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FRANOO-GEEMAN WAE,
1870-71.

Tan Fabt:— History of the War to the Down&Il of
the Empire.

FIRST TOLUHH : FROK THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES TO THE
BATTLE OF GBAVELOTTE.

TUSBUTBO raOK TBI

GERMAN OFFICIAL ACOOUHT

IDTBLLIOENCB BRANCH OF THE QDARTGBUASTBR-aENBRAL'S
DEPARTMENT, HOESK GUARDS, BY

Major P. C. H. CLARKE, C.M.G., RA., late D A.(pi.G. at Headquarters.

Second Edititm. Beviaed and Corrected.

LONDON;
PraUfd mdtr lit Smpariatsudatee of Ser Majt*l^$ StaUontry Q^Im,

Um BOLD BT

N. Ciaynt k SoHB, Limited, 13, Cbving Cross ; Hibhiboh & Sohs, G9, Pall MiU i

W. H, Au.ait A Co., 18, "Waterloo Place -. W. MrrcHKLL, Charing Crow ;

LOKO-IUK A Co., PatOTiioBtOT Bow ) Tbdbkes & Co., 67 & 69, Ludgate Hill ;

SlumiaD, Cbariiig Cross i and C. Kkqah Facl A Co., 1, Faternoitcr BqiiMe i

AIM) b7 Qaura A Co., Tlie Hard, PorUea ;

A. A C. Buck, Edinbnrgli ;

Amx. Tboh a Co., Abb«7 Btreat, and E. PovBonT, Grafton 5tr««t, Dublin.

1881.

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German pacee muet he understood.

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deteriorated origiiial

1995

PREFACE TO THE FIRST VOLUME.

In completing the translation of the first vohiine of
the German Official Account of the Campaign of 1870-71,
the translator would beg the indulgence of his readers
for the many imperfections which are inherent in a work
of this nature. Compiled, as the original has been, by
officers of the German head-quarter staff, whoso reputa-
tion with the pen is not less brilliant than that with the
sword, and under the superintendence of Field Marshid
Count V. Moltke himself, the account will ever remain a
standard military classic of one of the most remarkable
campaigns in the world s history. Although the translator
feels that he has fallen far short of doing justice to the
undertaking entrusted to him, he hopes that he has to
some extent succeeded in his object, viz., that of giving
a clear and accurate rendering of the German original,
without any attempt at word-painting ; with the addition
of su£5cient foot-notes to render the text intelligible
without detracting from the originality of the work.

The translator cannot refrain from taking advantage
of the present opportunity to express lus deep obligations
to Major General Walker, C. B., Her Majesty's Military
Attach^ in Berlin, for the labour which he has bestowed
in looking through the proof sheets and in suggesting
many corrections and additions, an assistance doubly
valuable from his knowledge of the German military insti-
tutions, and from his having been attached to the Crown
Prince's head-quarters throughout the campaign.

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

Paqk

Ajf XKOI^UvTIOIf .,(« •••• ..t< •••• •*•• •..• •••• <••• 0

The French Army. Plan of operations and movements, 15th-3l8t July 10
The Gernian Armies. Plan of oiieratioiLs and movements to the 3 1st

Juiv a4

^^ lAAT •■•• •••■ •••« ■••• •••• ••«• •••• •■•■ •••« f^^

Naval preparations to the 31st July 76

Qeneral description of the ground for the first period of the Ccunpaign.... 83

The Royal Head Quarters at Mainz 89

Movement of the annies from the 1st to the 5th August 93

1. The First Army. Action at Saarbrilcken on the 2nd August.... 93

2. The Second Army .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 105

3. Tlie Third Army. Action at Weissenbtirg on the 4th August.... 115

Movements of the French Army from the 2nd to the 5th August .... 141

The Battle of Worth on the 6tli Anmist 147

The Battle of Spicheren on the Gth August 200

The Retreat of Marshal MacMahon^s Army to Chalons and advance of

the Ilird Aiiuy to the Moselle 255

Movements of the army from the Sjiar to the Mo.selIc 271

The Battle of Colombey-Nouilly on the 14th August .... 303

The operations of the 1st and Ilnd Army on the 15th and 16th August

uj) to the Battle of Vionville-Mara la Tour 339

The Battle of Vionville-Mars la Tour 357

The operations of the 1st and Ilnd Army up to the eve of the 18th

AA-UIf %«9v ■»•• •••■ ••«• ■••> ■••• •••« «•■• •••• •«•• nl22

APPENDICES.

Appendix I. Onler of battle of the Army of the Rhine, beginning

of August, 1870 1*

II. Proclamation of the Emperor Napoleon to the

French nation, 23rd July, 1870 23*

III. Proclamation of the Emperor Naix)leon to the army 24*

IV. Distribution of the Geiman navy at the outbreak of

V. Order of battle of the German armies on the 1st
Auffust, 1870, under the su{>reme conmiand of

H. M. King William of Prussia 27*

VI. From the Royal Head Quarters 83*

VII. Army order of the 4th Axigust, 1870 84*

VIII. Order of march of the Vth, Xlth, and Ilnd Bavarian

Army Gorpp on the 4th August, 1870 87*

IX. Return of casualties in the action at Weissenburg .... 91*

X. Disposition of the Ilird Army for the 5th August.... 94*

♦f

»>

Paob

Appendix XL Ordres de bataiUe and orden of nurch of the

Qerman troopB engaged in the hattle of Wdrth,
on the 6ih August, 1870 ^ 95*

„ XII. List of casoaltieB in the Battle of W5rth ^ 101*

Xni. Older of march of the two Infantiy Diviaiona of the

Vllth Army Corps .... .^ 108

XrV. Return of casualties in the action at Spicheren on

the 6th August^ 1870 .,.. ^, 109*

XV. Beturn of casualties in the Battle of Golombey-

X^ mi 1 1 1 IT ...• .••• >.•• .•«• •*•• ••* * a A (9

„ XVI. Despatch from General v. Steinmetz to Qeneral ▼.

Manteuffel .... .... ••.. .... .m. .••• 121*

^ XVII. D^patch from General ▼. Steinmetz to General ▼.

Summer .... .... mm •••••«• mm 128*

„ XV HI. Army order of Prince Frederic Charles mm m.. 188

XIX. The capture of Flavigny in the battle of VionviUe-

Mara la Tour .... .... .... 124*

yy. Army order of Prince Frederic Charles, on the 16th

August, 1870, 12 a.m. 126*

XXL Beturn of casualties in the battle of VionviUe-Man

Urn xour ••.. .••• ..a* ...« «..« «^^ A3R}

XXII. Beturn of casualties in the expedition to Toul on the

16th August.... , « 143*

f»

ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

Text:—
Page 168, line 16 from botiom
It 159, linefl 11 and 12 from top

On the eketoh facing p. 260
Page 200, line 14 from top

,y Sou N 26 „

,, 260 „ 6 from bottom

Appendices : —
Pages 113* and 114*

For *' 2nd battalion" read let battalion.

Should read " At Wdrth the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th,
" 8th, and parts of the 11th oo. 87th Regi-
" ment."

'< Pf affendorf " should be *< Pfaffenhofen."

For "Lieutenant Kurz" read "Lieutenant
Kurr."

For " cuirassiers*' reetd " cavahfy."

For ** Lnutcrbarh" read '* Luiitorburg.*

The luuuc of '* Vice Sergt.-Major Borbstaedt**
should be included among the wounded of
the 3rd Grenadiers.

The additions and corrections to the First Section were noted at the end of the
Second Section of the work. They are reproduced here.

Additions and Correci'ions to Fikst Section.

N.B. — ^The earlier copies of the 1st Section ai-e paged with the text and
appendix consecutively. It lias been since «)U8idei*ed desirable to
page them independently, so «as to keep ilie text and appendix sepa-
rate, and this has been done in the later copies, and will be so in
futiu^. The appendices to the 1st Section should therefore be paged
1* 2* 3*, &C. . . . . 82*.

Text:—
Page 26, line 16 from bottom

>»

„ 83 from top . .

n 14 „ • •

l»

tt *■* tt • •

For *Raoult'* read " Douay," and add "At
" this time (end of July) Ducrot's Division
" was alreaidy at Beichshoffen, and had
** pushed forward detachments towards the
" frontier." Correct Sketch 1 accordingly.

For " Tauberbischofsheim'* read " Werlheim."

For *< Belgian*' read " Luxemburg."

For " to collect on the line Wadem-Losheim"
read ''not to pass the line Wadem-Saar-
burg."

TUl

Appendicf?« : —

Page 121 or 39* foot note . . . . For " War ArtUlery ** read *' Corps Artillery."

,f 122 or 40* To staff of Ilird Army Corps add Commander

of Head-quarter Guard : 1st Lieutenant t.
Liitsow, 12th Dragoons (reserre).

124 or 42*, line 9 from bottom For " v. Roppert, 4th " read " v. Reppert, 6th."

161 or 69* „ 12 „ For " 6th CaTolry Division" read " 4th0aTali7

Dirision.

167 or 76* n 7 „ For " Major Oeneral Gundell ** read " Colonel

Gundell." He was promoted Major Gene-
ral on 18th January, 1871 .

168 or 76* „ 20 „ For " ▼. Selle " read " Preiniticr."

168 or 76* „ 4 from bottom For " One proWsion column " read ** A detach-

" ment of a prorision column (with a wag-
*' gon-park column) of the Ilnd Army
** Corps and half a Sanitary, &c."

160 or 78* „ 9 from top . . For " 1st Lieutenant v. Roon, Ac," read " 2nd

*' Lieutenant Reichert, d6th Fusiliers."

n 163 or 81* To staff of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-

Schwcrin add "Present at Head-quarters,
** H.8.H. Duke of Saxe-Altenburg."

INTEODUCTION.

With the fall of the First Napoleon the succession of great wars,
which had convulsed the States of Europe and laid the foun-
dation of a new order of things, came to an end. The '' General
Congress " treaty of Vienna, from which this era dated, gave,
however, no lasting satisfaction to the nations.

Necessity and extreme danger had at times comi)elled the
separate states of Germany to make common cause together, but
the want of unity in their policy exerted a paralysing influence
on the conduct of a campaign even so far back as the " War of
Liberation/' and exhibited itself prominently iu tlie treaties of
peace. On two occasions the German armies entered Paris as
victoi*s without demanding from the vanquished the restoration
of those lands which had been torn from the Empire in the time
of its impotence. There was no lasting criterion of unity, no
feeling of permanent security of the frontier for the German
race, which for the fii'st time in the lapse of centuries asserted
its place in the world as a Power ; but the consciousness of
belonging to one common stock, though its influence was ignored
in the policy of the country, abided in the nation.

In France a republic and a monarchy had alternated, and in the
monarchy different dynasties had prevailed. Tlic French nation
had not, however, forgotten that but a short time previously they
had governed half Europe. The important fortresses of Cologne
and Antwerp had belonged to them, and in the hearts of the whole
nation the idea of a re-conquest of the Rhine, fostered alike by
historians and poets, was ever present. The fulfilment of this
wish appeared merely a question of time.

The wounds sustained by France herself in that era of military
gi^atness were healed, her fame and prestige had endured. Far
advanced in the arts and sciences, fertile in talent, and in their
own opinion the pioneers of civilisation, Frenchmen esteemed
success in arms of the first importance.

Napoleon III. had to bear this aspiration in mind, njs the spell
of his great uncle's name had helped him on the road to power.

He brought about with consummate skill the entente cordiaUf
when England sought an ally on the continent, and could not
find one in disunited Germany. Allied with England he first
unfurled his standard against Russia, which country on this
occasion was rained by that vast extent of territoiy which had
once been her safeguard.

The French army .under Napoleon next fought in alliance
with Italy and, ostensibly for Italy, against Austria, On this

29982, A 2

occasion the strife not only yielded honour and satisfaction to
the army, but territorial acquisition, albeit at the expense of
its otherwise indemnified ally.

In neither campaign had France to put forth all her military
force; both were directed against Powers wtiich lay beyond
her frontiers. Even an unfortunate issue could hardly nave
endangered the position of the Emperor. Towai'ds his imme-
diate neighbours Napoleon III. observed a friendly and bene-
volent policy as long as he remained master of his own
resolutions.

France seemed satisfied. Her soil had not been trodden by
hostile feet for more than fifty years. The country enjoyed a
good administration and a high measure of matcncd prosperity.
Excellent roads and canals facilitated commerce ; thrift, cleanli-
ness, and indeed elegance pervaded even the cottages. Riches,
luxury, and taste graced her triumph at the Paris Exhibition.
The Tuilleries received the monarchs of Europe as guests, the
Emperor's new year's speech constituted an event, and diplomacy
watched his dictum on the political situation of the world.

On the other hand, how unassuming the position of Germany,
where all foreign policy was paralysed by the jealousy of Austria
and Prussia, and who not so long ago had to submit to a
humiliating peace with the most insignificant of her neighbours I
* Germany could only lisc to political influence by the two great
rivals coming to an understanding, or by the subordination of one
of them to the other.
/ Even their union in a common campaign against Denmark
was a matter for reflection, whilst the struggle in which they
soon afterwards turned their arms against one another might be
attended with consequences of the greatest moment to France.
Again, the hope was perhaps cherished that, fairly matched in
point of numbers, Austria and Prussia would mutually exhaust
one another, and that an intervention might then bring some
fresh advantage. But France was not prepared for so rapid and
so complete an overthrow of Austria.

This event was the move unwelcome to the Imperial Cabinet,
as the somewhat quixotic campaign in Mexico, which not only
exhausted the I'CHources of France, but also laid bare great defects
in her organisation, had come to an end ; defects not indeed
apparent to the world, in whose eyes the lustre of France, in
spite of her ill success, remained undimmed ; nor to the nation,
to whom the truth was not revealed, — ^but to the kedn-sighted-
Emperor and his confidential advisers.

The French, who hoped to gain possession of the Rhine and
Belgium as the result of the strife oetween the Germans, seem
scarcely to have calculated upon the King of Prussia's deter-
mination never to consent to <any such arrangement, or oven to
I yield a single German village. It was unintelligible to them that
i frermany should presume to decide its own destiny. They
demanded "Vengeance for Sadowa," while France had done
nothing to avert Sadowa.

In order to pander to the self-love of the French nation, the
Loxembiirg question was raised. But Prussia, who wished to
preserve peace so long as it was consistent with her honour,
showed the greatest moderation. The doubtful ri^htof garrison*
ing Luxemburg was exchanged for its iieutitiTisation. This
diplomatic success, however, did not satisfy the French. The fame
inanns of their lightly esteemed neighbour was taken as an
affront,.and in order to avenge it the Cirsar hesitated to draw
his sword. North Germany was now more consolidated, and had
extended her influence over the Main. The last moment seemed
to have aiTived if the supposed sympathies of South Germany
were to be turned to account. The victory of the French aims
— everyone believed — could not be doubtful, the resolution of the
authorities was alone wanting. The Opposition raised its head
in a threatening way, and even part of the army gave vent to its
diq)leasure in the plebiscite.

Under these circumstances the Emperor thought he must make
concessions, and selected the advisers of the crown fioni the ranks
of the Opposition.

But much as he availed himself of the services of the Left in
doing this the experience of all times was coufirmed once raorc-^
that the most liberal member of the Opposition, when minister, is
looked upon as reactionaiy by those who go Iw^yond him in Radical
policy. A diversion in foreign politics, so often resorted to under
these circumstances, seemed at length the only counterpoise to
the continual pressure of the parties at home.

There is no greater misfortune to a country than a weak
Government. The power of the Emperor and his dynasty
seemed to be in the balance owing to the pressure of the Liberals,
who represented the national honour as in danger. The minis-
ters believed that they could only hold out by overbidding this
party. In any case the Government stood in need of some
new and great success, and it was certain that a conflict with
Prussia would find most sympathy with the prevailing feeling in
the country. A pretext was therefore sought for a rupture with
this State, and found, for want of a better one, in the affair of the
succession to the Spanish throne.

On the 3rd July 1870, the first communication on the subject
was forced into notice by the " Havas Correspondence," that the
Spanish ministry had resolved to elect the hereditary Prince
Leopold of Hohenzollem as their king, and that a deputation had
been despatched to Germany to offer him the Spanish crown.

A communique to the " Constitutionnel " announced that it
had been accepted, and expressed astonishment at seeing the
^sceptre of Charles V. placed in the hands of a " GeiTnan prince."

On the same day the French Chargd d' Affaires, Le Sourd, appeared
in the Foreign Office at Berlin, to express the feelings of pain
which this intelligence had evoked in Paris. The only answer
that could be given was that the question was Spanish and not
Prussian.

The circumstances, in point of fact, were that the Spaniards
bad selected a catholic prince related alike to the King of

>0 s,

Prussia and the Emperor of France for the tfaronCi and had
entered into the necessary negociations dii'ectly "with him. This
interested the King as a family matter, but it was no subject
for communication to the Qovernment either of Prussia or of
the North German Confederation. Any dealings with foreign
powers must be left to Spain herself.

The Prussian ambassador in Paris had previously received leave
to go to Ems, and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Due
de Qi-amont, begged him to describe to the King, who was there
on a visit, the excitement which agitated the French nation.

On the 5th July Deputy Cochery brought forward a question
in the Corps L^gislatif, which the Due de Gramont answered in
the most peculiar fashion. He declared that he was not privy to
the negociations which had taken place between Marshal Prim
and the Prince of Hohenzollern ; he declared emphatically that
it was not their duty to meddle with the internal affairs of the
Spanish nation, in tlie exercise of its own sovereignty. " We
shall continue to watch this proceeding," he continued; ''but
'' we do not think that deference to the rights of a neighbour-
" ing nation binds us to suffer a foreign Power to disturb the
" present equilibrium of Europe to its advantage, by placing
" one of its princes on the throne of Charles V."

If a French interest was really endangered by the candidature

;of the Prince of Hohenzollern, why were not the good services of

t^ a friendly power, Prussia for example, called in with a view to

mediation 7 But this plan was never once tried.

>^ The words of the Due kindled a spark ; a storm of applause

sfoUowed. There was no time for remarking either that the

^beginning and ending of his speech were contradictory, or

that the threat conttaned in it now rendered any adjusbnent

impossible.

The threat in reality should have been directed against Spain ;
but as this would yield no satis£a*ction for Sadowa to the
Government and to public opinion, Prussia was substituted by a
veiy clumsy change of front

In vain the Spanish ambassador declared in Paris on the
8th July that all negotiations with General Prim had passed
directly with the Prince of Hohenzollern, and not through the
Prussian Government. The press fanned the flame according to
its wont, and instead of enlightening the people did homage to
their emotions. '' The caudme forks are reaqy for the PiTissians,"
>n»ote the " Pays '* on the above-mentioned date ; " they will bend
'' under them, and will be vanquished and disarmed without a
'' struggle, unless they venture to accept battle ; the issue of
" which cannot be questioned. Our war-cry is as yet un-
** answered. The echoes of the German Rhine are still mute.
" Had Prussia spoken as France now speaks, we should long ere
" this have been on the mai*ch."

Such was the language used in France auiid the applause of the
people and of the Government before the first step was taken to
bring about an explanation of the matter.

Count Benedetti, on the 9th July, requested and received

« ' % •»

audience of the King of Prussia, then staying in Ems. He
requested that His Majesty would condemn the resolution taken
by the Prince of Hohenzollern without his previous permission,
and order him to withdraw from it.

To this the King answered that in his capacity of supreme
head of the family he had neither given him any order to accept
it, nor would he give him any order to refuse it.

On the 11th the same demand was renewed in a raoro pressing
manner, and refused once more with the intimation tluit the
Prince was perfectly free to form his own resolutions.

At this stage of the negotiations a despatch from the Prince
of HohenzoUem-Sigmaringen of the 12th July announced, tlmt
he, in the name of his son then travelling, withdrew his candi-
dature.

The Spanish ambassador notified this in Paiis on the same
day.

The object which France had sought to attain by pursuing a
wrong course, was now actually fulfilled by this declaration.
Ijut l^such a simple arrangement did not satisfy tlio French
Government. Apparently it was no longer complete master of
its own resolutions, and required a brilliant triumph to satisfj'
the public opinion which it had itself aroused, f

Altliough the Due de Gramont had once assured the English
ambassador that the voluntiiry withdrawal of the Prince would be
sufficient to jcompromise the rupture, the *'Moniteur" now said
that the qi^estion must be widened, and that the renunciation of
the Prince would be no longer sufficient. The latter, Gramont
declared to the Prussian ambassador, he looked u})on as a secondary
matter, as Fnince would under no circumstjinces have suffered the
succession to the throne. lie fe;ued that Hmj action of Prussia
would sow the seeds of a lasting dissatisfaction between the two
countries^ and submitted for consideration that a document
addressed by the King to the Emperor might give an outlet ;
the document to run somewhat as follows : — " That his Majesty,
** by empowering the Prince to accept the crown, could not have
'* believed that he would so closely trench upon the interest
" and dignity of the French nation ; the King would add to
*' this disclaimer the wish and hope that every ground for a
" rupture between the two Govemmenis would now disai)pear.*'
The letter was to contain expressions to this effect, Avhich on being
nr)ised abroad would conduce generally to appease public oj)inion,
and it was also recommended that the relationship of the Prince
to the Emperor should not be alluded to, as this argument
would be particularly offensive to France.

In explanation the Minister of Justice, M. Ollivier, came for-
ward and remarked that the Hohenzollcrn-Spanish affair had
excited the nation far more than it had occupied the Emperor.

Both French dignitaries declared in a naive way that their
ministerial position dci)ended upon the proposed plan of adjust-
ment.

How little was Gramont acquainted with the character of

King William when he presumed to expect that the Prussian
ambassador would recommend his sovereign to write a document
of such a character !

At noon on the 13th the King received confirmation of the
Prince's renunciation of the throne, and at once sent Prince
Badziwill, one of his aides-de-camp, to Count Benedetti to inform
him that he now considered the matter arranged.

But on the evening previously the French Cabinet had tele-
graphed to the Count " It is necessary that the King . . . should
" assure us that he will not again authorise this candidature."

In consequence of this the ambassador again appeared,

demanding that the King should give his distinct assurance that

he never would give his consent, should the question of the sue-

• 0 cession to the Spanish throne be at any time revived. This

' demand, which was repeatedly renewed, was definitely declined.

When Count Benedetti a few hours later sought a second
• .( audience on the same subject, he was referred to the routine
, channel of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

All that had passed up to this time in the personal intercourse
of the monarch and the ambassador was of a private nature,
and could not bo of international import. As yet no communi-
cation whatever had been made to His Majesty's Government
by the French Government,
14th July. Count Benedetti left for Paris on the 14th July, and upon
\ doing so the King, in token of his personal esteem, afforded him

the opportunity of taking leave of him at the railway station.

; ,; The proceedings of the French Cabinet are without parallel in

I , ^ diplomatic intercoui*se. They commenced with a threat, then

^' '^' \ went on to an attempt at an explanation, and in doing so

imposed conditions which left no choice but humiliation or

war.

The order for calling in the French reserves dates from 3 p.m.
on the 14th July. It was, however, postponed on account ot
a six-hour council presided over by the Emperor. In this con-
ference they deliberated upon "a collective mediation of the
great Powers," but in consequence of the reports which anived
during the night, the calling out of the reserves was finally
decided upon early on the loth. On the same day the bills
necessary for a war were brought before the Senate and the
legislative body.

They demanded :

A preliminary credit of 66 millions of francs.

A law calling out the Garde Mobile.

A second law authorising the enlistment of recruits for the

duration of the war, according to the conditions prescribed

in the law on recruiting.

It was now necessary to justify all these measures in the eyes
of the nation, and, above all things, to appeal to their feelings in
doing so.

The refusal of a second audience was repi^esented as a personal

affront to the French ambassador, although the latter was in
perfect ignorance of the fact. The Prussian ambassador's leave,
granted long before the commencement of any complications,
was to be looked upon as bis recall in the middle of the
negotiations.

The Prussian preparations were said to have commenced on
the night of 13-14tli, when not a soul dreamt of war being so
imminent.

They asserted that the other Powers had acknowledged the
justice of the French demands with more or less wai-mth, although
Lord Lyons had not concealed his regret at the hesitation on
the part of the French ministry to accept the withdrawal of the
Prince as a settlement of the pending question.

The ministerial proposals met with little resistance in the
Legislative Assembly. A very weak opposition sought to place
the affair in its proper light, but even this party inclined to the
opinion that an opportunity must be sought — for receiving
satisfaction for Sadowa.

The contention was only as to the opportunity ; the fault of
1866 must not be repeated [in 1870. M. Thiers, who, in his
Histoiy of the Empire, had done more than any other man
towai*ds accustoming the French to look upon the Rhine frontier
as an outstanding claim, deemed only the moment for its prefer-
ment ill-chosen, and demanded the production of the despatches
on which the determination for war had been based. M. Jules
Favre joined in this demand, and the documents in question were
laid before a commission selected by the chamber, upon whose
report the Senate unanimously, and the legislative body with a
large majority, ratified the proposals of the Government amid
the plaudits of the people.

No less a sum than,

440 millions for the War Ministry,
GO millions for the Navy, and,
5 millions for the Treasury,
was granted on the 18th and 19th.

In the Empire 16 Departments only voted for war without
I reserve ; 34 were against it, and in 37 Departments opinioas
, L JKfire divided.

But in France a word coiTies as much weight as a deed.
« J , Frenchmen congratulate one another on the delivery of a speech,
and the inspiriting elocution which appeals to the honour of the
7 nation may impel even discreet persons to the most rash conclu-

sions. In the existing centralisation the provinces involuntarily
follow the impulse from the capital, whether for revolution or
for war.

Napoleon III. appears to have played a passive part, it might
almost be said the part of a man without any tenacity of
piupose, throughout the whole affair.

King William had an opportunity of satisfying himself of the
nature of the impression which the whole conduct of the French

Government had made on his people when he returned from Ems
on the 15th July to fierlin, where the joy was unanimous that
the monarch had repelled the unprecedented demands of their
overbearing neighbour.

Owing to the unexpectedly rapid course of events the Cro^vn
Prince, accompanied by the Minister-President, the War Minister,
and the Chief of the General Staff, went to meet the King, so
that no time should be lost in carrying His Majesty's commands
into effect. Telegraphic news of the foregoing proceedings in Paris
had reached the railway station in Berlin. War now appeared
unavoidable, and the resolution immediately formed to accept it
was hailed by crowds of people of eveiy rank and age with
long-continued acclamations. The German nation had sincerely
wished for peace ; it had been suddenly startled from a state
of tranquil security, but the honour of the Fatherland was held
dearer than any other consideration. Any hesitation at this
moment would have made Prussia unwortli}^ of taking the lead
of Germany.

The judicious and exhaustive repoi-ts of the French Military
Attach d in Berlin, Lieutenant-Colonel Baron Stoffel, should have
left no doubt in the mind of the French- Government that Ger-
many was fully able to take up the proferred gauntlet. The War
Minister, Le Bceuf, on his part declared that '' France is doubly
ready." The Minister, Ollivier, protested tliat he would take
upon himself the responsibility of the war with a light heart, as
France had been forced into it. It appeal's that their only
concern was not to allow any oppoiimiity to slip by.

The preparations in France had been scarcely commenced, and
no army was collected, when the French Charg^ d'Affaires
presented the declai-ation of war on the 19th July.

The French Army. — Plan of Operations and Movements.

15th to 31st July.

Owing to the surprising success of the Prussian arms in 186G,
public attention in France had been turned to their own forces,
and a book by General Trochu, in which great defects in the
organisation of the French armj^ wei*e pointedlj*^ exposed and
laid bare, naturally excited general sensation.

The Emperor entrusted the energetic and intelligent ^Tarshal
Kiel, just then appointed Wai* Minister, with the drawing up of a
new military code. This code, dated the Ist February 1808, was
based in many respects on the Prussian organisation, the main
principles of which were altered to suit the ^^eculiar characteristics
of the French.

According to it, the armed forces were to consist of active
army, reserve, garde nationale mobile, and navy.

The object of the reserve was to reinforce the field army,
to garrison fortresses, and foim depdt troops, whilst the Oarde

Natioualc Mobile was only iateiuled to coinpleto the garrisous
of home fortresses and form a reserve to the army.

The obligation to service already established in principle was
carried into effect by limiting the legal exemptions ; substitution,
however, was allowed to remain, and prcniiunis alone were
abolished.

The duration of the time of service was extended to nine years
in tlie active army, of which live years were reckoned ^vith the
colours and four with the reserve. Men included in the last
category could only be called in by an imperial dcci^ee when there
was any danger of war.

The old distribution of the yearly contingcn into "fii-st"
and " second *' j>o?*^io?i was retained ; but as presumably the
number of re-cngagcmcnts would diminisli by doing aw-ay with
the premiums, they endeavoured, in order to be sure of the effec-
tive numbers, to augment the number of the ^^ first poiiion " at
the expense of the " second portion.'* The latter, as a rule, served
only five months, spread over three yeai-s, but it remained at all
times at the disposal of the War Minister.

This reorganisation could not be computed until tlio con-
tingent of 1875 was called in, when the army on a war footing
would have been brought up to a normal strength of 800,000
men, including 120,000 of the " sccorul ]ioriion'' By tlie same
date the Garde Nationale Mobile would have cr)nsistod of 500,000
men. France could, it is true, raise a ycaily contingent of more
than 300,000 men, yet we must deduct one third of them for men
unfit for service, and 1 4 per cent, for those legally exempt, so that
the effective contingent for the army and garde mobile amounted
to little more than 172,000 mea

The latter troops could in peace time only be called in for 15
days each year, and only for one day's training at a time. But,
as men on this one day would have to travel several miles to
the rendez\'0us, clothe and equip themselves when they got there,
and then go through a day's training, the arrangement could not
be of any real advantage.

Mai-shal Le Boeuf, successor to Marshal Niel, who was snatched
by death fi-om his work of reorganisation, soon perceived the
necessity of abandoning this measure.

In consequence of this, in 1870, the cadres for 150,000 to 180,000
Garde Mobile were but partially in existence, those more especially
in Paris and in the Departments of the noiih and north-east.

Towards the middle of July 1870, according to the best French
authorities, the strength of the army, inclusive of the 1869 con-
tingent, which would not be enrolled before the 1st August 1870,
amounted to 567,000 men.*

* According to Martin de Fallii^res 564,748 men (actiye army and reserve).

Of these there were with the colours, indusiye of 82,490 men
forming the 1868 contingent^

398,500 men
In the reserve - - - 61,000

The '^ second portion " inclusive

of the 1868 contingent - 112,600

f»

Total . - ,667,000

»f

In the foregoing the following were included : —
Non-effectives (discipline and re-
mount companies, tradesmen,

&c.)- - - - 60,000

Gensd'armes ... 24,000

Dep6to - - - 28,000

Home garrisons - - 78,600

Algeria ... 50,000

Total - - 230,600

9f
»

which, if deducted from the firat total, leaves a field army of
nbout 836,000 men, which number almost exactly agrees witli
that fixed upon by the Prussian General Staff before the war,
who had calculated that France would be able to place in the
field an army of 343,000 men.

In consequence of the mobilisation of the French taking place
at the frontier and the reserves being clothed at dep6ts away
from their regiments, and, lastly, owing to the confusion which
prevailed, neither of these numbers was really attained.

The forces were formed in peace according to the different arms
of the service. Their strength was as follows : —

I. Guard.

InfiEtntry — 3 Grenadier regiments of 3 battaliona

4 Voltigeur „ 3 „

1 Zouave „ 2 „

1 Rifle battalion.
Cavalry— 1 Cuirassier regiment -'

1 Carbineer „

1 Lancer „

1 Dragoon „

1 Guide „

1 Mounted Rifle,,

Aitillery— 1 mounted i-egiment ^ 1 Of six batteries eadi
1 Horse Artillery regiment/ "* ^ »>atteries eacli.

Total - - 24 battalions.

24 squadrona
72 guns.

* ThlB number (four sqiutdronf ) was in all probability repeatedly ezeeeded.

>- Of four squadrons eacb.^

>"0f 4 squadrons.

11. Line.

Infantry — 100 regiments of 3 battalions.
20 rifle battalions.
3 Zouave re^ments of 3 battalions.
1 Algerian light-infantry regiment of 3 battalions
(Turcos).

3 Algerian rifle regiments of 3 battalions.
1 Foreign regiment of 3 battalions.

Cavalry— 10 Cuirassier regiments

12 Dragoon „

8 Lancer „

12 Mounted rifle regiments
8 Hussar „

4 African rifle „
3 Spahis „

Artillery — 16 Mounted regiments of 12 batteries.*

4 Horee-artilleiy regiments of 8 batteries.

Engineers — 3 regiments.

Total of the mobilised lino troops, exclusive of garrison
batteries :—

344 battalions.
228 squadrons.
912 guns, and
3 regiments of engineers.

Which gives a total field army of

368 battalions.
252 squadrons.
984 guns and

3 regiments of engineers.

For this field army there was an abundance of war material at
hand, and part of it in exceedingly good order.

The infiintry possessed an excellent arm in the Chassepdt rifle,
combining long range with flat trajectory.

On the 1st July the total number of Chassepot rifles available
was 1,037,655, consequently, deducting the 30,000 rifles handed
over to the navy, there were more than three times the required
number available for the field aimy. The small arm factories
could also turn out, in addition, a monthly supi)ly of 30,000 stand
of arms.

Each infantry soldier canicd ^'90 rounds ; every two com*
panics had a two-wheeled cart, Avhich can*ied 24 rounds more per
man, and besides these there would be 40 I'ounds per man with
the columns.

* Of these, howeyer, only 8 batteries per regiment were mobilised ; generally
speaking, 1 to 4 remaned behind as batteries for garrison service (sorties).

The field artillery was just as abundantly provided with
mat^eL It numbered on the let July 1870 —

S,216 4-pi*-9 8-pr., and 12-pr. guns (la Hitte system).
581 rifled 4pr. (mountain guns).
190 mitrailleuses.

Total 3,987 rifled guns, with 3,175 field-carriages, 7,435 am-
munition waggons, or sufficient mat^el for 500 batteries of G
guns each.

As there were also 5,379 smooth bores, 3^554 carriages, and
4,627 ammunition waggons availabley 360 additional batteries,
although smooth bore, could have been equipped. But there
were only sufficient teams and men at hand for the 164 batteries
of the field army, and of these 10 batteries were still in Algeria
and Civita Vecchia when the war broke out ; consequently only
924 guns, inclusive of the mitrailleuse batteries, could really take
the field at the end of July.

The Emperor^ in spite of all the interest he had taken in
artillery matters, had not been fortunate in the adoption of the
La Hittc system, and in a very sliort time tiie superiority of the
system adopted by Prussia became evident. The mitrailleuse
iMt^tteries, so carefuUy kept secret, never realised the expectations
which had been entertained of them.

The half organised Garde Mobile was deficient in almost every
respect as an army reserve.

For the present all that could be expected was the show they
would make as large masses of in&ntry.

For their equipment the foUowing breech-loaders were avail-
able :

342,115 conveited percussion rifles (k tabati^re), of very

doubtful value, and as second and third reserve.
1,673,734 rifled, 315,667 smooth bore, muzzle-loading
percussion arms, quite unsuited for the armament of
an army.

There was nothing in store for clothing and equipping a
second army for the field, its artilleiy and cavalry would have to
be newly raised.

Consequently they had to trust almost entirely to the field
army at first, and its organisation was not well adapted for a
rapid transition firom the peace to the war formation. The form-
ation by corps only obtiuned with part of the army, viz., tlie
Guard, the Algerian troops, the armies of Paris and Lyons, and
the troops temporarily organised at the camp of Clid^lons. On
the outbreak of war the larger units of troops composing the
corps had, as a rule, to be fonned by combining the separate
regiments, and it was necessary to organise the stafis anew, so
that the whole war organisation was not called into existence
until the critical moment had amved.

Military administration was in the highest degree centra-
lised, and hence, as well as by charging it with judicial duties,
overwhelmed with business. Army Corps and Divisions had

no Intendance in peace, and were thus deprived of its media-
tory functions. As a consequence, the equipment materiel was
concentrated at a few places in time of peace. Stores of trans-
port carriages were accumulated at Vernon and Chateauroux,
depots of camp-equipment had been formed principally at Paiis
and Versailles. Rapid distribution to the diflFerent corps from these
depots, on a general mobilisation, was a work of extraordinary
difficulty.

On mobilisation, the men to complete the establishments
ought, according to Marshal Niel's .plan, to join their regiments
on the ninth day, if they happened to be stationed at the dei)6ts
from whence they received their clothing.

As each battalion gave up two of its eight companies to form
the 4th or dep6t battalion, each battalion required 250 reserves
to bring it up to the war strength.

Niel further calculated that the troops could, by calling in the
reserves by telegraph, be at their stations in readiness to march
on the twelfth day.

As the order was issued on the 15th the necessary transport
for the troops should have l)een ready by the 28th JiUy. But
even witli a well-regulated mobilisation this could scarcely be
expected, when only 35 out of 100 infantry regiments were in
the same garrison with their depfits on the outbreak of the
war. For example, the 87th regiment was at Lyons, while
its depot was at St. Malo ; the 98th regiment was garrisoning
Dunkirque, but its depot was at Lyons. In consequence of these
circumstances every soldier, not actually serving with the colours,
even if he was in the district where his regiment was quartered,
had to be first forwarded to his depot, find when clothed to be
again conveyed back to his legiment.

The different depots could not be supplied in time witli many
articles of equipment and the necessary trains, as they were also
concentrated in a few stores ; moreover, by the general centralisa-
tion which prevailed, a special order from the War Ministry
was necessary for the issue of arms and many other necessary
articles.

The difficulties would be still fuither increased by the
regiments not remaining stationary until their mobilisation ;
and yet the course was adopted of transporting the troops
straight from their garrisons to the points of assembly of the
corps on the frontier.

The cavalry and artillery establishments being on a Ijirger scale
from spring to autumn, re<iuired a proportionally small reinforce-
ment at this time, which was an important circumstance with
regard to the supply of hoi'ses.

The Guard Artilleiy and the four regiments of Hoi-se Artillery
had all their batteries (the former 12, the latter 32), horsed in
time of peace, whilst the 12 batteries of each of the 15 regiments
of artillery were for the most part provided with trained hoi-ses,
and only required additional horses for the ammunition park.
A 4-pr. battery in each infantry Division was converted into a

mitrailleuse battery by substituting a mitrailleuse barrel. 25,000
to 30,000 animals, chiefly draught horses and mules, were
purchased, and when a few reserves were drawn in (a cavalry
regiment requires 156 men to make 'up its number) these two
arms were in a condition to take the field, and were moreover
mainly quartered in the north and north-east.

To form the depot, the No. 8 companies of the second and
third battalions of the line regiments were assigned as a
nucleus, and this was then raised to four companies by the
formation of two new ones, whilst the fourth battalions were
formed of all the No. 7 companies and No. 8 company of the
first battalion. The personnel of the Custom House (Dowane)
was formed into bivttalions and assigned to the military sub-
divisions, and the Qarde Nationale Mobile of the three first
Army Corps, and of the Departments of the Seine (noith and
north-east) were incorporated with tliese newly-formed bodies
of troops.

The National Guard was iu a very primitive condition,
weak in organisation and of little real use. Numerous appoint-
ments of company and battalion commanders were now made
for the fii>it time, some of the oiticers being detailed fiom the line
for that purpose ; but these battalions were only ordered to be
formed into regiments, brigades, and Divisions on the 18th July.
In fact this reserve was a mere heap of anned men in unifonn,
only suited at the best to fight behind walls.

The inteinal state of the army laboured under many serious
defects.

Even in the opinion of their own countrymen the French
soldier at the outbreak of the war was not what he had been in
the Crimean war and in Italy; the law on re-engagements,
exemptions, and endowments had had a prejudicial influence
upon him. This law permitted an excessive number of substitutes ;
for instance, in a contingent of 75,000 men in 1869, there were
42,000 substitutes, and experience showed that the quality of
those men gi*ew worse with the long service. Long extended
furloughs, formerly unknown, were also stated to be disadvan-
tageous to military discipline.

It might be added that the non-commissioned officers had
lost their former high position. In many regimenti thei'e
were non-commissioned officers who had performed tlie functions
of that rank for 11 yeara and upwards, without prospect of
advancement or relief from the existence whicli they had
sacrificed to their country in an almost tmiuterrupted succes-
sion of active service. Consequently many good men sought
more remunerative occupation in civil employment. The corps
of officers was equally deficient in homogeneity. Nearly one-
third consisted of former non-commissioned officers.

Whereas the junior officers did not devote their entire abilities
to the service, the older subaltern officers were a marked contrast
to them. They constituted as a body the best element of the army,
uniting abundant experience and valuable personal qualities,

which Imd beon matured in the various campaigns under the
Empire. And although the prevailing favouritism, extended even
to persons of tarnished reputation, very naturally disgusted them,
and opened out very little prospect in the future, yet this class
had been making rapid strides professionaly ever since 1866.
and it was these officers chiefly who, on the battle jBelds of France,
sought to redeem with their life-blood those errors for whicli they
were in nowise responsible.

The same element of favouritism had also raised into high
positions many men who were unequal to tlieir duties, exerciwing
its disastrous influence here as it ever will.

In these matters the side taken in politics was jualnly considered.
Owing to the constant change in the form of Government, that
loyalty and attachment to a lineal dynasty whicli in other
countries avert serious dangers to the public well-being, had
ceased to exist both in the army and in the nation. The French
officer and even the private soldier serves his country, and sei'ves
it with submission and devotion, but he does not cleave to the
changing form of the head of the State with that lively sense of
duty which sacrifices all its strength in an unconditional sub-
mission to authority.

The French officer and the French nation are animated by a
high and in many respects an excusable confidence, but at the same
time they are too apt to depreciate others. Thoir whole education
tends to inculcate tlie conviction that France is far ahead of all
other countries. When the pupil from St. Cyr paces the gilded
saloons of Versaillefj, his eyes rest almost exclusively upon pictures
of battles, in all of which the French were victorious. One after
another come the heroes who have borne the oriflamme, the
banner of the fleur-de-lis, the eagle, or the tricolor — still the
emblems of France — to nearly every capital of the world. So
with the French history of the wars — a history of unbroken
triumphs, an epic in which misadventure is only to be accounted
for by secondary and accidental circumstances, or by treachery.
Search after truth does not repay the trouble ; to acknowledge it
would be unpatriotic.

No wonder then that the young officer troubles himself little
about foreign countries, their language and institutions.

The French had scarcely a conception of the revolution which
two campaigns had effected in the sentiments of the German race —
of the feeling of a common nationality never again to be repressed
— and they have been completely surprised at finding an enemy
worthy of their steel. Only a few clear-sighted men believed that
they had anything to learn in the military institutions of foreign
countries. Among these was Marshal Niel, who exerted himself
not only to assimilate French organisation to the military system
of Prussia, but also to introduce its formations for battle. The
weak French battalion of at most 800 men formed in six companies
was, it is true a scarcely successful application of the company

S998S. B

column. The battalion must be adhered to as the unit, and the
independent action of the company commanders discouraged.

The excellence of the French infantry rifle, and perhaps also
the character of the branch of the service to which the Marshal
belonged, might have induced him to attach a preferential value
to the defensive and its advantages in respect of effect of fire ;
but it was little in harmony with French ilan. The War
Ministry Regulations of 1867 and 1868 lay down ''the defensive "
as the rule, and only permit an advance to the attack when the
enemy is more or less shattered by the continuation of the
struggle. Hasty eiitrencliment of the selected position certainly
lessens the losses in the earlier stage of the engagement, but
impedes freedom of movement as it progressea

The employment of large cavalry reserves during the course of
the battle, as used by Frederick the Great and iTapoleon I., is
rejected in the " Observations ** as no longer applicable to present
tactics ; but they nevertheless assign an independent action to
this arm in advance of the battle field. Tet it needed special
orders from the Emperor and Mai^shal Bazaine to induce the
cavalry to reconnoitre the ground, even for a distance of a few
kilomHres.

The artillery, in which all the detachment is carried, exhi-
bited a high degree of manoeuvring power and mobility ; but
this advantage was prevented from bearing its full fruit by a
want of mobility in the other arms. The former arm, in contrast,
was always at hand and always effective.

The latest French " Field Exerdse of 1869 " was based in the
most striking way upon the Prussian, entirely abandoning the
previous formations for battle ; but it did not know how to em-
body the spirit of them. Careflil elementary training was ignored ;
to say the most, a little more value was attached to shooting ; but
this was nevertheless very superficially treated. The value of that
binding medium, Prussian discipline, which exists in the mutual
understanding between officer and private, in the strictest training
in even the most unimportant duties, which makes obedience
second nature, and pei*mits of a high state of discipline with a
small " defaulter's sheet," was completely misunderstood.

The French fleet before the outbreak of war included the
following men-of-war : —

18 iron-clad frigates, armed with 12 to 17 guns of the heaviest

calibre, and of 800 to 900 horse power ;
9 iron-clad coiTcttes, of 12 guns and 450 horse power ; (one

corvette in Japan) ;
7 iron-clad ve&sels for coast defence, six carrying 1 to 2 guns

and of 250 to 530 horse power, one (the Rochambeau) with

14 guns and 1,000 horse power ;
15 iron-clad batteries, of 18 guns and of 150 horse power ;
making a total of 49 iron-clads, including the one absent.

The iron-clad batteries were, liowever, not capable of being
employed on the probable theatre of war (North Sea and Baltic),
on account of their want of sea-worthiness. There were therefore
33 iron-clads at disposal.

France also possessed the following unarmoured men-of-war : —

24 screw corvettes, carrying 11 to 38 guns, and of ISO to G40
horse power. The smaller ones were very old.

19 corvettes, carrying 4 to 22 guns, and of 300 to 450 horse

power (one in Japan).
51 screw despatch boats, 2 to G guns, and of 100 to 150
horse power (one of them on the east coast of Africa).

10 paddle-wheel frigates, of 4 guns each, and of 300 to 450

horse power.
6 paddle-wheel corvettes, of 2 to 6 guns, and of 200 to 500

horae power.

Making a total of 69 large unarmoured steamsln'ps, of which 50
were at disposal, and 51 small, all of which, with one exception,
were available.

Of steam transports there were : —

27 old screw line-of-battle ships, of 11 to 12 guns and 400
to 800 horse power, one being an instruction ship.

47 screw transports, of 90 to 800 horse power.

20 paddle-wheel steamers, of 80 to 200 horse power, one
being on the coast of Algiers.

22 small steamers, of from 15 to 7G hoi-se power.

The sailing ships may bo left out of the calculation, as they
were but little fitted for a long continuance at sea.

The entire fleet in the French ports therefore numbered —

33 iron-clads,
100 wooden men-of-war steamers, and
96 transports.

An imposing force, truly, if collected and ready for service ; but
this was far from being the case.

The equipment of a transport fleet entirely fell to the ground
when the result of the battles of Worth and Spieheren turned the
attention of the authorities to duties nearer home rather than to
prospective diversions on distant coasts. The marine forces thus
became disposable elsewhere. Their number was not incon-
siderable. The marine infantry nunibercd 136 companies in four
regiments, of which 04 weic in the colonies. There were
therefore 72 companies of 9,600 men available.

The marine artillery regiment consisted of 28 batteries, of
which 20 batteries, with 120 guns, were on homo service.

The intention had been originally to form out of this excellent
material two brigades (5,000 to 6,000 men), with eight batteries,
to add to them two cavalry regiments, and to embark them ;
but in consequence of the imi)res8ion made by the earlier battles,
3,000 men were summoned to Paris from Cherbourg, and by

n 2

degrees the greater part of the marine forces were employed ia
the defence of the capital and at other important theatres of wan

Such was the state of the military and naval forces at first at
the Em|)eroi*'s disposal.

The way in which they were to be employed in a war against
Germany must have been for many yeai^ the subject of delibe-
ration, and isolated attempts had been made to procure information
upon the gcogmphical and statistical conditions on tho other
side of their frontier.

What the ultimate decisions were as to tho conduct of the
operations are not as yet precisely kno^vn ; but a brochure which
appeared during the latter half of the war, and which is ascribed
to the Emperor Napoleon himself, contains the essential features
of the plan eventually adopted.

According to it, the French commanders were aware of the
great superiority which united Germany could oppose to the
military forces of France. Starting with the assumption that
the number of effective combatants never exceeds half the whole
force of the army, they presumed that the strength of the German
military forces brougiit on the field of battle might be reckoned
at 550,000 men and their own at 300,000 men.

But the Emperor hoped that this superiority of force, amounting
to almost double his own, would be not only paralysed by the
rapidity of his movements, l)ut that he would be able to turn this
circumstance to his advantage. The condition on wliich this
depended was, that ho should suddenly cross the Upper Rliine,
and thereby sepamtc South from North Germany.

It was calculated that if Prussia were isolated in this way, she
would only have a force of 350,000 combatants, and that with
the fii'st success Austria and Italy would join Fmnce.

According to the Emixjror's plan, which was communicated in
Paris only to Mai-shals MacMahon ami Le Bamf, tlio first con-
centration of the army was to take place as follows : — 150,000
men round Metz, 100,000 at Strassburg, and 50,000 in tho camp
of Chalons.

It was in tho next place intended to move forward the aimies
fiom Met/, and Strassljurg, and to cn>s.s tlio Rhino near Maxau,
with a force of 250,000 men.

After binding the South Gorman states to neutrality, the next
step was to seek out and give battle to the Prus:.ian army.

In these operations the duty of covering the rear of the army
and watching the north-east frontier devolved upon tho reserve
corps, which was ordered fiom Cbillons to Metz, At tho same
time it was expected that tho appeaitinco of the fleet in tho
Baltic would detain pai-t of the enemy's force in that direction
ibr the delence of the coast.

The proposed plan was unquestionably based on the correct
principle that the superiority of the enemy can only be balanced
by rapidity of movement, but it implied a false view of the solid-

nrity of the relations between South and North Gennany, and
under-mted the independence of action and the nunibei*s of the
Prussian military forces. The latter was the more astonishing,
as they must have known that Prussia had already bi-ought into
the field in 1866 a force of a1x)ut 350,000 men, and her forces
had since then undergone no inconsiderable augmentation.

On the other hand, it had been overlooked liow ill>adapted the
French anny was, as it then stood, for an expeditious opening of
the campaign and a rapid conduct of the operations.

In the first place, the network of railways in Finance in no way
favoured a concentration to the extent that was geneitiUy assumed.
The difierent lines certainly favoured a first concentration of the
military forces on the Moselle and round Strassburg, but as the
line fiom Verdun to Metz was not yet completed, the various
groups of railways eventually led to the frontier district in but
four lines, dischai^ging themselves at Diedenhofen (Thionville),
Metz, or Nancy, and Strassburg.

In the country between Mezi^res and Diedenhofen there was
only a single line of rail at disposal. The rail from Vesoul to
Nancy could, on the contrary, be used either for transport to
Lon*aine or to Alsace.

An error was, however, committed in assuming that the con-
centration of the army by rail could be efiectcd with order
and precision without a very thorough and comprehensive
preparation.

Besides this, tliere were the difficulties already adverted to in
raising the troops to their full strength, in accumulating stores at
the points of concentration, and in completing the organisation
of the newly-fonned staffs, Corps, Divisions, &c., as well as in
furnishing them with the necessary transport. All these mattera
must necessarily infltience both the duration of the concentration
and the interior economy of the commands.

Even in spite of all the zeal which pervaded the departments
of the War Ministry, and the devoted efforts displayed by the
railway administrations, the concentration of the army was not
carried out without great inteiTuptions, and its power of move-
ment, at any rate at first, was considerably hampered. The latter
was the more important, as by the intended plan of operations the
junction of the bulk of the army from Metz with the Strassburg
army could only be assisted by a single line of rail, and must
therefore be cfTected l)y means of the few rojids traversing tlio
Vosges.

Moreover, experience of the last war ia Italy had in no way
shown any s])ecial capabilities for marching on tlie part of
the French troops when in large masses. It was, at any rate,
perfectly well remembered in Prussia that the Imperial army, at
that tune mustering but 100,000 men, only marched on an average
♦J miles daily between the victory of Magenta and the battle of
Solferino.

French diplomacy might have delayed the outbreak of hos-
tilities until they were ready to strike, but they declared war

before the Government was in n position to give immediate effect
to this declaration, and thus the military ferces of France were
subsequently attacked in their own country by the German
armies before they were fully assembled and ready for offensive
operations.

The forces at disposal were distributed into eight Army Corps
(inclusive of the Guard), three Reserve Divisions of aivalry, and
an Artilleiy Reserve.

The strength of the Coii)S was by no means equal ; the 1st,
3rd, and 6th Corps, commanded by marshals, each consisted of
4 Divisions of infantry, a cavalry Division of 3 brigades, nnd
a reserve artillery of 8 batteries ; whilst the 2nd, 4th, 5th, and
7th Corps consisted each' of 3 Divisions of infantry, a cavalry
Division of 2 brigades, and a reserve artillery of 6 batteries.

The Imperial Guard differed from the preceding in having

2 Divisions of infantry and a reserve artillery of 4 batteries ; it
had, however, a cavalry Division of 3 brigades.

The Infantry Divisions were, as a rule, composed of 2 brigades,
each of 2 regiments of 3 battalions and a rifle battalion, and to
each Division a division of artilleiy of 3 batteries (including a
mitrailleuse battery) was assigned. The cavalry was differently
distributed in the various corps. Some of them definitely assigned
regiments or squadrons from the reserve cjwalry to their Divisions ;
others only temporarily, and others none at all. The combined
cavalry of the Corps was distributed into brigades of 2 or 3
regiments each.

Appendix I. The special composition of the army, as well as any differences
in detail, are shown in the order of battle in Appendix I.

The total numbers at first available for employment in the field
would be therefore —

311 infantry batbdions.

21 Chasseur battalions.
220 squadrons (counting regiments at 4 squadrons).
924 guns (including 144 mitrailleuses).

37 companies of engineers.

But as the French aimy numl>ered t\(\H battalions, 252 squadron^,
and 984 guns, there still remained 3G Iwittalions, 32 squadrons,
and GO guns available for employment elsewhere.

