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)NYHURST  PHILOSOPHICAL  SERIES 


THE  FIRST  PRINCIPLES 
OF   KNOWLEDGE 


BY  JOHN    RICKABY.S.J, 


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n 


•>  > 


STONYHURST    PHILOSOPHICAL    SERIES 


ROEHAMPTON    . 
PRINTKU    BY    JOHN    GRIFFIN 


STONYHURST   PHILOSOPHICAL    SERIES 


THE   FIRST   PRINCIPLES 


KNOWLEDGE 


JOHN      RICKABY,      S.J 


Fourth  Edition 


LONGMANS,     GREEN,    &     CO 

39  PATERNOSTER  ROW,  LONDON 
NEW  YORK,  BOMBAY,  AND  CALCUTTA 

igoi 


IKE  INSTITUTE  OP  HFDIAFVAL  STUDIES 

10  elmsley  place 

Toronto  5,  canad*, 


OCT  2 -1931 

430 


PREFACE. 


A  few  words  will  be  enough  to  put  exactly  before 
the  reader  the  object  at  which  the  present  volume 
aims.  A  well-known  criticism  on  the  Aristotelian 
Logic  is  the  complaint, 'that  it  "provides  for  the 
consistency  of  thought  with  thought,  but  not  for 
the  consistency  of  thought  with  things ;  that  it 
secures  right  processes  upon  given  or  assumed 
materials,  but  does  not  guarantee  the  materials 
upon  which  the  processes  are  conducted.  To  supply 
the  want  thus  indicated,  several  modern  logicians 
have  curtailed  or  omitted  portions  of  the  old 
Logic,  and  added  new  chapters,  of  which  the 
following  headings  may  serve  as  specimens,  taken 
from  Mr.  Bain's  work :  "  Uniformity  and  Laws  of 
Nature,"  "  Elimination  of  Cause  and  Effect,"  "  Ex- 
perimental Methods,"  ''Frustration  of  the  Methods," 
"  Chance  and  its  Eliminations,"  "  Secondary 
Laws,  Empirical  and  Derivative,"  "  Explanation  of 
Nature,"   "  Hypotheses,"   "  Classification,"  "  Logic 


PREFACE. 


of  Mathematics,"  "  Logic  of  Physics,"  "  Logic  of 
Chemistry,"  "  Logic  of  Biology,"  "  Logic  of  Rhet- 
oric," "Logic  of  Politics,"  "Logic  of  Medicine." 
These  titles  show  the  kind  of  addition  that  now-a- 
days  is  asked,  beyond  the  simple  bill  of  fare  found 
in  the  Aldrich  who  satisfied  the  students  of  a  past 
generation,  and  to  many  even  afforded  more  than 
they  wanted. 

It  is  unfortunate  that  those  who  in  this  country 
were,  perhaps,  the  loudest  in  their  clamours  that 
logic  should  take  account  of  the  reality  which 
hitherto  it  had  seemed  to  neglect,  should  have 
embraced  a  system  of  philosophy  which  is  fatal  to 
firm  belief  in  any  reality  beyond  thought  itself. 
Messrs.  Mill  and  Bain  assuredly  have  not  directly 
tended  to  take  men  out  of  idealism,  and  make  them 
realists.  Yet  the  former  was  explicit  enough  in  his 
demands  :x  "I  conceive  it  to  be  true,  that  Logic  is 
not  the  theory  of  thought  as  thought,  but  of  valid 
thought :  not  of  thinking,  but  of  correct  thinking.  .  . . 
In  no  case  can  the  thinking  be  valid  unless  tne 
concepts,  judgments,  and  conclusions  resulting  from 
it  are  conformable  to  fact.  And  in  no  case  can  we 
satisfy  ourselves  that  they  are  so  by  looking  merely 
at  the  relations  of  one  part  of  the  train  of  thought 
with   another.      We    must    ascend   to   the   original 

■  Examination,  c.  xx.  pp.  397,  seq.  (2nd  Edit.) 


PREFACE.  vii 

sources,    the   presentations   of  experience,   and    ex- 
amine the  train  of  thought  in  relation  to  these." 

Little  as  the  modern  representatives  of  the 
Schoolmen  are  satisfied,  either  with  the  spirit  of 
Mr.  Mill's  demand,  or  with  the  mode  of  his  own 
response  to  it,  they  have  deemed  it  well  worth 
while,  not  indeed  to  change  the  old  Logic,  but  to 
add  to  it  a  new  book.  Pure  Logic  remains  substan- 
tially what  it  was,  and  is  justified  in  its  position. 
It  assumes,  as  all  other  sciences  do  and  must,  that 
human  thought  has,  in  general,  objective  reality ; 
and  on  this  most  legitimate  assumption  it  proceeds 
to  lay  down  the  laws  of  orderly,  consistent  thinking. 
The  newly  added  part  of  Logic,  often  called 
Material,  Applied  or  Critical,  takes  for  its  special 
purpose  to  defend  the  objective  reality  of  thought. 
It  is  thus  an  assertion  of  a  form  of  realism,  as 
against  idealism,  and  is  called  in  this  book  the 
Philosophy  of  Certitude.  For  the  whole  question 
comes  to  this :  what  reasonable  account  can  be 
given  of  man's  claim  to  have  real  certainty  about 
things  ?  What  are  the  ultimate  grounds  for  holding, 
that  man  may  regard  his  knowledge  about  objects 
as  undoubtedly  correct  ?  Scientifically  to  draw  out 
the  account  here  demanded  is  a  work  appositely 
described  by  the  title,  The  First  Principles  of 
Knowledge, 

&D 
161 

l  Qfll 


PREFACE. 


An  endeavour  has  been  made  throughout  these 
pages,  while  stating  the  sound,  traditional  principles 
of  certitude,  to  bring  them  into  constant  contact 
with  the  antagonist  principles,  more  particularly 
with  the  principles  of  Hume  and  the  pure  empirics. 
It  is  not  true  that  the  only  possible  philosophy  is  a 
history  of  the  opinions  which,  at  various  times, 
have  prevailed;  but  it  is  true,  that  the  modern 
spirit  will  not  be  satisfied  without  a  statement  of 
how  controversies  stand  on  questions  which  are 
notoriously  disputed.  The  truth  as  made  manifest 
in  conflict,  is  what  has  to  be  exhibited  :  and  this 
necessity,  whether  exactly  desirable  or  not,  must 
stand  as  explanation  or  apology  to  those,  whose 
own  special  tastes  might  prompt  them  to  desire  a 
simple  exposition  of  scholastic  doctrine  apart  from 
the  encumbrance  of  adverse  systems.  Scholasticism 
must  now  be  militant,  and  that,  not  only  with  a 
view  to  outsiders,  but  with  \  dew  to  retaining  its 
own  clients,  who  cannot  fail  to  come  across  much 
in  modern  literature,  for  the  understanding  and 
the  consequent  rejection  of  which  some  direct 
preparation  is  needful. 

Readers  not  already  familiar  with  the  questions 
here  discussed,  would  do  well  at  first  to  leave  alone 
the  notes  which  are  printed  in  smaller  type,  and 
concentrate   attention  on  the  positive   doctrine,  the 


PREFACE.  to 


importance  of  which  must  be  judged,  not  by  the 
length  of  its  statement,  but  by  the  weight  of  the 
words.  The  matter  is  eminently  one  which  is 
best  conveyed  in  a  few  precise  sentences,  the  full 
import  of  which  must  be  mastered  by  leisurely 
consideration. 


PREFACE   TO   THE   SECOND   EDITION. 

In  spite  of  paragraphs  which  expressly  assert 
the  contrary,  some  readers  have  declared  their 
suspicion,  or  more  than  suspicion,  that  the  writer, 
giving  up  the  cause  of  a  purely  natural  certitude, 
has  fallen  back  upon  revelation  to  fill  up  gaps  in 
his  argument  which  otherwise  he  could  not  bridge 
over.  A  careful  inspection  will  show,  that  the 
power  of  unaided  reason  to  attain  the  truth,  even 
about  God  and  man  in  relation  to  God,  is  openly 
maintained. 

But  besides  natural  knowledge,  it  is  as  certain 
as  the  certainty  of  Christianity  that  a  supernatural 
knowledge  is  within  human  reach ;  and  of  this, 
though  it  does  not  belong  to  logic  as  such,  some 
mention  is  necessary  in  a  logical  course,  in  order 
to  give  completeness  to  the  treatment.  The 
Pelagian    controversy   fully   brought    out    the    fact 


PREFACE. 


to  which  we  refer.  •  Pelagius  himself  was  not 
very  clear  as  to  his  own  doctrines,  but  his  state- 
ments in  general  committed  him  to  the  assertion 
of  such  an  efficacy  in  unassisted  nature  towards 
the  accomplishing  of  its  own  salvation,  as  was  in 
direct  conflict  with  Holy  Scripture.  While  in  the 
East  the  heresiarchs  had  busied  their  subtle  minds 
over  the  highly  mysterious  natures  of  the  Trinity 
and  of  the  Incarnation,  he,  with  a  truly  British 
instinct,  asked  himself  the  homely  question  :  How 
far  in  the  saving  of  our  souls  are  we  able  to  manage 
the  business  by  ourselves  alone  ?  The  answer  given 
by  the  Church  most  unmistakeably  was,  that  possible 
as  is  the  act  of  natural  faith,  yet  the  saving  faith 
requisite  for  the  present  order  of  Providence  must 
be  supernatural,  resting  on  grace  which  has  for  its 
double  office  to  enlighten  the  understanding  and  to 
urge  on  the  will.  Here,  therefore,  is  the  reason 
why  in  the  course  of  our  logical  treatise  reference 
is  occasionally  made  to  revelation,  without  any 
derogation  from  the  natural  powers  of  the  human 
intellect  when  working  within  its  own  sphere. 

The  second  matter  on  which  the  attitude  taken 
up  by  this  volume  needs  a  word  of  explanation, 
is  in  regard  to  idealism.  No  doubt  it  is  against 
idealism  that  the  polemical  part  of  this  treatise  is 
largely    directed.      But    the    error    takes   so    many 


PREFACE.  ** 


shapes,  or  rather  in  the  hands  of  most  authors  it 
is  left  so  very  shapeless,  that  in  a  small  volume  to 
single  out  individual  systems  is  impossible.  There- 
fore the  refutation  has  been  attempted  in  very 
general  terms,  leaving  open  to  each  idealist  the 
subterfuge  that  his  particular  views  have  not  been 
combated.  At  any  rate  against  all  adversaries 
alike  we  may  urge  the  most  complete  neglect  on 
their  part — a  neglect  as  complete  as  that  of  some 
destructive  critics  of  the  Bible — to  follow  the  good 
example  of  the  schoolmen  in  stating  and  answering 
the  main  objections  to  their  own  theories.  One 
consequence  of  such  omission  is  that  we  find 
idealists,  among  themselves,  complaining  on  this 
very  head ;  as,  for  instance,  when  Hegel  lays  it  to 
the  charge  of  Schelling  that  the  "  intellectual  intui- 
tion of  the  absolute,"  from  which  the  latter  starts 
his  philosophy,  is  quite  unwarranted  in  reason  ; 
after  which  salutary  admonition  to  another,  Hegel 
himself  is  not  deterred  from  grounding  the  whole 
of  his  own  system  on  a  process  equally  unwarranted. 
Kant,  who  declared  himself  to  have  been  "  awakened 
out  of  his  dogmatic  slumber  "  by  Hume,  had  been 
roused  only  to  fall  into  another  slumber  not  less 
dogmatic ;  so  that  Hegel  and  Schelling  were  but 
copying  their  master  in  their  neglect  to  consider 
objections.  Exactly  this  contempt  for  difficulties  and 


PREFACE. 


this  groundlessness  of  assumption  are  what  stagger 
us  in  the  works  of  idealists.  They  seem  to  rely  on 
certain  catch-phrases  for  carrying  them  over  the 
most  mountainous  obstacles,  telling  us  that  the 
object  as  out  of  knowledge  cannot  be  known,  and 
that  therefore  there  is  no  knowledge  of  things  as 
existing  independently  of  the  mind ;  that  the  differ- 
ence between  subject  and  object  is  fully  satisfied 
by  supposing  a  double  aspect  of  one  reality,  which 
in  itself  is  sometimes  said  to  be  above  and  beyond 
all  such  difference,  being  the  identity  of  the  two ; 
that  the  object  can  never  be  placed,  as  dualists  pre- 
tend to  place  it,  on  a  line  of  equality  with  the  subject 
which  posits  it  by  distinguishing  itself  from  its  anti- 
thesis ;  that  new  knowledge  can  enter  man's  mind 
only  because  the  universal  mind  communicates  itself 
to  the  finite  and  realizes  itself  in  an  organism  ;  that 
the  mind  can  know  only  what  itself  has  caused  or 
constructed,  and  that  hence  the  constructive  ima- 
gination is  the  highest  human  faculty;  that  the 
development  of  thought  is  but  the  reverse  side 
of  the  development  of  things,  so  that  thought  and 
thing  are  identical,  and  each  system  of  thought  is 
true  for  its  own  stage  of  evolution,  error  being 
nothing  but  relatively  imperfect  knowledge.  One 
and  all  of  these  principles  are  open  to  the  gravest 
objections,  yet    idealists   who   hold  a  greater  or  a 


PREFACE.  xSil 


less  number  of  them  can  rarely  be  brought  seriously 
to  meet  objectors  on  these  grounds  ;  they  are  satis- 
fied with  a  mere  repetition  of  their  stock  phrase. 
Our  refutation  of  their  position  is  given  simply 
from  an  analysis  of  what  knowledge  reports  about 
its  own  nature,  which  certainly  is  that  realism  is 
the  right  interpretation ;  and  a  realism,  be  it 
observed,  which  is  not  confined  simply  to  the 
assertion  of  an  external  world  of  matter,  but 
includes  also  realities  of  a  higher  order. 


CONTENTS. 


PART  I.— THE  NATURE  OF  CERTITUDE  IN  GENERAL. 

PAGE 

Chapter    I. — Definition  of  Truth  i 
„        II. — In  what  act  of  the  Mind  a  Truth  may  be 

FOUND    COMPLETELY    POSSESSED               .                  .  14 

„      III. — Definition  of  Certitude  and  of  the  states 

of  Mind  falling  short  of  Certitude     .  42 

„       IV. — Kinds  and  Degrees  of  Certitude     .            .  50 

„        V. — Metaphysical  and  Physical  Certitude        .  68 
„       VI. — The  order  of  precedence  between  Natural 

and  Philosophic  Certitude            .            .  108 
„     VII. — The   charge   of   Discord    (or  at    least  of 
want  of  co-operation)  between  natural 
and  Philosophic  Certitude            .            .119 

,,    VIII. — Universal  Scepticism    ....  134 

„       IX. — Cartesian  Doubt           ....  148 
,,         X. — The  Primary  Facts  and  Principles  of  the 

Logician           .....  164 

„       XI. — Retrospect  and  Prospect        .            .            .  183 
„     XII. — The  rejection  of  Various  Theories  about 

the  Ultimate  Criterion  of  Certitude  .  188 
„    XIII. — Evidence   as  the    ultimate   objective   Cri- 
terion of  Truth        ....  216 
„    XIV. — The  Origin  of  Error  in  the  Understanding  232 


Xvl 


CONTENTS 


PART    II.— SPECIAL  TREATMENT   OF  CERTITUDE. 

PAGE 
249 


Chapter  I. — Short  Introduction 

„      II. — The  Trustworthiness  of  the  Senses 

„    III. — Objectivity  of  Ideas,  whether  singular  or 

UNIVERSAL 

„     IV. — Exaggerated     Realism,     Nominalism,     and 

CONCEPTUALISM    . 

„       V. — Consciousness 

M     VI. — Memory 

„  VII. — Belief  on  Human  Testimony 

„  VIII. — Beltef  on  Divine  Testimony 


258 
301 

332 

340 
366 
377 
«8» 


THE 
FIRST  PRINCIPLES  OF  KNOWLEDGE 


Part   I. 
The  Nature  of  Certitude  in  General. 


CHAPTER   I. 

definition  of  truth. 

Synopsis. 

i.  Three  kinds  of  truth. 

2.  Definition  of  truth  as  found  in  knowledge,     (a)  The  com- 

mon-sense view,  agreeing  with  the  scholast'ic  definition. 
(b)  Assigned  reasons  for  modifying  and  even  radically 
altering  that  definition,  (c)  Assertion  of  the  old  definition, 
a  course  which  the  rest  of  this  work  must  defend,  but  for 
which  a  little  may  be  said  at  the  outset. 

3.  Definition  of  error,  as  a  corollary  to  the  definition  of  truth. 
Addenda. 

i.  Truth  is  commonly  divided  into  truth  of  things, 
truth  of  thought  about  things,  and  truth  in  the 
outward  expression  of  our  thought  about  things. 
The  first  kind  of  truth  is  called  ontological,  the 
third  moral,  and  each  of  these  is  discussed  in 
separate  volumes  of  the  present  series.  It  is  with 
the  second  member  of  this  division,  about  what  is 
often  styled  logical  truth,  that  the  treatise  which 
we  are  here  beginning  is  concerned.  What  true 
knowledge  is,  and  how  its  possession  by  the  human 

B 


NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE. 


intellect  can  be  vindicated,  these  are  the  questions 
specially  calling  for  our  investigation. 

2.  (a)  An  ordinary  man,  if  asked  to  explain  what 
true  knowledge  is,  would  reply  simply,  that  know- 
ledge was  true  when  the  thing  was  really  such  as 
we  thought  it  to  be.  He  would  thus  agree  with  the 
definition  of  the  schoolmen,  "  Truth  is  an  equation 
or  a  conformity  of  thought  to  thing."1 

(b)  But  a  matter  which,  at  first  sight,  seems 
thus  readily  settled,  presents,  on  reflexion,  a  number 
of  difficulties,  which  some  have  regarded  as  so 
serious  as  to  upset  the  plain  man's  view,  backed 
though  it  be,  by  other  philosophies,  and  by  the 
massive  volumes  of  scholastic  philosophy  which  the 
centuries  have  piled  one  on  the  top  of  another. 
For  when  the  case  is  more  narrowly  sifted,  are  we 
not  driven  to  make  some  awkward  inquiries :  How 
can  mental  images  be  like  outer  objects,  especially 
material  objects  ?  How  are  sensations  like  the  ex- 
ternal bodies  which  stimulate  them  ?  When  several 
senses  give  their  reports  of  one  object,  as  there  is 
no  likeness  between  the  several  reports,  say  between 
the  taste  of  an  orange  and  its  colour,  how  can  they 
be  all  like  the  object  ?  What  is  the  conclusion 
from  the  notorious  fact  that  in  different  persons, 
and  even  in  the  same  person  at  different  times,  any 
one  of  the  five  senses  may  bear  divergent  testi- 
monies ?  Besides,  even  if  our  knowledge  were  like 
what  we  call  its  object,  to  observe  this  correspon- 
dence must  be  an  act  of  comparison,  which  not  we, 
but  some    one    else,  must    make  :    for  we   at    least 

i  Tongiorgi,  Institutiones  Philosophic^,  Vol.  I.  nn.  370,  seq. 


DEFINITION   OF   TRUTH. 


cannot  compare  the  thing  as  known  to  us,  with  the 
thing  as  out  of  our  knowledge.  Such  an  attempt 
on  our  part  would  be  preposterous,  a  fraudulent 
endeavour  to  assert,  for  our  essentially  relative 
faculties,  an  absolute  validity. 

Moved  by  these  considerations,  a  number  of 
modern  philosophers  dare  to  claim  for  human 
knowledge  only  some  correspondence  with  its 
object  which  is  less  than  that  of  likeness,  and 
is  describable  as  symbolic :  just  as  a  mathema- 
tical formula,  though  not  like,  may  yet  sym- 
bolize, the  path  of  a  cannon-ball.  Thus,  in  the 
words  of  Mr.  Frederick  Harrison,  "  our  scien- 
tific conceptions  have  a  very  good  working  corres- 
pondence with  the  assumed  reality  without ;  but  we 
have  no  means  of  knowing  whether  the  absolute 
correspondence  between  them  be  great  or  small,  or 
whether  there  be  any  absolute  correspondence  at 
all."  Mr.  H.  Spencer,2  in  expounding  his  theory  of 
"  transfigured  realism,"  sets  forth  still  more  clearly 
the  position  of  the  "relativist,"  that  is,  of .  the 
philosopher  who  denies  that  we  can  know  things 
absolutely  as  they  are.  Maintaining  that  "  resistance, 
as  disclosed  by  opposition  to  our  energies,  is  the 
only  species  of  external  activity  which  we  are 
obliged  to  think  of  as  subjectively  and  objectively 
the  same,"  still  even  here  he  will  not  positively 
affirm  that  knowledge  is  like  the  object.  And  for 
ordinary  objects  his  teaching  is  this :  "  If  x  and  y 
are  the  two  uniformly  connected  properties  in  some 

2  Mr.  Spencer's  doctrine  may  be  seen  in  his  Psychology,  Part  I. 
c.  xix.;  First  Principles,  Part  I.  c.  ii. 


NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 


outer  object,  while  a  and  b  are  the  effects  which 
they  produce  in  our  consciousness ;  the  sole  need  is 
that  a  and  b,  and  the  relation  between  them,  shall 
always  answer  to  x  and  y,  and  the  relation  between 
them.  It  matters  not  if  a  and  b  are  both  like  x  and 
y,  or  not ;  could  they  be  exactly  identical  with  them 
we  should  not  be  one  whit  the  better,  and  their 
total  dissimilarity  is  no  disadvantage."3  In  other 
words,  if  for  every  definite  change  in  objects,  there 
is  one  constant  change  in  the  mind  which  is  affected 
by  that  object,  then  this  is  enough,  without  any 
resemblance  of  thought  to  thing;  concomitant  varia- 
tion suffices. 

(c)  Against  this  theory  the  time-honoured  defini- 
tion of  knowledge  must  be  re-affirmed.  The  objec- 
tions raised  against  it  are  only  the  old  arguments  in 
favour  of  complete  distrust  in  the  power  of  man  to 
attain  truth  ;  and  to  refute  them  will  be  the  main 
purpose  of  all  that  follows  in  this  volume.  At  the 
outset,  this  book  defines  truth  of  intellect  to  be  "the 
conformity  of  thought  to  thing":  subsequently  its 
one  grand  aim  will  be  gradually  to  make  good  the 
definition.  Whilst  patiently  awaiting  the  develop- 
ment of  a  long  line  of  argument,  the  reader  may 
find  some  consolation  in  a  few  declarations  that  can 
be  offered  him  at  once.  First  of  all,  when  knowledge 
is  said  to  be  a  sort  of  "  equation  "  of  mind  to  thing, 
it  is  not  meant  that  knowledge,  in  order  to  be  true, 
must  exhaust  the  whole  object :  a  partial  knowledge 
is  true,  as  far  as  it  goes,  especially  when  it  is 
recognized  as  only  partial. 

3  First  Principles,  Part  I.  c.  iv.  §  25. 


DEFINITION   OF   TRUTH. 


Next,  the  likeness  which  is  asserted  is  quite 
sui  generis.  An  idea, — to  use  the  word  at  present 
in  its  broad  sense  of  any  act  of  knowledge, — is  not 
a  dead  picture,  but  something  effected  by  and  in 
the  living,  cognitive  mind ;  it  is  a  thing  with  a  con- 
scious meaning  of  its  own:4  it  is,  as  Spinoza  says, 
self-assertive  or  self-referent ;  it  is  what  the  school- 
men sometimes  call  a  signum  quo,  a  sign  which 
taken,  not  in  its  isolation  as  a  mere  phenomenon, 
but  as  it  exists  in  the  mind,  is  the  knowledge  of  the 
thing  signified.  Thus  it  differs  from  a  signum  ex 
quo,  a  sign  which  has  first  to  be  known,  that  from 
it  the  mind  may  travel  to  the  thing  signified.  To 
quote  Father  Liberatore :  "  The  signum  a  quo  is 
that  which,  by  being  first  known,  leads  on  the  mind 
to  the  knowledge  of  the  thing  it  signifies.  Another 
way  of  signifying  is  presented  to  us  in  those  inward 
signs  which  do  not  come  before  the  mind  as  objects 
of  its  perceptions,  but  which,  by  informing  the 
cognitive  faculty,  effect  actual  knowledge.  These 
latter  may  be  called  signa  in  quibus  [or,  signa  quibus'] , 
or  also,  '  formal  signs,'  in  that  they  do  not  represent 
objects  as  previously  known,  but  are  forms  deter- 
mining the  mind  to  perceive  the  object.  To  this 
category  belong  mental  concepts."5  Hence  the 
representative,  significative,  or  meaning  power  of  an 
idea  is  not  photographic,  nor  anything  analogous  to 
photography;    and   to   fancy  it  so  is  the  cardinal 

4  Hence  Hume  greatly  errs:  "The  reference  of  an  idea  to  an 
object  is  an  extraneous  denomination,  of  which  in  itself  it  bears  no 
mark  or  character."  (Treatise,  Part  I.  sec.  vii.  pp.  327,  330.) 

5  "  Signum  ex  quo  quod  prius  in  se  cognoscatur  et  ex  sui  cognitione 
potentiam  ducat  in  cognitionem  rei  significatae.  Alter  modus  signi- 
ficandi  locum  habet  in  signis  internis,  quae  non  «»e  offerunt  ut  objecta. 


NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 


error  of  scepticism.  The  idea  depicts  its  object  in  no 
way  open  to  our  artists  :  neither  by  similarity  of 
substance,  nor  of  colour,  nor  of  outline,  nor  by  any 
mode  of  material  portraiture.  The  process  is  so 
peculiarly  mental  or  spiritual,  that  illustrations 
borrowed  from  matter  are  more  calculated  to  mis- 
lead than  to  direct.  The  uniqueness  of  the  phe- 
nomenon is  essentially  its  strangeness,  for  we  cannot 
explain  it  by  reduction  to  any  familiar  class.  Yet 
the  strangeness  is  welcome  as  serving,  in  another 
treatise,  to  show  the  inadequacy  of  the  materialistic 
hypothesis. 

A  difficulty,  raised  by  Cousin,  really  amounts  to 
no  more  than  a  matter  of  words.  He  says6  that  an 
idea  cannot  be  "  an  image  "  of  an  object,  because 
only  material  representations  can  be  "images;" 
that  we  cannot  strictly  speak  of  "  likeness  "  between 
spiritual  objects,  but  only  between  material :  and 
that  therefore,  if  we  do  call  ideas  "  images  "  bearing 
the  "  likeness  "  of  their  objects,  we  are  talking  not 
properly  but  metaphorically.  As  our  knowledge 
begins  in  sense,  so  far  all  our  spiritual  ideas  may 
be  said  to  be  conveyed  in  metaphorical  terms ;  it 
seems  however  a  fair  procedure  to  regard  a  term  as 
no  longer  metaphorical,  when  we  no  longer  advert 
to  the  figurative  meaning,  but  pass  straight  to  the 
main  object.     Thus,  in  speaking  of  moral  rectitude 

sed  informando  potentiam  earn  efficiunt  cognoscentem  in  actu. 
Ha?c  dici  possunt  signa  in  quibus  [vel  signa  quibus] ,  vel  etiam  signa 
formalin  :  quia  non  reprassentant  tanquam  objecta  prius  cognita  sed 
tanquam  formse  determinantes  potentiam  ad  perceptionem  objecti. 
Hujusmodi  est  conceptus  mentis."  (Logica,  Pars  I.  c.  i.  n.  5.) 
6  Histoire  de  la  Philosophie,  le9on  21  me,  et  alibi  passim. 


DEFINITION   OF  TRUTH. 


we  hardly  refer  to  the  image  of  a  man  keeping  the 
straight  path  as  he  walks ;  but  we  go  at  once  to  the 
notion  of  right  conduct.  Similarly,  whatever  may 
have  been  the  origin  of  the  terms,  we  can  now 
claim  to  apply  the  word  "image"  or  "  likeness " 
straight  to  spiritual  resemblances.  However,  if  any 
one  should  insist  on  seeing  a  trace  of  metaphor 
left  here,  the  point  is  not  worth  controverting. 

We  assume,  therefore,  that  ideas  are,  in  the 
language  of  Aristotle,  6 fio lco fxara  twv  irpayfidrcov, 
— "  likenesses  of  things,"  and  so  stand  contrasted 
with  words  which  are  conventional  signs  :  whereby 
a  special  meaning  is  given  to  the  saying,  that  man 
is  a  microcosm.7  Not  only  does  man  sum  up  the 
several  constituents  of  our  Cosmos  by  uniting 
together  mineral,  vegetable,  and  animal  nature ; 
but  by  knowing  all  things,  he,  in  a  manner,  repro- 
duces, or  becomes  all  things.  Homo  est  quod  est,  says 
the  materialist  scoffingly ;  translating  the  words, 
"  Man  is  what  he  eats,  what  his  food  makes  him." 
False  as  a  complete  statement,  this  is  true  as  a 
partial  statement ;  and  equally  true  is  it,  homo  est 
quod  scit — "  Man  is  what  he  knows."  In  this  sense 
St.  Thomas  writes  anima  est  quodammodo  omnia — 
"  The  soul  is  in  some  sense  everything ;  "  which  is 
the  repetition  of  Aristotle,8  rj  ^rvxh  T<*  ovra  wco?  iari 
ircLvra — "  The  soul  is  in  a  manner  all  things." 

3.  From  the  definition  of  true  knowledge  before 
given,  a  corollary  as  to  the  nature  of  error  may  be 
gathered.  Not  any  absence  of  likeness  between 
thought  and  thing  is  straightway  falsehood  :  rather 

7  Silvester  Maurus,  Quastiones  Philosophic^,  quaestio  vi. 
8  De  Anima,  Lib.  III.  c.  viii.  i. 


NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 


such  mere  absence  is  ignorance.  Before  downright 
error  is  reached,  there  must  be  not  only  want  of 
conformity  but  positive  deformity.  For  knowledge, 
however  limited,  is  true  knowledge  so  long  as  it 
does  not  transgress  or  deny  its  own  limits — a  fact 
highly  important  to  finite  intelligences  like  ourselves 
who  can  but  "  know  in  part."  Be  it  our  consolation, 
then,  to  remember  that  the  opposition  between 
knowledge  and  ignorance  is  only  what  the  logicians 
call  a  "  contradictory ;  "  while  it  is  not  till  we  have 
gone  as  far  as  the  "  contrary  "  opposition  that  we 
commit  error. 

Addenda. 
(i)  The  mysteriousness  of  the  act  of  knowledge,  and 
its  apparent  impossibility  on  any  material  analogy, 
were  points  that  arrested  the  attention  of  the  early 
speculators.  Whereas  St.  Thomas1  argued  that  because 
the  mind  was  capable  of  becoming  cognizant  of  bodies 
it  could  not  itself  be  corporeal,  some  of  the  old  Greeks 
had  pushed  to  its  extremes  the  principle,  Like  is  known 
by  like  —  ofioia  Ofiolots  ytyvcoafceTai.  Empedocles, 
for  example,  had  said,  "  We  perceive  earth  by  means 
of  earth,  water  by  means  of  water,  air  by  means  of  air, 
fire  by  means  of  fire,  love  by  means  of  love,  and  strife 
by  means  of  strife,"  where  love  and  strife  stand  for 
what  we  call  attractive  and  repulsive  forces.  Others 
spoke  either  of  the  eye  sending  out  its  influences  to  the 
object,  or  of  the  object  emitting  its  ef£a>\a,  or  minute 
images  to  the  eye,  which, 

Like  little  films  from  outer  surface  torn, 
In  mid  air,  to  and  fro,  are  lightly  borne.* 
>  ia,  q.  75.  art.  2. 

2  Quae  quasi  membranae,  summo  de  corpore  rerum 
Dereptae,  volitant  ultroque  citroque  per  auras. 

(Lucretius,  iv.  31,  32. 


DEFINITION   OF  TRUTH. 


All  such  conceptions  are  the  follies  of  a  crude 
materialism  ;  and  a  long  way  the  better  course  is, 
while  admitting  that  how  knowledge  is  possible  is 
inscrutable  to  us,  yet  to  insist  that  the  fact  is  manifest 
to  experience.  The  reaction  of  our  faculties  to  their 
appropriate  stimuli  must  simply  be  accepted  for  what  it 
declares  itself  to  be,  namely,  not  any  kind  of  a  reaction, 
but  the  special  reaction  which  must  be  called  cognitive. 

(2)  Preferring  theory  to  fact,  and  a  theory  the  very 
arguments  for  which  rest  on  an  assumption  which  is 
just  the  contrary  to  what  they  are  fancied  to  prove,  a 
number  of  modern  writers  quite  set  aside  the  doctrine 
that  we  have  knowledge  like  to  the  realities  outside  of 
ourselves.  From  America  comes  the  voice  of  Mr.  Borden 
Browne,  telling  us,  as  an  introduction  to  his  volume  on 
Metaphysics,  that  because  we  cannot  compare  thought 
with  being,  therefore,  "  truth  cannot  be  viewed  as  the 
correspondence  of  thought  and  thing,  but  as  the  univer- 
sally valid  in  our  thought  of  the  thing.  That  is  the  true 
conception  of  reality,  which  grasps  the  common  to  all, 
and  not  the  special  to  one  ;  "  so  that  the  test  of  truth  is 
"the  necessity  of  the  conception  and  the  inner  harmony 
between  several  conceptions.  It  is  not  the  lack  of 
harmony  between  our  conceptions  and  reality  which 
disturbs,  but  the  discord  of  our  conceptions  among 
themselves."  A  like  utterance  we  have  from  a  German 
author,  according  to  whom  "  truth  does  not  consist  in 
any  sort  of  correspondence  between  our  thought  and 
the  things  outside  us,  but  in  a  character  that  belongs 
to  our  mode  of  putting  together  our  internal  experi- 
ences. Our  thoughts  are  true,  when  their  nature,  as 
internal  events,  is  understood  ;  when  they  are  placed  in 
equal  relation  to  the  rest  of  experience.  The  criterion 
of  truth  is  the  feeling  of  universality  and  necessity  in 
the  ultimate  axioms."     In  our  own  country  we  have 


lo  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

some  authors  completely  rejecting  the  doctrine  that 
truth  is  conformity  of  mind  to  thing ;  while  others, 
using  the  same  words,  are  less  thorough  in  their 
divergence  from  us,  though  sufficiently  divergent  to 
be  in  decided  opposition.  They  distinguish  between 
perception  and  thought,  so  as  to  make  thought  more 
especially  a  matter  of  subjective  forms  without  ascer- 
tainable objective  validity.  "Truth  relatively  to  the 
human  mind,"  writes  Mansel,3  "  cannot  be  defined  as 
a  conformity  with  its  object ;  for  to  us  the  object  exists 
only  as  it  is  known  by  one  or  other  faculty.  Hence 
material  truth  consists  rather  in  the  conformity  of  the 
object  as  represented  in  thought  with  the  object  as 
presented  in  intuition  ;  while  logical  truth  consists  in 
the  conformity  of  thought  to  its  own  laws."  With 
these  words  may  be  compared  the  following  from 
another  countryman  of  ours,  Mr.  S.  Hodgson:  "With- 
out thought  no  truth,  without  perception  no  reality. 
By  reality  I  understand  the  actual  existence  of  the 
object,  its  actual  presence  to  consciousness.*  Reality 
is  not  greater  after  thought  than  before ;  thought  has 
transformed  it  into  a  new  shape,  has  given  it  new- 
relations,  but  has  added  nothing  to  its  real  existence. 
Truth,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  product  of  thought,  the 
form  which  an  object  assumes  after  investigation,  and 
is  thus  greater  after  thought  than  before  it.  Reality 
depends  on  the  relation  between  objects  and  con- 
sciousness :  truth  on  the  relation  between  objects  in 
consciousness."  The  difference  here  is  partly  a  matter 
of  words,  but  it  is  also  a  matter  of  fundamental 
doctrine ;  and  with  regard  to  each  of  the  authors 
cited,  it  is  sufficient  for  present  purposes  if  the  reader 

3  Prolegomena    Logica,    c.    vi.  in    fine;    also     Mansel's    Aldrich, 
Appendix  M.  p.  277.  (3rd  Ed.) 

4  See  Green  on  Thought  as  constitutive  of  the  Reality  of  the  World 
Introduction  to  Hume,  §  173.    The  passage  from  Mr.  Hodgson  is  found 
in  his  book  on  Time  and  Space,  p.  352. 


DEFINITION   OF   TRUTH. 


understands  them  as  representatives  of  a  now  wide- 
spread revolt  against  the  scholastic  definition,  "  All 
truth  in  cognition  consists  of  the  assimilation  or  con- 
formity of  the  mind  with  the  object." 5 

(3)  The  consequences  of  the  doctrine  logically 
carried  out,  that  ideas  are  mere  symbols,  are  very 
fatal  to  all  religious  belief,  as  well  as  to  everything 
worth  calling  true  knowledge:  and  though  it  is  often 
protested,  that  a  doctrine  is  not  to  be  judged  by  its 
inconvenient  logical  consequences,  but  by  its  intrinsic 
truth,  yet  there  are  consequences  so  manifestly  bad,  as 
to  afford  evidence  that  the  premisses,  whence  they  are 
drawn,  cannot  be  sound.  If  our  knowledge  of  things  is 
what  adversaries  say  it  is,  then  it  is  not  genuine  know 
ledge  at  all :  and  this  some  of  themselves  admit.  Take, 
for  instance,  Lange's  confession,  in  words  gathered 
from  a  long  declaration :  "  All  our  knowledge  of 
nature  is,  in  fact,  no  knowledge  at  all,  and  affords 
us  merely  the  substitute  for  an  explanation.  The 
intelligible  world  is  a  world  of  poesy,  and  precisely 
upon  this  fact  rests  its  worth  and  nobility.  No  thought 
is  so  calculated  to  reconcile  poesy  and  science  as  the 
thought,  that  all  our  reality  is  only  appearance."6  So, 
too,  Mr.  Spencer  7  is  perpetually  harping  on  the  string, 
"  ultimate  religious  ideas,  and  ultimate  scientific  ideas 
are  mere  symbols  of  the  actual,  not  cognitions ;  "  even 
"the  personality  of  which  each  is  conscious,  and  of 
which  the  existence  is  to  each  a  fact  beyond  all  others 
the  most  certain,  cannot  be  truly  known  at  all :  know- 
ledge of  it  is  forbidden  by  the  very  nature  of  thought." 
It   is   well   that   the   reader    should    thus   be   brought 

5  "Veritas  in  cognoscendo  est  mentis  assimilatio  vel  conformitas 
ad  rem." 

6  History  of  Materialism  (English  Translation),  Vol.  II.  p.  309. 

7  See  the  conclusions  to  the  early  part  of  First  Principles,  Part  I. 
cc.  iv.  and  v.,  Part  II.  c.  iii. 


12  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

plainly  to  see  into  what  a  gulf  of  nescience  he  is  about 
to  plunge,  if  he  is  resolved  to  take  up  the  theory,  that 
the  old  definition  of  man's  actual  knowledge  must  be 
abandoned.  Ultimately  he  must  be  driven  to  say  with 
Fichte,8  "  Reality  all  merges  into  a  marvellous  dream, 
without  life  to  dream  about  or  spirit  to  dream — a  dream 
which  is  gathered  up  into  a  dream  of  itself." 

(4)  In  unconscious  anticipation  of  modern  difficul- 
ties, the  scholastics  strongly  insisted  on  knowledge  as 
being  mental  assimilation;  in  proof  of  which  assertion 
we  will  borrow  a  few  citations  made  by  Kleutgen  on 
this  subject. 9  "  Every  cognition  is  brought  about  by 
the  likeness  of  the  object  known,  in  the  mind  that 
knows."10  "In  the  first  place,  we  suppose  it  to  be 
essential  to  the  act  of  the  intellect,  aye,  and  to  every 
cognition,  that  a  certain  assimilation  be  produced  in 
the  mind  of  the  intelligent  agent.  This  fundamental 
position  may  be  taken  to  be  a  dogma  and  a  principle 
both  in  theology  and  in  philosophy,  questioned  by 
none."11  "It  can  in  no  w^ise  be  denied,  that  when 
the  rational  mind,  reflecting  on  itself,  becomes  self- 
conscious,  a  likeness  of  itself  is  produced  by  this  cogni- 
tion, or  even  that  this  cognition  is  an  image  of  self, 
fashioned  after  its  own  likeness,  as  it  were  an  impres- 
sion of  self  upon  self."12     Theologically  the  doctrine  is 

8  Quoted  in  Hamilton's  Reid,  p.  129,  note. 

9  Die  Philosophic  der  Vorzeit,  I.  i.  §§  23 — 25. 

10  "  Omnis  cognitio  fit  secundum  similitudinem  cogniti  in  cognos- 
cente." (St.  Thomas,  Contra  Gentes,  Lib.  ii.  c.  77.) 

11  "In  primis  supponimus  de  ratione  intellectionis,  imo  et  cogni- 
tionis  esse,  ut  per  quamdam  assimilationem  intra  mentem  intelli- 
gent fiat.  Hoc  fundamentum  videtur  esse  veluti  dogma,  et 
principium  in  philosophiaet  theologia  communi  consensu  receptum." 
(Suarez,  De  Angelis,  Lib.  ii.  c.  3 ;  De  Anima,  Lib.  iii.  c.  i.) 

12  "Nulla  ratione  negari  potest,  cum  mens  rationalis  se  ipsam 
cogitando  intelligit,  imaginem  ipsius  nasci  in  sua  cognitione  ;  imo 
psam  cognitionem  sui  esse  suam  imaginem  ad  sui  similitudinem, 
tanquam  ex  ejus  impressione  formatam."  (St.  Anselm,  Monol.,  c.  33.) 


DEFINITION   OF  TRUTH.  13 


of  importance  in  reference  to  the  Blessed  Trinity,  in 
which  the  Son  is  begotten  in  the  likeness  of  the 
Father,  as  the  Father's  Word,  or  intelligible  term.1* 
Silvester  Maurus  has  some  apposite  remarks:  "The 
procession  of  the  Son  is  of  such  sort  as  to  express  the 
Father  in  His  nature  and  essence.  The  act  of  the 
intellect,  whereby  we  know  ourselves,  is  likewise  posited 
for  the  purpose  of  expressing  the  intelligent  agent  in 
his  essence  and  nature,  into  which  the  intellect  alone 
can  penetrate.  Since  in  God,  the  Word,  i.e.,  the 
term  produced  by  the  act  of  the  intellect,  receives  the 
self-same  nature  and  essence  with  the  Father,  His 
production  or  procession  is  hence  fitly  termed  a  gene- 
ration, that  is,  the  origin  of  a  living  subject  from  a 
conjoint  living  principle,  from  whom  it  receives  a 
similar  nature."14 

13  Heb.  i.  3 ;  Coloss.  i.  15. 

14  "  Filius  producitur  ad  hunc  finem  ut  exprimat  patrem  in 
natura  et  essentia.  Intellectio,  qua  quis  intelligit  seipsum,  pro- 
ducitur in  hunc  finem  ut  exprimat  intelligentem  in  natura  et  essentia, 
quam  penetrat  solus  intellectus.  In  divinis  intellectio  producta,  seu 
Verbum,  accipit  eandem  numero  naturam  et  essentiam  Patris :  ergo 
ejus  productio  proprie  est  generatio,  hoc  est,  origo  viventis  a  vivente 
principio  conjuncto,  in  similitudinem  naturae."  (Quxstiones  Philoso- 
phica,  q.  ii.) 


CHAPTER   II. 

IN    WHAT    ACT    OF   THE    MIND    A   TRUTH    MAY    BE 
FOUND    COMPLETELY    POSSESSED. 

Synopsis. 

i.  Division  of  the  mind's  acts  into  three,  Apprehension,  Judg- 
ment, Reasoning. 

2.  It  is  in  the  judgment  that  a  truth  may  be  found  completely 

possessed. 

3.  Hereon  certain  discussions  arise,      (a)  The  various  defini- 

tions of  judgment,      (b)  Suggestions  on  the  subject  from 
comparative  philology.      (c)  A  view  taken  of  judgment  by 
St.  Thomas. 
Addenda. 

i.  For  their  own  convenience  logicians  have  long 
been  accustomed  to  divide  the  acts  of  intellect  into 
three.  The  mind  in  viewing  an  object  may  be 
regarded  either  as  making  an  affirmation  or  a 
denial  about  it,  or  else  as  not  affirming  or  deny- 
ing. In  the  last  case  the  act  is  called  an  Appre- 
hension ;  in  the  first  case  it  is  called  simply  a 
Judgment,  when  the  decision  is  immediate,  and 
Reasoning  or  Ratiocination,  when  the  decision  is 
mediate,  a  conclusion  drawn  from  previous  judg- 
ments. Now  the  question  to  be  raised  is,  to  which 
of  these  acts  does  the  complete  grasp  of  a  truth 
belong;  and  because  between  an  immediate  judg- 
ment and  a  mediate  judgment  the  difference  does 
not    affect    the   present    inquiry,    the    selection    lies 


TRUTH  COMPLETELY  POSSESSED.  15 

between  Apprehension  and  Judgment.  Thus  the 
threefold  division  is  no  longer  necessary :  a  two- 
fold suffices.  Throughout,  however,  the  reference 
is  only  to  human  modes  of  knowledge,  not  to  those 
higher  modes  which  transcend  our  comparatively 
imperfect  act  of  judgment. 

On  the  threshold,  the  investigation  seems  to 
be  stopped  by  serious  doubts  which  may  be  started, 
as  to  whether  any  act  of  apprehension  is  simply 
such,  and  not  also  a  judgment — a  judgment 
on  some  point,  if  not  precisely  on  the  definite 
point  proposed.  What  is  meant  is,  that  when, 
for  example,  the  proposition,  "  Quinine  will  benefit 
the  patient,"  passes  through  a  physician's  mind, 
he  may  very  well,  for  lack  of  evidence,  leave 
the  main  judgment  unformed;  but  all  the  same, 
some  contend  that  he  cannot,  without  forming  upon 
them  any  judgment  whatever,  simply  apprehend 
the  two  terms,  "quinine"  and  "beneficial  to  the 
patient."  Still  less  could  he  do  this  in  an  analytical 
proposition  such  as  "  The  whole  is  greater  than  its 
part." 

We  need  not  decide  this  controversy  at  starting, 
but  will  return  to  it  presently.  Meantime  we  proceed 
thus.  Instead  of  the  definition,  "  Apprehension  is  the 
act  of  the  mind  which  neither  affirms  nor  denies,"  we 
have  but  to  substitute,  "  Apprehension  is  the  act  of 
the  mind  so  far  as  it  neither  affirms  nor  denies,  but 
merely  places  an  object  before  the  consciousness." 
Then  if  the  distinction  between  apprehension  and 
judgment  should  prove  to  be,  not  real,  but  only  the 
result  of  a  mental  abstraction,  or  only  a  difference 


*6  NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE. 

between  a  judgment  of  one  order  and  a  judgment 
of  another  order ;  still  it  would  be  available  for  the 
discussion  in  which  it  is  now  to  be  used. 

2.  An  apprehension,  as  above  defined,  cannot  be 
false  :  what  is  apprehended  is  so  far  truly  appre- 
hended and  cannot  be  otherwise.  The  object  before 
the  mind  must,  of  course,  be  the  object  before  the 
mind ;  just  as  what  a  man  sees,  with  his  eyes,  that 
he  sees,  even  though  he  should,  by  a  mistake  in 
inference,  proceed  to  name  it  wrongly.  But  while 
apprehension  enjoys  this  immunity  from  error,  it 
has  the  countervailing  disadvantage  that  it  never 
fully  contains  a  truth  :  and  here  is  just  the  fact 
which  has  to  be  brought  out.  Unless  the  mind  has 
equivalently  got  as  far  as  an  affirmation  or  a  denial, 
it  has  not  completely  possessed  itself  of  a  truth. 
No  man  can  claim  the  merit  of  having  uttered  great 
political  truths,  if  he  has  only  thrown  out  a  number 
of  terms  as  in  apprehension,  not  as  combined  into 
Judgments:  "force  of  popular  will,"  "resistance  of 
the  wiser  few  to  the  ignorant  many  ;  "  "  adaptability 
to  circumstances,"  "  fixity  of  principle  ;  "  "  generous 
liberalism,"  "prudent  conservatism,"  and  so  forth. 
These  are  terms  which  might  occur  in  any  one's 
speech,  no  matter  what  were  his  opinions.  The 
case  is  so  clear,  that  it  is  hardly  needful  to  amplify 
the  bare  statement  of  it ;  though  it  may  be  useful 
to  note  that  a  student  might  confuse  himself,  if, 
without  warning,  he  were  to  light  on  some  very 
self-evident  proposition  and  test  the  doctrine  by  it ; 
thus,  "  The  whole  is  greater  than  its  part."  But 
here,  however  inevitable  and  simultaneous  the  judg- 


TRUTH   COMPLETELY  POSSESSED.  17 

ment  may  be,  it  is  not  exactly  identical  with  the  ap- 
prehension as  limited  by  the  definition  already  given. 

In  every  instance,  then,  to  affirm  or  to  deny,  to 
say  is  or  is  not,  this  is  the  point  where,  and  where 
alone,  the  mind  fully  commits  itself  to  a  truth  or 
to  a  falsehood.  To  make  some  assertion,  positive 
or  negative,  there  lies  the  risk,  there  is  the  success 
or  failure,  so  far  as  truth  is  concerned.  A  mere 
apprehension  is  a  step  along  the  right  road,  but  it 
does  not  quite  reach  the  goal.  Hence  the  need  of 
insisting  on  the  judgment  as  the  great  crowning  act 
in  the  order  of  intelligence;  and  of  giving  to  "is" 
and  "  is  not "  a  most  prominent  position  in  the 
science  of  logic.  Grammarians  may  settle  among 
themselves  how  much  or  how  little  they  will  put 
into  their  definition  of  a  verb ;  but  for  logicians  the 
words  of  St.  Thomas  must  be  the  guide :  "  Intel- 
lectual truth  consists  in  the  equation  between  the 
mind  and  reality,  in  consequence  of  which  the  mind 
affirms  that  the  object  is  that  which  it  really  is,  or 
denies  it  to  be  what  it  really  is  not."  x 

3.  Still  it  must  not  be  pretended  that  in  assign- 
ing to  apprehension  a  definition,  which  shirked  the 
real  difficulty  of  its  distinction  from  judgment,  an 
author  has  fulfilled  all  justice.  We  must  solve  the 
doubts  already  suggested. 

(a)  There  is  an  awkwardness,  at  the  outset, 
about  the  definition  of  a  judgment — what  precisely 
it  is.     Of  proposed  definitions  some  obviously  have 

1  "Veritas  intellectus  est  adaequatio  intellectus  et  rei,  secundum 
quod  intellectus  dicit  esse  quod  est,  et  non  esse  quod  non  est." 
(Contra  Gentes,  Lib.  I.  c.  lix.) 
C 


28  NATURE  OF  CERTITUDE. 

no  proper  title  to  that  name,  being  rather  things 
that  may  be  affirmed  about  propositions,  than 
accounts  of  the  very  nature  of  propositions.  In 
treating  the  subject  with  a  view  to  definition,  some 
authors  prefer  to  represent  the  predicate  as  con- 
taining the  subject,  others  the  subject  as  containing 
the  predicate ;  a  difference  that  amounts  to  one 
which,  in  pure  logic,  is  styled  that  between  "  exten- 
sion "  and  "comprehension"  or  "intension."  In 
the  enunciation,  "Man  is  an  animal,"  "animal" 
may  be  regarded,  in  extension,  as  a  class  under 
which  man  is  included  ;  or  "  man  "  may  be  regarded, 
in  comprehension,  as  including  a  number  of  con- 
stituent notes,  of  which  animality  is  one.  A  third 
method  is  to  put  subject  and  object  on  a  line  of 
equality,  instead  of  on  a  scale  of  subordination. 
Such  is  the  tendency  of  the  following  definitions 
taken  in  order  from  Hobbes,  James  Mill,  and  John 
S.  Mill.2  "  In  every  proposition  the  thing  signified  is 
the  belief,  that  the  predicate  is  the  name  of  the 
same  thing  of  which  the  subject  is  a  name : " 
"  Predication  consists  essentially  in  the  application 
of  two  marks  to  the  same  thing :  "  "  According  to 
the  formula  best  adapted  to  express  the  import  of  a 
proposition  as  a  portion  of  our  theoretical  know- 
ledge, all  men  are  mortal,  means,  that  the  attri- 
butes of  man  are  all  accompanied  by  the  attri- 
butes of  mortality ; "  while  from  another  point 
of  view  the  best  formula  is,  "  The  attributes  of  man 

2  See  James  Mill's  Analysis,  c.  iv.  s.  iv. ;  John  Stuart  Mill's  Logic, 
Vol.  I.  Bk.  I.  cc.  v.  and  vi.,  where  the  quotation  from  Hobbes  is 
given ;  see  also  Leviathan,  Part  I.  c.  iv.  p.  23.  (Molesworth's  Edition.) 


TRUTH  COMPLETELY  POSSESSED.  19 

are  evidence  of,  a  mark  of,  mortality."  The  co-ordi- 
nation of  subject  and  predicate  is  still  more  secured 
by  the  device  of  Mr.  F.  H.  Bradley,3  who  regards 
the  simple  judgment  as  containing,  not  two  ideas, 
but  one  compound  idea,  which  the  judgment  "refers 
off  to  the  region  of  reality."  Thus,  the  wolf  is  eating 
the  lamb  is  interpreted  as  assigning  over  to  reality 
the  complex  notion  of  wolf-eating-lamb  :  wolf-eating- 
lamb  is  a  reality  or  fact.  This  way  of  regarding 
the  matter  at  least  calls  attention  to  an  important 
truth  in  logic,  namely,  that  judgment  is  not  simply 
any  mode  of  linking  ideas  together,  even  though 
there  be  no  copula  and  nothing  equivalent  to  it.  Nor 
is  Mr.  Bradley's  view  to  be  confounded  with  the 
extravagant  theory  of  Antisthenes  and  others,4  to  the 
effect  that  the  only  valid  judgments  are  those  in 
which  subject  and  predicate  are  identical  (Aristotle, 
Metaph..  v.  29) :  for  he  does  not  maintain,  that  in  the 
proposition,  "  The  wolf  is  eating  the  lamb,"  predicate 
and  subject  are  one  in  the  fullest  sense  of  oneness. 

Evidently,  if  anywhere,  it  is  especially  in  defini- 
tions that  the  relation  between  subject  and  predicate 
may  be  called  one  of  co-ordination :  "  Man  is  a 
rational  animal,"  and  convertibly,  "  A  rational 
animal  is  a  man."  In  other  propositions  the  rela- 
tion may  be  changed  from  superordinate  to  sub- 
ordinate, according  as  we  read  them  either  in 
extension  or  in  comprehension  :  "  man  is  an 
animal,"  in  the  first  case  is  interpreted,  "man  is 
a  species  Under  the  class  animal ;  "  in  the  second, 

3  The  Principles  of  Logic,  cc.  i.  and  ii. 
4  Zeller's  Socrates  and  the  Socratic  Schools,  c.  xiii.  p.  253 


NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE. 


"man,  being  a  rational  animal,  includes  animality 
under  his  total  nature."  "  Extension,"  undoubtedly, 
is  the  aspect  mainly  chosen  by  Aristotelian  logi- 
cians, who  have  good  reasons  for  their  preference ; 
but  we  need  not,  therefore,  deny  that  "extension" 
may  fairly  be  said  to  have  its  basis  in  "comprehen- 
sion." "Extension,"  better  than  "comprehension," 
could  occasionally  be  dispensed  with  ;  for  it  is  quite 
intelligible,  though  not  necessary  from  all  aspects, 
to  teach  with  some  logicians  that  an  abstract  term, 
such  as  "  rotundity,"  has  no  "  extension,"  inasmuch 
as  it  is  a  form  prescinded  from  all  subjects.  On 
the  other  hand,  an  idea  with  no  "comprehension" 
would  scarcely  be  an  idea  at  all — a  point  urged 
against  Mill's  doctrine  that  proper  names  have  no 
"  comprehension,"  or,  as  he  says,  "  connotation." 
Carlyle's  frequent  use,  in  the  plural,  of  words 
ending  in  -ity,  may  furnish  examples  showing,  how 
to  abstract  terms  an  "  extension "  may  be  given  : 
as  when  we  predicate  of  several  objects  that  they 
are  each  "  lugubrities,"  or  "  fantasticalities." 

After  all,  it  is  not  the  relative  rank  of  subject  and 
predicate,  which  is  the  vital  point  in  the  definition  of 
judgment,  but  rather  the  copula.  It  is  from  the 
copula  as  centre  that  Aristotle,  and  St.  Thomas  after 
him,  frame  their  definitions.  According  to  the 
former,5  "  a  simple  proposition  is  the  declaration 
that  something  zs  or  is  not;"  it  is  "a  synthesis  of 
ideas,  in  which  a  truth  or  a  falsehood  is  contained:" 
and,  according  to  the  latter  authority,6  "judgmem 

5  Prior  Analytics,  Bk.  I.  c.  i.  n.  2. 
6  Quast.  Disp.  qusest.  xiv. ;  De  Veritute,  art.  i. 


TRUTH   COMPLETELY  POSSESSED. 


is  an  act  of  intellect,  whereby  the  mind  joins  or  sepa- 
rates two  terms  through  affirmation  or  negation." 
So  denned,  judgment  is  manifestly  the  act  in  which 
truth  receives  its  completion  ;  for  it  is  in  settling 
what  are  a  man's  affirmations  or  negations,  what  he 
says  is  and  what  he  says  is  not,  that  we  decide  his 
correctness  or  error.  Unless  we  can  reduce  his 
utterances  to  definite  propositions,  we  cannot  pro- 
nounce him  right  or  wrong.  While,  however,  we 
are  thus  considering  the  copula  as  specially  decisive 
of  the  nature  of  judgment — as  being  the  determining 
form  to  which  the  two  terms  serve  as  matter — we 
may,  under  another  aspect,  find  the  relation  of 
matter  and  form  repeated  in  the  position  of  subject 
towards  predicate.7  For  at  least  in  what  are  called 
normal  propositions,  the  subject  stands  for  the  whole 
thing  in  general,  as  it  is  in  itself,  while  the  pre- 
dicate is  some  special  form  attributed  to  it  by 
the  mind ;  and  the  truth  of  the  judgment  is  the 
truth  of  the  application  of  this  form.  The  very 
name  "  subject"  signifies  a  recipiency  of  some  deter- 
mining form,  not  physically,  but  logically.8  Thus 
in  "  aconite  is  poisonous,"  "  aconite  "  stands  for  a 
whole  object  which  the  speaker  might  simply  point 
out  with  his  finger,  or  with  a  demonstrative  pro- 
noun :  "  poisonous  "  is  a  special  notion  which  he 
has  about  the  object,  and  he  contends,  that  this 
notion   rightly  represents   a    determinate  character 

7  Tongiorgi,  Logica,  n.  374. 

8  St.  Thos.,  Summa,  Pars  I.  quaest.  xvi.  art.  ii.  "  Quando  intel- 
lectus  judicat  rem  ita  se  habere  sicut  est  forma  quam  de  ea  appre- 
bendit,  tunc  primo  cognoscit  et  dicit  verum." 


22  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

or  formality  in  the  object,  which  formality  he 
is  now  distinctly  contemplating,  and  wishes  to 
affirm.  In  some  types  of  proposition  this  mode 
of  interpretation  will  be  less  suitable,  while  in  all 
the  subject  will  be,  not  simply  the  thing  in  itself 
out  of  thought,  but  the  thing  ideally  present  in  the 
mind  of  him  who  judges  :  else  he  could  not  judge  at 
all.  Still  the  point  of  view  here  indicated  explains 
the  use  of  the  word  "  subject,"  and  is  of  some 
assistance  towards  the  attempt  which  has  just  been 
made,  to  give  a  definition  of  judgment, — an  attempt 
the  result  of  which  may  be  finally  stated  in  the  few 
words  of  Cardinal  Zigliara :  "  The  act  whereby  we 
affirm  or  deny  that  a  thing  is."9 

(b)  But  no  sooner  do  we  congratulate  ourselves 
on  being  tolerably  free  from  a  troublesome  ques- 
tion, than  a  philologist  tries  to  drag  us  back  into 
our  old  difficulties.  It  was  all  very  well,  he  says,  for 
Aristotle,  St.  Thomas,  and  others,  who  knew  no 
language  but  Greek,  Latin,  and  kindred  tongues,  to 
put  the  force  of  the  judgment  in  the  copula;  but  a 
wider  range  of  linguistics  brings  the  modern  student 
across  languages  without  the  copula,  and  even  with- 
out a  verb  strictly  so  called.  As  Mr.  Sully  urges, 
although  our  natural  beliefs  are  expressed  in  propo- 
sitional  form,  yet  ''progressing  philology  may  show, 
that  among  many  people  confidence  is  really  suscep- 
tible of  expression  in  other  than  our  affirmative 
forms  of  language."  Nay  even  a  melodic  phrase  on 
an  instrument  is  declared,  by  Mr.  Gurney,  to  be  to 

9  "Est  actus  quo  aliquid  esse  affirmamus  aut  negamus."  (Logic* 
Lib.  II.  c.  i.  art.  i.) 


TRUTH   COMPLETELY   POSSESSED.  23. 

him,  in  more  than  a  metaphorical  sense,  an  affirma- 
tion. Reply  is  easy :  all  speech  equivalently  has  the 
copula,  even  though  this  be  not  explicitly  recognized. 
We  ourselves,  as  children,  once  spoke  with  no  con- 
scious distinction  of  verb  and  noun  :  even  still  we 
occasionally  omit  the  verb,  or  make  a  simple  sound 
or  gesture  stand  for  a  whole  sentence.10  Nevertheless 
every  sentence,  when  rightly  analyzed,  is  found  to 
involve  the  sign  of  affirmation  or  denial.  "  There 
is,"  writes  Max  Miiller,  "  beneath  the  diversity  of 
human  speech,  that  one  common  human  nature, 
which  makes  the  whole  world  kin.  However  different 
the  families  of  language  may  be,  so  far  as  their 
material  is  concerned,  let  us  not  forget  that  their 
intention  is  always  the  same  ;  and  that  if  there  are 
forms  of  thought  common  to  all  mankind,  there  must 
be  forms  of  grammar  too,  shared  in  common  by  all 
who  speak."  More  directly  to  the  point  is  what 
Mr.  Findlater  writes  in  a  note  to  James  Mill's 
Analysis:11  "Logicians,  in  treating  of  propositions, 
have  almost  exclusive  regard  to  Greek  and  Latin, 
and  the  literary  languages  of  modern  Europe,  which 
are  all  of  one  type.  It  might,  therefore,  be  pre- 
sumed that  the  theory  thus  formed  would  not  be 
found  to  fit  in  all  its  parts,  when  applied  to  language 
of  an  altogether  different  structure.  The  mental 
process  must,  doubtless,  be  the  same,  but  the  words  that 
express  the  several  parts  may  be  used  in  new  and 
unprecedented  ways."  So  obvious  is  this  answer 
to  a  difficulty  that  it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  insist 
further :    but    lest    any  one  should   be    over   much 

*°  See  a  letter  by  Reid,  given  in  Hamilton's  Reid,  p.  71. 
11  C.  iv.  s.  4. 


24  NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE. 

moved  by  a  plausible  objection,  the  further  confir- 
mation of  two  more  witnesses  shall  briefly  be  cited. 
These  are  the  words  of  Mr.  Sayce  :  "  With  all 
their  differences  the  minds  of  most  men  are  cast  in 
the  same  mould.  Thought  is  one,  though  the  forms 
under  which  it  shows  itself  are  infinitely  various. 
The  unity  which  underlies  diversity  is  seen  in  the 
tendency  of  all  languages  to  assume  common  forms." 
Finally,  Mr.  Jevons  shall  speak  :  "  Investigation  will 
probably  show  that  the  rules  of  grammar  are  mainly 
founded  upon  traditional  usage,  and  have  little  logical 
significance.  This  is  sufficiently  proved  by  the  wide 
grammatical  differences  that  exist  between  languages 
though  the  logical  foundations  must  be  the  same." 

(c)  No  longer  for  the  purpose  of  answering  diffi- 
culties, but  in  order  to  shed  more  light  on  an 
important  subject,  a  view  taken  by  St.  Thomas 
(ia,  q.  xvi.  a.  2)  with  regard  to  judgment  shall  now 
be  introduced,  as  eminently  worth  our  study.  He 
says  that  though,  in  an  ordinary  judgment,  what 
we  primarily  assert  is  the  fact/' This  man  is  white:" 
yet  indirectly  we  look  to  our  own  knowledge  of  this 
truth,  not  by  a  new  act  (in  actu  signato)  but  implicitly 
in  the  very  act  itself  whereby  we  originally  judge 
(in  actu  exercito).  Each  judgment  is,  as  it  were, 
accompanied  with  an  "  I  know,"  or  "  as  I  perceive;  " 
and  but  for  this  simultaneous  consciousness  of  the 
Tightness  of  our  judgments,  they  would  not  have 
much  intellectual  value.  For  if  to  the  vainglorious 
man  it  can  be  said : 

Your  knowledge  is  nought,  unless  another  knows  that  you 
know,12 
12  Scire    uum  nihil  est,  nisi  te  scire  hoc  sciat  alter. 


TRUTH  COMPLETELY  POSSESSED.  25 

much  more  may  it  be  said  to  every  man, 

Your  knowledge  is  nought  unless  you  yourself  know  that 
you  know. 

Now  it  is  precisely  this  being  aware  that  we  know 
which  characterizes  a  clear  judgment,  and  makes  it 
so  confident,  dogmatic,  imperious.  It  bears  its  own 
inner  conviction  with  it,  as  an  indispensable  condi- 
tion ;  nor  is  this  fact  to  be  set  aside  for  any  mere 
theory,  which  asserts  arbitrarily  that  one  and  the 
same  act  is  incapable  of  attaining  to  self  and  to  not- 
self.  St.  Thomas  does  not  fall  into  the  error  which 
Mill  lays  to  the  charge  of  many  Aristotelians,  namely, 
that  of  supposing  judgments  to  be  about  ideas  instead 
of  things  :  but  he  does  insist  on  the  important  fact, 
which  Mill  also  has  noticed,  that  judgments  are,  as 
it  were,  lit  up  with  a  recognition  of  their  own  truth. 
It  is  this  recognition  which  Mill13  has  in  view  when 
he  says,  that  "belief"  is  the  characteristic  mark  of 
a  judgment.  u  It  is  impossible,"  he  writes,  "  to 
separate  the  idea  of  judgment  from  the  idea  of  the 
truth  of  a  judgment ;  every  judgment  consists  in 
judging  something  to  be  true.  The  element  of 
belief,  instead  of  being  an  accident,  which  can  be 
passed  over  in  silence  and  admitted  only  by  impli- 
cation, constitutes  the  very  difference  between  a 
judgment  and  any  other  intellectual  act.  The  very 
being  of  a  judgment  is  something  which  is  capable 
of  being  believed  or  disbelieved,  which  can  be  true 
or  false,  to  which  it  is  possible  to  say  yes  and  no." 

13  Logic,  Bk.  I.  c.  v.  §  1 ;  Examination  0/  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  c.  xviii 
pp.  347,  seq.  (2nd  Ed.). 


26  NATURE  OF  CERTITUDE. 

The  last  words  admirably  bear  out  the  main  thesis 
of  this  chapter,  namely,  that  truth  is  specially  in 
the  judgment ;  but  the  passage  also  implies  that 
consciousness  of  the  possession  of  a  truth  is  part 
of  that  possession  itself.  This  consciousness,  rather 
than  the  "  readiness  to  act,"  on  which  Messrs.  Bain 
and  Clifford  lay  stress,  is  the  mark  of  the  judgment. 

It  is  gratifying  to  find  how  different  schools  of 
philosophy  confirm  the  doctrine  of  St.  Thomas ; 
but  on  this  point,  not  to  be  diffuse,  four  very  short 
illustrations,  two  German  and  two  English,  shall  be 
the  limit  of  quotation.  Ueberweg14  gives  as  the 
very  definition  of  judgment  the  "  consciousness  of 
the  objective  validity  of  a  subjective  union  of  con- 
cepts :  "  while  Bergmann  teaches,  that  in  judgment 
there  is  always  conjoined  with  the  apprehension  of 
the  object  as  simply  existing,  or  as  having  these  and 
those  attributes,  a  critical  reflexion  on  the  truth  oj 
these  attributes,  a  verdict  on  the  correctness  of  the  attri- 
bution. Of  the  English  pair,  Mill,  whom  we  have 
just  cited,  further  says :  "  The  perception  of  truth 
or  falsehood  I  apprehend  to  be  exactly  the  meaning 
of  an  act  of  belief  [a  judgment]  as  distinguished 
from  simple  conception:  "  and  Mr.  Sully,15  "Judg- 
ment is  accompanied  by  a  belief  that  the  objects 
have  a  relation,  or  a  relation  corresponding  to  the 
relation  in  thought." 

St.  Thomas  further  supports  his  view  by  a  con- 
trast between  intellectual  judgment  and  mere  sensi- 
tive,  animal  perception.     "  Though   the   sense  can 

14  Logic,  Part  IV.  parag.  67,  et  seqq. 
13  See  the  chapter  on  Judgment  in  Outlines  0/ Psychology. 


TRUTH  COMPLETELY  POSSESSED.  27 

take  cognizance  of  its  sensation,  it  knows  not  its 
own  nature,  and,  consequently,  is  ignorant  also  of 
the  nature  of  its  act  and  of  its  proportion  to  the 
object  affecting  it."16  The  lower  animal  can  never 
take  account  of  its  own  perceptions,  whereas  man 
recognizes  himself  as  intelligent ;  the  lower  animal 
never  recognizes  truth  as  such,  man  does.  Here 
again  is  a  point  which  has  so  forced  itself  on 
rational  observation,  that  representatives  of  the  most 
widely  divergent  schools  have  a  unanimity  which, 
from  their  professed  principles,  might  hardly  be  ex- 
pected. In  proof  of  the  fact  the  only  available 
method  is  quotation,  but  quotation  shall  be  short, 
leaving  each  reader  to  make  fuller  verification  for 
himself.  After  his  own  way  of  using  words  Lewes 
says,  "  To  perceive  a  difference  is  one  thing,  to  know 
a  difference  is  another.  The  dog  distinguishes  meat 
from  bread  without  knowing  that  one  is  not  the 
other."  Less  explicitly  Mr.  Sully  remarks,  "  An 
intelligent  dog  can  distinguish  and  recognise,  but  he 
cannot  mentally  juxtapose  objects,  or  compare  them, 
except  perhaps  in  a  very  imperfect  and  rudimentary 
way."  It  was  from  a  like  persuasion  that  a  German 
philosopher  declared  his  readiness  to  give  a  pig  the 
honour  due  to  a  rational  creature  as  soon  as  it 
intelligently  affirmed,  "  I  am  a  pig  :  "  and  another 
philosopher,  of  the  same  country,  promised  to  dis- 
mount from  his  horse  as  soon  as  it  said,  "  I  am  a 

16  •«  Quamvis  sensus  cognoscit  se  sentire,  non  tamen  cognoscit 
naturam  suam,  et  per  consequens  nee  naturara  sui  actus  nee  pro- 
portionem  ejus  ad  rem,  ita  nee  necessitatem  ejus."  [Quastiones  de 
Veritate,  quaest.  i.  art.  ix.) 


28  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

horse."  The  bacon  for  breakfast  and  the  morning 
ride  to  digest  it,  are  not  much  endangered  by 
promises  of  this  kind  :  for  only  a  truly  intelligent 
being,  like  man,  can  judge  with  full  consciousness 
of  the  truth. 

Addenda. 

Logicians,  as  it  has  been  pointed  out,  can  make  an 
intelligible  distinction  between  Apprehension  and  Judg- 
ment ;  but  they  leave  over  to  psychologists  a  rather 
subtle  piece  of  investigation  as  to  the  nicer  discrimi- 
nation of  these  two  acts.  How  this  inquiry  has  been 
pursued  may  be  illustrated  as  follows  : 

(i)  Whereas  other  writers  largely  tend  to  reduce 
Apprehension  to  Judgment,  Hume  would  reduce  Judg- 
ment to  a  case  of  Apprehension  or  Conception.1  He 
regards  it  as  "a  very  remarkable  error,"  though  one 
"  universally  received  by  all  logicians,"  that  the  acts  of 
the  mind  should  be  divided  into  Conception,  Judgment, 
and  Reasoning.  "  For,  first,  'tis  far  from  being  true, 
that  in  every  judgment  we  form,  we  unite  two  different 
ideas  ;  since  in  that  proposition,  God  is,  or  indeed  in  any 
other  which  regards  existence,  the  idea  of  existence 
is  no  distinct  idea,  which  we  unite  with  the  object. 
Secondly,  as  we  can  form  a  proposition  which  contains 
only  one  idea,  so  we  may  exert  our  reason  without 
employing  more  than  two  ideas."  As  an  inference 
needing  no  middle  term,  "  we  infer  a  cause  immediately 
from  its  effect."  The  so-called  three  acts  are  reducible 
to  one;  "they  are  nothing  but  particular  ways  of 
conceiving  our  objects."  The  only  note- worthy  thing  is 
belief,  "which  has  never  yet  been  explained  by  any 
philosopher,"  and  leaves  room  for  the  putting  forth  of 
*  Treatise,  Part  III.  §  vi.  note. 


TRUTH  COMPLETELY  POSSESSED.  29 

an  hypothesis,  namely,  that  belief  is  "  a  lively  idea 
related  to,  or  associated  with,  a  present  impression." 
"  'Tis  only  a  strong  and  steady  conception  of  any  idea, 
and  as  such  it  approaches  in  some  measure  to  an  im- 
mediate impression." 

(2)  Reid2  teaches,  that  in  mature  life  a  judgment 
goes  along  with  every  concrete  apprehension.  As 
regards  abstract  conceptions,  he  says  indeed  that 
apprehension  may  be  exercised  without  either  judgment 
or  reasoning :  but  as  he  likewise  teaches  that  in  the 
perception,  at  least  of  sensible  objects,  the  appre- 
hension is  derived  from  the  analysis  of  the  judgment, 
and  not  the  judgment  from  the  synthesis  of  mere 
apprehensions,  he  gives  the  absolute  priority  to 
judgment.  "  Simple  apprehension,  though  it  be  the 
simplest,  is  not  the  first  operation  of  the  under- 
standing ;  and  instead  of  saying  that  the  more  complex 
operations  of  the  mind  are  formed  by  compounding 
simple  apprehensions,  we  ought  to  say  that  simple 
apprehensions  are  got  by  analyzing  more  complex 
operations." 

(3)  If  Hamilton 3  and  Mansel*  are  taken  next,  the 
reason  is,  not  chronological  order,  but  the  fact  that 
Hamilton's  view  appears  in  his  Notes  to  Reid,  and 
Mansel  was  a  disciple  of  Hamilton.  Hamilton  finds 
fault  with  Reid,  even  for  that  degree  of  admission 
which  the  latter  makes,  when  he  allows  that  in  case 
of  abstract  ideas  apprehension  can  stand  alone,  without 
a  judgment.  "  The  apprehension  of  a  thing,  or  the 
notion,  is  only  realized  in  the  mental  affirmation,  that 
the  concept  ideally  exists,  and  this  apprehension  is  a 
judgment.     In  fact  all  consciousness  supposes  a  judg- 

2  Intellectual  Powers,  Essay  I.  c.  vii.;  Essay  IV.  c.  iii.;  Essay  VI.  c.  i 

3  See  his  notes  on  the  above-cited  passages  from  Reid. 

4  Prolegomena  Logica,  c.  ii. 


30  NATURE   0?  CERTITUDE. 

ment,  as  all  consciousness  supposes  a  discrimination. 
There  is  no  consciousness  without  a  judgment  affirming 
its  ideal  existence."  Hereupon  Mansel  distinguishes 
between  psychological  and  logical  judgment  :  "  The 
psychological  is  a  judgment  of  the  relation  between 
the  conscious  subject  and  the  immediate  object  of 
consciousness ;  the  logical  is  the  judgment  of  the 
relation  which  two  objects  of  thought  bear  to  each 
other."  Man  judges  psychologically  when,  as  the 
idea  "  cow "  passes  through  his  mind,  he  simply 
recognizes  the  object  as  ideally  existent — "there  is  a 
cow;"  he  judges  logically  when,  for  the  terms  of  his 
judgment,  he  has  two  distinct  concepts,  "  a  cow  is  a 
ruminant."  "The  former  cannot  be  distinguished  as 
true  or  false,  inasmuch  as  the  object  is  only  thereby 
judged  to  be  present  at  the  moment  when  we  are 
conscious  of  it  as  affecting  us  in  a  certain  manner,  and 
the  consciousness  is  necessarily  true.  The  psychological 
judgment  is  coeval  with  the  first  act  of  consciousness, 
and  is  implied  in  every  mental  process,  whether  of 
intuition  or  thought.  It  cannot,  therefore,  be  called 
prior  or  posterior  to  any  other  mental  operation  in 
which  it  does  not  take  its  place."  Between  judgment 
and  conception  Mansel's  most  concise  distinction  is 
that  the  two  differ  "in  their  data.  In  conception 
attributes  are  given  to  be  united  by  thought  in  a 
possible  object  of  intuition :  in  a  judgment  concepts 
are  given  to  be  united  by  thought  in  a  common 
object." 

(4)  To  go  back  now  in  chronological  order  we  find 
that  Dr.  Browns  does  not  care  much  for  the  old 
traditional  distinctions  between  apprehension,  judg- 
ment, and  reasoning:  but  rather  insists  on  one  great 
mental  process,   "  relative  suggestion,"  for  putting  all 

5  Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind,  Lecture  li.     Cf.  Lecture  xlv. 


TRUTH  COMPLETELY   POSSESSED. 


concepts  into  order,  whether  by  judgment  or  by 
reasoning.  "  The  tendency  of  mind,  which  I  have 
distinguished  by  the  name  of  relative  suggestion,  is 
that  by  which,  on  perceiving  or  conceiving  objects 
together,  we  are  instantly  impressed  with  certain 
feelings  of  their  actual  relation.  These  suggested 
feelings  are  feelings  of  a  peculiar  kind,  and  require 
therefore  to  be  classed  separately  from  the  perceptions 
or  conceptions  which  suggest  them,  but  do  not  involve 
them.  .  .  .  With  the  susceptibility  of  relative  suggestion, 
the  faculty  of  judgment,  as  that  term  is  commonly 
employed,  may  be  considered  as  nearly  synonymous." 
Another  passage  bearing  on  the  same  point  is  one  in 
which  he  compares  what  he  calls  perception  and 
apperception.  "  Simple  perceptions  are  so  feeble, 
dim,  confused,  and  short-lived,  and  their  objects  are 
so  numerous,  run  so  into  one  another,  come  and  go  in 
such  rapid  succession,  that  the  subject  is  unable  to 
distinguish  them  one  from  another.  .  .  .  Perception 
becomes  apperception  by  becoming  more  marked  and 
distinct."  This  corresponds  to  a  clear  judgment. 
His  reason  for  not  using  the  more  ordinary  term 
"judgment"  was  given  in  an  earlier  Lecture:6  "The 
term  'judgment,'  in  its  strict  philosophical  sense  as 
the  perception  of  relations,  is  more  exactly  synonymous 
with  the  phrase  I  have  employed  (Relative  Suggestion), 
and  might  have  been  substituted  with  safety,,  if  the 
vulgar  use  of  the  term  in  many  vague  significations 
had  not  given  some  degree  of  indistinctness  even  to  the 
philosophic  use  of  it.  Intellectual  states  of  mind  I 
consider  as  all  referable  to  two  generic  susceptibilities 
— those  of  Simple  Suggestion  and  Relative  Suggestion. 
Our  perception  or  conception  of  one  object  excites,  of 
itself,   and  without  any  known  cause  external   to  the 

6  Lecture  xxxii. 


?2  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

mind,  the  conception  of  some  other  object,  as  when 
the  sound  of  a  friend's  name  suggests  the  conception 
of  himself :  in  which  case  the  conception  of  our  friend, 
which  follows  the  perception  of  his  name,  involves  a 
feeling  of  any  common  property  with  the  sound  which 
excites  it,  and  might  have  been  produced  by  the  chair 
on  which  he  sat,  of  the  book  which  he  read  to  us,  &c. 
This  is  Simple  Suggestion.  There  is  another  suggestion 
of  a  very  different  sort,  which  in  every  case  involves 
the  consideration,  not  of  one  phenomenon  of  mind, 
but  of  two  or  more  phenomena,  and  which  constitutes 
the  feeling  of  agreement,  disagreement,  or  relation  of 
some  sort.  All  the  intellectual  successions  of  feeling 
in  these  cases  which  constitute  the  perception  of 
relation,  differ  from  the  results  of  Simple  Suggestion  in 
necessarily  involving  the  consideration  of  more  objects 
that  immediately  preceded  them." 

(5)  Rosmini's?  doctrine  rests  on  his  view  as  to  the 
impossibility  of  deriving  the  idea  of  Being  from  expe- 
rience :  but,  given  this  idea  innately,  it  is  what  enables 
us  to  grasp  our  first  conceptions  of  reality,  and  to  grasp 
them  by  way  primarily  of  judgments.  In  this  sense  he 
approves  of  Kant's  doctrine,  "that  all  our  intellectual 
operations  may  be  reduced  to  judgments,  and  the 
intellect  generally  may  be  represented  as  the  judging 
faculty." 

(6)  Lewes8  takes  up  something  very  like  Brown's 
"  relative  suggestion"  when  he  makes  "grouping"  the 
fundamental  process  of  intellect.  Each  idea,  as  it 
comes  up,  groups  itself  with  its  likes,  and  marks  itself 
off  from  its  unlikes.  The  copula  of  the  judgment  is 
precisely  this  grouping.      Every  term    is    a  judgment 

7  Origin  of  Ideas  (English  Translation),  Vol.  I.  sec.  i.  c.  iii.  art.  vi.; 
sec.  iv.  c.  iii.  art.  xviii.  xix.  et  alibi  passim. 

8  Problems  0/  Life  and  Mind,  Vol.  II.  problem  iii.  c.  ii. 


TRUTH  COMPLETELY   POSSESSED.  33 

completed  and  over :  every  subject  is  a  group  of 
predicates.  The  judgment  lasts  only  while  the  grouping 
is  being  done :  that  once  done,  the  judgment  ceases 
to  be  and  becomes  a  term.  Mill  and  Bacon  agree 
with  Lewes  that  a  proposition  which  has  ceased  to 
convey  fresh  information  has  become  merely  verbal, 
or,  as  Lewes  words  it,  "  a  mere  tautology." 

(7)  Mr.  Spencer  holds  that  nothing  short  of  a  "judg- 
ment "  is  an  intelligent  act ;  and  if  we  take,  as  his 
description  of  "  apprehension,"  the  account  which  he 
gives  of  the  formation  of  an  "  idea,"  we  have  the 
following  account  of  it:8  "  It  is  because  of  the  tendency 
which  vivid  feelings  have  severally  to  cohere  with  the 
faint  forms  of  all  preceding  feelings  like  themselves,  that 
there  arise  what  we  call  ideas.  A  vivid  feeling  does  not 
by  itself  constitute  a  unit  of  that  aggregate  of  ideas 
entitled  knowledge.  Nor  does  a  single  faint  feeling  con- 
stitute such  jl  unit.  But  an  idea,  or  unit  of  knowledge, 
results  when  a  vivid  feeling  is  assimilated  to,  or  coheres 
with,  one  or  more  of  the  faint  feelings  left  by  such  vivid 
feelings  previously  experienced.  From  moment  to 
moment  the  feelings  that  constitute  consciousness 
segregate,  each  becoming  fused  with  a  whole  series  of 
others  like  itself  that  have  gone  before  it :  and  what 
we  call  knowing  each  feeling  for  such  and  such,  is  our 
name  for  this  act  of  segregation.  As  with  the  feelings, 
so  with  the  relations  between  feelings.  Each  relation, 
while  distinguished  from  various  concurrent  relatione-, 
is  assimilated  to  previously  experienced  relations  like 
itself.  Thus  result  ideas  of  relations.  What  we  cali 
knowing  the  object  is  the  assimilation  of  the  combined 
group  of  real  feelings  it  excites  with  one  or  more  pre- 
ceding ideal  groups,  which  objects  of  the  same  kind 

8  Psychology  Part  II.  c.  ii.  §  373. 


34  NATURE  OF  CERTITUDE. 

excited." 9  So  much  for  the  formation  of  ideas:  and 
that  these  ideas  are  not  mere  apprehensions,  exclusive 
of  judgments,  we  are  expressly  told  :  "  No  state  of 
consciousness  can  become  an  element  of  what  we  call 
intelligence,  without  becoming  one  term  of  a  proposition 
which  is  implied  if  not  expressed.  Not  only  when  I 
say  *  I  am  cold '  must  I  use  the  universal  verbal  form 
for  stating  this  relation,  but  it  is  impossible  for 
me  clearly  to  think  that  I  am  cold  without  going 
through  some  consciousness  having  this  form." IO 
Below  this  stage  of  full  intelligence  he  places  a 
continuous  process  of  evolution,  starting  from  mere 
unconscious  nerve-shock,  gradually  reaching  sensation, 
and  then,  in  the  same  smoothly  ascending  course, 
attaining  successively  higher  points.  "  In  the  lowest 
conceivable  type  of  consciousness,  that  produced  by 
the  alternation  of  two  states,  there  are  involved  the 
relations  constituting  the  forms  of  all  thought."  "  In 
all  cases  perception  is  the  establishment  of  specific 
relations  among  states  of  consciousness,  and  is  thus 
distinguished  from  the  establishment  of  the  states  of 
consciousness  themselves.  .  .  .  Now  the  contemplation 
of  a  special  state  of  consciousness,  and  the  contemplation 
of  the  special  relations  among  states  of  consciousness,  are 
quite  different  mental  acts — acts  which  may  be  per- 
formed in  immediate  succession,  but  not  together.  To 
know  a  relation  is  not  simply  to  know  the  terms 
between  which  it  subsists.  Though,  when  the  relation 
is  perceived,  the  terms  are  instantly  perceived,  and 
conversely,  yet  introspection  will  show  that  there  is  a 
distinct  transition  of  thought  from  the  terms  to  the 
relation,  and  from  the  relation  to  the  terms.  While 
my  consciousness    is  occupied    with   either   term    of   a 

9  Compare  Part  II.  c.  viii.  §  211  ;  Part  VI.  c.  xviii.§  355.  and  c.xxvii. 
10  Part  II.  c.  i   §  60. 


TRUTH   COMPLETELY  POSSESSED.  35 

relation,  I  am  distinguishing  it  as  such  and  such, 
assimilating  it  to  its  like  in  past  experience,  but  while 
my  consciousness  is  occupied  with  a  relation,  that 
which  I  discriminate  and  class  is  the  effect  produced 
in  me  by  transition  from  one  term  to  the  other."11 
By  his  whole  treatment  Mr.  Spencer  shows  his  great 
desire  to  make  it  appear,  how  from  the  simplest  to  the 
most  complicate  act  of  mind,  the  process  is  the  same — a 
process  which  Hobbes  calls  "  addition  and  subtrac- 
tion,"12 and  Lewes  " grouping."  The  passage  in  which 
Mr.  Spencer  sets  forth  the  difference  between  perceiv- 
ing terms  and  perceiving  the  relations  between  terms 
is  considered  by  Mr.  Guthrie  to  be  one  of  the  most 
important  doctrines  in  the  author's  system :  a  doctrine, 
however,  which  Brown  had  before  clearly  enounced.^ 

(8)  Under  the  present  paragraph  the  reader  need 
look  for  nothing  more  than  a  rough  grouping  together 
of  authors  who  agree  in  the  opinion,  which  may  be  use- 
fully recurred  to  on  various  occasions,  that  the  earliest 
judgments  of  the  child  are  judgments  in  a  very  defec- 
tive sense  of  the  word.  Very  different  minds  concur 
in  this  observation,  and  herein  lies  the  point  of  interest. 
Dr.  Porter  says,  "  The  infant  begins  to  perceive  when, 
and  so  far  as,  it  begins  to  attend.  The  soul  of  the 
infant  is  at  first  in  a  condition  of  activity,  in  which 
sensation  greatly  predominates,  with  only  the  feeblest 
exercise  of  intelligent  perception.  The  infant  at  first 
feels  many  sensations,  but  it  can  scarcely  be  said  to 
know  objects  at  all ;  it  perceives  with  the  lowest 
activity  possible  of  a  power  undeveloped  by  exercise. 
Perhaps  it  is  something  of  the  same  sort  which  Luys, 
in  his  work  on  the  brain,  wishes  to  indicate  when  he 
writes :    "  Substantives   play   a   principal   part   in   the 

"  Part  VI.  c.  xviii.  §  354. 
17  Leviathan,  Part  I.  c.  v.  »a  Human  Mind,  Lecture  xlv. 


36  NATURE   OF    CERTITUDE. 

evolutions  of  thought  and  speech.  They  are  the 
primordial  data  around  which  the  verbs  and  other 
parts  of  speech  group  themselves.  They  are  the 
elements  that  underlie  the  combinations  of  human 
thought."  Again,  Morell,  in  the  Outlines  of  Mental 
Philosophy,  expresses  the  opinion,  that  "  both  sensation 
and  perception  are  prior  to  language.  They  cannot 
possibly  be  expressed  in  words,  and  conveyed  to 
another.  They  belong  to  the  more  primary  form  of 
our  intellectual  activity." 

From  these  non-scholastic  authors  we  may  turn 
to  St.  Thomas,1*  who  speaks  of  two  divisions  of 
the  sensitive  faculty,  which  he  calls  sensus  communis 
and  vis  cogitativa,  and  which,  since  he  regards  them 
as  sensitive,  he  must  conceive  to  be  incapable  of 
seizing  an  idea  as  such,  reflexly  and  in  its  uni- 
versality. They  judge  of  concrete  single  facts,  and 
serve  as  guides  in  individual  cases.  Now  to  the 
activity  of  such  powers  would  often  correspond  those 
cognitions  which  Mr.  M'Cosh,  in  his  Intuitions  of  the  M 
talks  of  as  preceding  true  judgment — cognitions  that 
are  "of  the  vaguest  and  most  valueless  character,  till 
abstraction  and  comparison  are  brought  to  bear  upon 
them."  "  An  infant,"  says  Mr.  Sully, J5  "  as  an  intelli- 
gent brute,  may  form  a  few  rudimentary  judgments, 
e.g.,  I  am  going  to  be  fed,  without  language.  There 
may  be  many  implicit  judgments,  where  there  is  no 
statement.  This  applies  to  acts  of  perception  and 
recollection.  The  child's  first  exclamation  on  seeing 
a  large  object,  big,  may  be  said  to  imply  the  statement, 
that  is  a  big  object.     Singular  judgments  are  the  first  to 

l*  Summa,  Pars  I.  quaest.  Ixxviii.  art.  iv. ;  De  Anima,  Part  II. 
lectio  xiii. 

*5  See  the  chapter  on  "Conception"  in  Outlines  of  Psychology, 
where  the  author  gives  in  detail  Professor  Preyer's  observations  on 
child  life. 


TRUTH   COMPLETELY   POSSESSED.  37 

be  formed  by  a  child,  and  constitute  a  very  important 
step  in  the  development  of  thought."  Mr.  Sully's  view 
of  judgment  proper  has  already  been  given,  and  need 
not  be  repeated  here  ;  but  for  the  sake  of  marking  an 
important  distinction  between  sense  and  intellect,  it 
must  be  noted  that  what  he  says  about  imperfect 
singular  judgment,  would,  at  least  in  many  instances, 
be  referred  by  the  scholastics  to  what  they  call  the  vis 
cogitativa,  and  so  far  would  fall  outside  the  question  of 
strictly  intellectual  acts.  But  even  among  these  there 
must,  at  the  beginning,  be  many  mere  dawnings  of 
light,  thin,  vague,  fleeting  ideas,  which  just  visit  the 
consciousness,  show  a  few  of  their  connexions  with 
other  ideas,  and  then  disappear. 

To  return  once  more  to  Mr.  M'Cosh.  He  dis- 
tinguishes "our  primary  cognitions  and  beliefs"  from 
"our  primary  judgments,"  and  builds  the  latter  upon 
the  former.  "  Every  cognition  furnishes  the  materials 
of  a  judgment,  and  a  judgment  possible,  I  do  not  say 
actual,  is  involved  in  every  cognition.  As  the  relation 
is  implied  in  the  nature  of  the  individual  object,  and 
the  judgment  proceeds  on  the  knowledge  of  the  nature 
of  the  object,  so  the  two,  cognition  and  judgment,  may 
be  all  but  simultaneous,  and  it  may  be  scarcely  neces- 
sary to  distinguish  them  except  for  rigidly  exact  philo- 
sophical purposes." 

(9)  According  to  Wundt,  the  content  of  the  judgment 
is  first  given  as  an  undivided  whole,  a  whole  which 
is  not  a  mere  bundle  of  associated  ideas,  but  an 
apperceptive  combination  or  Gesammtvovstellnng.  Judg- 
ment is  the  analysis  of  this  whole,  a  dividing  of  it  into 
parts  as  the  very  name  uvtheilen  declares.  Things  first 
enter  "  into  the  field  of  view,"  and  then  "  into  the  point 
of  view :"  the  first  is  perception,  the  second  apperception. 
The   opposite  theory  supposes  concepts  first  to  exist 


38  NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE. 

separately,  and  then  to  be  put  together  by  means  of 
judgment. 

(10)  From  the  above  list  of  opinions  one  obvious 
suggestion  comes,  that  we  ought  not  to  be  precipitate 
in  drawing  a  very  hard  and  fast  line  between  appre- 
hension and  judgment,  as  between  quite  different  acts 
of  mind.  The  scholastics  are  prepared  to  recognize 
in  the  two  a  certain  identity  of  act.  If  apprehension 
were  taken,  precisely  on  that  side  on  which  the  intellect 
has  to  form  its  idea,  at  the  suggestion  of  the  sensitive 
image,  the  description  of  this  aspect  of  the  process, 
by  the  scholastics,  may  not  seem  to  be  allied  to  the 
description  of  a  judgment.  But  if  we  take  apprehension 
as  they  speak  of  it,  no  longer  in  fieri  but  in  facto  esse,  no 
longer  in  process  of  being  made,  but  as  made,  then, 
though  the  distinction  be  only  mental  and  not  real, 
it  enables  us  better  to  understand  how  Suarez,  after 
St.  Thomas,  teaches  that  the  apprehension  is  a  sort 
of  judgment  {aliquale  judicium).16  -What  Mansel  calls 
the  "psychological  judgment"  answers  fairly  well  to 
the  opinion  of  Suarez.  An  idea  in  the  consciousness 
cannot  be  there,  without  affirming  its  presence  and  its 
object :  it  cannoi  rest  simply  in  itself,  as  if  it  were  a 
dead  picture.  It  is  a  kind  of  cognition,  and  therefore 
tends  to  a  judgment.  Furthermore,  when  the  mind  is 
well  stored  with  ideas,  it  is  impossible  that  these  should 
be  present  without  in  many  directions  asserting  their 
mutual  affinities ;  and  so  they  stand,  not  as  isolated 
concepts,  but  as  more  or  less  clearly  formed  judgments. 
When,  however,  two  concepts  are  called  up  which, 
either  in  themselves,  or  at  any  rate  for  us,  have  no 
special  connexion,  they  may  remain  in  the  mind  with 

16  "  Quatenus  apprehensio  est  aliqua  rei  cognitio,  est  etiam 
aliquale  judicium,  quo  implicite  judicatur  res  esse  id  quod  de  ilia 
cognoscimus."  (Metaphys.,  disp.  viii.  sees.  3  et  4.) 


TRUTH   COMPLETELY    POSSESSED  39 

no  tendency  to  enter  into  relation  as  terms  of  our 
judgment.  Thus  "  Oxford  eight  "  and  "  winners  of  the 
boat  race  "  are  complex  terms,  that  may  remain  quite 
un-united  by  copula  in  the  mind  of  an  old  oarsman,  till 
he  receives  a  telegram  supplying  the  anxiously  awaited 
"are"  or  "are  not."  Cases  like  this  form,  perhaps, 
the  single  exception  to  Dugald  Stewart's  law,  that  each 
mental  state,  as  it  comes  up,  asserts  for  itself  a  certain 
degree  of  credence — a  doctrine  re-affirmed  by  De 
Morgan,  who  "  takes  it  for  granted  that  every  pro- 
position, the  terms  of  which  can  convey  any  meaning 
at  once,  when  brought  forward,  puts  the  hearer  into 
some  degree  of  belief."1?  In  using  these  words,  he  can 
hardly  have  had  in  mind  the  extreme  cases  of  what  are 
called  a  posteriori  and  synthetic  propositions,  in  which 
the  connexion  of  subject  and  predicate  is  a  most  purely 
contingent  fact,  the  mere  terms  having  no  tendency  to 
disclose  a  mutual  relation  in  the  shape  of  subject  and 
predicate. 

(11)  Locke,18  while  fully  agreeing  with  us  that  truth 
and  falsehood  are  not  properly  in  ideas,  but  only  in 
propositions,  yet  has  a  peculiar  use  of  the  term 
"judgment,"  which  calls  for  notice.  He  says  :x9  "  The 
faculty  which  God  has  given  man  to  supply  the  want 
of  clear  and  certain  knowledge,  in  cases  where  this 
cannot  be  had,  is  judgment,  whereby  the  mind  takes 
its  ideas  to  agree  or  disagree,  without  perceiving  a 
demonstrative  evidence  in  the  proof,  but  presuming  it." 
This  is  using  "  I  judge"  in  the  looser  sense,  which  is 
obviously  not  the  sense  intended  in  the  above  dis- 
cussion, as  Locke  himself  would  admit,  who  means 
by  "proposition"  what  we  have  been  signifying  by 
"judgment." 

17  Logic,  p.  193. 
18  Human  Understanding,  Bk.  II.  c.  xxxii.  13  Bk   IV.  c.  si  v. 


40  NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE 

As  we  have  mentioned  Locke,  we  may  take  occasion 
from  his  name  to  add  some  of  Cousin's  criticisms  upon 
him,  which  bear  directly  on  the  priority  between  ideas 
and  judgments,  and  are  much  in  the  spirit  of.  some 
recent  publications.  "  It  is  not  true  that  we  start  with 
simple  ideas,  from  which  we  proceed  to  those  which 
are  complex.  Rather  we  begin  with  very  complex 
ideas  and  proceed  to  those  which  are  simple ;  and  the 
process  of  the  human  mind  in  the  acquisition  of  ideas 
is  the  inverse  of  that  described  by  Locke.  Our  first 
ideas  are,  without  exception,  complex,  for  the  plain 
reason  that  all  our  faculties,  or  at  least  most  of  them, 
begin  to  act  simultaneously.  This  simultaneous  acti- 
vity supplies  us  at  one  and  the  same  time  with  a 
certain  number  of  connected  ideas,  forming  a  whole. 
In  a  word,  we  have,  at  starting,  a  multitude  of  ideas 
which  come  to  us  contained  or  implied  in  each  other, 
and  all  our  primitive  ideas  are  complex.  A  further 
reason  for  this  is  that  they  are  particular  and  concrete." 20 
Again,  in  the-  twenty-second  lesson,  he  teaches  that 
judgments  are  the  primitive  elements  of  thought,  not 
simple  ideas.  "  Language,  that  faithful  expression  of 
mental    development,  begins  with   compound   proposi- 

20  ••  II  n'est  pas  vrai  que  nous  commencions  par  les  idees 
simples  et  qu'ensuite  nous  allons  aux  idees  complexes  ;  au  contraire 
nous  commencons  par  des  idees  complexes,  puis  nous  allons  aux 
idees  simples;  et  le  procede  de  l'esprit  humain  dans  l'acquisition 
des  idees  est  precisement  inverse  de  celui  que  Locke  lui  assigne. 
Toutes  nos  premieres  idees  sont  des  idees  complexes,  par  une  raison 
eVidente,  c'est  que  toutes  nos  facultes,  ou  du  moins  un  grand 
nombre  de  nos  facultes,  entrent  a  la  fois  en  exercice ;  leur  action 
simultanee  nous  donne  en  meme  temps  un  certain  nombre  d'idees 
liees  entre  elles,  et  qui  forment  un  tout :  en  un  mot  vous  avez 
d'abord  une  foule  d'idees  qui  vous  sont  donnees  l'une  dans  l'autre 
et  toutes  vos  idees  primitives  sont  des  idees  complexes.  Elles  sont 
complexes  encore  par  une  autre  raison  ;  c'est  qu'elles  sont  particu- 
lieres  et  concretes."  (Histoire  de  la  Philosophie,  Lecon  2ome.) 


TRUTH   COMPLETELY  POSSESSED.  41 

tions.  A  primitive  proposition  is  a  whole,  corresponding 
to  the  natural  synthesis  by  which  the  mind  enters  on 
the  course  of  its  development.  These  primarily  formed 
propositions  are  in  no  wise  abstract  propositions,  as,  for 
instance,  'There  are  no  qualities  without  a  subject,'  but 
wholly  particular,  as  '  I  am,'  '  This  body  exists.'  "2I 

21  "  Images  fideles  du  developpement  de  l'esprit,  les  langages 
debutent  non  par  des  mots,  mais  par  des  phrases  et  des  propositions 
tres-composees.  Une  proposition  primitive  est  un  tout  qui  cor- 
respond a  la  synthese  naturelle  par  laquelle  l'esprit  debute.  Ces 
propositions  primitives  ne  sont  nullement  des  propositions  ab- 
straites,  telles  que  celles-ci :  II  n'y  a  pas  de  qualite  sans  un  sujet, 
pas  de  corps  sans  espace,  et  autres  semblables,  mais  elles  sont 
toutes  particulieres,  telles  que:  J'existe,  ce  corps  existe." 


CHAPTER    III. 

DEFINITION    OF   CERTITUDE    AND    OF  THE    STATES    OP 
MIND    FALLING    SHORT   OF    CERTITUDE. 

Synopsis. 

i.  Definition  of  Certitude. 

2.  The  question  at  present  is  one  rather  of  definition  than  of  fact 

3.  Definitions  of  the  states  of  mind  which  fall  short  of  certitude 

(a)  Ignorance,     (b)  Doubt,     (c)  Suspicion,     (d)  Opinion. 

4.  Probability,  a  very  large  subject,  not  here  discussed  at  any 

length. 

5.  The  use  of  the  word  "  belief." 

I.  The  assured  possession  of  truth  by  the  intellect 
is  called  Certitude,  which  is,  therefore,  defined  to  be 
the  state  of  the  mind  when  it  firmly  assents  to  some- 
thing, because  of  motives  which  exclude  at  least  all 
solid,  reasonable  misgivings,  though  not  necessarily 
all  misgivings  whatsoever.  The  definition  applies 
not  only  to  every  truth  which  is  reached  mediately 
by  inference,  but  also  to  immediate  intuitive  truths, 
of  which  the  motive  lies  simply  in  the  self-evident 
connexion  of  the  given  terms.  Hence  it  is  not 
always  needful  to  look  for  a  motive  outside  of  the 
judgment  itself. 

2.  Such  is  a  short  description  of  what  those  com- 
petent to  speak  on  the  matter  commonly  understand 
by  certitude.     It  is  not  yet  formally  under  discus- 


DEFINITION   OF   CERTITUDE.  43 

sion  whether  we  mortals  can. arrive  at  such  a  state; 
though  that  we  can  is  implied  in  every  pretence  to 
rational  discussion  of  any  sort.  Still  as  far  as 
explicit  declaration  is  concerned,  just  as  in  an 
earlier  chapter  it  was  enough  to  say  hypothetically, 
that  if  we  have  knowledge,  it  will  bear  a  resem- 
blance to  the  thing  known;  so  now  it  suffices  to 
say,  that  if  we  have  certitude,  it  must  be  as  above 
defined.  Positively,  however,  to  allow  that  we  may, 
perhaps,  be  devoid  of  all  certitude  in  our  knowledge 
and  that  we  must  wait  for  philosophy  to  settle  the 
doubt,  this  would  be  to  cut  from  under  our  feet  all 
available  ground  for  philosophizing.  But  we  may 
omit  the  explicit  assertion  of  a  fact  without  allowing 
it  to  be  dubious. 

3.  Certitude  is  far  from  being  our  only  mental 
condition  in  regard  to  things ;  and  it  becomes  ot 
the  highest  importance,  for  a  well-ordered  mind,  to 
distinguish  its  several  attitudes  in  relation  to  objects 
of  knowledge.  Some  confused  intellects  make  no 
attempt  to  sort  their  own  contents,  to  put  like  with 
like,  and  to  mark  off  the  unlike  hy  contrast ;  neither 
have  such  minds  any  clear  views  as  to  what  they 
know  or  what  they  do  not  know.  It  would  help 
them  vastly,  as  the  beginning  of  a  re-organization, 
to  note  the  following  stages  in  the  ascent  from 
ignorance  to  certainty. 

(a)  Ignorance  strictly  so  called,  is  either  purely 
negative,  simple  nescience,  or  else  it  is  privative, — 
want  of  some  piece  of  knowledge  which  the  person, 
all  things  considered,  ought  to  possess.  A  surgeon 
need  not  know  what  the  "  eccentric "  of  a  steam 


44  NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE. 

engine  is,  but  he  ought  to  know  what  a  "  tourni- 
quet "  is.  Ignorance  is  not  as  bad  as  error ;  per 
accidens,  it  may  even  be  M  bliss  ;  "  but  in  itself  at  least 
it  is  no  good,  for  it  is  nothing. 

(b)  Next  to  sheer  ignorance  comes  doubt,  which, 
in  its  widest  sense,  would  include  all  the  states  inter- 
mediate between  ignorance  and  certitude.  But  for 
technical  purposes,  or  at  any  rate  for  the  occasion, 
it  is  convenient  to  narrow  down  the  meaning  of  the 
word  by  what  in  itself  is  rather  an  arbitrary  limi- 
tation, and  need  not  be  borne  in  mind  beyond  the 
pages  wherein  the  limitation  is  explained. 

