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OOD SUPPLIES IN
EACE AND WAR
R. HENRY REW
FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE
AND WAR
H>r
FOOD SUPPLIES IN
PEACE AND WAR
BY
(SIR) R. HENRY REW, K.C.B.
TREASURER, INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL INSTITUTE J HON. FOREIGN
SECRETARY, KOYAL STATISTICAL SOCIETY; AUTHOR OK
LONGMANS, GREEN AND GO.
39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON
FOURTH AVENUE & 30TH STREET, NEW YORK
BOMBAY, CALCUTTA, AND MADHAS
I92O
PREFATORY NOTE
To my old friend, and sometime colleague,
Major Craigie, C.B., I inscribe this book,
knowing that in him it will find one sympa-
thetic reader.
My interest in food supply statistics, and
in agricultural economics generally, extends
over nearly forty years, and it has been my
good fortune to have opportunities of con-
tinuing, and, in some degree, supplementing
the pioneer work in this field, for which
Major Craigie's name is known throughout
the world. The influence which, mainly on
his initiative, the International Statistical
Institute exercised in formulating general
principles for the collection of statistics of
agricultural production has been, in more
recent years, reinforced by the specialised
and systematic work of the International
Agricultural Institute. There still remain
many gaps to be filled and many defects to
be remedied before statistics of the world's
food supplies attain completeness. The war
has set new obstacles in the path of statistical
progress, and it is impossible at once to
vi PREFATORY NOTE
re-establish all the old international relations.
The years that have passed since the Inter-
national Statistical Institute last met, at
Vienna in 1913, have left scars which time
alone can heal, and some of those who fore-
gathered there have passed away.
An adequate survey of the wide field sug-
gested by the title of this book must await
fuller knowledge and more quiet times.
Here is an attempt only to indicate the main
features and to get the salient facts into right
perspective. The treatment of the subject
is more insular than I intended at the outset,
but it is not easy to look with equal eye on
all the nations when our own difficulties
loom large and insistent. The aftermath
of the war involves a re-orientation of
national policy in regard to all economic
and social questions, among which the
future of the Land and all that this implies
is prominent. Politics are outside the
scope of this book, and it deals with the past
as well as the present. For, after all, if the
problems of to-day present themselves in a
new guise they have their roots in a very old
world.
R. H. R.
December 1919.
CONTENTS
CHAP. i PAGE
INTRODUCTION ..... I
I. BEFORE THE WAR
i. THE WORLD'S SUPPLY AND DEMAND . . 7
II. THE FOOD SUPPLY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 2O
II. WAR TIME
I. THE EFFECT ON WORLD'S SUPPLIES . . 30
II. FOOD PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 40
III. STATE CONTROL OF FOOD SUPPLIES . . 59
III. AFTER THE WAR
I. THE WORLD POSITION .... 96
II. BRITISH AGRICULTURE . . . .136
III. THE HUMAN FACTOR . . . 175
INDEX l8l
FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE
AND WAR
INTRODUCTION
OF the three elementary needs of man-
food, shelter and clothing food is not only
the most vital, but also the most universal
and constant. Dwellings and clothes may
be, in some climates and under some con-
ditions, temporarily or even permanently
dispensed with, but a regular supply of food
is the prime necessity of life. Man may rely,
like the "black fellow" of the Australian
bush, on nature, and make little more pro-
vision for his sustenance from day to day
than the animals, or he may depend, like the
inhabitants of crowded cities, for every meal
on a complicated and widespread organisa-
tion ; but in any case food he must have
or die.
2 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
It follows from this elementary fact, that
food has been in all ages a munition of war,
as well as a commodity of peace. Instru-
ments of slaughter have been developed by
man's ingenuity. Slings, catapults, bows and
arrows, spears, swords, muskets, cannon,
torpedoes, bombs, poison gas all the devilish
paraphernalia for the destruction of human
life have been evolved with the progress of
invention and science, but starvation remains
the simplest and most deadly of all the means
by which war may be waged. The history
of warfare is full of instances of the use of
beleaguerment or blockade as a military
operation whether of an isolated stockade
or fort in the wilderness ; of a city, as in the
case of Paris in 1870, or of a nation as in
the case of the United Kingdom or Germany
in the recent war. The operation may have
been successful or unsuccessful, but its legiti-
macy has never been questioned. The fact
that the Germans, while using their utmost
efforts to employ the weapon of starvation
against their enemies, protested vehemently
that it was a violation of the laws of warfare
INTRODUCTION 3
when employed against themselves, is only
an instance of that strange Teutonic mentality,
the revelation of which so puzzled the civilised
world.
The invention of mechanical motive power,
and the consequent development of regular
and rapid means of transport throughout the
world, have de-localised food supplies. No
longer is any nation doomed to starvation
because its harvests fail or pestilence destroys
its flocks and herds. All the ends of the
earth can contribute to feed those who are in
need. The distribution of food is determined
not by physical but by economic forces, and
so long as the machinery of transportation
by land and sea is unhampered, the risk of
famine is shared by the whole community of
nations.
In considering the question of food supplies
in peace and war, we confine ourselves,
therefore, to the period, which is not after all
more than about forty years, in which the
means of transporting all kinds of food have
been so developed that any commodity,
however " perishable," may be conveyed
4 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
from the place of production to the place of
consumption, regardless of distance. There
are still some exceptions, but broadly speak-
ing, all the main articles of food can be, and
have been, conveyed in a marketable con-
dition from one end of the earth to the
other.
Food is the product of Agriculture, and
Agriculture embodies and typifies peace.
The husbandman is not easily disturbed by
war's alarms, and his intimate association
with the placid and inevitable processes of
Nature, engenders a calmness of spirit which
is unshaken by catastrophe. Many stories,
illustrative of this attitude of mind, were told
of the French and Flemish peasants. Even
within the range of the guns, and up to the
line of trenches, they pressed the plough,
resolved that the madness of mankind should
not interrupt the sane and ordered cultivation
of the soil. So sure a sense of values, so
complete an absorption in the things that
matter, are possible only to the tiller of the
soil. The quarrels of man are transient, the
processes of Nature are eternal.
INTRODUCTION
"The East bowed low before the blast
In patient deep disdain ;
She let the legions thunder past,
And plunged in thought again."
The devastating fury of war may pass over
the land, and the scars it leaves may long
remain, but Nature keeps her calm pro-
cession of seed-time and harvest, summer and
winter ; man returns, like a babe to the
breast, to the bosom of Mother Earth, who
brings forth her fruits in due season.
But if Nature remains serenely unchange-
able, mankind has changed. A new world is
being fashioned from the wreck of the old,
and a questioning spirit challenges the ancient
customs and traditions. Nowhere do these
customs and traditions hold stronger sway
than among the cultivators of the soil.
"The chief of Saints is him you name
Old Use-and-Wont, which was and is,
And is to come, always the same."
Use and wont, however, will not suffice in
the days which have now come upon the
earth. The old ways are trodden by the
feet of those who fought for freedom in many
6 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
lands and have come back with a new outlook
on life, while those who have not wandered
from their native fields have, nevertheless, felt
the perturbation of a great emotion. The
old men have dreamed dreams and the young
men have seen visions.
The Black Death has been called the
watershed of English economic history ; the
Great War is the watershed of the world's
economic history. In these pages an attempt
is made to present an outline of the facts
relating to that side of the economic upheaval
which affects the supply of food.
I. BEFORE THE WAR
CHAPTER I
THE WORLD'S SUPPLY AND DEMAND
" Subsistence is t in the nature of things, prior to con-
veniency and luxury." ADAM SMITH.
FOR two or three decades before the war
the predominant economic fact was the cheap-
ness of the main necessaries of life, and the
steadiness of prices in the world's markets,
year after year, of the chief articles of food.
This is readily shown by any table of index
numbers of the prices of commodities. Saeur-
beck's well-known index number for food in
1884 was 79, and fell to 70 in 1887. It rose
to 77 in 1891, and then fell rapidly to its
lowest point, 62, in 1896. It did not reach
70 again until 1907, but had risen to 75 in
1911, touched 81 in 1912, and stood at 77 in
1913. During the whole period the change
between one year and another was aever
7
8 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
more than six points, and the extreme varia-
tion during thirty years was nineteen points.
These records apply to prices of food in this
country, but inasmuch as the English market
is the largest and most regular in the world
for food supplies of all kinds, they substan-
tially represent the course of the world's
prices.
This stability of food prices is a remark-
able fact. Price represents the point at
which effective demand and available supply
meet, and it may rise or fall by a change
in the one or the other. But in the case
of the prime articles of food, price in a
prosperous community is especially the
barometer of supply. Demand per capita is
very constant, and a 10 or 20 per cent,
change in the general price level has only
a slight effect on the total quantities con-
sumed. The returns of food imports, and
such information as is available of consump-
tion, corroborate this. It appears, therefore,
that the world's demand for food, steadily
increasing by the regular growth of popula-
tion, was, for a quarter of a century or more,
HKFORK TI1K \VAI{ 9
almost exactly met, year after year, by the
world's supplies.
It is easy to overlook the significance of
this fact. The response of supply to demand
appears only natural and inevitable. We
regard it as an automatic process. But the
main food crops take a year, or, under favour-
able conditions, six months, to grow ; cattle
and sheep take two or three years to mature;
the producer, when he decides to risk his
capital and labour, must consciously or un-
consciously calculate a long way ahead the
probable state of the world's markets, which
depends largely on the effect of similar cal-
culations made by competing producers in
other parts of the globe. And when he has
calculated and toiled, Nature intervenes,
doubles or halves his expected crops, or
decimates his herds and flocks. It may
therefore be said that the maintenance of so
even a balance between the world's supplies
and the world's demands is remarkable.
In this connection, it may be noted that
as in any single country all the food crops
of the year may fail as they practically did
10 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
in this country no longer ago than 1879, and
in many previous " famine " years which
English history records so there is ever the
possibility that all the crops in the world
may fail in the same year. That event is
improbable, but it cannot be said that the
risk is negligible.
The world's supplies of food, therefore,
depend partly on the efforts of man, and
partly on the kindliness of Nature ; their dis-
tribution depends entirely on the enterprise
of man. The organisation which brought,
with unfailing regularity, from diverse and
remote corners of the globe, the daily meal
of the humblest consumer, was a triumph
of human endeavour. The intricacy of the
machinery which worked with such smooth-
ness was apparent when the operations of
war interfered with it. Apart from direct
enemy action, a dislocation of the machine
was caused immediately ships had to be
withdrawn from the regular trade routes,
and the delicacy of the adjustment of the
several parts was demonstrated when the
heavy hand of the State had to be intro-
BEFORE TIIK \VAI<
11
duccd, in substitution for the lighter and
more flexible fingers of those who were
previously responsible.
In the world's exchange of commodities,
wheat takes a foremost place, both in impor-
tance and bulk. The selling countries were
few. Taking them as they ranked on the
basis of their exports of wheat and flour, in
the five years before the war (the figures
representing the average yearly quantity in
thousands of tons exported in 1909-13), they
were :
Wheat.
Flour.
Total
(as wheat).
Russia
4,!? 1
117
4,333
United States
1,428
914
2,697
Argentina
2,386
119
2,551
Canada
1,988
33
2,409
Roumania
i3
74
1,414
India .
1,300
53
1,374
Australia
1,125
129
i,34
There were one or two other minor sources
of supply, such as North Africa.
The buying countries were rather more
numerous. The list of them, with their
12 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
average imports in thousands of tons in
1 909-1 3' being:
Wheat.
Flour.
Total
(as wheat).
United Kingdom
5^64
532
5;95
Germany .
2,383
15
2,404
Holland .
1,791
190
2,055
Belgium .
i,977
3
1,981
Italy
1,528
2
J ;53 J
France
1,022
10
1,036
Brazil
340
162
565'
Switzerland
443
443
Sweden
181
7
191
Greece
182
i
183
Denmark .
109
5i
180
Spain
I2O
120
Egypt and China imported considerable
quantities of flour. Belgium and Holland
rank as importing countries ; but both, in
fact, exported large quantities of wheat, so
that the figures of their purchases do not
represent their own requirements.
In dealing with the food supplies of the
world, we are concerned mainly with crops
and produce in which there is international
trade, and in this connection wheat is pre-
dominant. But it is not the sole, perhaps
in; FORE THE WAK 18
not the chief, crop which furnishes the "staff
of life " to the world's inhabitants. Even
in Europe, there are probably more persons
whose daily bread is made from rye, than
there are who eat a wheaten loaf. Rice
is the main " bread-stuff" of Asia, as maize
is of South Africa, while maize also forms a
considerable part of the dietary of America.
India supplies nearly the whole of the world's
demand for rice, her exports in 1909-13
being 2,350,000 tons per annum. There
was a large international trade in maize,
mainly for stock-feeding : Argentina, the
United States, Roumania and Russia being
the chief sellers, and the United King-
dom, Germany, Holland, Belgium, France,
Austria- Hungary, Italy and Denmark the
chief buyers.
Of meat, including the flesh of swine as
well as of cattle and sheep, the chief sellers
were the United States, Argentina, New
Zealand, Denmark, Australia, Uruguay and
Holland, and about nine-tenths of the whole
supply came to the United Kingdom.
Sugar, cheese, butter, and certain kinds
14 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
of fruit, vegetables and nuts, are largely the
subject of international trade, but the details
need not for the present detain us.
The capacity of a nation for contributing
to the general stock is dependent on its
own production and consumption. Obvi-
ously it exports only the surplus which
remains after supplying the requirements of
its own people, and the continuance of its
exports depends upon the rate at which
its agricultural output keeps pace with, or
lags behind, its increasing population. The
increase in the population of the earth as a
whole, and in practically every nation on it
(with the exception of China, which is a
mystery in regard to vital statistics, and
some of the older nations, such as the
North American Indians), is, as Sir William
Crookes l forcibly pointed out, the menacing
factor in the problem of the world's food
supplies in the future. The Great War,
directly and indirectly, checked for a time
the increase of population in Europe, but
with a world population of, say, 1,650,000,000,
1 The Wheat Problem. Longmans, 1917.
UK FORE THE WAR 15
even the decimation of Europe would
only temporarily affect the secular increase
of mankind. The pressure on the means
of subsistence may for a time be relaxed,
but it will inevitably be resumed, and al-
though the time predicted by Sir William
Crookes, when the world may be faced with
an insufficiency of food, is much more distant
than he feared, and may, indeed, never come,
the relation of production to population is,
nevertheless, the vital issue to be faced in
any discussion of food supplies.
It is needless to say that any attempt to
relate the world's production of food to the
world's population is extremely difficult.
The statistical data are in some cases en-
tirely lacking, and in others of questionable
accuracy. A census of population is now
taken in most countries every ten years, and
fortunately they mostly synchronise, having
been last taken either in 1910 or 1911. The
influence of the International Statistical
Institute, and later also of the International
Agricultural Institute, has not only stimu-
lated the collection of official agricultural
16 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
statistics, but has also done much to co-
ordinate them.
The wheat area in a number of countries
in 1911 and in 1901, when compared with
the census returns of the two dates, gives
some indication of the extent to which pro-
duction kept pace with population during
the decade. Comparable figures for this
period are available for the British Empire
(comprising for this purpose the United
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, India and New
Zealand), for eleven European countries
(other than the United Kingdom), and for
six other countries, viz. Algiers, Argentina,
Japan, Russia in Asia, the United States
and Uruguay. Briefly summarised the
comparison is as shown on opposite page.
These figures show that during the first
decade of the century wheat-growing was
extended by about 46,000,000 acres, while
the population of the same countries increased
by 93,000,000, and the number of acres of
wheat per 1,000 persons increased from 280
to 310. The quantity of wheat represented
by an acre varies widely, and is, generally
BEFORE THE \\.\K
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18 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
speaking, in inverse ratio to the area under
cultivation in each country. Thus in Bel-
gium, with some 400,000 acres, the average
yield per acre was about 37 bushels, and in
the United Kingdom, with less than 2,000,000
acres, 33 bushels ; while in European Russia,
with 60,000,000 acres, it was 9! ; and in
India, with 28,000,000 acres, n| bushels.
An attempt to make a similar comparison
of the position of the world's resources of
meat, gave conflicting and less satisfactory
results. Within the British Empire the
numbers of cattle, sheep and pigs, showed
no general increase in relation to population,
except in South Africa, where cattle and
sheep markedly increased. In Europe,
Denmark increased her stock of cattle, but
in most countries neither the herds nor the
flocks had increased with the growth of
population, the tendency being in the oppo-
site direction. In most other countries the
figures for this period were too untrust-
worthy to afford any guide. 1
Further details as regards both crops and stock may
be found in Agricultural Statistics, Part V., for 1911 and
1912, issued by the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries.
HKFORE THE WAR 19
Without relying overmuch on the dubious
evidence of international statistics, from
which safe inferences can be drawn only
when the many traps for the unwary which
they contain are fully appreciated, it may
be said that up to the outbreak of war
there was no cause for anxiety as to the
adequacy of the world's supply of food to
meet the demand for any period which
seriously concerned the present generation.
The exploitation of new lands, brought within
reach by the development of transport, was
rapidly proceeding, and vast areas of im-
mense potentiality were being harnessed to
the service of mankind. With all the re-
sources of civilisation man must, in a sense,
ever live from hand to mouth, trusting from
year to year that the ancient promise will
not fail. But apart from this, his subsistence
was assured, and the spectre of famine was
only to be feared if it were invoked by the
deliberate action of his fellow-creatures.
CHAPTER II
THE FOOD SUPPLY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
"England has learnt lessons in agriculture from many
countries . . . but on the whole she has taught more than
she has learnt" ALFRED MARSHALL.
THE increasing dependence of the United
Kingdom on imported food supplies was for
many years before the war a familiar theme.
It was attributed to the combination of two
causes : a greater demand by reason of the
growth of population, and a lesser production
of home-grown food. The first is an evident
fact. The population of the United King-
dom increased from 21,000,000 in 1821, to
31,000,000 in 1871, and 45,000,000 in 1911.
At the same time the average standard of
living steadily rose, and the consumption of
food per head, if it did not greatly increase
in bulk, certainly became more varied, and
the demand more fastidious. The common
20
BEFORE T1IK \VAH 21
assumption that the home production of food
seriously diminished, particularly during the
past forty or fifty years, is not so well-
founded. It may be the fact, but there is no
sufficient evidence of it.
