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DEPARTMENT

BOSTON PUBUCUBRARY

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORTS ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

BOOK VI

FINAL REPORT

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS

WITH RESPECT TO

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
UNITED STATES SENATE

5UpCl"Uil'--ilui..'«. ■.. • -i!>-'--J)

nr.T 1 2l3/\j

April 23 (under authority of the order of April 14), 1976

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
70-890 O WASHINGTON : 1976

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $3.40

SENATE SELECT COMIVIITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

FRANK CHURCH, Idaho, Chairman
JOHN G. TOWER, Texas, Vice Chairman

PHILIP A. flART, Michigan HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee

WALTER P. MONDALE, Minnesota BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona

WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, Kentucky CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr., Maryland

ROBERT MORGAN, North Carolina RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, Pennsylvania

GARY HART, Colorado

William G. Miller, Staff Director

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief C'ounsel

Curtis R. Smothers, Counsel to the Minority

Audrey Hatry, Clerk of the Committee

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, and pursuant to
the mandate of Senate Resolution 21, I am transmitting herewith to
the Senate two studies prepared by the Library of Congress which
supplement the other books of the Committee's Final Report. The pub-
lication of this book completes the record of the Committee's hearings,
findings, and reports on the intelligence activities of the United States
Government.

The first study is entitled "The Evolution and Organization of the
Federal Intelligence Function: A Brief Overview (1776-1975)" and
was prepared at the Committee's request and under its direction, by
Dr. Harold C. Relyea of the Congressional Research Service. It is
published to provide a comprehensive compilation of public, unclassi-
fied, sources of information on American intelligence activities, and
includes a full bibliography.

The second study is entitled "Executive Agreements: A Survey of
Recent Congressional Interest and Action" and was prepared by
Marjorie Ann Brown of the Congressional Research Service. This
survey is published to help the American people understand an im-
portant means used by our Government in the execution of its foreign
policy and the efforts made by Congress to ensure that its constitu-
tional responsibilities in foreign affairs are properly executed through
the appropriate use of executive agi'eements and treaties.

On behalf of the Committee and its staff, I would like to express
our deep appreciation to the staff of the Library of Congress, and par-
ticularly the Congressional Research Service. Their work has been
of the highest quality and their prompt response to the Committee's
numerous and diverse requests deserves a full measure of praise.

Frank Church,

Chairman.
(in)

CONTENTS

Page
Letter of Transmittal III

THE EVOLUTION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL
INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION: A BRIEF OVERVIEW (1776-

1975) 1

Introduction 1

I. Research Limitations 2

II. Intelligence Authority 3

PART ONE: The SmaU Beginnings (1776-1914) 7

I. Revolution and Intelligence 9

II. The New Nation I5

III. The Mission to Florida I7

'1
4
5
2
4

IV. Mexican War 2

V. Civil War 2

VI. Pinkerton 2

VII. Seward 3

VIII. Baker 3

IX. Dodge 45

X. Carrington 4^

XI. Signal Services 5q

XII. Lesser Efforts 5y

XIII. Secret Service 5g

XIV. Armed Forces Intelhgence 6j

XV. Spanish-American War 6^

XVI. Post War Developments 6q

PART TWO: The Middle Years (1914-39) 75

I. Military Intelligence 76

II. Naval Intelligence 89

III. Bureau of Investigation 94

IV. American Protective League 102

V. Other Factors 107

VI. Red Scare 112

VII. American Black Chamber 115

VIII. Intelhgence at TwiUght ,119^

PART THREE: The National Security Colossus (1939-75) 132

I. Neutral America 133

II. Attack 137

III. Office of Strategic Services 138

IV. Air Intelligence 156

V. Military Intelligence 183

VI. Naval Intelligence 216

VII. Civihan Intelhgence 222

VIII. Postwar Adjustment 240

IX. Atomic Energy Commission 243

X. National Security Council 244

XI. Central Intelligence Agency 253

XII. Defense Intelligence 265

XIII. State Department 271

XIV. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 273

XV. Loyalty-Security 274

XVI. Watergate 277

XVII. Justice Department 282

XVIII. Treasury Department 286

XIX. Overview 290

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Page

BIBLIOGRAPHY 293

APPENDIX I: The Evolution and Organization of Federal Intelligence

Institutions (1882-1975) 309

APPENDIX II: Government Information Security Classification Policy. _ 313

I. National Defense 314

II. World War I 321

III. Peacetime Protection 324

IV. World War II 327

V. The CooUdge Committee 332

VI. The Wright Commission 334

VII. The Moss Committee 337

VIII. Other Congressional Acts 344

I X. Overview 348

Government Information Security Classification Policy: A Select

Bibliography 350

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 353

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS: A SURVEY OF RECENT CON-
GRESSIONAL INTEREST AND ACTION 355

I. The Making of Executive Agreements 356

II. Congressional Interest and Action Before 1967 357

III. Senate Resolutions: 1969, 1970, and 1972 358

IV. The Case Act, Public Law 92-403 360

V. Attempts to Limit Spending Required by Executive Agreements- __ 360

VI. Disapproval Procedure for Executive Agreements 363

VII. Future Congressional Concerns 364

APPENDIX A: Statistics on Executive Agreements and Treaties Entered

Into by the United States, 1930-45; 1946-73 365

APPENDIX B: Department of State Revision of Circular 175 Procedure. 367

APPENDIX C: Legislation Pending in the 93d Congress Relating to the

Making of International Agreements 375

THE EVOLUTION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE FED-
ERAL INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION : A BRIEF OVERVIEW

(1776-1975)*

Introduction

Four centuries before the birth of Christ, Sun Tzu, a Chinese mili-
tary theorist, counseled that :

The reason the enlightened prince of the wise general con-
quer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements
surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge. . . . What
is called "foreknowledge'' cannot be elicited from spirits, nor
from the gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from
calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the
enemy situation.^

In this observation is the essence of what modern civilization refers
to as "intelligence." As defined by the prestigious and highly respected
Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch, chaired
by former President Herbert C. Hoover : "Intelligence deals with all
the things which should be known in advance of initiating a course
action." ^ But the concept is not synonymous with "information."
Admiral William F. Raborn, Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency from 1964 to 1966, explained :

"Intelligence," as we use the term, refers to information which
has been carefully evaluated as to its accuracy and signifi-
cance. The difference between "information" and "intel-
ligence" is the important process of evaluating the accuracy
and assessing the significance in terms of national security.^

Expanding upon the idea of information evaluation preparatory to
policy development, intelligence may be understood as "the product
resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and in-
terpretation of all available information which concerns one or more
aspects of foreign nations or of areas of operations and which is im-
mediately or potentially significant to planning." *

Intelligence activities need not rely upon spies and informers to
secure "foreknowledge." Information obtained in the open market
place of ideas and international communications media can, with

* Prepared for the Select Committee by Dr. Harold C. Relyea, Analyst in
American National Government, Government and General Research Division,
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.

'Samuel B. Griffith, tr. Sim Tzu: The Art of War. New York and Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1963, pp. 144-145; generally, see chapter 13 "Employ-
ment of Secret Agents."

^ U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government.
Intelligence Activities. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1955, p. 26.

^Anon. What's CIA? U.S. Neics and World Report, v. 69, July 18, 1966: 74.

* U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Department
of the Air Force. Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage.
Washington, Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, 1955, p. 53.

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proper analysis, significantly contribute to an intelligence product.
Further, the possible utilization of spies and informers raises both
the Machiavellian question of ends versus means and a practical ques-
tion regarding impersonal spying. For some, the righteousness of the
cause sanctions clandestine information gathering. Others condone
such activity when it is confined to technological devices such as robot
spy planes, space satellites, deep sea sensors and listening devices,
or code breaking machines.

Intelligence activities were a developed art among the ancients.
Practice, experience, and technology have contributed to the sophis-
tication of this pursuit. Today, it may be assumed that every nation,
regardless of their form of government or guiding political phi-
losophy, engages in some type of intelligence activity. JNIinimally, the
intelligence function contributes to the preservation and security of
the state. Beyond this denominator, the intelligence function variably
extends to the cultivation of the most grandiose schemes of interna-
tional relations and world power.

/. Research Limitations

Because intelligence activities are generally cloaked in official and
operational secrecy, research on the evolution, organization, and ac-
tivities of the Federal intelligence community may be hampered by a
scarcity of useful resource material and a plague of inaccuracies
effected by a lack of corroborating evidence or reliance upon a com-
mon erroneous source.^

Other research problems derive from the attitude of Federal officials
and leaders of the armed services toward the intelligence function
prior to World War I: within the departments and agencies, intel-
ligence activities were viewed as neither necessary nor serious concerns.
The naive view prevailed that the major foreign powers of the day
made little use of and had little use for intelligence. If this was the
case, then the United States need not engage in such efforts. When
World War I introduced America to modern warfare, it also provided
an opportunity to examine the intelligence activities of the allies. The
net effect was one of embarassment. Much was learned from the war
experience with regard to building a useful and effective intelligence
structure. Nevertheless, the historical record must necessarily reflect
scant consideration being given to intelligence activities at the Federal
level prior to the World War. Perhaps as an attempt to compensate
for the actual circumstances of the pre-war situation, some accounts
of Federal intelligence activity appear to overstate or overemphasize
the importance of certain agents or operativeiS and the significance of
certain accomplishments. Thus, a careful effort must be made to main-
tain a sense of historical proportion with regard to the exploits of
individuals and the causation of events in the sphere of intelligence
operations.

It should also be kept in mind that very early intelligence activities
in the United States were highly sporadic and individualistic.

^ Official secrecy refers to some type of legal authority establishing the com-
pulsory withholding of certain types of information from disclosure ; operational
secrecy refers to nonacknowledgement of actions either by announcement or upon
open questioning.

These conditions contribute to research difficulties with the result that
very few records were produced or continue to exist.

And one final note must be added regarding the limitations of his-
torical records in this area of research. Some significant develop-
ments in the evolution of Federal intelligence operations have escaped
written account and useful and important documents for this research
have been destroyed for reasons of political sensitivity, embarrass-
ment, security, and personal privacy.

//. Intelligence Authority

The Constitution of the United States is silent regarding any direct
reference to intelligence activities. Within Article I, section 8, Con-
gress is granted certain powers which have an implication for the
enactment of statues operationalizing the intelligence function. These
include the authority to "support armies," "maintain a navy," and
"make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces." Relying upon these provisions, Congress might have directly
established armed forces intelligence operations and provided for the
restriction of intelligence information by enacting appropriate rules
for Federal civilian employees and regulations for military and naval
personnel. That the House and Senate did not directly legislate on
these matters does not eifect the implied constitutional authority.
What the Legislature did was provide a more ambitious and sophis-
ticated organizational and administrative stiiicture derivative of these
powers — the Department of War, created in 1789 (1 Stat. 49), and
the Department of the Navy, established in 1798 (1 Stat. 553). It
may be argued that it was within the discretion of the Executive
authority of these entities to organize intelligence operations in con-
formity with the constitutional power exercised by Congress in creat-
ing the departments.^ Modern intelligence operations authority
continues to rest upon these basic constitutional provisions, interpreted
by Congress to grant power to legislate for the defense and security of
the nation.'^

The President would appear to derive authority for intelligence
activities from two constitutional provisions: Article II, section 2,
names the President the Commander in Chief of the army and navy
and section 3 directs that the Chief Executive ". . . take care that the
laws be faithfully executed. . . ." As these are very vague and general
provisions, reliance upon them alone as authority for intelligence
activity would depend upon a President's view of his office. A Chief
Executive adopting Theodore Roosevelt's classic "stewardship theory"
would, undoubtedly, have little reservation in utilizing such implied

' A permanent intelligence unit was established in the Navy Department in 1882
and in the War Department in 1885. Both actions were by internal directive. Ad
hoc and temporary spy systems of varying sophistication had been utilized by the
armed forces since the time of the Revolution.

' The principal contemporary intelligence activities' statutes are the National
Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 495) and the Central Intelligence Act of 1949 (63
Stat. 208) which establish the National Security Council and the Central Intelli-
gence Agency (see 50 U.S.C. 401-404 [1970]). Much of the existing intelligence
structure was created at the direction of the President or other Executive Branch
officials and therefore has no direct statutory base.

powers to justify intelligence operations. In his autobiography, Roose-
velt exemplified his view of the presidency, explaining :

The most important factor in getting the right spirit in my
Administration, next to the insistence upon courage, honesty,
and a genuine democracy of desire to serve the plain people,
was my insistence upon the theory that the executive power
was limited only by specific restrictions and prohibitions
appearing in the Constitution or imposed by the Congress
under its constitutional powers. My view was that every
executive officer, and above all every executive officer in high
position, was a steward of the people, and not to content
himself with the negative merit of keeping his talents im-
damaged in a napkin. I declined to adopt the view that what
was imperatively necessary for the Nation could not be done
by the President unless he could find some specific authori-
zation to do it. My belief was that it was not only his right
but his duty to do anything that the needs of the Nation
demanded unless such action was forbidden by the Consti-
tution or by the laws. Under this interpretation of execu-
tive power I did and caused to be done many things not
previously done by the President and the heads of the De-
partments. I did not usurp power, but I did greatly broaden
the use of executive power. In other words, I acted for the
public welfare, I acted for the common well-being of all our
people, whenever and in whatever manner was necessary,
unless prevented by direct constitutional or legislative pro-
hibition. I did not care a rap for the mere form and show of
power ; I cared immensely for the use that could be made of
the substance.^

Just a few months before leaving office in June, 1908, Roosevelt
told Sir George Otto Trevelyan :

While President I have been President, emphatically;, I
have used every ounce of power there was in the office and I
have not cared a rap for the criticisms of those who spoke of
my "usurpation of power;" for I know that the talk has been
all nonsense and that there had been no usurpation. I believe
that the efficiency of this Government depends upon it pos-
sessing a strong central executive, and whenever I could
establish a precedent for strength in the executive, as I did
for instance as regards external affairs in the case of sending
the fleet around the world, taking Panama, settling affairs
of Santo Domingo, and Cuba ; or as I did in internal affairs in
settling the anthracite coal strike, in keeping order in
Nevada ... or as I have done in bringing the big corporations
to book ... in all these cases I have felt not merely that my
action was right in itself, but that in showing the strength of,
or in giving strength to, the executive, I was establishing a
precedent of value. I believe that responsibility should go

* Theodore Roosevelt. An AutoMoffraphy. New York, Scribners, 1920, pp. 388-
389.

with power, and that it is not well that the strong executive
should be a perpetual executive.^

Opposed to this view of the presidency was Eoosevelt's former
Secretary of War (1905-1908), personal choice for and actual suc-
cessor as Chief Executive, William Howard Taft. According to
America's twenty-seventh President :

The true view of the Executive functions is, as I conceive it,
that the President can exercise no power which cannot be
fairly and reasonably traced to some specific grant of power
or justly implied and included within such express grant as
proper and necessary to its exercise. Such specific grant must
be either in the Federal Constitution or in an act of Congress
passed in pursuance thereof. There is no undefined residuum
of power which he can exercise because it seems to him to be
in the public interest, and there is nothing in the Neagle case
[^In re Neagle^ 135 U.S. 1 (1890)] and its definition of a law
of the United States, or in other precedents, warranting such
an inference. The grants of Executive power are necessary in
general terms in order not to embarrass the Executive within
the field of action plainly marked for him, but his jurisdic-
tion must be justified and vindicated by affirmative constitu-
tional or statutory provision, or it does not exist. There have
not been wanting, however, eminent men in high public office
holding a different view and who have insisted upon the
necessity for an undefined residuum of Executive power in
the public interest. They have not been confined to the present
generation.^"

Between these two views of the presidency lie various gradations
of opinion, as many conceptions of the office as there have been holders.
The argument may be advanced, however, that those holding Roose-
velt's stewardship theory would be more comfortable with undertaking
constitutionally ill defined intelligence activities. Also, a President's
view of his office will change with time and circumstances. Though
he had argued against the stewardship theory in his Blumenthal
Lectures at Columbia University in 1915-16, former President Taft,
writing the majority opinion of the Supreme Court as Chief Justice
in the Myers case, appealed to the opening clause of Article II of the
Constitution as a grant of power. He held that the Chief Executive
had the right to remove executive and administrative officers of the
United States nominated or appointed by him, without the least
restraint or limitation by Congress. The Constitution, Taft contended,
intended such officers to serve only at the President's pleasure." Fol-
lowing this example, if momentary circumstances suggested such
action and neither the Constitution or Congress offered any restraints

'Joseph Bucklin Bishop. Theodore Roosevelt and His Time (Vol. II). New
York, Scribners, 1920, p. 94.

"William Howard Taft. Our Chief Magistrate and his Forcers. New York,
Columbia University Press, 1916, pp. 139-140 ; for a direct response to Theodore

Roosevelt's expression of presidential power, see . The Presidency. New

York, Scribners, 1916, pp. 125-130.

" See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106-177 (1926) .

upon same, then a President might enter into intelligence operations
under the color of the Commander in Chief clause or the faithful
execution of the laws provision.

The Founders of the Republic did not have intelligence activities
in their immediate purview when drafting the Constitution and assign-
ing powers and functions to the branches of government established
by this instrument. Nevertheless, implied authority for such pursuits
appears to have been granted to both the Executive and the Legisla-
ture. This situation has iDermitted each branch to act independently
with regard to intelligence organization and policy and has con-
tributed, as well, to conflicts between them on these matters. What
follows here is an overview of the evolution and organization of the
Federal intelligence function with a view to its origins and develop-
ment within the context of a constitutional, democratic republic.

Part One
The Small Beginnings (1776-1914)

Warfare in Europe during the age of New World discoveries was
a captive of formalism, an extreme of etiquette and familiarity with
the foe tempered by a static condition with regard to weapons tech-
nology. On the Continent, this situation probably was radically
altered by the increased use of gunpower and the horse. In the Amer-
icas, it was challenged by a competing strategy — familiarity with and
utilization of natural surroundings in defeating the enemy. This was
the technique of the Indian. Devoid of military identification symbols,
adept in tracking and skillful observation without detection, and
given to making attacks by surprise from the vantage of protective
cover, the natives of the Americas constituted a unique and mysterious
combatant to those daring to venture into the new land.

Colonists struggling to found permanent settlements along
the Atlantic seaboard ("past the vast ocean, and a sea of
troubles before," as William Bradford put it) encountered
in the Indian what to them was a new kind of foe — a foe
with a remarkable technique of patient subterfuge and cun-
ning device, evolved in surroundings quite different from
those of the Old World. By virtue of his training in the
Indian mode of war, every brave was also in effect a spy.
Through inborn capacity for the finesse of prowling and
scouting, he was, in his own environment, so skillful as to
make white men seem comparative bunglers. So declared
Col. Richard I. Dodge, writing in 1882, while still there was
a frontier, regarding the warriors of the western plains and
mountains. So said the young Washington, who through
frontier service became versed in the ways of eastern red-
skins.^

By the time colonial rivalries began to flare in the New World, an
awareness and appreciation of Indian allies, both as warriors and as
sources of intelligence information, was fairly well established. In
the area of the St. Lawrence River valley, the French quickly estab-
lished (1609-1627) trade relations and missionary ties with the fierce
Iroquois tribes of the region. Occasional reversals were experienced
in the course of these diplomatic efforts with the Indians, the most
devastating occurring when the Iroquois, supplied with arms by the
Dutch, began a decade (1642-1653) of intermittent attacks upon the
Hurons with whom the French also had trade and political alliances.
While a treaty ended these hostilities, eventually the Iroquois allied
themselves with the British. Open conflict between the French and the

^ George S. Bryan. The Spy In America. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Com-
pany, 1943, p. 15.

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Iroquois erupted in 1684, reaching as far west as the Mississippi and
embroiling the territory surrounding Lakes Erie and Ontario. An
ineffectual campaign by the French in 1687 prompted the Iroquois
to retaliate the following year in bloody raids throughout the St.
Lawrence valley. In August of 1689, the Iroquois slaughtered 200
inhabitants of Lachine (now a suburb of Montreal in Ontario prov-
ince) and took another 90 as prisoners.

On the eve of the intercolonial wars (King William's War, 1689-
1697; Queen Anne's War, 1702-1713; King George's War, 1740-1748;
French and Indian War or Seven Years' War, 1754-1763), the French
counted Indian alliances, extending from the Abenakis in Maine to
the Algonquin in Wisconsin and north toward Hudson Bay, and a
number of coureurs du hois^ familiar with forests and trails in the
area of conflict, among their intelligence resources. The English were
assisted by the powerful Iroquois alliance. That the French were
resourceful in their use of Indian spies and scouts is evidenced by the
circumstances surrounding the disastrous expedition to Fort Duquesne
led by General Edward Braddock in 1755. Himself disdainful of In-
dians and their services as scouts, Braddock and his forces were sur-
prised by a smaller but better-positioned French unit a few miles
away from Duquesne. The battle was one of confusion and terror
within the British ranks. A great number of officers were killed, add-
ing to the disorder among the troops. Braddock died three days after
the battle from wounds he received in the fray.^ And to what may
the success of the French for this action be attributed ?

From the "Life and Travels" of Col. James Smith we know
what the French had been doing. Smith (then a youthful
Pennsylvania frontiersman), while at work on a military
road from Fort Loudoun westward, was captured by Indian
allies of the French and taken to Fort Duquesne. There he
fell to talking with a Delaware who had a smattering of
English. "I asked him," Smith wrote, "what news from
Braddock's army. He said the Indians spied them every day^
and he showed me by making marks on the ground with a
stick that Braddock's army was advancing in very close
order and that the Indians would surround them, take trees,
and (as he expressed it) 'shoot um down all one pigeon.' " ^

Of course not everyone within the British military forces was ad-
verse to the utilization of Indians in their cause. In a routine com-
munique to Colonel Henry Bouquet, dated July 16, 1758, George
Washington acknowledged the dispatch of certain Indian bands with
the observation that

... I must confess, that I think these Scalping Parties of
Indians we send out, will more effectually harass the Enemy

- For Washington's account of the events see his letter of July 18, 1775 to Robert
Dinwiddle in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed. The Writings of Oeorge Washington From
the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799 (Vol. 1). Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1931. pp. 148-150.

^ Bryan, op. oit., p. 16 ; see .lames Smith. A Narrative of the Most Remarkable
Occurrences in the Life and Travels of Colonel James Smith . . . During His
Captivity Among the Indians in the Years 1755, '56, '57, d '59 . . . Philadelphia,
J. Grigg, 1831.

(by keeping them under continual Alarms) than any Parties
of white People can do ; because small parties of ours are not
equal to the undertaking, (not being so dexterous at skulking
as Indians) ; and large ones will be discovered by their spies
early enough to give the Enemy time to repell them by a su-
perior Force ; and at all events, there is a greater probability
of loosing many of our best men, and fatiguing others before
the most essential Services are entered upon and am afraid
not answer the proposed end.*

The influence of the Indian upon intelligence activity is undeniable,
effecting both information gathering and interpretation techniques
as well as troop deployment practices (which were accordingly modi-
fied to confuse intelligence operatives). The intelligence skills of the
Indians were continued and refined by the frontier scouts who guided
wagon trains and cavalry across the plains with the westward migra-
tion. It may be argued that by the time of the "Jessie Scouts" (a name
applied to Federal scouts masquerading in Confederate uniforms)
and their southern counterparts, the Indian tradition of field intel-
ligence, surprise attack and sabotage had penetrated the Federal
armed services and, in one form or another, has remained operative
within that institution through guerrilla units, marauder groups,
rangers, and special forces.

/. Revolution and Intelligemce

With the advent of a revolutionary war against the British, the
American colonists demonstrated a willingness to utilize certain intel-
ligence techniques familiar from the intrigues of the Continent. As
repressive trade and economic measures began to kindle opposition
to the King's policies in the New World, various secret societies were
formed, aiding the cause of liberty with both intelligence and mis-
chievous deeds. The most famous of these clandestine organizations,
the Sons of Liberty, was formed in the summer of 1765 to oppose the
Stamp Act. Active through the provincial towns and settlements, they
constituted an underground information network and resorted to vio-
lent actions in their protestations. The Sons were thought to be re-
sponsible, for example, for the burning of the records of the vice-
admiralty court in Boston and the ransacking of the home of the
comptroller of the currency there in August. These and lesser feats
were of sufficient impact that, before the effective date (November 1,
1765) of the Stamp Act, all of the royal stamp agents in the colonies
had resigned.

By the time of the signing of the Declaration of Independence, a
variety of partisans — revolutionaries and loyalists — were providing
intelligence for tlie cause.^ Also, at this early date, perhaps as a con-
sequence of prior exposure to spy activities during the intercolonial
hostilities or even as a result of some familiaritj'^ with the prevailing
espionage situation, initial policies regarding defense information

' Fitzpatrick, o'p. cit. (Vol. 2), p. 237.

^ Generally, on the activities of British intelligence, operatives, see : Bryan,
op. cit., pp. 18-50; Allen French. General Gage's Informers. Ann Arbor, Univer-
sity of Michigan Press, 1932 ; Carl Van Doren. Secret History of the American
Revolution. New York, Viking Press. 1941; C. H. Van Tyne. The Loyalists in
the American Revolution. New York, Peter Smith, 1929.

security appeared.® Articles of war adopted in 1775 forbid any un-
authorized correspondence with the enemy on the part of the Con-
tinental armed forces. The following year the Continental Congress
enacted an ordinance against spying by civilians in time of war. Exe-
cutions for spying were public affairs, designed to further reinforce
the legal prohibitions established by the revolutionaries and in inter-
national law.

Nevertheless, the Crown recruited and maintained an effective and
highly important espionage organization in the colonies.

Had it not been for the clandestine service rendered by loy-
alists, the British would hardly have been able to prolong the
struggle for eight years. The Revolution has in that sense to
be viewed as a domestic war in far greater measure than had
been perceived until the twentieth century, when research
threw convincing light on the subject.

As agents provocateurs^ whose function was that of all-
round trouble-making ; as informers and sly correspondents ;
as dispatch-bearers; as military spies, civilian intelligence
agents, and go-betweens, the Tories labored and dared for the
side to which in the majority of instances they were honestly
attached, upon whose victory they confidently reckoned, and
which had dangled before them the encouragement of final
reward. To British commanders in America, this aid was
indispensable.'^

It is not certain as to when the Continental armed forces began
utilizing the services of undercover operatives but, with the leaderehip
of George Washington, they had a strategist well aware of ways to foil
and enhance the intelligence function.

No other commander of his time knew better than did Wash-
ington the necessity of being constantly informed about the
enemy. If there were a surprise, he chose to spring it, as he did
at Trenton — not to be the victim of it. He employed light
horse, mounted and dismounted, for reconnaissance; he had
"harassing parties" to annoy the enemy and, more impor-
tant, to return with prisoners, from whom valuable intelli-
gence might be obtained. He ordered that the north shore of
Long Island, especially the bays, be constantly watched from
high ground on the opposite shore by lookouts with good spy-
glasses, who could note unusual movements of enemy ship-
ping.^

One of Washington's first actions after taking command of the army
in July, 1775, at Cambridge, was to dispatch an agent to Boston to
establish a secret correspondence network to report on enemy move-
ments and activities. He preferred intelligence in writing and to safe-
guard such communiques a variety of codes and an invisible ink were
utilized at different times. The British had no personnel schooled in
decoding and reasonably complex ciphers withstood various efforts of

' The evolution of information security policy and practice is discussed in
Appendix II.
' Bryan, op. cit., p. 18.
' Ibid., p. 51.

translation. "Washington also established fixed terms of service for
secret agents and specific matters of importance upon which he sought
precise details.^

Among major topics of intelligence, Washington listed ar-
rivals, troop movements, signs of expeditions by land or water,
shifts of position, localities of posts and how fortified,
strength and distribution of corps, and the state of garrisons.
In addition to such things there were all kinds of minor par-
ticulars whose interest and value would, he felt, be obvious to
a competent agent.^°

"Washington made regular but guarded use of spies. His caution was
prompted by the precarious division of allegiance which transversed
familial, religious, and regional ties and a variety of lesser human
loyalties. Still, he knew the value of clandestine operatives.

On the basis of results, he said after some four years of war :
"The greatest benefits are to be derived from pei-sons who live
with the other side. It is with such I have endeavored to es-
tablish a correspondence, and on their reports I shall most
rely." These people had a chance to examine freely without
attracting suspicion, and they could report more literally not
only on factual details but also on the enemy's morale.^^

The most sophisticated and enduring spy system — in good running
order for five years — maintained by Washington was led by Major
Benjamin Tallmadge and operated in the environs of New York City
and Long Island. A commissioned officer in the Second Light Dra-
goons of Connecticut (also known as Sheldon's Dragoons) and the
Yale classmate, and closest personal friend, of the martj^red Xathan
Hale, Tallmadge recruited his agents from among his friends.

Tlie organization consisted of Tallmadge, [Robert] Town-
send, Abraham Woodhull, Austin Roe, and Caleb Brewster —
all young men of imagination, daring, and social position.
Their operations were conducted by a method that was both
devious and secure. Townsend lived in New York where he
ran a general store which attracted British customers who
were adroitly pumped for information. Roe was an active
horseman who liked to ride from the heart of New York over
Long Island country roads in all kinds of weather. He carried
the reports to Woodhull. Woodhull then hurried to a point on
the north shore of Long Island to look for a black petticoat
and handkerchiefs on a clothesline. If they were hanging,
it signaled that the boatman Brewster, who sailed his boat
from one side of Long Island Sound to the other, had landed
in a small cove on Long Island. Brewster then took the coded

' Ibid., pp. 52-53.

" Ibid., p. 53.

^ Ibid, p. 52 ; generally on the activities of Washington's intelligence operatives,
see : John Bakeless. Turncoats, Traitors, and Heroes. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippin-
cott Company, 1959 ; H. P. Johnston. The Secret Service of the Revolution. Maga-
zine of American History, v. 8, February, 1882 : 95-105 ; Morton Pennypaeker.
General Washington's Spies. Brooklyn, Long Island Historical Society, 1939.

messages across to Connecticut to Tallmadge who transmit-
ted them to General Washington.^^

In this venture, as in all of his spy arrangements, Washington had
certain particulars of information which were of priority importance.

It was Washington's request that he be specifically in-
formed as to :

The health and spirits of the British army and navy in the
city;

The number of men allotted to the defense of the city and
its environs (the corps to be specified, and where posted) ;

The guarding of transports (whether by armed vessels or
with chains, booms, etc.) ;

The works crossing York Island at the rear of the city (the
redoubts, and the number of gims in each) ;

The works (if any) between these and Fort Knyphausen
and Washington ;

The works (if any) on the Harlem River, near Harlem
town — also on the East River, facing Hell Gate ;

The character of the defenses (whether, for example, they
included pits in which stakes had been fixed) ;

Existing supplies of forage, provisions, and wood;
Movements by land or water.

He also wished intelligence regarding vessels and boats on
Long Island Sound. Somebody in the vicinity of Brooklyn
could, he thought, under pretext of marketing obtain daily
admission to the garrison there. Always he stressed the im-
portance of concrete details, the value of accuracy, the worth-
lessness of rumors.^^

The employment of spies and informers was an expensive prospect
which Washington managed quite well. His first appeal for an in-
telligence fund appears to have been made on August 25, 1978.^^

Congress sent 500 guineas, which would, he said, be used
with discretion as it might be required. He added that the
American intelligence service had been far from satisfactory,
either because swift decline in the value of Continental cur-
rency had rendered the terms of service extravagantly high,
or because in some instances any offer whatever of paper
money had been refused. When he accepted his commission,
it was with the distinct proviso that no salary would attach
to it, but that he would keep a record of his expenses. On
July 1, 1783, he drew up in his own handwriting a detailed
statement of these accounts, from which we learn that in
eight years the total ex]Denditure for "secret intelligence"
was £1,982 10s [the Continental Congress had authorized an

" Monro MacCloskey. The American Intelligence Community. New York, Rich-
ards Rosen Press, 1967, pp. 33-34 ; a personal account of the activities and opera-
tion of the Tallmadge organization may be foimd in Benjamin Tallmadge with
H. P. Johnston, ed. Memoir. New York, Gilliss Press, 1904.

"Bryan, op, cit., pp. 78-79; see Washington's letter of March 21, 1779, to
Tallmadge in Fitzpatrick, op. cit. (Vol. 14), pp. 276-277.

" See Fitzpatrick, op. dt. (Vol. 12) , p. 356.

amount not to exceed 2000 ^lineas in gold specie to be drawn
from the Treasury by Washington for secret services]. Here
is sufficient evidence of how frugally he must have dealt out
guineas in those pinching times.^^

In terms of the development of intelligence techniques, the period
of the Revolutionary War witnessed two innovations : the introduction
of special devices — in this case, an invisible ink — and counterintelli-
gence arrangements.

This particular ink and its re-agent or counterpart (the for-
mulas for which remain unknown) were invented by Sir
James Ja}', John Jaj^'s elder brother, a physician living in
England, where in 1763 he had been knighted. Sir James, by
the account he later gave Thomas Jefferson, believed, from
what he had learned of certain curious experiments, that ''a
fluid might possibly be discovered for invisible writing which
would elude the generally known means of detection, and yet
could be rendered visible by a suitable counterpart." When
war in America seemed inevitable, he saw that in forwarding
secret intelligence this method would possess great advan-
tages. Accordingly he sent from England to his brother John
in New York "considerable quantities" of the liquids he had
hit upon.^6

Counterespionage efforts appear to have begim around July of 1776
and soon developed into an effective organized effort. However, it fell
to the sub-national jurisdictions to cultivate these actions. This course
of initiative created certain problems and confusion for Washington's
intelligence program. Typical of these frustrations was a case where
Xew Jerse}^ authorities had mistakenly jailed three of Washington's
agents working in the Xew York City area.

"I hope," wrote Washington to the Governor, "you will put
a stop to the prosecution, unless other matters appear against
them. You must be well convinced that it is indispensably
necessary to make use of such means to procure intelligence.
The persons employed must bear the suspicion of being
thought inimical ; and it is not in their power to assert tlieir
innocence, because that would get abroad and destroy the con-
fidence which the enemy puts in them."

He later mentioned to the President of Congress the annoy-
ance occasioned through intermeddling by state officials.
There had been instances, he said, of prosecution in the civil
courts when it had been necessary for headquarters to reveal
the true character of the accused men. "This has served to
deter others from acting in the same capacity, and to increase
the dread of detection in our confidential friends." Once in a
while it happened that a man who undeiixDok to get intelli-

^^ Bryan, op. cit., p. 74 ; see Washington's letter of September 4, 1778, to the
President of Congress acknowledging receipt of the 500 guineas, in Fitzpatrick,
op. cit. (Vol. 12). pp. 399-400; also see Washington's letter of June 11, 1779,
to Michael Hillegas, Treasurer of the United States, noting the authorization of
upwards of 2000 guineas for secret service, in Ibid. (Vol. 15), p. 263.

" Bryan, op. cit., p. 75.

gence under the subterfuge of trade did seem to devote more
attention to his own profits than he did to intelligence ; but it
wasn't best to be too severe with him.^^

The most vigorous counterintelligence program was in New York
where, in May of 1776, the Provincial Congress established a panel on
"intestine enemies" which is often referred to as the Committee on
Conspiracies. Under the authority of tliis body, John Jay, future Chief
Justice, diplomat, and Federalist Papers author, and Nathaniel Sack-
ett, another leading figure of the time, directed as many as ten agents
in ferreting out British spys and informers. Among these heroes was
Enoch Crosby who is generally thought (Cooper's protestations to the
contrary) to have been the model for James Fenimore Cooper's char-
acter Harvey Birch in Ths Spy (published in 1821).^^ This network
was superseded by a more ambitious unit, the Commissioners for De-
tecting and Defeating Conspiracies, which was created in February,
1778, and lasted until 1781.^^ Washington was assisted in his counter-
espionage efforts by such state initiatives and by his own agents oper-
ating behind British lines. Also, in this regard, it should not be
forgotten that Washington's intelligence system extended beyond the
shores of the Americas to England and the Continent. Thus, for ex-
ample, when Lord Cornwallis returned to his homeland in the waning
days of 1777 and reported that the conquest of America was impossible,
a secret agent in London passed this information on to Benjamin
Franklin at Passy by January 20, 1778.^° Other bits of intelligence and
counterintelligence made their way across the Atlantic to Washington
through similar routes.

With the congressional ratification of the articles of peace on April
15, 1783, and the subsequent disbanding of the army over the next
few months, Washington's intelligence corps went out of existence.
Of those spies employed by the revolutionaries and the British, only
one is thought to have re-entered such secret activities ever again.^^
The vast majority of Washington's operatives settled back into normal
business pursuits and relative obscurity. Only one or two of these indi-

" IMd., p. 54; the letter to Governor Livingston appears in Fitzpatrick, op. cit.
(Vol. 10), p. 329; the letter to the President of Congress appears in Ibid. (Vol.
15), pp. 42^5.

^ Generally, on counter-intelligence activity during the Revolution, see Bake-
less, op. cit., pp. 125-153; on the career of Enoch Crosby, see H. L. Barnum.
The Spy Unmasked ; or Memoirs of Enoch Crosby. New York. J. J. Harper, 1828.

" Generally, on the efforts of inquisitorial bodies in New York, see Alexander
Clarence Flick. Loyalism in New York During the American Revolution. New
York, Arno Press and The New York Times, 1969 ; originally published 1901 ;
also see Victor H. Paltsits, ed. Minutes of the Commissioners for Detecting and
Defeating Conspiracies in the State of New York * * * Albany, State of New York,
1909.

^ Bakeless, op. cit., p. 220 ; also, of general interest is Michael Kammen. A
Rope of Sand: The Colonial Agents, British Politics, and the American Revolu-
tion. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1968 ; a provocative comment upon Frank-
lin's activities may be found in Cecil B. Currey. Code Number 12 — Benjamin
Franklin: Patriot or Spy? Englewood Cliffs, Proutice-Hall. 1972.

'^This was the British agent John Howe who settled in Canada after the
Revolution and was reactivated during the War of 1812 when he made a tour
of the United States reporting on military preparations and popular mood. His
model report was discovered by American historians long after his mission was
completed.

viduals received any special commendation or decoration for their
service and intelligence officers in the armed services received only their
regular promotions, nothing more. The prevailing attitude seems to
have been that the intelligence services rendered by these individuals
were necessary, were gratefully appreciated by Washington and the
Nation, but were not to be glorified or publicly discussed. A few —
Tallmadge and Crosby, among others — had their exploits captured
in print, but not always in a format with any visibility. Captain David
Gray, for example, published a pamphlet on his adventures but the
last copy was destroyed in a fire at the State library in Albany in 1911 ;
he had also told his story to the Massachusetts legislature but his
petition there also vanished; however, his pension claim of 1823 did
survive, complete with his personal account of wartime activities, and
remains with the National Archives.^^

//. The New Nation

With the conclusion of hostilities with Great Britain, the new nation
turned its attention to preparing, and then ratifying, a written con-
stitution establishing a new Federal Government. The document itself,
as noted previously, contained: provisions which appear to be conducive
to the cultivation and development of the intelligence function, but,
with the disbanding of Washington's forces, the nation's leaders would
actually organize intelligence operations in an ad hoc manner and on
an extemporaneous basis during the course of the next century.^^

Of great importance, as well, for the evolution and operationali-
zation of the Federal intelligence function are certain of the guaran-
tees in the Constitution's Bill of Rights. Among these are prohibitions
against Congress enacting any law abridging the freedom of speech
or of the press, or of the right of the people to peaceably assemble,
or of the right of the public to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. These
strictures on governmental power could have special significance in
the event an ambitious and zealous intelligence program were at-
tempted to protect the citizenry from itself (or enemies of the state
imperceptible to the people).

Indeed, shortly after the Federal Government was instituted, cir-
cumstances might well have prompted an enthusiastic intelligence
endeavor. When France, an old ally of the United States, was seized
by the winds of revolution, the French Republic, in 1793, dispatched
an agent, Edward Charles Genet, to Charleston in South Carolina.
Before presenting his diplomatic credentials, Genet commissioned
four privateers and dispatched them to prey upon British shipping as
France had declared war on England. He also sought to recruit an
expedition to conquer Louisiana which was then controlled by Spain,
another declared enemy of France. While the United States sought
to remain neutral in the conflict between France and England, Presi-
dent Washington was faced with an agent firovocafeur of a foreign
power recruiting ships and men to engage in hostilities off the Ameri-
can coast and possibly marching through American territory to engage

** Generally, on the post-war lifestyles of former spies and intelligence opera-
tives, see Bakeless, op. cit., pp. 359-365.
* See Introduction, pp. &-9.

Spanish authorities. Washington received Genet with cool formality
and subsequently informed him that his grants of military commis-
sions on American soil constituted an infringement on the national
sovereignty of the United States. Notice was also given that Genet's
privateers would have to leave American waters and that their prizes
could not be sent to ports of the United States. Although he initially
agreed to comply with these demands, Genet was soon attempting to
arm The Little Sarah, a recently captured prize. When warned against
dispatching the ship, Genet threatened to mobilize opinion against
Washington. Ultimately, the vessel escaped to sea and efforts were
made to have Genet recalled. By this time, however, the Jacobins had
seized power in France and a new minister to the United States had
been dispatched with orders for Genet's arrest. Washington refused
to extradite Genet and he subsequently became an American citizen.
Conditions continued to remain tense with regard to America's rela-
tions with France. In 1797, with the French Directory in power,
harassments and seizures were made on American shipping. The
American ambassador to France, Charles Pinckney, was refused an
opportunity to present his diplomatic credentials. In an attempt to
smooth the situation — ^the French were basically disturbed by the
terms of Jay's Treaty which, in part, granted American ships entry
to the British East Indies and West Indies while placing British trade
with the United States on a most- favored nation basis — President
Adams dispatched a special mission to Paris. Delayed on a pretext
from beginning official negotiations, the American delegation was ap-
proached by three agents of the Foreign Ministry. Described in
diplomatic dispatches as X, Y, and Z, these operatives suggested an
American loan to France and a bribe of $240,000 to settle matters.
When this "offer" was refused and the failure of the negotiations
reached Adams, he informed Congress of the clandestine effort and
submitted the XYZ correspondence to the Legislature for inspection
and public disclosure. The dispute with France was settled by an un-
declared naval war (1798-1800). This incident and the Genet affair
set off a variety of conspiracy theories and fears of foreign intrigue
in America. But, rather than creating any countervailing intelligence
organization, the response of the Federal Government appears to be
that of restrictive law — the Alien and Sedition Acts. These consisted
of four statutes enacted by Congress in June and July of 1798 which
changed the residency period for citizenship from five to fourteen
years (1 Stat. 566) ; authorized the President to order all aliens re-
garded as dangerous to the public peace and safety or suspected of
treasonable or secret activities out of the country (1 Stat. 570) ;
authorized the President, during a declared war, to arrest, imprison,
or banish aliens subjected to an enemy power (1 Stat. 577) ; and made
it a high misdemeanor, punishable bv fine or imprisonment, for citi-
zens or aliens to enter into unlawful combinations to oppose the
execution of the national law, or to impede a Federal officer from
performing his duties, or to aid or attempt any insurrection, riot, or
unlawful assembly (1 Stat. 596).

Under these circumstances the spy-fever raffed. Federalist
Noah Webster said that "in case of any fatal disaster to Eng-
land, an invasion of America may not be improbable." A

Coneressional document held that France and her partisans
in America would unite for "the subversion of religion,
morality, law, and Government." Her means, the report said,
"are in wonderful coincidence with her ends ; among these and
not the least successful is the direction and employment of the
active and versatile talents of her citizens abroad as emissaries
and spies." Federalist journals babbled of conspiracy, and
hurled insults at Anti- Federalists.

William Cobbett ("Peter Porcupine" of Porcupine^s Ga-
zette) announced that on May 9th, 1798 (ordained as a
national fast day) "desperate villains" would set fire to Phila-
delphia — but nothing happened. When the innocent
Dr. George Logan of that city went abroad, "Porcupine"
smelled a rat. "Take care." he raged; "when your blood runs
down the gutters, don't say you were not forewarned of the
danger." Volney, the historian, whose journeyings had carried
him to America, was branded as a French spy darkly ma-
neuvering to return Louisiana to France. Genet, who settled
peacefully on Long Island as a naturalized American, was
said to be in correspondence with "the Tyrants." ^*

///. Mission- to Florida

Spy-fever remained rampant in America as Napoleon Bonaparte
emerged from the political turmoil in France as a new unifying
force on the Continent. The ambitions of the new French regime soon
became apparent to President Jefferson. The Treaty of Fontainebleau
(1762) ceded the Louisiana Territory to Spain but the secret Treaty
of San Ildefonso (1800) returned the province to France at the behest
of Napoleon who projected the revival of a colonial empire in North
America. The Treaty of Madrid (1801) confirmed the retrocession
and shortly thereafter the matter came to Jefferson's attention, prompt-
ing him to begin efforts for the purchase of New Orleans and West
Florida. The result of these actions was the acquisition of the entire
Louisiana area and a heightened sensitivity to the intrigues of
Bonaparte.

The French were not the only threat to the security and sovereignty
of the infant L^nited States at this time. The phobias about spies and
espionage within America were kindled anew with the disclosure of
the so-called Burr Conspiracy. Shortly after the duel in which
Alexander Hamilton was fatally wounded (July 11, 1804), Aaron
Burr began his efforts at organizing a movement for separating the
western territories of the Mississippi region from the United States.
After being refused financial assistance for his cause by the British,
Burr obtained a small sum from the Spanish and began focusing upon
lands of the Southwest and Mexico for establishing a western empire.
It is still unclear if his intent was treasonable or merely a filibustering
expedition against his benefactors in the Spanish dominions. Never-
theless, Burr is known to have made a tour of the Mississippi River
valley (ISIay-September, 1805) and to have conferred with General
James Wilkinson, commander of the armed forces in that region. At
the end of August, 1806, he stayed at Blennerhasset's Island on the

^ Bryan, op. cit., pp. 106-107.

Ohio River where he recruited some sixty to eighty men and ten
boats. In the meantime, Wilkinson warned Jefferson of Burr's activi-
ties and the President issued a proclamation on November 27, 1806,
warning citizens against participating in an illegal expedition against
Spanish territory.^^ Unaware of this declaration, Burr and his com-
pany began their journey down the Mississippi, passing several Ameri-
can forts without interference. When they came within thirty miles
of Natchez, Burr learned that Wilkinson had betrayed him and he
fled toward Spanish Florida but was captured and arrested in Ala-
bama. Indicted for treason. Burr's trial l3efore Chief Justice Marshall
presiding over the U.S. Circuit Court ended in an acquittal. Burr went
into European exile to escape further prosecutions for murder (in
New York and New Jersey in the case of his duel with Hamilton)
and for treason (in Ohio, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Louisiana.)

In spite of the confusion about the exact nature of Burr's expedition
popular sentiments against France and Spain remained fixed. The
Louisiana Purchase of 1803 left the status of Spanish ruled East and
West Florida unsettled. Jefferson supported the view that Louisiana
included the portion of Florida between the Mississippi River to the
west and the Perdido River to the east (the most southern portions of
the current states of Alabama and Mississippi). In 1810 a group of
expansionists led a revolt in the Spanish dominion, captured the
fortifications at Baton Rouge, and proclaimed the independent Re-
public of West Florida. On October 27, a month after its liberation,
the Republic was proclaimed a U.S. possession and its military occupa-
tion as part of the Orleans Territory was authorized.^*' There were also
designs on West Florida (which Congress ultimately incorporated
[2 Stat. 734] into the Mississippi Territory on May 14, 1812) and
scattered outbursts of opposition to Spanish authority within the
Florida peninsula.

Into this situation President Madison dispatched George Matthews
as a political emissary and intelligence agent. Ordered to proceed
"secretly" to Florida, Matthews was to present himself to the Spanish
authorities as an American commissioner authorized to accept such
territory as might be turned over to the United States by Spain.

The Peninsular War was then cauterizing Spain, and the
colonial office in Madrid had neither funds nor power. A new
war between Britain and the United States was forseen in
1811, and President Madison believed that the English would
probably seize Florida as a base of operations. To prevent
this, he appointed Matthews and Colonel John McKee, an
Indian agent, to negotiate with the Spanish governor and
secure if possible a cession of the provinces. They were to
"fix a date for their return, if desired." In case the commis-
sioners were successful, a provisional government was to
be established; but if unsuccessful, it was understood from
the beginning that forcible possession was to be taken, should

^ See James D. Richardson, comp. A Compilation of the Messages and Papers
of the Presidents (Vol. 1). New York. Bureau of National Literature, 1897, pp.
392—393

* See Ibid., pp. 465-466.

there be any reason to suppose a foreign Power was moving
to capture the Floridas.

McKee seems to have abandoned this enterprise, leaving
Matthews to carry on alone, which was very much to that
gentleman's taste. He was a native of Ireland, had fought in
the Revolutionary War, and had risen to the rank of general.
No celebrated exploit of that struggle is connected with his
name, but he was described as a man of "unsurpassed bravery
and indomitable energy, strong-minded but almost illiterate."
Moving to Georgia in 1785, his indomitable energy won him
election as governor the very next year. In 1794-95 he was
again elected governor of the state, and some time thereafter,
though entitled to be called both Honorable and General, he
did not disdain to work for the War Department as a special
agent on the Florida f rontier.^^

As an agent provocateur, Matthews took it upon himself to recruit
former Americans residing in Spanish Florida to revolt against their
foreign ruler. When the colonial governor indicated opposition to these
activities, Matthews returned to Georgia where he gathered a private
army of sharpshooting frontiersmen and Indian fighters and once
again entered the Spanish territory on a mission of espionage.

A number of Georgian frontiersmen, preparing for a de-
scent upon Florida, assembled on the opposite bank of the St.
Mary's River. Uniting with the border settlers on the Spanish
side, they proceeded to organize an independent "Republic of
Florida," with Colonel John Mcintosh as president and a
Colonel Ashley as military chief. Ferdandina, on Amelia
Island, had become in 1808 a port of free entry for foreign
vessels. On the excuse of protecting American shipping in-
terests, General Matthews determined to occupy Ferdandina
and Amelia Island, and to that end sent nine armed vessels
into the harbor. Forces of the "Republic of Florida" he en-
listed in his project, and, commanded by Ashley, they ap-
proached Ferdandina by water and summoned the Spanish
commander, Don Jose Lopez, to surrender. Lopez was forced
to sign articles of capitulation March 17, 1812, possibly a deli-
cate compliment to the Irishman, Matthews. These articles —
which added to the political apoplexy of the Spanish minis-
ter in Washington — provided that Ferdandina should re-
main a free port, but in case of war between Britain and the
United States, British ships could not enter the harbor after
May 1, 1813.28

In Washington the Spanish minister maintained a vehement protest
of Matthews' activities even though the Ferdandina settlement con-
stituted something of a compromise of his diplomatic position. Re-
luctantly President Madison and Secretary of State James Monroe
announced that Matthews had "misunderstood" his instructions.

^^ Richard Wilmer Rowan with Robert G. Deindorfer, Secret Service: Thirty-
three Centuries of Espionage. London, William Kimber, 1969, pp. 241-242.
*" rbid., p. 705n.

Governor Mitchell of Georgia was appointed to replace him
and directed to assist Estrada [the Spanish colonial gov-
ernor] in enforcing order. Because of his unwanted versa-
tility Matthews was dismissed; but his successor seems to
have been given instructions no less opaque. Mitchell, it is
said, was to obtain safety for the "revolutionists" in Florida,
aid them as much as possible, and withdraw "troops as slowly
as might seem feasible." No better way of pursuing Matthews'
imperial aim could have been contrived; and Mitchell made
so much of his opportunities that the armed force Matthews
had organized and commanded did not retire from Florida
for fourteen months. Then — in May 1813 — it moved to join
the army of Andrew Jackson, who was himself presently
ordered to renew the invasion and march upon Pensacola.
Only a Congressional outcry checked this expeditionary
thrust, and Old Hickory turned aside to the timely defense
of New Orleans.^^

How far astray had Matthews actually gone in interpreting his in-
structions? Was he isolated from changing policy developments or the
architect of a self-styled soldier of fortune escapade ?

It was known at the time that George Matthews reported
regularly to Washington. While discussing the necessity of
occupying Florida to prevent the British from seizing it as a
base, the American Congress sat in secret session, and many
precautions were taken to keep the matter from becoming
known. Matthews was in no sense, therefore, a filibuster or
private plotter acting from selfish motives. Instead he typi-
fied the land-hungry American frontiersman of his age, who
regarded himself as an agent — not a bit secret — of divine
interposition and looked upon no boundary of the United
States as final until it vanished into a sea, gulf or ocean. Mat-
thews' conduct, as a government commissioner, was indefen-
sible; and it is easy to understand why his project, carried on
by his successor, has no forward place in the annals of the
day. A blunt instrument adding one more note of apology to
the sorry record of events surrounding the War of 1812, he
has had to be ignored as he was formerly disowned.^*'

And with regard to the evolution and advancement of the intelli-
gence function, the following conclusion seems appropriate.

There was very little secret service of a professional mold
in the three-year War of 1812 and not much effective work
of the Intelligence on either side. This is surprising, for there
were any number of living Americans who had been officers
in the Revolutionary War, and some of them ought to have
remembered General Washington's profitable dependence
upon systematic espionage. And it is all the more surprising
as a fault of the British, for Napoleon was beaten and exiled

^ Ibid., pp. 242-243.

^IMd., p. 243; also see David Hunter Miller. Secret Statutes of the United
States: A Memorandum. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1918, pp. 4-6.

to Elba, and in 1814 the government in London could afford
to train its heaviest guns upon the weaker American ad-
versary.^^

IV. Mexican War

Insensitivity to intelligence needs persisted in Washington during
the next three decades. "\Mien General Zachary Taylor marched into
the recently annexed Republic of Texas, he had little useful informa-
tion about the terrain or natural defenses of the territory. When Texas
was admitted to the union in December, 1845, Taylor advanced to the
Rio Grande to repel an anticipated Mexican attack. On February' 6,

1846, the army received notification that field maneuvers might be
ordered on short notice.

For six months, while at Corpus Christi, although he had
engineers, and although traders were streaming through the
place from beyond the Rio Grande, Taylor did not even know
the way to Matamoros — so wrote Lieut. Col. E. A. Hitchcock,
then commanding the 3rd infantry, whose dmvj and papers
are now in the Library of Congress. It was not until February
24th that the necessary data were procured, not until March
8th that the army began to move. A light unit for scouting
purposes was an obvious need ; and [William L.] Marcy, the
secretary of war, had given Taylor express orders to call for
assistance from the Texans, "by whom legs were valued
chiefly as the means of sticking to a horse." Yet nothing of
the kind was done.

There was no intelligence service. Dense ignorance reigned
at headquarters as to topography or local conditions. Taylor
had been instructed to learn all he could regarding both, and
to keep the War Department informed; but in spite of
Marcy's earnest requests, he appears to have forwarded
nothing whatever and to have had no useful ideas about the
campaign. Xapoleon had said that any general who, when
taking the field in a peopled countrj', neglected intelligence
service, was a general "ignorant of his trade." ^^

Contrary to the advice of General Winfield Scott, who was about
to enter the field, Taylor made no effort to recruit disgruntled contra-
handistas — Mexican border-folk skilled in smuggling and otherwise
unhappy with their own government — as spies or informers. He
marched to Monterey without utilizing scouts, without almost any pre-
cautions against surprise attack, and, assuming he would encounter
no serious resistance in seizing the city, without any real information
as to the fortifications or defenses he would encounter.

When General Scott landed at Vera Cruz with his army in March,

1847, Lieut. -Col. Hitchcock, previously serving with Taylor in the

^ Rowan and Deindorfer. op. cit., p. 244 ; there is evidence that Andrew Jack-
son had a secret agent in Pensacola. Florida, who was instrumental in informing
Jackson of the size and armament of his opposition at the battle of New Orleans
and it is also thought that Jackson had utilized the services of the notorious
pirate Jean Lafitte for intelligence purposes but these were very crude and
elementary endeavors ; see Ibid., pp. 244—246.

^- Bryan, op. cit., pp. 116-117.

north, had joined his expedition serving as assistant inspector general.
By his own account, it would appear that it was Hitchcock who re-
cruited and organized the spy forces which had been urged on Taylor
and subsequently served Scott so well. On June 5, 1847, Hitchcock
noted in his diary that he had taken into service "a very celebrated
captain of robbers" who "knows the band and the whole country."
This was Dominguez whom Hitchcock tested with the delivery of a
communique "and if he performs the service faithfully, I shall further
employ him." ^^ Two weeks later Hitchcock recorded his return with
a letter of response — thus was the Mexican Spy Company (or Spy
Company, or "the Forty Thieves") , as it came to be known, established,

Dominguez, leader of the Spy Company, had been an honest
weaver, it was said, but on being robbed by a Mexican officer,
took to the road and became a brigand chief. When the Ameri-
cans reached Puebla he was living there quietly with his
family; but, knowing the insecurity of his position, he ac-
cepted Hitchcock's offer to become a scout. His band consisted
at first of five men but rose to about 100, and probably might
have been increased to 2000. He and men of his even entered
the capital in disguise. While he was at the head of the com-
pany, the actual captain was a Virginian named Spooner, who
had been a member of his band ; and the two lieutenants were
also foreigners. The men seem to have served and obeyed
orders faithfully, and their leader refused very advantageous
terms offered by Santa Ana.^*

Eventually, Hitchcock obtained the release of some of Dominguez's
compatriots from local jails, arranged to pay each recruit $20 a month,
organized the band into companies, and placed them under the direct
orders of General Scott with Dominguez acting as leader of the
forces.^^ While the Spy Company was most useful to Scott, its members
were regarded as loathsome and immoral by many of the officers and
men of the army. Dr. Albert G. Brackett, a lieutenant with General
Joseph Lane's forces under Scott's command, has penned the following
first-hand observation :

The contra-guerrillas under Dominguez were a rascally set
of fellows, and I never could look upon them with any degree
of sympathy. Traitors to their own country in the darkest
hour of stern trial, they aided the Americans against their
own countrymen, and covered themselves with lasting infamy.
There is an old saying "we love the treason but despise the
traitor," which did not hold good with us. We loathed the
treason and cursed the traitor. Every man in the company was
a "jail bird," and a worse body of men could not have been
collected together.

^ W. A. Croffut, ed. Fifty Tears In Camp and Field: Diary of Major-Oeneral
Ethan Allen Hitchcock, U.S.A., New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons,
1909, p. 259.

** Justin H. Smith. The War imth Mexico (Vol. 2). New York, Macmillan
Company, 1919, p. 362n.

"= Croffut, op. oit., pp. 263-265.

I once rode from the National Bridge to En Cerro with a
squadron of these chaps, and was the only American with
them. I had been carrying an order down from En Cerro to
the Bridge, and was on my return. They rode along singing
ribald songs, discharging their escopettes [a short rifle or
carbine] every few minutes, and behaving in the most un-
soldier-like manner. They had a few women along with them
who seemed to be as thoroughly steeped in vice as the men.
Each man carried a lance and wore a wide red band around
his hat, Mexican treachery is proverbial, and these contra-
guerrillas were a complete embodiment of it. On first seeing
them, I thought very much, as one of our Irish soldiers did,
"may the devil fly away wid'em for a set of ragamuffins." ^^

Undoubtedly those in the Spy Company were aware of these re-
sentments and prejudices and a trace of that feeling can be detected
in this brief passage in a letter from Captain Robert Anderson, Third
Artillery, to his mother.

We have in our pay a Company of Mexicans who are called
the Forty Thieves; they are, I expect some of the gentlemen
robbers Thompson mentions. They were asked, the other day,
if they would not be afraid of being murdered by their coun-
trymen for acting with us, after we left the Country, and their
Captain's answer was : "That is our business, we will take care
of ourselves." They are very useful in getting information,
etc., and are used individually or collectively, as their services
are required. The Captain says he can increase his band to
1500 or 2000, if a greater number be wanted than he now has.^^

Indeed, what was the fate of the Spy Company as an American victory
became apparent?

As danger diminished so did the need for the irregulars'
services. Promises of payment remained promises only. Ap-
parently President Polk had an appropriation he could utilize
for such things, and it would seem that he drew on it. But
either the commitments were made by irresponsible people, or
the political and military machines simply were not set up to
administer such unorthodox operations despite the official-
sounding name of Spy Company. Some officers of high per-
sonal integrity paid out of their own pockets. "^ATien they did,
it was their own decision, and their own loss, as far as the
government was concerned.

With the signing of peace, even these amenities stopped.
The once sought-after irregulars were bandied about, even
ordered from camps. Doubtless the qualities which had been
found useful to the army now posed threats or at least em-

** Albert G. Brackett. General Lane's Brigade in Central Mexico. New York,
J. C. Derby, 1854, pp. 186-187.

^ Eba Anderson Lawton, ed. Ati Artillery Officer in the Mexican War, 1846-7:
Letters of Robert Atiderson. New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1911,
p. 266 ; abbreviated words appearing in the original have been reproduced in
full in the above quotation.

barrassment, and their possessors were classed as undesirable.
Some were ordered to get out of the country. Others still in
the United States were advised that the best that could be
done for them was an offer of transportation to the border
and freedom to cross into Mexico, the one area on the face of
the globe where they could not live, at least not for long.^^

In his diary entry of June 5, 1848, Hitchcock records he was to
discharge the Spy Company "with their own consent, by paying them
$20 per man at Vera Cruz — except the chief, Domingues, who will go
to New Orleans.'' Those electing to remain in service "expect to go to
Compeachy on an expedition proposed by General Lane 'on his own
hook . . . ." ^^ As it does not appear that the Compeachy mission was
realized, the remnants of the Spy Company probably were dispersed
into the countryside, without any further American payments, to pur-
sue their old craft as bandits.

Another account regarding the fate of the Spy Company says simply
that its members "were offered $20 apiece and a trip to Texas.^° Thus,
it remains uncertain as to how many in the Mexican Spy Company
received final compensation for their services and, beyond this, how
many were left to fend for themselves in their homeland or were
removed to the United States. While the Spy Company is generally
thought to have provided useful intelligence .for General Scott, its
unique nature and the experience of United States armed forces in the
Mexican hostilities prompt agi'eement with the conclusion that :

The AVar with Mexico gave many American officers a certain
practical training for Civil War marches and battlefields. But
from its extempore secret service little of positive value could
have been derived.*^

V. Oivil War

In 1860, following the election of Abraham Lincoln to the presi-
dency, the South Carolina legislature, by a unanimous vote, called
for a state convention. It assembled at Columbia and passed without
dissent an ordinance declaring that "the Union now subsisting be-
tween South Carolina and the other States, under the name of the
'United States of America,' is hereby dissolved." Seceding on Decem-
ber 20, 1860, South Carolina was followed by Mississippi (January 19,
1861), Louisiana (January 26, 1861), and Texas (February 1, 1861).
Tlie seceding states called for a convention. Meeting in Montgomery,
Alabama, it framed a constitution resembling the U.S. Constitution,
and on February 8, 1861, set up a provisional government. Thus was
the Confederacy born.

President-elect Lincoln was unable to halt the cataclysm of a dis-
solving Union and open warfare among the states. By the time of his

^Allison Ind. A Short History of Espionage. New York, David McKay Com-
pany, 1963, p. 79.

^ Croffut, op. cit., p .330.

*° Smith, op. cit., p. 476n.

*^ Bryan, op. cit., p. 118 : of passing interest is the diflSculty President Polk had
in protecting his secret diplomatic efforts and the lack of any intelligence orga-
nization to assist on this security problem : see Anna Kasten Nelson, Secret Agents
and Security Leaks : President Polk and the Mexican War. Journalism Quarterly,
V, 52, Spring, 1975 : 9-14, 98.

inaugural (March 4, 1861), the Confederate Provisional Government
had been established (February 8, 1861), Jefferson Davis had been
elected (February 9, 1861) and inaugurated as President of the Con-
federacy (Febniary 18, 1861), an army had been assembled by the
secessionist states, and Federal forts and arsenals within the South had
been seized, beginning with the Charleston weapons installation
(December 30, 1860).

Confronted with a civil war, the Federal Government lacked any
centralized intelligence organization and, in desperation, scrambled to
establish a piecemeal makeshift secret service. Efforts in this regard be-
came imperative when it was soon realized that the territory surround-
ing Washington — Virginia, eastern Maryland and southern Dela-
ware — was a hotbed of treason, Confederate agents, and poisonous
conspiracies against the Union.

War, Navy, and State departments at first acted independ-
ently. Seward of the State Department took the lead, sending
detectives into Canada and the South. The War Department
was then administered not by the tireless and incorruptible
Stanton but by that cynical party boss Simon Cameron, to
whom has been attributed the definition of an honest politi-
cian as "one that, when he's bought, stays bought." (Lincoln
dispensed with Cameron in January 1862, and removed him as
far as possible from the scene by appointing him minister to
Russia. )

Police chiefs of Northern cities — for example, "Uncle
John" Kennedy, superintendent of the metropolitan police of
New York — had been called in to assist, not only by trailing
and arresting suspects but by lending trained operatives. Gen-
eral [Winfield] Scott appears to have consulted and worked
with Seward rather than with Cameron, his own superior.
After a while the military jails at Fort Warren (Boston),
Fort McHenry (Baltimore), and Fort Lafayette (New
York) were crowded to the limit ; so in February 1862 Lin-
coln ordered the release on parole of all political and state
prisoners except spies or those otherwise inimical to public
safety. Thenceforth the principal arrests of all suspects of
that character were by military power.*^

VI. Pinkerton

Among the more famous private detectives recruited by the Federal
Government was Allan Pinkerton who served as an intelligence orga-
nizer and coordinator from April, 1861, until the fall of the following
year. His activities in and around Washington were under the direc-
tion of the Secretary of War and Colonel Andrew Porter, provost
marshall responsible for the capital's security while under martial
law. Pinkerton's field operations were in the service of General George

*^ Bryan, op. cit., pp. 121-122; generally, on the questions of arrest and incar-
ceration authority, see James G. Randall. Constitutional Proilems Under LiticoVn.
Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1951, pp. 118-186 ; also see Clinton Rossiter.
Constitutional Dictatorshiw: Crisis Government in Modern Democracies. Prince-
ton, Princeton University Press, 1948, pp. 223-240.

B. McClellan during his command of the Ohio forces and the Army
of the Potomac.*^

Pinkerton's involvement in intelligence activity in the Union cause
actually occurred before the Great Emancipator arrived at the White
House. Early in 1861, Samuel H. Felton, president of the Philadelphia,
Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad, secured Pinkerton's services to
investigate threats of damage to the line "by roughs and secessionists
of Maryland." ■** The detective dispatched undercover agents to infil-
trate gangs and secret societies thought to be making the intimidations
and soon learned of a plot to assassinate President-elect Lincoln.*^ In
league with members of the Baltimore police force, the conspirators
planned to kill the Chief Executive when he traveled by open carriage
from the Northern Central Railroad station to the Washington depot,
a half mile away.*^ Informing the President-elect's entourage of this
scheme, Pinkerton set about devising an alternative travel plan for
the Lincoln party. After finally meeting with the President-elect in
Philadelphia, agreement was reached that a special train would
secretly carry Lincoln through Baltimore the night before the official
caravan was to arrive in that city.*^ Thus eluding the assassins, the
Chief Executive made his way safely to Washington. For his part in
these activities, Pinkerton not only had an effective spy force, but
"fixed" the telegraph to render communication of the ploy impossi-
ble,''^ detained two journalists by force of arms from immediately
reporting the plan,*^ and assumed responsibility for the security of
the tracks which the special train traveled.^"

Next, in late April, Pinkerton was prevailed upon to provide a
secure courier service to Washington. "Several gentlemen of promi-
nence in Chicago, intimate friends of President Lincoln, and men of
influence and intelligence in the State, desired to communicate with
the President upon questions connected with the existing condition of
affairs, and applied to me for the purpose of having letters and dis-
patches conveyed directly to Washington by the hands of a trusty
messenger." ^^ For this mission, Pinkerton selected Timothy Webster
who was destined to become one of the Union's most successful, but
martyred, spies. When he arrived at the White House with the com-
muniques, Lincoln thanked him for safely conveying the messages
and for his role in apprehending a Confederate spy along the way.
Return dispatches were prepared by the President, one of which sum-
moned Pinkerton to the capital.^^ A few days later, Pinkerton was in
Washington.

^ Allan Pinkerton. The Spy of the Rebellion. New York, G. W. Carleton and
Company, 1883, p. xxvii.

"/6i(Z., p. 46..

^ See Ibid., pp. 55-64.

" Ibid., p. 68.

" See Ibid., pp. 83-87 ; by this time Lincoln had also received word of the plot
from William Seward's son who had been given the information by General Win-
field Scott ; see James D. Horan. The Pinkertons: The Detective Dynasty that
Made History. New York, Crown Publishers, 1967, p. 56.

"* Pinkerton, op. cit., pp. 89-90.

" Ibid., pp. 99-100.

■^ Ibid., p. 96.

"^ Ibid., p. 110.

^'Ibid., p. 130.

Arriving at the capital I found a condition of affairs at once
peculiar and embarrassing, and the city contained a strange
admixture of humanity, both patriotic and dangerous. Here
were gathered the rulers of the nation and those who were
seeking its destruction. The streets were filled with soldiers,
armed and eager for the fray ; officers and orderlies were seen
galloping from place to place ; the tramp of armed men was
heard on every side, and strains of martial music filled the air.
Here, too, lurked the secret enemy, who was conveying beyond
the lines the coveted information of every movement made or
contemplated. Men who formerly occupied places of dignity,
power and trust were now regarded as objects of suspicion,
whose loyalty was impeached and whose actions it was neces-
sary to watch. Aristocratic ladies, who had previously opened
the doors of their luxurious residences to those in high office
and who had hospitably entertained the dignitaries of the
land, were now believed to be in sympathy with the attempt
to overthrow the country, and engaged in clandestine corre-
spondence with Southern leaders. The criminal classes poured
in from all quarters, and almost every avenue of society was
penetrated by these lawless and unscrupulous hordes. An
adequate idea can be formed of the transformation which had
been effected within a few short weeks in this city of national
government.^^

Observant of the conditions which might prompt the enlistment of
his intelligence services, Pinkerton shortly met with Lincoln and some
of the members of the Cabinet who informed him "that the object in
sending for me was that the authorities had for some time entertained
the idea of organizing a secret-servnce department of the government,
with the view of ascertaining the social, political and patriotic status
of the numerous suspected persons in and around the city." ^* No plans
on this matter had been drawn up. Pinkerton was asked for his ideas,
which he gave, and then departed with the understanding that further
communications on the subject would be forthcoming. Not only did
such discussions fail to materialize, but, it was quite apparent to Pinker-
ton "that in the confusion and excitement which were necessarily inci-
dent to the novel and perplexing condition of affairs then existing,
that anything approaching to a systematized organization or operation
would be for a time impossible." ^^ The nation needed armed forces :
too many competing demands for men, money, and the attention of
Federal officials for this task mitigated against plans for a secret serv-
ice. A few days after liis meeting with Lincoln, Pinkerton unsuccess-
fully attempted to obtain additional details regarding the intelligence
plan, left his address with the President's secretary, and returned to
Philadelphia.

In the meantime. Major General George B. INIcClellan, an old friend
of Pinkerton's who had just been named commander of the Ohio vol-

^' Ibid., pp. 137-138.
" Ibid., p. 139.
^ Ibid.

unteers, wrote asking for a secret meeting in Cincinnati.^^ Pinkerton
hastened to the rendezvous, informed McClellan of what had trans-
pired in Washington and of the conditions he found there. The Gen-
eral was also interested in establishing a secret service and wanted
his friend to organize and direct it. An agreement was struck.

Our business was settled. It arranged that I should assume
full management and control of this new branch of the serv-
ice, and that I should at once enter upon the discharge of
the multifarious duties attending so responsible a position.
The General then informed me he would write to General
[Winfield] Scott for permission to organize this department
under his own personal supervision; and he also agreed to
submit the project to Governor [William] Dennison, of Ohio,
with a request to that gentlemen to solicit the co-operation
of the Governors of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and Wiscon-
sin, in sustaining the organization.^^

Pinkerton set up offices in Cincinnati and brought a group of his
detectives to the city for the intelligence mission. It would appear that
he utilized only his own trained agents for this enterprise.

The general informed me that he would like observations
made within the rebel lines, and I resolved to at once send
some scouts into the disaffected region lying south of us, for
the purpose of obtaining information concerning the num-
bers, equipments, movements and intentions of the enemy,
as well as to ascertain the general feeling of the Southern
people in regard to the war. I fully realized the delicacy of
this business, and the necessity of conducting it with the
greatest care, caution and secrecy. None but good, true, re-
liable men could be detailed for such service, and knowing
this, I made my selections accordingly. . . .^^

Agents were dispatched singly and in pairs over carefully selected
and differing routes. Among the first to depart was Timothy Webster
who traveled to Louisville and Memphis with stops at Bowling Green
and Clarkesville.^^ Webster was also the first of Pinkerton's opera-
tives to come into contact with the Confederacy's counter-intelligence
corps or safety committees.*^° Two other famous Pinkerton agents were
Pryce Lewis and John Scully .^^

In organizing and controlling this secret service, I endeavored
to conceal my own individual identity so far as my friends
and the public were concerned. The new field of usefulness
into which I had ventured was designed to be a secret one
in every respect, and for obvious reasons I was induced to
lay aside the name of Allan Pinkerton — a name so well known
that it had grown to be a sort of synonym for detective. I

^ See lUd., pp. 140-141.
^' lUd., pp. 153-154.
^ Ibid., p. 155.

^^ See Ibid., p. 157fe; Webster's activities are discussed throughout Pinkerton's
book ; also see Bryan, op. cit., pp. 123-130, 167-170.
*" See Pinkerton, op. cit., pp. 160-165, 174-175, 180-181.
'^ See Ibid., pp. 501-529.

accordingly adopted the less suggestive one E. J. Allen; a
Tiom, de guerre which I retained during the entire period of
my connection with the war. This precautionary measure was
first proposed by the General himself, and in assenting to it
I carried out his views as well as my own. This ruse to con-
ceal my identity was a successful one. My true name was
known only to General McClellan, and those of my force who
were in my employ before the breaking out of the rebellion,
and by them it was sacredly kept.^^

When McClellan was given command of the Army of the Potomac
in November, 1861, Pinkerton moved on to Washington with him.

Among the first things the General did, after being assigned
to the command of the troops around that city, was to orga-
nize a secret ser\dce force, under my management and con-
trol. I was to have such strength of forces as I might require;
my headquarters were for the time located in Washington.
It was arranged that whenever the army moved I was to go
forward with the General, so that I might always be in close
communication with him. My corps was to be continually
occupied in procuring, from all possible sources, information
regarding the strength, positions and movements of the en-
emy. All spies, "contrabands," deserters, refugees and pris-
oners of war, coming into our lines from the front, were to
be carefully examined by me, and their statements taken in
writing.^^

It was also at this time that Pinkerton took on added responsibili-
ties for security within the capital city. This aspect of intelligence
operations was described by Pinkerton in a letter to General
McClellan shortly after the Washington command was secured.

In operating with my detective force, I shall endeavor to
test all suspected persons in various ways. I shall seek access
to their houses, clubs, and places of resort, managing that
among the members of my force shall be ostensible repre-
sentatives of every grade of society, from the highest to the
most menial. Some shall have the entree to the gilded salon
of the suspected aristocratic traitors, and be their honored
guests, while others will act in the capacity of valets, or do-
mestics of various kinds, and try the efficacy of such rela-
tions with the household to gain evidence. Other suspected
ones will be tracked by the "shadow" detective, who will fol-
low their every foot-step, and note their every action.

I also propose to employ a division of my force for the dis-
covery of any secret traitorous organization which may be
in existence ; and if any such society is discovered, I will have
my operatives become members of the same, with a view to
ascertaining the means employed in transmitting messages
through the lines, and also for the purpose of learning, if
possible, the plans of the rebels. All strangers arriving in

•* lUd., p. 156.
* lUd., p. 245.

the city, whose associations or acts may lay them open to
suspicion, will be subjected to a strict surveillance.®*

In addition to these security and surveillance activities, Pinkerton's
operatives cooperated with the Loyal League, a group of southern
blacks who "had banded themselves together to further the cause
of freedom, to succor the escaping slave, and to furnish information
to loyal commanders of the movements of the rebels, as far as they
could be ascertained."®^ Another intelligence source cultivated by
Pinkerton was the double agent. As the master detective himself con-
cluded :

In war, as in a game of chess, if you know the moves of your
adversary in advance, it is then an easy matter to shape your
own plans, and make your moves accordingly, and, of course
always to your own decided advantage. So in this case, I con-
cluded that if the information intended for the rebels could
first be had by us, after that, they were welcome to all the
benefit they might derive from them.®®

For all of his efforts, doubts persist as to the capabilities and accom-
plishments of Pinkerton. To the extent his intelligence activities were
successful, did they derive from careful planning and evaluation or
luck? Shortly after the fall of Fort Sumter, Pinkerton offered the
services of sixteen to eighteen of his agents to serve the Union.®'' By
the time final arrangements were being made for a spy force to assist
McClellan's Ohio volunteers, ten agents had been put into the field.®®
At the height of his career in the capital, it is uncertain as to the
number of personnel Pinkerton had m his employ.®^ For the most
part, he hired and utilized his own detectives. "He held the not im-
plausible notion that a good private detective can, automatically,
become an expert secret agent in time of war ; and nowhere, either m
the performance of his duties or in subsequent records dictated by
him, is there to be discovered any conception of the essentially military
character of the work he sought to direct." ^°

The reasons for Pinkerton's deficiency in correctly evaluat-
ing the military information he received were his blind hero
worship of McClellan, the investigative methods he had in-
troduced in the field that had made his agency so remarkable
in civilian life, and his intense abolitionist fervor.

In Chicago, when he was on a case, Pinkerton's method was
to assemble an infinite number of small details, which when
put together gave a clue to the mystery. Pinkerton's opera-

** Ihid., pp. 247-248.

'^lUd., pp. 355-357.

*/&?■(?., pp. 429-430.

•^ James D. Horan and Howard Swiggett. The Pinkerton Story. New York,
Putnam's Sons, 1951, p. 92.

"* Richard Wilmer Rowan. The Pinkertons: A Detective Dynasty. Boston,
Little, Brown and Company, 1931, p. 92.

** Pinkerton was sufficiently secretive about the number and names of those
in his employ that he apparently was in constant dispute with the Assistant
Secretary of War who had to approve his bills for service; see Horan and
Swiggett, opt. cit., p. 120.

™ Rowan, op. oit., 145.

tives traditionally sent in reports every day, no matter how
difficult it was to do so. In Chicago these reports were filed
in a systematic fashion. This very system, which Pinkerton
introduced on the battlefields, defeated him : It failed because
the man making the final report was an amateur at war. Then
there was Pinkerton's antislavery attitude. For years he had
been helping slaves who came to him with the most touching
stories. In the field, Pinkerton, in his sympathy, was uncriti-
cal of the excited, uneducated slaves who stood before him
in his tent, twisting a ragged hat, shuffling their feet in the
excitement of knowing that at last they were incapable of
giving realistic information about what was happening on
a grand scale behind Confederate lines, it is evident that
Pinkerton believed everything they told him.^^

Ultimately, Pinkerton's inabilities as an interpreter of intelligence
information for military purposes contributed to his downfall as head
of the Washington spy corps. Early in 1862, Lincoln set February 22nd
for the launching of a general Union offensive. McClellan, who had
already exhibited a tendency to hesitate in engaging the enemy, did
not start operations in the offensive until March when he began moving
on Richmond in the Peninsula Campaign. Advancing over the terri-
tory^ between the James and York Rivers, he was given an estimate
of enemy troop strength of 200,000 men. In fact, the Confederate
forces numbered 86,000 to McClellan's 100,000. Nevertheless, the effect
of this inflated estimate was sufficient to make the Union commander
even more hesitant to engage the enemy than he had been in the past.
After a series of skirmishes, troops under General Robert E. Lee and
General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson launched a counterattack
on the McClellan forces in the Seven Days' Battles, resulting in a re-
treat of the larger L^nion army to the James River and a check on
the advance toward Richmond. Two months later, in September, Mc-
Clellan surprised Lee at Antietam but, failing to use his reserves,
fought the rebels to a bloody draw. Angered at Lee's escape, by Mc-
Clellan's procrastination, and alarmed by a daring cavalry raid by
General James E. B. "Jeb" Stuart around the Union forces and into
Pennsylvania. Lincoln finally replaced McClellan as commander of
the Army of the Potomac on November 7, 1862. ^^ Thereupon, Pinker-
ton resigned his position as head of the secret service.

The detective, as it was to turn out, did not really do much
more than effect a change of front, for he was active on behalf
of the government as long as the States were in conflict. There
were innumerable damage claims being pressed in Washing-
ton — the deeper into the South the Union armies penetrated,
the more they multiplied — and these the Pinkerton agents
investigated, with a high average of success in controlling
the schemes of imposters and swindlers. For the particular
purpose of looking after cotton claims, in the spring of '64,
Allan Pinkerton was transferred to the Department of the
Mississippi, General Canby commanding. And now his other

"■ Horan, op. cit., pp. 116-117.

" See Ibid., pp. 115-137 ; Horan and Swiggett, op. cit., pp. 107-122.

son Robert was deemed mature enough to join his brother
in the secret service. Meanwhile, the military espionage de-
partment which Allan had initiated continued to expand,
operating under the fairly successful direction of various offi-
cers — in the East the most noteworthy being Colonel, after-
ward Brigadier General Lafayette C. Baker, an inventive
man, one of the few American spymasters in any war who
seems to compare with the brilliant if throughly unscrupu-
lous practitioners of Europe. In the West Grenville M. Dodge,
who also attained a general's rank, capably controlled a hun-
dred spies, but he was to become far more celebrated subse-
quently as the indomitable builder of the Union Pacific
RailroadJ^

VII. Seumrd

When the Lincoln Administration suddenly foimd itself faced with
open hostilities and accompanying espionage and spy intrigues in
1861, one of the first officials to react to the situation was Secretary
of State Seward. His organization combined both the police func-
tion — pursuing individuals with a view to their incarceration and
prosecution — and the intelligence function — gathering information re-
garding the loyalty and political views of citizens without any par-
ticular regard for possible violations of the law. In combining the
two tasks, of course, their distinction often became lost. One com-
mentator notes :

The Government's first efforts to control the civilian popula-
tion were conducted by the Secretary of State for reasons both
personal and official. William H. Seward, the "Premier" of the
Cabinet, had an unquenchable zeal for dabbling in everyone
else's business. In addition, since the establishment of the
Federal Government the office of the Secretary of State had
been somewhat of a catchall for duties no other executive
agency was designed to handle. With the war, and the new
problem of subversion on the home front, Seward soon began
to busy himself about arrests of political prisoners, their in-
carceration, and then the next step of setting up secret agents
to ferret them out.'^*

There are no informative records as to how or why the initial arrests
of political prisoners and the creation of a secret service fell to Secre-
tary Seward. It is entirely likely that he requested these duties. The
more important consideration, however, concerns the extent to which
he responsibly carried out these obligations. According to one of the
Secretary's biographers :

Arrests were made for any one of many reasons : where men
were suspected of having given, or intending to give, aid or
comfort to the enemy in any substantial way, — as by helping
in the organization of troops, by supplying arms or provisions,
or selling the bonds of the states in secession; by public or
private communications that opposed United States enlist-

''^ Rowan, op. cit., pp. 186-187.

''* George Fort Milton. Abraham Lincoln and the Fifth Column. New York, The
"Vanguard Press, 1942, p. 48.

ments or encouraged those of the Confederacy ; by expressing
sympathy with the South or attacking the administration;
by belonging to organizations designed to obstruct the prog-
ress of the war — in fact for almost any act that indicated a
desire to see the government fail in its effort to conquer
disunion."^

But the question was not simply one of fact. A number of due proc-
ess considerations were raised by the manner and nature of the arrest
and detention of political offenders.

The person suspected of disloyalty was often seized at
night, searched, borne off to the nearest fort, deprived of his
valuables, and locked up in a casemate, or in a battery gen-
erally crowded with men that had had similar experiences. It
was not rare for arrests regarded as political to be made by
order of the Secretary of War or of some military officer; but,
with only a few exceptions, these prisoners came under the
control of the Secretary of State just as if he had taken the
original action.

For a few days the newcomer usually varied reflection and
loud denunciation of the administration. But the discomforts
of his confinement soon led him to seek his freedom. "V\nien he
resolved to send for friends and an attorney, he was informed
that the rules forbade visitors, except in rare instances, that
attorneys were entirely excluded, and the prisoner who sought
their aid would greatly prejudice his case. Only unsealed let-
ters would be forwarded, and if they contained objectionable
statements they were returned to the writer or filed in the De-
partment of State with other papers relating to the case.
There still remained a possibility, it was generally assumed,
of speedy relief by appeal to the Secretary in person. Then a
long narrative, describing the experiences of a man whose
innocence was equaled only by his misfortunes, was addressed
to the nervous, wiry, all-powerful man keeping watch over
international relations, political offenders, and affairs gen-
erally. The letter was usually read by the Chief Clerk or As-
sistant Secretary, and then merely filed. A second, third, and
fourth petition for liberation and explanations was sent to the
department — but with no result save that the materials for
the study of history and human nature were thereby en-
larged ; the Secretary was calm in the belief that the man was
a plotter and could do no harm while he remained in
custody.^®

To rectify this situation, two important steps were taken in Febru-
ary, 1862. On St. Valentine's Day. an Executive order was issued pro-
viding for the wholesale release of most political prisoners, excepting
only "persons detained as spies in the service of the insurgents, or
others whose release at the present moment may be deemed incom-
patible with the public safety." '''' In addition, a special review panel.

■^ Frederick Bancroft. TTie Life of William H. Scica)-d (Vol. 2). New York, Har-
per and Brothers, 1900, p. 260.
'^Ibid.. pp. 261-262.
■" See Richardson, op. cit. (Vol. 7) , pp. 3303-3305.

consisting of Judge Edwards Pierrepont and General John A. Dix,
was established to expedite releases under this directiveJ^

With regard to intelligence activities, Seward apparently employed
Allan Pinkerton for such operations during the summer of 1861, "but
did not keep him long, perhaps because he felt that the detective was
too close to the President, and Seward wanted his own man, whose
loyalty would be direct to him." ^^ A listening post was sought in
Canada for purposes of checking on the activities of Confederate
agents and to monitor the trend of sentiment in British North America
during the secession crisis.®" Former Massachusetts Congressman
George Ashmun was appointed special agent to Canada for three
months in early 1861 at a salary of $10 a day plus expenses. Seward
advanced $500 cash on account. Another operative, Charles S. Ogden,
took residence in Quebec and additional stations were subsequently
established at Halifax and St. John's, among other seaports.®^

A domestic network also came into being while the Canadian group
struggled to recruit confidential agents.

Seward's "Secret Service Letter Book" for 1861 was full of
inquiries dispatched to friends and trusted official associates
throughout the country asking them to discover persons who
could be put on important investigating tasks. He wanted "a
discreet and active man" for the Northern frontier, to arrest
spies seeking entrance from Canada, and offered to pay such
a man $100 a month. A little later he appointed a special
agent at Niagara Falls, to examine the persons coming over
the Suspension Bridge, and seize and hold any who seemed
suspicious. He sought, without immediate results, a good man
for Chicago and another for Detroit. He authorized the
United States Marshal at Boston to employ two detectives for
two month's time, each at $150 a month. This was particularly
urgent ; therefore let the Marshal consult the governor of the
State, "and take effective measures to break up the business of
making and sending shoes for the Rebel Army." ®^

Almost unnoticed, Seward's intelligence organization began to grow,
though its agents often proved to be ineffective amateurs. Shortly,
however, professionalism, discipline, and a careful sense of mission
came to the Secretary's spy corps in the person of Lafayette Charles
Baker.

YIIL Baker

Born in New York in 1826 and reared in the Michigan wilderness,
Lafayette Baker engaged in meclianical and mercantile pursuits in the
state of his birth and in Philadelphia in 1848 before departing, in

'® The correspondence of this panel and lists of those released at its direction
may be found in Fred C. Ainsworth and Joseph W. Kirkley, comps. The War of
the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and 'Confederate
Armies, Series II (Vol. 2). Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1897.

™ Milton, op. cit., p. 49.

^ See John W. Headley. Confederate Operations In Canada and New York. New
York and Washington, The Neale Publishing Company, 1906 ; also of related in-
terest is James D. Bulloch. The Secret Service of the Confederate States in
Europe. New York, Thomas Yoseloff, 1956 ; originally published 1884.

" Milton, loc. cit.

^' Ibid., pp. 50-51.

1853, for California. Three years later he was an active member of the
Viofilance Committee. This experience and his admiration of Francios
Vidocq (1775-1857), an infamous Paris detective whom Baker came
to imitate, whetted his appetite for intrigue and the life of the sleuth.
AVhen hostilities broke out between the Xorth and the South, Baker
happened to be heading for Xew York City on business. When he
became aware of the mischief and misdeeds of Confederate spies and
saboteurs in and around AVashinfrton, he set out for the capital deter-
mined to offer his services as a Union agent. ^^

Arriving in the District of Columbia, Baker obtained an interview
with General Winfield Scott, commander of the Army and himself not
unfamiliar Avith spy services. In need of information about the rebel
forces at Manassas, Scott, having already lost five previous agents on
the mission, solicited Baker's assistance. After an adventure of daring
and dash, the intrepid Baker returned three weeks later with the de-
tails sought by General Scott. The success of the mission earned Baker
a pennanent position with the War Department.^^

The next assignment given Baker involved ferreting out two Balti-
more brothers who were running the Union blockade to supply muni-
tions to the Confederates. This he did, breaking up the smuggling
operation and earning himself a considerable amount of press
publicity.^^

These activities came to the attention of Secretary Seward who hired
Baker at the rate of $100 a month plus expenses ^® and sent him off to
prowl wherever espionage, sabotage, or rebel spy agents were thought
to be lurking.^^ Assisted by three hundred Indiana cavalrymen. Baker
was later ordered to probe the Maryland country side for the presence
of rebel agents and Confederate sympathies. His mission took him to
Chaptico, Leonardstown, Port Tobacco, Old Factory, and the farni-
land of St. George's, St. Charles and St. ISIarys counties.^^ As his
column advanced, they punished the disloyal. As a result, "he left
behind a trail of burning buildings, frightened men, women, and
children, terrified informers, [and] bullet -pierced Secesh tobacco
planters." ^^

As a consequence of this campaign. Baker attempted to interest
Postmaster General Montgomery Blair in a purge of disloyal Mary-
land postmasters, replacing them with Union stalwarts or closing the
stations. Blair was well aware of disloyalty among some of the ISIary-
land postmasters and earlier had ordered their displacement. In a
report to the Secretarj' of State, Baker claimed he had obtained mi-
limited authority to conduct the postmaster purge and requested a
military force of two hundred to three hundred men to police the
localities in Maryland where these disloyal officials had been dis-

^ See L. C. Baker. History of the United States Secret Service. Philadelphia,
Kins: and Baird. 1868, pp. 1,5^20; Jacob Mogelever. neath to Traitors: The Story
of General Lafayette C. Baker, Lincoln's Forgotten Secret Service Chief. New
York, Doubleday and Comnanv. 1960. pp. 22-48.

" Baker, op. eit., pp. 4.5-72; Mogelever. op. cit., pp. 48-62.

^ Baker, op., cit., pp. 72-84 ; Mogelever, op. oit., pp. 68-72.

®* Mogelever, op. cit., p. 73.

*'' See Baker, op. cit., pp. 85-101.

^' Ibid., pp. 102-111 : Mogelever, op. cit., pp. 74-79.

** Mogelever, op. cit., p. 79.

covered. The proposal was ignored but Baker had a variety of other
tasks to occupy him as Seward's intelligence chief .^°

With enough endurance for a dozen men, he worked almost
without rest to educate himself in the ever-spreading opera-
tions of the rebels and their sympathizers. He traveled to
Canada to see for himself what the South was doing to build
a fire in the rear of the Union : he made the acquaintance of
police chiefs of the big northern cities; he personally took
prisoners to the harbor forts to look over conditions ; he un-
covered and jotted down identities of suppliers of war goods
to the South; he acquired a firethand knowledge of Secesh-
supporting newspapers, in sedition-ridden New York, New
Jersey, and the seething West. Only on rare occasions, when
official duty took him there, did he see his wife Jennie, who
had gone to the security of her parent's home in Philadel-
phia.91

As a consequence of Lincoln's St. Valentine's Day directive regard-
ing the release of political prisoners and limiting "extraordinary
arrests" to "the direction of the military authorities alone," Baker
was recommended to the War Department and its new Secretary,
Edwin M. Stanton.^- In accepting Baker's services, Stanton warned
him of the grave and desperate situation facing the government, ad-
vised him that he would never be permitted to disclose the authority
for his actions, and gave notice that he would be expected to pursue
all enemies of the Union, regardless of their station, power, loyalty,
partisanship, or profession. Baker's detective service was to be the
terror of the North as well as the South, secretly funded, and account-
able exclusively and directly to the Secretary of War.^^

The enemies of the state took many forms. An enemy could
be a pretty girl with swaying hips covered by an acre of
crinoline, carrier of rebellion-sustaining contraband goods.
Or an enemy could be a contractor selling the Union shoddy
clothing. Or an enemy could be a Copperhead sapping the
strength of the Union by discx)uraging enlistments. An enemy
could also be a Union general with larceny in his soul,
gambling away the pay of his soldiers. He could be a guerrilla
with a torch firing a government corral within sight of the
White House.^*

For three years, Baker gathered intelligence on the enemies of the
Union, reporting his findings to Stanton and Lincoln. In addition,
at their direction or sometimes on his own authority, he functioned
as an instrument for directly punishing the enemy or for arresting
and incarcerating them. Utilizing his intelligence sources, Baker
identified and prejudged the despoilers of the Union; relying upon
extraordinary military authority and martial law, he seized his foe
in his capacity as a Federal policeman; and as the custodian of the

** See Ibid., pp. 79-81.

'^ Ibid., p. 84.

*^ See Richardson, op. cit. (Vol. 7), pp. 3003-3005.

^ See Mogelever, op. cit., pp. 86-88.

"/bid., p. 89.

Old Capitol Prison and its nefarious annex, the Carroll Prison, he
served as jailer of those he captured.

Of Baker's Commander-in-Chief, one authority has commented:
"Xo one can ever know just what Lincoln conceived to be limits of
his powers," ^^

In his own words, the Sixteenth President wrote :

. . . my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of my
ability, imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every
indispensable means, that government — that nation — of
which that Constitution was the organic law. Was it possible
to lose the nation, and yet preserve the constitution? By
general law life and limb must be protected; yet often a
limb must be amputated to save a life, but a life is never
wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures, otherwise
unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming indis-
pensable to the preservation of the constitution through the
preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed this
ground, and now avow it. I could not feel that, to the best
of my ability, I had ever tried to preserve the constitution
if, to save slavery, or any minor matter, I should permit the
wreck of government, country, and Constitution all to-
gether.''*^

And in the more contemporary view of Clinton Rossiter:

. . . Mr. Lincoln subscribed to a theory that in the absence
of Congress and in the presence of an emergency the Presi-
dent has the right and duty to adopt measures which would
ordinarily be illegal, subject to the necessity of subsequent
congressional approval. He did more than this; he seemed
to assert that the war powers of the Constitution could upon
occasion devolve completely upon the President, if their
exercise was based upon public opinion and an inexorable
necessity. They were then sufficient to embrace any action
within the fields of executive or legislative or even judicial
power essential to the preservation of the Union. [He] . . .
implied that this government, like all others, possessed an
absolute power of self-defense, a power to be exerted by the
President of the United States. And this power extended to
the breaking of the fundamental laws of the nation, if such
a step were unavoidable.^^

The presence of this operating viewpoint at the highest level of
the Executive Branch, coupled with his own personal ambitions for
power and prestige, contributed significantly to Baker's zealous, au-
thoritarian, and often illegal manner of carrying out his War Depart-
ment mission. Nevertheless, Baker must be recognized as a professional

^ Wilfred E. Binkley. President and Congress. New York, Alfred A. Knopf,
1947, p. 126.

*" Letter to Albert G. Hodges (April 4. 1864) in Roy P. Easier, ed. The Col-
lected Works of Abraham Lincoln (Vol. 8). New Brunswick, Rutgers University
Press, 1953, p. 281.