Mill *  gives  one  definition  of  doubt  which  really 
belongs  rather  to  sheer  ignorance,  when  he  describes 
doubt,  "  not  as  a  state  of  consciousness,  but  the 
negation  of  a  state  of  consciousness  —  nothing 
positive,  but  simply  the  absence  of  belief."  It  is 
true  the  scholastics  speak  of  a  dubium  negativum,  but 
they  make  it  more  than  mere  ignorance ;  they 
apply  the  term  to  the  state  of  the  mind  we  are  in, 
when  a  question  is  proposed,  and  the  mind,  simply 
for  want  of  any  valid  reasons  on  either  side,  remains 
quite  neutral.  Thus  if  we  are  asked  whether  some 
large  assembly  forms  an  odd  or  an  even  number,  we 
lean  to  neither  side,  for  lack  of  the  means  of 
deciding,  even  with  probability,  one  way  rather 
than  another. 

Now  if,  just  for  convenience,  a  name  may  be 
given  to  the  perfectly  balanced  state,  it  can  be 
called  negative  doubt,  and  comes  very  near  to 
sheer  ignorance  ;   but  is  not  quite   sheer   ignorance 

i  Examination  of  Sir  W .  Hamilton,  c.  ix.  p.  133.  (2nd  Edit.) 


DEFINITION  OF  CERTITUDE.  45 


because  at  least  the  question  has  been  intelligently 
entertained,  and  its  utter  insolubility  intelligently 
decided.  It  may  be  defined  as  the  equipoise  of  the 
mind  due  to  the  absence  of  any  valid  reasons  on 
either  side.  The  parallel  definition  of  positive  doubt  is 
"  the  equipoise  of  the  mind,  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
reasons  on  either  side  are  equal  and  opposite."  In 
one  case  the  balance  is  due  to  the  absence  of  pro- 
ducible reasons,  in  the  other  case  to  the  presence  of 
exactly  countervailing  reasons.  Of  course  it  would 
be  absurd  to  insist  on  the  constant  use  of  the  words 
under  these  definitions,  all  the  more  so  as  no  exact 
scales  are  usually  at  hand  wherein  to  weigh  reasons. 
Still  the  definitions  are  useful  for  the  moment,  while 
degrees  between  ignorance  and  certitude  are  being 
measured.  Etymologically,  according  to  Max  Miiller, 
dubium  expresses  literally  the  position  between  two 
points,  and  comes  from  duo,  as  Zweifel  points  back 
to  zwei.  The  distinctions  just  drawn  fit  in  well  with 
the  etymology. 

(c)  The  first  step  out  of  doubt,  when  doubt  is 
understood  in  the  way  above  explained,  may  be 
called  Suspicion,  which  is  described  as  so  faint  an 
inclination  to  yield  in  one  direction,  that  not  even  a 
probable  assent  is  yielded,  but  there  is  a  leaning 
towards  a  side. 

(d)  When,  however,  an  assent  is  given,  but  as 
to  a  mere  probability,  and  therefore  only  under 
restriction,  there  is  Opinion,  Soija,  if  not  quite  in 
the  Platonic  sense,  then  in  the  general  sense  of  what, 
from  the  appearance,  seems  likeliest,  or  at  all  events 
likely.     In   opinion,   so   defined,  there  is  evidently 


46  NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE. 

wide  room  for  variation  between  the  limits  of  slender 
and  of  very  substantial  probability.  It  is  a  matter 
of  choice  whether  we  say  that  the  assent  is  given  to 
the  probability  of  the  proposition,  or  to  the  propo- 
sition as  probable.  Cardinal  Newman,  because 
of  his  special  use  of  the  word  "assent,"  prefers  the 
former  expression.  Again,  the  admission  must  be 
made,  that  in  ordinary  speech  it  would  be  absurd  to 
insist  on  the  use  of  the  words  "dcubt,"  "suspicion," 
and  "opinion,"  in  strict  accordance  with  the 
account  of  them  just  given ;  and  yet  the  account 
has  its  manifest  utility.  It  puts  before  the  mind 
successive  stages  on  the  way  to  certainty,  and  gives 
to  each  a  name.  Now  plainly  it  belongs  to  logic 
not  only  to  treat  of  certitude,  but  also  to  compare 
it  with  other  states  of  mind,  which  form  the  constant 
surroundings  of  our  group  of  assured  convictions. 
Only  the  intelligences  that  are  blessed  with  the 
absence  of  all  uncertainty  can  afford  to  confine 
their  attention  to  certainty  alone. 

4.  Much  might  be  said  of  probability,  but  this 
is  hardly  the  place  in  which  to  say  it.  Under 
certain  aspects  its  treatment  is  largely  mathemati- 
cal ;  and  as,  in  many  instances,  the  mathematicians 
guarantee  their  results  only  for  an  infinite  series, 
it  follows  that  for  any  practical  series  they  do  not 
guarantee  them  to  be  strictly  accurate.  They  cannot 
lay  down  any  definite  limits,  however  large,  with 
the  certainty  that  this  will  secure  a  fair  game  of 
chance,  ending  in  a  balanced  condition.2  For  the 
definite  period,  say  one  thousand  years,  spent  in 
2  Cf.  Note  A  at  end  of  chapter. 


DEFINITION   OF  CERTITUDE.  47 


tossing  heads  and  tails,  may  expire,  just  when  a  run 
of  luck  has  fallen  to  one  side.  Still  insurance 
companies,  which,  if  no  catastrophe  happens,  have 
a  kind  of  interminable  existence,  can  manage  by 
statistics,  not  only  to  make  their  gains  compensate 
their  losses,  but  also  give  fair  dividends  to  share- 
holders. For  the  information  they  require  about 
the  theory  of  chances,  they  look  not  to  logicians, 
but  to  statisticians  and  mathematicians. 

5.  This  chapter  ought  not  to  conclude  without 
a  remark  on  the  use  of  the  word  "belief."  To 
believe  signifies  sometimes  {a)  to  hold  a  thing  as 
a  probable  opinion  ;  and  sometimes  (b)  to  hold  it  as 
certain,  whether  (a)  generally,  without  specially  dis- 
tinguishing the  nature  of  the  grounds  or  (j3)  specially, 
on  the  ground  of  the  testimony  of  witnesses,  or  (7) 
again  specially,  in  cases  where  the  object  is  not 
immediately  presented  to  the  perceptive  faculties, 
e.g.,  belief  in  a  fact  as  remembered. 

What  Hamilton3  says  of  belief  may  be  usefully 
quoted  as  a  help  to  the  understanding  of  subsequent 
discussions  in  which  his  opinions  will  be  involved  : 
"  Knowledge  and  belief  differ  not  only  in  degree, 
but  in  kind.  Knowledge  is  a  certainty  founded 
upon  insight :  belief  is  a  certainty  founded  upon 
feeling.  The  one  is  perspicuous  and  objective,  the 
other  obscure  and  subjective.  Each,  however,  sup- 
poses the  other,  and  an  assurance  is  said  to  be 
a  knowledge  or  a  belief,  according  as  one  element 
or  the  other  predominates."  Elsewhere  he  says,4 
u  Belief  is  the  primary  condition  of  reason,  and  not 

4  Note  A,  on  Reid,  p.  760.         3  Metaphysics,  Lecture  iv.  p.  G2. 


48  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

reason  the  ultimate  ground  of  belief."  When, 
further,  Hamilton  teaches,  that  we  believe  the 
Infinite,  yet  cannot  conceive  it,  or  know  it  as  possible, 
he  does  not  wish  to  retract  his  declaration  that 
what  we  believe,  we  must  always,  to  some  extent, 
likewise  know :  but  he  falls  certainly  into  an  ap- 
pearance of  contradiction  :  and  beyond  apology  his 
views  are  at  times  misty  and  misleading.  Perhaps 
it  was  some  participation  in  them  which  prompted 
the  line  at  the  opening  of  In  Memoriam  :5 

Believing  what  we  cannot  know. 

The  distinction  is  widely  received,  but  probably 
not  with  very  determinate  meaning;  sometimes  it 
has  its  very  legitimate  sense  of  accepting,  on  suffi- 
cient authority,  truths  which  we  could  not  establish 
on  their  own  intrinsic  evidence,  and  which  we  do 
not  fully  comprehend  after  revelation. 

With  regard  to  the  doubt  which  is  often  implied 
in  the  word  "belief"  it  is,  on  religious  principles, 
important  to  note,  how  the  loss  of  dogmatic  authority, 
and  the  assertion  of  private  opinion,  had  much  to  do 
with  spreading  the  erroneous  notion  that  man's 
religious  beliefs  were  but  a  set  of  opinions.  Need- 
less to  say,  in  the  Catholic  Church,  belief  means 
absolute  certainty  on  the  supreme  authority  of  God, 
whenever  it  is  used  for  the  act  of  Christian  faith. 

5  ••  When  I  deny  that  the  Infinite  can  by  us  be  known,  I  am  far 
from  denying  that  by  us  it  ought  to  be  believed."  (Metaphysics, 
Lecture  ii.  Appendix.)  As  to  how  we  can  believe  the  inconceivable, 
see  Mansel.  The  Philosophy  of  the  Conditioned,  pp.  69,  70. 


DEFINITION   OF  CERTITUDE,  49 


Note  A. 

On  the  theory  of  probabilities,  and  as  to  the  fact 
that  the  very  improbable  sometimes  happens,  the 
following  extract  is  instructive :  "  An  extraordinary 
incident  in  a  game  at  whist  occurred  in  the  United 
Service  Club,  Calcutta,  a  few  days  ago.  The  players 
were  Mr.  Justice  Norris,  Dr.  Harvey,  Dr.  Sanders,  and 
Dr.  Reeves.  Two  new  packs  were  opened  and  were 
trayed  and  shuffled  in  the  usual  way.  Dr.  Sanders  had 
one  of  the  packs  cut  to  him,  and  proceeded  to  deal. 
He  turned  up  the  knave  of  clubs,  and  on  sorting  his 
hand  found  that  he  had  the  other  twelve  trumps.  The 
fact  was  duly  recorded  in  writing.  The  odds  against 
the  combination  are  158,750,000,000  to  one."1 

1  St.  James  s  Gazette,  February  14,  1888. 


CHAPTER   IV. 

KINDS    AND    DEGREES   OF    CERTITUDE. 

Synopsis. 

Preliminary  remarks  about  the  assent  and  the  motive  of  judg- 
ment. 

i.  Species    of   Certitude.       (a)    Metaphysical.      (b)    Physical. 
(c)  Moral. 

2.  Degrees  of  Certitude.  Proofs  of  their  existence:  (a)  From 
the  side  of  objective  truths  varying  in  kind,  (b)  From  the 
experienced  facts  of  compulsory,  of  easy,  and  of  laborious 
assents.  (c)  From  the  side  of  the  subjective  force  of 
intellect,  varying  in  different  men. 
Addenda. 

Before  satisfactory  advance  can  be  made  towards 
the  next  points  of  discussion,  a  few  further  remarks 
on  the  nature  of  judgment  are  quite  indispensable. 

It  is  a  controversy  amongst  the  scholastics,1 
which,  as  Cardinal  Zigliara  thinks,  may,  perhaps, 
be  reduced,  in  the  end,  to  a  difference  of  words,2 
whether  the  assent  in  a  judgment  is  completed  in 
the  clear  perception  of  the  relation  between  subject 
and  predicate,  or  whether  it  is  not  rather  another  act, 
a  sort  of  intellectual  nod,  following  upon  the  perceived 
connexion  of  terms.  One  side  says  that  the  act  01 
judging  is  itself  a  compound  act,  a  compounding  oi 

i  Suarez,  De  Anima,  Lib.  III.  sec.  vi. 
"  Logica,  Lib.  II.  cap.  i,  art.  i.  §  iii. 


KINDS  AND   DEGREES   OF  CERTITUDE.  51 

predicate  with  subject ;  the  other  side  says  it  is  a 
simple  act,  a  simple  affirmation  or  negation,  following 
upon  the  comparison  of  the  terms.  The  former  party 
are  careful  to  insist  that  there  really  is  affirmation 
and  negation,  and  they  would  not  be  content  with 
any  mere  linking  together  or  fusion  of  ideas,  or 
any  comparison,  short  of  what  is  required  by  the 
meaning  of  the  copula  "  is,"  or  "  is  not."  But,  this 
asserted,  they  hold  that  no  element  of  the  judgment 
can  be  shown  to  be  lacking  when,  in  comparing  the 
terms,  the  mind  perceives,  with  or  without  additional 
light  from  outside  the  terms,  the  connexion  between 
the  two.  In  the  following  pages  no  distinct  super- 
added act  of  assent  will  be  supposed,  on  the  ground 
that  no  argument  in  support  of  it  seems  convincing. 
If  a  man  likes  to  confirm  any  of  his  judgments 
with  a  "Yes,  that's  it,"  the  added  act  of  approval 
is  a  new  judgment,  the  result  of  reflexion  on  the 
previous  one. 

Taking,  then,  the  assent — at  least  the  legitimate 
assent — to  be  the  perceived  connexion  between 
subject  and  predicate,  we  are  able  to  reject  a 
fallacious  procedure  which  we  must  briefly  describe. 
Those  authors  who  make  the  assent  a  distinct  act, 
following  on  the  perceived  connexion  of  the  terms, 
occasionally  manage  to  play  some  strange  tricks  in 
their  account  of  a  judgment,  so  that  they  can  pro- 
nounce those  propositions  to  be  possibly  doubtful 
which  are  generally  reckoned  indubitable.  Thus 
Descartes,  in  behalf  of  his  claim  to  be  able  to  doubt 
certain  mathematical  truths,  which  seem  indubitable, 
.asserts,  in  explanation,  his  power  to  look  away  from 


52  NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE. 

the  meaning  or  from  the  grounds  of  the  proposition. 
He  admits  that  while  he  considers  the  meaning  of 
the  terms  he  cannot  doubt ;  but  he  contends  that 
he  can  doubt  as  soon  as  he  ceases  to  consider  this 
meaning;  and  it  is  on  this  most  flimsy  pretext  that 
he  declares  these  truths  to  form  possible  objects  of 
doubt : 

"  I  have  sufficiently  explained,  on  several  occa- 
sions, how  this  is  to  be  understood.  As  long  as  the 
mind  is  attending  to  some  truth  of  which  we  have 
clear  conception,  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  call  it  into 
question."  3 

It  must  be  confessed  that  this  passage,  by  sug- 
gesting the  case  of  wilful,  precipitate,  and  irrationally 
formed  judgments,  suggests  also  a  most  obvious 
argument  in  favour  of  judgment  being  a  sort  of 
simple  nod  of  the  mind,  and  not  being  intrinsically 
constituted  by  a  perceived  connexion  between  terms. 
The  difficulty  thus  raised  must  stand  over  till  we 
come  to  treat  of  the  nature  of  error  :  and  meantime 
it  must  suffice  to  say,  that  a  solution  is  coming,  and, 
further,  that  all  error  is  sub  specie  vert ;  that  it  is 
because  of  some  really  perceived  truth  that  the 
mind  is  able  to  assent  at  all ;  and  that  if  the  mind 
is  carried  on  to  add  untruth  to  truth,  or  falsely  to 
detract  from  truth,  these  are  not  strictly  intellectual 
acts,  but  effects  of  obscurity  in  ideas,  of  the  will, 
and  of  the  force  of  association  and  habit.    All  which 

3  "J'ai  assez  explique,  en  divers  endroits,  en  quel  sens  cela  se 
doit  entendre.  C'est  a  savoir  que  tandis  que  nous  sommes  attentifs 
a  quelque  verite  que  nous  concevons  clairement,  nous  ne  pouvons 
alors  au  meme  facon  douter."  (Meditations,  p.  467 — Jules  Simon's 
edition). 


KINDS   AND   DEGREES   OF   CERTITUDE.  53 

declarations  must  be  expanded  afterwards :  at 
present  it  is  enough  to  plead,  that  an  assent  worth 
the  name  cannot  be  wholly  a  sort  of  blind  nod.  In 
words  anything  may  be  said ;  but  an  assent  not 
inwardly  lit  up  with  some  intellectual  motives  is  not 
strictly  an  intellectual  act,  for  it  is  devoid  of  all 
insight.  In  a  mixed  act,  the  assent  ceases  to  be 
intellectual  at  the  point  where  insight  ceases. 

Let  the  word  "motive"  be  clearly  understood. 
The  passage  from  ignorance  to  knowledge  is  a  move- 
ment :  therefore  a  motive  power  is  required,  one  of 
the  same  order  as  the  mind  itself,  an  intelligible 
motive  for  an  intelligent  act.  So  far  as  any  assent 
is  not  thus  motived  it  is  not  properly  an  act  of 
intellect.  It  is  quite  true  that  the  intellectual 
faculty  itself  is  a  power  to  move,  and  the  term 
motive  might  be  used  on  the  subjective  side ;  but  it 
is  here  regarded  on  its  objective  side,  as  an  object 
soliciting  the  faculty,  not  as  a  faculty  answering  to 
the  solicitation.  In  the  proposition  "  A  straight 
line  is  the  shortest  way  between  two  points,"  the 
motive  for  the  assent  is  intrinsic  to  the  terms 
assented  to — it  is  their  own  immediate  evidence; 
in  the  proposition  "  A  pistol-shot  killed  two  recent 
presidents  of  the  United  States,"  the  motive  of  belief 
is,  with  most  of  us,  historic  evidence,  whxle  with  no 
one  is  it  the  intrinsic  force  of  the  two  terms.  In 
the  one  case,  subject  and  predicate  both  terminate 
and  motive  the  assent :  in  the  other  they  terminate 
it,  but  do  not  motive.  Many  assents,  the  original 
motives  of  which  are  all,  or  most  of  them,  forgotten, 
find  still  an  adequate  motive  in  the  clear  recollection 


54 


NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE. 


that  they  have  been  validly  established :  at  any 
rate,  motive  of  some  sort  they  must  have  present, 
under  pain  of  being  irrational. 

i.  The  way  is  now  clear  for  treating  of  the 
different  kinds  or  species  of  certitude.  In  the 
terminology  of  Aristotelian  logic,  the  species  is 
what  constitutes  the  essence  of  a  thing  :  but  certi- 
tude, in  one  respect,  is  not  an  essence,  but  only 
an  accident  of  the  mind.  Essence,  however,  is 
an  accommodating  word,  and  allows  of  being 
varied  in  meaning  according  to  the  variability  of 
ends  in  view  ;  the  same  difference  becomes  essen- 
tial or  non-essential,  specific  or  non-specific,  with 
the  change  of  purpose.  A  round  biscuit,  and  a 
square  biscuit,  both  of  the  same  material,  differ 
specifically  for  the  mathematician,  non-specifically 
for  the  child  who  eats  them.  In  general,  according 
to  the  usage  of  human  speech,  that  difference  in  any 
order  is  to  be  regarded  as  specific,  which,  in  relation 
to  that  order,  goes  to  the  very  essence  or  nature  of 
the  thing.  If  we  want  a  red  object  to  excite  a  bull, 
then  the  colour,  not  the  material,  is  the  specific 
character  :  if  we  want  a  woollen  garment,  then  the 
material,  not  the  colour,  is  specific. 

This  being  so,  we  observe  that  the  essential 
character  of  certitude,  that  which  radically  dis- 
tinguishes it  from  other  states  of  mind,  such  as 
suspicion  or  opinion,  that  which  gives  it  its  lower 
generic  place  under  the  higher  genus  of  intellectual 
assents,  is  the  firmness  of  the  assent.  In  other 
cases  we  either  withhold  assent,  or  give  it  only  with 
reserve ;  but  in  certitude  we  are  without  any  doubt. 


KINDS  AND   DEGREES   OF  CERTITUDE.  55. 

In  the  firmness  of  the  assent,  therefore,  if  anywhere, 
specific  differences  of  certitude  are  to  be  found  ;  for 
differences  here  will  be  difference  within  the  essential 
constituents.  In  establishing  three  such  differences 
we  shall  be  disregarding  one  pet  modern  theory 
about  the  non-necessary  character  of  all  truth  ;  but 
it  will  be  better  to  go  on  our  way  in  disregard  of 
adversaries  for  the  present,  and  to  come  back  again, 
in  the  next  chapter,  to  see  what  objectors  have  got 
to  urge. 

(a)  The  highest  motive  of  certitude,  giving  the 
highest  species  of  assent,  is  metaphysical;  which 
implies  a  necessity  so  absolute  as  to  be  bound  up 
with  the  immutable  nature  of  God  Himself.  In  this 
sense  we  may  adopt,  or  rather  adapt,  the  heathen 
saying,  avdyfcy  S'  ovSe  Oeol  ybdyovrai ;  God  cannot 
fight  against  the  necessities  of  His  own  all-perfect 
Nature,  and  their  inevitable  consequences  in  regard 
to  the  possibilities  of  creation.  But  we  must  avoid 
the  pagan  error  of  looking  upon  this  necessity  as 
something  extrinsic  to  God,  a  fate  or  destiny  having 
an  independent  existence.  The  prime  metaphysical 
necessities  are  that  God  should  exist  as  the  one 
absolutely  necessary  Being;  that  He  should  be  just 
what  He  is,  and  that  from  the  nature  of  this  First 
Being  should  follow  the  laws  regulating  the  possi- 
bilities of  all  that  can  be  created,  and  of  all  finite 
truths.  This  is  the  matter  of  a  whole  section  in  the 
scholastic  treatise  on  General  Metaphysics.  Here 
it  must  suffice  to  give  a  few  specimens  of  truths 
metaphysically  necessary ;  to  which  the  ordinary 
mind,  unbiassed  by  philosophic  theory,  will  feel  no 


56  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

difficulty  in  allowing  a  most  absolute,  irreversible 
character.  "  God  cannot  lie  ;  "  "  Moral  right  is 
sacred ;  "  "  Nothing  can  at  once,  under  the  same 
aspect,  be  and  not  be ; "  "  Every  new  reality  or 
event  must  have  a  cause ; "  "  Two  straight  lines 
cannot  enclose  a  space."  These  examples  at  least 
give  a  clue  to  what  is  meant  by  the  species  of  truth 
called  metaphysical. 

(b)  Strongly  contrasted  with  absolute  necessity  is 
physical  necessity,  which  we  call  contingency.  The 
physical  (cfrvetv)  is  what  comes  into  being,  what  has 
an  origin  and  a  growth,  what  is  produced  or  made ; 
and  so  it  differs  from  the  metaphysical,  which 
simply  and  eternally  is.  Hence  the  term  physical, 
as  here  understood,  does  not  apply  to  the  order  of 
mere  possibilities.4  The  physical  is  the  actually 
created  order  of  real  existence,  which  existence  is 
contingent,  and  might  never  have  been.  As  a  fact, 
out  of  the  various  worlds  which  in  His  Omnipo- 
tence God  might  have  created,  He  has  created  the 
existent  universe ;  whereas  He  might  have  created 
another,  or  might  have  abstained  from  creating 
altogether.  Even  the  present  system  is  not  so 
rigorously  settled  that  He  cannot  miraculously 
interfere  with  the  ordinary  sequence  of  effects. 
Thus  the  physical  necessity,  to  which  we  have  to 
bow,  is  not  a  priori  and  immutable,  but  a  posteriori 

4  This  use  would  exclude  God  from  the  order  of  the  "  physical," 
though  as  far  as  He  has  real  existence  He  is  often  included  under 
it ;  the  fact  being,  that  "  physical  "  is  a  term  of  varied  meaning,  as 
when  we  distinguish  physical  science  from  the  science  of  things 
spiritual,  physics  from  chemistry,  physics  from  physic,  and  so 
forth. 


KINDS  AND  DEGREES   OF  CERTITUDE.  57 

and  mutable  by  Divine  power.  It  is,  however,  a 
briori  to  this  extent,  that  all  its  possibilities  were 
fixed  a  priori,  and  to  an  intellect  able  to  look  into 
the  very  constitution  of  bodies,  all  their  powers 
would  presumably  be  thence  deducible  ;  while  from 
the  primitive  collocation  of  world-elements,  all  sub- 
sequent phenomena,  apart  from  what  is  due  to  the 
interference  of  free  will,  might  be  calculated.  We, 
however,  who  can  neither  adequately  penetrate  the 
inmost  nature  of  matter,  nor  quite  solve  even  the 
comparatively  simple  problem  of  three  attracting 
bodies,  have  to  proceed  on  a  humbler  method :  so 
for  us  physical  truths  are  a  posteriori,  and  are 
ultimate  facts,  which  we  take  on  the  evidence  of 
experience,  without  being  able  to  give  their  final 
account.  All  our  physical  explanations  end  in  mere 
empirical  facts. 

(c)  The  third  kind  of  motive  for  certitude  need 
not  detain  us  long;  for  we  shall  have  to  give  a 
separate  consideration  to  historic  evidence,  and 
then  the  nature  of  moral  truth,  as  it  is  styled,  will 
appear  in  a  fuller  light.  We  have,  in  this  matter, 
the  difficult  problem  to  find  a  sort  of  necessity,  in 
spite  of  free  will  being  mixed  up  with  the  elements 
of  our  calculation.  We  shall  have  to  claim,  that 
occasionally  we  can  know  how  people  have  used,  or 
will  use,  their  power  to  choose  under  given  circum- 
stances. Thus  moral  truth,  in  the  sense  at  present 
given  to  it,  is  truth  about  human  action,  which  in 
many  details  is  free,  though  it  has  not  a  freedom 
unbounded.  The  theoretic  difficulties  against  the 
possibility  of  ever  calculating   human  conduct  on 


58  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

the  hypothesis  of  a  real  liberty  of  choice,  vanish  at 
once  before  a  concrete  case ;  it  is  a  sheer  impossi- 
bility that  historians  should  be  deceiving  us,  when 
they  narrate  certain  substantial  events  in  the  lives 
of  Alexander  the  Great,  Julius  Caesar,  and  Charle- 
magne. Again,  there  are  cases  where  we  may  be 
certain,  that  a  very  well  tried  character  will  not 
prove  treacherous  under  moderate  temptation  and 
enormous  responsibility.  These  instances  convey 
sufficiently  what  is  to  be  understood  by  the  third 
species  of  certitude,  which  is  here  styled  moral. 

It  must  be  added,  however,  that  the  same 
phrase,  "  moral  certitude,"  which  is  here  used  for 
strict  certitude,  is  employed  also  in  a  looser  way  to 
mean  high  probability,  such  as  would  be  enough 
to  determine  the  action  of  an  ordinarily  prudent 
man.  It  is  moral  inasmuch  as  it  suffices  for  a 
moral  agent.  Thus  a  merchant  would  make  a  great 
venture  on  "  a  moral  certitude,"  which  meant  the 
probability  of  a  thousand  to  one,  yet  did  not  quite 
leave  the  level  of  probability,  and  mount  into  that 
of  strict  certitude. 

While  it  belongs  to  philosophy  to  draw,  in 
general,  the  distinction  between  the  three  species 
of  certitude,  it  would  be  preposterous  to  ask  it  to 
settle,  in  all  concrete  cases,  whether  we  can  have 
certitude,  and  if  so,  of  what  kind.  Not  all  the 
departments  of  science  together  can  discharge  this 
function  :  but  each  department  is  left  by  philosophy 
to  do  what  it  can  in  its  own  sphere,  while  philo- 
sophy itself  investigates  certitude  in  its  highest 
generality.     Should    any   one   try  to    illustrate    its 


KINDS   AND  DEGREES   OF   CERTITUDE.  55 

doctrines  by  examples  confessedly  dubious  in  theiv 
own  scientific  order,  it  simply  begs  the  person  to 
choose  a  more  suitable  illustration ;  it  does  not 
undertake  to  meddle  out  of  its  own  province,  and 
it  borrows,  to  exemplify  its  teaching,  only  safe 
instances. 

2.  Next  to  difference  of  kind  in  certitude  may 
be  taken  difference  of  degree.  It  is  maintained  by 
some,  that  from  its  very  nature  certitude  admits  of 
no  degrees,  of  no  less  and  more ;  that  if  a  man  is 
sure,  he  is  sure,  and  that  is  all  about  it ;  so  that  to 
talk  of  assurance  being  made  doubly  sure  is  a  mere 
facon  de  parley.  We  are  not  concerned  to  maintain 
that  under  no  acceptation  of  the  word  "  assent "  is 
it  possible  to  deny  the  existence  of  degrees  in  it ; 
but  if  we  take  "  assent "  in  its  wider  and  more 
ordinary  meaning,  the  certitude  of  our  assent  does 
admit  of  degrees,  in  the  sense  we  are  about  to 
explain  in  the  following  paragraph. 

Every  certitude  must  absolutely  exclude  all  solid 
doubt,  which  exclusion  of  doubt  is  the  negative  side 
of  certitude  and,  of  its  own  nature,  allows  of  no 
degrees  ;  but  the  positive  side,  or  the  positive  assent 
itself,  is  of  a  nature  to  admit  degrees.  Certitude,  then, 
on  its  negative  side  has  not,  on  its  positive  it  has, 
degrees.  The  two  sides  are  only  distinguishable 
aspects,  not  separable  elements ;  by  one  act,  we  are 
sure  and  do  not  doubt.  Before  this  doctrine  can 
appear  quite  satisfactory,  it  needs  a  little  elaboration. 
For  against  it,  in  its  cruder  form,  might  be  urged 
the  fact,  that  the  same  motives  which  produce  assent 
also  drive  out  doubt  ;  and  that,  therefore,  doubt  is 


60  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

expelled  with  a  force  varying  with  the  expelling 
motives,  all  of  which  are  alike  in  that  they  annihi- 
late doubt,  but  differ  in  that  some  effect  the  annihi- 
lation with  greater  energy.  So  of  two  men  who 
agree  in  the  fact  of  being  no  longer  in  a  certain 
assembly  room,  one  may  have  been  quietly  lifted 
into  the  adjoining  street,  and  another  shot  with  a 
catapult  into  a  street  some  distance  away.  Thus, 
it  is  argued,  even  the  negative  side  of  certitude,  the 
expulsion  of  all  doubt,  may  differ  in  degree. 

To  answer  the  objection  we  must  limit  the 
meaning  of  expelled  doubt.  We  must  take  the 
absence  of  doubt  purely  on  its  negative  side,  or  on 
its  side  of  nonentity;  then  nonentity,  as  such,  is 
unsusceptible  of  less  and  more.  Of  course  mathe- 
maticians, with  whom,  however,  positive  and  negative 
often  mean  no  more  than  one  direction  and  its 
opposite,  extend  negative  quantities  as  far  backward 
as  positive  quantities  go  forward  :  to  the  plus  series 
i,  2,  3,  4,  &c,  they  can  oppose  a  minus  series  i,  2, 
3,  4.  Still  it  will  be  only  by  positive  considerations 
that  degrees  are  estimated  in  the  negative  direction. 
For  example,  a  man  who  is  said  mathematically  to 
be  minus  £1,000,  is  interpreted  to  have  no  money, 
and,  worse  than  that,  to  be  under  obligation  to  give 
the  first  available  £1,000  he  gets  to  his  creditors. 
Here  the  negative,  as  a  negative,  is  the  fact  of  a 
man  having  no  money  :  beyond  that  the  degree  of 
his  indebtedness  must  be  calculated  on  positive 
grounds.  The  case  is  not  quite  parallel  with  the 
one  in  hand ;  but  it  sheds  upon  it  some  light,  by 
helping   to  show  how  a  negative,  as  a  nonentity, 


KINDS  AND   DEGREES   OF  CERTITUDE.  61 

cannot  be  greater  or  less.  A  negation  in  the  sense 
of  an  intellectual  denial  may  be  given  with  greater 
or  less  intensity ;  but  a  negation  in  the  sense  of  the 
mere  non-existence  of  a  doubt  has  no  varying  inten- 
sity. And  so  the  whole  statement,  that  certainty, 
on  its  negative  side,  has  no  degrees,  is  reduced  to 
saying,  that  the  non-existence  of  doubt  in  every 
certitude  is  a  simple  non-existence,  or  nothing;  and 
that  nothing  does  not  admit  of  more  and  less. 

The  way  is  thus  cleared  for  establishing  the 
possibility  of  degrees  on  the  positive  side  of  cer- 
titude. What  a  man  does  is  one  thing,  what  in  strict 
logic  he  ought  to  do  is  another ;  and  speaking  from 
the  former  point  of  view  only,  it  is  not  incumbent 
on  us  to  prove  that  every  man  does  always  regulate 
the  degree  of  his  assent  according  to  the  considera- 
tions now  to  be  brought  forward.  Cardinal  Newman 
ably  maintains  that  as  a  fact  man  does  not  so  pro- 
portion his  assents  ;  it  is  enough  for  us  that  the 
considerations  we  have  been  urging  are  such  that, 
of  their  own  nature  and  cczteris  paribus  they  produce 
the  effect  of  varying  the  force  of  intellectual 
adherence.  Those  who,  like  Dr.  Gutberlet,  start 
from  the  notion  that  certitudes  are  equations,5  and 
argue  that  however  the  terms  equated  may  vary, 
yet  equation  itself  is  constant,  plainly  leave  out  of 
the  question  elements  which  claim  to  be  noticed. 

St.  Thomas,  while  he  allows  to  the  objection 
derivable  from  this  idea  of  knowledge  as  an  equa- 
tion, the  truth  it  contains,  still  manages  to  take 
out  of  the   difficulty  all   its  force  as  an  objection. 

5  Logik,  Die  Erkenntnisstheorie,  I.  4. 


62  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

Not,  indeed,  that  he  is  designedly  combating  the 
adverse  view :  his  words  form  only  the  better 
answer  to  the  difficulty,  because  they  meet  it  un- 
intentionally and  in  the  mere  act  of  explaining 
the  real  position  of  assent.  What  he  says  is  this  : 
"According  as  a  thing  happens  to  have  more  truth 
in  it,  it  elicits  a  higher  belief.  For  while  truth 
consists  of  an  equation  between  intellect  and  object, 
if  we  regard  truth  merely  as  an  equation,  it  does 
not  allow  of  less  or  more :  but  if  we  consider  the 
very  Being  of  the  object,  and  remember  that  truth 
has  its  ground  in  the  Being,  and  that  such  as  the 
Being  is,  such  is  the  truth  ;  then  those  things  which 
have  more  of  Being  have  also  more  of  truth."6  That 
is,  if  you  regard  truth  as  a  mere  equation  between 
a  mental  act  and  its  formal  object,  equality  is 
equality  all  the  world  over,  whether  the  terms 
equated  be  greater  or  less.  But  intellectual  assent 
is  no  mere  dead  uniform  sign  of  equality,  like  our 
algebraic  symbol :  it  is  a  living  response  to  objective 
evidence,  and  is  apt  to  vary,  c ceteris  paribus,  with  the 
evidence  that  calls  it  forth.  Hence  St.  Thomas 
again  affirms  :  "  An  assent  is  nothing  but  the  deter- 
mination of  the  intellect  to  one  affirmative  :  and  by 
so  much  greater  is  the  certitude  by  how  much 
stronger  is  the  motive  by  which  it  is  determined." 

Arguing  first  of  all  on  the  line  here  suggested, 
we  may  hope  soon  to  find  force  of  demonstration 
•enough  to  overpower  the  hostile  statement  of  Mr. 
Lewes :  "  The  widest  of  all  axioms,  whatever  is,  is, 
cannot  be  more  certain,  more  irresistible,  than  the 

6  St.Thos.,  Quasi.  Disp.De  Caritat.,  art.  ix.  ad  i. 


KINDS  AND   DEGREES   OF  CERTITUDE.  63 

most  fleeting  particular  truth."     Against  this  let  us 
try  three  arguments. 

(a)  Whilst  certitude  always  remains  up  to  the 
level  of  certitude,  and  never  sinks  to  the  lower  grade 
of  strong  probability,  still  its  accidental  degree  may 
vary :  it  reasonably  so  varies  when  the  truth  pro- 
posed is  of  a  higher  order.  Thus  a  man  is  certain 
that  he  lit  his  fire  with  one  of  Bryant  and  May's 
matches :  he  is,  or  may  be,  certain  in  a  more 
intense  degree  that  the  fire  would  not  have  blazed 
up  without  an  igniting  cause  of  some  sort.  He  is 
certain  that  Victoria  in  1887,  the  Jubilee  year,  was 
Queen  of  England  :  he  is,  or  may  be,  certain  in  a 
more  intense  degree  that  God  is  sovereign  Lord 
of  all.  He  is  certain  that  he  paid  a  bill  for  four 
shillings  with  two  florins  :  he  is,  or  may  be,  certain 
in  a  more  intense  degree  that  two  and  two  make 
four.  Where  an  adequate  cause  for  intenser  degree 
is  assigned,  and  where  we  have  a  faculty  susceptible 
of  stronger  and  weaker  excitation,  it  is  fair  to  infer 
a  possible  variation  in  the  effects.  To  say  that  the 
variation  is  something  outside  the  rational  assent,  or 
that  it  belongs  only  to  concomitant  emotion,  is  to 
ignore  explained  facts.  It  is  quite  true  that  some 
degrees  of  intensity  are  emotional ;  as  when  an 
Englishman  assents  more  keenly  to  the  authentic 
news  of  a  victory  for  the  British  arms,  than  to  the 
equally  authentic  news  of  a  victory  gained  by  one 
savage  tribe  over  another.  But  the  possibility  of 
degrees  in  the  region  of  emotion  does  not  exclude 
their  possibility  in  another.  It  was  in  intellectual 
motives  that  a  cause  for  intenser  assent  was  above 


64  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

pointed  out;  and  therefore  it  is  in  intellectual  assent 
that  the  intenser  degree  may  sometimes  reside : 
which  is  all  we  had  to  show. 

(b)  A  second  argument  may  be  put  thus  :  Always 
supposing  true  certitude,  sometimes  we  assent  as 
under  compulsion,  and  perhaps  against  our  wish  to 
believe  otherwise  :  sometimes  we  assent,  with  ease 
indeed,  but  not  with  the  feeling  of  strong  compul- 
sion ;  sometimes  we  assent  but  not  without  a  certain 
effort  of  the  will,  urging  on  the  mind  to  put  carefully 
together  and  admit  the  just  sufficient  evidences. 
Against  saying  universally  that  these  represent  three 
descending  grades  of  assent  stands  the  fact,  that  the 
firmest  of  all  assents,  the  act  of  supernatural  faith, 
results  from  a  command  of  the  will ;  but  keeping 
within  the  natural  order,  and  speaking  of  general 
cases,  we  may  assert  of  the  above,  that  they  are  three 
varying  grades,  the  variation  being  precisely  in  the 
intellectual  character  of  the  acts. 

(c)  Again,  if  the  simple  argument,  "  Certitude  is 
certitude  all  the  world  over,"  were  decisive  of  the 
whole  question,  it  might  be  questioned  whether 
Divine  and  Angelic  intelligence  were  to  be  re- 
garded as  following  under  the  rule.  But  waiving 
these  points  and  keeping  strictly  to  human  in- 
telligence, just  as  we  drew  a  proof  from  the  varying 
force  of  objective  truths,  so  we  may  draw  a  proof 
from  the  varying  force  of  human  minds ;  some 
men,  because  of  their  keener  faculties,  may  give  an 
intenser  assent  to  the  same  argument  which  draws 
likewise  the  assent  of  their  duller  brethren.  And  so 
once  more,  a  certitude  can  vary  in  degree. 


DEFINITION  OF  CERTITUDE.  65 


Addenda. 

(1)  In  distinguishing  three  kinds  of  certitude  it  is 
worth  while  to  notice  their  interdependence.  Though 
some  physical  conditions  of  brain  must  be  fulfilled  in 
order  that  the  mind  may  understand  a  metaphysical 
truth,  yet  man  may  claim,  in  regard  to  metaphysical 
truths,  that  he  can  obtain  them  without  the  admixture 
of  truths  of  a  different  order.  The  principle  of  contra- 
diction is  reached  in  its  purely  metaphysical  character. 
But  all  physical  truth  must  be  inseparably  bound  up 
with  some  metaphysical  principles ;  for  example  with  the 
just-mentioned  principle  of  contradiction.  For  where 
would  be  the  use  of  discovering  that  a  planet  exists,  if 
there  were  no  guarantee  that  its  existence  was  incompati- 
ble with  its  non-existence.  Obviously  the  metaphysical 
principle  is  not  applied  after  the  physically  ascertained 
fact,  but  enters  indissoiubly  into  union  with  such  ascer- 
tainment, which  else  would  be  impossible.  In  the  third 
place  moral  truth  must  have  joined  with  it,  not  only  meta- 
physical, but  also  physical  truths  :  for  we  judge  human 
conduct  through  physical  manifestations ;  and  human 
speech  or  writing  is  equally  a  physical  phenomenon. 

(2)  It  has  been  asserted  that  the  intenser  degree  is 
never  in  the  certitude  as  such,  but  in  some  concomitant 
emotion.  Thus  a  writer  in  Mind,  who  betrays  the  fact 
that  he  has  not  cleared  up  his  own  thoughts  on  the 
subject,  ventures  on  the  declaration,  that  "there  are  no 
degrees  of  intensity  in  cognition :  the  intensity  is  a 
matter  of  feeling  concomitant  with  the  cognition." 

The  relation  between  what  are  called  feeling  and 
cognition  forms  a  matter  of  much  vague  discussion.1 

1  See  Mr.  Bain's  The  Senses  of  the  Intellect,  Introduction,  c.  i. ; 
Mr.  Spencer's  Psychology,  Part  IV.  c.  viii. ;  Lotze's  Microcosmns, 
Bk.  II.  c.  ii. 


66  NATURE  OF  CERTITUDE. 

Some  place  the  foundation  of  feeling  in  cognition,  on  a 
wide  extension  of  the  principle,  "  There  is  neither  desire 
nor  fear  of  the  unknown ;  "  others  reverse  the  position, 
and  make  blind  feeling  primitive — pure  subjective  feeling 
without  an  object.  Feeling  again  is  made  to  include  all 
consciousness;  so  that  a  stronger  intellectual  assent, 
making  itself  felt  in  consciousness,  could  be  put  down 
to  feeling. 

In  face  of  such  ill-defined  terms  in  the  objection,  it 
is  enough  to  reply,  that  if,  from  an  examination  of  any 
case,  it  appears  that  one  assent  has  no  intellectual  motive 
or  cause  stronger  than  another,  then  it  is  no  illustration 
of  our  thesis ;  but  if  a  distinctly  intellectual  ground  of 
superiority  can  be  shown,  then  it  is  an  illustration.  If 
exactly  the  same  vouchers  tell  a  man  of  the  equally 
credible  events  that  a  friend  and  a  stranger  have  both 
perished  in  a  shipwreck,  then  the  intenser  act  in  regard 
to  the  friend's  death  may  be  put  down  to  emotion.  There 
may  also  be  something  intenser  in  the  intellectual 
energy,  but  this  element  would  be  difficult  to  detect  and 
estimate. 

And  generally  we  may  say,  that  people  are  too  apt 
to  think  that  they  can  mark  off,  with  nicety,  assent  from 
assent,  affective  movement  from  affective  movement, 
and  the  former  of  the  two  elements  from  the  latter. 
Whereas  clearly  to  isolate  an  act  in  reflexion,  is 
often  most  difficult  or  impossible.  It  may  very  well 
be  that,  not  acting  on  the  possible  principles  ex- 
plained in  the  argument  which  we  used  to  prove  the 
greater  force  of  a  metaphysical  over  a  physical  truth, 
a  schoolboy  will  concentrate  even  a  greater  intellectual 
energy  on  the  very  contingent  fact  that  he,  a  poor  player 
usually,  has  had  the  luck  once  to  score  fifty  at  a  cricket 
match,  than  on  the  eternally  abiding,  necessary  truth 
that  two  straight  lines  cannot  enclose  a  space.     But  in 


DEFINITION  OF  CERTITUDE.  67 

a  concrete  case  of  this  kind,  who  is  to  disengage  the 
intellectual  from  the  emotional  elements  ?  Again,  the 
mere  size,  or  amplitude  of  the  object  assented  to  may 
easily  get  confused  with  a  notion  that  the  assent  itself 
is  intenser ;  and  who  then  is  neatly  to  discriminate  ex- 
tension from  intensity  ?  Take  once  more  the  rule  some- 
times laid  down,  that  in  any  given  case  feeling  and 
intelligence  are  in  inverse  ratio ;  the  heavier  drain  in 
one  direction  exhausting  the  supply  in  the  other.  There 
is  some  truth  expressed  in  such  a  rule ;  but  on  the  other 
hand,  the  force  of  an  emotion  is  sometimes  to  increase 
the  intellectual  power,  not  to  diminish  it,  as  in  those  who 
speak  best  under  a  fairly  strong  excitement.  Let  us 
not,  then,  be  deceived  by  a  fancied  simplicity,  but  rather 
apply  to  acts  of  the  human  soul  what  a  French  writer, 
quoted  by  Sir  H.  Maine,  says  of  human  society:  "  I 
have  hitherto  discovered  but  one  principle  which  is  so 
simple  as  to  appear  childish,  and  which  I  scarce  dare 
to  express ;  it  is  no  other  than  the  observation,  that 
a  human  society,  a  modern  society  especially,  is  an 
immense  and  complicated  object."2 

A  human  intelligence  too  works  by  a  very  compli- 
cated process. 

(3)  It  will  save  a  difficulty  for  some  to  observe  that, 
whereas  generally  degrees  are  estimated  only  within  the 
same  kind,  in  the  last  chapter  they  have  been  calcu- 
lated between  kind  and  kind  within  the  same  genus, 
certitude.  The  possibility  of  so  doing  appears  on 
inspection. 

2  "  Jusqu'  a  present  je  n'ai  guere  trouve  qu'un  principe  si  simple 
qu'il  semblera  pueril,  et  que  j'ose  a  peine  l'annoncer.  II  consiste  tout 
entier  dans  cette  remarque,  qu'une  societe  humaine,  surtout  une 
societe  moderne,  est  une  chose  vaste  et  compliquee." 


CHAPTER   V. 

METAPHYSICAL   AND    PHYSICAL   C#ERTITUDE. 

(continued)* 

Synopsis. 

I.  Metaphysical  certitude. 

i.  Mr.  Huxley's  three  meanings  of  necessary  truth,  (a} 
Uniformity  or  consistency  in  the  use  of  terms,  (b)  In- 
dissoluble association,  (c)  Facts  of  immediate  con- 
sciousness. 

2.  Argument   in   behalf  of  metaphysical   truth    from    the 

admission  of  adversaries,  (a)  Admissions  as  to  moral 
truth,     (b)  Admissions  as  to  intellectual  principles. 

3.  Defence  of  metaphysical  certitude. 

II.  Physical  certitude. 

1.  The  sum-total  of  matter  and  force  a  constant  quantity. 

Various  meanings  of  "the  Uniformity  of  Nature." 
(a)  Like  agencies,  under  like  conditions,  will  always 
have  like  effects.  (b)  The  sum-total  of  physical 
agencies  in  the  world  is  constant,  (c)  Nature  presents 
periodic  phenomena,  or  the  recurrence  of  like  events 
in  her  course. 

2.  Physical  science  saved  on  principles  above  enunciated, 

lost  on  principles  of  pure  empiricism. 

3.  Distinction  drawn  between  simpler  physical  truths,  on 

which  we  can  have  certitude,  and  more  complex,  on 
which  often  we  cannot  have  certitude. 

4.  How  to  judge  that  no  miraculous  interference  need  be 

suspected. 
Addenda. 

Some  years  ago,  what  has  been  briefly  laid  down 
about  metaphysical  and  physical  certitude  would 
have  been  much  more  readily  taken  for  granted  than 

1  Beginners  may  omit  this  chapter. 


METAPHYSICAL   AND   PHYSICAL   CERTITUDE.      69 

it  will  be  to-day,  when  so  many  are  boasting  that 
they  have  changed  the  prevalent  ideas  on  the 
subject.  It  will  be  the  endeavour  of  this  chapter 
to  show  that  the  change  is  not  for  the  better,  and 
to  recommend  a  return  to  the  old  way  of  thinking. 

I.  Starting  from  the  examination  of  meta- 
physical truth,  we  must  carefully  guard  against  a 
prejudice,  with  which  some  seek  to  discredit  the 
cause ;  the  notion,  namely,  that  those  who  hold 
some  principles  to  be  in  a  real  sense  a  priori  and 
beyond  mere  experience  of  facts,  are  thereby 
committed  to  the  assertion  of  innate  ideas.2  This 
is  not  so.  They  allow  that  all  human  knowledge 
is  started  by  experience,  internal  or  external ;  but 
they  further  contend — and  here  they  differ  from  pure 
empiricists — that  while  some  truths  might  have  been 
different,  other  truths  are  perceived  to  be  founded 
on  absolute  necessity,  and  are  therefore  valid  for  all 
places  and  for  all  times,  nay,  even  beyond  all  place 
and  time.  In  the  latter  case,  though  our  knowledge 
has  its  origin  in  single  experiences,  yet  no  sooner 
have  the  ideas  been  grasped,  than  they  are  seen  to 
imply  universal  principles. 

1.  To  understand  against  what  manner  of  teach- 
ing we  have  to  contend,  it  will  be  well  to  examine 
the  three  meanings,  which  Mr.  Huxley,3  in  his  little 
work  on  Hume,  thinks  it  possible  to  attach  to 
"  necessary  truth." 

(a)  The  first  interpretation  is  founded  "  on  the 
•convention  which    underlies   the   possibility   of  in- 

3  See  Mr.  Bain's  Mental  Science,  Bk.  II.  c.  vi.  n.  1. 
3  C.  vi.     See  also  Mr.  Bain,  loc.  cit.  n.  7. 


70  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

telligible  speech,  that  terms  shall  always  have 
the  same  meaning."  This  is  what  Mr.  Bain,  an 
expounder  of  the  philosophy  which  Mr.  Huxley 
substantially  adopts,  has  called  "  the  principle  of 
consistency,"4  which  he  thus  formulates:  "It  is  a 
fundamental  requisite  of  reasoning,  as  well  as  of 
communication  by  speech,  that  what  is  affirmed  in 
one  form  of  words  shall  be  affirmed  in  another." 
The  need  of  this  rule  no  one  will  deny,  if  he  wishes 
to  secure  intelligible  communication  between  men, 
whose  principal  means  of  intercourse  is  by  speech. 
But,  while  needful,  the  rule  holds  a  very  secondary 
place  in  the  philosophy  of  the  subject ;  for,  deeper 
than  consistency  of  speech  is  consistency  of  thought, 
and  deeper  than  any  mere  consistency  of  thought  is 
its  correspondence  to  the  reality  of  things.  Now 
this  correspondence,  neither  Mr.  Huxley  nor  Mr. 
Bain  attempts  to  defend ;  they  reject  the  definition 
of  truth,  as  "  conformity  of  mind  to  thing,"  inasmuch 
as  they  both  proclaim  that  idealism  cannot  indeed  be 
proved,  but  neither  can  it  be  disproved. 

On  the  matter  of  this  all-important  consistency 
of  thought  with  things  Mr.  Bain 5  has  to  content 
himself  with  making  three  postulates,  one  for  objects 
of  present  consciousness,  another  for  objects  of 
memory,  and  a  third  for  objects  of  expectation  in 
the  future.  On  the  first  point  "we  must  assume 
that  we  feel  what  we  do  feel ;  that  our  sensations 
and  feelings  occur  as  they  are  felt.     Whether  or  not 

4  Mental  Science,  loc.  cit. 

5  Mental  Science,  loc.  cit. ;  Inductive  Logic,  Bk.  II.  c.  ii. ;  Deductive 
Logic,  Appendix  D. 


METAPHYSICAL   AND   PHYSICAL   CERTITUDE.       7r 

we  call  this  an  irresistible  belief,  an  assertion  whose 
opposite  is  inconceivable,  we  assume  it  and  proceed 
upon  it  in  all  that  we  do.  Calling  its  negative 
unthinkable  does  not  constitute  any  reason  for 
assuming  it :  we  can  give  no  reason  better  than 
that  we  do  assume  it."  Secondly,  belief  in 
memory  is  also,  and  more  especially,  taken  as  a 
practically  needful  assumption  for  which  we  can 
assign  no  reason  in  justification.  And  thirdly, 
to  crown  the  whole  work  of  assumption,  and  to 
do  away  with  all  solid  motive  for  trust  that  our 
thoughts  represent  things,  the  two  first  postulates 
are  supplemented  by  a  third,  and  not  only  supple- 
mented by  it,  but  made  in  some  sort  to  rest  on  it  for 
support ;  at  least  there  is  a  reciprocal  dependence 
between  the  three.  "  What  has  uniformly  been  in 
the  past,"  says  the  third  postulate,  "will  be  in  the 
future ;  what  has  never  been  contradicted  in  any 
known  instance,  there  being  ample  means  and 
opportunities  of  search,  will  always  be  true."  For 
this  postulate,  "  we  can  give  no  reason  or  evidence  : " 
indeed  it  is  "  an  error  to  give  any  reason  or  justi- 
fication," instead  of  treating  it  as  "begged  from 
the  outset."  At  all  events,  "if  there  be  a  reason 
it  is  practical  and  not  theoretical ; "  theoretically 
or  rationally  considered,  the  postulate  "  involves  a 
hazard  peculiar  to  itself,  and  any  belief  as  to  the 
future  which  we  adopt  on  its  authority  is  "  a  perilous 
leap."  Nay,  experience  is  even  positively  against 
the  postulate,  testifying  to  us  that  "  nature  is  not 
uniform  in  everything,"  by  the  "  establishment  of 
exceptions  to  uniformity."    So  situated,  "  we  go  forth 


72  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE 

in  a  blind  faith  until  we  receive  a  check.  Our  con- 
fidence grows  with  experience,  yet  experience  has 
only  a  negative  force  ;  it  shows  us  what  has  never 
been  contradicted,  and  on  that  we  run  the  risk  of 
going  forward  on  the  same  course."  Furthermore 
the  curious  fact  is  noted,  that,  although  without 
justification  for  itself,  "  this  assumption  is  ample 
justification  of  the  inductive  operation,  as  a  process 
of  real  inference.  Without  it  we  can  do  nothing, 
with  it  we  can  do  anything." 

The  passages  thus  quoted  have  an  immediate 
bearing  on  physical  truth,  in  relation  to  which  we 
shall  presently  consider  them  ;  but  they  have  also  a 
connexion  with  metaphysical  truth,  on  which  account 
they  have  been  thus  early  introduced.  The  con- 
nexion is  this :  we  are  speaking  of  metaphysical 
truth,  another  name  for  which  is  necessary  truth. 
Now  the  first  meaning  assigned  by  Mr.  Huxley  to 
necessary  truth  is  "  consistency  of  language."  Even 
if  we  suppose  this  consistency  of  language  to  be 
backed  by  a  corresponding  consistency  of  thought,  we 
may  not  suppose,  without  inquiry,  that  behind  the 
consistency  of  thought  there  is  secured  a  solid  basis 
of  objective  reality.  Investigation  shows  us  that  such 
foundation  is  not  secured  ;  as  well  because  of  Mr. 
Huxley's  own  assertion  that  idealism  cannot  be  dis- 
proved, as  because  of  Mr.  Bain's  futile  attempt  to 
rest  the  objective  reality  of  thought,  for  past,  present, 
and  future,  on  three  postulates,  of  which  he  gives  a 
most  lame  account.  They  are  three  postulates  in 
the  worst  sense  of  question-begging.  We  conclude, 
therefore,  that  the  first  of  the  three  suggested  mean- 


METAPHYSICAL   AND   PHYSICAL    CERTITUDE        73 

ings  of  necessary  truth  is  quite  inadequate.  To 
repeat  once  more  and  emphasize  the  main  burden 
of  complaint,  the  school  to  which  Mr.  Huxley  has 
attached  himself,  does  not  make  any  provision  for  a 
knowledge  of  necessary  truth  about  things.  Just  as 
Mill  declares  that  he  cannot  extend  the  principle  of 
contradiction  to  things  in  themselves,  nor  absolutely 
make  of  it  more  than  an  empirical  law  of  our 
thought,  so  Mr.  Bain  similarly  stops  short  of  reality. 
"Were  it  admissible,"  he  writes,  "that  a  thing 
could  be  and  could  not  be,  our  faculties  would  be 
stultified.  That  we  should  abide  by  a  declaration 
once  made  is  indispensable  to  all  understanding 
between  man  and  man.  The  law  of  necessity  in 
this  sense  is  not  the  law  of  things,  but  an  unavoid- 
able accompaniment  of  the  use  of  speech.'"  So 
explained,  the  law  is  quite  empty  of  reality. 

Yet  inadequate  as  it  is,  Mr.  Bain  does  not  allow 
it  its  full  force.  He  mentions  as  being  outside  the 
range  of  consistency  in  speech  or  of  "truths  of 
implication,"  the  axioms  that  "things  equal  to  the 
same  thing  are  equal  to  one  another,"  and  that 
"  the  sums  of  equals  are  equals ;  "  also  the  principle 
that  "  every  event  must  have  a  cause."  These 
several  propositions,  he  maintains,  are  reached 
inductively,  are  "  not  necessary,"  and  "  may  be 
denied  without  self-contradiction."  So  much  for 
necessary  truth  when  described  in  Mr.  Huxley's 
words,  as  "  the  convention  underlying  the  possi- 
bility of  intelligible  speech,  that  terms  shall  always 
have  the  same  meaning." 

(b)    Let    us   try   the    second    interpretation    of 


74  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

necessary  truths  ;  now  they  are  "  propositions  the 
negation  of  which  implies  the  dissolution  of  some 
association,  memory,  or  expectation,  which  is  in 
fact  indissoluble."  Fastening  on  the  word  "  associa- 
tion "  we  have  one  of  the  terms  round  which  so  much 
of  the  present  controversy  gathers  ;  nor  is  it  possible 
intelligently  to  conduct  the  discussion  unless  we 
understand  the  large  part  played  in  the  philosophy 
of  our  English  empiricists  by  association.  In  this 
matter  Mr.  Huxley  often  follows  so  closely  the  foot- 
steps of  Mill,  that  it  is  better  at  once  to  recur  to  the 
more  original  author,  though  Hume  most  deserves 
to  be  called  the  prime  offender.6 

Mill,  however,  is  not  such  an  out-and-out  associa- 
tionist  as  it  might,  from  some  of  his  utterances,, 
appear.  It  is  true  that  not  only  in  intellectual 
processes,  but  even  in  volitional,  he  attributes  very 
much  to  association.  Denying  free  will,  and  yet 
clinging  to  what  might  easily  be  taken  as  a  remnant 
of  the  belief  in  freedom,  after  a  manner  which  it 
puzzles  even  his  friend,  Mr.  Bain,  to  regard  as  other 
than   an    inconsistency,7    he  was    alarmed,    at    one 

6  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  Part  I.  §  iv. 

7  His  theory  is,  that  though  man's  conduct  is  rigorously  deter- 
mined by  character  and  circumstances,  yet  man  can  do  something 
to  improve  his  character.  "Modified  fatalism  holds  that  our  actions 
are  determined  by  our  will,  our  will  by  our  desires,  and  our  desires 
by  the  joint  influence  of  the  motives  presented  to  us  and  of  our 
individual  character ;  but  that  our  character  having  been  made  for 
us  and  not  by  us,  we  are  not  responsible  for  it,  nor  for  the  actions  it 
leads  to,  and  should  in  vain  attempt  to  alter  them.  The  true  doctrine 
maintains  that  not  only  our  conduct,  but  our  character,  is  in  part 
amenable  to  our  will ;  that  we  can  by  employing  proper  means 
improve  our  character." — Examination,  c.  xxvi.  p.  516.  (2nd  Ed.) 


METAPHYSICAL   AND  PHYSICAL   CERTITUDE.       75 

period  of  his  life,  lest  his  early  educators  should  not 
have  formed  in  him  associations  of  right  conduct 
sufficiently  strong  to  keep  him  always  on  the  line  of 
rectitude.  But  it  is  on  the  intellectual  side  of  asso- 
ciation that  we  are  at  present  considering  his  views ; 
and  here  he  distinctly  departs  from  his  father's 
teaching,  that  judgment  is  mere  association.8  He 
declares  that  belief  is  a  new  element  of  a  special 
kind,  though  he  nowhere  goes  so  far,  as  does  Mr, 
Bain,  in  the  assertion  of  spontaneous  beliefs,  ex- 
ceeding all  warrant  for  their  formation.  According 
to  Mr.  Bain  :9  "it  may  be  granted  that  contact 
with  actual  things  is  one  of  the  sources  of 
belief,  but  it  is  not  the  only  nor  the  greatest 
source.  Indeed  so  considerable  are  the  other 
sources  as  to  reduce  this  seemingly  preponderating 
consideration  to  comparative  insignificance."  Mill 
rather  adheres  to  the  view,  that  in  producing 
belief  the  force  of  association  is  at  least  prepon- 
derant, as  will  be  manifest  in  instances  now  to  be 
adduced.10 

He  divides  indissoluble  associations  into  those 
which  we  cannot  so  much  as  conceive  to  be 
reversible,  and  those  which  he  fancies  he  can 
conceive  to  be  reversible  ;  but  not  even  the 
former  will  he  pronounce  absolutely  irreversible. 
For  "it  is  questionable,"  he  holds,  "if  there  are  any 
natural  inconceivabilities,  or  if  anything  is  incon- 
ceivable to  us  for  any  other  reason,  than  because 

8  See  his  note  to  James  Mill's  Analysis,  c.  xi.  n.  98. 

9  Logic,  Introduction,  n.  7,  Bk.  VI.  c.  iii.  n.  1. 

10  Examination,  c.  vi.  pp.  67,  68.  (2nd  Ed.) 


76  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

nature  does  not  afford  us  the  combinations  necessary 
to  make  it  conceivable."  More  strongly  still,  passing 
from  the  phrase,  "  questionable,"  to  "  can  only  be," 
he  says,  "  If  we  have  any  associations  which  are  in 
practice  indissoluble,  it  can  only  be  because  the  con- 
ditions of  our  existence  deny  us  the  experience  which 
would  be  capable  of  dissolving  them." 

After  such  declarations  we  are  not  surprised  to 
find  how  ready  Mill  is  to  allow  the  possibility  of 
dissolution  in  associations  which,  he  says,  are  to  us 
at  present,  not  alterable  in  any  form  that  we  can 
conceive.  Apparently  forgetful  of  his  admission  that 
judgments  are  more  than  associations  of  ideas,  he 
takes,  as  test  cases,  the  three  primary  principles  of 
identity,  contradiction,  and  excluded  middle ;  and 
about  them  he  avers,11  "  I  readily  admit  that  these 
three  principles  are  universally  true  of  all  phenomena. 
I  also  admit,  that  if  there  are  any  inherent  necessities 
of  thought,  these  are  such.  I  express  myself  in  this 
qualified  manner,  because  whoever  is  aware  how 
artificially  modifiable,  the  creatures  of  circumstance, 
and  alterable  by  circumstances,  most  of  the  supposed 
necessities  of  thought  are,  (though  real  necessities 
to  a  given  person  at  a  given  time),  will  hesitate  to 
affirm  of  any  such  necessities  that  they  are  an 
original  part  of  our  mental  constitution.  Whether 
the  three  so-called  fundamental  laws  are  laws  of 
thought  by  the  native  structure  of  the  mind,  or 
merely  because  we  perceive  them  to  be  universally 
true  of  observed  phenomena,  I  will  not  positively 
decide ;    but   they   are   laws   of  thought    now   and 

u  Examination,  c.  xxi.  p.  417.  (2nd  Ed.) 


METAPHYSICAL   AND   PHYSICAL   CERTITUDE.      77 

invincibly  so.  They  may  or  may  not  be  capable  of 
alteration  by  experience,  but  the  conditions  of  our 
existence  deny  us  the  experience  which  would  be 
required  to  alter  them."  This  passage  is  the  plain 
negation  of  all  certitude ;  for  if  with  regard  to  such 
self-evident  truths  as  that  "whatever  is,  is,"  and 
that  "whatever  is,  cannot  at  the  same  time,  and 
under  the  same  respect,  not  be,"  we  are  unable  to 
rely  upon  our  clear  mental  insight  when  it  tells  us 
that  these  axioms  are  true  for  all  intelligence  and 
beyond  all  possibility  of  alteration  ;  then  we  never 
can  have  any  really  solid  foundation  for  a  firm  assent. 
Certitude  even  ceases  to  have  a  meaning. 

To  pass  now  to  those  metaphysical  truths  which 
Mr.  Mill  thinks  to  be  conceivably  alterable,  under 
conditions  of  experience  other  than  what  this  world 
affords  ;  we  will  take  his  assertion,  that  to  beings 
differently  situated  square-circle  might  be  as  rational 
as  sweet-circle  is  to  us.  His  argument  is,  that  just 
as  to  us  the  sensations  sweet  and  circular  may  be 
derived  together  from  one  object,  so  to  persons  of 
another  constitution,  or  in  other  surroundings,  the 
sensations  of  square  and  circular  might  be  derived 
together  from  one  object.  It  is  a  revelation  of  the 
thorough  unsoundness  of  Mill's  philosophy,  when  he 
thus  confounds  sensations  with  intellectual  percep- 
tion of  universal  truths.  So  long  as  he  looks  only 
to  chance  association  of  sensations,  he  may  fancy 
that  any  combination  of  these  is  possible  ;  but  if  he 
would  look  to  the  mind's  insight  into  the  proposi- 
tion, "  a  square  cannot  be  circular,"  he  would  see 
that  it  included  the  truism, "  a  square  cannot  be  not 


78  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

square :  "  for  incontrovertibly  that  which  consists 
of  curved  lines  is  not  square,  and  a  circle  is  wholly 
curvilinear.  Mill  proclaims  very  loudly  against 
Hamilton  that  v/hat  is  self-contradictory  cannot  be 
sound  philosophy :  let  him  take  his  words  home  to 
himself. 

Another  example  he  borrows  from  a  barrister, 
and  it  is  to  this  effect.  Two  and  two  might  make  five ; 
for  example,  it  would  do  so  in  any  region  in  which, 
when  two  and  two  things  were  put  together,  a  fifth 
always  "  interloped."  Really  the  argument  seems 
childish,  for  the  fifth  object  would  never  appear 
without  a  sufficient  cause  ;  and  even  though  the 
inhabitants  of  the  strange  land  never  could  discover 
what  the  cause  was,  at  least  they  would  rationally 
infer  its  existence,  and  never  could  form  the  judg- 
ment, "  two  and  two  make  five."  Yet  Mr.  Huxley 
has  accepted  the  suggestion,  and  gravely  told  an 
American  audience,  "  every  candid  thinker  will 
admit  that  there  may  be  a  world  in  which  two  and 
two  do  not  make  four,  and  in  which  two  straight 
lines  enclose  a  space."  If  so,  neither  "  candid  " 
thought,  nor  any  other  kind  of  thought,  has  much 
intrinsic  value. 

From  the  same  barrister  Mill,  whom  Mr.  Huxley 
follows  obsequiously,  shows  how  two  straight  lines 
may  be  judged  to  enclose  a  space.  Writing  lately 
in  the  Nineteenth  Century  against  the  Duke  of  Argyll, 
Mr.  Huxley  is  inconsistent  with  his  earlier  view ;  for 
he  lays  it  down  "  that  omnipotence  itself  could  not 
make  a  triangular  circle."  But  let  us  go  to  the  more 
original  fount  of  wisdom,  the  barrister.  "Imagine," 


METAPHYSICAL   AND   PHYSICAL   CERTITUDE.       79 

says  the  learned  counsel  for  the  non-necessary 
truth  of  mathematical  axioms,12  "  a  man  who  has 
never  had  experience  of  straight  lines  through  any 
sense  whatever,  suddenly  placed  upon  a  railway, 
stretching  out  in  a  straight  line  in  each  direction. 
He  would  see  the  rails,  which  had  been  the  first 
straight  lines  he  had  ever  seen,  apparently  meeting, 
or  at  least  tending  to  meet,  at  the  horizon.  He 
would  thus  infer,  in  the  absence  of  other  experience, 
that  they  actually  did  enclose  a  space  when  pro- 
duced far  enough.  Experience  alone  could  undeceive 
him."  Far  more  faults  could  be  found  with  this 
piece  of  sophistry,  which  many  grave  writers  patro- 
nize, than  it  is  worth  while  to  enumerate  ;  suffice  it 
to  say,  briefly,  that  in  the  supposed  case  a  man, 
ignorant  of  perspective,  erroneously  judges  from 
appearances  two  lines,  which  really  are  parallel,  to 
be  convergent :  but  he  never  judges  that  parallel 
lines  can  converge,  for  the  notion  parallel  is  nowhere 
shown  to  have  entered  his  head.  Here  the  barrister's 
random  shot  misses  its  mark  utterly.  No  man,  with- 
out secretly  changing  the  meaning  of  his  words,  could 
intelligently  say  parallel  lines,  if  prolonged,  may 
meet.  Even  one  of  the  empiricist  school,  Mr.  Bain, 
has  the  wisdom  to  depart  from  his  colleagues  in  this 
particular  instance  :  "that  two  straight  lines  cannot 
enclose  a  space/'  he  confesses,  "  is  implicated  in  the 
very  essence  of  straightness,  as  defined  by  mathe- 
maticians :  to  deny  it  would  be  a  contradiction."  It 
is  against  the  convention,  to  which  Mr.  Huxley  is  a 
party,  that  terms  should  keep  the  same  meaning. 

12  Quoted  in  Mill's  Examination,  ch.  vi.  p.  69. 


80  NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE. 

The  case  of  the  barrister  may  be  put  in  the 
form  of  question  and  answer.  Q.  "  How  may  we 
reverse  the  apparently  irreversible  judgment,  that 
parallel  lines  can  never  meet  ?  "  A.  "  By  making  a 
mistake,  and  fancying  two  lines  to  be  convergent, 
which  really  are  parallel."  This  is  not  a  satisfactory 
conclusion.  The  view  might  have  been  given  more 
speciously ;  but  in  its  most  specious  form  it  would 
be  dissolved  by  the  words  which  Mill  uses  against 
Mansel :  "  I  take  my  stand  on  the  acknowledged 
principle  of  logic  and  morality,  that  when  we  mean 
different  things,"  e.g.,  parallel  and  convergent,  "  we 
have  no  right  to  call  them  by  the  same  name."13 

The  result  of  an  examination  into  Mill's  con- 
ceived alteration  in  what  most  people  call  necessary 
truths  of  mathematics,  is  to  show  the  futility  of  his 
suggestions  ,  and  to  convince  us  that  there  is  no 
need  to  abandon  the  old  views.  Neither  are  we 
more  inclined  to  believe  Professor  Clifford,  in  his 
solemn  assurances,  that  while  for  the  present  our 
laws  of  geometry  are,  perhaps,  only  approximately 
true,  for  the  future  we  cannot  guarantee  them  to  be 
even  approximations.  The  necessity  we  continue  to 
assert  for  geometric  truths,  we  assert  also  for  all 
other  truth  which  shows  itself  to  the  mind  to  be 
evidently  unalterable  :  it  must  be  judged  by  the 
clear  insight  we  have  into  the  terms  and  their  con- 
nexion, not  by  a  fanciful  theory,  which  derives  all 
knowledge  from  the  chance  combination  of  sense- 
impressions,  with  the  surmise  that  there  is  no 
assignable  limit  to  the  modes  in  which  such  corn- 
's Examination,  c.  vii.  p.  101. 


METAPHYSICAL   AND   PHYSICAL   CERTITUDE.       81 

binations  could  be  altered  ;  that  all  judgment  is  the 
effect  of  association,  and  that  all  associations  are 
possibly  variable. 

(c)  Mr.  Huxley's  third  sense  given  to  necessary 
truth  is  that  it  signifies  "  facts  of  immediate  con- 
sciousness " — "our  sensations,"  he  says  elsewhere, 
"  our  pleasures  and  our  pains,  and  the  relations  of 
these,  make  up  the  sum  total  of  the  elements  of 
positive  unquestionable  knowledge."  He  does  not 
exactly  mean  that  there  is  no  other  knowledge  : 
but  that  no  other  is  beyond  a  question.  Against 
the  sufficiency  of  this  view  it  has  to  be  urged, 
that  facts  of  consciousness  are  in  themselves  con- 
tingent, not  necessary :  and  that  what  we  regard  as 
our  chief  necessary  truths,  though  knowable  to  us 
only  through  facts  of  consciousness,  are  universal 
principles,  not  specially  limited  to  facts  of  conscious- 
ness. 

Moreover,  facts  of  consciousness,  as  accounted 
for  by  the  empiricist  school,  are  made  to  appear  in 
anything  but  the  guise  of  necessary  truths ;  rather 
they  are  reduced  to  a  position  of  great  confusion  and 
uncertainty.  Truism  as  it  may  appear  to  be,  when 
we  say  "what  we  feel  we  feel,"  yet  empiricism 
manages  to  obscure  this  act  of  self-consciousness. 
Mr.  Bain,  as  we  have  seen,  makes  the  matter  one 
of  a  postulate  for  which  no  reason  can  be  given. 
Mr.  Spencer14  declares  that  "a  thing  cannot  at 
the  same  instant  be  both  subject  arid  object 
of    thought,"     that     "  no     man     is     conscious     of 

x*  First  Principles,  Part  I.  c.  iii.  §  20 ;  Pyschology,  Par*  II  c.  i. 


82  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

what  he  is,  but  only  of  what  he  was  a  moment 
before  ;  "  man  is  not  conscious  of  his  present,  but 
only  of  his  immediately  past  state  ;  man  holds  in 
memory  what  he  never  held  in  immediate  percep- 
tion. In  the  same  spirit  M.  Comte  had  written  : 
"  In  order  to  observe  your  intellect  you  must  pause 
from  activity ;  yet  it  is  this  very  activity  you  want 
to  observe."  If  you  cannot  effect  the  pause,  you 
cannot  observe,  and  if  you  effect  it,  there  is  nothing 
to  observe."  Which  words  Dr.  Maudsley15  approves, 
and  supports  them  by  the  principle  that  "  to  persist 
in  one  state  of  consciousness  would  be  really  to  be 
unconscious :  consciousness  is  awakened  by  the 
transition  from  one  physical  or  mental  state  to 
another." 

We  have  not  yet  arrived  at  the  stage  for  dis- 
cussing consciousness,  but  the  passages  quoted  are 
to  our  point,  because  they  show,  that  unsatisfactory 
as  it  is  itself  to  take  "  necessary  truth  "  to  mean 
"facts  of  consciousness,"  the  school  of  empiricists 
double  that  unsatisfactoriness  by  the  difficulties  they 
throw  in  the  way  of  all  consciousness.  On  this 
ground  alone  Mr.  Huxley,  if  he  were  true  to  his 
authorities,  as  he  need  not  be,  would  be  disqualified 
from  saying  "we  have  seen  clearly  and  distinctly,  and 
in  a  manner  which  admits  of  no  doubt,  that  all  our 
knowledge  is  knowledge  of  states  of  consciousness." 
Yet  this  is  his  assertion  :   and  it    agrees  with   his 

*S  Physiology  of  the  Mind,  c.  i.  Mill  controverts  Comte's  views 
about  Psychology.  (Logic,  Bk.  VI.  c.  iv.  §  2.)  Of  course  Comte 
admits  that  somehow  we  do  know  our  thoughts  by  reflexion. 
{Philosophic  Positive,  i.  35.)  Mr.  Huxley  repudiates  Comte's  attack 
on  self-introspection.  (Hume,  p.  52.) 


METAPHYSICAL   AND   PHYSICAL   CERTITUDE.       83 

third  meaning  of  necessary  truth,  which,  at  best,  is 
quite  insufficient. 

Three  descriptions  of  necessary  truth  having 
been  passed  in  review  and  found  wanting,  it  remains 
that  we  argue  in  behalf  of  that  fuller  sense  of 
necessity  which  undoubtedly  is  required,  if  man's 
position  as  a  genuinely  intelligent  being  is  to  be 
vindicated. 

2.  Our  argument  shall  begin  from  admissions 
made  by  adversaries,  who,  when  thrown  off  their 
guard,  speak  not  according  to  the  exigencies  of  a 
false  theory  about  associated  ideas,  but  according  to 
the  intellectual  insight  which  is  theirs  by  nature. 

(a)  If  no  truth  can  with  certainty  be  shown  to 
be  more  than  a  de  facto  association  under  present 
experience,  it  ought  to  be  impossible  to  arrive  at 
any  element  of  absolute  morality.  Yet  adversaries 
do  make  it  a  point  of  absolute  morality  that  truth 
itself  is,  at  all  costs,  to  be  held  sacred.  Whereas  they 
ought  always  to  say  what  Mr.  Leslie  Stephen  says  at 
least  once,16  namely,  that  "  if  in  some  planet  lying 
were  as  essential  to  human  welfare  as  truthfulness 
is  in  this  world,  falsehood  may  be  there  a  cardinal 
virtue  ;  "  nevertheless  they  do  say  with  Mr.  Mill  just 
the  opposite,  that  it  is  better  for  human  kind  to 
suffer  eternal  misery  than  compromise  the  truth. 
The  passage17  is  well  known  in  which  Mill  declares, 
that  rather  than  call  any  being  good,  who  is  not 
good  in  the  human  meaning  of  the  word,  he  would 
go  down  for  ever  into  Hell.  Hereby  he  asserts  a 
very  strong   conviction    as   to    the    absoluteness    of 

16  The  Science  of  Ethics,  c.  iv.         I?  Examination,  c.  vii.  in  fine. 


84  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

moral  truth,  not  only  in  this  world  but  in  the  next, 
not  only  in  man  but  in  the  Supreme  Being.  This  is 
more  than  we  could  logically  expect  from  a  man 
who  professed  to  doubt,  whether  a  changed  experi- 
ence might  not  render  inconceivable  things  now 
regarded  as  conceivable,  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
render  conceivable  things  now  regarded  as  in- 
conceivable ;  or,  after  Mill's  own  phraseology, 
dissociate  the  ideas  of  any  present  conceivability, 
and  associate  the  ideas  of  any  present  inconceiv- 
ability. If  truth  were  indeed  at  its  root,  what 
mere  empiricism  makes  it  to  be,  it  is  impossible 
to  show  a  valid  reason  why  man  should,  in 
all  cases,  rather  die  than  lie  :  and  why  Mr.  Huxley 
can  affirm  "that  the  search  after  truth,  and  truth 
only,  ennobles  the  searcher,  and  leaves  no  doubt 
that  his  life,  at  any  rate,  is  worth  living."  Only 
when  you  give  truth  and  goodness  their  foundation 
in  some  absolute  necessary  worth,  are  you  able  to 
show  that  between  truth  and  untruth,  right  and 
wrong,  the  difference  is  as  between  Heaven  and 
Hell.  No  wonder,  then,  Mr.  Bain  is  puzzled,  on  his 
own  principles,  to  justify  a  worship  of  truth  for 
truth's  sake,  and  has  to  apply  the  theory  about 
means  getting  mistaken  for  ends.18  "  Associations," 
he  pleads,  "  transfer  the  interest  of  an  end  of  pur- 
suit to  the  means.  The  regard  for  truth  is,  and 
ought  to  be,  an  all-powerful  sentiment,  from  its 
being  entwined  in  a  thousand  ways  with  the  welfare 
of  human  society.  We  are  not  surprised  if  an 
element,  of  such    importance    as    a   means,  should 

18  Mental  Science,  Bk.  II.  c.  i.  n.  34. 


METAPHYSICAL   AND   PHYSICAL   CERTITUDE.       85 

often  be  regarded  as  an  absolute  end  to  be  pur- 
sued irrespective  of  consequences,  whether  near  or 
remote."  Nevertheless,  a  more  correct  insight 
occasionally  asserts  itself  in  the  mind  of  the 
empiricist,  and  he  becomes,  in  relation  to  his  own 
dull  principles,  splendide  mendax. 

(b)  But  not  only  in  the  matter  of  morals,  where 
it  may  be  suggested  that  grandness  of  sentiment 
may  have  gained  a  momentary  victory  over  clear 
thought,  but  even  in  the  region  of  cold  clear  thought 
itself,  adversaries  are  betrayed  into  admissions  of 
metaphysical  principles  strictly  so  called.  It  is  all 
very  well  to  refuse  attention  to  these  admissions. 
Mr.  Leslie  Stephen,  in  answer  to  very  forcible 
difficulties  urged  by  Mr.  Balfour,  may  reply  with 
lordly  disdain,  as  he  has  done  in  Mind,  that  he 
simply  steps  over  metaphysical  puzzles,  and  so 
reaches  science ;  and  he  may  own  to  only  one 
exception  :  "  To  believe  anything  is  the  same  as 
to  disbelieve  its  contradictory :  this  is  all  the 
dogmatism  to  which  I  can  plead  guilty."  Well, 
that  one  article  only  is  fatal  to  empiricism,  and  has 
proved  too  much  for  Mill's  powers  of  defence : 
besides,  there  are  many  other  articles  of  which 
Mr.  Stephen  can  be  "  proved  guilty,"  even  though 
he  does  not  "  plead  guilty." 

All  that  is  needful  is,  to  employ  a  means  of 
conviction,  which  the  late  Dr. Ward  used  to  employ 
with  good  effect.19  He  used  to  urge  upon  men  of 
the  school  of  Hume,  that  really,  throughout  their 
polemics,  they  were  relying  on  the  absoluteness  of 

l9  See  the  Preface  to  his  Philosophy  of  Theism. 


86  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

those  very  metaphysical  principles,  which  they  were 
labouring  to  prove  only  relative  and  contingent.  To 
verify  the  force  of  this  contention  we  have  only  to 
take  up  their  books.  It  is  not  without  an  assump- 
tion of  his  own  absolute  knowledge  that  Comte  can 
say,  "  There  is  only  one  absolute  principle,  namely, 
that  there  is  nothing  absolute/' 

Hume  himself,  in  a  sense  which  requires  more 
sifting  than  can  be  afforded  here,  refuses  to  admit 
the  validity  of  the  inference,  whereby,  from  past 
changes  in  nature,  belief  in  the  constancy  of  the 
same  sequences  for  the  future  is  derived.  Why  this 
refusal  ?  Because  he  sees  in  the  inference  none  of 
the  demonstrative  force  that  he  acknowledges  in 
the  sciences  of  quantity  and  number,  in  which 
"reason  is  incapable  of  variation ;  the  conclusions 
which  it  draws  from  considering  one  circle  are  the 
same  which  it  would  form  upon  surveying  all  the 
circles  in  the  universe."  On  the  other  hand, 
empirical  investigations  are  declared  to  want  this 
invariability:  "All  inferences  from  experience, there- 
fore, are  effects  of  custom,  not  of  reason."20  He 
distinguishes  a  mathematical  from  a  physical  truth 
by  saying  that  the  former  does  not  allow  of  any 
contradiction,  whereas  the  latter  might  not  be  what 
de  facto  it  is ;  and  so  far  as  facts  are  merely  empi- 
rical, it  is  absurd  to  talk  of  them  as  demonstrable. 
He  claims  that  his  theory  of  causality  upsets  the 
common  principle,  that  every  event  must  have  a 
cause,  because  upon  this  theory  "  we  may  easily 
conceive  that  there  is  no  absolute  and  metaphysical 
30  Inquiry,  Part  I.  sec.  v. ;  cf.  Part  III.  sec.  xii. ;  Part  I.  sec.  iv. 


METAPHYSICAL   AND   PHYSICAL   CERTITUDE.      87 

necessity  that  every  beginning  of  existence  should  be 
attended  with  such  an  object."21  Thus  he  requires 
for  the  establishment  of  a  principle  of  human  certi- 
tude, "absolute  and  metaphysical  necessity,"  and 
rejects  a  most  widely  received  axiom  on  the  sup- 
posed defect  of  such  necessity.  Here  is  the  tacit 
confession  that  every  conclusion  valid  in  reason  must 
be  drawn  in  virtue  of  some  "  absolute  metaphysical 
necessity."  Explicitly  asked  to  make  this  confession, 
the  empiricist  would  demur  :  implicitly,  in  the  very 
act  of  using  his  reason,  he  yields  his  acknowledg- 
ment. He  is  constantly  recurring  to  the  phrases, 
"  I  see  no  necessary  connexion,"  "  I  see  no  com- 
pelling evidence,"  "The  conclusion  is  not  inevitable,' 
and  on  these  pleas  he  considers  himself  justified 
in  stopping  short  at  a  probable  assent. 

It  takes  up  too  much  space  to  transpose  long 
quotations  into  these  pages  ;  but  whoever  wants  a 
further  illustration  of  how  empiricists  tacitly  sup- 
pose metaphysical  principles,  need  only  read  Mill's 
Preface  to  his  Logic.  There  it  will  be  seen  how 
absolute  is  the  character  which  Mill  gives  to  logic  ; 
how  carefully  he  submits  all  sciences,  under  pain 
of  becoming  unscientific,  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
logician ;  how  little  he  thinks  of  repudiating  all 
necessity,  or  allowing  for  a  possible  alteration  of 
experiences.  Only  two  sentences  shall  be  quoted, 
in  which  the  noteworthy  words  shall  be  italicized. 
"  Logic  points  out  what  relations  must  subsist 
between  the  data  and  whatever  can  be  concluded 
from  them  :  between  the  proof  and  anything  which 

21  Treatise,  Part  III.  sec.  xiv. 


NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 


it  can  prove.  If  there  be  any  such  indispensable  rela- 
tions, and  if  those  can  be  precisely  determined,  every 
particular  branch  of  science,  as  well  as  every  individual 
in  the  guidance  of  his  conduct,  is  bound  to  conform 
to  these  relations  under  penalty  of  making  false 
inferences,  which  are  not  grounded  on  the  reality  of 
things." 

Of  course  it  may  be  possible  to  trim  these 
utterances  into  some  sort  of  conformity  with  Mill's 
metaphysics  ;  but  the  process  is  one  of  mere  torture 
on  a  Procustean  bed. 

3.  It  remains  that  we  ground  certitude  upon  its 
only  satisfactory  basis  of  metaphysical  principles, 
which  have  absolute  necessity  and  universal  validity. 
We  can  know  metaphysical  truths  in  the  strict 
sense  of  the  phrase. 

A  modern  paradox  is  the  denial  by  adversaries 
at  once  of  necessity,  of  free  will,  and  of  chance. 
Hume22  had  led  the  way,  saying,  "Necessity  is 
something  that  exists  in  the  mind,  not  in  objects." 
"  Necessity,"  Mr.  Huxley  repeats,  is  but  "  a  shadow 
of  the  mind's  throwing,"  an  "  intruder "  that  he 
"  anathematizes  ;  "  he  claims  to  be  a  necessarian 
without  being  a  fatalist,  because  he  regards  neces- 
sity as  having  only  a  logical  existence.  Free  will 
he  equally  repudiates,  and  he  would  laugh  at  chance 
as  a  factor  in  scientific  calculations.  Necessity,  free 
will,  chance — these  he  does  not  recognize  ;  but  he 
adds,  "  Fact  I  know  and  law  I  know." 

One  point,  at  any  rate,  is  asserted  here  ;  and 
while  we  cannot  agree  with   Mr.  Huxley's  denials, 

32  Treatise,  Part  III.  sec.  xiv. 


METAPHYSICAL   AND   PHYSICAL   CERTITUDE.       89 

fortunately  we  can  agree  with  his  assertion  of  fact 
and  law.  We  yield  to  none  in  putting  fact  and  law 
at  the  foundation  of  all  things,  so  far  as  God  may 
be  called  (not  indeed  in  the  etymological  sense)  the 
first  Great  Fact,  giving  the  law  to  all  others.  The 
substitution  asked  for  in  Faust,  whereby  "  in  the 
beginning  was  the  Word,"  should  give  place  to  "  in 
the  beginning  was  the  deed,"  has  no  point  at  all  as 
directed  against  the  reality  of  the  Creator. 

Next,  what  sort  of  a  fact  was  this  first  fact?  Not 
a  chance  fact,  for  that  has  no  meaning:  nor  a  free  fact, 
for  that  is  absurd  in  a  first  origin  :  but  a  necessary 
fact,  for  that  alone  will  satisfy  the  requirements  of 
sound  reason.  Necessity  being  thus  at  the  root  of  all 
being,  is  therefore  at  the  root  of  all  truth  ;  the  exist- 
ence of  the  primal  Being,  its  nature,  its  whole  con- 
dition— this  was  the  one  great  original  necessity. 
Hume,23  therefore,  is  too  sweeping  in  his  assertion, 
when  he  says,  that  of  no  fact  is  the  contradictory 
inconceivable.  It  is  inconceivable  that  the  prime 
fact  of  existence  should  be  reversible. 

Here,  therefore,  is  the  foundation  of  metaphysical 
truth  :  here  is  "  fact  and  law,"  but  bound  up  with 
the  anathematized  "  necessity."  For  the  nature  of 
necessary  Being  inevitably  gives  rise  to  certain 
necessary  truths  about  being,  on  account  of  the 
identity  between  truth  and  being.  But  now  observe, 
as  a  matter  of  great  importance,  that  for  the  indi- 
vidual investigation  it  is  not  requisite,  that  before 
perceiving  a  truth  to  be  of  metaphysical  necessity, 
he  should  have  set  before  himself  the  origin  of  all 

23  Inquiry,  Part  III.  sec.  xii. ;  cf.  Part  I.  sec.  iv.  in  initio. 


go  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

things  and  of  all  truth,  as  in  the  sketch  just  given. 
It  is  enough  that  the  intellect  should  clearly  con- 
template some  of  the  easier  first  principles,  and 
judge  by  evidence  and  insight.  "  The  same  thing 
cannot  be  and  not  be,  at  the  same  time  and  under 
the  same  aspect : "  "  nothing  can  begin  to  be  without 
a  sufficient  reason  for  its  commencement:  "  "  things, 
equal  to  the  same  thing,  are  equal  to  one  another." 
The  simple  understanding  of  these  terms  and  of 
their  interrelations  is  metaphysical  certitude,  neces- 
sary, universal,  beyond  all  contingency.  Evidence 
and  insight — these  are  the  things  to  insist  upon,  in 
opposition  to  the  mere  de  facto  experiences  and 
associations,  which  Mill,  at  times,  makes  all  in  all. 
To  set  these  latter  in  the  place  of  supremacy  is  to 
yield  to  an  utter  scepticism,  such  as  will  presently  be 
shown  to  be  impossible.  Mr.  Huxley  is  fully  aware 
into  what  an  abyss  the  denial  of  insight  into  neces- 
sary objective  truth,  and  the  substitution  of  mere 
empiricism,  inevitably  conduct  the  speculator,  who 
has  logic  and  courage  to  follow  his  principles  to 
their  conclusions.  Accepting  Hume's  principles,  he 
boldly  proclaims24  that  "  for  any  demonstration 
which  can  be  given  to  the  contrary,  the  collection  of 
perceptions  which  make  up  our  consciousness  may 
be  only  phantasmagoria?  generated  by  the  ego,  un- 
folding its  successive  scenes  on  the  background  of 
the  abyss  of  nothingness." 

Is  the  reader  willing  to  go  this  length  ?  If  not, 
the  only  remedy  is  to  keep  a  firm  foothold  on 
metaphysical     certitude ;     for    assuredly    there     is 

**  Huxley's  Hume,  c.  iii.  p.  81. 


METAPHYSICAL   AND   PHYSICAL   CERTITUDE.      91 

error  in  the  supposition  of  Mr.  Carveth  Read, 
that  "  to  doubt  the  possibility  of  necessary  cog- 
nitions is  not  the  same  thing  as  to  doubt  the 
possibility  of  actual  and  objective  cognitions." 
If  there  are  no  "  necessary  cognitions,"  that  is, 
cognitions  of  necessary  truth,  then  there  is  no 
fixed  basis  whereon  to  found  the  cognition  of 
contingent  facts  or  laws.  Some  support  must  be 
found  for  the  contingent  outside  of  contingency, 
that  is,  in  necessity. 

It  is  satisfactory  to  find  a  confirmation  of  the 
doctrine,  that  metaphysical  truth  is  to  be  judged 
by  evidence  and  insight,  rather  than  on  a  theory 
of  empirical  associations,  in  the  better  utterances 
of  Mill  himself.  Already  we  have  seen  that  he 
asserts  "belief"  to  be  something  different  from 
association  of  ideas.  If  he  had  seen  only  this 
much,  he  had  seen  enough  to  warn  him  against 
judging  the  validity  of  the  three  great  axioms  of 
metaphysics — the  principles  of  Identity,  Contra- 
diction, and  Excluded  Middle25 — almost  solely  on 
the  ground  of  conceivability  as  regulated  by  asso- 
ciation. But  Mill  goes  beyond  the  mere  proposi- 
tion that  belief  is  more  than  association :  for 
when  speaking  of  evidence  in  relation  to  belief, 
he  says:26  "Inasmuch  as  the  meaning  of  the 
word  evidence  is  supposed  to  be  something  which, 
when  laid  before  the  mind,  induces  it  to  believe  ; 
to  demand  evidence  when  the  belief  is  insured 
by  the  mind's  own  laws,  is  supposed  to  be  ap- 
pealing to  the  intellect  against  the  intellect.  But 
2s  Examination,  c.  xxi.  26  Logic,  Bk.  III.  c.  xxi.  §  1. 


92  NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE. 

this,  I  apprehend,  is  a  misunderstanding  of  the 
nature  of  evidence.  By  evidence  is  not  meant  any- 
thing and  everything  which  produces  belief.  There 
are  many  things  which  generate  belief  besides 
evidence.  A  mere  strong  association  of  ideas  often 
causes  a  belief  so  intense,  as  to  be  unshakable  by 
experience  or  argument.  Evidence  is  not  that  which 
the  mind  does  or  must  yield  to,  but  that  to  which  it 
ought  to  yield,  namely,  that  by  yielding  to  which  its 
belief  is  kept  in  conformity  to  fact.  To  say  that 
belief  suffices  for  its  own  justification,  is  denying 
the  existence  of  an  outward  standard,  conformity 
of  opinion  to  which  constitutes  its  truth.  A  mere 
disposition  to  believe,  even  if  supposed  instinctive, 
is  no  guarantee  for  the  truth  of  the  thing  believed." 
Agreeing  with  Mill  that  the  mind  must  conform  in 
its  true  beliefs  to  an  outward  standard,  we  have 
defended  metaphysical  truth  on  the  ground  that  it 
has  an  outward  standard  in  the  objective  evidence, 
which  the  mind  perceives,  and  to  which  it  con- 
forms.    But  of  evidence  we  must  treat  hereafter. 

II.  In  passing  from  metaphysical  to  physical 
certitude,  the  transition  is  between  two  categories 
of  Being,  which  Aristotle  recognized  under  the 
names  of  necessary  Being  and  contingent  Being  (rou 
ef  avar^KT]^  virapyeiv  and  rov  ev^e^eaOai  virapyeiv). 
The  ultimate  possibilities  of  all  things  created  are 
settled  by  metaphysical  necessity,  following  inevit- 
ably, as  is  shown  in  Ontology,  from  the  nature  of  the 
First  Being  and  His  powers  of  creation.  Yet  when 
the  possibilities  come  to  be  actualized  in  the  world, 
there  belongs  to  them  a  lower  order  of  necessity, 


METAPHYSICAL   AND   PHYSICAL   CERTITUDE.      93 

which  we  call  physical,  and  which,  resting  upon 
conditions  that  need  not  have  been  fulfilled,  may  be 
called  contingent.  Contingent  necessity  may  seem 
a  paradox,  but  it  is  easily  explainable.  Physical 
necessity  rests  upon  a  double  contingency,  on  God's 
free  election  to  create  at  all,  and  on  His  further  free 
election  of  one  out  of  many  eligible  plans  of  creation. 
The  de  facto  elements,  their  number  and  original 
collocations,  were  matters  of  choice.  But  the  system 
once  established  has  intrinsic  laws  of  action,  which 
according  to  some  theories  of  matter  could  not  be 
altered  without  putting  a  different  set  of  substances 
in  place  of  the  actually  existent,  while  other  theories 
would  not  so  rigorously  identify  mode  of  action 
with  substance.  These  laws  we  can  partially  detect, 
not  by  intuition  or  a  priori  argument,  but  by  arguing 
back  from  effects  to  causes. 

1.  The  sum  total  of  created  things  and  of 
their  forces  is  regarded  as  a  constant  :  so  that  we 
speak  of  physical  nature  as  of  a  fixed  aggregate, 
not  liable  to  increase  or  diminution  of  parts.  If  it 
be  asked  how  this  fact  can  be  known,  the  answer  is, 
that  our  only  natural  means  of  discovery  is  by  very 
wide  observation.  Undoubtedly  God,  if  He  had 
liked,  could  have  put  us  into  a  world  where  He 
frequently  took  away  old  agencies  and  introduced 
new,  or  suddenly  altered  previous  arrangements. 
Or  He  could  have  framed  a  world,  different  parts  of 
which  were  composed  of  quite  diverse  elements,, 
such  even  that  no  inter-action  could  go  on  between 
some  parts  and  others.  No  one  need  have  been 
very  much  surprised,  had  an  old  opinion  proved  to 


94 


NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 


be  true,  and  had  the  heavenly  bodies  shown,  that 
they  rejected  all  kindredship  with  the  physical 
constituents  of  our  planet.  Yet  it  would  have  been 
inconsistent  with  the  essential  Wisdom  to  have 
placed  us  in  a  creation,  where  the  variability  was 
so  great,  as  to  reduce  us  to  absolute  bewilderment, 
or  to  the  position  of  dwellers  in  chaos,  who  could 
not  familiarize  themselves  with  their  outer  surround- 
ings, or  so  accommodate  themselves  to  their  cir- 
cumstances as  to  be  able  to  continue  the  life  of 
the  race.  There  must  then  be  some  uniformity 
of  nature,  and  it  becomes  urgent  upon  us  to  dis- 
tinguish different  uses  of  that  phrase. 

(a)  The  most  radical  meaning  of  all,  is  that  like 
agencies,  under  like  circumstances,  will  always  have 
like  effects.  Messrs.  Bain  and  Pollock,  not  admitting 
the  principle  of  efficient  causality,  have  agreed  in 
maintaining,  that  for  anything  we  can  know  to  the 
contrary,  the  mere  lapse  of  time  may  make  an 
alteration.  On  this  point  Lewes  rightly  took  the 
other  side,  and  held,  though  in  an  imperfect  manner, 
that  the  circumstance  of  time,  as  such,  is  irrelevant, 
and  that  the  principle  is  an  a  priori  truth.  Time,  as 
time,  never  alters  anything  ;  but  alteration  is  due  to 
the  activities,  which,  in  time,  produce  their  effects. 
What  is  relevant  as  regards  time  is  this :  created 
things  continue  in  their  communicated  existence  only 
by  virtue  of  the  constantly  supplied  support  of  Him 
who  originally  gave  them  being :  and  on  this  score, 
a  natural  object  has  no  intrinsic  power  of  prolonging 
its  own  duration.  But  when  we  speak  of  like 
agencies  having  like   effects,  the  presupposition  is 


METAPHYSICAL   AND   PHYSICAL   CERTITUDE.      95 

that  they  are  preserved  in  their  proper  natures ;  else 
we  could  not  call  them  like.  The  non-theistic 
school  of  philosophers  will  not  approve  of  the 
mention  of  creation  and  conservation ;  but  they 
must  remember  that  questions  of  this  sort  neces- 
sarily drive  us  back  into  the  theory  of  first  origins ; 
and  that  those  who  simply  have  no  view  as  to  the 
beginning  of  things,  or  as  to  the  production  of  exis- 
tant  objects,  must  allow  that  they  have  a  great  and 
fatal  deficit  in  their  philosophy. 

This  something  which  is  wanting  shows  itself 
in  many  curious  opinions  about  a  means  of  origi- 
nation, which  ultimately  may  be  reduced  to  the 
illogical  idea  of  chance.  As  theism  is  true,  no 
apology  is  needed  for  using  it  to  settle  points, 
which  otherwise  cannot  rationally  be  discussed : 
and  we  must  consider  the  agnostic  position  as  quite 
unfitted  to  give  its  occupiers  the  safety,  which  they 
vainly  imagine  that  they  possess  in  the  word,  igno- 
ramus. On  the  plea  that  they  do  not  know  anything 
to  the  contrary,  they  speak  of  it  as  a  possibility,  that 
there  might  be  a  world  where  things  spring  into,  and 
out  of  existence,  as  it  were  spontaneously  and  capri- 
ciously ;  in  which  case,  as  Professor  Clifford  sug- 
gested, it  would  be  worth  while  trying  to  settle  what 
objects  were  given  to  such  vagaries;  whether,  for 
instance,  buttons  were  prone  to  these  pranks.  The 
great  mystery,  what  becomes  of  all  the  old  pins, 
might  be  more  hopefully  investigated  on  the  hypo- 
thesis of  sudden  ceasings  to  be.  Wild  as  the  notion 
may  seem,   it   is  contained  in  Mr.  Bain's27  solemn 

27  Mental  Science,  Bk.  II.  c.  vi.  n.  9. 


96  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

announcement:  "That  every  event  must  be  preceded 
by  some  other  event  is  obviously  not  necessary  in 
the  sense  of  implication,  and  the  opposite  is  not 
self-contradictory.  There  is  nothing  to  prevent  us 
from  conceiving  an  isolated  event.  Any  difficulty 
that  we  might  have  in  conceiving  something  to  arise 
out  of  nothing,  is  due  to  our  experience  being  all  the 
other  way.  If  it  were  not  for  habit  there  could  be 
no  serious  obstacle  to  our  conceiving  the  opposite 
state  of  things  to  every  event  being  chained  to  some 
other  event."  Thus  to  abolish  the  principle  of 
efficient  causality  is  to  take  away  all  genuine  science ; 
for  in  that  case  there  could  be  no  proof  that  unifor- 
mities would  continue,  not  even,  strictly,  that  they 
had  existed  in  the  past.  To  guard  against  this 
chaotic  result,  we  state  the  first  sense  of  nature's  uni- 
formity to  be  the  a  priori  self-evident  principle,  that 
from  like  causes,  under  like  circumstances,  uniformly 
constant  results  may  be  relied  upon  to  follow. 

(b)  The  second  sense  of  uniformity  in  nature  is 
a  posteriori,  as  the  first  was  a  priori.  The  first  says, 
like  agencies,  under  like  conditions,  will  always  have 
like  effects ;  the  second  says,  the  sum  total  of 
physical  agencies  in  the  world  is  constant,  neither 
matter  nor  its  inherent  forces  suffer  increase  or 
decrease.  This  is  not  going  as  far  as  the  Law  of 
Conservation  of  Energy ;  but  it  is  its  foundation. 
The  asserted  uniformity  cannot  be  verified  in  every 
separate  detail;  but  it  is  what  all  observation  of 
nature  goes  to  establish. 

(c)  The  third  sense  of  uniformity  is  again  a 
matter   of    observation.     It    is    noticeable   that   in 


METAPHYSICAL   AND   PHYSICAL   CERTITUDE.      97 

some  climates,  for  instance,  the  dry  and  the  rainy 
seasons  are  calculable  almost  to  a  nicety :  whereas 
here  in  England,  which  has  according  to  an  American 
authority,  "  no  climate  but  only  specimens  of  all 
sorts  of  weather,"  we  take  it  as  a  matter  of  no 
surprise  that  fair  or  wet  weather  should  predomi- 
nate in  any  of  the  four  seasons.  The  laws  are  fixed 
for  us,  as  for  the  most  regular  of  climates ;  but 
whereas,  for  the  latter,  they  result  in  obvious  regu- 
larity, for  us  they  result  in  apparent  irregularity. 
Speaking  of  the  uniformity  of  nature  from  this 
point  of  view,  we  have  evidences  of  it  in  many 
recurrent  phenomena,  such  as  day  and  night,  the 
seasons  of  the  year,  planetary  conjunctions,  secular 
variations  like  those  effected  by  the  precession  of 
equinoxes,  and  lastly  successive  stages  of  animal 
life  in  one  and  the  same  individual.  Thus  the 
universe  on  which  we  dwell,  in  many  of  its  phe- 
nomena, does  not,  but  in  many  also  does,  present 
us  with  detectable  periodicities ;  and  these  we  may 
fairly  call  uniformities  of  Nature. 

But  another  physical  universe  is  possible,  where 
such  recurrences  would  be  so  rare  as  to  give  to 
an  observer,  having  the  average  life  of  man, 
no  token  of  regularity.  Uniformity  would  be 
there  in  the  first  sense  of  the  word  and  in  the 
second ;  matter  and  force  would  be  constant, 
physical  causes  would  keep  rigorously  to  their  laws ; 
still  the  combinations  would  be  so  various  as  to 
present  an  appearance  of  chaos.  Elementary  laws 
would  result  in  complicated  effects,  without  discer- 
nible law  of  complication.     Compared  with  such  a 

H 


98  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

possible  world,  ours  we  call  uniform,  because  of  its 
many  observed  recurrences. 

2.  If  we  hold  by  the  several  truths  just  enun- 
ciated, we  shall  be  saved  from  the  sad  lot  of  empiri- 
cists, who  have  to  take  refuge  in  "  a  primitive 
instinct,"  or  in  an  "  unaccountable  adaptation  of 
our  beliefs  by  the  Creator  of  our  faculties,"  in  order 
to  explain,  why  it  is  that  we  rely  on  our  past 
experiences  for  knowing  what  nature  will  do  in  the 
future.28  Our  reliance  is  rationally  grounded  on  the 
three  uniformities  above  described  ;  one  a  priori  and 
quite  necessary,  the  other  two  a  posteriori  and  neces- 
sary only  inasmuch  as  God  cannot  fail  to  give  to 
His  works  their  strict  requisites  for  the  purpose 
they  are  meant  to  serve.  This  is  theism  if  you  like, 
introduced  into  philosophy;  but  theism  is  itself 
philosophic,  and  so  necessary  to  philosophy,  that  if 
you  deny  it,  you  have  no  stable  basis  for  physical 
truth,  but  at  best  a  hope,  logically  quite  unjustifi- 
able, that  the  course  of  things  will  go  on  with  that 
orderliness,  which  hitherto  you  have  known  it  to 
observe.  Further  than  this  the  non-theist  cannot 
advance :  for  him  any  time  there  may  be  "  chaos 
come  again."  Mill 2g  is  quite  open  in  his  avowal  that 
on  his  principles,  there  may  be  a  planet  where 
"  events  succeed  one  another  at  random,  without 
any  fixed  law,"  and  that  "  it  is  perfectly  possible  to 
imagine  the  present  order  of  the  universe  brought 

28  Examples  from  one  who  so  speaks  have  already  been  given 
under  the  head  of  Metaphysical  truth,  for  reasons  there  stated. 
§ee  the  present  chapter  under  the  headings  I.  1. 

