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THE FOUNDING 



gekma:^ empire 



BY AVILLIAM I. 



HEINRICH VOX SYBEL 



TRAXSLATED BY HELEN K SCIIIMMELFEXNIG WHITE 



Vol. YII. 



Auf ranlien I'faileu iiniuer aufwJirts 



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XKW Vf>KK : 4(5 East ForicrKKNTii Street 

I'lIo.MAS Y. CROWHLL & COMPANY 

IJOSTOX : 1(X» 1*1 l{< llASi: .SlKEET 



Copyright, 1898, 
Bv Thomas Y. Crowell & Company. 



Typoorapht by C. J. Peters & Son, Boston. 
Peesswork by Rockwell & Churchill. 



PEE FACE. 



This volume was already in print when, on No- 
vember 26th, I received a copy of Figaro of the 23d, 
containing the lengthy preface to Emile Ollivier's pro- 
spective history (in seven volumes) of the Liberal Em- 
pire; i.e., of the Ollivier Ministry, from January 2d 
to August 9th, 1870. As I have since heard, the first 
volume of this exhaustive work appeared on the 26th. 
Although I have as yet not seen it, the preface suffices 
fully to reveal both the character of the author and the 
nature and extent of his information. His main pur- 
pose seems to be to establish that the war of 1870 was 
the result of a diabolical intrigue devised by Bismarck ; 
although the evidence he offers in proof of this is con- 
lined to a repetition of the inventions of the Duke of 
Clramont, an authority a1:)out as reliable as the author 
himself. 

These assertions have long since been refuted, and 
may be found in full in the contents of this volume 
following page 285. 

HEINRICH VON SYBEL. 
Bbblin, November 2'Jlli, ISIM. 



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CONTENTS OF VOLUME YII. 



BOOK XXIII. 
GERMANY AXD FRANCE. 

CHAPTKll 1'A<;E 

I. THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT .... 3 

I. First Half of the Reichstag Session. — Benefi- 
cent Federal Legislation. — An Old Motion revived. — 
Freedom of Speech for Deputies. — Miquel's Proposed 
Clause. — Responsible Ministry debated. — Bismarck's 
Speech. — II. The Customs Parliament. — The Parlia- 
ment organizes. — South German Elections criticised. — 
Proposed Address rejected. — Commercial Treaties. — 
Treaty with Austria ratified. — Tax on Tobacco debated. 

— The Government's Bill rejected. — The Tobacco Tax 
greatly reduced. — A Question of Competency. — Develop- 
ment of the Debate. — The National Spirit prevails. — The 
Duty on Petroleum. — The Duty rejected. — Re-opening of 
the Reichstag. — III. Closing Weeks of the Rkkhstag. 

— Renewed Debate on ^liquel Clause. — The Point at Issue. 

— The Governments propose a Compromise. — The Pro- 
■;ressists oppose It. — The Compromise Bill passed. — A 
Court of Accounts. — A Bill regarding Federal Officials. 

— Co-operative Associations. — Make-Shift Bill to regulate 
Trades. 

II. FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS . . . SI 

T. The Rise of Liberalism. — ^Nlorny. — Emile Ollivitr. 

Napoleon's Plans of Reform. — Napoleon and Ollivier. 

Manifesto of Jan. 19. — Ollivier returns to the Opposi- 
tion. — II. Atte.mpt to for.m a Triple Alliance. — The 
Conservative Bonaparti.sts. — The Arcadians. — Purchase 
of Belgian Railways. — Belgium protests. — The Triple 
Alliance proposed. — Austria agrees. — Opposition to Napo- 
leon's Plans. — Pru.ssia's Attitude of Reserve. — Napoleon 
and Belgium reconciled. — Draft of a Treaty of Alliance. — 
Napoleon and Victor Emmaimel. — Tlie .VUiance is not con- 
cluded.— III. Tkiu-mfh of the Liberal Tendencies.— 



vi CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER PAOE 

Elections in France. — A Liberal Majority. — Modification 
of the INIinistry. — Senatus ConsuHum of Sept. 10. — Serious 
Illness of Napoleon. — The Plans of Alliance fail. — Pru.s- 
sia's Crown Prince in Vienna. — His Cordial Reception. 

III. COSMOPOLITAN ASPIRATIONS 138 

Adversaries of Individual Liberty. — I. Communistic 
Movement. — Schulze-Delitzsch. — Ferdinand Lassalle. — 
Organization of "The International." — Marx's Theory 
of Surplus Value. — Criticism of Marx's Theory. — Lieb- 
knecht sent to Germany. — Annual Meeting at Niirnberg. 

— -Vnnual Meeting at Eisenach. — Annual Meeting at Stutt- 
gart. — The Danger of a Class Conflict. — II. Clerical 
Aspirations. — Triumphs of the Clerical Movement. — 
Pope Pius IX. — A New Dogma. — Encyclical and Sylla- 
bus .— Agitation Against Prussia. — The Austrian Constitu- 
tion cursed. — A Vatican Council called. — Bishops issue 
a Pastoral Letter. 

IV. PARLIAMENTARY CONFLICTS, 

RESULTS ACHIEVED BY THE GOVERNMENT . 181 

Prussian Deficit announced. — Determined Opposition. — 
Greater Freedom in Business. — Mutual Legal Aid. — Elec- 
toral Law. — Freedom of Speech. — Civil Code. — Responsi- 
ble Ministry discussed. — The Federal Budget criticised. — 
Many New Taxes proposed. — The Military Burden Criti- 
cised. — Reichstag rejects the New Taxes. — The Customs 
Parliament. — Tax on Sugar approved . — Duty on Petroleum 
rejected. — Prussian Deficit. — Plan to reduce the Debt. — 
Criticism by the Opposition. — Y irchow's Lapsus Lingusc. 

— Camphauseu's Plan adopted. — Opening of the Reichs- 
tag. — Motion in Favor of Admitting Baden. — The Penal 
Code. — Eduard Lasker. — The Customs Parliament. — Op- 
position to the Death Penalty. — The Penal Code adopted. 

V. CLERICAL TENDENCIES IN THE FRENCH GOV- 
ERNMENT 233 

Difiiculty in forming a New Cabinet. — A Responsible 
Ministry instated. — Great Victory for the Ministry. — Gov- 
ernment Candidatures. — Count Daru's Foreign Policy. — 
Austrian Plan of Campaign. — France and the Vatican. 

— Ollivier and Daru differ. — OUivier prevails. — A Pleb- 
iscitum proposed. — Rouher's Influence. — Draft of a New 
Constitution. — Republican Opposition. — Ministerial Crisis. 

— Preparations for the Plebiscitum. — Victory for the Mon- 
archy. — The Duke de Gramont. — Effect of the Crisis. — 
Debate iipon St. Gothard Railway. — Francis Joseph against 
the Alliance. 



CONTENrS. vii 



BOOK XXIV. 
ORIGIN OF THE FREXCII WAR. 

•tHAPTER PAGE 

I. THE HOHENZOLLERN CANDIDACY . . . .289 

Salazar's Proposals of February, 1869. — Prince Charles 
Anthony declines. — Benedetti interviews Bismarck. — 
The Second Spanish Attempt. — A Second Refusal.— 
Spain's Fruitless Attempt in Italy. — Spanish Offer made a 
Third Time. — King William opposes Acceptance. — Bis- 
marck advocates It. — A Fourth Attempt determined upon. 

— Negotiations unknown to the King. — Prince Leopold ac- 
cepts. — Prim and the French Ambassador. — Survey of the 
Transaction. 

II. THE WITHDRAWAL OF PRINCE LEOPOLD . . 320 

Gramont Indignant. — The Official Press attacks Prussia. 

— Prussia explains its Position. — The Cochery Interpel- 
lation. — The Cabinet discusses the Reply. — Napoleon for 
Peace. — Gramont for War. — Gramont's Threatening 
Speech. — Intense Excitement in Paris. — King William 
asked to retract. — Benedetti sent to Ems. — Instructions 
given by Bismarck. — Gramont wavers. — Napoleon cir- 
cumvents Gramont. — Gi'amont's Appeal to Precedent. — 
Benedetti's First Interview. — Gramont L^rgent. — Bis- 
miarck Ready to goto Ems. — Benedetti's Second Interview. 

— The Withdrawal determined upon. — The Withdrawal 
announced. — Bismarck in Berlin. 

in. NEW CLAIMS MADE BY FRANCE .... 2m 

The Withdrawal not Sufficient. — Letter of Apology 
asked. — Gramont demands Guaranties. — Gramont's Policj' 
criticised. — Napoleon's Consent obtained. — Excitement 
in Paris. — Question of Mobilization in Paris. — Urgent In- 
structions to Benedetti. — King William and Benedetti. — 
Beneiletti rebuffed. — Bismarck and Lord Loftus. — The 
Ems Despatch. — Refusal of French Claims published. — 
Patriotic Excitement in Germany. 

IV. THE DECL.\R.\TION OF WAR 402 

First Cabinet Council of July 14. — Second Cabinet Coun- 
cil of July U. — The Decision is for Peace. —Tliird Cabi- 
net Council of July 14. — The Decision is for War. — What 
led to the Declaration of War. — Mobilization. — Message 



viii CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER PAGE 

to the Chambers. — The Left and Thiers oppose AYar. — 
The Govermiient asks Means for War. — Gramont's De- 
ception. — War.— Yitzthum's Endeavors. — King William's 
Return to Berlin. — North German Enthusiasm. — Federal 
Council and Reichstag. — National Enthusiasm in Bavaria. 

— Clerical Opposition. — National Sentiment triumphs. — 
Wiirtemberg Enthusiastic also. — National Enthusiasm in 
Baden. — "If defeated, we will endure." 

V. ATTEMPTS TO FORM ALLIANCES .... 448 
Spain Neutral. — England Neutral. — Contraband of War. 

— Russia Neutral. — Denmark Neutral. — French Offers to 
Italy and Austria. — Count Beust's Apprehensions. — Aus- 
tria influenced to Neuti-ality. — Count Beust's Letter of 
July 20. — Evacuation of Rome proposed. —The Septem- 
ber Convention. — Victor Emmanuel and Sella. — Italy's 
Preparations for War. — Italy Neutral. — The Conference 
at Vienna. —Vitzthum's Mission in Florence. —Victor Em- 
manuel's Final Decision. — Indignation in the Vatican.— 
Incentives of the Combatants. 

NOTE TO CHAPTER V. 

Gramont's Fabrications Regarding the Alliance Negotla- 

Tioxs OF 1870 4'Jl 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 499 

INDEX 519 



BOOK xxm. 



GERMANY AND FRANCE. 



GERMANY AND FRANCE. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. 

It is now our purpose to observe how the national 
idea asserted itself in our German Fatherland amid the 
varying movements of European politics during that 
turbulent year, 1868. 

I. FIRST HALF OF THE REICHSTAG SESSION. 

Wliilst the elections in South Germany were still in 
progress, it was determined in Berlin to convoke the 
Reiclistag for the 23d of March. With a short inter- 
mission for the Easter holidays, this would allow it to 
continue its deliberations for four weeks before its 
ranks would be increased by the addition of the South 
German members of the Customs Parliament for the 
session to be opened on April 27th. 

In the speech from the throne with which, on tlie 
appointed day, King William opened the Reichstag, 
he confined himself to the formal announcement of the 
bills which had l)een prepared for its consideration. 
For the further development of freedom of migration 



4 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PAULIAMEyT. [1868 

there was a bill regulating tlie canying on of a trade or 
business ; by another, certain police restrictions upon 
the right of contracting marriage were to be removed. 
Besides these, there was a bill regarding the quarter- 
ing of soldiers in time of peace, and one for the intro- 
duction of a uniform system of measures and weights, 
based upon the metric and decimal systems. 

These proposed measures all gave promise of further 
advance in the direction of the reforms introduced 
through the action of the previous session, and were 
well adapted in their realization to promote prosj)erity, 
facilitate intercourse, and insure personal freedom. 

They were followed by a number of postal treaties, 
the object of which was to extend the advantages of 
the new postal laws to international intercourse. 
Another treaty regulated the much-disputed lawful ob- 
ligations of returning emigrants who had acquired the 
right of citizenship in America, upon whom, however, 
their native State had a claim for military service 
avoided by emigration. 

The budget for 1869 could not as yet be submitted, 
since the estimates for some of the important items 
could not possibly be made at this early date, or else 
were dependent upon the action of the Customs Par- 
liament. 

Finally, the King commended to tlie consideration 
of the Reichstag the proposed law regarding the admin- 
istration of the Federal debt, which had been discussed 
during the previous session. In connection with it 
he expressed the hope that the difficulties which had 



1868] BENEFICENT FEDERAL LEGISLATION. 5 

then presented themselves would be surmounted by 
a spirit of mutual concession. 

At present, however, the political aspect of the 
House gave little prospect for the realization of this 
hope. The Liberal elements, it is true, were animated 
by the best of intentions, in so far as possible to go 
hand in hand with the Governments in common labor 
to complete and strengthen the interior equipment 
of the Confederation. No one could fail to perceive 
the degree of prosperity and security before the law 
which had even now followed, and would continue 
to follow, in the wake of uniform Federal legislation. 
To all proposals involving emancipation of economic 
labor and production, of internal and international in- 
tercourse, the Iveichstag invariably devoted can'ful 
investigation, which frequently led to instructive dis- 
cussion, not rarely to needless amendments, l)ut hardly 
ever to party opposition on principle. 

The convention with America, by wliieh Prussia 
relincjuished its right to claim military service of nat- 
uralized Anu'rican citizens u[)()n their return to their 
(ierman fatherland, was approved, with little iiesi- 
tation ; even less opposition was encountei'cd l)v the 
postal treaties, everywhere hailed with joy. 

The report made by the Conunittee in cliarge of the 
l)ill [)roviding greater freedom in contracting marriage 
presented a sad picture of the consequences attending 
the complicated restrictions heretofore in force, and tlie 
arbitrary interference on the ])ait of magistrates and 
police authorities; of the kigal insecurity in these 



6 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

matters to which especially the poorer classes were- 
subject; of the many cases of illegal cohabitation 
which were the result, together with the increasing 
number of illegitimate children. Not a voice was 
raised in defence of these evils. There was a diiference 
of opinion merely with regard to the means best 
adapted to their remedy, and this soon ended in an 
agreement which received general approval. 

In addition to these measures, the benefits of which 
would be immediately reaped, a Avide ^^rospect of future 
advance was opened. In response to a request originat- 
ing with Wagner and Planck for the introduction of an 
improved criminal code as well as a new criminal j^ro- 
ceclure, together with the change in the organization of 
the courts which this necessitated, the President of the 
Federal Chancery, Delbrlick, at once announced the 
willingness of tlie Governments to comply with it, and 
the Federal Council forthwith appointed a number of 
committees to draw up the desired bills. 

Another committee was charged with the drafting of 
a new law of domicile ; another one, with the prepara- 
tion of a revised civil procedure ; a third, with a plan 
for improved regulations governing mortgages. In 
fact, the two organs of the Confederation seemed to be 
engaged in a rivalry for legislative production. " We 
are making too many laws ; we are working too fast ! 
Soon we shall have to devote all our time to learning 
the law, and have none left to live bj' it," exclaimed 
the highly conservative Councillor Basse witz, who 
later became Minister. 



1868] AN OLD MOTIO.X ItEVIVEI). 7 

This, however, was only one side of the situation. 
As willing as the liberal elements in the Reichstag' 
were to further every tendency of Federal legislation 
toward promoting the welfare of the people, as little 
inclined were they to relinquish their efforts to extend 
parliamentary influence beyond the sphere to which the 
Federal Constitution limited it. This was but what 
was to be expected of the Extreme Left ; but the atti- 
tude of the National Liberals too, who heretofore had 
been so well disposed toward the Government, was such 
us to make the second half of the party name appear 
more and more appropriate. 

And so, in the Reichstag, fair weather and foul 
alternated continuously. Hardly had the assembly or- 
ganized on April 2d, before the veteran Waldeck chal- 
lenged to combat, by presenting a motion granting 
compensation to the members of the Reichstag. " We 
are the representatives of the entire population," he 
declared; "therefore the people, free from restriction 
of any kind, should have entire liberty in the choice 
of deputies ; thus only can the right man always be se- 
lected." He believed in the infallibility of the people 
as did the Ultramontanes in that of the Pope. " Our 
interests will be best served by a spirit of utmost libe- 
rality," he remarked further ; " for thus alone can we 
win tlie South." 

Bismarck opposed the motion with the remonstrance 
that it was highly unwise at this early day to tinker 
at the Constitution, as yet hardly a year ohl. and 
especially so to begin with this Article, -wliic h, as tlie 



8 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

result of a coiiipioniise between the Governments and 
tlie lleiclistag, bad made tbe adoj)tion of the Constitu- 
tion })(>ssil)le. And so far as tbe South was concerned, 
he declared that Waldeck, living only in his ideals, had 
no conception of the actual conditions. 

'•The South,"' he explained, "is avei-se to union Avith 
us, not because we are not liberal enough, but because 
we are much too lil)eral for its taste. Baden, the only 
liberal State of the South, is most eager to be admitted 
into the Confederation. It is the liberal South Ger- 
mans, therefore, who desire union with us ; those who 
do not are the reactionary parties. These I will not 
designate more particularly: the latest elections in 
South Germany have cast a strong light upon them, and 
it bespeaks an almost inconceivable ignorance of facts 
to dispute this condition of affairs. Should we guar- 
antee to the parties now predominant in South Ger- 
many certain institutions of which their El Dorado, 
Austria, is about to rid itself, — and which would surely 
be no advance toward liberalism, — then, perhaps, we 
might hope to secure a South German majority favor- 
able to union with us." 

As powerful as was the impression made b}^ this con- 
vincing exposition of the true state of affairs, and as 
strong as was the influence which the immovable atti- 
tude of the Government exerted, still it was only by 
the very slight majority of 97 voices against 92 that the 
motion was finally rejected in a very poorly attended 
sitting of the House. Almost all the National Liberals, 
and even a iew Old Liberals, sided with Waldeck. 



1868] FREEDOM OF SPEECH FOR DEPUTIES. 9 

A much greater interest was evinced in a motion 
presented on the following day by Lasker, with the 
support of forty-five associates, proposing the enact- 
ment of a Federal law securing the members of the 
Representative Assemblies and Chambers of the several 
German States against prosecution for uttt'rauces made 
in the performance of their functions. 

We have seen how in the preceding year Lasker's 
efforts for the enactment of a similar law for Prussia 
were crowned by success in the Prussian House of Dep- 
uties, whereas, when presented to the Upper House, 
the bill was rejected there by an almost unanimous 
vote. Thus deprived of all hope to achieve his desire 
througli Prussian legislation, he resolved to bring this 
important question before the Reichstag. 

The principal arguments for and against were de- 
veloped anew in a long and interesting debate ; the 
deciding question, however, was whether the Reichs- 
tag had authority by so momentous a decision to 
affect the constitutional rights of the individual 
States. 

'•Tlio law which we desire," Lasker declared, "will 
bo no infraction on the State Constitutions, but will 
sinqjly bring ;il)out a modification of the criminal law, 
a province which as expressly as possible is placed 
within our jnrisdictioii. The Federal authority has 
the privilege to revise the entire existing criminal 
code ; surely, then, it has tlie right to decree that cer- 
tain acts, heretofore considered as violations of law, 
shall cease to be unlawful, and therefore no longer 



10 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

subject the perpetrator to legal prosecution. If for 
certain acts a deputy may be called to account by the 
law of the land, this presupposes that these acts are 
declared punishable by the criminal code there in 
force ; therefore, by making the necessary change in 
the code, legal prosecution may no longer follow, even 
without a modification of the Constitution." 

To this his opponents replied, that in spite of his 
seemingly correct deduction, the fact remained that 
by the proposed measure a privilege heretofore not 
generally conceded would be granted to the members 
of the several Chambers, whereby the position of the 
people's representatives would be materially strength- 
ened, resulting in an increase of power for the Cham- 
bers, and consequently in a modification of the rights 
granted by the Constitution. Therefore, it was further 
argued, this measure also implied an extension of the 
competency of the central power, and a I'estriction of 
the individual independence of the States ; to pro- 
claim such a tendency would, under present condi- 
tions, be most disastrous, and would arouse a violent 
spirit of reaction. 

An earnest remonstrance to this effect was added 
by the Weimar Minister, Herr von Watzdorff, to 
whom no one had ever ascribed reactionary or par- 
ticularistic propensities. Windthorst declared himself 
ready to further the proposed measure in the Prus- 
sian Assembly, but believed that its adoption by the 
Reichstag would endanger the permanence of the Con- 
federation. ''Do not mistake the spirit of the times," 



1868] JilSMARCE-S CHAXGE OF ATTITUDE. 11 

he cried, •• llie flood tide of the Gennau unity move- 
ment is past; the ehb lias set in, and it therefore be- 
hooves lis to be doubly careful!" 

Bismarck's attitude was conciliatory. The time had 
been, as we have seen, when he forcibly opposed the 
deputy's privilege to calunniiate ; now, however, inudi 
in need of the friendship as well as the moderation 
of the middle parties, he volunteered to tise his in- 
fluence in Prussia to secure to the originators of the 
motion the realization of their wish, upon one condi- 
tion. Although advocating that freedom of speech 
should in no way be restricted with respect to those 
present in the House, both Ministers and deputies, — 
"for they can defend themselves," he said, "and more- 
over, no one is compelled to be a Minister," — he yet 
felt constrained to stipulate for the continuance of 
legal protection for tlu; individual honor of all other 
persons whose character had been defamed \\i)on the 
floor of the Hotise. Such a measure, he said, would 
command his support in the Prussian Assembly ; he 
would, however, not jjromise to use his influence with 
the Federal Council for the adoption of a Federal 
law such as was proposed by the motion now before 
the House, since it exceeded the competency of tlie 
Confedei-ation. 

The House, however, was not to be moved; and 
Lasker's motion was carried by a majority such as has 
rarelv been given in this asseiiil)ly u[)on a [)oli(i(al 
issue, namely 119 voices against •»;"). liisuiarck had 
been victorious over Waldeck with only a few Notes 



12 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PABLIAMENT. [1868 

to spare, but upon tliis question he failed utterly to 
carry the majority with him. In the Federal Council, 
however, his influence sufficed to defeat Lasker's hill 
by a unanimous rejection. Nevertheless, the opposi- 
tion which the question aroused upon this occasion 
was no longer of a vindictive nature ; for although the 
legal redress of the grievance was thus indefinitely 
postponed, still, from that day forth, no deputy was 
ever again prosecuted upon German soil for his par- 
liamentary utterances. 

These deliberations were not concluded until just 
before the recess for the Easter holidays ; after these 
came six peaceful days, during which the common care 
for the common good kept the two organs of Federal 
legislation bent upon the same purpose, their tempers 
unruffled by any question of power. But on the 
seventh day the scene was suddenly changed ; and 
from an insignificant beginning a vehement Constitu- 
tion strife was quickly developed, which in its bitter- 
ness was suggestive of the evil days of the great 
conflict. 

The order of the day for April 22d included the re- 
port of the Committee in charge of the bill regarding 
the administration of the Federal debt, which had been 
announced in the speech from the throne. It will be 
remembered that in 1867 the Reichstag had made a 
number of changes in the proposed measure, and upon 
motion of Miquel had resolved upon an additional 
paragraph empowering the Reichstag to make legal 
complaint against all functionaries charged with the 



1868] MIQUEVS PROPOSED CLAUSE. 13 

administration of the public del)t mIio liad been dere- 
lict in the performance of their official duty. 

Although in framing the new bill the Federal Coun- 
cil had with great decision rejected this additional 
clause, it had accepted all the other amendments, some 
of them with a heavy heart, and now expected a like 
spirit of friendly concession from the House. This 
hope was, however, doomed to early disappointment. 
In the Committee to which the bill was referred a mo- 
tion was at once made to restore Miquel's clause ; and 
after Bismarck had emphatically opposed such a step, 
the motion was lost by only seven votes against seven, 
after which the clause was nevertheless again proposed 
in the plenum by jNIiquel together witli forty-four 
associates. 

Miquel at first treated it as an unimportant matter- 
of-course, stating that according to the draft of the l)ill 
the administration of the debt would be placed under 
the control of a Committee on the Public Debt, which 
would render periodic reports to the Reichstag, and 
advise that body either to grant or to refuse discharge 
to the officials intrusted with the administration of the 
debt. Now, the purpose of the additional clause, he 
explained, was evidently no other than to render this 
control effective in every case, that it might be exerted 
even should the highest authority of the administration, 
the Federal Chancellor himself, fail to take the steps 
required by the Committee's report. The application 
was therefore only to a most exceptional case, from 
which no further doubtful consequences could arise. 



14 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PAliLIAMENT. [1868 

But against this construction a vigorous protest was 
made by his most ardent supporters, Reichensperger 
and Hiinel. "Not at all," said they; "the merit of the 
clause lies chiefly in its greater and fundamental signif- 
icance, since this will lead to an effective responsibility 
not only of the subordinate officials, but of the Federal 
Chancellor himself in case of faulty directions given 
to his subordinates, or of failure to take proper meas- 
ures against those guilty of unlawful acts." That the 
Chancellor really was a responsible officer, they argued 
further, was distinctly stated in the Constitution; the 
principle being thus fully recognized, its practical ap- 
plication by means of the proposed clause was no devia- 
tion from the intention of the Constitution, but, oc the 
contrary, was putting it into effect. 

The theory that the responsibility provided by the 
Constitution was intended to be only a so-called moral 
one and not a legal one, they sneered at as mere child's 
play. The Constitution, said they, was neither a 
prayer-book nor a code of morals ; it was a law, and 
as such could only provide legal duties and responsi- 
bilities. There was quite as little foundation, they 
held, for the criticism that the right to enter legal 
complaint which this clause bestowed upon the Reichs- 
tag was an innovation and an attempted extension of 
parliamentary power. Should a practical responsibilitj^ 
of the Ministry ever be brought about, the legal com- 
plaint in case of a violation of a constitutional right, 
namely a right of the people, must, as had heretofore 
been conceded by everj^one, proceed from the body 



1868] L'ESPOySIBLE MI.XlsriiY DEBATED. 15 

representative of the people. The proposed clause was 
therefore the means by which the most important right 
of the people could find an actual existence iiLstead of 
one on paper only, even though, as yet, but in a limited 
sphere. 

Those who opposed the measure declared this argu- 
ment to be faulty from beginning to end. Not only, 
said they, had the Reichstag, to whose action the 
Constitution had been submitted, refrained from mak- 
ing the Chancellor's responsibility a legal one, sul> 
jecting him to prosecution by the law, but it had 
distinctly rejected a motion to that effect, namely, 
the assurance that a law regarding the procedure 
and tribunal for such a suit would be enacted in 
the future. To represent the consequences of the 
moral responsibility to be merely the judgment ren- 
dered by history, they declared to be a mistake, since, 
notwithstanding the absence of legal prosecution, the 
political and parliamentary consequences might be of 
a most serious nature, especially so at a time like 
the present, when there was still so much uncertainty 
regarding the jurisdiction of the highest Federal aitd 
State authorities. 

The further conclusion they held to be indisputable, 
namely, that no matter how desirable the Reichstag's 
right to Ijring suit might a})[)('ar with reference to 
the future, for the present the Constitution simj)ly 
provided that a report regarding the Federal receipts 
and expenditures should be submitted to the Reichs- 
tag for the ])iup()se of discharge, and in no way con 



16 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

ferred upon the body the right to instigate legal pro- 
ceedings in case irregularities were discovered. Evi- 
dently, therefore, by Miquel's motion not only would 
a specific conclusion be deducted from general princi- 
ples recognized by the Constitution, but in reality 
the motion implied a fundamental modification of the 
Constitution, an extension of the Reichstag's power 
to a degree almost incalculable in its effect. 

Here Bismarck entered the conflict with the drastic 
energy characteristic of his remarks. " It is youv 
intention," said he, " in the event of a dispute re- 
garding the interpretation of the law, to place the 
Federal Chancellor under the jurisdiction of the dis- 
trict judge ; in that case the Chancellor can feel 
secure in his actions only by continued conferences 
with the district judge, consulting him daily as a 
sort of ' constitutional ' family physician. It might 
instead be advisable to appoint the district judge as 
Chancellor at once, although in that case you would 
probably cease to intrust him with the further inter- 
pretation of the law." 

He then pointed out the absurdity of making two 
factors of legislation, both of the highest sovereign 
power, subject, in case of a dispute between them, 
to the decisions of a civil judge, who, although 
doubtlessly well versed in the law of the Pandects, 
was yet deficient in the technical knowledge of those 
matters upon the proper appreciation of which the 
final decision must depend. 

In reply to the remarks of a previous speaker, who, 



1868] BISMARCK'S SPEECH. 17 

to convince his hearers that an effective control sus- 
tained by the right to bring suit was a necessity, 
had reminded them of the fact that at the outbreak 
of the last war the Government, without asking leave 
or license, had issued treasur}^ notes to the amount 
of twenty-two millions, Bismarck now said, "Very 
true ; had we not had the courage to undertake tliis 
step of which the district judge woukl most likely 
have disapproved, you would to-day still be subject 
to the ordinances of that most august l)ody, the old 
Confederate Diet, and Prussia would be smaller by a 
number of provinces. Instead of censuring us, you 
should praise us ! " 

But still more unfavorably did he regard the fore- 
most demand of ^Nliquel's proposed amendment, the 
Reichstag's right directly to prosecute subordinate 
officials. The principle which would thereby be in- 
troduced into our judicial system, he declared, would 
quickly spread, and soon result in the destruction of 
discipline and in a total lack of respect for those in 
authority. Every official made responsible in the pro- 
posed manner would feel liimself authorized to criti- 
cize every order given him by his su})erior in office, 
as to whether it conformed to the parliamentary or 
judicial view. The administration would thus no 
longer be directed l)y the Minister, but by the courts 
of justice or the parliamentary majorities. It mat- 
tered little, therefore, from which sitle jMiciuel's motion 
was viewed, its object remained identical, — an ex- 
tension of the Reichstag's power. 



18 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

Bismarck concluded Avitli a criticism of the tactics 
which the champions of the motion had adopted in 
choosing the time to secure their end. Twesten ^ had 
revealed them when he said that the House could with 
impunity insist unyieldingly upon its decision of 1867, 
since the loan of ten millions, approved at that time 
for the speedy establishment of a navy and for coast 
defences, could not be obtained by the Government 
except by the passage of the bill regarding the Federal 
debt. " Since the formation of a navy is an urgent 
necessity," he had said, "we are in the fortunate posi- 
tion of being needed by the Government, which will 
find itself compelled to concede to our demand if we 
remain firm." To this Bismarck now replied, "What 
would you say, gentlemen, should the Federal Govern- 
ment reverse your weapon, and use it against you ? 
You take it for granted that the Federal Government 
is more vitally interested in the navy than are you. 
What would you say if we, assuming you to possess 
a degree of patriotism such as you ascribe to the Gov- 
ernment, and which I have no doubt you do possess, 
although unevinced at the present moment, if we 
upon this supposition should announce, ' You shall 
have no navy, no telegraphs, unless you are willing 
to sacrifice one or the other of your parliamentary 
privileges ; for instance, unrestricted liberty of speech.' 
You would, to express it mildly, consider that not very 
handsome of us. You are very sure, however, that we 
will not do this, and therefore feel quite free to resort 

1 Page 154 of the stenographic reports. 



1868J OPEMyG OF THE CUSTOMS FAULIAME.XT. 19 

to this means of bringing i)i'essure to bear upon the 
Governments.'" 

The opposition made a \igorous defence against this 
accusation. "We are quite as read}- to promote the 
interests of the navy as are the Governments," it A^as 
said. " Should the Governments make tlie loan im- 
possible by persistently rejecting our perfectly just and 
beneficial amendment, we will be found ready to pro- 
vide the required amount in some other way. The 
sum to be raised for this year is three and one-half 
millions ; should this be included in the budget in the 
form of pro rata contributions, the result would be an 
assessment of only three and one-half groschens upon 
every person." 

The question of how great a tax burden already 
rested upon each individual was not taken into con- 
sideration. Bismarck closed with the suggestive re- 
mark, that as recently as the preceding day the Federal 
Council had unanimously declared against accepting 
Miquel's motion. The House, however, also remained 
firm to its purpose, and cast 133 votes in favor of 
Miquel's motion against 114 in opposition. Bismarck 
iinmediately withdrew the 1)111 ; and the loan being 
thus made inq)ossil)lt', the Government directed that 
all work foi' the navv which was not absolutely neces- 
sary should be suspended. 

II. THK (TSTOMS I'AULIAMKN r. 

Thus opcjdv at varianc(; with tlic Lilx-rals, and \vv\- 
ing that tlie friendship of thr Conservatives was his 



20 TUE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

merely at the dictate of necessity, Bismarck faced the 
crucial test of the first Customs Parliament. Notwith- 
standing the unfavorable results of the elections in 
South Germany, he remained firmly resolved to lessen 
the antipathy of the opposing elements by preserving 
as friendly an attitude as possible, and to guide them 
into the way leading to closer union by engaging 
them in labor for the common good. 

His intention to evince a spirit of courtesy and 
hearty good will was shared by the Conservatives, al- 
though for wholly different reasons. German unity 
had never been an inspiration to them ; the fundamen- 
tal idea of their feudal system had ever rested upon 
a certain independence of the landed proprietors and 
town magnates ; how, then, could they consistently 
oppose a corresponding desire for independence in the 
South German States? 

With the National Liberals it was otherwise. They, 
too, desired to avoid contention ; they were, however, 
deeply incensed by the ill-usage their party associates 
in the South had received, and were therefore little 
disposed to allow an opportunity to condemn such pro- 
ceedings to pass unimproved. The members of the 
Sovith German majority were prepared for such attacks, 
which, to say the least, was not conducive to a diminu- 
tion of the distrust and sensitiveness which they felt 
upon their arrival in Berlin. In fact, every one be- 
lieved that as it had been in the South German elec- 
tions, so it would be in the Customs Parliament; the 
question of German unity would come to the front in 



1868] THE PARLIAMEM ORGANIZES. 21 

every transaction. And so the atmosphere of the hall 
of assembly was surcharged with electricity, ready at 
any moment for the lightning's flash. 

In the speech from the throne with which on April 
27th King William, as bearer of the presidential dig- 
nity of the Customs Union, opened the session of the 
Customs Parliament, he directed attention to the ex- 
pansion of the Union brought about by the force of 
the national idea, and to the unity of interests arising 
as a consequence to all its membei'S. Until now. he 
said, it had not been possible to fulfil the well-justified 
demand of the German people for an effective share in 
the legislation of the Union, although the advisability 
of such a step had become more and more apparent 
with the increasing changes in the politic o-economi* 
life of the country. That to-day it was possible for 
the representatives of the whole nation to be assembled 
together for deliberation upon the common economic 
interests of Germany he believed to be the fruits of 
a natural developiiieiit. 

After enumerating the important bills to be sub- 
mitted to the Parliament, the king concluded with the 
counsel : " In these deliberations, gentlemen, keep the 
common German interest ever before you ; from this 
standpoint seek to harmonize the individual interests, 
and a result will crown your labors such as will earn 
for you the gratitude oi the whole German nation."' 
To this he added the hopeful expression, that tlie 
friendly relations maintained between tlie German Gov- 
ernment and all forci''!) INiwers seemed to assure the 



22 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

blessings of peace, for the protectiou of which the Ger- 
man States had allied themselves, and could at all 
times depend upon the united strength of the German 
people. 

To these utterances no one could object, yet to the 
majority of the South Germans it was not pleasing to 
hear these repeated allusions to the aspiration for 
nationality, to the representation and gratitude of the 
people, and especially not to the undesired treaties of 
alliance. What, indeed, had all this to do with the 
Customs Union of the Prussian, Bavarian, and Swabian 
nations ? 

Neither was it agreeable, although quite unavoid- 
able, that whereas the members of the North German 
Reichstag, whose claims had long been verified, took 
their places in the Customs Parliament without prelim- 
inary formalities, the South Germans had to await the 
decision of a North German majority with regard to 
the validity of their election. Therefore it was with 
tempers already ruffled that on April 28th they pro- 
ceeded to the choice of officers, which was destined 
not to pass without a violent clash of opposing spirits. 

The election of the excellent President of the Reichs- 
tag, Simson, to the corresponding place of honor in 
the Customs Parliament was accomplished without a 
party struggle ; when, however, it came to tlie choice 
of the two vice-presidents the battle waxed hot indeed. 
To evince a spirit of friendliness toward their asso- 
ciates from the South, the North German majority 
had selected South German candidates for both these 



1868] SOUTH GLllMAN ELECTIONS (.lUTIClSEI). 2o 

offices ; for the first, the Premier of Bavaria, Prince 
Hohenlohe ; for tlie second. Baron von Koggenbach, 
formerly Minister of liaden. To the Bavarian Cler- 
icals Hohenlohe was, however, most odious ; and they 
opposed to him one of their own leaders. Baron von 
Thiingen, who, to he sure, received but 59 votes (South 
German Particularists and a few North German Demo- 
crats). But the National Liberal, Koggenbach, for the 
very reason that he was a South German and yet was 
nationally inclined, they regarded as a traitor, douljly 
dyed, to the sacred cause of southern independence. 
AVith shrewd calculation they turned to the Conserva- 
tives of the Reichstag, and proposed to them that their 
First Vice President, the Duke of Ujest, be put in 
Roggenbach's place, wliereby they really succeeded in 
excluding Roggenbach. 

Encouraged by so happy a result, the South German 
Particularists, re-enforced by a few Democrats from 
Saxony, at once constituted themselves under Thiin- 
gen's leadership as the " South German " fraction, whose 
openly avowed watchword was protest against every 
expansion of the functions of the Customs Parliament, 
but who in secret were resolved to allow as little fruit 
as possible to ripen upon this field so entirely hateful 

to thrill. 

On May 1st a Committee of the House reported upon 
the examination into the Bavarian elections. Tt ap- 
peared that the law promulgated in liavaria tt) govern 
the Customs Parliament elections had not in every 
particular roiit'onncil (o tla; dircclions of the I'nion 



24 THE FinST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

treaty of July 8tli; however, in consideration of the 
very general participation in the elections, and the 
overwhelming majorities rendered in most cases, this 
was not regarded as sufficient cause to dispute the 
validity of the elections, or to make any further steps 
necessary. It afforded an occasion, however, for a dis- 
play of the irritated mood of the National Liberals to 
which allusion has been made. Miquel moved that 
the House request the presiding officer of the Customs 
Federal Council to come to an understanding with the 
Bavarian Government, to the end that in the future 
such irregularities might be avoided. It was in vain 
that the Bavarian deputies, irrespective of party, en- 
deavored to show how really insignificant and free 
from practical consequences the cause of complaint 
really was ; all the Liberal fractions supported Miquel's 
motion, securing for it a majority. Otherwise calm- 
ness and moderation characterized the discussion, the 
objective point of which was simply the interpretation 
of a law. 

But when on the following day. May 2d, the Wiirtem- 
berg elections were reached, a vent was found for the 
discharge of the mutual displeasure. In this report the 
election law published in Wiirtemberg was criticised 
much as had been that of Bavaria, and especially were 
the orders for its enforcement, issued by the Ministry, 
disapproved. Although the report did not recommend 
that as a consequence the results be declared invalid, 
yet the House was advised to request Bismarck to en- 
deavor to effect an agreement with Stuttgart as with 



1868] DEFENCE MADE BY SOUTH GERMANY. 25 

Munich, that a recuiTence of the evil might be pre- 
vented. 

Hereupon Minister von ]\Iittnacht attempted to prove 
that the Wlirtemberg election measures had entirely 
conformed to the directions given in the treaty of 
July 8th, his reasoning being, however, more sophistical 
than convincing. Now Braun (Wiesbaden) took the 
floor, and giving the rein to his scathing and sarcastic 
wit, with a few short but effective sentences cut into 
shreds the Minister's carefully constructed web of legal 
argument. Then, in vivid colors, he set forth the 
Wlirtemberg campaign, in which, he said, three par- 
ties, each overflowing Avitli venom toward the others, 
but now, prompted by their common disinclination to 
national unity, as well as by an artificially nurtured 
hatred of Prussia, had combined to prevent the elec- 
tion of ever}' candidate who was known to be at all 
favorable to the Confederation. To this proceeding, 
he said, the Government had openly influenced its 
officials, and the officials in turn the voters ; of this 
he then gave a number of examples. 

Mittnacht's defence against these accusations was 
both energetic and skilful. A few of the examples 
cited he could prove to be without foundation ; al- 
though, without doul)t, much that was underhanded 
remained irrefutal)le. With reference to the irrational 
abuse of Prussia, he said, that whenever the poi)ulace 
is stirred by intense excitement, a great deal that 
is noxious rises to the surface; but to hold the Min- 
isters responsible for this he declared to be the height 



26 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PAliLIAMENT. [1868 

of injustice. The real originators of the excitement 
were the men of the National Party, who upon every 
occasion had demanded that Wiirtemberg should seek 
admission into the Northern Confederation, and to that 
end had represented their own State as corrupt and 
hastening to its decline, whereby they had deeply 
offended the patriotic self-esteem of the people. " The 
greater number of our deputies," he said in conclusion, 
" surely do not belong to the Government Party ; but 
that as a body they are truly representative of the opin- 
ions prevailing in Wiirtemberg, of this I can assure 
you." 

In tliis spirit the debate Avas carried on for some 
time. The Conservatives expressed regret at the tone 
which Braun had introduced into the discussion, to 
which Lasker replied that a thunder-storm often clears 
the atmosphere. " We have told one another some 
plain truths," he said, "and we will gradually learn 
to know one another better. At all events, one thing 
has become evident ; as in the elections so in the Cus- 
toms Parliament, the German question can no longer 
be kept down ; to-day, in spite of the greatest discre- 
tion, it forces itself to the front everywhere, whether 
we approve of this or disapprove it." 

The motion presented by the Committee, expressing 
disapprobation of the course pursued by the Wiirtem- 
berg Government, was then voted upon by roll-call, the 
parties being greatly divided ; and the result showed 
that it had been carried by 162 voices against 105. 

Encouraged by these victories, the National Liberals 



1868] PROPOSED ABBliESS liEJECTED. 27 

determined to follow tlieni \ip. Eleven of their South 
German associates, from Darmstadt and Baden, sup- 
ported by their entire party in the ReicLstag, moved 
that in reply to the speech from the throne the draft 
of an address prepared and submitted l)y them shoidd 
be accepted. In response to the first sentence of the 
speech, namely, that as a result of the national idea 
the Customs Union, from a small l)eginning, had grown 
into a firm union of all the (jerman States, the draft 
expressed the hope tliat the thought of nationality 
would uninterruptedly continue to exert its beneficent 
influence, so that soon, beyond the sphere of the Cus- 
toms Union, the inalienable right of the whole Ger- 
man nation to a full representation of all the common 
interests might be realized. 

They were soon to discover, however, that they had 
entirely misjudged the? disposition of the House. Al- 
though it had not been possible to reject the criticism 
of illegality passed upon the Wiirtemberg election-law, 
nevertheless all the other parties were wholly disin- 
clined to reopen the ])olitical strife; and at the close 
of the final deliberation upon the motion, two counter 
motions to set aside the one regarding the address, 
and to pass to the order of the day, with a statement 
of the reasons for this action, Avere presented, one by 
The Free Conservatives, the other by the Party of 
Progress; and even as many as three motions. siiiii)ly 
to pass to the ordc^r of the day, without stating any 
reasons, were before the House, moved by the (Con- 
servatives, tlie North (German Clericals, and ihc Souih 



28 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PABLIAMENT. [1868 

German fraction, all indicative of the same opinion, 
that the best way to promote all the common German 
interests was, for the present, to labor together in har- 
mony to solve those problems by which, within the 
limits fixed to its activity by treaty, the Parliament 
found itself confronted. 

It was in vain that on May 7th Bennigsen declared 
most positively that no one in the ranks of the Na- 
tional Liberals desired to violate existing treaties ; that 
they, too, believed, as a matter of course, that any 
change in these treaties must depend upon the free 
consent of all the South German Governments and 
Chambers. But why, he asked, forbid the expression 
of patriotic desires and hopes, the future fulfilment 
of which no one doubted, and to deny which no one 
had the courage ? 

Baron von Thilngen fought his battle from behind 
the bulwark of the existing treaties, the stipulations of 
which the South would fulfil with perfect good faith, 
he declared (he himself, it will be remembered, had 
done all in his power to prevent their conclusion), and 
would therefore expect the North to fulfil its obliga- 
tions quite as scrupulously. In the South, he said, 
ever since the war of 1866, a deep distrust of the 
powerful victor had taken possession of the people, 
and filled them with apprehension of further deeds 
of violence. Although this was not encouraging, it 
was but natural ; and it would therefore be most 
unwise, by over-hasty expectations beyond the stipu- 
lations made by the treaties, to alarm and so check 



1868] COMMERCIAL TREATIES. 29 

the growth of the friendship which as yet was in its 
earliest and tenderest stage. 

The motion simply to proceed to the order of the 
day was then adopted by a vote of 18G voices, Conser- 
vatives, Clericals, and Democrats, in its favor, against 
150 Free Conservatives and North and South German 
National Liberals, opposed. 

Wliilst these political battles were being fought, the 
actual business of the Customs Parliament had besrun. 
At first came a number of proposed measures of minor 
importance, having no bearing upon the chief work of 
the session, and involving no disputed questions of prin- 
ciple ; these were therefore disposed of both quickly 
and harmoniously. 

The first one was a commercial and navigation treaty 
between the Customs Union and Spain, by which each 
of the two contracting parties granted to the other 
the privileges of the most favored nations, a measure 
securing to German commerce the advantage of as low 
entrance duties in Spain as that country had hereto- 
fore accorded to the French. When H. H. Meier of 
Uremen expressed regret that the advantageous condi- 
tions to arise to the Customs Union from the treaty 
had not been extended to include the Spanish colonies 
as we'll, President Delbrlick was in a position to reply 
that this desire had been presented in the Congress of 
the Spanish Cortes, and that tlie Spanish Minister liad 
thereupon transmitted to Berlin the announcement that 
such a step would be sanctioned. 

It was with greater n-adiiu'ss, therefore, tliat tlio Par- 



30 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

liament ratified the treaties, which it did by a unan- 
imous vote- 
It will be well to mention in this connection that a 
commercial treaty of like purpose between the Customs 
Union and the States of the Church was submitted ten 
days later, and was also sanctioned without occasion- 
ing a difference of opinion between the parties. 

The object of another measure proposed by the Fed.- 
eral Council was to mitigate certain prescriptions of 
the customs penal code, and to facilitate the entrance 
of imports into the territory of the Union by simplify- 
ing the handling of the goods by the customs officers. 
This bill was also received with great favor, and an 
agreement between the Federal Council and the Par- 
liament was quickly reached upon every point. Re- 
gret was even expressed that the Federal Council had 
confined its action to these individual, though doubt- 
lessly beneficial, changes ; and a resolution was adopted 
by the House expressing the hope that the Govern- 
ments would as quickly as practicable undertake a 
comprehensive and liberal reform in the customs laws 
and penal code. To this tlie Federal Council made no 
objection. 

Meanwhile the more important measures to be con- 
sidered during the session had been reached, — H new 
commercial treaty between Austria and the Customs 
Union, as also a revision, based upon the principles of 
the treaty, of that part of the former Union tariff left 
untouched by the treaty : and finally a proposed law 
regarding uniform taxation of tobacco throughout the 
territorv of the Union. 



1868] FBEVALENVE OF FUEE-TUADE VIEWS. 31 

All these measures were closely related in a two- 
fold manner. Ever since the English-French commer- 
cial treaty of 1860, a great free-trade movement had 
spread through one-half of Europe, finding expression 
in a reduction or total remission of numerous impost 
duties, as well as in the extension of the privileges 
of the most favored nations to many new contracting 
parties. Since 1866 Austria also had relinquished the 
position theretofore maintained, and according to the 
more recent fashion had concluded treaties with Eng- 
land, France, and Belgium. When, in 1867, negotia- 
tions between the Customs Union and Austria were 
begun relative to a renewal of the commercial treaty 
of 1865, which had been set aside by the war, it be- 
came evident that here, too, the former desire for a 
great customs combination between tlie Union and 
Austria had been relinquished, and that the aim of 
the present treaty was simply to extend and facilitate 
intercoui-se in so far as this was compatible with self- 
interest. 

Pfrluqts lliis view was even more generally held in 
Germany than in Austria. Owing to the circumstances 
of the time, Bismarck had been thus inclined ever 
since 1853, and more especially so after the French 
commercial treaty. Delbriick had always, both in 
theory and in practice, been an earnest advocate of 
the principles of free trade ; and in the North German 
Reichstag the great majority shared his views. The 
Conservatives of that day were (piite as eiithusiiisti- 
cally eager to abolish the duties on iron as were their 



32 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

followers of the next generation to increase the im- 
port duties upon grains. Among the National Liberals 
and the Party of Progress, those who advocated the 
opposite theory formed but an insignificant minority. 
This was also true of the representatives of Darmstadt 
and Baden, and only among the deputies from Bavaria 
and Wiirtemberg was a large group of determined 
protectionists to be found. On the whole, therefore, 
the new tariffs were not only favorably received by 
the Parliament, but were hailed with joy. 

It was but natural that under these circumstances 
the Governments should flatter themselves with the 
hope that in gratitude for these desirable tariff rates 
the second and less popular half of their proposed 
measure would receive favorable consideration. The 
abolition or reduction of so many impost duties would, 
for the next few years at least, cause a considerable 
decrease in the revenues arising from customs ; this 
the Governments estimated would reach in round fig- 
ures two and one-half million thalers annually, for 
which they were most anxious to find reimbursement, 
nay, even hoped to secure a surplus, since many of 
them, and foremost among these Prussia, knew their 
home budgets to be seriously embarrassed. It was 
therefore proposed that both the excise upon native 
and the impost duty upon imported tobacco should 
be increased, and that a duty should be levied upon 
imported petroleum, at present untaxed. 

The commercial treaty with Austria was the first to 
be considered, and from the outset it was to be seen 



1868] TREATY WITH AUSTRIA RATIFIED. 33 

that the deliberation would terminate favorably. Most 
auspicious for the result, however, was the fact that 
there was no opportunity to display the customary zeal 
to amend, since a motion involving an agreement with 
a foreign Power leaves no intermediate course open ; 
it must be either accepted or rejected. It, however, 
occasioned a division in the ranks of the South German 
fraction, whose members were so firmly resolved to hold 
together upon all other questions. They were all ar- 
dently devoted to Austria, were filled with indignation 
that Prussia had ousted their Austrian brothers from 
the German Confederation, and were inspired by the 
hope again to win the favor of Austria. Three-fourths 
of these gentlemen could not find it in their hearts to 
reject a treaty which promised to bring them into closer 
sympathy with Austria. And so the deliberations were 
more in the nature of an amicable exchange of opinion 
than of a controversy. Of the great number of reduced 
tariff rates, only those on three articles were exhaus- 
tively discussed, — those on linen yarn, pig-iron, and 
wine. 

In reply to a prophecy made by Moritz IMohl, that 
these flourishing industries would be destroyed by di- 
minishing the protection thus far afforded them against 
foreign competition. Otto Camphausen stated, that al- 
though the linen spinneries had, without doubt, needed 
protection for a time, to allow tliem to accumulate the 
capital required for the transition from hand to machine 
spinning, yet their present financial condition was such 
that, with proper management, they need fear no foreign 



^4 . THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

competition, notwithstanding the reduction in the pro- 
tective tariff. With regard to pig-iron, this zealous 
protectionist was informed by Herr von Henning that 
at one time when iron was unprotected, a thriving iron 
industry was developed in East and West Prussia be- 
cause raw material could be imported from England by 
sea much more cheaply than it could be obtained from 
Westphalia by way of the long overland route ; but that 
this industry perished when the importation of English 
pig-iron was rendered impossible by a high protective 
duty. 

A peculiar condition of affairs was revealed by the 
debate upon the duty on wine. Mecklenburg and 
Llibeck were not at that time members of the Customs 
Union because they were still bound by an earlier com- 
mercial treaty with France. Now the French Govern- 
ment had consented to release them from this agreement 
on condition that the Customs Union would make a 
corresponding reduction in the impost duties upon 
wines, and would also agree to remove all internal 
excise duties from imported wines. Since Austria also 
was very desirous of this reduction, the Federal Coun- 
cil had embodied it in the treaty <, g.nd the members of 
the House who were most familiar with these matters, 
especially those from the South, declared that the Ger- 
man vineyards need fear no competition, and that there 
was therefore no reason why the duty should not be 
lowered, and Mecklenburg and Liibeck be thus gained 
for the Customs Union. 

The representatives from Darmstadt and jNIainz. 



1868] TAX ON TOBACCO DEBATED. 35 

Metz and Bamberger, declared that they fully approved 
such a step, but mentioned the fact that within their 
own State there was an excise on wine which was 
nearly as high as the proposed duty on that which was 
imported ; so that for Hesse the peculiarly unfortunate 
circumstance was brought aljout that protection was 
given the foreigner at the expense of the native pro- 
ducer, in regard to which they gave notice that they 
would present a special motion. 

The treaty was then voted upon by the House, and 
was accepted by a vote of all voices except seventeen in 
its favor. The latter were all stanch protectionists of 
the South German fraction, who, mucli to their sorrow, 
were obliged to admit that according to the doctrines 
tliey held, greater freedom of intercourse with Austria 
would result to the disadvantage of their own laud. 

According to the usual course, the deliberation upon 
the second tariff bill submitted l)y the Federal Council 
was now in order, for in tliis way only could a cor- 
rect estimate be formed of the deficiency which the 
reduction of the customs duties would occasion in tlu' 
I'eceipts of the States; this would naturally lead to 
tlie question of how the deficiency might be made 
good liy tlic iui[)osition of new taxes. The South 
German fraction feared, however, that in this wav the 
majoi-ity might i)er]ia[)S Ix; induced to vote for tlie 
tobacco tax proposed by the Governments; and .Morit/, 
Ab)ld moved that tliis l»e placed upon the order of the 
day. He regarded it as so important a sul)jeet, he 
said, thai it ougiit to be consitlered in its conse([Ucnces, 



36 THE FIRST CUST031S PARLIAMENT. [1868 

apart from everything else which might tend to in- 
fluence the decision in regard to it. 

Georg Vincke, who in this session preserved a re- 
markable silence, objected to such a proceeding, declar- 
insr it to be the invariable custom first to estimate the 
expenditures or deficiencies which might arise, and 
then to adjust the revenues to these demands. " How- 
ever," he added, " since Mohl, as I understand, ex- 
presses the unanimous desire of our South German 
associates, we ought to be obliging and grant it." 

Agidi lent his support to this expression of a fra- 
ternal spirit ; and although Bamberger remarked, " We 
South Germans are never unanimous, neither is this a 
convent of the Knights of Malta with a North and a 
South German tongue, but a German Parliament," still 
Mohl's motion carried the day, and on May 15th the 
preliminary deliberation upon the taxation of tobacco 
was begun. 

Since that time this question has frequently been 
discussed in our parliaments, and its solution sought in 
the most divers ways. To treat of it here in full 
would hardly be a pleasure to my readers ; it will 
suffice to call to mind the leading points in con- 
troversy. 

Whenever the subject arises, immediately is mar- 
shalled an array of interested disputants, tobacco plant- 
ters, manufacturers, and dealers. It was argued that 
by increased taxation this flourishing industry would be 
seriously crippled, if not totally ruined. This was 
especially to be taken into consideration, since the 



1868] THE DEBATE COyTINUEB. 37 

producers were largely men of smaller means, such as 
tobacco growere, factory employees, etc., who by the 
proposed measure would suddenly be deprived of their 
means of subsistence. As in the production, so in the 
consumption, it would be the poorer classes who would 
be chiefly affected by the heavier tax upon tobacco ; 
since, as was generally conceded, it was they who 
shouldered the greater part of the burden imposed by 
indirect taxes. It was declared to be both unjust and 
cruel to add to the cost of the poor man's one luxur}-, 
his j)ipe. This appeal in the name of philanthropy 
was the more effective, since the men of the middle 
class also preferred to pay a lower rather than a higher 
price for their Bremen cigars, as did the rich man for 
his Havana. 

The advocates of the tax met these objections by 
declaring that tobacco was not one of the necessaries 
of life, but a luxury, and as such, and because of its 
peculiar nature, was especially well adapted to be an 
article of taxation. The great quantities consumed in 
Germany showed its use to be general in all classes ; 
therefore this tax, more than any other, would yield 
a large revenue to the State without being seriously 
felt by the individual consumer. ^Moreover, every one 
could, if he chose, avoid the sliglit increase of ex- 
pense by smoking a little less. In so far as philan- 
thropy toward the poor man was concerned, surely the 
word was never more misapplied ; for should the poor 
nmn smoke a few cigai-s loss eacli day and spend the 
money thus savcil for l)rc'ad to feed his cliihlrcii, this 



38 TEE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

would be a benefit both to liis family and himself. 
With regard to tobacco, it happened to be the case 
that the cheaper, and therefore poorer, kinds, and 
above all others those raised in Germany, contained 
much more nicotine than did the finer American 
brands,! and therefore were much more injurious to 
liealth. What, asked they, could be said against a 
tax which, if consumption remained the same in spite 
of its imposition, would fill the State treasuries, and 
if it acted as a restraint upon consumption would 
improve the health of the poor man? 

To the further objection, that the manufacturers 
would suffer, the reply was given that any material 
change in the customs-system alwaj^s resulted momen- 
tarily to the detriment of some branches of industry 
and to the advantage of others. Unless conditions 
were doomed to remain at a complete stand-still, 
changes must be undertaken in the hope that, judg- 
ing by past experience, after a short period of transi- 
tion the equilibrium would again be restored. At all 
events, so small a revenue for national purposes as was 
derived from the consumption of tobacco in Germany 
was unexampled elsewhere in the civilized world.^ 

1 According to Liebig's careful investigations. 

2 With regard to the conditions prevailing at the time, Micbaelis 
made the following statement : Duty on coffee per hundred-vs'eight in the 
Customs Union 5 thlrs., in England 91 thlrs. ; on tea per cwt. 8 thlrs. in 
the C. U., 18§ in Eng. ; on 100 quarts of brandy 13 thlrs. in the C. U., 
an average of 8G thlrs. in Eng. ; on a like quantity of wine 6 thlrs. in 
the C. U., 81 in Eng. ; on beer, a like quantity, U thlrs. in the C. U.^ 
4i in Eng.; on tobacco per cwt. 4 thlrs. in the C. U., 116 to 129 thlrs. 
in Eng. 

In France the State revenues arising from tobacco amounted iu 



1868] THE DEBATE CONTINUEI). 39 

111 1868 these arguments and counter-arguments 
Avere presented l)y the disputants M'ith etjual ardor. 
From the outset it was evident, as indicated by the 
number of speakers who desired to be lieard, tliat the 
current of sympathy was wholly toward dicap t'igai-s 
and against the imposition of the new rates of taxa- 
tion. That which decided the question, however, Avas 
tlie circumstance that, besides the Part}- of Progress 
and the South German fraction. In' far tlie greater 
number of the National Liberals also opposed the 
measure with as much aciimony as they had shown 
toward the bill presented b}- the (Tovernment on 
April 22d. It was by one of their leadei-s that the 
deliberations were given the turn leading to the final 
decision ; admitting that the essential features of the 
IhII were well taken, he, however, denied the need 
of an increase in the State revenue. 

It was the duty of every jjopular representative 
body, said Twesten, before consenting to increased 
taxation of the people, to require convincing })r()of of 
its necessity, or else to demand a l)inding agreement 
that corresponding relief would be afforded through 
the reduction of other taxes. Both of these condi- 
tions were wliolly absent in this case. A previous 
speaker, he continued, had pointed oul iliuL l)y in- 



18()5 to 233 million francs, in the Customs Union to 2,700,000 tlilrs., oi 
10 million francs. As based upon the averafje prices of that day, cane 
sufjar was taxed in the C. U. at 55% o^ its value, coffee at 229;^, rice at 
25%, cocoa at .33%. As opposed to this, tobacco was taxed at IS. 2%, 
which made it appear that the le-^islators desired to inHutixe the 
people to purchase tobacco in preference to food materials. 



40 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PAELIAMENT. [1868 

creasing the tax on tobacco the more grievous tax on 
salt could be discontinued ; this was very good, yet, 
as every one knew, it was much more difficult to effect 
the abatement of a tax than to establish one. There- 
fore the House ought not to relinquish its restrain- 
ing power upon the tax on tobacco until the abatement 
of the duty on salt was an accomplished fact. 

It was true, he said, that the reduction of duties 
proposed Ijy the tariff reform was apparently very 
great ; a closer examination would, however, reveal 
the fact that it was largely confined to duties which 
were as insignificant to commercial interests as they 
were to the Customs treasury. The hopes which in 
commercial circles had been placed upon the reform 
had by no means been realized. The question natu- 
rally arose why, for instance, the duty on pig-iron was 
lowered, and that on the various forms of manufac- 
tured iron remained unaltered. In fact, of all the 
long list of articles upon which the duty had been 
lowered, there were really onlj^ three, pig-iron, wine, 
and linen yarn, on which the reduction of duty threat- 
ened for the moment materially to affect the State 
treasuries. In connection with these, it was, however, 
more than j)robable that the decrease in duties would 
be quickly followed by a corresponding increase in 
importation, and thus an abundant return be made 
to the State treasuries for their momentary loss. 
Therefore the necessity of a new, and especially of 
so high a tax as that proposed to be levied upon 
tobacco, was by no means convincingly shown. 



1868] THE GOVERNMENT BILL BEJECTEI). 41 

At the time of this discussion the situation was as 
follows : The duty upon imported tobacco amounted 
to 4 thalei-s per hundi-ed- weight. In the Xorth (Jer- 
man Confederation native tobacco yielded a land tax, 
in four classes, of from 3 to 6 thalers to the Prussian 
acre. In South Germany no tiix of any kind was 
levied upon tobacco-raising, but in exporting their pro- 
duction to Xorth Germany the tobacco-planters were 
obliged to pay a transportation duty QUehergangs- 
steuer} ^ of 20 silver groschens per hundred-weight. 

What was now proposed l)y the Federal Council 
was to raise the duty on imported tobacco from 4 to 
6 thalers, and to place a uniform tax of 12 thalers on 
tobacco produced within the territory of the Customs 
Union, which was double the maximum rate hereto- 
fore levied in the North ; in consideration of this the 
South would no longer be required to pay the trans- 
portation duty. 

In opposition to this, Twesten proposed, for the 
reasons Avhich have been stated, that the duty on for- 
eign tobacco should remain unchanged, and that the 
tax on the liome production should be fixed at G 
thalers per acre, or three silver groschens on every 
[)arcel of three square roods. 

These rates would yield aiuiually, instead of a rev- 



1 Translator's Note.— J'l-hcrgangssteuer is the tax which those 
States of tlio Oeriiiaii Empire wliicli levy a tax upon articles of coii- 
suiiiptiou prodticed within tlieir territory are permitted to levy upon 
like articles imported from otlier States of the Empire; the rate of 
this tax is not allowed to exceed the le<j;al rate of tlie excise levied upon 
the home i)roduction. 



42 THE FinST CUSTOMS PAllLIAMENT. [1868 

enue of 1,900,000 thalers as was desired by the Gov- 
ernments, about 450,000 thalers, of which, however, 
after deducting the South German transportation duty 
heretofore levied, and the cost of collecting, little 
would remain to be turned over to the Customs 
Union treasury. 

Michaelis, as representative of the Governments, 
submitted a statement based upon exact figures, show- 
inof that unless the revenue of the Korth German 
Confederation were augmented by receipts from the 
Customs Union, the Confederation would be compelled 
to increase its pro rata assessments by two millions, 
in consequence of which the Prussian budget would 
close with a deficit of five millions. Nevertheless, 
Twesten won a complete victory. 

After the proposed Government measure, as well as 
an amendment with a view to a compromise, had been 
rejected by an overwhelming majority, Twesten's mo- 
tion was voted upon by roll-call, and adopted by 167 
voices in its favor against 135 opposed. The minority 
consisted of those deputies who antagonized a new 
tax of any kind, of North German Progressists and 
Democrats, and South Germans of all parties. 

Under these circumstances the National Liberals de- 
sisted from hostility to the Government as well as from 
all further opposition on principle. At least a part 
of the original bill would have been rescued by them 
despite the general disapproval. They declared that 
equalization of the taxes throughout the North and 
South was in itself a great advance ; more than this was, 



1868] THE TOBACCO TAX GliEATLY Ji EDUCED. 43 

for the present, impracticable. The newly created na- 
tional institution, the Customs Parliament, would show 
but little wisdom should it begin its aclivil\- bv in- 
creasing the burdens of the i)eople. Especially inju- 
dicious ^yould it be to alienate the South from the 
national idea by diminishing the protection heretofore 
extended the cultivation of the vine, and at the same 
time placing a heavy tax upon the ^^I'oduction of to- 
bacco, so long as a continued delieit in the State treas- 
uries w^as no more in evidence than it was at present. 
Should such a condition come about, the National 
Liberals, they declared, would not be found wanting. 

In the Federal Council these fine promises created 
but little confidence. Notwithstanding all the reasons 
given, the No was plainly to be discerned in all that 
was said. Nevertheless, the next day was destined to 
l)ring with it a bright afterglow of the old sentiments, 
and, strange to say, in connection with a budget ques- 
tion. To be sure, it was not one dealing wdth the 
imposition of a new tax, but A\ith the reduction of an 
existing one. 

On May 18th the final deliberation, or third reading, 
of the commercial treaty wdth ^Vustria was in order. 
With icgard to one of its positions, the reduction of 
the import dut\' on Mine, r>aiiil)erger and his associates 
now^ brought forward the motion of whieli they had 
given notice, asking that the T'ederal Couneil of the 
Customs Union take steps toward a redress of the 
grievance to which, in tlu; (J rand Duchy of Ilesse, 
the conflict between the re(luction in the dulv on wine. 



44 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

and the existing system of indirect taxation gave rise. 
As has been stated, unless relief were afforded, the 
duty on French wines would be only a trifle higher 
than the tax on domestic wines in Hesse-Darmstadt; 
on the Hessian tierce the duty would be about twelve 
florins, the tax, a little over nine,i which, together with 
the greater expense connected with the cultivation of 
the vine in Hesse, rendered competition with the 
French wines simply impossible. Moreover, the com- 
plaint was made, by those presenting the motion, that 
the method pursued in collecting the duty was intol- 
erable, and opposed to the principles of the Customs 
Union, impeding intercourse, occasioning the searching 
of houses by day and by night, provoking the people 
to smuggle and defraud. 

Although these statements were not to be denied, 
Moritz Mohl, in the name of the South German frac- 
tion, rose to offer relentless opposition to Bamberger's 
request. " What existing treaties require of us in this 
matter is evident," said he. " The treaty of July 8th 
enumerates the articles upon which every State is free 
to levy an internal tax ; wine is one of these, although 
the maximum tax which may be placed upon it is lim- 
ited. JSTow, the present tax of nine florins levied upon 
wine in Hesse is less than this maximum allowed, ten 

1 According to a statement rendered by Fabricius, Tax Counsellor for 
Hesse (p. 253 of the stenographic reports) ; he, however, omits from the 
total amount of the taxes his own estimates regarding the wine-trade at 
wholesale and under grant of a charter, and therefore places the entire 
amount of the tax at seven florins and ten kreuzers. 

Compare also the speech made by the Hessian Government Coun- 
sellor, Pfannebecker, to be found a few pages farther on. 



1868 J A QUESTIOJSr OF COMPETENCY. 45 

florins, and therefore quite in conformity witli the re- 
quirements of the Customs Union treaty. Consequently 
if any actual grievance exists, it is wholly within 
the province of the Hessian Asseml)ly to relieve it. 
The Customs Parliament has as little right to inter- 
fere in this matter as has the Customs Federal Coun- 
cil, and would by such a stcii unlawfully extend its 
jurisdiction." 

The Hessian representative in the Customs Federal 
Council, Privy Councillor Hofmann, hastened to con- 
firm the correctness of this view, denying the Parlia- 
ment's jurisdiction in the matter, and reserving to 
his Government all right to act. 

The ardent zeal of these two gentlemen was not 
destined to bring them much glory. Up to this point 
Bismarck had taken no [uirt in the discussion person- 
ally. Now, however, he made the plain yet effective 
statement, that at the present moment he was not, 
any more than was his colleague from Hesse, in a 
position to say whether or not the Federal Council 
would regard the subject of the motion just presented 
as within its jurisdiction. " Since, however," he con- 
tinued, ''the competency of the Federal Council in 
the matter under discussion has been questioned by 
one of its members, I feel compelled to state that 
this is the personal opinion of the gentleman, and 
tliat neither of us is authorized to express an opinion 
upon this question in the name of the Federal ( 'onn- 
cil. Moreover, my impression prima facie is tlu- if- 
verse of that expressed by my Hessian colleague. 



46 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

[Cries of "Bravo!"] I can readily imagine that 
should the Federal Council believe that the freedom 
of intercourse in the interior which the institutions 
of the Customs Union are designed to guarantee is 
either restricted or endangered by the absence of uni- 
formity in the tax system, it would no doubt consider 
itself competent to undertake the remedy." [Enthu- 
siastic bravos.] 

To this Bismarck added, after listening to a reply 
made by Hofmann, " In my estimation the question is 
not whether the Hessian laws conform to the require- 
ments of the Customs Union treat}', but whether the 
legislative organs of the Customs Union are authorized 
to decide the question whether this is the case or not." 

To-day it would be difficult to find any one in either 
the North or the South to whom the objection of in- 
competency would appear reasonable. For example, 
the Parliament resolves upon a certain tax on wine, 
resulting in a serious disadvantage to one of the States 
of the Union. Shall this State not be privileged to 
call the attention of the Federal Council to this griev- 
ance, leaving to this body the speedy redress ? The 
Customs Union declares it to be its purpose to bring 
about a general uniformity in all the inland duties on 
articles of consumption. Shall its Parliament be de- 
barred from considering and deciding upon a case of 
gross non-uniformity ? 

The treaty required co-operative action to prevent 
smuggling and fraud in connection wdth the collec- 
tion of excise duties ; the Bamberger motion was 



1868] DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEBATE. 47 

directed against a legislative measure which was con- 
stantly provocative of these abuses ; and yet it was 
questioned whether this step were one beyond the 
jurisdiction of the legislative organs, and it was even 
looked upon as evincing a systematic attempt to extend 
their power. 

Up to this point the discussion had at least l)een con- 
lined to the special question in hand, that is, whether 
the Parliament were privileged to concerii itself with 
the Hessian wine-tax, so long as this did not exceed 
the maximum of ten florins allowed by the treaty. 
Now, however, after Bismarck had so plainly indicated 
his approval of the motion, the suspicious irritability 
of the South German fraction was doubly aroused ; and 
the Wiirtemberg Clerical, Probst, allowed his excite- 
ment to lead him to intensify to the utmost the ill- 
feeling created by Mohl's political blunder, and so to 
induce an important political discussion by the very 
warning he uttered against it. 

" There is in this House," said he, " a large party 
which hopes by extending the competency of this as- 
seml)ly to open to the South the way into the Northern 
C(jnfederation. Our party is opposed to this. It is 
our intention rigidly to uphold the limits set to the 
competency of this Itody, and llierefore to discouiite- 
nance ever}^ attempt to introduce the German question, 
that our differences nui}' not be noised al)roa(l, nor 
peace within this Parliament be disturbed. There is 
yet another consideration. Over our heads liangs an 
avalanclie, which, h\ Ihc concussion caused bv our con- 



48 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

flict, may be set to rolling. There is one who would 
listen with lurking satisfaction should we be compelled 
here to state whereby the antagonism between the 
North and the South is maintained ; why the elections 
in the South gave evidence of so great disinclination 
to Prussia ; why we refuse to seek admission into the 
Northern Confederation." 

By this speech all the sluices were thrown open, and 
a torrent of indignation rushed forth ; for every mem- 
ber of the Majority was burning to i-efute every one of 
these assertions. 

Again Bismarck took the word. He directed atten- 
tion to his well-known circular note of September 7th, 
and the statement contained in it, that the North Ger- 
man Confederation would scrupulously refrain from 
bringing pressure to bear upon the South to induce it 
to seek entrance into the Confederation. Not until the 
latter should of its own free will announce such a de- 
sire would the North give consideration to the question 
whether its own interests would' admit of such a step. 
" For," said he, " we are not so anxious as you sup- 
pose us to be, gentlemen. Continue your deliberations 
upon matters of taxation in peace of mind ; we have 
no thought to extend the power of this Parliament ; 
neither, however, will we allow it to be diminished." 
Then, in conclusion, he uttered one sentence which fell 
like a thunderbolt upon Probst's insinuation of danger 
threatening from France, and shattered it: "Above all 
else, I woiild advise you to remember that an appeal 
to fear never finds a response in German hearts." 



1868J TUE NATIONAL SPllUT PREVAILS. 49 

At once, and from all sides, the storm burst upon the 
Southern fraction and their Tltramontane and Social- 
democratic sympathizers. '^ Yes," it was declared, 
"we do desire national unity; we intend to proclaim 
that, both here and everywhere. We are not averse to 
an honest encounter, for thus alone will we learn to 
undei-stand one another ; we intend to carry the internal 
struggle to its close, and at the same time to proclaim 
abroad that even now we are united in the purpose ta 
forbid any foreign interference with the consummation of 
German unity. But surely we do not seek it by way 
of an extension of this assembly's competency. To 
that end the Customs Union will not suffice ; the con- 
vocation of even a great parliament cannot call into 
being a national political existence, such as will meet 
our aspirations for Germany ; this will require the in- 
stitution of an established government such as we have 
in the North German Confederation, and which the 
Customs Union cannot supply." 

Such were the leading thoughts that formed the 
key-note of the many-tuned speeches of the parties 
which, though usually so divided in their opinions, 
were for the moment united through Probst's short- 
sighted zeal — Old Liberals and National Liberals, 
Progressists and Conservatives. 

Probably the greatest discomfiture of the day was 
caused the Southern fraction toward the close of the 
debate by the appearance upon the orator's platform of 
Volk, the representative of the Bavarian province of 
Schwaheii. In a speech ovcrllowiiig with wit, ciitlni- 



^0 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

siasm, and good sense, he disputed the right of his asso- 
ciates from the South to make that entire section 
responsible for their utterances by using the expression, 
" we South Germans, we Swabians," since, as he clearly 
demonstrated, it was solely due to the accidental dis- 
tribution of the inhabitants in the election districts that 
his opponents had been enabled to secure the larger 
representation in the House, whereas the greater num- 
ber of votes had really been cast for the national side. 
As he closed with the exclamation, " Among us there 
are some who still seem to enjoy throwing snowballs 
at one another, but the time is at hand when the sun 
with the increasing warmth of its rays will deprive 
them of the material for their missiles. Yes, truly, 
my friends, the springtime has come upon Germany!" 
jubilant acclamation rang through the House ; and not 
only the treaty with Austria, but Bamberger's motion 
as well, was approved by an overwhelming majority. 

This was the most vexatious day the Southern frac- 
tion had as yet experienced ; there was, however, ample 
consolation in store for them. It soon appeared that 
even in the nationally inclined majority, there still 
remained much of the old spirit w^hich raised German 
unity as its ideal high upon its standard, but decided 
all practical action by local and material interests alone. 
On May 18th enthusiasm had run high for a great 
and united future; on the 19th the finances received 
cool and careful scrutiny in the light of home interests. 

The subject under consideration was the Govern- 
ment bill regarding the reform of the general customs 



1868] THE DUTY OX PETROLEUM. 51 

tariff, in so far as this liad not already been modified in 
favor of greater freedom of intercoui-se by the Austrian 
commercial treaty. There was a long list of commod- 
ities upon which the duty was either to be entirely 
remitted or to be materially lowered, classed under 57 
heads, including many subdivisions, and making a re- 
duction in duties estimated at 200,000 thalei-s annu- 
ally. In this list, so pleasing to the eye of free-tradei-s, 
only one item stood forth conspicuously and annoy- 
ingly ; it was not the abolition of an existing duty, but 
the restoration of one remitted in 1865, a duty of fif- 
teen silver groschens on a hundred-weight of coal-oil, 
the annual revenue from which it was estimated would 
amount to 500,000 thalers, and would probably grow 
larger with every year. All the liberal sympathizer's 
of the people who on the day before had voted with 
Bismarck were on this point in perfect harmony mth 
the Southern fraction, whose intention it was to prevent 
the Customs Parliament from passing a single new tax. 
The House concerned itself but little with the other 
positions of the tariff ; all the interest was centred 
upon petroleum. It was even rumored that should its 
general unpopularity result in the defeat of this Article 
of the bill, the Federal Council would withdraw the 
entire measure. To gain certainty upon this point, 
liraun (Wiesbaden), after a short general delta to, 
moved that tlie separate Articles should not be consid- 
ered in the order in which they ai)peared in the bill, but 
that the one regarding petroleum should be given the 
precedence. The House so decided, alliiough President 



52 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

Delbriick had declared that it was not the usa^re of 
the Federal Council to make hypothetic decisions ; it 
would await the action of the House, and then declare 
its intentions. 

That the duty on petroleum would fare even harder 
than had the tax on tobacco was not to be doubted. 
For, to begin with, all the arguments which had been 
arrayed against the latter applied with equal force to 
petroleum : the insufficient evidence of an actual finan- 
cial exigency, which could only be established by a 
careful study of the completed budgets for both Union 
and State for the coming year; the probability that 
the reduction of the other duties would not result in 
a deficiency of revenue, but by inducing greater con- 
sumption would eventually be to the advantage of the 
Customs treasuries ; further, the malicious imputation 
that in this case, as in that of every indirect tax, the 
burden would fall upon the shoulders of the poor man ; 
and, finally, the impossibility, politically, for the Cus- 
toms Parliament to establish a continuous source of 
revenue over the disbursement of which it had no 
right of supervision. 

" My vote," said the leader of the Bavarian National 
Party, Marquard Barth, " will be cast against any 
form of consent, so that the Federal Council will find 
itself compelled to convoke this assembly again next 
year, and grant us greater privileges, such as become 
a true representation of the German nation. He who 
keeps his purse-strings tied," he added in closing, 
'' holds power within his grasp, for he will find him- 



1868] ARGUMEXTS FOR AXD AGAINST. 53 

self surrounded by suppliants ; but he who has emp- 
tied out all that he has, is no better than a Ijeggar 
himself." 

There was still another argument against the dut}- 
on coal-oil, namely the indisputable fact, that, unlike 
tolxicco, it was not an article of luxury, the consump- 
tion of which had no more desirable effect than to 
injure the health of the consumer ; but that in con- 
sequence of its enormous importation and exceeding 
cheapness, it had become a means of labor, conse- 
quently a source of increased j)roduction and wealth ; 
that it had become indispensable to all classes of the 
population, and, bringing light to the poorest hut, had 
made night-work possible to the occupants. " Will 
you," exclaimed Braun at the close of a flowery speech 
full of pathos, '• will you, l)y raising the price of coal- 
oil, transform the people's light into darkness ? "' 

This multiplicity of reasons was met by thi; former 
Prussian ^Minister of Finance of the new era, Herr von 
Patow, with the calm assurance of one who knows well 
that of which he speaks. He called Barth's attention 
to the possibility that a Customs Parliament habitu- 
ally sterile of desired results would cease to be con- 
voked at all by the Federal Council ; he advised his 
adversaries not to use the Customs Pailiament's ofTieial 
ignorance of the ])udget mattei"s of tlie iudivitlual 
States as a pretext to deny the existence of public 
exigencies, since every one was fully aware that tlie 
members of the House were perfectly familiar with the 
budgets of their icspective States. Ho set at naught 



54 TUE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

the complaints regarding the pernicious effects of the 
tax on oil by showing how insignificant would be the 
share falling to the individual. He had obtained from 
both consumers and dealers exact data regarding the 
quantity of oil used upon his estates, and had found 
that for the poorest field laborers this averaged ten 
pounds a year for each family. Since the tax proposed 
was fifteen silver groschens per hundred-weight, tlie 
average laborer would in consequence be burdened 
with a tax of one and one half silver groschens, an 
exaction which he could meet almost exactly by drink- 
ing one pint of beer less each year. 

Deputy von Wedemeier confirmed these statements ; 
his statistics were based upon more extended research, 
the books of both large and small oil-dealers having 
been submitted to his examination, by which it was 
clearly demonstrated that the consumption of petro- 
leum increased materially with each ascending degree 
of prosperity, until for the millionnaire it reached the 
large amount of nine hundred pounds, entailing a tax 
of four and one-half thalers, ninety times as large a 
sum as that required of the poor man. It was there- 
fore pre-eminently a tax of which it could not truth- 
fully be asserted that it unjustly oppressed the small 
consumers. 

However, the majority was not to be influenced in 
its decision, and the Article regarding petroleum was 
rejected by a vote of 190 voices against 99. The 
deliberations upon the other Articles of the bill passed 
most smoothly ; all the proposed remissions of duties 



1868] THE UVTY ItEJKCTEl). 55- 

were sanctioned despite Mold's strenuous opposition. 
The only action of sufficient interest to be recorded 
here was a motion receiving the support of more than 
one party, proposing that a clause be added asking the 
Federal Council to submit a bill in thf nt'ur future 
dealing with a corresponding reform in the taxation 
of sugar, since a decrease in the i)resent rates would 
most likely be followed by a much larger consumption^ 
and consequently by a proporticmate increase in the 
State revenues. 

To this Delbriick replied that he fully appreciated 
the grounds upon which the request was based. Since, 
however, sugar was by far the most important item in 
the whole system of taxation of articles of consump- 
tion, even a slight error in the arrangements concerning 
it would have most serious financial consequences ; the 
desired action must therefore be preceded ly a most 
thorough investigation ; and for this reason the prom- 
ise to give the subject careful consideration was the 
only one wliich he could at present make. 

When, on May 23d, the House proceeded to the final 
deliberation upon the tariff bill, Delbriick announced, 
in the name of the Federal Council, that unless the 
tax on petroleum were approved, the entire bill ANould 
be unacceptable to the Governments. 'Jliis had been 
fully expected, and therefore made little impression. 
The free-trade majority believed that by the time 
another j^ear had passed, the Federal Council \vt«uld 
find itself compelled to be less unyielding, ami there- 
fore dcfinitivclv refused its consent to the tax on oil hy 



56 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

149 voices against 86, whereupon Bismarck at once 
announced that the Federal Council withdrew the 
entire bill. 

This closed the business of the session ; all that 
now remained was a series of courtesies to be extended 
by the North to the representatives from the South. 
In the speech from the throne, with which King Wil- 
liam closed the session, he commended the results so 
far achieved, and presaged an auspicious future for the 
•desired measures which had as yet failed of enactment. 
The labors shared during the past weeks, he hoped, 
had removed, or at least softened, dividing prejudices ; 
in the future, as heretofore, his attitude would be 
prescribed not by the power vested in himself, but by 
a, sacred regard for the rights of the several States of 
the Union and for existing treaties. 

In honor of its South German guests, the City of 
Berlin gave a brilliant garden party ; this was followed 
by an elegant banquet in the Exchange, the festivities 
Ijeing closed by a pleasure trip to Kiel, where the new 
Federal naval station and the beginnings of the German 
war marine were inspected. 

Our South German friends gladly accepted all these 
evidences of friendship ; their official thanks, however, 
appeared in the form of an address to their constitu- 
ents, in which they rendered an account of their 
stewardship, taking much credit to themselves for hav- 
ing unyieldingly and effectively obstructed every at- 
tempted change in the nature of the Customs Parliament, 
as well as every proposed increase of significance in 



1868] RE-OPENING OF THE REICHSTAG. 57 

the taxes. In conclusion, they declared that their 
observations in the North had but deepened their con- 
viction that union with the Xorthern Confederation 
would require of the Southern States the complete 
surrender of their independence ; that the Prussian 
tendency to excessive furtherance of military oI)jects 
was prejudicial both to material interests and moral 
culture, and must rest as a crushing burden upon tlie 
people. 

The only way of escape from all this, they believed, 
lay in the direction of a firm association uniting all the 
strength of South Germany on a basis of liberal institu- 
tions, namely, the formation at last of the Southern 
Confederation. 

ni. CLOSING WEEKS OF THE REICHSTAG. 

The idea of national unity had, as has been seen, 
made no converts in the first Customs Parliament. 
Bismarck who, as he had himself informed the South 
Germans on May 18th, could aAvait their desire to be 
admitted into the Confederation without the least im- 
patience, was little disturbed by this fact, and l)cfore 
many days had passed, on Ala}^ 27th, authorized tlie 
re-assembling of the German Reichstag, that the work 
of promoting tlie pu])lic welfare, and consolidating the 
Confederation, so well begun, might be completed. 

The first condition to such a result was that the un- 
certainty in mattei-s of finance should be relieved, an 
end for whicli the action of the Customs Parliament 
had been as ])arren of results as it had been for tlie as- 



58 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PAULIAMENT. [1868 

piration after German unity, and for the achievement 
of which Miquel's motion, accepted by the Reichstag on 
April 22d, proved an effectual barrier by making an 
agreement between that body and the Federal Council 
impossible. 

What was most necessary, therefore, was that an 
understanding upon this point should be reached as 
quickly as possible. 1'herefore, as the first stej) in the 
desired direction, immediately after the close of Whit- 
sun-tide week, the draft of the Federal budget for 18G9 
was on June 4th submitted to the House, which then 
selected June 8th as the date for the preliminary delib- 
eration by the plenum. 

Although some complaints were heard that the time 
thus allowed was much too short for a thorough study 
of the budget, the great majority were desirous to es- 
cape from the heat of the dog-days in Berlin ; and upon 
closer inspection the budget was after all found to co- 
incide so nearly with its predecessor in most points, 
or else the reasons for deviation were so apparent, that 
a more detailed examination was really not necessary. 
Therefore, when the session was opened on July 8th, 
every one felt convinced that the only hotly debated 
point would be the additional clause proposed by Mi- 
quel to the bill regarding the Federal debt. 

As has been seen, in the last discussion of the bill 
Twesten urged insistence upon this clause ; since the 
Government could not afford an interruption in its- 
work of founding a navy, and through its dependence 
upon the money to be realized by the loan would be 



1868] RENEWED DEBATE ON MiqUEL CLAUSE. 5^ 

forced to accept the clause upon which this was con- 
ditionah To be sure, the other members of the Na- 
tional Liberal Party who were heard in the House 
declared that now, as Ijcfore, the party intended to 
further the interests of the nav\- hy a vigorous support, 
and that, should the (jovernment, through its persist- 
ent rejection of the clause, fail to obtain the loan, the 
National Liberals would be quite willing to consent 
to other means of raising the required amount: still, 
since the party, in direct contradiction to these line 
phrases, by its attitude in the Customs Parliament had 
denied to the Governments every increase of revenue, 
bttt little credence was given these protestations of 
good will. 

The Conservative press daily developed the theme, 
that it w^as the purpose of the Lil)eial Opposition to 
deprive the Government of every sotirce of suppl}- for 
the requirements of the navy, except that offered by the 
loan, thus compelling it to accept the Micpu'l clause. 
In every key the changes were rung upon the malevo- 
lence of a course of action by whieli it was intended 
to force an unconstitutional extension of power at tlie 
expense of the v^-ountry's safety, by refusing the neces- 
sary funds for tlie navy. 

To this the Li])erals. of course, made reply by revei-s- 
ing the accusation, declaring the responsibility for re- 
tarding the work upon the navy to lie wliolly al the 
door of the Government, whit-li for llie sake of retain- 
ing a reactionary and arbitrary jtowcr lefused its sanc- 
tion to this clause, emanating from a true conccjition 



60 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

of constitutional government ; in consequence, it found 
but 30.0,000 thalers at its disposal for expenditure upon 
the navy instead of the three and a half million of the 
loan. 

In this warfare of charges and counter-charges, the 
position of the Government, which was simply that of 
insistence upon the retention of an existing provision 
of the Constitution, was far more tenable than was 
that of the Opposition, advocating, as they did, a 
fundamental change of existing conditions. Outside 
of the initiated few, the far-reaching consequences of 
Miquel's apparently inoffensive clause were little un- 
derstood ; and with the popularity at that time enjoyed 
by the aspiring young navy, the dispute by which its 
prospects were jeopardized caused much vexation 
among the people. 

It was therefore wdth greater eagerness that the Na- 
tional Liberals reiterated their former assui-ance that 
they were far from intending to injure the navy ; 
quite the contrary was true ; should the Government 
insist upon making the loan impossible, they would 
see to it that the required funds were forthcoming 
from other sources. 

What they expected to gain by their proposed course 
it is hard to discover. Should they provide the Gov- 
ernment with the desired funds through increased 
taxation this would, to be sure, make a navy possible ; 
but that the end had been achieved by means of a 
heavier tax burden instead of the loan v/ould not be 
likely to add to the popularity of the party, besides 



1868] FUTILE ATTEMPTS OF THE LIBERALS. 61 

which, should the necessity of a loan he removed, 
that of a law regarding the administration of the Fed- 
eral deht, together with AIi(|uers clause, would also 
disappear. 

However, this course once adopted, nuist he i)ur- 
sued ; and so, in reversal of the usual order, it was 
the Liberal Left which now anxiously scanned the 
items of the budget to discover a possible way of aug- 
menting the revenue, whereas the Governments per- 
sisted in their refusal to lay additional burdens upon 
the people. 

To raise the three and a half millions which the 
loan w'as originally intended to furnish, their hrst re- 
course Avas to an increase of the j-jro rata contribu- 
tions. Delbrlick with decision pronounced this to be 
infeasible ; sinc^e it had already been found necessary 
to fix the amount of the contri])uti()ns at twenty-three 
millions, three millions more than had been required 
the preceding year. A still further increase would 
completely demoralize the finances of the individual 
States. 

" Very well," w^as the reply, " then we \\\\\ desist 
from this proposed increase in the contributions. The 
budget, however, affords other ways and means of 
coming to the assistance of the navy. It is (piite obvi- 
ous that the principal receipts of the Confederation have 
been estimated at too low a figure : the deficiency 
apprehended as the result of the loduced postal rates, 
as also that arising in f<)nsc(|ut'nc'e of certain reduc- 
tions in duties, will not be as great as I'tarcd, but, 



62 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

on the contrary, will be transformed into a surplus by 
the impetus given to intercourse." 

Delbriick admitted that in a few years this might 
perhaps be the case, but directed attention to the fact 
tiiat it was the budget for 1869 that was now being 
determined, and that for the coming year the continu- 
ance of a deficit was beyond question. The criticism 
had been made, that the half million to accrue from 
the tobacco tax in its new form had not been taken 
into account in the estimates. " Why should it ap- 
pear in the budget for 1869," asked Delbriick, " for 
its amount is not decided upon until the summer 
of 1869, and it is not due until December of that 
year? " 

No better success awaited a proposition made by 
Lasker. It had appeared that franking privileges had 
been extended to twenty-two per cent of all the letters 
passing through the mails during the past year ; 
should this privilege be withdrawn a large sum would 
be realized by the Government, it was claimed. To 
this Delbriick remarked, that of these letters by far 
the greater number represented the official correspond- 
ence of the Government authorities ; should postage 
be required upon them, the revenue realized from this 
source would be paid l)y the several States, and there- 
fore would be equivalent to an increase in the pro 
rata contributions. 

Thus the search in the ordinary budget for the 
means wherewith to meet the extraordinary demands 
of the navy had to be abandoned, leaving the realiza- 



1868] THE POINT AT ISSUE. 63 

tion of the loan as the only resource. The more ap- 
parent this fact became, the more animated grew the 
debate upon the Miquel clause, each party seeking to 
throw upon the other the responsibility for the disad- 
vantage to be suffered by the country, should the con- 
dition made be insisted upon. Ikick and forth flew 
the charge of doctrinaire obstinac}-, and lack of patri- 
otism. A large part of the House, however, remained 
wholly unaffected by these i^olemic pyrotechnics. From 
various sides came the criticism that all this recrimi- 
nation-was useless ; since all parties were united in the 
wish to see the German navy established in strength, 
and it was not possible that no way could be devised 
by which the nation's desire could be realized and 
yet neither party be forced to abandon its principles 
in the fullihnent. 

In response to tliis appeal, rose Otto Camphausen, 
at that time one of the highest officials in the Prus- 
sian Ministr}' of Finance. He was as well known for 
his proficiency in matters of this department as he was 
for his skill as a pailiamentariaii : in his utterances 
there was generally little attempt at rhetoric elegance 
a,nd oratorical effect, but, based upon extensive tech- 
nical knowledge, and characterized by convincing logic 
and unerring judgment as to the attainable, they never 
failed to convince. 

To a vehement utterance made by Schulze-Delitzsch, 
he now added the remark that it was most nni-eason- 
able of the Federal Council, which had but just di-- 
rived its power, to autlioir/.c governnicnl loans from 



64 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

the Reichstag, in that the latter had embodied this 
provision in the Constitution, now to refuse the Reichs- 
tag the right to control the exercise of this power. 
Camphausen then directed attention to the circum- 
stance, that in connection with this subject very dif- 
ferent kinds of official control were possible ; that in 
Prussia, according to a law enacted in 1850, the ad- 
ministration of the public debt was placed under rigid 
supervision, and that this arrangement, after a test of 
eighteen years, had proved itself beyond objection. 
When in 1867 the Federal Council had announced, in 
connection with the loan for the navy, that the draft 
of a law regarding the Federal debt would be sub- 
mitted, it had been the general understanding that 
this law, by conforming in its general features to the 
excellent one in force in Prussia, would secure the ad- 
vantages of the latter to the administration of the 
Federal debt, and that it would be unopposed in the 
Reichstag. 

" The Governments also were greatly surprised when 
the reverse of this appeared," he said, " and even more 
so when it was proposed to infuse into the bill a po- 
litical principle of far-reaching significance. That they 
should refuse their consent was but natural." 

He then exhorted the two parties not to exasperate 
each other by prolonged contention, not to tie their 
own hands for the future by rashlj^ vehement assevera- 
tions, but instead, to direct their efforts towards an 
adjustment whereby an agreement would become pos- 
sible. 



1868] THE GOVTS. PROPOSE A COM PROMISE. 05- 

His counsel was received with enthusiastic applause, 
but did not prevent a last wrathful battle of words 
between Wagener (Neustettin) and Count Schwerin. 

This closed the general debate, and on June 9th the 
special deliberation upon the several items of the bud- 
get was begun. The estimates for the navy being set 
aside for the time, all the other sections were conferred 
upon on the 9th and 10th of June in a manner more 
suggestive of an academic discussion than of a parlia- 
mentary struggle. There was no lack of criticism or 
of hopes expressed with regard to the future, nor were 
a few harmless motions for amendment wanting ; the 
result of each vote, always excepting the estimates for 
the navy, was, however, invariably favorable, until all 
the paragraphs of the budget were approved. Evi- 
dently the anticipated action of the Federal Council 
claimed the interest to the exclusion of the figures 
presented for consideration. 

The Governments had, in fact, agreed upon a ])ro- 
posal of compromise after the manner suggested by 
Camphausen, for whith they had obtained the sanc- 
tion of the King as well as the approval of Bismarck, 
who was absent owing to illness. On the 10th, when 
the voting upon the budget by headings was draw- 
ing to a close, Presidc'iit Sinison ainionnced to the 
House that a bill of tlic following conicnts liad lieen 
received from the Federal Chancellor: — 

The administration of the loan for expenditures upon 
the navy as approved l»y the Reichstag in 1867 shall, 
until llic enactment of a (leliniti\e law rcirulatintr the 



■66 THE FIRST CUST03IS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

administration of the Federal debt, be committed to 
the charge of the Prussian central administration of 
State debts, by which it shall be conducted according 
to the law of 1850, and under the restriction that no 
change shall be made in the rate of interest except 
as may be provided by a special law. To the Federal 
Chancellor shall be intrusted its supreme supervision ; 
the oath required of the officials in accordance with 
the Prussian law by which they engage not to execute 
any unlawful order received from the Government 
shall, however, henceforth apply to the administra- 
tion of Federal matters as well. The administration 
shall be conducted under the supervision of a Com- 
mittee on the Federal Debt, consisting of three mem- 
bers of the Federal Council and three of the Reichstag, 
elected by the members of the body to which they 
respectively belong, together with the President of 
the Prussian Court of Accounts. This Committee 
shall have the unqualified right at any time to exam- 
ine the records and accounts of the administration, 
to make inquiry into the methods pursued by it, and 
regarding the balance on hand ; with regard to all this 
the Committee shall annually render an account to the 
Reichstag for the purpose of discharge. 

The proposed compromise consisted, therefore, in 
that the general and permanent arrangements for the 
administration of the Federal debt were not now to 
be determined, since this would have required of one 
of the two parties the renunciation of its principles 
regarding the Miquel clause, but that for the present 



1868] THE PROGRESSISTS OPPOSE IT. GT 

only the administration of the loan of 1867 was to 
be placed under a provisional management in a man- 
ner providing all necessary precautions for the pro- 
tection of the State's interests. 

The House at once decided upon u preliminary delib- 
eration on the bill l)v the [)loiuim. the date for which 
was as yet left undetermined, since it was the general 
wdsh that the public discussion of the decisive question 
^should be preceded by consultation within and between 
the several fractions. Of these discussions we have no 
account ; their results, however, soon appeared. 

The Progressists had from the outset looked with 
disfavor upon the assumption of a loan by the young 
Confederation, and at the most had been willing to 
consent to it only if responsil)ility of the Ministry could 
be achieved in connection with it. They would, there- 
fore, have nothing to do with the proposed compromise. 
That its rejection entailed a complete stand-still in the 
development of the navy mattered little to them. The 
navy was of no great interest to them under any cir- 
cumstances ; and, moreover, that they should lie ex- 
pected to yield a great principle of political freedom for 
fear of a war as yet invisil)le upon the political horizon, 
they resented with indignation. •' A State that is will- 
ing to renounce lil)erty," was Waldeck's expression, 
"(lops not deserve to exist! 

In opposition to tlicm the Conservatives, Free Conser- 
vatives, and Old Lil»crals had persistently voted against 
-Micjuers clause: l)ut now, influenced I)y their interest 
in the navy, and the hope of a reconciliation between 



68 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

the two legislative organs, they were willing to accept 
the new proposition by which the enactment of the 
clause was at least indefinitely postponed. 

Under these circumstances the deciding power lay in 
the hands of the large National Liberal Party. Up to 
this point, side by side with the Party of Progress, it 
had battled valiantly for responsibility of the Ministry ; 
now, however, when through the inflexibility of the 
Government, and the pressure of the financial situa- 
tion, it became a choice between giving up the navy 
or the Miquel clause, for an indefinite time, it became 
apparent at once how great a difference of disposition 
there really was between this and the radical parties, 
notwithstanding the great number of constitutional doc- 
trines held by them in common. Germany's power at 
sea was dear to the National Liberals, and they decided 
in favor of the proposed compromise. " Since I must 
choose between inflicting an injury upon my father- 
land, or relinquishing a right of freedom, I will vote 
to-day, as I shall always vote, for my fatherland I " ex- 
claimed Lasker in striking contrast to Waldeck's utter- 
ance. 

But, as wise as it was to abandon a position grown 
untenable, it was, nevertheless, especially after all that 
had preceded it, a surrender on the part of the National 
Liberals. And when, on June 15th, the deliberation by 
the plenum was begun, it soon developed into a vehe- 
ment explanation between the former allies. With 
every possible shaft of ridicule and pathos did the Pro- 
gressists point their representation of the weakness and 



1868] THE COMPROMISE BILL PASSED. 69 

want of principle evinced by the friends who had de- 
serted them ; in bitter derision they showered upon 
them quotations from their former valiant speeches in 
which thcv had proclaimed that a retreat from the posi- 
tion which had been assumed with regard to this most 
important question was impossible for them. 

As a matter of course, those upon whom this violent 
onslaught was made found abundant material with 
which to defend themselves and make connter-charges. 
At several points even Delbriick as well as a numl)er 
of Conservatives entered the debate with effective ar- 
guments against the Party of Progress. Lowe (Kalbe) 
had deplored the wasteful expenditure upon the navy 
to which this l)ill would throw open the door. To this 
General von Moltke now replied,^ '•' Where, indeed, is 
an intelligent person to be found wlio would not prefer 
that the enormous sums which all the countries of 
Europe expend for militar}- purposes might be diverted 
into peaceful ihannels? An international agreement 
such as has often been proposed to this end will, how- 
ever, never achieve the desired result. I can see but 
one way in which this can be accomplished, whicli is 
that in the heart of Europe a Power will arise ^\ hieh, 
\\ithout itself l)eing one to seek C()n([uest. will yet be 
so mighty that it can forbid its neighlioi's to enter 
into war. 1 lu'lieve, therefore, tliat should this benefi- 
cent coiulitidti f\ci- be realized, it nnist be l)r(iiight 
about by ( iiTinaiiy. Tliis, lutwever, gentlemen, camiot 
come to pass until (Jeiiiiauy is snlTiciently strong, 

' Stciioyraitliic rt'ixiits, pp. 44J and 4.'>(l. 



70 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

which means when it is united. And to unive at this 
goal despite the disapprobation of Europe, we need an 
army and a navy. I trust, therefore, that you will 
sanction the bill submitted by the Government." 

Von Moltke's speech recalls the famous woi'ds of 
Frederick the Great : "• Were I King of France, not a 
cannon-shot should be fired in all Europe without my 
permission." Moltke would have modified the say- 
ing to read: "When King William becomes Emperor 
of Germany, he will not permit a cannon-shot to be 
fired in Europe." 

No more effective argument could have been made 
against the short-sighted opposition to the so-called mil- 
itarism. It was a trul}' prophetic speech with which 
the great soldier portrayed for the eyes of Europe the 
coming era. The Reichstag responded to his appeal by 
hearty applause and a vote of 151 favorable against 42 
dissenting voices. 

Immediately afterward, feeling assured of a like re- 
sult for the budget at its third reading, Delbriick 
presented it in the altered form occasioned by the real- 
ization of the loan. The final deliberation took place 
on the 19th of June, and resulted in the approval, fii'st 
of the proposed compromise-bill, and then of the entire 
budget as presented for its final reading without 
amendment of any kind. This was followed by the 
election of the three members of the Reichstag who 
were to represent that body in the Committee on the 
Federal Debt. 

Thus internal peace was restored, and after many 



1868] A COURT OF ACCOUNTS. 71 

revei'ses the Goveriinieiit had at last won a great vic- 
tory ; an imposing sum had been appropriated for the 
navy, and the aspirations of the Liberals to an exten- 
sion of parliamentary power had suffered defeat. And 
yet, that this presaged more peaceful days for the 
future was by no means to be assumed ; although the 
advantages just won within the province of financial 
politics were for the moment most agreeable, the gen- 
eral situation was nevertheless conducive of serious 
apprehension, even for the near future. 

The Federal budget for 18G9 showed a total expen- 
diture of 77,700,000 thalers (of this sixty-six millions 
were for the army, one and one-half for coast defences, 
and eight and one-half for the navy). The receipts by 
which this was to be met were from Federal sources 
49,300,000 thalers; the deficit was covered by 5,100,000 
thalers out of the loan and by pro rata contributions 
amounting to 23,300,000 thalers. That the ordinary 
receipts of the Confederation should be increased 
seemed most necessary therefore ; this, however, could 
be brought about in a productive manner, only through 
the action of the Customs Parliament ; and, after [)ast 
experience, what could be expected of that body? 

Thus the politico-financial activity of the Reiclistag 
was ended. We iiiiisU however, gkince at the results 
achieved in the sphere of legislation during tliese last 
weeks. 

First of all nuist be mentioned the ratiliealitm of new- 
postal treaties with Switzerland and Belgium, as also a 
telegraph treaty with Luxemburg. Then tht-ri- were 



72 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

numerous and urgent demands that the arrangements 
for the Federal administration should be perfected, 
and upon every possible occasion attention was called 
to the need of a collegiate and responsible Ministry. 
Formal motions and resolutions with regard to this 
were, however, not again attempted. The only motion 
which was passed was one relating to the budget, and 
proposed by Count Bethusy-Huc ; by it the Federal 
Chancellor was requested to transfer such expenses for 
the Foreign Office as were still charged to the Prussian 
budget, to that of the Confederation. 

In this connection two bills originating with the 
Federal Council are still to be mentioned. The one 
concerned the establishment of a well-regulated and in- 
dependent system of accounts to insure lawful collection 
and application of the Federal revenue. That there 
was urgent need of such an authority it will not be 
necessary to demonstrate. The present time was, how- 
ever, much too limited to permit the careful thought 
required to devise and perfect a wholly new plan. 
The Federal Council therefore, proposed that a course 
similar to that pursued with regard to the administra- 
tion of the Federal debt should be adopted, and until 
a definitive arrangement could be determined upon, 
the conduct of the Federal system of accounts should 
be placed under the management of the correspond- 
ing Prussian authority, the Chief Court of Accounts, 
conducted under most careful restrictions. 

Deputies Twesten and Kirchmann called attention to 
the fact that the regulations governing this authority 



1868] A BILL REGARDING FEDERAL OFFICIALS. 73 

had been devised in the year 1824, and consequently 
could not in all particular meet the requirements of 
the principles of constitutional government. For this 
reason the House passed a motion offered by Twesten 
to the effect that the proposed arrangement should 
apply only to the yeare 1867, 1868, 1869, and, owing 
to the limited period for which it was to be in force, 
refused to discuss the objections of a technical nature 
suggested by Kirchmann. 

The other of the two bills proposed by the Federal 
Council related to certain legal relations affecting all 
Federal officials. For the elaboration of a comprehen- 
sive system of regulations to govern the civil service, 
the time had also been found insufficient. It was 
therefore proposed that the House should confine its 
action to the solution of certain questions which would 
not permit of delay. The fii-st matter to be considered 
was the frequent transfer of Federal officials from the 
territory of one State to that of another, and the ques- 
tions of legal residence, rights of domicile, and tax 
obligations which this suggested. 

The Reichstag expressed itself as agreed to all the 
provisions of tlie draft with one exception. That the 
Federal officials should with regard to the payment of 
taxes be sul)ject to the same reguhitions as were the 
local olficials of the State in which tlu-y happened to be 
employed met \\'\\\\ opposition. It was pointed ont 
that in Prussia as well as in a number of tlic smaller 
States, thei'el'orc in hy tar the larger part of the Con- 
federation, the State ollicials, although suhject to the 



74 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMEyT. [1868 

same requirements with regard to State taxes as were 
all other residents, yet, in so far as municipal taxes 
were concerned, were assessed on a basis of only one- 
half of their salaries, and that this unjust distinction 
was now to be extended to Federal officials as well. 

The debate soon became most animated. When Del- 
briick declared that it would hardly be seemly to with- 
hold from the Federal officials the privileges granted 
to those of the several States, he received the reply : 
" Nothing is easier than to place every one on an equal 
legal footing ; instead of conferring this privilege upon 
the officials of the Confederation, withdraw it from 
those of the States." This stand was jjersisted in ; and 
as a first step in the desired direction, the privilege was 
refused to the Federal officials. 

There was a larger number of bills whose subjects 
were matters affecting the public welfare. 

The repeal during the past year of all legal restric- 
tion upon rates of interest induced the Conservatives 
to introduce a motion providing that imprisonment for 
debt should be entirely abolished. Now that an un- 
just creditor was permitted to demand the most extor- 
tionate rate of interest, it was not to be tolerated that 
the law should be made instrumental to so atrocious a 
practice by decreeing the imprisonment of the debtor. 
The jurists of the assembly entertained serious misgiv- 
ings with regard to the measure because of the further 
change in the law governing the order of procedure 
which it entailed ; and for this reason the Federal 
Council proposed to replace it by one of like tendency 



1868] CO-OPEItATIVE ASSOCIATIOXS. 15 

but of more careful preparation, which was appioved 
by the Reichstag after a brief discussion. 

A similar course was followed in the action upon 
another bill originating, like the previous one, with the 
Reiclistag, It dealt with the co-operative associations 
which during the jiast ten years had been called into 
existence through the indefatigable efforts of Schulze- 
Delitzsch, and by which, without assistance from the 
State or marked revolution of any kind, a system of co- 
operation had been inaugurated, the purpose of which 
was to procure more advantageous economic conditions 
for the members by seeking to place within their reach 
cheaper raw materials, credit, and independent Indus 
trial plants, ^lost desirable results had been achieved, 
and the associations had spread to every part of 
Germany, their number having reached the imposing 
figures of from thirteen to fourteen hundred ; twelve 
hundred of these were to be found within the limits of 
the Confederation alone, and by them sums amounting 
to more than sixty-seven thalei's had been advanced 
within the year to members. 

This organization as it had been practically developed 
was not provided for by any existing law. In st)me 
respects it resembled an open, in others a secret, busi- 
ness partnei-ship, in still othei"s a stock company, oi" a 
free public association. At all events, tlie jjropoi-tions 
A\bi(]i it had assumed peremptorily demanded the regu- 
lation by law of its legal, personal relations (relations 
of tlie association to the authorities, to its meinbei-s, its 
officers, debtors, creditors, etc.) ; and therefore, in con- 



76 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

sonance with Schulze-Delitzscli, the Prussian Govern- 
ment had in 1867 agreed with the Assembly upon a 
law which the associations generally regarded as to the 
purpose. Schulze (Delitzsch), therefore, now proposed 
to the Reichstag that this Piussian law, with as little 
modification as possible, should be adopted into Federal 
legislation. 

To this the Reichstag consented ; the Federal Council, 
however, before arriving at a decision in regard to the 
motion, referred it for careful examination to the Com- 
mittee which it had appointed for the revision of the 
civil procedure, and which was already actively engaged 
in the performance of this duty. The result appeared 
in a few weeks in the form of numerous improvements 
in the text. " A contention about mere trifles," mut- 
tered Twesten. " Nevertheless," exclaimed Schulze, 
" I am willing to accept all that has been suggested 
without the slightest hesitation." And so did the 
Reichstag ; on the very last day of the session this 
important measure was enacted. 

The extreme but perfectly justifiable caution which 
induced the Federal Council to scrutinize every pro- 
posed measure with respect to its possible influence 
upon existing legal regulations, and by which its action 
was made most thorough, but also more deliberate than 
suited the taste of the impatient, led to a peculiar de- 
vice to expedite matters with regard to a measure of 
greatest moment just before the curtain was dropped 
upon this session's labors. 

Just after the publication of the law regarding free- 



1868] MAKESHIFT BILL TO llEGULATE TRADES. 77 

doiii of migration, it became apparent that tlie pel mission 
to change his domicile could little benetit a pei-son if 
he was prohibited from supporting himself hy his trade 
in the abode of his selection. The endless multiplicity 
of industrial and nnmicipal regulations in force in the 
several States, provinces, and connnunities of the Con- 
federation made the enactment of a ne^Y and uniform 
law for the regulation of industrial pursuits in the Con- 
federation as difficult as it was necessary. It had been 
fruitlessly attempted in 18G7 ; and in the next year tiie 
Federal Council had submitted a comprehensive bill re- 
garding it, consisting of 172 paragraphs, worked out 
wholly upon the principle of liberty in industrial pur- 
suits. It was for just this reason that the Conservative 
element in the Committee to whit-h the l)ill had l)eeii 
referred opposed it with renewed energy in ever}- one 
of its 172 paragraphs, so that, although the session was 
fast approaching its close, there seemed no prospect of 
ending these deliberations. 

At this point, so that the pe()i)le miglit at least be 
kliown some results within this province in which their 
interest was so great, Lasker and ]\li(|ucl took the 
matter in hand. Rejecting all the provisions of a posi- 
tive nature to be found in the long Government ])ill, 
they selected only four negative ones for tlieir new 
bill, by which, however, all the most oppressive restric- 
tions were removed : — - 

The guilds sliall not be allowed to j)revent a non- 
member from exercising his trade 

Xo pers(jn shall be proliibited from carr\iiig on moie 



78 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

than one trade at one and the same time .... nor 
from hiring journeymen apprentices at his own discre- 
tion ; nor from engaging as laborer with any employer 
without distinction as to trade 

No distinction of town or State with regard to the 
pursuit of a trade shall henceforth be allowed. 

To this Delbriick declared that the Federal Council 
had as yet not been enabled to arrive at a decision 
with regard to the newly proposed measure; personally 
he did not hesitate to say that he could see no objec- 
tion to it; that he, moreover, understood the bill not 
to be antagonistic to that of the Government, but to 
be offered merely as a temporarj^ arrangement, which, 
with the adoption of the more comprehensive bill, 
would, as a matter of course, be abrogated. 

The authoi-s of the bill confirmed this view, with- 
drew an objectionable paragraph, and, for the sake of 
insuring the adoption of the essential features, re- 
jected with decision every attempt to amend, whether 
proceeding from the Left or the Right. Thus their 
effort was crowned by success in the Reichstag, and 
they could also feel assured that their motion would 
receive the sanction of the Federal Council. 

By these three laws regarding imprisonment for 
debt, co-operative associations, and this first advance to- 
ward freedom in industrial pursuits, new avenues were 
opened to a broader field of labor and intercourse, the 
fruits of which would be reaped by all within the limits 
of the Confederation. 

Finally, to the credit of this session must be men- 



1868] RESULTS OF THE VEAB'S LEGISLAJ I0\. 79 

tioned that the hannonioiis action of the Ffdcial Coun- 
cil and Reichstag gave to the German people at this 
time the advantages of the metric and decimal systems 
of measures and weights, whereby an impetus was also 
given to the reform of the German system of coinage 
so hopelessly confused. To this must be added, that 
v\-ith equal unanimity of purpose the Federal organs 
adopted the Prussian law by which but a short time 
previously the public gambling-houses had been or- 
dered to be closed on December 31st, 1872, and made 
it applicable to all the territory of the Confederation. 

Taking all this into consideration, together with 
that wliicli had been accomplished in the spring, as has 
been related, we can readily understand that notwith- 
standing the sterility of the Customs Parliament, not- 
withstanding the political quarrel in the Reichstag 
and the disaffection in the annexed provinces, which 
made itself felt in many ways, the King had good 
reason for the warm words of commendation with 
which, in his speech from the throne, he closed the 
session, expressing his tliauks for the past fatiguing 
and successful laboi-s, as well as his appreciation of the 
great significance of the results achieved. Foi'. party 
contentions, like the discontent in the land. \\(nil(l pass 
awav: Init the emancipating laws would remain, bring- 
ing with them ever-increasing blessings. ])y wliirli the 
entire life of the people in business and intei-course, in 
labor and enjoyment, would be raised to a higher level 
of develo])ment. 

In truth, altiiough a generation lias as yet not passed 



80 THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT. [1868 

away, the old life during the days of national disunion 
has been forgotten, and existence in the national Con- 
federation and Empire has been accepted as the natural 
order of things ; of course, always with the proviso, 
which every independent man reserves to himself, — 
that he is privileged to find quite as much to criticise 
and quarrel about upon the now fruitful field as he 
once did upon that Avhich was so sterile. 



1852] MATTERS IN FRANCE. 81 



CHAPTER II. 

FLUCTUATIONS IX FRENCH POLITICS. 
I. THE RISE OF LIJ3ERALISM. 