Of these troops, 12 battalions, viz., the 22nd, 34th, o8th, and
72nd regiments, and the 8th and half of the 7th regiments oi
Chasseurs a clieval, were formed into a Division at Toulouse, for
the purpose of watching Spain ; the 3otli and 42nd regiments,
with 2 squadrons of the 7th Chasseur regiment and 2 batteries,
were still in Civita Vecchia.

Total, 18 battalions, 8 squadrons, 12 guns.

There still remained in Algiers, the 16th, 38th, 39th, and 92nd
regiments of the line, the foreign regiment (3 battalions), and

3 battalions of Infanterie Lighre ; also the 8th Hussars, the
1st and 9th Chasseur regiments, 3 regiments of Spahis, and
8 batteries, making a total of 18 Imttalions, 24 squadrons, 48

gaiiB. By a decree of the 25tli August, 8 marching regiments
^yere formed from the 6th squadrons of the guard and line/
which, however, never joined the army on tlie frontier.

The 115-4th battalions could also be used as garrisons in the
interior of the country or for reinforcing the field army, as soon
as the Qarde Rationale Mobile was in a position to replace
them.

Tlie establishment of this latter force exhibits an effective of
100 battalions, each of 1,000 men, and 10,000 artillerymen.

The following places wore appointed as the head-quarters or
points of concentration of tlie different corps about to take the
field :—

1st Corps — Marshal McMahon — Strassburg.

2nd Corps— General of Division Frossard — St Avoid.

3rd Corps — Marshal Bazaine — Metz.

4th Corps — General of Division Ladmirault — Dicdeuliofen.

6 th Corps — General of Division Failly — Bitsch.

6th Corps — Marshal Canrobert — Camp of Chalons.

7tli Corps — General of Division Felix Douay — Belfort

Imperial Guard — General of Division Bourbaki — Nancj^

The march of the principal force to the Moselle was to take place
under cover of the 2nd Corps pushed forward as advanced guard,
while two Corps concentrated in Alsace. The 5tli Corps at
Bitsch was to keep up the communication between those two
groups, and the Gth Corps to form a general rescvivo at Chillons.

The Emperor reserved to himself the chief command of the
whole active military force, which reccdvoil the designation of
"Ai'iny of the Rhine." It is not known wliulhcr Ukto was any
intention at a later period of organising it int-o soj)ai"ate armies.
The prevailing principle of centralisation in France was at jiny
rate the prime cause of all the Corps being placed under the
direct command of the Emperor, from whom, as their sole chief
authority, they were to take their orders. Mai*slial Le Boeuf
was appointed Chief of the Staff*, and was succeeded in his
capacity of War Minister by General D^jean; on the 10th August
Count Palikao finally assumed the direction of the War
Ministry.

Marshal Bazaine assumed the chief command of the Corps
assembling in Alsace and Lorraine until the arrival of the
Emperor.

The removal of the troops from tlie camp of Chjllons and of
the armies of Paris and Lyons by rail, and the embarkation of the
regiments ordered from Algiers commenced on the evening of
the 16th July without waiting for their reserves to come up.

The march to the prescribed points was carried out.

The 2nd Army Corps (the advanced guard) having been
brought up to its full strength in the camp of Chalons, was
concentrated (with the exception of an extra Cuirassier brigade

* In the hcaTy caralry regiments these 6th squadrons were only fonned after
mobilisation.

left behind) on the evening of the 18th July near St. Avoid.
Its in&ntry regiments,howevery only numbered 1 ,350 men« General
Froesard received an order from Marshal Le Boeuf not to move
the main body of the Corps beyond St Avoid, but to reconnoitre
as far as the frontier, and at the same time to be careful not to
compromise any large detachments, adding ** that he was to bo
the eye of the army."

The General pushed forward Bataille's Division with Valabi'^gue's
Chasseur brigade as far as Forbach on the 19th, with which
arrangement the marshal expressed his concun*encc, but once
more reminding him '' not to engage prematurely.*^

Laveaucoupct's Division was transferred to the milway junc-
tion at BeniDg, to which place Bachelier s brigade of dragoons
was moved up on tlie 21st from St. Avoid.

The hcad-quartei'S of the corps, with Verge's Division and tlie
Resei've Artillery and Engineers, remained at St. Avoid.

This dchelon position was further extended by throwing forward
a detachment from Bataille's Division in the direction of Spicheren
on the 21st, as a post of observation. This detachment was in-
creased to a brigade when the Prussian patrols began to disturb
the outposts.

An infantry regiment from Laveaucoupet's Division, with some
artillery, also occupied Saargemiind for the purpose of watching
the roads at that poiut and maintaining communications with De
Faill/s Corps.

In other respects tlioy fancied themselves secure by making
frequent reconnoissances and placing outposts in accordance with
the instructions issued to them.

Next to Fro.s.snrd's Corps, the 4th Corps (Ladmiriinlt), formed ot
tlie ganisons of Northern Fmnce, concentrated near DicJenhofen ;
then the 3rd Corps (Bazaine), formed of the troops of the army of
Paris and the garrison of Metz, at Metz ; and the Imperial Guard
at Nancy.

In consequence of a false report cuntjnt in Paris on the IGth
July that Prussian troops were advancing from Trier (Treves) on
Sierck, Mai-shal Bazaine received instructions to send an advanced
guard towards Sierck "to raise the enemy's apprehensions as to
" their (the French) intentions."

The 4th Corps carried this order into effect by pushing forward
Cissey's Division.

General Failly, who was to maintain the communication with
the military forces in Alsace, formed his Corps of the Lyons troops,
and by the 18th July had 17 battalions in position at Bitsch.
Other detachments followed shortly after, but the Anny Corps
never entirely collected at that place. Guyot de Lespart's Division
of infantry remained for a short time at Haguenau, where it was
under the orders of General Duerot the territorial commandant ;
Bernis' brigade belonging to Brahaut's cavalry division was
ordered to Niederbronn, whilst the Lancer brigade moved one
regiment to Bitsch and the other to Rohrbach.

The 1st Corps was formed at Stiassburg from the troops quartered
in the eastern dei)artments and from those brought from Algiers.

Marshal MacMnliOD, who had been appointed to the command of
this Coi^ps, could not an-ive in Paris from Algiei-s before the 22nd.
The formation consequently went on at fii'st without the Com-
mander, and not until the 20th was any telegraphic despatch sent
to General Ducrot, the teiritorial commandant in Strassburg, to
assume the command of the coii>s pending the anival of the
Marshal.

This Army Corps, amongst which the African regiments were
distributed, was hardly fit to take the field, even at the beginning
of August.

The 7th Corps was still more to the rear, filling up its ranks from
the troops in the south-east of the empire. As it was not deemed
advisable to denude Lyons at present of troops of tlie line,
Dumont\s Division, with a brigade of Cavalry, was left there
until the 12th August.* Conseil Dumesnii's Division formed at
Colmai-, the remainder of the Army Corps in the neighbourhood of
Belfort.

Of Canrobert s Corps, which included the former garrisons of
the centre and west, a Division and Beville's cuirassier brigade
assembled at Paris, a second Division at Soisscms, whilst the
remainder concentrated at the camp of Chalons.

Of the Cavalry Reserve, Bonnemain's cuirassier Division joined
the 1st Corps in Alsace; Barai Is chasseur Division (on its way
from Africa) was ordered to Metz, whilst Forton's Division
was formed partly at Luneville, partly at Poiit-Ji-ilousson.

The Artillery Reserve, consisting of the 13th Regiment (field)
and the 18th Regiment (horse), completed their mobilisation in
the ganusons of Boui'gcs and Toulouse.

Tlie 4-pr. guns in the Artillery Reserve of the Corps were
exchanged for 12-prs. at Metz in the middle of August.

They hud but little information about the enemy in the early
days of the concentration, and this could not well be otherwise,
as the intended points of concentration of the German armies
were not so self-evident from the first day of the mobilisation as
those of the French.

On the 21st July Marshal Bazaine wrote from ilctz on this
subject ; —

" It would appear that the Prussians intend awaiting battle
in the neighbourliood of Mainz ; they are concentrating
troops between that place and Coblenz ; their sul»sistence in
that district is difficult; it is gonerally believed that a war
lasting over two or tliree months will be ruination and
dastruction. Only the weakly men are allowed to remain
with the depots ; all the robust men between the nges of 18
and 30 are obliged to march.'*

While the formations of the French Corps were in anj'thing but 23rd July,
a forward stage, instructions were sent on the 23rd by Marshal Le
Bceuf from Paris ordering changes in some of their destinations.

* Jolif's eavalry brigade remained at Lyons after the departure of Dnmont^s
Division, and never actonlly joined the 7th Corps.

According to these orders : —

Bazaine's Corps was to move fi-om Metz on Boulay, and keep
np communication between the Corps of Oenerak Frossard and
Ladmirault. A Division of the last-mentioned Corps was to move
on Bouzonville.

General Failly was directed to advance, with the two Divisions
concentrated round Bitsch, to Saargemlind, from whence the
detachment of the 2nd Corps was to move off to join its own
Corps. Quyot De Lespart's Division, which had been at Hagenau
up to tliis time, received orders to march on Bitsch, and a Division
of the Ist Corps was to relieve it. Lastly the Imperial Guard
was ordered to move from Nancy to Metz by road.

In consequence of these orders, which were carried out on the
24th JuljT. 24>th and following days, Frossard's Corps remained in its old
position, merely drawing in the detachment from Saargemlind.
Marshal Bazaine established his head-quarters in Boulay, where
Castagny's Division, the Beserve Artillery and the Cavalry
division were posted, whilst Montaudon's Division advanced to
Bouchepom, Alettman's to Teterchen and Aymard's to Bettange.

General Ladmiiuulb transferred his head-quarters and a Division
to Bouzonville, a Division remained in Diedcnhofen and Cissey's
Division near Sierck.

Failly's Corps was at the same time ordered to place itself in
communication with General Frossard's troops, and if necessary
to support his left wing ; in this way the railway from Nieder-
bronn to Saargcuiiuid would be covered. The head-quarters
of the Corps and the Divisions of Ooze and Abadie arrived at
Saargemiind. Of the cavaliy, General Bernis with the 12th
Chasseurs was lefc at Niederbronn to keep up communications
with the 1st Corps, whilst General de la Morti^re, with the
5th Lancers and a battalion of Infantiy, occupied Rohrbach.
A squadron of the dth Hussars was attached to each of the
infantry Divisions ; the remainder of the cavalry moved to
Saargemlind.

Tlie 1st Corps detached Baoult's Division to Hagenau ; Septeuil
sent the 11th Chasseurs to the same place and the Srd Hussai^s
to Sulz ; the 2nd Lancers moved to Hatten, and the remainder of
Duhesme's Division bivouacked round Brumath.

The Srd Hussars being attached to the 1st Infantry Divi-
sion, the 11th Chasseurs to the 2nd, the 2nd Lancers to the
Srd, and the 10th Dragoons to the 4th Infantry Division, there
only remained the 6th Lancei'S and Michel's Cuirassiers at the
special disposal of tlie commander of the Cavalry Division. The
last cavalry detachments did not, however, amve until the end of
the month.
25th July. On the 25th July, Marshal Le Bceuf left Paris for Metz, where
the chief head-quartei*s were established. On the 27th he tele-
graphed from that place to the Emperor :

" MacMahon's four Divisions must be pretty nearly formed
at Strassburg and Hagenau. The Marshal has consequently a

considerable uiilitaiy force in Lower Alsace. He can call up
Conseil Dumesnil's Division of Douay's CV)rps from Colmar.
But I consider it of great importance that the railway from
Lyons to Strassburg should be well watched. A-s the mobilisa-
tion of the Garde Mobile is only in an elementary stage, this
duty cannot be confided to it."

With a view to giving Marshal Mac^Tahon unrestricted dis-
posal of all the forces in Alsace, General Douay's Corps was placed
under his orders from that date.

Thus the French commanders had taken upon themselves all
the disadvantages which are inseparable from an army taking
the field in an unprepared state, without availing themselves of
the solo advantage which such a proceeding offers — that of an
immediate and unexpected initiative. For ten days entire Aimy
Corps had been standing close to the frontier opposite the Aveak
garrisons of Saarlouis and Saarbrilcken.

We see further, that the original intention of an advance into
South Germany was wavering even at this stage. The powerful
magnet of an army " between Coblentz and Mainz " was irresis-
tibly attracting the French arms. We do not see a concentrated
force moving from Metz to the Upper Rhine, but a divided
force drawn piecemeal to the Saar, so that five French corps are
thronged together in the narrow triangle Bouzonville — Sa.arge-
miind — Metz.

The Emperor Napoleon transferred the regency to the Empress
on the 23rd, and issued the proclamation subjoined in Appendix
II., to the French people. Shortly before his departure from Paris Appendix n.
the plan for the oi-ganisation of the Garde Nationale Sedentaire,
and a law for the formation of the Franctireure corps during
the war, had received his approval. The latter corps were to be
employed in the defence of their hearths and homes, and were
only to be called up to the frontier as an exceptional measure.

On the 28th the Emperor entered Metz and decisive mea- 28th July,
sures were now expected. But he must have been very soon
convinced that the condition of the army was in no way suited
for an offensive operation.

Tlie troops intended to take part in the operations had not
attained their full strength ; the 6th and 7th Corps, the 1st and
3rd Reserve Cavalry Divisions, and the Reserve Artillery were
not yet available.

If the infantry battalions are reckoned at 700, the cavalry
regiments at 500 men, the army, inclusive of Canrobert's Corps
and the Reserve Cavalry Divisions, but exclusive of the troops in
Lyons, must have numbered 224,000 infantry and 26,500
cavalry.

Instead of this, the brochure ascribed to the Emperor Napoleon
asserts that the troops at disposal on the Saar at this time
numbered only 100,000 men, that the Corps under McMahon's
orders consisted of 40,000 men, and that Marshal Canrobert had

only two of his Divisions at hand in the camp of ChMons, and
his cavahry and artillery had not yet anived.

Against these figures, which possibly only included the in-
fantry, the strength of the army is reckoned considerably higher
in the quasi official returns of the 29th July, viz. :*

Guard - - - .

l&t Corps - - - .

2nd „ .
3rd „ -
4th „ .
6th „ .
6th „ .

7th „ - . . .

Reserve Cavalry -
„ Engineei'S-

20,500 1

men.

37,000

23,430

35,800

26,000

23,000

29,900

9,900t

4,100

450

210,080 men.

Of those the ftrmy of the left wing

numbered - - - 128,730 men.

Tlie army of the right wing - 46,900 „

Reserves (Canrobert, Reserves of

Cavalry and Engineers) - - 34,450$ „

The Emperor desired to see the rest of the available troops
drawn forward as soon as possible; but it was held in op-
position to him that Paris, Lyons, and Algiers should not be
left unoccupied. The first three battalions of the Qarde Mobile
arrived at the camp of Ch&lons from Paris on the 28thy but for
want of discipline and training they wei'e unfit for immediate
employment.

Not only was the army incomplete, but its internal condition
raised apprehensions from the moment the mobilisation com-
menced ; each day exposed the insufficient preparation and the
defects of the system in a more and more glaring way.

Numerous difficulties arose fii'st in the csdling in of re&ei*ves and
afterwards in their transport. There was a dense accumulation
of men at the different depots, but no means of causing a speedy
outflow of them. Tlie railways, although taxed to the utmost,
could not transport the men either to the depdts or from thence
to the troops. Mistakes in forwarding i-einforcements to regi-
ments on the march were unavoidable, and a great number of
reseiTcs lighted upon places where no one knew the temporary

* The conibutaiiU of all urins apptiar to be included in this return.

f One division only is reckoned, whereas the 7th Corps must have had 2 divisions
on the Upper Khine by this time.

X The same writer (Y.D.) estimates the French army between the 2ud and 6(h of
August at 272,000 men in his order of battle, an increase of strength which, in spite
of the losses, may be explained by the constant arrival of reserves. It agrees per-
fectly with our calculations and with those of Colonel Fay (who puts them at 262,000
at the begining of August), reckoning the 6th Corps in the first-mentioned total and
at the effective it attained on the 13th August.

position of their regiments. All the railway stations and all the
restaurants in the larger towns were thronged, and the War
Ministry was eventually compelled to issue orders for the
Reserves to be collected and forwarded to the nearest depot.

In certain districts where tl)c lines were comi)letely blocked,
the further transport of Reserves was stopped ; for instance,
the commandant of the territorial division at Marseilles
telegraphs :

" 9,000 reserves here ; I do not know what to do with them.
In order to give me room I shall ship tliem all on board the
transports in harbour for Algiers/'

A measure which was no doubt prevented in time !

At this time the Cliief of the Staff found it necessary to inform
the "War Minister, that according to reports received from the
depots the Reserves were in readiness but had no instructions
where to join the field battalions.

In the confusion and liaste with which everything liad to be
pushed on, the Reserves joined the regiments, as ini^jlit be expected,
deficient of their necessary equipment. Many of them were
without cooking utensils, water flasks, and tentes cVahri

In consequence of this, Marshal Le Boeuf, on tlie 27th, made
application to Paris with a. view to preventing the detachments
constantly joining the army insufficiently equipped.

The regimental and corps transport was incomj^lete ; they
were deficient in horses, ambulances, commissariat columns, and
especially in sick-bearers, veterinaiy surgeons, train soldiers
and officials for the administrative branch. !Many of the latter
arrived singly, most of them veiy late, so that some of the
Divisions had none at all at first On the 28th the intendant of
the 1st Corps loported that he could not hoi-se the waggons for
want of men and horses.

It was found that a considerable part of the harness in the
artillery train was of no use, and they were at this juncture
obliged to have recourse to the trade. Some of the ammunition
reserves were not at hand, some were incompletely equipped,
and in some places there was no mitrailleuse equipment wnat-
over.

Large consignments of ma]>s Iiad arrived, but they only com*
prised the German territory. There were none whatever for the
French frontier districts where they were first wanted.

Independently of this internal condition, there were whole
bodies of troops, of whose whereabouts the head-quarter staff
were in ignorance.

The Chief of the Staff was obliged to send the following tele-
gram to General Douay :—

" How far have you progressed witli your formation ? Where
are your Divisions ? The Emperor commands you to hasten
their formation with a view to joining McMahon in Lower
Alsace as quickly as possible."

On the following day General Douay received the following
reply to an application :

" There is no train-division in Metz and no camp equipment
which can be placed at your disposal. You did well to apply
to Paris ; renew your request."

Supplies of food were not even prepared, consequently the men
suffered the greatest inconvenience from the very commence-
ment.

From the 1st of August the magazines at Metz were assigned
to the Corps on the Saar as dep6ts of supply. There were small
stores there of biscuit and bacon, but neither coffee, sugar, rice,
brandy, nor oats. The reserve supplies, even the biscuit, had to
be drawn upon, for there were only 38 bakei*s with the army.
Attempts were made to augment this number from the civil
population, but in vain ; and there was moreover a deficiency of
field ovens. It was the same at Stitis-sburg, where there were
certainly supplies of flour, biscuit, and oats in store ; l>ut no con-
tract for rice, sugar, coffee, and wine was concluded by the local
intendant until the 20th July. This was the fii-st day on which
it was possible to conclude a contract for meat for the whole anny ;
and, moreover, at some places where troops were stationed there
was no money for the purchase of actual necessaries. Comiolaints
and inquiries poured in from all sides. The intendants of the
different Corps endeavoured to remedy the evil by dniwing upon
the supplies of the neighbouring fortresses, but in vain. Answers
were received from Meziferes and Sedan that there was neither
biscuit nor salt meat, and the tenour of the replies from other
sides was to the eame effect. Although circumstances improved
daily in consequence of the aii'ival of convoys, yet by the
28th July the most neccssaiy requirements for offensive opera-
tions were not ready. The difficulties were much increased by
encamping the men for a considerable time close together, for
which aiTangement the system of requisition, employed usually
by the French army to a very considerable extent, was quite
inapplicable.

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the idea
forced itself upon the French generals, that instead of entering
Germany they would have to defend themselves in their own
country.

Attention was now naturally directed to the French fortresses,
and it was found that they also were in the most defective condi-
tion. So confident were the French of an offensive movement
that the fortresses had been comj^letely denuded of troops, and
the garrison of Neu Brisach for instance hardly numbered 50 men
on the 21st July. Fort Mortier, Schlettstadt, LiitzeLstein (Petite
Pierre), and Lichtemberg were just as weakly occupied. In
Straasburg there only remained about 2,000 troops of the line after
the departui'e of the Ist Corps. In Metz the works were neither
revetted nor armed ; even the gorges of the detached forts were
not dosed. When the question of withdrawing the main army

collected at that ])oiut Avns subsequently iikkiIccI, the Commander
of the Engineer Corps, OenernI Cofiinicrcs, asserted in a council
of war that the fortress could not withstand a siege of ]4j days
without an army to support it. The garrison necessary for its
occupation was by no means ready, and at ilic bc[(inning of
August the calling uj) of fourth battalions and dipots was
pressingly demanded.

Diedenhofen (TliionvilK*) had only about 1,000 men at this
period instead of a garrison of 4,000 to 5,000 men, and among
them were about GOO Garde Mc^bilo, 5)0 douaniers, and 300
untrained artillery and cavalry.

Under such circumstances the foitrosses could give no j^rotection
to the army, but on the contrary they would have t<» look to it
for protection, at any rate in the commencement.*"*

The result was that the Emperor Napoleon, on j(»ining the
army on the 2Sth Jul}-, did not iind a single Corps u]> to its full
strength or in a really cfTectivc condition for tlio ileltl. The
different parts of the army, which were intendod for one common
object, were distribuUMl along the line* SiiMck, IVitsch, ITngtman,
Colmar, some 150 miles apart, their rear dt«taebments as far back
as CliAlons and Paris. From such a position manifestly they
could not at once assume a vigorous offensi\c.

But public opinion in France, and more particularly in Paris,
clamoured for conquests, and the Emperor ap]>ears in spite of all
the impediments to have adhered to his offensive i»lnn. This Appendix III
intention is declared in tin* proclamation (.Appendix III.) issued
to the army on tlie 28th.

The project of a lamling on the Gennan recast had not <'ven
been given up. The fleet had iK'en warnetl to pri'pare for the
transport of 30,000 men, anrl the Toulouse l)ivisi<»n as well as the
Marine troojis were kejit in readiness with this object in view ;
the command of these forces was intended i'ov General Trochu or
General Bourbaki.

It was known that the Germans had but a very small force
at Saarbrucken and Saarlouis, the Vlllth Aniij- (Jorps had (»nlj''
come up since the 27th, one of its Divisions in Rt. \Vendel, the
other in Dudweiler, Ottweiler, and Lebach, with a cavahy brigade
pushed forward to reconnoitre ; altogether about 40,000 men.
Strong detachments might be expected from Triei*. and large
bodies of troops were known to be at Jlannheinj, Landau,
and Kastatt.

The Emperor in conserjiience ordered the 2nd, fird, and 5th
Corps under Bazaine to cross the Saar between Saarbrlicken and
Sarrguemund, and the 4th to make a simultaneous demonstration
agaiast Saarlouis ; but the Marshal and tlie other three generals

* Even in such favourably situated fortresses as ^Tetz and Diedcnliofeo, the army
should have taken up a position in front of them. Such a position had already been
reconnoitred in 1867. It stretched from Saargemtind by Cnleultronn as fur as Betting
les 8t Arold, trherc the lef^ ^ >ng had to be covered ufrninst a flanking movement
from Saarlouis by a division at St. Avoid. General FrosFiird is <»f niiinitm tliat
the 2nd, 3rJ, and 4th Corps should have hccn concentrated tiiero, and (lie r>th sent to
Marshal McMahou.

in command declared themselves unanimously of opinion that
this movement could not be carried out, as their troops were
deficient of the necessary supplies of food and equipment. The
enterprise had therefore to be abandoned until the French forces
were ready. Marshal MacMahon was informed that the Emperor
did not expect him to move for a week.

This delay was the more painful from not having any infoima-
tion of what the enemy was doing on the other side of the frontier.
Some days previously one of his detachments had been seen at
Niederbronn. The instructions issued to the French cavalry were
more directed to measures for the safety of their own army than to
far-reaching reconnaissances into the enemy's temtory. There
was a feeling that more should be demanded from this arm,
and a notification was sent to the difierent commanders as
follows :

" Practise your troops in keeping most watchful guard, in
sending out patrols, in reconnaissances, etc. You will soon
have an enemy before you, who from long practice in peace is
skilled in all duties connected with outposts. Let instructions
in these matters be issued in all Corps, and let exemses
of this nature bo practised as much as possible."

Soon after —

" Let your cavaliy be seen ; it should reconnoiti'e far beyond
the line of the Saar ; it must not even avoid passing the
frontier, taking the necessary precautions for safety. The
commanders should send you reports on their reconnaissances.
Make your reports to me."

With a view to doing something, the three Corps furthest
pushed forward on the Saar were to be drawn together more
closely, and by this airangement the subsistence of the troops was
rendered more easy, the railway from Metz being used for the
purpose.
si»t July. On the 31st July the head-quarters of the 2nd CoiTps moved

to Forbach in accordance with this plan ; Laveaucoupet's Division
established itself on the Oetigen plateau forming a second line
to the brigade of Bataille'a Division which was at Spicheren ;
Verge's division occupied the camp at Bening.

The head-quartei-8 of the 8rd Corps, Marshal Bazaine, moved to
St Avoid, one Division remaining in Boucheponv, the other moving
to St Avoid, Haut-Hombourg and Ham-Bous-Varaberg.

In the 4th Corps, the head-quarters and a Division took up
their position in IJoulay ; a second Division came to Bouzonville
whilst the first (Cissey) advanced to Sierck in order to cover
the left flank of the army. Tlie Guard and the 5th Corps
remained in their position round Metz and near SaargemUud.

At the same time the 3rd Division of Reserve Cavalry (Forton)
was ordered to advance fi'om Pont-i-Mousson to Faulquemont,
but the order had to be revoked as the Division was not in a
position to march.

The position of the whole army on the 31st July is indicated
on Sketch 1. Sketch l.

The conclusions which the French had drawn from the enemy's
movements had been somewhat substantiated by late reports. It
was known that the Vllth and Vlllth Prussian Corps, under the
command of General Steinraetz, were on the point of uniting
behind the Saar. Their columns were approaching Saarlouis and
Saarbriicken. Besides this, regiments of the Ilird and IXth
Corps, wliich were to form part of the army of Prince Frederick
Charles, were signalled on the march from Mainz to Kaiserslau-
tern. It was also rumoui*ed that the enemy was making prepara-
tions to assume the offensive, and that infantry detachments had
crossed the river below Saarbriicken in some force, and were
seen by the French reconnoitring parties near Geislautern and
Ludweiler.

But their information as to the precise composition of the
German military forces was far from complete.

Incapable of assuming the offensive and yet unwilling to give
it up, uie French had recourse to the half measure of a recon-
naissance in force against Saarbrucken. They hoped, by occupy-
ing the hills on the left bank of the Saar, to compel tbe enemy to
deploy his force and show his intentions.

The enterprise was entrusted to Marshal Bazaine, the 2nd and
5th Corps, in addition to his own, being placed at bis disposal.

In a conference held on the 31st with the two generals in
command, the Marshal directed the 2nd Corps to advance
against Saarbrucken, the operation being supported by the
advance of a Division of the 3rd Coi^ps on Wehrden, and of a
Division of the 5th Corps from Saargemiind. The 2nd August
was fixed for carrying out the project.

With this object in view, General Frossard advanced Verge's
Division nearer to Forbach, where it encamped on both sides of
the main road to the west of the town. In the event of his
bridge train not being ready, that of the 3rd Corps was placed
at his disposal. This, however, had to be first brought up from
Metz by railway to Forbach. It was to be horsed by the reserve
horses of the artillery of the 3rd Corps, or if these were not
within reach, by those of the 2nd Corps, or " by any other teams
which might be at hand."

3998S. C

The German Armies. — Plan of Operations and Movements

TO the 31st July.

The excitement which pulsated throughout France left no
doubt in tlie mind of the Prussian Government that every
outwardly visible prepamtion against the danger of war must
inevitably bring about war itself.

It was known that for a long time great activity had prevailed
in the French War Ministry, that prcpjirations for railway trans-

1)ort had been made, and that considerable stores of foi-age had
)een collected. Hoi^ses which had been cast were restored to the
ranks of the aitillery ; tran.si)orts were equipped in the harbours ;
the Algerian troops were held in readiness to maicli ; but up to
the 15th July no proper mobilisation of the aiuny had been
commenced.

With the Germans all partial measures, even to the aniia-
ment of the fix)ntier fortresses, were in abeyance. We wished to
prepare eiOter completely or iiot at all, and were confident that
with the order which prevailed in all the military departments
we should not be behindhand.

It was only when we became certain, from information which
reached us on the 15 th July, tliat the French Reserves and Garde
Mobile had actuall}*^ been called in, and that the fleet was to be
equipped in the poiis, that the order for mobilising the whole
Noi*th German army was issued on the night of the 15th-16th.

But Prussia, and the States united with her in the Noi-th Ger-
man Confedcratiou, were not to stand alone in the impending
Btrucfgle.

The danger, with which all Germany was threatened by the
proceedings of its old sworn enemy, was thoroughly appreciated on
all sides, from the very moment that France, after the retirement
of the llohenzoUern Prince, declared that the affair was not yet
settled.

In thu Bavarian Chambers anoL inconsiderable minority wished
at first to gi*ant the necessary credit, solely " for the maintenance
of armed neutrality," but general opinion in the country did
not share this *'partic\darism." The noble-minded King Louis
and his ministers were foremost iu their support of the noith.
The monarch expresjsed his views at the opening of the Assembly
as follows : —

'* True to the treaties of alliance to which I have pledged my
royal word, I shall join with my i)owerful ally for the honour of
Germany, and through her for the honour of Bavaria, if duty

demands it."

The order for mobilisation was also promulgated in that country
on the IGth, the tii-st day of mobilisation was appointed for the
I7th, and on the 19th the army was placed under the orders of
King William.

King Charles of Wurtcniberg hastening back from St. l[auricc
reached Stuttgai^d on the 17th, and forthwith issued orders for
mobilisation. On the 21st the Ministiy declared to the Chamber
" that they considered the integi'ity of German}' threatened, and
that it was necessary to unite with Prussia/*

The prevailing feeling in Germany left no doubt as to the
result.

It was no less the case in the Gitmd Duchj^ of Baden, where
the effoi*ts of the Prince to establish German unity had for a
long time met with a most joyous response from the people.
Mobilisation was ordered on the night of the 15th-16th, and
on the 22nd an official declaration was made by the Grand Ducal
Qoveiimient that in consequence of their alliance with Piiissia,
and the French declaration of war, they considered themselves
at war with Fiunce.

The militaiy relations of the Grand Duchy of Hesse Daimstadt
with North Germany were fiimly established by A'iifcue of a
special convention. The mobilisation promulgated by the King
of PiTissia included also the troops of the Grand iJucby, and met
with prompt acquiescence.

Thus all Germany united in taking up aims, from the fii-st
moment that danger threatened, as she had never done before.
The German Diets showed the utmost willingness to gitmt the
necessary money for the conduct of operations on a large scale.

On the 19th July, the anniversary of the deatli of the Queen,
who will never be forgotten as the participator in all the soitows
which Pmssia suffered at the hands of Franco in times gone by,
on the day that the old enemy once more hurled the war manifesto
against us (the first official act whilst the question was pending),
the Reichstag of the North German Confederation had an extra-
ordinaiy sitting and gi-anted 120,000,000 of thnlei-s. Until this
money could be available, the Prussian '* lleiclis-schatz " * of
30,000,000 would have to suffice, inclusive of any assistance
which South Geiinany might require.

In the same way the reinesentatives of the people placed the
following sums at disposal : — Bavaria, 18,200,000 ; Wiirtemberg,
5,900,000 ; Baden, 6,287,000 ; Ilosse, :3,37G,000 florins.

Although war had burst upon tliem unexpectedly, the German
annies were not taken by surprise. The experiences of the cam-
paign of 18G6 had not been wasted upon any of the Powers
engaged in that war, and tlic active effoiis put forth on all sides
had in many cases led to iinjuovemeiits, and in sonic cases to
new organisations.

Ever since that war tlie North German military organisation
had been established on an uniform principle by the exertions
of the Prussian War Ministry, on the basis of tbc constitu-
tion and the special conventions which Prussia had concluded
with all the Federal states except Brunswick. The acquisition of

* A war-fund always kept ready in coin, and applicable to no other purpose than
that of meeting the expenses of mobilising the German army. — Tr.

c 2

Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein, Electoral Hesse, Nassau and
Frankfort, as well as the amalgamation of the smaller Federal
contingents with the Prussian army, had produced a reinforcement
of 21 regiments of infantry, 3 rifle battalions, 17 regiments of
cavalry, 3 regiments of field artillery and 3 divisions of garrison
artillery, besides 3 battalions of pioneei*s and 3 battalions of
train.

The IXth, Xth, and Xlth Prussian Army Corps were newly
formed in consequence, and the independent contingents of the
two Mecklenburgs and Brunswick (3 regiments of infantry,
1 battalion of rifles, 3 regiments of cavalry and 5 batteries) were
incorporated with them.

The Royal Saxon army, organised by its own War Ministry on
the Prussian model, was added to the North German army as the
Xllth Army Corps, and the whole contingent of the Grand Duchy
of Hesse also became the 25th Division by virtue of a special
convention.

Changes had also been introduced in the different arms. The
peace strength of all regiments of cavalry had been augmented to
5 squadrons, one of which was to remain at home as a dep6t
squadron on mobilisation. The artillery had been equipped
throughout with rifled guns, and at the outbreak of the war an
essential improvement in the needle rifle had been commenced,
but this of course had to be set aside for the present.

Fortifications were thi*own up at several threatened points for
the pit)tection of the coasts, improved guns of the heaviest calibre
were constructed, and arrangements made for laying down
'torpedoes.

All the anttngements provisionally introduced in the reorgani-
sation of the army since 1859 had been legally sanctioned by the
Army Bill of 9th November 1867.

In anticipation of this becoming law, and with a view to
canying it into effect, the organisation of the Reserves and Land-
wehr had been fixed by the Regulations of the 5th September
1867 and the 4th July 1868, and new orders had been issued
83 to the control over those on furlough.

In dividing the Federal territory into Landwchr districts, those
of the old Prussian provinces had been adapted to the new orga-
nisation of the army, as well as to the changes which they had
undergone, both as regards population and commerce.

The number of Ltmdwenr battalions in Prussia, which had
hitherto been 116, was increased to 216.* At the same time
the recruiting within the Confederation was regulated on a
uniform plan by the Military-Ersatz instructions of the 26th
March 1868.

A new plan for the mobilisation of the army of the North
German Confederation and its fonnation for war had been

* According to the plan of mobiUsation for 1870, only 166 could be placed in
the field, at Uiere was itill a want of trained men in the diftricti of the newly formed
AxBkj Corpf .

arranged by the War Ministry and the Chief of the Staff in
accordance with the altered peace organisation and the experience
gained in 1866. Material improvements, especially in point of
rapidity, were the result.

Experiences of the war in Germany had led to changes in
other branches of army organisation and administration. Among
others, the " Etappen '* service more particularly was completely
reorganised ; the services connected with hospitals and attendance
on tJie sick in war were newly arranged in harmony with it, and
improvements were introduced in the railway and telcgi*aph
seiidces, as well as in the commissariat.

Especial attention had been devoted to tactical mattei's. The
labours of the General Staff on the subject had received the royal
sanction in 1869. These chiefly referred to the aiTangements for
a new order of march and to regulations for the employment
of cavalry and artillery in accordance with the requirements
of modem war&re.

The organisation and foimatlon of the military forces of Ba- BaTarian
varia had been modelled on the type of those of the North orgwiMation.
German Confederation. The Bill of 30th January 18G8 intro-
duced a military constitution analogous to the Army Bill, including
the liability to personal service, the institution of the Landwehr
and of the one-year volunteers. Subsequent orders laid down the
details on these subjects. The points of difference were tliat the
duration of service in the Resei*ve was reduced to three years,
and for financial reasons the time of service with the colours in
the infantiy was but sliglitly increased, so that on an average it
barely reached 1^ years.

The Infantry had adopted a new formation by decreasing the
number of companies from six to four, thus giving the latter a
larger establishment. The drill was altered to suit this change,
due consideration being at the same time given to the experience
gained in war and the enhanced efiect of fire. The number of
rifle battalions was increased by two.

Tlie old Podewil rifle had been transformed into a breech-
loader in 1867 ; and although the improved Werder rifle was
adopted in 1869, only 4 battalions (rifles) were armed with it at
the outbreak of the war.

In the Cavalry, one cuirassier and one lancer regiment were
reduced, the remaining 10 regiments receiving an increased
establishment of horses (125 per squadron) ; regiments were
formed, as in Prussia, into 5 insti^jul of 4 squadrons.

In the Artillery the batteries were formed of C rifled guns ;
14 new batteries were raised, and a uniform distribution of the
4 regiments into 8 field, 4 garrison, and 1 park batteries was
resolved upon. In addition, 2 artillery regiments were combined
into a bri^stde.

The regiment of Engineei^s received an augmentation of two
companies, and these six field engineer companies were formed
into two divisions of three companies each.

From the 1st February 1869, the title of " General Command *'
was no longer applied to the foi£r Divisions, and '^ General

Commands," (i.e.. Corps commands. — Tr.), on the Prussian plan«
were formed at Munich and Wurzburg.

The mobilisation and war formation were regulated on similar
principles to those obtaining in North Qermany, and the organi-
sation of field, dep6t and garrison troops, as well as the pre-
paration of all the necessary personnel and mat&iel were to
DC conducted for the future in the same way. The only important
differences lay in the organisation of the train.

The country was divided into 32 Landwehr districts. The
regulations on this subject had not been in force a sufficient time
to obtain the requisite number of drilled men and non-com-
missioned officers, and they had to be satisfied for the present
with forming 16 Landwehr battalions, one for every two districts.

The regulations for the Fi-ussian " Etappen " service were
adopted without any change in Bavaria.

A railway and a telegi*aph division were to be raised if required
from the engineer regiment, and the preliminaries for the forma-
tion of a railway transport service were also arranged.
Wiirtemberg In Wiirtemberg they had decided, immediately after the
organiMtion. campaign of 1866, to raise their Division up to the strength

of an Army Corps ; but from financial considerations this could
only be done by giving the infantiy a militia-like trainhig
and by an excessive reduction of the time of service of the
other aims with the colours. Tliis plan was therefore allowed
to fall to the ground in the spring of 1867, and the preference
given to a smaller but for that reason more substantial force.
The formation and strength of the tactical units were to be
assimilated as much as possible to those of the North Geiman
army.

The infantry and rifle battalions were accordingly reduced
from five to four companies with an increased peace and war
establishment. A Landwehr battalion "permanent staff" was
formed for each infantry regiment.

In the cavalry the 5th squadron was disbanded ; the remaining
16 squadrons were bix)ught up to a strength of 119 horses, the
intention being that the 10 squadrons fii*st taking the field should
be completed in horses &om those remaining behind.

For the artillery, the organisation contemplated before 18GG
was adopted. The battalion of garrison artillery gave up its
teams to the regiment of field artiller}^ and was itself increased
by one batteiy. The regiment of field artillery was formed into
9 semi-mounted field batteries* of 4 guns in peace, 6 in war ;
the number of depot batteries and ammunition columns was in-
creased to 3 each. The technical artillery (arsenal) formed
another company.

The cadres of the pioneer companies were increased so as to
allow of the fon nation of a company of garrison engineers on
mobilisation.

In the train division the cadres were doubled.

* i.e., with a larger establishment of horses than field, but less than horse artil-
ery.— Tr.

' The infantry, rifles, and cavalry received the Prussian needle
gun, the whole of the artillery rifled guns. Important improve-
ments were introduced in the harness and saddlery.

The Prussian Drill, with the exception of certain modifications
necessitated by differences in equipment, was introduced in all
branches of the service. Part of the Service Regulations were
based on those obtaining in Prussia.

The superintendence of milit<ary duty and of the training of
the troops was transferred in 18G8 from the War Ministry to the
Corps Commander.

All these innovations were based on an Axmy Bill of the same
year passed by the deputies, which fixed the obligation for service
with the colours for all arms, except the cavalry, at two years ;
but which in its other features did not differ much from the law
prevailing in Prussia.

On the other hand, the Prussian '^ Ersatz Instructions " did not
receive the consent of the Giambers, and had therefore to be
replaced by other regulations.

At length a plan of mobilisation for infantry, cavalry, pioneers,
and other branches of the service was drawn up similoi* to the
one which had obtained with the artillery and train for some
years ; but for want of officei^s provision could only be made for
i instead of 8 Landwehr battalions.

In tbe Grand Duchy of Baden the Prussian anny institutions Baden organi-
liad been most thoroughly introduced. sation.

On the promulgation of th(3 now Army Dill ou the 1 2Ui Febru-
ary 18G8, the Prussian regulations anil orders, with haidly any
alteration, came in rapid sequence into use for all branches of the
.service, and a special Mobilisation Instruction, based on the plan of
mobilisation of the North German Federal army, was projected.

The Baden contingent had been increased in time of peace by
5 battalions, 3 squadrons, 3 field batteries, 1 garrison artillery
company, and 1 pioneer company.

The country was also divided into 10 Landwehr districts, which
in 1870 furnished 6 Landwehr battalions of 602 men each. The
needle rifle was introduced, and at the same time the artillery
was armed throughout with the Prussian breech-loading gun.

It was to these exertions on the part of the allied »Statcs that
Germany was indebted for the placing in the field of a force
which in point of strength and uniform training had never been
equalled by any other nation.

The total number of men maintained in peace shows an effective Strength and
strength inclusive of non-combatants of 382,568 men, exclusive ^^c^b^
of the superior staffs, seconded officers, Landwehr cadres, and German anny.
special formations. On the other hand this number was diminished
somewhat by men on furlough and temporaiy deficiencies.

Of this number there belonged to, —

North Germany - . - - 304,413 men.

Bavaria 60,068 „

Wiirtemberg - - - - 14,124 „
Baden 13,963 „

^ The mobilisation ordered in Berlin on the 15th July included
the whole Norili German Federal army, the I6th July being
fixed as the first day of mobilisation. To the 13 Army Corps, of
which the field army consisted, were added 4 Landwehr Divisions,
formed of mobilised Landwehr and Reserve troops at the following
places : —

Guard Landwehr Division at Berlin.
The 1st (Pomeranian) Landwehr Division at Stettin.
The 2nd (Brandenburg) „ „ at Berlin.

The 3rd (mixed) „ „ at Posen.

The Brandenburg numbered IG, the othera 12 battalions each, all
of 802 men ; each Division was augmented by 1 1'eserve cavalry
regiment, 3 reserve batteries, and 1 garrison pioneer company.

The I7th Infantry Division which had to be detained tem-
porarily for covering Schleswig-Holstein, was removed fix)m its
position in the IXth Army Coq)s, and replaced by the 25th
Division, thus departing from the peace organisation.

In addition, those regiments of cavalry which were not
attached to Infantry Divisions were ordered to be formed into
independent Cavalry Divisions. The Guard Coqos and the
Xllth (Royal Saxon) Army Corps, which had cavalry Divisions
on their peace establishments, as well as the cavalry of the 17th
and 25th Divisions, remained exceptions to this an*angenient.

The formation of the new cavalry Divisions could however only
proceed after the different regiments had been transported to the
main points of assembly.

The head-quarter guard of His Majesty the King was composed
of men from the '* instructional infantry battalion," and the
*' military riding school"

Besides these the following services were formed, the greater
part at once : —

7 Field telcgi-aph divisions.
5 Etappen telegraph divisions.
5 Field railway divisions.
5 Reserve ammunition depots, and
21 Reserve ammunition columns.

In addition to the establishment of depot divisions included in
the mobilisation of the line troops, all the garrison troops were
formed according to the plan of mobilisation ; the companies of
gaiTison artillery and of pioneera at the secmul aivffnientation.^

The fortresses of Saarlouis, Mainz, Coblenz, Coin, Wesel,
Minden, the fortifications of Sonderburg-Diippel, the tempo-
rary works on the lower Elbe as well as the detached foils of
Magdeburg were ordered to be armed agains a coxip-de-main.

* The second augmentation comprises the older onniial draughts of Landwehr not
mobilised at the outbreak of the war, and th« Ersatz Reserve. — Tr.

Eight infantry regiments, part of which were on the spot
were at once ordered to garrison the following fortresses : —

Mainz : the 19th, 30th, and 81st Infantry regiments.
Saarlouis : the 70th Infantry Regiment.
C!oblenz : the 68th „ „

Coin : the 65th ,, „

Rastatt : the 34!th Fusilier Regiment.
Sonderburg-Diippel : the 25th Infantry Regiment,

The 23rd Infantry Regiment had jbeen divided between the
fortresses of Neisse and Qlatz in the first instance, but w&s
in the coui-se of a few days ordered to join its own corps in the
field

In nearly eveiy case the troops attained their proper esta-
blishment of effectives witli unimportant exceptions, and in some
of the Landweln- battalions, especially in the western provinces,
the numbers were fai* in excess.

After mobilisation the military forces of the North German strength of

Confederation (including Hesse) stood as follows : — North Gennan

iinnj.

(1.) Field Abut.

396 battalions of infantry and rifles (of which 52 were

Landwehi').
320 squadrons (of which 16 were reserve).
214 batteries (of which 12 were reserve) with 1,284

guns.
44 pioneer companies (of which 4 wei-e garrison).

From the above must be deducted those left tempomrily at home
(the 17th and 4 Landwehr Divisions), viz. : —

65 battalions.

28 squadrons.

18 batteries with 108 guns.
5 pioneer companies.

(2.) Garrison TROOPa

138 battalions (among which were 24 field battalions
of the line).

48 squadrons.

27 field batteries with 162 guns.
173 ganison artillery companies.

29 pioneer companies.

Of these troops, 23 squadrons, 10 batteries, and 7 pioneer
companies were not told off to gaiTison any foiiress, and were
consequently available for any service.

(3.) Depot Troops.
118 battalions.
18 rifle companies.
76 squadrons.

41 field batteries with 246 guas.
13 pioneer companies.

Oonsequently the field army, exclusive of the staff, offioerSi &e«
amounted in round numhers to —

385,600 infantry, 48,000 cavalry, and 1,284 gun&

The garrison troops amounted to—

115,200 infantry,^ 7>200 cavaby, 34,600 garrison artillery,
162 horsed guna

Finally the dep6t troops consisted of 122,500 infiGmtry, 16,200
cavalry, and 246 horsed guns.

The strength of this military force, inclusive of non-combatants,
amounted, taking the average of the effectives in August 1870,
to 982,064 men, with 209,403 horses, which numbers were dis-
tributed as follows : firstly, Prussia and the smaUer Federal
states under her administration ; and secondly, the States having
an independent administration :

Prussia, &c. - - 888,254 men, 187,537 horses.

Saxony - - 59,428 « 18,989 „

Mecklenburg - - 12,109 „ 2,646 „

Hesse - - - 22,278 „ 6,231 „

Total - 982,064 „ 209,408 „

Fkepantioitf, In Bavaria both army coq)s were placed on* a war footing;
ac,of BuTR- the garrison and reserve troops were formed in accordance with
anny. ^j^^ pj^^^ ^£ mobilisation, as well as the following : —

1 Railway engineer company.

1 Eta])pen telegi-aph division.t

2 Reserve ammunition depots.

Tlie under-mentioned line troops remained behind to ganison
the fortresses : —

Qermersheim : 4 battalions (4th and 8th Regiments — two

each) ;
Landau : 2 battalions (4th and 8th Regiments — one each) ;
Ulm : the 3rd battalion of the 12th Regiment ;
IngoLstadt : the 3rd battalion of the 13th Regiment.

Landau, Germersheim, Ulm (right bank) and Ingoldstadt were
ordered to receive their first armament when the mobilisation
took place.

By the 25th July and the 1st August, the two first fortresses
were respectively in a state to withstand a coup de maiai ; in
the course of a few days the batteries, &c. were completed, and
the provisioning was also in a very advanced stage.

The same haste did not appear necessaiy for Ulm and Ingol*
stadt, and, from the course which the operations took, the works
at those places were very shortly discontinued.

* According to the << Establishments," which, howerer, were exceeded eren dnriiig
the mobilisation,
t One field telegraph division was added to each division of Field Enghieers.

The total of the Bavarian field army amounted to —

50 battalions of in&ntiy and rifles ;
40 squadrons ;

32 batteries (192 guns); and
6 companies of engineers.

In round numbers 60,000 infantry, 6,500 cavah'y* and 192
guns.

The gan-ison troops consisted of —

24 battalions (among them 8 battalions of the line) ;

1 squadron ;

16 garrison batteries ;

4 garrison engineer companies (one mobilised for the
Etappen service).

They numbered altogether 18,400 infantry, f 90 cavalry, and
3,800 garrison artillerymen.

The depot troops :

16 battalions;
10 rifle companies ;
10 squadrons ;
8 batteries (3 horsed guns in each) ;

2 engineer companies ;

giving a combatant force, in round numbers, of 20,400 infantry |
and 1,800 cavalry and 24 guns (horsed).

The efiective of all these troops including non-combatants,
consequently the number of troops h^ougkt into the field by
Bavaria, may be estimated, taking the average calculation for
the month of August, at —

128,964 men and
24,066 horses.

In Wuiliemberg also the l7th of August was the first day of Wflrtcmberg
mobilisation, and on that day orders were issued for the arma- **""^*
ment of Ulra (left bank).

In accordance with the plan of mobilisation the troops were
])laced on the war footing in their garrisons, where the ammu-
nition columns, reserve and depot divisions, which are not kept
up in time of peace, were also formed.

The depdt troops formed of the War Reserve and the drilled
Ersatz-Reserve, were intended to serve partly as garrisons, partly
to complete the ranks of the field army in men and horses.

The depots of the infantry regiments, rifle battalions, and
mounted regiments, as well as those of the regiments of field
artillery and pioneer- corps, were at first only cadres, but subse-
quently, by embodying recruits, they were extended into com-
panies, squadrons, and batteries.

* The squadrons were not as strong as in Prussia.

t The Landwehr battalions are here calculated at 650 men ; they were sabseqnentlj
819 strong.

X This establishment of depot infantry was larger than in Prussia, and moreover
was soon exceeded.

Of special formations, finally, a field telegraph division, not
induded in the plan of mobilisation, was formed ; two sections
of the ammunition-depot company wei'e subsequently mobilised.

The following troops were originally intended for ganisoning
the fortress of Ulm : —

4 battalions of the line (the 4th and Gth InfSetntry
Regiments) formed into a brigade ;

1 battalion of garrison artillerj' of 4 batteries ;

1 company of engineers ;

1 of the 6 dep6t squadrons ;

1 of the 3 depot batteries.
Buteventually the line battalions were replaced by two Landwehr
dep6t battalions.

The whole force of the Wui-temberg troops, taking the avemge
of the month of August, amounted to :

37,180 men and
8,876 horses.

The Field Division consisted of :

15 battalions of infantry and rifles ;
10 squadrons ;

9 batteries with 54 giins ;

2 pioneer companies ;

which gives a combatant force of 15,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry,
and 64 guns. They were perfectly i*eady to march on the tenth
day of mobilisation. The cavalry had been already moved to the
Bhine on the fifth day.

The following garrison and depot troops were left at home :

8 battalions (including 4 line battalions) ;
6 squadrons ;

3 batteries with 12 guns, horsed ;

4 garrison batteries ;
1 engineer company ;

1 pioneer depot division, as well as a depot of each
regiment, &c.

These troops numbered, until the depots were foimed into
regular i*egiments, a combatant force of 8,000 infantry, 900
cavalry, 900 garrison artillery, and 12 guns*
Baden army. The Grand Duchy of Baden, which from its geogi-aphical posi-
tion was chiefly threatened, saw the necessity, on the 15th
July, of taking preliminary measures for the defence of the
country. Orders for the compulsory requisition of 4,479 re-
mounts were issued on this day, as well as for calling in the men
on permanent and summer furlough.

On the same night (15th-l(jth July) that the mobilisation of
the troops was decreed, Bastatt was ordered to be completely
armed.

* The 4 Landwehr depot tiattalioDS were very soon in cooflidenble excess of their
estahUshments.

The 6th Infantry Regiment and the two fusilier battalions
of the 4th Regiment were at first left to gaiTison Rastatt, but
the following troops were moving to the fortress; four Land-
wehr battalions, Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6 (C02 men each), formed into
a regiment ; a garrison squadron, partlj' formed from line troops
and partly from the Ersatz ; the garrison artillery battalion, and
a garrison pioneer company.

On the 4th August the 1st Landwehr battalion had been moved
to Maxau, tlie 2nd to Mannheim and Carlsruhe.

The strength of the whole troops, inclusive of non-combatants,
when the mobilisation was completed, amounted to 35,181 men
and 8,038 horses.

The Field Division consisted of :
13 battalions;*
12 squadrons ;
9 batteries with 54 guns ;
1 pioneer company ;
or 11,700 infantry, 1,800 cavalry, and 64 guns.

The following remained behind as garrison troops :
11 battalions (including 5 line battalions) ;
1 squadron;
9 garrison artillery companies (including a horsed

battery of 6 guns) ;
1 garrison pioneer company ;
or 8,600 infanti7, 100 cavahy, 1,200 garrison artillery, and 6 guns.

Finally, the depot troops consisted of :
6 infantry-depfit-detachments ;
3 depdt squadrons ;
2 depot batteries with 12 guns ;
1 pioneer detachment ;

giving a total combatant force of 4,400 infantry, 600 cavalry,
and 12 guns. These last divisions were cantoned in the valley of
the Tauber between Tauberbischofsheim and Qerlachsheim.

The following " Recapitulation " indicates the numbers of all Recapitulation,
the forces of united Germany which were brought into the field :

Field Aumy.

Tnoops.

COMDATANTS.

i
i

•

(2*

214

32
9
9

6
2

Infantry

Cavalry.

Guns.

Men. Men.

(1.) Nortli German Confederation *
(inclading Hesse).

