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Full text of "Final report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate : together with additional, supplemental, and separate views"

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GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS 
DEPARTMENT 

BOSTON PUBUCUBRARY 

SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF 

EEPOETS ON FOBEIGN AND 

MILITAEY INTELLIGENCE 



BOOK IV 



FINAL REPORT 

OF THE 

SELECT COMMITTEE 
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS 

WITH RESPECT TO 

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 
UNITED STATES SENATE 




April 23 (under authority of the order of April 14), 1976 



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
WASHINGTON : 1976 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documenta, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, B.C. 20402 - Price $1.90 



SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS 
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 

FRANK CHURCH, Idaho, Chairman 
JOHN G. TOWER, Texas, Vice Chairman 

PHILIP A. HART, Michigan HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee 

WALTER F. MONDALB, Minnesota BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona 

WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, Kentucky CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr., Maryland 

ROBERT MORGAN, North Carolina RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, Pennsylvania 
GARY HART, Colorado 

William G. Miller, Staff Director 

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel 

Cdrtis R. Smothers, Counsel to the Minority 

Audrey Hatry, Clerk of the Committee 

(II) 



LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 



On behalf of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, and pursuant to 
the mandate of Senate Resolution 21, I am transmitting herewith to 
the Senate two detailed staff reports which supplement Book I of the 
Committee's final report, entitled Foreign and Military Intelligence. 
In addition, this Book contains the addenda to the Committee's In- 
terim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots and a composite of writ- 
ten interrogatories submitted by the Committee to former President 
Richard M. Nixon and his responses. 

The turbulent history of the past 30 years is closely bound to reasons 
for the growth and evolution of the intelligence functions in the 
United States Government. The first study in this volume is an un- 
classified history of the Central Intelligence Agency. It is published 
to assist the Congress and the people of the United States to better 
understand the nature and character of the intelligence activities 
undertaken by their government. It is also intended to assist those 
who must make judgments about the necessity for intelligence activi- 
ties by the United States in the future. The Select Committee is grate- 
ful for the assistance given by the Executive branch to the Committee 
in the preparation of this historical study. 

The second study contained in this volume, "Intelligence and Tech- 
nology", was written by Dr. Richard Garwin, a distinguished scien- 
tist who has served the Select Committee as a consultant. It was pre- 
pared for the Committee in order to enable the Congress to understand 
the potential threats that intelligence technology can create for the 
rights of U.S. citizens. Successor committees will have the task of 
drafting charter legislation for the intelligence activities of the United 
States Government. This essay is intended to provide a glimpse into the 
future of intelligence technology so that in the drafting of new laws 
there could be a sufficient awareness of intelligence technology to make 
sensible balancing judgments between the needs of intelligence and 
the rights of American citizens guaranteed by the Constitution. 

Once again I want to acknowledge the great effort, dedication, and 
talent of the Committee staff. Finally, I want to express the deep ap- 
preciation of the Committee to Senator Walter D. Huddleston for his 
work as Chairman of the Foreign and Military Intelligence Subcom- 
mittee and the work of the other Subcommittee members. Senator 
Charles McC. Mathias, Senator Gary Hart, and Senator Barry 
Goldwater. 

Frank Church, 
ChaivTrum. 



CONTENTS 



Page 

Letter of Transmittal m 

HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 1 

Introduction 1 

PART ONE : The Central Intelligence Group and the Central Intelligence 

Agency, 1946-52 4 

I. The OSS precedent 4 

II. The Origins of the Central Intelligence Group 6 

III. The Directors of Central Intelligence, 1946-52 9 

IV. The Evolution of the Central Intelligence Function, 1946-49 12 

V. Clandestine Activities 25 

PART TWO : The Dulles era, 1953-61 42 

I. The Clandestine Service 45 

II. Intelligence Production 55 

III. The Coordination Problem 60 

PART THREE : Change and Routinization, 1961-70 64 

I. The Directors of Central Intelligence, 1961-70 65 

II. The Clandestine Service 66 

IIL The Effort at Management Reform 72 

IV. The Directorate of Science and Technology (D.D.S. & T 77 

V. Intelligence Production 78 

PART FOUR : The Recent Past, 1971-75 83 

I. Tlie Directors of Central Intelligence, 1973-75 84 

II. Attempts at Redirection 85 

PART FIVE : Conclusions 91 

Organizational Charts 96 

List of Acronyms 103 

INTELLIGENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 109 

L Background 109 

II. Covert Observation and Intercept 110 

III. File Technology — 114 

ADDENDA TO THE INTERIM REPORT ON ALLEGED ASSASSINA- 
TION PLOTS 121 

I. Schneider Case 121 

II. The "Special Operations" Unit 128 

III. The Question of Discrediting Action Against Jack Anderson 133 

IV. Miscellaneous Evidence and Errata 138 

APPENDIX : 

Select Committee Interrogatories for Former President Richard M. 

Nixon 143 

Staff list 173 

(V) 



EDITORIAL NOTE 

This history was reviewed and declassified by the appropriate execu- 
tive agencies. These agencies submitted comments on the security and 
factual aspects of the history. On the basis of these comments some 
deletions were made to protect intelligence sources and methods. They 
included names of individuals, dollar amounts, and personnel numbers. 
Proportions and percentages are used in lieu of specific figures. 

Although the Committee received access to some files on covert oper- 
ations, the access was by no means complete. For this reason and be- 
cause executive agencies have objected to disclosures to covert activi- 
ties, the treatment of covert operations has been restricted to general 
descriptive information. 

The limited time available prevented making this history on so com- 
plex a subject thoroughly comprehensive. 

(VI) 



HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

Introduction ^ 

During the past two years the Central Intelligence Agency has been 
the object of continuing public scrutiny, much of which has focused 
on the Agency's abuses. The current political climate and the mystique 
of secrecy surrounding the intelligence profession have made it dif- 
ficult to view the CIA in the context of U.S. foreign policy and the 
Agency's development as an institution. This history will examine 
the CIA's organizational evolution, evaluating the influences that 
have shaped the Agency and determined its activities. An historical 
study of this nature serves two important purposes. First, it provides 
a means of understanding the Agency's structure. Second, and more 
importantly, by analyzing the causal elements in the CIA's pattern of 
activity, the study should illuminate the possibilities for and the ob- 
stacles to future reform in the United States foreign intelligence 
system. 

An institutionalized intelligence function is not unique to the United 
States Government, The tradition of formalized reporting organiza- 
tions dates back to the 16th century in Britain, to the 19th century in 
France, and to the 18th century in Czarist Russia. In establishing a 
peacetime central intelligence body after World War II, the United 
States as one of the great powers came late to defining the need for 
an intelligence institution as an arm of foreign policy. Secretary of 
State Henry Stimson's alleged statement, "Gentlemen do not read each 
other's mail" reflected the United States' rejection of ongoing espionage 
activities. Over the course of history American presidents and the 
military services employed agents to engage in clandestine missions, 
particularly in times of war. However, the distinction between these 
sporadic activities and an institutionalized structure for generating 
information for senior officials was a significant one. The decision to 
create a separate agency implied recognition of the intelligence func- 
tion as an integral part of the foreign and military policy process. 
Today the United States military and civilian intelligence establish- 
ment employs thousands of people and expends billions of dollars 

' This history of the CIA is based on four principal groups of sources. Since 
classification restrictions prevent citing individual sources directly, the categories 
are identified as follows : (1) Approximately seventy-five volumes from the series 
of internal CIA histories, a rich if uneven collection of studies, which deal with 
individual Agency components, the administrations of the Directors of Central 
Intelligence, and specializetl areas of intelligence analysis. The histories have been 
compiled since the late 1940's and constitute a unique institutional memory. (2) 
Approximately sixty interviews with present and retired Agency employees. These 
interviews were invaluable in providing depth of insight and understanding to 
the organization. (3) Special .studies and reiwrts conducted both within and 
outside the Agency. They comprise reviews of functional areas and the overall 
administration of the CIA. (4) Documents and statistics supplied to the Com- 
mittee by the CIA in response to specific requests. They include internal com- 
munications, budgetary allocations, and information on grade levels and personnel 
strengths. This history of the CIA was prepared for the Select Committee by Anne 
Karalekas, staff member. 

(1) 



annually. The Central Intelligence Agency is one organization in that 
establishment. 

In contemplating the role of a central intelligence organization and 
its relationship to foreign policy, one can define the objectives that 
the agency might achieve. It should gather information that is other- 
wise unobtainable ; it should have the institutional independence that 
allows it to interpret information objectively and in a way that assists 
policymakers to make decisions ; it should have the access that insures 
maximum use of its analysis; with appropriate direction from the 
Executive branch and oversight from the Legislative branch it might 
undertake clandestine operations in support of United States foreign 
policy. 

The CIA has functioned in each of these capacities, but not with 
equal concentration of resources and attention to each area. During 
the past twenty-nine years, the Agency's overall effort and the relative 
emphasis among its functions have been affected by four factors : the 
international environment as perceived by senior policymakers; the 
institutional milieu created by other agencies serving similar func- 
tions; the Agency's internal structure, particularly the incentives 
which rewarded certain kinds of activities more than others; and the 
individual serving as the Director of Central Intelligence, his prefer- 
ences and his relative stature. This study will examine the CIA's 
history, determining which influences were most important at which 
periods and evaluating their impact on the Agency's development. 

Today the CIA is ideiitified primarily in terms of its espionage and 
covert action capabilities, i.e. spying operations and political action, 
])ropaganda, economic, and paramilitary activities designed to in- 
fluence foreign governments. However, the motivating purpose in the 
creation of the Agency was very different. Before the end of World 
A\'ar II American policymakers conceived the idea of a peacetime 
central intelligence organization to provide senior government officials 
with high-quality, objective intelligence analysis. At the time of the 
new agency's creation the military services and the State Department 
had their own independent collection and analysis capabilities. How- 
ever, the value of their analysis was limited," since their respective 
policy objectives often skewed their judgments. A centralized body 
was intended to produce "national intelligence estimates" independent 
of policy biases and to provide direction over the other intelligence 
organizations to minimize duplication of efforts.- 

Within two years of its creation the CIA assumed functions very 
different from 'its principal mission, becoming a competing producer 
of current intelligence and a covert operational instrument in the 
American cold war offensive. In size, function, and scale of activities 
the CIA has expanded consistently. 

In addition, the problem of duplication among intelligence agencies 
remained. Since 1947 growth in the scale and number of United States 
intelligence agencies has paralleled the CIA's own growth. In fact, 
much of the history of the CIA's role in intelligence analysis has been 



- "National" intelligence meant integratetl interdepartmental intelligence that 
exeeedetl the persi>ective and competence of individual departments and that 
covered the broad aspects of national policy. "Estimates" meant predictive judg- 
ments on the policies and motives of foreign governments rather than descriptive 
summaries of daily events or "current intelligence." 



a histoi-y of its efforts to emerge as an independent agency among num- 
erous intelligence organizations within the government. Today these 
organizations and the CIA itself are referred to as the intelligence 
"community," although they have been and continue to be competi- 
tors in intelligence collection and analysis.^ 

This study is not intended to catalogue the CIA's covert operations, 
but to present an analytical framework within which the Agency's de- 
velopment and practices may be understood. The CIA's twenty-nine 
year history is divided into four segments: 1946 to 1952, 1953 to 1961, 
1962 to 1970, and 1971 to 1975. Because the CIA's basic internal or- 
ganization and procedures evolved during the first period, these years 
are treated in somewhat greater detail than the others. 

^ At the time of the CIA's creation in 1947 only the State Department and the 
military services engaged in intelligence collection and analysis. Today the or- 
ganizations responsible for U.S. intelligence activities include : 

—The National Security Agency (NSA) which was established in 1952 and is 
under the direction of the Defense Department. NSA monitors and decodes for- 
eign communications and electronic signals. It is the largest U.S. intelligence 
agency and is a collector of data rather than a producer of intelligence analysis. 

— The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), established in 1961, is responsible 
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. DIA was intended to 
limit duplication among the service intelligence agencies. Its primary task is 
production rather than collection. 

— The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the State Department's intelli- 
gence component, has no independent collection capability of its own but employs 
Foreign Service reports in the production of analyses for the Department's 
senior oflScials. 

— The service intelligence agencies. Army, Navy and Air Force, collect and 
analyze information related to "tactical intelligence," essentially regional in- 
telligence on foreign military capabilities. 

— The FBI, the Treasury Department and the Energy Research and Develop- 
ment Administration have intelligence capabilities that support their respective 
missions. 



Part One 

The Central Intelligence Group and the Central Intelligence 
Agency, 1946-1952 

introduction 

The years 194'6 to 1952 were the most crucial in determining the 
functions of the central intelligence organization. The period marked 
a dramatic transformation in the mission, size, and structure of the 
new agency. In 1946 the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), the CIA's 
predecessor, was conceived and established as a coordinating body to 
minimize the duplicative efforts of the departmental intelligence com- 
ponents and to provide objective intelligence analysis to senior policy- 
maker. By 1952 the Central Intelligence Agency was engaged in 
clandestine collection, independent intelligence production, and covert 
operations. The CIG was an extension of the Departments; its person- 
nel and budget were allocated from State, War and Navy. By 1952 
the CIA had developed into an independent government agency com- 
manding manpower and budget far exceeding anything originally 
imagined. 

/. The OSS Precedent 

The concept of a peacetime central intelligence agency had its ori- 
gins in World War II with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). 
Through the driving initiative and single-minded determination of 
William J. Donovan, sponsor and first director of OSS, the organi- 
zation became the United States' first independent intelligence body 
and provided the organizational precedent for the Central Intelli- 
gence Agency. In large part, CIA's functions, structure, and expertise 
were drawn from OSS. 

A prominent attorney and World War I hero, "Wild Bill" Donovan 
had traveled extensively in Europe and had participated in numerous 
diplomatic missions for the government after the war. A tour of 
Europe for President Roosevelt in 1940 convinced him of the neces- 
sity for a centralized intelligence organization. Donovan's ideas about 
the purposes an intelligence agency should serve had been shaped by 
his knowledge of and contact with the British intelligence services, 
which encompassed espionage, intelligence analysis, and subversive 
operations — albeit in separately administered units. The plan which 
Donovan advocated in 1940 envisioned intelligence collection and 
analysis, espionage, sabotage, and propaganda in a single organiza- 
tion. Essentially, this remained the basic formulation for the central 
intelligence organization for the next thirty years. 

The immediacy of the war in Europe gave force to Donovan's pro- 
posal for a central agency, the principal purpose of which was to 
provide the President with integi-ated national intelligence. Acting on 
Donovan's advice, Franklin Roosevelt established the Office of Coor- 

(4) 



dinator of Informtion (COI) in the summer of 1941. COI with 
Donovan as Coordinator, reported directly to the President. Its spe- 
cific duties were to collect and analyze information for senior officials, 
drawing on information from the Army, Navy, and State Departments 
when appropriate. A year after its creation, when the United States 
was embroiled in war with Germany and Japan, the Office was re- 
named the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and placed under the di- 
rection of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

The British provided invaluable assistance to OSS. British experts 
served as instructors to their American counterparts in communica- 
tions, counterespionage, subversive propaganda, and special opera- 
tions. In real terms the British provided American intelligence with 
the essence of its "tradecraft" — the techniques required to carry out 
intelligence activities. 

OSS was divided into several branches. The Research and Analysis 
(R&A) branch provided economic, social, and political analyses, sift- 
ing information from foreign newspapers and international business 
and labor publications. The Secret Intelligence (SI) branch engaged 
in clandestine collection from within enemy and neutral territory. 
The Special Operations ( SO ) branch conducted sabotage and worked 
with resistance forces. The Counterespionage (X-2) branch engaged 
in protecting U.S. and Allied intelligence operations from enemy 
penetrations. The Morale Operations (MO) branch was responsible 
for covert or "black" propaganda. Operational Groups (OG) con- 
ducted guerrilla operations in enemy territory. Finally, the Maritime 
Unit (MU) carried out maritime sabotage. 

Although by the end of the war OSS had expanded dramatically, 
the organization encountered considerable resistance to the execution 
of its mission. From the outset the military were reluctant to provide 
OSS with information for its research and analysis role and restricted 
its operations. General Douglas MacArthur excluded OSS from China 
and the Pacific theater (although OSS did operate in Southeast Asia). 
In addition to demanding that OSS be specifically prohibited from 
conducting domestic espionage, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and 
Nelson Rockefeller, then Coordinator of Inter- American Affairs, in- 
sisted on maintaining their jurisdiction over Latin America, thereby 
excluding OSS from that area. 

These operational limitations were indicative of the obstacles which 
OSS encountered as a new organization in the entrenched Washington 
bureaucracy. On the intelligence side, OSS failed to establish a con- 
sistent channel of input. Roosevelt relied on informal conversations 
and a retinue of personal aides in his decisions. The orderly procedure 
of reviewing, evaluating, and acting on the basis of intelligence was 
simply not part of his routine. Roosevelt's erratic process of decision- 
making and the Departments' continued reliance on their own sources 
of information frustrated Donovan's hope that OSS would become 
the major resource for other agencies. 

Nonetheless, General Donovan was firm in his conviction that a cen- 
tralized intelligence organization was an essential element for senior 
policymakers. Anticipating the end of the war, Donovan recommended 
the continuance of all OSS functions in a peacetime agency directly 
responsible to the President. Having endured the difficulties surround- 
ing the establishment of OSS, Donovan had by 1944 accepted the fact 



6 

that a separate, independent intelligence agency would have to coexist 
with the intelligence services of the other Departments. In a November 

1944 memorandum to Roosevelt in which he recommended the main- 
tenance of a peacetime intelligence organization Donovan stated : 

You will note that coordination and centralization are 
placed at the policy level but operational intelligence (that 
pertaining primarily to Department action) remains with- 
in the existing agencies concerned. The creation of a central 
authority thus would not conflict with or limit necessary in- 
telligence functions within the Army, Navy, Department of 
State, and other agencies. 

Donovan's hope that OSS would continue uninterrupted did not 
materialize. President Harry S Truman ordered the disbandment of 
OSS as of October 1, 1945, at the same time maintaining and trans- 
ferring several OSS branches to other departments. The Research and 
Analysis Branch was relocated in the State Department, and the Se- 
cret Intelligence and Counterespionage Branches were transferred to 
the War Department, where they formed the Strategic Services Unit 
(SSU). Although it is impossible to determine conclusively, there is 
no evidence that OSS subversion and sabotage operations continued 
after the war. SSU and the former R&A Branch did continue their 
activities under the direction of their respective departments. 

The OSS wartime experience foreshadowed many of CIA's prob- 
lems. Both OSS and CIA encountered resistance to the exex^ution of 
their mission from other government departments; both experienced 
the difficulty of having their intelligence "heard"; and both were 
characterized by the dominance of theii- clandestine operational 
components. 

//. The Origins of the Central I^ntelligence Group 

As the war ended, new patterns of decisionmaking emerged within 
the United States Government. In the transition from war to peace, 
policymakers were redefining their organizational and informational 
needs. A new President influenced the manner and substance of the 
decisions. Unlike Franklin Roosevelt, Avhose conduct of foreign policy 
was informal and personalized, Harry Truman preferred regular 
meetings of his full cabinet. Senior officials in the State, War, and 
Navy Departments were more consistent participants in presidential 
decisions than they had been under Roosevelt. In part this was a 
result of Truman's recognition of his lack of experience in foreign 
policy and his reliance on others for advice. Nonetheless, Truman's 
forthright decisiveness made him a strong leader and gained him the 
immediate respect of those who worked with him. 

Secretary of State James F. Byrnes had little diplomatic experi- 
ence, although he had an extensive background in domestic politics, 
having served in the House and Senate and on the Supreme Court. 
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, a lawyer by training, had 
been immersed in the problems of war supply and production. In 

1945 he faced the issue of demobilization and its implications for 
the U.S. postwar position. Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal 



was probably the individual with the most fully developed ideas on 
foreign policy in the cabinet. As early as May 1945 he had expressed 
concern over the potential threat of the Soviet Union and for the 
next two years he continued to be in the vanguard of U.S. officials who 
perceived the U.S.S.R. as the antagonist to the United States. 

Among the Secretaries, Forrestal was also a vocal proponent of 
more effective coordination wdthin the Government. He favored some- 
thing similar to the British war cabinet system, and along with it a 
central organization to provide intelligence estimates. In the fall of 
1945, Forrestal took several initiatives to sound out departmental 
preferences for the creation of a central agency. These initiatives 
were crucial in developing a consensus about the need for centralized 
intelligence production, if not about the structure of the organization 
serving the need. 

Truman himself shared Forrestal's conviction and supported the 
Secretary's efforts to review the problem of centralization and re- 
organization. From October through December 1945, U.S. Govern- 
ment agencies, spurred on by Forrestal, engaged in a series of policy 
debates about the necessity for and the nature of the future U.S. 
intelligence capability. Three major factors dominated the discus- 
sion. First was the issue of postwar defense reorganization. The de- 
bate focused around the question of an independent Air Force and 
the unification of the services under a Department of Defense — 
whether there should be separate services (the Air Force becoming 
independent) with a Joint Chiefs of Staff organization and a civilian 
Secretary of Defense coordinating them, or a single Department of 
National Defense with one civilian secretary and, more importantly, 
one chief of staff and one unified general staff. Discussion of a sepa- 
rate central intelligence agency and its structure, authority, and 
accountability was closely linked to the reorganization issue. 

Second, it was clear from the outset that neither separate service 
departments nor a single Department of National Defense would 
willingly resign its intelligence function and accompanying personnel 
and budgetary allotments to a new central agency. If such an agency 
came into being, it would exist in parallel with military intelligence 
organizations and with a State Department political intelligence or- 
ganization. At most, its head w^ould have a coordinating function 
comparable to that envisioned for a relatively weak Secretary of 
Defense. 

Third, the functions under discussion were intelligence analysis 
and the dissemination of intelligence. The shadow of the Pearl Har- 
bor disaster dominated policymakers' thinking about the purpose of 
a central intelligence agency. They saw themselves rectifying the 
conditions that allowed Pearl Harbor to happen — a fragmented mili- 
tary-based intelligence apparatus, which in current terminology 
could not distinguish "siojials" from "noise," let alone make its as- 
sessments available to senior officials. 

Within the government in the fall of 1945 numerous studies ex- 
plored the options for the future defense and intelliarence organiza- 
tions. None advocated givinjr a central independent group sole 
responsibility for either collection or analysis. All favored making the 



8 

central intelligence body responsible to the Departments themselves 
rather than to the President. Each Department lobbied for an arrange- 
ment that would give itself an advantage in intelligence coordination. 
In particular, Alfred McCormack, Special Assistant to Secretary of 
State Byrnes, was an aggressive, indeed, belligerent, advocate of State 
Department dominance in the production of national intelligence. 
President Truman had encouraged the State Department to take the 
lead in organizing an intelligence coordination mechanism. However, 
as McCormack continued to press for the primacy of the State Depart- 
ment, he encountered outright opposition from the military and from 
Foreign Service stalwarts who objected to the establishment of a sepa- 
rate office for intelligence and research within State. 

Among the studies that were underway, the most influential was 
the Eberstadt Report, directed by Ferdinand Eberstadt, an investment 
hanker and friend of Forrestal. Eberstadt's recommendations were 
the most comprehensive in advancing an integrated plan for defense 
reorganization and centralized decisionmaking. In June 1945, For- 
restal commissioned Eberstadt to study the proposed merger of the 
War and Navy Departments. In doing so, Eberstadt examined the 
entire structure of policymaking at the senior level — undoubtedly 
with Forrestal's preference for centralization well in mind. Eberstadt 
concluded that the War and Navy Departments could not be merged. 
Instead, he proposed a consultative arrangement for the State Depart- 
ment, the Army and the Navy, and an independent Air Force through 
a National Security Council (NSC) . 

Eberstadt stated that an essential element in the NSC mechanism 
was a central intelligence agency to supply "authoritative information 
on conditions and developments in the outside world." Without such 
an agency, Eberstadt maintained, the NSC "could not fulfill its role" 
nor could the military servicer "perform their duty to the nation." 
Despite the fact that the Ebei-stadt Report represented the most af- 
firmative formal statement of the need for intelligence analysis, it did 
not make the giant leap and recommend centralization of the depart- 
mental intelligence functions. In a section drafted by Rear Admiral 
Sidney Souers, Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence, and soon to be- 
come the first director of the central intelligence body, the report 
stated that each Department had its independent needs which required 
the maintenance of independent capabilities. The report recom- 
mended only a coordination role for the agency in the synthesis of 
de^^artmental intelligence.^ 

The Presidential Directive establishing the Central Intelligence 
Group reflected these preferences. The Departments retained au- 
tonomy over their intelligence services, and the CIG's budget and 
staff were to be drawn from the separate agencies. Issued on Janu- 
ary 22, 1946, the Directive provided the CIG with a Director of 
Central Intelligence (DCI), chosen by the President. The CIG was 
responsible for coordination, planning, evaluation, and dissemination 

^ Amid this major effort to define the role of a central intelligence agency, only 
one individual advocated the creation of an independent agency which would 
centralize the intelligence functions in the Government. General John Magruder, 
Chief of SISTJ, openly questioned the vpillingness of the separate agencies to co- 
operate in intelligence production. On that basis he argued for a separate agency 
wholly responsible for the collection and analysis of foreign intelligence. 



9 

of intelligence. It also was granted overt collection responsibility.^'' 
The National Intelligence Authority (NIA), a group comprised of 
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the 
Navy, and the personal representative of the President, served as 
the Director's supervisory body. The Intelligence Advisory Board 
(lAB), which included the heads of the military and civilian intel- 
ligence agencies, was an advisory group for the Director. 

Through budget, ])ersonnel, and oversight, the Departments had 
assured themselves control over the Central Intelligence Group. CIG 
was a creature of departments that were determined to maintain in- 
dependent capabilities as well as their direct advisory relationship 
to the President. In January 1946, they succeeded in doing both; by 
retaining autonomy over their intelligence operations, they established 
the strong institutional claims that would persist for the lifetime of 
the Central Intelligence Agency. 

///. The Directors of Central Intelligence^ 194-6-196^ 

At a time when the new agency was developing its mission, the role 
of its senior official was crucial. The Director of Central Intelligence 
was largely responsible for representing the agency's interests to the 
Department and for pressing its jurisdictional claims. From 1946 to 
1952, the strength of the agency relative to the Departments was de- 
pendent on the stature that the DCI commanded as an individual. 
The four DCIs during this period ranged from providing only weak 
leadership to firmly solidifying the new organization in the Wash- 
ington bureaucracy. Three of the four men were career military offi- 
cers. Their appointments were indicative of the degree of control 
the military services managed to retain over the agency and the ac- 
ceptance of the services' primary role in the intelligence process. 

Sidney W. Souers {January 19^6-June 1946) 
In January 1946, Sidney W. Souers — the only one of these DCIs 
who was not a career military officer — was appointed Director of Cen- 
tral Intelligence. Having participated in the drafting of the CIG di- 
rective, Souers had a fixed concept of the central intelligence function, 
one that did not challenge the position of the departmental intel- 
ligence services. 

Born and educated in the Midwest, Souers was a talented business 
executive. Before the war he amassed considerable wealth revitaliz- 
ing ailing corporations and developing new ones, particularly in the 
aviation industry. A naval reserve officer, Souers spent his wartime 
service in naval intellience, rising to the rank of Rear Admiral. His 
achievements in developing countermeasures against enemy subma- 
rine action brought him to the attention of then Secretary of the 
Navy Forrestal, who appointed him Assistant Director of the Office 
of Naval Intelligence in July 1944. Later that year, Souers assumed 
the post of Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence. 

^* Participants in the drafting of the January 1946 Directive have stated that 
clandestine collection was an intended function of the CIG at that time, although 
it was not formally assigned to CIG until June 1946. See p. 14. It is unclear how 
widely shared this understanding was. Commenting on the maintenance of SSU, 
Secretary Patterson wrote to the President in October 1945, saying that "the 
functions of OSS, chiefly clandestine activities, had been kept separate in the 
Strategic Services Unit of the War Department as the nucleus of a possible cen- 
tral intelligence service. ..." 



10 

The combination of his administrative skills and his intelligence 
background made him Forrestal's choice to head the newly created 
Central Intelligence Group. Souers accepted the job with the under- 
standing that he would remain only long enough to build the basic 
organization. Holding to that condition, Souers left CIG in June 
1946 and returned to manage his business interests in Missouri. 

The close relationship between Souers and President Truman re- 
sulted in Souers' return to Washington a year later to assume even- 
tually the position of Executive Secretary of the National Security 
Council, a job he held from September 1947 until 1950. It was prob- 
ably in this position rather than as DCI that Souers exerted the most 
influence over the central intelligence function. His stature as a 
former DCI and his friendship with Truman lent considerable weight 
to his participation in the early NSC deliberations over the CIA, 

Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenherg {June WJfi-May 
1H7) 

The appointment of Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg as DCI 
on June 10, 1946 marked the beginning of CIG's gradual develop- 
ment as an independent intelligence producer. Vandenberg was an 
aggressive, assertive personality. As a three-star general, he may have 
viewed the DCI's position as a means of advancing his Air Force 
career. His actions during his one-year term were directed toward 
enhancing CIG's stature. Soon after leaving CIG he became Air 
Force Chief of Staff, acquiring his fourth star at the same time. 
Vandenberg's background, personal connections, and strong opinions 
contributed in a significant way to changes which occurred over the 
next year. 

A graduate of West Point, Vandenberg had sei"\'ed as head of the 
Army's intelligence division, G-2, and immediately prior to his ap- 
pointment as DCI had represented G-2 on the Intelligence Advisory 
Board. This experience gave him the opportunity to obser-ve the prob- 
lems of directing an agency totally dependent on other departments. 

One of Vandenberg's important assets in the never-ending battles 
with the military was the fact that he was a high-ranking military 
careerist. As such, he could deal with the military intelligence chiefs 
on more than equal terms. Vandenberg was also well-connected on 
Capitol Hill. The nephew of Arthur Vanderberg, ranking Repub- 
lican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Vandenberg 
gained wide access to members of the House and Senate. 

Vandenberg's achievements touched on two areas: administrative 
authority and the scope of CIG's intelligence mission. He first ad- 
dressed himself to the problem of the budget. The existing arrange- 
ment T-equired the DCI to request funds from the Departments tor 
operating expenses as they developed. There were no funds earmarked 
in the departmental budgets for CIG's use; therefore, the DCI was 
dependent on the disposition of the Department secretaries to release 
the money he needed. 

Since CIG was not an independent agency, it could not be directly 
granted appropriations from the Congress. Vandenberg pressed the 
DcDartments to provide CIG with a specific allotment over which the 
DCI would have dispersal authority. Although both Secretary of War 
Patterson and Secretary of State Byrnes objected, arguing that 
CIG's budget had to be kept confidential, Admiral Leahy, President 
Truman's Chief of Staff, provided Vandenberg with the support he 



11 

needed. Through the certification of vouchers, the DCI could pay 
personnel and purchase supplies. 

Under Vandenberg, CIG moved beyond a strict coordination role 
to acquire a clandestine collection capability, as well as authority to 
conduct independent research and analysis.^ During this period, CIG 
also replaced the FBI in Latin America.^ When Vandenberg left the 
CIG, he left an organization whose mission had considerably altered. 
Admiral Roscoe H. HiUenkoetter {May 19 1^7 -October 1950) 

Rear Admiral Roscoe HiUenkoetter assumed the position of DCI 
at a time when the Central Intelligence Group was about to be recon- 
stituted as the Central Intelligence Agency and when international 
pressures placed widely disparate demands on the fledgling agency. 
Under HiUenkoetter, the Agency experienced undirected evolution in 
the area of intelligence, never fulfilling its coordination function, but 
developing as an intelligence producer. In this period the Agency 
also acquired its covert operational capability. Hillenkoetter's part 
in these changes was more passive than active. Having only recently 
been promoted to Rear Admiral, he lacked the leverage of rank to deal 
effectively with the military. 

HiUenkoetter had spent most of his almost thirty-year naval career 
at sea, and he remained a sea captain in mind and heart. A graduate 
of Annapolis in 1919, he served in Central America, Europe, and the 
Pacific. His assignments as naval attache had given him some ex- 
posure to the intelligence process. However, the position of the DCI 
required bureaucratic expertise; HiUenkoetter did not have the in- 
stincts or the dynamism for dealing with senior policymakers in 
State and Defense, 

In fairness to HiUenkoetter, he labored under the difficulty of 
serving during a period of continuing disagreements between Secre- 
tary of State Dean G. Acheson and Secretary of Defense Louis A. 
Johnson. With the Agency having to execute covert operations which 
were to serve the policy needs of the two Departments, the antagonism 
between the two Secretaries left the DCI in a difficult position. HiUen- 
koetter left the Agency in 1950 to resume sea command. 

General Walter Bedell Smith {October 1950-Febrmary 1953) 
It was precisely because of Hillenkoetter's weakness that General 
Walter Bedell Smith was selected to succeed him in October 1950. 
Nicknamed the "American Bulldog" by Winston Churchill, Smith was 
a tough-minded, hard-driving, often intimidating military careerist. 
Smith came to the position of DCI as one of tlie most highly re- 
garded and most senior-ranking military officers in the government. 
During World War II, he had served as Chief of Staff of the Allied 
Forces in North Africa and the Mediterranean, and later became 
Dwight Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, after Eisenhower's appointment 
as Commander of the European theater. Following the war, Smith 
served as U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet L"^nion. 



° For a full discussion of these changes, see pp. 13, 14. 

' CIG's acquisition of nominal authority in Latin America may have been a 
symbolic gain, but the organization faced institutional obstacles in the assump- 
tion of its mission there. In mid-1946, jurisdiction for Latin America was reas- 
signed to the CIG. The process by which the transfer occurred is unknown, but it 
is clear that FBI Director Hoover had conceded his authority grudgingly. A 
formal agreement between the two agencies (presumably initiated by Hoover) 
stipulated that no FBI Latin American files were to be turned over to the CIG. 



70-725 O - 76 - 2 



12 

The Korean War placed enormous pressures on the Agency during 
Smith's term, and had a major impact on the size and direction of the 
CIA. Although by the time of Smith's appointment the Agency's 
functions had been established — overt and clandestine collection, 
covert operations, intelligence analysis, and coordination of depart- 
mental activities — Smith supervised sweeping administrative changes 
which created the basic structure that remains in effect to this day. 
As DCI, Smith easily outranked the service intelligence chiefs with 
whom he had to deal. His stature and personality made him one of 
the strongest Directors in the Agency's history. 

IV. The Evolution of the Central Intelligence Fimction^ IdJ^B-WIfd 

A. The Pattern Established, 1946-1949 

The CIG had been established to rectifj^ the duplication among the 
military intelligence services and to compensate for their biased 
analyses. The rather vaguely conceived notion was that a small staff 
would assemble and review the raw data collected by the departmental 
intelligence services and produce objective estimates for the use of 
senior American policymakers. Although in theory the concept was 
reasonable and derived from real informational needs, institutional 
resistance made implementation virtually impossible. The military 
intelligence services jealously guarded both their information and 
wdiat they believed were their pierogatives in providing policy 
guidance to the President, making CIG's primary mission an exercise 
in futility. 

Limited in the execution of its coordinating responsibility, the 
organization gradually emerged as an intelligence producer, gen- 
erating current intelligence summaries and thereby competing with 
the Departments in the dissemination of information. The following 
section will explore the process by which CIG, and later the CIA, 
created by the National Security Act of 1947, drifted from its original 
purpose of producing coordinated national estimates to becoming pri- 
marily a current intelligence producer. 

In January 1946, Souers assumed direction over a feeble organiza- 
tion. Its personnel had to be assigned from other agencies, and its 
budget was allocated from other departments. Clearly, the Depart- 
ments were not inclined to relinquish manpower and money to a 
separate organization, even if that organization was little more than 
an adjunct of their own. Postwar personnel and budget cuts further 
limited the support which the Departments were willing to provide. 
Tliose who were assigned could not remain long; some were of 
mediocre ability. By U.S. Government standards, CIG was a very 
small organization. In June 1946, professional and clerical personnel 
numbered approximately 100. 

CIG had two overt collection components. The Domestic Contact . 
Service (DCS) solicited domestic sources, including travelers and 
businessmen for foreign intelligence information on a voluntary and 
witting basis.* The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 
an element of OSS, monitored overseas broadcasts. There were two 
staffs, the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff 

*The term "witting" is used by intelligence professionals to indicate an in- 
dividual's knowledgeable association witli an intelligence service. 



13 

(ICAPS) , which dealt with the Departments, and the Central Reports 
Staff ( CRS ) , which was responsible for correlation and evaluation. A 
Council, comprised of three Assistant Directors, dealt with internal 
matteis. 

In March 1946, the Central Reports Staff consisted of 29 profes- 
sionals, 17 "on loan'' from the Departments of State, War, and Navy, 
and 12 full-time analysts. The crucial element in the conception of 
CRS Avas Souers' plan to have four full-time representatives from the 
Departments and the JCS who would participate in the estimates pro- 
duction process and speak for the chiefs of their agencies in presenting 
departmental views. The plan never developed. The departmental rep- 
resentatives Avere eventually assigned, but they were not granted the 
requisite authority for the production of coordinated intelligence. 
Only one Avas physically stationed Avith CIG. The Departments' failure 
to provide personnel to CIG Avas only the first indication of the re- 
sistance which they posed on every level. 

The military particularly resented having to provide a civilian 
agency Avith militar^y intelligence data. The servrces regarded this 
as a breach of professionalism, and more importantly, believed that 
civilians could not understand, let alone analyze, military intelligence 
data. The intensity of the military's feelings on the issue of civilian 
access is indicated by the fact that CIG could not receive information 
on the capabilities and intentions of U.S. ar-med forces. 

Almost immediately the State Department challenged CIG on the 
issue of access to the President. Truman had requested that CIG pro- 
vide him Avith a daily intelligence summary from the Army, Navy, 
and State Departments. HoAve\^er, Secretary of State Byrnes asserted 
his Department's prerogative in providing the President with foreign 
policy analyses. While CIG did its summary, the State Department 
continued to prepare its OAvn daily digest. Truman received both. 

The United States' first major postwar intelligence evaluation 
project further revealed the obstruction Avhich the Departments posed 
to CIG's mission. In March 1946, the Army, Navy, and Air Force 
intelligence services Avere directed to join Avith CIG "to produce the 
highest possible quality of intelligence on the U.S.S.R. in the shortest 
possible time." Intended to be broadly focused, the study began in 
an atmosphere of urgency. Recent events had aroused alarm over the 
groAving belligerency of the Soviet Union and had revealed the United 
States' relative ignorance of Soviet military strength in relation to 
its own. 

The project was ridden with contention from the start. The military 
regarded the project as their OAvn and did not expect or want CIG to 
review and process their raAv intelligence materials for evaluation. 
Security restrictions prevented assignment of Avork to interdepart- 
mental task forces and required that subject areas be assigned De- 
partment by Department. Each agency was interested in the project 
only as it served its individual purposes. For example, the Air Force 
regarded the study exclusiA^ely as a means of evaluating the U.S.S.R.'s 
air capability. CIG's intended role as an adjudicator between Depart- 
ments Avas quickly reduced to that of an editor for independent depart- 
mental estimates. The r-eport was actually published in March 1948, 
tAvo years after it had been commissioned. 

In the spring of 1946 the NIA, probably at the request of Vanden- 
berg, authorized CIG to carry out independent research and analysis 



14 

"not being presently performed" by the other Departments. The 
authorization led to a rapid increase in the size and functions of CIG's 
intelligence staff. In August 1946, DCI Vandenberg established the 
Office of Kesearch and Evaluation (ORE) to replace the Central Re- 
ports Staff, which had been responsible for correlation. ORE's func- 
tions were manifold — the production of national current intelligence, 
scientific, technical, and economic intelligence, as well as interagency 
coordination for national estimates. At the same time, CIG was 
granted more money and personnel, and Vandenberg took full advan- 
tage of the opportunity to hire large numbers of people. One partici- 
pant recalled Vandenberg as saying, "If I didn't fill all the slots I 
knew I'd lose them." By the end of 1946, Vandenberg took on at least 
300 people for ORE. 

With its own research and analysis capability, CIG could carry out 
an independent intelligence function without having to rely on the 
Departments for guidelines or for data. In effect, it made CIG an 
intelligence producer, while still assuming the continuation of its role 
in the production of coordinated national estimates. Yet acquisition 
of an independent intelligence role meant that production would out- 
strip coordinated analysis as a primary mission. Fundamentally, it 
was far easier to collect and analyze data than it had been or would be 
to work with the Departments in producing coordinated analysis. In 
generating its own intelligence, CIG could compete with the Depart- 
ments witliout the problem of departmental obstruction. 

The same 1946 directive which provided the CIG with an inde- 
pendent research and analysis capability also granted the CIG a 
clandestine collection capability. Since the" end of the war, the remnant 
of the OSS clandestine collection capability rested with the Strategic 
Services Unit (SSU), then in the War Department. In the postwar 
dismantling of OSS, SSU was never intended to be more than a tem- 
porary body. In the spring of 1946, an interdepartmental committee, 
whose members had been chosen by the President, recommended that 
CIG absorb SSU's functions. 

The amalgamation of SSU constituted a major change in the size, 
structure, and mission of CIG. Since 1945, SSU had maintained both 
personnel and field stations. Seven field stations remained in North 
Africa and the Near East. Equipment, codes, techniques, and com- 
munications facilities were intact and ready to be activated. 

The transfer resulted in the establishment of the Office of Special 
Operations (OSO). OSO was responsible for espionage and counter- 
espionage. Through SSU, the CIG acquired an infusion of former 
OSS personnel, who were experienced in both areas. From the begin- 
ning, the data collected by OSO was highly compartmented. The 
Office of Reports and Estimates did not draw on OSO for its raw 
information. Overt collection remained ORE's major source of data.® 

The nature and extent of the requests made to ORE contributed to 
its failure to fulfill its intended role in national intelligence estimates. 
President Truman expected and liked to receive CIG's daily summary 
of international events. His known preference meant that work on the 

"The acquisition of a clandestine collection capability and authorization to 
carry out independent research and analysis enlarged CIG's personnel strength 
considerably. As of December 1946. the total CIG staff numbered approximately 
1,816. Proportionately, approximately one-third were overseas with OSO. Of 
those stationed in Washington, approximately half were devoted to administra- 
tive and support functions, one-third were assigned to OSO, and the remainder 
to intelligence production. 



15 

Daily^ as it was called, assumed priority attention — every day. The 
justification for the Daily as an addition to other departmental sum- 
maries was that CIG had access to all information, unlike the Depart- 
ments that had only their own. This was not true. Between 1946 and 
1949, CIG and later CIA received almost all its current information 
from State. Although CIG had been created to minimize the duplica- 
tive efforts of the Departments, its acquisition of an independent intel- 
ligence production capability was now contributing to the problem. 

The pressures of current events and the consequent demand for in- 
formation within the government generated a constant stream of 
official requests to ORE. Most were concerned with events of the 
moment rather than with national intelligence, strictly defined. ORE, 
in turn, tended to accept any and all external requests — from State, 
from the JCS, from the NSC. As ORE attempted to satisfy the wide- 
ranging demands of many clients, its intelligence became directed to 
a working-level audience rather than to senior policymakers. As such, 
it lost the influence it was intended to have. Gradually, ORE built up 
a series of commitments which made it less likely and less able to direct 
its efforts to estimate production. 



The passage of the National Security Act in July 1947 legislated 
the changes in the Executive branch that had been under discussion 
since 1945. The Act established an independent Air Force; provided 
for coordination by a committee of service chiefs, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS), and a Secretary of Defense; and created the National 
Security Council (NSC).' The CIG became an independent depart- 
ment and was renamed the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Under the Act, the CIA's mission was only loosely defined, since 
efforts to thrash out the CIA's duties in specific terms would have 
contributed to the tension surrounding the unification of the services. 
The five general tasks assigned to the Agency were (1) to advise 
the NSC on matters related to national security; (2) to make recom- 
mendations to the NSC regarding the coordination of intelligence ac- 
tivities of the Departments; (3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence 
and provide for its appropriate dissemination; (4) to carry out "serv- 
ice of common concern" and (5) "to perform such other functions and 
duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the 
NSC will from time to time direct . . . ." The Act did not alter the 
functions of the CIG. Clandestine collection, overt collection, pro- 
duction of national current intelligence, and interagency coordination 
for national estimates continued, and the personnel and internal struc- 
ture remained the same.^^ 

As the CIA evolved between 1947 and 1950, it never fulfilled its 
estimates function, but continued to expand its independent intelli- 
gence production. Essentially, the problems that had developed in the 
CIG continued. Since its creation in 1946, incentives existed within 
ORE for the production of current rather than national coordinated 



' Not until the Act was amended in 1949 was provision made for a statutory 
chairman for the JCS or for a Department of Defense. It then took a series of 
presidential reorganization decrees in the 1950's to give the Secretary of Defense 
the power he was to have by the 1960's. As of 1947, the positions of the Secretary 
of Defense and the DCI were not dissimilar, but the DCI was to remain a mere 
coordinator. 

'" For chart showing CIA organization as of 1947, see p. 96. 



16 

intelligence. ORE was organized into regional branches, comprised of 
analysts in specialized areas, and a group of staff editors who were re- 
sponsible for reviewing and editing the branches' writing for inclusion 
in the ORE summaries. Since the President's daily summary quickly 
became ORE's main priority, contributions to the summaiy were vis- 
ible evidence of good work. Individuals within each of the branches 
were eager to have their material included in the Daily and Weekly 
publications. To have undertaken a longer-term project would have 
meant depriving oneself of a series of opportunities for quick recog- 
nition. Thus, the route to personal advancement lay with meeting the 
immediate, day-to-day responsibilities of ORE. In doing so, individ- 
uals in ORE perpetuated and contributed to the current intelligence 
stranglehold. 

The drive for individuals in the branches to have their material 
printed and the role of the staffs in reviewing, editing and often re- 
jecting material for publication caused antagonism between the two 
groups. The branches regarded themselves as experts in their given 
fields and resented the staff's claims to editorial authority. A reorgan- 
ization in 1947 attempted to break down the conflict between the re- 
viewers and the producers but failed. By 1949, the regional branches, 
in effect, controlled the publications. 

The branches' tenacious desire to maintain conti-ol over CIA pub- 
lications frustrated successive efforts to encourage the production of 
estimates. Several internal studies conducted in 1949 encouraged the 
re-establishment of a sepai'ate estimates group within ORE, devoted 
exclusively to the production of national estimates. The branches re- 
sisted the proposed reorganizations, primarily because they were un- 
willing to resign their jjrerogatives in intelligence production to an 
independent estimates division. 

A July 1949 study conducted by a senior ORE analyst stated that 
ore's emphasis in production had shifted "from the broad long-term 
type of problem to a narrowly defined short-term type and from 
the predictive to the non-predictive type." The same year a National 
Security Council-sponsored study concluded that "the principle of 
the authoritative NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] does not yet 
have established acceptance in the government. Each department still 
depends more or less on its own intelligence estimates and establishes 
its plans and policies accordingly." ^ ORE's publications provide 
the best indication of its failure to execute its estimates function. 
In 1949, ORE had eleven regular publications. Only one of these, 
the ORE Special Estimate Series, addressed national intelligence 
questions and was published with the concurrence or dissent of the 
Departments comprising the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Less 
than one-tenth of ORE's products were serving the purposes for 
which the Office had been created. 

B. The Reorganization of the Intelligence Function^ 1950 
By the time Walter Bedell Smith became DCI, it was clear that 
the CIA's record in providing national intelligence estimates had 
fallen far short of expectation. The obstacles presented by the de- 
partmental intelligence components, the CIA's acquisition of au- 



From the Dulles-.Jaekson-Cori-ea Survey. See p. 1' 



17 

tliority to carry out independent research and analysis, demands from 
throughout the government for CIA analyses, and internal organiza- 
tional incentives had contributed to the failure of the coordinated 
national estimates function and to ORE's current intelligence ori- 
entation. In 1950 ORE did little more than produce its own analyses 
and reports. The wholesale growth liad only confused ORE's mis- 
sion and led the organization into attempting analysis in areas alrcady 
being serviced by other department.^'' 

These problems appeared more stark following the outbreak of the 
Korean War in June 1950. Officials in the Executive branch and 
members of Congress criticized the Agency for its failure to predict 
more specifically the timing of the North Korean invasion of South 
Korea. Immediately after his appointment as DCI in October 1950, 
Smith discovered that the Agency had no current coordinated estimate 
of the situation in Korea. Under the pressure of war, demands for 
information were proliferating, and it was apparent that ORE could 
not meet those demands. 

The immediacy of the war and the influence of William H. Jackson, 
who served with him as Deputy Director for Central Intelligence 
(DDCI), convinced Smith of the necessity for changes. After 
taking office, Smith and Jackson defined three major problems in 
the execution of the CIA's intelligence mission : the need to en- 
sure consistent, systematic production of estimates; the need to 
strengthen the position of the DCI relative to the departmental in- 
telligence components; and the need to delineate more clearly CIA's 
research and analysis function. Within three months the two men 
had redefined the position of the DCI; had established the Office 
of National Estimates, whose sole task was the production of 
coordinated "national estimates"; and had limited the Agency's inde- 
pendent research and analysis to economic research on the "Soviet 
Bloc"' nations. Nevertheless, these sweeping changes and the strength 
of leadership which Smith and Jackson provided did not resolve the 
fundamental problems of jurisdictional conflicts among departments, 
duplication, and definition of a consumer market continued. 

Jackson, a New York attorney and investment banker, had gained 
insight into the intelligence function through wartime service with 
Army intelligence and through his participation in the Dulles- 
Jackson-Correa Survey.** Commissioned by the National Security 
Council in 1948, the Survey examined the U.S. intelligence establish- 
ment, focusing principally on the CIA. The report enumerated the 
problems in the Agency's execution of both its intelligence and opera- 
tional missions, and made recommendations for reorganization. Vir- 
tually all of the changes which Smith made during his term were 
drawn from the Survey in which Jackson participated." 



** For chart showing CIA organization as of 1950 prior to the reorganization 
and including the clandestine operational component discussed on pp. 25 ff., See 
p. 97. 

'Matthias Correa, a New York lawyer and a wartime assistant to Secretary 
Forrestal, was not an active participant in the Survey. Allen W. Dulles, later 
to become DCI, and Jackson were its principal executors. 

^' There is some indication that .lackson assimied his position with the under- 
standing that he and Smith would act on the Survey's recommendations. 



18 

The I AC and the Office of National Estimates 

In an August 1950 memorandum to Smith, CIA General Counsel 
Lawrence E. Houston stressed that the Intelligence Advisory Com- 
mittee had assumed an advisory role to the NSC and functioned as a 
supervisory body for the DCI — contrary to the initial intention."^ The 
lAC's inflated role had diminished the DCI's ability to demand de- 
partmental cooperation for the Clxi's national estimates responsi- 
bility. Houston advised that the DCI would have to exert more specific 
direction over the departmental agencies, if coordinated national in- 
telligence production was to be achieved. Smith acted on Houston's 
advice and informed the members of the lAC that he would not sub- 
mit to their direction. At the same time, Smith encouraged their 
participation in the discussion and approval of intelligence estimates. 
Basically, Smith cultivated the good will of the lAC only to avoid 
open conflict. His extensive contacts at the senior military level and 
his pervasive prestige freed him from reliance on the lAC to accom- 
plish his ends. 

Smith's real attempt to establish an ongoing process for the Droduc- 
tion of national estimates focused on the Office of National Estimates 
(ONE). At the time Smith and Jackson took office, there were at least 
five separate proposals for remedial action in ORE, all of which rec- 
ommended the establishment of a separate, independent office for the 
production of national estimates." Jackson himself had been the 
sti'ongest advocate of such an office during his participation in the 
Dulles-Jackson-Correa Survey, and he was prepared to act quickly 
to implement a separation of the re earch and reporting function from 
the estimates function. As a first step, ORE was dismantled. 

To organize the Office of National Estimates, Smith called on 
William Langer, the Harvard historian who had directed the Re- 
search and Analysis Branch of OSS during the war. In addition to 
his intellectual capacities, Langer possessed the bureaucratic savvy 
and personal dynamism to cany out the concept of ONE. He was 
determined to keep the organization small and loosely run to avoid 
bureaucratic antagonisms.^^ 

As organized in 1950, the Office of National Estimates had two 
components, a ei'oup of staff' members who drafted the estimates and 
a senior body, known as the Board, who revicAved the estimates and 
coordinated the intelligence judgments of the several Departments. 
Jackson envisioned the Board members as "men of affairs," experi- 
enced in government and international relations who could make 
sa;re, pragmatic contributions to the work of the analysts. At first all 
staff members were oeneralists, expected to write on any subject, but 
gradually the staff broke down into generalists, who wrote the esti- 
mates and regional specialists, who provided expert assistance. 

With the help of lecommendations from Ludwell Montague, an 
historian and a senior ORE analyst, and others, Langer personally 
selected each of the ONE staff members, most of whom were drawn 



'"* See p. 25 for more discussion of the Intelligence Advising Committee. 

" The individuals who advanced the recommendation included John Bross of 
the Office of Policy Coordination, General Magruder of SSU, Ludwell Montague 
of ORE. and William Jackson in the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Survey. 

'^ One story, perhaps apocryphal, has Bedell Smith offering Langer 200 slots 
for ONE, to which Langer snapi^ed back, "I can do it with twenty-five." 



19 

from ORE. liy the end of Xoveinber, ONE had a staff of fifty pro- 
fessionals. Seven Board members were also hired. They included four 
historians, one former combat conmiander, and one lawyer.^'' 

As a corrective to what he regarded as the disproportionate number 
of academics on the Board, Jackson devised the idea of an outside 
panel of consultants who had wide experience in public affairs and 
who could bring their practical expertise to bear on draft estimates. 
In 1950 the ''Princeton consultants"/* as thcT came to be called, in- 
cluded George F. Kennan, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the editor of 
Foreign Affairs, and Vannevar Bush, the atomic scientist." 