In Germany, through its great results in war, tlie 
Government had gained sutBcient power to keep tlie 
movements of the political parties within bounds. At 
the same time, through the national significance of its 
triumphs, it had won the hearts of the nation as well, 
or at least the great majority of those in North (Ger- 
many. Confident of this, it could without anxiety 
recognize and extend the rights of the people, and 
yield to the representative body of the Confedera- 
tion a strong and influential position. To be sure, the 
onward movement would continue ; new and greater 
demands would be made ; an enduring balance of 
power was, however, assured for some time to come. 

In France matters stood differently. To understand 
this last phase of the Second Empire, together Avitli 
the causes which led to the great wai', it will be well 
to take a rapid survey of the ])revious events. 

The Empire was tlie product of poliliiMl niid social 
revolution. In view of the threatening (hiiiger of fur- 
ther overthrow and connnmiistic tyranny, every one in 



S2 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1852 

France wlio was numbered among the proprietary or 
earning classes — and to these belonged the great mass 
of the peasantry — welcomed with acclamation the res- 
cuing coup d 'etat of Louis Napoleon, notwithstanding 
its many deeds of blood, and accepted without remon- 
strance the dictatorship fatal to political liberty which 
sprang from it. 

Every one was content that order and peace had 
again been restored to the land, and rejoiced that prop- 
erty was once more secure, that industrial and com- 
mercial development was again possible, and that in 
consequence every kind of material enjoyment was 
increased. 

So much the greater, however, was the bitter resent- 
ment which filled the hearts of the parties vanquished 
for the time. He who had violated his oath on Decem- 
ber 2d was in their eyes an outlaw against whom every 
true patriot should use every weapon at his command. 

At first Napoleon could afford to look with disdain 
upon the exhibition of these violent passions. He was 
popular with the clergy, the army, and the peasantry. 
The great discernment displayed by his administration 
had achieved important results upon the economic field ; 
but that which probably served him best was, that dur- 
ing the first seven years of his reign his foreign policy 
had been conducted with so much energy and insight 
that France suddenly found herself once more the 
leader in European affairs. Nowhere has such a sov- 
ereign ever been deposed, but least of all in France. 

Yet here, as everywhere, the transforming hand of 



1860] MOB NY. 83 

time was at work, and with permanence of power the 
empire witnessed a rapidly progressive change in the 
foundation upon which it rested. The dread of the red 
spectre had converted the intelligence of France, as it 
had its property-holders, to the coup d'etat. However, 
as with the effective administration of government the 
danger of revolution grew more and more remote, the 
question whether this dictatorial power were still ne- 
cessary was agitated in ever-widening political circles. 
Ever since 1815 France and Paris had been uncoii- 
strainedly extolled as the source of all political freedom 
upon the European Continent ; and now, instead of the 
great principles of 1789, there was in reality the omnip- 
otence of a most arbitrary police system, the repression 
of the right of association and of the freedom of the 
press, whilst the elections to the popular representative 
body, although based \\\)o\\ the principle of universal 
suffrage, were conducted under the domineering direc- 
tion of the State officials. 

Shame and anger at this were felt by the best ele- 
ments of the population, — by the men who were still 
public-spirited, and still inspired by an ideal. Should 
this tendency continue, the Emperor would soon stand 
surrounded only ])y a company of office-seekei"s, de- 
serted by all save his soldiers and the peasantry, entirely 
estranged from the intellectual life of the nation. 

It was the abh'st of liis advistTS of that tinie, bis 
half-brolhcr Morny, who, as in the coup iVrtat be bad 
been the foremost aetor, so now was tlie iiist to perceive 
that a change must ])e \vr(»ugbt in tbe internal policy: 



84 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCU POLITICS. [1860 

the absolute empire must be transformed into a liberal 
one. It was, of course, not the intention that on some 
hue day the Emperor should lay all his sovereign rights 
at the feet of the representatives of the people ; by no 
means, for the power of final decision was to remain his 
under any consideration. In truth, he possessed such 
an abundance of prerogatives that without in the least 
endangering the stability of his crown, he could relin- 
quish a great number of individual ones to the de- 
lighted parliament and people, who, it was hoped, 
would be duly appreciative. 

In 1860 an experiment was made by conferring upon 
the Legislative Body, as the French call their repre- 
sentative chamber, the right to reply to the Emperor's 
speech from the throne at the opening of the session, 
by an address to be discussed in that assembly ; at the 
same time the official publication of all the transactions 
of the assembly was inaugurated. But what should 
the next step be ? 

It was evident that the solution of the problem re- 
quired a man of marked prominence in the parliament, 
one actuated at once by liberal and monarchical, in 
fact, by Bonapartist ideas, and who, holding firmly to 
his principles, would yet be dexterous in the manipu- 
lation of given conditions. Such a phoenix it was, 
however, difficult to find. The strong Majority of the 
representative body was not at all liberal and quite 
as little intellectual ; the slender Opposition, well- 
endowed, but most decidedly republican in its views. 
Yet it was in just this group that Morny's discerning 



1864] J^MILE OLLIVIER. 85 

eye descried the man wlioiu he sought in the repre- 
sentative of a thoroughly democratic district of Paris, 
Eniile OUivier. He was tlie son of. a much-persecuted 
Republican of tlie days of 1848, the pupil and favorite 
of the great tribune of the people, Ledru-Kullin, then 
in exile. Ollivier was therefore a man who of all men 
might naturally be supposed to be bound to the repub- 
licau cause; he, however, did not allow himself to be 
restrained by the memories of the past. He was in 
the prime of life, ambitious and self-appreciative; of 
an excital)le temperament, and exceedingly vain. His 
desire was not to revolutionize, but to rule ; not to 
pull down, but to build U[). He had discovered how 
largely the promises of his republican friends were 
made u[) of sounding and empty pbrases, and how 
little true freedom could be expected from the in- 
tolerant Jacobin school from whose principles he had 
long been at heait an apostate. 

Thus Morny found him when, in 18G4, he laid before 
him the draft of a (Jovernment bill in favor of labor 
coalitions heretofore so strenuously [)rohibited, solieit- 
ing him to I)e its ehampioii in the Flouse. He declared 
this to be merely the first step in the direction of 
liberalism toward which the (rovernment had set its 
face, gladly willing in the new course before it to 
give ear to Ollivier's counsel. The [jleadcr had struck 
the right chord. ( )!li\ier ciudd imt resist the jiicturi' 
of France organized according to his liberal [)rinci[)les, 
and, as he lioped, govei-iied under his ascendency. 
How little would it matter then wlietlu-r in name 



86 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1865 

France were monarchy or republic. No more was 
necessary : Ollivier was won. 

Robespierre's biographer, Hamel, assures us that 
Ollivier was rewarded for his treason to the sacred 
cause of the republic by an annual income of 30,000 
francs. I cannot gainsay this; but justice demands 
that this allusion should be accompanied by the state- 
ment that his liberal principles in their essential fea- 
tures were never to be bought either with gold or 
with the prospect of power. 

Unhesitatingly he entered upon his task. Should 
the liberal empire, or, in other words, the constitu- 
tional monarchy under Napoleon III., gradually be- 
come a reality, it would in the first place be necessary 
to raise the standard of the new cause in the parlia- 
ment itself, in the midst of the monarchical and re- 
publican absolutists. Success attended this effort in 
so far as that in the debate upon the address of 1865, 
a group of 61 members (out of 280) was induced 
to vote for a motion protesting the nation's utter 
loyalty to the Bonaparte dynasty, and entreating the 
Emperor to vouchsafe to his devoted people a further 
advance toward political freedom. The motion, as- 
sailed by both the Right and the Left, was defeated ; 
but the " third party," by which it had been made, 
was established, and favorable circumstances combined 
to promote its progress. 

First of all, through an uninterrupted succession of 
mistakes and failures in its foreign policy, the prestige 
of the absolute empire had suffered greatly since 1859. 



1865] NAPOLEON'S PLANS OF REFORM. 87 

The Opposition, constituted of a variety of elements, 
made a point of holding up to the gaze of the ambitious 
and easily irritated populace the loss of power which 
France had sustained through Napoleon's toleration of 
the growth of German and Italian unity wiihout secur- 
ing compensation for himself in a corresponding en- 
largement of his own kingdom. In these reproaclics 
the ultimate aim of the Opposition was by no means to 
incite to an early war of conquest, which was dreaded 
more than it was desired; its purpose was to testify 
to the inefficiency of the personal government, and to 
spread parliamentary tendencies among the people. 

The nature of these attacks was such as must ne- 
cessarily cause Napoleon great anxiet}- ; a Bonaparte 
could ill afford the continued sneer that under him 
Fmnce had been degraded to the rank of a third-rate 
Power. Against his own will, therefore, he found 
himself forced to strive for acquisition abroad, and to 
endeavor to place a check upon the growth of his 
neighbors. This he did by seeking powerful alliances, 
and by endeavoring to. put his own military forces into 
an ever higher state of readiness. This naturally ren- 
dered the assurance of European peace impossible, al- 
though the French people, like every other, earnestly 
desired it. 

No one, moreover, wished for it more eagerly than 
did the Emperor himself. Hy nature he was a man of 
peace and not of war. He loved to meditate, to plan, 
to dream; to make the decision requisite for action 
was always dillicult for bim, and rapid decision, such 



88 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1866 

as warfare demands, was simply impossible to him. 
And finally, by his nearer view of the horrors of the 
battlefield in 1859, his nerves had received a serious 
shock, making the thought of more bloodshed abomi- 
nable to him. 

This was his state when he received the blow which 
for his future career was the decisive one. In the 
year 1865 he suffered the first attack of a serious 
kidney and bladder malady, after which, with longer 
or shorter intervals of remission, no year passed with- 
out a return of these attacks with ever-increasing se- 
verity, at times complicated with lancinating gout 
pains, and precluding all hope of ultimate recovery. 
When enduring these agonizing pains the Emperor's 
physical and mental powers forsook liim ; his only 
wish was for utter repose. After the sufferer had been 
relieved, he pondered the future with gloomy forebod- 
ing ; not his own alone, but that of his young son as 
well. In August, 1866, just arisen from a bed of suf- 
fering, he summed up the situation in the words : "• A 
fundamental change has become necessary, — the in- 
auguration of an entirely new plan of action in our 
foreign and internal policy." 

He began the first by giving the cold shoulder to 
conquered Austria, and by making the notorious pro- 
posal of alliance to victorious Prussia, according to 
which he should receive Luxemburg at once and Bel- 
gium later. South Germany to fall to the share of 
Prussia. The third member of this alliance, he hoped, 
would be Italy ; thus without the shedding of a single 



1867] NAPOLEON AND OLLIVIEIi. 89 

drop of blood, the name of Napoleon would he re- 
stored to all its former glory. 

We have seen how the negotiations with Prussia 
were delayed. In December the Emperor was seized 
with the suspicion that Prussia would not only decline 
the alliance, but in open opposition would block his 
way to Luxendjurg. He gave orders to the Minister 
of War under any circumstances to undertake a reor- 
ganization of the army, by which its strength would 
be doubled. Soon after this, in January, 1867, the plan 
of a Prussian alliance suffered final shipwreck, and the 
attempted agreement with Italy fared no better. " I 
have not an ally in Europe," said Napoleon to his 
Ministers ; " my reliance must therefore be upon my 
people alone." As a consequence, he was resolved to 
turn his face toward liberalism, to win the gratitude of 
his people by liberal concessions, and upon this firm 
foundation to rest his throne and liis dynasty's succes- 
sion to it. 

This decision was far from an easy one for him ; un- 
nundjered times, probably, his hope gave way to fear, 
and fear to hope. He knew full well with what bitter 
malignity the Republicans, Socialists, and Radicals pur- 
sued the name of Bonaparte, as lie also knew how large 
a proportion of the townspeople these formed. The 
only wise plan was, tlierefore, to proceed slowly and 
by degrees upon his newly adopted course of liberal 
concession. In consequence, however, the great mass 
of his constitutionally inclined subjects miglit be 
seized with impatience, and use every conceded lil)- 



90 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1867 

erty as a weapon to enforce the restriction of im- 
perial power. 

As for himself, he longed for the time when he could 
transfer a part of the burden and responsibility to other 
shoulders, and, ensconced behind a responsible Minis- 
try, view in safety the combat without. But would 
these jMinisters always, with discerning glance and 
honest endeavor, act in the interest of his crown and 
his son ? Would the parliament always permit this ? 
Would it not, perhaps, after all, be safest to keep the 
rudder in his own hands as heretofore ? How long, 
however, would the grasp, enfeebled by age and illness, 
be able to control it ? Was not haste necessary in the 
provision of a substitute, or at least of assistance ? 

He had already discussed the question with the most 
eminent of his advisers, Rouher, who at this time 
filled the office of Minister of State. As such, it was 
his duty to represent in the Chambers all the bills of 
the Government, as well as its entire policy ; thereby 
his position far transcended in power that of his col- 
leagues, who, without solidarity among themselves, were 
merely the obedient secretaries of the Emperor. 

At Napoleon's first allusion to liberalism and popu- 
larity with the people, Rouher opposed the idea most 
vigorously, saying he had no wish to meddle with such 
dangerous things. Napoleon, however, who was not 
thus to be deterred, put himself in personal communica- 
tion with Ollivier, and disclosed to him the concessions 
which he intended to make to liberalism. 

Ollivier expressed his great joy at these tendencies,. 



1867] MANIFESTO OF JANUAIiY lOTII. 91 

but regarded the privileges to l)e granted as insufficient 
to make a decided impression. Aljove all else he em- 
})hasized the importance of an unqualitied and o2)enly 
announced peace policy, which was synonymous with 
sanctioning the complete achievement of German and 
Italian unity; for thus alone could the army reform, 
already begun and so generally disapproved, become 
unnecessary, whereby he believed the Emperor would 
win so great popularity that without the slightest ap- 
prehension for the safety of his crown he could inaugu- 
rate an entirely liberal and parliamentarv government. 
Napoleon passed over this allusion to a decrease of the 
military force in silence, for it was the time when the 
Luxemburg negotiations were daily growing more criti- 
cally dubious. 

When immediately afterwaid lie offered Ollivier a 
cabinet portfolio, the latter, not wishing to sei've under 
Rouher, refused it with the courtly i)hrase that he 
hoped to serve the Emperor better as an independent 
deputy tlian he could as ^Minister. Napoleon con- 
sented. Ollivier's clever and dazzling discourse had 
won for him the entire sympathy of the Empei-or. who 
was wont to cling with an enduring tenacity to such 
impressions, which, however, were not always based 
upon a reliable knowledge of human nature. After a 
short time he wrote Ollivier that he had adopted into 
his programme certain points which 011i\iei- lia<l reconi- 
iriended : but that this must be the limit of his cdn- 
cessions, since it would lie impossible for him to go 
beyond. 



92 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1867 

On January 19tli this programme was published in 
the form of a letter to the Minister of State. It con- 
tained the following declarations : — 

By the address introduced in 1860 the results ex- 
pected had not been realized, wherefore, in its stead, 
every member of the two Chambers would be granted 
the privilege, when adequately supported by the Cham- 
ber, of interpellating the Government. 

When advantageous to the discussion of certain 
questions the Emperor would, in addition to the Min- 
ister of State, commission the Minister of the depart- 
ment concerned to represent the Government in the 
Parliament. 

By the enactment of a new press law the discre- 
tionary power of the police authorities over the press 
would be restrained, and the jurisdiction over offences 
against this law would be assigned to the courts of 
justice. 

By another law the right to assemble and unite in 
associations would be regulated. 

" Thus," concluded the Emperor, " at length I crown 
with completion the structure raised at the will of 
the nation." 

This reveals to us at a glance that, as eager as 
Napoleon was to be liberal and popular, the anxiety 
which the relinquishment of even the smallest part of 
his power caused him was quite as great. The pos- 
sibility that in individual cases the Minister of a de- 
partment would be allowed to confer directly with 
the Chamber was rather too slight an approach to the 



1867J OLLIVIER RETURNS TO THE OPPOSITION. 93 

responsibility of tlie Ministry desired by the Liberals, 
and as yet the degree of freedom which would arise 
from the promised legislation regarding the press and 
the right of assembly was left wholly undecided until 
the enactment of the law. It was, however, in just 
this connection that Napoleon was destined to make 
his first unpleasant experience with liberalism. 

Until this promised law should be issued, the Gov- 
ernment regarded the press as still subject to the reg- 
ulations heretofore in force. In the country at large, 
however, it was believed that after the manifesto of 
January 19th, the former arbitrary control of the press 
police would, even if not wholly suppressed, be at 
least restricted within narrow and fixed limits. As 
a consequence, every one wrote and published as his 
inclination prompted, and of course the hot-headed and 
radically inclined were the first to take advantage of 
the opportunity, and to abuse it. Of rejoicing and 
gratitude there was no thought. The liberty granted 
seemed but to have added to the numbers of the enemy, 
or at least to have In-ouLjlit to light tliose who here- 
tofore had ])een concealed. 

After such an experience it was no difticult task 
for Rouher to obtain the Emperor's consent to the use 
of severe measures to repress tlicse pioceedings. Tliis 
resulted after a few montlis in au open rupture be- 
tween Napoleon and Ollivier. Tlie latter, who was 
little disposed to allow liiiiist'lf to lie ])ut oiT with 
liberal promises only, assailed the .Minister of State in 
a famous speecl I on .Inlv ll'tli. iSliT. in which he aceusid 



94 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1867 

him of being inimical to the good cause, an enemy of 
all liberal aspirations ; the manner in which he uti- 
lized his high position to repress these was intolerable ; 
e^■en greater than the power of a major-domo or of 
a grand vizier was the irresponsible control which he 
exercised as a sort of vice-emperor. 

Napoleon looked upon this as an affront to himself, 
and sent the Minister the grand cross of the Legion 
of Honor, accompanied by a most gracious letter. His 
personal intercourse with Ollivier was thus interrupted ; 
and the latter again devoted his entire energy to the 
interests of the Opposition, allowing no opportunity to 
pass unimproved w'hich he could utilize in conjunction 
with Thiers and the Left to demand a Ministry respon- 
sible to the parliament, believing this to be the quin- 
tessence and guaranty of all political freedom. 

To all the politically active advocates of liberalism 
this principle in its various shades and gradations did 
in fact constitute an important article of faith, which 
their newspapers and associations constantly sought 
to impress upon their adherents. But the great mass 
of the peasants in the country and the industrial pop- 
ulation of the cities, ever since the alarm of 1848, 
had turned their backs upon political contentions, and 
under the "personal government" were enjoying their 
growing prosperity. Now, it was just within this 
province of material welfare that since 1866 they felt 
the depressing effect upon their credit and specula- 
tions caused by the uncertainty of European peace. 

We have seen how earnestly in January, 1867. 



1867] ROUHER'S OPINION. 95 

OUivier presented this to the Emperor. "If by sanc- 
tioning German unity you make peace assured, you 
will achieve so great popularity that you can grant the 
most comprehensive political rights without incurring 
the slightest risk to your crown,"' he had urged. 

Tn the fall of 18GT Rouher coniirnied this opinion, 
a,lthough in a directly contrary application. "Pro- 
cure peace for yourself," said he, '*and let the re- 
organization of the army drop, whereby you will 
occasion such popular rejoicing that without the least 
apprehension you can recall the dangerous privileges 
conferred on January 19th." Afterward, however, 
the Minister felt himself constrained to cpialify his 
remarks by the explanation that for the present the 
achievement of this desirable result would have to 
Ije postponed, since it would hardly be wise to let 
the Prussians have South Germany, and then to dis- 
arm, both because of the agreement arrived at with 
Austria at Salzburg, and, above all else, because the 
army must not be offended. And so he came to the 
conclusion that, after all, the [)resent attitude would 
have to be maintained, and liberty of the press as well 
as the reorganization of the army be permitted. 

Consequently Niel's army reform became the prin- 
cipal subject of the parliamentary struggles of the 
winter 1867-1808. As we have seen, the townsfolk 
and peasants were incensed ly the heavier military 
Ijurden I'ni- wliidi they saw no need, and llic nu'-rt' 
announcement of which sul'licecl to disturli (•(tnlidt.'ncr 
in the continualion oi' peace. Of this the orators and 



96 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1867 

writers of the Opposition eagerly took advantage, 
pointing to the dissatisfaction and distrust which had 
at last taken possession of the peasants and shop- 
keepers, heretofore the sturdy friends of the Emperor. 

" You know of no reason for these tremendous 
preparations for war. The fact is, everybody desires 
peace just as do you. It is the Emperor alone who 
wants war. After marring French reputation in Europe 
by his foolish policy, through which he has even for- 
feited the love of his people, he now hopes by foreign 
conquest to renew his popularity at home, and to 
re-dye his faded royal purple in the blood of France. 
Do you wish to prevent this and to retain the blessings 
of peace? We know one means only by which this 
can b^ done, and at the coming election you will hold 
it in your hands. The Ministers must be made sub- 
ject to the assembly which represents the people ; they 
must no longer be subservient to the caprice of the 
Emperor, but to the will of the nation." 

Such was the appeal by which, as early as 1868, 
the assurance of European peace through a responsible 
Ministry was made the watchword for the elections to 
take place in the following year. An eloquent apho- 
rism uttered by OUivier at this time found respon- 
sive hearers in every part of the country : " Freedom 
and peace, or war and despotism ! " 



1868 J THE CO^'SEnVATlVE BONAPAllTISTS. 97 

n. attb:mpt to form a triple alliance. 

Opposed to these excited masses- tlie vindicators 
of the former unrestricted empire formed a minority 
which was less formidable because of its numbers 
than on account of the influential position of its mem- 
bers. Here, as in the Opposition, there M^ere moderate 
and radical elements, both of which were influenced 
by a combination of divei-sified motives. Until now 
they had shared in the splendor and benefits of the 
empire ; uj^on them had been conferred the high i)osi- 
tions at court, in the army, in the administration, etc.; 
they had reason to fear that the further development 
of the system inaugurated on January 19th would lead 
to the appointment of new men in their places. ]\Jany 
were oppressed by the greater dread that the decrees 
of January 19th would in themselves suffice to bring 
about not only a change of the Ministry in the consti- 
tutional sense, but would reopen the abyss of social 
revolution liastily closed in 1851. 

It cannot be denied that in the year 1868 the 
radical parties furnished reason sufficient to create 
such an impression. After the ap})earance of the laws 
regarding the press and the right of assembly, tliere 
was general indignation felt at ilic Diaconic penalties 
imposed for tlicir every violation, even tlic least, as 
also that the jurisdiction over these ott'ences was as- 
signed to the correctional tril)unals instead of to those 
in whicli the trial would l)e ])y jury. However, evincing 
no fear of prosecution in tliese courts, the ( )j)i)osition 



98 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1868 

availed itself of the newly acquired weapons to make 
a violent onslaught upon the Government which had 
conferred them. Soon the respectable organs of the 
political leaders were joined in their warfare by such 
infamous and slanderous sheets as Rochefort's La 
Lanterne, Ulbrich's La Cloche, and similar papers, 
occasioning press trials interminable in their number. 
In the larger cities evidences of wide-spread ferment 
appeared ; not infrequently the public peace was dis- 
turbed by small riots. There could be no doubt that 
new associations were constantly being formed, deriv- 
ing both firm support and the requisite centralization 
from the London International Association. 

The conservative Bonapartists maintained universal 
suffrage in itself, unaccompanied by freedom of the 
press and the right of assembly, to be inoffensive, 
as had been demonstrated by past experience; now, 
however, provided with these means of attack, they 
prophesied it would speedily become the all-powerful 
means of driving all the conservative elements out of 
the representative assembly, and then all would be in 
readiness to deal the death-blow to the monarchy, to 
religion, and to the right to hold property. The Em- 
peror had himself torn down the barriere on Januar}- 
19th, and it was now impossible to retrieve the fatal 
step. Thus, they declared, the empire was already 
tottering to its fall. Where, indeed, could saving 
power still be found? 

Some of the most zealous converts to this view 
established a club in Arcadia Street, from which they 



1868] THE ARCAIJIAXS. 99 

derived the nickname of Arcadians. In the fii-st 
place, through their organs they proclaimed their de- 
termined opposition to all liberal aspirations, and their 
intention vigorously to uphold the empire as tlie bul- 
wark standing in defence of order, justice, and pros- 
perity. They did not stop at this, however. With 
regard to the future they could see but one way of 
salvation for the dynasty ; this had been indicated by 
the Opposition itself. Incessantly its leaders proclaimed 
to the people that the Emperor was ambitious for war, 
tliat through brilliant victories lie might restore the 
glory of his House. It was this very war-policy 
which the Arcadians daily suggested and urged. 
" Either peace and revolution, or military renown and 
order," was their device. Nevertheless, with a due con- 
sideration of the spirit abroad in the land, they were 
most careful not to unfold their war banner in public. 
Only too well, however, did they know the vacillating 
and excitable French temperament; any sudden step 
taken by Bismarck might be regarded as an insult to 
the nation's honor, and thus without a moment's 
warning the torch might be set to the warlike passions 
of the people. 

It was just this possibility which was so great a 
source of anxiety to the Emperor, so thoroughly averse 
to war. Tlie Arcadians, liowever, did all in tlicir 
power to l)ring it about. Tlu-ir newspai)ei"s published 
everything conceivable wliieli might incite or promote 
hatred of Prussia and Italy. Above all else they 
made it tlieir business U> kee[) in eirculalioii the most 



100 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENVll POLITICS. [1868 

exasperating reports about Bismarck, representing him 
to be the omnipresent instigator of mischief and dis- 
turber of the j)eace. He was sujjposed to bribe the press 
of Vienna, Budapest, and South Germany; to have 
supplied Garibakli's red-bloused volunteers with money 
and arms; to hire the champions of the revolution in 
Roumania and Spain, and to be in touch wdth the 
Russian Panslavists ; to have in his employ aristocratic 
ladies of the highest social circles in Paris, that through 
them the seeds of discontent might there be sown. 
There was no promise which he was not accused of 
having broken, nor treaty which he had not violated. 
He was a man of genius and daring they admitted, 
but a statesman without conscience, neither to be relied 
upon nor trusted. Ever since the defeat of Austria he 
was believed to be engaged in laying mines whose ex- 
plosion would demolish French ascendency, in which 
he recognized the only barrier to his schemes of inor- 
dinate ambition. France must be on her guard ! 

In the Emperor's immediate circle this party was no 
less zealously active. Empress Eugenie was beautiful, 
clever, and fond of enjoyment — not at all bloodthirsty 
nor eager for war ; but her ailing and aging husband 
caused her many anxious moments, as with each day 
she realized more and more that her youthful son's 
succession to the throne was far from assured, so long 
as the name of Napoleon remained unadorned by the 
laurels of fresli victories to brighten the splendor of 
its glorious inheritance. With a large part of the 
clergy every invective against Protestant Prussia and 



1868] NAPOLEON SOUNDS PRUSSIA. 101 

\'ictor Emmanuel, the despoiler of the Church, found 
hearty response. That the great majority of the corps 
of officers looked forward with eagerness to revenge for 
Sadowa w^as but a matter of course. 

As we are aware, the highest government authorities 
by no means shared this ardent desire for war. Napo- 
leon, Rouher, and Niel realized too fully their country's 
isolated position in Europe, the inadequacy of its new 
military preparations, and the substantial strength of 
its North German rival. Not only annoying, however, 
but most dangerous as well, was this double concert 
incessantly being dinned into their ears by friend and 
foe alike. The Left developed the theme, " You have 
destroyed French pre-eminence;" whilst from the 
Right came the wonderfully harmonious refrain, -'You 
must restore the glory and honor of France!" Noth- 
ing suggested itself more quickly, therefore, than the 
question, " Are there no peaceable means by which the 
French nation's thirst for glory may be satisfied, and 
yet no blood be shed ? " 

It was at this time that the Customs Union was 
reorganized, and early in 18(38 it was decided to con- 
vene the first Customs Parliament. This suggested 
to the Government at Paris that as Prussia throuo-h 
its connecti<Mi with the Customs Union liad even be- 
fore 1866 attained a position (»f pre-eminence among 
the German States, so Fi-ance might enter into a simi- 
lar relationship with Luxemburg and IJelgium. p(^i- 
liups also with Holland and Switzerland. To tbis end 
customs and I'ailroad treaties minlil si-rvc as a bfirin- 



102 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1868 

iiing ; and, if all went well, these might lead to mili- 
tary conventions and treaties of alliance, offensive and 
defensive. 

This picture appeared so alluring to the Emperor 
of France, that, without a closer examination into the 
difficulties which might present themselves, he under- 
took the first step toward the realization of his pleasing 
fancy. Early in March, 1868, his cousin, Prince Jerome 
Napoleon, made a tour to Berlin, ostensibly for the pur-' 
pose of enjoying the beauties of the jNIark Brandenburg, 
travelling as a private gentleman. He was received 
with utmost courtesy and friendliness in Berlin, where 
he discussed the French plan Avith Bismarck. Since 
then Bismarck has stated that in allusion to the pro- 
posals of August, 1866, the Prince dropped a remark 
suggesting that should the French hopes be realized, 
Prussia, too, might find her Belgium. 

That Bismarck expressed no opinion either with 
regard to this intimation or to any other part of the 
French disclosures is certain. Immediately afterward 
the English Ambassador at Berlin, Lord Loftus, re- 
ceived the following communication : " Although we 
have no information with regard to what Bismarck said 
to the Prince, there can be no doubt that the latter 
returned to Paris without a new French province in 
his pocket." At the same time a confidential com- 
munication was sent from London to the Cabinet of 
the Tuileries declaring that a military convention, or 
even a customs union with France, was rendered im- 
possible for Belgium by that country's neutralit}^ as 
guaranteed by the European Powers. 



1868] PUULUASE OF BELGIAN RAILWAY H. lU3 

As we have seen, Napoleon's attention was fully 
oeeupied during the sunnner of 1868 by the German 
and Oriental occurrences, and consequantly for the time 
allowed the Belgian interest to rest. Ilardlv, however, 
had he been relieved of these anxieties, when late in, 
the fall he determined to approaeh the subject in a 
most inoffensive manner, placing his hopes upon the 
sympathy of the Belgian Ultramontanes, and their ex- 
asperation with the liljeral Frere-Orban Ministr}-. He 
induced the French Eastern Railway Company to open 
negotiations with the management of one Dutch and 
two Belgian railways for the purchase of these roads, 
promising to reimburse it for the expense which this 
would entail as well as that the Government would 
guarantee to it a reasonable rate of interest. 

Allured by a temptingly generous offer, the Belgian 
companies signed a preliminary agreement in Decem- 
ber, 1868, by which the French Government was given 
possession and control of direct lines to Brussels and 
Rotterdam. IIardl\-, however, had this become kno\\n 
in Brussels, when a feeling of uneasiness spread through 
the land, and the cry went up that this ^^as the first 
step toward the incorporation of Belgium witb tbe 
French Empire. On DecenilHT lltli llic luattcr was 
taken up by the Second ('hainbci-, \\\\v\\ tbe .Minister, 
Frere-Orban, declared that the surrender of a Belgian 
railway to a foreign company was invalid without the 
sanction of the Govenunent; and this consent the (Jov- 
ernment wonld never give. In ii-baiice upon tbe pow- 
crt'iil support of France, the rail\va\' companies (Iciiicfl 



104 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1869 

the Government's right to interfere with their profitable 
transaction, and concluded the final negotiations with 
the Eastern Railway Company on January 31st, 1869. 

Immediately the patriotic indignation of the people 
broke forth on all sides ; party differences were for- 
gotten in the impulse given to the national sentiment, 
and the Minister, quickl}- resolved, hesitated not a mo- 
ment to give unmistakable expression to the Govern- 
ment's authority and the people's love of independence. 
On February 10th he submitted to the Second Cham- 
ber the draft of a law making an abalienation, such as 
was involved in the sale of the railways, dependent 
upon the consent of the Government. Ten days later 
the projected law received the almost unanimous ap- 
proval of both Chambers, and on the 23d it was pub- 
lished, thus invalidating the contracts of sale. 

Paris was both highly surprised and incensed at this 
inconsiderate interference on the part of Frere-Orban, 
whose declaration of December 11th had been wholly 
disregarded, the contracts concluded on January 31st 
being looked upon as terminating the matter. Fore- 
most among the clamorers was the press of the Arca- 
dians, who now hoped that the seeds for a great war 
had been sown. As was their laudable usage, they 
announced as a fully authenticated fact that the Bel- 
gian Government, actuated by a most friendly spirit 
at the beginning, had been influenced to its final hos- 
tile attitude by pressure brought to bear upon it by 
Bismarck in the hope that France would be of- 
fended, that 'this would lead to discord, and provide 



1869] BELGIUM PROTESTS. 105 

Prussia with a convenient excuse to make war upon 
France. 

This malicious invention was emphatically denied by 
all concerned, nor could its originators substantiate 
tlieir assertions by so nuich as a grain of evidence. 
This but heightened the French indignation, that little 
Belgium should have the audacity to oppose itself to 
a plan made by mighty France. Such an attitude 
must be regarded as an open insult to French honor, 
for which unconditional satisfaction nuist be rendered ; 
the least amends which could be made would be the 
immediate sanction of the transactions which had been 
put in question. 

Napoleon, too, was sorely perplexed and personally 
offended. His intention had been so inoffensive, — the 
purchase of a railway involving no infringement upon 
the sovereign authority of the State ; and yet the 
patriotic indignation which this had aroused created an 
uproar echoed lirst in France, and then re-echoed in 
every part of Europe. "• The action of the Belgian 
Goverinnent is a slap in my face," said he. 

At this juncture fuel was added to the fire by re- 
ports from Germany regarding French diplomacy which, 
in liis irritated condition, exasperated Napoleon to a 
much greater degree tliiiii their actual jMiipdit war- 
ranted. It was rumonMl that Prussia had entered an 
agreement \\\\\\ France according to which no modili- 
cation in the (uganization of (Jermany sliduld be un- 
dertaken (hiring the next three yeai"s. Naiioleon id' 
course knew that the icport was wholK unt'ouinh'd : 



lOG FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1869 

still, it added to his annoyance that Bismarck should 
hasten to assure the South German Courts that the 
rumor was utterly groundless, and that France and 
Prussia had not had negotiations of any kind upon the 
subject. 

Still worse was the effect of a report from Karlsruhe 
to the effect that Baden and Prussia were negotiating 
a treaty with regard to military freedom of migration, 
which meant that in future any citizen of Baden could 
fulfil his military obligations in North Germany, and 
that, vice versa, every North German could serve his 
term in a Baden regiment. This, to be sure, would in 
no way affect the State rights of the grand duchy : 
still, it would constitute another step in the direction 
of German unity, and this, too, at that most sensitive 
point along the long Alsace frontier, where there was 
daily talk of Prussian preparations and spies by which 
the people were kept in constant excitement. This 
latest news was received at a time when Belgium's 
attitude under English protection was felt to be an in- 
sult to French honor. To what violent eruptions of 
the internal ferment might this not lead, or what com- 
plications might it not produce ! A peaceful meas- 
ure of skilful diplomacy had been intended, and at the 
very first step France found herself upon ground glow- 
ing with fervor for war. It behooved her to look 
about for protection and support. 

The French Minister at Brussels, La Gueronniere, 
an ardent chauvinist and enemy of Prussia, who looked 
upon Bismarck as a shallow-head, a restless politician 



1869] THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE PROPOSED. 107 

without fixedness of purpose, outlined the French 
opinions as follows : " The Emperor is more peaceahly 
inclined than are his Ministers, and they are more so 
than the people ; the people, too, prefer peace to war, 
but are easily provoked through their sense of national 
honor. If Bismarck continues his uncertain policy in 
German affairs, he may bring about a terrible outbreak 
despite the general desire for peace." 

It was this apprehension which drove Napoleon to 
wholly unexpected action. lie summoned Metternich 
and Vitzthum to the Tuileries, and referring to their 
j)roposition for a general disarmament, declared this to 
l)e less feasible at the present moment than ever be- 
fore. He could suggest something better to them ; 
namely, a triple alliance. France, Austria, and Italy. 
Negotiations with regard to it would have to be carried 
on with Rouher ; not a soul must know of it, not even 
Lavalette, wlio usually enjoyed the confidence of the 
Emperor, and who had recently been made jNIinister 
of Foreign Affairs, but most assuredly not that idle 
gossiper, (Jramont, the French Ambassador at \'i('iiiia.^ 

In a few days Rouher submitted to tliem the draft 
of the proposed treaty of alliance. It stated that the 
three Powers combined for the purpose of placing a 
check upon Prussia's immodcraU' (h-siri' for coiKjiu'st. 
and of re-establishing Austria's fornici' position in (ut- 
many. If Rouher supposed that this proposition would 
act as an irresistible magnet u])on Austria, he was 
soon to be undeceived. Vitzthum at oiuc declared 

' Beust, Vol. II., p. !341. Also uiipubli.shed ineiiioirs. 



108 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLFTICS. [1869 

that in view of Austria's present internal conditions 
and Benst's principles as lie knew them, there could 
be no thought of such a design. Metternich unhesi- 
tatingly confirmed this opinion, but requested Vitz- 
thum to outline a draft which would express the 
Austrian view, to which Vitzthum consented. 

His production began with the words : " The three 
Powers, being resolved to follow the same line of 
policy both in the Orient and the Occident, have con- 
cluded a defensive alliance." The subsequent Articles 
expressed in general terms the intention of the three 
Powers to give one another effective mutual support ; 
to this there was one carefully stated exception, - — in 
case France should be induced to make war upon 
Prussia, Austria reserved to herself the liberty to re- 
main neutral during the continuance of such a war. 

This by no means fulfilled the French desire. De- 
cided objections were, however, at the time to little 
purpose ; to begin with, for the simple but all-sufficient 
reason that Beust, speedily acquainted with the matter, 
and alarmed by Rouher's original proposition, refrained 
from giving instructions to the Austrian representa- 
tives. Actual negotiations could not be opened, there- 
fore, and the matter was allowed to rest at a number 
of conferences in which these gentlemen came to a pre- 
liminary agreement upon Vitzthum's draft, modified 
somewhat in its details. In March, 1869, Vitzthum 
received permission to take the writing to Vienna in 
person, that it might receive a more careful examina- 
tion. 



1869J AUSTlilA AGJIEES. 109 

There a decision was soon reached. For, althuuoh 
Ronher's offensive and defensive alliance had been lit- 
tle to Beust's mind, Vitzthum's proposal of joint action 
with regard to every question which might arise was 
exactly to his purpose, since it would act as a re- 
straint upon over-liasty action in Paris, and would 
allow Austria, in case of extremity, to reassume her 
attitude of neutrality ; otherwise, however, it would 
establish an effective friendly relation between Paris 
and Vienna. It received Emperor Francis Joseph's 
approval also, and earl}- in April, IcSGO, Vitzthum re- 
turned to Paris to open formal negotiations with regard 
to the triple alliance. 

At the same time Napoleon reopened the discus- 
sions with Italy which, having })rovcd so fruitless, had 
been gradually dropped during the past year. For 
the time, the military attache of the Italian embassy 
at Paris, Count Vimercati, served as agent between the 
Emperor and Victor Ennnanuel ; very soon, however, 
the Ambassador, Nigra himself, and General Menabrea 
in Florence, became participants in the negotiations, 
the latter only in his official capacity as the King's 
Adjutant-General, and without the knowledge of the 
Ministry of which at the time he was })resident. 

With such good news from Vienna, and in reliance 
upon the stanch sn})[)ort of Euro[»c, Kouiicr, to whom 
Napoleon had also intrusted the negotiations with Bel- 
gium, determined to read this recalcitrant little neighbor 
a sharp lecture upon its unseemly behavior. As nsnal 
bis intentions were far from warlike, but he believed 



110 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1869 

that by assuming a high and mighty tone he wouhl 
overawe the negotiator, no other than Frere-Orban him- 
self, who on April 22d had come to Paris to manifest 
his good will. Rouher informed him that first of all 
Belgium must recognize the contracts of sale to the 
Eastern Railway Comjjany ; in that event any clause 
which might be regarded as endangering Belgian in- 
dependence would be gladly expunged. 

With great decision Frere-Orban declined consent to 
this standpoint. " The mere existence of the contracts 
imperils our independence," he cried; "they are and 
will remain annulled ! We will, however, gladly make 
just amends to the Eastern Railway Company by way of 
special concessions to facilitate intercouree between the 
two countries." In the further course of the confer- 
ences he submitted proposals of this nature ; Rouher, 
however, declared nothing would be considered until 
Belgium should first have sanctioned the contracts of 
sale. 

In private all manner of influence was brought to 
bear upon Frere-Orban, from threats to blandest cajo- 
lery. It was represented to him how far better Bel- 
gium's position would be should its isolated neutrality 
be replaced by close relations with France by means of 
a customs union or military convention. Frere, how- 
ever, remained inflexibly firm : Belgium was quite 
content with its condition of neutrality and desired 
nothing better, was his reply. 

On April 19th he made a last proposal to Rouher 
regarding indemnification to be rendered to the East- 



1869] OPPOSITION TO yAt'OLEON'S PLA\s. Ill 

ern Railway Compauy ; Rouher, however, was not to be 
moved, and persisted in his demand that the contracts 
of sale be tu-st recognized. In this he was upheld by Na- 
poleon ; Frere-Orban would weaken before long, thought 
they. He, however, although abandoning all h()[)c of 
an amicable adjustment, had no tliought of surrender, 
but pre})ared for his return to Brussels, there to await 
whether and how P^rance would take active measures. 

This attitude of firm intrepidity availed. Napoleon 
and Rouher made the discovery that they had not only 
misjudged the Belgian Government but the French 
people as well. To satisfy the French national pride 
they had grasped at the idea of a commercial union 
with Belgium, only to find that not only was the exist- 
ing commercial treaty with that country already far 
too liberal to suit the stronger party representative of 
French industrial interests, but that the resulting Bel- 
gian competition was exceedinglv distasteful to them, 
and that, far from desiring complete amalgamation 
with Belgium, tliey would have preferred entire sepa- 
ration, the precise opposite of that which Napoleon 
proposed to l)ring about. 

When, therefore, the tone of the conferences with 
Frere-Orban grew more and more hai'sh, and on all 
sides there was talk of warlike measures to l)e taken 
against tlujse iuipolite Belgians, the great niaiiufactui'ers 
threw the weight of tlieii- infiuence upon tlie side of 
the Liberal Opposition, aud joined them in their party 
cry of '■'• Peace abroad and a responsible .Ministry at 
home I " The t'ntiie indepenfieiil press (le(lai'e(l that 



112 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1869 

Belgium had done no more than any other Govern- 
ment would have done under similar circumstances. 
Should Prussia attempt to purchase an important rail- 
way in Alsace, would France permit it? The Radical 
journals were of the opinion that the whole affair was 
simply a subterfuge, and that it was not so much the 
Belgian railways upon which the Government had a 
design as it was the liberal Constitution of Belgium 
at which its action was aimed. 

With the Powers the prospects for Napoleon's plans 
were no more hopeful than they were in his own 
country. The negotiations regarding the triple alli- 
ance developed unexpected difificiilties. In England 
public opinion was rampant against any attempt to 
tamper with Belgian neutrality as established under 
European guaranty. Napoleon's friend, Lord Claren- 
don, was now Minister of Foreign Affairs ; and he care- 
fully avoided even t\,e approach to a threat, so that 
retreat might not be made impossible for the Emperor. 
No one, however, had the least thought that England 
would stand passively by and allow violence to be done 
Belgium. And finally came the momentous question : 
In case of a rupture, what would Prussia do? To 
which of the contending Powers would it extend its 
sympathy ? 

To begin with, it was Bismarck's opinion that the 
railway transaction must not be allowed to lead to a 
rupture. AYhat Prussia could do to discourage warlike 
inclinations on either side should be done. England, 
at that time so discreetly careful to avoid all action,. 



1869] PRUSSIA'S ATTITl'DE OF RESERVE. 113 

must nut Ite iillowed to imagine thai il (.ould entangle 
Prussia in the conflict and then remain inactively in 
the background. Neither should France flatter itself 
that in fear of a French war Prussia \\ould submit to 
the least injury to its interests. 

I will at this jjoint (i[Uote fioiii a U-tter. the copy of 
which lies before me. It was ^^l•itten l»y IJismarck at 
this time ; and in it his attitude toward France, not 
only with respect to the Belgian question, but during 
the entire period from 1866 to 1870, is distinctly 
portrayed. 

"Above all," he wrote, "we must not give Paris 
the impression that we fear an encounter. We do 
not wish to overestimate our p()\\ cr, nor do we desire 
war ; nevertheless, after careful examination of our 
strength as well as that of tlie enemy we nnist even- 
tually face, it is our conviction tliat we are a match for 
France, and that, although recognizing the issue to 
lie in the hands of a higher poAv^er, from our human 
standpoint the chances of victory are with us. War 
in itself is always an evil : but that it would be a 
greater calamity for us than for !'' ranee, that we have 
more reason to avoid it tliaii has j^'iance, is a view 
which we cannot understand. It is tliis conscious- 
ness, united with a true lox'e of jieace. that actuates 
our wliole bearing to\\ard l*'raiice : it is diu- to this. 
too, that we do not asciilx' greater importance to the 
varying phases of oj»inion vww in the leading j)()liti- 
eal circles of I-'rance. nor to tiie oci'asional nianiresta- 
lion ot iiostiU; vellcities." 



114 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1869 

Owing to this love of peace and reliance upon con- 
scious strength, Prussia's course in connection with the 
Belgian question was a most simple one, — complete 
silence. The King remained inaccessible. Bismarck, 
approached by all the ambassadors, gave pointless and 
evasive replies, such as, we hope that peace will be 
maintained ; or, we must await results, and allow our 
action to be controlled by circumstances. 

Beyond doubt this was the policy most conducive 
to the preservation of peace. His silence placed a 
damper upon each party's ardor for war without giv- 
ing either cause for complaint, and ultimately brought 
Prussia general commendation for the beneficial influ- 
ence exerted by its attitude. 

After all this. Napoleon could no longer be in doubt. 
He felt constrained to sound a retreat, painful as this 
was to him. He had hoped for a diplomatic triumph, 
and lo, he had suffered another defeat I When in 
Paris it was said that the Emperor succeeded in noth- 
ing nowadays, he was compelled to submit to it. He 
gave orders that Frere-Orban's latest proposition, which 
had been rejected, should again be laid before him. 
He now discovered that in its essential features it was 
excellently adapted to serve as a basis for the techni- 
cal consideration of the railway interests by a joint 
commission. The Belgian statesman was then sum- 
moned to an audience with the Emperor, and was 
acquainted with the new turn affairs had taken. 

It was the Marquis I^avalette who upon this occa- 
sion discussed the matter with him, the harshness of 



1869] NAPOLEON AND BELGIUM RECONCILED. 115 

tone adopted b}- the Minister of State in his con- 
ferences with Frere-Orban liaviug made his further 
particijjation in the negotiations impossible after the 
Emperor had decided to yield. 

On April 27th the two agreed upon a protocol in 
which the contracts of sale made on January 31st 
were renounced, and it was arranged that a joint com- 
mission, to be appointed fourteen days later, should be 
charged with the duty of deciding upon an equitable 
indemnity to be rendered the Eastern Railway Com- 
pany, and upon practical facilitation of railway inter- 
course between the two countries, their action to 
be based upon the memorial submitted b}' Frere- 
Orban. 

Tliis ended the political controversy Mhich in its 
beginning had flashed up so ominously. We have no 
further interest in the labors of the joint commission 
upon the technicalities involved ; they were compli- 
cated and tedious, and were not concluded until July 
10th. They did not, however, in any way affect the 
peaceful relations re-established by the protocol of 
April 27th. 

The affair was, however, furnislied willi a remarkable 
after-play l)y Count Jieust.' 'Tlie slow progress made 
by the negotiations regarding the triple alliance evi- 
dently prompted him to the desire to do Xapoleon a 
friendly service in another line; and so, o])viousl\ as 
yet unacipiainted with tlie decision I'eaclicd on the 

1 C^ompure the transactions of tin- Au>ticv-If iiii;,'aii:in Delofiations in 
the year 1H«;'.>. 



116 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1869 

i^Tth, lie undertook to give Belgium advice by means 
of a despatch sent on May 1st, the contents of which 
he communicated at the same time to several of the 
other Courts. In it he fervently and impressively com- 
mended to the lielgians unreserved submission to 
France, since otherwise their commercial treaty with 
that country, so greatly to their advantage, would be 
annulled, inflicting a fatal blow to their industries ; 
their misgivings regarding the French demands he de- 
clared to be unfounded ; in Austria there were a num- 
ber of railways conducted under foreign management, 
from which the State had never suffered disadvan- 
tage ; the German Customs Union was in itself suf- 
ficient evidence that smaller States could enter into 
such relations with a larger one without surrendering 
any part of their independence ; a customs union l)e- 
tween France and Belgium offered the best means of 
relieving the present strained relations. 

Lord Clarendon expressed indignation at the servility 
to the unauthorized pretensions of France which this 
tone evinced, a criticism in which the other Courts fully 
concurred. Xapoleon himself moreover gave Beust 
small thanks for his belated interference. The Emperor 
had determined to yield ; and the more clearly Beust 
demonstrated the groundlessness of Belgium's resis- 
tance, the less could be concealed the weakness of the 
French policy displayed in the retreat. 

Meanwhile, undisturbed by the varying course of the 
Belgian affair, the secret negotiations regarding the 
triple alliance of France, Austria, and Italy had been 



1869] DRAFT OF A TREATY OF ALLIAXCE. 117 

eoutiiiued.i In so far as the compact between Fiance 
and Austria was concerned, Beust and Roulier arrived 
at an agreement without encountering any special diffi- 
culty, after the latter had submissively accepted the 
Austrian principle of no offensive, but only a defen- 
sive, alliance. The following three Articles t^-pify the 
character of the draft as it left their hands : — 

The three Powers combine in a defensive alliance for 
the purpose of maintaining peace in Europe 

All questions which may arise shall be decided by 
joint diplomatic action 

Austria reserves the liberty to remain neutral in case 
France feels compelled to declare war.- 

IJeust relied u})on the hope that these stipulations 
would remove the danger of a sudden determination on 
the part of Napoleon, without the previous concurrence 
of his allies, to make war upon Germany. 

The question was now wdiether Italy could be in- 
duced to agree to the conditions of the draft, and here 
wearisome difficulties arose. 

King Mctor Emmanuel, to l)c sure, unlike Beust, was 
untroubled Iw the fear of being forced into a position 
of entire ili']nMidence upon the will of France should 
Napoleon \>v the victor in a war with Prussia, although 

1 I have not seen tlic documents which resulted from these iiejjiotia- 
tions, and therefore cannot vouch for accuracy in tlie wordinjj of the 
several drafts and iiroposed modifications, although T can unreservedly 
attest to the correctness of their sense, as well as of the jjeneral course of 
the nej^otiations, as hased upon information derived from hi>;lily autliiMi- 
tic sources. The ultimate result, as is well known, was made puhlic in 
Beust's Memoirs. 

2 Hcust. II.. :w.). 



118 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1869 

such a possibility was in reality much greater f<u' him 
than for Austria. The King, however, in so far as 
this was concerned, relied upon his personal relations 
of friendship with Napoleon, in addition to which he 
l)y no means felt as certain of Prussia's over\\helraing 
defeat in a war with France as did Beust. Therefore, 
far from being repelled by the prospect of participating 
in a great war as the ally of France, this proved rather 
alluring to him ; since he hoped in some way to make it 
subserve his great aim in life, — the possession of Rome. 

In his own country there were but few who shai-ed 
this view. In his Cabinet the majority of the Ministers 
were filled with deep distrust of Napoleon and an un- 
disguised desire for peace. Since the day at Mentana 
the hatred which the greater number of the people felt 
for everything French had steadily grown more intense ; 
all the liberal and radical parties pronounced an alli- 
ance with France to be an abomination. Mazzini's 
agents spread the doctrine that through his ignominious 
subjection to Napoleon's behests the King had forfeited 
his right to the crown ; he must therefore be deposed, 
w^hen the triumphant republic could purge Italian soil 
of the taint of the French soldiery. 

Although the King did not really fear revolution, 
he realized a French alliance to be a game of high 
stakes for him, which, should Rome after all not be 
won, might prove highly disastrous to him politically. 
He therefore replied to the proposal of a triple alliance 
by referring to his propositions of 1868, and desired, 
as then, that the renewal of the September convention 



1869] NAPOLEON AND VICTOlt EMMANUEL. 119 

as construed hy Italy should constitute the primary con- 
dition ; namely, that Ital}' would guarantee the Pope's 
security against violence of any kind ; France, however, 
in recognition of the principle of non-interventiou, 
must agree to remove the French troops (^never to 
return) from Iloman territory. 

But Rouher, in remembrance of his thrice uttered 
"Never" of 1867, and the burst of applause with 
which it was greeted in the Chamber, declared that 
this demand could not possibly be conceded ; whereas 
Beust, at that time engaged in bitter controversy with 
the Curia over the rights of the Church in Austria, 
would only too gladly have complied with Italy's wish. 
On the other hand, when during the further examina- 
tion of Italy's stipulations that one regarding the ac- 
quisition of the Italian Tyrol was reached, Rouher made 
no objections ; whereas Beust would not listen to it 
for a moment, and Menabrea consecpiently restricted 
his demand to the extension of the Italian frontier to 
the Isonzo, and although this was not so peremptorily 
refused as was the former proposition, it nevertheless 
found no place in the treaty. How, indeed, could it 
be insisted uj)on, when according to the Italian ])ro- 
posals of 18(58 this acquisition Avas not to be realized 
until after the close of a successful war. whereas the 
purpose of the draft under discussion was, as explicitly 
stated, the preservation of peace. 

Auollici' of tlie clauses Menabrea himself proposed 
shdiild he eliminated, — the one regarding the com- 
bined influence of the three Powers upon the next papal 



120 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1869 

election, a suggestion which the other two Powers, in 
reflection upon the thorny nature of the subject, gladly 
accepted. 

Upon all other questions arising in the mutual dis- 
cussion complete harmony prevailed. And so a final 
result would have been attained had not the Roman 
enigma again and again delied solution. The Austri- 
ans took courage to try their fortune once more with 
the perplexing problem. Could they but prevail upon 
Napoleon to renew the ^September treaty, which was 
synonymous with a recall of his troops from Rome, 
Ital} would, after the alliance under consideration had 
been concluded, no longer need to demand the explicit 
recognition of the principle of non-intervention as es- 
sential to its future security. For should Napoleon 
after its conclusion propose, for one reason or another, 
to send a garrison to Rome, this step, according to 
Article ii. of the treaty draft, must depend upon the 
decision reached through a joint consultation between 
the three Powers, in which Austria as well as Italy 
would decidedly oppose every forcible measure. 

In fact, Menabrea, quite as favorably disposed toward 
France as toward the Pope, did allow himself to be 
persuaded to further negotiations on this basis, and 
restricted his demands to a withdrawal of the French 
troops from Rome, as conditional upon Italy's agree- 
ment neither to attack the Pope nor to suffer him to 
be attacked. But even with regard to this Napoleon 
had misgivings. He was willing formally to agree to 
the Avithdrawal of his troops from Roman territory as 



1869] THE ALLIANCE IS NOT CONCLUDED. 121 

soon as practicable, but forthwith to designate a date 
for the evacuation he did not deem advisable. He 
promised to remove his troops as soon as the Pope's 
safety should be assured, but more than tins he would 
not do. 

liouher and Yitzthum iui[)()rtuned the Italians to con- 
tent themselves with the imperial word; and toward 
the end of iMay, after much writing back and forth, 
Vimercati broug'ht the Italian consent from Florence. 
Vitzthum announced this witli exultation to Beust : 
"The only real ditliculty was Rome, and this we have 
conquered by patience." On the 4th of June he re- 
turned to Brussels satisfied with his achievement. 

Thus the triple alliance was agreed upon by the dip- 
lomats, and the documents were now read}^ to be pre- 
sented to the sovereigns for their signatures. 

The production, however, did not fully meet Napo- 
leon's expectations. The thought that through this 
alliance one hundred million Catholics would be ruled 
as by one will he felt to be a most imposing one, an 
utterance which reveals to us the light in which he 
had viewed himself throughout the long years of his 
protectorate over Rome. The firm association of these 
millions in time of peace was without doubt a cause 
for rejoicing; unfortunately, liowcvcr, its eflicacy in 
days of trial, \\hcn it was most needed, was rendered 
problematic to a dangerous degree by the reservations 
made by the two I'owci-s. 

As early as tiic lnllowiug .luiie this fact \\as clcaily 
shown. Alter learning the opinion iA' tlu' ollici- .Min- 



122 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1869 

isters, Menabrea had not the courage to reveal to them 
the contents of the treaty draft, and so the King's 
sanction had to be deferred to some future day. When 
this was announced to Napoleon he laid the thus in- 
complete document aside, without the least feeling of 
annoyance, until such time as his action should be re- 
(^[uired. During the past few weeks more urgent cares 
arising close at hand had claimed his attention ; on 
May 23d the general elections for tlie Legislative 
Body had taken place, and by their result a momen- 
tous verdict upon the absolute regime of 1852 had 
been pronounced. Should Napoleon remain firm in 
his desire to be relieved from his anxious cares, the 
men were now at hand who would willingly assume 
the weary ruler's burden. 

III. TRIUMPH OF THE LIBERAL TENDENCIES. 

The programme which Ollivier had once submitted 
to the Emperor had included the demand that the 
organs of State authority should no longer, as hereto- 
fore, influence the elections in favor of candidates put 
forward by the Government. But the more critical 
the situation grew for the absolute power, the more 
generally and emphatically the demand for a responsi- 
ble Ministry was made, tlie firmer grew Rouher's de- 
termination to resort, as heretofore, to every means at 
his disposal to secure a majority favorable to the Gov- 
ernment. Prefects, curates, and gendarmes all received 
strict orders and unlimited power to influence the 



1869] ELECTIONS IN FRANCE. 123 

voters by means of persuasion, inliniidalinn. and cny- 
ruption. In many places the people were more than 
willing to respond to these methods. It was (piite as 
often the wish of the people which lixed the price 
of a loyal election as it was the offer made by the [jre- 
fect ; here, the construction of a new street; there, 
the dir.ection which a railway should take; still else- 
where, the support o-ivcn the erection of a church, and 
so on.^ 

The candidates of the ()p])osition did luit refrain 
from holding out similar allui'ements : the manufac- 
turer was promised protective duties : the laborer was 
made hopeful of an increase in his scanty means of 
support; and to every one were portrayed the blessings 
to be realized through peace, libert}-, and a responsi- 
ble Ministrj'. 

The voters who lived at a distance from the polls 
had Ijut to choose between the elegant carriages in 
which either party was anxious to convey them to tlie 
place of voting ; arrived at this, they were sumpiuously 
regaled both before and after casting their votes, and 
in the.eveninp" were driven lionu' in a hilarious frame 
of mind. And so, thanks to the right of uni\('i's;d 
suffrage, in a large part of France, the '2-)d of ^h^y. 
1869, was transformed into a gala day upon wliirli liie 
sovereign ])eoj)le sold their votes for the highest price 
possible: liert; for gi-eatei' liberty, there for security 



' To-diiy siicli ])r<>r('('iUii;is ;ire ixit (•unliiii-d ti> Fr;iin'c almii'. At tliat 
time, however, tlwy wen? looked upon in (Jcnnaiiy as a si;;ii of ixilitical 
ami moral nittcmirss in I-'ri-ni'li <MHiiliti(>iis. 



124 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1869 

and order, but everywhere for the preservation of 
peace. 

The result showed that the absolute government and 
the Arcadians had bid too low. The old Majority 
which had always been so submissive to the Govern- 
ment began to dwindle. The large cities had evinced 
their radical or even republican tendencies. Ollivier 
failed to be re-elected from Paris, but regained a seat 
in the House through the votes of a country district in 
the South ; Thiers and Jules Favre managed to hold 
their own against Ilochefort's associates only as the 
result of a supplementary election. For several days 
after the elections there were riotous republican demon- 
strations in the streets in defiance of the police, having 
finally to be suppressed by the military. 

At first the reports from all over the country indi- 
cated the success of 199 candidates favored by the 
Ministry ; as soon, however, as the Chamber convened, 
this number was considerably reduced, so that the mod- 
erately liberal Middle Party (which counted Ollivier 
among its leaders) was now found to control 130 
votes, to which would be added the 40 voices of the 
Left upon every liberal motion, thus insuring to it a 
majority. An inquiry with regard to how the votes 
cast were divided brought to light the fact that the 
Government had lost over a million adherents since 
1863, and that the Opposition had gained in round 
numbers one and a half million. 

That the days of the unrestricted government of 
1852 were numbered was therefore declared. Rouher 



1869] .1 LIBERAL MAJORITY. 125 

was, however, not yet willing to concede the game lost, 
and held the wavering Emperor firm. Above all, time 
must be gained to determine upon the course to be 
pui-sued with regard to the future ; the Chamber was 
therefore convened for the 28tli of June, although in 
extraordinary session only, its sole duty being the ver- 
ification of powers of the newly elected deputies, the 
drafts for the budget being as yet not quite ready. 

The Liberals, urged on by the current of public 
opinion, were impatient of delay and postponement. 
The Middle Party announced an interpellation in- 
dorsed by 116 members, which it desired to present 
immediately after the organization of the Chamber, 
and in which the necessity of a responsible Ministry 
was emphatically set forth as constituting, together 
w ith further parliamentary rights, the surest means of 
securing to the country a greater share in the direction 
of its affairs. 

A few weeks passed in the veritication of powers of 
the deputies, a sufficient time for Napoleon to accom- 
modate himself to circumstances ; although unwilling 
to yield fully, he had decided to show a spirit of 
concession, in ihc hope of jirocuring more advantage- 
ous conditions, llardl}' had the Chamber organized 
when an imperial message was received forestalling 
the transaction regarding the ihi'eatene(l inter[tellation. 
In it the Emperor annonneed liis intention to reeoin- 
niend to the Senate, wliieli alone liad tlie right to 
modify the Constitution, that the Legislative Body be 
granted greater freedom of action with respect to. 



126 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1869 

proposing and examining amendments, the privilege 
of electing its committees, as well as the right to vote 
the budget by headings. In so far as the jNIinisters 
were concerned, however, only that Article of the 
Constitution was to be abrogated according to which 
they were disqualified from becoming members of 
either Chamber. No allusion wliatever was made to 
their responsibility. 

Naturally enough, the Chamber offered no opposition 
to the extension of its privileges, but the displeasure 
which was felt at the total disregard of the chief de- 
mand was by no means concealed. Many members of 
the Right felt an additional provocation, jealousy of the 
great power exercised by the present "vice-emperor," 
the Minister of State, Rouher, a feeling which, as was 
no secret, was shared by more than one of the other 
Ministers. This feeling was so general that the Presi- 
dent of the House, Schneider, a great manufacturer, 
sought an audience with the Emperor to assure him 
that matters could not continue as at present ; the 
Chamber and the entire country alike demanded that 
the ^Minister of State should be replaced by a respon- 
sible council of Ministers. 

In painful indecision the Emperor struggled with 
his conflicting desires. Rouher's advice was, " Give 
me the authority, and I will drive all these bickerers 
out of the House, and simply restore the Constitution 
of 1852." This was, however, too directly opposed to 
the Emperor's views. They were always the same old 
questions by which he was tortured, first by the one 



1869] MODIFICATION OF THE MI.MSTHY. 127 

side and then by the other. He longed to be relieved 
of the troubles, cares, and suffering associated with the 
supreme j^ower, and 3'et the prospect of its diminution 
gave him a sense of personal Imiiiiliatidii. Would a 
parliamentar}' ^Ministry be always both inclined and 
able to defend his son's succession against the attempts 
of the Repul)licans ? This, to be sure, was exceedingly 
doubtful. lUit with his unfortunate bodily condition, 
how long would he still possess the physical and mental 
power to hold the reins of government in his' o\\n 
grasp? In short, he resolved upon the second course. 
On August 2d the Senate should be convened, not 
only to extend the parliamentaiy privileges as promised, 
but to enact the amendments necessary to the forma- 
tion of a responsible ^linistry as well. 

This implii'd a fundamental transformation of affairs, 
and nuicli labor in arranging for all the changes re- 
quired by the new conditions. To obtain the time 
needed for this it was decided to prorogue the Chamber 
for an indclinitc tiinc, gii-atly to thi- dissatisfaction of 
the Radicals. 

On July 17th the office of Secretary of State was 
abolished by an imperial decree (Rouher was nomi- 
nated to the Presidency of tlie Senate, an imposing but 
cnipty (lignitN ). and l)y another, a modilication of {\ic 
Ministrx' was oi(lainc{l. Five of its niL'nd)crs retained 
their positions, two dej)uties were intrusted with tho 
Dejtartmeiits of Public Instruction and Agrieulluie, 
and that of Justice passe*! into tlie hands of a hiberal. 
To the surprise of every one, Lavalette resigne(l the 



128 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1869 

Foreign Office, exchanging positions with the Ambas- 
sador at London, Prince Latonr d'Auvergne, a pupil 
and sympathizer of Drouyn de Lhuys, an unmistakable 
evidence that Napoleon was far from pleased with 
Italy's attitude. 

Throughout the entire country the impatient Liberals 
in round terms denounced the new Cabinet as reaction- 
ary. In reality, however, most of them felt convinced 
that the present arrangement was but a transitory one, 
and offered no opposition to the institution of a parlia- 
mentary Ministry in the near future, but rather looked 
forward with eagerness to the day when Ollivier, the 
present leader and acknowledged head of the Middle 
Party, should be called to take charge. 

And so the draft for a senatns coyisultum was at last 
completed, bearing the traces of the varying influences 
and mental conflicts which the Emperor had undergone ; 
and on August 2d it was submitted to the Senate for 
legislative action. 

Upon first sight it seemed thoroughly impregnated 
with constitutional principles. The rights conferred 
upon the Legislative Body even exceeded the measure 
of expectation which the message of July 12th had 
suggested ; there were the additional privileges of 
making its own rules and electing its own committees ; 
of proposing new laws, of voting the budget of expen- 
diture by headings, and of interpellating the Govern- 
ment). On the other hand, there remained unchanged 
the prohibition of the right to take action upon an Arti- 
cle of the Constitution, since aside from a general vote 



1869] SENATUS CONSULTUM OF SEPT. 10. 129 

of the people the Senate still ivtained the sole right to 
amend the Constitution. 

The position of the Ministers \vas then dehnud : they 
\\ere to he wholly dependent upon the Emperor; in 
council they were to he presided over hy him ; thev 
were to be responsible and liable to arraignnu-nt only 
upon accusation by the Senate; they were privileged 
to become membei-s of either the Senate or Legislative 
Body, and w^ere to have the right to appear in tliese 
assemblies, and ask to be heard there, at any time. 

Thus, that much advocated principle, the responsi- 
bility of the Ministry, was at last to be a reality. Since, 
however, the Articles of the Constitution by which the 
Emperor was made responsible to the French people 
remained in force, the Ministers' constitutional inde- 
pendence of the Emperor, and their dependence upon 
the parliament, could have but little significance. 

Nevertheless, he who remembered the consequences 
to political conditions by which the concessions made 
on Jantiary lOtli were followed might very willingly 
overlook the vagueness and incompleteness of tlie pres- 
ent achievement in the belief that tiie re[)resentative 
assembly would in the end, nevertlieless, have sufficient 
power to enforce its wishes in connection with every 
question of importance. 

Meanwhile, l)efore the Senate had completed its task, 
an event occnncd which excluded the thoULjht of everv- 
tlnng else from the minds of all. 'I1ic I']niperor, who 
during the preceding summer luid again been (piite ill, 
and o])liged to spend several weeks in retirement at 



130 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1869 

Fontainebleau, suffered another attack of tJie malady 
on August 12th, which now developed so rapidly and 
seriously that toward the end of the month the physi- 
cians feared his early dissolution. Immediately an 
exceeding alarm spread through the whole countr}-, 
and the Socialists and Anarchists were jul:)ilant; a ter- 
rible panic Dlayed havoc with the exchanges ; gloomy 
forebodings made all hearts heavy. 

The two most prominent members of the Cabinet, 
Forcade, Minister of the Interior, and Magne, of Fi- 
nance, were eiigaged in bitter contentions; the Minis- 
ter of War, ]\hirshal Niel, had died on August 14th, 
and Lebceuf, a general of no great ability, had taken 
his place. In the midst of a constitutional crisis the 
country was without a representative assembly, without 
a head, and practically without a Government. 

The Senate made great haste, therefore, to arrive at a 
decision regarding the draft submitted to it. The re- 
port of the Committee to which it had been referred for 
immediate consideration contained only a few suggested 
amendments in favor of the rights of the Senate. The 
deliberation in the plenum continued from the 1st to 
the 6th of September. In connection with it a great 
sensation was created by Prince Napoleon, who in a 
vigorous speech demanded an effective responsibility of 
the Ministers, and equal power for the Legislative Body 
with that of the Senate in any modification of the Con- 
stitution. 

Everybody recognized in this a bid for the throne in 
opposition to the claims of the Empress and her son in 



1869] SERIOrS ILLXESS OF NAPOLEOX. 131 

tlie event oi the Emperor's death. The Senate, how- 
ever, gave tlie Prince a support of only ten voices ; all 
the others were in favor of enacting the senatus cohhuI- 
tum as it had been submitted to that body. 

Meanwhile the Emperor's condition gradually im- 
proved, so that on September 10th he could be re- 
moved to Paris from his sick-chamber at St. Cloud. 
On the same day the senatus considtum was published 
in the official gazette, and thus became a part of the 
Constitution. Still, Napoleon's state of health remained 
so critical and his exhaustion so great that a previously 
planned celebration at the ('am[) of Cludons had to be 
abandoned : and soon afterward the convening of the 
Chamber had to be [)ostponed until the end of Xovend)er, 
bv which a storm of indignation was raised among the 
K.idicals. liefore that time there couhh of course, be no 
thought of undertaking a reeoustriu'tion of the Ministry. 

In addition to all this, the momentous and long-dis- 
cussed matter of the triple alliance came to a decision 
in September. 

We have seen how, on account of the unfavorable 
form which the Roman clause had taken. Minister 
Menabrea had for a time refrained from laying the 
(haft of the treaty before his colleagues. When at 
length lie did so, it at once became apparent that his 
solii-itude had not been without cause. The Ministe- 
rial Council declared an alliance of ai-ms against the 
associate of iHOb to be impossible. Victory thus won 
would lead to an unlimited i)reponderance of Fremh 
power. The C'ouncil offered no objections to a defen- 



132 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1869 

sive alliance in which hostility to the results of 1866 
and to German unity should find no place, and insisted 
upon the further stipulation that the French troops 
should be withdrawn from Rome, and that witli regard 
to that city France should recognize the principle of 
non-intervention. 1 

During the last days of August, Menabrea addressed 
a request to Vienna asking Austria to influence Napo- 
leon to remove his troops from Rome at an early day, 
thus making it possible for Italy to sign the treaty of 
alliance. To this Beust gladly consented, and again 
sent Vitzthum to Paris. By this time, however, Napo- 
leon's illness had become so serious that the Count 
could not obtain an interview. Since, owing to his 
well-known disinclination to Italy, there could be no 
hope of accomplishing anything through the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Latour, Vitzthum returned to 
Vienna with his mission unaccomplished. This was 
followed by the Italian declaration, that since Austria 
had reserved the liberty to remain neutral in case of a 
war, so Italy must make the condition to refrain from 
participation in war until after Rome had been evac- 
uated ; otherwise no objection was raised against the 
treaty of alliance. 

After his recovery Napoleon discussed the subject 
with Lavalette and Latour. Lavalette, who, as we 
know, was in general so well disposed to Italy, was 
nevertheless of the opinion that by such an alliance 
France would find herself in a peculiar position. "We 

1 Compare Guiccioli, " Quintino Sella," T. 242. 



1869] THE PLANS OF ALLIANCE FAIL. 133 

would," said he, " renounce all right to independent 
decision in our diplomacy ; and in return for this, we 
should, in the event of war, when the alliance would 
be of greatest value, be left in the lurch by our two 
allies. Tliat would be a most one-sided bargain." La- 
tour, to whom any nearer approach to Ital}- was detest- 
able, fully agreed with Lavalette. 

This view remained undisputed by the Emperor also. 
He recognized, moreover, that the conditions which 
had acted as an incenti^■e to his proposal of alliance 
in April had materially changed since then. He had 
become convinced that Prussia's attitude in the Bel- 
gian railwa}' controversy had been one of strict neu- 
trality. The convention between North Germany and 
iJaden, regarding military freedom of migration, had 
in the meantime gone into effect; clearly the political 
position of the grand duchy had in no way been af- 
fected by it. Bismarck maintained inflexibly the stand- 
jjoint he had announced on September 7th, 1867 : The 
South German States have the right at any time to 
declare their intention to join the Northern Confedera- 
tion ; Prussia, however, will make no effort to induce 
them to such a step. 

Napoleon's conclusion, therefore, was: Since 18t)8 
the outlook has improved : it does not appear to be Prus- 
sia's intention to })recipitate mattei's ; if German unity 
is gradually effected, tlie French people will beconu' 
accustomed to the idea, and, looking upon it as the 
inevitable consequence of a national development, will 
not be exasperated by it to the [)oint of war. 



134 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1869 

With so peaceful a prospect before liiin, Napoleon 
did not feel impelled to conclude a treaty offering so 
few inducements. His severe attack of illness had left 
him exhausted in body and mind, and the thought of 
inaugurating a complete change in his foreign policy 
had lost the charm it once had for him. He longed 
for rest ; soon he would have responsible ^linisters ; 
he would leave it to them to determine what it was 
best to do. He wrote Emperor Francis Joseph that he 
had indefinitely postponed signing the treaty ; never- 
theless, should Austria be attacked, he would render 
assistance, even though not bound to do so by treaty. 
Francis Joseph in his reply expressed his thanks, and 
added, that the reopening of the negotiations would 
be left wholly to Napoleon's judgment. The Emperor 
allowed the matter to rest at that, but very soon after- 
wards said to Count Vimercati, that after all that had 
occurred he could not possibly reopen the discussions 
concerning the triple alliance ; Austria must be the 
one to do so. 

And so the only result of the long-extended nego- 
tiations was the promise which the three sovereigns 
gave one another by letter, that no one of them would 
enter into alliance with an}- of the Powers without first 
informing the other two of the intention, a promise, 
moreover, which Francis Joseph and Napoleon had ex- 
changed verbally as early as 1867. 

Whereas the attempt to bring about a firm associa- 
tion of France and Austria had thus proved futile, 
success attended the effort made soon afterwards by 



1869] PliUsaiA'ti CEOWN PItlNCE IN VIENNA. 135 

the ri'Lissian Government to effect ;i thaiii^t' in its 
relations to V'^ienna, proving of greatest moment in its 
consequences. 

Since 18GG intercourse between the two ca[)itals had 
been restricted to official connnunications. not always 
of a pleasant nature. ()nly recently, after the termina- 
tion of the Belgian railway transaction, Beust, irritated 
by the fiasco made by his despatch of May 1st, in con- 
trast to the general commendation accorded Prussia for 
its attitude of silent reserve, had sent a letter ' to Dres- 
den on July 8th in which he conn)lained that the 
Saxon view of the despatch of May 1st had been influ- 
enced by another Power to the disparagement of Aus- 
tria. This gave rise to a diplomatic correspondence 
between the three Cabinets, in wliich I>eust, as was to 
be expected from the nature of the subject, did not add 
to his laurels. The official press of Berlin and N'ienna 
then took up the battle, until finally Prussia, which, 
despite all the recent friction, was still actuated \)\ tlu- 
desire to re-establish the old friendship with Austria, 
put an end to the quarrel by a most unexpected step. 

It w^as at this time that the Egyptian Khedive, 
Ismail, invited all the potentates of Europe to be 
present at the formal opening of the Suez Canal. Em- 
peror Francis Joseph accepted; Najjoleon, owing to his 
state of health, declined, but sent his Empress, who 
gladly went in liis stead. In P)crlin the Crown Prince 
sought the Iviiig"s pei'iiiissioii to take the interesting 

' I'ulilislicd in tlu! Austrian Hed Hook. Prussia was not nii'ntioMfd 
by uatnii, but was unmistakably iiulicatiMl. 



136 FLUCTUATIONS IN FRENCH POLITICS. [1869 

journey, which suggested the thought of going by way 
of Vienna, should it be found, upon inquiry at the 
Hofburg, that an official visit from the Crown Prince 
would be welcome to the Imperial Court. 

An affirmative reply was at once received, and on 
October 7th the Crown Prince arrived in Vienna. His 
reception left nothing to be desired. The Emperor, 
wearing the Prussian uniform, awaited the Crown 
Prince at the railway station ; in the Hofburg, much 
to his surprise, he was received by the Empress, whom 
he had supposed at Ischl ; no distinction of honor was 
omitted. 

"After the events of 1866," wrote the Crown 
Prince, "every Austrian must have found it hard to 
look upon a representative of our King ; no one, how- 
ever, allowed me to feel this. The Emperor was un- 
changed in his demeanor to me, and one who knows 
his manner as well as I do could not for a moment be 
in doubt that his welcome was a sincere one." 

The archdukes, too, were most cordial, especially 
Archduke Albert, who, being best versed in such mat- 
ters, expressed his appreciation of the manner in which 
the Prince had fulfilled his duty as a soldier, which, he 
said, every one was compelled to recognize. The Lib- 
eral Minister, Giskra, gave expression to the pleasure 
wliich the visit afforded him as being indicative of a 
return to relations of friendship ; the consequences of 
the visit would gradually make themselves felt. Count 
Beust, too, he remarked, no longer harbored thoughts of 
revenge, but had concluded to let bygones be bygones. 



1869] HIS L'ORDIAL RECEPTION. 137 

111 fact, Beust defended himself vigorously against 
Bismarck's accusation that he influenced the press 
against Prussia, hut closed with the remark, that, in so 
far as the South German situation was concerned, he- 
was not at all opposed to its further development ; 
however, as Minister of Austria, it was his fii-st duty 
to advance the interests of the Austrian crownlands, 
and that therefore he must watch the development of 
the South German question with a jealous eye, that he 
might guard against anything by which their welfare 
miglit he threati'ued.^ 

This declaration, together with the general conditions 
prevailing at that time, is a sufficient explanation of the 
fact that Emperor Francis Joseph carefully excluded 
every topic of political interest from his conversation 
with tlie Prince, either in Vienna or later in Egypt. 
The Emperor's attitude for the future had, however, 
been quite correctly forecast by Giskra's utterance. 
The first eventful step toward a reconciliation 1)etween 
the two former rivals had thus been taken, and with it 
a greater pr()S[)eot of establislied peace for Europe had 
been opened. 

1 III the Delegations of Auj^ust, 18G9, Beust had in fact repeated his 
dechiration of March, 18(i7, namely, that the treaties of alliance, defen- 
sive and ofifensive, between Prussia and the South German States, were 
a violation of the Treatv of Prague. 



138 COSMOPOLITAN ASPIBATIONS. [1866 



CHAPTER III. 

COSMOPOLITAJSr ASPIRATIONS. 

The prodigious advance toward realization of Ger- 
man unity which the year 1866 had witnessed was by 
no means allowed to halt there, but was carried onward 
through the united efforts of the Liberal and National 
parties. Although thpir ideas did not wholly coincide, 
they sprang from a common fountain-head ; and this, 
despite many differences and frequent friction, always 
made a return to united and fruitful labor possible. 

The endeavor of the Liberals was to secure greatest 
freedom for all individuals in the incalculable multi- 
plicity and variety in which nature produces them. 
In recognition of this principle they held that every 
person should have the right to free development and a 
full realization of himself, unrestrained by foreign and 
unfavorable influences, in so far as this was compatible 
with a state of order in the community. 

Prompted by wholly the same spirit, the National 
Party demanded that tlie German people as a whole 
should be allowed the freedom fully to develop the 
aspirations common to the individuals, and should be 
protected against the domination or influence of ele- 



1868] ADVERSAIilES OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY. 139 

ineiits contrary to their nature and inimical to their 
independence. 

The surprising power with which these tendencies 
liad asserted themselves upon German soil in the very 
heart of Europe had not failed to produce a corre- 
sponding reaction in more than one direction. The 
advei"saries were by no means united, but, on the con- 
trary, were divided by bitter enmity, their ultimate 
aims being as widely sundered as are brief human 
happiness and eternal blessedness. But in their an- 
tagonism to German unity they met upon connnon 
o-rouud in their devotion to one fundamental, negative 
doctrine, the rejection of all individual libeity and 
national independence. 

All men are equal, for in them all the chief qualities 
of human nature find repetition. The minor traits in 
which the imlividuals differ are comparatively of little 
importance, and give no one a claim to particular 
rio-hts. When a man whom nature has especially fa- 
vored seeks to raise himself above his fellow-men, it 
l)ecomes the duty of the coiiiiiiunity, in the irame of 
reason and the love of humanity, to crush this arro- 
gance, and restore equality in every respect. 

It was upon this principle that the social-democratic 
State was developed which in ITi'o showed the world 
how conq)letely indiviiliial lilicily can lie snppressed. 
;iii(l the conlines of nations be ol)literated. 

The same end, thfmgh by a wlnilly different i-outc 
is reached by the clerical nuKlc of ivasoning. All men 
are equal, for they an; all sick with sin, which is 



140 COSMOPOLITAN ASPIRATIONS. [1863 

dragging them to everlasting destrnction ; it therefore 
behooves them, one and all, king as well as beggar, 
children of the North as well as of the South, to seek 
salvation by submission in their inward convictions and 
outward actions to the ordinances of the one holy phy- 
sician. 

For both of these movements the year 1868 was an 
epoch-making one. 

I. COMMUNISTIC MOVEMENT. 

Poverty and misery have existed upon our earth at 
all times, and will continue to do so as long as nature 
produces not only strong and clever men, but weak 
and stupid ones as well. No less has there ever been 
a lack of endeavor, both by theory and by force, to 
transform poverty into prosperity, or, as it is expressed 
nowadays, to solve the social question. 

In olden times it was the condition of the peasantry 
which in this respect claimed the attention of the na- 
tions. Since the last century the mammoth manufac- 
turing establishments, performing their labor largely l)y 
machinery, have l)rought together great numbers of la- 
borers at certain centres, resulting not only in colossal 
production, but in an enormous amount of misery as 
well, in consequence of which a new impetus has been 
given the endeavor to solve the social question. 

In Germany, where this industrial development did 
not assume proportions of significance until after the 
Customs Union had been formed, there were compar- 
atively few writei*s before 1848 who devoted them- 



1863] SCUULZE-])EL1TZSCH. 141 

selves to the study of the woikiiigman's condition ; 
and these received but little response from the public. 
Chief among them were Friedrich Engels and Karl 
Marx. In the ]\larch revolution the Republican Party 
became thoroughly impregnated with socialistic ele- 
ments of a most radical kind, wherefore, after the tri- 
umph of the reaction the Socialists found themselves 
pursued with twofold severity, and to a great extent 
sought refuge in foreign lands. ^Nlarx, after nuich 
wandering about, finally made London his head(|uar- 
ters. 

The consequence was, that in Germany within the 
j)rovince of economics the individualistic and free-trade 
views had the field to themselves once more. Pre- 
dominant above all other demands were heard those 
for freedom to hold property and to transact business; 
freedom to combine and to compete. It was finnlv 1)c- 
lieved that the unrestricted activity of these ao-encics 
would lead not only to greatest possible production, 
but to the most etpntable distribution of wealth as 
well ; at the same time the State authority A\as A\ai-n('(l 
to withhold its hand from direct interference \\'\\\\ these 
matters. 

The working-classes received tlie fair-sounding prom- 
ises contained in these axioms with more of suspicion 
than of confidence. Maikcd success, ]io\\t'vcr, liad at- 
tended the effoi'ts made in tlicii- liclialf by Sclnd/e- 
Delitzsch, when, as has been I'clatcd in connection 
with the ti-ansactions of the Reichstag of 1S(!7. in a 
truly lieljjfnl sj)irit of ])hihinlhi'()py, he not oidv urged 



142 COSMOPOLITAN ASPIRATIONS. [1868 

them to help themselves, but furnished through his 
co-operative associations at once credit, cheaper raw 
materials, and a market. At the same time he made 
the earliest suggestions regarding liberty both for em- 
j)loyer and employed to combine in coalitions. Schulze, 
however, was not allowed to continue long undisturbed 
in his well-intentioned activity. Since 1863 he was 
made the object of constant hostile attacks by Ferdi- 
nand Lassalle, a Hebrew bourgeois like jNIarx, from 
whose writings Schulze had adopted certain socialistic 
views. Lassalle was a clever, eloquent writer of ex- 
ceeding self-conceit, Avho said of himself that every 
line he wrote was equipped ^^•ith all the erudition of 
the nineteenth century. In fact, his addresses and 
writings bespeak an extent of reading which in a 
measure justifies his proud assertion ; quite as evident, 
however, is the fact that the nineteenth century makes 
much greater demands for unprejudiced conception of 
premises and correctness of deduction than Lassalle 
ever evinced. 

In so far as his character is concerned, I will con- 
fine myself to the statement that after his death his 
co-workers expressed very different opinions regarding 
it. In the year 1869, at the Congress of Internationals 
held at Basel, Liebknecht paid him the tribute of pro- 
nouncing him to have been a man of great ability and 
energy of purpose, and above all else, highly honor- 
able, which was more than could be said of his suc- 
cessors. In contrast to this, Bernhard Becker, who 
took his place as President of the German Working- 



1863] FERDINAND LAtiSALLE. 143 

men's Association, in a special pamphlet puljlished in 
1868, portrayed him as a man given over to the pleas- 
ures of life, and who came to his death through a dis- 
graceful love affair. 

Lassalle not only antagonized Schulze, but together 
with him the whole Party of Progress. His earliest 
weapon of attack was Ricardo's iron law of wages, 
according to which competition and the constant 
growth of the population always keep the laborer's 
wages at the minimum required for the mere neces- 
saries of life. Therefore, it was argued, the economy 
which Schulze advised the workingmen to practise was 
to them an impossible virtue ; no wage-earner could 
accumulate property. To advise the laborer to rely 
upon self-help was futile ; it was the duty of the State 
to furnish the necessary aid. 

To this end Lassalle proposed that the Stiite should 
advance to each working-men's society the capital re- 
quired for tiie estaljlishment of a factor}-, to be con- 
ducted by the workingmen collectively and u[)on their 
own responsil)ility. He hoped that these companies 
would soon be enabled from the proceeds of the fac- 
tories to repay the State the sum advanced, together 
with a reasonable interest. 

The German working-men eagerly grasped at this 
suggestion of aid to be rendered by the State; manv 
thousands were won oNor by the new hope held out to 
them, turned their l»a(ks upon Schulze-Delitzsch, and 
combined in societies wliicli were to lead to the organi- 
zation of productive associations with State aid. How- 



144 



COSMOPOLITAN ASPIRATIONS. 



[1864 



ever, even when the necessary capital could be raised, 
the practical execution of the plan proved successful 
only in very rare instances. In the case of all factories 
requiring a complicated industrial technique, the re- 
publican administration by the working-men evinced 
itself to be impracticable. In the instances in which 
their management proved efficient because of the less 
complicated conditions, and the success of the estab- 
lishment made the employment of additional laborers 
necessary, the thought failed to suggest itself to the 
founders that these new co-laborers should l)e admitted 
into their association. They regarded themselves as 
the owners, backslid to the odious capitalist system, 
and simply employed the new laborers as wage-earners. 
When these made complaint, they received the conclu- 
sive reply : " We have devoted ten years of thought 
and labor to accumulate a capital ; you have not 
shared the labor, why should you now participate in 
its fruits? " 

The argument was unanswerable, and was a blow 
felt by the entire social-democratic system. 

Lassalle never openly advocated abolition of private 
property. In his writings upon jurisprudence he con- 
fines himself to an attempt to establish with a great 
show of historical learning and dialectic skill that the 
liistoric foundations upon which rest our notions re- 
garding property and the principle of inheritance have 
wholly disappeared, and that these ideas owe their 
existence at the present day wholly to the arbitrary 
decree of the law, wherefore they can at any moment 



ORGANIZATION OF ''THE INTERNATIONAL.'' 145 

be legally aljolished by the enactment of new laws, 
and, as he explicitly states, without rendering indennii- 
fication of any kind to tlie erstwhile property-owners. 

Any outwardly visible effect these writings seem not 
to have had. and as contributions to scientihc literature 
they have i-eeeived but slight recognition. 

On August 31st, 18G4, Lassahe d'wd of a wound re- 
ceived in a duel ; a few weeks later a much more able 
successor stepped into the place thus left vacant. On 
the 28th of September, Marx took part in the orgiuiiza- 
tion of an International Working-men's Association in 
London, although the original suggestion came from 
Paris. At the time, the originatoi-s of the plan had 
little thought either of politics or revolution in con- 
nection with it; soon, however, Marx, who had long 
made it his j)urpose to impart an international charac- 
ter to the entire labor movement, and as early as 1848 
had closed a (iercely revolutionary manifesto with the 
words: "Proletarians of all nations, combine!" soon 
influenced his associates to adopt his progranune. Al- 
though not their president, he became the general sec- 
retary of the association for all its affaii-s in Germany. 

No other one of the managers could compare witli 
him in point of information and capability tj work, in 
bonndh'ss fanaticism and nati\-e executive ability: and 
very soon ]\birx l)ccanie the life and soni ot the *" In- 
ternational" so highly esteemed by the working-men, 
and hated and feared quite as much by all otlier 
parties. 

liis aims he hail lon'j; \>c(i)Vf proclainicd in a nnnd^er 



146 COSMOPOLITAN ASPIRATIONS. [1867 

of shorter writings. In 1867 he began the publication 
of a ponderous work entitled " Capital." In this it is 
his purpose, by tracing the history of the rise and con- 
solidation of English capital since the 16th century, 
and by portraying in conjunction with this the present 
wretched condition of the English laborer, to exhibit to 
its full extent the enormity and intolerableness of this 
state of affairs. At the same time he attempts to dem- 
onstrate scientifically, that, by the existing social and 
economic order, the laborer is hopelessly condemned to 
be the exploited slave of the capitalist, who holds sole 
control of the means necessary to labor; this he de- 
clares to be so inevitable a consequence of the system 
that even the merciful capitalist is forced to exploit the 
labor of his workmen. There is no remedy for this, he 
holds, other than the annihilation of the entire system, 
by compelling the parasitic capitalists to surrender the 
materials and instruments of labor indispensable to 
the management of a factory, such as land, buildings, 
machinery, raw materials, money, etc., into the hands 
of the productive workers. Consequently all private 
competing capital should be transformed into a united 
collective capital. Since such a revolution in affairs can 
of course be accomplished only by force, the laborers 
of all countries are advised to organize in firm unions 
under the direction of the International. 

He seeks further to prove such a social revolution to 
be both justifiable and inevitable by a theory regarding 
values and wages again borrowed from the English 
political-economist, Ricardo. Its leading features must 



1867 J MARX'S THEORY OF SURPLUS VALUE. 147 

be briefly outlined here, since it continued to be the 
creed of the Soeial-democratic Party of Germany. 

According to it, human labor creates the exchange 
or purchase-value of a commodity, provided this satis- 
fies a want of the community, in other words that it 
serves a purpose useful to the community. " A bee," 
says jNIarx,^ '* in the construction of its cell puts many 
an arcliitect to shame, but that which from the outset 
distinguishes the poorest architect from the best bee is 
that he has constructed his work mentally before he 
builds it with materials. At the end of the process of 
labor, a result appears which at its beginning existed as 
an imasfe in the brain of the workman. He therefore 
not only transforms natural materials, but with them 
realizes the purpose which he knows, which determines 
the nature and method of his la])or, and to which his 
will must be subordinated." 

The effect of labor conducted according to such a 
plan is, to quote i\Iarx, that the worker, through the 
use of his brain, nerves, and muscle, imparts to the 
materials employed a value not previously theirs ; he 
creates a surplus value. 

This maybe well exemplitied by a trivial illustration. 
A tailor purchases cloth for 35 marks, and incurs a 
further expense of 5 marks ; in twelve hours he pro- 
duces a coat of a t'asliioiialtle cut, and sells it for ()() 
marks; by his lal)or, therefore, tiie value of tlie clotb 
has been increased l)y 20 marks. This the [)urehaser 
recognized in paying thi' price ; llie tailor received the 

I Vi.l. 1., p. 14-J. 



148 COSMOPOLITAN ASPIRATIONS. [1867 

amount of the surplus value because he produced it, 
and therefore earned it. 

Further, however, the new style of coat meets Avith so 
great approbation, that, to lill all the orders he receives, 
the tailor employs ten wage-earners. According to the 
iron law of wages he hires them at a rate corresponding 
to the minimum of expense required for existence in 
his locality; we will assume, 5 marks. He provides 
them with material and implements, gives them the 
necessary instructions, and then lies down on his sofa 
to see that they carry them out. In the evening the 
ten coats are finished, and on the next day they are deliv- 
ered and paid for. And now, how stands the account ? 

Receipts, 600 marks ; expenditure for cloth and other 
necessaries, 400 marks ; gain, or surplus value, 200 
marks. Of this each wage-earner receives 5 marks ; all 
of them together, 50. This leaves 150 marks for the 
employer, who performed no labor, — thirty times as 
much as any one laborer, and ten times as much as 
they all receive. 

He has the money wath which to purchase materials 
at a low price as occasion may offer ; laborers he can, 
according to the iron law of wages, procure at any 
time at the lowest possible price. Human labor, which 
creates all surplus value, falls, as a consequence of the 
always greater supply than demand, far below the actual 
value of that which it produces. 

In the place of the little tailoring workshop, let us 
now substitute a great factory with several hundred 
employees; with machinery which in every hour pro- 



1867] CRITICTS^f OF MARX'S THEORY. 149 

duces tenfold, perhaps a hundred-fold, that which can 
be made by hand. It w ill then be realized how, by a[)- 
propriating the product of his workmen's labor, though 
performing none himself, the manufacturer becomes 
with rapid strides a millionnaire, whereas the daily ex- 
plnitt'd wage-earners, with their meagre daily wages, 
can never be more, notwithstanding all their exertion, 
than poor wretches looking forward with eagerness to 
the emancipating revolution. 

It will be at once perceived that this theory rests 
upon a twofold foundation: the iron law of wages, and 
the doctrine of the origin of surplus value. Should 
either bo [)roved fallacious, the whole structure falls to 
the ground. Both, however, are false, — contrary to 
truth and contrary to experience. 

The iron law of wages is a scientific abstraction, the 
answer to a tlieoretically circumscribed question : Pre- 
supposing that the inunediate advantage of the tw^o con- 
tracting parties decides the point, what will be the rate 
of wages? 

In realit}-, however, the question seldom arises so free 
from modification; usually, numerous other influences 
are brought to bear upon it. A compassionate enq)loyer 
seeks to alleviate the wretchedness of his workmen, and 
nevertheless is able to meet the ever-menacing competi- 
tion, livery far-sighted employer knows that his own 
intert'sts are Itcttcr sci'Ncd by licaltliy and contented 
workmen than by miserable and resentful ones. 

Mf»reovei', the measure uf the law of wages — the 
niininnnn of expenditure necessary for existence — is 



150 COSMOPOLITAN ASPIRATIONS. [1867 

in its amount constantly subject to change. At a 
time of growing and general prosperity, there is a rela- 
tive increase in the demands made by the people in all 
stations of life, and public opinion compels every em- 
ployer to better the condition of his workmen in a 
corresponding degree. 

To these considerations must be added another, which 
has become an important factor since the day when free- 
dom to form coalitions was achieved, and the right of 
assembly established, — the workmen's greater power of 
resistance. Very soon thereafter their income had l)e- 
come so much larger that they could save and accumu- 
late. They are at present enabled to meet the demand 
made upon them by innumerable strikes and boycotts ; 
they pay into the treasuries of their local or trades 
unions as well as into the treasury of the general Com- 
munist Union their regular dues, sufficing to provide 
the salaries of numerous officials and editoi-s, as well as 
compensation for their representatives in the Reichstag, 
though paid in violation of the law. The party itself 
has in consequence repudiated. the iron law of wages. 
How, indeed, could it uphold it, and at the same time 
demand contributions from its members belonoinor to 
the laboring class? 

The second question, who among those engaged in a 
large manufacturing establishment is the real producer 
of surplus value, it seems to me is peremptorily answered 
by the very illustration cited by Marx ; and it is to be 
regretted that in the statement of details Marx forgot 
to draw the conclusion. Labor, he declares, creates new 



1867] INTELLECTUAL POWER VNAPPllECIATED. 151 

values when it serves a useful purpose, the idea of 
which exists in the brain of the workman before he be- 
o-ins his labor ; " which he knows, which determines the 
nature and method of his labor, and to which his will 
nuist be su])ordinated/' This is in itself a suilicient an- 
swer to the question. He who has preconceived the 
manufacturing process in its entirety, who determines 
upon and provides the necessary means of production, 
who assumes the entire risk of the undertaking, who in 
the process of production su])ordinates his own will and 
the activity of his employees to the demand of the great 
purpose to be accomplished — he is not to be found 
among the laborers attending to the machinery according 
to instruction, but in him alone by wliom the enterprise 
was undertaken — the factory owner, the capitalist. 

Marx's assertion, that lie is the parasite aaIio without 
effort on his own })art pockets the surplus value pro- 
duced by his workmen, is a subversion of the truth. 
The manufacturer by his intellectual labor, unremitted 
during the entire process of production, is in reality the 
creator of the surplus vahu' which therefore justly be- 
longs to him alone. The operatives have no greater 
influence upon it tlian have the machines ^\■]\u■]\ they 
manipulate according to his instructions, williout under- 
standing or needing to understand the coimection or 
pin|)ose of the various stages of the process. 

Upon this point Uic scholarly Abiix, who was never a 
wage-earner himself, exhibits a strange want of appreci- 
ation of intellectual as compared with manual labor, a 
tendency which ever since that day has been steadily 



152 COSMOPOLITAN ASPIRATIONS. [1867 

growing in the Communistic Party. Notwithstanding 
the many years of wearisome preparation by which in- 
tellectual pov\^er can alone be gained, notwithstanding 
the incalculably great achievements which under proper 
direction it can render, he concedes to it no higher 
merit than that which he attributes to the generally 
meanly regarded exertions of the day-laborer. 

The adequate remuneration of the intellectual pro- 
ducer lies in his greater appreciation of the production 
itself, has recently been said by a wiseacre. This is all 
of a piece with the utterance heard in the Reichstag in 
connection with the dotations to our military leaders in 
recognition of their services. " Every soldier imperils 
his life for his country; what more can a general do? " 
He can do that which every soldier can by no means 
do, lead our armies to victory, and save our country. 

That the fallacious reasoning of the communistic 
theory should secure a lasting hold upon the minds of 
millions of people might appear strange did we not 
remember that the arguments are clothed in the ob- 
scure language of philosophy, unintelligible to the half 
or wholly uneducated public to whom it appears most 
impressive, and to whom, moreover, the conclusions 
drawn are perfectly intelligible, since they appeal not 
to the understanding, but- to the strongest passions of 
those to whom they are addressed. 

Besides his literary labors, Marx undertook the in- 
stitution of an effective propaganda immediately after 
the organization of the International. A general coun- 
cil, having its seat at London, exercised a general con- 



1865] LlEBKNECIir SENT TO GEIiMANV. 153 

trol over tlie affairs of the association ; and a general 
secretary was appointed, to liave special charge of its 
interests in each country, where a central committee 
served as the directing authority for the district groups 
or sections of the several societies. At a consrress to 
be held at Geneva in 1866, reports were to be given 
upon tlie progress so far made, and the permanent or- 
ganization of the association was then to be completed. 

To Germany, Marx sent in 1865 one of his ablest 
disciples and most ardent admirere, Liebknecht, whose 
acquaintance we have made in the German Reichstag. 
Arrived there, he found it necessary, first of all, to famil- 
iarize himself with a most confused state of affairs. 

After Lassalle's death, the societies over which he 
had exercised a dictatorial sway had either been wholly 
discontinued or were engaged in bitter contention. 
The one party recognized as leader the Countess Ilatz- 
feld, a once beautiful, and now wholly emancipated 
lady, very rich, crafty, and imperious. The other had 
fallen under the d(jiniuation of the son of a Frankfort 
patrician, Von Schweitzer, a man of profligate hal)its, 
but equipped with a fine intellect and great will-power. 
Ostracized by his own class of society because of his 
ill fame, he liad in tlie hope of finding a new spice of 
life, grasped tlie reins of government over one group 
of socialist societies, which he hi'ld with a liiiii liaiid, 
guiding its affaii-s to most excellent results. 

The warfare which Lassalle had l)egun ai^ainst the 
Berlin Progressists, Von Schweitzer now pursued with 
fresh vigor. W'hni. in imitation of the l-]n!>lish ex- 



154 COSMOPOLITAN ASPIRATIONS. [186T 

ample, this party undertook the organization of trades- 
unions, under the direction of Dr. Hirsch, for the 
purpose of establishing a fund to be used in maintain- 
ing strikes, a course Ijy which they hoped to make 
Progressists of the workmen, Schweitzer immediately 
did likewise, after which the Progressist and Socialist 
trades-unions were unceasingly engaged in a lively 
quarrel. 

Suddenly, however, appeared an acrimonious mani- 
festo issued by the Hatzfeld group ; in it Schweitzer 
and Hirsch were criticised in an equally rancorous tone 
of enmity, and strikes in general were condemned as 
a folly, working ruin to the participants. Thus there 
was strife everywhere; one after another the societies 
disbanded, and only by strenuous exertions did Schweit- 
zer succeed in holding his together. 

In this confusion new labor unions were organized 
in Saxony and Thliringen ; and, by keeping aloof from 
these dissensions, they gradually became more numer- 
ous, added greatly to their membership, and in politics 
either associated themselves with the Progressists or 
entered the arena as a democratic People's Party. 

In these circles Bebel, an honest artisan and self- 
made man, gradually rose to a position commanding- 
respect and influence; in 1865 he was elected to the 
presidency of a working-men's society of Leipzig, and 
in 1867 became chairman of a committee charged with 
the affairs of an association composed of these recently 
organized societies. He was at the time a member 
of the constituting Reichstag, and as such denied 



1868] AXNUAL MEETING AT yUliyBEUa. 155 

being a Socialist, claiming to belong to the People's 
Party. If he was not alread}- a Socialist, he was 
about to become a Connnunist. 

As early as 1865 he and Liebkiiecht had become 
fast friends, and the latter had initiated him into the 
doctrines of his prophet, Marx. In 1868 the annual 
meeting of the German working-men's societies was in 
session at Xilrnberg, from the 5th to the 7th of Septem- 
ber. More than one hundred and twenty societies were 
represented by delegates. As President of the principal 
society, that of Leipzig, Bebel moved that the assembly 
adopt as its own the approved programme of the Inter- 
national as accepted by the Geneva Congress. After 
a long and excited discussion, the motion was carried 
by sixty-eight voices against forty-eight ; whereupon 
the minority protested, and left the hall to constitute 
themselves an independent (ierman organization upon 
the basis of the old programme. 

In the new programme adopted by the majority, the 
words " abolition of private property " were carefully 
avoided. The communistic doctrine was, however, 
clearly indicated ; in the first place, by the words 
"identification with the aspirations of the International, 
since the emancipation of the working-men can be 
achieved only by the combined endeavor of the workers 
of all lands ;" and further l)y the declaration that the 
working-men's economic de[)endenee upon iiw monopo- 
lists of the instruments of laboi- is the foundation of 
their servitude in all its forms, the source of their social 
wretchedness, their mental degradation, and political 



156 COSMOPOLITAN ASPIBATIONS. [1869 

dependence. This assertion was again simply a dis- 
creet circumlocution of Marx's demand, that the capi- 
talists should be forced to surrender the means of labor, 
— and what is not to be classed among these ? — to the 
associated craftsmen, and meant nothing less than that 
all private property should revert to the community. 
In contradistinction to the course pursued by the seced- 
ing minority, by the Lassalle societies, and by the 
Progressist trades-unions, from all of which political 
aims were excluded, their activity being directed solely 
toward promoting the material welfare of the working- 
man with reference to the existing social order, the 
majority now declared further: Political activity is in- 
dispensable to the economic emancipation of tlie work- 
ing-men ; the social question is inseparable from the 
political question, and can be solved only in a demo- 
cratic State. 

Thus it was that cosmopolitan communism was for 
the first time in Germany proclaimed to be the political 
creed of a large association. The effect was soon found 
to be by no means an insignificant one. Bebel and 
Liebknecht called a general congress of the Social-dem- 
ocratic working-men's societies of Germany to meet at 
Eisenach on August 7th of the next year. At this 
assembly, there appeared, besides their own adherents, 
the representatives of the Lassalle societies, who, al- 
though greatly in the minority, yet numbered one hun- 
dred and ten delegates, whereas the Communists sent 
two hundred and sixty-two, nominally the representa- 
tives of 150,000 working-men. 



1839] ANNUAL MEETING AT EISENACH. 157 

New dissension, however, quickly arose, and the Las- 
salle representation again withdrew, the two parties 
continuing their deliberations in separate halls. The 
promising outlook Avhieli the Niirnberg jirogramme had 
opened to the working-men had evidently proved a 
magnet of great attraction. Nevertheless, Liebknecht 
did not even yet deem it advisable to come to the front 
openly, partly because of the excessive power unfortu- 
nately still exercised by the jiolice, partly for fear of 
repelling some of the less resolute among his associates. 
The programme of this assembly, therefore, began Avith 
tlie declaration: The Social-democratic Party in Ger- 
many is in favor of a State ruled by the people. 

Thus the designation of tne party as communistic, 
and the word republic as the name of the desired form 
of government, were discreetly avoided. Wherf during 
the course of the debate an outspoken delegate moved 
the use of the word republic, this was at once rejected 
as inopportune. 

It was then further resolved, tnat the existing po- 
litical and social systems were highly unjust, that they 
were to be indefatigably combated, and that eveiy form 
of class-supremacy ought to be destroyed. To this 
was joined the declaration in which at Niirnberg the 
abolition of private property liad Ix'cii cloaked, namely, 
that all the instruments of labor should be sui-rendei-ed 
into the hands of the workers. It appeared, however, 
with some of its rough edges smoothed away, thus : 
The economic dependence of the working-man u])on the 
capitalist is the origin of iiis sei'vitiule in all its forms: 



158 COSMOPOLITAN ASPIRATIONS. [1870 

therefore the Social-democratic Party devotes its ac- 
tivity to securing to every worker a full share in the 
products of labor; it seeks to accomplish this through 
the downfall of the present system of production (the 
Avage system). 

At this point, which was the decisive one, it ap- 
peared how wise had been the course pureued out of 
consideration for the possibly irresolute members of the 
party. For the clause as it had been proposed, the 
assembly now substituted the words : The present sys- 
tem of production must be supereeded by that of co- 
operative labor. Liebknecht consoled himself with 
the reflection that in this form the communistic prin- 
ciple was embodied full as well, which was quite 
true. 

Political freedom was then declared to be insepa- 
rable from social freedom, and with respect to the exist- 
ing conditions it was especially desired that all men 
over twenty years of age be given the right to vote for 
every representative assembly ; that direct legislation 
by the people be introduced ; that a system of defence 
by the people take the place of the standing army ; that 
education in the public schools be compulsory and free 
to all; and that all indirect taxes be discontinued, and 
a single, progressive income tax be levied (an inheri- 
tance duty was added by the assembly). 

It was also emphasized and resolved, that it was most 
expedient that the party should be united in its organ- 
ization ; that it should be constituted under the direc- 
tion of a committee of five ; and that final decision 



1870J ANNUAL MEETIJSG AT STITTUAUT. ir)9 

upon the more iiupoitunt resolutions of a congi-ess be 
reached through a vote of all the menibei-s. 

The i)arty then announced itself to be a branch of 
the International, but ^^'ith the distinct reservation : 
'' In so far as this is not in conflict with the law of the 
land." Liel)knecht was designated as editor of their 
party organ, Dcr Volksstaat, for \\hieh every member 
was expected to subscribe, or else contribute a groschen 
a week for party purposes. To avoid financial irregu- 
larities, a special connuittee to control the money affairs 
was appointed. 

As resolved at this meeting, the next general as- 
sembly of the Social-democratic Party was held at 
Stuttgart from the 4th to the 7th of June, 1870. 
Again the Lassalle delegates appeared, and again to no 
purpose; they were too few to assume control, and so 
disappeared from the scene. Bebel and Liebknecht 
found a support of seventy four delegates, representing 
a hundred and eleven localities, or 15,398 members. 
The mend)ership had therefore fallen off greatly since 
1869; many of the lukewarm had pr()l)ably dropped 
out, whilst othe^rs may have been unwilling to pay 
regular fees. 

At all events, in this assembly the forethought and 
discretion which had marked the previous meetings 
were cast to the winds. It was felt to be a circle of 
friends, iiiid caution was, therefore, no longer necessary. 
The leaders now advised tlie party to seek representa- 
tion in both IxeiclLstag and Customs Parliament, in the 
liope that at times the scales might be turned in favor 



160 COSMOPOLITAN ASPIRATIONS. [1870 

of less undesirable legislation ; always, however, to agi- 
tate the party views, and upon every occasion to ex- 
pose the transactions of both these assemblies as idle 
and a mere farce. 

It was then resolved, that since in agriculture as in 
manufacturing, production is most profitable when con- 
ducted upon a large scale, in consequence of which the 
great land-owners would soon crowd out the smaller 
farmers, forcing them into the position of wage-earners, 
and since the soil to be tilled is the original source of 
all the means of production, therefore, all agricultural 
lands should be transformed into common property, and 
this be leased to agricultural companies, which should 
be placed under obligation to cultivate the land to best 
advantage by accepted scientific methods, and to divide 
the proceeds among the associated laborers according to 
a contract to be agreed upon. 

In this resolution the congress openly avowed the com- 
munistic doctrine to be its programme. If Bebel and 
Liebknecht really thought that such a proposal would 
win the farmers for their cause, they simply showed 
how little idea they had of the true conditions and 
views prevailing among the peasants. The more recent 
counter-proposal made by Herr von VoUmar (to divide 
the large estates among the farm-hands) proves him to 
be a better posted and therefore more dangerous dema- 
gogue. 

By danger in this connection I do not refer simply 
to the imperilling of existing social conditions, but far 
more to the danger incurred by the thousands who £(s 



1870] TUE BANGER OF A CLASS CONFLICT. 161 

yet put faith in the words of the coinmunist leaders, 
and allow themselves to become enlisted in the ranks 
of those who in the class conflict are arrayed against 
capital. Should I be called upon to indicate the way 
in which the solution of the social question may be ap- 
proached, it would be the very reverse of an association 
of laborers for the purpose of entering the class con- 
flict. For, as class against class, there is no antago- 
nism between capital and labor; their interests are one. 
Capital is but the fruit of past labor, and proficient 
workers are constantly stepping into the ranks of the 
capitalists. 

At the time of which I write, such aspirations on the 
part of the working-men had, for more than a decade, 
been furthered with ever-increasing devotion by the 
citizens as a body, their incentive to this by no means 
being fear of Lassalle or Marx, l)ut onl}' their own 
liberal inclinations ; especially was this true since the 
achievements of 1866. It was not an assembly of 
craftsmen who, in the Cathedral of St. Paul, and later 
in the North (iernian ConhMlcratioii. piocurcd for the 
people the right of tuiiversal suffrage ; agaiji, it was the 
citizens in general who since 1867 were seeking to 
o]>tain for the working-men the right of coalition ; and 
yet again it was the "■bourgeoisie" as represented in 
the Fecleral Cbnennnent and i-epresentative body, to 
wliom the laws regarding libcrtx- (if innnigration, free- 
dom from i)ass-re8trictions, greater iiubistrial lil)erty, 
and freedom in contracting marriage, owed tlieir be- 
in<r. 



1(52 COSMOPOLITAN ASPIRATIONS [1870 

It was Sclmlze-Delitzsch, so bitterly reviled by the 
Socialists, who had called into existence the co-opera- 
tive associations and people's banks, which during 
the foregoing year had increased in number from thir- 
teen hundred to two thousand, and the capital ad- 
vanced by them to members from sixty-seven to one 
hundred and eleven millions. Numerous building asso- 
ciations were endeavoring to place healthy habitations 
within the reach of the laborers, and the administration 
of public instruction was everywhere ordering the erec- 
tion of ^\- ell-lighted and spacious public school build- 
ings ; city communities were establishing scliools to 
improve the education of workmen, that through in- 
creased knowledge their advancement might be facili- 
tated ; savings banks were being instituted in which 
the poor man could place the smallest sum at interest, 
and in which in Germany hundreds of millions were 
soon deposited. 

Public opinion among the property-holding classes 
was incessantly directed to like humanitarian designs, 
endeavoring to discover existing defects, and reminding 
the citizens of the obligations incurred by ownership. 
As yet the declaration of war made by the Commu- 
nists, was not allowed to interfere in the least with these 
philanthropic aspirations, partly in the belief that rev- 
olution is best prevented by removing just causes of 
complaint, partly in the vain hope that wholly unre- 
stricted freedom of discussion would lead the mal- 
contents to discover the fallacy of their programme 
themselves. The chief reason was, however, that 



1848] CLERICAL ASPIRATIONS. 163 

with our firmly established institutions there was little 
belief in any real danger from connnunism. 

However, should this ever seriously menace our coun- 
try, which God forlnd, the outcome Avould be in Ger- 
many as in 1851 it was in France, — the nation would 
welcome with ac('lamution the dictator wIk) under sus- 
pension of political freedom would furnish protection 
against Communist domination. 

II. CLEllICAL ASPIRATIONS. 

After the development of I^ltramontanism in the 
Catholic Church from 1811 to 1810, as has been 
related,^ this tendency continued to assert itself more 
and more in (xermany as it did in every other part of 
I^urope. In Prussia, under Frederick William IV.. it 
encountered little to impede its progress. The State's 
controlling po^er over the Church, which was so an- 
tagonized by tlie n tramontanes, was exceedingly dis- 
tasteful to the King also. In the Catholic connnunion 
lie beheUl a sister church, of whose iirnuiess of doc- 
trine and mighty influence he was inclined to be 
envious, although with a feeling of admiration and not 
of malice. 

It was tliis already powerful intluence for ^\ liich the 
achievements of 1818 opened new jjaths to ])ower. 
The pei-secutiou whicli 'the Friends of Light and Ger- 
man Catholics had suffered at the luinds of the State 
authorities who were entirel}' in sympathy with the 

1 V..1. I., p. <i:;. 



164 COSMOPOLITAN ASPIBATIONS. [1848 

orthodox confession, had filled the Liberals of the 
Protestant faith with indignation ; and, with a short- 
sightedness incomprehensible to us, they yielded to 
this feeling sufficiently to restrict in ever}^ direction 
the State's sovereign power over the Church, that reli- 
gious freedom might be secured; whereupon they soon 
discovered that it had been for the so-called liberty of 
the Church for which they had been working ; namely, 
for the unfettering of a temporal power which regarded 
the annihilation of every dissenting opinion to be its 
highest duty. 