(2.) Bayaria

(8.) Wmtcmborg . - • -
(4.) Baden

396

50
15
18

474

320

40
10
12

385,600

50,000
15,000
11,700

48,000

5,500
1,500
1,800

1,284

192
54
54

Total ...

882

264

462,800

56,800

1,584

*The liaebattalioDf took the field 900 Btrongi those In garrison consitted of 1,000 men.

GaBBISOH AMD DlPdT Tboofs.*

Tmon.

Man.

Ki^

Men.

i£.

HUM

ituoo

,ISS

njtat

lot

ill

,;'

»s

MM
m

■i

_•

1JW

Total ■ •

■"

lul

101

Bli

ta7jM

EUOO

4WM

«■

En-ECTivc STBBNotn (iacludiag non^combaUnts) in Acqust.

—

Uen.

B<^

(1.) Horth aenuD Coiiftdcnti<» ■

(1.) Btrarim .....

(8.) Wnrtemlnirg- . . . .

88S,0«4
1«,9M
87,180

3s,iei

209,408
M,OSS
8^78
8,088

Total of Qcttoui MUimr »ot«- -

I.ISS^S

150,878

B^m»w« ^1 ) including 63 ItaAwtbx battalioiu, 18 BcMrre iqiiadToni, IS ReMrre
bMtariM, ukd 4 QanisOD piooecr eompuilM.— <>.) Hie Mreiigth of the guriMii
and depAt troop* i* here c«laal*t«d ueordiog to the estabUihmenti. Thttt wttt,
bowerer, conrideikbly exceeded in tome of the Pnmtan L«nd«ehr battalioni, in
the BaTarian dep6t and the WurtembuTK lAadwehr dep(t tuttalioni. (3.) In-
cloding 94 liae boltalioni. (4.) InclndiaK 8 line batttUotu. <S.) Inclading 4
line hctuliou . (6.) Inelodbg 5 line battallont.

Wo have still to speak of the maritime forces which Prussia
bod at her t^poaat for the defence of the Qerman coasta.
The men-of.war consisted of :

3 iron-clad fiigates ;
2 iron-clad vessels ;
6 spar-decked and

4 flush-decked corvettes;
1 ship of the line ;

5 despatch boats ;
S sailing frigates ;
4 sailing brigs ;

the royal yacht " Grille ;"
nutking a total of 26 ships. Besides these there vere —
8 gun boats of the Ist, and
14 gun boats of the 2nd class.

Fart of these vessels could not, however, be counted upon for
a naval engagement ; viz., the sailing sliips, the " Renown " (a
ship of the line stationed at Kiel and used as an artillery and
guard-ship), 2 spar-decked and 2 flush-decked corvettes, 1 des-
patch boat, and 1 gun boat of the 1st class ; the last six partly
on account of their undergoing repairs and, for the first few
weeks,ypartly for want of men.

Consequently there remained but 12 large men-of-war and 21
gun boats fit for service, and of these 3 coivettes and 1 gun
boat of the 1st class being on foreign service could not effect their
junction with the home naval forces before the outbreak of
hostilities.

The navy numbered 6,204 men : this force, inclusive of officers,
cadets, deck-officers, and non-combatants, consisted of—
The naval division - - . 3,923 men

The dockyard division (machinists and

artificers) - - - -918,,

The marine battalion (of five companies) - 905 „
And the marine artillery (1 division of

three companies) ... 453 „

Total . 6,204 „

Of the 12,940 men belonging to the reserve, there were 0,105
absent, leaving only 6,835 men immediately available.

The preparation of the naval forces for war required longer
time than the mobilisation of the land army, as the i*eserves had
to be embodied and the vessels equipped.

In addition to this, the necessary orders about coast defence
had to be issued.

Owing to the tedious process of calling in the reserves, the
whole fleet could not be expected to be ready for three or four
weeks.

Five hundred sailors, who had completed their service, having
been called in on the 15th July, a Boyal Cabinet Order was
iasued on the 16th ordering the navy to be placed in com-
mission 'and the marine battalion and [marine artillery to be
mobilised.

In accordance therewith, the calling in of the reserves and
" Seewehr " of the dockyard division and of the marine forces
was ordered on the 16th, and on the 18th all the reserves who
had served, the pilots and the two youngest yearly levies of
the '* Seewehr " were embodied with the naval division. Laatlyy
on the 27th July, the calling in was extended to the sailors of
all the yearly levies, as well as to all those liable to service
with the fleet as far back as those born in 1842.

Kiel was appointed the place of assembly for the reserves. As,
however, this harbour was not well suited as a central position in
consequence of its being badly situated as regards communication
with the interior of the country and the other coast fortresses,

interruptions were unavoidable, and in consequence the reserves
in some of the Corps were not present on the 30th July.

By an order of 19 th July, the marine battalion depot company
was, at the beginning of August, amalgamated with the reserve
maiine battalion then in process of foimation.

The Maiine Artillery foraied 6 companies of 251 men each, of
which 4 were stationed in Friedrichsort and 2 in Wilhelmshaven.
On the 4th August they were ordered to be further augmented by
the formation of 3 reserve companies of 148 men each. Officers
and men of the Landwehr artillery, from the districts of the
Vllth and Vlllth Army Corps, were brought in to complete the
establishment.

Thus, on the 31st July the strength of the navy amounted to
10,382 men, as follows:

Naval division ------ 5,824

Dockyard division ------ 1,41 1

Marine battalion (including the depot company
and the reserve marine battalion in process
of formation) --.--- 1,998
Marine artilleiy ------ 1,149

Total - 10,382

In addition to these preparations a Eoyal Cabinet Order was
promulgated on the 24th July, ctilling upon the public to form
a " Volunteer Seewehr " for the offensive torpedo service. There
were 322 men employed in this service in August.

The ships were placed in commission by the Naval Ministry
in concert with the Commander-in-Chief of the navy.

Of the ships fit for active service, the following were already in
commission by the middle of July : — *

The iron clad frigates " Konig Wilhclm " '* Kronprinz " and
" Friedrich Carl," and the ironclad " Frinz Adalbert," forming
a squadron under the command of Prince Adalbert, which was
intended to cruise in the Atlantic, practice sea manoeuvres, and
test the sea-going qualities of iron-clad ships ; furtlier, there were
4 gun boats on harbour and coast service.

The orders now issued included the placing in commission of,
the iron-clad ship " Arminius," the two corvettes " Elisabeth "
and " Nymphe," the royal yacht ** Grille,'* and the remaining 20
gun boats.

In addition, several vessels of the commercial marine were
hired or purchased in the Weserand Elbe, as well as at Kiel and
Stettin, for reconnoitring and other purposes.
Appendix IV. '^^^ entire available naval force is shown in Appendix IV.

The necessary orders for coast defence were at first issued by
the War Ministry, but after the 18th July by the newly formed
" Government General of the coasts.''

All lightships, buoys, &c were removed from those waters

where there was any approliension of a descent, and a coast-guard
service established.

At the same time arrangements were made for placing obstruc-
tions in the channels, with batteries to defend them ; temporary
fortifications were also thrown up, in which the troops could offer
resistance in the event of the enemy effecting a landing.

The two war harbours at Wilhclmshaven and Kiel were never
less prepared for war than in July 1870.

Wilhelmshaven was in process of creation ; the ramparts
were incomplete, not a gun was mounted, and the port could not
be efficiently closed before the 3 1st July. Tlie protection of the
liarbour, in the first instiinco, devolved upon the North Sea
squadron assembled there. For the interior defence of the Jade
district 6 coast batteries were in course of construction, with
works on the land side to protect them in rear.

The fortifications at the entrance to the bay of Kiel were being
entirely rebuilt.

Yet by the 19th July the entrenchments at Moltenort and
Jagerberg at the mouth of the harbour were completely armed, and
on the 5 th August tiie whole of the batteries were ready to open
fire.

It was further necessary to protect those points of the coast
at the mouth of rivers and other harbours, wliich were acceasible
to the enemy's ships, with obstructions and coast batteries.

Similar arrangements on a very extended scale were made on
the coasts of the North Sea for the protection of tlie Weser and
Elbe ; 14 steam torpedo boats and 7 torpedo row boats, manned
chiefly by volunteer See-wehr, were posted at different points in
readiness to aid in the defence.

On the shores of the Baltic, in addition to Kiel, there were
batteries at Sonderburg, Travemlincle, and Wismar, besides
obstructions at both the first-named points.

All the fortifications were provisioned for 3 months.

One of the ]>rincipal duties of a " general staff* in peace is the Count v.
preparation b«3forehand of detailed plans for the concentration Mo^tke's pro-
and trans])ort of the troops with a view to meeting all the probable inrasion of
eventualities to which war may give rise. France.

When an army first takes the field, manifold political and geo-
graphical con?^iderations, as well as the purely military, have to
be weighed. Errors in the original concentration of the army can
scarcely ever be made good during the course of the campaign. All
these arrangements, however, may be considered long beforehand,
nnd — assuming the troops are in readiness for war and the transport
ser\'ice organised — ^must lead to the result which is contemplated.

It is otherwise with the subsequent task of strategy, that is to
say, with the adaptation of the means thus prepared to the
purposes of war — the operations.

In this case we have to grapple with the enemy's opposi-
tion. It may, of course, be limited in its effects by our ready

29982. ^

and resolute initiative ; but it cannot be crushed except by
battle.

The material and moral consequences of every great battle ai-e
of so comprehensive a character, that they commonly produce an
entire change in the situation, and with it a fresh starting point
for new measures. No plan of operations can with any safety
include more than the first collision with the enemy's main
force. It is only the laity who believe that they can trace
throughout tlie course of the campaign the prosecution of an
original plan, arranged beforehand in lul its details and observed
to the very close. The Commander-in-Chief most undoubtedly
wiD, in spite of the changing fortunes of war, always have the
main object of the campaign before his eyes, but the means by
which he hopes to attain it cannot be sketched out with certainty
long beforehand.

Tlie detailed scheme for the concentrjition of all the Geimaii
military forces in the event of a war with France and for the
disposition and formation of the different armies as a basis for
further operations is to be found in a project of the Prussian
general staff dated in the winter of 1808-69.

The primary object of the operations is therein pointed out —
" to seek out the enemy's main force, and, when found, to
attack it." In this simple plan, attention is drawn to the diffi-
culties which are inseparable from the handling of those " very
large masses " necessary for the purpose, but from the very
first movements we can detect the leading idea — ^forcing the main
hostile army in a northerly direction away from its communi-
cations with Paria

General von Moltke's project, which we shall repeatedly quote,
fii*st examines the relative strength of the two field armies. It
starts with the assumption that in consequence of considerations
connected with transport, and, perhaps, owing to political circum-
stances, North Germany would have at first only 10 corps at her
disix>sal, or a total of

330,000 men,*

against which France, at the outset, could array only 250,000,
or after enrolling her reserves,

343,000 men.

This proportion between the opposing armies at the com-
mencement would be changed considerably in our favour should the
South German States also take part in the war — a circumstance
of which we were then not so certain — or if the thi*ee reserve
corps and some Landwehr Divisions could be brought up in time
from North Germany.

" It is obviously important," says the project, " to make full
use at once of the superiority which the North Gcnnan forces
alone confer upon us.

* The combatants of ali nrins arc included in this number.

" This advantage ^ill be still more increased at the decisive
point should the French commit themselves to expeditions agaiast
the North Sea coast or against Soutli Germany. Sufficient men
are left in the country to protect us against the first-named
enterprise. With regard to the latter operation, conferences
had been held in Berlin with the representatives of the South
Geiman contingents some little time back, by which it was
clearly shown that, on account of the distance, Nortli Ger-
many was not capable of giving effective and immediate help
in a direct defence of the upper Rhine and Black Forest, and
tliatthe safety of the South would be better secured by a concen-
tration of all the forces on the middle Rhine. These combined
forces would then be in a position to assume the offensive at
pleasure on either bank against the flank of the enemy s line of
invasion, and must soon compel him to halt or retire."

It is deserving of special mention that the South German
princes, subscribing to these views and devoting themselves to the
common cause in full confidence of the supreme commander, did
not hesitate to denude their own land of troops in order to array
themselves with the North German forces, a proof of confidence
which made the responsibility of the North so much the graver.

*' The neutrality of Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland, limits
the theatre of war to the area between Luxemburg and Basle.

" Should France disregard the neutrality of one of these states
— say Belgium — her army must weaken itself considerably in
Brussels and before Antwerp. Her further advance over the
Meuse can be more effectively met from the Moselle than fi-om
Cologne, as we should compel the enemy to form front to the south,
and whilst threatening his communications give him decisive
battle. As the distance from Brussels to Cologne is greater than
from either Mainz, Kaiserslautern, or Trier, we should in such an
eventuality still be in time to take up a j^osition on our Lower
Rhine front

" No less difficulties would ensue were France to violate the
neutrality of Switzerland, in which countiy she would have to
encounter a strong and well-organised militia.

" Now the concentration of considerable forces on the Moselle
would so immediately threaten France and her capital that she
could hardly embark in such very remote enterprises.

'* We may therefore assume with all probability," the pro-
ject goes on to say, "that the French will effect their fii-st
concentration on the line Strassburg-Metz, and, avoiding our
strong fi'ont on the Rl^ine, push forward to the Maiu^ separate
Noiih from South Germany, come to terms with the latter, and
use that country as a base for further offensive operations on the
Elbe.

^ It follows, then, that a concentiution of the whole of the
available military forces to the soutli of the Moselle in the
Bavarian palatinate is the most suitable means for counteracting
such plans.

" The prospect of some easy success might perhaps tempt the

D 2

French to advance from Strassburg against South Germany with
part of their force. Au operation up the Rhine on the flank of
this movement will prevent any advance beyond the Black Forest,
and compel the enemy to disengage himself in a northerly
direction.

" If the Baden- Wiirtemberg Corps closes in to our left wing we
could so reinforce it from the Palatinate that a decision could
be sought as near as Rastatt, which, if in our favour, would
render the enemy's retreat disastrous.

" In order to sittain this object we can detach part of our

I principal force without any hesitation, as the enemy has weakened
limself in our front by the troops ho has withdrawn for his enter-
prise on the Upper Rhine.

" If the French make full use of their mil way system with a
view to a more rapid concentrati(m of their military forces, they
are compelled to disembark in two main groups at Stnissburg and
Metz with the Vosges dividing them. If the Strassburg force,
probably the smaller of the two, is not intended to act against
South Germany, the operation of uniting it to the main force on
the upper Mosello can only be effected by road.

" In the Palatinate we stand on an interior line of opemtion to
the two grouj)s of tlie enemy. We are in a position to act against
either of them, or against both simultaneously, provided we are
strong enough.

" The concentration of all the forces in the Palatinate protects
the Lower as well as the Upper Rhine, and permits of an offensive
operation in tlie enemy's country which, if resolved upon in time,
will probably anticipate every attempt on the part of the French
at setting foot on (icrnuin soil.

" The sole question which remains is, whether we could
make our first concentration beyond the Rhine, in the Palatinate
and close to the French frontier, without endangering its success ;
and this question, in mj' opinion, may be answered in the affir-
mative.

" Our mobilisation is complete down to the most minute details.
Six through-railways are available for tmnsport to the district
between the Rhine and Moselle. Time tables indicating the
day and hour for the departure and arrival of every regiment are
prepared. The first detachments could be landed by the tenth
day close to the French frontier, and on the thirteenth da)' the
combatant troops of two Army Corps could be collected tljere.
On the eighteenth day the number of our force would amount to
300,000 men, and by the twentieth day they would be completed
with nearly all the trains.

* We have no reason whatever for supposing that the mobi-
lisation and concentmtion of tho French army, upon which
point wo however lack experience, could be more rapidly
effected. Since the time of Na^ioleon I., France has only carried
out pai*tial mobilisations, on which occasions the vacancies in
the field army were filled up from that which remained at
home.

" The French, from the fact of their gamsons and camps hemg
massed in the north-e&stem part of the empire, the completeness
of their railway system and the abundance of rolling stock, could,
if they dete)*mined to take tlie field without reserves, concentrate
an anny of 150,000 men on the frontier in a very short time.
The adoption of a bold initiative would accord with the national
character, and has been discussed in military circles.

" Supposing an army thus improvised, which in any case would
be abundantly furnished with cavalry and aiiillery, were collected
at Metz by the fifth day and crossed the frontier by Saarlouis
on the eighth, we should still be enabled to stop our transport
by mil in time and disembark our troi>ps on the llhine. To that
}X)int the invader would still have six marches, and on the four-
teenth day he would be opposed by superior forces. The passages
of the stream being in our possession, we could a few days later
assume the offensive with more than twice his numbei-s.

'* The disadvantages and dangers of this course of action on
the part of the French are so evident that it would hardly be
attempted.

" If, then, the concentration in the Palatinate and on the lloselle
be conceded as possible, no objection against the a&sembly of all
our available forces at that point can be deduced from the appa-
rent denudation of our Rhine front. It has been already shown
that it is protected by the nqutrality of Belgium ; and if the latter
were violated, by distance, by its own strength, and by the
operations.

The project then expatiates upon the grouping of the military
forces, as "a host, such as must be brought into the iield against
France, can evidently only operate by being combined into sev^eral
armies. The strength of each anny must depend upon the
special object it has in view, and the different Corps to compose
it must be so allotted that no delay may take place in getting
ready for the field.

*•' No change could be made in the following distribution with-
out prejudice to the object in view : —

" The 1st Army, Vllth and VllUh Army (Jorps, to ibrm the
right wing (about G0,00() nien) near Wittlich.

" The llnd Army, lllrd, IVth, Xth, and Guard Corps, in the
centre by Neunkirchen-Homburg (about 131,000 men).

" The Ilird Army, Vth, Xlth Ai*my Corps, and the Bavarians,
"Wurtembergers, and Badeners, to form the lull wing (about
130,000 men), near Landau and Rastatt.

" A reserve, composed of the IXth and Xllth Army Corps, in
front of llainz (about 03,000 men); tliis employed as a rein-
forcement to the centre would increase the Ilnd Army to about
194,000 men.

" The strength of the three armies together would amount to
384,000 men."

In addition to the foregoing there still remained the 1st, Ilnd,
and Vlth Army Corps. Tliese, liowever, were not immediately

54;

available, as at that time tlie railways would be in use by the
other Corps up to the twenty-first day.

For the present only 9 infantry regiments were requii-ed for
gamsoning the fortresses, and the 17th Division^ when mnforced
by the newly-fonned Landwehr troops, seemed adequate for the
defence of the coast.

Consequently after a lapse of three weeks we could assume flic
offeasive with 384,000 men, or, if we waited four days longer for
the aiiival of the other three Corps, with 484,000 men.

The project proceeds to sketch the special positions of the
three separate armies.

Id Army.

'* In order t^:) secure the concentration of the 'N^Ith and VII I th
Army Corps on the Moselle, it is of importance not to withdiaw
the troops garrisoning that district, but to leave them as an
advanced guard near Trier and Saarbriick, and to reinforce them.

** The line of posts at tlie latter place has to be furnished for tluj
time being by the two battjxlions and four squadrons quartered there
and at Saarlouis, just a suiticient fiace for the mere observation
and protecti«>n of the railway against minor enterprises of the
enemy. Directions will be sent from head-quarters as to how
much of the railway is to be destroyeJ from time to time, and a
railway division will be att«ached to the detachment for this purj)05:e.
If possible, the detachment shoujd not fall back beyond Nenu-
kirchen, as it will be relieved or reinforced on the twelfth day by
troops of the Ilird Corps. It may then rejoin its own corps.

" The garrison of Tiier, consisting of 4 battalions, 4 squadrons
and a battoy (which latter should Ije at once despatched from
Cobleiiz), should be able to hold its ground at Trier, Schweich, or
at least in front of Wittlich, as it is not immediately threatened bj'
the enemy, and the grouml favoui-s it in ever}^ way. As early
as the fourteenth day detachments would arrive to its support,
and by the sixteenth day the whole of the Vlllth Corps
(except the 33rd Regiment) and the Vllth Coii)s (without
trains).

** There will be then

47 battalions, 32 squailrons, 30 batteries

ready for action, and on the nineteenth day both Army Corps
will be completely mobilised and ready to advance in any direc-
tion which may be ordered.**

Iliid Aynvj.

" By taking up a poaitiou at Saarbriicken ov Neunkirchen, as
the case may be, we gain information as to the distance we can
safely run the Palatinate railways. On the tenth day troops of
the Ilird Corps commence to annve at the former place, and
othera fi-om the XVth Corps on the eleventh day. Oxi the fifteenth
day both corps, complete in troops, would take up a position close
to the frontier (somewhere by Bildstock and St Ingbert), behind

which the XUi and the Guard Corps would be disembarked ; and
thus by the nineteenth day there would be collected round Homburg

104 battalions, 108 squadrons, (JO batteries."

Ilird Army.

*' The line occupied by a Bavarian brigade at Landau would
be supported on the fifteenth and sixteenth day, by the arrival
of the infantry Divisions of the Vth Corps. By the thir-
teenth day the greater portion of the XI th Corps, partly airiving
on foot, would be collected, and consequently by the eighteenth
day there would be a Prussian force in a strong position behind
the Klingbach, of

50 battalions, 40 squadrons, 30 batteries,

which would be able to afford assistance to the Baden- Wlii+em-
berg Corps between Bastatt and Carlsruhe in the event of the
French crossing the Upper Rhine. Should the Ilird Army be
required in South Qennany, the reserve army would fonn the left
flank-dchelon of the army assuming the offensive towards the
west. If, on the other hand, the Rhine should not be crossed,
the Baden-Wurtemberg corps can also be drawn forward to the
left bank of the Rhine."

The Reserve.

" Of the reserve, the IXth Army Corps will be in Kiix^heim-
Bolanden, the Xllth Army Corps in front of Alainz by the
seventeenth day, so that

52 battalions, 40 squadrons, 31 batteries, could reach the neigh-
bourhood of Homburg, in rear of the Ilnd annj-, by the nineteenth
day.

*' It is very unlikely that the French would be able to attack
our Ilnd ai'my, which is the most advanced, at an earlier date
with a superior force.

" Supposing they had concentrated their whole force against
it, and the Ilnd was obliged to fall back upon the reser\-e aimy,
we should still be able to accept battle in an exceedinuly favour-
able position near Marnheini, with a foi-cc of nearly 200,000 men
by the twentieth day. In this case the French could not execute
any gi*eat enterprise against the Upper Rhuie or the Lower Moselle,
and it would consequently be perfectly possible to reinforce
our piincipal army from the Ilird Army, and to direct the 1st
Aimy over the Nahe, upon the fiank and rear of the enemy's
advance. With only moderately good management we might
concentrate 300,000 men for a decisive blow.

" If, on the other hand, the Ilnd Army holds its gi-ound on the
frontier, as may with some probability be assumed, reinforce-
ments would reach it in time from the reserve, whilst the 1st
and Ilird Army secure the flanks, and thus the ollensive might at
once be taken into the enemy's country.

** Should we still be in ignorance as to the point of assembly
of the main forces of the enemy, there are foiu* ca> aliy Divisions
of 76 squadrons at hand, which, supported by infantry, should
furnish us with the information we desire.

The project concludes vrith an examination of the coast defence.

A landing on the part of the French, even if meditated at all,

need only be apprehended in the very earliest stage of the war,

* as any wide-sweeping enterprise of this nature would be out of

the question directly we touched French soil.

The shores of the North Sea would appear to be primarily
threatened ; for their protection there were local garrisons (dep6t
and garrison troops) of about 26,000 men, as well as the 17th
field Division of infantry near Hamburg, and the 2nd Landwehr
Division near Bremen, giving a total available field force of
29,000 men. For the defence of the Baltic coast, which was less
threatened, there were, besides the local garrison, the 1st Landwehr
Division consisting of 11,000 men, and the Guard Land welu* Divi-
sion of 11,000 men near Hanover, forming a resei-ve to.the whole.
Any movement in the Baltic could not fail to be obsei*ved, and
we should have ample time to despatch our military forces by rail
in that dii*ection and meet the enemy there with a force of
40,000 men. Moreover, in the fii-st stage of the war there would
still be three Prussian Corps in the countiy.

This project, drawn up, as before remarked, in the winter of
1868-69, formed without modification the basis for the initiatory
orders, when hostilities suddenlj' broke out.
Railway pre- 111 anticipation of their meeting with approval, all the neces-

paratioDs. sary preparations down to the smallest details were made before-

hand, and when His Majesty the King, on his return to Berlin,
signified his approbation, it was only necessary to insert the firat
day of mobilisation in the marching and time tables, for the
movement of the troops to commence. These tables had been
worked out for each separate regiment by the Railway Section
of the General Staff (under Lieut.-Colonel v. Brandenstein).

His Majesty the King commanded the different armies to
fonn in the proposed niamier on the 18th July, and their
commandei'S to take charge directly the concentration was
completed. The cavalry divisions were assigned to them on the
25th July.

The 1st Anny was accordingly formed of the Vllth and Vlllth
Aimy Corps, and the 3rd Cavaliy Division under the supi-eme
command of General of Infantiy v. Steinmetz.

The Ilnd Army, General of Cavalry, H.R.H. Prince Frederick
Charles of Pnissia ; of the Guard, Ilird, IVth, and Xth Army
Coii^s, and the 5th and Gth Cavalry Divisions.

The Ilird Army, General of Infantry, H.R.H. the Crown
Prince of Prussia ; of the Vth and Xlth Corps, the 1st and Ilnd
^Bavarian C()r|)s, the AVuitemberg Division, Baden Division, and
the 4th Cavalry Division.

The Reserve consisted of the I Xth and XII th Army Corps.

Of the mobilized troops, for which no transport was at first
available, and which consequently could not be assigned to any
particular army, there remained —

The 1st, Ilnd, and Vlth Anny Corps and the 1st and 2nd
Cavalry Divisions.

Besides these the 17th Infantry Division, the Guard, the Ist,
2nd, and 3rd Landwehr Divisions were told off for coast
defence.

The "Order of Battle" in Appendix V. gives tlie special Appendix V.
formation of all the above-mentioned troops and their staffs.

The whole territory of the North German Confederation was
divided into five Governments-General, which were to continue
in force as long as the army remained on a war footing, as
follows : —

(1.) The districts of those corps situated on the coasts, Ist,
Ilnd, IXth, and Xth Corps. General of Infantry Vogel von
Falkenstein — head-quarters, Hanover.

(2.) The districts of the Vllth, Vlllth, and XI th Corps, Gene-
ral of Infantry v. Herwarth — Coblenz,

(3.) The districts of the Ilird and IVth Corps. General v.
Benin — Berlin.

(4.) The districts of the Vth and Vlth Corps. Lieutenant-
General v. Lc5wenfeld — Poscn.

(5.) The district of the Xllth Corps — Lieutenant-Qeneral v.
Fabrice (Royal Saxon War Minster) — Dresden.

On the 13th August, War Minister v. Suckow was nominated
Governor-General for Wlirtemberg.

The Commander-in-Cliief in the Marches and the Military
Governor of the Rhine Provinces, wore at the same time relieved
from their functions. The duties of these new commands were
to control the different depdts of the Corps iu the field, to super-
intend the formation of new regiments and to take general pre-
cautions for the safety of their respective districts.

For the latter purpose the command of the mobilized troops
in their districts, not forming part of the aainy, were also handed
over to the Goveniments-General at Hanover and Coblenz ; those
in the first Government wore placed under the special command
of H.R.H. the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin.

The mobilisation of the troops in the Rhenish districts bordering
on the French frontier was threatened by the proximity of
the French peace garrisons and camps of cxoiclse, yet by taking
precautionary measures this might be provided against.

In order to meet this eventuality, the district commands, the
stores, and the surplus war materiel in the district between the
right bank of the Moselle and the left bank of the Rhine were
tmnsferred to the Rhine. The reserves and depdt troops were
assembled at those points, and from thence sent on to join the
I6th Division, which garrisoned the parts immediately threatened.
The only exceptions were the men required to fill up the 69th
and 70th Regiments^ who were ordered to Saarlouis direct,
80 as to reinforce the gan'isoh of that fortress as speedily as
possible*

Owing to the effective co-operation of all concerned, and the
independent and salutary measures adopted by the local autho-
rities, the mobilisation of the Vlllth Corps was effected without

material hindrance in the time contemplated. By the 26th July
the (General commanding reported its completion.

Saarlonis, although exposed and so near the frontier, was
from the I7th July quite secure from a coup-de^mai/n, and was
abundantly provided with food and cattle ; on the following day
the levies for the artillery and a pioneer detachment reached
the place.

Tne district commanders in the Bavarian Palatinate did not
quit their posts, but were held in readiness to withdraw ;* the
depdts were removed frt)m the open towns to Aschaffenburg and
Wurzburg.

In Baden the mobilisation was conducted from the commence-
ment on the probability of an immediate invasion. The Land-
wehr-district* commanders remained in their places in readiness
to move ; the reserves in the district between Rastatt and Lorrach
were embodied at their regimental points of assembly. The
regiments quartered in Fi'eiburg and Constance had been already
moved on the 16th July by rail to Rastatt, for the purpose of
augmenting the garrison ; the 34th Pomeranian Fusilier Regi-
ment and a company of miners from Frankfort and Coblenz
arrived on the 17th. These troops formed the first assistance
sent to the South of Germany.

Tlie mobilisation being completed, the transport sex^vice was
now brought Into requisition.

The capabilities of the sei-vice, which had formed the data for
calculation in the campaign of 1866, had since then been much
extended and increased.

The mode of proceeding now was to move the field troops
directly after the reserves had been brought in ; the daily work
of a single line of rail had been increased to 12 trains^ a double
line to 18 trains, and the number of carriages to each train was
increased, so that the transport of a Corps was a matter of 6^
or 3^ days work.

By a careful allotment of the different lines leading to the
theatre of war, none would remain unused, no matter for how
short a time, and thus the fullest amount of work would be
realised from all.

In carrying this out, newly constructed lines had to be brought
at once into use, which necessitated continual changes during
peace time in the time tables for each regiment. This labour
was the more heavy from the fact that every acceleration in
mobilising the separate detachments would entail fresh plans for
the transport of the whole army, so that the lines might never
lie idle fr'om the time the troops were ready.

As a general rule it was so an*anged that the combatant troops
should be first despatched and the trains next ; the mingling of
troops of different Corps on one line should be avoitled as much
as possible, but there Avas no objection to forw2U*ding the same
Ai-iny Corps by several lines.

* The district command at ZveibrUcken iras removed to Spejer ou the 30th July.

No railway employ^ were called upon to sei-vo with the colours
until a later date, bo that the railway service should not be
short-handed at first.

The following 9 lines of rail were available for forwarding
the whole of the North and South German troops. For the North
German Corps —

A. Berlin, Hanover, Cologne, Bingerbruck, Keunki/rcheiu

B. Leipzig or Harburg, Kreiensen, Moabach (near Biebrich).

C. Berlin, Halle, Cassel, Frankfort, Mannheim, Homburg.

D. Dresden or Leipsic, Bebra> Fulda, CasteL

E. Posen, Gorlitz, Leipzig, Wurzburg, Mainz, Landau.

F. Munster, Diisseldorf, Cologne, Call,
For the South German corps—

1. Augsburg, Ulm, Bruchsal.

2. Nbrdlingen, Crailsheim, Meckesheivi.

3. Wttrzburg, Mosbach, Heidelberg.

Four subsidiary lines brought the troops belonging to the
northern provinces of Prussia to the main lines. Only four of
the latter crossed the Rhine.

There was ample railway materiel for the transport. Only
about I of the carriages and f of the locomotives were required
for the transit of the first 10 army corps, even if the carriages
were used but once.

Officers belonging to the Head-quarters Staff, who were absent
on duty from Berlin, were telegraphed for on the night of the
15th-lGth July. On the 17th, marching and time tables,
indicating the points of concentration, were transmitted to each
Army Corps.

According to these tables all three armies were to be concen-
trated and in readiness to move at the points assigned to them
on the 3rd August, viz., the 1st Army on the line Saarlouis-
Merzig, the Ilnd Army near Volklingen, Saarbrlicken, and to-
wards Saargemund ; the Ilird Army on both banks of the
Rhine by Landau and Carlsruhe.

Of the reserves, the Xllth (Saxon) Army Corps was to be
at Kafeerslautem on the same date, the IXth Corps near Hom-
burg and Zweibriicken.

Owing to the untiring zeal of the Railway Directions, all the
preparations for the transport by rail were carried out with
perfect oixier. As the first troops completed their mobilisation
by the 23rd July, the transport of the larger units could be
commenced on the following day.

Meanwhile we had not been unmindful of how affairs were
progressing in France.

The hap-hazard way in which the French reserves and troops
were moved — and it must be remembered but very few troops
had formed part of an Army or Army Corps in peace — made it
difficult to form a conception of how the new army was formed
From the newspapers we could only gather the mere numbers of
numerous regiments coming from the most varied parts of Fronoei
and we were compelled to foim suppository combinations of them
based on the grouping of the troops in the peace garrisons.

Major Krauae of the General Staff, who was entrusted with this
duty, succeeded in compiling an order of battle on these data,
which was communicated to the army on the 24th July, and
which was afterwards found to require but few unimportant
alterations to be perfectly correct.

From this plan the formation, up to date, of the 2nd Fi*ench Corps
at St. Avoid, as well as of the 4th, 3rd, and Guard at Thionville,
Metz, and Nancy, were known in Berlin. The concentration of
the 5th Corps between Saargemiind and Bitsch, of the 1st Corps
at Strassburg, of the Gth Corps at Ch&lons, and the presence
of two divisions in Paris, were also known. The only points
about which wo were uncertain were as to the formation of
the 7th Corps at Belfort, where it was first supposed that
there was but one reserve Division, and also about the reserve
cavalry divisions ; and we also imagined that the Divisions still
remaining in Paiis were intended for a naval expedition. The
names of the different Corps commandera and tne strength of
their Corps in infantry Divisions were correctly known ; very few
mistakes were made in the names of the Division and Brigade
commanders, and in the numbers of the regiments composing them.

The following communication as to the strength of tlie different
units was made verbatim to the commandei*s :—

'' The marching out strength of the French battalions is on an
average 500 men. With reserves, on the 29th July, it "may be
probably calculated at 700 men. The regiments of cavalry will
not exceed 500 sabres.

*' Consequently the infantry Division is at the present only
G,500 ; after the 29 th July it will be 9,100 strong.

" The 19 Divisions of the first five Corps and of the Guard
represent therefore at the present time only 123,500 men^ but
they will subsequently muster 162,500 infantry/*

To these the Divisions in Chalons, Paris, and Belfort have to
be added, so that the total force may be assumed at 172,000
men at first, and after the 29th July at 227,500 men.

By keeping a cai*eful watch over the enemy's movements we
obteaned unmistakeable evidence that the French were moving
towards the frontier without previously enrolling their reserves,
and without completing the mobilisation in their respective
garrisons.

The mere interruption of the mobilisation of part of the
Prussian 16th Division did not appear to be their object, and this
would alone justify such an unusual and doubtful measure.

It would not be natural to assume that the enemy would
renounce the advanUiges which belong to an orderly mobilisation
and organisation, without crediting him with the desire of some
compensation in the attaitniicnt of greater aims. On the
contrary, we should expect the French to cross the frontier of
the Rhine in'ovinces and the Palatinate with every available
man and with a decisive superiority at first, so as to prevent the
concentration of the German armies on this side of the Rhine.

Whatever the after consequences might be of such a pro-

ceeding, it was sufficient to alarm iis for the time being, and
demanded anticipatory measures.

The 1st Army need scarcely apprehend any surprise. Protected
by neutral territory its columns marched to the point of concen-
tration by road. They could close up the moment the heads of
the columns had to halt, and either res^ist or evade the enemy in
gi'ound extremely favourable for the purpose.

Neither had the Illrd Amiy any cause to apprehend a real
attack. Tlie weaker force of the enemy, with its formation still
incomplete, was in front of it, and on the other hand it would
itself receive a considerable accession of strength in a few days.

The Corps of the Ilnd Aniiy which were to be brought from the
most distant parts of the co\mtry by rail, could not, however, be
disembarked in the face of an enemy, who, although not mobilised,
was still strong in point of numbera.

For this reason the concentration of the Ilnd Army, as provided
for in the project of the General Staff, was ordered by His Majesty
the King to take place nearer to the Rhine. It would thence
advance by road marches without loss of time in compact order,
and so dispose<l as to be ready at any moment for iighting. The
olBensive invasion of France was thereby postponed for a few
days, but not given up.

The necessary orders were issued from the Royal head-quarters
on the 23rd July, therefore before the great transport of troops 23rd July,
commenced. Directions were given that the Illrd and Xth Corps,
which used the line Cologne-Coblenz-Bingen, were to bo disem-
barked ^at the last place, and to be cantoned at first in the
direction of Kreuznach and Mainz. The Guard and the IVth
Corps were ordered to alight at Mannheim and to canton in that
neighbourhood.

Advanced guai'ds were to be pushed forward by the Illrd and
IVth Aimy Corps beyond Kreuznach and Diirkheim respcctivery,
and the 5th Dragoons, which commenced its march from Frank-
furt-a-Main to Kaiserslauteni on the 22nd July, was to keep up
the communications between tliem.

As by these arrangements detachments of the Ilnd Army
would trench upon the rayon intended for the I Xth and Xllth
Corps, both corps were placed under the orders of the
Commander-in-Chief of this army as regards their quarters
in the neighbourhood of Mainz, and for all services in con-
nection with the Etappcn.

Besides these, the 2i)th Hessian Division was orderetl to canton
at Gemshein on the 25th July, and at Worms on the 26th.

As the Ilnd Army might 1)0 expected to advance at once, the
Vlllth Corps of the 1st Army received instructions, in the event
of the line of posts on the frontier being driven back, only
to destroy the railways in so far that they could be speedily
restored.

Of the troops temporarily left at home, the 1st Corps received
orders to collect by rail at Berlin, and the Vlth at Gorlitz and
Breslau.

In ordei* to give the different Corps commanders a primary
idea of how the forces were to be assembled in accordance with
the new ordera, the following summary of the first movements
was communicated to them.

I. Arait.

Vllth Corps— 13th Division ; 24th— 27th July, to Call by
raol ; 31st July — 1st August, to Trier by road 14th
Division ; 24th — 26th July, to Aachen and Stolberg
by rail ; 1st — 2nd August, to Trier by road.

Vlllth Corps — To inarch generally on the right bank of the
Moselle (the troops coming from the north crossing at
Bernca&tel), and to be cScheloned between Saai'louis
and Hermeskeil on the 2Dd August, or to be assem-
bled in the neighbourhood of Kirchberg between the
28th and 31st July.

II. Army.

Ilird Corps ; 25th— 28th July, to Bingen by rail.
Xth Coi'ps ; 29th July — 5th August, to Bineen.
IVth Corps ; 26th to 29th July, to Mannheim.

Guard Corps ; 30th Julj'^ — 5th August, to Darmstadt
or Mannheim.

III. AmiY.

Xlth Corps ; 25th — 27th July, to Qermersheim and Landau.
Vth Corps ; 27th July — 3rd August, to Landau.
Bavarians ;

1st CorjDS, at Speyer.

Ilnd Corps, at Qermersheim ; both to be completely

mobilised by the 3rd August, and by the 9th ready to

move.

Wurtembergei-s ; 27th— 28th July, concentrated at Carlsrahe ;

10 squadrons moved there yesterday (22nd July).
Badenei*s; the Baden Division is now to the northward of

Bastatt.

Reserves.

IXth Corps ; of this coi^ps, the 25th Division moves to Worms
on the 26th July. 18th Division ; 28th July— 2nd
August, to Mainz.

Xllth Corps ; 27th July — 2nd August, to Mainz.

Corps ik the Eastern Districts of the MoNARCHy*.

Ist Corps ; 27th July — 6th August, to move westward as fer

as Berlin.
Ilnd Corps ; 26th— 31st July, to Berlin.

1st Landwehr Division

Vlth Corps ; to move chiefly by road (on the 25th and 26th
July.) The 11th Division at Giirlitz ; 12th Division at
Breslau.

17th Infantry Division and Landweiiu Divisions.

17th Division ; 26th — 28th July, near to Hamburg.
Guard Landwehr Division : 28th July — 3rd Auc^ust, near
Hanover.

2nd Landwehr Division ; 29th July — 1st August, near Bremen.

''To be Echeloned along the railways

until the 5th August, viz., at

2nd Landwehr Division*^ Sehneidcmuhl, Magdeburg, Stettin,

(^ Glogau, Posen, and Tilsit.

The garrisons of the fortresses will be complete by tlic fol-
lowing dates :

Saarlouis (is now fully garrisoned

on the war establishment).
Mainz - - - - on 28th July.

Cologne - - - - „ 1st August.

Coblentz - - - - „ 30th July,

and the menaced coast-fortresses on the 29th and 30th July.*

The weak detachments whidi were already at hand in the
western garrisons of the Rhine provinces were quite suflicient to
watch the movements of the enemy on the other side of the
frontier, and to secure their own railwaj'S within his reach
against raids.

There still remained in Trier, after sending a battalion apiece
to Saarlouis and Saarbriicken, the Ist and 3rd battalions of the
40th Fusiliers, as well as the 9th Hussars. Saarlouis, now com-
pletely armed, was garrisoned by the 6 battalions of the 69th
and 70th Kegiments and a squadron of the 7th Lancers, and was
amply provided with artillery and pioneers. The remainder of
the Lancers was at Saarbriicken, besides the 2nd battalion of the
40th Regiment, which had arrived there on the 17th.

On the 25th July the 5th Dragoons closoxl up further to
the south near Bliescastel. Their duty was to hold the railway
between Ludwigshafen and Homburg against weak detach-
ments of the enemy, and at the same time to keep up
communication with the Bavarian detachments in the
Palatinate.

The garrisons of Germersheim and Landau were formed of the
4th and 8th Regiments, with artillery and engineers. Besides
these, there were the 5th Rifle battalion, the 1st battalion
of the 7th Regiment, and the 5 th Chevaux Legers available
for being * employed in the first dispositions for securing the
frontier, to which point the commander of the 8 th Infantry

♦On all the linei of. transport tlie times Imitc been calculated to include the first
lines of amjnnnition, columiis and trains.

Bngade, Major General Maillinger, ordered part of his brigade to
move on the IGih.

In consequence of the insufficiency of his force, only aome of the
important points on the main roads could be occupied, and fi'om
these constant patrols were sent out. The 5th Rifle Battalion,
with two squadrons, watched the hills in the Western Palatinate,
and occupied Homburg, Zweibrlicken, Firmasens, and Vorder-
Weidenthal. The infantry battalion and the other two squadrons
remained in Bergzabem, Winden, and Langenkandel.

The garrison in Winden was augmented by a Baden squadron
on the 19th.

In order, however, not to endanger the frontier by holding it
for too long a period with weak detachments, the 5th and 9th
Bavarian regiments, the 6th and 10th Ritle Battalions, two
regiments of Chevaux Lagers and two batteries were moved
before their mobilisation was completed into the Palatinate by
rail on the 22nd July and Echeloned on the Landau- Weisscnburg
chaxi8s&e. All these troops except the 5th Chevaux Ldgers
belonged to the 4th Division. On the 23rd Lieutenant-General
v. Bothmer assumed the command. The cavalry was alone up
to its proper sti'ength ; the infantry was deficient of one-third of
its complement of men, and each battciy was about 30 horses
shoi*t.
24 July. By the evening of the 24th there were consequently 10 batta-

lionsy 8 squadrons, and 2 batteries of Bavarians concentrated in
the Palatinate ; the head-quarters were established at Billigheim,
2 battalions 2 squadrons were pushed forward towards Weissen-
burg, 1 battalion and 2 squadrons patrolled from Langenkandel
through the Bien-wald towards Lauterburg.

On the Baden side, Uagenbach on the left bank of the Rhine,
had been occupied since the 1 8th by a battalion and a squadron,
which served to watch Lauterburg and to keep up communications
with Winden.

On the right bank of the Rhine, the Baden cavalry brigade had
been near Carlsruho since the I7th, reconnoitring as far as the
Lauter. On the arrival of the reserves, the 3rd and 5th Baden
regiments were withdrawn from Rastatt and formed into a brigade,
which took up a position on the 20th between Morsch and Dax-
landen. This brigade (3rd) reinforced by a squadron of the 3rd
Dragoons and 2 battevics watched the country between the Lauter
and the Murg.

South of this river the Rhine from Rastatt to the Hugelsheim
lulls was also under observation.

On the 23rd the Baden Division was concentrated between
Carlsruhe and Moi-sch until the trains were ready to march. It
had pushed forward an advanced guard, consisting of the 2nd
Grenadier and 2nd Dragoon regiments and 2 batteries, under
Geneitil v. La Roche to the Murg. The main body of this
detachment was echeloned between Kuppenheini and Oos ; two
squadrons stationed beyond the line of outposts in Blihl and Lich-
tenau observed the Rhine as far as Kehl. The cavalry was in

this position by the 18th, the infantry occupied it on the 22nd
July.

On the same day, 10 Wiirtemberg squadrons joined the Divi*
sion by order from Berlin. They were despatched by rail from
Stuttgart and Ludwigsburg to Durlaeh, and were cantoned
between Ettlingen and Grotzingen.

Barricades were prepared in the Bien-wald and on the railway
all along the frontier of the Bavarian Palatinate, as further
measures of precaution.

Communication with Baden by the Kebl bridge was cut off
on the 16tb, the pontoons of the ship bridge taken away, and
telegitiphic communication established along the entire frontier.

In the next few days the remainder of the ferries and flying
bridges between Hliningen and Lauterburg were removed, and
at the same time guards for watching the frontier were formed
of volunteers from the parishes.

On the 22nd the pier on which the Kelil bridge revolved on
the right side was blown up. As it was important, on the other
hand, to presei-ve the Maxau bridge as long as possible, the Bava-
rian and Baden engineers had thrown up a VHc-ih-iiont for its
protection, which was finished on the 24th. With the aid of
two tugs which were lying in the harbour of Mnxau, the bridge
could be rapidly removed to Qcnnersheim, to which place a
tramway had also been laid along the Brachsal road by the 80th.

As intelligence had been received that some French flat-
bottomed gunboats were off Strassburg, an obstniction in the
river was completed on the 22nd above the llaxau bridge,
and a battery of eight 12-pounders (from the demolition works
at Kehl) was erected at that point. Another obstruction was
prepared near Germersheim. Some ships filled with stones were
also sunk at the mouth of tlie !Murg near Rastatt.

It was further proposed, in the event of the enemy crossing
the Rhine, to break up the railways in tlie vallies of the Rhine and
Kinzig, as well as the roads leading from the Kniebis to Stuttgart,
and for this purpose a flying detachment was stationed at Ober-
kirch.

The western frontier of the Rhine provinces and Palatinate
was only watched by a weak line of outposts facing the large
bodies of the enemy, .ind they miglit at any time expect to bo
attacked.

Saarbriickcn having been threatened on 19th July by French
douaniers, three squadrons of the 7th Lancers moved forward
to reconnoitre in the direction of Forbach. They fell in with the
flankers of several squadrons of Cliasseurs & Cheval at the Prussian
custom house on the frontier and formed up to attack them. The
enemy, however, fell back on Stiring, and on tlie next day the
fact of Bataille's Division l>eing on the other side of the frontier
was confirmed.

In consequence of the Saarlouis patrols having been fired at
by the French douaniers, and two of their horses killed, the 8th

29983. B

I company of the 70th Regiment occupied the toll-bouse at Shi*eck-

ling and carried off the money chest ; 2 dooaniers were killed
and 4 taken prisonera. Lieutenant yon Alten of our army was
wounded.

As numerous hostile detachments had been seen in front of
Yolklingen, above Saarlouis, the commandant of the fortress
despatched to that place 3 companies of the 2nd and 1 company
of the fusilier battalion of the 69th Regiment ; the former were
relieved on the 28th by the remainder of the fuisilier battalion.

On the extreme right flank a hussar advanced picquet had
been driven in from Perl on Saarburg ; and as a few days later
the enemy made a raid on the Metz road in the direction of
Saarlouis as far as Nieder-Villiug, the garrison advanced from
Trier to Conz, and occupied the country as far as the Belgian
frontier and also the towns of Saarburg and Merzig for the pro-
tection of the railway.

On the 24th Lieutenant von Voigt with a party of the 7th
Lancei*8 attempted to destroy the SaargemUnd-Bitsch French
railway near Bliesbrucken, but they only succeeded in removing
some of the rails. Further attempts on the 26th led to a skirmish
near Rheinheim, in which the lancers were supported by some
Bavarian riflemen (5th Rifle Battalion) from Zweibinicken.

At length on the 27th large bodies of French troops of all anns
advanced from Forbach and Saargemiind upon SaarbrUckeUi
and it seemed as if we should soon have some real work to do.
The French occupied the Stiftswald, exchanged shots with de-
tachments of the 40th Regiment, destroyed uie rail to Saarge-
miind on Pmssiau tenitory, and bivouacked near St. Arnual and
Gr. Blittersdorf. A Prussian infeintry detachment, advancing
from Yolklingen to Ludweilcr, was driven back by superior forcea

On the 28th July the French reconnoitred in the direction of
the elevated drill ground at^ Saarbriicken. Two guns on the
Spicheren heights supported their advance, firing about 20
rounds of sheUs ; but the infantry did not approach nearer than
800 yards.

Constant bi*ushes had taken place with the enemy near Merzig,
but as he did not seem to aim at any real enterprise on the
Lower Saar, it was only necessary to occupy Rehlingen and
Dillengon with detachments of the 70th Regiment from Saar-
louis.

On the 29th the adversaiy withdrew his advanced posts more
to the rear. This and the keen way in which he threw up
entrenchments at various points, more particularly on the
Spicheren heights, pointed to a defensive course of action.
Deserters and spies stated that there was already a deficiency of
food among the lai*ge body of troops collected on the other side
of the frontier. All the French, villages between Forbach and
Saargemiind were densely occupied, but at the same time it
became still more evident that the enemy was making a general
movement towards the right. Movements from St. Avola in an
eaaterly direction were reported, and Colonel Wright with the

5th Dragoons oame into collision with the outposts of a strong
French force of all arms near Breidenbach^ half-way between
Zweibriicken and Bitsch. The 4th French Corps also appeared to
be moving from Diedenhofen in a south-easterly direction ; regi-
ments^ which belonged to it had been seen by the outposts to the
noiirh of Bouzonville near Colmen. The French not only restored
the blown-up bridge at Saargemund, but threw first one bridge
of boats and then two more across the Saar in that neighbour-
hood.

A concentration of the enemy's forces on the line Forbach-
Biisch appeared probable.

Lieutenant-Colonel von Pestel had up to this time not only held
Saarbrlicken with a battalion of the 40th Regiment and three
squadrons of the 7th Lancers, but had covei^ed a respectable strip
of the frontier. On the 30th he drove the enemy out of the
St. Amual forest with the 8th company ; a strong patrol also
threatened the enemy's position at Spicheren and Alsting.

It was not, however, the intention at Head-quarters to
allow the weak detachment at Saarbrlicken to be cinished by
an overwhelming force. It was not practicable to support it
by the Ilnd army at present, and Lieutenant-Colonel von Pestel
received orders (firect from Berlin to keep on watching the enemy
with his cavalry, but to withdraw his infantry to Salzbach or
Bildstock.

But General von Qoeben had, on the 31st July, ordered the
other two battalions of the 40th Regiment to Saarbrlicken,
and in view of a retreat bad posted a supporting detachment at
Lebach. Lieutenant*Colonel von Pestel considered that under
those circumstances he could still hold his ground at the exposed
poets. His propositions to this effect, submitted with the con-
currence of the general commanding, were confirmed.

On the Slst a great deal of movement was again remarked in
front of the Saarbriicken position. Fresh reinforcements were
disembarking near Stiring ; strong columns with artillery were
moving from Si Avoid to Forbach. Tlie French forces decreased
in front of Sierck, and at the same time an advanced guard was
pushed forward from Bitsch on Hanviller and entrenched itself
on the heights.

On the south front in advance of the Lauter only douaniers
had been seen up to this time, and in order to gain some intelli-
gence about the enemy Captain Count Zeppelin of the Wiir-
temberg Staff, accompanied by three Baden oflicers and three
dragoons, made a reconnaissance from Lauterburg at the instance
of the commander of the Baden Division. He found the Selz-
bach weakly occupied by cavalry, and eventually reached Nieder-
bronn, where the French General Bemis was stationed with the
12 th Chasseurs. When resting the following day at Scliirlenhof
the little band was surprised. Count Zeppelin alone succeeded in
getting away. Lieutenant Winsloe was killed and the rest taken
prisoners. The expedition, however, procured the information that
at present there were no masses concentrated on this side of Worth.

£ 2

This confirmed a reconnaissance made to the other side of the
Lanter on the 26th by the outposts with a company from each
of the 4th Bavarian and 4th Baden regiments and a squadron of
the Baden Body*guard Diugoons, -which force levied requisitions
in LauterbuTg and cut the telegraphic communication. On the
other hand^ the outposts of the Bavarian brigade came across the
enemy at Dambach and Sturzelbronn to the eastward of Bitsch.

In order to secure the disembarkation of detachments close to
the frontier against surprise, H.R.H. the Crown Prince had by
an order of the 25th from Berlin commanded the Vth and Xlth
Prussian Corps to go into close cantonments near Landau and
Oermei-sheim, and, being temporarily placed under the orders of
Lieutenant-General von Kirclibach, to defend the line of the
Klingbach to the last against the enemy's advance. If the French
crossed the Rhine near Strassburg the Xlth Corps was to pass to
the right bank near Germershcim and reinforce the Baden troops
near Oos. General von Werder, who had been sent to Carlsinihe,
was then to assume the command on that side of the Rhine. If,
however, the enemy pushed forward on the left bank the Baden
and WUrtcmburg Division was to be called up to the Klingbach
by way of Maxau and Gennersheini. If the Bavarian Corps
was not yet available, support would be afforded by the IVth
Army Corps which was now disembarking near Mannheim.