There is no question that the total quantity
of food produced in Ireland has increased
since the " seventies " or "eighties," so that
any reduction which took place must have
been in Great Britain. That there was
a substantial reduction in the extent of
arable land in Great Britain amounting
between 1871 and 1911 to nearly 4,000,000
acres, and that the acreage of wheat during
the same period declined by 1,700,000
acres, are well-known facts. But the total
extent of cultivated, i. e. farmed, land was
maintained, and although there was a sub-
stantial loss in food productivity on land
turned from arable to grass, on the other hand
there was a great increase of market garden-
ing, and of intensive cultivation of the land
still kept under the plough. In live stock
there had been, on the whole, a substantial
increase. Sheep are a fluctuating quantity,
22 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
and went up and down by several millions
during the forty years, but the number at the
end of the period was practically the same as
at the beginning, while the head of cattle had
increased by 1,750,000. Both cattle and
sheep were brought much earlier to maturity,
so that the meat production represented by
animals annually enumerated had substantially
increased. This factor of increased produc-
tion per unit, whether per acre or per animal,
is sometimes overlooked, and leads to false
deductions from the figures. Milk is a salient
instance. Although the number of milk-pro-
ducing animals cows and heifers has sub-
stantially increased, it is true that while in
1 88 1 there were in the United Kingdom 105
cows and heifers for every 1,000 persons,
in 1911 there were only 97. But to draw
from these figures the conclusion that the
milk supply had diminished, would not be
warranted. The population increased by
14,000,000, there were no imports, and it
is notorious that large sections of the com-
munity drank far more milk per head than
they did forty years previously. The ex-
TIIK \YAH 28
planation lies in the greatly increased output
per cow. Cows were bred, kept and fed for
milk production much more generally and
effectively, and supply steadily increased to
meet the increased demand.
When British farmers are accused of lack
of enterprise or adaptability, the milk supply
before the war provides them with a fair
rejoinder. There were, no doubt, defects of
quality, condition, and distribution, but they
were due as much to the indifference of the
consumer as to the ignorance or cupidity of
the producer. Milk varies in quality, and its
quality can be improved by the use of better-
bred animals and by higher feeding both of
which involve extra cost. But the public
refused to pay a higher price for a better
article. The only thing the consumer cared
about was the price, and British farmers are
entitled to claim that the one product in
universal demand, of which they possessed
an absolute monopoly, was probably the
cheapest in relation to its food value in
the market.
Two or three years before the war com-
24 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
plete returns of the food production of this
country were for the first time obtained.
Certain additional information on some points
has been collected during the war, but the
inquiry made by the Board of Agriculture in
connection with the Census of Production
in 1 908 l still affords the basis for calcula-
tion. A Committee of the Royal Society
carefully examined the data in 1916, and
elaborated them by working out the food
values of each food product, and doing the
same for imported produce. The report of
this Committee, issued as a Parliamentary
Paper, 2 should be referred to by those who
wish to know, as accurately as possible, the
position in which this country stood as regards
its consumption of food at the outbreak of
the war. It effectually .disposed of a popular
misconception which even yet occasionally
appears as to the proportion of the nation's
food supply which is produced at home. In
1912, using for the first time the material
supplied in the Return of Agricultural Output,
1 The Agricultural Output of Great Britain (Cd. 6277).
2 Cd. 8421.
HKFORE THE WAR
I suggested that, excluding sugar and beve-
rages such as tea, coffee and cocoa, rather more
than half the total food requirements of the
United Kingdom was produced at home,
The Committee of the Royal Society, on the
same basis, and for practically the same
period, calculated the gross weight and food
value of home-grown and imported food
products as shown in the summary on the
following page.
From this calculation it appears that, omit-
ting sugar, home-grown produce amounted in
crude weight to nearly two-thirds (64 per
cent.) of the total supply. When to these
figures are added an estimate for cottage and
farm produce, for which the weight is not
given, and the total supply is converted into
calories, it appears that home produce sup-
plied about 48 per cent, in food value of the
total consumption. The Committee, how-
ever, also estimated that the nation consumed
1 5 per cent, more than was necessary for full
sustenance, and, if this were the case, we
were importing in excess of our needs, and
the home supply was relatively greater than
26 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
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HK10KK THE WAR U7
is indicated by the figures. It should, how-
ever, be added, without examining the calcu-
lations in detail, that there is some reason to
doubt the accuracy of this apparent excess of
consumption. It rests upon a calculation that
the theoretical requirements of an average
man doing an average day's work are 3,40x3
calories per day, which is not universally
accepted, and, in any case, is based on
a somewhat slender foundation of exact
observation.
That the nation before the war was amply
supplied with food is a fact, however, which
does not rest alone on statistical and physio-
logical evidence. At no time and in no country
was food so plentiful, varied and cheap. The
world competed to keep the larder of John
Bull fully stocked with all the necessaries
and luxuries of life. In 1913, the main
sources of supply outside the United King-
dom arranging them roughly in order of
the value of shipments of foodstuffs were :
the United States, Argentina, Denmark,
Canada, India, Australia, Russia, Nether-
lands, Germany, New Zealand, Austria-
28 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
Hungary, France, Spain, Ceylon. The
countries from whence mainly came the chief
articles of general consumption were:
Wheat: United States, Canada, India, Argentina,
Australia, Russia.
Beef and Mutton : Argentina, Australia, New Zealand,
Uruguay.
Bacon^ Hams and Pork : United States, Denmark,
Netherlands, Canada.
Rice: India.
Sugar: Germany, Austria, Cuba, Netherlands, Bel-
gium.
Butter and Margarine : Denmark, Netherlands, Russia,
Australia, Sweden, France, New Zealand.
Cheese : Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands.
Fruit : Spain, United States, France, Canada, Canary
Islands, Costa Rica, Colombia.
Tea : India, Ceylon, Java, China.
Cocoa : British West Africa, British West Indies,
Netherlands, Brazil, Switzerland.
Coffee : Brazil, Costa Rica, Colombia, Guatemala,
India, Mexico.
This catalogue includes only the principal
sources of supply for each commodity, and
other countries . also contributed in smaller
quantities.
It is not to be wondered at that an import
trade of such extent and magnitude its an-
nual value on arrival at these shores exceeding
BEFORE THE WAR 29
^200,000,000 should loom large in the eye
of the public, and that whatever statisticians
might say, the nation's dependence for food
on overseas supplies should be regarded as
the pregnant and predominant factor in our
national existence :
" For the bread that you eat and the biscuits you nibble,
The sweets that you suck and the joints that you
carve,
They are brought to you daily by All Us Big Steamers,
And if any one hinders our coming you'll starve ! "
This might not be literally true, and it has
since been proved that very great hindrance
may occur before we are brought to actual
starvation. But it expressed the popular
belief, and when war broke out even our firm
trust in the Navy did not altogether prevent
a moment of panic.
II.WAR TIME
CHAPTER I
THE EFFECT ON WORLD'S SUPPLIES
" The shattered links of the worlds broken chain"
BYRON.
ALTHOUGH certain pious people believed
in the coming, at some indefinite and ever-
receding date, of Armageddon, and although,
certain prescient people were convinced, by
sinister signs, that a megalomaniac monarch
intended to crown his career by an attempt
to seize the dominion of the Earth, the great
mass of work-a-day folk refused to believe
seriously that at this stage of civilisation the
madness of a great war was possible. All
nations, except those who planned the crime,
were unprepared. In the sphere of military
and naval action some provision for defence
against aggression had been made, and that
30
WAR TIME 81
the preparations were at the outset entirely
inadequate, was due to the universal failure
to foresee the nature of the struggle which had
to be provided for. In the economic sphere
no preparation had been made. The storm
burst upon the world of business which is
the world in which nine-tenths of every com-
munity live, move and have their being
with stupefying force. If Governments had
failed to visualise the situation, the commer-
cial community were infinitely more blind.
There is a bitter sense of humour in recalling
the first weeks of the war, when we prated
of ''business as usual," and many of the
eager spirits who sprang to obey the call
chafed during their training in fear that they
might not be out in time for the finish.
The first blow fell upon shipping. The
mercantile marine of Germany, representing
about 1 1 per cent, of the world's ton-
nage, disappeared, and heavy drafts were
made upon the remaining ships for the
transport of troops and stores, and for the
" lawful occasions " of the White Ensign.
Great liners, whose names were household
82 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
words, were withdrawn from public use ; all
the trade routes were denuded ; ocean services
which had been during the memory of man
as regular as the Holyhead to Dublin packet
were interrupted, and even the fishing fleets
were raided. In the belligerent countries
land transport was similarly reduced and
crippled. As an army marches and fights
on its belly, so commerce lives on transport,
and the measure of international trade is the
measure of the facilities for the movement of
commodities. The complete stoppage of the
oversea trade of Central Europe, and the
rapid reduction of the exporting capacity
of the belligerent countries whose ports were
open, modified for a time the effect of the
sudden reduction of the mercantile marine,
but before long the ever-increasing demands
of the fighting forces, and the development
of the submarine attack, so reduced the
world's tonnage available for commercial use,
as practically to stop all international trade,
except in food and material for carrying on
the war. The war, in fact, not only became
the " national industry" of each of the Allies,
WAR TIME 88
but almost the whole of the world's commer-
cial and industrial organisation was enlisted
for its requirements.
International trade in foodstuffs was, in the
first instance, mainly affected by the loss of
the sugar supplies of Germany and Austria,
and in a lesser degree by the interference
with supplies of butter and eggs from Russia.
A still heavier blow was struck when Turkey
entered the war, and the closing of the Dar-
danelles blockaded the Russian and Balkan
grain supplies. On the other hand, the
demand on the world's food supplies was re-
duced by the elimination of Central Europe
from the oversea markets, in which Germany
had been a heavy buyer.
The outbreak of war was timed, no doubt
deliberately, for the period when the harvest
in Central Europe was practically all in-
gathered. Whether or no a " lightning "
campaign, to be crowned with victory in a
few months, was, as is probable, confidently
expected, the German Government, with the
whole of the crops of wheat, rye and pota-
toes in hand, could look forward without
D
84 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
serious anxiety, even if the war lasted until
the following autumn. Comparatively slight
economies in consumption would enable them
to keep the country well fed on its own
resources, while, especially after the closing
of the Dardanelles, they counted with some
certainty on drawing supplies, if necessary,
from Roumania and Bulgaria. The idea
which found so much popular favour in the
early stages of the war, that Germany could
be reduced to submission by starvation,
was chimerical. It was probably originated
and fostered by German agents, in the hope
that the Allies would limit their military
preparations, and rely upon the easier and
less costly method of the blockade, which
the German Government well knew could
never win the war. The same propaganda
was pursued even beyond the signing of the
Armistice, although in its later stages its object
was to convince the world and the German
people that Germany was not defeated by
force of arms, and that the German army
retired from the struggle unconquered and
unconquerable. Germany was short of food
WAR TIME 85
in the later years of the war, mainly owing
to the exhaustion of her soil, and had to
endure privation and hardship, but not to
a greater degree than some of the nations
who were the victims of her crimes. The
real difference was that she exploited the
suffering which she brought upon her people
to serve the ends of her policy, and to invoke
the facile sympathy of that large section of
mankind who give their alms to the most
plausible and importunate beggar.
The wheat crop in the United States in
1914 was fortunately good, and although
in Canada it was short, the total supply from
North America was well above the average.
Everything depended, however, on the crops
of Argentina and India. In India a notable
effort was made to increase the wheat acre-
age, and no less than 4,000,000 acres were
added. In the following spring India pro-
duced one of the largest wheat crops she had
ever grown, although the actual shipment of
the surplus presented special difficulties. In
Argentina, although the acreage was not in-
creased, the crop was exceptionally large, but
36 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
Australia had one of the smallest crops on
record, and was, in fact, an importing country
for that season.
The war lasted for just over four "cereal"
or harvest years, as they are commonly
reckoned, and the first September-August
1914-15 was the most critical as regards
the world's wheat supplies. Only the
bumper crops in India and Argentina, which
were not available until the spring, saved
the situation after the Russian supplies
were cut off in February 1915. Owing
to the unusual lateness of the harvest of
1915 in North America, the supplies had
to suffice for thirteen months, but even
then there was a substantial quantity avail-
able for export, but not shipped before
August 1915, which counted as a "carry-
over " for the following year. Thereafter
there was no deficiency of supplies in sight,
although, owing to increasing difficulty ol
finding the necessary tonnage, large quanti-
ties could not be brought to market. The
fact was, that wheat-growers responded
alertly to the demand. India, being the first
WAR TIME 87
country after the outbreak of war to have a
sowing time, at once, as has been noted, in-
creased her acreage, and both the United
States and Canada did the same, although
their crops could not be available until the
next "cereal" year. In North America
about 12,000,000 acres more wheat were
sown at the first seed-time after war
was declared. Australia, which was the
most unfavourably situated, as regards both
time and distance, increased her wheat area
in 1915 by 3,000,000 acres, or about 30 per
cent. Altogether, therefore, it may be said
that during the first year of the war, the area
of wheat in the world was extended by over
18,000,000 acres. The exceptional crops of
1915-16 brought a natural reaction, and the
breadth of wheat sown somewhat decreased
in later years, owing to the menace to the
wheat-grower of the accumulated surplus,
especially in Australia.
Some stimulus was given to meat pro-
duction, particularly in Brazil and South
Africa, but as the export of meat from
countries south of the equator is dependent
38 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
entirely on the number of vessels with re-
frigerating fittings, as the available supply of
such vessels was known to be limited, and
its increase practically impossible, the risks
of marketing additional numbers of cattle
and sheep when they had been bred and
reared were obviously deterrent. The pos-
sibilities of increased supplies when more
favourable conditions return were fully ex-
plored, but the probability of their realisation
belongs to the post-war period. After
America had come into the war, an ener-
getic attempt was made in the United States
to supply the deficiency of the Allies in bacon
and pig-products, which for a time disturbed
the great swine-feeding and packing industry
of that country. This, however, belongs rather
to the category of the difficulties of belli-
gerents, than to that of the general world
interests, as affected by the war. It became
impossible, in fact, to dissociate the two
during the last two years of the war. Apart
from the fact that some States eventually
became belligerents, more or less actively,
and the " neutral" world almost disappeared,
WAR TIME 89
the commercial and agricultural interests of
the nations, whether officially engaged in the
struggle or not, were so interwoven that any
real discrimination of their economic position
is impossible.
CHAPTER II
FOOD PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
" The game is more than the player of the game>
And the ship is more than the crew." KIPLING.
THE crops in the United Kingdom, which
were being harvested, or on the point of
in-gathering, at the outbreak of the war, were,
on the whole, above the average of recent
years, and the agricultural situation was
favourable. The annual return of the harvest
showed the following results for each of the
corn crops and for potatoes, and the average
production of the preceding ten years is
given in each case for comparison :
1914 1904-13
Wheat quarters 7,804,000 7,094,000
Barley 8,066,000 7,965,000
Oats 20,664,000 21,564,000
Potatoes tons 7,476,000 6,592,000
The crop of beans was slightly above, and
that of peas considerably less than average.
40
WAR TIME 41
The root crop was below average, turnips
and swedes being about 2,700,000 tons,
and mangolds about 400,000 tons short.
The hay crop was also 1,700,000 tons be-
low average, but there was a considerable
quantity of old hay left from the heavy crop
of 1913.
The numbers of live stock in the country,
as returned in the previous June, were as
follows :
1914 1904-13
Cattle .... 12,185,000 11,756,000
Sheep .... 27,964,000 29,882,000
Pigs .... 3,953)000 3,805,000
It may be added that the number of horses
on farms was 200,000 below average,
but important as these were to the Army,
no one then thought of them as potential
meat supply. The availability of oats and
barley as potential breadstuffs was, how-
ever, speedily pointed out, and their use in
the loaf seriously discussed in view of the
uncertain prospects of wheat supplies during
the next twelve months. There was, however,
no immediate need for drastic action. The
military situation was so desperately critical,
42 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
that any outward sign of anxiety about our
vital food supplies would have given en-
couragement to our enemies at a time when
it was highly important to do nothing to
increase their confidence in their speedy
triumph. Prices of farm produce during
that autumn showed little sign of abnormal-
ity. Wheat rose about 10 per cent., barley
remained stationary, cattle rose about 3 per
cent, by November, but sheep and calves
showed no rise until December. Poultry
were plentiful and cheap, but eggs rose
substantially, and butter slightly. During
the first three months of the war, the imports
of wheat and flour were considerably heavier
then in the corresponding period of the
previous year.
Reference has previously been made to
the general position of home production in
relation to consumption. The extent to which
we could, at the outbreak of war, rely on our
own resources for the main articles of food,
may be seen from the following statement
of the approximate percentage of home sup-
plies to total requirements in each case :
WAR TIME 48
Per cent.
Wheat and flour 19
Meat (including pig meat) ... 60
Poultry 80
Eggs ... 65
Butter (including margarine) . . 40
Cheese ao
Milk (including condensed) ... 95
Fruit 30
Vegetables 90
The manner in which British farmers met
the situation during the first year of the
war, when they were unhelped and un-
hampered in the management of their busi-
ness by any direct action of the State, is
of some historical interest, and I venture,
therefore, to reproduce the substance of a
description of the agricultural position during
that period, which I gave in September
1915,* when the facts were freshly in mind.
The nation began to take a keen interest
in the agricultural resources of the country,
and farming became the object of general
solicitude. It was freely pointed out, with
undeniable truth, that our agricultural system
had not been arranged to suit the conditions
1 Presidential Address to Section M of the British
Association.
44 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
of a European war, and many suggestions
were made to meet the emergency. Some
of these suggestions involved intervention
by legislative or administrative action. It
was decided, however, that ajiy attempt
violently to divert the course of farming
from its natural channels would probably
not result in an increase of total production.
An Agricultural Consultative Committee, of
a very representative character, was ap-
pointed by the President of the Board of
Agriculture on August 10, 1914. It issued
some excellent and timely advice to farmers
as to their general line of policy, and this
was supplemented by the Board of Agri-
culture itself. Thirty special leaflets con-
taining suggestions and admonitions were
issued in a few weeks, but while all the
official recommendations were suitable and
reasonable, it would be rash to assume that
farmers universally adopted them. They
did not at that time accept official guidance
or direction with enthusiasm.
Unkempt about those hedges blows
An English unofficial rose,
WAR TIME 45
and official plants were not then wont to
flourish very kindly in the fields of this
country. Patriotism, however, suggested the
need for an effort to obtain the utmost possible
production from the land, and self-interest
also pointed in the same direction. During the
autumn the lure of self-interest was not very
apparent, but at the end of the year prices
began to rise rapidly. The price of English
wheat stood 25 per cent, higher than the
July level in December, 45 per cent, in
January, and 80 per cent, in May. Imported
wheat rose even higher, No. 2 Manitoba
being in May 95 per cent, above the July
level. Cattle and sheep had risen in March
by 20 per cent., and in May and June cattle
had risen by 40 per cent. Butter rose by
about 20 per cent., and cheese by about
40 per cent. Milk rose little during the
winter, but when summer contracts were made
the winter price was generally maintained.
There are three main types of farming :
corn-growing, grazing and dairying. They
intermix indefinitely, and there are large inter-
ests such as fruit-growing, market-gardening,
46 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
etc., which are not included in this classi-
fication, but, broadly speaking, the tripartite
division corn, meat, milk includes the
large majority of farms, and one or other
of these represents the dominant interest of
the farmer. During the first year of the
war, the corn-growing farmer did well, the
meat-producing farmer moderately well, and
the dairy farmer indifferently.
While the markets were going in his
favour, the farmer's difficulties began. Feed-
ing-stuffs rose substantially in price. The
supply of potash, which came entirely from
Germany, was, of course, stopped, and other
fertilisers became dearer. The calling up
of the Territorial battalions, and the ready
response of the countryside to the appeal
for the new armies, resulted in the with-
drawing of 15 per cent, of the pick of the
agricultural labourers by the end of January.