To be sure, when the liberal majority of the Repre- 
sentative Assembly adopted among the other Prus- 
sian fundamental rights the clause : The recognized 
churches shall be free to conduct their internal affairs 
according to their own judgment, the intention was 
not to ascribe to them complete sovereignty. It was 
understood as a matter of course that ecclesiastical ad- 
ministration should, notwithstanding the independence 
of the Church as a corporate body, conform to the re- 
strictions of the general laws of the State, just as was 
expected of communities of citizens, or of science and 
its teachings, to which the Constitution also guaranteed 
freedom. 

However, the authority upon which within this prov- 
ince ever3d3hing depended was inchned to yield to the 
Catholic bishops the greatest possible extension of the 
right granted. The King practically allowed every 
form of control which, during the past century and 
from 1814 to 1840, the State had undisputedly exer- 



1 



1848] TllIUMPHS OF THE CLERICAL MOVEMENT. 165 

cised over the Church, to fall into desuetude. In the 
direction of the public schools by the clergy, and the 
separation of the gyninasiunis according to the faith pro- 
fessed, he now Ix'lield no more than tlie just fulfilment 
of a provision of the Constitution. He relincpiished 
every kind of influence he had heretofore exerted upon 
the nomination, transfer, and removal of parish priests, 
whereb}' the arbitrary authority of the bisho[)S was 
allowed full sway. He desisted from every kind of 
inspection and oversight over religious orders or cor- 
porations, in consequence of which Jesuit communities 
and institutions more than all othei-s were soon spread 
like a network through all North German}-. Finally 
the State gave up all participation in the administration 
of church property also ; the body of directors to whom 
the Church assigned that duty was responsible neither 
to the connnunity nor to the State authorities, but only 
to the bisliop and his court of accounts. 

In fact, with the sole exception of the continued 
existence of that wicked Protestant heresy, no wish of 
Rome was at that time left unfulfilled in Prussia. The 
bishops especially were well content, were most gra- 
ciously disposed toward the Government, and took care 
to avoid all doctrinal disputes. Thus, even after a 
change of sovereigns, the (iovernment of William 1. 
found no cause to interfere with the existing condition 
of affairs. 

The cl(;rical movement which was so trium[)hant here 
was developed in like niannei- in all the countries of 
Europe; everywhere, as its imnu^diatc aim, tlic cinanci- 



166 COSMOPOLITAN ASPIliATIONS. [1848 

pation of the Church from the doniinion of the State 
was kept in view, and, to gain strength for the combat 
all stood firmly gathered about the common centre of 
the universal Church, the Holy See at Rome. The 
storms of revolution liad played havoc with the prin- 
ciples of the proud Galilean national Church as well 
as with the demands of tlie three Rhenish Electors as 
put forth at the convention of Ems. It was the boast 
of Rome that never before had the Pope rejoiced in so 
undivided and submissive an episcopate as during the 
present century. The clergy, from the lowest to the 
highest order, gave evidence of no other spirit than that 
of zealous submission to the commands of the repre- 
sentative of Christ. 

So great and general adulation could not fail of its 
effect upon him who was its object, the head of the 
Church ; although it inspired him with no new ideas, it 
increased his ardent desire to witness the realization 
of his aspirations. 

Pope Pius IX. (Mastai Ferretti) was by nature a 
man of vivid imagination and extreme self-conscious- 
ness, his nervous system was so highly wrought that 
in his youth he had suffered from epileptic attacks. 
Owing to the limitation of his acquirements his intel- 
lectual horizon was necessarily a circumscribed one ; 
and through his susceptible temperament he was greatly 
influenced in outward matters by the impressions of the 
moment, which made him unsteady of purpose in his 
political relations. So much the greater, however, was 
his inflexibility in matters of conviction. Spiritually 



1855] POPE PIUS IX. A NEW DOGMA. IGT 

lie was strongly inclined to mysticism, a tendency which 
it is said first asserted itself whilst he was still very 
30ung. At a later period he claimed to be the recipient 
of Divine revelation, and to be in spiritual comnninica- 
tion with the Holy Virgin, inaiiifcstatidns which he 
experienced to tlie end of his days. Every year found 
him more absorbed in religious meditation, and Avith 
higher ideals of what the authority of the Church should 
be in the world, and the authority of the Pope witiiin 
the Church. His convictions were not leased upon scien- 
tific evidence, but upon spiritual revelation, and were 
therefore proof against every douljt. 

Later, when he himself occupied the [)oiititic'ai chair, 
and his exile in Gaeta, whither he had fled before the 
Roman revolution, had terminated in his restoration to 
the throne through the combined intervention of the 
Catholic Powers of Europe, it became the desire of his 
heart to add new lustre to the name of his heavenly 
queen whose protection he had implored in the days of 
adversity. 

With this intention he convened a numerous council 
of bishops, and laid before them for their consideration 
a solemn decree, in which an old question, controverted 
between the Doiiiiiiicaus on the one side and tlic i-^raii- 
ciscans aixl Jesuits on the other, was decided in fa\()i' 
of the latter. It [)ro(daimed to the world that the 
Pope, l»y the authority of Christ and the apostles 
Peter and PauK as well as by the authoi'ity vested in 
himself, declaicd and decreed the iininaculate con- 
ception of the lUessed \'ir<4in \n lie a docti'ine tann'ht 



168 COSMOPOLITAN ASPIRATIONS. [1855 

of God, and therefore binding as an article of belief on 
tlie acceptance of all the faithful. This was followed 
by the customary threat of punishment made against 
every one who should dare to think otherwise. 

When several of the bishops gave utterance to a few 
timidly expressed doubts, they were silenced by the 
answer: Should the Pope make this declaration simplj^ 
upon his own authority, it would still be a manifesta- 
tion of the sovereign power of the Holy See over tlie 
Church, as well as of the infallibility with which Christ 
has clothed his representative. This ended the delib- 
eration, and on December 8th the new dogma of the 
Catholic Church was solemnly proclaimed. 

It was not long before the Pope enjoyed a new 
triumph of wide significance, which he accepted as a 
gracious reward from the hands of his heavenly queen 
for the homage he had rendered her. In 1855 Em- 
peror Francis Joseph allowed himself to be persuaded 
by Bishop Rauscher to conclude a concordat, in which 
he formally recognized the canon law in its integrity 
to be the established ecclesiastical law in all the lands 
subject to him, — the very law which asserts the power 
of the papacy over states and sovereigns, together 
with the right to depose the latter under certain condi- 
tions. In addition, the concordat invested the bishops 
with sovereign authorit}- over the clergy, the schools 
and literature ; it placed under their independent ad- 
ministration a fortune of two hundred million florins ; 
it provided for the institution of a large number of 
•Fesuit schools, and for severe restrictions upon the 
riq-hts of Jews and Protestants. 



1855J liOMJE'S EXPECTATIONS FRUHTRATEU. 169 

Urgently and with gratifying success the Vienna 
diplomats then commended a like course to the Protes- 
tant Courts at Stuttgart, Karlsruhe and Darmstadt, 
tliat from the vantage ground of equall}- excellent con- 
cordats they might witlistand the re-awakened aspira- 
tions of Prussian ambition. In Vienna, moreover, there 
was at this time great hope that as Prussia through the 
Customs Union had linked Germany's material welfare 
to her own, so its intellectual intert-sts might hecome 
identified witli Austria througli her ecclesiastical policy. 

In all this the Roman Curia beheld prospects of wide 
extended conquests, greater than any made during the 
last generation. 

What the future really held in store, llo^^'v^ver, was a 
radical change in affairs. That great national move- 
ment was begun, first in Italy and then in Germany, by 
which after a struggle of ten years Italy was brought, 
a united State, including two-thirds of the papal terri- 
ioTj^ under tlie sceptre of Victor Emmanuel, and In- 
Avhich in Germany was achieved the founding of the 
North German Confederation under William I. ; in both 
countries Austrian su[)remacy came to an end. 

To the Curia all this was of course most odious. 
That two nations, licrctofoi'c; so divided, should stand 
forth in the vigor of newly l)orn Great Powers, was 
in itself an infraction of the principle upheld ever since 
the 13th century; namely, that all extensive realms 
should be dismembered that tlu' luiti-cd |)i'icst might 
rule over all. ^b)I•('o\■('r, although Ihc national princi- 
ple had been led to \i(torv by the arms of two Ivings, 



170 COSMOPOLITAN ASPIRATIONS. [1864 

it nevertheless owed its birtli to the Liberal parties, 
and it was therefore to be assumed that from the first 
day of their existence these two new political creations 
would be dominated by liberal ideas. And finally the 
sub-Alpine robber had even dared to extend his hand 
toward the territory of the Church, and only through 
the protection of a French occupation had the patri- 
mony of St. Peter, together with its capital, been pre- 
served to the Pope. 

Pius IX. was not the man to accept such proceedings 
with meekness ; but instead, at the earliest stirring of 
the adverse elements he grasped his weapons of de- 
fence, and with every degree of danger the energy of 
his resistance grew apace. In Italy he excommuni- 
cated the usurpers of the Romagna in the sj^ring of 
1860, and the conquerors of Urbino and the Marches 
in the following December. Through the obstinacy 
with which he adhered to his demand to be restored to 
full power, he made the role of protector so irksome 
to Emperor Napoleon that in 1864 the latter concluded 
the convention of September 15th, in which he agreed 
to recall his troops from Rome, and Victor Emmanuel 
in return gave his promise both to respect and protect 
Rome and the papal territory. 

In this the Pope beheld an open menace to Rome, 
and therefore daily expected its occupation by the Ital- 
ians, never loth to break either their word or their 
faith. On December 8th, 1864, the day celebrated as 
the anniversary of the immaculate conception, he made 
a formal declaration of war against modern culture and 



1864] ENCYCLICAL AND SYLLABUS. 171 

politics, in the form of a eoiisistorial address to the 
cardinals, which then found its way as an encyclical 
to every part of the world, acconipanieil l)y a list or 
syllabus of eighty pernicious errors. Ainong these were 
religious liberty, freedom of the press, freedom in mat- 
ters of philosophical research, the education of children 
by the laity, the exclusion of the Church from all do- 
minion over temporal affairs, the placetum reyium, the 
assertion that Roman Pontiffs and Oecumenical Cottn- 
cils have exceeded their authority, and liave usurped 
the rights of princes, as also the opinion that the 
Church has not the right to avail herself of force, or 
has any direct or indirect temporal power in general, 
and that the abolition of the temporal power of which 
the Apostolic See is possessed would contribute to the 
liberty and prosperity of the Church, etc., etc. 

This document left no possibility of doubt that the 
Church claimed entire independence from the control 
of the State in matters ecclesiastical, and beyond this, 
demanded ol)edience from the State in temporal affaii"S 
as well as in spiritual. 

Wlien on February 25 th, 1865, a great Roman jubi- 
lee was proclaimed, this decree again referred to the cir- 
cular and the syllabus which as the ordinance of the 
visi])le head of the Chureh u\\\:,t be received as the 
voice of God. 

T'pon a representation made by the French ^Minister, 
Drouyn de Lhuys, that the continued occupation of 
Home by the French troops was rendered dinieult 1)\" 
the difference in the policy of the two (Jovernnients, in 



172 COSMOPOLITAN ASI'IRATIONS. [1866 

that they were not actuated by like ideas or j)iiiiciples, 
Cardinal Secretary of State Antonelli repHed on Iso- 
veniber 19th, that if the Minister referred to the princi- 
ples which lay at the root of the social transformation, 
— for example, liherty of conscience and of worship, and 
other like exemptions from restraint, — the Holy See 
had frequently condemned these errors, and it was there- 
fore the duty of every good Catholic to subordinate 
liis judgment upon such questions to the judgment of 
him whom God had set above the people, to be their 
guide and teacher, not alone in matters spiritual, but 
in whatever belongs to the sphere of morals and the 
right. 

Of what prescription emanating from the State 
could it, indeed, be said that it did not affect either 
morals or the right, directly or indirectly, and there- 
fore would not come under the deciding influence of 
the Pope? 

In so far as Germany was concerned, it was but to 
be expected that as soon as the old rivahy between 
Prussia and Austria should again break forth, the 
Roman Curia would with greatest energy take sides 
with its ally, Austria, and seek to advance the interests 
of tliat country. In this respect, the Pope's chief re- 
liance was placed upon the Jesuits, who, ever since the 
doctrine of the immaculate conception had been es- 
tablished, basked in his favor, wielding an influence 
over him to the exclusion of all others, and, whilst 
commending his every thought, insinuated their own 
ideas into his mind. They were, therefore, quite 



1864] AGITATION AGAINST PRUSSIA. 173 

ready to foment an active agitation against Prussia 
and in favor of the greater Germany. 

As a beginning to this, such newspapers of Rome, 
Italy, P"'rance, and Austria as were subject to their 
influence, as well as those of like sympathies in South 
Germany and even in Prussia, oi)ened a cross-lire of 
adverse criticism u[)oii the liismaick Ministry, and 
thus during the contlict-period became valiant allies 
of the Liberals otherwise so odious to them. 

The Prussian bishops having been exempted ])y 
William IV. from su})ervision ])y tlu^ State, and being 
alienated from the Jesuits by mutual aversion, kc[)t 
discreetly aloof; so much the more did the lower 
clergy, assistant curates, vicars, and chaplains, smarting 
under the oppression of their utter de[)endence upon 
the bishops, join with great ardor in the Jesuit agita- 
tion, the object of which was to do honor to the INtpe 
and to assail Prussia's policy. Now, ever since 1848, 
there existed in Germany a number of Catholic societies 
which during the ensuing years of peace Avith the 
Church had fallen into a state of calm iiiacti vilw 
These were now to be quickened, llicir iiiiiiil)er in- 
creased, their organization strengthened, and the an- 
nual general assembly was to be re-enforced by a cen- 
tral committee to serve as the ormmiziuir medium for 
the discontented lower clergy. 

Outside of ]*russia the storm of ritraiiioiitaiie dis- 
pleasure was, in IJadcii, directed against tiie liberal 
Koggenbach .Ministiy because of its \ igorous defence 
of the State's sovereign power o\cr tiie Cliiircii in its 



174 COSMOPOLITAN ASPIRATIONS. [1866 

outward relations, as well as of the State's unqualified 
right to control the schools. In Darmstadt the cleri- 
cally inclined Minister Dalwigk, hand in hand with 
the ambitious Bishop Ketteler, was waging fierce war 
against the liberal Majority in the Second Chamber. 
How greatly this general agitation strengthened the 
hopeful courage of both Rome and Vienna it is not 
necessary to say. In the latter it reached its climax 
in the assertion, claimed to be based upon reliable 
information from Prussia, that not a Catholic among 
the Prussian soldiers would fire upon the Catholic 
emperor's troops. 

But, as we know, each and all of them did fire, and 
Koniggratz opened a new era for Germany. In no re- 
spect, however, did this deprive the Catholic Church 
in Germany of its liberty. Nevertheless, the Vatican 
could not forgive King William the deadly sin of hav- 
ing allied himself with Victor Emmanuel. Nor was 
this the end of the vexation. Not only had Austria 
been vanquished by Prussian arms, but, that internal 
harmony might be restored, it had yielded to the per- 
suasions of liberalism, and had bestowed upon itself 
a Constitution which was not only at variance with its 
concordat, but was directly opposed to the declarations 
of the syllabus. For it granted liberty of worship to 
all confessions of faith, and freedom of the press to all 
citizens, and by special laws did away with the controll- 
ing influence of the clergy upon the right of contract- 
ing marriage, and upon the direction of the schools. 

This blow from the hand of a secular ally incensed 



1866] THE AUSTRIAN CONSTITUTION CURSED. 175 

the Pope beyond endurance. In another aUueution, 
issued on June 22d, 1868, he condennied the Austrian 
Constitution, and it« accompanying fundamental laws, 
as productions of unspeakable infamy and abomination, 
declared them invalid now and forever, and instructed 
the Austrian bishops to do all in their power to pre- 
vent them from being carried into effect. 

If the circular and syllabus of 1864 had indicated 
a complete revulsion in the Pope's feelings, and his 
reconversion to all the assumptions of his mediieval 
predecessors, this, his latest address, proclaimed his ac- 
tual pretensions to supremacy over all State authority. 
The more cautiously inclined of his adherents sought 
to soften matters by the explanation that all tliis was 
not meant as harshly as it sounded ; that the Pope 
should denounce a law by which a one-sided modifica- 
tion of the legal status of the Church was decreed could 
hardly cause surprise ; the severity of expression was 
wholly due to the traditional othcial language of the 
Roman Church. 

The reply suggests itself, that he who feels entitled 
to employ such official expressions by their use makes 
pretensions to sovereignty and supremacy, or else he 
cuts a ridiculous figure, and that Pius IX. was such 
neither his friends nor his foes will maintain. 

By way of digression, how, in connection with this 
address, appears the oft repeated assertion that the pos- 
session of the Papal States is necessary to the Pope's 
ecclesiastical independence? If in 18(i7 Ausli'iaii do- 
minion had still ]irevaile(l in Italy, and that ot the 



176 COSMOPOLITAN ASPIHATIOyS. [1868 

Pope in the States of the Church, at this declaration 
of hostility an Austrian army would have invaded the 
papal territory. Would that have contributed to the 
independence of the Church ? 

As it was, divested of his sovereignty over the Papal 
States the Pope uhcs free ; and, ready as ever to assume 
the initiative in coml)at, he now decided to take the 
step he had long pondered, and which he intended 
should lead to the complete and valid sanction of the 
standpoint which he had adopted. On June 29th, 
1868, he convoked an Q^cumeiiical Council, an as- 
sembly of all the Catholic bishops of the world, to meet 
in the Vatican on the 8th of December, 1869, the day 
of his favorite festival, the immaculate conception of 
the Virgin. 

The bull said nothing of the questions to be delibe- 
rated upon by the council, or rather, it said too much, 
namely, that the council was called to remove all the 
wicked prejudices of this sinful age. But the Civiltd 
Cattolica^ the special organ of the Pope, founded and 
endowed by Pius himself, and edited by two Jesuits 
under the daily supervision of the Pope, created a pro- 
found sensation by an exhaustive discussion of the fa- 
mous bull issued by Boniface VIII. in 1302, according 
to which all kings and princes derive their sovereign 
power from the Pope, and must exercise it at his be- 
hest upon penalty of being deposed. This decree had 
been corroborated by a council convened in the 16th 
century, and it was now doubtlessly intended that the 
ac^tion of the proposed council should give it additional 
sanction. 



1868] .1 VATICAX COUNCIL CALLED. 177 

The excitement which these articles piudviced was 
intense ; soon after their appearance tliey were officially 
(liselairaetl, but this only added to the surprise which 
the secrecy whereby in Rome the assiduous preparation 
of the propositions to be laid before the Council con- 
tinued to be surrounded. Nevertheless, it gradual) \- 
became known that the Couneil was called for the 
special purpose of defining the infallibility of the Pope 
as regards " whatever belongs to faith and morals, or 
the primacy and teaching authority of Peter," as also 
that the discipline and welfare of the Chunh would be 
discussed. Further it was rumoi'cd that the tenets 
of the sj'Uabus were to be transformed into positive 
dogmas; and it Avas also discovered that a special coin- 
mittee was employed upon politico-ecclesiastical ([ues- 
tions, hence, with the relations of ehureli and State. 

These reports were regarded as of so gi-ave iiiipoi- 
tance that the Bavarian Preiniei'. Prince Ilolienlolie. 
was induced to address a circular note to the Powers 
on April 9th, 1869, in which he invited them to con- 
sider whether it were not advisable by a conference of 
the European Powers to determine upon some com- 
l>ined plan of action wliertdw the Couil at IJome would 
be relieved of all uncertainty regarding the attitude 
which they would assume toward the Couucil. 

However, the existing political situation was not fa- 
vorable to such a course of action. Of the Catholic 
Powei-s, of whom it would natuiall\- be expected that 
they would take the lead, France, as having reassumed 
the rdh' of ])rotector of Rome, stood lirst : here the 



178 COSMOPOLITAN ASPIRATIONS. [1868 

outward and internal crises Avere so all-absorbing that 
there was no inclination to arrive at a decision as yet 
regarding the Council. The relations of Austria to the 
Curia, and those of Italy and Spain as well, were of 
so strained a nature that the effect of representations 
made to the Pope by these Governments would most 
likely have been to stimulate him to more extreme 
action. It was therefore decided to await events. 

Rumor said that many bishops of different countries 
would dissent to the papal proposition ; among the 
more educated classes of the Catholic world signs of 
opposition were also perceptible ; in May an address 
against infallibility was sent from Coblenz to the 
Bishop of Trier; prompted by a like spirit, a large 
number of noted scholars and their enthusiastic dis- 
ciples gathered about the foremost theologian of Catho- 
lic Germany, Dr. DoUinger of Munich, who had ere 
now experienced the papal displeasure ; members of 
the faculty at Bonn and Breslau had similar experi- 
ences. There was, therefore, after all, a possibility that 
the ecclesiastical endeavor would suflfice to dispel the 
threatening storm and that intervention by the Govern- 
ments would not he necessary. 

However, to have assumed this to be the probability 
at this early stage would have been rash indeed. The 
announcement of the Council was followed by redoubled 
activity on the part of the Jesuits in France and Ger- 
many. Numberless pamphlets, newspaper articles, and 
society resolutions proclaimed the fact that all faithful 
Catholics had long been convinced of the Pope's infalli- 



1869] BISHOPS ISSUE A PASTORAL LETTER. 179 

iiility; thai ihe Cuuiieil was not about to establish a 
new dogma, but simply to acknowledge a truth which 
even now dwelt in the hearts of all ; without entering 
into a prolonged debate, the bishops would sanction 
the doctrine of infallibility by acclamation ; and should 
an obstinate one be found among them the entire clergy 
of his diocese would rise as one man against him. Even 
tlie more moderate Ultramontane newspapers of the 
Rhine district, and which in the beginning had dared 
to be doubtful of the infallibility, were in the end 
carried along with the current, and violently attacked 
the signers of the Col)lenz address. The general as- 
sembly of the Catholic societies in its latest resolutions 
outdid all it had heretofore done — which is saying a 
good deal — in the way of zealous adulation of the 
Pope, and of vehement threats against his adversaries. 
At all events, there was no (jpposition evinced by the 
great mass of the conniioii people. The following 
words of Deput}' Jorg, which appeared in the Ilistoriseh- 
politischen Blatter of the day, although written with 
especial reference to conditions in Bavaria, were be- 
3^ond d()ul)t aptly descriptive of the general situation 
as well: " lielween us and the Libci'als a social war- 
fare is waged, a warfare in which the people are 
arrayed against the bourgeoisie and their official repre- 
sentatives." 

I>v this gi'uci'al agitation the majority of the (ler- 
nian bisliops wow ])lace(l in a grave pi'cdicanicnt. 
'V\u'\ wrll knew what pajial infallibility meant, and 
could not therefore conscicntiousU noIc lor it. For 



180 COSMOPOLITAN ASPIRATIONS. [1869 

years, however, in their struggle against the State's 
right to superior authority, they had been so utterly 
subservient to the Pope, that to assume an attitude of 
opposition now did violence to their feelings. More- 
over, it mattered little what stand they might take in 
Rome ; in the present state of excitement their action 
would be sure to meet with disapproval at home, which, 
if coming from the learned profession, would be annoy- 
ing, but coming from the Jesuits would be dangerous. 
In the end they decided to pour oil upon the troubled 
waters by issuing a joint pastoral letter. In it they 
assured their people that all rumors which had caused 
them anxiety regarding the Councirs possible action 
were groundless. The Council would establish no new 
dogma ; its deliberations would be carried on in entire 
freedom, and, far from causing a division into parties, 
would, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, and in 
mutual love, result in wise decisions. 

That the contents of the letter were not born of a 
spirit of prophecy its authors were soon to discover. 
As early as October, this was clearly indicated by the 
explicit declaration which appeared in the Civiltd Cat- 
tolica, stating that the bishops were not called to Rome 
to make decisions according to the opinion of the ma- 
jority, but only to give their formal sanction to that 
upon which the infallible Pontiff had already resolved. 



1868] PARLIAMENTAliY CONFLICTS. 181 



CHAPTER IV. 

PARLIAMENTARY CONFLICTS. 
RESULTS ACHIEVED I5V THE GOVERNIMENT. 

The coni-se of our narrative has l)ronght us to that 
period when during the years whose events we are fol- 
lowing the activity of the State within the sphere of 
home politics claimed the attention of the leading 
statesman to a greater degree than did questions of 
foreign policy. The social and ecclesiastical aspira- 
tions with whicli we have become familiar did not for 
the present occupy much of Bismarck's time, not he- 
cause he failed to recognize in their evidences the 
earliest intimation of a possible danger menacing the 
future, but l)ecause at the time there was either ni> 
possibility of effective intervention on his part, or else 
the occasion for it was wanting. 

The .Socialists of that day were as yet rendered im- 
[)otent thKiu^li tlieii- division into four gi'oups, each of 
whicli had but a small membersliiji. Their time being 
wholly occupied by bitter contention with one another 
aiul with the Party of Progress, they made little 
trouble for tlie Government. 

With icLTard to the (Ecumenical Council, concerning 



182 PARLIAMENTARY CONFLICTS. [1868 

which Bismarck was b}' no means free from anxiety, 
his hands were tied so long as the Catholic Courts 
maintained their attitude Ol extreme reserve. 

That which now demanded liis thought was not a 
subject of so theoretic a nature, but a very prosaic and 
very real difficulty, the present financial exigency of 
Prussia and of the North German Confederation. 

In the speech from the throne with which tlie Prus- 
sian Assembly was opened on November 4th, 1868, the 
King discussed in the first place the existing deficit, 
then the reforms to be undertaken in the Constitutions 
of the pi'ovinces and districts in favor of a greater de- 
gree of self-governme!,nt, and lastly the prospect of 
enduring peace in Europe. 

There was a close connection between these three 
subjects. Provincial self-administration required that 
each of the provinces should receive a considerable en- 
dowment, such as had already been granted to Hanover 
and Electoral Hesse ; and yet this would not be fol- 
lowed by a corresponding reduction in the expenditure 
of the State. Confidence in European peace, which 
the Luxemburg affair had so seriously shaken, had not 
as yet been restored , the French army reforms, the 
constant allusions made by that country to the Treaty 
of Prague, and later, the strained relations in the 
Orient, and the anxiety with regard to Belgium, had 
not allowed the equilibrium in the world of great 
industrial and commercial enterprises to he regained ; 
the stag-nation in husiness was ofrowinsf more serious 
with every day. We have observed how in France 



1868] PRUSSIAN DEFICIT ANyOUXCED. 183 

this condition of affairs produced a political revulsion 
of great magnitude ; in Germany its effects were felt 
in the decrease of State receipts. 

On Xovember Gth the Minister of Finance, Von der 
Heydt, submitted the budget for 1860, accompanied by 
a memorial in which he called attention to a deficit of 
5,200,000 thalers. He stated, that although the l)al- 
ance between expenditures and receipts had not been 
disturbed in 1866, still, by the interruption which the 
war had caused in industrial pursuits, together with 
the anxiety occasioned by the rumors of new wars, the 
after effects had been extended into the next year. 
This condition had been aggravated by the poor har- 
vest of 1867, which had resulted in actual famine in 
East Prussia, requiring heavy sacrifices on the part of 
the State. The Federal treasury had also suffered a 
considerable diminution in its receipts, a loss for \\hit'h 
the Customs Parliament had refused to provide, mak- 
ing it necessary that the pro rata contributions of tlie 
confederated States should be increased. The Govern- 
ment had. however, not yet relinquished the ho[)e that 
an early revival of business would l)ring relief, and 
believed that the present ebb in ihc liuances was l)ut a 
temporary condition. It therefore [)n)p()S('d that the 
deficit be covered by a sale of a })art of the State's 
property, especially of Cijln-Mindeu Railroad stock. 

In the absence of a better plan. IJismai'ck and lioon 
had both consented to this proposal as an cxpL-dient, 
although thcii- hearts were filled with indignalion that 
mattei'S had been aIlow»'(l to conic to siicli a ])ass. for 



184 PABLIAMENTAliY CONFLICTS. [1868 

in their opinion, to (lra\^' upon the capital to meet cur- 
rent expenditures was, if continued, a ruinous viola- 
tion of tlie first principles of any wise economy, whether 
public or private. 

The deputies, on the other liand, breathed a sigh of 
relief at this prospect of covering the deficit without 
adding to the burden of their constituents either l)y 
increased taxes or by the necessary interest upon a 
public debt. Minister Von der Heydt had reason to 
rejoice at this, so much the more so, since the parlia- 
mentary horizon in general wore a most threatening 
aspect. From the annexed provinces came reports of 
complaint and disaffection which in Electoral Hesse 
and Hanover had found expression in the formation 
of a society advocating the re-admission of Austria into 
the German Confederation, together with equal rights 
for all the allied Governments, which was synonymous 
with the re-establishment of the Federal Constitution 
of 1815. 

In the House itself a bitter feeling of resentment 
prevailed against Count Eulenburg because of his slow- 
ness and feudal tendencies in matters of administrative 
reform, in consequence of which he was subjected to 
some very unpleasant experiences in connection with 
several items of the estimates submitted by him. The 
rigid orthodoxy of the Minister of Education and Pub- 
lic Worship, Miililer, as well as his exaggerated econ- 
omy in the plans for the public schools, had roused an 
indignant spirit of protest ; whereas a number of de- 
sired appropriations were refused Eulenburg, Miihler 



1868] DETERMINED OPPOSITION. 185 

was criticised for having placed his estimates so 
low. 

During the debate upon the budget, the Minister of 
Justice, Leonhardt, raised a tremendous storm by 
declaring in plain terms that in defiance of the House 
he intended to make a certain outlay to which the 
House had refused its sanction ; he was, however, 
finally induced to agree upon a compromise. Great, 
however, was the ap[)robation with which the House 
received a bill providing new regulations to govern 
mortgage transactions in Prussia, which he submitted, 
together with an able exposition of the need of a uni- 
form system of national law for all Germany, at the 
same time expressing the hope that when the bill just 
submitted should have become a Prussian law it would 
be adopted, not only by the North German Confedera- 
tion, but by the States south of the Main as well. 

The other transactions, dealing with questions of 
special Prussian interest, do not concern our narrative. 
One motion, jointly made by Free Conservatives and 
National Liberals, must, however, be mentioned. It 
was proposed that the Reichstag and the Prussian Repre- 
sentative Assembly should be so far identified that the 
Prussian members of the Reichstag should constitute 
the Prussiiin Assembly. Bismarck opposed the plan 
on the ground that the King -would thereby lose his 
right to dissolve the Assembly, since the Reichstag 
would not submit to a partial dissolution, and for the 
fui'ther reason that the Prussian Tapper House could 
tiud no j)lac;e under the Federal Constitution; and 



18G PA ELI AMEN TAB Y CONFLICTS. [1869 

finally, because the number of Prussian citizens willing 
to accept the office of deputy would grow appreciably 
smaller if this implied a twofold duty making a double 
demand upon their time. Hereupon the motion was 
abandoned. 

Immediately after the budget was passed, the session 
closed on March 6th, 1869. 

Two days before, on March 4th, 1869, King William 
had opened the session of the Reichstag with a speech 
from the throne, in which lie submitted to the consider- 
ation of this assembly a long array of treaties and bills, 
at the same time utilizing the occasion to repeat the 
advice he had given the Prussian Assembly urging the 
necessity of providing for the deficiency in the Federal 
chest, so that a reduction in the pro rata contrilmtions 
might become possible. In conclusion he said that the 
happy solution of the Oriental question had made peace 
in Europe assured, the Governments being wholly dis- 
inclined to disturb it and the enemies of order lacking 
the power to do so. 

It became evident from the first that the financial 
question would form the central point of all interest 
and action, and would be the decisive one in determin- 
ing the character of German politics. That we may 
arrive at this all-absorbing subject with as little delay 
as possible, we will take but a rapid survey of the 
most important legislative achievements of the session. 

A number of postal treaties, as well as several con- 
ventions for the protection of literary property, were 
sanctioned by the Reichstag ^^•ith()ut calling fortli crit- 



1869] GREATER FREEDOM IN BUSINESS. 187 

icism of any kind; but the treaty establishing military 
freedom of migration between Baden and the North 
German Confederation aroused great patriotic enthu- 
siasm, to which Bennigsen gave eloquent expression. 

A most conscientious and thorough consideration, 
partly in the whole House, partly in committees, was 
given to a number of bills for the promotion of freedom 
and security within the province of economics. Of 
these the most important ones, those dealing with the 
regulation of trade and industrj-, remained a subject of 
discussion throughout the entire session. With regard 
to the general principles underlying them there was 
but one mind, the furtherance of freedom in industrial 
pursuits ; numbei'less practical details suggested them- 
selves, however, and gave rise to many amendments 
and corresponding changes in the text of the bill. 
The Federal Council recognized the merit of many of 
these, and submitted to the others. The result was a 
production so excellent that it still forms the basis of 
our present industrial system. 

The purpose of another bill was to protect the labor- 
ing classes against a baneful i)ractice which at this 
time was working wide-spread mischitl': it was in- 
duced by the right which every creditor had of sccin- 
iny himself against the loss of a loan made to a laborer 
by attaching the wages due the debtor or to become 
due in the futiwe, thus thn»wing the responsibilit}' 
upon the em})Ioyer. The eonsecpieiice was an un- 
wholesome and usurious credit, which the laborer 
would have found it inipossil)le to obtain except for 



188 PARLIAMENTABY CONFLICTS. [1869 

the security rendered l)y the attachment on nis wages, 
and of which many a careless one took advantage to his 
own ruin. As an example, a large factory was cited, 
among the employees of which 1,600 cases of attach- 
ment on wages had occurred within a year. In the 
Dartmund district, there had been 10,000 like instances 
within the same period. The hill l^ecame a law by the 
large vote which the Reichstag cast in its favor. 

It had been intended to supplement the law estal> 
lishing freedom of migration by another enactment fix- 
ing the conditions necessary to the acquirement of a 
legal residence by which public relief could be claimed. 
The Prussian Government liad submitted such an one 
to the Federal Council, based like its predecessor upon 
the principle of greatest freedom in intercourse ; but it 
met with so much opposition from several of the Mid- 
dle States that it was abandoned, and never reached 
the Reichstag. 

A better fate was in store for a bill which provided 
that the tribunals of every State belonging to the Con- 
federation should, upon requisition made by a tribunal 
of any other one of the confederated States, render 
legal aid such as could be demanded were the applying 
tribunal and the one addressed within the limits of the 
same State. The first section, that concerning aid in 
civil suit, encountered no opposition, and was quickly 
accepted ; with regard to criminal prosecution, how- 
ever, it was questioned whether it were not better to 
postpone action until after the appearance of the 
promised Federal penal code. Doubts were also ex- 



1869] MUTUAL LEGAL AID. ELECTORAL LAW. 189 

pressed regarding compulsory evidence, and the sur- 
render of a person accused of having trespassed the 
law in the State making requisition, ])ut who was a cit- 
izen of the one to which application was being made. 
These difficulties did not, however, ])rove insurmount- 
able, and the bill becanic a law. 

In the foregoing year, there had been talk of adopt- 
ing as a part of the law of the North German Confed- 
eration the German commercial law and the statute 
laws concerning bills of exchange wliich had origi- 
nated in the time of the old Confederation, thus making 
them binding upon all the confederated States, This 
was now done, furnishing an opportunity for the Gov- 
ernment of Saxony to propose the establishment of a 
Federal Superior Court of Commerce at Leipzig. Al- 
though Hamburg made the counter proposal that a 
general Federal Supreme Court should be established, 
the Reichstag complied witli Saxony's request as rec- 
ommended by the Federal Council. 

A greater contrariety of opinion appeared in con- 
nection witli a l)ill wliicli the Federal Council had re- 
garded as hardly more than a mere matter of form, — 
a law regulating the elections for the Reichstag accord- 
ing to the princi})les of the Constitution. It will be re- 
membered that ill this respect slight irregularities had 
occurred in several of the States during the recent elec- 
tions. Regarding most of tlie amendments to wliicli 
the debate gave rise, an agreement was soon reached ; 
])ut the clause by wliich luenibcis of tlie army and navy 
wei'e excbt(lc(l fioin the privih-gc of voting caused a 
vigorous clash (if ojiiiiidus. 



190 PARLIAMENTArxY CONFLICTS. [1869 

Lasker, Waldeck, and Bebel, in nnusnal combination, 
declared that in view of the nniversal oblioation to 
serve, in other words, with a citizen army such as ^^■as 
tliat of North Germany, it was most pernicious to ex- 
clude for j-ears its members, the young and able men 
of the nation, from the most highly prized privilege of 
the people. To be sure, said they, the Government 
Avas doing all in its power to render the army entirely 
distinct from the people ; nevertheless, the principle 
that a free nation and its army should be one re- 
mained true. 

To this, General Steinmetz retorted by way of a 
question, asking whether the gentlemen advocated an 
army of disputants who while under arms might form 
themselves into parties, and make it possible for am- 
bitious generals to issue proiiunciamentos after the 
Spanish fashion. It was finally decided that the clause 
should read : All members of the army or navy are 
debarred from the privilege of voting as long as they 
are in active service. 

During the very first daj'S of the session Lasker 
again presented his motion for the inviolability of dep- 
uties, or their exemption from prosecution in conse- 
quence of utterances made in the exercise of their 
functions, a privilege to which the Prussian Upper 
House had remained inflexibly adverse. In connection 
with it he now expressed the hope that Bismarck, in 
fulfilment of the promise he had given during the ses- 
sion of the past year, would further its sanction by the 
Federal Council. 



1869] FBEEDOM OF SPEECH. CIVIL CODE. 191 

In reply, Bismarck declared that he was fully in sym- 
pathy with the i^irinciple which the motion embodied, 
as also that in his opinion this was a matter within 
the jurisdiction of the Reichstag, but added that, 
whereas upon questions of great practical importance 
he always sought to throw the full weight of Prussia's 
influence with the Federal Council into the scale, yet 
it was his practice upon all other occasions to adhere 
strictly to his principle upon all questions of less mo- 
r.ient fully to respect the independence of the several 
States. Such a question he considered the one now 
before the House to be, since in consequence of past 
events the prosecution of a deputy for the cause in- 
dicated had been practically rendered impossible. 

To this the retort was made, "You are quite willing, 
then, to see Prussia dominated by the smaller States?" 
With imperious calmness Bismarck replied, " My action 
in the Federal Council must be determined wholly by 
my own judgment ; by this coui-se I have so far been 
successful in promoting the stability of our union, 
which was ])y no means always an easy task. I can- 
not allow myself to be influenced through the opin- 
ions of others to foi'sake my principles." Lasker's 
motion was then adopted by a vote of 140 voices 
against 51. The Federal Council, however, refused 
to saiicti(»n it. 

Another motion made by Laskor in conjimction with 
Miquel had no Ijcttcr late. Its design was to extend 
the jurisdiction of tlic Confederation, as di'liiicd in 
Article iv. of the Constitution, to the entire domain of 



192 PAELlAMENTAnr CONFLICTS. [1869 

civil law, as well as to legal procedure inclusive of the 
organization of the courts. 

That in any extensive country uniformity in the de- 
partment of the law is of benefit, and gives increased 
security both to the public and the interpreters of the 
law, as also that in a Federal State it has its political 
advantages, no one will dispute. In the present debate 
the objections of a technical character, which this ques- 
tion also did not fail to suggest, receded before the 
greater interest which centred about the more radical 
objection, that since herein a modification of the Consti- 
tution without the required unanimous consent of all 
the Governments was involved, it was a matter beyond 
the jurisdiction of the Confederation. This was an 
argument which had been put forward as early as 1867 
in connection with the deliberation upon the Constitu- 
tion, but had been disregarded by both the Reichstag 
and the Federal Council. 

This motion also was adopted by the Reichstag, and 
rejected by the Federal Council. 

Two motions of a contentious nature, originating in 
the desire for parliamentary power, are still to be men- 
tioned ; by the first of these, presented by Waldeck, it 
was proposed to substitute for the clause of the Consti- 
tution by which deputies were prohibited from receiv- 
ing compensation of any kind for their services in the 
Reichstag, one granting allowances to the membei-s. 
No new arguments for or against were brought for- 
ward ; and though the motion was carried by a vote 
of 109 against 94 voices in its first reading, in the 



1869] liESPOySIBLi: MIXISTEJRS DISCUSSED. 193 

second it was lost by 110 voices against and only 100 
in favor. Whether its advocates had deserted it, or its 
adversaries had increased in number, I cannot say. 

A most brilliant and interesting parliamentary en- 
counter took jjlace on April IGth, induced by a motion 
made by Twesten and Count Miinster with the support 
of eighty-one sympathizere gathered from the ranks of 
all the various parties. Its theme was an old one often 
disputed, — a demand for responsible Ministers at the 
head of the Federal Departments of Foreign Affaii-s, of 
^^'ar, of the Navy, of Justice, of Finance, and of Com- 
merce. The gentlemen who introduced the motion pro- 
tested most earnestly that it was not meant as a vote 
of want of confidence in the Chancellor, but quite the 
contrary ; the intention was to lighten the labor which 
was now required of him, and which far exceeded any- 
thing that human strength could render. They pro- 
posed, therefore, to divide it among several independent 
departments ; thus more firmly established order and 
greater system in the conduct of the affaii-s of the 
State would be secured, and tlie present uncertainty 
regarding parliamentary influence \q)()n the action of 
the Government would be removed. 

Since the proposed plan designated iicithci- the degree 
of responsibility to be assumed, nor the manner of en- 
forcing it l)y legal measures, Bismarck did not find it a 
difficult task to prove its total inconsistency witli tlic 
Federal Constitution and with the prerogatives of the 
allied sovereigns, as well as to demonstrate the advan- 
tages of the present system. It was one of liis red- 



194 PARLIAMENTARY CONFLICTS. [1869 

letter days. His speech ujjon this occasion, occupying 
several hours, is one of his most brilliant jJiU'liamentary 
achievements, both for richness of original thought and 
for versatility of style, leaving no tone untouched in 
the scale of argument, from the most impassioned and 
l)old polemic to the most subtle but always good- 
natured irony. It is a masterpiece of which an abstract 
can give no idea, and which to be appreciated must be 
read. 

Despite the fact that Bismarck had deprived tlie ad- 
vocates of the motion of all hope that it would be suc- 
cessful in the Federal Council, it was nevertheless 
passed by the House, although by but a small majority 
(111 against 100 voices). 

The lively interest which the majority had shown in 
the subject was due in the first place to their wish to 
diminish the influence of the Federal Council upon the 
Federal Government, and it was chiefly against this 
that Bismarck's attack had been directed. It was, how- 
ever, also prompted by the old desire of the majority to 
acquire a controlling influence upon the Government 
through the parliament. There was doubtlessly in con- 
nection with it less thought of the few cases in which 
a Minister's breach of trust would make proceedings 
advisa])le, than there was of the practice to which the 
institution of a responsible Ministry had led in other 
constitutional States, namely, that of compelling an 
unpopular Minister to retire AT once by a vote of 
want of confidence. Of the dark side which this 
system presents in the consequent instability of the 



1869] THE FKDERAL BUDGET. 195 

Government, Prussia had at this time seen as little as 
it had of the possibility of getting rid of an oltiioxious 
Minister even without legal responsibility by means of 
PERSISTENT parliamentary opposition. It was not long 
before such an instance occurred. 

Three days previously, on April l;^>lli. the Federal 
Council had su])mitted the budget for 1870 to the 
Reichstag, and the spirit with which it was there re- 
ceived was not improved by the unqualified rejection 
which the Twesten-Miinster motion had met in the 
Federal Council. To be sure, the estimates for the 
Federal expenditures offered little opportunity for crit- 
icism ; live-sixths of the entire amount were comprised 
in the army budget, which by the provision of the Con- 
stitution was not subject to criticism by the House until 
1871. That the mucli-discussed loan for tlR> navv had 
been increased from ten to seventeen millions roused 
no opposition ; and the first appearance of the Foreign 
Office in connection with the Federal estimates was 
rather an occasion for congratulation than otherwise, 
wherefore its individual items were not called iiit(* 
question. The estimated expenditures for the other 
departments fared ecpially well. 

A much less pleasing prospect was revealed by the 
chapter of estimated receipts. In consequence of the 
reduced ])ostal rates the revenue from tliis source had 
fallen oif gi'eatly, and there M'as l»ut little hope tliat 
this condition would be modified by an increase in the 
postal })usiness. A iiuml)er of icductions in customs 
rates had ])ecii followed by a similar residl. In I'ait, 



196 PARLIAMENTARY CONFLICTS. [1868 

the second reading of the budget showed the expendi- 
tures of the Confederation to exceed its independent 
revenue by twenty-five million thalers, or by two and 
one half millions more than for the current year 1869. 
This increase for 1870 would therefore have to be 
met by correspondingly larger pro rata contributions 
required of the individual States. 

This brings us to the source of all the dissatisfaction. 
Prussia, whose proportionate share according to the 
number of its inhabitants was four-fifths of this sum, 
a round twenty millions therefore, had a growing defi- 
cit to face at home, and was consequently neither able 
nor inclined to furnish so large a contribution. As we 
have seen, the Prussian Minister of Finance, Von der 
Heydt, had avoided the difiiculty in connection with 
the Prussian budget for 1869 by the sale of a part of 
the State's active capital, in the hope that the long 
delayed revival of business would soon set in, and 
would then quickly supply the deficiency, whereas, ow- 
ing to the strained relations prevailing in Europe dur- 
ing the year 1868, quite the contrary of this was true. 
The closed account of the actual receipts and expendi- 
tures for 1868, as presented, showed that the current 
fiscal year had been begun Avith a larger deficit than 
had been anticipated ; that in the business world better 
times were as yet not at hand ; that Prussia had dimin- 
ished its active capital by seven millions, and was con- 
fronted by a probable deficit of between ten and eleven 
millions in its accounts for 1870. 

The Prussian ^Ministry liad rejected the proposed rej> 



1869] MANY NEW TAXES PROPOSED. 197 

etition of the expedient resorted to in 1868 quite as 
emphatically as it had refused to meet the exigency 
by a loan, its action being based upon the principle 
that in a well-conducted system of economy ordinary 
expenditures are provided for by ordinary receipts. But 
in so far as a defrayment by additional taxation was 
concerned, it was believed in Prussia that the direct 
taxes could not possibly be increased ; it was therefore 
determined in the Federal Council, that about one-half 
of the amount of the necessary pro rata contributions 
should be raised through indirect taxes, which, to be- 
come lawful, required in part the sanction of the Reichs- 
tag, in part that of the Customs Parliament. 

Consequently, in connection with the first reading 
of the Federal Imdget, President Delbriick at once 
proposed three new means of adding to the revenue, — 
stamps on bills of exchange, withdrawal of the franking 
[)rivileges, and, what was most important of all, a 
higher tax on brandy. A fortnight later a Federal 
delegate made the rather thnid announcement, that yet 
four other propositions were receiving their Ihuil revis- 
ion in the Federal Council, — a very low tax on beer, 
a most modest one on illuminating-gas, a tax on certifi- 
cates of sale re([uiied in stock ti'ansactions, and an in- 
crease of ten per cent in the tariff of railway charges 
for j()unic\s of more than thi-ct' miles. Finally, that 
the eiitiiv tidil of it'< linaiicial activity might lie fully 
revealed to the critical eye of the representative body, 
notice was jjiven tliat the Customs Parliament also 
would 1k' called upon to give its consent to higher tax- 



198 PAULIAMENTAUY CONFLICTS. [1869 

ation, — besides the duty on petroleuiu refused in the 
last session, a higher tax on beet^root sugar. All these 
revelations were then concluded, again after the lapse of 
a few weeks, by a memorial submitted by Minister von 
der Heydt, and containing an explicit statement of 
Prussia's financial dilemma, offered in proof of the 
necessity for all these demands. 

The conclusive argument which these figures pre- 
sented by no means improved the Minister's position 
in the eyes of the Assembly. The consequences of the 
mistake he had made in seeking escape from the diffi- 
culty of 1868 through the sacrifice of a part of the 
interest-bearing capital of the State, which was in 
itself an unwise measure, had now to be faced. As 
diligently as his subordinates had worked ever since 
it had become evident that the hope of better times 
was a vain one, much time had nevertheless been lost ; 
therefore, instead of being able to present a compre- 
hensive, well-devised plan of action at the beginning 
of the session, one inadequate and supplementary de- 
vice after another in the shape of new taxes, the 
necessity for which failed to be shown, was now 
brought forward, with intermissions of weeks between. 
And all this was done toward the latter half of the 
session, as though it were intended to make a thorough 
examination by the Reiclistag impossible. 

Lasker did not hesitate to rise to the very personal 
criticism that a man who in two years had reduced 
the Prussian finances from a condition of prosperity 
to this pass was not fitted to conduct the affairs of 



1869] THE MILITARY BUIiUEN CltlTWISED. lOQ" 

a great State. The most unfortunate circumstance 
for the Minister was that in 1868 he had supported his 
plan hy the claim that the deficit was of a transitory 
nature, and that there was every reason to believe it 
would soon disappear. The arguiuents which he liad 
then offered in evidence of this were now repeated to 
him as being still entirely pertinent. Such a deficit 
has, in fact, frequently arisen in the Prussian finances 
without being foUow^ed by an}- serious consequences, 
a surplus soon appearing in its place. 

" And for a cause so transitory you expect us to 
sanction a long list of taxes, which, unlike it, will be 
permanent," asked the orators of tlie National Liberal 
Party, "so that long after the deficit has disappeared, 
the people will still be staggering under this additional 
burden, although the Government will be rolling in 
wealth? " (In Prussia no tax can be abated or reduced 
without the consent of the Government.) "It will bo 
our privilege to discuss the army biulget for 1871,"' 
said Lasker, " and I am l)y no means disposed to con- 
sent to all these taxes to-(biy ; for so we shall place our 
opponents in the position to say to us two years lience, 
' There is no reason why the military expenditures 
should not continue as at present ; the means with 
which to defray them are at hand.' " And tliat was 
the biu'den of every speech made en the Liberal si(h^, — 
no more taxes to continue for an indefinite time. 

"You are willing, then, that a ([uestion of constitu- 
tionality sliall again arise in I'russia ? " remarked His- 
mai'ck ; "that again an cxtciisidn of pailiainentary 



•200 PARLIAMENTARY CONFLICTS. [1869 

power be made the condition to procuring needed 
funds for the State ? Evidently the centre of gravity 
of Prussian State authority is not located to your 
liking ; you would move it a few points nearer the 
reach of the parliament. This might be made matter 
for a bargain between us ; I have no scruples which 
would restrain me from coming to terms with you. 
Never, however, by such a barter as this. If you per- 
sist in making a modification of constitutional privileges 
the price of higher taxation, you will force the Gov- 
ernment to renounce the increase in revenue, and to 
get rid of the deficit through a reduction of expendi- 
tures by incurring only such as are legally and ab- 
solutely necessary, forcing it not only to postpone 
everything that is not immediately needed, but to leave 
undone much that would promote the best interests 
of our countr}-." 

In reply to the criticism that this was a threat, he 
said that it was simply the expression of that which the 
Constitution imposed as a duty ; he could hardly as- 
sume that a representative assembly would prefer to see 
him spend money which had not been duly appropriated. 

Nothing could have been more pleasing to the major- 
ity of the House than the intelligence that by a reduc- 
tion of expenditure all necessity for additional revenue 
would be obviated, and every one knew full well what 
that great item of expenditure was of which above all 
others they wished to be rid. Upon this point also, 
Lasker's intimation found repeated echo on the Left. 

The present condition is not to be endured, it was 



1869] REICHSTAG REJECTS TUE NEW TAXES. iJOl 

said ; our oppressive military system is fatal to culture, 
prosperity, and liberty ; moreover, it is wholly un- 
necessary ; for the nations, prompted both by their 
natural inclinations and by regard for their inter- 
ests, advocate peace, whilst in every speech from the 
throne his Majesty reiterates how little disposed are 
the Governments to disturb it. Why, then, do we 
maintain this colossal soldiery? Why this waste of 
money and ability? Prussia was the first to put its 
army upon such a footing ; it should be the first to re- 
duce it, or at least to propose to the other Cabinets a 
general disarmament. 

" There is but one waj-," said Lowe in concluding a 
vigorous speech, " by which we can return to a well- 
ordered financial condition, and that is by econoni}^ in 
our army budget." It was on the 22d of May, 1869, 
that a truly conscientious politician indulged in these 
dangerous illusions, and by their utterance won the ap- 
plause of the Reichstag. 

To heighten the disfavor with which Von der Ileydt's 
proposals for increased taxes were received, there was 
the disap[)n)])ati()n \\ith which the majority regarded 
indirect taxes in general, as being an unjustly imposed 
addition to the burden of tlie poorer classes. lu tlic 
Reichstag this opiniou found its strongest expression in 
the utterances of Becker (Dortmund), a fearless revolu- 
tionist in 1S4H, an lioiicst Democrat ever since. As 
was consistent witii his earnest nature, he liad passed 
from a sphere of divei-sified activity and wcll-grouiKh'd 
study through the stage of speculative theorizing, ami 



202 PARLIAMENTABY CONFLICTS. [1869 

had arrived at a thoroughly practical comprehension of 
public affairs. In the present connection, however, he 
allowed his humanitarian sympathies to lead him into 
exaggerations and contradictions ; he spoke of all taxes 
on articles of consumption in the same tone, as though 
taxes on the necessaries of life and those on superfluous 
articles of luxury were alike reprehensible ; whereas 
those proposed by the Minister all belonged to the lat- 
ter class. Becker, however, condemned them all, be- 
cause he believed the poor man felt their pressure more 
than did the rich man. " I shall vote against every 
tax," he exclaimed, " which adds to the cost of labor 
and to the difficulty of intercourse." This added diffi- 
culty is, however, encountered by the rich as well as 
by the poor, and it is not possiljle that a tax which 
enhances the price of labor, therefore raises wages, can 
be especially oppressive to the laborer. 

Be this as it may, Becker succeeded in convincing 
the assembly. After a long-continued debate, all the 
lucrative tax projects were rejected on June 1st, the 
tax on brandy by a nearly unanimous vote, the one 
side hesitating to add to the price of the glass of 
schnapps which warms the poor man, the other fearing 
that the proposed tax would cause the ruin of the 
small distilleries, and would therefore be fatal to the 
prosperity of the rural middle class. Both, however, 
were as yet not inclined to extricate the Governments 
from their financial embarrassment, that these might for 
a while continue to realize their dependence upon the 
parliament. 



1869] THE CUSTOMS PABLIAMENT. 203 

On the field upon which had been fought the battle 
for higher taxation there now remained amid the ruins 
of all the other propositions only two as yet unscathed, 
because, forsooth, they had been reserved for the action 
of the Customs Parliament, — the reintroduction of the 
duty on petroleum, and a slight increase in the duty 
on imported sugar, besides a corresponding tax upon 
domestic beet-root sugar. 

The first measure which was submitted to the Cus- 
toms Parliament after the opening of the session on 
June 3d was the promised law making general reforms 
in the administration of customs affairs with a view to 
facilitating commerce ; after this came the bill regard- 
ing the tax on sugar which the advocates of free trade 
had suggested in 1868 ; and finally the bill dealing 
with a comprehensive tariff reform. In this a reduc- 
tion of the duties upon a variety of iron manufactures 
and of the duty on rice appeared ; and between these, 
as a compensation for the loss of revenue to which 
these would lead, figured the duty on petroleum. The 
bill was accompanied by the positive statement that the 
tariff propositions were inseparable ; that is, the entire 
tariff reform was conditional upon the sanction of the 
duty on petroleum. 

In consideration of the fact that the advocates of 
free trade were in the majority in the I'arliament, the 
(Tovernmcnts had made their already liljcral (iffer still 
more so l)y supplementing the rediictioii on pig iron 
proposed in the previous l)ill by coiTcspondi'igly lower 
duties on the various forms of manufactured iron, hop- 



204 PABLIAMENTAEY CONFLICTS. [1869 

iiig in this way at last to procure the consent of the 
Parhament to the duty on petroleum. The prospect 
for a definitive result was, however, not at all encoura- 
ging. The free-trade majority was by no means of one 
mind. The conservative landowners of East Prussia 
Avho in 1868 had voted for the duty on petroleum were 
now delighted at the prospect of a less restricted im- 
portation of iron manufactures, picturing to themselves 
the happy consequences which would ensue for their 
agricultural interests. The same regard, however, 
would have prompted them readily to forgive the Gov- 
ernments had they omitted from the list of reductions 
that on rice. 

Influenced by wholly different motives, an uncouipro- 
misingly free-trade group insisted upon the reduced 
duty on rice, and in opposition to the judgment of the 
•Governments demanded a still further reduction of that 
on pig iron. The group of sugar manufacturers also 
had their interests to guard; they made their consent 
to the tax on beet-root sugar conditional upon a higher 
duty on the imported article, and the assurance of a 
legally established export premium for the product of 
their factories. And finally, by far the greater number 
of the party, although they would gladly have seen the 
tariff reform enacted, nevertheless hoped to compel 
the Governments to content themselves with the duty 
on sugar as sufficient compensation for the tariff reduc- 
tions. For they were fully resolved to reject the duty 
on petroleum ; at the same time, they were most solici- 
tous that the Governments should be protected against 



1869] TAX ON SUGAR APPROVED. 205 

the sin of wilfuliu'ss and tlie dangei-s besetting too 
great riches. 

As Avitli the majority, so it was with the minority ; 
the protectionists were no more harmonions than were 
their opponents. The sole object of the German 
brothers from the Soutli was, as it had been during the 
previons session, to prevent any fruit from being pro- 
duced upon tills Prussian soil. Tlie South German 
National Liberals, who had now constituted themselves 
an individual fraction as "the bridge over the Main," 
nevertheless remaincMl united with the Opposition in 
hostility either to the duty on petroleum or to certain 
provisions of the revised tariff schedule. As for the 
others, the representatives of the iron industry were 
unreservedly for the rejection of the entire bill, whereas 
a more moderate group would have cpialitied the rejec- 
tion bv a resolution promising consent to the reduction 
of the duties on iron in the next session, provided the 
Governments would, in the meantime, procure corre- 
spondingly advantageous conditions in England and 
France for the German manufactures. 

-When the varying influences which these conflicting 
interests brought to bear upon the debate are taken 
into consideration, it will not ])e difficult to realize how 
])arty combinations changed again and again. How- 
ever, to record these here would not be to oui- purpose. 
After the bill regulating custoius affairs had bt'cii ac- 
cepted almost without cliange, the lirst reading of the 
tariff-reform bill resulted in tlie following deeisions: a 
reduction of the duties upon iion manufactures, but 



206 PARLIAMENTARY CONFLICTS. [1869 

none on pig iron, was jiassed by a vote of 130 against 
104 voices; the lower duty on rice was also approved, 
despite the opposition of the conservative element; the 
duty on petroleum was rejected by a vote of 155 
against 93 voices, Lasker having delivered a most 
acrimonious speech against it; after which, with quite 
as much energy, he defended the cause of the sugar 
interests as represented in the higher protective duty 
and the correspondingly increased tax on beet-sugar. 
When this had been adopted, he moved that the rates 
on sugar should go into effect simultaneously with the 
new tariff law. President Delbrlick, however, in the 
name of the Governments, at once protested against 
the association of these two laws Ijetween which there 
was not the slightest connection, and announced at the 
same time that the Governments would accept the 
amendments which the proposed sugar law had re- 
ceived. 

At the beginning of the final deliberation upon the 
tariff, Bismarck again commended the duty on petro- 
leum to the favorable consideration of the House, and 
reiterated the declaration that a tariff reform apart 
from a duty on petroleum would not receive the sanc- 
tion of the Presidium. That this announcement would 
not effect a change in the decisions arrived at in the 
second reading was, however, quite evident from the 
beginning ; and the duty on petroleum was rejected by 
157 voices against 110. 

Neither did the Parliament alter its decision with 
regard to the sugar law ; although it was in this connec- 



1869] DUTY ON PETllOLEVM BEJECTEl). 207 

tion that the Government won its only victory of the 
entire session, Lasker's motion to associate it with the 
tariff reform being lost. 

The Government then v/ithdrew the tariff-reform bill, 
and the Parliament was closed on June 22d. 

The session of the Reichstag was concluded on the 
same day. The King on this occasion expressed his 
appreciation of the effective legislative activity of the 
House, as well as his regret that an agreement had not 
been reached with regard to the finances. No action 
making possible a reduction in the j^ro rata contribu- 
tions devolving upon the several States having been 
taken, the question of finance must now be solved in 
the several Representative Assemblies, the emergenc}- 
having to be provided for either by curtailing expendi- 
tures or by increasing such taxes as were subject to 
local control. 

What this implied was revealed when, three months 
later, the winter session of the Prussian Assembly was 
opened on October 6th, 1869. In the speech from tlie 
throne, it was announced that the year 1870 would be 
entered upon with a deficit of five and one-half millions, 
in consequence of which the income, class, fl(mr, and 
slaughter taxes would have to ])e raised twenty-five per 
cent; a great reduction of expenditure in nearly all the 
departments \\'as reported ; it was proposed that the 
thirteen millions worth of treasury notes issued during 
the fi)regoiiig year should l)e covered b}- a definite 
loan ; and, finally, two inqiortant bills were submitted, 
which, having been Ioiil;^ looked for and much desired. 



208 PARLIAMENTABY CONFLICTS. [1869 

would, it was hoped, cheer the spirits of the assembly ; 
they were a law introducing a new system of district 
regulations in the six eastern provinces, placing these 
on a basis of self-government, and the general education 
law of which the Constitution had given promise. 

That the Government had at length taken the initi- 
ative in these important matters was gratefully recog- 
nized by the House ; although the impression which 
the contents of the two bills, when heard, made upon 
the majority was of a doubtful if not wholly unfavor- 
able nature. If such was the reception accorded these 
bills, what might not be expected for the propositions 
of the Minister of Finance ? What he heard of the 
spirit manifested by the deputies robbed Herr von 
der Heydt of all hope. It was to no avail that Otto 
Camphausen advised him to strike at the root of the 
evil by means of a radical reform ; he did not believe 
that such a measure could be carried out, even should 
the House consent to it. On October 25th he tendered 
his resignation ; and on the 26th it was accepted, Otto 
Camphausen, at the time President of the Institute 
of Maritime Commerce, being nominated as his suc- 
cessor. 

It was on the same day, the 26th, that the House 
appointed the 29th as the day for the opening discus- 
sion on the budget. After a few other matters on 
the order of the day had been disposed of, the new 
Minister of Finance addressed the House, both to in- 
troduce himself, and to present the difficulty of the 
position by which he found himself suddenly forced to> 



1869] PRUSSIAN DEFICIT. 209 

assume tlie resp()ii8il)ility for tlie budget, although his 
knowledge of the preparatory work and preliminary 
deliberations was wholly inadequate. It was there- 
fore impossible for him, he said, to present the finan- 
cial situation from his point of view; and he nuist, 
therefore, beg permission to 2)ostpone his exposition of 
the chief point in dispute, namely, the amount of the 
deficit and the best way to get rid of it, until such a 
time as he should be better acquainted with the subject. 

"A general intimation," he continued, '• I think I 
may allow myself even to-day: the intimation that in 
my opinion a correct financial policy requires that 
greater liberty of action be allowed the State with 
regard to the deficit ; it should have the privilege to 
set aside larger sums for this purpose in years of pros- 
perity, and smaller ones during less favorable times." 
(Cries of ''Very good I" from more than one part of 
the House.) " When I realize through a closer exam- 
ination of the budget before me that it closes A\ith a 
deficit of five and one-half millions. l)ut at the same 
time applies, as the law demands it should, eight and 
one-half millions toward the liquidation of debts of 
longer standing, I must acknowledge that our finan- 
cial estimates are such as might arouse the envy of 
most of the otlier countries of Europe." 

A lively expression of approval ran thi-ougli the 
House. As thougji l)y a magic toiicli darkness were 
turned into light, so the deficit seemed suddenl}' to 
vanisli and give j)l;rce to a suri)lus. and instead of vio- 
lent c(jnfliet appeared the; pros|)e(t of inteiiial peace. 



'210 PARLIAMENTARY CONFLICTS. [1869 

To be sure, the goal was still far distant, and misgiv- 
ings, doubts, and differences of opinion would not be 
wanting ; still, the way seemed once more clear, and 
he who was the leader upon it impressed all as being 
an al)le financier in whom full trust could be placed. 
"■ Even his intimation of the manner in which he means 
to set about his great task was masterly," said Lowe. 
The House complied with his request, and deferred 
the debate until the Minister should have had time to 
formulate his system of action. 

On November 4th, after Camphausen's plan had 
been approved by the King and his Ministers, the first 
preliminary deliberation upon the budget was begun. 
Before following its course, report must first be made 
upon a motion introduced by Virchow, with the support 
of the entire Party of Progress, on October 21st, a few 
days preceding Camphausen's nomination. It was di- 
rected against Von der Heydt's proposed increase in 
taxes, a song to the old tune of relief for the over- 
burdened people through reduction of the military ex- 
penditures. So large an army, it was declared, was 
especially unnecessary, since this constant state of read- 
iness for war was not brought about by the jealous dis- 
position of the people, but only by the attitude of the 
Cabinets ; through diplomatic negotiations a general 
disarmament might therefore be rendered possible. 

Lasker sought to prevent action upon this motion by 
the counter motion to pass to the order of the day, 
assigning as the reason for this proceeding that the 
Federal army budget was legally fixed until the close 



1869] FLAJy TO REDUCE THE DEBT. 211 

of 1871, that the conviction of the Prussian people 
and their representatives with regard to the necessity 
of lightening the military burden was too evident to be 
doubted, and that therefore in 1872 the then newly 
elected Reiclistag would certainly take up this question, 
and finally that diplomatic negotiations upon the sub- 
ject of general disarmament would at present be much 
more likely to lead to discord than to an agreement. 

Lasker's action was not prompted by any doubt of 
the final rejection of Yirchow's motion, but by the wish 
that through his motion the disapprobation of the mili- 
tary burden which it voiced might find a record as being 
the sentiment of the House. 

The decision of the House was that a general discus- 
sion of Camphausen's plan should be followed by one 
on Yircho^^•^s and Lasker's motions. 

Accordingly Camphausen developed his theory of 
action. A full exposition of this and its advantages, 
together with the objections and doubts raised against 
it, would lead us too deeply into the technicalities of 
finance ; we must content ourselves with an outline of 
the controlling^ thouocht. 

Since 1820 Prussia possessed a sinking-fund into 
which the law required the State to pay annually a sum 
amounting to one per cent of all government loans, 
together Mith the interest accruing upt)n these sums ; 
the fund grew steadily under this accuuudation of 
interest upon interest, until, with the additional one per 
cent on all these loans, it had in thirty -eight yeai-s be- 
come sufficient to repay them. This was an excellent 



212 PARLIAMENTARY CONFLICTS. [1889 

system so long as there was a surplus ; when, however, 
the State found itself confronted by a deficit in its ac- 
counts, this necessity of paying interest compelled it to 
raise a new loan to pay the old ones, a scheme evi- 
dently both absurd and improvident. 

Since within recent years Prussia had contracted 
many new and large government loans, its annual pay- 
ments into the sinking-fund now amounted to eight and 
two-thirds millions, besides which a deficit of five and 
one-half millions had arisen in its exchequer. Camp- 
hausen proposed to relieve tlie State of one-half of its 
obligations to the sinking-fund by transforming one- 
half of the State debt, two hundred and twenty-three 
millions, bearing interest partly at four and one-half, 
partly at four per cent, into a perpetual loan, with a 
uniform rate of interest at four and one-half per cent.^ 
To induce the creditors to consent to this conversion, 
a premium of not more than one per cent was to be 
offered. Camphausen hoped that these favorable con- 
ditions would influence by far the greater number of 
creditors to accept the new arrangement ; for those who 
refused to do so, matters were to continue as heretofore. 

The Minister then explained, that, owing to its re- 
lease from these compulsory payments upon 223,000,- 
000, the State would be enabled to save four and a 
half millions annually ; it would therefore not need 



1 It was not deemed advisable to place the rate of interest lower, 
since ^ % paper was quoted at 97. Should a lower rate of interest be 
offered, the risk would be incurred for the future that many debtors 
would demand the payment of the debt at its face value. 



1869] CRITICISM BY THE OPPOSITION. 'IVo 

the higlier taxes, and could cover the remaining detieit 
by the amount to be realized upon certain domains long- 
destined to be sold. 

In the discussion whieli ensued, and which at once 
entered minutely into the details of the plan, this was 
assailed by scarcely so much as a single advei-se criti- 
cism ; on the contrary, one of its keenest opponents, 
E. Richter, declared that if the principle underlying 
the measure were admitted to be correct, its applica- 
tion could not have been more ably or carefully worked 
out. 

But what of the princii)le itself? It soon appeared 
that the first favorable impression made upon a part 
of the Opposition on October 29th had been replaced 
by a feeling of uneasiness. They had hoped by refus- 
ing the Oovernment new sources of needed revenue, or 
at least by restricting these as much as possible, to 
compel it to make certain concessions dear to their 
hearts, such as an extension of their [)arliamentarv 
privileges, or a reduction in the yearly levy of recruits, 
or perhai»s limiting the term of military service to two 
\'ears. All these pleasing anticipations, which were 
to be realized through the success of their strategic 
[)lan, woidd vanish into empty air should Camphausen 
succeed in itcnnaiiciiily relieving the financial crisis. 
Slioiilil his plan of action be adopted, tlie fiitni'e wonld 
not fail to provide occasions enough when the I'rnssian 
Assembly would be calh'd n[)on to sanction new loans 
or taxes to m(M't fui'ther demands of the Stale: Imt. 
according to all human foresight, a deficit, that is, an 



214 PARLIAMENTARY CONFLICTS. [1869 

insufficiency of means wlierewitli to meet the expendi- 
ture required by existing institutions, would not arise 
for many years to come. 

By means of tlie old system, the extinguishment of 
the debt was gradually accomplished ; but tlie amount 
of money at the disposal of the Government for the 
defrayment of yearly expenditures was diminished, 
although the financial condition of the State was stead- 
ily improved. The reverse of this would be the case 
should Camphausen's plan be put into practice ; then 
the State would continue to carry its burden of debt 
undiminished, but the sum annually to be expended 
by the Government would for a time be increased by 
three and a half millions, and later, through the con- 
solidation of the entire debt, would for the indefinite 
future be eight and a half millions larger than at pres- 
ent, without so much as being mentioned in the yearly 
budget. " By doing away with the sinking-fund," said 
one orator, " we shall give the Government liberty 
equivalent to the privilege of icontracting a loan of 
three and a half millions annually without the need of 
parliamentary sanction." 

That this was not to be tolerated Virchow doubted 
not for a moment ; he therefore opposed Camphausen's 
plan, as he had Von der Heydt's, by his motion to 
reduce the deficit by curtailing army expenditures ; to 
force the Government to adopt this course, no other 
way out of its dilemma should be left open to it. 

When Lasker confronted him with the Article of the 
Constitution by which the military expenditures were 



1869] VIRCIIOWS LAPSUS LINGUA. 215 

lixed until 1872, lie replied that tlii.s need not be re- 
garded as an insurmountable obstaele if only the Gov- 
ernments would manifest a spirit of willingness to 
concede to the wish of the people and their re[)resenta- 
tives. In the heat of the discussion he declared further 
that this Article luid moreover been so negligently 
worded that its text permitted of two constructions : 
the one, that in 1872 the Reichstag could diminish the 
expenditure for the army at its pleasure ; the other, 
that even after 1871 the present estimate Mould con- 
tinue in force until such time as the Governments 
should consent to its change. 

This was, in fact, quite true, and exactly expressed 
the intention of the Governments ; but Virchow could 
not have allowed a remark more fatal to the hopes of 
the Opposition to escape him. His hostility to the- 
demands necessary for the maintenance of an army 
adequate to the countrj-'s safety was a widespread dis- 
temper of the time, a remainder of the conflict of former 
days. His confidence in the peaceful disposition of the 
French people only seven months before the declaration 
of war was also shared by many others in those days. 
It is, however, iK)t to the credit of the gj'cat naturalist 
that he allowed tins opinion to lead liim to make the 
general statement that this condition of constant readi- 
ness for war was not necessitated by the nnitual jeal- 
ousy of the nations, but by the attitude of the Cabinets 
toward one another. For since 1813 this century has 
not witnessed ;i ("ultinct war; that is, a conflict into 
which the licsitating ruler was not swept l)v tlie cur- 



216 PARLIAMENTARY CONFLICTS. [1869 

rent of a strong popnlar sentiment, or at the close of 
which (with the single exception of 1866) his people 
did not express to him their gratitude for his defence 
of the national idea. 

It became more and more evident as the discussion 
progressed that the game was a hopeless one for the 
Opposition. They were advocating a motion ^vhich, 
even if adopted, could not at the time he put into prac- 
tice, but which would leave the finances in a very un- 
settled condition for the present, with prospects of 
serious conflicts ahead. To this the Government op- 
posed a plan l)y which a system in itself fallacious 
would be abandoned, the deficit which had dragged on 
from year to year would be got rid of, and harmony 
would be restored between the factors of legislation. 
There could be little doubt regarding a choice of such 
alternatives, especially since a large part of the House 
shared neither A^irchow's confidence in the continuance 
of peace, nor Lasker's opinion that a reduction of the 
military burden was necessary. 

And so, on November 5th, Lasker's motion to pass 
to the order of the day was promptly rejected, and 215 
voices against 99 spoke their disapproval of Virchow's 
motion as well. 

After a l)ill embodying the completed plan of the 
Minister of Finance had on November 16th been sub- 
mitted to the House, and then referred to the Commit- 
tee on the Budget, it was on December 13th reported 
back to the House, with a recommendation in favor of 
its adoption approved by the voices of 17 against 13 



1869] CAMPHAVSENS I'LAX ADOPTED. 217 

of the membei-s of the Committee. At the close of the 
very animated debate which followed, the House, re- 
jecting all amendments involving any important or 
fundamental changes, approved the bill by 242 against 
128 voices. 

It was a turning-point of great consequence in the 
German political situation of the day. This was real- 
ized so much the more since neither the friends nor the 
foes of the new law had any thought of how soon a 
tremendous rush of conflict would sweep the German 
nation on to a complete transformation of its political 
existence. 

For the present the effect produced by the relief of 
Prussia's financial difficulty, as evinced by the changed 
relations between the Government and the representa- 
tives of the people, was less perceptible in the Prussian 
House of Deputies tlian in the Reichstag. P'or in the 
Prussian Assembly there was a fundamental difference 
of opinion not only upon matters of finance, but with 
regard to affairs of legislation as well; among the 
latter may be mentioned Eulenburg's proposed system of 
provincial self-government, and Miihler's education law, 
both of wliich failed to 1)e enacted dui-ing the session. 

In the ReichstaL;-. on the contrary, with the disap- 
pearance of tlic i*iussian deficit and the reaction upon 
the Federal ccoiioTiiy. all cause for dissension was I'e- 
moved, so that the Federal l)ii(lget for 1871 was 
quicklv and liai'inoiiionslv deteniiiiied. With reo-ard 
to Fedeial lcL;isla1i(iii. moreover, tliei-e was from the 
outset, iiudei- the leadri-sliip of liisiiiari 1< and Delbriick, 



218 PARLIAMENTARY CONFLICTS. [1870 

perfect concord of action between the Federal Council 
and the Reichstag Majority. Their endeavors were 
directed toward the attainment of the same general 
ends, although naturally this by no means excluded the 
possibility of a difference of opinion — at times slight, 
at times very decided — upon individual points. 

Now, after the financial difficulty had been sur- 
mounted, the Reichstag, on February 14th, 1870, en- 
tered upon a session which promised to be rich in 
much-desired results. 

At the very beginning of the session the speech from 
the throne announced a bill of utmost importance, the 
just-completed draft of a uniform penal code for the 
States of the North German Confederation. To this 
was added a law to protect the rights of authors. 
Then there were the drafts of four laws which may be 
characterized as supplementary of the recently enacted 
laws regarding freedom of migration and the regulation 
of trade and business. These were followed by a 
treaty with Baden, according to which the trilainals of 
this State and those of the North German Confedera- 
tion were to render each other mutual legal aid ; it 
corresponded to the law of this nature which, during 
the past year, had been enacted for all the States of 
the Confederation. Finally there was a bill to sup- 
ply the defects in the law on weights and measures, 
intended to lead to the establishment of uniformity 
within this sphere throughout the States of North and 
South Germany. 

" The entirety of the treaties, by which the North 



1870] OPENING OF THE REICHSTAG. 219 

and the South of Germany are linked together," the 
King continued, '' forms a safeguard for the security 
and welfare of our common German fatherland, and 
affords those reliable guaranties which are inherent in 
the strong and firmly established organization of the 
North German Confederation. The confidence which 
our South Germ^i allies place in these guaranties rests 
upon complete reciprocity. The sentiment of national 
unity, the mutually pledged word of German princes, 
the community of our common country's highest inter- 
ests, impart to our relations with South Germany a 
solidity wholly independent of the ever-changing waves 
of political passions."' 

The speech concluded with an expression of confi- 
dence that peace would continue undisturljed, since 
everj'wliere. among the Governments as well as among 
the nations, the conviction was daily gaining ground 
that each political community is entitled to the right 
independently to foster its own welfare, and that each 
country regards its armed force as a protection to its 
own independence, not as a means of assailing that of 
others. 

This speech surely afforded no one an opportunity to 
i-ead between its lines an urgent desire for the union of 
the South Germans with the Northern Confederation. 
( )n the coiitrarv, despite the attacks to which the Min- 
ister, Prince Ildhculohc.' had been subjected at tlie 
hands of the clerically inclined foes of Prussia, the 
King's utterances were only such as expressed confident 

1 The retirement of the Prince did, in fact, follow a few weeks latt-r. 



220 PARLIAMENTARY CONFLICTS. [1870 

satisfaction with the aspect of Germany's political rela- 
tions. The treaties are to be relied upon, he said; the 
interests of our common country are secure ; no one of 
our neighbors has any thought of interfering with our 
internal affairs, nor is the least trace of hostility 
evident. 

A proposal for mutual disarmam^t made by the 
French Minister, Daru had, notwithstanding Bismarck's 
repellent attitude, in no way disturbed the relations 
between the two countries ; in short, King William saw 
no occasion to change the policy heretofore pursued by 
Germany, but rather every reason to continue upon the 
carefully selected and well-tried course of the past. 

In connection with the debate upon Virchow's mo- 
tion in the House of Deputies, Lasker had spoken 
words of warning against diplomatic negotiations regard- 
ing disarmament ; but at the same time had emphati- 
cally declared that Germany need ask neither leave nor 
license of the other Powers with respect to the policy 
it might choose to pursue in furthering its internal 
interests, — a valiant stand to take, but one which was 
hardly to be expected of a deputy who almost in the 
same breath advocated a reduction of the army. 

His eagerness to welcome Baden into the Confedera- 
tion continued unabated, however. Through his oppo- 
sition an address in reply to the speech from the throne 
was defeated because it did not, as he wished, express a 
desire for Baden's admission into the Confederation. 
On February 24th, 1870, in connection with the delib- 
eration upon the Baden treaty providing for mutual 



1870] MOTION IN FAVOR OF ADMITTING BADEN. 221 

legal aid, he moved tliat the Reichstag sanction the 
treaty, and at the same time express its appreciation of 
the national aspirations which the Baden (xovernment 
and people had manifested, declaring fnrther that the 
Reichstag regarded these as indicative of national 
unity, and witli gratification recognized their object to 
be an early union with the established Confederation. 

The motion was a failure, even with respect to its 
form ; it should have been addressed to the Govern- 
ment of the North German Confederation, for it was 
manifestly not within the province of the Reichstag to 
commend or advise a foreign State. Why this particu- 
lar time rather than 1869 or 1871 was selected by the 
originator of the motion remained undisclosed ; surely 
every occasion for it was wanting. It is, moreover, an 
unpardonable indiscretion to give a momentous ques- 
tion, involving serious consequences, the notoriety of 
a parliamentary debate without the Minister's previous 
knowledge, unless, indeed, the intention is to force him 
to retire. 

Lasker, liowever, (^uite upon his own responsibility, 
commended the national policy of Baden, the State 
(n^er ready to unite with the Confederation. " With 
whom lies the blame for its continued exclusion ? " he 
asked. "• I can find it only with Prussia. Tiiis is a 
([uestioii into whicli regard for the opinions of foreign 
Powers should not enter. France and Austria are 
fully occupied by their own internal affaii"s ; the for- 
mer to so great a degree that the vei-y existence of 
the dynasty is at stake.'" ( Wiiicli, we interpiUate, is 



222 PABLlAMENTAltY CONFLICTS. [1870 

the very reason why a party growing stronger with 
every day is incessantly urging to war.) " This," he 
continued, " cannot therefore be the reason by which 
Bismarck is deterred. You have heard his declaration, 
that an appeal to fear finds no res^Donse in German 
hearts; what, then, is the solution of this enigma?" 

The motion was a most unpleasant surprise to Bis- 
marck. He, too, regarded combination with the South- 
ern States as the ultimate aim of his endeavor ; he 
did not, however, wish to see it consummated until 
such time as both Governments and people, wlioll}- 
uninfluenced from abroad, should desire it and wel- 
come it with gladness. But this was still far in the 
future, and for this reason the speech from the throne 
had sought to emphasize the fact that even under 
present conditions the security of the common father- 
land was well established. 

Bismarck hoped that when the time should be rij^e 
for the much-desired step, all the Southern States 
would stand forth together to claim the new relation- 
ship. Alone, he might perhaps be willing to admit 
Bavaria ; Baden, however, less than any one of the 
others, for, as a glance at the map will reveal, its long 
and narrow extent would greatly add to the difficul- 
ties of defence for Prussia, whilst by its admission 
Bavaria and Wiirtemberg would be delivered over to 
Austrian influence, and France would be given a pre- 
text for war. 

This was all true beyond a doubt, but was of a na- 
ture not well adapted to public explanation. Bismarck, 



1870] THE PESAL CODE. 22o 

ill his reply, took the standpoint that it was to the 
interest of German unity that the nationally inclined 
Baden, as the pioneer of the national idea, should bt* 
allowed to reniain undisturbed in its relations to the 
South, rather tlian he encouraged to sever them by 
union with the North. The skill with which he de- 
veloped tills argument was quite wonderful. The con- 
sequence was, that Lasker witlidre\^- his motion on the 
gi-ound that through its discussion his purpose had 
already been accomplished. The treaty regarding mu- 
tual legal aid was, of course, sanctioned. 

The transactions which are now to be reported are 
those concerning the bills announced in the speech 
from the throne, the new penal code, and the four pro- 
posed laws supplementary of those already enacted re- 
garding freedom of migration. Their discussion dealt 
with legal details of so technical a character, involv- 
ing many complicated and much-controverted questions, 
that only a jurist of widest information and experi- 
ence could give an accurate account of them. I shall 
therefore attempt no more than to indicate the general 
purpose of the several bills, together with the pre- 
dominating influences which entered into the delibera- 
tions and shaj)ed the final result. 

After a l)rief debate, several of the bills of minor 
importance were accepted wholly unaltei-ed in their es- 
sential fcatui'cs. 'i'lic l)ill which in this session again 
fared the hardest was the one regarding the conditions 
requisite to a settlement; and again, as in 18(i'.>. it was 
at the hands of the Federal Council that it received 



224 PARLIAMENTARY CONFLICTS. [1870 

its harshest treatment. The end, which in this con- 
nection also the Prussian Government kept steadfastly 
in view, was to procure for the citizens of the Con- 
federation the highest possible degree of liberty and 
freedom from legal complications in their movements 
in all the States subject to its jurisdiction ; the Gov- 
ernment had, therefore, made the provisions of the pro- 
posed law applicable to all the States alike. To this, 
Saxony, Hesse, Mecklenburg, and a number of the 
smaller States objected, claiming that exception should 
be made in favor of their peculiar institutions. This 
led to a lively altercation between the respective Fed- 
eral delegates, which was carried even into the Reichs- 
tag ; here, however, the majority took hold, and in 
full sympathy with the Prussian standpoint went even 
so far as to strengthen and extend the provisions so 
distasteful to the opponents of the bill. The result 
was, that with mournful resignation Hesse and Saxony 
consented to a compromise, thus making the enact- 
ment of the law possible. 

As was natural, much greater importance attached 
to the discussion of the penal code. In these debates, 
which were continued throughout the entire session, 
the loftiest heights of philosophical or theological specu- 
lation upon the lawful authority of the State to punish 
alternated with minute consideration of the measure of 
penalty represented by a fine of a given sum of money, 
or by imprisonment for a certain number of days for 
slight offences. 

The reform now undertaken had been awaited with 



1870] hUUAllD LASKER. 225 

growing impatience ; for, viewed from the standpoint of 
humane liberahsm, the law lieretofore in force, and es- 
pecially that of Prussia, was regarded as much too rigor- 
ous and inflexible. Although it was wholly in this spirit 
that the Committee of the Federal Council in t-luirgc of 
the draft had constructed it, the special debate soon 
revealed that the expectations and demands far ex- 
ceeded that which the draft realized. A motion wholly 
doing away witli the death penalty induced a most vio- 
lent and protracted debate, which, despite Bismarck's 
energetic opposition, ended in its adoption. And so it 
went on. All kinds of penalties were made lighter; 
the judges were allowed greater liberty to use their 
own discretion in imposing them ; many mitigating cir- 
cumstances were allowed ; for all political offences, the 
motives of which were not dishonorable, penal servitude 
in a house of correction was replaced by imprisonment, 
or confinement in a fortress ; disregard of official orders 
was made punishable only upon the one condition that 
convincing proof had l)een given the judge, that the 
order violated was one within the jurisdiction of the 
authority by whom it had been issued. 

Among the ablest advocates of these views, as also in 
connection with the reform laws of a later date, Lasker 
figured most prominently. The subject was one within 
his own particular j)r()vince. and therefore brought into 
play all his versatile takuits. He was a jurist of un- 
usual keenness and assiduity, a highly edneate(l and 
philosophical idealist, an enthusiast foi' tlie cause of 
hunianitw (.)ne of his most iiitiiiiate friends lias pt)r- 



226 PARLIAMENTARY CONFLICTS. [1870 

trayed him most excellently in the words, " He was 
a man of law and justice." His entire activity was 
prompted by the desire to obtain for every fellow-man 
the protection of the law against arbitrary power and 
error; for every one unjustly accused, efficient defence 
and due exoneration ; for every minority, the right to 
just consideration. To this end he sought not only 
to make the law the foundation of the State, but the 
judge upon all points the deciding authority of the 
State. Even Bamberger admits that for the fulfilment 
of duties such as Lasker would have assigned to judges, 
they had need to be ideally perfect men, such as existed 
in Lasker's imagination, but not elsewhere.^ 

It cannot be denied also that his ardor to vindicate 
the unjustly accused led him to slight the equally 
grave obligation to endeavor as earnestly to bring the 
guilty criminal to justice, so that honest citizens may 
have protection for person and property. We find the 
explanation for this in the fact that he was an idealist 
of extremest kind ; although he by no means despised 
the maintenance of order in the community, yet nearer 
his heart lay the thought of personal freedom, al- 
though it is patent that without the proper restriction 
of the latter no degree of order is conceivable. To 
realize these ideals was the sole ambition of his life ; 
outward show and material pleasures were never objects 
of pursuit to him. As is usual with thoroughly devoted 
idealists, in his plans he took intt) consideration human 
judgment and insight more than he did the passions of 

1 Bamberger, " Charakteristiken," p. 101. 



ISTO] THE (TSTOMS PAULIAMEXT. -- 1 

111311, his enthusiasm rendering him incapable of seeing 
men and conditions in their true light, and of acting 
accordingly, an alnlitv Avhich is, however, most essential 
to the practical statesman. Still, when all is said, his 
weaknesses were but such as were iiiseparal)le from his 
strength, and consistent with the moral purity and pre- 
eminent nobility of his nature. 

The special debate upon the penal code was closed 
on April 8th. 1870. and the final deliberation upon it 
was not ill order until after the session of the Customs 
Parliament had ))een opened on the 21st. 

Aside from a few matters of minor importance, this 
assembly found a most simple task awaiting it, — an 
altered and it was hoped, improved tariff reform ; again 
a long list of reduced or wholly abated customs duties; 
iind to supply the resulting deficiency in the customs 
revenue, an increase, this time not in the un[)opular 
coal-oil duty, but in that on coffee, wliich would yield 
a half million more of revenue than had been expected 
to accrue from the coal-oil duty proposed in 1869. 

At iirst the prospects seemed very dubions. The 
several groups having special interests at heart continued 
to thwart one another by motions and counter-motions 
as during the foregoing session when we made their 
acquaintance. One group favored the retention d tlie 
protective dutv upon cotton goods, and anothei- that on 
iron manufactures, whereas a third l)histcicd in t'a\(»r 
of a still sfreater reduction of the duties on iron, whilst 
still another reopened the dispute regarding th.e duty 
on rice. For the iuLihcr dut\' on coffee a ininorit\- <inlv 



228 PARLIAMENTARY CONFLICTS. [1870 

was won, although the Government had again made 
the entire tariff reform conditional upon the sanction 
of this duty. 

The members of the South German faction rubbed 
their hands in glee. "For a third time," said they, 
'^ this Customs Parliament will prove itself a sterile 
institution ; this is the last session of the present legis- 
lative j)eriod, and as yet nothing has been accomplished. 
Perhaps next year we shall be spared the trouble of 
elections for this Prussian creation." 

It was, however, just this attitude which led to a 
strong reaction. All the Conservatives and National 
Liberals to be found in the various groups united to 
declare that the German name should not thus be 
sullied, the national idea should receive no such rebuff, 
the old dismemberment of the fatherland should not be 
renewed. Herr von Patow, an Old Liberal, took the 
matter in hand, and after consultations which occupied 
several days, brought about a compromise between all 
the groups with the exception of the South German 
faction and the " German " Party of Progress. The 
protectionists were mollified by the retention of the 
higher duties on cotton goods, the free-trade deputies 
were won by a reduction of the duty on pig iron and 
rice ; and the Governments were granted the desired 
higher rate on coffee, thus oljtaining an increase of 
revenue although but a small one. Such was the de- 
cision reached on May 6th by a vote of 186 voices 
against 84, and by which the Customs Parliament was 
after all given a happy issue. 



A 



1870] OPPOSITION TO THE DEATU PENALTY. 229 

On May 9th the Reichstag resumed its labors, which 
were at once directed toward the removal of an evil of 
long standing, the Elbe duties, a Government bill to 
that effect being passed without delay. On the 13th 
the law for the protection of literary property was 
approved. The draft of a bill providing government 
aid for the St. Gothard Railway submitted at this time 
will be referred to later. 

On the 21st the final deliberation upon the penal 
code was begun. The Minister of Justice announced 
that the Federal Council had as far as possible accepted 
the amendments proposed ; with regard to the most 
important point in controvers}-, tliat of the death pen- 
alty, it had been decided to retain it only in punish- 
ment of murder, and attempts upon the life of the head 
of the Confederation or upon that of a ruling prince. 

Fortunately for the code, Bismarck returned to Berlin 
on tliat day, after a sojourn of several weeks at Varzin 
on account of serious illness. 

On the 23(1 a compromise motion was introduced by 
Planck and associates to the effect that the death 
penalty slmukl at least not be reintroduced in Saxony 
and 01denl)urg where it had been abolished. To this 
Bismarck immediately replied that for the sake of 
furthering the national object the Governments had 
made many concessions against their better judgment: 
there was, however, one which they would not make 
even for tliis purpose, and that was tlie sacrifice of tlie 
principle of national unity itself. "I sbouM Ix' untrue 
to al) my past endeavoi-," said he, "should I now favor 



230 PABLIAMENTARY CONFLICTS. [1870 

iui act establishing two different codes of law for Nortli 
Germany, two different classes of North Germans, — 
the select few of Saxony and Oldenburg, a sort of 
higher-culture class who no longer need the execu- 
tioner's axe for their evil-doers, and the profanum 
vulgus of twenty-seven millions who have not as yet 
attained to this superior grade of culture. 

"The declared purpose of our present task is to 
place all North Germans upon an equal footing before 
the law; to establish an inequality would, therefore, be 
a political impossibility. Our hands have been raised 
against peculiar rights, against special institutions, 
against the prejudices of individual Governments and 
individual races ; at times, in realization of the worthi- 
ness of our ultimate aim, we have been hard, or at 
least severe ; but we liave never lost siglit of our 
national object, and to its inspiration was due our 
strength, our courage, our power to act as we have. 
The moment we lose this inspiration we shall no longer 
be justified in being unyielding and in crushing with 
an iron heel the obstacles which obstruct our progress 
toward the restoration of the German nation's strength 
and glory." (Enthusiastic shouts of " Bravo ! " fol- 
lowed by the cry of " Oho ! " from the Social-demo- 
crats. Renewed and deafening applause). 

It was a powerful and masterly speech, the A\'orthy 
supplement and companion of the one against Lasker's 
motion for the admission of Baden. The one was a 
warning uttered against over-hasty action l)y Avhich the 
way leading to the national goal might be blocked ; 



1870] THE PENAL CODE ADOPTED. 231 

the other was an appeal nut to allow seetioiial sym- 
pathies to iiupede the onward march toward the object 
pui-sued. That no one had at this point expected such 
a clarion-call to rally to the cause of German unity 
made it none the less effective, whereas a repeated 
refutation of the arguments against tlu- death penalty 
would most likely have fallen flat. 

The Minister of Justice then ollicially announced 
what Bismarck's speech had already made clear, that 
the Govermnents would sanction the penal code oidy 
upon couditioii that the death penalty be agreed upon. 

There were, nevertheless, many and long speeches 
still to be heard; but when on May 25th the final 
vote Avas taken, the Federal Council's amendment was 
accepted by 128 voices against 107. 

Thus harmony had been fully restored : and when 
on May 26th, with the end of the session and of the 
legislative period as well, the King had occasion in 
his speech from the throne to review w^ith gratitude the 
glorious results achieved during the four sessions since 
1867, he had but words of praise and appreciation for 
the vast amount of work accomplished in so short a 
time, as represented by the new institutions, treaties, 
and laws, by the organization of the army, iht- found- 
ing of a navy as yet still in pi'ocess of iOrniation, by the 
well-regnlatcd a(hiiiiiistration of ihe l-'edrral ;iiiaiices. 

Ilis closing words were: "These achievemenls with- 
in tlic province of [)ul)lic welfai'c and culture, of liln 
erty and oi-der, made i)ossil)K' oiih by faithful and 
incessant laboi', are evidences which give assiiiance 



232 PARLIAMENTART CONFLICTS. [1870 

abroad as well as at home that the strength of the Ger- 
man nation, as promoted by the North German Confed- 
eration in perfecting its interior arrangements and 
establishing its national union with the States of South 
Germany as provided by treaty, is not a menace to the 
general peace, but a powerful agency in its favor. The 
respect and confidence which this course has won for 
us among foreign peoples and Governments are addi- 
tional influences in the same direction. 

" Should we, in God's providence, be the instruments 
by which the German nation will achieve the position 
among the nations of the world to which it is entitled 
and peculiarly fitted through its historic significance, 
its strength and its peaceable disposition, Germany will 
not forget the share Avhich this Reichstag had in the 
work, and for which, again, I thank you." ^ 

1 Despite the facts related in this chapter, a number of French histo- 
rians liave asserted tiiat Bismarck incited the war against France to ex- 
tricate himself from the difficulties and embarrassment of his position 
at home. How little thought of war there really was in Germany at 
this time is shown by the circumstance that during the latter half of 
June the King was seeking refreshment from the baths at Ems, Bis- 
marck was at Varzin recuperating from the nervous strain of the win- 
ter, Moltke was in Silesia, Boon was rusticating in Brandenburg, 
Camphausen was visiting his relations in the Rhine Proiuvces. 



1869] ILLNESS OF THE EMPEROR. 233 



CHAPTER V. 

CLERICAL TENDENCIES IN THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT. 

When Napoleon abolished the office of Minister of 
State, and nominated Rouher to the Presidency of the 
Senate, he took the first irretrievable step in the transi- 
tion to constitutional government. That each advance 
toward its realization should be hesitatingly under- 
taken, and carried out with much vacillation, was not 
only consistent with his character, but lay also in the 
nature of the matter in hand. lie longed to l)e re- 
lieved of anxiety, yet every renunciation of personal 
power filled him with misgivings. He wished to see 
ins dynasty permanently established, but where in the 
France of that day was permanence in anything to be 
found ? 

As a consequence, he sul)mitted the draft of the se- 
natus coyisultum to the Senate, but nominated for the 
administration of State affaii-s a milk-and-water .Minis- 
try of docile officials. Then came his severe attack of 
illness, and the exhausted condition in which he re- 
turned to official life forbade all further delay. 

His personal liking for Ollivier had not suffered 
through his recent difference with the leader of the 



234 TENDENCIES IN FRENCH GOVERNMENT. [1869 

Liberals ; and as early as October he reopened corre- 
spondence with him, in which the formation of a re- 
sponsible Ministry under Ollivier s direction was now 
discussed without reserve. Notwithstanding the good- 
will brought to the task by both parties, many difficul- 
ties nevertheless arose. 

The Emperor was willing to subscribe to the prin- 
ciple of the Ministry's dependence upon the majority 
in the representative assembly, but stipulated that only 
conservative and reliable Bonapartists should be nomi- 
nated to it. In contradistinction to this, Ollivier felt 
impelled by all the power of past and present influ- 
ence to desire a numerous and strong representation of 
the moderately liberal elements in the Ministry ; he had 
turned his back upon the republic ; he felt constrained 
therefore to proclaim in loudest tones his adherence to 
the principles of liberalism. 

The first question to be decided was whether any 
of the present Ministers should continue in office. 
Against the Ministers of War, of the Navy, and of the 
Imperial House, Ollivier had no objections ; but to the 
Minister of the Interior, who was entirely in sympathy 
with Rouher, he was decidedly opposed, although he 
was willing to place upon his list the present Minister 
of Finance, Magne, because of his technical skill and 
pliable politics. The Emperor's offer of the portfolio 
of Foreign Affairs was in turn declined by each of its 
last two heads ; by Prince Latour because Ollivier had 
announced his programme for this department to be the 
unconditional preservation of peace, from which Latour 



1869] DIFFICULTY IN FORMING A NEW CABINET. 235 

drew the conclusion that South Germany would be 
yielded to Prussia, and Rome to Italy. Althoug-h this 
would have troubled Lavalette but little, he, it appears, 
had not sufficient conhdence in the practical ability of 
the new leader to dare to take the leap into the dark 
with him without which a constitutional government 
could hardly be achieved under a Naj)oleon. 

That by far the greater number of cabinet positions 
would fall to the share of the third party was, as mat- 
ters had developed, but to be expected. In the consul- 
tations on this point, it soon became evident that the 
party was by no means a unit, but, on the contrary, was 
composed of a number of very different elements, of 
which it was exceedingly doubtful whether they would 
remain united in the future. About one-fourth of its 
members made much more extreme demands with re- 
gard to the reforms to be inaugurated by the new (iov- 
ernment than did Ollivier and the great majority of the 
party ; as a consequence, the former gradually consti- 
tuted themselves a minority (later called the Left 
Centre), in distinction from the majority (later, the 
Right Centre). Napoleon would have jireferred to con- 
fine his cabinet nominations to members of this ma- 
jority. Ollivier, however, directed his attention to tlic 
fact tbat a nnich larger number of talented and capal)Ie 
men were to be found on the other side; and to insure 
to the Cabinet a strong position, their leaders should 
not be excluded from it. F>ut when lie addiessed these 
gentlemen, his offer was not only received without any 
great show of gratitude. l)nt, to his sur[irise, most ex- 



i36 TENBEyCIE^ IN FRENCH GOVEBNMENT. [1869 

acting demands were made the condition to acceptance. 
The very first of these, that aside from the Ministers of 
War, of the Navy, and of the Imperial House, none of 
the present members of the Cabinet were to remain in 
office, placed OUivier in a painfully embarrassing posi- 
tion with respect to the Minister of Finance. Concern- 
ing the future reforms, there were also many conflicting 
opinions which failed to be harmonized ; at all events, 
nothing was accomplished in this quarter. 

The next attempt was to make a list of the possibili- 
ties in the Right Centre ; these candidates, however, 
had no prospect of commanding a majority in the Legis- 
lative Body except in absolute dependence upon the 
Right, an utterly impossible position for OUivier. 

The Emperor was beginning to weary of these end- 
less consultations back and forth. His own mind was 
fully made up ; and the Empress, whose insight into 
affairs of State had inspired him with a high regard for 
her opinion, quite agreed with him. After his recovery 
she had taken the trip to Egypt ; and in one of her 
letters from the Nile she advised him to pursue unde- 
terred the course upon which he had entered, that the 
world might see that his action was not the result of 
passing influences, but of unalterable conviction. 

He was of the same opinion, and urged speedy ac 
tion ; since, although he was for the present free from 
suffering, his physical condition could not be relied 
upon from one day to the next. It was at this time 
that he drew up the draft of a decree arranging for the 
regency in the event of his death ; it provided that the 



1869] A liESPONsIBLE MIX I ST UV IX STATED. 2o7 

Empress should assume this respuiisil)ility. and in case 
she were absent from the country at tlie time of liis 
death. Prince Napoleon was named as regent until her 
return. He did this at a time when he expected the 
Empress to return in four weeks, — an evidence of 
how precarious he felt his condition to he. 

This, moreover, fully explains his readiness to con- 
cede to OUivier's proposal. When on November 29th 
the interrupted session of tlie Chambers was resumed, 
the speech from the throne was an echo of OUivier's 
views. In it reaction and revolution were alike repu- 
diated, and freedom based upon order was proclaimed. 
"For order I will answer," said the Emperor. "Aid 
me, gentlemen, to establish liberty." He then an- 
nounced a great number of refoi'nis and improvements 
to be inaugurated, called attention to the larger reve- 
nue arising from indirect taxes as an unmistakable evi- 
dence of a corresponding advance in the prosperity of 
the French people, and closed with a brilliant tribute 
to the nineteenth centuiy. To live in it he deemed a 
liigh privilege ; for it was an age in which sovereign>f 
and nations alike were earnest advocates of peace, in 
which slavery had ])een suppressed in America and in 
Ilussia the serfs had been liberated, in wliieli from llic 
assembled bishops at Rome a work of beneficence and 
wisdom oidv was expected, and in wliich tlie fruits of 
advancing civili/.aiion were everywhere visil»lc. 

Tt was an eloquent speech, abounding in ])leasing 
phrases, but from wliieli binding and decided promises 
were carefulh- exchidcMl. 



238 TENDENCIES IN FRENCH GOVERNMENT. [1870 

During the next few weeks, which the Legislative 
Body devoted to the verification of disj^uted election 
returns, Ollivier renewed his negotiations with the Left 
Centre, and brought them to an issue by adopting a 
number of desired reforms and by agreeing upon a 
compromise Ministry in which, besides the present Min- 
isters of the Imperial House, of War, and of the Navy, 
there were to be eight deputies, chosen equally from 
the Right and Left Centre ; from the former, Ollivier 
(Justice), Talhouet (Public Works), Louvet (Com- 
merce), Richard (Fine Arts) ; from the latter Count 
Daru (Foreign Affairs), Buffet (Finance), Chevandier 
de Valdrome (Interior), Segris (Public Instruction). 

The more important departments, those directly af- 
fecting and affected by politics, had, as we see, been 
captured by the Left Centre. 

The Emperor now accepted the tendered resignations 
of the present Ministers, and invited Deputy Ollivier 
to name persons who would in association with himself 
form a homogeneous Ministry, faithfully representing 
the ^Majority of the Legislative Body, and resolved to 
carry out the spirit of the senatus co^isidtum of Sep- 
tember 8 th. 

On January 2d, 1870, the nomination of the gentle- 
men named above was made public. The liberal em- 
pire had at last received its responsible INIinistry, and 
Ollivier had now to show whether he could suit the 
action to the word. 

That the first condition requisite to the existence of 
the new Cabinet, the support of a majority in the 



1870] PROMISED REFORMS DELAYED. 239 

Chamber, would be forthcoming was assured from the 
outset. Together, the Right and Left Centre num- 
bered about one-half of all the representatives ; and 
since the Right was composed throughout of declared 
adherents of the Government, the Ministry could rely 
upon most of these as well, if for no other reason than 
simply because it ^cas the Ministry. To be sure, the 
former Arcadians, who now as a group of from thirty 
to forty constituted the Extreme Right, took no pains 
to conceal their thorough disapproval of the liberalism 
and the peace policy of the Cabinet. When after an 
utterance to that effect Ollivier asked them to give 
their distrust definite expression, the reply was, "^We 
are biding our time." 

Still more decidedly and (piickly came the direct 
declaration of war from the opposite side of the House. 
Here hatred was rife against the deserter from their 
camp, their former associate, Ollivier, the man of tlie 
flexible conscience, as Gambetta once calle(l liim during 
a passionate scene wliidi took place luiiid ntinost tuinnlt 
in the House. 

Attacks of this nature would not have been dancrer- 
ous to the ^Ministry had it been in a })osition to give its 
proclaimed lil)ei'al tendency, which the country had 
liailcfl witli sncli juMlant eagerness, inimediale and 
[)ractical ex[)ressiou llirongli tlie introduction of re- 
forms of \arions kinds. Some ste[)s in this direction 
wei"e taken: scNcial cxtremcdy unpo[)idar oflicials were 
dismissc(l, old bcclni-Kdllin was gi\cn permission to 
return to his natixc hunk and the [lolice were directed 



240 TENDENCIES IN FRENCH GOVERNMENT. [187a 

to allow the newspaper press somewhat greater lil)- 
erty. 

The programmes of both the Right and Left Centre 
gave promise of many» and excellent reform laws : one 
to regulate anew the affairs of the communities ; a sys- 
tem of general decentralization in the administration 
of the communes, cantons, and departments ; the abro- 
gation of some especially oppressive police regulations ; 
a revised electoral law ; certain economic reforms ; and 
a parliamentary inquiry into the relative merits of pro- 
tection and free-trade. All this had a very inviting 
sound; but no part of it had as yet assumed definite 
shape, nor had any more detailed information with re- 
gard to the import of the promised laws been given. 

And so one week after another Avas lost in petty 
skirmishes, interpellations, and motions. On the Left 
all hearts were set upon two points in particular, with 
respect to which the two programmes of the Centre 
unfortunately differed. The firet of these concerned 
the electoral reform, in connection with which the Left 
claimed that since the members of the Chamber just 
entered upon its activity had been elected under the 
pressure of the absolute regime., the Chamber ought 
now to be dissolved, and replaced by an assembly 
elected under the new conditions of liberty. Naturally 
the majority was little inclined to so suicidal a step, 
and the Ministry held to the parliamentar}^ principle 
that a Chamber whose majority is in sympathy with the 
Government is never dissolved. 

The second demand put forth by the Left was of a 



1870] GitKAT VICTony FOll THE MINISTRY. 24T 

still more radical nature. According to the Constitution 
of 1852, the Legislative Body liad no shaiv in legis- 
lation involving a modificaticjn of the Constitution; 
such laws could only he enacted hy the Senate at the 
suggestion of the Emperor. The Left now proposed 
that the right to determine upon a Constitution or any 
one of its Articles shotdd no longer l)elong to a Senate 
nominated hy the Emperor, hut solely to the Chamher 
elected by the sovereign people. T\\q result to whieli 
this might lead was obvious, — a radically inclined ma- 
jority could at any time, in perfect conformity with the 
law, abolish the empire. 

In the Ministry the opinion prevailed that the Senate 
should be deprived of this exclusive right, and in its 
stead sliouhl b(! given the privilege of participating n 
every kind of legislation. However, when tlie n)em- 
bers of this privileged body were sounded witli icgaid 
to such a change, they would not hear of it; and tlie 
Emperor, too, thought the time not yet ripe for tliis 
step. 

Thus day after day found nothing accomplished. At 
last, on F'el)ruary 22d, Jules Favre arose in the name 
of the Left to present an interpellation. Tie expatiated 
upon the country's earnest desire for a iVee press, the 
right of asseiul)ly, the responsihilit v of all Stale olh- 
cials, a reduetion of tlie military Imrdeii. and greater 
opportunities for superior instruetioii for tlie masses. 
'•In view of tliese demands," he asked in conclusion, 
"what policy does the Cabinet propose to pursue? 
What is its jirogianime ? " 



242 TENDENCIES IN FRENCH GOVERNMENT. [1870 

It was Count Daru who upon this occasion under- 
took the reply in an exact and exhaustive statement 
regarding the two programmes of the Centre, giv^ing full 
assurance of the Ministry's constitutional independence, 
and the complete harmony of its members. His effort 
was rewarded by a vote of 232 voices against 18 upon 
a motion to pass to the order of the day, thus indi- 
cating the full confidence of the House in the Gov- 
ernment. 

Unfortunately, however, on the very next day the 
scene was entirely changed. On February 23d the 
principle of Government candidatures for the parlia- 
ment elections was made the subject of a further inter- 
pellation. The Minister of the Interior, Chevandier de 
Valdrome, replied : " The institution of a parliamen- 
tary Ministry necessarily involves discontinuance of the 
practice of putting forward official candidates ; how- 
ever, in making this admission the Government by no 
means implies that it is inclined to relinquish the right 
which every Government may justly claim of informing 
the public which of the candidates it regards as its 
friends and which as its enemies." (Enthusiastic ap- 
plause ; demonstrations of disapproval on the Left.) 

The spirit of animosity displayed in connection wdth 
so simple a question as this gave evidence of how this 
long-continued abuse under Rouher's administration had 
exasperated men and biased their judgment. 

Ollivier now arose to reiterate the declaration made 
by his colleague with regard to the Government's right, 
after AA'hich he however allowed himself to be carried 



1870] GOVERNMENT CANDIDATURES. 243 

away by the tli(night of the past, and by the impulse of 
his own speech. •• Tliis right," he cried, " is indisputa- 
ble ; but just as unquestionably should it be the ambi- 
tion (jf a liberal Ministry never to resort to it. The 
influence of the Ministry vipon the country should be 
such that it can commit the defence of the Government 
wholly into the hands of the voters. Our counsel to 
the people therefore is : ' Do not become dependent 
upon our guardianship ; exert your own power in de- 
fence of yourselves and of us. The strong Government 
is not that which protects its friends, but the one which 
is defended and supported by them." 

Now it was the Left which was delighted ; but so 
nuich the more did the Right give vent to its wrath. 
•• How shall we understand the speeches of yester- 
day?" asked Granier de Cassagnac on February 24th. 
'• Which of the two Ministers voiced the opinion of the 
Cabinet?" 

Without a moment's hesitation OUivier replied, " The 
import of the two speeches is identical, and precisely 
that which I gave you to understand yesterday ; the 
Government will put forward no candidates should an 
election occur during its continuance, but Avill preserve 
an attitude of utter neutrality." No more radical a 
position could have l)een taken. Accouding to this 
stand tlif ( lONcrmiKMit could not so iinicli as (Icclarc 
itself to be Whig or Toiy ; as a pi'i'limiiiai'\' to the 
elections it could not even aiiiioiiiici! the bills it hoped 
to carry in the new House : but, in passive neutrality, 
it would have to await the connnands which the repre- 



244 TENDENCIES IN FRENCH GOVERNMENT. [1870 

sentatives of tlie sovereign people would be pleased to 
impose upon it. Such a course would be unwise, even 
in a democratic republic ; in a constitutional monarch}- 
it would be a transgression of the first principle of the 
Constitution. 

For Ollivier, however, it earned his first and last 
tribute of applause from the Left, whereas by far tlie 
larger half of the Right voted against him. Two days 
later the members of the Right organized a club in de- 
clared opposition to the Government, under the leader- 
ship of the former Minister of the Interior, Forcade 
de la Roquette, ably assisted by a gay Court cavalier. 
Baron David, and by a former pupil and disciple of 
Ollivier s, Clement Duvernois, a j^oung man as ambi- 
tious as he was gifted, who had expected an aj^point- 
ment to the Cabinet of January 2d, and through his 
disappointment had been transformed into an open an- 
tagonist of his former master. 

Owing to the great esteem with which the members 
of this group were regarded in the highest circles, their 
open desertion of the Ministry did not tend to lessen 
the difficulties besetting it in its home policy. 

Meanwhile, Count Daru was guiding the foreign af- 
fairs of France with a firm and skilful hand. He was 
a veteran parliamentarian, who had retired from public 
life twenty years before the era of the Xajjoleonic dicta- 
torship, and now, after the last elections, had made his 
reappearance in the Legislative Body as a liberal mem- 
ber. He was very much in earnest with respect to his 
party's peace programme, and quite as much so with 



1870] COUNT DARVS FOREIGN POLICY. . 24o 

regard to the Ministry's responsibility. The Emperor, 
fully as desirous to maintiiin peace as was his Minister, 
was quite willing to yield upon both points. 

Prince Latour had sent General Fleury, the intimate 
confidant of Napoleon, to St. Petersburg with the gen- 
eral commission to arouse S3'mpathy for France in the 
Emperor Alexander, which might perhaps lead to com- 
Ijined action in the Orient ; his special charge, how- 
ever, was to recall to the Czar's mind the unsettled 
North-Schleswig question, as well as the unfulfilled 
Article (V-) of the Treaty of Prague. Bismarck had 
resented this with considerable sharpness, as being an 
inexcusable interference ; whereupon Count Daru had 
cautioned (icneral Fleury to be most circumspect. 
'•The new Minister,"" wrote a companion of (Jeneral 
Fleury to a friend in Paris, '• has bound us hand and 
foot ; for great results we can therefore no longer 
hope. From Emperor Napoleon we hear not a word ; 
he seems to have fallen into apathy, and to leave 
everything to the Minister." 

This attitude was still more marked in connection 
with another step by wdiich Daru intended to convince 
Europe that peace was indeed assured. We remem- 
ber how decidedly Napoleon had rejected the plan sug- 
gested by Vitzthum, and submitted to him by Rouher 
in the fall of 18(58, according to wliich the Emperoi' 
sliKidd propose mutnal disarmament to the King of 
I'russia. He had at that time, in view of the Prussian 
military system, pronounced any such idea to be a self- 
delusion ; an opinion in which IJaron S toff el, the French 



246 TENDENCIES IN FRENCH GOVERNMENT. [1870' 

military attache at Berlin, had fully agreed, saying: 
"As long as universal obligation to military duty con- 
tinues in force in Prussia, disarmament is not possible 
in that country." 

Now Count Daru, in the name of the Ministry, 
advocated the selfsame step, and the Emperor raised 
no objections. On February 1st, 1870, Count Daru 
requested the good offices of England to transmit such 
a proposal to the Prussian Government. Bismarck re- 
plied that the idea was so entirely oj^posed to the Prus- 
sian military orgaxiization that he did not so much as 
trust himself to suggest it to the King. But Daru was 
not so easily discouraged ; a fortnight later, to remove 
all doubt regarding the sincerity of liis purpose, he 
made the announcement in Berlin, through Lord Clar- 
endon, that the French Government on its part was 
ready to reduce the levy of recruits for the present 
year from 100,000 to 90,000 men. In reply, Bismarck 
regretted that even this could not influence him to a 
change of opinion. 

For the European situation and the general peace 
it mattered little whether these two Powers, keeping 
jealous watch over each other, diminished their armed 
force in equal proportion or not; and so this fruitless 
correspondence attracted little attention abroad. 