We had found out that the formation of Douay's Corps (7th),
collecting at Belfort, was far from complete. On the other hand
two Divisions of McMahon's Corps (Ist) yfere near Strassburg,
the other two being Echeloned along the railway beyond Bru-
math, apparently in bivouac. Reports from the outposts in
the south of the Palatinate confirmed the movements of hostile
troops in the direction of Bitsch to Weissenburg and the Bien*
wald as well as the occupation of Hornbach, Stlirzelbronn, and
Schonau. One infantry regiment, two regiments of cavalry, and
a battery were said to be in Altenstadt. The Baden outposts
fiirther i*eported that they had remarked an advance from Stross*
burg towards the line of the Lauter, and that Mai-shal AEacMahon
himself had taken this direction. Finally rei)orts were brought
in that a considerable amount of bridi'innr mattSviel was collected
to the .south of Lauterburg.

We might therefore expect at once, or in the course of a few
days, either that the Ilird Army would be attacked on the left of
the Rhine, or that the enemy would cross to the right bank and
invade South Gennany. If the 1st and 5th French Corps united
respectively from Strassburg and Bitsch on the lower Lauter,
there would be 80,000 men available for such an eutei-prise.

In point of lact, the reports received by General Count Both-
mer led us to expect this offensive movement on the 2Gth,
and consequently on that morning all the troops of the Xlth
Corps who arrived by rail were at once concentrated at Landau
by the commander of the 22nd Division, Lieutenant-General v.
Gersdorffy and the two genei*als concerted fresh measures.-

Towards nooHy however, the threatening reports turned out to be
groundless, and the troops were able to occupy their cantonments.

His Royal Highness the Crown Prince quitted Berlin on the
26th July. He firat visited the allied princes, whose contingents
bad been placed under liis orders, at Munich, Stuttgart, and
Carlsruhe, and reached Speyer on the 80 th. He at once ordered
the Baden Division to be concentrated near Carlsruhe and the
Wurtemberg near Graben.

In order to pacify the feai-s of the people the Wurtemberg War
Minister, Lieutenant-General v. Suckow had, in addition, pushed
forward a flying column consisting of the 6th Regiment, 1 depot
squadron, and a depot battery, under the command of ^Colonel
Seubert, by rail to Donaueschingen vid Flochingen, and from
that place by march route or country waggons through the Black
Forest to the valley of the Rhine.

The Royal German head-quarters were compelled to consider
what course should l^e adopted if the French forces, now collected
close to the frontier, should assume the offensive in large bodies
towards the end of the month, however unprepared they might
be for the enterprise.

The 1st Army which numbered about 50,000 infantiy could,
as already mentioned, avoid an attack from superior forces in the
mountainous ground, which was extremely favourable for the
purpose.

The Ilird Army was, it is true, not yet up to its full strength,
and was separate<l by the Rhine. It was, however, in con-
siderable stiength behind the line Landau-Carlsruhe, which was
oidy 19 miles long. The Xlth and half of the Vth Army Corps, a
Bavarian, the Wurtemberg, and the Baden Division were collected
there — a force of about 77,000 infantry. In a few days the arrival
of the other half of the Vth Army Corps and three Bavarian
Divisions would luise this number to 125,000 men.

In accordance with the orders already mentioned thelind Army
concentrated in front of Mainz, its assembly at that point being
rendered secure by the two flank armies and by its distance from
the frontier. It was necessary, however, to move off the Ilnd
Army promptly so as to make room for the troops which were
coming up, as the transport of the Ist and YIth Array Corps
was ordered to commence directly the railways were free.

In this advance through the Palatinate the army had always
to be prepared for a collision with the main body of the Fi^ench.
It nevertheless did not appear hazardous to carry out the first
marches as far as the line Alsenz-Griinstadt on a broad front for
the convenience of the troops, as the enemy himself could not,
even with extraordinary marches, arrive before this front until
the 5th August, and the army- could be concentrated in one day,
even on the wings.

By that date the Ilnd Army, to which the IXth and Xllth
Corps had been definitively assigned on the 30th July, would
be reinforced by the 1st and by half of the Vlth Army Corps,
by which the force at Prince Frederick Charles* disposal would
consist of 194,000 infantry.

The position of the Ist Army was such that the French could
not advance into the Palatinate past it without leaying a strong
detachment, say their 4th Corps, to oppose it Even if thev suc-
ceeded in bringing up the 6th Corps from ChAlons they could then
only attack the Ilnd Army with 183,000 in&ntry. Prince
Frederick Charles could consequently meet the enemy with
superior forces as he debouched from the mountain&

Should the enemy continue still longer in his present state of
inactivity the advance of the Ilnd Army towards the Saar would
be continued, the reinforcements overtaking it by rail according
to the progress it made. The only precaution to be taken was
that the Ist Army Hhould not by too rtapid a rate of march come
singly into collision with the enemy before the Ilnd Army
reached the Saar. Its further movement must be arrested and
meastu^d by the advance of the Ilnd Army.

A telegram was accordingly sent to the Ist Army on* the 29th
July to collect on the line Wadem-Losheim, and the Commander
of the Ilnd Army was ordered to shift the cantonments of the
Ilird and lYth Army Corps as far as the line Alsenz-Gollheim-
Qrlinstadt, a district which, when reconnoitred on a former occasion
by the general staffs had been found to be particularly favourable
for defence. Advanced guards were to be pushed forward beyond
this line, and the rayons temporarily assigned to the IXth and
Xllth Army Corps were to be evacuated as soon as possible so na
to make room for the Ist and Vlth Army Coi-ps.

On the 30th the Commander of the Army was ordered to send
forward without delav the 6th and 6th Cavalry Divisions towards
the frontier Saarbriicken-Bitscb.

Further, the IXth Corps was to be brought up in line with the
IIIixl and IVth ; the remainder to close up shortly.

As regaitls the IIIi^ Army, the opinion was held at the Royal
Head-quarters, that it would now be well, while the Maxau bridge
was still standing, to call up the Baden and Wttrtemberg Division
to the left bank, and then to assume the oft'ensive in a southerly
direction. Lieutenant-Qeneral von Blumenthal, Chief of the
Qeneral Staff, had been already communicated with, and at 9 p.ni.
on the 30th the following telegram was despatched to that effect.
" His Majesty deems it expedient for the Ilird Army, when

joined by the Baden and Wiirtemberg Division, to advance

forthwith by the left bank of the Rhine in a southerly direction,

seek out the enemy and attack him. The construction of

bridges above Lauterburg will be thereby prevented, and South

Germany most effectively protected.

" (Signed) VoN Moltke."

The Commander-in-Chief of the Ilird Army, however, con-
sidered that he must refrain from caiiying out this operation
forthwith, as the army wns not yet collected in its entirety, a
considerable part of the train being still in rear, and the com-
mencement of operations before everything was in readiness
might entail complications which would be difficult to remedy
afterwards.

The Ciown Prince reported on the Slat July that he could not
assume the offensive at present for these reasons, and that he
would leave the Baden and Wurtemberg Division on the right
bank for the present.

In any case, the Ilird Army was in sufficient force on the left
bank of the Rhine for the defensive, and for securing the left
flnnk of the Ilnd Army, should the latter continue its advance.

The march of the Ilnd Ai*my was therefore not interrupted, and
orders were issued on the 31st July that from the 2nd August
the detachments of this army which had still to be forwarded,
and the Corps still in rear were to follow by rail, and that their
points of disembarkation should be advanced to Birkenfeld and
Kaiserslautem, where they would be covered by the forward
position which had meanwhile been gained.

Whilst the preliminary movements of the German armies
approached completion July slipped by without the French uti-
lising the superiority which their taking the field in an unprepared
state had transiently conferred upon them.

The condition of affairs was now reversed, and it only remains
to show what aspect the situation had assumed on the evening of
the 31st July, 14 days after the French declaration of war, for
which we must refer our readera to Sketch No. 1. Sketch No. i.

In the 1st Army the Vllth Army Corps had reached the
line F between the 24th and 2Cth July, the 1 3th Infantry Divi-
sion and the 14th Lancers at Call, the 14th Infantiy Division
and the 5th Lancers at Aachen and Stolberg. The Corps was
marched from those points of disembarkation in two columns by
Daun and Priim through the Eifel to Trier. The corps artillery,
disembarking at Aachen and Call, as well as the first line of
columns and trains, had joined the left wing column, and the
principal part of the second line was in a position to follow at a
day's march in rear.

On the 30th July the advanced guard reached Trier through
the Eifel by forced marches, and the Corps itself was assembled
ready to move on the 31st July ; the van pushed forward beyond
Saarburg and Conz.

A day's rest had been granted the Corps on the 30th July, but
it did not avail itself of the permission until it rcjvched Trier on
the 1st August.

Of the Vlllth Army Corps, the battalions of the IGth Infantry
Division, which were at Coblenz and Simmern moved by route
inarch vid Morbach, and reached the neighbour! lood of Wadem
and Hermeskeil on the 31st July ; those quartered in Trier,
Saarlouis, and Saarbriicken were left there, pending their relief
by other troops.

Two battalions of the 40th Regiment were pushed forward
towards Hilschbach (one mile from Saarbriick), and the 2ud
battalion of the 29th, 2 squadrons of the 9th Hussars, and 2
batteries towards Lebach, on the roads leading to Saarbriick ; the
whole under the command of Major-Qenerid Count Qneisenau.
The other two squadrons of Hussars of the same Division

were on the Saar in Rehlingen and Dillingen ; in Saarlouis
meanwhile there were still 2 battalions of the 69th, and 50 of the
7th Lancers ; the remainder of this squadron was with the fusilier
battalion of the 69th in Yolklingen ; whilst Saarbrucken was occu-
pied by Lieutenant-Colonel v. restel, with the 2nd battalion of
the 40th and 3 squadrons of the Lancers.

The 15th Infantry Division was moved from Coblenz beyond
Morbach ; the troops in garrison on the Lower Rhine had to cross
the Moselle by a bridge thrown near Bemcastel. The infantry
of the Division was on the 31st July near Thalfang and Birken-
feld, a day's march behind the 16th Division.

The 8th Rifle Battalion had already reached Wadem, the 7th
(King^s) Hussars, Nonnweiler. The 33rd East Prussian Fusilier
Regiment, which hud only just completed its mobilisation, em-
barked likewise on the 31st from Cologne for Boppard and St.
Gear, with a view to jouiing its Division from those points. The
batteries of the Division had only reached Bemcastel.

Of the corps artillery, the horse artillery division had already
reached Mettnich and the neighbourhood (cast of Wadem), the
field division Wittlich on the left bank of the Moselle. Trains
and columns were still one or two days' march in rear of the tail
of the Army Corps.

The Corps therefore required some days more before it could
close up. In consequence of a telegram of the 3l8t July, which
ordei^ed the advance of the army on the line Wadern-Losheim,
General v. Steimnctz issued the necessary orders, so that both
Corps could be concentrated there on the 3rd August, the Vllth
Corps at the same time watching the Perl-Trier road, the Vlllth
maintaining communications with Saarlouis.

The 3rd Cavalry Division was not yet formed ; the regiments
were still with their respective Corj^.

Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia, Commander-in-Chief of
the Ilnd Army, joined it on the 30th at Alzey, the point of dis*
embarkation of the army having been, as already mentioned,
transfeiTcd from the Saar and Blies. On the 31 st the Ilird Army
Corps reached Worrstadt by way of Bingen ; its advanced guard,
FUrfeld. The Corps was still deficient of 7 batteries, 3 pioneer
companies, ns well as a part of the firet line of trains, which were
not despatched till after the Xth Army Corps.

As these detachments could be disembarked in Birkenfeld,
there was a prospect of the coi^^s being completely collected by
the 3rd August. The IVth Ai-my Corps was completely united,
even to the second line of waggons and the trains. Its main
body had arrived at DUrkheim and Hochspeyer from Mannheim
and the advance, Kaisei'slautern.

In rear of these two corps came the Xth Corps at Bingen, the
Guard Corps in process of concentration between Woiins and
Mannheim, round Frankenthal. Tiie former was still deficient
of 6 battalions and 7 batteries, as well as a part of the first line
of waggons, which detachments might, however, arrive by the
2nd August. Of the Guard Corps there were still 4 battalions,

4 squadrons, and 4 batteries in rear belonging to the Infantry
Divisions, but these reached Mannheim on the Ist August.

The 3rd Guard Regiment from Hanover alighted on the 31st at
Bingerbriick and joined its corps by march route. On the other
hand, the Cavalry Division of the Guard and the Corps Artillery
(24 squadrons, 7 batteries), with the principal part of the^7'5^ line
of trains, were not yet in position. They might be disembarked
in Kaiserslautem by the 3rd August, which place the heads of
the Guard Infantry Divisions reached on the 4th.

Of the IX th Corps, the 18th Infantry Division was disembarked
in Mosbach from the line B by the 29th July, whilst the 25th
Division remained at Worms. Up to the 31st the IXth Corps
was concentrated round Oppenheini. The greatei* part of the
Xllth Corps, which had been collected round Mosbach and Castel
up to the 31st, crossed the Rhine on that da}'. The advanced
troops cantoned round Nieder 01m, in front of Mainz.

On the 29th the Commander-in-Chief, in accordance with the
directions given from the Royal head-quartera of the same date,
ordered the advance of the Cavalry Divisions under the command
of General v. Rheinbaben. The Gth Division was to take the road
from FUrfeld by Meisscnheim to Nounkirchen. On its right and
left in two columns by brigades came the 5 th Cavalry Division ;
Redem's brigade moving by Sobemheim, Baumholder, on
Vblklingen ; Bredow's Brigade by Dlirklieim and Kaiserslautern
on Homburg. A flank detachment was to keep up communica-
tions with the Ilird Army.

This body of cavahy was to establish itself at a short day's
march on this side of the frontier, and from thence carry out
constant enterprises against the enemy with squadrons and regi-
ments, to keep an unflagging watch on the frontier, and to
find and keep the touch of the enemy.

On the 31st July the right wing column was near Sobernheim,
the centre near Meissenheim. The leading regiments had reached
the line Martinstein (in the Nahe valley) and Lauterecken. The
left wing, with Lieutenant-General v. Rheinbaben, was in Diirk-
heim. The 13th Dragoons, moving on Pirmascns, reached
Winzingcn to the east of Neustadt. Tlie frontier would probably
be reached on the 3rd August. A Division of infantry from each
of the Ilird and I Vth Corps was to follow as support.

On receipt of the order from Berlin removing the point of dis-
embarkation to Birkenfeld and Kaiserslautern, the Commander-
in-Chief determined to order a further advance of the IlIrd
and IVth Corps on the next day. The Ilird Corps was to reach
the lino Birkenfeld-Cusel, with the head-quarters in Baumholder,
on the 3rd August ; the IVth Corps as far as Eaisei-slautem and
to the westward ; the 5th and 8th Infantiy Division on the same
day to make an additional march forwards, covered by the
Cavalry Divisions

Besides the Ilird Army Corps the Xth had to follow it on tho
bad northern road by Chisel ; the remainder by the southern line.

The transport by rail of the Ilird Army was alao being carried
out according to plan, but it was not yet completed.

Between the Elingbach and Speyerbach were cantoned — the
Xlth Corps round Germersheim, the Vth round Landau, and the
4th Bavarian Division near Billigheim and Bergzabem.

To the northward of these the Ist and 2nd Bavarian Divisions
were concentrated round Speyer, the Srd at Neustadt.

The advanced guard of the Xlth Corps — ^the 42nd infSuitry
brigade, 3 squadrons of the 14th Hussars, and the 2nd light field
battery — were near Bheinzabem with outposts at Langenkan-
del, which latter maintained communication towards the left with
the Baden outposts neai* Hagenbach. Their right touched Both-
mei/s Bavarian division, the outposts of which covered the Lan-
dau-Weissenburg road and were m contact with the detachments
posted in the mountains to the westward.

The widely-extending Bien-wald was carefully patrolled in
front of the outposts. In oixler to secure the right flank the
Annweiler pass was occupied by the 58th Regiment, a squadron
of the 4th Dragoons, and 2 guns ; the whole imder the command
of Colonel v. Rex.

The Xlth Corps had united all its combatant troops ; head-
quarters in Landau, staff of 22nd Division in Bellheim, that of
21st in Enittelsheim.

The Vth Corps was still deficient of 4 squadrons and 6 batteries,
and the greater part of its columns and trains was not yet in
position.

In case of an alarm there were to be assembled on the north
bank of the Elingbach — the Xlth Corps at Herxheimweiher
(corps-artillery at BeUheim), the Yth Corps to the west of
Jnsheim (19th infantry brimde as advanced guard between
Rohrbach and Billigheim), l£e Bavarian Division on the ridge
between Heuchelheim and KlingenmUnster.

The 4th Cavalry Division was not yet formed, although all the
regiments intended for it had arrived ; the Divisional staff was
still on the way.

The Ist Bavarian Corps round Speyer was still short of
11 battalions, 8 squadrons and 13 batteries, as well as almost $31
its columns and trains.

The Ilnd Bavarian Corps round Neustadt was also deficient of
its columns and trains, and of the following troops — 1 battalion,
4 squadrons, 11 batteries.

The Baden and Wurtemberg Field Divisions were concentrated
round Carlsruhe and Qraben, with their establishments complete
and ready to move.

Altogether the Ilird Army, exclusive of the trains and
columns, was still deficient of 12 battalions, 16 squadrons, and
30 batteries. There were now 116 battalions, 86 squadronS| and
300 guns in position, ready to oppose a hostile attack.

After inquiries had been addressed by the Royal Head-quarters
on the 31st to the different Commanders-in-chief as to the day
their armies would be ready to operate, the Srd August was

appointed the day for all the troops to be ready and formed,
with the necessary trains and columns, and for the armies to be
considered in a perfect condition for opeiations.

The troops were abundantly furnished with maps of those
districts which would probably be first affected by the war
through the agency of the geographical-statistical division of
the Pinissian Head-quarter Staff (Colonel v. Sydow), considerable
assistance having been rendered by tlie topographical ofiice at
Munich (Major Orff). About 170,000 sections of France, in-
cluding more than 132,000 on a scale of 1 : 80,000, and about
62,000 sections of western Germany, had been distributed up to
the 31st July.

The successful feeding of such considerable bodies of troops
as were collected on the French frontier at the end of July was
beset with great difficulties owing to the sliort time permitted
for preparation, yet the German War Minister and the Intendant-
General of the army, Lieutenant-General v. Stosch, overcame
them successfully.

Twenty field-ovens were at once constructed at each of the fol-
lowing places : Cologne, Coblenz, Bingen, Mainz, and Saarlouis, and
the flour stores of the nearest peace-magazines were placed .at their
disposal. Large bakeries for the army wore set up in hoases near
Frankfurt-a-M., and in Mannheim ; and the bakeries established
in the larger garrisons situated on railways were enlarged and
rendered capable not only of suppl3^ing the current wants of
the field troops, but also of forming considerable stores of bread
and reserve supplies of biscuit.

In the Corps districts the Intendantur secured a six-weeks'
supply of food, oats, and hay, which was forwarded to a point
within the rayon of concentration of each Corps ; and a con-
siderable part of the '' fortress supplies " from Cologne and Wesel
was forwarded by steamer to Bingen and applied to the use of
the field army.

As in the first days of the transport the Army Corps could only
forward their supply of food and forage by taking it with them
in the railway waggons, or by attacliing separate waggons for
the purpose, the troops were ordered to relieve the commissariat
by supplying themselves within the rayon of their position ;
a special 14 days' reserve of flour and oats Wtis collected
in the large magazines on the railways, which was kept com-
plete by filling it np after each issue. A six-weeks' supply,
forming a reserve, of food, oats, and hay, for seven army corps,
was accumulated in Cologne, Coblenz, Bingen, and Frankfrirt-
a-M., whilst Baden formed magazines for the army in Heidelberg
and Meckesheim, Bavaria in Germersheim, Ludwigshafen and
Neustadt, and Wtirtemberg in BruchsaL

At the end of July, when th^ greatest part of the troops had
been moved to the front (receiving the regular ration at different
feeding stations on the road), the Army Corps were able to beffin
to move forward their supplies of food, so that at the end of ^s

month and the commencement of the next about 60 through-
provision trains were forwarded to the Rhine.

Meanwhile the waggon parks were completed; every Army
Corps received a park of 400 waggons, each drawn by two hones.
The General-Etappen Inspection had altogether 3,000 waggons
at its disposal

Naval Preparations up to thk SIst July.

In consequence of the great superiority of the French navy the
North German naval forces could not compete with the enemy
on the open sea without exposing themselves to almost certain
annihilation, and afterwards laying their defenceless shores open
to an invasion by the enemy ; their efforts must tend in pre-
ference to the defence of the war harbours, the more important
commercial ports, and the mouths of the rivers, against the
enemy's inroads.

Vice- Admiral Jachmann's proposal, which met with the royal
approval, as to the duties of the navy in the impendin^Q^ -w^ar,
very properly laid stress on this defensive role, but at the same
time did not exclude the possibility of dealing a combined blow
with the three iron-clad frigates, under specially favourable cir-
cumstances, with prospect of a partial success. In the distribution
of the naval forces {vide Appendix IV.) we were guided by
the probable operations of the enemy and by considerations for
those points on the coast which were either of the greatest im-
portance or could be defended most effectively by a fleet. The
most important object of defence was the naval establishment
at Wilhelmshaven (at this time not quite finished) on accoimt
of its future importance and its situation in regard to the mouthi
of the Weser and Elbe.

The naval forces concentrated at this point would lie on the
flank of the enemy's fleet in the event of nis tiying to run into
those rivers, and would be always ready to attack or cut the
communications of an enemy operating to the eastward when a
fiftvourable opportunity presented.

The concentration of the tliree iron-clad frigates was therefore
necessary both for the defence of Wilhelmshaven and for the
possibility of an offensive blow or a successful action, whilst the
presence of the ironclads " Aiminius " and '* Fiince Adalbert " on
the Elbe offered the best chance of a well-timed co-operation.

On the other hand, a proportionately weak naval rorce co-ope-
i*ating with the harbour fortifications, the river obstructions and
torpedoes, would suffice for the protection of the Baltic harbours
and rivers against the enemy's inroads. The building and armsr
ment of these fortifications was pushed forward in the most
active manner, especially at Kiel.

Besides those ships absolutely required for the defence of our
coasts, the corvette " Elizabeth " alone remained for employment
as a cruiser ; a first-class vessel of its kind, but still of little avail

against the numerous and more foimidable ships of the enemy.
So little expected was the sudden outbreak of war that the four
ironclads, " Konig Wilhelm," " Friedrich Carl," " Kron Pi-inz,"
and " Prinz Adalbert," wci'e, at the time when the first diplomatic
complications occurred, formed into a squadron under H.RH.
Prince Adalbert of Prussia, and were cmising in the Atlantic
Ocean. They had left Plymouth after a few necessary repairs
on the 10th July, but in consequence of the threatening news
brought by the ironclad " Prinz Adalbert " from Dartmouth on
the 13th, they returned to Plymouth with a view to commencing
their homeward journey to Wilhelmshaven, which they reached
on the ICth ; preparations were made for an energetic defence
against the enemy. The ironclad " Prinz Adalbert," in accord-
ance with the plan of distribution, was moved to the mouth of
the Elbe directly after the arrival of the ironclad squadron off
the Jade.*

As from the turn affaii*s had taken, all common action of the naval
forces had to be abandoned, H.RH. Prince Adalbert of Prussia
was recalled from his command in order to take part in the cam-
paign of France at the head-quarters of the 1st Anny, The
chief command of the North Sea naval force devolved upon Vice-
Admiral Jachmann ; that of the Baltic, head-quarters Kiel, on
Rear- Admiral Heldt.

The organisation of the naval force kept pace with the suc-
cessive calling-in of Reserves and Seewehr, and was finished
before the end of the month. The ships were sent to their stations
immediately they were ready, those intended for the North Sea
being first despatched.

On the loth the "Comet" was moved from Kiel, and on the
16th the "Pfeil," from Swinemunde, to the North Sea.

The "Vineti/' which required repairs, and the sailing ships
"Gesion," "Niobe," and "Rover" were towed from Kiel to
Swinemunde under the conuDand of Lieutenant Schulze of the
Navy in order to anticipate any attempt on the pait of the
enemy to capture or destro}*^ these sliij^s in the present incom-
plete state of the harbour fortifications and before the bay of
Kiel could be efTectivi^y defended.

On the 24th July the " Cyclops," " Hay," nnd " Sperber '* lull
Kiel under the command of Captain- Lieutenant von Rostitz for
the North Sea, and reached the mouth of tho Elbe on the 2Sth,
and between the 26tli and 31st July 7 gun boats of tho 2nd

♦ The fighting powers of the iron-cla«l frigates "Kiinig Wilhchn " and ** Friedrich
Carl," had uDforttuiatcly heen considcntbly impaired by rcccut damages, for the repair
of "which there had been neither time iiar means.

One of the cylinders of the " Konig AVilhelm" was damapjcd hy the heating of the
engines daring the cruise, which prevented the full steam power being used, and the
si)eed of the vessel was thereby reduced from 14 to 10 knots.

The " Friedrich Carl," when passing " the Great Belt " in charge of a pilot on its
outward voyage at the end May, had touched the ground and lost two blades of its
screw, by which the speed was considerably lessened.

dass, "Habicht/' ''Jiiger/' "Hyane/' •' Natter," ''Schwalbe/'
" Wespe/' and '' Fuchs " were despatched from Sael and Stralstmd
to the North Sea vid the Eider canal.

On the eyening of the 27th the ^* Arminius " left Kiel for its
place of destination, followed on the morning of the 28th by the
" Elisabeth/'

The arriyal of the French fleet at Skagen on the 28th put an
end to these movements and orders of re^Jl were sent to both
ships, but the counter-order only reached the ** Elisabeth/' The
" Arminius '* continued on its oourse, and came in sight of the
enemy's squadron on the 28th.

In order to delude the enemy, the commander. Captain
Livonius, apparently *' went about," but as soon as the enemy's
ships were out of sight bore up for the Swedish coast, and taking
during the night a northerly course continued his way without
interruption and reached Cuxhaven on the 81st July.

Although not contemplated in the original plan of defence a
gun-boat flotilla was ordered to be formed on the 22nd July at
Stralsund, consisting of the yacht " Grille " and the gun-boats
" Drache/' '' Blitz," and " Salamander," under the orders of Cap-
tain of Corvette Count von Waldersee.

The distribution of the naval forces on the 3 1st July was
therefore as follows : —

A. — North Sea.

(a) On the Jade, east (6) On the Elbe, (c) On the Heven,
of Wangeroog. off Cuxhaven. off Ilnsom.

« Konig WiUielm.''
'* Kronprins."
** Friedrich Carl."
M Basiliak."
"Comet'*'
" Wolf.*'

" Arminius."
" Prin* Adalbert."
*« Cyclopi."
" Hay."
•« Bperber."

** Pfeil."

!d) Under weigh
or the North Sea,
in the Eider
CauoL

" Habicht."
« Xager."
«' Hy&ne."
" Natter."
•* Schwalbe."
" Weape."
** Enohfl."

(a) OffFriedrichaort.

" Renown."
« EUaabeth."
" Preuas. Adler."
« Camiileon."
" Tiger."
•' Scorpion."

B.— Baltic.

(() Off Stralaund.

•« Grille."
« Drache."
« BliU."
M Salamander."

(e) New Channel, off
Daniig.

« Nymphc."

Yice- Admiral Jacbmann had taken up a defensive position wiUi
the three iron-clad frigates at the Outer-Jade, near the Wanm-
roog channeli as the most favonrable for awaiting an attadc;
communication with Wilhelmshaven (four Gennan miles) was
kept up by hired steamers.

Meanwhile, the same evils, which had attended the French
land forces from the premature declaration of war, were repeated
with the navy.

Admiral Rigault, the ^Minister, declared publicly in the Council
that the navy was not prepared for a great war. The rapid
commissioning of all the ships must meet with considerable
hindrances, and, owing to the iusufliciency of the supplies in the
arsenals, the most necessaiy stores were deficient. A com-
paratively long time was therefore requisite to equip the fleet
for sea.

It was only on the afternoon of the 24th July that the iron-
clad frigates '* Surveillante," " Gauloise," " Ouyeune," *' Flandi-e,"
" Ocean,'* " Thetis," the iron-clad corvette ** Jeanne d'Arc," and
the despatch boat " Le Cassard '* put to sea from Cherbourg in
presence of the Empress.

Two days previously Vice-Admiral Count Bouet-Willaumez
had been infoimed that he would have to take command of the
fleets and that it would be subsequently reinforced up to a
strength of 14 iron-clad frigates and a large number of dispatch
boats.

Besides this, there was a prospect of a second fleet being
equipped at an early date, under the command of Vice-Admiral
la Biond^re le Noury, consisting of gun boats, floating batteries
and transports, and which was intended for the embarkation
of troops for the landing expedition. The strength and position
of these troops has already been mentioned.

Admiral Bouet-Willaumez's instructions were to go first to
the Sound. He was to detach the frigate '^Thetis" to Copenhagen,
where it appears negotiations for a coalition had been already
mooted. The squadron itself was however to turn back at
nightfall, in order to blockade the Fi*ussian ships in Jade Bay.
Meanwhile reinforcements would arrive, and the Admiral was
then to go on to the Baltic, leaving behind a division under
Rear-Admiral Dieudonnd.

At the same time Count Bouet-Willaumez was ordered to
observe Russia. With a view to meeting any coui"se which this
Power might take, the slii|)S in the Mc(li terra nean were ordered
to unite in a squadron at Brest, where they would be in a position
to operate either in the Baltic or in the Mediterranean.

Count Bouet first intended to go in search of and attack the
North German iron-clad squadron which he imagined was still off
the English coast. He vciy soon discovered that owing to the
timely resolve of Prince Adalbert these ships were safe, and
he continued his course to the Baltic, not, however, without some
loss of time.

On the 28th July, as the fleet was rounding Cape Skagen,
it was met by Captain de Champeaux who had been sent to
Copenhagen. He had succeeded not only in procuring Danish
pilots, but also in finding a suitable victudling dep6t for the navy
in Kioge Bay on the east coast of Secland. He demanded in the

name of the French Ambassador at the Danish Court that the
fleet would at once enter the Baltic as Denmark was ready to
rise up directly the first French detachment set foot on land.

We now know that no force for a real landing was carried by
this first squadron of the French fleet. Admiral Willaumez also
considered himself bound by his instructions, and that he must
therefore delay in complying with the Ambassador's views until
the receipt of further orders. He hastened to communicate with
his Government asking for fresh instructions.

This despatch crossed with a telegi*am fixjm Paris, ordering the
Danish neutrality to be respected, and at the same time com-
manding him to select a point of observation from which the
enemy's coast could be watched, and which would also serve as a
dep6t of supply.

If this was to sei-vc for the North Sea as well as the Baltic,
it could not plainly be done by the maritime forces at the
Admh^ars disposal Uncertain what to do he resolved to await
an answer to his despatch.

Thus the French naval operations came to a standstill by the
end of July contrary to our expectations.

Meanwhile, on the pait of the Germans, the necessary troops had
arrived at the difierent fortresses to oppose any landing. Up to
the 27th July the mobilised field troops of the 1st Ilnd IXth and
Xth Anny Corps were available for the purpose. On their de-
part\ire they were replaced by the detachments specially intended
for coast defence. Of these, —

The 17th Infantry Division arrived on the 2Sth of July in
Hamburg, pushing forward large detachments to Liibeck and
Neumiinster as posts of observation.

The 2nd Landwehr Division assembled round Bremen by the
Ist August, with detachments in Oldenburg and Bremerhafen.

The Guard Landwher Division reached Hanover partly by rail
and partly b}^ road, between the 29 th July and 3rd August, and
was posted along the Celle-Uelzen railway.

H.R.H. the Grand Duke of Mecklenbm-g Schwerin established
his head-quaiiers in Uhlenhorat, near Hamburg, on the 30th
July.

Tlie 1st Landwehr Division would probably arrive near
Wismar and Lubeek between the 8th and 12th Aumist.

The different Divisions were so distributed that the rearmost
<letachmcnts could move by rail within 12 houi*s of the receipt of
the order.

Besides the Divisions above mentioned, there were the foUowinjv
(•anison and depot troops at the disjKJsal of General Vogel von
Falkenstein the Govcmor-Geneml, 77 battalions, 5 rifle com-
panies, 33 squadrons, 17 batteries, 48 companies of garrison and
marine artillery, as well as 11 pioneer companies; a total of
89,000 or 90,000 fighting men.

Arrangements were forthwith made for employing part of them

for defence against a hostile landing, and on the 28th Julj' an
order was issued by the Governor- General for all the depot troops,
not already disposed for imme<liatc defence of the coast, to hold
from one third to one half of their foi-ce in a constant state of
readiness for employment against the enemy.

Thus the security of the countiy was amply provided for and
the German aimies were ready to cany the war into the enemy's
country as a defence against his aggression.

The presence of the King with the anny was now nccessaiy,
and the departure of His Majesty with the head-quartei^s from
Berlin for Mainz took place in the afternoon of the 31st July.

Tlie stnigglc about to commence was a ten-ible one. It called
seriously to mind the great time of the War of Liberation, and
earnest, though enthusiastic, was the spirit of the German people
which now took up arms.

With this feeling uppennost the King of Pnissia ordered the
revival of the decoration of the " Iron Cross " for the new war
against the old enemy, and responded to the patriotic sentiments
which reached him from every i)rovince of Germany. The pro-
clamation issued on the 25th July "To the German people"
inns as follows : —

" From all tribes of the German fatherland, from all classes
of the Ctennan people, even fix)m across the seas, such numerous
manifestations of devotion and self-denial for our common
country have reached me on the occasion of the impending
struggle for the honour and independence of Geiinany ; mani-
festations proceeding from communities and coiporations, from
societies and private people, that I feel impelled to testify
publicly to the harmony of the Gennan feeling, and in ex-
pressing my royal thanks to assure my people that time shall
never alter the troth which we now mutually plight. Love for
a common Fatherland, the unanimous rising of the Geimaii
races and their princes, has healed and conciliated all differences
and opposition, and united as never before, may Gei-many find
the security in her unanimity as in her right, that the war will
bring her a lasting peace, and that from the seed sown in blood
a harvest of German freedom and unity will with God's blessing
be reaped.

(Signed) *' WlLUAM."

Before leaving his residence His Majesty took leave of his
subjects with an act of royal grace : —

" To my people !

"In leaving this day for the anny to participate in the
struggle for the honour of Germany and the presentation of
that which we esteem most dear, I hereby grant an amnesty

29982. F

for political crimes and offences in I'ecognition of the unanimous
rising of my people. I have instructed the liGnister of State
to submit for my approval a pardon in these cases.

'' My people know, with me, that we neither bear enmity,
nor are we really responsible for the breach of peace.

'' But being challenged we are resolved, like our fathers, and
trusting firmly in Qod, to accept the struggle for the salvation
of the Fatherland.

(Signed) " WiLLlAM.

Berlin 31st July 1870."

General Description of the Ground for the First

Period op the Campaign.

With a view to tlio clearer comprelieiiBion of subsequent
events, it will be well to cast a glance at the conformation of
the thcivtre of war. This, as wo know, was ti^ansferrcd at tlio
outset to the left bank of tlie Khine, owing to the rapid con-
centration of the German armies and the hesitation at the
frontier of their ill-prepared adveraary. Before long the strife
was entirely removed to French temtor5\

In following the militaiy operations of the first half of the
month of August, the groimd l>etween the Rhino and Moselle
first attracts our attention.

I. Country Westward of the Rhine as far as the Saar

AND the Vosges.

Parallel to the course of the Rhino, between Basle and
Mninz, for some 200 miles, there extends on the west a broad
plain vaiying in width from 14 to 23 miles. This plain is but
imperfectly closed on the south by the hilly Sundgau and the
spurs of the Vosges, owing to the existence of a gap some 23
miles wide, between the latter mountains and the Jura — the
so-called " troupe de Belfort " of the French. The latter has at
all times formed the natural communication between Germany
and Burgundy, and has been utilised for the construction of a
canal and railway. It is closed by the fortress of Belfort.

Veiy similar is the configui*ation of the ground on the right
bank of the Rhine, the lowland being shut m on the north by
the baiTier of the Taunus. These mountains divert the course
of the Rhine westward, until it agaui forces its way in a
northerly direction through the scliistose mountains of the
Lower Khine.

On the east, between the Taunus and the spurs of the
Odenwald, there extends at the mouth of the Main a broad
plain, through which pass the roads leading from the Palatinate
to Franconia and Hesse. These approaches to the heart of
Gei-many are guarded by Mainz.

The West-Rhenish plain, first alluded to, has an average Watt-Blieii
breadth in Southern Alsace of 14 miles ; it is much intersected ifitan.
with woods, and between Thanu and Molslieim is sharply
defined by the eastern foot of the Upper Vosges. The water-
coiu'ses nui for the most part parallel to the Rhine, thereby
ofiering impediments to movements of troops westward. More*
over the defenders have points of support in the fortresses of
Neu-Brisa,ch and Schlettstadt.

BheiuaU
Falotinate.

Bhenitli

In Northern Alsace, between the Ik'euseh and the Lunter,
the middle and lower Vosgea recede from the Rhine to a
diatance of .about 23 miles, but this increased intervening; space
assumes the form of a hilly district, the eastern spurs of which
frequently protrude to within fimr miles or so of the stream, and
in some places are bathed by its watere. Through this tract
of country the tributaries of the Rhine flow chiefly fi-om west
to east. The movements of troops parallel to the Rhine arc in
consequence repeatedly inteifered with by obstacles, the diffi-
culties of which are increased, especially to the north of
Haguenau, by extensive woods and hop gardens. The main

Eoint of suppru't for the defence ot* Northern Alsace lies in
trassburg. Weissenburg, Lauterbiu'g, and Haguenau had
already lost their character as foi-tresses.

Nfathward of the Lnuter, extending from Lauterburg to
Worms, lies the plain of the Rhenisii Palatniate, some 14 miles
broad, its western border marked by the steep and rocky
terraces of the Haardt. Neither has the gi'oiuid here the
character of a true plain, as the spurs of the mountain are con
tinned in low ranges of hills, between which the ramifying
rivulets and the frequently extensive woods afford numerous
]>ositions. If acting on the defensive in this country, the
Germans would be supported by Landau and Germei'slieim ;
if on the offensive, the extensive Bienwald on the left bank of
the Lauter would become of importance.

Lastly, to the northward of Worms, stretches the ui)land of
Rhenish Hesse, a gently undulating country, liigldy cultivated
and for the most part free from forest.

The fi^iarply defined mountains forming the boundary on the
west — the range of the Vosges — ^inclusive of the northern part,
the so-called Haardt, is about 150 miles long from Ronchamp to
Gollheim, and from 18 to 22 miles wide. The range is divided
at about the middle of its length by the deep mvine at Zabem
(Saverne) into two portions, which exhibit remarkable dif-
ferences in their structure. The southern Vosges form lofty
chains of mountains, which ai'e clothed with the most lovely
toroBt-giowths, and capped with dome-shaped summits; the
abundance of water in the valleys enclosed by them has
operated in developing a thriving industry. The crest is only
pierced by a lew narrow passes. The less elevated northern
Vosges, bomided on the west by the ccmrso of the Saar fiom
Saarebonrg* to SSaargemiind, bears the general appearance of
an upland })lateau, which falls gently away towards Lorraine ;
on its eastern side the ground is cut up by naiTow gorges, and
descends abruptly to the valley of the Rhine. In the Haardt
the Vosges again rise and become more mountainous, but the
table-land characteristics can still be traced. Deeply-cleft
ravines present narrow defiles closed in by forests anil pre-
cipitous rocks, without any gromul on the flanks accessible to
troops. The gap at Zabern, previously alluded to as the line of

* Beforenco u hero mado to Uppc Soarburg, in Iiomioo.

demarcation between the Bouthern and northern Vosges, is
impoiiant in many waj'R. Hero tlio Zorn breaks through the
monntaiu between walls of rock 300 feet higJ), opening a path
for the Strasflbiirg-Paris railway and the Rhine-JIanie canal;
the road, on the other hand, shapes its courae fiu*ther north by
Pfalzbm-g.

In Rlienish Hesse the sharply defined boundary of the
mountains is absent. The upland countiy merges gi-adually
on the south-west into a mountainous district, which is much
broken up and beara no distinctive name.

We here enter the tract between the Haardt and the Himds- Palatinate.
riick, about 20 miles broad, defined approximately by the two
Hues of road : Kirclilieimbolanden-KaiserRlautern-Saarbriicken,
and Kreuznach-Birkenfeld-Mci'zig. The landscape is partly
made up of broadly undulating well-cultivated hills and partly
of lofty wooded mountain spurs, ^vith here and there a steep
peak uplifting itself, like the Donnersberg on the east. In the
valleys, which are more numerous in the Nahe and Glan
districts and less frequent in that of the Saar, lies a network ot
roads. This is the Palatinate so well known in military history
as the land of passage from Lorraine to Geiinany,* with the old
imperial road and new railways leading from the Saar to tho
middle Rhine. In addition to these roads, with the road-
jimctions at Kaiserslautem and Homburg, we should not omit
to mention those on the noith in the Hundsriick, which latter
is shaiply defined towai'ds the west by the lower Saar.

The distance between that portion of the Rhine from Mann-
heim to Coblenz and the Saar, whether we pass through the
moimtainous tract of the Palatinate or the Hundsriick, averages
from five to seven marches, which distance had to be accom-

{^lished in general by the troops of the 1st and Ilnd Aimies.
n the case of the Illrd Army it was a matter of importance,
after its first advance southwards, that the upper Saar lay con-
siderably nearer to the Rhine than tho lower. The distance
from Worth at the eastern foot of the Vosges to Saargemiuid
or San-ebourg at the western is only three marches. But there
were mountains to be crossed, and of the numerous roads tho
two of gi'eatest moment were baned by tho fortresses of
Bitsch and Pfalzburg.

Thus, at the very opening of the campaign, the Vosges
present no unimportant oDstacle to both contending Powers.

II. LORRiVINE.

The extensive province westward of the Saar bears the
name " Loiraine," and includes in its whole extent the greater
part of the departments of the Moselle, Meuse, Meurthe and

* The district is knot«-n scieniiilcally as the Saarbrucken or Rhenish PaUitioaie
coal-meamunes and poiphjritic rocks. In the Southern Vosgei, granite is the
prevBiling formation; in the Northern Yosges, the now red sandstone j and in
tiorraine, the lias and oolite.

Vosges. The ciiistoinaiy division of Lon*aine, according to
language, is of lesA importance in a military point of view, but
it is necessary to dmw a distinction between Northern and
Southern Loniiine ; the division between the two is foimed by
the natural trough which extends from the Vosges to the
Meuse, and along which pass the Rhine-Mai-ne canal and the
Sti-assburg-Paris railway.

The IdghUind of Northern Lorraine extends eastward beyond
the Upper Saar, where it blends with the gentle western slopes
of the Vosges. Taking its average length between the Saar
and the Argonnos at 87 miles, and its bi*eadth between thd
Khme-Mame canal and the northern frontier of France at 60
miles, it includes an area of about 5,200 square miles.

In this richly cultivated and generally open district we find
gently undulating arable land of fertile character alternating
with extensive tmcts of well- wooded hills, here and there vaiiea
with rugged mountain ridges.

On tiie east the slopes of the plateau of Northern Loiraine
below Saarbiiicken recede to a greater distance from the left
bank of the Saar, giving place to the coal basin which laps
over towards the west between Saarlouis and Saarbriicken.
About half way between Saarbiiicken and &Ietz it first lises to
a height of 150 feet above the plain, foiming a good position
facing the east.

East of the Forbach railway, at St. Avoid, a spur from the
high table land juts out towards Saarbrilcken ; it is well defined
south of the town by the Spicheren heights, and is continued
again on the right bank of tlie Saar, so that the river at this
point flows in a deep valley. The steep declivities of the
Westrich between Homburg and Landstulil may be considered
as a continuation of the highland of Loin-aine, and this district
again, with its unifonn plateaux, is linked with the llaardt by
the heights of Pinnasens.

Below Saarlouis the dintaiice i>f the French frontier from the
valley of the Saar was only five miles ; it approached to wthin
a mile of it near Saarbriicken, at the commanding position of
Spicheren ; a short distance above that place it touched the
river, and at Saargemiind crossed to the right bank.

In consequence of the assembly of large bodies of French
troops upon this frontier, it became nccessaiy, as wo have seen,
to give up the lino of th(^ Saar as the point of concentiation of
the Germans, and it nnist now bo gained and crossed in the
course of the operations.

In the country l)otwccn the Saar and the llosclle the folds
of the ground lie cliielly north and smith, the Kteepur side facing
the cast. South-east of the Saargeniihid-Nancy road the con-
stantly recurring hillw, woods, and shoets of water impede the
free movonicnt of large bodicH of troops.

To the north-west of the 8anie road, and therefore on the
shortest line of march from tlio lower Saar to the MosoUei
deeply cut valleys, with their rivei'S, have to be crossed; for

instance, between Baarbriickeu and Metz, the valleys of the
French and of the German Nicd ; and between Saarloms and
Diedenhofen (Thionyille), those of the Nied below the point of
junction of the two rivers of that name, and the Canner. Still
nirther south, on the ix)ad from Saarbriicken to Pont-ii-Mousson^
and beyond the two valleys of the Nied, lies the obstacle formed
by the Seille. «A11 these valleys may be made use of in a
greater or less degree to bar an enemy s progi-ess westward.

But of still more vital importance is it to oppose his passage
of the Moselle. This river, in conjunction with the so-called
Mousson-Moselle hiUs, offers an extended position, which ap-

5 roaches the line of the Saar more nearly on the north. The
istaiice of these two positions from each other is about 50
miles between . Sarrebourg and Nancy, and only 14 between
Merzig and Sierk.

In north-easteni, and even in central France, we frequentljr
meet with rolling groimd forming natural ramparts, of a curvi*
linear «8ection, and of considerable length and elevation. The
western slopes fall gentlv away in the direction of Paris, but
the eastern faces ai*e nearly always more or lees abrupt, and are
broken up into steep and rugged mountain slopes. French
geologists look upon these features of gromid as natural barriers
for the protection of the capital. In approaching the ]Mosello
from the east one of these fassurod and creviced natural ram-
parts rises up before us. The river brcalvs through it and flows
iJong its whole length as fur as Pi-ussian tcrritoiy.

Above Frouard th.e Mcurthe forms a natural continuation to
the line of the Moselle. Nancy, it is true, is deficient of
artificial defences, but there is the double water-line of the
river and canal to bo overcome. Still move to tlu5 rear a fresli
obstacle is presented by the Moselle and the fortress of TduI^
Below Frouard, in tiie strip of ground with which we are here
more particularly concerned — at Pont-a-Mousson, for instance-^
the vfilley of the MoBelle has an average breadth of 2,000 paces.
It seldom narrows to 500 paces, and at Metz its breadth in-
creases to 3,000 or 4,000 paces. Tlio Btcep slopes of the valley
on both sides rise above tlio river t<> a heiglit of Honic 300 to

500 feet.

Some 5 to 9 miles to the east of the obstacle forined by the
Moselle lies the already mentioned Seille, cradled in a valley
equally deep, but not nearly so broad. The gi*ound between
the two. rivers is overspread by a narrow mountain belt, across
the southern part oif which he hidden in sunken defiles the
roads from the Seille to the Moselle. On the right liand^ of the
Moselle close to Pont-arMousson, a vine-clad hill rises in
terraces to a height of COO feet above the level of the river,
the Bat summit of which is crowned by the village of Mousson,
and the old castellated ruins. This point, from the extent of
valley which it commands, is of great importance for securing
the passage of the river in that direction.

At Jony. aux Arches the Moselle emerges from the high
of the Mousson plateau, where its northern extremity on

the right bank is terminated by the isolated conical liill
** Chateau St. Blaise," some 400 feet high. Lower down on the
left bank, Mont St. Quentin commands the geneml level of the
river at Metz by some 600 feet ; whilst e.ast of the fortress the
so-called Motz plateau, at a distance of two miles, hardly
attains the relative altitude of 200 feet. Again, north-east of
the depression through which nicanderH the do Vallicrcs rivnlct,
that is to say, in fiiMit of forts liellecroix and St. Julien, the
land riHOH Honio 100 feet higher. Tlic last-meutionud plateau
then stretches away nortliward between the Moselle and the
Canner, its margin generally preserving a relative distance from
the river of 1,000 to 1,500 paces, but m some places bordering
immediately on its banks.

This in a military point of vicAV is of no slight importance,
as the high sides of the valley on the left bank of the Moselle,
with its outlying terraces so well adapted for batteries, recede
just below Metz to a distance of 5,000 p<aces fi'om the river,
and thus the valley, with its network of roads and buildings,
18 commanded from the less elevated heights on the right bank.
Even north of the mouth of the Orne the right bank of the
Moselle has still somewhat the advantage, although the left side
of the valley approaches nearer to the river at this point.

The Moselle between Frouard and Diedenhofen has an
average breadtli of from 150 to 200 paces. The fords are only
practicable after continuous dry weatlier. There are permanent
bridges at Frouard, Marbache, Dieulouard, Pont-i\-Mousson,
Corny, and Ars, but farther doAvn stream there ai-e only the
bridges within the rayon of the two fortresses.

In conclusion, let us turn our attention to West Lorraine,
on the left bank of the Moselle. It extends northward of Toul
between the Moselle and Meuse as a gently undulating upland
eovmtry of a generally uniform and feiiuo character. The
eastern slope fooing the Moselle is high, wooded, and fissured.
Above Metz there are no iutermediato outlying terraces, and
the roads ascend by steep slopes or thi*ough narrow forest
defiles. Below Metz, howe^'cr, there is ahvays a lower ten-ace,
increasing in breadth as wo move northwards, iu fVont of the
invariably wooded and fissured plateau. Let us remark also
the croBS*valleys of the district t the Kupt do Mad, extending
ftu'thest on the south, and running by Thiarcoui-t j the valley
of the Orucj. passing by Ktain and Uonflans, on the north.
Between the two lie the shorter valleys of Gorze, Gravelotte,
ChAtol, and others.

The sketch just given will permit of a general idea being
fonnod of tjio impoi*tance of the Moselle and the Vosges as
lines of defence.

If the French plan of invasion and the network of railwajrs
led to tlic assembly of their forces iu two main groups, tois
sepai-ation could only have been remedied by an immediate
advance. Tairying ni such a position in presence of au
energetic foe could not fail to bo punished, for apy advance on
his part, whether by the lower or upper Baar, would threaten

ihe retreat of the unbeaten wing of the army based on Lorraine,
and, as a consequence, might even entail the abandonment ot
the line of the Sloselle.

The Gennan annies were at the outset in close intercom-
munication between the Nahe and Laiiter. When therefore
they assumed the offensive, the position of the adversary com-
pelled them to advance on divergent lines. From that moment
the importance of the A'osges as regards ourselves became
manifest. AVe must cross the mountains in order to reap from
the success of one wing the fullest advantage with the other.
But there was this gi'oat difference, that the defeat of one of
the German annies would at the worst have thr(nvii it hack on
the others, whereas a victory for our arms would drive the French
aimies away fi^om one another.

Biit at what cost it would be possible for us to cross the
Saar on the right, Ihe Vosges on the left, and subsequently the
Moselle, remamed at firat an open (question. The coui-se of the
operations has given tlie solution.

The RoTiVL Head-Quarters at Mainz.

We have already seen tliat by the close of July the (central
pivot of the German military forces had been transferred to the
south-west of Mamz, and that the advanced wings were but a
few miles distant from the French frontier. At this period of
the concentration Mainz formed the most suitable link between
those armies which had already moved forward, the corps
about to follow and the resources in rear. For those reasons
the royal head-quaitei-s were firat shifted to that place. The
train by which His Majesty tmvelled left BerUn at 6 p.m. on
the Slst July, and reached Mainz vift Magdeburg, Hanover and

Cologne, early on the 2nd August.*
Ihe rejoicingfi

^ . ^.'8 which greeted the King at every stages of
his journey to the Rhine,t were the sincercst pledge that he
was leading against the foe a united people, who only awaited
the opportunity to testify by deeds to tlieir self-sacr Hieing
devotion. Until more serious works were demanded of theni,
their sentiments found kindly expression in the hearty greeting
accorded to the troops in transit, for whoso benefit an abuiuU
ance of refreshment, in addition to the regulation ration, had
been jprovided, and for the proper distribution of wliieh special
committees had been organised.

Immediately after the public notification of the declamtion
of war, societies were formed throughout the land for volunteer

* Tlio jouniGj was performed at a comparatively alow rate, because the six
extra tniiua containing the hea<(-quartcr8 had to be inserted in tlie tinio tftbles
prepared for the military tniins in such a way that no iniorfei-enoe^with the gcncml
scheme of fornarding the troo^vs should take place.

t The reception of the King at all tlie stations was enthusiastic beyond descrip-
tion, and reached its climax on his arrival at Cologne on the evening of the Ist
Aogast The cheers of the crowd which luid oollecteil liardly ceased for throe-
quulen of an hour, and fau>Iy drowned the band of music which was playing
clote by.

aid to the sick in the field aud at home. Tine to their calling
and rich in the experience of two campaigns, the knights of
St. John forthwith commenced their labouiB. Her Majeaty the
Queen became patroness of all volunteer ambulances and
hospitals at home, and the Prince v. Pless received charge of
those at the seat of war.

When the proper time comes we shall revert to the success
which attended tliese voluntary acts of the nation.

On his arrival at Mainz, the King* issued the following
order: —

*' To the Army I

"All Germany rises with one accord to anus against a
neighbouring State which has unexpectedly and for no cause
declared war against us. Tlie safety of the threatened
Fatherland, of our hearths, and our honour is at stake. I
assume to-day the command of the imited armies, and enter
wth confidence on a struggle which our fathei*s of yore so
gloricmsly sustained.

'*The whole Fatherland, as well as myself, looks confi-
dently to you. The Almighty will favom* our rigliteous
cause. (Signed) WlLLlAM."

*• Head-quarters, llainz,

2nd August, 1870.^'

The general instructions issued from Berlin tothe commanders
of the different armies have been already stated.! A notification
of the impending advance of the Hnd Army was sent by tele-
gi*aph on the 1st August to tlie commanders of the 1st and UIrd
Annies, dmdng the transit of the roj^al head-quartera.