A rise in wages followed, and the gross
additional payment to labour by farmers
during the twelve months was calculated at
about ,2,000,000.
At the end of the cereal year the results
WAR TIME 47
of the agricultural effort were seen in an
increase of the wheat acreage by 22 per
cent., and of the oats acreage by 7 per cent.,
while the area under potatoes had been kept
up to the high and sufficient level of the
previous year. The stock of cattle was
increased in Great Britain, but slightly de-
creased in Ireland, so that the total for the
United Kingdom was about the same as
in 1914, i.e. the highest on record. Sheep
were increased by about 300,000.
The second year of the war saw the
difficulties of farmers, especially in regard
to labour and feeding-stuffs, increase con-
siderably, but, on the other hand, the prices
of all kinds of farm produce continued to
rise. But for the persistent belief in some
quarters that 1916 would see the end of
the war, there was every inducement to
farmers, in their own interests, to increase
production still further. Their failure to do
more may be attributed mainly to the short-
age of labour, but largely also to their re-
luctance to break up grass land, and incur
the heavy liability of doing so, under what
48 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
appeared to be the uncertainty of the im-
mediate future, and the possibility that before
even one crop from the new arable land
could be harvested, war conditions might
be over, and prices might come down with
a run.
The third year of the war opened with
the agricultural position steadily getting
worse. The Government, however, began
to take direct measures for the control of
foodstuffs, and the cereal year 1916-17 had
hardly commenced when the trade in im-
ported wheat, and soon afterwards the whole
trade in grain, was taken out of the hands
of private traders and undertaken by the
Wheat Commission. This in itself was
obviously not encouraging to British corn-
growers, who naturally feared the effect on
their business when their competitor in the
market was the Government, which might,
or might not, sell at a profit, and which in
any case, by requisitioning vessels, could
bring grain to the country more cheaply
than private individuals. A little later,
however, though somewhat tardily from the
WAR TIMK 49
farmers' point of view, as the main wheats
sowing season had passed, the Government
took direct action to stimulate home pro-
duction by offering a guarantee of prices,
by ordering, under the powers of the De-
fence of the Realm Act, an extensive break-
ing up of grass land, and by undertaking
the supply of labour, both manual and
mechanical, to supply the gaps left on the
land by conscription. These efforts to
increase food production were, however,
accompanied by a series of orders, commenc-
ing in November 1916, which eventually
fixed maximum prices for all the produce
which farmers had to sell. However care-
fully prices may be fixed and they were,
in fact, adjusted with anxious consideration
for the producers' interests the simple fact
that the State assumes the power of settling
the market value of any commodity, must
inevitably tend to check the enterprise of
the producers of that commodity.
The net results of the various influences
which affected agricultural production are
shown by the returns of acreage of crops
50 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
and of live stock in each year. It must
be remembered that the figures represent
the state of affairs in June, so that those
for 1914 show the position two months
before the outbreak of war, and those for
1918 the position five months before the
Armistice was signed. The figures are for
the United Kingdom as a whole, and for
thousands of acres :
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
Arable land
19,414
'9,347
19,499
19,748
21,221
Wheat
1,906
2,335
2,054
2,106
2,796
Barley
i,873
1,524
1,653
i,797
1,840
Oats .
3,899
4,182
4,171
4,789
5,641
Rye .
67
60
66
69
116
Total Corn .
7,745
8,101
7,944
8,761
io,393
Beans .
301
273
243
218
I All
Peas .
170
130
113
132
1 1 A *
Potatoes
1,209
1,214
1,155
1,512
Small Fruit .
IOI
97
96
96
91
Of the crops included in the above table,
wheat, potatoes, and small fruit are grown
exclusively for human consumption, and the
WAR TIME 51
remainder only partially so. Barley, oats,
and rye are potential breadstuff's, and during
the year 1917-18 were largely introduced
into the loaf, especially barley. Beans were
slightly used, while potatoes were also used
somewhat largely at one time for this purpose.
The whole extent of the increased area
devoted to food crops is not shown in these
figures. Under the insistent call for home-
grown food, a large number of allotments
were created in and around the towns ;
parks, recreation grounds, golf links, etc.,
were partially cultivated, and private indi-
viduals dug up their lawns and grew vege-
tables on plots formerly devoted to flowers.
Even the flower-beds in front of Buckingham
Palace were utilised as potato grounds. The
enthusiasm for the potato was, in fact, as it
turned out, somewhat excessive, as both
1917 and 1918 were marked by good croj s
following on the exceptionally short crop of
1916. If the sky had rained potatoes, in
response to Falstaff's invocation, they could
hardly have been more plentiful, and there
was, in consequence, a certain amount of
52 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
waste. The multiplication of self-suppliers,
of course, greatly restricted the demand
upon the supply grown for market.
While Paul might plant and Apollos might
water, the increase remained in the hands of
Providence, and the crops of 1918 were un-
usually good. Of the four preceding years
1914 was, on the whole, the best, the inter-
mediate harvests being generally moderate.
The production of corn crops and potatoes,
in each year of the war which included five
harvests in the United Kingdom, is shown
in the following table, the numbers being in
thousands :
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
Wheat (quarters)
7,804
9,239
7,472
8,040
11,643
Barley
8,066
5,862
6,613
7,185
7,76o
Oats
20,664
22,308
2i,334
26,021
3M96
Beans
I,I2O
924
893
474
93i
Peas
374
300
261
278
441
Potatoes (tons)
7,476
7,540
5,469
8,604
9,223
The difficulties confronting farmers in
maintaining the meat and milk supply were
not less than those with which they had to
deal in maintaining the cultivation of the soil.
WAR TIME 58
The problem which faced them was, indeed,
in some respects more difficult. In the case
of crops there was no dubiety as to their
duty to the nation, or much reason to ques-
tion that, on the whole, their self-interest
pointed in the same direction. But it was
not always clear whether the public interest
would be best served by maintaining the
number of live stock, or by deliberately
reducing it. It was easy to see that it would
be disastrous if milk-yielding cows and heifers
were reduced in number, but beyond this it
was uncertain. The clamour which arose
over the alleged excessive slaughter of stock,
especially calves, tended to perplex the stock-
keeper. This question of the slaughter of
calves, which so much agitated the Press and
public from time to time, was not without
its humorous aspect. It began first in the
spring of 1915, when a number of persons,
earnestly solicitous about our food supplies,
discovered to their horror that a large
number of farmers were either knocking
calves on the head as soon as they were
born, or were selling them for slaughter at
54 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
a very tender age. Why, these good people
asked, with a vehemence which aroused the
honest indignation of readers of the morning
papers why were not all these calves kept
to maturity, and properly turned into much-
needed beef? The crude physiological fact
that the production of a calf is the neces-
sary prelude to the production of milk, the
economic fact that to the cow-keeper the
calf is a bye-product which he disposes ot
if he can at a profit, but which he cannot
possibly keep and rear without altering his
whole business and reducing his stock of
cows, were not appreciated by the average
townsman. It wanted a still wider outlook
to realise that any systematic prohibition,
complete or partial, of the slaughter of calves
must mean, in the long run, a limitation of
the milk supply. If the number of calves
born is to be determined not by the quantity
of milk required, but by the number of stores
which can at any time be dealt with by
graziers, it is evident that the capacity of
the country for meat production will always
fix the limit of its output of milk. It is, of
WAR TIME 55
course, desirable that as many calves as pos-
sible should be reared, but that is the same
thing as saying that it is desirable to increase
the home production of meat.
The Government, in the last year of the
war, intervened very thoroughly in the busi-
ness of the home meat supply, the whole
trade in live stock for slaughter being
taken under control, and the arrangements
for marketing, slaughtering and distributing
being undertaken officially. To say that
this was agreeable to farmers, or that it en-
couraged the breeding of more stock, would
be untrue, but the action of the State was
accepted as inevitable, and stock-breeders
generally carried on under the novel con-
ditions as energetically as the inherent
difficulties of the situation allowed.
The story of the live-stock interest during
the war is shortly summarised in a statement
of the numbers returned in June of each year,
the figures being for the United Kingdom,
in thousands :
56 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
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WAR TIME 57
The steadfastness with which the herds
and flocks were maintained throughout all
the vicissitudes and difficulties of the war
period is a record upon which British stock-
owners may fairly be congratulated. The
heavy loss of pigs was unfortunate, but there
were peculiar reasons for this, and it is the
class of stock which can be re-established in
the shortest time.
Producers are never popular with con-
sumers, and high prices of food do not
engender a friendly feeling towards farmers.
But when the history of home food produc-
tion during the war comes in the future to be
calmly reviewed, it will be recognised that,
on the whole, the country is indebted to the
agricultural community for a successful effort
to assist in the great struggle. Those
engaged in food production, whether as
farmers or labourers, worked strenuously and
unceasingly in a real spirit of patriotism to
secure the utmost possible output. It is
easy for the cynic to say of the farmers that
the incentive was monetary gain, and he
might say with equal truth that this was the
58 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
motive which impelled those who worked
in munition factories. That many of those
engaged in the production of war material
of which food is an important part benefited
financially, is true enough, but it is not true
to say that it was only for personal gain
that they worked as they had never worked
before. There are a few wastrels in every
class of the community, but the men who
went from the countryside to fight, and who
return to the old homes, may be assured
that the overwhelming majority of those who
were left behind were not shirkers, but in
the sphere allotted to them honestly and
faithfully "did their bit."
CHAPTER III
STATE CONTROL OF FOOD SUPPLIES
" A nation is made powerful and honoured in the world
not so much by the number of its people^ as by the ability
and character of that people" WILLIAM COBBETT.
BEFORE the war the only interest which
the State took in food supplies was to impose
certain enactments and regulations for the
protection of the consumer against fraud,
misrepresentation and injury. The principles
laid down in the Sale of Food and Drugs
Acts had practically abolished the old con-
dition of things when
" Chalk and alum and plaster were sold to the poor for
bread,"
and in the main the food supply of the people
was honest and wholesome, as well as cheap.
The State also drew a substantial amount
of revenue from certain articles of food and
drink, such as sugar, chocolate, cocoa, tea,
59
60 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
coffee and alcoholic liquors. Beyond this
the feeding of the nation was left entirely to
private enterprise, and the basic principle
of supply was caveat emptor. Plenty of
theoretical, and some practical, faults were
to be found. Physiologists and medical men
consistently pressed for stricter supervision
and more meticulous regulation by public
authorities, and undoubtedly their efforts had
been beneficial. Step by step the general
standard of food sold was raised, and its
producers and purveyors were increasingly
subjected to restrictions designed for the
protection of the public. As to the suffi-
ciency of supplies, which in earlier stages
of our history had often greatly concerned
the Government, no one suggested that any
action of the State was necessary or desirable
for the feeding of the nation in time of peace,
though some urged that measures should be
taken to ensure supplies in time of war. For
current needs food of all kinds was plentiful,
and it did not occur to any one that State
action could increase the total supply.
In theory it is quite possible for the State
WAR TIME 61
to undertake the supply to the nation of any
commodity, as in France matches, and in
Russia vodka, were supplied. Every state
also bought and manufactured goods for
the supply of its naval and military forces.
Except in its magnitude, there is nothing
novel in the socialistic ideal of the State as
universal provider to the community of all
the necessaries of life. The objections are
not theoretical, but practical. The question
to be faced is, will the community be better
served, and with regard to food in particular,
will the supply be equally good and plentiful ?
Every one answers this question, usually
with extreme confidence, according to his
convictions and prejudices, and, generally
speaking, without any evidence to support
his contention. The exigencies of war com-
pelled the State to embark on many adminis-
trative adventures, and to undertake many
economic experiments. When the time comes
to review in detail the economic history of
the war, the experience thus gained will form
a valuable contribution to the discussion of
the advantages and disadvantages of State
62 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
control of commodities. Whatever the con-
clusions may be, they will not solve the
problem, for success or failure under the
artificial economic conditions of the war
furnishes no final evidence that similar results
would follow under normal conditions. It is
easy to show, for instance, that certain food
prices would have been higher during the
latter part of the war without state control,
but this does not prove that prices would be
lower under a system of maximum prices
when economic conditions are normal.
The time has not yet come to discuss in
detail the wisdom or unwisdom of the various
steps taken by the Government during the
war to ensure and regulate the supplies of
food. Like all other measures adopted in
this supreme crisis, they will form the subject
of controversy for generations to come. At
present it is ' not possible to view them in
true perspective. Wisdom after the event
is to be desired as a guide to action in the
future, but it is futile as a basis for criticism
of past action. Every step taken must be
regarded in its relation to the circumstances
WAR TIME 68
of the time at which it was taken, and the
information then available to those who took
it. One general observation may be made
on this point. The Government may not
always have had complete information on
every occasion when they had to decide to
act, or not to act, but it is certain that they
usually had more comprehensive knowledge
of the facts of the situation than their
critics. At no moment throughout the war
was the economic situation simple. Even
when it was fairly clear as regards this
country, there was always the effect on each
of our Allies and the effect on the enemy to
be considered, and the best course for this
country might be highly inexpedient for
reasons which were extraneous but exigent.
The sort of critic whose watchword is
41 thorough," and whose favourite adjective
is "drastic," will never understand why the
Government did not at the outbreak of war
immediately take control of all food supplies,
and put the country on rations. He will
always maintain that this would have settled
the food problem at once, and we should
64 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
have had no more trouble. Of course, in
the nature of things he cannot be contra-
dicted ; he can only be disbelieved. At any
rate, that course was not adopted. On the
contrary, the policy adopted at the outset,
and consistently adhered to throughout, was
to deal with the situation as it developed,
and to avoid putting the people to incon-
venience and involving the State in large
financial liabilities and a costly machinery
of administration until it appeared to be
inevitable.
The first action of the Government in
regard to food supplies was to take stock
of the resources actually in the country
when war broke out. With the exception
of returns of stocks of grain at the port,
which were collected for the use of the grain
trade, there were no statistics of the quantity
of food in the country, although certain
estimates of the normal stocks of wheat and
some other foodstuffs (which proved to be
substantially accurate) had been laid before
the Royal Commission on Food Supplies in
time of war. It may be said, indeed, that
WAR TIME 65
the evidence and reports of that Commission,
as well as the information collected by the
Committee of Imperial Defence, contained
a considerable amount of information which
proved very useful. It was, however, neces-
sary to organise at once a system of periodical
returns of stocks of foodstuffs and of feeding-
stuffs for cattle, and this was done in the
first few days of the war indeed, it was
begun two days before the actual declaration
of war. No legal power existed to compel
traders to make such returns, but an Act was
at once passed for the purpose. It may be
recorded, however, to the credit of the trading
community, that neither before nor after the
passing of the Act was any reluctance (except
in one or two rare instances) shown to give
the information asked for, although it was
of a nature which up to then had been
regarded as a private, and often carefully-
guarded, secret of business. This may be
noted as the earliest interference by the
State in the business of food supply. The
exportation of food and of feeding-stuffs fro
animals was at once prohibited, except by
66 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
licence. The control of exports, which was
after a time placed in charge of a special
department, was the subject of much public
discussion. Our exports of food were, of
course, practically negligible, and mainly
consisted of supplies of certain articles, e.g.
biscuits to India and the Colonies. There
was, however, a considerable transit trade
in some articles, such as tea, maize, etc.
The restriction of exports had two objects,
the conservation of our own resources and
the prevention of supplies reaching the
enemy. The latter object was, of course,
part of the blockade which eventually
developed into a system of rationing the
supplies to neutral countries, whether reach-
ing them direct or through this country.
For a long time this control, which naturally
involved diplomatic difficulties of some deli-
cacy, was utilised as a means of coming to
friendly bargains with countries such as
Denmark, Norway and Holland, from whence
we normally drew large quantities of food, for
the maintenance of these supplies. Towards
the latter part of the war these arrange-
WAR TIME 67
ments were not maintained, our own supplies
of these articles were substantially reduced
in consequence, and the enemy for a time
had the advantage of the food which had
previously come here.
As we had drawn about half our supplies
of sugar from enemy countries, this was the
first article to claim the active intervention
of the Government. On August 20, 1914,
the Royal Commission on Sugar Supplies
was set up, to control all imports of sugar,
to buy all necessary supplies, and to regulate
their distribution. This, in fact, embodied
all the principles of State control which were
afterwards adopted, except that of individual
rationing. For a long time a system of
regulated distribution through the normal
trade channels was adopted, and worked so
smoothly that, except for the increase in
price, the public were hardly conscious of
a change.
On the first day of the war, the Govern-
ment announced that, reckoning the crop
then being harvested, there was sufficient
wheat in the country to last for five months.
68 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
During the next three months imports were
practically sufficient to keep pace with con-
sumption, so that at the end of October the
stocks in the country were about the same as
at the beginning of August. Nevertheless,
as has been previously noted, the outlook was
far from satisfactory. The action taken by
the Government was two-fold. A Committee
was set up to buy wheat and flour on
Government account, so as to accumulate a
reserve stock for the time when supplies
might run short, and its operations were con-
tinued in the following year. In February
1915, an arrangement was made with the
Indian Government for the exclusive ship-
ment of wheat to the United Kingdom,
under a system of regulated prices, a Com-
mittee being set up here to arrange for
purchase, shipment and distribution.
The supply of meat to our rapidly growing
armies soon involved the problem of the
maintenance of supplies for the civilian
population, and a scheme was arranged
between the War Office and the Board ol
Trade, which later developed into a system
WAR TIME 69
of the control and distribution of all oversea
supplies.
During 1914 and 1915 the competition of
France and Italy with the United Kingdom
in the world's markets, especially for grain,
had obviously tended to raise prices, and had
been detrimental to the mutual interests of
the Allies. The advantages of co-operation
in obtaining supplies had been recognised,
and at the instance of the British Govern-
ment the Commission Internationale de
Ravitaillement was established at the begin-
ning of the war, consisting of representatives
in the first instance of France, Belgium and
the United Kingdom, and later of all the
Governments who joined the Allied cause.
At the end of 1915, with the assistance of
the International Commission, a Joint Com-
mittee was established to purchase wheat and
other grain for the Allies in common, and
to arrange for freight and shipment to the
respective countries. Two Committees were
also set up to exercise control over British
shipping. A large number of British vessels
had, of course, been requisitioned for military
70 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
and naval service, and this was controlled
by a special department of the Admiralty, but
the regulation of shipping for civilian require-
ments, which were mainly grain, was under-
taken for some time by these Committees.
Shipping was the dominant factor of the
whole food supply position. Up to the end
of 1915, the actual loss by enemy action of
food-carrying vessels had been relatively
small, and the losses from the ordinary risks
of sea were less than the average an extra-
ordinary tribute to British seamanship, in view
of the fact that the lights were extinguished
round the coast, and the difficulties of naviga-
tion were greatly increased. In 1916 the
submarine attack became more effective, and
food-ships suffered heavily, many cargoes of
wheat being lost. Oversea supplies had
nevertheless been well maintained. During
the last five months of 1914, the imports of
wheat and flour amounted to 2,500,000 tons ;
during the year 1915 to 5,000,000 tons, and
in 1916 to 5,500,000 tons. The imports in
May and June 1916, were the largest which
had been made in a similar period since
WAR TIME 71
August and September 1914, when they
were unusually heavy. It could not be said,
therefore, that there had been any break-
down in the arrangements for maintaining
supplies, but, nevertheless, it was apparent that
with the ever-increasing difficulties of freight,
more stringent measures were desirable, it
not imperative.