*' Rossiter, op. cit., p. 229.

thoroughly familiar with the methods and tactics of his profession.
Reflecting a classically Machiavellian perspective, he once wrote :

It may be said that the deception and misstatements resorted
to, and inseparable from the detective service, are demoraliz-
ing and prove unsoundness of character in its officers. But it
must be borne in mind that, in war, no commander fails to
deceive the enemy when possible, to secure the least advan-
tage. Spies, scouts, intercepted correspondence, feints in army
movements, misrepresentations of military strength and posi-
tion, are regarded as honorable means of securing victory
over the foe. The work of the detectives is simply deception
reduced to a science or profession; and whatever objection,
on ethical grounds, may lie against the secret service, lies
with equal force against the strategy and tactics of Washing-
ton, Scott, Grant, and the host of their illustrious associates
in the wars of the world. War is a last and terrible resort in
the defense of even a righteous cause, and sets at defiance all
of the ordinary laws and customs of society, overriding the
rights of property and the sanctity of the Sabbath. And not
until the nation learns war no more, will the work of deception
and waste of morals, men and treasures, cease.^^

Establishing offices at 217 Pennsylvania Avenue, in close proximity
to both the White House and the War Department, Baker began
gathering recruits and organizing his unit. Operating without official
status, the group was generally referred to as the Secret Service
Bureau. Its personnel, known only to Baker in terms of number and
complete identity, bore no credentials other than a small silver badge.^^
Secretly commissioned as a colonel. Baker initially represented him-
self, when absolutely necessary, as an agent of the War Department.
Later, he publicly cited his military rank and held the title of
Provost-Marshal.

He initiated the nation's first police dossier system although
the rebels, the Copperheads, and the misguided among the
Loyalists in the North charged him with poking his private
eyes into the homes of the innocent.

He gathered systematically the first criminal photo file,
enabling a more efficient pursuit of the enemies of the nation.

He instituted a policy of seizing suspects in the dead of
night when their resistance to interrogation and their ability
to seek help would be at the lowest ebb.

He made a science of the interrogation of prisoners, using
teams of detectives to work over a suspect until he was satis-
fied he either had the full story or he could drag no more
information from his victim.

He established a secret fund for building and feeding a
vast army of informers and unlisted agents. No one except
he knew the full range of his organization. Even his most
trusted aides were not allowed to loiow the identity of all of
his operatives.^""

** Mogelever, op. cit., p. 91.
"* Ibid., pp. 95, 169.
'~ Ibid., p. 111.

For reasons of both security and strategy, Baker's agents were di-
vided into daylight and nighttime units — the men in one group did
not know the identity of those in the other — and another section
counted operatives who infiltrated and trafficked in the capital's high
society.^"^ He cultivated contacts with the police in the nation's major
cities ^°^ and kept a close watch on Confederate activities in Canada."^
By the summer of 1863, a branch office had been set up in New York
City ^"^ and he succeeded in placing his personnel in the Post Office for
purposes of inspecting the mails.^"^

On two occasions Baker's spy service gathered intelligence which
probably contributed to the downfall of General McClellan : Baker's
personal penetration of the Confederate forces at Manassas resulted in
the discovery that the fortifications and artillery which were sup-
posedly keeping McClellan's army at ba}' were actually earthen and
wooden fakes and later Lincoln utilized the services of one of Baker's
agents to secretly observe McClellan's conduct on the battlefield.^"^
With the decline of McClellan, Allan Pinkerton, whom Baker re-
garded as "sagacious," departed from the scene, leaving some agents
and the spy field to Baker.^"' The only other threat to Baker's supreme
command of secret service operations was the reputed organizer of
the old Mexican Spy Company, Ethan Allen Hitchcock, but he was
found to be an old man seized with mysticism and pursuits of alchemy
with no desires for any responsibility in the hostilities.^"*

In June of 1863, Baker gained an open commission in the army with
the rank of colonel, the opportunity to wear the Union uniform, and
command of a military police force he had sought for some time.^°^ The
exact size of the unit is not known, or its losses, or its complete record
of action. After much pressuring from Baker, Stanton agreed to es-
tablish the troop utilizing authority entitling the District of Columbia
to a battalion of infantry and cavalry for use within its confines.^^"
Placed under the direct authority of the Secretary of War, the First
Regiment Cavalry, knoAvn as "Baker's Rangers,'' consisted, ironically,
of recruits from Robert E. Lee's former command, the Second Dra-
goons, renamed the Second Regular United States Cavalry at the out-
break of the war.^^^

Hundreds of men sought places in the new regiment ; some
offered bribes. A^liether the attraction was the promise that
no soldier in the Baker command would ever be sent outside
the immediate vicinity of the District of Columbia or whether

^"^ Ihid., pp. 169-170.

'"" Ibid., p. 109.

^'^ Ibid., p. 242 ; also see Baker, op. cit., pp. 174-178.

'"" Ibid., p. 241.

^'^ Ibid., p. 164.

'»• See Ibid., pp. 101-107, 139^140.

^■^ See Ibid., p. 108.

"* See Ibid., pp. 107-108.

"' See Baker, op. cit., pp. 195-203.

"" Mogelever. op. cit., p. 214 : the District of Columbia had only one cavalry
unit during the civil war but counted the First and Second Regiment Infantry,
serving from 1861 until 1865. and several short-lived infantry battalions and
militia companies which were hastily organized in 1861 and mustered out by the
end of the year.

"^/Md., pp. 215-216.

Baker's fame inspired all types of adventurers to flock to his
banner was the subject of much conjecture at that time."^

In an appeal to the Governor of New York, Baker wrote :

. . . the duties to be performed by this regiment demand on
the part of both men and officers qualities of a high order, both
mental and physical. Among these, I may enumerate intel-
ligence, sobriety, self-dependence, bodily vigor, the power of
endurance and, though last not least, that knowledge of the
horse which results from early practical experience and man-
agement of that noble animal. ^^^

The personal qualifications of Baker's recruits, of course, cannot be
assessed. By their actions, how-ever, they demonstrated great military
ability, intense loyalty to their commander, and a complete insensi-
tivity to the property, liberties and lives of those they encountered as
enemies. For reasons of high morality and public image, the Rangers
w^ere unleashed upon the gambling parlors and vice dens of Washing-
ton."* Soon, however, they began engaging in forays of destruction
against enemies of the Union beyond the confines of the capital.^^^

The Rangers were an auxiliary to Baker's intelligence activities;
they were his agents of espionage, enforcement, and protection. Secret
operatives gathered information in both the cities and the countrysides
of the Potomac region. Baker devoured their reports, conferred with
Stanton and/or Lincoln, and then set out with enforcements against
the subversives.

In addition to ferreting out spies, blockade runners, and locals giv-
ing aid and comfort to the rebels. Baker engaged in three major intel-
ligence enterprises : unmasking crimes in the Treasury Department,
smashing the Northwest conspiracy, and capturing the President's
assassin."® The opportunity to probe the Treasury Department regard-
ing allegations that it had become a bawdyhouse and command post
for certain predatory interests arose around Christmas, 1863, when
Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase invited Baker to investigate the
situation.

There was growing talk of scandals in the Treasury Depart-
ment. Newspapers were saying that the hundreds of girls busy
scissoring the new greenbacks were hussies in the night. There
were oyster feasts in the bonnet room. Clerks were making off
with sheets of uncut currency. Counterfeiters were discover-
ing it was easier to steal a plate and run off bales of money
rather than go to the trouble of making an imitation engrav-
ing in some hideaway. The Treasury's own police seemed
helpless to stem the tide of corruption and debauchery. The

"' Ibid., p. 220.

"' Ibid., p. 221.

"* See Baker, op. cit., pp. 241-253 ; Mogelever, op. cit., pp. 245-248.

"^ Generally, see Mogelever, op. cit., pp. 213-241.

^^" Baker's own account of his bureau's activities and his troops' adventures is
thin and, compared with the Mogelever account which relies on Baker's corre-
spondence and the letters and diaries of relatives, fails to convey the questionable
nature of their operations or their possible illegality ; see Baker, op. cit., pp. 147-
198, 230-241, 253-261, 329-378, 384-452.

Blair family, avowed enemies of Chase, were giving support
to the rumors. [Postmaster General] Montgomery Blair's
brother, Frank, cried out for congressional inquiry.^^"

The probe was charged and politically explosive. Seward, eyes upon
the 1864 election and the White House beyond, might well have wanted
Lincoln's top detective mired in the scandals, defused and defamed
along with most of the Administration. In Hanson A. Eisley, special
Treasury agent, Seward had his own source of intelligence. So close
were the two men that Risley gave over one of his daughters to Seward
for adoption and, after Mrs. Seward's death, the old man sought her
for his second wife.

In detailing Baker to Treasury, Stanton probably thought he would
be the best man to vindicate the President as untainted, honest, and
ignorant of the conditions there. Himself a frequent critic of Lincoln,
the Secretary of War nevertheless realized that public confidence in
the President must be maintained in the midst of the moment's perils
and he might well have been aware that Lincoln had no direct involve-
ment in the Treasury calamities.

Factions within Congress were ready to intervene to attack Lincoln,
Chase, and Baker. Ultimately, a committee of investigation was
formed, probed the situation, and beclouded the facts and the guilt
of those involved.

Baker plunged into the Treasury probe with ferocity and determi-
nation. He temporarily relinquished command of the Raiders and
established an office in the dark basement of the Treasury building.
His techniques were direct and dauntless; he stalked the printing
facilities and subjected clerks and lesser officials to ruthless and mer-
ciless interrogation. At one juncture he halted a funeral cortege in
the midst of the city, seized the corpse of a Treasury girl and had an
examination made to determine if her death had resulted from an
abortion.^^*

And what did Baker find ? At the outset he discovered that young
James Cornwell, who had the function of burning mutilated bonds
and notes, had pocketed $2,000 worth of notes. Cornwall was convicted
and sent to jail for this offense, the only individual to be prosecuted
for crimes against the Treasury in this probe.

Next, Baker alleged that two printers who had sold the Treasury
new presses, paper, and a technique for printino; currency were con-
spiring to sell the government worthless machinery and processes.
Their presses were weakening the upper floors of the Treasury build-
ing and their security procedures were viritually non-existent, allow-
ing ready access to both plates and process. In the midst of the inquiry,
the new presses began malfunctioning and greater demands were
placed on the building for "improved" printing devices.

"^Mogelever, op. at., p. 249; in 1863 (12 Stat. 713 at 726) Congress authorized
the Secretary of the Treasury to appoint three revenue agents ". . . to aid in the
prevention, detection, and punishment of fraxids upon the revenue." These were
the small beginnings of the Treasury Department's intelligence organization and
the only designated investigative force available to the Secretary at the time
of the Baker inquiry.

"* See Mogelever, op. cit., p. 252.

Baker discovered that the head of the department of printing and
engraving, Spencer Clark, was involved with a number of young
women who were cutting and preparing new currency. An associate
of Clark's was also implicated and both men were named for dis-
missal by Baker. Eventually it came to pass that it was Secretary
Chase who was to resign and the great Treasury scandal passed into
history.^ ^^

In mid-November of 1863, a full month before the Treasury in-
vestigation got underway, rumors of a dangerous conspiracy along
the Canadian border began circulating. Baker's agents pursued the
facts of the matter and by late spring of the following year a fairly
clear image of the attack planned by the Confederates Avas evident. In
Richmond, Judah P. Benjamin, Secretary of State for the rebel gov-
ernment, a holder of three cabinet posts in the Confederacy, and a man
of imagination, conceived a desperate plan of havoc : utilizing secret
societies reminiscent of the later Ku Klux Klan, guerrilla warriors
behind Union lines would burn down New York City, free rebel troops
imprisoned in the North to loot and pillage throughout the industrial
Northeast, and seize Chicago, Buffalo, and Indianapolis. The plan
failed to recognize the drift of northern morale : those disenchanted
with the war still supported Lincoln, sought the Union as was and the
Constitution as is, and otherwise had no interest in or sympathy for
a separate Confederate nation.

In the aftermath of the destructive campaigns of Generals Sheridan
in the Shenandoah Valley and Sherman in Georgia, the rebels were
ready for unconventional warfare of their own making. The Copper-
head firebrand Clement Vallandigham was recruited to obtain support
for a new nation composed of states adjacent to the Canadian border.
Army officers in civilian dress were dispatched north to act as terror-
ists. The first target for revenge was Chicago. Assembled in Toronto,
the band of insurgents made their plans — all of which were carefully
recorded by a Baker informer.

Commanders of military prisons were informed of these develop-
ments and advised to be prepared for uprisings within or attacks from
outside of their institutions. Baker advanced a squadron of agents to
Toronto to maintain surveillance of the conspirators who were followed
and observed as they straggled into Chicago in the midst of the Demo-
cratic National Convention. More than 2,000 civilian-clad Confederate
soldiers were scattered aroinid the city. At the height of the convention
proceedings, the area would be put to the torch. ^Yhi\e police and fire-
men fought the flames, an attack would be made on Camp Douglas and
its prisoners freed. The banks would be looted. City Hall seized, and
the police headquarters occupied. Thus, the second largest city in the
land was to fall to rebel control.

Politics among the conspirators caused a postponement of their
assault until Election Day. After reassembling in Toronto, burnings
and attacks on local authorities were scheduled for simultaneous occur-
rence in Chicago, New York, Cincinnati, and Boston. Still the surveil-
lance of these preparations continued and still flowed the informer's
details to Baker.

' Generally, see Ibid., pp. 252-278 ; Baker, op. oit., pp. 261-287.

Offensive actions were unleashed against the terrorists. Without
warning. General Benjamin F. Butler, seasoned in maintaining the
security and serenity of Xew Orleans, marched into New York with
10,000 Union troops as the clock moved toward Election Day. Con-
federate arsonists abandoned their grandiose plan of havoc, set a few
fires in some hotels (which were quickly extinguished), and fled to
Canada. Across the border, they soon learned that they had been for-
tunate in their escape. A Baker spy in Chicago brought about the
ruination of terrorist activities in that city and a Union operative in
Indiana gathered enough information to implicate almost the entire
band of Confederate conspirators in that state. While these elements
were being rounded up and jailed. Union authorities took an im-
prisoned Confederate officer into their intelligence corps, swore him
to loyalt}' to the Union cause, and released him to make contact with
some of the remaining members of the Xorthwest Conspiracy. Fol-
lowed by Baker's agents, the man soon met with a group seeking to
liberate 3,000 rebel officers incarcerated on Johnson's Island in Lake
Michigan. The intervention of this spy cost the conspirators a cache of
arms and the loss of a few men in Chicago and indirectly contributed
to the scuttling of the Johnson's Island mission.

By late fall, 1864, the Northwest Conspiracy had collapsed and its
principal leaders and organizers had been jailed.^^"

The excitement and stimulation of the chase ended. Baker
found himself in a now familiar situation. He was given no
public credit for his part in smashing the great conspiracy.
On the contrary, his enemies increased their efforts to build up
the ugly image of the bastille master, and he continued to be
identified in the public mind with unjust arrests and imprison-
ments, invasions of the rights of private persons and rumored
profiteering. Baker still knew that, as a secret agent, the
details of his activities must remain secret. If, however, he
had hoped that this sensational case would change the attitude
toward him in Congress and Administration circles, or would
convince the Copperheads that he put the Union before per-
sonal gain, he must have been sadly disappointed. His success
in securing and transmitting information which led to the
dramatic collaspe of the great conspiracy and the punishment
of its leaders in the North still brought him no evidence that
his services were to be fairly judged by the results he achieved
for the Union cause. ^^^

Baker had just completed a successful investigation of fraud and
deception surrounding the draft, bounty-hunting, defrauding sailors
out of prize money, and efforts at morally corrupting Union troops in
the New York City area when he received the news of Lincoln's assassi-
nation. LTndoubte'dly he felt guilt for not having had advance infor-
mation about the conspiracy against the President and for not having
had agents near the Chief Executive when the murderer struck. Upon

^'' Generally, see Baker, op. cit., pp. 452-476 ; Mogelever, op. cit., pp. 278-292 ;
John W. Headley. Confederate Operatio-ns in Canada and New York. New York
and WaBhington, The Neale Publishing Company, 1906, pp. 211-382.

^ Mogelever, op. cit., pp. 291-292.

receiving word that Lincoln had been shot and was dead, Baker threw
himself into the pursuit and capture of those responsible for the crime.
After producing a handbill, the first to be circulated for a nationally
wanted criminal, describing John Wilkes Booth in detail, Baker set
about interrogating everyone and anyone who knew anything about the
conspirators involved in the assassination.^^

Stanton went along with the detective's thinking and sup-
ported his tigerish moves to stalk his prey. One by one,
Booth's accomplices were rounded up. Baker's rival police
agencies did most of the work. But he took charge of the pris-
oners, dragged incriminating admissions from them, put
black hoods on their heads, and stuffed them in the hold of a
monitor in the river.^^^

Finally, Baker found Booth's track, pursued him with a command
of cavalry, and came at last to the Garrett farm where the assassin had
taken refuge in a barn. His prey cornered. Baker confronted the killer,
demanded his surrender or the alternative of firing the barn. In the
midst of negotiations and flames. Booth was shot by either himself or
by Sergeant Boston Corbett. Baker took charge of the body unci later
sought a portion of the rewards for capturing Booth. The amount sub-
sequently awarded Baker was reduced to $3,750 from a potential of
$17,500 : the secret service chief continued to be unpopular with the
Congress.^^*

With the death of Lincoln, Baker became the protector of the new
President, Andrew Johnson, and set up the first White House secret
service detail in the history of the Republic.^^^ With the peace of Ap-
pomattox, however, the career of the spy chief began to rapidly decline.
The rebel foe of wartime now walked the streets of the capital. Many
of the prostitutes and gamblers Baker had jailed under military law
were again free. These, together with political enemies, taunted and
reproached the once powerful secret service, a vestige of war which
seemed to have no future mission. Nevertheless, Baker attempted to
carry on in the old style. His task was to protect the President : his im-
mediate foe, he surmised, were various female pardon brokers, lately
sympathetic to the South, who prevailed upon the President to grant
clemency and forgiveness to all manner of rebels. In attempting to halt
this traffic in and out of the White House, Baker incurred the wrath of
President Johnson and a lawsuit which successfully damaged his
status and role. In the midst of the trial, he was routinely mustered out
of the army and effectively left without a friend or defender.^^*' He
departed Washington in disgrace, returned to his wife in Philadelphia,
wrote his memoirs in lieu of finding other work, contracted spinal
meningitis and died on the evening of July 3, 1868.

Lafayette Baker was a zealot who, imbued with a strong sense of
righteousness and a taste of vigilantism, in the name of a cause became
oblivious to the ends-means relationship underlying his function. In

^ See IMd., p. 337.

^' Hid., p. 339.

^" Generally, see Baker, op. oit., pp. 476-567 ; Mogelever, op. ait., pp. 342-385.

^ Mogelever, op. cit., p. 386.

^Generally, see Baker, op. cit., i>p. 582-693; Mogelever, op. cit., pp. 385-^19.

his defense of the Union and democratic government, he resorted to
extreme actions obnoxious to popular rule and, in some instances, in
violation of constitutional guarantees. He actively sought to exceed
his intelligence role and became policeman, judge, and jailer. His
desires in this regard, and his capacity for achievement of same, were
fostered and fed by the exigencies of the moment and the liberties
Lincoln took in administering (or not administering) the law. When
Lincoln died and the war ended. Baker became a political pariah with
a vestigial function. His activities had annoyed many, frightened
some, and made bitter enemies of an important and powerful few.
With the onset of peace in the Nation, he was virtually stripped of
his organization and official status and left vulnerable to legal, politi-
cal, and financial reprisals. These forces converged, coalesced, and
crushed. Due to the secret nature of Baker's operations and his
tendency to embellish fact, the full account of the activities of this
spy chief may never be known. In all likelihood, his record of service
will always be controversial and of debatable value.

IX. Dodge

"WTien Allan Pinkerton withdrew from the intelligence field in 1862,
Lafayette Baker became his heir in the East. In the West, the princi-
pal l^nefiactor of Pinkerton's legacy was Grenville M. Dodge. Born
in a Massachusetts farmhouse in 1831, he attended the Durham
Academy (KH.), Norwich University (Vt.), and matriculated from
Partridge's private school in 1851 with a degree in civil and military
engineering. Prior to the Civil War he held various surveying posi-
tions with western railroad companies. With the outbreak of hostili-
ties, he served in a military capacitj^ on the Iowa governor's staff
before becoming a colonel of the 4th Iowa Regiment. He saw heavy
fighting in the Southwest and distinguished himself in combat
with the result that in March of 1862 he was advanced to
brigadier-general.

Dodge was introduced to intelligence operations in late 1861 when
General John C. Fremont, the commander of Missouri, ordered him
to investigate certain rumors regarding rebel activity in the area.^-^
It is not evident that he had prior familiarity with this type of duty
but it is possible that his surveying positions had acquainted him with
the techniques of frontier scouts and railroad detectives. In response
to Fremont's order, Dodge sent his cavalry into all parts of the state,
spent two months in the pursuit, exhausting many horses and riders.
From this experience, he decided to maintain a few men in the field
who knew Arkansas and Missouri, paying them with money received
from fines and licenses. Thus began his spy network, a system subse-
quently credited with saving the Army of the Southwest in March,
1862, from advancing Confederate forces.^^*

l^Tiile rebuilding the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, Dodge
again sent agents into the field. He concluded that most of
the rumors he heard were false, but about this time he hit

^'^ Stanley P. Hirshson. Grenville M. Dodge: Soldier, Politician, Railroad
Pioneer. Bloomington and London, Indiana University Press, 1967, p. 67.

^"^Ibid.; J. R. Perliins. Trails, Rails and War: The Life of General G. M.
Dodge. Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1929, pp. 108-109.

upon a method by which a spy could estimate the size of any
enemy force by noting the space it occupied on a road. Be-
fore long Dodge was receiving detailed descriptions of Con-
federate troop movements throughout the South.^^^

In July, 1862, Major-General Henry W. Halleck became general-in-
chief of the U.S. Army, opening the way for a major intelligence role
for Dodge.

When Halleck went east and Grant succeeded to the com-
mand in the West the hour had come for guessing and
blundering through to give way to strategy and even to cun-
ning. No one knew the strength of the South, and the Con-
federates fought as if they had plenty of reserve. Moreover,
rumors were everywhere about the superior strength they
would bring to bear in the [Vicksburg] campaign at hand.
It was thought that there were sixty thousand Confederates
south of Grant and nearly as many to the east of him. A
loose and inefficient system of secret service in the first eight-
een months of the war had left the Federal officers in the
West believing no one. It was to obviate this condition and
to secure authentic information that General Grant turned
to General Dodge and gave him the responsibility of reor-
ganizing the whole system.^^"

Dodge came to his new assignment at the recommendation of Gen-
eral John A. Rawlins, Grant's chief of staff, and had not actually met
with the new commander of the western troops. In his new role,
Dodge had two forces. He organized the First Tennessee Cavalry,
a regiment of southern Unionists who served in the regular army.
By virtue of their relatives and friends in the Confederacy, members
of this unit contributed to Dodge's clandestine spy network with con-
tacts and informers. He also utilized many blacks who, disregarded
by southern pickets and patrols, functioned as messengers.

Dodge's system brought headaches as well as rewards. Fi-
nancial troubles were especially severe, for a spy commencing
a long trip was usually given between $5,000 and $10,000 in
Confederate money. Moreover, Dodge paid his spies for each
mission. Those who lived permanently within enemy lines re-
ceived what they requested, although some of them refused
compensation because they were Unionists or because their
sons, brothers, or husbands were in the Federal army.^^^

In early 1863 the economic problem was solved when Grant au-
thorized the use of confiscated Confederate funds to maintain the
spy network. At its peak, Dodge's intelligence system counted 117
field agents, known personally only to him and familiar to his most
trusted aides only by an identifying number. This situation created
certain accountability problems. Once Dodge's immediate superior
cut off his funds when the identities of the spies were refused for
reasons of security but the matter was appealed to Grant who, taking

"' Hirshson, loc. cit.

"° Perkins, op. cit., pp. 105-106.

^'^ Hirshson, op. cit., p. 67.

time from his Vicksburg campaign, reinstated the funding.^^^ Another
time Dodge was charged with land cotton speculation for financially
enhancing his spies and/or himself. The dilemma was such that, in
refuting the allegation, the identities of certain agents operating be-
hind Confederate lines might become known, and Dodge decided, at
Grant's suggestion, to remain silent about the matter. For many years
thereafter, however, accusations about the charges dogged him.^^^

During the war about half of Dodge's spies were captured or
killed by the enemy. Some were court-martialed and exe-
cuted by the Confederates, but not one betrayed the North,
although to save their lives, many pretended to do so. Forced
to join the Southern army, one agent within a short time was
made first sergeant of his company. For a year Dodge be-
lieved he was dead. Late in the war, however, the spy, still
dressed in his Confederate uniform, slipped through the lines
and again reported for duty.^^^

Dodge proved to be a shrewd spy master, disguising his operations
and utilizing the information he gained for the best possible military
advantages. He emphasized geographic data and details regarding
weapon and troop strength. In his intelligence activities. Dodge was
Grant's general and, when Grant was given command of all Union
forces in March, 1864, the secret service force began to be phased out.
In August, in the battle for Atlanta, Dodge was severely wounded and
temporarily retired from active duty. During this time, the intelli-
gence network he had built terminated completely and no directive for
reinstatement ever revived it. Dodge returned to military service in
November and finished war duty. He later fought in Indian skirmishes
before turning his attention to politics and railroad development. In
1866 he served in the House of Representatives, declining renomination
in 1868. He subsequently became active in railroad construction, was
president of the Union Pacific, Denver and Gulf line in 1892, and even
promoted railroads in Cuba before his death in 1916. In his intelli-
gence activities, Dodge reflects military professionalism: he sought
information almost exclusively to enhance army field operations and
to develop ejffective strategy for pursuing the Confederate fighting
forces.

X. Carrington

Unlike Dodge, Henry Beebee Carrington conducted intelligence op-
erations against political enemies — the Copperheads and rebel con-
spirators attempting to undermine the Union cause. Born in Con-
necticut in 1824, Carrington became an ardent abolitionist in his youth,
graduated from Yale in 1845, and taught for a while in the Irving
Institute at Tarrytown, New York. Under the influence of the school's
founder, "Washington Irving, he subsequently wrote Battles of the
American Revolution which appeared in 1876. He was also to write
seven other major titles. Leaving New York, he taught at the New
Haven Collegiate Institute while pursuing a law degree at his old
alma mater. In 1848 he moved to Ohio and entered upon a law prac-

"' nid., p. 68.

^ Perkins, op. cit., pp. 112-113.

^ Hirshon, op. cit., p. 68.

tice. Over the next dozen years Carrington represented a variety of
commercial, manufacturing, banking, and railroad interests and be-
came a pioneer in Republican politics. A close friend and supporter
of Governor Salmon P. Chase, he was subsequently appointed to a
position to reorganize the state militia (1857) . He subsequently became
the adjutant-general for Ohio, mustering nine regiments of militia at
the outbreak of the Civil War. He then was commissioned a colonel of
the 18th United States Infantry and took command of an army camp
near Columbus.

In neighboring Indiana, Governor Oliver P. Morton had need of
Carrington's services. For reasons not altogether clear — perhaps it
was his partisan political past and/or his ardent abolitionism — Car-
rington was ordered, upon the request of Morton, to organize the
state's levies for service.

Wlien Carrington arrived in Indiana, political warfare be-
tween the adherents of the ladministration and its opponents
was beginning in earnest. The favorite weapon of the Re-
publicans was that ephemeral and elusive order, the Knights
of the Golden Circle. Carrington joined in wholeheartedly.
On December 22, 1862, he blamed the apalling rate of de-
sertion on the treasonable secret societies, whose penetration
of the army was shown by knowledge among soldiers of a
"battle sign" which would save them from rebel bullets. In a
long report dated March 19, 1863, he described the situation
as so alarming that it bordered on open revolt. He claimed
that the Knights had ninety-two thousand members between
sixteen and seventy who were drilling constantly. They were
plotting to seize the arsenals, the railroads, and the telegraph
in order to revolutionize Indiana and "assert independent
authority as a state." They communicated with Confederates,
in particular with General Morgan, whose picture hung in
many homes and whose name was "daily praised." Thousands
of them believed the bold raider would shortly appear to
"raise the standard of revolt in Indiana." If he did, Carring-
ton was sure Morgan could raise "an army of 20,000
traitors." ^^^

What prompted these comments by Carrington and where did he
get his information? The answer to these questions appears to derive
from the activities of Governor Morton. Taking advantage of the
crisis conditions which the war created, Morton had established him-
self as virtual dictator of the state. He dealt harshly with rebel
sympathizers, Copperheads, Democrats, and anyone opposed to his
rule. Before the end of 1861, a spy system had been inaugurated to
keep watch of these enemies.^^^ Carrington was given charge of this
intelligence organization and thus became familiar with the "foes of
the Union" which it kept under surveillance. There is strong e^ndence
that Carrington had no desire for combat service and twice Morton
intervened to prevent his transferral to the front lines. Thus, it was

^^G. R. Tredway. Democratic Opposition to the Lincoln Administration in
Indiana. Indianapolis, Indiana Historical Bureau, 1973, pp. 209-210.
^^/ftid., p. 216.

important that Carrington cast himself in the role of an intelligence
chief devoted to maintaining the security of the state, even though
disaster appeared to be just around the comer.

In ]\Iarch, 1863, Carrington was promoted to brigadier-general and
made commander of the District of Indiana of the Department of
the Ohio, later renamed the Northern Department. By this time, how-
ever, he had intelligence activities organized and operating under his
direction. His secret service —

. . . was composed of spies, informers, betrayers, and outside
secret agents. Inside officials who were jealous of more impor-
tant leaders were worked on; the itch for money played a
part; in quite a few instances, unsuspecting loyal men who
had joined the castles were amazed at the lengths to which
love of constitutional rights or Southern sympathies could
carry the assertion of dissent. From many sources, and for
almost as many motives, disclosures flowed in to Carrington's
headquarters.^^^

Claiming to have between two and three thousand men reporting to
him, Carrington enlisted the services of almost anyone who would
provide information about an "enemy." Unsolicited reports were grate-
fully accepted as well. The amateur sleuths and informers were sup-
plemented with a few choice agents and detectives. Spies apparently
were paid from state funds at the rate of $100 per month, over six
times the amount received by a Federal soldier.^^^

Early in 1863 Carrington claimed to have emissaries at the
meetings of the secret societies. In April, 1864, he asked
Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas for money to organize
a twelve-man detective force. One of his agents said he had
eighteen men at such work early in 1864. General Alvin P.
Hovey, who succeeded Carrington August 25, 1864, continued
his espionage organization. Colonel Conrad Baker, the state
provost marshal, also employed informers who reported di-
rectly to him. At least one of the district provost marshals,
Colonel Thompson, had an agent who worked for him among
Democrats of the Seventh District. He signed his reports only
as "H.," and his identity was not even known to Colonel
Baker, Thompson's superior. Carrington claimed he partici-
pated personally in this work, once attendina: "iu disqfuise" a
meeting of the Sons of Liberty in Indianapolis. Be that as it
may, the general was probably not exagg^erating when he
claimed to know every morning what had happened in the
lodges the night before. Not only did he have his own spies,
but he kept in close touch with other officials who conducted
espionage.^^^

^"Milton, op. cit., pp. 76-77.

^^Tredway, op. cit., p. 217.

^^ Ibid., p. 216; also see William Dudley Foiilke. Life of Oliver P. Morgan
(Vol. 1). Indianapolis-Kansas City. The Bowen-Merrill Company. 1S99, pp. 405-
407 ; also, for a view of Carrington's spies reporting on each other and otherwise
over-insratiating themselves with un.suspeeting rebels, see Tredway, op. cit.,
pp. 216-217.

While Carrington's operatives were effective in breaking up the Sons
of Liberty, the Knights of the Golden Circle, and elements of the
Northwest Conspiracy, they also contributed to arbitrary arrests,
infringements upon the freedom of speech and freedom of association,
and otherwise maintained a corrupt and despotic regime. The manner
in which the intelligence organization was recruited — utilizing betray-
ers, jealous and disgruntled officials, informei"s, and unvalidated
hearsay from unsolicited sources- — caused it to traffic in unreliable
information of generally more political than military value. And the
suspicion prevails that the whole arrangement served to mahitain
Governor Morton's administration and coincidently counteracted Con-
federate operatives who happened to count among his foes.

Carrington was replaced by General Alvin P. Hovey in August,
1864. With less than a year of warfare ahead of him, Hovey assumed
control of the espionage organization as the new commander of the
Indiana District. It is not immediately evident if he made any changes
in the intelligence operation other than to gain access to the funds
seized from bomity juinpers to pay his agents.^*° If the spy system did
noc collapse at the end of the war, it must certainly have been dis-
carded in 1867 when Governor Morton resigned to enter the United
States Senate.

Carrington was first mustered out of service as a brigadier-general
of volunteers, rejoined his old regiment in the Army of the Cumber-
land, completed war duty and saw Indian campaigns in the West. He
built and commanded Fort Phil Keamy but lost the respect of his
fellow officers due to his reputation as a "political warrior" and his
demonstrated lack of aggressiveness in several Indian skinnishes.
Before a decision to remove him from command could be implemented,
Carrington became further embroiled in controversy. In December,
1866, a force of eighty officers and men under Captain William J.
Fetterman was massacred by a force of fifteen hundred to three thou-
sand Indians. The disaster was attributed to Fetterman's disobeyance
of Carrington's order to proceed on a certain route of march : instead,
he had directly engaged the war party from their rear while they
were attacking a group of woodcutters. The Indians turned on Fetter-
man's force and annihilated them. Because no one had heard Carring-
ton's orders to Fetterman, coupled with existing distrast of the
colonel's leadership, rumors persisted that the men had been ordered
into tragedy. General Grant moved to court-martial Carrington but,
at the suggestion of General William T. Sherman, submitted the
matter to a court of inquiry which subsequently exonerated Carring-
ton. Nevertheless, Carrington was relieved of command and. with his
military career ruined, he resia^ied and spent the rest of his life at-
tempting to convince the public of his innocence in the incident. He
also wrote a number of books and taught military science at Wabash
College in Indiana before his death in 1912.

XI. Signal Services

The Civil War, which was first in many things, provided the oppor-
tunity for the extensive use of the telegraph for all possible wartime

^*°Tredway, op. cit., p. 218.

purposes. The introduction of this communications device effected
two important developments in the evolution and organization of the
Federal intelligence function. One innovation was the utilization of
sophisticated codes for communication not just among some elite
groups, but within the entire military system.^" Further, as by-
products of this phenomenon, the first concerted efforts at code-
breaking and communications system penetration, or telegraph line
tapping, were undertaken.

The other important occurrence was the creation of the United
States Army Signal Corps. Not only did this organization have in-
telligence responsibilities during the war, but it became the institu-
tion, thereafter, which fostered and advanced coding, code-breaking,
and communications system penetration practices. Prior to the occa-
sion of the Civil War, no nation, except Germany, had a permanent
military telegraph unit within its armed forces organization.i'*^ "yyith
the outbreak of hostilities in the United States in 1861, two signal
services were pressed into action by the Union.

The Signal Corps, the pioneering communications unit of the United
States Army of a century's duration, came into existence largely
through the efforts of General Albert J. Myer. Born in New York in
1827, Myer apprenticed as a telegraph operator while preparing for
his college education. Graduated from Hobart College in 1827, he
continued his studies at Buffalo Medical College, obtaining his M.D.
in 1851. During his final year of academic studies he became inter-
ested in the use of communications signals for military and naval
purposes. Thus, early in his life, Myer became acquainted with two
important means of long-distance communication.

After practicing as a physician for three years, he sought and ob-
tained a commission as assistant surgeon in the regular army. Ordered
to New Mexico, his interest in signal communications was renewed in
observations of the various Comanche practices of this nature. After
developing his thoughts on the matter, Myer wrote to the War De-
partment in 1856, asking if the government might be interested in his
signaling system. No action was taken on the inquiry until 1859 when
a board of evaluation, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Lee,
considered the matter and gave qualified approval to the idea. Field
tests followed and negotiations were made in the War Department
for some institutional accommodations for the new communications
effort. As a consequence, provision was made in legislation enacted (12
Stat. 64 at 66) in 1860 authorizing the appointment of one signal

'"It will he recalled that spies in the service of General Washington used
ciphered messages. The Civil War experience was an elahoration on this situa-
tion : more sophisticated codes were developed for use within the entire army. A
cipher system usually substitutes a single symbol (number, letter, or special sign)
for a single letter of the standard alphabet. A code system substitutes a code term
(number, number group, letter, letter group, word, sign, or marking) for an item
of plaintext (a word, phrase, date, general prefix or sufl3x, or some such identifi-
able language referent). The two systems can, of course, be intertwined and
otherwise sophisticated by skilled cryptographers.

'"William R. Plum. The Military Telegraph During the Civil War in the United
States (Vol. 1). Chicago, Jansen, McClurg and Company, 1882, p. 62.

officer with the rank of major and $2,000 for signaling equipment.
Thus, the Signal Corps began to take shape."^

Shortly after the initiation of hostilities between the North and
the South, Myer, in May, 1861, traveled east, arriving at Fort Monroe
in June where General Benjamin F. Butler ordered details for signal
duty and Myer proceeded to instruct them. The practical application
was a signal line between the Fort and Newport News and the direct-
ing of artillery fire from a battery at Kip Raps. Such direction of gun-
fire would be a primary Signal Corps responsibility into the Twentieth
Century.

While still assigned to Butler, Myer sought orders by which
he could control all military telegraphy, asserting that the
law under which he held his commission gave him "general
charge of the telegraphic duty of the Army, whether . . .
by means of signals transmitted by . . . electricity or by
aerial signals." Although Myer obtained no War Department
help, Butler ordered all telegraphic duty in his department,
in which the budding U.S. Military Telegraph was already
at work, placed under Myer's control. Myer implied that the
immediate results were quite satisfactory, but the historian
of the Military Telegraph later revealed that the word went
out sub rosa to all telegraph operatore to ignore Myer while
seeming to comply with his orders, and that the Secretary
of War soon instructed Butler not to interfere with them.^**

The U.S. Military Telegraph, a quasi-military organization created
in 1861 to operate the existing commercial telegraph lines, was the
great rival of the Signal Corps for control of telegraph communica-
tion during the Civil War. It ceased to exist after the cessation of
hostilities in 1865 and the telegraph communication field was left
to the Signal Corps. While it existed, however, it had direct access
to and favor of the Secretary of War. Its organization and operations
will be discussed shortly.

During the Civil War, the Signal Corps had limited responsibility
for telegraphic communications. It provided some telegraphy services
for the shifting Union forces, but, generally, its efforts in this field of
communication were supervised by Military Telegraph officials. The
Corps apparently developed codes ^^^ and ciphers ""^ but there is some
question as to their security.^*^ Signal Corps telegraphers were sworn

"^ While it is ironic that Lee should be the head of the panel approving the
idea of a Signal Corps, which would be combat tested facing forces subsequently
under his command, it is also equally ironic that Senator Jefferson Davis (D.-
Miss. ) opposed the signal oflBcer provision in the 1860 legislation ; the Confed-
eracy was destined to have a fine Signal Corps of its own, one which Davis
supported in all ways. See J. Willard Brown. The Signal Corps, U.S.A., in the
War of the Rebellion. Boston, U.S. Veteran Signal Corps Association, 1896, pp.
205-224 ; also see Max L. Marshall, ed. The Story of the U.S. Army Signal Corps.
New York, Franklin Watts, 1965, pp. 63-76.

"* Paul J. Scheips. Union Signal Communications : Innovation and Conflict.
Civil War History, v. 9, December, 1963 : 401 ; the reference to the Military
Telegraph historian is to Plum (Vol. 1), op. dt., pp. 71-73; also see Brown,
op. cit., pp. 171-172.

^^ See Brown, op. cit., pp. 91-99.

"* See Ibid., pp. 83, 99-102, 118-119.

"' See Scheips, op. cit., p. 407.

to secrecy regarding both the cipher-codes they utilized and the con-
tent of their communiques, a condition which sometimes created diffi-
culties when high-ranking officers were curious about telegraph
traffic."^

Until 1863, Myer had to rely largely upon detailees for his man-
power. It was in that year, however, on March 3, that Congress en-
acted legislation (12 Stat. 744 at 753) creating an organization beyond
the authority for a single Signal Officer.^*^

According to one source, 146 officers were "commissioned in
the Corps" during the war, or were offered commissions.
About twenty of this number "declined the appointments of-
fered them, and some ten or twelve resigned from the army
soon after the reorganization was effected." In addition, about
297 acting signal officers served in the wartime Corps, but
some of them for only very brief periods. The total number of
enlisted men who served at one time or another was about
2,500. In October, 1863, 198 officers, besides Myer, and 814 en-
listed men graced the rolls of the Signal Corps.^^"

In addition to cryptological activities, Meyer, on the occasion of his
assignment to General Edward Canby's Military Division of Western
Mississippi, sought to involve Signal Corps personnel in another as-
pect of intelligence operations.

Within a week or two of his reporting to General Canby,
Colonel Myer proposed a new service which Canby assigned
at once to the Signal Corps. Canby's order of May 30, 1864
read : "Deserters, refugees, and other persons coming in at
any military post in the Division of West Mississippi, or any
of the spots on the east bank of the Mississippi River, will be
carefully examined by a discreet officer, and the information
obtained from them compared and collated with that de-
rived from scouts and other sources, and reported direct to
the Chief Signal Officer at these headquarters, Natchez,
Mississippi. . . ." ^'^

It would appear that only this one command utilized a Signal Of-
ficer to coordinate this intelligence information. Meyer completed his
war service with General Sherman and sought to continue his military
career as Chief Signal Officer of the U.S. Army. In November, 1863,
he had clashed with Secretary of War Stanton over control of the
telegraph lines and the rivalries between the Signal Corps and the
Military Telegraph. As a consequence of this dispute, Myer had been
removed as Chief Signal Officer and he believed that the action was
illegal. Through litigation and politics, he won his reinstatement on
October 30, 1866. The victory for Myer was total: his position had
been made permanent in the recently enacted Armed Forces Act (14
Stat, 332 at 335-336) ; Stanton was suspended from office; and the
Signal Corps was granted sole responsibility for telegraphy in com-
bat zones. The Corps itself depended upon detailees for its manpower

'*® See Brown, op. dt., pp. 70, 191.

"' See lUd., pp. 141-169.

^ Scheips, op. cit, p. 406 ; also see Brown, op. oit., pp. 160-161, 713-902.

^^ Marshall, op. oit., p. 60.

under the Armed Forces Act. Myer promoted the visibility of his
organization by establishing a Department of Practical Military En-
gineering, Military Signaling, and Telegraphy at West Point, im-
proved upon the signaling courses at the Naval Academy, and
instituted signaling curricula at the Artillery School of Practice
(Fort Monroe, Va.) and the Engineering School of Practice (Willett's
Point, N.Y.). His achievements on behalf of the Corps and military
communications were both numerous and continuous until his death in
August, 1880.

The great rival of the Signal Corps, and in some regards Myer's
nemesis, ^Yas the United States Military Telegraph. The organization
derived from the expediency of Union seizure and control of the com-
merical telegraph lines.

In April 1861, the Government took exclusive control of
the telegraph lines radiating from Washington; and the
function of censoring the dispatches sent over the wires from
the national capital was at different times under the charge
of the Treasury, the State, and the War Departments.
Operating under the instructions from the Cabinet officer in
whose department he was placed, the censor excluded com-
munications giving military information, and also those
which were deemed to convey too much news concerning the
activities of the Government. Reports of delicate diplomatic
questions, criticisms of Cabinet members, comments giving
the mere opinion of correspondents, advance information of
contemplated measures, and stories injurious to the reputation
of officers, were denied the wires.^^^

With the onset of hostilities and the seizure of the telegraph lines,
the government needed some group to operate and maintain the com-
munications system. Secretary of War Simon Cameron enlisted the
assistance of Thomas A. Scott of the Pennsylvania Railroad who
provided four operators to man the telegraph. Their supervisor was
Andrew Carnegie, shortly followed by David Strouse and others.^^^

The U.S. Military Telegraph did not obtain formal sanction
until Lincoln, in October, 1861, authorized Cameron to act on
recommendations that had been made by Anson Stager, a
Western Union official who had been invited to Washington.
On February 26, 1862, under permissive legislation [12 Stat.
334—335] of the preceding month, the President took control
of all telegraph lines in the United States, which meant in
practice that the Military Telegraph could use them as cir-
cumstances demanded.^^*

Stager became head of the organization which counted somewhere
between 1,200 to 1,500 operators and linesmen.^^^ With the exception
of a handful of immediate leaders who were given commissions, the

'^Randall, op. cit., 481-482; also see Plum, op. cit. (Vol. 1), pp. 64-66.

^" See David Homer Bates Lincoln In The Telegraph Office. New York, The
Century Company, 1907, pp. 30-32, 35; Plum, op. cit. (Vol. 1), pp. 66-68, 127-134.

^* Scheips, op. cit., p. 402.

"^Ibid., p. 403; Bates, op. cit., pp. 26-27; Plum, op. cit. (Vol. 2), pp. 352,
376-380.

personnel of the Military Telegraph were denied military status in
order that field officers could not give them orders regarding com-
munications cloaked in secrecy. Technically, the group was a segment
of the Quartermaster's Department and the officers in the Military
Telegraph could, by these arrangements, disburse funds and property.
If proper channels of communication were to be used, Stager had to
send messages to the Secretary of War through Quartermaster Gen-
eral Montgomerj^ C. Meigs while Myer could speak directly to the
Secretary on behalf of the Signal Corps. Stager, however, soon gained
Stanton's favor and "channels" were no barrier to the advancement
of the cause of the Military Telegraph.

Generally, operators in the Military Telegraph took an oath of
secrecy regarding the contents of messages and their work.^^^ On vari-
ous occasions these personnel were pressured by field officers to breach
security by revealing the contents of telegraph traffic or cipher-code
keys but the operators stood f ast.^^"

The Military Telegraph also developed its own ciphers and codes.

Anson Stager was the author of the first Federal ciphers,
which he devised for General McClellan's use in West Vir-
ginia, in the summer of 1861, before McClellan came to Wash-
ington. They were very simple, consisting merely of cards,
about three inches by five, on which was printed a series of
key- words and arbitraries, the former indicating the number
of lines and columns and the route or order in which the
message might be written, the arbitrary words being used to
represent names of places and persons. When an important
dispatch was intrusted to a cipher-operator for transmission,
he first rewrote it carefully in five, six, or seven columns, as the
case might be, adding extra or blind words on tlie last line, if
it was not full. A key-word was then selected to indicate the
number of columns and lines and the order in which the words
of the message were to be copied for transmission by wire.^^^

Stager encouraged his immediate Washington staff to develop new
cipher-codes and to break those of the rebels.^^^ On the general success
of the Military Telegraph in regard to this aspect of intelligence, one
authority has written :

Copies of cipher messages quite often reached the enemy, and
some were published in their newspapers, with a general re-
quest for translation, but all to no purpose. To the statement
that in no case did an enemy ever succeed in deciphering such
messages, let us add that neither did any Federal cipher op-
erator ever prove recreant to his sacred trust, and we have, in
a sentence, two facts that reflect infinite credit upon the corps.
Fidelity is an attribute of the business of teleo;raphy. However
deficient an operator may be in other qualifications, he is in-
variably to be trusted with any secret that comes to him in the

^'^ See Plum. op. cit., (Vol. 2), pp. 108-109.

"'See Bates, op. cit., pp. 49-85; Plum, op. oit. (Vol. 1), pp. 34-61; Plum, op.
cit. (Vol. 2), pp. 170-174
"^ Bates, op cit., p. 49.
"' See Ibid., pp. 68-85.

line of his employment. To a natural disposition to merit such
a trust, is added a habit or faculty, acquired by constant, daily
experience, of keeping the ears open and the mouth shut.^*°

Friction between Stager and Myer reached a decisive point in the
autumn of 1863 when the latter attempted, by public advertisements,
to lure telegraphers away from or out of the Military Telegraph and
into the Signal Corps where they would "have . . . charge of the . . .
light field telegraph lines which are under . . . the Signal Corps, and
which, in battle or at sieges, are run out and worked on the field or
in the trenches under fire." For this unauthorized and independent
action, Myer, at the outset, earned Stanton's enmity.

Events now moved rapidly. Stager, who could not let Myer's
challenge to the Military Telegraph go unanswered, wrote
Stanton. He spoke of "the embarrassment already experi-
enced and the complications likely to arise from the organiz-
ing of Field Telegraphs by the Signal Corps," and advised
"the propriety of placing the Field Telegraphs under the
. . . Military Telegraph Department, and thus avoid . . .
two organizations in the same grade of service." He explained
that the Signal Corps "is now making efforts to secure the
best electricians in the service by offers of rank and increased
pay, which it is enabled to do through its military organiza-
tion, an advantage not possessed by the Military Telegraph.
. . ." He recommended that either the Military Telegraph
should have all telegraphic responsibilito
iron to steel.

Recognizing the need for keeping in touch with such
progress in foreign navies, the Secretary of the Navy, on 23
Mar 1882, signed General Order 292, establishing the "Office
of Intelligence" in the Bureau of Navigation "to collect and
record such naval information as may be useful to the De-
partment in wartime as well as in peace."

The Navy Department Library was combined with the Of-
fice of Intelligence. Naval Attache posts were set up in Lon-
don in 1882, in Paris in 1885 and in Rome in 1888. The attache
in Paris was also accredited to Berlin and St. Petersburg
(later Petrograd, then Leningrad) and the attache at Rome
included Austria in his area of accreditation.^'^^

As constituted, the Office of Naval Intelligence collected and dis-
seminated largely technical information about naval affairs. Un-
doubtedly some amount of political information was garnered through
the attache system managed by the Office. It would appear, however,
that until World War I, the unit, which was attached to the newly
created Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in 1915, concerned
itself largely with technical matters. Some of these topics of concern
to the Office are reflected in the titles of its general information series
of publications.^^-

From its inception until June, 1899, the Office had no authorization
for clerical employees and relied upon detailees from other bureaus
for staff. The advent of the Spanish-American War not only
prompted an authorization (30 Stat. 846 at 874) for clerks, but also
triggered an expansion of the attache system. Officers were assigned
to Tokyo (1895), Madrid (1897), Caracas (1903), Buenos Aires
(1910), and The Hague (1911). Commenting on the evolution of the

^^ W. H. Packard. A Briefing on Naval Intelligence. All Hands, No. 591 April
1966: 15.

"- These include the following :

U.S. Navy Department. Bureau of Navigation. Office of Naval Intelligence. Ob-
servations Upon The Korean Coast, Japanese-Korean Ports, and Siberia, Made
During a Journey From The Asiatic Station to The United States Through
Siberia and Europe by Lieutenant B. H. Buckingham, Ensigns George C. Foulk,
and Walter McLean, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1883. 163 p.

. . . Report on The Exhibits at the Crystal Palace Electrical

Exhibition, 1882 by Ensign Frank J. Sprague. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1883. 169 p.

. . . Examples, Conclusions, and Maxims of Modem Naval

Tactics by Commander William Bainbridge-Hoff. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1884. 149 p.

. . . Papers on Naval Operations During the Year Ending

July, 1885. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1885. 135 p.

. . . Papers on Squadrons of Evolutions: The Recent De-
velopment of Naval Materiel. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1886. 265 p.

. . . Recent Naval Progress. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.

Off, 1887, 346 p.

. . . Naval Reserves, Training, and Materiel. Washington,

U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1888. 433 p.

— . . . Naval Mobilization and Improvement In Materiel.

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1889. 485 p.

. . . A Year's Naval Progress. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.

Off., 1890. 423 p.

Xav3''s intelligence unit vis-a-vis the emergence of the Army's counter-
part structure, one authority, himself a former director of the Office
of Naval Intelligence, has said :

... it is well to recognize that [the] Military Information
Division has much more complex duties, not only in keeping
track of eneni}^ activities within our own borders and foiling
them, but in expanding and coordinating all the military re-
sources of the country. The ^arvj is always ready for war
or on a tentative war footing with some trained reserves to
draw upon. It is a comparatively simple matter to pass from a
peace to a war footing. Intensive target practice, torpedo ex-
ercises, mine laying exercises and maneuvers keep the person-
nel deeply interested through the competitive spirit. It is the
duty of the Xavy to hold the enemy in check while the Army
mobilizes and deploys. Curiously enough, naval strategy may
be planned in time of peace by building stations, acquiring
bases, and studying all the elements of the possible enemy's
strategy, but an army cannot acquire supply bases or forti-
fied stations in the same way in time of peace. A navy is not
efficient unless it is always on a tentative war footing, for
when war comes you cannot improvise a navy. We have never
done anything else than impro\dse an army."^

The War Department inaugurated its permanent intelligence institu-
tion three years after the Xavy established the Office of Naval
Intelligence.

In 1885 the Secretary of War had asked the Adjutant Gen-
eral for information on the armed forces of a certain power —
it may have been Russia, against whom Germany's Bismarck

. Office of Naval Intelligence. The Year's Naval Progress. Washington,

U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1891. 491 p.

. . Notes on the Year's Naval Progress. Washington, U.S. Govt.

Print. Off., 1892. 366 p.

. . The International Colutnbian Naval Rendezvous and Revieiv

of 1893 and Naval Manoeuvres of 1892. Washingon, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1893.
238 p.

. . Notes on the Year's Naval Progress. Washington, U.S. Govt.

Print. Off., 1894. 458 p.

The series was continued until at least 1902 under the title Notes on the Year's
Naval Progress, one volume for each year (1895-1902).

Another series of four reports were produced during this same period (1888-
1900) under the title Coaling, Docking, and Repairing Facilities of the Ports of
the World. Another frequent issuance (188?-1909) was a pamphlet, updated at
various times, entitled Informatio7i Concerning Some of the Principal Navies of
the World which was apparently created for public distribution.

One special report was produced as a consequence of the Spanish- American
War which was in the format of the general information series but captioned
"war notes" and entitled: U.S. Navy Department. Office of Naval Intelligence.
Notes on the Spanish American War. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1899.

Other specialized studies may have been produced for publication during the
period in addition to these documents indicated here which are based upon hold-
ings of the Library of Congress.

"^U.S. Navy Department. Division of Operations. The History and Aims of
the Office of Naval Intelligence by Rear Admiral A. P. Niblack. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Office, 1920. p. 11. Copies of this study bear the marking "Not
for publication," indicating limited distribution ; the copy utilized in this study
was supplied by the National Archives and Records Service.

was busy aligning allies to effect a balance of power. To the
Secretary's surprise, he learned that no such information was
readily available in Washington. Furthermore, no govern-
ment agency existed for collecting and compiling such infor-
mation. From this frustration was born what would become
the Military Information Division of the Adjutant General's
office. The grandiose name did not originally apply to the one
officer and clerk detailed to "gather and file information con-
cerning the military organizations of foreign countries in
which, for one reason or another, the United States might
become interested."

Four years later the military attache system was authorized
[25 Stat. 825 at 827-828] by Congress. It has functioned ever
since, although sometimes with hardly more than a flicker,
overtly to gather and forward to the War Department mili-
tary information on the countries to which attaches were
assigned. It became a function of the Military Information
Division to select attaches, to pass them their instructions
from the War Department, and to receive their reports for the
Army.^''*

The Military Information Division remained small and went un-
noticed by the Army's officer corps, its attache system almost non-
existent on the eve of the Spanish-American War. Nevertheless, how-
ever minute, the United States had a permanent intelligence stnicture
when once again faced with the prospect of hostilities in 1898.

XF. Spanish- American War

The declaration of war against Spain adopted by Congress on
April 20, 1898, can be attributed to a variety of real and imaginary
factors : among the real considerations were American sympathy for
the Cuban revolutionaries waging war against their colonial oppres-
sors (1868-1878) , sugar interests in Cuba, and outrage over the tactics
of General Valeriano "Butcher" Weyler and his concentration camps;
among the imaginary subjects were all of the propaganda targets
of William Randolph Hearst's New York Journal and Joseph
Pulitzer's New York WoiM. The sinking of the battleship U.S.S.
Maine in Havana harbor on February 15 set the wheels in motion for
a culmination of declared war two months later. The formal resolu-
tion adopted by Congress (1) recognized the independence of Cuba,
(2) demanded the withdrawal of the Spanish armed forces from that
island, (3) authorized the President to utilize the army and navy
to carry out this policy, and (4) disclaimed any American interest in
controlling Cuba or its people. The United States entered the hostili-
ties with a modern "steel navy" of 2,000 officers and 24.000 enlisted
men ; the army, by contrast, consisted of an ill-equipped 2,100 officers
and 28,000 enlistees. Colonel Arthur L. Wagner, chief of the Military
Information Division, counseled the President and the Cabinet against
an immediate invasion of Cuba for reasons of weather and disease
control. His advice won him the enmity of his overlord. Secretary
of War Russell A. Alger, cost him his job, and caused him to be denied
a promotion in rank until he lay on his deathbed.^ ^^

' Ind, op. cit., p. 111.
• See Ibid., pp. 110-112.

There were, however, a number of successful intelligence operations
carried out during the war. Among the first of these was a mission by
Lieutenant Andrew S. Rowan, a former military attache in Chile and
once in charge of the Military Information Division's map section,
who, at the request of the President, was directed to carry a series of
questions to the elusive rebel leader Calixto Garcia somewhere in
Cuba. After finding Garcia, Rowan was to determine "the numbers,
location, and morale of the Spanish troops, the character of their
officers; the topography, the condition of the roads in all seasons;
how well each side was armed, and what the insurrectos were most in
need of until an American force could be mobilized." ^^^ To his great
credit and the gratitude of the War Department, Rowan completed
the mission, popularly captioned "a message to Garcia." ^^''

A series of similar missions were carried out by Lieutenant Victor
Blue, the executive officer of the gunboat Suwanee at the time of the
undertaking. The first venture Blue made into enemy territory was
prompted by a need to know where a shipment of arms, ammunition,
and provisions, under escort by the Suicanee and destined for guerrilla
forces, was to be landed. A second mission came at the urging of
Admiral William T. Sampson, commander of the Caribbean fleet, who,
having blocked Santiago harbor, wanted to determine how much of
the Spanish fleet lay at anchor within the port. Blue was required to
make a deep penetration of long duration into the Cuban countryside,
much of which afforded him little protection from detection by patrols.
In a third trip. Blue returned to observe Santiago harbor for purposes
of informing Sampson of channel obstructions, port defenses, and ship
positions relative to an attack on the facility. An unusual officer of
demonstrated abilities, Blue advanced quickly in rank: by the end
of World War I he was a rear-admiral, served as chief of staff of
the Pacific fleet, and was chief of the Bureau of Navigation. Retired
in 1919, he died in 1928.i^«

A secret agent using the name "Fernandez del Campo" was dis-
patched to Spain by the War Department during the hostilities of
1898.1"

Stopping at the capital's best hotel, he made no advances and
presented no letters of introduction but let his dislike of the
"Yankees" be understood and gave it out that his visit to
Madrid must be brief. Members of fashionable clubs, military
officers and officials of the government met him, accepted his
casual invitations, were sumptiously entertained and also en-
riched by one who lost money at cards with the insouciance of
inherited manners and income.^^"

The man carefully and cleverly maneuvered himself into favor with
Spanish officials and naval personnel, was shown the armaments, muni-
tions, and stores of their fleet, observed the Cadiz dockyards and

'™ Brj-an, op. cit., pp. 201-202.

'" See Ibid., pp. 200-203 ; Ind, op. cit., pp. 113-116.

''^ See Bryan, op. cit., pp. 203-217.

"* The atutal identity of this agent supposedly has never been disclosed but the
source discussing his activities has suggested that he might have been Lieutenant
Colonel Aristides Moreno, an American intelligence officer of Spanish descent, who
was in charge of counter-espionage matters on General John J. Pershing's staff
in France during World War I. See Rowan and Deindorfer, op. cit., p. 719n.

^ Ibid., p. 399.

arsenal, and learned both the departure date and destination of the
armada — the last item being the purpose of his mission. Admiral
George Dewey and his forces around the Philippine Islands were
alerted that they were the target of this Spanish flotilla, and the spy
returned safely to the United States for private honors.^^^

The Signal Corps was an established entity within the army when
the declaration of war against Spain was ratified. At the time, the
unit's duties were

... to establish and maintain intercommunication between
the territorial components of the nation, by submarine or
overland telegraph and telephone ; with its armies in the field,
wherever they may be located ; between the subdivisions of its
armies, in camp, in campaign, and in battle, by visual signals
and by flying or semi-permanent telegraph and telephone
lines; and the gathering of such valuable military informa-
tion as its command of the channels of communication may
make possible. As its duties indicate, its work embraces the
construction and operation of all military telegraph and tele-
phone lines, the manipulation of submarine cables, the opera-
tion of captive balloons, visual signaling and telegraph cen-
sorship.^^^

Immediately prior to entering the war, the Signal Corps consisted
of approximately eight officers and fifty enlisted men. This was quickly
expanded to about 150 personnel, pending the organization of a volun-
teer corps. Congressional approval (30 Stat. 417-418) for a, Volunteer
Signal Corps occurred in May, 1898, and the regular ranks of the
unit eventually reached 1,300 men.^^^

The Signal Corps performed important intelligence service in three
instances during the Spanish-American War. The first of these ex-
ploits involved severing the submarine cables serving Cuba, thereby
isolating the island for purposes of communication, and utilizing the
detached lines at other terminals beyond the island for our own pur-
poses. In 1898, five submarine cables connected Cuba with the conti-
nents : two ran between Havana to Puntarassa,, Florida, one connected
Santiago with Haiti and thence to New York or to South America,
and two linked Santiago with Kingston, Jamaica, where one line con-
tinued on to the Bahamas and Halifax and the other skirted the coast
of South America to Pernambuco and ran on to the Canai*y Islands
and then to Lisbon. The Florida cables presented no problem as the
United States controlled the terminals and allowed some communica-
tions of a supposedly non-military nature to flow between Cuba and
Florida.

To Colonel James Allen, United States Volunteer Signal
Corps, was entrusted the task of severing Cuba telegraphi-
cally from Spain, and rearranging the cables for American
use. The ship Adria was immediately chartered in New York,
and the cable machinery of the Mexican Telegraph Company

'^'iSee Ibid., pp. 399-400.

"" Howard A. Giddings. Exploits of the Signal Corps in the War with Spain.
Kansas City, Missouri, Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Company, 1900, p. 10.
"' Ibid., pp. 15, 16.

secured and installed in the ship, which proceeded to Boston
and took on twenty-four miles of deep-sea cable furnished by
the Western Union Company, and then returning to New
York took on twenty-nine miles of intermediate type cable
and fifty miles of insulated but unarmored wire, with instru-
ments and supplies, and proceeded to Key West, without
having attracted the attention of the press."*

After a great deal of difficulty with the ship's crew and his own
technicians assigned to the mission, Allen could recruit only three sig-
nal sergeants, a detail of ten artillery volunteers from the garrison at
Key West Barracks, an assisting Signal Corps officer, and a motley
ship's chew. Of those under this direct command, only one had been
to sea previously and none of them had ever seen a submarine cable.

The Adria arrived off the coast of Santiago on the afternoon of
June 1 and began dragging for the cable within the three-mile limit
which was well within the range of Spanish shore batteries. This prox-
imity was necessary because, the cables not being the property of Spain,
they could legally be severed only within the jurisdiction of the na-
tions at war — i.e. within three miles of the coast of their territory. This
position also contributed technical difficulties to the mission as sub-
marine cable was armor plated where it became subject to coastal tides,
currents, and frictional contact with the ocean bottom. The Adria' s
machinery for lifting the cable almost proved impossible for the task.
The cable was snared and lost, relocated and finally surfaced by strain-
ing hoists and coughing motor pulleys. The Adria was fired on by
shore batteries a few times but the mission was finally completed.

Allen and his group also assisted in making the cable between San-
tiago and Haiti operational for United States forces after it was sev-
ered by a party aboard the St. Louis. These actions not only isolated
the Spanish forces on Cuba from ready communication with points
beyond the island, but gave the United States almost total control of
cable communication around the theater of war.^^^

Another important accomplishment of the Signal Corps was the
reporting of the arrival of Aclmiral Pascual Cervera y Topete's squad-
ron at Santiago within two hours after it entered the harbor. A^Hiile
the Spanish fleet was known to have departed for the Caribbean, its
mission was unknown : would it attack the United States coast, would
it immediately engage in a sea battle with American ships blockading
Cuba, would it attempt to refuel and drop supplies at a Cuban port
and what harbor would it utilize ? Even the army was afraid to dis-
patch troops to Cuba for fear of having these forces caught in trans-
ports by the unlocated Spanish flotilla.

On May 19, after eluding the blockading American forces, Cervera,
unobserved on the open sea, entered Santiago harbor. One hour after
the fleet made port, details about its arrival and composition were dis-
patched to Washington from Key West by Colonel James Allen.

^** lUd., pp. 30-31.

^ Generally, see lUd., pp. 23-^6.

No confidence is violated in now telling that the information
regarding Cervera's squadron came to Colonel Allen through
an employee of the cable company at Havana, who was in the
pay of the Signal Corps. All the information about Cervera
came from Santiago, over the Cuba submarine cable on the
south coast, to the Captain-General at Havana, and Colonel
Allen's agent obtained it from "a Spanish government official
holding a high position." ^^®

Ten days after its arrival, the Spanish fleet came under blockade
in the harbor when ships under Admiral Sampson arrived off San-
tiago. The situation remained static until July 3 when Cervera at-
tempted to make a dash for the sea. In a four-hour battle along the
Cuban coast, the Spanish ships succumbed to superior American fire-
power. The fleet was destroyed, 474 Spanish seamen were killed, and
another 1,750 were taken prisoner. American forces counted one dead
and one w^ounded. On July 17, the Santiago garrison surrendered, re-
sulting in another 24,000 prisoners. The destruction of the Spanish
fleet marked the virtual end of the war.

The Signal Corps' third intelligence effort derived from its mission
of communications control and duty as censor, "whose purpose was not
to restrict the press, or to muzzle the people, but m thwart treason, and
to prevent new^s of military and naval operations from reaching
Spanish territory, to the injury of the American cause." ^^^

The lines constructively seized by the Signal Corps, at the
order of the President, embraced the land lines of Florida, the
seven submarine cables to foreign countries having their
termini in New York city, the French cable on the south coast
of Cuba, the English cables in Porto Kico and Santiago, and
the Cuba submarine cables.^^^

The Signal Corps did not actually displace any personnel operating
these lines but, instead, assiuned supervision of operators and messages
in each case. The signal officer attached to each station assumed some
responsibilities as a censor while the Chief Signal Officer held final
authority on such questions. Not all communication was prohibited
over these cables and, in fact, a certain amount of intelligence de-
rived from allowing personal and commercial traffic.

All telegrams in Spanish to and from Spain, Cuba, Hayti,
Porto Rico, Jamaica, and St. Thomas were prohibited, as
well as all messages in cipher to any foreign country, except
that the right to communicate in cipher was allowed the legal
diplomatic and consular representatives of neutral foreign
governments.

Personal and commercial messages in plain text were ad-
mitted, when deemed advisable, and when not containing mili-
tary information, as it was the purpose of the chief signal
officer to exercise the necessary military censorship with the
least possible inconvenience to legitimate commercial busi-

'** JUd., p. 46 ; generally see Tbid., pp. 37-46.
"' Ibid., p. 113.
"^^ Ibid., p. 114.

ness. Thiis it happened that throughout the war messages
pertaining to domestic or commercial affairs were passed
freely over the lines to Havana, and even to Santiago.

Much information of inestimable value was gleaned from
a perusal of messages which were attempted to be passed by
Spanish agents, blockade-runners, newspaper correspondents,
and imf riendly or neutral persons. The movements of Spanish
ships, the plans of blockade-runners, and the presence and
doings of Spanish agents were thus discovered and watched.
By accepting messages of treasonable character and quietly
dropping them in the wastebasket, the sources of the informa-
tion were not alamied and repeatedly furnished to the United
States valuable intelligence.^^^

The first efforts at establishing peace were made through the
French ambassador at "Washington shortly after the defeat of the
Cervera squadron. A protocol signed on August 12 provided for a
peace treaty to be concluded in Paris and halted hostilities under the
terms that (1) Spain was to relinquish Cuba and cede Puerto Rico
and one of the Ladrone Islands to the United States, (2) American
forces were to continue to hold Manila, and (3) occupation of Manila
would continue until a peace treaty was concluded detennining the
disposition and control of the Philippine Islands. The Paris treaty
was finalized on December 10, ceding the Philippines, Puerto Eico,
and Guam to the United States, calling for a payment of $20 million
for the Philippines, and effectively establishing Cuba as a free nation.
The treatj^ came to the United States Senate for ratification and a
close division between imperialist and anti-imperialist factions left
its adoption in doubt for a few months. Finally, on February 6, 1899,
it was accepted on a 57-27 vote, a 2-vote confirmation margin. The
war was over.

XVI. Post-War Developments

TMien the Philippines were ceded to the United States, revolutionary
forces within the islands anticipated independence for their country.
When they learned that they had merely exchanged colonial overseers,
agitation and insurrection became their tactic of reprisal. Among
those leading these assualts was Emilio Aguinaldo, an insurrectionist
of long-standing whom the United States enlisted in the war against
Spain only to have him become a foe when peace gave America control
of the Philippines. By 1901. Aguinaldo was an intelligence interest.
His pursuer was Frederick Funston, an agent of the ]\Iilitary Infor-
mation Dix-ision.

Funston had served with the Cuban revolutionary forces, was
caught by the Spanish authorities, and obtained release from prison
throuffh the intervention of American diplomats. I^pon returning to
the United States, he was debriefed by Colonel Arthur Wagner, head
of the Military Information Division, wlio recognized his keen eye
and remembered his abilities when difficulties arose with Aguinaldo.
Ha\dng ser\^ed in the islands during the Spanish-American War,
Funston was stationed at San Isidro on Luzon when, in February,

' lUd., pp. 115-116.

1901, he received word of the capture of a band of insurrectos, one of
whom was a courier from Aguinaldo with cipher messages for other
insurrectionist leaders. It also appeared that Aguinaldo himself was
encamped in the northern area of Luzon, perhaps in the friendly
village of Palanan.

Funston's mind went into action. He knew it would be impos-
sible to take Aguinaldo by conventional military methods —
any movement of that kind would be telegraphed far ahead
by means only the keen-eyed Tagalog guerrillas knew. He
studied the map. Palanan lay inland from the east coast at the
northern end of Luzon. A plan began to form in his head.
A chosen band of Filipinos loval to the United States and
led by only a cadre of Americans, who would have to be
disguised somehow, might be taken by sea to the north, then
disembarked at night for quick penetration of the hinterland.
By one ruse or another, Aguinaldo's stronghold would have
to be breached without a fight, or the slippery rebel chief
would disappear into nothingness as he had so often done
before.""

Funston recruited approximately a hundred Macabebes as "rev-
olutionaries" and explained the presence of Americans with them as
being "captives." Their cause and case was strengthened by the addi-
tion of some forged communiques and lingidstic cramming on the part
of the Macabebes to learn the Tagalog dialect. Authenticity was added
to the band with appropriate uniforms and weapons. Tlie gimboat
Vickshurg landed the group on the northern coast and a grueling
march inland was begun. After much suffering, the party came in
contact with one of Aguinaldo's forward observers; the Macabebes
were taken into the enemy camp while the American "captives" were
held a short, distance away. At the proper moment, the Macabebes
seized the rebels, the Americans rushed in, and Aguinaldo was cap-
tured.

Word of the American success spread across wild northern
Luzon with the rapidity that always has astounded those
accustomed only to the electric marvels of civilization. Funs-
ton turned his force about, prepared for the worst. He knew
that if the trip inland had been rough, the return could be
all but impossible if the country remained hostile. To his im-
measurable relief, it did not ; Aguinaldo in captivity seemed
to paralyze the people. The trip to the coast was made al-
most without incident and thence by ship to Manila. The
back of the insurrection was broken."^

It was also in 1901 in the Philippines that another intelligence
actor, Captain Ralph H. Van Deman, made his api^earance. A grad-
uate of West Point and once an army surgeon. Van Deman cham-
pioned the fledgling INIilitary Information Division and urged his mili-
tary superiors to give more consideration to intelligence development.
In the Philippines, he came to the attention of General Arthur Mac-

'°° Ind. op. cit., p. 119.
'" Ibid., p. 123.

Arthur who asked him to organize a Philippines Military Informa-
tion Bureau. Although patterned after the Adjutant General's unit,
Van Deman's office had no official connection with the Washington
namesake. There was also one major operational difference between
the two organizations : Van Deman utilized undercover operatives,
all Filipinos except for one American. Subsequently, the Philippines
Military Information Bureau would uncover a plot to assassinate
General MacArthur, apprise the army of Japanese interests and in-
telligence activity in the Philippines, and make clandestine observa-
tions in China during the Boxer Rebellion.^^- In 1903. after the Gen-
eral Staff system was introduced in the army and the intelligence orga-
nization became the second division (G-2) of the General Staff, the
Philippines INIilitary Information Bureau was given branch status
to the new intelligence division. Van Deman returned from Asian
duty in 1915 and would assume a major leadership role in intelligence
activities as America prepared for world war.

When the General Staff of the Army was created by Congress (32
Stat. 830-831) in 1903, the Military Information Division of the Ad-
jutant General's office became the second division (G-2) of the new
entity.^^^ This change in status generally pleased intelligence advo-
cates within the army. However, General Franklin Bell, a man with
whom Van Deman had publicly disagreed over intelligence matters
in the Philippines and an officer not favorably disposed toward the
intelligence function, became Chief of Staff. When the head of the
Army War College (G-3) suggested that the intelligence division be
physically housed with the War College to facilitate use of common
resources. Bell approved the proposal as being practical. Shortly there-
after, the War College sought to absorb the intelligence unit : this ac-
tion Bell also approved but perhaps not merely for reasons of prac-
ticality alone.^^* Transferred to the War College in 1908, the intelli-
gence function was administered by an information committee from
1910 until the dawn of World War I, a panel described by one au-
thority as "personnel with no knowledge of the intelligence unit's aims
and functions and no interest in learning them." ^^^

The military were not unaware of possible intelligence penetration
by foreign powers and of the necessity of protecting defense facili-
ties and information from such scrutiny. New regulations in 1908 on
this matter said :

Commanding officers of posts at which are located lake or
coastal defenses are charged with the responsibility of pre-
venting as far as practicable, visitors from obtaining infor-
mation relative to such defenses which would probably be
communicated to a foreign power, and to this end may pre-

"' Generally, see Ibid., pp. 124-127.

"'Generally, on the general staff concept, see: J. D. Hittle. The Military Staff:
Its History and Development. Harrisburg, The Military Service Publishing Com-
pany, 1949; Otto L. Nelson, Jr. National Seeurity and the General Staff. Wash-
ington, Infantry Journal Press, 1^6; Raphael P. Thian. Legislative History of
the General Staff of the Army of the United States, Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1901.

'" See Ind, op. cit, pp. 128-129.

"^Ibid., p. 130.

scribe and enforce appropriate regulations governing visitors
to their posts.

American citizens whose loyalty to their Government is un-
questioned may be permitted to visit such portions of the
defenses as the commanding officer deems proper.

The taking of photographic or other views of permanent
works of defense will not be permitted. Neither written nor
pictorial descriptions of these works will be made for pub-
lication without the authority of the Secretary of War, nor
will any information be given concerning them which is not
contained in the printed reports and documents of the War
Department.

It is thought that this language constitutes the first open admission
by the War Department of an effort to protect fixed defenses and in-
formation pertaining to same against foreign intelligence penetra-
tion.19*^

At approximately the same point in time as this security directive
was issued, efforts at establishing the government's first general in-
vestigative organization came to fruition, resulting in a force gen-
erally designed to probe crimes against the Federal establishment
and to pursue those alleged to have committed such offenses. Inherent
in this investigative mission was an intelligence function — the sys-
tematic gathering and interpretation of information with a view to
crime control and prevention. A point of contention and debate within
this mission, as will be seen, is whether the "crimes" in question are
solely those which are prosecutable or whether other potential or ac-
tual offenses, not stated in law, may be included in the understanding.

While the Attorney General was one of the original Cabinet officers
of 1789, a Department of Justice did not exist until (16 Stat. 162)
June, 1870. The following year. Congress provided (16 Stat. 495 at
497) the new agency with $50,000 for the "detection and prosecution
of crimes against the United States." However, because Attorney
General Amos J. Ackerman had only one "Special Agent" for detec-
tion work, he utilized the appropriation by employing private detec-
tives, borrowing Secret Service agents, or otherwise burdening United
States Attorneys and marshals with investigative tasks. In 1875, At-
torney General George H. Williams appointed four regional "special
detectives" and occasionally hired private detectives when the United
States Attorneys had need of such services for specific duties. A few
"examiners" were added to the Justice Department's forces in 1878.
These personnel scrutinized the records of court clerks, marshals,
commissioners, and district attorneys but, because their appointments
soon became embroiled in patronage, they rendered what has been
described as "desultry service." ^^^ During his tenure of office, Attorney
General Benjamin H. Brewster (1881-1884) declared he was per-
sonally opposed to utilizing private detectives for Department inves-
tigatory work but, while he said he wanted to dispose of such oper-
atives as soon as possible, he was forced to rely on some private

^■^The evolution of information security policy and practice is discussed in
Appendix II.

^"^ Harry and Bonaro Overstreet. The FBI In Our Open Society. New York,
W. W. Norton and Company, 1969, p. 14.

assistance and chose the Pinkerton agency. After the Homestead
Massacre tarnished the Pinkerton name. Congress, in indignation over
the incident, forbid (27 Stat. 368. 591) the further utilization of these
agents and effectively ended the use of private detectives by the
Federal government.^^®

The Justice Department continued to rely upon the Secret Service
for investigators after the utilization of private detectives was halted
and, by 1906, as many as thirty-two of these operatives had been
detailed from Treasury. The arrangement was a makeshift and rested
upon congressional sanction through the annual appropriations proc-
ess. B}' 1907, Attorney" General Charles J. Bonaparte, the American-
born grandson of Xapoleon's youngest brother, attempted to obtain
his own investigators but Congress, for various reasons, was uncon-
vinced of their necessity.

One factor was an overgeneralized but not unwarranted
contempt for detectives and their practices. Many persons
who then went into such work were recommended for it by
their own criminal records and what these had taught them
about the underworld, not by any respect for the law.

To Attorney General Bonaparte, the fact that detectives
tended not to be a ''high type" signified that Justice should
have its own force of care full}' chosen and rigorously super-
vised investigators. But to many members of Congress —
among them Chairman James A. Tawney of the House Ap-
proriations Committee — it signified that detectives should,
to the greatest possible extent, be kept out of the Federal
Government.

The other factor was a state of tension between Congress
and the President. Its basic cause was the fact that a Congress
still rooted in the McKinley-Mark Hanna tradition of politics
had no taste for Roosevelt's many-sided reform program — or
for his "trust-busting" fervor.

Speaker Joe Cannon, for example — the most powerful man
in the House — broke with the President and became one of
his arch-foes because of the Government's antitrust action
against Standard Oil. This and other actions of like type
had. Cannon contended, shaken the confidence of the business
community and brought on financial panic.

Secondary causes of tension were, however, soon added to
the primary cause. In 1905, Senator John Mitchell and Rep-
resentative John Williamson, both of Oregon, were indicted
in land- fraud cases. "When Roosevelt said, in terms that
sounded like a blanket charge of wrongdoing, that he would
order as many more investigations of members of Congress

"' On July 6, 1892, strikers at the Carnegie Steel Company plant in Homestead,
Pennsylvania, fired upon two barges on the Monongahela River containing some
300 Pinkerton detectives. The Pinkertous were known strike breakers and their
presence generated hatred among the strikers. After several hours of fighting,
the Pinkerton forces surrendered and were roughly escorted out of town. In the
aftermath of the encounter, three guards and ten strikers lay dead and others
suffered severe injuries. Some 8.000 National Guardsmen restored order in the
community and subsequently, after holding out for almost five months, the strike
was given up. No effective steel union was organized in the area until the 1930s.

as seemed warranted, that body went on the defensive. It
was kept there by rumormongers, some of whom were in-
dubitably in the pay of elements that wanted to goad Congress
into halting Justice's use of Secret Service operatives.^^^

Not only did Congress deny Bonaparte's request for an investigative
force in 1907, it refused to comply again the following year when a
prohibition (35 Stat. 328 and 968) on the detailing of Secret Service
agents to the Justice Department was also effected. Faced with the
prospect of having no avenue for organizing a detection group other
than on his own authority, the Attorney General, with the President's
approval and at the suggestion of Henry L. Stimson who was then
United States Attorney in New York, hired nine Secret Service
agents who were separated from Treasury on June 30, 1908,

On July 1, 1908, Attorney General Bonaparte put his nine
new detectives and such special agents and examiners as
were already on his payroll under the supervision of his
Chief Examiner, Stanley W. Finch — and thus gave himself
a force of twenty-three men. On July 26th, acting on Presi-
dential instructions, he issued the order which made this
force a permanent subdivision of the Department, with Finch
as its Chief .2°°

Reluctantly, Congress accepted the new investigative unit. At first
it did not have a strong mission prescribed by existing laws. Soon,
however, it began operations pursuant to the Constitution's interstate
commerce clause — tracking down stolen Federal property and thieves
transvereing State boundaries, pursuing white slavei's violating the
Mann Act (36 Stat. 825), and scrutinizing the sources of labor unrest
and revolutionary rhetoric. Soon it, along with the other fledgling
intelligence institutions, would be confronted with monumental re-
sponsibilities as war clouds in Europe cast shadows upon America
and plunged the world into war.

"® Overstreet, op. cit., pp. 19-20.
'°° Ibid., p. 27.

Part Two
The Middle Years (1914-1939)

Sometime in 1915 the Japanese warship Asama went aground in
Turtle Bay in the Gulf of Lower California. The presence of this
vessel in that part of the world was not a total surprise as Japanese
fleet units had been previously sighted a few times in the area. Earlier
the Grand Admiral of Nippon had paid a visit to Mexico, expounding
a blood brother theme. What appeared to be somewhat incredible
about this incident was that the formidable veterans of Tsushima
could be so inept as to allow this accident to happen. Indeed, it sub-
sequently became questionable that the event was an accident at all.
According to Sidney Mashbir, an intelligence officer destined to gain
fame with General Douglas MacArthur's Allied Translator and Inter-
preter Section during World War II, there were "unquestionable
proofs that whole companies of Japanese soldiers had traversed a
part of southern Arizona in 1916 during secret exercises, proceedings
that could only have been associated with the Asama's wallowing in
the mud the previous year."

As an intelligence officer in 1916 with the First Arizona
Infantry he had been detailed by that General Funston of
Aguinaldo fame on a mission to seek the truth of rumors
among Indians of Japanese columns present in northern
Sonora in Mexico. Mashbir, who later acted as a spy for
America in Manchuria, tramped across the desert (which he
knew well enough to make the first map of it our Army
ever had). His knowledge of the desert told him that even
the Japanese, incredible marchers that they were, could not
have made the trip without violating Arizona territory to
the north for water. He made his estimate and headed for
the area he believed they would have to touch. There he
discovered Japanese ideographs written in charcoal upon
the rock walls of passes of the Tina j as Atlas Mountains.
They were, he estimated, the notes of column commanders
who had gone before to those who would follow. His own
Indian scouts told him that parties of fifty came ashore
at intervals and made the killing march.

Mashbir hastened to send a detailed report to Washington.
But in 1916, a General Staff that had no intelligence section
for receiving and assessing information, appended a com-
ment to the report that the ideograph "had no military value."
Even in retrospe€t, as he was telling the story, Mashbir's
mustachios bristled. The point completely missed by that com-
mentator was, of course, that any indication of Japanese
presence in Arizona or northern [Mexico at that time had the

(75J

highest military implication. One can imagine how a similar
bit of information indicating the presence of Americans on
Hokkaido would have been treated by Tokyo intelligence
analysts at that time.^

Although war had been raging in Europe for two years when this
incident occurred, military intelligence was practically non-existent
in the United States. The Military Information Division had become
the second section (G-2) of the new General Staff organization in
1903. However, because it had no champions among the army's leader-
ship, it was transferred to the War College in 1908 and fell under an
unappreciative and insensitive committee leadership within that in-
stitution in 1910. Its forces and identity dwindled : when the United
States entered the world war, the new Chief of Staff, General Pey-
ton C. March, discovered his intelligence personnel consisted of two
officers and two clerks."

Returning from Asian duty in 1915 where he had seen intelligence
service as organizer and head of the Philippines Military Information
Bureau, Major Ralph H. Van Deman came to the information branch
of the War College.

He was delighted but soon found reason to be appalled. He
discovered that reports had been coming in from all over a
warring world, gathered by conscientious military attaches
and from intelligence organizations of belligerents on both
sides, a treasure trove of information. But these priceless doc-
uments had never left the War College building. Van Deman
found them in tall, dusty piles. In other piles were telegrams
marked urgent filed by an information officer especially as-
signed to General [John J.] Pershing, then engaged on the
Villa punitive expedition in the same regions of northern
Mexico that were giving so much concern to Washington.
These had never left the room where they had been filed.^

Van Deman attempted to correct this situation by appealing first
to the president of the Army War College, urging that the Military
Information Division be re-established but correspondence endorsing
this recommendation was ignored by the Chief of Staff, General Hugh
Scott. Next, Van Deman sought the relocation of the Division, naming
the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth as a
possible site. But shortly after Leavenworth endorsed the plan, offi-
cials in Washington and London became aware of it and condemned
the action. General Scott quashed the proposal and almost did the same
for Van Deman's assignment. America would be at war before the
revival of the Military Information Division occurred.

/. Military Intelligence

The political balance of the Great Powers of Europe in 1914 con-
stituted a delicate Newtonian system : any weakening or strengthening
on the part of one resulted in a corresponding oscillation on the part

^Allison Ind. A Short History of Espionage. New York. David McKay Com-
pany, 1963, pp. 131-132.

^Peyton C. March. The Nation At War. New York, Doubleday, Doran and
Company, 1932, p. 226.

' Ind, op. cit., p. 133.

of all the others. A jolt to the arrangements had the potential for un-
leashing aggressions of enormous magnitude. "With three pistol shots
at Sarajevo, a match was fiimg into the powder-keg of European poli-
tics. On August 1, Germany declared war on Russia and on France
two days later while simultaneously invading Belgium. Britain came
to war against the Kaiser on the next day. During the rest of the
month. President Wilson issued a series of neutrality proclamations
(38 Stat. 1999-2024). American intelligence activities, however, were
already underway in the war zone.

Colonel Richard H. "Williams, a captain of coast artillery
when sent abroad with the group of American military ob-
servers in the smnmer of 1914, was one who not only exper-
ienced some of the hazards of a spy inside the enemy's lines —
being repeatedly bathed in chilling German suspicion — but
who also was destined to take part in striking and import-
ant — and officially authenticated — secret service exploit of the
A.E.F. "Williams observed the war for three years before be-
coming another of its multitude of combatants. His first duty,
assisting Americans stranded in Europe, took him to Belgium
and he was there when the steel-tipped tide of Von Kluck's
and Von Billow's armies inundated that land, after which he
was sent to Constantinople aboard the USS North Carolina
to serve as military attache under Ambassador Henry Mor-
genthau. He was the only attache with the Turkish forces on
the Gallipoli peninsula and the only American who saw,
from the defender's side, the desperate landings and attacks of
the British and colonial troops of Sir Ian Hamilton.

After the British, ably commanded by Sir Charles Monro,
effected their masterly evacuation of the peninsula. Colonel
"Williams accompanied a Bulgarian army to the Dobrudja
and watched Bulgars and Germans mopping up strong con-
tingents of Roumanians and Russians. In January 1917 the
"War Department in "Washington ordered its widely experi-
enced attache home.*

Random observers, however, were no substitute for a continuous and
mature military intelligence organization. As the war raged on in
Europe, Major Van Deman became increasingly worried over the
prospect of the United States entering the hostilities with virtually no
intelligence arrangements established. "When, on April 6, 1917, a
declaration of war against Germany was effected (40 Stat. 1), Van
Deman met personally with the Chief of Staff to plead for an intelli-
gence unit. General Scott said no. The plea was again made, but to no
avail. "With his third try. Van Deman was told to cease his efforts and
to not approach Secretary of War Newton D. Baker with the idea. Van
Deman circumvented this order. Shortly after his last meeting with
the Chief of Staff, he found himself' escorting novelist Gertrude
Atherton on visits to training camps in the Washington area. Con-
vincing her of the perilousness of the intelligence situation, he asked
her to put his case before Baker. The next day he planted the same

* Richard Wilmer Rowan with Robert G. Deindorfer. Secret Service: Thirty-
three Centuries of Espionage. London, William Kimber, 1969, p. 569.

story with the District of Columbia police chief who was not only
Van Deman's friend but also breakfasted regularly with the Secretary
of War.

The dual attack brought results. By April 30, Baker was on
the phone instructing the president of the Army War College
to have Van Deman report to him at once. After an hour's
conversation, Baker told Van Deman that within forty-eight
hours an order would be on its way to the president of the
War College setting up a new intelligence section. By May 3,
Van Deman had his intelligence bureau and complete charge
of it. He also had been promoted from major to lieutenant
colonel.

From that time on, the ^Military Intelligence force had
grown by means of commissioning civilians in the Army
Reserve and by use of volunteer investigators. Van Deman's
agents were soon scattered about the country, working under
cover among the IWW in the Northwest and among the
enemy aliens in New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago. In
July, 1917, Van Deman had started a Plant Protection Sec-
tion which placed undercover operatives in defense plants.
By August, his men were so involved in investigating and
arresting civilians that Attorney General Gregory had to
complain to Baker, whereupon Baker had ordered Military
Intelligence agents report all enemy agents to the Justice
Department instead of pursuing investigations and causing
arrests.^

Ultimately, Van Deman's ventures into civilian law enforcement
would cost him his intelligence leadership. In the spring of 1918, while
Congress was enacting the Sedition Act (40 Stat. 553), Van Deman
continued to build his network of secret agents, spies, and volunteer
operatives. From the beginning of America's entry into the war, Van
Deman had utilized the services of volunteer patriots eager to report
on their neighbors. Some of this information might have been reli-
able ; most of it was gossip and some amounted to lies and slurs.
While the American Protective League, an organization of voluntary
sleuths, had been established with the encouragement of the Justice
De])artment as an auxiliary informer-enforcement body. Van Deman
had eagerly utilized its services and nourished its development. Now
he cultivated a very select cadre of secret agents in the Midwest.

He was inclined to avoid going to the state councils of de-
fense [sub-national affiliates of the Federal Council of Na-
tional Defense which functioned as an administrative coordi-
nating body during the world war] . Too likely to be involved

^Joan M. Jensen. The Price of Vigilance. Chicago, Rand McNally and Com-
pany, 1968 ; Jensen consistently places an extra letter in Van Deman's name in
her book, misspelling it "Van Dieman," but there is no doubt as to the actual
identity of the person she is discussing. The error in spelling has been corrected
in the above (luotation. Van Deman's effort to have the Military Information
Division re-established as a separate structure with sufficient manpower and re-
sources to carry out the military inteUigence function is also recounted in
Ind. op. cit., pp. 176-180.

in politics, he thought. He had different men in mind: a
retired brigadier general in Minnesota, a retired army officer
in Nashville, Tennessee, members of the Volunteer Medical
Service Corps, American Federation of Labor informants,
groups of private detectives from mining and industry. An
agent of the Norfolk and Western Railway Company vol-
unteered to supply operatives. A Denver man promised to
obtain the services of detectives hired by mining and indus-
trial companies in Colorado. An agent for a railway in Vir-
ginia promised to do the same. A lawyer from Kansas City
was to organize Missouri, another from Indianapolis was to
organize Indiana. Three attorneys from Kansas City, Kansas,
were to form the nucleus of a group for their state. AJnd all of
these would be working entirely for the military.^

When Secretary of War Baker returned to Washington from a tour
in Europe, he learned of Van Deman's recruitment efforts and
promptly attempted to restrain the military sleuths. Van Deman was
ordered to overseas duty and Lieutenant Colonel Marlborough Chur-
chill was detailed to head the Military Intelligence Division. The im-
mediate spy network Van Deman was attempting to establish was aban-
doned but other operating secret agent arrangements appear to have
remained in place.^ The effect of Baker's disciplinary action was that
of driving military intelligence underground. While there would be
greater caution in the arrest of civilians, surveillance remained active
and pervasive.

• Jensen, op. cit., p. 123.

'' Van Deman's interest in intelligence and concern for internal security remained
strong after he departed M.I.D. He seemingly retained his ties to old volunteer
intelligence operatives and, when he retired from the Army in 1929, he was given
two civilian employees, filing cabinets, and working materials by the military to
start a private intelligence organization. He apparently built a huge store of files
on American left-wing political activists, ranging from responsible liberals to
avowed communists. These files were divided, the major portion being taken over
by Sixth Army headquarters which maintained them until 1968 when they were
sent to Fort Holabird in Maryland. In 1970, when the Army was under congres-
sional investigation for its political surveillance practices, the decision was made
to give up custody of the papers, to not subject them to the scrutiny of Army
historians as they were too politically sensitive materials, and to donate them,
instead, to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee which had, by prearrange-
ment, oflicially requested them. These papers are apparently still within the Sub-
committee's control.

Tlie portion of Van Deman's files not taken over by the Army remained in Cali-
fornia at the San Diego Research Library, a private institution created in 1952
by three of Van Deman's closest associates : Major General George W. Fisher of
the California National Guard, Colonel Frank C. Forward, commander of intelli-
gence operations of the California Guard, and Alfred Loveland, a San Diego
businessman. The files were maintained and built upon until 1962. During this
time three California Governors utilized the files to check on the backgrounds of
prospective state appointees. In 1962, California Attorney General Stanley Mosk
seized the files on tlie grounds that they had been used "by unauthorized persons
for political purposes." After a threatened court suit by the San Diego Research
Library, the files were returned and were placed in a vault in the San Diego Trust
and Insurance Company, of which Colonel Forward was an oflficer. When asked
in 1971 if the files were still in San Diego. Colonel Forward said yes but "I can't
tell you where." When asked who was in charge of them, he responded : "I am not
at liberty to talk about that." See New York Times, July 9, 1971; also Ibid., Sep-
tember 7, 1971.

The son of a professor of sacred rhetoric at the Andover Theological
Seminary, Marlborough Churchill was born in 1878 at Andover, pre-
pared for college at Phillips Academy there, and was subsequently
graduated from Harvard in 1900. After teaching English at his alma
mater for one year, he obtained a commission as a second lieutenant of
artillery and lamiched on a military career. Having served in various
artillery commands, Churchill became editor of the Field Artillery
Journal (1914—1916) while also performing duties as inspector-instruc-
tor of the national guard field artillery of Virginia, Pennsylvania, and
the District of Columbia. From January, 1916, to June, 1917, he served
as a military observer with the French army in the field, next was de-
tailed to General Pershing's staff until February, 1918, when he be-
came acting chief of staff of the army artillery. First Army Division.
In May, 1918, he returned to the United States and became assistant
chief of staff and director of the ]Military Intelligence Division, hold-
ing that position until 1922. He retired from active duty in 1930 and
died in 1947. He appears to have had no intelligence experience before
assuming command of ]\I.I.D. and to have had no association with in-
telligence operations after leaving the Division.

While Churchill inherited and retained Van Deman's private spy
network and an official structure of regional domestic personnel, de-
fense plant operatives, overseas attaches and observers, the A.E.F.
intelligence structure and a variety of "special agents," his tenure of
office at M.I.D. did have its own unique aspects.^ General Peyton C.
March was brought back from France to become Chief of Staff in
March, 1918, and he effected certain changes in Army structure. Under
General Order No. 80 of August 26, 1918, a variety of organizational
refinements were made within the Army and certain units of the War
Department. One of these was the upgrading of the Military Intelli-
gence Division, "which had previously been a branch first of the War
Plans Division and later of the Executive Division, as a separate and
coordinate division of the General Staff.^ Also, because the Wilson
Administration was unwilling to impose wartime price controls and
organized labor retaliated with a series of crippling strikes, Federal
troops were pressed into duty to man facilities or maintain peace
where labor unrest prevailed. AVhen the Army became interested in
labor disturbances, INIilitary Intelligence took to the field. A vast
counter-espionage network resulted and unions became suspicious of
Churchill's intentions."

Writing in the Journal of the United States Artillery for April,
1920, Churchill outlined functions which M.I.D. had performed dur-

* One of these special agents was Mrs. Arthur M. Blake, a newspaper cor-
respondent accredited to the New York Evening Post and the Baltimore Sim, who
was in the employ of Churchill, sending messages and observations out of Mos-
cow during the war with Jewish refugees fleeing across the border into Finland.
She later provided similar services while stationed in Japan, Sakhalin, and
Manchuria. See Ind. op cit., pp. 195-197.

® Otto L. Nelson. National Seourity and the General Staff. Washington, In-
fantry Journal Press, 1946, p. 232.

'" See Jensen, op. cit., pp. 276-277.

ing the war and armistice.^^ Formally, General Orders 80 of August
26, 1918, had said that the Military Intelligence Division

shall have cognizance and control of military intelligence,
both positive and negative, and shall be in charge of an officer
designated as the director of military intelligence, who will
be an assistant to the Chief of Staff. He is also the chief mili-
tary censor. The duties of this division are to maintain esti-
mates revised daily of the military situation, the economic
situation, and of such other matters as the Chief of Staflf may
direct, and to collect, collate, and disseminate military intelli-
gence. It will cooperate with the intelligence section of the
general staffs of allied countries in connection with military
intelligence; prepare instructions in military intelligence
work for the use of our forces; supervise the training of per-
sonnel for intelligence work; organize, direct, and coordinate
the intelligence service ; supennse the duties of military at-
taches; communicate direct with department intelligence
officers and intelligence officers at posts, camps, and stations,
and with commands in the field in matters relating to military
intelligence; obtain, reproduce, and issue maps; translate
foreign documents; disburse and accomit for intelligence
funds; cooperate with the censorehip board and with intelli-
gence agencies of other departments of the Government.