Much greater was the impression made by the news 
of Lasker's motion of February 24th, advocating Ba- 
den's admission into the North German Confederation, 
and Bismarck's manner of disposing of it; for, although 
he had for the present disapproved of such a step, he 



1870] AUSTRIAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. 'lAl 

had utilized the occasion again to hold up German 
unity as the ideal to be realized hy the future, " It 
is his intention, therefore, to overstep the Treaty of 
Prague upon the very first occasion which may present 
itself," was the angry comment of Paris ; and witli 
increased energy the Arcadians, who beheld in Olli- 
vier's renunciation of official influence upon the elections 
a new peril to the Empire, now urged the Court, the 
army, and the press to pick up the gauntlet thr()\\n 
down by Prussia, and to restore the no\v tarnished fame 
of the dynasty to its former splendor by a brilliant 
exploit at arms. 

It was at this time that Archduke Albrecht, returning 
from a pleas lu-e trip into Southern France, spent a few 
weeks in Paris. ^ He was most cordially received by 
the French officers, and was given every opportunity 
to study the military arrangements and resources of 
France. One day he said to the Emperor, '' It seems 
the situation is again becoiniiig more strained, as thougli, 
perhaps, our two States might be forced into war. 
Would it not be advisable to come to an understanding 
with regard to our joint preparations? " Napoleon was 
little disposed to discuss the political question, under 
what conditions he would coiisidci' a conllict to be un- 
avoidable, and so eagerly took up ihc uiilitaiy topic. 
''Should we feel compelled to resort to war, what mili- 
tary^ operations would you suggest ? "' he asktMl. 

1 Wliat follows is based upon the authority t)f unprinted memoirs, as 
well as upon the statements of Prince Napoleon and Generals Lebruii 
and J arras. 



248 TENDENCIES IN FRENCH GOVERNMENT. [1870 

In reply, the Duke sketched out a pLan of campaign. 
The main body of the French army, leaving Strasburg, 
would as rapidly as possible move upon Stuttgart ; an 
Italian army of one hundred thousand men would ad- 
vance toward Munich ; an Austrian division from Bo- 
hemia would press forward into Bavaria : thus the 
South of Germany would be severed from the North. 
Meanwhile, the remainder of the French troops, follow- 
ing the Saar, would be distributed through the Rhine- 
lands, and a French fleet manned by Danish troops 
would make a landing on the Baltic coast. 

Napoleon listened in silence, and tlien asked for a 
written statement of what he had heard. The Arch- 
duke added that his plan presupposed the existence of 
the triple alliance discussed during the past year ; he 
regarded it to be his duty to tell the Emperor that 
judging from all he had seen while in France he be- 
lieved that without an ally the French army, even 
should it include all the troops now stationed in Al- 
geria, would be too weak to undertake a war against 
Germany. Najjoleon himself was not free from this 
apprehension, but, without entering into a further dis- 
cussion of the plan, told the Duke that he would ere 
long send an adjutant to Vienna with all the latest 
army estimates, from which he hoped the Duke would 
receive a better impression of the French forces. 

Napoleon, on his part, evidently did not consider the 
situation to be as precarious as did the Archduke ; for 
he laid away the plan of campaign without discussing 
it with any one, or submitting it to his general staff ; 



1870] OLLIVIER WARNS GERMAN LIBERALS. 249 

nor, for the present, was anything further said about 
sending an adjutant to Vienna after the Duke's depar- 
ture thither. 

Napoleon's Ministers, however, despite their love of 
peace, upon which their programme laid so much stress, 
were more sensitive than A\'as their Emperor. When 
the first reports of the Berlin occurrence were received 
in Paris, Daru, in the presence of several diplomats, 
expressed surprise that Bismarck, in his reply to Las- 
ker's motion, had not referred to the Treaty of Prague, 
by which the admission of Baden was prohibited. This 
found its way into the newspapers ; and Bismarck, al- 
ways determined not to allow the slig'htest foreign 
interference in German affaire to pass unreproved, or- 
dered a reproduction of the Article in the ITord 
Deutsche AUgemeine Zeitung, accompanied by a short 
comment, stating that the Federal Chancellor had cer- 
tainly not mentioned the Treaty of Prague in this 
connection, nor did he deem it at all necessary to do 
so, since the stipulations of the treaty did not cover 
the case of Baden's admission into the North German 
Confederation.' 

Napoleon and Daru allowed this to pass unnoticed. 
But the more impressiona])le Ollivier, who in connection 
with these transactions had discovered to how great 
a degree the incessant endeavors of recent yeai-s to 
stir up enmity ai^ainst Prussia had succeeded in ini- 
planting in the hearts of the I'rcnch townsmen and 
peasants, as a rival to tlicir lo\c of peace, a bitter 

1 llcrliii 'I'iiKcs ((iric-siiiiiiilciit. Mairii '.Hli. 



2;30 TENDENCIES IN FRENCH GOVERNMENT. [1870 

hatred of Prussia, now feared that any new provoca- 
tion might lead to serious consequences. He there- 
fore summoned a correspondent of the Kolnische Zeitumj 
to an interview, intending through this medium to 
impart a timely warning to the German nation. He 
told the correspondent that he regarded the fostering 
of friendly relations between France and Germany as 
a matter of supreme importance, and that immediately 
after his accession to office he had instructed General 
Fleury to let the North-Schleswig question rest. He 
and his colleagues, he declared, were by no means 
averse to a combination between South and North Ger- 
many ; but he felt compelled to say that a large part 
of the French nation was most unpleasantly affected 
by the new conditions across the Rhine, and that this 
element might prove strong enough to force the Em- 
peror to resist any further Prussian aggrandizement. 
Only in case union between the two sections of Ger- 
many should result from a wholly spontaneous desire 
on the part of the South could the Ministry see an}- 
prospect of its consummation without entailing warlike 
intervention. The German Liberals, he believed, could 
not be too cautious in this respect. 

Bismarck did not think that this explanation called 
for public comment, and thus the controversy to which 
Lasker's speech had given rise subsided without being 
followed by any immediately harmful consequences. It 
cannot be doubted, however, that it had re-aroused sus- 
picion in Paris, and had led to instructions to Bene- 
detti, enjoining him to l)e exceedingly watchful, orders. 



1870] FRANCE AND THE VATICAN. 251 

which were not culculuted to iiu})rove the relations be- 
tween the Ambassador and Bismarck. 

At this juncture the attention of the French Gov- 
ernment was diverted from German affairs i)y nearer 
anxieties, growing more absorbing witli every day. 

Since December 8th, 1869, the Oecumenical Council 
was holding its sessions in the Vatican. Its delibera- 
tions were of a nature to affect the whole world, more 
or less ; but no other Government was at one and the 
same time so directly responsible for the assembly, and 
yet so impotent to influence its proceedings, as was 
that of France. 

Napoleon's peculiar position with regard to it was 
this : it lay within his power at any moment to put 
an end to its deliberations ; but he had no other means 
wherel)y to influence, even in the slightest degree, the 
action about to be taken. Should he recall the French 
troops from Rome, the Council would be immediately 
dissolved ; ^ therefore, by continuing his protection, he 
shared with the Fope the responsibility for its de- 
cisions, as little as he approved theii' import in so far 
as this could l^e anticipated. 

The attitude which the Pope Imd iiiaintaiued for 
ihe past twenty years gave little eneouragcment to 
the hope that action regarded as politically dangerous 
might be prevented. He did, in faet, continue the 
course lie had resolved uiioii. wlioUv undeterred by 

1 Tlic I'oiJc would not h:ivp oxposcil tlio ass('nil)ly of bisliops to the 
tender mercies of (raribaltii's volunteers, nor allowed theui to remain 
under the protection of the ■■.sub-Ali)ine robber." 



252 TENDENCIES IN FBENCH GOVERNMENT. [1870 

the Emperor's repeated remonstrances. He was fully 
aware that fear of the French clergy and their influ- 
ence upon the elections for the Chamber would prevent 
the Emperor from recalling his troops, and maintained 
that in protecting the Holy Chair, and rendering rev- 
erent service to him who occupied it, Napoleon, as a 
Catholic ruler, did no more than fulfil the demands 
of duty. 

We know how in 1867 Napoleon sacrificed the 
contemplated triple alliance to considerations of this 
nature. Nevertheless, the more decidedly the Jesuit 
principle of the supremacy of church over State was 
now asserted in Rome with a view to its practical en- 
forcement, the power thus gained to be concentrated 
in the hands of the Pope, the more unalterable grew 
Napoleon's determination to meet the appearance of 
such tendencies in the Council with advice, warning, 
and protest addressed to the Pope, and to uphold the 
liberties of the Gallican Church as established by the 
concordat. 

To this effect Prince Latour had instructed the 
French representative at Rome, Monsieur de Banne- 
ville, and immediately after the formation of the liberal 
Ministry, Count Daru had reissued the orders of his 
predecessor. Very soon, however, it became evident 
that Ollivier, the Minister of Justice, to whose depart- 
ment, according to French usage, belonged all matter 
affecting the church, took an entirely different view of 
the Roman question than did the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. 



1870] OLLIVIER AND DARU DIFFER. 253 

Both men were sincere Catholics, and both belonged 
to the circle of Count Montalembert's intimate friends. 
Strange as it may seem, the Count was at this time 
ardently advocating Ollivier's election to the French 
Academy against that of Lamartine. Now, it so hap- 
pened that in furthering his wisli to see the church 
emancipated from the control of the State, which was 
ofttimes formal and self-interested, Montalembert had 
done more than any other Frenchman to arouse wide- 
spread enthusiasm in France for the supremacy of the 
church in general, and of the Papacy in particular. 

When, however, it became the proclaimed endeavor 
of the Jesuit order to turn the tables, and make the 
States subject to the command of the church, and this 
in turn to the unrestrained influence of the Pope, then 
Montalembert's experience was like that of Dollinger, 
his German fellow-combatant in the long struggle for 
the liberty of the church. He recognized in this move- 
ment the beginning of the suppression of all liberty, in- 
comparably more dangerous than was the inconvenience 
arising from the jus circa sacra in the hands of the 
State ; therefore, with an ardent protest, he turned 
against it. 

Wholly different was Ollivier's attitude. Surel}', ac- 
cording to his view of it, he was not clerically inclined ; 
no one, he declared, could justly accuse him of that. 
The incentive of his every action, controlling his entire 
being, was freedom, — freedom of tlie State in its s[)here, 
freedom of the chinch in hers, and a liberal and kindly 
agreement between the two in i-egard to their eoinnion 



254 TENDENCIES IN FRENCH GOVERNMENT. [1870 

affairs. The insignificant point upon which everything 
liinged, however, namely, as to what constituted these 
*• common affaire," Ollivier did not deem it necessarj- to 
explain, regarding it as all-sufficient if with respect to 
tlie question in hand the right solution were found. 

As every one knew, the Council was called for the 
special purpose of defining the infallibility of the Pope ; 
and this, Ollivier doubted not, was a matter wholly 
within the province of the church, one regarding which 
the State had not the least right to interfere, or by its 
action to deprive the assembly of holy fathers of per- 
fect freedom in their decisions. Utter passivity in this 
connection was, he held, the unmistakable duty of the 
State. 

But as yet the Council was not dealing with the 
question of infallibility, and the Government could 
therefore postpone all action ; this it was the more will- 
ing to do, since the French bishops in Rome were quite 
as far from harmonious as were the Ministers in Paris. 
The leader of the minority was Archbishop Darboy 
of Paris, heretofore Napoleon's trusted adviser in all 
ecclesiastical affairs. The majority were unquestioning- 
adherents of the Pope, in which they enjoyed the full 
sympathy of the lower clergy, vicars and parish priests, 
by far the larger number of whom were uncompromising 
Ultramontanes. 

Now, toward the middle of February, 1870, it be- 
came generally known that the Pope had laid before 
the Council the draft of a decree, a so-called schema, 
in which the church reasserted her claim to a control of 



1S70] DARU OPPOSE,^ THE NEW DOCTRINE. 255 

the State and civil ssocietj in general in very inediteval 
style. The excitement it produced throughout Europe 
was intense. This was a measure of which Ollivier 
could not assert that it concerned the rhnrcli alone; 
nevertheless, his admiration for the imposing picture 
suggested by tliis proposed spiritual empire of the world, 
tosrether with his disinclination to enter into a contro- 
versy with him who wore its crown and dispensed its 
blessing's, remained unshaken. 

It was on the ground of momentary inexpediency 
that Ollivier now opposed a forcible note, in which, with 
the Emperor's approval, obtained on the 20th of Feb- 
ruary, Daru defended the rights of the modern State 
against the pretensions put forth in the schema, and 
announced that a personal representative of his Majesty 
the Emperor would be sent to Rome, in his name to 
present to the Council the claims made by France. 
Until the days of Pius IX. this had been the undis- 
puted privilege of every Catholic sovereign. Ollivier, 
who would have preferred the preservation of complete 
silence, ]iad his way in so far, at least, that the note 
underwent a total revision in the Council of Ministers ; 
the announcement of an imperial representative to be 
sent to Ivome was wholly omitted, and every demand 
was qualilicd, and deprived of all character, tlie whole 
being fittingly closed with a respectful request for infor- 
mation regarding the action taken upon the schema. 

As might have been expected, so exti-eiiK* and (h'voiit 
humility received a corresponding repl\. in which. uncU'r 
date of March l!»th, the Curia peremptorily ni)hehl every 



256 TENDENCIES IN FRENCH GOVERNMENT. [1870 

paragraph of the schema, demanding that to the church 
be conceded the control of every State arrangement 
affecting "whatever belongs to faith and morals." (It 
would be difficult indeed to find one that did not do 
so.) 

Again Count Daru's indignation was roused by this 
new evidence of papal arrogance. He proposed, again 
with Napoleon's consent, that France should make vig- 
orous protest against the proposed subjection of the 
State to the church ; further, that this should be made 
known to the world at large and to the Council, and be 
then communicated to the other Courts, with a request 
for their support. 

Ollivier heard all this with deep anxiety, believing 
that if France assumed this tone, the haughty pontiff 
would resort to a still loftier one, and an open rupture 
would become unavoidable. This would naturally be 
followed by a severance of diplomatic relations, which 
would result in the recall of the French troops, and 
finally in the dissolution of the Council. This calamity^ 
Ollivier intended to avert at any cost. He flattered 
himself with the thought that to him, the Liberal, 
would be ascribed the world-renowned deed of having 
made it possible for the Council to complete its delibe- 
rations. He did not, to be sure, succeed in preventing 
a reply to the uncivil note received from the Curia, 
but carried his point in so far that a memorial express- 
ing Daru's view was, like his despatch of an earlier 
date, greatly modified and softened in its form, and 
was then, on April 10th, forwarded to the Pope with 



1870] OLLIVIER PREVAILS. 257 

expressions of deepest reverence, together with the 
request that its contents be made known to the Coun- 
cil. That the Pope would meet this with a refusal 
couched in friendliest terms, OUivier knew full well 
before it was sent. 

Although Daru's memorial received the support of 
several of the Powers, — Austria, Prussia, and liavaria, 
— the Pope was not to be moved. *' As Abbot Mastai 
I believed in the Pope's infallibility ; as Pope ]\Iastai 
I FEEL IT," said he. Cardinal Antonelli explained to 
the French representative that the memorial could not 
possibly be officially presented to the Council, and 
added, " Nor will I trouble your Government with a 
refutation of its contents. You have, however, no 
cause for alarm ; in theory we are zealous and aggres- 
sive as were Gregory YII. and Innocent III., in practice 
we are lenient and long-suffering; and especially will 
a State like France, between whom and us there exists 
the tie of a concordat, experience no change in our 
relations so far as we are concerned." 

It was evident that this second rebuff left no further 
opportunity open for negotiations. The only choice 
now left to the Governments was either to submit in 
silence, or to take extreme measures, demand the sus- 
pension of the Council, or coiii[)cl its dissolution. There 
was but one way in which the latter could bt; accom- 
plished, and {''ranee alone contiolled it, — the recall of 
the French bi'igade now garrisone(l in the Papal Stales, 
thus leaving Rome at the mercy of the Italians. 

Again OUivier, in opposition to Daru, won the ma- 



258 TENDENCIES IN FBENCH GOVERNMENT. [1870 

jority of the Ministry over to his polic}^ of inactiv- 
ity; and upon his representation that the recall of 
the troops was incompatible with the national honor, 
and that the longest possible duration of friendly rela- 
tions with tlie Pope was an irremissible duty, the 
Emj^eror also yielded, and allowed the Ministry" to 
follow the course determined uj3on. 

All thought of harmony between Ollivier and Daru 
was now at an end. A new complication soon arose 
through which the crisis was precipitated. 

The applause which the Left had accorded the Min- 
istry on February 24th for its stand against official 
influence upon the elections as declared by Ollivier 
soon died away, whereas the Arcadian aversion to 
Ollivier's liberalism was more openly displayed with 
each succeeding day. 

The worst feature of the internal situation was the 
Government's utter sterility in all the provinces of 
legislation and administration. In January the Minis- 
try had veritably deluged the people with promises of 
new laws and reforms, but month after month passed in 
inactivity : numerous committees were at work upon 
the preparation of bills, but actual results there were 
none ; and so public opinion with regard to the Min- 
istry was constantly changing. March Ijegan as Febru- 
ary had ended ; scarcely a day passed without an urgent 
interpellation or important motion from the Left ; tre- 
mendous battles of words were daily fought, often with 
vehement l)itterness, the attack being not infrequently 
directed against Ollivier, who met it with haughty 
d''fiance. 



1870] A PLEBISnrrM PROPOSED. 259 

Xow came a repetition of the deiuaiul for the dis- 
solution of the Chanil)er; the mayors, it was moved, 
shoukl nti longer l)e nominated as heretofore by the 
Government, Ijut be elected by universal suffrage ; the 
Senate's constituent power Avas again assailed, and its 
transfer to thr popular Chamber demanded. Indeed, 
there seemed to be no limit to the possibilities of demo- 
cratic motions. This led the Government, I cannot say 
whether at Napoleon's or Ollivier's instance, to the 
resolution as quickly as possible to reach a definitive 
decision upon such cpiestioiis at least as affected the 
Constitution, that an end might be nuule of this uncer- 
tainty regarding puljlic opinion. 

On March 9th OUivier announced to the Senate that 
the Government would ere long submit to its consider- 
ation the draft of a decree making all needful modifica- 
tion in the Constitution. 'Hiis course had the approval 
of the Emperor. Count Daru, however, declared that 
the Constitution of 1852 had been sanctioned b}- the 
voice of the people, or in the speech of ancient Konie, 
by a plebiscitum of eight million suffrages. Accord- 
ino- to the provisions of this Constitution, amendments 
to its several Articles could l)e enacted by the Senate 
at the instance of the Emperor; but a fundamental 
revision, such as was now contemplated, could become 
valid oiil\- tlir()iiL;li lat iticat ion by the jx'ople by means 
of a ])lel)iscituiii. as liad l)eeii tlie case w ith tlie original 
compact. To this. liowcNcr. the ljii[)eror offered un- 
vielding resistance : ' perhaps l)ecaiise after the elec- 

1 Ollivi.i, •■ I/K-li^c ul r total," 11., •-'•J.J. 



2G0 TENDENCIES IN FRENCH GOVERNMENT. [1870 

tions of 1869 the risk appeared too great to him, al- 
though Daru assured him that according to the reports 
of the prefects a plebiscitum would awaken great pop- 
ular enthusiasm, especially so since its purpose was 
a direct fulfilment of that which had been desired in 
1869, the transformation of the empire into a liberal 
monarchy. 

As in either case the first requisite to action was an 
expression of opinion from the Senate, which was by no 
means favorably inclined to the matter, it was at once 
suggested that the president of that body, the former 
Minister of State, Rouher, be invited to participate in 
these preliminary conferences. It was the first occasion 
upon which the once powerful statesman found himself 
associated with his successful rival in the discharge of 
a joint official duty. As may be supposed, Rouher was 
by no means disposed to make difficulties for Daru in 
connection with the plebiscitum, but, on the contrary, 
recognized in it a means by which a more conservative 
direction might he given the policy of the Ministry, 
which with every day appeared more doubtful to him ; 
but especially did he hope that through it the empire 
might regain its former position of strength. 

He had long interviews with the Emperor, and later 
with the Empress also. It is said that the Prime Min- 
ister, Ollivier, had been known to sit a long time wait- 
ing in the anteroom while Rouher was conferring with 
royalty. The representations made upon these occa- 
sions by the former Minister probably revolved about 
the following thoughts: Since the enactment in 1868 



1870] ROUHEE'S INFLUENCE. 261 

of the laws concerning the press and the right of assem- 
bly, the implacable Republicans have continued their 
revolutionary incitement with renewed zeal ; the jVIin- 
istry of January 2d has caused the announcement of a 
number of prospective laws, all of which are destined to 
promote individual liberty at the expense of the Gov- 
ernment's means of exercising power; this naturally 
increases the danger inherent in a wholly unrestrained 
Republican party intent upon overthrow, and by which 
the permanence of the dynasty may ultimately be jeop- 
ardized. Under these circumstances, it is the opinion 
of the Extreme Right, the prestige of the Emperor and 
certainty with regard to the succession can be restored 
oidy by the triumphs of a great war; when the absence 
of a strong alliance and the enemy's thorough prepara- 
tion for war are taken into consideration, this must, 
however, be regarded as a most dangerous remedy ; 
^\hereas (in Rouher's estimation), a judiciously man- 
aged plebiscitum will ])e quite as effective. As yet, in 
l)y far the larger part of the countr}^ sentiments of 
l>eace and contentment prevail, so that there can be no 
doubt that the plebiscitum will result favorably. And 
what possible argument will then be left to these Dem- 
ocrats who are constantly speaking in the name of the 
people, if the people, by the direct vote of many mil- 
lions, prtxlaiiii tlicii' desire to upliold and fortify the 
empire? 

At all events, Rouher succeeded in convincing the 
Emperor and Empress. On March 22d a letter was 
published, addressed to Ollivier, in which Napoleon ex- 



202 TENDENCIES IN FRENCH GOVERNMENT. [1870 

pressed his approval of the Prime Minister's views, and 
requested him in association with his colleagues to pre- 
pare the draft of a senatus coiisultum, firmly fixing the 
dispositions of the Constitution and dividing this form 
of legislation from the ordinary. 

As early as March 28th, Ollivier submitted the com- 
pleted draft to the Senate, together with a report re- 
markable for its display of erudition and rhetorical 
ability. It was said of it in Paris that never before 
had an invitation to political suicide been couched in 
so elegant a speech. For, if the provisions of the Draft 
were enacted, the Senate, in which heretofore had been 
vested the exclusive right of amending the Constitu- 
tion, would now exercise this power for the last time, 
and for the purpose of renouncing it forever. Hence- 
forward the new Constitution could be amended only 
by means of a plebiscitum authorized by the Emperor, 
in precisely the same manner as that in which the new 
constitutional pact was now to receive the sanction 
necessary to its validity. According to its provisions 
the Emperor, as chief of the State, retained all his 
former prerogatives, — the chief command of the armed 
force of the country, the appointment of public officials, 
the nomination and direction of the Ministry, the right 
to declare war and conclude peace ; he remained re- 
sponsible to the nation, and could at any time appeal 
to its decision. The members of the Senate were, as 
heretofore, to be nominated by the Emperor ; their num- 
ber was, however, to be increased. The legislative 
power was to extend to all subjects except such as, 



1870] DRAFT OF A NEW ('ONSTITUTIOy. 203 

according to the deorei', were direrily reserved lor 
control by the Constitution. \ nuinl)er of especially 
obnoxious ^Vrticles of tiie former Constitution were re- 
voked, and upon the LegisUitive Body was bestowed 
the privilege of receiving pctilioiis. 

The jjublication of the Draft aroused deep and gen- 
eral interest. The first impression was, that the auto- 
cratic Constitution of 1852 was wow to be replaced by 
a liberal one based upon the modern two-chamber sj-s- 
tem, and definitely establishing all that which in 18G0 
and 1869 had been granted the 2)eoplc in the form of 
rights. 

A closer inspection, however, gave rise to grave mis- 
givings. What possible value could attach to the 
Ministry's responsibility to the representative body as 
compared with the Emperor's direct responsiljility to 
the nation, and the power of its plebiscita ? It would 
be of little consequence how decided a stand the two 
Chambers might take against pernicious demands made 
by the Emperor; for should he re-enforce these by the 
omnipotence of a plebiscitum, would not any opposi- 
tion which the Chambers might offer prove utterly 
futile? The final opinion was therefore: hereby the 
significance of the parliament becomes a mere sem- 
blance ; all real power will lie in the authoritv which 
the Emperor can at any time reassume by sanction of 
a plebiscitum. 

That the introduction of the j)le)>iscitum was not 
calculated to enhance the reno\\ni of tlic ])ar]iamoiit no 
one will deny. On the othci' hand, it will In- as read- 



264 TENDENCIES IN FRENCH GOVERNMENT. [1870 

ily conceded that the occasions would be exceedingly 
rare upon which this course would be adopted ; only 
indeed at such critical moments as would otherwise be 
met by a coup cVetat, or end in revolution; for in con- 
nection with a situation of less gravity, the risk in- 
curred by the Emperor through such a proceeding 
would be entirely too great, out of all proportion to 
that which might be gained. In the future, as had 
been the case in the past, in the ordinary course of 
events, decades would probably pass before an appeal 
to the plebiscitum, whereby the authority of the Cham- 
bers might suffer, would be even so much as suggested. 

We cannot therefore feel that Ollivier was wrong in 
declaring that the plebiscitum would inaugurate the 
transition from the absolute to the constitutional em- 
jiire, and lay the foundation for the rule of liberty in 
France : that otherwise, however, it would lead to no 
innovations. 

As circumscribed as the effect of this plebiscitum 
proved in reality to be, it was nevertheless a disposition 
by the sovereign people through the medium of univer- 
sal suffrage ; and therefore to oppose it was but an awk- 
ward beginning for the republican Left, whose orators 
upon other occasions could not say enough in glorifica- 
tion of the people's sovereignty and the right of uni- 
versal suffrage. They, however, had as little doubt that 
the plebiscitum would result favorably to the Emperor 
as had Rouher and Daru ; and, quite like their Jacobin 
predecessors of 1793, their love for the republic was 
greater than their regard for the idolized sovereignty of 



1870] REPUBLICAN OPPOSITION. 265 

the people. It would be difficult to find severer criti- 
cism, or more acrimonious derision of the right of uni- 
versal suffrage, than was indulged in upon this occasion 
by the oratoi-s of the republican Left. Whereas at all 
other times they delighted to pose in the parliament as 
the truest representatives of the exalted people, and as 
the special champions of the right of universal suffrage, 
they now spoke of the sovereign citizens as though they 
were mere voting cattle, without judgment or will of 
their own, because, forsooth, their action in connection 
with a plebiscituni N\'as not through the medium of the 
parliament, Init in utter dependence upon themselves. 

"The plebiscitum," declared Grevy, "calls upon 
every citizen to cast his vote individually, without the 
opportunity of previous consultation with his associates, 
or of adding to the proposition, or modifying it by 
aiibendments. By such a procedure the will of the 
people cannot be asserted ; every appeal made by the 
Emperor becomes a command." Now, no one Avill be 
disposed to defend this inal)ility to amend as an advan- 
tage of tlu; system : neither, however, can it be made 
the ground for disputing that tlie plebiscituni is in the 
nature of an expression of tlu^ popular will. 'I'lie as- 
sertion made at tlie time, tliat the plel)iscitnni afi'ords 
no opportunity for considtation between the several 
political parties, or l)etween the mendiers of a ])arty. was 
a departure from the exact truth: these oj)jiortunities 
were no more restricted in connection with a j)lebis(i- 
tum than with an election for the Legislative Lody, and 
we can see no reason why the people's power of judg- 



266 TENDENCIES IN FRENCH GOVERNMENT. [1870 

meiit should be less in the one than in the other in- 
stance. If this ability is not sufficient for the demands 
of a plebiscitum, then universal suffrage in general is a 
folly. 

The exasperation of the Left was increased by the 
realization that the discussion of the Constitution or a 
plebiscitum was wholly without the province of the 
parliament. To be sure, a new Constitution was about 
to be enacted ; but for the present the old one was still 
in force, and according to its provisions all power to 
act upon constitutional questions was reserved to the 
Emperor and the Senate. The Left Centre also com- 
plained so bitterly of this complete exclusion of the 
popular Chamber from the discussion of this important 
matter, that Ollivier sought and obtained the Empe- 
ror's consent to reply to an interpellation regarding it, 
presented by the Left, whereby all the floodgates of 
oratory were thrown wide open on April 4th and 5th. 

After an exceedingly animated debate, three motions 
to pass to the order of the day were before the assem- 
bly; one by the Left, together with a direct rejection 
of the Senate's Draft on the ground of its being opposed 
to the principles of 1789 ; a second one by the Left 
Centre, expressing appreciation of the reforms contem- 
plated in the draft, to which, however, should be added 
the provision that henceforward no plebiscitum whose 
text had not previously been examined and approved by 
the two Chambers should be submitted to the people ; 
a third, expressing entire confidence in the Govern- 
ment. After the first two of these had been rejected. 



1870] MINISTERIAL CRISIS. 267 

the third one was approved by 225 voices against 34 
of the Left, the Left Centre having voted in favor 
of the motion. 

The triumph of the Ministry was complete ; the 
decision was made ; no further discussion of the mo- 
mentous question was possible in the Legislative Bod}", 
and on April loth, at the suggestion of Ollivier, the 
Chamber adjourned until after the vote upon the pleb- 
iscitum should have been cast, since the deputies 
wished to be among their constituents while the great 
conflict was being waged. 

This put an end to a ministerial crisis as well ; 
whereas the practical Prime Minister, Ollivier, saw 
no objection to the institution of the plebiscitum either 
for the present or for the future, the Minister of 
Finance, Buffet, was, on principle, opposed to the pleb- 
iscitum in every respect. Count Daru, although he 
had himself been the originator of the one now pro- 
posed, believed that in the future an appeal to the 
plebiscitum should be allowed only in case the draft 
(jf the plebiscitum Inul been approved by the two 
Chambers. Both these gentlemen retired from the 
Cabinet on April 14th ; and in a few days their example 
was followed by a third member. Marquis Talhouet. 
Ollivier deferred filling the places tlius li'ft vat-ant 
until after the decision of the plebiscitum. In tlie 
iulcrini, lie himself assumed the adniiuistraliou of tlie 
Department of Foreign ^Vffairs ; the Minister of Public 
Instruction, Segris, that of I'iimuee : and the ]\Iinister 
of Fine Arts, Richard, thai of J'ublic Instruction. 



268 TENDENCIES IN FRENCH GOVERNMENT. [1870 

Thus relieved of any further consideration for tlie 
three most powerful of his colleagues, Ollivier threw 
himself ardently into the agitation for the plebiscituni. 
He had promised to purge the elections for deputies of 
all official influence ; the matter now before the public 
he regarded as of an entirely different nature, declaring 
that in connection with it there was but one official 
candidate, and that candidate was Liberty ; to achieve 
it every patriotic citizen ought to use every influence 
at his command. He therefore charged all officials of 
his own department, as well as those of the interior 
administration, prefects, under-prefects, mayors, and 
police officers, to be " consumingly " active ; in fact, 
he instigated an official agitation of such magnitude 
that it might have been the envy of Rouher. 

It very soon appeared who the actual official candi- 
date of the plebiscituni was. On April 20th the 
Senate approved the draft of the Constitution as sub- 
mitted to it ; and on the same day the Left published 
a manifesto which was no less than an out-and-out 
declaration of war against the empire in any form, and 
called upon the people to end the conflict in victory for 
themselves by answering " No " to the plebiscituni. 
''The 2d of December," it said, "brought the French 
nation under the yoke of one man ; in the elections of 
1869 the voice of the people declared against this 
personal regime, and demanded in its place the govern- 
ment of the people by the j)eople. It is now repre- 
sented to you that through the decree of the Senate 
.such a Government is to be established, and you are 



1870] PREPARATIONS FOR THE PLEBISCITUM. 269 

expected to recognize this by voting for the plebisci- 
tum. You will, however, refuse to do tliis ; for you 
are too well aware that the promised reform is a mere 
chimera. You have not forgotten that all the misery 
and outrage of the past eighteen years were brought 
upon you l)y two plebiscita. You will therefore lujt 
allow yourselves to be duped a third time, for you 
realize that only in a free democracy can the lib- 
erty of the people and the nation's sovereignty be 
enduringly established." 

Nothing could be more plainly spoken ; should the 
plebiscitum result in a " No," the republic would be 
proclaimed. 

The suspense was soon over. 

On April 23d an imperial decree formulated the pleb- 
iscitum as follows : 

The French people approve the lilx'ral reforms which 
the Emperor, with the co-operation of the great bodies 
of State, has wrought in the Constitution since 1860, 
and sanction the Senate decree of April 20th, 1870. 

Together with it appeared an imperial proclamation 
addressed to the people, which, after a retrospective 
glance at the restoration of the empire by the voice of 
the people, culminated in the appeal : 

Give me now a fresh proof of contidence. In bring- 
ing to the urn an affirmative vote you will dispel the 
menacing danger of revolution, you will establish order 
and liberty upon a firm foundation, and render the 

TRANSAUSSION OF THE CROWN TO MY SON MORE 
EASY. 



270 TENDENCIES IN FRENCH GOVERNMENT. [1870 

A circular note addressed by the Ministers to all of- 
ficials was of like tenor : 

In 1852 the Emperor appealed to the people for 
power to restore order; in 1870 he appeals for power 
to establish liberty. The question which your vote 
will decide is not whether the empire shall continue, 
but onl}^ whether or not it shall undergo a liberal 
transformation. We must seek to give our country 
the prospect of a tranquil future, so that upon the 
throne as in the humblest cottage the son may fol- 
low HIS FATHER IIST PEACE. 

Here, then, the purpose of the plebiscitum was boldly 
iicknowledged to be the permanence of the hereditary 
monarchy, even without the expedient of war; and, 
as the sugar coating to sweeten the pill, it was accom- 
panied b}^ an extension of political freedom. The " one 
official candidate" was in reality the heir to the throne, 
the Prince Imperial. 

From the Pyrenees to the Ardennes, France now be- 
came the scene of stirring activity. Manifestos and 
newspaper articles, central and local party committees, 
travelling preachers and government agents, — all these 
became factors that worked together or against one 
another with daily increasing energy. 

A most anxious hour was passed on the afternoon of 
May 8th, when for a time the official reports had a du- 
bious sound; and no one dared to admit even to himself 
what the full extent of the consequences of defeat 
luight be. Soon, however, the sky brightened ; and 
A\hen in the evening the voting was at last over, the 



1870] VICTORY FOR THE MONARCHY. 271 

result showed how correct had been the judgment of 
Rouher and Daru. The plebiscitum had been ap- 
proved by seven million suffrages, and rejected by onl}^ 
one and a half millions ; an overwhelming majority 
had therefore spoken in favor of the new Constitution, 
and at the same time in fa^'or of the hereditar}- mon- 
ai'chy. Xotwitlistanding all that could be said of the 
undue influence exerted by prefects, magistrates, and 
by the clergy, divided even upon this question, so tre- 
mendous a majority could not have been secured 
through artificial devices ; it bespoke a mighty current 
of public opinion that had asserted itself at the j)olls. 
There was much to be criticised in the eighteen yeavH 
during which Napoleon III. had reigned, but the result 
of the plebiscitum was an irresistibly convincing evi- 
dence of the Emperor's present popularity. 

The opponents laid great stress upon the fact, that, 
of the three hundred thousand votes cast by the army, 
over forty thousand had been in the negative ; which to 
our mind is ])ut anotber instance in proof of the rule 
that to obey and not to vote is the business of the 
armed force. 

Similarl}- it was emphasized, that in by far the 
greater number of large cities, which ai'e generally re- 
garded more as the centres of culture than are the vil- 
lages, the majority had l)een on the negative side. 

Despite these criticisms, the fact remained that the 
impression made by the event uj)on friend and foe 
alike was tremendous. It was generally believed that 
the Napoleonic Emjiiii' hud taken a new lease of life, and 



272 TENDENCIES IN FRENCH GOVERNMENT. [1870 

was unassailable at least for twenty years to come. 
That the impetuous spirit of the Opposition had been 
broken, both the Chamber and the press gave evidence. 

During the days of greatest agitation against the 
plebiscitura, the Left had divided, forming a close and 
an open fraction, as they were styled, one group even 
yet implacable, the other evincing a spirit of concession 
toward the expressed will of the people. The Left 
Centre had not only lost all influence with the Minis- 
try, but was for the present completely disorganized 
in consequence of the difference of opinion existing 
among its leaders ; there had been no party decision 
with regard to the plebiscitum, every member having 
been left wholly free to act. All sections of the Right 
had been united in their zealous exertions for the pleb- 
iscitum ; even the Arcadians had for the time forgot- 
ten their distrust of the Ministry. Ollivier could now 
proceed unhindered to the re-formation of the Ministry. 

His first effort was to restore the interrupted rela- 
tions to the Left Centre. Since Segris remained per- 
manently in charge of the Department of Finance, that 
of Public Instruction was assigned to Deputy Mege, 
one of the Vice-Presidents of the Legislative Body, 
and a party associate of Segris. To the position at the 
head of the Department of Public Works, left vacant 
by Talhouet, Deputy Plichon was nominated, who, be- 
ing a moderate Liberal of decidedly clerical predilec- 
tions, was well fitted to be a support to Ollivier in 
more than one respect. And finally, on May 15th, to 
every one's surprise, the portfolio of Foreign Affairs 



1870] OLLIVIEli'S FOREIGN POLICY. 275 

was offered to Ageiior de Gramoiit, Duke of Giiiche 
and Prince of Bidaehe, who for the past nine years had 
been the representative of France at Vienna. 

It was well known that the Emperor had no very 
high regard for the ability of the nev*^ Minister of 
Foreign Affaii"s ; and among the people, too, the gen- 
eral opinion was not tiattering to him. That Napoleon 
suggested his nomination is not at ail likely. Had 
the Emperor really cherished plans of war at the time, 
he would nevertheless hardly have selected for so im- 
portant a post the man whom in 1869 he had excluded 
from participation in the consultations regarding the 
triple alliance, a preparatory step to war, because of 
his inefficiency. If, on the other hand, Napoleon was 
anxious to preserve peaceful relations with Prussia, 
Gramont's advancement is still more inexplicable ; for 
the Duke's hatred of Prussia was quite as notorious 
as was his indiscretion. We must therefore conclude 
that Napoleon, being now a constitutional monarch, 
accepted him in the belief that a gentleman of so in- 
ferior mental calibre would make a ^Minister easily to 
be managed, forgetting, however, that shallow-headed 
individuals have not infrequently l)een also hard and 
hot-lieaded, and with these qualities have carried the 
wise but undecided along w\\\i tliciii. 

And who may it have been ])\ whom tlu' Knqjcror 
was persuaded to this nomination ? 

Certain information with regard to this point I have 
none ; the following facts may, however, throw some 
light upon the question. 



274 TENDENCIES IN FRENCH GOVERNMENT. [1870 

After Daru's retirement on April 14th, Ollivier had, 
as has been told, temporarily assumed the direction of 
foreign affaii-s. With evident pride he himself relates 
that a telegram was at once sent to the Vatican read- 
ing : " Daru dismissed ; succeeded by Ollivier ; the 
Council is free to act." Ollivier then withheld the 
French memorial from presentation to the Council, and 
-a little later instructed Monsieur de Banneville in no 
way to discuss the Council, either with the Pope oi- 
with Antonelli. Meanwhile, the French troops were 
not recalled, and the States of the Church continued 
to be protected against an Italian attack. Thus the 
Pope and the Council were shielded against interrup- 
tion, and the proclamation of papal infallibility was 
placed beyond the possibility of doubt. 

Aside from the Roman affair, Ollivier searched the 
documents of the Foreign Office for general informa- 
tion regarding the immediate past ; and, as he expressed 
himself later, the records of the negotiations concern- 
ing Luxemburg and the Treaty of Prague filled him 
with deep patriotic indignation at the repelling haugh- 
tiness of Bismarck and the cowardly weakness of the 
P"'rench Ministers. He tells us that then and there he 
made a vow, that, although he would by no means pre- 
cipitate a war from a sense of injured national pride, 
he would, however, despite his love of peace and his 
German sympathies, conduct diplomatic negotiations 
with Prussia in a very different tone and with differ- 
ent results than had the Messieurs de Moustier and 
de Lavalette. 



1870] THE DUKE BE GRAMONT. 275 

It is more than likely, therefore, that in Darn's 
place he desired a colleague who was disposed to pro- 
tect the Council and the Papal States, and at the 
same time to conduct negotiations with Prussia with 
fitting firmness and spirit. Having these two (pialities, 
it mattered little whether the new Minister possessed 
more or less information or talent, since the Prime 
Minister felt that out of his own superabundance he 
could supply any deficiency in this respect which might 
he found in his colleague in charge of the Foreign 
Office. From this point of view we can readily un- 
derstand that Gramont must have been just the man 
for Ollivier; for in his tendencies he was thoroughly 
clerical, and it would have been difficult to find in 
all iMirope any one more eager for an opportunity to 
strike at Prussia, and, above all else, at Bismarck. 

To estimate the achievements of the great German 
statesman according to his principles and methods of 
action was wholly beyond (framont's capacity. He 
saw in them no more than the triumphs of a success- 
ful course of disregard for the impositions and restric- 
tions of the ordinary sense of duty and honor. Tn 
1866 the story was told in Paris, that iqioii being 
informed of Gramont's enmity, Bismarck had given 
the terse reply: "He is the greatest blocklu-ad in 
Europe." Incensed at this, (irainont had exclaimed 
to Count Mcnsdorf, -1 will i-cvcuge France!" ^lore- 
over, the saying Avas often licaid iii Paris, that al 
though Gramont was not actually a native of Gascony, 
still he was lx)rn just iicross its boundary. 



276 TENDENCIES IN FRENCH GOVERNMENT. [1870 

His imaginative faculty was excitable and creative 
to a high degree ; e very impression produced by a 
strong emotion assumed the form of an imagined ex- 
perience, an event of the reality of which, owing to 
the weakness of his memory and the dulness of his 
pereej)tion, he remained immutably convinced until the 
next excitement drove the old fantasy out of his mind, 
only to replace it by some freshly imagined fable. 
Moreover, once having in this way assumed a position, 
he was proof against all argument, the irritation caused 
by its refutation simply urging him on. lie Avas as 
little open to conviction as was Ollivier, although for 
a wholly different reason. AVith Ollivier, this was to 
be found in the vanity of the successful orator and 
advocate, which prevented him from recognizing the 
truth in the arguments of others ; whereas, with the 
dialectic of the virtuoso, he succeeded in persuading 
himself of the correctness of the most erroneous views. 
With Gramont it was merely the naive haughtiness of 
the aristocrat of circumscribed education, who in his 
opinions is undisturbed by any annoying consciousness 
of the rest of the world. 

When he condescended to assume the arduous duties 
of a responsible Minister he declared himself wht)lly in 
sympathy with OUivier's views : no offensive war, but 
energetic resentment of every affront. 

Perhaps there remained this distinction, that in any 
difficulty which might arise Ollivier would resort to 
the sword with regret, whereas Gramont would do so 
with inward satisfaction. And herein Gramont would 



1870] EFFECT OF THE CBISIS. 27T 

h;i\i' found no scarcity of powerful sympathizei'S. His 
thorough antipathy to Prussia made him quite as wel- 
come to the Minister of War and to the army as to 
the clergy who hoped for new Gesta Dei per Francos 
against Prussia and Italy. To the Arcadians he was 
also most acceptable ; for, despite the plebiscitum, they 
still firmly believed that through 011i^der^s liberal 
measures the monarchy would in a short time be ren- 
dered defenceless against the Republicans unless the 
dynasty sliould a('([uire renewed prestige through bril- 
liant success in war. 

And herein lay an indication of the change which 
the situation had undergone. The influence of the 
plebiscitum had been toward a peace policy ; the crisis 
ill the ^Ministry m liich it had induced had furthered the 
opposite tendencies. Daru had owed his nomination 
not to Ollivier alone, but to the wish of the Left Centre 
which was distinctly a peace party ; for Gramont, the 
Extreme Kight, a war ])arty, had been active. 

However, as yet Ollivier's interim administration 
still continued ; since (iramont, before assuming his 
duties on June 1st, had returned to Vienna to make 
his adieus in person. Meanwhile France gave no sign 
of an intended departure from its present policy: 
European affaii-s had settled into a deep calm; in no 
direction did an occasion ])resent itself for a cliarac- 
teristii; assertion of P'rench di[)lomacy. 

About the middle of June, public opinion in l*aris 
gave evidence of considerable agitation when it became 
known that the North German Confedeiation contem- 



278 TENDENCIES IN FRENCH GOVERNMENT. [1870 

plated participating in a treaty concluded between 
Switzerland and Italy on October 15th, 1869. The 
Swiss Government had furnished twenty million and 
the Italian forty-tive million francs toward the con- 
struction of a railway over the St. Gothard ; and North 
Germany now held out the prospect of twenty millions 
more, which decided the choice of the St. Gothard as 
the point at which the railway should cross the Alps, 
a matter which until then had not been fully settled 
in Switzerland. 

To contribute so large a sum of money toward a 
foreign railway, the nearest station of which was six 
hundred kilometres distant from the frontier of the 
Confederation, was certainly not an every day occur- 
rence ; and to induce the Reichstag to consent to the 
appropriation of the sum, Bismarck characterized the 
undertaking as one of great significance to Germany, 
not only from a commercial point of view, but from 
a political one as well ; a significance which was so 
generally understood, and had ])een so frequently dis- 
cussed, that he felt any further explanation to be un- 
necessary. His meaning was simply this, that at 
present Germany was dependent upon either the Aus- 
trian or the French Alpine railwa3's in its intercourse 
with Italy, which would therefore be seriousl}^ inter- 
fered with in the event of a quarrel between these 
Great Powers. Being under the control of Switzer- 
land, which was always neutral, there would be no 
such uncertainty in connection with the proposed St. 
Gothard railway, whereby security in our Italian rela- 
tions would be greatlv promoted. 



18701 DEBATE UPON ST. GOTHARI) RAILWAY. 279 

It would seem that no transaction could be less 
provocative of criticism than was this one ; however, 
suspicion and dislike of Prussia having been once 
aroused in Paris by Thiers and his associates, the cir- 
cumstance that Bismarck had declared the St. (xothard 
railway to be advantageous to Germany was sufficient 
to create uneasiness there. It was regarded as an evi- 
dence of malice that Prussia had deprived France of 
this opportunity of profit ; to be sure, Switzerland had, 
in 1865, applied first to the French Government for 
pecuniary aid, which had, however, been refused. The 
Government was now reproached with this by the 
orators of the Left. The disadvantage of competition 
which the St. Gothard road would force upon the 
French railways was pictured in vivid colors ; but 
above all else, the opportunities it afforded the Prus- 
sian love of conquest were presented to the hearers 
in every possible and impossible aspect. " By means 
of it," exclaimed Keratr}^ " Prussia can in one night 
transport an army from Mainz to Venice, whilst we 
remain shut in between the Rhine and the Alps." 

Hereupon the Minister of War informed him that 
Prussia would require four days to move twenty-five 
thousand men from Mainz to Verona, whereas France 
could in the same time transport a whole army from 
Lyons to Verona; and that, moreover, in sudi an 
emergency it would be an easy matter to destroy the 
Baden road at several points. Gramont, too, spoke to 
the same effect, declaring that there could be no doubt 
that Switzerland would inaintain its cnstoniai'X" ncu- 



280 TENDENCIES IN FRENCH GOVERNMENT. [1870 

trality with regard to the St. Gothard road, and would 
not allow it to be used for the transportation of troops. 
The representations of the Ministers were so convin- 
cing, that when Gramont again arose to reply to renewed 
expressions of apprehension from Deputy Ferry, the' 
Chamber saved him the trouble of further explanation 
by a vote to close the debate. 

This Avas an instance when the endeavor of the 
French Government was wholly in the interest of 
peace, liefore the week ended another event occurred 
which, althougli creating much less stir, was of a 
nature well calculated to influence the initiated few 
not to depart from this course. 

As long as Daru was Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Napoleon maintained as complete silence with respect 
to Archduke Albert's plan of campaign, discreetly 
locked away in his chest, as he did with regard to the 
Prince's remarks, as carefully preserved in his memory. 
When, on May 15th, Gramont was nominated to the 
Ministry, and Ollivier remained temporarily in charge 
of foreign affairs, the Emperor hoped as heretofore to 
be able to avoid war, especially since at the time 
neither Germany nor Italy gave the slightest indication 
of an offensive policy. Still, ever since 1866, he 
believed peace to be uncertain from one day to the 
next, and was therefore constantly employed with 
thoughts of how, in case a complication should arise, 
he might promote his prospects of victory. He was of 
course fully aware that he had no formal alliance with 
any Power to rely upon ; the negotiations of the past 



1870] FRANCIS JOSEPH AGAINST AN ALLIANCE. 281 

year had, however, given him hope that both Austria 
and Italy would render him friendly assistance should 
France be compelled to undertake a great war. He 
now, on May 19th, submitted the Archduke's plan of 
campaign to the examination of a council of the high- 
est officers. After carefully performing their task, 
these gentlemen came to the conclusion that the mobil- 
ization of the Austrian troops would require at least 
six weeks, that of the Italian army a still longer time ; 
it was deemed unadvisable to expose the main army of 
the French for so long a time in an isolated position far 
from home.^ A new plan was therefore worked out 
and one of the officere. General Lebrun, a pei-sonal 
friend of the Emperor, was sent on June 6th upon a 
confidential mission, devoid of any political signi- 
ficance, to Vienna, there to discuss the matter with the 
Archduke. 

But even this led to no definite decision; the Arch- 
duke rejected the French plan, and agreed with Lebrun 
upon a third one only in so far that it remained subject 
to further revision. Before the General's departure 
the Archduke urged him to seek to ol)tain a private 
audience with Emperor Francis Joseph, notwithstand- 
ing the fact that the General was neither accredited 
nor empowered by his Government. Leijrun consented, 
although not without misgivings, and was most gra- 
ciously received. lie told the Emperor of his com- 
mission to the Archduke; without entering into a 

1 "Souvenirs du (icneral Jarras," p. 47. " Missiou du General Le- 
brun," in Figaro of January 19th, 1887. 



282 TENDENCIES IN FRENCH GOVERNMENT. [1870 

discussion of the plan of the campaign, the Emperor 
remarked that he wished to employ this opportunity 
to make a frank declaration, namely, that under no 
consideration could he bind himself to declare war 
against Prussia simultaneously with France should a 
conflict between these two countries become unavoid- 
able. He then referred to the difference of sympathies 
and opinions existing among the various races under 
his dominion ; his German subjects would resist to the 
utmost a declaration of war against North Germany. 

The plan of campaign, he said, appeared to him to 
be a most practicable one ; he felt, however, that he 
could not too urgently beg the Emperor Napoleon not 
to rely upon any false hopes of Austrian assistance. 

The prospect of an alliance had not, therefore, been 
held out by even so much as a verbal promise. Again, 
as in January, 1867, Napoleon had reason to exclaim, 
"I have not a friend in the world!" Austria was 
firmly determined upon neutrality ; Ollivier's Roman 
policy had rendered an Italian alliance highly improb- 
able. The situation was surely one to place a damper 
upon any warlike spirit which might arise in Paris. 

It was not surprising, therefore, that on June 30th, 
in connection with * the deliberations upon the army 
budget for 1871, the Minister of War should, in view 
of the unclouded prospect of peace, declare himself 
content with a levy of ninety thousand recruits instead 
of the usual one hundred thousand. When later, in 
the same connection, Glais-Bizoin advocated the discon- 
tinuance of the great standing armies, and Thiers in 



1870] MOST PEACEFUL PROSPECTS. 283 

reply argued their existence to be the surest means of 
preserving peace, exchiiming, ''Do we wish to promote 
peace ? Then we mvist tiret of ail be very peaceable, 
and secondly be very strong," Ollivier arose to say, 
'' I wish to state that the Government entertains no 
fears whatever that peace will be disturbed, for never 
has it been more certain than at present. Look 
in whatsoever direction we will, no question is en- 
countered which is at all likely to prove dangerous. 
Upon all the Cabinets of Europe the conviction has 
forced itself that treaties must be respected, especially 
those two upon which the peace of Europe chiefly 
rests, the Treaty of Paris of 1856, securing peace for 
the Orient, and the Treaty of Prague, securing peace 
for Germany." 

This final allusion to a treaty upon which, as \\as 
notorious, the contracting parties placed two entirely 
different constructions indicated that the love of peace 
was after all but conditional. The subject was not 
pursued further, however. 

In the En"-lish Parliament also it was announced 
at this time that in foreign affairs a dead calm pre- 
vailed. 

The day after Ollivier's declaration, on July 1st, 
the Emperor was again laid upon a bed of suffering 
l)y a renewed attack of liis ailment. Here was an ad- 
ditional reason why hostile intentions were not to be 
expected of the French Government. 



BOOK XXIV. 



ORiaiN OF THE FRENCH WAR, 



OKIGIN OF THE FRENCH WAE. 



When amidst the profound tranquillity prevailing 
throughout Europe in the spring of 1870, a quarrel 
suddenly arose by which within twelve days two great 
nations were precipitated into a war of vmparalleled 
results and colossal sacrifices, the world demanded to 
know upon A\'hom rested the responsibility for this tre- 
mendous disturbance, bringing unexampled renown to 
the one side, and fearful disaster to the other. Opin- 
ions differed in sharp contrast; and even now, after a 
lapse of twenty years, are not agreed. 

In France it is to this day the general belief that 
Bismarck, excellently prepared for war and hard pressed 
by difficulties at home, Avished to entice Emperor Na- 
poleon into a dec'laration of war ; that through an 
intrigue of long preparatit)n he systematically offended 
the French nation's self-respect ; and that the Emperor, 
although aware of the inadequacy of his military j)re[)- 
arations, allowed himself, with deplorable stupidity, to 
be led into the well-devised trap. 

In (ieriiiaiiN', from tiie outset, tlu; conviction li;is pre- 
vailed that the casuH belli declared in I'aiis was no 
more than a tlireadl)are excuse to grasp llii' sword, 

287 



288 ORIGIN OF THE FRENCH WAR. 

seek revenge for Sadovva, and throw the German na- 
tion back into the old state of dismemberment. 

More recently, however, it has been claimed that 
evidence has been discovered establishing the fact that 
for two years Napoleon was engaged in attempts to 
bring about a great European coalition for the purpose 
of an attack upon Prussia ; but that, fortunately for 
Germany, on the eve of its consummation he was 
carried away by impulse to declare war. That by this 
newly made discovery Napoleon's attitude, just before 
the declaration of war, is placed in a false light, our 
narrative has demonstrated. 

On both sides there are those, as need hardly be 
mentioned, whose judgment is calmer and whose re- 
search is more careful, and who therefore represent in 
varying degree views that are more moderate. 

Under these circumstances my readers will, I trust, 
forgive me if, supported by valuable and hitherto un- 
published material gathered from manifold sources, I 
seek to relate the events of those twelve days most 
accurately and correctly, and consequently with an 
attention to detail not elsewhere permitted to my 
narrative. 



1869] PARTIES IN SPAIN. 289 



CHAPTER I. 

THE HOHENZOLLERN CANDIDACY. 

In Spain the revolution of September, 1869, was fol- 
lowed by a period of great uncertainty and agitation. 
The victors had established a provisional government, 
at the head of which were Marshal Serrano as Regent, 
and Marshal Prim as Minister of War and President 
of the Ministry. Both men were monarchists, their 
view being the prevailing one also in the constituent 
Cortez convened in February, 1869. The duty next 
at hand was, therefore, to find a royal race to supply 
the place of the dethroned dynasty. 

All such plans were, however, vehemently and bit- 
terly opposed by four different parties, who, fortunately 
for the Government, pursued one another quite as re- 
lentlessly as they did the present head of the Stiite. 
Of these factions the largest and most daring one was 
that of the Republicans, who at various points and 
without any attempt at concealment were pirpariiig the 
country for another uprising. 

There were also the adherents of the dethroned 
queen, Isabella, who were endeavoring to combine for 
the purpose of reinstating either the (^uccu or her son. 



^290 THE HOHENZOLLERN CAyDlDACY. [1869 

Alfonso. As yet these were few in number, but en- 
joyed a most decided advantage in possessing Napo- 
leon's declared favor. In the Basque Provinces the 
remnants of the old Carlist Party were bestirring them- 
selves, although without meeting with any marked 
response from the people, who were weary of war. 
And finally there was the circle of friendly admirei-s 
surrounding Queen Isabella's brother-in-law, the Duke 
of Montpensier, the youngest son of Louis Philippe. 
In January. 1868. Prim had opened negotiations witli 
him, holding out prospects of the throne to him if he 
would espouse the cause of the revolution. Prim had, 
however, turned from him in disgust when the Duke's 
extreme discretion induced him to keep out of sight on 
the battle-field of Alcolea.^ 

In the tumult of this party conflict, a memorial with 
regard to the candidates likely to appear in connection 
with the coming choice of ruler was published by an 
influential member of the Liberal Party, Salazar y 
Mazarredo,2 State Councillor and Deputy. In it he 
demonstrated that neither Bourbon nor Orleans could 
be thought of in connection with the throne ; that the 
difference of creed must inevitably debar an English 
prince, even should he bring with him Gibraltar as 
dower ; or a Prussian, and were it even the famous 

1 This, as well as what follows, is according to Salazar's memorial of 
October 23d, 1869. 

2 Gramont in his books and Chaudordy in his deposition insinuate 
that Salazar was influenced to this action by Prussia, but there has not 
been so much as an attempt to prove this intimation. W^ith regard 
to the manner in which the candidacy originated, Chaudordy offers a 
number of data, not one of which is confirmed. 



1869] SALAZAR\S PROPOSALS OF FEBI!UAliY,'69. 291 

military hero, Prince Frederick Charles. He then sug- 
gested in the firet place the name of Ferdinand, titular 
King of Portugal, who had been Prince Consort to 
INlaria da Gloria when she was the reignino- queen of 
that country ; the second phue he accorded to the 
Prince's son-in-law. the Hereditaiy Prince Leopold of 
Ilohenzollern-Sigmaringen. in whom, h-e claimed, all 
tlie qualities most desirable were combined, — firmness, 
prudence, integrity ; a man of thirty-five, hence in the 
prime of life, happily wedded and blessed witli chil- 
di-en ; not I^ltramontane ' in his inclinations, and yet 
an orthodox Catholic. 

The proposals put forward l)y the memorial soon 
found their way into a number of n-ewspapers, and, as 
can ])c readily imagined, were discussed with much in- 
terest.2 Toward the end of March, 18(39, the French 
Ambassador at Berlin, Count Benedetti, learned that 
his former Spanish colleague. Ranees, lately transferred 

1 New Catholic was the expression in Spain. 

2 Lauser (Spanische Geschichte, I., 219) claims to have learned from 
the Spanish diplomat Marcoartu, that in March, 1869, the candidacy of 
Prince Leopold had been suggested to Napoleon for consideration bj- a 
relative of tlie Emperor; that the Emi)ress had, however, opposed it. 
her former friendship tor the House of Hohenzollern having been trans- 
formed into enmity by the failure of one of her matrimonial projects, 
through a refusal on the part of the Prince of Rouniania. Marcoartu's 
account is, however, rendered highly improbable by the entries in the 
diary of King Charles of lloumania, made during his sojourn in Paris 
in the fall of 18G9, as well as by those regarding the manner in wliich 
Napoleon received the announcement of his intended mariiage ; as also 
by letters of Madame Conm. and by certain reniaiks made bj' the Em- 
press in conversation with tlie Houmanian c/Kii-f/e iVaJI'airfa at Constan- 
tinople. (Dpidsc/tp Rpvuc Novc^mber, 1H9.'5.) Every word of tlie diar^' 
testifies to the unbroken relations of intimate fricndsliip between Naim- 
leon and the Holieii/.olierns. 



292 THE HOHENZOLLEEN CANDIDACY. [1869 

to Vienna, had recently spent five days in Berlin, and 
luid during that time had two long interviews with 
liismarck. Forthwith the suspicion was aroused in the 
Ambassador that the subject of discussion must have 
been the elevation of Prince Leopold to the Spanish 
throne. Bismarck being at the time in Varzin, Bene- 
detti made inquiry of the Undersecretary of State, 
Von Thile, from whom he received the reply, as he re- 
ported on March 31st, 1869, that Von Thile had heard 
absolutely nothing of such intentions ; and that he 
could, moreover, assure the Ambassador upon his word 
of honor that Ranees had not so much as alluded to 
such a possibility, but on the contrary, had referred to 
the Duke of Montpensier as the probable candidate for 
the throne. 

Every word of Thile's statement conformed entirel}- 
to the truth. Bismarck himself could have given the 
Ambassador no other information ; for as yet not a 
word from Madrid regarding the future occupant of 
the Spanish throne had been received, either by the 
Prussian Government or by Prince Leopold. 

The Spanish Ministry was composed of members of 
the Liberal Union and of the Progressist Party ; Prim 
was a Progressist, Deputy Salazar a Unionist. Prim, 
like Salazar, would have preferred a Portuguese candi- 
date to all others, but failing to procure such a one, 
would have sought an Italian Prince, and not a Hohen- 
zollern. Accordingly, on April 4th, 1869, he induced 
the Ministry to offer the crown to King Ferdinand, and 
upon his instant and not very gracious refusal on the 



1869] PRIXCE CHARLES ANTHONY DECLINES. 293 

6 til, to extend ii like invitation to the King of Italy for 
his second son, Amadeo, Duke of Aosta. Here, too, 
the answer was unhesitatingly given that the House 
of Savoy was not so rieh in princes that it could re- 
sign one of them to S[)Hin. 

Prim was seriously annoyed. In view of Napoleon's 
endeavors for the restoration of Isabella, he had every 
reason to assume that neither an Austrian nor a Ba- 
varian prince would accept the dangerous gift. But 
where else could he find a Catholic prince ? Only 
through the pressure of necessity, therefore, was he in- 
duced to act upon Salazar's second proposal, and al- 
low an inquiry to be made of Prince Charles Anthony 
at Diisseldorf as to whether Prince Leopold would con- 
sider an offer of the Spanish crown. 

The answer was a direct refusal ; the Prince, King 
William, and Bismarck were all of the same mind 
with regard to it.^ 

^Meanwhile Count Benedetti had been summoned to 
Paris to participate in a consultation of some kind. 
Upon this occasion he told the Emperor of his inter- 
view willi Tliile, adding, however, that Thile was not 
always intrusted with Bismarck's secrets, and that it 
was therefore his intention before long to approach the 
Ministei' himself with reganl to tlie mattei-. Napoleon 
approved of this, and explained to him that the ele- 
vation of Montpcnsier, being anti-dynastic, would l)e 
an affront to himself alone, and that he could tliere- 
fore suffer it; whereas, on tlie other hand, the Hohen- 

1 Compare Benedetti, ■" M;i Mission," p[). .SO? and ;>;>!. 



294 THE HOIIENZOLLERN CANDIDACY. [1869 

zollerii candidacy, being anti-national, -would not be 
tolerated by the people ; it must therefore be pre- 
vented. (This, we observe, was not the expression of 
his personal view, but of a popular opinion.) Ac- 
cordingly the Minister's instructions to the Ambas- 
sador were to interview Bismarck upon the subject, 
but to regulate his own conversation in such a manner 
as would avoid any appearance of a wish on the part 
of France to enter into negotiations with regard to 
the matter. 

After his return to Berlin, Benedetti reported on 
May 11th that Bismarck had not shown himself at all 
averse to a discussion of the subject, and had at once 
declared that in view of the very uncertain condition 
of affairs in Sjiain, the King would most assuredly 
not advise the Prince to accept the crown should the 
Cortes proffer it to him; and that Prince Anthony, as 
he, Bismarck, knew with certainty, quite agreed with 
the King. 

'' If full reliance were to be placed on his word,"' 
wrote Benedetti, " we might feel re-assured ; but past 
experience leads me to believe that he has not fully 
disclosed his mind to me. I therefore remarked to 
him that the Prince could not, of course, comply with 
the wish of the Cortes without the King's consent, and 
that the Prince's decision must therefore l)e such as 
the King might command, Bismarck acknowledged 
THIS TO BE THE CASE ; ])ut instead of assuring me that 
THE King was fully DETERIVnNED UNDER ANY CIR- 
CUMSTANCES to insist upon the Prince's refusal, he re- 



1869] BENEDETTI INfEUVJEWS BISMARCK. 295 

turned to his former position, reiterating that the perils 
by which the new sovereign woukl find himself sur- 
rounded were such that the King would surely advise 
the Prince against the step. ' Moreover," he added, 
who knows whether the offer will ever be made ? 
' Whether so ambitious a man as Prim will not in the 
end prefer to keep the highest place for himself ? ' 
Before leaving the subject, I impressed upon him the 
fact, that, although the Emperor's Government was in- 
clined to be most circumspect in its observation of 
events in Spain, nevertheless their further development 
would never cease to be a matter of supreme interest 
to it. Bismarck, however, did not go beyond his pre- 
vious statement. He took j^ains to avoid the direct 
declaration that the King would ix xo event allow 
the Prince to accept, although Tliile had given me 
this assurance on his word of honor. We can but 
conclude, therefore, that Bismarck intends to reserve 
to the King full freedom of action for any future 
event. To put the question to him directly, and thus 
force him to a reply which might lead to sci'ious con- 
sequences, I did not deem advisable, owing to my in- 
structions to observe extreme caution." 

Here we have an excellent example of liow a sus- 
picious mind can, from al)S()lutcly iiotliing. draw in- 
ferences ^\•hicll are so sclf-chdudiiig llial llic actual 
facts ai)pear wholly distorted; not infrequcuth- the 
seeds of terrible catastrophes are thus sown. 

Benedetti, in this connection, refers to Ids rcj»ort of 
March 31st as n-pi-cscnting Tldlc to lia\-c pledged his 



296 THE HOHENZOLLERN CANDIDACY. [1869 

word that the King would never consent to the candi- 
dacy of the Prince ; whereas in reality the report 
speaks of Thile's word as having been given merely in 
assurance of the fact that he had not had the least 
intimation of the matter. Further, Benedetti repre- 
sents Bismarck as having conceded that the Prince in 
his decision would be entirely subject to the King's 
command ; whereas we know from what we learned of 
the provisions of the Hohenzollern family compact in 
connection with the Roumanian question ^ that Bismarck 
COULD not have said this ; he may have said that the 
Prince would not accept without the King's consent, 
but surely not that he could not. And finally, Bene- 
detti had not given Bismarck the slightest intimation 
that Napoleon was decidedly opposed to the Hohen- 
zollern candidacy, but had deemed it sufficient to allude 
to the fact, of which everyone was aware, that France 
was greatly interested in the Spanish throne question. 
To him it seemed but a matter of course that Prussia 
must engage never to entertain a view differing from 
the present one ; consequently he regarded it as a 
serious ground for suspicion that Bismarck, into whose 
mind the possibility of such a demand did not enter, 
should persistently confine his statements to the present 
phase of the case, and not include all possible conditions 
which the future might bring about. 

And yet Benedetti was a man inclined to peace ; to 
him it would have been cause for rejoicing had France 
unconditionally accepted the consummation of German 

1 Vol. VI., p. 417. 



1869] THE SECOND SPANISH ATTEMPT. 297 

unity.^ He did not dream that by his endeavors to 
draw from Prussia a promise that the candidacy would 
he })ositively forbidden, both for the present and the 
future, he had suggested a fateful thought in Paris ; 
one which would prove the cause of frightful bloodshed 
and of a conflict most disastrous to his country. 

After the occurrence of these conversations reported 
by Benedetti. several months passed during wliich the 
Hohenzollerns heard not a word regarding the Span- 
ish question. At Madrid the Cortes completed the 
Constitution on June 1st, and then reinvested Serrano 
with authority to conduct the regency. This, how- 
ever, was by no means conducive to a more tranquil 
state of affairs in the country ; but, on the contrary, 
both Carlists and Republicans now endeavored with 
redoubled energy to gain the upper hand. In Jul}' 
the Carlist pretender himself appeared on the scene 
of action in the Basque Provinces, and succeeded ii' 
the organization of armed troops at several points. 
The Government, however, took such vigorous steps 
to suppress the attempt, that order was restored within 
a few weeks, and the pretender, in great trepidation, 
fled to France. 

The energy and extent of the Republican agitation, 
on the other hand, were such as to give the provisional 
iidministnitiou sulHcient cause to be anxious to liiid an 
occupant for the vacant throne as speedily as possibh*. 
In tills i)r('(]icaiii('iit Prim vicldcd to Sala/.ar's cntbu- 

1 ('omi»a,re, in " .Mil Mission en Prusse," tlio cxiuiustix c ifiion of .Ian 
uary .5th, 18G8, purticulurly on p. 265. 



298 THE UOHENZOLLEEN CANBIBACY. [1869 

siastic representations, and gave him permission to go 
to Germany, there to present the Spanish offer to 
Prince Leopold in person, and to assure him that if 
he were at all inclined to respond to the call he could 
feel assured of a large majority in the Cortes. At 
the same time Prim gave Salazar a letter of introduc- 
tion to a German acquaintance in Munich,^ who was 
in a position to put him in communication vidth the 
Prince of Hohenzollern. 

About the middle of September, preserving the deep- 
est secrecy, Salazar hastened to Munich, and upon his 
arrival there was announced by the Munich acquain- 
tance to the Prince, then sojourning at Castle Weinburg 
in Switzerland. The Prince having signified his wil- 
lingness to receive him, Salazar hastened to the village 
nearest the castle, and there awaited the evening, when, 
in the darkness of night, he made his way to the castle, 
and gained admission without having been recognized 
by any one. 

He was received with utmost courtesy, but without 
the slightest sign of enthusiasm. The Prince evinced 
little inclination to the idea, and the Hereditary Prince 
unhesitatingly declined the offer. But Salazar did not 
allow himself to be so easily discouraged. He pictured 
the excellency of the conditions which awaited the 
Prince in Spain ; although he admitted that the atti- 
tude of the Republicans was sufficiently dangerous to 

1 That which immediately follows was learned through a conversa- 
tion lield many years ago with the acquaintance to whom reference is 
made. 



1869] A SECOND REFUSAL. 299 

make an early decision advisable, since all might l)e lost 
by long-continued hesitation. He asked to be told the 
obstacles which were in the wa}', and under what con- 
ditions a favorable answer might be expected. This 
led to a further discussion, in whieh the i-losing words 
of the Prince were to this effect : When the Spanish 
Government can lay before me convincing evidence that 
Emperor Napoleon and King William both regard my 
son's accession to the throne of Spain with favor, and 
not until then, can I give the subject serious considera- 
tion. 

This was the only reply that Salazar could take back 
with him to Spain. 

It is again characteristic of the relation of the Ho- 
henzollern House to the Crown of Prussia, that Prince 
Anthony upon this occasion left the inquiry to be 
made of King William to the Spanish Government; 
whereas any true prince of Prussia would, without 
doubt, have hastened at once to inform the sovereign 
head of his family of what had occurred. No less sig- 
nificant, on the other hand, is the fact that, as Prince 
Leopold told an English newspaper correspondent a 
year later,^ when Emperor Napoleon was informed of 
what had transpired, he raised no objections at the 
time, and still less did he give any intimation that 
the ([uestion might develop into a cause for war. 

Napoleon's conduct u})on this occasion can be readily 
uiiderht(»o(l ; for the negotiations had I'cnuiined wholly 

1 "War Diary of W'illiaiii Kussell," German translation by Voih 
Schlesinger, p. 28. 



300 THE HOHENZOLLERN CANDIDACY. [1869 

without result, and in the event of a future offer, ac- 
ceptance had been made conditional upon Napoleon's 
approval. There was therefore no occasion for a hasty 
protest, which, if presented at this juncture, might mar 
the cordial relations wliicli for years had existed be- 
tween the Emperor and the Prince, and might also 
give rise to unnecessary negotiations with Spain. 

When Salazar reported the result of his mission at 
Madrid, Prim at once pronounced it to be a politelv 
framed, but none the less positive, refusal, and there- 
fore, still actuated by his earliest preference, induced 
the Ministry to make a new application to Victor Em- 
manuel, this time asking his sanction to the candidacy 
of his young nephew, Thomas, Duke of Genoa, for the 
Spanish throne. But here, too, difificidties did not fail 
to present themselves without delay. Although the 
Republican agitation, which just at this time culmi- 
nated in open revolt, was completely subdued within 
a week, and order and quiet were restored throughout 
the country with a firm hand, yet the question of a 
choice of king effected a new division of parties. In 
opposition to Prim's advocacy of an Italian candidate, 
Salazar, on October 23d, issued a revised form of his 
appeal to the country to place upon the throne the 
Hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern ; and, could he have 
vouched for acceptance, he would dou])tlessly have 
found ready response among his friends of the Liberal 
Union. Since, as mattere stood, this was not possible, 
the prospects of a third candidate grew brighter, those 
of the Duke of Montpensier who. although he had 



1870] SPAIN'S FRl'ITLESS ATTEMPT IN IIALy. oUl 

avoided exposing liini.->elf to the l)allet.s at Alcolca, 
now came forward with ahicrity to recognize the new 
Constitution, and encourage his adherents to advocate 
his election among tlie membei-s of the Cortes. 

For Prim this was all highly vexations. lie had 
broken so completely with Montpensier that the hit- 
ter's accession to the throne meant political annihila- 
tion for him. ^lean while in Florence the prospects 
for his plans took on an unexpectedly favorable aspect. 
Victor Euunanuel evinced a much greater inclination 
to the election of his nephew than he had shown t'oi- 
that of his son. What was most auspicious, however, 
was that Napoleon, who in the interest of the deposed 
Isabella had expressed himself as opposed to the Duke 
of Aosta, had by this time recognized tlie hopelessness 
of her cause; and, being averse to l)Oth Montpensier 
and Hohenzollern, now used his influence in Florence 
with great effect in favor of the youthful Thomas, so 
that Prim for the time found his endeavor furthered 
by the mighty support of France. 

Upon his opponents in the Cortes who were members 
of the l^nion all this made no impression whatever; for 
they rather resented the idea of liaving a king forced 
upon them by a foreign Power; and for this very reason 
a considerable number of them advocated the choice 
of Montpensier. All of them, however, opposed that of 
the Dnke of (ienoa, on the ground that he \\as still a 
minor, and Spain in its present crisis needed above all 
else a sti'ong man at the lielni of State. In this tlicy 
found an unexpected ally in the widowed niotiier of 



302 THE HOHENZOLLERN CAN BIB ACT. [1870 

the young Duke, a lady of sense and decision, who re- 
fused with unwavering firmness to yiekl her son to so 
perilous an adventure. King Victor Emmanuel hesitated 
for some time ; when, however, it became evident that 
the Duke's j^opularity with the Cortes was waning, he 
finally declared, on December 31st, 1867, that his action 
could not be contrary to the wish of the Duke's mother, 
and that he must therefore decline Prim's offer with 
thanks. 

And so matters still stood as they had at the outset, 
a vacant throne and a kingdom without a king. Party 
dissension made the election of a native of the country 
impossible ; and yet with offended pride the sons of 
Spain were compelled to behold the once world-subdu- 
ing crown of Spain disdained by foreign princes. 

The firm union of the Progressists and Unionists, 
wherein the present Government found its chief sup- 
port, had been severely shaken by the conflict caused 
by the latest attempt to procure a king ; and to Prim's 
discomfiture he now beheld the seeds sown by the 
friends of Montpensier, the candidate most distasteful 
to him, spring up in every direction. He realized that 
there was nothing so desirable as a return to combined 
action between the two liberal parties. It Avas this 
which now disj^osed Prim to lend a more willing ear to 
Salazar's representations than he had during the past 
year. Salazar urged upon the Marshal that the Hohen- 
zollern refusal had not been an unqualified one, and 
that the Prince had expected the Spanish Government 
to obtain the consent of Napoleon and King William. 



1870] SPAXlslf OFFER MADE A THIRD TIME. oOo 

To be sure, Salazar was obliged to admit that it was to 
be feared Napoleon would not suffer a Hohenzollern 
to ascend the Spanish throne. 

But at this point it became evident that Prim's 
regard for Napoleon had l)een impaired through the 
fruitlessness of French influence in Florence. " What 
objection can the Emperor have to the Prince of Ho- 
henzollern?" he asked. "Our original choice was not 
a Prussian prince. Were we not compelled to endure 
the most cruel derision from the Paris press when our 
first efforts proved futile ? We have been unfortunate 
everywhere ; and, as every one knows, the Duke of 
Montpensier or the republic will also encounter Napo- 
leon's veto. Shall this be reason sufficient to condemn 
the September achievements to a never-ending state 
of incompleteness? What has France to fear from a 
Prussian prince upon the throne of Spain ^" ' 

Prim believed that although Napoleon Avoiild receive 
the announcement ungraciously he would in the end, 
nevertheless, prefer the Prince of Hohenzollern, with 
whom he was u[)()n terms of personal friendship, to the 
Duke of Montpensier as head of the Spanish Govern- 
ment. 

The result of the consultation was that in February ,2 
with Serrano's consent, Salazar was again sent to Ger- 
many to ivopeii the negotiations witli the Hohenzol- 
lerns, which had been suspendetl in the fall. He took 

' As stilted in Suluziir's preface to llie third issue of liis pamphlet, 
July 8th, 1870. 

2 " Vers le mois de mars," says Gramoiit in " La Fraiuie et la Prusse." 
p. 21. 



304 THE HOHENZOLLERN CANDID ACT. [1870 

with him a personal letter to King William, which he 
was commissioned to deliver into the Kings's hands if 
possible,^ and another of like tenor to Bismarck ; ^ the 
object of both being, of course, to discover the views 
of the recipients with regard to an eventual candidacy 
of the Prince of Hohenzollern, and, if possible, to 
incline them in its favor. Both letters contained an 
earnest request that profoundest secrecy be preserved, 
to the end that the undertaking might not be frustrated 
by hostile party intrigues.^ 

From beginning to end the overture was of an unoffi- 
cial character;* neither the Spanish Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, nor any member of either of the two embassies, 
had taken part in the transaction or had any knowl- 
edge of it.^ From the outset King William was de- 
termined on liis part, also, to treat the matter not as 

1 The King's statement to Benedetti. Benedetti, "Ma Mission en 
Prusse," p. 331. Benedetti misunderstood these remarks made by the 
King, believing him to refer to the later negotiations conducted in June, 
which is utterly impossible, since it is an established fact that no Spanish 
agent either sougiit or obtained an audience with the King at Ems. In 
fact, the King knew nothing of the negotiations carried on behind Ins 
back until after their conclusion, and, therefore, could not have given 
Bismarck information regarding " divers incidents," since he knew of 
none such. Nor did Bismarck receive his first information regarding 
the issue of the negotiations through an official announcement made to 
him by the King, but from a gentleman accompanying Salazar. It is 
highly important that this fact should be definitely established, since 
the consequences of Benedetti's error were so grave. 

2 Gramont, at the place mentioned. 

3 As stated by Bismarck to the Federal Council, according to Hahn, 
"Deutsche Politik," 18f)7-1870, p. 354. To be found in other publica- 
tions also. 

^ According to the same statement. 

s As stated by Prim, accortling to Benedetti, p. 419. As stated by 
Rascon, according to Gramont, pp. 19, 365. 



1870] EI.XG WILLIAM OPPOSES ACCEPTANCE. 305 

an affair of State, but as one of family interest alone. 
Consequently he refused Salazar an audience ; neither 
the ^linistry at home nor the Prussian embassy at 
Madrid received instructions from him to give the sul)- 
ject consideration. 1 As liead of the family he called 
the Hohenzollern magnates together to a family con- 
sultation, to determine upon the eoui"se to pursue 
should the Spanish crown be actually offered to Prince 
Leopold. 

As had often been the case theretofore upon occa- 
sions of less moment, and has been since, the King 
invited the most trusted of his advisers, Count Bis- 
marck, to be present at these discussions. During their 
progress the disinclination which Prince Leopold had 
frequently manifested since 18G9 evidently remained 
unchanged. The King's attitude was as we learned it 
to have been in 1866 and again in the spring of 18Gi>. 
It conformed in every respect to the prescriptions of the 
Hohenzollern family compact. The King allowed the 
Prince full liberty to decide for himself ; if, however, 
he desired advice, the King's counsel was decidedly 
against the vnidertaking, unless, indeed, the Prince felt 
a strong inward calling to assume the responsibility .^ 

Under tliese circumstances the matter Avould have 
been ver^- ([uickly disposed of liad not I>ismarck ex- 

1 Beiiedetti, p. 333. 

2 Compare the communications of Buiou Wertlier made immediately 
after his return from Ems to tlie FriMicli Minister, aicordin}; to Halm 
(in the puhlioation to wliicli reference lias been made), p. 318; also the 
statement to be found in a letter written by Wilmowski, '' Deutsche 
Kcvue," January, IH'.M, p. 5. 



306 THE UOUENZOLLERN CANDIDACY. [1870 

pressed an entirely different view. Regarding tlie 
motives which actuated liim I am enabled to give a 
somewhat explicit account. Among them hostility to 
France, or the wish to utilize the occasion as a means 
of goading France on to an over-hasty declaration of 
war, had no place whatever. In this assembly, gathered 
for consultation, there was even less thought than had 
Marshal Prim that the candidacy of the Prince would 
call forth a decided protest from Napoleon, much less 
provoke him to designs of war (an inference which had 
evidently been drawn from the Emperor's attitude in 
connection with the Roumanian choice of sovereign, 
and from his silence with respect to the communication 
received by him from Weinburg in September). 

In discussing the candidacy, the question whether 
France would oppose it, and the attitude to be assumed 
in that event, was not so much as suggested. Bismarck 
was of the opinion that, owing to Napoleon's dislike for 
Montpensier, as well as to the relations existing between 
the Emperor and Prince Charles Anthony, it would not 
be difficult for Prince Leopold, immediately after his 
election, to obtain a personal interview with Napoleon 
in Paris, and come to an understanding with him in 
perfect harmony and uninterrupted friendship. This, 
he believed, would be quite possible if the Prince, in 
conformity to the demands of his new position, would 
forget his German origin, and become wholly a 
Spaniard.^ 

1 Just after the battle of Sedan, when in the darkness of night Bis- 
marck was riding to his quarters accompanied by a Prussian general, 



1870] BISMAliVK AVVOCATES IT. 307 

This supposition 1ki\ iiig been once assumed, Bismarck 
could point out many advantages, although, in truth, 
not very great ones, which, owing to the similarity of 
interests between the two countries, would arise to 
Prussia should a prince friendly to that country rule 
at Madrid. Further, he was of the opinion that al- 
though the contemplated step would have been an 
utterly reckless one in 1869, when the waves of revo- 
lution were running high in Spain, yet now, after the 
rebellion had been twice suppressed, and the Govern- 
ment had acquired strength upon which reliance could 
be placed, there was much to be hoped from the acces- 
sion of an able monarch. Moreover, before irretrievably 
deciding the question, the stability of conditions in 
Spain could be ascertained. 

Whenever Bismarck advocated a point wdth earnest- 
ness and persistence he was wont, as the w^orld well 
knows, to make a deep impression upon his hearei-s. 
Upon this occasion, however, before the discussions 
were concluded he was attacked by a tedious indisposi- 
tion, which conqx'llcd him to seek rest at Varzin, where 
he grew so seriously ill that he was forbidden to take 
any thouglit of political affairs for a long time. 

During his absence the favorable aspect of the Span- 



the conversation fell ui)(>n the ori<,nn of the war, and Bismarck related 
the events of the caii.liilacy. Tn this connection he used the expression, 
" It would have required of the Prince that he should turn Spaniard, 
and forget liis (Jernian origin." He was not aware that the Prince and 
several officers were riding directly behind him ; to his surprise the 
Prince called out, "Pardon me! A Spaniard I would willingly have 
he<ome, but never would I have forgotten that I am a Cerman." 



308 TUE HOllENZOLLEllN CANDIDACY. [1870 

ish offer found no representative in the family council ; 
both the King and the Hereditary Prince remained un- 
shaken in their disinclination to the project ; and early 
in May a telegram addressed to ^Marshal Prim was sent 
to the Prussian legation at Madrid,^ definitely stating 
it to be the Prince's intention to decline the offer, 
should it be made him. The King believed that this 
matter, so annoying to him, was now disposed of 
definitively. 

Upon his return to Berlin toward the end of May, 
Bismarck could not alter the situation ; but to Prim, 
who had insisted upon an expression of opinion from 
him also, he wrote a consoling letter, in which he spoke 
encouragingly of the Prince's candidacy at some future 
time, saying it was an excellent idea, one which ought 
not to be relinquished, but regarding which it would be 
wise to conduct negotiations with the Prince himself, 
and not with the Prussian Government.^ 

Notwithstanding these hopeful possibilities, the still 
vacant throne placed the Spanish Government in an ex- 
ceedingly embarrassing position for the moment. The 
factions which had been subdued took courage afresh ; 
after the second refusal had been received from the 

^ As stated in Prim's speech to the Cortes in the sitting of June 11th. 
The date given was learned through word of mouth from Bernhardi, at 
that time military attache to the Prussian legation at Madrid. 

' Gramont, "La France et la Prusse," at the place mentioned. 
"Passe et Present," p. 88. Chaudordy also refers to this letter; its 
text, as he quotes it, does not, however, agree witli Gramont's state- 
ment in detail, although the general tenor of tlie two is identical. A 
third letter of like purport is to he found in Bl. Jerrold's " Life of Na- 
poleon III.," Vol. IV., p. 45(i, altliough its authority is not mentioned. 



1870] A FOURTH ATTEMPT DETERMiyED UPON. 309 

Prince of Ilohenzolleni, the iidherents of the Duke of 
Montpensier among the Unionists rapidly increased in 
numher, and the great majority of the deputies, weary 
of this fruitless detention, were importunate in their 
■desire to return to their homes; and yet should the 
assemhlv adjourn Ijefore this cpiestion of an oeeupant 
for the throne had been settled, a deep gloom threat- 
ened to fall upon the future of the country. 

Prim knew not whither to turn for another and hap- 
* pily more willing candidate. The situation grew des- 
perate ; and so he came to the hardly less desperate 
determination to make a fourth attempt to secure the 
same candidate, despite the discouraging replies he had 
received to all the confidential incpiiries he had set 
afoot. He decided to open the new negotiations, not 
witli tlie Prussian (Tovernment. l)Ut with the Hohen- 
zollerns themselves, A\ho by this time had left Berlin, 
and were in South Germany. Though success had not 
been possible with the kiu>wledge of King William, 
Prim still hoped to gain his object behind the King's 
back. For that tliere was such a possibility Salazar, 
who was aware of the position accorded to the Ilohen- 
zollern princes by their family compact, hail infoi'incd 
him; and he therefore knew that from a legal point 
of view the Prince could accept, even should the King 
refuse his consent. 

Tills time the iiileiition was iu)t to iiKpiire of Pi'iuce 
r.eo|told what his attitude would l)e \v the crown were 
off'eied him. hut to ])roffer it under the conditicMi of 
certainty as guaranteed hv tiie conlirming action of the 



310 THE EOHENZOLLERN CANDIDACY. [1870 

Cortes. This required first of all that the election 
should be placed beyond doubt in the Cortes. To this 
end Marshal Prim effected the enactment of a resolu- 
tion by that body making an absolute majority, not of 
the members present, but of the whole number of depu- 
ties, namely 273 votes, necessary to a choice. This 
was the death-knell of Montpensier's candidacy; there 
was not the remotest prospect that he could command 
so large a number. 

No rival now stood in the way of the Hohenzollern 
candidacy ; and Prim, again with the full approval of 
Serrano, found it no difficult task to persuade the prin- 
cipal leaders of the two great parties to consent to it. 
They, too, were requested to maintain complete silence 
with regard to it, but most of those who were initiated 
into the secret kept it but illy. On June 11th Prim 
addressed the Cortes at length upon the throne question, 
for the double purpose of allaying the impatience of the 
deputies, and of eliciting from them an expression of 
consent to the plans he entertained. 

After referring to the refusals received from the titu- 
lar King of Portugal and the Dukes of Aosta and 
Genoa, he continued : " You now probably expect, 
gentlemen, that I am about to propose the name of a 
new candidate with whom I have opened negotiations 
in the name of the Spanish Government. This, how- 
ever, is not my intention, since it would not onl}- be 
highly indiscreet, but would most likely lead to compli- 
cations ; and, aside from this, I have given my word in 
promise of silence. You, gentlemen, will undoubtedly 



1870] NEGOTIATIONS UNKNOWN TO THE KING. 311 

approve of my reticence. (Cries of Yes, yes I) The 
candidate Avhom I have in mind would, unquestionably, 
meet the requirements of Spain : he is of royal lineage 
(sic')., a Catholic, and of age. But fate decreed that 
upon this page of our history also should be recorded 
an unsuccessful attempt to procure a King. With as 
great courtesy as good will, I have been apprised that 
the Prince cannot at the present moment accept the 
crown. The Government has therefore thought it ad- 
visable to turn to the Cortes, and make this assembly 
the arbiter of the question. Fortune has not favored 
the Government in its negotiations ; we are not in a 
position to present to you the name of a candidate, at 
least not to-day. But shall we be able to do so to- 
morrow, or the next day? That is the very point upon 
which I can give you no definite information. I can 
only assure you that the Government and the monar- 
chically inclined members of this assembly are actuated 
by one and the same spirit, and that the Government 
has not been deprived of all prospect of finding a King. 
Without designating a definite time or date, the Gov- 
ernment will continue to pui-sue the matter with both 
caution and reserve until it shall be enal)led to present 
to you the name of a candidate who shall be one to 
compel piil)lic ()[)ini()ii in his favor." 

He concluded with tlie remark, tliat although the pro- 
longation of the interim vv^as doubtlessly an evil, yet 
the Government held control of the means where- 
with to ward off any dangers which might be induced 
by it. 



312 THE HOIIENZOLLEBN CANDIDACY. [1870 

Thus, as we have seen, he mentioned no name ; and 
yet there coukl hardly have been a doubt with regard 
to this point among liis hearers. Salazar's pamphlets 
and Prim's conferences with the party leaders had 
made the name of HohenzoUern famous ; all the world 
felt certain that Prince Leopold was the candidate who 
had declined. So said the reports which the correspon- 
dents of the Times and Daily News sent to London ; 
such was the opinion of the Italian Ambassador, Cerutti, 
as expressed to the Madrid academician, Lauser; so, 
later, Herr von IJernhardi assured me with the remark 
that at the Prussian legation, ever since the appearance 
of Salazar's first pamphlet, the entire proceeding was 
looked upon as a rash venture on the part of Prim. 

Who this future candidate was to whom Prim re- 
ferred, every one except the initiated few was left to 
decide for himself ; whether it was again the Prince of 
HohenzoUern, or a Bavarian or an Austrian Prince, the 
speech in no way indicated. Of two persons we can 
assume with certainty that they had no thought of a 
renewed overture to be made the Prince of Hohenzol- 
lern, — King William, who was aware that the offer 
had been thrice declined ; and Emperor Napoleon, wlio 
now knew of at least two refusals, and who had also 
been assured that without his consent the offer would 
not so much as receive consideration from the Hohen- 
zollerns. 

However, on June 14th, only three days after his 
speech to the Cortes, Prim sent Salazar, now fully pro- 
vided with all the requisite credentials of his Govern- 



1870] PRINCE LEOPOLD ACCEPTS. 313 

inent, to Sigiiiaringen. Arrived there, Salazar found 
the mood of both father and son greatly changed in 
favor of Spain. Through what influence, I cannot say. 
Soon thereafter it was rumored in Berlin that Prince 
Charles Anthony had come to the conclusion that the 
position of King of Spain was after all more desirable 
than that of a Prussian staff-officer. Perhaps Bis- 
marck's arguments presented during the March confer- 
ences, although at that time without apparent effect 
upon the Prince, had upon longer reflection made ac- 
ceptance of the crown ap})ear in the light of a })atriotic 
duty. However that may be, he now met Salazar's 
urgent appeal with the single condition that the elec- 
tion to the Spanish throne should be deferred for three 
montlis.^ The events now to be related show, however, 
that he did not insist upon this condition. At any 
rate, on June 20th he decided, and, without previously 
consulting the King, gave the Spanish envoy his prom- 
ise to accept. 

On the same day the King arrived at Ems to enjoy 
the baths as was his wont. lie was accompanied only 
by a number of adjutants and Legation Counsellor 
Abeken. It was here that King William received the 
communication from the Prince (a simple act of cour- 
tesy, as Salazar styled it), stating that, owing to the 
promptings of an inward calling, he had accepted the 
proffer of the Spanish crown, and now begged the King 
for an expression of api)r()val. The King was com- 

1 Tin; Kiiiji's stateiiK'iit to lieiiedetti. " M;i Mission en Prussf," [i. 



814 THE HOnENZOLLERN CANDIDACY. [1870 

pletely taken aback, and did not seek to hide his an- 
noyance from the Prince in his autogi-aph reply, in 
wliich he declared, however, that he could not oppose 
a step which the Prince might decide upon in response 
to an inward calling.^ 

Thus, at last, the object so persistently pursued by 
Spain seemed to be attained ; and Prim hoped to be able 
in a few days to ask the Cortes to elect their King, 
when a wholly unexpected event in Madrid put an end 
to all these anticipations. The longing which the dep- 
uties felt for hearth and home entirely overpowered 
their political scruples ; and on the 24th of June the 
assembly, which by this time had dwindled to one hun- 
dred and thirty members present, resolved to adjourn 
until the tst of November. 

More definite information regarding the motives 
which led to this step, so astonishing at this juncture, 
I am not enabled to give. Rothan ^ tells us that a 
despatch in faulty cipher gave the French Ambassador 
premature information of the secret. This does not, 
however, explain how such a despatcli could bring 
about the adjournment of the Cortes : although it is 
perfectly evident that by this step the Cortes made it 

1 Compare, in addition to the statements by Werther and Wilmowski 
to which reference has been made, Salazar's preface to his pamphlet of 
.July 8th, and an article in the KreuzzcUiou/ of July 14th. Tliiers. after 
claiming to have received his information from persons lillinji some of the 
highest places in Europe, says, that in answer to the Prince's letter, the 
King made the significant reply that Leopold was free to accept or refuse, 
but that he, the King, could not protect him against the consequences, 
of his undertaking. " Enquete Parlameutaire, Depositions," I., p. 6. 

2 " L'Allemagne et I'ltalie," p. 3. 



1870] PRIM AND THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR. 315 

impossible to keep tlie caudidacy a secret uuiil ilie time 
of the election, since, before this could now take place, 
the Cortes would have to be convened in extraordinary 
session by a public manifesto. 

On the afternoon of July 2d the Ministere discussed 
the situation with the President of the Cortes ; and later 
in the evening- Prim ijave an audience to the French 
representative, Baron Mercier de Lostande, for the pur- 
pose of preparing him in as discreet a manner as possible 
for the momentous intelligence. The remarks made by 
the Aml)assador upon hearing the announcement were 
of a most threatening character, whereupon Prim assured 
him that his fii-st choice, from first to last, had been a 
Portuguese, and, failing that, one of Italian extraction, 
in consequence of which it had l»een with great dif- 
ficulty that he had kept Montpensier and the republic 
in check. "But," said he, "-the danger grew more 
menacing with every day, when at last a candidate was 
suggested to us in whom were combined all the qual- 
ities desirable in a Spanish sovereign. It is our only 
bope ; I cannot reject it. How will the Emperor re- 
ceive it? " 

First of all ^lercier declared that in liis official ca- 
pacity he could make no reply, since as yet his only 
instructions were to preserve an attitude of extreme 
reserve. He could, therefore, oidy express liis per- 
sonal opinion, wliicli was tliat tlie S[)anisli ( Jdvennneiii 
could not have determined upon a more lia/.aidous and 
dangerous step. "'With tlie existing feeling against 
Prussia," he continued, "the accession of a Prussian 



316 THE HOHENZOLLERN CANDIDACY. [1870 

priuce to the throne of Spain cannot fail to make a tre- 
mendous impression in France. The nation will look 
upon it as an intentional provocation, and a Napoleon 
cannot remain insensible to that." Like Napoleon him- 
self in his conversation with Benedetti in the spring 
of 1869, Mercier now spoke no: of the Emperor's per- 
sonal view, but of a national current of public opinion 
which he could not resist. 

It was in vain that Prim tried to persuade Mercier 
that this first impression would, upon maturer consid- 
eration, gradually wear away. " Not at all," was the 
reply; "-for this first feeling is one of those which a 
national Government will always share, for it springs 
from the very heart of the nation." 

Thus beset. Prim gave utterance to a word which 
was destined to be quite as fateful as Benedetti's report 
of May 11th, 1869. "My chief consolation," said he, 
" is that this candidacy is not one which I suggested, 
nor did I even solicit it ; it was put into my hands. 
There was a time when, just as I told the Cortes, I 
thought it would disappoint us as had the others ; then, 
unexpectedly, it was presented to me all cut and dry, 
and in our predicament I cannot refuse it." 

The candidacy had, as we know, been presented to 
him by Salazar and the Liberal Union ; and he had 
consented to it only when forced to do so by necessity, 
after repeated refusals had been received from both 
Lisbon and Florence. ]\Iercier, however, gathered a 
very different meaning from liis words. " Ah," cried 
he, " I have for some time observed that Herr von Bis- 



1870] THE PRINCE DECLARED CANDIDATE. 317 

marck seeks to meddle in your affaii-s; and you nuist 
admit that, did he not expect great gain, lie would 
not venture so high a stake." 

Here Prim interrupted him. " You are entirely 
mistaken,"* said he ; '' the idea originated here. I have 
never discussed polities either with Ilerr von Bern- 
hardi or witli Herr von Canitz '" (the North German 
Amhassador). 

" And the Prussian squadron whose arrival in Span- 
ish waters has just heen announced to you ? " asked 
Mercier. 

" I have had no such information," declared Prim ; 
''so much is certain, however; if we let this opportu- 
nity escape us, Montpensier or the re})ublic, that I hate 
as I do perdition, will triumph over us." 

"Very well; then let it he Montpensier." 

" What ! Am I to understand that the Emperor 
prefers Montpensier to a Ilohenzollern ? " 

"He has not said so, hut I have no doubt of it; 
for the Emperor is tii-st i)f all a Frenchman." 

On the following morning Mercier tiret sent a short 
telegram and then a full report of tliis conversation to 
Paris. As yet he did not consider the matter as de- 
cided beyond recall. He closed his report with the 
remark that the rumor of an accepted (Jei'iiian can- 
didacy was general in (own ; a (le])nty had told liini 
that in all ])i'ol)ability the Cortes would lie con\-ened 
in extraordinary session during August. It was there- 
fore liis intention to continue to make every possible 
endeavor to influence Prim a<rainst it. 



318 THE HOHENZOLLERN CANDIDACY. [1870 

However, as early as July -tth, the Council of Miii- 
istei"s, presided over by the Regent, Serrano, decided 
formally to recognize the Hereditary Prince Leopold 
of HohenzoUern as the candidate of the Goveriunent, 
and to convene the Cortes for July 20th for the pur- 
jjose of electing a King. 

Now, at the close of these long protracted negotia- 
tions, it will be profitable to take a brief survey of 
their most important features. 

He who originated and first advocated the Hohen- 
zoUern candidacy was not a Prussian, but the Spanish 
State Councillor. Salazar. For Gramont's assertion 
that he was donbtlessly acting at the suggestion of 
Prussia, that he was in fact a Prussian agent, no proof 
has been so much as attempted, much less established. 

Prince Leopold in no way endeavored to secure for 
himself the Spanish crown, but, on the contrary', thrice 
refused the offer made him from Madrid, and accepted 
it only in response to a fourth solicitation. 

According to the HohenzoUern family compact he 
was entirely free to decide this matter according to his 
own judgment; he did not require the King's -permis- 
sion either to accept or to refuse. This is not gain- 
sa3^ed by the fact that the King's opinion had great 
weight with him. 

Of the first inquiry made in the spring of 1869, and 
of the refusal which was its reply, the King was fully 
informed ; he approved the latter, and discussed it con- 
fidentially with Bismarck. -Of the second offer received 
at Weinburg, and its provisional refusal. Prince Charles 



1870] SURVEY OF THE TRANSACTION. 319 

Anthony informed the Emperor Napoleon ; but King- 
William and Bismarck did not learn of it until later. 

The third offer, made in the spring of 1870, was in 
the form of letters addressed l)y Marshal Prim to King 
William and Bismarrk ; tliese, as the writer expressly- 
stated, were private comimuiifations, wholly unofficial 
in their character, and were accompanied by the re- 
quest that they be regarded as strictly coiitidential. 
Hereupon the King called a Ilohenzollern family coun- 
cil to discuss the question, and to these conferences 
Bismarck was invited. The result was, that the offer 
was declined by both tlie King and the Prince, after 
which Bismarck addressed a private letter to Prim, in 
which he declared the candidacy to he in itself an ex- 
cellent idea, ])ut that it must not be negotiated with the 
Prussian Government. 

This was followed by a fourth offer in June, made by 
the Spanish Government and addressed directly to the 
Prince, wholly without the knowledge of the King; it 
Avas accepted l)y the Prince A\ith<)nt previously consult- 
ing the King. altli(inL;li ho had long been fully aware of 
the King's disapproval of this ste[). 

Such weiv the facts in which French suspicion 
claimed to discovci- a carefully prepared Prussian, or 
rather Bismarckian. intrigue. 1)\' which it was inlended 
so to offend the honor of France that the (Jovei-nment 
would be provoked into a premature declaration of 
war. 



320 WITHDRAWAL OF FRINCE LEOPOLD. [1870 



CHAPTER II. 

THE WITHDRAWAL OF PKINCE LEOPOLD. 

On July 3d two telegrams were received at the 
Paris Foreign Office ; one was from Mercier, reading : 
The Hohenzollern affair has reached an advanced stage, 
if, indeed, it is not already decided ; Prim is my author- 
ity. The other one was sent by the (incorrectly 
informed) Havas Agency, and was to this effect: The 
Government has decided to offer the Spanish crown to 
Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern ; a Spanish deputation 
is on its way to Germany for that purpose. 

Mercier's telegram indicates that the " Hohenzollern 
affair " was a matter with which Minister Gramont was 
fully acquainted.^ Now, as we know, in March, 1869, 
Emperor Napoleon had himself advised Count Benedetti 
that the French nation would not suffer this choice, and 
it must therefore be prevented. Mercier, as we are 
aware, knew this to l)e the Emperor's wish, but had not 
received the corresponding instructions to interfere 
with the election, but, on the contrary, had been directed 

1 That this was the case is also revealed by an expression used by 
Mercier in his report; he says that Prim opened the conversation with 
the remark that he had an unwelcome communication to make ; after 
which the report continues, " And I knew at once to what he alluded." 



1870] GRAMONT jyUIGyAST. 321 

to maintain an attitude of absolute reserve. We natu- 
rally ask why was this the case ? Was it because after 
the crown had been twice refused it was believed that 
it could not possibly be accepted without Napoleon's 
consent, and that the consequently umiccessaiy and un- 
pleasant negotiations with Spain in regard to it might 
therefore be avoided ? Or was it because in secret 
Gramont cherished a desire at variance with that of his 
Emperor, intending to p(:^rinit the choice of Prince Leo- 
jjold because he knew the French nation would not en- 
dure it, and hoped it would prove a means of rousing 
the masses out of their peace-loving lethargy? Who 
can tell? 

Upon one point there can, however, be no doubt ; 
namely, that instantaneously with its reception (ira- 
mont's interpretation of the intelligence received was 
unalterably fixed. He assumed, as a matter of course, 
that the candidacy was of Prussian origin, — a compre- 
hensive intrigue devised l)y IJisnumk. with the ultimate 
aim of re-estal)lishing the world-empii'e of Charles V. 
That there was not tlie least evidence in support of this 
theorj' was a fact of whicli he was superlatively inicon- 
scious ; in his excited imagination rose the wildest 
fantasies, which, owing to the weakness of his pcnver of 
discenmient, were no sooner conceived than they ap- 
peared to him as actual experiences. *' One feels 
INTUITIVELY," he wrotc in one of his circular de- 
spatclies, "that this is a project of the imscrui)uh)us 
Berlin policy, and not of the gallant Spanish nation, 
with wliich we air dcalincr." 



^22 WITHDRA UAL OF PRINCE LEOPOLD. [1870 

111 this, as he assumed, Prussian plan to place upon 
the Spanish throne a Prussian prince he beheld an 
injury to the vital interests of France, a menace to its 
position of jiower maintained for more than a century ; 
it was, therefore, a deadly insult to the honor and dig- 
nity of the nation, for which Prussia must give France 
complete and public satisfaction. I do not mean to say 
that Gramoiit was already fully resolved to render a 
-conflict with Prussia uiiavoidalile ; for, to begin with, 
he was so thoroughly convinced that the French army 
was invincible, and Avas so regarded by the world in 
general, that he did not for a moment suppose it possi- 
ble that either King William or Bismarck would dare 
maintain an attitude of defiance should France signify 
her displeasure by any serious threat of war ; but, on 
the contrary, he fully expected that Prussia would 
forthwith be cowed into penitent submission to the 
commands imposed by the bold and spirited diplomacy 
of France. However, should matters after all turn out 
differently, should Bismarck be rash enough to offer 
resistance, then, to be sure, France would be compelled 
to let the thunder of her cannons reverberate through 
German}^ 

Unhesitatingly he set about his task. Immediately 
upon the receipt of the two telegrams on July 3d he 
directed the French charge cf affaires at Berlin, Le 
Sourd, Benedetti being on leave of absence, to inter- 
rogate the Prussian Government regarding the can- 
didacy. "We have been informed," he wrote, "that 
an offer of the Spanish crown has been made the Prince 



1870] THE OFFICIAL PRESS ATTACKS PRUSSIA, olio 

of IlolienzoUern through a deputation sent to Germany 
by Marehal Prim, and that the Prince has accepted 
it. We can but feel surprised that a Prussian prince 
should aspire to the crown of Spain. We should be 
glad to leani that the IJei-liu Cabiiu'l has had no [»art 
in this intrigue; should the reverse of this be tnic, my 
only coiiuucnt at present is, that the impression here 
would be a most unfavorable one ; let your words be 
to this effect." 

This despatch was sent before (iramont had received 
Mercier's report. Me did not. therefore, at the time, 
Icnow that the Prince had accepted, but took this for 
granted, just as he had that the Prince had striven 
to secure the crown of Spain. 

His second official step of that day, taken like the 
first one in ignorance of the true state of affaii"s, was 
a still greater blunder. The excitement which the 
Havas telegram created in Paris was already intense. 
Gramont hastened to stimulate it to a perfect stonn 
of indignation by means of two official announcements 
published in Le Constitutionel of the 4th. The liist 
of these made known to the public the contents of the 
Havas telegram, and was accompanied by the comment 
that as yet il had not been ascertained whether the 
event were merely the result of a pei'soiial intrigue on 
the i)ai't of I'riiii. or wlietliei- the undertaking liad been 
ajjproved or desire(| li\ the Spanish people. '••Should 
tlie latter be the ease."" it was said in eouidusion. •• it 
wonld ha\-e tliat claim upon oni- eousidei'ation tliat the 
will of a nation e(»ntrolling its own destiny may exj)eet. 



324 WITHDRAWAL OF PRINCE LEOPOLD. [1870 

But even then we could not repress a feeling of sur- 
prise that the sceptre of Charles V. should be 
INTRUSTED TO A PRUSSIAN PRINCE, the granclson of 
a Princess Murat, whose name can have no other than 
unhappy associations for Spain." 

There can be no doubt regarding the official nature 
of this article, since it gave an exact outline of the 
programme followed by the Government immediately 
afterward, — we respect the will of Spain, but through 
pressure brought to bear upon Prussia we mean to pre- 
vent it from being put into effect. It is somewhat 
surprising that the Minister of a Bonaparte should 
seek to make Prince Leopold distasteful to the Spanish 
people by referring to his relationship to the House 
of Bonaparte. 

A second article from the same pen suggested the 
question of how this Prussian candidacy had originated, 
and at the same time directed attention to the rumors 
current in the French press during 1868, although these 
had been promptly contradicted in Berlin, namel}-, that 
the thought of deposing Queen Isabella had been sug- 
gested to the leaders of the Spanish malcontents by 
Bismarck, and that in the September revolution they 
had received aid in the form of large sums of money 
from him. According to the same authority, Bismarck's 
next step had been to suggest the name of the unpopu- 
lar Duke of Montpensier for the candidacy, that upon 
his defeat he might propose that of the Prussian prince, 
etc. The writer closed with the questions : " How much 
of truth is there in these rumors ? Does to-day's occur- 



1870] PRUSSIA EXPLAINS ITS POSIT lOX. 325 

rence form but a link in the eliain of those events which 
are the talk of all Europe ? " 

The tremendous effect produced by this double signal 
we shall soon learn. 

Hardly had it been sounded abroad through all 
France by Le Constitutionel when Gramont received 
Le Sourd's telegrapliic reply from Berlin. Bismarck 
being still at Varzin, the cliarge d'affaires had addressed 
his inquiry to Herr von Thile, and had Ijeen given 
the plain and brief reply that the Prussian Govern- 
ment knew absolutely notliing of this affair ; in fact, 
it had no existence so far as the Government was con- 
cerned (no information could therefore be furnished 
with regard to any negotiations which the Spanish (iov- 
ernment might have conducted with the Prince of 
Hohenzollern).' Le Sourd's despatch closes wath the 
extraordinary comment that Thile had not* directly 
asserted that the Government had no knowledge of the 
negotiations and their issue. It would seem that this 
had been clearly enouqli indicated, for he wlio is totally 
io-norant of a matter can ha\'e no knowledge of the 
negotiations which have taken place in regard to it. 

Tims Gramont had received confirmation of that 
whicli oil the forejToiiiL!' day he liad claimed it would 
give him jileasure to learn. It would ap}H'ar that, did 
he not M ish to be regarded as a disturlu'r of the peace, 
tlie coui-se to ])ursue now lav plainly bcfoiv him, — a 

1 The parenthetical clause does not form a part of I^o Sourd's (U'spaich : 
it is, liowever, to be found in lUsniarck's njiort made to the Federal 
('ouncil on July lOth. 



326 WITflBRAWAL OF PRIXCE LEOPOLD. [1870 

statement that he was satisfied with Tliile's official as- 
surance that the Prussian Cabinet had not been a Darty 
to the negotiations, followed by a courteous but decided 
declaration that the candidacy was incompatible with 
French interests, and under existing circumstances 
would tend to excite public opinion in France to a 
dangerous degree ; joined to this, the wish that the 
Prussian Government, regarding whose influence at the 
Court of Sigmaringen there could lie no question, would 
act as mediator, or would express itself in favor of 
allowing the matter to be decided by a concert of the 
Great Powers. 

With opinions such as we know were held by both 
the King and the Prince, this would have put an enil 
to the Prince's candidacy. 

However, that which Gramont had on the day be- 
fore referred to as information which would be highly 
welcome, namely, a declaration by Tliile that Prussia 
had not participated in the negotiations regarding the 
candidacy, he now denounced as a well-planned lie. 
a derisive reply, the attempt of a detected plotter to 
hide his duplicit}-, and to circumvent those who would 
expose it. He regarded it as beneath his dignity to 
continue the correspondence he had begun with the 
Prussian Cabinet ; instead, he now sent the King, who 
was seeking health from the baths at Ems. a threaten- 
ing message. When the Prussian Ambassador, Baron 
Werther, whose acquaintance witli the Minister dated 
from the old Vienna times, took leave of him liefore 
his departure for Ems, the Duke urgently requested 



1870] THE COCH^ET INTERPELLATION. 827 

him to present tlie danger of the situation to his sov- 
ereign ; for never, he declared, would France tolerate 
that a condition of affairs prejudicial to her safet}- 
should take place just beyond her borders. 

On July 5th, the note of alarm which had been 
sounded by Le Constitutionel was echoed with in- 
creased force and with many variations In' the Paris 
newspaper press. Moderate sheets sucli as Le Temps 
and Le Steele represented, that, should a Prussian Prince 
be placed upon the throne at Madrid, France would be 
thrown back into a position even worse than had been 
hei"S during the days of Charles V. In a more violent 
tone Le Rappel declared, ''The Ilohenzoll^rns evi- 
dently aspire to an empire of the w orld such as that 
of Charles V. ; not content with the conquest of Ger- 
many, they hope to subjugate Euri>[)c. It is to the 
everlasting shame of our times tliat such a plan could 
be so much as devised, let alone attempted." 

During all this ado Gramont received the intelli- 
gence from Madrid that the Cortes had been convened 
for July 20th for the purpose of electing a King ; his 
anxiety increased, for now there remained onl}- four- 
teen days in which to prevent the present choice, be- 
fore an accomplished fact would confront liiiii.' Haste 
was advisable, therefore, and tlic iissuiuptioii of a liigh 
and might v tone, that an immediate clicck miglit be 
placed u[)oii this Pi'ussian arrogance. That Mercier's 

1 Tn l^-'U tlic Bnisscls Congress dcciilcd 11)1011 tlic clioicf' of tlic nuke 
do Nemours for the throne of Kelfjiuni : this did not, liowever, deter 
Louis I'hilipite from refusinj; his consent to tiie election. 



328 WITHDRAWAL OF PRINCE LEOPOLD. [1870 

report of the 3d now came to hand, in which he read 
the confirmation of Thile's declaration in Prim's state- 
ment that the candidacy had not been suggested by 
Bismarck, but had originated in Spain, made no im- 
pression whatever upon liim. In this, too, Gramont 
belield only a hypocritical concealment of the truth ; 
and he told his colleagues that Mercier had stated that 
the candidacy had been suggested to the Spaniards 
from al)road. 

In the Chamber, also, a violent spirit of exasperation 
was now asserting itself. Several members of the Left 
Centre, under the leadership of a Monsieur Cochery, 
presented an interpellation. As was to be expected, 
lack of information did not deter Gramont from making 
a reply. It did not occur to him to await Werther's 
communication from Ems regarding King William's 
intentions ; by no means. His one thought was to 
thwart Bismarck's covert plotting by opposing to it 
the peremptory will of France, which was now to be 
voiced in the Chamber as it had already been pro- 
claimed through the press. He found momentary en- 
€ouragement in the general disfavor with which the 
Holienzollern candidacy was regarded abroad ; the con- 
fident assertion made by France had everywhere given 
the impression that the candidacy had been devised by 
Bismarck. 

In Germany people scoffed at the absurd excitement 
stirred up in Paris by the anticipation of great dis- 
advantage to be incurred by France because a petty 
German prince was to sit upon the tottering throne of 



1870] rilE CABINET DISCUSSES THE REPLY. 329 

Spain. This, however, also suggested the (luestion of 
what benefit Prussia couhl expect to reap ; and not a 
few were vexed that for so slight a cause the peace 
of Europe should he endangered. Especially did the 
Swabian Repuliicaus and the Bavarian Ultramontanes 
rejoice that in this, IJisnuirck had at last made a fiasco; 
and they cheered their French partisans on by hearts- 
acclamation. 

The Great Powers of Europe, although hardly 
approving the violence of the connnotion raised by 
France, still, without exception, cautioned the Berlin 
authorities to be considerate of the not wholly un- 
justifiable irritation in France. 

