, any agi'eements which

13 govern that coordination, and the extent to which a lack

14 of coordination has contributed to activities or actions

15 which are illegal, improper, inefficient, unethical, or con-

16 trary to the intent of Congress.

17 (5). The extent to which the operation of domestic

18 intelligence or counteriritelligence activities and the

19 operation of any other act>ivities within the United States

20 by the Central Intelligence Agency conforms to the leg-

21 isktive charter of that Agency and the intent of the

22 Congress.

23 (6) The past and present interpretation by the

24 Director of Central Intelligence of the responsibility to

25 protect intelligence sources and methods as it relates to

640

1 the provision in section 102(d) (3) oi the National

2 Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(d) (3)) that

3 "... that the agency shall have no police, subpena, law

4 enforcement powers, or internal security functions. . . ."

5 (7) Nature and extent of executive branch over-

6 sight of all United States intelligence activities.

7 (8) The need for specific legislative authority to

8 govern the operations of any intelligence agencies of

9 the Federal Government now existing without that

10 explicit statutory authority, Including but not Kmited to

11 agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency and

12 the National Security Agency.

13 The natme and extent to which Federal agencies
1"^ cooperate and exchange intelligence information and
1^ the adequacy of any regulations or statutes which
1^ govern such cooperation and exchange of Intelligence
1' Information.

18 (9) The extent to which United States Intelligence

19 agencies are governed by Executive orders, rules, or

20 regulations either published or secret nnd the extcait

21 to which those Executive orders, rules, or regulations

22 interpret, expand, or are in conflict with specific legls-

23 latlve authority.
(10) The violation or suspected violalion of any

State or Federal statute by any intcllijicm-e agency or

24
25

641

1 by any pei-son by or on Ijchalf of any intelligence agency

2 of the Federal Government including but not limited

3 to surreptitious entries, surveillance, wiretaps, or eaves-

4 di'opping, illegal opening of the United States mail, or

5 the monitoring of the United States mail.

6 (11) The need for improved, stiengthened, or con-

7 solidated oversight of United States intelligence ac-

8 tivlties by the Congress.

9 (12) Whether any of the exisiting laws of the
10 ' ' United States are inadequate, either in their provisions
il or manner of enforcement, to safeguai-d the rights of

12 American citizens, to improve executive and legislative

13 control of intelligence and related activities, and to re-

14 solve uncertainties as to the authority of United States

15 intelligence and related agencies.

16 (13) Whether there is unnecessary duplication of
1'' expen^itui-e and efifoit in the collection and processing

18 of inteiUigence information by United States agencies.

19 (14) The extent and necessity of overt and covert

20 intelligence activities in the United States and abroad.

21 (15) Such other related matters as the committee

22 deems necessary in order to rarry out its responsibilities
-•^ under section (a) .

24 Sec. 3. (a) To enable the select committee to make
-•^ the invcstio-ation and study authorized nnd directed by this

69-983 O - 76 - 41

642

1 resolution, the Senate hereby empowers the select committee

2 as an agency oi the Senate (1) to employ anil fix the eom-

3 i)ensati(»n of snch clerical, investij^atory, legal, technical,

4 and other assistants as it deems necessary or appropriate,

5 but it may not exceed the nonnal Senate salary schedules;

6 (2) to sit and act at any time or place during sessions,

7 recesses, and adjournment periods of the Senate; (3) to hold

8 hearings for taking testimony on oath or to receive docu-

9 mentary or ph3'sical evidence relating to the matters and

10 questions it is authorized to investigate or study; (4) to

11 require by subpena or otherwise the attendance as witnesses

12 of any persons who the select committee believes have

13 knowledge or infonnation concerning any of the mafctei's
!■* or questions it is authorized to investigate and study; (5)
1^ to require by subpena or order any department, agency,
1^ officer, or employee of the executive branch of the United
^'^ States Government, or any private person, firm, or corpora-
ls tion, to produce for its oonsideratlon or for use as evidence