By Churchill's own account, M.I.D. had responsibility for (1) reten-
tion of combat intelligence experience information. (2) application
of combat intelligence historical information to training programs,

(3) awareness of combat intelligence developments in other armies,

(4) conducting internal ser^-ice loyalty investigations (''... if a state
of war makes such investigation necessary, we want it done by agencies
under our own control, and not be unsympathetic civilian bureaus."),

(5) detection of sabotage, graft, and fraud within the Army, (6)
foreign map collection, (7) preparation of terrain handbooks, (8)
supervision of information collection by military^ attaches,^^ (9) pres-
ervation of the history and experiences of international duty expedi-
tions," (10) "initiating and sustaining the interest and knowledge of

^ See Marlborough Churchill. The Military Intelligence Division General
Journal of the United States ArtiUery, v. 52, April, 1920 : 293-316.

12 '.fjjg information obtained by Attaches is of two kinds — general and techni-
cal. The general information is sub-divided into military, economic, political and
psychological information. . . . The technical information consists of all data
connected with scientific developments as they relate to the military profession.
In the large capitals, officers who have specialized in aviation and ordinance
are assigned as assistants in order that these matters may be handled properly.
As soon as such information is received, M.I.D. at once makes a distribution
which aims to place the information in the hands of the technical service or
the civil official who can best evaluate it and see that it is used." Churchill,
op. cit., pp. 301-302.

^^ Examples of such expeditions offered by the author included General Leon-
ard Wood's administration of Cuba, the China Relief Expedition, the Military
Government of the Philippine Islands, the Siberian Expeditionary Force,
United States forces at Archangel, duty at the Paris Peace Conference, General
Harry Bandholtz' mission to Hungary, and General James Harbord's mission
to Turkey.

officers in general in foreign languages, foreign countries and in the
currents of historical events which produce world situations," ^\(11)
determining the tactical intelligence duties of the Troop Subsection,^^
(12) forecasting international and domestic security situations in
what was called a "normal product,"^'' (13) making translations,^^

" Churchill, op. cit., p. 299.

^' According to the author, these duties included :

"1. Preparation of instructions for Intelligence work with troops and methods
to be used in Intelligence instruction in the Army. (Liaison with W.P.D. [War
Plans Division], U.S.M.A. [United States Military Academy at West Point],
Air Service and Garrison Schools and with G-2 of Departments and troop units. )

"2. Preparation of Tables of Organization insofar as they concern Intelli-
gence work with troops, revision of General Orders, Army Regulations, etc., in-
sofar as they affect troop intelligence work. (Liaison with War Plans Division.)

"3. Consideration of questions pertaining to troop Intelligence work: (a) Ob-
.servation, (b) Transmission of information, (c) Location of our own front lines,
(d) 'Listening in' both of enemy lines and of our own, (e) General subject of
Wireless Interceptions, (f) General subject of 'Trench Codes,' (g) Information
to be obtained from Flash and Sound Ranging Services, etc. (Liaison with Equip-
ment Branch, Operations Division and Artillery and Branch Information
Services.)

"4. Consideration of subject of tactical information to be obtained from and
furnished to Artillery Information Service. (Liaison with Artillery Information
Service. )

"5. General subject of Branch intelligence work. (Liaison with Air Service
Information Service.)

"6. General subject of aerial photographic interpretation.

"7. Consideration of needs for special tactical manuals, handbooks, maps, etc.,
for use of troops or in Intelligence training. (Liaison with Operations and AVar
Plans Division when necessary. )

"8. Consideration of the general question of the use of 'false information' and
of the methods by which it should be used. (Liaison with Psychologic Section,
MI2.)

"9. Intelligence personnel for duty with troops ; utilization of trained person-
nel now in the army and in civil life.

"10. The 'spotting' of new foreign tactical methods, devices, plans and projects.

"11. The maintenance of liaison with all American G.H.Q's. that may now or
hereafter be in existence.

"12. Study of foreign intelligence .systems." Churchill, op. cit., pp. 302-303.

^* "This normal product, with the exception of map and terrain handbook
information, consists of :

" ( a ) The Current Estimate of the Strategic Situation.

"(b) The Situation Monographs.

"(c) The Weekly Summary and, in emergencies. The Daily Summary.

"(d) The Original Sources, or Supporting Data, upon which (a), (b), and
(c) are based.

"(e) The Weekly Survey of the United States.

"The [Current] Estimate of the [Strategic] Situation is arrived at by the cor-
rect use of a 'check list' known as the 'Strategic Index' which guides not only
the oflBcer who collates the information but also the officer or agent who collects
it. The Strategic Index is based upon the assumption previously stated that the
situation in any given country may be divided into four main factors : the combat
factor, the economic factor, the political factor and the psychologic factor. Each
of these factors is divided, subdivided and redivided until every point from
which constitute the supporting data upon which rest the summarized statements
is assigned a number which serves not only as an identification but also as a
convenient paragraph number when observers' reports are prepared and a page
number for the 'Situation Monographs' in which information is collated and
which constitute the supporting data upon which rest the summarized statements
of the 'Estimate of the Situation.' The method thus briefly outlined constitutes

(14) developing codes and ciphers/^ and (15) various systematic
counterintelligence efforts.^^

To accomplish these duties, the Military Intelligence Division under
Churchill, in accordance with General Orders No. 80, was organized

what may be considered a system of philosophy applied to the gathering and
presentation of information." Churchill, op. cit., pp. 304-305.

"Of the Translation Section (MI6), the author writes: "Theoretically, all
War Department translation is centralized in this section. As a practical neces-
sity many of the technical bureaus during the war maintained separate trans-
lation sections. With the reduction of personnel and appropriations in other
bureaus, MI6 will more and more be called upon to serve the entire Army. During
the past year this section has translated sixty technical works in seven foreign
languages, all the 'suspect lists' furnished by the French and Italian intelligence
services, 1438 letters in thirty-one different languages, as well as 3562 citations
of American officers and men. In addition, thirty-eight foreign daily papers in
ten different languages from thirteen different countries are read and the im-
portant parts extracted for the other sections of the division or for the Histor-
ical Branch of the War Plans Division. The personnel of this section is compe-
tent to translate nineteen foreign languages ; and, by utilizing the servicesi off'
temporary personnel, seventeen additional languages can be translated. Thirty
nine Government offices habitually make use of the services of this section."
Churchill, op. cit., p. 307.

18 ..rpjjg Code and Cipher Section or 'MI8' was a war-time agency which it is
not practicable to continue in peace. It was secretly maintained after the war
until 1929 and was to become known as the American Black Chamber and will
be discussed later in this narrative. Tlie work of this section concerned an impor-
tant field of endeavor which, before the war with Germany, was almost entirely
unknown to the War Department or to the Government of the United States as a
whole. Early in 1917 it was realized not only that secret means of communication
were essential to the successful prosecution of the war, but also that, in order
to combat the means employed by a skillful and crafty enemy, a War Depart-
ment agency was required in order to make an exhaustive study of this com-
plicated subject and to put to practical use the results of such study. As finally
developed this section comprised five bureaus, as follows :

"The Shorthand Bureau — Organized in response to demands which came
chiefly through cooperation with the postal censorship because of the fact that it
was almost impossible for examiners to discriminate between unusual shorthand
systems and cipher, this bureau was in a few months able to transcribe documents
written in some 300 shorthand systems in seven different languages.

"Secret Ink Bureau — By direct liaison with the French and British intelligence
services, this bureau built up a useful fund of knowledge covering this hitherto
little-known science which is at once so useful and so dangerous. Over fifty impor-
tant secret-ink spy letters were discovered which led to many arrests and pre-
vented much enemy activity. Prior to the lifting of the postal censorship an
average of over 2000 letters per week were tested for secret inks.

"Code Instruction Bureau — This bureau provided the necessary practical in-
struction in codes and cipers given to prospective military attaches, their as-
sistants and clerks, and to officers and clerical personnel designated for duty in
similar work in the American Expeditionary Forces in France and Siberia.

"Code Compilation Bureau — The 1915 War Department code soon fell into the
hands of the enemy, and this bureau was required to compile Military Intelligence
Code No. 5 which succeeded it, as well as two geographical codes specifically
adapted to the sending of combat information from France. A casualty code
designed to save errors and time in connection with the reporting of battle
casualties was commenced in September, 1918. It was not published on account
of the signing of the armistice, but the work on it is complete and available for
future use.

"Communication Bureau — This bureau was the nerve center of a vast com-
munication system covering the habitable globe. By special wire connections and
a twenty-four hour service maintained by skillful and devoted operators excep-

(C5ontinued)

into an Administrative Section and three branches as detailed below : 2°

Military Intelligence Division Administrative Section
(M.L 1)

(a) Kecords. Accounts, and General Section.

(b) Interpreters and intelligence police sections.

The Positive Branch

(a) Infonnation Section (M.I. 2 Prepared the strategic
estimate which attempted to answer the questions, "What is
the situation today?" and "What will it be tomorrow?" by
analyzing the situation in each country under the military,
political, economic, and psychological headings.)

(b) Collection Section (M.I. 5 Administered the military
attache system.)

(d) Code and Cipher Section (M.I. 8).

(Continued)

tionally fast and confidential communication was established with our forces
overseas and all important news centers at home and abroad. Messages from
Paris were received and decoded within twenty minutes after sending ; and the
average time necessary to communicate with Vladivostok and Archangel was
less than twenty-four hours. From September 1918 to May 1919 this bureau sent
and received 25,000 messages containing 1,300,000 words.

"The only remaining agency of MIS is the present telegraph or code room which
functions as a part of the Administrative Section or Mill. To a limited extent it
operates as the Communication Bureau did during the war. [At this time the
American Black Chamber was operating secretly in New York City but Churchill
may not have known about its existence or activities.]"

Churchill, op. cit., pp. 307-309 ; also see Herbert O. Yardley. The American
Black Chamber. London, Faber and Faber, 1931, pp. 15-166.

"The counter-intelligence section, titled the Negative Branch, was formally
organized by Colonel K. C. Masteller in August, 1918. Reduced in size and re-
organized after the war, the Negative Branch consisted of the following three
sections by Churchill's description :

"The Foreign Influence Section (MI4) is the parent Section from which grew
the Negative Branch. As delimited by the diversion of specialties to other Sec-
tions, the duty of this Section in general is the study of espionage and propaganda
directed against the United States or against itvs allies, and also the study of the
sentiments, publications and other actions of foreign language and revolutionary
groups both here and abroad, in so far as these matters have a bearing upon the
military situation. Individuals are not investigated.

"The News Section (MHO) is a combination of a radio interception section and
a press summary section. In addition to the frontier stations, it maintains a
trans-oceanic interception station in Maine which enables the War Department
to follow promptly foreign events. Under the war-time organization of M.I.D.,
MHO performed such censorship functions as were assigned the War Depart-
ment.

"The Fraud Section (MI13) originated in the Quartermaster Corps in the
Spring of 1918, when, at the request of the Quartermaster General, an officer of
Military Intelligence was detailed to organize a force to detect and prevent
fraud and graft in the purchase and handling of Quartermaster stores. On
July 13, 1918, this force was transferred to the Military Intelligence Division
and the scope of its duties enlarged to include the detection of any case of graft
or fraud in or connected with the Army. At the beginning this group constituted
a subsection of MI3, but the work developed to such an extent that on Septem-
ber 24, 1918, it was made a separate section." Churchill, op. cit., pp. 313-314.

'^ From Nelson, op. cit., pp. 264-265.

(e) Shorthand Bureau.

(f ) Secret Ink Bureau.

(g) Code Instruction Bureau,
(h) Code Compilation Bureau,
(i) Communication Bureau.

(j) Combat Intelligence Instruction Section (M.I. 9).
The GeograqyMc Brom^-h {maps and military monograpJis of
all countries) .

(a) May Section (M.I. 7).

(b) Monograph and Handbook Section (M.I. 9).

The Negative Branch (collects and disseminates information
upon which may be based measures of prevention against
activities or influences tending to harm military efficiency
by methods other than armed force) .

(a) Foreign Influence Section (M.I. 4).

(b)Army Section (M.I. 3).

(d) Travel Section (M.I. 11).

(e) Fraud Section (M.I. 13).

At the time of the signing of the Armistice in November, 1918,
M.I.D. consisted of 282 officers, 29 noncommissioned officers, and 948
civilian employees.-^ It is impossible to estimate how many thousands
of volunteer and secretly recruited private agents were assisting this
staff. By August, 1919, M.I.D. had been reduced to 88 officei-s and 143
civilians.-- Its forces would continue to wane during the next two
decades.

Paralleling this structure of M.I.D. was the intelligence section of
the General Staff of the American Expeditionary Forces under Gen-
eral John J. Pershing. Created by General Orders No. 8, of July 5,
1917, the General Staff was directed b}^ General James G. Harbord,
Chief of Staff, who has commented :

The Intelligence Section dealt with a line of work in which
Americans were less experienced than in any other war activ-
ity. America had never admittedly indulged in a secret serv-
ice, in espionage, or in developing the various sources of in-
formation which furnish what comes under the general
designation of Military Intelligence. The Military and Naval
Attaches serving with our legations and embassies abroad,
while alert for information which might be of advantage to
the United States, were without funds for procuring such
matter, and were generally dependent upon military and
naval publications open to anyone who cared to obtain them.
Occasionally they were thrown a few crumbs in some for-
eign capital, under the seal of confidence, and more, perhaps,
in the hope that some third power would be embarrassed,
than by the thought that any real use of them would be made
by the careless and sometimes amusing Americans. Certainly

^ March, op. eif ., p. 226.
^ Nelson, op. cxt., p. 265.

censorship was an unknown activity anywhere under the
American flag.

Intelligence services were highly developed by our Associ-
ates, and by our enemies — especially had Germany before the
World War maintained a network that spread through many
countries. Our Intelligence Section endeavored to embody in
its organization the best that could be borrowed from French
and British sources. It was responsible for information on the
enemy order of battle ; his war trade and economic resources ;
recruiting and man power ; strategical movements and plans.
The examination of prisoners of war, and of enemy docu-
ments, situation maps from all sources, and information of
the theater of war immediately behind the enemy lines, all
were Intelligence. Compiling information from aerial photo-
graphs and reconnaissances; the enemy wireless and
ciphers; signal communication; carrier pigeons; it dissemi-
nated information on these and kindred subjects of military
interest. Counterespionage, regulation of passes for travel;
the preparation of maps of all kinds, surveys, and the person-
nel and activity of the topographical engineers lay within its
jurisdiction. Its duties with regard to censorship were very
comprehensive, touching the censorship of the press, of corre-
spondence by mail, messenger and telegraph, as well as that
of official photographs and moving pictures. The visitor's
bureau, and the intelligence personnel, vehicles, and police,
besides a multiplicity of detail involved in these and kindred
matters, came under it.^^

The man in charge of the A.E.F. intelligence organization was
Major Dennis E. Nolan, born in 1872 at Akron, N.Y., of Irish immi-
grant parents. A West Point graduate, he served in infantry and
cavalry units prior to general staff duty in 1903, seeing service in
Cuba, the Philippines, and Alaska. Arriving in France in June, 1917,
he served as chief of intelligence operations until demobilization. He
was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal in 1918 "for organizing
and administering the A.E.F. intelligence service" and also various
combat decorations. After the war Nolan saw duty at the Army War
College and with the General Staff, becoming a deputy chief of staff in
1924. In 1926-1927 he was chief of the Army representation with the
preparatory commission on reduction and limitation of armaments
meeting at Geneva. He completed his military career as commander of
the Fifth Corps area (1927-1931) and Second Corps area (1931-
1936), retiring in 1936.

Nolan apparently had autonomy of command apart from M.I.D.,
although there seems to have been close cooperation in information ex-
change and dissemination between the two organizations. It is very
likely that Nolan and Churchill were personally acquainted as both
men joined Pershing's staff in France in June, 1917.

According to Harbord, the A.E.F. intelligence unit was organized
into five sections with the following areas of supervisory responsi-
bility specified : ^^

^ James G. Harbord. The American Army in France 1917-1919. Boston, Little,
Brown and Company, 1936, pp. 94-95.
^ From Ibid., pp. 5&1-585.

G-2

(a) Information

1. Enemy's order of battle; enemy organization.

Preparation of diagrams and statements showing dis-
tribution of enemy's forces.
War trade and enemy's economic resources.

2. German recruiting and classes ; man power.

Examination of prisoners and documents.
Information on German armament and equipment.
Translations.

3. Situation maps, except special maps made by G-3. In-
formation of theater of war behind enemy's front.

German lines of defense.

Strategical movements of enemy and plans.

Air reconnaissance and photographs.

4. Preparation and issue of periodical summary. Informa-
tion concerning railroads, bridges, canals and rivers.

Road and bridge maps and area books. Summary of
foreign communiques and wireless press.

5. Collation of information regarding enemy's artillery.

Preparation of daily and weekly summaries of enemy's

artillery activity.
Preparation of periodical diagrams showing enemy's

artillery grouping.

6. Enemy's wireless and ciphers.

Enemy's signal communications.

Policy regarding preparation and issue of ciphers and

trench codes.
Listening sets.

Policy as regards carrier pigeons.
Training of listening set of interpreters.

7. Dissemination of information.

Custody and issue of intelligence publications. Infor-
mation of theater of war (except portion immedi-
ately in rear of enemy's front) .

Intelligence Diary.

(h) Secret Service

1. Secret service in tactical zone and co-ordination with
War Department and with French, English and Belgian
system.

Atrocities and breaches of international law.
Counter-espionage ; direction and policy.
Secret service personnel.

2. Dissemination of information from secret service sources.

Ciphers, selection and change of.
Examining of enemy's ciphers.
Intelligence and secret service accounts.

3. Counter-espionage; index of suspects; invisible inks
and codes.

Dissemination of information from English, French
and Belarian counter-espionage systems.

Control of civil population as affecting espionage and
all correspondence with the missions on the subject.

Censorship as affecting counter-espionage.
Counter-espionage personnel.

Regulations regarding passes in the Zone of the
Armies.

((?) Topography
1. Preparation and issue of maps and charts; all litho-
graph and photography in connection with map repro-
duction.

Survey and topographical work and topographical

instruction of engineer troops.
Topographical organization — Attached from engi-
neers.
Experimental sound and flash ranging section — Liai-
son with engineer troops.

{d) Censorship

1. Press correspondents.

Press censorship.

Examination of U.S., British, French and other for-
eign newspapers.

2. Compilation and revision of censorship regulations.

Issue of censor stamps.

Postal and telegraph censorship.

Breaches of postal and telegraph censorship rules.

Cooperation with Allied censorhips.

Control of censor personnel under A.C. of S. (G-2).

3. Official photographs and moving pictures.

Military attaches.
Press matters.
Visitors.

(e) Intelligence Corps

1. Policy with regard to the establishment of the intelli-
gence corps.

Records, appointments and promotions of intelligence

corps officers.
Intelligence police.
Intelligence corps, motor-cars.
Administration of intelligence corps.

Generally, the organization and structure of A.E.F. intelligence
operations may be characterized as follows: (1) combat intelligence
forces attached to ground troop units and whose primary responsi-
bility was to provide support to the operations of their immediate
command and forward findings to A.E.F. G-2 headquarters;^^ (2)
special support agencies, such as the air corps, signal corps, or artil-
lery intelligence, which provided relevant information to field com-

^ Generally, on combat intelligence dnring World War I. see : Thomas R.
Gowenloek with Gny Mnrchie. Jr. Soldiers of Darkness. New York. Donbleday.
Doran and Company, 1937; Edwin E. Schwien. Combat Intelligence : Its Acquisi-
tion and Transmission. Washington, The Infantry Journal, 1936; and Shipley
Thomas. 8-2 In Action. Harrisburg, The Military Service Publishing Company,
1940.

manders and to A.E.F. G-2 headquarters; and (3) special agencies
directly subordinate to G-2, such as interpreters, cryptographers, and
secret service-counter-intellioen e forces who supplied some relevant
information to other special support agencies and to field commanders
but who also exercised some internal security and crime control pow-
ers resulting in the collection and maintenance of derivative informa-
tion which was autonomously held by intelligence headquarters.^*'
These arrangements seem to have existed until the withdrawal of
troops from Europe and demobilization of the armed forces at the
end of the war.^^

During the world war, the Signal Corps continued to be a major
supplier of intelligence support services, though it had little direct
responsibility for intelligence operations. In April, 1917, just prior to
the United States' declaration of war on Germany, the Signal Corps
consisted of 55 officers and 1,570 enlisted men of the Regular Army
forces.^^ At the time of the Armistice, the strength of the Corps had
risen to 2,712 officers and 53,277 enlistees divided between the A.E.F.
and forces in the United States. Their organization at this peak
strength included 56 field signal battalions (10 Regular Army and 8
domestically stationed), 33 telegraph battalions (5 Regular Army
and 7 domestically stationed), 12 depot battalions (1 domestically
stationed), 6 training battalions (all domestically stationed), and 40
service companies (21 domestically stationed).^® The support pro-
vided by the Corps for intelligence operations, though not exclusively
for these activities in every case, included communications facilities
and services,^" photographic assistance and products,^^ meteorologic
information,^^ and code compilation.^ These duties would remain as
basic intelligence support services provided by the Signal Corps until
surpassed bv more specialized national security entities in the after-
math of World War II.

//. Naval Intelligence

When war broke out on the Continent in August, 1914, the Office of
Naval Intelligence had immediate access to situational information
through the naval attache system begun in 1882. These official observa-
tion stations existed in London, Paris, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Rome,
Vienna, Madrid, and The Hague and gave the Xavy a reason for a
less obtrusive presence amidst the hostilities than the Army's observer
arrangements.

^See Tnd. op. cit., pp. 181-184. 191-195; C. E. Russell. Adventures of the
D.G.I. : Department of Criminal Investigation. New York. Doubleday, Page and
Company, 1925 ; . True Adventures of the Secret Service. New York, Dou-
bleday. Page and Company, 1923.

^For an academic overview of military intelligence organization and opera-
tions during World War I see Walter C. Sweeney. Military IntelUgenee: A New
Weapon In War. New York. Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1924.

'^United States Army. Signal Corps. Report of the Chief Signal Officer to the
Secretary of War: 1919. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1919, p. 23.

^Itid.. p. 543.

* See nid., pp. 133-215, 303-338, 542.

^ See nid.. pp. 341-347.

"^ See nid.. pp. 347-357.

^ See nid., pp. 536-539.

No better work was done in the war than that conducted
and covered by the offices of some of our naval attaches. Their
work primarily of course was to acquire purely naval infor-
mation; secondarily, military, economical and political news
that could be of any benefit to America or her associates in the
war. In some cases, however, a great deal of the work was not
strictly either naval or military, though indirectly of vast
import to both branches. Affiliations were established with in-
fluential men in the Country — men in government positions
or in business — and their sympathy for the Entente and
America encouraged, and in some cases enlisted — for in Spain
and the Northern neutral countries there was a strong tide
of pro-Germanism to fight. In collaboration with the Com-
mittee on Public Information means were taken through the
channels of the newspapers, movies, etc., to influence public
opinion, and give it the Allies' point of view.

Among the most important things which came under the
jurisdiction of our Naval attaches were the investigation of
officers, crews and passengers on ships bound for and com-
ing from America; the senders and receivers of cablegrams,
inspections of cargoes and shipments, and investigations of
firms suspected of trading with the enemy. Under the naval
attaches too, the coasts were closely watched for the detection
of enemy vessels or persons who might be giving aid or infor-
mation to them. In every foreign country to which an Ameri-
can naval attache was accredited they carried on for the
Navy in line with her best traditions.^"*

In the spring of 1915, Congress established (38 Stat. 928 at 929) a
central administrative structure within the Navy with the creation of
the Chief of Naval Operations. Shortly after this office was estab-
lished, the Office of Naval Intelligence was transferred to it and re-
named the Naval Intelligence Division. This heightened organiza-
tional status provided Naval Intelligence with continuous access to the
higher levels of Navy administration and decision-making, extending
all the way to the Secretary, Josephus Daniels.^^ Unlike Military In-
telligence, the naval counterpart seems to have enjoyed some degree of
acceptance with the officer corps and had various leaders, rather than
one champion, from the inception through the war years.

^U..S. Navy Department. Office of Naval Records and Library. U.S. Naval In-
telligence Before and During the War by Captain Edward McCauley, Jr. Undated
typescript, pp. 1-2. This document is currently on file with, and was made avail-
able for this study by, the National Archives and Records Service ; with regard
to the Committee on Public Information, see: George Creel. How We Advertised
America. New York and London, Harper and Brothers, 1920 ; James R. Mock.
Censorship 1911. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1941 ; — — . and Cedric
Larson. Words That Won the War. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1939;
William Franklin Willoughby. Government Organization In War Time and After.
New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1919, pp. 33-39.

^ See, for example, E. David Cronon. ed. The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus
Daniels, 1913-1921. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1963, pp. 117, 209,
211-12, 246, and 293.

DIRECTORS OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

T. B. M. Mason, 1882-85.
Raymond P. Rodgers, 1885-89.
Charles H. Davis, 1889-92.
French E. Chadwick, 1892-93.
Frederic Singer, 1893-96.
Richard Wainwright, 1896-97.
Richardson Clover, 1897-98.
John R. Bartlett, 1898-98.
Richardson Clover, 1898-19C0.
Charles D. Sigsbee, 1900-03.

Seaton Schroeder, 1903-06.
Raymond P. Rodgers, 1906-09.
Charles E. Vreeland, 1909-09.
Templin M. Potts, 1909-12.
Thomas S. Rodgers, 1912-13.
Henry F. Bryan, 1913-14.
James H. Oliver, 1914-17.
Roger Welles, 1917-19.
Albert P. Niblack, 1919-20.

At the time of American entry into the world war, Naval Intelli-
gence consisted of 18 clerks and 8 officers. With the Armistice, the
division counted 306 reservists, 18 clerks, and over 40 naval attaches
and assistant attaches. By July, 1920, this force was reduced to a staff
of 42. During the war years the division was organized into four sec-
tions: administrative, intelligence (or incoming information), com-
piling (or processing), and historical (or "by products").

In by-products, for instance, we include (1) the naval library ;
(2) the dead files, which include war diaries of all ships and
stations and their correspondence during the war; (3) statis-
tics; and (4) international law questions and cases which
arose during the war. The compiling section works over a
good deal of information that comes in to put it in more use-
ful form. A monthly bulletin of confidential information on
naval progress is issued and this section also prepares mono-
graphs of various kinds on various countries and subjects. All
information that is received is routed out to the various Gov-
ernment departments to which it is considered it will be of
use. The State Department and Military Intelligence receive,
of course, practically all that we get of general value. Special
information we send to the various departments of the Gov-
ernment such as the Department of Justice. The attitude of
the office is that it is its duty to collect and furnish informa-
tion but not necessarily to advise or suggest.^®

By this, and other accounts, it would seem that Naval Intelligence
collected, maintained, and supplied raw data, but engaged in little
analysis of this material other than the most rudimentary assessments.
The intelligence product it offered was crude.

The information collection arrangements instituted by Naval In-
telligence reflected both ambition and sophistication.

The home work was divided under fifteen aids for informa-
tion, one of these aids being attached to the Admiral in

^U.S. Navy Department. Division of Operations. The History and Aims of the
Office of Naval Intelliffence by Rear Admiral A. P. Niblack. Washington. U.S.
Govt. Print. Off.. 1920, pp. 23-24. Copies of this study bear the marking "Not for
publication," indicating limited distribution ; the copy utilized in this study was
supplied by the National Archives and Records Service.

command of each Naval District. Each aid had the super-
vision of intelligence work in his district, but he worked, of
course, in conjunction with and under instructions from the
main office in Washington. His duty included information
about all shipping and information necessary for its protec-
tion against possible unfriendly acts of agents or sympa-
thizers of the Central Powers. He had to arrange for the
observation of the coast and to establish information services
for the report of any suspicious vessel or coast activities ; to
discover the location and establishment, actual or proposed,
of bases for submarines, and to detect illegal radio stations,
or the location of enemy goods in storage. Under the Naval
aids came the duty of detecting and combatting espionage or
sabotage, incipient or actual, along the water fronts, in the
navy yards, or in the factories or works connected with the
yards. That included any investigations that were required
in connection with the naval personnel of the district. In
order to prevent damage to ships, guards were placed on every
ship entering the harbors of the United States and remained
on board until the ship cleared. In addition to this, all crews
were inspected in order to see that each member had his
proper identification papers, and suspicious members of a
crew or a passenger list were thoroughly searched, together
with their baggage. All cargoes were inspected and mani-
fests checked in order to thwart any illegal shipments from
the Country, and to prevent bombs and incendiary devices
from being placed on ships. Later this work was taken over
by the Customs Division of the Treasury Department, and
controlled by them, though the Navy continued the work with
them.^^

While the above account provides some indication of the tasks per-
formed by Naval Intelligence during the hostilities, "the specific
orders under which the office operates for war purposes is best given
in the instructions to naval attaches and others in regard to intelli-
gence duty, issued in 1917 :"

( 1 ) The fleets of foreign powers.

(2) The war material of foreign powers.

(3) The nautical personnel of foreign powers, and a gen-
eral record of the strength, organization, and distribution
of all foreign naval forces.

(4) The war resources of foreign powers.

(5) Doctrine of foreign powers. Foreign policies and rela-
tions.

(6) Characteristics of foreign naval officers of command
rank.

(7) Defenses and armaments of foreign ports.

(8) Time required for the mobilization of foreign navies
and the probable form and places of mobilization.

(9) The lines and means of water communication of for-
eign countries and their facilities for transporting troops
overseas.

^ MacCauley, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

(10) The adaptability of forei^ private-owned vessels to
war purposes and the routes followed by regular steamer
lines.

(11) The facilities for obtaining coal, fuel, oil, gasoline,
and supplies, and for having repairs made in all foreign
ports of the world.

(12) Climatic, sanitary, and other peculiarities of foreign
countries which can have a bearing upon naval operations.

(13) The facilities on foreign coasts for landing men and
supplies and means for supporting detached bodies of troops
in the interior.

(14) The canals and interior waterways of the United
States and foreign countries available for the passage of
torpedo boats and other naval craft.

(15) The collating and keeping up to date of data relating
to the inspection and assignment of merchant vessels under
United States registry and of such foreign private-owned
vessels as may be indicated.

(16) Through correspondence with owners, consulting
trade journals, and by any other practical means keeping
track of the status and location of different United States
merchant vessels listed as auxiliaries for war ; of sales to other
lines ; and of changes in trade routes or terminal ports which
may make necessary a change in the yard designated for war
preparation; and to report such changes in the list of ships
to the department for its information, the information of the
General Board, and the Board of Inspection and Survey, in
order that a further inspection of particular ships may be
made, if necessary.^^

Another dimension of Naval Intelligence operations was its secret
service facility.

In the Fall of 1916 a small branch office had been estab-
lished under cover in New York. Thus began what was to
prove one of the largest and most useful phases of the war
work of Naval Intelligence. The New York office was used
as a model for the others which it was later found necessary
to establish in Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, Chicago,
Pittsburgh and San Francisco. These branch offices worked
directly under the control of Washington, covering work
which could not properly be turned over to the aids for in-
formation. Their work was of paramount importance and a
whole job in itself. To them fell the investigation and guard-
ing of plants having Navy contracts. Over five thousand
plants were thus surveyed and protected and hundreds of
aliens and many active energy agents were removed and
thus prevented from fulfilling their missions. In a district
such as Pittsburgh for instance, with its large foreign popu-
lation, that work assumed such proportions that it became
necessary to establish our Pittsburgh office to handle it.^®

It would also appear that some of these special undercover agents
served in overseas duty. One documented example is George F. Zim-

'^ Niblack, op. Git., pp. 14^15.
'* MacCauley, op cit., p. 3.

mer, a Los Angeles attorney who, after secret service in the New
York and Washington districts, toured in the Middle East and on
the European Continent. For some portion of these duties he traveled
on credentials representing him as working for the United States Food
Administration "for the sole purpose of food relief." After the Armis-
tice he went on a photographic mission, concentrating on conditions in
Europe and taking him into portions of Russia.*" It is not immedi-
ately clear as to how many agents of this type Naval Intelligence spon-
sored during and shortly after the war, but their number would
seem to be relatively few. With peace restored in the world, the attaches
once again assumed their stations in the territory of recent enemies,
leducing the necessity for roving special operatives.

///. Bureau of Investigation

Created on his own administrative authority in 1908 by Attorney
General Charles J. Bonaparte in the face of congressional opposition
for reasons of statutory obligations and practical need, the Bureau of
Investigation had virtually no intelligence mission until European
hostilities in the summer of 1914 precipitated a necessity for Federal
detection and pursuance of alleged violations of the neutrality laws,
enemy activities, dislo3'alty cases, the naturalization of enemy aliens,
the enforcement of the conscription, espionage, and sedition laws,
and surveillance of radicals. These duties evolved as the United States
moved from neutrality to a state of declared war and then, in the
aftermath of peace, found its domestic tranquility and security threat-
ened by new ideologies and their practitioners.

The Bureau's principal function during the war years was that of
investigation. During this period, agents had no direct statutory au-
thorization to carrj^ weapons or to make general arrests. In the field,
they worked with and gathered information for the United States
Attorneys. Direction came from the Attorney General or the Bureau
chief. In the frenzy of the wartime spy mania, Washington often lost
its control over field operations so that agents and U.S. Attorneys, as-
sisted by cadres of volunteers from the American Protective League
and other similar patriotic auxiliaries, pursued suspects of disloyalty
on their own initiative and in their own manner. To the extent that
their investigative findings underwent analysis with a view toward
policy development, an intelligence function was served, but for the
most part this type of contribution appears to have been lost in the
emotionalism and zealotry of the moment.

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION LEADERSHIP, 1908-25

Attorneys General Bureau Chiefs

Charles J. Bonaparte (1906-09) Stanley W. Finch (1908-12)

George W. Wickersham (1909-18) A. Bruce Bielaski (1912-19)

James C. McEeynolds (1913-14) William E. Allen (1919)

Thomas W. Gregory (1914-19) William J. Flynn (1919-21)

A. Mitchell Palmer (1919-21) William J. Burns (1921-24)

Harry M. Daugherty (1921-24) J. Edgar Hoover (1924-
Harland F. Stone (192^25)

*" See George F. Zimmer and Burke Boyce. K-1, Spies at War. New York,
D. Appleton-Century Company, 1934.

In 1915, the first full year of the war, the Bureau, in the words of
one sympatlietic chronicler of its development and activities, consisted
of a "small and inept force of 219 agents" which "was totally im-
equipped to deal with the clever espionage and sabotage ring of
World War I which was organized by Gennan Ambassador Johann
von Bernstorff/^ Two years later, when America entered the hostili-
ties, the Bureau's agent force was increased from 300 to 400, "a puny
squad for policing more than 1,000,000 enemy aliens, protecting har-
bors and war-industry zones barred to enemy aliens, aiding draft
boards and the Army in locating draft dodgers and deserters, and
carrying on the regular duties of investigating federal law viola-
tors." *- This state of affairs was one of the reasons the Justice Depart-
ment welcomed the assistance of the American Protective League.

In many of its initial wartime activities, the Bureau was still
searching for a mission.

Early in 1917, the Bureau proclaimed that it was in charge
of spy-catching and the Department's representative called
it "the eyes and ears" of the Government,

However, the Army and Xavy were the armed forces endan-
gered or advanced on the European battlefields by espionage
operations, and their own detectives necessarily had primary
control of stopping the movements of enemy spies and of war
materials and information useful to the enemy, everywhere in
the world, including the homefront. The military authorities
associated with their own agents the operatives of the State
Department, traditionally charged with responsibility for for-
eign affairs.

The military departments seemed primarily to want the
help of the specialized forces of the Treasury, the War Trade
Board, and the Labor Department for cutting off the flow of
enemy spies, goods, and information ; those of the Agriculture
and Interior Departments for safeguarding production of
food and raw materials; and the local police departments
throughout America, as well as the Treasury detectives, for
protecting American war plants, waterfront installations, and
essential war shipping against sabotage and carelessness.

This attitude brought the Treasury police to the forefront.
The Treasury's agents possessed not only vast equipment im-
mediately convertible to wartime espionage in behalf of the
United States, but also the necessary experience. They pos-
sessed the specific techniques that enabled them to find enemy
agents in ship's crews, among passengers, or stowed away; to
pick them up at any port in the world where they might em-
l3ark or drop off the sides of ships ; to foil their mid-ocean sig-
nals to German submarines.

Moreover, the Treasury's men knew how to discover, in the
immense quantities of shipments to our allies and to our neu-
trals, the minute but vital goods addressed to neutral lands,
actually destined to reach the enemy. Treasury operatives had
the right training for uncovering the secret information trans-

"■ Don Whitehead. The FBI Story. New York, Pocket Books, 1958 ; first pub-
Ushed 1956, p. 14.
"7&td., p. 38.

mitted to the enemy in every medium — in ships' manifests and
mail, in passengers' and crews' papers, in phonograph records,
in photographic negatives, and in motion picture fihn. They
had the experience for the job of protecting the loaded vessels
in the harbors, the warehouses, and the entire waterfront.

The Justice Department police were invited to participate
in various advisory boards. But when invited by the Post Of-
fice detectives, old hands at inspection of enemy mail, to sit
on an advisory board, the Justice police spoke with self depre-
cation ; perhaps after all, there was "no use in littering up the
board" with one of their men.*^

What did evolve as a major wartime Bureau function, and one
having intelligence implications in light of espionage (40 Stat. 217)
and sedition (40 Stat. 553) law, was the investigation and cataloging
of the political opinions, beliefs, and affiliations of the citizenry. This
Bureau activity also had a menacing aspect to it in terms of guaranteed
rights of speech and association ; also, it did not come to public notice
until after the Armistice.

The disclosure came as an indirect consequence of a politi-
cal quarrel between ex-Congressman A. Mitchell Palmer (a
Pennsylvania lawyer and corporation director who became
Alien Property Custodian, and was soon to become Attorney
General o,f the United States) and United States Senator
Boies Penrose of Penns3dvania. Mr. Palmer had accused
the Senator of receiving political support from the brewers
and of being a tool for their anti-prohibition propaganda.
The attack was made while the war was still going on, and
Mr. Palmer added the charge that the American brewers
were pro-German and unpatriotic. The "dry" element in the
United States Senate promptly seized on the publicity thus
provided and pushed through a resolution to investigate
both charges, political propaganda and pro-Germanism. In
the course of the hearings dealing with pro-Germanism, the
investigating committee turned to A. Bruce Bielaski, war-
time chief of the Bureau of Investigation, and others con-
nected with the Bureau. They revealed the fact that the
Bureau had already been cataloging all kinds of persons
they suspected of being pro-German, They had found sus-
pects in all walks of American life. Among those of whose
"pro-Germanism" the public thus learned, were members
of the United States Senate, other important officials (e.g.,
William Jennings Bryan, President Wilson's first Secretary
of State, and Judge John F. Hylan, soon to become mayor of
New York City), and many persons and organizations not
connected with the Government (e.g., William Randolph
Hearst, his International News Sendee and various news-
papers, his New York American, and the Chicago Tinbune) ;
Americans agitating for Irish independence (including edi-

*^Max Lowenthal. The Federal Bureau of Investigation. New York, William
Sloane Associates, 1950, pp. 22-23; this highly critical account of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation contains the only detailed discussion of early operations
of the agency.

tors of the American Catholic Weekly and the Freeman's
Journal) ; some of the foremost men in academic life ; politi-
cal leaders such as Roger Sullivan of Chicago; and men of
prominence in the financial and business world.**

During the course of the congressional investigation, the Bureau's
offerings were found to abound with factual inaccuracies and to have
resulted in wrong conclusions even when the facts were correct.*^
The occasion did not instill much public confidence in the Bureau's
intelligence acti\4ties or product.

"Wlien confronted with a series of bombings directed against public
officials during late 1918 and 1919, the Bureau's analytical skills again
appeared to be deficient.

As in the case of the 1918 bombing, the Justice Depart-
ment detectives made a prompt announcement of who the
criminals in the 1919 cases were. The bombing jobs, they
said, were the work of radicals, whose purpose was the assas-
sination of Federal officials and the overthrow o,f the Gov-
ernment. To support this deduction, they pointed out that
some of the bombs arrived at their destination shortly before
the first of May, 1919, and others shortly after that time, and
that May Day is the date traditionally chosen by some radi-
cals to celebrate their doctrines bj' j)arading. However, an-
other series of bombs was sent in June, posing the question
how the detectives could attribute these new bomb attempts
to May Day radicalism.

The theory that the bombs were sent by radicals was
beset with further embarrassments. The Government officials
to whom the bombs were addressed included some men who
were hostile to radicalism, but prominent public men whom
the Bureau of Investigation suspected of being themselves
radicals, and misympathetic with the program against the
radicals were included among the addressees. Indeed, some
of the men were targets of denunciation from Capitol Hill
as dangerous radicals. Critics who disagreed with the detec-
tives' conclusion asked why radicals with bombs should select
as victims the very men who might be their friends. Why,
in particular, should they seek to bomb ex-Senator Hard-
wick of Georgia, who had asked the Senate to vote against
the very wartime sedition law under which the I^^IY [Inter-
national Workers of the World] leaders and other radicals
had been convicted?

A further difficulty arose out of the fact that some of the
bombs were sent to minor businessmen and to relatively
minor local officeholders, while most of the top Government
officials whose death would have been of particular im-
portance to revolutionaries were not included among the
potential victims selected by the bombers.**

**Ihid., pp. 36-37.

*^ See Ihid., pp. 37-43.

*^IUd., pp. 68-69.

Radicalism captured the attention of the Bureau in the aftermath
of the world war. Preoccupation with the ideology, its leadership,
and organizations became so great that, on August 1, 1919, a General
Intelligence Division was established within the Bureau to devote
concentrated scrutiny to the subject.

There was, however, a difficulty with respect to the expendi-
ture of the money appropriated for the Bureau's use by
Congress. It specified that the appropriations were for the
"detection and prosecution of crimes." A provision for the
detection of seditious speech and writings, however, might
some day be passed, and the detectives concluded that prep-
aration would be useful, in the form of an advance job to
ascertain which individuals and organizations held beliefs
that were objectionable. With this information in hand, it
could go into action without delay, after Congress passed a
peacetime sedition law, similar to the wartime sedition laws
enacted in 1917 and 1918. The Bureau notified its agents on
August 12, 1919, eleven days after the creation of the
anti-radical Division, to engage in the broadest detection of
sedition and to secure "evidence which may be of use in
prosecutions . . . under legislation . . . which may here-
after be enacted." ^^

The new intelligence unit thus appears to have been created and
financed in anticipation of a valid statutory purpose and seems, as
well, to have engaged in investigations wherein the derivative infor-
mation was not gathered in pursuit of Federal prosecution (s).

Coincident with the creation of the new Division, the Bureau
selected J. Edgar Hoover as Division chief. He had joined
the Department of Justice two years earlier, shortly after
America entered the war, and shortly before Congress en-
acted the wartime sedition law. He had been on duty at the
Justice Department during the entire war period, and ob-
viously he was in a position to obtain a view of the detective
activities against persons prosecuted or under surveillance
for their statements. He had also been in a position to note
the pre-eminence of the military detective services during the
war and the connotations of success attached to their names —
Military and Naval Intelligence Services. Besides, the new
unit at the Department of Justice was in the business of de-
tecting ideas. He called it an intelligence force, in substitu-
tion for the names with which it started — "Radical Division"
and "Anti-Radical Division." Mr. Hoover avoided one action
of the War and Navy Intelligence agencies; their scope had
been narrowed by the qualifying prefixes in their titles. He
named his force the General Intelligence Division — GID.*^

In 1920, when "one-third of the detective staff at Bureau head-
quarters in Washington had been assigned to anti-radical matters, and
over one-half of the Bureau's field work had been diverted to the
subject of radicalism, GID reported that "the work of the General

"Ibid., p. 84.
"^Ibid., pp. 84-85.

Intelligence Division . . . has now expanded to cover more general
intelligence work, including not only ultra-radical activities but also
to [sic] the study of matters of an international nature, as well a?
economic and industrial disturbances incident thereto."' *^ And as its
mission developed, so too did the GID's manner of operation and
techniques of inquiry.

The Bureau of Investigation faced and solved one problem
in the first ten days of the existence of Mr. Hoover's division,
the problem of the kind of data the detectives should send
to headquarters. They were going to receive material from
undercover informers, from neighbors, from personal enemies
of the pei-sons under iuA'estigation. The detectives were going
to hear gossip about what people were said to have said or
were suspected of having done — information derived, in some
instances, from some unknown person who had told the Bu-
reau's agents or informers or the latter's informants. Some of
the information received might relate to people's personal
habits and life.

The Bureau's decision was that everything received by the
special agents and informers should be reported to head-
quarters ; the agents were specifically directed to send what-
ever reached them, "of every nature." But they were warned
that not everything that they gathered could be used in trials
where men were accused of radicalism. Some items about per-
sonal lives, however interesting to the detectives, might not
be regarded as relevant in court proceedings against alleged
radicals. Furthermore, despite the fact that the Bureau in-
structed its agents to transmit to headquarters everything
that they picked up, "whether hearsay or otherwise," it
warned them that there was a difference between the sources
from which the GID was willing to receive accusations and
statements for its permanent dossiers and the evidence which
trial judges and tribunals would accept as reliable proof. In
judicial proceedings, the Bureau of Investigation informed
all its agents, there was an insistence on what it called "tech-
nical proof," and judges would rule that the rumors and gos-
sip which the detectives were instructed to supply to GID
had "no value." ^°

In order to assess the program and thinking of the radicals, it was
necessary to study the literature and writings of the ideologues. Gath-
ering such printed material became a major GID project and acquis-
itions were made on a mass basis.

Detectives were sent to local radical publishing houses and
to take their books. In addition, they were to find every pri-
vate collection or library in the possession of any radical, and
to make the arrangements for obtaining them in their en-
tirety. Thus, when the GID discovered an obscure Italian-
born philosopher who had a unique collection of books on the
theory of anarchism, his lodgings were raided by the Bureau

lUd., p. 85.
' lUd., pp. 86-87.

100

and his valuable collection became one more involuntary con-
tribution to the huge and ever-growing library of the GID.

Similar contributions came from others, among them the
anarchist philosophers who had retired to farms or elsewhere.
A number of them had, over the years, built up private li-
braries in pursuit of their studies ; these are discovered by the
General Intelligence Division, and it was soon able to report
that "three of the most complete libraries on anarchy were
seized." The Bureau took over the contents of a school library
which it discovered in a rural community of radicals. It also
obtained the library of a boys' club, and assured Congress
that the library was "in possession of this department. . . ."
Catalogs of these acquisitions were prepared, including a
"catalog of the greatest library in the country which contains
anarchistic books."

In the search for literature, the Bureau sent many of its
men to join radical organizations, to attend radical meetings,
and to bring back whatever they could lay their hands on.
The book-seekers, and the raiding detectives tipped off by
them, were directed to find the places where specially valu-
able books, pamphlets, and documents might be guarded
against possible burglaiy ; they were to ransack desks, to tap
ceilings and walls ; carpets and mattresses had to be ripped
up, and safes opened; everything "hanging on the walls
should be gathered up" — so the official instructions to the
detectives read.^^

In an attempt to improve upon the wartime surveillance records of
the Bureau, and to enhance the GID information store. Hoover cre-
ated a card file system containing "a census of every person and group
believed by his detectives to hold dangerous ideas."

The index also had separate cards for "publications," and
for "special conditions" — a phrase the meaning of which has
never been made clear. In addition, Mr. Hoover's index sepa-
rately assembled all radical matters pertaining to each city
in which there were radicals. Each card recorded full details
about its subject — material regarded by the detectives as re-
vealing each man's seditious ideas, and data needed to enable
the Government's espionage service to find him quickly when
he was wanted for shadowing or for arrest. The Intelligence
Division reported that its task was complicated by reason of
"the fact that one of the main characteristics of the radicals
in the United States is found in their migratory nature."

The GID assured Congress that Mr. Hoover had a group of
experts "especially trained for the purpose." This training
program was directed to making them "well informed upon
the general movements in the territory over which they have
supervision;" they were also trained to manage and develop
the intricate index ; and they had to keep up with its fabu-
lous growth. The first disclosure by the GID showed 100,000
radicals on the index ; the next, a few months later, 200,000 ;

^ lUd., pp. 87-88.

101

the third, a year later, 450,000. Within the first two and one-
half years of indexing, the General Intelligence Division had
approximately half a million persons cataloged, inventoried,
and secretly recorded in Government records as dangerous
men and women.

A considerably older unit of the Department of Justice,
its Bureau of Criminal Identification, had long maintained
an index of actual criminals. In 1923, after several years of
trying, the Bureau of Investigation took over the older bureau
and the 750,000-name index it had developed in the course of
a quarter of a century. Whether the two indices were merged
or kept separate has not been announced. Hence, when Mr.
Hoover stated in 1926 that his Bureau's index contained
1,500,000 names, it is not clear whether this was the total for
both indices or for one only.^^

Also, in addition to indexing radicals, GID prepared biographical
profiles of certain of them deemed to be of special importance.

The writing up of lives and careers proceeded rapidly, so
that within three and one-half months of the GID's existence
its biographical writers had written "a more or less complete
history of over 60,000 radically inclined individuals," accord-
ing to the official information supplied the Senate. Included
were biographies of persons "showing any connection with an
ultra- radical body or movement," in particular "authors, pub-
lishers, editors, etc."

Eigorous secrecy has been imposed on the list of names of
newspapermen, authors, printers, editors, and publishers who
were made the subjects of GID's biographical section. How
many additional biographies have been written since the mid-
dle of November 1919, who were the GID's first or later biog-
raphers, how they were trained so promptly, and how they
managed to write 60,000 biographies in 100 days — these ques-
tions have never been answered.^^

Besides all of this activity, the General Intelligence Division pre-
pared and circulated a special weekly intelligence report.

For this purpose, the Division first "engaged in the collec-
tion, examination, and assimilation of all information re-
ceived from the field force or from other sources." On the ba-
sis of such preparation, it drafted a report, every week, on the
state of radicalism in America that week. Only top echelon
people in the Government of the United States were allowed
to see these secret reports : their names could not be disclosed,
nor could the GID describe them to Congress any more
revealingly than to say that they were "such officials as by the
nature of their duties are entitled to the information." Every
copy that left the closely guarded Washington headquarters
of GID left only "under i^roper protection." Congress was in-
formed that the weekly GID bulletin covered three classes of

'Tbid., pp. 90-91.
* Ibid., p. 91.

102

facts : First, "the entire field of national and international op-
erations;" second, "the latest authoritative statements or def-
initions of tactics, programs, principles or platforms of
organizations or movements;" and third, "a bird's eye view
of all situations at home or abroad which will keep the officials
properly informed." ^*

Such were the Bureau of Investigation's efforts at intelligence oper-
ations and the generation of an intelligence product during World
War I and the years immediately following. As a consequence of both
presidential and public displeasure with Attorney General Harry M.
Daugherty, new leadership came to the Justice Department in 1924 ;
Harlan F. Stone became Attorney General and J. Edgar Hoover as-
sumed the leadership of the Bureau of Investigation. Official concern
with radicals diminished when a more conscientious effort at respon-
sible law enforcement Avas made by Stone in his attempt to instill
public confidence in the agency which Daugherty had sullied and
which had to deal with the bold advances of organized crime and the
gangsterism brought on by National Prohibition.

IV. American Protective League

The understaffed nature of the Federal intelligence institutions and
mounting fears of internal subversion, disloyalty, and espionage con-
spiracies among the American public during the world war prompted
an extraordinary development in intelligence practices : the cultivation
of a private organization to provide supplementary assistance to gov-
ernment agencies having responsibilities for the detection surveil-
lance, and capture of individuals thought to be a threat to the nation's
security. Just before the eru])tion of hostilities in Europe, the Bureau
of Investigation had fostered an informer network in efforts to combat
white slave traffic.

In 1912, Bureau Chief A. Bruce Bielaski directed his
agents to ask waiters, socialites, and members of various
organizations to eavesdrop on private conversations and to
forward tips to Bureau offices if their suspicions were aroused.
Many prosecutions had resulted from these tips. From using
volunteers against organized vice to using them against con-
spiracy to commit espionage and sabotage was an easy
transition.^^

What made the espionage-sabotage detection arrangement unique
was its private organization character : it functioned as an institution
in parallel to the Federal intelligence agencies. Called the American
Protective League, the group was a ])roduct of the efforts of Chicago
advertising executive Albert M. Briggs and two other wealthy busi-
nessmen, Victor Elting and Charles D. Frey.^*' In late 1916, BrigffS
became concerned about the inadequate strength and equipment of the
Bureau of Investigation and subsequently urged Bureau Chief Bie-
laski and Attorney General Thomas W. Gregory to establish an auxil-

^ Ibid., p. 92.
^ Jensen, op. cit., p. 19.

^ For the authorized, but unreliable, history of the League see Emerson Hough.
The Web. Chicago, The Reilly and Lee Company, 1919.

103

iary force to assist in pursiiino; security risks. As presented to the
Justice Department, Briggs' proposal gave the following details.

Its Purpose : A volunteer organization to aid the Bureau
of Investigation of the Department of Justice.

The Object : To work with and under the direction of the
Chief of the Bureau of Investigation, of the Department of
Justice, or such attorney or persons as he may direct, render-
ing such service as may be required from time to time.

Membership : This organization is to be composed of citi-
zens of good moral character who shall volunteer their service
and who may be acceptable to your Department.

Construction : It is proposed that national headquarters
be established either in Washington, or perhaps, Chicago, be-
cause of its geograj^hical location, and that branch organiza-
tions be established in such cities as your Department may
direct.

Finances: It is proposed that headquarters organization
and branch organizations shall finance themselves either by
outside subscriptions or by its members.

Control : It is proposed that each unit of this organization
shall be under the control of the Government but will report
to and be under the direction of the nearest Department of
Justice headquarters.^^

Approval of the idea was given on March 20, 1917, and cities with
high alien populations were targeted as organization centers for the
A.P.L. "Notices went out the same da^^ to Bureau agents across the
country announcing that Briggs was forming 'a volunteer committee
or organization of citizens for the purpose of co-operating with the
department in securing information of activities of agents of foreign
governments or persons unfriendly to this Government, for the pro-
tection of public property, etc' " ^^ The group would supply informa-
tion upon request and at its own volition, was to operate in a con-
fidential manner, and could exercise no arrest power "except after
consultation with the Federal authorities," according to Bielaski's
notices.

APL organizing activities proceeded with great speed and
amazing secrecy, in view of the method of recruiting and the
numbers of individuals involved, during the first war months.
Not until September, 1917, did miniscule newspaper notices
acknowledge publicly the existence of the league; Justice
Department requests to publishers for cooperation in retain-
ing APL anonymity achieved results. In midsummer, 1917,
the league numbered 90,000 membei-s organized in 600 locals.
By war's end 350,000 APL agents staffed 1,400 local units
across the coimtry. By January, 1918, every Federal attorney
had an APL local at his disposal. From a free taxi service in
Chicago, the APL developed swiftly into a nationwide
apparatus.^^

" Jensen, op. cit., pp. 22-23.
^Ihld., pp. 24-25.

^^ Harold M. Hyman. To Try Men's Souls: Loyalty Tests in American History.
Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1959, p. 273.

104

With the national office in Washington, League locals received
instructions through State directors, who also functioned as internal
inspectors general for the organizations, and directly from head-
quarters.^" Out of the capital command post flowed circular instruc-
tions to locals, manuals of operation, assignments to investigations,
and the League's weekly journal, the Spy Glass. Funding appears to
have been entirely private, deriving from contributions and member-
ship fees.

At the local level, organization followed a military pattern with
ranks, badges, and sworn oaths of loyalty. Large factories and
businesses with many League members in their employ became self-
contained divisions with a pyramid-structured leadership.^^ But, while
the A.P.L. was a mass membership group, recruitment was selective
and class conscious.

With great acuity the league directors searched among the
upper social, economic, and political crust of each community
for local chiefs and members. Bankers, businessmen, mayors,
police chiefs, postmasters, ministers, attorneys, newspaper
editors, officers of religious, charitable, fraternal, and
patriotic societies, factoryowners and foremen, YMCA
workers and chamber of commerce leaders, insurance com-
pany executives, and teachers were favored sources of league
personnel. Such men possessed means and leisure to devote to
APL work, and opened their professional, business, and
official records for APL use. Many were also members of
draft boards, war-bond sale committees, food- and ^u el-
rationing units, and state defense councils, aifording tho,
league illicit access to information denied even to commis-
sioned government investigators.*'^

The intelligence mission which most often inspired Leaguers to
probe privileged files and otherwise private depositories of personal
information was its responsibility as primary loyalty investigator for
the civil and military services.

When the war started no adequate mechanism existed for
security clearances. The APL, with Gregory's permission,
assumed this task. APL instruction manuals and special issues
of the Spy Glass offered neophyte APL investigators advice
on how to make character investigations. One such article
suggested that the final success or failure of American arms
would depend upon the quality of officer leadership. Every
applicant for a military commission, every civil servant with
more than clerical responsibilities, all welfare group officials
who were to do overseas work, rated loyalty investigations.
The APL newspaper warned leaguers that a loyalty inquiry
irnplied no guilt, and that unjustified innuendos of disloyalty
might ruin a career and a life. A confidential APL manual
warned that "no two oases are exactly alike for the reason
that no two men are exactly alike." The pamphlet advised
all APL loyalty testers to examine a substantial cross section
of the subject's ancestors in enemy countries, his social, po-

^ See Jensen, op. cit., pp. 130-134.
*' See Ibid., pp. 25-26.
*^ Hyman, op. cit., p. 275.

105

litical, and church affiliations, his attitude toward the Lusi-
tania sinking and the rape of Belgium, what he had said
about war bonds, draft dodgers, and the Espionage Act. Had
he purchased enough bonds, dug victory gardens, and ap-
peared at patriotic rallies ? Did neighbors recall untoward
statements he might have made, did he own stock in enemy-
held corporations, was his labor union respectable ? But cau-
tion was the watchword in loyalty-hunting, and the manual
pleaded for objectivity and fullness in re^^orting. Officials
would normally put full credence in the decision of the
loyalty investigator; APL reports received almost complete
acceptance in Washington. Thus the APL agents became
the judge, the jury, and sometimes the executioner in the lives
of many who knew nothing of its existence.^^

The League became active in other Federal policy areas apart from
loyalty investigation, including capturing suspicious immigrants,®*
enforcing liquor and vice control around military cantonments,®^
investigating the background of certain passport applicants,®® and
probing the qualifications of persons applying for American
citizenship.®^

Aside from the Bureau of Investigation, the League's other great
champion and supporter was Colonel Ralph Van Deman and the Mili-
tary Intelligence Division of tHe War Department. Van Deman had
sought League assistance shortly after it was established.®^ Later,
M.I.D. crushed efforts to create a competitor to the A.P.L. and directed
that field personnel use only League assistance in civilian investiga-
tions.®^ In the matter of policing war material production plants under
strike, the League and Military Intelligence worked closely to control
labor unrest.'®

Eventually, both Justice and War would sour on the zealous antics
of the A.P.L., trampling personnel sanctities, privacy, and civil lib-
erties. Badges, which bore the legend "Secret Service" for a time,
were flaunted as official authority to do about anything the bearers
wanted to do; Treasury Secretary ]\rc ^ doo T^rotested that they gave
the public the impression that their holders were agents from his De-
partment, a viewpoint wliich T ea^ruers did little to discourage."^
A.P.L. raiders made arrests without proper authorization and many
carried firearms on their missions. In an e^ort to assist the Justice
Department, some League locals even tapped and tampered with tele-
graph and telephone lines."^

Even when APL'ers contented themselves with investiga-
tions, the result was wholesale abuse of civil liberties and in-
vasions of privacy. An investigation typically began with a
request forwarded from APL headquarters in Wnshington
to the city chief, who assigned the case to one of his opera-

'lUd., pp. 276-277.

"^IMd., pp. 276-277.

°^ Jensen, op. cit., p. 127.

^Ihid., p. 135 ; Hyman, op. cit., pp. 276, 180-185.

" Jensen, op. cit., pp. 178-179.

'"Ihid., p. 243.

** lUd., p. 86.

*" Ibid., p. 122.

''"Ibid., pp. 276, 27^-280, 286.

'^ Ibid., pp. 48-49.

" Ibid., pp. 149-150.

106

tives. Once the operative received this request, he had numer-
ous investigative weapons from which to choose. Member-
ship in the APL provided each operative with an entree to
the records of banks and other financial institutions; of real
estate transactions, medical records, and, inevitably,^ legal
records. Any material ordinarily considered confidential by
private firms or corporations could be made available to
operatives. Even institutions customarily regarded as reposi-
tories of confidence and trust compromised their standards.
Bishop Theodore Henderson helped to spread the APL
throughout the Methodist Church, with the result that Meth-
odist ministers could often be approached for information
about members of their congregations. Liaison was also estab-
lished with Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant churches. The
Maryland Casualty Company of Baltimore asked its agents
throughout the country to join the League so that insurance
information was readily available. Private detective agencies
would check old records and disclose their contents. Anti-
labor and nativistic groups opened their secret files to the
APL."

Official interest in the services of the A.P.L. waned with the arrival
of Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer in the spring of 1919. The
death knell sounded with the arrival of the Republicans two years
later. Still the old ties were not easily broken.

As late as 1924 Military Intelligence officers were being in-
structed to maintain friendly relations with former APL
members as well as other counterradical groups who might
be called upon in time of trouble. Counterespionage investi-
gations had been discontinued, but questionnaires were being
sent out to collect information on domestic affairs. A few men
in the Military Intelligence realized that the MID's roving
activities among the civilian population had given them an
"evil reputation" that they must live down by scrupulously
avoiding civilian investigations in the future. One book on
Military Intelligence, published in 1924, alarmed some offi-
cers because it told how the secret service of the general staff
had operated far beyond military limits. But 1924 marked the
end of anti-radical activity for both the War Department
and the Justice Department.'^^

No agency of the Federal government would ever again attempt
to cultivate so ambitious and visible an intelligence auxiliary as the
American Protective League.^^

"^ Ibid., p. 148.

''^ Ibid., p. 288.

'^Nevertheless, there are private intelligence organizations in existence today
which, as part of an anti-communist program, maintain vast flies on the political
activities of their fellow Americans : prominent among these groups are the
American Security Council and the Church League of America. See: Harold
C. Relyea. Hawks Nest: The American Security Council. The Nation, v. 214,
January 24, 1972 : 113-117 ; George Thayer. The Farther Shores of Polities. New
York, Simon and Schuster, 1967, pp. 256-262 ; Wallace Turner. Anti-Communist
Council Prepares A Voting 'Index' on Congress. New York Times, August 17,
1970 ; William W. Turner. Power On The Right. Berkeley, Ramparts Press, 1971,
pp. 134-140, 199-215.

107

V. Other Factors

In addition to the War, Navy, and Justice Department intelligence
organizations, there were also various Federal investigative agencies
which, during and immediately after the war, engaged in activities
bearing upon the intelligence function but not clearly resulting in an
intelligence product.

By authority of its organic act (22 Stat. 403) of 1883, the Civil
Service Commission was empowered, indeed, required, to make investi-
gations in the enforcement of its rules. Trained personnel, however,
were not immediately available for this task.

Without a staff of investigators, the Civil Service Com-
mission couldn't make any personal investigations to deter-
mine the character or fitness of the job applicants. The
Commissioners had to rely on questionnaires filled out by the
job-hunters and vouchers certifying they were of "good moral
character."

In 1913, however, Congress for the first time allowed [38
Stat. 465] the Commission to hire investigators. To get
trained men, the Commission tapped the Postal Inspection
Service for four investigators who concentrated mainly on
charges of misconduct.

In 1917, President Wilson made the first stab at the type
of investigation that occupies most of the time of the Civil
Service Commission's sleuths today. He issued an order re-
quiring the commission to investigate the experience, fitness,
character, success and adaptability of applicants for the job
of postmaster where the incumbent was not to be reappointed.
For the first time, the investigators were to look behind the
answers on questionnaires and make personal investigations
into the background of the job-seekers.^''

It was also in 1917 that the Chief Executive, by confidential direc-
ti v^e, instructed the Commission to

. . . remove any employee when . . . the retention of such
employee would be inimical to the public welfare by reasons
of his conduct, sympathies, or utterances, or because of other
reasons growing out of the war. Such removal may be made
without other formality than that the reasons shall be made a
matter of confidential record, subject, however, to inspection
by the Civil Service Commission.

Commenting on the Commission's operationalization of this author-
ity, one expert in this policy area has said :

The Civil Service Commission assumed the power to refuse all
applications for employment "if there was a reasonable belief
that . . . [this] appointment was inimical to the public interest
owing to . . . lack of loyalty." Its agents conducted 135 loyalty
investigations in 1917, and 2,537 more in 1918. In the latter
year 660 applicants were debarred from federal employment
for questionable loyalty, a tiny percentage of the total of fed-
eral workers. But there were many agencies not under com-

" Miriam Ottenberg. The Federal Investigators. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-
Hall, 1962, pp. 232-233.

70-890 O - 76 - 8

108

mission control, and thousands of loyalty investigations were
conducted by other internal security agencies. Despairing of
slow civil service recuiting practices, federal departments em-
ployed tens of thousands of workers outside civil service pro-
cedures, with the result that the established loyalty regula-
tions were only partially effective in their coverage/^

This type of investigation virtually ceased with the end of the war.
The Commission did, however, continue its inquiries into the fitness
and character of certain new applicants, such as those seeking postmas-
ter positions, and loyalty-security checks would not enter consideration
again until warfare once more engulfed Europe.^^

The new kind of investigative work prompted the Commis-
sion to establish a separate Division of Investigation and Re-
view in 1920. The following year, the President ordered the
Civil Service Commission to investigate postmasters for reap-
pointment as well as for their original appointment.

Law enforcement officers were the next to come under the
personal scrutiny of the Civil Service Conunission's investi-
gators. When Congress, in 1927, brought all positions in the
Bureau of Prohibition into the classified civil service, the
Conunission decided the prohibition enforcers should be in-
vestigated because of the special temptations that came their
way. To carry out this chore, the Commission hastily recruited
and trained 40 investigators.

In two years, the investigators completed more than 3,000
investigations into the background of Bureau of Prohibition
employees. The results were startling. About 40 per cent of
those investigated — including many already working for the
Bureau of Prohibition — had records which showed them unfit
for Federal service.

The Commission, with the blessing of Congress, decided it
had better take a look into the background of other law en-
forcement officers. It doubled its investigative staff and started
making personal investigations of customs inspectors and bor-
der patrolmen.

By 1939, the Commission's investigative program required
investigations of the character and fitness of job applicants
wdierever practicable. Since its sights were set higher than its
funds, however, it could only use its authority to check on the
background of those going into key positions.

Up to this time, the question of loyalty to the Government
had been recognized as something to consider, but it hadn't
played a major part in investigations. Congress and the Com-
mission had been more concerned with cleaning up political
favoritism in Federal Jobs and rooting out criminal elements
and ofrafters."^

'^ Hyman, op cit., p. 269; the portion of the Presidenfs confidential directive
quoted above appears in Ihid., pp. 268-269.

™ The most ambitious loyalty-security program was established after World
War II ; see Eleanor Bontecou. The Federal Loyalty-Security Program. Ithaca,
Cornell Univesrity Press, 1953.

™ Ottenberg, op. cit., pp. 233-234.

109

On the eve of World War II, the Civil Service Commission had
both the techniques and available loyalty-security files to again screen
Federal employees. The files could have been scrutinized by other gov-
ernment agencies in pursuit of an intelligence objective or utilized by
the Commission itself to contribute to an intelligence product. It
would seem quite apparent, in any regard, that the Commission's in-
vestigative files had a potential for intelligence matters.

The Post Office Department, temporarily established in 1789 (1
Stat. 70) and given Cabinet status in 1872 (17 Stat. 283), also devel-
oped the potential for providing an intelligence product with regard
to both criminal detection and internal security matters. Investiga-
tions on behalf of this agency trace their origins to the pre-Federal era
when Benjamin Franklin, appointed Postmaster General by the Con-
tinental Congress, created the position of "surveyor of the Post Of-
fice," the predecessor to modern postal inspectors. T\Tien Congress
created (21 Stat. 177) the Chief Post Office Inspector position in
1880, a force of ninety men were ready for investigative duties within
the department.^" Prior to World War I, the inspectors cooperated
with the Treasury and Justice Departments in preventing frauds
against the government, robberies of mail, and other crimes within
the Federal purview and postal service jurisdiction. During the war,
inspectors assisted the military and naval authorities and the Justice
Department in monitoring foreign mail traffic and identifying espio-
nage networks. To the extent that an information store was main-
tained on these criminal and security matters, such materials would
seem to have a potential for contributing to an intelligence product.
As in the case of the Civil Service Commission, these holdings could
have been examined by other government agencies in pursuit of an
intelligence objective or utilized by the Post Office Department itself
for such purpose.

From the earliest days of the Republic, special care had been taken
to protect American diplomatic communications through the use of
codes and ciphers, the creation of secure facilities, and qualification
tests for all persons entrusted with such communiques.

It took the twentieth century, however, with its interna-
tional stresses, its hot and cold wars, to propel the State De-
partment into establishing a security force. In 1916. Secre-
tary of State Robert Lansing created a Bureau of Secret
Intelligence headed by a Chief Special Agent. It was such a
hush-hush outfit that the Chief Special Agent drew his oper-
ating funds from a confidential account and even paid his
agents by personal check.

The Chief Special Agent's job was to advise the Secretary
of State on matters of intelligence and security. By 1921, his
staff amounted to 25 men.

One of the first problems of these special agents involved
passports and visas. Beginning in 1914, European nations
began demanding proof of identity. The XTnited States had
previously issued passports on request but most people didn't

*• See IMd., 310-313 ; of related interest, see : E. J. Kahn. Jr. Fraud. New York.
Harper and Row, 1973 ; P. H. Woodward. The Secret Service of the Post Office
Department. Hartford, Connecticut, Winter and Company, 1886.

bother to get them. With the outbreak of World War I,
United States missions abroad were authorized to issue
emergency passports but by the end of 1918, Congress passed
a law [40 Stat. 559] requiring every departing American to
have a passport from the State Department and every alien
to show a passport from his homeland and a visa from one
of our consular offices before he could enter this country.

The Chief Special Agent's force started sorting out Ameri-
can Communists seeking passports for trips to Moscow and
So^aet agents using fraudulent passports. Through the 1920's
and 1930's, the State Department investigators uncovered
passport frauds world-wide in scope and involving chains
of subversive agents on four continents. The investigators
pinned down the Soviet use of American passports taken
from American volunteers in the Spanish civil war, exposed
several elaborate passport frauds to supply traveling Com-
munists and thwarted at least two N^azi espionage plots cen-
tering on the use of American passports.

With the outbreak of World War II, the Chief Special
Agent's office was expanded to cope with the problem of in-
terning and exchanging diplomatic officials of enemy powers
and screening Americans — or those claiming American citi-
zenship — after they were expatriated from enemy controlled
areas.^^

Granted authority (12 Stat. 713 at 726) in 1863 to appoint not more
than three revenue agents, the Treasuiy Department, by the time of
American entry into World War I, had a variety of investigative
arms, each with a potential for contributing to the intelligence effort.
In addition to the Customs Division, the Secret Service gathered in-
formation pursuant to its mission of protecting the President, con-
ducted security investigations of government and war production
facilities, made loyalty checks on the employees of some agencies,
cooperated with the Food Administration and War Trade Board in
uncovering violations of the Food and Fuel Control Act (40 Stat.
276), and uncovered fraudulent activities in connection with war
risk insurance. Often during the war years the Secret Service and
Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation duplicated each other's
efforts and quarreled over jurisdictions.^^ Treasury Secretary McAdoo
also vigorously protested the use of the "Secret Service" referent on
American Protective League badges and documents, arguing that
the Attorney General should halt this practice by his auxiliary allies.
In his disputes with Justice over these various matters, Secretary
McAdoo had proposed the creation of a central intelligence agency to
coordinate the various intelligence activities and operations occurring
durinj? the war.^^

Additional wartime taxes and controls on the production of dis-
tilled spirits and intoxicating liquors also added to the Treasury De-
partment's surveillance duties.

^Ottenberg, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

^ See Jensen, op. cit., pp. 40-41, 91-93, 95-97.

^ See ihid., pp. 40-41, 54, 95-96.

Ill

Internal Revenue's Intelligence Division started out more
as a weapon against corruption within the service than crime
without. Early in 1919, Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Daniel C. Roper, who later became Secretary of Commerce,
began to hear sordid complaints that some of his tax-collect-
ing employees were taking bribes or extorting money from
taxpayers. Mr. Roper had previously served as First Assist-
ant Postmaster General and knew the work of the postal
inspectors in ferreting out dishonest employees as well as
mail fraud. He wanted a similar unit in Internal Revenue,
and he wanted to man it with postal inspectors.

On July 1, 1919, six postal inspectors were transferred to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Their assignment: to in-
vestigate serious violations of revenue laws through collusion,
conspiracy, extortion, bribary or any other manipulation
aimed at defrauding the government of taxes.^*

During the war the Justice Department bore the responsibility of
controlling aliens and alien property. The Bureau of Immigration
and Naturalization (then located in the Department of Labor) appar-
ently had no investigators, as such, of its own and seems to have uti-
lized agents from the Justice Department's Bureau of luA^estigation
to monitor espionage suspects entering the United States as aliens.
The Secret Service also was active in alien surveillance.

Within the Justice Department there was established, under the au-
thority of the Trading With the Enemy Act (40 Stat. 415) , an Office
of Alien Property Custodian which was to receive, administer, and
account for money and property within the United States belonging
to a declared enemy or ally of such enemy.^^ A. Mitchell Palmer held
the Custodian's position until he became Attorney General in 1919 and
Francis P. Garvan took over the duties of the office. The unit had its
own investigation bureau, created shortly after the agency was estab-
lished, which lasted until 1921. As noted with other investigatiA'e
bodies, the Office of Alien Property Custodian had a potential for con-
tributing to an intelligence product, but it is not known to what
extent, if any, such actually occurred.

There is also evidence of some type of intelligence activity on the
part of the Federal government with regard to foreign trade. After
the United States formally entered the war, the President, in August,
1917, created the Exports Administrative Board, which replaced the
Exports Licenses Division of the Commerce Department, to adminis-
ter and execute the laws relating to the licensing of exports. The
Board had a War Trade Intelligence Section which apparently did
some investigative work. In October, 1917, the War Trade Board was
created (E.O. 2729- A), succeeding the Exports Administrative Board.
Three days after this entity came into being, a AYar Trade Intelligence
Bureau was established to replace the War Trade Intelligence Section
of the E.A.B. The duties of the Bureau were to determine the enemy
or non-enemy status or affiliations of persons trading with any indiv-
idual or firm' in the United States, to supply the Enemy Trade Bureau

Ottenberg, op. cit., p. 252.
■ See Willoughby, op. cit. pp. 319-327.

112

with information concerning applicants for licenses to trade with the
enemy, and to act as a clearinghouse for war trade intelligence for the
United States and its allies.^*' Once again, the intelligence potential
for such an investigative body is recognized, but its actual contribu-
tion to an intelligence product cannot be determined. In May of 1919
the Intelligence Bureau was absorbed by the Enemy Trade Bureau
and a month later the entire War Trade Board was transferred to the
State Department.

VI. Red Scare

In the closing weeks of World War I, fears of revolutionaries,
anarchitsts, Bolsheviks, radicals and communists began to mount in
America. A series of bombings aimed at public officials, labor unrest,
remnants of wartime hysteria and xenophobia, and zealous govern-
ment investigators eager to prove their worth in ferreting out the
despoilers of democracy contributed to the frenzy.^^ Reflective of this
mood, Congress, in late 1918, enacted (40 Stat. 1012) legislation de-
signed to exclude and expel from the United States certain aliens
belonging to anarchistic groups or otherwise found to be in sym-
pathy with the tenets of anarchism. The opening paragraph of the
statute stipulated.

That aliens who are anarchists; aliens who believe in or
advocate the overthrow by force or violence of the Govern-
ment of the United States or of all forms of law ; aliens who
disbelieve in or are opposed to all organized government;
aliens who advocate or teach the assassination of public offi-
cials; aliens who advocate or teach the unlawful destruction
of property; aliens who are members of or affiliated with
any organization that entertains a belief in, teaches, or ad-
vocates the overthrow by force or violence of the Government
of the United States or of all forms of law, or that entertains
or teaches disbelief in or opposition to all organized govern-
ment, or that advocates the duty, necessity, or propriety of
the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers,
either of specific individuals or of officers generally, of the
Government of the United States or of any other organized
government, because of his or their official character, or that
advocates or teaches the unlawful destruction of property
shall be excluded from admission into the United States.

Although this law was not a criminal statute, did not outlaw speci-
fied beliefs and actions, and contained no authority for prosecution, it
soon became a punitve device in the hands of the new Attorney Gen-
eral, Alexander Mitchell Palmer. A former Democratic Member of
the House of Representatives from Pennsylvania (1909-1915) and
recently the Alien Property Custodian (1917-1919), Palmer came to
the Wilson Cabinet as the country's chief legal officer in March, 1919.

"' See Ihid., pp. 128-143.

*' On the mood of the country at this time, see Murray B. Levin. Political
Hysteria In America. New York, Basic BoolvS, 1971 ; for a concise history of
this episode, see Robert K. Murray. The Red Scare: A Study in National Hys-
teria. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1955.

113

He rode the tide of prevailing sentiment and launched an attack upon
radicals of all persuasion, perhaps in an effort to marshal public
opinion in an eventual bid for the White House.

The atmosphere which prevailed after World War I was
such that anti-radicalism and xenophobia became insepar-
ably fused. Thus, the deportation statute was made to order
for an Attorney General who combined with his own per-
son an overdose of the spirit of the times and a will to propel
himself into the limelight as the very model of a modern
anti-radical.

The anti-radicalism of that period was not much ado about
nothing. Rather, it was much too much ado about some-
thing : a gross over-reaction. For a host of Americans, a real
problem had assumed fictional proportions.

Radical violence existed. Its adv^ocates were, for the most
part, members of the Industrial Workers of the World, Bol-
sheviks, or members of one wing of the anarchist movement —
the other wing being pacifist. The hopes to which the revolu-
tionary radicals geared their actions were wildly unrealistic.
There was no danger of their overthrowing the Government.
But there was danger of their causing an intolerable destruc-
tion of life and property.*^

The wonder of the episode is that the intelligence agencies failed
so badly in conveying the reality of the situation; the truth of the
experience is that accurate intelligence was not sought and political
expedience otherwise, ruled the day. Palmer gave the Bureau of
Investigation the primary investigative/enforcement mission. The
other intelligence units were either incapable or unwilling to temper,
qualify, or modify the assault which manifested itself in raids,
harassments, arrests, and expulsions from the land.

The Labor Department had jurisdiction over the deporta-
tion statute. Secretary of Labor [William B.] Wilson was
responsible for deciding which bodies, by reason of their
beliefs and practices, so clearly fitted the terms of the statute
that membership in them w^ould be sufficient basis for an
alien's being deported. He named the Communist Party ; and
the Department's Solicitor, called upon to make a decision
when the Secretary was absent, named the Communist Labor
Party — a decision which Mr. Wilson reversed some months
later. These two parties were the prime targets of Palmer's
"Red raids."

Arrest warrants had to be issued by Labor; but Justice,
in a cooperating capacity, could request their issuance — and
did so in wholesale lots. After arrests were made, the evidence
was turned over to the Secretary of Labor. The Assistant
Secretary, Louis B. Post, had the task of evaluating the
evidence to determine whether or not it justified, in individual
cases, the signing of deportation orders.

*® Overstreet, op. cit., p. 41.

114

These details may seem academic. But one factor which led,
in the end, to Congressional hearings and an aroused public
interest was a collision between the Attorney General's policy
of mass arrests and Post's policy of judging cases on an
individual basis — and cancelling a host of warrants.®^

The first raids on alleged anarchists and radicals occurred in
November, 1919, but it was in January the following year when
massive dragnet operations began in earnest. In spite of Post's cautious
administration, it has been estimated that more than 4,000 suspected
alien radicals were imprisoned during the winter of 1919-1920 and
eventually the deportation of "a wretched few hundred aliens, who
never had the opportunity to plead their innocence and whose guilt
the government never proved." ^^

And what were the techniques of the Bureau of Investigation in
pursuing the radical quarry? Tactics utilized included reliance on
undercover informants to identify and locate suspects,^^ keeping State
and local authorities ignorant of moves against suspects so that
Federal supremacy in this area of arrests would be assured,''^ and
engaging in the physical entrapment of suspects.

The radicals seemed so numerous that GID [Hoover's
General Intelligence Division] decided to try to herd big
groups of them into meeting halls on the nights assigned for
raiding their membership. The way this was done in the case
of the Communists was revealed in the secret instructions to
the Bureau's special agents from its headquarters dated
December 27, 1919 in a document which the Bureau's agents,
were required to produce in . . . [a] . . . Boston trial. It
read:

"If possible, you should arrange with your undercover
informants to have meetings of the Communist Party and
Communist Labor Party held on the night set.

"I have been informed by some of the Bureau officers that
such arrangements will be made. This, of course, would
facilitate the making of arrest." ^^

Other practices included night raids to facilitate obtaining con-
fessions and to discourage interference by counsel,^* coordination of
all raids from Washington by communications with intelligence chief
Hoover,**^ simultaneous arrest of all suspects, whether at the target
meeting halls or in their homes,^** and a heirarchy of arrest locations.

The places where the largest hauls might be expected were
the meeting rooms of the radical organizations. Next in im-

^^ Ibid., pp. 42-43; for his own account of these matters see Louis F. Post. The
Deportations Delirium of Nineteen-Ttventy. Chicago, Charles H. Kerr and
Company, 1923.

™ Hyman, op. cit., p. 320.

"^ See Lowenthal, op. cit., pp. 149, 153.

^ See Ihid., p. 149.

"= Ibid.

'* See Ibid., pp. 156, 161.

"' See Ibid., p. 156.

^ See Ibid., p. 157.

115

portance were the choral societies and the schools for foreign-
born adults. Here the Bureau's agents picked up both teachers
and students, including those on their way to class, and others
on the street suspected of having that destination.

Next in importance were small shops operated by suspected
radicals, in which the police picked up the customers as well
as the businessmen — this was the case at an East St. Louis
tailor's shop, where men were standing about in the evening
hours, chatting with the proprietor. In some exceptional
cases, customers were left behind; thus, when a barber was
arrested in his Bridgeport, Conn., place of business, and the
raiders were in too big a hurry to let him get his overcoat and
to permit him to make his premises secure, they did not bother
to wait for the half-shaved customer in the chair.

Other places for arresting customers in considerable num-
bers were restaurants, cafes, bowling alleys, billiard and pool
parlors, social rooms for playing checkers and other games,
and similar points of resort. In cases where concerts or lec-
tures, no matter on what subject, were being given at halls
frequented by radicals, the raiders arrested everyone pres-
ent.^^

The campaign became so enthusiastic that American citizens who
had spent the war period overseas were seized,''^ raiders engaged in
violence, the destruction of radical's presses, threatened suspects at
gunpoint, and made incarcerations without arrest warrants.^^ Those
imprisoned were harassed, coerced, and otherwise forced into con-
fessions of guilt which were frequently thrown out by Assistant Secre-
tary Post or rejected by the courts.^"" Similarly, the Bureau delayed
and denied bail to jailed suspects or demanded exorbitant bonding.^"^

All in all, the episode demonstrated a shameless disregard for
human rights on the part of the Justice Department, evoked a con-
temptuous attitude toward the Bureau of Investigation on the part of
both Congress and the public, and undoubtedly contributed in some
degree to the failure of the Democrats to retain control of the White
House in 1920. Better intelligence and/or the proper use of available
intelligence might have averted the fiasco. But politics was in ascen-
sion and intelligence activities were in decline in the aftermath of the
war. Wliat was to follow was the further disintegration of the Justice
Department under Harry Daugherty, the Teapot Dome scandal,
crime wars, and the decomposition of the intelligence structure.

YII. American Black ChmnheT

Not everyone within the Federal intelligence community, however,
succumbed to the pronouncements of idyllic world peace in the after-
math of the European conflagration which witnessed the collapse of

lUd., pp. 157-158.

See lUd., pp. 15^160.

See lUd., pp. 161-168, 18.S-198.
*> See lUd., pp. 209-223.
'' See ma., pp. 12^^Z1.

116

the Hapsburg, Hohenzollern, the Romanov empires."^ For some with
intelligence responsibilties, the war had brought their organizations
into full flower and provided an opportunity to scrutinize the intelli-
gence capabilities of both ally and enemy. Thus, there was an unwill-
ingness to return to prewar intelligence infancy. And it was this cli-
mate of opinion which fostered the creation of the secret crypt analysis
structure which came to be known as the American Black Chamber.

Born in April 1889, in Worthington, Indiana, Herbert O. Yardley
had wanted to become a criminal lawyer but, after learning the skills
of a telegraph operator, he came to the State Department in 1913 and,
imbued with a strong sense of history and penchant for deciphering
masked communications, he soon discovered that existing American
codes could be easily broken. ^°^ Having attempted, with little effect,
to encourage improvements in the diplomatic codes, Yardley ob-
tained a commission in the Army at the time of United States entry
into world hostilities and went to work for Ralph Van Deman and the
Military Intelligence Division.^"^ Witliin the War Department he
organized and directed the Cryptographic Bureau which eventually be-
came MI-S.^""^ In August, 1918, he sailed for England where he studied
British cryptographic and decoding methods and then went on to
Paris to assist the American delegation to the peace conference.^"*' In
April, 1919, Yardley returned to the United States for the scaling
down of Military Intelligence for peacetime conditions.

After several conferences with responsible officials of the
State, War and Navy Departments, we decided to demobilize
the Shorthand Subsection ; demobilize the Secret-Ink Subsec-
tion, transfer the Code Compilation Subsection to the Signal
Corps (. . . Army regulations required the Signal Corps to
compile codes) ; and restore Military Intelligence Communi-
cations to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

This, then, left only the Code and Cipher Solution Section.

My estimate for an efficient Cipher Bureau called for one
hundred thousand dollars per annum. The State Depart-
ment agreed to turn over to Militarv" Intelligence forty thou-
sand dollars per annum out of special funds, provided the
Navy Department was entirely excluded, for they refused to
share their secrets with the Navy. This left, a deficit of sixty
thousand dollars, which Military Intelligence managed to ob-
tain from Congress after taking some of the leaders into their
confidence. I was told that there was a joker in the Depart-

102 rpjjg "lust" for world peace was apparent in the organization of tlie League
of Nations and the treaties resulting from the Washington armament conference
of 1921-1922. It reached its zenith in 1928 with the curious Kellogg-Briand Pact
which outlawed war. Simultaneous with these developments were embittering
encroachments and manipulations of the economics and politics of the recently
defeated central powers by certain victors in the world war, ambitions of empire
by the Japanese in the Pacific, and the rise of totalitarian regimes in both Europe
and Asia.

^"^ See David Kahn. The Code Breakers, Ret'ised Edition. New York. New
American Library, 1973, pp. 167-168 ; Herbert O. Yardley. The Ameriean Black
Chamher. London, Faber and Faber, 1931, pp. 3-11.

^°* See Yardley, op. cit., pp. 11-15.

^°» See Kahn, op. cit., pp. 168-172 ; Yardley, op. cit., pp. 15-16, 22-23.

^°« See Kahn, op. cit., p. 172 ; Yardley, op. cit., pp. 160-166.

117

ment of State special funds: they could not legally be ex-
pended within the District of Columbia.

Since it seemed that we could not remain in the District of
Columbia I was commissioned to go back to New York and
find a suitable place where the famous American Black
Chamber could bury itself from the prying eyes of foreign
governments.^"^

On the first of October, the unit set up initial operations at 3 East
38th Street in Manhattan, a former town house owned by T. Suifern
Tailer, a New York society figure and political leader.

It stayed there little more than a year, however, before
moving to new quarters in a four-story brownstone at 141
East 37th Street, just east of Lexington Avenue. It occupied
half of the ornate, divided structure, whose high ceilings did
little to relieve the claustrophobic construction of its twelve-
foot-wide rooms. Yardley's apartment was on the top floor.
All external connection with the government was cut. Rent,
heat, office supplies, light, Yardley's salary of $7,500 a year,
and the salaries of his staff were paid from secret funds.
Though the office was a branch of the Military Intelligence
Division, War Department payments did not begin until
June 30, 1921.i''«

All employees were relegated to civilian status. The mission : "We
were to read the secret code and cipher diplomatic telegrams of for-
eign governments — by such means as we could. If we were caught, it
would be just too bad !" ^°^ Materials first came to the unit in the form
of documents held by the State Department.^^" Japanese secret codes
were of special interest.^" During the Washino^ton armament confer-
ence of 1921-1922, the unit made over five thousand decipherments and
translations.^^^ According to Yardley's own reminiscences :

We solved over forty-five thousand cryptograms from 1917
to 1929, and at one time or another we broke the codes of
Argentine, Brazil, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, England,
France, Germany, Japan, Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Peru, Russia, San Salvador, Santo Domingo,
Soviet Union and Spain.

We also made preliminary analyses of the codes of many
other governments. This we did because Ave never knew at
what moment a crisis would arise which would require quick
solution of a particular government's diplomatic telegrams.
Our personnel was limited and we could not hope to read the
telegrams of all nations. But we drew up ]ilans for an offen-
sive, in the form of code analyses, even though we anticipated
no crisis. We never knew at what moment to expect a tele-
phone call or an urgent letter demanding a prompt solution

^'" Yardlev, op. cit., pp. 166-167.
^'^ Kahn. op cit., p. 173.
^■^ Yardley, op cit., p. 167.
™ See IMd., p. 168.

"^ See Ibid., pp. 174-225 : also see Kahn, op. cit., pp. 173-176.
"^ Yardley, op. cit., p. 225 ; also see IMd., pp. 199-225 and Kahn, op cit., pp. 176-
177.

118

of messages which we had never dreamed would interest the
Department of State.^^^

By the late 1920's, the Black Chamber had gained access to diplo-
matic telegraph traffic through cooperative arrangements with the
Western Union Telegraph Company and the Postal Telegraph
Company.^^*

In 1929, with the arrival of the new administration, Yardley, upon
hearing Herbert Hoover's first presidential address to tlie nation,
sensed a high moralism had gripped government leadership, a moral-
ism which would not tolerate the continuance of the Black Chamber.
Shortly after the new Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, took
office, a series of important code messages, deciphered by the Black
Chamber, was forwarded to acquaint the Secretary with the existence
and activities of the cryptanalysis operation. The reaction was the one
anticipated by Yardley.^^^

[Stimson] was shocked to learn of the existence of the
Black Chamber, and totally disapproved of it. He regarded
it as a low, snooping activity, a sneaking, spying, keyhole-
peering kind of dirty business, a violation of the principle of
mutual trust upon which he conducted both his personal
affairs and his foreign policy. All of this it is, and Stimson
rejected the view that such means justified even patriotic
ends. He held to the conviction that liis country should do
what is right, and, as he said later, "Gentlemen do hot read
each other's mail."' In an act of pure moral courage, Stimson,
affirming principle over expediency, withdrew all State De-
partment funds from the support of the Black Chamber.
Since these constituted its major income, their loss shuttered
the office. Hoover's speech had warned Yardley that an ap-
peal would be fruitless. There was nothing to do but close up
shop. An unexpended $6,666.66 and the organization's files
reverted to the Signal Corps, where William Friedman had
charge of cryptology. The staff quickly dispersed (none went
to the Army) , and when the books were closed on October 31,
1929, the American Black Chamber had perished. It had cost
the State Department $230,404 and the War Department $98,-
808.49 — just under a third of a million dollars for a decade of
cryptanalysis."''

Yardley could not find work in Washington and returned to his fam-
ily home in Worthington where the Depression quickly devoured his
existing resources. Out of financial desperation, he set about writing
the story of the Black Chamber, serializing portions of tlie account in
the Saturday Evening Post and then producing a book for Bobbs-
Merrill in June 1931. Though the volume was an instant success, it was
denounced by both the State and War Departments. In all, it sold
17,931 copies in America and appeared in French, Swedish, an un-
authorized Chinese version, and in Japanese. In the Land of the Ris-

"^ Yardley, op. cit., p. 235.

"* Kahn, op. cit., p. 177.

"^^ See Yardley, op. cit., pp. 262-263.

"^ Kahn, op. cit., pp. 178-179.

119

ing Sun the book quadrupled American sales with 33,119 copies sold
amidst much outrage over its revelations. Yardley was already at work
on a second expose entitled Japanese Diploiimtic Secrets^ an account
utilizing Japanese diplomatic cables transmitted during the 1921-1922
naval disarmanent conference, when the State Department learned of
his efforts and, subsequently, "United States marshals seized the manu-
script on February 20, 1933, at the office of The Macmillan Company,
to whom Yardley had submitted it after Bobbs-]Merrill had declined
it, on the grounds that it violated a statute prohibiting agents of the
United States government from appropriating secret documents." ^^^
Yardley next turned his attention to writing fiction, at which he
proved moderately successful, and some real estate speculation in
Queens, New York. In 1938 he was hired by Chiang Kai-shek at about
$10,000 a year to solve the messages of the Japanese who were then
invading China. Two years later he returned to the United States
where he made a brief effort at being a Washington resturanteur, at-
tempted to establish a cryptanalytic bureau in Canada though Stimson
and/or the British forced the reluctant Canadian government to dis-
pense with his services, and then served as an enforcement officer in
the food division of the Office of Price Administration until the end of
World War 11. After the war he turned to his old card playing talent
and offered instruction in poker. Out of this experience came another
book. The Education of a Poker Player^ which appeared in 1957. A
year later, in August, he died of a stroke at his Silver Spring, Marj^-
land, home.^^^

VIII. Intelligence at Twilight

While the period between the two world wars was largely one of
dormancy or disintegration with regard to Federal intelligence activi-
ties and operations, there were certain exceptions to this situation,
developments which, due to a few outstanding personalities and/or
monumental events, marked the continued, but slow, evolution and
advancement of intelligence capabilities. ^-'—

In 1920, Marine Corps Commandant John A. Lejeune overhauled
the headquartere staff in a manner emulating the Army's general staff
reorganization of 1903 and the Navy's central administrative struc-
ture of 1915 when the Chief of Naval Operations position came into
existence. Within the Operations and Training Division, which was
one of seven administrative entities reporting directly to the Com-
mandant, an intelligence sedition was instituted."" Little is known
about the resources or activities of this unit but it appears to have
developed combat intelligence products for the Corps and to have
cooperated with Naval Intelligence in preparing war plans and stra- I
tegic information. „-^

One of the Marine officers who was concerned with such
planning during the early 1920s was Major (later Lieutenant

"^/&i(i., p. 181.

^^ lUd., pp. 181-183.

""Generally, see: U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters. Historical Division. A
Brief History of Headquarters Marine Corps Staff Organization by Kenneth V.
Condit, John H. Johnstone, and Ella W. Nargele. Washington, Historical Divisioii,
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1971, pp. 12-15; Robert Debs Heinl, Jr.
Soldiers of the Sea. Annapolis, United States Naval Institute, 1962, pp. 253-2.'r!l

120

Colonel) Earl H. Ellis. Like many other military officers,
Ellis was cognizant of the Japanese threat in the Pacific. In
1920, the Office of Naval Intelligence prepared a study con-
cerning the possibility of a transpacific war against Japan,
and various agencies within the Navy Department were
directed to implement the study with plans of their own. The
Marine Corps contributed to what ultimately became known
as the "Orange Plan," and Ellis made a major contribution
to that portion of the plan which dealt with advanced base
operations. The document he wrote, Operation Plan 712
(Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia), was approved
by the Commandant on 23 July 1921.

In his writing, Ellis pointed out :

". . . it will be necessary for us to project our fleet
and landing forces across the Pacific and wage war
in Japanese waters. To effect this requires that we
have sufficient bases to support the fleet, both during
its projection and afterwards.

To effect [an amphibious landing] in the face of
enemy resistance requires careful training and prep-
aration to say the least; and this along Marine lines.
It is not enough that the troops be skilled infantry-
men or artillerymen of high morale; they must be
skilled watermen and jungle-men who know it can
be done — Marines with Marine training."^"

Though the observations of Earl Ellis were prophetic, he never lived
to realize their actuality for he was to become a martyr to the intelli-
gence cause he served so well. A Kansas farm boy born in 1880, Ellis
joined the Marine Corps at the turn of the century and sufficiently dis-
tinguished himself that he received a commission before American
entry into World War I, advanced to major during the conflict and won
four decorations as well. Closely associated with Lejeune since 1914,
Ellis was brought to Washington when his superior assumed command
of the Corps in 1920. He was apparently put to immediate work on
Orange Plan studies which consumed so much of his time and energy
that he was rarely seen outside of his office and eventually fell ill
shortly after completing his paper. During his recovery, his views
drew harsh criticism from the peace proponents and disarmament ad-
vocates of the hour.