As OXE Avas conceived in 1950. it was to be entirely dependent on 
departmental contributions for research support. Although Langer 
found the arrangement somewhat unsatisfactory for the predictable 
reasons and considered providing ONE with its own research capa- 
bility, the practice continued. However, as a result of the CIA's 
gradual development of its own independent i-esearch capabilities over 
tho .next twenty years, ONE increasingly relied on CIA resources. 
The shift in ONE's sources meant that the initial draft estimates — the 
estimates over which the Departments negotiated — became more CIx\ 
products than interdepartmental products. 

The process of coordinating the Departments' judgments was not 
easy. A major problem was the nature of lAC representation and 
interaction between the lAC and the Board. At first, the lAC mem- 
bers as senior officers in their respective agencies were too removed 
from the subjects treated in the estimates to provide substantive dis- 
cussions. An attempt to have the Board meet with lower-ranking 
officers meant that these officers were not close enough to the policy 
level to make departmental decisions. This problem of substantive 
background vs. decisionmaking authority was never really resolved 
and resulted in a prolonged negotiating process. 

Almost immediately the militaiT challenged ONE on the nature of 
the estimates, demanding that they be factual and descriptive. 
Montague, however, insisted that the}^ be problem-oriented in order 
to satisfy' the needs of the NSC. Jackson, Langer, Montague and others 
viewed the NIEs as providing senior policymakers with essential 
information on existing problems. 

one's link to policymakers existed through the NSC, where meet- 
ings opened with a briefing by the DCI. Bedell Smith's regular attend- 
ance and his personal stature meant that the Agency was at least 
listened to when briefings were presented. Former members of ONE 
have said that this was a period when they felt their work really was 
making its way to the senior level and being used. The precise way in 



" The historians : Sherman Kent, Ludwell Montague, DeForrest Van Slyck, 
and Raymond Sontag. General Clarence Huebner, retired U.S. Commaiuler of all 
I'.S. forces in Europe, represented the military. Maxwell Foster, a Boston 
lawyer, and Calvin Hoover, a professor of economics at Duke University, were 
the otlier two members. Both resigned within a few months, however. 

" They met at the Gun Club at Princeton University. 

" ONE'S practice of using an outside group of senior consultants for key esti- 
mates continued into the 1960's. although the consultants' contribution became 
less substiintial as the OXE analysts developed depth of background and under- 
standing in their respective fields. 



20 

which these NIEs were used is unclear. Between 1950 and 1952 ONE's 
major effort dominated by production of estimates related to the Korea 
War, particularly those involving analyses of Soviet intentions. 
The Office of Research and Reports 

The estimates problem was only symptomatic of the Agency's 
broader difficulties in intelligence production. By 1950 ORE had 
become a directionless service organization, attempting to answer re- 
quirements levied by all agencies related to all manner of subjects — 
politics, economics, science, technology. ORE's publications took the 
form of "backgrounders,'' country studies, surveys, and an occasional 
estimate. In attempting to do everything, it w^as contributing almost 
nothing. On November 13, 1950, the same order that created ONE also 
renamed ORE the Office of Research and Reports (ORR), and re- 
defined the Agency's independent intelligence production mission. 

The Dulles-Jackson-Correa Survey had recommended that out of 
ORE a division be created to perform research services in fields 
of common concern that might be usefully performed centrally. 
Specifically, the report suggested the fields of science, technology, and 
economics. The report pointedly excluded political research, which it 
regarded as the exclusive domain of the State Department's Office of 
Intelligence Research. Once again, having participated in the Survey 
group, Jackson was disposed to implement its recommendations. 

The issue of responsibility for political research had been a source 
of contention between ORE and State, which objected to the Agency's 
use of its data to publish "Agency" summations on subjects which 
State believed were appropriately its own and which were covered 
in States own publications. Jackson had already accepted State's 
claims and was more than willing to concede both the political re- 
search and coordination functions to the Department. In return, the 
Office of Research and Reports was to have responsibility for eco- 
nomic research on the "Soviet Bloc." 

There were three components of ORR: the Basic Intelligence Di- 
vision and Map Division, both of which were maintained intact from 
ORE, and the newly created Economic Research Area (ERA). Basic 
Intelligence had no research function. It consisted of a coordinating 
and editing staff in charge of the production of National Intelligence 
Sui-A'eys, compendia of descriptive inforanation on nearly every coun- 
tiy in the world, which were of primary interest to war planning 
agencies,^^ The Map Division consisted of geographers and cartogra- 
phers, most of whom were veterans of OSS. As the only foreign map 
specialists in the government, the division provided government- wide 
services. 

The Economic Research Area became the focus of the Agency's 
research and analysis effort, and the Agency's development of this 
capability had a major impact on militar\^ and strategic anal- 
ysis of the Soviet Union in the decade of the'^1950's. ERA benefitted 
enormously from Jackson's appointment of Max Millikan as Assistant 
Director of ORR. A professor of economics at the Massachusetts In- 
stitute of Technology, Millikan had participated in the Office of Price 

" ORE had assumed this funotion in 1948. 



21 

Administration and War Shipping Administration during the war 
and later served in the State Department's Office of Intelligence 
Research. 

Millikan came to ORR in January 1951 and devoted his exclusive 
attention to organizing ORR's economic intelligence effort. He di- 
vided ERA into five areas: Materials, Industrial, Strategic, Eco- 
nomic Services, and Economic Analysis, and embarked on an extensive 
recruitment program among graduate students in corresponding 
specialties. In July 1951, ORR personnel numbered 461, including the 
Map and Basic Intelligence Divisions and some ORE personnel who 
had been retained. By January 1952, when Millikan left to return 
to ]MIT, ORR's strength had increased to 654, with all of that growth 
in ERA. ORR continued to grow, and in February 1953, it employed 
766 persons. 

This remarkable and perhaps excessive escalation was a result of 
the redefinition of the Agency's research and analysis mission and the 
immediate pressures of the Korean War. Although the Agency was 
limited to economic research, its intelligence had to service virtually 
all levels of consumers. Unlike ONE, ORR's intelligence was never 
intended to be directed to senior policymakers alone. Instead, ORR 
was to respond to the requests of senior and middle-level officials 
throughout the government, as well as serving a coordinating func- 
tion. The breadth of ORR's clientele practically insured its size. In 
addition, the fact that ORR was created at the height of the Korean 
War, when the pressure for information was at a consistent peak, 
and when budgetary constraints were minimal, meant that personnel 
increases could be justified as essential to meet the intelligence needs 
of the war. After the war there was no effort to reduce the personnel 
strength. 

Despite ORR's agreement with State regarding jurisdiction for 
political and economic intelligence, there remained in 1951 tioenty- 
four government departments and agencies producing economic intel- 
ligence. Part of ORR's charge was to coordinate production on the 
"Soviet Bloc." In May 1951 the Economic Intelligence Committee 
(EIC) was created as a subcommittee of the I AC. With interdepart- 
mental representation, the EIC, under the chairmanship of the Assis- 
tant Director, ORR, was to insure that priority areas were established 
among the agencies and that, wherever possible, duplication was 
avoided.^^ The EIC also had a publication function. It was to produce 
reports providing "the best available foreign economic intelligence" 
from IT.S. Government agencies. The EIC papers were drafted in ORR 
and put through the EIC machinery in much the same way that 
ONE produced NIEs. Because of ORR's emerging expertise in eco- 
nomic intelligence, it was able to exert a dominant role in the coordi- 
nation process and more importantly, on the substance of EIC 
publications. 

The Agency's assumption of the economic research function and the 
subsequent creation of the EIC is a prime example of the ill-founded 
attempts to exert control over the departmental intelligence compo- 
nents. 'While the Agency was given primary responsibility for eco- 



"The EIC included representatives from State, Army, Navy, Air Force, CIA, 
and the JCS sat on the EIC. 



22 

nomic research on the "Soviet Bloc," other departments still retained 
their own intelligence capabilities to meet what they regarded as their 
specific needs. Senior officials, particularly the military, continued to 
rely on their departmental staffs to provide them with information. 
The EIC thus served primarily as a publication body. Yet the assign- 
ment of a publication role to the EIC only contributed to the already 
flooded intelligence paper market within the government. 

The fundamental problem was one of accretion of additional func- 
tions without dismantling existing capabilities. To assume that a sec- 
ond-level committee such as the EIC would impose real control and 
direction on the entrenched bureaucratic interests of twenty-four gov- 
ernment agencies was at best misplaced confidence and at worst fool- 
hardy optimism. The problem grew worse over the next decade as 
developments in science and technology created a wealth of new intel- 
ligence capabilities. 

The Office of Current Intelligence 

Completely contrary to its intended functions, ORE had developed 
into a current intelligence producer. The Dulles-Jackson-Correa Sur- 
vey had sharply criticized CIA's duplication of current intelligence 
produced by other Departments, principally State. After his appoint- 
ment as Deputy Director o,f Central Intelligence, Jackson intended 
that CIA would completely abandon its current political intelligence 
function. State's Office of Intelligence Research would have its choice 
of personnel not taken into ONE and ORR, and any former ORE 
staff members not chosen would leave. 

In spite of Jackson's intention, all former ORE personnel stayed on. 
Those who did not join State, ONE, or ORR were first reassigned the 
task of publication of the Daily. Subsequently, they joined with the 
small COMINT (communications intelligence) unit which had been 
established in 1948 to handle raw COMINT data from the Army. The 
group was renamed the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) on Janu- 
ary 12, 1951. Drawing on COMINT and State Department informa- 
tion, OCI began producing the Current Intelligence Bulletin which 
replaced the Daily. As of January 1951 this was to be its only func- 
tion — collating data for the daily CIA publication. 

Internal demands soon developed for the Agency to engage in cur- 
rent political research. Immediately following the disbandment of 
CIA's current politicial intelligence functions, the Agency's clandes- 
tine components insisted on CIA-originated research support. They 
feared that the security of their operations would be jeopardized 
by having to rely on the State Department. As a result of their re- 
quests, OCI developed into an independent political research orga- 
nization. Although OCI began by providing research support only 
to the Agency's clandestine components, it gradually extended its in- 
telligence function to service the requests of other Departments. Thus, 
the personnel which Jackson never intended to rehire and the orga- 
nization which was not to exist had survived and reacquired its pre- 
vious function. 

The Office of Scientific Intelligence 

The Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) had been created in 1949, 
and like other CIA components, had confronted military resistance 



23 

to the execution of its coordination role.^« OSI's real conflict with the 
military lay with the division o,f responsibility for the production of 
scientific and technical intelligence. The chief issue was the distinction 
between intelligence relating to weapons and means of warfare already 
reduced to known prototypes and intelligence at the pilot-plant stage, 
anterior to prototypes. The military resisted OSI's intrusion into the 
first area and fundamentally, wished to restrict OSI to research in the 
basic sciences. 

In August 1952 the military succeeded in making the distinction in 
an agreement which stipulated that the services would have primary 
responsibility for the production of intelligence on all weapons, 
weapons systems, military equipment and techniques in addition to 
intelligence on research and development leading to new military 
material and techniques. OSI assumed primary responsibility for re- 
search in the basic sciences, scientific resources and medicine. Initially, 
this order had a devastating effect on the morale of OSI analysts. 
They regarded the distinction which the military- had drawn as arti- 
ficial, since it did not take into account the inextricable links between 
basic scientific research and military and weapons systems research. 
Ultimately, the agreement imposed few restraints on OSI. With tech- 
nological advances in the ensuing years, OSI developed its own capa- 
bility for intelfigence on weapons systems technology and continued 
to challenge the military on the issue of basic science-technology 
research. 

The OSI-military agreement included a provision for the creation 
of the Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC) which, like the EIC, was 
to serve as a coordinating body as well as a publication source for inter- 
agency scientific intelligence. Like the EIC, the SEC represented a 
feeble effort at coordination and a source for yet another publication. 

In January 1952, CIA's intelligence functions were grouped under 
the Directorate for Intelligence (DDI). In addition to ONE, the 
DDI's intelligence production components included : the Office of 
Research and Reports (ORR), the Office of Scientific Intelligence 
(OSI), and the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI). Collection of 
overt information was the responsibility of the Office of Operations 
(00). The Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD) engaged in 
the distribution of intelligence as well as storage and retrieval of 
unevaluated intelligence. 

The immediate pressures for infoiTnation generated by the Korean 
War resulted in continued escalation in size and intelligence produc- 
tion. Government- wide demands for the Agency to provide informa- 
tion on Communist intentions in the Far East and around the world 
iustified the increases. By the end of 1953 DDI personnel numbered 
3,338. Despite the sweeping changes, the fundamental problem of 
duplication among the Agency and the Departments remained. Smith 
and Jackson had painstakingly redefined the Agency's intelligence 
functions, yet the Agency's position among the departmental intel- 
ligence services was still at the mercy of other intelligence 
producers. 



" OSI's creation was prompted by the DuUes-Jackson-Correa Survey's evalua- 
tion of the poor state of scientific intelligence in the CIA. 



24 

G. Departmental Intelligence Activities 

Apart from their role in the production of coordinated national 
estimates CIG and CIA were intended to exercise some direction over 
the intelligence activities of the State Department and the military — 
determining which collection and production functions would most 
appropriately and most efficiently be conducted by which Departments 
to avoid duplication. 

The intention of CIA's responsibility in this area was essentially 
a management function. The extent to which Souers, Hillenkoetter, 
Vandenberg and Bedell Smith saw this as a primary role is difficult 
to determine. Each DCI was concerned with extracting the coopera- 
tion of the Departments in the production of national intelligence. 
That was a difficult enough task. 

A major problem related to tlie coordination of departmental 
activities was the role of the Director of Central Intelligence, specifi- 
cally his relationship to the military intelligence chiefs. The Director 
had no designated authority over either the departmental intelligence 
components or over the departmental intelligence chiefs.^^* Thus, he 
could not exert any real pressure on behalf of the Agency and its 
objectives. Confronted with objections or a challenge from the Army 
G-2 chief, for example, the Directoi- had no basis on which to press his 
arguments or preferences except in terms of the Agency's overall 
mission. This give him little or no leverage, for the intelligence chiefs 
could appeal to their Department heads, who served as the DCI's 
supervisors. The military chiefs of intelligence and the military staffs 
ncted in a way which assumed that the DCI was one among equals — 
or less. 

By the end of his term Vandenberg had become convinced that the 
only means by which CIG could accomplish its coordination mission 
vas through control of the departmental intelligence agencies. Ap- 
proaching the Intelligence Advisory Board, Vandenberg asked that 
they grant the DCI authority to act as "executive agent" for the de- 
i:>artmental secretaries in matters related to intelligence. In effect, the 
DCI was to be given authority for supei-vision of the departmental 
intelligence components. The lAB approved Vandenberg's request 
and drafted an agreement providin<x for the DCI's increased au- 
thority. However, Hillenkoetter preferred not to press for its enact- 
ment and instead, hoped to rely on day-to-day cooperation. By failing 
to act on Vandenberg's initiative. Hillenkoetter undermined the posi- 
tion of the DCI in relation to the Departments. 

Consideration of the 1947 National Security Act by the Congress 
was accompanied by active deliberation in the Executive about the 
newly constituted Central Intelligence Agency. The DCI's relation- 
ship to the departmental intelligence components, the Departments' 
authority over the Agency, and the Departments' roles in the produc- 
tion of national intelligence continued to be sources of contention. 
The fundamental issue remained one of control and jurisdiction: how 
much would the CIA gain and how much would the Departments be 
N^illing to concede? 



wa Through the 1&47 Act the DCI was granted the right to "inspect" the intelli- 
gence components of the Departments, but the bureaucratic value of that right 
was limited and DCIs have traditionally not invoiced it. 



25 

As the bill took shape, the Departments resented the DCI's stated 
role as intelligence advisor to the NSC, thereby responsible to the 
President. The military intelligence chiefs, Inglis of the Navy and 
Chamberlin of the Army, favored continuation of the Intelligence 
Advisory Board. They advocated providing it with authority to grant 
approval or dissent for recommendations before they reached the NSC. 
If enacted, this arrangement would have given the Departments veto 
power over the Agency and, in effect, would have made the lAB the 
advisory body to the NSC. 

Robert Lovett, Acting Secretary of State, made a similar recom- 
mendation., He proposed an advisory board to insure "prior considera- 
tion by the chiefs of the intelligence services" for matters scheduled 
to go before the NSC. The positions of both Lovett and the military 
reflected the reluctance of the Departments to give the CIA the pri- 
mary intelligence advisory role for senior policymakei-s. 

More specifically, the Departments themselves resisted conceding a 
direct relationship between the President and the DCI. Such an ar- 
rangement was perceived as limiting and threatening the Secre- 
taries' own advisory relationships to the President. 

Between 1946 and 1947, in an effort to curb the independence of the 
DCI, the military considered successive pieces of legislation restrict- 
ing the Director's position to military careerists. Whether the at- 
tempted legislation was prompted by the concern over civilian access 
to military intelligence or by a desire to gain control of the Agency 
is unknown. In either case, the Departments were tenaciously pro- 
tecting what they perceived to be their best interests. 

In spite of continued resistance by the Departments the National 
Security Act affirmed the CIA's role in coordinating the intelligence 
activities of the State Department and the military. In 1947 the In- 
telligence Advisory Committee (lAC) was created to serve as a co- 
ordinating body in establishing intelligence requirements ^^ among the 
Departments. Chaired by the DCI, the I AC included representatives 
from the Department of State, Army, Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission.^" Although the DCI was 
to "establish priorities" for intelligence collection and analysis, he 
did not have the budgetary or administrative authority to control the 
departmental components. Moreover, no Department was willing to 
compromise what it perceived as its own intelligence needs to meet 
the collective needs of policymakers as defined by the DCI. 

V. Clcmdestine Activities 

A. Origins of Covert Action 
The concept of a central intelligence agency developed out of a con- 
cern for the quality of intelligence analysis available to policymakers. 
The 1945 discussion which surrounded the creation of CIG focused 
on the problem of intelligence coordination. Two years later debates 
on the CIA in the Congress and the Executive assumed only the co- 
ordination role along with intelligence collection (both overt and 
clandestine) and analysis for the newly constituted Agency. 

" Requirements constitute the informational objectives of intelligence collec- 
tion, e.g., in 1947 determining Soviet troop strengths in Eastern Europe. 

^ Note : With the creation of the CIA and NIA and the lAB were dissolved. 



26 

Yet, within one year of the passage of the National Security Act, 
the CIA was charged with the conduct of covert psychological, po- 
litical, paramilitary, and economic activities.^i The acquisition of this 
mission had a profound impact on the direction of the Agency and 
on its relative stature within the government. 

The precedent for covert activities existed in OSS, The clandestine 
collection capability had been preserved through the Strategic Serv- 
ices Unit, whose responsibilities CIG absorbed in June 1946. The 
maintenance of that capability and its presence in CIA contributed to 
the Agency's ultimate assumption of a covert operational role. 

The United States, initiation of covert operations is usually associ- 
ated with the 1948 Western European elections. It is true that this was 
the first officially recorded evidence of U.S. covert political intervention 
abroad. However, American policymakers had formulated plans for 
covert action^ — at first covert psychological action — much earlier. De- 
cisions regarding U.S. sponsorship of clandestine activities were grad- 
ual but consistent, spurred on by the growing concern over Soviet 
intentions. 

By late 1946, cabinet officials were preoccupied with the Soviet 
threat, and over the next year their fears intensified. For U.S. policy- 
makers, international events seemed to be a sequence of Soviet incur- 
sions. In March 1946, the Soviet Union refused to withdraw its 
troops from the Ii-anian province of Azerbaijan; two months later 
civil war involving Communist rebel forces erupted in Greece. By 1947, 
Communists had assumed power in Poland, Hungary, and Rumania; 
and in the Phillipines the government was under attack by the Huk- 
balahaps, a communist-led guerrilla group. 

For U.S. officials, the perception of the Soviet Union as a global 
threat demanded new modes of conduct in foreign policy to supple- 
ment the traditional alternatives of diplomacy and war. Massive eco- 
nomic aid represented one new method of achieving U.S. foreign policy 
objectives. In 1947, the United States embarked on an unprecedented 
economic assistance program to Europe with the Truman Doctrine 
and the Marshall Plan. By insuring economic stability, U.S. officials 
hoped to limit Soviet encroachments. Covert operations represented 
another, more activist departure in the conduct of U.S. peacetime for- 
eign policy. Covert action was an option that was something more 
than diplomacy but still short of war. As such, it held the promise of 
frustrating Soviet ambitions without provoking open conflict. 

The suggestion for the initiation of covert operations did not origi- 
nate in CIG. Sometime in late 1946, Secretary of War Robert Patterson 
suggested to Forrestal that military and civilian personnel study this 
form of war for future use. What prompted Patterson's suggestion is 
unclear. However, from Patterson's suggestion policymakers proceeded 
to consider the lines of authority for the conduct of psychological 
operations. Discussion took place in the State-War-Navy Coordinating 
Committee (SWNCC), whose members included the Secretaries of the 

^ Psychological operations were primarily media-related activities, including 
uuattributed publications, forgeries, and subsidization of publications ; political 
action involved exploitation of dispossessed persons and defectors, and support 
to political parties; paramilitary activities included support to guerrillas and 
sabotage; economic activities consisted of monetary operations. 



27 

three Departments, Byrnes, Patterson and Forrestal.^^ In December 
1946, a SWNCC subcommittee formulated guidelines for the conduct 
of psychological warfare in peacetime and wartime.^^ The full 
SWNCC adopted the recommendation later that month. 

Discussion continued within the Executive in the spring and summer 
of 1947. From all indications, only senior-level officials were involved, 
and the discussions were closely held. From establishing guidelines for 
the possibility of psychological warfare, policymakers proceeded to 
contingency plamiing. On April 30, 1947, a SWNCC subcommittee was 
organized to consider and actually plan for a U.S. psychological war- 
fare effort. On June 5, 1947, the subcommittee was accorded a degree 
of permanency and renamed the Special Studies and Evaluations Sub- 
committee. By this time, the fact that the U.S. would engage in covert 
operations was a given ; what remained were decisions about the orga- 
nizational arrangements and actual implementation. Senior officials 
had moved from the point of conceptualization to determination of a 
specific need. Yet it is not clear whether or not they had in mind specific 
activities geared to specific countries or events. 

In the fall of 1947 policymakers engaged in a series of discussions 
on the assignment of responsibility for the conduct of covert opera- 
tions. There was no ready consensus and a variety of opinions emerged. 
DCI Hillenkoetter had his own views on the subject. Sometime in 
October 1947 he recommended "vitally needed psychological opera- 
tions" — again in general terms without reference to specific countries 
or groups — but believed that such activities were military rather than 
intelligence functions and therefore belonged in an organization 
responsible to the JCS. Hillenkoetter also believed congressional au- 
thorization would be necessary both for the initiation of psychological 
warfare and for the expenditure of funds for that purpose. Whatever 
Hillenkoetter's views on the appropriate authorization for a psycho- 
logical warfare function, his opinions were undoubtedly influenced by 
the difficulties he had experienced in dealing with the Departments. 
It is likely that he feared CIA's acquisition of an operational capa- 
bility would precipitate similar problems of departmental claims on 
the Agency's operational functions. Hillenkoetter's stated preferences 
had no apparent impact on the outcome of the psychological warfare 
debate. 

Within a few weeks of Hillenkoetter's statement, Forrestal, the Sec- 
retaries of the Army, Nav^, and Air Force, along with the JCS, ad- 
vanced their recommendations regarding the appropriate organiza- 
tion to conduct covert psychological warfare. In a proposal dated 
November 4, they held that propaganda of all kinds was a fimction of 
the State Department and that an Assistant Secretary of State in 
consultation with the DCI and a military representative should be 
responsible for the operations. 



'" SWNCC was established late in 1944 as an initial attempt at more centralized 
decisionmaking. 

^' In peacetime, psychological warfare would be directed by an interdepart- 
mental subcommittee of SWNCC with the approval of the JCS and the National 
Intelligence Authority. During war. a Director of Psychological Warfare would 
assume primary responsibility under a central committee responsible to the 
President. The committee would consist of representatives from the SWNCC 
and from CIG. 



70-725 O - 76 - 3 



28 

On Noveml)er 24, President Tiiiman approved the November 4 rec- 
ommendation, assigning psychological warfare coordination to the 
Secretary of State. Within three weeks, the decision was reversed. 
Despite the weight of numbers favoring State Department control, 
the objections of Secretary of State George Marshall eliminated the 
option advanced by the other Secretaries. Marshall opposed State 
Department responsibility for covert action. He was vehement on the 
point and believed that such activities, if exposed as State Depart- 
ment actions, would embarrass the Department and discredit Ameri- 
can foreign policy both short-term and long-term. 

Apart from his position as Secretary of State, the impact of Mar- 
shall's argument derived from the more general influence he exerted 
at the time. Marshall had emerged from the war as one of America's 
"silent heroes." To the public, he was a quiet, taciturn, almost unim- 
pressive figure, but as the Army Chief of Staff during the war, he 
had gained the universal respect of his civilian and military col- 
leagues for his commitment, personal integrity, and ability. 

In the transition from military officer to diplomat, he had developed 
a strong sense that the United States would have to adopt an activist 
role against the Soviet Union. Immediately after his appointment as 
Secretary in February 1947, he played a key role in the decision to aid 
Greece and Turkey and quickly after, in June 1947, announced the 
sweeping European economic recovery program which bore his name. 
It was out of concern for the success and credibility of the United 
States' recently articulated economic program that Marshall objected 
to State Department conduct of covert action. Marshall favored plac- 
ing covert activities outside the Department, but still subject to guid- 
ance from the Secretary of State. 

Marshall's objections prevailed, and on December 14 the National 
Security Council adopted NSC 4/A, a directive which gave the CIA 
responsibility for covert psychological operations. The DCI was 
charged with ensuring that psychological operations were consistent 
with U.S. foreign policy and overt foreign information activities. On 
December 22 the Special Procedures Group was established within the 
CIA's Office of Special Operations to carry out psychological 
operations. 

Although Marshall's position prevented State from conducting psy- 
chological warfare, it does not explain why the CIA was charged with 
the responsibility. The debate which ensued in 1947 after the agree- 
ment on the reed for psychological warfare had focused on control and 
responsibility. At issue were the questions of who would plan, direct, 
and oversee the actual operations. 

State and the military wanted to maintain control over covert 
psvchological operations, but they did not want to assume operational 
i-esponsibility. The sensitive nature of the operations made the De- 
partments fear exposure of their association with the activities. The 
CIA offered advantages as the organization to execute covert opera- 
tions. Indeed, in 1947 one-third of the CIA's personnel had served with 
OSS. The presence of former OSS personnel, who had experience 
in wartime operations, provided the Agency with a group of individ- 
uals who could quickly develop and implement programs. This, 
coupled with its overseas logistical apparatus, gave the Agency 
a ready capability. In addition, the Agency also possessed a system 



29 

of unvouchered funds for its clandestine collection mission, which 
meant that there was no need to approach Congress for separate ap- 
propriations. With the Departments unwilling to assume the risks 
involved in covert activities, the CIA provided a convenient 
mechanism. 

During the next six months psychological operations were initiated 
in Central and Eastern Europe. The activities were both limited and 
amateur and consisted of unattributed publications, radio broadcasts, 
and blackmail. By 1948 the Special Procedures Group had acquired 
a radio transmitter for broadcasting behind the Iron Curtain, had 
established a secret propaganda printing plant in Germany, and had 
l)egun assembling a fleet of balloons to drop propaganda materials into 
Eastern European countries. 

Both internally and externally the pressure continued for an 
expansion in the scope of U.S. covert activity. The initial definition 
of covert action had been limited to covert psychological warfare. In 
May 1948, George F. Kennan, Director of the State Department's 
Policy Planning Staff, advocated the development of a covert political 
action capability. The distinction at that time was an important and 
real one. Political action meant direct intervention in the electoral 
processes of foreign governments rather than attempts to influence 
public opinion through media activities. 

International events gave force to Kennan's proposal. In February 
1948, Communists staged a successful coup in Czechoslovakia. At 
the same time, France and Italy were beleaguered by a wave of Com- 
munist-inspired strikes. In March 1948, near hysteria gripped the 
U.S. Government with the so-called "war scare." The crisis was pre- 
cipitated by a cable from General Lucius Clay, Commander in Chief, 
European Command, to Lt. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director 
of Intelligence, Army General Staff, in which Clay said, "I have 
felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude which I cannot define but which 
now gives me a feeling that it [war] may come with dramatic 
suddenness.'' 

The war scare launched a series of interdepartmental intelligence 
estimates on the likelihood of a Soviet attack on Western Europe 
and the United States. Although the estimates concluded that there 
was no evidence that the U.S.S.R. would start a war. Clay's cable had 
articulated the degree of suspicion and outright fear of the Soviet 
Union that was shared by policymakers at this time. Kennan pro- 
posed that State, specifically the Policy Planning Staff, have a "di- 
rectorate" for overt and covert political warfare. The director of the 
Special Studies Group, as Kennan named it, would be under State 
Department control, but not formally associated with the Department. 
Instead, he would have concealed funds and personnel elsewhere, and 
his small staff of eight people would be comprised of representatives 
from State and Defense. 

Kennan's concept and statement of function were endorsed by the 
NSC. In June 1948, one month after his proposal, the NSC adopted 
NSC 10/2, a directive authorizing a dramatic increase in the range of 
covert operations directed against the Soviet Union, including political 
warfare, economic warfare, and paramilitary activities. 



30 

While authorizing a sweeping expansion in covert activities, NSC 
10/2 established the Office of Special Projects, soon renamed the Office 
of Policy Coordination (OPC) , within the CIA to replace the Special 
Procedures Group. As a CIA component OPC was an anomaly, OPC's 
budget and personnel were appropriated within CIA allocations, but 
the DCI had little authority in determining OPC's activities. Responsi- 
bility for the direction of OPC rested with the Office's director, desig- 
nated by the Secretary of State. Policy guidance — decisions on the 
need for specific activities — came to the OPC director from State and 
Defense, bypassing the DCI. 

The organizational arrangements established in 1948 for the conduct 
of covert operations reflected both the concept of covert action as de- 
fined by U.S. officials and the perception of the CIA as an institution. 
Both the activities and the institution were regarded as extensions of 
State and the military services. The Departments (essentially the 
NSC) defined U.S. policy objectives; covert action represented one 
means of attaining those objectives; and the CIA executed the oper- 
ations. 

In a conversation on August 12, 1948, Hillenkoetter, Kennan, and 
Sidney Souers discussed the implementation of NSC 10/A. The sum- 
mary of the conversation reveals policymakers firm expectation that 
(^overt political action would serve strictlv as a support function for 
U.S. foT-eign and military policy and that State and the services would 
define the scope of covert activities in specific terms. The summaries 
of the participants' statements as cited in a CIA history bear quoting 
at length : 

Mr. Kennan made the point that as the State Department's 
designated representative he would want t-o have specific 
knowledge of the objectives of every operation and also of 
the procedures and methods employed in all cases where those 
procedures and methods involved political decisions. 

Mr. Souers indicated his agreement with Mr. Kennan's 
thesis and stated specifically that it has been the intention of 
the National Security Council in preparing the document 
that it should reflect the recognition of the principle that the 
Departments of State and the National Military Establish- 
ment are responsible for the conduct of the activities of the 
Office of Special Projects, with the Department of State tak- 
ing preeminence in time of peace and the National Military 
Establishment succeeding the pre-eminent position in war- 
time. 

Admiral Hillenkoetter agreed with Mr. Kennan's state- 
ment that the political warfare activity should be conducted 
as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy and subject in peace- 
time to direct guidance by the State Department. 

Mr. Kennan agreed tliat it was necessary that the State 
Department assume responsibility for stating whether or not 
individual projects are politically desirable and stated that 
as the State Department's designated representative he would 
be accountable for providing such decisions. 
Likewise, reflecting on his intentions and those of his colleagues in 
1948, Kennan recently stated : 



31 

... we were alarmed at the inroads of the Russian influence 
in Western Europe beyond the point where the Russian troops 
had reached. And we were alarmed particularly over the situ- 
ation in France and Italy. We felt that the Communists were 
using the very extensive funds that they then had in hand 
to gain control of key elements of life in France and Italy, 
particularly the publishing companies, the press, the labor 
unions, student organizations, women's organizations, and all 
sort of organizations of that sort, to gain control of them and 
use them as front organizations. . . . 

That was just one example that I recall of why we thought 
that we ought to have some facility for covert 
operations. . . . 

... It ended up with the establishment within CIA of a 
branch, an office for activities of this nature, and one which 
employed a great many people. It did not work out at all the 
way I had conceived it or others of my associates in the De- 
partment of State. We had thought that this would be a 
facility which could be used when and if an occasion arose 
when it might be needed. There might be years when we 
wouldn't have to do anything like this. But if the occasion 
arose we wanted somebody in the Government who would 
have the funds, the experience, the expertise to do these things 
and to do them in a proper way.^* 

Clearly, in recommending the development of a covert action capa- 
bility in 1948, policymakers intended to make available a small con- 
tingency force that could mount operations on a limited basis. Senior 
officials did not plan to develop large-scale continuing covert opera- 
tions. Instead, they hoped to establish a small capability that could be 
activated at their discretion. 

B. Th£ Oifice of Policy Coordination, 19J^8-1952 
OPC developed into a far different organization from that envisioned 
by Forrestal, Marshall, and Kennan in August 1948. By 1952, when it 
merged with the Agency's clandestine collection component, the Office 
of Special Operations, OPC had expanded its activities to include 
worldwide covert operations, and it had achieved an institutional inde- 
pendence that was unimaginable at the time of its inception. 

The outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950 had a sig- 
nificant effect on OPC. Following the North Korean invasion of South 
Korea, the State Department as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
recommended the initiation of paramilitary activities in Korea and 
China. OPC's participation in the war effort contributed to its trans- 
formation from an organization that was to provide the capability for 
a limited number of ad hoc operations to an organization that con- 
ducted continuing, ongoing activities on a massive scale. In concept, 
manpower, budget, and scope of activities, OPC simply skyrocketed. 
The comparative figures for 1949 and 1952 are staggering. In 1949 
OPC's total personnel strength was 302; in 1952 it was 2,812 plus 3,142 
overseas contract personnel. In 1949 OPC's budget figure was $4,700,- 
000; in 1952 it was $82,000,000. In 1949 OPC had personnel assigned 

'^ George F. Kennan testimony, October 28, 1975, pp. 8-10. 



32 

to seven overseas stations ; in 1952 OPC had personnel at forty-seven 
stations. 

Apart from the impetus provided by the Korean War several other 
factors converged to alter the nature and scale of OPC's activities. 
First, policy direction took the form of condoning and fostering 
activity without providing sci-utiny and control. Officials throughout 
the government regarded the Soviet Union as an aggressive force, 
and OPC's activities were initiated and justified on the basis of this 
shared perception. The series of NSC directives which authorized 
covert operations laid out broad objectives and stated in bold terms 
the necessity for meeting the Soviet challenge head on. After the first 
1948 directive authorizing covert action, subsequent directives in 1950 
and 1951 called for an intensification of these activities without es- 
tablishing firm guidelines for approval. 

On April 14, 1950, the National Security Council issued NSC 68, 
which called for a non-military counter-offensive against the U.S.S.E., 
including covert economic, political, and psychological warfare to 
stir up unrest and revolt in the satellite countries. A memo written 
in November 1951 commented on the fact that such broad and com- 
prehensive undertakings as delineated by the NSC could only be 
accomplished by the establishment of a worldwide structure for covert 
operations on a much grander scale than OPC had previously con- 
templated. The memo stated: 

It would be a task similar in concept, magnitude and com- 
plexity to the creation of widely deployed military forces 
together with the logistical support required to conduct 
manifold, complex and delicate operations in a wide variety 
of overseas locations. 
On October 21, 1951 NSC 10/5 replaced NSC 10/2 as the governing 
directive for covert action. It once again called for an intensification 
of covert action and reaffirmed the responsibility of the DCI in the 
conduct of covert operations. Each of these policy directives provided 
the broadest justification for large-scale covert activity. 

Second, OPC operations had to meet the very different policy needs 
of the State and Defense Departments. The State Department en- 
couraged political action and propaganda activities to support its 
diplomatic objectives, while the Defense Department requested para- 
military activities to support the Korean War effort and to counter 
conununist-associated guerrillas. These distinct missions required 
OPC to develop and maintain different capabilities, including man- 
power and support material. 

The third factor contributing to OPC's expansion was the organiza- 
tional arrangements that created an internal demand for projects. 
The decision to undertake covert political action and to lodge that 
responsibility in a group distinct from the Departments required the 
creation of a permanent structure. OPC required regular funding to 
train and pay personnel, to maintain overseas stations (and provide 
for the supporting apparatus) , and to carry out specific projects. That 
.funding could not be provided on an ad hoc basis. It had to be budgeted 
for in advance. With budgeting came the need for ongoing activities 
to justify future allocations — rather than leaving the flexibility of 
responding to specific requirements. 



33 

To fulfill the different State and Defense requirements OPC 
adopted a "project" system rather than a programmed financial sys- 
tem. This meant that operations were organized around projects — in- 
dividual activities, e.g. funding to a political candidate — rather than 
general programs or policy objectives, and that OPC budgeted in 
terms of anticipated numbers of projects. The project system had im- 
portant internal effects. An individual within OPC judged his own 
performance, and was judged by others, on the importance and num- 
ber of projects he initiated and managed. The result was competi- 
tion among individuals and among the OPC divisions to generate the 
maximum number of projects. Projects remained the fundamental 
units around which clandestine activities were organized, and two 
generations of Agency personnel have been conditioned by this system. 
The interaction among the OPC components reflected the internal 
competition that the project system generated. OPC was divided be- 
tween field personnel stationed overseas and Headquarters personnel 
stationed in Washington. Split into four functional staffs (dealing 
with political warfare, psychological warfare, paramilitary opera- 
tions and economic warfare) and six geographical divisions, Head- 
quarters was to retain close control over the initiation and imple- 
mentation of projects to insure close policy coordination with State 
and Defense. Field stations were to serve only as standing mechanisms 
for the performance of tasks assigned from Washington. 

The specific relationship between the functional staffs, the geograph- 
ical divisions and the overseas stations was intended to be as follows : 
With guidance from the NSC, the staffs would generate project out- 
lines for the divisions. In turn, the divisions would provide their re- 
spective overseas stations with detailed instructions on project action. 
Very soon, however, each of the three components was attempting to 
control project activities. Within the functional staffs proprietary at- 
titudes developed toward particular projects at the point when the 
regional divisions were to take them over. The staffs were reluctant 
to adopt an administrative support role with respect to the divisions 
in the way that was intended. Thus, the staffs and the divisions began 
to look upon each other as competitors rather than joint participants. 
In November 1949 an internal study of OPC concluded that : 

. . . the present organization makes for duplication of effort 
and an extensive amount of unnecessaiy coordination and 
competition rather than cooperation and teamwork. . . . 
A reorganization in 1950 attempted to rectify the problem by as- 
signing responsibility for planning single-countrj^ operations to the 
appropriate geographical division. This meant that the divisions as- 
sumed real operational control. The staffs were responsible for coordi- 
nating multiple country operations as well as providing the guidance 
function. In principle the staffs were to be relegated to the support role 
they were intended to serve. However, the break was never complete. 
The distinctions themselves were artificial, and staffs seized on their 
authority over multiple country activities to maintain an operational 
role in such areas as labor operations. This tension between the staffs 
and the divisions continued through the late 1960's as some staffs 
achieved maximum operational independence. The situation is a com- 
mentary on the project orientation which originated with OPC and 



34 

the recognition that promotion and rewards were derived from proj- 
ect management — not from disembodied guidance activities. 

The relationship between Washington and the field was subject to 
pressures similar to those that influenced the interaction between the 
divisions and the stafl's. Predictably, field personnel began to develop 
their own perspective on suitable operations and their mode of conduct. 
Being "there", field personnel could and did argue that theirs was the 
most realistic and accurate view. Gradually, as the number of overseas 
personnel grew and as the number of stations increased, the stations 
assumed the initiative in project development. 

The regional divisions at Headquarters tended to assume an ad- 
ministrative support role but still retained approval authority for 
projects of particular sensitivity and cost. The shift in initiative first 
from the staffs to the divisions, then to the stations, affected the rela- 
tive desirability of assignments. Since fulfillment of the OPC mission 
was measured in terms of project development and management, the 
sought-after ])laces were those where the projects originated. Indi- 
viduals who were assigned those places rose quickly within the Direc- 
torate. 

C. Policy Guidance 

Responsibility for coordination with the State and Defense Depart- 
ments rested with Frank G. Wisner, appointed Assistant Director for 
Policy Coordination (ADPC) on September 1, 1948. Described almost 
unanimously by those who worked with him as "brilliant," Wisner 
possessed the operational instincts, the activist temperament, and the 
sheer physical energy required to develop and establish OPC as an 
organization. Wisner also had the advantages of independent wealth 
and professional and social contacts which he employed skillfully in 
advancing OPC's position within the Washington bureaucracy. 

Wisner was born into a prominent Southern family and distin- 
guished himself as an undergraduate and a law student at the Uni- 
versity of Virginia. Following law school, Wisner joined a New York 
law firm where he stayed for seven years. After a brief stint in the 
Navy, Wisner was assigned to OSS and spent part of his time serving 
under Allen Dulles in Wiesbaden, Germany. At the end of the war 
he returned to law practice, but left again in 1947 to accept the post 
of Deputy to the Assistant Secretai-y of State for Occupied Areas. It 
was from this position that Wisner was tapped to be ADPC. 

Although the stipulation of NSC 10/2 that the Secretary of State 
designate the ADPC was intended to insure the ADPC's primary iden- 
tification with State, that did not occur. Wisner quickly developed an 
institutional loyalty to OPC and its mission and drew on the web of 
New York law firm connections that existed in postwar Wasliington 
as well as on his State Department ties to gain support for OPC's 
activities. 

The guidance that State and Defense provided OPC became very 
general and allowed the maximum opportunity for project de- 
velopment. Approximately once a week Wisner met with the desig- 
nated representatives of State and Defense. Given that Kennan had 
been a prime mover in the establishment of OPC, it was unlikely that 
as the State Department's designated representative from 1948 to 1950 
he would discourage the overall direction of the organization he had 
helped create. From 1948 to 1949 Defense was represented by General 



35 

Joseph T. McNarney, the former Commander of U.S. Forces in 
Europe. Having stood "eyeball to eyeball" with the Russians in Ger- 
many, McNarney was highly sympathetic to the OPC mission. 

With the broad objectives laid out in NSC 10/2, the means of 
implementation were left to OPC. The representatives were not an 
approval body, and there Avas no formal mechanism whereby individ- 
ual projects had to be brought before them for discussion. Because it 
was assumed that covert action would be exceptional, strict provisions 
for specific project authorization were not considered necessary. With 
minimal supervision from State and Defense and with a shared agree- 
ment on the nature of the OPC mission, individuals in OPC could 
take the initiative in conceiving and implementing projects. In this 
context, operational tasks, personnel, money and material tended to 
grow in relation to one another with little outside oversight. 

In 1951, DCI Walter Bedell Smith took the initiative in requesting 
more specific high-level policy direction. In May of that year, after a 
review of NSC 68, Smith sought a clarification of the OPC mission 
from the NSC.^** In a paper dated May 8, 1951, entitled the "Scope and 
Pace of Covert Operations" Smith called for NSC restatement or re- 
determination of the several responsibilities and authorities involved 
in U.S. covert operations. More importantly, Smith proposed that the 
newly created Psychological Strategy Board provide CIA guidance 
on the conduct of covert operations.^^ 

The NSC adopted Smith's proposal making the Psychological 
Strategy Board the approval body for covert action. The body that 
had been responsible for exercising guidance over the CIA had re- 
ceived it from the DCI. Whatever the dimensions of the growth in 
OPC operations, the NSC had not attempted to limit the expansion. 

D. OPC Activities 

At the outset OPC activities were directed toward four principal 
operational areas: refugee j^rograms, labor activities, media develop- 
ment, and political action. Geographically, the area of concentration 
was Western Europe. There were two reasons for this. First, Western 
Europe was the area deemed most vulnerable to Communist encroach- 
ment ; and second, until 1950 both CIA (OSO) and OPC were excluded 
from the Far East by General Douglas MacArthur, who refused to con- 
cede any jurisdiction to the civilian intelligence agency in the Pacific 
theater — just as he had done with OSS during the war. 

OPC inherited programs from both the Si)ecial Procedures Group 
(SPG) and the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). After 
the issuance o.f NSC 10/2 SPG turned over to OPC all of its resources, 
including an unexpended budget of over $2 million, a small staff, and 
its communications equipment. In addition to SPG's propaganda ac- 
tivities OPC acquired the ECA's fledgling labor projects as well as 
the accompanying funds. Foreign labor operations continued and be- 

'^ Soon after his appointment as DCI in October 1950, Smith succeeded in hav- 
ing OPC placed directly under the jurisdiction of the DCI, making Wisner re- 
sponsible to him rather than to the Department of State and Defense. See pp. 37- 
38. 

^The Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) was an NSC subcommittee estab- 
lished on April 4, 1951 to exercise direction over psychological warfare programs. 
Its membership included departmental representatives and PSB staff members. 



36 

came a major focus of CIA activity on a worldwide basis throughout 
the 1950's and into the mid-1960's. 

The national elections in Europe in 1948 had been a primary 
motivation in the establishment of OPC. By channeling funds 
to center parties and developing media assets, OPC attempted to in- 
fluence election results — with considerable success. These activities 
formed the basis for covert political action for the next twenty years. 
By 1952 approximately forty different covert action projects were 
underway in one central European country alone. Other projects were 
targeted against what was then referred to as the "Soviet bloc." 

During his term in the State Department Wisner had spent much 
of his time on problems involving refugees in Germany, Austria and 
Trieste. In addition, his service with OSS had been oriented toward 
Central Europe. The combination of State's continuing interest and 
Wisner's personal experience led to OPC's immediate emphasis on 
Central European refugee operations. OPC representatives made con- 
tact with thousands of Soviet refugees and emigres for the pui^pose of 
influencing their political leadership. The National Committee for 
Free Europe, a group of prominent American businessmen, lawyers, 
and philanthropists, and Radio Free Europe were products of the 
OPC program. 

Until 1950 OPC's paramilitary activities (also referred to as pre- 
ventive direct action) were limited to plans and preparations for stay- 
behind nets in the event of future war. Requested by the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, these projected OPC operations focused, once again, on West- 
ern Europe and were designed to support NATO forces against Soviet 
attack. 

The outbreak of the Korean War significantly altered the nature 
of OPC's paramilitary activities as well as the organization's overall 
size and capability. Between fiscal year 1950 and fiscal year 1951, OPC's 
personnel strength jumped from 584 to 1531. Most of that gi^owth took 
place in paramilitary activities in the Far East. In the summer of 3950, 
following the North Korean invasion of South Korea, the State 
Department requested the initiation of paramilitary and psychological 
operations on the Chinese mainland. Whatever MacArthur's prefer- 
ences, the JCS were also eager for support activities in the Far East. 
This marked the beginning of OPC's active paramilitary engagement. 
The Korean War established OPC's and CIA's jurisdiction in the Far 
East and created the basic paramilitary capability that the Agency 
employed for twenty years. By 1953, the elements of that capability 
were "in place" — aircraft, amphibious craft, and an experienced group 
of personnel. For the next quarter century paramilitary activities re- 
mained the major CIA covert activity in the Far East. 

E. OPC Integration and the OPC-OSO Merger 
The creation of OPC and its ambiguous relationship to the Agency 
precipitated two major administrative problems, the DCI's relation- 
ship to OPC and antagonism between OPC and the Agency's clandes- 
tine collection component, the Office of Special Operations. DCI 
Walter Bedell Smith acted to rectify both problems. 

As OPC continued to grow, Smith's predecessor, Admiral Hillen- 
koetter, resented the fact that he had no management authority over 
OPC, although its budget and personnel were being allocated through 



37 

the CIA. Hillenkoetter's clashes with the State and Defense Depart- 
ments as well as with Wisner, the Director of OPC, were frequent. 
Less than a week after taking office Smith announced that as DCI he 
would assume administrative control of OPC and that State and 
Defense would channel their policy guidance through him rather than 
through Wisner. On October 12, 1950, the representatives of State, 
Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally accepted the change. 
The ease with which the shift occurred was primarily a result of 
Smith's own position of influence with the Departments. 

OPC's anomalous position in the Agency revealed the difficulty of 
maintaining two separate organizations for the execution of varying 
but overlapping clandestine activities. The close "tradecraft" relation- 
ship between clandestine collection and covert action, and the frequent 
necessity for one to support the other was totally distorted with the 
separation of functions in OSO and OPC. Organizational rivalry 
rather than interchange dominated the relationship between the two 
components. 

On the operating level the conflicts were intense. Each component 
had representatives conducting separate operations at each station. 
Given the related missions of the two, OPC and OSO personnel were 
often competing for the same agents and, not infrequently, attempting 
to wrest agents from each other. In 1952 the outright hostility between 
the two organizations in Bangkok required the direct intervention of 
the Assistant Director for Special Operations, Lyman Kirkpatrick. 
There an important official was closely tied to OPC, and OSO was 
trying to lure him into its employ. 

The OPC-OSO conflict was only partially the result of overseas 
competition for assets. Salary differentials and the differences in mis- 
sion were other sources of antagonism. At the time of its creation in 
1948 0P(^ was granted liberal funding to attract personnel quickly 
in order to get its operation underway. In addition, the burgeoning 
activities enabled people, once hired, to rise rapidly. The result was 
that OPC personnel held higher-ranking, better-paid positions than 
their OSO counterparts. 

Many OSO personnel had served with OSS, and their resentment 
of OPC was intensified by the fact that they regarded them- 
selves as the intelligence "purists," the professionals who en- 
gaged in collection rather than action and whose prewar ex- 
perience made them more knowledgeable and expert than the 
OPC recruits. In particular, OSO personnel regarded OPC's high- 
risk operations as a threat to the maintenance of OSO security and 
cover. OPC's favored position with State and Defense, its generous 
budget, and its visible accomplishments all contrasted sharply with 
OSO's silent, long-term objectives in espionage and counterespionage. 
By June 1952 OPC had overtaken OSO in personnel and budget 
allocation. Soon after his appointment as DCI, Smith addressed the 
problem of the OPC-OSO conflict. Lawrence Houston, the CIA's 
General ('ounsel, had raised the issue with him and recommended a 
merger of the two organizations.^* Sentiment in OSO and OPC 



^ The DuUes-Jackson-Correa survey had also advised a merger of OPC, OSO 
and the Office of Operations, the Agency's overt collection component. 



38 

favored the principle of a merger, Lyman Kirkpatrick, the Executive 
Assistant to the DCI, Major General W. G. Wyman, Assistant Direc- 
tor for Special Operations, Wisner, and William Jackson all appeared 
to have favored a merger— although there was disagreement on the 
form it should take. 

Between 1951 and 1952 Smith made several cosmetic changes to 
foster better coordination between OPC and OSO. Among them was 
the appointment of Allen W. Dulles as Deputy Director for Plans in 
January 1951.^^ Dulles was responsible for supervising both OPC and 
OSO, although the two components were independently administered 
by their own Directors. During this period of "benign coordination" 
Smith consulted extensively with senior officials in OPC and OSO. 
OPC's rapid growth and its institutional dynamism colored the 
attitude of OSO toward a potential merger. In the discussions which 
Bedell Smith held, senior OSO personnel, specifically Lyman Kirk- 
patrick and Richard Helms, argued for an integration of OPC 
functions under OSO control rather than an integrated chain of 
command down to station level. Fundamentally, the OSO leadership 
feared being engulfed by OPC in both operations and in personnel. 
However, by this time Bedell Smith was committed to the idea of an 
integrated structure. 

Although some effort was made to combine the OSO and OPC 
Western Hemisphere Divisions in June 1951, real integration at the 
operations level did not occur until August 1952, when OSO and OPC 
became the Directorate of Plans (DDP). Under this arrangement, 
Wisner was named Deputy Director for Plans and assumed the 
command functions of the ADSO and ADPC. Wisner's second in 
command, Chief of Operations, was Richard Helms, drawn from the 
OSO side to strike a balance at the senior level. At this time Dulles 
replaced Jackson as DDCI. 

The merger resulted in the maximum development of covert action 
over clandestine collection. There were several reasons for this. First 
was the orientation of Wisner himself. Wisner's OSS background and 
his OPC experience had established his interests in the operational 
side of clandestine activities. Second, for people in the field, rewards 
came more quickly through visible operational accomplishments than 
through the silent, long-term development of agents required for 
clandestine collection. In the words of one former high-ranking DDP 
official, "Collection is the hardest thing of all ; it's much easier to plant 
an article in a local newspaper." 

F. Congressional Review 
The CIA was conceived and organized as an agent of the Executive 
branch. Traditionally, Congress' only formal relationship to the 
Agency was through the appropriations process. The concept of Con- 
gressional oversight in the sense of scrutinizing and being fully 
informed of Agency activities did not exist. The international atmos- 
phere, Congress relationship to the Executive branch and the Con- 
gressional committee structure determined the pattern of interaction 
between the Agency and members of the legislature. Acceptance of the 

^ Dulles had been serving as an advisor to successive E>CIs since 1947. Smith 
and Jackson prevailed upon him to join the Agency on a full-time basis. 



39 

need, for clandestine activities and of the need for secrecy to protect 
those activities contributed to Congress' relatively unquestioning and 
uncritical attitude regarding the CIA, as did the Executive branch's 
ascendancy in foreign policy for nearly two decades following World 
War II. The strong committee system which accorded enormous power 
to committee chairmen and limited the participation of less senior 
members in committee business resulted in informal arrangements 
whereby selected members were kept informed of Agency activities 
primarily through one-to-one exchanges with the DCI. 