A statesman of truly peaceful iuclinations would 
have concluded from this condition of affaire that 
little difficulty would be encountered in the endeavor 
through diplomatic action to prevent the undesirable 
candidacy ; above all else he A\'ould have been careful 
not to forfeit the general good will abroad by i-ash 
and offensive measures.^ But with (iramont there was 
little likelihood of so much forethought. He, on the 
contrary, reasoned: All the Powers are on our side; I 
must, therefore, make the most of this opportunity to 
resent the attempted insult on the part of Prussia. 



1 (Iramont liolds that siuli a roiirsp was iiiailo impossible to him 
by Prussia's declaration ttiat it could not enter into negotiations with 
regard to tlie matter. That Thile's reply to Le Sourd docs not imply 
this, is patent; and, in truth, (Jramunt bases his claim cliictly upon 
stat(!ments made by the Pnissian Ambassador at London, withliolding 
the f.act that these were tlic result of instructions received from lii.s- 
marck as late as July 8th. 



330 WITHDRAWAL OF PRINCE LEOPOLD. [1870 

As early as the 6th of July the Council of Ministers, 
presided over by the Emperor, determined upon the 
official reply to be made to the Cochery interpellation. 
With regard to the course which these deliberations 
took, there are several conflicting accounts, the leadings 
features of which will be briefly mentioned here. 

Gramont, in his testimony Ijefore the parliamentary 
Investigation Committee in 1872, stated that his draft 
of the reply did not contain the last sentence making 
the threat of war, but that this was added by the 
Council, and that he read the reply thus framed, word 
for word, to the Chamber.^ According to this state- 
ment, it would appear that it was he, more than the 
other members of the Council of State, who was dis- 
j^osed to proceed in a peaceable manner. After the 
disastrous issue of the war he wrote an imposing 
volume, the purpose of which is to show that he pre- 
served this attitude throughout the entire crisis. 

This narration was supplemented after Napoleon had 
been deposed by an anonymous publication, according 
to which the reply, as formulated by the Ministers, was 
of a pacific tone throughout, but at the last moment 
was transformed into a war manifesto by the imperious 
intervention of the Emperor at the decisive point. 

The incredibility of this story is palpable. Tt was 
quite the fasliion in Paris, after the fall of the Empire, 
to lay all the cause of disaster at Napoleon's door. If 
the bellicose final clause really was added by the Coun- 
cil of Ministers, this does not by any means signify 

1 " Depositions," I., 90, 91. 



1870] NAPOLEON FOR PEACE. 331 

that it was clone at Napoleon's command. Such a step 
would have been entirely inconsistent with the Empe- 
ror's brooding, undecided character, which made him 
averse to any sudden action, and is, moreover, rendered 
highly improbable by the fact that at the time he ^\■as 
suffering from a renewed attack of his malad}-, by 
which, as has been mentioned in a former connection, 
his craving for rest was always increased, and his pow- 
ers of judgment and of will were paralyzed. i Is it at 
all likely that in this condition he should, by an impera- 
tive order, ha\'e spurred his resisting Ministers on to 
what was equivalent to a declaration of war ? 

There is, moreover, no want of positive evidence to 
the contrary. 

Thiers, who at this time was upon terms of intimate 
friendship with Ollivier, assures us ^ that Ollivier was 
decidedly inclined to peace, as A\as also the Emperor, 
who at this period had lost much of his will power, and 
was, in general, vacillating in his opinions and slow of 
decision. 

Of a still more positive nature is the evidence given 
by the Minister of War, Leboeuf, before the Investiga- 
tion Committee. What could have been more welcome 
to this unhappy man at the close of the fatal year 1871,, 

1 Accordint; to tlie testimony of Madamo Carette (II., 123), a consul- 
tation of the ablest jdiysi'iiU'S, P'icord, Faurel, Sec, Nelaton, and Corvi- 
Kiirt. took place on July 'Jd. 

The " Papiers dc la Faniille Iniperiale," TI., 59, contain an ()i>iiiiou by 
Professor See, dated July ^d, LSTO. accor.liji.;; to which N;ii.<>lcon Wiw 
sufferin}; from jrout, hemorrhoids, and a serious bladder malady of fiv& 
years' standing. 

2 " Depositions," I., 8. 



332 WITHDRAWAL OF PRINCE LEOPOLD. [1870 

as well as to his hearers, than to be able to prove that 
the fallen Emperor had been the originator of this ill- 
fated war? 

Lebuenf, however, declares : ^ " In the Council of 
Ministers opinions were divided with regard to the 
reply ; several members, although otherwise approving 
the contents of the draft, criticised the form as being too 
harsh. Permit me to say, that the Emperor also was of 
this opinion. In consequence, many of the expressions 
were modified. But upon our arrival in the Chamber 
we found great agitation and evidences of an over- 
wrouglit 2)atriotic feeling rife among the deputies. We 
allowed ourselves to be carried away by the prevailing 
spirit ; and the original writing, or at least one which 
approximated it, was read from the orator's tribunal. 
Wliether Gramont had brought two forms with him, or 
whether the modified expressions had been written be- 
tween the lines of the original draft, I cannot say ; 
neither do I remember whether an}^ part of the modified 
form was read. We adopted a version which we re- 
garded as more dignified and more in harmony with 
public opinion." 

Thus Lebceuf not only testifies to the peaceable in- 
clinations of the Emperor, but to an independent pro- 
ceeding on the part of (Tramont as well, in which he 
himself was a participant. The Emperor advocated 
moderate expressions ; Gramont desired that Prussia 
should be humiliated. When at a later sittino- of tlie In- 
vestigation Committee he was confronted with Leboeuf's 

1 " Depositions,"' I.. 46. 



1870] GRAMONT FOR WAR. 080 

vei-sion of the matter, w itliout being told who was its 
authority, and was asked m hat he had to say to it, he 
exclaimed in consternation, '•'Mon iJieu ! That is a hard 
question for nicl" And then, painfully and in frag- 
ments, he disclosed the facts as stated above. 

There is no opportunity left us to be in doubt with 
regard to the inference; it was not the Emperor, but 
Gramont, who on the 6th of July entailed war upon 
his country by the speech which upon liis own responsi- 
bility he made in the name of France. 

Before presenting it to my readers, we will cast a 
glance at the heai-ei-s and readei-s for whom it was 
intended. 

Through the newspapere of the 4th and 5th the 
country had already been thrown into a state of 
unusual excitement. Although the French people 
earnestly desired peace in the interest of their material 
welfare, nevertheless, throiigh their veins coursed un- 
changed the old Gallican blood with its easily touched 
sense of honor and its sensitive vanity. There was 
scarcely one among all these millions who did not feel 
the eclipse of Solferino's glory by the greater renown 
of Sadowa to be a personal affront. 

Then came the Opposition's incessantly reiterated 
charges that Napoleon's sliortr-sighted policy had per- 
mitted the eoiisnmmation of German unity under 
Prussian leadership to the prejudice of France. 'I'his 
was followed hy Ahirslial Niel's demands I'oi- a(le(|uate 
prote('tion against this powerfnl neighboi-, as well as 
against the grasping eoNctonsness of Prnssia, wiiirh re- 
(luiicd that the niilitar\- lunilcn he (lonhlc(L 



334 WITHDRAWAL OF PRINCE LEOPOLD. [1870 

The tendency of all this A\'ti.s to arouse a constantly 
growing dislike of all that was Prussian. So far only 
a minority among the Liberals had allowed this to influ- 
ence them to an openly acknowledged eagerness for 
war. But the opinion of the majority also, if put into 
words, Avould have read somewhat after this fashion : 
We desire peace, and are rejoiced that since January 
our Government has felt itself justified in declaring it 
to be assured; nevertheless, should these arrogant Prus- 
sians allow themselves the slightest discourtesy toward 
us, the whole French nation ^^'ill arise as one man, and 
crush them to atoms. 

And now, one after another, like the alarum of trum- 
pets, came the reports that in Spain Prussia had long 
been intriguing against France, that now it was openly 
extending its hand toward the crown of Charles V., 
that this was but the first step toward inflicting a seri- 
ous injury and humiliation upon France. It was not 
surprising that deep anxiety quickl}^ took possession of 
the great mass of the population. The number of those 
advocating Avar grew Avith every day ; in all the larger 
towns the press gave forth violent signals of war. 

As a matter of course, excitement ran highest in 
Paris, Avhere the influence of the Government, of the 
army officers and the prelates, of the political parties 
and the press, Avas most quicklj' and directly felt. In 
the Chamber the Extreme Right, consisting of the 
group of Arcadians, believed the object of all their 
ardent hopes to be at length attained, a pretext for Avar 
upon Prussia, by Avhich the declining renoAvn of the 



1870] GRAMONT'S TUMEATEXiya tiPEECH. 335 

dynasty would be raised to unapproachable heights of 
glory. Since the Government itself was now evidently 
facing m this direction, they had reason to expect that 
the ever-submissive Kight, and a part of the Right 
Centre as well, wo\dd be with them. 

Hut upon the side of the Liberals also were to be 
found impetuous men of ^Monsieur de Keratry's stamp ; 
men who, although free from dynastic considerations, 
were eager to take up the sword against Pi-ussia with- 
out further delay. Of the Left Centre, only a part still 
clung to the hope that peace might be preserved ; and 
the Extreme Right was quite alone in its resolve to 
luake a determined stand against a war policy. 

Such was the assembly in whirh, on the afternoon of 
July 6th, Gramont and Ollivicr made their appearance 
to reply to the Cochery interpellation. All parties 
were waiting in breathless expectation ; the galleries 
were crowded with diplomats, officers, high officials, 
and ladies of rank and distinction. 

Gramont began. He said it was true that Marshal 
Prim had offered the Spanish crown to Prince Leopold 
of Hohenzollern, and that it had been accepted; but 
the Spanish nation had not yet given its decision. 
With the details of these negotiations, which had been 
concealed from the French (Jovernment (evidences of 
excitement in the Chaud)er),he was still unacquainted; 
consequently, an exposition of the aftair would be to 
no purpose, and the Government therefore requested 
that it be deferred to some future day. 

All this was prifectl}' true, and it would seem that 



336 WITHDRAWAL OF PRINCE LEOPOLD. [1870 

the obvious wisdom of his last remark would have 
deterred the speaker from attempting that which he 
himself had declared to be fruitless. He, however, con- 
tinued: first he did homage to the sovereign will of 
the Spanish people, whose decision France would always 
duly respect ; this was followed by the wholly untruth- 
ful statement that France had refrained from exerting 
any influence whatever with regard to the former can- 
didates, manifesting neither approval nor disapproval of 
them. 

Then he came to the principal point with the words : 
" But regard for the rights of a neighboring people does 
not require us to suffer a foreign Power to place one 
of its princes upon the throne of Charles \., thereby 
disturbing the European balance of power [animated 
applause] to the detriment of the national honor and 
interests of France. [Renewed applause ; continued 
bravos.] This event, we confidently trust, will, how- 
ever, not come to pass. We count upon the wisdom 
of the German and upon the friendship of the Spanish 
people to prevent it. Should it, nevertheless, befall 
otherwise, then, made strong through your support and 
that of the nation [applause], we will know how to do 
our duty without hesitation and without weakness." 

An unexampled storm of tumultuous acclamation 
greeted these closing words ; two objecting voices were 
quic'kly silenced. On his way from the orators' tribune 
to his seat, the Minister received a perfect ovation of ap- 
plause and congratulations. The entire audience was in 
a state of intense excitement ; there was general clap- 



1870] INTENSE EXCITEMENT IN FABIS. 337 

ping of hands, the ladies waved their handkercluet's, the 
men shouted hurrah ; the uproar was indescribable. 

Gramont could, m fact, pride himself upon having 
achieved the unprecedented. In almost one and the 
same breath to acknowledge his ignorance of the trans- 
action which had taken place, to make complaint of 
the secrecy preserved in connection with it, and then, 
with categoric assn ranee, to hurl in the face of a foreign 
Power an open threat of war on aceotmt of its supposed 
attitude, which it had however oflicially disclaimed — 
this was in all likelihood a deed without a precedent. 

Even in the Chamber the opinion prevailed, to Avhich 
Cremieux gave unreserved utterance, that it had been 
the Duke's intention to indicate a casus belli against 
Prussia, so that Ollivier, who could but regard such a 
proceeding as ill-advised, in order to soften the impres- 
sion made, intervened with the emphatic declaration 
that the Government desired peace, but peace consist- 
ent with honor. The effect of Gramont's great achieve- 
ment was, of course, not to be counteracted l)y such 
words. The diplomats present were utterly amazed. 
Is this conduct, they asked, to he regarded as the result 
of a fixed determination to declare war, or is it to be 
laid to the inexperience of Ollivier and the incompe- 
tence of Gramont? Upon one iH)iiit, however, there 
was but one mind among them all ; and that was, that 
any negotiations for the i)urpose of i)reserving peace, 
any attempt at international mediation, had been ren- 
dered extremely difHcult, if not impossible, by Gi-a- 
mont's offensive threat. 



338 WITHDUAWAL OF PRINCE LEOPOLD. [1870 

Meanwhile the tumult which Gramont liad occasioned 
in the Chamber was transmitted to all the various par- 
ties and classes of the population. The newspapers, 
irrespective of party, vied with one another in a show 
of valiant patriotism. ^ " Our country's honor has been 
saved! " exclaimed the Gaulois; "for the first time this 
Ministry has spoken words worthy of France ! Can 
peace be preserved, it will be well ; should it come to 
war, it will be still better." Another organ of the Left, 
the Opinion Rationale, proclaimed, " If the Government 
abides by its noble and strong words, it will find the 
whole country with it. Bismarck oversteps all bounds : 
if he wants peace, he must retract; for us this is no 
longer possible." The Ultramontane Univers declared 
that to-day the Ministers had spoken as the deliberate 
organs of the entire nation, and his Majesty King Wil- 
liam and Herr von Bismarck might as well know it. 

And so the same tune was rung through all the 
various changes ; and if the Extreme Left, the Repub- 
licans and the Socialists, did not join in, it was not 
because of any wish to defend Prussia, but to deride 
the Government. " What if Monsieur de Gramont is 
not in possession of Bismarck's secretly preserved doc- 
uments," asked the Reveil, " and Prussia declares that 
it knows no more of this affair than does France ? 
What answer can the Cabinet of the Tuileries make 
to that? In that case would Prussia not be justified 
in demanding satisfaction, which the French Govern- 
ment, lieing wholly in the wrong, cannot refuse ? " 

1 Conipare (Jiiaudeau, " La Ve'rite sur la Campagne de 1870." 



1870] KIXG WILLIAM ASKED TO liETIiACT. 339 

In the position Avliich (Jraniont had created for liini- 
self, such criticisms were like so many lashes goading 
him on to speedy action, especially so since above the 
noise of applause could even now be discerned individ- 
ual voices which in their demands went far beyond the 
line which he had indicated. '' If Prussia to-day with- 
draws its support of the Prince," said the Figaro^ 
'•• France has the right to ask still more. After all the 
subterfuges which have been made, guaranties must be 
required." And forthwith the Liherte joined in with 
the remark, " Should Spain reject the candidate that 
has been forced upon her, France and Europe must 
demand of Prussia binding guaranties for the future." 

All this insured Gramont against an}' criticism of 
his independent action which the Emjjeror or his col- 
leagues, less eager for war than was he, might be in- 
clined to make, and stimulated his desire to proceed 
upon the course on which he had entered. On the day 
after his \aliant speech he made a clean breast of it 
to Lord Lyons, the English Ainl)assador, saying, "We 
cannot 11 v in tlie face of public opinion; considerations 
of a di})loinatic nature must give way before that which 
our internal safety demands. Prince Leopold's acces- 
sion to the S[)anish throne is s\ii(tiivinous witli war." 

Accordingl}^ on the 7th of July, he sent another 
despatcli to Le Sourd at Berlin, the spirit of which was 
quite in harmony with liis speech of that day, l)ut with 
ji marked advance in that which was demanded of 
Prussia. It was in this connection that the idea by 
wiiieli his polic\- was coiit lulled, the ke\iiole of his 



340 WirilDHAWAL OF PRINCE LEOPOLD. [1870 

entire diplomatic action, was first fully revealed. In 
his speech he had made the maintenance of peace depen- 
dent chiefly upon the condition that the Prince should 
not ascend the Spanish throne. He now indicated 
more definitely the manner of its prevention ; namely, 
that King William should forbid it. For since the 
candidacy had implied an affront to the honor of France 
for which the King through his sanction of it had 
become responsible, P'rance must receive satisfaction 
directly from him, — a formal retraction of the insult 
offered ; the King must therefore command the Prince 
to withdraw his acceptance of the crown. 

"No one will believe," said Gramont, "that a Prus- 
sian jDrince could accept the Spanish crown without the 
approval of the King who is the head of the house. 
Now, if the King has authorized the Prince's action, 
what becomes of the alleged official ignorance on the 
part of the Berlin Cabinet? This is a case in which 
the King can eitlier permit or forbid ; if he has not 
permitted, he can forbid. By doing so he will avoid 
grave complications. It is no more than the Emperor 
did with regard to Prince Murat's candidacy for the 
throne of Naples. A like course now would be con- 
vincing evidence that Prussia really desires the bond 
of friendship between the two counti'ies to be endur- 
ingly strengthened." 

And again he did not await Le Sourd's reply, but 
supplemented the demand made by a step most sur- 
prising in itself. On the evening of the same day, the 
7th of Jul}', he sent instructions to Count Benedetti, 



1870] BENEhETTI SENT TO EMS. 341 

then staying at A\'il(ll)a(lK directing liim to go to Ems, 
there to open personal negotiations with King WilHani 
in addition to tliose of an official character which were 
being conducted with Berlin. In a confidential letter 
to the Ambassador lie wrote: "Thile's evasive reply 
is not snflicieiit : you nnist seek to procure a positive 
statement. The only one which will satisfy us is : The 
King disapproves of the Prince's candidacy, and com- 
mands him to withdraw from it. There is need of 
haste in regard to this ; for in case the answer should 
not be satisfactory, we must forestall the enemy, and 
l)egin the mobilization of the troops on the day after 
to-morrow. Should you succeed in influencing the 
King to RECALL his consent, we will have achieved a 
great triumph : if not, war is inevitable." 

And so the strategic move preparatory to the two- 
fold diplomatic onslaught upon Prussia was executed. 
As is not infrequently the case in connection with 
(iramont, we remain in doubt as to which in liim was 
greater, the ignorance or the presumption with which 
he led his country into a fatal conflict. Without evi- 
dence of any kind, he imagined that Bismarck ha<l 
devised the candidacy, that Prince Leopold was a meni- 
lu'r of the royal house of Prussia, that he had received 
the King's consent to accept tlie offer of the Spanisli 
crown, that the Prussian Oovernmcnt was I'csponsihle 
for the answer wliich the k'ing determined upon witli- 
out consultation witli his Ministers, and sfave after 
the Prince had signihcd his willingness to accept. 

The actual facts were just the rcvei-se of all these 



342 WITIIDBAWAL OF PRINCE LEOPOLD. [1870 

fantasies. Let us, however, assume that it was all as 
true as it really was false, to what inference would it 
lead ? There can be no question that a Power does 
not exceed its rights when it opposes an undertaking 
which it believes will result to the prejudice of its 
national interests. But in the case under considera- 
tion every unbiassed jJereon will pronounce the anxiety 
evinced by France to have been highly exaggerated, 
and the allusion to the empire of Charles V., in con- 
nection with the condition of Spain at this time, to 
have been simply al)surd. Still, every nation is justi- 
fied in the claim that it is a better judge of its oami 
interests and that by which they may be injured than 
any other one can be ; and no one would be inclined to 
criticise France had it sought to protect its interests by 
preventing the candidacy in a seemly manner. 

As has already been stated, and as later events will 
show, success would undoubtedly have attended any 
such endeavor. That which imprints upon Gramont's 
policy the perpetual stigma of malice, and makes him 
responsible for all the consequent calamity, is the 
hatred and arrogance which prompted him to declare 
the candidacy to l)e an affront to the honor and dignit}:- 
of France, justifying the demand that it be not only 
renounced by the Prince, but that the King of I^russia 
must give France satisfaction by commanding the with- 
drawal. And this he asked of the mighty victor of 
Koniggriitz ! Although constantly alluding to the sov- 
ereignty of the Spanish nation, the indignity offered 
Spain by his attitude toward Prussia seems never to 
have occurred to him. 



If he looked upon a closer connection between Prus- 
sia and Spain as an affront to the honor of France, does 
this not imply that he regarded Spain as exclusively 
the domain of France? Did he not deny to it the 
right to form alliances? And surely, although Bis- 
marck hoped that with Prince Leopold upon the Span- 
ish throne friendly relations would he fostered between 
Spain and Germany, he nevertheless fully realized how 
wholly improbable it was that the Spanish marshals 
and Cortes would ever allow their youthful foreign 
King to form a defensive alliance with Germany. But 
the mere possibility of such an event appeared to 
Gramont to be incompatible with French honor. It 
could not have been proclaimed more plainly that in 
Paris Spain was considered as vassal to France, and 
that it was the intention to punish Prussia above all 
others for having presumed to lay her hand upon that 
which belonged to France. 

So far much has been said of wliat took ])lace in 
Paris, and but little of that which nieaiiwhile was 
going on in CJei-inany. The very good reason for this 
silence is, that there was little to relate. In the Gov- 
ernment circles of Prussia there was, as mo are aware, 
as little thought of a possibility of wai- toward the 
middle of June as there was in the wsx of the woild. 
The King and the Ministers of the most important 
departments had left Berlin for tlicii' xarious siuiimer 
retreats, and were engaged with plans for i-cci'eation at 
the baths, in the country. o7' upon journeys. 

On the H(h of Jnnc, IJismarck had returned to Var- 



344 WITIIDUAWAL OF PRINCE LEOPOLD. [1870 

zin to lecuperate in the seclusion which his country- 
seat afforded, and to invigorate his overtaxed nerves 
with Carlsbad water, intending to remain away from 
Berlin for six weeks, until the beginning of August. 
He, too, had no thought of war. 

Since 1866 he had upon several occasions observed, 
that if, in case of a difference of opinion, Prussia main- 
tained an attitude of calm intrepidity, the turbulent 
waves of French wrath soon subsided. Far from an- 
ticipating any real difficulty in connection with the 
Spanish affair, he had, as we know, hoped it could 
1)6 easily adjusted. He was of course aware of Gra- 
mont's hostility, and of the hatred of Prussia cherished 
by many of the political parties in France, such as the 
Arcadians, Clericals, and Chauvinists ; ^ but he also took 
into consideration Napoleon's irresolute character and 
abhorrence of war; and as late as the 25th of -June, 
after the King had informed him of the Prince's in- 
tention to accept, he made the remark to Herr von 
Schlozer, a diplomat with whom he was pereonally on 
terms of friendship, that he rejoiced in the prospect of 
a peaceful summer. Accordingly he was completely 
taken by surprise when, three days after the Prince's 
acceptance had been made public, he found himself 
face to face with a casus belli uncivilly proclaimed in 
Gramont's speech, and when, immediately afterward, 
the Paris press began its insolent Witches' Sabbath. 

However, without a moment's hesitation, he resolved 

^ As stated in a speech delivered in the Reichstag on December 12th, 
1874. 



1870] INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY BISMARCK. 345 

upon the attitude now to be assumed. It mattered not 
whether the candidacy was of great or Httle value to 
Prussian interests, whether it was popular or unpopular 
in Germany and elsewhere in Europe — after the gaunt- 
let had been so insultingly thrown down as ii hud 
been b}' Grainont in the name of France, and before 
the eyes of all Europe, the Prussian Government could 
not enter into negotiations with Gramont in regard to 
the matter until the affront publicly offered had been 
as publicly retracted. Consequently, immediately on 
July 8th, instructions of like tenor were recei\ed by 
Thile in Berlin, Solms in Paris, and Bernstorft' in Lon- 
don,^ and which may be summed up as follows : Prussia 
has had no part whatever in the negotiations carried 
on without the King's knowledge between Madrid 
and Sigmaringen : friendly explanations with regard 
to them we should not have refused, but Gramont's 
threats have sealed our lips ; we shall seek no quarrel 
on this account ; however, should the French attack us, 
we will defend ourselves, — defend ourselves in a way 
that will make tbem smart. On .luly 10th the Chan- 
cellor made a similar announcement to the Federal 
Council. 

Under existing circumstances tliis position was un- 
assailable ; and I)ismarck now calmly waited to see 
whether Ficncli w ratli wonld be discharged in the form 
of cannon-balls or onl\- in blnsterinLr words. For the 



1 As learned from tlic Eii^lisli reports of tlic statciiiciits m:i<]t' by 
these gentlemen. Comi)ar<' also Horst Kolil's I5ismarek-It(^f;eslon, July 
7tli, 1870. 



346 WITHDIiAWAL OF PIUNCE LEOPOLD. [1870 

present he remained in Varzin, and neither he nor the 
Minister of War gave orders for military precautions of 
any kind to be taken for the event of war. Nor was 
Moltke disturbed in his rural retreat by any alarming 
communication . 

The wisdom of this course appeared even more 
clearly when on July 7th Prussia's explanation received 
official confirmation through the action of Spain. On 
that day the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Sagasta, sent out a circular letter in which he declared 
most positively that the Serrano Government had been 
influenced in its selection of a candidate for the throne 
by no other consideration than the w elfare of Spain ; 
that from the moment of his accession to the throne 
the Prince would be a Spaniard, and a Spaniard only; 
that in accordance with the democratic Constitution he 
would thenceforward be subject to the will of the 
people, by which he would be constrained to observe the 
strictest neutrality in his foreign policy. With particu- 
lar emphasis Sagasta stated that in this matter the 
Government had acted wholly according to its o\vn 
judgment ; and that he who was at its head had been 
influenced during the course of the negotiations by no 
national interest abroad, and most certainly not by any 
foreign interest. The Prince upon whom the choice 
had fallen was entirely free to control his own action ; 
being related to most of the reigning houses, although 
excluded from the possibility of succeeding to any 
throne, his election precluded all thought of intended 
hostility toward any one of the Powers. His candidacy. 



1870] GHAMOyr n'AVERS. 347 

therefore, could in no way ufteet Spain's I'liendl} re- 
lations to the other Fowei-s, and neither eoukl nor 
should dislurb the relations existing between an}- of 
these. 

Entirely in harmony with this was the preface to 
Sahizar's pamphlet as reissued on July 8th, stating ihat 
the Prince had accepted the offer of the erown w iih- 
(»ut previously iuforming King William of his inten- 
tion, and that his letter begging the King to sanction 
his undertaking was merely an act of courtesy. 

Either owing to this declaration on the part of Spain, 
or to Prussia's silent reserve, Gramont now began to 
waver in his haughty offensive. Early on the morning 
of July 8th, as he tells us, in consequence of a de- 
spatch received from Mercier, he telegraphed instruc- 
tions to Benedetti, directing him to address himself 
directly to Prince Leopohl; tlie intention being to desist 
from the demand which it had been designed to make 
of King William, anil, as the speech of the 6tli had 
indicated, to l>e satisfied Avith the voluntary withdrawal 
of the Prince. 

Emperor Napoleon entirely approved of this ; and it 
wius doubtlessly at his suggestion that on the afternoon 
of the same day Gramont had an interview with Lord 
Lyons, during which, although he opened the conver- 
sation with the usual violent threats against Prussia, he 
suddenly made llic conciliatijry remark that there was 
one possiljle solution of the difliculty, one which he 
asked Lord Lyons to connnend most earnestly to the 
attention of his Government ; namely, that the Prince 



348 WITHBEAWAL OF PRINCE LEOPOLD. [1870 

of Hohenzollerii should of his own free will renounce 
the Spanish crown. This voluntary withdrawal would 
be the happiest possible termination of the affair, and 
he entreated the English Government to exert as strong 
an influence as possible to this end. Lord Lyons, who 
had severely criticised Gramont's previous attitude 
toward Prussia, declared himself gladly willing to 
comply with this request, and held out encouraging 
prospects with regard to his Government also. 

But the Minister's good intention was not destined 
to long life. The tone of the Paris press was now 
more violent than it had yet been ; the official sheets 
vied with the independent ones in the wildest war fan- 
faronades against Prussia. The allusions were now no 
longer to the Spanish question alone, but to Prussia's 
violation of the Treaty of Prague as well ; and between 
these rang out the taunt that despite all the provoca- 
tion received, Prussia still remained inertly silent. 
Louder and louder rose the demand that the Ministei-s 
should put an end to this trifling. Generals and depu- 
ties importuned the Government with equal impatience, 
and Gramont had not the fortitude to witlistand the 
clamor he himself had occasioned. 

" I admit," he relates,^ " that early on the morning 
of July 8th, resolved to leave no means of preserving 
peace untried, I determined to appeal directly to Prince 
Leopold. But this was a mistake. He had not become 
a candidate without the concurrence of the King; the 
candidacy was of Prussian origin, and as such France 

1 " France et Prusse," p. 66. 



1870J NAPOLEON CIRCUMVENTS GUAMONT. 349 

resented it. The King was responsible for it, and 
therefore to the King alone could Benedetti address 
himself. On July 9th I begged the Emperor to give 
me ordere conforming to tliis view."" 

He does not tell us what representations he made to 
tlie Emperor at the time. The outcome was, that on 
the afternoon of July 9th he was enabled to telegraph 
to Benedetti : You are not to enter into any transac- 
tion with Prince Leopold; the Emperor does not ap- 
prove of an appeal to liim. 

Gramont's intention was, therefore, that the instruc- 
tions given on July 7th should remain in force ; namely, 
that the King should be asked to cause the Prince to 
Avithdraw from the candidacy, which would be equiv- 
alent to a recall of the King's sanction of it.^ The 
Emperor's idea was, however, an entirely different one. 
Whether Benedetti addressed himself to the Prince or 
not was a matter of indifference to him. There were 
still other ways by which the Prince could be induced 
to withdraw, and, as Napoleon believed, peace be pre- 
served. He had just received- a Berlin telegram from 
the Havas Agency containing the announcement: The 
King of Prussia, who, by the way, is not the chief of 
the elder line of the house of Hohenzollern,-'^ advised 
Prince Leopold against accepting the offer of the Spaii- 

1 " France ct Prusse," p. 67. 

2 According to a German translation by llirth of Diary I. (j). 104), 
found by Prussian troojjs amongthe papers left by Napoleon at St Cloud. 

8 Tli(! statoini'nt should have been: Who as head of the family has 
no right to lay his (.'ommands upon the Priiii'e wilii regard to the Span- 
ish matter. 



350 WITHDRAWAL OF PRINCE LEOPOLD. [1870 

isli crown ; since then he has not heen again consulted 
in regard to the project. 

From this Napoleon concluded that the King wovdd 
not oppose the Prince's withdrawal ; and he therefore 
decided, that, instead of acting through Benedetti, he 
would use his influence directly with the Prince in the 
interest of peace. Without consulting his ^Ministers he 
solicited the King of Belgium in his behalf to represent 
to the Prince of Hohenzollern that his renunciation of 
the Spanish crown was the only means of preserving 
peace to Europe. 

Napoleon had no doubt regarding the effect of this 
step, but fully expected that the Prince would withdraw 
his acceptance, and that consequently the threatening 
Avar-cloud would l)e dispelled. King Victor Emmanuel, 
Avho, notwithstanding his strong inclination to a French 
alliance, did not at the time consider himself in a posi- 
tion to participate in a conflict, had, immediately after 
Gramont's fierce speech of the 6th, announced to the 
Spanisli Government that for the sake of obviating the 
necessity for the Hohenzollern candidacy which was 
giving so much offence, he was willing to reconsider the 
offer of the Spanish crown to his son Amadeo, which he 
had at one time i-efused.^ But greatly to his peace of 
mind, he received a despatch from Napoleon on July 
lltli, stating that peace was assured.^ 

As creditable as the Emperor's incentive to this 
step was, the whole proceeding, from l)egining to end, 
furnishes an excellent example of Avhat a jiolicy should 

1 ZNIiissari, II., 'M2. - Kothaii, "L'Allemagne et Tltalie,"' II., 60. 



1870] GRAMONT'S APPEAL TO PRECEDENT. 351 

not be. Here we have a Minister who on July 6th 
puts forward a demand which he supplements by a 
neA\ and highly dangerous one on the 7th ; he re- 
calls this on the 8th, and renews ii on the 9th. Over 
him is a monarch wlio never openly opposes this 
vacillation, hut in the end endeavors in secret to defeat 
the Minister's purpose. Such a Government could not 
escape shi})wreck, even had its opponent possessed only 
one-tenth of Bismarck's ability. 

Hardly less severely will we be inclined to criticise 
Gramont's next step, by which, on July 9th, he called 
upon the neutral Great Powers for support against 
Prussia. His circular letter of that day directed at- 
tention to the fact that France made no claim in con- 
nection A\ith the Spanish affair A\luch was not based 
upon the principles of European international law; that 
in 1831 the son of Louis Philippe had not been per- 
mitted to ascend the throne of Belgium, in 1862 the 
Prince of Leuchtenberg and the English Prince Alfred 
liad had a similar experience in connection witli the 
Greek throne, and in I860 Napoleon HI. luid forbidden 
the candidacy of Prince Murat for the crown of Naples. 
All this had been in pui-suance of the principle that no 
prince of the reigning dynast}' of any one of the Great 
Powers should acquii-e a foreign throiu- without tlie 
consent of the other Powei-s. France \u>w ex2)ected to 
be allowed to l)enerit by tliis oft-enforced doctrine. 

In this document Gramont, for good reasons, ])assed 
in silence over the fact that he not only (lesirt'd the 
witljilraw:il of I'liiice l^eo[)old in conformity with the 



352 WITHDBAWAL OF PRINCE LEOPOLD. [1870 

precedents cited, but that he made the additional claim 
which formed the objectionable feature of the demand, 
that King William should cause him to take this step. 

For in that case what reply could he have made if 
Bismarck had very courteously recognized tliis prin- 
ciple of international law, and had as politely added 
the remark that Prince Leopold was not a member of 
the royal house of Prussia, and with respect to this 
matter was not subject to the ordei"s of the King? 

And further, is it not rather surprising that the Gov- 
ernment of Napoleon III. should be the one to insist 
upon the enforcement of this principle ? For had he 
not in 1859, without asking the consent of the other 
Powers, used every means at his command to place his 
Cousin Jerome upon the throne of Tuscany? In 1860, 
again wholly upon his own responsibility, he had ad- 
vocated the candidacy of an Austrian archduke for the 
throne of Mexico; and in 1866, greatly to the discom- 
fiture of England, Austria, and Turkey, he had not 
only suggested the name of Prince Charles of Hohen- 
zollern, the brother of Prince Leopold, as candidate for 
the throne of Roumania, but had furthered his election 
in every Avay possible. There is no escape from the 
alternative — if he considered Prince Charles a Prus- 
sian prince, he had repudiated the principle to which 
Gramont now appealed ; or, if he had then acted in 
conformity to the principle, he could not have regarded 
Prince Charles as a Prussian prince. Whj^, then, was 
all this outcry made because of Prince Leopold's ac- 
ceptance of the Spanish crown ? 



1870] BENEDETTI'S FIRST INTERVIEW. 358 

The answer, to be sure, is not difficult to tincl. The 
Ronnianian occurrence was distasteful to the other 
tlu'ee Powers, but the Spanish one was displeasing to 
France. 'Iliere lay tlie difference. 

Meanwhile, on the evening of July 8ili, Benedetti 
had arrived at Ems, not especially delighted with the 
ticklish task which lay before him ; lirst of all to dis- 
cover what the King's attitude had been, and what his 
present intentions were ; then to pro^jose to this power- 
ful monarch that he should retract that which he had 
said. In truth, he could have felt little surprise if, 
after Werther's announcement of Gramont's demands, 
the King had refused to grant him an audience at all, 
asking that the communication he made through the 
usual official channels ; or if he luid briefly declared 
tliat Prince Leopold was entirely independent in this 
matter, and that all further explanations must be con- 
ditional upon a recall of the unprovoked threats made 
by Gramont. 

The King, pro])ably apprehensive that in view of the 
lately displayed French arrogance such an attitude 
might precipitate a rupture, and being himself linnly 
determined upon the course to pursue, leniently con- 
sented to waive formality. 

Early on the morning of July i^Hh Wert her called on 
iJenedetti to state that, since the King liad felt he luul 
no rigiit to forbid the Prince to accept the Spanish 
offer, he would hardly ])e likely to conunand his with- 
drawid, or even to advise it. Althougli Henedetti's 
hopes of snceess fell in consecpienee of lliis eoinnnini- 



354 WITHDliAWAL OF PRINCE LEOPOLD. [1870 

cation, they rose again when the King graciously 
granted him an audience. The King, to be sure, 
opened the conversation with a severe criticism of 
Gramont's speech, which he denounced as a defamation 
of Prussia's policy-, being, in fact, an open challenge. 
Benedetti, who was most anxious to preserve peace, did 
all in his power to soften the impression made by the 
speech, representing its sole purpose to have been to 
allay the exciteinent in the Chamber. As conducive to 
the same end. he then laid his proposal before the King- 
in the most courteous form possible, namely, in that of 
a wish that the King would advise the Prince to with- 
draw from the candidacy which had assumed so critical 
an aspect. 

In his reply the King rehearsed the events as we 
know them, laying especial stress upon the fact that in 
this matter he had acted wholly in the capacity of head 
of the family, and not as sovereign, his Government 
having therefore had no part whatever in the affair ; 
that when ^larshal Prim's agent had desii-ed to deliver 
into his hands a private letter from the Marshal, he had 
refused him an audience ; that, instead of laying the mat- 
ter before his Ministers, he had discussed it exclusively 
with the HohenzoUern princes, although he had made 
Bismarck his confidant:^ that the Prince had in the 
end accepted the candidacy without his knowledge ; 
after which he, the King, had been solicited as head 



1 As li.as been told. Benefletti. who had no knowledge of the family 
oouncil held in Maroh. misunderstood this remark, believing it to refer 
to the final negotiations in June. 



1870] GRAMONT UUGENT. 355 

of the family to give his consent ; and finally tiuit he 
had no right to forbid the undertaking. Accordingly, 
the King declared it wonld ])e hnpossible for him to 
command the Prince to withdraw, or to anticipate him 
in any step upon which he might decide voluntarily. 
He had, moveover, written to the Prince's father at 
Sigmaringen, the Prince himself being away upon a 
journey through Switzerland, and as soon as he had 
received a reply from Prince Charles Anthony he would 
o-ive the Ambassador his final answ er ; should the 
Prince decide to renounce the Spanish crown, iliis stcj) 
would meet with his unreserved ai)pr()\al. 

According to this statement, the King had evidently 
made known at Sigmaringen, not that he desired the 
Prince to decline the offer. ])iil that, as u])on the former 
occasion he had made no objection to the Prince's ai'- 
eeptance, so now he would make none to his with- 
drawal. Had France desired no moie than to remove 
the objectionable candidacy, this would have been the 
solution iif the crisis. 1>\U. as we are aware, (ii'amoiil 
demanded more, — the King's retraction of a permis- 
sion supposed to liave been granted; and, as might 
have been expected, all Benedetti's attempts to make 
this proposal appear acceptable to the King were des- 
tined to entl in failure. 

Xevei-theless, Px'iiedetti was not at all disheartened 
bv the result (.f this lirst interview. Not w ithstamliug 
the offence which (JrauKtut's speech had evidentlv 
given, the l\ing hail ((Hiseutt'd to a discussion of the 
matter, during- which he had acknowledged that the 



356 WITHDRAWAL OF PRINCE LEOPOLD. [1870 

Prince had solicited his sanction of the candidacy and 
had received it, — a point which had been surmised in 
Paris, but of which heretofore there had been no def- 
inite knowledge. And finally the King had explained 
his Government's attitude by the distinction existing 
between his own position as sovereign and that of head 
of the family, a distinction which Benedetti at once 
assailed by the argument that the King's position as 
head of the family was his simply by virtue of his 
sovereignt}-, — an argument which was in turn sus- 
tained by the fact that he had asked the Prime Min- 
ister to participate in the deliberation in question. 

Upon Gramont these explanations had no other effect 
than to encourage him in the hope of final triumph in 
the demand he had made. On the 10th and 11th the 
Ambassador received from him one telegram after an- 
other, all urging him on to action. Get us a decisive 
answer from the King, we cannot wait; we must have 
it by to-morrow, the day after will be too late ; if the 
King refuses to command or advise the Prince to with- 
draw, 300,000 reserves will be called into active service : 
that the king shall cause the Prince to withdraw 
is of greater importance to us than the withdrawal 
itself. 

On the 11th Gramont decided to inform the Cham- 
ber that as yet he had no definite announcement to 
make, since the reply, upon which all depended, had 
not arrived. "All the Cabinets which we have ad- 
dressed have recognized that we have just cause for 
complaint," was the remark with which he concluded.. 



1870] BISMARCK READY TO GO TO EMS. 357 

Witliin certain limits this had been true at the begin- 
ning of the controversy ; he, however, preserved a 
discreet silence regarding the change of opinion which 
had taken place among the Powers since Jnly 6tli. 
With respect to King William, Gramont had no doubt 
that he had adopted the right course to extort from 
liim the penitent declaration he desired. Immediately 
after the close of the day's session he telegraphed to 
Benedetti : Your demands lack firmness ; the Prince 
must receive the King's ordere to withdraw from the 
candidacy by to-morrow at the latest. 

.Vcross the Rhine the interview at Ems had pro- 
duced just the contrary effect ; Avhereas in Gramont 
it had aroused hopes of victory, it had awakened 
anxious thoughts in Bismarck. It was not the mena- 
cing clatter of French sabres by wliich it was followed 
tliat disquieted him ; for, as small as was his belief in 
anj^ serious intention behind the French threats and talk 
of mobilization, as great was his faith in the ultimate 
superiority of Germany's strength, should the}' be actu- 
ally carried out. Neither did the Prince's renunciation 
uf the Spanish crown, which had now become highly 
probable, disturb him. As pleasing as it would have 
been to him to sec the Prince upon tlie throne of 
Spain, lie nevertheless appreciated the motives wliii'li 
might induce the Prince to witlidraw in consequence 
of the bui-st of displeasure in Paris. To Prussia it 
was a matter of small moment. From the outset tlu' 
Government liad (Icchu'e*! tliat it liad taken no |iait in 
the transaction, but that tlie Prince, in coiKbictinL!' the 



358 WmiDBAWAL OF PRINCE LEOPOLD. [1870 

negotiations and eventually accepting, had acted wholly 
upon his own responsibility ; if now, \\ith a like free- 
dom from restraint, he decided to renounce the crown, 
what was this to Prussia? 

However, to maintain this standpoint consistently 
required that the French demand, asking the King to 
cause the Prince to withdraw, should be rejected most 
rigidly ; every word was to be avoided in which Gra- 
mont might behold even so much as the semblance of 
interference by the King. Otherwise the Prince's re- 
nunciation would imply a retreat on the part of the 
King in consequence of Gramont's threats, whereljy 
Prussia w^ould suffer a serious defeat. 

It was this which caused Bismarck anxiety; for he 
well knew the King's great love of peace, and how 
ui'gent an appeal was being made to it at the present 
time by certain members of the circle surrounding him. 
Bismarck considered it too friendly an advance that 
the King had granted the French Ambassador an audi- 
ence at all, and had not first demanded a retraction of 
the insults Gramont had cast at Prussia ; that he had 
admitted his acquiescence in the candidacy ; that he 
had mentioned having written to Prince Charles An- 
thony ; that he had promised, in case the Prince should 
decide to withdraw, to announce to the Ambassador that 
he had given his consent to this step, — all this appeared 
m(^st hazardous to Bismarck. How easily, thought he, 
could a malevolent opponent distort such an announce- 
ment into a concession to the advantage of France I 
And we shall soon see that this was actually done. 



1870] liENEDETTI'S SECOND INTERVIEW. 359 

Bismarck was quickly resolved. He sent word to the 
Kinor at Ems that the state of his healtli had so im- 
proved that he was quite able to undertake a journey ; 
he was therefore ready to proceed to Ems at the King's 
command. The reply, sent on the following' day, was 
that Bismarck should come as soon as possible.^ 

General von Roon, too, found it advisable to leave 
his country-seat for the city on July 11th, that he 
might be at hand in case of need. On the evening of 
the same day he discussed the all-absorbing <iuestion 
of the day with the Ministers who had remained in 
Berlin ; liowever, in the absence of Bismarck, Canq)- 
hausen, and Moltke, no decision could, of course, l)e 
reached, and of military preparations there was as yet 
no thought.^ 

In the country at large the affair had, unquestion- 
ably, aroused great interest, but of any strong excite- 
ment there was no evidence. At fii-st it had not been 
supposed possible that the choice of a ruler for Spain 
could lead to a conflict between France and Germany ; 
gradually, liowever, the proceedings in Paris developed 
the suspicion that perhaps the Spanish ipiestion was 
being made the pretext for a rupture whicli liad long- 
been resolved upon. Evidently public ()[)ini()n was 
not free from the influcmce of geographical position; 
in the Rhine Provinces tlie possibility of wdv was 
regarded not without a certain amount ot" anxiety; 

1 As related hy T'.isiiiank. Compare Jiilfs F:ivio. " rJouvenieineiit 
de la Dc^feiise Natioiiale," I., ]>. 177. 

- According to a report made by lAjrd LcifUis on .luly IJlli. 



360 WITHDRAWAL OF PRINCE LEOPOLD. [1870 

whereas in the East voices could be heard here and 
there declaring that it was time to end this dilly- 
dallying, and reply to these French aspersions with 
German musket-shot. 

Benedetti's second interview with the King, on the 
morning of July llth,^ took much the same course as 
had the first. The Ambassador was a little more ur- 
gent in his representations, but failed to bring forward 
any new reason justifying Gramont in his demand that 
the King should take the matter in hand, and command 
the Prince to withdraw from the candidacy. The King 
began to show some impatience at this second un- 
seemly attempt to enforce an unjust demand, but did 
not depart from the position he had previously taken, 
again declaring that he could do nothing before receiv- 
ing the expected reply from Sigmaringen. 

Hereupon Benedetti besought him to take into con- 
sideration the terrific ferment in the French Cham- 
bers, by which his Government was being driven to 
extremity ; action could not, he declared, be long de- 
ferred with safety. 

To this the King replied that he expected the answer 
within twenty-four hours ; to be impatient of so short a 
delay bespoke a desire on the part of France to pre- 
cipitate a conflict in any case. 

When Benedetti earnestly protested against this con- 
struction of his Government's diplomacy, the King 

1 On the evening of the 10th Benedetti had exchanged a few words 
with King William during an accidental meeting on the street, the 
King informing him that he had not yet heard from Prince Leopold. 



I 



[1870 ]]lTnDllAUAL DETEllMUSED I POX. 3t)l 

iigain intimated that the answer woukl in all proba- 
bility bring the announcement of the Prinee's with- 
drawal, which would iliL'ii l)e followed by Ids own 
approval of this step.' From this Benedetti concluded 
that the Kim;' already knew with certainty that the 
Prince would withdraw his acceptance ; he therefore 
believed that with the King's expressed consent all 
cause for war would be removed. 

This, however, was by no means Gramont's view of 
the matter. .Vlthough by a telegram sent at noon on 
the 12tli, he declared himself willing to postpone action 
for a single day, this first despatch was followed l)y a 
second one, only one hour later, containing the instruc- 
tions : Employ all the skill, nay, even cunning, at your 
command to establish the fact that the Prince's with- 
drawal was announced or counnunicated to you, or at 
least acknowledged by the Kinc; or his Government. 
This is of great moment to us ; it is absolutely neces- 
sary that the King should himself adnut his concur- 
rence, or that this should be manifestly evident from 
the facts. 

Thus, ii) the very last moment, Gramont persisted in 
the demand by which war was made inevitable, insist- 
ing that the King's approval of the Prince's with- 
drawal would not suffice, but that the step must be 
taken as the consequence of the King's express com- 
mand, or at his instance, that he nnght stand a peni- 
tent simicr before France and the rest of tin; world. 
But (jramont's iiour of disa[)pointment was at hand. 

' Lritrt; i»urliculii;re, 11 .Fiili, " Mission," p. ;<r>H. 



362 WITHDRAWAL OF PRINCE LEOPOLD. [1870 

After sending his second despatch he was permitted 
just one brief hour in which to indulge in his pre- 
sumptuous hopes. 

For the King, as might have been foreseen, was im- 
movable in his determination not to humiliate himself 
or his country by compliance with the French exactions. 
He met Gramont's discourteous urgency by the simple 
tactics of deferring all action on his own part until 
after the Prince's voluntary withdrawal from the candi- 
dacy had been announced in Madrid by the Hohenzol- 
lerns themselves. Then the orders which Gramont 
desired the King to give the Prince would not only be 
imnecessary, but every occasion for them would be 
wanting ; and, like a soap-bubble when pricked, the 
Minister's carefully devised cause for war would vanish 
in air. And this was in fact just what Gramont was 
about to experience. 

This way out of his embarrassing position had been 
suggested to Prince Charles Anthony from more than 
one side. We are told that at the instance of Olozaga. 
Stratt, the Roumanian charge d'affaires at Paris, went 
to Sigmaringen to ask, in the name of Prince Charles, 
that the Hereditary Prince renounce the Spanish crown. 
The appeal made by Emperor Napoleon with the same 
end in view has been mentioned. Presumably also 
King William had at least made it known at Sigma- 
ringen that he Avould not object to the Prince's with- 
drawal. 

This was all-sufficient for Prince Charles Anthony, 
who had no wish to allow his son's candidacy to oc- 



1870] THE WITTlDIiAWAL AN.yOUNCEU. 363 

casion a devastating war; and without awaiting- the 
Prince's return to Sigmaringen he sent the folhnving 
despatch at eleven o'clock on the morning of July 1 2th. 
not to King William, but to Marshal Prim at ^Madrid, 
and simultaneously with it one of like tenor to Olozaga, 
the Spanish Ambiissador at Paris : — 

In view of the complications which have arisen in 
consequence of my son's candidacy, and by wdiich the 
vote of the Spanish people will be deprived of that 
freedom which my son believed it would have at the 
time he accepted the Spanish crown, I now, iu his 
name, withdraw his acceptance of the offer. 

At the same time he made a like announcement to 
the public, although in briefer form, through the pages 
of the Schwdhische Merkur. To King William he sent 
a telegraphic message stating that on the following da}- 
the King would receive detailed information with re- 
gard to the matter. 

In the course of the afternoon of July 12th the news 
of the Prince's withdrawal was carried to every part of 
Germany by telegrams and extra sheets. It was re- 
ceived with mixed feelings ; no one regretted that the 
candidacy, which had at no time been popular, luul 
been abandoned ; and there was rejoicing that, as was 
Ijelieved, peace was again assured. Nevertheless, with 
many people the news left a bitter after-taste ; for, in 
a matter wholly justifiable, a Gcnnaii prince liad re- 
tired in consequence of the entirely inijust interfcrenee 
of France. 

On the evening of the same da}' Bismarck, who hail 



364 WITHDRAIVAL OF PRINCE LEOrOLD. [1870 

left Varzin at once upon learning the King's wish, ar- 
rived in Berlin, fully intending, despite the fatigue 
caused by a hot journey of ten hours, to take the night 
train for Ems. Upon hearing the news of the Prince's 
withdrawal as received at the Foreign Office, he, how- 
ever, determined not to undertake the tedious night 
journey, since evidently the decision had already been 
made at Ems ; for, like Napoleon and all Europe, Bis- 
marck believed the matter to be disposed of now. He 
sent a message to King William excusing himself on 
the ground of extreme fatigue ; and, as the King had 
expressed a desire for advice, he requested the Minister 
of the Interior, Count Eulenburg, to go to Ems in his 
stead. 

He himself remained in Berlin, although by no means 
with a mind relieved from care, but, on the contrar}^ 
oppressed by anxious thoughts. For now no oppor- 
tunity remained to resent Gramont's insulting threats 
as they deserved ; since, after the chief point at issue 
had been decided, any subsequent conq)laint would be 
out of place. He was harassed by the fear that the 
King might not have found it possible to avoid even 
the slightest approach to participation in the step which 
the Prince had taken, as ^acU as any connnunication 
regarding it to Benedetti, and thus, through him, to the 
French Government. For it was by this course only 
that Prussia could escape so much as the semblance of 
having suffered a defeat. 

Should it have happened otherwise, lie was resolved 
to have no further share in a policy which he could not 



1870] BiSMAJiCK I\ llERLiy. 365 

approve. He wrote to his wife advising bt-r lujt to fol- 
low him to Berlin, as in all probability he would return 
to Varzin in a few days, bvtt whether he would then 
still be ^Minister was very doubtful. In painful sus- 
pense he awaited news from Ems and Paris.' 

1 Compare Bismarck's personal report of September 23d, 1888, re- 
garding the diary of Emperor Frederick III. (Publislied in the lieichs- 
anzeiger of the 27th.) 



366 NEW CLAIMS MADE liY FRANCE. [1870 



CHAPTER III. 

NEW CLAIMS MAi5e BY FRANCE. 

To the utmost surprise of every one, Prince Leopold's 
Toluntary withdrawal, far from having a pacifying effect 
upon Paris, seemed but to add fresh fuel to the fire. 

The despatcli which Prince Charles Anthony sent to 
Olozaga was not in cipher ; and before delivering it to 
him for whom it was intended, the telegraph-office at 
which it was received forwarded a copy of it to Minis- 
ter Ollivier. Despite the good will which the Minister 
had so consistently shown toward Germany, the recent 
agitation had not failed of its effect upon his excitable 
temperament ; and within the last few days he had in- 
veighed as valiantly against Prussia for the supposed 
insult offered France as had Gramont himself. Still, 
he had at no time been really eager for war ; and now, 
at sight of the despatch, all his former love of peace re- 
asserted itself. Without a word to his colleagues he 
hastened to the palace of the Legislative Body ; upon his 
arrival there, he found the halls and corridors crowded 
Avith deputies, reporters, and membei-s of the Exchange, 
all eagerly expectant of important news. Ollivier rushed 
into their midst with the ciy: "Peace, peace! We 



1870] THE WITHDRAWAL NOT SUFFICIEyT. 367 

luive triumplied; the Prussian candidate has withdrawn! 
Peace is once more assured!" He allowed the de- 
spatch to be passed from hand to hand, and the greatest 
tumult soon arose. The speculator hurried to the Ex- 
change, where witliin a few iniiiutcs prices rose from 
68 to TO, and millions changed hands. 

In the Chamber, however, the Bonapartists and 
Chauvinists surrounded OUivier with angry exclama- 
tions. Is this, they aske<l, the satisfaction which was 
to be required of Prussia, this a trium})li over liis- 
marck ? Is peace as the result of this paltry note from 
Papa Charles Anthony a peace consistent with French 
honor? What liave we to do with Papa Charles An- 
thony? Or with his precious son. either, for that 
matter? Our (piarrel is with Prussia. What satisfac- 
tion has Prussia rendered for the injury done us ? 

Immediately after the session was opened Clement 
Duvernois announced liis intention to interpellate the 
Government as follows : We desire information regard- 
ing the guaranties which the Cabinet has agreed upon, 
or expects to agree upon, for the purpose of preventing 
a repetition of complications with Prussia. 

The discussion of the budget, whicli was the order 
of the dav, proceeded amidst general indifference. 
Many of the membeis who were adherents of the Min- 
istry crowdetl about Tliiers. wlio. at the very tii"st 
words uttere(l li\- r)lli\icf. had called out to liim to 
make sure of peace this time. They implored the 
famous orator most earnestly to continue to bring all 
lii- iiilliienct' to bear upon the ( Jo\-eiiiiiiciit to this end. 



368 .Y£ir CLAIMS MADE BY FRANCE. [1870 

promising to give him their al)lest support. These 
were the men whose election had been advocated by 
the Government, all of them peace-loving fathers of 
families, but at the same time the implicitly obedient 
servants of the Government. 

Ollivier, deeply perplexed, had withdrawn immedi- 
ately after the first outburst of this storm of indig- 
nation to confer with Gramont. For hours Thiei's 
discussed the situation with the Ministers present, and 
in the end hoped he had converted at least two of them 
to his opinion. Toward the close of the day's session 
a member of the Left, Guyot-Montpayroux, declared 
himself resolved to compel the Ministers to break the 
silence which implied disrespect for both the Chamber 
and the country. It was rumored that in opposition to 
Thiers, he intended to call upon the Government to 
throw down the gauntlet to Prussia for its infraction 
of the Treaty of Prague. 

Shortly before three o'clock the Duke of Gramont 
received a call from Baron Werther, who had just 
returned from Ems. Their conversation had, however, 
scarcely begun, when the Duke was handed a copy of 
the Sigmaringen telegram forwarded to him by the 
Havas agency ; at the same time the Spanish Am- 
bassador was announced, who had come to give official 
information regarding the same despatch. He remained 
only long enough to congratulate the Minister upon 
this happy result, and then withdrew. 

Gramont was dismayed ; ^ he had written Benedetti i 

1 Gramont, "La France et la Prusse," p. 114. 



1870] LETTER OF APOLOGY ASKED. 369 

That the Prince shall withdraw is not of so much 
importance to us as that tlie King shall cause him to 
take this step. Now the Prince of Hohenzollern had 
prevented the King's intervention by his voluntary 
withdrawal, and far from having ascribed his decision 
to a Prussian command, had assigned as its reason the 
threats made by France. Gramont had a feeling of 
having been outwitted by the King, and defrauded of 
his demanded satisfaction. 

It was with this end in view, then, that the Kimr 
had delayed matters ; this was why he had pretended 
to await a reply from Sigmaringen which could not 
arrive before the next day, — that he might avoid, both 
for himself and liis Government, every appearance of 
having participated in the transaction. On the spot 
Gramont became convinced that the King had long 
known of the Prince's decision, perhaps had even influ- 
enced him to it in private, and certainly had sanctioned 
it. What perfidy ! To affect ignorance, and ask for 
delay until France should have received from Madi'id 
the announcement of the Prince's withdiawal, deter- 
mined upon without the least interference on the part 
of the King I King William, thought Gramont, could 
not have been capable of such an intrigue ; this was 
but another of liismarck's dialiolical schemes, and nuist, 
therefore, be frustrated at any cost. This time the 
King had escaped the clutch of France; by \\hat 
device could he be cornered now, and, des|)i)e the 
Prince's voluntary withdrawal, be force(| to make 
fonual amends to France for the indi'niit \- suffered? 



370 XEW CLAIMS MADE BY FRANCE. [1870 

As Gramont could find no answer to this question, 
he took up his interrupted conversation with Werther, 
hoping that before its close something might be said 
which would suggest a new pretext for war J " The 
Prince's withdrawal is a minor consideration," said he ; 
" for that we should have suffered him to ascend the 
Spanish throne was simply out of the question. Our 
real grievance is Prussia's action, — that its King per- 
mitted the candidacy without previously asking France 
for* an expression of opinion regarding it." 

To this Werther replied that King William had no 
right to forbid the Prince to accept the Spanish offer ; 
and then explained that the King, moreover, had not 
had the least idea that the candidacy of a prince closely 
related to the imperial house of France would give 
offence in Paris. These words suggested a sudden 
thought to Gramont. " If such was the King's belief 
at the time," said he, "he will now probably have no 
objection to make this known to the Emperor ; he 
might, for instance, write him (Gramont at once 
jotted down a draft of the desired letter), that in 
sanctioning the candidacy he had no intention to injure 
the interests or influence of France ; that he now con- 
curred in the Prince's refusal to be a candidate for the 
crown of Spain, and hoped that henceforward all cause 
of misunderstanding between his own Government and 
that of France misfht be removed." 

Gramont requested the Ambassador to lay this pro- 
posal before his sovereign at the earliest moment pos- 
sible. 

1 " France et Prusse," p. 115 



1870] UliAMOM' DEMANDS GUARANTIES. oil 

Whether it was malice or want of judgment which 
caused Gramont to overlook the tremendous difference 
between such a thought entertained hy the King on the 
21st of June, and its formal expression in a letter ad- 
dressed to Napoleon after all the late threats of war 
made by France, is a point which I will not attempt to 
decide.^ With great candor he then explained to the 
Ambassador how the publication of such a letter, or of 
its substance, would tend to allay the frantic indigna- 
tion of the Frent-h people. At this juncture Ollivicr, 
still under the influence of the recently witnessed scene 
in the Chamber, entered the room, and added his urgent 
representations to those of his colleague. 

Again it must remain an open question whether it 
\\"as weakness of insight or of character l)y which the 
Ambassador was deterred from resenting the very sug- 
gestion of such a humiliating step as the height of inso- 
lence. He contented himself with the answer that 
Gramont's speech of the 6th had done much to make 
the sending of such a letter more than ordinarily dil'li- 
cult. When the two French Ministers replied to this, 
that if he would not transmit the new proposal to the 
King, they would instruct Benedetti to lay it before 
him, Werther consented to make the desired connnu- 
iiicaiioii to King William. This oHicial discussion, in 
wliicli a new <-nxiis l>rUl had arisen, had lasted little o\'er 
hall an hour. 

' <Jii lliu sumo {ni'^ii (" France et Prussc," 124) on wliicli he cites liis 
draft of the proposed letter to be written by the King, he indulj;i's in aw 
ex]>ressit>ii of ri};htet>us indijjniition iit " HisiMiirck's lie," by w hicli it liiid 
been asserted that lie, (iraniont. had demanded of the King line Ivlti-c 

(1'c.rriiKf. 



372 NEW CLAIMS MADE BY FRANCE. [1870 

Immediately after its conclusion, at four o'clock, 
Gramont hastened to St. Cloud to discuss this latest 
phase of the situation with the Emperor. Napoleon, 
like OUivier, had hailed the Sigmaringen despatch 
as the solution of the crisis, perhaps had even looked 
upon it as the result of his own endeavor, and in an 
audience just given the representatives of Austria and 
Ital}', had expressed himself as overjoyed that thus 
the preservation of peace had again become possible. ^ 
'•Write your King," he had said to Vimercati, "that 
the dispute is ended ; there will be no war." ^ Then, 
however, he had learned of the intended interpellation 
announced by Duvernois concerning the guaranties 
which the Government proposed to demand ; and when 
the Duke of Gramont now appeared, he complained to 
him of the annoyance which this intention caused him, 
explaining that this required the immediate re-opening 
of negotiations concerning this highly dangerous sub- 
ject, whereas ordinary prudence would suggest that 
any further negotiations should be deferred to as late 
a day as possible.^ 

At the mention of guaranties a new idea regarding 
the course of action now to be adopted toward Prussia 
flashed upon Gramont. " Quite right," he exclaimed ; 
"it will not do to accept Prince Charles Anthony's 
announcement of his son's withdrawal unless accompa- 
nied by fixed guaranties for the future. The motive 

1 Duret, " Histolre de Quatre Aiis," I., p. 109. 

2 According to a communication sent by Vimercati to Vienna. 

3 Gramont, p. 130. 



1870] XE\r IXSTh'UCTIOXS TO BI'SEDETTl. 373 

whit-li led to the proposed interpellation is so fully in 
liannony with the temper of the majority in the Cham- 
i)er, as well as with public opinion in general, to which 
almost the entire press has given vigorous expression, 
that it -will he impossible not to give it due considera- 
tion. Do we wish to retain the faintest hope of bring- 
ing this affair to a close without bloodshed, we must to 
a certain extent act in sxinpathy witli the national 
feeling." 

The account which Gramont's book gives of this 
interview concludes with the words : *' I pass in silence 
over the careful and conscientious deliberation which 
preceded the final decision of the Government." Cer- 
tain it is that his object was not as easily attained with 
Napoleon as with Werthcr : for instead of half an hour, 
as with tlie Ambassador, the discussion with the Em- 
peror was continued for three hours before Gramont 
obtained Napoleon's hesitatingly given permission to 
instruct Benedetti to make the attempt with King 
William, and lay the i)ro}»osal before him in the most 
courteous foi'ui of which it admitted. Then he hur- 
ried back to Paris, and at seven o'clock telegiu[)hed to 
Benedetti : Through Olozaga we have been informed 
of Prince Leopold's withdrawal as announced iu Ids 
name by Prince Charles Anthony : to be effectual tliis 
step iTMpiircs tli;it llic KiiiL; of Prussia shall coiicui- in 
it, promising that this candidacy will not be permitted 
at some future time: ask the King at once to give you 
this assui'aiice. which he eainiot I'efiisc if his intentions 
are truly such as he claims tlicni to be ; make a paia- 



374 NEW CLAIMS MADE BY FRANCE. [1870 

phrase on this despatch such as you can communicate 
to the King. 

Accordingly, on the morning of July 13th, King 
William would learn of these two latest demands, — 
a humble letter of apology to be written to Napoleon, 
and the issue of orders forbidding the Hohenzollern 
candidacy for the future. Whether the two were to 
be regarded as inseparable or as an alternative, Gra- 
mont in his haste forgot to state. 

After the despatch had been sent, the Duke dis- 
cussed the situation with the English Ambassador. 
Making no mention of Benedetti's latest announce- 
ment, namely, that the King had promised his consent 
to Prince Leopold's withdrawal, and that this was to 
be communicated to the French Ambassador on the 
morrow, the Duke now complained to Lord Lyons : 
"• The manner of this withdrawal places us in a most 
embarrassing position ; public opinion is so exasperated 
that the Cabinet may be forced to resign to-morrow if 
this affair is declared to be concluded without satisfac- 
tion having been obtained from Prussia. Otherwise," 
said he, " the Prince's withdrawal removes the original 
cause for complaint ; Spain has no further part in the 
transaction, and the quarrel, should it come to a quar- 
rel, is now between France and Prussia." 

Lord Lyons was utterly and most unpleasantly sur- 
prised. " What ! " he exclaimed, " you hesitate to 
accept this simple solution of the crisis, although only 
a few days ago you declared to the English Govern- 
ment throuirli me that should the Prince decline the 



1870] GHAMONT'S POLICY ( RITICISED. 375 

crown the situation would be relieved? Sliould your 
policy lead to war, the verdict of all Europe will be : 
" The responsibility rests with France ; without real 
provocation, but wholly because of over-sensitiveness 
and a feeling of injured pride, she has rushed into 
war.' In that case entire Germany will stand by 
Prussia, and France will incur the censure of the 
whole world." 

Lord Lyons was a far-sighted and experienced states- 
man, a man of calm judgment, and ^\■holly unprejudiced 
with respect to the question in controversy. In what 
he said he expressed no more than that which the facts 
in the case would lead every unbiassed observer to 
conclude ; namely, the conviction that by making new 
demands Gramont would entail most terri])le disaster 
upon his country. On Gramont, however, it made 
no impression. "To-morrow morning," said he, "the 
matter will be finally considered in a Cabinet Council, 
and the decision reached will then be announced to 
the Chambers, and thus to tlie world." 

If the English Ambassador's unreserved criticism 
had annoyed the Duke, he found ample compensation 
for this in a letter from the Emperor, which was de- 
livered to him at about ten o'clock. In it Napoleon 
declared that after maturer reflection upon the subject 
of their last conversation he had arrived at the fol- 
lowing conclusions : — 

That since the Sigmaringen despatch bad not been 
addressed to the Freneh Government, it was not to be 
regarded in tlie light of an ollicial coinnmnicatioM. . . . 



376 NEW CLAIMS MADE BY FRANCE. [1870 

That since the withdrawal had been announced by 
Prince Charles Anthony, it was not binding upon Prince 
Leopold. . . . 

Accordingly, Benedetti must demand a categorical 
reply, by which King William would pledge himself not 
to permit the Prince to follow his brother's example, 
and some day make his appearance in Spain. . . . 

So long as such a reply was not forthcoming, military 
preparations must be continued. . . . 

Until this point should be decided, it would be inex- 
pedient to give the Chamber any nearer information. 

Every word in this letter is remarkable ; in the first 
place, that the official character of the desj^atch which 
the Spanish Ambassador had formally communicated 
to the French Government should be denied, as well 
as that the assertion should be made that the declara- 
tion it contained was not binding upon Prince Leo- 
pold, although it especially stated that it was in his 
name Prince Charles Anthony made the announce- 
ment. Furthermore, the unreasonable apprehension 
that, despite his father's declaration and the hostility 
manifested by France, Prince Leopold might suddenly- 
appear in Madrid as had Prince Charles in Bucharest 
in 1866, although the latter had not been restrained 
from doing so by a previous withdrawal, and had, 
moreover, been in every way supported and encouraged 
by Napoleon. And finally, we are prompted to ask, 
what had suggested all these strange fancies to Napo- 
leon, who only three days previously had alluded to the 
Prince's withdrawal as the surest means of preserving 



1870] NAPOLEON'S CONSENT OliTAINED. 377 

peace, and no nioie than two lioui-s before, in conver- 
sation with two anibassadoi-s, had referred to the hap- 
piness which the achievement of this event had given 
him ■/ 

Gramont solves this ritldle for ns. 

In his l)()()k he cites the Emperor's letter/ and adds 
the comment : " The letter, truth to tell, was no more 
than a concise recapitulation of that which Ave had 
determined upon in the afternoon.'' Since at the be- 
ginning of their convei-sation Napoleon had advocated 
just the reverse of these views, Gramont hei-eby fathers 
the opinions now expressed by the Emperor. The 
letter, therefore, testifies not to the warlike spirit of 
the Emperor, but to the weakness and want of will- 
power jof an ailing man. Gramont, during the coui-se 
of liis discussion witli the Emperor, may even have 
outlined a draft of this defiant writing, just as for 
Werther he liad indicated the text of the letter to be 
written by King William. However that may be, the 
assertions made in it are an echo of (iramont's opinion. 
According to this view of it, Napoleon's consent to the 
very polite request now to l)e made of the Prussian 
King bad l)een finally wrung from him after a struggle 
of three hours; 1)UL it required yet three hours more 
before tbe eager advocates of war by whom he was 
suiroundrd could in(hicc him to sign the desii'cd writ- 
ing. Its final clanse (inly, the one directing that for 
the present no conuiuuiication concerning the matter 
should be made to the C'hainbeis, would seem to be the 

' ■' Kniiu-e et Pru.sso," [i. l.>7. 



378 



NEW CLAIMS MADE BY FRANCE. 



[1870' 



Emperor's own suggestion, since, as Ave are aware, it 
was Gramont's intention to take this ste]) on the ver}' 
next day. 

Be that as it may, Gramont had achieved his desire, 
for now OUivier also gave his consent. Just before 
midnight the Duke sent another telegram to Benedetti, 
followed an hour later by a second one of similar im- 
port, from which, however, the direction to make a 
polite paraphrase on its contents was omitted. Quite 
in the spirit of the waiting received from the Emperor, 
the despatch briefly and unceremoniously declared : 
" The communication received by us, but not addressed 
to us, announcing the Prince's withdrawal, cannot be 
accepted as a sufficient answer to our just complaints, 
and still less as a guaranty for the future. Toansure 
us against the possibility that the son may not feci 
bound by his father's word, or that he will not appear 
in Spain as did his brother in Roumania, it is absolutely 
necessary that the King shall promise that he will not 
permit Prince Leopold to accept the candidacy at some 
future time." 

The despatch closed with the assurance that in mak- 
ing this demand the French Government had no hidden 
motive, neither did it seek a pretext for war, but de- 
sired only that the crisis might be terminated with 
honor to itself. 

Even yet I would hesitate to assert that this assu- 
rance was a delil)erate falsehood, that Gramont fully 
intended to make a conflict inevitable. Not that he 
was at all loath to undertake it, but he still hoped to 



1870] EXCriKMENT IN PAlilS. 370 

acliieve the desired liumiliatioii (tf Prussia's kino- wiih- 
out it. That by wliicii he was inflexibly hekl to this 
fatid coui-se, aside tVoin his pei-sonal feeling of enniit}-, 
was his fear of the patriotic fury to which he himself 
had roused the populace within the space of one shoi't 
week. He had set the stone to rolling, and imw. an 
irresistible avalanche, it swept him onward.' 

The untruthful representations with which he had 
flooded the country; the assertion that Prussia had 
striven to place Prince Leopohl iqioii the Spanish 
throne; that this was au affront to the honor of 
Prance for which full and glorious satisfaction must be 
re([uired of King William, — all this had been gradually 
absorbed into the very life of the Parisians and throbbed 
in their veins. With noisy demonstrations the\" ci>u- 
curred in the criticisms which wric showered upon 
()lHvier for his aiiiiouiicement that peace was again 
assured; they were enthusiastic over Duvernois' demand 
that guaranties against Prussia's eagerness for con(piest 
must be insisted upon. Louder and louder rose the 
(;ry that the Spanish incident was the last drop by 
which the cup of Fi'cnch endurance had l)eeu tilled 
to overflowing. It mattered little what Papa Charles 
Anthony might write. France had quite enough of 
this Prussian presum])tioii; ever since Sadowa this ra- 
l)acious neighbor was seeking to rol) h' ranee of its lead- 
ing [jositioii ill l^ni'ope: it was higli time to end all 

1 He admits lliis liimsi-lf (Depositions I., 105), saying: " Wi- were 
forced to inak<^ tlu; demand for guarantie*; liy tlie pressure i>f pulilio 
opinion," ete. " It was, moreover, necessary," he adds, " and in no way 
an affront to Prussia." 



380 NEW CLAIMS MADE BY FRANCE. [1870 

this; to take the step whereby South Germanj would 
be prevented from falling under the Prussian yoke ; to 
rescue the annexed provinces from out of Bismarck's 
iron clutch; to throw this over-ambitious rival back 
into the old impoteney. 

On this warm July night the people gathered in 
crowds upon the boulevards, and struggled eagerly to 
get the latest editions of the evening papers, which 
gave vehement utterance to the war feeling. Seated 
high upon a cart amidst the crowd, an opera-singer 
struck up the Marseillaise, which was greeted with 
wild applause. Wherever soldiers appeared they were 
hailed as the protectors and avengers of French honor. 
Organized bands marched through the streets uttering 
fierce cries of " War, war ! Down with Bismarck ! 
Down with Prussia I To Berlin, to Berlin ! " The po- 
lice looked on impassively. As an appreciative eye- 
witness remarked later, a war was here organized as 
is a riot ordinarily. 

Amidst all this tunuilt there were, of course, many 
who did not lose their heads, — quiet citizens and sub- 
stantial business men, who looked forward with anxiety 
to the disturbance and injury which even a successful 
war would cause. ^ But no one dared to stem the tide, 
and thus incur the suspicion that his was but a luke- 
warm patriotism. And finally, when early on the 13th 
the morning papers Avith few exceptions violently de- 
nounced Prussia, and invoked imprecations upon a 
peace secured on the present basis, scarcely one person 

1 So Thiers, an eye-witness, tells ns. 



1870] QUi:STlOJ^' OF MOniLIZATIOX IJV PARIS. 381 

in this seething metropolis liad any doubt that the 
heart of the French nation was set upon a war with 
Prussia, upon revenge for Sadowa, and tliat any stand 
which the Ministry might take against this vahant 
i)eginning woukl be utterly useless. 

So mattei-s stood \\lien, on the morning of the 13th, 
the Cabinet met in council at St, Cloud, presided over 
b}' the Emperor.^ Clramont presented the situation 
thus : After the Prussian king had authorized the 
Hohenzollern candidacy, which was injurious to the 
honor and dignity of France, we could not do other- 
wise than require satisfaction of him, and therefore 
demanded that he give the Pi'ince orders to withdraw 
his acceptance of the Spanish crown. He has made 
compliance \\ ith this demand impossible l)y treacher- 
ously delaying his reply mitil after the Prince had 
voluntarily renounced the candidacy. After this evi- 
dence of perfidy it was advisable to place tlie future 
under the safeguard of guaranties. Hence, we asked 
the King to declare that he will forbid the Prince to 
renew his attempt to acciuire the Spanish crown. 

This exposition gave rise to two entireh' contrary 
opinions. The Minister of War, Leboeuf, had little 
hope that the King would make any such humiliating 
concession; whatever the issue, there was a probaliilitx- 
of war to face, and everv reason to take wise precau- 
tions. In Prussia the niol)ilizati(>n of the army was 
being rai)i(ll\' ( airie(l I'orwaid. lie said; it A\as a matter 

1 (^imparl- ( i iMJiiont, p. HH, unci I.ilid'ufs tcstiiiioiiy ht'foro the lii- 
vestiK.ilKiii ('omniittfc, [., 47. 



382 NEW CLAIMS MADE BY FRANCE. [1870 

of life and death for France that the enemy should not 
be allowed to gain the advantage in this respect. He 
therefore proposed, with the concurrence of the Minis- 
ter of the Navy, that the war reserves be called in at 
once. 

In opposition to this view the great majority of the 
Ministers not only advised against any such measure as 
being equivalent to a declaration of war, but against 
Gramont's demand for guaranties as well. They held 
that all that Gramont had claimed on the »»th had been 
complied with in that the Prince had withdrawn ; hence, 
the affair was ended. 

They were supported in this opinion by a writing 
received from Lord Lyons during the course of the 
consultation, in which, in the name of his Govern- 
ment, he most earnestly commended the adoption of 
this course. 

Count Beust liad also condemned Gramont's quarrel- 
some attitude in a most vigorously expressed telegram 
sent on July lltli, declaring that entire Europe would 
hold him responsible for all the suffering ^^•hieh the 
coming war would cause. On the 18th he sent another 
despatch counselling Gramont to accept as sufficient, 
and to make the most of the diplomatic trium|)h which 
had been achieved in the Prince's withdraM'al. 

Despite all these warnings, the outcry made by the Ar- 
cadians, tlie newspapers, and the street mobs, impelled 
Gramont to hold to the unreasonable standpoint that 
the preservation of French prestige required not only 
the Prince's withdrawal, l»ut that formal satisfaction be 



1870J THE LEFT ClUTIfltiES THE MIMSTllY. 383 

rendered by Prussia. " lu what we ask for the achieve- 
ment of this end we are as moderate as can be," he ex- 
plained to his colleagues. " The instructions given the 
Ambassador at Berlin were not intended as an ulti- 
matum, and should not be regarded as such. Xeither 
was our demand for guaranties inflexible ; il permitted 
of qualification and modification ; nothing, for instance, 
was said with regard to any particular form in which 
they should be given; the Government is inclined to 
come to almost any agreement in this respect." 

Gramont's latest telegrams to Benedetti, as we re- 
member, were in a very different tone ; but that the 
demand he desired to make might not encounter the 
opposition of the Cabinet, he now represented it as an 
uioffensive proposal, leaving almost everything optm to 
further agreement. As is obvious, the action desired by 
Leboeuf did not carry out this idea at all ; if the de- 
mand for guaranties was of so inoffensive a nature, 
where was the necessity for great military preparations 
1)\- which the now glowing spark would l)e fanned into 
a ])laze ? Idealizing this. Gramont felt constrained to 
oppose Leboeuf, and thus succeeded in pacifying his 
more peaceably inclined colleagues. The result was a 
half-way measure ; the demand for guaranties was per- 
sisted in, the military preparations were postponed. 

Hereupon Lebceuf declared that he iinist in that 
case tender his resignation, in consequence of which 
the Emperor directed that the question of mo])ilization 
should be fiu-tlier discussed on the 14tli. 

At tw(t o\l(iiI< tlie ('iiiuulter was awaiting the ajipear- 



384 NEW CLAIMS MADE BY FRANCE. [1870 

ance of the Ministers with illy suppressed impatience. 
Gramont announced that the Spanish Ambassador had 
given official notification that the Prince of Hohenzol- 
lern had withdrawn his acceptance of the Spanish 
throne ; the negotiations with Prussia, however, which 
throughout had been directed toward the achievement 
of this one object, had not yet been concluded; mean- 
while it was impossible to give the House a full and 
detailed explanation of the matter. This intelligence 
was received by the middle party with feelings of anxi- 
ety and disappointment ; on the Right, however, Duver- 
nois instantly called attention to his interpellation 
regarding guaranties ; and, in order to deepen the 
vinfavorable impression, Baron David, prompted by his 
enmity toward the Ministry, added a second interpel- 
lation, asking the reason for the Cabinet's dilatoriness 
in conducting the negotiations with Prussia, through 
which it was incurring the sneers of the world, endan- 
gering the nation's dignity, and destroying the prosper- 
ity of the country. 

When Gramont protested against this criticism of 
the Ministry's policy, and asked that the discussion of 
the two interpellations be deferred until the 15th 
of July, Monsieur de Keratry called out from his seat 
on the Left : " By such hesitation you allow Bismarck 
to make game of you! As a Frenchman, I protest 
most earnestly against it ! " Nevertheless, the desired 
delay was granted by a large majority. 

Minister Gramont breathed again ; this would give 
him a respite of at least twenty-four hours. He left 



1870] URGENT INSTIiUCriOXS TO BENEBETTI. 385 

tlie hall of assembly to repair to the Senate, there to 
make the same statement. Hardly had he arrived 
there when he was handed a despatch from Ems, the 
contents of which left him little hojjc of success for the 
latest negotiations undertaken by IJenedetti. In con- 
sequence, Gramont was doubly eager in the representa- 
tions he made to Lord Lyons innnediately afterwards, 
assuring him of his own desire for peace, explaining 
that so far Prussia had not made even the smallest 
concession, or offered the least satisfaction, and railing 
the Ambassadors attention to the moderation whieh 
marked the French demands (again he put them in 
writing) : If the King forbids the Prince ever to 
reconsider tlie candidacy the quarrel is at an end. — 
He desired the .\.ml)assador to report this in London, 
accompanied by the re([uest that Lord Granville advise 
Prussia to comply with this demand. 

To such strange inversions of the truth did Gra- 
mont's blind obstinaey lead him. He, who from the 
outset had maintained that Prussia had suggested and 
furthered the t-andidaey, now insisttMl that in al)andon- 
ing it Prussia made no coneession, did not retreat from 
its original position. 

Count Uenedetti, as we saw, look a different view. 
King William, in his couversalioii \\'\\\\ the Aiiiltassadof 
on the t'tli of July, and again on tiic 11th. had given 
him to understand that \\v fully exi)cctt'(l the i'liiicc to 
withdraw voluntarily, and tliat his consent to this stej* 
woidd then Ik; given without licsitation. Henedctti 
ilattered himself with the anticipation that thus his 
task would Im- biilliaiit !\- acc(Hii|ilisli('d. 



386 NEW CLAUIti MADE BY FRANCE. [1870 

Oil the 12th of July the King told him that by a 
telegniiu from Sigmahngeu he had been notified that 
the letter expected from Prince Charles Anthony would 
arrive at Ems on the forenoon of the 13th ; as soon as 
it had been received he would summon the Ambassador, 
and give him his final answer. 

Whether this telegram contained a preliminary an- 
nouncement of the Prince's withdrawal or not, the 
nature of the matter in hand required that the King 
should enter into no definite negotiations with the 
Ambassador before the letter containing the full state- 
ment was at hand. 

During the night, from the 12th to the 13th, Bene- 
detti received the despatch which Gramont had sent on 
the previous evening, instructing him to endeavor at 
once to induce the King to promise that he would for- 
l)id the Prince to re-accept the Spanish crown at some 
future time. Tlie Ambassador had little heart to do 
this latest bidding ; ho^vever, on the morning of the 
13th he took a stroll in the Park near the springs, hop- 
ing that he might there meet one of the gentlemen of 
the royal suite, and through his intervention obtain as 
early an audience as possible with the King. At the 
end of the promenade that follows the bank of the 
Lahn, qnite near the music pavilion, which as usual 
was surrounded by a crowd, he suddenly came face to 
face with the King, who was attended only by an 
adjutant. 

King William turned to the Ambassador with a 
friendly greeting. " The courier from Sigmaringen has 



1870] KI\G WILLIAM ASD BE]\'EI)ETTL 887 

not yet arrived ; but here is good news," said he, hand- 
ing Benedetti an extra edition of the KolniscJie Zeifuny 
containing the Signiaringen despatcli. " This ends all 
your anxiety and trouble."" \w added cheerily. 

After retiiniing i\vv King's .salutation, Benedetti 
replied that he had already heard of the Prince's with- 
drawal through a despatch received from his Govern- 
ment during the past niglit ; this had, however, also 
contained instructions directing him to request the 
King — then followed the new demand for guaranties. 

Tlie King was utterly surprised and greatly dis- 
turbed ])y this latest development. He, however, con- 
fined himself to the reply that before the arrival of 
the .Signiaringen courier he could say no more. 

Hereupon Ucnedetti grew more urgent. " But, your 
Majesty, could we not even now discuss the letter hypo- 
thetically ? //' the Prince withdraws, will your Ahij- 
esty authorize me to telegraph my (iovernment tliat 
you give the desired promise ? '" 

"You ask,'" replied the King, "that I shall bind 
myself for all future time and foi' any event ; I cannot 
and ought not to undertake such an obligation; I nuist 
reserve the liberty to decide each individual case ac- 
cording to the circumstances. Most assuredly I have 
no hidden motive in this coiuiection ; the affair has 
causecl mi; too nnicli anxiety not to be glad to ha\e 
it settled past recall. Xevertlu'less. I cainhit j)ossibl\ 
go as fai" as vou desiic." 

Still undaunted. r>ciifdi-tti made a tliird attem[)t. 
••I can readily undei-sland,"' said he •• \\ hy your (io\- 



388 NEW CLAIMS MADE BY FRANCE. [1870 

ernmeiit, or you as sovereign, should hesitate to bind 
yourself for the future ; but your Majesty has assured 
me that in this matter your action has been simply that 
of head of the family, and as such it would seem pos- 
sible that you might comply with our wish without 
incurring any political disadvantage. I dare to hope, 
therefore, that your Majesty will graciously authorize 
me to send the despatch mentioned." 

At this unseemly importunity upon the public prom- 
enade, the King's patience at length gave way. With 
impressive dignity he replied, " No ; on the contrary, I 
must repeat what I have already said ; I cannot give 
you the desired authority. I refuse, once for all, to 
comply with this new and unexpected claim." ^ This 
ended the conversation ; and beckoning to the adjutant, 
who had stepped a little to one side while the two were 
conversing, the King continued his walk. 

Owing to the articles which had appeared in the Paris 
newspapers, Benedetti had been an oliject of general 
interest to the public of Ems ever since his arrival in 
town. Consequently this brief discussion, growing more 
earnest and animated with every word, was observed 
with eager attention by the people in the immediate 
vicinity of the King; and the impression received by 
all was that something unusual must have occurred. 

Indeed, this day was destined to bring with it much 
more that was out of the ordinary. 

In the course of the afternoon the King received 
Werther's report informing him of the French demand 

^ Benedetti, p. 37G. 



1870 J BENEDETTI REBUFFED. 389 

tliat in an autogiaph letter to the Emperor Napoleon 
he should formally disclaim having had any intention 
to injure the honor or influence of France in giving 
his consent to the HolienzoUern candidacy. The effect 
was such as was to be expected, especially after the 
irritation caused hy the demand which Benedetti had 
presented in the morning. The King was indignant 
that sucli a humiliating act should be expected of him, 
and so much the more so in view of the publicity which 
it was intended it should have.* 

Toward one o'clock the letter from Prince Charles 
Anthony arrived, containing, as had been anticipated, 
the announcement that the Prince had withdrawn his 
acceptance of the Spanish crown. In conformity with 
Avhat the King had said to lienedetti, the latter should 
]i(>\\ liave been invited to an audience A\ith the King; 
tlie ^Vmbassador, who in the meantime had received the 
more urgent despatches Avhich Gramont had sent dur- 
ing the night, was in fact counting the minutes until 
he should be summoned. However, the encounter in 
the Paik had not failed to affect the King's sentiments 
toward Benedetti also. He determined ( we sliall soon 
hear more with regard to this) that the Amiiassador 
should not receive another audience about this affair; 
and that this decision might be placed beyond recall it 
was to be made pul)lic at once. 

The Minister of I'^inaiice. ("aiiipbaMseii, who liad just 
arrived in Kms, cuiicurrcd most liearlily in tliis stc^p. 

• lienctlctti, i>. '.'A'.^. (Jranioiit diil not deein it necessary to acquaint 
tilt! Ambassador with tliis second demand. 



390 NEW CLAIMf^ MAUE BY FRANCE. [1870 

Soon after two o'clock King William notilicd I>enedetti 
by one of the adjutants, C'ount Radziwill, that the let- 
ter expected from Prince Charles Anthony had arrived ; 
that it contained the announcement of his son's with- 
di'awal; and that the King now considered the affair 
as ended. 

Nevertheless, Benedetti continued his request for an 
audience for the purpose of concluding the conversation 
begun in the morning, making special mention of the 
latest despatches received from Minister Gramont. 

The answer conveyed to him by the adjutant was 
that the King approved the Prince's withdrawal in tlie 
same manner and to the same extent that he had ap- 
proved his acceptance of the candidacy,^ and desired 
that this be communicated to the French Government; 
but with regard to the guaranties which had been 
asked for the future, his decision of the moiiiing re- 
mained unaltered. This Avas again the answer which 
Benedetti received when later, in the evening, he made 
another attempt to obtain an audience. It was the 
Kinsf's final decision. 

Even King William himself probably had no idea 
how momentous would be the consequences of this step. 

We know what were Bismarck's feelings on the even- 

1 These are the words used in the report made by the adjutant, 
whereas Benedetti announced in Paris that the consent had been given 
entiere et sans reserve. The expression used by the adjutant unques- 
tionably conforms to the orders received from the King, whose intention 
it was to convey the idea that he now consented to tlie withdrawal as 
once he had to the Prince's acceptance, namely, in his capacity as head 
of the family and not as sovereign. Entiere et sans reserve was appli- 
cable to it in tliat case also. 



1870] niSMAUCK AMJ LOUD LOFTUS. 391 

iiig- ot' July \-l\\. DiiriiiL,^ llie lirst liuuis i»l' the iit'xt 
morning lie still believed that the controvei'sy had been 
concluded without satisfaction having been obtained lor 
Granionts unprovoked threats, consequently in a man- 
ner detrimental to Prussian lu)n()i-: he entertained seri- 
ous intentions thereiore of n'liriui;- fioiii t)tHce. Soon, 
however, he rei-eived news of the changt; in the situa- 
tion; iirst, a connuunicalion from the Russian embassy 
in Paris,^ stating that the French Government, not sat- 
isfied with the Princ-e*s withdrawal, now made further 
complainis against Prussia for the course it had pur- 
sued, and intended to put forward new claims against 
the Prussian Government. 

If this re})ort was true, all liismarck's apprehensions 
of the night before ct)ukl be cast to the winds. At a 
glance lu' gras[)f(l the situation, recognizing how (ira- 
mont's customary uncurbed eagerness had lc<l liim into 
a blunder by which he had become the offender. Xow 
Germany was again in a position tt» claim rejjaration 
from the arrogant antagonist from whom such unmer- 
ited insults had Iteen suffei'cd during the past week. 

In conversation with the I-^nglish Ambassador, Lortl 
.Vugustus Loftus, Bismarck gave full expression to 
these sentiments: "If the French Government really 
intends to declare itself nnsatistied \\ iih the w ilhdrawai 
of the Prince, and lo put forward new claims, it will 
at once become evident to every one that all this ado 
over the Spanish throne ijucstion was nothing more 

1 According; to tlio entry iu tlic dhiry of l^niiicmr I'icdi rii-k, July 
13tli, 1870. 



392 NEW CLAIMS MADE BY FRANCE. [1870 

than ail empty pretext, and that the real purpose be- 
hind it all was to incite a war of revenge for Sadowa. 
Germany, however, is resolved not to allow any affront 
or humiliation suffered from France to pass unresented, 
but to fight if she is unjustly provoked. Assuredly we 
do not seek war ; of that we have given proof, and we 
will not now depart from our past course ; but we can- 
not let France gain an advantage over us in the matter 
of military preparations." He then enumerated the 
measures which to his knowledge had been taken ; from 
what we learned of tlie declaration made by Gramont 
to Lord Lyons on the 8th, and of that made by Napo- 
leon on the 12tli, we know that there were good grounds 
for all Bismarck claimed. 

"If this continues," said he, "we shall have reason 
to ask France for an explanation regarding the purpose 
of her military preparations. Moreover," he declared, 
"in view of recent French action our safety demands 
that we require guaranties against the danger of being 
taken by surprise. France ought to be required to make 
a formal declaration to the other European Powers that 
it regards the Spanish question as settled, and conse- 
quently makes no further claims. Should this not be 
done, and should France neither recall the threats made 
in Gramont's speech, nor give an adequate explanation, 
Prussia must demand satisfaction from France. Under 
no other condition can I have further transactions with 
the French Aml)assador after the utterances which Gra- 
mont allowed himself with regard to Prussia, and which 
were heard by all Europe." 



1870] THE EMS DESPATCH. 393 

We see from this how fully Bismarck intended to 
bring home to her antagonist the indignities offered 
Prussia l)y Gramont, — a demand for explanations, for 
retraction and reparation, for guaranties for the future. 
Not one had been omitted. The English Ambassador 
spoke not a word in (Imprecation, but, on the contrary, 
made an earnest appeal to his Government to bring the 
strongest influence possible to bear upon the French 
Minister in the interest of peace. 

As yet, during these midday hours, Jiisnuuvk had no 
intimation of that whicli meanwhile was taking pUice 
at Ems. With impatience the Minister awaited ne\Ns 
of how the King had received the communication from 
Werther disclosing to him the insufferable assumption 
that he would write the humiliating letter of apology 
to Napoleon. Until lie sliould be assured upon this 
point, Iiisnuirck deemed it nna(l\i>al»lc openly to sever 
diplomatic relations l)etween the two countries, lie, 
however, sent Werther orders to quit Paris at once, 
directing him to take leave of absence on the pretext 
of ill health; at the same time he delivered a severe 
rebuke to the Ambassador foi- tlic manner in which he 
had conducted matters. 

That afternoon Roon and Moltke dined with Pis- 
marck. At six o'clock he received Abeken's despatch, 
sent from Ems at three, informing him of what had 
occurred up to tlie time of the; Inst message sent Bene- 
detti through Radziwill. He opened i I, hastily scanned 
its contents, and then read it aloud to liis two guests. 
As fi'equently as this despatch has appeared in piint, 1 
will nevertlicless insert il iiere. 



394 NEW CLAIMS MADE BY FRANCE. [1870 

Abeken to Count Bismarck : — 

" His Majesty, the King, writes me : ' During an acci- 
dental encounter with Count Benedetti upon the public 
promenade he asked me, finally in a most obtrusive 
manner, to authorize him to telegraph his Government 
that I would bind myself never to give my consent 
should the Hohenzollerns at some future time recon- 
sider the candidacy for the Spanish crown. I refused, 
somewhat sternly in the end, to comply with his de- 
mand, saying that I neither could nor would enter into 
an engagement of this nature a tout jamais. I of course 
told him that I had as yet not received any word ; and 
since he had ah-eady been notified through Paris from 
Madrid, it must be obvious to him that my Government 
again had no part in this transaction.' 

" Later his Majesty received a letter from the Prince 
(Charles Anthony). His Majesty having told Count 
Benedetti that he expected a communication from the 
Prince, he decided, in consideration of the demand 
mentioned above, and upon the advice of Count Eulen- 
burg and myself, not to grant Count Benedetti another 
audience about this affair, but to notify him by an ad- 
jutant that the Prince's letter had confirmed the intel- 
ligence received by Benedetti from Paris, and that his 
Majesty had no further communication to make to the 
Ambassador. 

" His Majesty leaves it to your decision whether this 
new demand presented by Benedetti, and our rejection 
of it, should not be immediately made known to our 
Ambassador and the press." 



1870] REFUSAL OF FRENCH CLAIMS PUBLIsnEI). 395 

The first effect of thus despatch upon the two gene- 
rals was a feeling of deep dejection. 

France, then, had not even stopped at the affront 
of which Werther had given notice, hut had added to 
it this unprecedented and outrageous insolence I Had 
Gramont forgotten w itli whom he was dealing? He 
had himself been willing to concede independence of 
action to Spain, but had insulted our King because 
he had done likewise. And opposed to this arrogance 
there was the good-natured mildness of our monarch. 
Instead of turning his l»ack u})on the Ambassador at 
the first intimation of such a message, he had deigned 
to enter into negotiations with him, had tried to justify 
his own Government, and had asked for advice as to 
whether it was advisable to grant the iVmbassadt)r 
another audience I What assurance was there that to- 
morrow Benedetti woidd not come forward with some 
new and still more preposterous demand? And all this 
was to be made known to the world ! 

But did compliance with the royal order rtMiuire this 
after all/ 'V\\v King's directions were that the I^'reiieh 
demand and its rejection should be made public. But 
the very nature of the matter in hand forbade the publi- 
cation of the details mentioned in the despatch ; and it 
was hardly advisable that the exact words of the King 
should be given to the world, if only for tlie reason that 
some (|uite bai'nilessly inexact word iiiiglit tliiis beeonie 
]ial)le to contradiction by IJenedetli.' .Moicoxci'. Abe- 

' This (lid ill fiictoccur; Ilciicilclti's ii'iioit stiitcil that ihf Khvj. iuiil 
atldre.ssed liiui (not lie the Kin-;;). 



396 NEW CLAIMS MADE BY FRANCE. [1870 

ken's allusion to advice asked by the King before decid- 
ing not again to receive the Ambassador was a matter 
concerning the Cabinet alone, and easily admitted of 
misconstruction in a number of ways. All these con- 
siderations determined Bismarck to comply with the 
letter of the royal order, and he therefore wrote out 
the following despatch : — 

After the Royal Government of Spain had officially 
announced to the Imperial Government of France that 
the Prince of Hohenzollern had withdrawn his accept- 
ance of the Spanish crown, the French Ambassador at 
Ems presented a further demand to his Majesty, the 
King, asking him for authority to telegraph to Paris 
that his jNIajesty, the King, would bind himself never to 
give his consent should the Hohenzollerns at some fu- 
ture time reconsider the candidacy for the Spanish crown. 
Hereupon his Majesty refused to grant the French Am- 
l)assador another audience about this affair, and notified 
him by the adjutant on dut}- that his IMajesty had no 
further communication to make to the Ambassador. 

This despatch conformed strictly to the King's direc- 
tions, its wording being exactly that of tlie despatch 
from Ems ; and, in the face of the two docinnents, the 
accusation of forgery trumped up by certain French 
organs is childish in the extreme.^ 

Nevertheless, in this more concise form, and b}' the 
omission of all particulars and explanations regarding 

1 Tliis accusation arose in consequence of comparing Bismarck's tele- 
gram, not with the then unpuhlished original of the despatch, hut with 
a report made later by Adjutant Radziwill regarding his three commi.s- 
sions. 



1870] MO LIKE I OSFIDENT. 397 

motives, the iiupivssiijii made by the announceuu'iil wius 
an entirely different one. For the ptist eight days 
France with vociferous threats ol' war had demanded 
the humiliation of the King ; for livf days negotiations 
with reference to this had l)cen unceasingly in progress; 
now, unaccoini)auied hy e\i)hinations of any kind, there 
would appear Uw the eyes of the world the account 
of how the German monarch had flatly refused these 
demands, declaring the matter to be thus definitely 
settled. 

Bismarck realized this with inward exultation. More 
<iuk-kly than the two generals he had recognized at a 
glance how all important for the outcome was this order 
given by the King. By publishing the refusal its signif- 
icance would be doul)led; by this concise form it would 
be made ten times greater. Now it would be lor 
France to choose whether it would swallow this bitter 
dose or carry out its threats. 

Bismarck read his despatch to his friends. "That 
sounds better," said Roon. '• At first it sounded like 
the beat of the chamade, now like a fanfare," added 
Moltke. Bismarck remarked, •• If the despatch to llie 
embassies is sent out al ek'ven (/clock it will l)e re- 
ceived in Paris l)y midnight, and then these Frenchmen 
will see how mistaken their newsijapei-s were when they 
declared that Prussia was kiioddiig under. But," lie 
Contiiiue(l. •• assuiiiiiig tliat tlicy tal<c offence at this 
and strike out, what are our prospects of \ictor\' in lliat 
ca«e? " 

"I believe," rci)licd .Mollke, •• tiiat we are more than 



398 NEW CLAIMS MADE BY FRANCE. [1870 

a match for them, always with the reservation that no 
one can foresee the issue of a great battle." After enter- 
ing somewhat into the reasons for this, he closed with 
the remark, emphasizing it by striking his breast as he 
spoke, " Should it be my privilege to lead our forces 
in this war, death will be welcome to these old bones as 
soon as it is over." 

The despatch was given to the public at once through 
the columns of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 
and at eleven o'clock it was sent to the embassies. 

It was a plain statement of facts, the correctness of 
which could not be disputed. Now, a fact may be in- 
disputable, and yet its publication may be ill advised ; 
it will, however, be generally conceded that in this case 
the French Government, which had made its original 
demand publicly through Gramont's speech of July 6th, 
bristling with threats of war, and then, after this de- 
mand had been complied with, liad announced to the 
Chamber on July 13th that new claims would be put 
forward, was not in a position to complain, if now 
Prussia on her part made the public acquainted with 
the manner in which the discussion at Ems had been 
terminated. Inseparably associated A\ith this, however, 
was the fact that the King had declined to give Bene- 
detti further audiences about the matter; although in 
the absence of the Minister it was a personal favor 
on the part of the monarch to grant them at all, and 
after Gramont's speech of July 6th was an evidence of 
his extreme love of peace. 

Nor did Benedetti in any way consider the King's 



1870] rATRIOTIC EXCITEMENT IX GERMANY. 399 

decision to imply a slight to himself or an affront to 
his Emperor. Before leaving Ems he read the despatch 
as published in Berlin, and made no further comment 
upon it than that its apj^earanee in the press must be 
attributed to the Prussian Cabinet, since he had given 
no one the least information regarding the occurrence, 
lie tlien took formal leave of the King in a short audi- 
ence which the King had granted for this purpose at 
Benedetti's request, and which passed without the 
slightest evidence oi any other spirit than one of per- 
fect courteousness on the part of both monarch and 
ambassador. 

In tlie coui-se of the day, on July 13th, reports of 
the luifavorable manner in which the discontinuance of 
the HohenzoUern candidacy had been received in Paris 
were circulated among the people of Berlin also. If on 
the preceding day the prospect of continued peace had 
been greeted with but half-hearted satisfaction, now, at 
the greater likelihood of war, this feeling was trans- 
formed into one of vehement exasperation. 

What more do these Parisians want, was askt'd. Has 
not the candidacy over which they made so al)siir(l an 
ado been al)andoned? By what right does tliis Bona- 
parte assume to dictate to Spain regarding its choice of 
a king? And now he even seeks a quarrel with us 
l)ecause of it I Let other nations bow submissively l)e- 
fore him if tliey like; if lie meddles with us, be will 
tind his day of reckonuig. We know him now : tn 
what purpose are further negotiations? Why let that 
old fox, Benedetti, imlntter our venerable monanh's 



400 NEW CLAIMS MADE BY FRANCE. [1870 

stay at Ems ? Let lis have no more leniency, no igno- 
minious peace ! We wish to wrong no one, but neither 
will we allow any one to give us orders about our 
affairs. If Napoleon is not inclined to respect the 
German nation's independence of action, he shall learn 
how the German arin wields the sword. 

Such were the sentiments which filled all hearts 
when, on the evening of the 13th, an extra edition of 
the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung made known to 
the people by means of the published despatch what 
had occurred at Ems. The eifect was a tremendous 
one ; deep from the hearts of the nation rose a single 
cry of rejoicing uttered by thousands of voices. At 
length, at length, the shadow of dishonor which had 
lately fallen upon Prussia's fame was gone; her men 
could breathe again, for he who represented all this 
boastful arrogance had received a fitting reply, — he 
had been shown the door. 

On the streets the crowds of excited people surged 
back and forth ; men embraced one another with tears 
of joy ; thunderous cheers for King William rent the 
air. Meanwhile the despatch had also been posted up 
in Ems ; on the morning of the 14th it appeared in all 
the newspapers, accompanied in every instance by ener- 
getic comments, and everywhere calling forth the same 
expressions of indignation and satisfaction. 

Owing to the prevailing state of intense excitement, 
the aroused imagination pictured all that had occurred 
in most vivid colors. In Ems the story went the rounds 
that at Benedetti's unseemly importunity upon the jjuIh 



1870] SOUTH GERMAN ENTHUSIASM. 40L 

lie pruineiiude the King had suddenly turned his hack 
upon him, calling out to the adjutant accompanying 
him, '' Say to the gentleman that I w ill not answer his 
demand, neither will I see him again I "" 

The picture which this scene suggested was reiuo- 
duced again and again with many variations; in hoth 
prose and verse Benedetti's audacity was derided, and 
King William's manly dignity was extolled. A me- 
morial stone was set up on the spot where the King 
had repelled the French presumption. The people were 
prepared foi' war, and looked forward to it with the 
confidence inspired by conscious strength. 

And now a like flood of national enthusiasm swept 
in mighty waves over South German}' also; before a 
musket-shot had been fired, Gramont's audacious |)ro- 
ceeding had brought about that which Napoleon had 
used all his ingenuity to prevent, — the unification of 
the German nation, the extension of the (German Con- 
federation to the Alps. In Baden the i)eople and the 
Government spoke as with a single voice ; in Wlirteni- 
bersf and Bavaria the aiili-Prussian Democrats and 11- 
tramontanes suddenly found themselves to Ijc in an 
alarming minority; through every province rang the 
enthusiastic call, "To arms.'"" X few days previously 
the Bavarian Minister, Count Bi-ay, had remarked to 
the French representative, "Should it I'onie to war, 
France will find all CJermanv a uuit." 



402 THE DECLARATION OF WAR. [1870 



1 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE DECLARATION OF WAR. 

Stjch was the pass to which the French Government 
had brought matters under Gramont's guidance. For 
the purpose of intimidating the Prussian King into mak- 
ing a humble apology, it had begun operations with a 
loudly proclaimed threat of war, and had continued 
them with the accompaniment of constantly increas- 
ing demonstrations of hostility in the Chambers, by 
the press, and by street mobs. Now it had received 
Germany's reply, a deliberate, irrevocable, publicly 
spoken No. And was the so hastily threatened war to 
follow? If so, where could a pretext which sensible 
people would regard as plausible be found now that the 
candidacy was a thing of the past? And, on the other 
hand, if war were not declared, how, after indulging 
in such boastful denunciations, could France escape 
derision ? 

The dilemma was a much too difficult one for the 
mediocre minds b}^ whom Napoleon was surrounded, 
and to whom as his parliamentary Minister he now 
gave carte blanche in matters political. It was but on 
the day before that Gramont represented the demand 



1870] FIRST CABINET COUNCIL ON JULY I4. 403 

for guaranties to be so promising, and compliance with 
it so probable, that it was deemed unnecessary to call 
out the reserves. And yet, before the day ended, came 
Benedetti's telegram, saying. The King desires me to 
announce to the French Government that the Prince 
has withihawn, and that this meets with liis unreserved 
approval. The guaranties for the future he, however, 
refuses most positively, and declines to give me another 
audience about the matter. 

On the morning of July 14th, at nine o'clock, the 
Cabinet assembled in council, presided over by the Em- 
peror, to discuss the situation as revealed by this latest 
intelliofence. In the face of Avar, the ardor for it suf- 
fered a sudden collapse. Oramont assured ^ his col- 
leagues that the King's announcement of the withdrawal 
accompanied l)y his approval of this step had been the 
foremost demand made by France, and had from the 
outset been considered as the first step toward a peace- 
ful solution of the difficult}' ; and further, that if the 
King had fully resolved not to entertain the proposal 
of guaranties for the future, this was in itself reason 
sufficient for declining to grant Benedetti another audi- 
ence, since any further discussion of the subject would 
be to no purpose. 

According to Gramont's present view of the situ- 
ation, tilt' prospects for a peaceable issue were not 
even (lisluilxM] by a d(\spatcli now received ri'oiti I.c 
Sourd, stating that tiie rcjcclioii of the French demand 
had been fficially pul)lishcd on the previous evening 

1 " France et Prusse," pp. 195, 207. 



404 THE DEC L All AVION OF WAB. [1870 

ill the Norddeutsche AUgevieuie Zeitung, although Gra- 
uioiit could not deny that in all probability when this 
became known in Paris the popular excitement would 
reach a dangerous pitch. Upon these representations 
the Council of Ministers did not alter its previous de- 
cision that for the present the reserves were not to be 
called out. 

But hardly had Gramont arrived at the Foreign 
Office after the close of the Cabinet meeting, when he 
received another calamitous message. Baron Werther 
had meanwhile learned of Bismarck's displeasure at the 
manner in which he had conducted matters, his orders 
being to take leave of absence upon the pretext of ill 
health, and before leaving France to notify the French 
Minister that, during his absence. Count Solms would 
conduct the affairs of the embassy. 

In giving these instructions, it was Bismarck's inten- 
tion, as we know, to avoid the appearance of a formal 
severance of diplomatic relations between the two 
governments ; but owing to the disgrace into which 
poor Werther had fallen, he had lost his head com- 
pletely, and, instead of simply making the communica- 
tion to Minister Gramont, as he had been directed, his 
demeanor in the presence of the Minister was such as 
fully to reveal his disturbance of mind. " I am in the 
most unfortunate predicament," he said. '' I have been 
severely reprimanded by my Government because I took 
your latest proposal into consideration at all and com- 
municated it to the King. My orders are to leave Paris 
at once." 



1870] SECOND CABiyET (OUyCIL ON JULY I4. 405 

From tliis (Tramont learned that of his two hopeful 
demands made on July 13th, the second one also had 
not only been refused even more unceremoniousl}' than 
had the tii-st. l)ut had not been so nnieh as considered. 
After this, it seemed hardly p()ssil)lc to him that peace 
could be preserved. According to the Emperor's direc- 
tion, another meeting of the Cal)inet, presided over by 
himself, was to be held at noon. On his ^^"ay thither 
Gramont's carriage could make its way but slowly 
through the tleiisi- throng of people 1)y \\hi(di it was 
surrounded. C'jiesof: War I War with Prussia I War 
without longer hesitation I rose upon every side, while 
menacing fists were thrust into the carriage, and angry 
threats were uttered against the Minister for his dilato- 
riuess. 

InniuMliately after the opening of the council, Le- 
boeuf, with renewed earnestness, again urged the advisa- 
bility of mobilization, and again he \^as ojiposed by the 
great majority of the Ministers. •* I am convinced," 
said the .MarshaL --that Prussia has already begun prep- 
arations; orders have been given for the })urc]iase of 
horses in Belgium, and a call has been issued to all 
reserves in foreign lands to rctni'n to their country's 
service." ' 

His assertir)ns could, of coui'se, not be gainsayt'd by 
thr otbei- Ministers, yet the discussion was iiroloiiged 
for hours before LeboMif's colleagues at length acceded 
to his deii) nd ; towai'd three o'clock in the afternoon 

1 His testiinoiiy. iiccordinn to Depositions 1., 47. 'I'lie latter \v;is cor- 
taiiily iiii erroneous stuteinoiit. 



406 TEE DECLARATION OF WAR. [1870 

he left tliem to issue orders for the intended prepara- 
tions. 

The Cabinet Council then continued its delibera- 
tions ; a number of measures were suggested, by which 
it was hoped that war might be averted and the frantic 
excitement in Paris be allayed, but not one of them 
all gave promise of success. But the desire for con- 
ciliation entertained by the majority of the Ministers 
remained unchanged ; and especially did Ollivier most 
eagerly advocate a peace policy, in which he was sup- 
ported by the Emperor to the full extent of his author- 
ity.i In the end Napoleon returned to his favorite plan 
of long ago, the convening of a congress of the Powers.'^ 
The majority of his hearers gladly acceded to the impe- 
rial wish ; although Gramont showed much hesitation, 
and brought forward many adverse arguments, the Cab- 
inet acted upon the Emperor's suggestion, and forth- 
with a draft of the request to be addressed to the Powers 
was written out. It contained the proposal : that a con- 
gress of all the European Governments should formally 
and solemnly sanction the principle that hereafter the 
princes of all Great Powers were to be excluded from 
the possibility of acquiring a foreign throne. 

Finally Gramont also desisted from opposition, and 

1 As stated by Ollivier in conversation with Rothan. " L'Allemagne 
et ritalie," I., p. 18. 

2 Gramont in his book (p. 212) does not say with whom the proposal 
originated, but only that when, at the close of the deliberations, the 
Emperor and the Ministers separated, the decision was still for a peace- 
able policy (although this conclusion was not reached without much 
hesitation and great sacrifice, p. 214). Why I designate the Emperor 
as the originator of the proposed measure will appear later. 



1 



1870] THE BEClSIOy IS FOR PEACE. 4U7 

submitted to the idea of a congress, consoling himself 
with the reflection that, as he remarked, King William's 
approval of the Prince's withdrawal would constitute 
the necessary guaranty for the present, and the action 
of the congress, which he had no dotil)t would be favor- 
able, would furnish that for the futtire ; tliis would 
probably allay the excitement in the Chaml)er. 

It was nearly six o'clock when the Cabinet Council 
adjourned. To Ollivier was intrusted the duty of pre- 
paring the message by which the plan of a congress 
was to be announced to the Chambers, and Leb(Euf 
received orders from the Emperor to defer the calling 
out of the reserves. Immediately afterwards Napoleon 
showed the Italian Ambassador, Nigra, a copy of the 
proposal to be made to the Powers in the form in 
which it was to be submitted to tlie Chambers, say- 
ing that thus, it was hoped, war would l)e happily 
averted.^ 

With like cheerful anticipations of a peaceable ter- 
mination of the difficulty. ()llivi('r sat in the otlice of 
his Department busily engaged in })n'i)aring tlu- mes- 
sage to the Chambers, when suddenly the door was 
thrown open, and Gramont entered, showing evidences 
of strong excitement, a stack of loose papers in his 
hands, among tlieiu a despatch from Munich notifying 
him that, according to Bismarck's instructions, the 
Prussian representative had announced to the Bavarian 
Court, that, owing to Benedetti's insuhing dcuicaiuir, 

1 As relatCMl by Nifjra to IJi'Ust, ;icct>riliii^' to llu- " MiMimirs " of ilie 
latter, Vol. 11., p. ;Jo'J. 



408 TIIK DECLARATION OF WAR. [1870 

King William luid refused to grant the Ambassador 
further audiences. ^ "• This is nothing less than a slap 
in the face for France,"" cried Gramont ; " I will resign 
my portfolio rather than submit to such dishonor! " 

Ollivier was sorely distressed ; in the midst of his 
lal)()r for the preservation of peace he was suddenly 
called upon to face the probability of war forced upon 
him by this provocation ; he did not, however, oppose 
Gramont's wish that a Cabinet Council should be im- 
mediately called.^ 

Meanwliile a like request had been received by the 
Emperor from another quarter. In the Department of 
War the order that mobilization should be postponed 
had raised a veritable storm of indignation, which soon 
sw-ept through all military circles and then through the 
whole city. A report made by Lord Loftus during 
these houre of intense excitement stated that in his 
opinion the agitation in the army and among the peo- 
ple was so great that no Government which should 
decide for peace could hope to survive. Leboeuf at 
once hastened to the Emperor at St. Cloud, where he 
found the war sentiment quite as strong in the Court 

1 From this we conclude that the alhisioii here is to the despatch 
sent by the French representative at Munich, and cited by Rothan, ]). 17. 
This states that in conversation with tlie Bavarian Minister tlie represen- 
tative of Prussia had maintained that King Louis could not leave unno- 
ticed the fact that Benedetti had addressed the King in a most unseemly 
manner upon the public promenade to demand of him the guaranty for 
tlie fviture. 