Discharged after three months' hospitalization, he returned
to duty. Two weeks later, with considerable casualness,
he asked for 90 days leave "to visit France, Belgium and
Germany."

There were two curious circumstances connected with his
request for leave. In the first place the request was approved
by the Secretary of the Navy the same day it was received.

^""U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters. Historical Division. A Concise History of
the United States Marine Corps 1775-1969 by William D. Parker. Washin^on,
Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1970, p, 46; also see Heinl,
op. cit., pp. 255-257.

121

Returned the following day, the letter set an all-time record
for prompt handling of official correspondence.

The second oddity was noticed by Gen Lejeune's secretary.
Prior to his departure, Ellis called at the Commandant's
office to say goodbye. During the apparently normal conversa-
tion between the two officers, the secretary noticed Ellis pass a
sealed envelope to the General. "Without comment, Lejeune
unobtrusively slipped it into his desk drawer.

Having said his goodbyes, LtCol Ellis walked out of the
front door of Marine Corps headquarters — and vanished.^-^

Ellis was never seen in Europe. No communication was received
from him for almost a year. AVlien his official leave expired and an
inquiry was made as to how he was to be carried on the muster roll,
the x^djutant Inspector ordered "Continue to carry on leave." Finally
a friend received a cryptic cablegram from Ellis who was in Sydney,
Australia. He had been treated for a kidney infection there and was
enroute to Japan. Some six weeks later he was in the Philippines where
he sent a classified and coded dispatch to Marine Corps Headquarters
inquiring about the extension of his leave. The response, sent "Top
Priority," was a single sentence : "Leave extension granted for period
six months."

In mid- August, the U.S. Naval Hospital in Yokohama, Japan, was
asked to attend to a desperately ill American at the Grand Hotel. The
man was Ellis, again suffering from nephritis. He identified himself,
indicating he was a Marine officer touring the Orient on leave. Two
weeks later he was released, only to be admitted the following week
with the same acute condition. Believing him to be an alcoholic, Navy
medical authorities gave Ellis the choice of returning to the United
States by the next transport or by Mail Steamer to facilitate his re-
cuperation. Ellis chose the latter, wired his American bank for a
thousand dollars on October 4, received the money two days later, and
vanished that night from his hospital bed.

Nothing was heard about Ellis for six months. Then, on May 23, 1923,
the State Department re^^eived the following from the American Em-
bassy in Tokyo : "I am informed by the Governor General of Japanese
South Sea Islands that E. H. Ellis, representative of Hughes Trading
Company, #2 Rector Street, New York City, holder of Department
passport No. 4249, died at Koror, Caroline Islands on May 12th. Re-
mains and effects in possession of Japanese Government awaiting
instructions."

As a matter of standard procedure, the State Department
checked with the Hughes Trading Company. By a strange
coincidence, the company's president turned out to be a retired
Marine colonel. From him, State was surprised to learn that
E. H. Ellis was not a commercial traveller at all. He was, in
fact, a Marine Corps officer on an intelligence mission. At that
point, a lot of Washington telephones began ringing, followed
by a noticeable increase in Pacific cable traffic.^^^

"^P. N. Pierce. The Unsolved Mystery of Pete Ellis. Marine Corps Gazette,
V. 46, February, 1962 : 36-37. This is the most complete account of the Ellis case
to date and the material which follows is taken from this story.

^ Ibid., p. 38.

122

In many regards, the phones are still ringing, in need of someone
to answer. Badgered by reporters, Lejemie reinforced his claim of in-
nocence regarding Ellis's activities by finally claiming that the officer
had been AWOL for some time ; he apparently could not bring him-
self to use the contents of the sealed envelope which Ellis had given
him — supposedly an undated letter of resignation, which the Com-
mandant burned.

From various piecemeal sources it would appear that Ellis was, in-
deed, on an intelligence mission, surveying Japanese held islands in
the Pacific, probably with a view to gathering as much information to
support the Orange Plan suppositions regarding Japanese strategic
power as he could observe. It would also seem that Ellis did not have a
credible cover posing as a trader, had too much unaccounted for money
with him, and was given to drinking bouts during which he very likely
dropped his guard. In any event, the Japanese were aware of his real
identity and mission in their territory. Confirmation of his true pur-
poses for being in the Pacific has yet to be made through documenta-
tion and records. And, of course, the manner of Ellis's death, the reason
for his remains being cremated, and the loss of his personal effects all
still remain a mystery.^-^

The Army and the Navy continued their less daring attache arrange-
ments during the period between the wars, though there was reluctance
on the part of the United States armed services to appoint air attaches
during most of these years.^^* There were various tribulations which
intelligence operatives faced at this time due to the prevailing disarma-
ment fervor and the inability of defense leaders to appreciate the in-
telligence product when it was available. Captain Ellis M. Zacharias
was a career Navy officer who went to Japan in 1920 to study the cul-
ture and language of the country and to report on strategic develop-
ments coming to his attention as well. Within the Office of Naval In-
telligence, however, the whole Far East Section

. . . occupied just one room, holding one officer and one
stenographer. ONI itself comprised a handful of officers and
a few yeomen, filing the occasional reports of naval attaches
about naval appropriations of the countries to which they
were attached, a few notes on vessels building or projected,
most of them clipped from local newspapers, ancl descrip-
tions of parties given in honor of some visiting American
celebrity. The last-named usually represented the most illu-
minating and comprehensive of these so-called intelligence
reports.^^^

After three years and six months in Japan, Zacharias returned to
Washington filled with trepidation and information regarding the
plans and activities of imperialist Japan. However, his greeting at
ONI was not enthusiastic.

^ See lUd., pp. 39-40.

^^ Alfred Vagts. The Military Attach^. Princeton, Princeton University Press,
1967, p. 67. This account surveys the growth and development of the military
attache system in international politics, tracing its evolution from the 17th
Century to the modern diplomatic period.

"^ Ellis M. Zacharias. Secret Missions: The Story of an Intelligence Officer.
Nevsr York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946, pp. 20-21.

123

The director listened to m}^ report with gentlemanly boredom
and evident condescension and then suddenly closed the dis-
cussion without any indication of a folloAv-up job for me. I
soon found out that no one had given it the slightest thought.
It was not in the routine. I had spent three years studying a
forbidding language, penetrating the mind of a strange peo-
ple, gathering data of vital importance, participating in secret
missions — and now it was my turn for sea duty. To put it
bluntly, I was to forget all extraneous matters and refit myself
into the general routine of a naval career. I went to the Far
East Section of Naval Intelligence, but there, too, I found but
yawning indifference and complacency, regardless of the hos-
tile attitudes then displayed by the Japanese in their vitriolic
press. My reports were gratifyingly acknowledged but com-
pletely overlooked. I was concerned and frustrated, a state of
mind which was hardly conducive to ingratiating myself to
my superiors, but I could not arouse them to the dangers of
the day.^^"^

While in Japan, Zacharias and his colleagues had also experienced
this indifference to intelligence operations and products in the limita-
tion of their resources and number.

The limited means at our disposal prevented us from ob-
serving the Japanese in their administration of the mandated
islands. Neither did we have means or men to find out Jap-
anese intentions and aggressive plans beyond what we could
pick up in the open market of peacetime intelligence. Captain
Watson was concerned about these mandated islands, where
the Japanese were reliably reported to be going about merrily
violating the mandate which prohibited their fortification.
The few reports which reached us from these Pacific islands
indicated feverish activities : merchantmen discharging mate-
rial obviously designed for the building of gun emplacements,
bunkers, and underground passages ; naval vessels calling at
those islands and delivering heavy-caliber coast guns and
other equipment — all contraband according to the provisions
of the mandate. Although greatly concerned, Watson could
not obtain permission to establish an effective check on these
activities or to ascertain the accuracy of the numerous reports
coming to his ears.^^^

Concern over the fortification of the mandated islands had also
apparently prompted the mission of Earl Ellis, whom Zacharias and
his colleagues scrutinized, but lost, in Yokohama.^^^ Ironically, when
the islands were seized during World War II, "we discovered that it
was their weakness rather than strength that the Japanese were so
anxious to conceal." ^^^

Before his second tour of duty in Japan, Zacharias, in 1926, gained
acquaintence with the Navy's ciyptanalytic organization.

^ IMd., pp. 71-72. '
"' IMd., pp. 40-41.
^ See Ibid., pp. 42^8.
"* Ibid., p. 48.

124

My days were spent in study and work among people with
whom security had become second nature. Hours went by
without any of us saying a word, just sitting in front of piles
of indexed sheets on which a mumbo jumbo of figures or
letters was displaced in chaotic disorder, trying to solve the
puzzle bit by bit like fitting together the pieces of a jigsaw
puzzle. We were just a few then in Room 2646, young people
who gave ourselves to cryptography with the same ascetic
devotion with which young men enter a monastery. It was
known to everyone that the se<*recy of our work would prevent
the ordinary recognition accorded to other accomplishments.
It was then that I first learned that intelligence work, like
virtue, is its own reward.^^"

Zacharias had a second tour of duty in Japan, monitored and de-
ciphered Japanese Navy radio messages from a station in Shanghai,
headed the Far East Section of ONI at the time of the outbreak of war
in Europe, became the director of Naval Intelligence in 1942, saw com-
bat duty, was assigned to the Office of War Infonnation at the time
of the Japanese surrender, and retired from active duty in 1946 as a
rear admiral. An author and lecturer on intelligence operations, he
died in 1961.

Military Intelligence also had its professional problems during this
period too, as was graphically demonstrated during the Bonus March.

In the summer of 1932, President Hoover faced one of the most
trying problems imaginable, the presence in the nation's capi-
tal of thousands of needy veterans who were determined to
force the immediate payment of the soldiers' bonus. From
every part of the country, by almost every conceivable means
of transportation, veterans flocked to Washington to demand
that Congress relieve, by a flood of cash, the economic paraly-
sis which had settled over the United States. Reminiscent of
the followers of Coxey 40 years before, the veterans seized
trains in East St. Louis and Baltimore and took temporary
possession of the Pennsylvania Railroad yard at Cleveland.
Their presence in Washington was described as a "supreme
escape gesture." ^^^

Although the House passed a bill allocating the funds sought by
the marchers, the President let it be known he would not approve the
measure. The legislation failed in the Senate and Congress, shortly
thereafter, adjourned. Before leaving Washington, however, the Legis-
lative Branch, at the Chief Executive's urging, provided $100,000 to
transport the veterans home. Still they came to the capital and tracing
their advance was Military Intelligence which had sent the following
request, in secret code, to all Corps Area commanders : "With refer-
ence to any movement of veteran bonus marchers to Washington orig-
inating or passing through your corps area, it is desired that a brief
radio report in secret code be made to War Department indicating
presence, if any, of communistic elements and names of leadei-s of
known communistic leanings."

^lUd., p. 89.

^^ Bennett Milton Rich. The Presidents and Civil Disorder. Washington, The
Brookings Institution, 1941, pp. 167-168.

125

Most of the replies to this were reasonably sane, if not too
astute. Ninth Corps Area for example, could not discover
when the Oregon contingent left Portland, a fact that was
reported in the local newspapers. It did correctly evaluate the
political complexion of Royal W. Robertson's Californians,
pointing out not only the absence of Communist activity, but
also that its leader was "firm in stand that [Communists] will
not be tolerated." In neighboring Eighth Corps, however, an
almost undiluted paranoia prevailed. The intelligence reports
emanating from Fort Sam Houston, Texas, are simply in-
credible, and lend verisimilitude to at least the last proviso of
the army legend that the brainy go to the engineers, the brave
to the infantry, the deaf to the artillery, and the stupid to
intelligence. In any event, the Texas-based intelligence
experts convinced themselves that the Californians were dan-
gerous Communists (with a leader named Royal P, Robin-
son) and that Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer was financing the whole
movement. In case Washington didn't know what it was.
Colonel James Totten told them :

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Picture Corporation is known to
be 100 per cent Jewish as to controlling personnel, and
that high officers of this company are in politics. An un-
confirmed rumor circulated many months ago, stated that
agents of U,S.S,R, had contacted motion picture com-
panies in California, and contributed to some of them
with a view to inserting propaganda and support of
U.S.S,R, policies.
Other reports spoke of machine guns in the hands of bonus
marchers, forged discharges available for fifty cents from
"any pawn broker in Chicago" (this from an officer in Phil-
adelphia), while another report, early in July, claimed that
[Bonus Army leader Walter W.] Waters had the "assistance
of gunmen from New York and Washington , , , [and] that
the first blood shed by the Bonus Army in Washington is to
be the signal for a communist uprising in all large cities," ^^-

Of course, there was blood shed in Washington that summer, but
not necessarily due to the ineptitude of Military Intelligence, The
communist uprising? Some marchers took advantage of the congres-
sional funds made available for their return home. But it was esti-
mated that some 11,000 persons located at 24 separate camps in the
capital remained behind. As a result of disturbances in and around
Federal buildings undergoing demolition and a brief riot which fol-
lowed one eviction scene where one veteran was killed at the scene
and another fatally wounded, Federal troops, requested by the Dis-
trict of Columbia government, were brought into the city. A tank
platoon and a cavalry squadron, together with an infantry battalion,
were called into action. About 500 troops were located in the District
with another 1,000 held in reserve at nearby military installations.

^^^ Roger Daniels. The Bonus March: An Episode of the Great Depression. West-
port, Connecticut, Greenwood Publishing Company, 1971, pp. 159-160; also see
Donald J. Lisio. The President and Protest: Hoover, Conspiracy, and the Bonus
Riot. Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 1974, pp. 87-109.

126

On the afternoon of July 28, these forces, under the command of
General Douglas MacArthur, advanced on the Pennsylvania Avenue
encampment of the veterans.

The cavalry led the way, followed by tanks, machine gun-
ners, and infantry, all headed toward the "fort" of the B.E.F.
[Bonus Expeditionary Force], a skeletonized building at
Third Street. After a half hour's wait the troops donned gas
masks and in a few minutes of tear gas bombing completely
cleared the "fort". The troops were deployed in such a
fashion as to drive the Marchers away from the business area
and toward the encampment at Anacostia. This was accom-
plished without the troops firing a shot although, apparently,
there was a considerable display of swinging cavalry sabres
and prodding bayonets.^^^

After a brief halt at the edge of the Anacostia encampment of the
veterans, the troops moved into the shacktown and, throughout the
night, completed its destruction. Without any shelter, penniless, and
unwanted, the veterans fled the District, reportedly "aghast at the
failure of their confident prediction that no soldier would move into
action against them." ^^*

There were, of course, higher plateaus of Army intelligence during
this time, the pinnacles being held by William F. Friedman and his
Signal Corps colleagues who broke the intricate and sophisticated
Japanese cipher known to Americans as the "purple" code. Born in
Russia in 1891, Friedman emigrated to the United States with his
parents the following year. He matriculated as one of ten honor stu-
dents in a class of 300 at Pittsburgh Central High School in 1909 and
received an undergraduate degree in genetics from Cornell University
in 1914. Through an interest in the authorship of the plays of
William Shakespeare and related literary questions, Friedman be-
came a skilled cryptologist. During 1917 and 1918 he taught crypt-
analysis to Army officers and produced some writing on the subject.
In 1921 Friedman and his wife, also a skilled cryptologist, entered
into a six-month contract with the Signal Corps and continued the
relationship as civil servants on the War Department payroll until
1922 when he became Chief Cryptanalyst and head of the Code and
Cipher Compilation Section, Eesearch and Development Division,
Office of the Chief Sigiial Officer.

Meanwhile, the Army had been studying its divided cryp-
tologic operation and, shortly before the State Department
withdrew support for Yardley's bureau, had decided to in-
tegrate both cryptographic and cryptanalytic functions in
the Signal Corps. The closing of the Black Chamber eased
the transition, and on May 10, 1929, cryptologic responsibility
devolved upon the Chief Signal Officer. To better meet these
new responsibilities, the Signal Corps established a Signal
Intelligence Service in its War Plans and Training Division,
with Friedman as director. Its officially stated mission was
to prepare the Army's codes and ciphers, to intercept and

"^ Rich, op. cit, p. 172.

^ New York Times, July 29, 1932 : 1.

127

solve enemy communications in war, and in peace to do the
training and research — a vague enough term — necessary to
become immediately operational at the outbreak of war. To
carry out these duties, Friedman hired three junior crypt-
analysts, all in their early twenties, at $2,000 a year— the
first of the second generation of American cryptologists. They
were Frank Rowlett, a Virginian, and Solomon Kullback and
Abraham Sinkov, close friends who had taught together in
New York City high schools before coming to Washington
and who both received their Ph. D.'s in mathematics a few
years later. It was the beginning of an expansion that led to
the PURPLE solution, the triumphs of World War II, and
the massive cryptologic organization of today. At his death
on November 2, 1969, he was widely regarded as the greatest
cryptologist that science had ever seen.^^^

The breaking of the complicated "purple'' code was part of a con-
tinous effort by the Army and Navy to decipher and monitor Jap-
anese communications. Largely under the immediate leadership of
Friedman since its creation sometime in 1936, the project had been
dubbed MAGIC.

The cipher machine that Americans knew as PURPLE
bore the resounding official Japanese title of 97-shiki 0-bun
In-ji-ki. This meant Alphabetical Typewriter '97, the '97 an
abbreviation for the year 2597 of the Japanese calendar, which
corresponds to 1937. The Japanese usually referred to it sim-
ply as "the machine" or as "J," the name given it by the
Imperial Japanese Navy, which had adapted it from the
German Enigma cipher machine and then had lent it to the
Foreign Ministry, which, in turn, had further modified it.
Its operating parts were housed in a drawer-sized box be-
tween two big black electrically operated Underwood type-
writers, which were connected to it by 26 wires plugged into a
row of sockets called a plugboard. To encipher a message, the
cipher clerk would consult the YU GO book of machine keys,
plug in the wire connections according to the key for the day,
turn the four disks in the box so the numbers on their edges
were those directed by the YU GO, and type out the plain-
text. His machine would record the plaintext while the other,
getting the electrical impulses after the coding box had
twisted them through devious paths, would print out the ci-
phertext. Deciphering was the same, though the machine ir-
ritatingly printed the plaintext in the five-letter groups of
the ciphertext input.

The Alphabetical Typewriter worked on roman letters, not
kata kana. Hence it could encipher English as well as ro-
maji — and also roman-letter codetexts. . . . Since the machine
could not encipher numerals or punctuation, the code clerk
first transformed them into three-letter codewords, given in a
small code list, and enciphered these. The receiving clerk

' Kahn, op. oit, pp. 191-192.

128

would restore the punctuation, paragraphing, and so on, when
typing up a finished copy of the decode.

The coding wheels and plugboards produced a cipher of
great difficulty. The more a cipher deviates from the simple
form in which one ciphertext letter invariably replaces the
same plaintext letter, the harder it is to break. A cipher might
replace a given plaintext letter by five different ciphertext
letters in rotation, for example. But the Alphabetical Type-
writer produced a substitution series hundreds of thousands
of letters long. Its coding wheels, stepping a space — or two,
or three, or four — after every letter or so, did not return to
their original positions to re-create the same series of paths,
and hence the same sequence of substitutes, until hundreds
of thousands of letters had been enciphered. The task of the
cryptanalysts consisted primarily of reconstructing the wir-
ing and switches of the coding wheels — a task made more
burdensome by the daily change of plugboard connections.
Once this was done, the cryptanalyst still had to determine
the starting position at the coding wheels for each day's
messages. But this was a comparatively simple secondary
job."«

The first complete solution of a "purple" communique was made in
August, 1940.^^^ By the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, decoded
Japanese messages were circulating at the highest levels of the Fed-
eral government. Though this decipherment advantage was not suffi-
cient, in itself, to prevent the surprise bombing of Hawaii and sim-
ultaneous aggression against American Pacific outposts, the ability
to decode Japanese communications served military and naval strate-
gists well during the war.

But there was another war, of sorts, fought within the United States
prior to the outbreak of hostilities once again in Europe and also in
Asia. This was the war against organized crime. A variety of law
enforcement agencies were involved in the Federal government's at-
tack upon the lawless and various intelligence developments occurred
during this effort.

With the arrivel of Harlan F. Stone at the Justice Department as
the new Attorney General in March, 1924, the General Intelligence
Division of the Bureau of Investigation began to be jDhased out of
existence. But the interests of G.I.D. did not fail to continue to receive
attention upon its demise if only because the unit's leader, J. Edgar
Hoover, ultimately became, on December 10, 1924, the head of the
entire Bureau. Other intelligence resources which were developed at
this time included special capabilities with regard to the identifica-
tion of kidnappers and their victims and a fingerprint data bank.

On July 1, 1936 the Bureau had on file 6,094,916 fingerprint
records, consisting of 5,5Yl,995 criminal records and 522,-
921 personal identification. Civil Service, and miscellaneous
non-criminal records. On that date, 9,904 law-enforcement
officials and agencies throughout the United States and for-
eign countries were contributing 4,700 fingerprint cards daily.

"^Ihid., pp. 21-22.
"'/6i(f., p. 25.

129

Six months later, that is, on December 31, 1936, the number
of fingerprint records had increased to 6,682,609; and the
number of contributing agencies, to 10,229.^^^

Not only did this elementary intelligence information prove useful
in the necessity of establishing a basic positive identification of cer-
tain individuals, but it also provided a basis for information exchange
between the Bureau and sub-national law enforcement agencies as well
as a relationship between the Bureau and international or foreign
law enforcement units.

The Bureau also established a technical laboratory during the latter
part of 1932. While the facility is largely concerned with the applica-
tion of scientific techniques to criminal evidence, certain aspects of its
program might be viewed as having a potential for contributing to an
intelligence product. ^^®

Increased responsibilities with regard to taxation, narcotics control,
and National Prohibition during this period brought about various
intelligence function developments within the units of the Treasury
Department.

Most of the other federal crime-control agencies are in the
habit of filing identification material on a comparatively
small scale. The Secret Service maintains an identification file
of single fingerprints of all known makers of counterfeit
money and their associates arrested since 1928. The names of
these offenders and their aliases are arranged alphabetically
for convenient reference. The Service also maintains an identi-
fication file of regular fingerprints of persons arrested and
convicted for counterfeiting, which also contains the photo-
graphs and previous criminal records of such offenders. The
Enforcement Division of the Alcohol Tax Unit operates an
elaborate filing and cross-reference system for identification
and classification purposes. An identification file is main-
tained in the Bureau of Narcotics. Included are the finger-
prints, photographs, and criminal records of persons arrested
for violation of the federal narcotics laws. The field offices of
the Customs Agency Service, including the Customs Patrol,
maintain identification files of individuals and also indexes
of various known smuggling vessels.^*"

With regard to its special mission of protecting the President, the
Secret Service continued, during this time, to "exercise, in general, a
tactful but effective surveillance over all those who come into contact
with the Chief Executive.'' "^

The United States Coast Guard, created (38 Stat. 800) in 1915 by
combining the Life-Saving Service and the Revenue Cutter Service,
had a single intelligence officer attached to the Commandant's staff
until prohibition era duties prompted the creation of intelligence units
within field offices. The first such intelligence group was established in

^^ Arthur C. Millspaugh. Crime Control By The National Goveryiment. "Washing-
ton, The Brookings Institution, 1937, p. 90; also see Whitehead, op. cit., pp.
154-166.

^^ See Millspaugh, op. cit., pp. 94-96 ; Whitehead, op. cit., pp. 166-178.

^*° Millspaugh, op. cdt., pp. 92-93.

^"^lUd., p. 116.

130

the New York office in 1930 with San Francisco, Mobile, and Boston
being favored with intelligence personnel during the next four years.
In 1936 the Coast Guard not only obtained (48 Stat. 1820) general
criminal law-enforcement powers, but also created an Intelligence
Division at its Washington headquarters."^

The purpose of these special intelligence field units was largely to
monitor radio communications between ships hovering outside the 12-
mile limit laden with illegal liquor and distilled spirits and their land-
based accomplices.

The operation was directed from clandestine shore radio
stations, but since the smugglers were aware that the radio
messages could be intercepted, they communicated the time
and place of rendezvous between speedboats and supply
vessels by way of complex codes. Obviously, if the Coast
Guard could break the ever-changing codes in a hurry, it
could catch up with the liquor-laden speedboats much more
effectively than through a blind search of the coast line.

By the spring of 1927, an enormous number of code
messages had accumulated on the desk of the one-man intelli-
gence office at Coast Guard headquarters. The secret com-
munications had been intercepted on both the Atlantic and
Pacific coasts and the volume was increasing daily. At that
point, an expert cryptanalyst, Mrs. Elizabeth Smith Fried-
man, was brought into the Coast Guard to solve the hundreds
of messages on file. Within two months, she had reduced the
mass of coded messages from unknown to known. It was then
that the Coast Guard decided to launch an intelligence service
based on fast translation of whatever secret messages fell into
its hands."^

The Coast Guard's expert was the wife of William F. Friedman,
the man who directed the MAGIC task force destined to break the
Japanese "purple" code. As a consequence of her efforts, the Coast
Guard, prior to World War II, maintained an intelligence staff of
investigators and cryptanalysts which did not exceed 40 individuals
during the 1930s."*

And within the Bureau of Internal Revenue there was the Intelli-
gence Unit which one contemporary account described, saying :

The Intelligence Unit is located in the immediate office of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. At the end of 1936 the
Unit consisted of three divisions: (1) the Personnel, Enroll-
ment, and Records Divisions; (2) the Fraud Division; and
(3) the Field Districts. The district were fifteen in number;
and the field force on June 30, 1936 numbered 196 men.

In addition to the investigation of violations of internal
revenue laws, the Intelligence Unit is concerned with serious
infractions of disciplinary rules or regulations on the part of
officials and employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
and, when directed by the Secretary of the Treasury, the Unit
investigates alleged irregularities by officials and employees

'*^ See Ottenberg, op. cit., pp. 13&-137.
'*" Ibid., p. 136.
^**IMd., p. 137.

131

of other branches of the Treasury Department. In addition,
a hiro;e part of the work of the I iiit relates to investifjations
of applicants for positions in the Bureau and in certain other
branches of the Department. To the Unit is also assigned the
investigation of applicants for admission to practice before
the Treasury Department as attorneys and agents, and the in-
vestigation of charges against enrolled attorneys and
agents."^

These were the intelligence forces engaged in warfare against or-
ganized crime, racketeers, and gangsterism. But a larger scale and
far more ominous warfare was in the offering as the 1930s spent them-
selves and international politics witnessed the arrival of totalitarian-
ism in Europe and Asia. Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany in
1933 and in six years led that nation in rearmament, a fanatic belief
in racial supremacy, dictatorial government, and a territorial expan-
sion which included portions of Czechoslovakia, all of Austria, and
threatened the Polish corridor and the Saar region. Japan, in the
meantime, had colonized Manchuria (renamed Manchukuo) and
Korea and continued to pressure the Chinese for more territory as
troops spilled southward toward the Nanyang peninsula. While these
developments occurred, the United States espoused and continued to
maintain an official policy of strict neutrality with regard to diplo-
matic entanglement and brewing overseas hostilities. However, this
position of international neutrality did not mean that the United
States would not prepare for its own defense or fail to take steps to
maintain its own domestic well-being during the period of crisis. If
conscientious intelligence personnel were not alerted to the gravity
of the world situation prior to the outbreak of war in Europe, then
they soon became so informed when, one week later, on September 8,
1939, President Eoosevelt declared (54 Stat. 2643) a condition of
"limited'' national emergency, thereby making certain extraordinary
powers available to the Chief Executive and "limited" only in the
sense that neither the defense of the country nor its internal economy
would be placed upon a war footing.^*^ It was a time of watching and
waiting.

^^ Millspaugh, op. cit., pp. 205-206.

**• Such a proclamation had apparently been contemplated in late 1937 at the
time Japanese aircraft bombed the American gunboat Panay on the Yangtze
River in China. The desire was to seize Japanese assets and investments in the
United States and to extract payment for damages. The idea for a national
emergency proclamation on the matter was outlines by Herman Oliphant, a
Treasury Department legal expert and close personal assistant to Treasury
Secretary Henry Morgenthau who was also involved in developing the plan.
Although a memorandum on the scheme reached President Roosevelt's desk, he
did not implement it and there is no evidence to indicate it was consulted on the
occasion of preparing the 1939 proclamation. Oliphant died in January, 1939.
See John Morton Blum. Roosevelt and Morgenthau. Boston, Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1970, pp. 225-230.

For a list of statutory powers granted under a proclamation of national
emergency at this time see Frank Murphy. Executive Powers Under National
Emergency. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1939. (76th Congress, 2d session.
Senate. Document No. 133) : on the evolution and use of emergency powers gen-
erally, see U.S. Congress. Senate. Special Committee on National Emergencies
and Delegated Emergency Powers. A Brief History of Emergency Potcers in the
United States by Harold C. Relyea. Committee print, 93rd Congress, 2d session.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974.

Part Three
The National Security Colossus (1939-75)

The calendar recorded the completion of a decade, but the events of
1939 would mark the passage of an era. The world stood watching,
transfixed by what Winston Churchill called "the gathering storm,"
awaiting the final climactic acts in what he described as "another
Thirty Years' War." ^ Hitler had been tolerated ; Der Fuehrer had
been appeased ; and then, with the invasion of Poland on the first day
of September, the aggression of Nazism had to be halted. Wliile Eng-
land, supported by the British empire, was destined to be Germany's
primary opponent for two years prior to American entry into the
European hostilities, His Majesty's Government had only recently
come to a wartime posture. Production of modern fighter aircraft —
the Spitfire and Hurricane types — had not gotten underway until
1937; it has been estimated that, in 1938 and the initial months of
1939. "Germany manufactured at least double, and possibly triple, the
munitions of Britain and France put together, and also that her great
plants for tank production reached full capacity." ^ Conscription was
not effected in the United Kingdom until April 1939. Churchill did not
form a government until May 1940, approximately nine months after
the declaration of war.

The British did have some advantages, one of them being the devel-
opment and deployment of radio direction-finding techniques or radar.
Experimental stations were erected in March 1936, for aircraft detec-
tion and efforts were also made to track ships at sea utilizing this
device. According to Churchill :

By 1939, the Air Ministry, using comparatively long-wave
radio (ten metres), had constructed the so-called coastal
chain, which enabled us to detect aircraft approaching over
the sea at distances up to about sixty miles. An elaborate net-
work of telephonic communication had been installed under
Air-Marshall Dowding, of Fighter Command, linking all
these stations with a central command station at Uxbridge,
where the movements of all aircraft observed could be plotted
on large maps and thus the control in action of all our own air
forces maintained. Apparatus called I.F.F. (Identification
Friend or Foe) had also been devised which enabled our
coastal chain radar stations to distinqfuish British aircraft
which carried it from enemv aircraft. It was found that these
long- wave stations did not detect aircraft approaching at low

^For Churchill's own account of events leading to the outbreak of World
War II see Winston S. Churchill. The Oatherinff Storm. Boston, Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1948.

' TMd., p. 336.

(132)

133

heights over the sea, and as a counter to this danger a supple-
mentary set of stations called G.H.L. (Chain Stations Home
Service Low Cover) was constructed, using much shorter
waves (one and a half metres) but only effective over a short
range.^
In June 1938, Churchill was introduced to another detection tech-
nique, the Asdics^ "the name which described the system of groping
for submarines below the surface by means of sound waves through
the water which echo back from any st^el structure they met." * This
process also stood ready for application at the time when open warfare
erupted on the Continent.

But, while these technological innovations would soon be replicated
by Germany, Britain obtained one inestimable intelligence advantage
over the Nazis which has only recently been publicly revealed. In 1938,
through the intervention of a Polish mechanic just fired from the pro-
duction facility in eastern Germany, British intelligence learned that
the Nazis were developing an improved Enigma mechanical cipher
process. Soon the Polish Secret Seiwice proved successful in purloin-
ing one of the machines. By the eve of war, the British had mastered
the operation of the de\nce and its resultant code. Simultaneously,
Gennany, unaware of the British intelligence advantage, put the new
Enigma process into sen'ice and utilized it all during the war.^

/. N eutral Amenca

With the outbreak of hostilities on the Continent, the United States
remained in a state of peace and qualified neutrality. But a policy of
detachment from international conflict did not signifv^ that American
officials were unaware that the nation's territory, resources, and politics
were subject to penetration and exploitation by the European belliger-
ents. During his first term as President, Franklin D. Roosevelt had
become sufficiently concerned about the traffickings of Fascists and
Communists in the country that he had urged Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation Director J. Edgar Hoover to begin probing the activities
of these ideologues.^

Late in 1938. President Roosevelt had approved a $50,000
appropriation for the FBI to conduct espionage investiga-
tions (a sum later raised by Congress to $300,000). Hoover
regarded this authorization of funds by the President as giv-
ing primary responsibility in the civilian field to the FBI. No
similar appropriation was earmarked for any other nonmili-
tary investigative agency. As a result, the FBI and the War
Department's Military Intelligence Division worked out a
cooperative program, with approval of the Office of Naval
Intellisrence, to exchange information in subversive investiga-
tions. This arrangement was approved in principle by the new
Attorney General, Frank Murphy. On February 7, 1939, the

'/fi/tf.. pp. 1.55-156.

* n\a., p. 163.

" Further details on the breaking of the German code and its use during: the
war may he found in F. W. Winterbotham. The Ultra Secret. New York, Harper
and Row, 1974.

• See Don Whitehead. The FBI Story. New York, Pocket Books, 1958 ; first pub-
lished 1956, pp. 188-197.

134

Assistant to the Attorney General, Joseph B. Keenan, in-
formed other investigative agencies of the agreement. He
asked that they send any information regarding espionage or
subversion to the FBI, Hoover advised his special agents that
Keenan's letter meant "all complaints relating to espionage,
counterespionage, and sabotage cases should be referred to
the Bureau, should be considered within the primary juris-
diction of the Bureau, and should, of course, receive preferred
and expeditious attention." ^

Keenan's letter elicited angry reactions from the other various Fed-
eral investigative agencies, protesting both the coordination plan and
the usurpation of aspects of their jurisdiction by the FBI. Assistant
Secretary of State George S. Messersmith called a conference with
War, Navy, Treasuiy, Post Office, and Justice Department (but not
FBI) representatives and announced that the President had selected
him to coordinate probes of foreign agents. When this assertion could
not be substantiated, Messersmith reversed his position, advocating
that espionage investigations be divided among the various agencies.®

Hoover felt that responsibility should be concentrated and
a pattern of close cooperation established. War and Navy
agreed : their intelligence units had already asked the FBI to
handle "within the United States and its territories" the ci-
vilian aspects of such espionage investigations as they were
conducting from the military angle. The State Department,
however, felt that its Office of Security must keep unshared
control over "sensitive" information — because of its extreme
delicacy and its relationship to foreign-policy decisions.

One fact which appears to have weighted the scales in
favor of a coordinated plan was that nobody wanted a repeti-
tion of the bungling which had, during World War I, re-
sulted from snarled lines of responsibility. Another was that,
without coordination, various federal bodies might all be
keeping tabs on the same individual, each from the angle
of its own work, without the pieces ever being put together to
form a pattern.^

Ultimately, it was the President who concluded that espionage,
counter-espionage, and sabotage information had to be coordinated.
Accordingly, the following directive was issued on June 26, 1939, to
members of the Cabinet.

It is my desire that the investigation of all espionage,
counterespionage, and sabotage matters be controlled and
handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the De-
partment of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the
War Department, and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the
Navy Department. The directors of these three agencies are
to function as a committee to coordinate their activities.

V&f(Z., p. 198.
« lUd.

" Harry and Bonaro Overstreet. The FBI In Our Open Society. New York,
W. W. Norton and Company, 1969, pp. 85-86.

135

No investigations should be conducted by any investigative
agency of the Government into matters involving actually or
potentially any espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage, ex-
cept by the three agencies mentioned above.

I shall be glad if you will instruct the heads of all other
investigative agencies than the three named, to refer im-
mediately to the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation any data, information or material that may come
to their notice bearing directly or indirectly on espionage,
counterespionage, or sabotage.

This was subsequently followed by another presidential directive
pertaining to F.B.I. intelligence responsibilities, issued September 6,
a few days after formal declarations of war had been made by the
European powers. It said :

The Attorney General has been requested by me to in-
struct the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department
of Justice to take charge of investigative work in matters
relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutral-
ity regulations.

This task must be conducted in a comprehensive and effec-
tive manner on a national basis, and all information must be
carefully sifted out and correlated in order to avoid confusion
and irresponsibility.

To this end I request all police officers, sheriffs, and all
other law enforcement officers in the United States promptly
to turn over to the nearest representative of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation any information obtained by them
relating to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversive
activities, and violations of the neutrality laws.

On September 8, President Roosevelt declared (54 Stat. 2643) a
national emergency within the nation, thereby granting extraordinary
powers to the Executive short of a condition of war.^°

Four months later, on January 5, 1940, Hoover told the
[House] Subcommittee on Appropriations about the steps
he had taken to ready the Bureau for its intelligence func-
tion, and also about the consequences of this new assignment
and the outbreak of war in Europe as measured in terms of
workload.

The field offices which had been requested earlier by Army
and Navy Intelligence had been opened in the Canal Zone,
Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, Field offices had been
opened, also, near six large shipping centers or military
bases: in Albany, Baltimore, Savannah, Grand Rapids,
Phoenix, and San Diego.

With an eye to preventing espionage and sabotage, the
Army and Navy had asked the FBI to assume jurisdiction
for them over "plant production activities" in places that

'" See Frank Murphy. Executive Powers Under National Emergency. Washing-
ton, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1939. (76th Congress, 2d section. Senate. Document
No. 133).

136

manufactured articles for their use. A procedure which in-
volved no policing, but which was educational and consulta-
tive, was currently being applied in 540 plants; and it was
capable of expanding to reach as many as 12,000 in "a time of
greater emergency." Most plant owners had welcomed it and
were giving "excellent cooperation."

At Washington headquarters, a General Intelligence Divi-
sion — forerunner of today's Domestic Intelligence Division —
had been created to coordinate and supervise all work related
to "espionage, sabotage, and other subversive activities and
violations of the neutrality regulations." Its Translation Sec-
tion made available for use the substance of subversive
foreign-language "communications, documents, and papers."
Its Code Section broke down codes and decoded intercepted
messages.

Also, special investigations were being made of persons
reported to be active in "any subversive activity or in move-
ments detrimental to the internal security." With reference to
those who might have to be more fully investigated in the
event of an acute national emergency, the results of the special
investigations were being kept on file."

Still, in many other regards, the American intelligence community
was insufficient to actual needs during the twilight prior to the na-
tion's entry into the world war. As one authority has observed :

As late as 1938 army counterintelligence in the United
States and its possessions abroad consisted of no more than
three officers and eighteen agents, exactly one of whom spoke
a foreign language. Even worse, the limited numbers in-
volved in intelligence and counterintelligence included many
who had neither the qualifications nor the feel for intrigue.
Frequently career naval and air officers who demonstrated
no special aptitude in other branches of service life were
relegated to intelligence work simply to be got rid of. In 1939,
despite memories of the substantial American commitment in
the First World War and an awareness that a new war was
threatening to follow the earlier pattern, the national secret
services amounted to very little.^^

On May 27, 1941, the President issued (55 Stat. 1647) a second
proclamation of national emergency, saying, in part :

I have said on many occasions that the United States is
mustering its men and its resources only for purposes of
defense — only to repel attack. I repeat that statement now.
But we must be realistic when we use the word "attack;"
we have to relate it to the lightning speed of modern
warfare.

Some people seem to think that we are not attacked until
bombs actually drop in the streets of New York or San Fran-
cisco or New Orleans or Chicago. But they are simply

" Overstreet, op. cit., pp. 89-90.

" Richard Wilmer Rowan with Robert G. Deindorfer. Secret Service: Thirty-
Three Centuries of Espionage. London. William Kimber, 1969, p. 613.

137

shutting their eyes to the lesson that we must learn from the
fate of every Nation that the Xazis have conquered.

The attack on Czechoslovakia began with the conquest of
Austria. The attack on Norway began with the occupation of
Denmark. The attack on Greece began with occupation of
Albania and Bulgaria. The attack on the Suez Canal began
with the invasion of the Balkans and North Africa, and the
attack on the United States can begin with the domination
of any base which menaces our security— north or south.

Nobody can foretell tonight just when the acts of the
dictators will ripen into attack in this hemisphere and us.
But we know enough by now to realize that it would be
suicide to wait until they are in our front yard.^^

The watching and waiting were over. America was preparing for
war. Seven months later war was a reality.

II.Attcwh

On Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, Japanese aircraft attacked
American military and naval installations at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii.
The surprise engagement lasted approximately two hours ; resolution
of the Pacific conflict would occur four years later with the amval
of the atomic age. Simultaneous with the raid on Oahu, the Japanese
launched assaults on the Philippines, Guam, and Midway Island.
These events tragically condemned the pitiful condition of American
intelligence efforts. The following day Congress declared war on
Japan. Three days later, the United States extended the declaration
to Germany and Italy.

The initial months of the Pacific conflict were desperate and devas-
tating for American forces. At Pearl Harbor, 19 ships were sunk or
disabled; about 150 planes were destroyed; 2,335 soldiers and sailors
were killed and 68 civilians perished. The Japanese seized Guam
(December 13) and Wake Island (December 22). The Philippine
invasion (December 10) repelled the American defenders with Manila
and Cavite soon falling to the Japanese (January 2). After a siege
of more than three months endurance, Bataan collapsed (April 9)
and American forces withdrew to Corregidor Island where 11,500
ultimately were forced to surrender (May 6) to the Japanese,

The costly Battle of the Java Sea (Februarys 27-]\Iarch 1) traded
vital naval war material and precious lives for time; having re-
grouped its forces, the Navy halted the Japanese advance in the
Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7-8), the first engagement in history
in which surface ships did not directly destroy each other as all fight-
ing was done by carrier-based aircraft. A month later, in the Battle
of INIidway, the Japanese suffered their first major defeat — 4 aircraft
carriers sunk and 275 planes lost— and the tide of the Pacific war
began turning against Nippon.

American forces did not actively join in the offensive aq:ainst Ger-
many and Italy until 1942. The first independent United States bomb-

" Samuel T. Rosenman, cnmp. The PuMir Papers and Addresses of Franklin D.
Roosevelt: 19Ifl Volume, The Call to Battle Stations. New York, Harper and
Brothers, 1950. pp. 188-189.

138

ing raid in Europe was conducted (August 17) by the Eighth Air
Force from England in an assault upon the railroad yards at Rouen.
By autumn, British and American troops under the command of
General Dwight D. Eisenhower executed Operation Torch with
landings (November 8) in North Africa. By the new year, Eisen-
hower was appointed (February 6) commander in chief of all allied
forces in Africa and by the spring (May 13) had succeeded in liberat-
ing that continent. Out of this campaign came the strategic advantage
for the invasion of Italy (September 3-9) and recognition of Eisen-
hower, soon transferred (January 16, 1944) to command of Allied
Expeditionary Forces in London, as a brilliant organizer and leader
of the diverse allied armies. Six months after assuming command of
the European Theater, Eisenhower was executing (June 6) Operation
Overload, the invasion of France along the Normandy peninsula. It
was the beginning of the end of the Nazi empire.

During the spring and summer months of 1945, World War II
came to a halt. On May 1 the provisional German government an-
nounced Hitler was dead, a suicide in the ruins of Berlin. An instru-
ment of surrender was signed at Allied headquarters at Reim on
May 7; V-E Day, the formal end of the war in Europe, occurred
the following day ; and the German surrender was ratified in Berlin
on May 9. Three months later. United States aircraft dropped atomic
devices on Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki (August 10). Agree-
ment as to the conditions for Japan's surrender was achieved on
August 14 ; V-J Day, the formal end of war in the Pacific, occurred
the following day ; and the Japanese surrender was finalized on Sep-
tember 2. Official termination of the declaration of war against Ger
many took place on October 19, 1951 (65 Stat. 451) ; official termina-
tion of war with Japan came on March 20, 1952, with the Senate
ratification of the treaty of peace.

///. Oifice of Strategic Services

Although various defense and civilian departments and agencies
of the Federal Government maintained units for intelligence purposes
during World War II, it was during this period of international
tumult that the first centralized intelligence structure came into
existence. The man proposing the new intelligence entity was William
J. Donovan, a much decorated hero of World War I, an attorney, a
Republican, an internationalist, and an ardent foe of totalitarianism.

President Roosevelt welcomed the suggestion of a single
agency which would serve as a clearinghouse for all intelli-
gence, as well as an organ of counterpropaganda and a train-
ing center for what were euphemistically called "special
operations," and invited Colonel Donovan to be its head.
At first Donovan was reluctant. His World War I antipathy
to desk generalship was still strong, and though he was now
fifty-eight he preferred to lead a combat division; but the
prospect of organizing a unified intelligence, sabotage and
subversive warfare unit, the first in American history, was
most tempting. After a lengthy discussion with the Presi-

139

dent, he agreed to form the new agency, under the somewhat
misleading title of Coordinator of Information.^*

Born in Buffalo, New York, on New Year's Day, 1883,
William Joseph Donovan's paternal grandparents had immigrated
to the United States from Ireland in about 1840. His father sold real
estate at one time and later operated an insurance business. After
attending St. Joseph's Collegiate Institute and Niagara University
(B.A., 1905), William studied at Columbia University (LL.B., 1907)
and was admitted to the New York bar in 1908. Four years later he
formed his first law partnership and began his military career, enlist-
ing in the 1st Cavalry of the New York National Guard. He saw nine
months of active duty along the Rio Grande during the INIexican
campaign in 1916. When the United States entered the European
hostilities the following year, Donovan was assistant chief of staff
of the 27th Division of the New York National Guard. With the
formation of the 42nd "Rainbow" Division, he was assigned to the
165th Infantry and subsequently became a colonel with the Fighting
69th Regiment. Wounded three times during twenty-one months of
active service overseas, Donovan became one of the most decorated
soldiers of the Great War. His own government awarded him the
Congressional Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Cross, and
the Distinguished Service INIedal. He was the only member of the
armed forces to receive these three cherished decorations during
World War I.

In the summer of 1919, returned to civilian life and about to resume
his law practice in Buffalo, Donovan and his wife of five years left
the United States on a long-deferred honeymoon to Japan. It was
then that he began his intelligence activities.

They had relaxed in Tokyo but a few days when the Ameri-
can ambassador, Roland Morris, called Donovan on urgent
business. Morris was about to depart for Siberia to evaluate
the reportedly unstable status of the Wliite Russian govern-
ment at Omsk, headed by Admiral Alexander Kolchak, and
advise the State Department whether the Kolchak regime
should be supported by the United States. He needed some-
one with Donovan's background and training to accompany
him on his confidential mission. Ruth Donovan reconciled
herself to what would become a pattern of similar missions
over the next forty years.^^
A variety of other government positions soon beckoned Donovan.
He became a U.S. Attorney for the Western District of New York
in 1922. Shortly thereafter he served as a delegate to a Canadian-
American customs conference held in Ottawa, which produced a
treaty of cooperation in preventing international criines. In 1924
Donovan was appointed Assistant Attorney General in charge of
Federal criminal matters; the following year he became the assistant

"Corey Ford. Donovan of OSS. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1970,
p. 108.

" IMd., p. 59.

70-890 O - 76 - 10

140

to Attorney General John G. Sargent, a position he held until 1929.
Keturning to New York, Donovan acted as counsel for the panel
revising the state laws pertaining to the Public Service Commission.
During the 1930's he traveled to Ethiopia as an impartial observer
of the invasion by Italy; next he was in Spain scrutinizing the
development of the civil war in that land. Through friends and con-
tacts in Europe, he kept well informed on the progress of totalitarian-
ism on the Continent. With the outbreak of war in 1939, Donovan
became a valuable operative for neutral America. In July, 1940, he
went to Great Britain to observe the Blitz for Secretary of the Navy
Frank Knox. Upon his return he made a vigorous effort to publicize
England's ability to survive the German assault and to secure aid
for the embattled British. In December he was again on a reconnais-
sance mission, touring Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt, Greece, Bulgaria,
Yugoslavia, Turkey, Cyprus, Palestine, Spain, Portugal, and again
to Great Britain." With his observations on the military, political,
and economic conditions in these nations he also offered the sugges-
tion for creating a centralized intelligence agency. The impetus for
such an organization derived not only from felt need for such an
entity at the Federal level, but also from a close familiarity with
the Special Operations structure of the British government.^^ Once
the American counterpart to the British intelligence office was estab-
lished, Donovan became its chief, but served from the fall of 1941
to the spring of 1943 without a government salary or an active duty
military rank.^^

In the summer of 1941, four months before the Japanese struck
Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt issued a directive (7 F.R. 3422-
3423) designating a Coordinator of Information which said:

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the
United States and as Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, it is ordered as follows :

1. There is hereby established the position of Coordinator
of Information, with authority to collect and analyze all
information and data which may bear upon national secu-
rity; to correlate such information and data, and to make
such information and data available to the President and to
such departments and officials of the Government as the
President may determine; and to carry out, when requested
by the President, such supplementary activities as may facili-
tate the securing of information important for national secu-
rity not now available to the Government.

2. The several departments and agencies of the Government
shall make available to the Coordinator of Information all
and any such information and data relating to national
security as the Coordinator, with the approval of the Presi-
dent, may from time to time request.

3. The Coordinator of Information may appoint such com-
mittees, consisting of appropriate representatives of the vari-

" On Donovan's overseas observation missions see /ft? (7., pp. 78-107.
" IMd., p. 107.
"* Ibid., p. 174.

141

ous departments and agencies of the Government, as he may
deem necessary to assist him in the performance of his
functions.

4. Nothing in the duties and responsibilities of the Coordi-
nator of Information shall in any way interfere with or im-
pair the duties and responsibilities of the regular military
and naval advisers of the President as Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy.

5. "Within the limits of such funds as may be allocated to
the Coordinator of Information by the President, the Co-
ordinator may employ necessary personnel and make provi-
sion for the necessary supplies, facilities, and services.

6. William J. Donovan is hereby designated as Coordinator
of Information.

Dated July 11, 1941, this purposely vague directive provided Dono-
van with an intelligence function, which might include special actions
requested by the President, and a propaganda mission. After a year of
operations, it was felt that the propaganda duties of the Coordinator
were inappropriate to his intelligence activities. Subsequently, on
June 13, 1942, these propaganda responsibilities were transferred to the
newly created (E.O. 9182) Office of War Information established
within the Office for Emergency Management. By military order (7
F.R. 4469—1470) of the same date, the Coordinator's office was renamed
the Office of Strategic Services and placed under the jurisdiction of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Donovan's new charter said :

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the
United States and as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
'NsLVj of the United States, it is ordered as follows :

1. The office of Coordinator of Information established by
Order of July 11, 1941, exclusive of the foreign information
activities transferred to the Office of War Information by
Executive Order of June 13. 1942, shall hereafter be known as
the Office of Strategic Services, and is hereby transferred to
the jurisdiction of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. The Office of Strategic Services shall perform the follow-
ing duties :

a. Collect and analyze such strategic information as
mav be required by the United States Joint Chiefs of
Staff.

b. Plan and operate such special services as may be
directed by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. At the head of the Office of Strategic Services shall be a
Director of Strategic Services who shall be appointed by the
President and who shall perform his duties under the direc-
tion and supervision of the United States Joint Chiefs of
Staff.

4. William J. Donovan is hereby appointed as Director of
Strategic Services.

5. The Order of July 11, 1941 is hereby revoked.

Although this directive clarified the duties of Donovan's organiza-
tion, it did not insure the gadfly agency's operational status.

142

Executive Order 9182 [divesting Donovan of propaganda
production responsibilities] had insured, at least for the
moment, the continuance of Donovan's controvei-sial experi-
ment in organized intelligence and paramilitary service; but
the transfer of its jurisdiction from the President to the Joint
Chiefs of Staif (which Donovan had personally requested)
posed even more critical problems. Now the struggling COI
had a new supervisor as well as a new name, and its functions
and the extent of its authority were entirely dependent upon
the decision of the JCS. This meant that all funds to operate
OSS must come from Congress, primarily the House and
Senate Appropriations Committees, and its budget requests
must first be submitted to and approved by the gimlet-eyed
Bureau of the Budget. The immediate problem of maintain-
ing OSS during the transition period was temporarily
bridged by instructions from the JCS that it should carry
on as usual, pending further study of its wartime functions;
but Donovan and his top staff were keenly aware that OSS
faced a critical struggle to convince the Joint Chiefs and
other ranking officials of the government not only that OSS
should be given adequate written authority and manpower
and supplies, but in fact that it should exist at all.^^

Preparing his own case, Donovan, with staff assistance, drafted and
redrafted a proposed OSS directive establishing the agency's opera-
tional authority. He was adamant that OSS should never be absorbed
by or subject to the control of any other government office or the armed
forces. In brief, OSS would assist and serve all segments of the Fed-
eral structure but would be subsei-vient to none. His painstaking effort
completed, Donovan forwarded the model directive and an explana-
toiy memorandum to the Joint Chiefs.^*' His time was then consumed
by preparations for Operation Torch — the invasion of North
Africa — and the execution of this first assualt asrainst the totalitarian
forces holding the Old World captive. Among other triumphs deriving
from the incursion, the

pre-invasion charts and estimates, and the OSS-pioneered
technique of keeping commanders informed of conditions
ashore up to the vei-y moment of landing, had clearly demon-
strated the new agency's value ; but Donovan's draft directive,
submitted to the JCS before Torch, was still being debated in
committee hearings. Early in December Donovan had an in-
formal chat with his old friend Frank Knox, Secretary of the
Navy. Knox was surprised to learn that so long a period had
elapsed without any formal or comprehensive instructions
from the Joint Chiefs, and he took up the matter with Presi-
dent Roosevelt, who told General George C. Marshall, chair-
man of the JCS : "I wish you would give Bill Donovan a little
elbow room to operate in." Shortly afterward the Joint
Chiefs appointed committees of high-ranking officers, in-
cluding Admiral Frederick Home and Generals Joseph T.
McNarney and Albert Wedemyer, to make a personal inspec-

' lUd., pp. 128-129.
• See lUd., p. 131.

143

tion of OSS and recommend what should be done. The com-
mittee promptly rendered reports (which were not made
available to OSS), and on December 23, 1942, six months
after it was created, the agency received its long-awaited
directive, almost word for word the draft which Donovan
had prepared.

In the field of intelligence, OSS was given the independent
status which Donovan sought, climaxing the bitter feud with
the rival service agencies. The Joint Psychological Warfare
Board, on which OSS had a minority of members, was
abolished by the JCS. Henceforth OSS was the sole agency of
the JCS authorized to operate in the fields of intelligence,
sabotage, and counterespionage, to conduct guerrilla opera-
tions, and to direct resistance groups in all enemy-occupied or
controlled territory. General Marshall stated in a personal
letter to Colonel Donovan, written on the same day the direc-
tive was issued :

"I regret that, after voluntarily coming imder the jurisdic-
tion of the JCS, your organization has not had smoother
sailing. Nevertheless, it has rendered invaluable service,
particularly with reference to the North African Campaign.
I am hopeful that the new Office of Strategic Services' direc-
tive will eliminate most, if not all, of your difficulties." ^^

Donovan's original idea for a centralized intelligence agency had
derived from his exposure to the British intelligence structure during
his 1940 observation missions.^^ Faced with the necessity of quickly
organizing an effective intelligence operation for the United States,
Donovan again relied upon the British.

William Stephenson had developed an undercover organiza-
tion in the United States, called British Security Coordinator
(BSC), which was staffed with experienced officers; and they
supplied the pioneer American agency at the outset with
much of its secret intelligence. Experts in counterespionage
and subversive propaganda and special operations were put
at Donovan's disposal, and he was shown their methods of
communicating with resistance forces behind the lines. In the
early days, COI agents were trained at a school near Toronto,
Canada, later a model for some of the training schools of
OSS. Donovan said after the war: "Bill Stephenson and the
British Intelligence Service gave us an enormous head start
which we could not otherwise have had." ^^

With information and expertise being supplied by the British, the
next task involved structuring the new intelligence entity.

Colonel Donovan brought a trained legal mind to the task
of organizing his fast-growing agency — ^OSS was to employ
some thirty thousand people by the war's end- — and set it
up as he would prepare a trial case, with research experts to
analyze the evidence and skilled assistants to conduct the

'"■ Ibid., pp. 162-163.
" See Ihid., p. 107.
»76td., pp. 112-113.

144

prosecution. At the top of the chart were Donovan as director
and [G. Edward] Buxton as [assistant] director, and beside
them were the Planning Group and the Planning Staff. Under
Donovan were his three deputy directors, with staff but not
command status, who were charged with the duty of coordi-
nating the three main OSS functions: intelligence (research
and analysis, secret intelligence, counterespionage, and col-
lateral offices), operations (sabotage, guerrilla warfare, psy-
chological warfare, and related activities), and schools and
training. A chief of services supervised the work of the offices
of budget, procurement, finance, and related problems. In
addition, there were some eighteen essential offices which
could not be assigned effectively to any subordinate com-
mand. Thus the Security Office reported directly to Donovan,
since security involved all procedures and all personnel re-
gardless of rank. Other offices which served the entire orga-
nization were also placed under the director, including
medical services, special funds, field photographic, communi-
cations, Navy and Army Commands which handled the
administrative problems of OSS naval and military person-
nel, and a liaison office to maintain relations with other gov-
ernment agencies. The functions of the principal branches
were:

Research and Analysis (R&A) To produce the eco-
nomic, military, social and political studies and estimates
for every strategic area from Europe to the Far East.
Secret hitelligence (SI) To gather on-the-spot infor-
mation from within neutral and enemy teriitory.

Special Operations (SO) To conduct sabotage and
work with resistance forces.

Counterespionage (X-2) To protect our own and
Allied intelligence operations, and to identify enemy
agents overseas.

Morale Operations (^10) To create and disseminate
black [covert] propaganda.

Operational Groups (OG) To train and supply and
lead guerrilla forces in enemy territory.

Maritime Unit (MIT) To conduct maritime sabotage.
Schools and Training (S«&T) In overall charge of the
assessment and training of personnel, both in the United
States and overseas.
Not only did this departmentalization increase the agency's
effectiveness, but it helped to maintain security. Each branch
of OSS had its own secret file of information, which was
available to members of other branches only on an official
"need to know" basis. Donovan himself was not told the
real names of some of his most successful agents, nor did he
seek to leam them. Complete anonymity was the best safe-
guard against detection by the enemy.^*

lUd., pp. 167-68.

145

With the establishment of the Office of Coordinator of Information
a recruitment of new faces into the intelligence system was inaugu-
rated. Most would continue their service with OSS until the end of
the war.

Heading Donovan's early staff was Colonel Edward Buxton,
a close friend since World War I days, who left his business
in Rhode Island to become the [assistant] director of the
COI. James ]\Iurphy, formerly Donovan's secretary when he
was Assistant Attorney General, was made his personal as-
sistant. Dr. William L. Danger, distinguished Coolidge pro-
fessor of history at Harvard, who had seen action as a ser-
geant in the Argonne and at St.-Mihiel, headed the key Re-
search and Analysis division, following the resignation of
Dr. James Phinney Baxter, president of Williams College
and a brilliant administrator, who served briefly as the first
chief of R&A. Dr. Edward S. Mason, later director of Har-
vard's School of Public Administration and a prominent
economist. Dean Calvin Hoover of Duke University, and the
late Dr. Edward Meade of Princeton's Institute for iVdvanced
Study, and Dr. Henry Field, curator of physical anthro-
pology at Chicago's Field Museum, joined Donovan's ex-
panding unit. David K. E. Bruce, later to be named U.S.
ambassador to the Court of St. James's, came to Washington
to head COI's Special Activities Bruce (SAB), the agency's
secret intelligence branch; and M. P. Goodfellow left his
newspaper business to head the sabotage branch (Special
Activities Goodfellow — or SAG). (Both of these branches
existed in the training stages only, since the U.S. was not yet
at war.) Robert E. Sherwood, noted American playwright
and an intimate of President Roosevelt assumed responsi-
bility for the Foreign Information Service (FIS) .-^

When OSS was created, Sherwood became director of overseas
operations at the Office of War Information. Most of the personnel
staying with OSS donned uniforms and held some type of rank in
the armed forces; nevertheless, they took their direction from Dono-
van and were not subjected to the command of the Army and Navy.

From the beginnings of COI before Pearl Harbor to the
termination of OSS after V-J Day, the Research and Anal-
ysis branch was the very core of the agency. The cloak-and-
dagger exploits of agents infiltrated behind the lines captured
the public imagination ; but the prosaic and colorless grubbing
of Dr. Danger's scientists, largely overlooked by the press,
provided far and away the greater contribution to America's
wartime intelligence. From the files of foreign newspapers,
from obscure technical journals, from reports of international
business firms and labor organizations, they extracted perti-
nent figures and data. With infinite patience, they fitted the
facts together into a mosaic of information — the raw material

IMd., pp. 110-111.

146

of strategy, Donovan called it — on which the President and
his Chiefs of Staff could form their operational decisions. ^°

The R&A branch gained sufficient prestige that other Federal agen-
cies sought its assistance. The Board of Economic Warfare, for
example, asked R&A to determine if Soviet requests for American
goods under lend-lease were justified by the conditions of their
economy. On this particular matter, OSS findings proved to be more
accurate than those of British intelligence.^^

At the start, Donovan established an R&A Board of Analysts,
consisting of half a dozen scholars, each of whom took charge
of some major activity and played an important role in
recruiting further staff membei^. In this way, he was able to
secure the high classifications needed to get the very best
people for a general directorate. (Subsequently this Board
of Analysts provided the model for the CIA Board of Na-
tional Estimates, set up in 1950 by Dr. Langer for General
Bedell Smith.) Due to its many-sided and brilliant staff,
R&A was credited with producing the most accurate estimates
made by the Allies in World War 11.^^

In addition to its research and analysis achievements, OSS was to
prove inventive and innovative in another capacity. These were the
products of the research and development unit (R&D) headed by
Stanley Lovell.

Dr. Stanley Lovell, in charge of the agency's calculated mis-
chief, was a sunny little nihilist, his spectacles twinkling and
his chubby face creasina: with merriment as he displayed his
latest diabolic devices. This simple candle could be placed by
a female acent in the bedroom of an amorous German officer,
Lovell chuckled, and would burn perfectly until the flame
touched the high explosive contained in the lower half of the
candle. This innocent -looking plastic cylinder called the Fire-
flv, dropped furtivelv into the a:as tank of a car by a Maquis
filling-station attendant, would explode after the gasoline
had swelled a rubber retaining ring. If the vehicle were a
German tank — Lovell had to pause to wipe his spectacles and
dab the tears of laughter from his eyes — the occupants would
be cremated before thev could open the escape hatch. This
anerometer. a barometric fuse attached to a length of hose
packed with explosive, could be slid into the rear of the fuse-
lage of an enemy aircraft ; at five thousand feet altitude, he

^Ibid., p. 148; ponnlar accounts of OSS cloak-and-dagger activities, which
were often heroic and valiant elforts, may be found in Steward Alsop and Thomas
Braden. Suh Rosa: Thr O.S!.S^. and American E-ipionapr, New York, Reynal and
Hitchcock. 1946: and Corey Ford and Alastair McBain : Cloak and Dagger: The
Secret Story of OSS, Xew York, Random House. 1946. An excellent account of
OSS field operations may be found in R. Harris Smith. OSS: The Sec>-et Historu
of America's First Central Intelligence Agency, Berkeley, University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1972.

" See Ford, op. oit.. p. 152 ; for an appreciation of the general approach of R&A
to intelligence anal.vses, see Sherman Kent. Strategic Intelligence for American
World Policy. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 191^9.

=* Ford, op. cit., p. 150.

147

explained gleefully, the entire tail section would blow off.
This limpet, fastened by a powerful magnet to the side of a
ship below waterline, would detonate when the magnesium
alloy was eroded by salt water, long after the saboteur had
left the area. It was used elfectively by the Norweign under-
ground to sink Nazi troop-ships in the narrow fjords of Oslo
and Narvik — Lovell doubled up and slapped his knees at the
thought — and sent untold thousands of German soldiers to a
watery grave.^^

In spite of the various intelligence accomplishments of OSS, not
everyone in Washington was happy about the creation and existence
ol Donovan's organization.

J. Edgar Hoover, perhaps fearing that COI would steal the
spotlight long enjoyed by his FBI, was not satisfied until
he had Roosevelt's word that Donovan would be expressly
forbidden to conduct any espionage activities within the
United States, Nelson Rockefeller, Chairman of the State
Department's Committee to Coordinate Inter-American Af-
fairs (once called, even more pretentiously, the Committee on
Cultural and Commercial Relations Between North and
South America) echoed the FBI in seeking assurance that
Donovan would likewise be excluded from his established
bailiwick in the southern hemisphere. Major General George
V. Strong, later chief of Army G-2, could not understand
that G-2 represented tactical military intelligence and COI
strategic intelligence of all kinds; and Strong therefore felt
there was a definite conflict of interests. He vigorously fought
Roosevelt's proposal that Colonel Donovan should be returned
to active duty with the rank of major general — a grade more
commensurate with his new duties — and offered the irrele-
vant arginnent that "Wild Bill" was too independent to be a
team player. "If there's a loose football on the field," Strong
protested, "he'll pick it up and run with it." Isolationist sena-
tors such as Burton Wlieeler and Robert Taft likewise op-
posed Donovan's advance in rank, and Taft rose on the
Senate floor to warn his colleagues of the danger of White
House control of intelligence and investigative units. Realiz-
ing that the supge-ted promotion minht cause a prolonged
Congressional fight, Roosevelt yielded, at least for the
moment, and Donovan took over as head of COI in a civilian
capacity.^"

Though the President granted the FBI exclusive intelligence juris-
diction over South and Latin America, OSS still made forays into the
region."'^ Tlie rivalry between the two agencies also exemplified itself
in other ways.

^ Ibid., p. 170: R&D also produced or nt least considered a number of bizarre
and totally Impractical schemes and devices ; see Stanley P. Lovell. Of Spies and
Sti-atagems. Engelwood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1963.

"" Ford. op. cit., p. 109.

^ See Smith, op. cit., p. 20.

148

In January 1942 Donovan's officers secretly penetrated the
Spanish embassy in Washington and began photographing
the code books and other official documents of Franco's pro-
Axis government. Hoover learned of this operation and was
angered because the COI men were invading his operational
territory. The FBI did not bother to register a formal pro-
test. While the COI officers were making one of their noc-
turnal entries into the embassy in April, two FBI squad cars
followed. When Donovan's men were in the building, the cars
pulled up outside the embassy and turned on their sirens. The
entire neighborhood was awakened and the COI interlopers
were sent scurrving. Donovan protested this incredible FBI
action to the White House. Instead of reprimanding Hoover,
Roosevelt's aides ordered the embassy infiltration project
turned over to tlie Bureau.^^

OSS was also restricted from entering the Pacific Theater (but not
Asia) by General Douglas MacArthur. The agency's intelligence ma-
terials were utilized by MacArthur in his invasion of and return to the
Philippines; Admiral Chester Nimitz had a small OSS maritime unit
for underwater demolition action with his fleet; and another OSS
force delivered special weapons to the Tenth Army for the Okinawa
landing, but Donovan's agents were otherwise unauthorized to operate
in MacArthur's command area.^^

General MacArthur's intransiofpnoe is difficult to explain.
His personal relationship with Donovan was cordial, they
had served together in the Rainbow Division during the First
World War, and both were highlv decorated heroes. Donovan
entertained the deepest regard for MacArthur's brillance as
a military strategist, and never offered any reason for his ada-
mant opposition to OSS; but members of the agencv had
their private theories. Some speculated that [Charlesl Wil-
louehby TMacArthur's intelligence chief], anxious to insure
full credit for his intelligence unit, feared that "Wild Bill"
would irrab the spotliffht. Othei-s held that ]Nfac Arthur, a West
Pointer and firm believer in the chain of command, obiected
to the presence of a uniformed civilian acting independently
in his theater. A few intimates, who knew Donovan's own de-
termination, suspected that it was the inevitable clash be-
tween two strong personalities, equally fixed in purpose.^*

In spite of these jurisdictional limitations placed on OSS by the
FBI and the Army, the agency gathered its intelligence materials
from all over the globe by whatever means available. Agreements were
negotiated regarding "special operations" by OSS at the outset of
efforts to liberate Europe, beginning with the North African invasion.

In planning the invasion, political problems posed them-
selves immediately. Roosevelt secured Churchiirs agreement

^ lUd.

^ See Ford, op. cit., p. 253.

'* Ibid., pp. 253-254 ; as commander of United Nations troops in Korea in 1951,
MacArthur also refused to allow the Central Intelligence Agency to operate in
his theater.

149

that the landings, code-named TORCH, should be a predomi-
nantly American operation (with the United States handling
the diplomatic aspects). The President and his advisors be-
lieved that anglophoic French commanders in North Africa
would offer less resistance to a landing led by American
troops with British forces remaining in the background.

At the secret service level, a similar agreement had been
reached in June 1942 as part of a comprehensive operational
accord with the British SOE [Special Operations Execu-
tive], negotiated in London by OSS Colonels Preston Good-
fellow . . . and Garland Williams, an official of the New York
Narcotics Commission. In the first of several war-time deline-
ations of "spheres of influence" for clandestine activity, OSS
took primary responsibility for subversion in North Africa
(as well as China, Korea, the South Pacific, and Finland).
The British, in turn, assumed temporary predominance in
India, West Africa, the Balkans, and the Middle East. West-
ern Europe was considered joint territory.^^

Such agreements, of course, were of momentary importance and re-
quired renegotiations as new areas came under liberation and when-
ever the grand strategists shifted their attack objectives and designs
for routing the enemy. In the midst of such planning, old jealousies
and new antagonism flared against OSS.

Back in the early days of COI, London had been most co-
operative, sharing its training facilities and operational tech-
niques with the struggling new agency. As OSS grew
stronger, however, SIS [the British Secret Intelligence Serv-
ice] showed an increasing reluctance to accept its American
counterpart as a full and equal partner.

Britain's position w^as enhanced by the Theater Command's
lack of sympathy with OSS objectives. Throughout 1942^3,
the practice of ETOUSA (European Theater of Operations)
was to rely mainly on British Intelligence and ignore OSS
offers of assistance, thus inadvertently aiding SIS efforts to
subordinate the younger American organization. The U.S.
Theater Command staff based their policy on Britain's
greater experience in the field; but they overlooked the fact
that OSS could provide new and different information to
supplement or even refute the intelligence from other sources,
and would serve long-range U.S. strategic needs best if it re-
mained independent.

The issue came to a head in September of 1943 when
ETOUSA refused to give OSS authority to conduct es-
pionage on the European continent unless it operated under
British supervision. General Donovan insisted that freedom
from the knowledge and influence of any outside power was
essential to the success of his Secret Intelligence branch, and
he strongly opposed the SIS efforts to force an amalgama-
tion. In an appeal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he pointed out
that Britain's proposal "suggests 'coordination' and 'agree-

^ Smith, op. cit., pp. 51-52.

150

ment,' but as employed here the word 'coordination' means
'control' and 'agreement' means 'dependence.' . . . This at-
tempt of the British, by reason of their physical control of
territory and communication, to subordinate the American
intelligence and counterintelligence service is shortsighted
and dangerous to the ultimate interests of both countries."
As a result of his arguments, a new JCS directive on Octo-
ber 27, 1943 gave OSS full and unqualified authority to op-
erate on the Continent, ETOIJSA accordingly reversed its
position, and the independence of American long-range es-
pionage was assured. Rather than engage in destructive
competition, the British yielded. OSS Special Operations
(SO) and Counterintelligence (X-2) greatly strengthened
their ETO and were given access to the extensive files which
Britain had taken decades to develop. In turn, OSS provided
funds, manpower, resistance supplies, three sub-chasers for
Norweg:ian operations, and a squadron of Liberator bombers
for airdrops to occupied countries. Thenceforth, throughout
the war American and British intelligence worked in pro-
ductive though discreet partnership.^^

On occasion, unusual organization schemes facilitated Donovan's
efforts at maintaining an effective intelligence operation. Early in the
war, influential German emigres to the United States were recruited
by Shortwave Research, Inc., a COI front, to broadcast anti-Nazi
messages to their homeland.^'' To retain an OSS foothold in China,
Donovan found it necessary to agree to creating the Sino- American
Cooperative Organization, headed by Chiang Kai-shek's feared and
hated secret police chief, Tai Li, described by one OSS report as "not
the Admiral Canaris of China, but the Heinrich Himmler."

The deputy director of the unit was Captain Milton "Mary" Miles
who, while chief of OSS Far Eastern operations and commander of
Navy Group/China, had befriended Tai Li. The scheme was harshly
criticized by the theater commander. General Joseph Stilwell and his
highly experienced State Department political advisors, John Paton
Davies, Jr. and John Service. The new organization soon began to
disintegrate; Miles became hostile toward OSS headquarters and
autocratic in terms of controlling OSS field operations in China.
Eventually, Donovan personally intervened, fired Miles, and chal-
lenged Tai Li to try and halt OSS agents operating in his country.
Donovan also enlisted the help of General Claire Chennault in estab-
lishing independence for OSS operations in China and championing
the agency's activities.^®

And in the middle of neutral Switzerland, attached to the American
Legation at Bern as a Special Assistant to the Minister, was Allen
Dulles, an OSS master agent literally surrounded by the Nazi regime.
Dispatched in November 1942, Dulles was instrumental in intelligence
gathering and directing special operations within enemy territory.
Froni February to May 1945, he served as the negotiator and concili-
ator in efforts which led to the unconditional surrender of close to a

'' Ford. op. cit., pp. 165-166.

" Smith, op. cit., p. 405n.

'^See Ford, op. cit., pp. 265-275; Smith, op. cit., pp. 242-285.

151

million men occupying Northern Italy and the termination of hostili-
ties on that f ront.^^

In the autumn of 1944, as Allied troops continued to roll across
Europe and press closer to Japan in the Pacific, President Roosevelt
sought Donovan's thinking on the matter of a permanent intelligence
organization for the period after the end of the war. In response to
the Chief Executive's request, Donovan offered the following classi-
fied memorandum:

November 18, 1944.

Pursuant to your note of 31 October 1944, 1 have given con-
sideration to the organization of an intelligence service for
the post-war period.

In the early days of the war, when the demands upon in-
telligence services were mainly in and for military operations,
the OSS was placed under the direction of the JCS.

Once our enemies are defeated the demand will be equally
pressing for information that will aid us in solving the prob-
lems of peace.

This will require two things :

1. That intelligence control be returned to the supervision
of the President.

2. The establishment of a central authority reporting di-
rectly to you, with responsibility to frame intelligence objec-
tives and to collect and coordinate the intelligence material
required by the Executive Branch in planning and carrying
out national policy and strategy.

I attach in the form of a draft directive (Tab A) the
means by which I think this could be realized without diffi-
culty or loss of time. You will note that coordination and
centralization are placed at the policy level but operational
intelligence (that pertaining primarily to Department action)
remains within the existing agencies concerned. The creation
of a central authority thus would not conflict with or limit
necessary intelligence functions within the Army, Navy, De-
partment of State and other agencies.

In accordance with your wish, this is set up as a permanent
long-range plan. But you may want to consider whether this
(or part of it) should be done now, by executive or legislative
action. There are common-sense reasons why you may desire
to lay the keel of the ship at once.

The immediate revision and coordination of our present
intelligence system would effect substantial economies and
aid in the more efficient and speedy termination of the war.

Information important to the national defense, being gath-
ered now by certain Departments and agencies, is not being
used to full advantage in the war. Coordination at the strat-
egy level would prevent waste, and avoid the present confu-
sion that leads to waste and unnecssary duplication.

Thougli in the midst of war, we are also in a period of
transition which, before we are aware, will take us into the

* See Ford. op. cit., pp. 291-295 ; also see Allen Dulles. The Secret Surrender.
New York, Harper and Row, 1966.

152

tumult of rehabilitation. An adequate and orderly intelligence
system will contribute to informed decisions.

We have now in the Government the trained and special-
ized personnel needed for the task. This talent should not be
dispersed.

William J. Donovan, Director.

TAB A

Substantive Authority Necessary in Establishment of a
Central Intelligence Service

In order to coordinate and centralize the policies and ac-
tions of the Government relating to intelligence:

1. There is established in the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent a central intelligence service, to be known as the

, at the head of which shall be a Director appointed

by the President. The Director shall discharge and perform
his functions and duties under the direction and supervision
of the President. Subject to the approval of the President,
the Director may exercise his powers, authorities and duties
through such officials or agencies and such manner as he may
determine.

2. There is established in the an Advisory

Board consisting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
War, the Secretary of the Navy, and such other members as
the President may subsequently appoint. The Board shall
advise and assist the Director with respect to the formulation
of basic policies and plans of the .

3. Subject to the direction and control of the President,
and with any necessary advise and assistance from the other

Departments and agencies of the Government, the

shall perform the following functions and duties:

(a) Coordination of the functions of all intelligence agen-
cies of the Government, and the establishment of such policies
and objectives as will assure the integration of national
intelligence efforts ;

(b) Collection either directly or through existing Govern-
ment Departments and agencies, of pertinent information,
including military, economic, political and scientific, concern-
ing the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign na-
tions, with particular reference to the effect such matters may
have upon the national security, policies and interests of the
United States;

(c) Final evaluation, synthesis and dissemination within
the Government of the intelligence required to enable the
Government to determine policies with respect to national
planning and security in peace and war, and the advancement
of broad national policy ;

(d) Procurement, training and supervision of its intelli-
gence personnel;

( e ) Subversive operations abroad ;

153

(f ) Determination of policies for an coordination of facil-
ities essential to the collection of information under sub-
paragraph "(b)" hereof ; and

(g) Such other functions and duties relating to intelli-
gence as the President from time to time may direct.

4. The shall have no police or law-enforce-
ment functions, either at home or abroad.

5. Subject to Paragraph 3 hereof, existing intelligence
agencies within the Government shall collect, evaluate, syn-
thesize and disseminate departmental operating intelligence,
herein, defined as intelligence required by such agencies in
the actual performance of their functions and duties.

6. The Director shall be authorized to call upon Depart-
ments and agencies of the Government to furnish appropri-
ate specialists for such supervisory and fimctional positions
within the as may be required.

7. All Government Departments and agencies shall make
available to the Director such intelligence material as the
Director, with the approval of the President, from time to
time may request.

8. The shall operate under an independent

budget.

9. In time of war or unlimited national emergencv, all

programs of the in areas of actual or projected

military operations shall be coordinated vnt\\ militai-y plans
and shall be subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Paits of such programs which are to l^e executed in a
theater of military operations shall be subject to the control
of the Theater Commander.

10. Within the limits of such funds as may be made avail-
able to the , the Director may employ necessary

personnel and make provision for necessary supplies, facili-
ties and services. The Director shall be assigned, upon the
approval of the President, such military and naval personnel
as may be required in the performance of the functions and

duties of the . The Director may provide for the

internal organization and management of the in

such manner as he may determine.*"

Three months later, on February 9, 1945, the isolationist press
triumvirate — the Chicago TrihvTie, the New York Daily Neios, and
the Washington Times-HeraM — carried an article by Walter Trohan
characterizing the proposed agency as an "all-powerful intelligence
service to spy on the postwar world" and one which "would supercede
all existing Federal police and intelligence units." The column con-
tinued with full quotations from the memorandum and draft direc-
tive prepared by Donovan. The effect of the story was to raise a
multiplicity of fears about such an entity being established and to
also unleash a profusion of jealousies among the existing Federal
intelligence and investigative units. The source of the leak regard-

*" Ford, op. cit., pp. 340-342.

154

inc^ Donovan's communique to the President was thought to be FBI
Director Hoover.^^

A second blow was delivered to OSS in April when the man who
had urg-ed its creation and had remained appreciative of its mission
vis-a-vis the other intelligence functionaries died suddenly in Warm
Springs, Georgia. In many ways, the war, due to end in four months,
claimed one more fatality in the case of Franklin D. Eoosevelt. Rut
it also seized a President who understood and championed the unique
intelligence activities of OSS. The new Chief Executive would be
far less appreciative.

It must be conceded, in fairness to Harry Truman, that he
had never been taken into the full confidence of President
Roosevelt. Their relationship was less than full or intimate ;
and, deliberately or due to carelessness, he had failed to brief
his Vice-President on the dangers of an intelligence gap in the
dawning atomic age. Whether it would have saved Donovan's
plan for a centralized and independent postwar intelligence
ser^nce is questionable. Truman was a practical politician;
and he saw OSS as a political liability because it gave the
opposition, both extreme right and extreme left, a chance to
attack the administration. The cry was on to cut the military
expenditure, to disarm, to bring the boys home. Roosevelt
might have refused to yield to public pressure, but Tniman
could not count on the same support of the American
people.*^

Without consulting Donovan or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Presi-
dent Truman, on September 20, directed (E.O. 9621) that OSS ter-
minate operations effective October 1, 191:5. The Bureau of the
Budget, prompted by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, insisted
on relocating the R&A section of OSS within the State Department
to facilitate research needs there. "At Secretary Byrnes's request.
Dr. Danger came to State in 1946 for six months, to set up the intel-
ligence unit, but the regional desks were not particularly interested
at the time." *^ Established as the Interim Research and Intelligence
Branch, the unit became the Office of Intelligence Research in 1947
and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research a decade later.

The Secret Intelligence (SI) and Counterespionage (X-2) sections
were transferred to the War Department where they formed the
Strategic Services Unit which, in one expert's view, "was nothing
more than a caretaker body formed to preside over the liquidation
of the OSS espionage network." **

Only after the integrated mechanism of OSS had been
scrapped, and the majority of its trained personnel, who
would liave liked to continue, had drifted away in disgust,
did the truth dawn on Truman that he was no longer able to
obtain overseas information of the type available during

'' See IMd., pp. 300-305 ; Smith, op. cit., pp. 363-365.
■ "-" Ford, op. cit., p. 312.
" Ibid., p. 314n.
** Smith, op. dt., p. 364.

155

TVorld War II. As General Donovan had predicted, a critical
intelligence gap had developed, leaving the United States far
behind the other major powers. So urgent was the need for
knowledge that in January, 1946, at far greater expense and
effort than would have been necessary if Donovan's advice
had been followed, Truman set up an intermediate Xational
Intelligence Authority, made up of the Secretaries of State,
War and Xavy, and' the Chief of Staff to the President,
Under this agency was a so-called Central Intelligence Group
(CIG), headed by Rear Admiral Sidney Souers. an acquaint-
ance of Truman's from Missouri whose intelligence back-
groimd consisted of a tour as deputy director of OXI [Office
of Xaval Intelligence] and who is said to have been instru-
mental in persuading Truman to set up the XIA and the
CIG. He was to be succeeded less than six months later by
Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenburg, a capable Air Force
strategist but equally lacking in intelligence experience, who
in less than a year returned to the Air Force.*^

While one authority credits OSS with a wartime budget of $135
million,**' another expert source has written: "From 1942 thr'ough
1945, excluding the salaries of membere of the armed forces on active
duty with the agency, and a substantial part of overseas logistics
support, the cost of OSS averaged less than thirty-seven million a
year." " While much of the agency's money was provided in un-
vouchered funds, there was apparently close accounting of its
expenditure.

"Donovan was the first man to whom Congress made a grant
of twenty-five million dollars without requiring an account-
ing," Dr. Danger notes. 'T recall the morning Avhen the
General announced this at a staff meeting, and at once turned
a cold douche on our elation. This does not mean, he said, that
a single dollar is going to be spent irresponsibly, because I
know when the war is over this agency will be in a ver\' ex-
posed position unless its record is spotless. For this reason I
have asked one of the leading Xew York accountants to join
the OSS, and he will see to it that all expenditures are ac-
counted for to me, even though I am under no such obliga-
tion to Congress." *^

However,, the vigilant bookkeeping applied to OSS expenditures
does not seem to have extended to the maintenance of its member-
ship list.

No one can even guess the actual size of OSS at its wartime
peak. Over thirty thousand names were listed on the agency's
roster; but there were countless Partisan workers in the oc-
cupied countries whose identities were never known, who
were paid OSS money and armed with OSS weapons and

*^ Ford, op. ait., pp. 314-315.

•* Rowan and Deindorfer, op. cit., p. 619.

" Ford, op. cit., p. 173.

** TMd., p. 173n.

156

performed OSS missions, yet for the most part were miaware
that their direction came from Washino^ton. Each field ao;ent
employed several local subagents, and they in turn recruited
anonym'ous friends from the surrounding countryside, some-
times nmnbering in the thousands. One lone parachutist,
Ernst Floege of Chicago, who dropped into the Hericourt
district of France, wound up the war in command of an
undergi'ound force of thiity-five hundred; another French-
American agent named Duval organized and personally
led an estimated seven thousand resistance fighters in the
Lyons area. Altogether, the Maquis in France, the Kachin
tribesmen in Burma formed a worldwide shadow anny Avhich
served under OSS in close support of the Allied military
effort, and which faded back into obscurity when the fighting
ceased.*^

Once he left the directorship of OSS, Donovan also began fading
back into obscurity. In the years immediately after the war he devoted
much of his time to the cause of European federalism as chairman
of the American Committee on United Europe. He was also a strong
advocate for wrestling the initiative from the U.S.S.R. in the so-called
cold war. After serving as ambassador to Thailand during 1953-1954,
he worked, as national chairman of the International. Rescue Commit-
tee, to assist refugees coming from North Vietnam to South Vietnam
and later, in 1956, he organized a campaign to raise a million dollars
for Hungarian refugee relief. Never again was he called into service
as an intelligence leader. Speculation ran high in 1947, with the crea-
tion of the Central Intelligence Agency, that Donovan would be
selected to direct the new organization, but the positioji went to Rear
Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, the last head of the Central Intelli-
gence Group. And again, in 1953, when President Eisenhower was
searching for a new CIA Director to replace the departing Bedell
Smith, Donovan's name was prominent among the candidates; but,
once again, and for the final time, the call went to someone else — on
this occasion to liis old friend and OSS colleague, Allen Dulles. Six
years later, on Februai-y 8, 1959, William J. Donovan died in the
nation's capital.

IV. Air Intelligence

The dawning of world war in 1939 found the United States rather
unprepared in another area of intelligence operations, a relatively new
field, but, nevertheless, a function which Japan and the principal
European powers had greatly refined at that time. Air intelligence
had been inaugurated in the American armed forces at the outbreak
of the Civil War with balloonists or aeronauts sei'ving both with the
field armies and with the Signal Corps. ^" The loosely organized bal-
loon corps of the Union Forces, disbanded in June 1863, did not exceed
seven balloons and nine trained aeronauts during its period of opera-

'"/ftif/., pp. 20.3-204.

^"Generally, see F. Stansbui-y Haydon. Aeronautics in the Union and Confed-
erate Armies. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1941.

157

tion.^^ Its mission was observation, a most niclimentary intelligence
task.

During the Spanish-American "War. the Signal Corps dispatched
its only available balloon and two aeronauts to Cuba where they ap-
parently saw tAvo brief, but effective days of service in the attack on
San Juan Hill. Although a second balloon unit was organized at
Tampa, Florida, to accompany a new expeditionaiy force to Puerto
Eico, the armistice rendered their departure unnecessary.-^-

Almost four years after the "Wright brothers successfully demon-
strated the ability of a machine-powered heavier-than-air apparatus
to carry man aloft, the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, Brigadier
General James Allen, established, on August 1, 1907, an Aeronautical
Division in his office. Two years and one day later, after a number of
trial tests, approval was granted for the purchase of the first Army
flying machine from the "Wrights. ^^

By the time of the long-delayed recognition of the "Wright
brothers in 1909, the Army's interest in aviation had been
primarily for the purpose of improving reconnaissance. The
first heavier-than-air craft, as well as lighter-than-air craft,
was evaluated by the militaiy solely in terms of collecting in-
formation. It took only a few years of Army experimentation
with airplanes to conclude that there was a greater develop-
ment potential for military reconnaissance in the airplane
than in captive or dirigible balloons; therefore, practically
all available funds for aeronautics in the Signal Corps, begin-
ning with fiscal year 1912, were devoted to the purchase and
maintenance of heavier-than-air craft. This was a bold de-
cision because limited airplane performances by that time had
not demonstrated any military value other than that the Army
could extend its range of vision. Airplanes were valued for
their relatively passive role of spying out the enemy's disposi-
tion and not as actively aggi'e&sive weapons in themselves.
Despite experiments made in shooting machine guns, taking
pictures, and dropping explosives from planes, the Signal
Corps decided to adopt two types of airplanes and both for
reconnaissance missions. The "Scout" was desired for service
with ground troops, for carrying two pilots and radio and
photographic equipment, and for travelling at least 45 mph
for four hours. The "Speed Scout" was designed to carry
only one pilot at a minimum speed of 65 miles fsicl for three
hours.^*

®^ U.S. Air Force Department. Air University Research Studies Institute.
"Development of Intelligence Function in the USAF, 1917-1950" by Victor H.
Cohen. Typescript, January 1, 1957. Chapter I, p. 16. Copies of this study bear
the marking '"Secret ;" the copy utilized in this study was declassified and sup-
plied by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

" lUd., Chapter I. pp. 24-26.

^ Ibid., Chapter I, pp. 26-27.

" Ibid., Chapter I, p. 28.

158

In 1913, the House Military Affairs Committee explored the possi-
bility of creating: an air imit apart from the Signal Corps, but found
little favor for the idea.^^

Three years later. Army airmen were afforded their first oppor-
tunity to operate under combat conditions when the First Aero Squad-
ron was deployed in support of Brigadier John J. Pershing's ]\Iexican
border campaign. While a number of missions were successfully
completed,

the most significant lesson which was brought forcibly to the
attention of the Government and the people, especially in the
face of the rapid development of aviation during the Euro-
pean war, was the need for increasing and properly equipping
an air force to accomplish the missions assigned to it. Con-
sequently, Congress appropriated $500,000 and over $13,000,-
000 in March and August of 1916 to expand the Aviation Sec-
tion of the Signal Corps, which had been established in 1914.
The total of these sums was thirteen times gi'eater than all the
money that hitherto had been appropriated for Army avia-
tion purposes.'^*^

As generous as these appropriations were, they proved insufficient
to significantly improve the air corps for immediate participation in
hostilities when the United States entered World War I the following
year.

[T]he United States entered World War I without a single
pursuit or combat type airplane ; hardly a single flying officer
was adequately familiar with aircraft machine guns, bombing
devices, aerial photogi'aphy, or other aviation instruments
well known to the aviators of England. In all respects, the
nation was several years behind European aviation develop-
ment. In fact, the Director of jNIilitary Aeronautics reported
that in contrast to European developments "the United States
at the time of its entry into the war stood very little ahead of
where it had been before the world war broke out." If the
United States had a doctrine for aerial employment, it
centered on the use of the few aircraft for the support of
ground forces as observation and courier vehicles. At the time
of America's declaration of war, the Aviation Section con-
sisted of 65 officers, two flying fields with 224 airplanes, mostly
training types, "nearly all obsolete in type when compared
with the machines then in effective service in France. In ad-
dition, there was little combat experience or knowledge of
European war lessons upon which to base an adequate state-
ment of aerial mission and a plan for aerial production to
implement that mission ; for a long period, European nations
guarded certain things, especially about airplanes, from
American observers. Unfortunately, actual American partici-
pation in war was necessary before the concept of aviation as

^ See U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Military Affairs. Acrouaiitirs in the
Army. Hearings, 63rd Congre.ss, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1913.

^^Coiien. op. ci,t.. Chapter I, p. 31.

159

a flexible and mobile instrument of war, and not merely as an
intelligence collecting agent, could be given a preliminary
trial."

Once the declaration of war had been made, efforts got underway to
organize air intelligence activities.

Prior to America's entry into World War I, military aviation
Avas considered nothing more than an information collecting
service i)erformed by lighter and heavier-than-air craft for
the use of individual ground commanders. Adequate intelli-
gence organizations for the systematic collection, collation,
evaluation, and dissemination of information to all com-
manders concerned did not exist. It was the prevailing con-
cept that troop commanders in combat should use their own
available means and resources for securing information about
the enemy. Higher commanders would get what they needed
by means of their own agencies or by direct request to com-
manders in contact with the enemy.^^

At no time during the war did the Military Intelligence Division in
Washington have a sub-section responsible for air intelligence mat-
ters.^^ Such was not the case in France. ''Under the general theory of
intelligence prevailing among the associated powers, intelligence units
in the AEF [American Expeditionary Force] were established in all
organizations beginning with the battalion, and each echelon was re-
sponsible for intelligence on its own front." ^°

The task of obtaining, assembling, weighing, and distribut-
ing information on all phases of the enemy's aviation — in-
cluding its organization, materiel, personnel, operations, and
the location of its units — was the responsibility of the office
of air intelligence, G-2-A-7, the [AEF] Military Informa-
tion Division's seventh sub-section which had been organized
in March 1918 by Lt. Prentiss M. Terry, who was later suc-
ceeded by Maj. C. F. Thompson.

As officers in charge of the air intelligence sub-division,
they were responsible for furnishing the General Staff on
GHQ, the staff of armies and corps, and the Air Service, with
intelligence concerning the enemy air arm. The first three
months of G-2-A-7's existence were consumed in organizing
the work of the office, in collecting intelligence infonnation
from French and British Intelligence Offices, and in visiting
Air Service Headquarters for the purpose of determining how
best it could be served.®^

The sub-section ultimately established five units for performing its
duties: an interrogation of prisoners section (staffed by one officer),
the air order of battle section (responsible for tracking the size,
organization, markings, location, duties, equipment, and personnel of

" Ibid., Chapter I. pp. 35-36.
'" Thid.. Chapter II. p. 1.
=' Ibid., Chapter II. p. 2.
^ Ihid.. Chapter II. p. 2A.
* Ibid., Chapter II. pp. 3-3A.

160

enemy air units), a bomb targets section, a technical section (re-
sponsible for assembling and disseminating information on the pro-
duction, performance, and maintenance of enemy aircraft), and an
enemy air activity section (responsible for collecting, assembling, and
disseminating intelligence on enemy air strategy and tactics, enemy
aviation training, ancl the effects of Allied air operations.) '^-

In view of the limited air operations during Woi'ld War I, the
list of air intelligence functions to be performed by approxi-
mately 7 officers and 16 enlisted men in G-2's Office of Air
Intelligence sounded more imposing than they actually were.
Before the office could gain much experience in the new
branch of military intelligence dealing with air matters, the
war ground to a halt. Nevertheless, G-2-A-7 was destined
to become a prototype of the air intelligence organization of
the next World War.*'^

Liaison between the AEF/MID air intelligence subsection and
units of the air service was conducted by Branch Intelligence Officers
who were under the supervision of G-2-A-7 and had staffs consisting
of a clerk, two draftsmen, and an orderly."^ Sent to air groups and
squadrons by the Office of Air Intelligence, the Branch Intelligence
Officers did not merely confine themselves to obtaining intelligence in-
formation about the enemy air arm, they, in fact, acted as the intelli-
gence officers of the air unit to which they were assigned.

But the control over intelligence operations in air units by
BIO's, who were detached officers from the Military Intelli-
gence Division of the GHQ, AEF, was objectionable to the
Air Service and its predecessor organization which had been
headed by Lt. Colonel William INIitchell, Aeronautical Officer,
AEF. The work of air intelligence was believed to belong
properly to the Air Service, and that such intelligence would
be made available to G-2 at Headquarters AEF through
channels and liaison activities. The thesis of the supporters
of this idea was that air intelligence officers required a tech-
nical knowledge of aviation for the proper performance of
their duty ; if possible, intelligence officers should be qualified
aerial observers so that they could better appreciate the prob-
lems of observation and be better able to interrogate observers
returning from intelligence gathering missions. It was im-
possible, they said to get good results from a system which
gave prominent place to intelligence officers detailed to the
Air Service as representatives of G-2, but not responsible to
the Air Service. If squadi'on intelligence officers were integral
])arts of the air squadrons, they could be selected from among
candidates for pilots and observers and they could be par-
tially trained during the squadron's organization and trahi-
ing period. During that time, the air intelligence officer would
be able to build up comradeship and a sense of responsibility
which could not be expected from a General Staff representa-

*' lUd., Chapter II, pp. 3B-3F, 29-32.
'" Ihid., Chapter II, p. 3G.
" Ihid., Chapter II, p. 5A.

161

tive who did not join a unit until it was at the front. Inas-
much as corps and army aviation commanders were re-
sponsible for the actual collection of air intelligence by
means of visual and photographic reconnaissance, they should
be better able to exercise closer supervision over the col-
lection and dissemination of air intelligence by lower units
than any Branch Intelligence Officer. Moreover, adherents to
the doctrine of air force control over air intelligence believed
that such control would make the Air Service more inde-
pendent and fieer in its effort to be progressive and effi-
cient.*'^

Because of this sentiment, the flying corps sought some vehicle to
serve its needs regarding intelligence production and placed its trust
for this function in the Information Section.