In 1946, following a Joint Committee review Congress enacted the 
Legislative Reorganization Act which reduced the number of commit- 
tees and realigned their jurisdictions.^" The prospect of a unified mili- 
tary establishment figured into the 1946 debates and decisions on Con- 
gressional reorganization. However, Congress did not anticipate hav- 
ing to deal with the CIA. This meant that after the passage of the 
National Security Act in 1947 CIA affairs had to be handled within a 
committee structure which had not accommodated itself to the exist- 
ence of a central intelligence agency. 

In the House and Senate the Armed Services and Appropriations 
Committees were granted jurisdiction over the Agency. No formal 
CIA subcommittees were organized until 1956. Until then small ad 
hoc groups composed of a few senior committee members reviewed the 
budget, appropriated funds, and received annual briefings on CIA ac- 
tivities. The DCIs kept senior committee members informed of 
large-scale covert action projects at the approximate time of imple- 
mentation. There was no formal review or approval process involved ; 
it was simply a matter of courtesy to the senior members. The initia- 
tive in gaining information on specific activities rested with the 
members. 

For nearly twenty years a small group of ranking members dom- 
inated these relationships with the Agency. As Chairman of the House 
Armed Services Committee, Representative Carl Vinson, a Democrat 
from Georgia, presided over CIA matters from 1949 to 1953 and from 
1955 to 1965, Clarence Cannon served as chairman of the House Ap- 
propriations Committee from 1949 to 1953 and from 1955 to 1964 and 
chaired the Defense Subcommittee which had supervising authority 
over CIA appropriations. Cannon organized a special group of five 
membei-s to meet informally on CIA appropriations. In the Senate 
between 1947 and 1954 chairmanship of the Armed Services Commit- 
tee was held by Chan Gurney, Millard Tydings, Richard Russell and 
Leverett Saltonstall. In 1955 Russell assumed the chairmanship and 
held the position until 1968. 

Because the committee chairmen maintained their positions for ex- 
tended periods of time, they established continuing relationships with 
DCIs and preserved an exclusivity in their knowledge of Agency ac- 
tivities. They were also able to develop relationships of mutual trust 
and understanding with the DCIs which allowed informal exchanges 
to prevail over formal votes and close supervision. 

Within the Congress procedures governing the Agency's budget 
assured maximum secrecy. The DCI presented his estimate of the 

^ The Act limited members' committee assignments, provided for professional 
staflSng, tried to regularize meetings, and made some changes in the appropria- 
tions process as well as legislating other administrative modifications. 



40 

budget for the coming fiscal year broken down into general functional 
categories. Certification by the subcommittee chairmen constituted ap- 
proval. Exempt from floor debate and from public disclosure, CIA ap- 
propriations were and are concealed in the Department of Defense 
budget. In accordance with the 1949 Act the DCI has only to certify 
that the money as appropriated has been spent. He does not have to 
account publicly for specific expenditures, which would force him to 
reveal specific activities. 

To allow greater flexibility for operational expenditures the Con- 
tingency Reserve Fund was created in 1952. The Fund provided a sum 
independent of the regular budget to be used for unanticipated large 
projects. For example, the initial funding for the development of the 
U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was drawn from the Contingency Reserve 
Fund. The most common use of the Fund was for covert operations. 

Budgetary matters rather than the specific nature of CIA activi- 
ties were the concern of Congressional members, and given tlie per- 
ception of the need for action against the Soviet Union, approval was 
routine. A former CIA Legislative Counsel characterized Congres- 
sional attitudes in the early 1950s in this way : 

In the view of the general public, and of the Congress which 
in the main reflected the public attitude, a national intelli- 
gence service in those days was more or less a part and parcel 
of our overall defense establishment. Therefore, as our de- 
fense budget went sailing through Congress under the impact 
of the Soviet extension of power into Eastern Europe, Soviet 
probes into Iran and Greece, the Berlin blockade, and even- 
tually the Korean War, the relatively modest CIA budget in 
effect got a free ride, buried as it was in the Defense and other 
budgets. When Directors appeared before Congress, which 
they did only rarely, the main concern of the members was 
often to make sure that we [the CIA] had what we needed 
to do our job. 

Limited information-sharing rather than rigorous oversight char- 
acterized Congress relationship to the Agency. Acceptance of the need 
for secrecy and Congressional procedures would perpetuate what 
amounted to mutual accommodation. 



By 1953 the Agency had achieved the basic structure and scale it 
retained for the next twenty years.^°'' The Korean War, United States 
foreign policy objectives, and the Agency's internal organizational 
arrangements had combined to produce an enormous impetus for 
growth. The CIA was six times the size it had been in 1947. 

Three Directorates had been established. In addition to the DDP 
and the DDI, Smith created the Deputy Directorate for Administra- 
tion (DDA). Its purpose was to consolidate the management func- 
tions required for the burgeoning organization. The Directorate 
was responsible for budget, personnel, security, and medical serv- 
ices Agency-wide. However, one quarter of DDA's total person- 
nel strength was assigned to logistical support for overseas opera- 
tions. The DDP commanded the major share of the Agency's 

^" For chart showing CIA organization as of 1953, see p. 98. 



41 

budget, personnel, and resources; in 1952 clandestine collection and 
covert action accounted f oi- 74 percent of the Agency's total budget ; ^^ 
its personnel constituted 60 percent of the CIA's personnel strength. 
While production rather than coordination dominated the DDI, oper- 
ational activities rather than collection dominated the DDP, The DDI 
and the DDP emerged at different times out of disparate policy needs. 
There were, in effect, separate organizations. These fundamental dis- 
tinctions and emphases were reinforced in the next decade. 



^^ This did not include DDA budgetary allocations in support of DDP operations. 



Part Two 

The Dulles Era, 1953-1961 

introduction 

During the years 1953 to 1961 the Agency emerged as an integral 
element in high-level United States policymaking. The CIA's covert 
operational capability provided the Agency with the stature it 
acquired. Kather than fmictioning in a strict support role to the 
State and Defense Departments, the CIA assumed the initiative in 
defining the ways covert operations could advance U.S. policy 
objectives and in determining what kinds of operations were 
suited to particular policy needs. The force of Allen Dulles' leader- 
ship and his recognition throughout the government as the quin- 
tessential case officer accounted in large part for the enhancement of 
and shift in the Agency's position. The reason for Dulles' influence 
extended well beyond his pei-sonal qualities and inclinations. The 
composition of the United States Government, international events, 
and senior polic^^makers' perception of the role the Agency could 
play in United States foreign policy converged to make Dulles' posi- 
tion in the government and that of the Agency unique in the years 
1953 to 1962. 

The 1952 election brought D wight D. Eisenhower to the presi- 
dency. Eisenhower had been elected on a strident anti-Communist plat- 
form, advocating an aggressive worldwide stance against the Soviet 
Union to replace what he described as the Truman Administration's 
passive policy of containment. Eisenhower cited the Commimist 
victory in China, the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, and the 
Korean War as evidence of the passivity which had prevailed in the 
United States Government following World War II. He was equally 
strong in calling for an elimination of government corruption and 
for removal of Communist sympathizers from public office. 

This was not simply election rhetoric. The extent to which the 
urgency of the Communist threat had become a shared perception is 
difficult to appreciate. By the close of the Korean War, a broad con- 
sensus had developed about the nature of Soviet ambitions and the need 
for the United States to respond. In the minds of government officials, 
members of the press, and the informed public, the Soviets would try 
to achieve their purposes by penetrating and subverting governments 
all over the world. The accepted role of the United States was to pre- 
vent that expansion. 

Washington policymakers regarded the Central Intelligence Agency 
as a major weapon — both offensive and defensive — against connnu- 
nism. By 1953, the Agency's contributions in the areas of political 
action and paramilitary warfare were recognized and respected. The 
CIA alone could perform many of the activities seemingly required 

(42) 



43 

to meet the Soviet threat. For senior government officials, covert opera- 
tions had become a vital tool in the pursuit of United States foreign 
policy objectives. 

During the 1950's the CIA attracted some of the most able lawyers, 
academicians, and young, committed activists in the country. They 
brought with them professional associations and friendships which 
extended to the senior levels of government. This informal network of 
contacts enhanced the stature of the Agency considerably. Men such as 
Frank Wisner, Desmond FitzGerald, then in the Far East Division of 
DDP and later Deputy Director for Plans, C. Tracy Barnes, the 
Special Assistant to Wisner for Paramilitary and Psychological Op- 
erations, William Bundy, an analyst in the Office of National Esti- 
mates, Kingman Douglass, former investment banker and head of 
OCI, and Loftus Becker, then Deputy Director for Intelligence, 
had developed a wide array of contacts which bridged the worlds 
of government, business law, journalism, and politics, at their 
highest levels. The fact that senior Agency officials had shared similar 
wartime experiences, came from comparable social backgrounds, and 
served in positions comparable in those of other government officials 
contributed significantly to the legitimacy of and confidence in the 
Agency as an instrument of government. Moreover, these informal 
ties created a shared consensus among policymakers about the role and 
direction of the Agency. 

At the working level, these contacts were facilitated by the Agency's 
location in downtown Washington. Housed in a sprawling set of 
buildings in the center of the city — along the Eeflecting Pond at the 
Mall and elsewhere — Agency personnel could easily meet and talk 
with State and Defense officials throughout the day. The CIA's physi- 
cal presence in the city gave it the advantage of seeming an integral 
part of, rather than a separate element of, the government. 

No one was more convinced than Allen Dulles that the Agency could 
make a special contribution to the advancement of United States 
foreign policy goals. Dulles came to the post of DCI in February 
1953 with an extensive background in foreign affairs and foreign 
espionage. By the time of his appointment his interests and his view 
of the CIA had been firmly established. The son of a minister, Dulles 
was raised in a family which combined a strong sense of moral purpose 
with a long tradition of service at senior levels of government. This 
background gave Allen Dulles and his older brother, John Foster, the 
opportunity to participate in international affairs and brought a di- 
mension of conviction to their ideas and opinions.^ 

Before becoming DCI, Dulles' background included ten years in the 
Foreign Service with assignments to the Versailles Peace Conference, 
Berlin, and Constantinople. Law practice in New York followed. 
After the outbreak of World War II William Donovan called on 
Dulles to serve in OSS. Dulles was assigned to Bern, the center for 
OSS activities against the Germans, where he developed a dazzling 
array of operations against the Germans and Italians. After the war 
Dulles returned to law practice in New York. He served as a consult- 



^ Dulles' paternal grandfather had been Secretary of State under Benjamin 
Harrison; his maternal grandfather had served as United States Minister (then 
the equivalent of Ambassador) in Mexico, Russia, and Spain; and his uncle, 
Robert Lansing, had been Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson. 



70-725 O - 76 - 4 



44 

ant to DCIs Vandenberg and Hillenkoetter, and in 1948 President 
Truman and Secretary Forrestal asked him to participate in the NSC 
Survey of the CIA. He joined the Agency in January 1951 as the Dep- 
uty Director for Plans. Later that year he replaced William Jackson 
as DDCI, a position he held until February 1953, when he was named 
Bedell Smith's successor. 

Dulles' experience in the Foreign Service, OSS, and the law cou- 
pled with his naturally gregarious personality had won him a vast 
array of domestic and international contacts in government, law, and 
the press. As DCI Dulles used and cultivated these contacts freely to 
enhance the Agency's stature. He made public speeches, met quietly 
with members of the press, and socialized constantly in Washington 
society. Dulles' own unofficial activities were indicative of the web of 
associations which existed among senior Agency persomiel and the 
major sectors of Washington society. By the early 1950's the CIA had 
gained a reputation among United States Government agencies as a 
young, vital institution serving the highest national purpose. 

In 1953, Dulles took a dramatic stand against Senator Joseph Mc- 
Carthy, and his action contributed significantly to the Agency's repu- 
tation as a liberal institution. At a time when the State Department 
and even the military services were cowering before McCarthy's pre- 
posterous charges and attempting to appease the Wisconsin Senator, 
Dulles openly challenged McCarthy's attacks on the Agency. He denied 
McCarthy's charges publicly, had Senate subpoenas quashed, and de- 
manded that McCarthy make available to him any evidence of Com- 
mmiist influence or subversion in the Agency. Within a month, Mc- 
Carthy backed off. The episode had an important impact on agency 
morale and on the public's perception of the CIA. As virtually the 
only government agency that had successfully resisted McCarthy's 
allegations and intrusions, the CIA was identified as an organization 
that fostered free and independent thinking. 

A crucial factor in securing the Agency's place within the govern- 
ment during this period was the fact that the Secretary of State, John 
Foster Dulles, and the DCI were brothers. Whatever the formal rela- 
tionships among the State Department, the NSC, and the CIA, they 
were superseded by the personal and working association between the 
brothers. Most importantly, both enjoyed the absolute confidence of 
President Eisenhower. In the day-to-day formulation of policy, these 
relationships were crucial to the Executive's support for the Agency 
and more specifically, for Allen Dulles personally in defining his 
own role and that of the Agency. 

Dulles' role as DCI was rooted in his wartime experience with OSS. 
His interests and expertise la}^ with the operational aspects of intel- 
ligence, and his fascination with the details of operations persisted. 
Perhaps the most important effect of Dulles' absorption with opera- 
tions was its impact on the Agency's relationship to the intelligence 
"community" — the intelligence components in the Department of State 
and Defense. As DCI, Dulles did not assert his position or the Agency's 
in attempting to coordinate departmental intelligence activities. 

For the Agency, this constituted a lost opportunity. Throughout the 
1950's, the CIA was in the forefront of technological innovation and 
developed a strong record on military estimates. Conceivably, Dulles 
could have used these advances as bureaucratic leverage in exerting 



45 

some control over the intelligence community. He did not. Much of the 
reason was a matter of personal temperament. Jolly and extroverted 
in the extreme, Dulles disliked and avoided confrontations at every 
level. In so doing, he failed to provide even minimal direction over the 
intelligence agencies at a time when intelligence capabilities were 
undergoing dramatic changes. Dulles was equally inattentive to the 
administration of the Agency itself, and the real internal management 
responsibility fell to his able Deputy Director, General Charles P. 
Cabell, who served throughout Dulles' term. 

/. The Clandestine Service ^ 

It is both easy to exaggerate and difficult to appreciate the position 
which the Clandestine Service secured in the CIA during the Dulles 
administration and, to a large extent, retained thereafter. The number 
and extent of the activities undertaken are far less imf)ortant than 
the impact which those activities had on the Agency's institutional 
identity — the way people within the DDP, the DDI, and the DDA 
perceived the Agency's primary mission, and the way policymakers 
regarded its contribution to the process of government. 

Covert action was at the core of this perception, and its importance 
to the internal and external evaluation of the Agency was derived 
largely ,f rom the fact that only the CIA could and did perform this 
function. Moreover, in the international environment of the 1950's 
Agency operations were regarded as an essential contribution to the 
attainment of United States foreign policy objectives. Political action, 
sabotage, support to democratic governments, counterintelligence — all 
this the Clandestine Service could provide. 

The Agency also benefitted from Avhat were widely regarded as its 
operational "successes" in this period. In 1953 and 1954 two of the 
Agency's boldest, most spectacular covert operations took place — the 
overthrow of Pi-emier Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran and the coup 
against President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman of Guatemala. Both were 
quick and virtually bloodless operations that removed from power two 
allegedly communist-associated leaders and replaced them with pro- 
Western officials. Out of these early acclaimed achievements both the 
Agency and Washington policymakers acquired a sense of confidence 
in the CIA's capacity for operational success. 

The popular perception was an accurate reflection of the Agency's 
internal dynamics. The Clandestine Service occupied a preeminent 
position within the CIA. First, it had the constant attention of the 
DCI. Dulles was absorbed in the day-to-day details of operations. 
Working closely with Wisner and his key subordinates, Dulles con- 
ceived ideas for projects, conferred with desk officers, and delighted 
in the smallest achievements. Dulles never extended comparable time 
and attention to the DDI. 

The DDP continued to command the major portion of Agency re- 
sources. Between 1953 and 1961, clandestine collection and covert 
action absorbed an average of 54 percent of the Agency's total annual 
budget.^ Although this percentage represented a reduction from the 

^ The term "Clandestine Service" is used synonymously with the Deputy 
Directorate for Plans. 
* This did not include DDA budgetary allocations in support of DDP operations. 



46 

period of the Korean War, the weight of the Agency's expenditures 
still fell to the DDP. During the same period, the DDP gained nearly 
2,000 personnel. On its fonnal table or organization, the DDP regis- 
tered an increase of only 1,000 personnel. However, increases of nearly 
1,000 in the logistics and communications components of the DDA 
represented growth in support to Clandestine Service operations. 

A. Internal Procedures ; Secrecy and Its Consequences 

Within the Agency the DDP was a Directorate apart. Because of 
presumed security needs the DDP was exempt from many o.f the re- 
view^ procedures that existed within the Agency. Secrecy was deemed 
essential to the success and protection of DDP activities. 

The demands of security — as defined by individuals within the 
DDP — resulted in capricious administrative procedures. Wisner and 
Dulles condoned and accepted exceptional organizational arrange- 
ments. Neither man was a strong manager, and neither had the dis- 
position to impose or to adhere to strict lines of authority. Both men 
believed that the functional dynamics of clandestine activities required 
the absence of routinization, and it was not unusual for either of them 
to initiate projects independent of the staffs and divisions that w^ould 
ordinarily l3e involved. 

Although the Comptroller's Office was responsible for tracking budg- 
etary expenditures in the DDP on a project-by-project basis, special 
activities were exempt from such review. For example, foreign intelli- 
gence projects whose sensitivity required that they be authorized at 
the level of the Assistant Deputy Dii-ector for Plans or above were not 
included in the Comptroller's accounting. Records on the costs of such 
projects w^ere maintained within the Directorate by the Foreign Intelli- 
gence Staff.* Often political projects which had a highly sensitive 
classification were implemented without full information being pro- 
vided to the DDA or to the Comptroller. 

The Office of the Inspector General was formally established in 1951 
to serve as an intra-agency monitoring unit. Its range of duties in- 
cluded surveys of agency components and consideration of grievances. 
Until 1957 there were restrictions on the Office's authority to investi- 
gate the DDP components and to examine specific operational problems 
within the Directorate. The DDP maintained its own inspection 
group, staffed by its own careerists. 

The DDP became a highly compartmented structure in which in- 
formation was limited to small groups of individuals. Throughout the 
Directorate information was subject to the "need to know" rule. This 
was particularly true o,f highly sensitive political action and paramili- 
tary operations, but it was also routine practice to limit the routing of 
cable traffic from the field to Headquarters. Within the DDP ex- 
ceptions to standard guidelines for project approval and review 
were frequent. In certain cases an operation or the identity of an 
agent was known only to the Deputy Director for Plans and the two 
or three officers directly involved. In the words of a former high-rank- 

* The Foreign Intelligence Staff was one of the several functional staffs in the 
DDP. Among its responsibilities were checking the authenticity of sources and 
information, screening clandestine collection requirements, and reviewing the re- 
gional divisions' projects, budget information, and operational cable traffic. 



47 

ing DDP official, "Flexibility is the name of the game." A forceful 
case can be made in support of these procedures, for reasons of counter- 
espionage, maximum creativity, etc. However, the arrangements placed 
enormous premiums on the pi'ofessional integrity of the individuals 
involved and left many decisions subject to the strains and lapses of 
personal judgments. 

The Agency's drug testing program is a clear example of the 
excesses that resulted from a system that allowed individuals to func- 
tion with the knowledge that their actions would not be subject to 
scrutiny from others either within or outside the DDP. Testing and 
experiments were conducted without the participants' prior knowledge 
and without medical screening, and drugs were administered without 
participation of trained medical or scientific personnel. One person is 
known to have died as a result of Agency experimentations. Those 
responsible for the drug testing programs w^ere exempt from routine 
Agency procedures of accountability and approval. 

Blurred lines of authority continued to characterize relationships 
among the DDP components. As discussed earlier, the intended roles 
of the functional staffs and the geographical divisions (administrative 
support vs. operational control ) had broken dowm under the incentives 
to generate and manage projects. During this period both the Covert 
Action (CA) Staff and the Counterintelligence (CI) Staff ran field 
operations while also serving as advisory and coordinating bodies 
for the operations conducted by the geographical divisions.^ 

The CI staff actually monopolized counterintelligence operations 
and left little latitude to the divisions to develop and implement their 
own counterintelligence activities. The staff maintained their own 
communications channels with the field, and CI operations were fre- 
quently conducted without the knowledge of the respective DDP Divi- 
sion Chiefs or Station Chiefs. The example of the CI Staff is the 
extreme. It was derived from the personal influence that CI chief, 
James Angleton, exercised for nearly twenty years. Nonetheless, the CI 
Staff is indicative of the compartmentation within the Directorate that 
created pockets of privilege for specific operations. 

An important consequence of the degree of compartmentation that 
existed in the Clandestine Service was the impact on the intelligence 
process. Theoretically, the data collected by the DDP field officers 
could have served as a major source for DDI analysis. However, 
strict compartmentation prevented open contact between the respec- 
tive DDP divisions and DDI components. 

The overriding element in the distant relationship between the DDP 
and the DDI was the so-called "sources and methods" rule. DDI 
analysts seldom had access to raw data from the field. In the decade 
of the 1950's information collected from the field was transmitted to 
Headquarters and summarized there for dissemination to all of the 
analytic components throughout the government, including the DDL*' 

The DDP adhered strictly to its principle of not revealing the 
identity of its assets. Reports gave only vague descriptions of assets 

^ The Covert Action Staff was involved with a full range of political, propa- 
ganda, and labor activities. 

' More recently, reports officers in the field draft intelligence summaries which 
receive minimal review at Headquarters before dissemination. 



48 

providing information. Intelligence analysts found this arrangement 
highly unsatisfactory, since they could not judge the quality of in- 
formation they were receiving without some better indication of the 
nature and reliability of the source. Analysts therefore tended to look 
upon DDP information — however limited their access to it — with res- 
ervations and relied primarily on overt materials and COMINT for 
their production efforts. 

Throughout Dulles' term desk-to-desk contact between DDP officers 
and DDI analysts was practically nonexistent. The rationale for this 
was to prevent individual analysts from imposing requirements on 
the collectors. The DDP viewed itself as serving the community's clan- 
destine collection needs subject to government- w^ide requirements. The 
DDI leadership, on the other hand, believed that the DDP should 
respond primarily to its requirements. The DDP's definition prevailed. 
The Clandestine Service maintained control over determining which 
requests it accepted from the community. 

Intelligence requirements were established through a subcommittee 
of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.^ After the intelligence priori- 
ties were defined, the DDP's Foreign Intelligence Staff reviewed them 
and accepted or vetoed the requirements imilaterally. Moreover, be- 
cause the requirements were very general the DDP had considerable 
latitude in interpreting and defining the specific collection objectives. 
The most significant consequence of this process was that the DDP 
itself essentially controlled the specific requirements for its collectors 
without ongoing consultation with the DDI. 

The existence of this enforced isolation between the two Directorates 
negated the potential advantages of having collectors and analysts 
in the same agency. Despite efforts in the 1960's to break down the bar- 
riers between the Dii-ectorates, the lack of real interchange and inter- 
dependence persisted. 

The tolerance of flexible procedures within the DDP, the Direc- 
torate's exemption from accountability to outside components and 
the DCI's own patronage gave the DDP a considerable degree of free- 
dom in undertaking operations. In addition, the loose process of 
external review, discussed later in this section, contributed to the 
Directorate's independence. The DDP's relative autonomy in the 
Agency also affected the mission and functions of the other two Di- 
rectorates. In the case of the DDI the consequences were significant 
for the execution of the intelligence function. These patterns solidi- 
fied under Dulles and shaped the long-term configuration of the 
Agency. 

B. Clandestine Activities^ 1953-1961 
Covert action expanded significantly in the 1953 to 1961 period. 
Following the Korean War and the accompanying shift in the percep- 
tion of the Soviet threat from military to political, the CIA concen- 
trated its operations on political action, particularly support to elec- 
toral candidates and to political parties. The Agency also continued 

'Later through the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). See p. 63. 



49 

to develop its paramilitary capability, employing it in Guatemala in 
1954, the Far East, and in the ill-fated Bay of Pigs landing in Cuba 
in 1961. Relative to the paramilitary operations in Laos and Vietnam 
in the 196()'s, the scale of these activities was minimal. 

Geographically, the order of priorities was Western Europe, the 
Far East, and Latin America. AVith the Soviets in Eastern Europe 
and Communist parties still active in Fi-ance and Italy, Europe ap- 
peared to be the area most vulnerable to Comnnmist encroachments. 
The CIA station in West Berlin was the center of CIA operations 
against Eastern Europe, and the Gernnan Branch of the Europeaji 
Division was the Agency's largest single country component. By 1962 
the Western Hemisphere Division had experienced considerable success 
in penetrating the major Communist Parties in Latin America- 
Just as the Agency's activities reflected certain geographical pat- 
terns, they also displayed functional patterns. In the period 1952 to 
1963 the Agency acquired most of its clandestine information through 
liaison arrangements with foreign governments. Both Wisner and 
Dulles cultivated relations with foreign intelligence officials and be- 
cause of the United States' predominant postwar position, govern- 
ments in Western Europe, in particular, were very willing to cooperate 
in infomiation sharing. Liaison provided the Agency with sources and 
contacts that otherwise would have been denied them. Information on 
individuals, on political parties, on labor movements, all derived in 
part from liaison. Certainly, the difficulty and long-term nature of 
developing assets was largely responsible for the CIA's initial reliance 
on liaison. 

The existence of close liaison relationships inhibited developing 
independent assets. First, it was simply easier to rely on information 
that had already been gleaned from agents. Regular meetings with 
local officials allowed CIA officers to ask questions and to get the 
information they needed with minimal effort. It was far easier to 
talk to colleagues who had numerous assets in place than to expend 
the time required merely to make contact with an individual whose 
potential would not be realized for years. Second, maintenance of 
liaison became an end in itself, against which independent collection 
operations were judged. Rather than serving as a supplement to Agen- 
cy operations it assumed primary importance in Western Europe. 
Often, a proposal for an independent operation was rejected because 
a Station Chief believed that if the operation were exposed, the host 
government's intelligence seiwice would be offended. 

Reliance on liaison did not mean that the Agency was not develop- 
ing its own capability. Liaison itself enhanced the Agency's political 
action capability through the information it provided on the domestic 
situation in the host country. With the Soviet Union and communist 
parties as the targets the Agency concentrated on developing anti- 
Communist political strength. Financial support to individual candi- 
dates, subsidies to publications including newspapers and magazines, 
involvement in local and national labor unions — all of these interlock- 
ing elements constituted the fundamentals of a typical political action 



50 

program. Elections, of course, were key operations, and the Agency 
involved itself in electoral politics on a continuing basis. Likewise, case 
officers groomed and cultivated individuals who could provide strong 
pro- Western leadei-ship. 

Beyond the varying forms of political action and liaison the 
Agency's program of clandestine activities aimed at developing an 
international anti-Communist ideology. Within the Agency the Inter- 
national Organizations Division coordinated this extensive organi- 
zational propaganda effort. The Division's activities included opera- 
tions to assist or to create international organizations for youth, stu- 
dents, teachers, workers, veterans, journalists, and jurists. This kind 
of activity was an attempt to lay an intellectual foundation for anti- 
communism around the world. Ultimately, the organizational under- 
pimiings could serve as a political force in assuring the establishment 
or maintenance of democratic governments. 

G. Executive Authorization of Covert Actimi 

During the Dulles period there were several attempts to regidarize 
and improve the process of Executive coordination and authorization 
of covert action. Although the changes provided a mechanism for 
Agency accountability to the Executive, none of the arrangements sig- 
nificantly restricted CIA activities. The perception of American 
foreign policy objectives encouraged the development of anti-Com- 
munist activities; the Agency held the advantage in its ability to 
introduce project proposals based on detailed knowledge of internal 
conditions in a given forei^i country; Dulles" personal influence and 
the fact of his brother's position lent enormous weight to any proposal 
that originated with the Agency. 

Until 1955 no formal approval mechanism existed outside the 
Agency for covert action projects. Sinc« 1948, when covert action was 
first authorized, senior State Department and Defense Department 
officials were designated to provide only loose policy guidance to 
CIA — with the assumption that covert opei-ations would be infrequent. 
As covert activities proliferated, loose understandings rather than 
sj^ecific review foimed the basis for CIA's accountability for covert 
operations. 

Following the Korean War, the Defense Department's role in rela- 
tion to coveit action became more one of providing pliysical support, to 
the Agency's pai'amilitary operations. Liaison between DOD and 
CIA was not chamielled through lower levels but was handled by a des- 
ignated DOD representative. For several years there was some tension 
between the two agencies because the Defense Department official who 
was responsible for liaison was not trusted by senior agency personnel. 
In 1957 he was dismissed, and his replacement was able to ease rela- 
tions between the two agencies. 

Apart from day-to-day liaison at the working level, a series of senior 
bodies developed over the years to provide guidance for the initiation 
of covert opei-ations. The Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), an 
NSC subcommittee, had been established in 1951. Since both depart- 
mental representatives and PSB staff members sat on the Board, it 
was too large and too widely representational to function as a senior 
policymaking body. Tlie Board's definition of covert activity was also 
faulty, since it assumed a neat distinction between psychological op- 



51 

erations and political and paramilitary operations. With the prolifera- 
tion of activities in the latter two categories there was a need to include 
these programs in the policy guidance mechanism. Where the initia- 
tive for change origmated is unclear, but in September 1953 the 
Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) was established to replace the 
PSB. Although the new Board's membership was restricted to 
Deputy-level officials,^ it never served in an approval capacity. More- 
over, its interdepartmental composition made Dulles reluctant to dis- 
cuss secret operations with OCB members. Dulles employed the OCB 
primarily to gain backing for requests to the Bureau of the Budget for 
reserve releases to meet unbudgeted expenses. 

In ]March and November 1955 two NSC policy directives, NSC 
5412/1 and NSC 5412/2 were issued, outlining revised control proce- 
dures. They established a group of "designated representatives" of 
the President and Secretaries of State and Defense to review and 
approve coveit action projects. Irregular procedures characterized 
the group's functioning. The actual membership of the 5412 
Committee or "Special Group" as it came to be known, varied as ad hoc 
task forces were organized for different situations. Neither the CIA 
nor the Group established clearly defined criteria for submitting 
projects to the NSC body, and until 1959 meetings were infrequent. 
In that year regular weekly meetings began, but the real initiative 
for projects continued to rest with the Agency. Spf^cial Group members 
frequently did not feel confident enough to judge Agency capabilities 
or to detemiine whether a particular project was feasible. 

After the Bay of Pigs failure President Kennedy requested a review 
of U.S. paramilitary capabilities. The President's request assumed the 
necessity for continued, indeed, expanded operations, and the purpose 
of the report was to explore ways of insuring successful future para- 
military actions — as well as determining why the Bay of Pigs landing 
had failed. Directed by General Maxwell Taylor, the report recom- 
mended strengthening the top-level direction for operations by estab- 
lishing a review group with permanent membership. As a result of the 
report, the standing members of the Special Group included McGeorge 
Bundy, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs as Chair- 
man, U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State, Roswell Gilpatric, 
Deputy Secretaiy of Defense, the DCI, and General Lyman Lemnitzer, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This group assumed a more 
vigorous role in plamiing and reviewmg covert operations. 

D. Congressional Review 
During the term of Allen Dulles the Congressional committee 
structure and the perception of the Agency as a first line defense 
against Communism remained t\\^ determinants in the relationship 
between the CIA and the Congress. Dulles liimself reinforced the 
existing procedures through his casual, friendly approach to Congress, 
and he secured the absolute trust of senior ranking members. While 
Dulles was DCI Richard Russell continued as Chairman of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, Carl Vinson remained as Chairman of the 



^ OCB members inchided the Umler Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary 
of Defense, the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War affairs, and the 
Director of the Mutual Security Administration (the designation for the foreign 
aid program at that time). 



52 

House Araied Services Committee, and from 1955 to 1964 Clarence 
Cannon held the chairmanship of the House Appropriations Commit- 
tee. Dulles' appearance before a group consisted of a tour d^horizon 
on the basis of which members would ask questions. Yet the proce- 
dure was more perfunctory than rigorous. Likewise, members often 
preferred not knowing about Agency activities. Leverett Saltonstall, 
the former Massachusetts Senator and a ranking member of the 
Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees stated 
candidly : 

Dominated by the Committee chairmen, members would ask 
few questions which dealt with internal Agency matters or 
with specific operations. The most sensitive discussions were 
reserved for one-to-one sessions between Dulles and individual 
Committee chairmen. 
In spite of the appearance of a comfortable relationship between 
Congress and the Agency, there were serious efforts to alter the nature 
of the procedures. During the Dulles administration there were two 
strong but unsuccessful attempts to strengthen Congress' oversight role 
and to broaden the participation of members in the execution of the 
Committees' responsibilities. The failure of these attempts derived 
principally from the strength of the Committee system and from the 
adroit tactics of the Executive branch in deflating the impetus for 
change. 

In 1955 Senator Mike Mansfield introduced a Resolution for a Joint 
Oversight Committee. The Mansfield Resolution resulted from a con- 
gressional survey of the Executive branch. The Hoover Commission, 
chaired by former President Herbert Hoover, was established in 1954 
to evaluate the organization of Executive agencies. A small task force 
under General Mark Clark was assigned responsibility for the intel- 
ligence community. The prospect of a survey of the Clandestine Serv- 
ice, information fi^om which would be reported to the full Congress, led 
President Eisenhower, presumably in consultation with Allen Dulles, 
to request a separate, classified report on the DDP to be delivered to 
him personally. The group charged with the investigation was the 
Doolittle Committee, so named after its Chairman, General James 
Doolittle, a distinguished World War II aviator. In turn, the Clark 
Task Force agreed not to duplicate the activities of the Doolittle Com- 
mittee. Essentiall3% the arrangement meant that the Congress was pre- 
vented from conducting its own investigation into the Clandestine 
Service.'' 



' The orientation and composition of the Doolittle Committee did not encour- 
age criticism of the Agency's activities or of the existing framework of decision- 
making. Early drafts of instructions to General Doolittle were prepared by the 
Agency. The four members of the Committee were well known in the Agency and 
had aflaiiations with the Executive. Doolittle himself was a friend of Wisner's ; 
Morris Hadley, a New York lawyer, was an old friend of Allen Dulles ; William 
Pawley was a former ambassador ; and William Franke had been an Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy. Although the Doolittle report did call for better coordi- 
nation between the CIA and the military and better cooperation between the DDP 
and the DDA, the report was principally an affirmation of the need for a clan- 
destine capability. The prose was chilling : 

"It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objec- 
tive is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no 



53 

Among the members of the Clark Task Force, Clark and Admiral 
Richard L. Connolly were responsible for the CIA.^* The Task Force 
found an excessive emphasis on covert, action over intelligence analysis 
and in particular criticized the quality and quantity of the Agency's 
intelligence on the Soviet Union. With regard to the Congress the 
Task Force recommended the establishment of an oversight group, 
a mixed permanent body including members of Congress and distin- 
guished private citizens. The full Hoover Commission did not adopt 
the Task Force proposal but instead recommended two bodies : a joint 
congressional oversight committee and a group comprised of private 
citizens. 

It was on the basis of the Commission's recommendation that 
Senator Mansfield introduced his resolution on January 14, 1955. 
Debated for over a year, the resolution had thirty-five co-sponsors. 
However, fierce opposition existed among senior members, including 
Russell, Hay den and Saltonstall, who were reluctant to concede their 
Committees' respective jurisdictions over the Agency. An exchange 
between Mansfield and Saltonstall during the floor debate is indicative 
of the pespective existing in the Senate at the time : 

Mr. Mansfield. Mr. President, I know the Senator from 
Massachusetts speaks from his heart, but I wonder whether 
the question I shall ask now should be asked in public; if 
not, let the Senator from Massachusetts please refrain from 
answering it : How many times does the CIA request a meet- 
ing with the particular subcommittees of the Appropriations 
Committee and the Armed Services Committee, and how 
many times does the Senator from Massachusetts request the 
CIA to brief him in regard to existing affairs ? 

Mr. Saltonstall. I believe the correct answer is that at 
least twice a year that happens in the Armed Services Com- 
mittee, and at least once a year it happens in the Appropri- 
ations Committee. I speak from my knowledge of the 
situation during the last year or so ; I do not attempt to refer 
to previous periods. Certainly the present administrator and 
the former administrator. Gen. Bedell Smith, stated that they 
were ready at all times to answer any questions we might 
wish to ask them. The difficulty in connection with asking 

rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. 
If the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of "fair 
play" must be reconsidered. "We must develop effective espionage and counter- 
espionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies 
by more clever, more sophisticated, and more effective methods than those used 
against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted 
with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy." 

»a rpjjg report called for a separation of the Clandestine Service into what was 
virtually the old OPC-OSO division. Its criticism was sharp and pointed : 

"It appears that the clandestine collection of raw intelligence from the USSR 
has been overshadowed by the concentration of the DCI and others of an 
inordinate amount of their time and efforts on the performance of the Agency's 
cold war functions. The Task Force therefore is of the opinion that the present 
internal organization of the CIA for the performance of the DDP types of func- 
tions has had a decidedly adverse effect on the accomplishment of the Agency's 
espionage and counterespionage functions." 



54 

questions and obtaining information is that we might obtain 
information which I personally would rather not have, un- 
less it was essential for me as a Member of Congress to have 
it. 

Mr. Mansfield. Mr. President, I think the Senator's 
answer tells the whole story, for he has informed us that a 
subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee has 
met only twice a year with members of the CIA, and that a 
subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee has 
met only once a year with members of the CIA. Of course, it 
is very likely that the meetings in connection with the Appro- 
priations Committee occurred only at a time when the CIA 
was making requests for appropriations. That information 
from the Senator from Massachusetts does not indicate to 
me that there is sufficiently close contact between the con- 
gressional committees and the CIA, as such. 

Mr. Saltonstall. In reply, let me state — and I should like 
to discuss this point more fully when I present my own views 
on this subject — that it is not a question of reluctance on the 
part of the CIA officials to speak to us. Instead, it is a ques- 
tion of our reluctance, if you will, to seek information and 
knowledge on subjects which I personally, as a Member of 
Congress and as a citizen, would rather not have, unless 
I believed it to be my responsibility to have it because it might 
involve the lives of American citizens. 

Mr. Mansfield. I see. The Senator is to be commended. 
Opposition to the Resolution also existed in the Executive branch. 
After its introduction, the NSC requested Dulles' analysis. The 
DCI responded with a long memorandum analyzing the problems such 
a committee would create. Although the memo did not express out- 
right objection, the effect of enumerating the problems was to recom- 
mend against its establishment. Dulles expressed concern about the 
possible breaches of security on the part of committee staff members. 
In particular he stated that foreign intelligence services would object 
to information sharing and that U.S. liaison relationships would be 
jeopardized. Dulles ably convinced the senior members of the Exec- 
utive that an oversight committee was undesirable. Although the 
Administration's objections were undoubtedly known by the con- 
gressional leadership, the decisive factor in the defeat of the Mans- 
field Resolution was the opposition of the senior-ranking members. 
In addition to the objections of Russell, Hayden, and Saltonstall, Sen- 
ator Alben Barkley, the former Vice President, and Senator Stuart 
Symington spoke strongly against the bill when it came to the floor. 
On April 11, 1956 the resolution was defeated by a vote of 59 to 27 
with more than a dozen of the original co-sponsors voting against. 

One change did result from the protracted debate on an oversight 
committee: formal CIA subcommittees were created in the Armed 
Services and Appropriations Committees. Yet the same small group 
of individuals continued to be responsible for matters related to the 
Agency. In the Armed Services Committee Russell appointed Sen- 
ators Saltonstall and Byrd, both of whom had been meeting infor- 
mally with Russell on Agency activities, to a CIA subcommittee. Sub- 
sequently, Senators Lyndon Johnson and Styles Bridges were ap- 



55 

pointed to the subcommittee. In 1957 the Senate Appropriations Com- 
mittee formalized a CIA subcommittee for the first time. The members 
of the subcommittee were, again, Eussell, Bridges and Byrd. Essen- 
tially, these three men held full responsibility for Senate oversight of 
the CIA. They frequently conducted the business of the two subcom- 
mittees at the same meeting.^" Despite attempts to regularize the sub- 
committee meetings, the most frequent fonn of interchange with the 
CIA remained personal communications between the subcommittee's 
chairman, Kichard Russell, and Allen Dulles. In 1961, following the 
Bay of Pigs, Senator Eugene McCarthy attempted to revive the idea of 
a formally designated CIA oversight committee, but his effort failed. 
In the House, under Chairman Carl Vinson, the Armed Services 
Committee formally established a CIA subcommittee, chaired by Vin- 
son. The Subcommittee reviewed the CIA's programs, budget and leg- 
islative needs. Briefings on CIA operations were more regularized than 
in the Senate and the House Armed Services staff maintained almost 
daily contact with the Agency. The House Appropriations Commit- 
tee did not establish a formal subcommittee. Instead Cannon contin- 
ued to rely on his special group of five members. As part of the secu- 
rity precautions surrounding the functioning of the special group, its 
membership never became public knowledge. 

//. Intelligence Production 

In the decade of the 1950's, the CIA was the major contributor to 
technological advances in intelligence collection. At the same time 
DDI analysts were responsible for methodological innovations in stra- 
tegic assessments. Despite these achievements, CIA's intelligence was 
not serving the purpose for which the organization had been created — 
informing and influencing policymaking. 

The size and structure of the Deputy Directorate for Intelligence 
remained constant during the Dulles Administration, retaining the 
composition it had acquired in 1950. ORR, OSI, OCI and ONE were 
the centers of DDI's intelligence analysis. The Office of Current Intel- 
ligence continued to pump out its daily, weekly and monthly publica- 
tions and in terms of volume produced dominated the DDI's out- 
put. OCI continued to compete with the other intelligence components 
of the government in providing up-to-the-minute summaries of world- 
wide events. 

The 1951 State Department-CIA agreement had given ORR ex- 
clusive responsibility for economic research and analysis on the 
Soviet Union and its satellites, and it was in this area that the Agency 
distinguished itself during the 1950's, ORR was divided into four 
principal components: the Office of the Assistant Director, the Eco- 
nomic Research Area (ERA), the Geographic Research Area (GRA), 
and the Coordination Staff. The Economic Research Area was the 
focus of the research and analysis effort. Each ERA division (Anal- 
ysis, Industrials, Materials, and Service) had two responsibil- 
ities : the production of all-source economic intelligence on the Soviet 
Union and the production of material for the NIEs.^"^ Day-to-day re- 
sponsibility for coordination rested with the respective divisions, but 

" Between 1955 and 1969 when Carl Hayden served as Chairman of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, he usually sat in on the subcommittee meetings. 
*'" ERA had gone through several reorganizations since 1950. 



56 

most ERA publications were based on CIA data alone and did not 
represent coordinated interdepartmental intelligence. 

The quality of EEA's work benefitted enormously from research 
and analysis done by outside consultants between 1953 and 1955. The 
Center for International Studies (CENIS) at the Massachusetts Insti- 
tute of Technology made the principal contribution in this category. 
When Max Millikan left the directorship of ORR in 195S, he arranged 
for an ongoing consultancy relationship between the Agency and 
CENIS. The CENIS effort contributed substantially to ORR's inno- 
vations in the analysis of Soviet strategic capabilities. 

Although at the insistence of the military the Agency was officially 
excluded from military analysis, ORR's immediate emphasis became 
Soviet strategic research. There were two reasons for ORR's concen- 
tration in this area. First, the prevailing fear of the Soviet threat made 
knowledge of Soviet strategic capabilities a prionty concern for 
civilian j3olicymakers as well as the military. Second, and more impor- 
tantly, military analysis was the area where the Agency had to estab- 
lish itself if it was to assume legitimacy as an intelligence producer 
in competition with the services. The military services constituted the 
Agency's greatest threat in the execution of its mission and only by 
generating strategic intelligence could CIA analysts begin to challenge 
the military's established position as intelligence pi"oducers. 

By introducing economic production capacities into assessments of 
Soviet strategic capabilities the Agency challenged the basic premises 
of the military's judgments. For example, the Air Force mission re- 
quired that it be informed about Soviet advances in nuclear weapons 
and air technology. The Air Force justified its budgetary claims in 
part on the basis of the projex^ted size and capabilities of Soviet stra- 
tegic forces. Air Force intelligence based its estimates on knowledge 
of Soviet technology and laboratory research, which by 1953 were 
well advanced. ORR based its estimates of Soviet deployments on 
Soviet economic production capabilities, which were severely limited 
as a result of the war. Consequently, ORR's methodology attributed 
lower strategic deployments, i.e., long-range bombers and missiles, to 
the Russians. 

ORR's contribution to the area of strategic assessments came quick- 
ly. In the mid-1950's a major controversy developed over the Soviet 
Union's long-range bomber capability. The issue was complicated and 
intensified because the military services were then suffering post- 
Korean War budget cuts and were vying with one another for mar- 
ginal resources. Air Force estimates that the Russians were making a 
substantial investment in intercontinental bombers argued for dispro- 
portionate allocations to the United States Strategic Air Command 
and air defense systems also belonging to the Air Force. The Navy 
and Army both questioned the Air Force case. 

In the midst of this controversy the Office of National Estimates, 
drawing heavily on work done by ORR and by CENIS at MIT, pro- 
duced its estimates of Soviet bomber ])roduction. The ONE assess- 
ments were more moderate than those of the Air Force. ONE analysts 
argued that because of production difficulties, the U.S.S.R. could not 
operate as large a long-range bomber force as the Air Force was pre- 
dicting. The Agency's contribution to military estimates at this tirne 
marked the beginning of its gradual ascendancy over the military in 



57 

strategic analysis. The real take-off point for the Agency occurred 
in the early 1960's with the data supplied by sophisticated overhead 
reconnaissance systems. 

Despite the Agency's analytic advances, the extent to which the 
CIA estimates actually influenced policy was limited. The CIA had 
been created to provide high-quality national intelligence estimates to 
policymakers. However, tlie communication and exchange necessary 
for analysts to calibrate, anticipate and respond to policymakers' 
needs never really developed. 

Although the NIEs were conceived and drafted with senior policy- 
makers in mind, the estimates were not consistently read by high- 
level officials. Between 1955 and 1956, a senior staff member of the 
Office of National Estimates surveyed the NIE readership by contact- 
ing Executive Assistants and Special Assistants of the President and 
Cabinet officers, asking whether or not the NIEs were actually placed 
on their superioi-s' desks. The survey revealed that senior policymak- 
ers were not reading the NIEls. Instead, second and third level offi- 
cials used the estimates for background information in briefing senior 
officials. 

Of all the products of the intelligence community NIEs represented 
the broadest, most informed judgments available. The process of coor- 
dinating NIEs was laborious, involving protracted painstaking nego- 
tiations over language and nuance. In those instances where a de- 
partment held views very different from those of the other agencies, a 
dissenting footnote in the estimate indicated the difference of opinion. 
The necessity to accommodate the views of numerous participants 
meant that conclusions were frequently hedged judgments rather than 
firm predictions. To obtain the broadest possible consensus the speci- 
ficity of the evaluations had to be compromised. This indefinite quality 
in the estimates limited the NIEs' utility for policymakers. 

The failure of the NIEs to serve their fundamental purpose as basic 
information for senior officials was indicative of the overall failure of 
intelligence to intersect with policy. Even in an office as small as the 
Office of National Estimates, where the staff never exceeded fifty- 
four professionals, close interchange did not exist betAveen staff spe- 
cialists and senior "consumer" officials, whose policy decisions de- 
pended on specific expert information. 

The problem was magnified throughout the DDL The Directorate's 
size constituted a major obstacle to the attainment of consistent in- 
terchange between analysts and their clients. In 1955 there were 466 
analysts in ORR, 217 inOCI, and 207 in OSI. The process of drafting, 
reviewing and editing intelligence publications involved large num- 
bers of individuals each of whom felt responsible for and entitled to 
make a contribution to the final product. Yet without access to policy- 
makers analysts did not have an ongoing accurate notion of how the 
form and substance of the intelligence product might best serve the 
needs of senior officials. The product itself — as defined and arbitrated 
among DDI analysts — rather than the satisfaction of specific policy 
needs became the end. 



By the 1960's the CIA had achieved significant advances in its 
strategic intelligence capability. The development of overhead recon- 
naissance, beginning with the U-2 aircraft and growing in scale and 



58 

sophistication with follow-on systems, generated information in great- 
er quantity and accuracy than had ever before been contemplated. 
Basic data on the Soviet Union beyond the reach of human collection, 
such as railroad routes, construction sites, and industrial concentra- 
tions became readily available. At the same time, CIA analysts began 
reevaluating assumptions regarding Soviet strategic capabilities. 
Largely at the initiative of the ONE Soviet staff, a different sorting 
of estimates developed. The general estimate of Soviet military in- 
tentions and capabilities had become unwieldly and took an inordinate- 
ly long time to produce. Gradually a series of separate estimates were 
drafted dealing with such subjects as strategic attack, air and missile 
defense, and general purpose forces. These estimates resulted in a shift 
from "worst case" assessments to projections on the most likely assort- 
ment of weapons. The military services tended to credit Soviet missiles 
with maximum range and payload and to assume that as many as pos- 
sible were targeted on the United States for a possible first-strike. TJie 
Agency advanced the proposition that the U.S.S.R. was not putting all 
or most of its resources into maximum payload intercontinental bal- 
listic missiles (ICRMs) but had priorities for "sizes and mixes" of 
weapons, including substantial numbers of intermediate-range ballistic 
missiles (IRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). In 
the short run the Agency proved to be more nearly correct than the 
services, though in the longer run, the Soviets were to develop much 
larger ICBM capabilities than ONP] predicted. 

An additional factor working to the CIA's advantage in the 
early 1960's was material supplied by Colonel Oleg Penkovsky. Well- 
placed in Soviet military circles, Penkovsky turned over a number of 
classified documents relating to Soviet strategic planning and capa- 
bilities. Having an agent "in place," i.e., a Soviet official who was pro- 
viding infoi-mation from within the Soviet Government, represented 
the ultimate achievement in the Agency's clandestine collection mis- 
sion. These three factors — technological breakthrough, analytic in- 
novation, and the single most valuable Soviet agent in CIA history — 
converged to make the Agency seem the government's most reliable 
source of intelligence on Soviet strategic capabilities. 

Of the three achieveemnts in the late 1950's and the early 1960's, 
overhead reconnaissance was by far the most significant. The develop- 
ment of the U-2 and its follow-on systems had an enormous impact 
on intelligence collection capabilities and on the Agency's relative 
standing in the intelligence community. 

Richard M. Bissell, whom Dulles named his Special Assistant for 
Planning and Coordination in 1954, organized a small group of 
Agency personnel to shepherd the project through. Bissell's back- 
ground was in economics, and he combined academic experience with 
extensive government service, fii-st during World War II in the De- 
partment of Commerce and the War Shipping Administration and 
later with the Economic Cooperation Administration, among other 
positions. Bissell was an innovator above all, quick to seize new ideas 
and to sponsor their development. For the next six years he maintained 
virtually exclusive control over the development of the U-2 program, 
its management, and the initiation of follow-on reconnaissance systems. 

The Agency's sponsorship and deployment of the U-2 reconnaissance 



59 

aircraft was a technical achievement notliing short of spectacular. 
The U-2 represented dramatic advances in aircraft design and pro- 
duction as well as in camera and film techniques. In July 1955, only 
eighteen months after contracting the U-2 became operational, and a 
fleet of 22 airplanes was deployed at a cost $.3 million below the 
original cost estimate. 

The U-2 marked the beginning of the Agency's emergence as the 
intelligence community's leader in the area of technical collection 
capability. Soon after the first U-2 flight in 1955 Bissell moved quickly 
to organize the research and development of follow-on systems. The 
Agency never attempted to establish its own technological R&D capa- 
bility. Instead, it continued to utilize the best private industrial man- 
power available. In large part this arrangement accounts for the 
consistent vitality and quality of the Agency's technical E&D capa- 
bility, which remains unsurpassed to this day.^°'' 

The deployment of the U-2's follow-on systems coincided with 
the growing controversy over United States defense policy and the 
alleged Soviet advances in intercontinental missile deployment. The 
services, in particular the Air Force, produced estimates on Soviet 
missile capability which stated that the U.S.S.R. was superseding the 
United States in long-range missile production. By 1959 the issue 
involved Congress and became a subject of heated political debate 
in the 1960 Presidential campaign. Democrats, led by former Secre- 
tary of the Air Force, Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, charged 
the Eisenhower Administration with permitting the U.S.S.R. to exceed 
the United States in bomber and missile strength. Data generated by 
the CIA's photographic reconnaissance systems produced evidence 
that these charges were ill-founded. The U.S.S.R. had not approached 
the United States in missile production. It is unclear to what extent 
Eisenhower relied directly on ONE estimates in taking his position 
on this issue. The controversy was largely a political one, dividing 
along party lines. However, it is likely that Eisenhower's stance, if 
not actually determined by, was at least reinforced by ONE intelli- 
gence analysis, which was never made public. 

The development of overhead reconnaissance systems created a need 
for another group of intelligence specialists: photographic interpre- 
ters. The Agency had established a photographic center in the DDI 
in 1958. As a result of the U-2 deployment that group formed the 
nucleus of a quickly expanding specialty among intelligence analysts. 
In 1961 the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) 
was established under the DCI's direction. Staffed by CIA and military 
personnel, NPIC was a DDI component until 1973, when it was a com- 
ponent transferred to the Directorate for Science and Technology 
(DDS&T). 