On October n, 1916, the Royal Com-
mission on Wheat Supplies was appointed
and took over the functions of the Grain
Supplies Committee. It was entrusted with
full powers to purchase, sell and deal in
grain, and it speedily took control of the
whole trade in imported grain. It also,
shortly after its appointment, took over the
functions of the Allied Grain- Purchasing
Committee, and a new inter-allied body
known as the Wheat Executive was estab-
lished, the Wheat Commission acting as its
agents.
The appointment of the Wheat Commission
marked a definite stage in the development
of food control, and as it came just after the
end of the second year of the war, the
72 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAE
following statement showing the imports of
the main foodstuffs during the two " cereal
years " may be of interest. The figures are
in millions of hundredweights :
1914-15
1915-16
Wheat and Flour
111-5
1 1 1-8
Rice
IO'I
8'3
Sugar
35'8
32-0
Beef
8-0
7 '3
Mutton
4'6
3*5
Bacon
6-4
6-9
Hams
i*3
1*4
Butter
37
2'8
Margarine
i*7
2'6
Cheese .
2'8
2-5
The next, and still more important stage,
in the development of food control, was the
appointment of a Food Controller. On
November 15, 1916, in the course of a debate
on food prices, the Government announced
their decision to appoint a Food Controller.
On the following day powers as to the
maintenance of food supply were conferred
on the Board of Trade under the Defence of
the Realm Act, and in the next few days
four Orders were made regulating the making
WAR TIME 73
of bread and flour, prohibiting the use of
wheat for brewing, fixing the price of milk,
and regulating meals in public places. On
December 1 5, a bill providing for the appoint-
ment of a, Food Controller was introduced,
and on December 22 passed into law. Lord
Devonport was appointed Food Controller
four days later.
By the terms of the Act (6 & 7 Geo. V,
c. 68) the Food Controller was appointed " for
the purpose of economising and maintaining
the food supply of the country during the
present war," and his duty was stated to be
" to regulate the supply and consumption of
food in such manner as he thinks best for
maintaining a proper supply of food, and to
take such steps as he thinks best for encourag-
ing the production of food." The last-named
duty, that of encouraging production, so far
as it related to production in this country, was,
obviously, a function of the Departments
of Agriculture, and the Food Controller at
once proceeded to come to an arrangement
whereby, without relinquishing his statutory
powers and duties, active measures for en-
74 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
couraging home production were left to those
Departments. The Board of Agriculture and
Fisheries established a special branch, called
the Food Production Department, while the
Scottish and Irish Agricultural Departments
carried out the duties falling to them in
co-operation with the English Department
without any material change in the organ-
isation of their offices, other than the
appointment of such special officers as were
necessary. Meanwhile the Government an-
nounced its agricultural policy (subsequently
embodied in the Corn Production Act, 1917),
under which minimum prices for wheat and
oats were fixed for six years, the principle
of a minimum wage for farm labourers was
adopted, and provision was made for the
enforcement of proper cultivation and for
restricting the raising of agricultural rents.
To secure economy in the use of food was
not only the primary duty of the Food
Controller, but the opening of the "unre-
stricted" submarine campaign early in 1917
emphasised its importance. The menace to
our food supplies was not only grave, but it
WAR TIME 75
was incalculable. Until then, after the first
few weeks of the war, we had been able to
measure the risk, and the wonderful efforts
of the Navy and the Merchant Service had
reduced it to proportions which had enabled
our oversea supplies to be maintained with
some amount of difficulty, but without serious
alarm. The new campaign of the Germans
was, however, loudly advertised as intended
to effect the starvation of this country and
to finish the war. The country ought, per-
haps, by then to have become accustomed
to German predictions, and to have placed
more confidence in the capacity of the Navy
to defeat the utmost endeavours of our
enemies at sea. But it needed some coolness
to calculate the reasonable chances and, in
any case, whatever they were, the necessity
of reducing as much as possible the demands
upon shipping was evident, especially as it
became impossible to resist the demand for
increasing reserve stocks by increased im-
portation. The effect of what seemed a wise
precaution was to use up more shipping for
food supplies at a time when it was most
76 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
short, and as it turned out the additional
reserve stocks were not actually required.
The idea of accumulating large reserves of
foodstuffs in this country was one which all
through the war obsessed many people who
were at a loss to understand why so obvious
a step was not taken. It may now be pointed
out that it was not possible, and it never will
be possible, to build up reserve stocks during
a great war. The world's supply of any food
is governed by the world's demand, and,
generally speaking, the year's production is
not, except by accident, substantially greater
than the world's requirements. If, therefore,
in any one year a nation were to attempt
to secure not twelve months' but eighteen
months' supplies (so as to get a six months'
reserve stock), it would not only have to pay
exorbitant prices, but to the extent to which
it succeeded, other nations, including its
Allies, must go short. Another consideration
is that it is worse than useless to land supplies
in this country for future consumption unless
they can be properly stored. All food is
perishable, and even wheat, which is perhaps
WAR TIME 77
the least perishable, will waste heavily unless
it is placed in suitable stores as the experi-
ence with Australian wheat, which was
perforce kept as a " reserve," though un-
obtainable, demonstrated. The Ar-my and
the Navy must have large stocks, because
they require them to be available at numerous
points of distribution, to provide for sudden
and unforeseen contingencies, and because
their stores in the nature of things are
specially liable to destruction. This extra
demand on the world's supplies must be met,
but the accumulation of additional stocks for
the civilian population on any large scale is,
frankly, impossible in war-time. If a reserve
stock is thought to be necessary, it must be
gradually built up during peace. After war
begins it is too late to repair the omission.
The Food Controller tackled at once the
problem of economising food supplies. On
February 2, 1917, he issued an appeal to the
Nation, requesting every one to limit their
weekly purchases of bread, meat and sugar,
to definite quantities which were named. A
Food Economy Department, and a depart-
78 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
ment for Women's Service were established,
and the assistance of the War Savings
Committee, which had already been success-
fully engaged in preaching the general need
for economy, was enlisted. An energetic cam-
paign by public meetings, advertisements,
leaflets, etc., was conducted, and was greatly
assisted by the co-operation of the Press.
Attention was especially directed to the need
for economy in bread and grain generally,
and at the beginning of May this was the
subject of the following Proclamation by the
King :
BY THE KING
A PROCLAMATION
GEORGE R. I.
We, being persuaded that the abstention
from all unnecessary consumption of
grain will furnish the surest and most
effectual means of defeating the de-
vices of Our enemies and thereby of
bringing the war to a speedy and
successful termination, and out of Our
resolve to leave nothing undone which
can contribute to these ends or to the
WAK TIME 79
welfare of Our people in these times
of grave stress and anxiety, have
thought fit, by and with the advice
of Our Privy Council, to issue this
Our Royal Proclamation, most ear-
nestly exhorting and charging all those
of Our loving subjects the men and
women of Our realm who have the
means of procuring articles of food
other than wheaten corn, as they
tender their own immediate interests,
and feel for the wants of others,
especially to practise the greatest
economy and frugality in the use of
every species of grain : /_ And We do
for this purpose more particularly
exhort and charge all heads of house-
holds to reduce the consumption of
bread in their respective families by
at least one-fourth of the quantity
consumed in ordinary times; to abstain
from the use of flour in pastry, and,
moreover, carefully to restrict or
wherever possible to abandon the use
thereof in all other articles than bread :
80 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
And we do also, in like manner, exhort
and charge all persons who keep
horses to abandon the practice of
feeding the same on oats or other
grain, unless they shall have received
from Our Food Controller a licence to
feed horses on oats or other grain to
be given only in cases where it is
necessary to do so with a view to
maintain the breed of horses in the
national interest.: And We do hereby
further charge and enjoin all Ministers
of Religion in their respective churches
and chapels within Our United King-
dom of Great Britain and Ireland to
read, or cause to be read, this Our
Proclamation on the Lord's Day, for
four successive weeks after the issue
thereof.
Given at Our Court at Buckingham
Palace, this Second day of May,
in the year of our Lord one thou-
sand nine hundred and seventeen,
and in the Seventh year of Our
Reign.
GOD SAVE THE KING.
WAR TIME 81
There was, of course, criticism of this
policy of appealing to the people to economise,
rather than compelling them to do so. Its
success was its justification, for neither before
nor since has the consumption of grain by
the nation as a whole been so small as it was
during this period. This achievement was
especially notable in view of the fact that
potatoes, owing to the failure of the home
crop, and the impossibility of obtaining
supplies elsewhere, were unusually scarce.
In the meantime all flour-mills had been
taken over by the Government, the price of
the 4-lb. loaf was fixed at a maximum of gd., in-
volving a heavy loss to the State which now
held the monopoly of the supply of bread to
the people, and effectively controlled all its
stages from the field (at home or abroad) to the
table. Beginning in November 1916, the
composition of the loaf was, step by step,
changed by the inclusion of a greater propor-
tion of the wheat (i.e. by a higher "extrac-
tion " of flour), and by admixture with other
grain. By the end of May 1917 the State
controlled the importation of sugar, wheat,
82 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
flour, rice, beans, peas and oats, and was
rapidly extending its grasp over other
imported suppliesTX
The first step in price-fixing was taken in
November 1916, when a maximum price for
milk was imposed. Potatoes were next dealt
with, and thereafter Orders fixing maximum
prices for various articles of food were issued
in rapid succession.
The imposition of a system of compulsory
rationing was under active discussion during
this period, and while the appeal for voluntary
rationing was being made, a department of
the Food Ministry was set up to prepare a
scheme of general compulsory rationing for
use, if and when required. The German and
other systems were carefully examined, and
two alternative schemes one of which was
with some modification eventually adopted
were elaborated in detail, and considered by
a special Committee, in readiness for the
decision of the Government.
Whether the adoption of the ticket system,
of compulsory rationing was decided upon by
the Government at the right time, or in the
WAR TIME 88
best form, is another of those debatable
questions about which those interested may
dispute indefinitely. From the point of view
of the conservation of food supplies, it is
not certain that it was in all cases the only
means, or even the best means, of securing
that object, and, indeed, it was not primarily
from that point of view that it was eventu-
ally put into force. After the resignation
of Lord Devonport, and the appointment
of the late Lord Rhondda as Food Con-
troller in June 1917, a considerable period
elapsed during which the new Minister was
taking stock of the position and deciding on
his course of action. During this time the
unequal distribution of supplies, which had
previously aroused dissatisfaction in some
localities, led to serious and general protests,
and it may be said that " queues " were the
immediate cause of the introduction of the
"coupon." The chief recommendation of
the ticket system, which outweighed all
objections, is that it is the best means by
which equality as between individuals can be
secured. Absolute equality no system can
84 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
secure, so long as human nature retains its
imperfections, and no vigilance in enforcing
penalties could prevent instances of evasion
and favouritism. But, on the whole, the
system, irksome as it was, worked successfully.
The evident reluctance of the Government to
adopt it, and the very unsatisfactory situation
which had arisen before they did so, helped
to secure its acceptation by the nation. The
people felt convinced that it was necessary.
The British people, as the war has repeatedly
shown, will endure much inconvenience, and
even hardship, if they are convinced of the
necessity, but they will resent and resist very
forcibly being subjected to annoyance without
adequate cause.
When all criticism has been made, and
all defects noted, it may fairly be said that
the compulsory rationing of food in this
country was accomplished without serious
difficulty owing largely to the good sense
and public spirit displayed by the people
generally.
The foods rationed were meat, sugar,
butter, margarine and lard, and the fact that
WAR TIMi; 85
the most vital of all bread was not rationed,
is sufficient evidence that wheat supplies were
never in serious danger. When the war ended
in November 1918, the stocks of wheat and
flour in the country were practically as large
as at any time during the war and, of course,
very much larger than in time of peace.
Nearly every article of food was sub-
ject to maximum prices ; the supply and
distribution of all the primary articles were
either completely taken over or subject to
strict official supervision. Supplies were on
the whole well maintained up to the require-
ments of the nation, though meat, bacon and
butter were at times scarce. The develop-
ment of the manufacture of margarine in this
country did much to make up the deficiency
of fat caused by the cessation of supplies of
butter from Denmark and margarine from
Holland.
The stocks of food in the United Kingdom,
prior to the establishment of the Ministry of
Food and subsequently, are shown in the
following summary, the figures representing
thousands of tons :
86 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
1916
1917
I9l8
1919
Sept. i
Jan. i
Sept. i
Jan. i
Sept. i
Jan. i
Wheat (including\
Flour) /
2,599
I,8i5
3,290
2,117
3,408
2,910
Rice .
7 1
60
88
120
207
140
Meat .
34
62
66
87
79
137
Bacon and Hams .
38
27
29
9
94
46
Fats
3 1
17
48
7
42
43
Sugar .
137
108
181
197
424
382
Tea ...
43
58
21
i7
45
65
The effect of Food Control on prices is
indicated in two tables published in the Re-
port of the War Cabinet for the year 191 8. 1
The first shows the rise in price of controlled
food in the United Kingdom as compared
with other articles, taking July 1914 as a
basis (see p. 87).
The details of price movements in other
countries are difficult to trace precisely, but
taking the four foods, bread, beef, butter and
milk, the following comparison is given of the
course of prices in the United Kingdom and
certain other countries (see p. 88).
It may no doubt be claimed that the
1 Cmd. 325.
WAR TIME
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WAR TIME 89
relatively favourable record of the United
Kingdom was due to the control of prices by
the State, but this was not, in fact, the domi-
nating influence, although, unquestionably, at
certain times the price of particular articles
would have risen much higher but for the
imposition of maximum limits. Maximum
prices were, however, generally speaking, not
fixed below the level at which the commodi-
ties could be bought overseas or profitably
produced at home. Bread was the main
exception, and in that case the price was
deliberately kept down by means of a heavy
draft upon the National Exchequer a
political measure the wisdom of which is
debatable. The true reason for the fact
that food prices generally rose less in the
United Kingdom than in any other European
country, was that supplies were on the whole
more plentiful. Control of prices was mainly
intended as a protection to the consumer
against exploitation by the sellers of food-
stuffs, and it was in some degree effective as
such. It is, however, not certain that it
was the best means of curbing the natural
90 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
tendency of the sellers of goods to take
advantage of temporary or local shortages.
A system of maximum prices entirely elimin-
ates competition between traders. Not
only is a maximum always a minimum,
but the trader meets all remonstrance by
the statement that it is "the Government
price," and assumes he is authorised, and
even ordered, not to sell for less. While,
no doubt, there were times when price-
control prevented a great rise, there were also
times when certain foods could probably have
been bought more cheaply if there had been
no "Government price." If it had been
possible to devise some system by which the
profits of individuals, instead of the prices of
commodities, could have been controlled as
was, indeed, suggested in the early days of
the Food Ministry it is probable that the
practices of the profiteer might have been
more effectively restricted. Any system of
maximum prices must necessarily be based
on a flat rate. An attempt made in connec-
tion with milk to establish differential prices
adjusted to varying costs of production proved
WAR TIME 91
conclusively what, indeed, required no de-
monstration the impracticability of applying
such a principle, however defensible it might
be in theory. A flat selling-price, however,
must necessarily involve excessive profits for
efficient and favourably situated traders, while
at the same time, it inflicts hardship on the
"small" men. It may, perhaps, be cited as
an example of the inherent difficulty of co-
ordinating the public services of a community,
that while we have an elaborate machinery
for assessing with meticulous accuracy the
profits of traders for purposes of Income Tax,
no attempt was made to utilise or adapt this
machinery for the restriction of profiteering.
Popular indignation against profiteering failed
to realise that the system of maximum prices,
while checking the more blatant methods of
the profiteer, inevitably legalised, and ap-
peared to authorise, undue profits for many
individuals.
Much the most difficult of the problems of
the Food Ministry was the control of distri-
bution. The arrangements had necessarily
to be different for each of the main articles,
92 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
and in the end very complicated administra-
tive machinery was constructed throughout
the country.
Schemes for the distribution of various
commodities began to be devised early in
1917, when the plans for rationing were laid
down in readiness for the decision of the
Government. The control of certain imports
of butter and cheese had been exercised by
the Board of Trade at a still earlier date, and
the Sugar Commission had, from the begin-
ning of the war, adopted a comparatively
simple and effective method. Broadly, the
principle of these early schemes was the
tying of retailer to wholesaler and wholesaler
to importer, on the basis of the amount of
business done by each at a previous period
known as the datum period. This plan had
the merit of preserving and utilising the
normal trade channels of distribution, was
simple and inexpensive to work, and avoided
the need for the employment of a large staff
of officials. One defect of the datum period
system was, that it did not allow for changes
in population and other alterations, but this
WAR TIME 98
was remedied by adopting the plan of basing
the distribution on the actual requirements of
the retailer for the supply of his registered
customers.
Much more complicated arrangements
were subsequently made in connection with
the distribution of potatoes, milk, meat and
some other articles. The scheme of meat
distribution was the most elaborate as it
involved the collection and distribution of
home live-stock as well as of imported meat.
The system consisted of two main parts :
(a) a territorial organisation for the control
of live-stock, and (6) an organisation of the
meat trade for the regulation of distribution.
The initial stages of the process were marked
by the registration of auctioneers, cattle-
dealers, butchers and slaughter-house keepers,
and by fixing maximum prices first for meat,
and later, under a grading system, for fat
cattle and sheep. The grading system did
not work very satisfactorily, and sale by
dead weight at Government slaughter-houses
was substituted in many districts. The unit
was an area consisting of one or more
94 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
counties under a Live-Stock Commissioner,
and the pivot of the scheme was the Area
Meat Agent, working with the Commis-
sioner and a representative Meat Distribu-
tion Committee, who were notified of the
requirements of the district and arranged
for its supply, either in cattle or dead meat.
The retailer was allowed to buy only upon
a permit, but in a number of cases a
Butchers' Committee was formed for the
Food Control Committee's district which
bought for the district on a single permit.
The necessary interference by the Govern-
ment with the freedom of individuals to eat
what they liked, or could afford, and to buy
it where they chose could not be expected
to be popular. It was done with anxious
care and deliberation, and with all possible
consideration for the susceptibilities of the
public, but nothing could prevent some
amount of irritation and much inconvenience.
Those who were responsible for the adminis-
tration would be the first to admit that the
success with which the various schemes of
food control were carried through was mainly
WAR TIME 95
due to the amazing patience and goodwill
with which the public co-operated. The old
virtues of the English race were never more
clearly shown than in the spirit of loyalty
and orderliness with which, on the whole,
they submitted to the irksome conditions
imposed upon them in connection with the
supply of their daily food.
III. AFTER THE WAR
CHAPTER I
THE WORLD POSITION
"Every man shall eat in safety
Under his own vine what he plants^ and sing
The merry songs of peace to all his neighbours."