The Information Section of the Air Service could be con-
sidered a quasi-air intelligence organization which duplicated
G-2-A-T operations for the avowed purpose of disseminating
air intelligence and information more quickly and widely
throughout the Air Service. ISAS had its origin in General
Order 21, Headquarters AEF. 13 August 1917. which directed
departments and corps, including the Air Service, to designate
an officer specifically charged with the collection and dissemi-
nation of military information relating to his organization.
Early in September an Information Department was inau-
gurated in the Air Service. It was charged with the "collec-
tion, preparation, and distribution of all information of
special interest to the Air Service; liaison with the Intelli-
gence Section. General Staff, A.E.F; and the organization
and supervision of air information officers attached to Air
Service units.'* Little information of the personnel and rec-
ords of that Department are available ; evidently it passed
through different commands until Februaiw 1918, at which
time its duties were absorbed by the Intelligence Division of
the Training Section, Air Service, A.E.F.^''

The Training Section's intelligence unit had been inaugurated in
Paris in December, 1917. A month later efforts were being made by
the section chief. Captain Ernest L. Jones, to expand his unit from
training responsibilities to central intelligence operations for the entire
Air Service. On INIarch 28. 1918. the Intelligence Division was given its
mandate to serve the intelliirence needs of the entire air corps and was
renamed Information Section, Air Ser^^Ce. "By the end of the war.
the ISAS had grown into six subdivisions : Statistics. Library. General
Information, Editorial and Eesearch, Production, and History: its
personnel had increased from an original staff of two officers and one
enlisted man to 10 officers, 30 enlisted men, and three civilians." ^'

The trials and tribulations of the ISAS in finding its place
in a new service under wartime conditions were essentially re-
peated by its comparable organization in America. The genesis

"^ Ihid.. Chapter II, pp. 8-9.
^ Ihid., Chapter II, pp. 13-13A.
^^ Ibid., Chapter II, pp. 13A-15A.

162

of the first air intelligence office in the Army Air arm appears
to be early in March 1917 when Lt. Col. John B. Bennet, offi-
cer in charge of the Aeronautical Division of the Signal
Corps, recommended on the basis of a General Staff memoran-
dum that his division be expanded in functions and personnel ;
his plans included the establishment of an air intelligence
unit. The reorganization of the Aeronautical Division, ap-
proved on 16 March by Gen, George O. Squier, Chief Signal
Officer, provided for an air intelligence office under the Per-
sonnel Sub-division which was redesignated Correspondence
Subdivision shortly after the United States declared war. The
functions of the small intelligence office, headed by Capt.
Edgar S. Gorrell, were to collect, codify, and disseminate
aeronautical information. ®^

A few months later, in June, the unit was renamed the Airplane
Division and a reorganization placed the intelligence section on a par
with the other three new majoi- sub-divisions for Training, Equipment,
and Organization. Placed in charge of the new intelligence unit was
Major Henry H. (''Hap") Arnold, destined to become World War II
Chief of Staff for Air, assisted by Ernest L. Jones, long time owner,
editor, and publisher of Aeronautics magazine.

The duties of the Intelligence Section at this time consisted
largely of collecting and filling military aeronautical data of
every nature and from all sources, and making digests of per-
tinent information for interested officials. Intelligence ma-
terial from military attaches and other representatives abroad
had been flowing into the OCSO since the early days of aero-
nautics in the Signal Corps, but after the United States en-
tered the war, the British, French, and Italian governments
released information of greater value and volume. The pres-
sures of war caused further expansion and changes in the Air-
plane Division. On 1 October the Air Division succeeded the
Airplane Division ; Brig. Gen. Benjamin D. Foulois continued
as Chief, with colonel Arnold as Executive in charge of the 15
sections constituting the entire Air Division of the Signal
Corps. The Intelligence Section was redesignated the In-
formation Section and Capt. Harold C. Candee succeeded
Lieutenant Jones as officer in charge. Tlie latter was soon
promoted to captain and order overseas to continue similar
work in the AEF [Training Section, Intelligence
Division] .'^^

Although further organizational alterations occurred, there was lit-
tle variation in the Information Section's functions until President
Wilson, by an Executive order of INIay 20, 1918, designated the Divi-
sion of Military Aeronautics, which had been created within the Signal
Corps during the previous month.

an independent agency with the duty of performing every
aviation function heretofore discharged by the Signal Corps,

*' Ihid.. Chapter II, p. 23.

"^ Ihid., Chapter II, pp. 24-24A.

163

except those pertaining to the production of aircraft and air-
craft equipment. The newly established and independent Bu-
reau of Aircraft Production (BAP), created on 24 April
1918, was given complete control over the production of air-
planes, airplane engines, and aircraft equipment for the use of
the Army. In August, Mr. John D. Ryan, then 2nd Assistant
Secretar}^ of War, was appointed Director of Air Service in
charge of both the BAP and DjNIA. As a result of these reor-
ganizations, the Information Section on 21 May became the
Intelligence Branch of the Executive Section of the DMA.
About two months later it was redesignated the Aeronautical
Information Branch, which, by the end of August had been
organized into seven sub-branches: Procurement, Confiden-
tial Information, Publicity and Censorial, Statistics, Clerical
Detail, Auxiliary, and Headquarters Bulletin.

Throughout the war, the functions of the air intelligence or
information sections in the Signal Corps, and their successor,
the Aeronautical Information Branch of the DISIA, primarily
consisted of the collection and dissemination of information
pertaininc: to domestic and foreign aviation activities, in-
cluding those of the enemy ; the maintenance of a library and
complete files, properly cross-indexed, of all information and
statistics on hand; the continuance of a liaison system with
the AEF, foreign governments, and other U.S. government
departments; and the censoring of articles and photographs
for publication submitted through the Committee on Public
Information. The American information unit exchanged bul-
letins and other material with its counterpart in the AEF, the
Information Section of the Air Service. The general informa-
tion and technical bulletins published on both sides of the
ocean pertained to every phase of aviation. Indeed, the Wash-
ington air information office, like its analogous section over-
seas, was a quasi-intelligence organization concerned in part
with knowledge about the enemy.'°

One other wartime structure is of interest at this juncture, the Re-
search Information Committee.

The RIC, with branch committees in Paris and London,
had been organized in the early part of 1918 by the joint
action of the Secretaries of War and XaA-y, and with the ap-
proval of the Council of Xational Defense. In cooperation
with the offices of military and naval intelligence, the RIC
was to secure, classify, and disseminate scientific, technical,
and industrial research information, especially relating to war
problems, between the United States and its allies. By this
plan, the Government endeavored to establish a central clear-
ing exchange information service by means of which the
Army General Stalf, the various bureaus of the Army and
Navy, the committees of the Council of National Defense, and
the scientific organizations in the United States working on

' Ibid., Chapter II, pp. 26-27.

164

war production and inventions, could be kept posted on tech-
nical and scientific developments at home and abroad. The
RIC in Washinoton consisted of a civilian member represent-
ing the National Research Council, a technical assistant, the
Chief of the Military Intelligence Section (MIS) , and the Di-
rector of Naval Intellioence. As a result of its membership on
the RIC, the Military Intelligence Section was made respon-
sible for securing and disseminating scientific and technical
research information for all branches of the Army, The MIS
was assisted in its duties by the liaison representatives to the
RIC from the DMA, BAP, and other military bureaus. In cer-
tain instances when information could only be obtained by
sending ex]:)erts to Europe, the individuals so designated were
supposed to clear through the RIC, which would check to see
if the information was available in this country or if the re-
search was necessary. Those cleared for travel were instructed
to contact the RIC's Paris or London committee through
which any information collected would be dispatched to the
RIC in Washington ; this was to be done even though different
communication channels were employed at the same time by
those sent abroad. The overseas committees each consisted of
the military, naval, and scientific attaches and a technical as-
sistant. In addition to serving as the clearing house for in-
formation flowing from both sides of the Atlantic, those
committees were designated to serve the commander-in-chief
of the military and naval forces in Europe, and to cooperate
and render assistance to the offices of the military and naval
attaches in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of scien-
tific and industrial research information.^^

With the end of World War I came the exhaustive task of reorganiz-
ing the Air Service for peacetime operations. In January, 1919, the
Director of the Air Service was made more directly responsible for the
supervision and direction of the Division of Military Aeronautics and
the Bureau of Aircraft Production. By mid-March, it was decided that
the Air Service would adopt the structure of its AEF operation in

France, thereby causing it to gain direct control over both DMA and
BAP.^2

The Information Group in the ODAS was designated to re-
ceive its intelligence information primarily through the
Military Intelligence Division of the WDGS [War Depart-
ment General Staff] and from foreign missions. Information
on military and commercial aeronautics in the United States
came from information officers at military posts and from
liaison officers with other governmental and civilian air activi-
ties. A Special Division was added to the Information Group
toward the latter part of 1919 for the purpose of collecting
and disseminating meteorological information and for han-
dling such special activities as publicity, and correspondence

IMd., Chapter II, pp. 33-35.
IMd., Chapter IV, pp. 1-2.

165

relative to congressmen and municipal landing fields for
airplanes."
The Army Eeorganization Act of 1920 (41 Stat. 759) had little
impact upon the intelligence structure of the military organization :
the Air Service became a coordinate combat branch of the line and
the Division of ^Military Aeronautics was formally abolished. "The
Director of Air Senice was hencefortli known as the Chief of Air
Service (CAS), similar to the title of 'Chief held by the other heads
of the combatant arms of the Army." ^*

On May 29, 1919, the Research Information Committee, renamed
the Research Information Service, was reorganized for peacetime
operations under the National Research Council.

It was not until shortly after Maj. Gen. Mason M. Patrick
succeeded General [C. T.] Menoher as CAS on 5 October 1921
that another reorganization of the Air Service was adopted.
The new structure was patterned after General Pershing's
1921 reorganization of the War Department General Staff
(WDGS) into the following five divisions: Personnel (G-1),
Military Intelligence (G-2). Operations and Training (G-
3), Supply (G-4), and War Plans; it was natural that the
WDGS be organized along the lines of Pershing's AEF. Gen-
eral Patrick's reorganization of 1 December 1921 abolished
the groups and created the Personnel, Information, Training
and War Plans, Supply, and Engineering Divisions. It was
not surprising that General Patrick, who had been Pershing's
Chief of Air Service, AEF, should follow the organizational
model of his war and peace time commander.

The new Information Division was assigned a more prac-
tical mission than its predecessor, the Information Group.
Instead of trying to collect "every kind of information" on
aeronautics, the primary function of the Information Divi-
sion was the collection of "essential aeronautical information
from all possible sources." Greater concern was shown for the
collection of information of an intelligence nature by the re-
quirement that one of the three general classes of information
should be concerned with "the uses of aircraft in war, includ-
ing the organization of the Air Forces of the world, tactical
doctrines, types of aircraft used, organization of the person-
nel operating and maintaining aircraft." The other two
classes of information dealt with technical matters and infor-
mation relative to other phases of military aviation. Because
of reduced military appropriations and the lack of person-
nel. Collection and Dissemination Divisions were abolished
during the reorganization and their duties were assumed by
the Library and Reproduction Sections, respectively.^^

In 1925, the Information Division created a military intelligence
section which worked in liaison with the Collection Section of the

■^ Ibid.. Chapter IV, p. 6.
■"^ Ibid., Chapter IV, p. 7.
'^ Ibid., Chapter IV, pp. 8-9.

166

Military Intelligence Division of the General Staff. This MID unit
(M.I. 5) administered the military attache system, maintained official
contact with State, Commerce and other Executive Departments in-
volved with foreio^i matters, and functioned as adviser to the Foreign
Liaison Officer on questions concerning the distribution of aeronau-
tical information to foreign countries. However, very little could be
accomplished by the understaffed unit.^*^

With the passage of the Air Corps Act (40 Stat. 780) on July 2,
1926, "the Information Division remained on the coordinating staff
level of the newly designated Office of the Chief of the Air Corps
(OCAC) as the counterpart to the Military Intelligence Division of
theWDGS.""

In placing the Air Corps Act into effect, the organizational
changes made in December 1926, among other things, divided
the Information Division of the OCAC into four sections and
re-named them to indicate their major functions: The Air
Intelligence Section became the successor to the ]\IID Section
and inherited the responsibility for maintaining liaison with
the MID of the War Department General Staff ; the new sec-
tion was also charged with the procurement, evaluation and
dissemination of foreign and domestic aeronautical informa-
tion, and with the maintenance and supervision of the Air
Corps Library. The Photographic Section was made respon-
sible for collecting, filing, and distributing all photographs
taken by the Air Corps; a voluminous file of negatives of
scientific, historical, and news value was maintained. The
Publications Section received the duties of printing, repro-
ducing, and distributing all i:)ublications and documents such
as Information Circulars, Airport Bulletins, Air Navigation
maps, etc. The Press Relations Section, replacing the Special
Section, was charged with the preparation and release of all
news items, and with Air Corps publicity matters.^^

These efforts at reorganization, however, did not necessarily result
in a better air intelligence capability.

Functionally . . . the Information Division, in the early
part of the thirties, had reached a new low. The Plans Divi-
sion, OCAC, took over part of the Information Division's
functions of collecting, evaluating, and disseminating intelli-
gence information because of the latter's failure to send out
copies of important reports to the Tactical School and to var-
ious Air Corps instructors and individuals. "When Lt. Col.
Walter R. Weaver became Chief of the Information Division
in June of 1933, his first moves were to protest vigorously
against this usurpation of functions and to strengthen his
organization. His actions were backed by the Chief of the Air
Corps who then confirmed the Information Division's respon-
sibilities for (1) the collection and dissemination of air in-
telligence information concerning foreign countries; (2) the

™ IMd., Chapter IV, pp. 9-10.

"/WfZ., Chapter IV, p. lOA.

'* IMd., Chapter IV, pp. lOB-11.

167

compilation and distribution of information on military avia-
tion; and (3) the coordination of matters of interest between
the Air Corps, and the State Department and the Military
Intelligence Division of the WDGS.

Under Colonel AYeaver's criiidance, the Information Divi-
sion increased its effectiveness, and by mid 1934 it had added
a number of additional duties, including the collection of com-
parative data on plane and personnel strength, air budgets,
and general organization of the air arms of England, France,
Italy, Japan, and the United States. This function was as-
sumed by the Intelligence Section, which for many years was
staffed by one officer and from two to five civilian employees.
Nevertheless, the Section during fiscal year 1935 not only
made comparative studies of national air forces, but it also
was able to initiate a digest of foreign aviation information.
The evaluation and distribution of such air intelligence, the
Chief of the Air Corps said later "has been of vital impor-
tance and interest. Owing to the increased aviation activities
abroad the volume of this particular type of work within the
Intelligence Section has materially increased." ^^

Recalling his thoughts on the eve of war in Europe, General "Hap"
Arnold, appointed Chief of Air Corps on September 29, 1938, wrote :

Looking back on it, I think one of the most wasteful weak-
nesses in our whole setup was our lack of a proper Air Intelli-
gence Organization. It is silly, in the light of what we came
to know, that I should still have been so impressed by the
information given me in Alaska by that casual German who
called my hotel and told me about their "new bomber." I know
now there were American journalists and ordinary travelers
in Germany who knew more about the Luftwaffe's prepara-
tions than I, [then] the Assistant Chief of the United States
Army Corps.

From Spain, where our Army observers watched the actual
air fighting, reports were not only weak but unimaginative.
Nobody gave us much useful information about Hitler's air
force until Lindbergh came home in 1939. Our target intelli-
gence, the ultimate determinate, the compass on which all
the priorities of our strategic bombardment campaign against
Germany would depend, was set up only after we were actu-
ally at war. Part of this was our own fault ; part was due to
the lack of cooperation from the War Department General
Staff's G-2 ; part to a change in the original conception of the
B-17 as a defensive weapon to a conception of it as a weapon
of offense against enemy industries.®^'

And what had Arnold learned from the Lone Eagle which neither
military nor air intelligence could supply ?

Lindbergh gave me the most accurate picture of the Luft-
waffe, its equipment, leaders, apparent plans, training meth-

"^ Ibid.. Chapter IV. pp. 12-12B.

^''H. H. Arnold. Global Mission. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1949, pp.
168-169.

168

ods, and present defects that I had so far received. Chief of
the German Air Force's shortcomings at that time seemed
to be its hack of sufficient trained personnel to man the equip-
ment ah'eady on hand, a fact "which might make unlikely
powerful sustained operations through 1940.

Goering's neglect of strategic bombardment and logistics
was not yet apparent. On the contrary, German industrial
preparations were enormous, and bombers with a range for
strategic attacks almost anywhere in Europe made up a large
part of his force, though these same DO-lfs and HE-lll's
could also be employed for direct support of ground troops.
Lindbergh felt that Hitler held the destruction of any major
city on the continent, or in Britain, in his hands.^^

Arnold had been made aware of the deficiencies of air intellig:ence
operations from other quarters, including the chief of his Plans
Section, Lt. Col. Carl Spaatz. As war plans were developed by the
"War Department and the strategic employment of air power applied,
accurate air intelligence became essential for the execution of those
plans. But, as Spaatz informed Arnold in August of 1939, such intelli-
gence data was "not being maintained ready for issue in the Office of
the Air Corps, or elsewhere.'" ^-

As a result of Spaatz's counsel, an Air Corps Board was
convened a week before Hitler's attack on Poland to deter-
mine the nature, scope, and form of intelligence required for
aerial operations; also, the Board was to make recommenda-
tions as to the methods and procedures for obtaining and
processing that intelligence. After meeting daily for several
days, the Board, composed of intelligence representatives
from the OCAC, ACTS, and GHQ AF, made what was
doubtless the most comprehensive analysis for air intelli-
gence requirements to that time.

The intelligence needed by the Air Corps, the Board stated,
fell into three categories: (a) that required by the C/AC for
strategic planning in connection with the preparation or re-
vision of Joint Basic "War Plans and the employment of air
power in any theater, (b) that required for technical plan-
ning to insure American leadership both in the production of
planes and equipment and in the development of adequate
tactics and techniques for aerial operations, (c) that re-
quired for tactical planning and execution of plans.

The Board recognized G-2's responsibility for collecting
and processing all intelligence information. Except for the
processing required for War Department estimates, however,
the Board believed the iiir Corps to be better qualified to
handle intelligence information on certain phases of foreign
aviation. Accordingly, the Board recommended that the Air
Corps should continue its current task of preparing air tech-
nical intelligence and should assume the responsibility for

^^ Ibid., pp. 188-189; Cp. Leonard Mosley. How the Nazis used Lindbergh. New
York. V. 9, March 3, 1976 : 32-38.
'* Cohen, op. cit., Chapter VII. p. 7.

169

processing information pertaining to tactical operations and
to the use of aircraft in antiaircraft defense. For strategic
intelligence required by the Air Corps, G-2 was considered to
be in a better position not only to prepare economic, political,
and combat estimates, but also to determine the vulnerability
of potential air objectives and systems of objectives, together
with an estimate of the probable effect of the destruction
thereof.

The Board also suggested that General Arnold, as Chief of
the Air Corps and principal adviser on air matters to the
Chief of Statf, WDGS. be allowed to establish in his office an
air intelligence agency considerably larger than the existing
Information Division's Intelligence Section. . . .^^

Never submitted for or otherwise given "War Department approval,
this report marked the beginning of a controversy, continuing into the
time of United States entry into the war, between the Military
Intelligence Division, War Department, and the Air Corp's Intelli-
gence organization over air intelligence activities and responsibilities.
When the Information Division, OCAC, started collecting intelli-
gence information outside of G-2 channels, the MID directed that
this activity cease and that requests for such data be routed through
the Military Intelligence Division. This action occurred in the autumn
of 1939 : relenting somewhat in ^lay of the following year, G -2 per-
mitted the Air Corps' Information Division to make direct contacts for
intelligence information with all Federal agencies except the Xavy
and State Department.^*

The War Department's G-2 had been cognizant for some
time of the incompetency of the personnel in his Intelligence
Branch to maintain digests of aviation information. More-
over, as the Branch was organized on a geographic basis with
each geographic section being responsible for all phases of in-
telligence for the countries assigned, it became obvious that a
separate unit was needed to evaluate and interj^ret the volum-
inous amount of air intelligence being received. Shortly after
Hitler's attack on Poland, a separate Air Section was estab-
lished in the Intelligence Branch of the ]MID for the purposes
of coordinating all air intelligence activities, of maintaining
a current summary of air operations, and of supervising the
preparation of air intelligence.

The Air Section, apparently, was not formally established
until March. 1940 when Maj. Ennis C. Whitehead, who was
Chief of the Southern European Section of the Intelligence
Branch and the only Air Corps officer on duty with G-2, was
named Chief of the new Air Section. For the first four months
he was assisted only by Lt. ^Marvin L. Harding; in July, ^SIi-s.
Irma G. Robinson was transferred to the Air Section from the
Air Corps' intelligence office. When Whitehead, who had been
promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, was replaced by Lt. Col.
Jack C. Hodgson in the late summer of 1941, the total person-

'Ibid., Chapter VII, pp. 8-9.
' Ibid., Chapter VII, pp. 12-13.

170

nel in the Air Section consisted of five officers, three analysts,
and four clerk-stenographers. Attempts Avere made to en-
large the Section by acquiring more airmen, but the AAF
itself had an urgent need for personnel to fill its numerous
vacancies and made a counterotler for the removal of G-2's
Air Section to the Intelligence Division of OCAC where it
would operate on behalf of G-2. Of course, the offer was de-
clined and the extension of air intelligence activities in the
MID was retarded. Until Pearl Harbor Day, the Air Section
could only process the air files for the British Empire, Ger-
many and satellites, France and Italy ; eventually, as person-
nel became available, full responsibility was assumed for the
G-2's air files of all countries.®^

Not only were air intelligence activities hampered by jurisdictional
disputes but the security procedures of MID also impeded operations
in this sphere.

In an early effort to clarify one phase of the jurisdictional
problem relating to [intelligence] dissemination, the War De-
partment on 15 November 1939 formally stated the func-
tions of the ]\IID and the arms and services. Unless documents
were marked "No Objection to Publication in Service Journ-
als" reproduction and redistribution of G-2 reports by arms
and services required the consent of the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2. Each document permitted to be reproduced also
had to contain a statement of sources and its classification
could not be lower than the original document.

For the Air Corps, such a policy meant that G-2 informa-
tion could be circulated, but not reproduced even for dissem-
ination to the limited number of Air Corps Headquarters
Agencies. Hence, intelligence was sometimes stale by the time
it was circulated to an interested user. Security, not economy,
was the basis for limiting distribution. The MID, highly se-
curity conscious because of the character of its work, was es-
pecially desirous that the intelligence currently being supplied
be carefully safeguarded.

But the necessity for securing G-2's approval before re-
producing and distributing each intelligence re]:)ort emanat-
ing from his office hampered the Air Corp's efforts to keep
pace with aviation developments arising from the experiences
in the European war. Consequently, General Arnold secured
blanket authority on 1 IMarch 1940 to reproduce and dissemi-
nate one or two copies of G-2 materials to major operating
Air Corps agencies, but they were prohibited from making
additional copies. G-2 thought the exception granted Arnold
was justified so long as Europe was at war and while the Air
Corps was engaged in an expansion program. Shortly there-
after, reproduction restrictions were further modified by
G-2's permission to the OCAC to make as many as five copies
of any confidential or restricted MID document,^*'

IMd., Chapter VII, pp. 13-15.
Ibid., Chapter VII, pp. 17-18.

171

Still the intelligence dissemination problems continued in spite of
G-2's reluctant grants of approval for increased co^D}- distribution
within the Air Corps. In an effort to further ameliorate intelligence
dissemination difficulties, a conference of OCAC intelligence repre-
sentatives and MID personnel was held in the spring of 194:1, Among
the various views expressed at this meeting,

Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Acting AC/S, G-2, was espe-
cially fearful that if the C/AC were to determine what MID
intelligence should be disseminated to his miits then it would
be possible for the Air Corps to authorize the reproduction of
verbatim secret reports from military attaches or Executive
departments of the Government, from strategic studies re-
quired in war planning, and from papers prepared in compli-
ance with specific requests of the War Department and other
government agencies.

Although the air arm would have been limited in its repro-
duction and redistribution by regulations on safeguarding
military information, protecting the source of information,
and limiting distribution to those Avith a need-to-know. Gen-
eral Miles refused to permit any excerptions to existing rules,
^loreover, he advised "intelligence agencies under control of
the Chief of the Army Air Forces [to] confine their dissemi-
nation of information to the Air Forces generally to tactical
and technical matters directly affecting the Air Forces, and
that no dissemination be made b}' those agencies, without the
consent of this Division, of any secret or confidential infor-
mation regarding the present disposition, strength or effec-
tiveness of foreign forces, ground or air,"

Such a restriction, along with the others requiring ap-
proval of G-2 prior to reproducing and disseminating intelli-
gence, hampered air intelligence operations not only at the
AAF Headquarters level but also down to and including
the commands. A-2 [Air Force intelligence] obviously knew
the intelligence needs of air units better than an outside
agency and he continued his efforts to secure exemptions from
the irksome prohibition placed upon him by the WDGS. But
freedom for the AAF to reproduce and redistribute G-2 mate-
rial did not come until Independence Day in. 1912 when the
Chief of the Military Intelligence Service, MID, authorized
the commanding generals of the AAF and the air conunands
to reproduce and distribute to lower echelons any and all
classified military information received from G-2 unless the
document contained a specific prohibition against reproduc-
tion. Formal "War Department approval of G-2's action came
the following month,*^
Still the major jurisdictional question, the rivalry for control over
air intelligence between G-2 and A-2, persisted. Seeing no other course
of action open to him on the matter. Arnold, with AAF intelligence
needs continuing to mount, placed the issue before the Chief of Staff,
General George C, ^Marshall, and asked for a command decision on his

Ibid., Chapter VII, pp. 23-25.

70-890 O - 76 - 12

172

recommendation for the removal of all restrictions thought to limit
the reliability and efRcienc}- of air intelligence operations,^^

On September 10, 1941, Arnold had his decision: the War Depart-
ment supported G-2's position for continuing the unity of strategic
intelligence responsibilities, saying:

The responsibility imposed on the Military Intelligence Divi-
sion, W.D.G.S., by par. 9, AR 10-15, for the collection, evalu-
ation and dissemination of military information includes
that which pertains to the Army Air Forces as well as to
other Arms. In carrying out this responsibility, the Military
Intelligence Division is charged with the compilation of all
information for the purposes of formulation of comprehen-
sive military studies and estimates; it will prepare those
studies and estimates. Intelligence agencies of the Chief of
the Army Air Forces will be maintained for the purpose of
the compilation and evaluation of technical and tactical in-
formation, received from the Military Intelligence Division
and other sources, plus the collection of technical air infor-
mation (from sources abroad through cooperation with the
M.I.D.), all or any of which is required by the Air Forces
for their development and for such operations as they may
be directed to perform.*^

In fact, however, the decision was not as devastating to Air Force
intelligence objectives as might be presumed.

As General Arnold stated : "we are getting what we want and that
we will simply try out the whole scheme." This cryptic remark meant
that a quiet and amicable settlement between G-2 and A-2 had been
reached. As recorded in the minutes of an Air Staff meeting on 11
September 1941 :

. . . General Scanlon stated that G-2 had agreed to practi-
cally everything we had asked for. Much of it will not be
written but is understood. Permits us to obtain information
ourselves but first, we must check through G-2 to determine
if they have the information desired. If not, then our person-
nel can be assigned to obtain it. Personnel, so assigned, will
work through G-2's organizations. In regard to studies G-2
has been working on reports received from their sources,
arrangements have been made that G-2 will furnish us the
complete report and we will make our own study. We are au-
thorized to contact direct, foreign military attaches on duty
in this country and other government departments.^"

During this particular period of conflict with G-2 over air intelli-
gence jurisdiction, the Air Corps, of course, continued to undergo
expansion, administrative adjustment, and reorganization. During
the autumn of 1940 General Arnold began making some changes, in-
cluding the re-designation of the Information Division as the Intelli-
gence Division, eifective December 1, 1940. New components added to
the unit included a Domestic Intelligence (counter-intelligence) Sec-

' See Ihid., Chapter VII. pp. 39-il.
/&)VZ.. Chapter VII, p. 48.
' lUd., Chapter VII, p. 52.

173

tion and an Evaluation Section; continued were the Administrative,
Foreign Intelligence, Press Kelations, and Maps Sections. The Library
and Photographic Sections were transferred to a Miscellaneous
Division.''^

Prior to the creation of a Counter Intelligence [or Domes-
tic Intelligence] Section, the functions assigned to it, includ-
ing the collection and dissemination of information concern-
ing espionage, sabotage, subversion, disloyalty, and
disaffection, had been performed by the Information Divi-
sion's Intelligence Section. By January 1940, a separate
Counter Intelligence Branch had been established, but for
many months no officer was available to head it and the work
was supervised by the Chief of Intelligence Section, Maj.
J. G. Taylor. By the time of the Air Corps reorganization in
December the volume of counter intelligence operations had
mounted to [a] point warranting the establishment of a
Domestic Intelligence Section, with a force of two officers and
three enlisted men, as one of the principal components of the
Intelligence Division.

The establishment of an Evaluation Section grew out of
the suggestion made to General Arnold on 23 October 1940
by Col. George E. Stratemeyer. Acting Chief. Plans Division,
OCAC. Xoting the vast amount on [sic] intelligence material
flowing into the OCAC and then being reproduced and dis-
tributed without being digested, Colonel Stratemeyer recom-
mended the creation of an evaluation unit in the Information
Division, not only to summarize and analyze the material for
busy commanders and staff personnel but to dig out lessons
indicating necessar}^ policy changes and new projects requir-
ing attention. The then current system for evaluating infor-
mation and securing the necessary action was in the hands of
the Air Corps Board at Maxwell Field, Alabama. Within
personnel limitations, the Board had been evaluating and
studying wartime lessons in order to prepare and revise air
tactical doctrine, and to provide educational and training
material for combat personnel. With the establishment of an
Evaluation Section, the Board was to continue its past func-
tions, but in its evaluation of war information it was to report
any foreign development and trends which might become
apparent. It was the Evaluation Section, however, which
was given the primary responsibility for detecting foreign
developments, and trends and for summarizing all pertinent
foreign intelligence appearing in periodic air bulletins.^-

Because of the hostilities in Europe, the Foreign Intelligence Sec-
tion was the largest and fastest growing unit within the Intelligence
Division. It consisted of a Current Intelligence Branch, a Foreign
Liaison Branch, and an Operations Planning Branch. While the first
of these components was responsible for processing information per-
taining to current military developments, "very little actual collec-

* Ibid., Chapter VIII, pp. 1-2.
'= Ibid., Chapter VIII, pp. 3-5.

174

tion, other than from such open sources as the New York Times, was
involved because the Military Intelligence Division was suppose to do
all the collecting and then to forward to the OCAC whatever con-
cerned air intelligence." ^^

The Operations Planning Branch of the Foreign Intelli-
gence Section, created as the result of an Executive directive
issued in December 1939, had developed into a significant ele-
ment of the Air Corps, which was emphasizing strategic
offensive operations against enemy airpower and enemy na-
tional structures. The Branch had been initially designated
the Air Force Intelligence Branch of the Information Divi-
sion's Intelligence Section and it brought to that Section some
specific duties and planning functions never before assigned
to the Air Corps. In general, operations planning intelligence
fell into two categories : first, to provide the C/AC with air
intelligence upon which he could base air estimates for vari-
ous war plans; secondly, to compile air intelligence upon
which to conduct initial air operations under each established
war plan. Specifically, the duties included such functions as
analyzing foreign national structures to determine their vul-
nerability to air attack ; preparing objective folders of specific
targets in connection with war plans; maintaining current
data on the strength, organization, and equipment of foreign
air forces, including detailed technical data on performance
and construction of foreign airplanes; keeping a complete file
of airports and flying facilities throughout the world; and
preparing air route guides for the movement of air units to
potential theaters of operation. At the time of the OCAC's
reorganization in December of 1940, the Operations Planning
Branch was manned by five officers and ten civilians under
Capt. H. S. Hansen.^* "

In April, 1941, as a consequence of a formal study conducted by
the Plans Division of the operations and functions of the Office of the
Chief of the Air Corps, a Special Assignment Unit was established
in the Public Relations Section of the Intelligence Division and the
name of the Foreign Liaison Branch became the Air Corps Liaison
Unit.95

Further changes were evident in the air arm in August, with three
sections within the Intelligence Division being renamed : the Domestic
Intelligence Section again became the Counter Intelligence unit, the
Foreign Intelligence Section was retitled the Air Intelligence Section,
and a Foreign Liaison Section was created from the renamed Air
Corps' Liaison Unit previously located within the old Foreign Intel-
ligence Section.^*' By the summer of 1941, the Intelligence Division
consisted of 54 officers and 127 civilians (see Table I regarding
distribution).^^

Una., Chapter VIII, pp. 6-7.
' Ihid., Chapter VIII, pp. 9-10.
' ma., Chapter VIII, p. 16.
' ma., Chapter VIII, p. 18.
' lUd., Chapter VIII, p. 26.

175

TABLE I.— ARMY AIR FORCES INTELLIGENCE DIVISION PERSONNEL, AUGUST 1941

Office

Civilians

Total

Section

On duty

Vacant

Total

On duty

Vacant

Total

On duty

Vacant

Total

Division chief

1
4

24
5
3

11
6

4
12
9
3

1 .

4
83

9
15
20

...

67
8
8

....

178

65
10
35

------

245
14
73
26
49

1
18
91
13
11
27
20

11
237
10
77
19
38

Executive

Air intelligence

Foreign liaison..

328
23

Counter intelligence

Public relations

88
46

Maps.-

Total

141

127

305

442

181

392

573

Note: Corrected version adopted from U.S. Air Force Department. Air University Research Studies Institute. "Develop-
ment of Intelligence Function in the USAF, 1917-50" by Victor H. Cohen. Typescript, ch. VIII, p. 26.

If air intelligence personnel were able to hnrdle the stum-
bling blocks imposed by mounting organizational charts and
changes, and time consuming preparations of budget requests
and justifications for mone,y and personnel, they were con-
fronted with jurisdictional obstacles. The delineation of
intelligence responsibilities between the air arm and the
]MID was a continuing one. and when the Army Air Force
(AAF) was created on June 20. 19il the problem of clarify-
ing responsibilities of the air arm became an internal one as
well as an external one.

The AAF had been created to substitute unity for coordi-
nation of command thus making it superior to both the Air
Corps, which was the seryice element headed by Maj. Gen.
George H. Brett, and the Air Force Combat Command
(AFCC) — formerly the GHQ Air Force — which was the
combat element headed by Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons. Gen-
eral Arnold had the responsibility for establishing policies
and plans for all Army ayiation actiyities, and the Chief of
Staff. "\YDGS, was the person to whom he was accountable.
Arnold also retained his position as Deputy Chief of Staff
for Air. and thus in his two positions he was able to pass on
air matters brought up by the members of the WDGS, as well
as the commanding generals of the AAF's main components.

To assist the Chief of the AAF in the formulation of
policies, an Air Staff was established by using as its core the
OCAC's Plans Diyision. which had been organized into sec-
tions corresponding to the diyisions of the WDGS. The air
sections were renamed A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, and AWPD (Air
War Plans Diyision) , Thus, by lifting the Plans Diyision out
of the Air Corps, the Chief of the AAF had a ready-made
air staff. All papers, studies, memoranda, etc., pertaining to
purely air matters, which hitherto had been processed by the
WDGS, were to be prepared for final War Department action
by the Chief of the AAF. The exceptions were those papers
pertaining to the Military Intelligence and War Plans Diyi-
sions of the WDGS.

The Air Staff was to assume the air planning functions
formerly performed by the WDGS. Its operating functions
were confined to the preparation of policies and instructions

176

essential to directing and coordinating the activities of the
two major AAF elements. Thus, in theory, the Air Staff was
the policy agency, with the Air Corps and the Combat Com-
mand performing operating functions.^®

However, because the relationships between the AAF and the War
Department were not clearly defined, old difficulties between the air
arm and the general Staff continued in many instances. In addition,
friction developed between the AAF Headquarters and the Office of
the Chief of the Air Corps, which had been the principal administra-
tive unit of the air arm. Between June of 1941 and March of 1942,
various activities were withdrawn from OCAC and relocated with the
Air Staff but with a view to maintaining separate operating and
policymaking entities.^^

The strained relationship between the air staffs of the AAF
and the OCAC could not endure for long. The crisis created
by the Pearl Harbor attack, together with the subsequent pro-
hibition imposed by the OCAC against informal communica-
tion between its divisions and the Air Staff, undoubtedly ac-
celerated the transfer of operating activities out of the
OCAC. Not until the elimination of that office by the War
Department reorganization of March 1942 was air intelli-
gence planning and operating completely consolidated into
one office, that of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-2.^°°

Until the collapse of France in June, 1940, air intelligence liaison
with Great Britain was cautious, formal, and conducted with the
customary restrictions on the release of classified information. As
German armies overran Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and the Nether-
lands, traditional military and naval attache contacts were the conduits
for the exchange of intelligence information between the United States
and embattled England. Then came the fall of the Fifth French
Republic.

All that seemed to stand between Hitler and American se-
curity was Great Britain. This alarming condition erased all
pretenses at observing neutrality. The new American policy
became assistance to the democracies bv "All INIethods Short
of War." Obviously realizing that "Knowledge is Power,"
especially in warfare. President Roosevelt approved in July
a British proposal for the interchange of scientific data. In a
swift follow-up, the British dispatched to Washington a com-
mission of technical experts headed by Sir Heniy Tizard,
Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Aircraft Production.
The mission was authorized to exchange secret data on such
things as radar, fire control, turrets, rockets, explosives, com-
munications, etc.. which items obviously interested the Ameri-
can military services.

Initially, the British, as they expected, gave more scien-
tific information than they received, but the general result
of the conversations of the Tizard Mission with representa-

' Ibid., Chapter VIII. pp. 27-29.
Ibid., Chapter VIII. p. 3.S.
"" Ibid.. Chapter VIII, p. 35.

177

lives of the American armed services and the newly created
American Xational Defense Research Committee (XDRC)
was "a orreat stimulus to research on new weapons on both
sides of the Atlantic."' "^

By January, 1941, after some British hesitation on the idea, an
XDRC office was opened in London and, durin^: that month, the
United States gave the British the means for deciphering the Jap-
anese code.^°-

The policy of close collaboration afforded a broad base for the
exchange of general military- information as well as scientific.
Early in August 194:0, about the time Hitler began his air
blitzkrieg on the Island Kingdom, the British and American
Governments had agreed secretly for a full exchange of mili-
tary information. The ]MID, as coordinating agency for such
an exchange desired all requests for military information
from abroad to be specifically worded and routed through
G-2 channels. But G-2*s radio and mail requests to England
did not always secure the information desired, especially on
technical matters. It was found extremely difficult to phrase
specific questions, even for technical personnel, when there
was very little data upon which to base precise queries. Send-
ing officers to England was considered by G-2 and the Chief
of the Air Corps' Intelligence Division as the best means for
gaining information which was not readily available through
attache channels or not at the disposal of the Tizard JNIission
or other British delegations sent to the United States.^"^

Thus, a bevy of Air Corps officers were dispatched to Great Britain
during 1940-41 as individual air observers in supplement to the regu-
lar military attaches. When, in March of 1941, ioint Anglo-American
war plans were perfected (called ABC-1), they provided for the
creation of Special Observer Groups of American officers to ostensibly
function as neutral observers but to also prepare for conversion into
an advance staff element for a theater of operations should the United
States enter the war.^"*

Under ABC-1, the SPOBS [Special Observation Groups]
was to become the official care of the United States Army
Forces in the British Isles, which later actually became the
European Theater of Operations. SPOBS' air staff section
eventuall}^ evolved into the Air Technical Section, ETO
Headquarters, and then re-designated Directorate of Tech-
nical Services of the Air Service Command. United States
Army Air Forces in Europe, with the functions of providing
for the inspection and evaluation of captured enemy aircraft
and directing the activities of air intellio'ence field teams.

The entire SPOBS irroups wore civilian clothes and to the
casual observer it would seem that the American Embassy was
expanding its staff. Each officer in SPOBS had contacts with

^"^ IbUL, Chapter VIII, pp. 36-37.
'"= Ibid., Chapter VIII, p. 38.
'"' Ibid., Chapter VIII, pp. 39-40.
"" Ibid., Chapter VIII, pp. 43-44.

178

a section of the British Army or Royal Air Force which cor-
responded most nearly to his own. Lt. Col. Homer Case,
SPOBS G-2, for example, conferred with the British INIinis-
try on methods of training photo interpreters and then he
recommended that American personnel be permitted to take
advantage of the EAF's photo-interpretation school and
units. Compared to British developments in that field, the
United States was in the elementary stages. Also, while get-
ting acquainted with British oj)erations and making war
plans, the SPOBS "provided the War Department with a
listening post which relayed intelligence concerning the
world's war fronts." ^°^

Meanwhile, on the homefront, eiforts continued at easing the way for
the exchange of technical data with the British.

In the interests of economy, efficiency, and simplicity for all
arms and services, the Secretary of War designated the AC/S,
G-2, to coordinate the exchange of information with British
representatives in America. In matters of aeronautical equip-
ment and technical information, the Air Corps in the fall of
1940 was authorized by G-2 to di\iilge data to authorized
representatives of the British Empire on unclassified, re-
stricted, or confidential infonnation, but secret documents
which could not be reclassified to a less restricted category
had to be cleared by G-2 prior to release. Requests for infor-
mation from the British Air and Purchasing Commissions
in America normally were made through the Foreign Liaison
Branch of the Intelligence Division, OCAC. Directed nego-
tiations by the Air Corps w^ith the British representatives
were permitted for the interchange of technical information
with the understanding that G-2 would be advised in the
form of receipt copies, of information secured and released.^"^

On another matter, when the Air Corps in May, 1941, indicated a
desire to establish a branch intelligence office in New York, it was
repulsed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, on the basis that such
a request infringed upon his exclusive responsibility for collecting
intelligence information and would duplicate an MID effort as that
agency already maintained a field facility in New York. Since MID
did not have an air operation expert in the branch office, an OCAC
Intelligence Division analyst was loaned for this purpose.^"^

By 1 August 1941 the branch office's new project of produc-
ing target folder [sic] for the Air Corps was in progress. The
original folder program involving single targets was ex-
tended to cover increasingly large areas until the Air Corps
sectionalized and numbered the various theater areas: from
then on area target folders were produced. Air target ma-
terials were collected from files of trade data, records of fi-
nancial transactions, engineering; reports, travel diaries, field
notes of scientists, and other similar items existing in the New

' Ibid., Chapter VIII, pp. 45-46.

' lUd., Chapter VIII, p. 49.

' TUd., Chapter VIII, pp. 59-61.

179

York area. This material could not be shipped to Washington
for processing and had to be examined at the sources.
Fortunatel}". the Xew York office was located contiguous to
and worked closely with tlie Army ^lap Service thus enabling
the office to produce a bonus in the form of topographical and
geographical intelligence.

The ]MID proposed to expand its branch in Xew York so
as to increase the production of objective folders. But in light
of the current international situation and the great magni-
tude of the task involved in ferreting out available data exist-
ing within the Ignited States, General Scanlon on the day
before Pearl Harbor told G-2 that the proposal was modest
in the extreme. The outbreak of war of course became the
signal for accelerating all exj^ansion plans into high gear and
the branch office, for example, was gradually assigned suf-
ficient personnel to enable it to ])rovide essential intelligence
for A-2's targeting operations for German and Japanese
areas. But it was the San Francisco Branch which concen-
trated on collecting available intelligence information on
Japanese industries.^"®

Then came the debacle of Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941.

A-2 was a madhouse, recalled one of the first officers as-
signed to air intelligence in AAF Headquarters after Pearl
Harbor Day. Sitting at a desk cluttered with ringing tele-
phones connecting important air installations, the intelligence
officer Avho valiantly attempted to handle the large number of
incoming calls during the hectic first days of Avar reminded an
observer of an old fashioned movie. In those days a newly
assigned officer would see red upon entering an office of A-2 :
With ever-increasing demands for intelligence, desks in a
crowded small room were frequently piled high with docu-
ments, and as almost everything was classified, the prevailing
red security cover sheets seemed to lend a reddish hue to the
room. A new officer could see red both literally and figura-
tively. In one instance, for example, an officer was rushed
from his pistol patrol of Boiling Field. Washington. D.C.,
to A-2 only to wait days before someone could find time to
assign him specific duties. Even then the young and inexperi-
enced intelligence officer had to use his own judoment and
imagination as to how his tasks should be accomplished.^"^

Efforts were soon made to restore order to military operations in
the aftermath of the Japanese attack. The only truly functional air
intelligence entity was the Air Corps Intellisfence Division and it
was quickly sought by A-2 in a centralized intelligence plan.

After a period of negotiations, the views of the higher
headquarters finally prevailed and the Chief of the Air Staff
on 23 January 1942 directed the Chief of the Air Corps to
transfer to A-2 all the functions, personnel, and equipment
of the Foreign Liaison Section and the Air Intelligence Sec-

' Thifl.. Chapter VIII, pp. 62-63.
' Ibid., Chapter XII, p. 4.

180

tion. The latter was the heart and soul of the Air Intelligence
Division because it was composed of : the Current Unit con-
taining the file of technical intelligence collected over a
period of years, the Evaluation Unit charged with correlat-
ine: and evaluating intelligence, and the Operation's Unit,
which translated intelligence into air estimate and target
objectives.

A small number of officers and civilians of the Air Intelli-
gence Section were permitted to remain in the Intelligence
Division so as to allow the CAC to continue his command
functions and responsibilities. The sections remaining in the
Intelligence Division were Maps, Counter Intelligence, and
Air Intelligence School. Furthermore, copies of all intelli-
gence matters received by A-2 were to be sent to the OCAC.
A sufficient amount of air intelligence functions remained
in the OCAC to prevent the attainment of the goal of cen-
tralization of intelligence authority. Further complication
and duplications resulted from the operations of an air
intelligence office in the INlilitarv Intelligence Division of
the A^T)GS."°

The importance of the air arm in the prosecution of the war soon
became evident and, accordingly,

the War Department throuoh Circular 59, issued on 2 March
1942 and efl'ective on 9 INIarch, decided that the most effec-
tive organization wdiich would give the desired freedom of
action for all services and at the same time ensure the neces-
sary unity of command, was one having three autonomous
and co-ordinate commands under the Chief of Staff : Army
Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and the Services of Sup-
ply (later, renamed Anny Service Forces).

The overall planning, coordinating, and supervisory role
of the WDGS was reaffirmed, but enough air officers were to
be assigned to the "War Department to help make strategic
decisions. The goal of 50 percent air officers on duty with the
"WDGS was never reached principally because qualified Air
Corps officers were so scarce. Thus G-2 was not only able to
enlarge his air imit, but he was reassured of this responsi-
bility for collecting all intelligence, both air and ground.
Nevertheless, the reorganized office of A-2 was to make the
most of the grant of autonomy to the AAF.

As the result of the reorganization of INIarch 1942, the
intelligence functions of the OCAC and Comliat Command
were transferred to A-2, headed by Col. R. L. Walsh who
had replaced General Scanlon on 21 February 1942. A-2,
however, lost the activities and personnel of its Foreign
Liaison Section to G-2's newly established IMilitai-y Intel-
ligence Service (MIS). About the same time, the Intelligence
Service (IS), the air intelligence operating agency com-
parable to the MIS, was established under the supervision
and control of A-2. The first Director of the IS, Lt. Col.

' lUd., Chapter XII, pp. 5-6.

181

C. E. Henry, was assigned the functions of collecting,
evaluating, and disseminating technical and other types of
intelligence, training air intelligence officers, and of)erating
the security services. To accomplish these duties the Ad-
ministrative, Operational, Informational Intelligence (less
the Current Unit), and the Counter Intelligence Sections
were transferred from the A-2 Division to the IS.

The Administrative Section served both the IS and A-2.
With the IS as the major operating agency, the other sec-
tions under A-2 were Executive and Staff, Combat Intelli-
gence, and Current Intelligence. A Plans Section was also
established in A-2 for the purposes of formulating plans
for collecting and disseminating air intelligence, training
intelligence officers, establishing air intelligence require-
ments, coordinating projects with the Air Staff and the
"\\T!)GS divisions, and establishing liaison with other Ameri-
can and foreign intelligence agencies. The section was short
lived as a separate entity as a result of A-2's order for its
absorption into the Executive and Staff Section.^^^

Three months after the IMarch reorganization took place, a formal
survey was conducted to deal with weaknesses in the new arrange-
ments. A-2 had little criticism of the scheme except for a clearer
relationship between the counterintelligence groups of the MID/
"WT^GS and those of the Air Intelligence Service.^^^

Slight changes were made and in a few instances some
offices were re-shifted. In A-2, an Office of Technical Infor-
mation, with a nucleus of four officers transferred from the
public relations branch, was created as a part of the Current
Intelligence Section. Col. E. P. Sorensen, who had assumed
the position of AC/AS, A-2, on 22 June 1942, used the newly
acquii'ed Office to prepare the weeklv brief for General
Arnold's use in the meetings of the War Council. By the
beginning of the following year the Office of Technical In-
formation had become an independent section in A-2's office.
In addition to preparing weekly summary reports for Gen-
eral Arnold, the Office also handled the AAF's public rela-
tions activities and helped prepare for publication the office
service journal, .4/;' Force, which on 6 September superseded
the Ah Force News Letter.

Other newly established imits included an Intelligence
Training Unit within the Air Intelligence Service. By early
1943 training functions had been incorporated into a Train-
ing Coordination Section and transferred from the AIS to
the A-2 level. The Special Projects Section in the AIS was
also moved to A-2 where it was eventually incorporated into
the Staff Advisors Section. In general the main divisions in
the Office of the AC/AS, A-2, remained fairly well stalnlized
from the time of the War Department reorganization of

Jh\d., Chapter XTI, pp. 9-11.
'ma., Chapter XII, p. 20.

182

March 1942 until the AAF streamlined its own structure in
the following March by abolishing the Directorates.^^^

This was the last major reorganization of the air arm's intelligence
structure during the period of the war.

After an adjustment and reconciliation of the various
plans and ideas that had been presented during the previous
months, a streamlined organization went into effect on 29
March 1943, Many offices devoted to the planning or execu-
tion of specific functions were telescoped into the offices of
assistant chiefs of staff and special staff. In the Office of the
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, all the functions
assigned to air intelligence were divided among five prin-
cipal divisions: Operational Intelligence, Counter Intelli-
gence, Intelligence Information, Historical, and Combat
Liaison and Training.

The last named Divisions combined the Combat Liaison
Section of the Air Intelligence Service and the Training
Coordination Section, which had been on the A-2 staff level.
The Current Intelligence Section was also removed from its
A-2 staff status and made part of the Infonnational Intelli-
gence Division. The only units left, out of the five main
divisions because of their sei^vice to the entire intelligence
office were the Office Services, Office of Technical Informa-
tion (to handle public relations), and Special Projects
(formerly Staff Advisors). Two sections of Counter Intelli-
gence, Safeguarding of INIilitary Information and Training
Clearance, were transferred to the Facilities Security and
Personnel Security Branches in the Air Provost Marshal's
Division in AC/AS, Material, Maintenance, and Distribu-
tion.

By June 1943, the Combat Liaison and Training Division
became the Training Plans Division and given the functions
of makinc: studies in and formulating policies and practices
for intelligence training in AAF schools and imits. At about
the same time, the Operational Intelligence and Intelligence
Information Divisions were renamed Operational and In-
formational Divisions, respectively. By October 1943 a few
minor changes had been made within the divisions and two
new agencies were added : The Air Intellio-ence School sec-
tion Avas created to operate the Air Intelligence School at
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, for the training of AAF officers
in combat and base intelligence, photo interpretation, and
prisoner of war interrogation.^^*

"WHiile certain post-war changes would be effected in the air intel-
ligence institution immediately after the cessation of hostilities in
1945, the next significant restructuring of this intelligence organi-
zation would occur with the establishment of the independent United
States Air Force in 1947.

lUd., Chapter XIT, pp. 22-23.
lUd., Chapter XII, pp. 24-25.

183

V. MUitary InteUigence

The militaiT intelligence ortranization of World "War II consisted
of a variety of field units, ranofincr from groups serving with combat
commands to the special staffs designed to assist allied combined
operations councils at the highest levels of armed services leadership.
The core or hub of this complex of overseas intelligence entities was
the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General
Staff, an agency which, in the twilight peace of 1938, consisted of 20
officers and 48 civilians.^^^

When the United States entered the war, the Military In-
telligence Division was ill prepared to perform the tasks
which were to be thrust upon it. The war in Europe and the
increasing!}' critical world situation had increased the num-
ber of persons employed in the Division and had added a
few new activities. Despite the expansion, there were real
deficiencies, which indicate the condition of the Division at
the end of 1941. There was no intelligence on enemy air or
ground order of battle; there was no detailed reference ma-
terial on enemy army forces such as weapons, insignia, for-
tifications, and documents; there was no detailed topographic
intelligence for planning landing operations; there were in-
sufficient facts — but plenty of opinion — on which to base
strategic estimates; and there were no trained personnel for
either strategic or combat intelligence. The production and
planning of intelligence was proceeding, but on a limited
scale and to an insignificant degree. Fortunately most of this
material could be obtained from our allies, but it no more than
satisfied current intelligence equirements and was completely
inadequate for long range requirements. Before Y-J Day,
the Division had developed into a large and efficient intelli-
gence organization, but this development, like the building
of Rome, did not take place overnight. Present estimates
indicate that an efficient intelligence machine was not devel-
oped until late 1944."^

Appointed chief of the Operations Division (successor to the War
Plans Division) of the War Department General Staff in March, 1942,
Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the man destined to command
Operation Torch and serve as Supreme Commander of the European
Tlieater, made the following observation with regard to intelligence
operations and capabilities during the period of America's entry into
world war.

Within the War Department a shocking deficiency that im-
peded all constructive planning existed in the field of In-
telligence. The fault was partly within and partly without

"^ U.S. Army. Military Intelligence Division. "A History of the Military
Intelligence Division. 7 December 1941-2 September 194.5." Typescript. 1946,
p. 3. Copies of this study bear the marking "Secret :" the copy utilized in this
study was declassified and supplied by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
[Hereafter referred to as MID History.]

"' Ihid., p. 2 ; with regard to the staff growth in MID, see Tables II and III
in this chapter.

184

the Army. The American public has always viewed with re-
pugnance everything that smacks of the spy : during the years
between the two World Wars no funds were provided with
which to establish the basic requirement of an Intelligence
system — a far-flung organization of fact finders.

Our one feeble gesture in this direction was the maintenance
of military attaches in most foreign capitals, and since public
funds were not available to meet the unusual expenses of this
type of duty, only officers with independent means could
normally be detailed to these posts. Usually they were esti-
mable, socially acceptable gentlemen ; few knew the essentials
of Intelligence work. Results were almost completely negative
and the situation was not helped by the custom of making
long service as a military attache, rather than ability, the
essential qualification for appointment as head of the Intelli-
gence Division in the War Department.

The stepchild position of G-2 in our General Staff system
was emphasized in many ways. For example the number of
general officers within the War Department was so limited
by peacetime law that one of the principal divisions had to
be headed by a colonel. Almost without exception the G-2
Division got the colonel. This in itself would not necessarily
have been serious, since it would liave been far prieferable to
assign to the post a highly qualified colonel than a mediocre
general, but the practice clearly indicated the Army's failure
to emphasize the Intelligence function. This was reflected also
in our schools, where, despite some technical training in battle-
field reconnaissance and Intelligence, the broader phases of
the work were almost completely ignored. We had few men
capable of analyzing intelligently such information as did
come to the notice of the War Department, and this applied
particularly to wliat has become the very core of Intelligence
research and analysis — namely, industry.

In the first winter of the war these accumulated and glaring
deficiencies were serious handicaps. Initially the Intelligence
Division could not even develop a clear plan for its own orga-
nization nor could it classify the type of information it
deemed essential in determining the purposes and capabilities
of our enemies. The chief of the division could do little more
than come to the planning and operating sections of the staff
and in a rather pitiful way ask if there was anything he could
do for us,^^^

The chronology of organizational developments in the military
intelligence structure necessarily focuses upon the Military Intelli-
gence Division, beginning with the final months before the Pearl Har-
bor attack.

"■^ Dwight D. Eisenhower. Crusade in Europe. New York, Doubleday and Com-
pany, 1948, p. 32.

185

TABLE II.— MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION PERSONNEL, 1938-45

Officers in Civilians in Officers Civilians

Year Washington Washington in field in field Total

1938

1939

1940 ___

1941

1942

19 13

1914

1945..... _ __

Note: Adopted from U.S. Army. iVIilitary Intelligence Division. "A History of the Military Intelligence Division, Dec. 7,
1941-Sept. 2, 1945." Typescript, p. 380n.

191

220

167

362

200

656

119

120

1,095

509

1,106

197

231

2,043

649

1,079

247

273

2,048

581

1,009

260

618

2,468

575

931

247

776

2,529

186

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187

In September 1941 the Military Intelligence Division was
organized vertically [and] prepared not only to produce in-
telligence, but also to expand in case war came. The Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, Brigadier General Sherman Miles, was
chief of the Division and was assisted by an Executive. Re-
porting directl}' to him was the Special Study Group (later
the Propaganda Branch). Reporting to him through the Ex-
ecutive were the chiefs of the Administrative. Intelligence,
Counterintelligence, Plans and Training, and Censorship
Branches.

The Administrative Branch included two types of func-
tions. Such sections as Finance, Personnel, Records, and Co-
ordination comprised the first type. By this consolidation
of administrative functions the remaining branches of the
Division were free to devote their full energies to their pri-
mary functions. This branch also was charged with the ad-
ministrative supervision of the Military Attache system, the
Foreign Liaison and Translation Sections.

The heart of [the] iSIilitary Intelligence Division was in
the Intelligence Branch, the largest of the branches. Orga-
nized along geographic lines, it controlled, in a large meas-
ure, all of the processes of intelligence. Information was gath-
ered and evaluated [and] intelligence produced by the follow-
ing seven sections: the Balkans and Near East, the British
Empire, Central Europe, Eastern Europe, Far East, Latin
America, and Western Europe. It will be noted that the lines
of demarcation were entirely geographical and that there
was no attempt to separate information and intelligence topi-
cally according to political, economic, scientific, and so on.
The Air section and later the Order of Battle Branch were ex-
ceptions to this rule. Intelligence was disseminated by the
Dissemination Section and by the G-2 Situation section which
maintained the G-2 Situation Room. The information gath-
ering activities of military attaches, observers and others
working "in the field" were directed by the Field Person-
nel section. This included directives concerning the types of
information desired but did not embrace administrative mat-
ters which were left to the Military Attache Section of the
Administrative Branch. In other words, the attaches looked
to the Administrative Branch for their administration, to
the Intelligence Branch for their directives, and reported
their findings to the geographic sections. To assist the Chief
of [the Intelligence] Branch in administrative matters there
was a small administrative group within the Branch. It will
be noted that the Branch controlled all of the processes of in-
telligence, and that it was devoted entirely to positive intelli-
gence, as opposed to negative or counter-intelligence.^^^

Organized functionally, the Counter Intelligence Branch, composed
of Domestic Intelligence, Investigation, and Plant Intelligence sec-
tions, probed subversion and disloyalty matters, supervised defense

^ MID History, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

70-890 O - 76 - 13

188

plant security, produced intelligence relative to the domestic situa-
tion, was responsible for safeguarding military information, and took
on such special assignments as were given to it.

The Plan and Training Branch "prepared plans for intelligence
requirements and developed policies for military and combat intelli-
gence" while also being "responsible for the development and su-
pervision of training doctrine in the fields of military and combat
intelligence." ^^^

Until the United States actually entered the war, the Censorship
Branch (renamed the Information Control Branch on December 5,
1941) remained small and confined itself to preparing plans for fu-
ture censorship. Because national censorship in wartime was not as-
signed to the War Department, G-2 was responsible only for military
censorship policy though liaison with the Office of Censorship which
provided MID with valuable information uncovered by that agency.^'"

In early 1942, a reorganization occurred within the War Depart-
ment, a restructuring which would prove functionally troublesome for
MID.

The new organization was announced to the Army in Cir-
cular #59. As it all'ected the army its changes were far reach-
ing and fundamental. The most striking feature of the
proposed reorganization was the distinction made between
operating and staff functions. The latter were to be retained
by the general staff division, but the former were to be placed
in operating agencies. This entailed the separation of the
larger part of the organization of each staff division from the
small policy making group who performed truly staff func-
tions. The policy groups would remain in the General Staff
as a small policy making and advisory staff divorced from
the operating functions of their organizations. By ruthlessly
regrouping many old offices and functions and integrating
them into the new organization, smoother functioning was
expected.

The language of the Circular did not make a clear distinc-
tion between the [old policy making] Military Intelligence
Division and the [newly created operating] Military Intel-
ligence Service. From the present point of vantage the
intentions of the circular seem clear. This distinction was not
made completely clear until Circular 5-2, September 1944,
was issued, although some progress had been made in the

""/&?•(?., p 8.

^° The censorship of communications between the United States and foreign
nations was authorized by the First War Powers Act (55 Stat. 840) approved
December 18, 1941. Pursuant to this statute, President Roosevelt, on December 19,
established (E.G. 8985) the OflBce of Censorship, a civilian agency located within
the National Defense Program tangentially attached to the Executive Office
of the President. The director of the Office of Censorship and its program was
Byron Price, who headed the unit until its demise by a presidential directive
(E.O. 9631) issued September 28, 1945 and effective on November 15 of that
year. See Elmer Davis and Byron Price, War Information and Censorship. Wash-
ington, American Council mi PubMc Affairs, 1943: also see Byron Price, Gov-
ernmental Censorship in Wartime. American Political Science Review, v. 36,
October, 1942 : 837-850.

189

July 1942 revision of AR 10-15. Circular #59 charged the
Military Intelligence Division, G-2, ''with those duties of the
War Department General Staff relating to the collection,
evaluation and dissemination of military information." The
Military Intelligence Service was established "under the
direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Military Intelli-
gence Division, War Department General Staff' . . . [to]
operate and administer the service of the collection, compila-
tion and dissemination of military intelligence."' Here was a
verbal paradox. In the vocabulary of G-2 intelligence is
based upon the evaluation of information. Information is the
raw product from which intelligence is produced. [The] Mili-
tary Intelligence Division was charged, then, with duties
relating to the evaluation and dissemination of information;
while [the] Military Intelligence Service was not charged
with the evaluation but with the dissemination of
intelligence.^-^

Subsequent discussions and attention to this verbal dilemma con-
tributed to a clarification of the functions of MID and MIS, but the
initial confusion and lack of an authoritative decision on the matter
did little to ameliorate ill feelings over the dichotomous organization
and subsequent rivalry between the two units.

A series of office memoranda implemented the reorganiza-
tion directed by Circular #59. The Military Intelligence
Service was created and all personnel, except certain com-
missioned officers, were transferred to it from [the] Military
Intelligence Division. An examination of the personnel
assignments in the memoranda and of assignments listed on
a Chart of 15 January 1942 reveals few essential changes.
Colonel Hayes A. Kroner, the new chief. Military Intelli-
gence Service, had been Chief of the Intelligence Branch.
Col. Ealph C. Smith, the new Executive Officer, Military
Intelligence Service, had been Executive Officer and Chief,
Administrative Branch. The latter function was assigned to
Col. T. E. Roderick, formerly Assistant Executive. He like-
wise retained his assignment as assistant executive officer. The
new Chief, Intelligence Group, Col. R. S. Bratton, had for-
merly been assigned to the Far Eastern section of the Intelli-
gence Branch. Chief of the Training Branch, Lt. Col. P. H.
Timothy, had been chief of the Plans and Training Branch.
Col. Oscar Solbert, now chief of the Psychological Warfare
Branch, was a past member of that Branch. Col. Black, its
former chief, had been transferred to the ^Military Intelli-
gence Division staff section. Other members of the Staff were
either newh' assigned members of [the] Military Intelligence
Division, detailed from the AAF, or former members of [the]
Military Intelligence Division.

The Military Intelligence Service was divided into four
groups, each reporting to the Chief, Military Intelligence
Service, through his executive. The Foreign Liaison Branch

"^ MID History, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

190

and the Military Attache Section reported independently to
the Chief, Military Intelligence Service, and not through a
Deputy. The Administrative group was divided into five
housekeeping sections. The Intelligence group was divided
into parallel Air and Ground sections, organized according to
theaters. In addition, an administrative Branch and a Situa-
tion and Planning Branch assisted in the supervision and
planning for the group.

The Counter Intelligence Group was divided into parallel
air and ground sections, devoted to Domestic. Plant Intelli-
gence, Military Censorship, and Security of Military Infor-
mation. They, too, were coordinated by an Administrative
and a Counter Intelligence Situation and Evaluation Branch.
Psychological warfare, training and dissemination were as-
signed to the Operations Group.^"

Tliree months after Circular #59 was implemented, the new Assist-
ant Chief of Staff, G-2, Major General George V. Strong, whom
Eisenhower described as "a senior officer possessed of a keen mind,
a driving energy, and a ruthless determination," ^-^ indicated his
dissatisfaction with the reorganization as it affected MID and offered
an alternate plan of structure to the Chief of Staff.^-*

It was essentially the same organization as before, except
that the office of Chief, INIilitary Intelligence Service, had
been established between most of the branches and the G-2.
The Military Intelligence Division Staff, aside from [the]
Military Intelligence Sei'vice, was new. The most apparent
difference between the old and new plan was the separation
of ground and air intelligence into parallel sections within
Intelligence and Counterintelligence. As before, a group was
established which met in the Situation Room to make the
final evaluation and to conduct broad planning and policy
making. Preliminary work of this sort was also done in the
Situation and Planning sections and the Evaluation section
of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence groups. Because
the final evaluation process w^as entrusted to the G-2, General
Staff, there was no clear break between [the] Military Intelli-
gence Division and [the] Military Intelligence Service.

General Strong believed in organizing the Division func-
tionally and sought therefore to place evaluation in the Intel-
ligence Group. In July, according to present evidence, the
Dissemination Branch was combined with certain other func-

^ IMd., pp. 15-16 ; another account comments that "after March 1942 there
was a small Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff
totalling 16 oflficers with 10 clerical assistants, and a Military Intelligence Service
consisting of 342 officers and 1005 civilian and enlisted assistants. The Service
was to carry out the operational and administrative activities for the General
Staff section, and while there were to be two distinct agencies, some of the key
officers were members of both organizations. This differentiation tended to be
an artificial distinction and in practice there was but one organization." From
Otto L. Nelson, Jr. National Security And The General Staff. Washington,
Infantry Journal Press, 1946, p. 525.

^^ Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 34.

'-"^ MID History, op. cit., p. 19.

191

tions and desi^iated the Evaluation and Dissemination
Branch, probably in the Intelligence Group. The date is un-
certain, but the G-2 telephone directories for June and July
indicate that this must have been the date. It was an agency
whicli evaluated the overall information collected within the
group and disseminated it as intelligence. In October its name
was changed to the Dissemination Group and it was placed
in the Intelligence Group. At the same time the Intelligence
Group was divided into the newly created North American
and Foreign Intelligence Command and the American Intel-
ligence Command, The two commands gave [the] Military
Intelligence Service the means to handle on the one hand all
intelligence affecting Latin America (American Intelligence
Command) and all other types of foreign intelligence (North
American and Foreign Intelligence Command) on the
other.^2^

Other changes in the intelligence structure were effected, such as
the decentralizing of the American Intelligence Command and re-
locating it in Miami.

By 29 November 1942 arrangements were sufficiently stable
to issue a chart showing the various changes. Tlie G-2 Staff
was retained, and the Chief, Military Intelligence Service,
was also designated as Deputy, G-2. The Executive office now
appeared to supervise the iNIessage Center. The Chief, Mili-
tary Intelligence Service, was given four Assistant Chiefs
for Intelligence, Training, Administration, and Security,
The Intelligence Group was divided into the two commands
mentioned above. North American and Foreign Intelligence
Command was organized geographically with a separate air
section further subdivided into general geographic sections.
American Intelligence Command was organized more func-
tionally with Branches devoted to Special Activities, "Ameri-
can," Air Control, Communications Control, and Hemisphere
Studies. The dissemination Group was so placed that its
Cable, Collection, Theater, Intelligence, and Publications
Branches received reports from both commands. At the top
of this pyramid with [sic] the Evaluation Board which re-
ported to the Assistant Chief, Military Intelligence Service,
Intelligence, and could receive reports from the aforemen-
tioned commands and groups.

The Training agency was divided into two groups : one for
intelligence schools and the other for liaison with other
schools and agencies concerned with intelligence training.
The Assistant Chief, Military Intelligence Service, Adminis-
tration was given certain operational Branches in addition
to his housekeeping branches. These included Foreign Liai-
son, Military Attache, Psychological Warfare, Prisoner of
War, and Geographic Branches. The latter was announced
25 November 1942 as the coordinating and policy making

Ibid., pp. 18-19.

192

agency for War Department procurement, preparation, and
reproduction of maps. The Assistant Chief, INIilitary Intelli-
gence Service, Security, the old Counterintelligence Group,
retained the same essential organization, being divided into
domestic intelligence (counterintelligence) and Safeguard-
ing Military Information (or Special).

Not shown on the chart was the Special Branch, which
handled all matters relating to cryptographic security and
communications, interception and analysis of cryptographic
and coded messages, and measures relating to the use and se-
curity of radar and signal intelligence. This branch reported
directly to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, because the
nature of its activities prevented a wholesale circulation of
its eft'orts.^^*^

The Evaluation Board, established on November 3, 1942, in accord-
ance with General Strong's particular wishes, was directly responsible
to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. and the Chief of the Military
Intelligence Ser\'ice. It maintained close liaison with both the North
American and Foreign Intelligence Command and the American
Intelligence Command; in addition, foreign country experts were
added to its membership, indicating increasing importance for coun-
try specialists.^^^

General Strong next proceeded to announce a new organiza-
tion which more closely met his demands for an intelligence
division. Although he disapproved of a separate Military
Intelligence Service, he retained it and attempted to fashion
his organization to produce the desired effect. The new
organization was announced 25 January 1943. The General
Staff section was divided into a Policy Section charged with
the study and revie^v of policies and tlieir cooi'dination in the
General Staff and War Department. The remainder of the
Staff was transferred to the Evaluation and Dissemination
Staff of the Intelligence Group. This staff was charged with
evaluation, interpretation, dissemination, and planning of
intelligence. Specifically, it was charged with the determina-
tion of the intelligence requirements of the Chief of Staff and
Operations Division. Current intelligence production and
planning were, therefore, taken out of the hands of the staff
where General Strong apparently felt it never should have
been placed. A policy group was left behind to study and co-
ordinate policy matters. No mention is made of strategy and
task force operations, but presumably these problems were
discussed by the Evaluation and Dissemination Staff. The
mission of the Staff had been stated even more fully on
8 January 1943, when an interim organization was an-
nounced. It was to "control policy on evaluation, supervise
its execution in the several levels of the Intelligence Group,
and give final and superior evaluation, from the Operations
viewpoint to military information for the application of

'IMd., pp. 20-21.
Ibid., pp. 21-22.

193

intelligence locally and for its dissemination wherever neces-
sary." Thus, it not only set the policy for evaluation, but re-
viewed, in its supervisory capacity, the products of the vari-
ous branches of the Intelligence Group.^-^

The four major units of the Military Intelligence Service —
Administration, Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Training —
remained as they were but new subdivision entities were created at
the discretion of the heads of these offices. The Xorth American and
Foreign Intelligence Command was abolished at this time and the
American Intelligence Command became the American Intelligence
Service, later the Latin American Unit.

Further alterations in the structure of the organization
were effected three months later. The Foreign Liaison and
Prisoner of War Branches were ordered to report directly
to the Chief, ^Military Intelligence Service. The Administra-
tive Group was abolished and its sections transferred to the
Executive. A "Chart of Functions and Personnel" dated
17 April 1943, reveals that the Chief. INIilitary Intelligence
Service, was also Deputv G-2. Four sections appear as part
of the "War Department General Staff, G-2": the Policy
Section, the Evaluation and Dissemination Section, the
Administrative Section and the Joint Intelligence Commit-
tee Section. At the same time, an Evaluation and Dissemina-
tion Staff is included in the structure of the Intelligence
Group. A study of its functions and personnel reveals an
interesting situation.

As a part of the G-2 General Staff, the Evaluation and
Dissemination Section's functions are listed first as those
assigned to the Evaluation and Dissemination Staff, and then
as a section to study : "physical, economic, political, and
ethnological geography in order to advise on measures of
national security and assist in assuring continued peace in
the post-war world; and . . . conducted studies of a broad
nature to assist in the prosecution of the war." Its other func-
tions were to advise the Chief, Intelligence Group, on the
Intelligence requirements of [the] Military Intelligence Di-
vision's customers and to assign priority to their requests.
They would also evaluate and synthesize information and
intelligence produced, and make sure that there was always
careful and complete consideration of all information in
[the] Military Intelligence Service. Finally, they were to
review and give final evaluation of intelligence before it was
disseminated, and exercise general supervision over Military
Intelligence Service publications and reports. Xow the first
function quoted above is exactly the same, except for slight
changes in verbiage, as the mission of the Geopolitical Branch
as stated in June 1942. Xowhere else in the chart is there a
reference to the Branch, nor had there ever been any mention
of it on anv chart, because of a desire to keep its activities

Ibid., pp. 22-23.

194

secret. In February or March, the Branch's title had been
changed to the less alarming "Analysis Branch." ^^^

Next came renewed efforts to abolish the Military Intelligence Serv-
ice and centralize intelligence operations under a new organization.

On 30 August 1943, it was announced that General Hayes
Kroner, then Chief, Military Intelligence Service, would
become Deputy for Administration, G-2. Col. Thomas J.
Betts was announced as Deputy for Intelligence, G-2. No
new chief was announced for the jNIilitary Intelligence Serv-
ice. All of the old agencies of [the] Military Intelligence
Division and [the] Military Intelligence Service were
grouped under these two deputies. This was done in recog-
nition of the fact "that all G-2 — Military Intelligence Serv-
ice activities, regardless of allocation, are concerned funda-
mentally with military intelligence and security." It was
further provided than an intelligence producing agency
stripped of all administrative and operational functions
should be established. All other functions were to be handled
by another agency. Thus two deputies were established, the
one responsible for administrative and "other" functions,
while the other was responsible for intelligence.^^''

A second stage of the MIS abolition plan came on September 22,
1943 in a memorandum announcing a furtlier reorganization around
three deputies, one for Administration, one for Air, and one for
Intelligence. The first of these remained with General Kroner, who
was also given responsibility for the operation of the Services Group,
the Training Group, and the Historical Branch.

The mission of the Deputy for Intelligence was defined in
the same terms as in the previous memorandum. He was to
direct not only the Policy and Strategy Group and Theater
Group, but also the Collection Group, the Prisoner of War
Branch, and the Order of Battle Branch. Thus, the function
of collection was returned to the Deputy for Intelligence.
The Deputy for Air was made responsible for the reestab-
lished Air Unit which was charged with the same liaison
function formerly assigned to the Air Liaison Section. The
Deputy for Air was also charged with the supervision of
Air Corps personnel assigned to G-2 and who were to be
integrated into the various sections of the Theater Group.
Their functions were not elaborated, but they presumably
remained the same as before. The "new" organization was not,
in point of fact, so new as it appeared to be. The memoran-
dum had merely recalled the earlier one [by General Strong
protesting the creation of MIS], and then accomplished the
same purpose. The primary difference was the return of the
collection function to the Intelligence group. It represents
General Strong's ideal organization of an intelligence agency.
He believed the separation of [the] Military Intelligence
Service from [the] Military Intelligence Division had been

• lUd., pp. 25-26.
' lUd., pp. 28-29.

195

"imfortiinate," therefore, it was abolished. He believed the
orjtyanizatioii should rest on functional bases, therefore, in-
telligence planning and policy, screening and evaluation, and
dissemination were brought together under one roof. The
many miscellaneous functions of G-2 (services, training,
mapping, history, etc.) were left outside the key organiza-
tion. In a sense, [the] Military Intelligence Service had be-
come the organization of the Deputy for Intelligence, ex-
cept that policy and planning was not left in the intelligence
producing agency.

Paradoxically, the organization charts of the War Depart-
ment and the Army continued to show a separate Military
Intelligence Service, although it had been abolished. The bulk
of the personnel allotted to the Military Intelligence Division
were allotted to a Military Intelligence Service. Many
papers prepared in G-2 continued to carry signatures indi-
cating that [the] Military Intelligence Service existed and
functioned. This situation was deliberate. The reorganiza-
tion memorandum stressed the fact that its details were to
be retained in [the] Military Intelligence Division. Outside
the Di\dsion, an effort was made to maintain the appearance
of a separate Military Intelligence Service.^^^

When General Strong's tenure at G-2 came to an end and, on
February 7, 1944, he was replaced by Major General Clayton Bissell,
the reinstatement of MIS, in accordance with the Chief of Staff's
original wishes, was assured.

The preliminaiy study for another reorganization was
alreacly in progress. Three days after General Strong was
relieved as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, the Adjutant Gen-
eral issued a letter order establishing two boards of officers
to study, recommend, and supervise the reorganization of the
Military Intelligence Division. The first board consisted of
Brigadier General Elliot D. Cooke, the "steering member,"
Col. John H. Stutesman, Lt. Col. Francis H. Brigham, Jr.,
Capt. Jerome Hubbard, and Mr. George Schwarzwalder
(Bureau of the Budget). This Board was directed to make
a detailed study and to submit recommendations for the re-
organization of [the] Military Intelligence Division. They
were further ordered to supervise the implementation of
these recommendations under the supervision of a second
board. It consisted of John J. MeCloy (Assistant Secretary
of War), Major General John P. Smith, Major General Clay-
ton L. Bissell. and Brigadier General Otto L. Nelson. Jr.
They were directed to "consider, approve, and super\nse" the
implementation of the recommendations submitted by the
Cooke Committee.^^^

The work of these two panels came to a conclusion within two
months from their creation.

Ibid., pp. 31-32.
'■ Ibid., pp. 33-34.

196

On 23 March 1944, Mr. McCloy reported to the Chief of
Staff the proposals of his committee, based upon the study of
the Cooke Committee. A revision of AR, 10-15 was suggested,
which would give to [the] Military Intelligence Service the
responsibility of securing pertinent information and convert-
ing it into intelligence for the use of the Chief of Staff,
the General Staff, and the Military Intelligence Service. The
Policy Staff would state and carry out all policies govern-
ing intelligence and counter-intelligence within the Army.
The G-2 was responsible for the interior security of the Army
and the production of intelligence necessary to the operation
of the War Department. The purpose of the proposed change
was clear. It not only separated [the] Military Intelligence
Service from the Policy Staff and delineated the responsi-
bilities of each, but it also clarified the relationship between
the Division and the Service. This recommended revision was
not adopted.

McCloy next outlined the proposed reorganization of G-2.
It emphasized the fact that the Policy Staff must not be
merged or integrated with [the] Military Intelligence Serv-
ice. The work of the Policy Staff was divided into four groups
of related subjects. A later regrouping and rephrasing of
these subjects integrated and reduced the number of functions.
The aim of both allocations was to enable a small body of ex-
perts to prepare policies, each in his particular speciality.

The broad outlines of [the] Military Intelligence Service
were likewise sketched, but it was emphasized that within the
organization, rigid compartmentalization would be avoided.
The Chief, Military Intelligence Service, was charged with
two responsibilities: the collection of information from all
sources, and the production of intelligence. The Director of
Information was to discharge the first function assisted by a
supervisor of information, gathering personnel, liaison
groups, etc., and a supervisor for receiving, classifying and
distributing information. The Director of Intelligence would
be assisted by an editorial group, intelligence specialists, and
a chief of research. Finally, an executive for administration
was to be created to relieve the Chief, Military Intelligence
Service, and his two Directors of administrative problems. He
was not to be a channel of communication between the Di-
rectors and the Chief of [the] Military Intelligence Service."^

Ultimately, there came the implementation of the proposals of the
Cooke-McCloy panels.

The Eeorganization Committee had recommended that All
10-15 be revised so that the distinctions between the Military
Intelligence Division and the Military Intelligence Service
would be properly stated and made clear for all. This recom-
mendation was not accepted. In September, however, a Gen-
eral Staff Circular, 5-2, 27 September 1944, was issued which
superseded the Regulation and achieved the desired end. It

^^ lUd., pp. 35-36.

197

carefully listed the responsibilities and functions of the Mili-
tary Intelligence Division and its subdivisions. The responsi-
bility of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, was defined and
the preparation of plans and policies concerning military
intelligence and counterintelligence. The functions of the
Division were listed and it was made plain that it was to
formulate plans and policies and to supervise the execution of
the eleven functions listed. The Circular was prepared by the
Policy Staff and there was, therefore, no confusion of lan-
guage between information and intelligence. One factor, how-
ever, was added which had not been made explicit before.
This was the supervisory responsibility of the Division.

The list of functions is clear and speaks for itself. It is
therefore quoted in full :

"The Military Intelligence Division formulates plans
and policies, and supervises :

1. Collection of information and intelligence at
home and abroad, to include interrogation of pris-
oners of war.

2. Evaluation and interpretation of information
and intelligence.

3. Dissemination of intelligence,

4. Terrain intelligence, including coordination of
producing agencies.

5. Intelligence and counterintelligence training.

6. Military liaison with representatives of foreign
governments.

7. Safeguarding military information, to include
censorship and communications security,

8. Counterintelligence measures, to include eva-
sion and escape,

9. Army participation in propaganda and psy-
chological warfare.

10. Army historical activities.

11. The Military Intelligence Service, which is
charged with appropriate operational functions
concerning matters within the purview of the Mili-
tary Intelligence Division."

For the first time, then, the distinction between the Military
Intelligence Division and the Military Intelligence Service
was clearly stated. It made a fact of the efforts of the last few
years to make the Military Intelligence Service the opera-
tional agency and the Military Intelligence Division the
policy and planning agency. The normal staff dutv of super-
vision was assigned to the Military Intelligence Division. No
less important was the fact that the Circular provided the
Division with an up-to-date statement of its mission, respon-
sibilities, and functions. In effect, it was the statement of
functions described in the report of the reorganization
committee.^^*

' Ibid., pp. 57-59.

198

Before leaving the evolution of the Military Intelligence Division,
brief attention should be given to its operational units and their gen-
eral activities. The first consideration in this regard is the intel-
ligence collection function.

As of 7 December 1941, the collection of intelligence infor-
mation was the responsibility of the Intelligence Branch of
the Military Intelligence Division. This Branch also eval-
uated and distributed intelligence information; maintained
digests of information of foreign countries ; prepared combat,
political, and economic estimates; and prepared special
studies on foreign countries. Its geographical subsections
directed and coordinated the collection of information by
military attaches, by means of Index Guide and direct
communication.

The iTidex Guide was a broad, general outline, covering the
various aspects of information to be reported on a foreign
country. It was too general to be considered an Intelligence
Directive from which timely intelligence information could
be expected. Specific direction to the military attaches in re-
gard to collecting intelligence information was spasmodic
and, therefore, incomplete. The geographic sections tended to
depend on the ingenuity and clairvoyance of the military at-
tache to forward desired information.

The first step toward centralization came in March, 1942,
when a Collection Section was established in the Situation and
Planning Branch of the Intelligence Group. Although the
primary function of collecting information remained with
the geographic and subsections of the Intelligence Group,
the Collection Section maintained liaison with other govern-
ment agencies to secure information. It was essentially a liai-
son section until in November when the Collection Branch
was placed in the Dissemination Group. Its new directive
made it the agency to receive and requisition all information,
except routine emanating from the Field Services. It ob-
tained special information for the geographic branches and
other divisions of the Military Intelligence Service, and from
time to time it issued such intelligence directives as the Chief
of the Intelligence Group might direct. The emphasis here
was on non routine reports; routine reports were still the
responsibility of the geographic branches. In securing its in-
formation, the branch used personal interviews, maintained
contact with governmental and civilian agencies, and con-
tacted field representatives.^^^

Field intelligence was gathered for battle commanders and strat-
egists with a view to its immediate use bv them and then subsequent
forwarding to the Military Intelligence Division."^ The intelligence

'« lUd., pp. 63-65.

"*0n the collection of field Intelligence for immedate combat purposes, see:
Robert R. Glass and Phillip B. Davidson. IntelUaence Is For Commanders.
Harrisburg, Military Service Publishing Company, 1948 ; also see Oscar W. Koch
with Robert G. Hays. 0-2: Intelligence for Patton. Philadelphia, Whitmore
Publishing Company, 1971.

199

needs of the General Staff in Washington were dictated by global
strategy; commanders closer to specific operations required detailed
intelligence of a more particularistic type. In many ways, MID
sought to collect and maintain information which would serve both
levels of intelligence need.

The functions of the Collection Branch were redefined 29
January 1943 by the Chief Intelligence Group after the re-
organization outlined in Memorandum #18. The Branch was
designated as the agency to requisition, receive and allocate
all material coming into the Intelligence Group. Neverthe-
less, the individual units of the Group could still correspond
with the Military Intelligence Service field representatives
in the area of the special interest, but henceforth, were re-
quired to keep the Chief of the Collection Branch informed
of this correspondence. A system of weekly reports to the Col-
lection Branch were inaugurated, which itemized the types
of information desired, assigned a priority rating, and dis-
tinguished new from old or repeated requests. These reports
helped the branch coordinate collection activities with
the requirements of other agencies. It did not yet have
complete control over the collection of information, but a
procedure by which a large portion of the requests were
cleared through the Branch was established. The responsi-
bility for liaison and the development of new sources in-
creased the degree of its control over the collection of
information.

On 18 March 1943 the Foreign Branch (actually the Field
Services Branch at this period) was transferred to the Col-
lection Branch. By this transfer, the Collection Unit gained
administrative control of the Military Attache system. On 2
April 1943 the organization of the unit was described and its
functions redefined. No new functions were added, except
those acquired through the incorporation of the Foreign
Liaison Branch, but the overall statement of responsibility
designated the unit as the agency to requisition, receive and
allocate all material coming into the Intelligence Group. The
regional branches were still authorized to communicate di-
rectly with our representatives abroad.^^^

Next came the reorganization of 1944 and its effects upon the collec-
tion of intelligence information.

The reorganization plan of the "McCloy Committee" recog-
nized the importance of the collection of information to the
production of intelligence. An agency, separate from the Re-
search branches, was created to exploit all possible sources
and to collect timely, useful information. The production of
information (the raw material of intelligence) was placed
under the Director of Information and more specifically in
the Source Control Unit.

The Supervisor of Source Control processed, trained, and
assigned information gathering personnel ; it advised them of

"" MID History, op. oit, pp. 65-66.

200

the types of information required; it assured the timely re-
ceipt of useful information; it weeded out useless informa-
tion; and developed new sources. As established, it was
largely an administrative and supervisory office, but it soon
acquired other functions.

In October 1944 a War Department Intelligence Collection
Committee was established under the Supervisor of Source
Control. It was formed to coordinate and integrate all War
Department intelligence target objectives for the exploitation
in Germany and other rehabilitated areas, formerly occupied
by the Axis. The Committee coordinated and compiled the
requirements of the research branches of the Military Intelli-
gence Service, the Technical Services, and the Air Forces into
Target Objective Folders. The Folders were sent overseas
to the Combined Intelligence Objectives sub-committee which
coordinated all allied intelligence requirements so as to pre-
vent duplication of investigation and to promote the most
efficient use of specialist personnel. The committee also sent
out investigative teams from the United States to exploit in-
telligence targets. In November 1944, the Committee began to
turn its attention to objectives in Japan and Japanese occu-
pied territory. The first of these folders was dispatched in
May 1945.

The formal charter of the committee was not issued until
June 9, 1945, but it had already been in operation for some
time before this. Its secretariat was created September 23,
1944 to do the actual writing and coordinating of intelligence
requests. The secretariat worked under the supervision of the
Supervisor of Source Control who had been performing this
work. Reports from the theaters were received in the Reading
Panel which determined the reproduction and distribution to
be given all incoming material. The secretariat filed new in-
formation in the Target Objective Folders as received. Docu-
ments of basic army interest were sent to the Pacific Military
Intelligence Research Section . . . , Camp Ritchie, Maryland,
and those of basic navy interest were sent to the Navy Docu-
ment Center. Both agencies maintained accession lists of
documents received.^^^

This committee marked an important pinnacle in centralized co-
ordination of intelligence information collection. To further facilitate
this organizational system, a monitoring control procedure for proc-
essing information requests was created. This practice allowed the
Supervisor of Source Control to assign requests to the appropriate
unit responsible for developing the type of information desired, to
supervise response time and quality, and to otherwise remain apprised
of the status of such inquiries. The Source Control United continued
to issue general directives, as well, regarding the collection of informa-
tion, thereby setting priorities and establishing a degree of quality
control as well.^^°

^"^Ihid., pp. 68-69.
"*/6id., pp. 70-71.

201

Another important entity within MH) was the military attache
structure.

The group which administered this system during the war
changed its name from time to time. It was known as the
Military Attache Section (and Branch) until April 17, 1943,
and thereafter as the Foreign Branch. The function and mis-
sion of the organization remained about the same through-
out the period. The relation of the Branch to the military
attache system was purely administrative. It processed per-
sonnel assigned to these offices. It brought them to the Mili-
tary Intelligence Division where passports were arranged,
innoculations procured, and intelligence indoctrination was
completed. Thereafter the branch handled all administrative
correspondence between them and the War Department, and
supervised the administration of their offices. Finally, it was
responsible for assisting the collection of intelligence by
transmitting specific requests and general directives, such as
the Index Guide.

In December of 1941 the section was composed of six officers
and nine civilians under the direction of Captain (later
Colonel) W. M. Adams. In the field, there were fifty-two
offices, staffed by 129 officers. Coincident with the reorganiza-
tion of the War Department, March 9, 1942, an Air Section,
made up of an increment of officers from the Foreign Liaison
Section A-2, was added to administer the air attache system.
In early 1942, there were twelve Assistant Military Attaches
for Air, each with an airplane and a crew chief. By Dec. 1,
1945 this number had grown to include 48 Military Air Atta-
ches and Assistants in 38 Military Attache offices abroad.^*"

Another mechanism developed for coordinated intelligence collec-
tion was the Joint Intelligence Collection agencies.

After the North African invasion, it was found that in
areas where a theater commander was actually present, the
flow of intelligence stopped. The Theater intelligence organi-
zations were interested in combat intelligence, rather than in-
telligence and information necessary for training and stra-
tegic planning. The solution was the formation of the Joint
Intelligence Collection Agency in North Africa (Algiers) by
an agreement with General Eisenhower, dated Jan. 26, 1943.
This agency was expanded on May 30, 1943 to include, not
just Algiers, but all of North Africa and became known as the
Joint Intelligence Collection Agency North Africa. A second
Joint Intelligence Collection Agency was established as Joint
Intelligence Collection Agency Middle East for the Middle
East Theater, April 23, 1943. On August 5, 1943, the system
was placed on a world wide basis by direction of the Joint
Deputy Chiefs of Staff. The third was established in the
China Burma India Theater, August 19, 1943, and from this
a separate one was established for China, April 27, 1945, when

^ 76Mf., pp. 74-75.

202

that theater was established. The Pacific Ocean Area was
served by the Joint Intelligence Collection, Pacific Ocean
Area, which was operated under the direction of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff."^

In addition to supplying administrative support and guidance for
the Joint Intelligence Collection agencies, the Foreign Branch of the
MID Collection Unit also supervised two special missions. Organized
in the summer of 1943, the first of these entities gathered all informa-
tion available regarding the latest developments and capabilities of the
enemy in the field of bacteriological warfare. The second, called the
ALSOS Mission, was operational by the autumn. It sought scientists
and scientific information which might reveal the progress of the
enemy in atomic research and allied subiects.^^^

As of June 1944, liaison between MID and other Federal agencies
was centralized in a Washington Liaison Branch but, even after that
time, informal liaison persisted beyond the new unit's control.

The roots of the branch are to be found in the Contact Sec-
tion, existing in the Intelligence Branch on December 5, 1941.
It was charged with contacting State, Office of Naval Intelli-
gence, etc. for Military information. Subsequent charts and
reorganization memoranda do not mention it, but a chart of
May 15, 1942, lists one of the functions in the Dissemination
Branch as interviewing returning observers, a task later as-
signed to the Washington Liaison Branch. Mention of a Con-
tact and Liaison Section is made October 23, 1942 in a
discussion of Intelligence possibilities in the interviews of re-
turning observers, officers, and civilians by Major Edward F.
Smith in Oct. and Nov. 1942. As we have seen in the discussion
of the Collection Branch, this function was included in the
directive of Dec. 9, 1942. Nevertheless, there seems to have
been at least three agencies doing this type of work independ-
ently and without coordination (War Department Liaison,
State Department Liaison, and Domestic Branch) — all in
[the] collection unit. In Feb 1944 there were 150 Liaison func-
tions performed in Military Intelligence Division, but they
were not coordinated or controlled. Many offices whose func-
tions were normally liaison acted independently of their
superiors and on their own initiative. As Col. H. H. Mole,
Chief of the North American Branch, said, "There were too
many people running too many contacts for successful
work." ^*3

While the coordination of liaison was a persistent and continuous
problem in Washington for MID, it was less so in field contacts with
private business enterprises due largely to the good efforts of regional
offices.

At one time there were four such offices in New York, San
Francisco, Miami and New Orleans. They were established to

^"- lUd., p. 76 ; for a view of coordinated intelligence operations within General
Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters in London, see Kenneth Strong. Intelligence
At the Top. New York Doubleday and Company, 1969, pp. 72-299.

'" MID History, op. cit., p. 79.

"' Ibid., pp. 84-85.

203

collect information of intelligence value to the War Depart-
ment from sources peculiar to their location. In addition, they
performed such functions as liaison with foreign personnel,
dictated by the characteristics of the industries and traffic of
their locations. Only the ^Miami Office survived the war, all of
the rest having been closed before the end of hostilities.

The Branch offices originated in 1940. At that time, most of
the information coming into the division came in the form of
Military Attache reports. It was recognized that there was a
considerable amount of information to be had in the principal
ports of entry and in the metropolitan centers of the nation.
Files of trade data, insurance maps, and related data, records
of financial transactions, engineering reports, travel diaries
and field notes of scientists, and other similar items existed in
these centers. This material could not be shipped to Washing-
ton for processing, so that it was necessary to go to the
sources.^**

The first such field office to be established by MID was in New York.
Opened on July 8, 1940, it initially concentrated on Latin American
intelligence but by August, 1941, the product had shifted to target
folders on Europe and, subsequently, on Japan. Before being closed
on December 31, 1944, a satellite of the Xew York office was opened
in Chicago sometime between January and March of 1943. A Xew
Orleans unit operated between April 17, 1941, and February 2, 1943.
The San Francisco office was inaugurated on July 31, 1941, and initially
devoted its attention to interviewing evacuees from the Asiatic and
Pacific areas of conflict. Later, the intelligence interest of the unit
shifted to business and educational sources familiar with the Orient.
While in operation, the office cooperated closely with representatives
of the Office of Naval Intelligence ; it ceased functioning on June 30,
1944. The Miami office, the longest lived and last to open, commencing
operations on April 7, 1942. Its principal focus was upon Latin and
South American developments and the trafficking of foreign visitors
to the United States via the ''Miami Gateway." "^

The Foreign Liaison Office was created 31 August 1941 to
facilitate the work of foreign military attaches and other
foreign officers in this country on official business. It made
arrangements to see that proper courtesies were extended to
them and systematized and controlled the military informa-
tion furnished them. At the beginning of the War it was a
part of the Administrative Branch. In March of 1942 it was
directly under the Executive, Military Intelligence Service,
but later was placed under the G-2. In March it consisted of
twelve officers and twenty-four civilians, but the same month
received an increment of personnel from the Foreign Liaison
Section of the Air Staff. After the reorganization of June
1944 it was placed in the Washington Liaison Branch where
it remained for the rest of the war.

Throughout the war, then, it was concerned with the prob-
lem of satisfying the needs of the diplomatic military repre-

^** Ibid., pp. 87-88.
^*^IMd., pp. 88-89.

it.

204

sentatives of foreign governmeiitB. The basic directives and
decisions which related to the release and exchangee of both
technical and military information were made outside of the
section. The results of these decisions flowed through

The policies adopted in regard to the exchange of informa-
tion and intelligence with the British and our other allies
were developed on a higher level than the Military Intelli-
gence Division, but it took part in the discussions. Once the
general policy was adopted there then remained the task of
implementing it and working out the details on the "working
levels." In general this was done not in broad general agree-
ments but in a series of specific arrangements, sometimes
verbal and informal.