"'" In 1955 to coordinate collection requirements for the U-2 program Bissell 
arranged for an informal Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (ARC), comprised 
initially of representatives of CIA, Army, Navy, and Air Force. Subsequently, 
representatives of NSA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the State Department 
vpere included. In 1960, after the deployment of the U-2's follow-on system, a 
formal USIB (see pp. 62-63 for a di.scussion of USIB) subcommittee, the Com- 
mittee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), succeeded the ARC. COMOR 
was responsible for the development and operation of all overhead reconnaissance 
systems. 



70-725 O - 76 - 5 



60 

These technological developments in the late 1950's constituted the 
beginning of an important expansion in the CIA's functions and capa- 
bilities. Technical collection was to have a significient eifect on the 
Agency's relationship to the departmental intelligence services and 
on the allocation of resources within the intelligence community. 
///. The Coordination Problem 

Dulles' neglect of the community management or coordination as- 
pect of his role as DCI was apparent to all who knew and worked with 
him. During a period when the Agency was responsible for numerous 
innovations, analytic and technical, Dulles might have seized the op- 
portunity to strengthen the DCI's position relative to the military 
services. As the community became larger and as technical systems 
required larger budgetary allocations, the institutional obstacles to 
coordination increased. 

Two episodes in Dulles' term illustrate his lack of initiative in co- 
ordination. One involved the Economic Research Area in ORR and 
the other, the Office of Scientific Intelligence. Both represented op- 
portunities that, if taken, would have enhanced the DCI's capacity 
to manage the community's intelligence activities. 

By 1956 the major portion of ERA's work was devoted to Soviet 
strategic analysis. The work was scattered throughout the four ERA 
divisions, making production unwieldy and inefficient. In that year 
senior ERxA. personnel advanced a proposal to estal)lish a Military 
Economics Branch which would combine the fragmented military 
intelligence efforts then being conducted in ERA. Dulles rejected the 
recommendation on the grounds that the services might interpret such 
a move as a unilateral attempt by the Agency to assume large respon- 
sibilities in their fields of primary concern. In effect, Dulles' reluctance 
to challenge the military services limited the Agency's own work 
effort. More importantly, it allowed the Agency's production of stra- 
tegic intelligence to go without formal recognition in the community. 
A decision by Dulles to establish the Agency's authority in the field 
of national military intelligence would have required a confrontation 
and a bureaucratic battle — neither of which Dulles was inclined to 
pursue. 

The second example involved the establishment of the interdepart- 
mental Guided Missiles Intelligence Committee (GMIC), an Intel- 
ligence Advisory Committee subcommittee created in 1956. Since 
1949 the Office of Scientific Intelligence had wrangled with the mili- 
tary services over the division of responsibility for producing scientific 
and technical intelligence. DCID 3/4, issued in 1952, stipulated that 
OSI's primary mission was research for basic scientific intelligence, 
leaving research for technical intelligence with the military. Despite 
the restrictions of DCID 3/4, the inseparable links between basic 
science and technology allow^ed OSI to branch into technical science. 
By 1955 OSI had five divisions in the technical sciences area, including 
a Guided Missiles Intelligence Division. 

The growing community-wide emphasis on guided missiles intelli- 
gence raised the issue of interagency coordination. Discussions on the 
subject provoked a split betw^een the State Department and the CIA, 
on the one hand, and the services on the other. State and the Agency, 
specifically OSI, favored an interdepartmental committee with overall 
responsibility for coordinating and producing guided missiles intelli- 



61 

gence. The services and the Joint Staff favored exclusive Defense De- 
partment control. It took two years to resolve the issue. Between 1954 
and 1956 Dulles hedged on the problem and w^as unwilling to 2:)ress 
OSI's claims. Finally in 1956 he took the matter to Secretary of De- 
fense Charles Wilson, who supported the creation of a committee over 
the objections of the Joint Staff and Navy and Army intelligence.^^ 
The services, however, retained the right to appoint the chairman. 

In both these instances, the organization of OSI and the formation 
of the GMIC, Dulles liad an opportunity in the first stages of new 
areas of intelligence production to establish a pattern of organization 
for the community and to assert the DCI's position. By not acting, 
Dulles allowed departmental procedures to become more entrenched 
and routinized, making later coordination attempts all the more 
difficult. 

At the time of its 1954 survey the Clark Task Force of the Hoover 
Commission ^- recognized the need for more efficient intelligence com- 
munity management. The Task Force members recommended the 
appointment of a Deputy Director to assume internal management 
responsibilities for the Agency, leaving the DCI free for his coordina- 
tion role. Dulles turned the recommendation around and appointed 
General Lucien Truscott his deputy for community affairs. Clearly, 
Truscott lacked even the DCI's limited authority in his coordinating 
task. 

Most of Truscott's efforts were directed at resolving jurisdictional 
conflicts between the Agency and the military intelligence services. 
The most persistent and troublesome operational problem in intelli- 
gence community coordination involved the Army's espionage activi- 
ties, particularly in Western Europe. The Army, Air Force, and to a 
lesser extent, the Navy, had continued their independent clandestine 
collection operations after the war. Among the services, the Army had 
been the most active in the field and grossly outnumbered the CIA in 
manpower. The services' justification for their operations had been 
that during w^artime they would need clandestine collection support. 
That capability required long-term development. Service activities, 
in particular the Army's, resulted in excessive duplication of the CIA 
effort and frequently, competition for the same agents. 

In 1958 Truscott succeeded in working out an arrangement with the 
services, which attempted to rationalize clandestine collection activ- 
ities. A National Security Council Intelligence Directive assigned 
CIA the primary responsibility for clandestine activities abroad. An 
accompanying directive gave the DCI's designated field representa- 
tives a modified veto over the services' field activities, by requiring 
that disagreements be referred to Washington for arbitration by the 
DCI and the Secretary of Defense. Although issuing these direc- 
tives theoretically provided the DCI with authority over espionage 
activities, in practice the directives only created a means of adjudicat- 
ing disputes. Military commanders continued to rely on service intelli- 
gence personnel to satisfy their intelligence requirements. To some 
extent the difficulties were eased after 1959 but this was not as a result 
of Truscott's efforts. The principal reason was that the development 



"The Air Force had come to support the idea of an lAC subcommittee. 
*^ See p. 52-53 for a discussion of the Hoover Commission. 



62 

of technical collection systems made heavy drains on service intelli- 
gence budgets and reduced the funds available for human collection. 
After 1959 Air Force activities declined sharply as the service began 
developing overhead reconnaissance systems. Likewise, the availability 
of photographic data made the Army less able to justify large budg- 
etary allocations for human collection. 

Within the Executive branch there were efforts to strengthen the 
direction of the intelligence community. In January 1956, President 
Eisenhower created the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign 
Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA). Composed of retired senior gov- 
ernment officials and members of the professions, the PBCFIA was to 
provide the President with advice on intelligence matters.^^ The Board 
was a deliberative body and had no authority over either the DCI or 
the community. Accorclingly, it had little impact on the administration 
of the CIA or on the other intelligence services. The Board did identify 
the imbalance in Dulles' role as DCI and in December 1956 and in 
December 1958 recommended the appointment of a chief of staff' foi 
the DCI to carry out the CIA's internal administration. In 1960 the 
Board suggested the possibility of separating the DCI from the 
Agency, having him serve as the President's intelligence advisor and 
as coordinator for community activities. Nothing resulted from 
these recommendations. In part the failure to implement these pro- 
posals was a reflection of PBCFIA's impotence. However, Dulles' 
personal standing had a major influence on policymakers' acceptance 
of his limited definition of the ix)le. President Eisenhower, who himself 
repeatedly pressed Dulles to exert more initiative in the community, 
indicated his fundamental acceptance of Dulles' performance in a 
statement cited in a CIA history : 

I'm not going to be able to change Allen. I have two alterna- 
tives, either to get rid of him and appoint someone who will 
assert more authority or keep him with his limitations. I'd 
rather have Allen as my chief intelligence officer with his 
limitations than anyone else I know. 
On another level the PBCFIA did try to create a stronger insti- 
tutional structure for the community. In 1957 the Board recommended 
merging the United States Communications Intelligence Board with 
the lAC. PBCFIA's proposal was directed at improving the commu- 
nity's overall direction. The USCIB was established in 1946 to advise 
and make recommendations on communications intelligence to the 
Secretary of Defense." The PBCFIA's recommendation for the 
lAC-USCIB merger was intended to strengthen the DCI's authority 
and to improve intelligence coordmation, by making the DCI chair- 

" The original PBCFIA members, all of whom were recommended by Dulles, 
included: General Doolittle, Sidney Souers, General Omar Bradley, Admiral 
Richard Connolly, General John B. Hull, Morris Hadley, a New York lawyer, 
William B. Francke, former Secretary of the Navy, David Bruce, Former Am- 
bas.sador, Henry Wriston, former president of Brown University, and Donald 
Russell, a member of the Clark Task Force and former Assistant Secretary of 
State. 

" USCIB's membership included the Secretaries of State, Defense, the Direc- 
tors of the FBI, and representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA. 
USCIB votes were weighted. Representatives of State, Defense, the FBI, and 
CIA each had two votes ; other members had one. Although the DCI sat on the 
Committee, he had no vote. 



63 

man of the newly established body. The services objected to the crea- 
tion of the Board, since it meant that in the area of electronic intelli- 
gence they AYOuld be reduced to an advisory role vis a vw the DCI and 
would lose the representational dominance they held in USCIB. 
Despite the services' objections, in 1958 the United States Intelligence 
Board (USIB) was created to assume the duties of the I AC and 
USCIB. As with the lAC, USIB worked mostly through interdepart- 
mental subcommittees in specialized areas. 

Like the lAC, I^SIB was little more than a superstructure. It had 
no budgetary authority, and did not provide the DCI with any direct 
control over the components of the intelligence conmiunity. The 
separate elements of the community continued to function under the 
impetus of their own internal drives and mission definitions. Essen- 
tially, the problem that existed at the time of the creation of CIG 
remained. 



From 1953 to 1961 a single Presidential administration and con- 
sistent American policy objectives which had wide public and govern- 
mental support contributed to a period of overall stability in the 
CIA's history.^^ Allen Dulles' orientation and policymakers' opera- 
tional reliance on the Agency made clandestine activities the dominant 
CIA mission. The ethos of secrecy witliin the DDP allowed the Direc- 
torate exemption from the usual accountability procedures resulting in 
a large degree of independence in the conduct of operations. 

The Agency's intelligence production, though distinguished by 
advances in technical collection and in analysis, had not achieved the 
consistent policy support role that had been the primary purpose for 
the CIA's creation. While Dulles may have served as the briefing 
officer during NSC meetings, in the day-to-day conduct of foreign 
policy policymakers did not look to the Agency for information and 
analyses. 

The Agency was equally unsuccessful in fulfilling its interdepart- 
mental coordination function. The inherent institutional obstacles to 
management of the community's intelligence activities combined with 
Dulles' indifference to this area, of responsibility allowed the perpetu- 
ation of a fragmented government-wide intelligence effort. 

" For chart showing CIA organization as of 1961, see p. 99. 



Part Three 

Change and Routinization, 1961-1970 

introduction 

In the 196()'s as in the previous decade the CIA's covert operational 
capability dominated Agency activities. Policymakers' reliance on 
covert action fostered the CIA's utilization of its existing operational 
capabilities as well as an increase in paramilitary activities in support 
of counterinsurgency and military programs. In intelligence produc- 
tion the Agency expanded its areas of specialization, but senior gov- 
ernment officials still did not consistently draw on the DDI's intel- 
ligence analysis or on the DCI for policy support. 

The most significant development for the Agency during this period 
was the impact of technological capabilities on intelligence produc- 
tion. These advances resulted in internal changes and necessitated in- 
creased attention to coordinating the activities of the intelligence com- 
munity. The large budgetary resources involved and the value of 
technical collection systems precipitated major bureaucratic battles 
and pointed up the increasing, rather than diminishing, problems 
surrounding interagency participation in the intelligence process. De- 
spite the Agency's internal adjustments and a sustained eifort in the 
early 1960's to eli'ect better management in the community, the CIA's 
fundamental structure, personnel, and incentives remained I'ooted in 
the early 1950's. 

Beginning in the fall of 1961 the CIA vacated its scattered array 
of buildings in downtown Washington and moved to its present struc- 
ture in Langley, Virginia. Allen Dulles had lobbied long and hard to 
acquire a single building for the Agency. Reasons of efficiency and 
the need for improved security dictated the move. Several locations 
were considered, including a building in the city. However, no single 
downtown structure could accommodate all the Agency employees sta- 
tioned in Washington and also f»rovide the requisite security for the 
clandestine component. The availability of land in Langley, eight 
miles from the city, made a new building there seem the ideal solution. 

The eifects of the move are difficult to gauge. Some have argued that 
the building has encouraged interchange between the DDI and the 
DDP, making the Agency a more integrated organization. That benefit 
seems marginal, given the procedural and institutional barriers be- 
tween the two directors. A more significant effect may be on the 
negative side, specifically the physical isolation of the Agency from 
the ixjlicymakers it was created to serve. 



In 1961, Cold War attitudes continued to shape the foreign policy 
assumptions of United States officials. One need only recall the mili- 
tant tone of John F. Kennedy's January 1961 inaugural address to 



(64) 



65 

appreciate the accepted definition of the United States role. Tiie Soviet 
pronouncement ending the moratorium on nuclear testing in July 
1961 and the erection of the Berlin Wall a month later reinforced 
existing attitudes. In the early years of the decade, American con- 
fidence and conviction were manifested in an expansive foreign policy 
that included the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, a dramatic con- 
frontation with the Soviet Union over the. installation of Soviet mis- 
siles in Cuba, increased economic assistance to underdeveloped coun- 
tries in Latin America and Africa, and rapidly escalating military 
activities in Southeast Asia. 

Although the American presence in Vietnam, beginning in 1963, 
symbolized U.S. adherence to the strictures of the Cold War, percep- 
tions of the Soviet Union had begun to change. The image of an in- 
ternational communist monolith began breaking down as differences 
between the U.S.S.K. and the People's Republic of China emerged. 
Moreover, the strategic arms competition assumed increased impor- 
tance in Soviet-American relations. By the mid-1960's the Soviet 
Union possessed a credible, but minimal, nuclear deterrent against 
the United States ; by the end of the decade the two nations were ap- 
proaching strategic parity. Soviet advances provided the impetus for 
efforts at arms control and for attempts at greater cooperation in 
cultural and economic areas. The CIA was drawn into each of these 
major developments in United States policy. 

/. I'he Directors of Central Intelligence^ 1961-1970 

In the 1950's Allen Dulles had given his personal stamp to the 
Agency and in large measure independently defined his role as DCL 
In the next decade the successive Presidents, John F. Kennedy, Lyn- 
don B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon, had a greater influence on 
the role of the DCI — his stature and his relative position among policy- 
makers. 

John A. McCone^ November 1961-April 1965 
John McCone came to the Central Intelligence Agency as an out- 
sider. His background had been in private industry, where he had dis- 
tinguished himself as a corporate manager. Trained as an engineer, 
]McCone entered the construction business and rose to become Execu- 
tive Vice President of Consolidated Steel Corporation. Later in his 
career, he founded his own engineering firm, and during World 
War II became involved in shipbuilding and aircraft production. 
Following t,he war, he served on several government conmiittees and 
held the position of Under Secretary of the Air Force. In 1958, 
McCone w^as named to the Atomic Energy Commision, and later that 
year he took over as its chairman. 

The Bay of Pigs failure precipitated President Kennedy's decision 
to replace!^ Allen Dulles and to appoint a DCI who had a more de- 
tached view of the Agency's operational capability. McCone brought 
a quick, sharp intellect to his job as DCI, and he devoted much of his 
attention to sorting out management problems at the community level. 
His political independence as a staunch Republican in a Democratic 
administration as well as his personal confidence made him a strong 
and assertive figure among policymakers. 

Unquestionably, the missile crisis in October 1962 solidified Mc- 
Cone's place in the Kennedy Administration as an active participant 
in the policy process. The" human and technical resources that the 



66 

Agency brought to bear— U-2 flights over Cuba, overhead reconnais- 
sance over the U.S.S.R., supplemented by agents in both places — 
clearly identified the Agency's contribution in a period of crisis and 
enhanced McCone's position as DCI. McCone resigned in 1965 be- 
cause Lyndon Joliiison had not accorded him the stature and access he 
had enjoyed under Kennedy, 

Vice-Admiral William Rabom, April 1965-June 1966 
At the time of his appointment as DCI Vice- Admiral William 
Eaborn had retired from the Navy and was employed in the aerospace 
industry. A graduate of Annapolis, Rabom had had a successful Naval 
career as an administrator and combat officer. His most significant ac- 
complishment was his participation in the development of the Polaris 
inissile system. Immediately prior to his retirement from the Navy 
in 1963, Raborn served as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations. He was 
Director of Central Intelligence for only a year, and his impact on 
the Agency was minimal. 

Richard M. Helms, June 1966-F ehruary 1973 

Richard Helms became DCI following nearly twenty-five years in 
the Clandestine Service. Just as Allen Dulles had identified himself 
with the intelligence professions. Helms identified himself with the 
Agency as an institution. Having served in a succession of senior 
positions since the early 1950's, Helms was a first-generation product 
of the CIA, and he commanded the personal and professional respect 
of his contemporaries. 

Helms' international orientation began early. ]\Iost of his secondary 
education consisted of private schooling in Germany and Switzerland. 
After graduating from Williams College in 1935, he worked as a jour- 
nalist. In 1942, he joined the service and was assigned to OSS. Helms 
remained an intelligence officer through the transitions to SSU and 
the Central Intelligence Group. As a member of the CIA's Office of 
Special Operations, he rose to become Deputy Assistant Director for 
Special Operations. An excellent administrator, lie served as Assistant 
Deputy Director for Plans (ADDP) under both Wisner and Bissell. 
In 1963 Helms was named DDP and was appointed Deputy Director 
of Central Intelligence (DDCI) under Raborn. 

As Director of Central Intelligence, Helms' inter-ests remained on 
the operations side, and he did not display a strong interest in the 
management problems related to the intelligence community. One col- 
league stated that "during his term as Director, Helms ran the DDP 
out of his hip pocket." Helms labored under the difficulty of two 
Presidents who were not i-eceptive to the DCI's function as senior 
intelligence officer. Lyndon Johnson was mired in Vietnam and bent 
on a military victory ; Richard Nixon had an inherent distrust of the 
Agency and preferred to work within his AVhite House staff. Neither 
President gave the DCI the opportunity to fulfill his role as chief 
intelligence advisor. 

//. The Cluruhstine Service 

A. Clandestine Activities, 1961-1970 
The Clandestine Sei-vice dominated the Agency's activities during 
this period. In budget, manpower, and degree of DCI attention ac- 
corded the DDP, clandestine operations remained the CIA's most con- 



67 

sumin^ mission. The DDP continued to function as a highly comjDart- 
mented structure with small groups of individuals responsible for and 
privy to selected activities. That ethos unquestionably fostered and 
supported the development of such excessive operations as assassina- 
tion plots against foreign leaders. Nonetheless, the policies and oper- 
ational preferences of the Executive branch dictated the priorities in 
the Agency's activities. 

Evidence of Communist guerrilla activities in Southeast Asia and 
Africa convinced President Kennedy and his closest advisors, includ- 
ing Robert Kennedy and General Maxwell Taylor, of the need for 
the United States to develop an unconventional warfare capability. 
"Counterinsurgency," as the U,S, effort was designated, aimed at pre- 
venting Communist-supported military victories without precipitat- 
ing a major Soviet- American military confrontation. Simultaneously, 
the CIA was called on to develop and employ its paramilitary capa- 
bilities around the world. In the decade of the 1960's, paramilitary 
operations became the dominant CIA clandestine activity, surpassing 
covert psychological and political action in budgetary allocations by 
1967. 

Political action, propaganda, and operations involving international 
organizations continued. By the early 1960's the DDP had developed 
the infrasti-ucture — assets in place — which allowed the development 
of continuing activities. The combination of the paramilitary surge 
and self-sustaining operations made the period 1964 to 1967 the most 
active for the execution of covert activities. 

In the 1950's the administrative arrangements in the DDP were 
highly centralized. The DDP or his assistant, the ADDP, personally 
approved every project initiated either at Headquarters or in the field. 
By 1960 the delegation of approval authority became a bureaucratic 
necessity. Because the number of projects had proliferated, no one or 
two individuals could either efficiently act on or competently make 
judgments on the multitude of proposed activities. In 1960 a gradu- 
ated approval process began to develop in the DDP, whereby Station 
Chiefs and Division Chiefs were authorized to approve projects, de- 
pending on cost and potential risk factors. The more sensitive projects 
were referred to the ADDP, the DDP, or the DCI. The extent to which 
the procedural changes affected the number and nature of projects 
approved is unclear. 

Under the direction of the Kennedy Administration, paramilitary 
programs were initiated in Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. The failure 
of the Bay of Pigs did not diminish senior officials' conviction that 
the U.S. had to take offensive action against the Cuban government. 
It is difficult to appreciate the near obsession that characterized atti- 
tudes toward Fidel Castro in the first two years of the Kennedy 
Administration. The presence of an avowed Communist leader ninety 
miles from the Florida coastline was regarded as an intrusion on U.S. 
primacy in the Western Hemisphere and as a direct threat to American 
security. 

Between October 1961 and October 1962, the Agency conducted 
Operation MONGOOSE. The program consisted of collection, para- 
military, sabotage, and political propaganda activities, aimed at dis- 
crediting and ultimately toppling the Castro government. MON- 
GOOSE was administered through a special Headquarters Task Force 
(Task Force W) that was comprised of some of the most able DDP 



6S 

"idea men" and operators. Describing the intensity of the Agency's 
effort and the breadth of activities that were generated, one former 
Task Force W member stated "It was very simple ; we were at war with 
Cuba." 

The Cuban effort coincided with a major increase in the Agency's 
overall Latin American program. The perception of a growing Soviet 
presence in the Western Hemisphere both politically and through 
guerrilla activity in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia resulted in a 40% 
increase in the size of the Western Hemisphere Division between 1960 
and 1965.^ 

In the early 1960's the decolonization of Africa sparked an increase 
in the scale of CIxA. clandestine activities on that continent. CIA ac- 
tions paralleled growing interest on the part of the State Department 
and the Kennedy Admmistration in the "third world countries," which 
were regarded as a line of defense against the Soviet Union. The gov- 
ernment-wide assumption was that the Soviet Union would attempt to 
encroach on the newly independent African states. Prior to 1960, Af- 
rica had been included in the European or Middle Eastern Division. In 
that year it became a separate division. Stations sprang up all over the 
continent. Between 1959 and 1963 the number of CIA stations in Africa 
increased by 55.5%. Apart from limiting Communist advances through 
propaganda and political action, the Agency's African activities were 
directed at gaining information on Communist China, the Soviet 
Union, and North Korea. 

The Agency's large-scale involvement in Southeast Asia began in 
1962 with programs in Laos and Vietnam, In Laos, the Agency imple- 
mented air supply and paramilitary training programs, which gradu- 
ally developed into full-scale management of a ground war. Between 
1962 and 1965, the Agency worked with the South Vietnamese Gov- 
ernment to organize police forces and paramilitary imits. After 1965, 
the CIA engaged in a full-scale paramilitary assistance program to 
South Vietnam. Tlie CIA program paralleled the escalating U.S. 
military conmiitment to South Vietnam. 

The Agency's extensive operational involvement in Southeast Asia 
had a tangible impact on the leadership within the DDP. By 1970, 
large numbers of individuals began retiring from the Agency, Essen- 
tially, these were the first-generation CIA professionals who had be- 
gun their careers in the late 1940's, Many were OSS veterans who had 
been promoted to senior positions early and remained. As these men 
began leaving the Agency, many of their positions were filled by indi- 
viduals who had distinguished themselves in Southeast Asia-related 
activities. In the Clandestine Service — the present Deputy Director 
for Operations,- his predecessor, the Chief of the Counterintelligence 
Staff, and the Deputy Chief of the Soviet/East European Division all 
spent considerable time in the Far East at the height of the Agency's 
effort there. 

By the end of the decade, the level of covert operations began to 
decline. Measured in terms of project numbers, budgetary expenditures 

^ Following the Bay of Pigs, an interagency inspection team recommended an 
increase in the Western Hemisphere Division to improve U.S. intelligence capa- 
bilities in Latin America. 

" In 1973 DCI James Schlesinger changed the name of the Clandestine Service 
from the Directorate for Plans to the Directorate for Operations. 



and personnel, the DDP's covert operations diminished between 1967 
and 1971. The process of reduction extended over several years and 
derived principally from factors outside the Agency. 

The most conspicuous intrusion into CIA operations was the 1967 
Ramparts magazine article, which exposed CIA funding of inter- 
national student groups, foundations, and private voluntary organi- 
zations that ihad begun in the 1950's. The revelations resulted in 
President Johnson's appointment of a three-person committee to ex- 
amine the CIA's covert funding of American educational and private 
voluntary organizations operating abroad. Chaired by the Under Sec- 
retary of State, Nicholas Katzenbach, the Committee included DCI 
Richard Helms and Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 
John Gardner. After conducting its review, the Katzenbach Commit- 
tee recommended that no federal agency provide covert financial assist- 
ance to American educational and voluntary institutions. The Katzen- 
bach Report prompted an internal CIA examination of its domestic- 
based organizational activities. Although the Agency complied with 
the strict terms of the Katzenbach guidelines, funding and contact 
arrangements were realigned so that overseas activities could con- 
tinue with little reduction. Overall, funding to educational or private 
voluntary organizations constituted a small proportion of covert activ- 
ity, and the Katzenbach Report did not affect major operations in the 
areas of overseas political action, labor, and propaganda. 

Government- wide personnel cutbacks had a wider impact on covert 
operations. In 1967 and 1969, concern over the U.S. balance of pay- 
ments deficit prompted Executive Orders reducing the number of fed- 
eral employees stationed overseas. Budgetary limitations imposed by 
the Office of Management and Budget and State Department restric- 
tions on the number of cover positions made available to CIA person- 
nel also contributed to significant reductions in DDP personnel. 

By the end of the decade, internal concern developed over tJie prob- 
lem of exposure for large-scale operations. It was this factor that 
determined Helms' 1970 decision to transfer the budgetary allocations 
for operations in Laos from the CIA to the Defense Department. 
Gradually, senior Agency personnel began to recognize the cumulative 
effects of long-term subsidies to and associations with political parties, 
media, and agents overseas — a large presence invited attention and was 
vulnerable to exposure. 

During this period of escalation and decline in covert operations, 
clandestine collection was also undergoing some changes. As indicated 
in the preceding chapter, in the 1950's much of the DDP's clandestine 
information had, for a variety of reasons, come from liaison relation- 
ships with host governments. By the early 1960's the Clandestine 
Service had developed its own capability and was less dependent on 
liaison for executing its clandestine collection function. DDP case 
officers had had approximately ten years to engage in the long-range 
process of spotting, assessing, cultivating, and recruiting agents. 

As Deputy Director for Plans from 1962 to 1965, Richard Helms 
attempted to upgrade the DDP's clandestine collection mission. Helms 
had been an OSO officer and, in contrast to both Wisner and Bissell, 
his professional identity had been forged on the "collection" side of 



70 

the Clandestine Service, In the early 1960's, Helms embarked on a 
concerted effort to improve DDP training to produce officers who could 
recruit agents as well as maintain liaison relationships. 

Technological developments had a major impact on clandestine col- 
lection "targets'" — the specific objects of an agent's collection effort."* 
From at least the early 1950's, information related to Soviet strategic 
capabilities was a continuous pi-iority for clandestine human source 
collection. However, the difficulties of access to the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe — the so-called "denied areas" — left even the most 
basic information out of the reach of hunuin collection. Reconnaissance 
filled that gap, providing hard data on Soviet strategic deployments — 
locations of missile sites, production centers, and transport facilities. 
With the acquisition of these broad categories of information, human 
collection was redirected to more specific targets, including research 
and development. 

B. Executive Authorization 

During the 1962-1970 period, procedures for Executive authoriza- 
tion of covert action projects became more regularized, and criteria 
for approval became more strictly defined. In large part these pro- 
cedural changes reflected a belated recognition that covert operations 
were no longer exceptional activities undertaken in extraordinary 
circumstances. Instead, covert operations had become an ongoing 
element in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and required formal- 
ized channels of review and approval. 

Although the approving bodies went through a number of name 
changes and adjustments in membership, fundamental assumptions 
governing review remained the same. Each group functioned in a way 
that blurred accountability for decisions ; no participant was required 
to sign off on individual decisions; and the frequency of meetings was 
irregular. The absence of strict accountability was intentional. By 
shielding the President and senior officials from direct association 
with covert operations, it was possible for the Chief of State to publicly 
deny responsibility for an exposed operation. Such was the theory. In 
fact, as the Soviet attack on the U-2 in ]\Iay 1960 illustrated, the Presi- 
dent has historically assumed ultimate responsibility for U.S. actions. 

During the Kennedy Administration the Special Group served 
as the review body for covert action. The Taylor Eeport in June 1961 
redefined the membership of the Group in an effort to insure better 
review and coordination for the anticipated expansion in paramilitary 
activities. It was not until 1963 that formal criteria developed for 
submitting covert action projects to the Group. Until then, the judg- 
ment of the DCI had determined whether an Agency-originated 
project was submitted to the Group and its predecessor bodies for 
authorization. In 1963 project cost and risk became the general criteria 
for detennining whether a project had to be submitted to the Special 
Group. Although the specific criteria wei-e not established in writing, 
the Agency used $25,000 as the threshold amount, and all projects at 
that level and above were submitted for approval. Agency officials 
judged the relative risk of a proposed project — its potential for ex- 
posure, possibility for success, political sensitivity. 

3 "Target" refers to the specific source through which information may be 
obtained, e.g., a scientist or a research laboratory may be a target for Soviet 
technological innovation. 



71 

The Kennedy Administration's initiation of large-scale paramili- 
tary activities resulted in the creation of two additional working 
groups, the Special Group on Counterinsurgency (CI), and the Spe- 
cial Group (Augmented). The Special Group (CI) had only three 
members. General Maxwell Taylor, the President's Military Advisor, 
McGeorge Bundy, the Assistant for National Security Affairs, and 
Attorney General Robert Kennedy. Established in January 1963, the 
Special Group (CI) was to provide coordination for counterinsur- 
gency programs. The Special Group (Augmented) was responsible 
for supervising only one operation, MONGOOSE. The members of 
this body included McGeorge Bundy, Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
Roswell Gilpatric, Under Secretary of State. U. Alexis Johnson, 
Chairman of the JCS, Lyman Lemnitzer, McCone, Taylor and Robert 
Kemiedy. The Special Group (Augmented) engaged in close super- 
vision of and liaison with CIA officials regarding the execution of the 
MONGOOSE program. Following the disbandment of the operation 
in October 1962, the Special Group (Augmented) was dissolved. 

The changes that occurred under Lyndon Johnson and Richard 
Nixon demonstrated that the review process remained subject to the 
working habits and preferences of individual Presidents. During the 
Johnson Administration, the Special Group was renamed the 303 
Committee. However, the real forum for NSC-level decisions became 
the "Tuesday Lunches," a luncheon meeting at the White House that 
included President Johnson, Helms, McNamara, Bundy (later his suc- 
cessor Walt Rostow), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 
the Press Secretary to the President. These discussions were dominated 
by the subject of military operations in Vietnam, and the informality 
of the meetings fostered consensual f uzziness rather than hard choices. 

In February 1970, the basic directive governing covert action 
authorization, NSC 5412/2, was replaced by National Security Deci- 
sion Memorandum (NSDM) 40. That directive spelled out the duties 
of the newly-designated 40 Committee, which replaced the Sj^ecial 
Group as the Executive decisionmaking body on covert operations.* 
NSDM 40 restated the DCI's responsibility for coordinating and con- 
trolling covert operations. Its only real modification from the 5412/2 
directive was a provision that the 40 Committee annually review covert 
action j^rojects previously approved. 

A major shortcoming in the review process was the limited number 
of projects subject to external authorization. The vast majority of 
covert action projects were initiated and approved within the Agency. 
Moreover, whole categories of projects were exempt from outside au- 
thorization. Covert political action projects — those involving political 
parties, the press, media, and labor unions — are often made possible 
and supported by the existence of clandestine collection projects. The 
assets maintained through these projects provide access and informa- 
tion and serve as conduits for resources. Desj)ite their importance to 
covert action projects and their frequently indistinguishable function, 
such projects were not defined as covert action and therefore were 
exempt from external authorization. 

In the field covert action coordination between the State Department 
and the CIA was a continuing problem. Since the relationship between 

* The 40 Committee members included the President's Assistant for National 
Security Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State 
for Political Affairs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI. 



72 

Ambassadors and Chiefs of Station was not strictly defined, consulta- 
tion between State and CliV was uneven. Ambassadors were generally 
informed of broad covert action programs undertaken in the host 
country but frequently did not know the details — identities of agents, 
methods of action, scope of the program. Some Ambassadors preferred 
not to know the extent of CIA activity, regarding it a diplomatic lia- 
bility to be too closely identified with the CIA. Still, it was not unusual 
for Ambassadors themselves to recommend or request the initiation of 
covert intervention to bring about political conditions more favorable 
to U.S. policy. In each case, the kind of information an Ambassador 
received was dependent on his preference for being informed, his 
disposition to assert his prerogatives, and his relationship with the 
CIA Station Chief. 

Efforts to improve coordination and to give the Ambassador a more 
formalized role were ineffective. In 1961 President Kennedy addressed 
a letter to all Ambassadors, indicating their responsibilities to oversee 
and coordinate all Embassy activities. A similar letter was addressed 
to Ambassadors by President Nixon in 1969. These Presidential ini- 
tiatives did not f undamenetally alter relationships in the field. Having 
no direct authority over the Station Chief, an Ambassador could only 
make requests in his capacity as head of the "country team" — ^the 
ranking government agency representatives posted to the Embassy. 
He could not make demands or exercise formal control based on a 
position of recognized seniority. In terms of overall foreign policy 
coordination the situation was less than satisfactory.*^ 

G. Congressional Review 

In the mid-1960's, international developments resulted in increased 
congressional demands for intelligence information. The 1967 Middle 
East War, advances in space teclmology, and nuclear proliferation 
contributed to heightened Congressional interest in the intelligence 
product. In response to Congressional requests DCI Richard Helms 
increased the number of briefings to committees, subcommittees and 
individual members. In 1967 thirteen Congressional committe-es, in ad- 
dition to the four with oversight functions, received substantive intelli- 
gence briefings. 

The increased Congressional demand for the intelligence product 
did not alter the closed, informal nature of Congressional oversight. 
Both John McCone and Richard Helms maintained good relation- 
ships with senior-ranking committee members, who were kept in- 
formed on an individual basis of important CIA activities. Cursory 
review of CIA activities continued to characterize the subcommittees' 
functions. In 1966 Senator Eugene McCarthy again sponsored a bill 
for the establishment of a CIA oversight committee, but the effort 
failed. Oversight had not progressed from information sharing 
to scrutiny. 

///. The Effort at Management Reform 

Technological developments forced attention to the problem of co- 
ordinating the collection activities of the departmental intelligence 
components. The costs of technical collection systems and competition 
for their deployment necessitated some working relationship to replace 
the undirected evolution that had marked the intelligence community 

^' In 1974 the Ambassador's responsibilities for coordinating field activities were 
outlined by statute, but the same problems remain. 



73 

in the decade of the 1950's. During McCone's directorship, the problem 
was identified more specifically than it had been before, yet the obsta- 
cles to coordination were considerable. Later, the pressures of Viet- 
nam, the changes in Executive decisionmaking, and the personal inter- 
ests of the DCIs once again relegated commmiity problems to a low 
priority. 

The Bay of Pigs fiasco had a major impact on John F. Kennedy's 
thinking about the intelligence community. He felt he had been poorly 
served by the experts and sought to establish procedures that would 
better ensure his own acquisittion of intelligence judgments. In short, 
Kennedy defined a need for a senior intelligence officer and in so doing 
assured John McCone access and influence. The fact that McCone was 
known to have that access — he had a regular weekly meeting alone with 
the President — provided him with a degree of stature and leverage 
among the Departments which strengthened his role in the community. 
Kennedy defined the DCI's role in a letter sent to McCone on 
January 16, 1962. In it Kennedy gave primary emphasis to the DCI's 
function as coordinator for the community and as principal intelli- 
gence officer for the President. The letter read, in part : 

In carrying out your newly assigned duties as DCI, it is my 
wish that you serve as the government's principal foreign in- 
telligence officer, and as such that you undertake as part of 
your responsibility, the coordination and effective guidance 
of the total U.S. foreign intelligence effort. As the govern- 
ment's principal intelligence officer, you will assure the 
proper coordination, correlation, and evaluation of intelli- 
gence from all sources and its prompt dissemination to me 
and to other recipients as appropriate. In fulfillment of these 
tasks, I shall expect you to w^ork closely with the heads of all 
departments and agencies having responsibilities in the for- 
eign intelligence field. . . . 

As head of the CIA, while you will continue to have over- 
all responsibility for the Agency, I shall expect you to dele- 
gate to your principal deputy, as you may deem necessary, 
so much of the direction of the detailed operation of the 
Agency as may be required to permit you to carry out your 
primary task as DCI. . . . 
The letter drew a sharp distinction between McCone's responsibili- 
ties as head of the Agency and as coordinator for the comnumity. 
Kennedy's action was in part an attempt to rectify Allen Dulles' con- 
spicuous neglect of community affairs.^ For any DCI, the demands of 
managing an organization with thousands of employees, overseeing a 
community nearly ten times the Agency's size, as well as keeping in- 
formed on substantive intelligence matters to brief the President, were 
excessive. Kennedy's instructions regarding the administration of tho 
Agency were intended to relieve McCone of his internal responsibili- 
ties to allow him to better fulfill his roles in intelligence and inter- 
departmental coordination. 

Although McCone agreed with Kennedy's concept of the DCI's 
job and vigorously pursued the President's objectives, the results were 
uneven. Following a 1961 study directed by Lyman B. KirkDatrick, 



® Between July and October 1961. PFIAB had, once again, recommended 
redefinition of the role of the DCI. 



74 

the Agency Inspector General, several organizational changes were 
made in the Office of the Director. The most important change was the 
creation of a new position, Executive Director-Comptroller." Kirk- 
patrick was appointed to the post, and his job was to assume most of 
the responsibility for internal management. In practice, the altered 
system did not significantly limit the DCI's involvement in Agency- 
related administrative matters. This was particularly true for issues 
involving the Clandestine Service. The fundamental nature of clan- 
destine operations, the fact that they involved people in sensitive, 
complicated situations, demanded that the Agency's highest ranking 
official assume responsibility for decisions. A former member of 
McCone's staff stated that despite his community orientation, McCone 
spent 90 percent of his time on issues related to clandestine activities.^ 
From 196-3 to 1966, much of the Agency's community effort was 
directed toward working out an agreement with the Air Force 
on overhead reconnaissance programs. The major issue was whether 
the CIA would continue to have an independent capability for the 
design and development of space systems. In 1961, the Agency and the 
Air Force had established a working relationship for overhead recon- 
naissance through a central administrative office, comprised of a small 
staff of CIA, Air Force, and Navy representatives. Its director re- 
ported to the Secretary of Defense, but accepted intelligence require- 
ments through USIB. Budget appropriations for the central office 
came through the Air Force. Under the agreement, the Air Force 
provided the missiles, bases, and recovery capability for reconnaissance 
systems, and the CIA was responsible for research and development, 
contracting, and security. Essentially, this arrangement left the 
Agency in control of the collection program. Since a i)rimary mission 
was at stake, the Air Force was not willing to relinquish control over 
development, production, and deployment to the Agency. 

Two other factors magnified the reconnaissance program's impor- 
tance to the Air Force. First, with the advent of intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the manned bomber had lost its primacy 
in strategic planning. Second, when the civilian-controlled National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was created in 1958, 
the Air Force had been deprived of directing the overall U.S. 
areospace program. Because of these developments, the Air Force, 
particularly the Strategic Air Command, looked upon overhead recon- 
naissance as yet another mission that was being snatched away. 

The Agency recognized that it could not assume management re- 
sponsibility for reconnaissance systems, once developed. Missiles, 
launch sites, and recovery capabilities were not elements in the 
Agency's repertoire. Thus, whatever claims the CIA made for research 
and development, the Agency was dependent on the Air Force for 
administering the systems.^ 

"Other changes included placing the General Counsel's office, Audit Staff. 
Comptroller, Office of Budget, Program Analysis and Manpower directly under 
the DCI and establishing a separate Office of legislative counsel. 

' An Agency employee characterized the three functional Directorates this 
way : "The DDI is a production outfit and can run itself, the DDS&T spends 
money, but the DDP always involves people problems." 

' There were some within the Agency who favored CIA control over all phases 
of the reconnaissance program, but they were in the minority. 



75 

These factoi-s complicated an already complex rivalry. Control by 
one agency or another involved more than budgets, manpower, and 
access to photography. A decision would affect the nature of the recon- 
naissance program itself. Given its mission, the Air Force was inter- 
ested in tactical information, which required high resolution photog- 
raphy. The CIA, on the other hand, was committed to procuring 
national intelligence, essentially long-range strategic information. 
This required an area search capability, one with broad coverage but 
low resolution. Also at issue was the question of who would determine 
targeting and frequency of coverage, i.e., the establishment of re- 
quirements. If the Air Force assumed responsibility, its decisions 
would reflect its tactical orientation ; if the Agency decided, national 
intelligence requirements would have precedence. 

While the rivalry between the Air Force and the CIA was intense, 
the competition within the Department of Defense was equally acute. 
The Air Force determination to secure control of the reconnaissance 
program jeopardized the Secretary of Defense's capacity to utilize 
reconnaissance data. The information generated by photographic 
collection was crucial to the Secretary of Defense in making inde- 
pendent judgments on weapons procurement and strategic planning. 
If the Air Force controlled the recoimaissance program, the service 
would gain an enormous advantage in pressing its own claims. Sec- 
retary of Defense Roibert McNamara was aware of the threat which 
the Air Force posed. In the protracted negotiations over the national 
reconnaissance program McNamara became McCone's ally against 
the Air Force in order to maintain the independence of his own 
position. 

In August 1965, an agreement was reached that gave the Agency 
and the Secretary of Defense decisionmaking authority over the na- 
tional reconnaissance program. A three-person Executive Committee 
(EXCOM) for the management of overhead reconnaissance was es- 
tablished. Its membership included the DCI, an Assistant Secretary 
of Defense, and the President's Science Advisor. The EXCOM re- 
ported to the Secretary of Defense, w^io was assigned primary admin- 
istrative authority for overhead reconnaissance. The arrangement 
recognized the DCI's right as head of the community to establish col- 
lection requirements in consultation with USIB and gave him respon- 
sibility for processing and utilizing reconnaissance-produced data. 
To balance the Secretary of Defense's authority, the DCI could appeal 
to the President in the event he disagreed with the Secretary's 
decision.^ 

The agreement represented a compromise between military and 
Agency claims and provided substantive recognition of the DCTs na- 
tional intelligence responsibility. As a decisionmaking structure, it 
has worked well. However, it has not rectified the inherent competi- 
tion over technical collection systems that has come to motivate the 
intelligence process. The development of these systems has created in- 

' In 1967, the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation 
(COMIREX) succeeded COMOR as the USIB subcommittee responsible for the 
management of collection planning. Unlike COMOR, COMIREX also had resiwn- 
sibility for the distribution of imagery obtained through photographic and aerial 
reconnaissance progrrams. 



70-725 O - 76 - 6 



76 

tense rivalry, principally between the Air Force and the Agency, over 
development. With so much money and manpower at stake with each 
new system, each Agency is eager to gain the benefits of successful 
contracting. 

Beyond the interagency agreement on the reconnaissance program, 
McCone took other initiatives to develop better community-wide co- 
ordination. The establishment of the office of National Intelligence 
Programs Evaluation (NIPE) in 1963 was the first major DCI effort 
to ensure consistent contact with other intelligence components. The 
NIPE staff had three major responsibilities : reviewing- and evaluating 
intelligence community programs as a whole; establishing an inven- 
tory of intelligence activities to facilitate judgments regarding the 
cost and effectiveness of particular programs; and assessing USIB 
committee actions to implement priority national intelligence objec- 
tives. In each area, the NIPE staff was limited by the absence of regu- 
larized procedures among intelligence agencies, by these agencies' re- 
sistance to any effort to impose external direction, and by the sheer 
magnitude of the task. 

For example, in attempting to develop a consolidated intelligence 
budget the staff confronted four different program packages. Signals 
Intelligence (SIGINT) was prepared in a Consolidated Cryptological 
Program, consisting of the National Security Agency budget and the 
activities of the military services' cryptological agencies. The budget 
for the Defense Intelligence Agency ^° included DIA's allocations as 
well as those of the military intelligence services. The overhead recon- 
naissance program had its own budget, and the CIA program was 
formulated on the basis of categories different from those of any other 
program. These arrangements made it exceedingly difficult to break 
down the costs for categories of activities within the respective agen- 
cies oi- for major subordinate components of the community. The first 
national intelligence budget was compiled in 1965, when the approxi- 
mation of intelligence expenditures was several billion dollars. 

The preliminary budgetary work of the NIPE staff resulted in 
the establishment of the National Intelligence Resources Board 
(NIRB) in 1968. The NIRB was to advise the DCI in making judg- 
ments on foreign intelligence resource needs. NIRB was chaired by the 
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and its members included the 
Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Re- 
search (INR) and the Director of the DIA. By 1970, a centralized 
reporting mechanism existed, capable of providing community-wide 
budgetary information in national foreign intelligence programs. 
Despite these advances in compiling budgetary and program informa- 
tion as well as other efforts at coordination through USIB subcom- 
mittees, a real process of centralized management and allocation of 
resources did not exist. Budgetary authority rested with the Depart- 
ments, each of which defined its programs in terms of its specific needs. 



" The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was created by Secretary of Defense 
Robert McXamara in 1961. Staffed by representatives from each of the services, 
DI.^ was intended to limit the existing duplication among the military intelli- 
gence services and to provide more objective intelligence analysis than that 
being produced by the service intelligence components. 



77 

IV. The Directorate of /Science and Technology {DDS&T) 

Internally, the Agency was also adjusting to the impact of tech- 
nical and scientific advances. The debate between the Air Force and 
the CIA over the national reconnaissance program coincided with 
the Agency's organization of an independent directorate for science 
and technology. The developments in technical collection programs, 
including overhead recomiaissance and ELINT (electronic intercepts) , 
made plain the necessity for centralizing collection and analysis of 
scientific intelligence. As early as 1957, there had been suggestions 
that CIA's technical and scientific activities be combined under a new 
directorate. Kichard Bissell's insistence on maintaining close control 
over the U-2 program and Allen Dulles' traditionalist definition of 
intelligence prevented the change. 

Immediately after his appointment, John McCone made the issue 
of technical and scientific organizational arrangements a priority. 
McCone was convinced of the importance of technical collection pro- 
grams and regarded the creation of a separate directorate essential 
to effective management and utilization of these ca.pa;bilities. The 19G1 
Kirkpatrick study also recommended integration and reinforced the 
DCI's own preference. 

In 1961, scientific and technical intelligence operations were scat- 
tered among the three Directorates. The reconnaissance component had 
been transferred to the DDP under the title Development Projects 
Division (DPD) ; in the DDI, the Office of Scientific Intelligence 
conducted basic scientific and technological research; the Technical 
Services Division of the DDP engaged in research and development 
to provide operational support for clandestine activities; and the 
Office of ELINT in the DDP was responsible for electronic intercepts. 
Organizing an independent directorate meant wresting manpower and 
resources from existing components. The resistance was considerable, 
and a year and half passed between the first attempt at creating the 
directorate and its actual establishment. 

McCone's announcement of the Directorate for Research (DDR) 
in 1962 precipitated the two major controversies which sur- 
rounded the consolidation of the existing components — DDI's claim to 
OSI and DDP's claim to TSD.^^ Unwilling to relinquish their respec- 
tive components, officials in both Directorates thwarted the initial 
effort to organize the Research Directorate. In August 1963, in the 
second attempt to integrate the scientific and technological functions, 
the Directorate for Science and Technology (DDS&T) was organized. 
As its first Deputy Director, Albert Wheelon aggressively supervised 
the organization of the new Directorate.^^ xhe component included 
OSI, the Data Processing Staff, the Office of ELINT, the Develop- 
ment Projects Division, and a newly created Office of Research and 
Development. Later in 1963, the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis 



" Bissell's departure early in 1962 removed the major obstacle to transfer of 
the DPD. ^ ^ _ . , 

"Wheelon joined OSI in the late 1950's from Thompson, Ramo-Wooldndge, 
the technical research firm. 



78 

Center was added. Significantly, the DDP retained TSD, which con- 
tinued to carry out all technical research and development related to 
clandestine activities as well as administering aircraft support for 
covert operations.^2* 

The DDS&T was organized on the premise that close cooperation 
should exist between research and application, on the one hand, and 
technical collection and analysis, on the other. The Directorate's 
specific functions inchided, and continue to include, research, develop- 
ment, operations, data reduction, analysis, and contributions to esti- 
mates. This close coordination and the staffing and career patterns in 
the Directorate have contributed to the continuing vitality and qual- 
ity of DDS&T's work. 

The DDP began and remained a closed, self-contained component ; 
the DDI evolved into a closed, self-contained component. However, 
the DDS&T was created with the assumption that it would continue 
to rely on expertise and advice from outside the Agency. A number 
of arrangements ensured constant interchange between the Director- 
ate and the scientific and industrial communities. First, since all 
research and development for technical systems was done through 
contracting, DDS&T could draw on and i3enefit from the most ad- 
vanced technical systems nationwide. Second, to attract high-quality 
professionals from the industrial and scientific communities, the 
Directorate established a competitive salary scale. The result has 
been personnel mobility between the DDS&T and j)rivate industry. It 
has not been unusual for individuals to leave private industry, as- 
sume positions with DDS&T for several years, then return to private 
industry. This pattern provided the Directorate with a constant in- 
fusion and renewal of talent. Finally, the Directorate established the 
practice of regularly employing outside advisory groups as well as 
fostering DDS&T staff participation in conferences and seminars 
sponsored by professional associations. 

In the early 1960's, the Agency acquired tacit recognition of its 
technical achievements among the departmental intelligence comj)0- 
nents. Within the intelligence community, DDS&T began to exercise 
informal influence through the chairmanship of several USIB sub- 
committees. DDS&T representatives chair the Joint Atomic Energy 
Intelligence Committee (JAEIC), the Scientific Intelligence Com- 
mittee (SIC), the Guided Missiles Astronautics Intelligence Com- 
mittee (GMAIC), and periodically, the SIGINT (Signals Intel- 
ligence) Committee. 

T^. InteJligence Production 

During the 1961-1970 period, the Agency expanded its finished 
intelligence production in two important areas, strategic and eco- 
nomic analysis. Although the Agency had engaged in research in both 
fields, its jurisdiction had been limited. According to the 1951 agree- 
ment with the State Department, the DDI could only pursue economic 
analysis on the "Soviet Bloc," while the State Department retained 
authority for economic reporting on the "Free World." In the mili- 



For chart showing CIA organization as of 1964, see p. 100. 



79 

tary sphere, Dulles had accepted the services' claims to production 
of strategic intelligence and had restricted internal efforts to ex- 
pand the CIA's coverage of military problems. By 1962, the interna- 
tional environment and bureaucratic factors in the Agency and the 
Pentagon converged to produce greater demands for economic and 
strategic intelligence and to support the expansion of the CIA's 
capabilities. 

A. Econwnic Research and Analysis 

In the early 1950's, the Economic Research Area of ORR had 
directed most of its efforts to long-term, strategic research and anal- 
ysis on the Soviet Union. At that time, economic intelligence had a 
limited audience among policymakers, since international affairs 
were defined in political terms. Even in the mid-1950's, when the 
Agency extended its economic research to include the "Free World" 
countries, economic intelligence was subsumed in analyses of Soviet 
political objectives. Referring to the period of the 1950's, a former 
ERA analyst said, "Our biggest problem was whether or not anybody 
would read our product." 

It was not until the mid-1960's that economic intelligence acquired 
an importance of its own. The emergence of independent African 
nations and the view that the Soviet Union would engage in economic 
penetration of the fledging governments resulted in more specific re- 
quests for information on these countries' economies. Approximately 
15 percent of ERA's professional strength shifted from so-called Sino- 
Soviet Bloc research to what was formally designated "Free World" 
research. Still, the focus remained on countries that were Soviet 
targets. 

Since ORR did not have specific authorization for research on non- 
Communist countries, McCone worked out an agreement with Sec- 
retary of State Dean Rusk in March 1965 whereby CIA's activities in 
this area were formally sanctioned. The combination of McCone's 
relative strength and ORR's recognized competence allowed the DCI 
to seize the initiative at a time when the State Department record on 
economic reporting was weak. This informal agreement gave the CIA 
a tacit charter to pursue economic intelligence worldwide. 

In 1967, a major change occurred, when a market developed for 
policy-oriented non-Communist economic intelligence. The growdng 
economic strength of Japan and of the countries of Western Europe 
produced a related decline in the U.S. competitive posture and re- 
flected the growing inadequacy of the dollar-dominated international 
monetary system. Economic analysts found themselves called upon for 
more detailed research on "Free World" countries as trading partners 
and rivals of the United States. In 1967, the economic analysis func- 
tion gained office status with the establishment of the Office of Eco- 
nomic Research (OER), which succeeded ORR. The devaluation of 
sterling at the end of 1967 and the international monetary crisis a few 
months later created additional demands for detailed analysis and 
reporting on international monetary problems. OER began receiving 
formal requirements from the Treasury Department in June 1968. 