29  Logic,  Bk.  III.  c.  xxi.  §  1. 


METAPHYSICAL   AND   PHYSICAL   CERTITUDE.       99 

to  an  end,  and  a  chaos  succeeding,  where  there  is  no 
fixed  succession  of  events,  and  the  past  gives  no 
assurance  of  the  future."  In  the  same  spirit  and 
on  the  same  principles  Mr.  Huxley  writes  in  his 
American  Lectures:  "Though  we  are  quite  certain 
about  the  constancy  of  nature  at  present,  it  by  no 
means  follows  that  we  are  justified  in  expanding 
this  generalization  into  the  past,  and  in  denying 
absolutely  that  there  may  have  been  a  time  when 
events  did  not  follow  a  fixed  order,  when  the  re- 
lations of  cause  and  effect  were  not  fixed  and 
definite,  and  when  external  agencies  interfered  in 
the  general  course  of  nature."  There  are  state- 
ments here  fatal  to  physical  science,  which  can  be 
preserved  from  extinction  only  by  holding  on  to 
principles  we  are  advocating,  not  indeed  as  anything 
new,  but  as  the  common  possession  of  unsophisti- 
cated mankind. 

3.  Wishing  now  to  maintain  the  power  of  the 
human  mind  to  reach  physical  certitude,  we  much 
need  a  distinction  between  two  classes  of  efforts 
— those  more  ambitious  efforts  which  often  do  not  get 
beyond  probability,  and  those  humbler  efforts  which 
often  reach  full  assurance.  Against  the  absolute 
certainty  of  the  sun's  rising  to-morrow  it  may  be 
urged,  that  even  though  our  system  were  clearly 
explained  as  to  its  planetary  movements,  still  there 
would  remain  elements  of  doubt.  For  instance,  we 
are  told  that  the  whole  system  is  travelling  in  space  ; 
that  the  stars  are  closing  up  behind  our  course  and 
opening  out  before ;  and  that  it  is  not  quite  sure  that 
we  shall  not  come  suddenly  under  perturbing  influ- 


NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 


ences  as  yet  unsuspected.  It  is  admitted  that  the 
danger  is  a  minimum,  as  far  as  we  can  calculate :  but 
nevertheless  there  is  a  particle  of  undispelled  doubt, 
nay  some  would  say  far  more  than  a  particle.  Well, 
give  this  theoretical  doubt  its  due,  and,  after  all 
that  astronomers  and  even  theologians  who  speak  of 
providence,  can  bring  forward  to  comfort  the  timid, 
suppose  it  to  remain  undissipated.  The  sun's  move- 
ments are  not  the  easiest  of  our  physical  inquiries, 
and  it  is  precisely  in  our  more  complicated  or  our 
abstruser  questions,  as  for  instance  whether  the  law 
of  the  inverse  squares  applies  to  gravity  at  minutest 
distances,  that  we  may  allow  some  truth  to  Mr. 
Huxley's  declaration,  "  that  our  widest  and  safest 
generalizations  are  simply  statements  of  the  highest 
degree  of  probability." 

But  take  the  simpler  case  of  letting  a  stone 
drop  to  the  earth.  Arrange  your  own  circum- 
stances, break  off  a  piece  of  sandstone  from  a 
quarry  which  you  know  well ;  get  out  of  the  way 
of  all  scientific  apparatus,  on  to  the  open  plain, 
and  there,  relaxing  your  hold  upon  the  stone,  leave 
it  to  nature's  forces.  You  may  not  know  all  about 
gravity ;  there  may  be  many  forces  acting  on  the 
stone  about  which  you  are  ignorant :  still  you  have 
physical  certainty  that  the  stone  will  not  stand  in 
mid  air.  As  to  the  possible  unknown  forces,  you 
have  sufficient  experience  to  warrant  the  conclusion 
about  what  they  will  not  do — that  they  will  not 
arrest  the  fall  to  the  ground.  It  is  a  physical 
certitude  of  this  simple  nature  that  we  often  want 
for  purposes  of  daily  life,  and  sometimes  for  such  a 


METAPHYSICAL   AND   PHYSICAL   CERTITUDE.     101 

religious  purpose  as  verifying  a  miracle.  Unless  he 
had  in  mind  the  grade  of  certitude,  about  which  I 
spoke  before,  and  of  which  his  example  would  give  a 
good  illustration,  it  is  hard  to  see  what  De  Morgan, 
in  his  Logic,  can  have  wanted  to  show,  when  he 
wrote :  3°  "I  know  that  a  stone  will  fall  to  the  ground 
when  I  let  it  go,  and  I  know  that  a  square  number 
must  (in  a  given  case)  be  equal  to  the  sum  of  odd 
numbers :  and  though  when  I  think,  I  become  sen- 
sible of  more  assurance  for  the  second  than  for  the 
first,  yet  it  is  only  on  reflexion  that  I  can  distinguish 
the  certainty  from  what  comes  so  near  to  it."  Is  not 
this  only  another  case  of  playing  fast  and  loose  with 
the  word  certainty  ?  "I  know  that  the  stone  will 
fall :  "  and  yet  the  knowledge  is  only  what  "  comes 
near  to  certainty,"  but  is  distinguished  from  it.  We 
should  say  that  the  certainty  from  which  it  is  dis- 
tinguished is  not  certainty  in  general,  but  that  special 
sort  of  certitude  which  carries  with  it  must  instead 
of  will  or  is  ;  or  that  one  is  metaphysical,  the  other 
physical  certainty.     But  both  are  full  certainties. 

4.  There  still  remains  the  objection,  what  about 
miracles  ?  If  God  can  interfere  at  any  moment  with 
the  course  of  nature,  how  determine  in  any  case 
that  He  does  not  interfere  ?     In  reply  we  must  say 

30  De  Morgan  gives  us  expressly  his  views  on  the  grades  of 
certitude.  (Logic,  chap.  ix.  in  initio,  p.  171.)  Speaking  of  the  know- 
ledge we  have  of  our  own  existence,  and  that  two  and  two  make 
four,  he  says  :  "  This  absolute  and  unassailable  feeling  we  call 
certainty.  We  have  lower  grades  of  knowledge,  which  we  usually 
call  degrees  of  belief,  but  they  are  really  degrees  of  knowledge,"  e.g., 
man's  belief  that  yesterday  he  was  certain  about  two  and  two 
making  four. 


NATURE   OF   ChRllTUDE 


that  the  objection  is  not  insuperable :  in  many 
instances  we  may  be  sure  there  is  no  miraculous 
interposition.  For  God  has  sufficiently  shown  us, 
by  experience  and  by  reasons  of  fitness,  that  miracles 
do  not  come  in  capriciously,  so  as  to  make  the  whole 
of  life  a  puzzle  to  us:  but  they  are  wrought  only 
occasionally  and  for  proportionate  ends. 

Nee  Deus  intersit,  nisi  dignus  vindice  nodus 
Incident. 

Surely  there  are  trivial  circumstances  in  our  lives, 
where  we  can  see  that  there  is  no  adequate  occasion 
for  miracle,  and  where,  in  consequence,  we  may 
know  that  none  will  be  performed.  And  as  for 
Descartes'  fear  of  a  mischievous  demon,  who  may 
be  always  tricking  us,  it  belongs  to  God's  provi- 
dence to  hold  in  check  the  limited  powers  which 
even  the  evil  spirits,  by  natural  endowment,  possess. 
Some  may  object  to  Divine  providence  as  a 
factor  introduced  into  philosophical  considerations. 
But  a  factor  it  is  in  the  world's  physical  course,  and 
as  St.  Augustine  long  ago  pointed  out,  if  we  neglect 
this  factor,  then  actum  est  de  philosophia.  Those, 
however,  who  exaggerate  the  possibility  of  Divine 
interference  seem  not  at  all  to  realize  what  they  are 
committed  to,  when,  because  of  it,  they  have  taken 
up  the  position,  that  never  can  we  be  quite  certain 
of  a  physical  fact  or  sequence.  They  fail  to  observe 
that  they  cannot  at  once  hold  this  position,  and  at 
the  same  time  claim  to  be  sure  that  there  are,  or 
have  been,  a  city  of  London,  a  man  called  Napoleon, 
and  a  plague  known  as  the  Black  Death.  When  they 
speak  of  miracles  as  always  possible,  they  forget  all 


METAPHYSICAL   AND   PHYSICAL   CERTITUDE.     103. 


the  ridiculous  interferences,  which,  on  their  theory, 
it  is  not  incredible  that  God  may  work ;  for  if  no 
physical  event  is  safe  from  the  suspicion  of  miracle, 
then  it  is  not  certain  that  to-morrow  all  men  will 
not  be  walking  on  their  hands,  all  corn  will  not 
become  poison,  and  all  sand  will  not  turn  into 
gold.  Really  with  the  fullest  allowance  for  large 
possibilities  in  the  way  of  unsuspected  miracles  and 
for  the  inadequacy  of  our  knowledge  about  any  one 
of  nature's  ultimate  laws,  still  we  must  not  go  the 
length  of  conceding  our  complete  inability,  to  be 
certain  of  physical  truths,  past  and  present.  As  to 
the  future,  if  any  one  likes  to  fancy  an  instantaneous 
arrival  of  the  end  of  the  world,  it  would  be 
difficult  to  plead  anything  against  him,  except  from 
the  signs  given  in  Scripture  about  what  is  to  precede 
the  consummation  of  all  things  terrestrial,  and 
from  the  fact,  that  the  immediate  future  of  our 
universe  is,  to  some  degree,  calculable  from  its 
known  present.  Conjectures  are  even  made  about 
the  natural  causes  of  a  final  period  to  be  put  to 
the  order  which  now  prevails. 

Addenda. 

(1)  That  the  exaggerated  manner  in  which  some 
urge  the  association  theory,  leads  to  the  denial  of  all 
immutable  truth,  cannot  but  be  known  to  any  one  at  all 
acquainted  with  our  English  writers  on  philosophy. 
To  take  a  single  specimen,  we  have  Dr.  Maudsley1 
telling   us   to  give  up  as  hopeless   "infinite,   absolute 

1  Physiology  of  the  Mind,  c.  v.  p.  141.  (2nd  Ed.)  Compare  Hume, 
Treatise,  Part  III.  sec.  xii. 


io4  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

truth."  If  he  means  only  that  we  cannot  grasp  truth  in 
all  its  infinity,  he  is  obviously  right ;  but  he  means  more 
and  worse.  He  says,  "  Because  each  one  has  a  certain 
specific  nature  as  a  human  being,  and  because  the 
external  nature,  in  relation  with  which  each  one  exists, 
is  the  same :  therefore  are  inevitably  formed  certain 
general  associations  which  cannot  without  great  diffi- 
culty, or  anywise,  be  dissociated.  Such  are  what  have 
been  described  as  the  general  laws  of  association,  in 
which  all  men  agree — those  of  cause  and  effect,  of 
contiguity  in  time  and  space,  of  resemblance,  of 
contrast ;  in  all  which  ways,  it  is  true,  one  idea  may 
follow  another,  though  also  probably  in  other  ways. 
The  universality  which  is  supposed  to  belong  to  the 
ideas  of  cause  and  effect,  of  the  uniformity  of  nature, 
of  time  and  space,  has  been  supposed  to  betray  an 
origin  beyond  experience,"  that  is,  beyond  mere 
empirical  association.  "  Nevertheless,  it  is  hard  to 
conceive  how  men,  formed  and  placed  as  they  are, 
could  have  failed  to  acquire  them,  and  still  more  difficult 
to  conceive,  how  they  could  even  have  been  supposed  to  have 
any  meaning  outside  human  experience,  to  have  an  absolute, 
not  a  relative  truth."  Thus  the  law  of  causality  is  true 
for  men,  with  a  mere  relative  truth,  and  has  no  absolute 
value  for  all  intelligence ;  a  theory  which  robs  science 
of  all  its  glory,  and  is  made  worse  by  what  follows. 
"  The  belief  in  the  uniformity  of  the  laws  of  nature  is  a 
belief  which  is  developed  of  necessity  in  the  mind,  in 
accordance  with  the  laws  of  the  nature,  of  which  mind 
is  a  part  and  product.  The  uniformity  of  nature 
becomes  conscious  of  itself,  so  to  speak,  in  the  mind 
of  man:  for  in  man,  a  part  of  nature  and  develop- 
ing according  to  nature's  laws,  nature  attains  to  self- 
consciousness.  To  declare  that  a  theory  is  conceivable, 
is  to    declare   that   conception  has  limits  based  upon 


METAPHYSICAL  AND  PHYSICAL  CERTITUDE.     105 

experience,  not  to  limit  the  possibilities  of  nature/'  All 
thought  thus  becomes  a  sort  of  de  facto  pattern,  worked 
out  in  the  mind  of  man  by  his  surroundings  :  whilst 
other  surroundings  would  have  worked  out  quite  a 
different  pattern,  and  no  pattern  has  any  absolute 
value.  What  is  true  of  mere  sensations  is  thus 
extended  to  the  highest  acts  of  intellect.  Hence  no 
fixed  system  of  philosophy  is  possible  ;  at  best  we  can 
but  have  ideas  suitable  to  our  own  age  and  Zeit-Geisi, 
or  spirit  of  the  time.  As  Mr.  Pollock2  puts  it,  "  Science 
makes  it  plainer,  day  by  day,  that  there  is  no  such  thing 
as  a  fixed  equilibrium,  either  in  the  world  without  or  in 
the  world  within  :  so  it  becomes  plain  that  the  genuine 
and  durable  triumphs  of  philosophy  are  not  in  systems 
but  in  ideas."  But  what  is  the  value  of  ideas,  which 
condemn  each  other  by  refusing  to  fit  into  consistent 
system  ? 

(2)  Reid3  has  told  us,  far  more  piously  than  wisely, 
"  God  hath  implanted  in  our  mind  an  original  principle 
by  which  we  believe  the  continuance  of  the  course  of 
nature,  and  of  those  connexions  which  we  have  observed 
in  the  past.  Antecedent  to  all  reason  we  have  an  anti- 
cipation that  there  is  a  fixed  and  steady  course  of 
nature."  Brown,*  in  default  of  a  belief  in  real  causality, 
is  also  obliged  to  fall  back  on  Providence,  appealing  to 
"the  instinctive  tendency  wherewith  God  has  endowed 
us  in  view  of  the  circumstances  in  which  we  are  placed." 
Mr.  Bain 5  leaves  out  all  mention  of  a  bountiful  Provider, 
whose  existence  he  would  consider  unverifiable,  and 
points  simply  to  blind  tendency.     He  asserts  that  there 

2  See  his  Life  of  Spinoza,  in  fine,  p.  408. 

3  Human  Mind,  c.  vi.  sec.  xxiv.  p.  198. 

4  Inquiry   into   the  Relation   of  Cause  and  Effect,  Part  III.  sec.  v. 
p.  249. 

5  Logic,  Appendix  D,  p.  273. 


xo6  NATURE   OP  CERTITUDE. 

is  "  a  primitive  credulity,  which  every  uncontradicted 
experience  has  on  its  side,"  "  an  initial  believing  impulse 
of  the  mind,  which  errs  on  the  side  of  excess,  and  which,. 
if  nothing  has  happened  to  check  it  in  a  particular  case, 
will  be  found  strong  enough  for  anything."  Neither 
Mr.  Bain's  theory,  nor  any  philosophy  of  Hume's 
school,  will  give  to  physical  science  a  rational  basis : 
and  this  is  a  serious  consideration  for  those  who  may 
feel  tempted  to  grasp  at  the  simplicity  of  experience 
and  association,  when  put  forward  as  explanations  of 
well-nigh  everything  that  can  be  rationally  explained. 

(3)  With  metaphysical  and  physical  truth  alike 
overthrown,  with  the  very  principle  of  contradiction 
undermined,  it  is  no  wonder  that  we  have  philoso- 
phies in  which  contradictions  abound. 

Nor  can  the  work  of  clearly  pointing  out  these 
contradictions,  be  looked  upon  as  a  useless  sort  of 
criticism.  Take  the  case  of  Mill  for  instance.  Mr. 
Jevons,  disgusted  with  the  task  of  having  to  teach  his 
system  for  several  years,  entered  a  protest  by  pub- 
lishing a  list  of  the  inconsistencies  which  he  had  come 
across,  many  of  which  are  undoubtedly  to  be  found  in 
the  author.  This  is  a  most  legitimate  and  effective  way 
to  discredit  a  philosophically  discreditable  writer,  and 
serves  the  very  good  purpose  of  doing  something  to 
check  the  spread  of  ruinous  principles.  It  is,  then, 
somewhat  difficult  to  see  the  force  of  the  objections 
made  by  the  Editor  of  Mind,  when  he  says'  that  Mill's 
inconsistencies  are  known ;  that  no  one  is  exactly  a 
follower  of  Mill ;  and  that  those  who  admire  him  most 
and  owe  him  most,  take  leave  to  dissent  from  him  when 
they  think  good.  All  this  may  be  true  :  and  yet,  since 
Mill  has  given  to  Hume's  philosophy  about  as  fair  an 
appearance  as  any  other  author  has  succeeded  in  impart- 
ing to  it,  the  labour  is  a  worthy  one,  to  show  in  detail 


METAPHYSICAL   AND   PHYSICAL   CERTITUDE.     107 

the  essentially  contradictory  character  of  a  bad  system. 
A  list  of  Mill's  inconsequences  and  contradictions  should 
be  kept  as  permanently  on  the  bookshelves  as  his  own 
works — the  antidote  ever  by  the  side  of  the  poison. 
Perhaps  it  was  because  he  rose  up  among  a  people  who 
had  long  neglected  philosophy,  and  whom  he  helped  to 
rouse  into  inquisitiveness  on  the  subject,  that  Mill's 
undoubted  cleverness  met  with  so  much  success  in  the 
propagation  of  irrational  principles.  But  there  is  no 
reason  why  Englishmen  should  go  on  worshipping  the 
god  of  unreason  :  especially  when  they  remember  Mill's 
wretched  education  from  earliest  years.  He  is  always 
to  be  spoken  of  more  in  pity  than  in  anger ;  but  when 
we  read  Mr.  J.  Morley's  extravagant  praises  of  him, 
and  profuse  acknowledgments  of  indebtedness  to  him 
as  a  teacher,  while  we  understand  better  Mr.  Morley's 
position,  we  also  understand  the  need  of  having  the 
hollowness  of  the  teacher  sounded  and  made  known  to 
all.6 

(4)  The  absolute  certainty  of  any  physical  generali- 
zation has  been  denied  by  several  authors  of  reputation. 
See  Bacon,  Nov.  Org.  Lib.  I.  a.  41,  50 ;  Lewes,  Aristotle, 
p.  33,  where  we  read:  "To-morrow  a  new  observation 
or  a  new  analysis  may  displace  all  our  astronomical 
theories  ;  "  and  Mr.  Venn,  Logic  of  Chance,  c.  viii.  That 
inductions  which  are  now  regarded  as  our  safest  may 
hereafter  be  upset,  is  the  opinion  of  Mr.  Huxley. 

6  See  two  articles  on  Mill  in  Mr.  J.  Morley's  Miscellanies. 


CHAPTER   VI. 

THE    ORDER   OF    PRECEDENCE    BETWEEN    NATURAL 
AND    PHILOSOPHIC    CERTITUDE. 

Synopsis. 

i.  As  a  fact,  non-philosophic  or  natural  knowledge  has  preceded 
philosophic. 

2.  What  is  meant  by  philosophy  in  general. 

3.  Applied  Logic  is  a  part  of  philosophy. 

4.  The  justification  of  one  who,  without   mastering  scientific 

logic,  cultivates  the  other  sciences. 

5.  How  scientific  arises  out  of  non-scientific  logic. 

6.  Consequent  deduction  of  practical  principles,  whereby  to 

judge  and  choose  a  system  of  philosophic  certitude. 

7.  Hopeless  search  after  a  philosophy  of  certitude,  built  up 

step  by  step  like  Euclid's  geometry,  and  never  anticipating 
the  results  of  a  future  step. 

8.  Parallel  case  of  trying  to  arrange  the  sciences  hierarchically, 

or  in  order  of  subordination. 

9.  Short   maxims  summarizing   the    practical   results  of    the 

chapter,  and  warning  the  reader  against  the  extravagances 
of  philosophizing. 

I.  We  must  next  begin  to  handle  the  question,  about 
our  real  possession  of  certitude  concerning  things. 
All  along  the  affirmative  answer  has  been  tacitly 
assumed,  as  it  must  be  assumed  by  whoever  pro- 
fesses to  be  conducting  a  rational  discussion  :  but  it 
is  now  time  to  talk  explicitly  about  the  subject. 
Philosophy,  though  an  inevitable  development  of 
mental  culture,  belongs  rather  to  the  bene  esse  than 


NATURAL   AND   PHILOSOPHIC   CERTITUDE.        109 

to  the  esse  of  intellectual  life.  If  ever  luxuries  pre- 
cede necessaries,  as  in  the  priority  of  metrical  over 
prose  literature,  there  is  some  accidental  reason  for 
this  apparent  inversion  of  right  order.  The  early 
Greek  philosophers  found  verse  decidedly  an  easier 
way  of  giving  currency  to  their  opinions :  so  that 
when  Heraclitus  of  Ephesus  made  the  experiment 
of  trying  to  invent  a  prose  style  that  should  have 
scientific  accuracy,  he  brought  down  upon  himself, 
perhaps  not  solely  because  he  wrote  in  prose, 
the  epithet  of  0  o-fcoreivos,  "  the  Obscure."  But 
before  any  systematic  philosophy,  which  is  worth 
the  name,  and  is  not  a  mere  fantastic  cosmogony  or 
something  of  that  sort,  there  must  go  a  fair  develop- 
ment of  the  intellect,  by  its  working,  we  do  not  say 
unphilosophically,  but  non-philosophically. 

2.  By  philosophy  is  here  meant  "  the  knowledge 
of  things  through  their  ultimate  causes." x  All  science 
agrees  in  being  scientia  rerum  per  causas  t  where  the 
word  "cause"  is  used  in  a  wide  sense,  to  signify 
the  rationale  of  things  :  but  it  is  special  to  philosophy 
to  investigate  the  very  ultimate  reasons  of  things. 
Not  all  parts  of  philosophy,  as  is  plain,  can  be  about 
things  equally  ultimate ;  but  all  parts  are  deservedly 
classed  as  ultimate  investigations. 

3.  The  subject  of  the  present  treatise  is  un- 
doubtedly, in  its  own  order,  an  ultimate  inquiry:  for 
it  discusses  the  very  radical  question,  What  is  the 
validity  of  human  knowledge  ?  The  special  sciences 
assume  this  validity,  and  upon  the  assumption  ob- 
serve, analyze,  synthesize,  and  methodize.     Applied 

1  "  Scientia  rerum  per  causas  ultimas." 


NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 


Logic  has  to  take  up  the  previous  question,  What  is 
the  guarantee  of  objective  validity  in  observation, 
analysis,  synthesis,  and  method  ?  Sometimes  the 
man  of  special  science  laughs  at  the  logician  :  but 
he  would  not  laugh  if  he  remembered  that,  unless 
Logic  is  valid,  his  own  conclusions  are  of  no  scientific 
value. 

4.  And  yet  the  man  of  concrete  science  need  not 
be  a  philosopher,  which  is  not  the  same  thing  as 
saying  philosophy  need  not  be  true ;  without  philo- 
sophy he  is  quite  right  to  take  the  validity  of  his 
faculties,  and  his  way  of  using  them,  for  established. 
We  may  go  some  way  with  Balmez  when  he  says  in 
his  Fundamental  Philosophy  :  "If  any  part  of  science 
ought  to  be  regarded  as  purely  speculative,  it  is 
undoubtedly  the  part  which  concerns  certainty."* 
For  consider  how  we  teach  philosophy.  We  let  a 
boy  go  all  through  his  school  course,  which  includes 
various  sciences,  but  we  do  not  ask  him  to  study 
philosophy  strictly  so  called.  If  he  intends  to  take  up 
this  branch,  we  are  glad  of  his  deferring  it  for  a  few 
years  more ;  and  if  he  enters  upon  his  course  at  the 
age  of  twenty-one,  we  are  rather  satisfied  than  sorry 
at  the  delay,  because  he  brings  to  his  task  a  maturity 
of  years,  which  is  usually  indispensable  for  real  philo- 
sophizing, as  distinguished  from  learning  systems  by 
rote,  or  from  learning  how  to  manipulate  stock 
phrases. 

Here,  then,  we  show  our  firm  belief  that  stores 
of  real  knowledge,  and  even  of  scientific  knowledge, 
may  be  gathered  by  the  mind  that  has  never  turned 
introspectively  upon   itself  to  systematize  its   own 


NATURAL   AND   PHILOSOPHIC   CERTITUDE.        in 

laws.  What  we  call  natural  knowledge  we  hold  as 
quite  valid  :  the  mind  observes,  reasons,  and  reflects, 
and  in  the  exercise  of  these  faculties  perceives  its 
own  powers,  and  is  convinced  that  it  acts  rightly. 
At  the  same  time  there  spontaneously  occur  these 
self-questionings,  which,  when  systematized  and 
answered,  form  a  body  of  philosophic  doctrine. 

5.  Philosophic  logic,  therefore,  is  natural  know- 
ledge rendering  reflexly  to  itself  an  account  of  itself. 
Wonderful  and  most  necessary  to  true  intelligence 
is  that  power,  whereby  the  mind  can  make  its  own 
thoughts  the  object  of  further  thought :  and  herein 
lies  one  of  the  manifest  discriminations  of  man  from 
lower  animals,  and  one  of  the  proofs  for  the  spiritua- 
lity of  the  soul.  We  have  not  two  intellects,  the 
one  ordinary,  the  other  extraordinary ;  the  one 
direct,  the  other  reflex ;  but  we  have  a  single  in- 
tellect to  think,  and  to  analyze  thought,  to  do 
our  common-sense  thinking  and  our  philosophical 
thinking. 

6.  Whence  follows  a  golden  rule — distrust  that 
philosophy  which  is  at  utter  variance  with  common 
sense.  What  Mr.  Bain  says  apologetically  for 
idealism,  forms  really  the  strongest  presumption 
against  it,  namely,  that  language,  as  we  now  have  it, 
is  based  on  the  contrary  hypothesis,  and  so  will  not 
serve  the  purposes  of  the  idealist.  Mill,2  too,  is 
uttering  his  own  condemnation,  when  he  pleads 
unfairness  in  language ;  and  says  that  if  his  theory 
of  mind  appears  more  incomprehensible  than  its 
rival,  the  reason  is  "  because  the  whole  of  human 

a  Examination,  c.  xii.  p.  213.  (2nd  Ed.) 


NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 


language  is  accommodated  to  the  latter,  and  is  so 
incongruous  with  the  former,  that  it  cannot  be 
expressed  in  any  terms  which  do  not  deny  its 
truth."  It  was  one  of  Ferrier's  pet  declarations 
that  "  philosophy  exists  for  the  purpose  of  correct- 
ing, not  for  the  purpose  of  confirming,  the  deliver- 
ances of  ordinary  thinking."  If  he  had  meant  no 
more  than  that  philosophy,  like  any  other  science, 
should  correct  some  popular  delusions,  there  would 
have  been  nothing  against  which  to  object ;  but  he 
meant  a  substantial  correction  of  ordinary  thinking, 
and  that  he  was  wrong,  his  own  untenable  idealism 
is  sufficient  token.  Hegel,  too,  was  wrong,  as  his 
system  again  proves,  when  he  asserted  that  "the 
mystics  alone  are  fit  for  philosophizing."  In  another 
direction  M.  Ribot  goes  astray  in  his  remark  that 
philosophy  has  the  value  of  mental  gymnastics, 
exercising  the  faculties  upon  problems  hopelessly 
beyond  their  grasp,  and  for  that  very  reason  calling 
forth  the  utmost  efforts  of  the  mind  :  just  as  a  man 
might  jump  at  a  stretched  string  which  he  had  no 
prospect  of  ever  reaching,  even  with  head  or  hands. 
Rather  we  should  hold  that,  as  the  perfect  Greek 
athlete  was  a  man  with  flesh-and-blood  muscles, 
trained  to  the  utmost,  but  still  of  flesh-and-blood , 
so  the  perfect  philosopher  is  a  common-sense  man, 
who  has  bestowed  uncommon  care  on  the  scientific 
examination  of  his  common  sense,  but  only  by  the  aid 
of  that  which  he  has  been  examining.  A  philosophy 
written  from  this  stand-point  will  read  as  if  written 
in  the  open  air,  not  in  some  sickly  closet,  where 
body  and  mind  have  their  natural  health  destroyed. 


NATURAL  AND  PHILOSOPHIC  CERTITUDE.        ri3 

On   the   principle   here   maintained,  philosophy 
must     never    do    anything    that    is    dead    against 
natural  reason,  as,  for  instance,  give  it  the  lie  direct, 
or  doubt  its  evident  convictions.     More  will  be  said 
of  Descartes  hereafter,  but  he  is  too  apt  an  illustra- 
tion not  to  be  used  at  present.     He  professed  to  be 
able   "  seriously  and   for   good   reasons "  to   doubt 
such  self-evident  truths  as  the  capability  of  his  own 
faculties   to   acquire    knowledge   and    the    plainest 
axioms  in  mathematics.     Now  this  was  sawing  off 
the  branch  on  which  he  sat,  and  it  brought  him  to 
the  ground,  shattered  beyond  the  possibility  of  rising 
again.      It  was  philosophic  suicide.      Even   Hume 
noticed   that   "the    Cartesian   doubt,  were    it  ever 
possible,  as  it  plainly  is  not,  would  be  entirely  in- 
curable ;  and  no  reasoning  could  ever  bring  us  to  a 
state  of  assurance  on  any  subject."     Aware  that  it 
cannot  create  an  intellect  of  its  own,  or  discover  an 
intellect  that  has  not  first  spontaneously  manifested 
itself,  the  scholastic  philosophy  accepts  the  position 
and  makes  the  best  of  it,  which  best  is  not  bad.     It 
does  not  aim  at  a  new  kind  of  knowledge,  a  Soufi 
ecstasy  or  Hegelian  dialectic,  but  only  at  elevating 
the   vulgar    knowledge,    extending    its    range,   and 
especially  training  it,  by  the  aid  of  its  own  lights, 
to  see  its  own  highest  principles  of  activity. 

Hence  the  theory  of  knowledge,  as  proposed  by 
the  scholastics,  whatever  may  be  said  of  some  de- 
tails, at  least  in  its  essential  parts  has  nothing  that 
makes  a  heavy  demand  on  the  credence  of  the 
ordinary  mind — such  a  demand,  for  instance,  as  is 
made  by  our  pure  empiricists,  and  our  so-called 
I 


114  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

Neo-Kantians,  who  scarce  have  the  first  requisite 
of  intelligibility,  and  who,  so  far  as  they  are  intel- 
ligible, are  often  extravagant.  Indeed,  the  scholastic 
account  so  falls  in  with  the  view  of  the  ordinary 
thinker,  that  the  latter,  when  he  takes  up  our 
treatises,  is  apt  to  exclaim  :  Is  this  what  you  call 
philosophy  ?  Why,  it  seems  to  me  that  it  needs  no 
philosopher  to  point  out  that  intelligence  is  intel- 
ligent ;  that  what  is  evident  is  true  ;  that  the  final 
test  of  understanding  is,  on  one  side,  the  actual  ex- 
perience of  being  able  to  understand  ;  and  to  utter 
other  such  plain  propositions  into  which  I  can  resolve 
your  rather  more  elevated  utterances.  There  is 
truth  in  these  remarks,  and  a  truth  not  to  be  dis- 
guised, nor  shamefacedly  admitted,  but  manfully 
recognized.  Our  philosophy  does  start  from  common 
sense,  and  can  never  shake  itself  free  from  its  humble 
beginnings.  It  is  a  terra  films  by  origin  ;  but  at 
least  it  is  the  offspring  of  a  healthy  soil ;  and  now 
that  it  has  dressed  itself  up  and  made  the  best  of 
itself,  it  presents  no  ignoble  appearance.  Neither 
was  its  parent,  natural  knowledge,  mere  blind  in- 
stinct ;  it  had  the  same  means  at  command  as 
philosophy  has,  but  its  skill  in  the  use  of  them 
was  somewhat  inferior :  though  it  saw  its  way  as 
it  went,  it  had  not  the  cleverness  actually  to  draw 
a  map  of  the  course.  Now  it  can  not  only  make 
journeys,  but  write  an  account  of  them,  and  gives 
sketches  by  the  way. 

7.  The  nature  of  philosophy  being  thus  explained, 
it  is  clear  that  we  can  never  find  what  some  seem 
to  insist   upon,  and   what  Ferrier  tried   to  give  in 


NATURAL   AND  PHILOSOPHIC   CERTITUDE.        115 

his  Institutes  of  Metaphysics,  namely,  a  philosophy 
of  certitude  built  up  after  the  plan  of  Euclid's 
geometry.  Euclid  begins  with  axioms,  postu- 
lates, and  definitions,  and  then  he  so  piles 
proposition  on  proposition  as  never  to  need  the 
conclusion  of  a  later  proposition  as  part  of  his  proof 
of  an  earlier.  But  Euclid  assumed  those  truths, 
which  the  philosophy  of  certitude  has  to  discuss : 
what  he  had  to  prove  lay  all  within  the  narrow 
department  of  quantity  in  extension,  as  represented 
by  lines  and  angles.  On  the  other  hand,  he  who 
draws  out  the  philosophy  of  certitude  has  to  discuss 
the  very  faculties  and  principles  which  he  must  be 
using  all  the  time,  and  cannot  proceed  a  step  with- 
out tacitly  assuming  the  conclusions  of  pretty  nearly 
his  whole  treatise. 

Write  any  first  chapter  you  like  to  your  Book 
on  Certitude,  and  see  how  far  it  is  from  in- 
volving only  one  simple  idea  or  principle :  see 
how  much  it  already  implies,  upon  which  you 
will  have  afterwards  to  raise  questions.  You.  are 
going  in  general  to  ask  if  man  can  have  real  know- 
ledge :  and  how  can  you  help  supposing  all  the  time 
that  he  can  ?  Relying  on  the  veracity  of  the 
senses,  in  spite  of  its  being  so  hotly  canvassed 
a  point,  you  refer  to  the  writings  of  other  authors, 
and  in  return  you  have  recourse  to  the  printed 
characters,  which  are  to  convey  your  thoughts  to 
the  world. 

The  reader,  therefore,  must  be  patient,  and  wait 
till  he  arrives  at  the  end  of  the  book,  before  settling, 
in  his  own  mind,  that  the  author  leaves  necessary 


n6  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

matters  undiscussed ;  and  he  must  not  expect  a 
Euclidean  inverted  pyramid — a  system  rising,  as  it 
were,  from  a  point  and  broadening  as  it  ascends — 
to  be  erected  where  that  style  of  structure  is  neither 
needful  nor  possible.  He  must  not  too  readily  take 
it  for  granted  that  there  is  illegitimate  arguing  in 
a  circle,  if  he  is  referred  about  from  chapter  to 
chapter,  or  told  to  put  off,  till  a  subsequent  chapter 
be  reached,  his  search  for  various  pieces  of  informa- 
tion. If  it  is  better  to  refrain  from  plainly  saying 
that  many  of  our  propositions  cannot  strictly  be 
proved,  it  is  not  because  this  declaration  would  not 
contain  a  truth ;  indeed,  it  is  eminently  true ;  but 
because  it  is  pretty  sure,  in  nine  cases  out  of  ten, 
to  be  taken  in  the  very  false  sense,  that  no  satis- 
factory account  can  ultimately  be  given  of  the 
judgments  we  hold  by,  and  that  we  can  take  our 
so-called  knowledge  only  on  blind  trust.  From 
such  a  view  we  must  strongly  dissent ;  and  if  some 
propositions  in  this  treatise  are  called  not  strictly 
demonstrable,  the  meaning  is  that  they  are  imme- 
diately evident,  and  do  not  admit  of  resolution  into 
simpler  propositions. 

8.  What  has  been  said  of  the  Allzusammenhcit, 
"  altogetherness,"  or  interfusion  of  parts,  in  the 
philosophy  of  certitude,  which  forbids  the  orderly 
march  of  propositions  that  we  see  in  Euclid,  may 
be  paralleled  by  the  impossibility  of  putting  the 
several  sciences  into  exact  hierarchical  order.  One 
objection  which  Mr.  Spencer  urges  against  Comte's 
classification,  namely,  that  some  of  the  earlier 
sciences  have  to  wait  for  advances  to  be  made  in 


NATURAL  AND  PHILOSOPHIC  CERTITUDE.        117 

the  later,  will  always  remain,  whatever  be  the 
arrangement  in  way  of  subordination  :  and  a  quite 
perfect  gradation  is  impossible.  This  is  a  fact,  but 
it  need  create  no  great  discomfort. 

9.  After  having  explained  some  wrong  and  some 
right  conceptions  as  to  the  nature  of  philosophy, 
and  having  in  mind  the  sad  extravagances  which 
the  history  of  philosophy  reveals  in  far  too  large  a 
proportion  of  its  pages,  we  may  now  draw  a  practical 
conclusion  as  to  the  sane  method  of  philosophizing. 
We  observe  that  the  strain  after  the  very  know- 
ledge of  knowledge  and  wisdom  of  wisdom,  has  led 
to  the  neglect  of  the  Apostolic  precept,  "  Not  to  be 
wiser  than  it  behoves  us  to  be  wise,  but  to  think 
soberly."3  Hence  are  suggested  golden  mottoes 
like  these:  "Moderation  is  the  best";4  "Be 
not  wise  beyond  thy  wits  "  ;  "  Be  not  wise  after 
the  manner  of  the  wiseacre " ;  "  Philosophize 
not  unto  foolishness " ;  "  Do  not  for  the  sake  of 
philosophizing  destroy  the  foundations  of  philo- 
sophy."5 These  and  the  like  maxims  the  philoso- 
pher should  keep  in  his  mind  as  ballast,  or  else  the 
mental  balloon  may  quickly  be  found  outside  the 
element  wherein  man  can  breathe.  With  regard 
to  how  many  a  writer,  Hegel,  say,  or  Hartmann, 
or  one  of  the  old  Gnostic  evolvers  of  i£ons,  have  we 
sorrowfully  to  exclaim  :  "  Alas,  poor  man,  he  has 
taken  the  headlong  plunge  into  the  great  inane :  it 

3  "  Non  plus  sapere  quam  oportet  sapere,  sed  sapere  ad  sobrie- 
tatem."  (Romans  xii.  3.) 

4  /xr]dky  'ayav,  fxsrpov  &pi<TTOV. 

5  "  Noli  propter  philosophiam,  philosophandi  perdere  causas." 


n8  NATURE  OF  CERTITUDE. 

is  hopeless  trying  to  follow  him,  and  he  himself  will 
never  re-emerge  !  "  The  greater  his  powers,  the 
more  desperate,  perhaps,  is  his  condition ;  for,  as 
St.  Augustine  observes,  Magna  magnorum  deliramenta 
doctovum;  or,  as  Balmez  puts  it,  "  There  are  errors 
which  lie  out  of  the  reach  of  an  ordinary  mind  " — 
words  which  for  present  purposes  it  may  be  allow- 
able to  understand  so  that  they  form  a  repetition  of 
the  dictum  of  St.  Augustine.  One  thing  this  volume 
does  promise  the  reader,  that  in  it  he  shall  never  be 
asked  to  believe  what  to  the  plain  Christian  man  is 
startling,  or  appeals  to  no  intelligent  principle  within 
him.  It  has  no  propositions  brought  down  from 
the  region  of  the  marvellous.  Mr.  M.  Arnold  has 
lately  told  us,  that  there  has  at  length  dawned  in 
England  a  day  for  which,  years  ago,  he  could  only 
hope ;  and  that  now  it  is  here  regarded  as  an  objec- 
tion to  a  thing  that  it  is  absurd.  If  ever  such  a  day 
dawns  for  philosophy,  how  will  its  light  dissolve  the 
hazy  reputation  of  many  a  once  cherished  philo- 
sopher 1 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE  CHARGE  OF  DISCORD  (OR  AT  LEAST  OF  WANT  OF 
CO-OPERATION)  BETWEEN  NATURAL  AND  PHILO- 
SOPHIC   CERTITUDE. 

Synopsis. 

i.  The  asserted  antagonism  of  Philosophy  to  Natural  Certitude. 
(a)  A  thorough-going  antagonism,  (b)  A  partial  antagonism. 

2.  The  asserted  want  of  co-operation  between  spontaneous  and 

systematic  thought,  or  between  natural  and  scientific 
reasoning,  can  be  explained  by  the  consideration  of  certain 
facts,  (a)  When  theory  is  not  yet  as  wide  as  all  the  con- 
ditions of  a  problem,  it  is  no  disrespect  to  theory  to  supple- 
ment it  by  rule  of  thumb :  theory  co-operates  to  the  extent 
of  its  powers,  and  there  stops  short,  (b)  By  long  habit  the 
mind  abridges  its  processes,  and  does  not  always  follow  out 
every  logical  step  in  an  inference,  (c)  The  spontaneous 
processes  of  the  mind  may  very  well  be  more  successful 
than  the  reflex  on  many  occasions. 

3.  Limits  within  which  the  doctrine  in  the  chapter  is  to  be 

taken. 
Addenda. 

The  philosopher's  prying  into  his  own  mind  has 
been  compared  to  Aladdin's  prying  into  his  wonderful 
lamp ;  before,  it  lighted  him  to  the  attainment  of 
all  things  needful,  afterwards,  it  became  unservice- 
able. This  accusation  is  urged  by  different  authors 
in  varying  extent ;  with  some  the  charge  is  one  of 
downright  antagonism  between  philosophy  and 
natural  certitude,  with  others  it  is  one  of  want  of 
co-operation  or  of  harmony. 


NATURE  OF  CERTITUDE. 


I.  The  assertors  of  antagonism  must  be  sub- 
divided into  those  who  represent  the  opposition  to 
be  complete,  and  those  who  represent  it  to  be 
partial. 

(a)  That  philosophy  utterly  discredits  the  validity 
of  ordinary  reasoning  is  what  we  should  gather  from 
some  of  the  stronger  expressions  used  by  Jouffroy. 
For  example,  he  declares  that  reason  "  absolutely 
affirms  human  belief  to  be  without  a  motive ;  it  is 
by  instinct  that  a  man  believes,  and  by  reason  that 
he  doubts.  When  reason  reflects  upon  its  own 
work,  scepticism  is  the  inevitable  result."  This  is 
but  a  repetition  of  Bayle,  who  declared  that  reason 
can  not  bear  to  turn  her  own  light  upon  herself; 
that  philosophic  reflexion  undoes  all  the  mind's 
previous  work  and  makes  her  a  Penelope,  un- 
weaving at  night  what  she  had  woven  by  day. 

Against  so  blank  a  scepticism,  as  resulting  from 
a  philosophic  examination  of  man's  position  in  regard 
to  knowledge,  it  will  be  the  business  of  the  next 
chapter  to  contend ;  so  at  present  we  may  pass  on 
to  the  milder  subdivision  of  the  first  impeachment. 

(b)  At  any  rate,  it  is  argued,  philosophy  is  only 
in  partial  agreement  with  common  certitude,  and 
there  is  a  partial  disagreement.  Speaking  of  the 
sceptic  doubts  which  philosophy  can  throw  on 
scientific  principles,  and  of  the  practical  progress  of 
science  in  spite  of  these  apparently  demonstrated 
difficulties,  Mr.  A.  Sidgwick  thinks  we  must  acquiesce 
in  a  certain  disregard  of  what  seems  philosophically 
valid  argument.  "  In  the  presence  of  all  the  acts  of 
useful  self-deception,  which  help  to  make  the  world 


THE  CHARGE   OF  DISCORD.  12X 

go  round,  may  we  not  admit  that  theory  and  practice 
cannot  as  yet  be  safely  presumed  to  coincide  ?  " 

A  writer  who  has  done  good  service  to  Catholic 
philosophy  in  this  country,  Dr.  Ward,  has  more  than 
once  expressed  an  opinion  which  bears  on  the  present 
discussion.  Though  a  great  stickler  for  logic,  yet  it 
was  his  deliberate  view,  "  that  there  are  several 
truths  of  vital  importance,  which  are  reasonably 
accepted  as  certain  only  on  implied  grounds  of 
assurance,  which  have  not  as  yet  been  scientifically 
analyzed ;  nay,  of  which,  perhaps,  the  scientific 
analysis  transcends  the  power  of  the  human  soul." 

Out  of  the  two  authors  quoted,  we  may  frame  a 
sort  of  common  objection  in  this  shape  :  Practical 
logic,  as  it  may  be  called,  outstrips  the  school  logic, 
sometimes  bidding  us  go  safely  forward,  where  the 
latter  posts  up  a  decided  "  No  Road."  Thus,  at 
least,  there  is  occasional  opposition. 

In  reply,  let  us  begin  by  distinguishing  between 
what  one  individual  and  what  another  individual  can 
do  :  as  also  between  what  any  unaided  individual 
may  accomplish  and  what  the  collective  force  of 
human  intellect  may  accomplish.  The  individual 
unaccustomed  to  the  analysis  of  his  thoughts  may 
often  have  a  genuine  certitude,  for  which,  neverthe- 
less, he  is  unable  to  render  a  philosophic  account, 
but  for  which  another  individual,  trained  in  philo- 
sophy, would  furnish  a  sufficient  analysis.  Next, 
beyond  the  individual,  we  have  to  take  into  account 
the  accumulated  labours  of  the  race,  especially  of  its 
ablest  members  working  in  conjunction  upon  the 
chief  problems  which  present  themselves  for  human 


T23  nature  of  certitude. 

investigation.  What  now  are  we  to  say  of  a  pro- 
fessed certitude,  which  both  the  individual  man  and 
collective  humanity  have  failed  to  support  by  pro- 
ducible motives  ?  The  certitude  is,  by  supposition, 
merely  a  natural  act  :  yet  nowhere  among  men  can 
immediate  or  mediate  evidences  be  brought  forward 
adequate  to  its  defence.  It  has  to  be  accepted  on  a 
general  feeling  that  it  is  right ;  but  how  or  why  it  is 
right,  no  one  can  exactly  declare.  Where  is  the 
instance  of  a  certitude  about  a  "  vital  truth"  in  this 
predicament  ?  If  such  there  be,  about  the  only 
rational  ground  on  which  it  could  be  defended  would 
be  by  saying,  that  the  race  of  men  being  rational, 
such  a  common  consent  could  not  have  been  pro- 
duced except  by  some  rational  motives,  however 
inscrutable  some  of  these  might  be.  But  we  may 
doubt  whether  any  human  certitude  is  so  circum- 
stanced. It  seems  more  correct  to  maintain,  that 
for  every  certitude  which  is  not  self-evident,  there 
is  a  producible  analysis  of  motives.  A  perfect 
analysis  may  not  be  forthcoming,  but  at  least  a  suffi- 
cient explanation  may  be  offered.  If  the  truth 
is  self-evident,  the  self-evidence  is  the  motive  of 
belief;  otherwise  there  must  be  some  inferential 
evidence.  At  any  rate,  for  a  real  certitude  of  the 
natural  order,  there  must  always  be  producible  evi- 
dence. 

By  far  the  most  pertinent  reply  to  alleged  instances 
of  the  difficulty  we  are  now  considering  is  to  point 
out  that  each  of  the  given  examples  is  not  a  case  of  full 
certitude,  but  only  one  of  high  probability,  quite  suffi- 
cient to  act  upon.  We  have  no  fear  that  the  sun  will 


THE   CHARGE   OF  DISCORD.  123 

not  rise  to-morrow ;  yet  those  items  which  are 
wanting  to  the  full  logical  proof  of  coming  events  are 
just  what  cause  our  legitimate  assent  to  fall  a  little 
below  absolute.  If  the  sun  did  not  rise  to-morrow, 
we  should  be  ready  to  confess  "Well,  after  all  we  had 
not  absolute  demonstration."  Thus,  as  a  fact,  valid 
assent  is  not  in  excess  of  the  premisses,  and  practical 
logic  does  not  really  carry  the  intelligence  further 
than  speculative  logic  would  allow.  In  all  cases 
genuine  certitude  is  strictly  proportionate  to  its 
known  motives. 

2.  Without  being  opposite,  paths  may  not  coin- 
cide ;  and  when  opposition,  between  the  ways  along 
which  spontaneous  reasoning  and  philosophy  respec- 
tively travel  to  a  conclusion,  is  not  asserted,  at  least 
divergence  is  affirmed.  "  Experience,"  says  Balmez, 
in  his  Fundamental  Philosophy ,  "  has  shown  our 
understanding  to  be  guided  by  no  one  of  the  con- 
siderations made  by  philosophers ;  its  assent  when 
it  is  accompanied  by  the  greatest  certainty,  is  a 
spontaneous  process  of  natural  instinct,  not  of  logical 
combinations  or  ratiocinations."  The  difficulty  here 
raised  may  be  answered  by  a  few  explanations  as  to 
facts. 

(a)  When  the  theoretical  account  of  a  case  is 
obviously  such  as  does  not  take  in  all  the  circum- 
stances, then,  in  practice,  we  do  not  follow  out  the 
mere  dictate  of  theory.  A  mathematical  formula 
tells  how  to  point  a  cannon  so  as  exactly  to  hit 
a  mark,  on  the  supposition  that  there  is  no  atmos- 
pheric resistance,  and  no  deflecting  power  in  a  whirl- 
wind that   is  blowing.     What    divergence  is  there 


I24  NATURE  OF  CERTITUDE. 

between  theory  and  practice,  if  the  gunner  calculates 
by  rule  of  thumb  the  disturbing  elements,  which  are 
too  unsettled  to  allow  of  theoretic  determination  ? 
Again,  a  physician  has  a  scientific  theory  about  the 
effect  of  a  certain  drug  on  a  limited  set  of  conditions 
within  the  human  body :  but  aware  that  these  con- 
ditions are  complicated  by  many  others,  which  he 
cannot  distinctly  formulate,  he  makes  a  rough  allow- 
ance for  these  last  on  empirical  grounds.  Often 
scientific  results  are  known  to  be  only  approxi- 
mative ;  and  scientific  men  know  how  to  relax  the 
rigour  of  these  terms  to  meet  refractory  cases.  One 
reply  to  Mr.  Stallo's  attack  on  scientific  theory  was 
made  precisely  on  this  ground,  that  physicists  use 
"attraction,"  "fluid,"  "atom,"  "potential  energy," 
with  a  recognised  elasticity  of  meaning,  for  which 
only  the  experienced  worker  in  science  can  make  due 
allowances.  This  is  an  acknowledgment  that  science 
is  imperfect,  but  no  acknowledgment  that  it  is  not 
in  accord  with  practice  :  it  goes  along  with  practice 
as  far  as  the  length  of  its  own  tether  will  permit. 
So,  too,  when  it  is  said  that  philosophy  travels  one 
road,  common  sense  another,  it  should  rather  be 
said,  that  philosophy  is  not  co-extensive  with  all 
practical  discoveries,  in  many  of  which  we  know  that 
things  are,  without  knowing  how  they  are. 

(b)  We  should  be  quite  unable  to  get  on  in  life, 
if  on  every  occasion,  when  we  wanted  a  conclusion, 
we  had  to  go  through,  in  order,  all  the  steps  which 
logically  lead  up  to  that  conclusion.  By  dint  of 
habit  our  mental  associations  become  very  nimble, 
and  partly  as  a  matter  of  direct  memory,  partly  by 


THE   CHARGE   OF  DISCORD.  125 

the  aid  of  dimly  suggested  inferences,  our  course  is 
expedited.     Whereas  the  full  number  of  steps  are 

A,  B,  C,  D,  E,  we  seem  to  go  at  once  from  A  to  E. 
Some   affirm    that   we    do    actually   pass    through 

B,  C,  D,  but  so  rapidly  as  not  to  advert  to  the  fact ; 
others  say  that  A  may  have  become  immediately 
associated  in  memory  with  E,  though  originally  the 
intermediate  stages  had  to  be  traversed.  At  any 
rate,  the  impression  left  is,  that  the  mind  takes  short 
cuts  to  its  ends,  and  that  occasionally  our  conclusions 
come  first,  and  our  premisses,  if  they  come  at  all, 
follow  afterwards.  Instead  of  being  in  the  case  of 
Dogberry,  when  he  said,  "  'Tis  already  proved  you 
are  guilty,  and  it  will  go  nigh  to  being  thought  so 
soon,"  we  are  in  a  position  of  saying,  "  the  con- 
clusion is  already  drawn,  and  it  will  go  nigh  to  being 
proved  soon."  Something  like  the  strange  process 
which  Alice  heard  recommended  in  Wonderland, 
seems  to  belong  likewise  to  Plain-man's-land,  "  sen- 
tence first,  and  verdict  afterwards." 

The  account  of  the  process  has  already  been 
briefly  given,  but  may  be  repeated  with  a  slight 
change  of  words.  The  mind  has  gone  through  much 
experience,  and  much  labour,  in  arranging  its  con- 
tents. Many  immediate  judgments,  many  syllogisms 
have  been  made.  As  a  consequence  there  is  left  an 
orderly  register  of  results ;  and  often  a  thought  gives 
or  seems  to  give,  by  direct  suggestion,  what  was 
originally  connected  with  it  through  many  intervene 
ing  links.  Whether  these  links  are  momentarily 
revived  in  the  memory,  but  so  momentarily  as  to 
escape  the  detection  of  conscious  analysis,  need  not 


126  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

here  concern  us  ;  it  is  enough  if  we  can  give  an 
acceptable  account  of  the  apparently  irrational,  or 
non-rational  process  whereby  reason  seems  to  outrun 
itself,  and  to  decide  before  it  has  the  motives.  We  may 
add,  in  this  connexion,  the  theory  of  Dr.  Maudsley, 
where  he  explains  some  of  those  cases,  in  which 
what  we  are  convinced  are  new  matters  of  thought, 
nevertheless  put  on  the  air  of  old  recollections.  He 
supposes  the  mind  to  reach  a  result  before  the  con- 
scious attention  is  directed  to  the  process  ;  so  that, 
when  consciousness  is  fully  roused,  the  object  seems 
familiar.  In  this  way  the  conclusion  would  appear 
to  anticipate  the  premisses.  The  quasi -automatic 
process,  however,  is  always  amenable  to  the  judgment 
of  deliberate  reflexion,  by  which  it  has  often  to  be 
corrected.  A  ludicrous  instance  of  inference  by 
rapid  association  is  given  in  Herodotus,  in  his  story 
of  the  revolted  slaves,  who  after  repulsing  armed 
attacks,  fled  when  their  masters  issued  out  against 
them  with  that  familiar  weapon,  the  whip.  Logical 
reflexion,  if  the  poor  wretches  had  been  capable  of 
it,  would  have  been  useful.  Thus  logic  retains  her 
position  as  the  friend  and  helper  of  spontaneous 
reasoning ;  a  position  which  is  accorded  to  her  even 
by  Messrs.  Mill,  Lewes,  and  Spencer,  who  fully 
admit  the  use  of  the  syllogism  as  a  "verifying 
process." 

The  doctrine  above  laid  down  enables  us  to  meet 
what  to  the  unprepared  might  seem  difficulties,  of 
which  a  specimen  or  two  shall  now  be  added. 
"  While   we    assume,"    says    Mr.    Sully,1    "  that    in 

i  Outlines  of  Psychology,  c.  iii.  Reasoning. 


THE   CHARGE   OF  DISCORD. 


127 


reasoning  the  mind  passes  from  premisses  to  con- 
clusion, we  must  remember  that  this  does  not  answer 
the  actual  order  of  mental  events  in  many,  and 
perhaps  in  the  majority  of  instances.  The  con- 
clusion presents  itself  first,  and  the  ground,  premiss, 
or  reason,  when  it  distinctly  arises  in  the  mind  at 
all,  recurs  rather  as  an  after-thought,  and  by  the 
suggestive  force  of  the  similarity  between  the  new 
case  and  the  old."  Mr.  Spencer2  has  remarks 
to  the  same  effect.  He  says  that  we  go  straight 
from  a  perceived  stone  to  its  lines  of  cleavage,  and 
do  not  travel  round  by  the  syllogism,  "  all  crystals 
have  lines  of  cleavage  ;  this  stone  is  a  crystal ;  there- 
fore it  has  lines  of  cleavage." 

So  far  from  resenting  such  objections,  we  welcome 
them,  as  helping  us  to  clear  up  our  own  conceptions, 
and  as  calling  our  attention  to  the  very  important 
fact,  that  our  mental  store  does  not  consist  of  ideas, 
isolated  like  atoms,  or  standing  in  rows  like  words 
in  a  dictionary.  Rather  our  ideas  make  up  a  sort 
of  organically  united  whole,  one  idea  developing  by 
epigenesis  upon  another,  somewhat  after  the  analogy 
of  cells  in  a  plant  or  animal.  The  analogy  is  only 
an  analogy,  but  it  is  a  help  for  our  understanding  to 
conceive,  under  these  figures,  processes,  the  precise 
nature  of  which  will  always  be  for  us  a  mystery. 
Goethe  compares  the  union  of  our  mental  concep- 
tions to  a  subtle  weaving  of  many  threads  together 
into  patterns  which  gradually  display  themselves  : 

The  web  of  thought,  we  may  assume, 
Is  like  some  triumph  of  the  loom, 

2  Psychology,  Part  II.  c.  viii.  §  305. 


128  NATURE  OF  CERTITUDE. 

Where  one  small  simple  treadle  starts 

A  thousand  threads  to  motion, — where 

A  flying  shuttle  shoots  and  darts, 

Now  over  here,  now  under  there. 

We  look,  but  see  not  how,  so  fast 

Thread  blends  with  thread,  and  twines,  and  mixes 

When  lo  !  one  single  stroke  at  last 

The  thousand  combinations  fixes. 3 

(c)  Ac  too  much  attention  concentrated  on  the 
bodily  functions  may  derange  them,  and  as  even  the 
simple  process  of  jumping  a  ditch  may  fail  from 
excess  of  care  to  do  it  neatly  ;  so  an  attempt  to  think 
out  a  question  in  strict  philosophic  form  may  deaden 
or  misguide  the  energies  of  thought.  But  these  facts 
argue  no  essential  want  of  convergence  between  the 
spontaneous  and  the  systematized  process ;  the  two 
may  be  mutually  helpful,  and  each  has  besides  its 
own  peculiar  place.  Let  them  combine  where  they 
usefully  can,  and  keep  apart  where  combination  is 
detrimental.  This  is  the  substantial  settlement  of 
the  matter ;  and  it  meets  any  such  case  as  that  of 
Sir  Walter  Scott,  who  found  it  sometimes  an  aid  to 
his  progress  in  a  novel,  if  he  began  to  read  a  book 
on  some  other  subject.  The  desired  train  of  thought, 
as  if  jealous  of  a  rival,  came  in  to  dispossess  the 
ideas  given  by  the  book ;  just  as  in  a  parallel  case 
church-goers  involuntarily  recall,  within  the  sacred 
walls,  the  fact  which  they  tried  in  vain  to  recover 
outside. 

3.  To  state  the  limits  within  which  a  doctrine 

3  Faust,  translated  by  Theodore  Martin,  Act  II.  Scene  1,  p.  89. 
See  too  Mansel's  criticisms  upon  Locke's  "simple  ideas."  (Prolegom. 
Log.  c.  vi.  p.  185.) 


THE   CHARGE   OF  DISCORD.  129 

is  meant  to  be  accepted,  often  saves  a  world  of  mis- 
construction ;  and  the  present  instance  is  one  calling 
for  a  statement  of  limitations. 

First,  no  account  is  taken  of  grace  and  of  super- 
natural revelation,  though  both  are  facts.  What 
we  call  revelation  is  of  rarer  occurrence,  and  vouch- 
safed only  to  the  favoured  few :  but  unless  the 
Church  is  to  give  in  to  Pelagius,  and  to  those  who 
go  further  than  ever  Pelagius  went  in  the  direction 
of  naturalism,  she  must  maintain  that  Christians  are 
in  constant  receipt  of  illuminations  by  grace  from 
above,  both  as  to  their  faith  and  as  to  their  guidance 
in  conduct. 

Besides  the  supernatural  mysticism  treated  of 
by  the  Pseudo-Dionysius,  his  commentator  Maxi- 
mus,  St.  Bernard,  Hugo  and  Richard  of  St,  Victor, 
St.  Bonaventure,  Gerson,  and  pious  writers  who 
have  not  been  professed  theologians,  there  is 
asserted  also  a  sort  of  natural  mysticism.  This  we 
must  make  over  to  the  Society  for  Psychical 
Research,  for  it  cannot  be  reduced,  by  our  present 
knowledge,  to  logical  system  :  whereas  the  truths 
that  can  be  so  reduced  suffice  for  a  Philosophy  of 
Certitude. 

Addenda. 

(1)  The  Tractarian  movement,  at  Oxford,  offers  some 
instructive  contrasts  between  the  mind  which  holds 
that  thought  can  be  rigorously  carried  on,  and  the  mind 
that  distrusts  philosophy.  In  the  notice  of  the  death  of 
the  late  Dr.  Ward,  a  leader  in  The  Times  remarked 
pointedly  upon  the  circumstance,  that  in  his  University 

J 


130  NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE. 

days  he  was  a  noted  stickler  for  logic  ;  "whereas,"  adds 
the  writer,  "  most  people  are  content  to  say  as  much  as 
meets  the  occasion,  in  the  blandest  form  and  in  the 
pleasantest  tone.  Logic  is  not  much  required  for  the 
dinner  table  or  on  the  platform." 

Before  bringing  forward  the  contrast  between  Dr. 
Ward  and  other  men  at  Oxford,  it  is  worth  while 
inserting  an  illustration  precisely  of  this  "  bland  form 
and  pleasant  tone"  of  the  illogician.  "One  peculiar 
defect  of  mine,"  confesses  or  boasts  M.  Renan,1  "  has 
more  than  once  been  injurious  to  my  prospects  in 
life.  This  is  my  indecision  of  character,  which  often 
leads  me  into  positions,  from  which  I  have  a  great  diffi- 
culty in  extricating  myself.  This  defect  is  further  com- 
plicated by  a  good  quality,  which  often  leads  me  into 
as  many  difficulties  as  the  most  serious  of  my  defects. 
I  have  never  been  able  to  do  anything  which  would  give 
pain  to  any  one.  ...  In  talking  and  in  letter-writing  I 
am  at  times  singularly  weak.  With  the  exception  of  a 
select  few,  between  whom  and  myself  there  is  a  bond  of 
intellectual  brotherhood,  I  say  to  people  just  what  I 
think  is  likely  to  please  them.  With  an  inveterate  habit 
of  being  over  polite,  I  am  anxious  to  detect  what  the 
person  I  am  talking  with  would  like  me  to  say.  My 
attention,  when  I  am  conversing  with  any  one,  is  en- 
grossed in  trying  to  guess  his  ideas,  and  from  excess  of 
deference  to  anticipate  him  in  the  expression  of  them. 
My  correspondence  will  be  a  disgrace  to  me,  if  it  is 
published  after  my  death."  From  this  charge  of 
extreme  complaisance  he  excepts  his  published  works  ; 
but  they  too  must  be  affected  by  certain  qualities  which 
shall  be  added  for  the  completion  of  the  picture.  "  By 
mere  force  of  things  and  despite  my  conscientious  efforts 

i  Recollections  of  my   Youth,  the  Part  entitled,   St.  Renan,  p.  65. 
(English  Translation.) 


THE   CHARGE   OF  DISCORD.  131 

to  the  contrary,  I  am  a  member  of  the  romantic  school, 
protesting  against  romanticism ;  a  Utopian  inculcating 
the  doctrine  of  half-measures  ;  an  idealist  unsuccessfully 
endeavouring  to  pass  muster  for  a  realist,  a  tissue  of 
contradictions  resembling  the  double-natured  hircocerf 
of  scholasticism.  One  of  my  two  halves  must  have  been 
busy  demolishing  the  other  half,  and  it  was  well  said  by 
that  keen  observer,  M.  Challemel-Lacour,  he  feels  like  a 
woman  and  acts  like  a  child.  I  have  no  reason  to  com- 
plain of  such  being  the  case,  as  this  actual  constitution 
has  procured  for  me  one  of  the  keenest  intellectual  joys 
a  man  can  taste."  That  will  do  for  M.  Renan  ;  now  for 
Dr.  Ward's  more  immediate  contrast. 

Again  the  risk  of  doing  an  injustice  is  avoided  by  our 
being  able  to  quote  an  autobiographical  sketch,  of  which 
the  responsibility  lies  with  the  subject.  Speaking  of  his 
part  in  the  Oxford  movement  Mr.  T.  Mozley  says:2 
11  Why  did  I  go  so  far  in  the  movement,  and  why  did  I 
go  no  further  ?  Why  enter  upon  arguments,  and  not 
accept  their  conclusions  ?  Why  advance  to  stand  still, 
and  in  doing  so  commit  myself  to  a  final  retreat  ?  The 
reasons  of  this  lame  and  impotent  conclusion  lay  within 
myself,  wide  apart  from  the  great  controversy  in  which 
I  was  but  an  intruder.  I  was  never  really  serious,  in  a 
sober,  business-like  way.  /  had  neither  the  power  nor  the 
will  to  enter  into  any  great  argument,  with  the  resolution  to 
accept  the  legitimate  conclusion.  Even  when  I  was  sacrificing 
my  days,  my  strength,  my  means,  my  prospects,  my 
peace  and  quiet,  all  I  had,  to  the  cause,  it  was  an  earthly 
contest  not  a  spiritual  one.  It  occupied  me,  it  excited 
me,  it  gratified  my  vanity,  it  soothed  my  self-com- 
placency, it  identified  me  in  what  I  honestly  believed  to 
be  a  very  grand  crusade,  it  offered  me  the  hope  of  con- 
tributing to  very  grand  achievements.     But  good  as  the 

2  Reminiscences  of  Oriel,  Vol.  II.  c.  ex.  p.  270.  Compare  c.  cxvi. 


132  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

cause  might  be,  and  considerable  as  my  part  might  be 
in  it,  I  was  never  the  better  man  for  it." 

If  it  may  be  permitted  to  allude  to  yet  a  third  auto- 
biography, we  will  mention  the  Memoirs  of  Mark  Pattison, 
who  tells  how,  having  engaged  in  the  Tractarian  move- 
ment, he  ended  by  diverting  his  thoughts  from  it  to 
scientific  ideas,  and  his  Tractarianism  succumbed,  not 
to  argument,  but  to  "  inanition  " — died  of  starvation. 

In  the  order  of  God's  providence  these  things  are 
"  written  for  our  instruction,"  that  so  far  as  we  have 
the  opportunity  and  the  need,  we  may  train  our  minds 
to  follow  a  more  rigorous  method  of  thinking.  It  is 
suggestive  in  the  course  of  reading,  to  notice  who  are 
the  authors  who  express  their  contempt  for  philosophic 
system,  and  who  claim  a  free  range  for  thinking  as  they 
fancy.  A  significant  list  could  be  drawn  up,  in  which 
the  much-belauded  Goethe  would  stand  as  a  warning 
example  ;  though  not  all  would  recognise  that  his  want 
of  hold  upon  systematic  truth  was  a  calamity  (Goethe, 
Sein  Leben  und  Seine  Werke,  von  Alexander  Baumgartner, 
S.J.,  Vol.  I.  pp.  27,  28). 

(2)  In  behalf  of  the  view  that  human  thought  is 
essentially  loose  and  inaccurate,  it  may  be  argued  that 
philosophy  has  shown  the  same  characters  in  the  for- 
mation of  grammatical  forms.  Far  from  having  a 
strict  propriety  in  them,  many  are  traced  back  to  bad 
analogies,  to  pieces  of  clumsiness,  and  to  downright 
blunders ;  so  that  a  man  who  has  had  a  little  insight 
into  the  origin  of  some  usages,  is  not  much  inclined,  at 
this  late  hour,  to  do  vigorous  battle  in  the  cause  of  a 
fancied  purism  against  established  usage.  If  it  be  asked, 
Why  may  not  thought  have  its  inner  anomalies  of  a  like 
character  ?  the  reply  is  ready  at  once,  Because  thought 
is  not  language.  The  latter  is  made  up  of  conventional 
signs,  which  may  very  well  have  had  an  illogical  origin ; 


THE    CHARGE    OF  DISCORD. 


133 


whereas  thought  is  no  conventional  sign,  but  the  most 
natural  of  all  natural  signs.  Thought,  if  anomalous,  is 
simply  undone. 

(3)  What  is  called  "  unconscious  thought,"  by  the 
aid  of  which  many  of  the  mind's  gathered  materials  are 
supposed  to  be  automatically  arranged,  will  be  con- 
sidered in  the  chapter  on  consciousness.  It  may  very 
well  be  that  certain  cerebral  changes  go  on  unconsciously, 
which  yet  are  most  useful  or  needful  for  the  clearing  up 
and  arranging  of  thoughts ;  but  whatever  these  processes, 
the  final  outcome  will  have  to  be  judged  on  conscious 
principles  before  it  can  reasonably  be  pronounced  true 
or  false. 

(4)  In  reference  to  what  has  been  said  about  the 
reasonable  defensibility  of  all  vital  truths,  we  may 
profitably  quote  a  decree  of  the  Congregation  of  the 
Index,  of  June  11,  1855  :  "  Reason  can  establish  with 
certainty  the  existence  of  God,  the  spiritual  nature  of 
the  soul,  and  the  freedom  of  man's  will."  3 

3  "  Ratio  Dei  existentiam,  animae  spiritualitatem,  hominis  liber- 
tatem,  cum  certitudine  probare  potest." 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

UNIVERSAL    SCEPTICISM. 

Synopsis. 

i.  Division  of  scepticism,     (a)  Dogmatic  scepticism,     (b)  Non- 
dogmatic  scepticism. 

2.  Other   sciences    may   refute    themselves,   but    not    so    the 

philosophy  of  certitude. 

3.  Scepticism  is  incapable  of  giving  the  promised   rest   from 

anxious  questionings. 

4.  A  word  on  Hume,  the  father  of  English  scepticism. 
Addenda. 

The  next  subject  may  be  introduced  by  a  character 
described  in  the  Essays  of  Elia  :  "  He  hath  been 
heard  to  deny  that  there  exists  such  a  faculty  at  all 
in  man  as  reason,  and  wondereth  how  men  first 
came  to  have  the  conceit  of  it — enforcing  his  nega- 
tion with  all  the  might  of  reasoning  he  is  master  of. 
He  has  some  speculative  notions  against  laughter, 
and  will  maintain  that  laughter  is  not  natural  to 
him — when  peradventure  the  next  moment  his  lungs 
will  crow  like  chanticleer.  It  was  he  who  said, 
upon  seeing  the  Eton  boys  at  play  in  their  grounds, 
What  a  pity  to  think  that  these  fine,  ingenuous  lads, 
in  a  few  years,  will  all  be  changed  into  frivolous 
Members  of  Parliament !  " 

The   character    of  the    sceptic  has  always  been 
one  of  which  jokers  have  made  capital,  and  Lamb 


UNIVERSAL   SCEPTICISM.  135 

has  taken  his  turn  in  the  mockery.  Against  the 
possible  existence  of  a  complete  sceptic,  as  a  fact  of 
real  life,  those  who  themselves  have  been  supposed 
to  be  far  gone  in  the  same  malady,  have  clearly 
pronounced.  Hume1  says  that  such  a  being  is 
imaginary,  for  speculative  doubts  give  way  utterly 
before  the  pressure  of  practical  life.  Rather  than 
have  sceptics  argued  with,  he  would  have  them  left 
alone,  lest  opposition  should  feed  that  perversity, 
which,  abandoned  to  itself,  would  perish  of  its  own 
weakness. 

1.  Nevertheless  we  must  do  a  little  in  the  way  of 
argument, if  not  with  sceptics,then  against  scepticism ; 
and  we  may  take,  as  a  division  of  the  matter,  what 
is  given  by  Sextus  Empiricus.  His  account  may  not 
be  historically  accurate,  but  at  least  it  furnishes  two 
convenient  headings  under  which  to  confute  scepti- 
cism. "  Many  persons,"  writes  Sextus,2  "  confound 
the  philosophy  of  the  Academy  with  that  of  the 
Sceptics.  But  although  the  disciples  of  the  New 
Academy  declare  that  all  things  are  incomprehen- 
sible, yet  they  are  distinguished  from  the  Pyrrhonists 
in  this  very  dogmatism.  The  Academicians  affirm 
that  all  things  are  incomprehensible — the  Sceptics 
do  not  affirm  even  that.  Moreover  the  Sceptics 
consider  all  perceptions  perfectly  equal  as  to  the 
faithfulness  of  their  testimony :  the  Academicians 
distinguish  between  probable  and  improbable  per- 
ception."    Here  we  have  the  suggestion  of  the  par- 

1  Inquiry,  Part  II.  sec.  xii.  in  fine,  et  alibi  passim. 

2  Ueberweg's  History  of  Philosophy,  Vol.   I.   Second   Period  of 
Greek  Philosophy,  §  60,  p.  213.  (English  Translation.) 


136  Mature  of  certitude. 

tition  of  sceptics  into  dogmatic  and  non-dogmatic  ; 
those  who  make  a  dogma  of  their  very  doubt,  saying 
that  the  one  certainty  is  the  uncertainty  of  all 
human  opinions,  and  those  who  abstain  from  claiming 
even  this  one  certitude.  It  should  be  observed, 
however,  that  unless  a  sceptic  were  extra  strange 
among  a  class  of  strange  beings,  he  would  hardly 
pretend  to  doubt  the  facts  of  his  own  consciousness 
—that  he  had  those  feelings  which  he  experienced. 
What  he  would  question  would  be  the  objective 
reality  of  his  thoughts,  not  his  subjective  states  as 
such. 

(a)  The  fatal  act  of  the  dogmatic  sceptics  is 
their  profession  to  have  strictly  proved  their  con- 
clusion, and  to  hold  it  positively  as  a  valid  inference. 
Being,  as  John  of  Salisbury  describes  them,  "  Men 
whose  whole  endeavour  is  to  prove  that  they  know 
nothing,"3  they  elaborately  argue  out  their  case,  and 
make  quite  a  system  of  their  views. 

Now  their  conclusion  is  either  proved  or  not.  If 
it  is  not  proved,  then  they  have  failed  in  their  main 
object  :  if  it  is  proved,  then  the  many  facts  and 
principles,  which  went  to  build  up  the  proof,  are 
thereby  declared  invalid  ;  for  they  imply  a  large 
mass  of  human  certitudes.  In  the  premisses  the 
sceptics  appeal  to  observed  facts,  within  and  without 
their  own  persons  :  these  facts  they  discuss  in  con- 
nexion with  the  principles  of  reason,  and  draw 
inferences.  Do  they  accept  the  observations  and 
the  principles  as  valid  ?  If  so,  theirs  cannot  be  the 
final  conclusion  to  gather  from  them,  for  this  con- 
3  "  Quorum  labor  in  eo  versatur,  ne  quid  sciant." 


UNIVERSAL   SCEPTICISM.  137 


elusion,  when  drawn,  at  once  turns  round  on  the 
premisses  and  says,  "  Out  upon  you,  you  vile  in- 
capables,  you  are  yourselves  suspects,  and  can  lead 
only  to  suspicious  conclusions."  The  premisses 
retort,  "  That  reproach  does  not  come  well  from 
you."  To  affirm  positively  the  invalidity  of  all 
reasoning,  supposes  a  mind  capable  of  a  number  of 
valid  decisions  :  the  one  dogma  of  scepticism  can 
never  stand  alone. 

The  mistake  of  the  dogmatic  sceptics  seems  to  be 
some  lurking  notion,  that  argument  ending  in  denial 
need  not  imply  fixed  principles,  but  may  be  like 
simple  nescience.  Possibly  they  look  to  some  false 
analogy,  like  that  of  a  drunken  man,  with  just  sense 
enough  left  to  see  that  he  cannot  transact  business, 
and  had  better  seek  retirement ;  or,  again,  like  that 
of  an  insane  man,  who  sufficiently  perceives  his  own 
state,  to  beg  that  he  may  be  taken  to  an  asylum; 
or,  lastly,  like  that  of  a  constitutionally  feeble  in- 
telligence aware  of  its  own  imbecillity.  In  the 
inebriate,  in  the  insane,  in  the  imbecile,  there  may 
be  intermittent  gleams  of  right  reason,  and  the 
examples  form  no  true  parallel  to  the  case,  in  sup- 
port of  which  they  are  supposed  to  be  adduced. 
A  light  shining  faintly  and  fitfully  through  a  cloud, 
does  not  illustrate  the  paradox  of  a  light  showing 
itself  to  be  absolute  darkness. 

The  position  of  the  dogmatic  sceptics,  when 
they  have  done  and  said  all,  remains  worse  than 
that  of  the  dumb  man  who  tries  to  speak  out  and 
declare  his  own  condition  :  or  that  of  those  who 
had  to  solve  the  old  puzzle,  how  to  believe,  on  a 


138  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

man's  own  testimony,  that  he  is  an  unmitigated  liar. 
Concerning  this  latter  knotty  point,  we  are  told  that 
Chrysippus  wrote  six  volumes,  and  that  Philetas  so 
overtaxed  his  energies  as  to  die  of  consumption 
and  deserve  the  epitaph  : 

Stranger,  Philetas  am  I ;  that  fallacy  called  "  The  Deceiver," 
Killed  me,  and  here  I  sleep,  wearied  of  lying  awake.4 

The  problem  of  dogmatic  scepticism  is  calculated  to 
prove  equally  killing. 

The  dogmatic  sceptic  need  not  maintain  his 
power  to  determine  grades  of  probability  ;  but  since 
the  New  Academicians  are  said  to  have  added  this 
burden  to  their  charge,  and  since  the  matter,  when 
investigated,  throws  more  light  upon  the  position  of 
scepticism,  we  shall  do  well  to  put  in  a  word  about 
the  sceptic's  probabilities.  When  a  probability  is 
declared  by  moralists  to  justify  a  certain  course  of 
conduct,  they  still  admit  that  an  action,  only  prob- 
ably permissible,  would  be  illicit  :  for  a  man  is  not 
allowed  to  act  at  a  venture.  But  falling  back  upon 
a  principle  which  they  regard  not  as  merely  prob- 
able, but  as  certain,  namely,  that  under  some  circum- 
stances, where  the  obligation  is  not  clear,  it  is  no 
obligation  at  all,  they  succeed  in  establishing  the 
maxim,  Qui  probabiliter  agit,  tuto  agit.  The  safety  is 
not  simply  in  the  probability,  but  in  the  certainty  as 
to  how  they  may  act,  where  what  stands  in  the  way 
of  action    is    only   a  probability   against    its    being 

*  EeiVe,  <f>i.\?jTas  eT/.Lr  \6ycov  6  \pev86/.iei>6s  /x« 

'  il\€(T€,   Kul    UVKTUV  {pffOVTldeS   fffTTfplOl. 


UNIVERSAL   SCEPTICISM.  139 

allowed.5  What  is  thus  illustrated  in  morals  has  an 
analogous  illustration  in  intellectual  matters.  Here 
also  a  probability  requires  the  aid  of  some  certainty. 
To  calculate  probabilities  and  assign  their  several 
grades,  needs  a  mind  which  knows,  by  its  experi- 
ence, how  to  discriminate  the  state  of  doubt  from 
the  state  of  certainty,  and  which  has  many  cer- 
tainties whereby  to  fix  the  probabilities.  It  is  simply 
ridiculous  for  dogmatic  sceptics  to  claim  that  skill 
which  the  Academicians  claimed,  in  the  nice  adjust- 
ment of  a  scale  of  probabilities.6 

(b)  The  non-dogmatic  sceptics  have  the  greatest 
difficulty  in  describing  themselves,  for  they  are  not 
allowed  definitively  to  declare  anything,  not  even  their 
universal  scepticism.  One  Greek  philosopher  tried 
to  evade  the  difficulty  by  pointing  out  his  meaning 
with  his  finger ;  but  there  is  a  limit  to  communi- 
cation by  this  means,  nor  does  the  device  exactly 
fulfil  its  purpose.  The  boasted  "dumbness"  or 
"suspension  of  judgment"7  cannot  be  maintained. 
Indeed,  the  non-dogmatic  sceptics  make  long  dis- 
courses and  write  big  books,  in  spite  of  the  obvious 
objection,  that  in  their  case  there  is  special  force 
in  the  malicious  wish,   "  O    that    mine  enemy  had 

s  Mill  is  a  probabilist  in  his  Subjection  of  Women,  p.  3.  "  The 
a  priori  presumption  is  in  favour  of  freedom.  Those  who  deny  in 
women  any  privilege  rightly  allowed  to  men,  must  be  held  to  the 
strictest  proof  of  their  case,  so  as  to  exclude  all  doubt." 

6  Hume  teaches  "that  all  our  knowledge  resolves  itself  into 
probability  :  "  and  that  he  "had  almost  said  this  was  certain,"  but 
refrains  on  reflexion  "that  it  must  reduce  itself,  as  well  as  every 
other  reasoning,  and  from  knowledge  degenerate  into  probability." 
(Treatise,  Bk.  I.  Part  IV.  sec.  1.) 

7  a<paala  or   iirox'h' 


i4o  NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE. 

written  a  book."  To  their  books  they  try  to  sign 
the  name  of  their  school  of  thought.  Now  without 
any  insult  to  them,  let  us,  merely  as  an  illustration, 
compare  their  procedure  with  the  case  of  the  animal 
that  is  really  an  ass  ;  how  is  the  poor  brute  to  write 
itself  down  accordingly?  A  bray  is  about  the  best  sign 
it  can  give  as  "its  mark."  Similarly,  a  non-dogmatic 
sceptic,  who  for  reasons  set  down  in  his  book,  takes 
up  his  position,  is  forbidden,  by  the  very  terms  of 
his  profession,  to  say  positively  what  his  intellectual 
stand-point  is.  To  say  "  I  am  a  non-dogmatic 
sceptic,"  would  be  as  clear  a  piece  of  dogmatism 
as  to  say,  "  I  am  a  dogmatic  sceptic ; "  for  it 
would  imply  that  dogmatic  scepticism  was  wrong, 
and  that  the  right  attitude  was  to  be  without  any 
affirmation  whatever.  Yet  so  to  teach  is  itself  an 
affirmation,  resting  on  many  others. 

Briefly,  the  non-dogmatic  sceptic  either  keeps  to 
his  profession  of  inability  to  speak  (acpacria)  and 
affirms  nothing,  in  which  case  there  is  nothing  to 
refute,  but  at  most  we  can  complain  of  faculties 
unused  ;  or  else,  breaking  loose  from  his  engage- 
ments, he  makes  an  affirmation,  and  so  refutes 
himself.  This  suffices  to  end  the  general  attack  on 
the  position  of  universal  scepticism  :  attacks  in 
detail  must  follow  afterwards,  as  occasions  succes- 
sively offer  themselves. 

2.  The  peculiar  position  of  the  Philosophy  of 
Certitude  is  not  appreciated  by  the  sceptic.  Another 
science  might  be  held  to  furnish  its  own  refutation 
by  presenting  manifest  contradictions ;  but  there 
cannot,  in  the  same  way,  be  a  sceptical  refutation  of 


UNIVERSAL   SCEPTICISM.  141 

the  Philosophy  of  Certitude  by  that  philosophy  itself, 
for  there  would  no  longer  be  an  umpire  left  to  give 
the  award  of  victory  or  defeat.  If  in  a  theory  of 
light  the  application  to  phenomena  of  reflexion  and 
refraction  belies  the  application  to  phenomena  of 
diffraction,  then  a  mind  is  still  by  to  judge  of  the 
contradiction,  and  of  its  fatal  consequences  to  the 
theory  :  but  if  the  very  mind  itself  is  to  be  proved 
essentially  contradictory,  how  is  it  to  establish  the 
result?  Mill8  seems  to  share  with  the  sceptics  their 
want  of  appreciation  for  the  position,  when  he 
writes  :  "  If  the  reality  of  thought  can  be  subverted, 
is  there  any  particular  enormity  in  doing  it  by  the 
means  of  thought  itself?  In  what  other  way  can 
we  imagine  it  to  be  done  ?  "  Surely  this  argument 
is  fallacious  :  because  there  is  repugnancy  in  sup- 
posing anything  but  thought  to  work  a  certain  effect, 
therefore  there  can  be  no  repugnancy  in  supposing 
thought  to  work  it.  Mill,  however,  continues  un- 
embarrassed :  "  If  it  be  true  that  thought  is  an  invalid 
process,  what  better  proof  can  be  given,  than  that  we 
could  in  thinking  arrive  at  the  conclusion,  that  our 
thoughts  are  not  to.  be  trusted  ?  The  scepticism 
would  be  complete  even  as  to  the  validity  of  its  own 
want  of  belief."  As  men,  after,  execution,  cannot 
sign  a  document  testifying  that  sentence  has  been 
carried  out,  neither  can  reason  sign  a  valid  testifica- 
tion to  her  own  proof  of  her  own  universal  inval- 
idity. A  man  may  with  one  eye  see  that  the  other 
is  hopelessly  injured,  whether  he  use  a  mirror  for 

8  Examination  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  Philosophy,  c.  ix.  pp.  132,  seq. 
(2nd  Ed.) 


i42  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

the  purpose,  or  employ  the  faculty  which  a  cele- 
brated Greek  philosopher  is  said  to  have  possessed, 
of  making  the  eyes  converge  till  they  looked  into 
one  another ;  but  a  single  blind  eye  will  never  liter- 
ally see  its  own  destruction.  Mill,  though  sometimes 
patronizing  the  man  who  never  believed  in  dreams 
because  he  dreamt  that  he  must  not,  yet  in  a  better 
frame  of  mind  himself  confesses,  that  "  denying  all 
knowledge  is  denying  none." 

Hamilton  is  another  who  has  let  himself  be 
caught  in  the  same  trap,  when  he  puts  a  hypothesis 
which  he  ought  to  have  seen  to  be  contradictory  : 
"  The  mendacity  of  consciousness  is  proved  if  its 
data,  immediately  in  themselves  or  mediately  in 
their  consequences,  be  shown  to  stand  in  mutual 
contradiction."  Glad  to  agree  with  one  from  whom 
we  often  differ,  we  may  let  Mr.  Spencer9  answer 
here  :  "  It  is  useless  to  say  that  consciousness  is  to 
be  presumed  trustworthy  until  proved  mendacious. 
It  cannot  be  proved  mendacious  in  this  primordial 
act.  Nay,  more,  the  very  thing  supposed  to  be 
proved  cannot  be  expressed  without  recognizing 
the  primordial  act  as  valid  ;  since,  unless  we  accept 
the  verdict  of  consciousness  that  they  differ,  men- 
dacity and  trustworthiness  become  identical,"  or  at 
least  not  distinguishable.  "  Process  and  product  of 
reasoning  both  disappear  in  the  absence  of  this 
assumption." 

3.  Scepticism,  being  so  clearly  a  sin  against  the 
right  use  of  intelligence,  could  not  lawfully  be  paid 
as  the  price  of  rest  from  all  anxious  questionings, 

*  First  Principles,  Part  II.  c.  ii.  ^  41. 


UNIVERSAL   SCEPTICISM.  143 

even  if  the  bargain  were  possible.  But  it  is  not 
possible.  For  the  complete  sceptic  is,  as  Mill10  says, 
"  an  imaginary  being,"  never  to  be  actualized:  while 
such  scepticism  as  man  can  actualize,  certainly  does 
not  bring  the  promised  quietude,  or  "  absence  of 
disturbance"  (arapatjla).  The  case  is  as  with  drink. 
If  drink  could  perfectly  drown  care,  still  we  ought 
not  to  turn  drunkards:  besides,  drink  does  not 
effectually  drown  care,  for  it  brings  in  its  train  alter- 
nations of  great  suffering.  Our  true  peace  is  to  be 
sought  in  a  right  use  of  that  reason,  in  which  is  the 
great  root  of  our  responsibility,  and  the  alternative 
source  of  our  highest  happiness  or  misery.  And 
when  we  remember  that  our  reason  is  not  our  own 
independent  property,  but  a  gift — an  entrusted  talent 
— we  shall  be  far  indeed  from  calling  her  calumni- 
ously,  with  Bayle,  "  the  old  destroyer,"  "  the  cloud- 
gatherer,"  and  far  from  adopting  the  pernicious 
sentiment  of  the  verses  : 

Thinking  is  but  an  idle  waste  of  thought, 

And  nought  is  everything,  and  everything  is  nought 

Rather  we  shall  recoil  from  intellectual  nihilism  as 
a  Russian  Czar  abhors  social  nihilism  :  for  the  loss 
of  all  belief  in  intellect  tends  to  paralyze  action, 
and  to  take  the  energy  out  of  life  by  robbing  it  of 
its  hope. 

4.  Unfortunately,  though  not  going  under  the 
name  of  sceptics,  but  rather  of  agnostics,  there  is 
a  large  party  of  our  philosophers  in  this  country, 
who  are  pledged  to  the  fundamental  principles  of 

10  Examination,  c.  ix.  in  initio. 


i44  NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE. 

scepticism  in  accepting  substantially  the  doctrine  of 
Hume.  The  irresoluteness  of  their  chief  might 
warn  them  to  distrust  him.  While  his  principles 
are  sceptical,  he  claims,  in  spite  of  them,  to  retain 
his  belief:  he  finds  comfort  in  setting  up  practice 
against  theory,  and  declares,  "  as  an  agent  I  am  not 
a  sceptic :  "  he  adds  that  there  is  no  real  sceptic. 
Ferrier  goes  so  far  as  to  suppose  that  Hume  was 
not  serious  in  his  work,  but  was  aiming  at  the 
reductio  ad  absurdum  of  the  philosophic  principles 
prevalent  in  the  England  of  his  day.  Dr.  Symon, 
taking  up  a  like  view,  says  that  Hume  was  "  merely 
and  undisguisedly  sarcastic,  and  in  jest,  never  in 
earnest,  when  he  wrote  on  metaphysics."  Even  one 
who  has  no  little  sympathy  with  Hume,  Mr.  Bain,11 
declares,  "  As  he  was  a  man  fond  of  literary  effects, 
as  well  as  of  speculation,  we  do  not  always  know 
when  he  is  in  earnest."  The  fair  estimate  of  Hume 
seems  to  be,  that  he  is  not  quite  as  bad  as  he 
appears  :  that  many  of  his  efforts  were  tentative  : 
that  he  began  to  destroy,  and  then,  alarmed  at  his 
own  vandalism,  set  himself  to  build  up  again  :  that 
his  avowed  principles  were  sceptical,  but  that  he 
dared  not,  and  could  not,  push  them  to  their 
extreme  conclusions.  Hamilton  tries,  but  not 
apparently  with  full  success,  to  save  Hume's  con- 
sistency by  the  plea  that  to  arrive  at  an  inconsist- 
ency was  the  very  object  of  his  aim,  it  being  "  the 
triumph  of  scepticism  to  show  that  speculation  and 
practice  are    irreconcilable."12     In  agreement  with 

11  Menial  Science,  Bk.  II.  c.  vii. 
w  Hamilton's  Reid,  p.  437.     Cf.  pp.  129,  144,  489. 


UNIVERSAL  SCEPTICISM.  145 

this  view  stands  Hume's  oft-quoted  account  of 
Berkeley's  sceptical  arguments,  that  they  "  admit  of 
no  answer,  and  produce  no  conviction."13  Finally, 
Hume's  recent  editor,  Professor  Green,  decides  that 
"  when  we  get  behind  the  mask  of  concession  to 
popular  prejudice,  partly  ironical,  partly  due  to  his 
undoubted  vanity,  we  find  much  more  of  the  ancient 
sceptic  than  of  the  positive  philosopher."14  At  any 
rate  this  is  certain,  that  Hume  should  have  no  influ- 
ence with  a  well  balanced  mind,  which  reverences 
itself  as  the  greatest  natural  power  upon  earth,  and 
as  the  only  means  of  entering  into  moral  communi- 
cation with  the  highest  Power  of  all.  Mind  is  our 
mightiest  possession  :  vovs  irdvra  Kparet. 

Addenda. 

A  posthumous  work,  sent  out  in  the  name  of  the 
famous  French  Bishop,  Huet,  is  a  combination  of  the 
tenets  of  non-dogmatic  scepticism  with  the  assertion 
of  the  dogmatically  sceptical  academics,  that  there  are 
degrees  of  probability  in  our  opinions  about  things. 
There  were  not  wanting  in  France,  about  his  time, 
abundant  seeds  of  scepticism,  diffused  by  Montaigne, 
Charron,  Francis  Sanchez,  Bayle,  Pascal,  and  others. 
Furthermore  Huet  might  feel  that  he  was  not  the  first 
prelate  to  put  forth  the  style  of  doctrine  which  he  was 
maintaining  ;  for  about  two  centuries  before,  Cardinal 
Nicholas  of  Cusa,  had  written  his  works,  De  Docta 
Ignorantia,  and  De  Conjecturis,  to  show  the  impotence  of 
human  reason,  and  to  affirm  the  need  of  some  sort  of 

13  Inquiry,  Part  I.  sec.  xii. 

14  Introduction,  §  202.     See  Hume's  account  of  his  own  feelings, 
Treatise,  Bk.  I.  Part  IV.  sec.  vii. 


146  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

intuition  of  God.  Huet's  Feebleness  of  the  Human  Mind 
appeals  to  isolated  passages  of  Scripture,  and  of  the 
Fathers,  which  seem,  in  their  naked  form,  to  give  some 
countenance  to  the  view,  that  man's  intellect  is  in- 
competent, and  that  knowledge  must  be  given  from  on 
high.  But  these  utterances,  separated  from  their 
original  accompaniments,  ought  to  have  been  taken  in 
their  context,  and  with  the  light  shed  upon  them  from 
other  passages,  expressly  declaring  the  prerogatives  of 
human  reason.  As  to  Scripture,  it  is  its  style  not  to  put 
in  qualifying  clauses,  but  to  take  one  side  of  truth  and 
speak  for  the  time  as  though  this  were  the  only  side. 
Now  faith  alone,  now  works  alone,  are  spoken  of  as 
efficacious  :  the  full  truth  being,  when  its  elements  are 
fused  together,  that  works  done  in  faith  are  requisite. 
The  Fathers  likewise  do  not  think  it  always  needful 
cautiously  to  balance  one  truth  by  its  counterpart. 

Huet  thus  endeavours  to  state  his  position  of  non- 
dogmatic  scepticism  :  "  In  saying  that  nought  is  either 
true  or  false,  I  enunciate  a  proposition  which  refutes 
itself,  as  it  is  not  excepted  from  the  general  law,  which 
says  that  nothing  is  either  true  or  false."1  About  scep- 
tical arguments  in  proof  of  the  position,  he  says :  "  They 
subvert  other  propositions,  while  subverting  themselves, 
it  is  for  this  sole  purpose  they  are  enunciated,  and  not 
with  a  view  to  proving  them."2  Other  authors  make 
the  same  statement  in  another  shape,  saying  that  scep- 
ticism is  like  a  drug  which  purges  out  everything,  itself 
included. 

1  "  Lorsque  je  dis  qu'il  n'y  a  rien  de  vrai  ni  de  faux,  cettc 
proposition  s'enferme  ellc  meme,  et  elle  n'est  pas  exceptee  de  la  loi 
generate  qui  prononce  qu'il  n'y  a  rien  de  vrai  ni  de  faux."  (De  La 
Faiblesse  de  L'Esprit  Humain,  Liv.  III.  ch.  xiii.) 

2  "  Elles  detruisent  les  autres  propositions,  en  se  detruisant 
elles-memes  ;  car  e'est  settlement  pour  cela  qu'on  les  emploie  et 
non  pour  les  etablir."  [lb.) 


UNIVERSAL  SCEPTICISM.  147 

Huet  places  what  he  conceives  to  be  the  superiority 
of  his  stand-point  over  that  of  ordinary  mortals  in  this  : 
"  They  know  nothing,  and  we  are  aware  of  the  fact, 
though  we  feel  uncertain  about  our  nescience.  Further, 
while  they  do  not  question  our  probability,  we  do  deny 
to  them  the  possession  of  the  truth  which  they  seek 
after."3  The  case  is  not  so  at  all:  for  Huet  cannot 
more  vigorously  deny  to  us  our  certitudes,  than  we 
deny  to  him  his  probabilities,  if  the  probabilities  are  to 
be  calculated  on  his  principles. 

3  "  lis  ne  savent  rien  et  nous  le  savons,  quoique  incertainement 
et  en  doutant.  De  plus,  il  ne  nous  contestent  pas  la  vraisemblance 
que  nous  suivons,  et  nous  leur  refusons  la  verite  qu'Us  recherchent." 


CHAPTER   IX. 

CARTESIAN    DOUBT. 

5)  nopsis. 

i.  The  methodic  doubt  of  Descartes  as  distinguished   from 
mere  scepticism. 

2.  The  plausible  part  of  Descartes. 

3.  Passages  in  his  works  whence  to  gather  the  substance  of  his 

method. 

4.  The  destructive  part  of  his  work. 

5.  It  falls  into  the  principles  of  universal  scepticism,  and  makes 

the  future  work  of  construction  logically  impossible. 

6.  The  constructive  part  itself. 

7.  General  estimate  of  Descartes. 
Addenda. 

i.  The  doubters  with  whom  we  have  just  been 
dealing  make  doubt  their  final  goal,  they  doubt  and 
rest  there  :  but  we  have  now  to  deal  with  a  universal 
doubt  which  is  supposed  to  be  a  means  of  helping 
on  the  mind  towards  well-assured  knowledge.  Hence 
it  is  called  methodic  doubt,  as  being  only  a  way, 
or  rather  part  of  a  way,  to  an  end,  not  an  end  in 
itself.  Descartes  who,  it  should  be  remembered, 
gives  wrarning  that  his  system  is  dangerous  for  all 
but  the  few,  is  the  deviser  of  this  method  of  doubt, 
which  has  won  for  him  more  credit  with  some 
people  than  close  investigation  of  its  merits  will 
bear  out.     The  fact  is,  Descartes  says  many  things 


CARTESIAN   DOUBT.  149 

that  are  either  quite  true,  or  contain  an  obvious 
element  of  truth;  and,  in  his  replies  to  objections,  he 
may  seem  to  get  over  certain  difficulties  which,  if 
reference  were  made  back  to  his  system,  would  be 
found  to  be  insuperable.  But  of  course  few  readers 
go  to  the  trouble  of  making  such  reference,  and  so 
the  author  is  the  gainer.  Even  a  well-informed 
writer  like  Hamilton,1  speaks  of  the  error  of  Descartes 
as  accidental  rather  than  substantial ;  whereas  his 
error  is  substantial  and  the  admixture  of  truth 
accidental.  There  are  other  critics  who,  to  less 
attentive  readers,  may  appear  to  approve,  in  the 
main,  of  Descartes,  yet  who,  if  read  more  carefully, 
will  be  found  to  disagree  with  him  fundamentally. 
Instances  are  Balmez,  Sanseverino,  and  Tongiorgi. 
However,  our  business  is  much  more  to  refute  the 
popular  version  of  Cartesianism,  than  to  score  a 
victory  over  one  long  since  dead  and  beyond  the 
reach  of  our  weapons ;  so  that  to  us  it  is  a  matter 
of  small  consequence,  whether  a  wide  collation  of 
passages  might  not  do  something  to  mitigate  the 
crudeness  of  the  system,  when  taken  in  outline. 

2.  What  the  snatch-and-away  class  of  readers 
would  seize  upon  in  Descartes  is  just  what  is  most 
plausible  and  insidious.  The  surface  of  his  doctrine 
looks  fair,  and  the  prominent  parts  are  easily  grasped. 
He  finds  that  his  mind  is  like  a  basket  containing 
apples,  good  and  bad  :  and  he  proposes  to  empty 
the  whole  out,  and  put  back  only  the  good.  Cer- 
tainly a  very  natural  thing  to  do,  if  the  mind  is  a 
basket  of  apples.     But  so  patently  is  the  mind  not 

1  Logic,  Vol.  IV.  Lecture  xxix.  p.  91. 


150  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

a  basket  of  apples,  that  a  directly  opposite  course  of 
action  has  suggested  itself  to  others.  Thus  Cardinal 
Newman  has  declarations  to  the  effect  that,  if  he 
were  driven  to  choose  between  the  two  extreme 
alternatives,  he  would  rather  begin  by  holding  all 
present  beliefs,  and  gradually  letting  go  the  untenable, 
than  start  with  the  clean  sweep  made  by  universal 
doubt.  And  this  process  Wundt  actually  recom- 
mends, so  far  as  he  teaches,  that  instead  of  begin- 
ning from  the  idealist  point  of  view,  men  should 
first  hold  their  ideas  to  be  real :  then  they  should 
eliminate  what  can  be  shown  to  be  merely  sub- 
jective, and  keep  the  residue  as  objective.  Thus 
the  analogy  of  the  basket  is  catching  indeed  to  an 
average  reader ;  but  catching  in  the  way  of  that 
now  forbidden  article,  the  man-trap. 

3.  In  three  different  places  of  his  works,  Des- 
cartes describes  the  successive  steps  of  his  system  ; 
yet  to  inquire  what  precisely  this  system  is,  seems 
hardly  to  enter  seriously  into  the  minds  of  ordinary 
retailers  of  philosophic  opinions.  Perhaps  they  are 
secretly  led  by  the  principle  which  we  have  seen 
Mr.  Pollock  avow,  namely,  that  "  systems "  are 
nothing,  but  a  few  "  vital  ideas  "  everything.  With 
regard  to  Descartes,  any  one  who  will  carefully 
compare  his  threefold  account  of  his  system,  will  be 
quite  convinced  that  the  author  had  not  steadily 
made  up  his  mind  how  the  several  steps  in  the 
progress  were  to  succeed  each  other.  The  Discourse 
on  Method,  Part  IV.,  the  Meditations,  especially  the 
first,  and  the  Principia  (Part  I.  in  initio),  would  not 
quietly  fuse  together  into  a  Summa,  though  they  are 


CARTESIAN  DOUBT.  151 

meant  to  be  three  descriptions  of  one  leading 
process.  However,  in  the  destructive  part  of  this 
process,  Descartes  is  pretty  uniform  :  and  it  is  this 
part  chiefly  which  we  must  assail,  destroying  the 
destroyer. 

4.  The  philosopher  soliloquises  somewhat  in  this 
strain  :  I,  being  now  in  the  maturity  of  my  faculties, 
find  that  the  formation  of  my  opinions  has  hitherto 
been  not  at  all  critically  conducted  ;  and  whereas  it 
would  be  endless  to  test  each  of  my  beliefs  separately, 
merefore  I  must  aim  at  some  comprehensive  method. 
Recurring  to  my  reasons  for  dissatisfaction,  I  find 
that  my  senses  have  often  deceived  me,  and  there- 
fore as  means  of  knowledge  they  are  to  be  sus- 
pected :  which  suspicion  is  immediately  extended  to 
the  rest  of  my  knowledge,  so  far  as  it  has  its 
beginning  in  the  senses.  But  my  intellect  itself  is 
open  to  direct  assault :  it  too  has  been  deceived  in 
matters  when  I  felt  quite  sure,  and  I  can  doubt  even 
about  mathematical  truths,  which  are  considered  as 
types  of  clearness.  Next  as  to  grounds  of  misgiving 
which  are  extrinsic  to  my  own  faculties,  sensitive  and 
intellectual ;  whence  have  I  these  faculties  ?  I  am 
told  that  I  have  them  from  an  Omnipotent  Creator: 
and  if  He  is  Omnipotent,  He  can  do  all  things,  and 
consequently  He  can  make  me  essentially  a  creature 
of  delusions.  Or  suppose  I  am  the  work  of  a  maker 
less  than  omnipotent ;  then  all  the  more  likely  is  the 
less  powerful  maker  to  have  made  me  ill.  But  per- 
haps this  is  irreverent :  so  let  us  suppose  it  is  some 
svil  spirit  that  is  perpetually  turning  me  to  mockery. 
Thus  on  all  sides  I  find  my  very  faculties  untrust- 


152  NATURE  OF  CERTITUDE. 

worthy,  and  trying  to  doubt,  I  can  doubt  the  existence 
of  my  body  and  its  senses,  of  earth  and  heaven : 
"  and  finally  I  am  driven  to  admit  that  there  is 
nothing  of  what  I  previously  believed  which  I  cannot 
in  some  way  doubt :  and  this  not  lightly  and  incon- 
siderately, but  because  of  very  strong  and  well- 
weighed  reasons." 

It  is  not  extravagant  to  hope  the  reader  will 
allow,  that  the  way  to  criticise  the  above  "  method  " 
is  not  simply  to  look  out  for  some  stray  "  vital 
ideas "  which  it  may  contain,  but  to  look  to  the 
whole  method  of  which  a  part  has  just  been  sketched, 
and  ask,  can  the  proposed  whole  admit  of  that 
part.  Descartes  is  not  arguing  in  behalf  of  per- 
manent doubt :  else  he  would  be  one  of  the  dogmatic 
sceptics  refuted  in  the  last  chapter :  he  is  arguing 
for  doubt  as  a  preliminary  to  certitude,  and  this 
fact  is  vital  to  his  system,  whatever  may  be  the 
"  vitality  of  ideas  "  out  of  systematic  connexion  with 
each  other.  Now  as  a  system  Descartes'  method 
fails,  if  his  principles  of  destruction  are  inconsistent 
with  any  subsequently  applied  principles  of  recon- 
struction. He  first  doubts  in  order  afterwards  to 
be  certain  :  he  does  not  indeed  try  to  draw  certitude 
out  of  doubt  itself;  but  he  does  try  to  start  from 
a  state  of  doubt  on  the  way  to  certitude.  Hume3 
and  Reid  agree  that  he  has  so  buried  himself 
beneath  the  ruins  of  the  edifice  he  has  pulled  down, 
that  rebuilding  is  beyond  the  power  of  the  utterly 
crushed  enterpriser. 