The other French representatives, so far as we know, announced no 
more than the receipt of the despatch from Ems without any allusion to 
Benedetti's maniere provocaiite. 

- Rothan, in the work to which reference has been made, p. 19. 



1870] THIRD CABINET COUNCIL OF JULY I4. 409 

circle (of which J shall soon give an instance) as in 
the army and city. Before returning to Paris he had 
persuaded the Euiperur to call the Cabinet together in 
council at ten o'clock that night. 

Concerning this consultation, so fateful for France, 
we have the testimony of three of the participating Min- 
isters, from which we get a vivid picture of that which 
occurred.! 

The Emperor's fii-st utterance after the ^Nlinistei-s had 
asseml)led was a complaint that the promise of silence 
respecting the decision of the morning had not been 
kept. " I have since then," said he, '•' been compelled 
to listen to the reproach that, forgetful of that which 
the plebiscitum ordained, I overstepped my authority 
by, in a measure, forcing a peace policy upon those 
who were to be my advisers. I recognize fully that 
to-day I am a constitutional monarch," he continued ; 
'• it is my duty therefore to rely upon your wisdom 
and patriotism in the decision we are now to reach re- 
garding the steps which the latest developments make 
necessary." 

The deliberations then began. Lelxi'uf insisted with 
impressive earnestness that the reserves ought to l)c 
called out without further delay : l)ut even yet he could 
not prevail on his colleagues to al)andon their purpose 
of confining their actittn foi- the present to di})lomatic 
measures. 'M>ut toward eleven o'elocl^,"* liis tesiinionv 

1 Leboeuf, "Depositions," I., p. 47. Gnmiont, ih'ul., p. 107. " FraiiPi* 
ct Pnisae," pp. 223, 232, 244. Ollivier, accordiiij,' to Rotliau, in the work, 
referred to, p. 20. 



410 THE DECLARATION OF WAli. [1870 

before the Investigation Committee of 1872 continues, 
"• Gramont received a despatch which he read to the as- 
sembled Cabinet ; its contents were such as to convince 
nearly all the Ministers that war, and consequently 
mobilization, was inevitable." It is to be regretted that 
in 1872 the unhappy General had forgotten the con- 
tents of this very important despatch also. 

However, Ollivier and Gramont do not fail to give 
us full information regarding this message. Ollivier 
says very concisely : " During the deliberations of the 
council Gramont submitted the despatches from which 
we learned that the honor of France had been offended, 
whereupon the Cabinet complied with Leboeuf's request 
that the reserves be called out at once." 

It is a suggestive circumstance that Gramont had 
not discovered this affront to the honor of France either 
in the Berlin despatch of the previous morning or in 
the fact of its publication ; that such was the case we 
learned from what took place in the earlier Cabinet 
meeting of that day. Moreover, from the statements 
made in Benedetti's despatch Ciramont knew very well 
that nothing in the nature of an insult had occurred at 
Ems, but that matters had been conducted in a quiet 
and formal manner. That which stung him was the 
official communication of the despatch to the other 
Courts of Europe, in order that immediately after the 
occurrence they all might receive formal confirmation 
of the newspaper statement that Prussia had categori- 
cally and irrevocably rejected the French demand. This 
procedure he regarded as a slap upon the cheek of 



1870] THE DECISIOX JS FOE UAE. 411 

France, altlioug-li iu reality it was the most naluiul 
tiling in the woiid, that, after all the fierce speeches 
and threats of war to wliich France had given utter- 
ance since July 6th, every one concerned (and who in 
Europe was not concerned?) should be notified of the 
storm which was threatening from the West. This did 
not occur to (iramoiit. however, and he \\as furious 
that a diplomatic defeat suffered by France should be 
so inconsiderately heralded forth into the world. 

"After the evening session of the Cabinet Council 
had begun," is his statement to the Committee in 
1872, ''we learned from our diplomatic agents, first 
from Munich and Bern, then from every direction, that 
Bismarck had not only sent the Ems despatch to all 
the Courts of Europe, but in addition had caused the 
circulation of a fictitious story in Berlin, aceordiu"- to 
which the King and Benedetti had insulted each other." 
Since Gramont was aware that this statement by no 
means conformed to the facts, he looked upon it as a 
malicious fabrication invented l)y Bismarck for the 
purpose of so offending the national pride of the two 
peoples that war would become inevitable. The " ficti- 
tious story," an English translation of which Gramont 
submitted to the Investigation Connnittee of 1872, 
was the one which originated in Ems, and with wliich 
liismarck liad nothing to do whatever. In his book 
Ciramont priideiitlv omits this tale, and replaees it l)y 
an ai-ticle from the Times written by the Berlin eorii'- 
spondent, in which the excitement caused in Ueilin hy 
the appearance of the Ems despatch is described. 



412 THE DECLARATION OF WAR. [1870 

However, unfortunately for him, he could lay neither 
the story nor the correspondence before the Cabinet 
Council holding its session on July 14th, 1870, for the 
very excellent reason that they were not published in 
England until a later date ; so that one is tempted to 
conclude that perhaps he added them to his account 
of the night session of the council as a convenient 
embellishment. 

But, as apt as Gramont has shown himself at such 
inventions, I am nevertheless inclined to believe the 
following explanation to be the more probable one. 
On the evening of July 14th the official Norddeutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung contained a short article in bold 
ty^Q stating that Benedetti had so far disregarded the 
rules of diplomatic etiquette as to obtrude himself upon 
the King during his sojourn at Ems for the benefit of 
his health, and had addressed him upon the jjublic 
promenade for the purpose of interrogating him about 
the Spanish affair, and of extorting promises from him. 
If immediately upon its appearance Le Sourd sent a 
telegraphic report of this article to Paris, it is quite 
possible that Minister Gramont may have received it at 
about eleven o'clock, if it was foi-^^arded to him at the 
council, and that he then made use of it to spur his 
colleagues on to war. The article does not, to be sure, 
mention an insult of any kind on either side, although 
it does criticise Benedetti for his violation of diplomatic 
form ; in addition to this, the article appeared in a 
semi-official paper, a circumstance which made it ]^)ossi- 
ble to represent it as another public affront offered 



1870] WHAT LED TO THE BECLARATIOX OF WAR. 413 

Fmuce l)y Bisiiuiick. Tlii-s may tlieret'ore have been 
the article to which LeUfuf alluded as the drop by 
which the cvip of French displeasure was filled to over- 
flowing.^ 

Gramont continues his account of the council with 
the words : ''This message \\as soon followed by othei-s, 
informing us that the Prussians ^\■ere marching toward 
our frontier, and that their forces were being concen- 
trated with remarkable rapidity. It was then that the 

1 Sorel (" Histoire Diploniiitiqiic,"' I.) advances the conjecture that 
t lie despatch mentioned by Lebceuf as the deciding influence was a copy of 
a report made by Lord Loftus regarding Bismarck's threatening utter- 
ances of July l.'Jth, and which in some unrevealed manner reached Gra- 
mont ; both Oncken and Delbriick eagerly accept this exijlanation as the 
most correct one. In tliat case, however, I can see no reason why both 
Ollivier and Gramont in their wholly independent testimony should 
have preserved such complete and inexplicable silence concerning the 
document which had so deciding an influence. That they sliould have 
ri'frained from mentioning it in connection with the public transactions 
in the Chamber on July 15th we can readily understand, since their 
knowledge of its contents, obtained in some irregular manner, might 
have seriously compromised Lord Loftus. But in 1872 Gramont gavo 
the despatch publicity through the pages of his book, stating that he 
received a copy of the report through a secret channel which he was still 
not at liberty to reveal ; in this connection he cites it as an evidence of 
Bismarck's hostility. Under these circumstances, what po.ssible reason 
could he have had for concealing the use he had made of it and the 
effect it had produced from the Investigation Committee before whom 
he testified just previous to the appearance of his book? 

Moreover, a conversation carried on between two people in Berlin in 
strictest privacy, and under the additional safeguard of oflicial secrecy, 
rannot be classed among the afl'ronts to the honor of Franco upon which 
riramont laid sn nincli stress; and furthprniore, the despatch would 
have done little toward deterring tlie French Ministers from carrying 
iiiit their project of a congress; for they were not so little ac(|nainted 
with Bismarck's energetic mode of action as not to expect from the out- 
set that they would meet with vigorous counter charges and coimter 
complaints in the congress upon wliich they had determined. 



414 THE DECLABATION OF WAR. [1870 

Government realized the necessity of mobilizing, and 
decided to ask the Chamber to provide the means 
wherewith to prepare for an attack becoming more im- 
minent with every day. I realized that peace was no 
longer possible, and, fully confident of victory, accepted 
the necessity of deciding for war." 

That on the 14th of July not so much as the firet 
step toward mobilization had been taken in Germany, 
much less any preparations made for an advance upon 
the French frontier, is not only established by the re- 
23orts of the Prussian general staff, but may also be 
learned from French testimony through the statements 
made by Benedetti and Stoffel.^ 

Gramont was now fully resolved upon Avar, because 
he believed that by advocating a peace policy he would 
incur the danger of l)eing forced to resign by either tlie 
Chamber or the Army, that he might be succeeded by 
a Minister who would l)e even less slow to precipitate 
a conflict than was he. Reflections of a similar nature 
now also put an end to Ollivier's long indecision. 
Should we be overthrown, he argued at this time, the 
war will be undertaken by a reactionary Ministiy, and 
the victory won will then be utilized to re-establish 
the despotism of 1852. 

Despite all tliis, the final decision of the council was 
not reached without a struggle. The Emperor made 
a last attempt to rescue his favorite plan of a European 
congress ; but hardly had he uttered the Avord, when 
Gramont turned upon him Avith the angry exclamation, 
1 Benedetti, " Ma Mission," p. 9. Stoffel, " Rapports," p. 453. 



1870] MOBILIZATION. MEfiSAGE TO CllAMBEilS. 415 

"Sire, if you so much as mention a congress again, 1 
will throw my resignation at your feet." ^ As Lebueuf 
also left no opportunity for doubt that he entertained 
a similar intention, Napoleon relapsed into his usual 
impotent silence. Thus it was that shortly before mid- 
night the majority of the Cabinet ■ determined upon the 
immediate issue of orders to mobilize, as also that on 
the coming morning Duvernois' interpellation should 
receive the exultant reply : Guaranties we could not 
get for you, l)ut we bring you war instead. 

On the morning of July loth the Cabinet decided 
u})on the form in which the fateful announcement was 
to be made. It began with an historic review of the 
recent negotiations, from their beginning to the King's 
rejection of the very moderate and courteously made 
claim for guaranties. " Although this refusal seemed 
wholly inexcusal)le to us," the writing continued, ''our 
desire for peace u^as so great that we hesitated to break 
off the negotiations, when, to our utter surprise, we 
learned that the King of Prussia had notified our Am- 
bassador ])y an adjutant tliut he would not give him 
another audience; and, that there might be no uncer- 
tainty with regard to the nature of this message, the 
Prussian (iovernment had given official information of 
it to the other Cabinets of Europe ; further, that Baron 
VVerther had received orders to take leave of absence, 

1 As related by rriaiiioiit to ('ouiit Vitzthuiu on the next day. as will 
be seen later. 

2 According; to Tliicrs (" Dc'nositioiis," j). D), Ministers ('lic\ ;inclifr di- 
V'aldroine and Sej^ris bad promised liini to vote for peace. 



416 THE DECLARATION OF WAR. [1870 

and that military preparations had been begun in Prus- 
sia. Under these circumstances," were tlie conclud- 
ing words, "• any further attempt at conciliation would 
have been not only derogatory to our dignity, but a 
folly as well. We have done all in our power to avert 
war, and now prepare to hold our own in this conflict to 
which we have been challenged, by committing to every 
one his rightful share of the responsibility. Yesterday 
our reserves were called out ; and with your co-operation 
we will promptly take all necessary measures to protect 
the interests, the safety, and the honor of France." 

This message was delivered to the Senate by Gra- 
mont, and to the Legislative Body by Ollivier. At 
the same time the Minister of War introduced two 
bills, the one providing for the arming of the Garde 
Mobile, the other for the enlistment of volunteers ; a 
preliminary credit of fifty millions was asked for the 
army, and one of sixteen millions for the navy. 

Gramont's duty in the Senate was quickly and easily 
performed ; in this exalted assembly of imperial favor- 
ites, pensioned dignitaries, and church magnates, the 
message was received with such unbounded enthusiasm 
that the President closed the session with the remark 
that the emotion by which the assembly was stirred was 
too intense to admit of the transaction of further busi- 
ness. Gramont then repaired to the Legislative Body, 
where his colleague had no such easy task before him. 

Here, too, there could, of course, be no doubt as to 
a favorable majority; for the bellicose Extreme Right 
was now joined by the Chauvinists of both Centres, and 



1870] THE LEFT AND THIERS OPPOSE WAR. 417 

l)y the men of the Right, who, altliough their heiirts in- 
clined to peace, were nevertheless the obedient fulluw- 
ers of the Government. But they were opposed with 
passionate vehemence by the Extreme Left, the group 
of Repul)licans, among whom were Jules Favre. Arago, 
Picard, and their associates. xVlthough these had only 
too often reviled the Emperor for his shameful lenity 
toward Prussia, now that war was actually to he faced, 
they were again seized with the old fear that a wholly 
unrestricted military regime would be established should 
Napoleon return from the campaign a glorious victor : 
and so we witness their sudden transformation into be- 
nignant apostles of peace. 

Hardly had the reading of the Cabinet programme 
been concluded, when, first and foremost of them all, 
the veteran Thiers took up the battle in seeming contra- 
diction to his entire past, and to the utter surprise of 
his beard's ; for, in truth, he it had been who more than 
any one else in France had spread the doctrine that the 
growing strength of Prussia was a serious menace to 
the vital interests of France, and that Napoleon ought 
long ago to have interposed. Even now he by no means 
abandoned this opinion ; he believed the time woidd 
inevitably come when France would be compelled to 
meet and undo the consequences of Sadowa. \\v have 
alreadvsccn him laboring with l)oth Ministers and depu- 
ties for the preservation of jicacc immediately alter it 
was learned that Prince Leopold bad declined to be a 
candidate. Now. in a speecli of .sur[)assing elocpience, 
he poured forth his w rath at the inability displayed by 



418 THE DECLARATION OF WAR. [1870 

the Miiiistiy from tirst to last by grasping at one ground- 
less pretext for war after another, thus forfeiting the 
good opinion of Europe ; by rendering mediation of 
any kind impossible through hasty and unreasonable 
action ; by raising u vain dispute about words after 
the chief point at issue had been conceded in the 
Prince's withdrawal. " Not in defence of our country's 
vital interests do we go to war," he exclaimed, "but 
because of the mistakes made by the Cabinet." 

By his very first words he provoked the anger of the 
Arcadians and Clericals, and their uproarious protests 
interru[)ted him at every sentence. "Traitor!" "Mis- 
erable Prussian I" "Shameful prater!" were some of the 
insulting epithets which were hurled at him amidst the 
wildest tumult. But the veteran of threescore years 
and ten neither faltered nor flinched ; he did not leave 
the orator s tribunal until his motion that the despatches 
and other documents concerned be submitted to the 
House had been recognized in spite of the confusion. 

As this old antagonist of Prussia now demanded, 
with all the power of which he was capable, that the 
peace be kept, so Ollivier, the former friend of Ger- 
many, upheld the war policy of the Government. 
•' We have done all that was reasonable to avoid a 
rupture," he explained. " Not even the King's rejec- 
tion of our claim for guaranties for the future, nor 
his refusal to give our Ambassador another audience 
about the matter, encountered our protest; but when 
Count Bismarck, with unseemly haste and obviously 
malicious intention, announced this refusal to all the 



1870] GOVERNMENT ASKS MEANS FOR WAR. 419 

Other Cabinets of Europe, we were compelled to rec- 
ognize in tliis proceeding an affront to France. We 
felt constrained to defend our country's honor with the 
sword ; and dared hesitate no longer when we were 
informed that mobilization had begun in Prussia, and 
that its troops were approaching our frontier." 

It was in this connection that he uttered those words 
which will always cling to his memory : '• We know 
that hereby we assume a great responsibility, but we 
accept it with a light heart." It was in vain that, in 
response to an indignant exclaniation from the Left, 
he added, *• No contention about words, gentlemen ; 
yes, with a clear conscience, and therefore with a light 
heart, as I have said." 

.Vt this juncture, (^ramoiU, who had just entered 
the liall, came to iiis assistance, saying, '"The lionor of 
Fi'ance is involved; should I Ik- compelled to witness 
the incredible, namely, a Chand)er insensible to this, 
1 would not remain Minister five minutes longer!"" A 
roar of api)lause was his reward for this high-sounding 
phrase; and the Cliamber at once nominated a com- 
mittee of ten of its members to examine into and report 
immediately upon the bills pro[)Osed by the Govern- 
ment, and the civdits asked. 

These gentlemen all belonged to the war party, w hieli 
Mas in the majority; 1)ut they had not failed to be im- 
])resse(l b\- Tliieis" forcil)le criticism ihal. al'icr i'rini'e 
LcopohTs w itlidrawal, the ( 'abiiiet had made new and 
unreasonal)le claims whereby peace had been dislurl)ed 
and tlie sym[)athy of iMirope forfeited. Afli-r Lebu'uf 



420 THE DECLARATION OF WAR. [1870 

had emphatically declared that France was ready for 
war, quite ready, and had the advantage over Prussia 
of being several days ahead in its military prepara- 
tions, a statement, we can but observe, that accorded 
illy with the one by which it had just been averi'ed 
that the Prussian forces had long been mobilized, and 
were marching toward France, the chairman of this 
Committee, the Duke of Albufera, asked Gramont 
whether it were true that the Government had from 
the outset made one and the same demand of the King 
of Prussia, since this point was one of paramount im- 
portance. 

Hereupon the incredible really did happen ; Gramont 
declared that from the beginning the Government had 
persistently pursued the one purpose of inducing the 
King's active concurrence in the Prince's withdrawal 
as constituting a guaranty for the future. Although 
thus far a formal lie had been avoided, still the real 
intent was to deceive the Committee; but the worst 
was still to come. When Albufera requested that the 
despatches in question be submitted, Gramont took 
from his portfolio several papers, but did not allow 
them to leave his hands ; and then, without mentioning 
any dates, but simply distinguishing the despatches by 
the numbers one, two, etc., he read from number one 
this sentence : The Prince's withdrawal will be effectual 
only in case the King concurs in it, and at the same 
time promises to forbid the Prince to reconsider the 
candidacy at some future time. 

This was obviously a deception in form as well as in 



1870] GRAMONT'S DECEPTION. WAR. 421 

intent ; for it was not from the first despatch sent Bene- 
detti on the 7th that (iranumt read, but from that of 
the 12th of July, which was in reality the tenth, and 
was the one by which the Ambassador was first in- 
structed to make the new demand for guaranties. Of 
course, no one could have read this despatch without 
at once observing both tlie date and the opening sen- 
tence, which referred to the Prince's withdrawal as 
announced by Prince Charles Anthony, whereby the 
untruthfulness of the jNIinister's previous statement 
would have been discovered at a glance. It was for 
this reason that Gramont did not submit the writing 
to the inspection of the deputies, and in reading it to 
them omitted the first sentence. 

In this way the Committee's solicitude regarding this 
all-important point was set at rest; and with etjual trust 
(iramont's statements regarding the affront to which 
Henedetti had been subjected, as well as his intimation 
concerning the prol)ability of alliances with Austria and 
Italy, were accepted. Immediately afterwards the Com- 
mittee recommended the desired credits and bills to the 
Mouse for its sanction, with the statenu-nt that all the 
desired information regarding the documents in question 
had been received fi-om the Ministers. 

All the opposition offered by Thiei-s. .lules Favre, and 
(iambetta was of no avail . by an overwhelming major- 
ity llic bills as approved by the Committee became the 
decisions of the I louse. 

Til US the war wliieli re(]uired greater sacrifice than 
any other ot the i-entuiy was occasioned on July Glh 



422 THE DECLARATION OF WAR. [1870 

by a suspicion for which there Avas not the slightest 
foundation, was made inevitable on the 13th by an un- 
reasonable demand, and was inflamed by a deception 
perpetrated by the Ministry on the 15th. 

That night the streets of Paris were again the scene 
of boisterous demonstrations and jubilation. Organized 
bands, with hundreds in their ranks, carrying flags and 
colored lanterns, marched about singing the Marseillaise, 
cheering for France, shouting, ^ Down with Prussia ! 
Hurrah for war! " and beating without mercy any one 
who dared to shout for peace. 

Similar expressions of the national spirit were re- 
ported from other cities of the j^i'ovinces ; there could 
no longer be any doubt that public opinion in France 
was eager for war. To be sure, the reports received 
a few days later from the prefects, who were usually 
very slow to make an adverse statement with respect 
to any pronounced Avish of the Ministry, announced 
that in only sixteen departments had the people de- 
clared themselves decidedly in favor of war, whereas 
in tliiity-four the sentiment had been unquestionably 
against it, and in thirty-seven opinions had been very 
equally divided. But what could this avail ? The will 
of the Capital was the will of France ; and the will of 
the politically active element, the statesmen and party 
leaders, the Avriters and newspaper men, and upon this 
occasion that of the clergy and army officers also, was 
the will of Paris. 

After the signal for war had once been sounded, the 
patriotic sentiment and enthusiasm to enter the conflict 



1870] VlTZTHUyrs ENDEAVORS. A'l^ 

uuturul to the young men of a nation everywhere as- 
serted itself ; for the past four years a feeling of re- 
sentment against Prussia had been systematically and 
pereistently fostered, and now the land resounded with 
the cry : Prussia is seeking to depri^'e us of our leader- 
ship in Europe ! Down with her ! 

Whilst thus the French jVIinisters were rushing head- 
long into war, their Emperor was making a last although 
hopeless attempt to preserve peace. ^ 

On the 11th and 12th of July, Count Beust, as we 
know, had severely criticised (iranioiit's policy, and 
had urgently advised a more pacific coui-se. Hardly, 
however, had he done so when he was seized with anx- 
iety lest thereby he might have incurred both for him- 
self and Austria the serious displeasure of the French 
Government; he therefore gave C'oTint \'it/,lhnin orders, 
on the loth to leave Brussels, and hasten to i*aris to 
learn the actual state of affair's. Immediately after the 
Count's arrival he w^as told by Prince Metternicli that 
mattei-s were beyond salvation here, that way could be 
averted no more than could a convulsion of nature — 
than coidd an earthquake, for instance. 

On the 14th Vitzthum made a fruitless attempt to 
obtain an interview with (Iranioiit, whose attendance 
upon the three sessions of the ("aliiiict ('ouiicil left liiui 
littli' time for diplomatic c(»iisiiltal ions. ( )ii the 1.")tli 
Xiipolcon. hoW(n'er, gave the Count an ainlicnce at St. 
(lond: he receive(l him most graciously, and i-emarked 

' VVIiiit follows is based upon infoniKitioii tlciivcil from iiii|iulilislu-il 
ineiJioirs. 



424 THE DECLAMATION OF WAR. [1870 

that the sudden change in the state of affairs had prob- 
ably been a surprise to him. Wlien Vitzthum confirmed 
this supposition with considerable emphasis, the Em- 
peror exclaimed, '' What would you have ? We had 
g-one too far ; we could not draw back ! " 

He expressed some concern lest he should be over- 
powered by the great body of the German troops, and 
made the suggestion that since Austria must prefer 
France to be the victor, that country should station an 
army of observation on the Boliemian frontier, thus com- 
pelling a division of the Prussian forces. When in reply 
Vitzthum deprived the Emperor of all hope that Aus- 
tria would act upon this suggestion, assuring him, how- 
ever, that the Austrian Government would do all in its 
power to avert the war by diplomatic means. Napoleon 
expressed his gratitude, and formally authorized the 
Count in his name to ask Emperor Francis Joseph to 
propose a European congress for the adjustment of the 
dispute. 

On this day, too, Count Vitzthum's efforts to inter- 
view the Duke of Gramont proved unsuccessful until 
late in the evening, when, just before the Count's de- 
parture, the desired opportunity presented itself. The 
Minister was just leaving the Chamber, and was in a 
most agitated frame of mind. " We have decided for 
war," he exclaimed ; " and if Austria realizes what is 
best for her own interests she will join us ! " To this 
Vitzthum replied, " The audience which the Emperor 
granted me this morning does not allow me to regard a 
conflict as inevitable. His Majesty directly commis- 



1870] KiyCr WILLIAM'S RETUBN TO BEHLl.S. 425 

sionecl me to request my Emperor to propose a congress 
of the European Powers."' At the mention of the wor<l 
congress Gramont became furious, and blurted out how- 
he hud on the day before resented tliis proposal when 
made to the Cabinet Council by the Emperoi-. " Our 
reserves have been called out, and Lebctuf lias assured 
me that we are archiprets,^'' was the remark with whicli 
he concluded. 

Vitzthum pui-sued the conversation no further, but 
proceeded to the railway station. Metternich, who ac- 
companied him, said : '• It is well that you saw^ him 
before you left ; now you can bear out my statement 
that it would be wasted effort to reason with a person 
who has lost his head completely, and is no longer in a 
responsible condition." 

Under these circumstances there could be no further 
thought of a congress. A few days later, Napoleon, 
evidently in a most gloomy and despondent mood, 
wrote to her who for yeai-s had been his most trusted 
fi'iend, and who was living in deep seclusion apart from 
all political interests. Queen Sophia of Holland : '"This 
war was no wish of mine : I was forced into it by the 
pressure of puljlic opinion." The Queen, who was one 
of Prussia's bitterest enemies, wrote this comment upon 
the margin of the letter : " It is true ; for this he is not 
to be blamed ; liis mistake was committed in 18fifi." 

On the l.")th of .July, tlic day on which France, 
tlirough j('ah)usy of its neighl)or's growing power, deter- 
mined upon an offensive war against Pinssia, King 
William left Vams for iieilin to prepare for defence. 



426 THE DECLARATION OF WAR [1870 

should events make it necessary. If during the earlier 
stages of the negotiations individual voices had been 
heard to criticise the patience with which he had lis- 
tened to the French demands, now, after his emphatic 
rejection of them, his people were grateful to him for 
the extreme forbearance he had shown, thus manifesto 
ing to the world Germany's real desire for peace and 
the fact that it entered the conflict with a clear 
conscience. 

Wherever the royal train stopped, the stations were 
filled with a dense crowd of people by whom the vener- 
able monarch was greeted with unceasing cheers. Here 
there was no distinction between young and old, be- 
tween city and country, between old Prussian and 
annexed provinces ; the patriotic enthusiasm was quite 
as marked and general in Hesse and Lower Saxony as 
in Brandenburg. 

The Crown Prince, Bismarck, Roon, and Moltke had 
gone as far as Brandenburg to meet the King, that the 
most necessary arrangements might be discussed with- 
out loss of time. Even yet King William could not 
bring himself to believe in the reality of the war; he 
hoped that now, at last, the excitement in Paris would 
subside. But when the train had arrived in the Berlin 
station, which, like the others, was filled and surrounded 
by an impenetrable mass of people, Bismarck was met 
upon the platform by Herr von Thile, who handed him 
a despatch just received from Paris, containing the 
report of the announcement which the French Cabinet 
had made to the Chambers. It was read to his Majesty, 



1870] NORTH GERMAN ENTnUSlA:SM. 427 

tlie King, wlio reinurked : '* Why, that has a very war- 
like sound. I suppose Ave shall have to niol)ilize three 
army corps at onee." To this Bismarck said : '• Your 
Majesty, that will not suffice ; the French are mohiliz- 
ing their whole army even now." Tn reply, the King 
asked that the whole message l)e read to him again , 
after hearing it he exclaimed, deeply moved: •• In 
truth, that is in itself a declaration of war ; and are we 
really to have another dreadful conflict?" And after 
a moment he added, ''■ It does, indeed, mean war ; well, 
then, so be it in God's providence." 

The Crown Prince, turning to the group of officers 
standing back of him cried out " War I We are to 
mol)ilize ! " whereupon the King, with tears in his eyes» 
embraced the Prince.^ 

The news spread like wildfire among the expectant 
people outside the station ; and inuncdialely a mighty 
cheer went up tliat made tlic w indows shiver, and tliat 
was repeated along the entire i-oute which the King's 
carriage took to the palace. This, too, was surrounded 
by an enthusiastic throng, cheering, and singing "God 
Save the King." Toward eleven o'clock, after the 
King liad repeatedly appeared at the Avindows to bow 
his thanks to the crowd below, an officer stepped out 
in front of the palace to announce to the multitude : 
" His Majesty is holding a council of war, and desires 
to ])(' undisturbed." Innncdiati-ly from mouth to mouth 
was passed the word: "The King wishes to l)c undis- 

1 As related by eye-witnessos. ("i>iii]>:irc ilu- k^imhi luadf by IJisinaiclt 
ill iicrsoii oil ScjJtciiibcr 23d. ]8S8. 



428 THE DECLARATION OF WAR. [1870 

turbed;" and two minutes later the people had disap- 
peared as though by magic, and the large square in 
front of the palace la}- deserted and silent. 

During the night the orders for mobilization were 
issued, and the corresponding despatches sent to the 
South German allies. 

On the following morning this notice was posted up 
in all the cities and towns of North Germany : All 
reserves are to report for duty, guards as well as third 
augmentation. First day of mobilization, July 16th. 

Speedily the call to arms was carried abroad, reach- 
ing even the remotest farms ; it claimed the occupant 
of the most sumptuous palace and of the poorest hut 
alike, and everywhere it met with the same patriotic 
response. Of the German people as a whole may be 
said that which upon a former occasion was remarked 
of the Prussian kings : they are a race mighty in wai', 
but not given to war. Here there was no talk of a 
position of preponderance in Europe, nor thought of 
aggression upon the neighbor in the West. Every one 
rejoiced in the hope of peaceful days, looked forward 
to enjoying the reward of successful labor, and desired 
to live by Goethe's maxim : '• Morning's duty ! even- 
ing's guest! Week day's labor! feast day's rest! " 

Suddenly into this peaceful existence came the news 
of the French hostility occasioned by the choice of a 
Spanish king ; at this attack, regarded by the Germans 
as an act of madness or of infamy, the Teutonic blood, 
which ordinarily coureed so tranquilly through their 
veins, seethed with bitter indignation, and, wdth the 



1870] EARNEST PREP A RATIONS. 429 

strength of a giant, tin' ancient furor ti'iitonlcuH rose 
to give ))attle to tlie French vehemence. And for tlie 
very reason that here the excitement had sprung from 
the necessity of self-defence, it was more intense and 
more general than in France. The ideal thought of 
defending German unity, and the very practical neces- 
sity of protecting private interests, combined to form a 
single mighty incentive. 

The national guardsman, who in only too many in- 
stances left wife and child in l)itter need, clenched liis 
fist in angry resentment as he man-lied away with the 
thought: God have pity upon tin- Freiichmau who 
may fall into my hands. The young soldiers took 
leave of their parents, who in anguish and Avith tears, 
and yet witli pride and gratitude, clasped tlit'lr gayl}' 
departing sons in their arms, perhaps [nv a last time. 
The lecture-rooms of the universities gicw silent and 
empty; the students who as yet had not served in the 
army travelled about the country in search of a regi- 
ment which they might enter, ])Ut usually without suc- 
cess, since all the corps Avere full and more than full. 
In that case they either found admission into a reserve 
l)attalion, or formed themselves into so-called (Mner- 
geucy corps, not infrecpiently under the leadership of 
professoi-s whose sympatliy with the general movement 
would not suffer them to i-emaiu inacti\ely at home, 
notwithstanding tlieii' advancecl age: tlie s[)e(ial duty 
for wliich these i'(»r[)s \\t'i'e organized was to ('arry the 
wounde(l from tlie battlc-ticMs, and jileiiliful and 
dan<;erous was the wojk which awaited them. 



430 THE DECLARATION OF WAB. [1870 

In every community societies were formed for the 
purpose of establishing suitable hospitals, and of col- 
lecting materials for bandages, as well as food and 
clothing of every description to supply the needs of 
the soldiers in the field, and of the sick and wounded 
who would soon fill the hospitals. German industry- 
had led many of the young men to take up their abode 
in the other countries of Europe ; at the first note of 
alarm, without waiting for official notification, all of 
these now hastened to take their places in the regi- 
ments of their native land. The writers of the day 
called to mind the similar uprising in 1813 ; to the 
old martial songs of Arndt, Korner, and Schenken- 
dorf, new ones were added by the poets of the land, 
among them some which were of the highest poetical 
ardor, such as Geibel's " Song of Victory ; " there was 
not a newspaper in the land which did not seek from 
day to day to stimulate the national enthusiasm. For 
long centuries past Germans had been arrayed against 
Germans without realizing what they did ; now at last 
the German nation had awaked to the consciousness 
of its unity and its strength, and with joyful resolve 
millions hastened to attest their allegiance to the newly 
found fellowship, and to repulse the bitter foe of old 
from whom so much had been endured. This conflict 
was to be no tournament for the display of knightly 
feats at arms or diplomatic skill ; but, far from it, 
prince and peasant, statesman and soldier, were alike 
determined to fight until the last breath, or until the 
disturber of the peace had been utterly vanquished. 



1870] FEDERAL COUNCIL AND REICHSTAG. 431 

All othei- interests receded ; party opposition and 
religious differences were forgotten; social intercourse 
was purged of its luxury, and of the petty jealousies 
of the several coteries ; no mean care, no selfish desire, 
dared to manifest itself ; it seemed as though in the 
presence of the grandly dawning conception of their 
fatherland the people had grown nobler and purer. He 
whose happy privilege it was to witness these first days 
of a nation's uprising in Germany will liis life long- 
cherish the remembrance of them as a sacred treasure. 

At the same time that the notice to mobilize ap- 
peared, on July 16th, Gramont's empty pretexts for 
the incitement of war were confuted by Bismarck in 
his report to the Federal Council ; in it he stated the 
facts, showing that the thought of the Hohenzolleni 
candidacy had originated in Spain ; that a preliminary 
inquiry, wholly unot'iieial in its nature and conducted 
with utmost secrecy, had then been made by Marshal 
Prim ; tliat, with regard to the answer to be given, 
King William had been consulted onlj- in his capacity 
as head of the family ; that the final ofiicial negotia- 
tions had been conducted betw^een Madrid and Sigma- 
ringen wiiboiil tlie King's concurrence; and that Prince 
Leopold had accepted the offer of the Spanish crown 
without the King's knowledge, wliieh bi' was fully at 
liberty to do, since the I loben/.olh'rn family compact 
gave the King no right eitlier to forl)id or to order tlie 
Prince's action in ibis matter. Accordingly the French 
(himand tliat the King should forbid any future candi- 
dacy had neitiier rhyme nor reason ; hence, the termina- 



432 THE DECLARATION OF WAR. [1870 

tion of the negotiations begun at Ems was unavoidable. 
The French Ambassador had, according to his own 
statement, been subjected to no indignity, nor had this 
been intimated in the now notorious despatch as pub- 
lished in the papers. The Prussian representatives had 
been given no further information regarding the inci- 
dent than that which the despatch itself conveyed. 

After hearing this exposition of the facts in the case, 
the Federal delegate from Saxony, Minister von Friesen, 
announced his Government's unqualified approval of the 
course pursued, concluding with the words : " France 
evidently seeks war ; let us then carry it through with 
all the expedition and energy of which we are capable.'' 
And to this all the other members of the Federal Coun- 
cil agreed. 

On July 19th Le Sourd presented the formal decla- 
ration of war, which was but a more concise form of 
the announcement made to the Chambers on the 15th. 
Hereupon the Reichstag was immediately convoked by 
the Presidium of the Confederation, and began its ses- 
sion on the same day. 

In his speech from the throne the King, with earnest 
and dignified words, deplored the coming conflict occa- 
sioned by passionate excitement in France and declared 
upon a wholly groundless pretext ; in conclusion he 
expressed his strong reliance upon the unanimity and 
self-sacrificing spirit of the German people. On the 
following day the House replied to this speech with 
a most enthusiastic address, adopted without a single 
dissenting voice, and closing with the declaration: 



1870] NATIONAL ENTHISIASM IN BAVAh'IA. 4oB 

Upon the field of battle the Gerimui luirKni will l)i- 
come united. 

The war loan of one hundred and twenty million 
thalei-s asked by the Government was approved quite 
as unanimously, both in its first and second readings, as 
well as in the final action on .Inly 'list, after whicli tlie 
House decided, notwithstanding the ()[j[)ositi()n of the 
Partv of Progress, to extend tlu' present legislative 
period, which was to terminate in the fall, to the end 
of the year. This was not the time to think of elec- 
tions, but of battles; a single mighty impulse swayed 
the hearts of the jjeople, the desire tt) share in the })ro- 
tection of the fatherland by giving the streiigtli of their 
support to its defendei-s and their leadei-s. 

During these days the aspiration for nationality 
asserted itself as the predoiniiiaiii iiitluciici- south of 
the ^lain also, although even now not witlioiit a hard 
struggle. 

In the Lower House at ^lunich the army budget was 
the subject under discussion from July 13th to 15th, 
the very days during which the crisis in Paris was at its 
lieight. The Ultramontanes, or, as they styled them- 
selves, the Patriotic Party (in their care for their own 
State, Bavaria), controlled the majority of the votes, 
and were for the time re-enforced by a number of Dem- 
ocrats. I'hey iiiaintaiiu'd that the standing aiMiiw by 
draining the money and labor supply of tlu' country, 
was ruining the land. The Havarian people could not 
continue to exj)end fifteen million florins for niilitaiy 
purposes ; a change would have to be made to the 



434 THE DECLARATION OF WAR. 1870] 

militia system, requiring a service of only eight months, 
which was quite sufficient to give the necessary train- 
ing, and would cost the country only half as much as 
the present method. 

When hoth the Premier and the Minister of War, 
Yon Pranckh, with great earnestness called attention to 
the immediate danger of a French war, they received 
the rej)ly : At present we are deliberating upon a peace 
budget ; in case of war, we will do our part ; after the 
war is over there will again be days of peace, and it is 
for these that we are legislating to-day. 

The men of the majority were especially eager that 
the action they advocated should be taken, since with 
the discontinuance of the standing army the hated Prus- 
sian alliance would lose all practical force ; in the ar- 
dor with which this object was pureued, the fact was 
entirely overlooked that the Government, which had 
no intention of relinquishing the reliable system of 
defence inaugurated in 1867, was thereby forced into 
closer union with Prussia. At the close of tlie general 
debate, on July 15th, the President of the House had 
the good judgment to postpone the special debate. That 
his action was well founded was soon to appear ; for 
the da} 's session had hardly closed when news was re- 
ceived of the announcement which had been made to 
the Chambers at Paris, and which was synonymous 
with war. 

Regarding the attitude which the Bavarian Govern- 
ment would assume, there was even now not the slight- 
est doubt. On July 16th, simultaneously with the 



1870] CLERICAL OPPOSITION. 435 

Prussian orders for mobilization, those for the Bava- 
rian army were issued. Ulti-amoutane and Democratic 
papers in "vvliich appeared abusive articles in denuncia- 
tion of a war fought at the side of Prussia were seized 
by the police ; although this precaution was hardly ne- 
cessary, since the patriotic German sentiment of the 
population had by this time become so intense that in 
Munich the editor of an Ultramontane paper begged 
to be taken under the protection of the police to es- 
cape violence from the populace, by whom his life was 
threatened. 

On July 17th the large square in front of the royal 
palace was thronged with a dense crowd of people, 
whose resounding huzzas gave expression to their appre- 
ciation of the firm stand which their King had taken. 
In Niimberg, a mass-meeting of four thousand men, 
in which the Democratic element also was represented, 
drew up resolutions voicing the hope that in the face 
of the declaration of war, so wantonly made by France, 
the Representative Assembly would by unanimous con- 
sent sanction all measures necessary to an energetic 
conduct of the war, and that the young men of the 
C(nnitr\- would cheerfully place themselves at the ser- 
vice of their fatherland. The latter half of the appeal 
was fulfilled even before it was heard, for from every 
part of the land the young men hastened to take up 
arms in (Ifffiicc of tlunr flag. 

l)ut witli the Kc[)resentative Assembly mattei-s stood 
very differently. ( )n .Iul\ l.^th the (iovernment ]Mt'- 
sented a motion in llic Lower House asking for a credit 



436 THE DECLARATION OF WAR. [1870 

of five million fiuriiis to cover the expense of mobilizing, 
and of twenty-one millions more for the demands ex- 
pected during the months intervening between this and 
the close of the year. Discretion suggested that this 
request be accoraf)anied by the statement that as yet 
the Government did not recognize the existence of a 
casus foederis, as also that attempts at mediation were 
in progress in which Bavaria had participated. (Ba- 
varia had transmitted the proposition to Berlin that 
Prussia should recognize the principle that the princes 
of Great Powers were hereafter to be excluded from 
foreign thrones, a suggestion which under existing cir- 
cumstances could, of course, receive no consideration 
in Berlin.) This attitude of reserve on the part of the 
Government, which at heart was fully resolved upon 
war, did not, however, make any impression upon the 
majority in the Chamber ; but, on the contrary, encour- 
aged the Ultramontanes to take a wholly unreserved 
stand against the Government, It was due to their 
votes that the motion was referred to a special com- 
mittee ; and in the evening, at their club, they pledged 
themselves to vote no money except for the purpose 
of maintaining an armed neutrality, and in much 
smaller amounts than those which had been asked. 

In the afternoon session of the 19th, Deputy Jorg 
read the report of the Committee to tlie House. As 
editor of the Historisch-politischen Blatter he had writ- 
ten many articles upon the subject of foreign politics ; 
he, himself, had a high appreciation of his alnlity in 
this field, and in his party he enjoyed the reputation 



1870] FALSE IMPRESSIONS. -437 

of being an expert in matters of diplomacy. Upon 
this occasion, however, it was his fate not only to dis- 
play a thoroughly anti-German spirit, but a remarkaltle 
deticiency in statesmanship as well. 

Every seat in the C"haml)er was occupied, the gal- 
leries were filled with an intensely excited and eagerly 
attentive audience ; outside, the streets were thronged 
with a dense mass of people so demonstrative in theii- 
disapproval of the course pursued by the majority that 
the Government had deemed it advisable to station a 
guard of soldiers U[)()n the lower floor of tlie building. 
.Vmidst such surroundings Jbrg developed his theory 
of armed neutrality, to the effect that it was the earnest 
and high-principled endeavor of a State to abstain from 
participating in the ware of other nations so long as it 
was not compelled to action by a danger threatening 
its own existence. 

During' the deliberations of the Committee, Count 
Bray had expressed the opinion that with the with- 
drawal of Prince Leopold the Spanish question had 
ended, and a German one had been opened. To this 
Jorg now replied that with regard to the demand sub- 
sequently made by France, and which he considered 
a perfectly just one, it would have cost Prussia only 
one little word to avoid the spilling of much and ])i('- 
cious blood. Till' King, howexci'. had tak'cu it amiss 
tliat l>cnc(lctti had addressed him ii]ion the public 
promenade; and so it was that a icnl or imagined trans- 
gression of the rules of eti(juette had given rise to this 
war, which, therefore, had nothing whatever to do with 



438 THE DECLARATION OF ]\'AE. [1870 

a German question. The Minister himself had ath ised 
neutrality, provided the contending parties would re- 
spect it. " Very good ; in the present case this condi- 
tion is forthcoming," declared the sj)eaker. " Prussia, 
to be sure, has as yet not expressed itself upon this 
point; but the advantages it would derive from the 
neutrality of the South in the protection afforded its 
left flank are so obvious that there can be no doubt 
concerning its decision. France, however, has offered 
to respect our neutrality ; for Minister Gramont has 
openly stated that France does not purpose to gain one 
foot of German soil through this war ; in fact, it is the 
intention to guarantee the Palatinate to us." 

Here, again, was a man who claimed to be well vei"sed 
in these matters, and yet had no idea of the true state 
of affaii-s, although to understand that which was under 
consideration required no technical knowledge, but 
only ordinary common sense ; this had, however, been 
impaired in the speaker by the inordinate party feeling 
of the Ultramontane. 

The true condition may be learned from the fact, that 
when Gramont read the despatch sent him by St. Val- 
lier, in which the latter reported the complaint made 
by Minister Varnbiiler that the course pursued by 
France made the neutrality desired by the South Ger- 
man States impossible to them, Gramont testily wrote 
upon the margin of the despatch : " As though we had 
ever consented to such neutrality ; we need the Palati- 
nate for our strategic march northward, and Swabia 
and Bavaria for our further operations." The last part 



1870] ^'ATIONAL SENTIMENT TlilUMPIIS. 439 

of his remark had reference to the union between the 
French forces and their Italian alHes, for Graniont still 
hoped for aid from Italy. 

Jorg could, of course, have no knowledge of this ; but 
the man to whom the map of Europe did not reveal 
the utter impossibility of Bavarian neutrality in case 
of war between North Germany and France had foT- 
ever forfeited all claim to statesmanship. As it was, 
the Ministers found it no difhcult task to prove him in 
error ; Count Bray on the ground of Bavaria's duty to 
Prussia and Germany, Herr von Pranckh by the argu- 
ment that to-day there was but one course by whicli 
Bavaria could maintain her independence, and that 
was by identifying her own interests with those of 
Germany. 

The exciting del)ate which ensued was continued 
until late into the night. During its progress it be- 
come evident that many of tlie Patriotic Party had 
been converted to true patriotism l)y the convincing 
power of facts. Professor Sepp, a Uiorough srliolar, 
although at times of an oddly religious turn of mind, 
told the House that no longer ago than the evening 
before he had written out a speech advocating neu- 
trality. " liut." said he, " yesterday and to-day are 
separated as by a decade of ordinary events : since then 
the French declaration of war has been received ; the 
King of Prussia in his speech from the throne takes 
our support for granted; who to-day is inclined to ask 
for the cause of the war? Yesterday the woes of 18GC 
were still remembered; to-da\' wrath ao-ainst France is 



440 THE UEVLARATION OF WAB. [1870 

pre-eminent in the heart of every German. In the 
battle of Leipzig we Bavarians took no part; in the 
new battle of nations we want to do our share/' 

A storm of applause rang through the hall at the 
close of this speech, after which Deputies P'ischer and 
Volk, both National Liberals, ardently advocated the 
German cause. Deputy Levi from the Palatinate de- 
clared : " With us all parties are as one ; we know full 
well what our j^rovince has to expect, but above all 
else we want to be Germans, and stand or fall with our 
German l)r()thers." When hereupon the old advocate 
of the greater Germany, Deputy Edel, with a speech 
glowing with enthusiasm, joined the Nationalists, the 
triumph of their cause could no longer be doubted. 

Despite the earnest warnings of the President that 
the rules of the House must be observed, energetic 
applause, and hisses too, had not infrequently inter- 
rupted the speakers ; at length, between ten and eleven 
o'clock, by a vote of 89 voices against 58, the House 
gave its decision against the motion presented by the 
Committee, and a little later rejected a modified form 
of it also b}' a vote of 76 against 72. Again cheer 
upon cheer rose from the galleries. 

And now, since war was mevitable, the motion for 
a credit of five millions for the expenditures of mobili- 
zation was after all passed ; hardly had the decision 
been announced when so deafening a roar of approval 
rang up from the street below that the President was 
compelled to pause in taking the votes upon the next 
<j^uestion in order, but soon was enabled to declare that 



1870] POLITICAL SITUATION IN WURTEMBERG. 441 

the further credit of twenty-one millions had also Ijeen 
granted. Before the close of the day's session the 
entire Government bill was accepted by 101 against 
47 voices. When the deputies left the hall of assembly 
they found the streets thronged with thousands of 
people whose ju1»ilaiit cheers rent the ail'. 

On the morning of July 20th the decision of the 
Lower Chamber received the unanimous sanction of 
the Upper Chamber without previous discussion of any 
kind. The action which the Assembl}' had taken was 
then at once announced to Berlin by telegram, and by 
the same medium the two monarchs exchanged warm 
fraternal greetings. 

The Bavarian people had shown that when put to 
the test their hearts, too, responded to Schenkendorf's 
immortal words : Germany, German}- above all else ! 

In Wilrtemberg matters took a very similar course. 
Here, too, the Democratic majority in the Lower Cham- 
ber had announced its intention in the coming fall ses- 
sion to force the introduction of the militia system by 
making sweephig reductions in thi' army budget, as a 
fii-st step toward the dissolution of llic Prussian alliance. 
The leadinrr Ministei-s, Mittnacht and Varubliler, were 
most anxious to avoid a rupture with the Chamber, and 
hoped to moderate the disposition of the House major- 
ity by making great concessions to the popular demand. 

U[)on King Charles. (h'S])itt' tlie various anti-Prussian 
influences that were hrongiit to beai' ujioii him, this 
Democratic attack n|)oii liis army had no other cftect 
than to make him ;i stanchcr friend io the national 



442 THE DECLAKATION OF WAR. [1870 

cause than \w had been before. He asked General 
Suckow, at that time Chief of the (jreneral Staff, 
Avhether he would be willing to undertake the admin- 
istration of the Ministry of War with the stipulation 
that although the present organizations should be con- 
tinued the expenditure should be reduced by a half 
million florins. Suckow consented, although with a 
heavy heart, and worked out a plan whereby the de- 
sired amount would be saved, in part by cutting every 
expenditure to the lowest possible figure, in part by 
making a great reduction in the number of privates in 
the army when on a peace footing, although the regi- 
ments as represented by the corps of officers were to 
remain intact, and the Prussian drill and manoeuvre 
regulations, as well as the term of two years' service, 
were to be retained. 

A draft of the army budget based on this plan re- 
ceived the King's sanction, and on June 14th was also 
approved by the Council of Ministers, although at the 
close of the deliberations Minister Varnbiiler remarked, 
" Our new Minister of War will have to come down a 
little from his plans, I am inclined to think," which 
was hardly encouraging to Suckow. On the 29th of 
June the draft went into the hands of the Committee 
of the Lower House for preliminary examination ; the 
final action, however, was not to be taken until the fall 
session. King Charles went to the Engadine for the 
summer. 

Suddenly a complete transformation was wrought in 
this state of affairs by the new and unreasonable de- 



1870] WURTEMBEliG ENTUUsiASTlV AL.^U. 44:J 

maiids which Fraiict- made of tlic Kiiiy oi Prussia after 
the Prince of lluheiizolleni had declined to be a can- 
didate for the Spanish throne. Like a flash the dis- 
content over the existing niilitarism, and the fear oi 
Bismarck's despotic rule, vanislied. .\.s with the IJava- 
rian so whh the Swabian jjeople ; indignant wrath at 
the unjust French attack conquered every other feeling. 
In many a Swabian city and village, where only four 
short weeks before the accusation. You're a Prussian, 
had been looked upon as an insult, the streets now rang 
with cheers for King William. On July 16th, the first 
day of mobilization in Prussia, Pavaria, and' Paden, an 
immense mass-meeting, in Avhich adherents of every 
party partici})ated, was held at Stuttgart, and unani- 
mously adopted the following resolutions, greeted with 
a roar of applause : The wav l^etween France and Prus- 
sia is a national war; it has been brought about l»y 
France npon an utterly groundless pretext for the })ur- 
pose of thrusting CJermany ])ack intt) its old state of 
dismemberment and impotence. In such a war there 
can be no question of party among Germans ; the hour 
lias come when the treaties of alliance are to hv put to 
the test; we expect the Government of Wiirteiul)erg to 
give its unswerving support to tlic German cause by 
every means at its command, and despite every danger. 
The Government was not deaf to the voice of the 
people. The King returned to Stuttgart with all haste : 
upon bis aiii\:il llicic on .Inly ITtli. lie ordcicd llic im- 
mediate mobiliziitidii (if the army, and conMikcd the 
ChanduM-s for ,1 ul v -1st . N'ai'ubiiler went to .Municli to 



444 THE DECLAllATION OF WAB. [1870 

come to an agreement with Count Bray. Mittnacht 
recognized the change which had taken place ; and as 
heretofore he had been an uncompromising particularist, 
so now he became the most unreserved of nationalists. 

In the name of the Government, Varnbiiler announced 
to the Lower Chamber, immediately after the session 
had been opened, that the Government believed it to 
be its duty to take an unwavering and vigorous stand 
in defence of the integrity and honor of Germany, 
which implied an open and close association with 
Prussia ; accordingly it now proposed that the neces- 
sary credit be granted by the Representative Assembly. 

The National Liberal leaders, Holder and Romer, 
gave the motion thus brought forward by the Govern- 
ment their hearty support, in which they were again 
and again interrupted by ringing plaudits from the au- 
dience which filled the galleries. The leader of the 
Extreme Left, Meyer, declared that although it had 
undoubtedly been the desire of his associates to abstain 
from participation in this war, and, together with Iki- 
varia, to preserve an armed neutrality in reliance upon 
Austria, which to their unceasing regret had been tln-ust 
out of Germany, nevertheless, now that Bavaria had 
said No to this, nothing remained but to acquiesce in 
the Government's policy, and, as quickly as possible, 
without the waste of more words, to grant the neces- 
sary funds. 

The rules of the House required that the bill should 
be referred to the usual Committee, whose report was 
made on the very next day, when the decision desired 



1870] NATIONAL ENTHUSIASM IN BADEN. 445 

by the Government was given by the House with only 
one dissenting voice. To be sure, thirty-eight of the 
deputies could not deny themselves the satisfaction of 
accompanying their votes Ijy the explanatory statement, 
that their action had been ftr the sake of maintaining 
Germany's integrity, although they believed that this 
war was but a consequence of 1866, and that they 
missed with heartfelt sorrow that member of the Con- 
federation which had once been the most powerful 
one. 

With the people this wail of regret uttered by the 
" People's Party " found no response ; as matters had 
gone in Munich, so they went in Stuttgart ; here, too, 
the cries that were raised by the multitude outside 
demanding participation in the coming conflict were 
heard within the walls of the Assembly hall ; and 
Avhen, at the close of the deliberations, the deputies 
stepped into the street, they were greeted with shouts 
of gratitude for the action they had taken. 

Even greater, if possible, than the enthusiasm here, 
was that displayed in Baden, although this State would 
be the first to suffer by the war. But because of the 
very nearness of the danger the patriotic excitement 
was the more intense and enduring ; and fierce and 
bitter was the feeling of indignation which reached 
its climax when on July 21st the Duke of Gramont 
announced to the Baden cJiar<ie d"* affaires at Paris that 
he had been informed that, in violation of tlu' law of 
nations, granades were going to l)e used by the Haden 
infantry, in consequence of which that State could ex- 



446 THE DECLARATION OF WAR. [1870 

pect no better treatment at the liand.s of Fiance than 
the Palatinate had received from Melac and Duras ; 
not even the women would he spared. 

That the Baden Government could upon the spot 
prove the utter untruthfulness of this accusation only 
increased the wrath of the people who were so barba- 
rously threatened. Baden had not participated in the 
uprising of 1813 ; now its people were reminded by the 
foe himself of the worst outrages which its flourishing 
proviiices hud suffered at the hands of the old arch- 
enemy. We can readily imagine what, after this, was 
the effect of Napoleon's war manifesto against Prussia, 
published on July 23d, and in which appeared the fine 
phrase: "Our quarrel is not with Germany; we respect 
its independence, and desire that its several peoples 
jshall be free to decide their own destinies." The suc- 
cessor of Louis XIV. was posing as the guardian of 
German liberty against Prussian tyranny. 

But only so much the more earnestly and quickly did 
Baden prepare for the conflict ; mobilization was or- 
dered for the 16th ; the fortress of Rastatt was armed 
with all haste, and the Kehl-Strasburg bridge across the 
Rhine was destroyed. The Representative Assembly 
was not in session ; but here the Government was so 
sure of the Assembly's unqualified approval that the 
members were spared the troul)le of coming together. 
Not without anxiety, but with a feeling of strong re- 
liance upon the promised help from their North Ger- 
man brothers in arms, did the people of Baden look 
forward to the war which was before them. 



18701 ''IF DEFEATED, WE WILL ENDUEE.'' 447 

Here, as elsewhere, the fear entertained arose iron) 
the very natural conclusion that France would not have 
rushed so headlong into a contest unless, by long and 
careful preparation, it felt itself to Le more than a 
match for its advei-sary; and tluit immediately after the 
declaration of wnv a French army would cross the Rhine, 
and inflict heavy losses upon the Germans, probably not 
so ready for war as were their assailants. Moltke, to 
be sure, was not troubled by any such apprehension ; 
on one occasion, m hen addressed upon the subject, he 
replied with great calmness : '^ It is possible that before 
our forces can get to South Germany, its soil may be in- 
vaded by French troops, but I can assure you that not a 
man of them will ever get back to France." 

The people, however, who had not his knowledge of 
the French conditions at that time, overestimated the 
strength of the enemy whose aiuiics for more than 
half a century had been the victors wherever they had 
appeared, and whose success in this conflict also was 
fully expected by the rest of Europe. And yet, con- 
cerning: thr linal issue there was little doubt in Ger- 
many; again and again in those days could have been 
heard the opinion : At first we may suffer defeat ; but 
our strength will endure, and in the end we will con- 
quer. The consciousness of a just cause, and the in- 
centive of national unity, raised all hearts above the 
anxiety of the moment, and inspired them with the 
hope of victory. 



448 ATTEMPTS TO FORM ALLIANCES. [1870 



CHAPTER V. 

ATTEMPTS TO FORM ALLIANCES. 

Germany was united, and was resolved to strain 
every nerve in a conflict for life or death. It was Bis- 
marck's opinion, moreover, that after the course events 
had taken, Germany could count upon Spain's assist- 
ance, since it was through that country's repeated and 
importunate endeavor to obtain the object of its desire 
that Prussia had become involved in this deplorable 
conflict; he believed, therefore, that Spain would con- 
sider participation in the war to be a matter of national 
honor as well as a necessary protest against French in- 
terference. These expectations were, however, doomed 
to disappointment. 

After Prince Leopold had withdrawn his acceptance, 
Spain felt relieved of all further responsibility with re* 
gard to the issue of the controversy, besides which, 
owing to the very precarious state of affairs prevailing 
at home, it felt itself to be in no condition to partici- 
pate in a struggle with so formidable an opponent as 
the French Empire. Germany was destined to engage 
in the contest unaided from abroad, and thus in utter 
self-dependence to prove its strength. 



1870] SPAIN yEUTEAL. 449 

1\) the Frencn manifesto of July 23d, Bismarck re- 
plied by publishing the proposal of alliance made in 
August, 186(3, according to which the French Govern- 
ment was to receive armed assistance from Prussia for 
the conquest of Luxemburg and Belgium, in return for 
which the North German Confederation would be al- 
lowed to incorporate the South German States. 

Despite Benedetti's cunningly devised refutation, the 
untruthfulness of which was soon authentically estab- 
lished, the impression which this disclosure made upon 
all Europe was a profound one. In South Germany it 
raised to the utmost the indignant avereion with which 
the people turned from all connection Avith France ; in 
England, where every menace to Belgian independence 
touched a most vulnerable spot, it won at a single 
stroke the favor of public opinion for the Prussian arms, 
without distinction as to political parties. The great 
popular organs, The Times, Daily News, etc., violently 
denounced the French policy. But the attitude of the 
English Government was of a different type ; it care- 
fully avoided the expression of any opinion except an i 
abhorrence of all the evils of war, as beseems good 
Christians, noble philanthropists, and prudent merchants. 
Still, it cannot be said that it adopted the course best 
calculated to put this humane view into practice. If 
on July 12th, — when, after the Mithdrawal of Prince 
Leopold, Gramont told the iMiglish Aiiil)assad()r of the 
new demands he intended to make, — Lord Ivot'tiis IkkI 
l)een in a position not onl}' to warn him that by such a 
proceeding he wonld incur the reproach of the w(^rld, 



450 ATTEMPTS TO FORM ALLIANCES. [1870 

bat alsd to iinnouiice to him that Great Britain was 
firmly resolved to oppose every new disturbance of the 
peace hy all the means at its command, Napoleon and 
the majority of his ministers would thnibtless have 
found the strength successfully to Avithstand the bluster 
of the i\.rcadians. Such was the stand taken against 
Talleyrand and Thiers by Lord Palmerston in the Bel- 
gian and Oriental questions of 1831 and 1840, and 
again as late as 18G9 by Lord Clarendon, when Belgium 
was menaced by Napoleon ; and in each instance peace 
was preserved to Europe. 

But who, indeed, would have expected so manly an 
attitude from men like Gladstone and Lord Granville ? 
To threaten with hand on hilt, even for the purpose of 
maintaining peace, would have appeared barbarous and 
unseemly to them, especially since for reasons of econ- 
omy they had greatly reduced England's armed force. 
Accordingly, at the last moment they made a hopeless 
attempt to see what diplomatic skill might accomplish. 

We remember that on July 13th Gramont urgently 
solicited Lord Lyons to induce his Government to influ- 
ence the Prussian king to forbid the Prince of Hohen- 
zollern to reconsider the Spanish candidacy in the future, 
since that would end the difficulty. This suggested to 
Lord Granville a proposal which he transmitted to both 
Governments on July 14th ; namely, that France should 
recall the demand for guaranties, whereupon King Wil- 
liam should formally announce the Prince's withdrawal 
to the French Government. This proposition was 
somewhat belated as to its one half, and a little prema- 



1870] ENGL AS D NEUTRAL. 451 

tare as to the other ; for the King had ah'eady made the 
announcement on the 13th through Benedetti, and (Jra- 
niont had not the least idea of withdrawing his demand. 
Consequently, on the loth, the proposal was simulta- 
neously declined in Paris and in Berlin. Lord Gran- 
ville's next resort was to that clause of the Treaty of 
Paris concluded in l.SoC), which requires that before 
declaring war, contending Powei-s sliall seek an adjust- 
ment through the good offices of friendly governments. 
To this Gramont replied that it was too late for media- 
tion, war was inevitable ; and Bismarck declared that 
since France was the aggressor, that country must be 
the one to take the first step toward conciliation. 

Thus this attempt also ended in failure; and on July 
r.'th, ICugland published a manifesto, in which the 
(^ucen proclaimed hci' country's neutrality. (U-claring 
that every violation of ii \)\ her sul)jc('ts would he pun- 
ished according to the law. 'I'lu- JMi^lish .Ministers 
were sorely perplexed ; they could not do otherwise 
than disapprove the course France had pursued since 
the Gth. and more especially since the 12th; neverthe- 
less, in their hearts remained the old sentiments, — 
in Lord Granville's a warm inclination to Fi-ancc, in 
GlaiLstones a sti'oug dislike for Germany, — although 
tliey were evinccil onh in so i'ai' as was com[)atiblc 
with a piiident I'egard for the [)rcssure of [)ul)lic- o[iinion. 
anil for the [)roniotion of I-Jiglaiid's mercantile interests. 

During the discussion of l>elgian neutrality in the 
House of Commons, Disraeli warned against placing loo 
great reliance upon fine phrases and old treaties, and 



452 ATTEMPTS TO FORM ALLIANCES. [1870 

advised that in any case England arm herself well. 
Moreover, he reminded his hearers of another guaranty 
which England had undertaken in the Vienna Congress 
of 1815; namely, Prussia's possession of the Rhine prov- 
inces. But Gladstone repelled this intimation as vigor- 
orously as possible by the unfounded argument that 
England had been absolved from this guaranty by the 
dissolution of the German Confederation and by Prus- 
sia's annexations. He carefully avoided every allusion 
to Disraeli's real meaning , namely, that Belgian inde- 
pendence would be of short duration after a French 
conquest of the Rhine provinces, and that therefore, if 
only for the sake of Belgium, English interests would 
be best served by the success of the Prussian arms. 

But Bismarck's disclosures had after all made Glad- 
stone somewhat apprehensive with regard to Belgium's 
future ; and he now roused himself to tlie wonderful 
endeavor to induce the two contending Powers to enter 
into a new treaty for the maintenance of Belgian neu- 
trality, with the additional provision ' that in the event 
of its violation by either party England would co-ope- 
rate with the other to secure the integrity of the coun- 
try, but would take no further part in- the military 
operations. The thought does not seem to have oc- 
curred to him that a Power that had disregarded the 
compact of 1839 was little to be relied upon to hold to 
the conditions of a new treaty. To his present gratifi- 
cation, however, the two belligerents signed the treaty 
without further parley. 

But more vexatious was the controversy between the 



1870] CONTRABAND OF WAIl. 453 

English and Prnssian Cabinets to which the duties of 
neutrality gave rise, especially with reference to the 
obligations requiring that English conniierce furnish 
neither belligerent with arms, ammunition, and other 
war-like stores, the so-called contraband of war. At the 
time of Xapoleon I., when England was a belligerent 
Power, that country had sought to include as nuicli as 
possible in that which was to come under the denomi- 
nation of contraband of war, insisting that all useful 
commodities, such as grain, for instance, came under 
that category, and had even contiscated all such stores 
ft)und upon neutral vessels bound for French ports. 
Now the tables were turned ; England was the neutral 
State, and was therefore desirous to preserve to its mer- 
chants the greatest possible amount of trade. 

Immediately after the French declaration of war had 
been proclaiincd, 1 Bismarck received information that 
English merchants of Birmingham and Newcastle had 
delivered large supplies of coal to French war vessels 
destined for service in the North Sea, and that other 
English linns IkuI made contracts with the French Gov- 
ernment to furnish arms and amnuinition. There could 
be no question that these articles were contraband of 
war; and accordingly Bismarck transmitted the re(piest 
to London, that in com[)liance with the Queen's procla- 
mation the English ( Jovci'nnu'nt forbid this trai'lic. l>ut 
this di'iiiaml nid willi an ill recei)tion. I>orcl (Gran- 
ville r('[)lif(l lliat coal and auunimition were at all times 
valuable and prolitablc connnoditii's of England's f\[)ort 
trade, and were now as heretofore sent to every part of 



454 ATTEMPTS TO FORM ALLIANCES. L1870 

the world. Under contral)u)id of war, therefore, could 
be included only the individual shipment when con- 
signed to a belligerent Power ; and since it was mani- 
festly impossible for the Government to inquire into 
this in every instance, it could comply with Prussia's 
request only by general restrictions upoii the export of 
these goods, which was obviously inexpedient in every 
way. Moreover, it was added, during the Avar of the 
Crimea, when Prussia was a neutral, such articles had 
constantly found their way from Belgium to Russia by 
way of Prussian routes. Prussia must therefore at that 
time have learned that it was hardly possible to prevent 
such transportations. 

Prussia admitted the truth of this; namely, the diffi- 
culty of putting a complete stop to smuggling of this 
kind, but directed attention so much the more emphati- 
cally to another fact, equally true, that at the time re- 
ferred to the Prussian Government had taken the action 
now desired of England, and had most vigorously sought 
to enforce it. 

In this connection the Attorney-General, or chief 
Government advocate, made the statement to Parlia- 
ment, that in England it is not within the province of 
the Government to decide the question what in indivi- 
dual cases is or is not to be considered contraband of 
war ; but that this falls within the jurisdiction of the 
prize-courts, whose duty it is to decide with regard to 
tlie character of the cargo found upon a captured ves- 
sel. As applied to the impending war, this implied the 
very friendly declaration that England would not in- 



1870] RU^SSIA yjSUTBAL. -455 

terfere should Prussian war-ships seize the English luer- 
chantnien carrying contraband of war to French ports, 
and the unlawful cargo be confiscated by the Prussian 
prize-courts. It is hardly necessary- to state that whether 
theoretically there was legal foundation for this decis- 
ion or not, practically it gave the English merchants 
full liberty to convey war material of every description 
to France ; since, owing to the immense superiority of 
the French naval force, there was not the slightest 
prospect that the Prussian war-ships could stop this 
unlaw^ful traffic. How grave were the consequences 
of England's attitude upon this (lucstion. not for Ger- 
many alone, we shall soon learn. 

If thus through England's mercantile interests, and 
despite the freely expressed Prussian sympathies of the 
Times, the English ^Ministry was influenced to a step 
redounding to the great advantage of France, there 
were in the wide field of English commerce other in- 
terests, a due regard for which resulted on the other 
hand in the frustration of important French aspirations. 
All warfare interrupts commerce : consequently' com- 
mercial interests demand that when a conflict of arms 
has become inevitable, it shall be restricted to as lim- 
ited a region as possible. The English Cabinet did all 
in its power, therefore, to localize, as it A\'as called, the 
German-French war ; that is, to deter other States from 
allying themsclvt's willi citlici' belligerent. As in the 
question regarding contraband nf war, this may. from a 
judicial ])oint of view, appear to be eminently imn-parti- 
san ; i)Ut in its practical effects it touched only one of the 



456 ATTEMPTS TO FORM ALLIANCES. [1870 

contending Powers, — not Prussia this time, wliicli had 
long ago concluded its alliances, but France, wliicli 
was still endeavoring to form them. The disadvantage 
incurred by the French policy in consequence of Eng- 
land's diplomatic activity in this respect soon proved 
to be most momentous, especiall}^ so since the English 
endeavor was energetically supported by the Russian 
Government; although the incentives by whicli the 
Court of St. Petersburg was actuated were entirely dif- 
ferent ones from those by which the English Cabinet 
was influenced. 

In the first place, there existed between the Emperor 
Alexander and his royal Prussian uncle not only the tie 
of relationship, but the bond of a warm personal esteem 
and affection. The Czar had at the beginning disap- 
proved the Hohenzollern candidacy as much as any one ; 
but when, after Prince Leopold had withdrawn, Gra- 
mont made new difficulties, he indignantly condemned 
this course. To this were added important political 
considerations. He, too, feared that Germany might not 
be strong enough to withstand the armies of France; 
and nothing seemed more probable than that a French 
invasion of Eastern Germany would be followed by re- 
newed revolt of the Poles, whom it had been so diffi- 
cult to reduce to submission in 1863, and w^ho were 
already noisily proclaiming to the world tlieir French 
sympathies and the hopes they set upon that country. 
And further, we know how bitter a feeling of humil- 
iation filled every Russian heart at the remembrance 
of how in 1856 the Black Sea w^as neutralized; and 



1870] DENMARK NEUTRAL. 457 

also that in 1866 Prussia declared itself willing under 
favorable circumstances to co-operate with Russia for 
the removal of this obstacle which England and France 
had placed in the way of Russian preponderance in the 
East. Since then the relations between Berlin and 
St. Petereburg had grown more and more cordial, even 
without the tie of a formal alliance ; and the more it 
was now feared by the Russian Court that the French 
armies would prove superior to the Prussian, the more 
eagerly did it endeavor to prevent their augmentation 
by those of an ally. 

Denmark was the firet to discover this. Immedi- 
ately after France had declared ^^■ar, the old hatred of 
Germany entertained by a large part of the Danish 
population was again wrathfully displayed. In Paris, 
too, a plan was at once devised, acccording to which 
a powerful fleet, carrying thirty thousand soldiers, was 
to be despatched to the Baltic ; the troops were to 
be landed at some point upon the coast, where they 
were to be re-enforced by twenty thousand Danes, and 
thus Berlin was to bo thi-eatened from a position in 
its immediate vicinity. 

This was quickly thought, })ut not so easily carried 
out. Without a nioincnt's loss of time Prussia sent a 
request to the Government at Copenhagen that Den- 
mark declare its neutrality in the impending Avar ; this 
was followed immediately afterwai'ds In' a very courte- 
ous l)ut uiiiiiistakalile iiitiiiiatiiiii that, at the fii-st indica- 
tion of Danish hostility. Prussian troojjs woiiM otcupv 
the wliole of .Inthiiid. King Ciiristian, li'ss in(linc(l to 



468 ATTEMPTS TO FORM ALLIANCES. [1870 

war than were his people, remembered only too well 
the difficulties in which his land had become involved 
through the ardor of the Eider Danes in 1864. And 
when, in addition, he now received urgent appeals, 
first from London and then from St. Petersburg, not 
again to stake Denmark's welfare upon the possibilities 
of a hazardous contest, he determined to follow the 
promptings of his own inclinations, and sign the decla- 
ration of neutrality. It was not until after this that 
Marquis Cadore, the special envoy sent by France, ar- 
lived in Copenhagen, bearing the proposition that Den- 
mark become the ally of France. He had come too 
late ; he had his labor for his pains. 

Meanwhile the Russian Government had proclaimed 
its own neutrality, which, it declared, would be rigidly 
maintained so long as this was at all compatible with 
the interests of the country. This reservation was ex- 
plained by diplomatic communications to the effect that 
Russia would consider its interests imperilled in the 
event either of a Polish insurrection, or of Austria's 
participation in the war against Prussia ; in either case 
Russia would enter the contest to the full extent of 
its ability. Although the Court of Vienna was not 
officially informed of this intention, it was not left in 
doubt with regard to it; this was a menacing danger 
which Count Beust, surrounded by perils as he was, 
could not afford to lose sight of for a moment. 

As soon as war had been decided upon, on July 
15th, France lost no time to invite the two friends 
with whom she had discussed alliances during the past 



1870] FUEyClI OFFEi;^ TO ITALY AX D AUSTRIA. 459 

year to join lier in llu; coming contest. As we remem- 
her, in September, 1869, Napoleon had deferred the 
sisrniner of the draft-treaty of alliance because Italy had 
insisted upon the proviso that the French garrison still 
remaining in the States of the Church be withdrawn, 
a stipulation to which Napoleon was not at the time 
willino- to aofree. Now, however, the handful of soldici's 
stationed there was of no })ractical significance what- 
ever ; for the great body of the French troops, being 
employed elsewhere, could render no support. 

Accordingly Napoleon addressed an autograph letter 
to King Victor Emmanuel, stating that he was now 
ready to comply with Italy's desire ; that he would 
authorize the withdrawal of his troops, thus returning 
to the basis of the convention of September 15th, 1864, 
provided that Italy would undertake the duty stipulated 
ill the treaty; namely, to respect the independence of 
the Papal territory, and to protect it against attack from 
abroad. The Duke of (ii-amont then gave the Italian 
military attache^ Count Vimercati, detailed information 
regarding the proposed offensive triple alliance ; this 
the Count was to convey first to Vieinia and then to 
Florence. The King's decision with respect to the mat- 
ter was likewise to be communicated first to Vienna. 
Prince Latour d'Auvergne was to be sent as envoy to. 
Vienna to repi-esent France in the negotiations. 

As it was well known in Paris that Austiia and Italy 
Would I'ciiuire at least six weeks, mid pcrhaj)s even a 
longer time, to mol)ili/,c their armies, it was understood 
lliat l)ot]i these countries, altlioiiu'li entei-iny into an 



460 ATTEMPTS TO FORM ALLIANCES. [1870 

offensive and defensive alliance with France, would for 
the present remain neutral, tlieir military preparations 
being only preliminary to a joint attempt at mediation. 
As soon as they were ready for war, assuming the role 
of mediator, they would propose unacceptable terms to 
Prussia, and upon their rejection would declare war. 
As demands suited to this purpose were mentioned the 
following: that no Prussian Prince would ever be per- 
mitted to acquire the Spanish crown ; that the con- 
dition of affaire ordained by the Treaty of Prague, 
namely, the complete independence of the South Ger- 
man States, be guaranteed by Prussia ; that Austria be 
reinstated in the German Confederation as bearer of 
the presidential dignity.^ 

This communication caused the Austrian Cabinet the 
deepest concern. We are aware how sadly in need of 
peace Austria was ; how desirous its Government was 
that the equilibrium of power between France and 

1 That these negotiations were actually hegun by France is fully 
established by the accordant testimony of Prince Napoleon (Revue des 
Deux Mondes, 1 avril, 1878, p. 496; Rothan's " L'Allemagne et Tltalie," 
IT.,pp. 57,64),Guiccioli ("Sella,"!., pp.258, 282), and Beust in his letter 
to Prince Metternich, dated July 20th. In this letter it is mentioned 
that Vimercati had been in Vienna, but on the 20th was no longer there, 
having continued his journey; that his return was, however, expected. 
This qiiite agrees with Guiccioli's statement that Vimercati left Paris 
on July 15th, bearing the proposal of alliance, and that he arrived in 
Florence on the 20th ; according to this he would have reached Vienna 
about the 17th or 18th. 

One of the propositions to be made by the mediators is mentioned by 
Beust in his letter of the 20th, and another in his " Memoirs," II., p. oOl. 
The third one I have taken from Guiccioli, p. 258, although, it must be 
confessed, under the supposition that the statements on this page stand 
in close connection with the contents of p. 262. 



1870] COUNT HEISTS APPHEIIEy SIONS. 4tjl 

Prussia slioukl continue as heretofore, thus preserving 
to Austria the ^possibility of subjecting Soutli Germany 
more and more to ^Vustriaii influence. .Vnd now tliis 
suddenly declared war would end all these hoijes. 
Should Napoleon be the victor, which Beust thought 
more than probable. South (jermany would fall under 
his domination as protector of a new Rhenish Con- 
federation. Should Prussia offer an unexpectedly ob- 
stinate resistance, he would most likely follow the 
promptings of his personal inclination, and conclude a 
peace as quickly as possible, perhaps at Austria's ex- 
pense ; that is, he would resign South Germany to 
Prussia upon the condition that in return the left ]yduk 
of the Rhine be ceded to him.^ To share in a war 
which would bring about sucli results, to add strength 
to the side which w as already the stronger, and there- 
by even run the risk of an attack from Russia, — all 
this Beust was tiriidy determined to avoid from ihe 
outset. 

But, on the other hand, might not the consequences 
be still woree if the mighty imperator's hopes of armed 
assistance were so completel}^ and immediately shat- 
tered? For, althougli he could not demand assistance 
in fulfilment of treaty obligations, he nevertheless fully 
expected it for old friendship's sake. .Vnd, should the 
French troops in rapid march overrun South (Jermany 
as far as the Bohemian frontier, would it not in that 
t-ase be more than likely that, after Austria had {tro- 
voked the dis[)lcasui-e (jf the l-'rencli Emperor, hi- would 

1 Beust, " -Mt'iiioirs,'' II., j). 'M'2. 



462 ATTEMPTS TO FORM ALLIANCES. [1870 

make overtures to Russia, and tlie two would then 
eonie to an agreement regarding a common policy in 
the Orient, and again probably at Austria's expense ? 

In short, difficulties and dangers presented them- 
selves on every side. Count Beust saw but one course 
open to him, which was to avoid any decided answer 
for the present, that time might be gained, and, far 
from breaking with the conqueror, to hold out flatter- 
ing prospects to him, without, however, entering into 
any binding agreement; and in the mean time Austria 
must make vigorous preparations for self-defence. No 
■effort must, however, be spared to bring this dreadful 
war to a close as speedily as possible by peaceful inter- 
vention in conjunction with some of the other Powere. 

Nothing could be more excellently adapted to serve 
as an opening in this direction than was Gramont's pro- 
posal that Austria should invite Italy to join her in an 
attempt at mediation ; although, in consenting to this, 
Beust's purpose was just the reverse of that whicli 
Gramont had in mind. The demands which the latter 
had suggested were therefore rejected by Beust as un- 
suitable in every respect — the S])anish question was 
disposed of ; to demand the independence of South 
Germany while its armies were taking the field against 
France was an absurdity; and, finally, the readmission 
of Austria into the German Confederation was not at 
all desired in Vienna. 

On July 18th a Cabinet Council of all the Ministers 
common to the two halves of the monarchy, together 
with the President of the Hungarian Ministrv, Count 



1870] AUSTRIA INFLUENCED TO XEUTRALITV. 463 

Andrassy. and of the (is-Leithan, Count Potocki, was 
held in ilu' Hofburg. In this assembly Count Beust 
proposed that neither alliance iiur neutrality be decided 
upon, but that Austria await events, and meanwhile 
provide for defence by placing the army upon a semi- 
war footing. But herein he was opposed most vigor- 
ously by Count Andrassy, who argued : •• Our action 
must be determined solel}' by consideration for the 
present needs of the countr}', ^^'ithout regard for senti- 
ment of any kind, and there can be no question that 
these peremptorily demand an open and decided decla- 
ration of neutrality. Otherwise, if Napoleon triumph 
over Prussia, Austria will fall into a state of absolute 
dependence upon the conqueror, and may expect France 
and Russia to come to an understanding highly preju- 
dicial to Austrian interests. On the other hand, if 
Prussia l)e victorious, our neutrality will have gained 
for us a valuable friend, between whom and us there 
exists no contrariety of interests; since Austria will, in 
all probability, not yield to the temptation held out by 
Fiance, and seek to reaccpiire its former title to the 
presidium of the German Confederation, a relationship 
wholly outgrown, and one fi-om which Austria never 
dei'ived benefit, but often suffered loss.' In my opin- 
ion military preparations are nevertheless absolutely ne- 
cessary under existing circumstances; " added Andrassy, 
"•and I therefore propose that we ask for an appro[)ria- 
tion (jf twenty millions foi- this purpose. Hut this sum 

1 A similar asstTtiun muilc in the Hungarian Representative Assem- 
bly was receivcil with Imiil ami i-ntlmsiastii' apjilauso. 



464 ATTEMPTS TO FORM ALLIANCES. [1870 

will never be granted by the Delegations except for the 
enforcement of onr neutrality." ^ 

He carried his point : the Emperor and the Council 
of Ministers decided upon the declaration of neutrality. 

Accordingly Count Beust announced this decision on 
July 20th, although not like England and Russia, V)y 
a publicly proclaimed manifesto, but by a circular note 
to the other European Courts ; this set forth that the 
safety of the land demanded the intended military 
preparations. This could arouse no one's suspicion ; 
when a fire breaks out in a neighboring house, it be- 
hooves us to put our own extinguishing apparatus in 
readiness. 

Beust had submitted to the will of the higher author- 
ity, but he was far from being either convinced, or re- 
lieved from anxiety. Whilst the copy of the circular 
note intended for Paris was being prepared for the 
courier, his old friend. Count Vitzthum, was with him. 
" Remember," said he to the Count, " that in eight 
days an army of three hundred thousand men may be 
at our Bohemian frontier ; we must try to keep Napo- 
leon well disposed toward us, and must, above all else, 
place Metternich in a position to emphasize the fact 
that our neutrality is one of benevolence toward 
France." 2 

Hereupon Vitzthum wrote out the draft of a private 
letter in confidential form to be addressed by Minister 

1 Compare Konyi's extracts from conversations with Andrassy, as 
well as Louyai's letters, Deutsche lievue, 1890. In addition, Beust's oft- 
repeated statements. 

2 Derived from unpublished memoirs. 



1870] (JOINT BEUST'S LETTER OF JULY 20. 465 

Beust to his representative at Paris. Ii lieuan w iili tlie 
words •• Dear Friend," and ended with the expression, 
" Accept a tliousand greetings," by which it was in- 
tended to convey to Prince Metternich that, although 
this was a confidential despatch, it was not an official 
message to be connnunicated, for instance, to Graniont 
or Napoleon ; but that it was meant exclusively foi' his 
personal instruction, and to suggest to him that, in 
making the verbal aiuiouncement of Austria's intended 
neutrality and the rejection of the proposed alliance, 
he should administer the bitter pill with as sweet a 
coating as possible. 

Beust had no idea that the letter would find its way 
into other hands, and would thus lead to endless misun- 
derstandings and misrepresentations of his policy. It 
seems advisable, therefore, that the letter be inserted 
here, accom[)anJed by explanatory comments indicating 
the true sense. It said : — 

" Count Vitzthum has made known to our Emperor 
the commission with which Emperor Napoleon pei"Son- 
ally intrusted him" (namely, his wish that a peace con- 
gress be proposed). " This iin[)erial message, together 
with Gramont's statements, proves the utter incorrect- 
ness of a misapprehension to which the suddenness with 
which this unexpected war was l)rought about may have 
given rise" (namely, the misapprehension tlial j)erson- 
ally Napoleon was eager for war). '-Vou will therefore 
say to the Emperor and his Ministers that, true to i>ui- 
obligations as stated in tiie written ])romise wliiih the 
two Emperors exchanged toward the elosi- of ilu; hisi 



466 ATTEMPTS TO FORM ALLIANCES. [1870 

year" (namely, that neither would conclude an alliance 
with, a third part}' without previously informing the 
other), "we look upon the cause of France as our own, 
and will do all that lies within the limits of what is pos- 
sible to contribute to the success of the French arms." 

He then sets forth that armed assistance is no longer 
within the limits of that which is possible, but that, 
much to the regret of the Government, the declaration 
of neutrality had become an absolute necessity, owing 
to the attitude of Russia, of the Magyars, and of the 
German element in Austria. The Government could 
not therefore enter into an alliance with a belligerent 
Power, although it w^ould gladly aid the French cause 
by diplomatic means. This is further developed in the 
letter as follows : — 

" We resort to neutrality only as a means by which 
to accomplish the ultimate aim of our policy, our pur- 
pose being to complete our military preparations with- 
out exposing ourselves in a defenceless condition to a 
hostile attack " (which may be expected when we begin 
our diplomatic activity). "We have, nevertheless," 
the letter continues, " already begun negotiations with 
Italy concerning the mediation suggested by the Em- 
peror Napoleon ; will the basis upon which this is to 
proceed, as indicated to the Emperor, serve the pur- 
pose he has in view? In other words, will the condi- 
tions be regarded as unacceptable by Prussia? To us 
this is a matter of indifference ; as I have already tel- 
egraphed you, we will accept these conditions if Italy 
agrees to them as the aim of our joint action." (At 



1870] EVACUATION OF ROME PROPOSED. 4H7 

this point Beust discreetly refrains from designating 
the process and purpose of this action as contemplated 
by himself. Instead, he makes the negotiations with 
Italy conditional upon a stipulation absolutely odious 
to Paris. The letter continues) : — 

•• In the despatch referred to above I mentioned the 
evacuation of Rome. This question must now be set- 
tled ; the September convention no longer meets the re- 
quirements ; the Italians will never be heartily with us 
until we have plucked this Roman thorn out of their 
tlt'sli. The day that sees the evacuation of Rome by 
the French troops must also witness its occupation by 
the Italians, with the sanction of Austria and France. 
And, to be candid, is it not better for the I'opc to be 
under the protection of Italian troops, than to be ex- 
posed to Garibaldi's hostilities? 

"If France would do us the honor of leaving to us the 
solution of the Roman question, the undertaking w^hose 
initiative it desires us to assume would be greatly sim- 
plified. By so liberal a proceeding it would deprive the 
enemy of one weapon, and would place an obstruction 
in the way of the Teutonic enthusiasm which Protestant 
Prussia has aroused in Germany, and which, because 
of its power of infection, we have double reason to 
fear. It is a fortunate circumstance," were the conclud- 
ing words. •' that Count Vimercati's return and Prince 
Latour's iiiTi\al licrc are coincident." 

Meanwhile, in impatient suspense, Gramont was 
awaiting an exj)ression of opinion from Beust. Day 
after day passed ; Prince Metternich had no furthei 



468 ATTEMPTS TO FORM ALLIANCES. [1870 

information to give tlian that the Austrian army could 
not possibly be placed on a war-footing before Septem- 
ber, but that Count Beust had alread}- opened negotia- 
tions with Italy. Gramont could do nothing further 
than to send Prince Latour to Vienna once more, with 
new proposals to be vigorously pressed. 

Notification of the course determined upon at Flor- 
ence was also expected for a week before it arrived, 
and Ambassador Nigra was from day to day compelled 
to admit that his Goveiiiment had as yet arrived at no 
definite decision.^ So much the greater was the re- 
joicing when the entirely favorable leply, written on 
July 20th, to Napoleon's letter concerning the Septem- 
ber convention, did arrive. It had been wholly due to 
the dispute engendered by this question that the triple 
alliance had suffered shipwreck in 1869; and, after an 
agreement had now been reached upon this jjoint, all 
Gramont's doubts regarding armed assistance from Italy 
were set at rest. And now, on July 23d, Prince Met- 
ternich presented to him Beust's confidential letter of 
the 20th,2 together with the demand that Rome be sim- 
ply resigned to the Italians, since otherwise they would 
never join the triple alliance. 

If Beust had hoped to win favor in Paris by the 
obsequious tone of his letter, any such effect was com- 
pletely counteracted b}' the closing sentences. '• What 
a wicked heretic this Beust is ! " was Empress Euge- 

1 Prince Napoleon's assertion that Nigra liad persistently raised false 
hopes in Paris was emphatically denied by the latter. Rothan, II., p. 64. 

2 As asserted by Gramont. That he read the letter there can be no- 
doubt. 



1870] TFIE SEPTEMBER COyVEXTION. 469 

nie.s roimiu'iit. (ii'ainont (.-oulcl not believe tliat, for- 
getful (if all liei' Catholic ti'aditions, Austria was calling 
upon France lo turn traitor to the Pope and his holy 
cause. He liiniself forgot .Vustria's bitter quarrel with 
the Curia, a state of affairs which the declaration 
of I^apal infallibilit} just determined upon by the 
Vatican Council was surely not calculated to improve. 
He wondered whether Beust had been influenced to 
his im[)ious proposal simply by his own Protestant in- 
clinations, or whether it had been the suggestion of 
Italj'. In either case he was resolved to interpose at 
once. "The Prussians in Paris rather thaii the Italians 
in Rome ! " was the highly patriotic maxim of the re- 
ligious enthusiasts who frequented the antechaml)ers 
of the Tuileries at this time.' 

liefore the close (jf the day Ciraniont sent a despatch 
to Karon Malaret. his representative at Florence, saying 
that Beust and Prince Napoleon had mentioned the 
abandonment of liome ; he desired Malaret to oppose 
this intrigue most vigorously. At the same time a de- 
spatch was addressed to tlie Italian Government read- 
ing: Tlu' only basis ujioii which we can come to an 
agreement is the September convention ; we have 
alread}- announced to His Holiness the Pope tin- in- 
tended witlidrawal of our troops; this will, however, not 
ensue unless Italy and France reciprocally promise to 
observe the stii)ulati()ns of the Se[)tember con\-ent ion." 

1 Itothaii, 11.. II. (;ti. 

2 Ouiccioli, 1., ]i. 270. The author states that for tlic roiitciit.s of lii.s 
ninth rhaiitt-r, in wliich ho tells of tlie negotiations ooncerninj; neutrality, 
he gaiiii'd his iiifnriiiatinn from statements made hy Sella and from the 



470 ATTEMPTS TO FORM ALLIANCES. [1870 

By this threat the scales at P'loreiice were turned^ 
but not as Gramont had expected. 

Up to this time the situation there had been the 
following: Upon the receipt of Napoleon's communi- 
cation of July 12th, declaring that through Prince 
Leopold's withdrawal peace had become assured, King 
A^ictor Emmanuel went to hunt in the Alpine valleys 
of Aosta. In this parliamentarily governed State, the 
Ministers enjoyed great freedom of action; and when 
now, during the King's absence, they learned of the 
breaking out of hostilities on the 15th of July, they 
decided upon a most important step. The Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Visconti-Venosta, proposed to the Eng- 
lish Ambassador that their two Governments enter into 
a treaty with Austria to preserve an attitude of neu- 
trality, and then invite the other Powers of Europe to 
join them herein. But Lord Gj'anville, distrustful of 
the peaceable intentions of the two Courts, feared that 
by concluding such an agreement he might be dis- 
turbed in the inaction so fully resolved upon and so 
dear to his heart, and therefore declined to accede to 
the proposal. 

On July 17th Victor Emmanuel returned to Flor- 
ence. In open opposition to his Ministers, he was 
ardently enthusiastic for the alliance with France, and 

documents of tlie Ministry, all of which had been open to his inspection: 
although he had not had documentary evidence regarding the King's 
confidential correspondence. "What he relates with respect to this he 
gathered from French sources, and everywhere qualifies his statements 
by such expressions as " in so far as we can see," " as it appears," " we 
may conclude," and the like. We shall have frequent occasion to refer 
to this distinction with respect to authenticity. 



1870] VICTOIi EMMANUEL AND SELLA. 471 

participation in the war, hoping- hy hrilliaiii deeds of 
valor to win a glorious reward from his imperial friend, 
— perhaps Rome itself, or, failing tiuit, the remaining 
Papal territory up to the very gates of the Eternal 
City ; and, if as yet that could not be obtained, then 
for the present other territor}- in which the Italian 
tongue was spoken, — the Italian Tyrol and Nice, for 
instance. But with these representations, the creations 
of his excited imagination, he made not the least im- 
pression upon his Ministers. The Cabinet was lu) 
longer, as in 1869, under the guidance of (icneial 
Menabrea, with sympathies enlisted for Fi-ance. The 
new President of the Ministry, Lanza, like Visconti- 
Venosta, was a grateful admirer of France; but botli 
these gentlemen were of a cautious and practical tiuii 
of mind; and in consideration of the weak condition 
of the army, made necessary by the low state of tlic 
finances, they now maintained that war must be avoided. 
and for the same reason advised against an over-hasty 
attempt to force or solve the Roman question. Their 
counsel was to wait, and lot)k forward hopefull\- to llie 
future. 

The real leader in the Cabinet, the Minister of Fi- 
nance, Sella, whose courage and energy exceeded his 
caution and forethought, took a somewhat different 
view of the situation. Like liis colk-agues, lie rejected 
the French alliance, and, hkr ihc King, his heart was 
set upon Rome. He liad spent some time in (iermaiiy 
])ursuing his studies, and thus liad come to have a high 
regard and admii-ation tor (ierman culture and abibty. 



472 ATTEMPTS TO FORM ALLIANCES. [1870 

He repelletl wiiii indignation the idea of an attack 
upon the ally (jf 18(36, with whose assistance Italy had 
regained Venetia, and upon whom war was now to be 
made because of the aspirations for nationality, the self- 
same aspirations upon which rested Italy's strength, and 
hopes for the future. Added to this was the bitter 
resentment he felt toward the crowned priest who, for 
the sake of retaining his political power, fast falling 
into decay, was willing to see the historic capital of 
Italy in the hands of foreign troops. Toward the im- 
perial protector of this state of affairs he had a feeling 
of deep aversion ; for through his occupation of Rome 
he held all Italy in subjection, and even demanded 
gratitude for the w^ar of 1859, although, had matters 
gone as he desired, Italy would simjjly have found 
herself vassal to a different foreign lord in consequence 
of it. 

And so Bella's relations to the King were of a 
peculiar nature. Victor Emmanuel loved him and 
valued him highly, not only as his able Minister of Fi- 
nance, but, above all other reasons, for the resolute 
stand he took upon the Roman question. And yet re- 
garding the best course to be pursued in connection 
with it, there were vehement altercations between them 
almost daily. Should it be a French alliance or armed 
neutrality? The two men did not spare each other. 
" You are averse to war," said the King ; " to be sure, 
it requires courage to give battle." Ready of tongue, 
Sella replied, " It takes more courage to oppose Your 
Majesty than it does to go to war." — " It is evident," 



1870] ITALY- S PIIEPARATIONS FOR WAR. 47o 

said the King, '• that your aiicestoi-s were not warrioi-s, 
but wool merchants." — '^ Our tirui," was Sella's quick 
retort, "has always honored its obligations; but it is 
Your Majestj^'s present wish to indorse a note whicli 
you will not be able to pay."' The King was provoked, 
but the resolute Minister remained in favor. 

The day after his return Victor Emmanuel received 
Napoleon's letter proposing the revival of the Septem- 
ber convention. The King looked upon the recall of 
the French troops as the fii-st step toward the realiza- 
tion of his desire, and gladly welcomed it as such ; he 
therefore determined at once to send a favorable reply. ^ 
His Ministers also expressed their approval, for they 
all were eager that the foreign flag flying over Rome 
should be removed. It was for this reason that Sella 
also gave his consent, with the reflection that by agree- 
ing to the September convention no ()])ligation to enter 
into an alliance of arms was assumed. 

Hardly, however, had this conclusion been reached, 
when the proposition to form a triple alliance was re- 
ceived from Paris, and consequent on this, Reust's 
proposal of joint mediation, together with that for the 
surrender of Rome to the protection of the Italians. 
The King and his Ministers entertained ver}- different 
opinions on this point, but w^ere quite in harmony upon 
another, namely, that, for the present, the so suddenly 
developed European situation demanded speedy prep- 
aration for war. As a first step in this direction the 
order was given to call into active service all the men 

' Uulhiiii uivcs its text, p. !l.'l. 



474 ATTEMPTS TO FOltM ALLIANCES. 1870 

wlio had been added to the reserves within the last two 
years ; as a result the army, whose numbers had been 
reduced to 130,000 men, would now have a strength 
of 200,000 men. 

The execution of this order was at once followed by 
the wildest excitement among the people throughout 
the length and breadth of the country, for by it all 
their pent-up wrath against the French was re-aroused ; 
in the larger cities the masses gave vent to their feel- 
ings in fierce riots ; in Florence they threatened to mob 
the palace of the French Ambassador ; everywhere was 
heard the cry : Death to the Frenchmen ] Long live 
Prussia I ^ 

In the Chamber the orators of the Left declared that 
never would the Government be allowed to give aid 
to the murderei-s of Mentana, not even if, in return, 
Napoleon would throw open the gates of Rome ; that 
which ought now to be done was to disregard the will 
of France entirely, and with self-reliant resolve to take 
possession of Rome. If the monarchy would not do 
this, then it would be accomplished by revolution. 

While thus abroad in the land the storm was raging, 
the King, who recognized the fact that his war policy 
was impossible of execution unless he could obtain 
Rome for the people to be their national capital, sent 
Count Vimercati back to Vienna on July 22d, there 
to announce the King's willingness to conclude the 
triple alliance, although only on the one condition that 

1 All paid for by Bismarck, was the comment made by French 
reports. 



1870] ITALY SErriiAL. 475 

this would secure for him an acceptable sohition of the 
Roman question in the manner suggested by Beust. 

And now, a blow to all these pleasing anticipations, 
came Gramont's peremptory despatch of July •23d, in 
which the recall of the troops was made dependent 
upon the renewed reciprocal recognition of the Septem- 
ber convention, wliicli implied the rejection of Beust's 
proposition, and deprived the King of all liope to pro- 
cure better terms.^ At this juncture Sella came to the 
front. " For the present," said he, " we must give the 
desired promise regarding the September convention ; 
for first of all we must rid Italian soil of Freneh bay- 
onets. We must, however, do all in our power to re- 
tain as great freedom of action for the future as possible. 
But this is not enough. In Paris the opinion prevails 
that for even these meagre concessions Italy's armies 
ought to, and will, follow the flag of the Emperor : it 
would therefore be a folly to expect the fullilnicut of 
our desire as a grateful reward at the close of the w ar. 
Let us not deceive ourselves ; under such circumstances 
a French triumph over Germany would be synonymous 
with the Pope's triumph over Italy, of the syllabus 
over culture and freedom of lliought. of (be policy of 
intervention over the principle of national nnitv. ^\'e 
must therefore shatter this tyrannical illusion under 
which the French Government is laboring by opcnlv 
and resolutely declaring our neutrality. Tlien we can 
«;alndy await fiii-tber ofi'ei's which I'^raiicc nia\- be in- 

1 Ollivicr (ilitiiiiic(l a liki- ilrclaral imi fr t'lr lMii|n-i(ir cm .1 uly 'l'i\\\ 

Ollivier, " L'K;;lis(3 et I'Ktat an ('umilc du Vatican," II., |i. 474. 



476 ATTEMPTS TO FORM ALLIANCES. [1870 

clined to make for the sake of securing our armed 
co-operation.' 

The King dechired himself fully convinced that upon 
this point the stand taken by Sella was the correct one. 
On July 24th Italy's neutrality in the impending war 
was proclaimed by a royal manifesto. At the same 
time a preliminary reply was telegraphed to Gramont, 
saying: Italy is ready to comply with the wish of 
France, and exchange the reciprocal promises regarding 
the September convention ; although we realize that it 
is beyond our power to send our armies abroad against 
Prussia, and at the same time protect the Pajjal terri- 
tory against attack from insurgents at home ; nor do 
we perceive any advantage to accrue to us through a 
revival of the September convention, since this compact 
has not proved beneficial, but harmful, to Italy. 

Although a promise was hereby held out, yet, in the 
same breath as it were, its fulfilment was declared to 
be impossible, or at least incompatible with participa- 
tion in the war. Gramont, hasty of conclusion as 
usual, entirely overlooked this trifling circumstance : 
it was suflicient that Italy was ^^illing to revive the 
September convention. The proclamation of neutrality 
appeared to him to be no more than a preliminaiy to the 
armed mediation which he had proposed. As soon as 
tlie promised declaration had arrived he would consider 
the offensive and defensive alliance as assured. 

On the next day Viseonti-Venosta announced to the 
Chamber tlie intended policy of neutrality and return 
to the September convention. With Sella the Left re- 



1870] NO TRIPLE ALLIANCE. 477 

joiced at the rejection of the alliance, the Right with 
Visconti-Venosta at the postponement of thi- Roman 
question ; and so the Chamber expressed its full con- 
lidence in the Ministry by a vote of 282 against 63 
voices. 

How fully convhiced the Ministers were that they 
owed the King's consent to neutrality wholly to (ira- 
mont's categoric insistence upon the September con- 
vention, is clearly evident from the fact, that, in reply 
to a notification from Vienna announeinw that Beust 
was still endeavoring to procure a more favorable clause 
with regard to the Roman question, they sent a de- 
spatch to Gramont saying that in view of the irrevo- 
cable decision of the French Government they believed 
Beust's clause to be neither practicable nor seriously 
intended. Thus it was that the Italian ^linisters them- 
selves advocated the sanction of the September conven- 
tion so long as tins served the }jurpose of deterring the 
King from concluding the French alliance. Alas, poor 
(Jramont ! 

The King made a last though rather faint attempt 
to ascertain from Malaret whether it might not be pos- 
sible to obtain Napoleon's consent to Italy's occupation 
of some strategically important point within the Papal 
States, to the end that the entire territory might be 
protected, and yet the emplo3'ment «»f <»nly a small mili- 
tarv force lu' made necessary. Miilarct was coiiipelled 
to give an absolutely negative reply; and so the King 
rotuni('(l t(i his policv of neutrality, to depai't from 
whieh, after the vote given by the Chamber, would 



478 ATTEMPTS TO FORM ALLIANCES. [1870 

under any circumstances have heeu attended by much 
difficulty. His biographer, Massari, says j^lainly : The 
King was for war ; the Ministers were against it ; the 
King gave way to liis Ministry. At all events, he 
determined, before taking any further steps, to await 
developments. 

And so, on July 25th, thanks to Gramont's clerical 
policy, Italy had definitely withdrawn from the triple 
alliance so eagerly desired in Paris. 

On the same day a like decision was reached in 
Vienna.^ 

On July 24th both Prince Latour from Paris and 
Vimercati from Florence arrived in that city, and nego- 
tiations were begun without delay on July 25th. J^a- 
tour renewed the proposal which Gramont had made 
immediately after the declaration of war. An offensive 
alliance between Austria and France, with the stipula- 
tion that Austria would remain apparently neutral 
until such time as its military equipment should be 
complete, when, assuming the role of armed mediator, 
it would make certain proposals to Prussia, and as 
.soon as these were rejected would declare war against 
that country. 

Vimercati acceded to this, and expressed the hope 
that the conclusion of the alliance would be made pos- 
sible to Italy, and thus at length the long desired triple 
alliance be realized. 

But, as we know, this was by no means what Beust 
contemplated. After Austria had, on the 20th, notified 

i What follows is derived from unpublished memoirs. 



1870 j THE CONFEREMJE AT VIENNA. 479 

all the Courts of Europe that it would remain ueuirul, 
it could uot now enter into an alliauce with one of the 
belligerent Powers, he said. Neither could he approve 
Gramont's proposal as to the purpose which the armed 
mediation should serve. Austria was, liowever, quite 
"willino- to endeavDr bv mediation to brinu" about a 
speedy termination of the war, and desired, with this 
end in view, to enter into close relations with Italy 
according to a detinite understanding. 

Vimereati dechired himself ready to attempt such an 
agreement. ( )n July 2t)th he and Beust decided upon 
a treaty of alliauce to be concluded between Austria 
and Italy, according to which each of these two Powei-s 
\\as for the present to complete its military prepa- 
rations for the enforcement of its own neutrality ; all 
independent action on the part of either was to be 
avoided; and all measures, whether for the purpose of 
mediation or of war, A\ere to be jointly undertaken 
after being agreed upon by the two Powers. 

Prince Latour announced that in tliis form he liad 
no objection to the treaty. To make it as inviting as 
possible to the Italians, Beust added another clause, to 
the effect that Austria would seek to gain Xapoleon's 
consent to more favorable conditions in the Roman 
matter. In reply to a telegraphic report stating the 
substance of the draft-trt'aty, Vimereati i-eceived Victor 
EmmanucTs nn hesitatingly and gladly given approval; 
for by it the King hoped to have the way to an alliance 
of arms again ojiened to him. To raise the Iving's 
hopes still liigher, IW-nst. on -Inly "iTth, subniilted to 



480 ATTEMPTS TO FORM ALLIANCES. [1870 

the Vienna conference a despatch to Napoleon asking 
that Austria be intrusted with the adjustment of the 
Roman question and the protection of the Pope. 

Concerning Count Beust's object in making these 
proposals, there can to-day be not the slightest doubt. 
He wished to hold Victor Emmanuel's eagerness for 
war in check, and to this end endeavored to make 
Italy's every movement dependent upon Austrian con- 
sent. Should Napoleon now leave even the decision 
in the Roman question to him, then Italy would be 
entirely subject to the will of Austria ; not, however, 
for the purpose of removing the last obstacle in the 
way of the desired alliance, as the King, so eager to 
join in the impending contest, flattered himself, but for 
the exactly opposite end of binding Italy to Austria's 
policy of neutrality and mediation. 

However, as well planned as was every thread in 
this diplomatic web, it became evident at once that it 
would not accomplish its purpose, either in Paris or in 
Florence. In Paris, Gramont insisted upon the re- 
establishment of the September convention, and that 
upon no other condition would the French garrison be 
withdrawn from Rome. In Florence, the Cabinet was 
more than willing to comply with this demand ; since it 
served the double propose of removing the French sol- 
diers from Rome, and of deterring the King from con- 
cluding the French alliance. The formal agreement for 
the re-establishment of the September convention, which 
had been promised Gramont on the 24th of July, was 
drawn up and signed on the 28th by the Italian Minis- 



1870] TIIK SEPTEMBER CONVENTION UENEWED. 4n1 

tei-s and the Fi-eiieli Ambassador; and Malaiet at once 
sent a despatch annoull(•ill^• the happy event to (iiamont. 

Without loshig a moment of time the hitter now 
telegraphed to Vienna: Napoleon and Victor Emman- 
uel have come to an agreement upon tlie Roman 
question on tlie basis of the September convention. 
By which tliis astute dipk)matist meant to imj)l\' that 
without further delay the triple alliance might now 
be concluded. 

But in Vienna, where both Latour and \'iuieicati 
had been left in total ignorance of the negotiations 
which Gramont had been carrying on with Florence 
since the 23d of July, his despatch of the 28th created 
utmost surprise and consternation. What does the 
King want? it was asked. It was but yesterday that he 
accepted with eagerness Beust's offer to obtain better 
terms for Italy in the Roman ([uestion, and to-day he 
submits without further ado to Napoleon's demands. 
What are we to conclude from this? One tliinp- is 
certain : if the King himself consents to the September 
convention, the clause inserted in the new draft-treaty 
regarding more liberal terms will certainly ])e excluded 
from it. 

It was decided to obtain the solution of the riddle 
directly from the two monarchs themselves. \ copy 
of the despatch sent Prince Metternich was to be con- 
veyed to Napol('()n l)y Count Vimercati, who was then 
to ac(iuaint the Emperor with tlu; sul)stance of Beust's 
ti*eaty-draft. But to Floi-ence, Beust sent Count Vitz- 
thum, with the commission to learn the true condition 



482 ATTEMPTS TO FOL'M ALLIANCES. [1870 

of affairs Iheie, to discuss the treaty-draft with the 
King and his Ministers, and, should all go smoothly, 
to sign it for Austria. By this proceeding the situation 
was soon clearly revealed. 

On the evening of the 28th Vitzthum and Vimercati 
left Vienna ; on the 29th they both arrived in Mestre, 
where their paths parted, Vimercati hastening to Paris 
loy way of Mailand, Vitzthum continuing his journey 
to Florence, which he reached late in the evening, 
finding country and city wrapped in peaceful repose. 
Earl}^ on the next morning he received a visit from his 
Majesty's private secretary, who had come to tell him 
that on the morrow he would call for him, and accom- 
pany him to an audience with the King, but that it 
was his Majesty's wish that his Ministers receive no 
information whatever of this. The suspense occasioned 
by this secrecy was, however, entirely dispelled on the 
following day. 

The King received the Count with extreme gracious- 
ness. "Napoleon," said he, "asks me for assistance, 
and personally I am inclined to comply with his re- 
quest. But this crisis has come about so suddenly that 
I must have more time. Moreover, my Ministers are 
disposed to raise objections, for which that vexatious 
September convention is to blame. Another impedi- 
ment to a prompt decision is the slowness with which 
the French army moves, making it impossible to form 
an opinion with regard to coming events, whereby the 
difficulty of determining upon our own attitude, which 
must, of course, be regulated accordingly, is greatly 
increased." 



1870] VITZTHUMS Mlf^SION IN FLOREXCE. 48B 

I'o this Vitzthum re^ilit^d that this sh)\viiess had also 
caused some sui'prise in Vienna. With respect to 
Rome, Count Beust had proposed to the Emperor Na- 
poleon that the negotiations \\\i\\ Italy regarding the 
guaranties to the Pope l)e intrusted to Austria; con- 
cerning this point he had l)rought with him a despatch 
to he submitted in confidence to the Minister, 

The King did not deem it necessary to discuss this 
question further, and dismissed the envoy with the 
promise to sunnnon him again as soon as developments 
should allow further decisions and communications. 

To so great a degree had " that vexatious September 
convention " already damped the King's ardor for the 
French alliance. If even now. whilst making the re- 
quest for armed assistance from Italy, Napoleon was 
so little inclined to make concessions to the Italian 
aspirations for nationality, how pt-reinptorily he would 
suppress these at the close of a victorious contest ! 

After this revelation of the King's attitude, Vitzthum 
did not consider it necessary to mention the audience 
he had received. m)r the despatch, nor the treaty-draft, 
to A^isconti-Venosta whei^ he called iqxm the Minister, 
l)ut conliiifd himself to incpiiries concerning the inten- 
tions which the Italian Government entertained witli 
respect to the war. He found the ^linister extremely 
reticent also. Tiic Italian ai'iiiy, lie said. \\as by no 
means prepared tni' war. Tlie doeiinieiils in e(iiiiieetii)ii 
witli the iiegdiiatioiis of iSd!) liad Keen eoiisigiu'd liy 
Napoh'oii tu a place among tlie archives; Italy was, 
therefore, free from any treaty ol)ligatioiis. The only 



484 ATTEMPTS TO FORM ALLIANCES. 1870 

obligation remaining to Italy was that of gratitude for 
1859; but by the presence of French troops in Rome, 
and by the blood shed at Mentana, this feeling of grati- 
tude had been put to a severe test. For the present, 
before any decision could be reached, the next events 
upon the arena of war must be awaited. 

And so Vitzthum waited ; but no mention was made 
of negotiations. He had abundance of time in which 
to examine the art treasures of Florence. 

On the 5th of August, Vimercati returned from Paris 
without having furthered the object of his mission in 
any way. On the 3d of August he had spoken with 
the Emperor at Metz, but the interview had been 
wholly without result ; Napoleon had simply insisted 
upon the September convention. Victor Emmanuel 
heard Vitzthum's report with but slight manifestation 
of interest; so much the greater, however, Avas the 
impression made upon him by the telegraphic report of 
the engagement at Weissenburg, received on the even- 
ing of the same day. 

At length, in the night from the 6th to the 7th of 
August, came the news of the battle of Worth, and the 
die was cast. A few hours later the King received a 
despatch from Napoleon ; its tone was sad l)ut digni- 
fied; in it the Emperor said that, having suffered de- 
feat, he could not and ought not to make any demands ; 
])ut in this hour of trial he appealed to the friendship 
and chivalry of Victor Emmanuel. 

The King was deeply moved. He summoned Lanza 
and Visconti-Venosta at once, and sent them to La 



1870] VICTOR EMMANUEL'S FINAL DECISIO.\. 485 

Marmora to ask whether there still remained a way to 
come to the Emperors assistance. The General was 
in despair. •' If it is the Government's intention to 
declare wdv against Prussia, I heg the privilege of com- 
manding a company which will tight at the side of the 
French arm\-,"" he exclaimed; ''but if the question is 
put to me as general and statesman, I am compelled 
to say that Italy is at present in no condition to do 
an3-thing for France."' A few minutes later Sella found 
him in tears. 

To the King this declaration brought great relief of 
mind. His easily aroused imagination \vas alread}' 
busily engaged with the thought that Napoleon's defeat 
w ould open the way to Rome to him. On the morning 
of August 7th he sent for Count Vitzthum, and upon 
his arrival received him with the words, " We have had 
a narrow escape. That the French have no generals 
\\ e kiu'w ever since 1859 ; nevertheless, this demoral- 
ized flight from Worth is incomprehensible, hi a mili- 
tary way there is no longer anything to be done for 
France. I will see if I can aid [)Oor Napoleon by 
(liplttiiiatir means." This ended Vitzthum's mission. 

The Italian .Ministers drew a breath of relief when 
tlie French tlomination mider which Italy had groaned 
for eleven years Avas thus terminated. Imniediatel}' a 
despatch was sent to Minghetti at London, instructing 
him to renew the pi'oposal of an alliance between Eng- 
land. Austria, and Ital\- for the maintenance of ncu- 
tialit\-. Hut even now Lord (iianxille. still fcarini:' l>y 
sucli an aixreement to become iii\(ilveil in ( "out iiiental 



486 ATTEMPTS TO FORM ALLIANCES. [1870 

(juarrels, declined the pr<)[)()sal. Hereupon Minghelti 
explained that in Florence the (lovernment was appre- 
liensive of further urgent appeals from F'rance for 
military assistance, and therefore was very desirous of 
English support against such pressure. This proved 
the Open Sesame to the sympathy of the Gladstone 
Cabinet. On August 10th Lord (jraiiville replied that 
England was ready to enter into an agreement with 
Italy to the effect that neither of these two Govern- 
ments would depart from its policy of neutrality with- 
out first coming to an understanding with the other. 
The treaty was then concluded without further hesi- 
tation, and was soon afterward announced to the other 
Powere. This w^as the way in which Italian diplo- 
macy came to the relief of Napoleon in his hour of 
need.^ 

A last appeal made by Gramont through Malaret, 
asking that at the earliest moment possible the Italian 
Government send an army of one hundred thousand 
men to France by the way of Mont Cenis, the very 
road by which the French army had hastened to the 
assistance of Italy in 1859, did not, of course, meet 
with the desired response. There was some further 
discussion of the subject between Malaret and Visconti- 
Venosta ; but, although the Minister invariably ex- 
pressed the most favorable opinions personally, the 
Cabinet decision communij^ated by him to Malaret was 
quite as invariably that Italy could not comply with 
the wish of France. It would require six weeks to^ 

1 According to the EiiijHsh Blue Book, Guiccioli, I., p. 288. 



1870] INDIGNATION IN THE VATICAN. 487 

[)lace only sixty tboiisand men in the field : and in view 
of the existing uncertainty in the military situation, the 
probability was that such a force would be exposed to 
utter destruction. 