19 in its investigation and study any books, checks, canceled

20 checks, correspondence, communications, document, papers,

21 physical evidence, records, recordings, tapes, or materials rc-

22 lating to any of the matters or questions it is authorized to

23 investigate and study which they or any of them may have

24 in their custody or under their control; (0) to make to the
^"^ Senate any recommendations it deems appropriate in respect

643

1 to the willful failure or refusal of any person to answer <|ues-

2 tions or give testimony in his character as a witness during

3 his appearance before it or in resj)ect to the willful failure

4 or refusal of any officer or employee of the executive branch

5 of the United States Government or any person, firm, or

6 corporation to produce before the committee i\\\y books,

7 checks, canceled checks, correspondence, communications,

8 document, financial records, papers, physical evidence,

9 records, recordings, tapes, or materials in obedience to any

10 subpena or order; (7) to take depositions and other tcsti-

11 mony on oath anywhere within the United States or in any

12 other country; (8) to procure the temporary or intcrmit-
1^^ tent services of uidividual considtiints, or organizations there-
^^ of, in the same maim€r and under th€ same conditions as
^^ a standing committee of the Senate may procure such scrv-
^^ ices mider section 202 (i) of the Legislative lleorgani/.a-
^'^ tiou Act of 1^46; (i)) to use on a rehnbursable basis, with
^^ the prior consent of the Committee on Rules and Adminis-
^^ tration, the services of personnel of any such department
^^ or agency; (10) to use on a reimbursable basis or other-
^^ wise with the prior consent of the chairman of any sub-
•^•^ committee of any committee of the Senate the facilities or
^^ .services of any members of the staffs of such other Senate
^"* conmiilloes or any subconnuittees of such other Senate com-
*"^ mitteos whenever the select committee or its cluiinnan deems

644

that such action is necessaiy or appropriate to enable the

select commit tee to make the investigation and study author-

^ ized and directed hy this resolution; (II) to h.ive direct

access throuoli the ao-ency of any mend)ers of the select

_ committee or any of its investigatory or legal assistants

divsignated hy it or its chairman or the ranking minoritj'^

monther to any data, evidence, infonnation, report, anal3'^sis,

Q or document or papers, relating to any of the matters or

Q questions which it is authorized and directed to investig-ate

IQ and study in the custody or under the control of any dq)art-

^-. ment, agenc}', officer, or employee of the executive l)ranch

y, of the T' iiitcd Slates (lovcrmnent, including any department,

-.o agency, officer, or employee of the Ihiited States Govern-

14, HK'nt having the power under the laws of the United States

15 to investigate any alleged criminal activities or to pr(>sccute

K) jKTSKuis charged mth crimes against the United States and

17 any departpient, agency, officer, or employee of the United

18 States Government' having the autboiity to conduct inteBi-

19 gence or surveillance within or outside the United States,

20 without regard to the jiu'isdiction or authority of any other

21 Senate C(miniittcc, which will aid the select committee io

22 prepare for or conduct the investigation and study authorized
28 and directed 1)y this resolution; and (12) to expend to the
24 extent it determines necessary or appropriate any moneys

645

- made available to it by the Senate to pci-form the duties

„ and exercise the powei^s conferred upon it by this resohition

o and to make the investigation and study it is authorized by

A this resolution to make.

K (b) Siibpenas may be issued by the select committee

f. acting through the chainnan or any other member designated

,, by him, and may be served by any person designated by

g such chairman or other member anywhere within the borders

g of the United States. The chairman of the select committee,

jQ . or any other member thereof, is hereby authorized to admin-

■i^ ister oaths to any witnesses appearing before the committee.

■JO (c) In preparing for or conducting the investigation

23 and study authorized and directed by this resolution, the

14 select committee shall be empowered to exercise the powei-s

15 conferred upon committees of the Senate by section 6002 of

16 title 18, United States Code, or any other Act of Congress

17 regukitang the' granting of inmiunity to witnesses.