SHAKESPEARE.
THE statement that the Great War has
created a new world has become an oratorical
platitude, but it is only a half-truth. The
world after all is what its inhabitants make
it, and only a new race of human beings
could make a really new world. Human
nature with all its aspirations and limitations
remains essentially unchanged through the
ages. An infant crying for the light this
is the state of man yesterday, to-day and
to-morrow. The instinct for the light, which
he shares with plants, the craving for a
higher good, is cumbered by the combative
96
AFTER THE WAR 97
instinct which he shares with animals. Not
until the fundamental competitiveness of
human nature is eradicated will the dream
of universal brotherhood be realised.
The development of civilisation the
emergence from the isolated struggle for
life into the social state is due to the human
faculty of learning by experience, and of con-
structively using the knowledge so acquired.
The great sociological lesson of the war is
the inter-dependence ot nations. Alliances
for mutual aggression or defence have been
common in history from the earliest times.
The lesson which the experience of the war
has taught, is that the world is an economic
entity, not mere congeries of competitors.
The fact dimly discerned by communities
like our own which lives, moves and has its
being by the sea, has been impressed with
the force of a revelation on the consciousness
of mankind.
It is for this reason that the League of
Nations, embodying the far-off vision of
poets, has become at last a possibility
of practical politics. Its ostensible cause
98 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
for existence may be to ensure peace among
the nations, but its solid foundation is mutual
relationship and common interest in the basic
needs of humanity. In other words, the
chain which will effectually bind the nations
of the world together, is the sense that they
are members one of the other, not only in
times of crisis, but in the everyday busi-
ness ot life. Thus the wheel comes full
circle, and the primary need of the savage
his daily food may, by progressive stages
of social evolution, compel the federation
of the world in response to the same
impulse.
The circumstances under which the League
of Nations was conceived, and the embodi-
ment of its constitution in a Treaty of Peace,
mask the fact, which will become more
evident in time, that its real basis is economic.
Its objects are thus set out :
" To promote international co-opera-
tioii and to achieve international peace
and security
" by the acceptance of obligations
not to resort to war ;
AFTER THE WAR 99
"by the prescription of open, just
and honourable relations between
nations ;
" by the firm establishment of the
understandings of international law
as the actual rule of conduct among
Governments ; and
"by the maintenance of justice and
a scrupulous respect for all treaty
obligations in the dealings of organised
peoples with one another."
Among the specific provisions of the
Treaty defining the functions of the League
is the obligation "to secure and maintain
freedom of communications, and of transit
and equitable treatment for the commerce
of all members of the League." Article 24
recognises the steps which have already
been taken in this direction, and contemplates
the development by the League of such
international organisations, of varying scope,
as existed before the war. It runs :
"There shall be placed under the
direction of the League all international
100 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
bureaux already established by general
treaties, if the parties to such treaties
consent. All such international bureaux
and all commissions for the regulation
of matters of international interest here-
after constituted shall be placed under
the direction of the League.
"In all matters of international interest
which are regulated by general con-
ventions but which are not placed under
the control of international bureaux or
commissions, the Secretariat of the
League shall, subject to the consent
of the Council, and if desired by the
parties, collect and distribute all relevant
information, and shall render any other
assistance which may be necessary or
desirable.
" The Council may include as part
of the expenses of the Secretariat the
expenses of any bureau or commission
which is placed under the direction of
the League."
Knowledge of the facts is, or should be,
a condition precedent to action. Most of
AFTER THE WAR 101
the administrative mistakes which have been
made during the war have arisen from neg-
lect of this principle, sometimes unavoidably
because the necessary information was not
available, and sometimes because the responsi-
bility for action was not co-ordinated with the
responsibility for information. Trustworthy
information in regard to the world's economic
conditions is scanty and partial. Much which
passes for information is at the best infer-
ence, and at the worst imagination. Such
information as exists is collected by various
agencies which work independently, and often
in ignorance of the details of each other's
activities. Consequently, while one field of
knowledge is untouched, there may be several
searchers after truth labouring in another.
The League of Nations affords for the first
time the means and opportunity for extend-
ing economic inquiries, so as to embrace
and co-ordinate under international direction
information of the world's production, distri-
bution and consumption of commodities.
Meanwhile, as has been pointed out in
previous pages, information as to the world's
102 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
food supplies is imperfect, and estimates of
the present and prospective demand for them
must be speculative.
When the Armistice was signed on
November n, 1918, it was easy to foresee
a period not only of social reaction and
restlessness, but also of economic disturb-
ance and difficulty. It was hoped that the
political settlement, complicated and pro-
longed though it might be, would be com-
pleted at any rate before the next European
harvest. But a year which many thought
to be the most critical has expired, and it is
scarcely more easy now than it was at the
end of 1918 to calculate the chances of the
future. The worst fears as regards supplies
of food have not been realised. There were
some who thought that the urgent demands
of Central Europe would be so enormous
that existing supplies could not satisfy them
unless other nations went short. Central
Europe would no doubt have welcomed
larger supplies than financial and transport
conditions made possible, but the world's
supplies proved more than adequate for the
AFTER THE WAR 108
effective demand, and when harvest-time
came in 1919, there remained in Argentina
and Australia a substantial "carry-over" of
wheat into the next cereal year, while the
people of Europe, though still suffering priva-
tion, were, for the most part, better fed than
during 1918.
The most critical period having passed,
the question remains how far the world's
supplies will suffice for actual requirements
during the present year and thereafter. Let
us examine the probable position in regard to
wheat. The table on p. 104 was recently
given in an authoritative trade-journal l show-
ing the estimated crops in 1919, and the
estimated requirements in 1919-20 of the
wheat-importing countries.
It is noted that the consumption reckoned
for Italy shows a substantial increase on the
pre-war average to allow for the additional
population and increased consumption, while,
on the other hand, the consumption of France
is reduced to allow for the effect of high
prices.
1 Corn Trade Arzvs, September 16, 1919.
104 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
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AFTER THE WAR 105
The requirements of importing-countries
before the war varied to some extent from
year to year, according to their crops, but
the total did not usually exceed 75,000,000
quarters. If the estimate above given should
prove accurate, the demand on exporting-
countries would, therefore, amount to some
20,000,000 quarters more than in pre-war
times. On the face of it, this would appear
to be an alarming prospect, bearing in mind
the fact that no reliance can be placed on
the availability of the existing surplus in
Southern Russia and the Balkans. The
exportable surplus from North America and
Argentina for the present cereal year is
largely above pre-war figures, while India
and Australia have also to be reckoned with.
But if the total demand estimated above
were to become actually effective, it is
doubtful if it could be met. This is the
uncertain factor.
It may be said at once that no sufficiently
trustworthy statistical information is available
to enable the estimates of requirements put
forward by a competent authority to be con-
106 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
tested in detail, but one or two general
observations may be made with regard to the
common assumption that the oversea food
requirements of war-ridden Europe will be
now and for some time largely in excess of
their pre-war demands. The devastation of
productive areas, the lack of fertilisers, the
deficiency of cattle-food, the reduction of
stock and the shortage of labour, are all
adduced, very plausibly, in support of the
view that the native supplies are greatly
diminished, and that greatly increased im-
ports are required.
In calculating the effects of warfare on
the agriculture of a country, it is possible
to exaggerate. No one who visited immedi-
ately after the war the tracts of France and
Belgium on which for four years the armies
fought, and over large parts of which the
terrible tide of battle ebbed and flowed, is
likely to minimise the abomination of desola-
tion of those once fair and fertile fields. It
is well to remember, however, that these
stricken fields, wide as they are, represent
only about 5 per cent, of the total area of
AFTER THE WAR 107
France before the war. Of the 4,000,000
acres rendered useless by war, nearly one-
fourth were handed back to the cultivators
before a year had elapsed. The cultivation
of the soil was maintained, fearfully and fit-
fully, up to the very edge of the battle-
grounds, and within a few weeks of the final
withdrawal of the enemy, the indomitable
peasantry were pushing the plough over the
restored fields wherever the wreckage of war
left a little space. Even here may be realised
that " amplitude of nature " which Ludendorff
complained prevented his utmost concentra-
tion of artillery from reaching every part of
the country within range. On other fronts
large armies passed over the land, and
ravaged as they went, but the injury to the
land was temporary. The marks of their
passage will long remain on the works of
man in razed villages and wrecked towns
but in one season Nature almost obliterates
the traces of their presence on the open
fields.
During the war the supply of fertilisers
was seriously disturbed, and certain kinds
108 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
were deficient in those countries where they
are mainly used. Germany was practically
the only source of supply for potash before
the war, and consequently countries like the
United Kingdom, which imported large
quantities, felt the deficiency. In Western
Europe, apart from potash, supplies of nitro-
genous and phosphatic manures were reduced
by the competing demand for certain essen-
tial materials required in the manufacture of
munitions. Nitrate of soda and superphos-
phate were especially affected. The exports
of nitrates from Chile, phosphate rock from
Northern Africa, and pyrites from Spain,
were, however, fairly well maintained not-
withstanding shipping difficulties, and on the
whole no serious reduction in the product-
ivity of the land or the output from it, can be
attributed to the temporary lack of artificial
fertilisers in the Allied countries. The sandy
soils of North and East Germany, which
depend very largely for the maintenance of
their output on regular applications of ferti-
lisers, were seriously affected by the deficiency
of phosphatic and nitrogenous manures. Be-
AFTER THE WAR 109
fore the war Germany used 273,000 tons of
nitrogen, and 782,000 tons of phosphoric
acid, and it is estimated in a recent report 1
that in 1918 the supplies available for agri-
culture were 120,000 tons of nitrogen and
220,000 tons of phosphoric acid. During
the war, however, the production of nitrogen
from the air was very greatly developed in
Germany for the making of munitions, and
there is good reason to believe that the
supply of nitrogenous manures for the crops
of 1918-19, and subsequent years, was at
least equal to the total pre-war supply.
Phosphatic manures are, and will for some
time continue to be, short, but it may be
doubted whether the crops in Germany after
1919 will materially suffer from a deficiency
of fertilisers. In the special case of the
sandy soils referred to, the absence or pre-
sence of artificial manures has an exceptional
influence, and the effect of their application
is rapid, while the effect of withholding
them is gradual. Ordinarily, however, the
increase or decrease of the yield of crops
1 Report on Food Conditions in Germany (Cmd. 280).
110 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
over the whole country, of even the total
absence of artificial fertilisers is, measured
in bushels, comparatively small, and much
less than the effect of weather conditions
during growth.
The deficient supply of feeding-stuffs, and
the reduction in the number of farm animals
consequent thereon, have reduced the pro-
ductivity of European agriculture more seri-
ously than the shortage of fertilisers. All
importing countries suffered more or less
from deficient supplies, but Germany most
severely. In the report already quoted,
it is stated that "in 1912-13, 157,838,000
tons of fodder was used for feeding to animals
in Germany, and of this amount 5,926,000
tons were imported." The figure of total
consumption so far as it relates to home pro-
duction may be taken as little more than a
guess, but the cessation of imports which
included the equivalent of 1,455,000 tons of
oil cake could not fail to affect meat and
milk production. Of home-produced feed-
ing-stuffs, milling offals were stated to be
reduced by about 5,000,000 tons by the
AFTER THE WAR 111
increased flour extraction from the cereals
milled for bread. It was estimated that in
1912 about 2,250,000 tons of wheat and rye
were fed to stock. The use of these cereals
for stock-feeding was prohibited during the
war, and although such a prohibition can
never be completely enforced, it had no
doubt a substantial effect. The use of pota-
toes for stock-feeding was restricted, and not
more than half the quantity so used in 1912
was used in 1917. The result of the restric-
tion of feeding-stuffs, was that, according
to the statistics furnished by the German
Government, the number of cattle was re-
duced during the war by about 4,000,000, or
20 per cent., and of pigs by about 15,000,000,
or 60 per cent, the number of sheep being
practically unchanged. The number of horses
was maintained, and the number of goats
increased. The reduction in the number of
pigs appears startling, but it may be re-
membered that in the United Kingdom
pigs were reduced by 30 per cent., while
both France and Italy suffered very heavy
depletion of their farm stock, and Belgium
112 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
was left in a far worse case than any other
country. The effect of the shortage of feed-
ing-stuffs, which was shared in a greater or
less degree by all European countries, was,
however, felt more directly in the reduction
of the output per head of meat and milk,
than in the actual depletion of the number
of animals. German official figures state that
the average slaughter-weight of cattle per
head fell by one-half, and although this is
improbable, it is quite possible that it may
have decreased by one-third, while the milk
yield per cow may have diminished to a
still greater extent. In the United Kingdom
the reduction in the average carcass-weight
of beef-cattle was somewhere about 20 per
cent., and a similar but smaller reduction
occurred in the yield of milk per cow.
Taking the German position as a sample
of the effect of the war on farm stock in
Europe, it may at once be said that there
is nothing to cause alarm for the future.
Cattle stocks will take longest to recover, but
a sufficiency of feeding-stuffs will speedily
restore the average output of meat and milk
AFTER THE WAR 118
per head, and two or three years will suffice
to re-establish the numbers. The stock of
pigs can, of course, be restored in a still
shorter period.
The depletion of farm stock reacted on
the productivity of the land, and the paucity,
as well as the poverty, of farmyard manure,
was a more serious factor than the deficiency
of fertilisers, as it affected tens of thousands
of the smaller holdings on which extraneous
manures are unknown.
The shortage of labour is commonly
believed to have affected very materially
agricultural production in Europe. Of the
millions of men in the armies of all the
nations engaged, it would probably be safe
to assume that at least three-fourths were
withdrawn from agriculture. At the same
time the supply of implements and mechanical
appliances for supplementing manual labour
was practically stopped for five years. On
the face of it, therefore, it would appear that
the absence of labour would have greatly
reduced the output from the land. That it
did so, to some extent, is certain, but it is
114 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
equally certain that the reduction was much
less than prima facie would have seemed
probable. The work of French women,
assisted by old men and boys, in keeping
the land cultivated, and maintaining food
production, has been seen and admired by
all the nations who fought on the soil of
France. It was not only in France, how-
ever, that the place of the absent soldier was
filled by those who were unable to fight,
while it must be remembered that before
the war had been long in progress, large
numbers of men returned, as prisoners, to
the cultivation of the soil. The report on
food conditions in Germany already cited
states :
" The accounts which we have received
from the various agricultural officials, and
also from the farmers whom we met, did
not indicate that agriculture had suffered
to any serious extent during the war from
lack of labour. At one time 1,500,000
prisoners were employed in agriculture. As
in England, large numbers of voluntary
workers also assisted. The extraordinary
AFTER THE WAR 115
clean condition of the crops is a clear indi-
cation of the great care which has been
taken to keep the land clean."
Numerous reports have been made setting
out in detail the position as regards present
food supplies, and prospects of agricultural
production in some of the regions affected
by war conditions. Some of these have been
published, and others have been prepared for
the information of the authorities charged
with the obligation of assisting, so far as
practicable, in relieving immediate distress.
In many parts of central and south-eastern
Europe there have been throughout 1919
conditions of extreme privation, and even
of starvation. These conditions, however,
have been due as much to the collapse of the
machinery of distribution as to an absolute
shortage of supplies. Broadly speaking, in
the rural districts there has been sufficiency,
and even in some cases plenty, while in the
towns and urban areas food supplies of all
kinds have been seriously deficient.
The recovery of industry and commerce
from the grievous wounds of the war will be
116 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
a long process, though it may be accelerated
by the energy or retarded by the perversity
of man. The recovery of agriculture is
more rapid and more certain. It depends
mainly on Nature, which never "strikes" or
"shuts down," but proceeds unremittingly
with the work of reproduction and recu-
peration. The cultivator of the soil lives
in too intimate contact with the law that
"if a man will not work neither shall he
eat " to cease his efforts to produce food, as
soon as he has a reasonable sense of security
that he can gather the fruit of his labours.
The restoration of the standard of pre-war
food production over the troubled territories
is not primarily an agricultural question.
Settled political and social conditions which
will ensure to every producer that when he
has expended his capital and his labour he
will not be robbed of the results, are the basis
of production. Where there is no security
there is no enterprise, and even the peasant
will take no trouble to do more than scratch
the soil and trust to luck. So long, therefore,
as there is social insecurity, food production
AFTER THE WAR 117
will be deficient ; but wherever ordered
government is re-established, and the ele-
mentary right of man to the reward of his
forethought and toil is recognised, agriculture
will rapidly be restored. It is, of course,
true that at the time of writing the requi-
sites of improved farming are more or less
deficient all over the Continent. Live-stock,
horses and implements, are lacking in many
districts, but it must be remembered that to
some extent this is due to re-distribution
rather than to destruction. The invaders
pillaged and " requisitioned," but did not
always destroy, so that the loss of one dis-
trict may sometimes have been the gain of
another.
We may proceed on two assumptions :
(i) that, given settled social and political
conditions, food production in Europe as a
whole may be expected to be restored to
its pre-war level in the course of two or
three years, or, say, after the harvest of
1921 ; and (2) that in the meantime, and
especially during the harvest year 1919-20,
production will be below the pre-war level in
118 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
most areas, and seriously below in some.
It may now be of interest to see what were
the drafts of Europe upon the world's
supplies of cereals before the war. The
table on p. 119 shows the net quantities (in
thousands of tons) imported in 1913.
The statement is not absolutely complete,
and figures relating to only one year may
be affected by seasonal conditions. Gene-
rally speaking, however, the imports in
1913 were above the average of the years
immediately preceding, and there is an ad-
vantage in taking the latest pre-war year as
representing the demand of the maximum
population. As a matter of fact, when
allowance is made for increasing consump-
tion, the imports from year to year are fairly
constant, i. e. the effect of the variation in
home crops on oversea requirements is com-
paratively small. The reason for this is
probably to be found in the interchange-
ability as breadstuffs of the cereals over
a large part of Europe, and also in the
elasticity of the quantity fed to stock. In
other words, a bad harvest affects the use
AFTER THE \VAH
119
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r- VO M vo
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Mlllllil
120 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
of cereals for stock-feeding to a much greater
degree than for human food.
The difficulty of forming any reasonable
estimate of post-war food requirements
arises from the fact that the effective de-
mand of necessitous countries is not capable
of calculation on the old basis of consump-
tion. Given a more or less established
standard of living, and figures of home
production plus imports for a number of
years, it was not difficult to reckon approxi-
mately for any country the quantity for
which in any year she was likely to be a
competitor in the world's markets. Under
the new conditions, however, new rates of
consumption will be established, and there
are many factors which combine to compli-
cate any attempt to calculate these rates.