80 

The increasing demands for information produced a current in- 
telligence orientation in OER as each component struggled to meet 
the requests for timely analysis. Publication became the vehicle for 
indiviclual recognition, and short-term research began to dominate 
OER's production output. In FY 1968 OER produced 47 long-term 
research studies, provided 800 responses to specific requests from U.S. 
Government departments, and published 1075 current intelligence 
articles. 

B. Strategic Research and' Analysis 
The growing importance of the strategic arms competition between 
the United States and the Soviet Union had important effects on the 
Agency's military intelligence effort. Although in the decade of the 
1950's the Agency had made some contributions to military intelli- 
gence, it had not openly challenged the military's prerogative in the 
area. That opportunity came in the early 1960's. The combination of 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's reliance on the Agency for 
analysis and .John McCone's insistence on the DCI's necessity to have 
independent judgments on military matters resulted in the expansion 
of the CIA's strategic intelligence effort and the acceptance of the 
Agency's role as a producer of military analysis. 

By 1962, three separate Offices were engaged in military-related 
research : OCI, OSI, and ORR. P^ach had at least one division devoted 
to strategic analysis. In OCI, the Military Division reported on mis- 
sions and functions in Soviet weaponry. OSI provided technological 
information through its Offensive and Defensive Divisions." In mid- 
1962, ORR's military research effort was consolidated into the Mili- 
tary-Economic Division. 

McNamara's initiatives to the Agency influenced the DDI's mili- 
tary intelligence capabilities in two ways. First, they legitimized the 
CIA effort, and second thev upgraded the quality of the product. As 
Secretary of Defense, McNamara introduced innovative management 
and strategic jjlanning programs. In particular, he sought to make 
long-range program decisions by projecting foreign policy needs, 
military strategy, and budgetary requirements against force struc- 
tures. The kinds of questions which McNamara posed required in- 
creasingly sophisticated and detailed research and analysis. Dissatis- 
faction with the quality of service-produced military estimates con- 
tributed to his establishing the Defense Intelligency Agency (DIA), 
although the stated reason was to reduce duplication. McNamara also 
turned to the CIA to procure better quality analysis. He requested 
special studies and estimates on questions of strategic planning. 

One of ]McNamara's priorities was to request comparative assess- 
ments on Soviet-American military programs. The Secretary's requests 
precipitated, once again, the conflict between the military and the 
Agency on the issue of CIA access to information on U.S. military 
capabilities. Given the military's longstanding objections to providing 
the Agency with data, senior officials in the DDI were reluctant to 
accept McNamara's requests. When the Secretai-y insisted on the esti- 
mates, the CIA had difficulty obtaining the necessary information. 
At the same time analysts in both the Pentagon and the Agency ques- 
tioned whether the requisite ruble-dollar conversion costs could be 



When DDS&T was created in 1963, OSI became part of th,at Directorate. 



81 

made.^* When the Agency made its first projections, the Air Force 
challenged the results. 

The Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 contributed to the Agency's 
capacity to make comparative estimates and to its chiim to engage in 
military analysis. Before the crisis, McCone had argued that the 
DCI had to be informed of IT.S. strategic capabilities in oi'der to give 
adequate intelligence support to tlie President. McCone was one of 
the key participants in the deliberations during October 1962, and 
the Agency's contribution to the verification of Soviet missile em- 
placements in Cuba was crucial. During the crisis, McC^one obtained 
the data he requested on U.S. force dispositions. This was a wedge he 
needed. Following the crisis, with encouragement from McNamara, he 
continued to make the requests. By the mid-196()'s the DDI was pro- 
curing information on U.S. strategic planning on a regular basis. 
Consistent access to this data increased the Agency's information base 
considerably and further established the CIA's claims to strategic 
research. 

Early in 1965, CIA's work in military-economic intelligence was 
formally recognized through an exchange of letters between McCone 
and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus Vance. The letters con- 
stituted recognition that the CIA had primary responsibility for 
studies related to the cost and resource impact of foreign military and 
space programs. Essentially, the Defense Department was agreeing 
formally to what the Agency had informally been doing for over a 
decade. 

In addition to requesting special studies and estimates from the 
DDI, ^NlcXamara included Agency personnel in joint CIA-DIA ex- 
ercises in long-term Soviet force projections. In 1962, McNamara 
established the Joint Analysis Group (JAG). Composed of military 
officers from DIA and representatives from OSI and ORR, JAG pro- 
vided regular assessments on Soviet and beginning in 1966, Chinese 
future jnilitar}^ strengths. These judgments were known as National 
Intelligence Projections for Planning (NIPP). 

The Vietnam War absorbed a large share of the DDI's research 
strength. FolloAving the initiation of the bombing campaign against 
North Vietnam in 1965, ORR was called on to provide regular bomb 
damage assessments, including information on the flow of supplies 
and men to South Vietnam, the recuperability of supply centers, and 
details of shipping and cargoes. 

By 1966 both the Office of Research and Reports and the Office of 
Current Intelligence had established special staffs to deal with Viet- 
nam. In addition, the Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs (SAVA) 
staff was created under the direction of the DCI. While the DDP 
effort was increasing in proportion to the American military buildup, 
DDI estimates painted a pessimistic view of the likelihood of U.S. suc- 
cess with repeated escalations in the ground and air wars. At no time 
was the institutional dichotomy between the operational and analytical 
components more stark. 

The increased volume of requests from the Pentagon pointed up the 
unwieldy nature of the DDI production effort. With two Offices per- 

" Another issue involved the question of whether NIEs should take account 
of U.S. forces. Sherman Kent, the Director of ONE. opposed using data on U.S. 
capabilities, fearing that ONE would be drawn into debates about U.S. military 
programs. 



82 

forming closely related functions under greater demands and with the 
Defense Department — at least at the civilian level — having sanctioned 
the Agency's activity in this area, individuals closely involved with 
strategic analysis began to press for consolidation and the establish- 
ment of an office-level component. Although recommendations were 
advanced as early as 1964, opposition to the changes existed at senior 
levels in the DDL In 1966, however, a series of personnel changes ele- 
vated several people who had long favored consolidation to senior Di- 
rectorate positions. With the approval of DCI Helms, the military 
inteligence units in OCI and OKR were combined into a separate 
Office, the Office of Strategic Research (OSR) . 



The decade of the 1960's brought increased attention to the prob- 
lem of coordinating intelligence activities in the community but illus- 
trated the complex difficulties involved in effective management. De- 
partmental claims, the orientation of the DCI, the role accorded him 
by the President, and the demands of clandestine oj)erations all af- 
fected the execution of the interdepartmental coordination role. Al- 
though policymakers were inconsistent in their reliance on the 
Agency's intelligence analysis capability, all continued to rely heavily 
on the CIA's operational capability to support their policies. That 
fact established the Agency's own priorities. Despite the Agency's 
growing sophistication and investment in technological systems, 
clandestine activities continued to constitute the major share of the 
Agency's budget and personnel. Between 1962 and 1970 the DDP 
budget averaged 52 percent of the Agency's total annual budget.^^ 
Likewise, in the same period, 55 percent of full-time Agency personnel 
were assigned to DDP activities.^'' Essentially, the pattern of activity 
that had begun to emerge in the early 195()'s and that had become 
firmly established under Dulles continued. 

^ This does not include the proportion of the DDA budget that supported DDP 
activities. 

^' This figure includes those individuals in the communications and logistics 
components of the DDA, whose activities were in direct support of the DDP 
mission. 



Part Four 

The Kecent Past, 1971-1975 

introduction 

The years 1971 to 1975 were a period of transition and abrupt 
change for the CIA. The administrations of DCIs James R. 
Schlesinger and William E. Colby both reflected and contributed to 
shifts in the CIA's emphases. Spurred on by increased attention from 
the Executive branch, intelligence production, the problems of the 
community, and internal management changes became the primary 
concerns of the DCIs. Essentially, the diminishing scale of covert 
action that had begun in the late 1960's and continued in this period 
both required and provided the opportunity for a redefinition in 
the Agency's priorities. 

The decline in covert action was indicative of the broad changes 
that had evolved in American foreign policy by the early 1970's. 
Detent© rather than cold war characterized the U.S. posture toward 
the Soviet Union, and retrenchment rather than intervention charac- 
terized U.S. foreign policy generally. The cumulative dissension over 
Vietnam, the Congress' more assertive role in foreign policy, and 
shifts in the international power structure ei-oded the assumptions on 
which U.S. foreign policy had been based. The consensus that had ex- 
isted among the press, the informed public, the Congress, and the 
Executive branch and that had both supported and protected the CIA 
broke down. As conflicting policy preferences emerged and as miscon- 
duct in the Executive branch was revealed, the CIA, once exempt from 
public examination, became subject to close scrutiny. The Congress and 
even the public began to seek a more active role in the activities that 
Presidents and the Agency had for so long controlled. 



Foreign affairs were a continuing priority in the Nixon Admiiiis- 
tration. Until 1971, Vietnam absorbed most of the time and attention 
of the President and his Special Assistant for National Security 
Affairs, Heniy Kissinger. After 1971. both turned to a redefinition of 
United States foreign policy. Sharing a global view of U.S. policy, the 
two men sought to restructure relationships with the Soviet Union and 
the People's Republic of China. It was Kissinger rather than Nixon 
who maintained regular contact with DCIs Helms and Colby, and in 
effect, it was Kissinger rather than the DCIs who served as Nixon's 
senior intelligence advisor. Under Kissinger's direction the NSC be- 
came an intelligence and policy staff, providing analysis on such key 
issues as missile programs. The staff's small size and close proximity 
to policymakers allowed it to calibrate the needs of senior officials in 
a way that made their information more timely and useful than com- 
parable CIA analyses. 



84 

Both Kissinger's and Nixon's preferences for working with (and 
often independently of) small, tightly managed staffs is well known. 
However, both were genuinely interested in obtaining more and better 
quality intelligence from the CIA. In December 1970 Nixon requested 
a study of the intelligence community. Executed by James Schlesinger, 
then Assistant Direx^tor of the Bui-eau of the Budget, the study 
resulted in a Presidential Directive of November 5, 1971, assigning the 
DCI foiTual responsibility for review of the intelligence community 
budget.^ The intention was that the DCI would advise the President 
on budgetary allocations by serving in a last review capacity. As a 
result of the Directive, the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee 
(IRAC) was established to advise the DCI in preparing a consoli- 
dated intelligence budget for the President.^^ 

The effort faltered for two reasons. First, Nixon chose not to i-equest 
Congressional enactment of revised legislation on the role of the DCI. 
This decision inherently limited the DCI's ability to exert control 
over the intelligence components. The DCI was once again left 
to arbitrate with no real statutory authority. Second, the implementa- 
tion of the Directive was less energetic and decisive than it might have 
been. Helms did not attempt to make recommendations on budgetary 
allocations and instead, presented the President with the agreed views 
of the intelligence components. Furthermore, within the Agency the 
mechanism for assisting the DCI in community matters was weak. 
Early in 1972 Helms established the Intelligence Community (TC) 
staff as a replacement for the NIPE staff to assist in community mat- 
ters. Between the time of the decision to create such a staff and its 
actual organization, the number of personnel assigned was halved. 
Moreover, the staff itself was composed only of CIA employees rather 
than community-wide representatives. This arrangement limited the 
staff's accessibility to other components of the community, and was 
a contributing factor to the disappointing results of the Nixon 
Directive.^'' 
1. The Directors of Central Intelligence, 1973-1975 

James Schlesinger's tenui-e as DCI from February to July 1973 was 
brief but telling. An economist by training, Schlesinger brought an 
extensive background in national security affairs to his job as DCI. He 
came to the position with definite ideas on the management of the com- 
munity and on improving the quality of intellig;ence. 

He began his career as a member of the University of Virginia fac- 
ulty. From 1963 to 1969 he served as Director of Strategic Studies at 
the Rand Corporation. He was appointed Assistant Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget in 1969 and continued as Assistant Director dur- 
ing the transition to the Office of ^Management and Budget. In 1971 
President Nixon named him Chairman of the Atomic Energy Com- 
mission. He left that position to become DCI. Schlesinger had a clear 
sense of the purposes intelligence should serve, and during his six- 

^ The directive was addressed to the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treas- 
ury, the Attorney General, the Director, Office of Science and Technology, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, PFIAB, and the Atomic Energy 
Commission. 

'*IRAC members included representatiyes from the Departments of State, 
Defense, 0MB, and CIA. 

^^ For chart showing CIA organization as of 1972, see p. 101. 



85 

month term he embarked on a series of changes that promised to alter 
the Agency's and the DCI's existing priorities. 

William E. Colby succeeded Schlesinger. An OSS veteran and 
career DDP officer, Colby's background made him seem of the tradi- 
tional operations school in the Agency. His overseas assignments 
included positions in Rome, Stockholm and Saigon, where he was 
Chief of Station. Yet Colby brought an Agency and community orien- 
tation to his term as DCI that was uncommon for DDP careerists. 
Colby saw himself fii'st as a manager — for both the Agency and the 
community — rather than an operator. 

His position as Executive Director under Schlesinger exposed him 
to Schlesinger's ideas of reform and reinforced his own clisposition 
for innovation. Well before public disclosures and allegations regard- 
ing CIA activities, Colby was committed to reconciling the Agency's 
priorities with changing public attitudes and expectations. Soon after 
his appointment, the Agency became the focus of public and Con- 
gressional inquiries, and most of the DCI's time was absorbed in re- 
sponding to these developments. 

//. Attempts at Redirection 

A. Internal Changes 

It is likely that had Schlesinger remained as DCI, he would have 
assumed a vigorous role in the community and would have attempted 
to exercise the DCI's latitude in coordinating the activities of the de- 
partmental intelligence services. Schlesinger's overall objectives were 
to maximize his role as Director of Central Intelligence rather than 
as head of the Agency and to improve the quality of the intelligence 
product. 

To strengthen efforts at better management Schlesinger altered the 
composition of the IC Staff by increasing the number of non- Agency 
personnel. In this w^ay he hoped to facilitate the Staff's contacts with 
the other components of the community. 

Schlesinger felt strongly that the Agency was too large. On the 
operations side, he believed the DDO ^ was overstaffed in proportion 
to the needs of existing activities. In the area of intelligence produc- 
tion he identified size as impeding the ability of analysts to interact 
with policymakers. Within six months he reduced personnel by 7 per- 
centr— wdth most of the cuts occurring in the DDO. 

Under Colby attempts at innovation continued. Consistent with his 
management orientation, Colby attempted to alter existing patterns 
of decisionmaking within the Agency, specifically in the DDO and 
the Office of National Estimates. The DDO staff structure had created 
enormous problems of competing claims on operational areas and had 
fostered the development of small "duchies." 

The counterintelligence function had become a separate entity, ad- 
ministered independently of the divisions and controlled by a small 
group of officers. Under this arrangement counterintelligence was not 
an integrated element in the Agency's clandestine capability. By break- 
ing down the exclusive jurisdiction of the staff, Colby attempted to 



- Schlesinger changed the name of the Clandestine Service from the Directorate 
for Plans to the Directorate for Operations. 



86 

incorporate coiinterintelligence into the day-to-day operations of the 
geographical divisions. 

Colby sought to force the DDO to interact with other elements of the 
Agency, He supported the transfer of the Technical Services Division 
(TSD) from the DDO to the DDS&T. At the time of the creation of 
the DDS&T senior officials in the DDO (then DDP) had opposed 
the transfer of TSD to the new Directorate, That opposition con- 
tinued. However, in 1973 Colby ordered the transfer. In addition to 
achieving management consolidation in the area of technology, Colby 
was attempting to break down the DDO's insularity. 

Colby's enactment of the system of Management by Objectives 
(MBO) in 1973 tried to alter DDO administrative patterns in an- 
other way. The MBO system was instituted throughout the Agency, 
but it potentially affected the DDO the most by attempting to replace 
the project-based system with specific progi'am objectives against 
which projects were to be developed. Under MBO, related projects are 
aggregated into "programs" aimed at a policy objective. As such, the 
system is primarily a means of evaluation to measure performance 
against stated objectives. Although the DDO directive establishing 
MBO in January 1974 ordered the elimination of the project system for 
purposes of planning, projects remain the basic units for approval pro- 
cedures and for budgeting at the station and division levels. Thus, 
the internal demand created by the project system remains. MBO 
was not intended to rectify the incentives for the generation of proj- 
ects, and has not succeeded in replacing the project system adminis- 
tratively. The nature of DDO operations makes it difficult to quantify 
results and therefore limits the utility of MBO. For example, recruit- 
ment of three agents over a given period may result in little worth- 
while information, while a single agent may produce valuable results. 

The changes that occurred on the intelligence side were at least in 
part a response to existing dissatisfaction with the intelligence 
product at the policymaking level. The Board of National Estimates 
had become increasingly insulated from the policymaking process. In 
1950 Danger, Smith and Jackson had established the Board with the 
assumption that senior experts would serve as reviewers for estimates 
drafted by the ONE staff. Over time the composition of the Board had 
changed considerably. Kather than continuing to draw on individuals 
from outside the Agency, the Board became a source of senior staff 
positions for DDI careerists themselves. Promotion to the Board be- 
came the capstone to a successful DDI analyst's career. This meant 
that the Office and the Board became insular and lacked the benefit 
of views independent of the DDI intelligence process. 

The Office and the Board had become more narrowly focused in 
other ways as well. ONE had a staff of specialists in geographic and 
functional areas. In the process of drafting estimates ONE analysts 
often failed to interact with other DDI experts in the same fields. As 
intelligence analysis became more sophisticated and specialized, par- 
ticularly in the economic and strategic areas, Board members' ex- 
pertise often did not equal the existing level of analysis. Consequently, 
the Board could not fulfill its fimction of providing review and crit- 
icism. Overall, the intelligence product itself suffered. With little 
direct contact between ONE and senior policymakers, there was no 



87 

continuing link between the NIEs and the specific intelligence needs 
of United States officials. On occasion, Special NIEs (SNIEs) re- 
sponded to questions specifically posed by policymakers, e.g., if the 
United States does such and such in Vietnam will the Chinese inter- 
vene. Even these documents, however, were seen by policymakers as 
seldom meeting their real needs. NIEs were defined and produced by 
a small group of individuals whose perspective was limited by both 
their lack of access to consumers and by their inbred drafting process'. 

After his appointment in 1973, when approximately half the Board 
positions were vacant, Colby abolished ONE and the Board and es- 
tablished in their place the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs). 
A group of eleven senior specialists in functional and geographic 
areas, the NIOs are responsible for intelligence collection and produc- 
tion in their designated fields. The senior NIO reports to the DCI. 
The NIOs serve two specific functions. First, they are the DCI's senior 
substantive staff officers in their designated specialties. Second, they 
are coordinators of the intellgence production machinery and are to 
make recommendations to the DCI on intelligence priorities and the 
allocation of resources within the communnty. Their access is com- 
munity-wide including the DDO. Their job is not to serve as drafters 
of national intelligence estimates but to force the community's intel- 
ligence machinery to make judgments by assigning the drafting of 
estimates to analysts. They do not collectively review estimates in the 
way that the Board did. Essentially, they are intended to serve as 
managers and facilitators of information. 

Colby was responsible for another management innovation, the 
Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs). A major problem in the DCI's 
fulfillment of his role as nominal leader of the intelligence community 
has been his inability to establish community-wide priorities for the 
collection and production of national intelligence. As DCI Colby 
addressed the problem in managerial terms and defined a set of Key 
Intelligence Questions (KIQs). By establishing specific categories of 
information needs and by utilizing the NIOs to activate the com- 
munity's responses, Colby hoped to encourage better policy-related 
performance. A year after issuance of the KIQs, the NIOs and the 
Director evaluated the community's responsiveness to the guidelines. 
The KIQ system has not altered the agencies' independent determina- 
tion of intelligence collection and production priorities. This applies to 
the CIA as well as to DIA and the service intelligence agencies.^ 
Although the limitations of the KIQ system are a commentary on the 
DCI's limited authority with regard to the Departments, the system 
also represents a larger misconception. The notion that control can be 
imposed from the top over an organization without some effort to 
alter internal patterns and incentives is ill-founded. 

These changes were accompanied by shifts in emphasis in the DDO 
and the DDL In the Clandestine Service the scale of covert opera- 
tions was reduced, and by 1972 the Agency's paramilitary program in 
Southeast Asia was dissolved. Yet, the overall reduction did not affect 
the fundamental assumptions, organization, and incentives governing 

' NSA appears to have integrated its requirements more closely with the KIQ 
system. 



88 

the DDO. The rationale remained the same, and the operational capa- 
bility was intact^as CIA activities in Chile illustrated. Presidents 
could and did continue to utilize the Agency's covert action capability. 
CIA operations in Chile included a wide range of the Agency's 
clandestine repertoire — political action, propaganda, economic activi- 
ties, labor operations, and liaison relations. In clandestine collection 
Soviet strategic capabilities remain the fii-st priority. Responding to 
recent international developments, the DDO expanded its collection 
activities in other areas, notably international narcotics traffic — with 
considerable success. 

In the DDI, economic intelligence continued to assume increased 
importance and to take on new dimensions. In sharp contrast to the 
British intelligence service, which has for generations emphasized 
international economics, the DDI only recently has begun developing 
a capability in such areas as international finance, tlie gold market, 
and international economic movements. A major impetus for this 
change came in August 1971 with the U.S. balance of payments crisis. 
Since that time, the demands for international economic intelligence 
have escalated dramatically. 

In 1974 the Office of Political Research (OPR) was established to 
provide in-depth foreign political intelligence analysis. OPR is the 
smallest of the DDI Offices. For the most part, OPR analysts are 
insulated from day-to-day requests to allow them to concentrate on 
larger research projects. The Office's creation i-epresented recognition 
of the need for long-term political research, which was not being ful- 
filled in the existmg DDI structure.* 

B. Outside Review 

Increased Congressional interest in the CIA's intelligence analysis 
continued in this period. However, oversight of the CIA did not keep 
abreast of demands for the intelligence product. In 1971 the CIA sub- 
committee of the Senate Armed Services Committee did not hold one 
formal meeting to discuss CIA activity ; it met only once in 1972 and 
1973. One-to-one briefings between the DCI and the senior members 
continued to characterize the arrangements for Congressional review. 

In 1973 Representative Lucien Nedzi made this comment on CIA- 
Congressional relations : 

Indeed, it is a bit unsettling that 26 years after the passage 
of the National Security Act the scope of real Congressional 
oversight, as opposed to nominal Congressional oversight, 
remains unformed and uncertain. 
Nedzi was reflecting the fact that no formalized reporting require- 
ments existed between the CIA and the Congress, particularly with 
regard to the initiation of covert action. Judgment and informal 
arrangements dictated the procedures. 

Two changes in this period signalled growing Congressional con- 
cern with the oversight function. Yet the changes did not alter the 
fundamental relationship between the Agency and the Congress, 
which continued to be one of mutual accommodation. Although both 
the DCI and the Congressional members who were involved in the 
process appear to have been satisfied with the frequency of exchange 
and quality of information provided, in 1973 unrest developed among 
younger members of the House Armed Services Committee who de- 

* For chart showing CIA organization as of 1975, see p. 102. 



89 

manded reform in intelligence oversight. Committee Chairman Ed- 
ward Hebert responded by appointing Nedzi to chair the CIA sub- 
committee, thus replacing Hebert himself. 

In 1975 the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance 
Act formalized the reporting requirements on covert action. Funda- 
mentally, it increased the number of committees to be informed of 
covert operations by requiring that the Senate Foreign Relations 
Conmiittee and the House International Ati'airs Committee receive 
appropriate briefings in addition to the four CIA subcommittees. 
The Amendment did not provide for prior notification or approval of 
covert action, and as such, still left Congress in the role of passive 
recipient of information. 

The Hughes-Ryan Amendment also altered procedures in the 
Executive branch somewhat. The Amendment specified that the Presi- 
dent himself must inform the Congress of decisions to implement 
covert operations and must certify that the program (s) are essential 
to U.S. policy. Until 1974, 40 Committee decisions on covert action 
were not always referred to the President. Only if there was a dis- 
agreement within the Committee or if a member of the Committee 
thought the proposed operation was important enough or sensitive 
enough would the President become involved. Once again, these am- 
biguous arrangements were intentional, designed to protect the Presi- 
dent and to blur accountability. The Amendment forced the President 
both to be informed himself and to inform the legislative branch of 
covert activities. Congress' action, though limited, reflected the grow- 
ing momentum for change in the standards of conduct and procedures 
governing U.S. foreign intelligence activities. 



Public disclosures between 1973 and 1974 of alleged CIA domestic 
programs had contributed to Congress' demand for l3roader and more 
regularized participation in decisions regarding CIA activities. Soon 
after Schlesinger's appointment the Watergate scandal exposed the 
Agency to charges of involvement with Howard Hunt, former CIA 
employee. As a result of repeated allegations concerning Agency 
acquiescence in White House demands related to Watergate revela- 
tions, Schlesinger requested that all Agency employees report any past 
or existing illegal activities to him or the Agency Inspector General. 
In response, Agency employees presented their knowledge and recol- 
lections of 693 possible CIA violations of internal directives. Known 
as the "Family Jewels," the file was reviewed by the Office of the 
Inspector General and by then DCI William Colby. 

The review revealed the Agency's extensive involvement in domes- 
tic intelligence activities — in violation of its foreign intelligence 
charter. In response to requests from the Federal Bureau of Investiga- 
tion and from Presidents Johnson and Nixon the Agency had partici- 
pated in several programs designed to collect intelligence on domestic 
political groups. Operation CHAOS, whose j^urpose was to detennine 
whether or not domestic political dissidents, including students, were 
receiving foreign support, resulted in the Agency's collection of in- 
formation on thousands of Americans. The Agency's mail opening 
program, conducted in partial cooperation with the FBI, was directed 



90 

against political activists, protest organizations, and subversive and 
extremist groups in the ITnited States. Although the program had 
begun in the early 1950's as a means of monitoring foreign intelligence 
activities in the United States, by the late 1960's it had taken on the 
additional purpose of domestic suiveillance. Following the internal 
Agency review, the mail opening program and Operation CHAOS 
were discontinued. 

In December 1974 newspaper disclosures made further allegations 
regarding CIA domestic activities. What had been consensual ac- 
ceptance of the CIA's right to secrecy in the interests of national 
security was rejected. The Agency's vulnerability to these revelations 
was indicative of the degree to which Amei-ican foreign policy and the 
institutional framework that supported that policy were undergoing 
redefinition. The closed system that had defined and controlled U.S. 
intelligence activities and tliat had left decisions in the hands of a 
small group of individuals began to break down. The assumptions, 
procedures and actions that had previously enjoyed unquestionable 
accej)tance began to be reevaluated. 



Part Five 

Conclusions 

The CIA was conceived and established to provide high-quality 
intelligence to senior policymakers. Since 1947 the Agency — its struc- 
ture, its place within the government and its functions — has undergone 
dramatic change and expansion. Sharing characteristics common to 
most large, complex organizations, the CIA has responded to rather 
than anticipated the forces of change; it has accumulated functions 
rather than redefining them; its internal patterns were established 
early and have solidified; success has come to those who have made 
visible contributions in high-priority areas. These general character- 
istics have affected the specifics of the Agency's development. 

The notion that the CIA could serve as a coordinating hody for 
departmental intelligence activities and that the DC! could orchestrate 
the process did not take into account the inher^ent institutional ob- 
stacles posed hy the Departments. From the outset no Department was 
willing to concede a centralized intelligence function to the CIA. Each 
insisted on the maintenance of its independent capabilities to support 
its policy role. With budgetary and management authority vested in 
the Departments, the Agency was left powerless in the execution of 
interdepartmental coordination. Even in the area of coordinated na- 
tional intelligence estimates the Departments did not readily provide 
the Agency with the data required. 

It was not until John McCone's term as DCI that the Agency ag- 
gressively sought to assert its position as a coordinating body. That 
effort demonstrated the complex factors that detei-mined the relative 
success of community management. One of tlie principal influences 
was the support accorded the DCI by the President and the coopera- 
tion of the Secretary of Defense. In a situation where the DCI com- 
manded no resources or outright authority, the position of these two 
individuals was crucial. A\Tiile Kennedy and McNamara provided 
McCone with consistent backing in a variety of areas, Nixon and 
Laird failed to provide Helms with enough support to give him the 
necessary bureaucratic leverage. 

It is clear that the DCIs' own priorities, derived from their back- 
grounds and interests, influenced the relative success of the Agency's 
role in interdepartmental coordination. Given the limitations on the 
DCI's authority, only by making community activities a first order 
concern and by pursuing the problems assertively, could a DCI 
begin to make a difference in effecting better management. Dur- 
ing Allen Dulles' term interagency coordination went neglected, and 
the results were expansion of competing capabilities among the De- 
partments. For McCone, community intelligence activities were 
clearly a priority, and his definition of the DCI's role contributed to 
whatever advances were made. Helms' fundamental interests and 

(91) 



92 

inclinations lay within the Agency, and he did not push his mandate 
to its possible limits. 

The DCI's basic problems have been competing claims on his time 
and attention and the lack of real authority for the execution of the 
central intelligence function. As presently defined, the DCI's job is 
burdensome in the extreme. He is to serve the roles of chief intelli- 
gence advisor to the President, manager of community intelligence 
activities, and senior executive in the CIA. History has demonstrated 
that the job of the DCI as community manager and as head of the 
CIA are competing, not complementary roles. In terms of both the 
demands imposed by each function and the expertise required to ful- 
fill the responsibilities, the two roles differ considerably. In the future 
separating the functions with precise definitions of authority and re- 
sponsibilities may prove a plausible alternative. 

Although the Agency was established pHmarily for the purpose of 
providing intelligence anxxlysis to senior policymakers^ withm three 
year's clandestine operati&ns became and continued to be the Agency'' s 
preeminent activity. The single most important factor in the trans- 
formation was policymakers' perception of the Soviet Union as a 
worldwide threat to United States security. The Agency's large-scale 
clandestine activities have mirrored American foreign policy priorities. 
With political operations in Europe in the 1950's, paramilitary opera- 
tions in Korea, Third World activities, Cuba, Southeast Asia, and 
currently narcotics control, the CIA's major programs paralleled the 
international concerns of the United States. For nearly two decades 
American policymakers considered covert action vital in the struggle 
against intei-national Communism. The generality of the definition or 
''threat perception" motivated the continual development and justifica- 
tion of covert activities from the senior policymaking level to the field 
stations. Apart from the overall anti-Communist motivation, succes- 
sive Presidential administrations regarded covert action as a quick and 
convenient means of advancing their particular objectives. 

Internal incentives contributed to the expansion in covert action. 
Within the Agency DDO careerists have traditionally been rewarded 
more quickly for the visible accomplishments of covert action than for 
the long-term development of agents required for clandestine collec- 
tion. Clandestine activities will remain an element of United States 
foreign policy, and policymakers will directly affect the level of opera- 
tions. The prominence of the Clandestine Service within the Agency 
may moderate as money for and high-level Executive interest in covert 
actions diminish. However, DDO incentives which emphasize opera- 
tions over collection and which create an internal demand for projects 
will continue to foster covert action unless an internal conversion 
process forces a change. 

In the past the orientation of DCIs such as Dulles and Helms also 
contributed to the Agency's emphasis on clandestine activities. It is 
no coincidence that of those DCIs who have been Agency careerists, 
all have come from the Clandestine Service. Except for James 
Schlesinger's brief appointment, the Agency has never been directed 
by a trained analyst. The qualities demanded of individuals in the 
DDO — essentially management of people — serve as the basis for bu- 
reaucratic skills in the organization. As a result, the Agency's leader- 
ship has been dominated by DDO careerists. 



93 

Clandestine collection and covert action have had their successes, i.e. 
individual activities have attained their stated objectives. What the 
relative contribution of clandestine activities has been — the extent to 
which they have contributed to or detracted from the implementation 
of United States foreign policy and whether the results have been 
worth the risks — cannot be evaluated without wide access to records on 
covert operations, access the Committee did not have. 

Organizational arrangements tcithin the Agency and the decision- 
making structure outside the Agency have permitted the extrernes in 
CIA activity. The ethos of secrecy which pervaded the DDO had the 
effect of setting the Directorate apart within the Agency and allowed 
the Clandestine Service a measure of autonomy not accorded other 
Directorates. More importantly, the compart mentation principle al- 
lowed units of the DDO freedom in defining operations. In many cases 
the burden of responsibility fell on individual judgments — a situation 
in which lapses and deviations are inevitable. Previous excesses of drug 
testing, assassination planning, and domestic activities were supported 
by an internal structure that permitted individuals to conduct opera- 
tions without the consistent necessity or expectation of justifying or 
revealing their activities. 

Ultimately, much of the responsibility for the scale of covert action 
and for whatever abuses occurred must fall to senior policymakers. 
The decisionmaking arrangements at the NSC level created an en- 
vironment of blurred accountability which allowed consideration of 
actions without the constraints of individual responsibility. Histori- 
cally the ambiguity and imprecision derived from the initial expecta- 
tion that covert operations would be limited and therefore could be 
managed by a small, informal group. Such was the intention in 1948. 
By 1951 with the impetus of the Korean War, covert action had be- 
come a fixed element in the U.S. foreign policy repertoire. The fre- 
quency of covert action forced the development of more formalized 
decisionmaking arrangements. Yet structural changes did not alter 
ambiguous procedures. In the 1950's the relationship between Secre- 
tary of State John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles allowed informal 
agreements and personal understandings to prevail over explicit and 
precise decisions. In addition, as the scale of covert action expanded, 
policymakers found it useful to maintain the ambiguity of the 
decisionmaking process to insure secrecy and to allow "plausible 
deniability" of covert operations. 

No one in the Executive — least of all the President — was required to 
formally sign off on a decision to implement a covert action program. 
The DCI was responsible for the execution of a project but not for tak- 
ing the decision to implement it. Within the NSC a group of indi- 
viduals held joint responsibility for defining policy objectives, but 
they did not attempt to establish criteria placing moral and constitu- 
tional limits on activities undertaken to achieve the objectives. Con- 
gress has functioned under similar conditions. Within the Congress a 
handful of committee members passed on the Agency's budget. Some 
members were informed of most of the CIA's major activities; others 
preferred not to be informed. The result was twenty-nine years of 
acquiescence. 

At each level of scrutiny in the National Security Council and in the 
Congress a small group of individuals controlled the approval proc- 
esses. The restricted number of individuals involved as well {is th^ as- 



94 

sumption that their actions would not be subject to outside scrutiny 
contributed to the scale of covert action and to the development of 
questionable practices. 

The DDO and the DDI evolved out of separate indepe7ident orga- 
nizations, serving different policy needs. Essentially, the two Direc- 
torates have functioned as separate organizations. They maintain 
totally independent career tracks and once recruited into one, indi- 
viduals are rarely posted to the other. 

In theory the DDO's candestine collection function should have con- 
tributed to the DDI's analytic capacity. However, DDO concerns about 
maintaining the security of its operations and protecting the identity 
of its agents, and DDI concerns about measuring the reliability of its 
sources restricted interchange between the two Directorates. Funda- 
mentally, this has deprived the DDI of a major source of information 
Although DDI-DDO contact has increased during the last five years, 
it remains limited. 

The DDI has traditionally not been informed of sensitive covert 
operations undertaken by the DDO. This has affected the respective 
missions of both Directorates. The Clandestine Service has not had the 
benefit of intelligence support during consideration and implementa- 
tion of its operations. The Bay of Pigs invasion was an instance in 
which DDI analysts, even the Deputy Director for Intelligence, were 
uninformed and represents a situation in which timely analysis of po- 
litical trends and basic geography might have made a difference — 
either in the decision to embark on the operation or in the plans for the 
operation. In the DDI, lack of knowledge about operations has com- 
plicated and undermined the analytic eflort. Information on a CIA- 
sponsored political action program would affect judgments about the 
results of a forthcoming election ; information provided by a foreign 
government official would be invaluable in assessing the motives, pol- 
icies, and dynamics of that government; information on a CIA- 
sponsored propaganda campaign might alter analyses of the press or 
public opinion in that country. Essentially, the potential quality of the 
finished intelligence product suffers. 

The Agency was created in part to rectify the problsm of duplication 
among the departmental intelligence services. Rather than minimizing 
the prohlenfi the Agency hxis contributed to it hy heconriing yet another 
source of intelligence production.. Growth in the range of American 
foreign policy interests and the DDI's response to additional require- 
ments have resulted in an increased scale of collection and analysis. 
Today, the CIA's intelligence products include : current intelligence in 
such disparate areas as science, economics, politics, strategic affairs, 
and technology ; quick responses to specific requests from government 
agencies and officials ; basic or long-term research ; and national intelli- 
gence estimates. With the exception of national intelligence estimates, 
other intelligence organizations engage in overlapping intelligence 
analysis. 

Rather than fulfilling the limited mission in intelligence analysis 
and coordination for which it was created, the Agency became a pro- 
ducer of finished intelligence and consistently expanded its areas of 
responsibility. In political and strategic intelligence the inadequacy 
of analysis by the State Department and by the military services 
allowed the Agency to lay claim to the two areas. As the need for spe- 
cialized research in other subjects developed, the DDI responded — as 



95 

the only potential source for objective national intelligence. Over time 
the DDI has addressed itself to a full range of consumers in the 
broadest number of subject areas. Yet the extent to which the analysis 
satisfied policymakers' needs and was an integral part of the policy 
process has been limited. 

The size of the DDI and the admmistrative jrrocess involved in the 
production of finished iiitelligence — a process which involves numer- 
ous stages of drafting and review hy large numbers of individuals — 
precluded, close association hetiveen policymakers and analysts, he- 
tioeen the intelligence product and policy informed hy intelligence 
analysis. Even the National Intelligence Estimates were relegated to 
briefing papers for second and third level officials rather than the prin- 
cipal intelligence source for senior policymakers that they were in- 
tended to be. Recent efforts to improve the interaction include creating 
the NIO system and assigning two full-time analysts on location at 
the Treasury Department. Yet these changes cannot compensate for 
the nature of the intelligence production system itself, which employs 
hundreds of analysts, most of whom have little sustained contact with 
their consumers. 

At the Presidential level the DCI's position is essential to the utili- 
zation of intelligence. The DCI must be constantly informed, must 
press for access, must vigorously sell his product, and must anticipate 
future demands. Those DCIs who have been most successful in this 
dimension have been those whose primary identification was not with 
theDDO. 

Yet the relationship between intelligence analysis and policymaking 
is a reciprocal one. Senior policymakers must actively utilize the intel- 
ligence capabilities at their disposal. Presidents have looked to the 
Agency more for covert operations than for intelligence analysis. 
"V^ile only the Agency could perform covert operations, decisionmak- 
ing methods determined Presidential reliance on the CIA's intelligence 
capabilities. Preferences for small staffs, individual advisors, the need 
for specialized information quickly — all of these factors circumscribe 
a President's channel of information, of which intelligence analysis 
may be a part. It was John F. Kennedy who largely determined John 
McCone's relative influence by defining the DCI's role and by including 
McCone in the policy process; it was Lyndon Johnson and Richard 
Nixon who limited the roles of Richard Helms and William Colby. 
Although in the abstract objectivity may be the most desirable quality 
in intelligence analysis, objective judgments are frequently not what 
senior officials want to hear about their policies. In most cases. Presi- 
dents are inclined to look to the judgments of individuals they know 
and trust. Whether or not a DCI is included among them is the Presi- 
dent's choice. 

Over the past thirty years the United States has developed an insti- 
tution and a corps of individuals who constitute the the U.S. intelli- 
gence profession. The question remains as to how both the institution 
and the individuals will best be utilized. 



96 



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LIST OF ACRONYMS 

ADDP: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, second person in line 
of command of the DDP. 

ADPC : Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, the senior admin- 
istrative officer in the Office of Policy Coordination. 

ADSO : Assistant Director for Special Operations, the senior admin- 
istrative officer in the Office of Special Operations. 

ARC : Ad Hoc Requirements Committee, an interdepartmental group 
established in 1955 to coordinate intelligence collection require- 
ments among the Departments for the U-2 program. Succeeded by 
COMORinl960. 

BID : Basic Intelligence Division, a component of ORR, responsible 
for production of National Intelligence Surveys. Became Office 
of Basic Intelligence in 1955. 

CA Staff : Covert Action Staff, a component of the DDP. responsible 
for review of covert action projects for the Directorate as V7ell 
as management and control of some field operations. 

CIG : Central Intelligence Group, 1946-1947, predecessor of the CIA. 

CI Staff : Counterintelligence Staff, a component of the DDP, which 
until recently maintained virtual control over counterintelligence 
operations. 

COMINT : Communications Intelligence, technical and intelligence 
information derived from foreign communications, not including 
foreign press, propaganda, or public broadcasts. 

COMIREX : Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation, 
established in 1967 to succeed COMOR as the USIB subcommittee 
responsible for the management of collection planning. 

COMOR : Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, a USIB subcom- 
mittee established in 1960 to coordinate intelligence collection 
requirements among the Departments for the development and 
operation of all overhead reconnaissance systems. 

CRS: Central Reports Staff, a component of the CIG, responsible for 
correlation and evaluation of information drawn from other 
Departments. 

DCI : Director of Central Intelligence, chief officer of the CIG and 
the CIA. 

DCID : Director of Central Intelligence Directive, a directive issued 
by the DCI which outlines general policies and procedures to be 
followed by the intelligence community. It is generally more spe- 
cific than an NSCID. 

DCS : Domestic Contact Service, a component of CIG, responsible for 
soliciting domestic sources for foreign intelligence information. 
Renamed the Domestic Contact Division in 1951 ; became a 
component of the DDI in 1952; renamed the Domestic Contact 
Service in 1965; transferred to DDO in 1973 and renamed the 
Domestic Collection Division. 

(103) 



104 

DBA : Directorate for Administration, established in 1950, responsible 
for personnel, budget, security, medical services and logistical 
support for overseas operations. 

DDCI : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, second person in line 
of command of CIA. 

DDI : Directorate for Intelligence, created in 1952, responsible for 
production o.f finished intelligence (excluding scientific and 
technical intelligence since 1963) and for collection of overt 
information. 

DDP : Directorate for Plans, created in 1952 from the integration of 
OSO and OPC, also known as the "Clandestine Service." Respon- 
sible for clandestine collection, counterintelligence, and covert 
operations. Renamed the Directorate for Operations in 1973. 

DDR : Directorate for Research, created in 1962, immediate predeces- 
sor to the Directorate for Science and Technology. 

DDt^d'T : Directorate for Science and Technology, organized in 1963, 
combining OSI, the Data Processing Staff, the Office of ELINT, 
the DPD, and a newly created Office of Research and Develop- 
ment. Responsible for research development and operation of tech- 
nical collection systems and for production of finished scientific 
and technical intelligence. 

DIA : Defense Intelligence Agency, created by Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara in 1961, responsible for production of mili- 
tary intelligence. 

DPD : Development Projects Division, a component of the DDP, re- 
sponsible for overhead reconnaissance. Transferred to DDS&T in 
1963. 

EIC : Economic Intelligence Committee, a subcommittee of the lAC 
created in 1951, charged with interdepartmental coordination of 
economic intelligence activities and the production of publications. 
Continued under USIB. 

ELINT : Electronic Intelligence, technical and intelligence informa- 
tion derived from the collection (or interception) and processing 
of foreign electromagnetic radiations such as radar. 

ERA : Economic Research Area, established in 1950 as a component 
of ORR. responsible for production of e^jonomic intelligence. 
Eventually developed into OER. 

EXCOM : Executive Committee, established in 1965 for the manage- 
ment of overhead reconnaissance, giving the CIA and the Depart- 
ment of Defense decisionmaking authority over the national re- 
connaissance program. 

FBID : Foreign Broadcast Information Division, as element of CIG 
which monitored overseas broadcasts. Became a component of the 
DDI in 1952; renamed the Foreign Broadcast Information Serv- 
ice in 1965. 

GMAIC : Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, 
a USIB subcommittee established in 1958, responsible for inter- 
departmental coordination of intelligence related to guided mis- 
siles. 

GMIC : Guided Missiles Intelligence Committee, an lAC subcommit- 
tee created in 1956, responsible for interdepartmental coordina- 
tion of intelligence related to guided missiles. Succeeded by 
GMAIC in 1958. 



105 

GRA: Geographic Research Area, created in 1950 as a component 
of ORR ; in 1965 transferred to OBI, which was renamed Office 
of Basic and Geographic Intelligence; OBGI became the Office 
of Geographic and Cartographic Research in 1974. 

lAB : Intelligence Advisory Board, an advisory group to the DCI, 
composed of the heads of the military and civilian intelligence 
agencies. Existed for the life of CIG. 

lAC : Intelligence Advisory Committee, created in 1947 to serve as 
a coordinating body in establishing intelligence requirements 
among the Departments. Merged with USCIB in 1958 to form 
USIB. 

IC Staff: Intelligence Community staff, established in 1972 as a re- 
placement for the NIPE staff. Responsible for assisting the DCI 
in the management of intelligence community activities. 

ICAPS : Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff, a com- 
ponent of the CIG. which handled the administrative aspects of 
CIG's contacts with the Departments. 

INR: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the State Department's 
intelligence analysis component. 

IRAC : Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, an interdepart- 
mental group established in 1971 to advise the DCI in preparing 
a consolidated intelligence program budget for the President. 
Members included representatives from the Departments of State, 
Defense, 0MB, and CIA. 

JAEIC : Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, a subcommit- 
tee of USIB, responsible for interdepartmental coordination of 
intelligence relating to atomic energy. 

JAG: Joint Analysis Group, an interdepartmental body established 
in 1962. to provide regular assessments on Soviet and Chinese fu- 
ture military strengths. 

KIQs: Key Intelligence Questions, initiated in 1974 and designed to 
produce intelligence on topics of particular importance to na- 
tional policymakers, as defined by the DCI. 

MBO : Management by Objectives, a system established in 1974 to 
measure performance against explicitly stated goals. 

MONGOOSE: Operation MONGOOSE, a program conducted be- 
tween 1961 and 1962, aimed at discrediting and ultimately top- 
pling the Castro government. 

NIA : National Intelligence Authority, supervisory body of the Cen- 
tral Intelligence Group (CIG), comprised of the Secretaries of 
State, War, and Navy, and the personal representative of the 
President. 

NIE : National Intelligence Estimate, a predictive judgment on the 
capabilities, vulnerabilities, and courses of action of foreign na- 
tions. It represents the composite view of the intelligence 
community. 

NIOs : National Intelligence Officers, a senior group of analysts, orga- 
nized in 1973 to replace ONE. Responsible for the management 
of intelligence collection and production. 

NIPE Staff : National Intelligence Programs Evaluation Staff, estaj?- 
lished in 1963 under the DCI to serve as a coordinating body in 
the management of interdepartmental intelligence activities. Re- 
placed by IC Staff in 1971. 



106 

NIPP : National Intelligence Projections for Planning, interagency 
assessments on Soviet and Chinese future military strengths, pro- 
duced by the JAG. 

NIRB : National Intelligence Review Board, established in 1968, to 
advise the DCI in making judgments on foreign intelligence 
resource needs. Replaced in 1971 by IRAC. 

NIS : National Intelligence Survey, a compendium of factual infor- 
mation on foreign countries drawn from throughout the intelli- 
gence community. The program was terminated in 1974. 

NPIC : National Photographic Interpretation Center, established in 
1961 under the direction of the DCI to analyze photography de- 
rived from overhead reconnaissance. 

NSC : National Se<*urity Council, the senior decisionmaking body in 
the Executive branch. Established in 1947, comprised of the 
President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and De- 
fense with representatives of the JCS, Special Assistant to the 
President and other officials attending as required. 

NSC ID : National Security Council Intelligence Directive, a directive 
issued by the NSC to the intelligence agencies. NSCIDs are often 
augmented by more specific DCIDs and by internal departmental 
or agency regulations. 

OCB : Operations Coordinating Board, established in 1953 to replace 
the PSB as a senior review body for covert operations. Its mem- 
bers included deputy-level officials from the Departments of State, 
Defense, the office of the President, and from the foreign aid 
program. 

OCD : Office of Collection and Dissemination, a component of the DDI 
charged with the dissemination of intelligence and the storage and 
retrieval of unevaluated intelligence. Renamed the Office of Cen- 
tral Reference in 1955 ; renamed the Central Reference Service in 
1967. 

OCI: Office of Current Intelligence, a component of the DDI, estab- 
lished in 1951. Responsible for the production of current intelli- 
gence in numerous areas. 

OER: Office of Economic Research, a component of the DDI, 
established in 1967. Responsible for production of economic 
intelligence. 

ONE : Office of National Estimates, organized in 1950, to produce 
National Intelligence Estimates. Dissolved in 1973. 

00 : Office of Operations, a component of the DDI. charged with the 
collection of overt information. Dissolved in 1965. 

OPC : Office of Policy Coordination, a component attached to the CIA 
but reportinsr to the Departments of State and Defense. Estab- 
lished in 1948 with re«ponsibilitv for the conduct of covert opera- 
tions. Merfred with OSO in 1952 to form the DDP. 

OPR : Office of Political Research, established in 1974 as a component 
of the DDT. Responsible for long-term political research. 

ORE : Office of Research and Evaluation, a component of CIG and 
CIA. established in 1946. Responsible for intelligence production 
and interagency coordination. Dissolved in 1951. 

ORR : Office of Rese4irch and Reports, established in 1950, became a 
component of DDI in 1952. Responsible primarily for economic 
and strategic research. Dissolved in 1967. 



107 

OSI : Office of Scientific Intelligence, created in 1949. Responsible for 
basic science and technical research. Became a component of the 
DDI in 1952. Transferred to the DDS&T in 1963. 

OSO : Office of Special Operations, a component of CIG and CIA, 
established in 1946, responsible for espionage and counterespion- 
age. Merged with OPC in 1952 to fonii the Directorate for Plans. 

OSR : Office of Strategic Research, established in 1967 as a component 
of the DDI, combining military intelligence units in OCI and 
ORR. 

OSS: Office of Strategic Sendees, U.S. intelligence agency from 
1942-1945. Responsibilities included research, analysis, espionage 
and overseas operations. 

PBCFIA : President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence 
Activities, an advisory body created in 1956 by President Eisen- 
hower. Renamed President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 
(PFIAB) in 1961. 

PSB : Psychological Strategy Board, a subcommittee of NSC estab- 
lished in 1951, charged with directmg psychological warfare pro- 
grams. Its members included departmental representatives and 
Board staff members. Replaced by OCB in 1953. 

SEC : Scientific Estimates Committee, a subcommittee of the lAC, 
established in 1952, charged with interagency coordination of 
scientific intelligence and the production of publications. Renamed 
the Scientific Intelligence Committee in 1959. 

SIGINT : Signals Intelligence, which involves the interception, proc- 
essing, analysis and dissemination of information derived from 
forei.071 electrical communications and other signals. 

SNIE : Special National Intelligence Estimate, request by policy- 
makers for a judgment on a particular question. 

SPG : Si')ecial Procedures Group, a component of OSO, established 
in 1947. Responsible for the conduct of covert, psychological 
operations. 

SSU : Strategic. Services Unit, a component of the War Department 
charged with clandestine collection and counterespionage. Trans- 
ferred to CIG in 1946. 

SWNCC : State, War, Na\^' Coordinating Committee, established in 
1944, the predecessor body to the NSC. 

TSD : Technical Services Division, a component of the DDP, engaged 
in research and development to provide operational support for 
clandestine activities. Transfem^ed to DDS&T in 1973. 

USOIB : United States Commmiications Intelligence Board, estab- 
lished in 1946 to advise and make recommendations on communi- 
catioiis intelligence to the Secret a r\^ of Defense. 

USIB : United States Intelligence Board, an interdepartmental body 
established in 1958. through the merger of the lAC and the 
USCIB. Responsible for coordinating intelligence acti\nties 
among the Departments. 



70-725 O - 76 • 



INTELLIGENCE AND TECHNOLOGY^ 

/. BacJcgroymd 

The First Amendment right to free speech and the Fourth Amend- 
ment riffht to be secure in one's person, papers, and home have been 
violated in recent years. Although these rights have been abridged in 
time-honored ways, in some cases the abridgement has taken place in 
ways that could not have been foreseen by the framers of the Constitu- 
tion and the Bill of Rights. A partial list of means employed follows : 

Breaking and entering into offices and homes ; 

Opening of letters in the Postal System ; 

Bugging or use of hidden microphones with no party to the 
conversation witting; 

Wiretap of telephone communications ; 

Intercept of telephone communications without actual con- 
nection to wires ; and 

Intercept of facsimile or printer communication. 
Although files have existed for many years in all societies, and have 
sometimes been used to pernicious ends, technology has now made avail- 
able to the managers of personal files greater speed and efficiency in 
the retrieval of data, as it has to managers of inventory files, of airline 
reserA^ations, of the corpus of legal decisions, and of the United States 
House of Representatives Computer Based Bill Status System. In 
recent years, too, heightened public sensitivity and legislative activity 
have begun to introduce legislation, guidelines and standards regard- 
ing governmental and private files on individuals, granting the indi- 
vidual in many cases the right to know of the existence and the content 
of such a file, and to be able to challenge information which may be 
found in that file (Privacy Act of 197-t, 5 U.S.C. 552A). Computer 
technology may not have been instrumental in the misuse of CIA or 
IRS files to i^rovide information to the White House on U.S. citizens, 
but the future impact of such technology must be assessed. 

It is a logical possibility that the modem technological tools em- 
ployed in the exercise of other rights and freedoms for the general and 
individual good might inadvertently result in such general exposure 
that the Firet and Fourth Amendment rights could no longer be pre- 
served, or that their preserv^ation would require severe restriction of 
other rights and freedoms with major damage to society. For example, 
such might be the impact of (fanciful and unphysical) spectacles 
which, while restoring perfect vision to older people, endowed them as 
well witli the ability to look through envelopes and walls. 

A second logical possibility is that the general exercise of technol- 
ogy for individual good and the good of society does not in itself 
imperil the rights under discussion, but that specific targeting of this 
technology toward individuals can imperil these rights. In this case, 
the particular threat to these rights could of course be removed by out- 
lawing the subject technology and enforcing such laws. It may be, 

^ This staff report was prepared for the Select Committee by Richard Garvin, 
consultant. 