Those portions of the army wliich had been left at homo
during the first period of concentration were now being for-
warded to the theatn* (if war as the lines of railway became
available. The first to nppcar were tht^. 1st Corps and the 1st
Cavalry Division, which eoinmLiiced to arrivo in Birkenfuld and
Kaiserslautern on the Dvd August. Althoiigli assigned to the
Hnd Army fur (|Uartrr.s on arrival, they were subsequently
incorporated with tlie Lst Army. Tiie A'lth Corps, which quitted
the line of rail at Lamlau ()n auil after the Ith August, and the
Hnd Cavalry Divi.sion in JIaiiiz, were assigned to the llird
Army. Still further in rear came the Hnd Cor[)s, whicli was
addcul to the Ilud Army. These definite distributions were
made on Ihe 4th and 5th August.

AftiT mid-day of the 2nd August tilegranhie intelligence
was received at the royal head-quarters in Maniz, of a serious
engagement at Saarbriieken, and subsequently of the retreat of
oiu* trooi)s.

* The 0 rami Duke of lle.-sc had placet! at the King'ii diBposal the '* Deutsche
llatifi," iiu'inorablu I'rom itd ?it nation uiid old as^ociutiona. Thu greater part of the
head'(|uartcM*s were occoiiunodaUd in il. The olHcu of the Federal ChniiccUor was
cstablidhod in the ** KupferbL-rg llauj*," in New Kiistrich.

t Soo page G\) ct 8cq.

All advanco of tlio main French force over the Saar, whicli
might now be expected, could at first only be opposed by the
Ist Army, the bulk of •which had, in accordance with prenous
orders, to assemble from the northward at Losheiin and AVadern.
But, as we know, it Avas never intended to commit this com-

{)aratively small body of troops to single combat against superior
lostile forces. Consequently, on the 3rd August instructions
were issued for the march to continue on the following day
from Losheim towards Tholey with a view to operating on the
flank of any advance on the part of the enemy. The French,
however, made no further endeavour to cross the frontier after
the engagement at Saarbriicken. On the other hand, the Ilnd
Amiy continued its advance across the Palatinate and shortly
came up on a level with the position of the Ist Army at Tholey*
Mention will hereafter be made of the further orders connected
with this subject.

From trustworthv reports which were received in Mainz up
to the evening of the 3rd August the positions of the Froncli
army were pictured as follows : —

Guard at Metz ; 1st Corps south of Hagenau ; 5tli Corps at
Bitsch ; 2nd Corps between Saarbriicken and Forbach, with a
Brigade or Division at Saargemiind ; Srd Corps at Boulay ; 4th
Corps at Bouzonville, with a strong advanced guard pushed
forward towards Saarlouis.

No precise intelligence with regard to the 6th and 7th Corps
had been lately reported ; it was supposed that they wore still
assembling at Chalons and in Southern Alsace respectively.

The reported weakness of tlio garrison of the Wcissenburg
lines rendered it doubtful on tlie Srd August whether a pai"t, if
not the principal part, of the 1st Coi-ps had not already passed
Zabeni fSavenie) in moving to the westward. In that case it
was conjectured that the troops at Strassburg were either the
rear of this or the advance of tlie 7tli Corps.

The despatch of an expeditionary force to effect a landing
on the German coast appeared to have been abandoned for the
present. On the other hand, a telegram was received at Mainz
on the evening of the 3rd from the German consul at Civita
Vecchia, reporting that the remainder of the French troops at
that place were to be embarked on the 5th.

The presence of a considerable part of the French forces in
Alsace marked out an independent mission for the Ilird Army,
in which for the present it must not expect any assistance from
the other two armies. This would continue so long as it had
to confront a foe suitable to its strength. Should, on the other
hand, the departure of McMahon's troops to join the main
French forces receive confirmation, then it was essential tliat the
Ilird Ai-my should be brought up to take paiij in a decisive
battle ; its further advance would m that case be a mere blow
in the air. It was evidently of the utmost importance to gain
prompt information of the situation of affaira. Although the
lllrd Army was still deficient of the Vlth Coi'ps and part of

its tmins, the commeuceiuent of operations coula no longer be
delayed.

It was therefore decided* that the Ilird Army should cross
the Lauter in several columns aiid drive back in the direction of
Ha^enau smj weak detachments which might offer opposition*
If daring tlus operation the enemy's retreat through the Vosges
should be confirmed, it was intended to leave only one corps to
watch Strassburg, and to move the rest along the Palatinate
frontier towards the Saar, so as to reacli that river at Saarge-
mlind about the 9tli AugUHt. The Vlth Coips, which was
expected to be complete at Landau by the 7th, would then by
advancing to Pinnasens form the link of connexion between the
Ilnd and Ilird Armies.

With this object in view, the iirHt offensive blow on Frencli
soil on the part of the Germans was prepared for the 4th August.

The King inspected the fortifications of Mainz on tlie after-
noon of this day; about 8 p.m. the Crown Prince's report on the
action at Weisscnburg amved. This telegram, which caused
the whole nation to thrill with joy and hope, ran as follows: —

"Brilliant but bloody victory ^ntncssed by me at the
storming of Weisscnburg, and the Geissberg lying behind it,
by regiments of the Vth and Xlth PiTissian and the Ilnd
Bavarian Corps. French Division of Douay driven back in
disorder, abandoning their camp equipage. General Douay
killed. Upwards of 500 unwounded nrisonei's and one gun
captured. On our wdc, (loniTal KirchlMich grazed by a shot.
King's Grenadiers and TiHtli rtuffered heavy losses.

(Signed) Frederick William,

Ci'own Prince."

This serious engagement at Weisscnburg was a contradic-
tion to the rumoui-s of the enemv's withdrawal from Alsace.
Reports which arrived from the Saar in the afternoon of the 5th
August pouited rather to a general n\ovement to the right of
the main French army.f

As the Ilird Army reported the resumption of their forward
movement, the commander of the Ilnd Army was recommended
on the 5th to throw forward a strong force of cavalry over the
Saargemiind-Bit«ch railway. That line was well known to l)e
the neareHt natural communication between the two bodies of
the foe as long as they were separated by the Vosges.

Such, generally, were the first instructions and opinions pre-
vailing at the royal head-quai*ter8 at Mainz, into whicli, however,
we shall enter more closely when speaking of the diflerent
armies. The concentration of the ainny was as good as finished,
the firat forAvard movement in preparation.} Further plans must
depend upon the issue of the serious events now imminent.

• Vide further on, under '* Ilird Amiy."
t Vide pp. 66-67.

J The order laying down tbc manner of trunsaelin^ butinew between the toyal
•qttartcrs and the ttnft ol llio commnndcri of tlie three annict i« giTon in
Appendix VI.

Movements of the Armies from 1st to 5th August.

The events of the first days of August can bo pictured most
clearly to the mind by following separately the movements ot
the armies, commencing from the right wing.

1. The First Army*

The Ist Army, as we know, had to asscmhlo by tlio 3rd on
the Hnc Losheim-Wadcrn.*

On tlio Ist August, the Divisions of tlic Vllth Corps stood as
follows : the 13th with the 7th Cavahy Brigade at Trier (Treves),
with an advanced guard of four battalions, four squadrons, and
two batteries at Conz and Saarburg. The general position of
the 14th Division was still more to tlic rear, as far as Bittburg,
on the left bank of the Moselle.

Of the Vlllth Corps, the 15th Division reached the neigh-
bourhood of Wadern ; the greater part of the IGth moved on to
Nunkirchen, which lies somewhat further to the south. All
the detachments from the latter Division which had been
pushed forward towards the Saar were placed under the orders
of General Count Gneisenau. Their positions on the morning of
the 2nd of August were as foUows: — The 6th and 7th cos. of the
2nd battn.t 40th Fusiliers occupied the drill ground at Saar-
brticken, the Nussberg, the Winterberg and St. Arnual : the 8th co.
at Brebach kept a look-out in the direction of Saargemihid ; the
5th CO. held itself in re^idiness to tmn out at St. Johann. The
other two battalions, with a squadron of the 9tli Hussars and the
6th light battery, occupied a position in support at Raschpfuhl on
the skirt of the forest, some 2 miles north-west of the town.

The patrol duties at Saarbriicken were performed by two
squadrons of the 7th Lancers, who were well acquainted with
the district.

The fusiHer battalion of the GOth was engaged in watching
the Saar lower down. The lOth co. occupied Malstadt and the
railway bridge at Burbach ; the other three cos. and ^100 lancera
secured the passages at Volklingen and Wehrden.

A squadron of lancers was posted at Dudweiler, while
Rehlingen and Dillingen were eacli occupied by a squadron of
hussars. Lastly, farther to the rear at Heusweiler on tlie Lebac^
road, were the 2nd battalion of the 29th, a squadron of hussars,
and a heavy batteiy.

Count Gneisenau was directed to retire upon Lebach if
pressed by superior forces.

• Vide p. 72.

t In the Priusian B«mce the companiefl of a battalion are numbered conBeca-
iiTely throQffhout the regiment ; thna, Coe. Nos. 1, 2, 8 and 4 belong to the let
battalion. Coe. Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8, to the 2nd. Cos. Nos. 9, 10, 11 and 12, to the
Srd or Faeilier battalioui at the case may be.«-TB.

Combat at Saahcruckex on the 2xd August.

SUiAi 11. Since the Slst July no essential changes had taken place in

the French posititjn.* On the 2nd Ancrnst they proceeded to
eany ont Iho n.connaissance in force decided upon for that

day.t

General FioKsard moved of[ towards the Saar in the forenoon
with the view to seizing the heights on the left bank, upon which
PniRsian outposts had been observed. DetachnientB of Bazainc's
Corps advan(;ed in the dirertion of Volklingen ; others from
Faiily's Corps crossed to the light Iwmk ut Saargeiuiind.

About 10 o'cloek the Prussian patr^»l« and pic<]uets in front
of Saarbriiijken rciported the enemy's advance, and soon after a
telegram was received from Dlittersdorf announcing the break-
up of th(^ French trom their camp at Saargemiind.

Bataillo's Division ot (Seneral Frossard's (Jorps fonned the
iirst line. On the right of the Forbaeh road Bastoul's Brigade,
descending the Spichercn lieights, moved against the llepperts-
berg, the Winterberg, and St. Arnual ; on the left of the road
Pouget's Brigade moved towards the drill giound, pushing a
battalion of the 8th Reghnent along the lino of railway. Three
squadrons of the 5tli Chasseurs scoiucd the ground in front.

In rear of the riglit wing, at a distance of 700 to 800 paces,
followed Micheler's Brigade of Laveaucoupet's Division ; m rear
of the left, Valaze's Brigade belonging to Verge's Division. The
former supported the advance of the first line on St. Arnual with
a battalion of the 40th and a company of engineera, at the
same time pushing forward the 10th Rifle Battalion more to the
south along the road from Saargennmd. Two battalions and a
squadron of the 4th Chasseurs froiri V^alaze's Brigade, advanced
on Gersweiler for the purpose of keeping up comnninication with
Bazaine's Corps.

The rcmamder of FrossanVs Coii")h followed in reserve.

The two Prussian companies in front of Saarbriicken moved
at once into the line of outposts. The company from St.
Johann hurried by at the doid)le with a view to occupying the
*' Rothe Haus." Before anything else was done. Major v. Horn
strengthened the post on the Winterberg, which was most imme-
diately threatened. Captain Gmnder occupied the Lowenburg,
and moved with the remainder of the (5th co. to St. Arnual.
(>aptain Ncydeeker's company in Brebaeh supported this last
detachment by extending a skirmishing division along the right
bank of the Saar. This division, and two guns In'ought up from
llaschpfiihl under Liouteuant Meyer received the enemy,
debouching from the Stiftswald witli a brisk fire, (leneral
Micheler on his side also brought up a battery ; but Lieutenant
Meyer maintained his position ui spite of the enemy's skirmishers.

• Sec Sketch I.
t Vide p. 33.

We had thus been successful in offering timely opposition to
the French at all pointa

But it was impossible for such weak forces to resist for any
time the enveloping attack of Bastoul*s entire brigade. After
St. Araual had teen abandoned by the Prussians and occupied
by the battalion of the 40th French Regiment, tlie enemy
advanced with the 67th Regiment towards the Winterberg, and
with the 66th towards the Rcppertsberg, and drove out tho
weak detachments occupying those points. Captain Grundner,
who retired from St. ArnuaT along the Saarbriicken road, was
forced to cross the upper (old) bndge under the enemy's fire,
but held the barricades thrown up on tho riglit bank and tho
nearest houses in St. Johann.

Meanwhile Captain Koscli, by a forward inovt'incnt with tho
5th CO., somewhat relieved the pressure on this retiring move-
ment. Lieutenant Schlesinger and his division,* which had
already come under fire at the "Rothe Ilaus/' mounted the
heights of the Reppertsberg in spite of the obstacles presented
by the hedges, ana attacked the French skirmishers occupjdng
the cornfield in front with the l)ayonet. The company tlicn
occupied tho foremost hcclges, and brought their fire to bear on
the detachments of the enemy ascending the Winterberg.
Being seriously threatened by superior forces the 5th co. also
fell b«ack over the upper bridge, covered by divisions tlu'own
out in front, which were tlien slowly witlidrawn by Lieutenants
Schlesinger and v. Schilgeu in the best order.

Captain Baron v. Rosen had liastened with the 7th company
to the assistance of his picquet on tlio drill ground. A dense
line of the caiemy's skirmishers had already opened a brisk fire
at a distance of 1,200 paces, and was now descending, followed
by several companies m line, into the hollow in front of the
drill ground. The other battalions of Pouget's Brigade were
also following in rear ; witli their left wing they occupied the
wood westward of the railway. Isolated detachments had
already penetrated by Deutscbmiihle towards the scythe
factory, where they came uiulor the file-fire of v. Ik^'herer's
company of the 69th Regiment from the right bank of the Saar.
Although threatened in rear, and repeatedly histructed to
retire ** if pressed," Captain v. Rosen nevertheless allowed the
enemy to approach to within oOO paces. The excellent efiect
of his sharpshooters* fire at this distance caused the enemy's
skirmishers to halt and lie down. It was only after a distinct
order to retire that Captain v. Rosen withdrew his company
over the lower (new) bridge. Lieutenant Goldschmidt covered
the movement with the skirmishing division, by talcing up
several intermediate positions, and even assumed the ofTensivo
agamst the hotly purauing enemy.

* Tho word *'Ziig," as applied to infuiiti-yf is translated throughout this vrork as
division, of which there are two in each couipanj. •'* Ealb-Zug " wiU be tRinsluted
by sttb-dirision, and " Section " by section. Thclargc unit of troops is distinguished
by an initial capital letter— DiTision.*-Tu.

General Count Gueisenau had watched the coui-se o( tho
combat from the dnll-ground, and had made timely preparations
to give support. So early as 11 o'clock ho had ordered the
3rd battahon of the 40th Regiment at Raschpfuhl and the four

guns still there to advance towards St. Johann. Major v.
[olieben firet occupied the i-ailway station and the new bridge
with tho leading half-battalion. Advancing subsequently vntli
the 11th cotnnany as far as the western issue from Saarbrii(;ken,
he niaintiiiiiCMi the (i^ht then; until noon, by which time all tho
detachinontH hud juissod the river. The retreat in fiice of the
enemy's supijrior force was defiMTod to tho latest possible
moment, an<l was then carried out with the greatest order, and
with comparatively slight Ions. Hoth of the town bridges as
well as tho railway bridge remained in our pOHHL»ssion. The
French did not press closely after us.

Tho tiring on both sides had almost ceased when at about
12.15 p.m. one of the enemy's batteries appeared on the
Reppertsberg ; soon aifter a second crime in sight on tho drill-
ground, followed later by a 12-pr. battery from the reserve.
Captain v. llelden led oft' the artillery fight from the heights at
Malstatt with his four guns at a range of 2,200 paces, and
carried it on for a considerable time, making several changes in
his position.

An attempt on the part of some hostile detachments to cross
the Saar at Gersweiler Avas defeated by non-commissioned
oilieia-s* patrols sent to the spot.

Opposite ViUkUngen also, at about 1 p.m., some battalions of
Bazaine's Corps with foia* guns advancecl towards the AVehrden
bridge, then occupied by the 12th co. of the GDth Regiment.
After the enemy had kept up an ineffective fire of shell and
shrapnel, ho withdrew his artillery; no seritms attack was
attempted.

Nothing further had been heard of the advance of the enemy
from Saargemiind, as reported fi'om Blittei-sdorf.

Towards 2 p.m. General Count Gneisenau ordered the troops
to retire from Saarbriicken upon Raschpiiihl.

Major V. Horn marched his companies as they came out of
action past the railway station to the Kollcrthal forest ; Major
V. Holleben occupied the border of the wood south of Russhiitte ;
his 10th company, which only moved off about 3 o'clock,
retired on Raschpfuhl. The four guns from Malstatt and the
lOth CO. of the r»Oth Regiment from Burbach also made for this
point.

The enemy's artillery commanded tho wholo gi'ound over
which the retreat was made. The mitrailleuse battery on the
Reppertsberg in particular swept the viaduct near the grinding
mill. The mass of stiaw collected at tho railway briugo was
set on fire from the drill-ground.

General Count Gneisenau awaited tho further measures of
tho enemy in this new position. But as tho latter did not cross
tho Saar, a tletnchment was despatched to St. Johann to bring
in the wounded, it was not until G p.m. that a patrol came

across the enemy in Saarbiiicken. The report which readied
General Count Gneisenau of the advance of strong hostile
columns upon Geraweiler decided Iiiin to evacuate tlie position
in front of the long defile of the Kollerthal forest between 5 and

6 o'clock, and to bivouac in rear of it at Ililschbach.

The troops from Volkliiigen and the squadron of lancers
posted at Dudweiler were now brought up to the Hame place
The detachment at Brebach marched back via Dudweihir about

7 o'clock, as soon as they heard of the evacuation of Saarbriickeu
and St. Johann. but were only able to reach the bivouac at
Hilschbach on the following morning.

The 2nd Battn. of the 29th Regiment, the squadron and the
battery at Ileusweiler had also received orders at noon to
advance. They met the retiring troops in the Kollerthal forest,,
and were now directed to take up a supporthig i)08ition at
Guichenbach. The battalion remained hero on outpost duty,
the squadion and the battery marched into the lUlsclibacli
bivouac.

For nearly 14 days the weak detachments under Lieutenant-
Colonel V. restel had been in immediate contac^t with tho
enemy's army. The determination witli which they maintained
tlieir position to the last in the combat at Saarbriickeu Avas a
worthy sequel to their dogged persistence.

One of the prisoners stated that the Emperor and Prince
Imperial had been spectators of this unequal fight.

The following were the losses of the small band : —

Killed - - — officers 8 men.

Wounded . 4 „ 04 „

Missing. - — „ 7 „

Total - 4 oflicei-8* 79 men.

the greater part belonged to the 2nd battaUon of the 40th
Regiment.

The colour of the 1st Battn. of this regiment had been hit *
by a splinter of shell.

The enemy's loss amounted to G officers and 80 men.

While these events were taking place at Saarbriickeu, the
V^IIth Army Corps continued its march on Losheim. The 13tli
Division from Irier and Conz reached the neighboin-hood of
Saarburg ; an advanced guard moved along the Thionville road
as far as Trassem, and thrcAV out cavahy to watch the French
frontier on this side of Sierk. A battalion remained in occupa-
tion of the bridge at Conz. The 14th Division (juitted its
quarters south of Bittburg, left two battalions to garnson Trier,
and reached Zerf and its neighbourhood late in tho evening,
The troops, in part at least, had marched 27 miles under a

* Captain t. Helden-Sarnowski, commander of the 6th liglifc battf^r^ ; Ist Licet.
T. Schilgen, 2nd Lieuts. v. Borrics and t. Kouarski, of the 40th Regiment.

burning sun. In rear of the two Divisions, the corps artillery
reached Pcllingcn ; the 7th Cavalry Brigade advanced to within
5 miles south of Trier ; the trains still remained at Schweich, on
the left bank of the ilosellc.

Of the Vlllth Array Corps, the greater part of the 15th
Division reached the neighbourhood of Wadem ; Colonel v. Loe
with the rifle battalion and tlu'oe squadi'ons of hussars moved to
Rehlingen and Dillingon for the pui-pose of watching the French
frontier, relieving the two scjuadrons of the 9th Hussarn, which
rejoined the 16th Division.

The movements of the 16th Division wore influenced even
on the 2nd August by the combat at Saarbriicken. We know
tliat General Count Gueisenaii at the finish of the aniiir took up
a position at Hilschbach and Guichenbach with about 4
battalions, 6 squadrons, and 2 batteries. The remainder of the
Division advanced this day from Nunkirchen as far as the
neighbourhood of Lebach. When General Cotnit Gncisenau'a
report of his intended withdrawal behind the Kcillerthal forest
reached Lebach in the nftenioon, the Commander of the Divi-
sion, Licutenant-Gcneral v. Barnekow, held the troops whicli
had amved at Lebach in readiness if necessary to move on^ward
to Heusweiler. The General himself rode on to Hilschbach,
took the neccssaiy stops to regidn the touch of the enemy, and
the same evening sent forward detachments from Lebach to
Landsweiler and Eppelbom.

The general commanding the Vlllth Army Corps, General
of Inftintry v. Goeben, had arrived from Coblentss on the Ist
August at Wadern, where, at 2 p.m., he received the report of
the combat and of the withdrawal of his troops from Saar*
briicken. It was his wish also to see the contiict -with the
enemy regained, and with this object in view In? ordered a
forward movement of the advanced parties to Dadweiler,
Saarbriicken and Volklingen for the following day. To support
these movements, he resolved to move his whole army corps
more to the south. He intended to advance the lath Division
to L'^biich, from wliiith place it could be most easily employed
in any direction. He reported this intention to the head-
quarter staft' of the army, whicli had anived at Trior on the
2nd August. General v. Steinmetz confirmed General v.
Goeben's dispositions.

In consequencM^ of this the Int Aimy, on the 3rd August,
instead of assembling at Wadem and Losheim, took up a some-
what more s(mtherly position.

Nearest to the enemy stood the 16th Division. Its advanced
guard under Gcnieral Count Gneisenau (still consisting of 4
battalions, 3 squadrons, and 1 battery) bivouacked between
HilKcliliadj and DiJKburg, witli its advanced parties in tho
Kolkrthal forest. The latter patrolled towards V<ilklingen and
St. Johami. The remahuUr of the Division (exclusive of the
two battalions of the 61)th Regiment at Saarlouis) stood to the
north of Heusweiler, at which place, however, General v,
Redern's Cavalry Brigade of the Ilnd Arniy airived this day.

The ISfli Division and Corps Artiileiy were quorfered in the
neighbourhood of Lebach; the trains came as £bu: as Wadem.
'On the Saajr below Saarlonis there was still left as a temporary
measure a small detachment of Loe's troops, which, however,
was relieved soon after by the 13th Division, The 33rd Regi-
ment of the 15th Division, coming from St Gear and Boppard,
had accomplished a march of 69 miles over mountainous
•country in three days, and also reached the neighbourhood of
Wadem this day.

The 13th Division advanced from Saarburg and Trassem
towards the south. The detachments marching at first along
the left bank of the Saar crossed to the right at Mettlach ; the
bridge which was thrown over the river at this point was then
removed. The main body of the Division reached Merzig, the
advanced guard Harliugen; a battaUon on the left bank of
the Saar covered the right flank; some divisions *(Z(lge) of
hussars watched the frontier between Saarburff and Sierk.
Another detachment relieved, as already mentioned, that of the
loth Division at Rehlingen in the com-se of the afternoon. The
batallion at Conz was drawn forward to Saarburg.

The l^th Division marched southward to beyond Losheim
and drew in the two battalions from Trier ; its right wing was
at Broddorf, to the noi-tli-cast of Merzig. The corps artiileiy
reached Losheim. The trains were still in rear as far as
Schweich.

On the 3rd August, by drawing in the 7th Lancere and the
8th Cuirassiers, the formation of the 3rd Cavaby Division was
also completed ; it took up its quartei-s between Losheim and
Lebach, consequently between the 14th and 15th Divisions.

The head-quarter staff of the army moved from Trier to
Losheim.

According to the repoi-ts received on the 2nd and 3rd
August from the troops pushed forward to the frontier it might
with certainty be assumed, that the hostile forces in front of tho
1st Anny had been moving southwards since the 1st August.
Although during the last days of July Trier seemed j;o be
threatened from the direction of Sierk, ftiid even on the 1st
August hostile troops had been observed between Waldwisso
and Filstroff, the patrols had come across no large bodies of
troops north of the Saarlouis-Bouzonville road since the 2nd
August, "with the exception of some 30 French chasseurs, with
whom there was a skirmish on the 3rd at Heyning. On the
other hand the commandant of the fortress of Saarlouis and the
Srdvanced pai-ties of the Vlllth Army Corps reported the
presence of considerable bodies of troops in the frontier district
<tbove that fortress ; it was said that 40,000 men under Marshal
Bazaine were assembled round Boulay, and that there were
large forces at Saarbriicken. The enemy, however, did not

* In the Prussian aerTioe the squadron of caralrj is divided into 4 Zi^fe^ which
is here &r.d throughout this work translated as dirieion. Each Zu^ contists of
about 80 Fabres. The large body of cavalrj attached to the Armies is diB^^ingnishcd
by an initial capital letter — DivUion. — Tb.

B 2

100

orofis the river even at this point, but entrenched himself on the
heights of the left bank. Even the telegraphic communication
between St. Johann and the Oerman stations in rear could be
carried on without interruption during the following days in a
most unaccountable manner, and from that place we received
uninterrupted intelligence of the enemy's attitude at Saar-
brCLcken. On the whole he showed himself careless in outpost
duties and little eager for enterprise ; he patrolled only in sti'ong
detachments.

The commander of the 1st Army deduced from these repoiis
that the enemy's main forces were about to move towards the
Palatinate, consequently against the line of advance of the Ilnd
Army. General v. Steinmetz therefore hoped by an advance on
his part to draw as large a force as possible of the enemy upon
himself, and thus facilitate the concentration of the Ilnd Army
on the Saar. With this in view he puiposed advancing on the
4th August into the line Saarlouis-HcUeuhausen, and from
thence despatching strong reconnaissances on the 5th from the
Cavalry Division and the Vllth Anny Corps towards the
Bouzonville, Boulay and St. Avoid roads. When on the point
of ordering these movements on the afternoon of the 3rd,
General v. Steinmetz received at Losheim the following tele-
gram from the royal head-quarters : —

'* Wavering advance of the French leads us to anticipate
that the Ilnd Anny can be assembled on the 6th inst in
fr'ont of the belt of forest at Kaiserslautem. If rapid
advance of the enemy cannot be checked, concentration of
the Ilnd Army behind the Lauter.* Co-operation of both
armies in battle purposed, Ist Army from St Wendel or
Baumholder. His Majesty commands the Ist Army to con-
centrate towards Tlioley on tlie 4tli. IlIrd Army crosses
the frontier to-morrow at Weissenburg. A general offensive
is proposed."

In consequence of this instruction General v. Steinmetz at
once issued flie following ai-my order : —

** The Ist Anny commences its advance to-moiTow in the
direction of Tholey. The Vlltli Army Coi-ps concentrates
at Lebach; the Vlllth Corps, with its 16th Division at
Ottweiler, 15th at Tholey. The 3rd Cavahy Division
between Tholey and St Wendel, northward of the Tholey-
St Wendel road ; line of demarcation between the rayons
of the Vllth and Vlllth Amiy Corps is defined by the
Miihlfeld as far as the confluence of the Theelbach and
Dirraingerbach. Head-quarters of the Ist Army — Tlioley."

These orders were communicated to the Ilnd Ai-my and re-
ported to the royal head-quarters at Mainz.

In compliance with the foregoing army order, the following
movements took place on the 4th August : —

• Bcferencc is here made to the Lauter, flowing by Kaiserslautem to Glan.

101

The staff of the Vlllth Corps moved to Ottweilor. The
advauced guard of the 16th Division, iiiider (jeiieral Count
Gnciseuau, marched from Hilschbach to SchiS'wciler ; the main
body, uuder Colonel v. Rex, from Heiisweiler to Stennweiller.
Generally speakinff the Division occupied wide cantonments
around and especially to the southward of Ottweiler. The 15th
Division occupied quai'ters between Tholey, Mainzweiler and
Aschbach ; the corps artillery on the Dmniugerbach at Eppel-
born and Dirmingen.

The staff of the Vllth Army Coi-ps moved to Lebach. The
14th Division advanced from Losheim to Lebach; its advanced
guard, under General v. Francois, took up a position two or
three miles further south, North-west of the 14th tlie mahi
body of the 13th Division advanced fi'om Merzig to Bettingen
and the advanced guard under Major-General v. d. Goltz, to
the neighbourhood of Hiitteredoif. The post which had been
hitheilo on the left bank of the Saar was withdrawn via Merzig
to Oppen ; the battalion in Saarburg followed to Zerf on the
4th, and to Neunku'chen on the 5th ; the corps artillery moved
to Nemiku'chen; the trains reached Wadern.

The outposts of the two aimy corps formed one continuous
line from the railway west of Neunldrchen as far as Bettstadt
on the Prims. Since the 3rd of August, however, as we have
before mentioned, there had been in front of the centre of this
line of outposts, at Heusweiler, Redern's Cavalry Brigade of the
Ilnd Army, its advanced troops watching Saarbriicken. There
were also some troops of the Ilnd Army at Neunkirchen on the
4th.

The 3rd Cavahy Division moved to the neighbourhood of
St- AVeudel and north of the town ; it tliere also came into
immediate contact with the Ilnd Amiy.

The head-quarters of the Ist Army wore removed on the 4th
to Tholey, where they were joined on this day by 1LR.1I. Prince
Adalbert of Prussia.

A telegram from General v. Moltke at Mainz expressed his
concuiTence with the position taken up this day, but at the
same time ordered that the troops were to remain in it until
further notice.

In accordance therewith, the army retained on the 5th
August the same general position which it had taken up on the
4th. The two battalions of the ()9th Regiment, left hitherto at
Saarlouis, which had become superfluous owing to the arrival of
the gaiTison battalions, alone moved on the afternoon of the 5th
to Heusweiler, so as to join their own — the Kith — Division on
the next day at Ottweiler.

Of greater consequence was tlie impeudiiig reinforcement
from the rear of the 1st Army, by the assignment to it of the
1st Cavalry Division on the 4th August, and wliich was further
supplemented by that of the Ist Anny Corps on tlie 5th.

The Ist Cavahy Division, consisting of six regiments (Pome*
ranian and East Prussian), had been assembled since the 2nd

lOS

AiigUHt at Berlin, from which iilacc thoy began to move by rail
on the 3rd, part bjing sent by the Nahe line to Birkenfcld, and
part by thu Palatinate lino to llomburg. On the evening of
the 5th Augnist the 3rd (/uiraswiers and 12th Lancers readied
Birkenfeld.

The 1st Army Corps, also transported by the same two hues,
was, after disembarking at Birkenfeld and Kaiserslautcni, to-
assemble, in accordance with previous orders* in the triangle
Tholey-St. Weiidel-Tiirkismiihlo. By the evening of the 5th
the ti-oops had arrived as follows: — At Birkenfeld, the 1st
Infantry Division; its foremost troops had already advanced
five miles to the north of St. AVendel; one battalion and
one batteiy were still wanting. In the neighbourhood of
Kaiserslantern stood the 2nd Infant ly Division, almost comphite;
only the 44th Regiment passed thnmgh to Ncunkirchen, owing
to the change in the point of disembarkation. The coiw
artillery was still deficient of three l)atteries. Nearly the whole
of the coii)s had therefore aiiived, but several days were still
necessaiy to bring those poi-tions at Kaiserslanteni into the
rayon of the Tst Ai-my.

Since the latter had withdrawn from the Saar, the enemy
seemed to bestir himself again in the abandoned frontier district
below Saarlouis. Reports were received at 'J'holey on the 4th
and 5th from Perl, Sivarlonis, Trier and from the outposts of the
Vllth Army Corps, that fresh concentrations of troops had
taken place towards Sierk, and that the frontier northwurd of
the Bouzon\'ille road was once more strongly occupied. As a
French movement to the right in a southerly direction could no
longer be questioned, General v. Stcinmetz behoved that the
above demonstrations probably proceeded from Diedenhofen
and were intended to veil other designs. In any case, however,
it was necessaiy to secure the lower Saar, and especially the
important point of Trier, ^vith its stores, against passing attacks.
In order not to weaken the field army proper for this purpose,
the Commander-in-Chief had during his sojourn in Coblenz
held a conference with the Governor-General at tliat place, at
which it was suggested that troops belonging to the latter
should be first concentrated at Wittlich. We now heard that
with this object troops of this Crovernmcnt, to the number of 5
battalions, 1 squadron and 1 batteiy, were to reach Wittlich on
the 8th August. General v. Stcinmetz determined therefore to
draw forward these troops towards Trier, with a view to taking
in hand the securitv of the lower Saar in conjunction with the
fortress of Saarlouis. In this sense provisional communications
were made on the 5th August to the Govenior-General of
Coblenz and the commandant of Saarlouis.

The intelligence received from St. J(»hann showed no essen-
tial change in the situation of aflairs at Saarbmcken on the 4th
and 5th August. On the preceding night the enemy's artillery*

* Vrom the oommander of tko Ilnd Aimj.

103

had set fire to the railway st4itiou buildingp. Li the course of
the 5th his forces appeared to have diimnishcd at that place;
giiiis were withdi-awn. This was connected "\^^th tlie victoiy of
the Crown Priiice yesterday at AVoissenburg, a report of whicli
had already arrived in Tholey from the royal hcad-qiiartei-B.

As the position of the 1st Army at Tholey extended sonth-
wards beyond Ottweiler, its quarters partly treiiched upon the
lines of march of the Ilnd Army, ana had, as previously men-
tioned, been travensed by detachments of the latter. The
Cavalry Divisions of tliis army had reached the frontier several
daj's since, and extended their right as far as Bouss (between
Saarbriicken and Saarlouis). General v. (loebcn also reported
on the 4th from Ottweiler the passage of troop.s of the 5th
Division towards Nemikirchen.

As confirmatory of tliis, the conmiander of the Ilnd Arniy
made the following communication on the 4th by telegraph : —

"The Ilnd Anny an-ives to-moirow with its Icarling corps
atSt. AVendel and llomburg, on the (Itli at Ncunkirchcn and
Zweibriicken. A movement to the right this day cm the
part of the Ist Army would be desirable in order to avoid
collisions."

General v. Steinmetz had, up to the afternoon of the 4th
received no other instructions from the royal head-quarters th?ui
that orderin;^' him to remain in his }>reseut position until further
notice.

The General thought, therefore, that he could Hf)t forthwith
agiec to the request made by the Ilnd Army ; he, however, at
once reported the present state of aftiiirs by telegraph to Mainz.
While asking for further instrnciions ho brouglit to notice that
should the advance of the Ilnd Army be continued, its front
would overlap that of the 1st Army, if the latter remained any
longer in its position.

Meanwhile, the ccmnnander of the Ilnd Army had also
requested a decision from the royal head-quarters upon the
pomt at issue, in answer to which the following telegram from
General v. Moltke reached Tholey on the r)th: —

"The road St. Wendel-Ottweiler-Neunkirehen, is to be
evacuated to-morrow by the 1st Army."'

The telegram also notified the assignment, as already men-
tioned, of the 1st Army Coii)s to tlic 1st Army.

In order, however, to carry out the orders received, General
v. Steinmetz could not confine himself alone to the evacuation
of the road in question, because the troops which were to bo
shifted Avestward would bo thrown on quarter which were
othei^wise occupied. Moreover, there was also the question of
gaining space for quartering the troops of the 1st Army Corps
and of the Ist Cavalry Division, which might bo expected
chiefly from the direction of Birkenfeld. General Stemmetz
therefore resolved to take in handon the 6th a general forward
shifting of the quarters of the Yllth and Vlllth Army Corpse

104

and of the Srd Cavalry Division, in a south-westerly direction
by which the army would be again brought within a march of
the Saar» and at the same time sufficient space be given to allow
of perfect freedom of movement for the right wing of the Ilnd
Army. The General had before him a copy of the order issued
by tne commander of the Ilnd Anny, by which it appeared that
the Ilird Amiy Corps was to assemble at Neunkirchen on
the 6th, and to push forward an advanced guard to Sulzbach
c«i the 7th. From this it would seem that in general the Rhine-
Nahe railway would be the best line of demarcation botween
the two armies.

Accordingly General v. Steinmetz issued the following army
cixloi' on the evening of the 6th August :—

" The army commences to-moiTow its advance towards
the Suar. The Vllth Anny Corps from Lebach, with its
head reaching as far as Guichenbach, and its advanced
guards pushed forward towards Volklingcn and Saarbriicken.
The head of the Vlllth Army Corps reaches Fishbacli,
westward of Sulzbach, echclouncd to the rear through
Quierscheidt as far as Mergweilor. The Ilird Army Coips
of the Ilnd Army, from information received, reaches the
neighbourhood of Bildstock to-moiTow. The 8rd Cavalry
Division moves on Lebach, five miles south-west of Lebach,
and covera the right flank of the anny. The head-quarter
staff of the anny moves to-mon-ow to Hellenhausen. The
Nahe railway forms the line of demarcation between the
Vlllth and Illrd Anny Corps as far as Landsweiler, and
afterwards the line Landswciier-Mainzweiler ; that between
the Vlllth and Vllth is formed by the line Russhutte-
Wiesbach-Eppelborn ; that between the Vllth Corps and
the 3rd Cavalry Division is the line Sprengen - Lebach.
The Int Anny Corps and the Ist Cavalry Division are
assigned permanently to the 1st Anny."

These ordeitj were reported by telegraph to lilainz tliat
evening, and were connnunicated to the commander of the
Ilnd Army, and as special information to the Ilird Corps.

The result of these movements of the 1st Anny was, as wo
know, an engagement on the (Jth August. That this was not
contemplated by General v. IStcinmetz hardly requires any
explanation. Tlio foregoing order merely regulatetl tlie areas
to be oeenpied in th(i positionH, and drew tlie lines of demarca-
tion between tlie Corps now in cloiic contact, as is the custom,
and also pri'Stiribed the ontpost dnticK in front. The pushing
forward of advanctMl guards towards tlie Saar M'as merely
intended as a nioasuie of saftty against tluj enemy, who was
natiu'ally supposed to be in considerable strength behind the
river.

But iMdi'pc-ndcnlly <»f thi«, it was unmistakable that there
was a considLrablo diflVrcnee in the opinions and in the first
intentions prevailing at the royal liead-(puirters and at the head-
quartei'fi of the Lst Anny re.spi'clively. The correspondenco of

105

Generals v. Moltke and v. Steinmctz, subsequent to the 3rcl
Au&^ist, gives the following particulars of the leading ideas on
both sides.

The 1st Army was assembled before either of the other two.
It was nearest to the enemy, and formed an ofTonsive flank for
the Ilnd Anny, at all events until the latter arrived on the
same front with it. (jonoral v. Steinmotz thoreforo endeavoured
from the commencement to draw the enemy's forces upon him-
self just as he had done with success at the l)ogiiiniiig of the
campaign of 18(56. It is evident that he had this object lu
view when he contemplated a forward blow from the line
Saarlouis-Hcllenhausen, on btnng informed of the movement of
the French main force iu a south-easterly direction after the
combat at S«iarbrUcken. When the position at Tholoy was
suljsequently taken up in virtue of superior orders, and troops
of the Unci Army already extended westward beyond the
quartet's of the Ist Army, General v. Steinmotz had cause for
apprehension that any longer delay on his part in the
Hundsriick might throw him completely into second line in the
event of the Coi^ps of Priiuie Frederick (yharles reaching the
frontier before him. The General started with tlu^ supposition
that the Ilnd Annv, while retaining its present direction of
march, was intended to operate against Nancy. In this case
there was still a field of operations for the Ist Army s(mth of
the Moselle fin-tresses, upon which gi-eater scope for independent
action presented itself to the connnander-in-chief. But up to
this time General v, Steinmetz had only received delaying or
hampering instructions from the royal head-quarters. He tliere-
fore wished to have m(n*o comi)rehonsive directions* extcniding
over a longer period, during which \w ronld preserve llie de-
sired freedc nn for his own resolutions.

On the other hand, the opinion was held at the royal head-

Saarteitj that neither the Ilnd, nuu^i less the wc^aker 1st Army,
lould be exposed singly to a colliKion with the French main
force.

• Contrary to expectation, the enemy had liitherto remained
inactive, but it was always possible th*at the Ilnd Army, if
attacked on emerging from the Avooded zone of the Palatinate,
might stand in need of support. But as the advance of the
main German Army coidd not be hastened more than it had
been, the only wav in which such an eventuality could be met,
was by drawing the Ist Army nearer to the Ilnd, in such wise
that during the gi-adual advance of the latter, whether at
Baumholdcr, or later on at St. Wendel, iho former might give it
a hand. But this obviously would not be possible if tlie Ist
Army advanced dose to or ov(;r the Saar. It eonsequentl}"
appeared essential to halt it foj* a time at Tholey.

As a matter of fact, the Ilnd Army reacln^d the line Neun-

* Directions (Direviiven)^ nrc com iiniiiicat ions from a higher to an inferior
oflScial, which are not so much put forth as definite orders for liis iomicdiatc line of
action, but rather as leading ideas. Thcj thus serro as a guide in the othe]*wiso
independent formation of t)io resolutions.

lOR

kirchcii-Zwcibrikkuii on the (Jtii August, but the complete con-
centration could not take place at that point before the 7th. It
was then intended to give it a day's rest on the 8th after the ex-
treniely fatiguing inarch over the mountainH, eo that the frontier
might be croased by both Armies simultaneously on the 9th. A
continuation of the march of the llnd Army upon Nancy formed
no part of the plan at the royal head-quart on* ; this line of
operation wfis from the first intended for the Ilird Ai-my.

It Wii.s expected at the royal heud-ciuarters that the Fi'cnch
army would bo found, if not earlier, at any rate in pobition
behuid the Alosello with its llanlcn resting on Diedenhofen and
Metz. In this event the 1st Anny was to engage the cnemv
in front, while the Ilnd was to attaek him dircetlv in flank
from the southward. During the wheel of one-eighth of a
circle to the right, which this operation rendered necessary, the
1st Army having the shortest line to traveree formed the pivot ;
it ought to leave the roads by which the right wing of the Ilnd
Armv marched perfectly free.

As oveiy day might usher in some gi'cat deciHive result, the
royal head-quai-ters tliought that it could not give any direc-
tions cxtendmg beyond the immediate events. It Avas, mtlier^
considered pennissiblo and necessary on this and subsequent
critical occasions to control the movements of the large units
by definite ordeiti from the royal head-quarters, hoM'ever nmch
that arrangement might provisionally limit the independence of
the commanders of aimiea

Especial stress must therefore bo laid upon the i'aet tliat
when General v. Steinmetz issued orders on tlie ev<.*ning of the
5th for a forward movement to the Saar he was not cognisant
of those future plans of the royal head-qua rtei*H, because they
were liable to be niodificid by the coui-se of events. They only
became known to him after the buttle of JSpicheren had become
an accomplished fact, which had then to be brought into the
calculation for our future line of action.

2, The Second A nmf.

On the 29th July the Ilnd Army had received orders to
advance to the line Alsenz-Oollheim-Orllnstadt.*

From that position the eastern issues of the llaardt moun-
tains, which the enemy must trav(»v80 in his advance, were
commanded; the cantonments in rear, which were the points of
assembly lor those parts of tlm army still in process of trans-
port, W( ro at the same time protected. In accordance with a
special onler, the 5th and (ith Cavalry Divisions were to push
foi*ward to tiio frontier' without delay, toUowod by a Division
of infantry from each wing of the anny,

1'ho following, therefore, were the positions of the Ilnd
Anny on the lot August : —

On tlie right, the Ilird Army Cojps at WBUsteiu, with the 5th
Infantry Division at JleiseiJieim ; ou the left the IVth Army

• Vide p. 70.

|107

Corps in the country west of Griiiistadt and Durklicim, with tho
8th Infantry Division at KaiBcrBlautern.

In rear of the centre of this foremost line came the IXtli
Coi'ps in its old position at Oppenheim and Worms, also intended
to move np into the first line. Behind the right Aving was the
Xth Coi-ps engaged in disemharking at Bingcn ; its foremost
troops (IJJth Division) wore at Kreiiznach. In rear of the left
wing was tho Guard Corps, westward of Mannheim ; its trans-
port by rail was as yet incomplete. Between the IXth and Xth
came tho Xllth (Koyal Saxon) Army Corps ; it had reached the
neighbourhood of Nieder-Olm and Ingellieim, on the left bank
of the Rhine, and was complete.

The head-quarters of the Ilnd Army remained at Alzey on
the Ist of August.

Li front of the IlIrd and IVth Army Coi-ps, the licht wing
of tho 5th CavaliT Division, Redern's and Barby's brigades,
extended to Reichenbaoh and Baumholder; the left wing,
Bredow's brigade, to Kaiserslautern. The 13th Dragoons,
detached from the latter brigade to keep up communication
with the IlIrd Army, reached Annweiler. The 6th Cavalry
Division, pushing forward between Barbj-'s and Bredow's
brigades, arrived at Altenglan.

We are already acquainted with the reasons which led to the
temporary suspension of the transport by rail at the Rhine, and
also that the subsequent prospect of an unmolested advance of
the anny enabled us to move the point of disemlxirkation
further fonvard on the other bank. In the night of 31st July-
Ist August instnictions were received by the commander of the
Ilnd Army, from the royal head-quarters, to the effect that the
disembarkation of troops was on and after the 2nd Augtist to
take place at Birkenfekt and Kaiserslautern.

Both points lay in advance of the front at that time. They
were already protected in some measure by the cavalry and tho
position of the Ist Army, l)ut in order to ensure their complete
safety, the (commander of the Ilnd Army decided to push
forward the llird Army Corps to Baumholder and the IV th to
Kaiserslautern. Both coips received orders on the 1st August
to reach the specified places with tlieir main forces on the 3rd.
On aiTival one of their first duties was to provide temporary
quarters for the detachments of the Xth and Guard Corps,
which were shortly expected.

The IXth Amiy Coi-ps had received orders to follow into the
lino Alsenz-Diirkheim ; the remainder were to extend their
quai-ters westward so as to gain space for the Vlth and Ist
Corps. No altemtions were made in the fiuictions of tlio two
Cavahy Divisions.

On the evening of the 2nd August tho positions were as
follows : the IlIrd Army Coi-ps at IMesenheim, "with the 5th
Division as far as Offenbach ; the IVth Amiy Corps between
Griinstadt and Kaiserslautern, the whole of the 8th Division
being at the latter place. The IXth Anny Corps reached the
ueignbourhood east of Kircliheimbolanden. The Ath and Guard

108

(yorps still continued iu ninch the Hamo poBitious at Krciiznach
and Mannheim; the cavalry of the Guard commenced dis-
embarking at Kaiscralautern. The Xllth Army Corps advanced
as far as Worretadt.

Tlie two Cavalry Divisions moved hito the line Tholey-St.
Wendel-Schoenenbcrg-MUhlbach. In front they were in com-
munication with tlie 5th Dragoons at Einod and Bliescastel, on
the right with the Vlllth Army Corps of the 1st Army.

The 13th Dragoons were at Piiinasens in immediate contact
with the Ilird Army.

The hcad-quartere of the Ilnd Army, which remained at Alzey
on the 2iid, r(ip(»rt(.'d to Mainz llie onlers respecting the pro-
tection of the new points of disenjbiirkation. In consequence
of this further directions* were sent from the royal head-quartei-s
the same evening to the effect that in the event of the enemy
haviiuj ah-eady advanced by Saarbrik'ken and Saargemiind, tlie
Ilird Army Corps was to remain in its present quarters, and
that the IVth was not to advance beyond Kaiserslautern. If,
on the other hand, the enemy made no attempt to push forward,
then tlie intended position of the Ilird Corps at Baumholder, on
the 3rd August, was to hold good ; in this case the principal

Eart of the IVth Corps was also to be moved forward as far as
landstuhl. No further advance beyond the line Baumholder-
Landstuhl was to tiike place until the remaining corps had
closed up to within half a day's march. The Ilnd Army was at
the same time charged with making such arrangements that
the 1st Corps, on its reaching Birkenfeld and Kaiserslautern,
might bo conooutrated at an early date towards the right
wing.

From reports received at Alzoy \ip to the 2iul August it
was evident that of late the outposts on both sides had bee& in
lively proximity t(j one another. There were no apparent
indications of a definite advance on the enemy's part ; at the
same time nothing was as yet known of the attack upon Siwir-
brilcken. In conformity with the instnictions from llamz, oi*ders
were issued, under these circumstances, for the Ilird Corps to
continue its march to Baumholder on the 8rd August, and for
the principal part of the IVtli to advance as far as Landstuhl on
the 4th, at which points both corps were then to remain until
the main body of the army could come up.

Accordingly, the following pofiitions were taken un on the
8rd August: In fir^t line, tlie Titli Infantry Division at Konken ;
behind it, tlic (Hh at Biiumlu)lder ; the 8th at Bruchmlihlbach ;
the 7th at Kaiserslautern. The head-quarters of the Ilird and
IVth Army Corps were at liaumholder and Kaiserslautern. In
second line came the Xth Army Coips to the south of and
beyond Kreuznach as far as Furfeld ; the Xllth advanced as far
as Alzey ; the IXth had extended its cantonments from Ku'ch-
heimboLanden to the left as far as Griinstadt ; the infantry of the

* Vide foot notCi p. 105.

109

Onard were in the neiglihourhood of Diirkheini ; the cavahy of
the Guard and the corps artillery to the north of Kaiserslaiitem,

The 5th and 6th Cavalry DiviBions drew near to the Saar
and Blies this day and Bent forward parties towards both rivers.
On the right Redern's and Darby's Brigades took up positions
at Eiweilcr and Guichcnbach in front of the riglit wing of the
1st Army. On the left IhTdow's Hrigade reached llomburg,
and sent forwai'd detachments to Einod and Blicscastcl. The
13th Dragoons, which had been detached to PirinaRcns, remained
at that place. The Gth Cavalry Division during its advance
gained intelligence of the events of the preceding day at Saar-
brlicken ; in consequence thereof it at once halted at Klein
Ottweiler, between llomburg and Neunkirchen, and sent
forward four squadrons along different rocads leading to the
frontier to accpiiro information as to the enemy's intentions.

The lioad-quarter staff move<l to Kircliheimbolandcn on the
morning of the 3rd, shortly after the first reports of the fight at
Saarbriicken were received.

A telegram dated in the evening of the 2nd August from the
royal hcad-cpiarters referred to the intelligence of the enemy's
advance at Saarbriicken and Saargemiind, and at the same
time communicated the concentration that day of the Ilird
Army in bivouacs to the north of the Klingbach.

A reply was sent that in the event of the news behig con-
fumed Pi'ince Frederick Clunles proposed a concentration of the
Ilnd Army on this side of the mountains.

During the 3rd August, however, it became evident that
the French attack on Saarbriicken was not followed up.
General v. llheinbaben also sent in a report from the left flaiik
of the Cavalry Divisions that " a detichmcnt of the eiunny,
** consisting of all arms, had in the afternoon of the 2nd August
** advanced as far as Rubenheim (five or six miles south of
" Bliescastel), and kept up an effective fire upon detachments of
" the 5th Dragoons, but had again retired in the evening over
" the frontier.*'* Both of these enterprises on the part of the
enemy bore the outward appearance of mere reconnaissjinces.
This view was confirmed uy the reports which the head-
quarter st^ff received in the course of the following day from
tlie Gth Cavalry Division.

A squadron of the fith Cuirassiers, belonging to that
Division, under Captain Count Monts, had advanced towards
St. Johann. That officer gathered that the enemy had been
seen at Saarbriicken, but had not actually occupied the ]:)lace.
Another squadron of the 3rd Lancci's, under Captain Bothe,
also moved via Brebach upon St. Johann, and by its appear-
ance caused the enemy to get under arms. In the course of
the day a division of the squadron, under Lieut. Lange, forced
its way into St. Johann and brought away under the enemy's

* These were obTiouslj the troopSi ^liicli, in the forenoon of the 2nd, were
reported to SaarbrQcken as harine broken up from Snargcmund, and which Iind not
ag^in been seen m the course of the day. Compare ** Combat at Saarbruckcn/'

110

fire seven French infantry Bolilierci as prisoners. Lastly, on the
left flank Captain v. Grimm's squadron of the 3rd Hussars and
Oaptain v. Kosenberg's of the 15th Lancers moved in the
direction of the lower Blies, and wei-e not fired upon until they
came to the callages of Bliesbolgen, Habkirchen, and Frauen-
berg, some 4 miles this side of Saargomiind.

On the whole wc might conclude that there was a consider-
able French fcn*ce on the Saar and Blies, but that the entire
intervening country as far as those rivers was clear of the
enemy, and that tlioro was no sign as yet of his undertaking
more koiious oflbnsivc movemcntH. Tliis conviction was also
expressed in tlio following- toli^gnim received in the afternoon
of Ihc ih'd from Iho royal liead-(|uartci'H : —

** Wavering advance of the French leads us to anticipate
that the ITml Army can he deployed on the iUh in>stnnt in advance
of the belt of forest at Kaisei'slauiern,**

"Ist Army is dra^vn forward to-morrow upon Tholey,
Both Annies should aim at a joint co-operation in battle."

" If rapid advance of the enemy cannot be checked, con-
centration of the Ilnd Army behind the Lauter, the 1st
Army upon Baumholder."

" Ilird Army crosses the frontier to-moirow at Weissen-
burg."

**-! tjeneral ojfemice is projyosed.^**

'Die combatant forces proper and the principal j^art of the
trains of the Ilnd Army were comi)letely assembled on the
theatre of Avar by the 3rd August. The Illrd, IVth, Xth, and
Guard Corps were still deficient of their second line'* of hainf
and waggon parks, which, OAnng to changes in the railway
transport arrangements, were only to be disembarked further
to the rear at ^losbach during the next few days, and were to
follow the army by degrees. Until their arrival the troops
were directed to obtain waggons by requisition as a provisional
measm-e. From the 4th August, however, the Ilnd Army was
completely ready to commence operations.