For France the bitterness of the situation was increased 
by the attitude of the Vatican, for whose sake Victoi' 
Emmanuel's assistance had been forfeited, through iu- 
sistence upon the September convention. The with- 
drawal of the French brigade, which had now become 
itnavoidable, was practically of no significance what- 
ever to the Curia. Should France be defeated l)y 
Prussia, the small garrison in Rome cotdd be of uck 
avail against an attack from the Italians : and. on the 
other hand, should Napoleon be gloriously- vit-torious, 
Italy would not dare to venture an attaidc. Never- 
theless, the announcement that the French brigade 
was to be embarked for France i)rovoked only feelings 
of consternation and resentment in the Curia. 

"This simply means," said Cardinal Antonelli to the 
French representative, "that yon leave us to certain 
destruction; for you know (juite as well as do we that 
the Italians will not alloAV the l)inding force of a treaty 
to restrain them for so much as a single moment. It 
was a mistake to rely upon your pi'otcction."' 

The Pope would not further express his opinion, l)ut 
so much the greater was the lack of ivstraint with 
which it was voiced in his ofliciai press. The Civiltn 
Cattolica declared that Napoleon was guilty of the 
heinous offence of breaking his imperial word and of foi- 
getting his duty as a Catholic; ihi- I'liihf ( '.iii,,li,-ii set 



488 ATTEMPTS TO FORM ALLIANCES. 1870] 

its hopes upon Prussia, which, it assured its readers, was 
firmly resolved after Napoleon's defeat to restore the 
temporal power of the Pope in all its former splendor. 

A few honeyed words dropped by the Prussian rep- 
resentative, quite equalled in sweetness, however, by 
those of his colleague at Florence to the Italian Min- 
isters, sufficed to induce the Curia to display in the 
presence of the representative of Catholic France the 
hatred and contempt felt for Napoleon. ^ 

In the year 1873 Victor Emmanuel visited Emperor 
William in Berlin, In the course of their first conver- 
sation, immediately after the reception at the railway 
station, if I mistake not, Victor Emmanuel said to the 
Emperor : " I must confess to Your Majesty that in 
1870 I was upon the point of taking up arms against 
you. I thought that my obligations of gratitude to 
Emperor Napoleon required this of me. If I was de- 
terred from drawing the sword, the reason for this lay 
in the unwillingness of my people and my soldiers to 
w^age war against you. But that which more than 
all else prevented me from carrying out my intention 
was the rapidity Avith which Your Majesty won victory 
after victory." ^ 

The perfect candor of the opening sentence, together 
with the well-turned compliment implied in the closing 
one, did not fail to make an imj)ression, it is said. It 
was the man and not the king who spoke thus. 

Ever since the 25th of July Italy's neutrality had 

1 Rothan. ii., p. 84. 

2 As related by tlie Crown Prince, who was present. 



1870] INCENTIVES OF THE ( OMHATANTS. 489 

been quite as firmly resolved upon as had Austria's 
since the 18th. Both Powere had felt themselves oom- 
pelled to this course b}^ the condition of their armies 
and their finances. For Austria, it was placed beyond 
recall by the threat uttered by Russia, by the persistent 
opposition of llie IIuiiL;ariaii ( i(i\cniinent, and !)}• the 
excited condiiion of the (ierman population ; for Italy, 
it became irrevocable through the resolute stand taken 
by the ^Ministry, through the opposition of the great 
majority in the Chamber, and through the hatred wliich 
the people l)ore France. 

What might have happened if Napoleon had been 
quickl}- and l)rilliantly victorious it is idle now to con- 
jecture ; in regard to it but one assertion can be made 
with confidence, namely, that both Powers w^ould have 
sought in every way possible to circumscribe the Ijcne- 
fits to be reaped by France as the result of success. 

It was, however, to be otherwise. Despite the many 
projected alliances, the two condxitants were destined 
to face each other in utter dependence each upon his 
own strength. So it had been in 1800. But whereas 
in 1866 Austria and Prussia were contesting for the 
same prize, — the leadership in the German Confed- 
eration, — in 1870 France and Germany had wholly 
different incentives, — Fianet' to defend the European 
hegemony it had so long asserted; on the strength of 
which it forbade Spain's fi-ee choice of a King, pre- 
vented Italy from taking possession of its national 
(capital, opposed the consummation of (ierman federal 
reform, threatened IfoUand on account of Luxemburg, 



490 ATTEMPTS TO FORM ALLIANCES. [1870 

and Belgium on account of the railway transactions, 
and even frowned upon Switzerland because of the St. 
Gothard undertaking. In Germany, on the other hand, 
there was no thought of acquiring a dominating influ- 
ence over any of the other nations ; in patriotic indig- 
nation the German people resorted to the sword for the 
purpose of ending for all time the foreign interference 
in German affairs which had been endured for centu- 
ries, and of securing the independence and union of the 
fatherland, let us hope forever. 

France was going into the struggle in defence of an 
old position of honor ; Germany to battle for its newly 
found existence. 



NOTE TO (11 AFTER V. 491 



NOTE TO ClIAPTEll V. 

Gbamont's Fabuicatioxs Regaiidixo the Alliance Xego- 
tiatioxs of 1870. 

The account which the foregoing chapter gives of the unsuccess- 
ful attempt made by France to combine with Austria and Italy in 
a triple alliance against Germany is in its every particular foiuuled 
upon authentic material. 

If my narrative differs in many respects from those which have 
preceded it, the principal reason for this is to be found in the fact 
that the authors of the others consulted Gramont's publications as 
the most important, nay, even indisputable, source of information ; 
whereas, with the exception of a few statements which I found 
corroborated elsewhere, I have entirely disregarded Gramont's writ- 
ings, believing them to be utterly misleading. 

I have already had occasion to refer to the astonishing power of 
invention for which the imaginative faculty of the Duke was re- 
markable. Individual instances of this are to be found in the pre- 
ceding volumes of this work, as well as in Count Beast's "Memoirs." 
But the most astounding, almost incredible, examples of that which 
he could render in this line occur in connection with his account of 
the events of 1S70 ; and since, afterward, when an exile, he wrote 
the history of his country in the same spirit as he shaped it whilst 
Minister, it seems well worth while briefly to consider him as an 
author. 

After the close of the war which proved so disastrous to France, 
Gramont was vehemently attacked for the rashness with which he 
precipitated the contest, although he knew France to be without an 
assured alliance of any kind. In December, 1872, he replied to this 
charge by declaring that, although it was true that no formal treaty 
of alliance had been concluded, nevertheless the friendly utterances 
of both .Austria and Italy, together with their cordial relations to 
France, fully justified him in relying upon their armed co-operation 
as soon as war slimild be dcclanMl. 

In 1872 Count Beust was no longer I'rinu; Minister, init ambassa- 



492 NOTE TO CHAPTER V. 

dor at London ; very naturally he did not wish it to appear that he 
had shared in Gramont's policy ; therefore, in a letter written for the 
press and dated January 4th, 1873, he reminded the Duke of the 
despatch he had sent him on July 11th, 1870, in which he had so 
severely criticised Gramont's course of action, and had told him 
that Austria would in no way participate in it. 

To this Gramont replied in a letter published on the 8th of Janu- 
ary. In it he says that, although the Austrian Ambassador, Prince 
3Ietternich, had not submitted the despatch to him, he had informed 
him of its contents, which had occasioned him everal days of anx- 
iety, and had led to vehement altercations. " Then, however," he 
continues, "Count Vitzthum came to Paris, and now all traces of 
the estrangement which the despatch had occasioned instantly dis- 
appeared, lie obtained an audience with the Emperor, conferred 
with me, and immediately after his return to Vienna you wrote to 
Prince Metteruich, on the 20th, as follows : — 

" ' Count Vitzthum has made known to our Emperor the commis- 
sion with which the Emperor Xapoleon intrusted him. This imperial 
message has removed every possibility of a misapprehension to which 
the suddenness with which this unexpected war was brought about 
might have given rise. Say to His Majesty and His Ministers, there- 
fore, that, true to the obligations we assumed in 1869 through the 
letters exchanged between the two Emperors, we look upon the cause 
of France as our own, and will do all that is possible to contribute 
to the success of the French arms.' 

"On the 24th of July, therefore,'' Gramont continues, "the day 
on which I received this despatch, i I had Austria's formal promise 
to do all that was possible to promote the success of oiu" arms. Or 
was I to understand that this would be done by means of sympathy 
and good wishes only, without unsheathing the sword in our behalf ? 
I cannot take this view of it ; and, moreover, you add, farther on in 
the despatch : — 

" ' It is to our regret that under these circumstances imperative 
necessity compels us to utter the word neutrality ; but this neutrality 
is only to serve as a means to the end, the only means by which we 
will be enabled to complete our military preparations without expos- 
ing ourselves to a hostile attack.' 

"On the evening of the 24th," Gramont adds, " Metternich wrote 
me that the Austrian army could not be ready to take the field before 
the beginning of September. How, after this, could I have any 
doubt of your co-operation ? Furthermore, I must direct your at- 
tention, although this would seem superiiuous, to that which took 
1 Inaccurate : he read it on the 23d. 



NOTE TO CHAPTER V. 493 

place after Count Vitzthuin's return to Paris. Assisted by Prince 
Metternich, he and I now determined upon the basis and the several 
articles of a treaty in which it was positively stated that the aiuned 
neutrality uf the contracting Powers [the reference here can only be 
to Austria and Italy, although in this case the absence of an Italian 
representative must occasion surprise] was resorted to for no other 
piu-pose than that of making a transition to active co-operation Avith 
France against Prussia possible. The manner in which this was to 
b3 accomplished was the suggestion of your own representatives ; 
namely, that after the necessary military preparations were com- 
pleted, the promise would be demanded of Prussia that nothing 
be undertaken by that State which woidd tend to disturb the statux 
quo established by the Treaty of Prague. It was again your repre- 
sentatives who expressed the opinion that I'russia would refuse to 
comply with this demand, and that Austria would thereby be given 
the occasion to declare war."' 

So much for Gramont's version. By some German writers this 
has been regarded as evidence sufficient to justify the conclusion 
that in 1869 there existed a great conspiracy of arms against Prussia. 
They hold that, in the passages quoted by Gramont, Beust himself 
admits that through the Emperor's letter Austria assiuued the obli- 
gations of an ally in arms ; and, furthermore, that Beust twice sent 
his most trusted coadjutor, Coiuit Yitzthiun, to Paris ; the first time, 
to dispel any existing misunderstanding ; the second time, to indi- 
cate to the French Government the way which might lead to com- 
bined warfare. 

This is to be assumed with so much the greater assurance, they 
contend, since Beust did not by so much as a single word refute the 
assertions made in Gramont' s letter, and thus, by his silence, con- 
ceded the truth of the statements. 

The latter argument may be met by the simple reply that the Am- 
bassador, Count Beust, was at the time advised by the Minister who 
was his suiierior in office to discontinue the correspondence with 
< Gramont. Moreover, upon closer examination, the facts related by 
(iramont will be found sullicicMt in themselves as evidence to the 
contrary. Xamely : — 

In the year 1860 the three sovereigns did not ])roinise one anolhcr 
armed assistance, l)ut only that no one of them would conclude an 
alliance with a third i)arty without the knowledge of the other two. 

From I5eust's then unpublislied letter of the '20th, which has. 
however, long since l)een made ])ublic, (Jiainont, for good reasons, 
selected only the jjortions quoted above, passing in silence over tlu^ 
rest of its contents. Had he made known the whole of its text, it 



494 NOTE TO CHAPTER Y. 

would have appeared at once that armed assistance was refused, as 
we have learned, and that the promise of diplomatic mediation was 
made conditional upon Italy's willingness to join in it, and upon the 
further stipulation that Kome be relinquished to Italy. Further- 
more, it would have been seen that the plan of making armed medi- 
ation serve the purpose of a transition from neutrality to war with 
Prussia, which Gramont ascribes to the Austrian representatives, 
was in reality a i:)roposition originating with the French Govern- 
ment, and was transmitted from Paris to Vienna no later than the 
16th of July. 

In fact, these conferences with Yitzthum on July 24th, wiiich 
Gramont so vividly describes, never took place at all ; for the Count 
left Paris on the 15th of July, and did not return thither until late 
in August. 

The whole account is the invention of Gramont, cut out of the 
whole cloth. Equally glaring misrepresentations have been made 
by other writers; but it is characteristic of Gramont that, within two 
and a half years of the date of the alleged occurrence, he openly 
confronted Beust with the fabrication, and must, therefore, in the 
interim have convinced himself of its correctness as a historic fact. 
Out of his conviction that in 1870 he had reason to rely upon Aus- 
tria's armed co-operation arose this picture in which people and 
events range themselves in such manner as to justify him in this 
belief. 

When, in 1873, Beust's and Gramont's letters appeared in the 
papers, the Investigation Committee appointed by the French Par- 
liament called upon Count Chaudordy, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
during the time when Gambetta was at the liead of French affairs, 
for supplementary testimony. He declared that he could not discuss 
these letters, from which no definite conclusion could be drawn ; he 
would, therefore, simply relate what he knew. The Austrian Gov- 
ernment [he said] did not urge France on to war, but in view of 
the growing complications sent Count Yitzthum to Paris for the 
purpose of securing every possible advantage for Austria. On July 
15th [therefore previous to the declaration of war] the official nego- 
tiations were begun, France being represented by Gramont, Austria 
by Metternich and Yitzthum, Italy by Ambassador Nigra and the 
military attache, Count Yimercati. At first a triple alliance was 
proposed, which was, however, soon abandoned, since thereby Aus- 
tria and Italy would have become involved in a war for which they 
were not prepared. In its place there was suggested a treaty of 
alliance between Austria and Italy for the maintenance of neu- 



NOTE TO CHAPTER V. 495 

trality, b}' which these two countries would be furnished the oppor- 
tunity to place their armies on a war-footing ; this done, the next 
step, quite in harmony with Gramont's account, was to be armed 
mediation in September, which woidd then lead to the declaration 
of war against Prussia, provided that by this time the French troops 
had penetrated into South Germany. These negotiations were con- 
tinued from July 20th to the 4th of August; and as South Germany 
was not then in the hands of the Fiench forces, which, instead, had 
been defeated at AVorth, nothing more was heard of the proposed 
treaty. 

To the question whether the treaty had been ratified. Count Chau- 
dordy could give no definite reply ; to the further question, whether 
he could submit the text of the treaty, he answered, " Xo ; it is not 
in my possession." 

He is, therefore, far from being a well-informed witness. His 
account differs from Gramont's in that lie makes the Italian repre- 
sentatives participants in this conference whicli never took place, 
and in that lie fixes upon the 15th instead of the 24tli of July as 
tlie date of its occurrence, which has the advantage that upon this 
day Vitzthum was still in Paris, although we know that he did not 
confer with (iramont regarding a treaty of alliance. 

In the spring of 1878 Prince Napoleon publislied an account of 
the attempts made in 1808 and 1870 to form alliances. His purpose 
was to vindicate liis assertion tliat each time the Koman question 
was the rock upon which the attempt suffered shipwreck ; Napo- 
leon's solicitude for the Pope's welfare liad therefore cost France 
the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. 

This the ardently clerical Graniont sought to refute. He con- 
ceded tliat such was the case in 18(59, but maintained that in 1870 
Napoleon arrived at an agreement witli Italy regarding the Koman 
question ; and so it was not due to consideration for the Pope, but to 
the rapid succession of German victories that, to the misfortune of 
France, the Emperor was deprived of Austria's and Italy's assistance. 

This was a new idea, and so the events of the past assumed a cor- 
icspondingly changed aspect in Gramont's mind. 

He begins by stating that, after the opening of hostilities. Napoleon 
decided to withdraw his troops from the States of the Church, and 
notified King Victor Emmanuel of the intended step, making it con- 
ditional, however, upon the King's promise, in conformity with the 
September convention of 18G4, neither to attack the Pope's domain, 
nor to suffer it to be attacked. With this, he says, the King com- 
plied in a conlichntial letter addressed to Napoleon on the 21st of 



496 NOTE TO CHAPTER V. 

July [the 2Uth is the correct date], the details of the arrangement 
heiug determined through further correspondence. By this agree- 
ment, Gramont continues, the obstacle which prevented the con- 
summation of the triple alliance in 18(5!) was removed, whereupon 
Austria and Italy at once proposed that the negotiations concerning 
the alliance be reopened. Their wish was fulfilled, says Gramont, 
and then relates, precisely as in his letter of January Sth, 1873, how 
the two Powers proposed to prepare the way to a rupture with Prus- 
sia by means of their armed mediation. "In tliese negotiations 
there was no allusion to the Roman question,'" he says in conclu- 
sion, "for it had been disposed of in the correspondence between 
the two monarchs." 

The King's letter was written on the 20th, therefore could not 
have been received in Paris before the 22d ; the subsequent corre- 
spondence between the two sovereigns may have been telegraphic, 
but even in that case a day must have elapsed before it was con- 
cluded ; the renewed negotiations which Gramont mentions could 
not, therefore, have been begun before the 24th. 

At this point a difficulty presents itself. It was on the 2od 
that Prince Metternich received Count Beust's letter of the 20th, in 
which the latter makes an agreement between France and Austria 
conditional uj)on the stipulation that Rome be simply relinquished 
to the Italians. Is it at all probable that in the negotiations of the 
24th Prince Metternich should have failed to present this categoric 
demand ? How does Gramont surmount this obstacle ? In the 
most artless manner possible. Just after stating that the negotia- 
tions were reopened after the arrival of the King's letter, tlierefore 
no earlier than the 24tli, he says, with extreme ingenuousness, four 
pages fartlier on, that these negotiations were concluded before 
Count Beust's letter was received, therefore on the 18th of July, or 
five days previous to the day on which, according to his own state- 
ment, they were begun. The reader is left to picture to himself as 
best he may a transaction which began on the 24th and was con- 
cluded on the 18th of July. 

This is, however, not the only discrepancy. As in his former 
version, Gramont mentions as his fellow negotiators the Austrian 
representatives, Vitzthum and Metternich, but now adds Vimercati 
and Nigra as the representatives of Italy. Now, as we are aware, 
Vitzthum could not have participated in the negotiations, for he 
left Paris on July 15th : and, unfortunately for Gramont's asser- 
tion, the same is true of Vimercati, who had gone from Paris to 
Vienna, and upon his arrival there had immediately started on liis 
journey to Florence, which he reached on the 20th. It is impossible, 



NOTE TO CUAPTEll Y. 497 

therefore, thai he eoukl have heen hi Paris, eUher on ilie ISth or 
the -lAih, to take part in the conference. Accordingly, the only 
remaining representatives who could have been present to deter- 
mine upon a treaty-draft are Ambassadors Metternich and Nigra. 
Here, however, an objection of anotlier kind ari.ses. Count Beust in 
his ••Memoirs" declares most positively that Metternieh was never 
given the authority or power to act upon a proposition of this 
nature ; and. in fact, Beust himself peremptorily rejected the alli- 
ance when proposed to him by the French Ambassador at Vienna. 

And in so far as Ambassador Xigra's participation is concerned, 
this gentleman publicly protested against Prince Napoleon's asser- 
tion that he had held out to the French Government prosi)ects of 
Italy's armed co-operation ; this, he declared, he had never done. 

Here, therefore, we have a conference with four plenipotentiaries, 
two of whom were at the time over a hundred miles distant from 
the place of assembly, while the other two were not empowered to 
act in the matter. 

Any further comment seems unnecessary. These negotiations, 
alleged to have taken place at Paris, never occurred at all, as has 
already been said. Something further still remains to be told, 
however. 

Immediately after receipt of Count Beust's letter, in which he 
not only insisted upon the withdrawal of the French troops, but, 
going f\cii bcvoud the stipulations of the September convention, 
demanded the occupation of Home by the Italians, (Jramont sent 
a telegram to Florence, as has been related, in which he made the 
withdrawal of the French troops conditional upon the formal recog- 
nition of the September convention by the Italian Ministry. 

To rid Italy of the French soldiers, the Ministry complied with 
Gramont's demand, but at the same time proclaimed their country's 
neutrality in the impending war, and prevaile<l upon the King pas- 
sively to await events, and see whether Napoleon would not make 
a better offer for Italy's armed co-operation. 

.Since, according to his own jilan. Italy was to cnti-r hikhi tli.' 
course which would lead lici- to llic l>aitlrliil(l by a dcilarailoii t)f 
neutrality, Gramont now U-\\ (|nitc conrKlriii thai the hoped-for 
alliance would be realized. When, on .liilv .'-^tb, lie received the 
notification from Florence that the September convention had been 
conlirmed, Ids nnnd wasentirtdy relieved of its burden of anxiety, and 
he now expected from day to day that the treaty of alliance would 
be signed. Again his firm conviction on this point suggested to liim 
an imaginary chain of events, the nanation of which, as authentic 
history, he bequeathes to posterity with authoritative assurance. 



498 NOTE TO CHAPTER V. 

After the 28th of July, he states, the day on which the September 
convention was formally recognized in Florence, the negotiations 
relative to carrying out that which had been agreed upon in Paris 
on the 18th proceeded rapidly and smoothly up to the very point of 
affixing the necessary signatures ; so little, he remarks, did the 
French insistence upon the September convention and the protec- 
tion of the States of the Church prove a hindrance to the alliance of 
arms. King Victor Emmanuel, according to Gramont's further 
statement, even suggested that his army should proceed through the 
Tyrol to Bavaria several weeks earlier than the time at which it was 
first declared it would be ready to take the field ; but to this the 
Austrian plenipotentiary. Count Vitzthum, demurred, since thereby 
Austria would become involved in war before its preparations were 
completed. 

Upon this occasion Count Vitzthum, who was usually miles dis- 
tant from the places at which the conferences were held in which 
Gramont represents him as a participant, was really at hand. But 
this time his presence is quite as fatal to a belief in Gramont's 
statements as his absence has been heretofore. 

Owing to Coimt Beust's inadequate knowledge of that which had 
been decided in Italy, he sent Count Vitzthum to Florence on July 
28th to learn the true state of affairs. We know what Vitzthum's 
experience there really was. The King had decided to await further 
developments of the war ; there was not the slightest opportunity 
for negotiations ; and after the battle of Worth, Victor Emmanuel 
told the Count that there was nothing he could do for poor Na- 
poleon. 

And so we see that this last transaction which Gramont describes 
had as little existence as the others. And, as Prince Napoleon very 
correctly avers, the "vexatious September convention" was the ob- 
stacle which, in 1870 as well as in 1869. prevented the alliance with 
Italy. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



1740-1786. Reign of Frederick the Great, King of Prussia. 

17S(i-1797. Reign of Frederick William IE. 

1797-1840. Reign of Frederick William III. 

1S40-18G1. Reign of Frederick William IV. 

1858-1861. Regency of William I. 

LS()1-1888. Reign of William I. 

180<j, July 12. Formation of the Confederation of the Rhine. 

Oct. 14. Battle of Jena. 
1807, July 9. Peace of Tilsit, between Prussia and France. 

18i:5, Oct. 16-19. Battle of Leipzig. 

1814, May 30. First Peace of Paris. 

Sept. 20-181"), June 10. Congress of Vienna. 

1815, May 22. (constitutional Law granted in Prussia by Frederick 

William IIL 
June 8. German Confederation constituted at Vienna. 
June 18. Battle of Waterloo. 
Nov. 20. Second Peace of Paris. 
181(;, Nov. 16. First Session of the German Confederate Diet at 

Frankfort. 

1819, Sept. 20. Carlsbad Decrees adopted. 

1820, June 8. Vienna Final Act. 
18:j0, July 27-29. Revolution at Paris. 

Sept. 7. Revolution at Brunswick; (light of the Duke. 
Sept. 13. Revolution in Saxony; abdication of the King. 
18.30-1848. Reign of Louis Philippe. 

l.S,31, Jan. 5. New Constitution in Hcsse-Cassel. 

Sept. .30. Elector William II. abdicates in favor of the Electoral 
Prince as Co-regent. 
1832, June 28. New Confederate' Laws |iasscd. 
18:U, Jan. 1. Establishment of the Tariff-Union. 

1835, March 2. Death of Francis I. of Austria, accession of Ferdinand 1. 
184G. Insurrections in Poland and Galicia. 

July 8. Christian VIII. of Denmark declares the integrity of 

the Kingdom, and the right <if llii^ Crown to Scbles- 
wig and lliilstcin. 
499 



500 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



1847, Feb. 13. Summons issued to the United Provincial Diet in 
Prussia. 

Meeting of Liberals at Offenburg. 

Meeting of Constitutional party at Heppenheim. 

Frederick William 1. becomes Elector of Hesse-Cassel. 

Accession of Frederick V'll., King of Denmark. 

Frederick VII. proclaims a new Constitution, uniting 
the Duchies more closely with Denmark. 

Outbreak of the Revolution in Paris. 

Insurrection in Vienna ; flight of Metternich. 

Insurrection in Berlin. 

Eider-Danish Government declares the incorporation 
of the Duchies. 

Insurrection in the DHchies; Provisional Government 
established. 

The rebels in the Duchies seize the fortress of Kends- 
burg. 
March 30-April 4. German Preliminary Parliament at Frankfort. 
April 9. Troops of the Duchies defeated near Flensburg. 
April 23. Danes defeated by Prussians, aiding the Duchies, at the 
Dannevirke. 

Capture of the fortress of Fridericia. 

Insurrection at Vienna ; Emperor tiees to Innspruck. 

Meeting of the German National Assembly at Frank- 
fort. 

Archduke John appointed Vicar-General of the Aus- 
trian Empire at Vienna. 

Decree of the National Assembly concerning a Central 
Government. 

Archduke John chosen Regent of the German Empire. 

The Confederate Diet remits its functions to the Arcli- 
duke John. 

Termination of the Confederate Diet. 

Italians defeated at Custozza by Radetzky. 

Truce and Compact of Malmo signed. 

Compact of Malmo rejected by the Committee of 
National Asseuibly. 

Compactof Malmo accepted by the National Assembly. 

Riot in Frankfort. 

Insurrection in Vienna; murder of Count Latour. 

Schwarzenberg appointed Prime Minister of Austria. 

Austrian Diet at Kremsier. 

The Emperor Ferdinand I. abdicates in favor of his 
nephew, Francis Joseph. 

Louis Napoleon chosen President of the French Re- 
public. 

Victory of Aqstrians over Hungarians. 

New Constitution proclaimed for Austria. 



Sept. 12. 
Oct. 10. 
Nov. 20. 
1848, Jan. 20. 
Jan. 28. 

Feb. 24. 
March 13. 
March 18. 
March 24. 

March 24. 

March 24. 



May 2. 
May 15. 
May 18. 

May 29. 

June 28. 

June 29. 
July 12. 

July 12. 
July 25. 
Aug. 26. 
Sept. 5. 

Sept. 16. 
Sept. 17. 
Oct. 6. 
Nov. 22. 
Nov. 22. 
Dec. 2. 

Dec. 10. 

1849, Feb. 26. 
March 4. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



501 



1849, March 7. 
March 23. 

March 24. 

March 2(5. 
March 2.S. 

April 3. 

April ;;. 

April 8. 
April 12. 

May 2H. 
June 5. 

July 3. 
July 10. 
Sept. 30. 



ia50. Feb. 23. 
Feb. 27. 
March and 
May 8. 
:May 10. 

July 2. 
July 14. 
July 24. 
Aug. 2. 

Sept. 2. 

Oct. 11. 

Oct. 17. 
Oct. 2(j. 

Nov. 2. 

N'<jv. tj. 
Nov. K. 
Nov. 9. 

Nov. !). 

Nov. 29. 



Close of the Kremsier Diet. 

Battle of Novara; abdication of Charles Albert, King 
of Sardinia, in favor ol his .son, Victor Emmanuel. 

The Prussian Kinj; formally recognizes the claims of 
the Duchies. 

End of the truce of Maliiio. 

Tlie German National Assembly elects the King of 
Prussia " Hereditary Emperor of Germany." 

The King declines the imperial crown. 

Hostilities with Denmark recommence. 

Wildenbruch's interview with the King of Denmark. 

The Gorman National Assembly recognizes the Provis- 
ional Government of the Duchies. 

Formation of the League of the Three Kingdoms. 

The King of Denmark sanctions a new liberal consti- 
tution. 

The French enter Rome. 

Armistice renewed at Malmo. 

Compact of the " Interim: " a treaty between Prussia 
and Austria f(jr the formation of a new central 
authority for a limited time. 

Appointment of Hassenptlug, Minister in Hesse-Cassel. 

Federation of the Four Kingdoms. 

April. Union Parliament meets at Erfurt. 

Meeting of Princes in Berlin. 

Confederate Congress, .summoned by Austria, meets at 
Frankfort. 

Separate Peace between Denmark and Prussia. 

Ohirial declaration from the King of Denmark. 

Battle of Idstedt; defeat of Schleswig-Holsteinerc;. 

Protocol signed in London by the Great Powers, pro- 
claiming the integrity of Denmark. 

Restoration of the Confederate Diet at Frankfort; 
Prussia and her associates refuse to join it. 

Ijeague formed at Bregenz by Austria, Bavaria, and 
Wiirtemberg against Prussia. 

Brandenbiiig meets the C/.ar at Warsaw. 

Brandenburg's first interview with the Austrian 
Emi)eror. 

Ministerial Council at Berlin decides upon i)eaceful 
measures. 

Deatii of Count Bratidenliurg. 

Skirmish at Bronzell. 

.SehwarzenberLT demands the abolition of tlie Prussian 
Cnion. 

Prussian iroop.s occupy the iniliiai-y roads in Hesse- 
Ca.ssel. 

Convention of (JImiitz. 



602 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



Dec 23-1851, May 15. Conferences at Dresden upon German affairs. 
Dec. 24. Prince Schwarzenbergs visit to the King of Prussia. 

The re-established Confederate Diet assembles witli its 

former membership. 
The Czar and the King of Prussia meet the Emperor 

of Austria at Warsaw. 
Bismarck appointed deputy to the Confederate Diet. 
Commercial Treaty signed between Hanover and 

Prussia. 
Death of Ernest Augustus, King »f Hanover; acces- 
sion of George V. 
The Emperor Francis Jose[)h revokes the Constitution 

of March 4, 1849. 
Royal Manifesto issued in a concessive spirit by the 

King of Denmark. 
Death of Prince Schwarzenberg. 
New Constitution proclaimed in Hesse-Cassel. 
Signing of the agreement concerning Neuchatel. 
Signing of the London Protocol concerning the Danish 

succession. 
German fleet sold at auction. 
Chastisement of He.sse-Cassel. 
Napoleon III. proclaimed Emperor of th& French. 
Treaty of commerce and navigation between Prussia 

and Austria. 
German States of the Tariff-Union agree to the condi- 
tions of tlie commercial treaty between Prussia and 

Austria. 
Protocol concerning the integrity of Turkey signed by 

tlie Four Powers at Vienna. 
Treaty of alliance between Prussia and Austria. 
New Constitution for the Duchies proclaimed by the 

King of Denmark. 
Alliance of Austria with the Western Powers. 
Death of Czar Nicholas; accession of Alexander 11. 
The Austrian Concordat, increasing the Papal power in 

Austria. 
New Constitution proclaimed in Denmark. 
Treaty of Paris, at the close of the Crimean War. 
Settlement of Prussia's troubles with Neuchatel. 
William, Prince of Prussia, a[)pointed temporary regent. 
Attempted assassination of Napoleon III. by Orsiiii 

and others. 
The Confederate Diet declares the Danish Constitution 

of 1855 to be illegal. 
Fortification of Copenhagen decreed. 
William, Prince of Prussia, appointed permanent 

regent. 



1850, 

1851, May 30. 
May 31. 

Aug. 29. 

Sept. 7. 

Nov. 18. 
Dec. 31. 

1852, Jan. 28. 

April 5. 
April 13. 
May 5. 
May 8. 

June. 
Nov. -Dec 
Dec. 2. 

1853, Feb. 19. 

April 8. 

1854, April 9. 





April 20. 




July 31. 




Dec. 2. 


1855, 


March 2. 




Aug. 18. 




Oct. 2. 


1856, 


March 30. 


1857, 


May 26. 




Oct. 23. 


1858, 


Jan. 14. 



Feb. 11. 



March 27 
Oct. 9. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 503 

1^58, Nov. 6. Frederick VII. concedes that the General Coiistitutinu 

is invalid in Holstein and LaiienbiirL:. 

Nov. G. Kesignaliun uf the .Manteutfel Ministry; succeeded by 

that of I'rince HoheiizoHern-Sicjinarinnien (Liberal). 
ISS'J, April 26. Austrian Ultimatum rejected by Sardinia. 

-May 1.). Resignation uf Count Buol; followed by Kechberg. 

June 4. Austrian defeat at Jlagenta. 

June 11. Death of Prince Metteraich. 

June '24. Battle of Solferino. 

July 11. IVeliminaries of Peace signed at Villalraiica. 

Aug. 14. Meeting at Eisenach for the establishment of the Ger- 
man National Association. 

Nov. 10. Treaty of Zurich ; the Italian Confederation established. 
ISiJU, Jan. 1(). Count Cavour returns to the Ministry. 

Feb. 10. Bills brought forward by the Prussian Government 
about military service and a military appropriation. 

March 24. Savoy and Nice ceded to France by treaty. 

June (i. Death of Cavour. 

June 11. Uicasoli forms a Ministry^ 

June 15. Prussian Kegeut and other (rernian Sovereigns meet 
Napoleon at Baden. 

July 2t). Meeting of the Prussian Ilegeiit and the Austrian Em- 
peror at Tei)litz. 

Sept. 11. Sardinian troojis enter tlu' Papal lerriinries. 

Oct. 20. Imperial Diploma inomising t<» restore to IIoKtein its 

old Constitution. 

<)ct. 22. The E'.nperor of Austria, the Czar, and the Regent of 
Prussia meet at Warsaw. 

Dec- l.'j. Ministerial Crisis in Viiiina: Schmerling becomes 
Minister. 
ISiil, Jan. 2. Death of Frederii k William IV.; Accession nf Wil- 

liam I. 

Feb. 2H. Ninv Cdustituiiim piuclainied for the whole Austrian 
Monarcliy. 

Feb. 27. Tumult in Warsaw. 

March S. HoliPuzollcni Ministry resigns: \'on ib-r Heydt suc- 
ceeds. 

March 17. Victor Enimnnnrd iiroclaimed King of Italy. 

July 14. Attenipt to assa.ssiualf the King of Prussia. 

Oct. IS. William I. crowned at Konigsbi-rg. 

18G2, .March 8. Austria and Prussia move iu the Diet to demand from 
the Elector of Hesse the renewal of the Constitutii)n. 

May 11. General Willisen sent to Cassd. 

July H-Aug. 10. -Meeting at V'ienna of plenipotentiaries from Ger- 
man States. 

Sept. 10. !)urando's Circular. 

Sept. 2'). Count Bismarck-Schonliauscn made Picsidi'ni <.f tbe 
Ministry. ' 



504 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



1862, Sept. 28. 
Sept. 30. 

Oct. 11. 

1863, Jan. 22. 
March 24. 
March 30. 

July 9. 
Aug. 2. 

Aug. 17. 
Aug. 2(). 
Sept. 28. 

Sept. 29. 



Nov. 


5. 


Nov. 


lo. 


Nov. 


15. 


Nov. 


16. 


Dec. 


2. 


Dec. 


7. 


Dec. 


21. 


Dec. 


24. 


Dec. 


25. 


Dec. 


30. 


Dec. 


31. 


1864, Jan. 


14. 



Jan. 16. 



Jan. 


20. 


Jan. 


31. 


Feb. 


2. 


Feb. 


5. 


Feb. 


7. 


Feb. 


13. 


Feb. 


18. 


March 5. 


March 10. 



Meeting uf deputies at Weimar. 

Bismarck informs the Chamber that the Budget is 
deferred till 1863. 

Budget passed by the Upper House; Chamber of Depu- 
ties declare this to be unconstitutional. 

Austria's proposals rejected by the Confederate Diet. 

Commencement of the JNIinghetti Ministry. 

Eider-Danish proclamation by the King of Denmark, 
abandoning the basis of 1852. 

Confederate Diet calls upon Denmark to retract. 

Visit of the Austrian Emperor to King William at 
Gastein. 

Opening of the Assembly of Princes at Frankiort. 

Denmark refuses (compliance. 

Special session of Danish General Council ; Speech 
from the Throne. 

Danish Government lays before Parliament a bill incor- 
porating Sell les wig. 

The French Emperor iiroposes a European Congress. 

New Danish Constitution adopted. 

Death uf Frederick VII.; accession of Christian IX. 

Prince Frederick of Augustenburg asserts his claim. 

Prussian liower House upholds Frederick as Duke of 
Schleswig-Holstein. 

Confederate Diet decides to execute federal chastise- 
ment upon Holstein. 

Representatives of German States meet at Frankfort 
and resolve to support Frederick; appointment of the 
Committee of Thirty-Six. 

German troops enter Holstein ; Danes retire. 

Federal Commissioners assume control in the Duchies. 

Prince Frederick enters Kiel as Duke of Schleswigand 
Holstein. 

Minister Hall retires; Bishop Monrad forms a Cabinet. 

Motion of Austria and Prussia to occupy Schleswig lost 
in the Diet. 

The two Powers agree to go ahead independently of 
the Diet. 

Marshal Wrangel takes command of the allied troops. 

The two Powers issue a joint note. 

Bombardment of Missunde. 

Danes abandon the Dannevirke. 

The allies occupy Flensburg. 

Federal Commissioners protest against Prussian occu- 
pation of Holstein towns. 

Prussians enter Jutland. 

New agreement signed between Prussia and Austria. 

Death of Maximilian II. of Bavaria. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



50S 



1864, April 4. 
April 18. 
April 25. 
April 29. 
May !). 
May 12. 
May 18. 

May 28. 



June y. 
June 10. 
June 22. 

June 2.0. 
June 29. 
July 8. 
July 11. 
July 18. 
July ■2(;. 
Aug. 22. 

Sept. 15. 
Sept. 21,22. 
Sept. 24. 
Oct. 27. 

Oct. 30. 
Dec. 5. 

Dec. 8. 
18t>5, Jan. 

Feb. 22. 
March 24. 
April G. 



April 17. 

May 2'.». 

June 27. 

July 21. 
Jiilv 2:5. 



Garibaldi arrives in Enj^land. 

Prussians take the fortress of Diippel by assault. 

Opening of Conferences at Loudon. 

Danes retreat to Alsen and Fnncn. 

Danish naval victory off Heligoland. 

Beginning of one month's armistice. 

Prince Frederick Charles replaces Wrangel as Com- 
mander-in-chief. 

German Powers move in the Conference the establish- 
ment of Schleswig-Holstein as an independent state 
under Prince Augustenburg; English proposal to 
divide Schlcswig at the River Schley. 

Armistice in Denmark prolonged a fortnight. 

Bismarck's interview with the Czar at Berlin. 

Emperor Francis Joseph and King William meet at 
Carlsbad. 

End of Conferences at London. 

Prussians bombard Alsen and caiitiire the batteries. 

Fall of the Monrad Ministry. 

Formation of the Bluhine Ministry in Copenhagen. 

Truce agreed to in Copenhagen. 

Peace Conference at Vienna. 

Visit of the King of Prussia to the Austrian Emperor 
at Schonbrunn. 

Franco-Italian Ci)n\ i-ntion signed. 

Kiots in Turin. 

Minghetti resigns ; La Marmora forms a Ministry. 

liesignation of Kechberg ; appointment of Count 
Mensdorff-Pouilly. 

Treaty of Peace with Denmark signed at VitMui.i. 

Withdrawal of troojis from the Duchies decreed by the 
Diet. 

Publication of the Papal Encyclical and Syllabus. 

Great tinancial difficulty in Austria. 

Prussian specifications sent to Vienna. 

Order to transfer Prussian .Marine station to Kiel. 

Ctmfederate Diet ado])t the resolution of Bavaria and 
Saxonj-, requesting tlie transference of Ilolstein to 
Prince Frederick. 

Prussia asserts to .-Vustria her determination to retain 
her power In the Duchies. 

Discussion ab(»ut annexation in the Ministerial Council 
at Berlin. 

New Austrian .Minislry: .Sclniiirling siiceccded by 
Belcredi. 

Prussia decides to send an nil iniatinn to .\ustria. 

Interview between Kiii^ William and Von (hi rioriii.n 
at Sal/.burg. 



606 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



18()5, .Tilly 27. 



Alljr. U. 

Au-. 19. 



Sept. 8. 
Sept. 14. 
Sept. 15. 



Sept. 20. 
Sept. oO. 
Oct. 1. 

Oct. 4. 
Oct. 14. 
Dec. 

Dec. 14. 
181)6, Jan. 20. 

Jail. 23. 
Jan. 26. 
Feb. 7. 
Feb. 24. 
March 7. 
March 7. 

March 14. 
Marcli 16. 



March 24. 



March 27. 
March 29. 
March 31. 
March 31. 

April 7. 
April 8. 
April 9. 
Apr. 11, 14 

April 14. 



Motion of Bavaria, Saxony, and Darmstadt, to summon 

the Estates in the Ducliies and to admit Schleswig 

into the Confederation. 
Convention of Gastein signed. 
Meeting of King William and Emperor Francis Josepli 

at Salzburg. 
Publication of tlie Frencli Circular to the embassies. 
Circular Despatch of Lord John Russell. 
The King of Prussia takes formal possession of Lauen- 

burg ; Manteuffel and Gablenz assume the adminis- 
tration of Schleswig and Holstein. 
Suspension of the February Constitution in Austria. 
Bismarck calls ujjon Drouyn de Lhuys in Paris. 
Gastein Convention condemned by the Diet at Frank- 
fort. 
Bismarck's first interview with Napoleon at Biarritz. 
Augustenburg's visit to Eckernfiirde. 
German States accept the Italian commercial treaty 

and recognize Victor Emmanuel as King of Italy. 
Meeting of Manteuffel and Gablenz at Kiel. 
Bismarck demands from Austria the banishment of 

Prince Augustenburg. 
Great mass-meeting at Altona. 

Bismarck's despatch complaining of Austria's infidelity. 
Austria's official reply to the above. 
Revolution in Bucharest; deposition of the Prince. 
Napoleon replies to King William's letter of March 3d. 
Austrian Council decides to send more soldiers to the 

north. 
Govone arrives in Berlin. 
Mensdorff's circular note to the German Governments, 

referring the Schleswig-Holstein question to the 

Confederate Diet. 
Prussian Circular to the German States informing them 

of Austria's military movements, and asking what 

side they would take in the war. 
Prussian Ministerial Council decides to prepare for war. 
Prussia issues orders securing her frontiers. 
Pfordten's note to the two Great Powers. 
John Bratianu, an influential Roumanian statesman, 

visits Charles Anthony. 
Austria demands the demobilization of Prussian army. 
Treaty between Prussia and Italy. 

Prussia's motion in the Diet for a German Parliament. 
Government at Bucharest issue;; proclamations bearing 

imprint of French origin. 
EnglaTid and Austria propose that definitive decision 

in relation to Roumania be postponed. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 507 

18»k), April 15. Priiu'e Clnirlcs Aiitliony receives telegram from I'.ra- 
tianu. 

April 19. Bismarck counsels Prince Charles rejjardiiig throiu* of 
Roumania. 

April 21. Prussia agrees to a common disarmament. 

April 21. Austria decides to mobilize. Archduke Albrecht a])- 
pointed Commander of the Army of the South ; 
Benedek of the Army of the North. 

April 22. Prime Ministers of the Lesser States meet at Augsburg. 

April 27. Italy decides to mobilize. 

May 1. Bratianu presents himself to Prince Cliarles announ- 

cing result of plebiscitum. 

May ■>. Thiers' speech in the Frencli Chamber. 

May 4. Count Mensdorff declares negotiations about disarming 

to be at an end. 

May 5. Austria's propo.sal to exchange Venetia for Silesia laid 

before Nigra. 

May 6. Napoleon's speech at Auxerre expressing contempt for 

treaties of 1815. 

May 7. Attempt to assassinate Bismarck. 

May y. Dissolution of the I'russian Chamber. 

May 11. It is decided to ask Pru.ssia to specify her plans of re- 
form. 

May 11. Prince Charles disappears from Diisseldorf. 

May 12. Alliance of Prussia and Italy. 

May 20. Prince Charles arrives in Koumauia. 

May 24. Napoleon otticially invites the contending Powers to a 
Congress; declined by Austria. 

May 2.S. Proposals of Anton Gablenz declined. 

June 1. Austria proposes to refer the matter of the Duchies to 

the Confederate Diet. 

June ;5. Bismarck protests against the above. 

June 7. Prussians enter Ilolstein ; Austrians retire. 

June 10. Prussia sends to all the German (Tovernments licr jdans 
for a future Confederate Constitution. 

June 10. Prussia assumes the administration of HoLstein. 

June 11. Austria's famous motion in the Diet, — to be voted 
upon in three days. 

June 12. Treaty of Frajice and Austria. 

June 12. Imperial Manifesto in the form of an official letter from 
Najioleon to Drouyn ile Lliuys, dated Juiie lltli. 

June 12. Austria breaks off dii)lom:itic relations witli PrMs>ia. 

June 12. Bismarck's Memorial eonccniing measures to be 
adopted. 

June 14. Vote in the Confederate Diet upon .Vustria's motion: 
declaring that Pru.ssia by entering Ilolstein jiad 
broken the treaties, and calling for intervention by 
the mobilizatit)n of the wliole Confederate army ex- 
(•i'|it Prussia's contingent, which should be deniolii- 
ii/.ed. Voted for by Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover. 



508 



CIIRONOLOaiCA L TABLE. 



1866, June 15. 

June 16. 

June 17. 
June 18. 
June 19. 
June 20. 
June 23. 

June 24. 
June 26. 

June 26. 
June 27. 
June 27. 
June 27. 
June 27. 
June 28. 
June 28. 
June 28. 
June 20. 
June 2!). 
June 29. 
June 30. 
July 1. 
July 2. 



July 3. 

July 4. 

July 4. 
July 5. 
July 8. 
July 10. 
July 13. 
July 13. 

July 13. 

July 14. 
July 15. 



He.sse-Cassel, Nassau, and others, 9 vs. 6. Prussia 
announces her withdrawal from the German Con- 
federation, declares the same dissolved, and invites 
the members to form a new one exclusive of Austria. 
The Diet protests, and continues its functions. 

Prussia declares war upon Hesse-Cassel, Hanover, and 
Saxony ; Prussians advance. 

Prussia's note to the German Petty States requesting 
their co-operation. 

Prussian occupation of Hanover. 

Prussian occupation of Dresden. 

Prussian occupation of Cassel. 

Italy declares Mar upon Austria. 

The First Army, under Prince Frederick Charles, and 
the Army of the Elbe enter Bohemia. 

Italians defeated at Custozza. 

The Second Army, under the Crown Prince, enters 
Bohemia. 

Prussian victories at Liebenau, Turnau, and PodoU. 

Second Army repulsed at Trautenau. 

Encounter at Langensalza. 

Left Column of Second Army victorious at Nachod. 

Prussian victory at Hiihnerwasser. 

Left Column of Second Army victorious at Skalitz. 

Battle of INIiinchengriitz. 

Second Army victorious at Trautenau. 

Victory of First Army at Gitschin. 

Surrender of the Hanoverians. 

Victory at Schweinschiidel. 

Communication opened between the two armies. 

Command assumed by the King. 

Falckenstein leaves Eisenach to conduct the campaign 
of the Main against the Confederate army under 
the Princes Charh's of Bavaria and Alexander of 
Hesse. 

Battle of Koniggriitz, or Sadowa. Total defeat of the 
Austrians. 

Emperor Francis Joseph cedes Venetia to Napoleon, 
and requests his intervention. 

Prussian victories at Wiesenthal and Dermbach. 

Publication of the note in the Moniteur. 

Cialdini crosses the Po and enters Venetia. 

Victories at Hammelburg and Kissingen. 

Victory at Laufach. 

Archduke Albrecht assumes command of all the Aus- 
trian forces. 

Members of the Confederate Diet retire from Frank- 
fort to Augsburg. 

Engagement at Asohaffenburg. 

Battle at Tobitschau. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 509 

1866, July 16. Frankfort occupied by Falokt-nsteiii. 

July 22. Fight at Bluinenau stopi)ed by the news of the truce. 

July 'J4. Victories at Bischofsheini and Werbach. 

July 25. Engagements at Neubrunn and Gerscheini. 

July 26. Fight at Kossbruun. 

July 26. Preliminaries of Peace signed at Nicolsburg. 

July 30. Armistice granted to the German states. 

./uly 31. Prus.sian army reviewed by the King fifteen miles from 
Vienna. 

Aug. 4. Bismarck's Circular to the states that had accepted the 
invitation to join a Northern Confederation. 

Aug. 4. Tariff Convention at Brunswick. 

Aug. 5. Opening of the Prussian Parliament. 

Aug. 13. Peace with Wiirtemberg concluded ; Aug. 17, with 
Baden ; Aug. 21.', with Bavaria; Sept. 3, with Hesse- 
Darmstadt. 

Aug. 17. Bill of annexation brought before the Prussian Parlia- 
ment. 

Aug. 18. Treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, signed be- 
tween Prussia and the following states: Saxe-Wei- 
mar, Oldenburg, Brunswick, Saxe-Altenburg, Saxe- 
Coburg-Ciotha, Anhalt, Schwarzburg-Itudolstadt, 
Scliwavzhurg-Sondershausen, Waldeck, lleuss the 
(Younger Line), Lippe-Detmold, Schaumburg-Li])pe. 
Liibeck, and Bremen; Aug. 21, with ISIecklenburg- 
Schwerin and Mecklenburg-Strelitz ; Sept. 3, with 
Hesse (for the country north of the Main) ; Sept. 26, 
with Reuss the (Elder Line) ; Oct. IX, with Saxe- 
Meiningen ; Oct. 21, with Saxony. 

Aug. 23. Treaty of Peace signed at Prague. 

Aug. 24. Last sitting of the Confederate Diet at Augsburg ; its 
dis.solution. 

Sept. 8. Indemnity Bill passed. 

Sept. 11. Passage of the Annexation Bill. 

Sept. 16. Napoleon's Circular to the French embassies. 

Sept. 27. Loan granted by the Prussian Parliament. 

Oct. 3. Treaty of Peace between Austria and Italy signed at 

Vienna. 

Oct. 6. Prussia takes po.ssession of ILmover. 

Oct. 8. Prussia takers po.ssession of He.sse-Cassel, Nassau, am! 

Frankfort. 

Oct. 21. Plebiscitum in Vcnctia concerning annexation to Italy. 
641,7.58 v.s. (;<i. 

Oct. 23. Electoral Law fortlic new Oerman I'arliauicnt jni iiiul- 

gated at Berlin. 

Oct. 27. Special treaty between Prussia and Oldenburg. 

Oct. ;W. Baron von Beust becomes Austrian Foreign Minister. 

Dec. 3-11. The Frencli trooj)s t|uit Home. 

Dec. 15. PhMiipotentiarics from Nortli (!crman ConfcderatLua 
meet at Berlin. 



510 CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 

1867, Jan. Napoleon sends tien. Fleury to Italy to demand renun- 

ciation of Rome. 

Jan. 7. Stepluin submits draft of contract in relation to postal 

affairs. 

Jan. 17. llicasoli ministry submits bill to Second Italian Cham- 
ber relating to Rome. 

Jan. 24. Sclileswig and Holstein incorporated. 

Feb. 3-5. Conference for consideration of uniform organization 
of South German armies held at Stuttgart. 

Feb. i). Draft of the new Constitution for North German Con- 

federation settled. 

Feb. 12. Election for the Reichstag. 

Feb. 14. Opening of French Chambers. 

Feb. 24. North German Parliament meets at Berlin. 

March 4. Bismarck presents draft of Constitution for considera- 
tion by the House. 

March 13. First reading of the Constitution ended. 

March 19. Benedetti receives instructions to prepare Bismarck 
for surrender of Luxemburg to France. 

March 20. Prince of Orange sent to Paris with a letter to Napo- 
leon. 

March 28. Prince of Orange delivers letter of King-Grand-Duke 
into hands of Napoleon. 

March 30. House completes section of Constitution relating to 
Reit^hstag. 

March 31. Moustier sends telegram to Benedetti. 

April 1. Benedetti calls upon Bismarck. 

April 1. Count Goltz informs INIarquis Moustier of Bismarck s 
attitude. 

April 1. Reichstag begins its deliberations upon individual ad- 
ministrative branches. 

April 2. Despatches received at The Hague from Prussia. 

April 4. Ricasoli resigns. 

April 5. Lord Derby announces to the English Upi^er House 
the intentions of his government in relation to Lux- 
emburg. 

April 6. Benedetti instructed to demand the real motive of Bis- 
marck's speech on the 1st. 

April 7. Hesse-Darmstadt enters into offensive and defensive 
alliance with Prussia. 

April 8. Jules Favre interpellates the French Government. 

April 11. Ratazzi succeeds Ricasoli. 

April 12. Austrian ambassador calls upon Bismarck offering iiis 
government's good ofiices in connection with Luxem- 
burg question. 

April 15. France sends circular note to St. Petersburg, Vienna, 
and London. 

April 17. Austria's formal proposals submitted to Napoleon. 

April 17. Federal Constitution adoi)ted. 

April 18. Bismarck sends communication to London. 



CIIIiOyOLOGIVAL TABLE. 



511 



1867, April 21. 

April 27. 

April 30. 

May 3. 

May 7. 
May 1). 

May 11. 
May 17. 
May .iO. 
May ol. 
June. 

June 1. 

June .■>. 

June (!. 
June 14. 
June 18. 
June 18. 

June 20. 

July 1. 

July 8. 
July 14. 

July 1,-.. 
July 2.-.. 

July .!(). 



Auj,'. 


4. 


Aug. 


12. 


Aug. 


1.^. 


Aug. 


ir,. 


Aug. 


18. 


Aug. 


2;}. 


Aug. 


.•n . 


Sept. 

<>lMif 


;>. 


ftl Jit. 

Sept. 


in. 



Malaret sends eoniniuMication to Freueli Government 
regarding Italian policy. 

The King of Wiirteniberg appoints Col. N'oii Wagner 
chief of the department of war. 

MoiUteur declares French military measures justifi- 
able. 

Lord Stanley forwards to the Powers draft of a i)ro- 
posed treaty. 

He receives communication from Prussian ambassador. 

Lord Stanley announces that English Cabinet would 
agree to BernstorlT's amendment. 

Prussia agrees to neutrality of Luxemburg. 

Bisnnirck rejects the Bavarian proposition. 

Conference held at NiJrdlungen. 

Batitications exchanged. 

Great World's Fair in I'aris. Arrival of Eniiicftir Al- 
exander of Russia. 

Denmark refu.ses Prussia's demands in relation to 
Schleswig-Holstein. 

Draft submitted by Prussian Government in relation 
to Customs Union. 

Arrival of King "SVilliam and Bismarck in Paris. 

King William leaves Paris. 

Bavaria granted six votes in enlarged Federal Council. 

Bismarck replies to Danish refusal of Prussia's de- 
mands. 

Representatives of North German and South German 
States assemble at Berlin. 

Napoleon receives intelligence of shooting of ^laxi- 
niilian. 

Formal treaty of Customs Union signed. 

Count Bismarck nominated as Chancellor of the Con- 
federation. 

Prussian ministry defends its action. 

Moustier sen<ls desiiatch to his churye d'uffaires at 
I'russian Court. 

King William grants audience to committee of Hessian 
Assembly. 

Bismarck arrives at Ems. 

A Federal Chancery instituted to assist the clian<'ellor. 

First session of the Federal Council ojicned. 

King of Prussia makes a detour through Frankfort. 

Napoleon meets Fran<'is .Iosei)h at Salzburg. 

The royal guests de])art from Sal/burg. 

Elections for the Reichstag take ]>lace. 

Grand Duke of Baden makes speech in favor of ;illianco 
with North German Confederation. 

Bismarck sends (circular note in con.sefpience of meet- 
ing of ('mi)erors at Sal/burg. 

First regular session of North German Kcichstag o])ens. 



512 CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 

181)7, Sept. 10. First Chamber of Baden vote.s in favor of treaty with 
Nortli German Confederation. 

Sejjt. 17. North German Reichstag elects its President. 

Sept. 17. Admiral Topete, commanding Spanish naval force, 
raises standard of revolt. 

Sept. 20. Andalusia in hands of Spanish revolutionists. 

Sept. 27. Itesolulions adojjted by National Party of Wiirtem- 
berg. 

Sei>t. 29. Resolutions adopted by Democratic Popular Party of 
Wiirtemberg. 

Sept. 29. Treaty regarding Hanoverian funds signed and rati- 
fied. 

Sept. 29. Menotti Garibaldi opens hostility against Papal troops. 

Sept. 30. Bavarian Legislative Assembly convened. 

Oct. Isabella of Spain offers Napoleon assistance in protect- 

^ ing Pope. 

Oct. 4. Bavarian National Party adojits resolutions in favor of 

treaty with North German Confederation. 

Oct. 5. Second Chamber consents by unanimous vote. 

Oct. 8. Prince Hohenlohe advises Lower Chamber of Bavaria 

to confirm treaties. 

Oct. 17. Ratazzi tenders his resignation. 

Oct. 21. A debate of unusual violence takes place in Bavarian 
Chamber. Customs Union treaty. 

Oct. 22. Bavarirou Lower Chamber confines the treaties. 

Oct. 23. Upper Chamber rejects treaty. 

Oct. 26. Upper Chamber reconsiders its action and accepts 
treaty. 

Oct. 27. Bavarian delegates arrive in Berlin. 

Oct. 28. First French battalions march into Rome. 

Oct. 28. North German Reichstag begins its final deliberations 
in regard to treaties. 

Oct. 29. Deliberations in "Wiirtemberg Lower Chamber on trea- 
ties with North German Confederation. 

Oct. 31. Treaties approved. 

Oct. 31. Gives unconditional sanction to the treaties. 

Nov. 1. Treaties sanctioned by Upper Chamber. 

Nov. 3. Garibaldi fights with Papal and French troops. 

Nov. 6. Exchange of ratifications takes place in Berlin. 

Nov. 7. General elections carried by the Government. 

Nov. 10. Marquis Moustier sends circular note to European 
Courts. 

Nov. 17. Bismarck receives note from Mazziui. 

Nov. 18. Napoleon, in speech from throne, laments general feel- 
ing of apprehension. 

Dec. 2. Jules Favre criticises French Government for its de- 

fence of Rome. 

Dec. 4, 5. Discussions on French policy in Rome continue. 
1868, Jan. 8. Debate on the Constitution of North German Confed- 

eration. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



513 



1868, Feb. 20. 
March. 



March 2. 
March 23 
April 2. 
April 22. 

April 27. 
April 2.S. 
May 1. 

May 2. 
May (j. 
May (i. 
May 7. 
May 14. 

May 18. 
May 19. 
May 23. 
May 27. 

June 9. 
June 15. 
June 19. 
June 22. 
Sept. 5. 

Nov. 22. 

Dec. 



Dec. 1. 
Dec. 11. 

Dec. 11. 
Dec. 1."). 
Dec. 21. 



1H(>9. 



Marcli. 

March 4. 
April. 

April 4. 



King William closes session of the As.sembly. 

Prince Jerome Napoleon makes a tour to Berlin. Prus- 
sia accedes to request of Baden oliicers to receive in- 
struction in Prussian military schools. 

Customs Federui Council assembles. 

Ileiehstag convoked in Berlin. 

Reichstag orgaTiizes. 

Committee in cliarge of bill regarding administration 
of Federal debt reports. 

King William opens session of Customs Parliament. 

Customs Parliament proceeds to election of ofHcers. 

Committee reports upon examination of Bavarian dele- 
gates. 

Wiirtemberg elections discussed. 

Suckow has an interview with Moltke. 

Suckow has a conversation with Bismarck. 

Bennigsen defends National Liberals. 

Suckow discusses with Moltke probability of French 
attack on South Germany. 

Commercial treaty with Austria discussed. 

Finances receive careful scrutiny. 

House proceeds to financial deliberation upon tariff bill. 

Bismarck authorizes re-assembling of German Ileicbs- 
tag. 

Special deliberation u]i(in items of tin; budget begun. 

Deliberation by the plenum begun. 

Final deliberation on the btidget takes place. 

Pope condemns Austrian Constitution. 

Annual meeting of German working-men's societies in 
session at Niirnberg. 

Bismarck demands Prince Charles of Itoumaiiia to ilis- 
miss his ministry. 

Belgian railway companies sign a preliminary agree- 
ment to give French Government possession and con- 
trol of direct lines to Brussels and Rotterdam. 

Turkish Government .sends ultinnitum to Athens. 

Matter of railway control discussed by Second Belgian 
Chamber. 

Turkish ultimatum presented. 

Ultinnitum rejected by Greece. 

Bismarck proposes that Turkish-Greek question should 
be settled by conference of Great Powers. 

Belgian railway companies conclude final negotiations. 

Vitzthum takes draft-treaty of triple alliance to 
Vienna. 

King "William ojkjiis session of Reichstag. 

Vitzthum returns to Paris to open formal negotiations 
witli regard to triple alliance. 

Prim induces Si)anish ministry to oiler crown to King 
Ferdinand. 



514 



CJJJIONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



1,S(;9, April (>. 
April 9. 
April 13. 
xVpril IG. 

April 22. 
April 27. 

May 1 . 

May 11. 

May 15. 
May 19. 

May 23. 
June 1. 
June 4. 

June 11. 
June 14. 
June 20. 

June 22. 
June 24. 
June 28. 
July 2. 
July 17. 

Aug. 

Aug. 2. 

Aug. 12. 
Sept. 

Sept. 10. 
Oct. G. 
Oct. 7. 
Oct. 15. 
Oct. 23. 

Oct. 25. 

Oct. 26. 

Nov. 4. 
Nov. 5. 
Nov. 16. 



Spanish crown offered to Amadeo, Duke of Aosta. 

Prince Hoheulolie addresses circular note to the Powers. 

Federal Council submits budget for 1870 to Reichstag. 

Brilliant parliamentary encounter takes place in North 
German Reichstag. 

Frere-Orban comes to Paris. 

Protocol agreed upon to appoint commission to decide 
upon in<lemnity to Belgian railways. 

Beust gives Belgians advice in regard to their submis- 
sion to France. 

Bismarck not averse to discussion on subject of Span- 
ish crown. 

Gramont nominated to the French ministry. 

Napoleon submits Archduke Albert's plan of campaign 
to council of highest officers. 

Elections in France. 

At Madrid Cortes comxiletes Constitution. 

Vitzthum returns to Brussels satisfied with his achieve- 
ment. 

Prim addresses Cortes upon throne question. 

Prim sends Salazar to Sigmaringen. 

Prince of Hohenzollern promises to accept Spanish 
crown. 

Session of North German Reichstag concludes. 

Spanish Cortes adjourns. 

French Chamber convened in extraordinary session. 

Napoleon again laid upon a bed of suffering. 

Office of Secretary of State abolished in France by im- 
lierial decree. 

Menabrea requests Austria to influence Napoleon to 
remove troops from Rome. 

Draft of senatns consultum submitted to French Sen- 
ate for legislative action. 

Napoleon suffers serious attack of illness. 

Period of great uncertainty and agitation in Spain. 
Salazar goes to Munich. 

Napoleon removed from St. Cloud to Paris. 

Prussian Assembly opens. 

Crown Prince of Prussia arrives in Vienna. 

Treaty between Switzerland and Italy. 

Salazar advises placing Hohenzollern prince on Span- 
ish throne. 

Herr A'on der Heydt, Priissian Minister of Finance, re- 
signs, and Otto Camphausen appointed his successor. 

House appoints 29th as day for opening discussion on 
budget. 

Discussion on Prussian budget begins. 

Lasker's and Virchow's motions rejected. 

Bill embodying completed plan of Minister of Finance 
submitted to Prussian House. 



CHROXOLOGICAL TABLE. 515 

18<}9, Nov. 29. Interrupted session of French Chambers re.sume(l. 

Dec. 8. (liciiinenieal Council begins its sessions in tlie Vatii-nii. 

1870, Jan. 'J. French empire receives responsible ministry. 

Feb. Pope lays before Council draft of a decree clainiiiij; 

control of Church over Stale. 

Feb. 1. Count Daru requests good offices of England with Prus- 

sian Government. 

Feb. 14. Reichstag enters upon iuijtortaiit session. 

Feb. 'JO. Ollivier opposes a forcible note defending rights of 
State. 

Feb. 22. Jules Favre interpellates French Government. 

Feb. 2.". Princii)le of Goveriinieut candidatures made subject of 
further interpellation. 

Feb. 24. I^asker eager to welcome Baden into Confetleration. 

Feb. 24. Freni-li Left applauds ministry for its stand against 
ofHcial influence in elections. 

March. Pitter debate in French Chambers. 

March 9. Ollivier announces draft of a decree making needful 
modifications in Constitution. 

March 11). The Curia peremptorily upholds every paragraph of 
schema. 

March 22. Napoleon expresses approval of Ollivier's views. 

March 28. Ollivier submits comploted draft to Senate. 

April 8. Debate in Reichstag upon penal code closes. 

April 13. French legislative body adjourns. 

April 14. Buffet and Daru retire from French Cabinet. 

April 20. French Senate approves draft of Constitution. 

April 21. Session of Customs Parliament opens. 

Aj)ril 2.'!. Imperial decree formulates the plebiscitum. 

jNIay 8. Voting on the plebiscitum. 

May 9. Reichstag resumes its labors. 

3Iay 21. Final deliberation upon penal code begun. 

May 2.".. Planck and associates introduce compromise motion. 

May 2ti. Session ends. 

July 2. Si)anish ministers discuss situation with I'resident of 

Cortes. 

July .'!. Telegrams received at Paris Foreign Office regar<ling 

Ilohenzollern affair; firamont directs French chur(je 
d'affaires at Pcriiii to interrogate I'russian Govern- 
ment. 

July 4. Counidl of Ministers decide to recognize Prince Leo- 

l)old as candidate. 

July 4. fJramont .stimulates excitement iu Paris by official au- 

nouncenu^nts. 

July ."). Notes of alarm sounded by I'arisian i>ress. 

July i;. rjramont ami Ollivier reply to Coclicry interpellation. 

July?. fJramont sends desi»atch to Li; Sourd at Berlin ; seiul> 

instructions to lienedetti. 

July 7. Saga.sta .sends <'ircu]ar letter e.K|daining position of 

Spaiii.sh Government. 



616 



CIIBONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



1870, July 
July 
July 


B. 
B. 
S. 


July 
July 
July 
July 
July 
July 


3,9. 

3. 

3. 

10. 

10,11 

11. 


July 
July 
July 


11. 
11. 
11. 


July 
July 


12. 
12. 


July 
July 
July 
July 
July 


12. 
13. 
13. 
13. 
13. 


July 
July 
July 
July 
July 


13. 

13. 

13-15. 

14. 

14. 



July 

July 
July 

July 
July 
July 

July 

July 
July 
July 
July 
July 
July 
July 
July 



Instructions sent to Prussian ambassadors. 

Benedetti arrives at Ems. 

Salazar issues pamphlet in relation to Hohenzollern 
prince. 

Gramont telegraphs instructions to Benedetti. 

"Werther calls on Benedetti. 

Benedetti has audience with King William. 

Bismarck makes announcement to Federal Council. 
, Gramont sends urgent telegrams to Benedetti. 

Gramont informs Chamber that he has no definite an- 
nouncement to make. 

Gen. von Koou leaves country-seat for Berlin. 

Benedetti has second interview with King William. 

Count Beust condemns Gramont's quarrelsome atti- 
tude. 

Gramont telegraphs instructions to Benedetti. 

News of Prince Leopold's withdrawal carried to every 
part of German}'. 

Great tumult in Paris. 

King William learns of latest demands of France. 

French Cabinet meets in council at St. Cloud. 

Benedetti has interview with King William in Park. 

Gramont announces to French Chamber new claims 
against Prussia. 

Reports of feeling in Paris circulated in Berlin. 

Reports of occurrences at Ems made known in Berlin. 

Army budget under discussion at ^Munich. 

French Chamber discusses question of mobilization. 

Lord Granville submits proposals to France and Ger- 
many. 

Vitzthum makes fruitless attempt to obtain interview 
with Gramont. 

Despatch posted up in Ems. 

French Cabinet assembles in Council ; orders issued to 
mobilize French army. 

Lord Granville's proposal declined in Paris and Berlin. 

Napoleon gives Vitzthum audience at St. Cloud. 

French Cabinet decides upon form of fateful announce- 
ment. 

King William leaves Ems for Berlin to prepare for de- 
fence. 

Orders for mobilization of Bavarian army issued. 

Mobilization in Baden. 

First day of mobilization in North Germany. 

Great crowds assemble in front of palace in Munich. 

King of Wiirtemberg orders mobilization of army. 

Victor Emmanuel enthusiastic for France. 

Cabinet council of Austrian ministers held. 

Debate in Bavarian Repi-esentative Assembly on war 
loan. 



CIinOXOLOGlCAL TABLE. 517 

1870, July 19. Deputy JiJrg reads report of committee to House. 

July 19. Englaiid publishes manifesto of neutrality. 

July 19. Le Sourd presents formal declaration of war. 

July 20. Decision of Bavarian Lower Chamber receives sanction 
of Upper Chamber. 

July "20. Count Beust announces Austria's neutrality. 

Julv 20. Favorable reply to Napoleon's letter received from 
Italy. 

July 20. Spanisli Cortes convene for purpose of electing king. 

July 21. King of Wiirtemberg convokes Chambers. 

July 21. Reichstag takes fiiuil action on war loan. 

July 22. Vimercati sent to Vienna in relation to triple alliance. 

July 2o. Bismarck replies to French manifesto. 

July 23. Metternich presents Beust's confidential hotter to Gra- 
mont. 

July 2."). Graniont sends despatch to Italy rejecting Beust's 
proposition. 

Julj- 24. Italy's neutrality proclaimed. 

July 25. Italy withdraws from triple alliance. 

July 20. Vimei-cati and Beust decide upon treaty of alliance be- 
tween Austria and Italy. 

July 27. Beust submits to Vienna conference a desijatch from 
Napoleon. 

July 28. Vitztlium and Vimercati leave Vienna. 

July 28. Formal agreement for re-establishment of September 
treaty drawn up by Italian ministers and French 
ambassadors creates surprise and consternation in 
Vienna. 
Vimercati has audience with Napoleon. 
Vimercati retiirns from Paris, his object unaccom- 
plished. 
News received in Italy of battle of Worth. 
England ready to enter into an agreement with Italy. 
The Imperial Crown offered to the King of Prussia. 
Re-establishment of the German Empire: William I. 
of Prussia proclaimed German Emperor at \'ersaille.s. 





Aug. 3. 




Aug. 5. 




Aug. 0, 




Aug. 10. 




Dec. 3. 


1871. 


Jan. 18. 



II^DEX. 



Ab6e, iMinister in Cassel, favors annex- 
ation of Duchies to Prussia, iii. 234. 

Abeken, Counsellor, acconiiianies King 
William to Ems, vii. .'iU; semis de- 
spatch to 15ismarck relatinj; to inter- 
view of King William and Beuedetti, 
393-395 ; his despatch given to the 
public, 398. 

Abel supports Ultramontane papers in 
their attacks on Prussia, i. 105. 

Aberileen, Karl of, warned against 
French ambassador, iii. 3G ; defines 
policy of Kugland with regard to Da- 
nish succession, ib. 

Act of Confederation, faults, i. 52 et 
seq. ; Germany's relation to Foreign 
I'owers under. 54 et seq. 

Adolphus, Duke of Nassau, not in favor 
of August. •iiliurg, iii. i'M; treated 
with maguaniiiiity by German Gov- 
ernment, vi. 351. 

Agidi takes part ia discussion of tariff 
question, vii. 36. 

Agreement between Austria and Prus- 
sia, iii. L'40. 

Albert, Archduke, desires manifesta- 
tion by Prussia and German Confed- 
eration in case of war, ii. 370 ; rejects 
French plan, vii. 281. 

Albert, Crown Prince, command.s Saxon 
army, v. 16. 

Albrecht, Austrian Archduke, sent to 
Munich, iii. 321 ; in command of Aus- 
trian Army of the South, iv. 394 ; as- 
sumes command of Austrian army in 
Italy, V. 94; deteritiines to fall upon 
the divideii Italian forces, 98, 99; 
protests against scattering Austrian 
forces, 301 ; forwards his troops by 
railway to Vienna, 302; visits Paris, 
.and discusses military matters with 
.Napoleon, vii. 247, 248. 

Albufera, Duke of, questions Gramont 
in relation to demands upon King of 
i'russia, vii. 420: recpiests that de- 
sp.itches be submitteil, ///. 

.VI<;olea, defeat f>f Queen of Spain's 
troops at, vi. 412. 

Alexander, Kmperor of Kussia, in- 
<;enKed at Garibaldi's action, ii. 4.30; 
desires to make concessions to Po- 
land, .''i28; unfavorable to NajK.leon's 
lilan of Congress, iii, 164; arrives in 
Berlin, 393; has interview with Hi.s- 



marck, ib.; regrets outbreak of war 
between Prussia and Austria, v. 251 ; 
fears revolutionary dangers, 430; 
discusses South German affairs, 431 ; 
writes a letter to King William upon 
conservative principles, 433; dis- 
l)leased with overthrow of three 
German dynasties, vi. 4 ; declines to 
interfere in Luxemburg matter, 149; 
interposes in behalf of peace, 15.5; 
visits Paris, 224 ; shot at by a Pole in 
Paris, 226; leaves Paris with unpleas- 
ant remembrances of France, 227 ; 
de-sires peace, 233; feelings of, toward 
Prussia, vii. 456. 

Alexander, Prince of Hesse, selected 
to commaiKl 8th Confederate army- 
corps, iv. 411 ; assiunes command of 
7th Confederate army-coriis, v. 15; 
refuses to co-operato with Prince 
Charles, 349 et neq. 

Alexandra, Grand Duchess, betrothal 
and marriage of, to Hessian Prince 
Frederick, iii. 27 ; her death, ib. 

Alfonso, son of Queen Isabella, party 
of, vii. 289, 2i)0. 

Algreen-Ussing, ])urgomaster of Co- 
penhagen, moves in the Diet that the 
Dahish .Monarchv forms one indivis- 
ible State, iii. 27." 

Allied (governments invited to send 
I)lenip.>tentiaries to discuss draft of 
Coiislitution, vi. 24; C(mfereiice of, 
29; aci'ept the Constitution, 197. 

Allied Princes, conference of, in Ber- 
lin, i. 426. 

Alsen, island of, Danish force on, iii. 
40!»; I'riissian i>rep,irations to attack, 
410; captured, 412; effectof the cata.s- 
troj)he in Copenhagen, 413 ; in Enir- 
land,414. 

Altona, city officials send congratula- 
tions to Augustenburg, iv. 166; gri'iit 
mass-meeting held in, ,Jan. 23, 1866, 
303. 

Alvensleben-Krxleben, former Minis- 
ter of Finance, death of, ii. ;J42. 

Alvensleben, (Jen. Giistav von, clioseii 
I'russian representative at the Dres- 
den Congress, ii. 88 ; opposes Selnvar- 
zenberg, 89; cli.iracter and career. 90; 
report on Seliw.irzenberg's scheme 

<■'"• th Mivocation of the m-w C.m- 

fedcratc executive, 100; .sent to ,St. 



)19 



520 



INDEX. 



Petersbui'g, 568 ; signs compact with 
Gortsclijikotf, 572 ; opposed to 
Moltlve's plans, v. 2G. 

Ain:uleo, Duke of Aosta, offered Spau- 
isli crown, vii. 293. 

Andrassy, Count, accompanies Aus- 
trian emperor to Salzburg, vi. 239 ; 
vigorously opposes Beust's plans, vii. 
4G2, 463. 

Annen-Gymnasiiun, St., visit of Xapo- 
leon to, vi. 238. 

Antibes Legion, the, vi. 390. 

Antonelli, Cardinal, on battle of Kijuig- 
grjitz, v. 239 ; replies to Brouyu de 
Lhuys in regard to Papal principles, 
vii. 172 ; represents the duties of good 
Catholics, ib. ; explains ti i French rep- 
resentative why memorial could not 
be received by Oi^cumenical Coinicil, 
257; censures action of France, 487. 

Apponyi, Count, Austrian representa- 
tive at London conference, iii. 353. 

Arago opposes Gramont's war policy, 
vii. 417. 

Arcadians, political club, activitj' of, 
vii. 98-100; bid too low in gc:ieral 
election, 124; disapprove of policy 
of Cabinet, 239 ; urge a w;ir policy, 
247 ; aversion of, to Ollivier's liber- 
alism, 258; for;:ct their distrust of 
the JNIinistry, 272; Graniont accept- 
able to them, 277 ; believe the object 
of their ardent hopes attained, 334. 

Archduke John chosen Imperial Ke- 
gent by the Ni'.tional Assembly, i. 
210 ; accepts, 213 ; enters upon" his 
duties, 214 ; refuses to resign, 387 ; 
hinders Prussia's advance against 
Baden, 388 ; resigns, 396. 

Arentschild apiiointed highest in com- 
mand of Hanoverian army, v. 40. 

Army of the Main, campaign of, v. 347- 
384. 

Arndt on German unity, i. 37. 

Arnim-Boytzenburg circulates address 
requesting complete separation of 
Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark, 
iii. 360. 

Arnim, Heinrich von, receives port- 
folio of Foreign Affairs, i. 159 ; re- 
plv to Camphausen, 363. 

Aschaffenhurg, battle of, v. 371. 

Attempts to form alliances, vii. 448. 

Auerswald, llerr Itudolf von, charac- 
teristics of, ii. 342 ; defends the rights 
of the Prussian Crown, 343 ; removed 
from his position, ih.; visits Prince 
William at Baden, ib. ; thinks peace 
with Austria desirable 357. 
- Augsburg Diet of 1555, i. 12. 

Augustenburg, Christian, Duke, ap- 
peals to Frederick William IV., iii. 
33 ; seeks protection of King of Prus- 
sia, 54 ; offer of indemnity to, for re- 
nouncing his claims, 77; willing to 
enter into negotiations, 79; accepts 
the Danish offer, 86. 

Augustenburg, Frederick, Duke of, 
not bound by promise given by his 
father, iii. 170 : claims government 
of Schleswig-Holstein, iJi. ; solicits 
aid of France, 209 ; arrives at Kiel, 



221 ; claims of, discussed by Lesser 
States, iv. GO-62 ; determines not to 
quit Schleswig-llolstein, 157 ; sees 
his last hopes vanish, 221 ; visits his 
cousin Prince Carl, 269 ; receives 
the homage of city of Eckenforde, ib. 

Aastrdgal Instanz, court of, vi. 184. 

Austria, rise of, 1. 15 ; rivalry with 
Prussia, ib. ; policy with regard to 
the Catholic Church, 16 ; a loose ag- 
gregation, 17 ; ratio of races, 18; ex- 
clusively Catholic policy, 18 ; foreign 
relations, 19 ; condition of, under 
Xapoleon, 39 ; antipathy to Prussia 
inci'eased by Stein's policy, 41 ; pol- 
icy of, toward secret societies and 
popular reform, 42 ; reception of the 
proposal to divide the <Jerman Eii- 
pire into Kreise, 47 ; threatened dis- 
integratioi^ 152; opposes Plan for 
Prussian hegemony, 163 ; attitude 
toward Dahlmann's scheme, 188 et 
seq.; policy of, in Schleswig war, 
256; changes, 298 et seq.; note pro- 
posing a colossal German Empire, 
333 ; delays proceedings in the Ka- 
tional Assembly, 334 ; proclaims a 
new Constitution and makes de- 
mands on the National Assembly, 
340 ; replies to Prussia's proposal, 
355 ; asks Russia's aid to suppress 
the Hungarian Kevolution, 370 ; s*:ate 
of her army, 457 ; protests against 
certain Prussian military move- 
ments, 465; forms an alliance with 
Bavaria and WUrtemberg against 
Prussia, 489 ; replies to Prussia's de- 
mand for a guaranty regarding the 
Hessian military roads, ii. 57 ; Man- 
teuft'el on, .59; Ladenburg 0)i, ib.: 
the reaction in, 121 et seq.; action 
of, in the Ilusso-Turkish war of 1854, 
209 ; sends a peremptory note to 
Ilussia, 232; approved by Prussia, 
ib. ; despatch to Russia, 275 ; Rus- 
sia's reply, 276; incomprehensible 
policy in the Neuohatel affair, 299 ; 
feeling of the European Powers in 
regard to her, 280 ; attituile of, dis- 
turbs Prussian king, 305 ; her posi- 
tion in relation to European Powers 
not an agreeable one, 355 ; offers to 
admit Prussian battalions into Ras- 
tadt conditionally, 358 ; appeals to 
Germany to crush ancient enemy, 
365 ; indignation in, at Russia's pro- 
posal of a Congress of the Great 
Powers, 368 ; expects sympathy from 
German brothers, 374 ; accepts offers 
of peace held out by Napoleon, 380; 
filled with indignation against Prus- 
sia, 386 ; will not accejit Prussia's 
proposition, 398: can never resign 
her position in Germany, 465 ; anger 
in, at Prussia's commercial treaties, 
591 ; declines French invitation to 
interfere in Danish affairs, iii. 36; 
agrees with European Powers in op- 
position to Prussia, 90 : hostility of, 
to Prussia's tariff policy, 99 ; Aus- 
tria and Prussia abandon direct nego- 
tiation ^^■ith Copenhagen, 106 ; sends 



IMJEX. 



621 



sharp answer to Denmark, 115 ; rec- 
ognizes Russell's desi)atch as basis 
for peace, lit) ; insists iipou a Confed- 
erate commissioner, 143 ; urges Con- 
federation to talie energetic action, 
117 ; position of, in relation to con- 
gress at Paris, 1G7, 1G8 ; desires to up- 
hold succession of Christian IX., 18U ; 
desires to leave the chastisement of 
l>enmark to Prussia, 184 ; satisfaction 
at Prussia's policy, ISG ; accedes to 
Prussia's wishes, 198 ; indignation in, 
at arrogance of Lesser States, 2;;9 ; de- 
ci<le3 upon agreement with Prussia, 
■JIO ; Danish war unpopular in, 296 ; 
distrust of Prussia in, 297; idea of 
Prussian annexation of Duchies not 
favored by, 377 ; her reason for al- 
liance with Prussia, 434 ; her fear of 
a rupture with France, iv. 22 ; lean- 
ing to Italy, 25; policy on the ques- 
tion of the Duchies, 27; anxiety in, 
on account of military movements of 
Prussia, 43; inconsistent action of, 
51 ; needs peace, 58 ; ojiposes interfe- 
rence of Confederate Diet, 60; irri- 
tated at Prussia's silence, 62 ; de- 
spatches to, published in newsjiapers, 
03 ; rejects Prussia's plan for gov- 
ernment of Schleswig-llolstein, T'j- 
75 ; ready to transfer her rights to 
Augusteuburg, 115; jirotests against 
Prussia's proceedings, 118 ; mutual 
relations with Prussia become less 
satisfactory, 119; inclination in, to 
leave settlement of Schleswig-llol- 
stein affairs to Prussia and future 
sovereign, 123 ; consents to Prussia's 
plan for calling Estates of Schleswig- 
llolstein, 128 ; a financial and consti- 
tutional crisis brewing in, 133 ; mili- 
tary officers and nobility in, enraged, 
134; her interests antagoidstic to 
those of Prussia, 147 ; desires re- 
newal of negotiations, 151 ; willing to 
make concessions to Prussia, 153 ; 
new and strange conditions arise in, 
ISO, 181 ; attitude of Liberal majority 
in Lower House of, 183 ; Prussian ul- 
timatum received in, 188; leaders of, 
not zealous for Blome's programme, 
195; distrustful of Lisniarck, 196; 
warlike feeling in, 197; treats 11<>1- 
stein as entirely independent, 271 ; 
stands firmly at Prussia's side in 
Confederate Diet, 275 ; new relapse 
of, 304; denies the right of Prussia 
to question its admiiustration in 
Holstein, ;i08 ; necessary to prepare 
seriously fur war, 342"; session of 
" Council of ."Marshals " of. .*m ; fresh 
vexation with Prussia, 348; fresh 
military measures on the part of, .'574 ; 
nulitary officers of, in favor of prep- 
arations for war, .'!S3 ; arming of the 
forces in tin- North ordered, .386 : ir- 
ritated at inovenients in Italy, .'!0() ; 
orders mobili/alion of Army of the 
South, 394; mobilization of Army of 
the North, 395; gives sharper turn 
to her diplomacy, .396 ; willing to ecde 
Yenetia, 420; coniplications and em- 



barrassments in, 442 ; statesmen of, 
sure of the defeat of Prussia, 458: 
ready to place Venetia at disposal 
of French monarch, 459 ; accepts in- 
vitation to congress on conditions, 
ib. ; discusses exchange of territory, 
460; about to refer question of the 
Duchies to decision of German Con- 
federation, 461 ; declares Prussia has 
violated Gastein treaty, 493 ; calls 
upon the Confederate Diet to de- 
fend the treaty, 495; lack of capable 
subordinate olhcers in army of, v. 9 ; 
composition of her troops, io ; to ex- 
pect no great help from her German 
allies, 21 ; forces of, in Italy, 78 ; ex- 
cited hatred against Prussia, 185; 
anger in, over the mismanagement 
of Belcredi, 238 ; offers to cede Vene- 
tia to France, 245 ; desires France to 
mediate with Italy, ib.; orders her 
troops to the Danube, 301 ; cabinet of, 
disappointed at Napoleon's course, 
311 ; discouraging state of internal 
condition, 312 ; stands by her German 
allies, 344 ; demands evacuation of 
TjTol and Istria, 424; negotiations 
for peace with Prussia, 4.55 ; has 
special questions to settle with Italy 
alone, 458 ; rejects Italian proposal, 
ib. ; signs treaty of peace with Prus- 
sia Aug. 23, 468; peace negotiations 
with Italy, 476 ; treaty signed Oct. 3, 
478 ; no present fear of Prussia from, 
vi. 4 ; negotiations pending between 
the court of, and those of Berlin and 
JIunich, 149; action of, to be deter- 
nnned by self-interest alone, 150 ; 
looks with displeasure upon revolt 
in Crete, 215; silent in regard to 
French interference in Germany, 
2;56 ; little inclined to give added 
strength to Pope's jiosition, 398 ; pro- 
posed alliance of, with France and 
Italy, 408-110 ; believes that integrity 
of Koumaida should be preserved to 
Turkey, 415 ; w ill not allow a con- 
signment of arms to reach Bucharest, 
430 ; finds her possessions threatened 
by Koumanians, 431,439; her policy 
a close alliance with France, 440; 
reiiresenfed at Paris by Count Vitz- 
thum, 441, 444, 445; influence of, in 
Roumania displeasing to Bismarck. 
447 ; commercial treaty of, with the 
Customs Union, vii. 31-34; diplomats 
of, urge German States to conclude 
concordats with Pope, 169 ; grants 
liberty of worship, 174 ; Constitution 
of, condemned by the Poi)e, 175 ; sup- 
ports Darn's memorial to Pope, 257; 
sadly in need of peace, 460; difficul- 
ties "and dangers of, 460-469 ; neu- 
trality of, assured, 481t. 
Baden, "influence of the Revohition of 
18.30 in, i. 84 ; press-law repealed, lOO; 
I,il>erals meet at Oirenburp, 139; 
Democratic uprising, 373 ; desires to 
enter into military <'onvenlion with 
Prussia, v. 44:1; national sentiments 
strong in, 525; desires to join North 
German Confederation, 526 ; views of 



522 



INDEX. 



Government of, in Treaty of Prague, 
vi. 219, 220 ; Grand Duke of, receives 
Napoleon in Karlsruhe, 238 ; favors 
imion with North German Confed- 
eration, 242 ; Government of, adopts 
Prussian needle-gun, 254 ; desires ad- 
mission of the Southern States into 
North German Confederation, 255; 
Grand Duke of, announces his pur- 
pose to strive for national union with 
North German Confederation, 317 ; 
Legislative Chambers of, favor meas- 
vu-es introducing universal obliga- 
tion to military duty, 318 ; the only 
State whose wish to join the Confed- 
eration could receive consideration, 
340 ; National Party elects majority 
of delegates to Customs Parliament, 
376 ; sovereign and people of, desire 
admission to North German Confed- 
eration, 432, 433 ; aspirants to officers' 
positions in army of, receive military 
education in Prussia, 434 ; represen- 
tatives from, favor increased com- 
mercial intercourse, vii. 32 ; reports 
of military treaty with Prussia, lOG; 
convention with North Germany, re- 
garding military freedom of migra- 
tion, carried into effect, 133; storm 
of Ultramontane displeasure in, 173 ; 
treaty of, with North German Con- 
federation, 218, 220-223 ; people and 
Government of, unanimous in favor 
of German unity, 401 ; patriotic en- 
thusiasm in, 445 ; prepares for the 
conflict, 446 ; fear of France's care- 
ful preparation, 447. 

Biihr presents amendment to bill in re- 
lation to labor unions, vi. 310. 

Balan, Prussian ambassador, begs King 
of Denmark to refuse sanction to new 
Constitution, iii. 174 ; representative 
at London conference, 354. 

Bamberger discusses taxation of to- 
bacco, vii. 36 ; taxation of wine, 43 ; 
his motion approved, 50 ; criticises 
Lasker's views on penal code, 226. 

Banneville, de, French representative 
at Rome, instructed by Latour and 
Daru, vii. 252. 

Barral, Count, proposes conciliatory 
plan, iv. 352 ; raises objections to 
terms of Prusso-Italian treaty, 354. 

Barth, Marquard, discusses the tariff 
question, vii. 52, 53. 

Bassermann proposes, in the Baden 
Chamber, the summoning of a Ger- 
man Parliament, i. 141. 

Bassewitz, Councillor, opposes hasty 
legislation, vii. 6. 

Baudin, French charye d'affaires at 
The Hague, reports that people of 
Luxemburg desire to retain their in- 
dependence, vi. 117; instructed to 
sound the Dutch Minister, Van Zuy- 
len, 118; lays before King of Holland 
secret propositions for alliance with 
France, 120; submits secret treaties 
to the King-Grand-Duke, 124 ; makes 
report, 125 ; returns to The Hague, 
130 ; sends message to Paris, 131. 

Bavaria, Chamber attacks the Govern. 



ment, i. 84 ; Constitution of, its adop- 
tion celebrated, 93 ; ambassador oi, 
lays before Prussia the outline of a 
treaty, 294 ; asks Austria's aid agaiii'^-t 
Prussia, 307 ; rejects Constitutional 
Draft of the 26th of INIay, 390; sub- 
mits a new German Federal Consti- 
tution, 406; the plan formally rati- 
fied by the Four Kings, 407 ; nature 
of this plan, ib. ; the draft received 
with coldness by Prussia, 409 ; de- 
fends the rights of the Confedera- 
tion, iii. 244; a dead weight in Ger-^ 
man politics, 323 ; sends circular-note 
to German Courts, iv. 70; beginning- 
of warlike preparations in, 367 ; cler- 
ical party in, denounce Bismarck's 
motion, 369 ; in event of war would 
hold to Austria, 371 ; strength of 
army of, v. 13 ; must pay for others • 
as well as for herself, 415 ; signs com- 
pact of alliance with Prussia, 452, 453 ; 
desires admission into Northern 
Confederation, 522 ; Ultramontanes 
of, complain of dismemberment of 
German fatherland, vi. 7 ; people of ,- 
dislike manners and customs of 
Prussians, 8, 9 ; hopes for establish- 
ment of federation between North 
and South German States, 149, 150 ; 
sends Count Taufkirchen to Berlin, 
150 ; independence in matters of in- 
ternal administration highly appre- 
ciated in, 248 ; Government of, des- 
tined to disappointment, 254; left in 
a position of isolation on the army 
question, 265; has no success in 
bringing about concerted action in 
South Germany, 269 ; discussions in, 
concerning treaty with North Ger- 
man Confederation, 324-334 ; Lower 
House adopts treaties, but Upper 
House rejects them, 329 ; proposal 
of, rejected by North German Con- 
federation, 334 ; Chambers of, sanc- 
tion the treaties, ib. ; relative 
strength of parties in, 376 ; people 
of, " wish to remain independent 
Bavarians," 377 ; disinclination to 
Prussia displayed in, 431 ; anti-na- 
tional movement in, continues, 434 ; 
demiirs at Suckow's mission in Ber- 
lin, 437 ; agent of, applies to Bismarck 
for information, 438 ; elections in, to 
Customs Parliament discussed, viir 
23, 24; determined protectionists 
among deputies from, 32 ; supports 
Darn's memorial to Pope, 257 ; Ultra- 
montanes of, rejoice that Bismarck 
has made a fiasco, 329 ; enthusiastic 
call to arms in, 401 ; LTltramontanes 
control majority of votes, 433 ; action 
of, 434; orders issued for mobiliza- 
tion of army of, 435 ; young men 
hasten to take up arms, ib. ; opposi- 
tion to Government in Legislative 
Chamber, 436 ; House votes expendi- 
tures for war, 440 ; approved by Up- 
per Chamber, 441. 
Bayrhoffer, Professor, calls a meeting 
oif the Democrats of the National As- 
sembly, i.239; their deliberations, 240, 



INDEX. 



52'i 



Bebel, August, only Socialist Demo- 
crat elected to new Reichstag, vi. 
42 ; believes that Bismarck is not in 
favor of admission of South German 
States, 189 ; not a Socialist of the 
school of Lassalle, 190 ; criticises Gov- 
ernment in relation to Luxemburg, 
1290 ; a Cosmopolitan, 308 ; rises to 
commanding position in labor-union 
circles, vii. 1&4 ; about to become a 
communist, 155; support of, at gen- 
eral assembly of Social'] )emocratic 
Party, 159 ; has little idea of the true 
conditions and views among the 
peasants, 160; favors members of the 
army and navy having the right to 
vote, 190. 

Becke, Herr von, etfects loan for Aus- 
tria in Paris, iv. 284. 

Beckerath, sent by the Imperial Min- 
istry to Berlin, i. 358; conversation 
with Frederick William IV., ib. 

Becker, Bernhard, criticises character 
of Ferdinand Lassalle, vii. 142, 143. 

Becker-Dortmund adds clause to new 
postal bill, vi. 300; proposes bill for 
greater emancipation of labor, 309 ; 
argues in support of bill, 311 ; con- 
demns all indirect taxes, vii. 201, 202 ; 
succeeds in convincing the Assem- 
bly, 202. 

Belcredi, Count, President of Austrian 
-Ministerial Council, policy of, iv. 185. 

Belgium desires to participate in coun- 
cil of Great Powers, vi. 203; postal 
treaty with North German Confed- 
eration, vii. 71 ; France desires to 
enter into commercial relations 
with, 101 ; neutrality of, guaranteed 
by European Powers, 102 ; alarm in, 
concerning French control of rail- 
ways, 103 ; takes measures to prevent 
sale of railways to France, 104 ; anger 
in France at action of, 104, 105; atti- 
tude of, under English protection, KW. 

Below, (Jen., sent to Malrao, i. 2GC; op- 
poses vmiversal suffrage, vi. 112. 

Bemsen, recommends the discussion of 
the Frankfort Constitution by all the 
German Princes, i. 331 ; recommends 
a restricted union, i/j.: anecdote about 
Frederick William IV., 332. 

lienedek, Gen., success of, at Solferino, 
ii. 377 ; relates a story of Francis Jo- 
seph, ib. ; given command of Army of 
the North, iv. 394; rises from the 
lowest step to tho highest, v. 4 ; cliar- 
acter, 5; his efforts to improve his 
troops, 10 ; leads his army towards the 
Elbe, 19; attempts to unite all his 
forces in north-eastern Bohemia, 117 ; 
his i)lan of instructing his subordi- 
nates contrasted with Moltke's, 121 ; 
plans to attack Prince Frederick 
Charles, 124; liis troojo defeated at 
Podol, 128 ; his delay in sending orders 
to Gitschin results in defeat of his 
forces, 1,37; his instructions to Gen- 
eral Baron Kamming and General 
Uaron Gablenz, 147 ; approves of l{am- 
ming'8 conduct at tho contlict at N;i- 
chod, 102; his vacillating decisions. 



163 ; receives news of the battle at 
Skalit>;,178 ; leads his retreating army 
back to Kfiniggratz, 179 ; loses hope, 
and implores the emperor to conclude 
peace at any price 184; decides to 
tight the decisive battle at KiJnig- 
griitz, 187 ; position of his army, 19(J ; 
his orders not carried out, 204 ; his 
generals responsible for his defeat, 
220 ; losses of his army, 237 ; estima- 
tion of, by the people iii Vienna, 239 ; 
receives orders to garrison Olmutz, 
then to bring the rest of his troops 
to the Danube, 302; dilticulties en- 
countered on the march, 308. 
Benedetti, French ambassador, iv. 79; 
interview of, with Bismarck, ib. ; 
complains of Bismarck's reserve, 467 ; 
arrives at Prussian headquarters, v. 
304; received cordially by Bismarck, 
ib. : meets King William, 305 ; has 
d;iily conversations with Bismarck, 
314 ; urges a peace policy on the 
Vustrian Government, 320 j meets 
iMcnsdorff and Esterhazy in tinal 
conference, ib. ; fears a repulse from 
Bismarck, 418; indignation of, at 
Bismarck's want of conlidi-nce, 470 : 
makes earnestclaim upon Bismarck's 
attention, vi. 43; has interview with 
Bismarck in regard to Franco-Prus- 
sian alliance, 48-50 ; discusses Luxem- 
burg question with Bismarck, 52, 53 ; 
reports Bismarck's opinions, 123, 124 ; 
receives instructions to prepare Bis- 
marck for surrender of Luxemburg, 
125 ; Bismarck's declarations to, 127 ; 
calls upon Bismarck, 131-133 ; directed 
to ascertain real motive of Bismarck's 
speech in Reichstag, 140 ; instructed 
to allude once more to proposed al- 
liance of Prussia and France, 148 ; 
questioned by Bismarck regarding 
programme of French Goverinnent, 
399 ; his unfavorable opinion of Bis- 
marck's action, 399, 400; instructed 
from Paris to be exceedingly watch- 
ful, vii. 250; his orders not calculated 
to improve relations with Hismarck, 
250,251 ; learns that Rancis had had 
interviews with Bismarck. 291, 292; 
makes inquiries of Von Tliile, ib. : 
sunmioned to Paris to participate in 
consultation, 293; has interview with 
Bismarck in relation to Prince Leo- 
pold, 294, 295 ; misreiireseiits remarks 
of Thile and Bismarck, 295, 296 : a man 
inclined to peace, 296; his endeavors 
to obtain promise from Prussia dis- 
astrous to his countrv, 297; advised 
by Napoleon that iFrench people 
Would not suffer choice of Ilohenzol- 
lern Prince, 320 ; on leave of absence 
from Berlin, 322; receives instruc- 
tions to open negotiations with King 
William, ,340, .341, ,349; receives tele- 
graphic instructions fron\ Gramont, 
■'{47; visits at Kms to discover King 
William's attitude, ;}.53; has audience 
with the king, . •(,54 ; not disheartened 
by residt of llrst interview, ;i,55 ; has 
second interview with King William,. 



524 



INDEX. 



360; believes that King William is 
certain of Prince Leopold's with- 
drawal, 361 ; letter of Gramont to, 368, 
369 ; French Ministers threaten to 
instruct him to lay new jn'oposal be- 
fore King William, 371 ; Napoleon 
hesitatingly permits him to be in- 
structed to make attempt, 373 ; must 
<lemand a categorical reply from King 
William, 376 ; receives telegrams from 
iiramont, 378, 383; takes different 
view from Gramont in relation to 
French demands, 385 ; has important 
interview with King William in the 
Park at Ems, 386-388; requests an- 
other audience with the king, 390; 
allusion to, in Abeken's despatch, 
394 ; his report of interview, 395, note ; 
did not consider king's decision a 
slight to himself, 398, 399 : takes for- 
mal leave of the king, 399 ; his au- 
dacity derided in Berlin, 401 ; sends 
telegram announcing withdrawal of 
Prince Leopold, 403 ; accused by Nord- 
tleufsche AlUiemeine Zeitung of disre- 
garding rules of dii)lomatlc etiquette, 
412 ; statement made by, 414 ; his cun- 
ningly devised refutation of Bis- 
marck's statement, 449. 

Bennigsen, Rudolf von, conversation 
with the Prussian ambassador to 
Hanover, i. 361 ; proposes change in 
Hanoverian Ministry, v. 36 ; influ- 
ence of, in Hanover," vi. 15 ; elected 
second vice-president of Reichstag, 
60 ; convincing speech of, 86 ; pro- 
poses and upholds motions, 105 ; mo- 
tion of, rejected, 107, 108 ; invited to 
conference with Bismarck, 129 ; pre- 
sents his interpellation to Reichs- 
tag, 133, 134 ; advocates agreement 
between the Reichstag and the Gov- 
ernments, 170; on the organization 
of the army, 180 ; announces his 
position on question of payment to 
members of Reichstag, 193 ; i^roposes 
a compromise, 195, 196 ; elected sec- 
ond vice-president of North German 
Reichstag, 288 ; asserts that agree- 
ments in regard to money questions 
must be submitted to Reichstag, 295 ; 
gives expression to patriotic enthu- 
siasm aroused by military treaty 
between Baden and North German 
Confederation, vii. 187. 

Bentinek, Baron, of Holland, declares 
himself without instructions from 
his Government, vi. 208. 

Berlin, revolutionary excitement in, i. 
155 et seq. ; street demagogism in, 
241 ; effect of Vienna Revolution in, 
288; state of feeling in, after Bran- 
denburg's arrival from Warsaw, ii. 
24; resentment in, at French and 
English circulars, iv. 240: indigna- 
tion in, at conduct of Falckenstein, 
V. 74 ; gives festivities in honor of 
South German representatives of 
Cvistoms Parliament, vii. 56. 

Bernard, Duke of Meiningen, forced to 
resign, v. 514. 

Bernhardi, Tlieodor von, sent to Italy, 



V. 80 ; has interview with La Mar- 
mora, 87 ; sends report to Moltke, 
90 ; his report of battle of Custozza, 
106 ; statement of, to Von Sybel, con- 
cerning Prince Leopold's candidacy, 
vii. 312 ; had never discussed politics 
with Prim, 317. 

Bernstortf, on Von Wessenberg's Con- 
federation, i. 50 ; secures tariff-trea- 
ties against the opposition of the 
Confederation, G7 ; two memorials to 
the Prussian king, 89 ; coldly re- 
ceived by Schwarzenberg, 307 ; sends 
an important Report to Berlin, 326 ; 
recalled from Vienna, ii. 88; on a 
proposal of Schwarzenberg, 101 ; not 
favored by deputies, 473; urges sup- 
port of Schleswig-Holstein, iii. 114 ; 
Prussian ambassador to England, 
354 ; sends communication to Lord 
Stanley, vi. 205, 206; telegraphs to 
Bismarck, 207 ; criticises absence of 
guaranty for neutrality of Luxem- 
burg, 207 ; j)romises to obtain opinion 
of his Government on withdrawal of 
Prussian garrison, 208, 209 : receives 
instructions from his Government, 
vii. 345. 

Berozowski, a Pole, shoots at the Em- 
peror Alexander, vi. 226 ; Paris law- 
yers offer their services in his de- 
fence, 227. 

Beseler, William, President of Schles- 
wig Diet, iii. 52. 

Bethmann-Hollweg effects adoption of 
provision relating to interest on pub- 
lic debt, vi. 302, 303. 

Bethusy-Huc, Count, proposes article 
to draft of Constitution, vi. 107; de- 
sires to vote for Ujest's pi-oposition, 
196 ; proposes motion relating to bud- 
get, vii. 72. 

Beust, Baron, on Confederate reform, 
ii. 285 ; memorial to Austria, Prus- 
sia, etc., 285 et seq.; criticism, 287; 
various opinions, ih. ; finds a rival in 
Meysenbug, 317 ; opposed to National 
Association, 394 ; brings a motion be- 
fore the Diet, directed against Prus- 
sia, 396 ; draws up plan for German 
Constitution, 461 ; has interview with 
Rechberg, 462; his plan a failure. 
463 ; makes declaration in Saxon 
Chamber, iii. 179 ; explains his posi- 
tion in the matter of the Duchies, 
202 ; comes to agreement with Bava- 
rian and Wiirtemberg Ministers, 223 ; 
opposes policy of Austria and Prussia, 
280 ; sends reports to Confederate 
Diet, 422 ; instructions to General 
Hake, iv. 40 ; replies to Prussian am- 
bassador, 41 : warlike preparations, 
43 ; has active correspondence with 
von der Pfordten, 60 ; fails in getting 
sympathy from Napoleon, v. 300; re- 
quests his dismissal from King Jt>hn 
of Saxony, 515 ; intrusted with reins 
of government in Austria, vi. 4; dis- 
appoints and irritates Moustier, 123 ; 
sends lifsp.itcli to Munich, 149; an- 
swers proposals for alliance with cool- 
ness, 150 ; sends despatch to Austrian 



INDEX. 



525 



Minister at Munich, 150, »io^e,- changes 
his plans, 151-103 ; unreasonable pro- 
test of, ■-'•22 ; misleads French states- 
men, 'JiJ ; remarks of, to Metternich, 
on friendship between France and 
Austria, 237; accompanies Austrian 
emperor to Salzburg, 239 ; submits a 
memorial to Napoleon on German 
and Oriental questions, 240. 241 ; re- 
jdies to communication of I>al\vigk, 
25G ; alludes to possible Austrian oc- 
cupation of Koumania, 428 ; opposed 
to a war policy for Austria, 440, 441 ; 
refuses to join with France in ad- 
dressing interpellation to Prussia, 
442 ; makes counter proposal to Na- 
poleon, 443, 444 ; mutual distrust be- 
tween him and Bismarck, 447; his 
views indorsed by the Hungarian 
press, 448 ; alarmed by Kouher's prop- 
osition for triple alliance, vii. 108, 
109; approves of Vitzthum's plan, 
109 ; desires to do Xapoleon a friendly 
service, 115, 116; arrives at an agree- 
ment with Rouher, 117; certain of 
Prussia's defeat in a war with France, 
118; engaged in bitter controversy 
with the Curia, 119 ; opposed to ac- 
quisition of the Tyrol by Italy, ib. ; 
consents to use his influence with Na- 
poleon in regard to removing troops 
from Rome, 132 ; sends Vitzthum to 
Paris, ib.; sends letter of complaint 
to Dresden, 135 ; no longer harbors 
thoughts of revenge against Prussia, 

136 ; his duty as Minister of Austria, 

137 ; condemns Gramont's quarrel- 
some attitude, 382; orders Count Vitz- 
thum to Paris to learn actual state of 
affairs, 423; aware of nunacini; dan- 
ger to Austria in Russia's attitude, 
458; letter of, to Metternich, 400, 
note ; thinks Napoleon more than 
probable to be victor, 461 ; his policy, 
462; announces Austria's decision by 
cinmlar note, 464 ; his anxiety, lb. ; 
letter of, to :\retteriuch, 464-467 ; his 
letter wins no favor in Paris, 468 ; not 
in favor of triple alliance, 478, 479 ; 
approves of alliance between Austria 
and Italy, 479 ; sul)mits to Vienna 
conference a despatch to Napoleon, 
479, 480 ; desires to make Italy's move- 
ments dependent upon Austria's con- 
sent, 480; sends Count ^'itzthuIu to 
Florence, 481 ; correspondence of, 
with Gramont, 491-493. 

Beyer, Gen. von, commands division of 
Prussian army, v. 28 ; undertakes ad- 
ministration of Ilesse-Cassel, 34 ; ten- 
ders his resignation as Prussian mili- 
tary plenipotentiary, and becomes 
Minister of War inljaden, vi. 4.34. 

Biegeleben, Ilcrr von, expresses Aus- 
tria's opposition to Aiigustenburg's 
claims, iii. .'US ; Austrian representa- 
tive at London conference, 3,53; de- 
pendence upon his counsellor, iv. 31. 

Bille, Baron, a zealous " ICider I)ane," 
iii.353. 

Billing, Baron, Frencli ambassador at 
the Danish Court, iii. 35. 



Birnbaum, Chancellor, wails over the 
division of Germany, vi. 259. 

Bismarck-Schiiidiausen, Otto vini, con- 
versati'iii with the Prussian king, i. 
286; appciinlcd deputy to the Confed- 
erate l)iet.ii. 168; his personal appear- 
ance, and his antecedents, 168 et sn/. .■ 
his relations with Freilerick William 
IV., 171; parallel between Bisman-k 
and Bonaparte, 173 ; a utilitarian, 174 ; 
his labors in the Diet , 175 ef getj. ; letter 
to Manteull'el on political and traile 
relations with Hanover, 186; iManteul- 
fel's reply, 187; urges Prussian neu- 
trality in the Russi>-Turkish war of 
1854,213(7 .se(/. ,• on Austria's proposal 
of a Central Euroi>ean alli.mce, 225; 
on Prussia's fears of a blorkadc, etc., 
243; letter to .Maiiteullel on thcdiUit;cr 
of proposingan alliance bet ween Prus- 
sia and Knt^land, 2.5.3; on Austria's 
policy in the Confederate Diet, 284: 
guides Prussia's action in the consid- 
eration of Bavaria's proposals, il>. : 
writes brilliant memorials, 316; re- 
ports to Berlin on Beust's projiosals, 
318; answers proposal of Buol and 
Beust, 321 ; suggested as Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, 342 ; is summoned to 
Baden, 359; replaced by Usedom in 
Confederate Diet, .'i67 ; looks upon 
Austria as the chief opponent of Prus- 
sia. /ft.,- will furnish a C^erman civil 
war in four weeks, 490 ; made Presi- 
dent of the Prussian iMinistry, 510 ; 
begins a four years' struggle, 514; ar- 
ranges the Cabinet, 517 ; forces Elec- 
tor of Ilesse-Cassel to yiehl, 519; an- 
nounces that (iernian problem could 
be solved only by blood and iron. ,521 ; 
consults with Count Karolyi, 521, 
.522; criticises Russia's concessions to 
Poland, 546; sends messenger ti> .St. 
Petersburg, 569 : stations troops on 
Polish frontier, 572; conversation with 
Sir Andrew Buchanan on Polish af- 
fairs, .573; watches development of 
French policy, 579 ; has difficulties to 
contend with at home, .581-583 ; con- 
tented with Austria's attitude. 590; re- 
gards the Austrian project of reform 
a piece of display. Ci;! ; •' had to break 
something," 618; his reply to Lord 
John Russell, 627; has conversation 
with Augustenburg, iii. 78; makes offi- 
cial proposal to Augustenburg, 81 : 
writes to .Manteuffcl in regard to Lon- 
don Protocol. 84; discusses alfairs of 
the Duchies, KM; threatens armed 
chastisement of Denmark. 108; mis- 
taken opinjiin of Danes concerning, 
121 ; asks infi>rni;itioti from Prussian 
Minister of War, l.!4 ; decl.iies that a 
pretext for war can be found, !;>."; 
war not favorable to Prussia, >l>. ; con- 
siders a watchful reserve proper. l.'!(> ; 

rejects motion to bre.-ik pacts, l.!*.); 

sends b-tter to (irand Duke of (tl.len- 
burg, 140 ; opens comniunicat inn with 

^■ieIln.•l, 141 ; i-espoiidence nf, with 

A\istria. coijcerniiig idi.-istisement id 
Denmark, 143; niodilies altitude of 



126 



INDEX. 



Prussia, 150; discusses question with 
Sir Andrew Buchanan, 152; sends 
answer to Blixen, 153 ; sends reply to 
English Minister, ib. ; sends instruc- 
tions to Prussian ambassador in Con- 
federate Diet, 154 ; on Danish conces- 
sions, 161, M. ; views of, on proposed 
congress at Paris, 166 ; in no hurry to 
enter into a Danish war, 181 ; his views 
approved by king, 182 ; arrives at 
agreement with Austrian ambassa- 
dor, 187 ; maintains caution in his 
relations to England, 189 ; objects to 
proposal of Minister of Finance, 196; 
favors spirit of concession to Den- 
mark, 198 ; sure of Prussia's freedom 
in military action, 203 ; defines Prus- 
sia's position, 204 ; his speech followed 
by a stormy debate, 205 ; comes to an 
understanding with Kussian envoy, 
212 ; interview of, with Lord Wode- 
house, ib. ; looks with calmness on 
German agitation, 228 ; weighs the 
chances, ib. ; his recommendation to 
the king, 230; views on " Pfordten's 
production," 236; decisive statement 
to English ambassador, 237 ; sends de- 
spatch to Vienna, 238 ; sharp circular 
of, to foreign powers, 255; writes note 
of Jan. 31, 256 ; instructs Sydow, 281 ; 
persists in his standpoint, 282 ; takes 
decisive part in military operations, 
291 ; gives reasons for invading Jut- 
land, 304; well spoken of in Vienna, 
306 ; rejects Denmark's proposal, 316 ; 
his reply to England's proposal, 317 ; 
writes to Sydow in regard to London 
conference, 325 ; has printed in Berlin 
newspapers a list of Russian towns, 
«tc., destroyed in Crimean war, 327 ; 
replies to Talleyrand, 342 ; sends reply 
to Goltz, 348 ; declares continuance of 
Danish blockade insufferable, 356 ; 
pleased at popular agitation, 360 : de- 
mands complete separation of both 
Duchies from Denmark, 371 ; observa- 
tions of, on th<- dynastic question, 372; 
dislikes the hereditary Prince of Au- 
gustenburg, 375 ; considers Austrian 
alliance desirable for Prussia, 376 ; re- 
solves to preserve silence toward Aus- 
tria with regard to future plans, 382 ; 
has interview with Augustenburg, 
389 ; result of conversation, 391 ; in- 
structs Werther, ib. ; has interview 
with Emperor Alexander, 393 ; favors 
appeal to the people of the Duchies, 
397, 398 ; has interview with Rechberg 
at Carlsbad, 405 ; communicates witli 
Austria concerning conditions of 
peace, 420 ; urges speedy action, 421 ; 
begs of Gortschakoff another visit to 
Berlin, lb. ; goes to Vienna, ib. ; puts 
a damper upon agitation aroused by 
Beust, 423 ; censures interference of 
commissioners, 425 ; discusses ex- 
penses of the war with Rechberg, 426 ; 
his opinion of the integrity of the 
Danisli kingdom, 433 ; has an inter- 
view with the king at Gastein, 436; 
differs from Delbriick, 454 ; relations 
with Rechberg, 455 ; private corre- 



spondence with Rechberg, 456-467 ; 
receives important telegram from Ba- 
den-Baden,470; advises against reject- 
ing Austria's request, ib. ; his opinion 
that war with Austria was bound to 
come, 478 ; prophecy of, in letter to 
Victor Emmanuel, iv. 24 ; his view of 
Mensdorff's appointment, 27 ; impor- 
tant counterniove concerning candi- 
dacy of Augustenburg, 36; calls upon 
Austria to protest against the doings 
of Saxony, 43 ; instructs Herr von 
Savigny to act in concert with Aus- 
tria, 45; avoids expression of Prussia's 
wishes,54; sends despatches to Vienna 
explaining Prussia's position, 54, 57 ; 
has no desire to hasten a crisis, 58 ; 
sends a provisional declaration to Vi- 
enna, 63 ; has interview with Count 
Karolyi, 04-69 ; considers it time to 
take steps in Vienna and Frankfort, 
70 ; sends instructions to Savigny, 71 ; 
asks Moltke for information concern- 
ing Austria's army, 76 ; conversation 
of, with Benedetti, 79 ; attitude of, to 
Courts of Vienna and Versailles, 81 ; 
important despatch of, to Goltz, Feb. 
20, 82-88 ; proposes to limit agitation 
of societies in Schleswig-Holstein,105; 
his proposition not favoredby Austria, 
105 ; hopes to attain his ends by peace- 
ful measures, 107 ; will shrink fron^ no 
possibilities necessary for interests of 
Prussia, 120 ; instructsGoltz to inform 
Napoleonof Prussia's desire forpeace, 
120 ; but has no fear for rupture forced 
upon her, 121 ; communicates with 
Count Usedom in Florence, 121 ; has 
new plan of settling Schleswig-Hol- 
stein diflBculty, 122 ; plan not favored 
by his friends, 122, 123; has no objec- 
tions to treatingwith future sovereign 
of Schleswig-Holstein, 124; favorscall- 
ing a representative assembly of the 
Duchies, 124 ; discusses ISIensdorff's 
despatch upon the subject, 126; con- 
vinced of the soundness of his cause, 
131 ; gathers in one whole all the com- 
plaints against Austria, 131 ; declares 
war with Austria not a civil war, 140 ; 
begins toabandon his faith in the dual 
supremacyin Germany, 148; continues 
correspondence with Austria inregard 
to assembling Estates of Duchies, 148; 
answers Karolyi's communication, 
151 ; willing to niake concessions, 153 ; 
writes to Inspector-General of Ar- 
tillery, and Minister of War, 167 ; has 
conversation with Due de Gramont, 
169; prepares instructions for Wer- 
ther's guidance, 170; complainsof con- 
duct of Augustenburg, 171 ; receives 
friendly assurances from France, 174 ; 
has interview with Pfordten, 177: 
discusses Blome's plans, 191 ; seeks 
friendly relations with Italy, 201 ; 
writes to Usedom, 206; sends instruc- 
tions to Goltz in Paris, 208 ; discusses 
Schleswig-Holstein question with 
Blome, 210-215 ; executes treaty, 219 ; 
declines to give a liberal turn to Prus- 
sian-German politics, 238 ; considers 



IXDEX. 