(109) 



110 

however, that comparable protection of these rights may be obta:inable 
by legal restrictions on the use of such technology, for such invasion, 
without denying society benefits which would otherwise be obtainable. 
If similar guarantee of rights may be achieved in this way, the ban- 
ning of technology (even if politically feasible) would be an exag- 
gerated remedy. 

Finally, in some cases new technology may aid in restoring privacy 
against invasion by people or tools. An old example is the use of locks 
on doors ; newer ones are the use of encryption for written communi- 
cations and for the privacy of information in files. On the other hand, 
it would be inappropriate to require the individual to go to great cost 
to preserve his rights if such preservation could be obtained at lesser 
social cost. e.g. by restrictions of the actions of individuals Avho would 
intentionally violate these freedoms or whose activities might inad- 
vertently imperil these rights. Thus, the expectation of privacy for 
the contents of a post card sent through the mails is quite different 
from that of a first-class letter in a sealed envelope, and the cost of an 
envelope is not regarded as an excessive charge for the guarantee of 
privacy. As the human senses and capabilities of vision, hearing, and 
memory are expanded by the use of new tools, what is the place for the 
analog of better envelopes ? 

//. Covert Ohservafi<m andlntercept 

Covert hearing {hidden Tnicrophones) . — It has always been possible 
for a person to secrete himself, unbeknownst to the participants in a 
conversation, in such a way as to hear the conversation and so to vio- 
late an expectation of privacy ("eavesdropping"). No doubt mechani- 
cal aids in the form of tubes were used at times to make eavesdropping 
easier and less dangerous. Furthermore, rooms equipped with speak- 
ing tubes to convey orders to another part of a building were vulner- 
able to another kind of eavesdropping in which the use of the appara- 
tus was other than that intended. 

Microphones were in use in the 19th century for telephone com- 
munication and more recently for radio, public address, and record- 
ing. The present state of microphone technology is apparent to us all, 
with microphones a few millimeters across and a millimeter thick 
common in portable cassette recorders in use for business, education, 
and pleasure throughout the world. Over the last few years, the devel- 
opment of integrated-circuit technology and its extremely wide use in 
such recorders, in stereo equipment, and in calculators has provided 
not only the possibility but also the widespread capability to house 
amplifiers in a snace of a few cubic millimeters and with power con- 
sumption of microwatts. Thus, microphones can be hidden in walls or 
moldings of rooms, in furnishings, or in personal possessions. They 
can be left behind by visitors or can be introduced as part of the nor- 
mal resupply or refurbishment process. 

Microphones can be accompanied by self-contained recorders or can 
transmit the signal (usually after amplification) either along near- 
invisible wires or by radio. In the case of wire or radio transmission, 
there would normally be a recorder or more powerful relay at some 
small distance of a few meters to a few hundred meters. The power 
requirements for microphones and amplifiers can be provided by bat- 
teries, by connection to the normal building power supply, from the 



Ill 

telephone system, or by silicon or other cells converting sunlight or 
roomlight into electrical power. Micropliones can also be provided 
with power by the absorption of radio or microwave signals, and can 
retransmit intelligence on the same carrier waves. In addition to dedi- 
cated wires or radio transmission, the microphone signal can also be 
transmitted on the building power line or on the telephone lines, if 
any. Under most circumstances, the ability with further advance of 
technology to make microphones still smaller would not be of great 
utility. They are already small enough to pose a near-maximum threat. 

Not only are apparatus containing microphones available by the 
tens of millions throughout the world, but the components are also 
common articles of commerce and can be assembled by any one of mil- 
lions of people. Many rooms are now permanently equipped (entirely 
overtly) with microphones for use in recording conferences or in pick- 
ing up clearly comments made by an audience during question period. 
Such microphones could easily feed recorders, wires, or transmitters 
at other times as well. Furthermore, every loudspeaker, whether built- 
in or part of a portable electronic device, is capable of working as a 
microphone in just the same way. Individuals with impaired hearing 
have particularly small microphone-amplifiers, some of them con- 
cealed in the frames of eye glasses. 

A slightly different kind of covert hearing is said to be possible by 
detecting with laser beams the vibration of ordinary windows enclos- 
ing a room in which the target conversation is taking place. Another 
approach to overhearing conversations outdoors is to use large direc- 
tional microphones distant as much as one hundred meters. 

Retarding the further development of microphone technology for 
commercial purposes would be of little help, even if it were feasible, 
given the already small size of microphones. It seems likely that pri- 
vacy can be adequately protected against covert hearing in the United 
States by proper legislation and enforcement requiring a warrant for 
the exercise of covert hearing capability. There being no expectation of 
privacy against a person present, legislation in the future, as now, 
should not restrict covert recording or retransmission by a person 
present, whether that person participates in the conversation or not. 
Of course, covert hearing capability can be banned administratively 
from designated premises, as it is now, by those in control of the 
premises — e.g.^ "no microphones, radios, recorders, etc. at defense in- 
stallations" (or on premises operated by the XYZ company). 

Covert seeing {hidden cameras). — Hidden cameras (whether elec- 
tronic or film) can imperil Fourth Amendment rights in analogous 
fashion to hidden microphones. Observation through a crack or peep- 
hole ; personnel observation via a partially transparent overt mirror ; 
large automatic or remote-control cameras or TV-type sensors behind 
an overt mirror; small cameras behind a small aperture — this series 
represents the application of technology to the goal of covert seeing. 
Vision comparable with that of a person can be obtained through a 
hole about 3 mm (i/g-inch) in diameter. A 1 mm hole would permit 
commercial TV-quality picture. Reading the text of papers on a desk 
across the room will require a larger aperture. Unlike microphones, 
such cameras are not yet common or cheap. A film camera taking a pic- 
ture every 5 seconds would need a considerable film supply and would 
have to be quiet if covert ; a TV camera capable of communicating even 



112 

at such a rate, Trith human vision quality is feasible, but is at present 
costly. With time, the technology of fiber-optic signal communication 
will allow unobtrusive relay from a hidden camera. A command link 
could direct the view of the camera toward the interesting portion of 
the room, saving power and communications rate (as could built-in 
intelligence at a later time). 

Clearly, the invasion by covert seeing of privacy would be inten- 
tional, not the i-esult of innocent exercise- of rights on the part of others. 
As s^^ch, preservation of such privacy can look toward legislation and 
the enforcement thereof, with such unconsented observ^ation available 
onlv under warrant. 

Wiretap of telephone lines. — Anywhere on the line running from the 
telephone instrument through the building to the junction box and on 
to the local exchange (typically a mile or so from the subscriber's in- 
strument) , connection to the line or proximity to that line will allow a 
high-quality telephone conversation to be provided for listening or 
recording. For many decades there has been no need for physical con- 
tact \nSX\ the line to allow "wiretap," and no telltale click or change in 
quality is necessary or likely. 

The technology needed for wiretap (whether by contact or non- 
contact) is primitive compared with that used for covert hearing. 
There is no way in which this technology' can be outlawed without out- 
lawing telephones themselves. However, in this field particularly, there 
is no necessity to abandon the protection of privacy. The intercept of 
communications from telephone lines may readily be controlled by 
legislation and bv the requirement of a warrant for such actions by 
government bodies.^* 

Intercept of voice from domestic micro^oave relay. — In the United 
States, most telephone calls beyond the local area are now transmitted 
via microwave relay. Towers about 20 miles apart contain receiving 
antennas, amplifiers, transmitters, and transmitting antennas. The 
microwave relay system operates near 4000 megahertz and 6000 mega- 
hertz, at wavelengths on the order of 6 centimeters. 

The transmitted beam from each of these relay towers has an angular 
width on the order of one degree and so can be picked up well over a 
wedge some 20 miles long by a third of a mile wide. Leased-line services 
such as the federal government FTS system, "WATS lines, and indi- 
vidual corporate "private-line" networks occupy permanent positions 
in the frequency spectrum in those relays which are used to carry the 
signals (not always by the most direct path) over the fixed network. 
Direct-distance-dialing calls, constituting the bulk of the traffic, cannot 
be so precisely located. In general, however, these DDD calls are pre- 
ceded b}'' digital information which serves to direct the call to the re- 
ceiving telephone number and to indicate the calling telephone number 
as well. 

At present, an individual with an instruction manual and a few 
thousand dollars worth of equipment can set up a makeshift antenna 
and listen or record continuously calls on any desired fixed-assigned 
channel. In principle, even the DIDD calls could, at substantially larger 
investment, be matched with a list of "interesting" telephone numbers 

'" Omnibus Safe Streets and Crime Control Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. 2510-2520). 



113 

so as to record only those calls originating from or directed to a given 
subscriber number. 

These voice messages, having traveled by wire at least some distance 
may be from the telephone instrument, legally afforded the same pro- 
tection as calls carried on wire from sendor to receiver.^ However, 
questions of extra-territoriality arise. There appears to be no way in 
which individuals on foreign embassy and consular properties can be 
forbidden from listening into those microwave links which pass their 
territories. It must be anticipated that certain powers will use such 
infomiation not only for afl'airs of state,^ but also simply to earn funds 
by taking advantage of information which is obtained in this way. 
Communication in regard to commodity markets, stock exchanges, and 
biddino- prices for large contracts all convey information which can 
have substantial value. 

Given this peculiar situation, one might judge that the threat to 
privacy from all but extra-territorial intercept is adequately control- 
lable by a legislative ban on such intercept (and the requirement of 
warrants for govermnent "search"), and that the rather limited ex- 
posure to personnel controlled by foreign powers and based outside 
the reach of U.S. law can be controlled by other means. Voice links 
carrying defense information are all encrypted. Other important 
information of the federal government can be rerouted to avoid some 
small number of possible listening posts. Direct-distance-dial calls 
eventually will be relayed with the destination and origination infor- 
mation going over separate channels. When all-digital transmission 
is used to carry voice, encryption can be available at negligible cost. 
It could be implemented with separate keys for each microwave link, 
or encryption could be done at the point of digitizing each signal, or 
both. 

Intercept of non-voice from domestic microwave relay linJcs. — Many 
channels on U.S. microwave relay are devoted to the transmission of 
non- voice information (facsimile machines, teletype, telex service, 
other printer traffic). The comments above regarding the intercept of 
voice communications from such microwave links apply with equal 
force to the intercept of non-voice communications. There is, however, 
a major difference. Existing law protects only communications from 
which intelligence can be "aurally acquired," ^ so there is at present no 
legal bar to the intercept of such non-voice communications. 

At prcFent, the value of the average non-voice communication re- 
layed over the microwave net is probably greater than that of the av- 
erage voice communication. Even if non-voice were protected by new 
legislation, it would still be subject to intercept from extraterritorial 
sites. Fortunately, the protection of non-voice data transmission by 
means of encryption is far easier than is the case for voice and is prac- 
tical now over all telex and printer links. Several machines and 
electronic devices of varying effectiveness are available to provide 
end-to-end transmission security. The National Bureau of Standards 



' 18 U.S.C. 2511. 

' Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the 
United States, June 1975, p. 8. 
*18 U.S.C. 2510(4). 



114 

has begun the promulgation of a national standard for data security 
via encryption, which apparently satisfies the concerns of the United 
States Government for maintaining the privacy of non-defense 
information. 

Intercept of voice or non-voice from domestic coTnmunication satel- 
lite links. — About half the international common-carrier communica- 
tions originating in the U.S. goes by satellite and half by submarine 
cable. A rapidly increasing fraction of purely domestic communica- 
tions is now relayed by satellite. Present satellites may receive com 
munications from any one of a number of ground stations and simply 
rebroadcast the signal at a different frequency, covering the conti' 
nental United States with the microwave beam. For some communica- 
tions with multiple addressees, this large potential receiving area is 
an advantage ; for most communications with a single addressee, the 
particular ground station to wliioh the inessa.fre is addressed will 
recognize the digital address and record or retransmit the message 
into the local net (or print it and put it into an envelope for delivery, 
etc.). 

Modem relay satellites are in stationaiy orbit, so that a fixed antenna 
can be used to receive signals, rather than the tracking antenna initially 
I'equired for the lower-orbit satellites. Thus, anywhere in the large area 
illuminated by the satellite microwave beam, a relatively simple an- 
tenna and amplifier would allow intercept of messages relayed by 
satellite. The satellite transmits microwave energ}^ not only onto the 
land mass of the U.S.. but also onto adjacent waters and countries, in- 
cluding Cuba. Non-U.S. citizens on non-U.S. territory are completely 
free to receive satellite relay of domestic T^.S. communications and to 
do with this information whatever they will. 

Although some satellite relay is digital in nature and thus readily 
protected by encryption at negligible added cost, the voice communica- 
tion is primarily analog (whereby the intelligence is carried by con- 
tinuous amplitude or frequency modulation as is the common case for 
terres*^rial multiplex relay). Encrypted voice communication would re- 
quire a wider channel at present than is needed by analog voice, but 
the additional cost for privacy via encryption might be small even so, 
since the satellite resource is a small part of the end-to-end communica- 
tions cost. 

Unfortunately, domestic satellite relay, as presently practiced, is an 
example of a case in which the indisputable l^enefi'ts of technology 
bring with them a threat to privacy. In this case, it is not the applica- 
tion of technology to intercept but the technological nature of satellite 
transmission which makes intercept as easy outside U.S. territory as 
within, thus putting protection of privacy outside the reach of U.S. 
law. Technology in the form of encryption provides an adequate solu- 
tion. This remedy is available now for non-voice communication and 
could be used with equal ease for digital voice. Aside from encryption, 
satellite voice communication could be provided some degree of pro- 
tection in the near future by avoiding fixed-assignment schemes for 
users desiring privacy. 

///. File Technology 

Some examples of current status. — Among the early large compu- 
terized file-oriented systems were the airlines seat reservations systems 
now in use by all U.S. airlines. The overall system accommodates thou- 



115 

sands of flights per day, with a hundred or more seats per aircraft, and 
can handle reservations months in the future. A reservation can be 
made, queried, or cancelled within seconds from many hundreds or 
thousands of terminals. Some of the records may contain little more 
than the name of the passenger ; othei-s may include a complex continu- 
ing itinerary, with hotels, car rental, telephone numbers, and the like. 

Seismic data bases are used by oil exploration companies to hold 
seismic reflection data and core logs. The former is the pattern of re- 
flected sound waves versus time at various microphones which are 
sensitive to signals from a small explosion at the surface of the ground. 
The reflection comes from change of structure at different levels in the 
earth below. Core logs (or bore logs) may measure the detailed ground 
conductivity, water content, radioactivity content, and the like in tens 
of thousands of oil exploration wells. The material is kept computer 
accessible so that it can be retrieved and processed in a timely fashion 
as new tools are developed or as new information makes it desirable 
to compare with old information in the neighborhood. 

Several government echelons have tax data bases. At the city or 
county level, such a data base may include details about everj^ dwelling 
in the city. Such data bases can be particularly useful in case a blanket 

The Xew York Times Information Bank ("NYTIB") provides at 
the New York Times building both abstracts and full texts of articles 
published in that newspaper. From remote terminals, subscribers can 
search the compendium of abstracts for all articles which have been 
published in the New York Times and may request photocopies of the 
full articles whose abstracts satisfy the search criteria. The abstract 
searching can be full-text search, i.e., a search on the name "Harold 
Ickes'' might result in a sheaf of abstracts, accompanying stories most 
of whose headlines say nothing about Ickes, but may refer to Roose- 
velt. 

Full-text search capability is used in several states for purposes of 
law and legal decisions. In addition to struggling with the often inade- 
quate index to such a corpus, an attorney can undertake a full-text 
search for statutes or cases which have some characteristics in common 
M'ith his current concern. 

The United States House of Representatives Bill Status Office 
handles over 1000 telephone inquiries each day concerning the status 
and content of legislation which has been introduced into the House. 

All these are file-oriented systems, some of which may retrieve files 
according to the index system under which they were prepared; others, 
as we have seen, have a full-text search capability, such that a file can 
be retrieved in accordance with its content rather than heading. 

Computer file systems are now in common use for text preparation 
and editing. A draft letter, rei)ort or publication is typed at a terminal 
connected with a computer (or sometimes at a stand-alone system). 
At any time, portions of the draft can be displayed, typed out loyally 
or on a fast printer. The typist can enter corrections into the com- 
puter S5^stem (including global changes, e.g. to change the group of 
characters "seperate" every place it may occur into the group 
"separate"), can rearrange paragraphs, append additional files, and 
the like. 



116 

Use of -files in intelligence loorh. — The work of intelligence agencies 
and their analysts is in large part the production of reports. There 
are routine periodic reports, reports in response to specific tasking on 
questions of concern to national leaders, reports which are initiated 
internally to the agency in response to some fact or complex of facts 
which seems to require' attention at a higher level. In presenting any 
such material, the analyst needs to obtain as much other information 
about the subject (What is the significance of the appointment of an 
unexpected person as premier?) as is possible. There is a strong anal- 
ogy to the NYTIB which should also serve to provide responsible re- 
porters with otlier information on the subject of current interest (ear- 
lier, perhaps contradictory speeches of public officials, and the like). 

Intelligence files may also have agents' reports, which are in the 
nature of fragmentary newspaper articles except that they are secret. 
Kaw intelligence files may also contain the full text of foreign radio 
broadcasts as transcribed and circulated in print^^d form by the 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). If plaintext mes- 
sages of a foreign military command are available, they Avill also be 
filed, and for efficient search and retrieval preferably in a computer 
store. 

The use of computers in all these file applications — commercial, 
educational, and intelligence — is motivated by the same drive for effi- 
ciency, reliability and the capability to retrieve materials at places, 
times, and by persons other than those who have filed them. Com- 
puters at present are not normally used to store pictures or things, 
but indexes to such collections can as readily be placed in the com- 
puter as can any other kind of information. In contrast with a single 
physical file of paper documents, the computer store never suffers 
from the document's unavailability because it is on somebody else's 
desk. Multiple copies of a micro-image store can also satisfy the 
requirement for multiple simultaneous use, but cannot be updated 
or searched so readily as can a computer store. 

Near-term future file technology : performance and cost. — In any 
case, it is not the purpose of this note to design a file system for the 
intelligence connnunity, but rather to inquire as to certain aspects of 
privacy in regard to such files. The Privacy Act of 1974 is both the 
result and cause of increased interest in desigii of safeguards, which 
is at present tlie concern of an active subset of data-processing profes- 
sionals and of a number of existing organizations,^ including the Pri- 
vacy Protection Study Commission, but a brief discussion of near-term 
future technology may be of help. 

Obviously, concern regarding files and privacy is with the chain 
of information from collection through storaf>:e and retrieval. One 
worry is that some government organization by the expenditure of 
enough money, could have the capability to "know everything about 
everyone" at any time. Because there is no general public right of 

^ See for inst-ance National Bureau of Standards Publications : FIPS PUB41 — 
"Computer Security Guidelines for Implementing the Privacy Act of 1974" (SD 
Catalog Number C13.52:41) and "Executive Gu de to Computer Security" (Avail- 
able from the Institute for Computer Sciences and Technology, XBS, Washing- 
tion, D.C. 20234). 



117 

access to the files of the intelligence agencies, it is of interest to know 
wliat these capabilities might amount to, as a guide to the introduction 
of safeguards. 

In order to provide some intuitive feeling for the magnitudes in- 
volved, consider the storage of full page, double-spaced text. Such a 
page may have thirty lines of sixty-five letters or digits, or about 2,000 
characters per page. Except as noted, it is assumed that a character 
requires one "byte" (8 bits) of storage, although by appropriate cod- 
ing of text, one can store as many as three characters per byte. 

Using a typical modern disk-pack magnetic storage device, storage 
of 300 million bytes can be obtained for a rental of about $1500 per 
month, or some $5 per month per million characters. Such a device 
can transfer about 1.2 million characters per second, so it would re- 
quire 250 seconds to search its entire contents if the logical search 
device could operate at the storage data rate. Search is normally done 
by a query, looking for an exact match in the data stream as it is 
brought from the store. Examples of simple queries are: "theft of 
service" in the case of the legal corpus; "Chamberlain/Munich" in 
the case of the NYTIB (where the "/" simply means that both "Cham- 
berlain" and "]Munich" should be in the same document) ; "seperate" 
in the case of ordinary text processing where the properly spelled 
word "separate" is to be substituted. Such queries against a small data 
base are handled well by a general purpose computer. Indeed, large 
data bases also have some structure which can often be used to reduce 
by large factors the amount of data which actually has to be searched. 
But even if the data base has little structure, one could imagine 
streaming the entire data base past some modest special-purpose elec- 
tronic device (a "match register") which may detect a match against 
the query and divert the matching document into a separate store, 
where it may be brought to the attention of the analyst. In large pro- 
duction, such a match-register might be bought for $100 in modern 
integrated-circuit technology. In any case, the cost of special-purpose 
match-registers would be small compared with the cost of the massive 
store and will henceforth be neglected here. 

By such techniques, as many queries as are desired may be entered 
from terminals and simultanously matched against the entire data 
stream. If the data base is entirely in this type of storage (at a present 
cost of $5 per month per megabyte, or 50 cents per month per nominal 
file of 50 typed pages) any query can be answered within five minutes. 
Of course, a single query might lead to many other sequential queries 
before all the desired facts are at hand, but the time is measured in 
minutes, not months. 

Given that most queries need not be answered in minutes, one can 
ask the cost of a slower system. There are now commercially available 
tape library products, of which a typical one can store 35 billion char- 
acters at a cost of about $18,000 per month (so 50 cents per million 
characters per month). This particular device can deliver data at a 
rate of 0.8 million characters per second, so that it would require some 
twelve hours for such a store to be searched entirely for as many 
queries as have been presented. The range of cost associated with such 
a system with current technology and twelve-hour response time thuS 



118 

goes from $10 million per month for a system capable of storing 50 
pages on each of 200 million individuals (without encoding) to about 
$200,000 per month for a system storing the same amount of infor- 
mation on each of 10 million individuals, with the characters com- 
pacted into more efficient form for storage. 

So much for the near term technology. It is being developed in this 
country and abroad entirely for commercial purposes. It serves highly 
important functions in allowing any organization — commerce, in- 
dustry, government, and the professions — to manage information 
quickly and accurately. 

Yet fresh in our memory is the use by the White House of the CIA 
to provide a "psychological profile'' on Daniel Ellsberg. An ordinary 
file drawer would be adequate if one knew long in advance that infor- 
mation would be requested on this particular person. Given the unusual 
nature of the case and the non-existence of that particular file drawer, 
it would be technically possible to search all govermnent files for docu- 
ments which mentioned the name in question. This would bring to 
light, of course, income tax returns, military service history, all em- 
ployees for whom social security tax had been paid in the past by the 
individual in question, names of relatives, etc. This material would 
not be found in IntelUgeni-e files, but it could be found if the queries 
were made available to cooperating individuals with access to files in 
non-mtelligence agencies like the IKS, Selective Service, and the like. 
Additional important information might be available by use of the 
NYTIB as a commercial subscriber. 

Thus the problem in regard to those intelligence agencies with large 
files of raw data is to ensure that tliese files are used only in support 
of the authorized mission of the agency and are not exploited for pur- 
poses of improving prospects of incumbent officials in an election, of 
punishing those on an "enemies list," and the like. But it is no longer 
enough to proscribe the creation of specific files on U.S. citizens; it is 
now possible to recreate such a file from the central file in less than a 
day, or to answer questions from the central file without ever having 
a manila folder or file drawer labelled "John Smith." There must 
therefore be control over the queries asked of the file, of whom, and 
by whom. It is just as important to ensure that information given 
freely by individuals to non-intelligence agencies is not exploited 
for unauthorized purposes and is not accessible to unauthorized 
individuals. 

The computer technology which makes possible rapid access to large 
masses of information also allows in principle for control of access 
to that information. Measures for preventing illegitimate use of gov- 
ermnent files could be proposed by the Executive, which can obtain 
help from equipment manufacturers, organizations experienced in 
computer use and analysis, and from the scientific societies. Such 
measures could be embodied in Executive Orders. Their adequacy and 
the need for legislation providing criminal and civil penalties should 
be the subject of Congressional hearings and research. 

Safeguards which are being considered and partially implemented 
in non-intelligence files are the following : 

1. There should be a limitation as to w'ho can keej) files on 
individuals. (But clearly the New^ York Times is allowed to 
put their own newspaper into computer- readable form. And 



119 

is it a file on an individual if the individual's name is only 
mentioned in a larger document?) ; 

2. Individuals should be allowed access to their files (for 
repayment of the actual cost of search) and to receive the 
information in the file on them. (But if the file is very large, 
such access might be made vei-y expensive. On the other hand, 
if the access were treated like an ordinary query in the ex- 
ample above, the cost might be quite reasonable.) ; 

3. The individual should be allow^ed to write into the file in 
order to contest the facts or in order to present his own point 
of view; 

4. There should be limitations on those who gain access to 
the file or who can receive information from the file; 

5. Duplication of the file should be limited and unathorized 
access prevented ; 

6. There should be. an indelible record of loho has queried 
the file and what questions were asked, so that failure of 
access limitations will not go undetected. 

Among the safeguards for any system should be adequate require- 
ments for identification of terminals from which queries are being 
made, identification and authorization of the inviduals who query; 
a complete record of the queries (with terminal and individual identifi- 
cation), adequate security against transmitting large amounts of in- 
formation and the like. The moment-by-moment execution of these 
controls on access is the task of the set of computer instructions known 
as the "operating system." " Although the design of an adequate op- 
erating system is a difficult task, the detailed specification of the con- 
trols is itself non-trivial and must be done with some understanding of 
what is technically feasible at present. Fundamental to the continued 
effectiveness of such safeguards is the maintenance of the integrity of 
the main program which controls the computer. Even in highly classi- 
fied applications, there is no reason for this main operating program 
to be classified, and a source of strength should be public scrutiny of 
this operating system. Clearly, the introduction of access controls 
should not wait for the perfect operating system. 

No matter what the safeguards, individuals might be able to gain 
access to some information for which they are not authorized. Ade- 
quate legislation, criminal penalties, and the enforcement of these 
laws should deter many who might otherwise try. Data security meas- 
ures, such as encryption of the file itself, can help also. 

What must be particularly guarded against is not so much the mis- 
use of intelligence files but the misuse of information freely given or 
collected for authorized purposes and which is then turned to an im- 
proper use. Indeed, open analysis by all those concerned should lead 
to an understanding of the protection which may be provided. 



• An introduction to tlie problem can be found in "The Protection of Informa- 
tion in Computer Systems," J. H. Saltzer and M. D. Schroeder, Proc. IEEE, Vol. 
63, No. 9 (September 1975), pp. r278-ff. 



ADDENDA TO THE INTERIM REPORT OX ALLEGED 
ASSASSINATION PLOTS 

The following sections are intended to supplement the Committee's 
Interim Report on alleged assassination plots.^ One of these sections 
smnmarizes evidence involving the plot agaiiist Chilean General Rene 
Schneider which has come to the Committee's attention since the issu- 
ance of the Interim Report. Two other principal sections — "Tlie 'Spe- 
cial Operations' Unit" and "The Question of Discrediting Action 
Against Jack Anderson" — report on the Committee staff inquiry into 
allegations of CIA involvement in assassination planning; neither in- 
quiry revealed evidence of such planning. Finally, some miscellaneous 
corrections of errata in the pre\ious report and some additional pieces 
of evidence are included. 

I. SCHNEIDER CASE 

Since the issuance of the Committee's Interim Report on alleged 
assassination plots involving foreign leaders, the Conmiittee has re- 
ceived statements from two sources to supplement its earlier inquiry 
into the death of Chilean General Rene Schneider: - (1) former Presi- 
dent Richard M. Nixon's responses to written interrogatories from the 
Committee; and (2) the recent statements and testimony of Edward 
Korry, former Linited States Ambassador to Chile. 



^ The Interim Report was published on November 20 (legislative day, November 
18), 1975 (91th Cong., 1st Sess. ; Report No. 94-465). 

^ With respect to the death of General Schneider, the Committee found : "On 
October 25, 1970, General Schneider died of gunshot wounds inflicted three days 
earlier while resisting a kidnap attempt. Schneider, as Commander-in-Chief of 
the Army and a constitutionalist opposed to military coups, was considered an 
obstacle in efforts to prevent Salvador AUende from assuming the oflSce of Presi- 
dent of Chile. The United States Government supported and sought to instigate 
a military coup to block AUende. U.S. officials supplied financial aid, machine guns 
and other equipment to various military figures who opposed AUende. Although 
the CIA continued to support coup plotters up to Schneider's shooting, the record 
indicates that the CIA had withdrawn active support of the group which carried 
out the actual kidnap attempt on October 22, which resulted in Schneider's death. 
Further, it does not appear that any of the equipment supplied by the CIA to 
coup plotters in Chile was used in the kidnapping. [The Committee found] no 
evidence of a plan to kill Schneider or that United States officials specifically 
anticipated that Schneider would be shot during the abduction." (Alleged Assas- 
sination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders : An Interim Report of the Senate Select 
Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Ac- 
tivities, United States Senate, 11/20/75, p. 5 ; hereinafter cited as Interim 
Assassination Report. ) 

(121) 



122 

A. Interrogator-y Responses of Richard M. Nixon 

Of the 77 written interrogatories submitted to former President 
Richard Nixon by the Select Committee on February 4, 1976, 36 
dealt with Chile. Of these, all but eight specifically related to the events 
discussed in the Schneider chapter of the Committee's Interim Assas- 
sination Eeport. 

In summary, Mr. Nixon's responses to the Committee's interroga- 
tories included the following statements relevant to the subject covered 
in the Interim Report.^ 

— According to the former President, the purpose of the September 
1970 White House meeting, attended by Mr. Nixon, CIA Director 
Richard Helms, Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs Henry Kissinger, and Attorney General John Mitchell was to 
discuss "the prospect of Salvador Allende's election to the Presidency 
of Chile." * Mr. Nixon stated that he informed Director Helms that 
he wanted "the CIA to determine whether it was possible for a polit- 
ical opponent of Mr. Allende to be elected President by the Chilean 
Congress." ^ "Specific means" to be used by the CIA to prevent Allende 
from taking office were not discussed; "general means" were. These 
included "the direct expenditure of funds to assist Mr. Allende's op- 
ponents, the termination of United States financial aid and assistance 
programs as a means of adversely affecting the Chilean economy, and 
the effort to enlist support of various factions, including the military, 
behind a candidate who could defeat Mr. Allende in the congressional 
confirmation procedure." ^ 

— Mr. Nixon stated that he was not aware that from September 15, 
1970, to mid-October 1970 "the CIA was attempting to promote a 
military coup in Chile." ^ With the exception of a mid-October dis- 
cussion with Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Nixon stated : "I do not presently 
recall being personally consulted with regard to CIA activities in 
Chile at any time during the period September 15, 1970 through 
October 24, 1970." « 

In mid-October 1970, Mr. Nixon was informed by Dr. Kissinger 
that "the CIA had reported to him that their efforts to enlist the sup- 
port of various factions in attempts by >Mr. Allende's opponents to 
prevent Allende from becoming president had not been successful and 
likely would not be." According to Mr. Nixon, Dr. Kissinger informed 
him that "under the circumstances he had instructed the CIA to 
abandon the effort." ^ Mr. Nixon stated that he informed Dr. Kissinger 
that he agreed with that instruction. 

— Mr. Nixon stated that he did not receive information "concerning 
plans for a military coup in Chile involving the kidnapping of Gen- 
eral Rene Schneider." '^^ He also stated that he was unaware that "the 
CIA passed machine guns or other material to Chilean military officers 
known to the CIA to be planning a coup attempt." ^^ 

Mr. Nixon's statements regarding the events surrounding the death 

* The full text of the Committee's interrogatories and former President Nixon's 
responses (hereinafter cited as Interrogatories) is set forth at pp. 143-171. 

* Interrogatory 39. 
^Ihid. 

' Interrogatory 45. 
■^ Interrogatory 51. 
*" Interrogatory 49. 
' Interrogatory 52. 
^" Interrogatory 54. 
" Interrogatory 55, 



123 

of General Schneider contrast with evidence received previously by 
the Committee. All CIA officials stated that they interpreted President 
Nixon's September 15 instruction as a directive to promote a military 
coup in Chile in the Fall of 1970 ; both CIA documents and the testi- 
mony of President Nixon's Assistant for National Security Affairs, 
Dr. Kissinger, are consistent with this interpretation.^^ Mr. Nixon has 
stated that he instructed Eichard Helms to determine whether it was 
possible for a political opponent of Mr. Allende to be chosen as Presi- 
dent by the Chilean Congress. He further stated that he "informed Mr. 
Helms that to be successful, any effort to defeat Mr. Allende would 
have to be supported by the military factions in Chile." ^^ Mr. Nixon 
stated that he did not recall, however, instructing the CIA to promote 
a coup in Chile." 

Of equal importance is the controversy surrounding whether the 
White House knew of the CIA's continuing efforts to promote a coup 
in Chile after mid-October, 1970. According to an October 15 CIA 
memorandum Dr. Kissinger instructed DDP Thomas Karamessines at 
a White House meeting to suspend coup planning by "de-fus[ing] 
the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily" and Kissinger also "in- 
structed Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in Chile, work- 
ing clandestinely and securely to maintain the capability for Agency 
operations against Allende in the future." ^^ Kissinger testified — and 
his former deputy, Alexander Haig agreed— that after October 15, the 
White House neither knew of nor specifically approved CIA coup 
plans in Chile. CIA officials, however, testified that their encourage- 
ment of coup planning by the Chilean military after October 15 was 
known to and thus authorized by the White House.^^ Mr. Nixon's rec- 
ollection is that in mid-October he had agreed with Dr. Kissinger's 
instruction to the CIA to abandon its effort in Chile to prevent Allende 
from becoming President. Mr. Nixon did not recall "being personally 
consulted with regard to CIA activities in Chile" between October 15 
and the October 24 vote in favor of Allende. 

The clear import of Mr. Nixon's statements, is that the CIA was 
pursuing coup plans in Chile without sufficient authority. His state- 
ment with respect to the September 15, 1970, White House meeting is, 
however, at variance with those of CIA officials and his Assistant for 
National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger. With respect to the mid- 
October instruction if Mr. Nixon's statements accurately describe the 
events, and if Dr. Kissinger unambiguously informed the CIA on 
October 15 to suspend all coup plans in Chile and gave no indication 

^^ See Interim Assassination Report, pp. 228, 233 ; e.g., Ricliard Helms, 7/15/75, 
pp. 6-7, 10-11 ; Chief. Chiile Task Force, 7/31/75. p. 53 ; Deputy Chief, WH Divi- 
sion, 7/15/75, p. 20; Memorandum/Genesis of the Project, 9/16/70; CIA Cable 
236, Headquarters to Station, 9/21/70; Cable 240, Headquarters to Station, 
9/21/70 ; Kissinger. 8/12/75, p. 12. 

^' Interrogatory 39. 

" Interrogatories 39, 45. 

For a full account of the evidence in the Committee's record relating to the 
question of authorization for the CIA to promote a coup in Chile, see the Interim 
Assassination Report, pp. 225-254. Richard Helms' notes of his September 15, 
1970 monthly meeting with President Nixon and his testimony about the meeting 
is included at pp. 227-228. See also the Committee Staff Report "Covert Action in 
Chile. 1963-1973" (12/18/75). 

'^ CIA Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger/Mr. Karamessines/General 
Haig, at the White House, 10/15/70. 

"See Interim Assassination Report, pp. 227, n. 1; 246-247; 250-253; e.g., 
Karamessines, 8/6/75, pp. 8, 72-73, 89. 



D-725 O - 76 - 9 



124 

of support for renewed coup plannino- before October 24, then the 
CIA would have been acting in contravention of White House policy. 
On the other hand, if, as CIA officials testified, the coup activity was 
authorized from the beginning and the White House was kept in- 
formed until the end, then the accounts of INIr. Nixon and Dr. 
Kissinger are called into question. 

B. Statenwnts and Testiinony of Edward M. Korry 

Former U.S. Ambassador to Chile Edward Korry has testified and 
submitted statements to the Committee since the issuance of its Interim 
Report on assassination plots.^' He made the following comments with 
respect to the Schneider case : 



" Mr. Korry appeared before the Committee in public session on December 4, 
1975. to testify on Cliile. In addition to his testimony, Mr. Korry submitted a 28- 
page letter, with accompanying documents, detailing his views on events in 
Chile. His testimony and letter (with accompanying documents) are contained 
in the Senate hearings before the Select Committee to Study Governmental 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Vol. 7, "Covert Action," De- 
cember 4 and 5, 1975. Finally, Mr. Korry was deposed by the Committee 
on February 24, 1976, in a six-hour ses.sion. During his testimony and deposition, 
and in various letters to the Committee, Mr. Korry objected to several items in 
the Schneider chapter of the Committee's Interim Assassination Report. 

The following points, among others, were made by Mr. Korry : ( 1 ) Korry 
statetl that his two-phase proposal (see Interim Assassination Report, p. 229) 
of June 18, 1970, had been requested the previous January "by the State Depart- 
ment" and CIA representatives in response to his suggestion that the Chilean 
presidential election be viewed in two phases ("one up to September 4th and 
then between September 4th and October 24, 1970"). He was aslced to "submit 
with dollar figures a precise scenario for a phase one and a phase two" (Korry 
deposition, 2/24/76, pp. 20-26). (2) Referring to the 40 Committee's directive 
of September 14 (see Interim Assassination Report, p. 230) "to go directly to 
President Frei" about a plan to prevent AUende's confirmation, Korry testified 
that he "refused to go" see President Frei (Korry deposition. 2/24/76, p. 36). 
Despite Korry's statements that he "would not approach Frei . . . even in- 
directly" (Korry deposition, 2/24/76, pp. 43-i6), on September 16, 1970, in re- 
sponse to the 40 Committees instructions. Ambassador Korry cabled Undersecre- 
tary of State U. Alexis Johnson : "I am extremely grateful for the confidence 
and support of President Nixon and the Forty Committee. ... To provide that 
moral base (so that President Frei will feel there is suflScient justification to 
move against Allende) is largely our task. ... It is highly unlikely that I 
shall be able to see Frei. I cannot go to the presidential palace without creating 
a storm ; I cannot go to his home anymore since it is subject to the same observa- 
tion that my residence is. There are no U.S. visitors ... in sight to provide 
an innocuous cover for another talk. Hence I delivered my message to Frei one 
hour after receipt of your message through [an intermediary] that there was 
no point in further analysis of the situation ... we were prepared to give appro- 
priate support if Frei could decide his own course, but if he preferred to live 
interminably the Hamlet ... I would take [his] indecision to mean that he had 
opted for a Communist Chile." (3) Although he did refer to General Schneider 
in a September 21, 1970, situation report to Dr. Kissinger and Assistant Secre- 
tary Charles Meyer. (See Interim Assassination Report p. 231.) Korry told the 
Committee that this was "an assessment provided by the Chileans." it was not 
a reference to kidnapping or assassination, and he was not iiersonally advocating 
any action with respect to Schneider. (Korry deposition. 2/24/76. pp. 57-63.) 
Korry also stated that, months earlier, he had reported the view that Schneider's 
constitutionalist "doctrine" would prevent the Chilean military from intervening 
in the electoral process : 

"I met with General Schneider myself in the middle of the spring of 1970 
to understand exactly what he stood for. I reported promptly thereafter what 
the Schneider doctrine was and said it was immutal)le and said that it would 
prevail in the military. 

"The military attache, subsequently to my recollection . . . repeated again and 
again that the" Schneider doctrine was a fact and as long as Schneider was in 
that job, nobody would ever move." (Korry deposition, 2/24/75, p. 60.) 



125 

— Korry took issue with the view, expressed in the Committee's Re- 
port and by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, that the line separat- 
ing Track I and Track II often became blurred.^^ According to Korry : 

]Much is made in the assassination report of the "two tracks" 
that the U.S. policy followed in Chile in September and 
October of 1970. The report stitches a new myth to suit some 
consciences or some ambitions or some institutions. There are 
many who it might wish the public and history to believe 
that no real dift'erence existed between the diplomatic Track 
I that I followed, and the covert military Track II that the 
White White launched. It is hogwash. Track I followed Mr. 
Frei, then the President of Chile and its constitutional leader. 
It adopted certain minimal and cosmetic suggestions put for- 
ward by one purportedly in President Frei's confidence. 
Track I led nowhere because President Frei would not en- 
courage or lead any Chilean military action, and because I 
would neither have the United States through the CIA, or 
anyone else even in the private community, assume a responsi- 
bility that had to be Chilean. I never informed President Frei 
of the money which was authoi-ized for work for Track I, and 
not a penny, as you also say, was spent on it. 

Track II, on the other hand, did not deal with Frei, did 
not seek his concurrence, did not follow his lead, did not pre- 
tend to be within any constitutional framework of Chile.^'' 

In his deposition of February 24, 1976, Korry qualified his asser- 
tion of the differences between Track I and Track II. which was to be 
carried out without his awareness. When asked if Tracks I and II 
blurred together in that they both sought the same objective, he 
replied : 

You could say blurring of objective. And at the point of 
inspiration. But at the point of execution, there was no blur- 
ring whatsoever.^" 

— There were numerous references in the Interim Assassination Re- 
port to United States contact with retired Chilean General Roberto 
Viaux, a Chilean coup-plotter, and the coup-oriented activities of a 
United States military attache assigned to Santiago.-^ In his letter to 
Senator Church, Kori-y stated that these activities were contrary to 
the instructions he had issued while in Chile : 

A. I barred, from 1969 on, any U.S. Embassy or U.S. mili- 
tary contact with the circle around General Viaux. I renewed 
this ban in the strongest teiTns again and again in 1970 and 
thereafter. I checked periodically by direct questioning of the 
CIA and of the military attaches, and by corroborative in- 
vestigation, to satisfy myself that this order was being carried 
out. 

B. I barred the CIA, in late 1968 or early 1969, from any 
operational contact with the Chilean military without my 
prior knowledge and approval, (I can recall "no permissive 
instance), from any physical contact with a colonel or higher 

" See Interim Assassination Report, pp. 229-232. 

" Hearings, Vol. 7. "Covert Action," December 4 and 5, 197.5, pp. 30-31. 

'" Korry deposition, 2/24/76, p. 100. 

^ Interim Assassination Report, pp. 235-246. 



126 

lank, from any contact with Frei or any Minister or deputy 
Minister, from any contact with any major political figures 
without my prior approval (rarely given) or any contact 
with the head of, or a leading figure in a government agency 
aside from the approved liaison with the Chilean police. I 
checked in every conceivable way. regularly .^^ 

— ^The Committee noted in its Interim Assassination Report that 
Ambassador Korry had informed the 40 Committee that the Chilean 
military would not move against Allende after he received the plural- 
ity in the presidential election of September 4, 1970.-^ In his testi- 
mony before the Select Committee, Korry added : 

I consistently warned the Nixon administration, starting 
in early 1970, months before the election, that the Chilean 
military was no policy alternative in Chile. I was pressed in 
September and October by Washington to develop possible 
scenarios for independent Chilean military intervention in 
Chile. Without exception, my responses excluded all possi- 
bilities. Indeed, I warned gratuitously and very strongly on 
two occasions that if anyone were considering such schemes, 
it would be disastrous for U.S. interests.^* 
Korry then cited two cables he sent after the September 4 election: 

Let me read from two cables sent to Undersecretary of 
State U. Alexis Johnson and Dr. Henry Kissinger, so that the 
public can judge for itself. 

One, on September 25 : "Aside from the merits of a coup 
and its implications for the United States, I am convinced we 
cannot provoke one and that we should not run any risks sim- 
ply to have another Bay of Pigs. Hence I have instructed our 
military and CAS", that is, the CIA, "not to engage in the 
encouragement of any kind." 

Again, on October 9, to the same two addresses, "Eyes 
Only," "In sum, I think any attempt on our part actively to 
encourage a coup could lead us to a Bay of Pigs failure, t am 
appalled to discover that there is liaison for terrorists and 
coup plotting, names deleted. "I have never been consulted or 
informed of what, if any, role the United States may have in 
the financing of" names deleted. "An abortive coup, and I and 
my chief State coleagues, FSO's are unalterably convinced 
that this is what is here under discussion, not more be- 
knownst to me, would be an unbelieved disaster for the 
United States and for the President. Its consequences would 
be to strongly reinforce Allende now and in the future, and 
do the gravest harm to U.S. interests throughout Latin 
America, if not beyond." ^^^ 

— Ambassador Korry also told the Committee that in late Septem- 
ber or early October 1970, he became suspicious that "the CIA was 

^ Hearings, Vol. 7, "Covert Action," December 4 and 5. 1975, pp. 122-123. 
^ Interim Assassination Report, pp. 230, 250. 

^* Hearings, Vol. 7, "Covert Action," December 4 and 5, 1975, pp. 31-32. 
"*" Ibid., p. 32, 



127 

'up to something behind my back.' •' -^ According to Mr. Korry, he 
asked his Deputy Chief of Mission to investigate. Neither he nor his 
•deputy were able to uncover any factual basis for Korry 's suspicions. ^^ 

— Mr. Korry testified that in the period September 15 to Octo- 
ber 15, 1970, he informed the Frei government of the identity of a 
likely assassin of Allende, "a military man who was then involved in 
provocative acts, bombings throughout Santiago." -^ This man, Major 
Arturo Marshal, was arrested shortly thereafter, a few days before 
the shooting of General Schneider. 

— Mr. Korry also informed the Committee that in the final two 
weeks of the so-called Track II period he met with President Nixon 
in the White House. According to Korry : 

I told President Nixon in the Oval Office in mid-October 
1970 that the United States had to avoid a self-fulfilling 
prophecy however correct my reporting and analysis might 
be, by seeking generally an understanding with Allende, 
starting even before his inauguration. I said this effort need 
not prevent subsidies by the CIA to non-conformist media 
and to non-conformist, non-extremist political parties which 
we knew, we knew from superb CIA penetrations and from 
excellent State Department reporting were soon going to be 
squeezed to the wall.-^ 

— Finally, Mr. Korry objected to the fact that the Interim Report 
attributed sole authoi-ship ^^ of the so-called "nuts and bolts" ^" cable 
to him. He has asserted that, his cable had a CIA designation, and that 
the Santiago CIA Station at least concurred in the wording of the 
cable. 

Mr. Korry also stated that the idea for such a severe cable orig- 
inated not with him but with President Frei : "President Frei asked 
the Ambassador [KorryJ through the minister of national defense 
for a statement that could be used" in Frei's negotiations with the 
Chilean military.^^ Korry said that the harsh language of the cable 
was a deliberate overstatement of the repercussions an Allende admin- 
istration could expect from the United States : 

I had to retain the confidence of an administration in 
Washington that I believed would inevitably get involved in 
military relationships with the Chileans. . . . 

^ Ibid. The Committee noted in its Interim Assassination Report (p. 227) 
that on September 15, 1970, President Nixon had informed CIA Director Helms 
that there should be no U.S. embassy involvement in what became knovpn as 
Track II. 

'' Ibid. 

" lUd., p. 31. 

^^ Ibid., pp. 32-33. 

" Interim Assassination Report, p. 231. 

^ That cable read : cc Frei should know that not a nut or bolt will be allowed to 
reach Chile under Allende. Once Allende comes to power we shall do all within our 
power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty, a 
policy designed for a long time to come to accelerate the hard features of a Com- 
munist society in Chile. Hence, for Frei to believe that there will be much of an 
alternative to utter misery, such as seeing Chile muddle through, would be strictly 
illusory. ( Situation Report, Korry to Meyer and Kissinger, 9/21/70. ) 

^ Korry deposition, 2/24/76, p. 68. 



128 

I know I deliberately, and the embassy knew it, overstated 
the message ... in order to prevent and halt this damn pres- 
sure on me to go to the military.^- 

II. THE "special operations" UNIT 

On December 26, 1975, the New York Times reported that former 
CIA officer E. Howard Hunt, Jr., told an interviewer that : 

[H]e was told in the mid-1950s that the CIA had a small 
unit set up to arrange for tlie assassination of suspected double 
agents and similar low-ranking officials . . . Hunt said he re- 
called liaving been told by CIA superiors in 1954 or 1955 
that Boris T. Pash, an Agency official, was in charge of the 
assassination unit.^^ 

Hunt was also reported to have said that he once met with Colonel 
Pash and broached the subject of planning an assassination of a sus- 
pected double agent. 

The Committee staff investigation concluded that a special unit 
headed by Colonel Pash in the early days of the CIA was assigned, 
among other things, responsibility for assassinations and kidnap- 
pings — including any which might be directed against double agents — 
in the event that such operations were authorized. We have found no 
evidence, however, that this unit performed any covert action involv- 
ing assassination or kidnapping operations.^^ Although the "Special 
Operations" unit had general jurisdiction for assassination or kid- 
napping, it appears that no such operations \\ere ever seriously con- 
sidered by this unit. 

A. Program Branch 7 : A Special Operations Unit with Assassination 
Jurisdiction 
Boris T. Pash, an Army colonel specializing in intelligence and 
counterintelligence, was assigned to the CIA from March 3, 1949, to 
Januaiy 3, 1952, and worked in connection with the CIA on several 
projects after that date.^^ In the formative years of the CIA, Pash 
served as Chief of Program Branch 7 (PB/7), a "special operations" 
unit within the Office of Policy Coordination, the original clandestine 
services oi'ganization which was eventually transformed into the Direc- 
torate of Plans. The responsibility for standard forms of covert action 
was assigned to the six other program branches within OPC's Staff 3 : 
political warfare, psychological warfare, economic warfare, escape and 
evasion, sabotage, and countersabotage.^^ According to Colonel Pash, 
PB/7 was responsible for "such activities which the other six branches 
didn't specifically have." ^^ Pash testified that PB/7 was "not opcra- 

"== lUd., pp. 74-76. 

^ New York Times, December 26, 1975, p. 9. 

^* Due to the fact that CIA has no record of documents which deal with this 
aspect of Pash's unit (CIA letter to Select Committee, January 16. 1976), the 
Committee has relied upon the testimony of the principal witnesses. It should 
be remembered that this testimony relates to events that transpired twenty-five 
years ago. 

^ CIA letter to Select Committee, January 16, 1976. 

■^^ Director of Operations Planning (Staff 3), January 1, 1976, pp. 4-5. 

*^ Colonel Boris T. Pash testimony, p. 13. 



129 

tional," but rather involved in the planning of "special operations" 
such as promoting- defections from Communist countries, facilitating 
the escape of prominent political refugees, disseminating anti-Com- 
munist propaganda behind the Iron Curtain, and contingency plan- 
ning for the death of foreign leaders, such as Stalin.^^ 

Howard Hunt's testimony pointed to an additional function of Pro- 
gram Branch 7. Hunt stated that, based on "hearsay" from his su- 
periors in the CIA's Southeast Europe division in the early 1950s, he 
had the "distinct impression" that Colonel Boris Pash had run a unit 
which would arrange an assassination mission if it were required.^^ 

The Director of Operations Planning for OPC, who supervised 
program branches, confirmed the fact that Colonel Pash's Program 
Branch 7 unit was responsible for assassinations and kidnapping as 
well as other "special operations." ^° The supervisor testified that he 
consulted with Frank Wisner, the Director of OPC, who agreed that 
Pash should have jurisdiction over assassinations.*^ Kidnapping was 
also part of PB/7's "catch-all function," according to the supervisor — 
"kidnapping of personages behind the Iron Curtain ... if they were 
not in sympathy with the regime, and could be spirited out of the coun- 
try by our people for their own safety ; or kidnapping of people whose 
interests were inimical to ours." ""^ 

Boris Pash testified that he did not believe that he had been charged 
with responsibility for assassinations, but allowed for the possibility 
that he was viewed as if he had such responsibility : 

It is conceivable to me that, if someone in OPC had thought 
that an assassination program and policy should be developed, 
the requirement might have been levied on PB/7 because of 
the "catch-all" nature of its responsibility ... I was never 
asked to undertake such planning. It was not my impression 
that such planning was my responsibility. However, because 
of the "catch-all" nature of my unit, it is understandable to 
me that others on the PP [Political and Psychological War- 
fare] Staff could have had the impression that my unit would 
undertake such planning.*^ 

The Deputy Chief of PB/7, who served under Pash, testified, how- 
ever, that he had a clear recollection that the written charter of the 
"special operations" unit included the following language : 

PB/7 will be responsible for assassinations, kidnapping, and 
such other functions as from time to time may be given 
it ... by higher authority." ** 

He said that the charter also assigned to PB/7 responsibility for 
any functions not specifically assigned to the other program branches.*^ 

^'' Boris Pash testimony, pp. 16-18, 20. 

^ E. Howard Hunt testimony, 1/10/76, pp. 33, 36, 51. 

^ Director of Operations Planning, 1/12/76, pp. 16, 18, 24-26. 

" IMd., p. 14. 

*^ Ibid., p. 18. 

" Boris Pash affidavit, 1/19/76. 

"Deputy Chief, PB/7, testimony, 1/5/76, p. 19-79. The CIA was unable to 
locate a charter for Program Branch 7. (CIA letter to Select Committee. 
1/7/76.) 

*• Deputy Chief, PB/7, 1/5/76, p. 19. 



130 

The Deputy Chief did not recall any discussion at the CIA of the as- 
sassination or kidnapping aspects of this charter because, compared 
to the charters of the other program branches, he believed that PB/7's 
charter was "more secret than any of the others.'' **^ He construed the 
charter's reference to "higher authority'' to include "State Depart- 
ment, Defense Department, Xational Security Council, the President 
of the United States.'' "' 

Boris Pash did not recall "particular wording" in a charter that in- 
cluded a reference to assassinations, but he did not dispute the ac- 
curacy of the Deputy Chief's testimony: "It could have been there 
without my recalling it, but I didn't give it any serious consideration 
because I knew that ... it would be beyond us." ** 

The Director of Operations Planning did not recall the charter of 
PB/7, but he testified that whether or not there was a written directive 
"it was clear"' to everyone iii OPC that assassination and kidnapping 
"was within the purview" of Pash's responsibilities.*'-* The Director 
testified that "the heads of the program branches" were all involved in 
general discussions of assassination as a tactic, although the subject 
did not have a high priority.^" The Director of Operations Planning 
said that Colonel Pash was entrusted with this jurisdiction not be- 
cause he had performed any assassination in the past, but because he 
had a general background in clandestine operations in World War 
II." 