Before the war food was universally plentiful
and cheap, and the per capita consumption
was, on the whole, relatively high. It could
abili be said, for example, that the people ot
a \c. United Kingdom were in any sense
elas^rt of food. But the consumption of food
othe^ead of Germany was estimated at nearly
AFTER THE WAR 121
20 per cent, more, and that of France 12 per
cent. more. All nations are impoverished,
and the collective purchasing power of the
peoples is greatly diminished. Assuming
that the rate of consumption in the United
Kingdom is irreducible, it cannot be impos-
sible for Germany and France to reduce
consumption to the same level. If this were
done, Germany, which imported 15 per cent,
of her food, will, when her home production
is restored, require to import nothing, and
France would also be completely self-sup-
porting. Several factors conspire to induce
a lower rate of consumption. Diminished
purchasing power, high prices, wider know-
ledge of food economy, habits of abstemious-
ness, all tend to reduce food consumption
and to prevent wastefulness. On the other
hand, there are factors tending to increase
food consumption. Of the millions of men
who have served in the nations' armies,
the great majority have been fed more
lavishly and well during the time of their
service than ever before in their lives,
and they will not willingly revert to their
122 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
old standard of living ; and apart from this,
there is the insistent and irresistible demand
of the proletariat for a larger share in the
good things of life, which in the first instance
include a more plentiful and more varied diet.
In any calculation of a nation's food require-
ments, the so-called " upper classes " are
negligible. The millionaire as a rule eats
less than the miner, and while there are
hundreds of thousands of miners, there are
very few millionaires. The food consump-
tion of the moneyed and middle classes will
undoubtedly be reduced in the future, but
the wage-earners, who previously were the
first to go short, in future will demand and
secure a larger share.
Whether we consider the question from
the point of view of theoretical requirements,
or of effective demand, it is equally specu-
lative, and he would be a bold prophet who
would dogmatise. One thing, however, is
certain amidst all uncertainties. The most
insistent demand for any commodity can
only be supplied to the extent that the
commodity is produced. The people may
AFTER THE WAR 128
demand more bread, more beef, or more
pineapples, but if the bread and the beef
and the pineapples are not produced, they
cannot be obtained. That is one of the
simple, but eternal, verities, which is freely
accepted by everyone, although its implica-
tion is not so universally recognised. The
complexity of the economic system of civili-
sation obscures the simple truth, and it is
often overlooked that the artisan is not only
a consumer but also a producer of food. The
way, and the only way, to ensure the pro-
duction of more bread and more beef, is to
produce more commodities to exchange for
them. The maker of clothing, of boots,
of tools, or of furniture, is producing food,
because if he ceases to make these articles
the man who grows the crops, and breeds
and feeds the cattle, will only produce as
much as he wants for his own consumption.
Some there are who believe that the
world's food supplies are limited, not by the
demand for them, but by the physical im-
possibility of producing more. The vision
of a world perishing from starvation, owing
124 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
to inability to feed its inhabitants, has
oppressed many of those who appear to
suffer from dread of the remoter risks of
life. They are like those who are haunted
by the fear of the collision of the earth with
a comet, or
"Like one that on a lonely road
Doth walk in fear and dread,
Because he knows a frightful fiend
Doth close behind him tread."
The increase of population beyond the
means of subsistence has been a theoretical
menace to the world for ages. It is of the
same order as the menace under which the
whole of animate nature lives. " Every
organic being naturally increases at so high
a rate, that, if not destroyed, the earth would
soon be covered by the progeny of a single
pair. . . . The elephant is reckoned the
slowest breeder of all known animals, and I
have taken some pains to estimate its pro-
bable minimum rate of natural increase ; it
will be safest to assume that it begins breed-
ing when thirty years old, and goes on
breeding till ninety years old, bringing forth
AFTER THE WAR 125
six young in the interval, and surviving till
one hundred years old; if this be so, after
a period of from 740 to 750 years there
would be nearly 19,000,000 elephants alive,
descended from the first pair." 1
The present population of the world is
estimated at 1,650,000,000. Although there
is still no complete enumeration, it is probable
that by present methods of computation this
total is not very far wrong. For earlier
dates in the world's history, we have to fall
back on conjecture, and we have no means
of knowing whether at any time the popula-
tion of the world was larger than it is now.
All we know is, that within the known period
of man's existence on the earth, the hypo-
thetical risk of over-population has been
ever-present. Mr. G. H. Knibbs 2 calcu-
lates that the present population of the
world might have been the descendants of
one pair of human beings in 1782 years.
Without speculating on how the world
would be fed if its population were doubled,
1 Darwin, Origin of Species.
2 Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1911.
126 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
it is sufficient for us to consider whether
there is any sign that the limit of the
world's food productive capabilities is being
reached, whether, in fact, there is any im-
minent risk of famine from insufficiency
of supplies and impossibility of increasing
them.
It may be recalled that under the in-
fluence of the submarine scare in 1917,
and with a singular failure to connect cause
and effect, there was a violent outburst of
pessimism, and the imminence of starvation,
even if the war ended, was the theme of
many arresting tongues and pens. One
eminent writer, in describing post-war con-
ditions, referred to " a calamitous general
deficiency of some of the principal food-
stuffs such as cereals and meat," and to
"the serious world-shortage in foodstuffs";
another said that " the world is not now pro-
ducing the quantity of food it requires," and
a Labour journal said " the threatened world
famine is upon us. ... The workers have
been slain by their millions in battle, and
to the suffering and anguish of the civil
AFTER THE WAR 127
population is now going to be added that
of a slow and painful death by starvation."
In December 1917, I ventured to call
attention to some of the relevant statistical
facts, to express a mild opinion that there
were " some reasons for thinking that the
prospects of food supplies after the war are
not hopelessly gloomy," and to suggest that
the difficulty of distribution and not the non-
existence of supplies, was the real trouble. 1
But the public, at that time, so far as its
opinions found expression, had made up its
mind that the world was on the verge of
starvation, and the natural fate of any one
who declined to believe it, was to be dubbed
an " incurable optimist."
The true inference to draw from the ex-
perience of the war, is that the food sup-
plies of the world can be increased very
rapidly, and that, given the necessary time
and inducement, they are still capable of
immense expansion. The immediate action
of the food-exporting countries in sowing
at the first opportunity, as already mentioned,
1 Journal of the Royal Statistical Society , January 1918.
128 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
18,000,000 acres more wheat, is a salient
fact. It demonstrates not only the pos-
sibility of extension, but also the readiness
with which producers will respond to the
probability of increased demand. It must
be remembered that when growers had
to make up their minds to increase their
acreage, there was no certainty either of
higher prices, and still less of access to
their markets. No doubt the tradition that
war brings high prices, counted for much
in the mind of the Canadian, Australian or
American farmer, without any exact calcu-
lations of the probable course of events.
But up to the battle of the Marne there
were many who shared the German belief
that the war would be over in a few weeks
or months, and even after that crisis, hopes
of an early ending were common. Under
these conditions, the economic stimulus to
increase food production was dubious, while
the risk that if the food were produced it
could not be got to market, steadily increased.
No doubt within the Empire, and at a later
stage in the United States, the commercial
AFTER THE WAR
129
incentive was supplemented in a large degree
by the desire to help in the struggle to hold,
as Lord Ernie said, the food-line, while
their sons and brothers held the battle-line.
This, however, does not affect the fact that
the war demonstrated the elasticity of the
world's resources of lood.
The idea that food production had reached
its possible limits, was founded on the belief
that all the land suitable for growing bread-
making cereals, had been already utilised.
The extension of corn-growing in Canada
is of course exceptional, and it may be
true that in no other part of the globe
can any comparable expansion now be an-
ticipated. The figures for the Dominion,
however, furnish so bold an example that
they are worth recalling. Since 1870, the
production of each of the chief cereal
crops has been as follows, in thousands of
quarters :
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1917
Wheat
Barley
Oats
2,090
1,437
5,3"
4,044
2,106
8,812
5,278
2,i53
10,429
6,947
2,778
i8,937
16,510
3,606
3 ,674
28,966
6,461
49,196
130 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
As the population of Canada doubled
between 1871 and 1911, a more illuminating
record of progress from the world supply
point of view is shown in the following
statement of the number of acres of wheat
and oats, and of farm live-stock per 1,000
of population :
Wheat
Oats
Cattle
Sheep
Pigs
Acres
Acres
No.
No.
No.
1870
472
711
855
354
1880
56l
8i3
729
279
1890
564
826
852
534
358
1900
794
1,008
1,038
467
428
1910
1,230
1,200
905
302
54
1917
1,764
i,592
The total number of cattle in Canada more
than doubled, and the number of pigs nearly
trebled in forty years, but sheep declined
by about 1,000,000. During the same period
there was a great extension of dairying, and
the annual exports of cheese increased from
13,000 tons to 79,000 tons.
Canada has not yet reached the limits of
her expansion in regard to the area which
can be placed under cultivation, and she has
AFTER THE WAR 181
hardly yet begun to develop the possibilities
of the land already under crops. In the
older parts, such as Ontario, more intensive
cultivation of the land has begun to show
results on a broad scale. In thirty years
the average yield per acre of fall wheat and
of oats has increased by 3 bushels, of spring
wheat by 4 bushels, and of barley by 5^
bushels. In Manitoba there has as yet been
no progress ; and, indeed, there has been
a decline in the average yield due to the
exhaustion, without return, of the original
fertility of the land. But inasmuch as the
average yield of wheat for the Dominion is
under 19 bushels per acre, as compared with
32 bushels in the United Kingdom, and
31 bushels in Germany (before the war),
the potentialities of increasing the output in
Canada are apparent.
The maintenance or extension of output
depends obviously on the prospect of a
remunerative market. The United States
in 1919, had 71,500,000 acres under wheat,
or 11,000,000 more than in any previous
year. There were also 6,600,000 acres
132 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
under rye, or three times the area under
that crop in 1912. It is very unlikely that
these acreages will be maintained, but the
fact that they have been reached is at least
an indication of possibilities. All over the
world, indeed, war conditions have revealed
a potentiality of food production hitherto
little recognised. The share of Brazil, for
example, in providing the beef supplies of
the future cannot yet be measured, but it
is quite probable that it will before long chal-
lenge the position of Argentina, while South
Africa will shortly become a serious com-
petitor in the same market. Mesopotamia,
once the granary of the East, may again
help to feed the world, while Australia has
shown that she can take a substantial part
in providing wheat, as well as meat and
wool. At the present time, to speak of the
development of Russia and Siberia may
appear ironical, but in calculations of the
world's food reserves they must sooner or
later be reckoned.
In short, so far from the war having
shown any grounds for fears of imminent
AFTER THE WAH 183
world shortage, it has disclosed potential
resources which are ready for development,
and demonstrated that for any period in the
future which directly concerns the present
generation, ample supplies of food are as-
sured under an adequate stimulus to pro-
duction. The adequacy of the stimulus,
expressed in terms of price, is beyond the
scope of this discussion. One factor may,
however, be referred to. The margin be-
tween the price given by the European
consumer, and that received by the oversea
producer has been greatly increased by
the cost of transport. Ocean freights rose
to extravagant heights. Before the war,
wheat was carried from New York to
Liverpool for is. gd. per quarter; in
November 1918, the freight paid by the
Government for foreign steamers was $os. per
quarter. From Buenos Ayres to Liverpool
the freight was 2s. id. per quarter in June
1914, and 485. $d. in November 1918. Since
then they have fallen very considerably, the
rates in September 1919, being 8s. 6d. from
New York, and 135-. $d. from Buenos Ayres.
184 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
The recovery of the world's shipping from
the heavy losses of war has been rapid. It
is partly accounted for by the fact, which
was sometimes forgotten, that the work of
replacement went on continuously. It was
most active in the United States, and to a
lesser degree in Japan, but even in the
United Kingdom, notwithstanding the strain
upon our resources in all directions, the
amount of merchant shipping built and
launched during the war was very sub-
stantial, although below the pre-war level.
The record amount of tonnage launched
in the United Kingdom before the war in
a single year was 1,932,000 tons, in 1913.
In 1916 it fell to 608,000 tons, but in
1918, when the demands of the Navy
on our shipyards had relaxed a little, the
total rose to 1,348,000 tons. In July 1914
the gross tonnage of merchant shipping
in the world was 49,100,000 tons, and in
July 1919 it was 50,900,000 tons. Taking
merchant steamer tonnage alone, the total in
July 1914 was 45,400,000 tons, and in July
*9 1 9 47,900,000 tons. I have quoted these
AFTER THE WAR 185
figures of shipping mainly from a memo-
randum by Sir James Wilson, who estimated
that by the end of 1919, the merchant
steamer tonnage of the world would amount
to 50,000,000 tons, or nearly 5,000,000 tons
more than before the war.
No difficulty, therefore, in obtaining food
supplies need be anticipated from a lack of
the means of ocean transport, especially as
for some time to come the total bulk of
commodities produced and available for
shipment must be less than before the war.
The efficiency of tonnage, however, depends
on the handling of it, and unfortunately
delays in the ports have very seriously re-
duced the average number of voyages per
vessel, and have thus tended to diminish
the supply of effective shipping space, which
the energy and enterprise of shipbuilders
and shipowners have provided for the
world's use.
CHAPTER II
BRITISH AGRICULTURE
" The despotism of custom is everywhere the standing
hindrance to human achievement" JOHN STUART MILL.
THE extent to which the United Kingdom
supplied itself with food, and the result of
the efforts made during the war to increase
the amount have been described. The con-
sideration of the future of production in this
country, involves a discussion of the probable
reaction on the course of British agriculture
of factors economic, political and social
all of which are uncertain.
From what has already been said, it is,
I hope, clear that in my judgment there
is no need to apologise for British agri-
culture, either before or during the war.
There is, nevertheless, frequently evident
a disposition on the part of the public to
assume that there is something rotten in
the state of farming in the British Isles,
136
AFTER THE WAR 187
and that in other countries farmers are more
efficient, and are more successful in utilising
the land to the best advantage. It is a
truism that there are many bad farmers,
but they are to be found in all countries,
while it is also true that inefficient persons
are common in all trades and professions.
But the generalisation that agriculture in
this country is on the whole less productive
than in other countries under comparable
conditions, is, to say the least, questionable.
One consideration, sometimes overlooked,
is that in making international comparisons
of crops, it is necessary to take approximately
equal areas. For example, the average yield
of wheat before the war was in Germany
31 bushels per acre, and in France barely
20 bushels. But, whereas, in Germany the
average was obtained on 5,000,000 acres,
in France it was obtained on 16,000,000
acres. A comparison of five European
countries of approximately equal total area,
showed the pre-war yields per acre of the
three main cereals, and of potatoes to be
as follows :
138 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
Wheat
Barley
Oats
Potatoes
Bushels
Bushels
Bushels
Tons
United Kingdom
32*7
34'7
42-7
5'8
Austria .
IQ'O
24*6
28-9
4-2
Hungary
i?'4
21-9
24-1
3' i
Italy
i5'3
16-3
24-7 2'3
Prussia .
3 r8
37'2
45'2
5*5
A comparison for the same countries of
the number of live-stock per 1,000 acres of
land under cultivation, gave the following
results :
Cattle
Sheep
Pigs
United Kingdom .
255
619
85
Austria ....
201
53
141
Hungary
168
196
174
Italy ....
121
218
49
Prussia ....
229
79
299
It will be observed that except for a slight
inferiority to Prussia, in regard to barley
and oats, the United Kingdom stood highest
in the scale of agricultural production.
It is true that in output per acre the
smaller countries which practice more in-
tensive farming Belgium, Denmark and
Holland surpassed this country generally
AFTER THE WAK 189
in the average yield of crops, and also in
the number of cattle and pigs per 1,000
acres, although the United Kingdom was
easily foremost in sheep.
The test, however, of economic production,
is the output per unit of energy employed.
The higher production in Belgium and
Holland was obtained by an excessive
amount of labour per acre, as compared
with this country. In the United Kingdom
115 agriculturists per 1,000 acres of arable
land were employed, whereas in Belgium
218, and in Holland 280, were required to
secure a not very much greater return. In
Denmark production was more economic,
the man power expended being only 81 per
1,000 acres, but this was bettered in the
Eastern division of England (an area of
approximately equal size), where no more
than 76 men per 1,000 acres of arable land
were employed.
Food supplies, in the economic sense,
consist of the surplus available after the pro-
ducers have provided for their own susten-
ance, and consequently the fewer the number
140 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
of persons engaged in producing a given
quantity of produce, the larger the surplus
and the greater the profit. The conclusion
is that, judged by the economic test, the
British farmer was more skilful and success-
ful than the foreign farmers with whom he
was sometimes unfavourably compared.
The figures above quoted relate to farming
as ordinarily understood, but for maximum
output from the land, whether per acre or
per man, the results of intensive cultiva-
tion should be considered. Unfortunately
the statistics are insufficient and defective.
It is estimated, for instance, that there are
at least 2,000 acres of crops grown under
glass in this country, and that the capital
expenditure (on a pre-war basis) repre-
sented, is ,4,500,000. It is evident that
the food production per acre so cultivated
must be very great. Thus, an average crop
of tomatoes is from 30 to 35 tons per acre,
and of cucumbers 60 to 70 tons. The
approximate weight of grapes grown under
glass in England is estimated at over 2,000
tons. The production of fruit and vege-
AFTER THE WAR 141
tables, other than under glass, has increased
very greatly in Great Britain. The area
returned as under small fruit on holdings
of an acre or more, doubled in thirty years,
and was before the war about 80,000 acres.
The total value of vegetables and fruit pro-
duced on a commercial scale in Great Britain
was estimated in 1908 at ^16,000,000, and
this took no account of the produce of allot-
ments and private gardens.
British agriculture has been under the
searchlight during the war, and its defects
and limitations have provided a theme for
much public discussion. The development
of agriculture, and the increase of home pro-
duction, are agreed by all parties to stand in
the forefront of post-war problems. Various
means are proposed for the attainment of
these desirable ends. Many of them are
evolved from the fertile brains of those who
advocate them, and others are derived from
a more or less informed belief in methods
which have succeeded, or appear to have
succeeded, in other countries. But, after all,
this is an old country, and it is not the first
142 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
time in its history that agriculture has been
the object of public solicitude, and the target
for public criticism. British farming to-day
(or rather up to 1914) was what varying
circumstances had made it. It had survived
many crises and fits of depression. Over
thirty years ago, in a long-forgotten essay,
written at a time when the "ruin of agricul-
ture " was believed by many to be imminent,
I recalled Macaulay's description of 1692
" The price of the quarter of wheat doubled.
The evil was aggravated by the state of our
silver coin, which had been clipped to such
an extent that the words pound and shilling
ceased to have a fixed meaning. . . . The
labouring man was forced to husband his
coarse barley loaf. . . . The necessity of
retrenchment was felt by families of every
rank." And Byron, in 1822, wrote:
'Lately there have been no rents at all,
And * gentlemen ' are in a piteous plight,
And ' farmers ' can't raise Ceres from her fall :
She fell with Buonaparte. What strange thoughts
Arise, when we see emperors fall with oats ! "
These recollections have some relevance
AFTER THE WAR 143
to the present situation, in that they mark
periods when the state of agriculture en-
grossed the attention of the nation, and when,
also, its future was thought by farmers to be
more or less hopeless. It may be added, also,
that any student who consults the rural litera-
ture and the parliamentary proceedings of a
century ago, or of later periods of depression,
such as those of the early " eighties " and
mid-" nineties," will find prototypes of many
of the proposals for the regeneration of
agriculture, which now re-appear as original
efforts of constructive genius.