The background of these agreements lies in the pre-war
period when the military staffs of the two nations met to
discuss plans for strategy and to prepare for eventualities.
Beginning in January 1941 Staff conversations were held to
this end. Throughout the American representatives were care-
ful not to commit the nation to a line of action which might
later prove embarrassing. Agreements were made and conver-
sations held not on the basis of when the United States
entered the war, but if it should be forced to enter it. After
7 December 1941 further conversations and meetings were
held and more definite agreements were made.^*^

One of the devices developed to facilitate cooperative intelligence
arrangements between the United States and Great Britain was a
special panel called the Combined Intelligence Committee. It was part
of a progression of intelligence coordinating units created during the
war. First, a Joint Army and Navy Intelligence Committee was created
under the Joint Army and Navy Board on December 3, 1941.^*^ Orga-
nized in 1903, the Joint Board made recommendations to the Secre-
taries of War and Navy on matters involving cooperation of the two
armed services. Its subordinate agencies included the Joint Planning
Committee (established in 1919), the Joint Economy Board (estab-
lished in 1933), and the intelligence unit. The Joint Board was
abolished in 1947 with the ipstitution of the Department of Defense.

Next came the Joint Intelligence Committee organized under the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This Committee, known also as JIC, was a continuation
and enlargement of the Joint Board committee of the same
name, which had been authorized in 1941. It received no
charter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff until May 1943, but it
was given a directive and was reorganized early in March
1942. Even before this, on February 11, 1942, a Combined
Chiefs of Staff paper had defined the duties and membership
of the Joint Intelligence Committee. Its primary functions
throughout the war period were to furnish intelligence in

'^'' IMd., pp. 88-89.
^*« lUd., pp. 92-93.
"■"lUd., p. 94.

205

various forms to other agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and to represent it on the Combined Intelligence Committee.

As originally constituted, the Joint Intelligence Commit-
tee was composed of the directors of the intelligence services
of the Army and Navy and representatives of the State
Department, the Board of Economic Warfare (later the
Foreign Economic Administration) and the Ck)ordinator of
Information (later the Director of Strategic Services'). The
charter of May 1943 added the director of the Intelligence
Staff of the Armv Air Forces. This membership remained un-
changed throughout the remainder of the war.

The Joint Intelligence Committee was assisted by a full-
time subcommittee and some ten or more special subcommit-
tees. The permanent working staff was organized by the Com-
mittee early in 1942 as the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee
(JISC). Its status was formalized in the charter of the Com-
mittee on May 1943. Two months later, the Joint Intelligence
Subcommittee was renamed the Joint Intelligence Staff
(JIS). The latter agency was given a charter by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in May 1944 and operated under it throughout
the remainder of the war.^*^

Then came the Combined Intelligence Committee.

Provision for this Committee, known also as CIC, was made
in the agreement to create the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but
it does not appear to have met before May 1942. Its working
subcommittee, however, known first as the Combined Intelli-
gence Subcommittee (CISC) and from August 1943 as the
Combined Intelligence Staff (CIS), met as early as Febru-
ary 19, 1942. This subcommittee was composed of the Joint
Intelligence Subcommittee, later the Joint Intelligence Staff,
and the British Joint Intelligence Committee* in Washington.
The Combined Intelligence Committee consisted of the Joint
Intelligence Committee and representatives of the British
Joint Intelligence Subcommittee in London. Both the Com-
bined Intelligence Committee and the Combined Intelligence
Staff continued throughout the war. The former was respon-
sible for collecting and disseminating military intelligence for
the use of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Combined
Staff Planners."^
Other units of the Military Intelligence Division with specialized

intelligence collection functions included a prisoner interrogation

group.

The Captured Personnel and Material Branch was orig-
inally known as the Prisoner of War Branch. It was not es-
tablished until 22 October 1942, although one of its functions,
the Interrogation Center, had been established a few months

^** General Services Administration. National Archives and Record Service. The
National Archives. Federal Records of World War II: Military Agencies (Vol.
2). Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1951, p. 9.

"•76id.,p.4.

206

earlier. Thus, the origins of the branch go back almost to the
beginning of the war.

The original impetus for the establishment of the interro-
gation centers came from the Navy. The Office of Naval In-
telligence had studied an interrogation center near London
during the period from 25 June to 17 December 1941. It found
that such a center, where selected prisoners were interrogated,
offered many advantages over a system of interrogation which
stopped with the initial questionings at the time of the cap-
ture. The Navy and War Departments had agreed that the
Army would be responsible for all captured personnel, and
that the Navy would turn them over to the Army as soon as
possible after capture. Upon completion of the study, the
Secretary of the Navy recommended the idea to the Secretary
of War. After study by the Military Intelligence Division,
the plan was agreed to. It was agreed that two interrogation
centers would be established : one in the East near Washing-
ton and the other in California. On 15 May 1942, Fort Hunt,
Virginia, was selected as the east coast center, and construc-
tion was completed by the end of July."°

Activated in April, 1942, the Fort Hunt Interrogation Center was
allotted 68 officers and 61 enlisted men ; in September of the following
year, these personnel were reduced to 41 officers and 61 enlisted men.
The West Coast Center, opened at the end of December, 1942, was lo-
cated at Byron Hot Spring, but had a mailing address of Tracy, Cal-
ifornia, thereby causing it to be geographically referred to by two
different names.

The interrogation centers. Fort Hunt and Tracy, were sub-
ject to a dual command. They were under the control of the
Provost Marshal General, who designated the Commanding
Officers for the two camps. These officers were responsible for
procurement of equipment and overhead personnel upon req-
uisition from the Corps areas. Interrogation personnel were
supplied by the Military Intelligence Division and the Office
of Naval Intelligence and their activities, coordinated by the
senior interrogating officer. The camps were classified as Tem-
porary Detention Centers. Within the compound of the camps,
the areas known as the interrogation center was operated by,
and was the responsibility of, the Chief of the Military Intel-
ligence Service. This arrangement was not satisfactory. G-2
requested a unified control be established as more efficient and
conducive to improved morale. The request was disapproved
as contrary to existing regulations. The Adjutant General was
then asked to establish a new regulation similar to that gov-
erning the harbor defenses. This was accomplished and on
14 April 1943 when the Post Commanders of Fort Hunt and
Byron Hot Springs were ordered reassigned [sic]. This
marked the end of the dual control system and the transfer of
these operations to the Chief, Military Intelligence Service.

^ MID History, op. cit., pp. 99-100.

207

The senior interrogating officer was, thereafter, post com-
mander.^^^

The last of the intelligence collection units of MID was the Map
and Photograph Branch which began as the Geographic Section of
the Plans and Training Branch in 1941 before reorganization into a
separate branch in the spring of the next year. Subunits included a
Photo Section, Still Picture Section (enemy motion picture film, mili-
tary technical photography), Photographic Division (processing).
Terrain Photo Section, Military Technical Photo unit (indexing and
filing), and Motion Picture Unit. There was, of course, close liaison
with the Army Map Service and Army Pictorial Service. Materials
were also drawn from the Aeronautical Chart Service, Navy Hydro-
graphic Office, Coast and Geodetic Survey, U.S. Geological Survey,
Office of Strategic Services, and several commercial firms including
the National Geographic Society.^^^

Generally speaking, the Division followed a traditionally
geographic approach to the problem of intelligence produc-
tion. There were those who found that the functional divi-
sions of the McCloy Committee were sound. In certain spe-
cialized subjects, as Order of Battle, Air, and Topographical
intelligence, a functional grouping was more desirable.
Shortly after the war, the Division again embraced the geo-
graphic arrangement which would seem to settle the matter,
at least for the moment, but a post war opinion of wartime
operations states that the Division was not operating effi-
ciently until the end of 1944 — by which time the geographical
arrangement had been abandoned.^^^

Whichever approach was operative in intelligence production, the
core element of the research sections was their filing systems. Accord-
ing to the Basic Intelligence Directive, numbers and subjects served
to indicate the most probable subdivisions into which information
might be placed.

Intelligence was produced by other means than merely filing
incoming reports. Careful studies were made from minutiate
collected from the files of business concerns. Thus, a laborious
study of the organization and production techniques used in
the manufacture of an essential item might point out those
places where the disruption of a simple process would halt
production with only a modest expenditure of bombs. Thus,
manufacturing, processing, and transportation bottlenecks
were sought as targets. Captured orders were examined to dis-
cover the formation of new types of outfits, for clues to future
plans. The who's who files were especially useful in turning
up new and special type organizations. All available infor-
mation on the enemy was studied because eventually it was
grist for the mill."*

^ Ibid., pp. 100-101.
^ See Ibid., pp. 108-113.
^Ibid.,w- 12^-124.
^/6id., pp. 125-126.

208

Under the geographic arrangement, the principal research units
were British Empire, Western Europe, Central Europe, Eastern Eu-
rope, the Far East, and Latin America. This 1941 structure gave way
the following year to the Eur- African, Far Eastern, and American
Intelligence Service Groups, the Air Unit, and Special Branch, the
last named being the larest intelligence producing agency in MID at
the time.^^^ The 1944 reorganization saw the establishment of the Mili-
tary, Topographic, Political, Economic, Sociological, Scientific, and
Who's Who Branches. But this scenario, too, was due for alteration.

Under the terms of the reorganization of June, 1944, Political
and Economic intelligence was to be produced by two branches
devoted to these subjects and working on a world wide basis.
To this end they were separated and personnel and equipment
were brought in from the geographic branches and the Special
Branch. In November the Far Eastern Section of the Political
Branch was separated and transferred to the Economic
Branch, and the European functions of the Economic Branch
were transferred to the Political Branch. Each became, in
fact, a Political-Economic Branch, responsible for the pro-
duction of intelligence on these matters, according to a geo-
graphic area. The old Political Branch being responsible for
Europe, Latin America, and North America; and the Eco-
nomic Branch being responsible for the Far East.^^®

The personalities of leaders and organized gi'oups opposed to the
Allies' cause were of interest to the War Department and this
prompted the collection of intelligence material pertaining to such
individuals.

Originally, this information had been filed in the Record
Section by relatively unskilled clerks who composed and filed
the cross reference sheets. Later, this function was removed
from the Record Section, and in January, 1943, Counter-
intelligence was removed from the Military Intelligence Divi-
sion and decentralized to the Service Commands under the
direction of the Army Service Forces. It was necessary, then,
to find a substitute whereby central files could be established
for the recording of biographical information needed in the
Military Intelligence Division. It should also be borne in
mind that the information which was secured by the Counter-
intelligence Group had been concerned largely with subver-
sive personnel and, thus, left out a large segment of the
world's population who did not fall, automatically, into this
category. The Geographical Branches had maintained files
of persons of interest to them in their particular area, but
these files were, of course, decentralized and suffered from the
limitations of decentralization. Persons shifting from area
to area could not easily be followed then unless proper in-
quiries were made between the geographic branches. In Janu-
ary, 1943, the Special Branch began a name file of persons or
persons of interest to it, and since it was not bound by geo-

"^ Ibid., -p. 126.
^ Ibid., p. 146.

209

graphical limitations, a nucleus of a central file was estab-
lished with trained personnel to operate it.^"

In June, 1944, the Who's Who Branch became the recipient of
Name File of the Special Branch and received, as well, the relevant
personality files of the geographical branches.

An offshoot of the Geographic Section of the Plans and
Training Branch (later Map and Photo Branch) was the
Topographic Branch, which was formed in June, 1944, by
separating the Map Service, Photo Intelligence, and Inter-
pretation Reports Sections from the remainder to form the
Map and Photo Branch. That which remained became the
Terrain (previously the Geographic Research) Section, the
Cartographic Section, and the Transportation Section. As a
result, it became more of a research section. The intelligence
which it produced was provided not only to the War Depart-
ment General Staff, but also to such agencies as the Joint
Intelligence Committee, the Joint War Plans Committee and
the Joint Logistics Plan Committee. It produced intelligence
concerning terrain, vegetation, routes of movements and
drainage, but also supplied intelligence concerning landing
beaches, climate, and soil trafiicability, which was generally
produced by other agencies. The Chief of the Branch repre-
sented the Military Intelligence Division on the Joint Intelli-
gence Committee to obtain topographic intelligence. He also
represented the War Department General Staff on the United
States Board on Geographical Names. The terrain section
procured, selected, evaluated, and integrated information
concerning terrain and climate. It also prepared written re-
ports and manuscript maps which interpreted terrain and
climate intelligence.

The Transportation Section was a new function, or a
specialization, which appeared after the reorganization. It
was designed to handle the demand for information and in-
telligence concerning the classifications and locations of rail
networks and terminals, roads, trains, bridges, and tunnels,
and the depths, widths, and currents of navigable rivers. It
also prepared manuscript maps, as directed, of transporta-
tion networks. By V-J Day, this objective was only partially
satisfied. The following sections of the Far East were com-
pleted : Burma, China proper, Netherlands Indies, Indo
China, Malaya, and Thailand ; with Formosa, Japan, Korea,
Manchuria, and the Philippines partially completed. The
Cartographic section produced maps and graphic material
required by the other sections to present topographic intelli-
gence in its final form.^^®

The Scientific Branch maintained liaison with Federal agencies in
an effort to keep abreast of the latest developments in American and
Allied war research and also sought to produce intelligence regarding

^ Ibid., pp. 150-151; on counterintelligence activities in the field see John
Schwaxzwalder. We Caught Spies. New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946.
"*/&td., pp. 156-157.

210

enemy progress in such diverse subjects as radar and related elec-
tronic matters, rocketry, jet propulsion, atomic energy production,
and conventional weapons improvements. Its subunits consisted of a
Chemical and Biological Warfare Section, Electronics Section, New
Weapons Section, and subsequently a Physics Section.

The Sociological Branch was a new agency in the Military
Intelligence Service, but its work had been foreshadowed in
the activities of other Branches. Under the new functional
organization, most of these dispersed activities were combined
and enlarged, and coordinated effort provided. The Geo-
graphic branches had done some of the work which the new
branch would perform; as well as the Propaganda Branch,
which had attempted some surveys of morale and propa-
ganda, which duplicated the later work of the branch. The
Geopolitical Branch had undertaken some population
studies during its brief existence and these were now taken
over by the Sociological Branch.

The main effort of the Branch was directed toward the dis-
covery of sociological trends of military importance. Popula-
tion and manpower data was studied for clues to vital sta-
tistics as well as the migrations and occupational character-
istics of groups and types. Manpower and labor problems
were studied to discover the availability of manpower for
military and industrial service and the effect of legislation
and organizations on the availability of manpower. Both
civilian and military morale was studied in enemy countries.
Social Groups and classes were studied to discover how their
cleavages and tensions might be used to serve military ends."®

Organized in June, 1944, the Military Branch produced intelli-
gence on all aspects of foreign ground and air forces, with an emphasis
upon order of battle data but including, as well, weapons, fortifica-
tions, air industry, and some translation activities assigned to the
unit. The functions of the branch were not new, but had appeared dur-
ing the war and had suffered ineffective execution due to dispersed
administration and treatment.

At the top of the pyramid of intelligence [production] per-
sonnel were the Specialists. While the rest of the Division
was organized functionally [in 1944], the Specialists were
organized geographically. In theory, they drew upon the re-
sources of the other branches for the types of information
which they required. To the material received from the re-
search sections, they gave the final evaluation and approval
before it was disseminated, thus inheriting some of the func-
tions of the Evaluation Staff. By means of the G-2's Morning
Conference, they presented the latest information from all
corners of the world with their evaluation of its meaning and
importance. Thereafter, during the day they sent him such
other reports as were required. They worked with the Di-
rector of Intelligence and assisted him in giving directives to
the Supervisor of Source Control to gather information,

"»/6td.,p. 161.

211

which they required, and gave direction and supervision to
the research sections for the same purpose.^^"

This, then, generally describes the MID intelligence production
organization. But once intelligence information had been collected,
analyzed, and a product was produced, one general function remained
to be served — dissemination.

Throughout the war there were efforts to centralize the dis-
semination of intelligence. Prior to 1944, the Dissemination
Unit had achieved the greatest degree of centralization so far
attained. At no time, however, did it or the Reports Unit es-
tablish complete control of all phases of this activity. Indeed,
this would have been impossible. Dissemination included, not
only the preparation of printed periodical publications of in-
telligence, but also the means by which intelligence was pre-
sented to the G-2, the Chief of Staff, and the various Staff
Division [s]. Intelligence was disseminated by periodic pub-
lications, special reports, conferences, and so on ; besides the
usual types of reports and memoranda, maps, photographs,
charts, and tables were used to present the material at hand.

The normal dissemination functions were the responsi-
bility of the Dissemination Unit in early 1944. Its antecedents
include the Dissemination Section of the Intelligence Branch,
which became the Dissemination Branch in April, 1942. Mean-
while, the Situation Branch, created early in 1942, was per-
forming dissemination functions. In August, 1942, the
Evaluation and Dissemination Branch was created to include
the work of the Dissemination and Situation Branches in the
Dissemination Section, along with other sections devoted to
Communications, Theater Intelligence, and Order of Battle.
A Project and Review Board reviewed all completed projects
before they were sent out. In November, 1942, the designation
of these sections was changed to Dissemination Group under
Col. G. S. Smith. It included Cable Branch, Collection
Branch, Theater Intelligence Branch, and Publications
Branch. In April, 1943, after a number of minor changes, the
Dissemination Unit was created to be responsible for the for-
mat and appearance of any publication produced in the Mili-
tary Intelligence Service. It also disseminated intelligence
approved by the Evaluation and Dissemination Staff. This
last group had been established as the final evaluation and re-
view authority for intelligence before it was disseminated to
the Army. It passed on periodical items, monographs, studies,
and similar reports.^^^

This was the pattern of reorganization and growth in the military
intelligence establishment during World War II.

In 1941, G-2 was a small organization. Under the impact of
wartime expansion and development, it grew. In 1942 a new
factor entered the picture in the form of a separate operat-

'■"/fttrf., p. 197.

"^ iJ>id., pp. 2O4r-2l05.

212

ing agency, and during the next two years, an effort was made
to mold the organization into a single intelligence producing
and policy making agency. In the course of these efforts, the
Military Intelligence Service tended to lose its identity. In
1944, it re-emerged as an intelligence operating and producing
agency with definite functions and responsibilities. At the
same time there was a struggle over the best method of
organizing to produce intelligence. Thus, evaluation was, for
a time, turned over to a Board which had as an additional
function policy making. In 1944, a new method was devised
by which intelligence was produced by supervised specialists
who were aided by the research groups. All of the policy
making activities were allocated to the Military Intelligence
Division. But one fact must be borne in mind. This method
was more easily devised in 194i than at any previous time be-
cause by then the Military Intelligence Division had lost its
counterintelligence functions. Prior to that time, the struc-
ture of the organization must include [sic] a provision for
counterintelligence. With the loss of this function, it was pos-
sible to greatly simplify the organization and emphasize the
importance of teamwork in the new Military Intelligence
Division.^®^

While there was a War Department reorganization effective June
11, 1946, "the Intelligence Division (G-2) did much the same work as
always." ^®^ As with the other armed services, the next great revision
of military intelligence functions and organization would occur in
1947 with the establishment of the Department of Defense, the National
Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Two other outstanding units within the military intelligence net-
work should be examined at this juncture: the Signal Corps' cryp-
tology group and the Allied Intelligence Bureau. The great impor-
tance of the former of these entities derived, of course, from the suc-
cessful decipherment of the Japanese code.

A trickle of MAGIC in 1936 had become a stream in 1940.
Credit for this belongs largely to Major General Joseph O.
Mauborgne, who became Chief Signal Officer in October
1937.

Mauborgne had long been interested in cryptology. In
1914, as a young first lieutenant, he achieved the first re-
corded solution of a cipher known as the Playfair, then used
by the British as their field cipher. He described his technique
in a 19-page pamphlet that was the first publication on cryp-
tology issued by the United States Government. In World
War I, he put together several cryptographic elements to
create the only theoretically unbreakable cipher, and pro-
moted the first automatic cipher machine, with which the
unbreakable cipher was associated.

^^lUd., pp. 59-60.

^^Ray S. Cline. U.S. Army in World War TI. The War Department: Washing-
ton Command Post: The Operations Division. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1951, p. 359.

218

When he became head of the Signal Corps, he immediately
set about augmenting: the important cryptanalytic activities.
He established the S.I.S. [Signal Intelligence Service] as an
independent division reporting directly to him, enlarged its
functions, set up branches, started correspondence courses,
added intercept facilities, increased its budget, and put on
more men. In 1939, when war broke out in Europe, S.I.S.
was the first agency in the War Department to receive more
funds, personnel, and space. Perhaps most important of all,
Mauborgne's intense interest inspired his men to outstand-
ing accomplishments. More and more codes were broken, and
as the international situation stimulated an increasing flow
of intercepts, the MAGIC intelligence approached flood
stage.^^*

When Mauborgne retired in September, 1941, being succeeded by
Major General Dawson Olmstead, the cryptanalytic capability he had
nurtured was commendable but, of course, in need of expansion and
further refinement when war engulfed the nation two months later.

It multiplied its communications-intelligence manpower
thirtyfold from its strength December 7, 1941, of 331 — 44
officers and 137 enlisted men and civilians in Washington and
150 officers and men in the field. Ever-growing requirements
quickly dwarfed early estimates, such as the early one in 1942
that a staff of 460 would suffice, and kept up a relentless pres-
sure for more and still more workers. Yet the agency faced
stiff competition for them in manpower-short Washington.
Moreover, the necessity for employees to be of unquestion-
able loyalty and trustworthiness, because of the sensitive na-
ture of cryptanalytic results, and the importance of their
being temperamentally suited to the highly specialized na-
ture of the work, greatly reduced the number of prospects.
To fill its needs, the agency launched a series of vigorous but
discreet recruiting drives. It snatched people out of its school
even though they were only partially trained: during the
school's entire time at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, not one
student completed the full 48-week course. It brought in
members of the Women's Army Corps — almost 1,500 of them.
These measures enabled the agency to grow to a strength of
10,609 at its peak on June 1, 1945—5,565 civilians, 4,428 en-
listed men and W.A.C.'s and 796 officers. (This figure ex-
cludes cryptologic personnel serving under theater com-
manders overseas.) Nevertheless, the personnel supply never
caught up to the demand. In April, 1944, for example, the
agency had more than 1,000 civilian positions empty. "^

Personnel growth, new functions, and the pressures of war also
dictated new structure of the cryptological unit.

In June of 1942, owing to a reorganization in the Office of
the Chief Signal Officer, the outfit shed its old name of Signal

'"David Kahn. The Codepreakers. New York, New American Library, 1973;
ori^hally published 1^7, p. 7.
"* /6itf., p. 316.

214

Intelligence Service and gained and lost three new ones with-
in two months. Then from July, 1942, to July, 1943, it was
called the Signal Security Service, and from July, 1943, to
the end of the war, the Signal Security Agency. Lieutenant
Colonel Rex Minckler, chief since before Pearl Harbor, was
replaced in April, 1942, by Lieutenant Colonel Frank W.
Bullock. In February, 1943, Lieutenant Colonel W. Preston
(Eed) Corderman, tall, husky, quiet, pleasant, who had
studied and then taught in the S.LS. school in the 1930s, be-
came chief. He remained in the post to the end of the war,
rising to a brigadier general in June, 1945.

Its population explosion and its voluminous output strained
its administrative structure, and this was realigned several
times. As of Pearl Harbor it was divided into four sections :
the A, or administrative; the B, or cryptanalytic ; the C, or
cryptographic, and the D, or laboratory.^®^

While the B section broke ciphers and decoded messages, the C sec-
tion devised new codes, ciphers, and related materials for the Amer-
ican military forces. In August of 1942 an E or Communications
section was created by upgrading the "traffic"' subsection of the crypt-
analytic unit. In March, 1943, the six sections were elevated to branch
status and by the following year a Machine Branch (mechanized cod-
ing/decoding operations) and an Information and Liaison Branch
were added.^^'^

In June of 1942, the Navy ceded all supervision and responsibility
for Japanese diplomatic code solutions to the Army, surrendering
both files and machinery at this time.^^^ In addition to its central
coding/decoding operations in Washington, the Signal Intelligence
Service established cryptanalytic units in various theaters of the war,
received tactical, combat-level communications intelligence via the Sig-
nal Corps radio intelligence companies in the field, and maintained
an active radio intercept program through the 2nd Signal Service
Battalion (later the 9420th Technical Service Unit).

Though this set-up held until the war ended, operational
control of the agency passed on December 15, 1944, to G-2,
the military intelligence section of the War Department Gen-
eral Staff, which was the agency's major customer and which,
as such, for many months had indirectly giiided its activities.
The Signal Corps merely retained administrative control.
This confusing arrangernent — complicated further by the
agency's having both staff and command functions — ended
in August, 1945, when the War Department transferred all
signal intelligence units to agency control. On September 6,
four days after the war ended, the War Department ordered
the creation within G-2 of a new cryptologic organization by
merging the Signal Security Agency, the field cryptanalytic
units, and Signal Corps cryptology. This was the Army

^''lUd., p. 317.
"' Ibid., p. 318.
^'^ Ibid., p. 315.

215

Security Agency, which came into existence September 15,
1945."^

The Allied Intelligence Bureau, composed of combined Allied
forces in the Pacific command zone of General Douglas MacArthur,
was established at Brisbane, Australia, on July 6, 1942. under the
auspices of his intelligence staff, headed by Major General Charles A.
"Willoughby. According to MacArthur's records which Willoughby
has cited :

. . . the history of the AIB is a secret, little-publicized but
highly important chapter in the story of the Southwest Pa-
cific. From the Solomons to Borneo, from Java to the Philip-
pines, a small adventurous group of carefully trained spe-
cialists spread a network of observers and operatives behind
the enemy lines well in advance of our main body. . . . Op-
erating in almost total isolation and normally without hope
of outside support, every expedition was carried out in the
face of great personal risk. If discovered by the enemy, the
small parties were doomed to almost certain capture and
probable death. In that event those who died quickly were
fortunate. . . . Jungle-wise "coastwatchers," with tiny radio
transmitter-receiver outfits, remained behind as the Japanese
invasion wave swept forward. . . . From these few fearless
men a powerful network of sea, air and ground spotters was
developed until finally it became impossible for the enemy to
make a single major move on the surface or in the sky with-
out intelligence reports being flashed in advance to Allied
forces. ... At the conclusion of the desperate Gaudalcanal
campaign, Admiral Halsey publicly stated that it was prob-
able that the allies could not have retained their hard-won
initiative on Guadalcanal Island had it not been for the con-
sistent advance radio warnings by AIB agents of impending
enemy air attacks.^^"

The Bureau was headed by Colonel C. G. Roberts, an Australian,
with Lieutenant Allison Ind, an American, as his deputy. The princi-
pal structural units included a British Special Operations ("sabotage
and silent killing") group, a British radio monitoring outfit, the
Netherlands Indies Forces Intelligence Service, an Australian propa-
ganda group, and the Australian "Coast Watchers." ^^^ MacArthur's
records comment :

... It was found necessary to adjust the organizational
structure on a "geographic" rather than a purely "functional"
basis primarily to protect and reconcile political sovereign-
ties. A very interesting figure emerged in the often delicate
negotiations, one Mr. Van der Plaas, a former Governor of
Eastern Java, related to native princes, and a top-flight dip-

"^ lUd., p. 318-319.

'™ Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain. MacArthur 19^1-1951. New
York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1954, pp. 145-146.

^'* Allison Ind. Allied Intelligence Bureau. New York, David McKay Company,
pp. 10-11.

216

lomat. His persuasive formula was the division of the vast
Southwest Pacific along colonial lines, preserving the prewar
status quo. Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith, G-2 Deputy who had
handled million dollar New York corporations before the
war, was just the tough hombre to cut his way through
tropical ambitions.

The chiefs of the various AIB sections were placed under
an Australian Comptroller who, in turn, was responsible to
G-2 headquarters ; an American Deputy Comptroller was in-
serted as the Finance Officer. Thus we retained a double
check upon the Bureau and its elusive international com-
ponents; a coordinating staff, consisting of liaison officers
from each headquarters, was named to assist the organization.

Running true to form, though ostensibly under a single di-
rectorship, each of the sub-sections attempted to remain more
or less autonomous, and continuous readjustments were neces-
sary during the lifetime of the Bureau in order to achieve
centralized control.^^^

The total manpower in the service of the AIB has been estimated at
"several thousand individuals." ^" More concrete statistics indicate 164
Bureau operatives lost their lives during the war while the fate of 178
other agents remains a mystery ; 75 Bureau members were captured.^^*
While a precise date for the termination of the AIB is not available,
it certainly had ceased operations by V-J Day.

VI. Naval Intelligence

Published accounts on the organization and operations of the Office
of Naval Intelligence and its Marine Corps counterpart during World
War II reveal very little about the structure and activities of these
units. Generally, the Marine Corps collected and generated its own
combat intelligence while ONI, which included Marines on its staff,
had combat intelligence responsibilities for the Navy and strategic
intelligence duties for both services. The Office of Naval Intelligence
was initially organized on a geographic basis, then a functional
scheme, and maintained units in each of the Naval Districts and
principal fleet commands. It supervised naval attaches, naval observ-
ers, and liaison officers abroad. The Office apparently suffered from a
fast turnover of Directors during the war years and was handicapped,
as well, by a limited view on the part of the Chief of Naval Operations
as to its role. According to one official history assessing the agency :

Arguments as to the scope of Naval Intelligence respon-
sibility were frequent. The position taken by CNO during
World War II was that Op>-16 [a Navy acronym identifying
ONI] was in effect a post office charged with forwarding In-
telligence reports and other data to the activity in the Navy
Department most likely to need and make use of the informa-
tion ; that Op-16 had neither the time nor the qualified per-
sonnel to search for obscure leads in the reports pointing to

^■^ Willoughby, op. cit., p. 148.

^■^ Ind, Allied Intelligence Bureau, p. vli.

"* lUd. ; Willoughby, op. cit., p. 157.

217

enemy intentions with respect, Nfor example, to new weapon
developments or future operations. . . .

The process of evaluating and disseminating^ the informa-
tion contained in Intelligence reports came in for investiga-
tion and some criticism by the Joint Congressional
Committee that inquired into the attack on Pearl Harbor.
It was brought out during the hearings that the Director of
Naval Intelligence had authority to disseminate technical,
statistical, and similar information received by his Office,
but that he had no authority to evaluate certain aspects of
military intelligence such as developing the enemy's inten-
tions, nor to disseminate such information and its evaluation.
These were responsibilities of the War Plans Division.

The questions asked, the conclusions reached, and the rec-
ommendations made by the Joint Congressional Committee,
indicated the belief that the Director of Naval Intelligence
should have had more authority to evaluate and disseminate
information of that kind. The Naval authorities held, how-
ever, that the responsibility for developing enemy inten-
tions from information gathered and analyzed by the
intelligence service, and its dissemination must be left to the
individual in the organization of the CNO responsible for
war planning. It was in general held by the Navy Depart-
ment that even the War Plans Officer could not be the final
arbiter in some cases. The Chief of Naval Operations, the
Secretary of the Navy, and even the President might have to
make the final decision.

A measure of the pressing need for military intelligence
in modern warfare was the increase in personnel employed
on such work in CNO and in the field during World War II.
In June 1938, about 60 officers and some 100 enlisted person-
nel and civilians were employed in the Naval Intelligence
Division — Op-16. On 1 July 1945, the numbers stood at 543
officers, 675 enlisted personnel, and 330 civilians. The increase
in the field was even greater. At Pearl Harbor, the Naval In-
telligence unit at the time of the attack consisted of a few
officers and enlisted personnel. At the peak during the war
some 4,500 people were engaged on such work at Pearl
Harbor.^^^

Special activities developed by the Office of Naval Intelligence dur-
ing the war seem to be security investigation, intelligence training, and
psychological warfare.

Three months before war broke out again in Europe in 1939,
President Roosevelt issued an executive memorandum recog-
nizing the Security Division as a functioning entity of ONI
responsible for investigating espionage, counterespionage
and sabotage.

Just as ONI's undercover, agents were the first American
investigators into Latin America in search of GeriiiaA Spies

** Jiilius Augustus Furer. Admmistration of the Tfavy Department in World
War il. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.. 1959, pp. 119-120.

218

before this country entered World War I, the ONI was the
first to deal with Japanese espionage before the FBI took
over in World War II. At that time, the Navy was the only
American agency with any degree of knowledge about Japan.

From the beginning of World War II, the rapidly ex-
panding corps of investigators literally covered the water-
front. They checked on the backgrounds of naval civilian
personnel in jobs involving the national security, investigated
suspected cases of espionage and subversive activities,
guarded against sabotage, uncovered fraud in the buying or
selling of naval materials, traced security leaks and did the
Navy's detective work on crime.

Security was their mission and protecting the naval estab-
lishment their goal. Not all threats to security, they found,
need be related directly to enemy efforts.^^®

Development of the intelligence training organization and function
must be credited to then (1942) Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Ellis M, Zacharias, who later wrote :

Training of personnel was our primary problem, since we
had only an inadequate intelligence school chiefly concerned
with the preparation of officers for investigation duties, known
as "gumshoe activities" among those in a belittling mood.
Complaints heard in the field offices decided me to make train-
ing my number one project. Radical changes had to be made,
and I took it upon myself to make them immediately.

The old school was abolished and two new schools were
created : one in Frederick, Md., called the Basic Intelligence
School, to introduce newcomers to the elementary principles
and techniques of intelligence; and another, the Advance In-
telligence School in New York, to train intelligence officers
on an operational level. This second school grew out of the
realization that Naval Intelligence in war has somewhat dif-
ferent tasks from those of Army Intelligence. The elements
of ground combat and the problems which it raises are largely
nonexistent in naval warfare, so that what the Army calls its
combat intelligence has but limited application in the Navy.
What we needed was operational intelligence, an activity be-
tween strategy and tactics providing in intelligence every-
thing a commander might need to take his ships into combat
or to conduct amphibious warfare. The immense mobility of
fleets and the wide expanse of our watery battlefield neces-
sitated a broadening of intelligence work, too; and we felt
that our operational intelligence would take all these factors
into consideration. We planned to train hundreds of opera-
tional intelligence officers by driving them through a hard
curriculum compressed into a comparatively short time. We
actually trained a thousand — and as I now look back upon
this proiect, and the demands which soon poured in upon us,
I feel that we were not disappointed in our exDectations. My
faith in Lieutenant (now Commander) John Mathis, USNR,

^"Miriam Ottenberg. TTie Federal Investigators. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-
Hall, 1962, p. 64.

219

who headed this school, was well founded. His legal mind,
pleasant personality, and keen investigative abilities gave me
confidence. Ably assisted by an outstanding faculty of men
high in the educational field, such as Lieutenant Richard W.
Hatch, Lieutenant Garrett Mattingly, and others, the success
of this undertaking was assured.^^'^

It was also in 1942 that ONI embarked upon its psychological war-
fare effort, the first undertaking being a carefully programmed prop-
aganda barrage designed to demoralize the German Navy. This
was followed by similar campaigns against the Italian Navy and the
Japanese. Always operating in extreme secrecy, the new unit made its
initial broadcast on January 8, 1943.

The establishment of what we called the Special Warfare
Branch (we feared that calling it Psychological Warfare
Branch we should engender even greater hostility by oppo-
nents of everything psychological) was greeted with extreme
enthusiasm by the Office of War Information, which then
found cooperation with the armed forces a very difficult task.
Elmer Davis, director of OWI, became our champion, and
whenever attempts were made to abolish our branch, he
pleaded with our highest echelons and borrowed time for us
so that we could continue our activities.

We worked in the closest and most harmonious cooperation
with OWI, which was the sole vehicle for the dissemination
of our material. The broadcast recordings were prepared for
OWI in a studio of the Interior Department then under the
able direction of Shannon Allen, and manned with capable
technicians. The broadcasts were put on the air by OWI seven
times a day, three days a week from all outlets OWI then had
in the United States, North Africa, and Great Britain. In
addition we prepared for them a program called Prisoner-of-
War Mail, an arrangement by which German and Italian
prisoners kept in this country could send greetings to their
relatives and friends in their homelands. This was the first
such attempt made in the United States, and it yielded splen-
did propaganda results. We also worked with OWI in draw-
ing up propaganda directives insofar as naval warfare was
concerned, and this close cooperation proved that a military
and a civilian agency could work together smoothly on what
was undoubtedly an important military operation.^^^

Cryptanalvsis operations were administered by the Office of Naval
Communications and the information derived from these activities
was shared with the Office of Naval Intelligence. Created in 1912 as
the Naval Radio Service of the Bureau of Navigation, Naval Com-
munications was attached to the newly created Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations in 1915 as a coequal unit with ONI and was
named the Communications Division some four years later. In the
twilight before American entry into the war, an effort was made, in

^" Ellis M. Zacharias. Secret Missions: The Story of an Intelligence Officer.
New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946, pp. 296-297.
'™ Ibid., pp. 305-306.

220

May of 1941, to create a special communications intelligence monitor-
ing capacity for the Pacific region.

In the middle of that month, the U.S. Navy took an impor-
tant step in the radio intelligence field. It detached a 43-year-
old lieutenant commander from his intelligence berth aboard
U.S.S. Indianapolis and assigned him to reorganize and
strengthen the radio intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor. The
officer was Joseph John Rochefort, the only man in the Navy
with expertise in three closely related and urgently needed
fields: cryptanalysis, radio, and the Japanese language.
Rochefort, who had begun his career as an enlisted man, had
headed the Navy's cryptographic section from 1925 to 1927.
Two years later, a married man with a child, he was sent,
because of his outstanding abilities, as a language student to
Japan, a hard post to which ordinarily only bachelor officers
were sent. This three-year tour was followed by half a year
in naval intelligence ; most of the next eight years were spent
at sea.

Finally, in June of 1941 ; Rochefort took over the command
of what was then known as the Radio Unit of the 14th Naval
District in Hawaii. To disiruise its functions he renamed it the
Combat Intelligence Unit. His mission was to find out,
through communications intelligence, as much as possible
about the dispositions and operations of the Japanese Navy.
To this end he was to cryptanalyze all minor and one of the
two major Japanese naval cryptosystems.^^^

Subsequently, the Director of ONI was given an indirect role in the
operations of this unit by simultaneously holding the position of
Assistant Chief of Staff for Combat Intelligence in the Headquarters
of Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, in charge of the Combat
Intelligence Division. As with all other intelligence agencies, CID
began to grow after the United States entered the war and struggled
with the challenges of 1942.

By the next year, it had changed its name to Fleet Radio
Unit, Pacific Fleet — FRUPAC, in the Navy's interminable
list of acronvms. Rochefort had departed in October 1942. for
two years of noncryptologic duties. He was replaced by Cap-
tain William B. Goggins, 44, a 1919 Annapolis graduate with
long communications experience. Goggins, who had been
wounded in the Battle of the Java Sea, remained as head of
FRUPAC to January 1945. [Lieutenant Commander Thomas
H.l Dyer continued to head cryptanalysis. Eventually
FRUPAC comprised a personnel of more than 1,000. Much
of the work was done in the new Joint Intelligence Center,
housed in a long narrow building across Midway Drive from
[Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester
W.l Nimitz' headquarters perched atop a cliff overlooking
Pearl Harbor. [Lieutenant Rudolph J.l Fabian, in Mel-
bourne, directed a field unit smiliar to FRUPAC. He was on
the staff of the Commander in Chief, 7th Fleet, which was

'^^ Kahn, op. dt., p. 8.

221

attached to MacArthur's South West Pacific Area command.
FRUPAC's growth mirrored that of all American crypt-
analytic agencies. This expansion compelled OP-20-G [a
Navy acronym identifying the agency] to reorganize as early
as February 1942. The workload had become too heavy for
one man ([Commander Laurence F.] Safford). The outfit
was split up into sections for its three major cryptologic func-
tions: (1) the development, production, and distribution of
naval cryptosystems, headed by Safford; (2) policing of
American naval communications to correct and prevent secu-
rity violations ; (3) crytanalysis, headed by Commander John
Redman. In September the development function was sep-
arated from the production. Safford retained control of the
development work until the end of the war, devising such new
devices as call-sign cipher machines, adapters for British and
other cryptographic devices, and off-line equipment for auto-
matic operation. About June, the Navy ceded Japanese diplo-
matic solutions to the Army, giving over its files as well as
its PURPLE machine.""

While FRI^PAC dealt with Japanese codes, only Washington —
Naval communications headquarters — processed foreign diplomatic
systems and naval ciphers used in the Atlantic theater, these being
primarily German.^^^

The Navy's official designation of OP-20-G indicated that
the agency was the G section of the 20th division of OPNAV,
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Navy's head-
quarters establishment. The 20th division was the Office of
Naval Communications, and the G section was the Communi-
cations Security Section. This carefully chosen name masked
its cryptanalytic activities, though its duties did include U.S.
Navy cryptography.

Its chief was Commander Laurence F. Safford, 48, a tall,
blond Annapolis graduate who was the Navy's chief expert
in cryptology. In January, 1934, he had become the officer
in charge of the newly created research desk in the Na\'y's
Code and Signal Section. Here he founded the Navy's com-
munication-intelligence organization. After sea duty from
1926 to 1929, he returned to cryptologic activities for three
more years, when sea duty was again made necessary by the
"Manchu" laws, which required officers of the Army and
Navy to serve in the field or at sea to win promotion. He
took command of OP-20-G in 1936. One of his principal
accomplishments before the outbreak of war was the estab-
lishment of the Mid-Pacific Strategic Direction-Finder Net
and of a similar net for the Atlantic where it was to play a
role of immense importance in the Battle of the Atlantic
against the U-boats.

Safford's organization enjoyed broad cryptologic func-
tions. It printed new editions of codes and ciphers and dis-

"»7&td., pp. 314-515.
"^ Ibid., p. 12.

222

tributed them, and contracted with manufacturers for cipher
machines. It developed new systems for the Navy. It compre-
hended such subsections as GI, which wrote reports based on
radio intelligence from the field units, and GL, a record-
keeping and historical-research group. But its main interest
centered on cryptanalysis.^^^

Both Naval Intelligence and Naval Communications persisted as
major agencies within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in
the aftermath of World War II. It would appear that in 1972 crypto-
logic duties were transferred from the Naval Communications Com-
mand to the Naval Security Group Command, an entity created in
1970 to manage certain internal physical and operational security
matters. In 1973, the Naval Communications Command became known
as the Naval Telecommunications Command. The old Office of Naval
Intelligence is currently called the Naval Intelligence Command.

YII. Civilian Intelligence

During World War II various Federal civilian departments and
agencies were involved in intelligence activities. Chief among these
was the Justice Department. Units principally involved in intel-
ligence included the Criminal Division, the War Division, the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. Responsible for prosecuting violators of all Federal
criminal statutes except those within the jurisdiction of the Anti-
trust and Tax Divisions, the Criminal DiWsion exhibited intelligence
capability in its General Crimes Section, where cases regarding the
illegal sale, manufacture, and wearing of armed forces uniforms and
insignia, the harboring of deserters, the making of threats against
the President, and the interference with any plant, mine, or facility
in the possession of the government were prepared ; its Internal Se-
curity Section, organized as the National Defense Section in the sum-
mer of 1940, where cases regarding espionage, sabotage, sedition,
foreign agents, treason, censorship, and other aspects of internal se-
curity were prepared; and its War Frauds Unit, established on
February 4, 1942, under the joint jurisdiction of the Antitrust and
Criminal Divisions, to locate and prosecute persons guilty of frauds
in the handing of war contracts.

The War Division, established on May 19, 1942, superseded the
Special Defense Unit organized in the Office of the Attorney General
in April, 1940. Ultimately abolished on December 28, 1945, it brought
together a number of special bodies scattered among the Justice De-
partment's regular components. Its principal substructures included
the Special War Policies Unit, responsible

for directing and coordinating activities of the Department
of Justice relating to espionage, sabotage, sedition, subversive
activities, and the registration of foreign agents. The Unit's
Subversives Administration Section, working with the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, directed investigations of , and
organized the evidence relating to, subversive activities car-
ried on by Nazi, Communist, and Fascist elements in the

"»/6tU, pp. 11-12.

223

United States, and recommended prosecutive and other ac-
tions. The Latin-American Section assembled information
about and prepared reports on the control of subversive activ-
ities in the Latin- American countries. The Organizations and
Propaganda Analysis Section collected, analyzed, and or-
ganized information on individuals, organizations, and pub-
lications in the United States that were considered to be
seditious or potentially seditious. The Foreign Language
Press Section made translations from and made reports on
the foreign-language press of the United States.^®^

The Economic Welfare Section,

which originated as the Economic Section of the Antitrust
Division in 1942, was transferred to the War Division on
August 28, 1943. Its chief functions were to collect industrial
information, prepare reports on enemy or enemy-controlled
industrial organizations, and aid in making this information
available for use in the economic warfare efforts of the Allies.
In the fiscal year 1944 the Bureau of the Budget designated
the Section as the central agency of the Government to carry
out research in the field of international cartels. The Eco-
nomic Warfare Section was dissolved at the end of 1945.

The objectives of the Section were: (1) To discover and
analyze important intercompany connections among Euro-
pean and Far Eastern firms and the control of these firms by
Germans and Japanese; (2) to analyze the means by which
German and Japanese control could be eliminated; (3) to
examine the legal problems that might arise because of the
use of intercompany connections by the German and Jap-
anese governments as a means of espionage and economic
warfare; (4) to analyze intercompany agreements between
foreign and American companies in order to determine their
effects on American trade and commerce; and (5) to ex-
amine the effect of cartel agreements among foreign compa-
nies upon the trade, commerce, and business structure of
Latin- American and other countries.

In carrying out these objectives, the Section made ex-
tensive investigations concerning bombing objectives and en-
emy potentials; engaged in studies of particular aspects of
international cartels with emphasis on the techniques em-
ployed by the Germans to penetrate the economies of other
countries, especially the United States and Latin- American
countries; participated in the formulation of plans and pre-
pared guides for the investigations of industrial combines
in enemy or enemy-held countries during the period of occu-
pation ; and made studies of the efforts of enemy interests to
obtain control of important assets in conquered areas and to
screen their efforts in order to avoid the economic conse-
quences of defeat.

^General Services Administration. National Archives and Records Service.
The National Archives. Federal Records of World War II; Civilian Agencies
(Vol. 1). Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1950, p. 789.

224

The Section made analyses of the chemicals, iron and steel,
nonferrous metals, electrical equipment and electronic devices,
and the machinery and tools industries of Germany; the
French, Swedish, Swiss, and other banking institutions that
might have helped to establish and maintain German eco-
nomic influence outside of Germany; the international con-
trol of certain commodities of international importance, such
as tin, fats oil, and industrial diamonds; and the I. G.
Farbenindustrie.^®*

In the process of reviewing registration statements and analyzing
the exhibits submitted by agents of foreign governments as required
by law, the Foreign Agents Registration Section, transferred from
the State Department on June 1, 1942, prepared reports of intelli-
gence value on both individuals and organizations that had failed to
comply with the registration requirement.

During the war, the Immigration and Naturalization Service "con-
linued its peacetime function of administering the laws relating to
the admission, exclusion, and deportation of aliens and the naturali-
zation of aliens lawfully resident in the United States, and it had a
special wartime responsibility for the registration and fingerprinting
of all aliens in the United States." ^®^ The Service had no investigators
of its own until 1946 so it had to rely upon occasional assistance in
this area from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.^^® Nevertheless,
its information holdings served an intelligence need.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation served as the primary inves-
tigative agency of the Justice Department durins: the war period. Its
principal components included the Office of the Director, the Identifi-
cation Division (fingerprints), the Securitv Division (investigation),
the Technical Laboratory (analysis development and application),
and the Training Division. In addition to its regular field force of
agents within the domestic United States, the Bureau also had a spe-
cial intelligence group in Latin America, South America, the Carib-
bean, Alaska, and Hawaii. This extension of operational jurisdiction,
of course, created personnel problems.

The grave security responsibilities placed on the FBI in war
forced [Director J. Edgar] Hoover to relax temporarily the
rule that new agents had to have a law degree or be account-
ants. The Bureau had 2,602 agents when the United States
went to war, with a total personnel of 7,420. Hoover immedi-
ately sent out orders to the field offices to begin interviewing
graduates of the FBI National Academy who could meet all
qualifications except legal training. The FBI had to be built
up to handle the tremendous volume of work, and its agent
force was increased to 5,072. The total personnel increased to
13,317 on the active rolls two years after the outbreak of
war.**^

"* iMd, p. 791.
"» nid., p. 795.
"• Ottenber^r. op. oit, p. 213.

"* Dor Whitehead. The FBI Story. New York, Pocket Books, 1958 ; originally
published 1956, p. 223.

225

Ways were sought to supplement the Bureau's information gather-
ing workforce. One innovation was attempted in defense plant pro-
duction security.

Even before the United States entered the war, the FBI
had, at the request of the Army and Navy, developed a system
of cooperation with workmen in defense plants as a check
against sabotage and slowdowns in plants with government
war contracts. In World War I the Navy had initiated a plant
protection program as a means of reducing the fires, explo-
sions, accidents and labor frictions which affected war pro-
duction, and the Navy plan had been adopted by the Army
and the U.S. Shipping Board's Emergency Fleet Corpora-
tion. In 1931, the military agreed that in another emergency
this work should be handled by the FBI.

It was through these specially designated workmen who
furnished information to the FBI that it was possible to de-
termine in hundred of cases that accidents — not enemy sab-
otage — were responsible for damaged material, machinery
and plant equipment. The informants were volunteers.^^^

Another opportunity to garner supplementary personnel presented
itself when the American Legion, in 1940, sought to organize an in-
vestigative force to ferret out subversives and seditionists. (These
detection efforts were complicated bj the fact that the United States
was in a state of declared neutrality with regard to international
hostilities at that time.) When the Legionnaires laid their plan be-
fore Attorney General Robert Jackson and were dismayed at this
response that such investigative activities should be. left to profes-
sional law enforcement agencies, Director Hoover came forth with a
proposal of his own.

The FBI plan suggested a liaison arrangement between
Post Commanders and Special Agents in Charge of field divi-
sions for discussions of national defense problems. Whenever
a Legionnaire was in a position to furnish confidential in-
formation about a particular problem, he would be desig-
nated to make reports to the FBI; but any investigation
would be made by the FBI, not the Legionnaire.

The proposal was accepted by the American Legion at its
conference in Indianapolis in November, 1940, and this ac-
ceptance laid the basis for the wartime cooperation between
the FBI and the Legion. The Legion's cooperation was typi-
cal of the aid given the FBI by many civic, fraternal and
professional groups.

The security program also included local law enforcement
officers, who were drawn together for courses of instruction on
such problems as convoy traffic, protection of public utilities,
civil defense organization and the investigation of espionage,
sabotage and subversion. The lessons taught were based
largely on the British wartime experiences. These schools
were attended by 73,164 law enforcement officers from 1940
to 1942.

'/6t<!„ pp. 250-251.

226

From this security network the FBI received information
not only from the military intelligence services, but also from
workers in industry, the Legion, police officers and others who
were mobilized for the war effort. Against this alignment,
saboteurs made little headway.^^^

The Bureau jealously guarded its intelligence functions and prerog-
atives, fought a number of agencies, including the Office of Strategic
Services, for jurisdiction in these matters, vigorously opposed the con-
cept of a new centralized intelligence entity during the closing months
of the war, and otherwise emerged as a major intelligence institution
in the aftermath of the international hostilities.

At the Department of the Treasury, three agencies or units had sig-
nificant intelligence duties. With the entry of the United States into
the war, the Secret Service took on additional responsibilities regard-
ing the forgery and counterfeiting of the increased number of govern-
ment securities and cheques as well as ration stamps and coupons.
Presidential protection required extensive security plans and intelli-
gence for the Chief Executive's trips abroad that involved journeys
through areas subject to enemy air attack and for conferences in places
where enemy agents and sympathizers were known to be present. In
addition, the Secret Service also had certain responsibilities for the
protection of distinguished wartime visitors to the United States,
necessitating an improved intelligence capability regarding individ-
uals or organizations of potential danger to the safety of such visiting
dignitaries.

After the entry of the United States into the war, the Customs
Service performed services with an intelligence potential for both the
Treasury Department and other Federal agencies. These duties, which
had a bearing upon intelligence matters, included assistance to "the
State Department and the Foreign Economic Administration by in-
v^estigating firms that applied for export licenses and by preventing
the unlicensed export of any materials subject to export control," pre-
venting "the entrance and departure of persons whose movements into
or out of the country would be prejudicial to the interests of the United
States," intercepting and examining "tangible communications car-
ried by vessels, vehicles, and persons arriving from and departing to
foreign countries to determine whether such documents contain matter
inimical to the interests of the United States or helpful to its enemies,"
participation in certain measures for the protection of domestic ports
and vessels therein against sabotage and espionage, and furnishing
"the War Department with statistical information on the import and
export of strategic war materials." ^^"^

The Division of Monetary Research, established on March 25, 1938,
supplied information and intelligence to assist the Secretary of the
Treasury and other departmental officials in formulating and execut-
ing international financial policy. In addition to its analytical units —
the Foreign Commercial Policy Section, the International Statistics
Section, and the Foreign Exchange and Controls Section being of pri-
mary intelligence interest — the Division maintained representatives in

^^ lUd., pp. 252-253.

^^^ General Services Administration, op. cit. (Vol. 1), pp. 754-755.

227

London, Paris, Rome, Berne, Lisbon, Stockholm, Cairo, Chungking,
Nanking, Shanghai, and Manila.

These offices conducted financial studies and participated
in financial planning in the areas for which they had re-
sponsibilities, provided representation on combined Allied
boards and committees and financial advisers to diplomatic
missions, and represented the Foreign Funds Control
abroad. In such places as Lisbon and Stockholm the Treas-
ury offices served also as confidential listening posts for
gathering information important for the operation of sev-
eral agencies of the United States Government. All of the
offices were responsible for collecting financial intelligence.
The offices of Treasury attaches, which were closely associated
with the offices of Treasury representatives, were concerned
only with the collection and analysis of information on
customs matters. Both classes of offices were administratively
considered as field offices of the Division of Monetary
Research.

Besides staffing these offices, the Division detailed person-
nel to the War and Navy Departments to furnish financial
advice and aid to military authorities outside the United
States. The officers thus detailed were usually organized into
"teams" or "missions" that were attached to the military
headquarters in each theater of action or occupation."^

Normally a Treasury Department agency, the United States Coast
Guard, in accordance with the provisions of its organic act (38 Stat.
800), was transferred (E.G. 8929) to the Na%'y Department for war-
time ser\'ice in 1941 and returned (E.G. 9666) to Treasury Depart-
ment jurisdiction on January 1, 1946. An Intelligence Division had
been established at Coast Guard Headquarters in 1936. Administra-
tion of intelligence responsibilities was conducted through fifteen
district offices and special field units.

Coast Guard Intelligence, now formally provided for in
the Coast Guard regulations and organization manual, drew
additional duties and manpower with the coming of war. It
was responsible for anti-sabotage and counterespionage on
the waterfront as well as security screening of merchant ma-
rine personnel and longshoremen. It became involved in the
search for the Nazi saboteurs after a Coast Guardsman spot-
ted them wading ashore with their boxes of dynamite on an
isolat-ed Long Island beach. It was charged with investigat-
ing Coast Guard military and civilian personnel for internal
security and breaches of discipline. The Intelligence Di-
vision's wartime force grew to 370, of which 160 were
investigators.

Its wartime achievements on the home front were in the
field of prevention. In World War I, Black Tom Island in
New York harbor, major transfer point for supplies shipped
to Europe, had been virtually destroyed by dynamite and
German saboteurs were busy on a dozen fronts. But during

'*" Ibid., pp. 770-771.

228

World War II, there was not a single known instance of
foreign-inspired sabotage on vessels or waterfront facilities
which the Coast Guard was responsible for safeguarding.

Since World War II, the Intelligence Division, reduced
to a peacetime force of 70 investigators, has been mainly con-
cerned with port security, keeping subversive elements out
of the Merchant Marine and off the waterfronts, enforcing
Coast Guard laws and insuring the internal security of the
Coast Guard."2

While the Department of State received a variety of information
with an intelligence potential from special overseas missions, roam-
ing diplomats, and foreign service officers during the war, its in-
telligence production capability was limited by the lack of per-
sonnel specifically responsible for intelligence collection, a decen-
tralized organization which dispersed the intelligence function, and
personal presidential intervention in foreign policy matters which
prompted the creation of special units serving intelligence functions
and reporting directly to the Chief Executive on foreign intelligence
concerns. Organizational problems resulting from dispersed war pro-
grams administration began in the spring of 1941 with the implemen-
tation of the Lend-Lease Act ( 55 Stat. 31 ) .

This act and other acts relating to the importation of stra-
tegic commodities, the control of financial transactions, the
establishment of priorities and allocations, and other "for-
eign economic warfare" programs not only had a profound
effect on the general direction of United States foreign policy
and the position of the United States in world affairs but also
brought about a vast expansion in the Department's foreign
activities and personnel. This expansion occurred chiefly in
connection with the following activities : ( 1 ) The operation of
the lend-lease program, involving the negotiation of lend-
lease agreements, the supplying of materials under these
agreements to the Allies and other eligible countries, and the
procurement of additional foodstuffs and raw materials for
the manufacture of lend-lease goods; (2) the procurement
abroad of additional foodstuffs and strategic materials needed
by the United States for its own war program; (3) the con-
trol of exports of goods and funds in order to prevent their
shipment directly or indirectly to the Axis countries and to
conserve materials needed for the war program of the United
States; (4) the distribution abroad of information concern-
ing the United States, its policies, and its military activities
in order to combat enemy propaganda; (5) the promotion of
the cultural-relations program of the United States on a
larger scale, especially in the other American Republic ; and
(6) the conduct of the political and diplomatic phases of the
war, especially those phases related to maintaining the Allied
coalition and developing the United Nations Organization.

Except for the last-named activity, the Department was
responsible for supervising and coordinating the programs
but did not undertake to carry out their operational phases.

"• Ottenberg, op. cit., pp. 137-138.

229

Instead, the following war agencies were established to plan
and effectuate the programs relating to lend-lease, preclusive
buying, foreign propaganda, cultural relations, and intelli-
gence procurement : The Office of Lend-Lease Administration
and the Board of Economic Warfare (later the Foreign Eco-
nomic Administration), the Office of War Information, the
Office of the Coordinator of Inter- American Affairs, and the
Office of Strategic Services. These new agencies were required
by the President to conform to the foreign policy of the
United States as defined by the Secretary of State, and their
field representatives, except those of the Office of Strategic
Services, were responsible to the chiefs of the Foreign Service
establishments in their areas. As the war progressed all
foreign-relations work tended to be centered in the Depart-
ment. It absorbed the long-range cultural programs of the
Office of the Coordinator of Inter- American Affairs in 1943,
prepared the way for the absorption of the continuing func-
tions of the above-named war agencies at the close of the war
by creating offices to perform related activities, assisted in
the planning that led to the establishment of the United
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and pro-
vided overseas military commanders with political ad^asers
to help them govern liberated areas in accordance with the
foreign policy of the United States.^*^

Against this background, the State Department does not appear
to have been a major intelligence producer during the war. It would
seem that, in many regards, the Office of Strategic Services, the Office
of War Information, the Office of Censorship, the Board of Economic
Warfare, and the armed services intelligence organizations supplanted
the Department in many areas of intelligence activity. Nevertheless,
State did have an intelligence capability and those entities involved
in such operations are profiled.

On November 22, 1940, a semi-secret Division of Foreign Activity
Correlation was established, appearing two years later as a unit within
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Finance, Aviation,
Canada, and Greenland. A departmental order of October 31, 1941,
indicated the Division "was directed to interview all foreign political
leaders promoting movements in the interests of their peoples and com-
mittees of foreign-bom groups visiting the Department, and to give
information on their activities and obtain all possible relevant infor-
mation regarding their purpose, organization, and membership." ^^*
Such information, when obtained, would seemingly have intelligence
value.

Within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs (previously the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for
Commerce and Trade) two divisions reflected an intelligence po-
tential in their activities. The Division of World Trade Intelligence

was established in the Department on July 21, 1941, to handle
State Department responsibilities pertaining to the Pro-

^^ General Services Administration, op. cit. (Vol. 1), pp. 691-692.
^ Graham H. Stuart. The Department of State: A History of Its Orgamzation,
Procedure and Personnel. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1949, p. 348.

230

claimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals. The Division was
at first under the direct supervision of Assistant Secretary
Dean Acheson but later became a part of the Board of Eco-
nomic Operations and successor economic offices. On March 1,
1945, it was renamed the Division of Economic Security Con-
trols and as such became a part of the Office of Economic
Security Policy on October 20 of that year. Its functions re-
mained substantially the same throughout the war and in-
cluded the application of the recommendations of the Inter-
American Conference on Systems of Economic and Financial
Control (except with respect to the replacement or reorgani-
zation of Axis firms), and the collection, evaluation, and
organization of biographic data.^^^

The Division of Commercial Policy (previously the Division of
Commercial Treaties and Agreements, wnen established on July 1,
1940, and then renamed the Division on Commercial Policy and
Agreements on October 7, 1941) "included correspondence and con-
tacts with American export-import interests and making arrange-
ments with the foreign representative negotiating for supplies." ^^®
Information derived from these activities would seemingly have in-
telligence value regarding the structure of the export-import business
community, its ties to the Axis powers and to the Soviet Union, and
the determination of strategic materials being commercially imported
by those regimes.

One other intelligence unit maintained, in part, by the State De-
partment was the Economic Warfare Division of the United States
London Embassy and Consulate General.

The Economic Warfare Division was established in the
Embassy in London in March 1942 and remained in existence
through June 1945. Its professional staff consisted of repre-
sentatives of various United States military and civilian
agencies, its top personnel being drawn to a large extent from
the Foreign Economic Administration and the Office of Stra-
tegic Services.

Although the Division was created to serve as a liaison
channel between agencies of the United States Government
concerned with economic warfare and the British Ministry of
Economic Warfare, it soon became an important operational
organization. Its principal functions during most of the war
were to restrict trade benefiting the enemy by means of block-
ade control ( working with the several sections of the Anglo-
American Blockade Committee) and neutral country trade
control ; to gather enemy economic intelligence ; and to assist
in strategic bombing activities. By March 1945 it was con-
cerned with postwar occupation problems. It began to gather
data on "Safehaven" operations (the prevention of enemy
property from finding a safe haven in neutral territory) ; to
develop plans to recover and restore enemy loot; to prepare
studies on the German economy; and to collect and exploit

^^ General Services Administration, op. cit. (Vol. 1) , p. 718.
"" Stuart, loc. cit.

231

captured enemy records through the Combined Intelligence
Objectives Subcommittee and the United States Technical
Industrial Intelligence Subcommittee. When the Division
was abolished in the summer of 1945, its functions relating
to neutral trade and "Safehaven" objectives were transferred
to the United States Mission for Economic Affairs in London.
Certain residual functions were assigned to the Office of the
Economic Minister Counselor of the Embassy.^®^

The Department had its own cryptographic unit, known since
January of 1931 as the Division of Communications and Records.
Located within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Ad-
ministration (previously the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
State/Fiscal and Budget Officer : Administration of Department and
Foreign Service), the component's cryptographic responsibilities in-
cluded code construction, the development of procedures and methods
for using same, the selection of code equipment, and the maintenance
of the security of information transmitted by means of cryptographic
systems. Although the Division had no cryptanalytic function, it was,
nevertheless, an immense organization at the time of America's entry
into the war.

The Division of Communications and Records was now by far
the largest agency in the Department : its telegraph section
had a chief, an assistant chief, two supervisors, and 107
clerks; its telephone section, a chief operator, assistant chief
operator, and thirteen operators ; the records section, divided
into seven sections — general, immigration, passport, person-
nel, political, mail, and wartrade board — numbered, together
with its supervisor, assistants, chiefs, assistant chiefs, clerks,
and messengers, 269, making a total personnel of 393. The cost
of the telegraph messages alone amounted annually to almost
$500,000. In the fiscal year 1940-1941, about 1,125,000 pieces
of correspondence passed through the division, and in 1941-
1942 this was almost doubled. This division, which worked
twenty-four hours a day and 365 days a year, put in annually
over 21,000 hours of unpaid overtime.^^^

By the end of 1943, however, the Division experienced a severe
breakdown in its operations.

The war had almost demoralized the work of this division.
Owing to the low salaries paid to its personnel and the pres-
sure of work which constantly necessitated overtime, the
Division of Communications and Records had long been very
unpopular with its employees. A survey of salaries indicated
that from 1936 to 1940 the Department of State personnel had
received an average salary increase of 5.91 percent, while
the increase in the Division of Communications and Records
was only 0.51 percent; in other words, the Department's
average increase was eleven times greater than that of the
Division of Communications and Records. As a result of the

'^^ General Services Administration, op. cit. (Vol. 1), p. 743.
** Stuart, op. cit., p. 363.

232

low morale, the work of the division was unsatisfactory and
under constant criticism. Incoming communications were
delayed in distribution, papers were misplaced or lost, and
inadequate records made it difficult to locate them. Serious
errors were made in the code room. Backlogs existed in every
section. It was customary to have approximately 15,000 docu-
ments in the records branch which were neither indexed nor
listed on the purport sheets. The vitally important telegraph
section was on several occasions as much as two days behind
in the coding and decoding of messages. The first requirement
insisted upon by Mr, [Raymond H.] Geist [Division Chief]
was a complete reclassification of positions so that salaries
commensurate with the work might be available. This was
begun immediately and resulted in a considerable improve-
ment in speed and accuracy. The other requirement was an
improvement of the procedure within the division.

The huge backlog in the telegraph section required emer-
gency action. The War Department was asked to help out,
and twenty enlisted men trained in cryptography were loaned
temporarily, and within forty-eight hours the backlog of
200,000 words, or groups of words, was completely eliminated.
Thereafter, from six to eight code clerks from the War
Department remained to keep the work current. As soon as
possible, high-speed equipment was added to eliminate the
slow, cumbersome manual labor of decoding. For example,
a machine will decode about 20 words, or word groups, per
minute as against 2.7 to 3 words manually, and the results are
more accurate. Workins: conditions were improved. Air con-
ditioning made it possible to endure the heat generated by the
mechanical cipher devices. Fluorescent lie:hts reduced the
percentage of error. The average time required for a massage
in the code room was reduced from forty-eight to six hours.
The introduction of airgrams also helped materially in reduc-
ing the strain in the code room.^^®

On September 22, 1944, a new Division of Cryptography was estab-
lished, concentrating entirely upon cryptographic and related com-
munications functions.

At the Commerce Department, the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic
Commerce "provided commercial information to various Government
agencies, making special studies and reports for them ; it acted as a
major fact-finding orgnization in the field of foreign commerce for

the Foreign Economic Administration " 2°" The Coast and Geodetic

Survey provided charts, maps, tidal data, and geodetic and coastal
survey services to the intelligence community. The National Bureau of
Standards "abandoned many of its normal activities in order to handle
research and testing projects for other Government agencies," some
of which are thought to have been of intelligence interest. The War
Division of the Patent Office "directed the search of applications for
inventions in categories deemed of importance by Government war

^*» Ibid., pp. 385-386.

** General Services Administration, op. cit. (Vol. 1) , p. 864.

233

[including intelligence] agencies." ^"^ The Weather Bureau, of course,
made its own unique contribution to intelligence activities when its
assistance was requested. And at the end of the war, within the Office
of Technical Services established by a departmental order on Septem-
ber 18, 1945, the Technical Industrial Intelligence Division

continued the functions of the Technical Industrial Intelli-
gence Committee, which was originally set up [under the
Joint Intelligence Committee] by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and was transferred to the Department of Commerce on
December 18, 1945. It conducted intensive searches in enemy
and other foreign countries to locate personnel, documents,
and material from which technical and scientific industrial
information that was developed especially during World
War II might be obtained ; it studied processes, methods, and
techniques useful for obtaining such information; and it
analyzed and appraised the information obtained to deter-
mine its possible usefulness to business and industry in the
United States.^"^

At the Department of Agriculture, the Agricultural Research Ad-
ministration developed infonnation regarding food productiion and
war-created scarcities within both the United States and enemy held
territory overseas. The Bureau of Agricultural Economics produced
similar information pertaining to demand and supply, consumption,
prices, costs and income, marketing, transportation, labor, agricul-
tural finance, farm management, credit, taxation, land and water
utilization, and other aspects of agricultural production and
distribution.

In order to unify and consolidate the administration of
governmental activities relating to foreign economic affairs,
the Foreign Economic Administration, known also as FEA,
was established by an Executive order [E.O. 9380] of Sep-
tember 25, 1943. The functions, personnel, and records of the
Office of Lend-Lease Administration, the Office of Foreign
Relief and Rehabilitation Operations of the Department of
State, and the foreign economic operations of the Office of
Foreign Economic Coordination of the Department of State
were transferred to the Administration. By an Executive
order [E.O. 9385] of October 6, 1943, "the functions of the
War Food Administration and the Commodity Credit Cor-
poration with respect to the procurement and development
of food, food machinery, and other food facilities, in foreign
countries" were also transferred to the Foreign Economic
Administration. And as military operations permitted, the
Administration assumed "responsibility for and control of
all activities of the United States Government in liberated
areas with respect to supplying the requirements of and pro-
curing materials in such areas."

=^ IMc!., p. 881.
*='/&id.,p. 202.

234

The Foreign Economic Administration was thus responsi-
ble for the wartime fmictions of export control, foreign
procurement, lend-lease, reverse lend-lease, participation in
foreign relief and rehabilitation, and economic warfare, in-
cluding foreign economic intelligence. Its activities were re-
quired to be in conformity with the established foreign policy
of the Government of the United States as determined by the
Department of State.^"^

There were three predecessors to the Foreign Economic Adminis-
tration which had responsibility for apprising the Chief Executive
of developments weakening or endangering the international eco-
nomic status of the United States during the period of world war.
In July, 1941, the President had created (E.O. 8839) the Economic
Defense Board "for the purpose of developing and coordinating
policies, plans, and programs designed to protect and strengthen the
international economic relations of the United States in the interest
of national defense.'' Within the Board's four geographic divisions —
American Hemisphere, British Empire, Europe and Africa, Far
East — information available to existing government as:encies and
private commercial enterprises concerning the economic organiza-
tion capabilities, and requirements of the foreign countries within
each unit's area of responsibility was obtained and analyzed.

On December 17, 1941, the name of the agency was changed (E.O.
8982) to the Board of Economic Warfare and it was subseauently
given (E.O. 9128), among other added responsibilities, the duty to
"advise the State Department with respect to the terms and condi-
tions to be included in the master agreement with each nation receiv- •
infr lend-lease aid;" to "provide and arrange for the receipt by the
United States of reciprocal aid and benefits" from the provemment^s
receivinsr lend-lease ; and to "represent the United States Government
in dealinpf with the economic warfare agencies of the United Na-
tions for the purpose of relating the Government's economi'- warfare
nrosrram and facilities to those of such nations." All of this meant
that the Board had to develop appropriate information about those
nations reoupsting- lend-lease aid to determine if the prrant was justi-
fied by conditions in that country. The agency also had some resnonsi-*
bilitv for deciding what strategic materials would be imoorted into
the United States. Such information, of course, had a areat intelli-
o-ence potential. To assist in these matters, the Board arranged
throu<?h the State Department to send technical, engineerinqr, and.
economic representatives abroad.

Bv a directive (EO. 9361^ of July 15. 1943, an Office of E'^onomic
Warfare was established within the Office for Emersrencv Manap^e-
ment. a wartime superstructure agency in close proximity to the
President, and its director assumed the functions, powers, and duties
of the Board of Economic Warfare which was terminat>pd bv the same
order. Lasting about six weeks, the Office of Economic Warfare oper-
ated and was orflranized in aoproximately the same manner as the old
Board. A directive ('E.O. 9380) of September 25 consolidated the
Office and certain other agencies, together with their personnel and

*'7&i<f.,p.636.

235

records, into the Foreign Economic Administration which was cre-
ated by the same order.

Foreign economic intelligence was prepared within the Foreign
Economic Administration by the Bureau of Areas, consisting of an
Office of the Executive Director and six branches — Pan American,
British Empire and Middle East, European, U.S.S.R., Far East and
Other Territories, and Enemy. All but the last were involved in assess-
ing the economic warfare of Allied nations. The Enemy Branch

was responsible for planning the economic program to be put
into effect when the enemy countries should be occupied. It
prepared studies and reports on the industrial disarmament
of tne enemy, including analyses of the entire economic struc-
ture of the Axis countries. Its staff units and divisions were
functional in nature and gave their attention to problems re-
lating to the industrial disarmament, external economic
security, reparations and restitutions, requirements and allo-
cations, food and agriculture, foreign trade, consumers'
economy, property control, transportation and communica-
tions, and industry of the countries to be occupied. The
Branch cooperated closely with the Technical Industrial In-
telligence Committee, a subconmiittee of the Joint Intelli-
gence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.^"*

With the end of hostilities in Europe and Asia, the necessity for
such an agency ceased to exist.

By an Executive order [E.O. 9630] of September 27, 1945,
the Foreign Economic Administration was abolished and its
remaining functions were divided among five other agencies.
To the State Department were transferred the functions per-
taining to lend-lease activities and to liberated areas and oc-
cupied territories, as well as responsibilities for economic
and commercial research and analysis and for the partici-
pation by the United States in the United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration. To the Reconstruction Fin-
ance Corporation were returned three corporations that had
been taken over from it by the Office of Economic Warfare
on July 15, 1943, and the functions relating to the procure-
ment abroad of all commodities except food. The Export-Im-
port Bank of Washington became again an independent
agency as provided by an act of July 31, 1945 (59 Stat. 527).
The Department of Agriculture received the functions per-
taining to food and to food machinery and other food facili-
ties, including those of the Office of Food Programs. The func-
tions pertaining to the control of exports, technical indus-
trial intelligence, and the facilitation of trade, and all other
functions not assigned to the other agencies named above,
were transferred to the Department of Commerce.^"^

Two special intelligence units were established at the Federal Com-
munications Commission. The first of these, the Radio Intelligence
Division,

"*/Md.,p.651.
""/Wd-.p. 637.

236

established on July 1, 1940, as the National Defense Opera-
tions Section of the Field Division of the Enfirineerina: De-
partment, developed in the early years of the war into the
largest single part of the Commission's staff. Under its direc-
tion monitoring stations, strategically located throughout
the United States and its Territories and possessions, kept all
radio communication channels under continuous surveillance.
This surveillance was primarily aimed at preventing radio
communication with the enemy abroad and the illegal use of
radio at home.

In addition to its monitoring stations the Division had
radio intelligence centers at Honolulu, San Francisco, and
Washington, D.C., which coordinated the reports in their re-
spective areas concerning radio surveillance and direction-
finding activities and enemy and illegal radio operations. It
also had mobile coast units that supplied a comprehensive mo-
bile radio surveillance extending throughout the coastal areas
of the Western, Eastern, and Southern Defense Commands.
At Washington headquarters, units of the Division prepared
and distributed abstracts of the intercepted messages for the
Chief Naval Censor, the Chief Signal Officer, the Weather
Bureau, and the Coast Guard ; plotted on maps the locations
of unidentified, clandestine, and illegal stations; translated
foreign language "intercepts" into English ; and provided full
investigatory services.

The Division picked up SOS calls and reports of subma-
rine attacks and relayed them to naval stations; furnished
"fixes" to locate lost airplanes, ships in distress, or stations
causing interference to vital military circuits; intercepted
enemy radiotelegraph intelligence covering economic condi-
tions, war production, materials, supplies, morale, and other
pertinent data ; trained personnel of other Government agen-
cies in direction-finding, detection and monitoring, and the
evaluation of "fixes." Its function differed from that of the
Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service in that it intercepted
messages that were sent in radiotelegraph code to specific
points as distinguished from broadcasts of enemy for pur-
poses of propaganda.^"^

In addition, the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service,

established as the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service in
February 1941, recorded, translated, analyzed, and reported
to other agencies of the Government on broadcasts of foreign
origin. It set up listening posts at Silver Hill, Md., London,
San Francisco, Portland, Oreg., Kingsville, Tex., San Juan,
P.K., and other places to intercept broadcasts of foreign news,
intelligence, or propaganda emanating from authorized sta-
tions and clandestine transmitters in belligerent, occupied,
and neutral countries. At the listening posts, translations of
the intercepted broadcasts were made and immediately tele-
typed or cabled to Washington headquarters. Some broadcasts

'/6i<f., pp. 937-938.

237

were also recorded on disks. At Washington, incoming wires
and transcriptions were edited and the more significant parts,
or the full texts, were teletyped to the Government agencies
that were waging war on the military, diplomatic, and propa-
ganda fronts. Special interpretations and daily and weekly
summaries were prepared at headquarters and distributed to
appropriate Government agencies and officials. Through co-
operative arrangements with the Office of War Information,
the British Ministry of Information, and the British Broad-
casting Corporation, editors of the Service were assigned to
overseas posts maintained by those agencies to select ma-
terial valuable for transmission to Washington. Editors and
monitors of the Service acted as part of the Army Psycho-
logical Warfare Branch in North Africa when Allied troops
were landed there in 1943. On December 30, 1945, the Service
was transferred to the War Department.^"^

The Office of War Information, established within the Office for
Emergency Management by a director (E.O. 9182) of June 13, 1942,
consolidated (the Office of Facts and Figures, the Office of Govern-
ment Reports, the Division of Information of the Office for Emergency
Management, and the Foreign Information Service's Outpost, Publi-
cations, and Pictorial Branches of the Office of the Coordinator of
Information) into one agency war information functions of the Fed-
eral government, both foreign and domestic. The unit's intelligence
functions included phychological warfare, both its development and
effects, and the collection of overseas media — print, film, and radio.

In general, the Office consisted of two principal branches : Domestic
Operations and Overseas Operations. A Policy Development Branch
was established in the initial organization but lasted only until Sep-
tember when it was absorbed by the Domestic Operations Branch.
Within the Domestic Operations Branch, in addition to the media
clearance and production bureaus (Book and Magazine, Graphics,
Motion Picture, News, and Radio) there were two intelligence entities :
the Foreign News Bureau and the Special Services Bureau. The
former

was established in March 1944, taking over the functions and
records of the Foreign Sources Division of the News Bureau.
Its main function was to provide the American press, radio
commentators, and other news outlets with war information
obtained from foreign sources available only in a limited
way, if at all, to nongovernmental agencies. To this end it used
monitoring services, excerpts from the press of occupied and
enemy countries, and special reports from overseas. A special
unit handled releases to the religious and educational press.
The Bureau served as a receiving and distributing agent for
all pooled press copy from overseas war theaters. Other
functions included the analysis of enemy propaganda
techniques ^"^

' Ibid., pp. 938-939.
'/6td.,p. 554.

238

On the other hand, the Special Services Bureau

continued functions begun in the Office of Facts and Figures
and the Office of Government Reports. The Bureau was re-
sponsible for providing specialized informational services to
all agencies and for providing the general public with a cen-
tralized source of information concerning Government activi-
ties, organization, and personnel. Its Division of Educational
Services, which provided informational material for discus-
sion groups and helped to coordinate the educational activi-
ties of war agencies, and its Division of Surveys, which con-
ducted public opinion and other surveys, were terminated
early in 1944. The Divisions of Press Intelligence, Public
Inquiries, and Research continued until August 31, 1945,
when the Bureau's remaining functions and records were
transferred to the Bureau of the Budget. The following year
they were a^ain transferred to the temporarily reconstituted
Office of Government Reports.'"^

Within the Overseas Operations Branch, in addition to its propa-
ganda and news production, distribution, and analysis bureaus (Com-
munications Facilities, News and Features, Overseas Motion Picture,
Overseas Publications, and Radio Program) , there was an adminis-
trative support unit — the Output Service Bureau — and the Bureau of
Overseas Intelligence.

The Bureau of Overseas Intelligence, originally known as
the Bureau of Research and Analysis, maintained a central
intelligence file, kept a running audit of the reliability of in-
telligence sources, and provided all sections of the Overseas
Operations Branch with information necessary to their activi-
ties. Until late in the war it functioned through the Current
Liaison Division, which maintained liaison with the Depart-
ment of State, the Military Intelligence Service, the Office of
Naval Intelligence, the Branch's Overseas Planning Board in
Washington and operational intelligence offices elsewhere, and
other agencies; the Analysis Division, which classified and
analyzed intelligence from the foreign press, radio broad-
casts, intercepted communications, and other sources and
cooperated closely with the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence
Service; and the Field Intelligence Division, which directed
the collection and distribution of intelligence from outposts.
In 1944 the Bureau was recognized and thereafter functioned
through the Central Intelligence Division, the Regional
Analysis Division, and a special research unit known as the
Foreign Morale Analysis Division. . . .^^°

The Foreign Morale Analysis Division referred to above

was established in the spring of 1944 under a cooperative ar-
rangement with the Military Intelligence Service of the War
Department General Staff to provide information about the
morale of the Japanese and social conditions within Japan. Its

***/&t<f., p. 560.
^° Ibid., p. 566.

239

work was performed by two groups, one in the Office of War
Information and the other in the "War Department. The first
group translated and analyzed materials available through
nonmilitary sources, such as Japanese publications and tran-
scripts of Japanese broadcasts, while the AVar Department
group analyzed materials received from military sources, es-
specially prisoner-of-war interrogation reports and captured
enemy documents. By the spring of 1945 the cooperative unit
was also known as the Joint Morale Survey and was divided
into the Morale Research Unit (OWI) and the Propaganda
Section (mainly Army) , which was concerned primarily with
the analysis of Japanese radio propaganda. The results of the
research weie presented to interested officials by means of for-
mal reports and special memoranda and in formal and in-
formal conferences. The reports ranged from over-all studies
of military morale and the effects of Allied propaganda to
special studies of subjects investigated upon request.^^^

In addition to its central Washington headquarters, the Office of
War Information maintained offices in Xew York and San Francisco
for the pe formance of certain of its functions. In addition to various
shifting outposts overseas, a major control facility was established in
London. On V-E Day the Office counted 38 outposts in 23 countries ;
the agency had no jurisdiction in Latin America. And with the termi-
nation of world hostilities, OWI came to an end.

The Office of War Information was terminated by an Ex-
ecutive order [E.O. 9608] of August 31, 1945, to become effec-
tive September 15, 1945. The Overseas Operations Branch,
including its executive and security Offices in Xew York and
San Francisco, the Office of the Assistant Director for Man-
agement, and the Office of General Counsel, were transferred
with their records to the Interim International Information
Service of the Department of State, which was established by
the same order. On January 1, 1946, these units became a part
of the Office of International Information and Cultural Af-
fairs of the Department of State. The functions and records
of the Special Services Bureau were transferred from the
Domestic Operations Branch to the Bureau of the Budget,
where they remained until they were transferred by an Execu-
tive order of December 12, 1946, to the reconstituted Office of
Government Reports.^^-

The Office of Censorship, created by a directive (E.O. 8985) of
December 19, 1941, had responsibility for censoring communications
by mail, cable, radio, or other means of transmission passing between
the United States and any foreign country. Deriving its basic operat-
ing authority from the First War Powers Act of 1941 (55 Stat. 840),
the Office conducted its work

in some 20 postal stations and 17 cable stations throughout
the country in accordance with standards of censorship estab-

^ Ibid., pp. 566-567.
°^ Ibid. 548.

240

lished by the Washington office. Commissioned officers of the
Navy performed cable censorship operations throughout the
war, but postal censorship, which was at first carried on by
commissioned officers of the Army, was transferred to civilian
officials early in 1943.^^^

Internally, the Office was organized into seven divisions: Press,
Broadcasting, Postal, Cable, Administrative, Reports, and Technical
Operations. With regard to intelligence matters, the Reports Division
"classified and delivered to interested Government agencies the vari-
ous types of submission slips made in the process of censorship." ^^

The Technical Operation unit

was created in August 1943 to perform the work of the Office
of Censorship in the field of counterespionage. It maintained
close liaison with the intelligence agencies of the Government
and supervised the work of censorship laboratories in combat-
ing the use of secret inks and developing techniques for de-
tecting codes and ciphers. Through its efforts the Office of
Censorship was able to hinder the effectiveness of the enemies'
secret communications. On the basis of evidence uncovered by
the Division the Federal Bureau of Investigation built up
espionage cases leading to the conviction and punishment of a
number of Axis agents.^^®

As with the other temporary wartime agencies, the Office of Censor-
ship ceased operations with the end of world war.

A Presidential directive of August 15, 1945, instructed the
Director of Censorship to declare voluntary press and radio
censorship at an end and to discontinue the censorship activi-
ties of the Office of Censorship. An Executive order [E.O.
9631] of September 28, 1945, provided that the Office should
continue to function, for purposes of liquidation only, until
November 15, 1945, at which time it should be terminated. The
Treasury Department took over responsibility for completing
the liquidation of the affairs of the Office.^^^

These were the principal Federal departments and agencies rec-
ognized to have exhibited a capacity for intelligence operations during
World War II. This is not a definitive collection of such intelligence
entities depicted here. Undoubtedly arguments could be made for the
inclusion of other units whose intelligence capacity was not immedi-
ately apparent in this research or which otherwise had secret intel-
ligence functions. However, such exceptions, in all likelihood, will be
most unusual omissions.

VIII. Post-war Adjustment

In the aftermath of the war, two not indistinct realizations were ex-
perienced within the Federal intelligence community : the loss of the
Office of Strategic Services and the need for some type of coordinating

=" lUd., p. 319.
'"' Ihid., p. 324.
=°* lUd.
^« IMd., p. 319.

241

and/or leadership mechanism within the postwar intelligence struc-
ture. Viewing OSS as a wartime necessity, President Truman, antici-
pating criticism for the continuation of the agency when world peace
had been restored, hastily abolished this entity in a directive (E.O.
9621) of September 20, 1945, effective ten days later. The result was
that the new Chief Executive and his aides were suddenly denied the
valuable intelligence produced by this unique and effective organiza-
tion and experienced this loss at a time when summit conferences
among the major world powers gave increased impetus for its
availability.

The Greneral Staff, Joint Intelligence Committee, and Combined
Intelligence Committee experiences during the war prompted interest
at the highest defense policy and organization levels in an improved
intelligence coordination mechanism. A centralized intelligence agency
had been proposed during World War I by Treasury Secretary Wil-
liam McAdoo.21'^ OSS Director William Donovan had also proposed
such an entity in 1944.^^^ To serve this intelligence coordination func-.
tion, the President issued a directive (11 F.R. 1337, 1339) , dated Janu-
ary 22, 1946, establishing a National Intelligence Authority with a
support staff called the Central Intelligence Group. Addressed to the
Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, this instrument said :

1. It is my desire, and I hereby direct, that all Federal
foreign intelligence activities be planned, developed and co-
ordinated so as to assure the most effective accomplishment
of the intelligence mission related to the national security.
I hereby designate you, together with another person to be
named by me as my personal representative, as the National
Intelligence Authority to accomplish this purpose.

2. Within the limits of available appropriations, you shall
each from time to time assign persons and facilities from
your respective Departments, which persons shall collectively
form a Central Intelligence Group and shall, under the direc-
tion of a Director of Central Intelligence assist the National
Intelligence Authority. The Director of Central Intelligence
shall be designated by me, shall be responsible to the National
Intelligence Authority, and shall sit as a non- voting member
thereof.

3. Subject to the existing law, and to the direction and
control of the National Intelligence Authority, the Director
of Central Intelligence shall :

a. Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelli-
gence relating to the national security, and the appropriate
dissemination within the Government of the resulting strate-
gic and national policy intelligence. In so doing, full use
shall be made of the staff and facilities of the intelligence
agencies of your Departments.

b. Plan for the coordination of such of the activities of
the intelligence agencies of your Departments as relate to the
national security and recommend to the National Intelli-
gence Authority the establishment of such over-all policies

*' See Chapter 2, [1651.

*» See Chapter 3, pp. [224-227] .

242

and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplish-
ment of the national intelligence mission.

c. Perform, for the benefit of said intelligence agencies,
such services of common concern as the National Intelli-
gence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomp-
lished centrally.

d. Perform such other functions and duties related to in-
telligence affecting the national security as the President and
the National Intelligence Authority may from time to time
direct.

4. No police, law enforcement or internal security func-
tions shall be exercised under this directive.

5. Such intelligfence received by the intelligence agencies
of your Departments as may be designated by the National
Intelligence. Authority shall be freely available to the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation or dis-
semination. To the extent approved by the National Intelli-
gence Authority, the operations of said intelligence agencies
shall be open to inspection by the Director of Central Intel-
ligence in connection with planning functions.

6. The existing intelligence agencies of your Departments
shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate
departmental intelligence.

7. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be advised by
an Intelligence Advisory Board consisting of the heads (or
their representatives) of the principal military and civilian
intelligence agencies of the Government having functions re-
lated to national security, as determined by the National
Intelligence Authority.

8. Within the scope of existing law and Presidential direc-
tives, other departments and agencies of the executive branch
of the Federal Government shall furnish such intelligence
information relating to the national security as is in their
possession, and as the Director of Central Intelligence may
from time to time request pursuant to regulations of the
National Intelligence Authority.

9. Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the mak-
ing of investigations inside the continental limits of the
United States and its possessions, except as provided by law
and Presidential directives.

10. In the conduct of their activities the National Intelli-
gence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence
shall be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources
and methods.

While this arrangement may have facilitated the coordination of
intelligence matters, the Central Intelligence Group was incapable
of ever approaching the scope of operations achieved by the OSS. Not
only was the staff inadequately small in number and temporary in
status, but its leadership was not stable: Rear Admiral Sidney W.
Souers first headed the unit but within six months he was succeeded
by General Hoyt S. Vandenberg; in May. 1947, Rear Admiral Roscoe
H. Hillenkoetter became director of the Group and, after the Central

243

Intelligence Agency displaced the CIG, made the transition to lead
the OIA.

From 1947 (when the armed services were unified and reorganized
under the Department of Defense superstructure, the National Secu-
rity Council, the now defunct National Security Resources Board and
the Central Intelligence Agency was established) to the present, there
has been a steady growth in intelligence institutions and organization.
The remaining portion of this study is devoted to the evolution and
growth of these entities.

/X. Atoinic Energy CoTrvmission

Created in 1946 (60 Stat. 755) and further empowered in 1954 (68
Stat, 919) as the sole agency responsible for atomic energy manage-
ment, production, and control, the Atomic Energy Commission
administered nuclear power matters for almost two decades before
a general reorganization of the Federal government's energy policy
structure brought about its demise in 1975. The Commission was the
recipient of the legacy of the Manhattan Project, operated by the
Army Corps of Engineers for the development of the atomic Jbomb
during the war. Since 1947 the agency has maintained an intelligence
unit under various identifications: Director, Office of Security and
Intelligence (1954-1955), Director, Division of Intelligence (1955-
1971), and Assistant General Manager for National Security (1972-
1975). "9

In the period between 1949, when the first Soviet nuclear
test was reported, and the end of February 1958, the AEC
announced some thirty-one nuclear explosions as having been
detonated by the Soviet Union. Not all Soviet atomic explo-
sions are publicly announced by the commission, nor are full
details given. But information about all such tests is quickly
communicated within the intelligence community.

Such information is a basic requirement for officials re-
sponsible for national security plans and programs. For ex-
ample, if the Soviets were known to be conducting certain
types of nuclear tests, these might reveal the state of progress
of hydrogen warheads for ballistic missiles or progress in
developing defensive nuclear missiles.-^"

This type of intelligence is gathered through machinery, such as
seismic devices, and atmospheric sampling procedures.

The United States has maintained continuous monitoring of
the earth's atmosphere to detect radioactive particles from
atomic tests. Samples of atmosphere are collected in special
containers by U-2 and other aircraft flying at high altitudes.
AEC is able to determine from these samples and other data
not only whether an atomic explosion has occurred, but
also the power and type of weapon detonated. It also con-

^ The periods indicated for these titles are approximate and are based upon
the appearance of the referrent in official government organization manuals for
the years specified.

^ Harry Howe Ransom. The Intelligence Establishment. Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 1970, p. 145.

244

ducts extensive research and experimentation to prevent de-
tection of atomic explosions and methods of penetrating
any such protedtive shielding as might be devised by another
nation.^^^

The agency also utilizes its own "state of the art" techniques in
nuclear energy production to assess the status of atomic power devel-
opments in foreign countries.

The Atomic Energy Commission is therefore a consumer
and producer of intelligence in the critical national security
field of nuclear energy, and is accordingly represented on the
U.S. Intelligence Board by its director, Division of Intelli-
gence, The AEC is vitally interested in receiving data on
foreign atomic energy or nuclear weapons developments and
provides technical guidance to CIA and the intelligence agen-
cies of the armed services in collecting these raw data. The
AEC, in turn, becomes a producer of intelligence when it pro-
duces information on nuclear energy and develops estimates
as to the atomic weapons capabilities of foreign powers. This
processed intelligence is disseminated to the National Secu-
rity Council, the armed forces, and others in the intelligence
establishment.

The specific functions of the AEC Intelligence Division
are to keep the AEC leadership informed on matters relat-
ing to atomic energy policy; in formal terms the division
"formulates intelligence policy and coordinates intelligence
operations." It sets the intelligence "requirements" of the
AEC, which may be supplied by the various operating arms
of the intelligence community. It represents the AEC in the
interagency boards and committees concerned with foreign
intelligence and it provides other intelligence agencies with
technical information in the hope of assuring competency in
the collection and evaluation of atomic energy intelligence.^^^

In accordance with the provisions of the Energy Eeorganization
Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 1233), the Atomic Energy Commission was
superceded by the Energy Research and Development Administration
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in January 1975. The first
of these new agencies assumed the old Commission's intelligence func-
tions, the AEC Assistant General Manager for National Security
becoming the Assistant Administrator for National Security at
ERDA. The new Administration is also represented on the United
States Intelligence Board.

X. National Security Coiuncil

The National Security Council evolved from efforts begun in 1944
for the unification of the armed services and culminating in the
National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 496). Both the Council and
its centralized intelligence coordinating sub-agency generally devel-

^ Monro MacCloskey. The Americcm Intelligence Community. New York,
Richards Rosen Press, 1967, p. 141.
^ Ransom, op. cit., p. 146.

245

oped from the National Intelligence Authority- Central Intelligence
Group experience and a principal study of post-war defense organiza-
tion matters prepared at the suggestion of Senator David I. Walsh
(D.-Mass.), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, for
Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal by New York investment
broker Ferdinand Eberstadt.-^^ "While numerous other reorganization
ideas would follow, the Eberstadt report

recommended the maintenance of three departments. War,
Air and Navy, with each having a civilian secretary, a civil-
ian under secretary, and a commanding officer. A National
Security Council, composed of the Secretaries of War, Navy
and Air, the Chairman of the National Security Resources
Board, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a perma-
nent secretariat would be established to facilitate interagency
clearances. In the absence of the President, the Vice Presi-
dent or the Secretary of State would preside as Chairman.
The duties of the Council would be to exercise critical policy-
forming and advisory functions in the setting up of foreign
and military policy. A Central Intelligence Agency was to be
made a constituent part of the Council's organization with
the Joint Chiefs of Staff serving as the principal coordinat-
ing unit. The latter would be given statutory authority per-
mitting it to advise the Council on strategy, budgetary prob-
lems, and logistics.-^*

As initially established in 1947, the Council was an independent
agency with a membership including the President, the Secretaries of
State, Defense, Army, Air, Navy, and the Chairman of the (now de-
funct) National Security Resources Board with the option that the
Chief Executive might also include the heads of two other special de-
fense units (now expired). Two years later the membership of the
Council was overhauled (63 Stat. 579) to include the President, the
Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman
of the National Security Resources Board, and certain other defense
officials which the Chief Executive might specify as members, subject
to Senate confirmation. Also, in accordance with Reorganization Plan
No. 4 of 1949 (63 Stat. 1067) , the Council was formally located within
the Executive Office of the President. Two aspects of NSC organiza-
tion and operation are of interest to this study : staff growth and ac-
tivities and coordination mechanisms developed under the auspices of
of the Council.

The general staffing pattern of the NSC would appear to be a move-
ment from a small secretariat to a large professionalized body compet-
ing with the bureaucracies of the defense and foreign policy agencies

*^ See U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Naval Affairs. Unification of the
War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security.
Committee Print, 79th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1945.

*^ Edward H. Hobbs. Behind the President: A Study of Executive Office
Agencies. Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1954. p. 129.

246

and departments for access to the President."^ The availability of the
Chief Executive to the NSC staff has been enhanced by the decline of
the Council's Executive Secretary and virtual replacement by a pres-
idential assistant for national security matters ; the creation of various
coordination mechanisms reporting to the Council, where the Chief
Executive presides, or directly to the President has also increased the
influence of this staff with the man in the White House.

Under President Truman, who did not make extensive use of the
panel, the NSC staff,

a small body of permanent Council employees and officers de-
tailed temporarily from the participating agencies, was
headed by a nonpolitical civilian executive secretary ap-
pointed by the President. An "anonymous servant of the
Council," in the words of the first executive secretary [Sid-
ney W. Souers] , "a broker of ideas in criss-crossing proposals
among a team of responsible officials," he carried NSC rec-
ommendations to the President, briefed the chief executive
daily on NSC and intelligence matters and maintained his
NSC files, and served, in effect, as his administrative assistant
for national security affairs.