Xone of the witnesses testified that any actual assassination opera- 
tion or planning was ever undertaken by PB/7, which was disbanded 
along with the other pi-ogram branches when the DDP was formed in 
late 1952.^- Pash testified that he was "never in charge of or involved 

*' Ibid. 

" Ibid. 

** Pash, 1/7/76, p. 22. Pash siieculated that the reason he may have dismissed 
charter language relating to assassination was that lie saw it as a part of the 
wartime mentality carried into the CIA's clandestine services by former oflScers 
who served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II: 

"I probably just sort of glanced over it, thinking well, this is a typical OSS 
approach to things ... to them using words like that is maybe a common 
thing. ... I think they felt big in talking that way. 

". . . There were some very good men in OSS, some dedicated men. . . . But 
also there were a lot of entrepreneurs and adventurers. ... So when the CIA 
was formed, a lot of these people with these wild ideas and wild approaches 
were there. So, of course, when you say you're in charge of 'all other activities' 
. . . these fellows might have ideas [such as] . . . 'it's easier to kill a guy than 
to worry about trailing him'." (Pash. pp. 15-16, 22.) • , 

" Director of Operations Planning, 1/12/76, pp. 18-19, 26. 

^^ Ibid. p. 12. The Director explained the reason for discu.ssion of assassina- 
tion in the early phase of organzing OPC after World War II : 

"One of the things that was taken into account and was discussed on a sort 
of last ditch basis was assassination . . . [I]t was a matter of keeping up with 
the Joneses. Every other power practiced, and as far as I know still practices, 
assassination if need be. So, reluctantly we took that into account." (Director 
of Operations Planning, 1/12/76, p. 8. ) 

''^Director of Operations Planning, 1/12/76, p. 23. It should be noted that, 
among his noteworthy activities in military intelligence, Colonel Pash was deco- 
rated for his leadership of the Alsos Mission to protect nuclear secfeits at, the 
end of World War II. , 

^^ Each area division in the DDP subsequently performed the functions which 
the program branches had handled. 



131 

in any assassination planning, nor ever requested to do so." ^^ Pash's 
Deputy said that no action or planning was ever undertaken pursuant 
to that portion of the PB/7 charter which assigned responsibility for 
assassination and kidnapping.'^* The Director of Operations Plan- 
ning testified that he knew of no assassination mission or planning, 
including contingency planning, by Pash or anyone in OPC.^^ 
The only consideration of assassinations that the Director was aware 
of was the general discussion among Pash and other program branch 
chiefs in the process of establishing OPC.^*' Likewise, Howard Hunt 
was unaware of any assassination planning or attempts by Pash.^^ 

B. The Hunt-Pash Meeting and the Handling of Double Agent 
Prohlems 

Howard Hunt testified that he once met with Boris Pash and his 
Deputy to discuss "on hypothetical basis" a method of dealing with a 
situation in which the CIA suspected that a double-agent was under- 
mining the Agency's liaison with a group in West Germany. Although 
suspicion had not yet focused on a particular agent, Hunt described 
his inquiry to Pash as "a search mission to determine the alleged capa- 
bility of Colonel Pash in 'wet aft'airs' . . . that is, liquidations, would 
have any relevance to our particular problem." ^^ Hunt said that Pash 
"seemed a little startled at the subject. He indicated that it was some- 
thing that would have to be approved by higher authority and I with- 
drew and never approached Colonel Pash again." ^^ Nonetheless, it was 
Hunt's impression even after leaving the meeting with Pash that as- 
sassination was one function of Pash's unit.^° 

Hunt testified : "I never asked [Pash] to plan an assassination mis- 
sion, I simply asked if he had the capability." ^'^ Pash did not encourage 
the discussion, according to Hunt, and "made it very clear that if any- 
body was going to get approval for such a thing, it would have to 
be . . . my division ; ... he was not going to go forward." ^^ Hunt stated 
that he believed that Pash was referring to Frank Wisner as "higher 
authority," but Hunt did not think that Wisner ever considered the 
idea : "no direct approach or a request for such approval was ever 
made." '^^ 

Colonel Pash testified that he did not recall any incident like the 
one described by Hunt : "I deny that I have ever talked to him about it 
and that he ever asked me about it." ^* Pash did not recall "any dis- 



" Pash, 1/7/76, pp. 23-25, 33. Pash added that he was philosophically opposed 
to assassination except in extreme situations where "if you don't do it, the United 
States is destroyed." (Pash, p. 28.) 

" Deputy Chief, PB/7, 1/5/76, p. 64. 

^ Director of Operations Planning, 1/12/76, p. 25. 

=*7&!d., p. 26. 

" Hunt, 1/10/76, pp. 12-13. 

^Hunt, 1/10/76, pp. 8-11. Hunt said that "liquidations" included "removals" 
by assassination or liidnapping. 

"' Hunt, 1/10/76, p. 10. 

•^ lUd. p. 38. 

* lUd. p. 52. 

"' Ibid. p. 38. 

«" Ibid. p. 35. 

" Pash, 1/7/76, p. 41. 



132 

cussion of any donble-aoent-type activity anyplace." ^^ The Deputy 
Chief of PB/7 also said that he knew "absolutely nothing" about the 
incident recounted by Hunt.^^ 

Pash stated that PB/7 would not have dealt with double-agent 
problems because his unit was more oriented to planning rather than 
"operational" activity.*'^ Likewise, Pash's Deputy Chief testified that 
PB/7 never handled double agent problems.^^ 

The Director of Operations Planning testified, however, that Pash's 
unit would have had responsibility for the planning aspects of dealing 
with a double-agent problem. But the Director was not aware of any 
specific instances in which the "Special Operations" unit had to handle 
a double-agent problem. The Director said that assassination or com- 
plete isolation was generally regarded as the means of dealing with 
a suspected double-agent.^^ 

C. Assassination Suggestions Rejected hy CIA Headquarters 

The Deputy Chief of the "Special Operations" unit recounted two 
instances where assassination was seriously suggested and, in both 
instances, was quickly and firmly rejected at CIA headquarters. 

1. Asian Leader 

The Deputy Chief testified that in the summer of 1949, while he was 
serving as Acting Chief of PB/7 because Boris Pash was out of the 
country, the Chief of the CIA's political warfare program branch 
approached him to request the assassination of an Asian leader. After 
attending a planning meeting at the State Department, the Chief of 
the political branch — who was the CIA's liaison with the State De- 
partment — told Pash's deputy that the Asian leader "must be sent to 
meet his ancestors." The Deputy Chief of PB/7 testified that the 
political branch chief assured him that there was "higher authority" 
for this request.'" 

The Deputy Chief referred the request to OPC Director Frank 
Wisner's assistant. Soon thereafter Wisner's assistant told the Deputy 
Chief: "It has gone right to the top, and the answer is no . . , we 
don't engage in such activities." He instructed the Deputy Chief to 

"^ IhUL pp. 38, 48-49. Pash al.so .stated : "Mr. Hunt claims to have discu«sed 
the alleged assassination matter with me sometime in 1954 and 1955, at least two 
years after I left the Agency. ... I categorically deny having had any discus- 
sion on any suhiect whatsoever with Mr. Hunt during tho.«e years." (p. 33) Hunt 
testified tiiat his meeting with Pash could have occurred before 1950 or after 
1953 — Hunt was on assignment to a non-European nation in the interim — but 
that it was much more likely that the meeting took place in 1954 or 1955, during 
which period Hunt was dealing with operations in West Germany. (Hunt, 
1/10/76, p. 44— 4.J. ) It should be noted that Pash did undertake certain projects 
in liaison with the CIA after his formal assignment terminated in January 1952. 

■^ Deputy Chief, PB/7, 1/5/76, pp. 73-74. 

'' Pash, 1/7/76, pp. 37-38, 48-^9. 

•^ Deputy Chief, PB/7, 1/5/76, p. 67. 

"" Director of Operations Planning, pp. 27, 34. He testified : "In the inter- 
national clandestine operations business, it was part of the code that the 
one and the only remedy for the unfrocked double-agent was to kill him . . . 
and all double-agents knew that. That was part of the occupational hazard of 
the job. ... So in a shadowy sort of a way, we did have in mind that possibly 
as a last ditch effort [assassination] might come up. But it didn't come up within 
my time there because we were very slow in getting off the ground on any of 
these activities." (Director of Operations Planning, 1/12/76, p. 9). 

^ Deputy Chief, PB/7, 1/5/76, pp. 28, 30, 34. 



133 

inform anyone involved of this position and to destroy any document 
related to the incident. The Deputy Chief followed these instructions. 
The Deputy Chief speculated that Wisner's assistant had been re- 
ferring to the Director of Central Intelligence when he said that the 
matter had gone to the "top." '^ 
2. East Asian Leader 

The Deputy Chief testified that during his tenure at a CIA's sta- 
tion in Asia,* where he served after PB/7 was disbanded, he sent a 
cable to headquarters from the station outlining a proposed media 
propaganda progi-am. He later learned that the other station officers 
had attached an additional paragraph to his cable suggesting that an 
East Asian leader should be assassinated to disrupt an impending 
Communist conference in 1955.^- 

A reply cable was received immediately from CIA headquarters 
disapproving the recommendation to assassinate the East Asian leader. 
According to the Deputy Chief, the cable "strongly censured" the 
Station and indicated "in the strongest possible language this Agency 
has never and never will engage in any such activities." The cable 
added: "immediately proceed to burn all copies" of any documents 
relating to this request." The Deputy Chief testified that a senior 
representative from CIA headquarters arrived shortly at the station 
to reprimand the officers involved in the incident."^^ 

III. THE QUESTION OF DISCREDITING ACTION AGAINST JACK ANDERSON 

The Washington Post recently reported that, "according to reliable 
sources," former CIA officer E. Howard Hunt, Jr., "told associates 
after the Watergate break-in that he was ordered in December, 1971 or 
January, 1972, to assassinate syndicated columnist Jack Anderson." 
The Post further reported that Hunt had said that the order, which 
came from a "senior official in the Nixon "Wliite House," was "cancelled 
at the last minute but only after a plan had been devised to make 
Anderson's death appear accidential." ''* 

According to the newspaper article. Hunt's "alleged plan" 

. . . involved the use of a poison to be obtained from a 
former CIA physician, said the sources, who added that the 
poison was a variety that would leave no trace during a 
routine medical examination or autopsy. 

Hunt told the sources Anderson was to be assassinated be- 
cause he was publishing sensitive national security informa- 
tion in his daily newspaper column . . J^ 

The Committee staff has found no evidence of a plan to assassinate 
Jack Anderson. However, a White House effort was made in consul- 
tation with a former CIA physician to explore means of drugging 
Anderson to discredit him by rendering him incoherent before a public 

^ Deputy Chief, PB/7, 1/5/76, pp. 35-37. 
'- Ibid., pp. 47-48, 50. 
''Ibid., pp. r)0-51, 56-57. 

''* "Washington Post, "Hunt Told Associates of Orders to Kill Jack Anderson," 
by Bob Woodward, 9/21/75, p. Al, A20. 
'^Ibid., p. 1. 



134 

appearance. This effort apparently never proceeded beyond the plan- 
ning stage. 

The Committee staff inquiry into allegations of CIA involvement 
in this matter produced no evidence of such involvement. 

A. The Meeting Between Howard Hunt and Charles Colson 

Howard Hunt testified that somewhere in late 1971 or early 1972 
Special Counsel to the President Charles Colson called Hunt into his 
office and asked him to find a means of discrediting newspaper 
columnist Jack Anderson : 

Mr. Colson at that juncture was — appeared rather nervous. 
He . . . had a common wall with President Nixon's suite in 
the Old Executive Office Building, and although he did not 
glance in that direction, my impression was that he had been 
with the President not too long before . . . [W]hat he 
indicated to me was that Mr. Anderson had become a great 
thorn in the side of the President and that ... it was 
thought that one way to discredit Anderson was to have him 
appear incoherent or rambling on a radio broadcast. . . . 
Mr. Colson asked me if I could look into it.'^^ 

Hunt testified that neither Colson nor anyone else ever mentioned to 
him the possibility of assassinating Anderson, even in the sense of 
contingency planning.^^ 

Hunt stated that Colson never explicitly mentioned any discussion 
witli President Nixon about discrediting Jack Anderson.^® Hunt's 
impression that Colson had recently spoken with the President before 
giving him the Anderson assignment was an "inference" Hunt drew 
from Colson's demeanor : 

Colson was normally a highly controlled individual. . . . He 
was agitated when he called me in, sort of talking to me and 
rifling through papers on his desk, which was very much 
unlike him, and the inference I drew from that was that he 
had just had a conversation with the President. So when I 
accepted the assignment I assumed, as I usually do with 
Colson, that he was either reflecting the desires of the Chief 
Executive or else that he, as a prescient staff officer, was 
attempting to find a solution to a problem that was troubling 
his chief.^^ 

Like Hunt, Charles Colson testified that he "never heard anyone 
discuss any plan to kill Jack Anderson," nor did anyone ever request 
him to make such a plan.*" Colson could not, however, "discount the 
possibility of having said something in jest" along this line.^^ 

Colson testified that he was asked "many times" by President Nixon 
to take action to discredit Jack Anderson ; and action was "probably" 
taken in response to those requests.*^ Colson did not recall being asked 

'" Hunt, 1/11/76, pp. 4-5. 

" Ihid., pp. 11, 15. 

" Ihid., p. 11. 

^ Ihid., p. 10. 

^ Charles Colson testimony, 3/6/76, pp. 7, 20. 

^ lUd., p. 10. 

'^ lUd., p. 34. 



135 

by the President to find a means of drugging Jack Anderson or 
rendering him incoherent during a public appearance.^^ 

Colson said that the only discussions that he recalls initiating 
"involving Howard Hunt regarding Jack Anderson would be during 
the ITT flap" when he sent Hunt to interview ITT lobbyist Dita 
Beard.** Colson testified that his logs show that he met with Hunt on 
March 14, 1972, and he assumed that the ITT affair was the subject 
of that meeting.*"' Colson did not recall if the subject of drugging Jack 
Anderson was raised during those discussions.*® 

Despite Howard Hunt's testimony that the discussion of drugging 
Jack Anderson was at Colson's initiative,*^ Colson recalled "Hunt on 
a couple of occasions coming to me with some hare-brained schemes, 
something to do with drugging involving Jack Anderson." Allowing 
for the possibility that a serious discussion of the subject took place 
which he did not recall, Colson said that as a routine matter he "would 
dismiss" most such suggestions coming from Hunt.** Colson said that, 
in the context of casual storytelling, as opposed to planning an opera- 
tion against a specific target, he recalled hearing Hunt describe tech- 
niques for the covert administration of drugs : 

I do recall him telling me about the CIA inducing drug reac- 
tions and how they did it, and the fact that it could be en- 
tered into a person's body through bodily contact.*^ 

The only serious discussion with Hunt about the effect of drugs on 
a specific target that Colson recalled involved a plan to disorient 
Daniel Ellsberg, which Colson said "never received a very sympathetic 
reaction" from him.^° 

B. Hunt and Liddy Discuss Drugging Techniques with a Former 
CIA Physician 
Howard Hunt testified that within a few days of the meeting in 
which Colson assigned him to "look into" means of rendering jack 
Anderson incoherent during a public appearance, Hunt "got in touch 
with a retired CIA physician" and arranged to meet for lunch at the 
Hay-Adams Hotel in Washington, D.C.'*^ Hunt then contacted G. 
Gordon Liddy, "who at that point had just left the White House and 
moved over to the Committee to Re-elect the President," to invite 
Liddy to attend the luncheon meeting. 

** lUd., pp. 33-35. 

^ Ibid., p. 24. 

^ Ibid., pp. 23, 29. 

*• Ibid., p. 24. 

'' Hunt, 1/11/76, p. 10. 

^ Cnli^on, pp. 24-25. 

* Ibid., pp. 30-31. 

"" Ibid., pp. 17, 31, 35. 

** Hunt, p. 5. Thp physician testified that he received Hunt's telephone 
call shortly prior to March 24, the day on which the meeting took place. (Former 
CIA Physician testimony. Before the Senate Subcommittee on Health of the 
Committee of Labor and Public Welfare and the Senate Subcommittee on Admin- 
istrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee of the Judiciary, 11/7/75, pp. 
88, 40. ) This places the Hay-Adams Hotel meeting within ten days of the Colson- 
Huot meeting of March 14, 1972, which was recorded in Colson's logs. 



136 

Hunt said he contacted the former CIA physician because "he had 
some knowledge of the unorthodox administration of behavior-chang- 
ing or altering substances." Hunt said that he never contacted anyone 
who was a current CIA employee in relation to this matter.^^ 

Hunt stated that he invited Liddy to attend the meeting "because 
Liddy also was interested in Jack Anderson." He said that he ex- 
plained to Liddy while walking to the Hay-Adams Hotel that Colson 
"w\ants me to find out something about hallucinogenic drugs and 
their applications to a particular individual, in this instance Jack 
Anderson, and Colson wants him to appear incoherent and rambling 
during a broadcast." ^^ 

The former CIA physician testified that he met with Hunt and 
Liddy at the Hay-Adams Hotel on March 24, 1972. He said that he 
knew Hunt from their previous work at the CIA; during the meeting, 
"Hunt said that he had an office in a part of the White House." The 
physician described the purpose of the meeting as follows : 

I was asked if I could help them provide behavior altering 
medication to an individual, unidentified, and in no way 
could I detect of whom they were speakmg. I said I could 
not. I had retired in 1971. ... I had no access to any kind of 
medicines. So I did not provide it.^* 

The former CIA physician testified that Hunt wanted an "LSD-type 
drug" in order "to make someone behave peculiarly in a public situa- 
tion." «= 

Despite his inability to provide a behavior-altering substance, the 
former CIA practitioner of "occupational medicine" testified that he 
discussed with Hunt and Liddy the operational problems involved in 
administering such a drug through ingestion or absorption through the 
skin.^'^ According to Hunt, they discussed various means of administer- 
ing a drug: painting the steering wheel of a car "for absorption 
through the palms of the hand," switching bottles in a medicine cabi- 
net, or dropping a pill into a cocktail. Hunt added that during the 
meeting with the doctor there was no discussion of techniques of 
assassination.^^ 

Hunt said that he made it clear to the former CIA doctor that he 
Avas making this inquiry on behalf of the White House.^^ 

Hunt did not ask the former CIA physician to procure any drugs 
because he "felt confident . . . that if the time came when any con- 
trolled substance were needed, that Mr. Liddy could secure what was 

"- Hunt, pp. 5. 13, 17. 

^^ Ibid., pp. 12-13. G. Gordon Liddy submitted a sworn statement to the Com- 
mittee indicating tliat he would refuse to answer any questions on this sub- 
ject under his Fifth Amendment privilege and that he would continue to refuse 
to answer such questions even if he were granted use immunity. (G. Gordon 
Liddv affidavit, 2/8/76. ) 

" CIA physician, 11/7/75, pp. 38-39. 

°^ Ibid., pp. 38-42. 

"" Ibid., pp. 40-42. 

"' Hunt, 1/11/76, pp. 6, 14. 

^^Ibid., p. 19. 



137 

necessary through a secure source" within the Treasury Department, 
where Liddy previously worked.^® 

C. Report to Colson on the Impracticability of Drugging Anderson 

Hunt testified that, while walking back to their offices, he and Liddy 
"discussed the matter . . . pointing out the impracticability of utiliz- 
ing [the] administration methods indicated" by the former CIA physi- 
cian: 

We almost had to have him under clinical conditions to make 
sure that A, he got a measured amount of the substance, what- 
ever it might be, and that the timing was just right, and that 
he would be able to sit down or stand up at the lecture plat- 
form in apparently good condition, that at least he would 
be navigable to get there before he began to talk and make a 
fool out of himself. . . . None of these conditions pertained 
at all.^°° 

Hunt said he promptly reported to Charles Colson that he met with 
"a former CIA physician who knows something about these things" 
and "in terms of what Mr. Colson was thinking about it was impracti- 
cal and we should just forget about it." ^°^ 

Charles Colson testified that he did not recall receiving such a report 
from Hunt nor did he recall whether he ever learned that a meeting 
took place between Hunt and a former CIA physician.^"- 

"That was the end of the afl'air," Hunt said. The proposal to drug 
Jack Anderson "never advanced beyond simply the information- 
gathering phase. There was never any proposal or any further refer- 
ence macle to it." According to Hunt, Colson did not seem to be dis- 
appointed and did not ask him to explore other alternatives."^ Hunt 
concluded : 

I don't think Colson would have been willing to let that thing 
drop on the basis of simply my preliminary inquiry if he were 
under great pressure from the Chief Executive.^''* 

Thus, although the prospect of drugging columnist Jack Anderson 
was explored by White House personnel, it appears that the planning 
was terminated in an early stage. 



^ Ibid., p. 6. 

^°^ Ibid., p. 9. Hunt said they considered the possibility that Anderson's car was 
chauffeured and, if he drove his own car, that he would be wearing gloves in 
the wintertime or would have moist palms in the summer, eliminating the possi- 
bility of absorption of a drug on the steering wheel. Second, they decided that a 
surreptitious entry to place a fake medicine bottle was impractical; it was im- 
possible to know who would swallow the drug or to control when it would be 
taken. Finally, Hunt understood that Anderson did not drink and thus could not 
be drugged by means of a pill in a cocktail. (Ibid., pp. 7-S.) 

"•^ Hunt, 1/11/76, pp. 8, 14. 

^'" Colson, 3/6/76, pp. 27, 33. Colson did recall "Hunt at one time or another 
talking about having met with CIA doctors" in connection with consideration 
of covert ac;ion against Daniel EUsberg." {Ibid., p. 28.) Colson also said that his 
logs do not show a meeting with Hunt after their meeting on March 14, 1972. 
(Ibid., pp. 28-29. 1 

^•"Hunt, 1/11/76, pp. 8-9, 15. 

"**/6id., p. 15. 



138 

IV. MISCELLANEOUS EVIDENCE AND ERRATA 

A. Aurand Afjidavit 

After the publication of the Interim Report, the Committee re- 
ceived the following sworn statement from retired Vice Admiral E. P. 
Aurand : 

... it was my honor to serve President Eisenhower as his 
Naval Aide during his second term (1957-61). My position 
was not one which included the regular discussion of high 
matters of state with the President. Therefore, the few occa- 
sions on which he did mention such problems to me were 
personally momentous and I recall them clearl}^. On one of 
these occasions, he mentioned that the assassination of a cer- 
tain dictator (Fidel Castro) had been hypothetically sug- 
gested to him. His reaction was that even if it would do any 
good, which he doubted, it was immoral in the first place and 
might bring on a wave of retaliatory assassinations which 
could be counter to world peace, his highest priority.^°^ 

B. Affidavit of Eisenhower Administration Officials 

In January 1976, the Committee received a statement signed by 
Eisenhower administration officials Gordon Gray, C. Douglas Dillon, 
General Andrew J. Goodpaster, John S. D. Eisenhower, and Dr. 
Marion W. Boggs requesting the Committee to "disavow" the portion 
of the findings of the Interim Report on assassination allegations 
which stated that "the chain of events revealed by the documents and 
testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the 
plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by President Eisen- 
hower." On February 2, 1976, Select Committee Chairman Frank 
Church and Vice-Chairman John Tower responded to this request, 
as follows: 

After reviewing the evidence in the Lumumba case once 
again, we remain convinced that the language used in the 
Committee's findings was warranted. Thus, we have decided 
that the Committee cannot accede to your request for a dis- 
avowal of the portion of the findings of the Report which 
stated that "the chain of events revealed by the documents 
and testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable infer- 
ence that the plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by 
President Eisenhower." We can only assure you that the 
Committee was mindful of the considerations you have raised 
when it wrote, at this same portion of the report : 

"Nevertheless, there is enough countervailing testimony 
by Eisenhower Administration officials and enough ambiguity 
aiid lack of clarity in the records of high-level policy meet- 
ings to preclude the Committee from making a finding that 
the President intended an assassination effort against 
Lumumba." '^°^ 



^'^ E. P. Aurand affidavit, 12/24/75. 

^^ The Committee cited the countervailing testimony from officials in the Eisen- 
hower administration in its Interim Assassination Report on the Lumumba case, 
both in the discussion of Robert Johnson's testmony and in a separate section 
entitled "Testimony of Eisenhower White House Officials" (Interim Assassination 
Report, pp. 55—60; 64-65.) 



139 

In summary, the argument advanced as the basis of the request was 
as follows: (1) Robert Johnson's testimony that he received the 
impression that he heard a Presidential order for the assassination of 
Lumumba at an XSC meeting is contradicted by the testimony of all 
others who were in attendance at that meeting and who appeared 
before the committee. (2) The "reasonable inference" about Presi- 
dential authorization by President Eisenhower in the Lumumba case 
was not drawn in the Castro case in relation to President Kennedy/"®* 

loiia ijujg notarized statement submitted by Messrs. Gray, Dillon, Goodpaster, 
J. S. D. Eisenhower, and Boggs stated in pertinent part : [page citations are to the 
Interim Assassination Report]. 

"As lar as the record discloses, Robert H. Johnson was the only person from 
whom the Committee received testimony who thought he had heard President 
Eisenhower say something that appeared to order the assassination of Lumumba 
and from a reading of the above quotation from his testimony it can be said 
that it was somewhat ambivalent. 

"By contrast, Marion Boggs, who attended the meeting of August 18, 1960, 
as Acting Executive Secretary of the NSC, states, after reviewing the Memoran- 
dum of Discussion of the Meeting : 

"I recall the discussion at that meeting, but have no independent recol- 
lection of any statements or discussion not summarized in the memoran- 
dum. Siiecifically, I have no recollection of any statement, order or 
reference by the President (or anyone else present at the meeting) 
which could be interpreted as favoring action by tlie United States 
to bring about the assassination of Lumumba." (page 59) 
'•Marion Boggs was Robert H. Johnson's superior officer in the NSC staff. 
"Gordon Gray, who was Special Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs and responsible for the organization of NSC meetings, specifi- 
cally impugned Johnson's testimony after hearing about it for the first time 
when he appeared before the Committee. The Committee report says that Gray 
testified that, despite the prevalent attitude of hostility toward Lumumba in the 
Administration, he did not recall President Eisenhower "ever saying anything 
that contemplated killing Lumumba." (page 64). Gray was head of the NSC staff 
and, therefore, was Robert H. Johnson's ultimate superior officer. 

"It seems noteworthy that the Committee did not take specific note of the 
fact that Robert H. Johnson's testimony was said to be incorrect by two of his 
superior officers nor of the fact that the August 18, 1960, meeting was the first 
of only two NSC meetings ever attended by Robert H. Johnson, when Presi- 
dent Eisenhower was present. 

"Additionally, General Andrew J. Goodpaster, White House Staff Secretary to 
President Eisenhower, was listed among the participants of the NSC meeting of 
August 18, 1960, and when asked if he ever heard about any assassination effort 
during the Eisenhower Administration, he replied unequivocally : 

"* * * at no time and in no way did I ever know of or hear about any 
proposal, any mention of such an activity. * * * (I)t is my belief that 
had such a thing been raised with the President other than in my 
presence, I would have known about it, and * * * it would have been a 
matter of such significance and sensitivity that I am confident that 
* * * I would have recalled it had such a thing happened." (page 64) 

"Furthermore, John Eisenhower, the President's son who served under Good- 
paster as Assistant White House Staff Secretary, was quoted as saying that 
nothing that came to his attention in his experience at the White House "can be 
construed in my mind in the remotest way to mean any Presidential knowledge of 
or concurrence in any assassination plots or plans." (page 65) 

"Acting Secretary of State, C. Douglas Dillon, attended the NSC meeting of 
August 18, 1960, and testified, after reviewing NSC documents and being informed 

(Continued) 



140 

In response to this argument, it should be noted that no witness in 
any of the other cases put forward eye-witness testimony about an^ 
presidential author'ization. It should also be noted that Johnson's testi- 
mony was unambiguous on the central point : although he allowed for 
the possibility that what he heard was actually discussion of some more 
general political action, it was his "clear impression' that he heard 
an order for the assassination of Lumumba/"^ 

Nevertheless, if the accoimt of this NSC meeting by one witness were 
the only evidence on presidential authorization before the Committee 
in the Lumumba case, we do not doubt that the findings would have 
been phrased in much the same manner as in the other cases. 

The Lumumba case was distinguished, how^ever, by the presence of 
a strong "chain of events," culminating in the dispatch of a CIA 
scientist to the Congo in late September 1960 on an assassination mis- 
sion, that appeared to originate in a particular meeting over which 

{Continued) 

of Robert Johnson's testimony, that he did not "iremember such a thing" as a 
"clear cut order" from the President for the assassination of Lumumba, 
(page 58) 

"Finally, as has been pointed out, the Committee stated that "the chain of 
events revealed by the documents and testimony is strong enough to permit a rea- 
sonable inference that the plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by 
President Eisenhower. Nevertheless, there is enough countervailing testimony by 
Eisenhower Administration officials and enough ambiguity and lack of clarity in 
the records of high-level policy meetings to preclude the Committee from making 
a finding that the President intended an assassination effort against Lumumba." 
(page 263) 

"It is noted in this regard that, concerning the findings with respect to assassi- 
nation attempts involving Fidel Castro, the Committee's reix)rt ireads : 

"In view of the strained chain of assumptions and the contrary testi- 
money of all the Presidential advisors, the men closest to both 
Eisenhower and Kennedy, the Committee makes no finding implicating 
Presidents who are not able to speak for themselves." (page 264) 

"We must point out that all of the Presidential advisors, the men closest to 
President Eisenhower, similarly gave contrary testimony in the case of the 
Lumumba allegations, as to any involvement on President Eisenhower's part. 
The Committee, in our judgment, was remiss in failing to point this out, as they 
did when President Kennedy's name was joined with that of President Eisen- 
hower in the case of allegations regarding Castro. 

"We do not undertake to evaluate the treatment given by the Committee to 
testimony concerning the extent to which President Kennedy and his senior 
advisors had specific knowledge of and involvement in the assassination plotting 
and efforts against Castro. In relation to the treatment given to Robert John- 
son's testimony in the Lumumba case the contrast is, to say the least, significant. 
Robert Johnson was not an advisor to President Eisenhower and was certainly 
not one of those closest to him ; in any case he has himself expressed doubt re- 
garding the interpretation of what he heard. 

"Finally the Committee disclaims "making a finding" that President Eisen- 
hower intended an assassination effort against Lumumba. Yet in the very pre- 
ceding sentence the Committee stated that "a reasonable inference' 'is permitted 
that Eisenhower authorized the plot — a statement that has the form of a find- 
ing and has been so taken in news reporting. 

"We can only conclude that the Committee's work has been compromised 
by the inclusion of this reference to a "reasonable inference." We, therefore, call 
upon the Committee to disavow the statement that "a reasonable inference" is 
permitted as to President Eisenhower's involvement in the Lumumba matter." 

^" See Interim Assassination Report, pp. 55-60. 



141 

President Eisenhower presided, probably the NSC meeting of August 
18, 1960."« 

^°* This chain of events was summarized in the Intei-im Assassination Report at 
pp. 52-58, as foliovvs: 

"Ihe chain of significant events in the Lumumba case begins with the testi- 
mony that President Eisenhower made a statement at a meeting of ihe National 
Security Council in the summer or early fall of 1960 that came across to one 
staff member in attendance as an order tor the assassination of Patrice 
Lumumba. The next link is a memorandum of the Special Group meeting of 
Augusit 25, I960, which indicated that when the President's 'extremely strong 
feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action' were conveyed, the 
Special Group 

•'. . . agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 
'consideration' of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to 
getting rid of Lumumba. (Special Group iMinutes, S/25/6U.) 

••'ihe following day, CIA Director Allen Dulles, who had attended the Special 
Group meeting, personally cabled to the Station Officer in Leopold ville that 
Lumumbas RExMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE 
... A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION. YOU CAN ACT ON 
YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL 
HERE. (CIA Cable, Dulles to Station Officer, 8/26/60.) 

"Although the Dulles cable does not explicitly mention assassination, Richard 
Bissell — the CIA official under whose aegis the assassination effort against 
Lumumba took place — testified that, in his opinion, this cable was a direct out- 
growth of the Special Group meeting and signaled to him that the President 
had authorized assassination as one means of effecting Lumumba's 'removal.' 
(Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. b3-34, 61-62; see Section 7(c), infra) Bronson Tweedy, 
who had direct operational resiwnsibility at Headquarters for activities against 
Lumumba, testified that the Dulles cable confirmed the policy that no measure, 
including assassination, was to be overlooked in the attempt to remove Lumumba 
from a position of influence. (Tweedy, 10/9/75, pp. 4-5.) 

"On September 19, 1960, Bissell and Tweedy cabled Station Officer Hedgman 
to expect a messenger from CIA Headquarters. Two days later, in the presence 
of the President at a meeting of the National Security Council, Allen Dulles 
stated that Lumumba 'would remain a grave danger as long as he was not yet 
disposed of.' (Memorandum, 460ih NSC Meeting, 9/21/60.) Five days after this 
meeting. CIA scientist, Joseph Scheider, arrived in LeopoldviUe and provided the 
Station Officer with toxic biological substances, instructed him to assassinate 
Lumumba, and informed him that the President had authorized this operation. 

"Two mitigating factors weaken this chain just enough so that it will not 
support an absolute finding of Presidential authorization for the assassination 
effort against Lumumba. 

'•First, the two officials of the Eisenhower Administration responsible to the 
President for national security affairs and present at the NSC meetings in 
question testified that they knew of no Presidential approval for, or knowledge 
of, an assassination oijeration. 

"Second, the minutes of discussions at meetings of the National Security Coun- 
cil and its Special Group do not record an explicit Presidential order for the 
assassination of Lumumba. The Secretary of the Special Group maintained that 
his memoranda reflected the actual language used at the meetings without omis- 
sion or euphemism for extremely sensitive statements. (Parrott, 7/10/75, p. 19.) 
All other NSC staff executives stated however, that there was a strong possibility 
that a statement as sensitive as an assassination order would have been omitted 
from the record or handled by means of euphemism. Several high Government 
officials involved in ix)licymaking and planning for covert operations testified 
that the language in these minutes clearly indicated that assassination was con- 
templated at the NSC as one means of eliminating Lumumba as a political 
threat ; other officials testified to the contrary." 



142 

Taking this chain of circumstances together with all the testimony 
and documents of the period, the Committee felt constrained "from 
making a finding tliat the President intended an assassination effort 
against Lumumba'" but obliged to point out that, in this case, the evi- 
dence was "strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the 
plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by President Eisen- 
howf r," whether explicitly or implicitly."'' 

C. Typographical Error 

T}ie last sentence in the first paragraph on page 65 of the Interim 
Report contained a typographical error. The sentence should read as 
follows : "As a participant at XSC meetings who frequently attended 
Oval Office discussions relating to national security affairs, John Eisen- 
hower testified that nothing that came to his attention in his experi- 
ence at the Wiiite House 'can be consti'ued in my mind in the remotest 
Avay to mean any Presidential knowledge of or concurrence in any 
assassination plots or plans.' " "° 

^** Interim Assassination Report, p. 263. 

"° John Eisenhower testimony, July 18, 1975, pp. 4, 14. 



APPENDIX 

Select Committee Interrogatories for Former President 
KiCHARD M. Nixon 

Throughout December 1975 and January 1976 the Senate Select 
Committee negotiated with the attorneys for former President 
Kichard M. Nixon to formulate a mutually agreeable procedure to 
take the former President's testimony on three of the Committee's 
case studies — Mail Opening, Huston Plan, and Covert Action in 
Chile. It was agreed by both parties that the following interrogatories 
would be submitted to former President Nixon at San Clemente for 
his written response. They were submitted on February 2, 1976, and 
the Committee received the former President's notarized response 
on March 9, 1976. 

Opening StateTuent 

The following submission of responses to the interrogatories 
propounded to me by the Senate Select Committee to Study Govern- 
mental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, as was my 
offer to meet informally with the ranking members of the Committee 
to discuss any matter within the Committee's jurisdiction, is made 
voluntarily and following careful consideration of the propriety of 
a former President responding to Congressional questions pertaining 
to activities which occurred during his term in office. 

It is my opinion that Congress cannot compel a President to testify 
concerning the conduct of his office, either in justification or in 
explanation of actions he took. The existence of such power in the 
Congress would, without doubt, impair the Executive and his sub- 
ordinates in the exercise of the constitutional responsibilities of the 
Presidency. The end results would be most unfortunate. The totally 
uninhibited flow of communication which is essential to the Execu- 
tive Branch would be so chilled as to render candid advice unobtain- 
able. No President could carry out his responsibilities if the advice 
he received were to be filtered by the prospect of compelled disclosure 
at a future date. The result would be the interference and interruption 
of the open and frank interchange which is absolutely essential for 
a President to fulfill his duties. 

As President Truman stated in a letter to a Congressional committee 
in 1953, this principle applies to a former President as well as to a 
sitting President. 

In his words: 

It must be obvious to you that if the doctrine of separation 
of powers and the independence of the Presidency is to have 
any validity at all, it must be equally applicable to a Presi- 
dent after his term of office has expired when he is sought to 
be examined with respect to any acts occurring while he is 
President. 

(143) 



144 

The doctrine would be shattered, and the President, con- 
trary to our fundamental theory of constitutional govern- 
ment, would become a mere arm of the Legislative Branch 
of the Government if he would feel during his term of office 
that his every act might be subject to official inquiry and 
possible distortion for political purposes. 

In their wisdom, the founders of this country provided — through 
the constitutional separation of powers — the safeguards prerequisite 
to three strong, independent branches of government. The zeal with 
which the Congress has guarded and defended its own prerogatives 
and independence is a clear indication of its support of that doctrine 
where the Congress is involved. 

I believe, however, it is consistent with my view of the respective 
powers and privileges of the President and Congress for me to reply 
voluntarily to the Committee's request for information. In responding, 
I may be able to assist the Committee in its very difficult task of 
evaluating the intelligence community of this nation. By doing so 
voluntarily, future Presidents or former Presidents need not be con- 
cerned that by this precedent they may be compelled to respond to 
congressional demands. 

Whether it is wise for a President, in his discretion, to provide 
testimony concerning his presidential actions, is a matter which must 
be decided by each President in light of the conditions at that time. 
I^ndoubtedly, as has been the case during the 200 years of this nation's 
history, the instances warranting such action may be rare. But when 
the appropriate circumstances arise, each President must feel confident 
that he can act in a spirit of cooperation, if he so decides, without 
impairing either the stature or independence of his successors. 

Finally, I believe it is appropriate to inform the Committee that 
the responses which follow are based totally upon my present recol- 
lection of events — many of which were relatively insignificant in com- 
parison to the principal activities for which I had responsibility as 
President — relating to a period some six years ago. Despite the dif- 
ficulty in responding to questions purely from memory, I wish to 
assure the Committee that my responses represent an effort to respond 
as fully as possible. 

Interrogatory 1. — Please state whether, while President, you re- 
ceived information that, at any time during your Administration, an 
agency or employee of the United States Government, acting without 
a warrant, opened mail : 

A. Sent between any two persons or entities in the United States, 
neither of which was a foreign government or a person or entity repre- 
senting a foreign government ; or 

B. Sent between two persons or entities in the United States, one. 
or both, of which was a foreign government or a person or entity 
representing a foreign government ; or 

C. Sent to, or from, any person or entity in the United States to, 
or from, any person, or entity outside the United States, where neither 
the originator nor the recipient was a foreign government or a person 
or entity representing a foreign government ; or 

D. Sent to, or from, any person or entity in the United States to, 
or from, any person or entity outside the United States where either 



145 

the originator or the recipient, or both, was a foreign government or 
a person or entity representing a foreign government. 

I do not recall receiving information, while President, that 
an agency or employee of the United States Government, act- 
ing without a warrant, opened mail : 

A. Sent between any two persons or entities in the United 
States, neither of which was a foreign government or a person 
or entity representing a foreign government ; or 

B. Sent between two persons or entities in the United States, 
one, or both, of which was a foreign government or a person 
or entity representing a foreign government ; or 

C. Sent to, or from, any person or entity in the United 
States to, or from, any person or entity outside the United 
States, where neither the originator nor the recij)ient was a 
foreign government or a person or entity representing a for- 
eign government ; or 

D. Sent to, or from, any person or entity in the United 
States to, or from, any person or entity outside the United 
States where either the originator or the recipient, or both, 
was a foreign government or a person or entity representing 
a foreign government. 

Interrogatory 2. — Please state whether, while President, you re- 
ceived information that, at any time during your Administration, 
an agency or employee of the United States Government, acting 
without a warrant, intercepted telex, telegraph, or other non-voice 
communications excluding mail : 

A. Sent between two persons or entities, in the United States, neither 
of which was a foreign government or a person or entity representing 
a foreign government ; or 

B. Sent between two persons or entities in the United States, one, 
or both, of which was a foreign government or a person or entity repre- 
senting a foreign government ; or 

C. Sent to, or from, any person or entity in the United States, to, or 
from, any person or entity outside the United States, where neither 
the originator nor the recipient was a foreign government or a person 
or entity representing a foreign government; or 

D. Sent to, or from, any person or entity in the United States to, or 
from, any person or entity outside the United States, where either the 
originator or the recipient, or both, was a foreign government or a 
person representing a foreign government. 

It seems to me quite likely that sometime during my Presi- 
dency I learned that the National Security Agency was 
engaged in, or had engaged in, both prior to and during my 
Administration, the practice of intercepting non-voice com- 
munications involving foreign entities, presumably without 
a warrant. However, I do not recall having received specific 
information to that effect. Nor do I recall receiving informa- 
tion, while President, that an agency or employee of the 
United States Government intercepted telex, telegraph or 
other non-voice communications with the cooperation of 
private organizations. 



146 

Except to the extent indicated, I do not recall receiving 
information, while President, that an agency or employee of 
the United States Government, acting without a warrant, 
intercepted telex, telegraph, or other non-voice communi- 
cations excluding mail: 

A. Sent between two persons or entities, in the United 
States, neither of which was a foreign government or a person 
or entity representing a foreign government; or 

B. Sent between two persons or entities in the United 
States, one, or both, of which was a foreign government or a 
person or entity representing a foreign government ; or 

C. Sent to, or from, any person or entity in the United 
States, to, or from, any person or entity outside the United 
States, where neither the originator nor the recipient was a 
foreign government or a person or entity representing a for- 
eign government; or 

D. Sent to, or from, any person or entity in the United 
States to, or from, any person or entity outside the United 
States, where either the originator or the recipient, or both, 
was a foreign government or a person representing a foreign 
government. 

Interrogatory 3. — Please state whether, while President, you re- 
ceived information that, at any time during your Administration, an 
agency or employee of the United States Government, acting without 
a warrant, intercepted telephonic or other communications by which 
voice is transmitted : 

A. Between any two persons or entities in the United States, 
neither of which was a foreign govei-nment or a person or entity 
representing a foreign government; or 

B. Between two persons or entities in the United States, one, or 
both, of which was a foreign government or a person or entity repre- 
senting a foreign government ; or 

C. To, or from, any person or entity in the United States to, or 
from, any person or entity outside the United States, where neither 
the originator nor the recipient was a foreign government or a person 
or entity representing a foreign government ; or 

D. To, or from, any person or entity in the United States to, or from, 
any person or entity outside the United States, where either the orig- 
inator or the recipient, or both, was a foreign government or person 
or entity representing a foreign government. 

While President, I was aware of certain instances involv- 
ing the investigations to discover the source of unauthorized 
disclosures of classified, national security information in 
which the FBI, acting without a warrant, intercepted tele- 
phonic communications which I assume would fall within the 
descriptions set forth in this interrogatory. I am also aware 
of one occasion in which the Secret Service, acting presum- 
ably without a warrant, intercepted telephonic communica- 
tions. I was generally aware of the fact that the Central 
Intelligence Agency or Federal Bureau of Investigation had 
the capability to intercept telephonic or other communica- 
tion involving certain foreign embassies located in the United 



147 

States. My understanding was that this capability stemmed 
from actions taken during prior Administrations. 

Other than the instances just referred to, I do not remem- 
ber being informed, while President, that during my Ad- 
ministration, an agency or employee of the United States 
Government, acting without a warrant, intercepted tele- 
phonic or other communications by which voice is trans- 
mitted : 

A. Between any two persons or entities in the United 
States, neither of which was a foreign government or a per- 
son or entity representing a foreign government; or 

B. Between two persons or entities in the United States, 
one, or both, of which was a foreign government or a person 
or entity representing a foreign government; or 

C. To, or from, any person or entity in the United States 
to, or from, an}- person or entity outside the United States, 
where neither the originator nor the recipient was a foreign 
government or a person or entity representing a foreign gov- 
ernment ; or 

D. To, or from, any person or entity in the United States 
to, or from, any person or entity outside the United States, 
where either the originator or the recipient, or both, was a 
foreign government or person or entity representing a foreign 
government. 

Interrogatory J^.- — Please state whether, while President, you re- 
ceived information that, at any time during your Administration, an 
agency or employee of the United States Government, acting without 
a warrant, engaged in "break-ins," "surreptitious entries," or entries 
otherwise not authorized by the owner or occupant of: 

A. A dwelling or place of business located within the United 
States; or 

B. A foreign embassy located within the United States. 

On March 17, 1973, 1 learned that employees of the United 
States Government had engaged individuals who, acting with- 
out a warrant, had entered what I assumed to be a place of 
business located within the United States without the author- 
ization of the owner or occupant. 

Apart from that incident, I do not recall learning, while 
President, that during my Administration an agency or 
employee of the United States Government, acting without a 
warrant, engaged in "break-ins," "surreptitious entries," or 
entries otherwise not authorized by the owner or occupant of : 

A. A dwelling or place of business located within the 
United States ; or 

B. A foreign embassy located within the United States. 

Interrogatory 5. — Please state whether, while President, you re- 
ceived information that, at any time during your Administration, the 
Central Intelligence Agency, acting without a warrant, intercepted 
and opened mail sent from within the United States to : 

A. The Soviet Union ; or 

B. The People's Republic of China. 



70-725 O - 76 - 10 



148 

While President, I remember being generally aware of 
the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency, acting without 
a warrant, both during and prior to my Administration, con- 
ducted mail covers of mail sent from within the United 
States to : 

A. The Soviet Union : or 

B. The People's Republic of China. 

However, I do not remember being informed that such mail 
covers included unauthorized mail openings. 
Interrogatory 6. — Please state whether, while President, you re- 
ceived information that, at any time during your Administration, an 
agency or employee of the United States Government; acting with- 
out a warrant, intercepted telephonic connnunications to, or from, 
the Israeli Embassy in the United States. 

I do not remember leai-ning, while President, that an 
agenc}' or employee of the United States Government, acting 
without a warrant, intercepted telephonic comnmnications to, 
or from, the Israeli Embassy in the United States. How- 
ever, as indicated in my response to Interrogatory No. 3, I 
w^as generally aware that the capability existed to conduct 
intercepts of telephonic comnmnications to or from various 
embassies located within the United States, and, therefore, 
despite the absence of any specific recollection in this regard, 
it is possible that at some time I may have learned that tele- 
phonic intercepts of conversations to or from the Israeli 
Embassy occurred. 

Interrogatory 7. — Please state whether, while President, you re- 
ceived information that, at any time during your Administration, 
an agency or employee of the United States Government, acting with- 
out a warrant, engaged in a surreptitious, or otherwise unauthorized, 
entry into the Chilean Embassy in the United States. 

I do not remember being infoi-med, while President, that 
at any time dui-ing my Administration an agency or employee 
of the United States Government, acting without a warrant, 
engaged in a surreptitious or otherwise unauthorized entry 
into the Chilean Embassy in the ITnited States. 

Interrogatory 8. — On April 17, 1975, John Ehrlichman gave the 
following testimony before the President's Commission on CIA Ac- 
tivities Within the United States : 

Question. Were you, ]Mr. Ehrlichman, aware at any time 
while you wei'e on the White House staff of a program of in- 
tercepting mail in Xew York or any other port, mail headed 
into the United States from, or headed out to, any of the 
Communist countries ? 

Answer. I knew that was going on because I had seen 
reports that cited those kinds of sources in connection with 
this, the bombings, the dissident activities. 

Please state whether: 

A. Mr. Ehrlichman ever informed you that he knew, or suspected, 
that some o,f the information in intelligence reports received by the 
White House was derived by means of mail openings; or 



149 

B. You, upon reading such reports, concluded, or suspected, that 
some of the information in said reports was derived by means of 
mail openings. 

I do not recall John Ehrlichman ever informing me 
that he knew, or suspected, that some of the information in 
intelligence reports received by the White House was derived 
by means of mail openings. I do not know, of course, what in- 
telligence reports Mr. Ehrlichman was referring to in his 
testimony cited in Interrogatory No. 8. However, with regard 
to intelligence reports which I may have reviewed, I do not 
recall concluding or suspecting that the information — or any 
part thereof — was derived by means of mail openings. 

Interrogatory 9. — Please state whether, while Vice President or 
President, you received information that, at any time prior to your 
Administration, an agency or employee of the United States Govern- 
ment, acting without a warrant, conducted any of the activities re- 
ferred to in Interrogatories 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. 

I remember learning on various occasions that, during Ad- 
ministrations prior to mine, agencies or employees of the 
United States Government, acting presumably without a 
warrant, conducted wiretaps, surreptitious or unauthorized 
entries, and intercepts o,f voice and non-voice communica- 
tions. 

Interrogatory 10. — If your answer to Interrogatories 1 through 9, 
inclusive, or any subsection of Interrogatories 1 through 9, inclusive, 
is in the affirmative, please state: 

A. The nature of any such activity as to which you received 
information ; 

B. The year, or years, in which any such activity occurred ; 

C. When and from whom you received information as to the 
existence of any such activity; 

D. Whether you directed, authorized, or approved any such 
activity ; 

E. Whether you took any action to: 

(1) terminate any such activity; or 

(2) prevent any such activity from occurring again after you first 
learned of it. 

With respect to my answer to Interrogatory No. 2 concern- 
ing N.S.A. intercepts of non-voice communications, the com- 
plete state of my knowledge is as set forth in that answer. 

With respect to my answer to Interrogatory No. 3 concern- 
ing F.B.I, intercepts of telephonic communications, it is my 
recollection that: 

A. The intercepts occurred in the course of two investiga- 
tion programs I authorized for the purpose of discovering the 
sources o,f unauthorized disclosures of very sensitive, security 
classified information. The first investigation involved pri- 
marily members of the National Security Council staff. The 
second investigation involved an employee of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. 

B. The first investigation occurred between approximately 
May 9, 1969 and February 10, 1971. The second investigation 



150 

occurred between approximately December, 1971 and June, 
1972. 

C. My Imowledge of both investigations stemmed from my 
participation in authorizing- their implementation. 

D. I authorized both investigations. 

E. I did not participate in the termination of the first in- 
vestigation. Witli regard to the second investigation, I did not 
participate in the decision to terminate the intercepts. How- 
ever, when the identity of the individual who had disclosed 
classified information was discovered, I directed that he be 
reassigned from his then present duties to a less sensitive 
position and that his activities be monitored for a period suf- 
ficient to ensure that he waos not continuing to disclose classi- 
fied information to which he had been exposed during his 
earlier assigmnent. 

With respect to my answer to Interrogatory No. 3 concern- 
ing the Secret Service intercept of telephonic communica- 
tions, it is my recollection that : 

A. The intercepts occurred as a result of efforts to deter- 
mine whether my brother, Donald Nixon, was the target of 
attempts by individuals to compromise him or myself. 

B. The intercepts occurred during an approximately three 
week period in 1970. 

C. I discussed with John Ehrlichman my concern that 
my brother's trips abroad had brought him in contact with 
persons who might attempt to compromise him or myself. I 
directed Mr. Ehrlichman to have my brother's activities mon- 
itored to determine whether this was in fact occurring. I 
subsequently learned that the surveillance revealed no at- 
tempts to compromise my brother or myself and that the 
surveillance was therefore terminated. 

With respect to my answer to Interrogatory No. 3 concern- 
ing F.B.I, or C.I.A. capability to intercept telephonic or 
other communications involving certain foreign embassies, 
the complete state of my knowledge is as set forth in that 
■answer. 

With respect to my answer to Interrogatory No. 4 concern- 
ing the unauthorized entry into a place of business, it is my 
recollection that: 

A. The entry was into the office of a psychiatrist. 

B. I do not know on what date the entry occurred. 

C. I received the information from then counsel to the 
President, John Dean, in a conversation on March 17, 1973. 

D. I did not direct, authorize or approve of the action. 

E. I learned of the event nearly two years after it occurred 
and therefore had no reason to act to terminate it. 

With respect to my answer to Interrogatory No. 5, the 
complete state of my knowledge is as set forth in that answer. 

With respect to my answei- to Interrogatory No. 9, it is my 
recollection that : 

A. I learned from J. Edgar Hoover that during each of the 
five previous Administrations which he had served as Direc- 
tor of the F.B.L, that agency had conducted, without a search 



161 

warrant, telephonic intercepts in connection with investiga- 
tions to discover the source of unauthorized disclosures of 
classified information. I also learned, perhaps from Mr. 
Hoover or others, that prior Administrations had engaged in 
surreptitious entries and intercepts of voice and non-voice 
communications. 

B. My understanding was that these activities, or certain 
of them, had taken place at various times during each of the 
five Administrations preceding mine. 