5.  If  it  were  necessary,  for  purposes  of  refuting 

•  Inquiry,  Part  I.  sec.  xii.  in  initio 


CARTESIAN  DOUBT.  153 

his  "  method,"  to  follow  Descartes  into  all  the 
details  of  his  arguments,  we  should  require  at  once 
to  enter  upon  such  special  subjects  as  the  trust- 
worthiness of  the  senses,  the  nature  of  mathematical 
truths,  the  nature  of  necessary  truth,  the  regulation 
of  Divine  omnipotence  by  Divine  wisdom  and  good- 
ness, the  permission  of  evil,  the  powers  of  wicked 
spirits  in  face  of  a  Provident  Ruler,  and  other  large 
questions.  But  there  is  a  shorter  way :  Descartes 
falls  into  the  inconsistencies  of  the  universal  sceptics, 
and  is  logically  forced  to  abide  with  those  in  whose 
company  he  is  unwilling  to  remain.  He  professes 
to  be  able,  "  seriously  and  for  well-weighed  reasons," 
to  doubt  the  validity  of  his  faculties,  and  truths 
which  present  themselves  to  his  mind  with  the  force 
of  evidence.  Out  of  such  doubt  there  is  no  rescue. 
A  man  so  circumstanced  has  no  right  even  to  his 
"  I  think,  therefore  I  exist"  (Cogiio,  ergo  sum) ;  and 
if  he  says  that  on  this  point  doubt  is  impossible,  he 
says  so  only  by  revoking  what  he  had  said  before ; 
for  if  his  whole  nature  may  be  radically  delusive,  it 
may  be  delusive  here.  He  says  the  doubter  cannot 
doubt  his  own  existence:  but  neither  can  the  doubter 
doubt  consistently  the  validity  of  his  own  faculties 
and  of  evident  propositions.  Some  have  so  be- 
muddled  themselves  that  they  have  felt  alarmed  as 
to  their  own  existence ;  and  a  large  system  of 
pantheism  denies  the  reality  of  the  separate  Ego. 
If  this  bemuddlement  is  a  degree  worse  than  that 
of  Descartes,  the  question  is  only  one  of  degree, 
not  of  kind.  It  is  substantially  the  same  kind  of 
evidence  which  testifies  that  I  exist,  and  that  what 


154  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 


I  know,  I  know,  or  that  my  faculties  are  veracious. 
A  man  may  and  must  start  from  ignorance,  and  by 
the  experience  of  his  intellectual  life  first  discover, 
empirically,  that  he  is  an  intelligent  being :  also  a 
man  may  gradually  test  by  experience  that  he  is 
waking  up  from  a  dream  or  from  a  delirium.  But  no 
man,  from  the  position  of  what  Descartes  styles  the 
proved  suspiciousness  of  his  very  power  of  knowing 
anything,  can  coolly  go  on  to  use  his  suspected 
faculties  as  witnesses  in  their  own  behalf,  when  they 
say  Cogito,  ergo  sum.  The  only  irrefragability  of 
Descartes,  at  this  point,  is  the  convincing  evidence 
of  his  maxim  on  other  principles  than  the  Cartesian, 
not  on  Cartesian  principles. 

There  is,  however,  one  point  stated  in  the  last 
paragraph  which  ought  not  to  be  left  without  further 
notice ;  and  it  is  that  some  defence  may  apparently 
be  made  for  Descartes,  inasmuch  as  he  places  the 
certainty  of  self  above  the  certainty  of  ordinary 
truths  which  are  immediately  evident.  A  large 
number  of  philosophers  have  remarked  that  our  own 
states  of  consciousness,  and  a  knowledge  of  some 
kind  of  self,  are  matters  beyond  all  question : 
whereas  at  least  a  question  may  be  raised  as  to 
whether  our  thoughts  in  general  stand  for  any 
objects  beyond  themselves.  The  absolute  unquestion- 
ableness  on  the  one  side,  and  the  possible  question- 
ableness  on  the  other,  seem  at  first  sight  to  rest  on 
a  well-grounded  distinction  :  but  closer  inspection 
will  not  bear  out  first  impressions.  For  if  we  push 
scepticism  concerning  truths  other  than  the  truth  of 
our  consciously  modified  self  to  their  logical  con- 


CARTESIAN  DOUBT.  i$5 

elusions,  we  shall  find  ourselves  reduced  to  the 
inability  of  making  any  certain  declaration  what- 
ever. We  shall  be  as  ill  off  as  Mill3  when  he 
admitted  the  necessity  of  deductions  from  axiomatic 
truths,  but  denied  the  necessity  of  the  axioms :  as 
though  the  evidence  for  one  were  not  as  compelling 
as  the  evidence  for  the  other,  and  as  though  reason- 
ing could  have  a  prerogative  over  immediate  intui- 
tion. If  Hume4  is  any  support,  we  have  him  as 
an  ally  in  the  present  instance ;  for  he  denies 
to  Descartes  that  there  is  "any  original  principle 
which  has  a  prerogative  over  others,"  such  as  the 
Cogito  ergo  sum  is  asserted  to  have.  Allow  Descartes' 
principles  to  the  full,  and  instead  of  your  fixed 
certainty  that  you,  the  doubter,  exist,  you  will  find 
yourself  muttering  some  verses  of  Byron,  which 
one  sees  occasionally  quoted  : 

So  little  do  we  know  what  we're  about  in 
This  world,  that  I  doubt  if  doubt  itself  be  doubting. 
O  doubt,  if  thou  be'st  doubt,  for  which  some  take  thee, 
But  which  I  doubt  extremely,  &c. 

These  expressions  are  wild  utterances,  but 
Descartes  has  no  right  to  complain  of  them,  and 
he  ought  to  have  realized  the  startling  fact. 

Let  it  be  clearly  understood  that  it  is  on  the 
ground  of  his  incompetent  method  as  such,  and  in 
its  entirety,  that  we  pronounce  Descartes  irre- 
trievably sceptical.  Some  speak  as  if  the  whole 
onslaught  on  him  was  because  he  stood  up  vigor- 
ously   for    the    fact   of    self-existence,    as   revealed 

3  Logic,  Bk.  II.  c.  vi.  §  i. 
4  Inquiry,  Part  I.  sec.  xii.  in  initio. 


156  NATURE  OF  CERTITUDE. 

in  thought  and  as  a  primary  cognition !  We  all 
stand  up  in  defence  of  that  piece  of  knowledge ; 
our  quarrel  is  with  the  previous  scepticism.  We 
would  wipe  out  from  Descartes'  system  other  things 
besides,  but  first  of  all,  that  which  most  strongly 
characterizes  it,  its  initial  stage  of  universal  doubt ; 
ignoring  which  the  "  good  easy  reader  "  of  reports  at 
second  hand,  seems  to  be  under  the  delusion,  that 
Descartes  merely  said  we  had  reasons  for  dissatis- 
faction with  our  early  way  of  laying  up  mental  stock, 
and  that  the  stock  in  naad  should,  in  mature  years, 
be  thoroughly  overhauled.  Descartes  teaches  a  great 
deal  more  than  that :  he  claims  to  have  proved,  by 
reasons,  that  mathematical  evidence  may  be  falla- 
cious, and  that  so  may  be  our  very  inmost  nature. 
Do  not  overlook  this  essential  part  of  the  system,  if 
you  would  be  anything  like  a  competent  critic  :  and 
do  not  fail  to  notice  how  such  a  beginning  is  abso- 
lutely fatal  to  further  progress. 

On  the  principles  involved  in  his  "  methodic 
doubt "  alone,  Descartes  would  find  defence  impos- 
sible ;  but  he  labours  under  the  further  disadvantage, 
that  there  are  principles,  in  other  parts  of  his 
philosophy,  which  serve  to  cripple  him  very  much, 
and  render  it  still  more  difficult  for  him  ever  to 
recover  his  certitudes.  Truth,  according  to  Des- 
cartes,5 rests  ultimately  on  the  Divine  free-will :  and 
had  God  so  chosen,  our  necessary  truths  might  have 
been  the  reverse  of  what  they  are.  This  is  a  very 
different  thing  from  saying,  that  God  could  have 
given  to  us,  or  to  other  beings  having  our  place, 

5  Meditations,  Reponses  aux  Sixiemes  Objections,  n.  8. 


CARTESIAN   DOUBT.  157 

a  palate  which  enjoyed  oil  of  vitriol,  and  a  stomach 
which  could  digest  aconite ;  in  all  which  assertions 
there  is  no  clear  contradiction.  But  to  assert  that 
God  could  have  reversed,  not  merely  physical 
arrangements,  but  also  metaphysical  principles,  is 
to  strike  at  the  root  of  all  truth  and  of  all  know- 
ledge, and  to  annihilate  the  difference  between  truth 
and  falsehood.  Truth  is  no  longer  a  sacred  thing; 
and  that  God  should  use  His  omnipotence  to  deceive 
us,  no  longer  admits  of  disproof.  In  fact  nothing 
admits  of  proof  or  disproof,  for  that  which  both 
aim  at  ceases  to  have  a  meaning. 

6.  As  to  the  constructive  part  of  the  Cartesian 
system,  we  need  only  note  its  futility.  In  some 
accounts,  next  to  his  first  great  fact,  Cogito  ergo  sum, 
he  places  a  criterion  of  truth  derived  from  the 
experience  of  this  fundamental  certitude.  This  last  is 
accepted  because  it  is  contained  in  clear  and  distinct 
ideas  :  hence  is  derived  the  criterion  :  "  That  is  true 
which  is  contained  in  clear  and  distinct  ideas."  But 
in  other  places  Descartes  pronounces  the  criterion, 
so  obtained,  to  be  invalid — an  invalidity  which  some 
might  suppose  him  to  limit  to  the.  external  world — 
until  we  have  settled,  that  the  faculty  which  has  the 
clear  and  distinct  ideas  is  from  God,  who  cannot 
create  lying  powers  of  mind.  Onward,  therefore, 
to  the  proof  of  God's  existence  Descartes  hastens : 
and  argues  in  a  circle,  that  God  exists  because  our 
clear  ideas  affirm  it,  and  our  clear  ideas  validly  make 
the  affirmation  because  God  is  their  voucher.  Few 
who  praise  Descartes  as  the  philosopher  of  "  clear 
thought,"   care   to  look  into  his  theory  of  "clear 


15*  NATURE   OP   CERTITUDE. 

ideas:"  and  from  that  theory  their  own  opinions 
are  utterly  dissentient.  Yet  it  is  a  fact  that  often  a 
doctrine  cannot  be  understood  till  its  meaning  is 
made  to  square  with  its  context,  and  it  is  ridiculous 
to  pretend  to  be  in  admiring  agreement  with  an 
author,  when  really  you  and  he  are  radically  at 
disagreement,  and  when  he  does  not  decisively 
know  his  own  mind.  As  a  system  Cartesianism  is 
quite  without  supporters :  and  this  is  a  fact — a  most 
important  fact — which  a  careful  examination  cannot 
fail  to  reveal  to  fancied  adherents. 

7.  The  general  estimate  of  Descartes  is  by  some 
put  very  high,  by  others  much  lower.  Buckle,  not 
a  great  authority  on  abstract  sciences,  is  quite  in 
the  characteristic  vein  of  the  History  of  Civilization, 
when  he  calls  Descartes  "  the  Luther  of  Philosophy," 
who  "  believed,  not  only  that  the  mind  by  its  own 
effort  could  root  out  its  most  ancient  opinions,  but 
that  it  could,  without  fresh  aid,  build  up  a  new  and 
solid  system.  It  is  this  extraordinary  confidence  in 
the  power  of  the  human  intellect  which  gives  this 
philosophy  that  sublimity  which  distinguishes  it 
from  all  other  systems."  If  Buckle  had  known 
more  of  what  he  was  talking  about,  he  would  have 
been  checked  by  the  reflexion,  that  Descartes,  in 
places  where  he  brings  forward  his  half-hearted 
theory  of  innate  ideas,  goes  very  near,  at  times,  to 
denying  the  intellect's  power  of  forming  its  own 
conceptions,  and  to  declaring  it  wholly  dependent 
upon  infused  ideas ;  that  he  takes  away  from  us 
any  natural  means  of  passing  from  sensations  to 
thoughts ;  that  he  makes  all  our  certitude  rest  on 


CARTESIAN  DOUBT.  159 

the  knowledge  of  God  as  the  Author  of  our 
faculties,  whilst  this  idea  of  God  he  makes  neces- 
sarily dependent  on  a  Divine  communication. 

The  real  position  of  Descartes  seems  to  be,  that 
he  brought  into  prominence  some  useful  doubts  and 
some  useful  conceptions,  which  others  carried  to  better 
issue  than  he  did,  and  in  this  respect  he  not  a  little 
resembles  Bacon ;  also  that  he  started  some  dan- 
gerous ideas,  which  again  others  carried  to  worse 
issue  than  he  did.  It  is  of  the  latter  that  Bossuet, 
himself  a  sort  of  Cartesian,  wrote  :  "  To  conceal 
nothing  from  you,  I  see  that  a  tremendous  conflict 
threatens  the  Church,  under  the  name  of  Cartesian 
philosophy.  I  see  that  more  than  one  heresy  will 
spring  from  its  principles,  though,  as  I  believe,  from 
their  wrong  interpretation."6 

The  mathematical  services  of  Descartes  were 
admittedly  great,  especially  his  share  in  the  inven- 
tion of  analytical  geometry ;  and  in  the  physical 
sciences  he  is  quite  welcome  to  whatever  honours 
his  friends  can  vindicate  for  him ;  it  is  only  his 
"  methodic  doubt "  that  is  here  expressly  con- 
demned. Yet  in  regard  to  science  as  distinguished 
from  philosophy,  it  may  be  noted  that  Whewell,  in 
his  History  of  the  Inductive  Sciences,  lodges  against 
him  such  charges  as,  that  he  misstated  the  third 
law  of  motion ;  that  he  claimed  to  himself  dis- 
coveries of  Galileo  and  others,  which  cannot  be 
allowed  to  one  who  "did  not  understand,  or  would 

6  "Pour  ne  vous  rien  dissimuler,  je  vois  un  grand  combat  se 
preparer  contre  l'eglise,  sous  le  nom  de  philosophic  Cartesienne ;  je 
vois  naitre  de  son  sein,  a  mon  avis  mal  entendu,  plus  d'  une  heresie." 


160  NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE. 

not  apply,  the  laws  of  motion  which  he  had  before 
him;"  that  "if  we  compare  Descartes  with  Galileo, 
then  of  the  mechanical  truths  which  were  easily 
obtainable  in  the  beginning  of  the  seventeenth 
century,  Galileo  took  hold  of  as  many,  and  Des- 
cartes of  as  few,  as  was  possible  for  a  man  of 
genius;"  that  "in  his  physical  speculations  Des- 
cartes was  often  very  presumptuous,  though  not 
more  than  half  right,"  that  he  would  not  question 
nature,  being  ambitious  of  showing  not  simply  what 
is,  but  what  must  be.  These  accusations  may,  or 
may  not  be  justified,  as  far  as  we  are  concerned ; 
our  one  great  accusation  is,  that  Descartes  attempted 
the  impossible,  in  trying  to  build  up  a  system  after 
giving  positive  reasons  for  the  conclusion,  that  his 
faculties  might  be  radically  incompetent. 


Addenda. 

(i)  As  an  additional  example  of  the  mischief  which 
comes  of  not  viewing  Descartes'  words  in  their  context, 
and  every  philosopher's  words  in  their  context,  it  is 
instructive  to  observe  how  falsely  St.  Augustine  has 
been  quoted  as  a  precursor  of  Descartes.  St.  Augustine 
does  indeed  use  the  very  valid  argument,  that  the 
existence  of  self  is  invincibly  brought  home  to  the 
conscious  individual,  and  that  it  is  asserted  even  in  the 
act  of  doubting.  But  St.  Augustine  does  not  preface 
the  argument  by  a  suicidal  declaration  of  scepticism, 
nor  does  he  fall  into  the  vicious  circle  of  proving 
reason  from  God,  and  God  from  reason.  Without 
first  taking  himselt  the  fatal  cathartic  of  universal 
doubt,  but  arguing  against   the  possibility  of  universal 


CARTESIAN   DOUBT.  161 

doubt,  he  has  passages  like  these :  "  If  a  man  doubts, 
he  lives  ;  if  he  doubts  that  he  doubts,  he  understands. 
If  he  doubts,  it  is  because  he  wants  to  be  certain.  If  he 
doubts,  he  thinks.  If  he  doubts,  he  is  conscious  of  his 
ignorance.  If  he  doubts,  he  deems  that  he  ought  not 
to  assent,  save  on  reasonable  grounds."1  "You  who 
wish  for  a  knowledge  of  yourself,  do  you  know  your 
own  existence?"  "Yes,  I  do."  "  How  do  you  know 
it  ?  "  "  That  I  don't  know."  "  Do  you  know  whether 
you  are  simple  or  complex  ?  "  "  No."  "  Do  you  know 
that  you  have  the  power  of  motion  ?  "  "  No."  "  Do 
you  know  that  you  are  capable  of  thought  ?  "  "  Yes."2 
Finally,  "  Without  any  delusive  phantasm  of  the  imagi- 
nation, I  am  certain  that  I  am,  that  I  know  and  love. 
As  regards  these  truths,  I  have  no  fear  of  the  arguments 
of  the  Academics  who  may  object :  but  what  if  you  are 
deceived?     If  I  am  deceived,  I  am."3 

Not  one  of  the  quotations  sanctions  universal 
scepticism  as  a  prelude  to  philosophic  certainty. 

(2)  By  the  side  of  Descartes'  theory  it  is  interesting 
to  place  the  view  of  Cousin,*  that  the  possible  forms  of 
philosophy  are  four,  sensism  and  idealism,  each  leading  to 
scepticism,  which  in  turn  has  for  its  reaction  mysticism. 
He  denies  that  scepticism  can  come  first,  being  neces- 
sarily   preceded    by    dogmatism,    either    sensistic    or 

1  "  Si  dubitat,  vivit.  Si  dubitat,  dubitare  se  intelligit.  Si  dubitat, 
certus  esse  vult.  Si  dubitat,  cogitat.  Si  dubitat,  scit  se  nescire.  Si 
dubitat,  judicat  se  non  temere  consentire  oportere."  (De  Trinitate,  14.) 

2  "  Tu,  qui  vis  te  nosse,  scis  esse  te?  Scio.  Unde  scis  ?  Nescio. 
Simplicem  te  scis,  an  multiplicem  ?  Nescio.  Movere  te  scis  ? 
Nescio.     Cogitare  te  scis  ?     Scio."  (Soliloq.  Lib.  II.  cap.  i.) 

3  "  Sine  ulla  phantasiarum  et  phantasmatum  imaginatione 
ludificatoria,  mihi  esse  me,  idque  nosse  et  amare  certissimum  est. 
Nulla  in  his  veris  Academicorum  argumenta  formido,  dicentium, 
quid  si  falleris  ?     Si  fallor  sum."  (De  Civ.  Lib.  XL  c.  26.) 

4  Histoire  de  la  Philosophie,  Lecon  i3me. 


162  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

idealistic.  "  Negation  is  not  the  starting-point  of  the 
human  mind,  as  it  pre-supposes  that  there  is  something 
to  be  denied,  hence  something  that  has  previously  been 
affirmed.  Affirmation  is  the  first  act  of  thought.  Man, 
therefore,  begins  with  belief,  belief  in  this  or  that ;  and  so 
the  first  system  is  dogmatic.  Its  dogmatism  is  either 
sensist,  or  idealistic  according  as  the  thinker  trusts 
respectively  thought  or  the  experience  of  the  senses. 
Mysticism  marks  the  despair  of  the  human  mind,  when 
after  having  naturally  believed  in  itself,  and  started 
with  dogmatism,  it  takes  refuge  from  scepticism  in  pure 
contemplation,  and  the  immediate  intuition  of  God. 
Such  is  the  necessary  sequence  of  systems  of  thought 
in  the  human  mind. "5 

(3)  Descartes  is  a  warning  against  over-confidence 
in  self  for  the  working  out  of  a  new  system.  He 
complained  that  philosophy  presented  the  appearance 
of  a  city  built  by  many  hands  at  different  times ;  and 
he  argued  that  a  symmetrical  whole  required  unity  of 
workmanship.  He  tried  himself  to  be  the  single  work- 
man, who  should  build  up  the  whole  of  an  enormous 
city,  after  first  pulling  down  the  old  structures ;  but 
in  both  respects  his  efforts  were  failures,  monumental 
failures  for  the  warning  of  posterity.  In  a  matter  so 
open    to    human    thought   as   the   nature   of    its   own 

s  "  L'esprit  humain  ne  debute  pas  par  la  negation ;  car,  pour 
nier,  il  faut  avoir  quelque  chose  a  nier,  il  faut  avoir  affirme,  et 
l'affirmation,  c'est  le  premier  acte  de  la  pensee.  L'homme  commence 
done  par  croire  :  il  croit  soit  a  ceci,  soit  a  cela,  et  lc  premier  systeme 
est  ledogmatisme.  Ce  dogmatisme  est  sensualiste  ou  idealiste,  selon 
que  l'homme  se  fie  davantage  ou  a  la  pensee  ou  a  la  sensibilite.  Le 
mysticisme,  c'est  le  coup  de  desespoir  de  la  raison  humaine,  qui 
apres  avoir  cru  naturellement  a  elle-meme  et  debute  par  le  dogma- 
tisme, effrayee  par  le  scepticisme,  se  refugie  dans  la  pure  contempla- 
tion et  1'intuition  immediate  de  Dieu.  Tel  est  l'ordre  necessaire 
(hi  developpement  des  systemes  dans  l'esprit  humain."  (lb.) 


CARTESIAN  DOUBT.  163 

certitude,  no  man  of  proper  modesty  should  venture 
upon  the  boast ;  Heretofore  the  world  has  gone  wrong, 
but  at  last  ecce  ego  !  Even  the  gentle  Ferrier  ventures 
to  claim  a  few  of  these  downright  new  discoveries ;  but 
they  are,  of  course,  all  delusions :  and  of  Comte,  who 
ceased  to  read  other  philosophers  in  order  to  develop 
his  own  thought,  Mill  says  that  he  developed  "a  colossal 
self-conceit." 


CHAPTER    X. 

THE      PRIMARY      FACTS      AND     PRINCIPLES     OF     THE 
LOGICIAN. 

Synopsis. 

i.  The  philosopher's  mental  outfit  in  general  when  he  starts  on 
his  course. 

2.  The  disengagement  of  certain  great  primaries,  notwithstand- 

ing the  complicated  condition  of  adult  thought,  and  the 
impossibility  of  reverting  to  the  first  thoughts  of  childhood. 
(a)  The  primary  fact  in  all  knowledge,  (b)  The  primary 
condition  of  all  knowledge,  (c)  The  primary  principle  of 
all  knowledge. 

3.  Other    primaries    may   be    asserted,   but   the   above  three 

deserve  special  mention. 
Addenda. 

i.  The  outfit  as  to  bodily  means,  with  which 
some  begin  a  University  career,  has  excited  partly 
the  amusement  and  partly  the  compassion  of  those 
who  have  heard  such  stories  as  are  typified,  on  one 
side  by  the  youth  with  the  "  great  coat  and  the  pair 
of  pistols ;  "  and  on  the  other  side  by  some  of  the 
poorer  students  of  Glasgow  and  Edinburgh,  who 
all  too  grimly  appreciate  Sydney  Smith's  joke : 
"  We  tune  our  song  on  slender  oats." ■  Still 
some  manage  to  feed  fat  the  mind,  while  the 
flesh  remains  lean,  especially  if  they  start  with  a 
1  "Tenui  musam  meditaraur  avena."  (Virgil,  Eel.  i   2.) 


PRIMARY  FACTS  AND  PRINCIPLES.  165 

good  mental  outfit :  for  that  is  the  immediately 
important  thing  in  the  freshman.  The  philo- 
sopher's stock-in-trade  at  starting,  after  the  clearing 
out  of  his  premises,  has  been  reduced  by  Descartes 
to  what  we  have  seen  to  be  ruinous  conditions :  and 
therefore  we  naturally  ask  ourselves  with  what 
supplies  we  undertake  to  make  a  commencement. 
Already  we  have  settled  to  keep  our  natural  know- 
ledge, not  in  the  extravagant  trust  that  all  our 
judgments  have  been  correct,  but  with  a  general 
assurance  that  we  have  fairly  trained  minds,  and 
have  laid  in  a  store  of  certitudes,  the  ultimate 
foundation  of  which  we  may  proceed  to  examine 
at  leisure,  without  the  slightest  fear  of  bringing 
about  a  total  collapse.  We  did  not  begin  systemati- 
cally to  philosophize  during  our  school  life,  because 
we  were  not  ripe  for  the  exercise ;  but  we  began  in 
early  manhood,  when  at  least  we  might  hope  that 
we  were  moderately  prepared  for  the  work.  We 
should  have  held  it  preposterous  had  we  been  called 
upon,  at  the  inaugural  lecture  of  our  philosophic 
course,  to  recite,  instead  of  a  Credo  a  Dubito,  after 
the  style  of  the  Cartesian  formula :  I  doubt  all  the 
truths  which  hitherto  I  have  held  most  certain ; 
I  question  the  reality  of  my  body,  and  the  reports 
of  all  my  senses ;  I  doubt  the  competency  even  of 
my  mental  powers,  and  by  means  of  this  doubt  do 
I  expect  salvation. 

2.  Not,  however,  to  rest  content  with  declaring 
a  general  trust  in  the  results  of  our  previous  life, 
subject  to  many  such  accidental  corrections  as  a 
more    critical    study   of    details    shall    suggest,    we 


166  NATURE  OF  CERTITUDE. 

must  pick  out  a  few  primary  truths,  as  of  universal 
prevalence  throughout  every  act  of  knowledge.  It 
has  before  been  declared  that  we  cannot  give,  in 
perfect  order,  first  a  single  principle,  then  another, 
and  then  another,  and  lay  it  down,  that  this  is  the 
progress,  step  by  step,  of  every  human  mind.  Much 
has  been  said,  both  in  prose  and  in  verse,  about  the 
first  waking  up  of  the  child  to  conscious  life,  and 
especially  to  the  distinction  of  self  and  not  self. 
One  sage  regards  the  latter  crisis  as  very  solemn, 
and  tells  how  the  infant  mind,  seeing  itself  opposed 
to  a  whole  universe,  with  a  strong  cry  proclaims  its 
right  to  assert  its  own  individuality,  and  to  live. 
Ferrier2  describes  the  moment  as  one  of  transition 
from  the  "  feral  "  to  the  "  human  "  state.  Other 
authors  have  carefully  chronicled  the  indications  of 
dawning  intelligence  in  young  children,  and  the 
study  of  new-born  animals  has  not  been  neglected. 
Richter  fancied  that  he  remembered  the  time  and 
the  circumstances,  in  which  the  thought  first  flashed 
upon  him,  "  I  am  I ; "  and  he  gives  a  detailed 
account  of  the  grand  revelation. 

But  these  are  matters  we  may  leave  to  other 
inquirers.  Probably  anything  like  the  clear,  steady 
possession  of  one  definite  certitude  does  not  come 
till  after  the  mind  has  acquired  many  floating  ideas, 
which  appear  and  disappear  fluctuatingly  on  the 
surface  of  consciousness,  and  after  many  judgments 
of  similarly  fluctuating  character.  That  the  child's 
first  thoughts  are  fixed,  clear-cut,  and  coherent  judg- 
ments, is  more  than  we  can  believe. 

a  The  Philosophy  of  Consciousness,  Par*  V.  c.  iii.  and  per  totum. 


PRIMARY   FACTS   AND   PRINCIPLES.  167 


Much  as  we  dissent  from  the  whole  theory  upon 
the  origin  and  the  nature  of  knowledge,  as  pro- 
pounded by  Mr.  Spencer,3  we  may  take  some  useful 
hints  from  a  passage  like  the  following :  "  Every 
thought  involves  a  whole  system  of  thoughts,  and 
ceases  to  exist  if  severed  from  its  various  corre- 
latives. As  we  cannot  isolate  a  single  organ  of  a 
living  body,  and  deal  with  it  as  though  it  had  a  life 
independent  of  the  rest ;  so,  from  the  organized 
structure  of  our  cognitions,  we  cannot  cut  one,  and 
proceed  as  though  it  had  survived  the  separation. 
Overlooking  this  all-important  truth,  however, 
speculators  have  habitually  set  out  with  some  pro- 
fessedly simple  datum  or  data ;  have  supposed 
themselves  to  assume  nothing  beyond  this  datum 
or  these  data ;  and  have  thereupon  proceeded  to 
prove  or  disprove  propositions  which  were,  by 
implication,  already  unconsciously  asserted  along 
with  that  which  was  consciously  asserted."  Our 
own  application  of  the  doctrine  will  appear  in  what 
we  are  now  to  explain. 

Probably  it  is  our  common  experience,  that  we 
cannot,  by  memory,  recall  how  knowledge  first 
sprang  up  in  the  mind,  but  we  can  do  something 
suggestive  on  the  subject.  We  can  actually  remember 
how,  upon  our  beginning  some  new  study,  the  terms 
and  principles  one  moment  seemed  to  show  a  gleam 
of  light,  and  then  were  suddenly  dark  again ;  then 
once  more  the  flame  flickered  up,  till  gradually  a  few 
strong  lights  were  fixed,  around  which  we  could 
range  others. 

8  First  Principles,  Part  II.  c.  ii.  §  39. 


168  NATURE  OF  CERTITUDE. 

And  if  this  was  the  case  in  later  years,  yet  more 
strongly  would  the  like  features  be  marked,  when 
our  intelligence  was  first  feeling  its  way  to  the 
exercise  of  its  own  powers.  The  child's  mind  is 
full  of  abortive  ideas,  incoherences,  and  fantastic 
combinations ;  so  that  nurses,  in  talking  to  children, 
by  a  sort  of  instinctive  sympathy,  talk  nonsense, 
while  nonsense  verses  form  the  child's  earliest 
literature.  Some  of  our  recollections  of  childhood 
are  probably  of  grotesque,  impossible  events,  which 
yet  we  should  simply  say  that  we  remembered, 
were  it  not  that  we  now  perceive  such  incidents  to 
be  absurd  as  realities ;  they  are  incidents  like  those 
of  the  nursery  rhymes,  one  writer  of  which,  Mr. 
Lear,  has  had  positively  to  defend  himself  against 
symbol-scenting  interpreters,  by  the  declaration, 
"  nonsense  plain  and  absolute  has  been  my  aim 
throughout." 

So  far,  however,  as  we  did  form  any  judgment, 
we  must  have  been  in  practical  possession  of  certain 
great  general  principles,  though  we  could  not  single 
out  the  abstract  elements  from  their  concrete  embodi- 
ments and  universalize  them.  Now  at  length  we 
are  called  upon  to  evolve  what  must  have  been 
involved  in  our  earliest  cognitions,  whatever  may 
have  been  their  concrete  matter ;  nor  must  we 
overlook  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  our  analysis. 
We  have  to  abstract  first  principles,  not  out  of  our 
first  thoughts,  which  are  equivalently  lost  to  us,  but 
out  of  our  adult  thoughts,  which  are  often  so  com- 
plicated that  a  single  sentence  may  suppose  an 
acquaintance  with  a  vast  subject-matter.     Without 


PRIMARY  FACTS  AND   PRINCIPLES.  169 

falling  into  the  exaggerated  doctrine  of  relativity,  we 
must  allow  those  facts  of  which  it  is  the  perverted 
account,  for  instance,  that  all  knowledge  is  closely 
interrelated.  Reverting  to  the  passage  just  now 
quoted  from  Mr.  Spencer,  we  must  allow  the  almost 
illimitable  blending  of  idea  with  idea,  in  the  texture 
of  mind :  indeed  the  body  of  our  knowledge  is  a 
sort  of  organism,  the  property  of  which  is,  that  the 
parts  exist  for  the  whole,  and  the  whole  for  the 
parts.  It  will  be  a  test  that  we  are  able  sufficiently 
to  isolate  by  reflexion  a  few  primary  truths,  which 
can  be  absent  from  no  act  of  knowledge.  We  insist 
much  on  this  power  of  reflective  abstraction,  and  by 
its  means  we  are  going  to  work.  A  primary  fact,  a 
primary  condition,  and  a  primary  principle — these 
are  what  we  are  about  to  single  out. 

(a)  The  fact  of  his  own  existence  is  given  implicitly, 
in  every  act  of  genuine  knowledge  which  a  man 
elicits.  For  knowledge  is  of  no  avail  unless  it  comes 
home  to  the  subject  as  his  own  ;  or,  according  to 
one  phraseology,  perception  is  useless  without 
apperception,  whereby  the  object  known  is,  for  each 
one,  brought  under  the  form,  "  I  know."  Ego 
Cogito,  not  Est  Cogitatio,  is  what  Descartes  rightly 
regards  as  an  important  recognition,  made  by  every 
human  mind  when  it  comes  to  the  proper  use  of  its 
powers. 

An  ordinary  man  would  hardly  raise  any  difficulty 
against  what  has  just  been  asserted,  unless  he 
laboured  under  some  delusion  as  to  the  extent  of  the 
assertion ;  fancying,  for  instance,  that  it  required  a 
clear,  explicit  thought  about  self,  or  a  cognition  of 


170  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

self  which  should  amount  to  a  definition  of  per- 
sonality or  of  selfhood.  To  guard  against  such  mis- 
conceptions, be  it  understood  that  the  recognition 
of  self  need  be  only  implicit,  and  need  be  no  more 
scientific  than  what  comes  within  the  competency  of 
the  newly  dawned  reason  of  the  child.  But  here 
precisely  we  are  taken  up.  Does  not  a  child  show 
that  it  has  no  perception  of  self,  by  speaking  of  itself 
as  "  baby,"  "  Georgie,"  "  Maggie,"  in  the  third 
person  ?  This  fact  proves  nothing,  for  it  is  natural 
enough  that  a  child  should  call  itself  by  that  name 
by  which  it  hears  others  call  it,  instead  of  at  once 
seizing  upon  the  use  of  the  first  personal  pronoun. 
Also  there  is  no  difficulty  in  allowing  that  self-con- 
sciousness is  not  as  strong  in  the  child  as  in  the 
adult  :  and  hence  the  simplicity  and  candour  of 
children.  The  assertion  of  this  characteristic  is  nor 
invalidated  by  the  counter-assertion,  that  there  is  to 
be  met  with  in  children  the  unpleasing  trait  of  great 
selfishness,  imperiousness,  vanity,  jealousy  of  rivals, 
which  manifestations  cannot  all  be  shown  to  proceed 
from  a  sort  of  mere  animal  instinct,  devoid  of  all 
intelligent  perception. 

If  next  we  consider  the  opposition  that  is  likely 
to  be  made  against  our  First  Fact  from  the  part  of 
philosophic  theory,  then  the  antagonism  is  greater 
than  what  was  offered  by  the  ordinary  thinker.  Still 
in  the  presence  of  a  plain  testimony  of  experience  we 
have  a  right  to  disregard  the  mere  exigence  of  a 
philosopher's  system,  which  otherwise  we  know  to 
be  wrong.  It  is  enough  therefore  to  mention,  with- 
out taking   the  trouble  to  refute,  the  view  of   Mr. 


PRIMARY  FACTS  AND  PRINCIPLES.  171 

Spencer.4  Driven  by  his  theory  to  hold  that  subject 
can  never  be  object,  and  that  reflexion  is  never  made 
upon  a  present  state  of  mind  but  always  on  a  past, 
he  says  that  though  we  have  a  "  certainty  "  of  self, 
we  cannot  have  a  "  knowledge  of  self."  "  The  per- 
sonality of  which  each  one  is  conscious,  and  of  which 
the  existence  is  to  each  a  fact  beyond  all  others  the 
most  certain,  is  yet  a  thing  which  cannot  be  truly 
known  at  all,  knowledge  of  it  being  forbidden  by  the 
very  nature  of  thought."  It  is  far  better  to  assert 
simply,  on  the  strength  of  evident  experience,  that 
we  know  self,  than  thus  recur  to  a  distinction,  which 
supposes  "  a  fact  most  certain  "  not  to  come  under 
"knowledge,"  but  only  under  some  obscurer  form  of 
consciousness.  If  such  consciousness  does  not 
amount  to  knowledge,  it  can  be  only  a  sort  of  blind 
belief;  a  consequence  we  may  deduce  from  many 
other  parts  of  Mr.  Spencer's  philosophy.  In  reliance 
on  his  principle5  that  "the  invariable  persistence 
of  a  belief  is  our  sole  warrant  for  any  truth  of 
immediate  consciousness  and  of  demonstration,"  he 
makes  the  unsatisfactory  announcement,  that  "  in 
the  proposition,  I  am,  he  who  utters  it  cannot  find 
any  proof  but  the  invariable  persistence  of  the  belief 
in  it."  It  is  far  simpler  and  truer  to  say,  that  to 
each  sane  man  his  own  existence  is  self-evident,  and 
admits  of  no  strict  proof;  his  constant  belief  in  it 
not  being  so  much  a  proof,  as  something  which 
requires  no  justification  by  proof,  because  the  thing 
is  self-evident,  and  therefore  above  proof  strictly  so 
called. 
.    4  First  Principles,  Part  I.  c.  iii.  §  20.        5  Ibid.  c.  iv.  §  26  in  fine. 


172  NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE. 

(b)  Descartes,  with  us  so  far,  now  abandons  us, 
declaring  that  he  can  and  does  doubt  the  validity  of 
his  very  faculties ;  and  that  in  consequence  he  is 
driven  to  set  about  a  scientific  verification  of  his 
mental  powers.  We  maintain  that  our  ability  to 
know  cannot  be  to  us  matter  of  strict  demonstration, 
of  inference  from  premisses  more  evident,  but  must 
be  taken  as  the  First  Condition.  This  is  no  assump 
tion,  in  the  bad  sense  of  the  phrase  ;  for  we  are  made 
immediately  conscious  of  our  power  to  know,  in  the 
very  exercise  of  our  faculties.  Nor  could  we  learn 
the  fact  any  other  way,  as,  for  example,  by  the  testi- 
mony of  others.  If  a  rational  being  uses  his  reason, 
the  result  is  that  he  finds  out  what  manner  of  being 
he  is ;  a  thing  that  the  irrational  being  never  does, 
especially  if  it  be  also  insensate,  like  a  plant  or  a 
stone.  As  Cardinal  Newman  puts  it,  we  trust  first 
of  all,  not  our  faculties,  but  their  acts,  or  our  faculties 
in  act.  And  Dr.  M'Cosh,  in  his  Intuitions  of  the  Mind, 
says :  "  We  do  not  found  knowledge,  as  the  Scotch 
metaphysicians  seem  to  do,  on  belief  in  our  nature 
and  constitution.  It  would  be  as  near  the  truth  to 
say,  that  we  believe  our  constitution  because  it 
makes  known  realities.  But  the  truth  is  that  the 
two  seem  involved  one  in  the  other.  In  our  cogni- 
tions and  feelings,  we  know  and  believe  in  objects, 
and  in  doing  so  we  trust  in  our  constitution." 

One  little  allowance,  however,  may  be  made  to 
those  who  teach  that  we  prove  our  ability  to  know, 
though,  it  is  to  be  feared,  they  will  not  be  satisfied 
with  the  concession.  We  must  remember  here  what 
we  stated  in  our  last  chapter,  how  a  man  waking 


PRIMARY  FACTS  AND   PRINCIPLES.  173 


slowly  from  a  vivid  dream,  may  gradually  explore  his 
own  state  and  so  convince  himself  by  degrees  that  he 
is  in  his  right  mind.  But  such  a  case  lends  no  support 
to  the  adversaries  of  what  here  is  being  assumed  as 
the  First  Condition  of  all  knowledge,  a  condition 
the  fulfilment  of  which  is  tacitly  recognised  in  every 
intelligent  act  that  we  perform.  "  Knowledge  is 
power,"  and  feels  itself  to  be  such  intrinsically:  it 
feels  that  it  is  a  power  to  know. 

(c)  Within  the  thinking  subject  we  have  now  got 
a  First  Fact,  the  recognition  by  the  subject  of  self; 
and  a  First  Condition,  the  subject's  power  to  know, 
also  recognised  as  a  fact ;  we  must  next  add  a  First 
Principle  on  the  objective  side,  namely,  the  Principle 
of  Contradiction.  To  show  the  objectivity  of  this 
principle  we  formulate  it,  not  on  the  logical,  but  on 
the  ontological  side.  We  do  not  simply  say,  "  the 
same  thing  cannot,  in  the  same  sense,  be  affirmed 
and  denied,"  but  "the  same  thing  cannot,  in  the 
same  way,  be  and  not  be."  Under  both  aspects  the 
principle  is  self-evident,  and  it  is  only  the  extreme 
of  irrationality  in  Mill,  which  makes  him  refrain  from 
asserting  its  absoluteness  both  for  all  thought  and 
for  all  things.  Yet  even  he  ventures  so  far  as  to 
write,6  "  that  the  same  thing  should  at  once  be  and 
not  be ;  that  identically  the  same  statement  should 
be  both  true  and  false,  is  not  only  inconceivable  to 
us,  but  we  cannot  conceive  that  it  should  be  made 
conceivable."  He  admits  too,  that  if  there  are  any 
primitive  necessities  of  thought,  this  is  one  of  them. 
With  him  Mr.  Bain  agrees  to  the  extent  of  affirming 

6  Examination,  c.  vi.  p.  67 ;  cf.  c.  xxi.  p.  417.  (2nd  Ed.). 


174  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

that,  "  were  it  admissible  that  a  thing  could  be  and 
not  be,  our  faculties  would  be  stultified  and  rendered 
nugatory."  Hampered  by  no  theories  from  Hume, 
we  simply  assert,  as  self-evident  to  reason,  the 
Principle  of  Contradiction,  or  as  Hamilton  prefers 
to  call  it,  the  Principle  of  Non-contradiction.  No 
statement  that  we  could  make  would  have  any 
meaning,  if  this  principle  had  not  clear  objective 
validity. 

3.  The  above  three  are  called  primaries,  but  not  in 
the  exclusive  sense.  Such  a  phrase  as  the  "  three 
first "  is  often  criticized,  and  by  some  declared  to  be 
quite  inadmissible.  If  it  stands  for  objects  which 
are  respectively  first,  second,  and  third  in  a  series, 
we  may  leave  it  undiscussed  ;  but  when  it  stands  for 
three  which  are  abreast  in  forming  the  first  rank, 
then  we  are  here  concerned  to  defend  the  expression, 
so  far  as  to  justify  our  assertion  of  "  three  primaries." 
The  word  "  first,"  like  any  superlative,  may  qualify 
simply  an  individual,  or  it  may  qualify  a  whole  class, 
and  be  predicated  of  the  individuals  in  that  class. 
Thus  we  can  use  it  when  we  say,  "  the  ten  first  men 
in  England  :"  each  of  the  ten  holds  independently  a 
first  place.  When,  therefore,  we  are  speaking  of  the 
three  primaries,  we  are  not  putting  one  before  the 
other,  nor  even  denying  that  there  are  other  primaries : 
it  is  sufficient  that  the  three  are  primaries,  and 
further,  that  among  primaries,  they  deserve  a  special 
prominence  to  be  given  to  them,  because  of  their 
importance.  But,  in  addition  to  them,  the  principle 
of  identity  is  primary,  so  is  the  principle  of  sufficient 
reason,   that   nothing  can  be  without   an   adequate 


PRIMARY  FACTS  AND  PRINCIPLES.  175 

account  for  its  existence ;  and  so  is  the  principle  of 
evidence,  that  what  is  evident  must  be  accepted  as 
true.  To  compile  a  catalogue  of  all  the  truths  which 
are  self-evident,  and  cannot  be  reduced  to  components 
simpler  than  themselves,  would  be  a  tedious  work, 
and  not  helpful  to  present  purposes.  If,  however, 
we  are  called  upon  to  emphasize  any  beyond  the 
three  mentioned  primaries,  it  will  be  the  Principle 
of  Sufficient  Reason,  so  often  violated  by  pure 
empiricists,  and  yet  so  vital  to  all  philosophy. 
When  Mr.  Bain  declares  that  there  is  no  repugnancy 
in  "  an  isolated  event,"  or  "  in  something  arising  out 
of  nothing,"  if  we  are  to  take  him  literally,  he  puts 
himself  out  of  the  pale  of  reasoning  creatures.  His 
friend  Mill  is  nearer  to  the  sane  principle,  at  least 
as  far  as  a  single  sentence  goes,  when  he  writes: 
"  That  any  given  effect  is  only  necessary  provided 
that  the  causes  tending  to  produce  it  are  not 
controlled  ;  that  whatever  happens  could  not  have 
happened  otherwise,  unless  something  had  taken 
place,  which  was  capable  of  preventing  it,  no  one 
needs  surely  to  hesitate  to  admit."  Unfortunately 
when  he  says,  "  cause,"  Mill  does  not  mean  "  cause," 
but  otherwise  his  words  are  in  the  right  direction ; 
and  we  at  any  rate  do  well  to  put  in  the  position  of 
a  primary  truth,  the  principle  of  Sufficient  Reason. 

We  must  dissent,  however,  from  the  peculiar 
treatment  of  this  principle  by  Mansel,  who  first  of 
all  states  it  only  in  its  logical  side,  "  Every  judg- 
ment must  have  a  sufficient  giound  for  its  asser- 
tion," and  then  denies  it  to  be  a  principle.  "  The 
only  reason  for  a  thought  of  any  kind  is  its  relation 


i?6  NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE. 

to  some  other  thought,  and  this  relation  will  in  each 
case  be  determined  by  its  own  proper  law.  The 
principle  of  sufficient  reason  is,  therefore,  no  law  of 
thought,  but  only  the  statement  that  every  act  of 
thought  must  be  governed  by  some  law  or  other."7 
He  even  ventures  something  like  a  possible  suspicion 
of  the  principle,  but  does  not  clearly  assert  it :  "  If 
considerations  [concerning  free-will]  suggest  a  limit 
to  the  universality  of  the  principle  of  sufficient 
reason,  so  be  it."8 

Addenda. 

(i)  Mill1  declares  "  there  is  no  ground  for  believing 
that  the  Ego  is  an  original  presentation  of  conscious- 
ness." When  it  does  become  such  we  have  the  follow- 
ing account  of  it :  "  The  fact  of  recognizing  a  sensation, 
of  remembering  that  it  has  been  felt  before,  is  the 
simplest  and  most  elementary  fact  of  memory ;  and  the 
inexplicable  tie,  or  law,  or  organic  union,  which  connects 
the  present  consciousness  with  the  past  one,  of  which  it 
reminds  me,  is  as  near,  I  think,  as  we  can  get  to  a 
positive  conception  of  self.  That  there  is  something 
real  in  this  tie,  real  as  the  sensations  themselves,  and 
not  a  mere  product  of  the  laws  of  thought,  without  any 
fact  corresponding  to  it,  I  hold  to  be  indubitable.  .  .  . 
Whether  we  are  directly  conscious  of  it  in  the  act  of 
remembrance,  as  we  are  conscious  in  fact  of  having 
successive  sensations,  or  whether  according  to  the 
opinion  of  Kant  we  are  not  conscious  of  self  at  all,  but 
are  compelled  to  assume  it  as  a  necessary  condition  of 

7  Proleg.  Log.  c.  vi.  pp.  198,  223. 

8  C.v.p.  153.     » 

1  Examination,    Appendix,    p.  256.     Compare    the   Appendix    to 
Hume's  Treatise,  at  the  end  of  Bk.  I.  Part  IV.  p.  559 


PRIMARY  FACTS  AND  PRINCIPLES.  177 

memory,  I  do  not  undertake  to  decide.  But  this 
original  element  which  has  no  community  of  nature 
with  any  of  the  things  answering  to  our  names,  and  to 
which  we  cannot  give  any  name  but  its  own  peculiar 
one,  without  implying  some  false  or  ungrounded  theory, 
is  the  Ego  or  Self.  As  such  I  ascribe  a  reality  to  the 
Ego — to  my  own  mind — different  from  that  real  existence 
as  a  Permanent  Possibility,  which  is  the  only  reality  I 
acknowledge  in  matter." 

(2)  There  have  been  authors,  whose  connexions  may 
be  traced  back  at  least  as  far  as  Heraclitus,  and  who, 
under  the  idea  of  "  becoming,"  as  distinguished  from 
"being,"  try  to  do  away  with  the  asserted  contradiction 
between  simultaneous  being  and  not  being.  Ferrier2 
explains  Heraclitus  thus :  "  When  he  says  that  all 
things  are  in  a  continual  state  of  flux,  that  a  thing 
agrees  with  itself  and  yet  differs  from  itself ;  when  he 
says  that  strife  is  the  father  of  all  things,  that  every- 
thing is  its  own  opposite  and  both  is  and  is  not,  he 
means  that  things  are  continually  changing,  or  that  the 
whole  system  of  the  universe  is  a  never-ceasing  process 
of  '  becoming.'  "  "  T  \e  principal  feature  in  the  concep- 
tion of  '  being '  is  rest,  fixedness.  Now  the  opposite  of 
this  is  the  principal  feature  in  the  conception  of  '  be- 
coming.' It  is  unrest,  unfixedness.  A  thing  never 
rests  at  all  in  any  of  the  changing  states  into  which  it  is 
thrown.  It  is  in  that  state  and  out  of  it  in  a  shorter 
time  than  any  calculus  can  measure." 

The  fallacy  often  used  to  illustrate  this  theory,  is  to 
suppose  that  mere  unextended  points  of  time  and  space 
are,  not  merely  limits,  or  ideal  boundaries  marking 
divisions  of  time  and  space,  but  are  their  actually  con- 
stituent elements  ;  so  that  extension  is  made  up  of  an 
infinite  row  of  inextensibles  placed  side  by  side.     This 

•  History  of  Greek  Philosophy ;  Remains,  Vol.  I.  pp.  114,  iifc. 

M 


NATURE  OF  CERTITUDE. 


notion  is  absurd,  and  is  not  held  even  in  what  is  known 
as  the  dynamistic  theory  of  matter,  which  asserts  at 
least  extended  areas  of  force,  the  centres  only  of  which 
are  unextended  points.  But  observing  the  fallacy,  let  us 
see  how  it  is  worked.  A  body,  moving  continuously,  is 
supposed  at  once  to  arrive  at  any  given  point,  and  to 
leave  it  at  the  same  moment,  and  thus  to  be  at  once 
there  and  not  there.  The  sophism  lies  in  making  the 
point  to  be  at  once  part  of  the  line  and  not  part  of  its 
extension.  If  we  keep  to  definitions,  a  point  of  time  is 
of  no  duration,  and  a  point  of  space  of  no  extent. 
When,  then,  we  say  that  a  body  moves  over  a  point  of 
space  in  a  point  of  time,  we  are  uttering  the  very  true 
statement,  that  in  no  time  no  space  is  traversed.  It 
being  clear,  therefore,  that  to  account  for  the  traversing 
of  a  literal  point  in  a  body's  path  is  to  account  for  no 
part  of  the  path  at  all ;  it  is  equally  clear  that  if  any 
part  is  to  be  accounted  for,  then  we  must  take  at  least 
some  small  extent  both  of  space  and  of  time.  But  as 
soon  as  extension  is  considered,  the  whole  argument 
fails :  it  can  no  longer  be  pretended,  that  the  body 
together  is  and  is  not  at  one  place. 

A  somewhat  like  fallacy  is  used  in  reference  to 
circular  motion,  which  may  be  considered  to  be  com- 
posed of  a  projection  in  a  straight  direction  and  a  con- 
stant attraction  by  a  definite  law  to  the  centre.  The 
result  is  that  the  body  never  gets  either  nearer  to  the 
centre  or  further  from  it,  the  curvilinear  path  is  the 
compromise  between  the  two  motions,  but  it  is  never 
one  component  alone.  Here  steps  in  the  fallacy-framer, 
and  pretends  that  the  motion  is  both  tangential,  away 
from  the  centre,  and  centripetal,  or  towards  the  point 
of  attraction.  We  answer  firmly,  there  is  no  such  union 
of  contradictories,  there  is  only  a  movement  of  revolu- 
tion, which  is  never  for  a  moment  either  centrifugal  or 
centripetal. 


PRIMARY  FACTS  AND  PRINCIPLES.  179 

(3)  Mill's  empirical  account  of  the  induction  by 
which  we  reach  the  principle  of  contradiction,  is  thus 
given  :  "  The  principle  of  Contradiction  should  put  off 
the  ambitious  phraseology  which  gives  it  the  air  of  a 
fundamental  antithesis  pervading  nature,  and  should  be 
enunciated  in  the  simpler  form,  that  the  same  proposi- 
tion cannot  at  the  same  time  be  false  and  true.  But  I 
can  go  no  further  with  the  Nominalists,  for  I  cannot 
look  upon  this  last  as  a  merely  verbal  proposition.  I 
consider  it  to  be,  like  other  axioms,  one  of  our  first  and 
most  familiar  generalizations  from  experience.  The 
original  foundation  of  it  I  take  to  be,  that  Belief  and 
Disbelief  are  two  different  mental  states,  excluding  one 
another.  This  we  know  by  the  simplest  observation  of 
our  own  minds.  And,  if  we  carry  our  observation  out- 
wards, we  also  find  that  light  and  darkness,  sound  and 
silence,  motion  and  quiescence,  equality  and  inequality, 
preceding  and  following,  succession  and  simultaneous- 
ness,  any  positive  phenomenon  whatever  and  its  nega- 
tive, are  distinct  phenomena,  pointedly  contrasted.  I 
consider  the  maxim  in  question  to  be  a  generalization 
from  all  these  facts."  3 

(4)  There  is  a  limit  to  human  patience  in  bearing 
with  subtleties,  which  have  for  their  object  the  over- 
turning of  such  fundamental  principles  as  that  of  con- 
tradiction ;  and  in  illustration  of  the  way  in  which  ex- 
hausted patience  rebels,  a  few  examples  may  be  borrowed 
from  Janet's  little  book  on  Materialism. 

Hegel's  dialectic  process,  which  goes  on  the  theory 
of  reconciling  contradictories  by  successive  steps  of 
antithesis  and  synthesis,  was  allowed  a  certain  degree  of 
triumph ;  but  it  also  called  forth  violent  denunciations 
from  its  opponents,  and  led  to  wide  divergencies 
between  its  friends.  Schopenhauer  expressed  a  common 
3  Logic,  Bk.  II.  c.  vii.  §  4. 


180  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

feeling  when  he  called  such  philosophy  "  a  minimum  of 
thought,  diluted  into  five  hundred  pages  of  nauseous 
phraseology."  Humbolt,  accustomed  to  the  more  sober 
physical  sciences,  turned  to  ridicule  what  he  called  "  the 
dialectic  tricks  "  of  Hegel ;  while  Goethe  avowed  that, 
"  if  the  transcendentalists  ever  became  aware  of  it,  they 
would  find  themselves  to  be  very  absurd." 

As  a  reaction  against  so  much  idea-weaving,  and  so 
much  building  up  in  the  clouds,  there  arose  the  gross 
materialism  of  Moleschott,  Buchner,  and  Vogt.  The 
second  of  this  trio  pronounced  the  pretended  philosophy 
to  be  "verbiage,"  "jargon,"  "  metaphysical  quackery,'* 
11  a  cooking  up  of  old  vegetables  under  new  names,'* 
and  a  proceeding  "which  inspires  legitimate  disgust  in 
learned  and  unlearned  alike." 

(5)  Hardly  as  a  serious  objection  to  the  principle  of 
contradiction,  and  yet  as  furnishing  a  straw  at  which  a 
desperate  opponent  might  clutch,  but  still  more  as 
having  an  interest  of  its  own,  the  fact  may  be  mentioned, 
that  of  late  years  lists  have  been  compiled  of  words  from 
out-of-the-way  languages,  which  have  a  double  signifi- 
cation, namely,  an  idea  and  its  opposite.  We  are  not 
quite  without  examples  of  the  kind  in  more  familiar 
tongues.  The  case  illustrates,  so  far  as  the  saying  is 
true,  the  old  dictum,  that  "  the  knowledge  of  opposites  is 
one."  Another  observed  fact  of  an  analogous  order  is 
that  people  recovering  from  amnesia,  or  loss  of  memory, 
are  found  using,  instead  of  the  right  word  for  a  concep- 
tion, just  its  opposite.  To  these  or  any  other  similar 
discoveries  the  friends  of  the  Hegelian  identification  of 
contradictories  are  welcome  ;  but  their  cause  will  remain 
hopeless  as  ever. 

(6)  At  the  root  of  much  difficulty  made  against  the 
isolation  of  primary,  absolute  principles,  stands  the 
theory  of  Relativity  in  all  knowledge,  on  the  strength  of 


PRIMARY  FACTS  AND   PRINCIPLES.  181 

which  the  notion  of  absolute  being  is  denied  to  us  ;  and 
what  is  refused  us  under  the  title  of  "  knowledge,"  at 
last  is  given  back  to  us  under  the  name  of  an  inferior 
mode  of  consciousness.  A  sentence  omitted  in  a  quota- 
tion lately  made  from  Mr.  Spencer,  shall  here  be 
supplied: 4  "The  development  of  formless  protoplasm 
into  an  embryo,  is  a  specialisation  of  parts,  the  distinct- 
ness of  which  increases  only  as  fast  as  their  combination 
increases — each  becomes  a  distinguishable  organ,  only 
on  condition  that  it  is  bound  up  with  others,  which  have 
simultaneously  become  distinguishable  organs :  and 
similarly,  from  the  unformed  material  of  consciousness,  a 
developed  intelligence  can  arise  only  by  a  process  which, 
in  making  things  definite,  also  makes  them  mutually 
dependent — establishes  among  them  certain  vital  con- 
nexions, the  destruction  of  which  causes  instant  death 
of  the  thoughts."  Now  if  we  refer  back  a  little,  we  shall 
learn  something  about  what  this  "  unformed  material  of 
consciousness  "  is  supposed  to  be.5  "  We  come  face 
to  face  with  the  ultimate  difficulty — how  can  there 
possibly  be  constituted  a  consciousness  of  the  unformed 
and  unlimited,  when  by  its  very  nature  consciousness  is 
possible  only  under  forms  and  limits  ?  In  each,  con- 
sciousness there  is  an  element  which  persists.  It  is 
alike  impossible  for  this  element  to  be  absent  from 
consciousness,  and  for  it  to  be  present  in  consciousness 
alone  ;  either  alternative  involves  unconsciousness — the 
one  from  want  of  substance,  the  other  from  want  of 
form.  But  the  persistence  of  this  element  under  succes- 
sive conditions,  necessitates  a  sense  of  it  as  distinguished 
from  the  conditions.  The  sense  of  this  something,  con- 
ditioned in  every  thought,  is  constituted  by  combining 
successive  concepts  deprived  of  their  limits  and  con- 

4  First  Principles,  Part  II.  c.  ii.  §  39. 
5  Ibid.  Part  I.  c.  iv.  §  26,  p.  94. 


182  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

ditions.  The  indefinite  concept  is  not  the  abstract  of 
any  one  group  of  ideas,  but  of  all  ideas,  namely, 
existence,  which  is  an  indefinite  consciousness  of  some- 
thing constant  under  all  modes.  Our  consciousness  of 
the  unconditioned  being  literally  the  unconditioned  con- 
sciousness, or  raw  material  of  thought  to  which  in  thinking 
we  give  definite  forms,  it  follows  that  an  ever  present 
sense  of  real  existence  is  the  very  basis  of  our  intelligence. 
At  the  same  time  that  by  the  laws  of  thought  we  are 
rigorously  prevented  from  forming  a  conception  of  abso- 
lute existence,  we  are  by  the  laws  of  thought  equally 
prevented  from  ridding  ourselves  of  the  consciousness  of 
absolute  existence  ;  this  consciousness  being  the  obverse 
of  our  own  self-consciousness.  And  since  the  only 
possible  measure  of  relative  validity  among  our  beliefs, 
is  the  degree  of  their  persistence  in  opposition  to  the 
efforts  made  to  change  them  ;  it  follows  that  this  which 
persists  at  all  times,  under  all  circumstances,  has  the 
highest  validity  of  any."  In  brief,  our  highest  belief  is 
about  a  matter  we  cannot  know ;  but  about  which  we 
have  an  indefinite  consciousness. 


CHAPTER   XL 

RETROSPECT   AND    PROSPECT. 

Synopsis. 

i.  Retrospect, 
a.  Prospect. 

The  last  proposition  has  brought  us  to  a  point 
whence  a  look  backwards,  and  another  forwards, 
become  necessary  in  order  to  clear  away  natural 
misgivings  that  we  may  be  wandering  about  aim- 
lessly. We  have  travelled  together  through  regions 
of  our  own  experience  as  knowledge-gathering  crea- 
tures ;  we  have  noted  down  the  general  charac- 
teristics of  certitude  and  of  its  allied  or  opposed 
states,  but  have  avoided  details.  The  consequence 
may  be  that  some  of  the  company  have  felt  uneasy, 
and  would  over  and  over  again  have  liked  to  pause 
on  some  such  questions  as,  how  the  reports  of  the 
senses  are  to  be  credited,  or  how  abstract  and 
general  ideas  are  valid,  which  confessedly  have 
corresponding  to  them  no  abstract  and  general 
objects.  But  steadily  and  inexorably  the  surveying 
party  has  been  led  on,  with  the  promise  that  another 
survey  shall  be  made  to  fill  in  details,  and  with  the 
declaration  that,  meanwhile,  human  certitude,  before 


184  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

our  philosophizing  about  it,  sufficiently  attests  its 
own  validity. 

i.  We  have  mapped  out  some  of  the  general 
features  of  human  knowledge,  and  spreading  out  the 
unfinished  sketch,  we  observe  what  we  have  done. 
Beginning  with  logical  truth,  that  is,  with  the  know- 
ing of  truth,  we  decided,  that  apart  from  any  theory 
as  to  how  the  mind  can  produce  a  resemblance  of 
the  several  objects  which  it  knows,  yet  we  cannot 
intelligibly  admit  that  it  really  knows  anything  while 
we  deny  that  the  knowledge  bears  any  likeness  to 
the  thing  known.  Some  sort  of  likeness  there  must 
be,  though  after  a  peculiar  mode  which  our  imitative 
arts  cannot  copy.  Mere  concomitant  variation  in 
mind  and  object  will  not  suffice,  if  it  is  declared  to 
carry  no  resemblance. 

Inquiring  next  what  is  the  special  act  of  mind  in 
which  logical  truth  is  to  be  found  in  its  fulness,  we 
settled  that  it  must  be  the  judgment,  the  act  by 
which  we  affirm  or  deny,  by  which  we  are  conscious 
that  something  is,  or  is  not.  Unless  we  go  as  far  as 
this  point,  we  are  not  yet  in  possession  of  a  truth  ; 
at  best  we  are  on  the  way  to  possession. 

The  conscious,  full,  and  firm  possession  of  the 
truth,  to  the  exclusion  of  doubt,  is  certitude,  a  state 
of  mind  which  we  contrasted  with  ignorance,  and 
with  mere  tendencies  to  assent,  or  assents  given  as 
to  probabilities  only.  To  distinguish  these  states 
belongs  to  the  logician,  though  it  is  not  his  province 
to  determine,  in  all  fields  of  knowledge,  what  is  the 
measure  of  assent  or  dissent  due  to  any  given  state- 
ment.    As   a   matter   of  self-analysis,   a  man   may 


RETROSPECT  AND   PROSPECT.  185 

sometimes  be  puzzled  whether  or  not  he  ought  to 
put  aside  suggested  reasons  for  doubt,  as  being  quite 
neutralised  by  contrary  reasons;  and  in  cases  of  such 
perplexity  he  will  often  have  to  appeal  to  considera- 
tions more  concrete  than  logic  supplies. 

Returning  to  certitude  we  gave  its  broad  distinc- 
tion into  natural  and  artificial,  non-scientific  and 
scientific,  philosophic  and  common-sense ;  and  we 
showed  the  interdependence  between  the  two. 
Either  branch — but  we  have  regard  especially  to  the 
second — is  divisible  according  to  its  specific  motive, 
into  three  kinds,  metaphysical,  physical,  and  moral. 
We  likewise  saw  in  what  sense  a  proposition,  which 
is  certain,  may  be  regarded  as  having  its  certitude 
greater  or  less. 

In  absolute  opposition  to  certitude  came  scep- 
ticism under  its  most  uncompromising  form,  or 
total  negation  of  the  power  of  mind  to  acquire  real 
knowledge  of  things.  Such  scepticism  was  shown 
to  be  quite  indefensible  as  a  position  taken  up  and 
defended  by  argument ;  its  very  possibility .  was 
denied  in  view  of  the  irresistible  self-assertion  of  a 
reasonable  nature.  However,  there  was  a  scepticism 
calling  itself  methodic,  and  professing  to  lead  to  the 
most  legitimate  dogmatism ;  but  its  professions 
proved  hollow,  and  its  failure  served  only  to  confirm 
our  own  previous  proposition,  that  philosophy  must 
build  on  natural  certitude.  In  the  words  of  Mr. 
Spencer,  the  philosophy  of  certitude  "  can  be  nothing 
but  the  analysis  of  our  knowledge  by  means  of  our 
knowledge,  an  inquiry  by  our  intelligence  into  the 
decisions  of  our  intelligence."     We  cannot  carry  on 


186  NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE. 

such  an  inquiry  without  taking  for  granted  the  trust- 
worthiness of  our  intelligence.  But  against  any  one 
supposing  that  this  assumption  itself  is  a  blind,  in- 
stinctive process,  we  entered  our  "  caveat "  not 
without  call. 

Having  rejected  the  Cartesian  primary  facts  and 
principles,  as  explained  by  their  author,  we  felt 
bound  to  agree  upon  some  of  our  own  ;  and  as 
primary  truths  we  assigned  what  were  called  the 
First  Fact,  the  First  Condition,  the  First  Principle  ; 
to  which  trio  the  Principle  of  Sufficient  Reason 
was  added.  Out  of  these  elements  we  cannot 
hope  to  build  up  a  system  as  Euclid  built  up  his 
geometry ;  but  so  far  as  the  logic  of  certitude  is 
reducible  to  a  few  elements,  these  are  they.  We 
need  hardly  try  to  make  all  that  Hamilton  has  made 
out  of  the  Principle  of  Identity ;  because  so  far  as 
what  he  says  has  truth  in  it,  the  truth  seems  scarce 
worth  such  explicit  proclamation  ;  or  at  any  rate,  it 
is  very  calculated  to  vex  the  souls  of  some  readers. 
In  behalf  of  our  own  primaries,  the  defence  is  avail- 
able, that  they  are  evident  without  demonstration, 
and  that  no  one  can  argue  against  them  without 
implicitly  affirming  them. 

2.  Thus  far  we  have  gone  ;  but  what  is  to  be  the 
next  step  ?  Many  schoolmen  follow  the  plan  of 
entering  here  upon  the  consideration  of  what  they 
call  the  means  or  the  sources  of  knowledge.  Their 
work  comes  pretty  much  to  a  division  and  a  defence 
of  faculties  which  successively  take  up  the  elements 
of  knowledge,  and  bring  them  out  in  the  shape  of 
formed  propositions.     A  justification  is  attempted  of 


RETROSPECT  AND   PROSPECT.  187 

sensations,  ideas,  memory,  judgment,  and  reasoning. 
But  without  a  word  of  condemnation  for  the  method 
of  others,  we  may  relegate  these  matters  to  the 
Second  Part ;  the  reason  being  that  they  may  fairly 
be  regarded  as  belonging  to  the  details  of  the  Subject, 
not  to  that  most  general  description  of  Certitude 
which  forms  the  First  Part.  As  belonging  to  the 
latter,  however,  we  will  at  once  grapple  with  a 
question  often  delayed  till  the  very  end  of  the 
treatise,  namely,  with  Evidence,  considered  as  the 
objective  criterion  of  truth.  Since  this  is  the 
perfectly  general  criterion  of  all  certitude,  we  are 
justified  in  putting  it  along  with  the  other  matters 
which  we  have  called  "  Generalities."  There  will 
thus  be  a  book  on  Generalities  and  a  book  on 
Particularities ;  after  which  the  reader  will  not  be 
asked  to  extend  his  patient  efforts  to  yet  another 
book. 


CHAPTER   XII. 

THE    REJECTION    OF  VARIOUS   THEORIES    ABOUT    THE 
ULTIMATE    CRITERION    OF    CERTITUDE. 

Synopsis : 

i.  Blind  impulse  to  believe. 

2.  Verification  by  the  senses. 

3.  Traditionalism. 

4.  Some  sort  of  vision  of  things  in  God,  or  in  divinely  cr^ma- 

nicated  ideas. 

5.  Clear  and  distinct  ideas  as  asserted  by  Descartes. 

6.  Consistency. 

7.  Inconceivability  of  the  opposite. 

8.  Concluding  remarks. 

As  builders  clear  the  ground  before  they  begin  to 
build,  so  we  shall  do  well  to  start  by  putting  out  of 
the  way  certain  proposed  criteria  of  truth,  which 
either  we  cannot  accept  as  criteria  at  all,  or  else  not 
as  ultimate  criteria. 

1.  Some  philosophers,  often  more  in  appearance 
than  in  reality,  or  more  as  an  occasional  aberration 
than  as  an  opinion  steadily  maintained  throughout, 
represent  the  cause  of  our  assents  to  be,  in  last 
analysis,  a  blind  instinct  to  believe.  What  is  true 
in  their  doctrine  is,  that  we  cannot  penetrate  the 
secret  of  the  intellectual  act,  and  see  how  it  is  that 
this  most  wonderful  act,  the  act  of  knowledge,  is 
elicited  from  the  faculty.     The  conscious  process 


ULTIMATE   CRITERION   OF  CERTITUDE.  189 

we  are  aware  of  because  it  is  conscious ;  but  the 
physical  process,  so  to  term  it,  we  do  not  com- 
prehend. When  we  think  of  the  marvellousness 
of  intelligence,  we  are  quite  lost  in  the  mystery 
of  the  process,  and  almost  feel  inclined  to  doubt 
whether  our  knowledge  is  not  illusion.  To  this 
extent  intelligence  gives  no  explanation  of  itself. 
But  to  say  that  we  assent  by  a  blind  instinct,  is  to 
take  out  of  the  assent  its  percipient  character, 
to  render  it  non-intellectual,  to  make  it  a  contra- 
diction in  terms.  Allowing,  therefore,  that  the 
manner  in  which  we  understand  is  impenetrably 
dark,  we  cannot  allow  that  the  understanding 
itself  acts  in  the  dark,  by  means  of  blind  instinct. 
Its  essence  is  to  see  its  way  as  it  goes. 

2.  The  first  proposal  can  hardly  be  called  that 
of  a  criterion,  for  a  criterion  supposes  something 
genuinely  intellectual ;  but  the  second  proposal  does 
offer  something  which,  at  least,  is  in  the  cognitive 
order,  though  in  the  lowest  grade  of  cognition. 
The  criterion  is  verification  by  the  senses.  Lewes, 
who,  in  his  Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,  is  one  of 
its  strong  advocates,  insists  that  the  great  mass 
of  our  thoughts,  being  abstract,  generalized  pro- 
ducts, are  only  symbolic  of  the  real,  and  must 
be  reduced  to  their  first  origin  in  sensation,  if 
their  value  is  to  be  tested.  Our  sensations  are  as 
the  arithmetic  of  objects,  our  conceptions  are  as  the 
algebra,  that  is,  symbolic  expressions.  Besides  the 
criterion  of  sense,  however,  he  allows  a  secondary, 
derivative  criterion,  which  consists  in  reduction  to 
intellectual  intuition. 


igo  NATURE  OF  CERTITUDE. 

Mill  cannot  quite  be  put  in  the  same  class  with 
Lewes,  for  he  speaks  of  the  necessity  we  are  under 
to  accept  all  averments  of  consciousness,  provided 
that  they  can  be  shown  to  belong  to  its  pure,  primi- 
tive state.  Still  the  following  passage  will  show  how 
inclined  he  was  to  make  sensation  a  sort  of  ultimate 
test :  "  When  I  say  that  I  am  convinced  there  are 
icebergs  in  the  Arctic  sea,  I  mean  that  the  evidence 
is  equal  to  that  of  my  senses  ;  I  am  as  certain  of  the 
fact  as  if  I  had  seen  it.  And  on  a  more  complete 
analysis,  when  I  say  that  I  am  convinced  of  it,  what 
I  am  convinced  of  is,  that  if  I  were  on  the  Arctic 
seas  I  should  see  it.  We  mean  by  knowledge  and 
by  certainty  an  assurance  similar  and  equal  to  that 
effected  by  our  senses.  If  the  evidence  can  in  any 
case  be  brought  up  to  this,  we  desire  no  more."1 

Here  Mill  evidently  is  speaking,  not  of  mere 
sensation,  but  of  intellectual  perceptions  following 
after  sensations.  However,  the  precise  nature 
of  neither  his  doctrine  nor  of  that  of  Lewes  need 
trouble  us  at  present ;  for  we  want  no  accurate 
estimates  of  different  philosophies,  but  only  a  refu- 
tation of  the  broad  proposition,  that  the  ultimate 
criterion  of  truth  is  verification  by  the  senses.  Now 
a  sufficient  objection  to  this  view  is  the  two-fold 
fact,  that  a  mere  sensation,  as  such,  cannot  be  the 
direct  criterion  for  an  intellectual  faculty,  and  that 
we  have  many  certitudes  about  objects  which  are 
supra-sensible.  What,  however,  we  may  allow  to  veri- 

1  Examination,  c.  ix.  in  initio.  Mill  is  blamed  by  Lewes  for 
saying  that  ideas,  unlike  sensations,  "  may  be  recalled  in  virtue  ot 
mental  laws  which  are  independent  of  material  conditions." 


ULTIMATE  CRITERION  OF  CERTITUDE.  191 

fication  by  the  senses  is,  that  often  a  physical  theory, 
carried  through  several  steps  by  the  mere  reasoning 
process,  requires  to  be  brought  to  the  test  of  obser- 
vation or  experiment,  in  order  to  make  sure  that  the 
reasoning  is  consecutive  and  leaves  out  none  of  the 
involved  data.  Thus  it  was  right  to  look  actually  with 
the  telescope  for  the  planet,  the  position  of  which 
Adams  and  Leverrier  had  mathematically  calculated. 
But  in  all  cases  alike  certitude  itself  is  intellectual, 
and  must  have  a  criterion  directly  intellectual. 

3.  Distrustful  of  self,  man  is  inclined  to  make  his 
last  appeal  to  his  fellows,  especially  to  the  majority 
of  men ;  and  more  especially  to  the  majority,  if 
they  are  supposed  to  be  the  divinely  appointed 
custodians  of  a  primitive  revelation.  Thus  we  have 
the  appeal  to  Tradition  as  an  ultimate  criterion  of 
truth.  Traditionalism  is  a  doctrine  which  has  had 
some  vogue  in  France.  Long  ago  our  own  John  of 
Salisbury  had  written :  "  As  both  the  senses  and 
human  reason  frequently  go  astray,  God  has  laid 
in  faith  the  first  foundation  for  the  knowledge  of 
truth."3  A  sober  interpretation  may  be  given  to  a 
sentence  like  this,  but  Bayle  was  outraging  alike 
God  and  man,  when  he  pretended  utterly  to  dis- 
credit human  reason,  in  order  to  make  way  for  the 
sole  reign  of  faith.  "  Human  reason  is  a  principle 
of  destruction,  not  of  construction ;  it  is  capable 
solely  of  raising  questions,  and  of  doubling  about  to 
make  a  controversy  endless.     The  best  use  that  can 

a  "  Quia  turn  sensus  quum  ratio  humana  frequenter  errant,  ad 
intelligentiam  veritatis  primum  fundamentum  locavit  Deus  in  fide." 
(Metalogicus,  Lib.  IV.  cap.  xiii.) 


192  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

be  made  of  philosophy  is  to  acknowledge  that  it  can 
but  set  us  astray,  and  that  we  must  seek  another 
guide,  which  is  the  light  of  Revelation."3 

In  recent  times  the  principle  here  enunciated 
has  been  taken  up  by  men  far  more  earnest  than 
Bayle,  but  all  their  earnestness  has  failed  to  make 
a  dangerous  doctrine  safe.  The  pith  of  De  Bonald's 
teaching  is  given  in  a  single  sentence  of  his  :  "  This 
.  .  .  proposition,  Thought  can  be  known  but  by  its 
expression,  that  is,  by  speech,  sums  up  the  whole 
science  of  man."4  Taking  up  the  idea  of  De  Bonald, 
De  Lamennais,  in  his  famous  Essai  sur  V Indifference 
dans  la  Matiere  de  Religion,  elaborated  a  scheme  of 
traditionalism.  He  supposed  a  primitive  commu- 
nication of  truth  from  above  to  the  race.  Then, 
working  on  a  principle  which  Aristotle  mentions 
without  sanctioning  its  abuse  (Eth.  Nick.  x.  2),  and 
which  Lord  Herbert  of  Cherbury,  in  his  treatise 
De  Veritate,  had  adopted,  namely,  "  What  appears  to 
all  men,  that  is  true,"  he  embraced  it  to  the  extent 
of  affirming  that  the  consent  of  the  majority  deter- 
mines what  is  the  authentic  tradition,  or,  in  other 
words,  what  is  the  truth. 

A  most  glaring  objection  to  the  theory  starts  up 
at  once  in  the  shape  of  the  obviously  raised  ques- 

3  "  La  raison  humaine  est  un  principe  de  destruction,  et  non 
pas  d'edification ;  elle  n'est  pas  propre  qu'  a  former  des  doutes,  et 
a  se  tourner  a  droit  et  a  gauche  pour  eterniser  une  dispute.  Le 
meilleur  usage  qu'on  puisse  faire  de  la  philosophic  est  de  connaitre 
qu'elle  est  une  voie  d'egarement  et  que  nous  devrions  chercher  un 
autre  guide,  qui  est  la  lumiere  revelee." 

4  "  Cette  proposition  rationelle,  la  pensee  ne  peut  etre  connue 
que  par  son  expression,  ou  la  parole,  enferrae  toute  la  science  de 
I'homme." 


ULTIMATE   CRITERION   OF  CERTITUDE.  193 

tion,  "  If  the  consent  of  mankind  is  the  ultimate 
test  of  truth,  how  do  we  know  that  such  is  the  fact, 
and  how  do  we  judge,  in  any  particular  case,  what  is 
the  view  of  the  majority  ?  "  De  Lamennais  himself 
acknowledged  his  inability  to  furnish  a  precise  reply; 
but  all  the  same  he  adhered  to  his  traditionalism. 
"  The  first  man  receives  the  primary  truths  on  the 
testimony  of  God,  the  highest  Reason.  These  truths 
are  preserved  for  mankind,  as  being  ever  set  forth 
by  universal  testimony,  which  is  the  expression  of 
general  reason,  of  common  sense."5  Whence  he 
argued  that  the  first  act  of  intelligence  is  an  act  of 
faith ;  so  necessarily,  that  unless  a  man  will  begin 
with  "  I  believe,"  he  will  never  arrive  at  "  I  know." 

With  a  view  to  giving  his  opinion  an  air  of 
reality,  De  Lamennais  laboriously  collected,  from 
many  languages,  testimonies  to  the  opinion  that 
primitive  man  drew  from  divine  sources,  and  that 
present  controversies  are  to  be  settled  by  reference 
to  what  has  been  taught  from  the  beginning.  In 
its  right  place  the  principle  of  tradition  is  sound 
enough,  and  that  right  place  is  pre-eminently  the 
position  of  the  depositum  ftdei,  the  body  of  revealed 
truths  committed  by  Christ  to  the  keeping  of  His 
Church ;  but  De  Lamennais  puts  the  principle  into 
a  wrong  place  altogether.  It  is  impossible  that  man 
should  ever  give,  as  the  ultimate  reason  of  his  belief, 
"  Because  I  was  told ; "  when  and  why  he  should 

5  "  Le  premier  homme  recoit  les  premieres  verites  sur  le 
temoignage  de  Dieu,  raison  supreme,  et  elles  se  conservent,  parmi 
les  hommes,  perpetuellement  manifestoes  par  le  temoignage  uni- 
versel,  expression  de  la  raison  generate. " 

N 


^94  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

accept  what  he  is  told,  is  always  a  question  going 
deeper  down. 

Apart  from  any  faith  in  a  revelation,  some  might 
urge  the  consent  of  the  majority  of  men  as  a  natural  rule 
of  truth.  Against  them  it  suffices  to  say  that  such 
rule,  for  the  most  part,  cannot  be  reduced  to  practice, 
and  is  sometimes  fallible,  never  ultimate.  Yet  there 
is  a  great  truth  hinted  at,  namely,  the  impossibility 
of  any  one  man  discovering  everything  for  himself 
by  independent  research,  without  the  aid  of  the 
accumulated  treasures  of  the  age.  What  could 
Newton  have  done,  had  he  been  born  into  an  age 
when  the  simple  rules  of  arithmetic  formed  all  that 
was  known  of  mathematics  ?  An  important  con- 
dition of  progress  is,  that  knowledge  should  accu- 
mulate ;  and  a  sufficient  cause  of  unprogressiveness 
in  animal  intelligence  is  its  want  of  power  properly 
to  preserve  and  build  upon  a  tradition.  There  is, 
of  course,  among  the  lower  animals  some  sort  of 
heredity  in  matter  of  transmitted  experiences ;  but 
there  is  not,  in  the  human  sense,  a  power  of  tradi- 
tion and  development.  Man  has  this  power,  and  it 
is  his  wisdom  not  to  sacrifice  it  by  self-isolation. 

4.  Blind  instinct  we  have  rejected  as  being  out- 
side the  pale  of  knowledge  altogether;  verification 
by  the  senses  as  being  the  lowest  grade  of  cognition, 
so  long  as  it  means  mere  sensitive  knowledge  ;  tradi- 
tion as  being  inadequate  and  never  ultimate ;  and 
now  we  come  to  a  pretended  vision  of  things  in 
God,  or  in  divinely  infused  ideas,  which  also  we 
must  reject.  The  chief  arguments  of  those  who 
hold  such  opinions,  run  on  the  lines  that  without 


ULTIMATE   CRITERION   OF  CERTITUDE.  IQ5 

Divine  aid  we  could  not  have  the  knowledge  of 
which  we  find  ourselves  possessed.  The  best  mode 
of  replying  to  the  so-called  demonstrations,  is  to 
show  that  they  amount  to  no  more  than  so  many 
ways  of  re-stating  the  dangerous  assumption,  that 
human  faculties  have  not  the  natural  power  of  intel- 
ligence, but  must,  at  least  to  a  large  extent,  have 
their  work  done  for  them  by  their  Creator.  No 
such  helplessness  can  be  proved,  and  the  assertion 
of  it  sounds  more  injurious  than  honourable  to  God. 
Our  experience  is,  not  that  we  descend  from  ideas 
or  principles  which  are  a  gift,  down  to  our  own 
concrete  applications  of  them,  but  that  we  ascend 
from  concrete  facts  to  abstract  ideas  and  principles; 
nor  that  we  travel  from  a  knowledge  of  the  divine 
to  knowledge  of  the  created,  but  that  our  course 
lies  from  the  created  to  the  divine.  The  fewness 
of  the  supporters  of  what  may  be  called  the  view 
of  Malebranche,  makes  it  unnecessary  to  go  at 
length  into  the  two  charges  against  it,  which  are 
that  it  brings  no  proof  and  goes  contrary  to  rightly 
interpreted  experience.6 

5.  To  assert  that  clear  and  distinct  ideas  are  the 
ultimate  test  of  truth,  might  be  correct  if  the  clear- 
ness and  distinctness  were  sufficiently  shown  to  be 
more  than  subjective  feeling,  and  to  be  founded 
on  objective  evidence.  What  has  been  explained 
of  the  system  of  Descartes  was  enough  to  make 
manifest  his  great  shortcomings  in  this  particular ; 
nor  does  Spinoza  give  a  more  satisfactory  shape  to 
the   theory   when   he   teaches   that    true    ideas  are 

6  See  Part  II.  c.  ii.  Addenda  (3). 


196  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

guaranteed  by  the  consciousness  of  truth  wherewith 
they  are  accompanied.  Of  course  from  the  sub- 
jective side  our  certainty  is  our  consciousness  that 
we  are  certain ;  but  the  objective  side  also  needs 
to  be  fully  stated,  whereas  both  by  Descartes  and 
Spinoza  it  is  neglected.  In  the  next  chapter  it  will 
form  the  main  subject  of  inquiry. 

6.  As  truth  can  never  conflict  with  truth,  what 
proves  inconsistent  in  its  parts  cannot,  as  a  whole, 
be  true.  As  a  secondary  test  of  truth,  therefore, 
consistency  is  useful ;  but  it  cannot  be  made  the 
ultimate  criterion,  for  there  may  be  consistency 
in  error.  The  wider  and  the  more  varied  is  the 
range  of  the  consistent  statements,  the  higher, 
cczteris  paribus,  is  the  probability  of  their  being  true  ; 
still  if  we  allow  that  consistency  throughout  our 
judgments  is  all  we  can  produce  in  proof,  while  we 
can  never  tie  down  the  consistent  whole  of  our 
thoughts  to  objective  reality,  our  ideas  are  still  a 
floating  mass,  well  compacted  together,  but  anchored 
safely  to  nothing  substantial.  We  may  have  a 
beautiful  arch,  key-stone  included,  but  what  if  there 
are  no  pillars  for  it  to  rest  on  ? 

It  is,  therefore,  lamentable  to  find  so  many 
writers  declaring  the  inability  of  man  to  get  any- 
thing beyond  consistency  as  a  basis  of  certitude. 
Of  necessity  they  must  speak  thus  who  push  the 
doctrine  of  relativity  to  extremes ;  but  others  adopt 
the  criterion  under  less  pressure  from  their  system : 
"  We  cannot,"  says  Mansel,  "  know  what  truth  is 
in  relation  to  a  non-human  intellect ;  and  truth  in 
man  admits  of  no  other  test  than  the  harmonious 


ULTIMATE   CRITERION   OF  CERTITUDE.  197 

consent  of  all  the  human  faculties."  This  must 
be  interpreted  in  conformity  with  the  principles  laid 
down  by  the  author,7  that  we  cannot  test  the  abso- 
lute validity  of  our  own  mental  laws,  but  that  we 
must  trust  our  Creator  for  having  given  us  powers 
sufficient  for  our  present  state  of  probation,  and 
rely  upon  it  "  that  the  portion  of  knowledge  of 
which  our  limited  faculties  are  permitted  to  attain 
to  here  may  indeed,  in  the  eyes  of  a  higher  Intelli- 
gence, be  but  partial  truth,  but  cannot  be  absolute 
falsehood.  But  believing  this,  we  desert  the  evidence 
of  reason  to  rest  on  that  of  faith  ;  and  of  the  prin- 
ciples on  which  reason  itself  depends  it  is  obviously 
impossible  to  have  any  other  guarantee."  Thus  we 
are  left  with  the  incomplete  result  "  that  the  laws 
to  which  our  faculties  are  subjected,  though  not 
absolutely  binding  on  things  in  themselves,  are 
binding  upon  our  mode  of  contemplating  them  :  "  a 
conclusion  which  leaves  us  open  to  many  of  Kant's 
sceptical  difficulties.  Again,  Mr.  Spencer,8  whose 
further  test,  from  the  inconceivability  of  the  oppo- 
site, will  be  considered  presently,  thus  expresses 
himself:  "There  is  no  mode  of  establishing  any 
belief,  except  that  of  showing  its  entire  congruity 
with  the  other  beliefs.  Debarred  as  we  are  from 
anything  beyond  the  relative,  truth  raised  to  its 
highest  form  can  be  for  us  nothing  more  than 
perfect  agreement,  throughout  the  whole  range  of 
our   experience,   between   those   representations   of 

7  Prolegomena    Logica,  c.  iii.  pp.  73 — 77.      Compare    Professor 
Veitch's  Institutes  of  Logic,  §  43,  p.  29. 

8  First  Principles,  Part  II.  c.  ii.  §  40;  Psychology,  Part  VII.  c.  L 


198  NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE. 


things  which  we  distinguish  as  real.  The  estab- 
lishment of  congruity  throughout  the  whole  of  our 
cognitions  constitutes  philosophy."  Thus  with 
Mr.  Spencer  the  avowed  process  is  to  assume  pro- 
visionally the  simple  states  of  consciousness ;  upon 
these  to  elaborate  a  system ;  and  in  the  end  to 
claim  acceptance  for  it  on  the  plea  of  the  complete 
congruity  which  has  resulted  from  philosophizing 
with  the  assumed  elements  for  starting-points.  Two 
more  instances  shall  be  borrowed  from  quite  a 
different  school  of  thought  to  that  of  Mr.  Spencer. 
"  The  ultimate  test  of  each  truth,"  writes  Mr. 
Caird,  in  his  work  on  Kant,  "  a  test  which  at  the 
same  time  fixes  the  limit  of  its  validity,  lies  in  the 
exhibition  of  its  relation  to  other  truths  in  a  system. 
Thus  philosophy  is  a  kind  of  reasoning  in  a  circle ; 
but  this  is  no  argument  against  it,  for  it  is  the  circle 
beyond  which  nothing  lies.  The  ultimate  unity  of 
knowledge  must  be  that  in  which  all  the  elements 
of  knowledge  are  reflected  into  each  other  ;  in  which 
the  parts  cannot  be  apprehended  except  as  merging 
in  the  whole,  and  the  whole  cannot  be  apprehended 
except  as  necessarily  differentiating  itself  into  parts. 
The  essential  presupposition  of  all  philosophy  is, 
that  the  world  is  an  intelligible  system,  and  there- 
fore capable  of  being  understood  and  explained." 
This  view  becomes  all  the  more  intelligible  if  read 
in  the  light  of  a  Hegelian  principle  which  Mr.  Wal- 
lace, at  the  beginning  of  his  work  on  The  Logic  of 
Hegel,  thus  enunciates  :  "  All  the  objects  of  science, 
all  terms  of  knowledge,  lead  out  of  themselves,  and 
seek    for   a   centre   and    resting-point.      They   are 


ULTIMATE   CRITERION   OF   CERTITUDE.  199. 

severally  inadequate  and  partial,  and  crave  ade- 
quacy and  completeness.  They  tend  to  organize 
themselves,  and  so  to  constitute  a  system  or  uni- 
verse, and  in  this  tendency  to  unity  consists  their 
truth  :  their  untruth  lies  in  isolation  and  pretended 
independence.  This  completed  unity  in  which  all 
things  receive  their  entireness  and  become  adequate 
is  their  truth :  and  the  truth  as  known  in  religious 
language  is  God." 

If  consistency  throughout  the  entire  body  of 
truths  were  the  only  criterion,  even  the  most  learned 
man  could  never  make  use  of  it,  for  he  never  knows 
all  truths  ;  and  the  man  of  little  education  could 
hardly  claim  any  certitude,  for  his  knowledge  is  so 
limited,  and  he  has  done  nothing  to  harmonize  the 
different  parts  of  his  slender  stock.  On  the  other 
hand,  as  a  fact,  the  ablest  thinker  among  men  may, 
on  secure  grounds,  hold  truths,  the  consistency  of 
which  he  fails  to  perceive,  though  of  course  he  per- 
ceives no  positive  inconsistency.  When  further  we 
repeat  that  consistency  alone,  without  a  guarantee  ot 
objectivity,  is  insufficient,  we  have  given  reasons 
enough  for  rejecting  the  proposed  criterion.  A 
consistent  novel  is  not  history,  and  a  consistent 
account  of  the  evolution  of  the  universe  is  not 
proved  true  till  it  be  connected  with  reality.  A 
theory  like  that  of  La  Place  might  be  possible, 
without  being  verified  in  fact. 

Still  consistency  is  an  excellent  test  in  its  own 
sphere,  and  Mr.  Spencer  might  have  been  saved 
some  of  the  chapters  which  he  has  unfortunately 
written  had  he  been  more  alive  to  the  use  of  his 


NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 


own  criterion,  consistency.  For  example,  Part  I. 
of  his  First  Principles  is  largely  employed  in  drawing 
up  a  list  of  antinomies,  which,  on  his  theory  of 
knowledge,  are  forced  upon  the  human  mind.  Xow 
these  antinomies  are  not  saved  from  being  incon- 
sistencies of  assertion,  by  his  adroit  distinction 
between  knowledge  and  indefinite  consciousness.  Ver- 
biage apart,  it  is  inconsistent  to  maintain  that  we 
must  firmly  believe  the  existence  of  the  Absolute,  but 
must  deem  it  quite  unknowable ;  that  we  must  believe 
in  the  Non-Relative,  but  confine  our  knowledge  to 
the  Relative.  Just  what  Mr.  Spencer  wants  is  escape 
from  his  doctrine  of  Relativity. 

7.  Inconceivability  being  itself  a  negative  term, 
does  not  promise  well,  at  first  sight,  to  be  a  good 
ultimate  criterion ;  while  it  has  the  additional  mis- 
fortune to  be  a  term  which  is  used  with  varieties  of 
meanings.9  To  clear  up  the  case,  it  is  quite  neces- 
sary to  start  with  a  distinction  between  what  can  be 
represented  by  the  sensitive  imagination  and  what 
can  be  represented  by  the  intellect  strictly  so  called. 

(a)  As  regards  the  sensitive  imagination,  what 
cannot  be  pictured  by  it  need  not,  on  that  account, 
be  impossible  or  untrue ;  else  all  our  highest  truths 
would  straightway  be  undone.  Contrariwise,  what 
can  be  roughly  pictured  by  the  imagination  may,  as 
a  concrete  fact,  be  quite  incapable  of  realization.  A 
chiliagon,  the  square  of  123456789,  a  mathema- 
tical straight  line,   the   morality  of  an  act,   are  all 

9  Hamilton's  Reid,  Intellectual  Poirers,  Essay  iv.  c.  iii.  p.  377; 
Mill,  Examination,  c.  vi. ;  Logic,  Bk.  III.  c.  vii. ;  Spencer,  Psychology 
Part  VII.  c.  xi. ;  Balfour,  Philosophic  Doubt,  c.  x. 


ULTIMATE   CRITERION   OF  CERTITUDE.  201 

objects  with  which  the  intellect  may  most  accurately 
deal ;  but  they  all  baffle  accurate  imagination  by  the 
sensitive  faculty.  On  the  other  side,  in  a  rough  way, 
the  imagination  can  form  a  sort  of  outline  picture 
of  a  man  standing  on  a  single  hair  of  his  head,  of 
Atlas  supporting  the  world,  of  the  cow  jumping 
over  the  moon, — all  which  feats  the  intelligence 
pronounces  physically  impossible.  They  ought  not, 
therefore,  to  be  called  without  qualification,  as 
they  sometimes  are,  conceivable ;  for  the  conception 
never  traces  out  the  whole  details,  or  it  would  find 
itself  brought  across  absurdities.  It  follows  that  the 
possibility  or  the  impossibility  of  picturing  the  oppo- 
site will  not  serve  as  the  last,  universal  criterion 
of  truth, — a  conclusion  for  which  we  have  already 
found  sufficient  reason,  when  we  were  considering 
the  criterion  afforded  by  verification  through  the 
senses. 

Nevertheless,  just  as  verification  through  the 
senses,  in  its  own  order,  is  an  excellent  and 
practically  indispensable  test  of  scientific  theory, 
yet  never  so  that  mere  sensation  is  the  ultimate 
criterion  of  intellectual  truth ;  in  like  manner  all 
that  Mr.  Tyndall  has  eloquently  uttered  about 
the  scientific  use  of  the  imagination  in  visualizing 
the  minute  processes  of  nature,  must  be  granted 
to  the  full  measure  of  the  truth  contained  in  his 
declarations.  But  sensitive  imagination  is  not 
the  last  test  of  certainty — of  the  universal  pro- 
position in  its  universality,  of  the  spiritual  truth  in 
its  spirituality,  nay,  not  even  of  the  sensitive  fact 
as   stated   in    strict  propositional  form.      A  highly 


202  NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE. 

important  consequence  is  the  revelation  of  the 
truth,  that  with  many  persons  their  so-called  in- 
tellectual difficulties  against  the  Trinity,  the  exist- 
ence of  the  soul,  and  the  life  after  death,  are  not 
really  intellectual  difficulties  at  all,  but  difficulties 
of  the  imagination  in  its  vain  effort  to  picture  the 
unpicturable.  The  proof  is,  that  such  people  have 
no  arguments  to  plead  ;  only  a  baffled  imagination.10 
(b)  The  question  must  now  be  narrowed  down 
to  intellectual  inconceivability;  in  which  shape  it 
calls  for  yet  another  distinction.  If  inconceivability 
of  the  opposite  is  taken  negatively,  for  a  mere  im- 
potence, it  is  not  the  ultimate  criterion  ;  for  obviously 
the  mere  inability  of  a  finite  mind  to  see  how  a 
thing  could  be  otherwise  than  as  conceived  by  it, 
is  no  proof  that  the  thing  could  not  be  otherwise. 
The  simple  incompetence  of  the  spectators  to  con- 
ceive how  a  conjurer  can  do  otherwise  than  betray 
certain  indications,  in  some  piece  of  sleight  of  hand, 
does  not  prove  that  he  cannot  avoid  the  betrayal. 
The  point  is  too  clear  to  allow  of  serious  dispute, 
unless  a  man  has  the  self-assurance  to  fancy,  that 

10  Hume  is  of  some  use  here  :  "  A  future  state  is  so  far  removed 
from  our  comprehension,  and  we  have  so  obscure  an  idea  of  the 
manner  in  which  we  shall  exist  after  the  dissolution  of  the  body, 
that  all  the  reasons  we  can  invent,  however  strong  in  themselves, 
and  however  much  assisted  by  education,  are  never  able  with  slow 
imaginations  to  surmount  this  difficulty,  or  to  bestow  a  sufficient 
authority  and  force  on  the  idea.  .  .  .  Except  those  few,  who  upon  cool 
reflexion  on  the  importance  of  the  subject,  have  taken  care  by  repeated 
meditation  to  imprint  upon  their  minds  the  arguments  for  a  future  state, 
there  scarcely  are  any  who  believe  the  immortality  of  the  soul 
with  a  true  and  established  judgment,"  say  rather,  with  a  conviction 
which  they  can  defend  in  set  terms.  (Treatise,  Part  III.  sec.  ix.) 


ULTIMATE  CRITERION  OF  CERTITUDE.  203 

there  is  no  possibility  beyond  his  powers  of  con- 
ception. We  are  left,  therefore,  to  deal  with  positive 
inconceivability.  What  for  positive  reasons  is  seen 
to  be  such  that  its  contradictory  is  impossible, 
implies  more  than  a  mere  impotence  to  conceive :  it 
implies  a  power  to  perceive  that  something  cannot  be. 
That  must  be  true,  the  opposite  of  which  is  thus 
seen  to  be  inconceivable.  But  it  is  a  clumsy  choice 
to  pick  out  precisely  the  inconceivability  as  the 
ultimate  criterion ;  for  the  more  important  element 
is  the  positive  conceivability,  or  the  evidence  that 
something  is  as  we  see  it  to  be.  Whoever  judges 
that  something  certainly  is,  implicitly  judges  that 
under  the  circumstances  the  opposite  is  incon- 
ceivable ;  the  thing  must  be  so  and  cannot  be  other- 
wise, however  contingent  may  have  been  the  fact  of 
its  realization.  Here,  however,  what  best  deserves 
to  be  called  the  criterion  of  the  judgment  is  its 
objective  evidence.  It  is  not  primarily  because  we 
cannot  conceive  the  opposite,  that  we  believe  that 
two  and  two  make  four ;  but  because  we  perceive 
the  necessary  identity  between  twice  two  and  four. 
Even  when  a  proposition  is  said  to  be  proved 
negatively,  the  case  is  the  same.  In  the  reductio  ad 
absurdum,  and  in  the  proof  by  exclusion  of  all  hypo- 
theses but  one,  positive  conceivability  is  still  the 
guide  ;  evidence  is  the  criterion.11 

Inasmuch,  then,  as  Mr.  Spencer's  criterion  agrees 
with  the  one  to  be  advocated  in  the  next  chapter, 
there  is  nothing  to  dispute  with  him ;  inasmuch  as 

11  Mr.  Bosanquet  argues  elaborately  for  a  certain  priority  of  the 
affirmative  over  the  negative  judgment.  {Logic,  pp.  294 — 297.) 


204  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

it  is  vague,  inadequate,  and  incorrect,  it  is  to  be 
repudiated.  Besides  those  already  indicated,  one 
great  flaw  in  it  is  its  admitted  fallibility,  on  account 
of  which  the  author  affirms  that  the  less  frequently 
his  "  universal  postulate  "  enters  into  an  argument, 
the  better,  for  the  less  is  the  liability  to  error. 
Every  use  of  the  criterion  is  a  fresh  possibility  of 
mistake.  This  premised,  his  rule  is :  Reduce  any 
proposition  to  its  simplest  statements ;  then  apply 
to  each  the  test  of  the  inconceivability  of  the  oppo- 
site :  the  result  is  the  nearest  approach  you  can 
make  to  truth,  while  your  dangers  of  having  gone 
wrong  are  to  be  estimated  by  the  number  of  times 
you  have  had  to  use  your  criterion.12 

8.  Here  must  end  the  review  of  criteria  to  be 
rejected ;  and  from  what  has  been  seen,  one  con- 
clusion impressed  upon  us  should  be,  that  the  real 
criterion  will  have  to  accord  with  what  we  know  to 
be  the  real  nature  of  human  intelligence.  If  a  man 
steadily  refuses  to  rise  above  the  standard  of  asso- 
ciated sensations  and  their  residues,  if  he  will  not 
ascend  beyond  the  conception  of  L  'Homme  Machine, 
he  can  never  hope  to  find  a  test  of  genuine  certitude, 
for  he  is  tied  down  to  mere  empiricism,  or  the 
doctrine  which  builds  up  knowledge  out  of  mere 
associated  ideas  of  experience,  without  any  sub- 
stantial soul  that  has  an  active  power  of  intelligence. 
In  a  good  sense  we  are  all  empiricists.     The  school- 

12  Compare  with  this  theory  Hume's  view,  that  in  strict  reason- 
ing every  successive  revision,  by  the  mind,  of  its  own  fallible 
judgment,  ought  to  reduce  the  mere  probability  with  which  it 
started  to  less  and  less  dimensions,  till  nothing  is  left.  {Treatise, 
Part  IV.  sec.  i.) 


ULTIMATE   CRITERION   OF  CERTITUDE.  205 

men  admit  no  innate  ideas,  no  knowledge  which  has 
not  an  origin  in  experience ;  yet  they  are  not  what 
we  call  pure  empiricists.  They  strongly  maintain 
that  the  Leibnitzian  salvo  to  a  famous  empirical  rule 
is  not  mere  verbiage,  but  expresses  an  important  fact. 
As  every  one  knows,  to  "  Nought  is  in  the  mind  which 
was  not  previously  in  the  senses,"13  Leibnitz  added, 
"Save  the  mind  itself,"14  a  most  substantial  addition 
against  those  who  speak  as  though  mind  were  a 
mere  series  of  phenomenal  states  inherent  in  no 
substance.  What  seems  a  truism  becomes  really 
an  important  truth  in  opposition  to  those  who 
deny  it  either  formally  or  equivalentiy.  The 
schoolmen  make  much  of  the  doctrine  that  the 
intellect  is  no  "  mere  abstraction  turned  into  an 
entity,"  is  not  a  mere  name  for  the  aggregate 
of  all  our  ideas,  but  a  principle  of  action,  present 
from  earliest  infancy,  though  not  ready  to  come 
into  proper  play  till  certain  material  conditions 
have  been  developed.  In  its  activity,  however, 
human  intellect  is  subject  to  a  condition  analogous 
to  that  inertia,  whereby  matter  does  not  act  unless 
acted  upon.  Mind  cannot  act  without  some  initia- 
tion on  the  part  of  the  senses.  Many  points  are 
left  obscure,  but  what  we  gather  with  certainty  from 
the  interpretation  of  experience  is,  that  the  same 
soul  which  shares  in  eliciting  the  sensation,  on  the 
occurrence  of  the  sensation  frequently  proceeds  to 
a  corresponding  act  of  intelligence ;  and  that  intel- 
ligence, once  possessed  of  ideas,  has  a  large  fund  of 

J3  "  Nihil  est  in  intellectu  quod  prius  non  fuerit  in  sensibus." 
14   "  Nisi  intellectus  ipse." 


co6  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

power  peculiar  to  itself,  whereby  it  is  enabled  to 
push  its  knowledge  far  beyond  the  bare  sensitive 
data.  No  doubt  these  data  always  form  some  limit 
to  intellect,  in  such  sort  that  the  physicist  must  be 
perpetually  feeding  his  mind  with  new  observations ; 
but  on  this  account  to  deny  the  special  power  of 
intellect  to  enlarge  upon  its  original  data,  is  simply 
preposterous. 

Consider  the  case  of  a  man  who  has  been  a  great 
observer,  but  not  much  of  a  thinker :  if  suddenly  he 
becomes  blind,  and  spends  the  rest  of  a  long  life  in 
elaborating  his  acquired  materials,  what  vast  pro- 
gress he  may  make  in  real  science !  Consider, 
again,  the  ample  and  objectively  valid  results  due 
to  geometry,  synthetic  and  analytic  ;  to  mathematics 
generally ;  to  mental  and  moral  philosophy ;  and  it 
will  appear  how  mighty  is  that  action  of  thought 
which  supervenes  upon  sensation,  and  carries  its 
conquests  into  regions  not  less  real  because  their 
objects  are  not  able  to  act  on  the  sense  organs.  As 
the  acute  disciple  may  pass  in  thought  beyond  what 
his  duller  teacher  tells  him,  so  and  still  more  may 
intellect  pass  beyond  its  source  in  sensation.  It  is, 
therefore,  the  veriest  perversity  to  limit  reality  to 
the  data  of  sense,  and  to  declare  all  besides  to  be 
mere  "  symbolism,"  of  no  value  except  so  far  as  it 
can  be  reduced  back  again  to  its  sensible  beginnings. 
Intellect  is  always  valid  so  long  as  it  proceeds  in 
the  only  way  which  is  intelligent,  namely,  not  by 
blind  mechanism  or  instinct  alone,  but  with  insight, 
seeing  its  way  as  it  goes.  Viewing  it  thus,  we  shall 
reach  a  criterion  of  certitude. 