627 



French circular a bold fabrication, 
239; goes to Paris and Biarritz, 24iJ; 
visits French statesmen, 24.5 ; lias au- 
dience with Napoleon. L^.'i ; presents 
Goltz with (levelopnieiit of his views, 
247, ?!.,• urges renewal of negotiations 
with Italy, 252; agrees with Manteuf- 
fel's policy in Sehleswig, 257 ; makes 
explanations of Prussia's interests, 
259 ; refuses to confirm proposed ap- 
pointment of Danes, 2(j0; suggests 
measures against Frankfort, 274 ; his 
visit to France produces unfavorable 
elFect in A'ienna, 2S1 ; instructs Ilerr 
von Werther in respect to demonstra- 
tions in Ilolstein, 293; denies asser- 
tions of IIofiuann,294; decisive epoch 
in his mighty career, 29G ; recognizes 
the results for Europe of an encounter 
with Austria, 2'J7 ; ■writes to Usedoni 
in Florence that acrisis seemsncarat 
hand, 299; states the situation to 
Werther, Jan. 20, 18GG, 301 ; sums up 
Prussian comphiints against Austria, 
305; considers reform of the Confed- 
eration a vital question for Prussia, 
312; considers mutual approximation 
between Austria and Italy improha- 
ble, 319; gives historical risnmi of 
Austrian attempts to oppose Prussia, 
321 ; does not consider Pavaria a cer- 
tain enemy, 323 ; inhaste toseelMoltke 
depart for Florence, .532; hasinterview 
with Govone, 336 ; conversation of, 
with Countess liohenthal, 344 ; his 
reply to (luestion of Karolyi, 349 ; his 
patience reaches its goal, 356 ; prepar- 
ing the way for propositions concern- 
ing Confeilerate reform, 357; the in- 
carnation of the Prussian state, 358; 
desires to draw Pavaria over to sup- 
port of Prussia, 359 : accepts her offer 
of mediation, 367 ; his action surprises 
Ein-fpl)e, 368 : warned against Bavaria 
by Prince Reuss, 371 ; goes forward in 
his course of (Confederate reform, 
373 ; sends circular to (icrman courts, 
375 ; declares that Prussia is forced to 
take measures for her security, 385 ; 
writes to 'Werther in regard "to de- 
spatch of April 7,387; tells French 
ambassailor that Prussia would su|)- 
[lort Italy against Austria, 401 ; will 
take no mllit.arysteps before receiving 
Austria's reply, 402; protests against 
warlike moveinents in Dresden ami 
Stuttgart, 402 ; decides not to reply to 
Austrian desi)atches, 403 ; attempted 
assas8inati<jn of , 408 ; doubts advan- 
tages of Congress proposed by Napo- 
leon, 415; decides to answer Mens- 
dorff's despatch of April 26,428; pro- 
ceeds with caution, 431 ; approves of 
Manteulfel's views, 435; feels obliged 
to I'oinit Hanover and Ilesse-Cassel 
among Prtissia's opiionents, 441 ; in- 
structs (ioltz toelTcct understanding 
bt.'tween Pi'ussia, Italy, and Franc(% 
451 ; cojnplainsto Heneiletti of hostile 
remarks of French ambassadors, 467 ; 
not willing to give up German terri- 
tory, 4(X ; receives parting call from 



Govone, 469 ; finds the old sentiments 
of Napoleon unchanged, 476; sends 
protest to A'ienna in reference to 
Selileswig-Holstein, 479 ; selections 
from letter written by, to Duke of 
Coburg-Gotha, 485 ; warns members 
of Confederate Diet, 496 ; lays me- 
morial before king and council, 497 ; 
urges moderate and <'oneiliatory 
policy, v. 48; shares opinion of king 
in regard to Napoleon's oiler of media- 
tion, 254 ; praises the Prussian troops, 
2S1 ; his attention takenup with politi- 
cal anxieties, 2S,!; his "blood boils" 
at the movements of French (Jovern- 
ment, 2j>4 ; announces Prussia's de- 
mands, 286 et seq. ; orders l>'aleken- 
stein tooccupy countries north of the 
Main, 289 ; limits his plans to consoli- 
dation of North Germany, 290; dis- 
cusses Prussian annexations with 
Benedetti, 314 ; asks Dr. Girska to go 
to Vienna, 315; has exciting scenes 
with King William, 318; instructs 
(lOltz in regard to Prussian annexa- 
tions, 318; undisturbed by Italian 
ebullitions, 328 ; brings forward pre- 
liminaries of peace, 329 ; demands 
positive indorsement on the part of 
France, 331 ; discusses treaty with 
Karolyi, 3.'U et seq. ; wishes to come 
to a settlement with Austria, 337; 
gives bis own opinir,n to the king, 
338 ; signs the preliminaries of peace, 
346; demands heavy contribution 
from Frankfort, 374 ; takes a deter- 
mined stand, 396 ; issues a circular 
despatch to the Gernuin States, 399 ; 
receives communication from Bene- 
detti on French coniiiensation, 410; 
accused of perverting history, 419; 
declares cession of Ciernian territory 
impossible, 420, 421 ; watches passage 
(jf crisis anxiously, 423; his resolution 
determined by IVIoltke's memorial, 
426 ; advises Italy to negotiate for 
peace, ih.: not disposed to concede 
right of Kussia to interfere in German 
all'airs, 432 ; postpones plans for 
annexation, 434 ; has no objection to 
union of South German States, 439; 
opposes the king's desire for accjuisi- 
tion of territory, 452; informs the 
Bavarian jNIinister of Benedetti's 
demand, ih.; reiterates his refusal to 
cede German territory to i'rancre, 465 ; 
keeps up a dilatory negotiation with 
Benedetti, 466 ; advises Court of 
Vienna to deal directly with Prussia, 
467; consiiiers it advisable to close 
negotiations concerning Belgian an- 
neNation, 469 ; expressi'S in detail the 
l)rinei pies t hat liad influenced the con- 
duct of the government, 492 ; his view 
on electoral law bill, 501; loses his 
patience with Caroline, princess re- 
gent, 513; rebukes Baron Brenner, i7<. ,• 
receives sliarc of appropriation given 
to generals as a loUen of national 
gratitude, vi. 23, 24 ; labors of, to con- 
solidate struct ure of newgoverinnent, 
25 ; relinquishes his ideal plan, 27 ; 



528 



INDEX. 



seeks to complete draft of Constitu- 
tion for North German Confederation, 
28 ; dictates articles of the new Con- 
stitution to Lothar Bucher,29 ; opens 
session, of plenipotentiaries, i6. ,• dis- 
cusses effect of new Constitution, 
30 ; declines to consider surrender of 
German territory to France, 44; con- 
vinced that the development of Ger- 
many would be opposed by France, 
45 ; objects to surrender of Luxem- 
burg and offensive alliance with 
France, 47 ; receives visit from 
French ambassador in relation to 
Belgium and Luxemburg, 48, 49 ; sub- 
mits French proposals to King of Prus- 
sia, 50 ; disagrees with von Moltke and 
Roon as to value of Luxemburg, 51 ; 
discusses Luxemburg questions with 
Benedetti, 52, 53; statements of, 
arouses distrust in Paris, 55 ; presents 
draft of Constitution to Reichstag, 60 ; 
takes part in the debate on draft, 76- 
80; makes crushing retort to Mal- 
linckrodt, 84 ; declares that Prussia 
has no designs prejudicial to indepen- 
dence of the Netherlands, 96; replies 
to Herr von Carlowitz, 97 ; declares 
in favor of Twesten's motion, 101 ; 
takes energetic part indiscussion, 106; 
his approval of universal suffrage has 
weight in Reichstag, 109, 110 ; disposes 
of Briiuneck's householder's right of 
suffrage. 111 ; opposed to daily re- 
muneration of members of Reichstag, 
115, 116 ; communications of, with 
Benedetti, 123-127, 131-133; invites 
Herr von Bennigsen to his house, 129 ; 
replies to Beunigseu in relation to 
Luxemburg, 135-138 ; explanation of, 
makes lasting effect upon Reichstag, 
139 ; surprised at patriotic demonstra^ 
tion, 140 ; submits question of Luxem- 
burg to Great Powers, 141 ; wishes 
excitement to spend itself, 145 ; pro- 
poses defensive alliance between 
Prussia and Austria, 151 ; suggestion 
of, adopted by members of the Party 
of Progress, 170 ; takes no part in de- 
bate on organization of army, 173 ; 
declines to discuss question of Hesse, 
188 ; takes the floor on the Miquel- 
Lasker motion, 191 ; announces to the 
Reichstag the action of the Allied 
Governments, 192 ; his views regard- 
ing compensation to members of 
Reichstag, 193 ; pleads for adoption 
of motions of Conservatives, 196 ; 
counted with the minority, 197 ; an- 
nounces that the Allied Governments 
have accepted the Constitution, ih. ; 
his vigorous words fully realized, 198 ; 
European conference welcome to him, 
201 ; non-committal attitude of, 202 ; 
hopes England will hasten opening 
of conference, lb. ; replies to Stan- 
ley that neutrality of Luxemburg 
must be guaranteed, 205 ; accepts 
Brunnow's compromise, 207 ; does not 
read reports of Prussian ambassador 
at Constantinople, 215 ; his action re- 
garded in France as a flagrant breach 



of promise, 216, 217 ; declares German 
unity to be his life-work, 217 ; atti- 
tude of, towards reconstruction of 
Customs Union, 222 ; accompanies 
King William to Paris, 224 ; has con- 
versation with Rouher, ib. ; declares 
to Rouher his good intentions in Lux- 
emburg matter, ib. ; makes short re- 
tort to Moustier, 225 ; defended by 
Gortschakotf , 225, 226 ; sends note to 
Prussian legations, to watch French 
diplomacy, 231 ; receives friendly let- 
ter from Gortschakoff, 232; irritabil- 
ity of, deplored by French historian, 
237 ; accepts imperial messages < )f 
peace without comment, 242 ; sends 
circular note regarding South Ger- 
man Governments, 242-244 ; his re- 
peated declaration excites feelings of 
mixed nature among Governments 
of the South German liingdoms, 247 ; 
his proposed action iu regard to ap- 
plication from Hesse, 256 ; opinion of, 
concerning Austria's right to protest, 
256, note; rejects proposition com- 
municated by Freydorf , 269 ; devotes 
himself to reconstruction of Customs 
Union, 269, 270; action of, astonishes 
Particularists, 271 ; remains true to 
his purpose to make no conditions 
hateful to Bavaria, 272, 273 ; concilia- 
tory attitude of, 273; nominated as 
Chancellor of the Confederation, 274 ; 
submits a number of bills to the Fed- 
eral Council, 275 ; vigorously supports 
the king's views in relation to new 
provinces, 284; states policy adopted 
by the Federal Government, 287 ; de- 
clares termination of Federal rela- 
tions of Luxemburg, 290 ; his views in 
regard to Schleswig-Holstein, 291 ; as- 
sumes responsibility as Federal Chan- 
cellor, 293 ; declares himself in favor 
of Lasker's bill in relation to rate of 
interest, 307 ; promises to place mort- 
gage system within the influence of 
Reichstag, ib. ; makes no reply to ar- 
guments on the labor question, 311 ; 
declares position of the Allied Gov- 
ernments, 332, 333 ; agrees with Varn- 
biiler in regard to the limits of the 
treaties, 339 ; finds himself confronted 
bysuccession of parliamentary labors, 
341 ; discovers era of national enthu- 
siasm upon verge of decline, 342 ; in- 
fluence of, in the House of Deputies, 
346 ; could neither do without Con- 
servative nor Liberal measures and 
laws, 347; concedes claim of King 
George to private fortune, 348 ; good 
reason for his liberality, 349 ; dis- 
covers jealousy of budget privileges 
by old Prussian Liberals, 352 ; ex- 
patiates upon the advantages to be 
derived from the treaties, 353 ; dis- 
position of the parties upon whom he 
relies for support argues ill for the 
future, 353, 354 ; surprised at violent 
opposition to bill by Conservative 
Party, 354 ; suspicion that' he has 
changed his political principles, 355 ; 
expects tlie support of the Conserva- 



INDEX. 



529 



tire Partj;, 357; warns the Party of 
results of its obstinacy, 358 ; becomes 
indignant, and does not again appear 
in the Assembly, 361 ; his reconcilia- 
tion with the C'onservativeiJ upon the 
surface only, ib. ; takes decisive steps 
to end undetermined relations to 
King George, 301, 3G2 ; explains cir- 
cumstances concerning confiscation 
of property of rulers ot Hanover and 
Hesse, 3CA, 3(j5 ; defends his colleague 
with little enthusiasm, 372 ; stand 
taken by, removes unfriendly opposi- 
tion, 374 ; cautiousness of, 380 ; allows 
matters to proceed without urging 
them forward, 382 ; question of a 
European Cougress submitted to him, 
396: his reply to agents of Ratazzi 
and Garibaldi, 390, 397 ; not in favor 
of Europeau Congress, 398 ; ques- 
tions Count IJenedetti regarding pro- 
gramme of French Government, 399 ; 
receives a note from Mazzini, 400 ; 
aware of Victor Emmanuel's inclina- 
tion to France, ib. ; writes to Count 
Usedom, 401 : accused of interfering 
in affairs of Spain, 412, 413, note; 
agrees with King William in regard 
to Koumunian question, 419 ; agents 
of, suspected of supporting Gari- 
baldi's expedition against Rome, 432 ; 
receives communication from JNIathy, 
President of Badeu Ministry, 433; 
personally makes no reply, ib. ; does 
not feel justified in abandoning his 
position on the German question, 
434 ; in a conversation with Suckow, 
expresses with vigor his views on 
German unity, 430, 437 ; applied to for 
information by Bavarian agent, 438; 
opinions in France and Austria of his 
policy, 439; plan of Beusttooverreach 
him, +14; Napoleon refuses to give 
credence to suspicions of his interfe- 
rence in Spanish affairs, 440; sweeps 
aside the glowing coals which lay 
smouldering in Turkey, 447 ; his view 
of affairs in Roumania, ib.; has no 
desire to offend the national pride of 
the Magyars, 448 ; instructs Count 
Keiserling to demand the dismissal 
of the Roumanian Ministry, 449; for 
a second time i)revents a European 
conflict, 4r)2; oppospsinotion to recom- 
pense mcnilicrs of Reichstag,, vii. 7, 8 ; 
conciliatory attitude of. on bill relat- 
ing to jirosciMitioM of rci)resentatives, 
11, 12 ; discusses Federal debt and the 
navy, 18, 19 ; faces the test of the first 
Customs Parliament, 20 ; favors com- 
mercial intercourse with Austria, 31 ; 
takes part in discussion on Hessian 
wine-tax, 45, 40; disclaims intention 
to extend jurisdii'tion of Customs 
Parliament, 48 ; withdraws the tariff' 
bill, 50; authorizes the reassembling 
of the Gernuin Itcichstag, .57 ; absent 
from Reichstag on account of illness, 
65; sends bill to President Simson, 
65,06; Arcadians circulate exaspe- 
rating reports about, '.Kl, 100; discusses 
French plan with Prince Jerome, 



102 ; accused of influencing Belgium 
against France, 104; assures South 
German courts that rumors of agree- 
ment with France were groundless, 
100; looked upon by French ^Minister 
as a shallow-head, 100, 107 ; opinion 
of, in relation to railway transaction 
between France and Belgium, 112; 
his attitude toward France portrayed, 
113; gives pointless replies to ambas- 
sadors, 114; maintains iuHexibly his 
standpoint in regard to South (ierman 
States joining Nortlieiu Conleilera- 
tion, 133 ; social and ecci, -in^ti.al as- 
pirations occupy little ol liih time, 181; 
his hands tied in re;;anl to Uicumen- 
ical Council, 1S2 ; tiiiaucial exigency 
of Prussia and North Germany de- 
mands his thought, ih.; consents to 
sale of state railroad stock to cover 
deficit in revenue, 183; opposes plan 
proposing that Prussian members of 
Reichstag should constitute I'russian 
Assembly, 185; gives the grouiuls of 
his action in the Federal Council, 191 ; 
proves inconsistency of demaiul for 
responsible Ministers, 193 ; brilliancy 
of his speech, 194 ; criticises action of 
National IJberjil Party on question 
of taxation, 199, 200; favors duty on 
petroleum, 200; perfect concord of 
action under his leadership between 
Federal Council and Reichstag ISIa- 
jority, 217, 218; Lasker's motion in 
regard to Baden treaty a suri)rise to 
him, 222; desires that Baden should 
remain undisturbed in its relations to 
South (ierniaiiy, 2J.1: opposed to abo- 
lition of death j)enalty, 225, 229, 230 ; 
accused of inciting war against 
France, 232, note; resents sending 
French commissioner to St. Peters- 
burg, 245 ; opjiosed to proposition of 
Dam for disarmament, 240; impres- 
sion produced in France of his posi- 
tion in relation to admission of Baden 
to North German Confederation, 240, 
247 ; makes no public comment on 
Ollivier's explanation, 250 ; calls Gra- 
mont the "greatest blockhead in Eu- 
rope," 275 ; favors construction of 
railway over St. Gothard, 278; belief 
in France that he enticed Napoleon 
into declaration of war, 287 ; has in- 
terviews with Rancfes, 292 ; opposed 
to elevation of Prince Leopold to 
Spanish throne, 293; has interview 
with Benedetti, 2'J4, 295; misrepre- 
sented by Benedetti, 290 ; invited by 
King William to be i>resent at discus- 
sions relating to.Spauish throne, .305 ; 
favors candiil.-iev of the prince, 305, 
.300; motives which actuated him, 300: 
advantages which would accrue to 
Prussia in consequence,. '507 ; becomes 
seriously ill, il>. : writes consoling let- 
ter to Prim, ;50S; discusses Ilobenzol- 
lern cindidaey with King William. 
318, 319; addresses private letter to 
Prim,:tl9 ; accused of intrigue by Gra- 
mont,.'i21 : of suggesting deposition of 
Queen Isabella, 324; of suggesting 



530 



INDEX. 



name of Montpensier as candidate for 
.Spanish throne, i6.,- clause found in 
his report to Federal Council, 325, 
note; impression abroad that Hoheu- 
zoUern candidacy had been devised 
by him, 328 ; Swabian Kepublicaus 
an<l Bavarian Ultramontanes rejoice 
that he has at last made a fiasco, 329 ; 
attacked by Paris press, 338 ; what he 
expected from Prince Leopold's elec- 
tion to Spanish throne, 343 ; returns 
to Varzin, 343, 344; has no anticipa- 
tion of real difficulty in connection 
with Spanish affair, 344; completely 
taken by surprise, ib. ; sends instruc- 
tions to Prussian ambassadors, 345 ; 
calmly waits the result of French 
wrath, ib.; gives no orders for military 
precautious, 346 ; interview between 
King William and Benedetti awakens 
anxious thoughts in his mind, 357 ; 
considers king's granting audience to 
French ambassador too friendly an 
advance, 358 ; proceeds to Ems at 
king's command, 359 ; arrives in Ber- 
lin, 3G3, 364 ; sends message to King 
William, 364 ; requests Count Eulen- 
burg to go to Ems, ib. ; harassed by 
fears as to king's action, ib. ; resolved 
to have no further share in policy 
which he could not appiove, ib. ; ad- 
vises his wife not to follow him to 
Berlin, 365 ; awaits news from Ems 
and Paris, ib. ; accused of diabolical 
schemes by Gramont, 369 ; feelings 
of, on evening of July 12, 390 ; grasps 
the situation, 391 ; gives expression of 
his sentiments to Lord Loftus, 391, 
392 ; impatiently awaits news from 
Ems, 393 ; orders Werther to quit 
Paris at once, ib. ; dines with Boon 
and Moltke, ib. : receives Abeken's 
despatch from Ems, 393, 394; sends 
despatch to ambassadors and press, 
396-398 ; views of, concerning effect of 
publication of despatch, 397 ; inten- 
tions of, in giving his instructions to 
Werther, 404 ; accused of malicious 
fabrication by Gramont, 411 ; goes to 
Brandenburg to meet king, 426 ; de- 
spatch from Paris handed him by Von 
Thile, ib. ; informs king that French 
are mobilizing their Avhole army, 427 ; 
confutes Gramont's pretexts for in- 
citement of war, 431 ; believes that 
Germany could count upon Spain's 
assistance, 448 ; replies to French 
manifesto, 449 ; his disclosures make 
Gladstone apprehensive, 452 ; receives 
information that English merchants 
are delivering coal to French war-ves- 
sels, 453. 

Bixio, Gen., takes sides against La Mar- 
mora, iv. 24. 

Blixen-Finecke writes to Bismarck, iii. 
151, 152 ; accused of exchanging coini- 
selswith enemy, 158 ; makes bungling 
speech against new Constitution, 161. 

Blome, Count, rising Austrian diploma- 
tist, ii.468; Austrian ambassador in 
Mimich, proposition of, iv. 189 : his 
discussion with Bismarck, 191 ; has 



audience with King William, 192 ; be- 
gins second series of negotiations at 
Gastein, 210. 

Bluhme, Counsellor, Minister of For- 
eign Affairs in Denmark, iii. 67 ; fa- 
vorsprogrammeacceptabletoGernian 
Powers, 68 ; gains consent of King 
and Cabinet to his programme, 69 ; 
has no inclination to' lose his place, 
72 ; against infringement of compacts 
by new Constitution, 159 ; sends prop- 
ositions for truce to Berlin and Vien- 
na, 418. 

BUnn, Robert, on Poland, i. 236 ; court- 
martialled and shot, 288. 

Blumenau, engagement at, v. 325. 

Blumenthal.letterof, to Moltke, iii. 273. 

Bockum-Dolffs, views of, on draft of 
Constitution, vi. 74 ; theory of, on 
rights of Prussian House of Deputies, 
169. 

Bodelschwingh, Minister of Finance, 
clings to mediation, iv. 321 ; resigns, 
478 ; attacks Bismarck, vi. 356. 

Bohemia, Prussian campaign in, v. 117; 
description of country, 118 ; army of 
Austria in, 119 et seq. 

Boigne, Monsieur de, French commis- 
sioner, appears in Luxemburg, vi. 
147 ; recalled, 148. 

Bonaparte, Prince Jerome Napoleon, to 
marry Italian princess, ii. 362 ; makes 
tour to Berlin, vii. 102; makes sensa- 
tional speech in French Senate, 130 ; 
receives a siipport of only ten voices, 
131; statement of, 247, note; testi- 
mony of, in relation to negotiations 
between France, Austria, and Italy, 
460, note ; his assertion denied by 
Nigra, 468, note ; alluded to in note to 
Chap, v., 495. 

Bonin, Gen. von, Minister of War, ii. 
347 ; takes command of Army of the 
Rhine, 438. 

Borries, Herr von, rouses storm in the 
Liberal Press, ii. 394. 

BouUier, his work " Mazzini et Victor 
Emmanuel " referred to, vi. 389, note. 

Brandenburg made President of the 
Prussian Ministry, i. 289 ; sent to War- 
saw on a mission to the Czar, 490 ; 
his death, myth i-egarding, ii. 3 ; his 
instructions for the interview with the 
Czar at Warsaw, 4 ; his conversation 
with the Czar, 7 ; conversation with 
Czar on the Holstein question, 9 
et seq.; the Czar's ultimatum, 10: 
recommendations to the Prussian 
Government, 11 ; first audience witli 
Czar Nicholas, 15; conversation with 
SchAvarzenberg, ib. et seq.; submits 
the six propositions to ScliAvarzen- 
berg, 16; discussion of the Hessian 
question, 19 et seq.; letter from War- 
saw to Berlin, 21 ; the " temporary 
agreement," 22 et seq.; efforts to 
avert war in Hesse-Cassel, 24 et seq. ; 
recommends that negotiations with 
Austria be continued on the basis of 
the recommendations at Warsaw con- 
ference, 26 ; deprecates hostilities in 
Hesse, 28; proposed despatch to Vi- 



INDEX. 



531 



enna, 33 ; his illness and death, 37 ; ' 
his despatch sent to Vienna, 40. 

Bratianu, Joan, of Roumauia, visits | 
court of Prince Charles Anthony, vi. ' 
416 ; character of, 417 ; leader of the ( 
Radical Party in Rouuiania, 4_'7; lured ; 
on by idea of a great Daco-Rounia- 
nian empire, ih.; instigates a witle- 
spread revolutionary agitation, 423; 
course of action supposed to be aided 
by Prussia and Russia, 4:>0, 431 ; in- 
trigues of, 439, 445, 447 ; his influence 
over Prince Charles, 449. 

Brauchitsch, Heir von, asserts the duty 
of party independence, vl. 3o8. 

Braun, Karl, of Wiesbaden, proposes a 
tariff resolution, v. 403 ; closes the de- 
bate on Federal tribunal, vi. 185; op- 
poses .Socialistic principles, 308; gives 
.South German States matter for re- 
flection, 326 ; his remarks not based 
upon groundless suspicions, 327 ; 
moves that treaties be approved, 330; 
attacks Wiirtemberg, vii. 2o ; Conser- 
vatives express regret at his tone, 26; 
moves that petroleum be given the 
preference in discussion on tariff, 51. 

Braun, of Nassau, supports Miquel in 
debate on draft of Constitution, vi. 
75 ; favors agreement between the 
Reichstag and the Governments, 170. 

Bravo, Gonzalez, succeeds Narvaez as 
liresident of Spanish Ministry, vi. 
411 ; orders the incarceration of prin- 
cipal generals, 412. 

Bray, Count, Bavarian Minister, de- 
clares that war with France will find 
all Germany a unit, vii. 401; opinion 
of, concerning withdrawal of Prince 
Leopold, 437 ; proves Jiirg to be in 
error, 439 ; meets Varnbiiler, 443, 444. 

Brignoni, Gen., at Custozza, v. 104 et 
stq. 

Bronzell, skirmish at, ii. 47 et seq. 

IJruck, Austrian .Minister, negotiates a 
trade-treaty at Berlin, ii. 195. 

Briihl, sent with a note from Frederick 
William IV. to .Schwarzenberg, i. 310. 

Briinneck favors householder's right of 
suffrage, vi. 109; disposed of by Bis- 
marck, 111. 

Brunnow, Baron, plan of, to influence 
King of Prussia, iii. 88; i)osition of, 
in regard toNeuch4tel Document and 
Danish Protocol, 89 ; proposes a con- 
ference in regard to Lu.xemburg, vi. 
206, 207 ; calls attention to losses of 
citizens of Luxemburg, 209. 

Brunswick, Duchy f>f, note from, to 
Prussia, ii. 54 ; Frederick William IV. 
on, r>i>. 

Buchanan, Sir Andrew, conversation 
of, with Bismarck, on Polish affairs, 
ii.573 ;dis(;usses Danish question with 
IJismarck, iii. 152: in communication 
with Bismarck, 189; uses threatening 
words, 203; demands withdrawal of 
motion of Dec. 28, 2.37 ; sends private 
note to Bismarck in reg;ird to boin- 
hardment of .Sonderhnrg, .•i2(i. 

Bucher, I.otliar, elaborates <lr:ift of ar- 
ticles of new Constitution, vi. 29. 



Budberg, Baron, on Russia's attitude 
in the Austro-Prussian dispute, ii. 
58. 

Buffet, French Minister of Finance, 
vii. 238 ; opposed to plebiscitum, 267 ; 
retires from Cabinet, ib. 

Bulgaria, Turkey assembles a large 
military force in, vi. 414 ; insurrec- 
tion in, suppressed by Turkish pacha, 
428 ; invaded by armed bands from 
Roumauia, 430 ; incursions repeated, 
431. 

Bunsen writes to Berlin in regard to 
ratittcatiou of Danish Protocol, iii. 
89. 

Buol, Count, at the Dresden Congress, 
ii. 93 ; succeeds Schwarzenberg, 192 ; 
his policy, ib. ; change effected there- 
in by the rise of liouis Is'apcjleon, 193 ; 
his policy in the Russo-Turkish war 
of 1854, 210 ; summons a conference 
of the four Great Powers, 226; pro- 
poses a new treaty between Austri.i 
and the Western Powers, 247 ; treaty 
concluded, 249 ; opinion in Russia, 
Prussia, and German .States, 249 et 
seq. ; on the peace conditions, 254 ; de- 
mands the mobilization of 200,000 
Prussian and of the Confederate con- 
tingents, ib. ; circular to the German 
States, 257 ; ^confidential note to sev- 
eral states,' asking them to place- 
troops at the disposal of Austria, 258 ; 
his defeat, ih.; on the Confederate 
Constitution, 274 ; his fear of taking 
a false step, 369; resigns, and is re- 
placed by Count Rechberg, 370 ; feels 
insult of Denmark's action, iii. 103. 

Bureaucracy, i. 99. 

HurschoiisciKiffen, i. m et seq., 60, 61. 

Cadore, Marijuis, sent on special eni- 
b:issy to Denmark, vii. 458. 

Camphausen, Ludolf, life, character, 
achievements, etc., i.223 et seq.; con- 
versation with Gagern,225; circular 
to the German Governments, 326 ; 
the Prussian king ojiposes it, 327; 
summons a conference of his col- 
leagues and the Plenipotentiaries of 
the Petty States, 335 ; hands to the 
Imperial Ministry a list of Consti- 
tutional .■imcndments agreed on by 
twenty-nine states. ;i37 ; his Consti- 
tutional amcMdinents rejected, .343 ; 
recommenilations to the Prussian 
king on the matter of accepting the 
Imperial dignity from the Nation;il 
Assembly, ;J50; "efforts in behalf ol 
Prussia and an Imperial Constitution, 
3.55 et seq.: resigns his position of 
Plenipotentiary at Frankfort, 3t>.3. 

Camphausen, Otto, discusses customs 
tariff, vii. ,'J3, 34 ; takes part in tieb.-ite 
on the builget in the Reichstag, (ii; 
suc(;ecds \'on der Heydt as Prussian 
Minister of Finan<'ei 208; jiresents 
bis views of the tin.incial situation. 
20S, 2()i»; his plan approved by the 
king iinii Ministers, 2I(i ; develops his 
theory of action, 211-21.3 ; his plan op- 
posed by \'ircliow, 214 ; .-ihsenl from 
Berlin on arrival of Gen. von Roon, 



532 



INDEX. 



359 ; concurs witli King William's 
decision to publish report of inter- 
view with Benedetti, 389. 

Canitz, Herr von, had never discussed 
politics with Prim, vii. 317. 

Canning, enthusiasm among Germans 
for, i. 80. 

Capital and labor, rights of, discussed 
in the lleichstag, vi. 309-31G. 

" Capital," Karl Marx's work on, vii. 
140-152. 

Carette, Madame, testimony of, in re- 
lation to Napoleon's health, vii. 331, 
note. 

Carlowitz, Herr von, complains of 
omission of Luxemburg from North 
German Confederation, vi. 97 ; inter- 
rogates Bismarck as to the policy of 
the South German States, 125; regrets 
concessions made to Bavarian Gov- 
ernment, 326. 

Carlsbad Decrees, the, proposed hy 
Metternich and accepted by the Diet, 
i. 62. 

Carlsruhe, Count of, opposed to Prus- 
sian motion in Confederate Diet, iv. 
370. 

Caruot calls bayonet true weapon of 
liepublicans, v. 11. 

Caroline von Reuss zu Greiz, Princess 
Regent, declines to join the new con- 
federation, v. 513; finally submits, 
514. 

Cassagnac, Granier de, takes part in 
debate on French foreign jiolicy, vi. 
93, 94 ; asks for explanation of Minis- 
ters' speeches, vii. 243. 

Catholic Church, reaction in favor of, 
i. 103, 104. 

Cavour converses with Prussian states- 
men at Baden, ii. 355 ; his understand- 
ing with Napoleon regarding war 
against Austria, 361 ; arouses the 
popular feeling in Italy, 363 ; troubled 
by Napoleon's submissiveness, 369 ; 
his answer to Austria's ultimatum, 
371 ; retires from the Ministry, 382 ; 
his instructions carried out by chiefs 
of the revolt, 382 ; seizes reins of gov- 
ernment in Turin, 411 ; assists Gari- 
baldi's attack on Sicily, 414 ; takes up 
the work of Garibaldi, 429 ; his fa- 
mous order of the day on March 27, 
1861, iv. 4 et seq. 

Central Government appoints a Min- 
istry, i. 231. 

Cerale, Gen., at Custozza, v. 102 et seq. 

Cerutti, opinion of, concerning Prince 
Leopold's candidacy, vii. 312. 

Chapeaurouge, of Hamburg, opposes 
formation of powerful German navy, 
vi. 158, 1.59. 

Charlemagne, heterogeneous character 
of his empire, i. 5 ; effect of its break- 
ing up, 6. 

Charles Anthony, Prince of Holienzol- 
lern-Sigmaringen, not disinclined to 
his son's election to throne of Rou- 
mania, vi. 416; receives a personal 
letter from King William of Prussia, 
419 ; continues to look with favor upon 
his son's candidacy, 420 ; approached 



by Prim in relation to Prince Leo- 
pold's acceptance of Spanish crown, 
vii. 293, 294; desires evidence tliat 
King William and Napoleon both 
favor his son's acceptance of Spanish 
crown, 299; relation of his house to 
the crown of Prussia, ib. ; informs 
Napoieon of offer of Sjianish crown, 
318, 319; withdraws his son's candi- 
dacy, 362, 363, 367, 372, 373, 376, 379 ; 
letter from, expected at Kms, 386; 
arrival of letter from, 389, 390. 

Charles, Prince, son of Prince Charles 
Anthony of Hohenzollern-Sigmarin- 
gen, proposed by Louis Napoleon as 
candidate for throne of Roumania, 
vi. 415 ; preserves air of reserve when 
visited by Roumanian statesman, 416 ; 
commended to the Roumanians as the 
embodiment of every possible virtue, 
420; correspondence of, with King 
William, 421 ; invited to visit Bis- 
marck, 422; Bismarck's advice, 422, 
423 ; visits the king, 423 ; accepts the 
throne of Roumania, 424 ; forms his 
Cabinet, and establishes order in the 
administration of the country, 425 ; 
assures the Sultan of his submission 
to the suzerainty of the latter, 426 ; 
political genius of, ib. ; seeks military 
instructors and arms from Prussia, 
427 ; seeks to establish friendly rela- 
tions with Russia, ib. ; declines to lis- 
ten to Bratianu's extravagant ideas, 
428 ; applies himself zealously to re- 
form and development of Roumanian 
military system, 429 ; loses favor with 
France, 430 ; has no thought of war- 
like intentions, ib. ; Bismarck de- 
mands the dismissal of his Ministry, 
449 ; fascinated by Bratianu, ib. ; had 
been supported in Bucharest by Napo- 
leon, vii. 376. 

Charles, Prince of Bavaria, has inde- 
pendent command, v. 17 ; in the cam- 
paign in South Germany, 348 et seq. 

Charles, King of Roumania, entries in 
diary of, vii. 291, note. 

Charles, King of WUrtemberg, greets 
Napoleon at Ulm, vi. 238; seeks to 
learn his own mistakes, 260 ; orders 
Albert von Suckow to write account 
of recent campaign , 261 ; appoints Col . 
von Wagner chief of department of 
war, 262 ; his fixed purpose to main- 
tain a competent army, 263 ; sanctions 
the introduction of the Prussian 
needle-gun, 264 ; expresses himself in 
favor of alliance with North (lermau 
Confederation, 335; approves Snc- 
kow's desire to go to Berlin, 435 ; dis- 
plays little interest in Wagner's re- 
port, 438 ; becomes a stancher friend 
to national cause, vii. 441 ; asks Gen. 
Suckow to become Minister of War, 
442 ; goes to Engadine for the smn- 
mer, ib. : returns to Stuttgart, and 
orders immediate mobilization of 
army, 443. 

Charles V., a persistent opponent of 
German Reformation, i. 11, 12; (Tra- 
mont expresses surprise that sceptre 



INDEX. 



533 



of, should be intrusted to a Prussian 
priuce, vii. 3'J4; position of France 
during days of , 3'J7 ; Prussia accused 
of extending its Land toward crown 
of, Sii. 

C'barlutte, Princess, claims of, to the 
thrune of Denmark, iii. 1-1, 1 ;> ; lier 
iiirtuence over her brother, Christian 
\11I., 21; throws her voice on the 
J)aiiish side, 175. 

Chaudonlv, Count, insinuations of. 
against .^alazar, vii. 2yO,Ho^e; alluded 
to in nuit to Chap. \ ., 4U4. 

Chauvinists, French, clamorous de- 
mauds of, vi. 50; of both Centres 
support Gramont's war policy, vii. 41(;. 

Chigi, Papal Kuncio, angry at treaty 
between France and Italy, iv. 18. 

Christian, L)uke of A ugustenburg, ac- 
quires power in the Duchies of 
.Sohleswig-llolstein, iii. 14; hostility 
of King of Denmark towards, 15 ; 
people of Sehleswig unfriendly to, 
31; "becomes an object of interest, 
lb. ; hated by the Danish people, 45. 

Christian Vll., of Denmark, o:i the 
•Schleswig and liolstein succession, i. 
1J9. I 

Christian YIII., of Denmark, succeeds 
Frederick VI., iii. 22; his character 
and aims, ib.; his devotion to his 
sister, the Princess Charlotte, ib. ; 
seeks to assimilate the internal con- 
ditions of Schleswig to I>enmark, 23 ; 
l)laces himself al>ove parties, 24; re- 
presses the '• Eider Danes," 26 ; denies 
intention f>f incorjjorating Schleswig 
into Denmark proper, 28; attemi)ts 
to win over the public opinion of 
Europe in favor of his plans, ib. ; ap- 
points a commission to examine the 
ijuestion of succession, 37 ; obliged to 
quiet the public mind, 44 ; sends dele- 
gates to Berlin, ib. : orders draft of 
Constitution for united monarchy, 47; 
bis death, ib. 

Christian IX. proclaimed King of Den- 
mark, iii. 16;) ; difficulties of his i)osi- 
tion, 174; gives fatal signature, 175- 
forced to give way to " Kiiler Danes," 
217 ; visits his army at Dannevirke, 
270 ; favors Russian i)roposals, 396 ; 
has heated discussion with his Cabi- 
net, i/>.; fails to form new Cabinet, 
ib. : yields to old Ministers, 397 ; seeks 
help from European Powers, 417 ; in- 
dignation of, with iNIinister Monrad, 
418 ; intrusts formation of new Cabi- 
net to Hluhme, ib. ,■ the Federal chas- 
tisement executed against, iv. 36 ; not 
inclined to war, vii. 458; signs decla- 
ration of neutrality, ib. 
Christian of (illicksl>urg, Prince, re- 
mains faitliful to service of Danish 
king, iii. GO. 
Cialdini, popular witli army and pef>ple, 
V. 93; disagrees with I. a Marmora, 
ib.; refuses to take l,a Marmora's 
place, 258; makes slow progress to- 
wards Vienna, .iOO ; regards alliance 
witli France tbe only remedy for 
troubles in Italy, vi. 40:;. 



Civilta CattoUca, special organ of the 
Pope, vii. 176 ; excitement produced 
by its articles, 177 : explicit declara- 
tion in, in regard to (Ecumenical 
Council, 180 ; accuses Kapoleon of 
breaking his word, 487. 
Clarendon, Lord, goes to Paris to fur- 
ther reconciliation between Austria 
and Prussia, vi. 446; >;apoleon un- 
burdens his heart to him, ib. ; IMinis- 
ter of Foreign Affairs in Great Brit- 
ain, vii. 112; expresses iiulignation 
at Beust's servility, 116; transmits 
jiroposal of Darn toPrussian Govern- 
ment, 246 ; stand taken by, when 
Belgium was menaced, 450. 
Clausen, theologian, member of politi- 
cal association in Copenhagen, iii. 17'. 
declares proclamation of a Constitu- 
tion a necessity, 49. 
Clerical aspirations, vii. 163-180. 
Clerical party, excitement and bitter- 
ness of, iv. 4; feelings of, regarding 
treaty between France and Italy, 18. 
Clermont-Tonnerre, Count, reports to 

FreiU'h (Government, iii. 338. 
Cochery presents an interpellation to 

French Chamber, vii. 328. 
Cohn, "VVUrtemberg Kepublican, at- 
tempts to assassinate Bismarck, iv. 
408. 
Cologne, Archbishop of, arrested, 1. 104. 
Commission of Seventeen, their delib- 
erations at Frankfort, i. 179. 
Comnuttee of Thirty-six, manifesto oT, 

iii. 277. 
Communistic movement in Germanv, 

vii. 140-163. 
" Compact of the Interim," i. 397. 
Compact of Malmi). passionate hostility 

to, in the Kational Assembly, i. 270. 
Confederate armv-cori)s, strength of, 

V. 14-16. 
Confederate Constitution, attack upon, 
by the leaders of the Opposition, i. 
124; a cry for reform, ii. 273; Count 
Buol on, 274. 
Confederate Diet, rhum^ of ten years' 
work, i. 78 ; suppresses Kadical news- 
jiapers, 93; conspiracy against, 95; 
passes a decree concerning elections 
for a National Assembly, called to 
frame a Constitution, i72 ; directs 
Prussia to protect the Duchies, ib.; 
recognizes the Provisional Govern- 
ment at Kiel, ib. ; admits East and 
West Prussia and the (German half of 
Posen into tbe Confederation, 173; 
defeats the insurgents under Hecker, 
Str\ive, and llerwegb, 174; rejects 
Dahlmainrs .scheme for a Constitu- 
tional monarchy, 18:5 : formally rec- 
ognizes the Provisional Government 
of Schleswig-IIolstein, and calls on 
Denmark to allow the entrance of 
Schleswig into the German Confede- 
ration, 251 ; feeling against, in Berlin, 
ii. 12. 
Confederate Diet (Now) meets in 1851, 
ii. 12!i ; motion of the two (Jreat Pow- 
ers, i:i(); ilisciissed and curied, 132; 
I lieaction Commission, 13.1; dualism 



534 



INDEX. 



in, 1G5 et seq. ; Tariff-ITnion matters, 
167 ; Prusi?iii asserts lier right as an 
independent power by withdrawing 
East and West Prussia from the Con- 
federation, 176; quarrel over the Ger- 
man fleet, 177 et seq.; the fleet dis- 
solved and sold, ISO ; discussion of 
trade-relations, 186; Austria's per- 
emptory claims, 244; overawes tlie 
German courts, 245 ; Prussia's warn- 
ing note to the same, ih. ; Austria 
changes front, ib. ; I'ef uses to assist 
Austria by mobilization, 258 ; passes 
decrees imposing requirements on 
Denmark, 359 ; motions and counter- 
motions in, by Prussia and Austria, 
080 ; uselessness of, agreed upon by 
Liberals, 388; expels managing com- 
mittee from Frankfort, j6. ; proposi- 
tions of Beust in, directed against 
Prussia, 396; discussion of, 398; re- 
moulds constitutions at will, 399: its 
treatment of Hesse resented in Ger- 
many, 404 ; report of Jan. 19, 1860, 407 ; 
excitement in German States over its 
action, 408-410 ; threatens to chastise 
Duchies, 455 ; accepts proposal of 
committees, iii. 142 ; sends demands 
to Copenhagen, 143 ; arranges to chas- 
tise Denmark, 148-150 ; admission of 
representatives of Denmark opposed, 
185 ; lively commotion in, on receiv- 
ing invitation to J^ondon conference, 
320 ; claims right to settle question of 
Augustenburgsuccession,iv. 50; votes 
that the administration of Schleswig- 
Holstein be transferi-ed to Augusten- 
burg, 114; majority of, appoint spe- 
cial committee to consider Prussia's 
motion, 373 ; reply of Prussia to Aus- 
trian motion, 480 ; Austria's motion 
put to vote, 503 ; adopted, 506 ; Prus- 
sia's declaration, ib.; terminates its 
existence, v. 469. 

Confederate troops withdraw from Hol- 
stein, iii. 75. 

Confederation, what it did to secure ex- 
ternal safety of Germany, i. 68 ; mili- 
tary organization of, 69, 70. 

Confederation, German, threatens 
armed chastisement of Denmark, iii. 
108 ; again postpones military action, 
111. 

Congress of Vienna, effect of incorpo- 
rating In Acts thereof the law relat- 
ing to the German Confederation, i. 
55 et seq. 

Constantine, Russian Grand Duke, ap- 
pointed Governor of Poland, ii. 552 ; 
recalled to Russia, 614. 

Constitution of May 26 accepted and 
revised, i. 416 ; Manteuffel moves, in 
the Prussian Cabinet, to declare it 
infeasible, 462 ; Radowitz defends it, 
463; Frederick William IV. on,4&i; 
Prussia proposes its abolition, ii. 50. 

Constitutionals meet at Heffenheim, 
and demand a government and par- 
liament for the States of the Tariff- 
Union, i. 140. 

Co-operative associations, action in the 
Reichstag upon bill relating to,vii. 75. 



Copenhagen, formation of political as- 
sociation in, iii. 17 ; discouragement 
in, at result of war, 3.35. 

Cornu, Madame, letters of, vii, 291, wo^c'. 

Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism, i. 
27. 

Cowley, Lord, goes to Vienna, ii. 368 ; 
confession of, to Count Goltz, iii. 339 ; 
receives assurance from Moustier of 
French approval of European confe- 
rence, vi. 202. 

Cracow, incorporated into the Austrian 
Monarchy, i. 127 ; France and Eng- 
land object, 128. 

Cremieux gives utterance to opinion 
of Chamber in regard to Gramont's 
speech, vii. 337. 

Crete, inhabitants of, revolt against 
Turkish Government, vi. 215 ; suj)- 
ported by Grecian Government, and 
abetted by Russian diplomacy, 429. 

Crimean war leaves many problems 
unsolved, ii. 354. 

Cugia, Gen., at Custozza, v. 106 et seq. 

Curia, anger in, at news of treaty be- 
tween France and Italy, iv. 21 ; per- 
emptorily iipholds every paragrapli 
of schema, vii. 255, 256. 

Cusa, Prince, of Roumania, deposed, 
iv. 334 ; deposition of, vi. 414. 

Customs Parliament, the first, vii. 19- 
57 ; another session of, 227, 228. 

Customs Union, review of the history 
of ,vi. 265-267 ; representative body of, 
should bear the name of Customs 
Union Parliament, 272 ; formal treaty 
of, signed by representatives of Ger- 
man States, 273 ; adoption of, a tre- 
mendous stride toward attainment of 
German unity, 27-i ; approved by Wiir- 
temberg Chambers, 338; re-estab- 
lished upon a higher plane of com- 
mon interest, 339; Federal Council 
of, prepares measures for Reichstag, 
375 ; results of elections in South 
Germany for, 375-377 ; conflict of 
opinion in Wiirtemberg in regard to, 
378, 379 ; renewal of, between North 
and South Germany distasteful to 
Napoleon, 431. 

Custozza, battle of, v. 101-110. 

Czar Nioliolas, his attitude on the 
Schleswig-llolstein affair, i. 255 ; his 
character, 443 ; motives for his atti- 
tude on the Schleswig-Holstein mat- 
ter, 443 et seq. ; his conversation with 
the Prince of Prussia, 445 ; his reac- 
tionary projects, 448 ; instructions to 
Baron Meyendorff, 449 ; urges a recon- 
ciliation between Prussia and Aus- 
tria, 457 ; demands the assistance of 
the German Confederation to restore 
order in Schleswig-Holstein, 469; 
angry with Austria, 470 ; sends ambas- 
sadors to Isclil, to urge the ratifica- 
tion of the Danish Peace, and recon- 
ciliation with Prussia, 472 ; on the 
Hesse-Cassel matter, 489 ; mobilizes 
troops, ii. .58 ; his influence on Euro- 
pean affairs, 200 ; the Eastern Ques- 
tion, 201 et seq. ; conversation with 
Sir Hamilton Seymour on Eastern 



INDEX. 



535 



matters, 203 ; warlike preparations 
and ultimatum to Turkey, 2(>4 ; occu- 
pation of Moldavia and Wallachia, 
and its effect ou European opinion, 
ib.; vacillating policy, 234; with- 
draws his troops from the principali- 
ties, 236; his death, 2G1 ; his career 
and policy summed up, ib. 

Czartoryski, Prince Adam, candidate 
ffir the throne of Toland, ii. 526. 

Da<<>-ltouniaiuan empire, vi. 427, 428, 
431 ; perishes before its birth, 4M. 

Dahlmann, his character and his plans 
for a Constitutional Government of 
Germany, i. 180 ; size of his proposed 
empire, 182 ; his scheme rejected by 
Confederate Diet, 183; criticism by 
the Prince of Prussia, 184 ; criticism 
of Frederick William IV. 's plan of an 
empire, 185 et seq. 

Dalwigk, of Hesse, aversion of, to Prus- 
sia, vi.255 ; discomtituro of, in action 
of Hessian Lower Chamber, 256 ; com- 
municates with Beust,i6.; speech of, 
on admission of Hesse to North Ger- 
man Confederation, 257, 258 ; his an- 
nual contribution to Jesuit com- 
munity at Jlainz rejected by Hessian 
Lower Chaml)er, 259; wages fierce 
war against liberal Majority in Second 
Chamber in Darmstadt, vii. 174. 

iJammers, Col., Adjutant-General of 
Hanoverian army, v. 40 ; negotiations 
of, with Moltke, 50, 51 ; does not ques- 
tion authenticity of documents in 
Medijig's " Memoires," vi. 307, Jio/e. 

Danes, contrast between, and Schles- 
wig-IIolsteiners,iii. 116; inSchleswig 
complain of German oppression, iv. 
255. 

Danish army, strength of, iii. 263. 

Danish currency introduced into the 
Duchies, iii. 23. 

Danish democracy sympathizes with 
Poland, iii. 129. 

Danner, Counte.ss, intrigues of, iii. 101. 

Dannevirke, fortifications of, iii. 263; 
evacuation of, 273. 

Darboy, Archbishoi), leader of Minority 
of French bisliops in CEcumenical 
Council, vii. 254. 

Darmstadt favors compromise meas- 
ures in Confederate Diet, iii. 201 ; mo- 
bilizes her troops, iv. 411 ; mourns loss 
of gaming-tables of Homburg, v. 454; 
treaty of peace with Prussia signed, 
4.55 ; lias long list of proposals to make 
in regard to new Constitution, vi. 36; 
would not be party to .South German 
military combination, 2.VJ; represen- 
tatives of, favor commercial inter- 
course, vii. 32. I 

Daru, Count, Lis proposal for mutual , 
disarmament docs not disturl) rela- ; 
tions between France and Prussia, 
vii. 220; French .Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, 238; gives an exhaustive 
statement of the two programmes of 
the <Jentre,242 ; guides foreign affairs 
of Fnmce with a skilful liand,244; 
cautions (!en. Klenry to be circum- 
spect at St. Petersburg, 245 ; takes 



step to convince Eurojie that peace 
was assured, 245, 246 ; requests Eng- 
land to transmit pr< jposals to Prussian 
Government, 246 ; expresses surprise 
at Bismarck's reply to Lasker, 249 ; 
allows his allusiuu to Baden to pass 
unnoticed, t6.; reissues orders of L;i- 
tour to de I5anneville, 2.52 j differs with 
Ollivier on Kimian question, 252, 253 ; 
defends tlie rights of the modern state 
against pretensions of the l*ni)e, 255 ; 
indignation of, at new evi<lence of 
Papal arrogMice, 256; his memorial 
receives support of Austria, Prussia, 
and Bavaria, 2.57 ; harmony with Ol- 
livier at an end, 258; declares that 
fundamental revision could be accom- 
plished only by a plcbiscitum, 259; 
assures the emperor that plebiscituni 
would awake great enthusiasm, 260; 
believes the plebiscituni would result 
favonilily toilieemperor, 264 ; retires 
from the Cabinet, 267 ; his judgment 
correct in regard to plebiscituni, 271 ; 
had owed his nomination not to Olli- 
vier alone, 277. 

David, Baron, member of club opposed 
to Government, vii. 244; denounces 
French Cabinet's dilatoriness, 384. 

Deak, Franz, leader of Hungarian Ojv 
position, iv. 182; popularity of, in 
Hungarian Parliament, 442; would 
not advocate separation of Hungary 
from Austria, v. 84 ; advises Emperor 
of Austria to withdraw from German 
Confederation, 310. 

Declaration of war, vii. 402. 

Decree of (h.istiseinent, iv. 36. 

Decree of ,June 28 accepted by the Ger- 
man (iovernments, i. '312. 

De Gramont, Due, denies statement 
concerning Bismarck, iv. 169, iiati'. 

Delbriick, Prussian .Superintendent of 
Commerce, character of, iii. 4,52; as- 
sists in elaborating draft of articles 
of new Constitution, vi. 29 ; represents 
Governments in matters of railway 
administration, 158 ; appointed Presi- 
dent of Federal Chancery, 274 ; calls 
attention to its spliere of activity, 
292; pronounces Micpiel's ideas in re- 
lation to public tlebt of doubtful ex- 
pediency, :503 ; announces consent of 
Federal Council to changes in hill pro- 
posing freedom of migration, 305 ; de- 
clares time not ripe for enactment of 
law in relation to labor unions, 310; 
announces willingness of the Govern- 
ments to introduce an improved crim- 
in.al code, vii. 6; gives intorination in 
relation to commercial treaties with 
Spanisli colonies, 29; an earnest ad- 
vocate of the i>rincipiesof free trade, 
31 ; views of, in regard to duties on 
sugar, .55; on petroleum, i7). ,• dis- 
cusses the budget In the Keichstag, 
01, (i2 ; enters tlcbate on l)udget with 
effective arguments, 69 ; presents 
budget in altered form, 70; on privi- 
leges gnmted to Federal ofliciuls, 74; 
states position of Feiieral Council in 
regard to measure regulating indus- 



536 



INDEX. 



trial pursuits, 78 ; proposes new means 
of adding to revenue, 197 ; protests 
against association of sugar rates with 
tariff law, 206 ; perfect concord of ac- 
tion under leadership of, between 
Federal Council and Reichstag Ma- 
jority, 217, 218. 
De Meza, Gen., counsels King of Den- 
mark, iii. 175 ; capacity of, 202 ; calls a 
coiuicil of war, 271 ; abandons Danne- 
virke, 272 ; relieved of his command, 
274. 
Democrats of Prussia protest against 
the new electoral law, and disappear 
from politics, i. 411. 
Denmark favored by the Foreign Pow- 
ers, i. 253 ; her demands in the 
Schleswig-Holstein negotiations, 2G0 ; 
proposal in reference to Schleswig 
(October, 1848), 430; hostilities re- 
newed, 432 ; negotiates for peace, ib. ; 
peace preliminaries, 434 ; German 
opinion on these, 436 ; peace signed, 
455 ; Articles thereof, ib. ; prepared 
to negotiate with Confederate Diet, 
ii. 359 ; attempts to make arrange- 
ments with German Great Powers, 
4C0 ; relation to Schleswig-Holstein, 
iii. 1-21 ; law of female succession in, 
15; rise of " Eider-Danish " party in, 
17-21 ; Lex JiegUi of, 30; integrity of, 
favored by Great European Powers, 
32, 34, 35 ; France appears as protec- 
tor of, 35 ; not disposed to endanger 
her friendly alliance with Russia, 36; 
an important element in the balance 
of European power, 37 ; hour of abso- 
lute monarchy in, struck, 47 ; effect of 
French Revolution on, 49; finds on 
its hands a difficult and bloody war, 
53; arrogance in, 57; controlled by 
the "Eider Danes," G7 ; proposes to 
pension Augustenburg, 80 ; exchanges 
ratifications with European Powers, 
89 ; breaks compacts, 97 ; announces 
new constitutions for the Duchies, 101; 
willing to regard general Constitution 
suspended, 108 ; to be punished by 
German Confederation, 111 ; issues 
warlike proclamations, 143 ; answer 
of, to Confederate decree, 146; decrees 
hlockade of Holstein and Schleswig 
ports, 289 ; ready to take part in con- 
ference, 316 ; exultation in, at English 
feeling, 356 ; rejects English proposal 
358 ; never fulfilled her obligations 
to Germany, 432 ; craves participation 
in council "of Great Powers, vi. 203; 
seeks support of French Government, 
231; sympathizes with France, vii. 
457 ; requested by Prussia to declare 
its neutrality, ib. ; king of, signs dec- 
laration, 458. 
Derby, Lord, advises Queen Victoria in 
regard to Danish succession, iii. 83; 
statement of, in English Upper 
House, on Luxemburg guaranty, vi. 
211; persistently upholds his views,212. 
Der Volksstaat, Liebknecht designated 

as editor of, vii. 159 
Devens opposes enactment of law in re- 
lation to boycotts and strikes, vi. 313. 



Diet of the German States under tlie 
Act of Confederation, i. 52 et scq. 

Diet, the Prussian, vote for the cessa- 
tion of the payment of taxes, i. 291 ; 
their session in Berlin broken up, ib. ; 
ordered to assemble at Brandenburg, 
ib. ; dissolved by Frederick William 
IV., 292. 

Directory proposed for Germany, i. 188; 
directory of three proposed in the 
National Assembly for Germany, 197. 

Disraeli, warning of, to English Parlia- 
ment, vii. 451. 

Dohna, Count Friedrich, proposal of 
the Czar to, i. 448. 

DoUinger, Dr., foremost theologian of 
Catholic Germany, vii. 178 ; experi- 
ence of, in the struggle for liberty of 
the Church, 253. 

Doring, Col., sent to negotiate with 
King George, v. 61. 

Draft of new Constitution discussed by 
plenipotentiaries of Allied Govern- 
ments, vi. 29-37; calls forth praise 
and adverse criticism by the press 
and the public, 59; continued dis- 
cussion of, 60-116. 

Dresden Congress, opening of, ii. 87 ; 
Schwarzenberg proposes a plan for 
the executive, 89 ; Petty States oppose 
Schwarzenberg, 90 ; Prussia and Aus- 
tria attempt a reconciliation on thi 
formation of the executive, 92 ; decis- 
ions of the committees, 93 tt seq. ; 
discussion on the marine, 95 ; on 
tariff-union, 96 ; discussion of popu- 
lar representation, ib. ; a majority of 
the states vote against the committee 
report, 105 ; Prussia moves to close 
the proceedings, 113; Baron Beust 
urges the approval of the committee 
work, ib. : Schwavzcnberg's futile ef- 
forts to aeconiplish SDniething, 114; 
close of the deliberations, 115. 

Dresden, riots in, i. 83 ; disturbances 
in, 373. 

Drouyn de Lhuys on Usedom's mission 
to London, ii. 252 ; character and pol- 
icy, 264 ; attitude toward the Catholic 
Church aiul Austria, 265 ; makes pro- 
posals to England with regard to the 
Black Sea, 266; conference with Fran- 
cis Joseph, ib. ; his neutralization 
scheme rejected by Russia, ib. ; de- 
sires the re-establishment of Poland, 
598; negotiations of , with Count Goltz, 
iii. 191 ; responds to Bismarck, 342 ; 
has conference with Goltz, 345 : re- 
called to the position of Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, iv. 5 ; removes Thou- 
venel's associates, Benedetti and 
Lavalette, from their posts as ambas- 
sadors, ib. ; on the proper division of 
Italy, ib., disregards requests of Ni- 
gra, 9 ; receives orders to reply to de- 
spatch of July 9, 1863, 10 ; his oppo- 
nents work for his downfall, ib.; his 
diplomatic discussions with Visconti- 
Venosta and Nigra, 11 ; treaty to be 
signed by, 13 ; interview with" Mena- 
brea, 14 ; grants the Italian demand, 
ib. ; conversations with Nigra, 15 ; in- 



INDEX. 



537 



ilignation against, for belying his 
principles, 18 ; delighted over attacks 
of Prussia by French press, 231 ; sym- 
pathizes with Austria rather than 
with Prussia, 233; sounds Count Goltz, 
449 ; desires outbreak of war between 
Austria and Prussia, 452; threatens 
French occupation of left bank of 
Rhine, v. 248 ; promises unconditional 
submission to Napoleon, 293: urges 
upon Napoleon the necessity of 
French annexations, 414 ; resigns, v. 
471 ; his opinion of the IlohenzoUern 
candidacy, vi. 424 ; makes represen- 
tation to Papal Government concern- 
ing occupation of Home by French 
troops, vii. 171, 172. 

Duke Charles stoned, i. 83. 

Dumont, Gen., sent to Kome by ^lar- 
shal Niel, vi. 390. 

Duncker, Franz, takes part in debate 
in Reiclistag on draft of (.'onstitution, 
vi. 80, 81; delivers doleful eulogy on 
black, red, and gold standard of 1848, 
159 ; declares the war of 1866 a mon- 
strous game of chance, 169. 

Duncker, Max, prepares draft of Con- 
stitution for North German Confed- 
eration, vi. 28. 

Diippel besieged by German army, ill. 
310 ; fierce engagements at, 312 ; cap- 
tured, 333. 

Durando, Minister, declares that Italy 
cannot dispense with the possession 
of Kome, iv. 4. 

Du Thil, Minister of Darmstadt, atti- 
tude toward Liberalism, i. 99 ; his re- 
forms, ib. 

Duvernois, Clement, becomes an open 
antagonist of Ollivii-r, vii. 244; an- 
nounces his intention to interpellate 
Government, 367, .372, 379, 384 ; inter- 
pellation of, to receive exultant replv, 
415. 

Eastern Question, ii. 201 et seq.: Herr 
von Beust on, 230; members of the 
Darmstadt Coalition meet at Bam- 
berg and discuss the Eastern Ques- 
tion, 231 ; attitudes of Austria and 
Prussia, 235; Count Buol's negoti;i- 
tions, ih. ; Western Powers propose 
an alliance with Austria against Rus- 
sia, 2.'i6; policy of the Lesser and Petty 
.States, 237 ; Prussia excluded froni 
the deliber.-itions of the Powers, 23S ; 
effect of this exclusion on the Prus- 
sian (Government, ih. ; demands of 
Austria ;ind the .Maritime Powers, ib. ; 
criticism of these demands, 2.'>9 ; ac- 
tion and attitude of Frederick Wil- 
liam IV., ib.: Austiia occupies Wal- 
lachia, ib. ; Von Prokcsch soun<ls the 
sentiments of the Confederate Diet, 
240; Russia rejecrts the demands of 
the Powers, ib. .■ Prussia's Circular to 
the German Courts, //;..• English and 
French embark for Sebasto|iol. 241 ; 
Western Powers resent Austria's ilii- 
plicity, (^. .■ policy of Napoleon, 242 ; 
I'lu.ssia fears .-i " m.inli of I''rencli 
tioops through .South (iermany and 
a blockade of the Prussian coast, 243 ; 



peace-conference delayed, 255 ; dis- 
agreements of the Powers, ib. ; dis- 
cussion on the treaty of l&ll, 262; 
England proposes the neutralization 
of the Black Sea, 263. 

Edcl. Dejiutv. of Bavaria, joins Nation- 
alists, vii. 440. 

Edclslieim, Baron, ardent zealot of 
"Entire Germany" party, iv, 360. 

Eichhorn, K. F., on question of succes- 
sion, iii. 29. 

" Eider-Danish " party, rise and growth 
of, iii. 17-21 ; endeavors to transform 
Schleswig into a Danish coiuitry, 25 ; 
onslaught of, upon German element 
in Schleswig, 31 ; demands the incor- 
poration of Schleswig into a ]>anish 
country, 39; continues its sway at 
Copenhagen, 58; an ultra-radical 
body, 63; its principle stigmatized by 
Schwarzenberg as incomjiatible with 
integrity of Danish monarchy, 66; 
obtains control of tiovernmciit, 67; 
Lonilon i)i<)tocol unac-ccjitable to,92 ; 
attacks Minister Orstrd, iii. 101 ; bold- 
ness and determination of, 120; con- 
siders England the chief sinner, ib. : 
a new epoch to open to, 126 ; liopes for 
a European war, 129 ; continues ag- 
gressive action, 160; encouraged at 
conflict of opinions in Germany, 245 ; 
newspaper organs of, discouraged,416. 

Eisenach, meeting at, to form German 
National Association, ii. 387. 

Elizabeth, Queen, devotion of, to her 
husband, ii. 341 ; tells the king that 
the prince must become regent, 346. 

Emigrants, returning, treaty witli Am- 
erica relating to, vii. 4, 5. 

Employers and employees, relations 
between, discussed in the Reichstag, 
vi. ,309-310. 

Engels, Friedrieh, devotes himself to 
the study of the working-man's con- 
dition, vii. 141. 

England desires good understamling 
between Austria and Prussia, ii. 356 ; 
desire for peace lucdonunates in, 368 ; 
accepts Russia's propos.il of a Con- 
gress, ib.: eiithusiastie tor the resur- 
rection (if Italy, 371 ; rejoices at Rus- 
sia's enib.-irrassments, 386, .387 ; Whig 
Ministry in, interested in struggle of 
Italy, 412 : advises Denmark to fulttl 
wishes of German Powers, iii. 68: ex- 
erts influence at Copenhagen, 111; 
might be driven tosui)port Denmark, 
190; refuses to attend Nai)oleon's 
Congress, 200 ; jirojxises a conference 
of the Powers, 232; renews proposi- 
tions of conference, 289; offers her 
services ,as mediator between Austria 
and Prussia, iv. 371 ; recommends the 
V(duntary cession of Venetia,.'!".!] ; has 
no icleaof opjiosing Prussi.-i's policy, 
V.252: not in f;ivorof iMiropean Coii- 
gresfi, 398; will not sutler l''r.in<'e to 
lay hands on Belgium, 464; pleased 
with I'russian vli'torles and Germ.'in 
ex.'iltatlon. vl. 5 : oppos.-d to interfer- 
ing In dispules of other nations, 20<; : 
looks with dispjeasiiri' upon revolt In 



538 



INDEX. 



Crete, 215 ; averse to participating in 
JBuropean Congress to settle affairs 
iu Italy, 398; believes that integrity 
of Kouinania sliould be preservetl to 
Turkey, 415 ; opposed to tampering 
with Belgian neutrality, vii. 112 ; pub- 
lic opinion iu, in favor of Prussia, 449; 
careful attitude of Government, ib.; 
merchants of, supply French war-ves- 
sels, 453 ; Queen of, publishes mani- 
festo proclaiming neutrality, vii. 451 ; 
vexatious controversy with Prussian 
Cabinet regarding neutrality, 453 ; 
merchants of, deliver supplies to 
French war-vessels, ib. ; not within 
province of Government to decide on 
articles contraband of war, 454 ; Cabi- 
net of, endeavors to localize German- 
French war, 455. 

English Parliament sympathizes with 
Denmark, iii. 27G. 

Ernest, Duke, liberal and national in 
his tendencies, ii. 3S7 ; desires forma- 
tion of a German National Associa- 
tion, 388. 

Erxleben, Hanoverian Minister, on rev- 
enue and appropriations, vi. 179. 

Estates, Confederate Laws directed 
against, i. 94. 

Esterhazy, Count Moritz, announces to 
the Prussian Minister a treaty of alli- 
ance between Austria and the West- 
ern Powers, and invites Prussia to 
join, ii. 249 ; character of, iv. 181 ; 
favors policy of conciliation, 188, 
198. 

Eugene, Prince, result of his victories, 
i. 15. 

Eugenie, Empress, goes to baths at 
Schwalbach, iv. 17 ; receives Goltz, 
217 ; considers union of Italy danger- 
ous, 455 ; coincides with views of de 
Lhuys, V.249 ; audience of, with Goltz, 
270 ; her dread of German unity, 272 ; 
believes no half measures should be 
adopted, 417 ; captivates all hearts at 
Paris Exposition, vi. 224 ; considers 
Herr von Beust's imagination most 
vivid, 240, 428 ; anxiety of, for her 
husband, vii. 100 ; present at opening 
of Suez Canal in place of Napoleon, 
135 ; reported opposition of, to candi- 
dacy of Prince Leopold, 291, MO<e; her 
comment on Beast's letter, 468. 

Eulenburg, Prussian Minister, goes to 
Schleswig, i v. 261 ; favors longer terms 
of election to Reichstag, vi. 114 ; faith- 
fully fulfils his promises, 282 ; asserts 
that the old German provincial as- 
semblies had no fluids under their 
control, 283 ; feeling of resentment 
against, vii. 184 ; his proposed system 
of provincial self-government, 217 ; 
requested by Bismarck to go to Ems, 
.364 ; allusion to, in Abeken's de- 
spatch, 394. 

European Great Powers favor neither 
"Eider Danes" nor Schleswig-Hol- 
steiners, iii. 63. 

Fabricius, tax counsellor for Hesse, 
statement of, in regard to wine-trade, 
vii. 44, note. 



Failly, Gen., report of, on etfect of 
Chassepot rifles, vi. 393. 

Falckenstein, Gen. Vogel von, tele- 
graphs to Bismarck, iii. 291 ; at sea- 
side, with staff, in Jutland, 419 ; ap- 
pointed commander 7th Prussian 
army-corps, v. 28 ; campaign of, 43- 
68 ; appointed provisional governor 
of Hesse-Cassel, 68 ; campaign of, in 
South Germany, 347 et seq.; makes tri- 
umphal entrance into Frankfort, 372 ; 
appointed Governor-general of Bo- 
hemia, 373 ; vigorous speech of, on 
organization of army, vi. 175. 

Favre, Jules, plan of, to avert Prusso- 
German danger, vi. 92, 93; inconve- 
nient interpellation of, 146 ; criticises 
French Government for its defence 
of Rome, 401 ; asks for the policy of 
the Cabinet, vii. 241 ; allusion to, 
p. 359, note; opposes Gramont's war 
policy, 417 ; his opposition of no avail, 
421. 

Federal budget, discussion in the Reich- 
stag on, vii. 58-71. 

Federal Chancery instituted, vi. 274. 

Federal Chastisement,executed against 
Christian IX., iv. 36. 

Federal Council, deliberations of, i. 
Z^Setseq. 

Federal Council, first session of, opened, 
vi. 274, 275 ; proposes coui'se in regard 
to collection of Federal revenue and 
administration of Federal debt, vii. 
72 ; in regard to legal relations of 
Federal officials, 73 ; extreme caution 
of, in regard to new measures, 76 ; sub- 
mits a comprehen.«ive bill to regulate 
industrial pursuits, 77 ; position of, 
in relation to measure regulating 
industrial pursuits, 78 ; harmonious 
action of, with the Reichstag, in re- 
lation to the metric and decimal sys- 
tems, and laws relating to gambling 
houses, 79 ; recognizes merit of many 
bills submitted to Reichstag, vii. 187 ; 
submits budget for 1870 to Reichstag, 
195 ; revises propositions for regulat- 
ing taxes, 197, 198. 

Federal debt, discussion in relation to, 
vii. 12-17 ; Federal Council proposes 
course in regard to administration of, 
72. 

Federal navy, discussion concerning, 
vii, 18, 19. 

Female succession, law of, in Denmark, 
iii. 15 ; as applied to Schleswig, 20. 

Ferdinand, King of Portugal, suggested 
as candidate for throne of Spain, 
vii. 291 : refuses offer of the crown, 
292. 

Ferry, Deputy, apprehensive of effect 
of St. Gothard railway, vii. 280. 

Feudal party of Prussia, opinion on, 
i. 412. 

Feustel, reporter, presents opinion of 
committee to the Bavarian Chamber, 
vi. 327. 

Fischer, Deputy, advocates German 
cause in Bavarian House, vii. 440. 

Flanders, Duke of, elected as succes- 
sor to Hospodar Cusa, vi. 414 ; King 



INDEX. 



539 



Leopold refuses to sanction his elec- 
tion, 415. 

Fleury, Gen., sent on mission to Fran- 
cis Joseph, ii. 379 ; sent to Italy by 
Napoleon, vi. 385 ; sent to St. Peters- 
burg to arouse sympathy for France, 
vii. Ii45. 

Fliegencle Blatter caricatures Prussian 
officers, vi.9. 

Flies, Prussian general, driven back by 
Hanoverian tn)ops, v. CD ; lights the 
enemy at Langensalza, 71 ; declines 
olfer of truce, 74. 

Flott well, President von, replaces West- 
plialen in Prussian Cabinet, ii. 347. 

Fore.-ide, Minister of Interior, engaged 
in contention with Magne, Minister of 
Finance, vii. 130. 

Furckenbeck, von, elected President of 
Lower House in Prussia, v. 407 ; de- 
fends greater parliamentary rights, 
vi. 170 ; considers it unwise to weaken 
present condition of army, 171 ; plan 
of, to flx number of army in time of 
peace, 171, 172; his plan not approved 
by Conservative Party, 173 ; plan of, 
adopted by Keichstag, 17G ; his motion 
carried, 182. 

Fiirsterliug, a disciple of Lassalle, vi. 
308. 

France, effect of a free Constitution, 1. 
79; threatens war, 116; attitude on 
Polish affairs, 255 ; democratic ten- 
dencies of the people in, ii. 297; accepts 
Kussia's proposal of a congress, 368 ; 
commercial treaties with (lermany, 
492^97 ; interested in affairs in Den- 
mark, iii. 35; sympathizes with Den- 
mark, 68; sympathy between France 
and Austria, iv. 5 ; unfriendly feeling 
in, towards Prussia, 78; would pre- 
serve friendly neutr.ility to Prussia, 
174; conduct of, doubtful, 209; in 
event of war would remain passive, 
228 ; public opinion in, on the Gastein 
treaty, 230; Prussia's action in Con- 
federate Diet arouses suspicion and 
distrust in, 372 ; will fight for terri- 
tory, not ideas, 416 ; aiijier in, over 
victory of Prussia at Kfiniggratz, v. 
243; pride in, at Napoleon's position 
as mediator, 247 ; complete isf)lation 
of, in Europe, 2"j1 ; compl.-iins of muti- 
lation of her iiroposition, 456; new 
proposal of, concerning compensa- 
tion, 462; v.mity iif, (iH'eiided at Prus- 
sia's suc(resscs,vi.6; otters conditifmal 
friendship an(l alliance with Prussia, 
43-45; Clianvinists of. m;ike clamor- 
ous demands, .'iO; gains no eminent 
results from Napoleon's policy, 216; 
the pre-eniinence of, an historiC fact, 
2;J5 ; again irritated l)y ilipbiniatic de- 
feat, 2.i7 ; inllueni'c of, weakened Ijy 
reorganiz.'ition <if (jerman States,. isl ; 
people of, anim.'tted by bitter batretl 
of Prussia ami Italv, Hi.: bond of 
friendsliip witli Italy seems com- 
jiletely severed, 402 ; Opposition Party 
in, oppose .Marslial N lei's army re- 
forms, 405 ; institution of tlie National 
(iuard unpopular in, 406; people of, 



believe their army to be invincible, 
407 ; views of, in relation to affairs in 
Houniania, 414 ; begins to withdraw 
its sympathy from Crete, 429 ; the See- 
ond Knipire the product of politic.il 
and social revoluti<jn, vii. 81 ; the pr.- 
prietary and earning classes aceept 
Napoleon's dictatorshiii, 82: bitter 
resentmentof the vancpiished parties, 
ib.: views of tbe ^lajority and Oppo- 
sition in the rejiresentjitlve body, 84; 
ultimate aim of Opjiosition, 87 ; peo- 
ple earnestly desire peace, ih. : Najm- 
leon pursue'd with bitter malignity 
by the Kei)ublicans, .Socialists, anil 
Kadieals, 89 ; new programme of Na- 
poleon, 92: great mass of peasants 
and industrial poimlation turn their 
ba<'ks upon political contentions, 94 : 
ai)peal of the Opjiosition for a respon- 
sible Ministry, 96 ; attempt to form a 
triple alliance, 97 : general indigii;i- 
tion at the laws regarding the jiress, 
ib. ; desires to enter into customs re- 
lationswith Luxemburg and Belgium, 
101 ; Government of, given control of 
direct railwav lines to Brussels and 
Kotterdam,103; attitude of Bismarek 
pm-trayed, 113; critical election in. 
1S!-124 ; changes in Constitution and 
Government of, 125-130; no inclina- 
tion in, to arrive at decision regard- 
ing tEcumenical Council, 177, 178; 
change of Ministry in. 238 : discussion 
in the Chamber over policy of Cabi- 
net, 239-244; gives no sign of depart- 
ure from its present policy, 277 : dis- 
satisfaction in, at .St.Gothard railway. 
279 ; general belief in. that Bismarck 
enticed Napoleon into dei-laration (^f 
war, 287 ; greatly interested in Span- 
ish throne question, 2il6 ; violent tone 
of Parisian press, 327; thrown into 
state of unusual excitement. 332: deej> 
anxiety takes possession of minds of 
people of, 334; newspapers applaud 
Graniont's speech in Chamber. ;i.>8; 
they demand guaranties from Prus- 
sia, 339 ; intense bitterness in, against 
Prussia, 379, 380 ; cities of, eager for' 
war with Prussia. 422. 42.S : invites 
Austria and Italy to join lier in com- 
ing contest, 458. 459 ; incentives of, to 
war, 489, 490. 

Francis, Emperor, on the proposed res- 
tf)ration of the Imperial dignity, i. 
42, 43; on the effects of the inde- 
pendence of the German St.ates, 43. 

Fr.ancis Joseph, made Knii>erorof Aus- 
tria, i. .300 ; note to Prussia, 4riO ; meets 
FrederickAVilliam I\'. at 'J'etselien.ii. 
232; urged to begin holy war against 
revolution, .W) ; takes command of 
army, .376 : defeated at Sidferino, 377 ; 
weary of the contest, 378; driven Ity 
Prus.sia to sacrilice Lonib:irdy, 386; 
discusses .'illiance between .\ustria 
and Prussia with Priiu'c Willi.ain, 
llegent of Prussia, 427 ; has no conli- 
dencein N;ijioleon,.'')l»9 ; satisfied with 
iinderstaniling with Prussia, iii. 200; 
opposed to pursuing Danes into •Jut- 



)40 



INDEX 



land, 292 ; rejects idea of diplomatic^ 
negotiations with France, 302; de- 
sires exact statement from Prussia, 
30-1 ; shows zeal to carry on war, 306 ; 
his views of Mensdorff 's appointment, 
iv. 27 ; his feeling towartls the Prus- 
sian alliance, ih. ; urges Mensdorff to 
finish up the Holstein matter, 31 ; 
impatient at Prussia's delay, 63 ; re- 
plies to King William's letter, 171 ; 
visits Pesth, 182 ; in conflict with his 
Cahinet, isi ; accepts their resigna- 
tion, 185 ; writes conciliatory letter to 
King Vfilliam, 199 ; interview with 
Anton Gablenz, 473 ; anticipated visit 
of, to Paris, impossible, vi. 228; re- 
ceives letter of condolence from Na- 
poleon, 237 ; visited by Napoleon and 
Eugenie, 238-241 ; accredits Count 
Vitzthum to the court of Napoleon, 
441 ; approves of Vitzthum's plan for 
triple alliance, vii. 109; corresponds 
with Napoleon in regard to triple al- 
liance, 134 ; accepts invitation to be 
present at opening of Suez Canal, 135 ; 
cordially receives the Prussian crown 
prince in Vienna, 13G ; carefully ex- 
cludes topics of political interest 
from his conversation, 137 ; concludes 
a concordat with the Pope, 168^ re- 
ceives Lebrun in Vienna, 281, 282; 
desired by Napoleon to propose Euro- 
pean Congress, 424. 

Prankfort, convention at, discusses the 
proposed German Parliament, i. 151 ; 
Kepublican insurrection in, 274 et seq.; 
assembly of princes at, ii. 604 ; Aus- 
trian in "feeling, 615 ; welcomes Fran- 
cis Joseph, lb. ; assembling of German 
princes at, and their deliberations, 
616-626; deputies in, sign document, 
iii. 359 ; required to pay heavy contri- 
bution to Prussia, v. 374 ; sullen rage 
of people of, against Prussia, vi. 12, 
13 ; opposed to immigration, 22 ; 
fares unfortunately in financial mat- 
ters, 281. 

Fransecky marches against Pressburg, 
V. 324. 

Frederick, Charles, Prince, commands 
Prussian army-corps, iii. 261; takes 
command of Prussian army in Jut- 
land, 409 ; in Bohemia, v. 117 et seq.; 
at battle of Ktiniggratz, 194 et seq.; 
supports Conservative motion in 
Reichstag, vi. 197. 

Frederick, Duke of Sonderburg-Augus- 
tenburg, opposes the incorporation 
of Schleswig-Holstein into Denmark, 
iii. 10. 

Frederick the Great, ends for which he 
labored, i. 23 ; services to Germany, 
24 ; literature under, 25 ; popular dis- 
content, 26 ; famous words of, recalled 
by Von JNIoltke, vii. 70. 

Frederick, Prince (Hessian), marries 
Grand Duchess Alexandra, iii. 27; 
heads revolutionary party in Rends- 
burg, 53. 

Frederick, Prince of Noer, becomes 
Danish royal governor in Schleswig- 
Holstein, iii. 24. 



Frederick, Princess, receives ovations 
in Holstein, iv. 291. 

Frederick IV., King of Denmark, drives 
Gottorp faction trom Schleswig-Hol- 
stein, iii. 13. 

Frederick VI., King of Denmark, char- 
acter of, iii. 9 ; orders his council to 
incorporate Schleswig-Holstein into 
Denmark, 10; obliged to enter the 
German Confederation, ib.; his hatred 
of Augustenburg, 15 ; seeks to extend 
the succession in the female line to 
the Duchies, ib. ; his contempt for the 
German Confederation, 16; tolerates 
the growth of the " Eider-Danish " 
party, 20 ; endeavors to secure the 
support of Russia for his plans, 21 ; 
his death, 22. 

Frederick VII., of Denmark, takes 
steps for the incorporation of Schles- 
wig into Denmark, i. 164 ; succeeds 
to the throne of Denmark, iii. 48; 
issues his father's draft of a Constitu- 
tion, i6.,- orders contents of Schleswig- 
Holstein treasury removed to Copen- 
hagen, 51 ; declares he has no respon- 
sibility, ib. ; obtains renunciation of 
members of female line, 64 ; auto- 
graph letter of, to Prussian and Aus- 
trian monarchs, 65 ; determines to 
rule Schleswig as an absolute mon- 
arch, 69 ; .agrees to Austrian interp^-e- 
tation of his intentions, 74 ; imposes 
Constitution upon Duchies, 100 ; an- 
nounces abolition of General Con- 
stitution, 109 ; proposes a revision of 
Constitution for Denmark-Schleswig, 
128 ; in favor of war with Germany, 
145 ; proclaims new Constitution for 
Denmark-Schleswig, 149 ; anxiety of, 
at prospect of Confederate chastise- 
ment, 157 ; death of, 162. 

Frederick William, Crown Prince of 
Prussia, on disastrous effects of war 
with Austria, iv. 139 ; opposed to war 
with Austria, 323 ; in Bohemia, v. 144 
et seq. ; desires higher rank for King 
of Prussia, 531 ; seeks king's permis- 
sion to be present at opening of Suez 
Canal, vii. 135 ; cordially received in 
Austria, 136 ; goes to Brandenburg to 
meet king, 4i26 ; announces " War " to 
otticers, 427. 

Frederick William, Elector of Branden- 
burg, his achievements, i. 20. 

Frederick William, Elector of Hesse, 
character and life, i. 476. 

Frederick William I., character and 
rule, i. 20; attitude toward the 
churches, 22 ; his army, ib. 

Frederick William III., death of , i. 108 : 
ministerial ordinance of, vi. 161-164; 
Bismarck's report concei-ning diary 
of, vii. 365, note. 

Frederick William IV., disposition, 
character, and attainments, i. 109 ef 
seq.; physical characteristics, 110 ; po- 
litical doctrine, 112 et seq. ; religious 
conviction, and attitude toward the 
churches, 114 ; foreign complications, 
116 ; sends Von Grolman and Von 
Radowitz to Vienna to prejiare for 



INDEX. 



541 



war with Francp, 117 ; proposes to ex- ' 
teiid the protection of the Confedera- 
tibnover Austria's Italiau proviuoes, 
lb.; concessions to the Provincial j 
Estates of KiJnigsberg, 118 ; conver- 
sation with Metteriiicli on the subject 
of Royal Estates, 120; slackens the 
restrictions on the press, 122 ; his ec- 
clesiastical projects opposed, ib.; in- 1 
creases the Commission, 130 : proposes I 
a union of German princes and na- I 
tions under liis leadershii), IGl ; for- ' 
mallyre<v lionizes the riy;hts i>t Schles- 
wig-IIolstein, lliy ; letter to the Prince- ! 
Consort of J'higland, outlining a Ger- 
man Empire, 185 ; attitude with regard 
to Schleswig-IInlstein, 217 el .sr(/. ,• 
message to the King of I)enmark,24D ; 
sets forth a parliamentary and demo- 
cratic Constitution, 292 ; his proposal 
of a College of Kings, ib. tt se(j. ; sus- : 
pected of collusion with the Frank- i 
fort Assembly, 21)4e<s<.(7.,- noteof, and 
Schwarzenberg's comments thereon, 
310 et seq. ; anecdote about, by Bun- 
sen, 332 ; changes of opinion, 33G ; 
opinion on the Electoral Law pro- 
posed at Frankfort, 3oi); elected Em- 
peror by the National Assembly, 347 ; 
his attitude and hisanswer,349e<.se(/v' 
his ambition, as revealed in a conver- 
sation with l>unsen,357; proposal to 
Austria, 370 ; changes ground with re- 
gard to the Constitution of ISIay 2t;, 
411 ; indignation against Austria, 42 i 
et seq. ; on the Strhleswig war, 433 ; 
writes to the Czar on the Danish 
war, 441 ; effect of Louis Napoleon's 
utterances, 455 ; opinion of, in regard 
to the troubles iu Hesse-Cassel, 484 ; 
friendly letter to Francis Joseph, ii. 
6 : instructions to Grciben, commander 
of the forces in Hesse, 13 ; on the 
Hessian war, 28 ; address to the !Minis- 
try, 30 et seq. ; oiiinions and designs, 
51 et seq.; on affairs in Hesse-Cassel, 
52; his attitude toward the French, 
50 ; proposes to settle the Austro- 
Prussian dispute by an interview be- 
tween ]Manteull'el and Schwarzen- 
berg, CI et seq. ; letter to Francis 
Joseph on Hesse-Cassel, ft"> ; hopes 
and plans, 83; outline of the latter 
sent to his associates in the Union, 
84 ; his standpoint in the Russo-Turk- 
ish war of 1H54, 214 ; his efforts, ib.; 
letter to Prince Albert, 21C ; letter to 
Francis Joseph on the Eastern Ques- 
tion, 221 et seq. ; proposes a defensive 
alliance of the Central European 
States, 222; Francis Joseph's reply, 
223; on the duplicity of Austria, ii. 
251 ; plans a Prussian alliance with 
the Western Powers, i/>.; letter to 
Queen Victoria, 252 ; alfected by the 
sujipression of the Royalist uprising 
in NeuchA.tel, 291 ; urges the Sover- 
eign of the Powers to support hia de- 
mand for the liberation of the pris- 
oners, ib. : the ri'plic'S, ib. ; liis ile- 
niands rejecteil, •J!ij <-/ .•oq.; letter to 
Nai>oleuu ill. on the Nouchitel affair. 



295 ; agrees to compact with Switzer- 
land, 314; hasty decision of, 322: 
desires to restore friendship with 
Austria, 323 ; his last otHcial act, 325 ; 
signs document conferring Regency 
on Prince William, 34G ; his death. 
44G ; relations of, with the House of 
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, vi. 417, 
418; state's controlling power over 
church distasteful to, vii. 103; prac- 
tically allows state control to fall 
into desuetude, 104, 10.5; exempts 
Prussian bishops from supervision by 
the state, 173. 

Freedom of migration and common 
citizenship provided by new Consti- 
tution, vi. 305. 

Free-trade movement, spread of, 
through Europe, vii. 31. 

French embassies, circular to, iv. 238. 

French Revolution, first effects iu Ger- 
manv, i. 28. 

French Revolution of July, 1830, effect 
of, in the Duchies and in Denmark, 
iii. 11, 17. 

Frentzel, Deputy, makes serious 
charges against director of Konigs- 
berg Police Department, vi. 367 ; legal 
action against, and acquittal of, 3GS, 
309. 

Frere-Orban declares surrender of Bel- 
gian railways invalid, vii. 103; in- 
censes France by his interference, 
104; has interviews with Rouher in 
Paris, 110, IU ; has audience with 
Napoleon, 114; discusses affairs with 
INlarquis Lavalette, 114. 115. 

Freydorf communicates Bavarian prop- 
osition to Bismarck, vi. 208, 209. 

" Friends of Light," i. 123. 

Friesen, Von, Minister from Saxony, 
supports Bismarck in opposition to 
dailyallowance tomem hers of Reichs- 
tag,' vi. 110; argues that Reichstag 
is not framing Ct>nstitution for a mil- 
itary state, 182 ; ainiounces Saxony's 
approval of course pursued by Prus- 
sian Government, vii. 432. 

Friesland, East, public feeling in, re- 
garding new conditions, vi. 13. 

Fries proposes provision for secret bal- 
lot, vi. 108, 109. 

Fundamental IMghts, i. 233. 

Gablenz, Baron Anton, of Prussia, pro- 
poses plan for mediation, iv. 420; 
Mensdortt' not unfavorable to it, ib. ; 
discussion with Bismarck, 41! 1 ; has 
interview with Francis Joseph, 437. 

Gablenz, Marshal von. commands Au.s- 
trian arniy-corjis, iii. 201; sot over 
Holstein, iv. 220; change of behavior 
in, 288; enters upon his duties as 
Statthalter of Holstein, iv. 2(w ; on 
friendly terms with Manteuffol, 207 ; 
summons Holstein Estates, 4'.M) ; re- 
ceivesconnnunication from Alanteuf- 
fel,4'.il ; withdraws with his troops to 
southern bounilary, ib. ; desires king 
to grant triuu-. v. 2.">4. 

Gagern, Heinrich von, at lleiilelberg, 
]>roposes the proclaiii.-ition of a Ger- 
man Empire, 1. 149; President of the 



)42 



INDEX. 



National Assembly, 194 ; character 
and attainments, ii*. e^A'cQ.; proposes 
a regency, naming Archduke John, 
199 ; contrasted with Campliausen, 
225; conversation with Camphausen, 
ib. ; visits Berlin, 296 ; effects of his 
visit, 297 ; appointed President of the 
Imperial Ministry, 303 ; statement of 
principles to be followed in negotia- 
tions with Austria, 320 ; granted the 
power to negotiate with Austria on 
her relations to the New German 
Empire, 323, 

Gagern, Max von, commissioned to win 
tile (ierman Courts to the project of 
a central government, i. 150. 

Galicia, uprising in, i. 127. 

Gambetta calls Ollivier a man of flex- 
ible conscience, vii. 239; vainly op- 
poses war policy of French Govern- 
ment, 421. 

■Garibaldi commands special division of 
Italian army, ii. 364 ; lands in Sicily, 
414; enters "Naples in triumph, 428; 
received with enthusiasm in England, 
iii. 344 ; march of his volunteers inter- 
rupts negotiations, iv. 4 ; requested 
byKi imanNational Committeeto take 
a ha]id in affairs in Italy, vi. 385, 386 ; 
X)lans to equip an expedition to attack 
the Roman coast, 386 ; allowed by the 
king to proceed undisturbed with his 
expedition, 388 ; opens enlistment of- 
fices in all the cities of Italy, 390; 
permits his volunteers to make in- 
roads upon the patrimony of St. Peter, 
391 ; arrested by order' of Katazzi, 
ib. ; escapes from Caprera, and as- 
sumes command of his volunteers, 
392 ; would not fight against the 
French, 393 ; fights with the Pope's 
troops, ib. ; his ill-fated enterprise 
ended, 394; his agents sound Bis- 
marck, 396. 

Garibaldi, Menotti, leads his father's 
volunteers, vi. 391. 

Gastein, conference of Prussian and 
Austrian rulers at, ii. C04 ; memorial 
of Francis Joseph, 606-608; treaty 
between Austria and Prussia, protest 
against, iv. 221. 

Geibel's " Song of Victory," vii. 430. 

George, King of Hanover, attitude of, 
toward Prussia, ii. 194 ; an absolutist, 
197 ; efforts to change the Constitu- 
tion, 198 ; opposed to Beust's plans, 
394 ; receives order of Legion of Honor 
from Napoleon, 419 ; his views of sa- 
credness of sovereignty, 422 ; inter- 
view of, with Manteulfel, iii. 287 ; 
wishes for more soldiers, Iv. 406 ; an- 
gry at Prussia, 439, 440; denounces 
Bismarck, v. 33 ; orders mobilization 
of his army, 35 ; revises answer to 
Prussia's note, 36 ; declines to change 
his policy, 3~ ; continues negotiations 
with Prussian officers, 50 ; charges 
Moltke with unfounded swaggering, 
.52 ; asks for truce between Prussian 
and Hanoverian troops, 58; protests 
against Prussia's tinlawful conduct, 
64 ; surrenders Hanoverian army, 75, 



76 ; surrenders to Prussian army, 348 ; 
not a Guelph, vi. 16 ; warlike proceed- 
ings of, 17 ; replies to Prussian decree 
of annexation in defence of his rights, 
20 ; refuses to absolve his officers and 
soldiers from their oaths of allegi- 
ance, 21 ; refuses to disband Guelphio 
legion, 214 ; claim to private fortune 
of, conceded by Bismarck, 348; re- 
gards the money paid to him as a res- 
toration of his rights, .350 ; obliged to 
support his soldiers, ib. ; makes retort 
to Prussian demand, 362 ; continues 
secret enlistment of soldiers, 363 ; suj)- 
ports Guelphic legion out of his pri- 
vate fortune, 3G6 ; authorizes disband- 
ing of the legion, ib. 

Gerber desires that civil and criminal 
law be subject to Federal legislation, 
vi. 100. 

Gerlach, Danish general, on the fur- 
ther defence of Diippel, iii. 328. 

German Catholic Church founded, i. 123. 

German Chambers, great assembly of 
members of, iii. 224. 

German colonization and conquest in 
early times, i. 8 ; anarchy in four- 
teenth and fifteenth centuries, 9, 10 : 
intellectual activity conducive to the 
political interests of Prussia and the 
salvation of the German nation, 36 ; 
salvation of, nationality, coincideut 
with Prussia's political interests, ib. 

German Confederation, Interference of 
Foreign Powers in the acts of, i. 56. 

German Constitution, debate ou the 
proposed, i. 49. 

German-Danish quarrel, iv. 6. 

German National Associations, ii. 387- 
390. 

German Particularism, real source of, 
vi. 26, 27. 

German princes, only nominal privi- 
leges granted them in the Imperial 
legislation, i. 325. 

German Unity, a modern conception, i. 
3 ; Duchies unite into a monarchy at 
Charlemagne's death, 6 ; effect of civil 
war retarding the conception, 7 ; new 
birth of the idea of unity, 37 ; Arndt 
on, ib. 

Germany, effect of long civil wars on 
national feeling, i. 7 ; divided into 
petty states by Napoleon, 29 ; hatred 
of foreign rule in the North, 31 ; for- 
eign relations under the Act of Con- 
federation, 54 ; Democratic reaction 
in, 100 ; stagnation in trade, 242 ; the 
calm preceding a revolution, ib. ; re- 
actionary movements, ii. 117 ; former 
Democratic demands, 119 ; designs of 
the lleactionists, ib. .■ excitement in, 
over progress of war in Italy, 383; 
public opinion in, demands Prussian 
leadership and assistance of Austria 
in Italian war, 386; eager desire of 
princes and people for Confederate 
reform. 451 ; conference of sovereigns 
at WUr/.burg, 451-454: popular excite- 
ment in, 455 ; the united Fatherland 
glorified, 456 ; rulers of, opposed to 
Beust's plan, 463 ; Prussia favors it 



INDEX. 



i43 



465 ; conflict of opinions, 4C(3-4rO; dis- 
cussions over tarilT-clianges, 491-500; 
danger to, from the Polish question, 
50S ; general feeling in, in favor of 
separation of Duchies from Denmark, 
iii. 177 ; gi-neral movement in favor 
of Augusti-nburg, 180 ; popular agita- 
tion in, iiii-reasing, 201 ; indignation 
in, at Confederate decree, 217 ; effect 
in, of tlie capture of tl»e Dannevirke, 
277 ; disorganized state of affairs in, 
298; national feeling in, takes ne\v 
start, 339 ; non-Prussian, noisy excite- 
ment in, at Austro-Prussian treaty, 
iv. 221 ; a new assembly of deputies 
called at Frankfort, 222"; treaty criti- 
cised liy Bavarians, 224 ; vexation of 
statesmen of Lesser States, 22r>-227 ; 
converted into one great camp of sol- 
diery, 411; revulsion in public feel- 
ings, 411, 4l2 ; people of Lesser States 
in north sympatliizewitli Prussia, 487 ; 
in the southwest with Austria, ib.; 
anxiety at Austria's motion in Con- 
federate Diet, 502 ; States of, have 
different aims, v. 21 ; no foreigner to 
dictate to, regarding German affairs, 
vi. 235; "Monroe Doctrine " of, 237 ; 
individualism in German parliament 
free from all restraint, 342 ; want of 
party disci|diiie in, 343; ideas preva- 
lent in parliament of, 344, 345 ; few of 
the talented leaders of, now living, 
346 ; prodigious advance toward real- 
ization of unity in, vii. 138; spirit of 
the Liberal and National parties in, 
138, 139 ; communistic movement in, 
140-163; Catholic societies in, in a 
state of calm inactivity, 173; Catho- 
lic Church in, not ileprived of its lib- 
erty, 174; grave predicament of ma- 
jority of bishopsin, 179, ISO; conviction 
in, tliat the casus belli was an excuse 
to grasp the sword, 287 ; people of, 
scoff at absurd excitement in Paris, 
328; state of public opinion in, con- 
cerning Hohenzollern affair, 359 ; 
news received in, of Prince Leopold's 
withdrawal, 303 ; feelings excited, ib.; 
call to arms in, 428 ; indignation 
against France in, 428, 429; forming 
of societies for establishing hospitals, 
etc., 430; new martial songs added 
by the poets, it. ; i)olitical and reli- 
gious differences forgotten, 431 ; war 
loan asked by Government approved, 
433; destined to engage in contest 
unaided from abroad, 448; incentives 
of, to war, 4.S9, 490. 

Girafdiii, iCmile, characterizes speech 
of Napoleon, iv. 425. 

Girauileau, " La Vcritti sur la Cam- 
pagne de 1870," vii. 338, vote. 

Giskra, Dr., sent for by Uismarck, v. 
315; expresses pleasure at visit of 
crown prince of Prussia, vii. 13(i; 
correctly forecasts I'^-ancis Joseph's 
attitude for the future, i;57. 

Gitschin, combat at, v. l:!;!-I42. 

GhKlstone not expe('tcd to take a manly 
attitude, vii. 4.">(J; strong dislike of, to 
Germany, 451; reply of, to Disraeli, 



452; made apprehensive by l>is- 
marck's disclosures, ib. 

Glais-Bizoin advocates discontinuance 
of great standing armies, vii. 282. 

Gneist, Rudolf, on legal responsibility, 
vi. 105 ; counsels caution in regard to 
long terms of electi(ni to Reichstag, 
114; argues that the military organi- 
zation should be fixed according to 
law, ICl ; party of, behold their prin- 
ciples adopted by Government, 1G5 ; 
opposes immoderate extension of 
budget privileges, 1,^0; compares ex- 
penditures in Knglish army, 181. 

Goben, commands division of Prussian 
army, v. 2S ; excellent leadership of, 
in South German campaign, 354 et 
seq. 

Goldmann, Deputy, proposes entrance 
of Hesse into North German Confed- 
eration, vi. 256. 

Goltz, Count, succeeds in pacifying Na- 
poleon, iii. 1C)7 ; meets the "friendly 
advances of France, 191 ; intercourse 
of, with Drouyn de Lhuys, lb.; ex- 
presses desire for boundary line more 
favorable to Prussia, 350 ; believes in 
the reliability of Napoleon, iv. 78; 
has interview with Empress Kugenie, 
217; explains the Gastein treaty to 
French Minister, 231 ; exchanges 
friendly greetings with Drouyn de 
Lbuys, 325 ; hints at change iuPrus- 
sianpolicy to Bismarck, 373; has in- 
terview with Napoleon in regard to 
Austrian and Prussian concessions, 
416 ; his story of his interview with 
Napoleon concerning Prussian terms 
of peace, v. 273 et .scr/. ,• presents to 
Napoleon outlines of peace proposals, 
298 ; receives declarations concerning 
Luxemburg from Rouher, vi. 51; 
sends report from Paris, 128; por- 
trays violence of popular excitement 
in Germany, 140. 

Gorres on revolutions, i. 136. 

Gortschakoff, Alexander, Prince, an- 
nounces Russia's recognition of the 
Confederate Diet, ii. 50; on the alli- 
ance between Austria and the West- 
ern Powers, 250 : conference with the 
representatives of the three Powers 
on the four requisitions, 2.">5 ; guiding 
si)irit in foreign all'airs, 528; vexed 
with advice from Bismarck, 546; ac- 
knowledges Italian sovereignty of 
Victor Kmnianuel, 553; false an- 
nouncement of, in relation to Prussin, 
580; expresses regret at Austria's 
action in Frankfort Assembly, 628 ; 
proposes to exert pressure upon Da- 
nish Government, iii. 211 ; urges pru- 
dence upon Prussian (iovernment, 
277 ; gives full powers to Bjiron Bruii- 
now, in r^oiidon conference, .■<53; dis- 
likeof,forBismarck,v.251 ; utteranci- 
of, in regard to the future, 4.'!2; ac- 
companies Emperor of Russia to 
P.aris, vi. 224 ; makes friendly ad- 
vances to Moiisfier, 225; discusses 
Russia's plans in tlu' ()rieiit,226 ; crit- 
Icisos reception ot Sultan in Paris, 



544 



INDEX. 



232 ; writes flattering letter to Bis- 
marck, 232, 233. 

Gortscliakotf, Micliael, Governor of 
Poland, ii. 529, 549. 

Gotha, citizens of, ask for a new Con- 
stitution, ii. 3S7. 

Giittingen, uprising among the stu- 
dents, i. 83. 

Gottorp, Dukes of, hold territorial sway 
over portions of Schleswig-Holstein, 
iii. 13 ; eldest branch of family accede 
to the throne of Russia, ib. ; younger 
branch receive Counties of Oldenburg 
and Delnienhorst from Denmark, ib. ; 
claims of, to portions of Duchies, 
might be resviscitated, 46. 

Govone, Gen., arrives in Berlin, iv. 
336 ; fears Prussia's reliability, 33S ; 
declines to form treaty, 339 ; ques- 
tions Bismarck in regard to treaty, 
423 ; discusses relations of Italy and 
Prussia with Bismarck, 469, 470 ; at 
Custozza, V. 104 et seq. 

Grabow, President of the Lower House, 
declines a re-election, v. 407. 

Gramont, Duke of, conference of, with 
Count Rechberg, iv. 22; states posi- 
tion of France on Italian affairs, 404, 
465 ; receives assurances from Beust, 
vi. 153 ; highly esteemed at Vienna for 
his hatred of Prussia, 441 ; becomes 
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
vii. 273 ; his hatred of Prussia, ib. ; in- 
competent to estimate achievements 
of Bismarck, 275 ; character of, 276 ; 
has no scarcity of powerful sympa- 
thizers, 276, 277 ; returns to Vienna to 
make his adieus, 277 ; speaks on the 
St. Gothard railway, 279 ; insinuations 
of, against Salazar, 290, note; asserts 
that Salazar was acting at suggestion 
of Prussia, 318 ; fully acquainted with 
" Hohenzollern affair," 320 ; accuses 
Bismarck of intrigue, 321 ; convinced 
of superiority of France over Prussia, 
322 ; directs Le Sourd to interrogate 
Prussian Government regarding Ho- 
henzollern candidacy, ib. ; stimulates 
the excitement in Paris by official an- 
nouncements, 323 ; suggests how the 
Prussian candidacy had originated, 
324 ; denounces declaration of Thile 
as a well-planned lie, 326; sends a 
threatening message to King William 
at Ems, lb. ; urges Baron Werther to 
present danger of the situation to 
his sovereign, .326,327 ; receives intel- 
ligence from Madrid that Cortes had 
been convened to elect a king, 327 ; 
beholds hypocritical concealment of 
truth in Prim's statement, 328; his 
one thought to thwart Bismarck's 
plotting, ib.; his lack of forethought, 
329 ; his course dictated by Prussia's 
declarations, ib., note; desires that 
Prussia should be himiiliated, 332 ; 
entails war upon France by his 
speech, 333 ; replies to the Coch^ry 
interpellation. 335 ; his speech greeted 
with tumultuous acclamation, 336; 
could pride himself upon having 
achieved the unprecedented, 337 ; ef- 



fect of his speech upon diplomats, ib. ; 
the tumult he had occasioned in the 
Chamber transmitted to all classes of 
the population, 338 ; assured against 
criticism, 339; defends his course to 
Lord Lyons, ib. ; sends another de- 
spatch to Le Sourd, ib. ; demands 
satisfaction from King William, 340 ; 
takes a most surprising step, ib. ; 
sends instructions to Benedetti, 340, 
341 ; his ignorance and presumption, 
341 ; prompted by his hatred and ar- 
rogance, 342; regards Spain as the 
domain of France, 343 ; Bismarck 
aware of his hostility, 344 ; throws 
gauntlet down to Prussia in the name 
of France, 345 ; begins to waver in his 
haughty offensive, 347 ; has interview 
with Lord Lyons, ib.; desires Prince 
of Hohenzollern to voluntarily with- 
draw, 348 ; entreats English Govern- 
ment to exert its influence, ib. ; has 
not fortitude to withstand the clamor 
he had occasioned, ib. ; declares King 
William responsible for candidacy of 
Leopold, 348, 349 ; telegraphs to Bene- 
detti in relation to matter, 349 ; calls 
upon the neutral Great Powers for 
support against Prussia, 351 ; de- 
mands a decisive answer from King 
William, 356, 357 ; informs Chamber 
that he has no definite announce- 
ment to make, 356 ; preserves discreet 
silence regarding change of opinion 
among Great Powers, 357 ; persists 
in demands by which war was made 
inevitable, 361 ; his discourteous ur- 
gency towards King William, 362; 
no opportunity for Bismarck to re- 
sent his insulting threats, 364 ; has 
conversation with Baron Werther, 
368-371 ; has a feeling of being out- 
witted by King William, 369 ; as- 
cribes his defeat to Bismarck, ib. ; 
discusses latest phase of the situation 
with Napoleon, 372; account of this 
interview given in Gramont's book, 
373 ; telegraphs to Benedetti, in- 
structing him to ask King William 
for guaranties, ib. ; discusses the situ- 
ation with the English ambassador, 
374 ; ambassador's criticism makes 
no impression upon him, 375 ; receives 
letter from Napoleon, 27>.; solves the 
riddle relating to Napoleon's letter, 
377; sends important telegrams to 
Benedetti, 378 ; his untruthful repre- 
sentations arouse bitter feeling in 
France against Prussia, 379 ; presents 
the situation to the Cabinet in coun- 
cil, 381 : his views opposed by major- 
ity of Ministers, by Lord Lyons and 
Count Beust, 382 ; attempts to explain 
telegrams to Benedetti, 383; opposes 
Leboeuf, ib.; announces official noti- 
fication of .Spanish ambassador, 384 ; 
protests against criticism of Minis- 
try's policy, ib. : has a respite, ib. ; 
has little hope of success of Bene- 
detti's negotiations, 385 ; calls Lord 
Lyons's attention to moderation of 
French demands, ib.; his strange in- 



INDEX. 



545- 



versions of the truth, jA. ,• hi3 outra- 
geous insolence, 395; liis audacious 
proceeding brings about unification 
of German nation., 401 ; pass to which 
his guidance had brought matters, 
402, 403 ; statement of, to his col- 
leagues, relating to French demands, 
403 ; receives another calamitous mes- 
sage, 404 ; learns that his two demands 
on Trussian king had been refused, 
405 ; threatened DV the Paris mob for 
his dilatoriness, tb.; not in favor of 
European Congress, 40(3 ; statement 
in his book in relation to Congress, 
406, note ; excitement of, on receiving 
despatch from JIunicli, 407; threat- 
ens to resign his portfolio, 408 ; reads 
important despatch to assemliled Cab- 
inet, 410 ; his feelings regarding de- 
spatch, 410, 411 ; accuses Bismarck of 
inventing malicifdis fabrication, 411 ; 
probable explanation of his charges, 
412; continues his account of the coun- 
cil, 413,414; fully resolved upon war, 
414 ; turns upon Napoleon with angry 
exclamation, 414, 415; delivers mes- 
sage of Cabinet to Senate, 416: comes 
to assistance of Ollivier, 419 ; declares 
that French Governniiiit had persis- 
tently pursued one purpose, 420; de- 
ceives Committee of Chamlicr in 
regard to despatches, 420, 421 ; his 
policy criticised by fJeust, 423; his 
empty pretexts for the incitement of 
war confuted by Bismarck, 431; his 
criticism on St. Yallier's despatch, 
438 ; threat of, to the Baden charf/d 
d'affaires, 44') ; urgent solicitations of, 
to Lord Lyons, 450 ; had no idea of 
withdrawinghisdemand,451 ; declares 
war to be inevitable, il>. ; gives Vimer- 
cati information regarding proposed 
triple alliance, 459; his proposal to 
Austria, 402; letter of Beust to Met- 
ternich not to be communicated to, 
4G5 ; impatiently awaits expression of 
opinion from Beust, 4G7; sends Latour 
to Vienna again, 4(J8; opposes Beust's 
propositions in relation to Italy, 4C9 ; 
sends peremptory despatch to Italy, 
475 ; misunderstands Italy's position, 
470,477 ; insists upon re-establishment 
of Se[>tember treaty, 4S0 ; telegraphs 
to \'ienna,481; makes last appeal to 
Italian (lovernment, 480; fabrications 
of, reganiing alliance negotiations of 
1870, 191-41)8; publicatiiiu of his cor- 
respondence with Beust, 404. 
Granville, Lord, writes to Copenhagen, 
iii. 78 ; requested by (iraniont to ad- 
vise Prussia in relation to French de- 
mands, vii. .'585; Jiot expected to take 
a manly attitude, 450; transmits pro- 
posals to France and Prussia, ih. ; his 
proposals dt!cliried, 451 ; resorts to 
clause of 'I'n-aty of Paris, ih. ; his 
warm inclination to France, if'..- ile- 
clines to accede tol'russia's request in 
regard to ■■irticles contraband of war, 
453-4.5.5 ; declines to accede to \'is- 
conti-Veiiosta's nroposals, 470 ; fears 
to become involved in Continental 



quarrels, 485 ; ready to enter into 
agreement with Italy, 486, 

Greece vigorously supports revolt in 
Crete, vi. 215. 

Grew, his opinion of the effect of the 
plebiscitum, vii. 265. 

Groben, Baron von, consults with Ste- 
phan concerning Thurn and Taxis 
postal system, vi. 39, 40. 

Groote, deputy from Uhenish Prussia, 
tries patience of Keichstag, vi. 76. 

Grumbrecht, Hanoverian burgomaster, 
expresses viewsof people of Hanover, 
vi. 82, 83, note. 

Grlinne, Count, ii. 370. 

Guelphic Legion, Hanoverian soldiers 
form,vi. 213,214 ; enlistment for, con- 
tinues unabated, 302 ; disbanded bj' 
King George, 366. 

Guiccioli, allusion to hook of, 460, note, 
469, 7iote. 

Giinther, Deputy, declares South Ger- 
many to be in favor of Federal union 
imder one constitution, vi. 290. 

Guyot-3Iontpayroux declares himself 
resolved to compel IMiuisters to break 
silence, vii. 3G8. 

Gyulay, Count, general, enters Pied- 
montese territory, with army, ii. 373 ; 
defeated near 31ontebello, 375 ; loses 
battle near JIagenta, and evacuates 
Lombard y, 376. 

Hake, Gen. von, receives command of 
troops to chastise Denmark, iii. 20S ; 
entefs upon his duties, 220; ref us« s 
to serve under Wrangel,247 ; instruc- 
tions to, iv. 41. 

Halbhuber declares the press in Austria 
free, iv. 105; refuses to co-operate 
with commissioners, 106; seeks to 
confirm hostile attitude of Schleswig- 
Holstein towards Prussia, 116. 

Hall, Carl Christian, President of Dan- 
ish Ministry, iii. Ill ; sends answer to 
England and to (ierman Powers, 122 : 
denies that agreements of 1851 and 
1852 were liimling, 123; semis despatch 
to St. Petersburg, 124 ; causes news- 
pai)ers to open war against Blixen, 
158; announces position of Danish 
Cabinet, 161; supportetl by Danish 
Council, ii<.; seeks signature of k