As the general offensive movement, which the royal head-
quaiiers had from the outset contemplated, was now about to
commence, and to that end more particularly the deplojnuent
of the Ilnd Army *' in advance of the belt of forest at Kaisera-
lautern " was awaited, the chief matter now was the advance
and concentration of this army. Should the enemy, mean-
while, make a forward movement from the Saar, he mtist be
held in check in the mountain passes by small detachments until
the two leading army coi'ps could take up a suitable position.

It was known that the right flank of such a movement was
directly protected by the Ist Army, whilst the Ilird Army con-
centrated behind the Klingbach, was to assume the offensive

* Similar telegraphic instructions xvcrc, as wo liaTO seen, scut at tho same timo
to tho let Anny.

t Tlio second line of trains (streife stajfet) consist of tho remainder of tho
proTision colnmni, flelil ho9])italSf field bokery and ammunition columns which are
not immediately required >vith the troops. — Tb.

Ill

on the 4th August. There appeared, therefore, no cause for
apprehension in continuing our advance through the Haardt.

As a matter of fact, tuo troops had aheady evinced p*eat
marching powers; thus the 5th Infantry Division, under a
glaring sun and over unfavourable ground, had made marches
of over 14 miles on four consecutive days. The situation also
of the main army had been at first somewhat embarrassing, as
the wjiolc force was compelled to pass through the mountains,
and several of its army corps wore limited to a singlii road.
Moreover, the quartering of the Ist Army Corps had to bo
thought of, while at the same time the close contact commencing
'W'lth the Ist Army began to bo M{,

Taking these matters into consideration, the commander of
the Ilnd army made his further dispositions. The orders issued
on the 2nd August to the Ilird and I Vth Corps wore still to hold
good. In accordance with these, the latter was to reach Land-
stuhl, the 8th Division pushing on beyond that place ; the former
was to remain in general about Baumholder, the 5th Di^^sion
being scMit on as far as was necessary for the suppm't of the
cavalry. For all the other coips one march forward was ordered.
In conformity ^with these orders the following were tho
positio?)S on the 4th August: The two Divisions of the infantiT
of the Gtiard reached Frankenstein and Ramsen on the roacfs
from Diirkheim and Oriinstadt to Kaiserslautern. Tho IX th
Anny Corps touched it on the right at Miiuchweiler and Koeken-
hausen, while further on was the Xth at LautcrcckiMi and
Meisenheim. The Xllth Army Corps advanced to tlie neigh-
bom-hood of Gollheim.

In first line the lYth Army C'orns moved Ixij'ond Landstulil,
with its 7th Divi8i(m as far as Miililbach and tho 8th as far as
Konigsbruchhof. An advanced guard of the latter Division
occupied Homburg. The gcnoral commanding the IlIrd Corps
now deemed it advisable to advance in stronger force into the
same front with tho neighbouring Corps, so as to be nearer at
hand for giving aid to the advanced Cavalry Divisions. Ho
therefore, on the 4tli August, ordered the 5th Infantry Division
to move its 9th Brigade to Neunkirclien and the 10th Brigade to
Waldmohr. Further to the north at Cusel was the Gth Infantry
Division. The head-quarters of the Ilird Army Corps wore
removed to St. Wendel ; the hoad-(iuaii;or8 of the Ilnd Army to
Winnweiler, half way between Kircheimbolandon and Kaisers-
lautei*n.

Both Cavalry Divisitms, the fith more particularly from its
position at Klein Ottweilc i\ had boon ordered to move f(»rward
their main bodies. In accordance therewith the latter Division
took up a position with its two brigades at Rohrbach and Neu-
haiisel, eastward of St. Ingbert. On theii* left Ihedow's brigade
of the 5th Cavalry Division was at Zweibriickon ; the 5th Dra-
goons wore attached to it as a temporary measure.* On the

* This regiment remiMned attached to tho brigade uiittl the 11th August, after
which date it joined the Ilird Armj, to which it properly belonged.

112

right Barby's and Kcdeni's brigades still remained in the iieii^h-
bourhood of Hcusweilcr ; the 11th and 17th HussatB l)elonging
to the latter brigade were pushed forward towards Volklingen
and Saarbriickcn. The line of cavalnr outposts ran from Hilscli-
bach past Dudweiler, Enshcini, Bel)eljsheim to Neu-Hombach on
the frontier south of Zwcibriicken. The 13th Dingoons were
still at Pirmasens, making daily reconnaissHnces in the direction
of Bitsch,* in which they were joined by small detachments of
Bavarian riflemen transported on waggons.

From this position the cavalry now commenced further
entei-prises. In conformity with instructions received from
General v. Bredow, the frontier between Suargemund and
Pirmasens was crosdcd by five dcUichmcntH, each consisting of
several squadrons, s(mic of which penetmted eight or nine mile«
into French temtory. Wherever the enemy was met with, he
retired, 8ueh wiis the case at Bliesbriickcn and Schwoigcn ;
nay, even at Ilnspelscheidt and Breidunbach, close to Bitsch.
The 13th Dragoons asceitained the presence of a large hostile
camp at this place. Wo now had certain intelligence of the
enemy's presence between Suargemihid and Bitsch, in addition
to the information which we had gathered from previous
repoi-ts as to his camps and positions l>ehind the Saar oetween
Saarbriickcn and Saargsmilnd. Some small reconnaissances
made from the outposts by the rtth Cavalry Division on the 4th
August showed that no essential change had taken place in the
position of affairs on the Saar. Caj)tain v. Knoolauch, 6th
Cuirassiers, found St. Johann unoccupied, but was fired upon .
from the bridge leading to Saarbriickcn.

On the extreme right flank, Genei-al v. Redeni sent forward
detachments via Volknngen to Ludweiler. There was no show
of resistance in this direction, and Captain v. KnobelsdorfT, 1 1th
Hussars, succeeded in penetrating impcrceived through Rosseln,
as fiir as Emmersweiler, where he found himself almost in rear
of the enemy's position. From his point of ol^ei-vation he
descried the enemy's infantry and baggage on the march to
Rosbrlick, and also leanit that since 9 a.m. troops had been
retuing in this direction. The reconnaissance therefore infonned
us that the left fljuik of the French position behind the Saar
only extended as far as Smirbrucken. These observations made
at Emmersweiler appear further to have fii-st originated the
opinion, which rapully gained ground, that the enemy was
retuing, and that there would be no combat on the Saar. The
French cavalry continued, in fact, without enterprise, and made
no attempt to move beyond the myon of their own positions.
The movements towards Rosbrlick, which had been obsen-ed,
pointed, however, merely to slight changes within the position
of Frossard's Corps.

This much, however, was gathered from the reports which
reached the head-quarters in Kirchcinibolanden up to the 4th
August, that an attack on the part of the enemy oecame more

* Pinnusciiii to BitMrh — 15 miles appros. — Tb.

113

and more improbable eveiy day. At the same time the pros-
pect increasea of carrying out our own plans nnthwarted.
buch being the case the first consideration was how to bring
the llnd Ai*my as quickly as possible through the mountainous
country so unfavourable to its deployment. But this being
accomplished, it appeared most in accord with the leading idea
of the royal head-quarters to remain in an attitude of expecta-
tion, and to hold fast the French Army on the Saar until the
advance of the Ilird Army could produce its effect. In tlio
event of a decisive battle on the French frontier, the 1st and
Ilnd Armies would thus attack in front, while the Ilird would
probably come up and attack in flank from the direction of the
Upper Saar.

These considerations formed the basis of the army order of AoDendix
the 4th August, in which the head-quarter staff ordered the"^^^*
further advance and deployment into fine of the Ilnd Army in
the course of the next few days. On the completion of the
movement the following were to be the positions on the 7th
August :

Ilird Army Corps, Neunkirchen, advanced guard Sulzbacli.
Xth Aiiny Corps, Bexbach, advanced guard St. Ingbert.
Guard Corps, Homburg.

IVth Army Corps, Zweibriicken, advanced guard Neu-
Uonibach.
In rear :

IX th Army Corps with its head at Waldmohr.
Xllth Army Coi-ps with its head at Muhlbach.

The intention was therefore to deploy the army on its issue
from the mountain defiles on such a breadth of front that it
would be available either for a further advance, or for battle.
In this contemplated vast position of readiness there would be
in first line an army corps on each of the four roads leading
from the line Neuntarchen-Zweibriicken to the Saar and Blies.
Tlie IXth and Xllth Aimy Corps were to form the genei-al
reserve in rear, and the two Cavalry Divisions thrown out in
front of the Army were to veil our own movements and
reconnoitre those of the enemy. The army order at the same
time did not lose sight of the imavoidable difiiculties caused bv
several army corps (the IVth, Guard, IXth and Xllth) with all
their trains moving firom Kaiserslautem through the same defile
some 23 miles long. It was therefore ordered that the second
Knea of trains* and the heavy baggage were to remain behind
for the present, and on the 7th August were to pass the town
of Kaiserslautem by coi-ps in the order named. The communi-
cation of this army order to the royal head-guartera at Mainz
crossed Avith a dispatch from thence, fi'om which it was evident
that the orders which had been issued were in accordance with
His Majesty's views.

Meanwhile the Ist Army had completed its movement upon
Tholey, but in doing so its quartera extended across the road

• Tide note to p. 110.

St. Wendel-Neunkiichen which formed the luie of march of the
right wing of the Ilnd Army. This led to a diBcnaaion between
the two commanders, one of whom considered the marches of
his troops intertercd with, and the other did not beUeve him*
self justified in making any change without the consent of
higher authority, when once the position was taken up. The
question at issue was settled, as has been ahready mentioned, by
tne royal head-quarters.

In other respects the movements contemplated in the army
order were duly carried out on the 5th August.

The Illrd Army Corps concentrated as follows: — The whole
of the 5th Infantry Division at Neunkirchen ; the 6th, with the
head-quarters of the Coips, at St. Wendel. The IVth Army
Coi-ps threw forward the 8th Division to Zweibriicken; the
head-quarters and the 7th Division moved to Homburg. In
second line the Divisions of the Xth Anny Corps reached the
neighbourhood of Cusel and Altenglan. The Guard stood west-
ward of Kaisei-slautern and extended beyond Landstuhl. In
third lino the IXth Army Corps was at Otterberg; the Xllth at
Miinchweiler and Enkenbach. The head-quarters of the Army
were transfei-red to Kaiserslautem.

The Cavaliy DivihionH remained in their old positions and
continued their raidH on the 5th August. On the rigiit bank
Major V. (uirnicr, llth Hussars, made a fresh reconnaissance by
Voiklingeu and Ludweiler towards Forbach. He alaimed a
hostile camp ; ho also observed French troops moving partly by
road and pai-tly by rail towards St. Avoid, and believed that he
saw divers other indications of a diminution of the enemy's
forces. The Brunswick Hussars which were pushed forward on
the Lebach-Saarbrucken road also remarked a decrease in the
camp on the other side of Saarbriicken. Lieutenant v. Konig
with two men rode into the town and under the enemy's fire
brought oiF two men as prisonei's. In corroboration of these
observations other private infoimation pointed to rearward
movements of the enemy, to which the burning of the Saar*
brucken railway stiition was probably the prelude. General v.
Rheinbaben communicated a summary of the observations made
by his Division to the head-quarters staff of the Army.

Reports were sent in from the 6th Cavalry Division that the
village of Ilabkirchen on the Blies, hitherto never left un-
occupied by the enemy, was evacuated ; that the camp at St*
Amual was desci-ted, and that the other camps on the Saar and
Blies were also breaking up. It was said that there was con*
siderable traffic upon the line of railway between Saargemiind
and Bitsch ; it was thereupon b]X)ken up in several places on the
following night by the German cavalry.

All these reports strengthened the view held at the head-
(piartei*s of the Ilnd Anny, that the enemy was making a move-
ment to the rear. Thev were expressed in the following
telegram to the royal head-quarters : —

115

** According to reporto fi*om the cavab'y the enemy is
breaking up his camp on the Saar and Blies and is in retreat.
Habkirchen no longer occupied. Cavahy will follow up
closely towards Bitsch and Rohrbach."

It was considered^ however, that the situation of affaii-s was
not yet sufficiently clear, and the existing orders were to be valid
for the Qtli Auatist.

Accordingly the following were the positions to be taken up
on this day —

nird Army Corps : Neunkii'cheji, an advanced guard pushed

forward towards SaarbrUcken.
I V th Army Corps : Zweibi*ucken, advanced guard at Neu*

Hombach.
Xth Anny Corps : Waldmohr.
Guard Coips : Uomburg.
IXth Army Corps : Landstuhl.
Xllth Army Corps : Kaiserslautem.

A telegram had been received from the Ist Army that its
two foremost army corps would amve at Fischbach and
Quichenbach on the 6th August, consequently that they would
also be still about seven miles on this side of the Saar. The
victory gained by the Illrd Army at Weissenburg was kuown,
and we nad also a communication from tliat army as to its
farther plans.

In the evening a telegi*am from the royal head-quarters
reached Kaiserslautem, containing the instructions, already
adverted to, for a forward raid by a large body of cavalry upon
the Saargemund- Bitsch railway. In accorcmnce with thesQ
orders both Cavalry Divisions were directed to remain in close
proximity with the enemy on the night of the 5th- 6th, to
capture prisoners, and to report frequently as to the probably
direction of the French retreat. They were more especially to
be on the alert in the direction of Rohrbach.

Having thus pointed out the prevailing views and measures
for the following day, we will now leave the two German
armies, moving towai'ds the Saai*, in then* positions on the
evening of the 5th August.* In order to throw light upoa
subsequent events, it should be noticed that both commanders of
Armies had ordered an ailvanced guard to push forward towards
SaarbrUcken on the 6th August, that moreover tlie opinion of d
retreat of Hie enemy* s armv having commenced had taken firm hold^
and that it received further confirmation on the morning of the
6ih August. We must now therefore bring up the events on
the theatre of war in Alsace.

8. The Third Army.

Towards the end of the month of July the Ilird Army waf
«t]ll engaged in its deployment ; this, however, was now nearly

• Tid« Skoleh Ut

116

completed. The number of troops pushed foi*ward to the left
bank of the Rhine by the 1st August was very insignificant.
Hie lifle battalion and a squadi'on of the Vth Army Corps
were despatched at the suggestion of the Bavarian Greneral,
Count Bothmer, to Wilgartsweisen and Hinter-Weidenthal, for
the purpose of supporting the Bavarian detachments in the
moimtains. On the right bank of the Rhine, the Baden
Division was closely cantoned between Carlsnihe and the river,
being protected on the south by Rastatt. The ganisou of this
fortress watched the river between the mouths of the Lauter
and Murg. Two squadrons left at Oos and Sandweier recon-
noiterod towards Kehl. The Baden detachment at Hagcnlmch,
on tlio left bank of the Rhino,* was relieved by the advanced
guard of the Xlth Army Corps, and was then bi-ought up to
Maxau.

Minor enterprises were earned out from both -wings of the
line of outposts on the Franco-Palatinate frontier. The village
of Scheibenhardt, lying to the west of Lauterburg, was oc-
cupied by a detachment of infantiy ; subsequently half of the
2na sauadrou of the 14th Ilussais crossed the lower Lauter.
This latter force came across an advanced picquet of the
enemy's cavaliy in the neighbomhood of SeJz, but finding
itself threatened in flank by other troops, it subsequently Avith-
di'cw skirmishing. The intelligence had, however, been gained
of thu presonco of two hostile squadrons at Solz. On the other
wing u baud of some 50 horsemen made a bold raid into French
teiTitory over the mountains; half of them were Bavarian
Chevauxlegers under Major v. Egloffstein, the other half were
Prussian Hussarsf under Major v. Parry. Through tlic naiTow
mountain defiles they ascended the heights southward of
Eppenbninn, and struck the main road from Bitsch to Weissen-
burg in the neighbourhood of Stiirzelbronn. Hei'e they came
across some French infantry, who fled to the hills on their
approach. The German horsemen continued on their way at a
ffallop, encountering a biisk musketry fire fi'om both sides of
flie road, and dashed to the other side of Sturzelbronn, whence
they returned homewards by another mountain path. Only a
few hornes were wounded.

The head-quarter staff of the llird Army learnt from other
sources that the railway south of Weisseiiburg had been made
impassable by the French, and that they were also prepaiin^
emplacements for guns and rifie trenches at Ober-Steinbach and
Lembach (westward of Weissenburg). Extensive entrench-
ments were also reported at Strassburg and Breisach. The
impression conveyed by all these proceedings and reports on
the 1st Aug\ist was that the enemy, feeliug his own unreadiness
and how mueh ho luid been <)utstripi>ed by the German prepara-
tions, had renounced all idefis of the oflenHive, and now
intended to receive battle behind the Saar.

• Vido p. 64.

t Part of tho 12th Hiii»an belonging to tho 8rh Infant rr DiTlilon, the Snd
iquadron of wliioh wat at thmt time puthod forward towards PlrmaMiit.

117

This view of the state of afTairs was altered, in soino
respects, on the 2nd August. Scarcely any change, indeed, hfiid
taken place in the situation on the lower Lanter. A squadron
accompanied by a division (Zug) of infantry, transpoi-ted on
waggons, had again been sent foi-ward from the advanced guai*d
of tlie Xlth Army Coips towards Selz, where they on this day
came across considerable bodies of French infantiy and cavalrj^
The small Prussian detachment, however, effected its retreat
immolested. French Lancers were observed at Ober-»Scel>ach.
AVeissenburg on the mornhig of the 2ud August wns found
unoccupied, the gates alone were closed ; the line of telegraph
between Weissenburg nnd Lauterburg was destroyed by tlio
enemy. On the other hand the oiitponU in the mountmns reported
the advance of the memyn vatroU through Hobenthal and Noith-
weiler towards Vorder- Weidenthal ; lastly, a telegram was
received from Pirmasens that sUvng bodies of French trere on Hie
march from BiUch to Pirmasetie. In consequence of this, (leneral
Count Bothmer despatched reinforcements to Dahn ; the 5th
Prussian Rifle Battalion, which had just arrived at Wilgarts-
weisen and Hinteiv Weidenthal, was concentrated at the last-
named village. Towards noon the enemy again retired ; Ids
movement at Bitsch was pronounced to be merely a change in
position of the troops along the frontier. The reinforcements
despatched to the hills could again be withdrawn.

Although no especial importance was therefore attached on
the 2nd Aumst to these proceedings, vet they became more
simificant when the news arrived on tho following day from
)£iinz that the enemy had occupied Saarbriicken and crossed
the frontier at Saargemiind. Ihe possibility of an offensive
movement on the part of the French against the centre of the
position of the German Armies again presented itself, and was
not lost rifjht of by tlie head-auarters staff of the Ilird Ai-my.
A communication was received from the head-quarters of Prince
Frederick Charles that in such aneventualitv thelind Army would
slowly withdraw the troops pushed forward into the Haardt, and
accept battle in a selected position at Kirchheimbolanden.

In general, we were still uncertain as to the real state of
affairs, for on the morning of the 3rd August the Baden cavalry
patrols discovered the enemy still in the neighbourhood of Selz ;
and moreover, reports were now received of the appearance of
lar^e bodies of troops near Weissenburg. We also heard that
civil labourers were busily engaged in throwng up entrench-
ments at that place.

With a view to prepaiing tho offensive movement towards
Alsace, previously* counselled by the roval head-quarters,
orders were sent from the head-quarters staff of the Ilird Army
to the different Corps in the forenoon of the 2nd to the effect
that they were at once to concentrate in bivouacs. On the arrival

• Piige 70.

118

of the tmiiiB, which were Btill deficient, a forward movement of
the whole army was intended. The troops began to move on
ilie same daj.

Towards evening Lieut-Colonel v. Verdy, who had been
despatched from Mamz to attend a verbal conference upon the
militaiy Bituatioti, airivcd at the nnny hend-quartors at Speyer*
The opinion was held, as we know, at the royal head-quarters,
that, with a view to the subBcquent co-operation of the entire
Gerninn forces against the lino of the Saar, the army on the left
flank should bo at once set in motion.

In consequence of this, the Ch'OA^ai Prince resolved not to
await the arrival of the trains, but to cross the frontier as early
as the 4th August. This resolution was reported to Mainz
during the niglit.

The anny reached the following position on the 3rd August:
On the Landau-Weissenburg road, pushed forward to Berg-
zabem, was Bothmer's Division of the Ilnd Bavarian Corps.
About two miles in rear were the Vth and Xlth Army Corps,
bivoiiacked close together at BilHghcim and Uohrbach respec-
tively ; still more to the rear at Walabeim, north of Landau, was
the remainder of tho Ilnd Bavarian Corps ; the 1st Bavarian
Corps was westward of Gerniemheim. The 4th Cavahy Division^
which was assembled as micli on the 1st August, occupied can-
tonments round Offenbach, eastward of Landau. The Baden
and Wdrttemborg Divisions, provisionally united into one Coi'ps
under the command of Geniral v. Worder, formed the left flank
of the army, which was separated from tho rest of tho position
by tho Gruat Bionwald. Tlie Badenoi-s wore at Pfortz and
Hagenbach, tho Wih'ttcmborgors were still on the right bank of
the Rhine at Knielingen. Tho Divisions wore sepai-atcd by the
bridge at Maxau, which was occupied by a battalion.

The detachments pushed forward into the mountains from
the right flank of the anny were in Aciy much the same posi-
tions as heretofore ; the detachment of the Vth Anny Corps was
alone drawn in from Hintcr-Weidenthal ; that at Anweiler was
reduced to a battalion of the 58th Regiment and a division of
dragoons. The 5th Bavarian Rifle Battalion and the two
squadrons of the 5th (Jhevauxlegers were directed to eficct an
early jiuiction with their Corps toAvards the front. The 5th
Dragoons at Zweibrlickcn, which liad already made themselves
well acquaintud with that neighbourhood, remained there to
assiist in tho reconnaissanccH of the 5th Cavalry Division,
and, a« already nicntioned, «ubscquently accompanied its
advance.

General Douiit liol Inner pUKluid a battalion from Bergzaberu
to Birkenhordt for the immediate protection of his flank.
Two other battalions and two squadrons were at Ober and
Nieder-Ottcrbach, with a chain of outposts extending from
Sohweigon to Schaidt. At Otterbach the chahi was continued
bj' tho outposts of the Xlth Army Corps, of which the 42nd
IJiigadc was posted at Winden and Minfeld as advanced guards

119

and afberwards by the Baden outposts from Biicbelberg to
Nenberg on the Rhine. The Wiirttembergers were engaged in
-watching the right bank of the Kliine.

The combatant forces of the Ilird Army, -which were ready
for an immediate advance, numbered on the evening of the Srd
August, 128 battaUons, 102 squadrons and 80 batteries. Fiuther
reinforcements were on their way by the assignment of the
Vlth Anny Corps and the 2nd Cavahy Division. I^ut as the
leading detachments of these troops could not arrive before the
4th August in 'Landau, Mainz, and Bingen respectively, their
co-operation could not be counted upon in the first engage*
ments.

Action at Weissenburg on the 4Tn August.

At 4 p.m. on the Srd August, the following diRpositioii was PUir 1-
issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ilird Array :

" Head-quarters, Landau, Srd Augusts

" It is my intention to advance to-monow with the army as
far as the Lauter, and to throw vanguards across it.

** With this object the Bienwald will be traversed on four
roads. The enemy is to be driven back wherever he
is foimd. The separate columns will march afl follows:

(1.) Bothmer s Bavarian Division will continue as advanced
guard, move on Weissenburg, and endeavour to gain
possession of the town. It will guard its rigiit mink
by moving a suitable detachment vift Bollenbom to
Bobenthal; it will break up from its bivouac at 6 a.m.

(2.) The remainder of Hartmann s Corps, inclusive of Wal-
ther's Division, will quit its bivouac at 4 A.m^, and
move, avoiding Landiau, vift Impflingen and Beiig-
zabem upon Ober-Otterbach.

(Dhe trains of the Corps will be moved forward as
far .as Appenhofen in the course of the forenoon.

(3.) The 4th Cavahy Division will concentrate to the south
of Morlheim at 6 a.m., and march vi& Insheim, Rohr-
bach, Billigheim, Barbelroth, Capellen, as far as the
Otterbach, 4,000 paces eastward of Ober-Otterbacli.

(4.) The Vth Corps will start from its bivouac in Billigheim
at 4 a.m. and march vi& Barbelroth and Nieder-Otter-
bach to Gross -Steiuf eld and Kapsweyer. It will
form its own advanced guard, which will cross the
Lauter at St. Beiliy and Sie Wooghaiisem, and iplaoe
outposts on the heights on the far side, li^ains
remain at Billigheim.
(5.) The Xlth (Corps will start from Rohrbach at 4 a.m., and
move vift Steinweiler, Wmden, Schaidt, across the
Bienwald to the Bienwald hut. It will form its own
advanced guard, wliich will press foi*ward over the

120

Lauter, and place outposts upon the heights on the
further bank. Trains at Bohrbach.

(6.) Werder's Corps will march along the main road to Lau-
terburg, and endeavour to gain possession of that
town and place outposts on the far bank. Trains at
Hagenbach. ^

(7.) Von d. Taun*8 Corps will break up from its bivouac at y
4 a.m., and move along the mam road vi& Rulzheim toV
Langenkandel, to the westward of which village it
will oivouac. Trains remain at Rheinzabern. Head-
quaiicrs of the Corps at Langenkandel.

(8.) My position in the forenoon will be on the heights
between Kapsweycr and Schweigen, and as far as I
can foresee, my head-quarters will be ti-ansferred to
Nieder-Otterbach.

(Signed) Frederick William,

Crown Prince/*

As from reports received on tlie 3rd about the enemy there

seemed a possibility of a serious collision as early as tiie 4th

August, a verbal communication from the Commander-in-Chief

accompanied the issue of the orders to the effect that in such an

event all the columns were to afford each other mutual support.

Tn/ptMiorj In accordance with the disposition the various columns were

MfnmmiM to in motion on the morning of the 4th August. The rain, which

11 %m. f^Yl during the night, had made the roads heavy with mire,

particularly in the Bienwald, and the weather continued very

overcast in the early morning.

The 4th Bavarian Division, Count Bothmer, was the first to
move off, with onl^^ 8 battalions, 4 batteries, 8^ squadrons, and
1 company of engineers.* The outposts, consistmg of 2 bat-
talions of the 9th Regiment, were not to be withdrawn until
the advanced ffuard had passed their position. The flanking
detachment, the 3rd battalion of the same regiment was
directed to march from Vorder-Weidenthal and Birkenhordt vift
Bollenborn, with a view to protecting the right flank of the
Division in its advance. It was then to advance vift Geimanshof
and Weiler upon Weissenbuvg. Two squadrons of the 5th
CSievauxlegers and the 5th Rifle battalion, the left wing of
which occupied Bundenthal and Bobenthal, were left behind to
furnish the posts of observation in the mountains as far as
Zweibriicken. Lastly, the 3rd battalion of the Ist Regiment
was still in rear, and only reached Walsheim on the preceding

day.

The 3rd squadron of the 2nd Chevauxlogers, which led the
Division, came across the first hostile outposts about 8 a.m.
which then retired upon Woissenbur^. The gates of the town
were closed, the ramparts and the Geissberg, which lies further
to the south, were apparently occupied bp the enemy's infantry.

* Tbo special order of march of all the columna if giren in Appendix YIII.

121

On seeing this, the advanced guard of the Division was de-
ployed for battle. . . . •

Weissenburg forms the point of intensection of the roads
from Landan, Bitsch, and Strassbnrg. Since 1867 the place has
ceased to be a fortress, but its ramparta foiTO a continuous
enceinte which cannot be carried by assualt; it is surrounded by
ditches from 20 to 30 feet broad, which can bo filled with water
to a depth of 6 feet. On tlie north front the rampart risos to a
height of 30 feet above the bottom of tlic ditch. Tho Ila^enau
and Landau gates are vaulted; the Bit«ch gate is a mere
opening in the rampart. In the front of the two latter gates
are small lunettes with crenelated walls. From both sides of
the town extend the earthworks so well known in former wars
as the " Weissenburg Lines."

The Lauter, whicli flows through the town, and which in its
immediate vicinity is not easily passable, forms in conscquenco
an obstacle capable of a powerful defence, the strength of which
is considerably enhanced by the commanding heights on the
right bank. For instance, while the last spurs of the Vosgcs on
the left bank extend only to Weissenberg, those on the right
bank extend for more than a mile eastward of the town, and
only terminate with the hill, so diflicult of ascent, on which tho
Ch&teau Geissberg is situated.

The entire locality thus presents a defensive position com-
manding the ground to the north for a considerable distance,
and capable of being maintained for some time wth small forces.
A turning movement to the left is rendered difficult by tho
mountains, to the right bv the Bienwald.

Some days previously Marshal Le Boeuf had informed
Marahal MacMahon of the assembly of considerable bodies of
the enemy in the Palatinate, and requested him to concentrate
the troops under his orders on the roads leading from Lower
Alsace to Bitsch.

The combatant forces at first available occupied the following
positions on the morning of the 4th August : —

Abel Douay's Division with Septeuirs Cavahy Brigade at

Weissenberg.*
Ducrot's Division, which had been for several days at

Reichshofien, on the march to Lembach.
Baoult's Division at Reichshofien.
Head-quartera of the Corps and Lartigue's Division at

Hagenau.
Nansouty's Cavalry Brigade occupied Selz, on the Rhino ;

Bonnemain's Cavalry Division and MiclicFs Cuirassier

Brigade were in rear at Brumath.
Conseil Dumesnil's Division of the 7th Corps was still at

Colmar.

• We rannoi giither for oertain from the Fivnoh aooountt of the Action wbelher
llie whole of Sc^teaU't Brigade was with Douay'i DiTiaion from the commencemeiit
or whether its main bodj onlj arrired later in the cngagemcDt.

122

The situation of Dotiay's Division was, in point of fact, very-
dangerous. He had, moreover, only 8 battahona, 18 guns, and
8 squadrons present ; the Rifle Battalion and one battalion of
the 50th Regiment were attached to Naneouty's Cavalry Brigade
at Selz, and the 78th Regiment was marched towards Climbach
on the moniing of tlie 4th for the purpose of relieving the 96th
Regiment belonging to Ducrot's Division. Consequently the
only support, whicli mxder the most advantageous cii'cumstances
could be reckoned upon in the course of the forenoon, was that
of the two last named regiments ; all the other troops of the
1st Coi'ps were a day's march or more to the rear.

The Marshal had, it is true, placed Douay's Di\nBion under
General Ducrot's ordere, with a view to securing unity of com-
mand over those paiis of his Coi-ps which were nearest to the
enemy; but on receiving the intelhgence at "Wortli, on the
evening of the 3rd, of the advance of strong columns of the
enemy s troops from the direction of Landau, General Ducrot
not only ordered Douay to remain with his Division at Weissen*
bm*g, but also to accept battle if necessaiy.

General Douay occupied the town with a battalion of the
74th Regiment, whilst tlie other det4ichments of his Division
encamped on the heights lying to the south. AHenstadt, dose
by, was left unoccupied, although the advance of the adversary
over the Lauter at this point and below the tovm must threaten
all the communications of the position with the south, and it
was natural to expect that the enemy, in all probability
advancing upon a broad front, would not fail to turn this
circumstance to account. The immerical weakness of his Divi-
sion may have forced Crcneral Douay to make this omission.

At 5.30 a.m. on the 4th August, a French reconnoitring
detachment was sent forward. It retui-ned without having dis-
covered any sign whatever of the adveraaiy's advance. A short
time after, as tne French ti^oops were busy, some with cooking,
others with procuring necessaries for the bivouac, a Bavarian
battery suddenly came into action on the hei^its south of
Schweigen, about 8.30 a.m., and opened fire upon Weissenburg..

General Douay at once orderea General PelW to occupy the
mil way station on the south-east of the town with tne Ist
Algerian Rifle Regiment and a battery. Under cover of the
infantiy the battery unlimbered about 200 paces in fiont of the
building; a battalion was posted at the Hagenau gate by the
special ordor of the commander of the Division, whilst the
remainder of the regiment prepared the station buildings and

position
point.

When Bothiner's Division deployed into line of battle in front
of Weissenburg, about 8.30 a.m., the advanced guard of theTth
Prussian Coi*ps had only reached Klein-Steinfeld, the main
body being at Obcrhausen, where it made a short halt. The
advanced guard of the Xlth Army Corps reached the Lauter^

123

6pit^ of the bad Bhite of the roads as early as 7 o'clock. The
bridges at tlie Bienwald mill and the Bienwald hut were found
to be intact ; three additional bridges were foiihwith thrown
over the river, and the roads leading to them were marked out for
the columns. Southward of the nver some pei-sons in peasants'
costume fired upon our troops, wounding three hussars; the
enemy's troops were nowhere to be seen. After emerging from
the Bienwald the advanced guard deployed, occupied Schleithal
and sent a battalion to the heights lymg fui'ther to the south.

Up to this time,, therefore, Bothmer's DiAnsion had alone been
immediately opposed to the enemy. It sent forward towards
Weissenburg tne 10th Rifle Battalion witli Bauer's batteiy.
The latter brought his guns into action GOO paces southward of
Schwei^en ; somewhat later Wuim's battery joined him. The
companies of the battalion, at open intervals, got under cover
on either side of the guns. Subsequently the 3rd battalion of
the 5th Regiment, 'with the exception of one company retained
for the occupation of Schweigcn, deployed on their left.

A brisk fire now gradually arose against the hostile troops
ported in the vineyards and on the rampaiis.

Two French battalions were seen to advance* along the
heights in rear of the town in a north-westerly direction,
apparently with the intention of turning the right ilank of the
Bavarians. In order to oppose this, General Mailliuger ordered
a battalion from the main body of his brigade, now forming
behind Rechteul>acli, to take up a position to the west of
Schweigcn. As a further protection to the right flunk. General
Count liothmer detached unotlior battalion and a half from the
7th Brigade at Ober-Otterbach to Dorreubach and towards the
Guttenburg, and left the two outpost coinpani(*H in their prusent
position at llechtenbach and Schweigen.

The remainder of this brigade, which, until the arrival of
the 2nd Battahon of the i»th Regiment, only consisted of 2
battalions and 2 batteries, now advanced to Rechtenbach. The
2nd Chevauxlegers also formed up to the east of this callage,
and souglit to keep up the communication with the Vth
Prussian Corps on the left.

The around was decidedly unfavourable for the twa
Bavarian oatteries in action before Weissenburg ; the vineyards
obstructed the view and impeded the movements. Their fire
was directed against the ramparts, the two gates which were
visible and the town itaelf. Some of the houses were very
shortly in flames. Most of the projectiles from the French guns
in front of the railway station ourst 300 paces in rear of our
position and could therefore be disregarded ; a forward rush
made by a skirmishing division under 1st Lieut, v. Massenbach,

• It i» conjectured tlint tliwo were port of tlio rc^iinoiit!i irlio wore cither at
Cliubach or moving to that place (the 78th and 96tli Kcgimeiit«), and that thcj
were odrancuig to the scene of tlio stntgglc. At nnr rate men of lK>th regiments
ircre among I he prisoners siibsequentlj captured by tlie Vth Army Corps.

124

moreover compelled the battery to ttike up a position more to
the rear. Ou the other hand the Bavarian artillery remained all
the time in action within range of the French akirmishers.

The infantry, in spite of the latter, succeeded in gaining
some gi'ound ; another French batteiy, however, appeared on
the heights south of the town, and bj' the effective Dursting of
its shells ch'ew the fire of Baiim's and Wurm's batteries (m itselC
The latter were on their side supported by Kirchhoffer's bat-
ter}', which came into action noithward of Windhof and took
part in the fight at a long range.

Meanwhile the Bavarian infantry had not remained inactive,
and had endeavoured to penetitite nito Weissenburg. Thus on
the extreme ii^ht flank, Ist Lieut. Emmeiich with a division of
the 4th Rifle Cbmpany liad approached close to the Bitsch gate.
All ftirther advance had, however, to be given up as the leader
was wounded, and half the men had fallen in the boggy
ditch of the town. The remainder of the little band took up a
covered position opposite the gate.

With Kirchhoflfer's battery the 6th Rifle Battalion had also
moved off to the left flank, and, shortly before, the Ist Bat-
talion of the 5th Regiment had been despatched to occup}- the
Ch&teau St. Paul. The whole of the 7th Brigade was therefore
deployed, and the two battalions of Maillinger's Brigade, winch
were still at disposal, formed the last reserve of the Division.
They were moved forward to the point where the road issues
from Schweigen on the south.

The flanking-detachment on the i-ight reached the Lautur by
diflicult forest tracks about 9.30 a.m., and took up a position
westward of Germanshof. As the pati-ols despatched from
this place found the valley of the Lauter, which was siipposed
to be entrenched, porfeclly free, Major v. Ebner moved off about
11 a.m. towards Weissenburg.

The 3rd Bavarian Infantry Di\'i8ion, which had bivouacked
9 miles in rear of the 4th, had started some 2 hours before the
latter, but was still a considemble distance behind. When
south of Bergzabern it received orders to advance 'without any
delay vi& Ober-Otterbach upon Weissenburg. It was, however,
at tliis time still four miles from the field of battle.

Consequently Count Bothmer had to look for his immediate
support to the Vth Pi-ussian Corps, which marched close to him
on his left. He determined to occupy the enemy until the
arrival of this Corps.

The Crown Prince of Prussia had been on the heights east-
ward of Schweigen since 9.15 a.m. On being informed of the
situation of affairs at Weissenburg by the officers of the general
staff sent forward to the advanced g^ard, he approved of this
resolution. Orders were sent to the Vth and Xlth Anny Corps
to hasten their march. About 10.30 a.m. Count Bothmer
received the intelligence that the former was coming up. At
the same instant the artillery of the latter Corps came into
action further to the eastwai*d. The Bavarian Division forthwith

125

took a vigorous oflTensive against the front of the enemy's
position, Avhich was at this time seriously tlu*eatenecl in flank.

Major-General Maillinger dashed forward with his two batta-
lions still held in I'eserve to the east of Bchweigon. He reinforced
the skirmishing line with three companies of the 3rd Battalion
of the 11th Regiment, and by the skirmishing divisions of the
3rd Battalion of the 14th Regiment, the mam body of which
advanced in close order.

Tliis line, now consisting of 14 companies, was joined by the
2nd Battalion of the 9th Regiment from the direction of Windhof,
which had moved forward from the position it had occupied on
outpost duty upon the arrival of the Vtli Corps.

Further in rear followed the 6th Rifle Battalion. Delayed in
its march by vineyards and defiles, it had to avoid the line of
fire of the Prussian ai'tillery which had just come into action.

Herold's battery had joined Kirchhoffer's battery to the north
of Windhof. Somewhat later both advanced 800 paces, so as
to engage more effectively the enemy's artillery. Bauer's and
Wunn's batteiy, which were much exposed to musketry fire,
retired behind Schweigen.

The Bavarian infantiy made a convergent attack upon the
Landau gate. They drove in the Turcos who were outside the
place, reached the countei*scai-p, got under cover there, and
kept up a brisk fire upon the defendei's of the ramparts. Major
Baron v. Feilitzsch, with the 11th and 12th cos. of the 5th
Regiment, advanced twice to stoim the place. The 3rd batta-
lion of the 14th Regiment also approached to within a few
hundred paces of the Landau gate. The drawbridges beinff
raised and the entrances banicadcd, all these attempts failed
under the defendei's' heavy fire.

But at this moment the booming of the guns of the Xlth
Corps on the left and the deployment of the detachments of the
Vth Corps at Altenstadt comd be clearly recognised. We will
now follow the advance of these two portions of the army.

The advanced guard of the Vth Army corps, on its arrival
at Klcin-Steinfeld at 8.30 a.m., was formed into two columns.
That on the left, under Colonel v. Bothmer, consisting of the
59th Regiment, the 4th co. of the 5th Rifle Battalion, and
Haupt's 2nd Light Battery, besides a squadron of the 4th
Dragoons and the pioneer company, advanced upon the Woog-
Iiaiisor. That on tlie right, luider Colonel v. Rex, composed of
both battalions of the 58th Regiment, the other three companies
of the lifle battalion, MichaeUs' 1st Light Battery, and three
squadrons of the 4th Dragoons, pressed forward to the bridge at
St. Remy.

The 1st squadron, which had hastened on in advance of the
other troops, had crossed the Lauter by 6.30 a.m., and pushed
forward patrols some distance to the south. Colonel v. Rex
reached the river at 9 o'clock, and shortly after met Avith some
troops of the Xlth Army Corps who were coming up from the

126

•eastward; the boomiug of the guns iu the directiou of Weiuseii*
biirg was audible.

The last-mentioned Coi^ps bad fiilfiUed the task assigned to it
in the day's disposition by its occupation of Schleithal and the
heights to the south of it, and reported to that effect to the
Commander-in-Chief at 8.30 a.m. Immediately afterwards the
noise of the cannonado was also heard at that place. Although
the distance to Weissenbm-g was still 4^ miles, and the vth
Corps might shortly be expected to paiiicipate in a combat at
that place, Lieut.-General v. Bose resolved to march the main
body of the 21st Infantry Division in a westerly direction^
leaving the advanced guard at Schleithal. Of this main body,
the squadron of the 14th Hussars, followed by the 11th Bino
Battauon, had at this period of the day — 8.45 a.m. — crossed the
Lauter. Both detachments were at once directed upon Weis-
senburg. The hussars took the main road ; the rifles, which had
ffone foi'ward to occupy the southern skirt of the forest, moved
by forest titicks. The fusilier battalion of the 87th Regiment
led the column in their place.

This was the column witli which the advanced giuird of the
Vth Corps came in contact. Lieut.-General v. Bose agreed ^vith
Major-General v. Sandrart that the latter should attack the
Geissberg in front with his Division, while the troops of the
Xlth Corps should join him on the left and outflank the hill
from the south-east In accordance with this aii-angemeuti
Rex's detachment continued to follow the main road, whilst the
21st Infantry Division moved awa^ to tlie left of it. General
v. Sandrart reported liis proceedmgs to his superior officer,
Oeneral v. Kircnbach.

The latter hud by this time reached Uross-Steinfeld with the
head of his main body, and while there also heard the caimonade.
He at ou(,'c despatched (Japtain Alaiitey of the (Jeiieral Staff to
the Bavarian Division, to liud out the stut(j of affairs, to report
the advance of the Vth Corps, and to ask in which direction he
could give tlie most effective Kupport.

Lieut.-Cceneral Count Bothmer sent a reply that he was
making a vigorous attack in front, but considered his right
flank threatened ; a pressure on the enemy's right flank would
therefore be desirable.

In consequence of this, the main body of the Vth Army (Jorps
was at once munched upon Altenstadt, to the eastward of which
the detachment under Colonel v. Kex had already deployed for
battle. General v. Sandrart sent forward 2 cos. of the 5th
Rifle Battalion and the 1st Battalion of the 58th Uegiment in
the direction of the railway station and the suburb of Wcissen*
burg. These detachments were received by a heavy tire in
front, flank, and rear from the enemy, who was posted behind
the old ramparts of the Weissenburg Lines and in the meadows^
and had to wago a protracted struggle, during which they
suffered heavily.

The fusilier battalion 58th Regiment and a company of rifles

127

were employed in covering the left flank on the railway em-
bankment, at which place the Ist Light l^attery also came into
action. The guns directed their fire chiefly upon the enemy's
mitrailleuse battery on tlie Geissberg, and were shortly after
reinforced by two batteries of the Xlth Army Corps, which had
been in action since 10.30 a.m. at the skiii; oi the forest opposite
Gutleithof. Colonel v. Bothmer's column was now gradually
cominff up, havhig forded the Lauter close below Wooghauser
about naif-past 10 o'clock. The attempt to make use of another
bridge lower do^vn had been abandoned in consequence of their
having come across the columns of the Xlth Army Corps
moving in that direction. The 2nd Light Battery pressed
forwwd at a i-apid pace along the Lauterberg road and came
into action close to the Ist.

The 4l8t Brigade of the Xlth Army Corps kid, on quitting
the Lauterburg road, taken the direction of the Geissberg ana
Biedseltz. During tiieir advance the enemy kept up a very
heavy artillery and musketry flre. A ceaseless muslcetiy flare
was also maintained from the plantations on the slopes of the
Geissberg. On the other liana the effect of the four Prussian
batteries, which directed a concentrated fire upon the French
artilleiy on the heights, soon began to tell in spite of the long
avenige range.

After a few rounds the mitrailleuse batteiy had to abandon
its position, apparently in consequence of one of the pieces
being dismounted and the explosion of two of the limbers. The
other French batteries made frequent changes of position;
their fire also became ffradually Aveaker. The 41st Brigade
was directed to occupy the enemy pending the amval of the
large reinforcements which might soon be expected.

In point of fact the main body of the Vth Army Corps was
now at Altenstadt preparing to deploy ui the direction of the
Geissberg ; the advanced guard of the Xlth Coi*ps (42nd
Brigade), which had already reached Schlcithal, received orders
to join the left flank of the 41st.

Lieut.-6eneral v. Bose had also ordered up the 22nd Division
tlien marching through the Beinwald, and tlie corps artillery.
Lieut.-General v. Kirchbach, who had been watching the pro-
gi'css of the fight of his advanced guard from the frontier house
at Windhof, ordered both heavy batteries of the 9th Division
and the whole of the corps artillery to go rapidly to the front.
Colonel Gaede, commanding tlie artillery of the Vth Army
Corps, ordered five batteries to take up a position to the soutli
of windhof; three others had to remain m rear for want of
spaoe for then* deployment. Before 11 o'clock 30 guns opened
me from this point upon Weissenburg and the neighbouring
heights. At this time the 18th Infantry Brigade was formed in
close order immediately to the north of Altenstadt ; the 19th
and 20th Brigades deployed to the north of Schweighofen.

Thus by 11 o'clock in the forenoon very superior forces were
deployed against the front and right flank of the isolated
French Division, while other large bodies of troops were at the

128

same time approaching', The mere appcaruuce of the Prussiaa
cohunns ou the Lauterberg roud compelled the euemy to throw
back his right flank and show front to the east.

General Douay, justly appreciating his position, had already
made up his mind to retreat soon after 10 o'clock. In a
southerly direction this was, however, already impracticable ; in
addition to this the right wing nnist at all hazards maintain its
position until the troops fighting in and around Weissenburg
had ettected their withdrawal, whieh wjis by no means so easy
owing to the serious nature of the engagement.

Storming of dencral Pelle had already been obliged to draw for\vard the

the railway 2nd HattaHou of the Rifle Regiment from the Hagenau gate to
to^n^amUho *'^^' ^"^i^^^^^Y station, and to reinforce his skirmishers. By order
Goissberff; <>f the Divisional Commander he made all the preparations to
11 to lialf-past retire slowly. Soon afterwards his adjutant, who had gone to
2 o clock. fetch up reinforcements and ammunition, brought him the news
tint (ieneral Douay was killed. It appeal's that the bmve com-
mander had lost his life at the explosion m the mitniilleuso
battery to which we previously alluded.

Lieut.-CJeneral v. Kirchbach had ridden forward with his
staff along the Scliwcighofen road to within a short distance of
Weissenburg. In the line of skirmishere, under fire fi'om the
ramparts, ho made himsi;lf pei-sonally acquainted with the pro-
gress of the engagement. His presence and encouragement
were ample proof to the Bavarians, Avho were endeavouring to
press forward through the vineyards, that they would be
strongly supported.

The General subsequently moved away to the 18tli Infantry
Brigade at Altenstadt. This village was occupied by three
fusilier conqiauies of the ITth Regiment; the remainder of the
regiment advanced across the meadows on the banks of the
Lauter towards Weissenburg, with the object of affording
immediate help botli to tlie Bavarians .and to Colonel v. Rex.

On tlie approach of these reinforcements Colonel v. Rex
passed from his delaying musketry a(;tion to the assault of the
railway station. This oceurred shortly after noon.

The advance of the 1st Battalion 58th Regiment along the
straight avenue of poplars brought them to a piece of ground
enclosiid by a wall (\ feet high. Two companies occui^ied the
side towards the foe, the skinnishing divisicms finding some
slight cover in the ditches alongside tlie road; the 1st and 3rd
companies, however, found no protection against the enemy's
heavy fire. The losses increased with every pace they ad-
vanced. Shortly before, the commander, Major v. Gronefeld,
fell, while in the act of leading forward his battalion on horse-
back along the road ; Lieutenant Neumann was also killed, and
Captain v. Kittlitz mortally wounded. Captain v. Sebottendorf
assumed the command ; but when he was wounded and most of
the senior officers were disabled, it passed into the hands of
Lieutenant Spaugenberg. In spite of the loosened oi*der, caused

*".*

129

by the companies being mixed np through heavy losses, this
officer aiid tlie few others who snr^'ived succeeded in leading on
the men to a fresh attack. Lieutenant Baron, though himself
wounded, seized the colour from the hands of its sorely wounded
bearer, and dashed forward, followed by his men with loud
cheers. The stonnere caiight the Turcos in their hurried retreat
at the railway station and in the suburb. The bamcaded
houses had to be broken into luider a hot fire from all direc-
tions, and in places had to be wrested from the enemy at the
point of the bayonet.

This attack had been powerfully supported by the 2nd co,
f)th Rifle Battalion, which, after checking a fonvard advance of
the enemy, moved simultaneously towards the thicket on the
Imnks of the Lauter and against the other paiis of thr* Weis-
senbm'g Lines, Captain v. Strantz led his nflemen with fixed
bayonets up to the houses of the suburb ; Lieutenant v. Bissing
took an outlying entrenchment by storm.

The 47th, joined by the 3rd Rifle Company, advanciMl along
both sides of the main road. Those troops also pressed tor ward-
fighting their way into the suburb.

The object was gained ; but when the 1st Battalion 58th
Regiment assembled at the railway station, it had lost 1 2 officers
and 1G5 men. The commander of the rifle battalion, Major (yoiuit
Waldei-sce, was mortally wounded before the real attack com-
menced. General v. Sandrart had a hoi-so killed under liiin.

Simultaneously with this attack on the railway station, the
Bavarians had also made a fresh assault upon the town.

When the 3rd Division nValther) reached Sc^hwcigcn, at
about half-past 12 o'clock, tlierc had been some intention to
employ the 5th Brigade on tlic right flank, but the slopes of the
AVurmberg were so thickly covered with vineyards as to prevent
any further extension of the force, and consequently Colonel
Bosmiller with the Gth Regiment advanced alone in tliat direc-
tion ; the other battalions were directed towards the left flank
of Bothmer s Division, but took no part in the action.

At the Landau gate the first thuig obviously to be done was
to open a practicable entrance into the town. A request for some
guns to batter the gate had been made to the Prussian batterie*
at Windhof, and a division of the 3rd Heavy Battery of the 5th
Regiment, under Lieutenant v. Berge, was told off to this duty.

At this time the order arrived from the CommandtT-in-(Jhief
to capture the town without delay.

Lieutenant v. Berge very soon succeeded (1.30 p.m.) in knock-
ing down the pillara of the gateway. Two more guns of
Kirchlioffer's Bavarian battery, arriving shortly after under the
command of Lieutenant Jamin, unlimbered close to the edge of
the ditch and brought a fire upon the interior of the j>lace just
within the gate. Some men of the lOtli Bavarian Rifle I^attalion
and of the 3rd Battalion 11th Regiment then scrambled over the
piers of the bridge and brought down the drawbridge with their

130

batohets, in Avhich service Private Schroll, of the last-mentioned
re^^iment distinguished himself. When the bridge was re-esta-
bbahed both battalions with detachments of the 3rd battalions of
the 5th and 14th Regiments penetrated into tlie town. General
Mlaillinger ordered the Gtli Rifle Battalion to follow as an addi*
tional support. As the gaiiison had meanwhile withdrawn
from this quarter of the town, the Bavarians advanced with-
out impecument along the main and by-streets as far as the
market-place. The Maiiie was occupied ; the other parts of the
toSvn were searched. Sounds of fighting were alone heard in
the direction of the Bitsch gate, towards wliich three divisions
of the 8rd co. 10th Rifle Battalion now pressed forward.

The fighting at the houses nearest to the railway station had
meanwhile brought the 1st Battalion 5th Regiment to the
Hagenau o;nte. It was found opened and the drawbridge
lowered ; the place seemed deserted, and the men were resting
in front of it, when a shot was suddenly fired from the town
wluch wounded one of them. In consequence of this, two non-
commissioned officers and 10 volunteera were sent into the
town; tliey came across the enemy in overwhelming force,
Sergeant-Mnjor Kassner, who had already distiuRuished himself
i 1 the prcceciin^ fight, and Lanco-C!orpoi-al Spuler alone suc-
ceeded in cnttmg their way through ; immediately after they
had passed, the chuwbridge was raised. The battalion was now
exposed to a heavy fii'e at close range from the rampaiis and
loopholes, whereby Lieutenant Spangenber^ was badly wounded.
It became necessary to withdi*aw to the railway station.

Soon after some detachments of the 47th Regiment, finding
the gate once more unoccupied, let down the diuwhridge and
penetrated into the town. As there seemed no probability of
any further serious fighting inside, while outside, on the heights
south of the railway statitm the stniggle was raging with
greater violence, they moved oft' Khortly after to the railway
station, where the greater part of the .regiment was at this time
assembled. A\nien later on sonic other detachments of Prussians
moved forward once more against the gate, the bridge had been
again di'awii up.

This re-occupatitni of the Hagenau gate, to which little
attention had been paid at first by the French, is peifectly
explained by tlio situation in which the gaiiison of Weissenburg
had meanwhile been placed.

In front of the westem (Bitsch) gate 1st Lieut. Emmerich's
division of the 10th Bavarian Rifle Batttilion had firmly main-
tained its po«ition until Major v. Ebner came up with tlie right
flanking-detachment, and deprived the enemy of eveiy means
of egress in that (lircclion. SubHcqueutly the Gth Regiment
oame up from the AVunnberg. Moreover, as we have seen, some
Bavarian detachmuuts had aheady moved from the Landau gate
through the town to the weateni poiut of exit.