The organization of the NSC staff was flexible and, as the
Council developed, changed to meet new needs. In general,
during the pre-Korean period, it consisted of three groups.
First was the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Sec-
retariat, composed of permanent NSC employees, which per-
formed the necessary basic functions of preparing agenda,
circulating papers, and recording actions. Next was the Staff,
consisting almost entirely of officials detailed on a full-time
basis by departments and agencies represented on the Council,
and headed by coordinator detailed from the State Depart-
ment who was supported, in turn, by a permanent assistant.
This body developed studies and policy recommendations for
NSC consideration. The third group consisted of consultants
to the executive secretary, the chief policy and operational
planners for each Council agency. Thus, the head of the
Policy Planning Staff represented the State Department, the
Director, Joint Staff, represented the Department of De-
fense, and so forth.^^®

Late in July, 1950, President Truman ordered a reorganization and
strengthening of the Council. Attendance at NSC sessions was lim-

"^ See : Paul W. Blackstock. The Intelligence Community Under the Nixon
Administration. Armed Forces and Society, v. 1, February, 1975 : 231-250 ; I. M.
Destler. Can One Man Do? Foreign Policy, no. 5, Winter, 1971-72 : 28-40; Stanley
L. Falk. The National Security Council Under Truman, Eisenhower, and Ken-
nedy. Political Science Quarterly, v. 79, September, 1964: 403-435; Paul Y.
Hammond. The National Security Council as a Device for Interdepartmental
Coordination : An Interpretation and Appraisal. American Political Science Re-
view, V. 54, December, 1960 : 899-911 ; Edward A. Kolodziej. The National Se-
curity Council : Innovations and Implications. Public Administration Review,
V. 29, November/December, 1969: 573-585; John P. Leacacos. Kissinger's Ap-
parat. Foreign Policy, no. 5, Winter, 1971-72 : 3-28 ; Alfred D. Sander. Truman
and the National Security Council : 1945-1947. The Journal of American History,
V. 59, September, 1972 : 369-389 ; Frederick C. Thayer. Presidential Policy Proc-
esses and "New Administration :" A Search for Revised Paradigms. Public Ad-
ministration Review, v. 31, September/October, 1971 : 552-561.

^ Falk, op. cit., pp. 408-^09.

247

ited to statutory members and five other specifically designated offi-
cials (the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, a Special Assistant to
the President [W. Averell Harriman], and a Special Consultant to
the President [Sidney W. Souers]) together with the Executive Sec-
retary (James S. Lay, Jr,).^^''

The President also directed a reshuffling of the NSC staff.
The permanent Secretariat remained, but the Staff and con-
sultants were replaced by a Senior Staff and Staff Assistants.
The Senior Staff was composed of representatives of State,
Defense, NSRB, Treasury, JCS, and CIA, and shortly there-
after of Harriman's office, and headed by the Executive Sec-
retary, an official without departmental ties. Members were
generally of Assistant Secretary level or higher and in turn
designated their Staff Assistants.

The Senior Staff participated closely and actively in the
work of the Council. Not only did it continue the functions
of the Staff, but it also took over responsibility for projects
formerly assigned to ad hoc NSC committees. It thus pro-
vided the Council with continuous support by a high-level
interdepartmental staff group. The Staff Assistants, who did
most of the basic work for the Senior Staff, spent a large part
of their time in their respective agencies, where they could
better absorb agency views and bring them to the fore during
the developmental phase of NSC papers. The position of the
executive secretary, moreover, as chairman of the Senior Staff
and also head of the permanent NSC staff in the White
House, gave that official an intimate view of the Presi-
dent's opinions and desires that he could brings to bear quite
early in the planning process. And finally, JCS and Treasury
representation on the NSC staff filled needs that had been
long felt.^28

With the arrival of the Eisenhower Administration, the Council
was transformed into a highly organized and enlarged forum for the
formulation of both national defense and foreign policy. Auxiliary
coordination units were added to the NSC structure and the panel's
factual research and policy paper production was supervised by the
first officially designated presidential assistant for national security
matters, Robert Cutler (James S. Lay, Jr., continued as the Council's
Executive Secretary ).22'' Most of this machinery disappeared in 1961,

^ By this time the Council's statutory membership had been altered by a stat-
utory amendment (63 Stat. 579) to the National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat.
496) and the panel had been officially located (63 Stat. 1067) within the Execu-
tive Office of the President.

'^Falk, op. CTf., p. 415.

^ Cutler's official title, first appearing in the government organization manual
for 1954, was Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
and was listed in both the White House Office staff and National Security Coun-
cil staff. Stress must be placed upon this being an official title for certainly other
presidential aides had been regarded as assistants for national security matters.
Thus one finds, for example. President Truman writing that when Admiral
William D. Leahy retired as White House Chief of Staff in March, 1941, "... I
brought Admiral Souers to the White House in the new capacity of Special
Assistant to the President for Intelligence." Officially, Souers was Executive
Secretary of the NSC. Truman, op cit., p. 58.

248

however, with the arrival of the Kennedy Administration and the
NSC became but one of several means by which foreign policy and
defense problems might be scrutinized.

Normally the President assigned the preparation of a
study or recommendation to a Cabinet official or one of his
top subordinates. This official, in turn, was responsible for
obtaining other departmental views and checking and coor-
dinating with other responsible individuals. Sometimes he
did this within small, interdepartmental groups, specially
created to study the problem, sometimes by arranging for
subordinates in each interested agency to develop the matter.
Where appropriate, this included close consultation with the
Budget Bureau. Fiscal matters were considered during the
development of a study and in drawing up recommendations
and proposals; papers no longer had separate financial ap-
pendices. The completed report included not only the respon-
sible officials own analysis and recommendations for action,
but also a full statement of any differing views held by other
agencies or individuals. This was true whether the report was
prepared by one person or by a special task force.

The final version, presented to President Kennedy at a for-
mal meeting of the NSC or within smaller or larger panel or
subcommittee meetings, was then discussed and, if necessary,
debated further before the President made his decision. Once
the chief executive approved a specific recommendation, the
responsible agency or department made a written record
of the decision and the head of that agency, or a
high-level action officer, was charged with overseeing its
implementation.^^"

President Kennedy did not, however, discard the special assistant's
role in Council operations and national security matters.

The Special Assistant to the President for National Secu-
rity Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, also played an important
role in the national security process. Not only was he a top
presidential adviser, but as overall director of the NSC staff
he participated in all Council-related activities. He and his
assistants had a variety of responsibilities in addition to their
normal secretariat functions. They suggested areas for con-
sideration and the mechanisms for handling these and other
problems; followed studies through the planning stage and
saw that they were properly coordinated, staffed, and respon-
sive to the needs and desires of the President ; ensured that
a written record was made of all decisions, whether they were
reached at formal NSC meetings or at other top conferences ;
and kept tabs on the implementation of whatever policy had
been adopted. In this work, Bundy and the NSC staff coordi-
nated closely with other parts of the presidential staff and
the Budget Bureau, performed whatever liaison was neces-
sary, and met frequently with the President at regular White
House staff meetings.

Falk, op. Git., p. 430.

249

Formal XSC meetings were held often but irregularly,
sometimes as frequently as three times a week and usually at
least once every two weeks. In the first half year of the Ken-
nedy administration, for example, the Council met sixteen
times. Many matters that had been considered at regular
NSC meetings under Eisenhower were now handled in sep-
arate meetings of the President with Secretaries Rusk and
McXamara or with a single Cabinet officer, or in committees
of the NSC that included only some of the statutory members
but also several of their top deputies or other government offi-
cials, or at meetings below the presidential level. ^"

While President Johnson largely continued to operate in much the
same manner as his predecessor with regard to national security mat-
ters, President Nixon significantly altered these arrangements by
vesting a great deal of autonomy in his assistant for national security
affairs, granting that agent a large staff responsible to his personal
supervision (the NSC Executive Secretary position remained vacant
during the Nixon tenure) .

When Kissinger came to Washington he told a number of
people of his determination to concentrate on matters of
general strategy and leave "operations" to the departments.
Some dismissed this as the typical disclaimer of a new White
House staff man. Yet much in Kissinger's writings suggests
that his intention to devote himself to broad "policy was
real. He had repeatedly criticized our government's tendency
to treat problems as "isolated cases," and "to identify foreign
policy with the solution of immediate issues" rather than
developing an interconnected strategy for coping with the
world over a period of years. And his emphasis was primarily
on problems of decision-ma^i/?^. He defined the problem
basically in terms of how to get the government to settle on
its major policy priorities and strategy, and had been slow to
recognize the difficulty of getting the bureaucracy to imple-
ment such a strategy once set.

Kissinger found a kindred spirit in a President whose cam-
paing had denounced the Kennedy-Johnson de-emphasis on
formal national security planning in favor of "catch-as-
catch-can talkfests." And the system he put together for
Nixon is designed above all to facilitate and illuminate major
Presidential foreign policy choices. Well over 100 "NSSM's"
(National Security Study Memoranda) have been issued by
the White House to the various foreign affairs government
agencies, calling for analysis of major issues and develop-
ment of realistic alternative policy "options" on them. These
studies are cleared through a network of general interdepart-
mental committees responsible to Kissinger, and the most
important issues they raise are argued out before the Presi-
dent in the National Security Council. Nixon then makes a

'^ lUd., p. 432-433.

250

decision from among the options, usually "after further pri-
vate deliberation." '^^"^

While the NSC itself may not have met any more frequently imder
President Nixon than it did during the Kennedy-Jolinson regimes,
the Council served as an important coordinating mechanism for Dr.
Kissinger in centralizing and amrming his control over national se-
curity and intelligence matters. As in the Eisenhower period, a variety
of auxiliary panels were created for special aspects of security policy ;
these were chaired by Kissinger and provided staff support by his
NSC personnel. The principal auxiliary units (not all, for some, un-
doubtedly, were never publicly acknowledged and a definitive list is
not otherwise known to exist) associated with the Council since its
creation are discussed below.

On May 10, 1949, President Truman announced the creation of two
panels which would flank the NSC structure. The first of these, the
interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, was chaired ini-
tially by the Special Assistant to the Attorney General with repre-
sentatives from the Department of State, Defense, and Treasury as
well as the NSC (the last in an adviser-observer capacity). Largely a
paper structure, this body has been almost totally inactive during the
past decade; nevertheless, responsibility for its operations currently
lies with the head of the internal security section of the Criminal Di-
vision, Department of Justice.

The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, the other unit estab-
lished by President Truman, was initially headed by J. Edgar Hoover,
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and counted among
its members the heads of Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence
agencies and an NSC representative (the last, again, in an adviser-
observer capacity). Slightly more active than the counterpart inter-
nal security panel, the Conference has, since the death of Director
Hoover, been maintained by a secretariat within the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.

Both of these entities, one predominantly military and the other
largely civilian in scope, are responsible for coordinating certain in-
vestigations of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, sub-
version, and related internal security matters. Because the differentia-
tion between their jurisdiction is not altogether clear, fundamental
disagreements between them over such matters are settled by the NSC ;
however, in view of the inactivity of these units, it would seem that
few disputes over jurisdiction have been taken to the Council recently
by these panels.^^^

In June, 1951, a Psychological Strategy Board was established by
presidential directive.^^* Supplanting an earlier board created in the
Department of State under Assistant Secretary Edward W. Barrett,
the new panel attempted to determine the psychological objectives of
the United States and coordinated and evaluated the work of operat-
ing psychological warfare agencies. Under the terms of its charter,

^^ Destler, op. cit, pp. 28-29.
'^ Hobbs, op. cit, p. 150.

''** See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry 8. Truman,
1951. Washington, U.S. Govt, Print. Off., 1965, pp. 341-342.

251

the Board was obligated to "report to the National Security Council
on . . . [its] . . . activities and on its evaluation of the national psycho-
logical operations, including implementation of approved objectives,
policies, and programs by the departments and agencies concerned."
Composed of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence (or their designees),
and such other representatives as determined by them, the unit was
ultimately abolished (E.O. 10483) on September 2, 1953, when Reorga-
nization Plan No. 8 of that year (67 Stat. 642) established the United
States Information Agency which assumed the functions of the Board.
Finding a need for improving the manner in which NSC policies
were carried out. President Eisenhower created (E.O. 10483) the Op-
erations Coordinating Board in September, 1953, which, after the
Chief Executive approved a policy submitted by the Council, was
to consult with the agencies involved as to :

(a) their detailed operational planning responsibilities re-
specting such policy, (b) the coordination of the interdepart-
mental aspects of the detailed operational plans developed
by the agencies to carry out such policy, (c) the timely and
coordinated execution of such policy and plans, and (d) the
execution of each security action or project so that it shall
make its full contribution to the attainment of national se-
curity objectives and to the particular climate of opinion the
United States is seeking to achieve in the world, and (e) ini-
tiate new proposals for action within the framework of na-
tional security policies in response to opportunity and changes
in the situation.

In addition to the Under Secretary of State, who acted as chair-
man, the panel consisted of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the
Director of Foreign Operations, and the Director of Central Intel-
ligence. The Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs might attend any session of the Board on Ms own volition
and the Director of the United States Information Agency was to
advise the body upon request. In his efforts at streamlining the na-
tional security structure. President Kennedy terminated (E.O.
10920) the Board in February 1961.

The Forty Committee (also known as the Special Group, the 54/12
Group, and the 303 Committee) was established by a secret NSC
order #54/12 and derived from an informal Operations Coordinat-
ing Board luncheon group. Created sometime in 1955, the panel has
had a varying membership but has reportedly included the Director
of Central Intelligence, the Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and, during
the past decade, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
presidential assistant for national security affairs. During the past
three administrations the President's national security assistant is
thought to have chaired the group's sessions. According to one author-
ity, it is this unit which makes "policies which walk the tightrope
between peace and war;" ^^^ another source credits the committee with

** David Wise and Thomas B. Ross. The Invisible Government. New York,
Vintage Books, 1974; originally published 1964, p. 263.

252

holding authority on the execution of CIA clandestine operations."*
In this latter regard, the group functions as a shield against claims
that the Chief Executive directly approved some morally question-
able clandestine activity ; this function of the panel would not, how-
ever, seem to excuse the President from his constitutional obligation
to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." ^^^

With the arrival of the Nixon Administration in 1969, Dr. Kis-
singer instituted three new NSC coordinating mechanisms. The
Under Secretaries Committee, initially headed by Under Secretary
of State John N. Irwin, was "originally designed as the chief im-
plementing body to carry out many (but not all) Presidential NSC
directives" but, according to a 1971 evaluation, the panel's "actual
importance (never very great) continues to lapse." ^^*

"Another is the Senior Review Group, now [1971] at an Under
Secretary level and chaired by Kissinger, which usually gives final
o,pproval to the NSC study memoranda after making sure that 'all
realistic alternatives are presented'." ^^®

The third entity, the Washington Special Actions Group, included
as members, as of late 1971, the Attorney General, the Director of
Central Intelligence, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, and the Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs. It functions as "top-level operations center for sudden crises
and emergencies." ^*°

On November 5, 1971, the White House announced additional re-
organization efforts with regard to the intelligence community, the
net outcome of which was the establishment of three more NSC
panels :

. . . a National Security Council Intelligence Committee^
chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Secu-
rity Affairs. Its members . . . include the Attorney General,
the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence], the Under Sec-
retary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Committee will
give direction and guidance on national intelligence needs
and provide for a continuing evaluation of intelligence prod-
ucts from the viewpoint of the intelligence user.

. . . a Net Assessment Group within the National Security
Council staff. The group . . . [is] . . . headed by a senior
staff member and . . . [is] . . . responsible for reviewing

•*■ Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence.
New York, Alfred A. Knop, 1974, pp. 325-327; this currently controversial
account of Central Intelligence Agency and foreign intelligence community op-
erations contains the most recent and detailed publicly available statistical
estimates regarding Federal Intelligence resources.

^ See U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Opera-
tions With Respect To Intelligence Activities. Allpped Asfassination Pl/yta In-
volvinn Foreign Leader n. Committee print, 94th Congress, 1st session. Washing-
ton, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975, pp. 9-13. [Also, published as S. Rept. 94-465
with identical pagination.]

^ Leacacos, op. cit., p. 7.

'^IMd.

^lUd., pp. 7-8.

253

and evaluating all intelligence products and for producing
net assessments.

. . . an Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee^
chaired by the DCI, including as members a senior repre-
sentative from the Department of State, the Department of
Defense, the Office of Management and Budget, and the
Central Intelligence Agency. This Committee , . . advise [s]
the DCI on the preparation of a consolidated intelligence
program budget.^^^

These units, together with the above named groups and the Verifi-
cation Panel, which is responsible for monitoring the intelligence
related to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and is chaired by Dr.
Kissinger, constitute the major NSC affiliates of interest to this study.
Unless otherwise noted, all of these entities are officially operative
though, in some instances, they exhibit little functional activity.

XI. Central Intelligence Agency

Viewed by some as a revitalized model of the Office of Strategic
Services, the Central Intelligence Agency was established as a sub-
unit of the National Security Council by the National Security Act
of 1947 (61 Stat. 496) with responsibilities (1) to advise the NSC
on intelligence matters related to national security, (2) to make rec-
ommendations to the Council regarding the coordination of intel-
ligence activities of the Federal Executive departments and agencies,
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence and provide for its appro-
priate dissemination, (4^) to perform such additional ser\'ices for the
benefit of existing intelligence entities as the NSC determines can be
effectively accomplished by a central organization, and (5) to perform
such additional functions and duties relating to national security
intelligence as the Council may direct.

The Agency's organic statute was amended in 1949 by the Central
Intelligence Agency Act (63 Stat. 208) which sought to improve
CIA administration bv stren^^henina: the powers of the director.
Among other authorities granted, this law exempts the Agency from
any statutory provisions requiring the publication or disclosure of the
"organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of
personnel employed" and, further, directs the Office of Management
and Budget (then identified as the Bureau of the Budget) to make
no reports on these matters to Congress. Nevertheless, in spite of this
restrictive lanmiage, some gleanings are available on the organization
of the CIA.^*2 This scenario necessarily includes not only the evolution
and current status of the Agency's internal structure, but extends
as well to entities apart from the Agencv which are headed by the
Director of Central Intelligence and unofficial affiliates in the service
of the CIA.

The head of the Old Central Intelligence Group. Admiral Roscoe H.
Hillenkoetter, served as the first director of the Central Intelligence

*" See Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, v. 7, November 8, 1971 :
14S2.

*" There are. of <'ourse. various aoconnts of CTA operaMons and exploits
but these are generally unenliehtenine: with regard to organizational considera-
tions and are, therefore, outside of the scope of this study.

254

Agency. But, while this leadership continuity assured an easy transi-
tion from one unit to its successor, the Agency was struggling with
internal organization difficulties and liaison relationships jdurmg its
first years of operation. These problems diminished with the arrival of
Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, former Secretary of the
General Staff under General George C. Marshall and Chief of Staff
to General Dwight D. Eisenhower in Europe, as Director of Central
Intelligence in 1950. Former CIA official Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.,
offers this view of Smith's impact on the Agency.

Under the persistent prodding of General Smith, the intel-
ligence community moved toward coordination and centrali-
zation. He was impatient with jurisdictional arguments,
whether within the CIA or among the services. His attitude
was that there was more than enough work for evwybody.
He had the authority and used it.

Within the CIA he reorganized the operational arm, estab-
lished new guidelines for interagency cooperation, and estab-
lished a support arm to provide the personnel, training, com-
munication, logistics, and security so necessary in intelligence
activities. He separated research from the estimating process
and proposed a division of research responsibilities among
the intelligence agencies. The Intelligence Advisory Com-
mittee ^amed stature as the governing body of the
community.

Perhaps no action more typified the style and personality
of General Smith than the organization of the operational
offices of the CIA. The agency had inherited its foreign intel-
ligence and counter-intelligence offices from the OSS, and in
the five years since the Second World War these had been
consolidated, reorganized, and reoriented to peacetime condi-
tions. By 1948 another office had been added to engage in
covert operations or political warfare. The new office was in,
but not of, the CIA. It took its directives from a State-
Defense committee, not the DCI. One of Smith's first
actions on becoming director in October 1950 was to an-
nounce that he would issue the orders to this office. He later
directed that the two offices (foreign intelligence and covert
operations) be merged and that the deputy director concerned
and the two assistant directors in charge of those offices work
out the details. As one of the assistant directors, I partici-
pated in what were extended and exhaustive negotiations. In
the summer of 1952 Smith finally accepted our proposals and
called a meeting of all of the division and staff chiefs of the
to-be-merged offices to announce the new organization. Al-
though everyone present knew that the director was impatient
to have the merger implemented, there were a couple who
wanted to argue it. Smith gave them short shrift; his quick
temper flared and he pcathingly stopped the discussion, an-
nounced what was to take place, and stalked out. One of my
colleaofues leaned over and whispered, "]My God, if he is that
terrifyiiifif now, imagine what he must have been at full
weight !" During the Second World War, when he was Eisen-

255

hower's Chief of Staff, Smith had weighed about 185, but an
operation for stomach ulcers had reduced his size by fifty
pounds.^*^

When Smith departed from the CIA directorship in 1952, he was
succeeded by a man who was not only his equal in organizational abili-
ties, but an individual virtually without equal in intelligence opera-
tions : Allen Welsh Dulles, the OSS master spy in Switzerland during
World War II, lately head of the CIA's Office of PoKcy Coordination
which carried out political subversion missions, and brother of the new
Secretary of State. While Dulles, himself, has written very little about
his organization and manner of administering the Central Intelligence
Agency, one close observer of his operating techniques has written :

. . . one of the first things we did when he became the Di-
rector was to abolish the office of the Deputy Director of
Administration [DD/A]. In a city renowned for its bureau-
cratic administration and its penchant for proving how
right C. Northcote Parkinson was, Mr. Dulles' first act was
more heretical to most Washingtonians than one of Walter
Bedell Smith's first actions — the one in which he told the
McCarthy [Senate investigation of Communist activity]
hearings that he thought there might well be Communists in
the Agency. Washington was not as upset about the Com-
munists as it was to learn that a major agency of the Govern-
ment had abolished Administration. Mr. Dulles took the view
of the intelligence professional, that it was much more
dangerous and therefore undesirable to have all kinds of
administratore acquiring more information than they should
have, than it was to find some way to get along without the
administrators.

While the public was mulling over that tidbit from the
CIA, the real moves were being made inside the organization,
where no one could see what was going on. The Deputy of
Intelligence fDD/I], strengthened by the addition of the
Current Intelligence organization [which prepares the daily
intelligence report submitted to the President] and other such
tasks, was to be responsible for everything to do with intelli-
gence, and more importantly, was to be encumbered by noth-
ing that had to do with logistics and administration. That was
the theory. In practice, the DD/I has a lot of administrative
and support matters to contend with, as does any other large
office. However, as much of the routine and continuing loads
as could be was set upon the Deputy Director of Support
[DD/S].

At the same time, the new and growing DD/P [Plans] (the
special operations shop) was similarly stripped of all en-
cumbrances and freed to do the operational work that Dulles
saw developing as his task. This left the DD/S (Support)
with a major task. He was responsible for the entire support

^ Lyman B. Kirknatrirk^ Jr. The VS. Tvtelligev/re CnrnmvnUvn Foreign Policy
and Domestic Activities. New York, Hill and "Wang, 1973, pp. 32-33.

256

of the Agency, support of all kinds, at all times, and in all
places.^**

As an "intelligence professional," Dulles held strong views as to the
type of individuals who should lead the Agency and serve it. During
tile hearings on the proposed National Security Act of 1947, he sent
a memorandum on the CIA provisions to Senator Chan Gumey (R.-
S.D.), Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, indicating his
view that the new intelligence entity

. . . should be directed by a relatively small but elite corps
of men with a passion for anonymity and a willingness to
stick at that particular job. They must find their reward in
the work itself, and in the service they render their Govern-
ment, rather than in public acclaim.

Elsewhere in his statement he opined that the Agency "must have a
corps of the most competent men which this country can produce to
evaluate and correlate the intelligence obtained, and to present it, in
proper form, to the interested Government departments, in most cases
to the State Department, and in many cases to the Department of
National Defense, or to both." "s

Dulles continued to express this view after he left the directorship,
offering perhaps his most developed account on this point in a 1963
writing.

From the day of its founding, the CIA has operated on the
assumption that the majority of its employees are interested
in a career and need and deserve the same guarantees and
benefits which they would receive if in the Foreign Service
or in the military. In turn, the CIA expects most of its career
employees to enter its service with the intention of durable
association. No more than other large public or private in-
stitutions can it afford to invest its resources of time and
money in the training and apprenticeship of persons who
separate before they have begun to make a contribution to
the work at hand. It can, in fact, afford this even less than
most organizations for one very special reason peculiar to the
intelligence world — the maintenance of its security. A siz-
able turnover of short-term employees is dangerous because
it means that working methods, identities of key personnel
and certain projects in progress will have been exposed in
some measure to persons not yet sufficiently indoctrinated in
the habits of security to judge when they are talking out of
turn and when they are not.

The very nature of a professional intelligence organiza-
tion requires, then, that it recruit its personnel for the long
pull, that it carefully screen candidates for jobs in order to
determine ahead of time whether they are the kind of people
who will be competent, suitable and satisfied, and that once

"* L. Fletcher Prouty. The Secret Team. Englewood Cliflfs, Prentice-Hall, 1973,
pp. 245-246.

^ Spe U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Natinval Defense
Eastablishment : Unification of the Armed Services. Hearings, SOth Congress, 1st
session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1947, pp. 525-528.

257

such people are within the fold their careers can be de-
veloped to the mutual advantage of the government and the
officer.^*^

Yet, regardless of these expressions of personnel policy, the over-
riding factor in CIA recruitment during Dulles' tenure would seem
to be security, a condition brought to bear not by the Director's own
choosing but, rather, by the tirades of the junior Senator from Wis-
consin, Joseph R. McCarthy.

The CIA Director told the President he would resign unless
McCarthy's vituperation was silenced. Eisenhower had been
reluctant to stand up to the politically powerful (and politi-
cally useful) senator. But he accepted Dulles' contention that
McCarthy's attacks on the Agency were damaging to the
national security. Vice-President Nixon was dispatched to
pressure McCarthy into dropping Ms plans for a public
investigation. The senator suddenly became "convinced ' that
"it would not be in the public interest to hold public hearings
on the CIA, that that perhaps could be taken care of
administratively."

The "administrative" remedy McCarthy demanded as the
price of his silence was a vast internal purge of the Agency.
The senator privately brought his charges against CIA "se-
curity risks" to Dulles' office. He had lists of alleged "homo-
sexuals" and "rich men'' in CIA employ and provided Dulles
with voluminous "allegations and denunciations, but no
facts." To insure, however, that his charges were taken seri-
ously by CIA, McCarthy continued to threaten a public in-
vestigation. At his infamous hearings on alleged subversion
in the Army, the senator frequently spoke of "Communist
infiltration and corruption and dishonesty" in CIA. He called
this a "very, very dangerous situation" which disturbs me
"beyond words."

The pressure took its toll. Security standards for Agency
employment were tightened, often to the point of absurdity,
and many able young men were kept from pursuing intelli-
gence careers.^*^

The author of the above passage suggests that the effect of the
new security standards were profound for the development of the
Central Intelligence Agency: in brief, individuals who had been in-
volved in any type of leftist ideological cause would find it difficult to
obtain employment with the CIA. Because of the situation, the flow
of diverse viewpoints through new personnel was restricted and a like-
minded manner of thinking began to evolve within the agency.

As a consequence of this state of affairs, and for other reasons, some
CIA employees abandoned their intelligence careers and sought more
rewarding positions in the diplomatic and foreign policy establish-
ment. These shifts also had an interesting effect in terms of the CIA's
image and impact.

^ Allen W. Dulles. The Craft of Intelligence. New York, Harper and Row,
1973. pp. 171-172.
"' Smith, op. cit., pp. 370-371.

258

State Department officials have learned the power of their
clandestine opposite numbers. In March 1954, a Texas at-
torney with long business experience in South America was
named Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Af-
fairs. At one of his first briefings, the Texan learned that the
CIA had set aside $20 million to overthrow a leftist regime in
Guatemala. The Assistant Secretary raised vigorous objec-
tions to the whole plan until he was silenced by his superior,
the Undersecretary of State — who happened to be ex-CIA
Director Walter Bedell Smith. On several other occasions
during the 1950s, John Foster Dulles felt that his own am-
bassadors could not be "trusted" and should not be informed
of CIA operations in their countries. And those operations,
as often as not, were undertaken by arrogant adventurers who
had developed operational independence from a relatively
enlightened staff at CIA's Washington headquarters.^*^

At present the Central Intelligence Agency is thought to be or-
ganised into five entities — the Office of the Director and its satellites
and four functional directorates.^*^ At the head of the agency are the
Director and Deputy Director, both of whom serve at the pleasure of
the President and are appointed subject to confirmation by the United
States Senate. Either of these officials may be selected from among the
commissioned officers of the armed services, whether active or retired,
but one position must always be held by a civilian. There is also a
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Com-
munity (prior to 1973 this official was known as the Deputy Director
for Community Relations) who assists the Director of Central In-
telligence in his administrative responsibilities outside of managing
the Agency.

One satellite entity attached to the Office of the Director of Central
Intelligence is a small group of senior analysts, drawn from the CIA
and other agencies, who prepare the National Intelligence Estimates
which are position papers assessing potentiality or capability for the
benefit of U.S. policy makers — e.g.^ Soviet strategic defense capabil-
ity, grain production in Communist China, or the political stability
of Argentina, Chile, Angola, or Jordan. Founded in 1950 as the
Board of National Estimates and initially headed by OSS veteran
Dr. William Danger, the unit was reorganized in October, 1973, when
its name was changed to National Intelligence Officers (NIO).

Each NIO is either a geographic or functional expert and is
allotted one staff assistant. "Flexibility" is a frequently used
word in the CIA under [Director William E.] Colby, who
has recruited an NIO for economic problems from RAND
corporation, another for arms control ("Mr. Salt Talks")
and others for key geographic areas such as Russia, China,
and the Middle East. Reportedly, the NIOs are to be recruited
from all agencies within the intelligence community (with a

"* rwrf.. p. 376.

"* This general description is taken from Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks.
The CIA and the Cult of Tntrlligevcc. New York. Alfred A. Knopf, 1974, pp. 67-
79 ; corroborating information has been compared from other public descriptiona
of the Agency.

259

sprinkling of functional experts from the outside), and the
military NiOs are to have general officer rank in order to add
prestige to the position. If so, this provision is suspect, since
the promotion system within the armed forces does not assure
that good intelligence estimators will be advanced to general
officer rank. On the contrary, as experience in Vietnam has
repeatedly demonstrated, high rank is often associated with
poor estimating ability and loss of touch with reality. If
NIO positions are stafied with general officers, the latter will
have to depend on their staff assistants for credible esti-
mates. However, the system as envisaged will enable the NIO
to go outside CIA for expertise and advice, thus playing
specialists from one government agency (or industry) against
each other in an adversary process of arriving at balanced
estimates. It will also enable the NIO to let contracts for the
study of certain problems to academia.^^"

The other satellite attached to the Office of the Director of Central
Intelligence is the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, succes-
sor to the National Intelligence Resources Board created in 1968 by
CIA Director Richard Helms. Both units were designed to assist in
the coordination and management of the intelligence community's
budget. While the old Board consisted of the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency and the Director of the State Department's
Bureau of Intelligence and Research with the Deputy Director of
CIA as chairman, the new Committee, established during President
Nixon's 1971 intelligence reorganization to advise "the DCI on the
preparation of a consolidated intelligence program budget," added
a senior representative from the Office of Management and Budget to
the group and designated the CIA Director, acting in his capacity
as coordinator of national intelligence, as chairman.

Another panel which might be mentioned at this juncture is the
United States Intelligence Board. Established in 1960 by a classified
National Security Council Intelligence Directive, the Board is the
successor to the Intelligence Advisory Committee created in 1950 as
an interdepartmental coordinating forum chaired by the CIA Direc-
tor and counting representatives from the armed services intelligence
units, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and the Atomic Energy Commission as members. The Conmiittee and
its successor function (ed) as a "board of directors" for the intelligence
community. At present, USIB reportedly assists and advises the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence with respect to the issuance of National
Intelligence Estimates; setting intelligence collection requirements,
priorities, and objectives; coordinating intelligence community esti-
mates of future events and of enemy strengths ; controlling the classi-
fication and security systems for most of the Federal Government and
protecting intelligence sources and methods; directing research in
various fields of technical intelliarence ; and deciding what information
is to be shared with the intelligence services of allied or friendly
nations."^ The Board consists of a representative from the State

"* Rlar^kstnck. np. cit.. p. 239.

"^ Marchetti and Marks, op. cit., pp. 81-S4.

260

Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Eesearch, the National Secu-
rity Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Energy Re-
search and Development Administration (successor to the Atomic
Energy Commission on nuclear intelligence matters) , and the Deputy
Director of CIA. The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
was included in 1961 and three years later the status of the armed
services representatives — the Army, Navy, and Air Force having been
represented on the original Board — was downgraded from member to
observer, on the grounds that the Defense Intelligence Agency mem-
ber represented all of them. In the 1971 intelligence community reor-
ganization announced by President Nixon, a Treasury Department
representative was added to USIB.

Meeting approximately once a week, the Board's agenda and min-
utes are classified; when the panel goes into executive session, all
staff members are excluded from the proceedings. USIB is supported
by an interdepartmental committee structure which "encompasses
every aspect of the nation's foreign intelligence requirements, ranging
from the methods of collection to all areas of research." ^^^ While these
standing committees have numbered as many as 15,^^^ a recent dis-
closure indicates a reduction to 11 units in mid-1975.^^*

The other components of the Office of the Director include
those traditionally found in governmental bureaucracies:
press officers, congressional liaison, legal counsel, and so on.
Only two merit special note: the Cable Secretariat and the
Historical Staff. The former was established in 1950 at the
insistence of the Director, General Walter Bedell Smith.
When Smith, an experienced military staff officer, learned
that agency communications, especially those between head-
quarters and the covert field stations and bases, were con-
trolled by the Clandestine Services, he immediately demanded
a change in the system. "The operators are not going to decide
what secret information I will see or not see," he is reported
to have said. Thus, the Cable Secretariat, or message center,
was put under the Director's immediate authority. Since then,
however, the operators have found other ways, when it is
thought necessary, of keeping their most sensitive communi-
cations from going outside the Clandestine Services.

The Historical Staff represents one of the CIA's more
clever attempts to maintain the secrecy on which the organi-
zation thrives. Several years ago the agency began to invite
retiring officers to spend an additional year or two with the
agency — on contract, at reirnlar pay — writing their official
memoirs. The product of their effort is, of course, highly clas-
sified and tightly restricted. In the agency's eyes, this is far
better than having former officers openly publish what really
happened during their careers with the CIA.^^^

^ Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p. 39.
^ Marrhetti and Marks, op. cU., p. 81.

*" U.S. Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States. Report to the
President. Washingrton. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975, p. 70.
^ Marchetti and Marks, op. cit., p. 70.

261

Outside of the Office of the Director, the Agency is organized into
four functional directorates: Operations, Management and Sendees,
Science and Technoloir}% and intelligence. The first of these — the
Directorate of Operations — is the clandestine services unit, reportedly
consisting of about 6,000 professionals and clerks in a rough two to one
ratio with approximately 45 percent of this workforce stationed over-
seas (the "vast majority" in cover positions). ^^^ Composed of some
fifteen components, the Directorate has most of its personnel ("about
4,800 people") within the so-called area divisions which correspond
to the State Department's geographic bureau arrangement.

The largest area division is the Far East (with about 1,500
people) followed in order of descending size by Europe
(Western Europe only). Western Hemisphere (Latin Amer-
ica plus Canada), Xear East, Soviet Bloc (Eastern Europe),
and Africa (with only 300 staff). The chain of command goes
from the head of the Clandestine Services to the chiefs of the
area divisions, then overseas to the chiefs of stations (COS)
and their chiefs of bases (COB).^^''

There is also a Domestic Operations Division which "is, in essence,
an area division, but it conducts its mysterious clandestine activities
in the United States, not overseas." ^^^

Grouped with the area divisions, the Special Operations Division's
"main function is to provide the assets for paramilitary operations,
largely the contracted manpower (mercenaries or military men on
loan), the materiel, and the expertise to get the job done." ^^^

Apart from the area divisions are three staffs within the Directorate
of Operations: "Foreign Intelligence (espionage). Counterintelli-
gence (counterespionage), and Covert Action, which oversee opera-
tional policy in their respective specialties and provide assistance to
the area divisions and the field elements." -®*'

The remaining three components of the Clandestine Serv-
ices provide technical assistance to the operational compo-
nents. These three are : the Missions and Programs Staff,
which does much of the bureaucratic planning and budgeting
for the Clandestine Services which writes up the justification
for covert operations submitted for approval to the 40 Com-
mittee ; the Operational Services Division, which among other
things sets up cover arrangements for clandestine officers;
and the Technical Services Division, which produces in its
own laboratories the gimmicks of the spy trade — the dis-
guises, miniature cameras, tape recorders, secret writing kits,
and the like.^®^
The Directorate of Management and Services, formerly the Direc-
torate of Support, is the Agency's administrative and housekeeping

""Ibid.

'" Il>i(l., p. 71.

**7bt<f., p. 72; certain of these "mysterious clandestine activities" have been
revealed in U.S. Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, op. dt.,
pp. 20»-225.

""Marchetti and Marks, loc. cit.

'^nid.

»" Ibid., p. 73.

262

component but, accordino; to one former insider, "most of its budget
and personnel is devoted to assistina: the Clandestine Services in car-
rying out covert operations," contributing "in such areas as commu-
nications, logistics, and training." 2^2 Within the Directorate :

The Office of Security provides physical protection for
clandestine installations at home and abroad and conducts
polygraph (lie detector) tests for all CIA employees and
contract personnel and most foreign agents. The Office of
Medical Services heals the sicknesses and illnesses (both men-
tal and physical) of CIA personnel by providing "cleared"
psychiatrists and physicians to treat agency officers; analyzes
prospective and already recruited agents ; and prepares "psy-
chological profiles" of foreign leaders (and onc€, in 1971, at ■
the request of the Watergate "plumbers," did a "profile" of
Daniel Ellsberg). The Office of Logistics operates the agen-
cy's weapons and other warehouses in the United States and
overseas, supplies normal office equipment and household fur-
niture, as well as the more esoteric clandestine materiel to
foreign stations and bases, and performs other housekeeping
chores. The Office of Communications, employing over 40
percent of the Directorate of Management and Services'
more than 5,000 career employees, maintains facilities for
secret communications between CIA headquarters and the
hundreds of stations and bases overseas. It also provides the
same services, on a reimbursable basis, for the State Depart-
ment and most of its embassies and consulates. The Office of
Training operates the agency's training facilities at many
locations around the United States, and a few overseas. . . .
The Office of Personnel handles the recruitment and record-
keeping for the CIA's career personnel.^^^

The Directorate of Intelligence, counting some 3,500 employees, is
concerned with the generation of finished intelligence products and
the provision of certain services of common concern for the benefit
of the entire intelligence community.^°* The Directorate's principal
units include an Operations Center (management and coordination),
a secretariat for the United States Intelligence Board which the CIA
Director chairs, an Intelligence Requirements Service (collection
and needs) , a Central Reference Service, a Foreign Broadcast Infor-
mation Service (a world-wide radio t-ele vision monitoring system),
an Office of Operations, an Office of Current Intelligence (daily
developments) , an Office of Strategic Research (long-range planning) ,
an Office of Economic Research, an Office of Basic and Geographical
Research, an Imagery Analysis Service (photographic analysis), and
a National Photographic Interpretation Center (run in cooperation
with the Defense Department for analyzing photographs taken from
satellites and high altitude spy planes) .

The fourth and newest of the Agency's directorates. Science and
Technology, employs about 1,300 people in carrying out basic research

*«/&f(f., pp. 73-74.
^lUd., p. 75.

263

and development functions, the operation of spy satellites, and intel-
ligence analysis in highly technical fields. Composed of an Office
of Scientific Intelligence, an Office of Special Activities, an Office of
Research and Development, an Office of Electronics, an Office of
Special Projects, an Office of Computer Services, and a Foreign
Missiles and Space Activities Center, the Directorate has been credited
with a leadership role in the development of the U-2 and SR-71 spy
planes and "several brilliant breakthroughs in the intelligence-satellite
field." ^^^ In the areas of behavior-influencing drug and communica-
tions intercept systems development, the Directorate experienced a
certain amount of controversy with regard to testing these entities
within the domestic United States.^®®

Beyond this structuring of the Central Intelligence Agency there
have been a variety of unofficial affiliates in the service of the CIA —
front groups, proprietary organizations, and well established social,
economic, and political institutions which received Agency funds for
assistance they provided or secretly transmitted such money to a
third party for services rendered, at least until these practices were
made public.

The CIA's best-known proprietaries were Radio Free Europe
and Radio Liberty, both established in the early 1950s. The
corporate structures of these two stations served as some-
thing of a prototype for other agency proprietaries. Each
functioned under the cover provided by a board of directors
made up of prominent Americans, who in the case of RFE
incorporated as the National Committee for a Free Europe
and in the case of RL as the American Committee for Libera-
tion. But CIA officers in the key management positions at the
stations made all the important decisions regarding the pro-
gramming and operations of the stations.^®^

Other CIA "businesses" which became apparent in the 1960s were
the Agency's airlines — Air America, Air Asia, Civil Air Transport,
Intermountain Aviation, and Southern Air Transport — and certain
holding companies involved with these airlines or the Bay of Pigs
effort, such as the Pacific Corporation and the Double-Chek Corpora-
tion.^''^ Then, in early 1967, the disclosure was made that the CIA had,
for fifteen years, subsidized the nation's largest student organiza-
tion, the National Student Association.^*^^ This revelation heightened
press interest in CIA fronts and conduits. Eventually it became known
that the Agency channeled money directly or indirectly into a panoply
of business, labor, and church groups, the universities, charitable
organizations, and educational and cultural groups, including : ^'°

African American Institute

^ Ibid., pp. 76-77.

"* See U.S. Commission or CIA Activities Within the United States, op. cit.,
pp. 225-232.

'" Ibid., pp. 134-135.

*" Ibid., pp. 135, 137.

"* See Sol Stern. A Short Account of International Student Politics & the
Gold War with Particular Reference to the XSA, CIA, Etc. Ramparts, v. 5,
March, 1967 : 29-38.

^"'This list is drawn from Wise and Ross, op. cit., pp. 247n-248n.

264

American Council for International Commission of Jurists
American Federation of State, County and Municipal

Employees
American Friends of the Middle East
American Newspaper Guild
American Society of African Culture
Asia Foundation

Association of Hungarian Students in North America
Committee for Self-Determination
Committee of Correspondence
Committee on International Relations
Fund for International Social and Economic Education
Independent Research Service
Institute of International Labor Research
International Development Foundation
International Marketing Institute
National Council of Churches
National Education Association
National Student Association
Paderewski Foundation

Pan American Foundation (University of Miami)
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers
Radio Free Europe
Radio Liberty

Synod of Bishops of the Russian Church Outside Russia
United States Youth Council
Andrew Hamilton Fund
Beacon Fund

Benjamin Rosenthal Foundation
Borden Trust
Broad-High Foundation
Catherwood Foundation
Chesapeake Foundation

David, Joseph and Winfield Baird Foundation
Dodge Foundation
Edsel Fund
Florence Foundation
Gotham Fund
Heights Fund
Independence Foundation
J. Frederick Brown Foundation
J. M. Kaplan Foundation
Jones-O'Donnell, Kentfield Fund
Littauer Foundation
Marshall Foundation
McGregor Fund
Michigan Fund
Monroe Fund
Norman Fund
Pappas Charitable Trust
Price Fund
Robert E. Smith Fund

265

San Miguel Fund

Sidney and Esther Rabb Charitable Foundation

Tower Fund

Vernon Fund

Warden Trust

WiUiford-Telford Fund

In addition to these domestically based entities, a number of foreign
beneficiaries of CIA funds were revealed as well. Probably others
have been disclosed which are not recorded here. Undoubtedly per-
sistent research and investigation will unearth additional entries for
this roster. However, to the extent that details regarding the organiza-
tion of the Central Intelligence Agency remain cloaked in secrecy,
the identity of the unofficial affiliates of the CIA will continue to be
elusive.

XII. Defense Intelligence

Since World War II, the intelligence organization of the Depart-
ment of Defense and the armed services has been subject to a variety
of changes which have sought to reduce the independence of the
nation's fighting forces by unifying their administration with a view
toward promoting a more effective use of resources. This effort began
in a grand manner with the creation of the National Military Estab-
lishment and the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 1947 (61 Stat.
495) and the institution of the Department of Defense two years later
(63 Stat. 578). Intelligence was but one common defense function
which was greeted by the unification trend.

At the end of World War II the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to
continue the Joint Intelligence Committee created in 1942 as a coor-
dinating mechanism. With the demise of the Office of Strategic Serv-
ices in 1945, the Joint Chiefs created the Joint Intelligence Group
(sometimes referred to as J-2) within its Joint Staff authorized by
the National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 505). In 1961 the Joint
Intelligence Group was supplanted by the newly created Defense In-
telligence Agency which assumed the role of principal coordinator
for intelligence matters among the armed services.

Until 1961, coordination with the civilian side of the De-
partment of Defense was maintained through the Defense
Secretary's Assistant for Special Operations, who served as
principal aide to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary on all
matters pertaining to the national intelligence effort. The
office of Assistant for Special Operations rather suddenly
disappeared in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs disaster in
1961. Another arrangement, never publicized, was made for a
special assistant to the Defense Secretary to supervise these
activities. He represented the Secretary on special interde-
partmental intelligence boards and committees."^

Intelligence coordination matters were given a significant impetus
in 1972 when an Assistant Secretaryship was created to supervise
"Defense intelligence programs through the entire management cycle,
from initial research and development through programming, budget-

"^ Ransom, op. cit., p. 102.

266

ing, and the final process of follow-up evaluation . . . [and to pro-
vide] the principal point for management and policy coordination
with the Director of Central Intelligence, the CIA, and other intelli-
gence officials and agencies outside the Department of Defense," ^^^

The new Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) also has
management overview responsibilities with regard to the Defense In-
telligence Agency and the National Security Administration in terms
of coordinating their programs with those of the other Defense De-
partment intelligence functionaries. Established by a departmental
directive (DoD 5105.21) dated August 1, 1961, the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency is responsible for :

(1) the organization, direction, management, and control
of all Department of Defense intelligence resources assigned
to or included within the DIA ;

(2) review and coordination of those Department of De-
fense intelligence functions retained by or assigned to the
military departments. Over-all guidance for the conduct and
management of such functions will be developed by the Di-
rector, DIA, for review, approval, and promulgation by the
Secretary of Defense ;

(3) supervision of the execution of all approved plans,
programs policies, and procedures for intelligence functions
not assigned to DIA ;

(4) obtaining the maximum economy and efficiency in the
allocation and management of Department of Defense intelli-
gence resources. This includes analysis of those DOD intelli-
gence activities and facilities which can be fully integrated or
collected with non-DOD intelligence organizations ;

(5) responding directly to priority requests levied upon
the Defense Intelligence Agency by USIB [United States
Intelligence Board] ;

(6) satisfying the intelligence requirements of the major
components of the Department of Defense.

The Agency was a by-product of the post-Sputnik "missile gap"
controversy of the late 1950s. Faced with disparate estimates of
Soviet missile strength from each of the armed services which trans-
lated into what have been called self-serving budget requests for weap-
ons for defense, the United States Intelligence Board created a Joint
Study Group in 1959 to study the intelligence producing agencies. In
1960 this panel returned various recommendations, among which were
proposals for the consignment of the defense departments to observer,
rather than member, status on the Intelligence Board and the creation
of a coordinating Defense Intelligence Agency which would represent
the armed services as a member of USIB. Defense Secretary Robert
McNamara adopted these proposals.

The Director of DIA functions as the principal intelligence staff
officer to both the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
reporting to the Secretary through the Joint Chiefs. The Direct<)r is

^"U.S. Department of Defense. National Security Strategy of Realistic
Deterrence: Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird's Annual Defense Department
Report FY 1973. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972, pp. 134-135.

267

also commander of the Defense attache system and chairman of the
weekly meetings of the Military Intelligence Board, composed of the
chiefs of the four armed services. In addition to a General Counsel
office, an Inspector General unit, and a Scientific Advisory Commit-
tee, the Defense Intelligence Agency presently consists of the follow-
ing components which i-espond directly to the Director/Deputy Di-
rector leadership : Chief of Staff/Deputy for Management and Plans
(policy development and coordination, plans, operations management
and formulation of requirements for functional management systems) ,
Deputy Director for Intelligence (including responsibility for all-
source finished military intelligence but not scientific and technical
intelligence, maintenance of target systems and physical vulnerability
research, military capabilities, and current intelligence assessments,
reporting, and warning) , Deputy Director for Collection, Deputy Di-
rector for Scientific and Technical Intelligence, Deputy Director for
Estimates, Deputy Director for Attache and Human Resources, Dep-
uty Director for Support (support activities and administrative serv-
ices), Deputy Director for Information Systems (intelligence infor-
mation and telecommunications systems). Deputy Director for Per-
sonnel, Comptroller, and the Defense Intelligence School created in
1962 and supervised by a commandant.^"^

The National Security Agency, an independently organized entity
within the Department of Defense, is the product of efforts at unifying
and coordinating defense cryptologic and communications security
functions.

In the first postwar years, the cryptologic duties of the
American armed forces reposed in the separate agencies of
the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. The Army, at least,
charged its agency with maintaining "liaison with the De-
partment of the Navy, Department of the Air Force, and
other appropriate agencies, for the purpose of coordinating
communication security and communication intelligence
equipment and procedures." Presumably the Navy and the
Air Force units were similarly charged. This arrangement,
which relied on internal desire instead of external direction,
prolonged the abuses [once] hinted at by [General Douglas
Mac Arthurs World War II intelligence chief. Major General
Charles A.] Willoughby. To rectify them and achieve the
benefits of centralized control, the Defense Department in
1949 established the Armed Forces Security Agency. The
A.F.S.A. took over the strategic communications-intelligence
functions and the coordination responsibilities of the individ-
ual agencies. It left them with tactical communications in-
telligence, which can best be performed near the point of
combat and not at a central location (except for basic system
solutions), and with low-echelon communications security,
which differs radically in ground, sea, and air forces. Even
in these areas, A.F.S.A, backed them up. A.F.S.A. drew its
personnel from the separate departmental agencies, though

'"'Earlier organization models for the Defense Intelligence Agency may be
found in MacCloskey (1967), op. cit., pp. 92-93; Ransom (1970), op. cit., p. 105;
Kirkpatrick (1973), op. cit., pp. 40-41.

70-890 O - 76 - 18

268

it later hired separately, and housed itself in their build-
ings.^''*

The success of the unified approach to cryptology evidenced by the
operations of the Armed Forces Security Agency warranted an ex-
pansion of that institution to include cryptosystems outside of the
Defense Department, such as those maintained by State, Accordingly,
President Truman promulgated a classified directive creating the
National Security Agency on November 4, 1952, abolishing the Armed
Forces Security Agency, and transferring its assets and personnel to
the new successor. Such an aura of official secrecy surrounded NSA
that no acknowledgement of its existence appeared in the government
organization manuals until 1957 when a brief, but vague, description
was offered. In brief, according to one expert, NSA "creates and
supervises the cryptography of all U.S. Government agencies" and
"it interprets, traffic-analyzes, and cryptanalyzes the messages of all
other nations, friend as well as foe." ^^^ It is the American Black
Chamber reincarnated with the most highly sophisticated technology
available, an estimated staff of 20,000 employees at its home base
(Fort Meade, Maryland) with between 50,000 to 100,000 persons in
its service overseas, and an annual budget thought to range between
$1 and $1.2 billion.^^^

According to best estimates, the National Security Agency is orga-
nized into three operating divisions — the Office of Production (code
and cipher breaking), the Office of Communications Security (code
and cipher production), and the Office of Research and Development
(digital computing and radio propagation research, cryptanalysis, and
development of communications equipment) — and supporting units
for recruiting and hiring, training, and the maintenance of both physi-
cal and personnel security.^^^

In November, 1971, President Nixon directed certain changes in the
organization of the intelligence community, among them the creation
of a "National Cryptologic Command" under the Director of the Na-
tional Security Agency.-^^ The result of this announcement was the
organization of the Central Security Service, comprised of the Army
Security Agency, the Naval Security Group, and the U.S. Air Force
Security Service with the NSA Director concurrently serving as the
Chief/CSS. Apparently established to consolidate the crvptanalytic
activities of the armed services, the official purpose of CSS, as stated
in the FY 1973 Annual Defense Department Report to Congress, is to

provide a unified, more economical, and more effective struc-
ture for executing cryptologic and related electronic opera-
tions previously conducted under the Military Departments.
The Military Departments will retain administrative and lo-

"*K9hn, op. cit., pp. 379-380.

"^ lUd., pp. 380-381.

"'Dousrlas Wafson. NSA: America's Vacuum Cleaner of Intelligence. Wash-
ington Post, March 2, 1975 : Al.

^" Kahn, op. cit., pp. 385-388 ; Ransom, op cit., pp. 130-132 ; Wise and Ross, op.
cit. p. 210.

"' See Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, v. 7, November 8, 1971 :
1482.

269

gistic support responsibilities for the military units involved,
but these units will be managed and controlled by the CSS."**

The 1971 intelligence community reorganization also called for the
consolidation of all Defense Department personnel security investiga-
tions into a single Office of Defense Investigations. From this man-
date a departmental directive (DoD 5105.42) dated April 18, 1972,
was issued chartering the Defense Investigative Service. Operational
as of October 1 of that year, the Service consists of a Director, a head-
quarters establishment, fourteen district offices and various subordinate
field offices and resident agencies throughout the United States and
Puerto Rico. The Service examines allegations of criminal and/or
subversive behavior attributed to potential and actual Defense De-
partment employees holding sensitive positions.

The 1971 reorganization "also directed that a Defense Map Agency
be created by combining the now separate mapping, charting, and
geodetic organizations of the military services in order to achieve
maximum efficiency and economy in production." The result of this
mandate was the establishment of the Defense Mapping Agency on
January 1, 1972, under the provisions of the National Security Act
of 1947, as amended, with a Director responsible to the Secretary of
Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In the afteiTnath of these unification efforts within the defense
establishment, each of the armed services continues to maintain an
intelligence organization and their departments control their own
intelligence production activities, particularly tactical or combat
intelligence affecting their operations (cryptological, mapping, and
pertinent personnel security investigation functions having been con-
solidated for administration as discussed above).

An Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2) has continued
with the Army General Staff since World War 11. This officer super-
vised the Army Intelligence Corps, which included both collection and
analysis functions, and the Army Security Agency, established Sep-
tember 15, 1945 to execute cryptologic duties. In June, 1962, a major
reorganization of Army intelligence operations brought about the
merger of these two units into the Army Intelligence and Security
Branch.

Prior to January 1, 1965, the Military District of Washing-
ton and each of the six Armies within the United States were
responsible for counterintelligence activities throughout
their geographic areas, and controlled an Intelligence Corps
Group which carried on these activities. On January 1, 1965,
the seven Intelligence Corps Groups were consolidated into
a new major command — U.S. Army Intelligence Corps Com-
mand. About two months later it was redesignated the U.S.
Army Intelligence Command.^®"

This Command, located at Fort Holabird, Maryland, continues to
function as a primary Army intelligence entity under G-2. The Army
Security Agency appears to have less direct intelligence production

^ U.S. Department of Defense. National Security of Realistic Deterencc. . . . ,
op. Git., p. 135.

"*" MacOloskey, op. (M., p. 100.

270

significance for G-2 in the aftermath of the 1971 reorganization when
it was placed under the control of the Chief of the Central Security
Service. Other Army agencies, such as the Army Transportation
Corps, are capable of contributing an intelligence product should
G-2 consult them regarding some aspect of their expertise. During the
Army's most recent major commitment of forces in Southeast Asia, a
combined intelligence organization was maintained in Vietnam. This
structure was headed by an Assistant Chief of StafP, Military Assist-
ance Command/ Vietnam (J-2) who was responsible for exercising
general staff supervision over all Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine
Corps intelligence activities as well as serving as Assistant Chief of
Staff for Intelligence (G-2) to General William Westmoreland, Com-
manding General, U.S. Army/Vietnam.^*^

The Office of Naval Intelligence is currently called the Naval In-
telligence Command and continues to report to the Chief of Naval Op-
erations through the Command Support Programs Office.

The field organization for carrying out ONI's missions
has three major components: (1) Naval District Intelligence
officers, under the management control of ONI and operat-
ing in the United States and certain outlying areas; (2)
intelligence organizations with the forces afloat, which are
directly under unit commanders with over-all ONI super-
vision; and (3) naval attache's functioning under ONI direc-
tion as well as State Department and Defense Intelligence
Agency supervisions.

District intelligence officers operate primarily in counter-
intelligence and security fields. The District Intelligence Of-
fice (DIO) is directly responsible to the Naval District Com-
mandant, with additional duty in some areas on the staff of
the commander of the sea frontier of his district. Civilian
agents usually are assigned to the district intelligence officers
along with naval intelligence officers, and the former con-
duct security and major criminal investigations involving
naval personnel or material.

With the forces afloat or in overseas bases, flag officers in
command of each area, fleet, or task force have staff intelli-
gence sections functioning primarily in the operational or
tactical intelligence field. The intelligence officer who heads
this staff section works not only for the unit commander,
but also performs some collection missions for ONI.

Naval attaches, trained by ONI in intelligence and lan-
guages, collect naval intelligence for ONI as well as serve
the diplomatic chief at the post to which they are assigned.^*^

While ONI serves certain of its intelligence needs, the Marine Corps
"maintains a small intelligence staff in its headquarters, and intelli-
gence officers are billeted throughout the corps" and these personnel

'^ See U.S. Department of the Army. Vietnam Studies: The Role of Military
Intelligence, 1965-1967 by Major General Joseph A McChristian. Washington
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974, pp. 4-6, 8, 11, 13-20, 24, 27-28. 41^2, 47-57, 71-78,
148. and 157.

^ Ransom, op. cit., pp. 119-120.

271

"are concerned primarily with tactical, or operational, rather than
national intelligence." ^®^

Transferred to the Navy Department for wartime service in 1941
(E.O. 8929), the Coast Guard was returned to the Treasury Depart-
ment in 1946 (E.O. 9666) and has maintained a very small intelli-
gence unit "mainly concerned with port security, keeping subversive
elements out of the Merchant Marine and off the waterfronts, enforc-
ing Coast Guard laws and insuring the internal security of the Coast
Guard." -«*

A\Tien the United States Air Force became a separate service apart
from the Army in 1947, a general staff directorate — called the Air
Staff — was instituted with an Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
(ACS/I and sometimes still unofficially referred to as A-2). This offi-
cer supervises an immediate office organized into a Special Advisory
Group (a "brains trust" designed to keep the ASC/I abreast of sci-
entific, technical, and strategic matters of prime concern to the air
arm), a data-handling systems group, a policy and programs unit, a
resources management component, a collection directorate, and a stra-
tegic estimates directorate. The ASC/I has also held staff supervision
authority of the USAF Security Service (personnel and physical
security) and the Aeronautical Chart and Information Center (aero-
nautical charts, graphic air target materials, flight information publi-
cations and documents, terrain models, maps, evaluated intelligence
on air facilities, geodetic and geophysical data, and related carto-
graphic services) . Overseas attaches are administered through the col-
lection directorate which at one time included a Reconnaissance Divi-
sion, acknowledged to be "charged with overseeing the development of
the latest 'spy-in-the-sky' equipment, some of it exotic." -^^ This entity
may have been displaced by the National Reconnaissance Office, an Air
Force intelligence agency only recently disclosed to exist, which re-
portedly operates satellite intelligence programs for the entire intel-
ligence community on a budget estimated at more than $1.5 billion a
year.^^^

XIII. State Department

The formal intelligence organization of the Department of State
began with the liquidation of the Office of Strategic Services.

By an Executive order [E.O. 9621] of September 20, 1945,
President Truman terminated the Office of Strategic Serv-
ices and transferred its research and analysis branch and
presentation branch to an Interim Research and Intelligence
Service in the Department of State. At the same time there
was established the position of Special Assistant to the Secre-
tary of State in charge of Research and Intelligence. Acting
Secretary [Dean] Acheson announced on September 27 the
appointment of Colonel Alfred McCormack, Director of Mili-
tary Intelligence in the War Department, as Special Assistant
to set up the new agency.

=*" Ihid., p. 119.

'*" Ottenberg, op. cit., p. 138.

=^ Ransom, op oit., pp. 123-125 ; also See MacCloskey, op. cit., pp. 102-103.

"• Marchetti and Marks, op. cit., p. 90.

272

Colonel McCormack explained the work of the Depart-
ment's agency as mainly a research program. "The intelli-
gence needed by the State Department" he declared, "is pri-
marily information on the political and economic factors op-
erating in other countries of the world, and on the potential
effect of those factors in relations with this Government." He
estimated that approximately 1,600 OSS personnel were
transferred to State, a number soon reduced by about 50 per-
cent. Two offices were created, an Office of Research and
Intelligence under Dr. Sherman Kent, with five geographical
intelligence divisions corresponding roughly to the Depart-
ment's geographic organization, and the Office of Intelli-
gence Collection and Dissemination under Colonel George R.
Fearing, who had served with distinction as an intelligence
officer with the army. Colonel McCormack indicated that
most of the work would be done in Washington, but that
from fifty to seventy-five representatives with special train-
ing would be attached to embassies overseas to do particular
types of work. As examples of the work done. Colonel Mc-
Cormack cited the report made on the transportation system
of North Africa, which was invaluable to the American forces
of invasion, and a study of the industrial organization and
capacity of Germany.

Once created, the intelligence program underwent a series
of revisions and modifications. For example, established as
a self-sufficient intelligence unit on a geographic basis, the
service was changed in April, 1946, in accordance with the so-
called Russell Plan, so that the geographic intelligence func-
tions were transferred to the political offices, thereby limiting
the functions of the Office of Intelligence and Research to
matters which cut across geographic lines. At the same time
an Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison was estab-
lished to formulate, in consultation with the geographic and
economic offices, a Departmental program for basic research.
The day after the Departmental regulations making this radi-
cal change were issued. Colonel McCormack resigned on the
ground that he regarded the new organization as unworkable
and unsound and felt that it would make impossible the es-
tablishment of a real intelligence unit within the Depart-
ment. On February 6, 1947, the original type of organization
was reinstituted when the Office of Intelligence and Liaison
was changed to the Office of Intelligence Research and the
geographical divisions were restored to its jurisdiction.^*^

While a variety of reorganizations have shaped the unit during the
succeeding years, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which the
component has been designated since 1957, is the principal intelligence
agency of the State Department. This status, however, should be quali-
fied : the State Department does not engage in intelligence collection
other than the normal reporting from diplomatic posts in foreign coun-
tries, though it has provided cover for CIA staff attached to U.S. diplo-

'^ Stuart, op. cit., pp. 429-430.

273

matic posts. As one authority has commented : "The Department of
State since World War II serves as a minor producer and major con-
sumer within the new intelligence community."^*^

Holding: status equivalent to that of an Assistant Secretary, the Di-
rector of the Bureau functions as senior intelligence adviser to the Sec-
retary of State, departmental representative on the U.S. Intelligence
Board, and chief of the intelligence staff at State. Recently reorganized
in 1975, the Bureau is composed of two directorates and three support-
ing oflEices. These are :

The Directorate for Research, organized into five regional
units (Africa, American Republics, East Asia and Pacific,
Europe and the Soviet Union, Near East and South Asia),
three functional components (Economic Research and Analy-
sis, Strategic Affairs, Political/Military and Theater Forces) ,
and the Office of the Geographer. The Direx^torate is respon-
sible for finished intelligence products ;

The Directorate for Coordination, consisting of an Office
of Intelligence Liaison, Office of Operations Policy, and Office
of Resources Policy, conducts liaison and clearances with
other agencies of the Federal government on matters of de-
partmental intelligence interest, activity, policy impact, and
resource allocation ;

The Office of the Executive Director, a support unit respon-
sible for administrative functions.

The Office of External Research another support entity
which encourages and contracts for non-governmental re-
search in the behavioral and social agencies; and

The Office of Communications and Information handling
which, in its support role, manages sensitive intelligence docu-
ments (security) and operates the Department's wateh center
for monitoring international crisis developments.^*^

XIV. President's Foreign InteUige7hce Advisory Board

Established as an impartial group of distinguished citizens who
would meet periodically to review the activities and operations of the
intelligence community, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board is officially mandated to :

(1) advise the President concerning the objectives, conduct,
management and coordination of the various activities mak-
ing up the overall national intelligence effort;

(2) conduct a continuing review and assessment of foreign
intelligence and related activities in which the Central In-
telligence Agency and other Government departments and
agencies are engaged ;

(3) receive, consider and take appropriate action with re-
spect to matters identified to the Board, by the Central Intel-
ligence Agency and other Government departments and
agencies of the intelligence community, in which the support

** Ransom, op. cit., p. 135.

** See U.S. Department of State. INK: Intelligence and Research in the Depart-
ment of State. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973, pp. 13-19.

274

of the Board will further the effectiveness of the national in-
telligence effort ; and

(4) report to the President concerning the Board's findings
and appraisals, and make appropriate recommendations for
actions to achieve increased effectiveness of the Government's
foreign intelligence effort in meeting national intelligence
needs.^^°

The current PFIAB is the successor to the President's Board of
Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities created (E.O. 10656)
in early 1956 out of a mixed motivation which sought to respond to a
recommendation of the (Hoover) Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of Government calling for "a committee of experi-
enced private citizens, who shall have the responsibility to examine
and report to [the President] periodically on the work of Government
foreign intelligence activities." '^^ The PBCFIA was also established
out of concern over congressional efforts then underway to institute a
joint committee on the CIA to carry out oversight duties with regard
to the intelligence community.^'^^

Composed of eight members, the Board of Consultants met a total
of nineteen times during its tenure under President Eisenhower, five
sessions being held with Chief Executive, and submitted over forty-
two major recommendations regarding the functioning of the intelli-
gence community. As a matter of formality, the panel submitted resig-
nations on January 7, 1961, in anticipation of the new Kennedy
Administration.

Inactive during the next four months, the unit was revitalized
(E.O. 10938) in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs fiasco and given
its present designation, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board. Provision was also made for the payment of compensation to
the PFIAB members, in addition to expenses incurred in connection
with the work of the panel. While President Johnson maintained the
Board under its 1961 mandate. President Nixon prescribed (E.O.
11460) specific functions for the group during his first year in office.
President Ford has continued the operations of the PFIAB under this
directive. The unit currently meets on the first Thursday and Friday
of every other month, is assisted by a small staff, and utilizes occa-
sional ad hoc committees or work groups to organize some aspects of
its work.

XV. Loyalty-Secui^ty

While domestic loyalty and security matters with regard to poten-
tial and actual Federal employees had been treated with concern dur-
ing World War II, investigations in pursuit of these ends became
more vigorous with the onset of the Cold War and the "Communist
menace" perceived in the late 1940s and 1950s.^^^ The signal for this

'^ E.O. 11460, March 20, 1969 (34 F.R. 5'35) .

^ See U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Govern-
ment. Intellig'^nce Activities: A Report to the Congress. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1955, pp. 1, 59-65, 71. [References also include the recommendations
of the Commission's Task Force on Intelligence Activities which are included in
the cited document.]

^^ Kirkpatrick, op. oit., pp. 34, 61 .

^ See Eleanor Bontecou. The Federal Loyalty-Security Program. Ithaca,
Cornell University Press, 1953, pp. 1-30.

275

heightened probing of public employee political sentiments, generally-
conducted by the Civil Service Commission's Bureau of Personnel
Investigations and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (some agen-
cies, such as the Atomic Energy Commission and the armed service
departments, had their own personnel investigative services), was
probably President Truman's March 21, 1947 directive (E.O. 9835)
establishing a government-wide loyalty-security program and an
organizational framework for its administration.

When President Truman issued his 1947 executive order
initiating the loyalty-security program for federal em-
ployees, he struck a new note in the expanded concept of exec-
utive powers. In all previous peacetime loyalty-testing ex-
perience. Congress rather than President had taken the lead.

Controversy greeted the order. Some critics condemned it
as totally unnecessary, others as needful but excessively rig-
orous, and still others as too mild. Truman may well have
headed off more stringent congressional action in this arena,
but [Former Interior Secretary Harold] Ickes insisted that
the order resulted from cabinet hysteria engendered by At-
torney General Tom C. Clark's pressures upon the President.
The listing of alleged subversive organizations, association
with which equated "disloyalty" for a federal official, by the
Attorney General has been one of the most fertile sources of
disagreement. Xever before in American history, even during
war crises, had the government officially established public
black lists for security purposes.

The vast literature supporting and condemning the execu-
tive loyalty order has searched deeply into complex and
contradictory aspects of contemporary^ American life, Ameri-
can liberals had long crusaded for the kind of executive initi-
ative that Truman exhibited, but exempted the field of civil
rights from governmental interference even in the cause of
security. Conservatives, who decried extensions of federal
functions, demanded that the security program increase in
rigor, scope, and effectiveness. Disagreement centers upon the
means the program used rather than the ends it sought. The
nation's servants, it seemed, could not have their positions and
at the same time enjoy traditional privileges of citizenship.^^*

In brief, the president's order required a loyalty investigation of
every individual entering Federal employment ; this inquire was to
be conducted by the Civil Service Commission in most cases ; sources
to be consulted in such a probe included FBI, Civil Service, armed
forces intelligence, and House Committee on Un-American Activities
Committees files as well as those of "any other appropriate govern-
ment investigative or intelligence agency," pertinent local law-enforce-
ment holdings, the applicant's school, college, and prior employment
records, and references given by the prospective employee. Depart-
ment and agency heads were responsible for removing disloyal em-
ployees and appointed loyalty boards composed of not less than three
representatives from their unit to hear loyalty cases. A Loyalty Re-

'^ Harold M. Hyman. To Try Men's Souls: Loyalty Tests in American History.
Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1959, p. 334.

276

view Board within the Civil Service Commission examined cases
where an employee was being dismissed from the Federal government
for reason of disloyalty.

Activities and associations of an applicant or employee which might
be considered in connection with the determination of disloyalty in-
clude one or more of the following :

a. Sabotage, espionage, or attempts or preparations there-
for, or knowingly associating with spies or saboteurs ;

b. Treason or sedition or advocacy thereof ;

c. Advocacy of revolution or force or violence to alter the
constitutional form of government of the United States;

d. Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person,
under circumstances which may indicate disloyalty to the
United States, of documents or information of a confidential
or non-public character obtained by the pei-son making the
disclosure as a result of his employment by the Government
of the United States ;

e. Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or
otherwise acting so as to serve the interests of another gov-
ment in preference to the interests of the United States;

f. Membership in, affiliation with or sympathetic associa-
tion with any foreign or domestic organization, association,
movement, group or combination of persons, designated by
the Attorney General as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or
subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or ap-
proving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny
other persons their rights under the Constitution of the
United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government
of the United States by unconstitutional means.^^^

l^^ile the program raised a variety of questions regarding the civil
rights of Federal employees, it also generated a cache of information
of intelligence interest (but of questionable quality).

The loyalty-testing problem remained to face Republican
President Dwight Eisenhower. Soon after he assumed office,
Eisenhower modified the loyalty-testing program. His 1953
directive [E.O. 10450] decentralized the security apparatus
to the agency level and altered the criteria for dismissal to
include categories of security risks — homosexuals, alcoholics,
persons undergoing psychiatric treatment — without refer-
ence to subversion. But security risk and disloyalty had al-
ready become a fixed duo in the public mind. The Eisenhower
modification [which eliminated the Loyalty Review Board]
did not basically alter the loyalty -testing structure.

Other executive orders and legislative requirements have
extended loyalty-security processes to passport applicants,
port employees, industrial workers, American officials in the
United Nations, recipients of government research grants,
and scientists engaged in official research and development
programs. The military services and the Atomic Energy Com-
mission [recently dissolved to form the Energy Research

«» See 12 F.R. 1935.

277

and Development Administration and the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission] conduct their own clearance procedures.
The American national government, in short, has been in-
volved in an unending, [almost two] dozen-year-long search
for subversives. How effective this drive has been no one has
yet satisfactorily proved.'^°

The Civil Service Commission continues to conduct most of these
investigations for the majority of Federal agencies; the Defense In-
vestigative Service performs the personnel clearance function for De-
fense Department employees and may provide assistance to other en-
tities in these matters at the direction of the Secretary of Defense.

XVI. Watergate

In the early morning hours of June 17, 1972, Washington, D.C.,
Metropolitan Police, responding to a request for assistance from a
security guard, apprehended and arrested five men who had illegally
entered the headquarters suite of the Democratic National Committee
located in the Watergate Hotel complex. Approximately three months
later these individuals, and two others who had escaped detection at
the arrest scene, were indicted. These were, as is now known, burglars
with an intelligence mission, authorized by some of the most powerful
officials in the Federal government. Inquiries into this incident by law
enforcement and congressional investigators subsequently revealed a
most unusual and legally questionable intelligence organization.^®^

^ Hyman, op. eit., pp. 335-356.

^"^ The major congressional investigators of Watergate matters were the Senate
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities and the House Judiciary
Committee. The most useful materials produced by these panels regarding orga-
nizational considerations were :

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities.
The Final Report of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. (93rd Congress, 2d Session. Senate.
Report No. 93-981) ;

. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Statement of Information: White

House Surveillance Activities (Book VII). Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1974.

. . . Statement of Information: Internal Revenue Service

(Book VIII). Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974.

. . . Testimony of Witnesses. Hearings, 93rd Congress, 2d

Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974.

Other relevant published congressional materials generated by other committees
include the following :

U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, Investigation
of the Special Service Staff of the Internal Revenue Service. Committee print,
94th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975.

. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. CIA Foreign and Domestic

Activities. Hearings, 94th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1975.

. . . Dr. Kissinger's Role in Wiretapping. Hearings, 93rd

Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974.

— ^ . . . Report on the Inquiry Concerning Dr. Kissinger's Role

in Wiretapping, 1969-1971. Committee print, 93rd Congress, 2d session. Wash-
ington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974.

. . Committee on the Judiciary. Electronic Surveillance for Na-
tional Security Purposes. Hearings, 93rd Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S.
Govt. Print. Off, 1974.

(Continued)

278

Sometime in 1970, the White House, concerned, in part, about in-
creasing domestic protests and acts of violence as well as recent leak-
ages of national security information embarrassing to the Admin-
istration, produced a top secret study entitled "Operational Restraints
on Intelligence Collection." Authored by Tom Charles Huston, assist-
ant counsel to the President and White House project officer on
security programs, this paper (commonly referred to as the "Huston
Plan") suggested techniques for making domestic intelligence opera-
tions, more effective, perhaps to curtail violent protests or to identify
those responsible for or otherwise trafficking in leaked national secu-
rity materials. Among the recommendations offered in the document
were increased use of electronic surveillances and penetrations ("exist-
ing coverage is grossly inadequate"), mail coverage, and surreptitious
entries (break-ins) . Huston was quite candid about the implications of
these undertakings, saying :

Covert [mail] coverage is illegal and there are serious risks
involved. However, the advantages to be derived from its use
outweigh the risks. This technique is particularly valuable
in identifying espionage agents and other contacts of foreign
intelligence services.

And with regard to break-ins :

Use of this technique is clearly illegal : it amounts to burglary.
It is also highly risky and could result in great embarrass-
ment if exposed. However, it is also the most fruitful tool
and can produce the type of intelligence which cannot be ob-
tained in any other fashion.^^^

When his report was completed, Huston, apparently forwarded it
for scrutiny by the President.

On July 14, 1970, [White House Chief of Staff H. R.]
Haldeman sent a top secret memorandum to Huston, notify-
ing him of the President's approval of the use of burglaries,

(Continued)

. . . Political Intelligence in the Internal Revenue Service:

The Speoixil Service Staff. Committee print, 93rd Congress, 2d session. Washing-
ton, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974.

■ . . . and the Committee on Foreign Relations. Warrantless

Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance — 1974. Hearings, 93rd Congress, 2d ses-
sion. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974.

. . . Warrantless Wiretapping and Electronic Surveilla/nce:

Report. Committee print, 94th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1975.

. House. Committee on Armed Services. Inquiry into the Alleged Involve-
ment of the Central InteUigenx;e Agenoy in the Watergate and Ellsberg Matters.
Hearings, 94th Congress, 1st session. Washington. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974.

. . . Inquiry into the Alleged Involvement of the Central

Intelligence Agency in the Watergate and Ellsberg Matters: Report. Committee
print, 93rd Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973.

. . Committee on the Judiciary. Wiretapping and Electronic Sur-
veillance. Hearings, 93rd Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1974.

^The Huston Plan continues to be a highly classified document; quotations
utilized here are extracted from sanitized segments of the paper appearing in
U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Presidential Camnaien Activities.
Presidential Campaign Activities of 1972: Watergate and Related Activities
(Book 3). Hearings, 93rd Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off.. 1973, pp. 1319-1324.

279

illegal wiretaps and illegal mail covers for domestic intelli-
gence. In the memorandum, Haldeman stated :

The recommendations you have proposed as a result of
the review, have been approved by the President. He does
not, however, want to follow the procedure you outlined
on page 4 of your memorandum regarding implementa-
tion. He would prefer that the thing siinply he put into
motion on the basis of this approval. The formal official
memorandum should, of course, be prepared and that
should be the device by which to carry it out. . . . [em-
phasis added]
It appears that the next day, July 15, 1970, Huston pre-
pared a decision memorandum, based on the President's ap-
proval, for distribution to the Federal intelligence agencies
involved in the plan — the FBI, the CIA, the National Secu-
rity Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. In his May
22, 1973, public statement, the President reported that the
decision memorandum was circulated to the agencies involved
on July 23, 1970. However, the decision memorandum is dated
July 15, 1970, indicating that it was forwarded to the agencies
on that day or shortly thereafter.

Huston's recommendations were opposed by J. Edgar
Hoover, Director of the FBI. Hoover had served as the chair-
man of a group comprised of the heads of the Federal intelli-
gence agencies formed to study the problems of intelligence-
gathering and cooperation among the various intelligence
agencies. In his public statement of May 22, 1973, President
Nixon stated:

After reconsideration, however, prompted by the op-
position of Director Hoover, the agencies were notified
5 days later, on July 28, that the approval had been
rescinded.
Haldeman's testimony [before the Senate Select Committee
on Presidential Campaign Activities] is to the same effect.
[White House Counsel John] Dean, however, testified that he
was not aware of any recision of approval for the plan and
there apparently is no written record of a recision on July 28
or any other date. There is, however, clear evidence that, after
receipt of the decision memorandum of July 15, 1970, Mr.
Hoover did present strong objections concerning the plan to
Attorney General Mitchell.^^^

Huston attempted to counter Hoover's argimients in a memoran-
dum to Haldeman dated August 5, eight days after the President
allegedly ordered the recision, in which he indicated "that the NSA,
DIA, CIA and the military services basically supported the Huston
recommendations." ^°°

Later, on September 18, 1970 (almost 2 months after the
President claims the plan was rescinded), Dean sent a top

*" U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activity.
The Final Report . . . , op. oit., p. 4.
*»/6t<Z, p. 5.

280

secret memorandum to the Attorney General suggesting cer-
tain procedures to ''^com/mence our donnestic intelligence opera-
tion as quickly as possible.'''' [emphasis added] This memoran-
dum specifically called for the creation of an Inter- Agency
Domestic Intelligence Unit which had been an integral part
of the Huston plan. Dean's memorandum to the Attorney Gen-
eral observed that Hoover was strongly opposed to the crea-
tion of such a unit and that it was important "to bring the
FBI fully on board." Far from indicating that the President's
approval of Huston's recommendation to remove restraints on
illegal intelligence-gathering had been withdrawn, Dean, in
his memorandum, suggested to the Attorney General :

I believe we agreed that it would be inappropriate to
have any blanket removal of restrictions ; rather, the most
appropriate procedure would be to decide on the type of
intelligence we need, based on an assessment of the recom-
mendations of this unit, and then proceed to reTnove the
restraints as necessary to obtain such intelligence, [em-
phasis added] ^°^

The Inter- Agency Domestic Intelligence Unit was never realized
and it is difficult to determine if any other recommendation from the
Huston Plan was directly implemented. Nevertheless, the document
may have functioned as an intellectual stimulant to those high officials
subsequently involved in the Watergate scandals. Huston left the
White House sometimes in 1971 and returned to private law practice
in Indianapolis. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, the principal critic
and opponent of the Huston Plan, died on May 2, 1972.

Out of this background, a number of intelligence organizational de-
velopments began to occur in and around the White House.

In Jime 1971, the leak of the Pentagon Papers prompted
the President to create a special investigations unit (later
known as the Plumbers) inside the "White House under the
direction of Egil Krogh. Krogh, in turn, was directly super-
vised by [Assistant to the President] John Ehrlichman.
Krogh was soon joined by David Young and in July the unit,
staffing up for a broader role, added G. Gordon Liddy and E.
Howard Hunt, both known to the White House as persons
with investigative experience. Liddy was a former FBI agent ;
Hunt, a former CIA agent.^"^

Probably the first such White House intelligence component in his-
tory, the special investigations unit planned and executed the burarlary
of the office of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's psvchiatrist, Dr. Lewis J. Field-
ing. Liddy. Himt, and two of their Cuban- American recruits later
broke into the Democratic National Committee headquarters in the
Watergate Hotel complex.^"^

The Co'^imittee to Re-FJect the President [headed bv for-
mer Attorney General John Mitchell and, together with the
Finance Committee for the Re-Election of the President,

^ Ihid., pp. 5-6.

^ Ibid., p. 12.

^ IMd., pp. 12-13.

281

counting some 35 former White House aides among its per-
sonnel] was gearing up for its own political intelligence-
gathering program around the same time as the Ellsberg
break-m. In September 1971, John Dean asked [former Spe-
cial Assistant to the President] Jeb Stuart ]Magruder to join
him for lunch with Jack Caulfield. Caulfield, a White House
investigator who had conducted numerous political investiga-
tions, some with [former New York City policeman] Anthony
Ulasewicz [who had conducted investigations for Ehrlich-
man] , wanted to sell Magruder his political intelligence plan,
"Project Sandwedge," for use by CRP. Magruder had been
organizing the campaign effort since May 1971, having re-
ceived this assignment from Mitchell and Haldeman. In es-
sence, the Sandwedge plan proposed a private corporation
operating like a Kepublican "InterteP' [a private inter-
national detective agency] to serve the President's campaign.
In addition to normal investigative activities, the Sandwedge
plan also included the use of bagmen and other covert intelli-
gence gathering operations.^"*

"\Miile Caulfield had proposed Sandwedge to the White House in
the spring of 1971 and later had proposed its adoption by the Com-
mittee to Re-Elect the President, the plan was rejected in both in-
stances.

With Sandwedge rebuffed, Magruder and Gordon Strachan
of Haldeman's staff asked Dean to find a lawyer to serve as
CRP general counsel who could also direct an intelligence-
gathering program. Magruder stated [before the Senate Se-
lect Committee on Presidential Campaign Activity] that he
and Dean had, on previous occasions, discussed the need for
such a program with Attorney General Mitchell. The man
Dean recruited was G. Gordon Liddy, who moved from the
special investigations unit in the White House to CRP. Ma-
gruder testified that, when Dean sent Liddy to the Commit-
tee To Re-Elect the President in 1971, he (Magruder) was
unaware of Liddy 's activities for the Plumbers, particularly
his participation in the break-in of Dr. Fielding's office.^°^

Once in place at CRP headquarters, Liddy's principal efforts were
devoted to developing, advocating and implementing a comprehensive
political intelligence-gathering program for CRP under the code name
"Gemstone.'' ^"^ Ultimately a version of this plan — calling for surrepti-
tious entry and bugging of Democratic National Committee head-
quarters in Washington and later, if sufficient funds were available,
penetration of the headquarters of Democratic presidential contenders
and the Democratic convention facilities in Miami — was executed with
the Watergate break-in on May 28, 1972.'"'^

Other intelligence activities were directly undertaken by members of
the White House staff during the period of the first Nixon Administra-
tion. These operations included electronic surveillance matters, moni-

"^Thid.. p. 17.
"^ Ibid., V. IS.
"^ Tbid.. p. 20.
'^ See Ibid., pp. 21-25, 27-29.

282

toring and investigating the behavior of Senator Edward Kennedy
(D.-Mass.) and Dr. Daniel Ellsberg with a view to causing them
public discredit, burglarizing and possibly damaging the Brookings
Institution, and probing individuals both within and outside of the
government in a clandestine manner to determine their involvement in
the disclosure of a memorandum written by ITT lobbyist Dita Beard
(columnist Jack Anderson had alleged that a $400,000 contribution to
the Nixon campaign was linked by the document to a favorable ruling
by the Justice Department on ITT's antitrust difficulties).^"^

In addition, White House staff, in pursuit of political intelligence,
enlisted the assistance of certain government agencies. These actions
resulted in what has been described as "attempts to abuse governmental
process." ^°^ Agencies utilized in this manner by White House person-
nel included the Internal Revenue Service (harassment of political
enemies, identification of sensitive cases, and supplying privileged in-
formation from taxpayer returns) , the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (supplying derogatory information about individuals from raw
investigative files) , the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department
(supplying sensitive or derogatory information about individuals or
groups), the Secret Service (wiretaps, surveillance information, and
sensitive political information), and the Federal Communication
Commission (media harassment). ^^"

This, in general, was an important part of the organization of the
White House intelligence forces during the Nixon tenure in the presi-
dency. A portion of it was lost with the arrest of the Watergate bur-
glars ; the remaining portion slowly crumbled with investigations into
its existence and operations by Congress and Federal prosecutors.

XVII. Justice Department

The Justice Department is presently organized into eight offices
(legislative affairs, management and finance, legal counsel, policy and
planning, public information, the community relations service, the
pardon attorney, and the executive office for the U.S. attorneys), two
boards (parole and immigration appeals), six prosecutorial divisions
(civil, criminal, antitrust, tax, land and natural resources, and civil
rights) , and six bureaus (FBI, Law Enforcement Assistance Adminis-
tration, Drug Enforcement Administration, Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service, the United States Marshals Service, and the Bu-
reau of Prisons/Federal Prison Industries). Certain of these units
have the potential for intelligence production, perhaps in the course
of developing materials (in the case of the divisions) or by virtue of
their particular information holdings (such as the files of the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service). The principal intelligence (and
investigative) component within the Justice Department, however,
is the FBI.311

Both the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI have respon-
sibilities for the coordination of intelligence activities within the De-

** See lUa.. pp. 111-113, 117-129.

^ IMd., p. 130.

^'' Thid., pp. 130-1.50.

*" It should also be noted that the mandate of the Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration provides that agency with a specified intelligence function (Reorganiza-
tion Plan No. 2 of 1973 [87 Stat. 1091] and E.0. 11727).

283

partment and with other Federal agencievS. Organizational efforts in
service to this duty exhibited themselves in 1967 when Attorney Gen-
eral Ramsey Clark created the Interdivision Information Unit for
"reviewing and reducing to quickly retrievable form all information
that may come to this Department relating to organizations and indi-
viduals throughout the country who may play a role, whether pur-
posefully or not, either in instigating or spreading civil disorders or
in preventing or checking them." ^^^ While this entity received and
indexed information from a variety of sources (Federal poverty pro-
grams, the Labor and Post Office Departments, the Internal Revenue
Service, and the neighborhood legal services offices), an Intelligence
Evaluation Committee, composed of representatives from Justice,
Defense, and the Service, was supposed to coordinate and evaluate
the information but proved to be a rather inactive entity.^^^

In July of 1969, Attorney General John Mitchell established the
Civil Disturbance Group to coordinate intelligence, policy, and opera-
tions within the Justice Department with regard to domestic civil dis-
turbances. Both the Interdivision Information Unit and the Intelli-
gence Evaluation Committee were placed under the new panel's juris-
diction and Mitchell asked the CIA to "investigate the adequacy of
the FBI's collection efforts in dissident matters and to persuade the
FBI to turn over its material to the CDG." "'*

In 1970 the moribund Intelligence Evaluation Committee was re-
constituted with representatives from Justice, FBI, CIA, Defense,
Secret Service, NSA, and late in its activities, a Treasury member.
Technically, Robert Mardian, Assistant Attorney General for Internal
Security, was chairman of the reconstituted panel but White House
Counsel John Dean also played a leadership role with the group and
meetings were held at his office on various occasions.

The lEC was not established by Executive Order. In
fact, according to minutes of the lEC meeting on February 1,
1971, Dean said he favored avoiding any written directive
concerning the lEC because a directive "might create prob-
lems of Congressional oversight and disclosure." Several at-
tempts were nevertheless made to draft a charter for the
Committee, although none appears to have been accepted by
all of the lEC members. The last draft which could be lo-
cated, dated February 10, 1971, specified the "authority" for
the lEC as "the Interdepartmental Actional Plan for Civil
Disturbances," something which had been issued in April
1969 as the result of an agreement between the Attorney
General and the Secretary of Defense. Dean thought it was
sufficient just to say that the lEC existed "by authority of
the President." ^^^

By the end of January, 1971, a staff had been organized for the
Committee and did "the work of coordination, evaluation and prepara-
tion of estimates for issuance by the Committee." ^^® For cover pur-

^TT.S. Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, op. oit., p. 118.
■" TMd. p. 119.
**/6id., p. 121.
^ lUd., I). 126.
'"Ibid., p. 127.

284

poses, the lES was attached to the Interdivision Information Unit,
even though the Unit was not actually involved in the operations of
the Staff.

The Intelligence Evaluation Committee met on only seven
occasions; the last occasion was in July 1971. The Intelli-
gence Evaluation Staff, on the other hand, met a total of one
hundred and seventeen times between January 29, 1971, and
May 4, 1973.

The lES prepared an aggregate of approximately thirty
studies or evaluations for dissemination. It also published a
total of fifty-five summaries called intelligence calendars of
significant events. The preparation of these studies, estimates
or calendars was directed by John Dean from the White
House or by Robert Mardian as Chairman of the lEC.^^^

Both the lEC and the lES were terminated in July, 1973, by As-
sistant Attorney General Henry Petersen.^^^

The Department's principal intelligence (and investigative) agency,
the FBI, currently employs over 8,400 special agents.

All operations of the FBI are directed and coordinated
through 13 headquarters divisions. Each of the headquarters
divisions reports to either the Assistant to the Director-
Deputy Associate Director (Administration) or the Assistant
to the Director-Deputy Associate Director (Investigation)
except for the Inspection Division and the Office of Planning
and Evaluation which report directly to the Associate Direc-
tor. The field operations are carried out by 59 field offices lo-
cated throughout the United States and Puerto Rico.^^^

Other special unit facilities of the Bureau include the FBI Labora-
tory, established in 1932, the FBI Academy for training new agents,
created in 1935, and the National Crime Information Center, a com-
puterized criminal information system operated by the FBI since
December, 1970.

Although the FBI relinquished overseas operations, in
1946, the bureau still maintains overseas liaison agents with
other security and intelligence agencies to insure a link be-
tween cases or leads which develop overseas but which come
to rest in the continental United States. In the aftermath of
the American intervention in the Dominican Republic crisis
in 1965, there were reports that President Johnson had as-
signed FBI agents to certain missions on that island. If so —
and the reports were never confirmed — such a mission was
limited and temporary.^^"

At present the Bureau maintains liaison posts in sixteen foreign
countries.^-^ There has also been a recent disclosure that the FBI

^^ Ihid.

"^ IMd., p. 128.

"' U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Departments of State,
Justice, and Commerce, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for
1976: Department of Justice. Hearings, 94th Congress, 1st session. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. p. 190.

^ Ransom, op. cit., p. 145.

^ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations, op. dt., p. 192.

285

periodically dispatches private citizens on intelligence-gathering mis-
sions outside of the United States.^^^

In January, 1973, the Bureau re-established its Liaison Section
which keeps in constant communication with other agencies of the in-
telligence community, Director Hoover had abolished the unit in Sep-
tember, 1970, reportedly due to a dispute with the Central Intelligence
Agency over a refusal to disclose an intelligence source.^^^

Responsible for criminal, civil, and internal security investigations,
the FBI conducted 745,840 such probes in FY 1974 and 774,579 such in-
quiries the previous fiscal year.^^*

Until his death on May 2, 1972, the Bureau was headed by J. Edgar
Hoover. L. Patrick Gray III was named Acting Director the following
day and ultimately nominated for the permanent position on Febru-
ary 17, 1973. Controversy over Gray's involvement in Watergate-
related matters caused him to request the withdrawal of his nomination
on April 5 and he resigned as Acting Director on April 27. He was suc-
ceeded by William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, who served as Acting Director until Kansas
City (Mo.) Police Chief Clarence M. Kelley, nominated June 7, was
confirmed to head the FBI on June 27, 1973.

One other Justice Department unit which has exhibited increasing
intelligence importance is the Drug Enforcement Administration.
Created by reorganization plan (87 Stat. 1091) in 1973, the agency is
only beginning its intelligence operations and recently provided the
following account regarding this aspect of its activities.

Our objectives with respect to the intelligence program have
been to begin the routine production of strategic intelligence
reports, to design and implement regional intelligence units,
to build an intelligence oriented data base through the pro-
duction of finished tactical intelligence reports, and to sup-
port our operations on the Southwest Border with a 24
hour-a-day intelligence center covering several regions and
including several agencies. Results in these areas are indicated
by the following facts :

DEA has taken the lead in developing a set of national nar-
cotic indicators which can be used by DEA, NIDA [National
Institute on Drug Abuse] and SAODAP [Special Action
Office for Drug Abuse Prevention] to monitor drug abuse
trends. These national narcotics indicators include data from
STRIDE (System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evi-
dence) on the price, availability and sources of heroin; data
from DAWN (Drug Abuse Warning Network) on emer-
gency room visits of drug users ; and data on serum hepatitis
throughout the United States. When these systems are forged
together with the NIDA systems, and general surveys, they
become a very powerful set of indicators on the drug abuse
situation.

*^See John M. Crewdson. U.S. Citizens Used By F.B.I. Abroad. New York
Timest, February 16, 1975 : Ifif.

^' See Jeremiah O'Leary. Gray Re-establishes Intelligence Link to Units.
Washington Star-News, January 10, 1973 ; also appears in Neio York Times, Janu-
ary 11. 1973.

^ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations, op. cit., p. 233.

286

Regional intelligence units have been established in every
DEA regional office. These units have responsibilities not only
for collecting intelligence information, but also for produc-
ing tactical intelligence products to be used at the regional
level. Personnel in these units are being trained in the collec-
tion and analysis of intelligence information by DEA's train-
ing program.

Through the first 6 months of fiscal year 1975, 160 analyses
of drug networks, 1,877 profiles of specific traffickers and 9,386
enforcement taro-ets have been produced. These analvses repre-
sent the foundation of the national narcotics intelligence
system.

In the development of a National Narcotics Intelligence
System it is mandatory on DEA that a high level of liaison
with other enforcement agencies, Federal, State and local be
maintained : and interchange of information with these agen-
cies be developed. In terms of this requirement I am particu-
larly encouraged with the operation we call the Unified
Intelligence Division of the New York Joint Task Force. This
is a true interagency operation utilizing DEA agents. New
York City and State Police and funded in part by an LEAA
grant. The program succeeds in brin<?ing combined drug in-
formation to bear on the traffickers in our most populous city
and greatest area of drug abuse.^^^

XVIII. Treasury Department

The Treasury Department has long contained components with an
intelligence potential. Treasury attaches serving with American em-
bassies provide valuable foreign economic intelligence for depart-
mental units within the jurisdiction of the Under Secretary for Mone-
tary Policy as well as for other units, such as the State Department
and other agencies represented on the United States Intelligence
Board and the National Security Council. The Treasury Department
is also developing and expanding its Federal Law Enforcement Train-
ing Center which will be utilized by a variety of agencies for training
investigative personnel as well as State Department security agents,
Internal Revenue Service intelligence special agents and internal
security inspectors, Secret Service agents, and Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms Bureau special agents.^^^

Among the intelligence units within the Treasury Department, the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms has primary responsibili-
ties for monitoring and pursuing illegal trafficking in and/or sale of
distilled spirits, tobacco, and firearms (including explosives). The
Bureau utilizes some 1,600 special agents, conducts electronic surveil-
lance operations, and has both undercover personnel and paid in-
formers in its service. In addition to maintaining intelligence activities
in support of its regular duties, the Bureau undoubtedly has an intelli-

'"From the statement of DEA Administrator John R. Bartels, Jr., in IMd.,
pp. 847-848.

"•See U.S. Consrress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Treasury, Postal
Service, and General Government Appropriations: Fiscal Tear 1976. Hearings,
94th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975, pp. 2309-
2324.