While, as suggested above, British farmers,
judged by a reasonable standard of economic
production, have on the whole no reason to
be ashamed of their record, it is admitted
that the total quantity of food produced might
be substantially increased. Except for the
possible reclamation of relatively small areas,
there is no chance of appreciably increasing
the land devoted to farming. The area of
land farmed has remained practically the
same, notwithstanding encroachments upon
it by the extension of urban requirements,
144 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
for the past thirty years at about 32,000,000
acres in Great Britain. The proportion of
the total area of the United Kingdom devoted
to agriculture is 61 per cent, in addition to
1 6 per cent, of " rough grazings " mainly
used as sheep-runs. The agricultural area
is about the same proportion as in Austria,
Belgium and Prussia, but considerably less
than in Denmark, and rather less than in
Holland. The number of farmers has also
remained almost unchanged since 1881, at
280,000. This, it should be noted, is the
number who returned themselves as farmers
or graziers at the census, and may be as-
sumed to represent the number of persons
who depend wholly or mainly on the occu-
pation of land as their means of livelihood.
The number of holdings of more than one
acre in Great Britain was 500,158 in 1917,
but of these 329,168 were not more than 50
acres, while 101,989 were not more than 5
acres in size. Allowing for a small propor-
tion of persons who occupy more than one
holding, it would appear that what may be
fairly described as the " farming class " does
AFTER THE WAR 145
not number more than about 300,000, or
with their families about 1,500,000 persons.
To arrive at the agricultural population
i.e. those who live by the land nearly
30,000 farm bailiffs and foremen must be
added, as well as the agricultural labourers
who before the war numbered 752,000. At
present the number of labourers has not
reached the pre-war level, nor under exist-
ing conditions is it likely to do so. In
round figures it may be reckoned that about
1,000,000 persons are engaged in the culti-
vation of the land in Great Britain, repre-
senting with their families a population
of from 5,000,000 to 6,000,000, or about
13 per cent, of the total population of the
country.
In this connection must be recognised the
progressive industrialisation and consequent
urbanisation of the people. The dwellers in
towns steadily increase while the inhabitants
of the country diminish. The tendency is
shown for England and Wales in the following
figures, taken from the Report of the Regis-
trar-General on the Census of 1911, giving
146 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
the population in urban and rural districts
respectively :
Per Cent.
Year
Urban
Rural
of Total Population.
Districts.
Districts.
Urban.
Rural.
1881
17,636,646
8,337,793
67*9
32-1
1891
20,895,504
8,107,021
72*0
28-0
1901
25,058,355
7,469,488
77-0
23-0
1911
28,162,936
7,9 7,556
78-1
21-9
The figures do not in themselves indicate
11 rural depopulation," or any marked ten-
dency on the part of persons living in the
country to desert it for the towns. The
normal increase of population must, in the
nature of things, be absorbed in the towns,
where alone there are expanding industries
and increasing demand for services. Under
any system of agriculture there necessarily
comes a stage when the land is employing
the maximum number of persons which the
system requires. This is equally true under
a system of ranching, of mixed farming, of
small holdings, or of intensive cultivation.
When that point is reached the population
AFTER THE WAR
147
of the district remains stationary, and cannot
absorb the natural increment. Industrial
enterprise has no such limit, the possibilities
of expansion being defined, not by any phy-
sical difficulty in building and equipping
factories or workshops, but by the demand
for the goods which can be produced. Long
after the agricultural land of the country is
filled up the increase of population may be
absorbed in the towns.
In Great Britain the system of agricul-
ture which existed before the war employed
752,000 agricultural labourers. Changes in
the system during the preceding thirty or
forty years had involved a diminution in the
number so employed. The following are
the returns of agricultural labourers at each
of the last four censuses, with the number
per 1,000 acres of land farmed :
Year.
Number.
No. per
1,000 acres.
Decrease in
each Decade.
Decrease
Per Cent.
1881
1,017,044
31-6
___
1891
898,232
2 7'3
Il8,8l2
irj
1901
724,314
22-3
173,918
19-4
1911
751,927
23*4
27>6r3*
j-<?i
1 Increase.
148 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
It should be noted that the census of 1901
was taken during the Boer War, and the
figures for agricultural labourers were reduced
owing to the absence of militia battalions and
other disturbing causes. I estimate that the
number returned would have been some
50,000 higher under normal conditions, and
consequently the decline between 1891 and
1901 was less, and the apparent increase
between 1901 and 1911 was fictitious. There
was, in fact, a continued, though less rapid,
decline.
This reduction by 265,000, or 26 per cent.,
in the course of thirty years is commonly
attributed to the shrinkage of arable land
and the extension of grass land. The area
of land under the plough was, in fact, reduced
by 3,000,000 acres during this period, but
this was not sufficient by itself to account
for so large a decrease in the number of
men employed, especially when it is remem-
bered that of the arable land in 1911 a much
larger proportion was devoted to the growth
of fruit and vegetables, and to other forms
of intensive cultivation which require more
AFTER THE WAR 149
manual labour than ordinary farm crops. At
the most, the conversion of 3,000,000 acres
of arable land to pasture would not displace
more than 100,000 labourers, leaving 165,000
to be otherwise accounted for.
The facts are somewhat complex. In the
first place, the census returns make no allow-
ance for continuous employment. A man
describes himself as an agricultural labourer
because that is his sole, or main, occupation ;
but in the old days large numbers of such
men were only employed seasonally, and
were idle for a considerable part of their
time. The general practice of " standing
off" men in wet weather enabled the farmer
to employ a maximum number in fine
weather, or at certain seasons, and to dis-
pense with them when work was slack. If
the figures are taken back a little earlier, and
the area of cultivated land added, this fact
appears evident in the statistics (see p. 1 50).
In the earlier period there was, in fact,
always a large surplus of labour in the
villages, but as time went on facilities for
transport increased, and the rural outlook
150 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
Labourers per
Year.
Cultivated Land.
Agricultural
Labourers.
1,000 acres of
Cultivated
Land.
Acres.
No.
1851
34,000,000 x
1.455,213
43
1861
33,000,000 *
1,364,908
4i
1871
30,839,000
1,142,347
37
1881
32,212,000
i,i7>45
32
1891
32,919,000
898,232
27
1901
32,417,000
724,3 J 4
22
1911
32,095,000
75 T ,927
23
widened. Labour became more mobile, men
passed from the country which offered so
meagre a living, and the number of agri-
cultural labourers accordingly fell. Partly
under this pressure employers gradually
tended to standardise their staff, so as to
keep the men in regular employment, and
the practice of " standing off" in wet weather
had become almost obsolete in recent years,
when the Agricultural Wages Board gave
it a coup de grace. At the same time, farmers
not only adopted in a steadily increasing
1 The Agricultural Returns were not collected until
1866, and the figures for 1851 and 1861 are accordingly
estimated. The acreage of cultivated land returned in
1871 was probably under stated.
AFTER THE WAR 1 >l
degree labour-saving implements and ap-
pliances, but a better-educated and more
intelligent generation arose who gave more
attention to the organisation and supervision
of labour whether mechanical, horse or
manual on their holdings.
The persistence of the old tradition which
regarded employment in agriculture as the
least skilled, and therefore the worst paid,
of all occupations, began to fail when the
farm-worker had access to other and better-
paid employment, which was a strong in-
ducement for the younger and the more
enterprising men to leave the land. Unfor-
tunately, the same bad tradition had imbued
farmers, especially of the older generation,
with an inability to realise the changed con-
ditions. The idea of offering higher wages
except in isolated cases to individual men
when other industries competed with agri-
culture for labour, was slow to enter the mind
of the average farmer, and any suggestion
of an increase usually met with obstinate
hostility. The fault lay not with all farmers,
but it was practically impossible for a few to
152 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
raise wages in a district without the general
consent of all, and the attitude of the majority
was decided by the mental outlook and
equipment of the average. It must be
admitted that, while within the limits of his
business, in the practical management of land
and stock, and in buying and selling in the
markets, the average farmer is, as a rule,
highly competent ; in political, sociological
or economic matters he usually stands on a
lower level than the rest of the capitalist
class to which he belongs.
In any forecast of the future of British
agriculture, it is desirable to be clear what is
expected of it. Shortly stated, the agricul-
tural land of a country may be developed
for one of three main objects profit, pro-
duction or population.
It is a truism to say of agriculture as ot
any other industry, that a man embarks
upon it and sinks his capital in it, with
the view of making a profit. There are
some exceptions to this generalisation in
the case of farming, for men do, in fact
occupy and cultivate farms either as in the
AFTER THE WAN 153
case of some public-spirited landowners (of
whom Sir John Lawes was a notable in-
stance) to experiment or demonstrate for
the benefit of their fellows, or, as is not
uncommon, as a form of recreation. But
generally speaking, a man takes a farm
with a view of using the land in such a
manner as will give him the greatest re-
muneration for his services and capital.
Under modern conditions of tenure he is,
as a rule, free to do anything he thinks
will pay him best. The old restrictive cove-
nants were objectionable and sometimes
unintelligent, but the principle underlying
them, the preservation of the natural fertility
of the soil, was sound. The occupier to-day is
unhampered, and he therefore grows such
crops, keeps such stock, and generally manages
the farm in such a manner as is best suited
to give him, under the conditions of soil,
climate and situation, the best financial
return. Up to a point it is his interest to
produce large crops from the land, and
the maximum output of meat and milk from
his stock. But that point is fixed by the
154 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
law of diminishing returns which governs
farming operations. Lord Ernie, in an
article 1 published shortly before he took
office as Minister for Agriculture, quoted
a Rothamsted experiment where the appli-
cation of 200 Ibs. of a complete fertiliser to
a wheat crop, gave an increased yield of
1 8 bushels, another 200 Ibs. increased the
yield by 8 bushels, but a further 200 Ibs.
gave an increase of only i'6 bushel. It
is evident, therefore, that the attempt to
obtain maximum output, is governed by
entirely different conditions from those which
obtain in industry, where increased output
generally means lower cost per unit produced.
This point of view is indicated in a
reasoned statement prepared in September
last by the National Farmers' Union, for
the Royal Commission on Agriculture :
" The mistake which brought disaster to
so many men in the eighties and nineties
was their attempt to keep up their produc-
tion in the face of a falling market. ' High
farming is no remedy for low prices,' and
1 Edinburgh Review } October 1915.
AFTER TiiK \VAK 155
thirty years of low prices have burned this
lesson deep into the minds of most farmers."
The land of this country will always find
men prepared to cultivate it. The "ruin
of agriculture" which is so glibly talked
about, means the ruin of a particular system
of agriculture, or the ruin of a number of
the present occupiers of land. Agriculture
in some form or other will be carried on,
for it is inconceivable that a nation of
46,000,000 should not utilise its agricultural
land to grow food of some kind. The real
question is what kind of food, and in what
quantities.
It is not very difficult to foresee the lines
upon which British agriculture would develop
without State intervention, or artificial stimu-
lus. The products will be in the first place
those for which the climate and the soil
are best suited, subject to the general rule
that products which will least bear the
charge of long transport, or will deteriorate
most from delay in reaching the consumer,
will have a preference. Up to the limit of
the demand, these products will be those
156 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
which on all soils and in all situations in
any way suited to them, will be primarily
produced. In other words, milk, butter,
fruit and vegetables, will be primary products
of British agriculture, while meat produc-
tion will hold its own so long as it maintains
its present superiority in quality. Corn will
be grown mainly as subsidiary to the pro-
duction of the primary products. It does
not necessarily follow that arable farming will
be greatly diminished, although land com-
pulsorily, and in some cases uneconomically,
ploughed up during the national emergency,
will mostly revert to grass.
In the pursuit of profit on these lines,
it is not certain whether, in the long run,
the total food production of the country
would be increased or decreased. In the
first instance, no doubt there would be a
further diminution of the land under the
plough, and as the total food produced on a
given area of arable land will almost always
be greater than that of an equal area of
grass land, whatever use is made of it,
production would t>ro tanto be reduced. As
AFTER THE WAR 157
the practice of using arable land for meat
and milk production became more general,
it might be that some recovery of arable
cultivation would take place.
In speaking ot the development of agri-
culture without State intervention, it is
assumed that under any circumstances the
State will maintain a Department of Agri-
culture, and provide in fuller measure than
heretofore all possible assistance in the way
of research, education, demonstration and
information. Very much has been done in
this direction more, indeed, than is generally
recognised. The system of agricultural col-
leges, and the arrangement by them, each
in its own area, of schemes suitable to its
locality, of educational and experimental work,
was not fully developed until shortly before
the war, and has naturally been hindered.
Such a system takes time to show results,
for it is the farmers of to-morrow, more than
the farmers of to-day, who will assimilate
the lessons which science can teach. The
average farmer, with all his inherited aptitude
for the cultivation of the soil, is not receptive,
158 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
and the younger generation will be far better
equipped for the struggle of life on the land,
wherever the influence of these centres of
agricultural education can penetrate.
The lines above suggested as those upon
which agriculture, if left to itself, will develop,
are in fact those upon which it had been
for a long time proceeding before the war.
Cereals had already been dethroned from
the pinnacle of supremacy which they once
occupied. In value of output, meat was
easily first, dairy products second and
cereals third. The estimated value of home-
produced meat (including pig- meat), just
before the war, was about ^100,000,000; of
milk, cheese and butter nearly ^60,000,000,
and of corn crops ,43,000,000. Fruit and
vegetables, as already mentioned, were grown
commercially to the value of ^16,000,000,
and were steadily increasing.
The interest of the nation, as distinct from
the class-interest of farmers, is two-fold :
(a) to secure the maximum quantity of
food from the land, and
(b) to maintain the maximum number
AFTER THE WAR 159
of persons on the land, as the
source from whence the whole
nation derives physical vigour.
There are two important reasons usually
given for producing the largest possible
proportion of the nation's food supply at
home, viz. reductions of imports and security
against starvation. Under present con-
ditions, and until our industrial system
regains something like its old measure of
production, the reduction of imports is
obviously of great importance to the finan-
cial rehabilitation of the country. 1 Unless,
and until, we produce sufficient commodities
to pay for them, every ton of goods we buy
is increasing our national indebtedness, and
further impairing our national credit. From
that point of view, drastic State action,
either to reduce the consumption of food
or to increase its production, might be
1 In considering reduction of food imports, two points
bulk and value have to be regarded. For saving
shipping it is preferable to import those commodities
which occupy least space. Thus wheat and maize
occupy about 50 to 60 cubic feet, butter and cheese
about 70 cubic feet, and meat from 100 to 120 cubic
feet per ton.
160 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
readily justified. Such measures would be
temporary, with the view of meeting what
we may well hope is a transition period
of financial stress. When the balance of
trade approaches equilibrium, restriction of
imports becomes, from this point of view, no
longer necessary or desirable, as obviously
our capacity to sell is limited by our
willingness to buy.
The increase of food production as an
insurance against the risk of famine, is a
more complex proposition. This is an old
subject, which was examined in considerable
detail by the Royal Commission on Food
Supplies in time of war, but undoubtedly
it now presents itself in a new aspect. It
was never assumed that if we were at war
with a great naval power, our food supplies
would reach us without interruption ; a
certain proportion of loss and capture of
food cargoes was anticipated, but it was
assumed that the fleet would be powerful
enough to prevent anything like a complete
blockade of these islands an operation
indeed, which our long coastline rendered
AFTER THE WAK 101
almost inconceivable. So far indeed, with
the knowledge of sea-warfare then possessed
by even the highest naval authorities, this
view appeared reasonable, and it was, in
fact, justified. The British Navy immedi-
ately on the outbreak of war, established a
command of the sea which was practically
complete, and was, at any rate, quite unpre-
cedented in the annals of the sea. But,
while Britannia ruled the waves, she found
her supremacy challenged under them. The
menace of the submarine had been foreseen,
but its rapid development was as little ex-
pected as was the almost equally rapid
development of measures of defence against
its attacks. In the case of all new weapons
of attack in war, methods of defence are im-
mediately devised, and the lesson of history
is, that although for a time the new weapon
is successful, the defence in the long run
defeats it, and new weapons have to be
adopted. Whether in the case of the
submarine there is any indication that the
turning-point has been reached, and that
the defence in future may be reckoned on
M
162 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
to defeat it, involves facts and speculations
which the present writer is quite unqualified
to discuss. What to the uninformed lay
mind seems clear, is that in the end the
human factor is decisive. That men, urged
by a sense of duty and patriotism, will
cheerfully take appalling risks, the war has
demonstrated. Human courage has never,
in the world's history, risen to greater
heights of daring. But, except in rare
instances, and at some extreme demand for
self-sacrifice, man will not face an enter-
prise without at least " a fighting chance "
of coming through alive. Service on a
submarine presents little chance of escape
if the craft is destroyed, but the chance of
not being caught was fairly high. If the
chance of being destroyed rises above a
certain point, men will "refuse to take it,
and the submarine will, in its present form,
become obsolete as a weapon of attack.
We may, however, assume, for the sake
of argument, that while a complete blockade
of these islands still remains improbable,
the risk of interference with our oversea
AFTER Till: WAR 163
food supplies has greatly increased, as
vessels now have to face submerged as
well as surface foes, in addition to attacks,
possibly even more formidable, from the air.
Our faith in the abolition of war is being
sorely tried, but many of us still 4< faintly
trust the larger hope," which is embodied
in the League of Nations. We cannot,
however, conclude that our sea-borne food
will suffer no risk of interruption if the
world remains at peace. A strike of sea-
men or of dock labourers, although less
prolonged, might for a time be more
effective than war in stopping vessels from
reaching our shores.
If the nation wishes to insure, it is
necessary to decide not only the form of
the insurance, but also the particular kind
of food in regard to which the risk is
greatest. It has hitherto been assumed
that if supplies of wheat could be assured,
all would be well, but the experience of
Germany has shown that a deficiency of
milk and fat will lower the vitality and
weaken the moral of a nation scarcely less
164 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR'
effectively than a shortage of bread. The
war has also shown that there are many
possible breadstuffs, but no substitute for
fat.
The nation was self-supporting in milk
and potatoes before the war, and remains
so now. At the end of the war the United
Kingdom was producing about 2,000,000
tons more cereals wheat, barley and oats
than in 1913. If the production of
1918-19 were maintained, and the whole
of the cereals were made into bread, the
population could be fed entirely on home-
grown grain. This assumption is, of course,
practically impossible. The use of barley
for beer may be substantially reduced as
it was and both oats and barley may be
utilised to some extent for the loaf. But
both these cereals are needed in large
quantities for the maintenance of live-
stock.