The only courno still open to tlie defenders of Weissenburg
was therefore to cut their way through the weak detachments

131

'which had been Been as jet at the Hagenaii gate. But iu the
meantime a much desired reinforcement had arrived in the

Serson of Major v. Mittelstacdt Trith the 8th co. of the 47th
Regiment, by which we were now in a position to repulse any
sortie.

Under these circumstances the Fi'ench officera entered into
negociations, by vii-tue of Avhicli some 500 men of the 74th
Regiment laid aown their arms (1.30 p.m.).

The Bavarian troops, as well as the 1st and 2nd Battalions
of the 47th Regiment, commenced to occupy the ramparts.
Whilst in this manner the enemy had been deprived of the

Kint of support to his left wing, the attack upon his right wing
d also made further progi^ess.

The 41st Brigade of the Xlth Army Corps, after forming up,
moved forward in two colnniBS. That on the left, under
Colonel Grolman, consisting of the 2nd Battns. of tlie 87th and
80th Regiments, reached the deep railway cutting ; that on the
right, iinder Colonel v. Colomb, comjposed of the fusilier battn. of
the 87th and the 1st Battn. 80th Regmient, drove the enemy from
the hop-gardens west of the railway and occupied GutleiUiof.

Tlie noiihem slope of the Geissberg was flanked from the
heights south-west of the railway station by a French battery,
probably the one which had retired from the railway station.
The fire from the direction of Windhof soon compelled it, how-
ever, to evacuate its position, leaving a sun behind. Some of
▼. Rex's detachment belonging to tne Vth Army Coips, two
fusilier companies of the 58th Regiment and the 1st Rifle
Company had moved forward in that direction from Altenstadt.
In order to prevent the rifle company from capturing the gun^
half a French company opened a brisk fire, whilst the artillery-
men humed up with six fresh horses to save it. Sergeant-Major
Meyer, however, succeeded in bringing his men close up and
opening a sudden fire on the enemy's flank. The riflemen then
dashed forward with flxed bayonets, and took possession of the
gun, in which Corporal Hausknecht and Private Leuschner
especially distinguished themselves. The near approach of sup-
port from the company rendered all attempts to recapture it futile.

Meanwhile the rest of the 9th Division had passed through
Altenstadt and reached the railway. General v. Kirchbach now
directed the 18th Infantry Brigade and v. Bothmer's detach-
ment to cany the heights in front.

The 7th Eiiig^s Grenadier Itegiment formed the centre of
the attacking line, preceded on the Altenstadt road by the lOih
Company of the 47th. On the right the fusiliere of the 59th
Regiment ascended the slopes, accompanied and followed by
the troops of v. Rex's detachment previously alluded to. On
the left the 9th and 12th cos. of the 58th Regiment took part in
the movement from the direction of Gutleithof; the Ist Bat-
iahon 59th Regiment followed the right whig.

Whilst ihefi(& 6^ battalions of the Vth Army Corps w&t^
Advancing between the railway station and the last-named

182

faiin, General v. Bose also ordered the 4l8t Brigade to open the-
attack from the south ^vith coloure fl}ang and drums beating.
The two battalions under Colonel v. Colomb took the direction
of the Chateau Geissberg, which the 2nd Battn. 80th Regiment
endeavoured to turn on the south side. The two musketeer
battns. 87th Regiment moved towards the Riedseltz road. The
3rd Battn. 80th Regiment and the 11th Rifle Battalion, which
the brigade commander had lield in reserve during the first
advance of the brigade, now crossed the railway close to
Riedseltz, forming the extreme left wing.

At tliis time the 42nd Brigade came into line on the western
edge of the Niederwald; the 10th and 22nd Divisions, with
the coips artillery of the Xlth Army Coips, were likewise
i4;)proaching the field of battle.

To meet tliis enveloping attack, Montmarie*s Brigade Iiad
occupied the edge of the hei£;hts and extended its right flank
along the road leading to Riedseltz. SepteuiPs Cavalry Brigade,
3rd Hussars and 11th Chasseui-s, took post near the latter village.

The strongly built Cli&teau of the Geissberg foniicd the
most impoilant point of suppoit for the defence. It consists of
a mass of solid buildings provided with an inner and outer
court, suiTounded by a wall 15 feet in height. Before the
eastern face is a vegetable garden, which rises in teiraces
above the ground in front. The only entrances are on the
uoiili and soiith sides, and thev are completely commanded
fi'om the inner buildings ; the deience is, moreover, favoured by
small windows and openings made in the walls up to a con-
siderable height. Anop-tield extends about 200 paces north-^
ward of the Ch4teau along both sides of the road to Altenstadt.

The 10th CO. 47th Regiment moving along this road had
driven the enemy from the adjacent heights, but had then to
await the arrival of the King's Grenadier Regiment, now ad-
vancing vnth. drums beating. Its fusilier battalion went past
on the right, the 2nd Battahon on the left of the 47th, the 1st
Battiilion moving towards the heights of the three poplare.

After a brief struggle, in which Major v. Winterfield, 47th
Regiment, wuh killed, the oiiuniy was driven from the weakly
occupied liop-field. But us soon as the skinnishoi'S endeavoured
to press forward towards tlie Chriteau, they found themselves
exposed in the oi)en to a most severe firu from the entire build-
ing, which was occupiiMl from tlu* gi'ound to the roof. The
detachmonlH of tlu; HrKt Hue. \vlii<:h Avere now joined by the 4th
CO. 5tli Rifle Battalion, ensconced themselves on the edge of the
plantations, in the nearest hollow roads and folds of the gi'ound^
and kept up a fire upon the adversary who was under cover,
Major V. KaiHCiiberg now lod forward the JUh and 12th cos. of
the King B Grenadier Regiment to the assault. Ho was joined
by the greater part of the 11th company. Regardless of the
accurate and heavy fire of the French ponring upon them at a
short range, the fusiliers witlumt firing a shot followed their
commander, who was Inmying in advance of them. But

the loflses augmented at eveiy step ; tlie bmve band was sooi^
deprived of most of its leaders who had led tlieni on the dan-
gerous road. Twice was the coloui* shot away, and its bearer
placed liors de cofnbat. M«jor v. Kaiscnberg seized the upper
part of the standard, and pressed onward, but fell soon after
mortally wounded in throe i)laceB. The some fate bcfel the
leader of the l»th company, Ist Lieutenant Sienion, wlicu ho
agsiin took up the cohmr, which was tlien scizud by a non-
commissioned officer. In addition to the foregoing, Captain
Batscli, the commander of the 11th company, Ist Lieutenant
Scholtz, the leader of the 12th, Ensign v. Glodcn and Vice-
Sergcant-Major Schai'fF uIho fell at this spot ; Lieutenant Baron
V. Ijiittwitz was mortally wounded. Nearly all the oilicei*8 of
the thi-ee companies were now disabled ; but neither these nor
5th and 8th companies of the regiment, which were brought up
by Major Schaumann to make an enveloping attack, nor the
other detachments of troops were able to make any head against
the building, which was perfectly secure from assault.

Part of the 8th company peneti*ated from the south side into
the outer Coui-t of the Cliateau, where some skirmishei's of the
9th CO. 87th Regiment established themselves ; but on the
northern main front all the bravery displayed was of no avail
against the insurmountable walls and a well-barricaded and
lofty gate. As any retreat would only entail fresh saciifices,
the men sought protection at the dead angle close under the
walls. Some of the skirmishers brought a fire upon the windows,
others placed straw under the loopholes and set light to it

At the special order of Lieut.-General v.Kirchbach, who was
present at tue combat which we have just described, Lieutenant
V. Kreckwitz led several divisions in a body round by the
western side of the Ch&teau for the pui-posc of bringing a fire
upon it from a more elevated position ; but he only succeeded
in subduing the enemy^s fire to a limited extent.

It was evident that no favoumble result could be obtained at
this point ^vithout the co-operation of the artillery. General v,
Kirchbach had already ordered Haupt's battery, now coming up,
to form a breach; but -it requu'ed ti*emendous efFoi-ts to bring
the guns over ploughed fields saturated vnth rain up the steep
northern slopes of the heights. xVs the horses were tired, tlic
battery coula only proceed at a walk, and a short flank move-
ment being necessary to reach the chosen position, it was
exposed to the enemy's skirmishei's at a short range as it moved
along in column of subdivisions. Only three guns at fii-st
succeeded in coming into action; but the remainder of the
battery followed soon after, and it was told off by divisions to
shell the different stories of the building.

The appearance of tlie battery naturally compelled the meji
who had penetrated into the court, and the detachments under
the walls, to evacuate their positions and retire to some distance.

Major Kipping had sent the 1st Light Battery to the heiglits
Boon after No. 2, and this battery opened fire at a range of

134

800 paces* On itw left came tip somewhat later the 3rd Heavy
Batteiy, which the commander of the Corps Artillery, Lieut.-
Colonel Kohler, brought up vi& Gutleithof.

About this time (jeneml v. Kirchbach was wounded in the
neck by a chassepot bullet not far from the hop-garden, and was
comj)elled in consequence to go to the dressing station at
AltciiBtadt. The chief of the general staff, Colonel v. d. Esch,
conducted the further course of the engagement until the com-
mander of the 10th Division, Lieut.-General v. Schmidt, could
come up from Alteustadt and assume the command.

Meanwhile tlie 1st Battn. King's Grenadiera and the fusilier
battn. 59th Regiment, strongly supported by the other troops of
the right wing, had driven the enemy from the "poplar" heights.
This movement had now rendered it possible to place artilleiy
on the heights for caimonading the Cnaiteau, and the 2nd field-
division Avas brought foi*w'ard for the purpose.

The defenders of the Cliatcau fimnd tliemsehos closely
hemmed in on all nides, an<l moreover threatened by a numerous
artillery. The other French battalions were now in full retreat
before tlie advance of the Xlth Corps; they no longer could
hope for support. Tlie gtiirison, therefore, now accepted (2 p.m.)
the previously rejected capituUition ; some 200 men and several
officers were made prisonei-s.

With the fall of the Chateau disappeared the lawt support for
the adversary's lU^fonce ; but its possession had been bought at
n gi-ievous sacrifice. The fuHiHcr battalion of the King's
Grenadiers had alone lost II officers and ensigns doing duty
as such, 9 non-commissioned officere, and 157 men killed and
wounded.

The enemy offered no further serious resistance in tlic open
field to the ti'oops of the Xlth Army Coi-ps; he only onco
endeavoured to check their advance in and around the Sehaf-
busch farm with a view to gaining time for the retreat. To this
point, however, portions of all the regiments which had been in
action now rallied, and the farm buildings were taken with the
first rush.

The left wing (»f the 4lHt Brigade cri)s.sed the Reltzbaeh not
far from Deiitsclienof, occupied the heights to the westAvard
and fired at the French detachments, who were tiying to gtiin
the cover afforded by the forest (^lose by. The battei'ies assigned
to the 4lst Brigade had followi^d the infantry, and supported its
advance from several positions. At this moment the horso
artillery division of the coi-ps artilh^ry arrived at a trot on the
left fiank, came into action in the line ot skirmishers, and
followed up the retreating enemy with its fire.

The Crown Prince liad reached Schalbusch soon after 2 o'clock,
and congratulated the troops upon their ifirst victoiy on French
soil. They responded with hearty cheers.

The 10th and 42nd Infantry Brigades had just followed to
the Geissberg heights, and the Ilnd Bavarian Army Coips was
ordered to the same place, when, at 2.30 pjn., the Couunander-

135

in-Gbief ordered that all fnrther pnrBnit by the iufimtiy wa4?i to
be discontinued.

^ An order had been sent at 11 o'clock to the 4th Cavahy
Division, instnicfing it to advance as far as the Wachholderberg;
near Altenstadt; the oflScei* sent on this duty, however, found
that the Division had not yet reached the rendezvous appointed
in the disposition*^ ^^^^g to an hour's detention at Billigheinci,
where the lOIJi Division was breaking up from its bivouac, it cBd
not reach Ober-Otterbach until 1.30 p.m., where it heard tKe
first tidings of the action then taking place from Major V.
Grodzki. ,

In consequence of this, the Divisional cavalry was alone
present on the battle field, and available for immediate pursuit.

Of this the 4th Dragoons, of which Major Senffl v. Pilsac^h
had received a mortal wound, was in the neighbourhood 6f
Schafbusch. It was sent forward on the road to Sulz.

The Ist Battn. 88th Regiment, which h«ad been moved on
Riedseltz, was fired upon from this village by some disperscfd
hostile troops, after two companies of the 11th Rifle Battalion
had previously made prisoners 20 French chasseui-s. The vilkj^o
was now searched for the second time and then poiinanentiy
occupied*

About 3.30 pjn. orders were issued at Schafbusch to form
bivouacs, which were aiTan^ed as follows :

The infantry of the Ilnd Bavarian Corps encamped in front
of Weissenburg and west of the Sulz road ; the cavalry and
corps artillery on the left bank of the Lauter, to the north and
east of the town. In the latter were tlie 3rd Battn. 5th Regi-
ment^ and the 10th Rifle Battalion, the latter of which had
sustained the severest part of the fighting and had lost 115 men.

Two battalions were told oif to secure the Bitsch road, l^heir
outposts extended from Rott to beyond Weiler, and opened
communication with the detachment in the mountains &t
BobenthaL Continuous skirmishing until the morning of tfa^e
^th August was kept up along this Tine with the French troO;^8
in the forest.

Th^ee more battalions and a squadron continued the line 6t
outposts alon^ the Seltzbach from Rott to the Hagenaii road. .

The Vth Army Corps concentrated to the south of AUeii-
stadt, the corps artillery in rear of the village. The 19th Brigade
remained with two squadi'ons 14th Di-agoons, and a battefy
pushed forward to the ^* poplar" heights as advanced guard;
the outposts were on both sides of the Hagenau road.

The 21st Division of the Xlth Corps bivouacked on th^
Geissbei-g, the 22nd between the railway and the Niederwald;
Outposts towards Riedseltz, Ober-Seebach and Sclileithal. A
flanldng detachmeiit was at Nieder-Lauterbach.

Of mose troops which liad not taken part in the action,
Werder's Corps had reached Lauterburg and placed outposts dm
-the line Ober liOuterbach-Mothem. The main nody of the Badea
^I^vision was eabfoned at Lauterbure; the Wiirttemberg Divi-
sion was in bivouacs to the northward.

13G

The Ifit Bavarian Corps eucamped between Langenkandel,
Minfeld, and Minderslachen.

Two battnfl. of the 24th Infantry Bri^de of the VI th Anuy
Coi-ps, now arriving at Landau, relieved the 2nd Battn. 58th
Regiment left behind at Annweilen

Towards evening Colonel v. Schenk reported that his
dragoons had found Sulz occupied by the enemy, and had come
across masses of infantry on the neighbouring heights. None
of Douay's Division had retired by this road. The debris of that
Division hud moved in a south-westerly direction.

The losses of the French in killed and wounded must have
been considerable, although tliey cannot be determined with
accuracy. The corpse of their deceased commander, Geneml
Abel Douay, and some 1,000 unwounded prisoners, fell into the
hands of the Germans; one gun, the whole of the camp
equipage, and an abandoned provision column were captured.

Ihe total loss on the German side amounted to 91 officers
and 1,460 men.*

The infantiy who took part in the storming of the strong
localities suffered very heavy loss, especially m officers ; the
King^s Grenadier Regiment occupies the first place, with a loss
of—

10 officers, 80 men killed,
13 „ 249 „ wounded,

Total 23 officers, 329 men.

On the evening of the 4th August all contact with the foe
defeated at Weissenburg was lost. The only information we
gathered from the reports of the 4th Dragoons was that he had
not taken the great Hagenau road. He tiierefore might either
have turned off at the eastern foot of the Hochwald towards
Worth, or have gained the Bitsch road by using the cross roads
over that mountain ridge.

Had the direction of the retreat of General Douay's Division
been one of its own choice, it might have been possible to
conjecture therefrom approximately where MacMahon's main
force would be foimd. But, as is well known, a retreat on
Hagenau had been as good as rendered impossible by the enve-
loping attack upon the Weissenburg position. The reported
presence of hostile infantry at Sulz merely increased the doubt
as to tlie present position of the enemy.

Under these circumstances the head-quarter staff resolved to
throw light upon the situation by a reconnaissance on a large
■cale. At the same time the army, while drawing in its left
wing, was to advance on the 5th August in such a manner

* Tlie details of the louet are giYcn in Appendix IX., *' Bttiun of catualtiet in
Uie action at Weiaaenbnrg."

137

that it could be concenh*ated either in a southerly or westerly
direction, according as circumstances demanded.

The dispositionfor the 5th Atigust charged the 4th Cavalry j^pp^uciix X.
Division with a reconnaissance towards Ilagenau and towarote
Rcichshoifen. To guard the i-i^ht flank the Ilnd Bavarian
Corps was to advance on the JBitsch road to Lcmbach, tho
Vth Army Corps to Preuschdorf, so as to form the advanced
gaard in the event of the operations being continued to the
westward. The Xlth Coi-ps was to take up a position at Suiz,
Werder's Corps at Aschbuch, both facing the south. Tho Ist
Bavarian Corps was to fonn the general reserve at lugolsheim.
Sulz was expected to be the army head-quai-terR.

At 5 a.m. the Cavalry Division moved off in the direction of
Sulz. Bemhardi's Lancer Brigade and the 2nd Body Guard
Hussara went on ahead to make the reconnaissance ; the former
along the Hagenau high road with a squadron of hussars as
advanced guaxd, another squadron on tho lefb moving in the
direction of the Rhine upon Roppenheim, the two remaining
squadrons, imder Colonel v. Schauroth, on the right towards the
upper Saar, with a view to canying out the reconnaissance upon
Reichshoffen, which had been especially ordered by the head-
quarter staff

Exceptincr a few shots fired from the ho\ises at Sulz, no
indications of the enemy were found this side of the Hagenau
forest. General v. Bernhnrdi had further secured his flanks by
detaching two squadrons of lancers ; he pressed forward with
the main body oi his brigade along the high road as far as the
southern issue from the forest ; but on reaching this point, close
to Hagenau, a bridge was found broken up and occupied by
hostile infantry, upon whom the fire from the hussai-s' carbines
made no impression. As it was impossible for the lancera to
deploy in tne forest, the brigade withdrew, the enemy's skir-
mishers following and keeping up a continuous fire upon them
from both sides of the roacL The frequent whistling of engines
and rumbline of carriages led to the inference that troops were
being moved on the Hagenau railway. The squadron of lancers
sent towards the left flank found the northern edge of the Hage-
nau forest at Ober-Betschdorf foimed into abatis, so that their
fm'ther progress was impossible. The hussars which had been
sent still further eastward by Roppenheim only came across
some marauders at first, and not before Sufielnheim did they
encounter a detachment of hostile infantry, which had retired
before the Baden Division. We learnt that the enemy was
assembling troops at Hagenau.

The detachments sent in a westerly direction brought more
important intelligence. Tho squadi-on of lancei-s covering
General v. Bernhardi*s right flank discovered traces of the
retreat of the preceding day along the road skii-tins^ the eastern
foot of the Hochwald. It afterwards crossed the Sauer at
Gunstett and observed a hostile camp upon tiie heights on the
further bank ; in front of it were some French lancers, which
were at once attacked. The hostile cavalry withdrew before

138

the athiek; and onr lancers, finding themselves exposed to
infantry fire from a ditch, retired upon Gunstett with slight loss.^
The two squadrons of hnssars under Colonel v. Schauroth pur-
sued their allotted coui-se towards Reichsho£Een, but found tl^e
bridge over the Sauer at Worth broken away. Two divisions
of hussars, which advanced nearer the villaget, were fired upon
from the houses by infantrr, and afterwards by artillery from
the heiglits on the right bank, where large bodies of tix>ops
were seen in movement. According to the statements of tbe
inhubitantH the 18th and 45th llegimcntHt wore collected tlicrcv
and 3,000 more troops wore siiid to be at Laugensulzbach.

On the whole the observations of the Cavalry Division esta-
blished the presence of French troops in considerable force
behind the Sauer at Woi-th. The situation was not quite clear
at Hagenau, because the cavalry had been unable to penetrate
as far as that place ; nevertheless it seemed probable that the
troops posted there were merely intended to protect the railway.

The intelligence received from the other parts of the army
tended to confirm these impressions.

The Ilnd Bavarian Coips fii-st found traces of the retreat of
Douay's Division on tlio Lembach road, such as 100 womided
left behind at Climl)ach, and signs of recent bivouacs in the
neighbourhood. The unanimous reports of the pati'ols that the
enemy on leavinf^- Lembach liad taken the road to Laugensulz-
bach, wer(; coufirined by the fact of the outposts, which wen*
thrown out towards Mattstall, being involved in constant
skirmishes.

The 10th Division of the Vtli Anny Conis advanced beyond
Bremmolbach and Lobsami by the road at tixe foot of tlio llocli*
wald, of wliich we have already made mention ; on its left the
9th Division and the corps artillery along the Sulz high roud.
As the greater part of the Xlth Army Coips marched in front of
them and the road bv which the other cohunu moved was
inconvenient, the march of the coips proceeded at a very slow
pace and was fatiguing for the troops. At Preuschdorf General
V. Kirchbach leanit that AVoith and the right bank of the Sauer
Wore strongly occupied by the enemy. Owing to the foregoing
caiises the coips would not be able before the evening to
support effectively the forward movement of the advanced
troops towards Reic;hshoffen, as ordered by the head-quarter
stafi*; the outposts were in consequence onlv thrown out
towards Worth. The patrols sent out towards this village were
fired upon from it ; extensive bivouacs could be distinctly seen
in rear at Elsasshauseu and Froschwiller.

Oil the left Aviiig of the anny Werdcr's Corps was only tcm*

1)orarily in contact with the enemy. A Baden advanced guard
lad been puslied forwanl upon Nieder-Rodern and Selz, \nth
tlie obj(;et of protecting tlie flank movement to the right from
Lauterburg to Aschbach. A flankhig-detachment on the left

• Ono man and two horsoa killod s six bonet wounded,
f Belonging to Ducrot*s Diriiion.

139

fo>m the flame Corpf^ conaistiiig of the 2nd Battalion Body
iSuard Grenadiers (Lieut.-<)olotiel Hofmann) and a squadron of
dragoons, met %yitli some hostile picquets at Miinchhausen on
the Rhine, which together with their snpportR were forced back
through the Selzwald ns far as Selz. The enemy evacuated
this village ^vithout fighting ; about noon it was occupied by
the Baden advanced ^ard, which had had only five men
wounded in the skirmish. The Ist Battalion 2nd Grenadier
Regiment and a squadron reached Nieder-Rodeni without meet-
ing the enemy, and subsequently sent out patrolR toAvards
Roppenheim, fi'om which place the French had meanwhile with-
drawn towards Suffclheim. The maui body of the Baden
Division had by this time fonned up at the Eherhof, between
Winzenbach and Nieder-Rodeni. The Wiiiiteraberg Division,
after crossing the Lauter above Lauterburg, had stnick the
main road from Weissenburg to Fort Louis at Keidenburg. On
hearing that some hostile troops were seen in the Ilagenau
forest a brigade was pushed foi-wards Obcr-Rodcrn. From
these temporaiy positions both Divisions proceeded on their
inarch to Aschbacn in the afternoon.

Of the Xlth Army Coi'ps the infantiy of the 22nd Division had
advanced along the railway embankment, the remainder along
the main road to Sulz ; they bivouacked southward of this town.

The Ist Bavarian Coi-ps, which had been considerably de-
tained by other troops on its march from Langenkandel, did not
reach Ingolsheim with its advanced troops imtil G p.m., and it
Was nearly midnight before tlie last detachmentK arrived.

The 4th Cavalry Division bivouacked to the soutli (»f
Iliindsbach between the last two corps.

Tlic line of outposts of the Illrd Anny extended, roughly
speaking, along the Saner and the northern edge of the
Hagenau forest. The outposts of the Ilnd Bavarian Corps ran
from HinBchthal (on the Palatinate frontier) tlirftugh Alattstall
to Liebfrauburg. The advanced guard of the VI h Army Corps
occupied Gorsdorff, Dieffenbach, and Gunstett. Of the Xlth
Army Corps, advanced troops of the 21st Division were at
Surburg, those of the 22nd at Ober-Betschdorf and Nioder-
Betschdorf. The Wurttembergere watched the countiy at
Ober-Rodem towards Rittershoffen and Hatten. Furthest of all
to the eastward were the Baden outposts, from Biihl to Nieder-
Rodern. Only along the h'ne from MattRtall to Gunstett was
the enemy immediately in fi-ont.

From the occuiTences which had taken place during the day,
the head-quarters of the llird Army at Sulz were convinced that
the main forces of the enemy must bo sought in a we^terhj
direction behind the Saner. The Crown Prince resolved to con-
oentrato his army more towards the right wing on the Gth
August, but in other respects to give them a day's rest. Part
were still to remain temiKH-arily fronting the south. An anny
order to this effect was JHSiied on the evemngof the 5tli August.

140

,«.In conclusion we will now alludo to ceiiain events on the
Upper Rhine, which were not >vithout influence on the adver*
saiy's proceedings at this period.

Seubcrt's detachment* pushed fonvard at the cud of July
from Ulm into tlie passes of the Black Forest, was posted on the
evening of the 1st August at Neustadt and St. Blasien, in the
countiy between Freiburg and Schaff hausen ; two companies
and a division of cavalry were further north on the Kniobis
roads and in the valley of the Kinzig.

With a view to attracting the attention of the enemy's troops
in Lower Alsace, Colonel v. Seubert ordered a general advance
towards the Rhine from the line occupied by lus troops. The
right flank detachment moved upon Oppenau and Bicberach
in the valley of the Kinzig, and sent fonvard patrols towards
Eehl and Lain*. A company mounted upon waggons and
escoi*ted by a division of cavahy passed through the UoUenthal
to Freiburg, and from thence made demonstmtions on that part
of tlie Rhine between Breisach and Neueubm*g. On the extreme
left flank. Colonel v. Seubert moved forward with two companies
to Waldslmt, took rail thence to Rheinfelden, and occupied at
nightfall a camp previously prepared by the inhabitants in the
neighbourhood of Loeri'ach. In order to deceive the enemy
into the belief that large bodies of troops were assembHng
at Loeri'ach, nimierous watch fires were lit, torches canied
about and drums beaten. No sign of the enemy's troops
could be seen, although repoits were cun-ent in Loerrach that
the 4th French regiments of hussai-s, forming the advanced
^ard of Douay's Corps, amved at Huningen. On the 3rd
August Colonel v. Seubert retired into nearly his old position,
so as not to betray the weakness of his force.

On the 5th, two companies and the battery moved forward
through the UoUenthal with the intention of destroying the
enemy's reported entrenchments at Breisach. As credible
repoi-ts reacned the detachment in the afternoon of the 6tb that
Douay's Coips was at that time assembled at Miihlhausen, and
that it purposed crossing the Rhine, Colonel v. Seubert ordered
a speedy concentration of all his troops at Schliengen. On the
7th, however, there were no traces of the enemy to oe foimd ; at
the same time intelligence was received of the events at Worth,
which we are now going to describe. The colonel now resolved
to cross the Rhine at Kirchen and Rheinweiler, and intercept the
comnmuication between Strassburg and Southern France. His
preparations were completed on the evening of the 7th, when
orders were received from Ciu'lsruhe that the idea was to be
abandoned, and that part of his force was to take in hand the
occupation of the Maxau bridge. A few days later the small
band was recalled to WUrttemberg.

• Tide p. 6e.

14t

The Movements op the French Army from 2nd to 5th

August.

The reconnaissance nndoi'taken in great force on the 2nd
August by General Frossard had produced no other effect than
that of causing a few weak detachments of Piiissian troops to
retire from the Saar into the Kollerthal forest, wliere they dis-
appeared from the view of the French. The stime state of
imceiiainty with regard to the niilitaiy situation prevailed in
the enemy s camp as heretofore. Forward movements with
small forces had certainly appeared inadequate to throw light
upon the state of aifairs. For an immediate advance on a large
scale, however, the co-operation of Marshal MacMahon was
requisite, and the formation of his army had not so far pro-
gressed that he coiild take the offensive from Lower Alsace
simultaneously with the army on the Saar.

Under these circumstances thev remained in an expectant-
attitude facing the Saar, and on the 3rd August were in very
much their old positions.

Generally speaking, the intention of bringing up the 3rd, 4th,
and Guard Corps nearer to the 2nd and 5th inav be assumed.
Should it then, on a consideration of their strength relatively to
that of the antagonist, not appear desirable to advance offen-
sively over the Saar, it would be possible to occupy a defensive
position at Calenbronn, between Forbach and Saar^emiind,
wliich position had already been selected in Marshal Neil's time,
and at the same time to call up the Corps of MaiBhals MacMahon
and Canrobert from Alsace and Ch&lons.

At all events they had not as yet made up their minds
whether their measm-es should bo of an offensive or defensive
character. Owing to tlio obscurity in which the position and
intentions of the German annies remained enveloped, every fresh
report on the situation of the adversaiy led to orders which had
to be soon after rescinded.

On the arrival of a report from the Upper Rhine that hostile
troops had been seen at LoiTach,* the Emperor gave orders that
the 7th Corps was not to join Alarahal MacMahon, as originally
intended, but was to remain for the protection of Upper Alsace*
Again, when the police commissary at Diedenhofen reported on
the eve of the 4tli August that 40,000 Pnissianst had passed
Trier, and were marching upon Saarlouis or Diedenhofen, pre-
parations were at once made for a concentration of the army
towards the left wing.

Marahal Bazaine, who was to assume the command in that
direction, joined the 4th Coiys at Boulay ; the reconnaissance by
it on a large scale ordered for the 4th was countermanded. In
order to have liis own Corps (3rd) nearer at hand, he drew

* This was the weak detachment of Colonel Seubert.

t The yilth Prossian Corps which was passing Trier on the 2nd August.

142

forward to St Avoid Montaudon's DivisioDy which was still in
support of the 2ud Corps at Forbach. General Frossard was
also to retire to the same place if the enemy showed in greater
force than had been hitherto anticipated. Seveiul contradictoiy
iusti-uctioiis were sent to the Guaro, one of which ordered them
to advance to Volmerauges westward of Boulay.

The anticipation, nay the hope, that the enemy would throw
forward an isolated fraction of hiu force into French tenitory
lay at the bottom of these orders. " The affair at Saarbnicken
*' and the reconnaissance towards Saarlouis/' writes the chief of
the staff, Lo Boeuf, to General Frossard, "have apparently
" evoked an offensive movement on the part of the enemy witn
'* a view to protecting the last-named foitress. It would be an
** extremely fortunate occurrence were we to be offered battle
** with 40,000 men at the place where, without your Corps, we
•* ah-eady have 70,000."

Yet before the day Avas over another view appears to have

Sined ground at the head-quarters in Metz. A document from
e Emperor, bearing date the 4th Aueust, starts with the
supposition that General v. Steiimietz Avas oetween Saarbiiicken
and Zweibriicken, that one of Prince Frederick Charles' Corps
was supporting him in rear, and tliat he was keeping up
communication on the left with the Crown Prince ; *' Their inten-
tion is Raid to be, to marcli on Nancy."

In tin's belief the following orders were issued : — The 4th
Corps wa8 to remain concentrated at Boulay and Teterchen, the
8rd prmcipally at St. Avoid and llarienthaf. A Division of the
latter was to move on Puttelange ^vith a view to covering the
road Saargcniiind-Nancy. General Failly was to hold Saarge-
mund with only one Division, while the principal paii of liis
Corps (oth) was to aHsomble at Bitsch. Aa resei-ves, the Guard
was to take up a position near ('ourcelK'S-Chaussy, and the 8rd
Reserve Cavnliy Division ta advance from Pont-a-Mousson to
Faulquemont.

They had already reached the stage that their own actions
wvYQ re^ulat(Ml J)y thoHe of tluj enemy, when the news of the
defuat at Wi'iHHcnbtirg of a Fniirli DiviHion arrived in the after-
noon of the 4th August.

The conclusion wliich thoy should have drawn from the
vigorous advance of the (lerman left Aving was that the adversary
had completed his concentration, that they were now thrown
entirely upon the defeuHive, and that their measures must bo
regulated in accordance with this circumstance.

The fii-st result was a telegiaphic message to General de
Failly, ordering hhn to concentrate nis whole corps at Bitsch. Hq
would be relieved at Saargemiind by a part of the 3rd Corps.
Then the Emperor resolved upon a step which had hitherto
been avoided — the fonnation of two sepamte annies corre-
spending to the local separation of the entire force. On the
5th August Marshal lilacMahon received the chief command
of the 1st, Sth and 7th Corps, and Marshal Bazaine of the
2nd, 3rd and 4th Corps. The Guards and the army reserves

143

remained under the special ordcra of the Emperor. The 6th
Coi-pa, expected at Nancy, was not at fii-Rt aseigiie:! to eitlier of
the two armies.

This arrangement bore on the whole the character of a pro-
visional measure. They were only independent authorities " in
respect to military operations," a term vagne enough to give
rise to any amount of misunderstimding. No special staffs were
formed, and both mai*shals continued to retnin command of their
own Corps as hitherto. As, moreover, no systematic instmictions
were issued to the commandci-s of the annies from the Imperial
head-quarters, this organization exorcised no influence at first
on the course of events.

At all events they now had to make up their miuds to the
advance of the enemy over the Saar.

In reply to an inquiry of the chief of the sbifF, Geneml
Frossard reported on the mornuig of the 5th tliat the night had
passed in peace, but he considered his position in front of Saar-
oriicken somewhat cndangertMl, and that it w(mld be dcsimblo
to withdraw to the heights between FiU-bach and Saargemund.
The Imperial head-quarters acceded to this proi>o8ition and sent
an answer that the U eneral might cany (mt his intention on the
following morning; the possibility of a further retreat to St.
Avoid was also indicated.

General Frossard, however, considered that the movement
of his Corps should not bo deferred so long, as in all probability
the advanced troops of the enemy, which were dra^^'lng nearer
and nearer, would disturb his retreat. He therefore took up his
intended position as early as the evening of the ftth. Laveau-
cpupet's Division pitched their camp on the Siucheren heiglits,
occupied a spur of the hill projecting towards the north, upon
which they threw up shelter-trenches, and kept a look out in the
direction of St. Aruual. One brigade of Verge's Division was
posted to the north-east of Stirling; the other renmined to the
west of Forbach, to which place it had advanced on the 4th f(u*
the protection of the stores accumulated at the niilway station.
Tempomiy entrenchments w^ere thrown up at that point also.
BataiUe's Division moved to Oettingen ; the cavahy and the
artiUeiy reserve were at Forbach.

In rear of the 2nd came the 3rd Coii>h, spread over a con-
siderable interval; the head-quartei's, Decaen's Division and
the resei-ves at St, Avoid; Motmau's Division at Mari(Mithal,
Castagny's at Puttelange. Montaudon's Division had been sent
to reheve the 5th Corps at Saargemund, but only reached tliat
place on the mon)ing of the (Jth August.

The 4tli Corps remained at Teterclicn with Cissey s Divinion.
As no German troops were to be seen on the Simr during the
morning of the 5th, Lorenccz' Division was pushed forward
closer to tlic 3rd Corps, so as to reach Boucheponi early on
the 6th. The remainder of the Corps stood fast in and around
Boulay.

In rear of this position of Marehal Bazaine s army were the

144

Ouards and the 3rd Reserve Cavalry Division at Courcelles-
Cliaiissy and Faulqueniont. The extent of front from Boulay
to Saargeiniind was about 28 miles, and about the same in
depth from Spicheren to Courcelles.

General Failly had marched on the morning of the 5th to
Bitsch and Rohrbach in accordance Avith his ordera. Lapasset's
brigade, with the 3rd Lancei-s and a batteiy, remained behind
near Saargemund to protect a large convoy of waggons. They
were there to await their relief by the 3rd Corps.

Meanwhile Marahal MacMahon had made liis preparations to
meet the Gennan army which had penetrated into Alsace. So
early as the evening of the 4th, the 1st Corps was concentmted
as the main body in a chosen position behind the Saner at
Froschwiller ; Bonnemain's 2nd Rcsei've Cavahy Division also
advanced to that point.

The infantry of (yonseil Dumcsnirs Division of the 7th Coi-ps
had been transported on the 4th August from Colmar to Milhl-
hausen, where Genei'al Douay contemplated the concentration of
his Coips. It had just reached the place when an order an-ived
fram MacMahon recalling it to the north with a view to joining
him. The Division was in consequence re-embarked at once
and reached Hagenau on the morning of the 5th. The Divisional
artillery, Avhich had received the amended order while on the
march between Cohnar and Miihlhausen, followed the same
evening from Colmar. Early on the morning of the ()th the
entire Division was concentrated on MacMahon s right ^ving.

It appears that on the 4tli the Mai-shal had still the intention
of striking a blow on the enemy's flank from his position, in
the event of the latter continuing his movement southwards.
But the French soon limited themselves to purely defensive
mcaHuroH. Lartigui^'H Division, wliich was still on the (lunstett
heights eastward of the Sauor, was withch'awn to the right
bank on the moniing of the 5th. Raoult's Division occupied the
centre of tlie position between Frosclnnller and Elsasshausen,
Ducrot's Division fomiing the loft Aving. The remainder of the
army was in socond line.

As early as t\\o. afternoon oF thii 5th August, the German
outposts ftmnd tlienisolves in close proximity to the front of the
anny. The Mai-shal had ordered the bridges over the Sauer to
be broken up, and issued insti-uctions for tne impending stnigglo
against **(aionnous forces and a f(»rmidable artillery.'* A report
was sent to tlie Emperor that tlic troops were concentrated and
that they held a good position on the enemy's flank.

Thus the ilarshal made serious preparation to meet a hostile
attack, but he does not appear to have expected this so early as
the following day. This is evident from his coiTespondence
with General Failly, an epitome of wliich we give here on the
authority of the latter :

On receipt of the connnunicati<in with regard to the recent
changes in tlie command, the Marshal at once ordered General
Failly to join him as soon as possible. In a second telegram,

145

however, he weakened tliis iiiRtmctioii by uskiiig on what day
ami in which dii'ection tlio appearance of the 5th Coips might be
expected. General Failly could not have collected two Divisions
at Bitsch before the morning of the Gth ; he considered tliat ho
ought not entii'ely to lay bare the road-juuction at this point, so
vital in respect to the communication of the two armies, as the
enemy was ah*eady reported to be at Pirmasens and Zweibriicken.
He therefore replied, " At present there is only Lcspai-t's Divi-
•* sion at Bitsch, which will march to join the Ist 0011)8 on tiio
** morning of the Gth ; the other Divisions will follow as they
" anive at BitscL*'

The Marshal assented to this, and at the same time, in antici-
pation of the impending reuiforcement, again fixed his attention
upon offensive measure& An officer was sent to Bitsch with a
letter on the morning of the Gth, in which the Marahal ordered
a general forward movement for the 7th August. The 5th Corps
was destined in this movement (presumably by Lembach) to
operate against the enemy's flank. The document ended as
follows : " Tlierefore send a Division to Pliilippsburg (between
*' Bitsch and Reichshoffen) as early as possibie, and hold the
** other in readiness to march."

As the German head-quarters likewise did not intend to give
battle before the 7th, as already mentioned, both sides would ou
this day have met one another on the offensive. The armies
were, however, so close together on the evening of the 5th that
the outposts were constant^ involved in small skirmishes. Owing
to the onward pressure of the troops on both sides, the intentions
of the leaders of the armies were anticipated.

The positions of the German and French ainiies on the 5th BkMk UL
Aug^t, the eve of tlie battles at Worth and Spicheren, are
shown on Sketch No. III. Up to this date the communications
of the German armies with their own temtory had been aiTanged
as follows : —

The 1st Army had for its line of Etappen^ the railway
MOnster-Oohi-Oall (line F), thence the Eifel road to Trier;
secondly, the main road from Ooblenz across the Hundsriick to
Hermeskeil ; the General Inspection of JStappen was at Wadern ;
5 battalions,* 4 reserve squaarons, and a battery were placed at
its disposal, and were to be assembled at Wittlich by the 8th
August

The Ilnd Army had, in addition to the two lines (A and C)
leading from Berlin to the Saar by way of Ooln-Bingerbruck
and by way of Halle-Oassel-Mannheim, the line Uarburg-
Kreiensen-Mosbach (B) and that from Leipsig-Fulda to Oastel
near Mainz (D). The latter line was shared in common with
the Ilird Army. The General Inspection of Etappen of the Ilnd
Army had been at Eaiserslautem smce the 2nd August, at which
place, as also at Birkenfeld and Neunkirehen, the Intendant-

* Indading 8 line battalions from tho OobleiuB and CMn garrisons.

146

General of the Amr^ foimed large magaziiies. For the protec-
tion of itB line of Mai>pen^ the llnd Simj was at firrt aaaigned
the 3rd Landwehr Division under Major-Geneoral Schuler ▼•
Senden, and this was drawn forward to Mainz. On the 6th
Angust this Division received another destination, and passed^
together with two line regiments of the Mainz ^;arrison, some
regiments of reserve cavalry and reserve battenes, under the
command of Licut-Qcneral v. Eummer. In place of it^ 8 Land-
wehr battalions and one re^ment of reserve cavalry were
assigned as Etappen troops to uie Ilnd Army.

The Ilird Army was m commuuication with its o^vn country
by the lines D and £; the latter from Posen by Gsrlitz,
Leipzig, Wurzburg, Mainz, to Landau, as well as by the three
South German lines, teiminating at Bmclisal, Meckesheim and
Heidelberg respectively. The chief Etappeti terminal station
was Mani3ieim; 8 battalions and 4 squadrons of Landwehr
ti'oops were shortly expected for the defence of the Etappen line.

147

The Battlk of Worth.

The Army Order issued on the afternoon of the 5th August
by H.R.H. the Crown Prince from tho hcad-qnarterf? at Snlz ran
as follows : —

" The anny will remain concentrated to-morrow round
Sulz, nnd execute a change of front.
" (I.) The Ilnd Bavarian and Vth Pmsfiian Coii)R remain in

their present position at Lerabach and Preuschdorf.
•* (2.) The Xlth Pnissian Array Coi-ps will wheel to the right
and bivouac at Holschloch ; its outposts pushed forward
towards the Sauer. • Surburg and the road to Hagenau
Avill be occupied.
** (3.) The 1st Bavarian Corps will advance as far as the neigh-
bourhood of Lobsann and Lampertsloch, Outposts
thrown forward through the Hoclnvald in the direction
of the Sauer,
" (4.) The 4th Cavalry Divimon remains in bivouac, but will

front westward.
** (5.) Werder's Corps will march to Roimerawiller and show
front towards the south; its outposts pushed forward
towards the Hagenau forest. The roads at Kiihlendorf
and the railway at HoflFen are to be protected by strong
outpost detachments.
" The head-quarters remain at Sulz."
This Army Order was based on the supposition that the
enemjr intended to cover, from his position oehind the Sauer,
the railway from Strassburg to Bitscn and the commimications
through tne Vosges, and that to this end the French com-
mander, by calling up the 7th and 5th Coi-ps, either entirely or
in pai-t, would accept a general action. Should this be the
case, as seemed probable from the most recent observations and
reports, the Germans had ample leisure for executing the pre-
paratory movements contemplated for the 6th, which nad chiefly
m view a closer concentration of the most distant portions of
the army— the 1st Bavarian and Werder's Corps.

Two less probable events had, moreover, to be taken into con-
sideration— (1) that Marshal MacMalion mi^iit march away west-
ward on the Gth August, or (2) that he might advance to the
attack of the Vth Corps, whicli was immediately in front of him.
In order to meet tlicse contingencies, the Ilnd Bavarian Coips
received instructions, on the afternoon of the 5th, to dii-ect its
attention not only to the Bitschroad, but also to the neighbour-
hood of Langensulzbach. Should the report of cannon be heard
on the following morning in the direction of Worth, a Division
of the Corps was to advance against the enemy's left flank, the
remainder to be halted facing Bitscli. This document also con-
tained a communication that the head of the Vlth Army Corps
had arrived at Landau, that a Divisigi) of that (!orps would

UNIVEV.iJlTl
.C4LIF0BH^

148

advance in the direction of Bitsch and Pirmasens on the follow-
ing day, occupying Weissenbnrg with two battalions, and that
the right flank of the Bavarians would consequently be fully
protected.

On receiving these instructions on the evening of the 5th
General v. Hartmann ordered the 4th Division, which bivouacked
at Pfaffenbronn, to move forward in a westerly direction at day-
break on the Gtli August. Of the 7th Infantry Brigade, two
battalions of the 5th Re^ment and a squadron oi the 2nd
Chevauxlegers were pushed forward towards the Kuhbrucke, in
the valley of the Sauer, from which place they kept up com-
munication with the Vth Army Corps.

The remainder of the 7th Brigade, with 3 squadrons of the
same Chevauxlegers and a battery took up a position southward
of Mattstall, on the Langensulzbach road. The 8th Infantry
Brieade, with its three batteries, moved up to the north of Matt-
stall. The lancer brigade and three batteries of the artillerv
reserve* were also assigned to the 4th Division for the 6th
August, but remained in readiness provisionally at Lembach.

The 3rd Division and the resei-ves at Lembach and Wingen
fronted towards Bitsch.

Such was the position occupied by the Ilnd Bavarian Coi'ps
at 7.30 a.m. on the 6th August.

Touching it on the left came the Prussian outposts, furnished
bv the 20th Brigade, Vth Armv Corps along the eastern edge
of the Sauer vcdley, from the ICuhbriicke through Spachbach to
Gunstett. Of these, half the 1st battalion 37tii Regiment was
at Gorsdorf ; the 2nd battalion 50th and the 4th squadron 14th
Dragoons at Gunstett. The remainder of the 20th Brigade,
with the 3rd squadron of the same remnent of dragoons and
the 6th light batterv, was westward of Dieffenbach ; flie village
was occupied by the fusilier battalion of the 50th. The re-
mainder of the 10th Division, the 9th Division, and the corps
artillery were to the south and east of this village on both sides
of the Sulz road. Jlitschdorf and Prouschdorf were each occu-
pied by a battalion from the 10th Division.t

The views held at the head-quarters of the Ilird Aimy with
regard to the circumstances of the enemy, and upon which its
line of action was based, proved to be correct, as we now know.

The forces at Marshal MacMahDii's disposition were amply
sufficient, even without the 5th Corps, for the occupation and
sustained defence of the position which he had selected ; and the
latter was, moreover, so exceedingly strong that success might
even be calculated upon against an enemy far superior in point
of numbers. The numerical disproportion was counterbalanced
by the large force of artillery, the superiority of the chassepot
rifle, and tlie favourable nature of the ground. Nay, the scale

* Sec Appendix XI.

t For details with regard lo the goiicral posilioii of the other Corps, which do not
here concern us, sec ])p. 139, 1 10.

149

might turn to the advantage of tho French arniB, wore Failly's
Corps to co-operate.

With regard to the latter, however, wo know that the greater
part of it was still marching from Saargemiind to Bitsch on the
5th, and that on the followmg morning Lefipart's Division, which
had been for some time at Bitsch, was alone moved upon Ileichs-
hoffen. On the other hand, Conseil Dumcsnirs Division of the
7th Corps had, as we are aware, effected its jmiction with the 1st
and hact moved up into poRition with it on the morning of the
6th.* The troops occupied a position upon the undulating 6pm*s
of the Vosges, which clad with vineyards and hopgardens, extend
between tlie Eberbach and Sauerbach. The front line from
Neehwiller through Frdschwillcr and Elsasshausen, as far as the
heights eastward of Eberbach, had a length of 3^ miles and was
held by 45,000 men. This front was covered by the Sauerbach,
which liver was veiy difficult to cross except at the bridges.
The meadow land, averaging 1,000 paces m breadth, which
bordered its banks, afforded no cover in the approach, so that
the French infantry could profit by all the advantages of their
superior weapon. The eastern slope of the valley is commanded
at all points from the western. The latter only approaches
tolerably near to the Sauer at the mountain spm* opposite
Gorsdorf, whilst everywhere else it is separated by an interval
of more than 500 paces. The course of the rivulet, through-
out the whole extent with which we are concerned, is within
effective range of musketry from the heights on the west, the
slopes of which, both from their steepness and extent of culti-
vation, offer considerable difficulties to an ascent. In front of
the centre of the position lies Worth, with its bridge over the
Sauer. That countiy town, as also the other villages wthin
the position, contains many spacious and well-built houses,
capable of being strongly defended. Thickly-planted gardens
and vineyards extend up tho heights from the la^t buildings
at the western exit, so that these localities are in immediate
connexion with the main position.

The village of Fi-osch wilier forms the crowning feature of the
position. Commanding the ground in all directions, situated at
the highest point of tho hilly plateau, at the jtmction of
several roads leading into the Sauer valley, and grouped around
the line of retreat to Reichshoffen in nearly the form of a square,
it constituted, with its spacious church and many other strong
buildings, a bastion-like i^eduit to the entire line of defence. The
approach to it from the south was protected by ilie village of
Elsasshausen, also very defensible, but lying somewhat lower.
The undulating character of the gi'ound and the cover which it
affords favoured the employment of a large number of skirmishei*s
and concealed the position and moA^ement of the resei*ves from
the advei*sary's view. The French, moreover, had not neglected
to sti*engthen the interior of tho position by well placed field

» See i>. 144,

150

enlronclniiLnl.s. jilortsbruiin, t)))(>o.sito the right Aviiig, i\'u\ not at
first form part ot* the poBition, bo as to avoid aii undue exten-
fiion of frout ; thia viUage waa, besides, perfectly commanded
from the poaition. The passagea of the Sauer at Gunstett and
Dui'renbach were within tne moat efifeetive cannon range. The re-
serves posted behind this flank and the open nature of the ground
to the south were additional safeguards against any immediate
Tienetration of the G ermans on the right flank. Any wide sweep-
mg flank movement would have to be made througu the Hagenau
forest, and was therefore hardly taken into consideration. Dan-
gerous, however, was the poaition of the left wing, as the road
from Lembach through Mattstall and LangensulzlDach, on the
western bank of the Sauer, led right into the position, and the ad-
vance of the adversary would be concealed by tne woods. Although
it was scarcely to be expected that the latter would move his
main force along this dif&cult mountain ti*ack, yet a single Corps
mi^ht take tliis du-ection whilst the bulk of the troops dejiloyed
in tront of the line Gorsdorf-Gunstett. It was imperative to
give additional security to tlie left flank by refusing this wing.

Tlie heights eastward of Elaasshausen gave the oest point de
vue of the entire neighbourhood, and it was there that Marshal
MacMahon took up Bis position during the greater part of the
battle.

The position, of which a general description has been given,
was occupied in detail as follows :*

The 1st Division, Ducrot, with its right wing in front of
Froschwiller ; its left wing resting on the Grosawahl, which
stretches towards Reichshoffen. It consequently formed the
defensive flank against Lembach ; Neehwiller and Jiigerthal were
each occupied by a company.

The 1st Brigade of tne 3rd Division, Raoult, occupied the
heights, Avhich branch ofl* at Froschwiller and fonn the spur
projecting towards Gorsdorf, previously alluded to; the 2nd
Brigade supported its left flank on Froschwiller, its ri^ht on
Elsasshauseu. On the right of the latter came the 4th Division,
Lartigue, forming a broken line, its 1st Brigade facing Gunstett
and the 2ndt opposite Morsbronn.

The 2nd Division, under the command of General of Brigade
Pelle after General Douay's death, waa posted in reserve behind
the right flank of the 3rd and the left of the 4th. In rear of
the latter, moreover, were Conseil Dumesnil's Division of the
7th Corps and MichcVs Cuirassier Brigade imder the ordei-s of
General of Division Duhesme.

Furth'M- northward, at tht- sources of tlio Eberbiich were
Bvmnemaiu's 2nd licserve Uavahy Division, and Septeuirs Light
Cavalry Brigade. Nansouty's Cavalry Brigade Avas (listrihuted
as Diviwonal Cavalry.

^ MucMoLon's re|K>rt to the Emperur.

t As the 87th Regiment remained at fi>lra»6burg, this brigade was only 8 battalion:*
strong.

151
The various Actions during the Morning and Afternoon

PRIOR TO THE ArRH'AL OF THE CrOWN PrINCE.

During the night, and more particuhu'Iy towards daybreak, Reconnais-
vigorous flkirmisnes had takon plaro between tho (nitpopts in ^"^Fbrth*'"'
front of the Vth Army Corpf?. nndGuu^ieU.

Major-General v. vValther. commanding the 20tli Iniuntry
Brigade, while making a reconnaisBance in person at 4 a.m.,
remarked an unusual noise and movement in the enemy's
camp, which led him to conclude tliat the adverwiry was moving
away. In order to be certain on this point, tlie Goneial ordered
a reconnaissance in force beyond Worth.

In compliance with this, the 6th light battery first took up a
position to the north of the Worth road at 7 a.m., and threw
10 shells into the place, some of which burst. Upon this the
2nd battalion 37th Fusiliers advanced to the attack in company
columns. The 7th company, moving along the road, found the
little to^vn imoccupied ; the bridges, however, were destroyed.
Meanwhile the sWrnishing divisions succeeded in wading
through the Sauer, a sunken river enclosed within steep banks,
and in penetrating to the further outskirts of the i^lacc, whilst
on either side of it, the other three companies took up a position
on the stream. They now became involved in an engagement
with French infantry and artillery which appeared on the
western edge of the heights ; four f^rench batteries, one after
another, opened the cannonade at distances varying from 3,000
to 4,000 paces. After firing a few ineflToctive rounds, they were
severally compelled to withdraw in consequence of the well-
aimed fire of Caspari's battery, aided by that of the infantry.

The appearance of French hospital-bearers carrying away
wounded, Dore testimony to the successful result of our fire, df
the Prussian battalion 1 man was killed, 1 officer and 20 men
woimded.

As there could no longer be any doubt that the enemy was

E resent in great force, General v. Walther broke off the action at
alf-past 8 o'clock, and ordered first the battalion and afterwards
the battery to return into bivouac. The Worth cemetery situated
on the eastern bank of the Sauer was occupied by two sub-
divisions.*

Simultaneously 'with these proceedings at Worth fighting was
rife at Gimstett, in which, however, the Frencli took the
initiative.