ULTIMATE   CRITERION   OF  CERTITUDE.  207 

But  for  pure  empiricists,  with  all  their  boasted 
adherence  to  the  most  literal  realities,  there  is 
nothing  left  but  that  blank  result,  which  Mr.  Huxley 
says  cannot  be  disproved — an  empty  idealism  with 
no  assured  basis  of  reality.  Their  "  objective  and 
subjective  sides,"  their  "  phenomena  of  the  ego  and 
phenomena  of  the  non-ego"  their  "  faint  and  vivid 
aggregates,"  all  turn  out  to  be  mere  shadows — 
shadows  of  the  Unknowable,  that  is,  of  the  Un- 
thinkable, that  is,  of  Nothing.  Brahm,  or  Buthos, 
or  Chaos,  or  the  Mundane  Egg,  were  names 
accounting  for  the  universe  of  which  we  are  con- 
scious just  as  validly  as  do  some  recent  specula- 
tions, which  are  supposed  by  their  authors  to  be  far 
above  the  old  mythologies.  In  face  of  such  dis- 
astrous philosophizing,  we  may  well  be  moved  to 
search  after  some  really  valid  criterion  of  truth. 

Addenda. 

(1)  It  would  be  small  satisfaction  to  be  told,  that 
the  laws  of  our  nature  are  such  as  to  compel  us  to 
accept  certain  propositions,  if  meanwhile  our  enforced 
belief  could  not  be  shown  to  rest  on  any  rational 
grounds.  FalstafF  would  "  give  no  man  reasons 
on  compulsion  ;  "  and  the  mind  equally  objects  to  take 
compulsions  for  reasons.  Are  the  Scottish  school  guilty 
of  attempting  this  violence  ?  Reid  is  not  unfrequently 
accused  of  basing  science  on  common  sense,  and 
common  sense  on  blind  instinct  ;  but  it  is  far  from  cor- 
rect to  say  that  this  is  his  doctrine  throughout  his  works. 
Many  passages  undoubtedly  there  are,  which  naturally 
enough  lead  to  the  unfavourable  interpretation,  and 
which,  if  they  were  not  counterbalanced  and  even  re- 


208  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

tracted  by  opposite  declarations,  would  deservedly 
bring  his  system  under  absolute  condemnation.  Ne- 
glecting what  cannot  be  approved,  let  us,  at  present, 
show  Reid  on  his  commendable  side ;  in  places,  at 
any  rate,  he  asserts,  not  simply  necessity,  but  mental 
necessity,  which  latter  is  a  very  different  thing  from 
blind  necessity. 

In  the  chapter  on  Common  Sense,1  passages  like  the 
following  are  found  to  redeem  the  author's  reputation  : 
' 'The  same  degree  of  understanding,  which  makes  a 
man  capable  of  acting  with  common  prudence  in  the 
conduct  of  life,  makes  him  capable  of  discovering  what 
is  true  and  what  is  false  in  matters  that  are  self-evident, 
and  which  he  distinctly  apprehends"  This  contrasts 
strongly  for  the  better  with  Hume's  doctrine,  that  our 
faculties  suffice  for  guidance  in  practical  life,  but  not  for 
the  acquisition  of  rational  truth.  Reid  continues  :  "  All 
knowledge  and  all  science  must  be  built  upon  principles 
that  are  self-evident,  and  of  such  principles  every  man 
who  has  common  sense  is  a  competent  judge,  when  he 
conceives  them  distinctly.  We  ascribe  to  reason  two 
offices  or  two  degrees :  the  first  is  to  judge  of  things 
self-evident,  the  second  to  draw  conclusions  about 
things  that  are  not  self-evident  from  those  that  are. 
The  first  of  these  is  the  province,  and  the  sole  province, 
of  common  sense."  And  in  the  opening  chapter  of  the 
Second  Essay  he  had  said :  u  Evidence  is  the  ground 
of  judgment,  and  when  we  see  evidence  it  is  impossible 
not  to  judge." 

To  declare,  therefore,  without  large  qualification, 
that  Reid  ultimately  makes  intelligence  an  unintelligent 
impulse  to  believe,  is  an  unguarded  criticism,  which 
has  been  written  too  exclusively  on  the  strength  of 
some  passages  that  we  must  now  consider. 
i  Intellectual  Powers,  Essay  vi.  c.  ii. 


ULTIMATE   CRITERION   OF  CERTITUDE.  209 

The  grounds  for  misconceiving  Reid  are  not  hard  to 
find ;  a  specimen  of  them  may  be  seen  in  Essay  ii. 
ch.  xx.  What  he  there  calls  dark  and  inscrutable  is, 
not  the  act  of  belief  itself,  but  the  nature  of  this  act — how 
it  is  that  we  have  faculties  at  all,  and  that  they  can 
do  such  a  wonderful  thing  as  is  involved  in  knowing  ? 
Blind  belief,  and  blindness  to  the  mode  of  working  in 
the  faculties — these  are  two  vastly  different  things : 
the  latter  of  which,  not  the  former,  is  what  Reid  really 
wants  to  assert.  The  process,  so  far  as  conscious,  is 
intelligent :  its  nature  considered  as  something,  in  the 
broad  sense  of  the  word,  physical,  is  beyond  the  grasp 
of  consciousness. 

But,  unfortunately,  Reid  has  gone  too  far  in  setting 
forth  the  mystery  of  knowledge,  thereby  giving  to  his 
adversaries  some  foundation  for  the  worst  charges  they 
bring  against  his  doctrine.  For  instead  of  regarding 
the  process  as  one  competent  to  nature,  he  signifies 
that  sensation,  and  its  consequent  idea,  may  have  no 
more  connexion  than  the  will  of  the  Creator  that  one 
should  follow  the  other  in  definite  order.  "  Whether 
they  are  connected  by  any  necessary  tie,  or  only  con- 
joined in  our  constitution  by  the  will  of  Heaven,  we 
know  not."  No  doubt  this  suggestion  of  occasionalism, 
or  of  the  doctrine  that  definite  conjunctions  of  created 
objects  are  merely  the  occasions  upon  which  God  acts  on 
them  in  definite  ways,  is  to  be  regretted  ;  for  it  shows  a 
readiness  to  take  knowledge  out  of  the  sphere  of  natural 
causation,  whereas  we  have  good  reason  to  regard  it  as 
a  natural  product.  Reid,  however,  does  not  allow  that 
his  teaching  thus  removes  knowledge  from  the  domain 
of  nature,  but  herein  he  is  hardly  consistent.  We 
cannot  more  favourably  take  our  leave  of  him,  than 
when  he  is  speaking  so  thoroughly  in  accord  with  our 
own  doctrine  as  are  these  words  of  his :  "  That  there 


210  NATURE  OF  CERTITUDE. 

are  just  grounds  for  belief  may  be  doubted  by  no  man 
who  is  not  a  sceptic.  We  give  the  name  of  evidence 
to  whatever  is  a  ground  of  belief.  To  believe  without 
evidence  is  a  weakness  which  every  man  is  concerned 
to  avoid.  Nor  is  it  in  a  man's  power  to  believe  any- 
thing, longer  than  he  thinks  he  has  evidence.  What 
this  evidence  is,  is  more  easily  felt  than  described. 
It  is  the  business  of  the  logician  to  explain  its  nature, 
but  any  man  of  understanding  can  judge  of  it,  and 
commonly  judges  of  it  right,  when  the  evidence  is  fairly 
laid  before  him,  and  his  mind  is  free  from  prejudice."2 

Another  representative  of  the  Scotch  school,  Brown,* 
has  expressions  which  some  might  seize  upon  to  justify 
the  common  accusation  that  belief  is  made  matter  of 
blind  impulse.  "  All  belief,"  he  says,  "  must  ultimately 
be  traced  to  some  primary  proposition,  which  we  admit 
for  the  evidence  contained  in  itself,  or  to  speak  more 
accurately,  from  the  mere  impossibility  of  our  dis- 
believing it,  because  the  admission  is  a  necessary  part 
of  our  intellectual  constitution."  What  is  here  called 
"  speaking  more  accurately  "  is  at  least  speaking  more 
ambiguously,  and  is  open  to  a  construction  which 
would  make  the  doctrine  condemnable.  Perhaps  the 
error  is  redeemed  by  referring  the  necessity  to  our 
"  intellectual  constitution :  "  for  if  the  necessity  is  truly 
intellectual,  it  is  not  blind,  but  the  effect  of  compelling 
evidence.  Still  Brown's  case  is  rendered  all  the  more 
suspicious  because  he  denies  the  principle  of  efficient 
causality ;  and  asserts,  for  such  causality  as  he  does 
admit,  grounds  which  by  his  use  of  the  word  "intui- 
tion," and  by  his  reference  of  this  "intuition"  to  the 
bounty  of  the  Creator,  are  rendered  very  insecure.* 
"  We  believe,"  he  writes,  "  in  the  uniformity  of  nature, 

a  Intellectual  Powers,  Essay  ii.  c.  xx.         3  Human  Mind,  Lect.  xiii.  xiv. 
4  Inquiry  into  the  Relation  of  Cause  and  Effect,  Part  I.  sec.  ii. 


ULTIMATE   CRITERION   OF  CERTITUDE.  211 

not  because  we  can  demonstrate  it  to  others  or  to  our- 
selves, but  because  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  disbelieve 
it.  The  belief  is  in  every  instance  an  intuition,  and 
intuition  does  not  stand  in  need  of  argument."  Un- 
doubtedly real  intuition  is  immediate,  not  reached 
through  the  medium  of  argument ;  but  Brown's  view 
of  intuition  is  peculiar. 

If  Brown  is  unsatisfactory,  so  too  is  Hamilton. 5  He 
teaches  that  knowledge  rests  on  insight,  belief  on  feeling; 
that  the  one  cannot  exist  without  the  other ;  and  that 
any  definite  act  takes  one  name  or  the  other  from 
the  element  which  is  predominant.  But  he  puzzles  us 
when  he  goes  on  to  say:  "What  is  given  as  an  ultimate 
principle  of  knowledge  is  given  as  a  fact,  the  existence 
of  which  we  must  admit,  but  the  reason  of  whose 
existence  we  cannot  know."  So  far  we  might  interpret 
him  benignantly  ;  but  the  next  sentence  is  hard  to  take 
in  good  part.  "  Such  an  admission,  as  it  is  not  know- 
ledge, must  be  a  belief:  and  thus  it  is  that  all  our 
knowledge  is,  in  its  root  blind,  a  passive  faith,  in  other 
words,  a  feeling."  This  apparent  basing  of  the  element 
of  "  insight  "  on  the  element  of  "  blind  feeling  "  is  very 
misleading :  and  the  difficulty  is  increased  by  all 
that  Hamilton  has  written  about  a  belief  of  ours,  the 
object  of  which  he  regards  as  inconceivable,  involving 
not  a  conception,  but  a  negation  or  impotence  of  con- 
ception, e.g.,  "the  infinite  is  conceived  only  by  thinking 
away  every  character  by  which  the  finite  was  con- 
ceived :  we  conceive  it  only  as  inconceivable."  6 

Those  who  wish  to  see  some  defence  of  this 
writer  may  consult  Professor  Veitch's  Hamilton,  and 
Mansel's  Philosophy  of  the  Conditioned.  The  latter  offers, 
as  a  key  to  a  large  part  of  the  position,  the  following 

5  Logic,  Lect.  xxvii.     Note  A  on  Reid,  p.  760  ;  Discussions,  p.  86. 
6  Logic,  Lecture  vi. 


NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 


suggestions :  "  To  conceive  a  thing  as  possible,  we 
must  conceive  the  manner  in  which  it  is  possible ;  but 
we  may  believe  in  the  fact  without  being  able  to 
conceive  the  manner.  Had  Hamilton  distinctly  ex- 
pressed this,  he  might  have  avoided  some  very  ground- 
less criticisms,  with  which  he  has  been  assailed,  for 
maintaining  a  distinction  between  the  provinces  of  con- 
ception and  belief."  This  hardly  accounts  for  such  a 
notion  as  we  have  of  the  infinite  being  called  a  mere 
"impotence  of  thought,"  "the  negation  of  a  concep- 
tion : "  nor  is  that  account  fully  rendered  even  when 
we  have  further  taken  into  consideration  Hamilton's 
doctrine,  that  to  conceive  is  to  comprehend  under  a  class. 

On  the  whole,  the  Scottish  school  cannot  be  ac- 
quitted of  blame,  yet  are  perhaps  less  blameworthy  than 
some  of  its  critics  have  supposed.  What  it  is  popu- 
larly taken  to  teach,  but  what  is  not  exactly  its  doctriner 
is  the  suicidal  theory,  that  there  is  a  practical  common 
sense,  which  sets  reason  at  defiance,  and  is  rightly  thus 
defiant.  Pascal  expresses  the  same  opinion  in  his 
famous  sentence:  "Nature  confounds  the  Pyrrhonists 
and  reason  the  dogmatists.  Our  inability  to  prove  a 
truth  is  such  as  no  dogmatism  can  overcome;  and  we 
have  an  apprehension  of  the  truth  such  as  no  Pyrrho- 
nism can  overcome." 

(2)  When  it  is  said  that  not  many  philosophers  in 
this  country  regard  our  knowledge  as  due  to  ideas 
communicated  from  above,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that 
the  late  Professor  Green  of  Oxford,  and  some  other 
kindred  thinkers,  depart  from  what  we  may  call  the 
natural  tradition  as  founded  by  Locke,  and  approach 
nearer  to  Malebranche.  As  a  specimen,  take  the  theory 
of  Professor  Green, 7  which  it  is  difficult  to  give  very 
intelligibly ;  but  a  few  hints  will  suffice.  He  describes 
7  See  more  on  the  subject,  Bk.  II.  c.  ii.  Addenda  (3). 


ULTIMATE   CRITERION   OF  CERTITUDE.  213 

our  process  of  learning  as  a  gradual  realizing  of  "  the 
universal  mind  "  in  the  ''finite  mind."  First  there  is 
"  a  spiritual  activity,"  which  produces  nature  as  a 
system  of  knowable  and  known  relations,  which  relations 
cannot  exist  except  as  objects  of  consciousness.  Then, 
part  of  this  universal  system  of  relations,  known  to  the 
Universal  Consciousness,  also  becomes  known  to  finite 
intelligences,  which  "are  limited  modes  of  the  world- 
consciousness,"  in  some  non-pantheistic  sense  of  the 
terms.  "  The  source  of  the  uniform  relation  between 
phenomena  and  the  source  of  our  knowledge  of  them, 
is  one  and  the  same.  The  question,  how  it  is  that  the 
order  of  nature  answers  to  our  conception  of  it,  is 
answered  by  the  recognition  of  the  fact,  that  our  con- 
ceptions of  the  order  of  nature  and  the  relations  which 
form  that  order,  have  a  common  spiritual  source."8 

(3)  In  denying  to  consistency  the  rank  of  the  ulti- 
mate criterion  of  certitude,  we  must  not  in  any  way 
detract  from  its  real  dignity.  Rather  we  ought  to  do 
our  best  to  assert  its  true  rank,  in  these  days  when 
system  and  coherence  are  often  despaired  of,  and  the 
best  we  can  do  is  supposed  to  be  to  lay  hold  of  a  few 
"  vital  ideas."  It  is  a  sign  of  the  times  that  a  prophet 
in  America  could  coolly  write  to  a  prophet  in  England, 
as  Emerson 9  to  Carlyle,  in  strains  so  characteristic, 
and  so  little  scandalizing  to  a  large  body  of  admirers : 
"  Here  I  sit,  and  read  and  write  with  very  little  system, 
and  as  far  as  regards  composition  with  the  most  frag- 
mentary result,  paragraphs  incomprehensible,  each 
sentence  an  infinitely  repellent  particle."10  The  same 
author  records  in  his  journal:   "I  hate  preaching;    it 

8  Green's  view  may  be  seen  compendiously  in  his  Introduction 
to  Hume's  Works,  §  146  and  §  152. 

9  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson  :  a  Biographical  Sketch.  By  A.  Ireland, 
pp.  27,  30,  no,  in,  124 — 129. 

10  lb.  pp.  27,  30. 


214  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

is  a  pledge,  and  I  wish  to  say  what  I  feel  and  think 
to-day,  with  a  proviso  that  to-morrow,  perhaps,  I  shall 
contradict  it  all." IX  Speaking  apologetically,  he  says  : 
"  It  strikes  me  as  very  odd,  that  good  and  wise  men 
should  think  of  raising  me  into  an  object  of  criticism. 
I  have  always  been,  from  my  very  incapacity  of  me- 
thodical writing,  a  chartered  libertine,  free  to  worship 
and  free  to  rail,  lucky  when  I  could  make  myself  under- 
stood, but  never  esteemed  near  enough  to  the  insti- 
tutions and  mind  of  society,  to  deserve  the  notice  of 
the  masters  of  literature  and  religion.  I  well  know 
there  is  no  scholar  less  willing  and  less  able  than  myself 
to  be  a  polemic.  I  could  not  give  an  account  of  myself 
if  challenged.  I  could  not  possibly  give  you  the  argu- 
ments you  so  cruelly  hint  at,  on  which  any  doctrine  of 
mine  stands."12  His  method  of  composition  answered 
to  the  rest  of  the  man.  His  habit  was  to  go  out  almost 
daily  and  hunt  after  a  thought ;  then  coming  back  to 
record  the  day's  capture  in  a  book.  So  day  by  day  he 
added  to  his  list  of  stray  ideas.  When  the  time  came 
to  deliver  a  lecture,  he  went  to  his  thought-record, 
strung  a  lot  together  like  beads  on  a  thread,  with  little 
care  for  definite  harmonious  result.  The  picture  of 
one  who  so  little  valued  consistent  wholes  is  worth 
holding  up  as  a  warning  to  the  present  generation,  in 
which  so  many,  despairing  of  the  reduction  of  their 
ideas  to  unity,  set  little  store  by  consistent,  systematic 
thought.  Provided  a  man  is  clever,  bold,  and  out- 
spoken, he  may  pass  for  a  great  thinker ;  as  is  the  case 
with  many  a  mischief-worker  like  Diderot,  of  whom  De 
Lamennais  testifies,  II  nie  tout,  croit  tout,  et  doute  de  tout, 
au  gre  de  son  imagination  ardente  et  mobile. 

It  is  notable  that  Emerson  was  one  of  the  first  to 
hail  Walt  Whitman  as  a  great  poet,  no  doubt  for  verses 
11  lb.  p.  no.  ,2  lb.  pp.  124 — 129. 


ULTIMATE  CRITERION   OF  CERTITUDE.  215 

like  these  which  are  culled  from  various  "poems"  in 
Rosetti's  collection  for  English  readers  : 

I  make  the  poem  of  evil  also,  I  commemorate  that  part  also. 
I  am  just  as  much  evil  as  good,  and  my  nation  is. 

And  I  say  there  is  in  fact  no  evil ; 
Or  if  there  is,  I  say  it  is  just  as  important  to  you,  to  the  law,  or  to 

me  as  anything  else. 
And  I  will  show  there  is  no  imperfection  in  the  present  and  can  be 

none  in  the  future. 
What  will  be,  will  be  well — for  what  is,  is  well. 
The  difference  between  sin  and  goodness  is  no  delusion. 
Whither  I  walk  I  cannot  define,  but  I  know  it  is  to  good. 
The  whole  universe  indicates  that  it  is  to  good. 
To  me  there  is  just  as  much  in  ugliness  as  there  is  in  beauty. 
Of  criminals,  to  me  any  judge  or  any  juror  is  equally  criminal, — and 

any  respectable  person  is  also — and  the  President  is  also. 

Some  may  say  the  context  will  explain  all  these  utter- 
ances :  but  that  is  not  a  plain  man's  experience,  who 
finds  one  of  the  most  intelligible  and  truthful  of  the 
verses  to  be  this  : 

Now  I  perceive  I  have  not  understood  anything — not  a  single  object 
— and  that  no  man  can. 

Unfortunately,  there  are  those  other  declarations  to  be 
got  over,  that  obscure  the  little  bit  that  seemed  so 
obvious : 

As  for  me  (lorn,  stormy,  even  as  I,  amid  these  vehement  days), 

I  have  the  idea  of  all,  and  am  all,  and  believe  in  all : 

I  adopt  each  theory,  myth,  God,  and  demigod : 

I  believe  materialism  is  true,  and  spiritualism  is  true — I  reject  no 

part. 
I  see  that  the  old  accounts,  Bibles,  genealogies,  are  true  without 

exception. 
I  assert  that  all  past  days  are  what  they  should  have  been, 
And  that  they  could  nohow  have  been  better  than  they  were, 
And  that  to-day  is  what  it  should  be. 

One  reason  for  insisting  on  the  First  Principles  of 
Knowledge  is  to  prevent  men  like  Walt  Whitman  from 
becoming  the  poets  either  of  the  future  or  of  the  present. 


CHAPTER   XIII. 

EVIDENCE   AS  THE    ULTIMATE    OBJECTIVE    CRITERION 
OF   TRUTH. 

Synopsis. 

i.  The  nature  of  human  knowledge,  and  the  consequent  nature 
of  its  objective  criterion. 

2.  We  have  to  show  that  this  is  evidence.     What  we  mean  by 

evidence. 

3.  Proof  that  evidence  is  the  ultimate  objective  criterion. 

4.  Confirmation  of  the  proof  from  animal  instinct. 

5.  A  series  of  objections,  serving  to  bring  out  more  clearly  the 

meaning  of  evidence  as  a  criterion,  (a)  The  criterion  of 
evidence  means  judgment  by  appearances,  (b)  The  cri- 
terion is  tautological,  "that  is  certain  which  is  evident;" 
whereas  we  want  a  rule  to  settle  what  in  every  case  is 
evident — not  a  declaration  that  the  evident,  when  found, 
is  the  true,  (c)  How  can  abstract  truths,  and  truths  about 
mere  possibilities  have  an  objective  reality,  when  they 
exist  only  as  terms  of  the  mind  ? 

6.  The  complicated  nature  of  evidence. 
Addenda. 

Often  because  they  have  expected  too  much  from 
a  universal  criterion  of  truth,  philosophers  have 
declared  that  no  such  thing  is  possible.  While 
some  affirm  that  there  are  innumerable  criteria  for 
different  cases,  but  no  common  criterion  for  all, 
others  have  gone  further  and  proclaimed  absolute 
certainty  to  be  beyond  human  attainment.  The 
question  is  undoubtedly  difficult ;  and  yet  difficulties 


ULTIMATE   OBJECTIVE   CRITERION   OF  TRUTH.    217 

will  yield  to  a  patient  examination  of  what  it  is  we 
experience  when  we  have  these  states  of  certainty, 
which  previous  propositions  have  shown  to  be  some- 
times ours. 

1.  The  subject  of  a  criterion  has  so  many  ramifi- 
cations, that  we  must  pick  out  what  part  precisely 
of  the  problem  is  to  occupy  our  attention.  And 
first  it  will  be  well  to  quote  the  very  words  of  some 
of  the  schoolmen,  in  which  they  describe  the  process 
of  knowing,  and  therefore  the  process  of  acquiring 
certitude,  as  involving  acts  of  conception. 

The  schoolmen,  to  show  that  knowledge  is  no 
mere  subjective  fact,  insist  upon  its  origin  in  us  by 
way  of  a  conception  and  birth,  and  of  double  parent- 
age.1 Knowledge  is  generated  by  subject  and  object 
together  :  "  Whatever  object  we  know,  this  in  union 
with  the  cognitive  faculty  generates  within  us  the 
knowledge  of  itself.  For  knowledge  is  equally  the 
product  of  both.  Hence  when  the  mind  is  conscious 
of  itself,  it  is  the  sole  parent  of  its  self-knowledge  ; 
being  at  once  the  knowing  and  the  object  known."  2 
The  union  of  object  with  subject  must  be  brought 
about  "  either  by  means  of  its  own  essence  or  by 
a  similarity  between  them." 3  Thus  teaches  St. 
Thomas.      In   the  same    sense  is   the   teaching  of 

1  Cf.  Kleutgen,  Philosophie  der  Vorzeit,  I.  §  22. 

2  "  Omnis  res,  quamcumque  cognoscimus,  congenerat  in  nobis 
notitiam  sui.  Ab  utroque  enim  notitia  paritur,  a  cognoscente  et 
cognito.  Itaque  mens,  cum  seipsam  cognoscit,  sola  parens  est 
notitias  sui;  et  cognitum  enim  et  cognitor  ipsa  est."  (St.  Thomas, 
De  Trinit.,  1.  ix.  c.  xii ) 

3  "  Sive  per  essentiam  suam  sive  per  similitudinem."  (Idem,  De 
Veritate,  q.  viii.  a.  6.) 


NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 


Suarez :  "  The  cognitive  power  is  in  a  state  of  in- 
determination  as  regards  the  production  of  this  or 
the  other  object :  hence  to  be  determined  to  a 
particular  act  of  knowledge,  it  needs  to  be  placed 
in  a  certain  relation  with  the  object."4  In  the 
same  way  Silvester  Maurus  argues,  that  know- 
ledge must  be  the  joint  product  of  faculty  and 
object :  as  a  vital,  assimilative  act  it  must  be  the 
work  of  the  intellect ;  but  for  its  determination  to 
one  definite  similitude  rather  than  to  another  it 
must  be  dependent  on  the  object. 

This  doctrine,  that  human  knowledge  results 
from  faculty  as  determined  by  object  would  be 
simple  enough,  if  the  intellectual  object  could  be 
shown  always  to  work  upon  the  intellect,  as  a 
luminous  body  upon  the  eye.  But  an  appeal  to 
examples  shows  that  the  case  is  otherwise.  Accord- 
ing to  St.  Thomas  and  the  Thomists,  it  is  truer  to 
say  that,  the  intellect  illuminates  its  object  than 
that  the  object  illuminates  the  intellect ;  evidence 
does  not  simply  pour  in  upon  the  mind  from  outer 
things,  but  the  intellect  has  rather  to  furnish  its 
own  light  of  evidence.  Hence  Lepidi  writes:  "The 
criterion  whereby  the  mind  judges  is  the  faculty  of 
judging;  the  criterion  according  to  which  it  judges,  is 
the  rule  or  norm  of  truth,  in  other  words,  that  inner 
light  whereby  an   object    becomes  evident." 5      He 

4  "  Potentia  cognoscitiva  est  indifferens  ad  operandum  circa  hoc 
vel  illud  objectum ;  et  ideo,  ut  determinetur  in  particulari  ad  cog- 
noscendum,  indiget  conjunctione  aliqua  ad  ipsum  objectum."  (De 
Anima,  1.  iii.  c.  i.) 

5  "  Criterium  per  quod  intellectus  judicat  est  ipsa  facultas  judi- 
candi :  criterium  secundum  quod,  est  ipsa  regula  vel  norma  veri,  nempe 
lux  ilia  interior,  secundum  quam  res  manifestatur."  (Logica,  p.  236.) 


ULTIMATE   OBJECTIVE   CRITERION   OF  TRUTH.   219 

further  adds :  "  This  light  has,  so  to  speak,  two 
aspects,  one,  in  so  far  as  it  is  in  the  soul  which  it 
informs  and  perfects ;  the  other,  inasmuch  as  it 
actually  represents  the  object  outside  the  mind."6 
The  first  aspect  he  calls  subjective,  the  second  objective  : 
but  what  may  disappoint  the  reader  is,  that  this 
objective  aspect  seems  really  part  of  the  subjective 
light,  not  an  influence,  an  irradiation,  a  determination 
coming  from  the  object.  If  only  thought  could  be 
described  as  the  direct  reaction  of  the  faculty  under 
a  directly  intelligible  impression  from  the  object,  it 
would  be  satisfactory :  whereas,  besides  its  own 
intrinsic  difficulties,  the  scholastic  account  of  how 
material  bodies  are  brought  to  bear  on  the  deter- 
mination of  thought  about  themselves,  seems  to 
deny  all  real  action  of  such  bodies  on  the  mind. 
The  problem  is  confessedly  difficult,7  and  has  been 
assigned,  not  to  the  logical,  but  to  the  psychological 
division  of  treatises  in  the  scholastic  system. 

Having  stated  where  the  deeper  difficulty  lies, 
we  may  proceed  to  do  enough  for  the  establishment 
of  an  objective  criterion  of  truth  within  the  limits 
of  our  own  treatise.8 

6  "  Habet  haec  lux,  ut  ita  dicam  duas  fades,  unain  quatenus 
est  in  anima,  quam  informat  et  perficit ;  alteram  quatenus  rem 
extra  animam  actu  repraesentat  ac  refert."  (Logica,  p.  361.) 

7  Kleutgen,  ut  supra. 

8  What  the  need  of  this  criterion  is,  will  the  more  manifestly 
appear,  if  we  look  into  the  writings  of  some  of  those  authors,  who  not 
being  downright  Kantians,  are  considerably  under  the  influence  of 
Kant's  doctrine  that  we  must  inquire  rather  how  objects  conform 
themselves  to  mind,  than  how  mind  conforms  itself  to  objects,  and 
that  there  are  a  priori  forms  of  mind,  such  as  substance  and  accident, 
causality  and  dependence,  which,  fox  aught  we  can  know,  may 


NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 


The  criterion,  quo  fit  judicium,  is  clearly  the 
intellect  itself,  and  this  we  suppose  given :  but  the 
objective  criterion,  secundum  quod  fit  judicium,  this 
in  its  ultimate  and  universal  nature  is  what  we  have 
to  investigate. 

Now  we  shall  avoid  the  difficulties  above  sig- 
nalized, if  we  take  the  problem  up  at  a  stage  to 
which  all  must  admit  that  it  advances,  however 
they  may  dispute  as  to  the  means  of  this  advance. 
All  certitudes  concern  propositions,  and,  in  last 
resort,  propositions  are  to  be  decided,  not  by  infer- 
ence from  others,  but  on  their  own  merits.  Our 
inquiry  into  an  ultimate  objective  criterion  may 
take  this  shape :  What,  in  last  analysis,  is  the 
objective  character  of  all  those  propositions,  which, 
when  they  come  before  the  mind  for  judgment,  claim 
from  it,  for  their  own  sake,  a  firm  assent?  This 
character  will  be  the  criterium  secundum  quod  of 
which  we  are  in  search. 

2.  It  may  be  declared  at  once  that  evidence  is 
the  objective  character,  quality,  or  property  which  we 
seek  :  but  since  the  manner  of  this  is  not  obvious 
at  once,  we  must  have  the  courage  to  plunge  into 
details. 


have  no  validity  except  as  conditions  of  our  thought.  Such  a 
doctrine  is  ruinous  to  objective  knowledge  and  is  too  much  favoured 
by  Mansel  {Prolegomena  Logica,  c.  iii.  p.  77),  who  tells  us,  that  "  the 
laws  to  which  our  faculties  are  subjected,  though  perhaps  not 
absolutely  binding  on  things  in  themselves,  are  binding  upon  our 
mode  of  contemplating  them."  When  we  hear  such  language  we 
are  prompted  to  seek  an  objective  criterion,  which  at  the  same 
time  shall  be  consistent  with  the  subjective  law,  cognition  est  in 
cognoscente  ad  modum  cognoscenti*. 


ULTIMATE   OBJECTIVE   CRITERION   OF  TRUTH.   221 

Evidentia  is  the  Latin  word  used  by  Cicero9  for 
ivApyeta,  the  root  of  which  is  found  also  in  argentum, 
argumentum,  &c.10  The  radical  meaning  therefore  is 
to  make  clear,  bright,  distinct,  conspicuous.  Every- 
thing, actual  or  possible,  as  is  proved  in  General 
Metaphysics,  has  its  truth — its  ontological  truth ; 
and  the  manifestation,  or  shining  forth  of  this, 
is  called  evidence.  Hence  the  speculation  as  to 
whether  there  are,  perhaps,  things-in-themselves, 
which  have  no  relation  whatever  to  any  intelligence, 
is  philosophically  absurd.  Ontological  truth  is 
co-extensive  with  all  being,  and  whatever  makes 
this  truth  apparent  to  the  mind  gives  its  evidence. 
Not  all  things  are  evident  to  us,  or  our  ignorance 
would  not  be  what  it  is :  still  several  things  do 
become  to  us  immediately  or  mediately  evident ; 
and  when  we  speak  thus,  we  are  using  the  word 
evident  not  in  its  popular  use  for  what  is  easily 
perceptible,  but  in  its  technical  use  for  what  is 
perceptible,  whether  by  easy  or  by  difficult  means. 

Evidence,  therefore,  is  that  character,  or  quality, 
about  proposed  truths  or  propositions,  whereby 
they  make  themselves  accepted  by  the  intellect,  or 
win  assent ;  while  the  intellect  is  made  conscious, 
that  such  assents  are  not  mere  subjective  phenomena 
of  its  own,  but  concern  facts  and  principles,  which 
have  a  validity  independent  of  its  perception  of 
them.  In  saying,  then,  that  evidence  is  the  ulti- 
mate criterion,  we  are  implying,  that  the  criterion 

9  Academ.  Lib.  II.  c.  vi.  n.  17.  (Nobbe's  Edition.) 

10  "Nihil  clarius  ivapyela,  ut  Grasci  perspicuitatem,  aut  eviden- 
tiam  nos,  si  placet,  nominemus." 


222  NATURE  OP  CERTITUDE. 

is  not,  as  some  have  vainly  imagined,  an  all-contain- 
ing proposition,  from  which  any  other  truth  may  be 
evolved ;  further,  that  is  not  a  proposition  at  all, 
but  a  character  of  all  propositions  which  so  come 
before  the  mind,  as  rightly  and  for  their  own  sake 
to  demand  its  assent.  When  the  nature  of  this 
character  has  been  discovered,  of  course  it  may  be 
declared  in  a  proposition,  or  enunciated  as  a  prin- 
ciple, "  Evidence  is  the  criterion  of  truth."  But 
the  criterion  in  itself  is  not  a  proposition  or  prin- 
ciple :  it  is  a  quality  found  in  all  propositions  or 
principles  which  we  can  rationally  accept,  for  their 
own  sake,  and  is  the  reason  of  that  acceptance. 

3.  To  prove  now  that  there  is  an  objective 
evidence,  which  experience  tells  us  to  be  our  ulti- 
mate criterion.  It  is  taught  in  theology  that  God 
is  the  substantial  truth  and  always  knows  all  truth. 
He  does  not  gradually  arrive  at  His  knowledge  by 
the  use  of  faculties  determined  in  their  activities 
by  outer  agents ;  eternally  and  immutably  He  has 
all  knowledge,  without  increase  or  diminution. 

But  we  are  beings  that  start  with  no  knowledge, 
and  gradually  acquire  our  stock  by  passing  de 
potentia  in  actum,  from  potentiality  to  act.  Moreover, 
this  transition  is  not  effected  by  mere  internal 
evolution ;  the  faculties  must  be  roused  and  deter- 
mined by  something  other  than  themselves.  Each 
faculty  has  it  own  proper  excitant  to  which  alone 
it  is  responsive.  The  ear  responds  only  to  one 
generic  mode  of  outer  vibration,  the  eye  only  to 
another,  the  palate  only  to  what  seems  to  be  a 
definite    kind  of  chemical  process,  and  so  on  with 


ULTIMATE   OBJECTIVE  CRITERION   OF  TRUTH.    223 

regard  to  the  other  senses.  Our  finite  intellect,  in 
like  manner,  responds  only  to  some  appropriate 
character  on  the  side  of  the  objects  presented  to  it, 
whatever  be  the  way  in  which  that  presentation  is 
effected.  Now  this  character  is  what  we  call  objec- 
tive evidence,  because  the  term  accurately  describes 
the  state  of  things  revealed  by  the  careful  con- 
sideration of  our  own  experience.  Surely  it  is  right 
to  frame  our  theory  on  the  analysis  of  experience : 
and  what  it  teaches  is,  that  we  do  not  make  truth, 
but  take  it,  when  it  urges  itself  upon  us  in  a  certain 
way,  such  that  we  feel  it  to  be  something  inde- 
pendent of  us,  existing  before  us,  and  giving  the 
law  imperiously  to  our  course  of  thought.  Consider 
the  proposition  :  "  Nothing  can  arise  by  chance, 
everything  must  have  a  sufficient  reason."  In 
viewing  the  terms  here,  we  feel  that  the  relation 
between  them  forces  itself  upon  us  by  way  of 
objective  evidence:  we  as  distinctly  feel  the  pres- 
sure put  upon  intelligence  by  some  reality  other 
than  itself,  as  we  feel  on  our  bodily  organs  the 
pressure  of  an  external  weight.11     Of  course  we  may 

"  This  is  the  idea  which  Locke,  with  no  great  success,  tries  to 
bring  out  in  answer  to  his  own  question,  how  do  men  know  that 
their  ideas  really  represent  the  conditions  of  things  ?  "  Simple 
ideas,"  he  replies,  "since  the  mind  can  by  no  means  make  them  to 
itself,  must  necessarily  be  the  product  of  things  operating  on  the  mind  in 
a  natural  way,  and  producing  therein  those  perceptions,  which  by 
the  wisdom  of  our  Maker  they  are  ordained  to."  {Human  Under- 
standing, Bk.  IV.  c.  iv.  §  4.)  He  adds  that  simple  ideas  "  carry  with 
them  all  the  conformity  which  is  intended,  or  which  our  state 
requires,  for  they  represent  to  us  things  under  those  appearances 
which  they  are  fitted  to  produce  in  us."  Words  like  these  last  convey 
to  many  readers  the  impression  that  Locke  regarded  knowledge  too 


224  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

view  the  case  on  the  subjective  side,  and  say  that 
it  is  insight  which  carries  us  along.  True,  but 
insight  must  have  its  object,  and  must  feel  the 
influence  of  that  object.  Mere  subjectivism  would 
never  so  distinctly  objectivize  itself,  never  tell  us  so 
plainly  that  the  truth  we  contemplate  is  valid  for 
all  intelligence,  and  that  to  no  intelligence  can 
it  really  be  manifest,  as  a  truth  for  it,  that 
events  may  happen  without  an  adequately  efficient 
cause.  Objective  evidence  must  here  lend  its 
aid. 

The  argument  will  not  avail  unless  we  recall  the 
doctrines  already  laid  down  about  necessary  truth, 
and  about  the  first  condition  of  philosophizing, 
which  is  our  assumed  ability  to  reach  objective 
truth.  But  with  these  doctrines  in  mind,  we  shall 
be  forced  to  admit  the  fairness  of  the  analysis, 
which,  from  an  experienced  act  of  certitude,  dis- 
engages objective  evidence  as  the  element  forming 

much  after  the  manner  of  the  passive  reception  of  a  stamp  im- 
pressed on  the  faculties  by  outer  agents ;  and  he  is  certainly 
unsatisfactory  in  what  he  teaches  elsewhere  in  the  same  book.  (c.  ii. 
§  14.)  Here  he  asserts  our  knowledge  of  the  outer  physical  universe 
to  be  beyond  "  bare  probability,"  yet  not  equal  to  "  intuition  "  and 
"demonstration."  If  he  meant  no  more  than  that  physical  certitude 
is  of  a  lower  order  than  metaphysical,  he  would  have  been  right 
enough  :  but  he  seems  to  allow  the  possibility  that  the  former  may 
not  be  a  full  certitude:  "There  can  be  nothing  more  certain  than 
that  the  idea  we  receive  from  an  external  object  is  in  our  minds : 
this  is  intuitive  knowledge.  But  whether  there  be  anything  more 
than  barely  an  idea  in  our  minds,  whether  we  can  thence  certainly 
infer  the  existence  of  anything  without  us  which  corresponds  to  that  idea, 
is  that  whereof  some  men  think  that  there  may  be  a  question  made : 
because  men  may  have  such  ideas  in  their  minds  when  no  such 
thing  exists,  no  such  object  affects  their  senses." 


ULTIMATE   OBJECTIVE   CRITERION   OF  TRUTH.   225 

the  criterion.  Those  who  deny  such  an  element, 
or  who  deny  to  it  its  right  position,  will  be  found 
denying  necessary  truth  and  violating  the  first  con- 
dition of  philosophy,  as  also  asserting  principles 
which  lead  directly  to  universal  scepticism.  Thus 
they  violate  the  implied  agreement  of  all  intelligent 
discussion,  that  whoever  in  the  course  of  it  enun- 
ciates principles  which  are  the  subversion  of  all 
rational  disputation,  should  be  thereby  declared  to 
have  sufficiently  refuted  himself,  and  to  be  silenced 
for  the  future. 

4.  The  proof  that  objective  evidence  is  man's 
criterion  of  truth  gains  some  confirmation  from  a 
contrast  with  animal  intelligence.  It  is  the  com- 
monly admitted  opinion,  that,  whatever  may  be  the 
process  of  animal  instinct,  it  is  not  one  of  calculated 
means  and  ends.  If  the  bee  does  build  what  is 
mechanically  the  best  sort  of  cell,  it  is  not  because 
of  perceived  mathematical  relations,  nor  because  of 
the  perceived  fitness.  Thus  the  process,  by  its 
contrast  with  our  way  of  deliberately  adapting 
means  to  ends,  serves  to  bring  out  more  clearly 
our  mode  of  thought,  and  to  emphasize  the  criterion 
of  objective  evidence. 

5.  The  meaning  of  evidence  as  a  criterion  will 
be  brought  out  into  still  greater  clearness,  if  we 
run  through  a  series  of  objections  against  the  term 
and  its  use. 

(a)  First,  it  may  be  said  to  sanction  a  habit  of 
judging  by  mere  appearances,  on  the  maxim,  "  That  is 
evident  which  to  me  appears  to  be," I2  yet  the  sounder 

,a  "  Evidens  est  quod  videtur," 
? 


226  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

maxim  is,  "  Trust  not  appearances."  In  answer,  we 
reply  that  appearances  always  are  what,  under  the 
circumstances,  they  ought  to  be,  if  we  except  moral 
deception  on  the  part  of  a  free  agent ;  so  that  it 
is  not  the  appearances  which  are  false,  but  our 
erroneous  interpretation  of  them.  In  a  sound  sense 
we  may  give  the  advice,  "Judge  by  appearances,"  for 
they  are  all  you  have  got  to  judge  by ;  and  they  are 
always  the  manifestation  of  some  truth,  with  the 
exception  just  mentioned.  By  evidence,  however, 
We  do  not  mean  sensible  manifestation  alone. 

(b)  From  a  charge  of  deceptiveness  we  pass 
to  a  charge  of  futility  or  tautology.  "  Where  is 
the  use,"  says  an  opponent,  "  of  settling  that  the 
evident  must  be  accepted  as  true  ?  Of  course 
it  must ;  but  the  criterion  we  want  is  one  which 
shall  tell  us,  in  all  cases,  what  is  evident."  We 
answer  that  such  a  criterion  cannot  be  found, 
or  logic  would  be  the  sole  science  pointing  out  in 
every  instance  where  truth  lies.  The  logical  cri- 
terion, which  takes  the  form  of  the  highest  generality, 
cannot  discharge  this  office  of  omniscience.  Yet  the 
function  it  does  discharge  is  useful.  When  logic  says, 
Objective  evidence  is  the  criterion  of  truth,  it  does 
not  leave  the  words  unexplained :  else  they  might 
convey  to  the  hearer  no  more  than  a  truism  :  but 
it  makes  them  the  outcome  of  an  analysis  of  the 
act  of  certitude ;  and  thus  they  receive  a  fulness  of 
meaning,  which  redeems  them  from  tautology. 

(c)  "  Be  it  so,"  rejoins  our  opponent ;  "  but 
at  any  rate  that  is  wholly  subjective  which  is 
wholly  in  the   mind  ;    now   truths  about  mere  pos- 


ULTIMATE   OBJECTIVE   CRITERION   OF   TRUTH.   227 

sibilities  are  wholly  in  the  mind,  and  all  abstract, 
universal  truths  formally  exist  only  as  terms  of 
the  mind.  They  are  truths  in  the  mind,  but 
where  is  the  objective  evidence,  or  outer  reality 
to  which  mind  conforms  ?  "  The  only  reply  to  the 
first  part  of  this  difficulty  is  got  by  borrowing  the 
results  of  a  distinct  section  in  General  Metaphysics; 
in  which  it  is  proved,  that  possibilities  are  not  mere 
nothings,  nor  mere  mental  terms,  but  have  a  real 
foundation  at  least  in  the  nature  of  the  Supreme 
Being,  and  often  more  proximately  in  some  actually 
created  nature.  Each  of  them  has  an  ens  essentia, 
though  not  an  ens  existentice.  As  to  the  second  part 
of  the  proposed  difficulty,  the  reality  attributable  to 
abstract  or  universalised  truths  will  be  proved  later. 
That  there  is  some  reality  in  possibilities  and  genera- 
lized science  every  one  must  feel,  however  much  he 
may  be  unable  distinctly  to  formulate  to  himself 
wherein  it  consists.  Still  the  mere  unformulated  per- 
suasion ought  to  induce  the  pure  empiricist  to  dis- 
trust his  position,  which  will  not  allow  him  to  regard 
science  as  real  in  the  laws  which  it  lays  down. 

6.  A  further  difficulty  stands  over  in  the  fact, 
that  what  we  speak  of  under  the  one  simple  name 
of  evidence,  enters  into  concrete  cases  after  a  very 
complicated  way,  and  is  far  from  being  one  simple 
thing.  We  must  distinguish  different  evidences. 
Evidence  is  sometimes  immediate,  and  then  it 
presents  no  difficulty :  but  sometimes  it  is  mediate, 
and  the  steps  of  inference  may  be  many  and  intri- 
cate. Both  mediate  and  immediate  evidence  may 
be  intrinsic  to  the  case  considered,  as  in  the  most 


228  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

abstruse  mathematical  theorem  :  but  sometimes  the 
evidence  is  extrinsic  to  the  truth  acquiesced  in,  as 
in  the  case  where  an  ignorant  man  accepts  a 
scientific  conclusion,  not  from  any  insight  into  how 
it  was  derived,  but  from  the  evidence  he  has  of  the 
trustworthiness  of  his  informant. 

Again,  the  way  in  which  what  we  call  "  the 
evidence "  for  a  case  is  made  up  of  several  evi- 
dences in  detail,  some  of  which  tend  in  opposite 
directions,  is  instructive  as  to  the  meaning  of  the 
term.  Suppose  a  man  charged  with  murder ;  the 
items  for  the  defence  being  (a)  that  the  prisoner 
had  no  discoverable  motive  for  the  crime ;  (b)  that 
his  previous  conduct  gave  no  serious  indication  of 
a  character  likely  to  be  guilty  of  excessive  vio- 
lence :  (c)  that  there  exists  another  man  likely 
enough  a  priori  to  have  committed  the  crime,  but 
quite  free  from  any  demonstrable  connexion  with 
it :  and  the  items  for  the  prosecution  being,  (a)  that 
the  prisoner,  and  only  he,  can  be  shown  to  have 
been  near  the  spot  about  the  time  of  the  murder : 

(b)  that  there  was  a  blood  stain   on   his   clothes: 

(c)  that  the  weapon  used  was  a  dagger,  and  he 
possessed  a  weapon  of  that  kind,  which  he  says  he 
parted  with  months  ago. 

Here  let  us  speak  of  the  evidences,  rather  than  the 
evidence.  First,  they  consist  of  the  arguments  which 
fully  prove,  as  we  will  suppose,  the  respective  three 
statements,  pro  and  con :  thus  we  have  six  separate 
certitudes.  The  difficulty  begins  when  out  of  these 
we  try  to  derive  a  seventh,  namely,  the  guilt  or  the 
innocence  of  the  man.    At  once  we  get  into  the  region 


ULTIMATE   OBJECTIVE   CRITERION   OF   TRUTH.    229 

of  probabilities,  the  very  character  of  which  is  that 
full  evidence  is  wanting,  and  we  are  left  to  con- 
jecture beyond  the  reach  of  proof.  It  is  precisely 
the  probabilities  which  point  to  contradictory  con- 
clusions:  the  evidences,  strictly  so-called,  cannot 
conflict,  for  so  far  as  there  is  evidence  there  is 
truth,  and  no  truth  can  gainsay  another  truth. 
There  is  some  way  of  reconciling  all  apparent 
conflict,  though  we  may  not  be  able  to  find  it  out. 
Advertence  to  complications  like  these,  while  it 
clears  up  our  ideas  about  the  practical  use  of 
evidence,  takes  away  all  misgiving  from  the  cir- 
cumstance, that  in  spite  of  our  having  an  infallible 
criterion,  we  are  yet  fallible  judges,  who  blunder 
oftentimes.  Evidence  is  safe  where  it  is  sufficiently 
abundant  and  direct  to  the  point :  but  evidence, 
scarce  and  indirect,  may  very  well  prove  a  fallacious 
means  when  employed  by  creatures  such  as  we  are. 
But  of  this  in  the  next  chapter.  Here  it  only 
remains  to  add,  in  conclusion,  that  unsolved  diffi- 
culties do  not  destroy  a  certitude  once  fully,  estab- 
lished ;  for  probabilities  disappear  before  a  contrary 
certainty,  no  matter  how  preponderant  their  weight 
may  have  been  as  probabilities.  If  the  highest 
probability  were  beyond  all  fear  of  a  failure,  it 
would  be  certainty,  and  not  probability. 

Addenda. 

(1)  Some  schoolmen,  besides  the  wider  sense  of 
evidence,  use  a  narrower  sense,  according  to  which 
that  only  is  evident,  which  has  necessitating  evidence, 
making  the  truth  so  clear  that  the  mind  cannot  well 


230  NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE. 

refuse  assent.  Such  evidence  does  not  exist  in  some 
instances,  where  an  element  of  good  will  is  requisite 
for  arriving  at  the  right  conclusion.  In  this  sense  we 
hear  of  propositions  being  certain,  but  not  evident. 

(2)  The  schoolmen  describe  material  objects  as  being 
in  themselves  not  immediately  intelligible :  hence  they 
deny  that  a  material  object  can  efficiently  act  on  the 
mind ;  and  many  carry  this  denial  even  as  far  as  to 
include  under  it  mediate  action  through  the  sense-image 
in  the  brain.  Hence  a  long  discussion  about  the  illuminatio 
phantasmatis  and  the  production  of  a  species  intelligibilis. 
The  matter  must  be  left  to  psychology  ;  but  it  so  closely 
bears  on  the  thesis  about  objective  evidence,  that  to  fail 
of  noticing  the  near  connexion  would  hardly  be  right. 
At  any  rate  we  can  always  insist  that  intellect,  be  its 
object  material  or  not,  is  guided  by  objective  law,  not 
by  mere  subjective  evolution,  independent  of  an  object ; 
and  that  the  senses  have  a  demonstrative  influence  on 
the  objective  side.  We  need  not,  therefore,  call  in  any 
mystical  theory,  such  as  that  apparently  suggested  in 
Mr.  Wylde's  Physics  and  Philosophy  of  the  Senses,  where 
we  read,  that  "the  whole  of  our  intercourse  with  nature 
is  literally  the  connexion  of  mind  with  mind,  between 
the  Great  Mind  and  the  mind  of  His  creatures,  not  by 
miraculous  means,  but  by  and  through  the  operation 
of  those  ordinary  laws,  of  which  He  is  the  present  and 
sustaining  principle."  If  this  means  only  that  God 
sustains  and  cooperates  with  all  secondary  agencies,  it 
is  correct ;  but  if  it  implies  that  secondary  agencies 
are  not  adequately  operative  in  their  own  manifestation, 
it  is  erroneous. 

(3)  The  criterion  is  laid  down  for  our  ordinary 
knowledge,  not  for  any  supernatural  or  preternatural 
communications.  Neither  does  it  concern  those  things 
which  must,  in  part    at   least,  be   matters  of  personal 


ULTIMATE   OBJECTIVE   CRITERION   OF   TRUTH.    231 

taste,  without  an  absolute  objective  standard,  such  as 
the  choice  between  two  recognized  styles  of  architec- 
ture, of  music,  or  of  painting.  Preferences  in  these 
matters  must  be  largely  referable  to  subjective  con- 
ditions ;  and  the  extravagance  is,  when  a  man  insists 
on  making  his  own  private  likings  a  law  for  others,  who 
are  just  as  competent  to  decide  for  themselves.  The 
misery  is,  that  so  many  people,  especially  in  matters  of 
variable  taste,  are  so  insistent  upon  an  invariable  con- 
formity to  their  favourite  standard,  which  has  no  valid 
claim  to  be  exclusive.  Because  the  matters  are  so  little 
to  be  fixed  by  argument,  therefore  strength  of  assertion 
is  called  in  to  supply  for  proof. 

(4)  A  curious  phenomenon  of  imagination  or  emotion 
which  some  seem  to  mistake  for  a  failure  of  intelli- 
gence, is  exhibited  in  cases  where  men,  out  of  fear,  will 
not  act  when  reason  clearly  tells  them  it  is  safe  to  act. 
Thus  some  will  go  to  great  trouble  rather  than  step 
over  a  serpent,  which  they  know  to  be  dead ;  others 
cannot  be  persuaded  to  take  an  eel  off  a  fish-hook,  on 
account  of  its  likeness  to  a  serpent ;  and  others  will  not 
go  near  a  corpse,  which  they  are  intellectually  convinced 
will  do  them  no  harm.  At  least  these  examples  do 
not  diminish  the  rank  of  evidence  as  a  criterion  for 
assents  of  the  mind,  whatever  they  may  do  against 
man's  character  for  reasonable  conduct. 


CHAPTER   XIV. 

THE    ORIGIN    OF    ERROR   IN    THE    UNDERSTANDING. 

Synopsis. 

i.  Ignorance  the  root  of  error.  How  we  begin  in  ignorance, 
slowly  acquire  some  knowledge,  but  never  cease  to  be  in 
many  ways  ignorant. 
a.  The  scholastic  theory  about  error  is,  that  the  intellect  is  p$r 
se  infallible,  per  accidens  fallible :  and  that  undue  influence 
of  the  will  is  exerted  in  the  case  of  error. 

3.  The  scholastic  theory  taught  outside  scholasticism. 

4.  Supplementary  considerations  to  complete  the  theory,     [a) 

Dependence  of  the  intellect  on  organic  conditions,  which 
are  liable  to  disturbance,  (b)  The  force  of  habit  on  the 
interpretation  of  sensation  by  the  intellect,  (c)  The  piece- 
meal, defective  way  in  which  we  obtain  evidence. 

5.  The  scholastic  theory  re-stated  and  modified  by  the  supple- 

mentary remarks. 
Addenda. 

The  next  problem  pressing  for  solution  is  to  settle 
how,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  in  evidence  we  possess 
an  unerring  criterion,  yet  we  do  err:  so  that  intellec- 
tually, perhaps  as  much  as  morally,  hutnanum  est 
errare.  The  difficulty  weighs  heavier  upon  us  than 
it  would  on  those  who,  with  Grote,  believe  that 
"  no  infallible  objective  mark,  no  common  measure, 
no  canon  of  evidence  recognised  by  all,  has  yet 
been  found."  We  who  assert  such  a  canon,  have 
to  explain  how  intellectual  error  is  not  only  possible, 


ORIGIN   OF  ERROR   IN    THE    UNDERSTANDING.    233 

but  of  constant  occurrence,  being  sometimes  practi- 
cally inevitable. 

1.  Ignorance  is  not  itself  error;  but  it  lies  at  the 
root  of  error  ;  inasmuch  as,  while  an  Omniscient 
Being  cannot  err  because  of  His  omniscience,  a 
creature,  because  his  knowledge  is  but  partial,  is 
exposed  to  the  risk  of  forming  false  judgments. 
It  is  the  little  knowledge  that  is  the  dangerous 
thing.1 

We  must,  then,  advert  to  the  fact  of  our 
ignorance — how  we  begin  in  blank  ignorance,  very 
slowly  emerge  from  the  universal  darkness,  and 
never  reach  the  full  blaze  of  knowledge  complete. 
Our  knowledge  is  always  a  small  sphere  of  illumi- 
nation enclosed  in  an  infinite  sphere  of  obscurity ; 
and  the  more  the  former  grows,  the  more  does  its 
wider  contact  with  what  is  without  make  it  sensible 

1  There  is  a  certain  semblance  of  truth  in  the  caution  given  by 
Rousseau :  "  Remember,  always  remember,  that  ignorance  has  never 
done  any  harm,  and  that  only  error  is  mischievous  ;  that  a  man  is 
not  led  astray  by  what  he  does  not  know,  but  by  what  he  wrongly 
fancies  that  he  knows."  {Emile,  Lib.  III.  in  initio.)  In  a  later  passage 
towards  the  end  of  the  same  Book  III.,  he  returns  to  the  subject :  he 
says  that  all  our  errors  come  from  judging  ;  if  only  we  had  no  need 
to  judge,  we  should  avoid  error,  and  should  be  happier  in  our  igno- 
rance than  our  knowledge  can  make  us.  He  thinks  that  learned  men 
have  less  of  truth  than  the  unlearned,  because  each  truth  that  they 
take  up  is  accompanied  with  a  hundred  false  judgments ;  so  that 
the  most  famous  of  our  learned  societies  is  only  a  school  of  false- 
hood, and  there  are  more  mistakes  in  the  Academy  of  Sciences 
than  among  a  body  of  Hurons.  "  Since  then  the  more  men  know 
the  more  they  fall  into  mistakes,  the  only  way  to  escape  error  is 
ignorance.  Never  judge,  and  you  will  never  deceive  yourself.  This 
is  the  lesson  of  Nature  as  well  as  of  reason."  He  adds,  however, 
that  as  circumstances  force  us  to  form  judgments,  we  had  bettei 
study  how  to  form  them  rightly. 


234  NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE. 

of  its  own  limitations.  Consider  our  personal  history. 
For  years  the  brain  is  not  fit  to  serve  the  uses  of 
higher  intelligence :  and  when  what  is  called  the 
age  of  reason  has  arrived,  long  years  of  education 
are  still  needed  to  form  the  faculties  into  efficient 
working  powers.  Again,  when  at  the  age  of  about 
twenty  the  condition  of  pupilage  is  over,  a  young 
man  is  told,  as  a  parting  piece  of  advice,  that  he  is 
not  a  learned  Doctor,  but  that  he  has  the  outfit 
necessary  for  setting  about  the  work  of  becoming 
learned ;  and  that  even  in  its  fully  developed  state, 
human  learning  is  an  ornament  which  is  to  be  worn 
with  a  modest  appreciation  of  its  perfection.  More- 
over, the  knowledge  which  a  man  is  said  to  have 
acquired  is  not  always  ready  at  need,  as  a  school- 
boy doing  his  Latin  exercises  will  testify :  and  the 
knowledge  that  does  not  come  up  when  wanted,  is 
for  the  moment  equivalently  ignorance.  Such  is  the 
extent  of  our  ignorance. 

2.  Ignorance  being  supposed,  the  transition  from 
it  to  error  has  to  be  studied  :  and  in  the  course  of 
our  explanation  we  shall  come  across  the  promised 
account  of  how  it  is,  that  while  judgment  is  defined 
as  the  full  perception  of  the  connexion  between 
subject  and  predicate,  yet  judgments  may  be  false.2 
It  is  the  theory  of  the  scholastics  that  intellect  in  man 
is  per  se  infallible,  per  accidens  fallible  ;  or  more  accu- 
rately, per  se  non  fallitur,  per  accidens  fallitur.  For  it  is 
per  se  fallible  only  inasmuch  as,  being  per  se  a  finite 
intelligence,  it  is  of  its  own  nature  exposed  to  the  possi- 
bility of  going  astray,  but  it  does  not  simply  of  its  own 

2  See  Bk.  I.  c.  iv.  p.  52. 


ORIGIN   OF  ERROR   IN   THE    UNDERSTANDING,    235 

nature  actually  go  astray.  Similarly  the  finite  will 
is  per  se  peccable  in  so  far  as  it  is  exposed  to  the  possi- 
bility of  sinning,  not  because  per  se  it  sins.  The  intel- 
lect, as  such,  is  moved  only  by  its  own  proper  object, 
which  is  evidence ;  and  as  evidence  is  the  unfailing 
criterion  of  truth,  the  action  of  the  intellect,  strictly 
so  called,  is  never  erroneous.  Intellect  acting^  se 
goes  only  by  insight,  and  insight  is  always  right. 
Thus  insight  per  se  can  no  more  assent  to  anything 
but  truth,  than  the  ear  proper  can  be  sensible  to 
anything  but  sound.  But  intellect,  so  far  as  it  is 
subject  to  the  undue  action  of  the  will,  may  be 
moved  to  go  beyond  or  against  the  evidence  it  has 
at  its  disposal.  This  theory  will  be  defended  as  in 
substance  correct,  though  it  may  be  usefully  sup- 
plemented with  some  further  considerations,  much 
urged  by  modern  writers.  First,  however,  it  may 
gain  for  itself  a  little  more  attention,  if  it  is  shown 
not  to  be  an  exclusive  property  of  scholasticism,  but 
to  be  owned  likewise  by  thinkers  of  various  classes. 
A  multiplicity  of  approvers  may  induce  some  not  to 
pass  over  the  theory  in  contempt. 

3.  Hamilton  was  fond  of  quoting  the  line  from 
Manilius — whom  we  may  take  as  our  oldest  witness, 
returning  after  a  moment  to  Hamilton  himself — 
Nam  neque  decipitur  ratio,  nee  decipit  unquam.  Second 
in  order  we  will  take  Descartes,  who  assuredly  had 
no  scruple  in  breaking  loose  from  the  scholastic 
bonds  of  his  early  educators,  whenever  it  suited  him. 
He  holds  firmly  to  the  doctrine  that  error  springs 
from  the  bad  use  of  the  will,  not  from  intellect  left 
to    itself.      In    the    first    book    of  the   Principia  he 


236  NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE 

writes  : 3  "  That  we  fall  into  error  comes  from  defect, 
not  in  our  nature  as  such,  but  in  the  employment  of 
our  powers,  or  in  the  use  of  our  free-will.  Since 
then  we  are  aware  that  all  our  errors  may  be  traced 
to  the  will,  it  may  seem  wonderful  that  we  should 
ever  be  deceived,  for  nobody  wishes  to  be  deceived." 
Then  he  adds  acutely :  "  But  the  will  to  be  deceived 
is  quite  other  than  the  will  to  assent  to  something 
which  happens  to  involve  error.  And  though  it  be 
true  that  no  one  is  willing  to  be  deceived,  there  is 
hardly  any  one  who  does  not  will  assent  to  what 
contains  error,  though  he  be  not  aware  of  it."4 

Another  Frenchman,5  Cousin,  writes :  "  Pure 
error  is  impossible,  and  quite  unintelligible :  for 
error  makes  its  way  into  the  mind  only  by  means  of 
the  truth  which  it  contains." 

Passing  next  to  those  who  write  in  the  English 
language,  we  may  begin  with  the  already  promised 
quotation  of  Hamilton's  opinion.6  He  holds  that 
what   we    really   and    positively   think    cannot    be 


3  "  Quod  in  errores  incidimus  defectus  quidem  est  in  nostra 
actione,  sive  in  usu  libertatis,  sed  non  in  nostra  natura.  .  .  Jam 
vero  cum  sciamus  errores  omnes  nostros  a  voluntate  pendere, 
mirum  videri  potest,  quod  unquam  fallimur,  quia  nemo  est  qui 
velit  falli."  (Principia,  Part  I.  nn.  37,  39.) 

4  "  Sed  longealiud  est  velle  falli,  quam  velle  assentiri  iis  in  quibus 
contingit  errorem  reperiri.  Et  quamvis  revera  nullus  sit  qui  ex- 
presse  velit  falli,  vix  tamen  ullus  est  qui  non  saepe  velit  iis  assentiri 
in  quibus  error,  ipso  inscio,  continetur."  (I.e.) 

5  See  his  twenty-fourth  lecture  on  the  History  of  Philosophy, 
where  he  treats  Locke's  theory  of  error:  "La  pure  erreur  serait 
impossible,  et  elle  serait  inintelligible :  comme  1'erreur  ne  penetre 
dans  l'esprit  d'un  homme  que  par  le  cote  de  verite  qui  est  en  elle." 

6  Logic,  Vol.  II.  Lectures  xxix.  xxx. 


ORIGIN   OF  ERROR   IN   THE    UNDERSTANDING.     237 

erroneous,  and  that  error  is  rather  a  want  of  intel- 
lectual action  than  an  intellectual  act.  Mansel7 
concurs  with  his  master,  and  holds  that  "  illogical 
thinking  is  no  thinking  at  all."  Dr.  M'Cosh8  is 
another  consentient  witness  :  "  I  cannot  keep  from 
giving  it  as  my  decided  conviction,  that  while  igno- 
rance may  arise  from  the  finite  nature  of  our  facul- 
ties, and  from  a  limited  means  of  knowledge,  positive 
error  does,  in  every  case,  proceed  directly  or  indirectly 
from  a  corrupted  (?)  will,  leading  us  to  pronounce  a 
hasty  judgment  without  evidence,  or  to  seek  partial 
evidence  on  the  side  to  which  our  inclinations  lean. 
A  thoroughly  pure  and  consistent  will  would,  in  my 
opinion,  preserve  us  from  all  mistake."  Finally, 
one  who  is  not  writing  on  philosophy  shall 
join  his  voice  to  those  of  philosophers :  "  Mere 
sophisms  or  imperfect  reasonings,"  says  Mr.  Lecky, 
"  have  a  very  small  place  in  the  history  of  human 
error ;  the  intervention  of  the  will  has  always  been 
the  chief  cause  of  delusion." 

4.  This  view  that  the  will  is  the  cause  of  error, 
supported  as  it  is  by  so  many  authors,  may  be  sup- 
plemented by  some  considerations  much  urged  by 
modern  writers — considerations  which  are,  however, 
really  supplementary,  not  contradictory  to  the  theory 
propounded. 

(a)  One  source  of  delusion  is  in  the  derangement 
of  the  nervous  apparatus  ;  and  the  nature  of  this  per- 
turbing action  will  require  some  detailed  account. 

^  Prolegomena  Logica,  p.  250.     See  Hobbes  on  Error,  Leviathan 
Part  I.  c.  v.;  and  Hume,  Treatise,  Bk.  I.  Part  IV.  §  1. 

8  Intuitions  0/ the  Mind  Bk.  II.  c.  ii.  §  2  ;  Bk.  IV.  c.  ii.  §  2 


238  NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE. 


It  is  no  new  fact  that  a  lesion  in  the  material 
organ  may  result  in  stopping  thought ;  and  that  on 
account  of  altered  cerebral  conditions  a  man  maybe 
in  any  one  of  the  countless  gradations  between  sleep 
and  wakefulness,  or  between  sanity  and  insanity. 
And  as  sleep  has  its  dreams  and  insanity  its  delu- 
sions, so  in  the  intermediate  stages  just  mentioned 
there  may  be  intermediate  degrees  of  deceptive- 
ness  due  to  an  abnormal  state  of  nerves.  Some 
people  labour  under  the  frequent  recurrence  of 
visual  or  auditory  illusions,  which  they  can  calmly 
correct  by  data  supplied  through  the  other  senses. 
When  the  inflow  of  sensations  from  the  ordinary 
channels  is  cut  off,  there  are  patients  whose  minds 
become  quite  deranged  by  their  own  subjective 
phantasies,  and  who  are  restored  to  composure 
only  by  being  brought  from  darkness  to  light,  and 
by  having  their  several  senses  fed  with  their  usual 
supplies.  They  need  the  steadying  influx  of 
impressions  from  the  outer  world  to  prevent  the 
inner  life  from  upsetting  its  own  balance.  An 
excitable  man  suddenly  deprived  of  his  hearing 
in  a  public  thoroughfare,  would  often  grow  quite 
bewildered  for  want  of  his  customary  guidance 
from  the  ear ;  and  still  more  would  this  be  the  case 
if  the  deprivation  was  effected,  not  merely  through 
an  external  stopping  of  the  ears,  but  through 
some  inner  disorder  of  the  nerves.  Thus  in  many 
.vays  a  disturbance  of  the  normal  working  of  the 
nervous  system  has  its  result  in  a  disturbance  of  the 
mind,  and  erroneous  judgments  not  unfrequently 
follow. 


ORIGIN   OF  ERROR   IN   THE    UNDERSTANDING.    239 

From  the  most  general  statement  of  the  fact  we 
may  now  come  down  to  a  particular  law,  which  may 
be  enunciated  thus :  Whenever  in  the  brain  extra- 
ordinary causes  which  are  internal  excite  those  phe- 
nomena which  ordinarily  are  excited  by  familiarly 
known  objects,  there  is  a  tendency  erroneously  to 
judge  those  objects  to  be  present,  though  in  reality 
they  are  not.  Sometimes  it  is  the  vehemence  of  an 
idea  which  excites  the  sensible  image,  and  at  once 
the  object  is  as  if  bodily  present :  at  other  times 
the  action  is  rather  from  below  upwards,  and  the 
abnormally  roused  sense-images  call  up  their  corres- 
ponding ideas.  Here  we  are  safe  in  asserting  that 
we  have  an  undoubted  occasion  for  an  erroneous 
judgment,  as  for  example  when  the  vivid  thought  of 
a  departed  friend  has  brought  up  his  image  in  the 
brain,  and  he  is  declared  to  have  been  seen.  Some, 
though  not  all,  ghost  stories  may  be  so  explained. 

(b)  Again,  there  is  a  second  special  law  of  delusion 
through  the  senses,  the  law  of  the  accidental  mis- 
carriage of  customary  interpretation;  and  it  differs 
from  the  first  in  not  implying  any  internal 
derangement  of  the  nerves.  Ordinarily,  what 
we  actually  at  any  time  perceive  is  the  merest 
item,  compared  with  all  that  is  at  once  filled  into 
the  object  by  inference  or  association.  We  catch 
sight  of  a  plume  and  we  at  once  supply  a  hearse ; 
we  observe  a  wheel  moving,  and  we  supply  the 
whole  carriage  and  its  occupants.  An  odour  leads 
us  to  assert  the  presence  of  oranges  or  lemons ;  a 
sound  the  presence  of  an  organist  and  his  instru- 
ment ;  a  touch  a  broken  bone  beneath  its  muscular 


240  NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE 

covering.  The  practical  necessities  of  life  drive 
us  to  make  these  short  cuts  by  the  aid  of  incom- 
plete inference ;  for  if  we  stopped  fully  to  verify 
everything,  we  could  not  get  through  one  tithe  ot 
our  business.  As  a  rule,  our  customary  inferences 
from  few  data  are  right,  but  every  now  and 
then  they  are  wrong;  and  whoever  cares  to  play 
us  a  practical  joke  may  probably  succeed  in 
doing  so,  if  under  familiar  appearances  he  will 
present  to  us  an  object  not  usually  associated  with 
them  in  our  experience.  In  the  examples  given 
above,  while  we  do  not  say  that  the  unusually  pro- 
duced sensations  or  sense-images  are  errors,  we 
must  say  that  they  may  be  occasions  of  error,  and 
sometimes  of  error  practically  unavoidable. 

This  is  the  moderate  statement  of  the  case, 
and  contrasts  with  the  immoderate  statement  of 
M.  Taine:9  "The  two  principal  processes  em- 
ployed by  nature  to  produce  what  we  call  acts 
of  cognition,  are  the  creation  of  illusions  within, 
and  their  rectification.  It  is  a  point  of  capital 
importance  that  external  perception  is  a  true 
hallucination.  When  sense-objects  really  impress 
us  we  have  first  the  sensations,  which  an  halluci- 
nated person  has  without  real  objects.  The  external 
perception  is  an  internal  dream,  which  proves  to  be 
in  harmony  with  outer  things.  We  have,  when 
awake,  a  series  of  hallucinations,  which  do  not 
become  developed.  This  hallucination,  which  seems 
a  monstrosity,  is  the  very  fabric  of  our  mental  life. 
Nature  deceives  to  instruct  us.  In  recollection  a 
9  De  V Intelligence,  Part  II.  Liv.  I.  c   i   pp.  41 1,  seq. 


ORIGIN  OF   ERROR   IN    THE    UNDERSTANDING.    241 

present  image  is  taken  for  a  past  sensation.  Just  as, 
in  external  perception,  simple,  internal  phantasms 
are  taken  for  external  objects,  so  in  memory  we  see 
simple  present  images  taken  for  past  sensations,  but 
corresponding  by  a  beautiful  mechanism  to  the  ex- 
terior presence  of  real  sensations.  The  history  of 
sleep  and  of  madness  gives  us  the  key  to  the  waking 
state."  Mr.  Sully10  has  some  remarks  of  somewhat 
like  tendency,  when  he  is  speaking  of  the  region  of 
hallucination  as  a  border-land  between  reason  and 
insanity,  or  rather  as  forming  the  extreme  confines 
in  which  these  two  regions  are,  as  it  were,  blended. 
He  adds  that  "in  perfect  normal  perception  we 
find  in  the  projection  of  our  sensations  of  colour, 
sound,  and  the  rest,  into  the  environment  or 
to  the  extremities  of  the  organism,  something 
which,  from  the  point  of  view  of  physical  science, 
easily  wears  the  appearance  of  an  ingredient  of 
illusion." 

We  may  be  pardoned,  if  in  place  of  other  answer 
to  these  authors  we  refer  once  more  to  the  force 
which  habit  has  in  misleading  us ;  for  herein  will  be 
found  the  solution  of  the  ordinary  sense-illusions.11 
Those  who  reduce  all  judgments  to  repeated  associa- 
tions of  ideas,  naturally  make  much  more  of  this 
source  of  error  than  we  can  allow ;  but  we  can  allow 
that  it  is  a  source. 

(c)  Lastly,  the  criterion  of  evidence  often  fails 
to  secure  us  from  error,  because  we  get  our 
evidence    piecemeal,    in    insufficient    amount,    and 

10  On  Illusions  (International  Series),  pp.  60,  seq.  pp.  in,  seq. 

11  The  subject  has  been  already  discussed  in  c.  vii.  pp    124,  seq. 


242  NATURE   OF   CERTITUDE. 

often  with  only  indirect  bearings.  If  the  evidence 
of  each  case  were  one  simple  thing,  we  should  run 
no  risk ;  but,  as  was  observed  in  the  last  chapter, 
we  usually  have  to  deal  with  a  complicated  mass  of 
evidences  in  the  plural. 

5.  Examining  next  how  the  scholastic  theory  can 
accommodate  the  three  supplementary  considera- 
tions, we  note  first  that  all  three  elements,  at  least 
indirectly,  come  under  the  control  of  will,  to  a  large 
extent.  By  force  of  will  we  can  often  resist  or  cor- 
rect abnormal  conditions  of  the  sensitive  system, 
and  by  force  of  will  we  can  aggravate  these  con- 
ditions. Again,  will  has  a  large  share  as  well  in 
forming  our  intellectual  habits,  as  in  checking  them. 
Lastly,  will  has  its  influence  in  setting  us  carefully, 
cautiously,  and  restrainedly  to  judge  from  compli- 
cated evidences,  or  in  urging  us  precipitately  to  force 
a  conclusion. 

While,  however,  these  several  conditions  are 
controlled  by  will,  they  have  distinct  influences  of 
their  own  ;  and  this  is  the  reason  why  the  theory, 
that  error  is  due  to  will,  seems  not  complete, 
unless  they  too  receive  special  mention  as  factors  of 
the  whole. 

In  what  sense,  therefore,  from  our  larger  survey  of 
the  position,  can  we  admit  Hamilton's  dictum,  that 
"No  error  can  be  really  thought?"12  Are  we  to  say, 

12  The  Hamiltonian  school  adhere  for  the  most  part  to  this 
doctrine.  Thus,  besides  Mansel,  we  find  Professor  Veitch  saying: 
"  There  is  only  one  way  of  thinking  by  the  understanding,  that  is, 
the  legitimate  way.  Any  other  is  mere  illusion,  not  a  reality  of 
thought  at  all."  (Institutes  0/  Logic,  p.  7  ) 


ORIGIN   OF  ERROR   IN   THE    UNDERSTANDING.     243 

that  he  who  honestly  mistakes  his  neighbour's  hat  for 
his  own,  does  not  really  think  it  his  own?  Not  so;  but 
what  we  may  assert  is,  that  in  his  way  of  forming 
this  judgment  there  were  some  steps  taken  in  which 
thought  was  a  blank.  The  man  never  really  thought 
out  all  the  steps  to  the  conclusion — "  This  hat  is  my 
own."  He  thought  out  part  and  filled  in  the  rest  by 
force  of  habit,  association,  or  rash  inference.  And 
the  like  may  be  affirmed  of  every  case  of  error.  A 
man  has  worked  out  a  long  mathematical  problem  : 
he  assents  to  the  conclusion,  but  not  from  clear 
insight  of  what  is  involved  in  it ;  his  assent  is  given 
in  trust  that  his  working  out  of  a  long  process  was 
right  at  each  step.  But  some  step  or  steps  there 
must  have  been  which  he  never  represented  in 
thought,  and  so  "  the  error  was  not  really  thought." 
Somewhat  in  the  spirit  of  these  last  explanations, 
it  has  been  said,  that  if  the  old  astronomers  had 
only  stated  the  limits  under  which  they  were 
speaking,  their  statements  would  have  been  correct. 
They  assumed  that  there  was  an  absolute  upside, 
opposed  to  an  absolute  downside  :  they  assumed 
that  men  could  not  stand  on  the  earth  if  it  were 
placed  upside  down :  from  these  premisses  their 
inference  was  valid,  that  the  earth  could  not  be 
revolving.  From  the  hypothesis  of  a  stationary 
earth,  they  rightly  inferred  the  motion  of  the  sun. 
Thus  they  never  fully  thought  out  the  real  problem, 
but  an  ideal  problem  which  was  consistent  with 
itself.  Not  thought,  but  something  else,  carried 
them  over  some  parts  of  their  argument  when  they 
applied  it  to  the  actual  system  :  but  if  they  had  put 


244  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 

in  their  limits,  then  their  view  would  have  been 
hypothetical  and  right.  Instead  of  taking  the 
absolute  form,  "  The  earth  is  fixed,  the  sun  re- 
volves round  it,"  their  astronomy  would  have  taken 
a  hypothetical  shape,  "  If  certain  suppositions  are 
true,  then  the  earth  is  fixed  and  the  sun  revolves 
round  it." 

To  put  the  whole  of  this  part  of  our  doctrine 
summarily :  the  error  assented  to  is  either  a  con- 
tradiction in  terms,  and  then  it  is  clear  that  it  has 
never  been  strictly  an  object  of  thought,  or  it  is  an 
error  in  a  contingent  matter,  and  then  the  final 
result  may  in  some  sense  be  said  to  be  an  object 
of  thought,  but  at  least  its  actuality  has  never 
properly  been  thought  out  to  the  full.  We  may 
really  think  that  X  was  intoxicated  when  he  was 
not ;  but  we  have  never  followed  out  in  thought 
all  the  evidences  for  the  fact.  At  some  point,  not 
thought,  but  another  power,  has  effected  a  part  of 
the  process. 

In  this  way  Hamilton's  saying,  which  is  in  con- 
formity with  the  scholastic  theory  of  error,  if  not 
made  to  mean  more  than  it  necessarily  implies, 
expresses  a  useful  doctrine.  It  corresponds  to  that 
which  Descartes  probably  meant  when  he  said  that, 
if  he  was  only  careful  always  to  follow  clear  ideas, 
and  nothing  else,  he  could  never  go  wrong.  Un- 
fortunately he  did  not  describe  properly  the  criterion 
of  clear  ideas;  but  we  may  add  the  explanation,  that 
clear  ideas  must  mean  insight  into  objective  truth. 
Insisting  on  this  insight,  we  necessarily  assign  a 
very  different  account  of  the  genesis  of  error  frorr 


ORIGIN  OF  ERROR  IN  THE   UNDERSTANDING.     245 

that  which  is  assigned  by  those  who  treat  only  of 
the  mechanism  or  chemistry  of  ideas ;  of  asso- 
ciations and  dissociations,  of  affinities  and  repulsions 
between  mental  atoms.  Once  more  it  is  seen  how 
a  philosophical  explanation  is  dependent  on  the 
radical  nature  of  a  system ;  and  how  the  followers 
of  Hume  are  in  their  whole  point  of  view  at  variance 
with  truth.  A  theory  so  erroneous  as  Hume's  can 
never  render  the  right  account  of  error,  though  it 
may  serve  as  an  illustration  of  it  to  an  expounder 
who  goes  on  true  principles.  On  these  true  prin- 
ciples we  have  laid  down  our  theory,  that  ignorance 
is  a  condition,  but  is  never  by  itself  alone  the  efficient 
cause  of  error,  and  never  identical  with  error :  that 
the  ignorant  mind  is  necessarily  fallible,  but  not  with 
the  same  necessity  actually  false :  that  the  man 
who  labours  under  incomplete  and  obscure  ideas  is 
essentially  exposed  to  the  danger  of  judging  wrong, 
but  does  not  so  essentially  judge  wrong  in  fact ;  that 
habits  and  associations  incline  us  to  assert  more 
than  is  in  the  evidence  before  us ;  and  finally  that 
the  will  exerts  its  power  to  urge  on  acts  of  assent  or 
dissent,  which  the  mere  intellect  of  itself  would  not 
have  made,  because  these  being  untrue,  are  not  fit 
objects  to  decide  an  intellectual  movement.  The 
grossest  mistake  must  have  some  element  of  truth 
in  it ;  and  "  falsehood  is  dangerous  only  from  its 
possessing  a  certain  portion  of  mutilated  truth." 
Thus  evidence  itself  helps  to  elicit  the  erroneous 
judgment ;  but  it  is  precisely  because,  besides 
evidence,  there  are  other  forces  at  work,  that  the 
total  result  is  a  failure. 


246  NATURE   OF  CERTITUDE. 


Addenda. 

(i)  In  saying  that  our  ignorance  is  infinite  compared 
with  our  knowledge,  we  must  be  taken  as  referring  to 
the  details  which  in  any  concrete  enunciation  are  left 
to  be  filled  in  :  for,  of  course,  under  the  generalized 
terms  Being,  Substance  and  Accidents,  God  and  Nature, 
we  include  all  things  in  our  knowledge. 

(2)  When  distinguishing  will  from  intellective  require 
no  more  than  such  a  distinction  as  all  admit  who  allow 
that  to  know  a  thing  is  not  the  same  as  to  wish  it. 
This  leaves  quite  intact  the  question  whether  the 
several  faculties  of  the  soul  have  a  real  distinction 
inter  se,  and  from  the  soul  to  which  they  belong.  Some 
of  our  modern  English  writers  assert  that  every  mental 
act  contains  an  element  of  thought,  feeling,  and  volition, 
the  three  constituents  of  mental  life.  It  may  be  true 
that  the  intellect  never  embraces  truth,  which  the  will 
does  not  somehow,  at  the  same  time,  embrace,  at  least 
for  its  truth's  sake,  though  under  other  respects  the 
will  dislikes  the  object  intensely.  Yet,  on  no  account 
could  we  admit  the  Malebranchian  theory,  that  the 
assent  in  a  judgment  is  the  act,  not  of  the  intellect, 
but  of  the  will. 

(3)  A  further  question  is  whether  the  action  of  the 
will  in  error  is  always  free.  Suarez l  speaks  as  though 
it  were  ;  but  allows  such  a  minimum  of  freedom  some- 
times as  would  save  from  moral  guilt.  In  accordance 
with  his  teaching,  we  hold  the  existence  of  countless 
limitations  upon  that  freedom,  especially  in  what  are 
called  "first  motions  of  the  will,"  the  motus  primo primi 
of  theologians.  Very  often,  at  any  rate,  our  errors  are 
proximately  or  remotely  due  to  an  abuse  of  freedom  ; 

1  Metaphysics,  disp.  ix.  §  2. 


ORIGIN   OF   ERROR   IN    THE    UNDERSTANDING.     247 

but    we    may    refrain    from    saying    that    they    are    so 
always. 

(4)  The  importance  of  the  power  of  will  in  deter- 
mining judgment  has,  besides  a  high  speculative,  an 
equally  high  moral  importance.  It  is  an  undoubted  fact, 
that  the  erroneous  judgments  of  many  persons  are  most 
culpable.  We  have  only  to  note  what  an  abatement 
of  assertions  there  is,  as  soon  as  an  ordinary  talker  is 
brought  to  book,  and  as  it  were  put  on  his  oath,  to  infer 
how  very  rash  are  a  great  mass  of  human  assents.  It 
is  said  that  many  would  sooner  have  their  good-will 
than  their  sound  judgment  called  in  question :  they 
prefer  to  confess  a  culpable  negligence  rather  than  an 
inculpable  mistake.  But  the  two  departments  are  con- 
nected ;  so  that  a  man  cannot  constantly  be  guilty  of 
great  wilfulness  in  his  judgments,  without  intrinsically 
damaging  his  very  power  to  know  the  truth.  In  the 
interest  of  his  intellectual  faculty  itself  he  must  exercise 
a  most  vigilant  use  of  his  will,  as  a  determinant  of  his 
assent. 


THE 
FIRST   PRINCIPLES  OF  KNOWLEDGE, 


Part  II. 
Special   Treatment   of    Certitude, 


CHAPTER  I. 

SHORT    INTRODUCTION. 

Synopsis, 

i.  Transition  from  the  general  to  the  special  treatment  of  the 
subject. 

2.  (a)  Substance  and  (b)  Efficient  Causality  at  the  basis  of  the 

treatment. 

3.  Enormous  difference  between  the  point  of  view  taken  by 
pure  phenomenalism  and  that  taken  by  the  schoolmen. 

I.  A  description  of  certitude  in  general  has  now 
been  given  ;  and  it  might  be  supposed  that  next, 
each  of  the  several  faculties  concerned  in  the  pro- 
duction of  certitude  would  be  taken  separately,  and 
shown  to  be  a  valid  instrument  of  knowledge.  This 
would  fairly  stand  as  the  special  treatment  of  the 
subject.  But  it  is  convenient  to  leave  alone  the  ques- 
tion as  to  how  many  faculties  there  are,  and  how  to 


25o  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

divide  them;  for  a  more  serviceable  method  suggests 
itself.  If  it  be  established  successively,  that  our 
sensations,  our  ideas,  our  consciousness  of  self  and 
its  affections,  our  memory,  and  our  belief  in  the 
testimony  of  others,  are  all,  in  their  own  nature, 
means  for  putting  us  in  possession  of  certitude, 
whatever  may  be  their  liability  to  occasional,  acci- 
dental error ;  then,  without  any  list  of  faculties, 
enough  will  be  done  to  satisfy  any  reasonable  re- 
quirements on  the  part  of  those  who  ask  a  detailed 
justification  of  our  claim  to  real  knowledge.  Here 
is  our  work  in  this  Second  Part. 

2.  Before  proceeding  to  the  task  proposed,  it  is 
quite  necessary  to  make  explicit  statement  of  some 
doctrines  about  substance  and  efficient  causality, 
doctrines  lying  at  the  very  root  of  any  theory  of 
knowledge,  yet  doctrines  which  do  not  belong  to 
this  treatise,  but  to  that  on  General  Metaphysics. 
Here,  however,  a  brief  declaration  is  almost  impera- 
tive, in  this  country  where  Hume  has  such  an 
influence. 

(a)  The  notion  of  substance,  which  scholasticism 
upholds,  is  not  what  the  school  of  Hume  is  apt  to 
fancy.  By  substance  is  not  meant  a  mysterious 
entity  which  cannot  be  reached,  and  is  hidden  away 
under  a  shell  of  merely  phenomenal  realities — what- 
ever these  may  be — like  an  Oriental  monarch,  awful 
in  his  utter  unapproachability.  Listen  to  what  are 
the  essential  demands  of  the  schoolmen,  who  hold 
a  very  different  doctrine.  Many  of  them,  it  is 
true,  do  suppose,  betweeen  the  quantity  and  the 
qualities  of  an  object  on  one  side,  and  their  subject 


SHORT  INTRODUCTION.  251 

of  inherence  on  the  other  side,  a  distinction  so  real, 
that  it  is  second  only  to  the  distinction  between 
substance  and  substance.  At  the  same  time,  they 
admit  that  such  real  distinction  is  not  contained  in 
the  primary  notion  of  substance ;  that  it  is  a 
secondary  point  of  investigation,  quite  open,  on 
merely  natural  grounds,  to  strong  controversy. 

But  the  primary  notion  of  substance,  the 
incontrovertible  notion,  the  universal  notion  apply- 
ing even  to  God  Himself,  Who  is  without  acci- 
dents— this  they  place  in  what  they  call  perseity. 
Substance  is  what  exists  per  se ;  and  what  to 
exist  per  se  means  is  brought  out  by  a  contrast, 
the  validity  of  which  cannot  be  gainsaid.  We 
leave  alone  these  accidents  of  quantity  and  quality 
which  are  supposed  by  some  to  be  more  than 
modal,  and  the  nature  of  which  is  matter  of  dis- 
pute. We  keep  to  what  is  indisputable  ;  thought, 
volition,  motion,  rotundity,  these  are  in  some  sense 
realities,  and  yet  none  of  them  can  exist  per  se,  all 
must  inhere  in  some  subject,  and  are  really  distinct 
from  that  subject  at  least  modally,  or,  inasmuch  as 
they  are  modes,  which  may,  or  may  not,  affect  a 
thing,  while  that  thing  remains  substantially  the 
same.  But  they  are  only  modes  :  no  one  yet  ever 
came  across  rotundity  existing  by  itself;  no  one  ever 
met  a  piece  of  motion  unattached,  without  a  thing 
of  which  it  was  the  movement.  Similarly  a 
wandering  thought  or  volition,  in  the  sense  of 
an  entity  which  is  nothing  but  a  thought  or  a 
volition,  an  isolated  phenomenon,  is  an  absurdity. 

To  recur  again  to  examples.  A  cannon-ball  is  now 


252  SPECIAL   TREATMENT   OF  CERTITUDE. 

at  rest,  and  now  endowed  with  a  most  terrific  velocity: 
in  the  one  instance  a  child  may  support  it,  in  the 
other  hardly  the  strongest  target  that  man  can  make 
will  resist  the  momentum  undamaged.  Therefore 
the  velocity  has  some  sort  of  a  reality  not  wholly 
identified  with  the  substance,  as  such,  of  the  ball. 
Again,  the  mind  may  rouse  itself  to  intense  thought, 
or  yield  to  comparative  quiescence  ;  the  thought  is 
some  sort  of  a  reality  not  wholly  identified  with  the 
substance  mind.  There  is  then  at  least  one  class  of 
accidents,  the  modal,  which  are  real,  and  which 
present  some  real  contrast  to  substance.  These 
suffice  to  enforce  the  definition :  "  An  accident  is 
that  which  exists  in  another,  as  in  a  subject  of 
inhesion  ;"x  where  the  precise  degree  of  real  dis- 
tinction involved  by  the  in  alio  may  be  left  without 
further  niceities  of  discussion.  Mill  has  a  glimpse 
of  the  truth,  soon  to  be  lost  amid  erroneous  ideas 
about  the  unknown  substratum.  In  the  third  chapter 
of  his  Logic  he  says :  "  Destroy  all  white  substances, 
and  where  would  be  absolute  whiteness  ?  Whiteness 
without  any  white  thing  is  a  contradiction  in  terms." 
As  illustration  of  a  doctrine,  the  full  proof  of 
which  is  to  be  sought  in  General  Metaphysics,  the 
above  account  must  suffice  to  justify  the  assertion, 
that  the  radical  notion  of  substance  is  intelligible 
and  real.  After  the  manner  described,2  "substance  is 
that  which  exists  by  itself,  and  does  not  inhere  in 

1  "  Accidens  est  id  quod  existit  in  alio  tanquam  subjecto  in- 
hssionis." 

2  "  Id  quod  per  se  stat,  et  non  inhasret  in  alio  tanquam  subjecto 
inhaesionis." 


SHORT  INTRODUCTION.  253 

something  else  as  in  a  subject  of  inhesion.''3  Reali- 
ties cannot  be  inherent  one  in  another  indefinitely, 
any  more  than  among  substances  the  earth  can  be 
supported  by  a  rock,  and  that  rock  by  another,  and 
this  by  a  third,  and  so  on  unlimitedly ;  in  the  end 
there  must  be  something  which  exists  per  se.  Now 
per  se  might  mean  self-existent,  uncreated,  unpro- 
duced ;  but  here  it  does  not  mean  that :  a  se  is  the 
expression  used  to  signify  underived  existence.  God 
alone  is  a  se,  and  therefore  also  He  is  per  se.  How 
perseity  can  be  assigned  to  creatures  without  denying 
their  continuous  dependence  on  the  Creator  is  a 
difficulty  which  is  briefly  met  by  saying,  that  unless 
some  creatures  were  per  se,  all  would  inhere  in  God 
as  accidents  of  the  Divinity,  as  parts  of  His  total 
reality.     This  would  be  pantheism. 

Whence  it  further  appears  that  the  primary  idea 
of  substance  is  not  permanence  under  varying  acci- 
dents. God  is  substance,  though  having  no  acci- 
dents. He  is  immutable;  created  substance,  though 
it  were  annihilated  almost  as  soon  as  created,  would 
have  been  for  the  moment  real  substance. 

Mr.  Bain,  therefore,  is  utterly  wrong  in  saying 
that  substance  has  no  meaning ;  and  Mr.  Huxley, 
who  says  that  "whether  mind  or  matter  has  a 
substance  or  not,  we  are  incompetent  to  discuss." 
But  Mr.  Spencer  has  got  hold  of  a  partial  truth, 
when  he  holds,  that  "  the  conception  of  a  state 
of  consciousness  implies  the  conception  of  an  exists 
ence  which  has  the  state;  we  are  compelled  to  think 

3  See  Lepidi's  Elementa  Philosophic,  Vol.  II.  Lib.  II.  sect.  ii.  c.  i. 
For  Mill's  admissions,  see  the  present  volume,  Bk.  I.  c.  xi.  Addenda. 


254  SPECIAL   TREATMENT   OF  CERTITUDE. 

of  a  substance,  mind,  that  is  affected,  before  we 
think  of  its  affections :  "  and  that  "  it  is  rigorously 
impossible  to  conceive  that  our  knowledge  is  of  ap- 
pearances only,  without  at  the  same  time  conceiving 
a  reality,  of  which  they  are  the  appearances."4  It 
is  idle  to  pretend  that  the  necessary  recurrence  to 
substance  is  a  mere  association  of  ideas,  or  a  mere 
grammatical  notion.  Grammar,  it  is  true,  dis- 
tinguishes substantive  and  adjective  ;  but  so  mani- 
festly is  this  not  the  philosophical  distinction 
between  substance  and  accidents,  that  many  nouns 
substantive  confessedly  stand  for  accidents,  as  velo- 
city, rotundity,  volition.  Also,  it  is  true,  Aristotle 
teaches  that  the  concrete  substance,  the  prima  sub- 
stantia, 7rpcorrj  ovala,  can  never  be  predicated  of 
anything  else  as  of  its  subject ;  but  what  is  this 
against  the  reality  and  the  knowableness  of  sub- 
stance ?  In  the  notion  of  substance  we  have  got 
hold  of  the  undoubtedly  real.  We  do  not  lay  bare 
a  great  mystery,  as  many  suppose  we  pretend  to 
do ;  but  we  do  affirm  a  clear  truth,  which  is  elemen- 
tary in  the  human  understanding,  and  without  which 
the  mind  is  lost  in  nihilism. 

(b)  Efficient  causality,  like  substance,  is  sup- 
posed to  be  a  chimera  by  the  disciples  of 
Hume.  Again  let  us  oppose  our  doctrine  to 
theirs.  We  waive  the  question  whether  there  are 
any  substantial  changes  in  nature :  but  at  least 
there   are   real   changes,  and    a  vast    multitude    of 

4  How  far,  however,  Mr.  Spencer  is  from  holding  the  true 
doctrine  of  substance,  will  appear  on  reading  Psychology,  Part  II. 
c.  i.  "The  Substance  of  Mind." 


SHORT  INTRODUCTION.  255 

them.  Forthwith  we  take  our  stand  on  plainest  and 
surest  of  principles.  Nothing  begins  to  be  without 
a  sufficient  reason :  real  events  are  perpetually 
beginning  to  be  in  this  world,  which  we  familiarly 
style  "  a  world  of  change :"  the  sufficient  reason,  or 
part  of  the  sufficient  reason,  for  a  real  change  is  an 
efficient  cause.  There  are  then  real  efficient  causes, 
and  we  know  that  there  are.  We  do  not  know  how 
efficient  causality  ultimately  acts,  but  we  know  that 
it  acts.  We  may  be  silent  as  to  the  difference  or 
the  identity  between  substance  and  its  powers  :  but 
on  the  reality  of  the  powers  we  may  not  be  silent. 
They  clamour  for  recognition.  If  anything  is  certain 
in  this  world,  it  is  that  mere  uniform  sequence, 
without  any  idea  of  power,  is  an  inadequate  account 
of  a  real  succession  of  events.  Mill,  after  the 
manner  of  his  school,  seems  to  be  confounding  the 
primary  with  the  secondary  question,  the  question 
as  to  the  reality  of  power  with  the  question  of  the 
reality  of  its  distinction  from  its  substance,  when  he 
says  with  an  air  of  apparent  triumph  :  "  It  is  as 
easy  to  comprehend  that  the  object  should  produce 
the  sensation  directly,  as  that  it  should  produce  the 
same  sensation  by  the  aid  of  something  else,  called 
the  power  of  producing  it."  If  the  reader  will  admit 
substance  efficiently  active,  without  any  question  raised 
as  to  an  intermediate  reality  between  the  substance 
and  its  activity,  he  will  admit  enough  for  the  pur- 
poses of  the  following  discussions  on  the  details  of 
certitude.  But  if  he  will  not  admit  thus  much,  he 
is  putting  himself  in  a  radically  unreasonable 
position. 


256  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

3.  That  these  preliminary  remarks,  these  borrow- 
ings from  a  department  of  philosophy  outside  our 
own,  are  not  uncalled  for,  will  be  recognized  imme- 
diately by  any  one  who  will  consider  the  vast  differ- 
ence between  certitude  viewed  from  the  point  of 
pure  phenomenalism,  and  certitude  seen  from  the 
point  of  view  here  enforced.  Of  course,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  no  one  is  consistently  a  pure  phenomenalist, 
believing  only  in  appearances  without  a  reality:  and 
Mill's  admission5  that  he  cannot  regard  mind  as  "  a 
series  of  states  aware  of  itself  as  a  series,"  without 
any  bond  of  union,  is  a  shabby  acknowledgment  of 
substance.  Nevertheless,  the  principles  of  pure 
phenomenalism  are  ever  being  insisted  on,  to  the 
active  promotion  of  the  cause  of  scepticism  ;  and 
the  perpetual  ridicule  cast  on  faculties,  or  on  any- 
thing beyond  ideas,  their  associations,  and  their 
sequences,  necessarily  fosters  agnostic  conclusions. 
The  conclusions,  when  reached,  contradict  the  prin- 
ciples which  have  been  used  to  establish  them ;  for, 
bad  as  the  account  is,  the  account  which  the  pure 
empiricist  gives  of  the  genesis  of  mind,  without 
substance  and  without  efficient  causality,  by  the 
heaped-up  experiences  of  unconscious  nerve-shock, 
involves  more  of  real  mind  in  its  arguments  than 
ever  could  have  been  supplied  by  a  mind  so  gene- 
rated. Some  real  psychological  knowledge,  and 
some  acute  pieces  of  reasoning,  are  mixed  up  with 
the  unreasonable  parts  of  the  procedure.  The  up- 
shot of  the  whole,  however,  is  logically  a  complete 

s  Examination,  c.  xii.  p.  213.  See  still  more  what  he  admits  in 
the  Appendix  on  this  subject. 


SHORT   INTRODUCTION.  257 

destruction  of  the  edifice  of  human  knowledge. 
Accept  this  theory  of  mind,  and  you  have  no  mind 
left. 

Therefore,  in  this  treatise,  so  much  stress  is  laid 
upon  starting  from  the  notions  of  substance  and  effi- 
cient causality,  as  from  real,  indispensable  ground- 
works for  a  philosophy  of  certitude.  Those  who 
know  something  of  the  state  of  philosophic  opinion 
in  this  country,  will  be  ready  to  admit  the  relevancy 
of  our  brief  reference  to  substance  and  causality, 
outside  of  the  treatise  in  which  they  are  properly 
discussed  ;  and  those  whose  reading  has  not  quali- 
fied them  to  be  judges  on  the  matter,  will  do  well 
to  accept  our  assertion  on  faith  for  the  present,  and 
verify  it  themselves  hereafter. 


CHAPTER   II. 

THE   TRUSTWORTHINESS   OF   THE    SENSES. 

Synopsis. 

(A)  Preliminaries. 

i.  How,  as  a  fact,  ordinary  people  come  to  believe  in  their  own 
and  other  bodies,  and  in  the  sensible  properties  of  both. 

2.  The  universal  tendency  so  to  believe  in  the  reports  of  the 

senses  is  a  strong  presumption  for  the  validity  of  the 
belief ;  but  the  matter  must  be  argued  out  in  form. 

3.  Some  distinctions  and  divisions  useful  in  the  course  of  the 

argument,  (a)  The  number  of  the  senses,  and  recent  dis- 
coveries as  to  the  action  of  the  senses,  (b)  Division  of  the 
objects  of  sense,  (c)  Distinction  between  sensation  and 
perception. 

(B)  Proof. 

4.  We  start  the  proof  from  the  admitted  community  of  experi- 

ences between  our  adversaries  and  ourselves  as  to  the 
sensible  world. 

5.  Then  the  trustworthiness  of  a  man's  senses  is  proved;  for 

(a)  that  they  testify  to  the  existence  of  his  own  body  and  of 
other  bodies  is  shown  (i.)  by  the  admitted  existence  of 
"other  men,"  (ii.)  by  an  analysis  of  the  facts  of  sense- 
perception,  (iii.)  by  confirmatory  considerations  drawn 
from  science  :  and  (b)  that  they  testify  something  as  to  cha 
nature  of  these  bodies  is  also  a  demonstrable  fact. 

6.  Summary  of  the  long  argument. 
Addenda. 

(A)  It  is  admitted  with  tolerable  unanimity  that 
the  acquisition  of  knowledge  is  a  process,  beginning 
with  the  senses ;  and,  therefore,  with  an  exami- 
nation of  their  testimony  we  must  start  our  critical 


TRUSTWORTHINESS   OF   THE   SENSES.  259 

investigation  of  certitude  in  detail.  During  the 
performance  of  this  task  it  will  be  made  apparent, 
how  much  we  need  the  ideas  of  substance  and 
efficient  causality,  and  how  little  we  could  do,  if  we 
were  to  accept  Professor  Clifford's  dictum,  that 
"the  word  cause  has  no  legitimate  place  in  the 
science  of  philosophy ;  "  or  the  saying  of  Reid,  that 
"for  anything  we  can  prove  to  the  contrary,  the 
connexion  between  impression  and  sensation  may 
be  arbitrary,"  and  that  "  causes  have  no  proper 
efficiency  as  far  as  we  know ;  "  or  lastly,  the  words 
of  Professor  Green,1  "  The  greatest  writer  must 
fall  into  confusion  when  he  brings  under  the  con- 
ceptions of  cause  and  substance  the  self-conscious 
thought  which  is  their  source ;  when,  in  Kantian 
language,  he  brings  the  source  of  the  categories 
under  the  categories" :  for  "the  mind  is  not  substance, 
but  subject,"  in  which  "tersely  put  formula  Hegel 
emphasizes  his  position  towards  the  ordinary  meta- 
physics." Such  doctrines  are  absolutely  fatal  to  the 
claim  that  man  can  gain  real  knowledge  through  the 
media  of  his  senses. 

1.  The  philosophical  discussion  of  the  validity  of 
the  senses  may  be  aptly  prefaced  by  a  statement  as 
to  what  is  the  way,  and  the  highly  reasonable  way, 
in  which  ordinary  people,  through  their  senses,  come 

1  Introduction  to  Hume,  §  129,  §  132.  Compare  Kuno  Fischer's 
account  of  this  same  doctrine,  which  forms  so  important  a  part  in 
Kantian  philosophy  :  "  Causality  is  not  the  product,  but  the  con- 
dition of  experience  :  it  is  not  experienced,  but  makes  experience.  With 
regard  to  the  categories,  this  is  the  difference  between  Kant  and 
Hume — between  criticism  and  scepticism."  {Fischer  on  Kant's  Critick, 
c.  iii.  §  vi.  p.  89,  Mahaffy's  Translation.) 


260  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

to  the  recognition  of  an  external  world  of  matter, 
distinct  from  their  own  bodies.  Apart  from  all 
philosophy,  it  is  a  commonly  admitted  truth — which 
the  idealist  also  allows  when  he  is  not  idealizing, 
and  still  allows  when  he  is  idealizing,  but  in  his 
own  perverse  way — that  each  man  has  a  body 
with  a  set  of  separate  bodily  senses  attached ;  and 
that  thus  constituted  the  individual  is  placed  in 
a  world  made  up  of  things,  which  also  are  bodies. 
From  earliest  infancy,  all  through  the  long  ceaseless 
course  of  education,  which  the  senses  have  to 
undergo  before  they  become  fitting  instruments 
of  perception,  and  thenceforth  continuously  up  to 
the  end  of  healthy  existence,  man  is  ever  receiving 
experiences  which  go  to  enforce  the  conclusion, 
that  there  is  a  thing  which  is  his  own  body,  and 
that,  distinct  from  this,  there  are  other  bodies. 
Constant  action  and  reaction  between  organism 
and  environment,  as  also  between  different  parts 
of  the  organism  itself,  serve  to  impress  this  con 
viction.  Daily  more  and  more  is  the  reason  satis- 
fied that  it  is  rightly  interpreting  the  situation.  It 
may  be  that  no  deliberate,  explicitly  designed  line  of 
argument  is  gone  through  :  or  that  if  such  argument 
be  explicitly  attempted,  it  seems  a  failure,  only 
obscuring  what  before  was  clear.  This  fact  leads 
a  number  of  writers  to  say,  not  accurately,  that 
belief  in  an  external  world  is  not  a  rational  process, 
that  reason  destroys  natural  conviction,  and  that 
only  instinct  is  to  be  trusted.  It  is  more  satisfactory 
as  a  theory,  and  more  in  accordance  with  the  truth 
of  facts,  to  hold  that  while  no  mere  verbal  argument 


TRUSTWORTHINESS  OF  THE  SENSES.  261 

can  contain  the  full  cogency  of  proof,  which  is  found 
in  a  life  spent  literally  in  knocking  about  the  world 
and  in  being  knocked  about  by  it — a  life  of  thumps 
and  bumps  against  hard  matter ;  yet  the  argument 
is  capable  of  verbal  expression,  in  a  form  which 
meets  the  requirement  of  demonstration.  The  verbal 
form  is  not  as  forcible  as  the  accumulated  experi- 
ence, but  it  is  argumentatively  valid,  especially  as  it 
is  addressed  to  those  who  have  the  experience. 
From  the  first  tumbles  of  a  child  learning  to  walk, 
up  to  the  last  stumbles  of  an  old  man  tottering  at 
the  verge  of  his  grave,  there  is,  first  of  all,  strong 
non-philosophical  proof  that  there  is  solid  matter  in 
and  out  of  the  human  frame.  Afterwards  the  non- 
philosophical  proof  can  take  philosophic  shape :  in 
which  transformation  philosophy  has  nothing  to  rely 
upon  except  its  power  to  give  systematic  shape  to 
nature's  spontaneous  interpretation  of  experience. 