C. My information concerning the use of telephonic inter- 
cepts by prior Administrations to discover the sources of un- 
authorized disclosures of classified information came from the 
Director of the F.B.I, in discussions in which he informed me 
that based upon over twenty years' experience, the F.B.I, had 
concluded that this investigative method was the most effec- 
tive means of discovering the source of unauthorized dis- 
closures. With regard to the use of unauthorized entries and 
intercepts of voice and non-voice communications by prior 
Administrations, I cannot specifically recall when and from 
whom I received the information except as reflected in the 
Special Report of Interagencv Committee on Intelligence 
(Ad Hoc). 

Interrogatory 11. — Please state, as to any activity mentioned in 
your answer to Interrogatory 9, whether you believe that any such 
activity was, at the time of its occurrence, legal. 

With respect to the intercept of telephonic comnumications 
by the F.B.I, for the purpose of discovering the source of un- 
authorized disclosure of classified information affecting the 
security of this country, it was my belief that such activity 
was legal. As to the use of surreptitious entries and intercepts 
of non-voice communications by prior Administrations, I do 
not recall learning the specific circumstances in which those 
actions were taken, and therefore did not have reason to form 
a belief as to their legality at the time I learned of the actions, 
nor do I have an adequate basis for forming such a belief 
now. 

Interrogatory 12. — If your answer to Interrogatory 11 is in the af- 
firmative, please : 

A. Identify the activity ; and 

B. State the reasons for your belief as to the legality of the activity. 

The basis for my opinion that the use of telephonic inter- 
cepts to discover the source of unauthorized disclosures of 
classified information was lawful stemmed from discussions 
I had with the Director of the F.B.I, and the Attorney Gen- 
eral of the United States in which I was informed that this 
method of investigation had been employed for that purpose 
by five prior Administrations, that it was the most effective 
means of conducting the investigations, and that the decisions 
of the Supreme Court and various lower courts at that time 
permitted the use of wiretaps when the investigation involved 
matters directly affecting the security of this nation and in 



152 

particular — as in that instance — the President's ability to 
conduct foreign policy. 

Interrogatory 13. — Attached at Tabs A, B, C, and D, respectively, 
are: 

A. The Special Keport Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad 
Hoc); 

B. The Domestic Intelligence Gathering Plan, including recom- 
mendations and rationale of Tom Charles Huston ; 

C. A July 14, 1970 memorandum from H. R. Haldeman to Tom 
Charles Huston ; and 

D. A July 23, 1970 memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to 
Richard Helms, indicating carbon copy sent to the President and 
H. R. Haldeman.^ 

As to each document, please state : 

A. Whether you have seen the document, or any part of it; and 

B. If your answer is in the affirmative, please state : 

( 1 ) When you first saw the document ; 

( 2 ) The circumstances under which you saw it ; and 

(3) With whom you have discussed it. 

I do not have a specific, independent recollection of having 
seen any of the four documents listed in Interrogatory No. 
13. I assume that I saw item A, and probably item B, at or 
about the time they were prepared. I do not believe that I 
have previously seen or discussed items C and D although it 
is possible that I did but do not remember doing so. With 
regard to when I may have seen items A or B, the circum- 
stances under which I may have seen them, or with whom I 
may have discussed them, see the responses to Interrogatories 
Nos. 14 to 32. 

Interrogatory lli.. — Please state whether you discussed the Special 
Report Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) (Tab A) 
with: 

A. H. R. Haldeman ; 

B. John N. Mitchell ; or 

C. John D. Ehrlichman. 

I do not specifically recall discussing the Special Report 
Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) with PI. R. 
Haldeman. However, I assume that I informed Mr. Halde- 
man at some point following my meeting with the Inter- 
agency Committee that I approved the Committee's recom- 
mendations and that he should arrange for the implementa- 
tion of those recommendations. 

Sometime after my approval of the Committee's recom- 
mendations, but before July 28, 1970, I recall talking with 
John N. Mitchell concerning the Committee's report. 

Although it is possible that I did, I do not recall discussing 
the Committee's report with Jolin D. Ehrlichman. 

Interrogatory 15. — Please state whether you discussed the Domestic 
Intelligence Gathering Plan (TabB) with: 

A. H. R. Haldeman ; 

B. John N. Mitchell ; or 

C. John D. Ehrlichman. 



' See Hearings Vol. 2. Huston Plan : Exhibit 1, pp. 141-188 (Tab A) ; Exhibit 2, 
pp. 189-197 (Tab B) ; Exhibit 3, p. 198 (Tab C) ; Exhibit 4, pp. 19^202 (Tab D). 



153 

I do not recall discussing the Domestic Intelligence Gather- 
ing Plan, as contrasted with the Special Keport Interagency 
Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), with H. E. Haldeman, 
John N. Mitchell, or Jolin D. Ehrlichman, except insofar as 
the discussions referred to in response to Interrogatory No. 
14 may have encompassed the Domestic Intelligence Gather- 
ing Plan. 
Interrogatoinj 16. — Please state whether you discussed the July 23, 

1970 memo (Tab D) from Tom Charles Huston to Richard Helms 

with : 

A. H. R. Haldeman; 

B. John N. Mitchell; or 

C. Jolin D. Ehrlichman. 

I do not recall discussing the July 23, 1970 memorandum 
from Tom Charles Huston to Richard Helms with H. R. 
Haldeman, John N. Mitchell or John Ehrlichman. 

Interrogatory 17. — With respect to any discussion identified in re- 
sponse to Interrogatories 13, 14, 15, or 16, please relate the substance 
of the discussion. 

"With respect to the possible discussion of the Committee's 
report with H. R. Haldeman, as referred to in Interrogatory 
No. 14, the likely substance of that conversation — as best I 
can recall — is set forth in response to Interrogatory No. 14. 
With respect to the discussion with Attorney General 
Mitchell, as referred to in my response to Interrogatory No. 
14, I recall that Mr. Mitchell informed me that Mr. Hoover, 
Director of the F.B.I, and Chairman of the Interagency 
Committee on Intelligence, disagreed with my approval of 
the Committee's special report. I recall this aspect of the con- 
versation because I was surprised to learn of Mr. Hoover's 
disagreement in view of the fact that only a few days earlier 
he had attended the meeting of the Committee in my office in 
which we had discussed the Committee's report and recom- 
mendations. At that time he had not voiced any objections 
or reservations to implementation of the Committee's recom- 
mendations. Mr. Mitchell informed me that it was Director 
Hoover's opinion that initiating a program which would 
permit several government intelligence agencies to utilize the 
investigative techniques outlined in the Committee's report 
would significantly increase the possibility of their public 
disclosure. Mr. Mitchell explained to me 'that Mr. Hoover 
believed that although each of the intelligence gathering 
methods outlined in the Committee's recommendations had 
been utilized by one or more previous Administrations, their 
sensitivity would likely generate media criticism if they were 
employed. Mr. Mitchell further informed me tliat it was 
his opinion that the risk of disclosure of the possible illegal 
actions, such as unauthorized entry into foreign embassies 
to install a microphone transmitter, was greater than the pos- 
sible benefit to be derived. Based upon this conversation 
with Attorney General Mitchell, I decided to revoke the 



154 

approval originally extended to the Committee's recommen- 
dations. 
Interrogatory 18. — The July 14, 1970 memorandum attached at Tab 
C, and the July 23, 1970 memorandum attached at Tab D, indicate 
that you approved certain recommendations and made certain deci- 
sions' relating to the so-called "Huston Plan." Please state whether 
you approved any of the recommendations or made any of the deci- 
sions attributed to you in the attached documents. 

With regard to H. R. Haldeman's memorandum of July 14, 
1970 to Mr. Huston, I do not recall what recommendation 
Tom Huston made concerning tlie implementation proce- 
dures and do not remember what, if any, objections I had to 
the recommendation. With regard to Tom Huston's memo- 
randum of July 23, 1970 to Richard Helms, to the extent 
the decisions attributed to me under headings 1 through 8 
are consistent with the recommendations of the Interagency 
Committee on Intelligence, I did approve the actions. 

Interrogatory 19. — If your answer to Interogatory 18 is in the 
affirmative, please state your reason for approving each such recom- 
mendation or making each such decision. 

In my view, the principal recommendation of the Inter- 
agency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) was that the 
functions of the various agencies be coordinated to reduce 
needless duplication of intelligence gathering activities and 
to provide for effective interchange of intelligence informa- 
tion. I am pleased to see that one of the recommendations 
that has resulted from the Senate Select Committee's In- 
vestigation is that there be greater coordination among the 
various intelligence agencies. 

With regard to the Interagency Committee's specific rec- 
ommendations for implementation of described investigative 
techniques, my approval was based largely on the fact that 
the procedures were consistent with those employed by prior 
administrations and had been found to be effective by the 
intelligence agencies. 

Interrogatory 20. — If your answer to Interrogatory 18 is negative, 
please state the respects in which the July 14 and July 23 memoranda 
are incorrect. 

See response to Interrogatory No. 18. 

Interrogatory 21. — Please state whether, sometime after July 23, 
1970, you withdi^w approval of, or otherwise rescinded, the recom- 
mendations or decisions referred to in Interrogatory 19. 

See response to Interrogatory No. 17. 

Intenogatoi^ 22. — If your answer to Interrogatory 21 is in the 
affirmative, please state, with respect to each such recommendation or 
decision, approval of which was withdrawn, your reasons for with- 
drawing approval. 

See response to Interrogatory Xo. 17. 

Interrogatory 23. — Please state whether you were advised, orally or 
in writing, at any time, that any of the recommendations or decisions 



155 

referred to in the referenced documents (Tabs A through D) were, or 
might be construed to be, illegal. 

To the extent that I may have reviewed the Special Report 
Interagency Committee on Intelligence, I would have been 
informed that certain recommendations or decisions set forth 
in that report were, or might be construed to be, illegal. I do 
not recall any discussion concerning the possible illegality of 
any of the intelligence gathering techniques described in the 
report during my meeting with the Committee. My only rec- 
ollection ol a discussion concerning the possible illegality of 
any of the investigative techniques is as described in response 
to Interrogatory Xo. 17. 

Inten'ogato'i-n/ 2Ji-. — If your answer to Interrogatory 23 is in the af- 
firmative, please state, as to each recommendation or decision as to 
which you were advised : 

A. 'i he specihc recommendations or decisions as to which you were 
so advised; 

B. Who so advised you ; and 

C. When you were so advised. 

See response to Interrogatories No. 17 and No. 23. 

Interrogatory ^5. — Please state, with respect to the recommenda- 
tions and decisions referred to in Interrogatory 21, whether you dis- 
cussed with anyone the legality, or possible illegality of any of these 
recomendations or decisions. 

See response to Interrogatory No. 17. 

Interrogat&r-y 26. — If your answer to Interrogatory 25 is in the 
affirmative, please state : 

A. With whom such discussion took place ; and 

B. When such discussion, or discussions, took pla€e. 

See response to Interrogatory No. 17. 
Interrogatoinj 27. — Please state, with respect to the recommenda- 
tions and decisions referred to in Interrogatory 21, whether you were 
informed by John X. Mitchell, either directly or through H. R. Halde- 
man, that some, or all, of the decisions were, or might be considered to 
be, illegal. 

Except as set forth in my response to Interrogatory No. 17, 
I do not recall being informed by John N. Mitchell, through 
H. R. Haldeman, that some, or all, of the decisions were, or 
might be considered to be, illegal. 
Intei-rogatory 28. — If your answer to Interrogatory 27 is in the 
affirmative, please state when you were so informed. 
See response to Interrogatory No. 27. 
Interrogatory ^5'.— Please state whether, while President, you re- 
ceived information that any of the recommendations contained in the 
Special Report (Tab A) involved programs which were in operation. 

A. Prior to July 23, 1970 ; 

B. Subsequent to July 23, 1970, but prior to any withdrawal on 
your part of approval of them ; or 

C. Subsequent to a withdrawal on your part of approval of them. 



156 

Except as discussed in the Special Report Committee on 
Intellioence (Ad Hoc) and as described in my response to 
Interroo'atory No. 9, I do not recall receiving information, 
while President, that any of the recommendations contained 
in the Special Report involved programs which were in 
operation : 

A. Prior to July 23, 1970 ; 

B. Subsequent to July 23, 1970, but j)rior to my withdrawal 
of the approval of them ; or 

C. Subsequent to an withdraM'al of approval of them. 

Inferroqator-y 30. — Please state whether, while President, you re- 
ceived information that any of the recommendations contained in the 
Huston Analysis (Tab B) involved programs which were in opera- 
tion : 

A. Prior to July 23, 1970; 

B. Subsequent to July 23, 1970, but prior to any withdrawal on 
your part of approval of them ; or 

C. Subsequent to a withdrawal on your part of approval of them. 

Except as discussed in the Special Report Committee on 
Intellioence (Ad Hoc) and as described in my response to 
Interrogatory No. 9, I do not recall receiving information, 
while President, that any of the recommendations contained 
in the Domestic Intelligence Gathering Plan involved pro- 
grams which were in operation : 

A. Prior to July 23, 1970; 

B. Subsequent to July 23, 1970, but prior to my withdrawal 
of the approval of them ; or 

C. Subsequent to my withdrawal of approval of them. 

Interrogatory SI. — Please state whether, while President, you re- 
ceived information that any of the decisions attributed to you in the 
July 23, 1970 memorandum (Tab D) involved programs which were 
in operation : 

A. Prior to July 23, 1970 ; 

B. Subsequent to July 23, 1970, but prior to any withdrawal on 
your part of approval of them ; or 

C. Subsequent to a withdrawal on your part of approval of them. 

Except as discussed in the Special Report Committee on 
Intelligence (Ad Hoc) and as described in my response to 
Interrogatory No. 9, I do not recall receiving information, 
while President, that any of the decisions attributed to me in 
the July 23, 1970 memorandum from H. R. Haldeman to Tom 
Huston involved programs which were in operation: 

A. Prior to July 23, 1970; 

B. Subsequent to July 23, 1970, but prior to my withdrawal 
of the approval of them ; or 

C. Subsequent to my withdrawal of approval of them. 

Interrogator-y 32.— li your answer to any part of Interrogatories 
29, 30. or 31 is in the affirmative, please identify the activity and state: 

A. How you learned that such activity, or activities, were in opera- 
tion ; 

B. Who informed you; and 

C. When you were so informed. 

See responses to Interrogatories No. 29, No. 30, and No. 31. 



157 

Interrogatory 33. — The Committee has received evidence as to a 
number of illegalities and improprieties committed by, or on behalf 
of, various components of the United States intelligence community. 
What controls within the Executive, IjCgislative, or Judicial branches 
of government could, in your view, best assure that abuses will not 
occur in the future % 

In general I believe the intelligence reorganization plans 
and the recommendations prepared by the Ford Administra- 
tion following intense study of this matter are appropriate, 

Interrogatoi'y 3Jf. — Please state whether you believe that actions, 
otherwise "illegal," may be legally undertaken pursuant to Presiden- 
tial, or other high-level authorization, following a determination by 
the President, or some other senior government official, that the actions 
are necessary to protect the "national security" of the United States. 

I assume that the reference to "actions, otherwise 'illegal'," 
in tliis interrogatory means actions which if undertaken by 
private persons would violate criminal laws. It is quite obvi- 
ous that there are certain inherently governmental actions 
which if undertaken by the sovereign in protection of the 
interest of the nation's security are lawful but which if 
undertaken by private persons are not. In the most extreme 
case, for example, forceable removal of persons from their 
homes for the purpose of sequestering them in confined areas, 
if done by a person — or even by government employees 
under normal circumstances — would be considered kidnap- 
ping and unlawful imprisonment. Yet under the exigencies 
of war, President Koosevelt, acting pursuant to a broad war- 
powers delegation from Congress, ordered such action be 
taken against Americans of Japanese ancestry because he 
believed it to be in the interest of national security. Similarly 
under extreme conditions but not at that point constituting 
a declared war. President Lincoln confiscated vessels violat- 
ing a naval blockade, seized rail and telegraph lines leading 
to Washington, and paid troops from Treasury funds without 
the required congressional appropriation. In 1969, during 
my Administration, warrantless wiretapping, even by the 
government, was unlawful, but if undertaken because of a 
presidential determination that it was in the interest of na- 
tional security was lawful. Support for the legality of such 
action is found, for example, in the concurring opinion of 
Justice White in Katz v. United States. 

This is not to say, of course, that any action a president 
might authorize in the interest of national security would 
be lawul. The Supreme Court's disapproval of President 
Truman's seizure of the steel mills is an example. But it is 
naive to attempt to categorize activities a president might 
authorize as "legal" or "illegal" without reference to the 
circumstances under which he concludes that the activity is 
necessary. Assassination of a foreign leader — an act I never 
had cause to consider and which under most circumstances 



158 

would be abhorrent to any president — might have been less 
abhorrent and, in fact, justified during World War II as a 
means of preventing further Nazi atrocities and ending the 
slaughter. Additionally, the opening of mail sent to selected 
priority targets of foreign intelligence, although impinging 
upon individual freedom, may nevertheless serve a salutory 
purpose when — as it has in the past — it results in preventing 
the disclosure of sensitive military and state secrets to the 
enemies of this country. 

In short, there have been — and will be in the future — cir- 
cumstances in which presidents may lawfully authorize 
actions in the interests of the security of this country, which 
if undertaken by other persons, or even by the president 
under difl'erent circumstances, would be illegal. 
Interrogatory 35. — If your answer to Interrogatory 34 is in the 
affirmative : 

A. Please state : 

(1) The basis of your belief; 

(2) The individual or individuals who may, in your belief, author- 
ize such actions; 

(3) The limitations, if any, on the type of action which may be so 
authorized; and 

B. Please supply illustrations or examples of such actions. 

See response to Interrogatory No. 34. 

Interrogatory 36. — ^Testimony has been received by the Committee 
to the effect that on September 15, 1970, you met with Richard Helms, 
Henry Kissinger, and John Mitchell at the White House to discuss 
Chile. The document attached at Tab E has been identified by Richard 
Helms as being handwritten notes taken by him during this Septem- 
ber 15, 1970 meeting." Please state whether these notes accurately re- 
flect, in whole or in part, the substance of your instructions to Richard 
Helms : 

A. On September 15, 1970 ; 

B. At any other time. 

My recollection of the September 15, 1970 meeting among 
myself, Henry Kissinger, Richard Helms and John Mitchell 
is set forth in response to Interrogatory No. 39. Except to 
the extent Mr. Helms' handwritten notes may coincide with 
my expressed recollection of that meeting, t am unable to 
state whether Mr. Helms' notes accurately reflect in whole or 
in part, the discussions at that meeting or the substance of 
my instructions to Mr. Helms communicated then or at any 
other time. 

Interrogatory 37. — With specific reference to the following phrases 
contained in the Helms notes : 

( 1 ) "not concerned risks involved" 

(2) "no involvement of embassy" 

(3) "game plan" 

(4) "make the economy scream" 



See Hearings, Vol. 7, Exhibit 2, p. 



159 

Please state whether you used, during the September 15, 1970 meet- 
ing, any of the above phrases or any phrase substantially similar to 
any of the above phrases. 

I do not recall using any of the four phrases set forth in 
Interrogatory No. 37, or any phrase substantially similar to 
those four phrases, during the September 15, 1970 meeting 
referred to in Interrogatory No. 36. 
Interrogatory 38. — If your answer to Interrogatory 37 is in the 
affirmative, please describe what you meant to convey by each such 
phrase. 

See response to Interrogatory No. 37. 

Interrogatory 39. — If your answer to Interrogatory 37 is in the 
negative, please state whether during a meeting with Kichard Helms 
you, in discussing the possibility of Allende's becoming the President 
of Chile, referred, to : 

( 1 ) Risks involved in a CIA activity in Chile ; 

(2) The American Embassy in Chile; or 

(3) The Chilean economy. 

It is my present recollection that the September 15, 1970 
meeting refened to in Interrogatory No. 36 was held for the 
purpose of discussing the prospect of Salvador Allende's elec- 
tion to the Presidency of Chile. At that time, as more fully 
set forth in response to Interrogatory No. 44, I was greatly 
concerned that Mr, Allende's presence in that office would 
directly and adversely affect the security interests of the 
United States. During the meeting in my office, I informed 
Mr, Helms that I wanted the C.I.A. to determine whether 
it was possible for a political opponent of Mr, Allende to 
be elected President by the Chilean Congress, It was my opin- 
ion that any effort to bring about a political defeat of Mr. 
Allende could succeed only if the participation of the C.I.A. 
was not disclosed. Therefore, I instructed Mr. Helms that 
the C.I.A, should proceed covertly, I further informed Mr. 
Helms that to be successful, any effort to defeat Mr. Allende 
would have to be supported by the military factions in Chile. 

Because the C.I.A. "s covert activity in supporting Mr. 
Allende's political opponents might at some point be discov- 
ered, I instructed that the American Embassy in Chile not 
be involved, I did this so that the American Embassy could 
remain a viable operation regardless of the outcome of the 
election, 

I further instructed Mr, Helms and Dr. Kissinger that 
any action which the United States could take which might 
impact adversely on the Chilean economy — such as terminat- 
ing all foreign aid assistance to Chile except that for humani- 
tarian purposes — should be taken as an additional step in pre- 
venting Mr, Allende from becoming President of Chile, there- 
by negating the communist influence within that country. 



160 

Interrogatory 40. — If your answer to Interrogatory 39 is in the 
affirmative, please relate the nature of your reference to these subjects. 
See response to Interrogatory Xo. 89. 
Interrogatory 1^1. — Please state whether, on September 15, 1970, 
you instructed Eichard Helms to have the Central Intelligence Agency 
attempt to prevent Salvador Allende from assuming the office of 
President of Chile. 

See response to Interrogatory No. 39. 
Interrogatory Jf2. — If your answ^er to Interrogatory 41 is in the 
negative, please state whether you gave such an instruction to some- 
one other than Richard Helms. 

See response to Interrogatory Xo. 39. 
Interrogatory JfS. — If your answer to Interrogatory 42 is in the 
affirmative, please identify each individual who received such an in- 
struction from you. 

See response to Interrogatory No. 39. 
Interrogatory 44- — Please state what national security interests of 
the United States, if any, were threatened by an Allende presidency 
in Chile. 

In 1964 Salvador Allende made a very strong bid for 
the Presidency of Chile. I was aware that at that time the 
incumbent Aclministration in the United States deterndned 
that it was in the interests of this nation to impede Mr. 
Allende's becoming president because of his alignment with 
and support from various communist countries, especially 
Cuba. It is important to remember, of course, that President 
Kennedy, only two years before, had faced the Cuban crisis 
in which the Soviet Union had gained a military base of 
operations in the Western Hemisphere and had even begun 
installation of nuclear missiles. The expansion of Cuban- 
styled communist infiltration into Chile would have provided 
a "beachhead" for guerrilla operations throughout South 
America. There w^as a great deal of concern expressed in 1964 
and again in 1970 by neighboring South American countries 
that if Mr. Allende were elected president, Chile would 
quickly become a haven for communist operatives who could 
infiltrate and undermine independent governments through- 
out South America. I was aware that the Administrations 
of President Kennedy and President Johnson expended 
approximately four million dollars on behalf of Mr. Allende's 
opponents and had prevented Mr. Allende from becoming 
President. 

It was in this context that in September 1970, after Mr. 
Allende had received a plurality but not a majority of the 
general electorate's votes, that I determined that the C.I.A. 
should attempt to bring about Mr. Allende's defeat in the 
congressional election procedure. The same national security 
interests which I had understood prompted Presidents 
Kennedy and Johnson to act from 1962-1964, prompted my 
concern and the decision to act in 1970. 



161 

Interrogatory J/). — Richard Helms has testified that if he ever 
carried a Marshall's baton in his knapsack out of the Oval Office, it 
was following: the September 15, 1970 meeting referred to above. 
Please state what your understanding was, on September 15, 1970, as 
to the means by which the Central Intelligence Agency would attempt 
to prevent Allende from assuming the presidency of Chile. 

I do not recall discussing during the September 15, 1970 
meeting specific means to be used by the C.I.A. to attempt to 
prevent Mr. Allende from assuming the Presidency of Chile. 
I recall the meeting as one that focused upon the policy con- 
siderations which should influence my decision to act and 
upon the general means available to accomplish the objective. 
As I have previously stated, I recall discussing the direct 
expenditure of funds to assist Mr. Allende's opponents, the 
termination of United States financial aid and assistance 
programs as a means of adversely affecting the Chilean 
economy, and the effort to enlist support of various factions, 
including the military, behind a candidate who could defeat 
Mr. Allende in the congressional confirmation procedure. 

Interrogatory Jfi. — The Committee has received testimony to the 
effect that information concerning the activity being conducted by the 
Central Intelligence Agency in Chile, as a result of instructions re- 
ceived from you on September 15, 1970, was not to be made available 
to the Department of State or the Department of Defense. Please 
state whether you issued instructions that the Department of State 
or the De})artment of Defense were not to be informed of certain CIA 
activities in Chile. 

I do not recall specifically issuing instructions that the ac- 
tivity being conducted by the C.I.A. in Chile not be disclosed 
to the Department of State or the Department of Defense. 
However, I do recall instructing that the C.I.A.'s activities 
in Chile be carried out covertly in order to be effective and 
that knowledge of the C.I.A.'s actions be kept on a need-to- 
know basis only. 

Interrogatory J^l. — If your answer to Interrogatory 46 is in the af- 
firmative, please state the reasons why you instructed such information 
to be withheld from the Departments of State and Defense. 

See response to Interrogatory No. 46. 

Interrogatory JfS. — Please state whether the activities conducted in 
Chile by the CIA as a result of instructions received by Richard 
Helms from j'ou in September 1970, known within the CIA as "Track 
II" activities, were known to : 

A. Secretary of State Rogers; 

B. Secretar}' of Defense Laird ; 

C. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Johnson; 

D. Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard ; or 

E. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff' Admiral Moorer. 

I do not recall being aware that the C.I.A.'s activities in 
Chile were being carried out under designations such as 



162 

"Track I" or "Track II.'' In any event, I do not know what, 
if any, of the C.LA.'s activities in Chile were known to : 

A. Secretary of State Rogers; 

B. Secretary of Defense Laird; 

C. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Johnson; 

D. Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard ; or 

E. Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Moorer. 

Interrogatory 4^^,— Please state approximately how frequently dur- 
ing the period September 15, 1970 through October 24, 1970, you were 
personally consulted with regard to CIA activities in Chile. 

I do not presently recall being personally consulted with 
regard to C.I.A. activities in Chile at any time during the 
period September 15, 1970 through October 24, 1970, except 
as described in response to Interrogatory No. 52. 

Intemrogatory 50. — Please state with whom, during the period re- 
ferred to in Interrogatory 49, you discussed CIA activities in Chile. 

See response to Interrogatory No. 52. 

Interrogatory 51. — Please state whether you were aware that during 
the period referred to in Interrogatory 49 the CIA was attempting to 
promote a military coup in Chile. 

Except as set forth in response to Interrogatory No. 52, 
I do not recall being aware that during the period referred to 
in Interrogatory No. 49 the C.I.A. was attempting to promote 
a military coup in Chile. 

Interrogatory 52. — Secretai-y Kissinger has stated that in mid- 
October 1970 you orally instructed him to call off CIA attempts to 
promote a military coup in Chile. Please state whether you, at any 
time, issued instructions that the CIA was to terminate efforts toward 
promoting a military coup in Chile. 

My present recolleetion is that in mid-October 1970, Dr. 
Kissinger informed me that the C.I.A. had reported to him 
that their efforts to enlist the support of various factions in 
attempts by Mr. Allende's opponents to prevent AUende from 
becoming president had not been successful and likely would 
not be. Dr. Kissinger told me that under the circumstances 
he had instructed the C.I.A. to abandon the effort. I informed 
Dr. Kissinger that I agreed with that instruction. 

Inten'ogatory 53. — If your answer to Interrogatory 52 is in the 
affirmative, please state : 

A. To whom such instructions were given ; and 

B. Whether the instructions were intended to cover all coup at- 
tempts or whether they were limited to a particular and specific coup 
attempt. 

See response to Interrogatory No. 52. 

Interrogatory 5If.. — Please state whether, while President, you re- 
ceived information concerning plans for a military coup in Chile 
involving the kidnapping of : 

A. General Rene Schneider ; or 

B. Any other Chilean. 



163 

I do not recall reeciving information, while President, 
concerning plans for a military coup in Chile involving the 
kidnapping of General Rene Schneider or any other Chilean, 

Interrogatory 55. — Please state whether you were aware that the 
Central Intelligence Agency passed machine guns and other material 
to Chilean military officials known to the Central Intelligence Agency 
to be planning a coup attempt. 

My recollection is that I was not aware that the C.I.A. 
passed machine guns or other material to Chilean military 
officials known to the C.I.A. to be planning a coup attempt. 

Interrogatory 56. — ^Testimony has been received by the Committee 
concerning a September 15, 1970 meeting between Donald Kendall, 
Augustin Edwards, publisher of the Chilean newspaper. El Mercui%o, 
Dr. Kissinger and Attorney General Mitchell. Please state whether 
you instructed either Dr. Kissinger or Attorney General Mitchell to 
meet with Messrs. Kendall and Edwards. 

I recall that during, I believe, September 1970, I received 
a call from Mr. Donald Kendall who informed me that Mr. 
Augustin Edwards, a man I had met during my years in pri- 
vate life, was in this country and was interested in informing 
appropriate officials here concerning recent developments in 
Chile. I told Mr. Kendall that he should have Mr. Edwards 
talk to Dr. Kissinger or Attorney General Mitchell, who was 
a member of the National Security Council. I do not recall 
whether I subsequently instructed either Mr. Mitchell or Dr. 
Kissinger to meet with Mr. Edwards. It is quite possible that 
I did. 

Interrogatory 57. — Richard Helms has testified that he was ordered 
to meet with Augustin Edwards and that he did so on the morning 
of September 14, 1970, or September 15, 1970. Please state who or- 
dered Helms to meet with Edwards. 

I do not recall directing Mr. Helms to meet with Mr. Ed- 
wards nor do I recall instructing anyone on my staff to so 
instruct him. 

Interrogatory 58. — Richard Helms has testified as to his impression 
that you called the September 15, 1970 meeting, referred to in Inter- 
rogatory 45, as a result of Edwards' presence in Washington and in- 
formation, passed from Edwards through Donald Kendall, about 
conditions in Chile and what was happening there. Please state whether 
any of the instructions given by you to Richard Helms in September 
of 1970 were given as a result of information, concerning conditions 
•^ Chile, supplied from Edwards to Kendall. 

I do not recall that either the timing or the purpose of the 
September 15, 1970 meeting concerning Chile had any rela- 
tionship to Mr, Augustin Edward's presence in Washington 
or the information he may have conveyed to Dr. Kissinger, 
Attorney General Mitchell, or Director Helms, Therefore, I 
do not believe that any instructions Director Helms may have 
received during that meeting were given as a result of in- 
formation, concerning conditions in Chile, supplied from Mr. 
Edwards to Mr. Kendall. 



-725 O - 76 - 11 



164 

Interrogatory 59. — Please state whether you informed Mr. Kendall, 
during the summer of 1970, in words or substance, that you would see 
to it that the Central Intelligence Agency received appropriate in- 
structions so as to allow it to take action aimed at preventing Allende 
from becoming President of Chile. 

I do not remember informing Mr. Kendall, in words or 
substance, that I would see to it that the C.I.A. received ap- 
propriate instructions so as to allow it to take action aimed 
at preventing Allende from becoming President of Chile. 

Interrogatory 60. — Please state whether, while President, you re- 
ceived information that the International Telephone and Telegraph 
Corporation had made any offer of money to the United States 
Government, to be used for the purpose of preventing Allende from 
taking office. 

I do not recall receiving information, while President, that 
the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation had 
made any offer of money to the United States Grovernment. 
to be used for the purpose of preventing Allende from taking 
office. 

Interrogatory 01. — If your answer to Interrogatory 60 is in the 
affirmative, please state : 

A. Who informed you of this offer ; 

B. Your response when so informed ; and 

C. Your understanding of the nature and terms of the offer. 

See response to Interrogatory No. 60. 

Interrogatory 62. — Please state whether, while President, you re- 
ceived information that : 

A. The International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, or 
any other United States corporation, was, in connection with the 1970 
Chilean election, making money available to anti-AUende groups; 

B. The International Te.lephone and Telegraph Corporation, or 
any other American corporation, made money available to opponents 
of Allende's 1964 campaign for the presidency ; or 

C. Cooperation was rendered by the CIA, in 1964, to any United 
States corporation in connection with the corporation's provision of 
funds to Chileans opposing Allende's election. 

I do not recall receiving information, while President, 
that: 

A. The International Telephone and Telegraph Corpora- 
tion, or any other United States corporation, was, in connec- 
tion with the 1970 Chilean election, making money available 
to anti-Allende groups ; 

B. The International Telephone and Telegraph Corpora- 
tion, or any other American corporation, made money avail- 
able to opponents of Allende's 1964 campaign for the presi- 
dency; or 

C. Cooperation was rendered by the C.I.A., in 1964 to any 
United States corporation in connection with the corpora- 
tion's provision of funds to Chileans opposing Allende's 
election. 



165 

Interrogatory 63. — If your answer to any portion of Interrogatory 
62 is in the affirmative, please state : 

A. Who informed you ; 

B. Your response when so informed ; and 

C. The nature of the information supplied you. 

See response to Interrogatory No. 62. 

Interrogatory 64. — Please state whether, after Allende was inaugu- 
rated, the United States, directly or indirectly, continued its contacts 
with Chilean military officers for the purpose of promoting a military 
coup d'etat. 

I do not know whether, after Allende was inaugurated, 
the United States, directly or indirectly, continued its con- 
tacts with Chilean military officers for the purpose of pro- 
moting a military coup d'etat. 

Interrogatory 65. — If your answer to Interrogatory 64 is in the 
negative, please state whether you issued instructions to the CIA to 
insure that Chilean military officials, with whom the United States 
had been in contact prior to Allenne's inauguration, knew it was not 
the desire of the United States Government that a military coup topple 
the Allende government. 

None of the instructions I recall issuing prior to Mr. 
AUende's becoming President of Chile, nor any of the infor- 
mation I recall receiving during that period led me to believe 
that it was necessary to issue instructions to the C.I.A. to 
insure that Chilean military officials, with whom the United 
States had been in contact prior to AUende's inauguration, 
knew it was not the desire of the United States Government 
that a military coup topple the Allende government. 

Interrogatory 66. — If your answer to Interrogatory 65 is in the 
affirmative, please state: 

A. To whom such instructions were given ; 

B. Whether they were oral or written ; and 

C. The approximate date of the instructions. 

See response to Interrogatory No. 65. 

Interrogatory 67. — Thomas Karamessines has testified as to his 
belief that the seeds laid in the Track II effort in 1970 had their 
impact in 1973. Please state whether you believe that the actions under- 
taken by the CIA in Chile : 

A. During September and October 1970 ; or 

B. Between October 1970 and September 1973 were, to any degree 
a factor in bringing about the successful 1973 coup. 

It is my opinion that the actions which I authorized the 
C.I.A. to take in September 1970 to prevent Mr. Allende from 
becoming President of Chile, and which with my approval 
were terminated in October 1970, were not a factor in bring- 
ing about the 1973 military coup. 

Interrogatory 68. — If your answer to Interrogatory 67 is in the 
affirmative, please describe the manner in which such activities con- 
tributed to the occurrence of the 1973 coup. 

See response to Interrogatory No. 67. 



166 

Interrogatory 69. — National Security Decision Memorandum No. 93 
is attached at Tab F. With respect to the "necessary actions" referred 
to at page 2, please discuss: 

A. The actions taken, if any, in connection with subsections a 
through d; 

B. Whether, as suggested on page 2 therein, any "existing commit- 
ments" were reduced, delayed or terminated; 

C. By what means United States private business interests were 
made aware of United States Government concern with the Govern- 
ment of Chile; and 

D. The extent to which the United States Government elicited 
the aid of United States private businesses with investments or 
operations in Chile. 

Apart from issuing the directives set forth in NSDM No. 
93, 1 do not recall receiving reports or other information con- 
cerning the specific implementation of the directives. 

Interrogatory 70. — A tape recording of a June 23, 1972 conversation 
between yourself and H. R. Haldeman attributes to you the follow- 
ing remark : ". . . we protected Helms from one hell of a lot of things." 
Please identify with particularity the "things" referred to by you in 
this conversation. 

I recall that in early 1972 Richard Helms, as Director of 
the C.I.A., discussed with me the fact that a former employee 
of the Agency was preparing a book for publication which 
would, for the first time, reveal a great deal of classified 
information about the C.I.A. which he believed should not 
be disclosed in the interest of the C.I.A. or the Nation. I 
assumed from Director Helms' long affiliation with the agency 
that his assessment of the detrimental effect of such revela- 
tions was accurate. 

Mr. Helms explained that the C.I.A. contemplated taking 
legal action to prevent these disclosures. I do not recall Mr. 
Helms discussing any specific revelations that might be made, 
but I was concerned that there might be disclosures of highly 
sensitive C.I.A. covert activities. Although disclosure of 
many of these matters would have involved actions of pre- 
vious Administrations, rather than mine, I believed it would 
damage the C.I.A.'s ability to function effectively in the 
future and thereby weaken the intelligence capabilities of 
the United States. It is also my recollection that Mr. Helms 
and I discussed the intense criticism my Administration and 
the C.I.A. might recieve in the media for taking such legal 
actions. He felt that charges might be made that we were 
"suppressing" the right of free expression. I recall assuring 
Mr. Helms he was doing the right thing in defending the 
C.I.A. and that he would have my full support despite 
criticism. Therefore, I assured the Director that the White 
House would support the C.I.A.'s position in opposing such 
disclosures. As I recall, it was in light of this incident that, 
on June 23, 1972, I made the statement to H. R. Haldeman 
referred to in this interrogatory. 



167 

Interrogator'!/ 71. — Please state whether you were ever informed 
that any presidentially-appointed member of your Administration, or 
any officer or official of any government agency, lied to, or intention- 
ally misled, any committee or subcommittee of the United States 
Congress, in testimony relating to events in, or affecting, Chile during 
the period 1970-1973, inclusive. 

I do not recall ever being informed that a presidentially- 
appointed member of my Administration, or an officer or offi- 
cial of a government agency, lied to, or intentionally misled, 
any committee or subcommittee of the United States Con- 
gress, in testimony relating to events in, or affecting, Chile 
during the period 1970-1973 inclusive. 

Interrogatory 72. — If your answer to Interrogatory 71 is in the 
affirmative, please state as to each instance in which you were so 
informed. 

A. Who informed you ; 

B. The name of the testifying official, or officials; 

C. The committee before which the testimony was given ; and 

D. The approximate date of the testimony. 

See response to Interrogatory No. 71. 

Interrogatory 73. — During your Administration, a number of 
"crisis" situations arose, domestically and throughout the world. 
Please describe the quality of the intelligence provided you in con- 
nection with those crises, including specifically : 

A. Whether it was adequate ; 

B. Whether it was timely ; and 

C. "Whether it was internally consistent. 

Considering the pressures and the enormous problems con- 
fronted by the intelligence community, I believe that, with, 
some unfortunate exceptions, the quality of intelligence re- 
ceived during my Administration was relatively adequate. 
Intelligence collection is a very difficult, highly sophisticated 
art and the United States has progressed in its development. 
Naturally, any President, holding the tremendous power he 
does — including the power to wage nuclear war — desires and 
needs the very best intelligence information available. It is 
comforting, for example, when sitting down to difficult nego- 
tiations, to know the fallback positions of our adversaries 
or their areas of vulnerability— an advantage that can be 
gained or lost not only through adept intelligence work but 
through deliberate or unwitting leaks of such information; a 
problem I faced at various times during my Administration 
and have referred to earlier. 

Desiring the very best intelligence information, of course, 
will in itself lead a President to believe that improvements 
are possible and warranted. On the international level, for 
example, better intelligence concerning the 1973 Yom Kippur 
War in the :Middle East might have permitted moves to avert 
it. On the domestic front, the need for improved information 
is equally as great. Terrorist activity in the United States, 
which had reached unprecedented heights in the late 1960's 
and early 1970's seems again to be on the increase. The tragic 



168 

bombino- at LaGiiardia Airport in whicli eleven persons were 
killed may only be a forerunner to a new round of premedi- 
tated violence. It was in a similar context in 1970 — a time at 
which incidents of bombings and hijackings had reached an 
all-time high — that I requested officials of the various intelli- 
gence agencies to evaluate domestic intelligence capabilities 
in this country and to recommend steps for its improvement. 
What many persons refused to recognize when the existence 
of the "Huston" evaluation became known, but what your 
Committee's investigation has now established beyond doubt, 
is that none of the recommendations contained in the Huston 
evaluation departed from actions taken under at least four or 
five earlier Administrations. Indeed, the recommendations 
set forth in that study were in most respects similar to the 
reconnnendations emanating from the current reviews of the 
intelligence community. The difference, of course, was that in 
utilizing the various intelligence methods suggested, such as 
C.I.A. informants within the United States to trace commu- 
nist alliances with terrorist organizations who had threat- 
ened domestic violence to protest the Viet Xam War, my 
Administration was viewed as bent upon stifling dissenting 
political views. The intermixture of protected political ac- 
tivity, civil disobedience, and acts of terrorism — all under 
the antiwar rubric — was so great that to move against terror- 
ism was to be guilty of political suppression. Unfortunately, 
the tools available to get at the one while avoiding the other 
were not as delicate as the surgeon's scalpel. Perhaps this 
Comniittee's recommendations in the area of improved do- 
mestic intelligence will more closely resemble the instruments 
of a surgeon. If, however, by overreacting to past excesses 
this Committee impedes domestic or foreign intelligence 
capabilities, it may later find that in a period of terrorists 
bombings, kidnapping and assassinations, the public interest 
will require more authoritarian measures — despite their im- 
pact on personal liberties — than the more delicate but less 
effective alternatives. 

Interrogatory 7^.— With regard to the situations referred to in In- 
terrogatory 73, please describe those situations, if any, in which the 
quality of intelligence you received, both foreign and domestic, was 
in your view: 

A. Inadequate ; 

B. Misleading; 

C. Otherwise unsatisfactory; or 

D. Extremely good. 

See response to Interrogatory No. 73. 

Interrogatory 7^.— Answering with respect to both foreign intelli- 
gence and domestic intelligence, please state your opinion as to how the 
quality of the intelligence received by the White House during your 
Administration could have been improved. 

See response to Interrogatory No. 73. 
Interrogatory 76. — Answering with respect to both foreign and do- 
mestic intelligence, please state what administrative reorganization of 



169 

the intelligence community, if any, would have improved the quality 
of the intelligence received by the White House during your 
Administration. 

See response to Interrogatory No. 77. 

Interrogatory 77. — As a result of your years of government service, 
including service as both Vice President and President, you have had 
occasion to develop insights into many of tlie issues currently before 
the Committee. The Committee would welcome your comments and 
suggestions as to the structure, organization, and function of the 
United States intelligence community, or any part of it, including 
any statement as to ways in which improvements might be made. 

Attached at Tab G is a copy of S. Kes. 21, the Resolution pursuant 
to which the Committee was established. Section 2 of the Resolution 
expressly authorizes and directs the Committee to investigate certain 
enumerated matters relating to the intelligence community. The Com- 
mittee would also welcome your comments with respect to any of 
these enumerated matters. 

In 1947 as a "freshman" Congressman and member of the 
Herter Committee, I visited a devastated European conti- 
nent. Seeing Berlin in the agonies of partition and seeing 
Italy under the severe challenge of Communist takeover; 
indeed, seeing Europe emerge from war in an age of stark 
idealogical conflict — all these as well as other factors fostered 
my firm belief in the need for a strong, determined, and ef- 
fective intelligence system during a period of Cold war. 

The world has changed since 1947, and I have been privi- 
leged to have played a role in much of that change. Tragi- 
cally, however, there is much that has not changed. The reali- 
ties of international relations have not lessened our need for 
intelligence. Throughout history, where the great powers are 
concerned, during a period of detente the danger of war goes 
down but the danger of conquest without war goes up. 

Consequently, I have found recent efforts to emasculate 
the Central Intelligence A'^encv and relate'! intp11i<Tence or- 
ganizations to be not only incredibly short-sighted but poten- 
tially dangerous to the security of all free nations. The great- 
est disservice of the Select Committee would be to take any 
action or make any recommendation which would diminish 
by the slightest degree the capabilities of our intelligence 
community. 

Even as a distant observer I can say without reservation 
that the revelations and investigations over the past year have 
had the obvious effect of lessening United States intelligence 
capabilities in the world. 

Even the least sophisticated among us can see that morale 
among these essential public servants is probably at an all- 
time low. 

The secrecy that is crucial to a successful intelligence sys- 
tem has been routinely violated, causing in many quarters 
a casual indifference to the need for security. For the na- 
tional media to publish and disseminate classified national 
security information is in my view irresponsible journalism. 



170 

That they and those who leak classified information to them 
in violation of the law would continue to be oblivious to the 
harm they are doin^ to the Nation reflects not on their pa- 
triotism but on their intelligence and judgment. 

From my experience in the Executive branch I would be 
prepared to predict that because of what has happened over 
the past year, vital intelligence sources have dried up. I am 
certain that other governments' readiness to accept our word 
as bond and to be assured that we can keep their confidences 
have steadily diminished. What new opportunities have been 
lost or what unwished consequences we might have suffered 
because of constant attacks in the media and by the Congress 
are not possible to know. It is all too likely that we will learn 
of them "the hard way." 

I realize it is in vogue to rail against covert activities and 
clandestine operations. Some have even rhetorically ques- 
tioned the very need for secrecy in the conduct of foreign af- 
fairs. Perhaps there was a time when some of this criticism 
was necessary or even helpful. However, I think that para- 
phrasing an old aphorism is apt here: nothing exceeds like 
excess. 

The pendulum has swung too far. Were today's conditions 
in existence seven years ago it is highly questionable whether 
the historic new opening could have been made to the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China. Efforts to get the return of our 
POW's and achieve an honorable peace in Vietnam might 
well have been aborted. Significant new initiatives in the 
Middle East would have been delayed. Nuclear arms limita- 
tions and other agreements with the Soviet Union — difficult 
achievements under the best of conditions — would have been 
much more difficult. 

Therefore, I make the following recommendations. 

1. That Congressional oversight responsibilities, which are 
appropriate as a mechanism for legislative participation in 
the policy decisions affecting intelligence activities, be dele- 
gated to a joint committee consisting of not more than twelve 
Senators and Representatives. 

2. That no information or material made available to the 
joint oversight committee be made available to any Congres- 
sional staff member, except the staff of the joint committee, 
which should be limited to not more than six members. 

3. That a statute be enacted making it a criminal violation 
to reveal to any unauthorized person information classified 
pursuant to applicable law or executive order. 

4. That a committee consisting of representatives from each 
of the intelligence agencies be established to coordinate their 
respective activities. 

5. That the joint intelligence committee study the question 
of the extent to which continued limitations on C.I.A. do- 
mestic intelligence activities, where there is a direct con- 
nection to matters of foreign espionage, sabotage or coun- 
terintelligence, should be continued. 

Freedom without security produces anarchy. Security 
without freedom produces dictatorship. Maintaining the deli- 



171 

cate balance between freedom and security has been the 
genius of the (American democracy and the reason it has sur- 
vived for 200 years. Failure to provide this balance has been 
the cause for the failure of democratic governments to sur- 
vive in many other parts of the world. 

The Executive, the Congress, and the Judiciary have in- 
herited a great legacy and have a special responsibility to 
maintain that balance so that our American system of gov- 
ernment will continue to survive in a time when security 
and freedom are in jeopardy at home and abroad. 

It is important at this time to step back and assess not 
only what action should or must be taken with respect to a 
particular matter, but also the inimediate circumstances 
which seem to compel that action be taken at all. In assessing 
the present circumstances, it is my opinion that the indis- 
criminate denigration that has been heaped recently upon 
the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and our other intelligence agencies has been 
most unfortunate. In the zeal of some to reform and others 
to expose, we have come very near throwing the baby out 
with the bath water. We live in imperfect times in an un- 
certain world. As a nation we need every possible capability, 
not merelv to survive, but to be better able to build the kind 
of world in peace that has been man's perpetual goal. I fear 
that the moralizing and posturing with regard to our in- 
telligence agencies over the past year have caused us to lose 
much of that capability. Let us hope that it does not cause 
us to lose the peace. 

EicHARD Nixon. 



173 



STAFF LIST 

This Final Report is the result of a sustained eflfort by the entire 
Committee staff. The Committee wishes to express its appreciation to 
the members of the support, legal, research, and Task Force staffs, who 
made a substantial contribution to this Report and who have served 
the Committee and the Senate with integrity and loyalty : 

David Aaron Task Force Leader. 

William Bader Task Force Leader. 

Barbara Banoff Counsel. 

Howard Barkey Consultant. 

Frederick Baron Counsel. 

Laurie Bartlet Secretary. 

Lawrence Baskir Counsel. 

John Bayly Counsel, 

Charity Benz Office Manager. 

Richard Betts Professional Staff Member. 

Beth Bloomfield Research Assistant. 

Sam Bouchard Professional Staff Member. 

Harriet Bramble Secretary. 

Belva Brissett Secretary. 

Nancy Brooks Secretary. 

Maxine Brown Secretary. 

Andrew Burness Clerk. 

David Bushong ^ Counsel. 

Margaret Carpenter Research Assistant. 

Barry Carter Counsel. 

Barbara Chesnik Research Assistant. 

Lot Cooke Clerk/Security. 

Elizabeth Culbreth Counsel. 

Lynn Davis Professional Staff Member. 

Spencer Davis Press Secretary. 

Rhett Dawson Counsel. 

Thomas C. Dawson Research Assistant. 

James De Marco Counsel. 

Joseph Dennin Counsel. 

Mary De Oreo Research Assistant. 

Mary de Temple Secretary. 

James Dick Counsel. 

Joseph di Genova Counsel. 

Dorothy Dillon Research Assistant. 

Patricia Doolittle Secretary. 

Daniel Dwyer, Jr Research Assistant. 

Robert Edwards, Jr Clerk/Security. 

John Elliff Task Force Leader. 

Betty Ellison Secretary. 

Michael Epstein Counsel. 



174 



Joan Erno Secretary. 

Peter Fenn Professional Staff Member. 

Harold Ford Consultant. 

Richard Garwin Consultant. 

Mark Gitenstein Counspl. 

Janette Glidewell Secretary. 

Bruce Grant Counsel. 

Edward Greissing Research Assistant. 

Arthur Harridan Consultant. 

William Harris Consultant. 

Audrey Hatry Clerk of the Committee. 

Deborah Herbst Assistant Press Secretary. 

Paulette Hodges Secretary. 

Karl Inderfurth __ Professional Staff Member. 

Portia Iverson Secretary. 

Arthur Jefferson Counsel. 

Dorothy Johnson Secretary. 

Loch Johnson Professional Staff Member, 

Yolanda Johnson Clerk. 

James Johnston Counsel. 

Anne Karalekas Professional Staff Member. 

Jeffrey Kay den Research Assistant. 

Robert Kelley Counsel. 

Lawrence Kieves Operations Coordinator. 

Charles Kirbow Counsel. 

Joseph Kirchheimer Consultant. 

Diane Koppal Secretary. 

Susan Koscis Secretary. 

Diane LaVoy Research Assistant. 

George Lawton Professional Staff Member. 

Howard Liebengood Consultant. 

Charles Lombard Professional Staff Member. 

Dan McCorkle Clerk/Security. 

Dorothy Mclntyre Secretary. 

Martha MacDonald Secretary. 

JSTaldeen MacDonald Research Assistant. 

Michael Madigan Counsel. 

Ben Marshall Security Director. 

Burke Marshall Consultant. 

Cynthia Mascioli Secretary. 

Judith Mason Research Assistant. 

Ernest May Consultant. 

Betty Mayo Secretary. 

Elliott Maxwell Counsel. 

Ellen Metsky Clerk. 

Paul Michel Counsel. 

William Miller Staff Director. 

Patricia Monaco Secretary. 

Janet Moore Secretary. 

Michael Murphy Clerk/Security Assistant. 

Lois Nuss Secretary. 

James O'Flaherty Professional Staff Member. 

Jan Orloff Research Director. 

Lynsey Oster Clerk. 



175 



Drena Owens Secretary. 

John Peterson Research Director. 

Susan Pitts Research Assistant. 

Andrew Postal Counsel. 

Christopher Pyle Consultant. 

Alton Quanbeck Task Force Leader. 

Theodore Ralston Research Assistant. 

Harry Ransom Consultant. 

Gordon Rhea Counsel. 

Eric Richard Counsel. 

Walter Ricks III Counsel. 

Alan Romberg Professional Staff Member. 

James Rowe Research Assistant. 

Ruth Schneider Secretary. 

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr Chief Counsel. 

Paula Schwartz Clerk. 

Lester Seidel Counsel. 

Patrick Shea Professional Staff Member. 

John L. Smith Counsel. 

Elizabeth Smith Research Assistant. 

Stephanie Smith Clerk. 

Curtis Smothers Counsel for Minority. 

Britt Snider Counsel. 

Martha Talley Counsel. 

Athan Theoharis Consultant 

Florence Thoben Administrative Staff. 

Sherry Towell Office Manager. 

Gregory Treverton Professional Staff Member. 

William Trueh;\rt Consultant. 

James Tschirgi Professional Staff Member. 

James Turner Research Assistant. 

Richard Ullman Consultant. 

Paul Wallach Counsel. 

William White Professional Staff Member. 

Burton Wides Counsel. 

Carol Wiik Document Clerk. 

Joan Wilson Secretary. 

Otis Wilson Consultant. 

Peter Zimmerman Consultant. 

Phebe Zimmerman Research Assistant. 

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