18 Sec. 4. The select committee shall have authority to

19 recoEomend the enactment of any new legislation or the

20 amendment of any existmg statute which it considers neces-

21 sary or desirable to strenghen or clarify the national secu-

22 rity, intelligence, or surveillance activities of the United

23 States and to protect the rights of United States citizens

24 with regard to those activities.

646

1 Sec. 5. The select committee shall make a final report

2 of the results of the iiives'tigation and study conducted by

3 it i)ursuant to this resolution, together with its findings and

4 its recommendations as to new congressional legislation it

5 deems necessary or desirable, to the Senate at the earliest

6 practicable date, but no later than September 1, 1975. The

7 sekct committee may also su'bmit to the Senate such interim

8 reports as it considers appropriate. After submission of its

9 final report, the select committee shall have three calendar

10 months to close its affairs, and on the expiration of such

11 three calendar months shall cease to exist.

12 Sec. 6. The expenses of the select committee through

13 Sopteml)er 1, 1975, under this resx)lution shall not exceed
U $750,000 of which amount not to exceed $100,000 shall be

15 available for the procurement of the services of individual

16 consultants or organizations thereof. Such expenses shall be

17 paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers

18 approved by the chairman of the select committee.

19 Sec. 7. The select committee shall institute and carry

20 out such rules and procedures as it may deem necessary to

21 prevent (1) the disclosure, outside the select committee, of

22 any infonnation relating to the activities of the Central In-

23 telligence Agency or any other department or agency of the

24 Federal Government engaged in intelligence activities, ob-

647

I tained by the select committee during the course of its study

and investigation, not authorized by the select committee

3 to be disclosed; and (2) the disclosure, outside the select

4- committee, of any infoniiation which would adversely affect

5 the intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence Agency

6 in foreign countries or the intelligence activities in foreign

7 countries of an}' other ilepartment or agency of the Federal

8 Government.

9 8eCo 8. As a condition for employment as described in

10 section 3 of this resolution, each person sh«ll agree not to

11 accept any honorarium, royalty or other payment for a

12 speaking engagement, magaz-ine article, book, or other en-

13 deavor connected with the investigation and study under-

14 taken by this committee.

15 Sec. 9. Xo employee of the select committee or any

16 person engaged 1)y contract or otherwise to perform services

17 for the select committee shall be given access to any classi-

18 fied infonnation by the select committee unless sttch em-

19 ployee oi- person has received an appropriate security clear-

20 ance as determined by the select committee. The tvpe of

21 security clearance to be required in the case of any such

22 employee or person shall, within the determination of the

23 select committee, be commensurate with the sensitivity of

24 the classified information to which stu-h cm])l()yce or person

25 will be given access bv the select conmiiltcc.

STAFF LIST

This Final Report is the result of a sustained effort by the entire
Committee staff. The Committee wishes to express its appreciation to
the members of the support, legal, research, and Task Force staffs, who
made a substantial contribution to this Report and who have served
the Committee and the Senate with integrity and loyalty :

David Aaron Task Force Leader.

William Bader Task Force Leader.

Barbara Banoff Counsel.

Howard Barkey Consultant.

Frederick Baron Counsel.

Laurie Bartlet Secretary.

Lawrence Baskir Counsel.

John Bayly Counsel.

Charity Benz Office Manager.

Richard Betts Professional Staff Member.

Beth Bloomfield Research Assistant.

Sam Bouchard Professional Staff Member.

Harriet Bramble Secretary.

Belva Brissett Secretary.

Nancy Brooks Secretary.

Maxine Brown Secretary.

Andrew Burness Clerk.

David Bushong Counsel.

Margaret Carpenter Research Assistant.

Barry Carter Counsel.

Barbara Chesnik Research Assistant.

Lot Cooke Clerk/Security.

Elizabeth Culbreth Counsel.

Lynn Davis Professional Staff Member.

Spencer Davis Press Secretary.

Rhett Dawson Counsel.

Tom Dawson Research Assistant.

James De Marco Counsel.