2.  That  the  common,  spontaneous  belief  of  man- 
kind is  what  it  is,  affords  strong  presumption  that 
it  is  right.  Clifford,  indeed,  tries  to  cast  doubt  on 
the  fact  that  the  popular  belief  in  an  outer  world  is 
such  as  we  assume  it  to  be,  but  herein  he  is  certainly 
wrong.  So  is  Mill  when  he  declares  that  apart  from 
philosophic  and  theologic  bias,  his  view  contains  all 
that  mankind  really  believe.  In  point  of  fact  the 
common  persuasion  is,  that  we  have  each  a  material 
organism,  brought  into  varied  contact  with  distinctly 
other  matter :  and  in  making  this  interpretation  of 
the  case  the  common  voice,  as  we  now  wish  to 
argue,  is  likely  to  be  correct.  For  the  belief 
concerns    not    abstruse,   remote    speculations,   but 


a6a  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

one  of  the  most  fundamental,  indispensable  notions 
about  the  constitution  of  self-conscious  human 
nature  and  of  its  surroundings.  Assuredly  the 
presumption  is,  that  the  easy,  ready,  and  universal 
account  rendered  by  our  intelligent  nature  of  itself, 
is  better  than  the  strained  effort  after  theory,  which, 
perhaps,  its  very  advocates  do  not  practically  believe. 
Even  Fichte  himself  confessed,  that  while  idealism 
was,  as  he  fancied,  demonstrable,  yet  it  would  never 
be  believed. 

3.  However,  we  must  go  beyond  presumptions  in 
favour  of  our  thesis,  and  set  about  the  solid  business 
of  proof;  for  which  the  way  must  first  be  prepared 
by  a  few  divisions  and  distinctions,  that  throw  light 
on  the  whole  matter  in  hand. 

We  may  leave  alone  the  division  of  the  senses 
into  inner  and  outer,  which  raises  the  controversy 
whether  the  seat  of  all  sensation  alike  is  the  brain, 
or  whether  the  outer  organs  are  likewise  seats  of 
sensation.  Nevertheless,  as  we  are  going  to  treat 
principally  of  what  are  called  "the  outer  senses," 
we  shall  do  well  to  frame  some  answer  to  the 
question,  How  many  these  are,  and  how  far  has 
the  old  account  of  them  been  upset  by  modern 
physiology  ? 

(a)  To  the  traditional  five  senses  modern  writers 
make  additions  by  splitting  up  what  used  to  be  com- 
prised under  the  one  faculty  of  Touch  into  several 
senses.  The  resulting  new  terms  have  now  grown 
pretty  familiar  to  a  reading  public  that  must  have 
been  sufficiently  often  brought  across  such  phrases 
as   "the  muscular  sense,"  and  "the  sensations  of 


TRUSTWORTHINESS  OF  THE  SENSES.  263 

organic  life."  It  has  heard  also  of  special  nerves, 
or  special  conditions  of  nerve,  for  perceiving  heat : 
it  knows  of  such  curious  facts  as  are  implied  in 
analgesia,  or  insensibility  to  pain,  while  there  is  no 
accompanying  anaesthesia  or  insensibility  to  touch. 
A  patient  has  seen  the  lancet  approach  the  flesh,  has 
felt  the  incision,  and  has  wondered  at  the  absence 
of  suffering.  Rarely  there  seems  to  be  anaesthesia 
without  analgesia.  These  facts  are  worth  knowing ; 
and  any  one  who,  treating  of  the  validity  of  the 
senses,  utterly  ignored  such  discoveries  might  be 
suspected  of  incompetency.  But  really,  on  careful 
consideration  it  will  appear,  that  with  the  exception 
of  the  stress  laid  on  what  is  called  the  muscular 
sense  for  coming  to  the  knowledge  of  resistance, 
of  externality,  of  magnitude,  and  the  like,  few  of  the 
new  ideas  enter  much  into  the  present  dispute. 
How  for  instance  does  it  affect  our  problem,  to  be 
told  that  the  rate  of  propagation  in  the  nerve 
stimulus  is  rather  slow,  and  that,  on  a  rough 
estimate,  while  stimulus  increases  in  geometric 
progression,  sensibility  increases  only  in  arith- 
metic ?  For  our  business,  then,  it  is  enough  to 
have  examined  what  is  the  style  of  modern  discove- 
ries with  regard  to  the  outer  senses,  in  order  to 
assure  ourselves  that  these  discoveries  offer  no 
obstacle  to  the  arguments  we  are  about  to  use,  and 
then  to  decide  that  the  old  division  into  five  senses 
will  satisfy  our  requirements  well  enough,  if  we  only 
remember  that  the  division  is  not  very  precise.  Bui 
the  general  fact  itself,  that  there  are  different  senses 
is  a  consideration  of  some  weight  in  our  problem ; 


264  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

because  it  raises,  for  example,  such  questions  as, 
how  can  these  diverse  senses  be  all  true  reporters, 
which  report  so  differently  of  the  same  object? 

(6)  Next  to  the  division  of  the  senses  comes  a 
call  for  a  division  of  the  objects  of  sense;  to  meet 
which  demand,  obviously  one  way  would  be  to  let 
the  first  division  settle  the  second.  But  there  is 
another  division  which  suggests  itself  to  nearly 
every  investigator,  and  is  often  introduced  into  the 
controversy  upon  which  we  are  preparing  to  enter. 
For  the  distinction  readily  occurs,  according  to  which 
some  sensations  are  specially  referred  to  the  object 
felt,  others  specially  to  the  subject  feeling,  and 
others  not  specially  to  either.  The  size  of  an  apple, 
its  taste,  and  the  combined  feeling  of  pressure  and 
resistance  to  which  it  gives  rise  when  the  hand  is 
placed  upon  it,  are  instances  respectively  of  the  three 
modes  of  sensitive  experience. 

Let  us  go  back  to  Aristotle,2  who  distinguished 
with  pretty  much  the  same  result  as  the  above,  those 
sensibles  which  can  be  reached  by  more  than  one 
sense — ra  kolvcl  alcrO^Ta  —  and  those  which  can 
be  reached  by  only  one  sense — ra  ISia  ala-Ojjrd. 
St.  Thomas3  calls  the  former  sensibilia  communia  and 
the  latter  sensibilia  propria.  Thus,  at  least,  in  the 
educated  condition  of  the  senses,  superficial  exten- 
sion is  perceptible  both  to  sight  and  touch,  and  is 
regarded  as  specially  objective;  colour,  sound,  odour, 
are  each  perceptible  only  by  one  sense,  and  are 
regarded  as  specially  subjective.  St.  Thomas  adds 
a  third  class,  the  "Things  which  fall  accidentally 

•  De  Anima,  II.  vi.  *  Summa,  ia,  qk  xvii.  a.  ii.  c. 


TRUSTWORTHINESS   OF   THE   SENSES.  265 

under  the  senses,  as  when  this  coloured  object 
happens  moreover  to  be  a  man."4  Aristotle's 
parallel  instance  is  seeing  the  son  of  Cleon.  We 
see  an  object  of  definite  colour,  light  and  shade, 
outline  ;  we  know  this  to  be  a  man,  and  even  to  be 
the  son  of  a  certain  father :  but  these  latter  facts 
are  not  at  the  moment  immediate  objects  of  our 
sight ;  they  are  known  aliunde.  The  corresponding 
classification  in  favour  among  English  philosophers 
is  that  according  to  primary  and  secondary  qualities; 
or  as  Hamilton  puts  it,  into  primary,  secondary, 
and  secundo-primary.  He  enters  into  great  minutiae, 
but  we  need  not  follow  him.  It  is  enough  to  have 
called  attention  to  the  fact,  that  whereas  sensation 
includes  an  objective  and  a  subjective  side,  some- 
times our  attention  is  called  predominantly  to  the 
one,  sometimes  to  the  other,  and  sometimes  neither 
side  seems  to  predominate. 

(c)  Hamilton  again  distinguishes  between  sensa- 
tion and  perception.  Those  who  push  this  distinc- 
tion to  the  uttermost,  describe  sensation  itself  as 
mere  subjective  feeling,  with  no  object  to  which  it 
points,  or  as  not  a  cognitive  act.5  They  make  all 
perception  a  separate  act,  supervening  on  sensation  ; 
and  they  make  it  the  business  of  the  mind  to  trace 
this  subjective  state  to  some  outer  cause,  almost  as 

4  "  Sensibilia  per  accidens,  sicut  quando  huic  colorato  accidit 
esse  hominem."  (I.e.) 

s  For  example,  Lotze :  "That  which  takes  place  in  us  imme- 
diately under  the  influence  of  an  external  stimulus,  the  sensation  or 
feeling,  is  in  itself  nothing  but  a  state  of  our  consciousness,  a  mood 
of  ourselves ;  "  it  belongs  to  the  activity  of  thought  to  convert  this 
•impression  "  into  an  "  idea."  (Logic,  pp.  io,  n.) 


266  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

we  might  interpret  the  meaning  of  a  foot-print  in 
the  sand,  saying  that  it  is  the  mark  of  an  extinct 
animal.  Reid  only  too  manifestly  tends  to  this 
extreme  view  and  is  therefore  reprehended  by  Hamil- 
ton. He  even  goes  further  and  almost  leaves  the 
work  of  assigning  the  objective  origin  of  sensation  in 
the  hands  of  the  Creator.  Regarding  the  perception 
as  an  act  only  of  the  mind,  Reid  connects  it  with 
the  sensation  as  with  a  mere  antecedent,  which  may 
have  no  closer  tie  with  the  perception  than  the 
will  of  God,  who  has  settled  that,  in  fact,  after  a 
bodily  impression,  a  mental  expression  shall  follow. 

It  pertains  to  psychology  to  treat  this  matter,  but 
we  may  state  a  few  leading  heads  of  doctrine.  First 
of  all,  sensation  itself  is  something  neither  purely 
mental,  nor  purely  material.  It  belongs,  as  Hamilton 
says,  to  the  animated  organism,  or  to  united  soul 
and  body ;  the  proof  of  its  compound  nature  being 
apparent  in  the  felt  phenomena,  which  are  partly 
of  a  spiritual  partly  of  a  bodily  character.  This 
composite  character  of  our  sensations  is  of  great 
importance  in  accounting  for  our  notion  of  Space, 
which  pure  empiricists  vainly  seek  to  derive  from 
non-spatial  feelings,  while  the  a  priori  school  make 
it  a  subjective  form  of  our  faculty,  which  they  call 
objective  because  all  men  alike  have  this  form.  As  to 
whether,  besides  sensation,  there  is  such  a  thing  as 
sensitive  perception,  the  condition  of  the  lower 
animals,  is  an  argument  that  there  is.  The  Duke 
of  Argyll  appeals  to  our  own  experience  in  the 
matter  as  very  convincing :  but,  while  it  is  true  that 
we  have  sense-perceptions,  it  is  also  true  that  we 


TRUSTWORTHINESS   OF  THE   SENSES.  267 

cannot  begin  reflectively  to  analyze  them  except  in 
terms  of  intellectual  perception.  What  is  called  the 
sense-perception  of  an  object  is  often  really  the 
intellectual  perception  consequent  on  the  sense- 
perception. 

(B)  Now  what,  in  the  coming  argument,  we  must 
chiefly  have  regard  to,  is  precisely  the  intellectual 
perception  and  judgment  about  objects  of  which 
we  are  made  cognisant  through  the  medium  of  the 
senses.  When  intellectually  we  judge  that  there  is 
an  outer  material  world,  having  really  such  and  such 
properties,  then  we  have  the  act  which  this  chapter 
is  concerned  to  prove  generically  valid.  We  do  not 
suppose  outer  objects  immediately  setting  a  seal 
upon  the  spiritual  mind :  and  Ferrier  is  quite 
misconceiving  our  problem,  when  under  the  wrong 
notion  just  repudiated,  he  declares,  "  Descartes  saw 
that  things  and  the  senses  could  no  more  transmit 
cognitions  to  the  mind  than  a  man  can  transmit  to 
a  beggar  a  guinea  which  he  has  not  got."6  We,  too, 
see  and  confess  as  much :  but  what  we  deem  still 
worthy  to  be  examined  into  is,  whether  the  intellect 
can  arrive  at  judgments  about  the  external  world, 
because  this  world  first  acts  on  an  animated  organism 
adapted  to  feel  and  sensitively  to  perceive  it ;  and 
because,  on  the  occurrence  of  the  sensitive  percep- 
tion, the  intellect,  which  is  only  another  activity  of 
the    same    soul   that    takes   part    in  the  sensation, 

6  Descartes  is  not  uniform  in  his  doctrine  about  the  senses ;  but 
he  has  made  distinct  admissions  that  our  theory  need  not  imply 
anything  like  the  literal  transference  of  an  image  from  sense  to 
intellect.     See  a  quotation  in  Mr.  Huxley's  Hume,  p.  84. 


268  SPECIAL   TREATMENT   OF   CERTITUDE. 

is  adapted  to  form  to  itself  ideas  corresponding 
to  the  objects  which  excite  its  sensibility.  Un- 
doubtedly it  is  a  very  obscure  point  how  the 
transition  is  made  from  sense  to  intellect;  but,  as 
we  have  to  repeat  so  often,  a  fact  may  become 
apparent  while  its  mode  remains  undiscoverable. 
The  mode  even  of  the  mere  sense-reaction  has  its 
obscurities,  under  cover  of  which  some  speak  as 
though  the  re-agency  were  merely  mechanical,  and 
not  the  re-agency  of  a  faculty,  which,  in  its  own 
lower  order,  is  cognitive.  Yet  surely  a  sense- 
impression  is  not  received  simply  like  a  stamp  upon 
wax  or  a  stroke  on  a  bell.  The  proper  attitude 
under  obscurities  is  neither  to  deny  ascertainable 
facts,  nor  to  assert  as  facts  what  are  fictions. 

The  above  divisions  and  distinctions,  even  though 
seldom  explicitly  appealed  to,  are  most  valuable 
in  shedding  light  on  the  matter  about  which  we  have 
now  to  argue ;  and  the  absence  of  them  leaves  a 
great  haziness  of  mind,  anything  but  conducive  to 
the  work  of  framing  or  appreciating  arguments. 

4.  Briefly  stated,  the  whole  proof  of  the  present 
thesis  will  consist  in  showing  that  the  experienced 
facts  of  sensation  are  confessedly  alike  with  our 
adveisaries  and  ourselves,  and  that  only  our  way 
of  accounting  for  them  is  adequate.  In  other  words, 
starting  from  the  common  ground  of  an  admittedly 
double  series  in  our  sensations,  we  have  next  to  show- 
that  the  true  account  of  the  fact  is  what  has  been 
broadly  expressed  by  the  terms  realism  or  dualism, 
which  mean  that  there  are  two  real  divisions  of 
things,    "  my   body,"    and    "  bodies   outside   mine.'' 


TRUSTWORTHINESS   OF  THE   SENSES,  269 

Let  us  start  with  the  declaration  of  what  is  common 
ground. 

It  would  be  very  awkward,  indeed,  for  us,  if 
we  found  adversaries  asserting  that  they  have  no 
experiences  answering  to  our  own ;  that  outer  and 
inner  objects,  the  different  personal  pronouns,  /, 
you,  and  they,  are  terms  which  correspond  to  no 
distinctions  in  their  consciousness.  But  it  is  the 
very  complaint  of  the  idealist  that  his  admissions  on 
these  points  are  not  recognized,  and  that  he  is 
supposed  to  be  logically  committed  to  an  utter  dis- 
regard of  mad  dogs,  infuriated  bulls,  express  trains, 
yawning  abysses,  on  the  one  side ;  and  on  the  other 
side,  of  good  dinners,  elegant  dress,  commodious 
lodgings,  and  entertaining  company.  His  protest  is 
that  all  ordinary  forms  of  speech  have  a  meaning 
for  him.  He  allows  that  the  sun,  on  present  calcu- 
lation, is  about  ninety  millions  of  miles  off;  he 
expects  in  about  a  week  to  complete  a  voyage  to 
America  and  find  "the  big  continent"  at  the  end. 
He  would  correct  a  child  who  mixed  up  the  doings 
of  Napoleon  and  of  Wellington,  and  he  claims  to 
himself  the  exploits  of  neither:  he  does  not  at  all 
allow  that  they  are  the  fictions  of  his  own  fancy. 
Perhaps  he  will  go  so  far  as  to  talk  of  a  time  a  long 
way  back  in  the  process  of  evolution,  when  con- 
sciousness as  yet  was  not.  Mr.  Spencer  thinks  the 
idealist  has  no  right  so  to  speak,  Mr.  Sully  thinks  he 
has,  our  view  of  the  matter  may  be  given  later :  at 
present  let  us  turn  to  some  examples  in  proof  of 
the  unanimity  between  idealists  and  realists  as  to 
the  facts  of  experience  for  which  an  account  has 


270  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

to  be  given.     Of  course  only  the  idealists  need  be 
quoted. 

Berkeley,7  remarking  that  he  can  call  up  fan- 
tastic images  as  he  likes,  adds,  "  but  when  in  broad 
daylight  I  open  my  eyes,  it  is  not  in  my  power  to 
choose  whether  I  shall  see  or  not,  or  to  determine 
what  particular  objects  shall  present  themselves  to 
my  view."  "  The  ideas  of  sense  are  more  strong, 
lively,  and  distinct  than  those  of  the  imagination. 
They  have  a  liveliness,  a  steadiness,  order,  and 
coherence,  and  are  not  excited  at  random,  as  those 
which  are  the  effects  of  human  wills  often  are,  but 
in  regular  train  and  series."  Berkeley,  it  is  true, 
was  only  a  half-hearted  idealist,  though,  as  his  note- 
book shows,  he  had  thoughts  of  abolishing  spiritual 
substance  among  created  things,  just  as  he  abolished 
material  substance,  and  then  he  would  have  become 
wholly  an  idealist.  If,  however,  we  want  a  man 
who,  according  to  his  principles,  ought  to  be  the 
most  out-and-out  idealist,  we  have  Berkeley's 
continuator,  Hume :  and  he  fully  admits  the  con- 
trast between  the  actual  and  the  imaginary  in 
our  objects  of  thought.  "  Nature,  by  an  absolute 
and  uncontrollable  necessity,  has  determined  us  to 
judge  as  well  as  to  breathe  and  feel ;  nor  can  we 
any  more  forbear  viewing  certain  objects  in  a 
stronger  and  fuller  light  upon  account  of  their  custo- 
mary connexion  with  a  present  impression,  than  we 
can  hinder  ourselves  from  thinking  as  long  as  we  are 
awake,  or  seeing  the  surrounding  bodies  when  we 
turn    our   eyes   towards   them    in   broad    sunshine. 

7  The  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  nn.  28 — 31. 


TRUSTWORTHINESS  OF  THE  SENSES.  271 

Whoever  has  undertaken  to  refute  the  cavils  of  this 
total  scepticism  has  really  disputed  without  an 
antagonist,  and  endeavoured,  by  argument,  to  estab- 
lish a  faculty  which  nature  has  antecedently  im- 
planted in  the  mind  and  rendered  unavoidable."8 
Passing  on  to  a  great  modern  representative  of 
Hume,  we  find  Mill9  owning  to  an  experience  like 
ours,  as  we  gather  from  what  he  says  about  his 
belief  in  the  permanent  existence  of  icebergs,  of  a 
piece  of  white  paper,  and  of  the  city  of  Calcutta. 
Elsewhere  he  distinctly  recognizes  his  own  bodily 
senses  as  the  organs  whereby  he  communicates  with 
the  external  world.  "  Physical  objects  are,  of  course, 
known  to  us  through  the  senses.  By  these  channels, 
and  not  otherwise,  we  learn  whatever  we  do  learn 
concerning  them.  Without  the  senses  we  know  no 
more  of  what  they  are  than  the  senses  tell  us.  Thus 
much,  in  the  obvious  meaning  of  the  words,  is 
denied  by  no  one,  though  there  are  thinkers  who 
prefer  to  express  their  meaning  in  other  language." 
The  twin  philosopher  with  Mill,  namely,  Mr.  Bain,10 
though  he  declares  the  question  whether  there 
is  an  outer  world  not  to  be  even  intelligible,  yet 
clearly  recognizes  the  experiences  which  we  call 
those  of  the  outer  world :  "  The  perception  of 
matter  points  to  a  fundamental  distinction  in  our 
experience.     We   are   in  one  condition  or  attitude 

8  Human  Nature,  Bk.  I.  Part  IV.  §  1.  As  Hume  wished  to  be 
judged  by  his  later  work,  we  may  say  that  similar  confessions  are 
found  in  the  Inquiry. 

9  Examination,  c.  ix.  p.  127 ;  c.  xi.  pp.  192,  199. 
K  Mental  Science,  Bk.  II.  c.  vii.  pp.  198 — 202. 


272  SPECIAL   TREATMENT   OF  CERTITUDE. 

of  mind  when  surveying  a  tree  or  a  mountain, 
and  in  a  totally  different  condition  or  attitude 
when  luxuriating  in  warmth  or  suffering  from  a 
toothache.  The  difference  here  indicates  the  greatest 
contrast."  And  again  :  "  Object  means  (a)  what 
calls  our  muscular  energies  into  play  as  opposed  to 
passive  feelings ;  (b)  the  uniform  connexion  of  defi- 
nite feelings  with  definite  energies,  as  opposed  to 
feelings  unconnected  with  energies  :  (c)  what  affects 
all  minds  alike,  as  opposed  to  what  varies  in 
different  minds.  .  .  .  The  greatest  antithesis  among 
the  phenomena  of  our  mental  constitution  is  the 
antithesis  between  the  active  and  passive."  A  more 
appropriate  quotation  still  may  be  given  from  the 
same  chapter  :  To  say  that  the  perception  of  matter 
is  an  ultimate,  indivisible,  simple  fact  "  is  as  doubt- 
ful in  itself  as  it  is  at  variance  with  the  common 
belief.  When  we  turn  to  the  fact  called  perception, 
we  cannot  help  being  struck  with  the  appearance  at 
least  of  complexity.  There  is  seemingly  a  combina- 
tion of  a  perceiving  mind,  a  mode  of  activity  of 
that  mind,  a  something  to  be  perceived — nothing 
less  than  the  whole  extended  universe.  To  make 
out  this  seemingly  threefold  concurrence  to  be  an 
indivisible  fact,  would  at  least  demand  a  justifying 
explanation."  Lastly,  to  quote  the  testimony  of 
a  prominent  scientific  man,  who  more  than  the 
common  run  of  his  brethren  claims  to  be  likewise 
a  philosopher,  Mr.  Huxley  admits  that  the  realistic 
hypothesis  so  well  satisfies  the  facts  of  the  case 
that  it  may  be  true:11  "  there  may  be  a  real  some- 

"  Huxley's  Hume,  c.  ill.  p.  81. 


TRUSTWORTHINESS   OF   THE   SENSES.  273 

thing  which  is  the  cause  of  our  experience."  This 
admission  he  unfortunately  follows  up  by  another 
admission,  which  shows  the  abyss  of  the  agnos- 
ticism into  which  he  has  fallen,  and  to  which  we 
shall  have  repeatedly  to  recur  afterwards,  because  it 
is  such  a  clear  declaration  of  his  philosophical  bank- 
ruptcy.  "  For  any  demonstration  that  can  be  given 
to  the  contrary  effect,  the  collection  of  perceptions 
which  makes  up  our  consciousness  may  be  an 
orderly  phantasmagoria,  generated  by  the  Ego  un- 
folding its  successive  scenes  on  the  background  of 
the  abyss  of  nothingness  ;  as  a  firework,  which  is 
but  cunningly  arranged  combustibles,  grows  from  a 
spark  into  a  coruscation,  and  from  a  coruscation 
into  figures  and  words  and  cascades  of  devouring 
flames,  and  then  vanishes  into  the  darkness  of 
night." 

This  last  avowal  is  not  satisfactory :  but  at  any 
rate  we  have  the  satisfactory  result  of  finding  a 
common  account  of  the  phenomena  to  be  explained; 
and  we  may  now  go  on  to  find  proof  of  the  mani- 
fest breakdown  of  the  idealistic  theory  and  of  the 
manifest  stability  of  the  moderate  realistic  doctrine, 
when  each  respectively  is  called  upon  to  explain  the 
universally  admitted  facts  of  experience. 

5.  It  is  not  with  the  whole  of  idealism  that  we 
have  got  to  do,  but  only  with  the  part  which  con- 
cerns the  sensible  world  of  matter.  However,  the 
fundamental  difficulty,  on  which  throughout  idealism 
is  based,  is  contained  in  the  question,  how  can  the 
individual  get  outside  of  itself?  how  can  thought 
transcend  itself?  how  can  the  subject  know  any- 
S 


274  SPECIAL  TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

thing  except  its  own  affections  ?  I2  In  reply  we  have 
to  repeat  the  old  truths,  that  we  may  be  certain 
of  a  fact  without  being  acquainted  with  the  how  of 
the  fact ;  and  that  "  from  a  fact  to  its  possibility  the 
inference  is  valid."13  At  least  it  is  a  piece  of  more 
gratuitous  dogmatism  than  they  seem  to  be  aware 
of,  when  idealists  lay  it  down  a  priori,  that  it  is  a 
plain  self-contradiction  to  suppose  the  perception  of 
an  object,  which  object  is  other  than  the  percipient, 
and  known  by  him  to  be  such.  Not  that  there  is  no 
mystery  in  the  process :  indeed  there  is  mystery 
even  in  the  simplest  instance  of  what  we  call  a 
transient  action,  as  when  a  moving  body  sets  in 
motion  a  body  before  at  rest.  Still  more  is  there 
mystery  in  the  process  of  thought,  an  act  at  once 
physically  immanent  in  the  subject,  and  transient, 
as  the  scholastics  say,  intentionaliter,  that  is,  having 
its  term,  so  far  as  meaning  and  intelligence  are  con- 
cerned, something  outside  the  subject.  The  mystery 
then  we  allow :  but  at  the  same  time  we  contend, 
that  however  mysterious,  still  a  fact  which  can 
be  established  ought  to  be  recognized.  In  order 
to  the  establishment  of  the  fact  we  have  two  points 
to  prove:  (a)  that  each  one's  senses  testify  to  the 

u  See  Mr. Bain's  Mental  Science,  Bk.  II.  c.  vii.  p.  198.  "The  prevailing 
doctrine  is,  that  a  tree  is  something  in  itself,  apart  from  all  percep- 
tion ;  that  by  its  luminous  emanations  it  impresses  our  mind  and  is 
then  perceived ;  the  perception  being  an  effect,  and  the  impressing 
tree  a  [partial]  cause.  But  the  tree  is  known  only  through  percep- 
tion, we  can  think  of  it  as  perceived,  but  not  as  unperceived.  There 
is  a  manifest  contradiction  in  the  supposition  ;  at  the  same  moment 
we  are  required  to  perceive  and  not  perceiva" 

»3  ••  Ab  esse  ad  posse  valet  illatio." 


TRUSTWORTHINESS   OF   THE   SENSES.  275 

existence  of  his  own  body  and  of  bodies  not  his  own ; 
and  (b)  that  they  testify  something  about  the  nature 
of  these  bodies. 

(a)  In   behalf  of  the   former  point   three  argu- 
ments may  be  adduced. 

(i.)  Our  adversaries  each  assert  the  existence  of 
other  men,  and  it  is  on  this  ground  that  we  will  do 
battle  with  them  in  the  first  instance.  Relegating 
all  account  of  individual  writers  to  a  note  in  the 
Addenda,  lest  it  should  here  perplex  the  course  of 
an  argument  already  sufficiently  difficult  in  itself, 
we  must  be  content  to  speak  in  quite  general  terms. 
We  say,  then,  that  on  the  strength  of  sensible  mani- 
festations, opponents  are  quite  unwarranted  in  their 
inference  that  "other  men  "besides  themselves  exist. 
By  the  very  principles  of  their  position  they  are  shut 
out  from  the  conclusion  that  anything  is  truly  other 
than  their  own  sensations ;  and  their  pretence  that 
"  other  men "  are  demonstrable  while  "  external 
matter  "  is  indemonstrable,  can  be  kept  up  only  by 
a  delusion  resting  on  great  confusion  of  thought. 
For  in  the  end  it  will  be  seen  that  the  assumption 
of  a  known  "  external  matter  "  is  needful,  and  is 
employed  in  the  argument  whereby  the  conclusion 
is  drawn  that  there  are  "  other  men."  A  reference 
to  Mill's  view,  as  explained  in  the  Addenda,  will 
make  this  point  clear.  The  strength  of  our  attack 
on  the  adversaries  always  lies  in  this:  they  assert 
distinctly  "  other  men  "  with  bodies  like  their  own, 
and  thereby  they  give  up  their  own  doctrine  as  to 
the  power  of  the  senses. 

After  showing  the  inability  of  idealists  to  defend 


276  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

their  belief  in  "  other  men,"  we  may  now  venture 
upon  doing  what  they  have  failed  to  do,  framing 
upon  their  suggestion  an  argument  of  our  own, 
which,  while  it  is  not  one  ordinarily  used  in 
books,  is  an  effective  demonstration  of  the  validity 
of  the  senses.  The  line  of  proof  runs  thus.  We 
certainly  do,  through  our  senses  and  the  material 
manifestations  furnished  to  them  by  "  other  men," 
come  to  a  sure  knowledge  that  these  men  exist. 
But  this  could  not  be,  unless  our  senses  were 
valid  means  for  reaching  the  knowledge  of  external 
bodies.  Therefore  our  senses  are  such  valid  means. 
The  major  of  the  syllogism  can  be  established  in 
a  special  way,  which  will  leave  untouched  the 
commoner  arguments  that  are  to  be  adduced 
presently.  For,  that  we  do  come  across  other 
minds,  is  most  clearly  evidenced  to  us  by  the 
intellectual  assistance  we  receive  from  them.  It 
would  require  a  very  foolish  or  a  very  shameless 
scholar,  seriously  to  maintain  that  all  the  infor- 
mation he  receives  from  teachers  and  books  is 
really  as  much  the  exclusive  product  of  his  own 
mind,  as  that  which  he  ordinarily  calls  his  original 
thought  or  discovery ;  allowing  this  sole  difference, 
that  the  former  knowledge  is  accompanied  by  a  special 
feeling  of  derivation  from  outside,  which  is,  after 
all,  only  a  part  of  his  own  inner  consciousness.  Let 
us  think  of  our  very,  very  wide  indebtedness  to  other 
minds ;  how  very  much  less  than  we  are,  we  should 
have  been,  intellectually,  had  others  not  taught  us 
orally  or  in  writing ;  how  very  little  we  really  know 
at  first  hand :  and  then  let  us  try  to  swallow  down, 


TRUSTWORTHINESS   OF  THE  SENSES.  277 

we  might  almost  have  called  it  the  idealist  joke  on 
the  subject,  were  it  not  that  some  idealists  are 
manifestly  in  earnest.  We  feel  that  we  have  not 
powers  of  deglutition  for  so  formidable  a  morsel. 
If  then  we  really  do  come  in  contact  with  other 
minds,  and  draw  knowledge  from  them,  the 
intercommunion  is  certainly  not  one  purely  spiri- 
tual :  it  is  through  the  senses  and  by  means 
evidently  material.  With  our  bodily  senses  we 
approach  those  bodily  objects,  the  books  of  the 
British  Museum,  the  Natural  History  Specimens  in 
its  Kensington  offshoot,  the  libraries,  the  custodians, 
and  the  professors,  who,  as  experts,  help  us  inex- 
perts  out  of  many  a  difficulty.  Surely  the  least 
recognition  we  can  pay  to  our  kindly  helpers  is  to 
acknowledge  unreservedly  their  real,  independent 
existence.  Mr.  Huxley,  in  spite  of  his  theory  that 
idealism  cannot  be  disproved,  expresses  himself 
gratified  with  the  tokens  of  esteem  that  he  receives 
from  former  pupils.  Now  if  he  would  good- 
naturedly  consider  the  impossibility  of  his  har- 
bouring any  genuine  doubt,  as  to  whether  he  has 
been  exercising  and  receiving  the  offices  of  real 
"altruism,"  or  has  simply  been  teaching  himself 
under  another  form,  and  receiving  from  the  pseudo- 
outsider  compliments,  which  his  modesty  would 
have  forbidden  him  undisguisedly  to  pay  to  him- 
self; he  might  be  brought  to  recognize  that  the 
existence  and  the  actions  of  really  "  other  men " 
can  be  fully  brought  home  as  a  conviction  of  the 
reason,  and  that  idealism,  in  consequence,  is  ex- 
ploded, not  only  practically,  but  theoretically.     He 


278  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 


would  retract  the  already  quoted  passage,  that  for 
aught  we  can  demonstrate  to  the  contrary,  all  our 
thinking  may  be  so  many  idle  fireworks  let  off  by 
the  mind  against  "a  background  of  nothingness." 

Beyond  a  doubt,  under  the  single  category  of  the 
intellectual  aids  which  we  derive  by  our  communi- 
cation, through  the  senses,  with  our  fellow-men, 
there  lies  proof  positive  that  idealism  is  an  insulting 
attempt  to  fool  a  man  out  of  those  faculties 
which  are  his  birth-right.  Because  we  are  treating 
philosophically  of  the  senses,  we  are  not  there- 
fore to  allow  ourselves  to  be  staggered  "  out  of 
our  five  wits,"  by  any  phantom  which  a  bit  of 
sophistry  may  conjure  up  before  us.  Because 
we  have  on  the  philosophic  mantle,  we  are  not, 
therefore,  to  yield  up  that  sound  judgment  which 
we  possess,  when  we  are,  so  to  speak,  in  our 
shirt  sleeves.  In  the  latter  condition  we  are  ready 
to  fight  a  pretty  vigorous  battle  for  the  reasonable- 
ness of  trusting  our  senses;  and  there  is  nothing  to 
prevent  us,  as  philosophers,  from  doing  the  same 
stout  battle.  As  philosophers  we  may  affirm,  what 
as  ordinary  men  we  affirm,  that  there  is  evidence 
from  the  senses,  such  as  to  warrant  our  belief  in 
the  existence  of  our  fellow-mortals ;  and  that  in 
this  conclusion  is  involved  the  wider  proposition, 
that  about  the  world  of  matter  in  general  our 
senses   can  testify  to   its   outer  reality. 

(ii.)  To  pass  now  from  the  consideration  of 
"other  men,"  a  consideration  which  our  adver- 
saries have  usefully  forced  upon  us,  we  may  turn 
to    the    arguments    more    commonly   adduced    on 


TRUSTWORTHINESS   OF   THE   SENSES.  279 

behalf  of  the  senses  by  standard  authors.14  Each 
one  who  is  unburdened  by  Kantian  views  as  to  space 
and  time,  may  formulate  to  himself  this  argument 
in  some  such  shape  as  the  following :  I  can  verify 
for  myself,  as  an  explorer,  the  existence  of  my  own 
extended  body,  of  definite  shape  and  size.  At 
least  by  repetition  and  comparison  of  experiences 
from  different  senses,  I  can  become  aware  of  my 
several  sentient  organs ;  of  one  sensation  as  being 
peculiar  to  one  inlet,  and  another  to  another;  of 
sights  entering  in  at  places  different  from  the  places 
where  sounds  enter.  I  can  feel  the  double  sense 
of  contact,  that  of  touching  and  being  touched, 
when  I  place  my  right  hand  upon  my  left,  and  I 
can  contrast  this  duplex  sensation  with  the  single 
sensation  given  by  putting  either  hand  upon  the 
table.  Gradually,  if  not  at  once,  I  can  explore  the 
limits  of  my  sentient  body.  I  find  this  body  of 
mine  at  the  same  time  brought  into  relation  with 
other  bodies,  in  such  sort  that  the  only  rational 
interpretation  of  the  situation  is  to  say,  these  bodies 
are  really  not  mine.  I  touch  them  and  feel  their 
resistance  to  my  energies,  but  invariably  without 
the  double  sense  of  touch  or  resistance  which  I 
usually  have  when  it  is  one  part  against  another 
part  of  my  own  body  that  I  oppose.  Conviction 
is,  in  a  million  instances,  brought  home  to  me  that  I 
am  passively  sentient,  not  of  course  with  a  pure 
passivity,  under  many  outside  influences — influences 
which  I  cannot  have  at  will,  or  carry  about  with  me, 

f«  Tongiorgi,   Logica,   Part    II.   Lib.    II.    cap.   iii. ;    Logik    und 
Erkenntmsstheorie,  von  Dr.  C.  Gutberlet,  Zweites  Kapitel,  pp.  174,  seq. 


280  SPECIAL   TREATMENT   OF  CERTITUDE. 

or  vary  with  the  same  degree  of  control  which  I  have 
over  a  mere  train  of  subjectively  originated  imagi- 
nations. The  control  in  the  latter  case  is  indeed  far 
from  absolute,  but  at  least  it  is  perceptibly  some- 
thing. Nor  can  I  persuade  myself,  on  Hume's 
suggestion,  to  get  over  the  difference  between  real 
and  imaginary  objects  by  attributing  it  only  to  a 
greater  and  less  degree  of  subjective  liveliness ;  for 
I  have  the  means,  while  reason  lasts,  of  detecting 
even  very  lively  fantasies  to  be  only  fantasies. 

So  might  a  common  man  argue,  and  validly. 
It  is  because  he  so  reasons  that  he  is  apt  to  receive 
the  often  inculcated  lesson  of  scientific  men,  like 
Mr.  Huxley,  that  about  physical  facts  we  must 
consult  outer  nature,  and  not  try  to  evolve  them 
from  our  inner  consciousness.  If  we  want  personally 
to  explore  the  home  habits  of  the  Polar  bear,  we 
must  join  a  Polar  expedition,  which  will  mean  a 
great  deal  more  than  the  idea  of  a  tedious  and 
perilous  voyage  preceding  the  idea  of  finding  what 
we  seek.  Yet  according  to  strict  idealists  this  is 
all  that  is  meant.  For  instance,  Professor  Huxley 
says  I5  that  the  analysis  of  the  proposition,  "Brain 
produces  thought,"  "amounts  to  the  following: 
whenever  those  states  of  consciousness  which  are 
called  sensation,  motion,  or  thought,  come  into 
existence,  complete  investigation  will  show  good 
reason  for  the  belief  that  they  are  preceded  by  those 
other  phenomena  of  consciousness  to  which  we  gave 
the  names  of  matter  and  motion."  As  the  Professor 
cannot  mean  that  we  always  think  of  matter  and 

*s  Huxley's  Hume,  c.  iii.  pp.  So,  81. 


TRUSTWORTHINESS  OF  THE  SENSES.  281 

motion  before  we  think  of  consciousness,  he  has  no 
right  to  call  the  cerebral  motion  which,  on  the  theory 
of  brain  producing  thought,  would  be  the  antecedent 
of  consciousness,  by  the  name  of  a  "  phenomenon  of 
consciousness."  How  can  that  antecedent  be  the 
phenomenal  antecedent  in  consciousness  which  in 
consciousness  does  not  antecede  the  result,  or  of 
which  generally  we  have  no'  consciousness  ? 

The  main  difficulty  brought  against  this,  which 
we  have  styled  "  the  ordinary  argument "  for 
realism,  is  made  to  rest  on  impossible  theories 
about  the  origin  of  the  notion  extension  or  outness. 
It  is  asserted  that  local  outness  is  not  given  simply 
by  the  consciousness  of  one  thought  being  other 
than  a  preceding  thought,  and  then  great  labour  is 
expended  to  develope  externality  in  space  out  of 
succession  in  sentient  states.  These  bugbears  set 
up  by  a  bad  psychology  must  be  encountered  in 
the  psychological  treatise ;  but  we  in  our  own 
treatise  at  least  are  justified  in  claiming,  on  the 
strength  of  natural  evidence,  a  clear  idea  of  outness 
in  space  as  derived  through  our  sensitive  experience. 
We  need  no  more  for  the  purposes  of  the  line  of 
proof  just  brought  to  an  end. 

(iii.)  It  is  not  necessary  to  develope  further  the 
argument  against  idealism  and  for  realism  as  fur- 
nishing the  genuine  account  of  those  experienced 
differences  between  inner  and  outer  bodies,  which  all 
parties  admit,  but  some  confirmation  of  what  has 
been  urged  may  be  borrowed  from  Professor  Tait's 
idea,  that  the  great  proof  of  external  reality  is  the 
scientific  truth  that  matter  can  neither  be  created 


2»2  SPECIAL    TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

nor  annihilated.  On  idealist  principles  this  pro- 
position might  still  be  held,  but  it  would  have  very 
little  value.  As  soon  as  the  scientific  man  was 
persuaded  that  matter  was  only  the  objective  side 
of  his  ideas,  without  ascertainable  independent 
existence,  he  would  care  very  little  about  its  increase 
or  decrease :  and  might  even  claim  to  increase  and 
decrease  it  at  will,  at  least  under  certain  conditions. 

Another  confirmation,  suggested  by  Mr.  Spencer, 
and  allowed  by  Mr.  Balfour,  but  disallowed  by  Mr. 
Sully,  lies  in  the  assertion,  that  "  if  idealism  is  true, 
then  evolution  is  a  dream."  For  evolution  supposes 
an  indefinitely  long  period,  during  which  there  was 
no  consciousness  in  the  universe.  Such  a  universe, 
as  an  existence,  cannot  have  been  ideal,  and  cannot 
be  affirmed  now  by  the  idealist :  for  it  would  once 
have  been  a  universe  out  of  all  human  thought, 
which  Mr.  Bain,  on  his  principles,  rightly  concludes 
to  be  a  "  manifest  contradiction." 

(b)  Some,  conceding  to  us  all  which  so  far  we 
have  been  pressing  to  prove,  but  not  all  we  have 
actually  proved,  would  bid  us  stop  short  here; 
they  admit  that  we  have  evidence  for  predicating 
the  bare  existence  of  bodies  outside  our  own,  but 
nothing  more ;  we  can  say  nothing  of  their  attributes 
or  nature.  Kant,  in  some  passages,  but  not  in  all, 
takes  up  exactly  this  position,  and  Schopenhauer 
declares  "  he  must  be  abandoned  by  all  the  gods  who 
imagines  that  there  exists  outside  of  us  a  real  world 
of  objects  corresponding  to  our  representations." 

At  this  juncture  the  distinction  is  of  some  use 
between   what   are   called    primary   and    secondary 


TRUSTWORTHINESS   OF   THE   SENSES.  283 

qualities,  though  it  is  not  to  be  pushed  to  excess, 
as  though  any  sensible  quality  could  be  perceived 
as  quite  out  of  all  relation  to  sense.  We  may 
contrast  the  relations  we  affirm  between  the 
object  and  the  organism  of  the  subject,  with  the 
relations  we  affirm  between  one  object  and  another. 
Whether  sugar  is  sweet,  ginger  hot,  and  aloes  bitter, 
depends  upon  the  subject,  and  would  change  with 
a  possible  change  of  subject ;  but  no  change  of  the 
subject's  faculties  could  validly  report  that  St.  Paul's 
would  go  inside  the  smallest  shop  in  Paternoster 
Row,  and  that  a  strip  of  carpet,  which  we  have  in 
a  corner  of  the  room,  would  cover  the  whole  floor. 
It  is  true  enough  that  all  objects,  whether  primary 
or  secondary  qualities,  affect  our  senses  relatively 
to  the  structure  of  our  organs ;  but  not  only  can 
there  be  no  knowledge  of  relations  without  some 
knowledge  of  the  absolute  terms  which  are  related, 
but  in  asserting  one  class  of  relations  between 
external  bodies,  we  assert  that  which  would  not 
change  with  a  change  of  our  organism,  though  this 
latter  change  might  increase  or  decrease  our  per- 
ception of  the  outer  facts.  That  a  whale  is  larger 
than  a  whiting  does  not  depend  on  any  percipient 
organism,  but  is  true  for  any  organism  that  can 
perceive  it. 

Again,  when  we  think  of  some  well-established 
chemical  analysis,  for  example,  the  resolution  of 
water  into  two  gases,  we  ask  ourselves,  is  there  no 
real  insight  into  the  nature  of  things  here  ?  Is 
physical  science  so  devoid  of  objective  reality  as 
to   tell    us  nothing  of  "  things  themselves,"  in  the 


284  SPECIAL    TREATMENT  OF   CERTITUDE. 

rational  meaning  of  that  phrase  ?  Is  the  resist- 
ance we  directly  encounter  from  external  objects 
nothing  proper  to  the  objects  themselves?  Is  it  a 
fact  that  we  can  regard  it  only  under  the  false 
analogy  of  a  will-power,  never  as  a  material  power  ? 
It  is  suicidal  in  the  idealist  to  quote,  as  he  does,  the 
instances  of  light  and  heat,  and  to  argue  his  case 
with  an  air  of  triumph,  from  the  fact  that  vibra- 
tions of  a  fluid  medium  are  quite  unlike  the 
sensations  of  sight  and  hearing.  He  forgets  that 
it  has  been  by  the  senses  that  the  vibrations  have 
been  discovered,  and  that  if  the  scientific  result  is 
worth  anything,  it  proves  the  ability  of  the  senses 
to  give  us  information  about  facts  as  they  are  in 
external  nature.  To  urge  in  reply  that  these  facts 
are,  for  us,  only  as  known  by  us,  not  as  existing  out 
of  relation  to  all  knowledge,  is  futile ;  for  this  does 
not  prove  that  we  cannot  know  objects  as  they 
really  are.  We  do  not  know  all  about  them,  but 
that  we  never  claimed  to  know ;  at  least  we  know 
something,  and  that  contradicts  idealism. 

In  saying  that  our  knowledge  is  a  compound  of 
subjective  and  objective  elements  inextricably  com- 
bined, adversaries  make  the  mistake  of  going  simply 
on  the  analogy  of  a  chemical  composition.16    Water 

16  Kantians  sometimes  speak  in  this  sense,  and  sometimes  they 
make  the  whole  perception  subjective.  "  The  external  object,  or  what 
we  call  the  thing  without  us,  is  not  by  any  means  the  thing  per  se.  The 
thing  without  us,  resolved  into  its  elements,  consists  of  sensation 
and  intuition,  partly  our  datum  and  partly  our  product:  it  is  nothing 
but  our  phenomenon,  our  representation.  The  thing  per  se  is  a  term 
by  which  we  designate  the  very  opposite  of  this,  namely  what  can 
never  be  phenomenon  or  representation."  (Fischer  on  Kant's  Critick. 
PP-  53-  54-) 


TRUSTWORTHINESS   OF   THE   SENSES.  285 


is  neither  oxygen  nor  hydrogen,  being  a  chemical 
compound  of  the  two.  But  thought  is  not  a 
chemical  compound,  having  for  its  constituents 
object  and  subject.  Materially  the  known  object 
has  not  to  be  shot  into  the  mind  and  fused  with  it. 
The  reaction  of  mind  after  the  stimulation  of  the 
senses,  is  not  any  kind  of  a  reaction,  but  a  definite, 
most  peculiar,  and  most  exalted  one.  And  the 
argument  which  urges  that  no  knowledge  attains 
to  reality  as  it  is,  because  all  is  relative,  is  so 
radically  false,  that  it  includes  not  only  finite  minds, 
but  all  minds,  even  the  Divine,  and  denies  to  God 
Himself  an  absolute  knowledge.  Its  perspicacious 
and  consistent  advocates  boldly  affirm,  that  from  its 
very  nature  no  knowledge  can  be  absolute,  attaining 
to  the  thing  as  it  is ;  knowledge  must  be  relative, 
must  transfigure  its  object,  must  mix  up  elements 
or  forms  of  self  with  elements  or  forms  of  non-self. 
No  such  a  priori  reasonings  are  valid.  There  is  no 
demonstration  that  even  a  finite  faculty  must  so 
transfer  its  own  conditions  to  objects  as  known  by 
it,  that  it  can  know  nothing  rightly.  The  only  point 
demonstrated  is,  that  a  finite  faculty  will  have  many 
limitations,  because  of  its  imperfection  ;  but  that 
knowledge,  as  such,  cannot  in  any  intellect  be 
absolute  and  complete,  is  the  merest  piece  of 
perverse  dogmatism,  without  the  shadow  of  a 
proof.  Lay  bare  the  falseness  of  an  analogy 
between  knowledge  and  chemical  combination,  and 
all  argument  for  the  dogma  collapses. 

Let  us  end  with  an  illustration  from  one  of  the 
primary  qualities  of  body,  impenetrability.     A  poor 


286  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

prisoner  in  Newgate  does  not  beat  idly  against  the 
walls  of  his  cell,  like  a  bird  just  caged.  For  intel- 
lectually he  perceives  that  huge  blocks  of  masonry 
are  hopeless  obstacles ;  that  they  bar  the  progress 
of  a  man  who  would  walk  through  them.  Im- 
moveably  they  occupy  the  space  where  they  now 
are,  and  in  the  fact  that  two  different  material 
bodies  cannot  naturally17  occupy  together  identi- 
cally the  same  space,  consists  the  familiar  property 
of  impenetrability.  So  thinks  the  prisoner.  But 
Mr.  Huxley,  who  is  at  large  in  the  world,  solemnly 
tells  it,  that,  "  if  I  say  that  impenetrability  is  a 
property  of  matter,  all  that  I  can  really  mean  is, 
that  the  consciousness  I  call  extension  and  the 
consciousness  I  call  resistance,  inevitably  accom- 
pany one  other."  We  cannot  think  of  impenetra- 
bility without  consciousness ;  but  all  the  same  we 
can  know  impenetrability  to  be  a  real  property 
found  in  unconscious  matter,  and  belonging  to  it, 
not  because  of  our  consciousness. 

While  maintaining  that  our  senses  enable  us  to 
form  some  correct  judgments  about  matter  and  its 
properties,  we  fully  admit  how  far  from  exhaustive 
is  our  knowledge.  Take  for  example  the  properties 
of  extension  in  space  and  succession  in  time. 
A  Catholic  least  of  all  would  arrogate  to  himself, 

'7  We  say  naturally,  because  we  do  not  deny  that  preternaturally 
two  bodies  may  together  be  in  the  same  place.  Hence  it  is  not 
wholly  true  to  say  that  the  "otherness"  of  bodies  loses  its  objective 
reality,  if  with  Kant  we  make  space  not  something,  in  our  sense 
of  the  word,  objective,  but  a  mental  form  of  the  subject ;  for 
"otherness"  radically  rests  not  on  difference  in  space,  but  on  the 
fact  that  this  body  individually  is  not  the  other  body. 


TRUSTWORTHINESS  OF  THE  SENSES.  28? 

on  these  points,  a  comprehensive  acquaintance ;  for 
some  of  the  mysteries  of  his  faith  warn  him  to  the 
contrary.  He  easily  admits  these  to  involve  no 
clear  impossibilities  ;  for  he  easily  admits  his  own 
ignorance,  and  the  possibility  of  that  being  brought 
about  preternaturally,  which  naturally  would  not  be. 
But  he  does  not,  on  that  account,  easily  forego  his 
own  knowledge  of  simpler  truths  about  the  material 
universe,  so  long  as  matter  is  left  in  those  normal 
conditions  with  which  he  can  familiarize  himself. 

6.  Our  argument,  which  has  been  long  rather  than 
abstruse,  calling  for  patience  rather  than  for  extra- 
ordinary penetration,  may  now  be  summarized.  In 
the  phenomena  of  sense-perception  rival  schools  are 
substantially  agreed  about  the  conscious  experiences 
of  which  an  account  has  to  be  rendered.  Pure 
idealists,  on  their  own  principles,  cannot  use  sensible 
manifestations  to  make  certain  of  the  existence  of 
other  men  like  themselves ;  they  assert  these  "  other 
men,"  but  inconsistently,  and  at  the  price  of  re- 
nouncing their  theory,  and  coming  over  to  our  side. 
Contrariwise  we  realists  find  a  strong  argument  for 
our  doctrine  in  finding  how  enormous  is  the  help 
we  receive  from  our  fellows  through  the  aid  of  the 
senses.  Again,  idealists  allow,  but  do  not  account 
for  the  general  contrast  between  sensations  of 
self  and  sensations  stimulated  by  bodies  outside 
self:  whereas  we  render  a  rational  interpretation 
of  the  antithesis — an  interpretation  so  rational 
that  Mr.  Bain  himself,  writing  in  Mind,  can 
condescend  to  say :  "  Every  one  of  us  readily 
admits   that  our  impressions  are  transient  things; 


288  SPECIAL    TREATMEN1    OF  CERTITUDE. 

yet  they  come  up  again  with  astonishing  regularity 
in  the  appropriate  situations ;  and  the  easiest  way  oj 
figuring  to  ourselves  this  regularity  is  to  suppose  a 
permanent  something,  with  all  its  parts  well  knit  together, 
so  as  to  repeat  our  conscious  state  with  a  fixity  that  we 
actually  find.  This  is  ordinary  realism.'"  The  scientific 
doctrine  of  the  constancy  of  the  sum  total  of 
matter,  and  the  evolutionary  hypothesis,  according 
to  which,  for  a  long  time,  there  was  no  conscious 
existence  in  the  material  universe,  are  conceptions 
which  are  badly  in  accord  with  idealism,  but  intel- 
ligible to  realism,  even  when  the  realist  does  not 
believe  that  all  life  has  been  developed  by  the  mere 
self-organization  of  dead  matter.  Moreover,  not  onlv 
have  we  proof  of  the  existence  of  our  own  and  other 
bodies,  but  likewise  it  is  clear  that  we  know  some- 
thing about  their  nature  and  their  attributes.  It 
would  be  to  know  something,  if  we  could  predicate 
of  them  only  the  secondary  qualities,  as  that  sugar 
is  an  object  exciting  a  sweet  taste  in  the  palate,  and 
that  vinegar  rouses  an  acid  feeling ;  but  we  can  go 
further  and  know  the  primary  and  more  intellectual 
qualities;  for  instance,  we  know  about  extended 
space  such  truths  as  geometry  teaches,  and  we 
know  about  motion  such  laws  as  help  to  form  the 
science  of  mechanics.  The  judgment  may  at  times 
err  in  its  interpretation  of  the  object  which  is 
exciting  a  sensation,  but  the  senses  themselves 
always  report  what,  under  the  circumstances,  they 
ought  to  report ;  and  no  sensation,  as  such,  can  be 
false.  Under  the  normal  condition  of  the  faculties, 
there  is  no  sensation  which  is  not,  of  its  own  nature, 


TRUSTWORTHINESS   OF  THE  SENSES.  289 

calculated  to  give  some  information  about  the 
material  world.  A  diseased  state  of  organism  may 
baffle  the  understanding;  but  it  is  beyond  cavil  that 
there  is  a  state  of  organism  which  is  normal,  and 
which  we  have  a  right  to  assume  as  our  standard 
for  testing  the  validity  of  the  senses.  Thus,  an 
examination  of  the  whole  case  leads  to  the  conclu- 
sion, that  the  common  belief  in  the  testimony  of 
the  senses  is  well  within  the  bounds  of  reasonable 
procedure ;  and  that,  in  doing  what  he  cannot  help 
as  regards  trust  in  his  senses,  man  is  not  being 
driven  by  a  blind  instinct,  but  is  acting  according 
to  his  intelligent  nature.  The  instincts  of  a  blind 
nature  are  blind ;  but  the  instincts  of  an  intelligent 
nature  may  often  be  shown  to  be  intelligent.  It  is 
so  with  our  use  of  the  senses. 

Addenda. 

(1)  We  omitted  (with  a  view  to  avoiding  dis- 
traction from  the  main  argument)  any  details  as  to 
the  way  in  which  our  opponents  come  to  the  asser- 
tion of  "  other  men"  beside  themselves;  these  niay 
now  be  supplied.  The  substance  of  Mill's  view  is 
contained  in  the  following  passage:1  "I  am  aware 
of  a  group  of  Permanent  Possibilities  of  Sensation 
which  I  call  my  body,  and  which  my  experience 
shows  to  be  a  universal  condition  of  every  part  of 
my  thread  of  consciousness.  And  I  am  also  aware  of 
a  great  number  of  other  groups,  resembling  the  one 
I  call  my  body,  but  which  have  no  connexion,  such  as 
that  has,  with  the  remainder  of  my  thread  of  conscious- 
ness. This  disposes  me  to  draw  an  inductive  inference, 
1  Examination,  Appendix,  p.  253. 
T 


2go  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

that  other  groups  are  connected  with  other  threads  of 
consciousness,  as  mine  is  with  my  own.  If  the  evidence 
stopped  here  the  inference  would  be  but  an  hypothesis, 
reaching  only  to  the  inferior  degree  of  inductive  evi- 
dence called  analogy.  The  evidence,  however,  does 
not  stop  here :  for  having  made  the  supposition  that 
real  feelings,  though  not  experienced  by  myself,  lie 
behind  these  phenomena  of  my  own  consciousness, 
which  from  the  resemblance  to  my  own  body  I  call 
other  human  bodies,  I  find  that  my  subsequent  conscious- 
ness presents  these  very  sensations  of  speech  heard,  of 
movements  and  other  outward  demeanour  seen,  and  so 
forth,  which  being  the  effects  or  consequences  of  actual 
feeling  in  my  own  case,  I  should  expect  to  follow  upon 
those  other  hypothetical  feelings,  if  they  really  existed : 
and  thus  the  hypothesis  is  verified.  It  is  thus  proved 
inductively  that  there  is  a  sphere  beyond  my  consciousness,  that 
there  are  other  consciousnesses  beyond  it.  There  exists  no 
parallel  evidence  in  regard  to  matter." 

Now  the  fact  is,  that  Mill  proves  his  "  other  con- 
sciousnesses "  only  on  the  tacit  assumption  of  "  other 
matter:"  and  to  real  otherness  in  either  department  he 
can  never  logically  attain.  For  logically  he  has  no 
right  to  pass  beyond  the  limits  of  subjective  idealism. 
Mr.  Balfour2  is  positive  in  the  assertion  that  "there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  Mill  considered  himself  an 
idealist : "  and  certainly  he  succeeded  in  establishing 
nothing  above  an  idealistic  existence  for  his  "possi- 
bilities of  sensation,"  however  boldly,  after  denying  the 
reality  of  substance  and  of  efficient  causality,  he  might 
arrogate  to  his  "possibilities"  both  substance  and 
efficient  powers.  It  is  part  of  the  want  of  clear  con- 
sistency in  the  man  3  to  account  for  physical  changes 

2  A  Defence  of  Philosophical  Doubt,  c.  ix.  p.  iS6. 
»  Logic.  Bk.  I.  c.  iii.  §§  5,  7,  8,  9,  et  alibi  passim. 


TRUSTWORTHINESS  OF  THE   SENSES.  291 

by  "  one  group  of  possibilities  of  sensation  modifying 
another  such  group,"  whilst  he  also  taught  "  that  all 
we  are  conscious  of  may  be  accounted  for  without  sup- 
posing that  we  perceive  matter  by  our  senses  :  and  that 
the  notion  and  belief  may  have  come  to  us  by  the  laws 
of  our  constitution,  without  their  being  a  revelation  of 
any  objective  reality : "  and  that  "  the  non  ego  alto- 
gether may  be  a  mode  in  which  the  mind  represents  to 
itself  the  possible  modifications  of  the  ego."  Again  he 
asks  :  "  How  do  I  know  that  magnitude  is  not  exclu- 
sively a  property  of  our  sensations?"  And  he  holds 
that  we  do  not  know  whether,  as  affirmed  of  Matter 
itself,  the  word  divisible  has  any  meaning.  Lastly,  in 
controversy  with  Mr.  Spencer,*  he  says :  "  Neither  of 
us,  if  I  understand  Mr.  Spencer's  opinion  aright,  believe 
an  attribute  to  be  a  real  thing  possessed  of  objective 
existence ;  we  believe  it  to  be  a  particular  mode  of  naming 
our  sensations,  or  our  expectations  of  sensation,  when  looked 
at  in  the  relation  of  an  external  object  which  excites 
them  :  "  yet  so  that  these  so-called  "  exciting  objects  " 
must  not  be  considered  either  as  substances,  or  as 
efficient  causes,  or  as  something  really  external  and 
independent. 

Mill  being  thus  in  many  ways  committed  to  idealism, 
cannot  argue  the  existence  of  "  other  consciousnesses  " 
or  "  other  men,"  from  the  data  of  their  external  mani- 
festations :  he  is  wholly  shut  out  from  every  notion  of 
real  "otherness."  And  yet  that  his  argument  does 
ultimately  fall  back  on  the  inference  of  human  agents 
from  human  activities,  other  than  his  own  but  like  his 
own,  will  again  appear,  if  we  add  a  concluding  specimen 
of  his  doctrine. 5  "  By  what  evidence  do  I  know  that 
the  walking  and  speaking  figures  which  I  see  and  hear, 

■*  Logic,  Bk.  II.  c.  ii.  §  3,  in  a  note  at  the  end  of  the  paragraph, 
s  Examination,  c.  xii.  p.  208. 


292  SPECIAL     TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

have  sensations  and  thoughts — in  other  words,  possess 
minds  ?  I  conclude  that  other  beings  have  feelings 
like  me,  because  first,  they  have  bodies  like  me ;  and 
secondly,  because  they  exhibit  acts  and  other  outward 
signs,  which  in  my  own  case  I  know  to  be  caused  by 
feelings."  If  Mill  had  once  shown  us  how  he  arrived 
at  the  otherness  of  the  manifestations,  we  could  allow 
him  the  otherness  of  the  human  agents ;  but  otherness  is 
wholly  denied  to  his  principles. 

Perhaps  what  Professor  Clifford  says  will  help  to 
explain  why  Mill  insisted  so  much  on  "  other  conscious- 
nesses," namely,  that  while  "material  objects"  may  be 
spoken  of  as  "  the  other  side  of  my  consciousness,"  it  is 
absurd  to  speak  of  "other  consciousnesses"  as  only 
"the  other  side  of  my  consciousness."  To  signalize 
this  special  character,  Clifford  calls  "  other  conscious- 
nesses," not  objects,  but  ejects,  for  they  must  be  pro- 
jected outside  of  self — "  they  cannot  be  a  group  of  my 
feelings  persisting  as  a  group."  As  to  the  difficulty  of 
asserting  any  "otherness"  beyond  his  own  thinking  self, 
Clifford  thinks  he  need  not  waste  time  over  consider- 
ing a  step  which  his  ancestors  took  for  him  long  ago. 

M.  Taine  avowedly  tries  to  lend  a  helping  hand  to 
Mill  for  the  purpose  of  securing  a  little  more  reality  to 
external  objects  than  his  friend's  theory  can  afford. 
He  allows  that  to  us  a  stone  is  "a  more  or  less 
elaborate  extract  from  our  sensations;"  but  further, 
"we  may  upon  authentic  evidence  refer  to  things  some 
of  those  more  or  less  transformed  and  reduced  materials, 
and  attribute  to  such  things  a  distinct  existence  without  us, 
analogous  to  that  which  they  have  within.  In  this 
respect  a  stone  is  a  being  as  real  and  as  complete,  as 
distinct  from  us,  as  any  particular  man.  By  this  addi- 
tion to  the  theory  of  Mill  and  Bain,  we  restore  to  bodies 
an  actual  existence,  independent  of  our  existence." 


TRUSTWORTHINESS   OF   THE   SENSES.  293 

It  is  instructive  to  see  idealists  trying  in  vain  to  get 
out  of  the  position  called  "  solipsism,"  or  belief  in  self 
alone.  Especially  they  feel  that  "  it  is  not  good  for 
man  to  be  alone,"  and  so  they  labour  strenuously  to 
justify  their  assertion  of  "  other  men  "  besides  them- 
selves ;  but  always  with  the  result  of  violating  their 
own  idealistic  principles. 

(2)  On  the  subject  of  primary  and  secondary  quali- 
ties of  body,  Hamilton  teaches  that  we  regard  objects 
sometimes  "  as  they  are  in  themselves,"  sometimes  "  as 
they  affect  us,"  and  sometimes  in  a  half-and-half  way : 
these  last  qualities  he  calls  secundo-primary.  For 
Hamilton's  three  terms  others  substitute  mathematical, 
mechanical,  and  physiological  properties ;  while  Mr. 
Spencer  prefers  to  use,  as  almost  equivalent  terms, 
statical,  dynamical,  and  stato-dynamical. 

(3)  Though  some  regard  materialism  as  the  contrary 
extreme  of  idealism,  Mr.  Huxley  is  constant  in  his 
theory  that  an  idealist  may  be  a  materialist,  though  he 
himself  refuses  to  be  either.  Let  us  extend  one  of  the 
quotations  given  in  the  text :  "  If  we  analyze  the  propo- 
sition that  all  mental  phenomena  are  the  effects  or 
products  of  material  phenomena,  all  that  materialism 
means  amounts  to  this,  that  whenever  these  states  of 
consciousness  which  we  call  sensations,  or  emotions,  or 
thought,  come  into  existence,  complete  investigation 
will  show  good  reason  for  the  belief,  that  they  are  pre- 
ceded by  other  phenomena,  to  which  we  give  the  names 
of  matter  and  motion.  All  material  change  appears  in 
the  long  run  to  be  modes  of  motion  ;  but  our  knowledge 
of  motion  is  nothing  but  that  of  a  change  in  the  places 
and  order  of  our  sensations :  just  as  our  knowledge  of 
matter  is  restricted  to  those  feelings  of  which  we  assume 
it  to  be  the  cause."6     This  comes  to  little  more  than 

Huxley's  Hume,  c.  iii.  pp.  80,  81. 


294  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

the  jejune  announcement,  that  if  matter  be  reduced  to 
idealistic  dimensions  then  materialism  and  idealism  are 
reconciled.  But  how  does  this  square  with  the  evolu- 
tionary hypothesis  that  ideas,  for  a  long  time,  did  not 
Appear,  but  supervened,  in  comparatively  recent  times, 
on  a  world  of  unconscious  matter,  which  cannot  be 
reduced  to  feelings  ? 

(4)  The  special  form  of  idealism  introduced  by 
Berkeley  has  so  few  patrons  that  it  is  not  necessary  to 
labour  much  in  its  refutation.  He  supposed  that  all  the 
sensible  impressions,  which  we  call  material,  were  due, 
not  to  the  action  of  any  independent  matter,  but  to  the 
immediate  agency  of  God.  With  regard  to  external 
bodies  the  difficulty  of  the  theory  is  somewhat  less  ;  but 
with  regard  to  our  own  bodies,  it  would  be  a  task  even 
to  Omnipotence  to  make  us  feel  ourselves  as  sentient, 
extended  beings,  if  all  the  while  we  were  pure  spirits, 
of  an  essentially  unextended  nature.  Moreover,  given 
such  a  God  as  Berkeley  rightly  admitted,  his  theory  as 
regards  bodies  other  than  our  own,  is  dishonourable  to 
the  Creator  rather  than,  as  it  aims  at  being,  honourable. 
For  an  adequate  reason,  and  after  a  sufficient  warning, 
God  may  permit  such  deceptions  as  may  take  place 
through  the  senses,  because  of  the  mystery  of  the 
Blessed  Eucharist,  on  the  explanation  given  of  it  by 
Catholic  theology ;  but  He  could  not  consistently  with 
wisdom  and  truthfulness,  arrange  a  wholesale  system  of 
delusion,  such  as  only  a  Berkeley  here  and  there  would 
detect,  while  the  mass  of  mankind  were  inevitably 
being  duped.  Few  as  have  been  Berkeley's  followers, 
some  of  our  modern  writers  in  this  country  have  an 
affinity  to  him,  as,  for  example,  Professors  Green  and 
Caird.  One  of  these  talks  much  about  finite  minds 
11  becoming  the  vehicle  of  an  eternal  complete  con- 
sciousness,"   which    is     "  a     consciousness    operative 


TRUSTWORTHINESS  OF  THE   SENSES.  295 

throughout  our  successive  acquirements,  and  realizing 
itself  through  them,"  "an  eternal  consciousness  opera- 
tive in  us  to  produce  the  gradual  development  of  our 
knowledge."  These  are  some  of  Green's  phrases,  while 
Professor  Caird's  expressions  are  such  as  these  :  "  The 
data  of  sense  are  taken  out  of  their  mere  singularity  of 
feelings  and  made  elements  in  a  universal  conscious- 
ness :  that  is,  they  are  related  to  a  consciousness  which 
the  individual  has  not,  as  a  mere  individual,  but  as  a 
universal  subject  of  knowledge.  Only  in  relation  to 
such  a  consciousness  can  an  individual  know  himself 
or  any  other  individual  as  such."  But,  perhaps,  it 
is  Ferrier  who  most  of  all  approaches  to  Berkeley. 
Ferrier,  denying  that  matter  per  se  has  any  meaning, 
makes  the  perception  of  matter  the  ultimate,  indivisible 
unit  of  knowledge.  He  wholly  rejects  the  analysis  into 
perception  as  subjective,  and  matter  as  objective ;  he 
declares  the  subjective  element  to  be  our  apprehension, 
that  we  perceive  matter,  and  the  objective  element  to 
be  our  perception  of  matter.  Still,  he  will  not  allow  that 
the  perception  of  matter  is  a  mere  modification  of  our 
own  minds :  he  will  not  lapse  into  subjective  idealism. 
And  it  is  thus  he  guards  himself  against  this  doctrine : 
"  Our  primitive  conviction  is,  that  the  perception  of 
matter  is  not,  either  wholly  or  in  part,  a  condition  of 
the  human  soul ;  is  not  bounded  in  any  direction  by 
the  narrow  limits  of  our  intellectual  span ;  but  that  it 
•  dwells  apart,'  a  mighty  and  independent  system,  a 
city  filled  up  and  upheld  by  the  everlasting  God.  Who 
told  us  that  we  were  placed  in  a  world  composed  of 
matter,  and  not  that  we  were  let  down  at  once  into  a  universe 
composed  of  external  perceptions  of  matter,  that  were 
beforehand  and  from  all  eternity,  and  into  which  we, 
the  creatures  of  a  day,  are  merely  allowed  to  participate 
by  the  gracious  Power  to  whom  they  really  appertain  ? 


296  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

When  a  man  consults  his  own  nature  in  an  impartial 
spirit,  he  inevitably  finds  that  his  generous  belief  in 
the  existence  of  matter,  is  not  a  belief  in  the  indepen- 
dent existence  of  matter  per  se,  but  is  a  belief  in  the 
independent  existence  of  the  perception  of  matter,  which  he 
is  for  a  time  participating  in.  The  very  last  thing  which 
he  naturally  believes  in  is,  that  the  perception  is  a 
state  of  his  own  mind,  and  that  the  matter  is  some- 
thing different  from  it,  and  exists  apart  in  natura  rerum. 
It  is  the  perception  of  matter,  and  not  matter  per  se, 
which  is  the  kind  of  matter  in  the  independent  and 
permanent  existence  of  which  man  reposes  his  belief. 
This  theory  of  perception  is  a  doctrine  of  pure  intui- 
tionism :  it  steers  clear  of  all  the  perplexities  of  repre- 
sentationism."?  Ferrier's  great  point  of  contention  is 
that  matter  detached  from  thought  is  a  delusion  ;  for  in 
pretending  to  detach  it  we  are  all  the  while  thinking 
about  it.  It  is  like  pretending  to  think  ourselves  anni- 
hilated ;  we  find  ourselves  contemplating  the  condition  ; 
that  is,  we  re-introduce  the  self  we  make  show  of 
abolishing.  It  is  a  simple  answer  to  say,  that  though 
we  can  know  matter  only  so  far  as  it  is  an  object  of  our 
ideas,  yet  we  can  know  that  this  matter  with  certain 
properties  has  an  existence  outside  our  mind.  There 
is  no  contradiction  in  the  geologist  affirming,  Had  I 
never  discovered  it,  the  fact  would  still  have  been,  that 
this  rock  was  scoured  and  striated  by  glacial  action 
thousands  of  years  ago. 

(5)  The  very  fact  of  having  tried  to  argue  out  the 
validity  of  the  senses  is  a  confession  that  the  result  may 
be  reached  mediately ;  but  this  leaves  untouched  a  further 
question,  whether  we  have  any  primarily  immediate  per- 
ception of  a  material  world  as  external,  that  is,  whether 
we  have  an}*  primary  intuition  of  the  outness  of  an  object 

7  Ferrier's  Remains,  Vol.  II.  pp.  454 — 456. 


TRUSTWORTHINESS   OF   THE   SENSES.  297 

which  we  perceive,  or  whether  externality  at  first  can 
be  reached  only  as  a  matter  of  inference.  In  point  of 
fact,  the  process  of  ratiocination  is  so  thoroughly  a  case 
of  repeated  and  combined  judgments,  that  the  distinction 
put  between  the  two  acts,  judgment  and  ratiocination, 
by  logicians  is  not  so  radical  as  some  suppose.  We 
judge  and  judge  again,  and  put  our  judgments  together, 
but  it  is  the  same  intellect  which  is  at  work  throughout. 
Now  every  one  will  admit  that  in  our  present  condition 
of  experience  we  can  in  some  cases  immediately  judge 
of  externality ;  and  every  one  will  admit  that  the  full 
reflex  distinction  between  outer  and  inner  world,  was 
not  made  by  the  child  without  several  repetitions  of 
acts.  So  much  being  settled,  we  may  leave  it  to 
psychologists  to  push  further  the  investigation  whether 
it  is  necessary  to  assume  an  immediate  intuition  of  the 
externality  of  the  sense-world,  or  whether  the  know- 
ledge of  this  rests  on  a  spontaneous  inference  as  to  the 
origin  of  some  of  our  bodily  affections — an  inference  so 
spontaneous  that  it  is  taken  for  immediate  perception. 
All  sensations  are  bodily  affections,  and  the  inferential 
school  say  that  it  is  only  by  argument  that  we  can,  in 
some  of  these  affections,  detect  an  outer  cause ;  while 
the  intuitive  school  declare  that  this  process  cannot 
have  begun  in  argument,  without  an  immediate  per- 
ception. Outside  the  sense-world  and  in  relation  to 
metaphysical  truths,  it  is  certain  that  we  have  imme- 
diate intuitions  of  principles  which  we  at  once  see  to 
be  objective  and  independent  of  ourselves  ;  but  how  the 
case  stands  as  regards  the  perception  of  the  outer  world 
of  sense,  gives  rise  to  dispute  among  philosophers. 

(6)  Another  psychological  difficulty  is  also  involved 
in  our  present  inquiry.  The  passage  from  the  image  in 
the  sensitive  imagination  to  the  idea  in  the  mind  is  an 
obscure  problem.     The  mind  does  not  gaze  upon  the 


298  SPECIAL   TREATMENT   OF  CERTITUDE. 

sensitive  representation  and  consciously  copy  it.  We 
are  safe,  however,  in  affirming,  though  the  affirmation 
hardly  amounts  to  an  explanation,  that  because  of  the 
harmonious  working  of  the  faculties  in  a  being  whose 
author  is  all-skilful,  when  the  sense  image  is  duly 
present,  the  intellect  has  the  power  to  produce  its  own 
corresponding  image.  The  harmony  is  as  natural,  as 
certain,  and  as  little  ultimately  explicable  as  the  corre- 
lation of  growth  in  the  body,  as  the  adaptation  of  bodily 
functions  inter  se,  and  as  any  symmetrical  arrangement 
of  organic  parts  ;  whilst,  however,  what  we  call  nature 
has  credit  for  so  much,  education  must  step  in  and  take 
a  large  share  in  the  formation  of  our  power  to  perceive  by 
the  senses.  Our  education  began  so  early,  and  has  been 
so  continuous  and  gradual,  that  we  are  apt  to  overlook 
the  fact.  It  requires  almost  a  case  of  congenital  cataract 
cured  in  later  life,  to  bring  home  to  us  the  need  which 
the  eye  has  of  being  trained  to  do  its  work.  Most  of 
our  educated  sense-perceptions  are  such,  that  what  is 
actually,  here  and  now,  presented,  is  a  small  fraction 
of  the  whole,  which  is  filled  up  by  association  or  in- 
ference. Whatever  revelations  have  been  made  by 
Wheatstone's  ingenious  contrivances  for  producing 
ocular  illusions,  by  means  of  familiar  effects  under  un- 
familiar circumstances,  all  these  we  must  readily 
acknowledge,  without  any  fear  for  the  truth  of  our  main 
proposition  that  the  senses  are,  in  their  own  order, 
veracious. 

(7)  There  is  a  deceptiveness  about  some  authors 
who  seem,  in  places,  to  agree  with  our  realism,  and  yet 
do  not.  Thus  Mr.  Spencer  argues  for  realism,  and  we 
may  adopt  some  of  his  arguments.  But  a  further  know- 
ledge of  his  system  tells  us  that  he  reduces  the  really 
distinct  phenomena  of  self  and  not-self  to  a  basis  in 
"  one  Unknowable  Reality ;  "   and  others  who  do  not 


TRUSTWORTHINESS   OF  THE   SENSES.  299 

explicitly  make  this  final  reduction,  at  least  allow  its 
probability.  This  is  called  "  Monism,"  the  doctrine 
that  all  manifestations,  however  different,  are  mani- 
festations of  but  one  underlying  Entity ;  and  the  oppo- 
site doctrine  is  called,  with  less  propriety,  Dualism, 
which  means  that  self  and  not-self  are  really  distinct 
existences,  the  non-self  being,  of  course,  a  congeries  of 
many  existences.  The  doctrine  maintained  in  this 
volume  is  clearly  dualistic — an  explicit  statement  which 
may  seem  needless.  But  any  one  who  has  had  expe- 
rience of  the  difficulty  of  trying  to  put  together  all  the 
various  declarations  of  an  author,  for  example,  like 
Lewes,  will  feel  thankful  to  a  writer  who  will  declare 
undisguisedly  where  he  stands. 

(8)  Where  Monism  makes  itself  most  awkwardly 
felt,  is  in  the  distinction  between  man  and  man.  Pro- 
bably Mr.  Spurgeon  does  not  more  strongly  feel  that  he 
is  really  not  Mr.  Huxley,  than  Mr.  Huxley  feels  that 
he  is  not  Mr.  Spurgeon ;  and  yet,  if  they  are  both 
manifestations  of  one  "  ultimate  unknowable  reality," 
the  identification  between  them  is  closer  than  the}- 
might  like.  As  we  saw  above,  those  who  are  idealists, 
or  who  admit  idealism  as  possibly  true,  do  not  satisfy 
us  that  they  have  sufficiently  applied  their  theory  to 
the  distinction  between  themselves  and  other  men. 
They  are  far  too  apt  to  assume  this  distinction,  and 
to  argue  only  for  the  common  nature  of  the  distinct 
individuals.  Thus  Professor  Clifford  says :  "I  have 
absolutely  no  means  of  perceiving  your  mind.  I  judge 
by  analogy  that  it  exists,  and  the  instinct  which  leads 
me  to  come  to  that  conclusion  is  the  social  instinct,  as 
it  has  been  formed  in  me  by  generations  during  which 
men  have. lived  together  ;  and  they  could  not  have  lived 
together,  unless  they  had  gone  upon  that  supposition." 
Similarly  Mr.  Huxley  is  intent  mainly  on  the  analogy 


300  SPECIAL   TREATMENT   OF  CERTITUDE 

between  individuals,  not  on  vindicating,  according  to 
his  own  principles,  the  real  difference  between  individual 
and  individual:  "It  is  impossible  absolutely  to  prove 
the  presence  or  absence  of  consciousness  in  anything 
but  one's  own  brain,  though  by  analogy  we  are  justified 
in  assuming  its  existence  in  other  men."  He  admits 
that  he  cannot  be  absolutely  certain  of  any  "otherness" 
beyond  his  own  thoughts. 

(9)  We  have  taken  as  our  standard  the  healthy 
condition  of  the  senses ;  and  without  denying  to 
Dr.  Maudsley  the  use  of  pathological  cases,  yet  we 
may  dissent  from  the  prominence  which  he  gives  to 
them.  His  professional  dealing  with  so  many  abnormal 
specimens  of  humanity,  seems  to  have  given  him  an 
unfair  opinion  of  the  race  in  general,  or  of  the  average 
man  ;  and  in  reading  his  books  it  is  useful  to  bear  this 
fact  constantly  in  mind. 


CHAPTER   III. 

OBJECTIVITY    OF   IDEAS,    WHETHER   SINGULAR   OR 
UNIVERSAL. 
Synopsis. 

1.  Proof  of  the  validity  of  the  senses  is  only  a  part  of  the 

general  refutation  of  idealism ;  ideas  are  not  mere  refined 
sensations  but  reach  objects  above  the  sensible  order. 

2.  Various  forms  of  idealism. 

3.  What  we  have  to  establish  in  general. 

4.  Arguments  for  this  purpose,     (a)  There  is  no  self-contra- 

diction in  the  way  in  which  the  realist  supposes  thought  to 
transcend  itself,  and  to  reach  out  to  objects  distinct  from 
itself,  {b)  Idealism  is  contrary  to  self-evident  truth,  and  in 
its  extreme  form  cannot  be  asserted  without  refuting  itself. 
§.  Caution  against  taking  too  narrow  a  view  of  what  is  meant 
by  the  reality  of  the  object. 

6.  Special  difficulty  as  to  the  reality  of  universal  ideas,     (a) 

The  possibility  of  a  finite  nature  being  specifically  repeated 
in  many  individuals :  a  repetition  which  is  impossible  to 
an  infinite  nature,  (b)  Universality  is  fundamentally  in 
things,  formally  in  the  mind  alone ;  hence  the  determination 
of  the  reality  proper  to  a  universal  idea,  {c)  The  insuffi- 
ciency of  the  pure  sensist  view,  and  of  the  analogy  borrowed 
from  the  average  photograph,  (d)  The  purpose  served  by 
multiplying  observations  and  comparisons  of  individuals  in 
forming  the  universal  idea,  (e)  How  we  manage  to  use 
common  terms,  which  are  not  perfectly  universalized. 
(/)  Not  at  all  need  we  fancy,  that  every  word  is  one 
definitely  universalized  term,  {g)  Difficulty  raised  against 
the  possibility  of  abstraction,  on  the  score  of  inseparable 
association  in  experience. 

7.  Conclusion. 
Addenda. 

I.  It  would  be  an  error  to  limit  the  problem  of 
idealism  to  the  material  world ;  and  hence  the  last 


302  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF   CERTITUDE. 

chapter  does  not  cover  the  whole  of  the  ground 
which  has  to  be  covered.  A  question  more  deep- 
reaching  and  more  universal  is,  whether  our  ideas 
in  general  attain  to  objective  reality,  be  this  material 
or  immaterial. 

That  our  ideas  are  not  bounded  by  our  sensa- 
tions, but  have  a  wider  range,  must  be  allowed  by 
all  who  will  take  the  trouble  to  go  through  an 
analysis  of  the  notions  which  they  possess.1  It  is 
true  that  a  trace  of  man's  organic  conditions  clings 
to  his  highest  intellectual  actions ;  but  all  the  same 
these  clearly  manifest  a  power  above  sense.  Against 
the  theory  advocated  by  Hume,  and  more  or  less 
favoured  by  many  other  English  philosophers,  that 
ideas  are  faded,  attenuated,  and  almost  etherialized 
sensations,  facts  are  in  dead  opposition.  Even 
Lewes,  who  so  largely  makes  verification  by  the 
senses  the  criterion  of  real  knowledge,  has  the 
candour  to  say :  "  Ideas  are  not  impressions  at  all, 
and  hence  not  faint  impressions.  Ideas  are  not 
sensible  pictures.  The  least  experience  is  sufficient 
to  convince  us  that  we  have  many  ideas  which 
cannot  be  reduced  to  any  sensible  picture."  Mr. 
Huxley,  in  his  manual  on  Hume,  is  also  a  witness  in 
our  favour,  maintaining  that  "  the  great  merit  of 
Kant  is,  that  he  upholds  the  doctrine  of  the  exist- 
ence of  elements  of  consciousness  which  are  neither 
sense-experiences  nor  any  modifications  of  them." 
Plain  facts  of  self-analysis  do  not  need  the  support 
of   confessions    made    by    adversaries ;     but    such 

1  Aristotle  {Metaphysics,  Bk.  I.  c.  i.)  makes  this  distinction  his 
very  starting-point 


OBJECTIVITY   OF  IDEAS.  303 

support   may   usefully   be    borrowed    as    an    acces- 
sory. 

2.  To  say  now  what  precisely  is  idealism,  pre- 
sents a  considerable  degree  of  difficulty,  because  of 
the  Protean  character  of  the  object  to  be  dealt  with; 
but  without  being  able  to  tie  the  wily  trickster  down 
to  one  shape,  we  may  be  able  to  effect  a  sufficient 
capture  for  purposes  of  inspection.  Negatively  an 
important  observation  is,  that  it  is  not  idealism  to 
maintain  that  the  thing-in-itself  is  unknowable, 
when  by  thing-in-itself  is  meant  an  object  out  of  all 
relation  to  knowledge.  The  stoutest  realist  would 
allow  so  much.  But  idealism  has  its  root  mainly 
in  these  two  contentions,  that  mind  cannot  go  out- 
side of  itself  or  of  its  own  conscious  states,  and  that 
least  of  all  can  mind  truly  represent  to  itself  external 
matter.  The  idealist,  who  on  these  grounds  should 
venture  to  affirm  that  there  is  nothing  outside  his 
thought,  and  especially  nothing  material,  would  be 
so  manifestly  guilty  of  unwarrantable  dogmatism, 
that  we  may  pass  him  by  and  consider  only  the 
more  plausible  adversary,  the  strength  of  whose 
position  lies  in  its  being  agnostic.  He  does  not 
deny,  he  only  pleads  his  inability  positively  to  affirm 
anything  beyond  the  idealistic  limit.  This  limit  he 
may  variously  set  according  to  any  one  of  the  fol- 
lowing formulae.  I  am  certain  (a)  only  of  present 
states  of  consciousness,  as  of  subjective  coruscations 
or  modes ;  (b)  only  of  present  along  with  certain 
remembered  and  certain  safely  expected  states ; 
(c)  only  of  past,  present,  and  future  states  along 
with  my  substantial  mind  as  the  subject  of  these 


304  SPECIAL    TREATMENT   OF   CERTITUDE. 

states.  So  far  the  two  fundamental  principles  of 
idealism  have  been  fairly,  though  in  varying  degrees, 
respected  :  there  has  been  no  passage  beyond  the 
thinking  self,  and  there  has  been  no  assertion  of 
independent  matter.  But  many  who  would  not 
dare  to  take  up  the  last-mentioned  of  the  three 
positions,  make  no  hesitation  in  assuming  the  next, 
which  is  to  idealism  really  a  more  formidable  posi- 
tion, namely,  (d)  I  am  certain  only  of  a  series  of 
conscious  states  which  I  know  as  my  mind,  and  of 
other  series  which  I  know  as  states  of  conscious- 
ness in  other  minds,  (e)  With  regard  to  an  outer 
material  world,  some  idealists,  not  quite  thorough- 
going, claim  to  have  a  knowledge  that  it  exists  and 
acts  upon  them,  but  disclaim  all  knowledge  about 
its  real  nature  and  properties. 

The  above  divisions  are  not  meant  historically 
to  represent  the  several  schools  of  idealism,  but 
rather  to  show  progressive  steps  from  the  extremest 
to  a  more  moderate  doctrine.  Berkeleyism,  as  having 
been  already  described,  is  omitted.  In  all  cases 
idealism  is  founded  mainly  on  a  common  difficulty 
which  is  felt  against  realism — a  difficulty  which  shall 
now  be  stated  in  the  words  of  an  upholder  of  the 
system.  The  following  passages,  culled  from 
Professor  Caird's  work  on  Kant,  will  convey  the 
information  required.  "  The  knowledge  of  things 
must  mean  that  the  mind  finds  itself  in  them, 
or  in  some  way,  that  the  difference  between 
them  and  the  mind  is  dissolved."  "  How  can 
anything  come  within  consciousness  which  is 
essentially    different    from     consciousness  ?      How 


OBJECTIVITY  OF  IDEAS.  305 

can  we  think  that  which  is  ex  hypothesi  unthink- 
able ? "  "  We  can  know  objects  because  in  so 
far  as  their  most  general  determinations  are  con- 
cerned, we  produce  the  objects  we  know."  Thus 
the  one  method  of  asserting  a  knowledge  of  things 
is  in  some  way  to  identify  thing  with  thought,  to 
make  thought  in  some  way  the  producer  of  its  own 
things,  so  that  esse  shall  be  percipi.  If  a  dualism, 
a  real  division  between  thought  and  thing,  is  allowed, 
then  you  have  thought  transcending  itself  and  reach- 
ing to  something  other  than  itself;  and  the  only 
way  to  get  over  this  difficulty  is  by  some  such 
rough-and-ready  but  logically  unjustifiable  means, 
as  that  employed  by  Professor  Clifford,  when  he 
says  that  he  is  satisfied  with  his  ancestry  for 
having  evolved  his  mode  of  consciousness,  and 
adds,  "  How  consciousness  can  testify  to  the  ex- 
istence of  anything  outside  of  itself,  I  do  not 
pretend  to  declare."  Thus  the  alternatives  seem 
to  be  either  to  identify  thing  with  thought,  or  to 
pass  from  thing  to  thought,  as  it  were,  by  brute 
force ;  unless,  indeed,  we  are  prepared  to  give  up 
the  attainability  of  real  knowledge  altogether,  and 
confess  that  all  things  are  unknowable,  except 
passing  mental  conditions. 

3.  One  point,  which  has  already  been  incidentally 
mentioned,  may  here  be  distinctly  emphasized,  when 
we  are  about  to  state  what  exactly  we  undertake  to 
establish  against  idealism.  In  asserting  that  ideas 
cannot  transcend  themselves,  no  plausible  idealist 
affirms  that  there  is  no  transcendent  reality :  he 
only  asserts  the  powerlessness  of  the  mind  to  make 


306  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF   CERTITUDE. 

sure  of  it.  As  Mr.  Bain2  remarks  in  an  article  in 
Mind,  "  The  statement  that  there  is  no  existence 
beyond  consciousness,  is  not  what  an  idealist  would 
make ;  but  what  he  says  is,  that  we  know  only 
what  wre  perceive.  Conscious  properties  make 
up  object  and  subject  alike :  consciousness  con- 
tains its  object  states  and  its  subject  states,  and 
all  our  knowledge  lies  within  the  compass  of 
these."  In  opposition  to  idealism  as  so  pro- 
pounded, without  making  special  reference  to  the 
outer  world  of  matter  which  was  dealt  with  in  the 
last  chapter,  we  have  as  our  substantial  task  to 
show  (a)  that  there  is  no  contradiction  in  the  fact 
of  the  intellect,  through  its  ideas,  knowing  objects 
really  other  than  itself;  and  {b)  that  the  objective 
reality  of  ideas  must  be  admitted,  because  of  its 
self-evidence,  and  because  the  fact  cannot  even  be 
denied  without  its  being  at  the  same  time  implicitly 
asserted. 

4.  These  being  substantially  the  points  to  be 
made  good,  the  requirements  will  be  found  satisfied 
under  the  following  arguments  and  conclusions  : 

(a)  Bilocation,  or  being  present  in  two  different 
places  at  once,  is  not  naturally  possible  to  a  material 
body.  This  is  true,  but  does  not  affect  realists,  who 
do  not  suppose  an  idea  to  be  an  extended  body, 
which  has  at  the  same  time  to  transfer  itself  to  a 
distant  space.  So  far,  however,  as  an  idea  is  in- 
directly subject   to    the    conditions   of  space,   it   is 

2  On  the  strength  of  the  fact  that  they  do  not  dogmatically 
affirm  that  there  is  no  reality  beyond  ideas,  some  idealists  repudiate 
the  name  of  idealists  as  applied  to  themselves. 


OBJECTIVITY   OF  IDEAS.  307 

physically  present  in  only  one  spot,  namely,  in  the 
soul  united  to  a  narrowly  circumscribed  body.  But 
besides  having,  as  all  other  things  have,  a  physical 
entity,  an  idea  has  something  else  peculiar  to  itself, 
its  vis  intentionalis,  as  the  scholastics  say,  its  power 
of  going  forth,  not  mechanically,  but  by  way  cf 
intellectual  perception.  Now,  coolly  to  affirm,  as 
idealists  are  in  the  habit  of  doing,  that  this  power 
is  unable  to  attain  to  anything  outside  the  thinking 
subject,  is  not  only  the  veriest  piece  of  dogmatism, 
but  is  against  the  evidence  of  experience.  Not  by 
any  a  priori  assumptions,  nor  by  a  false  analogy 
drawn  from  physics,  but  by  the  accurate  interpreta- 
tion of  conscious  facts,  are  we  to  know  what  ideas 
can  do.  A  door-post,  which  has  no  ideas,  can  never 
be  taught  what  is  the  power  of  ideas.  A  man, 
precisely  because  he  has  ideas,  can  judge  of  their 
value,  and  his  judgment  must  be  formed  on  the  case 
as  presented  in  consciousness,  not  upon  some  hypo- 
thesis wholly  arbitrary.  Using  the  method  of  self- 
introspection,  we  find  that  our  ideas  are — in  the 
wide  sense  of  the  word  things — things  having  a 
perceptive  power.  Nor  is  there  the  shadow  of  an 
argument  to  suggest  that  the  perceptive  power 
cannot  reach  to  other  objects,  even  to  objects  purely 
material  and  unintelligent.  As  we  do  not  know 
how  intelligence  produces  its  marvellous  act,  as 
that  mysterious  spiritual  agency  is  above  our  ken, 
it  is  very  arbitrary  on  our  part  to  limit  thought  by 
the  analogies  of  mechanical  action.  Such  an  attempt 
breaks  down  at  every  point.  Even  idealists  them- 
selves show  the  little   store  they  set  by  their  own 


308  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

theory  in  straightway  disregarding  it,  and  transgress- 
ing the  boundaries  put  by  themselves.  Their  main 
limitation  is  that  thought  shall  not  transcend  itself: 
hence,  theoretically,  present  consciousness,  viewed 
as  a  fact,  ought  with  them  to  be  the  whole  of  positive 
knowledge.  Yet  they  one  and  all  trust  memory  and 
expectation,  thereby  openly  going  beyond  present 
fact.  Few  would  seek  escape  by  a  hopeless  attempt 
to  deny  this  :  hence  Mill  candidly  confesses,  "  The 
psychological  theory  cannot  explain  memory."3  The 
few,  however,  who  are  venturesome  enough  to  make 
the  denial,  would  find  their  bold  course  lead  only 
to  speedy  confusion ;  for  they  would  have  to  abide 
rigorously  by  their  statement,  "  We  know  only  our 
present  conscious  condition."  "  Very  well,"  is  the 
reply,  "  define  your  term  '  present.'  If  it  is  an 
absolute,  unextended  point,  then  it  is  of  no  service 
to  you,  and  is  most  flagrantly  against  the  law  that 
a  certain  persistence  in  consciousness  is  necessary 
in  order  to  secure  advertence.  If  your  '  present '  is 
not  an  unextended  point,  then  it  has  a  certain- dura- 
tion :  it  involves  a  past  and  a  present,  and  you  begin 
to  be  in  the  same  condition  as  your  bolder  brethren, 
who  openly  claim  to  believe  in  memory  and  expecta- 
tion, and  who  so  far  give  up  the  dogma  that  thought 
cannot  transcend  itself." 

Another  surrender,  and  a  more  glaring  one,  of 
the  same  dogma,  is  the  almost  unanimous  admission 
by  idealists  of  "  other  men,"  or  other  conscious- 
nesses ;  which  is  surely  a  full  confession,  that  for 
thought  to  reach  an  object  other  than  itself,  it 
3  Examination,  Appendix. 


OBJECTIVITY  OF  IDEAS.  30$ 

needs  the  accomplishment  of  no  self-contradictory 
feat. 

If  considerations  like  the  above  have  the  salutary 
effect  only  of  making  the  idealist  less  confident  of  his 
assumed  position,  and  more  respectful  to  the  secure 
judgment  of  the  orbis  terrarum ;  if  they  only  rouse 
him  to  ask  himself  by  what  right  he  takes  it  for 
granted,  that  thought  must  be  shut  up  in  itself, 
then  they  have  been  not  without  the  beginnings  of 
success. 

(b)  To  carry  these  beginnings  further,  we  may 
urge  upon  the  thorough-going  idealist,  to  whom 
thought  is  not  for  certain  anything  more  than  a 
mental  firework,  that  he  has  been  all  along  sup- 
posing the  objective  validity  of  thought  in  arguing 
out  his  conclusion;4  and  that  his  very  assertion,  as 
to  the  nature  of  ideas,  is  founded  on  the  belief  that 
his  ideas  concerning  this  point  are  objectively  valid. 
On  the  strength  of  valid  ideas  he  tries  to  prove 
ideas  invalid,  thus  taking  up  the  position  of  the 
universal  sceptic,  which  we  have  seen  to  be  un- 
tenable. Also  we  have  seen  that  evidence  is  the 
guarantee  of  truth.  Now  to  any  one  who  will 
make  fair  use  of  his  faculties,  there  is  evidence  for 
the  general  truth  that  his  ideas  are  objectively  real, 
even  when  they  are  about  objects  not  actually 
existent,  but  only  possible.  The  result  cannot  be 
the  conclusion  of  strict  demonstration,  that  is,  of 
an  inference  from  the  known  to  the  unknown.  For 
no  premisses  can  be  framed  which  do  not  assume 
the  conclusion.     The  fact,  then,  must  be  taken  on 

*  Palmieri,  Logica  Critica,  Thesis  vi. 


310  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

its  own  self-evidence,  than  which  no  other  and  no 
better  guarantee  can  be  given.  Mediate  knowledge, 
through  means  of  proof,  has  no  advantage  over 
intuition,  for  it  must  rest  finally  on  intuition ;  nor 
is  the  evidence  whereby  we  see  the  sequence  of  an 
argument  more  valid  than  the  evidence,  whereby 
we  assent  to  the  simpler  truths  of  immediate  know- 
ledge. To  fancy  otherwise  is  a  common  delusion 
with  our  adversaries. 

But  about  intuition  there  is  a  confusion  to  be 
cleared  up,  and  a  mistake  to  be  removed.  Some 
limit  intuition  to  the  case  where  the  object  itself 
is  actually  present  in  the  mind ;  as  is  the  condition 
of  those  facts  of  our  own  consciousness,  which, 
Malebranche  says,  we  know  "  without  ideas,"  or  as 
the  scholastics  would  say,  through  no  vicarious 
"  species."  How,  then,  do  the  schoolmen,  insisting 
on  the  need  of  the  "  species  "  for  all  objects  outside 
the  mind  itself,  yet  manage  to  assert  an  intuition  of 
some  such  objects  ?  By  means  of  the  distinction, 
already  explained,  between  a  signum  quo  and  a 
signum  ex  quo.  Unfortunately  adversaries,  from  a 
leaning  to  materialism,  often  test  the  case  only  on 
the  merits  of  external  bodies,  about  which  there  is 
admittedly  a  difficulty,  such  as  to  cause  certain 
followers  even  of  orthodox  philosophy  to  declare 
themselves  "  cosmothetic  idealists  " — that  is,  they 
hold  that  an  inference  is  requisite  to  make  sure  of 
the  externality  of  a  body.  But  setting  aside  this 
vexed  question,  we  can  have  recourse  to  intuitions 
of  truths,  the  objects  of  which  are  certainly  not  part 
of  ourselves,  and  not  in  themselves  bound  up  with 


OBJECTIVITY   OF  IDEAS.  311 

the  actual  existence  of  an  outside  world  of  matter. 
Such  for  example  are  the  truths  contained  in  the 
propositions,  "  What  is,  cannot  at  the  same  time 
not  be ;"  "  Every  new  event  must  have  an  adequate 
cause."  Here  the  ideas,  "being,"  "not  being," 
"  event,"  "  cause,"  cannot  really  be  resolved  into 
simpler  constituents,  but  are  seen  in  themselves, 
as  soon  as  they  are  possessed,  to  be  no  idle 
fireworks  of  the  mind,  but  to  have  an  objective 
meaning,  leading  at  once  to  the  enunciations 
above  made.  They  are  signa  quibus,  a  phrase 
fairly  illustrated  by  some  quotations  to  be  found  in 
Hamilton's  edition  of  Reid's  Intellectual  Powers* 
where,  however,  neither  author  nor  editor  are 
exactly  of  our  mind.  Take  first  this  note  of 
Hamilton's  :  "  Arnauld  did  not  allow  that  perceptions 
and  ideas  are  really  or  numerically  distinguished,  i.e., 
as  one  thing  from  another ;  nor  even  that  they  are 
modally  distinguished,  i.e.,  as  a  thing  from  its  mode. 
He  maintained  that  they  are  really  identical,  and 
only  rationally  discriminated,  as  viewed  in  different 
relations ;  the  indivisible  mental  modification  being 
called  a  perception,  by  reference  to  the  mind  or 
thinking  subject,  an  idea  by  reference  to  the  mediate 
object,  or  thing  thought."  This  word  "  mediate  " 
should  have  been  omitted :  the  immediate  object 
of  the  mind,  as  percipient,  is  not  primarily  the  idea 
itself — though  we  shall  see  self  also  entering  in, 
when  we  come  to  describe  consciousness — but  it  is 
that  which  is  signified  by  the  idea.  This  immediate 
object  is  always   given   intuitively,  though   it  may 

s  Essay  ii.  c.  vii 


3i2  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

require  an  inference  to  refer  it  to  some  larger 
whole,  or  to  settle  its  existence  in  or  as  some  actual 
thing.  In  other  words,  every  idea  has  a  meaning, 
that  is,  an  immediate  object ;  every  idea  is  the 
intuition  of  an  object,  complete  or  partial.  Hence 
Descartes  is  cited  in  the  place  referred  to,  as  des- 
cribing ideas  to  be  "thoughts  so  far  forth  as  they 
bear  the  character  of  images," 6  and  Burner  as 
writing :  "  If  we  confine  ourselves  to  what  is  intelli- 
gible in  our  observations  on  ideas,  we  shall  say  that 
they  are  nothing  but  mere  modifications  of  the  mind 
as  a  thinking  being.  They  are  called  ideas  with  regard 
to  the  object  represented,  and  perceptions  with  regard 
to  the  faculty  representing.  It  is  manifest  that  our 
ideas,  considered  in  this  sense,  are  not  more  dis- 
tinguished than  motion  is  from  a  body  moved." 
Besides,  then,  the  intuitions  of  states  of  self,  we 
may  have  intuitions  of  objects  that  are  not  self; 
and  the  view  that  the  mind  first  looks  at  an  image 
within  itself,  and  then  vainly  tries  to  compare  this 
image  with  some  object  wholly  outside  itself,  would 
be  very  fatal  to  realism,  if  it  were  the  true  account 
of  the  process :  but  it  happens  to  be  a  caricature, 
or  at  any  rate  an  unintentional  piece  of  very  bad 
drawing. 

Briefly  to  resume.  Our  refutation  of  idealism  is, 
that  its  falsehood  appears  upon  immediate  evidence, 
for  no  one  can  have  the  normal  faculties  of  a  man 
without  some  real  knowledge  coming  home  to- him, 
and  showing  him  that  he  has  really  the  power  to 
know.     To  argue  against  this  fact  is  to  imply  its 

•  Cogitationes  protit  sunt  tanquam  imagines. 


OBJECTIVITY   OF  IDEAS.  313 

admission.  Hence,  in  the  First  Part  of  this  book,  the 
capability  of  the  human  mind  to  attain  to  truth  was 
put  down  as  the  first  condition  to  be  granted  at  the 
very  outset  of  philosophy.  Ideas  cannot  then,  as 
Mr.  Huxley  surmises,  be  mere  flashes  in  the  mental 
pan,  hitting  no  mark,  and  quite  ineffectual  for 
objective  knowledge.  If  the  argument  against 
idealism  should  to  some  appear  scarcely  to  be  an 
argument,  the  reason  lies,  not  in  the  weakness  of 
the  cause,  but  in  the  fact  that  the  case  is  too 
elementarily  clear  to  allow  of  demonstration  strictly 
so  called ;  and  in  that  sense  alone  "  the  opposite  of 
idealism  cannot  be  proved."  Man,  being  intelligent, 
in  the  very  exercise  of  his  faculty  is  immediately 
assured  of  its  existence  and  of  its  validity,  and  to 
ask  a  more  roundabout  proof  is  to  demand  the 
preposterous  and  the  impossible.  Every  idea  is 
necessarily  representative  or  cognitive  of  some- 
thing, and  only  in  the  rare  instances,  where  we  are 
reflecting  upon  our  ideas  themselves,  are  ideas  the 
direct  and  principal  objects  of  our  intellect. 