287

gence capacity rej2:arding political candidate and forei^ dignitary
protection obligations which must be met on occasion.^"

The U.S. Secret Service engages in intelligence operations in sup-
port of its responsibilities for protecting the President, presidential
candidates, and certain foreign dignitaries, pursuing counterfeiters,
and, in cooperation with its police auxiliaries (Executive Protective
Service, White House Police, and Treasury Security Force), the
maintenance of security at certain Federal and diplomatic facilities.
The Secret Service presently consists of slightly more than 1,200
special agents plus administrative personnel. During FY 1974 some
segment of this workforce completed 15,403 protective intelligence
cases and anticipated completing 16,000 such cases during the next
fiscal year.^2^

The U.S. Customs Service, while largely a law enforcement agency,
has an intelligence potential in such matters as narcotics and muni-
tions control, prevention and detection of terrorism in international
transportation facilities, and enforcement of Federal regulations af-
fecting articles in international trade.^-^

The Internal Revenue Service, responsible for administering and
enforcing the internal revenue laws other than those relating to alco-
hol, tobacco, firearms, explosives, and wagering, consists of a national
office and a decentralized field staff organized into seven regions con-
taining 58 districts. The Intelligence Division, staff with over 2,600
special agents, is the principal IRS intelligence component and is
responsible for identifying willful noncompliance with the tax laws
as well as devious and complex methods utilized to avoid tax obliga-
tions. In addition to the use of informants, undercover operatives, and
electronic surveillance, the Intelligence Division, until recently, main-
tained an Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System. Inaugurated
in May, 1969, this computerized data bank of personal information
was suspended in January, 1975, after criticism was made that the
system contained information of non-germane interest to a tax-collec-
tion and enforcement agency and that holdings constituted an inva-
sion of privacy.^^" This matter, certain surveillance activities involving
the IRS office in Miami (Operation Leprechaun), and related spying
operations have recently brought the agency's intelligence program
under congressional scrutiny.^^^

Another controversial aspect of IRS intelligence operations in-
volves the now defunct Special Service Staff established within the
Compliance Division. Initially created in July, 1969, as the Activist
Organizations Committee, the unit came into existence.

. . . apparently in response to pressures emanating from the
White House and from Congress to insure that dissident
groups were complying with the tax laws.

'*' Thid., pp. 157-160, 16.5-166.

^ See Ihid , pp. 704, 707 ; also see U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appro-
priation.?. Revieic of Secret Service Protective Measures. Hearings, 94th Con-
gress, 1st session. Washington. U.S. Govt, Print. Off., 1975.

"^See U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Treasury, Postal
Service, and General Government Appropriations . . ., op. cit., pp. 613-617.

'"'See Ihid., pp. 457-464.

^ See U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Ways and Means. Subcommittee on
Oversight. Internal Revenue Service Intelligence Operations. Hearings, 94th
Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975.

288

Several weeks before, at hearings before the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee
on Government Operations on June 18, 1969, a former mem-
ber of the Black Panthers had testified that it was his belief
that the organization had never filed tax returns and had
never been audited by IRS. Similarly, an IRS official had
raised the question of whether certain politically-active
groups, then tax-exempt, should continue to qualify for this
status.^^2

In the aftermath of these events. Dr. Arthur Burns. Counselor to
the President, and Tom Charles Huston, a White House staffer con-
cerned with security programs, began urging IRS to establish a spe-
cial political intelligence component to deal with these tax matters.^^^

The SSS was established in several organizational meet-
ings held in the IRS during July, 1969. During this time, the
initial SSS personnel were chosen and the functions of the
SSS were set out. The SSS was to "coordinate activities in
all Compliance Divisions involving ideological, militant, sub-
versive, radical, and similar type organizations; to collect
basic intelligence data ; and to insure that the requirements
of the Interna] Revenue Code concerning such organizations
have been complied with.'' Also, some people associated with
the SSS indicated that they believed the SSS was to play a
role in controlling "an insidious threat to the internal secu-
rity of this country."

The people involved with the SSS had a difficult time de-
termining precisely what organizations and individuals to
focus on. It appears from the staff's examination that the
day-to-day focus of the SSS was largely determined by in-
formation it received from other agencies, as the FBI and
the Inter-Divisional Information Unit of the Justice
Department.

The SSS generally operated by receiving information from
other investigative agencies and congressional committees,
establishing files on organizations and individuals of inter-
est, checking IRS records on file subjects, and referring cases
to the field for audit or collection action. Also the SSS pro-
vided information to the Exempt Organization Branch
(Technical) with respect to organizations whose exempt
status was in question. This method of operation was estab-
lished by late 1969.^^*

With a staff which apparently never exceeded eight individuals,
the Special Service unit "began with the names of 77 organizations
and by the time it was disbanded in 1973 there was a total of 11,458
SSS files on 8,585 individuals and 2,873 organizations . . . with

^ U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Political Intelligence in
the Internal Revenue Service: The Special Service Staff. Committee print, 98rd
Congress, 2d session. Wasliington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1074, p. 9.

^^ U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation. Investigation
of the Special Service Staff of the Internal Revenue Service. Committee print,
94th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975, p. 5.

'^ IMd., pp. 6-7.

289

widely varying points of view, from all parts of the country and from
many vocational and economic groups." -"^^ In addition to identifying
subjects for IKS scrutiny, the SSS also functioned as a reference
source for White House intelligence actors.^^*'

Assessing the experience of such special intelligence entities, one
congressional scrutinizer of the Special Service Staff observed:

The Constitution guarantees every American the right to
think and speak as he pleases without having to fear that the
Government is listening. There can be little doubt that politi-
cal surveillance and intelligence-gathering, aimed at the
beliefs, views, opinions and political associations of Ameri-
cans only inhibits the free expression which the First Amend-
ment seeks to protect. Yet the formation of governmental
surveillance units is not a new occurrence. Throughout our
Nation's history such programs have been instituted to pro-
tect "national security ' interests which were perceived to be
threatened.

It is apparent, however, that the extraordinary political
unrest of the late sixties had a powerful effect on those at the
governmental helm. Using this as justification, they under-
took to use the powers at their disposal to stifle and control
the growing political dissidence and protest they were wit-
nessing. The plain words of the Constitution were ignored.

There is no evidence to indicate that the creation of so many
"secret" intelligence units as well as the expansion of exist-
ing units throughout the government at roughly tTle same
time was the result of any conscious conspiracy. But the fact
remains that the contemporaneous creation of these units per-
mitted an incipient arrangement whereby the special talents
of investigation, prosecution arrangement whereby the special
talents of investigation, prosecution, and administrative
penalties (tax actions) — most of the powers at the govern-
ment's disposal — were levelled against those who chose to
dissent, whether lawfully or otherwise. Although each agency
may not have known specifically of another's intelligence pro-
gram, the fruits of such units were freely exchanged so that
each agency knew that another was also "doing something." ^^'^

Ultimately, the Special Service Staff operation came under ques-
tion at the highest level of the Internal Kevenue Service.

In May 1973 (one day after he was sworn in). Commissioner
Donald C. Alexander met with top IRS personnel with re-
spect to the SSS and directed that the SSS actions were to
relate only to tax resisters. This was reemphasized in a second
meeting held at the end of June 1973. In early August 1973,
the Commissioner learned of National Office responsibility
for an IRS memorandum relating to the SSS published in
Time magazine. The Commissioner felt that this memo-

"" Ibid., p. 7.
"^ Ibid., p. 9.

^ U.S. Confess. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Politioal Intelligence in
the Internal Revenue Service . . ., op. cit., pp. 49-o0.

290
randum described activities that were "antithetical to the
proper conduct of . . . tax administration" and he announced
(on August 9, 1973) that the SSS would be disbanded.^^s

XIX. Overview

This is the organizational status of the Federal intelligence func-
tion on the eve of America's bi-centennial.^^'' Institutional permanence
did not appear within this sphere of government operations until
almost a decade and a half before the turn of the present century.
For a variety of reasons — inexperience, scarce resources, lack of use-
ful methodology, failure to apply available technology, and a leader-
ship void — a functionally effective intelligence structure probably did
not exist within the Federal government until the United States was
plunged into World War II. And what observations might be offered
regarding the current intelligence community organization?

An outstanding characteristic of the contemporary intelligence
structure is its pervasiveness. There are a panoply of Federal agencies
with clearly prescribed intelligence duties or a reasonable potential
for such functioning. One authority recently estimated that ten major
intelligence entities maintain a staff of 153,250 individuals on an
annual budget of $6,228,000,000.^*° Such statistics provide some indi-
cation of the size of the immediate intelligence community within the
Federal government but, of course, ignores the commitment of re-

'^ U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, op cit., p. 7.

^™ This study does not purport to present an exhaustive scenario of intelli-
gence agencies but has sought to include the principal entities which have been
or continue to be involved in intelligence operations. Agencies not discussed here
but which do conceivably contribute information relevant to the intelligence
matters include the United States Information Agency, which maintains numer-
ous overseas offices, the Agency for International Development, with missions
in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, and the Department of
Agriculture, which has attache's in United States embassies.

For an overview of the chronological development of the principal Federal
inteUigence entities, see Appendix I.

**" The following estimate is taken from Marchetti and Marks, op. cit., p. 80 :
certain comparative data is supplied from Federal budget and U.S. Civil Service
Commission sources. The statistics appear to be for FY 72 or FY 73.

SIZE AND COST OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Organization

Personnel

Budget

Central InteUigence Agency .-. .-. -. 16,500 $750,000,030

National Security Agency - 24,000 1,200,000,000

Defense Intelligence Agency 5,000 200,000,000

Army Intelligence _ - 35,000 700,000,000

Air Force Intelligence (including National Reconaissance Office) 56, 000 2, 700, 000, 000

State Department (Bureau of Intelligence and Research)... 350 8,000,000

Federal Bureau of Investigation (Internal Security Division) 800 40, 000, 000

Atomic Energy Commission (Intelligence Division) 300 20,000,000

Treasury Department _._ 300 10,000,000

Total 153,250 6,228,000,000

COMPARE

Item

Fiscal year
1972

Fiscal year
1973

Budget outlay, actual (billions).
Federal employees (civilian)

$231.9
2, 811, 779

$246. 5
2, 824, 242

291

sources to intelligence efforts, on one hand, by front groups, pro-
prietary organizations, and informers, and, on the other hand, by
sub-national government agencies, and other Federal entities (such
as Department of Agriculture overseas attaches, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration satellite launching systems, and the prod-
ucts of the National Weather Service). With these additional com-
ponents identified, the pervasive nature of the intelligence organization
begins to become more apparent.

It might also be argued that the intelligence community exhibits an
organizational tendency toward clusters of centralized leadership.
Overseas intelligence operations leadership has been concentrated in
the Director of Central Intelligence ; armed forces intelligence leader-
ship has been concentrated in the chief of the Defense Intelligence
Agency ; armed forces cryptological leadership has been concentrated
in the head of the National Security Agency /Central Security Service.
A propensity for further unifying these leadership capacities may be
seen in the example of Dr. Henry Kissinger (when serving as Assist-
ant to the President for National Security Affairs/chief of staff. Na-
tional Security Council) and, to some degree, in the case of the White
House intelligence functionaries during the Nixon Administration.
While the coordination of intelligence activities is a desirable goal in
government efficiency, the centralization of intelligence leadership can
pose threats to civil liberties.

Finally, as the Federal intelligence organization has grown, there
appears to be a tendency toward the confusion of the purposes of
intelligence operations. Many intelligence institutions, past and pres-
ent, function (ed) without an explicit statutory mandate for their
activities. More consideration might be given to the relationship be-
tween domestic intelligence and law enforcement responsibilities : in-
telligence units have been organized to spy on citizens (and sometimes
harass them) seemingly without any regard as to whether or not
illegal behavior might be detected. Also, entities established to enforce
the laws domestically have become enamored on occasion with intelli-
gence pursuits which bear little significance to their primary law en-
forcement duty.

The Constitution of the United States continues to guarantee "the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searchers and seizures. . . ." The Federal
intelligence organization has the capacity to significantly enhance and
support that right or to manifest itself as one of the crudest detractors
of that tenet of American government. Vigilance on the part of the
citizenry as to encroachments upon its rights and liberties is an utmost
necessity for the preservation of a meaningful democracy. Yet, public
confidence in the state tolerates a condition of official secrecy with re-
gard to almost every aspect of intelligence activity. Institutional reli-
ance upon the fullest commitment of the intelligence community to
the preservation and realization of the constitutionally guaranteed
rights of the people is the necessary consequence. Endowed with its
special privilege of operational secrecy, the Federal intelligence orga-
nization, in any violation of its pledge of service to the citizenry, can
expect to elicit a prohibitive punishment from the polity, for it has,
of course, a unique potential to execute the ultimate breach of trust,
the demise of the demos itself.

January 1, 1976.
Washington, D.C.

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The bibliography that follows is intended as a reference for those
that may wish to study the subject of the evolution and organization
of the Federal intelligence function more completely. The following
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(1%3); David Kahn, The Codehreakers (1967), Lyman B. Kirk-
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Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders
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1963-1973 (a Senate Committee print).

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Congress catalog numbers, will be found below.

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APPENDIX I

The Evolution and Organization of Federal Intelligence
Institutions 1882-1975

1882 Office of Intelligence established within the Bureau of Naviga-
tion, Department of the Navy, by administrative directive ; first
permanent intelligence unit within the Navy.

1885 Military Intelligence Division established within the Adjutant
General's Office, Department of War, by administrative direc-
tive ; first permanent intelligence unit within the Army.

1901 Philippine Militaiy Information Bureau established within
the United States Army by administrative directive; special
intelligence unit developed for use in the Philippine Islands
relying upon both overt information collection techniques and
undercover operatives.

1902 Department of the Treasury^ Secret Serv'ice staff increased by
appropriation act (32 Stat. 120 at 140) for purposes of provid-
ing protection to the President ; origin of Secret Service intel-
ligence activities.

1903 General Staff of the United States Army created (32 Stat. 830) ;
intelligence section (G-2) organized by administrative direc-
tive,

1908 Intelligence section (G-2) of the General Staff, United States
Armv, absorbed by the Army War College at the direction of
the Chief of Staff.

Bureau of Investigation established within the Department
of Justice by administrative directive; efforts to create such a
unit by statute had been rejected by Congress earlier in the
year and also during the previous year.

1917 War Department Cipher Bureau (MI-8) created by adminis-
trative directive; first permanent cryptology, code development
and code breaking unit within the armed services.

General John J. Pershing, commander of the American Ex-
peditionary Forces, establishes an intelligence section (G-2)
within his General Staff in Europe.

1918 Intelligence section (G-2) of the General Staff, United States
Army, reconstituted and developed.

1919 Code and Cipher Solution Section. Department of War, secretly
established, secretly funded, and maintained in New York City ;
the unit became popularly known as the American Black Cham-
ber and was responsible for developing and breaking a variety
of codes, ciphers and cryptological messages for the War and
State Departments.

Intelligence Division, Bureau of Revenue, Department of the
Treasury established by administrative directive.

(309)

310

1920 United States Marine Corps undergoes reorganization of head-
quarters staff with the result that an Intelligence Section is
established within the Operations and Training Division.

1929 American Black Chamber is dissolved at the direction of the
Secretary of State, Henry Stimson; the Department of State
was the principal financier, user, and beneficiary of the services
of the unit but Stimson, newly appointed, disapproved of its
activities, saying "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail."

1936 Intelligence Division, United States Coast Guard, Department
of the Treasury, established by administrative directive ; while
the Coast Guard had maintained a single intelligence officer
prior to this time, additional law enforcement duties and pro-
hibition era responsibilities prompted a major intelligence staff
increase at this time.

1940 Intelligence Staff section (A-2) established within the United
States Army Air Corps by administrative directive.

1941 Office of the Coordinator of Information established by a presi-
dential directive of July 11, 1941 ; the authority of the Coordina-
tor was "to collect and analyze all information and data which
may bear upon national security,'' to correlate such data and to
make it available in various ways to the President.

1942 Office of Strategic Services establish. ed by military order of
June 13, 1942; the presidential directive of July 11, 1941 was
simultaneously cancelled.

Allied Intelligence Bureau established at the direction of Gen-
eral Douglas MacArthur; the Bureau functioned during the
war as a coordinating and planning device for allied armed
forces in the Pacific Theater.

1945 Office of Strategic Services terminated by E.O. 9621 of Septem-
ber 20, 1945 ; functions transferred to the Departments of War
and State.

1946 National Intelligence Authority and its staff arm, the Central
Intelligence Group, created by a presidential directive of Jan-
uary 22, 1946, for purposes of coordinating intelligence activi-
ties and advising the President regarding same.

Atomic Energy Commission established (60 Stat. 755) ; re-
sponsible for atomic energy intelligence regarding detection
and aspessment of worldwide atomic detonations and assess-
ments of the use of atomic energy.

1947 National Security Council, National Security Resources Board
(abolished 1953), and Central Intelligence Agency established
by National Security Act (61 Stat. 497).

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence established within the
newly created Department of the Air Force (61 Stat. 497).
Office of Intelligence Research established within the Depart-
ment of State by administrative directive ; renamed the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research in 1957.

1948 Office of Policy Coordination established by secret National
Security Council directive NSC 10/2; responsible for covert-
action programs, the unit was abolished in 1951 and its func-
tions and personnel were transferred to the Central Intelligence
Agency.

311

Office of Special Operations established by action of the Presi-
dent (possibly by secret directive) ; responsible for covert in-
telligence collection, the unit was abolished in 1951 and its func-
tions were transferred to the Central Intelligency Agency.

1949 Armed Forces Security Agency established by a Department of
Defense directive for purposes of administering strategic com-
munications-intelligence functions, cryptology, code develop-
ment and code breaking, and coordination of similar activities
by other defense agencies ; reorganized as the National Security
Agency in 1952.

1950 Intelligence Advisory Committee established (authority un-
clear) ; created at the urging of the Director of the Central In-
telligence Agency and functioned as an interdepartmental
panel composed of representatives of the major agencies having
intelligence responsibilities ; absorbed by the United States In-
telligence Board in 1960.

1952 National Security Agency created by a classified presidential
directive of November 4, 1952; largely unacknowleged as a
government agency until 1957, NSA functions under the di-
rection, authority and control of the Secretary of Defense and
is responsible for coordinating, developing, and advancing
cryptological, code breaking, code development, and communi-
cations intelligence activities.

1956 President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Ac-
tivities established by E.O. 10656 of February 6, 1956, for pur-
poses of a civilian review of the foreign intelligence activities
of the Federal government; established in the wake of a
Hoover Commission report of 1955 recommending a joint con-
gressional oversight committee on intelligence activities which
was being considered by Congress.

1960 United States Intelligence Board established by a classified Na-
tional Security Council directive, assuming the functions of
the Intelligence Advisory Committee ; the Board makes admin-
istrative recommendations concerning the structure of the Fed-
eral intelligence organization and prepares National Intelli-
gence Estimates for the National Security Council on specific
foreign situations of national security concern or a general in-
ternational matter.

1961 President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board established
by E.O. 10938 of May 4, 1961; successor to the President's
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, the
panel advises the President on the objectives and conduct of
foreign intelligence and related activity by the United States.
Defense Intelligence Agency established by Department of De-
fense Directive 5105.21 of August 1, 1961; coordinates armed
forces intelligence activities and provides direct intelligence as-
sistance to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.

1968 National Intelligence Resources Board created at direction of
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; interagency
committee created to bring about economy within intelligence
activities and operations.

312

1971 Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee created by the Di-
rector of the Central Intelligence Agency ; successor to the Na-
tional Intelligence Resources Board, the panel advises the
CIA Director on the preparation of a consolidated intelli-
gence program budget.

1971 Net Assessments Group established by presidential announce-
ment of November 5, 1971; responsible for analyzing United
States defense capabilities vis-a-vis those of the Soviet Union
and the People's Republic of China.

Verification Panel established by presidential announcement of
November 5, 1971 ; responsible for intelligence pertaining to
the SALT talks.

Intelligence Committee, National Security Council, established
by presidential announcement of November 5, 1971 ; advises on
intelligence needs and provides for a continuing evaluation of
intelligence products from the viewpoint of the intelligence
user.

Forty Committee (also called the Special Group, the 54—12
Group, and the 303 Committee) continued (authority uncer-
tain) ; in existence since the earliest years of the Central In-
telligence Agency, the panel's membership varies but its func-
tion remains that of reviewing proposals for covert action.
Central Security Service proposed (established in 1972) in
presidential announcement of November 5, 1971 ; functions
under the direction of the head of the National Security
Agency who serves concurrently as Chief of the Service.
Defense Investigative Serv^ice proposed (established by DoD
5105.42 of April 18, 1972) in presidential announcement of
November 5, 1971 ; new agency consolidates armed service and
Defense Department personnel investigation functions into
single entity.

Defense Mapping Agency proposed (established under the pro-
visions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, on
January 1, 1972) in presidential announcement of November 5,
1971; new agency consolidates armed service mapping activi-
ties and operations.

APPENDIX II

Government Information Securitt Classlfication Policy

A democratic system of government, based upon popular power
and popular trust, may both respect privacy, "the voluntary with-
holding of information reinforced by a willing indifference," and
practice secrecy, "the compulsory withholding of knowledge, rein-
forced by the prospect of sanctions for disclosure." Qualifications are
attached to these two conditions by legislatures, officers of govern-
ment, and the courts.

Both are enemies, in principle, of publicity. The tradition
of liberal, individualistic democracy maintained an equi-
librium of publicity, privacy, and secrecy. The equilibrium
was enabled to exist as long as the beneficiaries and pro-
tagonists of each sector of this tripartite system of barriers
respected the legitimacy of the other two and were confident
that they would not use their power and opportunities to
disrupt the equilibrium. The principles of privacy, secrecy
and publicity are not harmonious among themselves. The
existence of each rests on a self-restrictive tendency in each
of the others. The balance in which they co-exist, although
it is elastic, can be severly disrupted ; when the pressure for
publicity becomes distrustful of privacy, a disequilibrium re-
sults. Respect for privacy gives way to an insistence on pub-
licity coupled with secrecy, a fascination which is at once an
abhorrence and a dependent clinging.^

The abuse of secrecy in matters of government can be attributed to
no one particular realm. Public servants, beyond the reach of the
electorate, however, may tend to misuse secrecy simply because they
are immune to any direct citizen reprisal. In this regard, one of the
first serious analysts of social organization, the sociologist Max Weber
(1864-1920), has commented: "Every bureaucracy seeks to increase
the superiority of the professionally informed by keeping their knowl-
edge and intentions secret." Perhaps a more important observation
for the American democratic experience is provided by Weber when
he notes:

The pure interest of the bureaucracy in power, however, is
efficacious far beyond those areas where purely functional
interests makes for secrecy. The concept of the "official
secret" is the specific invention of bureaucracy, and nothing
is so fanatically defended by the bureaucracy as this attitude,

* Edward A. Shils. The Torment of Secrecy: The Background and Conse-
quences of American Security Policies. New York, The Free Press, 1956, pp.
26-27.

(313)

314

which cannot be justified beyond . . . specifically qualified
areas. In facing a parliament, the bureaucracy, out of a sheer
power instinct, fights every attempt of the parliament to gain
knowledge by means of its own experts or from interest
groups. The so-called right of parliamentary investigation
is one of the means by which parliament seeks such knowledge.
Bureaucracy naturally welcomes a poorly informed and hence
a powerless parliament — at least in so far as ignorance some-
how agrees with the bureaucracy's interests.^

The extent to which a sovereign legislature allows a bureaucracy to
create "state secrets" on its own initiative and authority also con-
tributes to the abuse of government secrecy. In a democracy, the elected
representatives of the people must bear the responsibility of fixing the
basis for and creation of official secrets. As an extension of its law-
making power, the legislature must exercise authority to determine
that its information protection statutes are faithfully administered.
Under a constitutional arrangement such as that found in the Ameri-
can Federal Government, care must be taken to divorce the use of
stn.te secrecy from the separation of powers doctrine. Because infor-
mation has been designated an official secret, this condition should not
necessarily serve to justify the Executive's withholding- of the data
from Congress. (See United States vs. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706
(1974)).

Ideally, all information held by a democratic government belongs
to the citizenry. However, for reasons of national defense, foreign re-
lations, commercial advantage, and personal privacy, some informa-
tion may require protection and, therefore, becomes a secret. Such a
limitation is not absolute: Congress, the Executive, and the courts
might, when circumstances so require, have access to official secrets and,
in time, efforts should be made to remove the secrecy restriction and
release the information in question to the public.

In addition, there are certain types of information which, in accord-
ance with the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers, might
justifiably be retained exclusively within one branch of the Federal
Government. (See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706.) Such a
class of information should be kept to a minimum and be withheld with
a considerate attitude. In brief, there are types of information which
may be protected from inspection by ot>er branches of government as
well as from general public scrutiny. Again, such a restriction need not
be an absolute matter of policy ; considerations of accountability, pub-
lic trust, criminal wrongdoing, or scholarly research needs may prompt
occasional exceptions to the rule. A type of information which may be
permissively protected is specified at present in the Freedom of In-
formation Act (5 U.S.C. 552) .

/. National Defense

Although members of the United States armed forces were, from
the time of the Revolution, prohibited from communicating with the

enemy and spying during war had similarly been condemned since

•_

^ H. H. Gerth and C. "Wright Mills, pds. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology
New York, Oxford University Press, 1946, pp. 233-234.

315

that time, no directives regarding the protection of information or
guarding against foreign military intelligence were issued until after
the Civil War. During the time of the rebellion, President Lincoln
placed strict governmental control over communications — the tele-
graph, the mails, and, to a considerable extent, the press. The military
controlled communications and civilians within the shifting war zones/

A few years after the cessation of hostilities, the AVar Department
turned its attention to security procedures for peacetime. General
Orders Xo. 35, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant General's Office,
issued April 13, 1869 read : "Commanding officers of troops occupying
the regular forts built by the Engineer Department will permit no
photographic or other views of the same to be taken without the per-
mission of the War Department." Such language thus placed limited
information control at the disposal of the War Department. The sub-
stance of this order was continued in compiled Army regulations of
1881, 1889, and 1895.^^

Deteriorating relations with Spain and the possibility of open
warfare subsequently prompted more stringent security precautions.
A portion of General Orders No, 9, Hdq. Army, A.G.O., issued
March 1, 1897, directed :

No persons, except officers of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and persons in the service of the United States
employed in direct connection with the use, construction or
care of these works, will be allowed to visit any portion of the
lake and coast defenses of the United States without the writ-
ten authority of the Commanding Officer in charge.

Neither written nor pictorial descriptions of these works
will be made for publication without the authority of the
Secretary of AVar, nor will any information be given concern-
ing them which is not contained in the printed reports and
documents of the AA^ar Department.

Revised for inclusion in General Orders No. 52, War Department,
issued August 24, 1 897, "the principal change was insertion of a para-
graph indicating that the Secretary of AA^ar would grant special per-
mission to visit these defenses only to the United States Senators and
Representatives in Congress ivho loere officially concerned thereicith
and to the Governor or Adjutant General of the State where such
defenses were located" [emphasis added] .^ That the AVar Department
did not want to extend special defense facilities visitation permission
to any or all Members of Congress is evident. This policy of selective
congressional access to secret defense matters has continued, in various
forms, into the present period.

In 1898 there was the passage of a statute (30 Stat. 717) "to protect
the harbor defenses and fortifications constructed or used by the

' See James G. Randall. Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln, Revised Edi-
tion. Urbana : University of Illinois Press, 1951, chapters III, IV, VII and XIX.

* Dallas Irvine. "The Origin of Defense-Information Markings in the Army
and former War Department" rtvpescript.l Washington, National Archives and
Records Service, General Services Administration, 1964 ; under revision 1972, p. 3.
All references from revision type.script ; military orders, regulations, and direc-
tives referred to may be found in the annexes of this study.

" lUd., p. 4.

316

United States from malicious injury, and for other purposes." The
sanctions of this law provided that "any person who . . . shall know-
ingly, willfully or wantonly violate any regulation of the War Depart-
ment that has been made for the protection of such mine, torpedo, for-
tification or harbor-defense system shall be punished ... by a fine of
not less than one hundred nor more than five thousand dollars, or
with imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or with both,
in the discretion of the court." The effect of this statute was that it not
only sanctioned War Department directives regarding the protection
of information, but also gave increased force to such orders by pro-
viding criminal penalties for violations. The statute was published for
the information of the military in General Orders No. 96, War De-
partment, A.G.O., July 13, 1898.

Army regulations of 1901 continued the language of the 1897 order
with its provision for granting certain Members of Congress special
access to the coastal and lake defenses. New regulations in 1908 omitted
specific mention of congressional visitors and said:

CJommanding officers of posts at which are Ibcated lake or
coastal defenses are charged with the responsibility of pre-
venting, as far as practicable, visitors from obtaining infor-
mation relative to such defenses which would probably be
communicated to a foreign power, and to this end may pre-
scribe and enforce appropriate regulations governing visitors
to their posts.

American citizens whose loyalty to their Government is
unquestioned may be permitted to visit such portions of the
defenses as the commanding officer deems proper.

The taking of photographic or other views of permanent
works of defense will not be permitted. Neither written nor
pictorial descriptions of these works will be made for publica-
tion without the authority of the Secretary of War, nor will
any information be given concerning them which is not con-
tained in the printed reports and documents of the War
Department.

These portions of the 1908 regulations (pars. 355 and 356) were con-
tinued in regulations books of 1910 (pars. 358 and 359), (pars. 347 and
348), and 1917 (pars. 347 and 348). The language constitutes the first
open admission by the War Department of an effort to protect fixed
defenses against foreign military intelligence.®

Criminal sanctions for unlawful entry upon military property were
extended in a codification statute (35 Stat. 1088-1159 at 1097) of
March 4, 1909. Whi^e the penalty provisions of the Act of July 7, 1898
(30 Stat. 717) were included in the law, another provision was added,
reading :

Whoever shall go upon any military reservation, army post,
fort, or arsenal, for any purpose prohibited by law or military
regulation made in pursuance of law. or whoever shall reenter
or be found within any such reservation, post, fort, or arsenal,
after having been removed therefrom or ordered not to re-
enter by any officer or person in command or charge thereof,

'Ibid., p. 7.

317

shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, or im-
prisoned not more than six months, or both.

Although supposedly based upon the provisions of the 1898 statute,
in the words of one expert in this policy sphere,

this language was so amplified as to amount virtually to new
legislation. The new language tends to divert attention to what
the earlier act had referred to by means of the word "tres-
pass." Attention therefore needs to be called to the fact that
the new language as well as the old effectively gave the force
of law, with imposed penalty for violation, to the provisions
of current Army regulations about photographs and written
or pictorial descriptions of seacoast defenses and about local
regulations to prevent visitors from obtaining information
for a foreign power.

In view of the pertinent content of current Army regula-
tions [this] section . . . from the Criminal Code of 1909 may
be regarded as the first very good approximation of legisla-
tion against espionage in time of peace. The act of 1898, even
in the light of then current Army regulations, can be argued,
from its text, to be directed more against sabotage than
against espionage.^

The provision was also incorporated, without change, in the United
States Code of 1925.

The first complete system for the protection of national defense in-
formation, devoid of special markings, was promulgated in General
Orders Xo. 3, AVar Department, of February 16, 1912. This directive
set forth certain classes of records which were to be regarded as "con-
fidential" and, therefore, kept under lock, "accessible only to the officer
to whom intrusted." Those materials falling into this category in-
cluded submarine mine projects and land defense plans. "Trusted em-
ployees" of the War Department, as well as "the officer to whom in-
trusted," might have access to "maps and charts showing locations on
the ground of the elements of defense, of the number of guns, and of
the character of the armament" and "tables giving data with reference
to the number of guns, the character of the armament, and the war
supply of ammunition."

Serial numbers were to be issued for all such "confidential" informa-
tion with the number marked on the document (s) and lists of the
records kept at the office from which they emanated. Within one year's
time officers responsible for the safekeeping of these materials were to
check on their location and existence. While available to all commis-
sioned officers at all times, "confidential" information was not to be
copied except at the office of issue.

The language of [these] instructions . . . was incorporated
(par. 94, p. 216) in the Compilation of General Orders^ Cir-
cul^rSj and Bulletins of the War Department Issued Betiveen
February 15^ 1881, and December 31, 1915 (Washington,
1916). The paragraph of this compilation in which the in-
structions were carried was rescinded by Changes in Com-

'lUd., p. 8.

318

pilation of Orders No. 35, October 1, 1922, which referred to
superseding pamphlet Army Regulations 90-40. The latter
had been issued on May 2, 1922 under the headings "Coast
Artillery Corps. Coast defense Command." The comparable
language appeared in Paragraph 17, "Safe-keeping of mili-
tai-y records concerning seacoast defenses." It was generally
similar to the language previously in effect, but specified that
the two major categories of records involved should be classed
as SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL, respectively. These
markings by that time had special meanings elsewhere
prescribed.^

Until the turn of the century, policy directives concerned with the
protection of national defense information were confined to coastal
and lake fortifications material. This should not necessarily indicate
that only documents having to do with these matters were protected
under such regulations.

On October 3, 1907 the Chief of Artillery invited the at-
tention of The Adjutant General ... to the fact that the
word "confidential" was being used without any prescribed
meaning as a marking on communications and printed issu-
ances. He pointed out the ridiculousness of the situation by
citing examples, including one issuance marked "Confiden-
tial" that contained merely formulas for making whitewash.
In his stated opinion there should be some way of indicating
degree of confidentiality, some time limit on the effect of a
marking whenever practicable, and requirement of an annual
return of confidential materials in the possession of particular
officers. He proposed the establishment of four degrees of con-
fidentiality that can be approximated by the following
expressions :

1. For your eyes only

2. For the information of commissioned officers only

3. For official use only

4. Not for publication ^

Additional communication on this matter elicited a response from
the Chief Signal Officer that printed issuances, such as manuals and
instruction books, contained instructions on their dissemination. An
example of this type of control prescription was cited from a Signal
Corps manual : "This Manual is intended for the sole personal use of
the one to whom it is issued, and should not under any circumstances
be transferred, loaned, or its contents imparted to unauthorized
persons."

The matter was subsequently referred to the Chief of Staff who
presented the suggestions to the Acting Secretary of War. In a memo-
randum of November 12, 1907, Major General William P. Duvall,
Assistant to the Chief of Staff

indicated that the idea of setting time limits on the confiden-
tiality of particular items was hardly practicable and that

^IWd., p. 11.

' Ibid., pp. 11-12 ; original letter contained in Annex E of Ibid.

319

the idea of having returns made of specially protected mate-
rial was undesirable because it would be too complicated in
application. The memorandum agreed that the marking
"Confidential" should have a prescribed meaning equivalent
to "For your eyes only" but went along with the remarks to
the Chief Signal Officer in proposing that materials intended
to be available only to a certain class or classes of individuals
should be "marked so as to indicate to whom the contents may
be communicated." ^°

As a consequence of this memorandum and an attached draft circular
on the whole matter, Circular No. 78, War Department, of November
21, 1907, in part, addressed itself to altering policy on this area.

The first paragraph prohibited further indiscriminant use
of the marking "Confidential" on communications from the
War Department and permitted its use on such communica-
tions only "where the subject-matter is intended for the sole
information of the person to whom addressed." The second
paragraph, dealing with internal issuances, required that
they be accompanied by a statement indicating the class or
classes of individuals to whom the contents might be dis-
closed. The third paragraph listed five internal issuances that
were not to be considered confidential any longer. The fourth
paragraph indicated that internal serial issuance marked
"Confidential" in the past were for the use of Army officers
and enlisted men and Government employees "when necessary
in connection with their work." ^^

It has been observed that this circular was not actually concerned
explicitly with defense information, but rather with internal com-
munications and publications of the military. As the first such direc-
tive addressed to these matters, it marks the beginning of a policy of
protecting internal documents for reasons of national defense.

"Second, it placed reliance for any necessary protection of the con-
tent of internal issuances, not on jargonized stamped words or expres-
sions, but on an accompanying statement of what was intended in the
case of a particular issuance." In brief, the authority of a protective
label was not acceptable for safeguarding internal documents. The
technique of utilizing an explanatory statement on these materials
served to maintain a rational and self-evident policy for safeguarding
internal information.

Third, the provision pertaining to use of the marking "Confiden-
tial" was unclear in that it did not identify any class of information
to which the label might be applied. The directive only served notice
that this marking could not be used on internal documents. No mean-
ing was prescribed for the term "Confidential" as used in written
and/or verbal discourse. And the thrust of the circular with regard to
the proper use of the marking related not to the content or origin of
the information in question but rather to the intended recipient.^^

• Ibid., p. 13.
Ihid., p. 14.
' Ibid., p. 17 ; original memorandum contained in Annex H of Ibid.

320

The provisions of Circular No. 78 were not included in Army regu-
lations of 1908, 1910, 1913, or 1917. It did appear in the Compilation
of General Orders^ Ciraalars^ and Bulletins . . . issued in 1916 (par.
176). This anonymity, together with the confusion already noted with
regard to the use of the marking "Confidential", would tend to reflect
that the directive had little impact in curtailing the improper use of
the "Confidential" label.

On May 19, 1913, the Judge Advocate General sent a communique
to the Chief of Staff wherein he proposed additional regulations for
the handling of confidential communications, saying :

Telegrams are inherently confidential. Outside of officials
of a telegraph company, no one has authority to see a tele-
gram, other than the sender and receiver, except on a sub-
poena duces tecum issued by a proper court,

A commanding officer of a post where the Signal Corps has
a station has no right to inspect the files of telegrams, at least
files other than those sent at government expense.

The record of the Signal Corps operators is excellent. I
consider the enlisted personnel of the Signal Corps superior
to that of any other arm. The leaks that occur through the
inadvertence or carelessness of enlisted men of the Signal
Corps are few in number. Those occurring through intention
on the part of these men are fewer still. In my opinion leaks
most frequently occur through the fault of officers in leaving
confidential matters open on their desks where others may
read as they transact other business.^^

The Judge Advocate General's suggestions resulted in Changes in
Army Regulations No. 30, War Department, issued June 6, 1916, and
reading :

In order to reduce the possibility of confidential communi-
cations falling into the hands of persons other than those for
whom they are intended, the sender will enclose them in an
inner and an outer cover; the inner cover to be a sealed en-
velope or wrapper addressed in the usual way, but marked
plainly CONFIDENTIAL in such a manner that the nota-
tion may be most readily seen when the outer cover is re-
moved. The package thus prepared will then be enclosed in
another sealed envelope or wrapper addressed in the ordinary
manner with no notation to indicate the confidential nature
of the contents.

The foregoing applies not only to confidential communica-
tions entrusted to the mails or to telegraph companies, but
also to such communications entrusted to messengers passing
between different offices of the same headquarters, including
the bureaus and offices of the War Department.

Government telegraph operators will be held responsible
that all telegrams are carefully guarded. No received tele-
gram will ever leave an office except in a sealed envelope,
properly addressed. All files will be carefully guarded and

" IMd., p. 17 ; original memorandum contained in Annex H I})id.

321

access thereto will be denied to all parties except those au-
thorized by law to see the same.

An examination of The Code of Laios of the United States of Amer-
ica in Force December 6, 1926 (44 Stat. 1-2452) does not readily re-
veal any specification of officials granted the authority to examine tele-
graph or telegram files. It is possible that this power is indirectly
conferred by some statutory provision or that the last line of the
above directive is of a prospective nature.

It has also been suggested that Changes in Army Kegulations No.
30 of 1916 was issued in ignorance of Circular No. 78 of 1907 which
was discussed earlier.^* This situation most likely resulted from the
somewhat fugitive nature of Circular No. 78.

//. World War I

On April 6, 1917 the United States declared war on Germany, (40
Stat. 1). This action prompted new regulations to protect national
defense information. Mobilization was begun immediately and the
first American troops arrived in France in late June. It was also at
this juncture that the American military, working with their French
and British allies, had an opportunity to observe the information
security systems of other armies.

November 22, 1917, General Orders No. 64, General Headquarters,
American Expeditionary Force, was issued on the matters of the pro-
tection of official information. This directive established three mark-
ings for information, saying :

"Confidential" matter is restricted for use and knowledge
to a necessary minimum of persons, either members of this
Expedition or its employees.

The word "Secret" on a communication is intended to limit
the use or sight of it to the officer into whose hands it is de-
livered by proper authority, and, when necessary, a confiden-
tial clerk. With such a document no discretion lies with the
officer or clerk to whom it is delivered, except to guard it as
SECRET in the most complete understanding of that term.
There are no degrees of secrecy in the handling of documents
so marked. Such documents are completely secret.

Secret matter will be kept under lock and key subject to
use only by the officers to whom it has been transmitted. Con-
fidential matter will be similarly cared for unless it be a part
of officer records, and necessary to the entirety of such rec-
ords. Papers of this class will be kept in the office files, and
the confidential clerk responsible for the same shall be given
definite instructions that they are to be shown to no one but
his immediate official superiors, and that the file shall be
locked except during office hours.

Orders, pamphlets of instructions, maps, diagrams, intelli-
gence publications, etc., from these headquarters . . . which are
for ordinary official circulation and not intended for the
public, but the accidental possession of which by the enemy
would result in no harm to the Allied cause ; these will have

^lUd., p. 19.

322

printed in the upper left hand corner, "For Official Circula-
tion Only."

. . . Where circulation is to be indicated otherwise than
is indicated . . . [above] . . . there will be added limitation
in similar type, as :

Not to be taken into Front Line Trenches.

Not to be Reproduced.

Not to go below Division Headquarters.

Not to go below Regimental Headquarters.
Commenting on this prescription, one authority has noted:

This order itself makes clear that the markings "Confi-
dential" and "Secret" were already in use, for it says "There
appears to be some carelessness in the indiscriminant use of
the terms 'Confidential' and 'Secret'." This previous usage
was undoubtedly taken over from the French, who used these
two markings, often with added injunctions such as "not to
be taken into the first line." The British also had a marking
"For official use only." ^^

In early December, 1917, a proposal was advanced by the Acting
Chief of the War College Division, War Department General Staff,
Col. P. D. Lockridge, regarding the use of information markings. The
matter prompting this communique to the Chief of Staff was seem-
ingly some concern that markings being utilized by the A.E.F. be
officially authorized and supervised within units of War Department
jurisdiction outside of the Expeditionary Force command. It would
also seem that "Secret," "Confidential," and other protective labels
were already in use among other military divisions. Obtaining quick
approval from the Acting Chief of Staff, Lockridge's suggestion was
next acted upon by the Adjutant General's Office which decided to
incorporate it in Changes in Compilation of Orders No. 6, War
Department, issued December 14, 1917. "In view of the importance of
the matter, unnumbered and undated advance copies of the intended
issuance were distributed, and a printed 'extract' of the regular printed
issuance was subsequently given wide circulation." ^^

The directive outlined the conditions under which "Secret," "Con-
fidential," and "For Official Use Only" markings were to be utilized.
Materials designated "Secret" would not have their existence disclosed
but those labeled "Confidential" might circulate "to persons known to
be authorized to receive them." The third marking was designed to
restrict information from communication to the public or the press.
In addition, the order contained the following proviso : "Publishing
official documents or information, or using them for personal con-
troversy, or for private purpose without due authority, will be treated
as a breach of official trust, and may be punished under the Article
of War, or under Section I, Title I, of the Espionage Act [40 Stat. 217]
approved June 15, 1917."

This reference to both the Articles of War and the Espionage
Act thoroughly confuses the purpose of the issuance. While

" IMd., p. 26.

" See Ibid., pp. 26-27.

323

the Articles of War contained provisions against correspond-
ing with the enemy and against spying, the reference here can
only be to the provisions of the Articles of War against
disobedience of orders and miscellaneous misconduct. Sec-
tion 1, Title I, of the Espionage Act, on the other hand, was
very comprehensive with respect to any mishandling of
"information respecting the national defense." If that section
alone had been referred to, the implication would have been
that the new issuance related entirely to defense information.
Inclusion of the reference to the Articles of War makes it
possible to argue that the marking "For official use only" was
not intended to apply exclusively to defense information and
that the intention with respect to the marking "Confidential"
is hardly clear.^^

The thrusts of the Espionage Act of 1917, and the Act of 1911 (36
Stat. 1084) prohibiting the disclosure of national defense secrets, were
toward the regulation and punishment of espionage. Neither statute
specifically sanctioned the information protection practices of the War
Department or the armed forces, nor were the orders and directives
of these entities promulgated pursuant to these laws. The markings
prescribed for the use of the military were designed for utilization
on internal communications and documents. With the passage of the
Trading with the Enemy Act (40 Stat. 411) provision was made (40
Stat. 422 § 10(i) ) for the President to designate patents, the publica-
tion of which might "be detrimental to the public safety or defense,
or may assist the enemy or endanger the successful prosecution of the
war," to be kept secret. No label was devised for this action. Quite the
contrary, the means provided for maintaining this secrecy was to
"withhold the grant of a patent until the end of the war." This would
appear to be the first direct statutory grant of authority to the Execu-
tive to declare a type of information secret. Also, although the
provision pertained to defense policy, utilization of this authority was
placed in civilian, not military hands.

There is speculation that reference to the Espionage Act was made
in Compilation of Orders No. 6 to emphasize the precautions for safe-
guarding defense information upon a wartime army composed of new
recruits at all ranks.

There is no indication that there was any realization at this
time that difficulties could arise in enforcing the Espionage
Act if official information relating to the national defense was
not marked as such, insofar as it was intended to be protected
from unauthorized dissemination. Violation of the first three
subsections of Section I, Title I, of the act depended in the
one case on material relating to the national defense having
been turned over to someone not entitled to receive it" and in
the other case on such material having been lost or compro-
mised through "gross negligence." Since the expression "re-
lating to the national defense" was nowhere defined the possi-
bility of the public being permitted to have any authenticated
knowledge whatever about the national defense, even the fact

" nid., pp. 28-29.

324

that Congress had passed certain legislation related thereto,
depended on application of the expressions "not entitled to re-
ceive it" and "gross negligence."

In any prosecution for violation of either of the last two sub-
sections the burden of proving that one or the other key ex-
pression had application in the case would rest on the prose-
cution, and proof would be difficult unless clear evidence could
be adduced that authority had communicated its intention
that the specific material involved should be protected or un-
less that material was of such a nature that common sense
would indicate that it should be protected. For purposes of
administering these two subsections of the Espionage Act the
marking of defense information that is to be protected is al-
most essential, and its marking can also be of great assistance
for purposes of administering the preceding three subsections.

It would be logical to suppose that the marking of defense
information began out of legal necessities for administering
the Espionage Act, but the indications are that such was not
the case. The establishment of three grades of official informa-
tion to be protected by markings was apparently something
copied from the A.E.F., which had borrowed the use of such
markings from the French and British.^^

///. Peacetime Protection

Changes in military regulations governing the protection of sensi-
tive information did not occur until well after the armistice and return
of American troops from Europe. On January 22, 1921 the War De-
partment issued a pamphlet (Army Regulations No. 330-5) entitled
"DOCUMENTS : 'Secret,' 'Confidential,' and 'For Official Use Only,' "
which, with slight modification, constituted a compilation of the war-
time information regulations which were to remain in force during
peacetime. Its essential provisions, with regard to the utilization of
the classification markings, were that (1) "Secret" was to be used on
information "of great importance and when the safeguarding of that
information from actual or potential enemies is of prime necessity;"

(2) "Confidential" pertained to material "of less importance and of
less secret nature than one requiring the mark of 'Secret,' but which
must, nevertheless, be guarded from hostile or indiscreet persons ;" and

(3) "For official use only" had reference to "information which is not
to be communicated to the public or to the press, but which may be
communicated to any person known to be in the service of the United
States whose duty it concerns, or to persons of undoubted loyalty and
discretion who are cooperating with Government work."

A basic shortcomin*? of these regulations would seem to be the in-
ferred unspecific qualitative nature of the instruction pertaining to
the use of "Confidential." The presumption is that regulations per-
tainingf to the use of the "Secret" marking are sufficiently clear that
material warranting this desip'nation might be easily distinguished
from that in the "Confidential" category and that the person affixing
"Confidential" to a document had some qualitative familiarity with
"Secret" information. Another fault of this directive

'/6i<f., pp. 31-32.

325

is its failure to relate itself to the Espionage Act of 1917 or to
limit itself to defense information. It merely provided for the
continuation of a system of markings that had been estab-
lished in war time. This system was not a product of any
thoughtful consideration of the general problem of protect-
ing defense information and other official information. It was
a result of reflex response to immediate necessities arising in
the prosecution of the war.^^

Two commendable aspects of the instructions, in terms of subse-
quent policy developments, were the inclusion of the name, authority,
and date of the affixing officer classifying a document and provisions
for the cancellation of a mark at a later time. These points served to
emphasize that responsibility must be personally borne for restricting
information, that limitation must be carried out under established
authority of some type, and that a time might arise when the protec-
tion was no longer warranted, desirable, or needed.

Between 1921 and 1937 the regulation underwent various modifi-
cations and changes. Only two major policy shifts appear to have oc-
curred during these revisions. A February 12, 1935 edition of the
pamphlet introduced "Restricted," a fourth marking designed to pro-
tect "research work or the design, development, test, production, or
use of a unit of military equipment or a component thereof which it
is desired to keep secret," The provision further noted that the class
of information which this new label was designed to safeguard "is con-
sidered as affecting the national defense of the United States within
the meaning of the Espionage Act (U.S.C. 59:32)." The instructions
regarding the other three information markings still contained no
reference to the Espionage Act.

The following year. Army regulations of February 11, 1936, omitted
"For Official Use Only" and redefined the other markings. Of particu-
lar interest is the broadened understandings of the type of information
to which these labels miffht be applied, including foreign policy ma-
terial and what might be properly called "political" data. "Secret"
referred to information "of such nature that its disclosure might en-
danger the national security, or cause serious injury to the interests
or prestige of the Nation, an individual, or any sfovernment activity,
or be of ereat advantage to a foreign nation." Similarly, "Confiden-
tial" could be applied to material "of such a nature that its disclosure,
althoup-h not endangering the national security, migrht be prejudicial
to the interests or prestige of the Xation, an individual, or any gov-
ernment activitv, or be of advantage to a foreign nation." And "Re-
stricted" might be used in instances where information "is for official
use only or of such a nature that its disclosure should be limited for
reasons of administrative privacy, or should be denied the general
Dublic." The outstanding characteristic of these provisions is their
broad disrretionarv nature with regard to subjects of application.
While initial regulations were designed to safeguard coastal defense
facility information, 1936 saw the possibility of information restric-
tion policv extending to almost anv area of governmental activity.
Such regulations were promulgated without any clear statutory au-

"/&tU. p. 34.

326

thority. Even the Espionage Act was designed for wartime use. Yet,
under armed forces directives governing information protection dur-
ing the late 1930s, "to reveal secret, confidential, or restricted matter
pertaining to the national defense is a violation of the Espionage Act,"
according to Army regulations of 1937.

In Changes in Navy Regulations and Naval Instructions No. 7 of
September 15, 1916, that service had gone so far as to prescribe that
"Officers resigning are warned of the provision of the national defense
secrets act," implying that former Naval personnel returned to civilian
life could not, without subjecting themselves to prosecution, discuss
information which had been protected under Navy regulations. The
violation in question would involve the 1911 secrets law (36 Stat.
1084), not the Navy's directives on the matter. The point is an interest-
ing one in that it illustrates armed forces regulations pertaining to the
protection of information, though not promulgated in accordance with
a statute, enjoyed the color of statutory law for their enforcement.

The omission of "For official use only" from Army regulations in
1936 raises another ponderable : to what extent was this referent used
after that date. Habits are difficult to break, perhaps more so in the
framework of military regimen. The label had been used since the es-
tablislunent of the A.E.F. in France. Were the old stamps kept, used,
obeyed ? To what extent were other markings fabricated and applied :
"private," "official," "airmen only." No informative response can be
made to this question. The point is that by the late 1930s, restriction
labels knew no bounds : they could be applied to virtually any type of
defense or non-defense information; they pertained to situations in-
volving "national security," a policy sphere open to definition within
many quarters of government and by various authorities ; and they car-
ried sanctions which left few with any desire to question their ap-
propriateness or intention.

If, in teiTns of the multiplicity of policy areas to which they could
be applied, the significance of a system of information control markings
came to be realized within the higher reaches of government leader-
ship, it is not surprising that the management of these matters should
be seized by the very highest level of authority within the Executive
Branch. There were, of course, political advantages, but the dictates
of good administration also prompted such action. The first presi-
dential directive on the matter (E.O. 8381), issued March 22, 1940,
was purportedly promulgated in accordance with a provision of a 1938
law (52 Stat. 3) which read:

Whenever, in the interests of national defense, the President
defines certain vital military and naval installations or equip-
ment as requiring protection against the general dissemi-
nation of information thereto, it shall be unlawful to make
any photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, map, or graphical
representation of such vital military and naval installation or
equipment without first obtaining permission of the com-
manding officer.

Utilizing the provision regarding "information relative thereto," the
President authorized the use of control labels on "all official military
or naval books, pamphlets, documents, reports, maps, charts, plans, de-

327

signs, models, drawings, photographs, contracts or specifications which
are now marked under the authority of the Secretary of War or the
Secretary of the Navy as 'secret,' 'confidential,' or 'restricted,' and all
such articles or equipment which may hereafter be so marked with the
approval or at the direction of the President." Commenting on this
situation, one authority has noted :

Congress, in passing the act of January 12, 1938 [52 Stat. 3],
can hardly have expected that it would be interpreted
to be applicable to documentary materials as "equipment."
. . . The Provisions of the Executive order were probably
a substitute for equivalent express provisions of law that
Congress could not be expected to enact. Mention may be
made in this connection of the refusal of Congress, long after
the attack on Pearl Harbor, to pass the proposed War Se-
curity Act submitted to Congress by Attorney General
Francis Biddle on October 17, 1942 (H.E. 1205, 78th Con-
gress, 1st Session).^"

Noteworthy, as well, is the wholesale adoption of the broad defini-
tions, prescribed by the armed forces, of the types of policy to which
these markings might be applied. Revision or modification of these
jurisdictions or the scope of label applications remained, essentially,
with the officers of the War and Navy Department. No civilian con-
trol was provided over the frequency or appropriate use of the labels.
It was apparently presumed that the markings would be utilized only
by the armed services.

IV. World War II

With the advent of the Second World War, more widespread use of
an information protection system was required. In addition, large
numbers of civilians would be responsible for its administration and
operation. Approximately one year after the entry of the United
States into the hostilities it became necessary to establish government-
wide regulations regarding security classification procedures. The
principal instrumentality issuing directives on this matter was the
Office of War Information. Established (E.O. 9182) on June 13, 1942
as a unit within the Office for Emergency Management, the War
Information panel consisted of the consolidated Office of Facts and
Figures, Office of Government Reports, Division of Information of
the Office for Emergency Management, and segments of the Foreign
Information Service. It operated until its abolition (E.O. 9608) on
August 31, 1945, when its peacetime functions were transferred to the
Bureau of the Budget and the Department of State.^^

On September 28, 1942, the Office of War Information issued Regu-
lation No. 4 governing the administration and use of security classi-
fication markings on sensitive documents. It is not known how this
directive was circulated, but it was not published in the Federal
Register. The authority under which it was promulgated is also of

*• /Wd., pp. 48-49.

*^For general information on the OflSce of War Information see: Harold
Childs, ed. "The OflBce of War Information. PuUic Opinion quarterly, v. 7,
Spring, 1943: entire issue; Elmer Davis and Byron Price. War Information and
Censorship. Washington, American Council on Public Affairs, 1943.

328

uncertain origin. Nevertheless, in addition to provisions warning
against overclassification and the proper identification, handling, and
dissemination of sensitive information, the instrument defined three
categories of classification : ^^

Secret Information is information the disclosure of which
might endanger national security, or cause serious injury to
the Nation or any governmental activity thereof.

Confidential Injormation is information the disclosure of
which although not endangering the national security would
impair the effectiveness of government activity in the prose-
cution of war.

Restricted Information is information the disclosure of
which should be limited for reasons of administrative priv-
acy, or is information not classified as confidential because the
benefits to be gained by a lower classification, such as per-
mitting wider dissemination where necessary to effect the
expedition's accomplishment of a particular project, outweigh
the value of the additional security obtainable from the higher
classification.

On May 19, 1943, Office of War Information Supplement No. 1 to
Regulation No. 4 was issued, prescribing the establishment of the
Security Advisory Board.^^ Composed of armed services officers, this
unit according to the directive creating it. functioned as "an advisory
and coordinating board in all matters relating to carry out the pro-
visions of OWl Regulations No. 4." Again, the authority for promul-
gating the supplementary instrument and the operating authority of
the Board are not clear.

After the end of World War II, the SAB continued to
function as a part of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Com-
mittee — later the State- Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating
Committee. On March 21, 1947, provisions of Executive Or-
der 9835 directed the SAB to draft rules for the handling
and transmission of documents and information that should
not be disclosed to the public. A preliminary draft was com-
pleted by the SAB but were not issued before the SAB and its
parent coordinating committee went out of existence.

After enactment of the National Security Act in 1947 [61
Stat. 495"! which created the National Security Council
(NSC), the NSC was given responsibility to consider and
study security matters, which involve many executive depart-
ments and agencies, and to make recommendations to the
President in this vital area. The Interdepartmental Com-
mittee on Internal Security (ICIS) was subsequently created
and the activity of this committee was, according to the
Wright Commission [on Government Security established in

" A copy of the directive is in the files of the House Government Information
and Individual Rights Subcommittee.
*» /bid.

329

1955] report, responsible for issuance of Executive Order

10290 in 1951.2*
Prior to the appearance of the 1951 directive, President Truman
promulgated, pursuant to the opening provision of the 1938 defense
installations protection law [52 Stat. 3], E.O. 10104 which replaced
E.O. 8381 issued by President Roosevelt in accordance with the same
authority. Authorization for the same three security classification
markings was continued and the new instrument also "formalized the
designation 'Top secret,' which had been added to military regula-
tions during the latter part of World War I to coincide with classi-
fication levels of our allies." -^ Supel•^asory authority for carrying out
the provisions of the order was vested in the Secretary of Defense and
the three armed services secretaries.

It is important to emphasize that through the historical pe-
riod of the use of classification markings described thus far
until 1950, such formal directives, regulations, or Executive
orders applied to the protection of military secrets, rarely
extending into either those affecting nonmilitary agencies or
those involving foreign policy or diplomatic relations. One
exception is in the area of communications secrecy, governed
by section 798 of the Espionage Act. This law, which protects
cryptographic systems, communications intelligence informa-
tion, and similar matters, applies, of course, to both military
and nonmilitary Federal agencies such as the State Depart-
ment. Aside from more restrictive war-time regulations, non-
military agencies had, until 1958, relied generally on the
1789 "housekeeping" statute . . . as the basis for withhold-
ing vast amounts of information from public disclosure.^^

On September 24, 1951, through the issuance of E.O. 10290, Presi-
dent Truman extended the coverage of the classification system to
nonmilitary agencies which had a role in "national security" matters.
The directive cited no express constitutional or statutory authority
for its promulgation. Instead, the Chief Executive seems to have relied
upon implied powers such as the "faithful execution of the laws"
clause. Although these postures for the order were generally recog-
nized and accepted as a legitimate basis for issuing such an instrument,
the President's role in the matter was felt to have limitations as well.^^

Foremost among these is the well settled rule that an Execu-
tive order, or any other Executive action, whether by formal
order or by regulation, cannot contravene an act of Congress
which is constitutional. Thus, when an Executive order col-
lides with a statute which is enacted pursuant to the constitu-
tional authority of the Congress, the statute will prevail

**U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Executive
Classification of Information — Security Cla^ssiflcation Problems Involving Exem-
tian (b)(1) of the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). Washinprton,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. (93rd Congress, 1st Session. House. Report No. 221),
p. 8.

" Ibid.

"Ibid., pp. 8-9.

" See U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Safeguard-
ing Official Information in the Interests of the Defense of the United States.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1962. (87th Congress, 2d session. House.
Report no. 2456), pp. 29-31

330

[Kendall v. United States, 12 Peters 524 (1838)]. This rule,
in turn, gives rise to a further limitation which finds its
source in the power of the Congress to set forth specifically
the duties of various officers and employees of the executive
branch. Since the President can control only those duties of
his subordinates which are discretionary, to the extent that
the Congress prescribes these duties in detail, these officials
can exercise no discretion and their actions cannot be con-
trolled by the President. In other words, if the Congress en-
acts a statute which is constitutionally within its authority,
the President cannot lawfully, either by Executive order, reg-
ulation, or any other means, direct his subordinates to dis-
obey that statute, regardless of whether it affects third
persons or whether it is only a directive concerning the man-
agement of the executive branch of the Government.^^

The legal justification for the program does not appear as barren
as the foregoing seems to imply. Not only have Constitutional grounds
(Article II) been put forward to justify the power of the President
to establish a classification program, but statutory authority has been
inferred from a number of laws, notably the Freedom of Information
Act (5 U.S.C.A. 552, as amended by Public Law 93-502), the espio-
nage laws (18 U.S.C.A. 792 et seq., notably sections 795 and 798), the
Internal Security Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C.A. 783(b)), and the 1947
National Security Act (61 Stat. 495). ^^^

Congress might attempt to overturn an Executive order by rescind-
ing it or by possibly offering alternative language supplanting or
amending the directive (though there would seem to be a constitu-
tional conflict in such a course of action in the case of E.O. 10290).
Thus, on September 28, 1951, Senator John W. Bricker (R. Ohio)
introduced S. 2190 which provided for the repeal of the directive, but
the bill failed to receive any consideration.^'' The order thus remained
in effect until 1953.

When President Eisenhower took office in January 1953,
he took notice of the widespread criticism of Executive Order
10290 and requested Attorney General [Herbert] Brownell
for advice concerning its rescission or revision. On June 15,
1953, the Attorney General recommended rescission of the
Executive order and the issuance of a new order which would
"protect every requirement of national safety and at the same
time, honor the basic tenets of freedom of information."

That fall, President Eisenhow^er replaced the controversial
Truman order with Executive Order No. 10501, "Safeguard-
ing Official Information in the Interests of the Defense of the
United States." This order, issued on November 5, 1953, be-
came effective on December 15, 1953 ; it was amended several

=• lUd., pp. 31-32.

»» "Developments in the Law — the National Security Interest and Civil Liber-
ties," Harvard Law Review, v. 85, 1972, pp. 1130-1198. For judicial recoenition
of these provisions as plausible justification for a documentation classification
program, see the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall in tfew York Times
Co. vs. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 740, 741 (1971).

=" See Ibid., pp. 33-35.

331

times in the succeeding years, but for almost twenty years
served as the basis for the security classification system until
it was superseded in March 1972.^°

It became necessary for the Eisenhower Administration and its suc-
cessor to issue clarifying directives and new orders relative to E.O.
10501 over the next decade. The additions included :

Memorandum to Executive Order 10501 (24 F.R. 3779)
dated November 5, 1953, specified 28 agencies without original
classification authority and 17 agencies in which classifica-
tion authoritv is limited to the head of the agency.

Executive Order 10816 (24 F.R. 3777), issued May 7, 19'59.
This order accomplished the following :

Under Executive Order 10290 (September 24, 1951) all
Government agencies had authority to classify information.
Executive Order 10501 canceled this authorization for those
agencies "having no direct responsibility for national def-
ense," but was silent on the problem of declassifying any
information which agencies with no direct defense responsi-
bility had classified previously. The new order clarified the
hiatus which had existed.

Under section 7 of Executive Order 10501 only persons
whose official duties were in the interest of "promoting na-
tional defense'' had access to classified information. It was
discovered that this excluded persons who wished to examine
documents while carrying out bone fide historical research.
The new order allowed access to classified information to
trustworthy persons engaged in such research projects, pro-
vided access was "clearly consistent with the interests of
national defense.*'

The new order allowed the transmission of "confidential"
defense material within the United States by certified and
first-class mail, in addition to the original authorization to use
registered mail.

Memorandum to Executive Order 10501 (24 F.R. 3777).
dated May 7, 1959, added 2 agencies to the 28 agencies pre-
viously designated by the President as having no authority
to classify information under Executive Order 10501.

Memorandum to Executive Order 10501 (25 F.R. 2073).
dated March 9, 1960, provided that agencies created after
November 5, 1953 (date of issuance of Executive Order
lOoOl), shall not have authority to classify information under
the Executive order unless specifically authorized to do so. In
addition, the memorandum listed eight such agencies which
were granted authoritv to classifv defense material.

Executive Order 10901 (26 F.R. 217), dated January 9,
1961, adopted a "positive" approach to the authority to con-
trol national defense information. Prior to this revision, all
Government agencies except those specifically listed, could
stamp "Top secret," "Secret," or "Confidential'' on the in-
formation they originated. Executive Order 10901 super-

»* See Ibid., pp. 33-35.

332

seded previous authority and listed by name those agencies
granted authority to classify security information. The order
lists 32 agencies which have blanket authority to originate
classified material because they have "primary responsibility
for matters pertaining to national defense," and the authority
can be delegated by the agency head as he wishes. The order
lists 13 agencies in which the authority to originate classified
information can be exercised only by the head of agencies
which have "partial but not primary responsibility for mat-
ters pertaining to national defense." The order states that
Government agencies established after the issuance of Execu-
tive Order 10901 do not have authority to classify informa-
tion unless such authority is specifically granted by the

Pr6SlQGIlt

Executive Order 10964 (27 F.R. 8932), dated September 20,

1961, set up an automatic declassification and downgrading
system. The four classes of military-security documents
created are:

(1) Information originated by foreign governments, re-
stricted by statutes, or req^uiring special handling, which is
excluded from the automatic system ;

(2) Extremely sensitive information placed in a special
class and downgraded or declassified on an individual basis ;

(3) Information or material which warrant some degree of
classification for an indefinite period will be downgraded
automatically at 12 year intervals until the lowest classifica-
tion is reached ; and

(4) All other information which is automatically down-
graded every 3 years until the lowest classification is reached
and the material is automatically declassified after 12 years.

The order requires that, to tl e fullest extent possible, the
classifying authority shall indicate the group the material
falls into at the time of originating the classification.

Executive Order 10985 (27 F.R. 439), dated January 12,

1962, removes from certain agencies the power to classify in-
formation, and adds other agencies to the list of those with
the authority to classify.^^

While these changes were being effected, the Executive also estab-
lished two evaluation commissions to examine the administration and
operation of the security classification system and to make recommen-
dations for its improvement. These panels were established at a time
when the Special Government Information Subcommittee of the House
Government Operations Committee was also undertaking an inquiry
into many of the same matters. The activities and recommendations of
the Subcommittee will be discussed shortly.

V. The Coolidge Committee

Shortly after the Special Government Information Subcommittee
began its hearings on the availability of information from Federal
departments and agencies, the Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wil-
son, created, on August 13, 1956, a five-member Committee on Classified

*" H. Kept. 87-2456, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

333

Information with Charles A. Coolidge, a prominent Boston attorney
and former Assistant Secretary of Defense, as chairman. Other mem-
bers of the panel were retired high-ranking ofl&cers representative of
the four armed services. In his letter establishing the committee, the
Secretary indicated he was "seriously concerned over the unauthorized
disclosure of classified military information" and urged that the group
"undertake an examination of the following matters affecting national
security" :

1. A review of present laws, executive orders, Department
of Defense regulations and directives pertaining to the classi-
fication of information and the safeguarding of classified in-
formation, to evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of such
documents.

2. An examination of the organizations and procedures fol-
lowed within the Department of Defense designed to imple-
ment the above cited documents, to evaluate the adequacy and
effectiveness of such organizations and procedures.

3. An examination of the means available to the Depart-
ment of Defense to fix responsibility for the unauthorized dis-
closure of classification information, and to determine the
adequacy and effectiveness of such means in preventing fu-
ture unauthorized disclosures of such information.

4. An examination of the organization and procedures in
the Department of Defense designed to prevent the inadvert-
ent disclosure of classified information in any manner.^*

Utilizing a small staff, the committee did not hold any formal hear-
ings but, according to the chairman, "we had conferences without a
stenographer present, to get the opinions of our conferees." After being
charged with their mission by the Secretary, the panel "decided we
would hold conferences starting with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense organization and running down into the services and in gen-
eral confer with people throughout the Department of Defense, whom
we thought had peculiar knowledge of and interest in security
matters." ^°

The instructions to the Coolidge Committee made no men-
tion of studying overclassification or arbitrary withholding
of information from the public and from Congress. In a Sep-
tember 25, 1956, letter to Secretary Wilson, Chairman Moss
of the Special Government Information Subcommittee ex-
pressed the hope that the Coolidge Committee would also re-
view the withholding aspects of the problem, as had been
revealed in the earlier subcommittee hearings. He was assured
in an October 9, 1956, response from Assistant Secretary of
Defense Ross that since the two subjects are related, "it is
probable that the report of the Coolidge Committee will make
recommendations bearing on our public information policies

** U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Special Sub-
committee on Government Information. Availability of Information from Federal
Departments and Agencies {Part 8). Hearings, 85th Congress, 1st session. Wash-
ington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1957, p. 2010.

" Ibid., pp. 2011-2012 ; a complete list of witnesses appears at pp. 2012-2014.

334

as well as our procedures for preventing the unauthorized dis-
closure of classified military information." '®

After three months of study, the panel issued a report on November
8, 1956, which contained twenty-eight specific recommendations, ten of
which concerned overclassincation, and the following general
conclusion :

Our examination leads us to conclude that there is no con-
scious attempt within the Department of Defense to withhold
information which under the principles set forth at the begin-
ning of this report the public should have ; that the classifica-
tion system is sound in concept and, while not operating
satisfactorily in some respects, it has been and is essential to
the security of the nation ; and that further efforts should be
made to cure the defects in its operation.^^

With the publication of the committee's report, Chairman Coolidge
and members of the panel went before the House Special Government
Information Subcommittee to discuss their findings and recommenda-
tion.^^ A few months later the Department of Defense implemented
portions of the study's recommendations.^^

Secretary Wilson issued a new DoD directive covering the
procedures for classification of security information under
Executive Order 10501. His July 8, 1957, action replaced a
dozen previous directives and memorandums and consoli-
dated classification instructions into a single new document —
DoD Directive 5200.1 — entitled "Safeguarding Official Infor-
mation in the Interests of the Defense of the United States."
It incorporated a number of the specific recommendations
made by the Coolidge Committee.

Despite concern over the problem of overclassification, the
Coolidge Committee made no recommendation for penalties
or disciplinary action in cases of misuse of abuse of classifica-
tion. The new DoD directive did mention disciplinary action
for overclassification, but there is no evidence of its ever
having been used.*"

YI. The 'Wright Commission

Paralleling the activities of the Coolidge Committee was the Com-
mission on Government Security, established by law (69 Stat. 595)

^' H. Kept. 93-221, op. oit., p. 16.

" U.S. Department of Defense. Committee on Classified Information. Report to
the Secretary of Defense ty the Committee on Classified Information. Washing-
ton, Department of Defense, 1956, p. 23.

T.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Special Sub-
committee on Government Information. Avadlahility of Information From Fed-
eral Departments and Agencies {Part 8), op. cit., pp. 2011-2095, 2097-2132; the
entire report of the Coolidge Committee may be found at pp. 2133-2160.

^ See U.S. Department of Defense. OflSce of the Secretary of Defense. Depart-
ment of Defense Implementation of Recommendations of Coolidge Committee
on Classified Information. Washington, Department of Defense, 1957 (published
in two parts).

^^H. Rept. 93-221, op. cit., p. 17; DoD Directive 5200.1 may be found in U.S.
Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Special Subcommittee
on Government Information. Availability of Information From Federal Depart-
ments and Agencies (Part 13). Hearings, 85th Congress, 1st session. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1957, pp. 3243-3260.

335

on August 9, 1955, and taking its popular name from its chairman,
prominent Los Angeles attorney and former American Bar Associa-
tion president, Loyd Wright. Composed of six Republicans and six
Democrats, four of whom were selected by the President, four by the
Speaker of the House and four by the President of the Senate, the
panel's mandate was thus expressed (69 Stat. 596-597) :

The Commission shall study and investigate the entire
Government Security Program, including the various stat-
utes. Presidential orders, and administrative regulations and
directives under which the Government seeks to protect the
national security, national defense secrets, and public and
private installations, against loss or injury arising from
espionage, disloj^alty, subversive activity, sabotage, or unau-
thorized disclosures, together with the actual manner in
which such statutes, Presidential orders, administrative regu-
lations, and directives have been and are being administered
and implemented, with a view to determining whether exist-
ing requirements, practices, and procedures are in accordance
with the policies set forth in the first section of this joint reso-
lution, and to recommending such changes as it may deter-
mine are necessary or desirable. The Commission shall also
consider and submit reports and recommendations on the ade-
quacy or deficiencies of existing statutes. Presidential orders,
administrative regulations, and directives, and the adminis-
tration of such statutes, orders, regulations, and directives,
from the standpoints of internal consistency of the overall
security program and effective protection and maintenance
of the national security.

Organized in December, 1955, the Commission was sworn on Janu-
ary 9, 1956. Four special subject subcommittees were formed with a
panel on Legislation and Classification of Documents composed of
James P. McGarnerj^, chairman, Senator Norris Cotton (R.-N.H.),
Senator John Stennis (D.-Miss,), and, ex officio, Chairman Wright.

After acquiring office space in the General Accounting
Office building, the Commission began recruiting a staff for
its challenging task. The chairman, with the approval of the
Commission, selected the supervisory staff, consisting of an
administrative director, a director of project surveys, a direc-
tor of research, a general counsel, a chief consultant and an
executive secretary.

The entire staff, carefully selected on a basis of personal in-
tegrity, unquestionable loyalty, and discretion, combined with
appropriate experience and a record of devotion to duty in
responsible positions, worked under the personal direction
of the Chairman.

To avoid entanglement in public controversies, to maintain
an obiective and impartial approach to its work, the Commis-
sion held no public hearings and made no press releases or
public statements reflecting its view or describing its
activities.*^

*^ Commispion on Gnvprnment Security. Report of the rnmmis«inn on Govern-
ment Secunty. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1957. (85th Congress, 1st
session. Senate. Document No. 64), pp. xiv-xv.

336

The Commission enlisted the assistance of four private consultants
and the loan of two special aides from the Senate Office of Legislative
Counsel and Government Printing Office. Expert advice was also re-
cruited through a Citizens Advisory Committee which met with the
Commission on three occasions. "During each of the several sessions
many aspects of the Commission's conclusions and recommendations
were discussed. These conferences provided views that emanated from
fresh, new perspectives, and contributed to the solution of many com-
plex and challenging problems." ^^

On June 23, 1957, the Commission issued a massive 807-page report
on various aspects of government security policy and operations. A
small portion of the document surveyed the historical evolution of the
document classification program, examined the legal basis for the then
existing arrangements, and scrutinized the scope and mechanics of the
operation. The report also offered suggestions for the improvement of
the classification effort, saying, in summary :

The changes recommended by the Commission in the pres-
ent program for classification of documents and other material
are of major importance. The most important change is that
the Confidential classification be abolished. The Commission
is convinced that retention of this classification serves no use-
ful purpose which could not be covered by the Top Secret or
Secret classification. Since the recommendation is not retro-
active it eliminates the immediate task of declassifying mate-
rial now classified Confidential. The Commission also recom-
mends abolition of the requirement for a personal security
check for access to documents or material classified Confiden-
tial. The danger inherent in such access is not significant and
the present clearance requirements afford no real security-
clearance check.

The report of the Commission stresses the dangers to
national security that arise out of overclassification of infor-
mation which retards scientific and technological progress,
and thus tends to deprive the country of the lead time that
results from the free exchange of ideals and information.*^

The Commission also addressed the attitude it found that Congress
had taken toward rules for classification, and the balance between free
speech and national security :

Congressional inaction in this particular area can be traced to
the genuine fear of imposing undue censorship upon the bulk
of information flowing from various governmental agencies
and which the American people, for the most part, have the
right to know. Any statute designed to correct this difficulty
must necessarily minimize Constitutional objections by main-
taining the proper balance between the guarantee of the first
Amendment, on the one hand, and reguired measures to estab-
lish a needed safeguard against any real danger to our na-
tional security.*^'

*' TMd., p. vii ; consiilfants are listed at p. ii and members of the Citizens Ad-
visory Committee may be found at pp. vii-ix.
'^ IMd., pp. xix-xx.
"^ Ibid., p. 620.

337

The "Wright Commission also provoked two major controversies. The
first of these was an allegation that the press often breached security
by utilizing classified information either directly or indirectly in news
stories. It was also charged that such information had been purloined
by journalists. Challenged by the House Special Subcommittee on Gov-
ernment Information, neither assertion was substantiated."**

The most controversial portion of the Wright Commission
recommendations was its proposal urging Congress to "enact
legislation making it a crime for any person willfully to dis-
close without proper authorization, for any purpose what-
ever, information classified 'secret' or 'top secret' knowing, or
having reasonable grounds to believe, such information to
have been so classified." The recommended bill would impose
a $10,000 fine and jail term of up to 5 years for those convicted
of violating its provisions. The Commission made it clear that
its proposal was aimed at persons outside of government, such
as newsmen. The recommendation was soundly criticized in
articles and editorials from such papers as the New York
Times, Baltimore Sun, Chicago Daily Sun-Times, Boston
Traveler, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Detroit Free Press, Wash-
ington Post and Times Herald, and Editor and Publisher. One
article by James Reston of the New York Times pointed out
that it would have even resulted in the prosecution of the re-
porter, Paul Anderson of the St. Louis Post Dispatch, who un-
covered and published "secret" documents in the "teapot
Dome" scandal during the 1920's.*^

YII. The Moss Committee

"\ATiile a number of congressional committees have some aspects of
government information policy within their jurisdiction, the House
of Representatives devoted concentrated attention to the matter in
1955 with the creation of the Special Government Information Sub-
committee of the Government Operations Committee. The establish-
ment of the panel was due to a variety of factors. According to one
authority, the event "took place in an atmosphere of press concern
about growing post-war secrecy in general and the Eisenhower Ad-
ministration's information policies in particular. In November 1954,
just as the nation was electing a Democratic Congress, the Admin-
istration established the controversial Office of Strategic Informa-
tion." *^ This particular agency of the Commerce Department was re-
portedly "responsible for formulating policies and providing advice
and guidance to public agencies, industry and business, and other

**See: U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Special
Subcommittee on Government Information. Ai-ailability of Information from
Federal Departments and Age^icies (Part JO). Hearinsrs, 8.5th Conerress 1st ses-
sion. Washineton. U.S. Govt. Print. Off.. 1957. p. 2435 Thid. (Part 13). pn. 330.5-
3316; U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Availnbilitj/
of Information from Federal D'eparfmDit.f atyd Aae^ieira. Washinerton, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1958. (85tli Congress, 2d session. House. Report No. 1884), pp. 14-19,
31-39.

*^ H. Rept. 93-221, op. rit., p. 21 ; the bill appears in Commission on Goverr
ment Securitv. "w. cit.. p. 737.

** Robert O. Bianchard. Present at the Creation : the Media and the Moss
Committee. Journalism Quarterly, v. 49, Summer, 1972 : 272.

338

private groups who are concerned with producing and distributing
unclassified scientific, technical, industrial, and economic informa-
tion, the indiscriminate release of which may be inimical to the defense
interests of the United States." ^^ The criticisms leveled against the
Office included "adding new classification categories of government,
failing to define 'strategic information' in a clear-cut way that would
limit the operation of the agency, favoring some companies with in-
formation withheld from others, and calling for voluntary withholding
of publication or broadcast of 'strategic information.' " *^ The press
community was particularly interested in such a subcommittee given
the experience of the Freedom of Information Committee of the Am-
erican Society of Newspaper Editors. Relying upon a March 29, 1955
directive from the Secretary of Defense regarding the limiting of de-
partmental information activities to matters that would make "a con-
structive contribution" to the mission of DoD, Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary ( Public Affairs) Karl Honaman responded to an information
request from the editors' group, saying :

The public is eager to be informed of the activities of the
Defense Department and need to have this information in
order to play their part effectively as citizens. There are,
nevertheless, many cases where demands for information
which take up the time of people with busy schedules do not
truly meet the requirement of being useful or valuable, nor
yet very interesting to the public. These are tests that should
be met. Thus, I would substitute for self-service, public-
serving, and I am sure this is a part of the interpretation of
constructive.*^

The Defense Secretary's directive, the experience and outcry of the
American Society of Newspaper Editors, and the mounting penchant
for information control witlun the Executive were of sufficient con-
cern to Government Operations Committee Chairman William L.
Dawson (D.-Ill.) and House Majority Leader John McCormack (D.-
Mass.) that they agreed to the creation of a government subcommittee
and selected Rep. John E. Moss (D.-Calif.) as chairman. Since 1963
the panel has functioned as a standing subcommittee of the Govern-
ment Operations Committee. In 1971, Rep. Moss relinquished leader-
ship of the unit whereupon Rep. William S. Moorhead (D.-Pa.) be-
came chairman; in 1975 Rep. Bella S. Abzug (D.-N.Y.) assumed
direction of the panel.

In its 2-year study of security classification policies that
spanned the Coolidge and Wright groups, the House Gov-
ernment Information Subcommittee concentrated heavily on
the Department of Defense. The conclusions and recommen-
dations made, in turn, through reports of the full Govern-
ment Operations Committee are particularly important to
recall because they pinpointed major problem areas which

^'U.S. General Services Administration. National Archives and Records Serv-
ice. PVfl^ral Rfsiste^ Division. Unifrd S!tafc° Government Organisation 1955-56.
Washington, U.S. Gov't. Print. Off., 1955, p. 258.

^'Blanchard. loo. cit.

"Cited in .Tames Rnsse'l Wie"'iTi«!. Freedom or Secrecy, Revised Edition. New
York, Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 109.

339

existed over 15 years ago. They also proposed a number of
specific recommendations to correct many of these prob-
lems . . . — recommendations that were largely ignored by
both Republican and Democratic administrations. Had such
recommendations been properly implemented by top Penta-
gon officials, it is possible that the security classij&cation
"mess" referred to by President Nixon almost 14 years after
the issuance of the first of these committee reports could have
long since been corrected.^"

On the general matter of the administration of information policy
and operations by the military, the Subcommittee observed :

Never before in our democratic form of government has the
need for candor been so great. The Nation can no longer
afford the danger of withholding information merely because
the facts fail to fit a predetermined "policy." Withholding
for any reason other than true military security inevitably
results in the loss of public confidence — or a greater tragedy.
Unfortunately, in no other part of our Government has it been
so easy to substitute secrecy for candor and to equate sup-
pression with security.

And further on in the same report :

In a conflict between the right to know and the need to pro-
tect true military secrets from a potential enemy, there can be
no valid argument against secrecy. The right to know has
suffered, however, in the confusion over the demarcation be-
tween secrecy for true security reasons and secrecy for
"policy" reasons. The proper imposition of secrecy in some
situations is a matter of judgment. Although an official faces
disciplinary action for the failure to classify information
which should be secret, no instance has been found of an
official being disciplined for classifying material which
should have been made public. The tendency to "play it safe"
and use the secrecy stamp, has therefore, been virtually
inevitable.^^

When the Subcommittee once again turned its attention to security
classification policy in 1972, a study of the administration of E.O.
10501 revealed "that administrative penalties are the only type of ac-
tion taken in cases involving improper physical protection of in-
formation. No criminal charges were ever made by the agencies
surveyed. . . ." ^^ No actions were taken against known cases of over-
classification.^^

With regard to the allegations of Chairman Wright of the Com-
mission on Government Security that newsmen were "purloining" clas-
sified documents, the Subcommittee concluded :

*" H. Rept. 93-221, op cit., p. 21.

^ H. Rept. 85-1884, op. cit., p. 152.

°^ See U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. U.S. Gov-
ernment Information Policies and Practices — Security Classification Problems
Involving Subsection (b)(1) of the Freedom of Iriformation Act (Part 7).
Hearings, 92nd Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972,
p. 2932.

^Ibid., pp. 2926-2937.

340

No member of the press should be immune from responsi-
bility if sound evidence can be produced to prove that he has
in fact deliberately "purloined" and knowingly breached
properly classified military secrets, But the press must not
be made the whipping boy for weaknesses in the security sys-
tem caused by overzealous censors who misuse that system to
hide controversy and embarrassment.^*

As a consequence of its first study of the security classification sys-
tem and the administration of E.0. 10501, the Subcommittee made the
following recommendations to improve operations.

1. The President should make effective the classification
appeals procedure under section 16 of the Executive Order
10501 and provide for a realistic, independent appraisal of
complaints against overclassification and unjustified with-
holding of information.

2. The President should make mandatory the marking of
each classified document with the future date or event after
which it will be reviewed or automatically downgraded or
declassified.

3. The Secretary of Defense should set a reasonable date
for the declassification of the huge backlog of classified infor-
mation, with a minimum of exceptions.

4. The Secretary of Defense should direct that disciplinary
action be taken in cases of overclassification.

5. The Secretary of Defense should completely divorce
from the Oflfice of Security Review the function of censorship
for policy reasons and should require that all changes made or
suggested in speeches articles and other informational ma-
terial be in writing and state clearly whether the changes are
for security or policy reasons.

6. The Secretary of Defense should establish more adequate
procedures for airing differences of opinion among respon-
sible leaders of the military services before a final policy
decision is made.

7. The Congress should reaffirm and strengthen provisions
in the National Security Act giving positive assurance to the
Secretaries and the military leaders of the services that they
will not be penalized in any way if, on their own initiative,
they inform the Congress of differences of opinion after a pol-
icy decision has been made.^^

Although these suggestions, as previously noted, failed to obtain any
response or support for implementation from the Executive, the Sub-
committee was not without some successes in its efforts to reduce un-
necessary secrecy practices in information management. As the panel
later saw the situation,^® the Department of Defense responded to its

^ H. Rept. S5-1884, op. cit., 154-155.

" Ibid., p. 161.

^ See U.S. ConffTPSS. House. Committee on Government Operations. AvnilahiUfy
of Information from Federal Departmevts and Agenciea (Progress of Study,
February, 1957-,Iuly, J95S). Washineton, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1958. (85th Con-
gress, 2d session. House. Report no. 2578), pp. 58-60.

341

wishes by issuing a new directive dated September 27, 1958 which,
according to the Pentagon's press release

. . . establishes a new method by which millions of military
documents, originated prior to January 1, 1946, and classi-
fied top secret, secret, and confidential will now be down-
graded or declassified.

The new directive which becomes effective 60 days after
signature, automatically cancels, except within a few limited
categories, the security clasifications on millions of documents
which no longer need protection in the national interest. In
addition, the directive will downgrade to secret all top secret
documents which are exempted from declassification.^^

Although the substance of the order was most agreeable to the Sub-
committee, the successful implementation of it, in the opinion of
the Subcommittee left much to be desired. An April 15, 1959 report
to the Moss panel from the DOD Office of Declassification Policy
indicated that means to carry out the directive were still under
discussion.^^

Additional efforts were made by the subcommittee to re-
duce the number of executive agencies authorized to exercise
classification authority under Executive Order 10501. Studies
on the use of classification authority by a list of agencies
surveyed by the subcommittee were made available to the
White House and on March 9, 1960, President Eisenhower
signed a memorandum having the effect of prohibiting some
33 Federal agencies from classifying information under the
Executive order. President Eisenhower later issued Execu-
tive Order 10901 on January 9, 1961, prohibiting 30 addi-
tional agencies from classifying military information, thus
limiting classification authority to 45 specifically named de-
partments and agencies.^®

The Subcommittee felt that, as constituted a decade before, it had
succeeded in prompting another DOD directive regarding the de-
classification of post-World War II documents.

The . . . directive was originally scheduled to take effect on
December 27, 1960, but its effective date was postponed until
May 1, 1961. It applied to documents originated on or after
Januars^ 1, 1946, and established two "time ladders" for auto-
rnatically downgrading or declasifying documents after spe-
cific time levels have elapsed. Non-exempted material would
be downgraded at 3-year intervals from top secret to secret
to confidential, and automatically declassified after a total
of 12 years' existence in a classified status. Exempted mate-
rial, such as war plans, intelligence documents, and similar

''U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Availability
of Information from Federal Departments and Agencies (Progress of Study,
August, ]958->Julv. 1959). Washington. U.S. Govt. Print. Off.. 1959. (86th Con-
gress, 1st session. House. Report no. 1137), pp. 81-82; the text of the directive
may be found at pp. 87-91.

" Ibid., pp. 93-97 ; H. Rept. 93-221,. op. cit., p. 24.

* H. Rept. 93-221, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

342

information, would be downgraded from top secret to secret
to confidential at 12-year intervals but would not be auto-
matically declassified. The automatic downorrading and de-
classification provisions of DOD Directive 5200.10 were sub-
sequently incorporated into Executive Order 10964, issued
by President Kennedy on September 20, 1961.

Executive Order 10964 also added a new section 19 to Ex-
ecutive Order 10501 directing department heads to "take
prompt and stringent administrative action" against Govern-
ment personnel who knowingly and improperly release classi-
fied information. Where appropriate, it directed that such
cases be referred to the Justice Department for possible
prosecution under applicable criminal statutes.'"'

With the advent of a new administration in 1961, both President
Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara were apprised
of the Subcommittee's findings and suggestions with regard to the
administration of information policy. "Among the major recommen-
dations was a proposal to make effective the classification appeals
procedure available under section 16 of Executive Order 10501, so as
to provide for a realistic independent appraisal of complaints against
overclassification and unjustified withholding of information. While
the President did name Mr. Lee C. White, Assistant Special Counsel
to the President, as the designated person to receive complaints under
section 16, there is no indication that the procedure was utilized." ®^

It was also at this time that the Subcommittee began turning its
attention to legislation to assist in and otherwise clarify public access
to documentary government information. By 1963 a variety of meas-
ures began to be introduced and hearings were undertaken on the
matter. The result was the Freedom of Information Act (80 Stat. 250)
signed into law by President Johnson on July 4, 1966 to go into effect
one year later.®^ In its provision of permissive exemptions of cate-
gories of information which might be withheld from the public, the
legislation recognized records "specifically required by Executive
order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign
policy." ^^

When oversight hearings on the administration and operation of
the act were undertaken by the Foreign Operations and Government
Information Subcommittee, successor to the Moss panel, in 1972,
scrutiny of the Executive's utilization of this exemption to withhold
information resulted in a broad re-examination of the security classi-
fication program. Relevant major findings were that, according to a
survey of the department and agencies regarding four years' admin-
istration of the law, the secret information exemption ranked third in

*/6id., p. 25

^ Thid.

" For a leprilative history of the act see U.S. Congress. House. Committee
on Government Operations. U.S. Govervment Informatinn Policies and Prac-
tices — Administration and Operation of tU" Frerdom of Informatinn Act (Part
4). Hearings, 92nd Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Gov.t Print. Off.,
1972. pp. 1.S67-1373.

"See 5 U.S.C. 5^2 (h) (1). 1970 ed : this language was amended in 1974 by
P.Ii. 93-502 which strengthened portions of the FOI law.

343

a field of nine in terms of being one of the least utilized provisions
for withholding documents.'^*

Another revelation resulting from the proceedings concerned the
costs of classification operations. One expert witness, a retired Air
Force official with many years of experience on the subject, testified :

There is a massive wastage of money and manpower in-
volved in protecting this mountainous volume of material
with unwarranted classification markings. Last year, I esti-
mated that about $50 million was being spent on protective
measures for classified documents which were unnecessarily
classified. After further observation and inquiry, and in-
cluding expenditures for the useless clearances granted peo-
ple for access to classified material, it is my calculation that
the annual wastage for safeguarding documents and equip-
ment with counterfeit classification markings is over $100
million.^^

Although the Defense Department reported that there was "no
available data on the total costs which could be attributed to security
classification or to the protection and handling of classified documents
and materials," ^'^ the Subcommittee commissioned a General Account-
ing Office study on the matter.**" In remarks on the House floor, Chair-
man Moorhead compared the results of the GAO analysis with an
Office of Management Budget report on public information costs,
saying :

The GAO analysis was requested last summer [1971] by
the Foreign Operations and Government Information Sub-
committee, which is charged with the duty of determining
the economy and efficiency of Government information activ-
ities. The 0MB figures were compiled from reports of Gov-
ment agencies the year after they were ordered by President
Nixon to cut down "self-serving and wasteful public rela-
tions activities" outside the White House [1971].

The GAO surveyed the secrecy systems in the Depart-
ments of Defense and State, the Atomic Energy Commission,
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration —
the four agencies responsible for the huge bulk of documents
classified under the secrecy system. Those four agencies, the
GAO reported, spend $126,322,394 annually on various activ-

" See U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. U.S. Gov-
ernment Information on Policies and Practices — Administration and Operation
of the Freedom of Information Act {Part 4), op. cit., pp. 1342-1343.

"U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. U.S. Govern-
ment Information Policies and Practices — Security Classification Problems In-
volving Subsection (&) (1) of the Freedom of Information Act (Part 7), op. cit.,
p. 2532.

*" U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. U.S. Govern-
mrnt Information Policies and Practices — The Pentagon Papers {Part 2).
Hearings, 92nd Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971,
p. 690.

"'For the entire study and accompanying papers see U.S. Congress. House.
Committee on Government Operations. XJ.S. Government Information Policies
and Practices — Security Classification Problems Involving Subsection (b)(1) of
the Freedom of Information Act, op. cit., pp. 2286-2293.

344

ities related to the security classification system, such as the
classification, declassification, storing, and safeguarding of
Government documents and the conduct of personnel security
investigations.

The 0MB listed the annual expenditures of the same four
agencies for all of their public information programs as $64,-
029,000.

While the $126,000,000 annual secrecy expense covers the
top four secret-generating agencies in Government, it is only
a part of the total cost of hiding information from the public.
The GAO admitted that even their experts could not get all
of the data necessary to arriA^e at the total cost of the security
classification system. They said they had to use assumptions,
extrapolations, and [sic] other cost-estimating techniques
and to ignore some costs where estimates could not be read-
ily developed.

One of the biggest blanks in the GAO study of the cost
secrecy is the money that defense contractors charge the tax-
payers for their role in the Government's secrecy system.
None of the big four Government agencies gave the GAO
firm figures on this cost, but we are working with the audi-
tors to develop a firm estimate on the cost of secrecy added to
defense contracts. It will, I fear, add hundreds of millions
of dollars to the secrecy budget.®*

The third major finding of the Subcommittee was that Executive
departments and agencies were variously utilizing some 62 different
information control markings to limit the distribution and dissemina-
tion of documents upon which they appear. Their number did not in-
clude the "Top secret," "Secret," and "Confidential" labels authorized
by E.O. 10501 and, in virtually every cause, they were promulgated
and used without any statutory authority.®^ An added note of discom-
fort derives from the fact that additional such markings might exist
and be employed to restrict information. There was no assurance from
Executive Branch witnesses that any management or elimination of
these document control labels would be undertaken.

VIII. Other Congressional Actors

The House Government Information Subcommittee was not, of
course, the only congressional panel involved in security classification
policy matters. During a hearing in 1970, a subcommittee of the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee challenged the authority of the
President to promulgate E.O. 10501. The legal adviser of the State
Department, with the approval of the Justice Department, responded
by citing justifications for the order which appeared in the 1957
Report of the Corrumission on Government Security which cited the
1789 "housekeeping" statute (1 Stat. 68), portions of the Espionage
Act of 1917 (40 Stat. 217), segments of the Internal Security Act of
1950 (64 Stat. 987), and the authority of the National Security Act

•* Congressional Record, v. 118. May 15, 1972 : H4557-H455a
* See U.S. Conarress. House. Committee on Government Operations. V.^. Gov-
ernment Information Policies and Practices — Security Classification Pro'blems,
Involving Subsection (6) (i) of the Freedom of Information Act, op. cit., p. 2933.

345

of 1947 (61 Stat. 495.)^° No additional action was taken by the sub-
committee on the question.

In the spring of 1972 the Special Intelligence Subcommittee of the
House Armed Forces Committee held hearings on the Nixon Admin-
istration's new classification directive, E.O. 11652, prevailing classi-
fication administration, and a bill to create a continuing classification
policy study commission. During eight days of testimony the panel
heard largely Executive Branch witnesses.^^ The bill did not receive
endorsement and no report has yet been issued on the proceedings.

E.O. 11652

Publication of the now famous "Pentagon Papers" prompted con-
gressional inquiry into the collection, unauthorized removal, dissemi-
nation, and press reproduction of these documents.^^

After the eruption of the controversy over the publication
of parts of the "Pentagon Papers" by the New York Times,
Washington Post, and other newspapers, it was revealed that
President Nixon had, on January 15, 1971, directed that "a
review be made of security classification procedures now
in effect." He established an "interagency committee to study
the existing system, to make recommendations with respect to
its operation and to propose steps that might be taken to
provide speedier declassification." He later directed that "the
scope of the review be expanded to cover all aspects of infor-
mation security." ^^

The interagency committee created was headed by William H.
Rehnquist, then Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,
and included representatives from the National Security Council, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, and
the Departments of State and Defense. With Rehnquist's appointment
to the Supreme Court in late 1971 David Young, Special Assistant
to the National Secuiity Council assumed the chairmanship of the
panel. Simultaneously,

the White House on June 30, 1971, issued an "administra-
tively confidential" memorandum to all Federal agencies
signed by Brig. Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Deputy As-
sistant to the President for National Security Affairs, order-
ing each agency to submit lists of the Government employees,
outside consultants, and private contractors who hold clear-
ances for access to top secret and secret information.

'" See U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee
on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abro