In 1918 there were in the United King-
dom 21,221,000 acres under arable culti-
vation, and about 50 per cent, of this area
was under corn crops. Before the war the
TIIK WAN L65
arable area was 19,414,000 acres, of which
39 per cent, was under corn. It is clear,
therefore, that the appeal for more cereals
induced farmers to break their rotations, and
to put a larger proportion than usual of their
arable land under corn. This, however,
was an emergency measure, and it must be
assumed, therefore, that with an arable area
of, say, 21,000,000 acres, the acreage of
corn would not be more than 8,500,000
acres. Of this on the pre-war basis about
half would be under oats, and the other half
would be equally divided between wheat
and barley. This acreage of wheat in an
average harvest would give a crop of
8,500,000 quarters, of which, after deduct-
ing seed and tail corn, not more than about
7,500,000 quarters would be available for
the loaf. On the basis of our present
population, and with a normal loaf the
United Kingdom consumes about 34,000,000
quarters per annum, so that we should still
need to import 78 per cent, of our require-
ments. It appears, therefore, that with
21,000,000 acres under arable cultivation,
166 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
our dependence on oversea supplies for
wheat would be very little reduced, and that
home resources would not furnish much
more than three months' supply. In the
case of another prolonged war, the fact that
so much more land was already under the
plough would, however, provide a greater
reserve, as it could be more quickly devoted
to corn-growing.
It is well to recognise that from the point
of view of having a reserve stock of wheat
in the country, as an insurance against the
abrupt and complete stoppage of oversea
supplies, nothing less than a crop equal to six
months' consumption would materially affect
our position. The late war broke out just
before harvest, and we had, therefore, the
whole of our home crop in stock, and with
the commercial stocks then in the country,
we could have lived for four or five months
on a wheaten loaf without imports. But if
we were suddenly blockaded in March, even
if we had harvested six months' supply
in the previous autumn, we should have
only enough wheat in the country to pro-
AFTER THE \V.\H 107
vide half-rations of bread for about four
months. If the previous harvest had been
very good, we should be slightly better off,
but if it had been very bad, we should be
so much worse off.
To secure this position, however, the
arable land would need to be increased by
nearly 8,000,000 acres above the level
reached in 1918, and having attained this
extension which is in fact not reasonably
possible the normal increase of population
would very quickly upset all the reckoning.
The argument for an extension of the
arable area does not rest alone, or indeed,
mainly, on security against famine, although
any increase in food production at home
helps, in some measure, in that direction.
A substantial increase in food production,
however, might be secured by augment-
ing the output from the present area. The
real national necessity is an increase in
the population engaged in the cultivation
of the soil, and deriving their subsistence
directly from it. The conception of an
industrialised and urbanised people is
168 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
appalling. To imagine an island which was
all London, or all the Black Country, is to
conceive conditions of human life which
would be unendurable, and a body politic
which was hastening to decay. The main-
tenance on the land of at least a substantial
proportion of the people is a social necessity,
and the larger that proportion is, the better
for the physical, moral and mental health of
the community. Agriculture is the phy-
lactery of a nation. It is the recuperative
and regenerative agency which sustains the
soul of mankind, and a people which has no
roots in the soil, and throws out no tendrils
to the open country, will become soulless
and effete.
The density of employment on arable land
varies greatly according to the system of
cultivation and the crops grown, but under
any circumstances, land which is under
tillage must employ at least three or four
times as many individuals as grass land.
The low ratio of man-power to produc-
tion, which from the profit-making point of
view is an indication of successful farming,
AFTKK Till- WAK 169
is from the national point of view a condem-
nation of the system of agriculture. The
agricultural policy of this country for ten or
twenty years prior to the war had recognised,
by legislation and administration directed to
the provision of small holdings and allotments,
that increased population on the land was
of vital importance, and that the State should
take special measures to promote it. Some-
thing also had been done to recognise in
principle that research and education were
the primary factors in securing increased
production. Development along these lines
must remain a foremost item in the pro-
gramme of any future policy, whatever may
be added thereto.
Neglect of our greatest industry has been
a stereotyped accusation against successive
Governments for the past forty years, but
it is not altogether well-founded. In some re-
spects, as, for instance, in the elimination of
animal diseases and the prevention of their
introduction, the State has been markedly
successful ; in other respects, such as the
multiplication of small holdings, it has been
170 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
ineffective, while in the encouragement of
research and the provision of facilities for
agricultural education, it has been laggard.
The estimates for 1919-20 showed, however,
a long step in advance, the amount allocated
in the vote of the Board of Agriculture and
Fisheries for agricultural education and re-
search being increased by over ,300,000,
and that for small holdings by ,100,000,
while 250,000 was provided for Land
Drainage and Reclamation. A sum of
nearly 1,000,000 was added to the Board's
vote, and substantial increases were also
made to the estimates for the Scottish and
Irish Departments.
If the interest of the State in agriculture
is to be measured by the amount of public
money devoted to it, the United Kingdom
may claim a high place. The provision
made by Germany before the war for foster-
ing agriculture is frequently cited as a model
for this country, while the large sums appro-
priated to the United States Department are
also quoted. It is not easy to make exact
comparisons, but the budget of the United
A1TKR TIIK WAU
i I
States Agricultural Department for 1919-20
was about ,7,000,000, while the votes for
the three Agricultural Departments of the
United Kingdom for the same financial
year, amounted to .2,700,000. The latest
figures available for Germany are for 1910,
and in that year the agricultural budget
amounted to ,4,000,000. On these crude
figures it might appear that we still lagged
behind, but when they are fairly compared
in relation to the interests involved, they tell
a different story, as is shown below :
Per i, ooo acres.
Per 1,000
ol 1 otal
Population.
Total Area
Cultivated
Land.
United States
68
4
14
Germany
63
3 1
47
United Kingdom .
60
36
60
In relation to agriculture, as measured by
the extent of land farmed, the public ex-
penditure of the United Kingdom, therefore,
is much higher than in America or Ger-
many. Direct expenditure from the national
172 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
Exchequer does not, however, in any of the
countries represent the total amount spent on
Agriculture. In the United States very large
sums are also spent by the various States,
and in Germany much of the expenditure on
agricultural education is provided through
Chambers of Agriculture with special rating
powers. In Great Britain also some expen-
diture on Agriculture is provided by local
authorities, and also by voluntary associa-
tions, such as the Royal Agricultural Society
the Highland and Agricultural Society and
similar societies to whom collectively the
progress of agricultural practice and science,
and particularly the improvement of live-
stock and implements, are very largely due.
The agricultural policy to which the nation
is committed as the result of the war, is
embodied in the Corn Production Act, 1917,
the Land Settlement (Facilities) Act, 1919,
and the Agriculture (Councils, etc.) Bill.
The main principles therein laid down, are
(i) the guarantee to farmers of minimum
prices for wheat and oats; (2) the establish-
ment of a minimum wage for farm workers ;
AFTKR Tin; \\.\n
(3) the restriction of the raising of farm
rents ; (4) the enforcement of proper cul-
tivation ; (5) the compulsory acquisition of
land for small holdings and farm colonies,
especially for the settlement of ex-service
men.
The lines upon which this policy is based,
involve a notable change in the relations of
the State to the agricultural community. As
regards the farm workers, it may be said
that the Corn Production Act applies to
them a general principle of regulation of
wages which is, in some form or other,
common to many other industries, and that
if they were not provided for in an agri-
cultural policy, they would be dealt with in
a labour policy. The occupiers of land,
however, are exceptionally treated. The
two main pillars of the policy are the
insurance of farmers against a disastrous
fall in corn prices, and the supervision by
the State of the farming of the country. It
may be said that guaranteed prices are only
a reversion to the principle embodied in the
Cora Laws, which had for their object the
174 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
encouragement of corn-growing and the ex-
tension of arable land. It is, however, a
new departure in agricultural politics for the
State to assume the responsibility for the
proper cultivation of every holding " accord-
ing to the rules of good husbandry," with
power to evict the occupier and carry on
the farm under Government control. The
State thus, without acquiring the ownership
of the land, steps into the position, and
exercises the functions of landlord an in-
novation in the land system of the country
of which the implications cannot at present
be foreseen.
CHAPTER III
THE HUMAN FACTOR
"Nothing is so contrary to fact as the common opinion
that the agricultural labourer and his family are stupid
and unintelligent." RICHARD JEFFRIES.
THE supply of food is an economic question,
in the discussion of which capital and labour
as essential to production and distribution,
may be treated as abstractions subject to
certain general laws and tendencies. But in
agriculture the human element, for which
capital and labour are generalised descrip-
tions, counts for much more than in most
industries. All occupations tend to " run in
families," but in none is heredity so strong an
influence as in the cultivation of the soil. In
this country, at any rate, farming families
attached, sometimes for hundreds of years,
to the same parish may be found in all
districts, while labourers have in numberless
176 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
instances still deeper roots in their native
village.
His dead are in the churchyard thirty generations
laid.
Their names were old in history when Domesday
Book was made.
This hereditary association with the land,
and the traditions which come down from
generation to generation, coloured and dis-
torted oftentimes by long transmission, result
in an instinct of possessive rights which is
to be found latent in the peasantry of all
countries, and in some cases has stimulated
fierce uprisings. The exciting cause of a
rising of the peasantry, as in the French
Revolution and our own Peasants' Revolt,
is oppression, but at the root of it lies the
conviction of an equal right in the land with
those who exercise ownership. The watch-
word of socialism " When Adam delved and
Eve span, who was then the gentleman?"
was coined more than 500 years ago on the
English countryside. For the past century
or more, there has been added to this vague
instinct of possession, a more definite feeling
AFTER THE WAR 177
of dispossession. Throughout the greater
part of rural England, the belief is firmly
held that the land belonged to " the people "
before the Inclosures, and was then taken
from them. It is easy for those who have
studied the records to argue that there is very
little historical foundation for this belief, that
the inclosure of the commons was an economic
necessity, that the existence of common rights
was a hindrance to the progress of agriculture,
that the rights of common were of little value,
that compensation to their then owners was
given on their abolition, and that in any case
a right of common is not, in fact, ownership
of land. No argument or historical evidence
will disturb the conviction that the people
have been deprived of the land they once
possessed.
It is on this stubborn tradition that the
advocates of the nationalisation of the land,
base their appeal to the agricultural labourers,
and from this they receive widespread sup-
port. No observer of the course of events
can fail to recognise, if he candidly faces
facts without allowing his sight to be obscured
178 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
by his own predilections, that this issue is
one which will come before the nation for
decision in the not far-distant future. For
the time being, the agricultural labourer is
mainly interested in the immediate improve-
ment of his economic position. In the short
space of two years, he has made a signal
advance. He has shared with other workers
in the general raising of the level of wages
which has been one of the results of the
war a rise which may be admitted to be
the inevitable corollary of the rise in the cost
of living, without prejudice to the discussion
whether it was greater or less than was
requisite. But the alteration in the labourer's
position has been more than is expressed in
terms of money. He has secured the general
recognition of his right of organisation and
collective bargaining, his claims to a certain
amount of leisure have been admitted, and
he can now no longer be described, by any
flight of oratory, as a serf or a drudge. This
change in his position and outlook has been
too sudden to allow its consequences to be
realised, or fully felt. At present the older
AFTER THE WAR 179
men are a little dazed. It will take some
time for the rural mind to adjust itself to
the new conditions, though the older genera-
tion is receiving a new and equally disturbing
leaven in the younger men who are returning
after having played their part in the war.
They bring back to the countryside minds
which have been widened and stimulated by
adventures and experiences such as a long
life-time of humdrum existence could not
dimly conceive. Their three or four years
of Europe, or of other fields of fighting, have
been more eventful than " a cycle of Cathay,"
and they will regard the old familiar fields
with a clearer and more critical vision.
The nation will be wise to recognise betimes
that the change in the countryside betokens
not only a demand for more wages or profits,
for freer access to the land, or for greater
efficiency in production. It implies a fuller
appreciation of the human need for a less
monotonous existence, for a life of wider scope
and variety, for better opportunities of re-
creation, and reasonable facilities for social
intercourse. The village club as a centre of
180 FOOD SUPPLIES IN PEACE AND WAR
social activity must in future be as familiar
as the village pump. The dullness and
isolation of village life, which in the past have
numbed the senses and stupefied the minds
of the inhabitants, will no longer be patiently
endured. Attempts to meet this need are
being made in many villages throughout the
country, and they can only be successfully
made with the co-operation of all classes in
the community. They cannot be made under
any super-imposed plan ; they must, like farm-
ing, be adapted in each case to the local
conditions. But herein lies the best means
of maintaining and retaining on the country-
side the intelligent and alert men and women
who are essential to the attainment of a high
standard of food production, and the best
hope of fostering the spirit of contentment,
brotherhood
and gentleness,
In hearts at peace, under an English heaven.
INDEX
AFRICA, u, 18, 28, 37, 108,
132
Agricultural area, 143, 150
Agricultural Consultative Com-
mittee, 44
Agricultural education, 157,
169
Agricultural holdings, 144
Agricultural output, return of,
24
Agricultural statistics, 18, 40,
59 52
Agricultural Wages Board, 150
Agriculture, Board of, 24, 44,
73. 170
Agriculture (Councils) Bill, 172
Allotments, 51
Arable land, 21, 47, 50, 148,
156, 164
Argentina, n, 13, 28, 35, 103
Australia, n, 28. 37, 103, 132
Austria- Hungary, 13, 28, 33,
88, 104, 119, 138
Bacon, 38, 72, 86
Bailiffs, farm, 145
Barley, 40, 50, 119, 129, 138
Beans, 40, 50
Belgium, 12, 13, 18, III, 119,
138
Black Death, the, 6
Blockade, 2, 66, 162
Board of Trade, 68, 72, 92
Boer War, effect of, 148
Brazil, 12, 28, 37, 132
Bread Subsidy, 81, 89
British Association, 43
British Empire, 16, 18
Bulgaria, 34
Butter, 13, 43, 72, 84, 86, 158
Byron, Lord, 142
Calves, slaughter of, 53
Canada, II, 28, 37, 129
Canary Islands, 28
Cattle, 9, 22, 41, 47, 56, in,
130, 138
Census, 145, 147, 150
Census of production, 24
Cereals, 26, 78, 158, 164
Ceylon, 28
Cheese, 13, 43, 72, 130
Chile, 108
China, 12, 14, 28, 148
Cocoa, 26, 28
Coffee, 25, 28
Columbia, 28
Commission Internationale de
Ravitaillement, 69
Committee of Imperial Defence,
65
Common, rights of, 177
Corn Production Act (1917),
172
Corn Trade News, 103
Costa Rica, 28
Crookes, Sir W., 14
Cuba, 28
Cucumbers, 140
Dairy produce, 26
Darwin, Charles, 125
181
182
INDEX
Defence of the Realm Act, 49,
72
Denmark, 12, 13, 18, 28, 66,
119, 138
Devonport, Lord, 73, 83
Diminishing returns, law of,
154
Edinburgh Review, 154
Eggs, 26, 43
England and Wales, 145
Ernie, Lord, 129, 154
Exports, control of, 66
Famine, 10, 15, 160
Farmers, 4, 23, 46, 57, 136,
144, 152, 173, 175
Farmyard manure, 113
Feeding-stuffs, 65, HO
Fertilisers, 46, 107
Fish, 26
Food Controller, 72, 83
Food economy, 77, 8 1
Food Production Department,
74
Food values, 25
France, 12, 28, 88, 103, 107,
in, 114, 119, 121, 137
Freights, 133
Fruit, 14, 26, 28, 43
Game, 26
Germany, 2, 12, 13, 28, 31, 33,
46, 88, 104, 109, 114, 119,
120, 131, 137, 171
Grain, 33, 64, 78
Grain Supplies Committee, 68,
71
Grapes, 140
Great Britain, 21, 141, 144, 147
Greece, 12, 104, 119
Guaranteed prices, 49, 172
Guatemala, 28
Hay, 41
Highland and Agricultural
Society, 172
Holland, 12, 13, 28, 66, 104,
H9, 138
Inclosures, 177
Index numbers, 7
India, u, 13, 18, 28, 35, 68
Indian Wheat Committee, 68
International Agricultural lusli-
tute, 15
International Statistical Insti-
tute, 15
Irish Department of Agriculture,
74, 170
Italy, 12, 13, 88, 103, in,
119, 138
Japan, 134
Java, 28
Joint Allies' Purchasing Com-
mittee, 69
Knibbs, G. H., 125
Labour, 113, 151, 163
Labourers, agricultural, 46, 57,
114, 145, 147, 175
Land nationalisation, 177
Land Settlement (Facilities
Act (1919), 172
Lard, 26, 84
Lawes, Sir John, 153
League of Nations, 97, 163
Live-stock control, 93
Ludendorff, 107
Macaulay, T. B., 142
Maize, 13, 119
Manitoba, 131
Margarine, 26, 28, 72, 84, 85
Maximum prices, 49, 62, 82, 90
Meat, 13,26,28,43,55,68,72,
84, 93, 158
Merchant Service, the, 70, 75
134
Mesopotamia, 132
Mexico, 28
Milk, 22, 43, 54, 158
INDKX
Minimum prices, 172
Minimum wage, 172
Ministry of Food, 73, 77, 82,
85,90
National Farmers' Union, 154
Navy, British, 29, 31, 75, 134,
161
New Zealand, 13, 28
Norway, 66, 119
Oats, 40, 47, 50, 119, 129, 138
Ontario, 131
Output per man, 139
Peas, 40, 50
1'igs, 41, 56, ill, 130, 138
Population, 14, 16, 20, 22, 125,
M5
Portugal, 104
Potatoes, 26, 40, 47, 51, 138
Poultry, 26, 43
Prices, 8, 42, 45, 81, 86
Profiteering, 91
Prussia, 138
"Queues," 83
Rabbits, 26
Rationing, 63, 82
Rents, restriction of, 173
Reserves of food, 68, 76, 86, 163
Rhondda, Lord, 83
Rice, 13, 28, 72, 119
Root-crops, 41
Rothamsted experiments, 154
Roumania, n, 13, 34
Royal Agricultural Society, 172
Royal Commission on Agri-
culture, 154
Royal Commission on Food
Supplies, 64, 160
Royal Proclamation, 78
Royal Society, 24
Royal Stntistical Society, 127
Rural population, 146, 168
t, ii, 13, 18, 28, 105, 132
Rye, 13, 50, 119, 132
Scottish Board of Agriculture,
o 74, 170
Sheep, 9, 21, 41, 47, 56, in,
13. J 38
Shipping, 31, 69, 134, 159
SiU-ria, 132
Small holdings, 170, 173
Spain, 12, 28, 104, 108, 119
State aid, 157, 169
State control, 60, 67, 72, 81,
174
Stocks of food, 64, 76, 85
Submarines, 75, 126, 161
Sugar, 13, 26, 28,67, 72,84
Sugar Commission, 67, 92
Sweden, 12, 28, 88, 119
Switzerland, 12,28,88, 104,119
Tea, 25, 28
Tomatoes, 140
Transport, 3, 19, 32, 135, 159
Turkey, 33
United Kingdom, 12, 13, 18,
20, 40, 104, HI, 119, 120,
136, 144, 164, 171
United States, n, 13, 28, 35,
37,88, 131, 171
Urban population, 146, 168
Uiuguay, 13, 28
Use-and-Wont, 5
Vegetables, 26, 43
Village Clubs, 179
Wages, agricultural, 46, 151
War Savings Committee, 78
West Indies, 28
Wheat, n, 1 6, 21, 28, 35, 40,
43, 47, 50, 70, 72, "9, 129,
131, 138, 165
Wheat Commission, 48, 71
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