5.  When  we  assert  that  the  object  of  our  ideas 
is  real,  the  word  "  real "  is  very  liable  to  misunder- 
standing. In  a  narrower  sense  "real  "  means  only 
the  actually  and  physically  existent ;  but  as  used 
in  this  chapter,  the  "real"  is  whatever  either  has  or 
might  have  its  own  physical  existence,  and  does 
not  exist  formally  as  an  object  of  thought  alone, 
as  also  whatever  is  a  real  aspect  of  such  an 
actual  or  •  possible  entity.  It  is  what  logicians 
strictly  understand  by  "a  first  intention,"  as  opposed 
to  "a  second  intention,"  that  is,  to  an  object  which, 


314  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

as  formally  described,  could  not  exist  except  as  the 
term  of  the  mind,  because  the  mind,  with  its 
abstractions  and  reflections,  has  imposed  upon  it 
some  conditions  essentially  mental.  Such  are 
genera  and  species,  subjects  and  predicates,  and 
universal  ideas,  all  which  are  essentially  logical 
entities,  with  no  more  than  a  ground  for  their 
formation,  in  the  extra-mental  order.  Besides  these, 
everything  else  which  is  truly  the  object  of  an  idea, 
is,  in  the  present  use  of  the  word,  "real;"  though 
often  that  which  is  allowed  to  pass  for  an  idea,  is 
in  fact  no  idea  at  all,  being  but  a  contradictory 
medley  of  ideas,  never  fused  into  one  idea.  It  is  a 
false  judgment,  or  fancy,  that  there  is  such  fusion 
between  mutually  repellent  elements,  for  example 
"  a  square  triangle." 

6.  It  is  useless,  however,  to  urge  the  objective 
reality  of  ideas  unless  a  special  explanation  is  given 
of  universal  ideas,  which  seem  to  be  condemned  by 
the  admitted  fact,  that  every  real  object,  actual  or 
possible,  is  singular.  Under  the  very  false  impres- 
sion that  all  realism,  when  the  word  is  used  in  its 
connexion  with  universals,  must  be  of  the  exagge- 
rated form,  which  asserts  universality  a  parte  ret, 
modern  writers  overlook  that  moderate  realism 
which,  giving  to  things  what  belongs  to  them,  and 
to  the  mind's  own  operations  what  belongs  to  them, 
is  manifestly  the  true  doctrine. 

(a)  We  shall  get  at  the  root  of  the  solution  if  we 
observe  the  difference  of  condition  between  an  infi- 
nite nature  and  a  finite.  The  infinite  nature  does 
not  allow  of  a  multiplicity  of  individuals :  there  is 


OBJECTIVITY   OF  IDEAS.  315 

but  one  God,  and  there  cannot  be  more,  for,  as  is 
shown  in  natural  theology,  a  plurality  of  individuals, 
having  a  nature  infinitely  perfect,  involves  a  contra- 
diction, so  that  the  three  Persons  are  but  one  God.7 
But  the  case  is  altered  with  finite  natures.  Among 
them  no  one  individual  can  claim  to  exhaust  the 
possibilities  of  the  nature  ;  no  one  is  so  a  man  as  to 
fill  up,  in  his  own  person,  the  whole  capabilities  of 
humanity.  However  great  the  man,  there  is  room 
enough  in  creation  for  others ;  and  if  "  there  is  no 
necessary  man,"  still  more  is  there  no  all-exhaustive 
man.  Any  created  nature,  and  any  character  about 
it,  may  be  specifically  repeated  an  indefinite  number 
of  times.  In  the  controversy  between  Leibnitz  and 
Clarke  as  to  whether  two  examples  of  the  same 
species  can  be  so  thoroughly  alike  that  the  only 
difference  existing  between  them  is  that  they  are 
individually  diverse,  the  affirmative  is  the  right 
answer.  Anything  that  has  once  been  done  may 
have  its  exact  copy  in  another  individual,  yet  the 
individualities  are  separate.  Another  Adam,  in  all 
respects  like  Adam,  but  not  Adam,  might  have  been 
the  first  man.  But  here  we  see  reason  enough  why 
no  universality  a  parte  rei  is  possible.  There  always 
must  be  the  difference  that  one  individual  is  not 
another,  while,  de  facto,  besides  this,  there  are 
always  other  differences,  at  least  in  accidentals. 
Nevertheless,  we  cling  to  what  we  have  before  said, 
and,  insisting  on  the  similarities  in  the  midst  of 
mentally  negligeable  dissimilarities,  we  affirm  that 

1  This  hint  cannot  be  developed  here. 


316  SPECIAL   TREATMENT   OF  CERTITUDE. 

the  real  likenesses  between  several  creatures  give 
the  foundation  for  universal  ideas. 

(b)  We  have  now  to  determine  the  way  in  which 
universal  ideas  can  be  formed,  so  as  to  be  predicable 
of  real  things  and  still  not  to  introduce  any  false- 
hood into  the  predication.  It  is  certain  that  all 
the  individual  differences  cannot  be  physically 
abstracted ;  such  abstraction  must  be  mental ;  and 
the  mind  has  to  be  careful  not  to  attribute  its  own 
processes  to  nature.  By  virtue  of  its  reflective 
power  the  human  intellect  has  a  mode  of  coming  to 
agreements  with  itself,  which  wonderfully  serve  the 
purposes  of  knowledge.  Thus,  being  finite,  it  cannot 
directly  represent  to  itself  what  an  infinite  object  is; 
but  by  a  contrivance  it  can  obtain  sufficiently  an 
idea  of  the  infinite  ;  for  it  knows  what  limited  being 
is,  and  it  has  only  to  deny  the  limit  in  order  to  form 
a  true,  though  imperfect,  conception  of  the  infinite. 
Similarly  it  is  by  a  contrivance  that  we  fashion  for 
ourselves  a  universal  idea,  the  requisites  of  which 
are,  that  it  shall  be  "  univocally  predicable  of 
several  individuals,  taken  singly  or  distributively." 
Thus  "  man "  is  predicable  -of  Peter,  Paul,  John, 
and  James :  all  and  each  are  men.  A  direct  and  a 
reflex  universal  must  both  conspire  to  make  up  the 
whole.  The  direct  universal  is  of  "  first  intention  :  " 
it  picks  out  some  nature  or  attribute,  prescinded 
from  its  individuality,  as  in  the  perfectly  unindividu- 
alized  conception  of  virtue,  vice,  substance,  round. 
The  individuality  is  not  denied,  but  merely  put  out 
of  the  reckoning,  as  is  indeed  all  "  extension  "  of 
the   term.      Next   comes   the   reflex   universal    due 


OBJECTIVITY   OF  IDEAS.  317 

precisely  to  the  addition  of  "  extension "  by  the 
observation  that  a  concept  so  prescinded  may  be 
applied  to  each  of  many  individuals  presenting  the 
notes  contained  in  the  comprehension.  "  Mammal," 
let  us  say,  is  the  notion  we  gather  from  the  inspec- 
tion of  a  cow ;  advertence  to  the  applicability  of 
this  idea  to  many  individuals,  actual  or  possible, 
gives  the  reflex  universal.  Because  of  the  process 
which  forms  the  direct  universal,  the  universal  is 
sometimes  called  an  abstract  idea ;  and  it  is  so 
inasmuch  as  it  is  always  abstracted  from  individu- 
alizing differences.  But  because  Pure  Logic  has 
found  it  convenient  to  define  "  abstract  term  "  as 
one  which  goes  a  greater  length  in  the  way  of 
abstraction,  and  "exhibits  a  form  without  a  subject," 
e.g.,  "  rotundity,"  "humanity,"  "  mammality  ;  "  we 
may  respect  this  appropriation  of  a  word,  and  say 
that  "rotund,"  "human,"  "mammal,"  are  prescinded 
or  abstracted  terms  instead  cf  calling  them  abstract. 
The  abstraction,  it  cannot  be  too  often  remarked,  is 
mental  and  not  attributed  to  the  things  themselves : 
whereas  the  characters  expressed  by  the  prescinded 
terms  are  in  the  things  themselves,  and  are  attri- 
buted to  them.  It  is  a  real  predication  when  we 
say  of  a  corpulent  old  gentleman  that  he  is  "human," 
"rotund,"  and  "mammalian." 

To  go  through  the  whole  account  once  more  in 
the  way  of  illustration.  Looking  at  a  triangle,  we 
see  its  essence  to  be  a  plane  figure  bounded  by  three 
straight  lines.  This  is  our  intellectual  insight  into 
the  quiddity  or  whatness  of  the  thing.  Any  existent 
triangle  will  be  scalene,  or  isosceles,  drawn  in  white 


318  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

chalk,  or  in  red  chalk,  and  so  forth :  but  content 
with  the  quiddity,  we  neglect  these  individual  pecu- 
liarities, though  any  one  of  them  might  be  singled 
out,  and  treated  just  as  we  are  treating  the  essential 
triangularity  itself.  But  to  rest  content  with  one 
example  at  a  time,  we  have  the  prescinded  concep- 
tion, "  plane  figure  bounded  by  three  straight  lines." 
This  is  the  direct  universal,  universal  as  yet  only 
in  potentia,  but  made  so  in  ache,  when  we  recognize  it, 
on  reflexion,  to  be  a  concept  which  is  one  in  many 
different  individuals,  actual  or  possible.  There  may 
be  thousands  of  figures,  each  of  which  is  a  triangle, 
and  admits,  univocally  with  the  rest,  the  predicate 
"triangle."  The  one  concept,  regarded  as  the 
common  predicate  of  many,  is  a  logical  entity,  a 
"  second  intention : "  the  direct  meaning  of  that 
concept,  in  "comprehension,"  is  literally  true  of  each 
individual,  and  is  "a  first  intention." 

The  whole  of  which  doctrine  is  condensed  by 
the  scholastics  into  the  phrase,  "  Universals  are 
formally  only  in  the  mind,  but  fundamentally  they 
are  in  things."  Things  are  really  like  one  another; 
and  this  is  the  foundation  whereon  the  mind  pro- 
ceeds to  build,  when  conceiving  the  likeness,  and 
prescinding  from  individual  differences,  it  ranks 
similar  individuals  under  one  common  idea.  We 
each  fall  under  the  concept  "  man,"  though  no 
single  one  of  us  is  simply  "  man  "  without  individual 
differences,  and  though  physically  we  each  form  no 
unity  with  other  men. 

(c)  The  objection  that  every  idea  is  physically 
one  thing,  with  one  meaning  attached  to  it,  simple 


OBJECTIVITY   OF   IDEAS.  319 

or  complex,  can  be  met  by  us  with  the  reply  that 
this  holds  of  the  direct  universal,  and  is  remedied, 
for  purposes  of  universality,  by  the  reflex  act  which 
we  have  described.  For  example,  an  idea  of  triangle 
is  one  psychological  state  of  the  mind,  and  it  has 
one  complex  signification  :  but  on  reflexion  this  one 
signification  can  be  applied  to  several  individuals. 
Hereupon  we  are  led  to  remark  the  incompetence  of 
the  sensist  theory,  which  accounts  for  universals 
thus :  Repeated  sensations  from  resembling  bodies 
produce  a  common  image  by  a  process  comparable 
to  a  recent  device  in  photography.  The  photographs 
of  several  persons,  for  example  mathematicians,  either 
by  a  simultaneous  or  by  a  successive  method,  are 
superposed  and  combined  into  one  image,  on  the 
principle  that  only  those  features  which  are  repeated 
sufficiently  often  in  the  different  originals  will  leave 
a  marked  impression  on  the  sensitized  plate  upon 
which  the  aggregate  image  is  thrown.  Other  features 
are  either  lost,  or  but  faintly  indicated.  The  result 
is  that  a  sort  of  average  face  stands  out,  in  which 
enthusiasts  are  glad  to  find  the  resemblance  of  some 
individual  who  has  been  famous  in  mathematics,  and 
who  is  thus  proved  to  have  had  the  typical  counten- 
ance. By  no  such  process  could  a  universal  idea 
be  reached ;  for  the  average  image  is  still  singular, 
applicable  rather  to  none  than  to  all  mathemati- 
cians ;  for  even  the  favourite  to  whom  it  is  assigned 
is  allowed  to  be  not  accurately  represented.  More- 
over, the  photograph  has  no  self-referring  power  at 
all :  it  keeps  strictly  at  home.  Assuredly  there  is 
no  power  in  sense-images  properly  to  abstract  and 


jk  SPECIAL    TREATMENT   OF   CERTITUDE. 

universalize ;  and  such  common  images  as  the  lower 
animals  can  frame  certainly  do  not  reach  to  the 
standard  of  universal  ideas.  Hence  we  must  insist 
very  strongly  on  the  strictly  intellectual  character  of 
the  process  of  universalizing,  and  on  the  fact  that 
abstraction  is  no  mere  dropping  of  sensile  details, 
without  the  addition  of  some  active  power  of  intel- 
ligence which  is  above  sense.8 

(d)  If  to  form  a  general  notion  it  is  often  necessary 
to  multiply  observations  and  comparisons  of  indivi- 
duals, the  reason  is  not  that  suggested  by  the  analogy 
of  the  average  photograph.  One  observation  would 
suffice  for  the  framing  of  any  universal  idea,  if  at  once 
we  could  observe  things  through  and  through,  and 
know  all  about  them.  One  observation  as  to  how  a 
circle  is  drawn  would,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  suffice  for 
the  universal  idea  of  a  circle,  because  the  mode  of 
genesis  is  so  clear.  But  in  physical  matters  we  are 
liable  to  all  those  difficulties  of  generalization  which 
are  studied  under  the  heading  of  Induction,  and  for 
which  Mill's  canons  were  originally  devised,  and 
have  since  been  improved  upon  by  later  writers. 

(e)  The  difficulties  of  universalizing  are  often 
so  great  that  we  do  not  accomplish  the  result,  but 
manage  to  get  along  with  terms  still  left  in  the 
vague.  An  ordinary  man  has  never  found  it  neces- 
sary to  settle  for  himself  precisely  what  he  means 
by  a  tiger,  a  hippopotamus,  or  even  a  horse.     He 

8  See  Kant's  clumsy  attempt  to  mediate  between  individual 
sense-image  and  universal  idea  by  means  of  his  schemata  or 
monograms  of  the  imagination.  (Critique  of  Pure  Reas&i,  Max  Miiller's 
Translation,  Vol.  II.  od   124,  491.) 


OBJECTIVITY   OF  IDEAS.  321 

has  vaguely  outlined  images  of  these  several 
animals  in  his  brain,  and  these  suffice  for  ordinary 
purposes.  If  called  upon  to  assign  the  precise 
marks  which  he  included  under  each  name,  he 
would  be  non-plussed ;  the  finer  discrimination 
would  be  beyond  his  powers.  A  rustic,  whose  idea 
of  fish  was  formed  simply  on  what  the  hawker  sold 
him  under  the  pleasant  name  of  "  fresh  herring," 
would  be  quite  puzzled  if  taken  into  a  town  to  see 
an  aquarium,  or  even  a  fishmonger's  shop :  while  a 
day  spent  with  a  merman  "  at  the  bottom  of  the 
deep  blue  sea,"  would  utterly  overwhelm  him  by 
the  endless  display  of  fishy  varieties.  Even  a 
learned  man  may  often  be  betrayed  into  calling  a 
whale  a  fish,  and  it  was  a  fish  so  far  as  the  old 
usage  went.  In  view  of  facts  like  these,  we  have 
only  to  say,  that  ideas  which  have  never  been 
properly  abstracted  and  universalized  must  not  be 
brought  as  specimens  of  universal  ideas.  There 
are  genuine  specimens,  and  these  we  must  use  as 
illustrations.  We  shall  find  them  especially  in 
mathematical  and  moral  definitions  :  as  also  in 
some  of  those  physical  laws — for  example,  the 
laws  of  motion,  which  have  been  satisfactorily 
formulated. 

(/)  What  has  been  asserted  of  ideas  is  still 
more  applicable  to  words.  An  idea  strictly  is  never 
vague  :  and  if  an  idea  is  said  to  be  indefinite  or  to 
vary,  it  is  not  one  idea,  but  the  addition  or  the 
subtraction  of  ideas,  or  the  element  of  indistinct- 
ness, which  is  variable.  Why,  the  mere  exercise 
of  school-boy  translation  was  enough  to  teach  us, 
V 


322  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

how  far  words  are  from  having  each  a  neatly 
denned  signification,  and  the  special  employment  of 
technical  terms  by  scientific  men  is  a  contrast  which 
calls  attention  to  the  looseness  of  ordinary  usage. 
Certainly,  we  cannot  flatter  ourselves  that,  by  the 
aid  of  a  dictionary,  we  shall  be  able  to  read  in- 
telligently any  book  written  in  our  own  language,  no 
matter  how  recondite  the  subject.  Words,  then,  are 
no  immediate  test  of  the  doctrine  about  universals. 

(g)  We  may  take  leave  of  the  matter  with  an 
answer  to  a  difficulty  which  Mill9  urges  in  this 
shape :  In  order  to  get  your  abstracted  general 
term  you  must  isolate  its  contents :  but  this  the 
law  of  inseparable  association  forbids  you  to  do : 
what  has  always  been  united  in  experience  and 
cannot  be  conceived  to  be  disunited,  must  always 
cohere  in  thought.  Against  this  fancied  difficulty, 
the  power  of  the  mind,  by  reflexion,  to  come  to 
agreements  with  itself,  must  once  more  be  insisted 
upon.  To  abstract  a  common  nature  or  a  common 
attribute,  it  is  not  necessary  to  shut  out  concomitant 
ideas  of  individual  peculiarities ;  it  is  quite  enough 
to  know  which  are  the  common  notes,  and  to  resolve 
to  take  account  of  them  alone.  It  is  possible  in 
society  to  ignore  the  presence  of  a  man,  of  which  yet 
you  are  aware.  If  any  one  has  the  general  notion  of 
a  plane  triangle  as  a  plane  figure  bounded  by  three 
straight  lines,  it  in  no  way  stops  his  reasonings 
upon  this  abstracted  nature,  if  there  is  concomi- 
tantly in  his  imagination,  or  in  his  thoughts,  the 

9  Examination,  c.  xvii.  pp.  320,  321.     Contrast   St.  Thomas,  ia. 
q.  85,  a.  2,  ad  2am. 


OBJECTIVITY   OF  IDEAS.  323 

representation  of  scalene  or  isosceles  properties. 
These  may  be  present  to  the  mind  and  yet  wholly 
left  out  of  count  in  a  selected  line  of  thought. 
Otherwise  all  reasoning  would  be  baffled :  for 
we  always  have  an  accompaniment  of  variously 
suggested  ideas  going  along  with  the  main  ideas, 
but  excluded  from  entrance  upon  the  course  of 
argument.  Whatever  may  be  our  doctrine  about 
the  number  of  thoughts  that  can  be  present  to  the 
mind  at  one  time,  we  must  find  room  for  that 
familiar  experience,  whereby  consciousness  has  its 
point  of  greatest  attention  surrounded  by  a  region 
of  diminishing  advertence,  and  shades  off  into  the 
subconscious  anii  the  unconscious.  There  is  one 
brightest  spot,  and  round  it  there  is  a  fainter  halo : 
there  is  a  substantial  vesture  of  thought,  and  to  it 
adheres  a  fringe.  But  we  can  abstract  what  part 
of  the  whole  we  like,  by  our  will  to  do  it.  Ideas 
need  not  be  in  our  mind  like  so  many  sharply 
distinct  atoms :  they  may  be  there  after  the 
analogy  of  parts  in  a  network  or  in  an  organ- 
ized body,  and  yet  we  can  fix  upon  such  a  portion 
as  we  choose,  and  equivalently  isolate  it.  Mill 
himself  allows  that  we  can  so  do,  though  he 
makes  a  great  fuss  about  the  inseparability  of  uni- 
formly associated  ideas  : I0  "  The  formation  of  a 
concept  does  not  consist  in  separating  the  attri- 
butes, which  are  said  to  compose  it,  from  all  other 
attributes  of  the  same  object.  We  neither  conceive 
them,  nor  think  them,  nor  cognize  them  in  any  way, 
as  a  thing  apart,  but  solely  as  forming,  in  combi- 

10  Examination,  1.  c. 


324  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

nation  with  other  attributes,  the  idea  of  an  indi- 
vidual object.  But  though  thinking  them  only  as 
part  of  a  larger  agglomeration,  we  have  the  power 
of  fixing  our  attention  on  them,  to  the  neglect  of 
the  other  attributes  with  which  we  think  them  com- 
bined. While  the  concentration  of  attention  actually 
lasts,  if  it  is  sufficiently  intense,  we  may  be  tem- 
porarily unconscious  of  any  other  attributes,  and 
may  really,  for  a  brief  interval,  have  nothing  present 
to  our  mind  but  the  attributes  constituent  of  the 
concept.  In  general,  however,  the  attention  is  not 
so  completely  exclusive  as  this :  it  leaves  room  in 
consciousness  for  other  elements  of  the  concrete 
idea.  General  concepts,  therefore,  we  have  properly 
speaking,  none ;  but  we  are  able  to  attend  exclu- 
sively to  certain  parts  of  the  concrete  idea,  and  by 
that  exclusive  attention  we  allow  those  parts  to 
determine  exclusively  the  course  of  thoughts  as 
called  up  by  association."  If  Mill  would  only  cease 
to  make  mind  so  much  of  a  mere  machine,  and  if 
he  would  make  it,  instead,  an  intellectual  faculty 
proceeding  on  insight,  with  a  vast  power  of  spon- 
taneity, with  a  power  to  reflect,  to  abstract,  and  to 
come  to  agreements  about  its  own  operations :  and, 
if  further  he  would  observe  that  to  think  certain 
characters  apart  need  not  mean,  and  does  not  mean, 
the  same  thing  as  to  think  that  in  real  objects  these 
characters  do  actually  exist  apart ;  then  he  would 
have  little  scruple  in  revoking  that  portion  of  his 
own  declaration  :  "  General  concepts  we  have 
properly  speaking  none."  Also  he  would  make 
less  of  the  necessity  for  an  association  with  words, 


OBJECTIVITY   OF  IDEAS.  325 

such  that  "the  association  of  the  particular  set  of 
attributes  with  a  given  word  is  what  keeps  them 
together  in  the  mind,  by  a  stronger  tie  than  that 
with  which  they  are  associated  with  the  remainder 
of  the  concrete  image."  If  only  he  could  have 
formed  a  truer  conception  of  how  human  intelligence 
works,  and  had  taken  warning  in  season  from  the 
necessity  under  which  he  found  himself  to  make 
such  confessions  as,  "  I  have  never  pretended  to 
account  by  association  for  the  idea  of  time,"  Mill 
would  have  ceased  to  regard  it  as  a  misfortune, 
that  mankind  ever  took  up  the  expression,  "  General 
conception." 

7.  The  object  of  this  whole  chapter  has  been  to 
defend  the  objective  validity  of  ideas  in  general ; 
but  not  of  course  to  say,  in  detail,  what  ideas  in  each 
science  are  the  correct  representatives  of  reality. 
The  main  root  of  difference  between  adversaries 
and  ourselves,  is  that  they  will  insist,  contrary  to 
us,  in  regarding  knowledge  as  primarily  not  a 
knowledge  of  things  but  of  ideas.  They  imagine 
that  what  we  first  of  all  know  are  always  subjective 
affections  as  such — signa  ex  quibus  and  not  signa 
quibus — and  then  of  course  they  see  no  way  to  a 
proof  that  these  subjective  affections  are  like  objects 
without ;  rather  they  are  inclined  to  believe  that 
there  can  be  no  likeness,  but  at  most  a  symbolic 
correspondence.  But  this  is  not  the  legitimate 
interpretation  of  the  doctrine  that  the  mind  per- 
ceives through  ideas.  The  mind  perceives  through 
ideas,  not  in  the  sense  that  it  looks  at  ideas  first, 
and  then    passes   on  to    infer  things ;    but   in   the 


326  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

sense  that  the  mind,  at  least  under  one  aspect, 
begins  as  a  tabula  rasa,  and  only  in  proportion 
as  it  stores  itself  with  ideas  is  it  rendered  by 
them  cognisant  of  objects.  The  mind,  as  informed 
by  an  idea,  is  cognisant  of  an  object :  but  the 
idea,  as  has  been  so  often  repeated,  is  a  signum 
quo,  not  signum  ex  quo;  it  has  not  first  to  be 
known,  but  is  itself  constitutive  of  the  act  of 
knowledge.  A  world  of  misconceptions  would  be 
saved  if  the  right  view  of  the  office  of  ideas  were 
acquired — misconceptions  which  have  led  to  the 
false  definitions  of  truth  exemplified  in  our  opening 
chapter.  In  support  of  our  own  definition  we  need 
only  a  right  appreciation  about  the  nature  of  ideas; 
then  ideas  are  seen  to  be  objectively  valid,  and  true 
knowledge  is  perceived  to  be  the  conformity  of 
thought  to  thing.  We  thus  escape  the  deduction 
from  Helmholtz's  theory  of  sensation — the  deduction, 
namely,  that  our  sensations  being  non-resembling 
signs  of  external  things,  all  our  ideas  are  non- 
resembling  signs  so  far  as  they  concern  objects  out- 
side ourselves.  Briefly,  we  recognize  that  we  have 
a  power  of  real  knowledge,  not  reducible  to  a 
mechanical  reaction,  or  quasi-chemicsA  combination. 

Addenda. 

(i)  It  is  a  fancy  of  some  semi-idealists  that  the 
thing-in-itself  is  something  out  of  all  relation  to  know- 
ledge, and  therefore  not  knowable  for  what  it  is.  The 
mind  gives  to  this  unintelligible  thing  a  form  of  its  own, 
frames  a  symbol  for  it,  but  symbol  and  symbolized  have 
nothing  alike  between  them. 

(2)  The  supposed   impossibility  of  knowledge  trans- 


OBJECTIVITY   OF  IDEAS.  327 

cending  the  conscious  state  is  really  not  kept  to,  by  those 
who  profess  to  keep  within  the  impossible  limit.  Thus 
Mr.  Spencer x  has  to  have  recourse  to  all  the  convenience 
of  knowledge  extending  beyond  the  conscious  state, 
under  the  subterfuge  of  calling  this  knowledge  by 
another  name.  He  says,  "  though  consciousness  of  an 
existence,  which  is  beyond  consciousness,  is  inex- 
pugnable, the  extra-conscious  not  only  remains  incon- 
ceivable in  nature,  but  the  nature  of  its  connexion  with 
consciousness  cannot  be  truly  conceived.  Ever  restrained 
within  its  limits,  but  ever  trying  to  exceed  them,  con- 
sciousness cannot  but  use  the  forms  of  its  activity  in 
figuring  to  itself  that  which  cannot  be  brought  within 
these  forms."  Thus  we  are  conscious  of  an  outer  reality 
which  we  do  not  conceive  or  know.  The  artifice  here  is 
ingenious  but  unsatisfactory;  any  fact  which  conscious- 
ness enables  us  with  certainty  to  predicate,  deserves  to 
be  called  knowledge. 

(3).  The  word  "  intuition "  has  been  employed 
above  with  a  risk  of  misinterpretation.  For,  not 
to  mention  other  views,  on  a  theory  given  more  or 
less  explicitly  by  different  writers,  an  "  intuition " 
stands  for  an  implanted  instinct  to  believe  some- 
thing, without  either  immediate  or  mediate  evidence. 
As  used  in  this  work,  an  intuition  is  no  innate  idea 
or  perception,  and  no  specially  communicated  know- 
ledge :  it  is  simply  knowledge  on  immediate  evidence. 
An  instance  in  point  is  man's  perception  that  his  ideas 
have  objective  validity ;  on  perceiving  a  clear  truth  he 
has  an  intuition  of  the  validity  of  his  faculties ;  and 
without  this  intuition  he  never  could  ascertain  the  fact 
by  strict  process  of  inference.2     There  are,  moreover, 

1  See  the  opening  chapters  of  First  Principles. 

2  Recur   to  what   is   said   in   the  body  of  this  chapter  about 
intuition  (pp.  313—319). 


328  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

intuitive   perceptions   beyond   this   matter  of  self-con- 
sciousness and  in  the  region  of  the  non-ego. 

(4)  Another  point,  already  touched  upon,  may  be 
further  elucidated.  With  logicians  an  "  abstract  "  idea 
is  strictly  one  representing  "  a  form  without  any 
subject,"  e.g.,  "  humanity."  But  any  universal  term 
abstracted  from  individual  peculiarities,  is  often  called 
abstract,  e.g.,  "man."  The  fact  is  there  are  degrees  of 
abstraction  increasing  in  extent :  from  the  concrete 
article  in  his  hand  the  bowler,  at  a  cricket-match,  may 
progressively  abstract  the  terms  "  ball,"  "  spherical," 
"  sphericity."  Only  the  last  of  these  words  is  an  abstract 
in  the  full  sense  required  by  Pure  Logic.  With  Hegel 
any  word,  not  significant  of  the  whole  universe,  was  an 
abstract  term,  so  complete  did  he  make  the  unity  of  the 
whole.  Thus,  as  we  are  not  omniscient,  all  our  know- 
ledge would  be  abstract,  though  Hegel  calls  much  of  it 
concrete  as  judged  by  its  own  lower  standard. 

(5)  In  admitting  that  the  mental  process  departs,  in 
the  formation  of  universal  ideas,  from  strict  reality,  we 
are  only  allowing  the  mind  to  do  what  it  often  does 
without  risk  of  falsehood.  In  nature  the  line  of  progress 
is  from  causes  to  effects :  in  our  knowledge  the  progress 
ordinarily  is  from  effects  to  causes ;  what  logically  is 
the  premiss  to  a  conclusion  is  often,  in  the  ontological 
order,  a  consequence  of  the  fact,  or  the  principle,  stated 
in  the  conclusion.  We  may  argue  God's  wisdom  from 
the  order  in  creation,  but  the  order  in  creation  is  a 
consequent  upon  the  Divine  wisdom.  Again,  we  often 
make  mental  distinctions  where  we  know  there  is  no 
real  distinction  :  as  when  we  divide  God  into  a  nature 
with  distinct  attributes.  Any  departure,  therefore, 
which  in  the  formation  of  universals  is  made  away  from 
reality,  can  be  recognized  as  such,  and  need  not  be 
asserted  of  the  reality.  To  the  real  that  alone  need  be 
assigned  which  belongs  to  it. 


OBJECTIVITY  OF  IDEAS.  329 

(6)  Hence  we  know  what  to  reply  to  those  who, 
like  Professor  Huxley,  maintain  that  our  generalized 
laws  of  nature  are  not  real  but  ideal.  It  is  true  that, 
supposing  the  law  to  be  correctly  formulated,  there  is 
no  general  law  of  gravitation  apart  from  the  several 
particles  of  matter  which  attract ;  but  as  each  and  all 
do  attract,  the  universalized  law  is  real  in  all  that  it 
attributes  to  nature.  The  difficulty  is  solved  in  the 
general  solution  of  the  problem  concerning  the  reality  of 
universal  ideas ;  and  to  declare  that  generalized  laws 
are  not  real,  is  a  statement  more  likely  to  mislead  than 
to  instruct.  They  are  real  so  far  as  they  are  applied 
to  nature,  and  have  their  foundation  there. 

(7)  Now  that  we  are  coming  to  an  end  of  the 
doctrine  about  universals,  we  may  observe  that  there 
seems  more  difficulty  about  individualizing  our  ideas  than 
about  universalizing  them.  The  Divine  nature  excepted, 
every  other  term,  in  its  mere  statement,  might  belong 
to  an  indefinite  number  of  individuals.  "The  first 
man  "  might  have  been  quite  another ;  and  all  that  we 
have  recorded  of  Julius  Caesar  might  have  been  verified 
of  another  man,  down  to  the  minutest  detail,  which 
human  description  can  record.  For  we  never  have  an 
intuition  of  individuality  itself  as  such.  Our  demon- 
strative pronoun  itself,  backed  up  by  additional  terms, 
"  this  very  individual,"  is  left  a  universal,  unless  we  can 
fix  it,  proximately  or  remotely,  by  some  fact  of  concrete 
experience.  Touch  a  thing,  while  you  call  it  "  this," 
and  you  are  fastening  upon  an  individual ;  but  mere 
ideas  without  an  experienced  connexion  in  fact, — either 
your  own  experience  or  the  experience  of  some  one  else, 
— will  not  carry  you  out  of  the  universal.  "  This  man  " 
has  no  individuality  till  it  is  somehow  concreted  in 
experience. 

(8)  The  true  doctrine  about  realism  was  settled  very 


330  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

early  in  the  course  of  the  scholastic  disputations ;  not 
that  some  did  not  continue  to  go  wrong,  but  the  right 
statement  was  elicited  and  widely  recognized.  This  is  a 
point  on  which  it  is  hopeless  to  consult  an  ordinary  non- 
scholastic  author ;  as  soon  as  ever  you  see  him  starting 
the  subject  of  the  old  controversy  about  universals,  as 
a  rule  you  may  say  to  yourself,  "  Now  for  some  quite 
incompetent  criticism,  and  a  large  display  of  ignorance." 
As  a  single  specimen  of  one  who  early  formulated  the 
doctrine  of  moderate  realism  we  will  take  neither 
Albert  the  Great  nor  St.  Thomas,  but  a  contemporary 
Dominican,  the  preceptor  in  the  home  of  St.  Louis  of 
France,  Vincent  of  Beauvais.3  "  Universals,"  he  writes, 
"  are  not  in  the  intellect  alone.  For  men  have  one 
common  undivided  nature,  which  is  humanity,  by 
reason  of  which  each  is  called  man ;  and  that  which 
is  thus  participated  by  all  is  called  universal."  Realism 
of  the  most  extravagant  type !  the  reader  will  perhaps 
exclaim ;  but  let  him  have  the  patience  to  continue. 
11  What  is  common  is  their  specific  likeness,  which  by  the 
intellect  is  taken  in  abstraction  fvom  the  individualities.  For 
as  a  line  cannot  exist  apart  from  matter,  and  yet  the 
intellect  makes  no  false  judgment  when  it  abstracts  the 
line  from  the  matter,  because  it  does  not  think  that  the 
two  are  really  separable,  but  merely  thinks  of  the  line 
without  taking  account  of  the  matter ;  so  in  general 
any  universal,  though  it  cannot  be  apart  from  its 
singulars,  yet  can  become  an  object  of  intelligence, 
while  no  attention  is  being  paid  to  what  is  individual." 
This  clear  explanation  invites  comparison  with  modern 

3  Quoted  by  Stockl,  Geschichte  der  Philosophic,  under  the  name 
Vincent  de  Beauvais.  Compare  how  this  doctrine  differs  from  Mill's 
popular  fallacy  about  the  scholastic  doctrine.  (Logic,  Bk.  I.  c.  vi. 
§  2.)  He  has  the  effrontery  to  put  down  exaggerated  realism  as 
"the  most  prevalent  philosophical  doctrine  of  the  middle  ages." 
(Examination,  c.  xvii.  pp.  308,  309.) 


OBJECTIVITY   OF  IDEAS  331 

statements,  such  as  that  of  Dr.  Maudsley,  when  he 
says,  that  while  "  no  animal,  as  far  as  we  can  judge, 
is  capable  of  forming  an  abstract  idea,  there  is  good 
reason  to  think  that  the  more  intelligent  animals  are 
able  to  form  a  few  general  ideas."  Generalization 
without  abstraction  is  impossible,  if  the  author  is 
speaking  strictly  of  a  general  idea.  To  return  to  the 
medievalists,  however ;  they  so  talk  of  abstracting 
the  essence  from  the  individual  accidents,  that  a  reader 
might  suppose  they  confined  universals  to  essential 
predications.  But  though  they  thus  emphasize  one  of 
the  most  important  cases  of  universalization,  they  fully 
allow  that  any  attribute  may  be  abstracted  and  made  a 
universal  term ;  but  in  all  instances  alike  this  will  be 
considered  in  its  quiddity  or  nature,  for  accidents  also 
have  their  quiddity. 

(9)  The  objective  validity  of  ideas  once  established, 
it  is  not  necessary  explicitly  to  argue  that  judgments 
and  reasonings  are  valid  processes,  when  they  properly 
embody  these  ideas.  Distinct  propositions  on  these 
subjects  may  be  found  in  the  ordinary  text-books  ;4  but 
it  is  not  difficult  for  any  intelligent  reader  to  guess  the 
substance  of  the  arguments  employed. 

<*  Palmieri,  Logica  Critica,  Theses  xiv.„  xviil. 


CHAPTER    IV. 

EXAGGERATED     REALISM,    NOMINALISM,    AND 
CONCEPTUALISM. 

Synopsis. 

i.  Exaggerated  realism. 

2.  Nominalism,    (a)  Nominalists  assert  that  universality  is  only 

in  the  word,  but  do  not  deny  real  likenesses  between  things. 
(b)  Refutation  of  nominalism,  (c)  Specimens  of  nomina- 
lists in  England. 

3.  Conceptualism.       (a)    How    conceptualists    improve    upon 

nominalists,     (b)  Refutation  of  conceptualism. 

I.  The  error,  which  is  often  confounded  with  the 
realism  defended  in  the  last  chapter,  is  the  doctrine 
of  exaggerated  realism.  Any  theory  which  asserts 
a  formal  universality  a  parte  rei,  which  supposes, 
for  example,  that  there  is  some  concrete  nature 
physically  common  to  all  men,  and  only  accidentally 
individuated  in  each,  must  be  rejected  as  wanting 
even  in  intelligibility.  Such  cases  as  that  of  sub- 
stance permanent  under  its  varying  activities  and 
passivities,  are  in  vain  quoted  as  examples  of  uni- 
versality a  parte  rei  :  while  Cousin's  assertion,  that 
space  is  a  real  universal,  shows  him  to  have  enter- 
tained crooked  notions  either  about  space  or  about 
universals.  No  pretended  instance  can  stand  test- 
ing :    and  if  some  mediaeval  philosophers  thought 


REALISM,  NOMINALISM,  AND   CONCEPTUALISM.  333 

otherwise,  we  give  them  up  and  say,  they  were 
mistaken ;  but  it  hardly  becomes  certain  modern 
critics  to  make  merry  at  the  expense  of  the  middle 
ages,  when  they  themselves  are  in  favour  of  monism, 
a  single  underlying  reality,  of  which  all  that  we 
experience,  and  we  ourselves,  are  but  the  pheno- 
mena. 

2.  (a)  In  extreme  opposition  to  the  exaggerated 
realist  is  the  nominalist,  who,  if  thorough-going, 
places  universality  in  the  name  only.  Not  that 
nominalists  deny  a  real  likeness  between  things, 
for  that  is  too  obvious  to  be  gainsaid ;  and 
Mill  finds  fault  with  Hamilton,  whom  he  supposes 
to  hold  that  such  likeness  is  denied.  Hobbes,  a 
notorious  nominalist,  says  clearly  enough,  that  "  one 
universal  name  is  imposed  on  many  things  for  the 
similitude  in  some  quality  or  other  accident."  Indeed, 
the  perception  of  similarities  and  dissimilarities  is 
made  by  some  nominalists  to  be  the  very  basis  of 
all  knowledge. 

(b)  The  state  of  the  case  is,  then,  that  while 
admitting  real  similitudes  and  our  knowledge  of 
them,  nominalists  have  so  far  ignored  these  in  their 
account  of  universals  as  to  declare,  that  the  univer- 
sality is  only  in  the  word,  and  neither  in  the  things 
nor  in  the  concepts.  That  it  is  not  formally  in  the 
thing  we  admit ;  that  there  is  no  foundation  in  the 
thing  we  deny,  for  there  is  the  real  likeness,  afford- 
ing to  a  mind  which  has  the  power  of  abstraction 
and  reflexion,  a  groundwork  for  the  formation  of 
universal  concepts.  Next  we  affirm  that  the  uni- 
versal formally,  or  as  such,  is  in  the  concept,  or  in 


334  SPECIAL   TREATMENT   OF  CERTITUDE. 

the  arrangement  of  concepts  already  described,  as 
respectively  direct  and  reflex  universals.  If  it  were 
not  there,  it  could  never  be  in  the  word ;  or  if  it 
were  in  the  word,  and  not  in  the  concept,  it  would 
never  enter  into  knowledge.  Besides,  it  is  absurd 
to  suppose  a  word,  as  such,  to  be  universal :  for  the 
spoken  sound  and  the  written  character  are  con- 
ventional signs,  and  always  in  themselves  singular, 
no  matter  how  often  repeated.  Each  repetition  is 
individual :  only  the  mind  can  universalize  a  sign, 
and  its  power  so  to  do  is  evident  from  our  previous 
explanation  of  the  process. 

(c)  These  facts  are  so  obvious  that  it  becomes 
necessary  to  give  evidence  that  there  are  professed 
nominalists  who,  whatever  their  consistency,  do 
promulgate  the  doctrine  here  refuted.  "  The  uni- 
versal," says  Hobbes,1  "is  neither  something  existing 
in  nature  nor  an  idea,  nor  a  phantasm,  but  always 
a  name."  Berkeley2  sets  out  from  nominalistic 
principles :  "  As  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  see  or 
feel  anything  without  an  actual  sensation  of  that 
thing,  so  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  conceive  in  my 
thoughts  any  sensible  thing  or  object  distinct  from 
the  sensation  or  perception  of  it."  He  disavows 
the  power  of  abstraction,  without  which  thoughts 
cannot  be  universalized :  "  Whether  others  have 
this  wonderful  faculty  of  abstracting  ideas,  they  best 
can  tell ;  "  as  for  himself  he  can  variously  compound 
individual  parts,  but  cannot  rise  above  the  indi- 
vidual.    Mixing  up  sensitive  imagination,  which  of 

1  His  doctrine  may  be  found,  De  Corpore,  c.  ii. ;  Leviathan,  Part  I.  c.  iv. 
a  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  Introduction,  §  15,  16. 


REALISM,  NOMINALISM,   AND   CONCEPTUALISM.     335 

course  cannot  duly  perform  the  office  of  abstraction, 
with  thought  proper,  he  says  :  "  For  myself  I  find, 
indeed,  that  I  have  a  faculty  of  imagining,  or  repre- 
senting to  myself  the  ideas  of  those  particular  things 
I  have  perceived,  and  of  variously  compounding 
and  dividing  them.  I  can  imagine  a  man  with  two 
heads,  or  the  upper  parts  of  man  joined  to  the  body 
of  a  horse.  I  can  consider  the  hand,  the  eye,  the 
nose,  each  by  itself,  abstracted  or  separated  from 
the  rest  of  the  body.  But,  then,  whatever  hand  or 
eye  I  imagine,  it  must  have  some  particular  shape 
or  colour.  The  idea  of  man  that  I  frame  to  my- 
self, must  be  either  of  a  white,  or  a  black,  or  a  tawny, 
a  straight  or  a  crooked,  a  tall  or  a  low  or  a  middle- 
sized  man.  I  cannot  by  any  effort  of  thought 
conceive  the  abstract  idea  of  man,  motion,"  &c. 
All  this  talk  is  an  utter  ignoring  of  the  power  of 
reflective  thought  to  pick  out  what  it  chooses,  to 
fix  upon  a  definition,  and  to  deal  with  that  as  with 
a  mentally  isolated  part.  Hume  continues  the 
tradition  taken  up  from  Berkeley,  whose  doctrine 
on  universals  he  pronounces3  "one  of  the  greatest 
and  most  valuable  discoveries  made  of  late  years  " 
— a  discovery  which  he  himself  seeks  to  "  put 
beyond  all  doubt."  He  frames  the  theory  thus: 
"  All  general  ideas  are  nothing  but  particular  ones, 
annexed  to  a  certain  term,  which  gives  them  a 
more  extensive  signification,  and  makes  them  recall, 
upon  occasion,  other  individuals  which  are  similar 
to  them.  A  particular  idea  becomes  general  by 
being  annexed  to  a  general  term,  that  is,  a  term 

*  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  Bk.  I.  Part  I.  sec.  vii. 


336  SPECIAL  TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

which,  from  a  customary  conjunction,  has  a  relation 
to  many  other  particular  ideas,  and  generally  recalls 
them  in  the  imagination.  Abstract  ideas  are,  there- 
fore, in  themselves  individual,  however  they  may 
become  general  in  their  representation.  The  image 
in  our  mind  is  only  that  of  a  particular  object, 
though  the  application  of  it  in  our  reasoning 
is  the  same  as  if  it  was  universal."  This  is  in- 
adequate and  wrong  de  more.  Mill,4  of  course, 
follows  in  the  wake  of  Hume,  and  we  have  already 
heard  him  declare :  "  General  concepts  we  have 
properly  speaking  none :  we  have  only  complex 
ideas  of  objects  in  the  concrete ;  "  and  by  exclusive 
attention  to  parts  of  an  associated  whole,  "  we  can 
carry  on  a  meditation  relating  to  the  parts  only, 
as  if  we  were  able  to  conceive  them  separately  from 
the  rest."  This  power  of  separate  conception,  so 
far  as  we  approach  to  it,  he  attributes  to  the 
association  of  the  separated  characters  with  a  word, 
instead  of  to  the  mind's  power  of  abstraction,  or 
prcEcisio  objectiva. 

3.  (a)  Conceptualists  allow  the  idea  to  be  uni- 
versal, but  call  it  vague,  merely  typical,  and  unreal. 
They  can  gainsay  the  real  likenesses  between  things 
no  more  than  can  the  nominalists ;  but  they  do  not 
perceive  that  herein  is  a  foundation  for  all  the 
objective  reality  which  we  want.  Where  they  im- 
prove on  the  nominalists  is  in  admitting  the  possi- 
bility of  a  universal  idea;  a  result  which  comes 
from  their  having  a  better  theory  of  mental  action. 
This   improvement    is   strongly  to  be  accentuated, 

4  Examination,  c.  xvii.  p.  321. 


REALISM,  NOMINALISM,  AND    CONCEPTUALISM.  337 

and  shows  the  large  step  from  nominalism  to 
conceptualism.  Mental  action,  according  to  the 
nominalists  of  this  country,  is  tied  down  to  sensa- 
tions, and  to  mechanical  or  chemical  associations 
of  ideas.  Instead  of  a  voluntary  power  of  abstrac- 
tion, they  assert  a  "  law  of  obliviscence,"  a  loss  to 
consciousness  of  one  part  of  a  complex  aggregate, 
through  an  excessive  attention  to  another  part. 
As  in  the  matter  of  human  will  they  allow  only  a 
conflict  and  final  preponderance  between  concurring 
attractions  or  repulsions,  while  we  assert  an  intel- 
lectual power  to  consider  the  pros  and  the  cons  of 
separate  courses,  and  a  power  of  free  choice  super- 
vening :  so  in  the  matter  of  general  ideas  they 
ignore,  while  we  and  conceptualists  insist  upon,  the 
spontaneous  activity  of  the  mind  in  taking  up,  or 
leaving  alone,  elements  in  an  aggregate  conception, 
according  to  the  purpose  in  view.  Thus  concep- 
tualists are  enabled  to  abstract  from  individualizing 
differences  and  to  universalize  what  they  so  acquire. 
In  spite  of  their  better  premisses  conceptualists 
arrive  at  a  false  conclusion :  but  it  is  something  that 
they  excel  the  nominalists  by  admitting  universality 
in  ideas,  while  their  mistake  seems  often  a  mere 
oversight  rather  than  a  rooted  error. 

(b)  Conceptualism  is  wrong  in  that  it  pushes  a 
truth  too  far :  it  sees  that  there  is  no  formal  uni- 
versality a  parte  rei,  and  thereupon  it  sweepingly 
denies  the  objectivity  of  universal  ideas.  A  dis- 
tinction is  needed.  The  universal  ideas  in  what 
they  represent  are  objectively  real ;  but  not  in  their 
abstract  mode  of  representation,  which,  however,  is 
w 


338  SPECIAL   TREATMENT   OF  CERTITUDE. 

not  predicated  of  objects.  When  of  any  individual 
it  is  predicated  that  he  is  a  man,  the  predicate  is, 
we  will  suppose,  strictly  applicable  :  but  no  indi- 
vidual is  man  in  the  abstract.  As,  however,  the 
individuality  is  not  pointed  out  by  the  universal 
term,  so  neither,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  indi- 
viduality denied  :  it  is  simply  omitted.  The  case  is 
made  all  the  clearer  by  the  reality  of  the  physical 
sciences.  When  we  are  told  that  the  best  scientific 
generalizations  are  not  real,  we  reply  that  this  is 
going  too  far.  Supposing  them  properly  made,  they 
are  real,  in  the  sense  in  which,  against  concep- 
tualism,  moderate  realism  is  true.  Any  one  who 
has  appropriated  to  himself  the  correct  doctrine  of 
universals,  has  got  the  means  of  exactly  determining 
how  far  a  legitimately  generalized  law  is  a  real  law. 
The  laws  of  motion,  for  instance,  represent  a  part 
of  the  reality  of  nature,  even  though  they  be  not, 
perhaps,  three  distinct  laws,  but  only  a  threefold 
enunciation  of  results,  due  to  one  common  principle 
and  even  though  their  enunciation  by  us  be  incom- 
plete as  a  statement  of  the  whole  case.  Perhaps 
there  is  some  simple  law  of  action  at  work  in 
nature,  which  law,  if  comprehended,  would  give 
us  all  that  we  know  under  our  three  laws  of 
motion  and  a  good  deal  more  besides.  Still,  as 
partial  solutions  of  a  complex  problem,  the  three 
laws  are  really  true :  for  they  sum  up  experi- 
enced facts,  and  they  do  not  necessarily  involve 
anything  not  in  the  experience.  Even  if  we  make 
our  simple  starting-points  what  are  really  not 
primal    elements    but    resultants    from    compound 


REALISM,   NOMINALISM,  AND  CONCEPTUALISM    339 


forces,  still,  as  we  never  declare  our  ultimates  to  be 
absolutely  ultimate,  but  only  ultimate  for  us,  we 
keep  on  safe  ground.  So  some  suppose  that  the 
law  of  attraction,  as  formulated  by  us,  may  be  not 
elementary  but  a  resultant ;  be  it  so,  and  it  remains 
a  real  law — a  law  of  derivatives,  if  not  of  primitives. 
A  being  who  could  ascertain  the  attraction  of  a 
large  spherical  planet  only  as  something  proceeding 
as  if  from  the  centre,  not  as  really  due  to  every 
single  particle,  would  be  right  as  far  as  he  went. 
In  such  a  way  do  we  maintain  the  reality  of  gene- 
ralized laws  in  physics.  A  scientific  man,  in  his 
own  interest,  should  be  slow  to  clutch  at  a  theory 
either  of  nominalism  or  of  conceptualism ;  whereas 
he  may  be  quite  happy  if  he  can  intellectually  justify 
to  himself  moderate  realism. 

In  separating  the  two  opinions,  nominalism 
and  conceptualism,  we  have  been  far  from  wishing 
to  signify  that  the  names  stand  for  two  rigorously 
distinct  schools  of  philosophers.  A  consistent 
nominalist  we  should  seek  in  vain,  if  we  searched 
for  one  who  would  always  keep  to  the  assertion 
that  only  the  name  has  universality,  while  the 
concept  has  none  whatever.  Other  writers  prefer 
to  use  the  single  appellation,  nominalist,  and  speak 
of  more  rigorous  and  less  rigorous  nominalists, 
an  arrangement  which  is  much  recommended  by 
the  fact  that  the  difference  is  only  one  of  more 
or  less ;  for  to  divide  authors  into  those  who 
place  the  universality  simply  in  the  name  and 
those  who  place  it  also  in  the  concept,  is  utterly 
impossible. 


CHAPTER    V, 

CONSCIOUSNESS. 

Synopsis. 

i.  Some  differences  of  definition. 

2.  Some   differences   of  doctrine,  especially  on   the  question, 

Are  there  any  unconscious  thoughts  ?  (a)  Authors,  really 
or  apparently,  on  the  affirmative  side,  (b)  Authors, 
really  or  apparently,  on  the  negative  side. 

3.  Some  settlements  on  the  subject  of  consciousness,     (a)  The 

meaning  of  self.  (b)  Consciousness  is  found  improperly 
in  the  sensitive  order,  properly  in  the  intellectual ;  the 
two  orders  must  be  carefully  distinguished.  (c)  The 
connexion  between  the  two  orders,  when  a  man  becomes 
intellectually  conscious  of  his  own  sensitive  states.  (d) 
Enumeration  of  the  objects  of  consciousness,  and  defence 
of  the  validity  of  consciousness  in  regard  to  its  objects. 
Addenda. 

I.  At  the  outset  many  differences  of  definition, 
accompanied  by  some  real  divergences  of  doctrine, 
perplex  the  inquiry  into  consciousness.  We  will 
begin  with  the  matter  of  definition,  not  so  much 
seeking  to  exhaust  the  list  of  actually  proposed 
definitions,  as  to  show  a  possible  scale  of  increasing 
contents  in  the  meaning  assignable  to  the  term 
defined.  First,  consciousness  may  be  made  to 
signify  no  object  beyond  the  simple  fact  that  we 
are  aware  of  our  own  thoughts  and  feelings  as  they 
occur.      Next,  we    may   include   in   consciousness, 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  341 

besides  the  states  just  mentioned,  the  substantial 
subject  of  which  they  are  the  modifications,  and 
which  upon  reflexion  is  manifested,  not  indeed 
in  itself  alone,  but  in  these  very  affections  or 
activities  of  its  own.  Thus  consciousness  would 
embrace  the  substantial  self  and  its  immediately 
perceptible  states  while  these  latter,  lasted.  A 
trust  in  memory  and  expectation  carries  conscious- 
ness still  further  beyond  present  states  of  self  to 
past  and  future.  Fourthly,  we  may  widen  conscious- 
ness to  the  compass  of  all  known  objects,  whether 
self  or  not-self,  provided  such  objects  be  present 
at  the  time  to  the  faculties  ; l  so  that,  in  the  language 
of  Hamilton,  we  should  be  conscious  of  last  week's 
concert  only  as  an  image  retained  in  the  memory, 
but  for  the  reality  of  the  past  fact  we  should  have 
to  depend  on  belief.  Lastly,  we  may  abolish  this 
distinction  between  present  and  non-present,  and 
declare  that  whatsoever  object  we  know,  of  that  we 
are  conscious.2  Distinguishing  between  conscious- 
ness and  self-consciousness,  some  prefer  to  say,  that 
while  we  are  merely  conscious  of  any  outer  object 
which  we  happen  to  know,  we  are  self-conscious  of 
a  headache,  a  mental  anxiety,  or  any  other  internal 

1  Hamilton  says,  "  Consciousness  and  immediate  knowledge  are 
universally  convertible  terms :  so  that  if  there  be  an  immediate 
knowledge  of  things  external,  there  is  consequently  the  conscious- 
ness of  an  outer  world."  (Discussions,  p.  51.) 

2  Hamilton  makes  some  accommodation  even  for  this  wide 
usage  :  "  Consciousness  comprehends  every  cognitive  act :  in  other 
words,  whatever  we  are  not  conscious  of,  that  we  do  not  know. 
But  consciousness  is  an  immediate  cognition.  Therefore  all  our 
mediate  cognitions  are  contained  in  our  immediate."  (Reid's  Works, 
p.  810.) 


342  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

state  of  our  own.     So  far  for  matters  of  choice  in 
the  definition  of  a  term. 

2.  We  must  now  approach  real  disputes,  and 
begin  with  that  about  the  existence  of  unconscious 
intelligence.  Some  would  make  the  test  of  the 
presence  of  reason  in  any  substance  its  power  of 
adjusting  itself  to  ends;  in  such  sort  that  a  growing 
plant,  and  a  developing  animal  germ  would  be  said 
to  reason  out  their  evolution.  Kant,  while  he  will 
not  say  that  organic  processes  are  intelligent,  would 
have  us  look  upon  them  in  that  light  as  an  aid  to 
our  understanding,  when  we  consider  the  operations 
of  living  matter ;  and  the  same  artifice  he  would 
extend  to  the  workings  of  merely  physical  law. 
Many  others  also  show  the  like  tendency  to  attribute 
some  dark  kind  of  intelligence  to  the  self-arranging 
powers  of  matter  in  chemical  reaction ;  and  this 
tendency  is  specially  natural  in  those  who  regard 
the  elements  of  matter  as  primitive  "  mind-stuff," 
only  needing  a  certain  degree  of  organization  to 
cause  it  to  wake  up  into  consciousness.  Long  ago 
Telesius  and  Campanella — and  they  were  not  the 
first — supposed  an  obscure  knowledge  to  reside  in 
minerals  and  plants.  Each  of  the  monads  of 
Leibnitz  was  supposed  to  reflect  within  itself  all 
the  universe  ;  the  difference  being,  that  some  monads 
were  as  in  a  deep  sleep,  others  as  in  a  dream,  others 
as  in  full  wakefulness.  Many  evolutionists,  however, 
attribute  no  cognitive  power  to  natural  objects  till 
something  higher  than  the  lowest  ranges  of  the 
animal  kingdom  is  reached ;  and  even  here  they 
would    regard   the    mere   organic  processes  as  not 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  343 


cognitive.  We  are  thus  brought  across  a  question 
which  is  far  more  than  a  matter  of  the  definition  of 
terms ;  the  conflict  is  between  two  most  opposite 
doctrines  as  to  the  source  of  intellect  and  conscious- 
ness— whether  consciousness  springs  directly  from 
unconscious  intelligence,  and  remotely  from  the  non- 
intelligent. 

.  The  dispute  however  which  specially  concerns  us 
turns  on  the  point,  whether  there  can  be  sensation, 
thought,  and  volition  without  consciousness.  Those 
who  answer  in  the  affirmative,  occasionally  make  of 
consciousness  a  distinct  faculty ;  but  now-a-days 
they  would  more  generally  be  content  with  main- 
taining that  consciousness  depends  on  the  relative 
degree,  or  intensity,  of  the  act  of  which  we  are  said 
to  be  conscious.  It  will  be  instructive  to  listen  to  a 
few  testimonies  on  both  sides  ;  on  the  part  of  those 
who  affirm,  or  seem  to  affirm,  and  on  the  part  of 
those  who  deny,  or  seem  to  deny,  that  conscious- 
ness is  bound  up  with  every  sensation,  thought,  and 
volition. 

(a)  Hutcheson,3  who  is  accused  by  Hamilton  of 
making  consciousness  a  distinct  faculty,  at  least 
teaches  that  all  sensations  and  thoughts  are  con- 
scious; and  Reid,4  who  does  indeed  make  con- 
sciousness a  distinct  faculty,  or  "  different  power," 
when  he  is  describing  it,  gives  no  hint  that  he  admits 
such  a  thing  as  unconscious  thought,  and  in  the 
second  of  the  given  references  he  says  expressly,. 

3  See  Hamilton's  Reid,  note  H,  p.  929. 
*  Reid,  Intellectual  Powers,  Essay  i.  c.  i.;  Essay  ii.  c.  xiii.  p.  223 


344  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

"  consciousness  always  goes  along  with  perception."5 
In  Leibnitz,  however,  we  have  an  author  who,  besides 
speaking  of  unconscious  ideas  in  minerals  and  plants, 
held  that  in  man  there  were  unconscious  percep- 
tions, or,  as  he  expresses  it,  perceptions  without 
apperceptions.  Ferrier  is  very  insistent,  and  rather 
mystic,  in  the  way  in  which  he  distinguishes  con- 
sciousness from  sensation  and  reason.  So  far  as 
a  single  passage  can  be  illustrative,  perhaps,  the 
following  is  one  of  the  best ;  but  it  must  be 
remembered  that  the  sense  attributed  to  the  word 
consciousness  is  peculiar:6  "What  do  we  mean 
precisely  by  the  word  consciousness,  and  upon 
what  ground  do  we  refuse  to  attribute  conscious- 
ness to  the  animal  creation  ?  In  the  first  place, 
by  consciousness  we  mean  the  notion  of  self;  that 
notion  of  self,  and  that  self-reference,  which  in  man 
generally,  though  by  no  means  invariably,  accom- 
panies his  sensations,  passions,  emotions,  play  of 
reason,  or  states  of  mind  whatsoever.  .  .  .  The 
presence  of  reason  by  no  means  necessarily  implies 

s  Hamilton  (Lectures  on  Metaphysics,  Vol.  I.  p.  212)  says:  "  Reid 
and  Stewart  maintain  that  I  can  know  that  I  know,  without 
knowing  what  I  know."  Yet  Reid's  theory  of  consciousness  as  a 
distinct  faculty  does  not  commit  him  to  the  doctrine  of  unconscious 
thought,  for  the  two  faculties  might  always  act  in  concert ;  on  the 
other  hand,  Hamilton,  who  denies  the  duality  of  faculty,  makes  it 
his  complaint  that  Reid  "  had  not  studied,  he  even  treats  it  as 
inconceivable,  the  Leibnitzian  doctrine  of  what  has  not  been  well 
denominated  obscure  perceptions  or  ideas — that  is,  acts  and  affections 
of  the  mind,  which  manifesting  their  existence  in  their  effects  are 
themselves  out  of  consciousness  or  apperception."   (Reid's   Works, 

P-55I-) 

6  Introduction  to  the  Philosophy  of  Consciousness,  Part  I  c.  v.  pp.  39, 
40 ;  Institutes  of  Metaphysics,  passim. 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  345 


a  cognisance  of  reason  in  the  creatures  manifesting 
it.  Man  might  easily  have  been  endowed  with 
reason,  without  at  the  same  time  becoming  aware 
of  his  endowment,  or  blending  with  it  the  notion 
of  himself."  The  context  shows  that  reason  is  not 
here  employed  in  its  ordinary  sense ;  we  had  better 
pass  on  to  the  plainer  terms  of  Mr.  Bain,  who 
says  : 7  "  Consciousness  is  inseparable  from  feeling 
(i.e.,  Sensation  and  Emotion),  but  not,  as  it  appears 
to  me,  from  action  and  thought.  True,  our  actions 
and  thoughts  are  usually  conscious,  that  is,  known 
to  us  by  an  inward  perception ;  but  the  conscious- 
ness of  an  act  is  manifestly  not  the  act,  and,  though 
the  assertion  is  less  obvious,  I  believe  that  conscious- 
ness of  a  thought  is  distinct  from  the  thought.  The 
three  terms,  Feeling,  Emotion,  and  Consciousness, 
will,  I  think,  be  found  in  reality  to  express  one  and 
the  same  attribute  of  mind  .  .  .  which  is  the  fore- 
most and  most  unmistakeable  attribute  of  mind." 
Thus  knowledge  and  feeling  are  distinguished,  and 
the  latter,  not  the  former,  is  made  the  essential 
fundamental  act  of  mind ;  on  which  theory  we  may 
conceive  a  mind  blindly  feeling  without  knowledge 
of  an  object,  yet  conscious  of  the  feeling.  Lewes 
holds  that,  "  we  often  think  as  unconsciously  as 
we  breathe."  His  theory  of  consciousness  is  thus 
stated:8  "Consciousness  and  unconsciousness  are  cor- 
relatives, both  belonging  to  the  sphere  of  sentience. 

1  The  Senses  and  the  Intellect,  c.  i.  in  initio.  The  doctrine  is  repeated 
in  Mental  Science,  note  E. 

8  It  will  be  enough  to  read  the  fourth  chapter  in  Problem  iii.  in 
The  Physical  Basis  of  Mind. 


346  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

Every  one  of  the  unconscious  processes  is  operant, 
changes  the  general  state  of  the  organism,  and  is 
capable  of  at  once  issuing  in  a  discriminated  sensa- 
tion, when  the  forces  which  balance  it  are  disturbed. 
I  was  unconscious  of  the  scratch  of  my  pen  in 
writing  the  last  sentence,  but  I  am  distinctly  con- 
scious of  every  scratch  in  writing  this  one.  Then 
as  now,  the  scratching  sound  sent  a  faint  thrill 
through  my  organism,  but  its  relative  intensity  was 
too  faint  for  discrimination ;  now  that  I  have 
redistributed  the  co-operant  forces,  by  what  is 
called  an  act  of  attention,  I  hear  distinctly  every 
sound  the  pen  produces.  The  consciousness — by 
Descartes  erected  into  an  essential  condition  of 
thought — was  by  Leibnitz  reduced  to  an  accompani- 
ment, which  not  only  may  be  absent,  but  in  the 
majority  of  cases  is  absent.  The  teaching  of  most 
modern  psychologists  is,  that  consciousness  forms 
but  a  small  item  in  the  total  of  psychical  pro- 
cesses;" a  doctrine  illustrated  by  George  Eliot  in 
the  important  part  which  that  author  makes  uncon- 
scious influences  exert  in  the  play  and  the  formation 
of  character.  Turning  to  Dr.  Maudsley,9  we  find  the 
following  confirmatory  sentences :  "  It  is  a  truth 
which  cannot  be  too  distinctly  remembered,  that 
consciousness  is  not  coextensive  with  mind,  but  is 
an  incidental  accompaniment  of  mind."  And  again, 
"  It  seems  to  me  that  man  might  be  as  good  a 
reasoning  machine  without  as  with  consciousness. 
It  is  only  with  a  certain  intensity  of  representation, 

'  The  Physiology  and  Pathology  of  the  Mind,  c.  i.  p.  15.  (Second 
Edition.) 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  347 


or  of  conception,  that  consciousness  appears."  Such 
opinions  are  largely  prompted  by  pathological  cases, 
in  which  the  patients  go  through  their  routine 
actions  as  if  they  were  unconsciously  rational.  A 
French  soldier,  wounded  in  the  Franco-German 
War,  has  furnished  a  very  striking  example.  Mr. 
Huxley  allows  that  possibly  he  is  conscious,  in 
spite  of  appearances  to  the  contrary.  In  a  different 
category,  yet  bearing  on  the  same  opinions,  and 
illustrating  the  old  law  that  objective  perception, 
and  subjective  advertence  to  self,  are  in  inverse 
proportion,  stand  some  words  of  Cardinal  Newman, 
which  shall  close  the  quotations  on  this  side 
of  the  controversy.10  "  In  what  may  be  called 
the  mechanical  operations  of  our  minds,  proposi- 
tions pass  before  us  and  receive  our  assent  without 
Dur  consciousness.  Indeed  I  may  fairly  say,  that 
those  assents,  which  we  give  with  a  direct  know- 
ledge of  what  we  are  doing,  are  few  compared  with 
the  multitude  of  like  acts  which  pass  through  our 
minds  in  long  succession,  without  our  observing 
them.  That  mode  of  assent,  which  includes  this 
unconscious  exercise,  I  may  call  simple  assent;  but 
such  assents  as  must  be  made  consciously  and 
deliberately,  I  call  complex  or  reflex  assents."  Scien- 
tific certitude  is  thus  "  the  perception  of  a  truth 
with  the  perception  that  it  is  true,  or  the  con- 
sciousness of  knowing  as  expressed  in  the  phrase, 
I  know  that  I  know." 

(b)  If  we  omit  the  discussion  of  mere  sensitive 
action,   and   confine   ourselves   to   the  main  point, 

10  Grammar  of  Assent,  Part  II.  c.  vi. 


348  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

intellectual  action  strictly  so  called,  it  is  certainly 
the  doctrine  of  St.Thomas,  that  all  thought  must  be 
consciously  referred  to  self,  though  the  advertence 
need  not  be  very  explicit.  That  such  is  his  teaching 
may  be  gathered  from  what  has  already  been  ex- 
plained in  Part  I.  chapter  ii.  concerning  his  doctrine 
about  judgment,  namely,  that  when  the  mind  judges, 
it  implicitly  affirms  the  consciousness  of  its  own 
knowledge.  And  a  more  general  assertion  of  the 
inseparability  between  thought  and  consciousness 
may  be  found  in  the  Summa.11  At  the  same  time  it 
is  well  to  remember,  that  the  disputes  about  con- 
sciousness as  a  special  element,  or  aspect,  in  mental 
life,  belongs  rather  to  recent  times. 

It  may  be  well  to  cite  here  one  or  two  English 
writers  on  philosophy  who  proclaim  that  conscious- 
ness must  ever  go  with  thought.  Locke,12  in  the 
course  of  his  well  known  contention,  that  we  could 
not  have  innate  ideas  without  being  aware  ot 
them,  writes :  "  It  is  altogether  as  intelligible  to 
say  that  a  body  is  extended  without  parts,  as  that 
anything  thinks  without  being  conscious  of  it,  or 
perceiving  that  it  does  so."  Dr.  Brown I3  may 
be  quoted  for  the  same  opinion,  though  his  main 
effort  is  bent  on  the  proof  of  what  is  not  quite  the 
same  thing,  namely,  that  consciousness  is  not  a 
distinct  act  or  faculty.  If  Hamilton  is  put  in 
the  same  class,  it  must  be  with  the  reservation 
that  what  he  says  about  latent  thought,  and  about 
the    difference   between    knowledge   and    the    blind 

"  Part  I.  quaest.  Ixxxvii.  art.  i.  et  iii.  I2  Bk.  II.  c.  i. 

*>  Lecture  xi.  at  the  end.     Cf.  Stewart's  Elements,  Part  I.  c.  ii. 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  349 

element,  belief,  considerably  takes  off  from  his 
value  as  a  witness.  For  example,  he  teaches  that 
"  to  know  is  to  know  that  we  know,"  and  in  note  H, 
already  referred  to,  he  lays  it  down,  that  "  while 
knowledge,  feeling,  and  desire,  in  all  their  various 
modifications,  can  only  exist  as  the  knowledge, 
feeling,  and  desire  of  some  determined  subject, 
and  as  this  subject  can  only  know,  feel,  and  desire 
inasmuch  as  it  is  conscious  that  it  knows,  feels, 
and  desires,  it  is  therefore  manifest  that  all  the 
actions  and  passions  of  the  intellectual  self  involve 
consciousness  as  their  generic  and  essential  quality." 
On  the  other  hand,14  he  declares  his  firm  conviction 
that  there  are  unconscious  "  mental  activities  and 
passivities ; "  but  then  he  seems  careful  not  to  call 
these  "  thoughts  "  or  "  cognitions,"  but  only  "  modi- 
fications "  of  the  mind ;  which  modifications  if  they 
were  referred  only  to  material  processes  in  the  brain, 
helpful  to  thought,  and  were  literally  "  unconscious 
cerebrations,"  could  be  allowed  without  demur.  A 
more  uncompromising  witness  than  Hamilton  is 
found  in  Dr.  M'Cosh :  "I  believe  that  we  are 
momentarily  conscious  of  every  sensation,  idea, 
thought,  or  emotion  of  the  mind."  Any  appearances 
to  the  contrary  he  attributes  to  faintness  of  adver- 
tence and  lapse  of  memoiy. 

In  using  authors  of  the  school  of  pure  empiricism, 

r*  Metaphysics,  Lecture  xviii.  Mill  declares  that  there  "is  no 
ground  for  believing  that  the  Ego  is  an  original  presentation  of 
consciousness"  (Examination,  c.  xiii.  in  initio),  and  in  the  Appendix 
to  Reid,  p.  932,  Hamilton  says  :  "  Consciousness  is,  first,  the  mentaJ 
modes  or  movements  themselves  rising  abovs  a  certain  degree  0/ 
intensity." 


350  SPECIAL    TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 


we  must  remember  the  deductions  to  be  made  for 
men  who  cast  doubt  on  the  substantial  self,  and 
assert  only  series  of  states  unaccountably  linked 
together  in  consciousness.  Under  these  drawbacks 
the  two  Mills15  may  be  quoted  ;  the  father  as  saying, 
"  To  feel  a  sensation  is  the  sensation,  to  be  con- 
scious of  an  idea  is  that  idea ;  "  and  the  son  as 
praising  his  father's  words.  From  the  same  school 
we  have  also  Mr.  Huxley  teaching  that  "  there  is 
only  a  verbal  distinction  between  having  a  sensation, 
and  knowing  that  one  has  it." 

If  now  we  may  leave  our  insular  for  continental 
writers,  we  have  an  example  in  Spinoza,16  who 
says :  "  As  soon  as  any  one  knows  a  thing,  by  that 
very  fact  he  knows  that  he  knows,  and  knows 
simultaneously  that  he  is  conscious  that  he  knows 
what  he  knows,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum."  Kant17 
declares  that  no  object  can  be  perceived  or  con- 
ceived, unless  through  the  unity  of  consciousness ; 
and  adds :  "  It  is  the  one  consciousness  which  unites 
the  manifold  which  has  been  perceived  successively. 
This  consciousness  may  often  be  very  faint,  and  we 
may  connect  it  in  the  effect  only,  and  not  in  the  act 
itself,  with  the  production  of  a  concept.  But  in 
spite  of  this  that  consciousness,  though  deficient  in 
pointed  clearness,  must  always  be  there,  and  without 
it  concepts,  and  therefore  knowledge  of  objects,  are 

xs  Examination,  c.  viii.  p.  115. 

16  "  Simul  ac  quis  aliquid  scit,  eo  ipso  scit  se  scire,  et  simul 
scit  se  scire  quod  scit,  et  sic  in  infinitum."  (Ethics,  Part  II.  Prop, 
xxi.  Schol.) 

J7  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  (Max  Miiller's  translation),  pp.  92 — 97 
277.  278, 


CONSCIOUSNESS,  351 


perfectly  impossible."  Cousin,  in  the  lectures  already 
quoted,  though  in  one  place  he  professes  to  leave 
the  question  open,  yet  speaks  as  if  his  impression 
were,  that  all  thought  must  be  conscious :  "  It  is 
the  fundamental  attribute  of  thought  to  have  con- 
sciousness of  itself.  Consciousness  is  the  inner 
light  which  illumines  everything  in  the  soul — the 
accompaniment  and  the  echo  of  all  our  faculties. 
And  in  his  Introducion  a  L' Historic  de  la  Philosophic,1* 
he  teaches  that  "  intelligence  without  consciousness 
is  the  mere  abstract  possibility  of  intelligence,  not 
actual  intelligence." 

3.  Enough  has  now  been  adduced  to  put  the 
reader  in  a  position  for  seeing  how  the  dispute  lies 
in  the  controversy  about  the  nature  of  conscious- 
ness as  distinguished  from  other  terms.  Probably 
the  divergence  between  some  of  the  writers,  who 
have  been  ranged  on  the  opposite  sides,  is  not  as 
great  as  might  at  first  sight  appear.  But  it  is 
time  to  be  laying  down  our  statement  of  the  true 
doctrine :  for  we  must  so  far  explain  and  defend 
consciousness  as  to  warrant,  in  general,  its  use  for 
the  acquisition  of  certitude. 

(a)  Consciousness  signifies  the  reference  of  some 
mental  state  to  self :  and  what  precisely  we  mean 
by  self  has  first  to  be  settled.  A  thorough-going 
idealist,19  who  confines  himself  to  ideas  as  succes- 

18  Lecon  5me,  p.  97.  In  his  Kant  he  very  expressly  rejects 
unconscious  thought. 

x9  Mr.  Bain's  attempt  to  distinguish  "object  consciousness"  as 
"  putting  forth  energy,"  and  "  subject  consciousness  "  as  "  pleasure, 
pain,  and  memory,"  is  not  very  happy.  (Mental  Science  note  E.) 
He  says  man's  body  belongs  to  the  object  world. 


352  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

sive  phenomena,  ought  to  call  self  the  subjective 
aspect  of  these  ideas,  and  not-self  the  objective 
aspect ;  considered  as  so  many  acts  of  thinking,  the 
ideas  form  the  self,  while  these  same  ideas  viewed  on 
their  reverse,  or  objective,  sides,  would  constitute 
the  not-self.  In  the  phrase,  "  My  thoughts  about 
things,"  "  my  thoughts "  would  be  self,  "  about 
things  "  would  be  not-self.  At  least  this  is  the  only 
consistent  course  for  idealism  pure  and  simple, 
which  is  at  the  same  time  phenomenalism  pure  and 
simple.  There  is  here  no  substantial  soul  and  no 
substantial  body  included  under  self.  A  system 
a  degree  better  would  admit,  within  the  self,  a 
substantial  principle,  either  a  spirit  only,  or  a 
compound  of  matter  and  spirit.  Lastly,  the  true 
meaning  of  self,  which  is  vindicated  partly  in  various 
passages  of  this  treatise,20  and  partly  in  the  treatises 
on  General  Metaphysics  and  on  Psychology,  is  the 
composite  substantial  man,  immediately  aware  of 
a  number  of  bodily  and  mental  phenomena  as 
belonging  to  himself,  and  aware  of  his  continuous 
personal  identity.  Though  it  clearly  requires  re- 
flexion to  bring  out  the  element  by  analysis,  man  is 
immediately  conscious  of  his  own  substantial  Ego, 
not  in  its  unmodified  condition,  but  under  its 
perceptible  modifications  :  and  what  is  called  the 
"  logical  unity  of  consciousness "  gives,  notwith- 
standing Kant's  denial,  the  fullest  warrant  for 
assuming  "the  substantial  unity"  of  the  thinking 
subject. 

(6)   If,  therefore,  we  regard  the  self  as  a  com- 

*>  See,  for  example,  Bk.  II.  c.  i.;    Bk.  I.  c.  xi.  Addenda  (i). 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  353 


pound  of  body  and  soul,  in  examining  into  the 
nature  of  human  consciousness  we  must  next  make 
a  distinction  between  sense  and  intellect.  The 
sensitive  faculty  in  the  more  perfectly  organized 
animals,  possesses,  as  we  judge  from  the  arrange- 
ment of  the  nervous  system  and  from  results  in  actual 
life,  a  certain  consentience,  which,  in  the  less  strict 
sense,  may  be  called  consciousness.  St.  Thomas 
teaches  that  the  sensitive  apparatus  is,  after  its 
manner,  sensible  of  its  own  sensations  ;  though  what 
is  the  relation  between  outer  organs  and  cerebral 
centres,  in  bringing  about  this  effect,  need  not  here  be 
discussed.  While  the  horse  or  the  dog  are  incapable 
of  the  full  recognition  of  a  self  as  such,  they  have, 
in  the  inferior  order,  a  practical  appreciation  of  self, 
which  ministers  to  their  pleasures  and  pains,  and 
to  self-preservation.  But  it  would  be  going  far 
beyond  data  to  argue  a  more  perfect  knowledge  of, 
self  from  the  signs  which  animals  exhibit  of  vanity 
or  jealousy,  analogous  to  these  passions  in  man. 
As  an  animal,  man  also  has  his  consentience,  or 
sensitive  consciousness.  What,  however,  specially 
interests  us  is  man's  intellectual  consciousness,  which 
some  scholastics  subdivide  into  direct  and  reflex. 
In  a  broad  sense  all  consciousness,  so  far  as  it! 
includes  some  knowledge  of  the  subject-knowing, 
some  return  of  self  upon  self,  must  be  reflex :  still 
the  difference  here  intended  will  appear  in  a  simple 
example.  While  we  explicitly  perceive  the  truth 
of  a  geometric  principle,  we  implicitly,  in  the  same 
act,  in  actu  exercito,  are  made  aware  of  our  own 
knowledge.  This  is  styled  direct  consciousness. 
x 


354  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

Afterwards,  by  a  new  act,  of  set  purpose,  in  actu 
signato,  we  may  return  upon  our  late  perception, 
and  make  this,  the  mental  fact,  the  object  of  our 
explicit  knowledge.  This  is  styled  reflex  conscious- 
ness, as  being  expressly  reflex.  In  the  one  case, 
while  we  know  an  object  we  are  subordinately 
conscious  of  our  knowledge ;  in  the  other  case,  we 
make  this  consciousness  the  principal  matter  of  our 
reflexion,  and  degrade  the  object  to  a  subordinate 
place. 

It  will  render  a  man  all  the  more  cautious  in 
denying  the  possibility  of  the  direct  consciousness, 
if  he  considers  how,  in  its  absence,  it  becomes 
apparently  impossible  to  have  the  reflex  conscious- 
ness. A  thought  not  in  consciousness  is,  in  itself, 
a  sufficiently  difficult  notion  to  entertain  ;  but  sup- 
posing such  a  thing  to  have  had  place  in  us,  how 
are  we  ever  to  recover  it  by  means  of  what  we  have 
called  reflex  consciousness  ?  How  is  memory  to 
catch  up  an  act  which  is  bygone,  and  which,  while  it 
lasted,  never  was  in  immediate  consciousness  ?  Some- 
times, indeed,  by  simple  inference  we  may  gather 
that  a  certain  idea  must  have  passed  through  the 
mind,  though  we  have  no  recollection  of  the  fact. 
But  the  more  we  think  of  it,  the  less  will  inference 
be  deemed  capable  of  supplying  the  want  of  all 
direct  consciousness.  With  Father  Palmieri,21  who 
understands  by  scnsus  intimus  what  we  have  called 
conscicntia  directa,  we  may  argue  thus :  "  The  act  of 
the  innermost  sense  (i.e.,  of  direct  consciousness) 
is  not  in  reality  distinct  from  the  act  it  reports,  or  at 
21  Logica  Critica,  thesis  xi. 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  355 


most  the  distinction,  if  any,  is  a  mental  distinction ; 
in  other  words,  when  the  living  agent  feels  (is 
conscious  of)  his  act,  his  experience  of  it  is  in 
reality  nothing  else  but  the  self-same  act  objectively 
present  to  the  thinking,  feeling,  or  appetitive  agent. 
For  if  another  act  were  needed,  this  in  its  turn 
would  have  to  be  reported  by  direct  consciousness, 
which  is  then  supposed  to  be  distinct  from  the  first 
act.  This  second  act,  for  the  same  reason,  would 
have  to  be  taken  as  a  distinct  act  from  a  third,  and 
thus  we  should  require  an  endless  series."22  In  other 
words,  if  our  acts  of  knowledge  did  not  at  once 
link  themselves  on  to  a  conscious  self,  they  never 
could  become  so  attached  at  all. 

It  is  with  the  fullest  advertence  to  the  difficulty 
we  have  in  "numbering  off"  acts  of  mind  that  the 
last  pages  have  been  penned.  It  is  only  very 
roughly  that  we  designate  a  process  to  be  one  act 
in  material  operations,  and  when  we  get  beyond 
these,  and  ask  ourselves  how  many  acts  the 
mind  can  or  does  perform  at  once ;  whether  there 
is  succession  between  acts  or  contemporaneity; 
whether  a  given  result  requires  one  act  or  more ; 
undoubtedly  we  are  on  ground  which  is  to  us 
generally  very  obscure.  It  is  the  teaching  of  St. 
Thomas,23  that  the  mind  can  exist  in  only  one  state 

22  "  Actus  sensus  intimi  non  distinguitur  realiter  ab  actibus  qui 
sentiuntur,  sed  tantum  ratione :  scilicet  cum  vivens  actum  suum 
sentit,  experientia  haec  sui  actus  non  est  realiter  nisi  ipse  actus, 
objective  praesens  sentienti  vel  cogitanti  vel  appetenti.  Si  enim 
alius  actus  requireretur,  hie  quoque  rursus  sentiri  deberet  sensu 
intimo,  qui  ab  illo  primo  actu  supponitur  distinctus,  eadem  rationa 
ab  hoc  etiam  distinctus  dicendus  erit,  et  sic  ibimus  in  infinitum." 

a3  Summa,  Part  I.  q.  lxxxv.  art.  iv. 


356  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

at  a  time,  and  that  an  apparent  multiplicity  of 
simultaneous  acts  must  really  be  reducible  to  a 
unity.  There  is  always  a  great  difficulty  in  dis- 
cussing such  subjects  in  detail,  because  we  can  form 
no  picture  to  ourselves  of  the  mode  of  operation 
proper  to  a  spiritual  substance,  which  has  not 
separate  parts,  but  which  works  with  a  mar- 
vellous unity  and  simplicity.  To  overlook  these 
truths  would  lay  us  open  to  the  danger  of  multi- 
plying, or  refusing  to  multiply,  acts,  in  a  way  which 
reason  could  not  afterwards  justify.  An  analysis 
into  mentally  distinct  parts  does  not  prove  physical 
parts.  Hence  in  the  little  that  has  been  said  about 
direct  and  reflex  consciousness,  care  has  been  taken 
to  speak  within  the  bounds  of  legitimate  analysis. 
Of  the  direct  consciousness,  which  is  the  most  diffi- 
cult to  speak  about  safely,  rather  than  say  that  one 
act  is  conscious  of  outer  object  and  of  inner  self, 
we  say  that  one  act,  whatever  its  simplicity  or  com- 
plexity, suffices  to  constitute  the  mind  conscious  of 
outer  object  and  of  its  own  knowledge  of  that 
object.  Thus  we  make  the  subject  of  the  predication 
rather  the  mind  acting,  than  simply  the  act.  At 
least  this  is  a  safer  form  of  wording. 

With  a  still  further  view  to  being  safe  in  the 
form  of  wording,  we  may  note  the  special  difficulty 
which,  when  we  are  dealing  with  an  act  of  volition, 
lies  against  saying,  that  in  direct  consciousness  the 
act  of  volition  becomes  part  of  its  own  known 
object.  For  we  do  not  attribute  knowledge  to  the 
volition  as  such  :  rather  we  speak  of  will  as  enlight- 
ened by  intellect,   and   of  intellect  as  cognisant  of 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  357 


volitions.  Hence  with  regard  to  our  immediate 
consciousness  of  the  acts  of  our  will,  we  are  led  to 
devise  this  mode  of  expression,  that,  without  further 
determination,  the  mere  presence  of  the  volition  in 
the  soul  suffices  to  enable  the  intellect  to  be  simul- 
taneously conscious  of  its  presence,  while  some  intel- 
ligence of  an  object  is  the  pre-requisite  of  any  voli- 
tion at  all.  How,  moreover,  the  distinction  between 
intellect  and  will  can  in  any  sense  be  called  real,  is 
discussed  in  psychology  :  at  least  the  soul  as  knowing 
may  be  distinguished  from  the  soul  as  willing. 
Another  cautionary  remark  is  that  while  we  have  not 
been  talking  in  comfortable  oblivion  of  the  difficulty 
which  besets  the  numbering  and  the  distinction  of 
mental  acts  and  faculties,  so  neither  have  we  been 
oblivious  of  the  very  strong  objection  which  some 
philosophers  have  to  the  idea  of  thought  or  self 
becoming  an  object  to  itself.  Mr.  Sully  is  but 
following  Comte,  Dr.  Maudsley,  Mr.  Spencer,24  and 
several  others,  when  he  affirms  that  all  introspection 
must  be  retrospection  :  that  man  can  reflect,  not 
oa  the  mental  state  which  is,  but  only  on  that 
which  was.  In  reply  we  must  be  allowed  to  plead, 
that  this  is  reducible  in  the  end  to  an  a  priori 
dogma,  or  at  best  to  a  false  analogy  taken  from 
material  action,  and  is  refuted  by  facts.  Do  what 
we  will,  we  cannot  be  true  to  fact  and  deny  a 
real  reduplication,  as  it  were,  of  thought  upon 
thought  and  of  self  upon  self.  There  is  in  us 
a  power   of  genuine  reflexion.      The    mind   has   a 

24  First  Principles,  Part  I.  c.  iii. ;    Psychology,  Part  II.  c.  i.,  The 

Substance  of  Mind. 


358  SPECIAL  TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

re-entering,  self-penetrating,  self-permeating  activity 
which  makes  it  more  intimately  at  home  with 
itself  than  anything  which  a  materialistic  philo- 
sophy can  allow ;  and,  say  we,  all  the  worse  for 
materialism,  not  for  facts.  So  far,  however,  as  the 
denial  that  thought  can  become  object  to  itself, 
rests  on  an  author's  definition  of  "  object "  or 
"  self,"  we  can  only  beg  him  to  improve  his  defi- 
nitions, and  allow  for  that  marvellous  gift  of  self- 
consciousness,  which  we  all  undoubtedly  possess, 
but  which  recent  definitions  seem  expressly  devised 
to  exclude. 

(c)  Now  that  we  have  first  called  attention  to 
the  fact  of  sensitive  consciousness  and  next  con- 
sidered intellectual  consciousness  in  its  two  branches, 
direct  and  reflex,  we  must  give  a  moment's  attention 
to  the  relation  between  sense  and  intellect  in  respect 
to  consciousness.  A  man's  feeling  of  hunger,  for 
example,  does  not  stop  short  at  its  animal  level, 
but  the  subject  becomes  intellectually  conscious  that 
his  stomach  is  craving  for  food.  Thus  we  are  re- 
minded that  one  object  of  our  intellectual  perception 
is  our  own  bodily  state :  and  because,  by  our  defi- 
nition, the  body  and  its  affections  are  part  of  the 
composite  self,  such  perceptions  must  be  ranked 
under  the  category  of  self-consciousness.  Hereupon 
a  question  suggests  itself.  We  have  been  unable 
simply  to  accept  the  fact  of  an  unconscious  sensation 
or  of  an  unconscious  thought ;  but  may  not  there 
be  some  sensations,  present  indeed  to  the  sensitive 
consciousness,  but  never  manifested  to  the  intel- 
lectual consciousness  :  so  that  we  can  never  intelli- 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  359 


gently  affirm  their  presence  ?  To  answer,  Yes,  might 
to  some  sound  an  unproveable  assertion,  but  at  any 
rate  it  would,  as  a  proposition,  not  contain  that 
intrinsic  conflict  of  terms  which  we  seem  to  see  in 
the  affirmation,  that  some  thoughts  are  unconscious. 
In  any  case,  there  are  many  facts  of  sensation 
which  become  objects  of  intellectual  consciousness, 
and  this  relation  between  the  two  departments  of 
consciousness  is  the  point  to  which  we  have  been 
directing  attention. 

(d)  We  are  now  in  a  condition  to  propose  our 
own  classification  of  the  objects  of  consciousness, 
and  to  defend  the  validity  of  consciousness  in  their 
regard.  To  begin  with  the  affections  of  the  com- 
posite self,  we  have  bodily  affections,  cognitive  and 
appetitive,  as  sensibly  perceived ;  we  have  the  same 
again  as  intellectually  perceived ;  and  thirdly  we 
have  the  spiritual  affections,  cognitive  and  appe- 
titive, of  course  intellectually  or  spiritually  per- 
ceived. All  these  objects  are  connected  with  our 
own  person.  Next,  so  far  as  whatever  outer  objects 
we  know,  or  have  any  volition  about,  are  known  at 
least  in  some  reference  to  our  conscious  self,  this 
element  of  self,  again  making  its  appearance,  justifies 
a  use  of  the  word  consciousness,  whether  we  dis 
tinguish  it  from  what  is  more  rigorously  self-con- 
sciousness or  not.  Thus  the  term  consciousness, 
as  Hamilton25  in  one  place  declares,  is  ultimately 
extended  to  our  whole  sensitive  and  intellectual  life, 
so  far  as  we  are  rendered  aware  of  our  condition, 
whatever    the    object    of    cognition    or    appetency. 

2s  Hamilton's  Reid,  Note  B.  p.  810. 


36o  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  Of   CERTITUDE. 

Against  the  above  classification  a  difficulty  of  minor 
importance  might  be  raised.  Mr.  Bain  dislikes 
calling  all  our  emotive  states  by  the  name  of 
volitions,  because  he  surmises  that  there  are  some 
neutral  feelings,  in  regard  to  which  we  have  no 
appetencies  either  for  or  against  them.  But  really 
to  make  provision  for  such  vague  and  disputable 
states,  it  is  not  worth  while  disturbing  the  old 
division  into  cognitive  and  appetitive  powers, 
whether  of  sense  or  of  intellect.  Accordingly  no 
scruple  has  been  made  about  going  on  the  lines  of 
the  old  tradition. 

A  short  exposition  of  facts  will  now  establish  the 
principal  thesis  of  this  chapter,  that  consciousness 
cannot  but  be  valid  in  what  it  testifies  about  self,  as 
also  in  what  it  really  testifies  about  non-self,  so  far  as 
it  may  be  applied  indirectly  to  this  latter  region.  It 
is  a  position  the  very  sceptics  have  been  unable  to 
impugn,  that  facts  of  consciousness,  as  such,  cannot 
be  gainsaid.  Whatsoever  a  man  is  conscious  of, 
of  that  he  is  conscious ;  and  this  principle  must 
be  extended  to  the  feeling  of  certainty  about  any 
objective  truth,  no  matter  what,  which  is  presented 
to  the  mind  with  objective  evidence.  As  Mr.  Conder 
argues :  "  Since  the  presentments  of  consciousness  are 
not  judgments  but  primary  facts,  they  cannot  be  un- 
real :  only  our  interpretation  of  consciousness  may 
be  erroneous."  "  On  this,"  adds  a  critic  in  Mind, 
"we  are  all  agreed."  The  matter  may  be  brought 
under  a  larger  doctrine  propounded  in  Part  I., 
chapter  ii.,  that  no  mere  apprehension  can  be  other 
than  true,  however  erroneous  may  be  the  judgment 


CONSCIOUSNESS  361 


of  which  it  is  made  the  occasion.  As  a  case  in 
point,  what  a  man  with  an  amputated  leg  feels,  he 
really  must  feel ;  but  he  judges  amiss  when  he 
declares  the  feeling  to  be  in  a  member  which  he  no 
longer  possesses.  The  like  may  be  said  of  a  fever 
patient  who  complains  of  being  cold  ;  of  the  Arctic 
explorer  who,  touching  a  piece  of  long-exposed  iron, 
pronounces  it  hot ;  of  the  man  who  says  that  he  has 
the  experience  as  of  two  selves  contending  within 
him — a  pathological  state,  which,  it  is  surmised, 
may  be  due  to  some  want  of  co-ordination  between 
the  two  hemispheres  of  the  brain.  So  far,  however, 
as  any  insanity  creeps  in,  the  subject  is  no  longer 
fit  to  serve  as  a  specimen  of  normal  humanity. 

Still  it  may  be  urged,  if  the  interpretation  of 
conscious  facts  may  be  wrong,  how  are  we  advanced 
beyond  idealism  by  the  assurance,  that  at  least  we 
may  rest  secure  as  to  the  facts  themselves  ?  We 
do  not  allow  that  interpretation  is  so  liable,  at  all 
times,  to  error,  that  never  can  it  be  safely  trusted. 
It  is  guaranteed  by  the  conditions  already  stated  in 
the  chapters  on  the  Criterion  of  Truth,  on  Error, 
on  the  Veracity  of  the  Senses,  on  the  Validity  of 
Ideas.  All  that  the  present  chapter  adds  to  what 
has  gone  before,  is  a  clearing  up  of  notions  upon 
what  is  meant  by  consciousness,  and  an  emphasizing 
of  that  truth,  so  neatly  stated  by  Cousin  :  "  It  is 
an  inherent  attribute  of  reason  to  believe  in  itself."26 
The  root  of  agnosticism  is  an  unreasonable  distrust, 
of  reason  in  itself,  as  the  root  of  sound  philosophy 
is  a  legitimate  self-confidence   on  the  part  of  the 

86  "C'est  un  attribut  inherent  a  la  raison  de  croire  a  elle  meme." 


362  SPECIAL  TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

mind  in  reliance,  upon  its  conscious  powers.27  As 
will  appear  in  Psychology,  it  is  rather  to  the  right 
reading  of  consciousness  that  we  must  appeal,  than 
to  a  theory  about  the  dynamics  of  motives,  when 
such  grave  questions  have  to  be  settled  as  that  of 
the  freedom  of  the  will ;  and  the  same  holds  true  of 
many  other  philosophical  questions,  notably  about 
consciousness. 

Not  at  all,  therefore,  can  a  special  chapter  on 
Consciousness  be  deemed  superfluous. 

Addenda. 
(i)  Kantians  have  got  such  a  decided  position  in  this 
country,  that  their  leader's  theory  on  consciousness  ought 
not  to  be  quite  passed  over  in  silence :  though  we  must 
beg  leave  to  reject  it  on  the  ground  that  it  is  against  the 
immediate  light  of  evidence,  resting  as  it  does  on  a 
denial  of  the  facts  that  some  of  our  clearest  conceptions 
of  things  are  more  than  forms  of  the  mind,  and  stand  for 
objects  which  the  mind  can  contemplate  as  such.  Kant 
then  distinguishes  the  empirical  consciousness  which  takes 
note  of  the  changeable  conditions  of  the  subject,  from 
the  pure  consciousness  which  is  a  priori  and  unchangeable : 

27  Kant's  doctrine  on  the  necessary  illusions  of  the  reason,  of 
which  we  have  spoken  before,  certainly  goes  along  with  affirmations 
on  his  part  that  the  faculties  themselves  are  infallible,  and  that  the 
illusions  of  reason  are  as  corrigible  as  are  the  illusions  of  sense, 
such  for  example  as  that  whereby  the  moon  appears  larger  on  the 
horizon.  To  this  extent  Kant  is  to  be  acquitted  of  the  charge  of 
making  reason  essentially  erroneous.  It  is  to  the  judgment  that 
Kant  attributes  error ;  and  though  we  have  seen  Rosmini  (Part  I. 
c.  ii.)  quoting  Kant  as  an  author  who  makes  judgment  the  one 
fundamental  act  of  Understanding,  we  must  remember  that  Under- 
standing is  not  here  co-extensive  with  the  whole  mind,  but  is  dis- 
tinguished from  sensitive  intuition  on  the  one  side,  and  from  reason 
on  the  other.  (Max  Miiller's  translation  of  the  Critique,  pp.  60 — 70.) 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  363 


but  he  utterly  denies  that  we  can  be  conscious  of  a 
substantial  Ego  or  personality.  "  It  is  clear,"  says 
Kuno  Fischer,  "that  the  thinking  subject  can  never  be 
an  object  of  possible  knowledge,  because  it  is  merely 
the  formal  condition  of  possible  knowledge;  and  it 
cannot  be  an  object  of  intuition,  because  it  forms 
in  itself  no  phenomenon,  but  only  the  highest  formal 
condition  of  phenomena.  All  the  conditions  are 
wanting  for  us  to  judge  that  the  subject  of  thinking 
is  a  thinking  substance,  or  that  the  soul  is  a  sub- 
stance." Again:  "The  Ego  is  no  object,  but  only 
appears  to  be  one :  it  is  the  formal  logical  condition  of 
all  objects.  On  this  illusion  rests  the  whole  of  rational 
psychology :  I  think  does  not  mean  a  substance  thinks. 
That  I  am  conscious  in  all  my  various  states  of  my 
unity  does  not  mean  that  a  substance  is  conscious  of 
its  unity — that  there  is  a  personal  substance.  From 
the  mere  Ego,  torture  it  as  you  will,  you  can  never 
prove  an  existential  judgment.  From  the  mere  unity  of 
self-consciousness  there  follows  no  cognition  of  any 
object.  That  in  all  my  states  I  am  conscious  of  my 
subjective  unity  is  a  mere  analytical  judgment,  which 
brings  us  no  further  than  /  think."  l 

(2)  The  curious  may  find  some  interest  in  seeing 
how  theorizers  of  the  calibre  of  Hartmann  work  out 
the  notion  of  unconscious  thought.  It  is  impossible 
to  say  exactly  what  that  author  means ;  but  he  has 
some  such  fancy  as  that  the  Great  Unconscious  evolved 
the  universe  for  a  long  time  intelligently,  but  without 
consciousness.  When  at  last  a  sudden  shock  produced 
consciousness,  this  was  found  to  be  a  source  mainly  of 
pain.  Hence  the  desirability  of  bringing  about  the 
abolition  of  consciousness. 

1  Professor  Mahaffy's  translation  of  K.Fischer  on  Kant,  pp.  179 
—185.     Cf.  Max  Miiller's  translation  of  the  Critique,  Vol.  II.  p.  347. 


364  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

(3)  The  subject  of  latent  thought  is  one  into  which 
we  cannot  probe  very  deep.  What  is  styled  our  habitual, 
as  distinguished  from  our  actual  thought,  is  certainly 
something  permanently  existing,  even  while  we  are  not 
using  it.  The  historian  with  the  materials  of  half  a 
Record  Office  stored  up  in  his  memory,  whilst  he  is 
wholly  engrossed  with  the  one  thought  of  his  own 
money  affairs,  indisputably  keeps  his  knowledge  in  a 
latent  condition ;  though  how  to  describe  this  condition 
is  to  us  a  great  puzzle.  If  "unconscious  thought" 
is  a  phrase  used  to  express  this  undoubted  fact,  then  it 
has  a  true  significance.  But  more  often  it  signifies 
operations  going  on,  with  rational  results,  among  the 
hidden  material,  or  even  additions  made  to  it  by  fresh 
observations,  and  then  the  question  becomes  more 
intricate,  and  many  are  inclined  to  suppose  some  degree 
of  consciousness  to  enter  in,  scarce  noticeable  at  the 
time,  and  straightway  forgotten — evanescent  as  a  dream, 
the  memory  of  which  is  occasionally  preserved  by  the 
merest  accident,  but  generally  quite  lost. 

(4)  The  assertion  of  our  consciousness  about  our 
own  ideas,  if  clumsily  made,  is  just  what  gives  the 
appearance  of  the  error  we  have  so  strongly  repudiated, 
namely,  that  knowledge  is  of  ideas,  and  that  to  get 
from  ideas  to  things  requires  a  bridge  which  no  philo- 
sopher can  build. 

(5)  As  bearing  out  the  statements  in  the  text  about 
the  complexity  of  human  action  and  the  difficulty  oi 
numbering  acts,  a  report  of  an  address  by  Sir  James 
Paget,  delivered  at  the  Mansion  House,  March  4, 
1888,  is  worth  preserving.  "  He  remembered  once 
hearing  Mdlle.  Janotha  play  a  presto  by  Mendelssohn, 
and  he  counted  the  notes,  and  the  time  occupied.  She 
played  5,595  notes  in  four  minutes,  three  seconds. 
It   seemed   startling,  but   let   them   look   at   it  in  the 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  365 


fair  amount  of  its  wonder.  Every  one  of  those  notes 
involved  certain  movements  of  a  finger — at  least  two : 
and  many  of  them  involved  an  additional  movement 
laterally  as  well  as  those  up  and  down.  They  also 
involved  movements  of  the  wrists,  elbows,  and  arms, 
altogether  probably  not  less  than  one  movement  for 
each  note.  Therefore  there  were  three  distinct  move- 
ments for  each  note.  As  there  were  twent}T-four  notes 
each  second,  the  total  was  seventy-two  movements 
per  second.  Moreover,  each  of  these  notes  was 
determined  by  the  will  to  a  chosen  place,  with  a 
certain  force,  at  a  certain  time,  and  with  a  certain 
duration.  Therefore  there  were  four  distinct  qualities 
in  each  of  the  seventy-two  movements  in  each  second. 
Such  were  the  transmissions  outwards.  And  all  these 
were  conditional  on  consciousness  of  the  position  of 
each  hand  and  each  finger  before  it  was  moved,  and, 
while  moving  it,  of  the  sound  of  each  note,  and  of 
the  force  of  each  touch.  All  the  time  the  memory  was 
remembering  each  note  in  its  due  time  and  place, 
and  was  exercised  in  the  comparison  of  it  with  other 
notes  that  came  before.  So  that  it  would  be  fair  to 
say  there  were  no  fewer  than  two  hundred  transmissions 
of  nerve  force  outwards  and  inwards  every  second  ; 
and  during  the  whole  of  the  time,  the  judgment  was 
being  exercised  as  to  whether  the  music  was  being 
played  worse  or  better  than  before,  and  the  mind  was 
conscious  of  some  of  the  emotions  which  some  of  the 
music  was  intended  to  impress."  An  appeal  to  the 
word  automatism  will  not  dispel  the  marvel  of  the  per- 
formance. 


CHAPTER  VL 

MEMORY, 

Synopsis. 

1.  Definition  of  memory. 

2.  The  veracity  of  memory,  and  how  far  it  can  be  made  matter 

of  proof  from  experience. 

3.  Limited  power  of  memory. 

4.  Freaks  of  memory  no  disproof  of  the  normal  faculty. 

5.  Memory  contrasted  with  anticipation. 

6.  Incidental  use  of  the  fact  of  memory  to  refute  pure  empi- 

ricism and  rigorous  idealism. 
Addenda. 

I.  It  would  be  a  fatal  thing  for  us  if  we  had  not 
what  is  sometimes  called  mental  adhesiveness,  that 
is,  if  nothing  which  we  learnt  "  stuck."  But  we  all 
recognize  a  power  of  retentiveness.  Though  the 
amount  of  knowledge  which,  at  any  one  time,  is 
actualized  in  the  mind  may  be  small,  yet,  below  the 
surface  of  consciousness,  and,  under  many  limits, 
ready  at  call,  is  a  comparatively  vast  mass  of 
gathered  information,  and  of  skill  in  its  use. 
Some  writers,  after  Aristotle,  distinguish  a  storing 
power  (fivijfjLT))  from  a  subsequent  recalling  power 
(dvdfiv7]ac<;)  ;  but  it  will  be  enough  for  us  to  include 
both  under  the  one  name,  Memory,  habitual  and 
actual. 

This  memory  is  not  so  clearly  defined  a  termr 


MEMORY.  367 


even  in  its  wider  usage,  as  we  might  imagine.  A 
person  is  rather  loth  to  say  that  he  remembers  a 
road  which  he  is  taking  almost  every  day  of  his 
life,  or  the  meaning  of  a  word  told  him  only  a 
minute  ago.  The  definition  of  memory  ought  to 
include  two  elements,  the  recalling  of  the  past,  and 
its  recognition  as  past.  To  begin  with  the  first 
element :  if  a  new  thought  is  sustained  in  the  con- 
sciousness for  five  minutes,  we  may  agree — and  it 
is  partly  a  matter  of  agreement — not  to  call  this 
memory.  But  if  a  thought  is  allowed  once  to  sink 
below  actual  consciousness,  and  then  is  resuscitated, 
no  matter  how  speedily,  we  may  call  this  Memory, 
so  far  as  it  fulfils  the  requirement  of  a  recalling  of 
the  past.  In  practice,  however,  it  is  often  impos- 
sible to  say  whether  we  have  momentarily  let  go  an 
idea  or  not ;  and  furthermore,  when  the  interval  is 
very  small,  as  there  is  no  sufficient  test  of  retentive 
power,  men  seldom  care  to  distinguish  such  a  revival 
from  the  first  impression  or  conception.  The  second 
element  of  memory  has  its  absence  illustrated  by 
the  man  who  honestly  repeats  his  friend's  epigram 
or  joke  as  his  own,  wondering  the  while  at  his  own 
readiness  of  wit ;  or  again,  by  the  old  person 
whose  memories  are  mistaken  by  him  for  present 
circumstances.  Though,  however,  we  distinguish 
remembered  from  fresh  knowledge,  we  should  bear 
in  mind  that  the  adult  never  discovers  anything 
altogether  new :  his  fresh  acquisitions  always  com- 
bine together  with  a  great  many  old  stores.  We 
should  at  once  feel  the  puzzle  of  locating  an  entirely 
new  fact;    and  in  general  we  may  safely  affirm  of 


368  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

every  adult  man,  that  every  act  of  knowledge  which 
he  elicits  must  be  largely  made  up  of  memories. 