Joseph Dennin Counsel.

Mary De Oreo Research Assistant.

Mary de Temple Secretary.

James Dick Counsel.

Joseph di Genova Counsel.

Dorothy Dillon Research Assistant.

Patricia Doolittle Secretary.

Daniel Dwyer, Jr Research Assistant.

Robert Edwards, Jr Clerk/Security.

John Elliff Task Force Leader.

Betty Ellison Secretary.

Michael Epstein Counsel.

(649)

650

Joan Erno ■. Secretary.

Peter Fenn Professional Staff Member.

Harold Ford Consultant.

Eichard Garwin Consultant.

Mark Gitenstein Counsel.

Janette Glide well Secretary.

Bruce Grant Counsel.

Edward Greissing Research Assistant.

Arthur Harrigan Consultant.

William Harris Consultant.

Audrey Hatry Clerk of the Committee.

Deborah Herbst Assistant Press Secretary.

Paulette Hodges Secretary.

Karl Inderfurth Professional Staff Member.

Portia Iverson Secretary.

Arthur Jefferson Counsel.

Dorothy Johnson Secretary.

Loch Johnson Professional Staff Member.

Yolanda Johnson Clerk.

James Johnston Counsel.

Anne Karalekas Professional Staff Member.

Jeffrey Kay den Research Assistant.

Robert Kelley Counsel.

Lawrence Kieves Control Coordinator.

Charles Kirbow Counsel.

Joseph Kirchheimer Consultant.

Diane Koppal Secretary.

Susan Koscis Secretary.

Diane LaVoy Research Assistant.

George Lawton Professional Staff Member.

Howard Liebengood Consultant.

Charles Lombard Professional Staff Member.

Dan McCorkle Clerk/Security.

Dorothy Mclntyre Secretary.

Martha MacDonald Secretary.

Naldeen MacDonald Research Assistant.

Michael Madigan Counsel.

Ben Marshall Security Director.

Cynthia Mascioli Secretary.

Judith Mason Research Assistant.

Ernest May Consultant.

Betty Mayo Secretary.

Elliott Maxwell Counsel.

Ellen Metsky Clerk.

Paul Michel Counsel.

William Miller Staff Director.

Patricia Monaco Secretary.

Janet Moore Secretary.

Michael Murphy Clerk/Security Assistant.

Lois Nuss Secretary.

James O'Flaherty Professional Staff Member.

Jan Orloff Research Director.

Lynsey Oster Clerk.

651

Drena Owens Secretary.

John Peterson Research Director.

Susan Pitts Research Assistant.

Andrew Postal Counsel.

Christopher Pyle Consultant.

Alton Quanbeck Task Force Leader.

Ted Ralston Research Assistant.

Harry Ransom Consultant.

Gordon Rhea Counsel.

Eric Richard Counsel.

Walter Ricks III Counsel.

Alan Romberg Professional Staff Member.

James Ro we Research Assistant.

Ruth Schneider Secretary.

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr Chief Counsel.

Paula Schwartz Clerk.

Lester Seidel Counsel.

Patrick Shea Professional Staff Member.

John L. Smith Counsel.

Elizabeth Smith Research Assistant.

Stephanie Smith Clerk.

Curtis Smothers Counsel for Minority.

Britt Snider Counsel.

Martha Talley Counsel.

Athan Theoharis Consultant

Florence Thoben Mail Clerk.

Sherry To well Office Manager.

Gregory Treverton Professional Staff Member.

William Truehart Consultant.

James Tschirgi Professional Staff Member.

James Turner Research Assistant.

Richard Ullman Consultant.

Paul Wallach Counsel.

William White Prof essional Staff Member.

Burton Wides . Counsel.

Carol Wiik Document Clerk.

Joan Wilson Secretary.

Otis Wilson Consultant.

Peter Zimmerman Consultant.

Phebe Zimmerman Research Assistant.

BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY

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Full text of "Final report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate : together with additional, supplemental, and separate views"

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