2.  The  veracity  of  memory,  as  a  general  faculty, 
is  made  intuitively  evident  during  the  course  of  its 
use.  Even  Mill  was  driven  to  allow,  that  we  must 
put  an  intuitive  trust  in  our  power  of  reminiscence, 
though  he  forbore  to  make  the  handsome  acknow- 
ledgment that  in  so  doing  we  are  not  blindly 
instinctive.  Again,  Dr.  Ward,1  in  his  passage  of 
arms  with  Mr.  Huxley,  was  undoubtedly  triumphant 
over  the  Professor  when  the  latter  undertook  to 
show,  that  the  validity  of  memory  can  be  proved 
empirically  by  successive  trials,  overlooking  the  fact 
that  for  the  knowledge  of  the  success  of  these 
repeated  experiences  he  was  relying  all  the  time 
on  memory.  Yet  we  all  must  admit,  it  is  only 
in  experience  that  memory  shows  its  powers,  and 
brings  them  home  to  consciousness;  there  is  no 
a  priori  revelation  of  its  trustworthiness.  Allowing 
a  certain  intuitive  perception  of  the  validity  of  the 
faculty  given  in  its  first  exercise,  a  man  can  then  go 
on  to  test  the  extent  of  its  ability;  and  he  can 
confirm  his  confidence  by  sundry  experiments  not 
difficult  to  devise.  In  like  manner,  it  is  empirically 
that  some  men  learn  that  their  memory  is  very  defi- 
cient, or  has  lacuna  in  it.  At  times  a  fact  which  we 
directly  remember  may  be  further  verified  by  calcu- 
lating back  from  present  data,  and  proving  that 
the  fact  must  have  been  as  remembered.  These 
admissions  may  safely  be  made  about  the  possi- 
bility of  putting  memory  to  the  proof:  all  the  same, 
■  See  the  Preface  to  his  Philosophy  of  Theism 


MEMORY.  369 


the  ultimate  guarantee  for  the  validity  of  the  faculty 
is  the  immediate  evidence  brought  forth  in  the 
exercise  of  remembering ;  and  this  is  implied  in 
all  our  proofs. 

3.  While,  however,  memory  is  undoubtedly  a 
valid  faculty,  its  limited  character  is  equally  beyond 
a  doubt.  It  may  fail  in  either  of  its  branches,  either 
that  of  recalling  or  that  of  recognizing.  For  prac- 
tical purposes  much  that  we  have  once  learnt  is 
lost  as  explicit  knowledge  ;  and  many  facts  are  so 
vaguely  recollected,  that  we  do  not  know  whether  to 
call  them  reminiscences  or  imaginations.  The  im- 
portant point  in  connexion  with  the  weakness  of 
memory,  is  not  to  be  deceived  into  taking  it  as  an 
argument  for  the  radical  incapacity  of  the  instru- 
ment, but  to  take  it  rather  as  a  warning  to  improve 
an  imperfect  faculty  by  cultivation,  and  not  to  spoil 
it  by  abuse.  Much  may  be  done  by  orderliness,  by 
strict  truthfulness,  by  careful  discrimination  of  facts 
from  fancies,  or  prejudices,  or  desires,  and  by  dis- 
tinguishing when  it  is  that  we  clearly  remember, 
and  when  it  is  that  we  are  perplexed.  Any  ordinary 
man  would  feel  that  his  life  was  safe  if  it  were 
simply  staked  on  his  correctness  in  enumerating  one 
hundred  facts  of  memory  at  choice :  while  he  would 
feel  great  alarm  if  the  one  hundred  facts  were 
assigned  by  another,  and  belonged  just  to  the  region 
where  memory  began  to  grow  shadowy.  A  third 
hundred  of  events  might  be  assigned  which  would 
simply  make  him  despair.  Therefore,  a  real  power 
with  limitations — such  is  the  description  of  human 
memory. 
Y 


37Q  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

4.  What  inclines  some  people  to  speak  ill  of 
memory  as  a  faculty,  is  the  very  great  and  striking 
variety  of  its  abnormal  conditions.  Diseased  or 
declining  state  of  mind  often  shows  its  beginnings 
by  the  manifestation  of  injury  done  to  the  power 
of  remembrance.  A  man's  consciousness  may  be 
split  up  into  two  or  more  almost  completely 
isolated  series,  which  cannot  be  brought  into  union 
with  each  other.  A  person  lays  in  a  stock  of 
knowledge  during  a  number  of  years,  then  he 
has  a  sickness,  which  leaves  him  under  the  neces- 
sity to  begin  the  learning  process  over  again ; 
next,  he  may  suddenly  relapse  into  his  first  mental 
condition,  and  after  that,  alternate  between  the  two 
states.  Again,  a  patient  may  forget  all  the  words 
beginning  with  certain  letters,  or  the  whole  of  one 
language  ;  or  he  may  recognize  the  spoken,  but  no 
longer  the  written  word,  though  he  sees  it.  Thus 
memory  may  fail  in  departments.  Others  again 
more  and  more  lose  the  discrimination  between 
things  remembered  and  things  only  fancied.  All 
which  proves,  indeed,  how  frail  and  liable  to  frustra- 
tion is  memory,  depending  as  it  does  on  the  preser- 
vation of  very  complex  organic  conditions  :  but  as 
long  as  a  man  keeps  his  mental  sanity,  he  can  take 
account  of  his  pathological  state,  and  make  allow- 
ances for  recognized  flaws  in  memory.  Some  have 
bravely  done  this  with  success  under  painful  circum- 
stances. Cases  of  aphasia  furnish  occasionally  good 
illustrations.  But  unfortunately  with  disease  of  the 
memory  there  often  goes  a  general  disease  of  the 
reason  ;  and  then  the  victim  is  no  longer  lit  to  serve 


.MEMORY.  371 


as  a  standard  man,  from  whom  to  take  the  measure 
of  the  human  memory.  He  cannot  become  even  to 
himself  a  disproof  of  that  faculty  ;  for  such  disproof 
must  always  fall  into  the  old  vicious  circle  of  dis- 
believing a  faculty  in  reliance  upon  the  faculty — a 
process  not  so  feasible  as  setting  a  thief  to  catch  a 
thief. 

5.  The  subject  of  memory  receives  further  light 
from  a  comparison  with  the  faculty  of  anticipation, 
to  which  it  is  sometimes  too  closely  likened.  Apart 
from  extraordinary  processes  of  foresight,  which  do 
not  concern  us,  there  is  no  faculty  of  immediate 
anticipation  corresponding  to  what  may  be  called 
immediate  memory.  Such  a  faculty  would  be  quite 
unaccountable,  whereas  of  memory  an  account  can 
be  given.  Impressions  abide  till  positively  effaced 
even  in  material  things :  and  we  are  ready  to  expect 
that  impressions  should  abide  also  in  the  faculties  of 
knowledge.  Moreover,  the  impressions  of  knowledge 
were  received  in  a  certain  order,  and  of  this  fact  also 
a  trace  may  fairly  be  expected  to  remain.  In  reliance 
upon  it,  we  sometimes  mentally  trace  back  a  fact, 
link  after  link,  in  a  chain  of  associations.  What 
seems  immediate  memory  may  be  something  like 
the  instantaneous  retracing  of  these  steps,  or  at 
least  of  some  of  them.  But  for  anticipation  we  have 
no  such  mental  residua  to  fall  back  upon ;  for  the 
experiences  are  yet  to  come.  Hence  at  the  very  most 
we  can  reason  out  a  future  event  from  present  data, 
just  as  we  might  reason  out  a  past  event,  which  we 
had  not  perceived  as  it  past,  and  therefore  could 
not  recall  by  memory. 


372  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

6.  An  incidental  use  of  the  fact  of  memory  is, 
that  its  inevitable  admission  is  fatal  to  pure  empi- 
ricism, and  to  the  pretence  of  rigorous  idealism 
never  to  transcend  the  fact  of  present  conscious- 
ness. For  first,  as  we  have  seen,  memory  must,  at 
starting,  demand  an  intuitive  trust  in  itself,  and 
can  never  be  guaranteed  simply  by  an  inference 
from  accumulated  experiences.  Secondly,  to  allow 
that  we  know  any  fact  as  really  an  event  of  past 
time,  is  to  give  up  the  idealist  dogma  that  no  idea 
can  travel  beyond  its  own  bounds  to  an  object  not 
itself.  Thus  our  previous  conclusions  receive  inci- 
dental confirmation,  and  the  theory  of  adversaries 
has  to  submit  to  one  more  exhibition  of  inconsis- 
tency. Faculty  is  proved  to  be  not  simply  the 
product  of  function ;  only  a  previously  existing 
faculty  can  develope  itself  by  functioning.  Memory 
is  not  the  creation  of  experience,  but  it  manifests 
itself,  grows,  and  is  perfected  by  experience.  And 
memory,  whether  primitive  or  highly  developed, 
always  transcends  the  present,  and  refutes  the  first 
principle  of  thorough  idealism. 

Addenda. 
(i)  Reid x  has  a  passage  calculated  to  give  rise  to 
some  controversy :  "  I  think  it  appears  that  memory 
is  an  original  faculty,  given  us  by  the  Author  of  our 
being,  of  which  we  can  give  no  account,  but  that  so 
we  are  made.  The  knowledge  which  I  have  of  things 
past,  by  my  memory,  seems  to  me  as  unaccountable  as 
an  immediate  knowledge  would  be  of  things  to  come; 
and  I  can  give  no  reason  why  I  should  have  one  and 
1  Intellectual  Powers,  Essay  iii.  c.  ii. 


MEMORY.  373 


not  the  other,  but  that  such  is  the  will  of  my  Maker." 
That  memory  is  more  intelligible  than  foreknowledge 
has  been  already  argued  in  the  principal  text :  and 
against  calling  knowledge  of  either  past  or  future, 
immediate,  Hamilton,  after  the  requirements  of  his 
theory,  enters  a  protest  in  a  note.  But,  leaving  these 
points,  we  may  turn  to  another,  and  ask  in  what  sense 
is  memory  a  peculiar  faculty  ?  Here  it  looks  as  though 
a  caution  were  needed  against  the  double  extreme  of 
making  memory  too  much,  and  of  making  it  too  little 
peculiar.  The  intellectual  memory  is  one  faculty  with 
the  intellect,  and  yet  it  is  a  special  exercise  of  that 
faculty,2  the  peculiarity  of  which  should  not  be  over- 
looked. Against  such  oversight  Sir  H.  Holland  makes 
the  remarks  "We  do  not  gain  greatly  from  these 
metaphysical  definitions,  which  resolve  memory  alto- 
gether into  other  phenomena  of  mind.  Among  modern 
writers  on  the  subject,  Dr.  Brown  has  gone  furthest, 
perhaps,  to  merge  this  faculty  in  other  functions  and 
names."  The  pith  of  Brown's  doctrines  seems  to  be 
conveyed  in  the  following  sentence :  4  "  To  be  capable 
of  remembering,  in  short,  we  must  have  a  capacity  of 
the  feelings  which  we  term  relations,  and  a  capacity  of 
the  feelings  which  we  term  conceptions,  that  may  be  the 
subjects  of  the  relations :  but  with  these  two  powers  no 
other  is  requisite— no  power  of  memory  distinct  from 
the  conception  and  relation  which  that  complex  term 
denotes."  The  relation  he  explains  to  be  one  of  priority 
and  of  subsequence  between  concepts.  Hamilton 
agrees  with  Brown  so  far  as  to  maintain  that  memory 
is  quite  an  explicable  function  of  the  intelligence ;  and 
the  precise  point  needing  explanation  he  makes  to  be 
the  persistence  and  the  recognition  of  past  intellectual 

•  St.  Thomas,  Summa,  Part  I.  q.  lxxix.  a.  vii. 

3  Chapters  on  Mental  Physiology,  c.  vii.  p.  149. 

4  Human  Mind,  Lecture  xii. 


374  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

acts :  "  I  think  we  can  adduce  an  explanation  founded 
on  the  general  analogies  of  our  mental  nature."  5  For 
the  retentive  part  he  borrows  the  account  of  H.  Schmid: 
"  The  mind  affords  in  itself  the  very  explanation  we 
vainly  seek  in  any  collateral  influences.  The  phenomena 
of  retention  are  indeed  so  natural  on  the  ground  of  the 
self-enevgv  of  the  mind  that  we  need  not  stop  to  suppose 
any  special  faculty  for  memory ;  the  conservation  of  the 
action  of  the  mind  being  involved  in  the  very  concep- 
tion of  its  power  of  self-activity.  It  is  a  universal  law 
of  nature,  that  any  effect  endures  as  long  as  it  is  not 
modified  or  opposed  by  any  other  effect.  But  mental 
activity  is  more  than  this ;  it  is  an  energy  of  the  self- 
acting  power  of  a  subject  one  and  indivisible ;  conse- 
quently a  part  of  the  ego  must  be  detached  or  annihilated, 
if  a  cognition,  once  existent,  be  again  extinguished.  At 
most  it  can  be  reduced  to  the  latent  condition."  After 
so  accounting  for  Retention,  Hamilton  accounts  for 
Reproduction  or  Resuscitation  by  the  laws  of  Associa- 
tion, which  he  thinks  make  abundantly  clear  what 
was  so  obscure  to  the  scholastics,  that  Oviedo  called 
it  "  the  greatest  mystery  of  the  whole  of  philosophy."6 
In  materialistic  phraseology,  Dr.  Maudsley?  describes 
memory  as  extending  analogously  throughout  organic 
life  :  "  There  is  memory  in  every  nerve-cell,  and  indeed 
in  every  organic  element  of  the  body.  The  permanent 
effects  of  a  particular  virus  on  the  constitution,  as  that 
of  small-pox,  prove  that  the  organic  element  remembers, 
for  the  rest  of  life,  certain  modifications  which  it  has 
suffered ;  the  manner  in  which  the  scar  on  a  child's 
finger  grows  as  the  body  grows,  evinces  that  the  organic 
element  of  the  part  does  not  forget  the  impression  that 
has  been  made  upon  it.      The  residua  by  which  our 

s  Metaphysics,  Lectures  xxx.,  xxxi. 

6  "  Maximum  totius  philosophise  sacrarjentum." 

t  The  Physiology  and  Pathology  of  Mind,  c.  ix.  p.  209. 


MEMORY.  375 


faculties  are  built  up  are  the  organic  conditions  of 
memory."  What  Dr.  Maudsley  does  not  labour  to 
explain  is,  the  passage  from  organic  conditions  to 
intellectual  memory. 

(2)  A  continuation  of  the  last  quotation  will  lead 
us  on  to  Mr.  Spencer's  theory  of  memory:  "  When  an 
organic  registration  has  been  completely  effected,  and 
the  function  of  it  has  become  automatic,  we  do  not 
usually  speak  of  the  process  as  one  of  memory,  because 
it  is  entirely  unconscious."  The  last  phrase  is  disputable  : 
and  in  all  cases  we  must  protest  against  memory  being 
set  down  as  a  mere  transitional  stage  on  the  way  to 
bodily  automatism.  It  is  constantly  the  tendency  of 
Mr.  Spencer's  doctrine  to  regard  the  automatic  adapta- 
tion of  organism  to  material  environment  as  the  highest 
goal ;  and  all  stages  in  consciousness  as  so  many 
accidents  by  the  way,  to  be  got  rid  of  by  higher 
development.  Such  is  the  tendency  of  his  doctrine  on 
Memory : 8  "  So  long  as  the  psychical  changes  are 
completely  automatic,  memory,  as  we  understand  it, 
cannot  exist.  There  cannot  exist  those  irregular 
psychical  changes  seen  in  the  association  of  ideas. 
But  when,  as  a  consequence  of  advancing  complexity 
and  decreasing  frequency  in  the  groups  of  external 
relations  responded  to,  there  arise  groups  of  internal 
relations  which  are  imperfectly  organized  and  fall 
short  of  automatic  regularity,  then  what  we  call 
memory  becomes  nascent.  Memory  comes  into  existence 
when  the  involved  connexions  among  psychical  states 
render  their  successions  imperfectly  automatic.  As 
fast  as  these  connexions,  which  we  form  in  memory, 
grow  by  constant  repetition  to  be  automatic,  they  cease 
to  be  part  of  memory.  We  do  not  speak  of  ourselves 
as  recollecting  relations  which  have  become  organically 
registered.  We  recollect  those  relations  only  of  which 
8  Psychology,  Part  iv.  c.  vi.  §  200,  p.  445. 


376  SPECIAL  TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

the  registration  is  incomplete.  No  one  remembers  that 
the  object  at  which  he  looks  has  an  opposite  side ;  or 
that  a  certain  modification  of  the  visual  impression 
implies  a  certain  distance;  or  that  the  thing  he  sees 
moving  about  is  a  live  animal.  To  ask  a  man  whether 
he  remembers  that  the  sun  shines,  that  fire  burns,  that 
iron  is  hard,  would  be  a  misuse  of  language."  Never- 
theless these  several  items  would  come  under  the  head 
of  memory,  as  we  have  defined  that  term ;  nor  should 
we  admit,  that  "  the  practised  pianist  can  play  while 
his  memory  is  [wholly]  occupied  with  quite  other  ideas 
than  the  memory  of  the  signs  before  him" — if  indeed 
he  is  playing  from  the  signs  as  his  guides.  In  con- 
clusion Mr.  Spencer  thus  describes  the  transitional 
character  of  memory :  "  Memory  pertains  to  that 
class  of  psychical  states  which  are  in  the  process  of  being 
organized.  It  continues  as  long  as  the  organizing  of 
them  continues,  and  disappears  when  the  organization 
is  complete." 

(3)  M.  Ribot,  whose  doctrine,  in  his  volume  on 
The  Diseases  of  Memory,  is  that  "  memory  is  per  se  a 
biological  fact,  by  accident,  a  psychological  fact,"  dis- 
cusses the  position  of  the  latent  results  stored  up  in 
memory,  and  waiting  to  be  called  into  actual  use.  He 
thinks  our  best  course  is  to  describe  these  residua  as 
"functional  dispositions,"  not  as  in  any  way  conscious 
acquisitions  ;  for  "  a  state  of  consciousness  which  is  not 
conscious,  a  representation  which  is  not  represented, 
is  a  pure  flatus  vocis"  Hence  he  asserts  "a  minimum 
of  conscious  memory  "  in  those  who  "  are  able  to  rise, 
dress,  take  meals  regularly,  occupy  themselves  in 
manual  labour,  play  at  cards  and  other  games, 
frequently  with  remarkable  skill,  while  preserving 
neither  judgment,  will,  nor  affections."  He  might 
in  these  cases  allow  some  degree  of  judgment  and  will, 
over  and  above  pure  unconscious  automatism. 


CHAPTER   VII. 

BELIEF   ON    HUMAN   TESTIMONY. 

Synopsis. 

i.  Belief  on  testimony  is  a  special  subject,  calling  for  special 
treatment. 

2.  Naturalness  of  such   belief,  both  from  the  knowledge  and 

the  veracity  of  the  speaker  and  from  the  expectations  of 
the  hearer. 

3.  Testimony  is  one  undoubted  source  of  certitude,  and  a  very 

abundant  one. 

4.  Single  and  cumulative  witness. 

5.  Points  on  which  we  must  be  guarded,     (a)  We  must  dis- 

tinguish the  completely  from  the  partially  feasible  in 
history,  and  remember  that  much  history  does  not  rise 
above  probability,  (b)  A  wrong  point  of  view  may  disturb 
a  whole  body  of  facts,  (c)  Fallacy  of  excessive  reliance  on 
internal  evidence,  especially  where  the  reader  tries  to 
impose  his  own  circumstances  on  a  writer  in  quite  other  cir- 
cumstances, (d)  Fallacy  of  the  argument  from  silence. 
6.  Providence  in  history. 

i.  While  it  is  clear  that  the  veracity  of  the  senses, 
as  has  been  shown  before,  forms  part  of  the  problem 
of  our  belief  in  the  testimony  of  other  men,  it  is 
equally  clear  that  it  is  not  the  whole  problem. 
There  is  something  special  about  our  trust  in  the 
word  of  another,  which  calls  for  a  separate  treat- 
ment. Hence  it  is  unsatisfactory  to  find  the  elder 
Mill    arguing    thus : x    "  Belief   in    events    or    real 

■  Analysis,  Vol.  I.  c.  xi.  p.  382. 


378  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

existences  has  two  foundations ;  first,  our  experi- 
ence, and  second,  the  testimony  of  others.  When 
we  begin,  however,  to  look  at  the  second  of  these 
foundations  more  closely,  it  soon  appears  that  it 
is  not  in  reality  distinct  from  the  first.  For  what  is 
testimony  ?  It  is  in  itself  an  event.  When,  there- 
fore, we  believe  anything  in  consequence  of  testi- 
mony, we  only  believe  one  event  in  consequence  of 
another.  But  this  is  the  general  account  of  our 
belief  in  events."  Yes  ;  and  still  things  which  agree 
in  being  events  may  differ  in  being  events  of  a 
specifically  different  order;  and  such  is  the  case  in  the 
present  instance.  Manifestly  belief  in  testimony 
has  its  peculiar  nature,  not  a  little  important  to  a 
Christian,  whose  religion  is  historic  and  rests  on 
historic  foundations. 

2.  Belief  in  testimony  is  natural,  and  natural  on 
its  two  sides.  First,  man  being  intelligent,  is  apt 
to  discover  truth,  and,  apart  from  extrinsic  reasons, 
is  inclined  to  declare  the  truth  as  he  knows  it.  Even 
the  downright  liar,  according  to  James  Mill's  esti- 
mate, for  one  lie  that  he  utters  tells  a  thousand 
truths.  Secondly,  on  the  side  of  the  recipient,  he 
has  been  accustomed  from  childhood  to  depend  on 
the  information  of  his  elders,  and  from  his  know- 
ledge of  himself  judges  what  he  is  to  expect  from 
others.  Mr.  Bain,  therefore,  seems  to  be  throwing 
a  needless  mystery  over  the  case,  when  he  talks  of 
"  a  primitive  credulity  in  the  mind,"  from  which 
he  derives  "  belief  in  testimony,"  and  which  he 
describes  as  "  a  primitive  disposition  to  receive 
all   testimony,"    till    sad    experience    of    deception 


BELIEF  ON  HUMAN    TESTIMONY,  yj$ 

gradually  modifies  the  too  ready  instinct.  Of  course, 
children  are  simple  and  credulous,  but  the  appeal  to 
"  a  primitive  instinct  "  is  hardly  necessary  to  account 
for  the  fact.2 

3.  That  testimony,  oral  and  written,  is  a  source, 
and  an  abundant  source  of  certitude,  cannot,  in 
concrete  cases,  be  plausibly  gainsaid.  The  whole 
plausibility  lies  in  keeping  to  the  abstract,  and  is 
well  illustrated  by  Mr.  Balfour's  ingenious  argu- 
ments against  the  theoretic  trustworthiness  of  any 
old  manuscripts.3  The  author's  subtleties  are  telling 
enough,  when  the  concrete  circumstances  are  not 
at  hand  whereby  to  put  a  rude  stop  to  their  light 
and  airy  play ;  but  take  them  out  of  the  air,  weight 
them  with  the  load  of  terrestrial  facts,  and  straight- 
way their  frolics  are  over.  It  is  simply  demon- 
strable by  way  of  testimony,  that  Alexander  of 
Macedon  and  Julius  Caesar  were  successful  leaders 
of  armies,  and  produced  notable  effects  in  the 
world's  history ;  also  that  Demosthenes  and  Cicero 
were  powerful  in  speech ;  and  that  there  was  a 
writer  of  comedies  called  Aristophanes,  specimens 
of  whose  work  we  yet  have.  In  the  history  of  our 
own  country  there  have  certainly  been  a  Roman, 
and  an  Anglo-Saxon,  and  a  Norman  conquest.  For 
in  regard  to  these  events  we  may  be  sure  of  the 
knowledge  and  of  the  veracity  of  the  witnesses,  just 
the  two  requisites  for  trustworthy  testimony.  And 
if  we  test  the  sceptical  generalities  which  are  urged 

2  Deductive  Logic,    Introduction,   n.   17,  p.   12 ;   Inductive  Logic, 
Bk.  VII.  c.  iii. ;  Reid's  Works,  p.  23. 

3  Defence  of  Philosophic  Doubt,  c.  iv.  pp.  53,  seq. 


380  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

against  the  possibility  of  any  historic  certainty,  by 
instances  like  the  above,  the  adversary  will  pro- 
duce little  impression,  when  he  argues,  in  the 
abstract,  that  the  occurrence  of  a  fact  is  only 
one  out  of  several  equally  possible  causes  for 
its  assertion ;  that  a  tradition  grows  weaker  with 
every  transmission  through  a  new  channel ;  that 
the  original  force  of  an  authority  becomes  dis- 
sipated among  its  countless  recorders,  and  that 
each  witness  being  fallible,  so  are  any  number 
of  witnesses.  Without  further  argument,  therefore, 
we  may  take  the  proposition  as  established,  that 
certitude  in  reliance  on  testimony  may  often  be 
had.  When  had,  it  is  what  we  have  called  "  moral 
certitude,"  in  the  sense  that  it  reposes  on  a  know 
ledge  of  the  actions  of  moral  agents,  or  men,  in 
speaking  the  truth.  It  is  real  certitude,  though  not 
metaphysical ;  and  so  Mr.  Mahaffy,  in  the  Intro- 
duction to  his  Prolegomena  to  Ancient  History,  is 
granting  all  we  contend  for,  when  he  declares  that 
historic  belief  may  be  beyond  all  doubt,  but  can 
never  reach  mathematical  demonstration.  If  it  is 
beyond  all  doubt,  it  is  quite  certain,  and  that  is  all 
for  which  we  stipulate. 

4.  Unquestionably  a  number  of  independent  wit- 
nesses are  often  required  to  establish  an  event ;  and 
the  special  force  of  the  argument  then  lies,  not  only 
in  the  fact  that  it  is  unlikely  so  many  together  should 
be  guilty  of  a  lie,  but  also  in  the  impossibility  that 
they  should  have  succeeded  in  lying  consistently. 
When  a  number  of  witnesses  are  agreed  to  perjure 
themselves  in  a  court  of  law,  about  the  only  safe 


BELIEF  ON  HUMAN  TESTIMONY.  381 

way  to  secure  uniformity  in  the  narration  of  a 
fictitious  event  of  some  complexity,  is  to  enact  the 
scene  before  the  eyes  and  ears  of  all.  Very  impos- 
sible is  it  that  without  any  previous  arrangements 
writers  should  independently  tell  one  intricate  story ; 
and  sometimes  it  can  be  proved,  not  only  that  there 
was  no  prior  conspiracy,  but  also  that  such  con- 
spiracy would  have  been  ineffectual,  because  of 
other  modes  of  information  outside  the  circle 
of  the  presumable  conspirators.  Busy  with  these 
considerations  about  the  value  of  a  multiplicity  of 
vouchers,  sometimes  people  are  led  into  the  asser- 
tion that  never  can  a  single  witness  be  a  sufficient 
authority  for  a  certain  assent.  Without  entering 
into  detail,  we  may  protest  that  this  declaration,  in 
its  universality,  is  a  calumny  against  human  nature. 

5.  So  much  in  general  about  belief  on  testimony ; 
in  particular  some  cautions  are  needed  for  the 
guidance  of  our  judgment — cautions  which  may  be 
illustrated,  but  not  exhausted,  in  the  following 
observations : 

(a)  We  must  distinguish  the  quite  feasible  in 
history,  from  the  partially  feasible.  If  the  historian 
binds  himself  to  put  down  nothing  but  what  he  can 
fairly  conclude  to  be  beyond  all  controversy,  he  will 
be  very  meagre  and  dry.  He  will  be  cut  off  from 
most  of  what  is  called  the  philosophy  of  history, 
and  reduced  almost  to  the  position  of  a  chronicler. 
Such  safe  but  jejune  writing  is  liked  neither  by 
authors  nor  by  readers;  and  hence  it  becomes 
necessary  for  both  sides  to  recognize  that  large 
portions  of  history,  as  now  composed,  do  not  rise 


382  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

above  probability.  Consequently  counter  proba- 
bilities must  l^e  treated  with  the  respect  due  to 
them,  not  as  though  one  party  were  entitled  to  the 
monopoly  of  conjectural  interpretation.  Even  the 
most  probable  account  need  not  be  the  truest.  It 
is  to  be  feared  that  not  sufficient  allowance  is  made 
for  the  essentially  problematic  character  of  much 
historical  writing.  Hence,  just  as  when  we  were 
considering  physical  certitude,  we  distinguished  the 
safer  from  the  more  venturesome  attempts,  so  in 
considering  moral  certitude  we  must  make  a  like 
distinction.  And  in  the  category  of  the  venturesome 
we  should  place  most  books  which  treat  of  com- 
parative m}7thology,  comparative  religion,  the  origin 
of  social  institutions,  and  such  matters,  in  which 
documents  are  scarce  or  obscure,  or  written  in  a 
language  ill  understood,  while  inferences  are  often 
marked  more  by  ingenuity  than  conclusiveness. 
Sobriety  of  judgment  in  these  subjects  characterizes 
rather  the  dispassionate  reader  of  rival  systems  than 
enthusiastic  partisans. 

(b)  Another  thing  to  note  is  how  wonderfully  a 
man  with  a  point  of  view,  especially  if  he  is  selec- 
tive in  his  incidents,  or  even  inventive,  can  make 
facts  conform  to  that  point  of  view,  without  at  all 
proving  that  he  is  right.  A  glaring  instance  is 
Draper's  Conflict  of  Science  and  Religion,  a  book 
which  it  is  well  to  quote  as  an  example,  because  it 
has  had  a  wide  circulation,  and  has  done  much 
harm  to  the  cause  of  truth.  Draper  may  have 
been  quite  honest,  as  honest  as  he  declares  himself 
to  have  been ;  but  at  any  rate  he  has  a  wonderful 


BELIEF  ON  HUMAN  TES1IM0NY.  383 

power  of  making  his  point  of  view  tell  upon  facts, 
instead  of  vice  versa.  Let  me  illustrate  this  power 
by  a  single  but  fairly  chosen  instance,  which,  in 
this  country,  will  be  more  easily  appreciated  than 
other  ecclesiastical  events  which  have  been  not 
less  misrepresented.  Fancy  a  man,  who  in  the  light 
of  modern  research,  could  categorically  assert 
without  the  shadow  of  a  qualification  that,  "  a  con- 
viction that  public  celibacy  is  private  wickedness 
mainly  determined  the  laity,  as  well  as  the  govern- 
ment in  England,  to  suppress  the  monasteries." 
This  example  will  do  to  illustrate  the  force  of 
"  point  of  view,"  and  its  influence  on  Mr.  Draper's 
credibility. 

(c)  A  third  danger  is  excessive  reliance  on  what 
are  called  "  internal  evidences,"  a  danger  all  the 
greater  when  a  critic  insists  on  carrying  his  own 
times  and  circumstances  into  distant  and  differently 
situated  ages.  The  full  bearings  of  this  remark  can 
be  appreciated  only  by  the  actual  examination  of 
cases  in  point ;  but  at  least  its  general  drift  may  be 
made  intelligible.  Where  we  are  abstract,  meta- 
physical, or  literal,  other  people  have  been  concrete, 
pictorial,  or  metaphorical.  The  unity,  the  sequence, 
and  the  completeness  which  we,  as  a  matter  of 
course,  try  to  give  to  a  historical  narrative,  they 
never  dreamt  of  giving ;  but  they  were  fragmentary, 
logically  and  chronologically  "  non-sequacious,"  and 
without  pretence  to  adequacy.  To  mention  only 
one  instance  out  of  several,  the  reticences  of  the 
Old  Testament  are  many  and  manifest,  especially 
on  points  of  mere  seculai    detail.     How  garrulous 


384  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

old  Herodotus  would  have  been,  if  he  had  known 
as  much  about  Egypt,  Nineveh,  Babylon,  and  Persia 
as  the  sacred  writers  must  have  known ;  yet  their 
remarks  upon  mere  manners  and  characteristics  are 
but  incidental.  There  is  no  sketching  for  the  sake 
of  sketching.  To  suppose,  then,  that  sacred  history 
is  something  other  than  what  it  is,  is  to  misinterpret 
it  by  judging  it  on  a  false  standard.  But  upon  so 
burning  a  question  we  had  better  stop  short  with 
what  is  obviously  only  an  example  by  the  way, 
rather  than  run  the  risk  of  damaging  an  important 
cause,  by  appearing  to  state  its  whole  defence  where 
no  such  statement  is  attempted. 

In  profane  history,  however,  we  may  pursue  the 
line  of  illustration  already  entered  upon.  A  great 
error  is  committed  by  supposing  old  authors  to  have 
written  with  that  completeness  which  is  expected 
in  our  days  of  abundant  books,  of  world-wide  inter- 
communion, of  accumulated  results  gathered  from 
exploration  in  all  fields,  of  easy  means  of  reference 
to  what  are  pre-eminently  works  for  reference,  and  of 
recognized  canons  for  literary  production.  Josephus4 
was  speaking  to  our  point  when  he  made  the  apolo- 
getic remark,  that  it  was  no  new  thing  for  one 
people  not  to  be  acquainted  with  the  history  of 
another,  "  a  fact  true  also  of  Europe,  in  which 
about  a  city  so  old  and  warlike  as  Rome,  mention 
is  not  made  either  by  Herodotus,  or  Thucydides, 
or  any  of  their  contemporaries ;  only  late  in  the 
course  of  events  Greece  became  acquainted  with 
Rome."     He  adds  that  Greek  writers  knew  little  of 

*  Contra  Apionem,  Lib.  I.  n.  12. 


BELIEF  ON  HUMAN  TESTIMONY.  385 

Gaul  and  Spain.  "How,  then,"  he  continues,  "is 
it  proper  matter  of  wonder  that  our  people  also 
were  unknown  to  many,  and  that  a  nation  so 
separate,  so  remote  from  the  sea,  living  after  its 
own  peculiar  customs,  should  have  given  no  occa- 
sion for  writers  to  make  mention  of  its  doings  ?  " 
At  least  there  is  a  substantial  force  in  this  argu- 
ment ;  and  though  it  was  the  fate  of  the  Jews  to 
come  into  very  rude  contact  with  the  great  empires 
of  antiquity,  Egyptian,  Assyrian,  Persian,  Greek, 
and  Roman,  yet  Tacitus  is  a  glaring  example  how 
little  an  intelligent  historian  may  have  known  about 
Israel.  And  even  with  regard  to  their  own  history, 
the  incompleteness  of  ancient  writers  is  further  in- 
stanced by  that  want  of  emphasis  or  proportion  of 
which  Cardinal  Newman  speaks :  "  Those  who  are 
acquainted  with  the  Greek  historians  know  well 
that  they,  and  particularly  the  greatest  and  severest 
of  them,  relate  events  so  simply,  calmly,  unostenta- 
tiously, that  an  ordinary  reader  does  not  recognize 
what  events  are  great,  and  what  events  are  little ; 
and  on  turning  to  some  modern  history  in  which 
they  are  commented  on,  will  find  to  his  surprise 
that  a  battle  or  treaty,  which  was  despatched  in 
half  a  line  by  the  Greek  author,  is  perhaps  a  turning 
point  in  the  whole  history,  and  was  certainly  known 
by  him  to  be  so." 

The  result  of  this  otherness  of  conditions  in  old 
times  was,  that  occasionally  we  find  just  saved  from 
oblivion  an  event  which  we  should  preserve  in  a 
thousand  ways.  In  these  matters  instances  are 
everything,  and  the  following  instance,  as  recorded 


386  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

by  Sir  C.  Lyell,  in  his  Principles  of  Geology,  is  much 
to  our  purpose.  "  The  younger  Pliny,  although 
giving  a  circumstantial  detail  of  so  many  physical 
facts,  and  describing  the  eruption,  the  earthquake, 
and  the  shower  of  ashes  which  fell  at  Stabiae,  makes 
no  allusion  to  the  sudden  overwhelming  of  two  large 
and  populous  cities,  Herculaneum  and  Pompeii.  In 
explanation  of  this  omission,  it  has  been  suggested 
that  his  chief  object  was  simply  to  give  Tacitus  a 
full  account  of  his  uncle's  death.  It  is  worthy  of 
remark,  however,  that  had  the  buried  cities  never 
been  discovered,  the  accounts  transmitted  to  us  of 
their  tragical  end  might  well  have  been  discredited 
by  the  majority,  so  vague  and  general  are  the  narra- 
tives, or  so  long  subsequent  to  the  event."  What 
Pliny  had  strangely  omitted  nearly  failed  of  being 
supplied  by  others,  in  which  case  his  omission  might 
easily  have  been  taken  as  proof  of  the  negative. 
Now,  let  us  compare  this  case  with  an  equally 
strange  omission  in  more  recent  times,  and  about 
a  more  recent  calamity — an  omission,  however, 
amply  made  up  for  by  other  sources,  because  the 
event  occurred  in  modern  times.  Spinoza's  friend, 
Oldenburg,  was  in  London  during  the  great  plague ; 
but,  says  Dr.  Martineau,  in  his  Study  of  Spinoza, 
"  when  we  remember  what  was  passing  in  the 
streets  of  London  and  on  the  Northern  Sea 
during  the  September  and  autumn  of  1665,  it  is 
strange  to  see  how  slight  a  vestige  it  has  left  on 
the  correspondence  of  its  witnesses  or  participa- 
tors. In  the  plague-stricken  city  where  Olden- 
burg  wrote,    ten   thousand   victims   perished    in   a 


BELIEF  ON  HUMAN   TESTIMONY.  387 

week ;  but  apparently  the  visitation  would  have 
elicited  no  remark,  had  it  not,  by  the  interruption 
of  business,  delayed  the  arrival  of  a  book,  and  sus- 
pended the  regular  meetings  of  the  Royal  Society!  "5 
Had  such  occasion  not  caused  the  mention,  and 
had  Oldenburg  remained  quite  silent  about  the 
calamity,  we  have  it,  nevertheless,  preserved  for  us 
in  numberless  other  records.  But  in  ancient  times 
the  perpetuation  of  such  a  fact  might  depend  on  a 
single  writer,  whose  works  were  to  be  extant  in 
distant  time,  and  he  might  either  fail  to  say  any- 
thing, or  say  it  so  off-handedly,  that  the  event  would 
be  either  not  known,  or  wholly  under-estimated. 
We  are  warned,  therefore,  not  to  rely  overmuch 
on  the  argumentum  ex  silentio,  which  some  critics 
urge  to  an  extravagant  degree,  in  the  case  of  writers 
who  never  dreamt  of  being  exhaustive. 

While  we  are  on  the  subject  of  the  differences 
between  ancient  and  modern  historians,  the  con- 
fession may  freely  be  made,  that  the  way  in  which, 
innocently  or  fraudulently,  forgeries  used  to  be 
committed,  is  very  surprising  to  us  in  these  modern 
days,  and  the  fact  much  perplexes  that  historic 
truth  which  we  wish  to  defend  as  attainable.  Still 
an  age  which  could  so  accept  forgeries  was  also  an 
age  clumsy  in  the  formation  of  them.  Dollinger 
instances  a  stupid  attempt  to  pass  off  some  volumes 
at  Rome  as  of  Numa's  authorship ;  they  were  sup- 
posed to  have  been  discovered  in  an  old  stone  coffin, 
and  were  written  in  Greek  and  Latin.  But  as  paper 
and    Greek    prose   were   evidently   articles   not   so 

5  See  a  parallel  instance  in  Professor  Knight's  Hume,  p.  48. 


388  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

readily  to  be  had  in  Numa's  days,  the  imposture 
was  betrayed.  Similarly  modern  criticism  has  been 
able  to  detect  certain  forgeries,  though  sometimes 
it  has  been  too  keen  after  a  case  for  exposure. 
Neither  is  it  first  of  all  within  modern  times  that 
any  critical  power  has  shown  itself  among  scholars. 
The  ancients  were  not  all  of  them  and  altogether 
fools  on  the  point,  as  many  recorded  criticisms  of 
theirs  remain  to  prove.  In  spite  of  many  regret- 
table forgeries,  therefore,  we  have  a  distinguishable 
history. 

6.  It  is  fashionable,  in  what  claim  to  be  en- 
lightened circles,  to  ridicule  Bossuet's  historical 
compendium  ;  but  whether  he  has  succeeded  or  not 
in  tracing  the  providential  course  throughout  the 
ages,  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  there  is  a  Provi- 
dence in  history,  and  even  in  making  ascertainable 
to  us  certain  vital  portions  of  history.  It  would 
have  been  against  the  Providence  of  God  to  have 
allowed  the  two  connected  dispensations,  Jewish 
and  Christian,  such  a  verisimilitude  of  historic 
support,  had  they  been  really  mythical  creations ; 
or  to  have  left  them  so  dimly  recorded  that  we 
could  not  substantially  trace  out  the  record.  For, 
as  Richard  of  St.  Victor  remarks,6  we  might  protest, 
"  Lord,  if  we  are  deceived,  Thou  hast  deceived  us;" 
or  on  the  other  hand  we  might  say,  "  Lord,  Thou 
has  left  us  without  sufficient  light." 

6  De  Trinitat.  Lib.  I.  cap.  2. 


BELIEF  ON   HUMAN   TESTIMONY.  389 


Addenda. 

(1)  As  an  instance  of  the  endeavour  to  be  over- 
clever  in  historic  science,  we  may  take  the  case  of 
Buckle,  who  so  gloried  in  his  imaginary  triumph  as  a 
philosophic  historian.  Borrowing  some  ideas  from 
others,  for  his  conception  was  not  new,  he  proved  to 
his  own  satisfaction,  that  militarism  must  die  out  with 
the  advance  of  popular  power ;  that  wars  were  made 
by  a  small  class,  who  looked  to  their  own  emolument 
or  honour,  but  would  not  be  made  by  the  masses, 
whose  interests  were  for  peace.  In  Europe  he  fancied 
that,  the  popular  will  being  dominant,  we  had  ended 
the  age  of  wars.  The  outbreak  of  the  Crimean  war 
displeased  him,  but-  did  not  upset  his  conviction.  He 
pointed  to  the  fact,  that  the  quarrel  originated  between 
Russia  and  Turkey,  two  of  the  least  advanced  nations 
which  had  a  footing  in  Europe.  Littre,  labouring  under 
a  like  pleasant  delusion,  was  more  effectually  roused 
from  his  dream  ;  for  he  lived  to  see,  what  Buckle  never 
saw,  a  succession  of  European  wars,  including  the 
Franco- German,  in  which  last  grim  struggle  he  had 
the  poignant  sense  of  being  on  the  beaten  side.  In 
1850  he  had  written  :  "  Peace  has  been  foreseen  by 
sociology  these  last  twenty-five  years.  Now-a-days 
sociology  foresees  peace  for  all  the  time  to  come  of  our 
present  transitional  state,  at  the  close  of  which  a 
republican  confederation  will  have  united  the  West, 
and  have  put  a  stop  to  armed  contests."1 

In  1878  his  comment  on  the  above  was  :  "  Would 
that  I  could  blot  out  those  unhappy  pages !  Scarcely  had 

1  "  La  paix  est  prevue  depuis  vingt-cinq  ans  par  la  sociologie. 
Aujourd'hui  la  sociologie  prevoit  la  paix  pour  tout  l'avenir  de  notre 
transition,  au  bout  de  laquelle  une  confederation  republicaine  aura 
uni  l'Occident  et  mis  un  terme  aux  conflits  armes." 


3QO  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

I  prophesied,  in  my  childish  enthusiasm,  that  there  would 
be  no  more  military  defeats  in  Europe,  but  political 
defeats  would  take  their  place,  than  there  happened 
the  military  defeat  of  Russia  in  the  Crimea,  of  Austria 
in  Italy,  of  France  at  Sedan  and  at  Metz,  and,  quite 
recently,  that  of  Turkey  in  the  Balkans."2  Thus  poor 
Littre  and  Buckle  were  sadly  out  in  their  calculations  ; 
yet,  reading  their  arguments,  we  find  them  quite  up  to 
the  average  plausibility,  such  as  is  to  be  found  in  recent 
theories  of  history  and  criticism.  The  course  seems 
triumphant  till  it  be  rudely  interfered  with.  M.  Pasteur 
further  tells  us  of  the  disappointed  Littre :  3  "  The 
work  published  by  him  in  1879  teems  with  the  blunders 
into  which  Positivism  betrayed  him."2 

(2)  In  his  work  on  the  Transmission  of  Ancient  Books, 
Mr.  Taylor  thus  speaks  of  the  nature  of  old  historic 
records  :  "  Man)7  instances  may  be  adduced  of  the  most 
extraordinary  silence  of  historians,  relative  to  facts 
with  which  they  must  have  been  acquainted,  and  which 
seemed  to  lie  directly  in  the  course  of  their  narrative. 
Important  facts  are  mentioned  by  no  ancient  writer, 
though  they  are  unquestionably  established  by  the 
evidence  of  existing  inscriptions,  coins,  statues,  or 
buildings." 

•  "  Ces  malheureux  pages !  je  voudrais  pouvoir  les  effacer. 
A  peine  avais-je  prononce,  dans  mon  pueril  enthousiasme, 
qu'en  Europe  il  n'y  aurait  plus  de  defaits  militaires,  que  celles-ci 
desormais  seraient  remplacees  par  des  defaits  politiques,  que  vinrent 
la  defaite  militaire  de  la  Russie  en  Crimee,  celle  d'Autriche  en 
Italie,  celle  de  la  France  a  Sedan  et  a  Metz,  et  tout  recemment  celle 
de  la  Turquie  dans  les  Balkans." 

3  "  L'ouvrage  qu'il  a  publie  en  1879  est  remplie  des  meprises  que 
la  doctrine  positiviste  lui  a  fait  commettre  en  politique  et  eu 
sociologie." 


CHAPTER   VIII. 

BELIEF   ON    DIVINE    TESTIMONY. 

Synopsis. 

i.  Motive  for  adding  to  the  philosophic  account  of  certitude  a 
little  doctrine  borrowed  from  theology. 

2.  Difference  between  human  and  divine  faith,  when  the  latter 

is  supernatural. 

3.  A  priori  probability  of  Revelation. 

4.  The  supernatural  revelation  which  has,  in  fact,  been  given. 

5.  Responsibility  of  writing  a  treatise  like  the  present. 

i.  So  far  the  claims  of  reason  have  been  asserted, 
and  put  higher  than  this  sceptical  age  is  inclined  to 
allow.  It  is  just  that  after  the  assertion  of  the 
prerogatives  of  reason,  the  claims  of  a  superior  power 
should  be  briefly  indicated ;  otherwise  a  false  im- 
pression might  be  conveyed  as  to  the  all-sufficiency 
of  man's  natural  lights. 

2.  Faith  in  general  is  belief  on  the  authority  of  a 
speaker ;  and  if  the  speaker  is  human,  so  too  is  the 
faith ;  if  he  is  divine,  so  too  is  the  faith,  at  least 
in  some  respect,  but  not  necessarily  in  the  degree 
required  for  salvation.  For  there  are  arguments 
convincing  to  the  natural  reason  both  as  to  the  fact 
that  God  has  spoken,  and  as  to  the  matter,  what 
God  has  spoken,  at  least  so  far  as  regards  the 
substantial   parts   of  His    message.      Reason,   too, 


392  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

affirms  that  what  God  says  is  to  be  implicitly 
received.  Now,  inasmuch  as  the  revelation  itself 
has  been  supernatural,  this  acceptance  of  God's 
word  would  be  a  faith  founded  partly  on  the  super- 
natural ;  but  it  would  not  be  simply  what  we  call 
supernatural  faith.  For  this  further  requires  that 
the  act  be  elicited  by  the  co-operation  of  intellect 
and  will,  not  as  left  to  themselves,  but  as  elevated 
by  grace,  and  as  using,  for  the  sole  motive  which 
enters  intrinsically  into  the  very  act  of  faith  itself, 
the  authority  of  God.  It  follows  that  what  are 
called  prceambula  fidei,  are  the  suitable  preparatives 
for  the  assent  called  the  act  of  faith  ;  but  they  neither 
give  to  it  its  formal  motive,  nor  lead  by  mere  natural 
force  to  its  being  elicited.  Hence  the  great  error  of 
those  who  are  accustomed  to  regard  supernatural 
faith  as  the  mere  outcome  of  reasoning  upon  the 
Christian  evidences. 

To  repeat  the  same  doctrine  in  other  words. 
Supernatural  faith  normally  presupposes  at  least 
some  sufficient  portion  of  the  arguments  which 
apologetics  supply,  and  goes  beyond  into  quite 
a  higher  sphere,  into  which  the  force  of  the  apolo- 
getics could  never  raise  it.  In  order  to  produce 
saving  faith,  grace,  with  the  twofold  office  of 
enlightening  the  intellect  and  impelling  the  will, 
must  enter  into  the  soul  and  its  powers.  The 
mind  so  elevated  elicits  the  act  of  belief.  Thus  the 
motive  of  faith,  strictly  so-called,  is  not  found  in  the 
grounds  for  coming  to  the  reasonable  inference  that 
God  has  revealed  a  certain  truth,  but  in  the  word 
of  God  alone,  in  the  divine  authority,  in  the  acknow- 


BELIEF  ON  DIVINE  TESTIMONY.  393 

ledged  omniscience  and  veracity  of  God  revealing. 
"  I  believe  this  article  on  the  divine  word  " — such  is 
the  formula  expressive  of  the  act  of  divine  faith. 
The  presence  of  grace  in  this  act  is  not  usually  a 
matter  of  direct  consciousness  :  rather  it  is  known 
by  the  secure  trust  we  have,  that  God  will  do  what 
He  has  promised  to  do,  if  we  honestly  endeavour  to 
fulfil  the  conditions. 

Faith  so  regarded  will  no  longer  be  looked  upon 
as  a  simple  matter  of  intellect.  Seeing  its  super- 
natural character,  its  only  partial  and  extrinsic 
dependence  on  the  natural  preliminaries,  we  shall 
the  more  readily  admit  that  God  supplies  in  the 
ignorant  the  defect  of  scientific  apologetics ;  that 
He  sustains  the  really  faithful  in  their  conflict  with 
learned  infidelity ;  that  the  preservation  of  faith 
once  received  is  no  mere  matter  of  examining  every 
fresh  objection  and  triumphantly  solving  it.  Know- 
ing that  while  reason  is  somehow  at  the  basis  of 
faith,  it  is  not  the  whole  basis — that  it  is  not  simply 
the  root  out  of  which  faith  naturally  grows— we 
shall  have  a  truer  estimate  of  how  reason  stands  to 
faith  as  its  condition ;  so  that  there  is  no  faith  with- 
out reason,  and  yet  reason  alone  is  inadequate  to 
the  production  of  faith. 

3.  Faith  in  revelation  being  as  described,  it  is 
left  for  us  to  consider  how  readily  disposed  we 
should  be  to  acquiesce  in  the  providential  order, 
that  unaided  reason  should  not  for  us  be  all  in  all.  A 
revelation  is  a  priori  probable.  Its  probability  is  sug- 
gested by  our  ignorance,  which  is  only  too  keenly  felt. 
For  no  sane  man  would  say,  I  am  so  clever,  I  am 


394  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 


above  being  beholden  to  the  aid  of  a  teacher.  When  a 
schoolboy  shows  no  sign  that  he  can  be  made  aware 
of  his  own  ignorance,  then,  whatever  his  "  sharp- 
ness," our  hopes  for  him  are  not  great.  Neither 
should  we  think  very  highly  of  any  scientific  man 
who  had  not  realized  the  inadequacy  of  human 
science ;  who  did  not  see  that,  even  when  we 
succeed  in  submitting  physical  phenomena  to  mathe- 
matical calculation,  the  mathematical  aspect  is  but 
an  aspect,  and  leaves  other  sides  of  the  truth  un- 
discovered. Mr.  Tyndall  represents  himself  as  con- 
founded with  the  vast  mysteries  left  undiscovered  in 
the  universe,  and  as  asking  himself  the  pertinent 
question,  Can  it  be  that  there  is  no  Being  who 
understands  more  about  things  than  I  do  ?  Now, 
human  ignorance,  felt  in  matters  of  physical  science, 
is  a  drawback,  but  does  not  touch  on  highest 
interests ;  whereas  human  ignorance  felt,  as  the 
mass  of  men,  when  left  to  their  natural  resources, 
do  feel  it,  about  the  very  origin  and  end  of  their 
existence,  certainly  touches  on  highest  interests. 
Hence  it  is  a  priori  probable  that  the  Creator  has 
supplied,  by  some  special  communication,  what  He 
has  left  imperfect  in  our  means  of  discovering  truth 
for  ourselves.  Probably  He  has  made  an  external 
revelation  the  complement  of  inner  incompleteness. 
Not  that  we  must  exaggerate  this  latter  defect,  and 
speak  as  though  reason  were  incapable  of  finding 
out  man's  destiny;  but  taking  the  bulk  of  mankind, 
we  are  safe  in  saying,  that  without  revelation  they 
have  not  a  sufficiently  easy,  sure,  and  universally 
available  means  of  keeping  constantly  in  mind  how 


BELIEF   ON  DIVINE   TESTIMONY.  395 

they  stand  related  to  life,  death,  and  after-death. 
Circumstances  thus  show  the  likelihood  of  a  reve- 
lation. 

4.  As  taught  by  the  revelation  which  we  have 
actually  received,  we  know  that  in  view  of  the 
strictly  supernatural  end  to  v/hich  de  facto  we  are 
destined,  revelation  is  not  merely  a  matter  of  more 
convenient  provision,  but  an  absolute  necessity. 
Not  natural  knowledge,  but  supernatural  faith  is 
the  sole  assent  of  intellect,  which  is  now  available 
for  salvation ;  or,  as  St.  Paul  expresses  it,  Sine  fide 
impossibile  est  placer e  Deo — "  without  faith  it  is  impos- 
sible to  please  God." 

5.  Reason,  not  faith,  has  been  the  main  point  of 
defence  in  the  foregoing  pages ;  but  in  defending 
reason  we  have  been  promoting  the  cause  of  faith. 
Vilify  reason,  and  you  will  never  make  good  the 
title  of  faith  to  be  honoured ;  but  secure  to  reason 
her  due  position,  and  she  will  be  able  to  add  to  her 
own  dignity  by  defending  the  dignity  of  faith,  and 
claiming  to  herself  her  due  participation  in  this 
higher  light. 

Such  being  the  final  use  of  that  part  of  Philo- 
sophy which  it  has  been  the  purpose  of  this  book 
to  explain,  it  is  manifest  how  no  one,  who  has  a 
sense  of  responsibility,  can  offer  to  the  public  a 
treatise  on  this  subject  without  feeling  how  much 
his  work  is  "  stuff  of  the  conscience."  It  is  an 
awful  crime,  in  the  spirit  of  levity,  to  meddle  with 
the  springs  of  human  knowledge ;  to  spread  abroad 
heedlessly  doctrines  that  may  be  infinitely  mischie- 
vous ;  to  allow  an  itching  for  novelty,  or  the  display 


396  SPECIAL   TREATMENT  OF  CERTITUDE. 

of  ingenuity,  to  make  the  pen  write  what  the  sober 
judgment  cannot  acquit  of  rashness ;  or  to  permit 
fear  of  being  thought  old-fashioned  and  mediaeval, 
to  dictate  the  adoption  of  what  is  new-fashioned 
and  modern,  and  worldly-wise,  yet  all  the  time  is 
an  outrage,  more  or  less  conscious,  upon  the  sacred 
cause  of  truth. 


INDEX. 


Abstraction,  its  use  169. 

Academicians,  account  of  135  ;  their  use  of  probabilities  139. 

Accidents,  definition  of  252. 

Affective  movement,  unable  to  be  clearly  isolated  66. 

Affirmation,  first  act  of  thought  162. 

Agnosticism,  and  possibility  95  ;   its  want  of  self-confidence 

361. 
Agnostics  pledged  to  scepticism  143. 
Allzusammenheit  in  philosophy  116. 

Animals  compared  with  man  27  ;  their  appreciation  of  self  353. 
Anticipation  compared  with  memory  371. 
Appearances,  truth  of  225. 
Apperception  contrasted  with  perception  yi> 
Apprehension,  definition  of  14,  15  ;  controversy  on  15  ;  never 

false  16  ;  doubts  raised  by  definition  of  17  ;  opinions  on 

28  seq.  ;  its  identity  with  judgment  38. 
Arrangement  of  thoughts,  utility  of  43. 
Assent  used  for  "  opinion  "  46  ;  the  perspectio  ?iexus  5 1  ;  motive 

of  53  ;  the  character  of  certitude  54 ;  metaphysical  55  ; 

admits  of  degrees  59  ;  living  62  ;  St.  Thomas'  definition 

62 ;    intellectual   and  emotional  63 ;    under  compulsion 

64;  cause  of  its  intensity  66  ;  blind  189;  an  act  of  will 

246  ;  simple  and  complex  347. 
Association,  importance  of  term  74  ;  Mill's  opinions  74  ;  of 

sensations  7J  ;  of  attributes  325. 
Association  of  ideas,  in  place  of  evidence  91  ;  cannot  account 

for  substance  254. 
Association  theory,  exaggeration  of  103. 
Becoming  distinguished  from  "being"  177. 

AA 


398  INDEX. 


BEING,  necessary  and  contingent  92  ;  distinguished  from 
"becoming"  177. 

Belief,  the  characteristic  mark  of  Judgment  25,  26 ;  Hume's 
definition  29  ;  definition  of  47  ;  Hamilton's  opinion  47  ; 
erroneous  notion  of  48 ;  in  the  Catholic  Church  48  ; 
spontaneous  75  ;  due  to  association  75  ;  persistent  171  ; 
opinions  on  209. 

Bilocation  not  naturally  possible  306. 

BODIES,  their  attributes  282  ;  Mill's  theory  of  289. 

Cartesianism,  popular  idea  of  149;  really  scepticism  153; 
result  of  155  ;  has  no  supporters  158. 

Causality,  theory  of  86  ;  efficient  denied  94  ;  its  nature  254 ; 
the  condition  of  experience  259  71. 

Certainty,  see  Certitude. 

Certitude,  definition  of  42  ;  necessity  of  its  admission  43  ; 
stages  on  the  way  to  it  43  ;  its  position  in  logic  46 ; 
essential  character  of  54  ;  metaphysical  55  ;  physical  56  ; 
moral  57  ;  difference  in  degree  of  59  ;  negative  and 
positive  59;  equation  of  61  ;  its  variation  in  degree  63  ; 
intellectual  and  emotional  63  ;  interdependence  of  the 
three  kinds  of  65  ;  plain  denial  of  76  ;  De  Morgan  on 
10 1  ;  real  possession  of  108  ;  natural  opposed  to  philo- 
sophic 119  ;  analysis  of  motives  of  122  ;  proportionate  to 
its  known  motives  123  ;  to  be  preceded  by  doubt  151  ; 
proposed  criteria  of  188  ;  supra-sensible  190  ;  not  de- 
stroyed by  unsolved  difficulties  229 ;  views  of  256 ; 
scientific  347  ;  moral  3S0. 

Chance,  a  substitute  for  creation  95. 

Change  in  nature  255. 

Children,  formation  of  judgment  in  35,  36  ;  dawn  of  con- 
sciousness of  166  ;  intelligent  perception  in  170. 

Church,  in  relation  to  tradition  193. 

Cognition,  its  relation  to  feeling  65  ;  necessary  91  ;  congruity 
of  198. 

Common  sense  and  philosophy  1 1 1,  114;  Reid's  view  of  20S. 

Comprehension  applied  to  judgment  18,  20. 

Conceptions,  isolated  38  ;  symbols  of  objects  189  ;  general  324. 

Conceptualism,  doctrine  of  336  ;  error  of  ^yj. 

Condition,  first  172. 


INDEX. 


399 


Consciousness  supposes  a  judgment  29 ;  Spencer's  opinion 
33;  Bain's  postulate  on  70;  contingent  81  ;  opinions  on 
81 ;  material  of  181  ;  Mr.  Huxley's  opinion  280  ;  degrees 
of  323  ;  nominalists  on  337  ;  definitions  of  340  ;  where 
commencing  342  ;  opinions  on  343  ;  scholastic  doctrine 
of  35 1  ;  direct  and  reflex  353;  in  acts  of  volition  356; 
objects  of  359. 

Conservation  to  be  admitted  95. 

Consistency,  principle  of  70  ;  of  language  72,  7^  ;  a  secondary 
test  of  truth  196;  its  want  of  value  alone  199;  its  real 
dignity  213. 

Contingency,  definition  of  56 ;  its  connection  with  physical 
certitude  93. 

Contradiction,  principle  of  65, 173;  Mill's  declaration  of  73,76. 

Contradictories,  Hegelian  use  of  179. 

Copula,  its  value  20  ;  equivalently  in  all  speech  23. 

Creation  to  be  admitted  95. 

Credulity  opposed  to  providence  106. 

Delusion,  due  to  nervous  derangement  237. 

Divinely  infused  ideas,  a  criterion  of  certitude  194. 

Doubt,  definition  of  44;  Mill's  definition  of  44;  negative  and 
positive  44  ;  etymologically  considered  45  ;  expelled  60  ; 
in  physical  certitude  99  ;  methodic  148;  Cartesian  151  ; 
a  preliminary  to  certitude  152  ;  St.  Augustine  on  160. 

Dualism,  definition  of  268  ;  opposed  to  monism  299. 

Dumbness  of  sceptics  139. 

Ego,  Mill's  theory  176  ;  man  conscious  of  352. 

Emotion,  its  effect  on  certitude  63,  67. 

Empiricism  on  association  74 ;  on  consciousness  81 ;  con- 
fusion of  84  ;  arguments  of  86  ;  opposed  to  scholasticism 
113;  result  of  207,  256  ;  in  relation  to  memory  372. 

ERROR,  nature  of  7  ;  as  distinct  from  ignorance  43,  233  ;  sup- 
plementary causes  of  237  ;  due  to  want  of  thought  244. 

EUCLID  compared  with  philosophy  115. 

Evidence,  in  opposition  to  experiences  90 ;  Mill's  assertion 
91;  Reid's  view  of  208 — 210;  the  criterion  secundum 
quod  fit  judicium  220;  definition  of  221;  necessity  of 
objective  225  ;  objections  against  225  ;  mediate  and 
immediate  227  ;  when  safe  229  ;  necessitating  229  ;  in- 
sufficient 241  ;  internal  383. 


400  INDEX. 


Evolution  opposed  to  idealism  282. 

Existence  implicitly  known  169  ;  Mr.  Spencer's  theory  of  182  ; 
to  be  proved  275. 

Expectation,  Bain's  postulate  on  71. 

Experience,  power  to  change  truth,  78,  84 ;  due  to  instinct 
123  ;  among  animals  194  ;  its  value  223. 

Extension  applied  to  judgment  18,  20  ;  fallacy  concerning  177. 

Externality,  how  reached  by  the  mind  296. 

FACT,  primary  89,  169  ;  establishment  of  274  ;  conscious  360. 

Faculty,  each  has  its  own  excitant  222  ;  finite  285. 

Faith,  a  criterion  of  certitude  191  ;  the  first  act  of  intelligence 
193  ;  natural  and  supernatural  391  ;  not  a  matter  of 
intellect  393. 

Feeling,  its  relation  to  cognition  65. 

Forgeries  in  history  387. 

Free  will,  abuse  of  246. 

Ghost  stories,  explanation  of  239. 

God  and  variability  93  ;  supporting  existence  94  ;  Descartes' 
doctrine  on  157  ;  His  Omniscience  222  ;  alone  a  se  253  ; 
knowledge  denied  to  285  ;  Berkeley's  theory  294  ; 
Ferrier's  opinion  295  ;  revelation  of  391. 

Grace,  its  action  on  the  soul  392. 

Habit,  its  influence  on  the  mind  124;  productive  of  error  241 
245. 

Hallucinations,  opinions  on  240. 

Heredity  among  animals  194. 

History,  sacred  and  profane  383  ;  ancient  and  modern  387  ; 
forgeries  in  387  ;  providence  in  388. 

Idealism,  refuted  260,  278,  284,  312  ;  protest  of  269  ;  difficulty 
of  273  ;  self-contradicted  275  ;  summary  of  287;  Berke- 
ley's theory  294  ;  idea  of  self  352  ;  defined  303  ;  dogma- 
tism of  307  ;  cosmothetic  310  ;  in  relation  to  memory  372. 

Ideas,  definition  of  5  ;  meaning  power  of  5  ;  Cousin's  definition 
6  ;  Aristotle's  definition  7  ;  Spencer's  ultimate  1 1  ;  value 
of  105;  not  isolated  127;  divinely  infused  194;  clear 
and  distinct  195  ;  innate  inadmissible  204  ;  not  bounded 
by  sensations  302  ;  their  position  in  space  307  ;  their 
nature  307  ;  intuitive  312  ;  definitions  of  312  ;  universal 
314;  abstract  317,328;  individualizing  of  329;  physi- 
cally one  thing  318  ;  never  vaene  321  ;  isolation  of  323. 


INDEX.  40 1 


Ignorance  differing  from  error  8,  233  ;  its  divisions  43  ;  extent 
of  234,  245  ;  infinite  246  ;  realized  394. 

Illusions,  causes  of  237  ;  Kantian  doctrine  on  362. 

Imagination,  its  powers  200  ;  phenomenon  of  231. 

Impenetrability,  Mr.  Huxley's  opinion  of  286. 

Inconceivability,  a  criterion  of  truth  200. 

Inertia  in  intellect  205. 

Inferences  at  fault  240. 

Infinite,  the,  Hamilton's  theory  on  48. 

Insight,  its  connection  with  assent  53 ;  into  terms  and  their 
connection  80. 

Instinct  opposed  to  reason  120  ;  experience  due  to  123  ;  blind 
188  ;  of  animals  225. 

Intension,  see  Comprehension. 

Intentions,  first  and  second  313. 

Intellect,  acts  of  14  ;  definition  of  205  ;  illuminates  its  object 
218  ;  how  fallible  234,  245  ;  distinguished  from  will  246  ; 
its  action  235  ;  its  relation  to  consciousness  358. 

Intelligence,  its  commencement  167  ;  not  self-explanatory 
189;  power  of  205  ;  of  animals  contrasted  with  human 
225  ;  unconscious  342. 

Intensity  of  certitude  59 ;  denied  65  ;  confused  with  size 
of  object  67. 

Intuition,  confusion  respecting  310  ;  definition  of  327. 

Judgment,  definition  of  14,  22  ;  how  differing  from  appre- 
hension 15  ;  the  crowning  act  of  intelligence  17  ;  theories 
on  18  ;  its  matter  and  form  21  ;  characteristic  of  clear 
judgment  25  ;  opinions  on  28  seq.  ;  of  children  35  ;  its 
identity  with  apprehension  38  ;  controversy  on  nature  of 
51  seq.;  not  mere  association  19,  74  seq.;  apparent 
absence  of  motives  in  125  ;  sceptical  suspension  of  139; 
first  168;  criterion  of  218;  false  234;  erroneous,  cause 
of  238  ;  culpable  247  ;  about  external  world  267. 

Knowledge,  its  correspondence  with  object  2 ;  symbolic 
correspondence  of  3  ;  partial,  its  value  4 ;  cognitive  re- 
action 9;  Lange's  opinion  11;  mental  assimilation  12; 
Spencer's  opinion  33  ;  differing  from  belief  47  ;  as  an 
equation  61  ;  confined  to  consciousness  82  ;  validity  of 
109;    natural   in  ;    interrelated   169;    of  self  171;    de- 


402  INDEX. 


pendent  on  tradition  194;  course  of  195  ;  process  of  209, 
217  ;  God's  and  men's  222  ;  growth  of  234;  transmitted 
276  ;  nature  of  284 ;  never  absolute  285  ;  mediate  and 
immediate  310. 

Language  useless  to  the  idealist  in. 

Logic,  its  relation  to  science  no;  practical  opposed  10 
scholastic  121. 

Majority,  consent  of  194. 

Man,  definitions  of  7  ;  compared  with  animals  27. 

Materialism  compatible  with  idealism  293. 

Matter,  solid,  existence  of  261. 

Memory,  Bain's  postulate  on  71  ;  employed  by  idealists  308  ; 
habitual  and  actual  366 ;  veracity  of  368  ;  limited  369 ; 
use  of  its  admission  372  ;  a  peculiar  faculty  373. 

Metaphysical  certitude  55  ;  contrasted  with  physical  56, 
66 ;  prejudice  against  69 ;  Bain's  postulates  72  ;  Mill's 
denial  of  76  ;  bound  to  necessity  89. 

Metaphysical  principles,  Descartes'  doctrine  on  157. 

Mind,  its  method  of  working  125  ;  empiricist  destruction  of 
257  ;  reaction  of  285. 

Miracles,  objection  to  physical  certitude  101. 

Modes  in  substance  251. 

Monism,  definition  of  299. 

Moral  certitude  57  ;  its  dependence  on  metaphysical  65. 

MOTIVE,  its  definition  53  ;  considered  objectively  53  ;  found  in 
clear  recollection  53;  metaphysical  55;  physical  56; 
expels  doubt  60;  of  certitude  always  producible  122; 
apparent  absence  of  126. 

Mysticism,  supernatural  and  natural  129  ;  a  form  of  philosophy 
161. 

Nature,  physical  93  ;  uniformity  of  94  ;  changes  in  254;  finite 
and  infinite  314. 

Necessary  truth,  Huxley's  interpretation  of  69 ;  question 
stated  73  ;  of  mathematical  axioms  78  ;  of  our  sensations 
81  ;  not  facts  of  consciousness  82  ;  answers  to  em- 
piricists S3. 

NECESSITY,  metaphysical  55;  physical  56;  moral  57;  law  of 
necessity  not  reality  73  ;  Hume's  theory  88  ;  and  meta- 
physical truth  89  ;  contingent  93  ;  of  revelation  395. 


INDEX.  403 


Negation,  not  the  first  act  of  thought  162  ;  its  intensity  61. 

Negative,  as  a  nonentity  60. 

Nerves,  stimulus  263  ;  their  action  238. 

Nominalism,  doctrine  of  333  ;  refuted  334. 

Object,  how  united  with  subject  217  ;  material  230  ;  immediate 

3ii. 

Opinion,  definition  of  45  ;  not  belief  48. 

Opposites  in  languages  180. 

Otherness  of  bodies  286 ;  Mill's  denial  of  291  ;  Huxley's 
denial  of  299. 

Perception,  Spencer's  definition  34 ;  prior  to  language  36 ; 
requiring  apperception  169;  of  self  170;  distinct  from 
sensation  265  ;  sensitive  266  ;  intellectual  267. 

Periodicities,  uniformities  of  nature  97. 

Permanence  of  substance  253. 

Perseity  of  substance  251  ;  meaning  of  253. 

Personality,  unknowable  11,  171  ;  recognized  169. 

Phenomenalism  in  relation  to  certitude  256. 

Philosophy,  its  office  in  regard  to  certitude  58  ;  its  place  in 
intellectual  life  108;  its  definition  109;  study  of  no; 
position  of  scholastic  113  ;  maxims  117  ;  versus  natural 
certitude  119;  not  co-extensive  with  practical  discovery 
124. 

Physical  certitude  not  mere  possibility  56  ;  bound  up  with 
metaphysical  65  ;  Aristotle's  contingent  Being.  92  ; 
answers  to  opponents  of  102. 

Physical  science,  its  basis  106. 

Physicists  elastic  use  of  terms  124. 

Popular  errors  concerning  Cartesianism  156. 

Possibilities  not  physical  certitude  56 ;  have  a  real  founda- 
tion 227. 

Predicate  relation  to  subject  18—21. 

Present,  of  an  idealist  308. 

Primaries,  the  three  1 74- 

Principle,  the  first  173. 

Probability,  treatment  of  in  mathematics  46  ;  curious  example 
of  49  ;  used  for  moral  certitude  58  ;  used  for  certitude 
j  22  ;  in  moral  and  intellectual  matters  138  ;  in  place  of 
truth  147  ;  use  of  220.  ;  its  part  in  history  381  ;  of  revela- 
tion 393. 


404  INDEX. 


Providence  a  factor  in  the  world's  physical  course  102  ;  in 
history  388. 

Pyrrhonists,  doctrines  of  135  ;  PaschaPs  opinion  of  212. 

Qualities,  primary  and  secondary  265,  282,  293. 

Ratiocination,  definition  of  14. 

REALISM,  transfigured,  theory  of  3  ;  definition  of  268  ;  unan- 
imity with  idealism  269  ;  moderate  273,  278  ;  summary 
of  287  ;  a  difficulty  concerning  304  ;  exaggerated  332. 

REALITY,  Mr.  Hodgson's  definition  10;  Fichte's  opinion  12; 
no  objective  72  ;  in  matter,  Mill's  theory  176  ;  of  acci- 
dents 2^2;  of  substance  254;  proof  of  external  281  ; 
the  Unknowable  298  ;  senses  of  313  ;  in  universals  328  ; 
in  scientific  generalizations  338. 

REASON,  and  instinct  120;  its  capabilities  133;  an  intrusted 
talent    143  ;    versus  instinct    260  ;    its   relation   to   faith 

393—395- 

Recollections  of  childhood  168. 

Reflection  the  cause  of  scepticism  120;  corrects  judgment 
126  ;  our  power  of  357. 

Relation,  ideas  of  33  ;  between  objects  283  ;  in  knowledge 
169,  180. 

Relativist,  his  position  3. 

Resistance,  the  only  external  activity  3. 

Revelation,  its  rare  occurrence  129;  belief  in  391  ;  proba- 
bility of  393  ;  a  necessity  395. 

Sceptic,  description  of  134,  135. 

Scepticism,  cardinal  error  of  5  ;  due  to  reason  120;  account 
of  by  Sextus  Empiricus  135  ;  dogmatic  and  non-dogmatic 
136  ;  a  sin  against  intelligence  142. 

Scholastics,  definition  of  truth  9  ;  on  apprehension  and  judg- 
ment 38  ;  on  metaphysical  necessities  55  ;  on  doubt  44  ; 
position  of  their  philosophy  113  ;  definition  of  intellect 
205  ;  on  the  generation  of  knowledge  217  ;  on  fallible 
intellect  234  ;  on  substance  250  ;  on  universals  318. 

Science,  definition  of  109. 

Sciences,  on  classification  of  116. 

Scripture,  appeal  to  isolated  passages  of  146. 

Self,  certainty  of  154;  perception  of  170;  consciousness  of 
176;  definition  of  351  ;  animal  appreciation  of  353. 


INDEX.  405 


Self-conceit  of  philosophers  162. 

Self-consciousness  defined  341. 

Sensation  prior  to  language  36  ;  confounded  with  intellectual 
perception  77  ;  truth  of  81  ;  Lewes'  theory  of  189  ;  Mill's 
theory  of  190;  distinct  from  perception  265;  definition 
of  266  ;  never  false  288  ;  permanent  possibilities  of  289  ; 
Helmholtz's  theory  326  ;  without  consciousness  343. 

Senses,  their  trustworthiness  2,  288;  verification  by  190; 
validity  of  259  ;  division  of  262  ;  value  of  276  ;  gradual 
training  of  298. 

Sensibles,  division  of  264. 

SlGNUM  QUO,  A  QUO,  EX  QUO   5. 

Solipsism,  difficulty  of  293. 

Soul,  definitions  of  7  ;  proof  of  its  spirituality  III. 

Space,  extension  in  286. 

Species,  Aristotle's  definition  54  ;  intued  310. 

Subject  relation  to  predicate  18 — 21  ;  how  united  with  object 
217. 

Subjectivity  valueless  alone  as  criterion  of  truth  224. 

Substance,  scholastic  notion  of  250  ;  efficiently  active  255. 

Sufficient  reason,  principle  of  175. 

Suspension  of  judgment,  employed  by  sceptics  139. 

Suspicion,  description  of  45. 

Syllogism  useful  for  verification  126. 

Systems,  definition  of  150. 

Taste,  referable  to  subjective  conditions  231. 

Testimony,  belief  in  377  ;  reasons  for  believing  378  ;  of  a 
single  witness  381,  387  ;  cautions  respecting  381. 

Theism,  necessary  95  ;  itself  philosophic  98. 

Theory  and  practice  123. 

Thought,  essentially  inaccurate  132;  unconscious  133;  first 
act  of  162  ;  not  to  be  isolated  167  ;  known  only  by 
speech  192  ;  mystery  in  process  of  274  ;  and  thing  305  ; 
objective  validity  of  309  ;  without  consciousness  343. 

Time,  alters  nothing  94. 

Touch,  division  of  262. 

Tradition,  a  criterion  of  certitude  191  ;  objection  to  192. 

TRUTH,  division  of  1  ;  ordinary  view  of  2  ;  schoolmen's  defini- 
tion 2  ;  opinions  on  scholastic  definition  of  9  ;  theological 


4o6  INDEX. 


importance  of  definition  12  ;  where  found  completely 
14 — 16  ;  metaphysical  55  ;  as  an  equation  62  ;  necessary 
truth,  meaning  of  69 ;  Bain  and  Huxley  on  70;  geometric 
77 ;  not  sacred  83  ;  confusion  respecting  84 ;  mathe- 
matical distinguished  from  physical  86  ;  self-evidence  a 
motive  of  belief  122;  Descartes'  doctrine  on  156;  self- 
evident  174;  never  inconsistent  196;  ontological  221; 
present  even  in  falsehood  245  ;  intuition  of  310. 

Uniformity  of  nature  94  ;  Dr.  Maudsley's  opinion  104. 

UNIVERSALS,  explanation  of  314;  how  formed  316;  sensist 
theory  319  ;  where  found  321  ;  difficulty  against  322. 

Variation,  concomitant  4  ;  in  degrees  of  certitude  63. 

Verification  by  senses  189. 

Will,  its  action  calculated  57;  commanding  assent  64;  con- 
trasted with  "association"  74  ;  its  action  on  the  intellect 
235—242. 

Words  no  test  of  universals  321 — 334. 


LIST   OF   AUTHORS    REFERRED    TO. 

Anselm  (St.),  knowledge  mental  assimilation  12. 

Antisthenes  on  judgment  19. 

AQUINAS  (St.  Thomas),  definition  of  soul  7  ;  nature  of  the  mind 
9;  knowledge  mental  assimilation  12  ;  on  judgment  17  ; 
value  of  copula  20;  on  clearness  of  judgment  24  ;  con- 
trast between  judgment  and  animal  perception  26  ;  on 
sensitive  faculty  36  ;  apprehension  aliquaie  judicium  38  ; 
on  knowledge  as  an  equation  61  ;  on  the  generation  of 
knowledge  217  ;  on  sensiblcs  264;  all  thoughts  must  be 
consciously  referred  to  self  348  ;  on  acts  of  the  mind  355. 

ARISTOTLE,  definition  of  idea  7  ;  definition  of  soul  7  ;  value  of 
copula  20  ;  on  species  54  ;  on  Being  92  ;  on  substance 
254  ;  on  sensibles  264. 

Augustine  (St.)  on  God's  Providence  102;  on  doubt  160. 

BACON  (Lord)  on  proposition  ^ 

Bain  (Mr.)  on  the  mark  of  judgment  26  ;  on  the  principle  ot 
consistency  70  ;  on  spontaneous  beliefs  75;  on  mathe- 
matical   axioms    79 ;    on    truth    84 ;    denial   of    efficient 


Index.  407 


causality  94,  96  ;  on  blind  tendency  106 ;  on  Hume's 
consistency  144;  on  principle  of  Contradiction  173  ;  on 
isolated  events  175;  on  substance  253;  on  the  per- 
ception of  matter  271  ;  274  n.  ;  on  idealism  282  ;  on 
ordinary  realism  287 ;  on  existence  beyond  consciousness 
306  ;  on  consciousness  345  ;  on  belief  in  testimony  378  ; 

Balfour  on  Mr.  L.  Stephen  85  ;  on  Mill's  idealism  290. 

Balmez  on  certainty  no;  on  errors  118;  experience  due  to 
natural  instinct  123. 

Bayle  on  instinct  and  reason  120 ;  faith  against  reason  191. 

Bergmann,  definition  of  judgment  26. 

Berkeley  (Bp.)  on  ideas  of  sense  270 ;  theory  of  idealism  294; 
on  nominalism  334. 

Bossuet  on  Cartesianism  159. 

Bradley  (F.  H.),  definition  of  judgment  19. 

Brown  (Dr.)  on  apprehension  and  judgment  30  ;  on  Provi- 
dence 105;  on  belief  210;  on  consciousness  348;  on 
memory  373. 

Browne  (Mr.  Borden)  conception  of  reality  9. 

Buchner  on  Hegelianism  180. 

Buckle  on  Descartes  158  ;  on  history  389. 

Buffier  on  ideas  312. 

Caird  (Prof.)  on  validity  of  a  truth  198  ;  on  Berkeleyism  295  ; 
on  idealism  304. 

Carlyle  (T.),  use  of  certain  plurals  21. 

Clifford  (Prof.)  on  the  mark  of  judgment  26  ;  on  our  laws  of 
geometry  80;  on  possibilities  95;  on  cause  259;  on 
belief  in  an  outer  world  261  ;  on  other  consciousnesses 
292,  299,  305. 

Comte  (M.)  on  consciousness  82  ;  on  the  absolute  86. 

Conder  (Mr.)  on  consciousness  360. 

Congregation  of  the  Index  on  reason  133. 

Cousin  on  idea  6 ;  criticism  on  Locke  40 ;  judgment,  the 
primitive  elements  of  thought  40;  on  scepticism  161  ;  on 
the  genesis  of  error  236  :  on  space  332  ;  on  conscious- 
ness 351. 

De  Bonald,  thought  known  only  by  speech  192. 

De  LAMENNAIS  on  traditionalism  192  ;  on  Diderot  214. 

De  Morgan  (Prof.)  on  belief  in  concep-ts  39  ;  on  certainty  101 ; 


4o8  INDEX 


Descartes  on  separation  of  assent  from  its  motives  51  ;  or, 
influence  of  the  demon  102  ;  doubt  of  self-evident  truth- 
113  ;  system  of  150;  on  truth  156  ;  real  position  of  159  ; 
as  a  physicist  159  ;  on  personality  170  ;  on  the  genesis  of 
error  235  ;  on  action  of  the  senses  267 ;  definition  of 
ideas  312. 

DoLLlNGER  (Dr.)  on  forgeries  in  history  387. 

Draper  (Mr.),  credibility  of  383. 

Empedocles,  like  known  by  like  8. 

Emerson,  on  want  of  coherence  213. 

FERRIER  on  the  use  of  philosophy  112  ;  on  Hume's  philosophy 
144;  on  intelligence  in  children  166;  on  being  and  not 
being  177  ;  on  the  perception  of  matter  295  ;  conscious- 
ness distinct  from  sensation  344. 

FlCHTE,  reality  a  dream  12  ;  on  idealism  262. 

FlNDLATER  (Mr.)  on  universality  of  copula  23. 

Fischer  (Kuno)  on  causality  259  11.  ;  on  nature  of  knowledge 
284  71.  ;  on  the  Ego  363. 

Goethe  on  union  of  mental  conceptions  127  ;  on  transcenden- 
talists  180. 

Green  (Prof.)  on  Hume's  consistency  145  ;  our  process  of  learn- 
ing 212;  on  cause  and  substance  259;  on  Berkeley  ism 
294. 

Grote  on  the  canon  of  evidence  232. 

GURNEY  (Mr.),  objection  to  universality  of  copula  22. 

Gutberlet  (Dr.),  certitudes  are  equations  61. 

Hamilton  (Sir  Win.)  on  apprehension  and  judgment  29  ;  on 
belief  and  knowledge  47  ;  on  proof  of  mendacity  of  con- 
sciousness 142  ;  on  Hume's  consistency  144  ;  on  the 
error  of  Descartes  149  ;  on  the  foundation  of  knowledge 
211  j  on  error  236,  242;  on  sensation  and  perception 
265  ;  on  primary  and  secondary  qualities  265,  293  ;  on 
idea  and  perception  311  ;  on  consciousness  341,  348, 
359  ;  on  memory  374. 

Harrison  (Mr.  F.)  on  the  correspondence  of  conceptions  with 
reality  3. 

Hartmann  on  the  Great  Unconscious  363. 

HEGEL  on  philosophy  112;  on  contradictories  179;  on  the  mind 
259  ;  on  abstract  ideas  32S. 

Helmholtz  on  sensations  326. 


INDEX.  409 


Herbert  (Lord)  on  traditionalism  192. 

Herodotus,  instance  of  inference  by  rapid  association  126. 

Hobbes,  definition  of  judgment  18  ;  on  Nominalism  333,  334. 

Hodgson  (Mr.  S.)  definitions  of  truth  and  reality  10. 

Holland  (Sir  H.)  on  memory  373. 

Huet  (Bp.)  on  non-dogmatic  scepticism  145. 

Hume  on  idea  5  n. ;  on  apprehension  and  judgment  28  ;  on 
inferences  from  experience  86  ;  on  necessity  88  ;  on  fact 
89;  on  Cartesian  doubt  113  ;  denies  existence  of  sceptics 
135;  on  probability  139  n. ;  his  consistency  144;  on 
Descartes  152,  155  ;  on  a  future  state  202  n. ;  on  idealism 
270  ;  on  universals  335. 

Hutcheson  on  consciousness  343. 

Huxley  (Prof.)  on  necessary  truth  69  :  no  objective  reality  72  ; 
self-contradiction  78  ;  on  consciousness  81,  82  ;  on  truth 
84  ;  on  necessity  88  ;  on  denial  of  insight  90  ;  on  uni- 
formity of  nature  99 ;  on  substance  253  ;  on  realism  272  ; 
on  idealism  280,  293  ;  on  impenetrability  286  ;  on 
materialism  293  ;  on  otherness  299  ;  on  ideas  302  ;  on 
consciousness  of  sensation  350;  on  memory  368. 

Jevons  (Mr.),  logical  foundations  of  languages  24  ;  on  Mill's 
inconsistencies  106. 

Josephus  on  history  384. 

Jouffroy  on  instinct  and  reason  120. 

Kant,  doctrine  on  judgments  32  ;  on  organic  processes  342  ; 
on  consciousness  350,  362;  on  illusions  of  reason  362. 

Lamb  (C.)  on  the  sceptic  134. 

Lance  on  value  of  our  knowledge  11. 

Lecky  (Mr.)  on  error  237. 

Leibnitz  on  empiricism  205  ;  on  unconscious  ideas  in  plants 
&c.  344. 

Lepidi,  criticism  of  judgment  218. 

Lewes,  perception  in  animals  27;  on  grouping  ideas  32,  35  ;  on 
certitude  62  ;  on  efficient  causality  94  ;  on  blind  instinct 
to  believe  189 ;  on  ideas  302  ;  on  consciousness  345. 

Liberatore  (Fr.)  signum  a  quo  5. 

Littre  (M.)  on  history  389. 

Locke  on  judgment  without  perceivable  proof  39  ;  on  simple 
ideas  223  n. ;  on  consciousness  348. 


410  INDEX. 

Lotze  on  sensation  265. 

Luys  on  evolution  of  thought  35. 

Lyell  (Sir  C.)  on  omissions  in  history  386. 

Mahaffy  (Mr.)  on  historic  belief  380. 

Manilius  on  reason  235. 

Malebranche  on  ontologism  195. 

Mansel,  definition  of  truth  10  ;  on  apprehension  and  judgment 
29  ;  on  psychological  judgment  38  ;  on  sufficient  reason 
175 ;  on  consistency  196 ;  on  Hamilton's  distinction 
between  conception  and  belief  211  ;  on  objective  criterion 
of  truth  219  n.  ;  on  error  237. 

Martineau  (Dr.)  on  omissions  in  history  386. 

MAUDSLEY  (Dr.)  on  consciousness  82  ;  on  the  theory  of 
association  103;  on  arts  of  consciousness  126;  how 
biassed  300;  on  general  ideas  331;  on  consciousness 
346  ;  on  memory  374. 

Maurus  (Silvester)  on  the  Blessed  Trinity  13  ;  on  the  genera- 
tion of  knowledge  218. 

M'COSH  (Mr.)  on  cognition  36,  37  ;  on  foundations  of  know- 
ledge 172  ;  on  ignorance  and  error  237  :  on  conscious- 
ness 349. 

Mill  (James),  definition  of  judgment  18  ;  on  process  of  percep- 
tion  35  ;    on    consciousness   350 ;    on   human  testimony 

377- 
Mill  (John  S.),  definition  of  judgment  18  ;  on  proper  names 
20  ;  belief  the  characteristic  of  judgment  25,  26  ;  on  pro- 
positions ^  '■>  on  doubt  44  ;  on  association  74  ;  nega- 
tion of  certitude  76  ;  on  mathematical  axions  79  ;  on 
truth  S^  ;  his  estimate  of  logic  87  ;  on  evidence  91  ;  on 
uniformity  of  nature  98 ;  inconsistencies  of  106 ;  on 
language  III;  on  probabilities  139  n.  ;  on  scepticism 
141,  denies  existence  of  sceptics  143  ;  on  axiomatic  truths 
155;  on  principle  of  contradiction  173,  179;  on  cause 
and  effect  175  ;  on  the  Ego  176;  on  sensation  190;  on 
substance  and  accidents  252  ;  on  efficient  causality  255  ; 
on  the  senses  271  ;  permanent  possibilities  of  sensation 
289  ;  on  memory  308  ;  on  universals  322  ;  on  the  isola- 
tion of  ideas  323  ;  on  general  concepts  323,  336  ;  on  con- 
sciousness 349. 


INDEX.  4" 


MORELL  on  sensation  and  perception  36. 

MORLEY  (Mr.)  on  Mill  as  a  teacher  107. 

Mozley  (Mr.  T.)  on  Tractarianism  131. 

MUller  (Max),  forms  of  grammar  common  to  all  nations  23  ; 
on  doubt  45. 

Newman  (Card.)  on  assent  46 ;  on  proportion  in  assents  61  ; 
opposed  to  Descartes  150  ;  on  acts  and  faculties  172  ;  on 
consciousness  347  ;  on  Greek  historians  385. 

Nicholas  of  Cusa  (Card.)  on  impotence  of  reason  145. 

Paget  (Sir  James)  on  the  complexity  of  human  acts  364. 

Palmieri  (Fr.)  on  direct  consciousness  354. 

Paschal  on  pyrrhonists  and  dogmatists  212. 

Pasteur  (M.)  on  M.  Littre  390. 

Pattison  (Mark)  on  Tractarianism  132. 

Paul  (St.)  on  faith  395. 

Philetas  and  dogmatic  scepticism  131. 

Pollock  (Mr.),  denial  of  efficient  causality  94  ;  on  the  value  of 
ideas  105  ;  on  systems  150. 

Porter  (Dr.)  judgments  of  children  35. 

Read  (Mr.  C.)  on  doubt  of  actual  cognitions  94. 

Reid  on  apprehension  and  judgment  29  ;  on  the  fixed  course 
of  nature  105  ;  on  Descartes'  system  152  ;  on  criterion  of 
truth  208  ;  on  cause  259 ;  on  sensation  266 ;  on  con- 
sciousness 343  ;  on  memory  372. 

Renan  (M.)  his  mental  diagnosis  130. 

RiBOT  (M.)  on  value  of  philosophy  112  ;  on  memory  376. 

RlCHTER  on  intelligence  in  children  166. 

Rosmini,  approval  of  Kant  32. 

Rousseau  on  ignorance  and  error  233  n. 

Salisbury  (John  of),  description  of  sceptics  136;  on  knowledge 
of  truth  191. 

Sayce  (Mr.)  on  universality  of  copula  24. 

Schopenhauer  on  Hegel's  philosophy  180;  on  the  attributes 
of  bodies  282. 

Sextus  Empiricus  on  scepticism  135. 

SlDGWlCK  (Mr.  A.)  on  theory  and  practice  121. 

Spencer  (Mr.  H.)  transfigured  realism  3;  ultimate  ideas  11 
on  the   formation  of  an  idea  35  ;   on  consciousness  8i, 
327  ;    on  proof  of  mendacity  of  conciousness   142  ;    op 


412  INDEX. 


classification  of  sciences  116;  on  absence  of  motives  in 
judgment  127  ;  on  isolation  of  thought  167  ;  on  certainty 
of  self  171  ;  on  development  of  intelligence  181  ;  on 
philosophy  of  certitude  185;  on  congruity  in  cognitions 
197  ;  his  inconsistencies  200  ;  universal  postulate  204  ; 
on  substance  253  ;  on  idealism  282  ;  on  the  Unknowable 
Reality  298  ;  theory  of  memory  375. 

Spinoza  on  idea  5  ;  on  true  ideas  196  ;  on  consciousness  350. 

Stephen  (Leslie)  on  truth  83  ;  his  only  dogmatism  85. 

Stewart  (Dugald)  his  law  on  concepts  39. 

Suarez,  knowledge  mental  assimilation  12;  on  judgment  38  ,' 
on  the  generation  of  knowledge  218  ;  on  error  246. 

SULLY  (Mr.),  objection  to  universality  of  copula  22  ;  judgments 
accompanied  by  belief  26  ;  on  recognition  in  animals  27  ; 
on  judgments  in  children  36;  on  judgments  127;  on 
hallucinations  241  ;  on  introspection  357. 

TAINE  (M.)  on  illusions  240  ;  on  external  objects  292. 

Tait  (Prof.),  proof  of  external  reality  281. 

Taylor  (Mr.)  on  omissions  in  history  390. 

Tyndall  (Prof.)  on  imagination  201  ;    on   human  ignorance 

394- 
(Jeberweg,  definition  of  judgment  26. 
Veitch  (Prof.)  on  modes  of  thought  242  n. 
Vincent  of  Beauvais  on  Universals  330. 
Wallace  (Mr.),  unity  the  test  of  truth  198. 
Ward  (Dr.),  refutation  of  empiricists  85;  on  analysis  of  grounds 

of  truth  121. 
Whewell  on  Descartes'  physical  science  159. 
Whitman  (Walt.)  want  of  coherence  215. 
WUNDT  on  judgment  37  ;  opposed  to  Descartes  150. 
Wylde  (Mr.)  on  connection  of  mind  with  mind  230. 
/.IGLIARA   (Card.),    definition   of  judgment   22  ;    on   assent  in 

judgment  50. 


A  LIST  OF  WORKS 

MAINLY   BY 

ROMAN    CATHOLIC 
WRITERS 


TABLE    QF   CONTENTS 

PAGE 

The  Westminster  Library 2 

Stonyhurst  Philosophical  Series 3 

The  Catholic  Church 3 

For  the  Clergy  and  Students 4 

Biography       6 

History    7 

The  Beginnings  of  the  Church 7 

Educational   ..........  8 

Poetry,  Fiction,  etc 8 

Novels  by  M.  E.  Francis  (Mrs.  Francis  Blundell)      .  9 

Works  by  the  Very  Rev.  Canon  Sheehan,  D.D.    .        .  9 

Works  by  Cardinal  Newman 10 


LONGMANS,     GREEN,     &    CO. 

39  PATERNOSTER  ROW,   LONDON,   E.C. 

91-93   FIFTH   AVENUE,   NEW  YORK 

8   HORNBY   ROAD,   BOMBAY 

303   BOWBAZAR  STREET,   CALCUTTA. 

1909 


A  LIST  OF  WORKS 


The  Westminster  Library, 
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Edited  by  the  Right  Rev.  Mgr.  BERNARD  WARD,  President  of  St.  Edmund's 
College,  and  the  Rev.  HERBERT  THURSTON,  S.J. 

THE    TRADITION     OF     SCRIPTURE:    its    Origin, 

Authority  and  Interpretation.      By  the  Very  Rev.  WILLIAM    BARRY. 
D.D.,  Canon  of  St.  Chads,  Birmingham.     Crown  8vo.     3s.  6d.  net. 

THE  HOLY  EUCHARIST.     By  the  Right  Rev.  John 

CUTHBERT  HEDLEY,  Bishop  of  Newport.     Crown  8vo.     3s.  6d.  net. 

THE   LEGENDS   OF   THE   SAINTS:    An   Introduction 

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THE  PRIEST'S  STUDIES.    By  the  Very  Rev.  Thomas 

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THE  CHRISTIAN  CALENDAR.   By  the  Rev.  Herbert 

THURSTON,  S.J. 

THE  STUDY  OF  THE  FATHERS.     By  the  Rev.  Dom 

JOHN  CHAPMAN.  O.S.B. 

THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE  GOSPELS.     By  the  Right  Rev. 

Mgr.  A.  S.  BARNES,  M.A. 

THE  BREVIARY.    By  the  Rev.  Edward  Myers,  M.A. 
THE  INSTRUCTION  OF  CONVERTS.      By  the  Rev. 

SYDNEY  F.  SMITH,  S.J. 

THE  MASS.       By  the  Rev.  ADRIAN   FORTESCUE,  Ph.D., 
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DIVINE  AUTHORITY.    By  J.  F.  Scholfield,  M.A., 

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THE    KEY   TO   THE    WORLD'S    PROGRESS:    an 

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4i  IN  THY  COURTS"  (La  Vocation  a  la  Vie  Religieuse). 

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THE   HISTORY  OF  ST.   CATHERINE   OF   SIENA 

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DUCHESS  OF  THURINGIA.  By  the  COUNT  DE  MONTALEM- 
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HISTORY  OF  ST.  VINCENT  DE  PAUL,  Founder  of 

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HENRY   STUART,    CARDINAL    OF   YORK,   AND 

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HISTORICAL     LETTERS     AND     MEMOIRS     OF 

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Contents. — Essays.  Religious  Instruction  in  Intermediate  Schools — In  a  Dublin  Art 
Gallery — Emerson — Free-Thought  in  America — German  Universities  (Three  Essays) — 
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Character— The  Limitations  and  Possibilities  of  Catholic  Literature. 


10  A  LIST  OF  WORKS 

Cardinal  Newman's  Works. 

i.   SERMONS. 

PAROCHIAL  AND  PLAIN  SERMONS.      Eight  vols. 

Crown  8vo.     3s.  6d.  each. 

SELECTION,   ADAPTED  TO  THE   SEASONS  OF 

THE     ECCLESIASTICAL     YEAR,     from    the    "Parochial    and   Plain 
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SERMONS  BEARING   UPON   SUBJECTS  OF   THE 

DAY.     Crown  8vo.     3s.  6d. 

DISCOURSES     TO     MIXED      CONGREGATIONS. 

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OCCASIONAL  SERMONS.     Crown  8vo.     3s.  6d. 

2.  TREATISES. 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  JUSTIFICATION.  Cr.  8vo.  3s.  6d. 
THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  CHRISTIAN  DOCTRINE. 

Crown  8vo.     3s.  6d. 

THE   IDEA   OF  A   UNIVERSITY  DEFINED  AND 

ILLUSTRATED.     Crown   8vo.     3s.  6d. 

UNIVERSITY   TEACHING  considered  in  nine  discourses.      Being  the 

First   Part   of    "  The    Idea   of    a    University    Defined   and    Illustrated ". 

With  a  Preface  by  the  Rev.  JOHN  NORRIS.     Fcp.  8vo.     Gilt  Top. 

2s.  net.      Leather,  3s.  net. 

A  GRAMMAR  OF  ASSENT.     Crown  8vo.     3s.  6d. 

AN  INDEXED  SYNOPSIS  OF  NEWMANS  'GRAMMAR  OF 
ASSENT".    Bythe  Rev.  JOHN  J.  TOOHEY.S.J.    Cr.  8vo.    3s.  6d. 

3.  HISTORICAL. 

HISTORICAL    SKETCHES.      Three  vols.      Crown   8vo. 

3s.  6d.  each. 

Vol.  I.  The  Turks  in  their  Relation  to  Kurope  — Marcus  Tullius  Cicero— Apollonius 
of  Tyana— Primitive  Christianity. 

Vol.  II.— The  Church  of  the  Fathers— St.  Chrvsostom— Theodoret— Mission  of  St. 
Benedict    -Benedictine  Schools. 

Vol.  III.— Rise  and  Progress  of  Universities  (originally  published  as  "  Office  and 
Work  of  Universities")— Northmen  and  Normans  in  England  and  Ireland— Mediaeval 
Oxford — Convocation  of  Canterbury. 

THE  CHURCH  OF  THE  FATHERS.  Reprinted  from  "Historical 
Sketches".  Vol.  II.  With  a  Preface  by  the  Rev.  JOHN  NORRIS. 
Fcp.  8vo.     Gilt  Top.     2s.  net.      Leather,  3s.  >nt. 


MAINLY  BY  ROMAN  CATHOLIC  WRITERS.  II 

Cardinal  Newman's  Works — continued. 

4.  ESSAYS. 

TWO  ESSAYS  ON  MIRACLES.     Crown  8vo.    3s.  6d. 

DISCUSSIONS  AND  ARGUMENTS.    Cr.  8vo.    3s.  6d. 

1.  How  to  accomplish  it.  2.  The  Antichrist  of  the  Fathers.  3.  Scripture  and  the 
Creed.  4.  Tamworth  Reading-room.  5.  Who's  to  Blame  ?  6.  An  Argument  for 
Christianity. 

ESSAYS,  CRITICAL  AND  HISTORICAL.    Two  vols., 

with  notes.  Crown  8vo.  7s. 
1.  Poetry.  2.  Rationalism.  3.  Apostolic  Tradition.  4.  De  la  Meinais.  5.  Palmer 
on  Faith  and  Unity.  6.  St.  Ignatius.  7.  Prospects  of  the  Anglican  Church.  8.  The 
Anglo-American  Church.  9.  Countess  of  Huntingdon.  10.  Catholicity  of  the  Anglican 
Church.  11.  The  Antichrist  of  Protestants.  12.  Milman's  Christianity.  13.  Reformation 
of  the  XI.  Century.     14.  Private  Judgment.     15.  Davison.     16.  Keble. 

5.  THEOLOGICAL. 
THE    ARIANS    OF    THE    FOURTH    CENTURY. 

Crown  8vo.      3s.  6d. 

SELECT  TREATISES  OF  ATHANASIUS.    Two  vols. 

Crown  8vo.     7s. 

TRACTS :   THEOLOGICAL  and  ECCLESIASTICAL. 

Crown  8vo.     3s.  6d. 

1.  Dissertatiuncula?.  2.  On  the  Text  of  the  Seven  Epistles  of  St.  Ignatius.  3.  Doc- 
trinal Causes  of  Arianism.  4.  Apollinarianism.  5.  St.  Cyril's  Formula.  6.  Ordo  de 
Tempore.     7.  Douay  Version  of  Scripture. 

6.   POLEMICAL. 
THE  VIA  MEDIA  OF  THE  ANGLICAN  CHURCH. 

Two  vols.  Crown  8vo.  3s.  6d.  each.  Vol.  I.  Prophetical  Office  of  the 
Church.     Vol.   II.     Occasional    Letters  and  Tracts. 

DIFFICULTIES  OF  ANGLICANS.      Two  vols.      Crown 

8vo.  3s.  6d.  each.  Vol.  I.  Twelve  Lectures.  Vol.  II.  Letters  to  Dr. 
Pusey  concerning  the  Blessed  Virgin,  and  to  the  Duke  of  Norfolk  in 
defence    of    the    Pope  and  Council. 

PRESENT    POSITION    OF   CATHOLICS   IN    ENG- 
LAND.    Crown  8vo.    3s.  6d. 

APOLOGIA  PRO  VITA  SUA. 

Crown  8vo.     3s.  6d. 

Pocket  Edition.     Fcp.  8vo.     Gilt  Top.    2s.  6d.  net.     Leather,  3s.  6d.  net. 

Popular  Edition.     8vo.     Sewed,  6d.  net. 

The  ''  Pocket  "  Edition  and  the  "  Popular  "  Edition  of  this  booh  contain  a  letter,  hitherto 
unpublished,  written  by  Cardinal  Newman  to  Canon  Flanagan  in  1857,  which  may  be  said 
to  contain  in  embryo  the  "  Apologia  "  itself. 


12      WORKS  MAINLY  BY  ROMAN  CATHOLIC  WRITERS. 

Cardinal  Newman's  Works — continued. 

7.   LITERARY. 

VERSES  ON  VARIOUS  OCCASIONS.      Crown  8vo. 

3s.  6d. 

THE  DREAM  OF  GERONTIUS, 

16mo.     Sewed,  6d.     Cloth,    Is.  net. 

School  Edition,  with  Introduction  and  Notes  by  Maurice  Francis  Egan,  A.M.. 
LL.D.,  Professor  of  English  Language  and  Literature  in  the  Catholic 
University  of  America,  Washington,  D.C.  With  Portrait.  Crown  8vo. 
Is.  6d. 

Presentation  Edition,  with  an  Introduction  specially  written  for  this  Edition  by 
E.  B(L).  With  Photogravure  Portrait  of  Cardinal  Newman,  and  5  other 
illustrations.     Large  Crown  8vo,  bound  in  cream  cloth,  with  gilt  top.     3s.  net. 

LOSS  AND  GAIN  :  The  Story  of  a  Convert.  Cr.  8vo.  3s.  6d. 
CALLISTA  :  A  Tale  of  the  Third  Century.    Cr.  8vo.    3s.  6d. 

8.   DEVOTIONAL. 

MEDITATIONS  AND  DEVOTIONS.  Part  I.  Medita- 
tions for  the  Month  of  May.  Novena  of  St.  Philip.  Part  II.  The 
Stations  of  the  Cross.  Meditations  and  Intercessions  for  Good  Friday. 
Litanies,  etc.  Part  III.  Meditations  on  Christian  Doctrine.  Conclusion. 
Crown  8vo.      5s.   net. 

Also  in  Three  Parts  as  follows.     Fcap.  8vo.      Is.  net  each. 

Part     I.  THE  MONTH  OF  MAY. 

Part    II.  STATIONS  OF  THE  CROSS. 

Part  III.  MEDITATIONS  ON  CHRISTIAN  DOCTRINE. 


LETTERS   AND    CORRESPONDENCE    OF    JOHN 

HENRY  NEWMAN  DURING  HIS  LIFE  IN  THE  ENGLISH 
CHURCH.  With  a  brief  Autobiography.  Edited,  at  Cardinal  Newman's 
request,  by  ANNE   MOZLEY.     2  vols.      Crown  8vo.     7s. 

ADDRESSES   TO    CARDINAL    NEWMAN,    WITH 

HIS  REPLIES.  1879  81.  Edited  by  the  Rev.  W.  P.  NEVILLE  (Cong. 
Orat.).      With  Portrait  Group.      Oblong  crown  8vo.       6s.  net. 


L.     5000-iv/09.     A.U.P. 


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