Of the detachment posted at that place,t the 5th company
501iL Regiment was pushed forward to the Bruch Mill, the 6tn
to the southern issue from the village ; the remainder in rear of
the latter, concealed by the vuieyards. The dragoons patrolled
in advance of the front and kept up communication with the
Xlth Army Corps through Biblisheim.

• Vide noto io p. 05.
t Sco p. 148.

152

The Btone bridge on the Eberbach road was inined* the mill
bridge, which had been destroyed by the French^ was repaired
for infantry, and the mill buildmgs airanged for defence.

A small reconnaissance dming the night had demonstrated
that the French outposts were in position on the opposite side of
the Sauer valley.

At 5 a.m. a Ime of skirmishers followed by two companies of
Zouaves advanced from thence towards the Bruch Hill, but
they were soon coiiipellud to retire by the fire of the Prussian
riflemen.

At 7 o'clock strong bodies of skirmishera again moved forward
as far as the Morsbronn-Worth road, and a violent shell and
musketry fire was directed against the mill buildines and Oun-
stett from the heights. The mill took fire ; the 5th company
however, did not quit the buildings and soon eztinffuishea the
conflagration. Meantime the detachment commander, Captain
V. Kamptz, ordered up the two companies behind Gunstett in
support. The enemy, however, made no real attack, but rather
satisfied himself with keeping up an artiUery and musketry fire,
which was answered by the Prussian skirmishers and caused
them but little lous.

AoUon at The 4th Bavarian Division, as we know, had been held in

Ijmgeliul*. readiness at Mattstall since the early morning of the 6th August,

with the object of participating in any action which mi^ht take

place at Worth. Only the special arms of the reserve* intended

for its support had remained behind at LembacL

General Count Bothmer found no enemy at Laugensulzsbach,
and occupied the place with the 6th Rifle battalion of the
advanced guard.

The cannonade audible at first fi'oju the direction of Worth
was only slight ; but a large French bivouac could be seen on
the Frosclnviller heights.

As the cannouade at AVorth increased in briskness, the oom-
tnandant of the Corps, v. Hartmann, who was present, ordered
up the special amis from Lembach and the 4th Division to move
forward on Frosclnviller ; the infantry of the advanced ffuard
commenced its march at a quarter-past 8 o'clock. In order to
engage the French ai-tillery at Fixischwiller, Kirchhoffer's 4-pr,
battery took up a position to the north-east of Lang^nsulzbach,
where it was subsequently reheved by Herold's 6-pr. battery.
Owing to the great distance, however, between the Bavarian
and French artillery, the cannonade, which was not very brisk,
was unproductive of results to either side.

The 8th Brigade was ordered to follow up in rear at once
from Mattstall, at which place the Corps reserves were to be
held in readiness.

The advanced guard moved towards the woody mountain
slopes ascending to Neehwillei*. The 6th Rifle battaUon, with

* 9m Appendix XL

153

the exception of the 4th company left with the battery, formed
the front line in extended order ; follown^ it came in line of
company columns two battaUons of the 9tii Regiment, the Ist
on the loft, the 2nd on the right ; behind these, the 3rd bat-
talion in column.

The hostile batteries on the heights in front of Froachwiller
fired upon the Bavarian riflemen as they debouched from Laneen*
sulzbach. After a troublesome ascent of the hillside, these
latter reached the southern sldrt of the wood in that direction.
Here, however, they were mot by the fire of the enemy's skir-
mishers from the border of the wood, some 300 paces in front
of them, and at the same tune by a shell and mitrailleuse fii'e,
which prevented their further progress.

The two leading battahons of tlie 9th Regiment were drawn
into the skirmishing line of the riflemen, so as to extend it and
fill up gai)8. The 2nd battalion guarded its own right flank in
the direction of Neehwiller.

The 3rd battalion of the regiment forming the rear lino,
although somewhat separated in marching through the wood,
came up with its first troops at a veiy opportune moment to
support the left wing against the .enemy's attack. They at once
extended in skirmishing order on the ground, which was more
open at this point, being onlv covered with scattered clumps of
trees. The remainder of tne battalion took up a position at
first further to the left on the Sulzbach, but, on tbe advance
of the 8th Brigade, was also speedily called in. There were now
no more reserves at hand, and there was no artillery in support.
Ilerold's 6-pr. battery, being masked by its own troops, could
not aim at the enemy's skirmishers, and was therefore only able
to keep up a desultory fire upon the French guns and mitrail-
leuses, which were visible from time to time at Froschwiller.
In spite of this, the four battalions succeeded in presenting a
stout resistance to the far more numerous enemy. Several
offensive counter-strokes made by the French were repulsed
by file-firing.*

When the advanced parties of the 8th Infantry Brigade
reached the southern issue from Langensulzbach at half-past 9,
the firing had become very hot, especiallv on the Bavarian left
wing. As the leit -wing of the advanced ^uard appeared to be
more particularly endangered thereby, Lieut.-Gencral Count
Bothmer ordered the four battalions t which first arrived to
advance in that direction, and to extend the fighting line as far
as the Saw Mill.

Shots had also fallen on the wooded heights between the
Sulzbach and the Sauer. In this direction were moving, besides
some companies of the 8th Brigade, the two battalions of the
5th Regiment, sent at an earlier period to the Kuhbriicke, which

* Tlie German *' Scknell-feuer^* is rendered throughout this tnuislAtion by " file-
fiiins^* It corresponds to the French " /Vm €^volonW — ^Tr.

t The third battalions of the Ist, 11th, nnd 14th, and the Ist battalion of the 7th
Rogiuients.

154

Boon after 0 o'clock occupied Avithout n coutcBt the Old Mill
after its evacuation by the French. They subsequently resinned
their march over the mountain slopes, and came into communi-
cation at the southern skirt of the ^vood with the left flank of
the Division.

The latter had towards 10 oVlock a front of 10 battalions,
extending over a distance of 2^ miles from the western skirt of
the wood between Neehwiller and Langensulzbach to the Sauer.

As reserves, tlievo were only i]ui 3rd battalion 5th Regiment.
3 companii'K of the lOtli Rifle battalion,* 3 smuulron.s, and
3 batteries at LangcriHulzbath. A battery had been left ai
Mattstall ready to m()vc\

In the action, which avu.s griulually l^vcoming nuav and nic>n*
lively, the Bavarians were making progress, especially on their
left wing. Their troops advanced from the more open eastern
slope, across the hollow towards the wood occupied by the
enemy, whilst a company of the 3rd battalion, 1st Regiment,
which had been sent by way of the Saw Mill, wheeled up against
the adversary's right flank. Being vigorously supported by
two companies of the 7th advancing on the Worth road, and
two companies of the 11th Regiment in tho Sidzbach valley, it
succeeded in throwin^j back tho French sharpshooters into the
wood, and in penetrating therein ; they had, however, again to
abandon the position, as it was impossible for the support to act
in the thick underwood. The skirmishers then ensconced them-
selves as well as they could in front of the outskirt of the forent,
against which thoy directed their Are. The companies of the
11th Regiment also niaintiiined their position in a copse on the
north-eastern spur of tho Friisch wilier heights. Still more to
the left, 3 companies of the 5th Regiment had taken up a
position extending from the southern edge of this wood as far
as the Sulzbach.

Tho detachments which rcmaiued in close order along the
hollow and upon the slopes, particularly the 3rd battalion of the
1st Regiment, suflered sensibly from the fire of the French
artillery and musketry at Froschwiller. Kirchhoffcr's batteiy
sought in vain a more eftective position on the right bank of
the Sulzbach ; the enemy's sharp musketry fire compelled it to
retire through Langensulzbach. With it also retired La Roche's
battery, which had come to Slattstall with the other reseive
battenes and the lancer brigade, and had meantime been
brought forward from thence by way of Langensulzbach. La
Roche's battery then came into action to tho east of the
village.

Tho 4th Bavarian Division was at first dependent on its own
resources, as the 3rd Division was still watching in the direction
of Bitsch, and tlie 1st Bavarian Corps had only just left In^ol-
sheim. Moreover the Vth Army Corps was making no visible

* The Snd company vas detached to the wooded heightf between the Bauer and
Sulzbach.

155

progress %n the western bank of the Saner, and they them-
selves were unable to support the infantrv in then* own front
with artillery in an effective manner. All this prevented *iuy
head being made against the strong heights of Froschwiller ; the
foot of the position, which had been gained at considerable loss,
could however be maintained for a time.

Such was the aspect of affairs when a Prussian orderly officer
brought verbal instructionH to (icncral v. ilnrtmann, at 10..30
a.m., to suspend the contest.* It was by no means easy to
carry out this order, as the struggle now raged with renewed
vigour to the south of Langensulzbach, and the troops had
become mixed up in fighting through the woods.

General v. Hartmann first sent away the lancer brigade, and
the greater part of the batteries to the bivouac at Lembach.
Herold's battery remained in its position as a support to the
infantry, and Speck's and zu Rhein s batteries were brought up
from Mattstall to support the former battery if required. In
addition to the foregoing, the two battalions left in reserve took
up a supporting position at Langensulzbach. All detucliments
which were engaged received orders to assemble in rear of the
village.

As the enemy did not press on very actively, the greater part
of the troops succeeded by half-past 11 o'clock in withdrawing
out of fire, and retiring behind Langensulzbach. On the left
flank, the wooded peak between the Sulzbach and the Sauer
was held, whilst the two companies of the 11th Regiment
occupied the Saw Mill, and later on the two battalions of the
5th the Old MiU.

Before these movements were quite completed, a communica-
tion was received from the Vth Army Corps at a quarter-past
11 o'clock, that it had been resolved to attack the Worth
heights, and that the co-operation of the Bavarians against the
enemy's left flank was expectecL

Shortly after the thunder of the guns reverberating from the
direction of Worth, betokened too clearly that the struggle had
burst out anew with redoubled energy.

General v. Hartmann now resolveu to renew the struggle on
his side, and in consequence ordered the ti'oops still effective to
advance at once, and a brigade of the 3rd Division to be called
up from Lembadi.

Independently of this, the action was still ^oing on to the
south of Langensulzbach. The two compames of the 37th,
posted at Gorsdorf by the Vth Army Corps for the purpose of
keeping up communication with tho Bavarians, had, when they
believed that thev saw indications of the progress of the
struggle towards Worth, passed the Sauer at tne Old Mill, and

* Iliete instructions were probably coDsequent upon a written onler sent pre-
TioQslj by the Commander-in-Chief to the Vth Prussian Corps to discontinue the
combat But the latter had already assumed such proportions that effect could not
be ^ren to the order. The Commander-in-Chief was not aware at the time of the
action which was taking place at Langensulzbach.

156

afterwards moved towards tlie steep heights on the western
bank of the Sulzbach. The Ist company advancing on the left
encountered such superior forces at the foot of a vine-clad hill
that it was forced to retire to Gorsdorf. The 2nd company,
however, opened up communication Avith the Bavarian detach-
ments still in action, and the latter in concert with it continued
the contest.

We must now depict the proceedings of the Vth and Xlth
Army Corps.

Oommeooe- The chief of the general staff of the Vth Army Coi-ps, Colonel

£Sle*by*tlw ^' ^* Esch, had proceeded to the advanced ffuard in consequence

Yth Annj of the vigorous firing at Worth. When ne amved there after

Corps. half-past o o'clock, the reconnoitring action had been broken off;

12 0^*0!)* ^ ^^ *^® ^*^®^ ^^^^^' at this time, from the heights east of Worth,

the firing from the direction of Langensulzbach was observed
to be increasing in intensity, as well as the development of an
action at Gunstett. Under these circumstances, Colonel v. d.
Esch, vnth the concuiTcnce of the commander of the advanced
guard, considered it imperative to resume the struggle at Worth,
so as to prevent the enemy from turning with his whole force
against one wing of the German army. The 6th light battery
was again ordered to advance, and from a position somewhat in
front of their former one, but still at a distance of 3,000 paces,
to open fire upon the French infantrv.

In agreement vnth the commander of the Division, Lieut.-
Gencral v. Schmidt, who was present, further oixlers were given
that the other three batteries of the 10th Division and the whole
of the corps ai'tillery should come into action opposite the
enemy's front, the 10th Division to the east of Diefienbach, the
9th more to the rear on both sides of the road.

The geneml commanding confirmed the measures reported to
him, and appeared soon after on the field of battle, where ho
assumed the command in spite of the wound he had received at
Weissenburg.

At half-past 9 o'clock the entire artillery of the Vth Army
Corps came into action in the following oraer on both sides of
the Diefienbach-Worth road : to the north of it, on the right of
and next to the batteries now in action, the two horse artillery
batteries and the two heavy batteries of the corps artillery ; on
the south, first the two light batteries of the latter and the other
batteries of the 10th Division. Then followed the artillery of
the 9th Division, the last battery but one of which reached as
far as the Diefienbach forest, whilst on the extreme left fiank the
2nd light battery took up a rather more foi-ward position.

The command of the whole artillery was assumed by its
brigade commander Colonel Gaede. The enemy's line of guns
was in front of them, at a distance of from 2,400 to 4,000 paces.

In conjunction with the 24 guns of the advanced guard of the
Xlth Army Corps, which were in action further to the south,
the 84 guns of the Vth Corps opened a very effective fire upon the

157

enemy's position at 10 o'clock. It had hardly commenced when
the mitrailleueeB found themBelves compelled to withdraw. The
other batteries continued the cannonade, it is true ; but their fire
was almost worthless, as the greater part of tlie shells which fell
in proximity to the Pnissian ar filler}' failed to burst. The whole
lino of French artillery was soon reduced to silence; only
one battery on the left flank coutiuucd in an advantageous
position.

A pause occuired in the cannonade, during which the Prussian
artillery directed its fire chiefly against the enemy's infantry,
seeking cover in the woods and hollows of the gi'ound. Some
fann buildings in Elsasshausen were also set on tire.

Meanwhile the infantry of the Vth Army Corps had concluded
its formation as follows :

Of the brigade on outpost duty ^the 20th), the two first com-
panies of the 37th Regiment had been at Gorsdorf from an
early hour, the 3rd and 4th were posted as escort to the guns
on the northern edge of the Dieffenbach copse. The two other
battalions of the regiment fonned the first line of the main

Sosition, 800 paces in rear of the Ime of guns. Of the 50th
legiment, the 2nd battalion, as we have seen, was at Gunstett ;
the other two battalions had occupied the western edge of the
Dieffenbach copse and Oberdorf, on the left of the main position.
The remainder on the 10th Division, viz. : the 19th infantry
Brigade and 3 squadrons of the 14th Dragoons were more to
the rear on the Worth road. The 9th Division had fonned up
in sevei-al lines to the north and west of Dieffenbach : on the
road to Gorsdorf were the 17t]i Brigade and the 5th Rifle bat-
talion ; the first and fusilier battalions of the 59th Regiment
were on the march towards the last-named village to strengthen
that post. The 18th Brigade was between the Sultz- Worth
high road and the Dieffenbach copse before mentioned. On
the Spachbach road to the south of the copse were the 4th
Dragoons.

This position was taken up when the infantry of the 21st
Division were visibly taking part in the action at Gunstett
As the other portions of the Xlth Army Corps were approaching,
and the superiority of our artillery was manifest, General v.
Kirchbacn gave ordci"B soon after 10 o'clock for the advanced
guard to occupy Worth and tlic heightH beyond.

The 20th Brigade, after deducting the troops detached to
Gorsdorf and Gunstett and those acting as escorts to artillery,
had only an available strength of four battalions, which force,
however, was supplemented by the addition of the 4th company
37th Fusiliers, the 3rd company remaining with the guns.

The 2 J battaHons of the Fusilier Regiment crossing the Saner
at Worth, and the two bathilions of the 50th at Spachbach, were
afterwards to ascend the Elsasshausen heights between the
Froschwiller high road and the Niederwald.

The details of the attack wore as follows : — Thr 2nd l>attilion
of the Fusiliei-H found Worth again unoccupied. The Gth and

158

7th companies crossed the Sauer on a bridge of planks and hop-

SoleSy wnich had been mpidlj improvised in lieu df the one
eetroyed. On the amval of the 5th company, which followed
in reserve ulong the road, this bridge was made practicable for
cavalry within half an hour.

Meanwhile the 8th company liad waded through the river
on the north, and the 4th on tlio south of the town, the men
breast-high in the water, and tlu^ lattor company exposed to n
heavy nmsketry and hIigU lu-c.

They firet cstiiblishcd theniBcl vi h on the weat side of the place,
and then commenced to climb the heights in front under a
crushing fire from the enemy. In spite of the heavy losses
which ensued, their efforts met with decided success until the
adversary brought forward strong reserves, and by vigorous
attacks, drove the thin and decimated lines down the hillside.

The remnant of the five companies, with the colours of the
two battalions brought out of action by Lieutenant Timm,
collected in the little town, the western border of which re-
mained in our handa

The 10th and lltli companies had passed the river to the
south of the town over a iiastily improvised bridge, and sub-
sequently crossed the Ilagenau high-road to the attack of the
heights ; the 9th and 12 th companies followed in close order
and took up a position in the meadows, under cover of a hop

Elantation. But the general forward movement of the enemy,
efore which the 2nd battalion had to give way, was also
directed upon the two foremost companies of the tliird battalion.
These were likewise unable to offer any real resistance to the
enemy's superior force ; the gi'eater pai-t inclined away to the
left and connected themselves with the battalions of the 50th
Regiment which had crossed between Worth and Spachbach.
Part of the 11th company was driven back upon Worth, where
it joined the deMs of the 2nd battalion.

The two battalions of the 60th liad from their position on the
left wing first advanced across the 6auer as far as the Hagenau
high-road. The 2nd battalion then deployed hito Unc of com-
pany columns to attack tlie Elsnsshausen heights. As the
attack was taken in flank by the fire of the enemy's skirmishers
in the Nicderwald, three companies of the fusilier battalion
opened a brisk fire in the diretition of the forest from their
position in the ditch bordering the road; whilst the 12th com-
pany, fm-thcr to the loft, penetrated into the Avood and con-
nected itself Anth the ti-oops of the Xlth Army Corps, which
liad advanced through Spachbach. The 1st battalion, after
ascending tlio heights, had even reached the vineyard in front
of Elsasshausen, but was fnrced back as far ns the road by the
enemy's forward movement, already alluded to. They were
accompanied in their retreat by the three fusilier companies,
one of which, the 10th, had remained with the 1st battalion,
whilst the other two had approached to within 200 paces of
the Niederwald. They cstaolished themselves by companies

159

in the ditches alongside the road, the Ist battalion on the right
the fneiliera on the left, and from this pomtion cheeked the
enemy's pursuit with an eflTectivc firo.

The artillery on the hciglits oast of the Sauer also took part
in this action, as it« fire was not masked by the forward and
rearward movements of the infantry, whilst the enemy's bat-
teries had become almost entirely mute.

After the fii'st unsuccessful attack on the Elsasshauson heights,
the battalions of the 20th Brigade, which had been employed,
found themselves — some in a Rhattored state — in the following
positions at half-past 11 o'clock.

At Worth the 4th, 5th, (Jth, 7tli, and 8th companies of the
Fusiliers and part of the 11th company 50th Regiment. In the
meadow south of the town : the 9th and 12th companies of the
Fusiliers, wiiich were later on brought up to the Dieffenbach
copse as escort to the artillery. Fiu-thcr to the south on the
Hagenau hieh-road and to the north-west of Spachbach, were
the 10th and 11th companies of the Fusiliers and the Ist batta-
lion 50th Elegiment ; still further to the south, opposite the Nieder-
wald, was the fusilier battalion of the latter regiment.

The troops maintained these positions with gi-eat difficulty
against the murderous firo and the repeated and violent on-
slaughts of the enemy. The latter had meanwliile got a firm
hold on the slopes, from any point of which, owing to their being
thickly interspersed with liedf;:es, Ktoiio walls, uuildings, and
plantations, he could suddenly fall upon tlio Prussian infantry
whenever they tried to advance, and overwhelm them with a
withering shower of projectiles. At no point were we successful
in making any progress beyond AVorth ; in all our attempts the
rearward movements were attended with especially heavy loss.
For instance, Major v. Sydow collected all the available men of
the Fusiliers at AVorth for a foi-ward movement ; he succeeded
hi ascending the slopes and in advancing some hundreds of paces
forward, but a counter-attack on the part of the French forced
him back again to Worth. The town was held with some difll-
culty against the onward pressure of the enemy, in which the
19th Brigade now took part. The fith Grenadiers, after an un-
successful attempt to gain ftTound beyond Worth, occupied the
western and Routhcrn skirt ol' the town with the 1st and fusilier
battalion in c<»mpany column.^, whilst tlic 2nd battalion protected
the left flank of the long line of guns. The renewed assaidts of
the French upon Worth recoiled before the mniiffled beaiing of
these fresh troops ; but at 12.30 o'clock, as the aspect of affaira
1)ecame more and more threatening, we were compelled to bring
up the 2nd battalion 4(Uli Kegimeut in support.

Meanwhile General v. Kircnba(;h had sent word to both of the
neighbouring Corps that he Avas about to attack the enemy's
position in his front, and tliat ho rahulatod upon tlie co-opera-
tion of both wings.

Wo have seen that this eomnninication rcaelied the Ilnd
Bavarian (-orps at 11.15 a.m., just as the tth Division was col-

160

lected at Langensulzbach. At noon General v. Kirchbach
received an answer from General v. Hartmann that he had
broken off the action by superior orders, but would resume the
attack with the least possible delay.

Of the Xlth Corps it was known that the advanced guard had
crossed the Sauer, out after some severe fighting had been again
driven back over the river.

We must now recoimt the proceedings of this Anny Corps.

OomlMiit of In confonnity with the Army Order of the preceding evening*

nlid ITtihf G®^®™^ V. Bose had prescribed the following movements for his
EShAnS* Corns on the 6th August :

Carptbetween The 21st Division was to bivouac with its main body south-^'
GiuMtaM and west of Holschloch,* its advanced guard was to occupy the
totoUft^.) ^^^^^^ lying ^ front of and to the west of it, and communicate
with the Vth Corps by way of Gimstett. The 22nd Division was
ordered to direct its march upon the neighbourhood of Surburg,
to occupy the latter place, to keep an especially watchful look-
out on the side of Hagenau, and to maintain communications
with Werder's Corps. The corps artillery was ordered to
Holschloch, the train to Sulz.

In consequence of these orders, both Divisions broke up from
their bivouacs near Sulz at 6 a.m. The 21st Division wasR)rmed
* as follows : advanced guard under Colonel Eoblinski consisted
of the 4l8t Brigade, 2 squadrons 14th Hussars, the Ist light and
2nd heavy batteries and part of the sanitary detachment ; the
rest of the Division formed the main body ; a battalion of the
82nd Regiment remained at Sulz to protect the amiy head-
quarters.

About 7 a.m., while on the inarch, the sound of guns was
audible in the direction of Worth, but as it again ceased the
men moved into the bivouacs previously indicated, and com-
menced to tarke up their quarters and place outposts.

On emerging from the wood, tlie head of tlie advanced guard
observed a French camp on the heights behind Gunstett; at the
same time the cannonade at Worth increased in intensity.

In consequence of this, Lieut.-General v. Schachtmeyer, com-
manding the Division, at once ordered tlie 3rd battalion 80th
Regiment to advance to the support of the troops of the Vth
AiTny Corps at Gunstett, whilst the rest of the infantry of the
advanced guard formed up at the western issue of the wood.
The 87th Segiment in first, the 80th in second line ; the first
battalions of each regiment were on the left wing. The entire
Divisional artillery fui-ther on the left took up a concealed poei-
t on south of the road.

At 8 o'clock a hostile battery appeared on the heights beyond
the Sauer ; at the same moment a battalion was seen descending
the slopes to attack Gunstett.

* HOlflclilocli is not shown on Plan 2 $ it lies to the north of the Gunstett -Surburg
rc*d at the eastern edge of the wood trayerted by it.

The advanced guard now received Orders to follow the bat-
talion which had already preceded them in this direction, with a
view to defending the eastern bank of the Saner; the 2nd batta-
lion 87th Regiment, which had connnenced placing its outposts,
was still engaged in assembling on the skirts of the wood.

The Divisional artillery first took up a position on the lioights
to the north-west of Gunstett. The 1st battalion 80th Regi-
ment was ordered as escort, a half battalion taking post on
each flank of the line of guns. The artillery became by degrees
engaged with five hostile batteries, three of which, including a
mitrailleuse battery, were on the heights opposite the liruch
Mill, the other two brought a flanking fire from the spur east-
ward of Elsasshausen. llowever, in conjunction with the left
flank battery of the Vth Army Corps, posted in front of the
Dieffenbach copse, they also succeeded in reducing the French
artillery to silence at this point, and tlius were enabled after-
wards to bring their fire to bear upon the enemy's infantry as it
came in sight. We shall presently see of how much importance
this had become.

The four battalions still available of the advanced guard had
formed two wings during the advance. On the right the fusilier
battalion and the first two companies of the 78th Regiment
marched in first line upon Oberdorf. At that place the troops
came under an effective shell fire which caused the fusiliers to
continue their march on Spachbach in companies at open inter-
vals. In second line behind them came the 2nd battalion 8()th
Regiment. On the left wing of the brigade the 3rd and 4th
companies of the 87th Regiment continued their march on
Gunstett, followed by the 2nd battalion which had meanwhile
re-formed.

The nth Rifle battalion marching at the head of the 42nd
Brigade advanced to Gunstett in order to strengthen that post.
This brigade followed closely on the 41st as far as the western
edge of the wood, and formed up outside it, with the hussars
on the left wing.

The six companies of the 87th Regiment which had advanced
to Spachbach crossed the Sauer at that place, some wading,
others scrambling over hastily felled trunks of trees. Under
a brisk fire from the enemy's guns they reached the opposite
bank. As the latter aff(mled no cover, and any furfher delay
could only be productive of loss, the officers with rajjid resolu-
tion rallied the men immediately next to them and <laKhed across
the meadows and the Hagenau high-road as far as the Nieder-
wald. At the first rush the French skirmishers along the whole
line were driven into the wood, whither they were followed bv
the 87th. Outside it there only remained the 9th company with
the colours and the greater part of the 1 2th company ; the latter
occupied a ditch running parallel to the road and between it
and the river. The 2nd battalion 80th Regiment, following in
second line, formed up at first in company columns on the
eastern bank of the Sauer at Spachbach, but on perceiving the

162

decisive iiTuption of our troops into tho wood on the other side,
h'kewise advanced over the nver. Although our troops giuned
ground in the Niederwald, connecting themselves on the right
with the 12th company 5()th Regiment of the Vth Army Corps,
they eventually encountered very superior hostile detachments oy
which their further advance was prevented. During tliis stub-
bom tight in the wood the companies had become separated
and for the most part had lost their leaders, so that afl unity
of action was impossible. Under these circumstances no pro-
tracted resistance could be offered, as about the same time that
the French advanced against the troops of the Vth Anny Corps,
some strong detachments on the soutnern side of the Nieder-
wald pushed forward on the flank and rear of the 87th. The
latter was repulsed down the slope and over the main road
with considerable loss, the four companies of the 80th Regiment
bein^ also involved in the rearward movement. Their com-
mander having previously fallen with his horse, Captain v.
Borcke had assumed the command ; when the latter at this
juncture received a mortal wound, all further unity of action
likewise ceased in this quarter. Borne away by the skirmishera
in their retreat from the wood, everyone maae a loish to the
Sauer, and the troops reached Spuchbach before they could be
re-formed into anytning like order. Only a few detachments,
chiefly the divisions of the 12th company posted as previously
mentioned in a ditch, held their position on the western bank ;
the enemy only followed as far as the border of the wood.

An attempt made about the same time to cross at the Bruch
Mill was equally unfavourable in its result as the abortive ad-
vance at Spachbach. On the approach of the left wing of the ad-
vanced guard, the 3rd battalion 80th Regiment, which was sent
forward to Gunstett, had posted the 10th and 11th companies
at the western issue from the village, whilst the six companies
of the 87th Regiment advanced from their position to the north-
west of Gunstett towards the Bmch Mill, us soon as the 42nd
Brigade came up. The rifles established themselves in the vine-
yards between tlie village and mill.

After half an hour's sharp skirmishing the rifles and the 6th com-
pany 50th Regiment crossed the Sauer at the Bi-uch Mill, but, on
reaching the embankment on the high road, were impetuously
attacked on the left flank by a superior hostile detiichment and
driven back to the river, where they received support from the
2nd battalion 87th Regiment. The attempt on tne part of the
enemy to foree the passage of the bridge was repulsed by the
effective fire of this battalion, and of two companies of the
50th Regiment in the vineyard. A weaker French detachment
meanwhile gained a Ann footing in a hop garden not far from
the bridge, and from thence directed an annoying musketry
fire upon the eastern bank of the Sauer.

General Ml ua- I^^ ^^^^ manner thus detailed were the three Coips of the
tion at noon. lUrd Anny in fir^t line committed in greater or less force to an

103

engagement, during the course of which advantages, which
had been derived, had either to be again pclded o^ving to
heavy losses, or were maintained only with dilHcuUy against
the vigorous onslaughts of the French.

General v. Kirchbach felt compelled to take the responsibility
upon himself of a very momentous decision. He knew that the
Commander-in-Chief did not contemplate a genend action on
that day, but merely a change of front. The cannonade in the
direction of Worth, which had been heard at the head-i^uartei-s
at Sulz in the early morning, caused the Crown Prnice to
despatch Major v. Halmke of tlie General Stafl* to that point.
This officer at 9 o'clock reported the advance of the Bavarians,
the entrance of the advanced guard of the Vth Army Corps into
the action, the consequent alarm of the whole Corps, and the
ordering forward of its artillery, and that brisk firing was
audible in the direction of Gunstett. As tlie Crown Prince did
not wish to give battle until his forces were concentrated, he
had thereupon sent word to General v. Kirchbach '* not to con-
" tmue the struggle, and to avoid everything which might
♦* mduce a fresh one." This was the order which also reached
the Ilnd Bavarian Corps by mistake, and, as we know, caused
them to break oflf the action. Part of this Corps was already
retiring on Lembach, wliile the remainder was still collecting at
Langensulzbach. Ueadily as General v. liartmann had promised
his assistance, he was not at this juncture in a position to render
effective aid.

Circumstances were not more promising on the left flank
where the advanced guard of the Xlth Corps was thrown
back in disorder to the Sauer, and part of it even over the
river.

In fi-ont of the Vth Army Corps, we had, it is true, eventually
succeeded for the time in reducing temporarily to silence the
enemy's artillery, and in establishing ourselves on the fm-ther
bank of the Sauer ; but the difficulty of a direct attack upon the
strong and well-defended position occupied by the enemy on the
further heights luid only become too manifest during the pre-
vious course of the action. A renewed forward movement of
the Vth Army Corps could not fail to lead to a dcciKive battle,
in which there was no positive certainty of a well-timed co-
operation of the Corps advancing in second Hne.

On the other hand, the fact was patent that it was impossible
to break off the action under its present conditions without
entailing great loss on the advanced guard, and that any with-
drawal of detachments from the right to the loft bank of the
Sauer, in conjunction with the rearward movements of the
Corps on either flank, would give the adversary undisputed
right to claim a material victory, wliich, were it ever so unim-
portant, could not be disregarded in its moral bearing. It may
also be added that the rumbling of railway trains which had
been audible m the night, and had continued diu'ing the morn-
ing, led to the inference that the enemy was receiving constant

n 2

164

reinforcements, so that a deferred attack would only have met
with increased difficulties.

Lastly, by an immediate attack in front, Oeneml v. Kirch bacth
might reaHonably hope for decisive results even if the co-opei*ation
from Langensulzbach and Gunstett should not be brought about
imtil later. After mature consideration of all these circumstances,
the Gcuerid ordered his C(»rp8 to renew the advance ; he re-
ported to this effect to the Commander-in-Chief, and requested
the neighbouring Corps to len<l their co-operation.

At this time General v. liose, who reached Gunstett in person
at 11 a.m., had also ordered the advance of the 22nd Division.

After the retirement of the rifle battalion a sharp standing
musketry action had broken out opposite the Bruch Mill, in
which the French skirmishers in particular suffered heavy loss.

At half-past 11 o'clock the latter renewed their attempt (m the
bridge, but were repulsed by the well-aimed fire of the Prussians.
When General v. Kirchbach's fresh request for a joint continu-
ance o{ the stniggle reached him. General v. Bose replied that lie
would not fail to support the Vth Corps; he ordered up his
corps artillery, and sent word to the 22nd Division to attack the
right flank of the enemy's position.

On the other hand the promised advance of the Bavarians
coidd not be put in practice at present. The airival of the
reinforcements coming up from Lembach could not bo expected
for some little time. The infantry which had fallen into some
confusion during the action at Langensulzbach had been partly
assembled in rear of the village ; part of it was still in action
on the south of the village covering the retreat. The greater
part of the troops needed a respitti from the action owing to
exhaustion and the huge expenditure of anununition, so that
only those who had taken a minor part in the struggle of the
forenoon were sent forward at iii'st to the attack.

TheHrd battalion 11th Regiment, in conjunction with the .5th
Prussian Rifle battalion, crossed the Sulzbiichel at the Saw Hill,
and pressed forward to the wooded eastern slope of the Frosch-
willer heights. !Somc divisions moved away towards the right
and linked thcniKclveH with the .'h-d battalion 5th Regiment. The
latter had advancred from the Koulhern issne of Lungelsulzbach
to the projecting wooded ridge which faced them to the south,
where the companies joined the skinnishers of other regiments
which had been left in* rear. A further advance upon Friisch-
willer failed, owing to the obstinate way in which the enemy
defended the j)Ositi(»n in front.

During the morning the adversary had shown but weak forces
at Neeh wilier. A sudden irnq)tion in thjit direction, even with
a small number of troops, held out a fair promise of success, and
the lOtii Rifle batUilion, Speck's batteiy, and a squadron of the
2nd (jhevauxlegers were api)ointed to this service. But as one
rifle company was still in the wood near the Old Mill, and
an«>tlier was left behiml at Langelsulzbaeh in give snpj)urt
wherevir it might be reqniietl, only two conq)anieH rL^manied

165

for the enterprise. They advanced, followed by the battery and
the squadron, through the wood in the direction of Nechwiller,
but on reaching tlie western edge, found their debouch pre-
vented by superior hostile forces, and after half an hour s skir-
mish were obliged to retreat. The French tirailleurs did not
allow them to retire unmolested, but followed into the wood,
until they had fallen back upon the 3rd battalion 5th Regiment,
close to Langensulzbach.

The remaider of the 4th Bavarian Division was not as yet
completely assembled, and consequently took no pai-t in the
renewed stniggles at this point. J'he other two battalions (»f
the 5th Regiment were at the Old Will; llerokVs and zu Rliein's
batteries, to the north-east of LangensulzUich ; in rear, the
remainder of tlie Division on the Wattsfcill-Langensulzbach road.
In this position they awaited the arrival of the 3rd Division.

As the thunder of the guns at Worth had, contraiy to expec-
tation, become more pronounced, the Crown I*rince, accompanied
by his staff', betook himself in that direction at noon. On the
road he received General v. Kinihbach's report, that he (Geneml
V. K.) could no longer stop the action, and that he had called
for the support of the Corps on either side of him.

At 1 p,fn, the Crown Prince reached the heights in front of
Wof^thj and personally assumed, the conduct of the battle.

Before proceeding with our description, it is necessary to
glance at the movements of those parts of the army now ad-
vancing to the battle field, so as to learn their respective
situations at this juncture.

The 1st Bavarian Corps was to come into line between the
Ilnd Bavarians and the Vth Pnissian Corps. Its advanced
guard — 2nd Infantry Brigade, 3rd Chevauxlegei*8 and a 4*pr.
battery — under the command of Major-General v. Oiif, had
marched at (> a.m. from Ingolsheim vi& Memelshofen upon Lam-
pertsloch, at which place, although very much hnpeded on the
march by the heavy state of the roads, it arrived at half-past
10 o'clock. The two squadrons of the vanguard had previously
moved out in extended order towards both flanks of the posi-
tion to be taken up by the cmtposts between Mattst^iU and
Giirsdorf. The remainder of the 1st Division* followed the
advanced guard at an interval of half an hour, and subsequently
the 2nd Division along the same road.

The cannonade which had been audible suice 8 o'clock, and
was now increasing hi intensity, caused at half-past 11 o'clock
the commander of the 1st Division, Lieut.-General v. Stephan,
who was with the advanced guard, to order their further advance
to be directed upon the village of Fixischwiller, now visible in
the distance. Written ordera were sent to Major-General Dietl,
commanding the main body, for the 1st Brigade to follow and
the 6-pr. batteries to be sent to tlie front at an increased pace.

Meanwhile the brigade of the advanced guard crossed the

* The order of march of the 1st DiTision is given in Appendix XI.

1G(>

Soltzbacliel, the iiifautiy between Prenschdorf and Mitschdorf,
the other anns at the latter plaee. At 1 p.m. the former had
formed np to the Honth of OorKclmf, tlie tAvo ontpont Iwittalions
in first, tlie otlierfl in Recond and third Hne ; the regiment of
cavahy remained in rear of (lor^dorf. Tlie advanced-ji^iard
battery had taken up a position on the heights to the south of
the villafj^e; it was joined later by the two 6-pr. batteries of
the Division, ly which the line of guns of the Vth Army Coi-ps
"waR extended still more to the right.

Thetse and the three Bavarian batteries, subsequently joined
by Gruithuison's 4-pr. batteiy, direeted a combined fire against
the French artillery on the nglit bank of the Saner.

The 1st Infantiy Ih-igade had reached Preuschdorf, and thenco
moved across country in the direction of Gcii-sdorf. The rest of
the Corps was on the march somewhere alxiut Lobsann. Alxmt
this period, General v. d. 'J'ann, commandhig the Corps, came
on the field of battle. He first made his way to General v.
Kirchbach for the jmrpose of obtaining infonnation as to the
state of the engagement, and to concert as to the measures to
be adopted.

The 5th Infantiy Brigade and the Lancer Brigade of the TInd
Bavarian Corns, advancing from Lembach, were still half an
hour's march trom Mattstall.

Tlie two Divisions of Werdcr's Corps had moved from the
neighbourhood of Asclibach to their new bivouacs at Reimers-
willcr and Ilohwiller.

The Wiirttembcrgershad connncnced their march* at i\ (/clock.
At 9 o'clock their advanced guard had reached the neigh.bour-
h(M»d of Schwabwillcr and Betsclidoif, which hadl)een indicated
as the position of the outposts for watching tlie Hagenau forest;
the main body of the [)ivi8ion arrived at Reimei-SAviller at 10
o'clock. After thi^ firing at Worth had been heard in the early
morning. General v. Werder was informed by General v. Bosc
at 11 o'clock, that he had ordered the advance of the Xlth
Army Coi-ps upon Gunstett in the direction where the roar
of the cannonade was heard. In consenuence of this the follow-
ing ordci's were issu(Ml for the Wilrttemuerg Division : —

Th(5 1st Ih'ig.ide (T) ba1tali«>nH, 2 H(|nadronH, 1 battery) re-
mained in their outpost position, with u view to defending it
efficiently against any attacks from the Hagenau forest. The
Cavalry Brigade, still 5 squadrons strong, was to advance to Sur-
burg under J hi jor- General Count v. Scheler. Being placed under
the ta-ders of tlie general connnanding the Xlth Army Corps, it
first took u]) a position at the issue from the Westerholz, and
later on at (lunstett. Of the 2i!d Biigade, the 3rd Rifle battali<m
with the 6th and Oth batleries had already been moving in the
direction of Gunstett since 10 o'clock. The other battnliona
followed after 11 o'clock, but were detauied in Surburg by the
trains of the Xlth Coi-ps, so that it was nearly 2 p.m. before the

* Tlio urilcr uf iiunrh ib givfii in Ajiin'iuHx XL

167

brigade was assembled ready for action between the AVester-
holtz and the Saner.

Meanwhile the 3rd Brigade, wliich was still at Reimerswiller,
was ordered forward to DiefTenbach by special direction of tho
Commander-in-Chief, wliich movement was joined in by the
reserve artilleiy. The head of this cohmm, consisting of
5 battalions, 2 squadrons, and fi batterieH, rcac^hed llolschkxli at
lialf-past 1 o'clock.

The Baden Division, which did not leave its qnarters until
7.30 a.m., had reached Holiwiller, where it was to hold itself in
readiness for a furtlier advance.

The 4th Cavalry Division had remained in its bivouac at Scho-
nenburg, as prescribed in the Army Order of the 5th August.

The Battle under the Conduct of the Crown Prince

(From 1 p.m.).

^Vhen the Crown Prince assmned the command on the battle- Prefatory
field at 1 p.m., he found two of his Corps involved in a brisk *^"^®"-
action. Only a part of the infantry of either liad crossed the
Saner, the remainder stood fast on the near bank of the river
in reserve. These purely direct and isolated attacks against
the position, in itself strong everywhere and held by a far superior
force, had as j'ct led merely to a detention of the enemy, a result
nevertheless of no slight iinj^ortance.

The advance of the 4th Bavarian Division against tho flank
had been broken off, but a resiunption of the movement was
ordered. Another Bavarian Division was suflicientlv far ad-
vanced to be able to come shortly into line, and thus complete
the immediate link with the Prussian right \vii\g.

On the left wing, the Xlth Army (/orps was now collected,
and in rear of it, a considerable part of the Wiirttemburg Division
might be shortly expected.

The appearance of the 3rd Bavarian Division was anticipated
at an early moment ; the other parts of the llird Army could
not become effective until a later hour.

In rear of this front, extending over a space of 2^ miles, from
Gorsdorf to Gunstett, there were, it is true, no real reserves avail-
able, yet with the co-operation of a powerful artillery of some
200 gims, the strength of the Vth Army Corps was adequate to
debar the enemy from breaking through, whilst in the course
of the afternoon a force of fnmi '50 to 40 thousiind men wouKl
be operating against ea(;h of his wings.

Supposing that Marshal MacMahon had unite<l one Divimon
of the 7th, and possibly Lesi)ai*t'8 Division of the r)th Cinps
wth tho four Divisicms of the 1st Corps, as the most recent
reports led us to suppose, tlu; strength of the Freiieli army
could not exceed (50.000 men.

Independently of the fact that the struggle could not now be
broken off for reasons previcmsly set forth, we could scarcely
indulge the hope of fighting later <»n under such advantageous

168

circumstances as the present. It might rather be expected that
the Marshal wouhl perceive the danger which threatened his
position, and would evacuate it as hodu as there was a cessation
m the attacks, whicli were vigorously and unremittingly directed
upon him, more especially by the Vth Army Coips. The Crown
Prince, after weighing all these circumstances, decided upon
pressing the battle to a conclusion.

The first point was to infuse harmony into the attacks of the
foremost fighting line, and to direct reinforcements as they came
up to the points where, as far as could be foreseen, they would
be most effective. With this object the Crown Prince issued
the following orders at 1 o'clock : —

" The Ilnd Bavarian Corps will press upon tlie left flnnk
of the enemy in such a manner as to gain a position in rear of
it towards Keichshoffen. The Ist Bavarian Corps will enter
into line as rapidly as possible between the Ilnd Bavarian and
the Vth Army Cori)s, holding a Division in reserve. The
Xlth Cor|)8 will advance with energy via Elwisshausen and
past the Niinlerwald upon Froschwiller. Of Werder's Coi'ps
the Wiirttemburg Divisicm '\>'ill follow the Xlth Corps on
GunHtett and over the Sauer; the Baden Division will move
for the i)resent as far as ISurbnrg."

These orders wen- communicated to the Vth Anny Corps ; it
was, however, instructed to <lilay its attack upon the heights in
froiit, as the co-operation (»!' llu; Ist Bavarian and Xlth Army
Corps could not be exjK.itcd for one or two lionrs, that of
Werder's Corps not for three hours.

Storming of the Hkigiits betwekn Worth and Froschwiller

BY THE Vtii Army Corps (1.30 p.m.).

Before the ri'C(5i]>t of this last comnnmication, (ieneral v.
Kirchbach had, for tlu; better secnrity of Worth, pushed forward
botli the 1st and thu iusilier battalions of tlie 4()th to the Sauer,
where thi-y were held in reserve on tlie east bank. The infantry
oftlu? lOlli DiviHimi, wilh the (sxrcption of the detachmentH at
(jiunstett, (jlorsdoil* and those with the artillery, was now wholly
employed in the foremost fighting line at Worth. The Oth Divi-
sion had been already (U'dered up so as to be within reach for any
eventuality. S|)achbaeh was assigned as the lino of direction for
the 18th, AVorth for the I7th Bri-ade. Theadvance of the latter
to the north of Diell'enbach had been covered by sending on to-
Avards tlie Sauer the 5th Rifle battalion, the 4th company of which
now joined the brigade in its advance. The other three com-
])anie8 turned towards (Jorsdorf, crossed the Sauer at that place,
and then moved forward, the 1st company on the left against an
eminence, occupied by Turcos, the 3rd on the right agahist the
heifihts south of Langi'nsnl/.bn<h. Both rifle companies, indis-
crinihialely mixed with the single company of the 37th and the

169

Bavarian detachments, continued the Bkirmish in this direction,
whilst the 2nd company remained in reserve at tlie Old Mill.

The advance of the 17th Brigade* through Worth met with
frequent obstmctions. The bridges had been repeatedly
damaged, the roads were encumbered with troops, woimded
men, and frightened townspeople ; the bursting of Rhc41s in-
creased the confusion. For these reasons we only succeeded at
fijrst in uniting the Ist and fusilier battalions of the 58th on the
right bank of the Sauer, at the north-western issue from the
town. The 2nd battalions of the 58th and 51)th llegiments
remained temporarily on the eastern bank of the river, where,
with the 2nd battalion (Uh Uegiment of the 19th Brigade, tlu^y
formed the available infantry reserve of the Army Coips. The
4th Dragoons formed up at the eastern issue from Worth.

The 47th Regiment, leadhig the advance of the 18th Brigade,
had waded through the Sauer, to the northward of Spachbach
by companies, in order to support the two battalions of the 5()th
Regiment, which were holding their ground with difliculty in
the cutting on the high-road on the western bank. When the
47th now prepared to advance from the meadow land on the
further bank towards the Elsasshausen heights and the Nieder-
wald, they were checked by a forward movement of sujierior
hostile forces. As it therefore seemed desirable to have a fence
on the eastern bank of the Sauer to full back upon in case of
emergency, the greater part of the fusilier Iwittalion, whi(;h had
not yet been in aeti<m, was again withdrawn to that point.
Withthesame object m view the Ut hand 11th companies 7th King's
Grenadiers, which were then advancing, occupied a shelter trench
on the heights north of Spachbach, whilst the other parts of the
regiment moved through the village to the western bank of the
Sauer. Here meanwhile the repeated offensive movements of
the French toAvards the Uagcnau road were nulliiied by the
resolute bearing of the fo\n- battalions of the 47th and ftOth
Regiments, although it called forth every effort to keep the
enemy's superior force at bay.

In this hot stniggle both regiments lost, their commanders;
Colonel V. BurghoiV wan killed and Ooloncl Mit^hchnann was
badly wounded.

The vigorous and opportune advance of the King h ( Jrenadiers,
joined also from Gunstett by the 2nd battalion 5bth Regiment,
enabled us however to hold the ground which had been gained
on i\\c left wing. The Kings Grenadiers under Cohmel v.
Kothen advanced in eight company columns; those of the U
battalion in the centre, the 7th and 8th on the right, and the lOti.
and 12th on the left wing reHj)ectively. The two fusilier com-
panies, left behind in the shelter-trenches on the left bank of the
Sauer, also rejoined the regiment by way of Spachbach, the 5th
and 6th companies remaining for a time in reserve at that village.

* Two battalions of tliis brignd<\ ns wc have seen, were dt^ptit cited lo (JurMlorf.
See p. 157.

170

The two companies of tlie left wing turned towards the Nieder-
wald, those of the Ist battalion advanced in the direction of
Elsasshaufien. The two companies on the right wing with
detachments of the 47th Regiment captured Galgen Hill* and
obstinately held it in spite of the enemy's repeated attacks. The
1st H. A. battery of the XTth Corps came into action on the hill
shortly after and opened fire on Elscisshausen.

As a special reserve to the Vth Army Corns could be dispensed
with after the 1st Bavarian Division haa advanced into tlie
fighting line, General v. Eirclibach determined to lead forward
the whole of the troops on the western bank of the Sauer to the
attack of the heights, A favoumble moment was chosen about
2 p.m., wlien a fresh fonvard movement of the Frencli upon
Worth had been repulsed with great slaughter. B(»th battalions
of the 5bth from the north-west issue of the town dashed for-
ward in order to get a firm footing in the hop plantations near
the Sauer. After a short skirmish they charged across the
meadows in company columns, the fusilier battalion along the
Froschwiller hign-road, the 1st battalion fui-ther to the right
against the steep eminence to the north-west of Worth, the
edge of which was gained and occupied by dense bodies of
skiimishei'S. All further advance failed in the face of the
vigorous fire of the well-covered lines of French sharp-
shooters, to oppose which the Prussian companies were likewise
broken into skirmishhig order. The 1st battalion 58th Regiment
now formed the extreme right flank of the fighting fine at
Worth. To its left, on and alongside the Froschwiller high-
road, advanced the 5 battalions of the 19th Brigade, the line
being prolonged further to the left by the 3rd and 4th companies
of the 37th Regiment. The meadows were crossed in company
columns under the hottest fire from the enemy. The skirmishers
succeeded in gaining a firm position on the slopes; but all
attacks uptm the heights were fruitless until a favourable diver-
sion occun-ed on the right flank of the brijjade. Here Colonel
v. d. Esch, chief of the general staff, was bnnging up the fusilier
battalion 4()th Regiment from the northern entrance to the town,
with a view to turning the tAvo nearest vine-clad spurs. The
12th company fomiod the skinniBhing line in front, the remainder
followed m column ; only a small detachment fi'(mi the 9th com-
pany remained in rear to guard the colour and five other colours
oelonging to battalions fighting in front. After the fusiliei-s had
followed the road leading over a narrow embankment between
a wet ditch and a hop plantation, they drove in the enemy's
skiiTnishers lining the slopes, and with a charge reached tne
heights almost simultaneously wnth them. The assailants were
here received with a murderous fire at close quarters from two
half-moon shaped breastworks. After responding to this for

• Gnlgen Hill is tlic nnme given to the spur of the hciglits Imlf-way between the
nortlicm edge of the Nicderw&ld and (ho souOiern border of Uie town of WCilh
(Altitude G»7).

171

dome time with file-firinp:, Major Canipc, ccnnmnncling the bat-
talion, placed hiniBelf with the surviving oflicers at the head of
his men, and stormed the breastwork. Bayonet to bnyonet
they pressed after the adversary, wlio fled in a north-westerly
du'ection, imtil they were compelled in tinii to withdraw by the
enemy's fire from the edge of the opposite wood. As the open
crest of the heights was almost everywhere within the most
effective range of musketiy, and the valley between the two
spurs was swept by mitrailleuses, no further progress could be
attempted at present. A standing musketrj'^ action took place,
during which tiie edge of the heights aiid tlu^ captured ciitrcnch-
ment were maintained.

On the left wing of the brigade, Captain v. Wolff, with the 9th
and 12th companies of the 6th Regiment, had repulsed the
enemv's renewed attacks upon the south-western issue from
Worth. He then rallied all the detachments engaged there,
and, although wounded, led them colour in hand against the
advancing French troops ; ho reached the heights which pro-
ject towards the south-east, where he fell, wounded for the
second time. The two right-flank companies of the 1st batta-
lion 46th Regiment also took part in tliis resolute attack ; the
2nd battalion, with the two companies of the fusilier regiment,
moved further to the left upon Elsasshausen.

While these successes were gained on the wings, the centre,
composed of the 1st battalion 6th Regiment and the 2nd of
the 46th Regiment, succeeded in breaking the resistance of the
enemy on the high-road, so that the whole of the upper edge
of the vineyard projecting towards Worth was sun*ounded by
the Prussian line of skirmishers.

In order, however, to maintain the ground, which hnd been
purchased at such great sacrifices against the unceasing and
energetic attacks of the French, the general commanding found
himself compelled to bring up his last reserves fi-om the eastern
bank of the Saner. It was above all things necessary to reopen
the artillery fire, which had been for the most part masked by
the advance of the infantiy on the west bank. The batteries of
the 10th Division and half the corps artillery crossed the Worth
bridge, which had been restored by the poutocm company, and
endeavoured as well as they could to make their way through
the blockaded streets. The artillery of the 9th Division, the
8rd light, and the two H.A. batteries of the corps artillery,
escorted by a company of the 6th Regiment, advanced as far
as the Worth-Gorsdorf road ; the line of guns was subsequently
reinforced by batteries of the 1st Bavarian Corps.

The whole of the infantry on the eastern bank of the Saner
was drawn into the foremost fighting line. The three fusilier
companies of the 47th Regiment,* which, during the fii"st ad-
vance of this regiment, liad retired to a jiosition of support,
advanced through Worth past the artillery, and followed the

* Tlie 9i1i roin(iaiiT was Hghting near tlie 60th Brginieiit.

172

troops engaged to the south of tlie Froachwiller road. The
2nd l>attaiious of the Hth* and 58tli Regiments crossed tlie Sauer
south of the town by a foot bridge, the former regiment then
moving towards Froschwiller, the latter upon Kl6a.s8hau6en.
The 2nd battahon r)9th llegiment, whieh had made use of the
same bridge, was kept temj)orai'ily in rear for the protection of
the artillery passing through Worth. The pontoon company was
sent forward to the vineyards in support of the infantry on
receiving a report of the state of aHan*s at that place, leaving
only a small detachment at the bridge.

Thus all the forces of tlui Vth Army Corps were employed in
gaining a firm footing on the woKtern bank of the Sauer, and in
occupying the adversary in front until the neighbouring corps
were m a position to operate effectively against his tianks.

The whole of the struggle had up to this time consisted of a
series of oftensive movements on both sides. The nature of the
ground and the powerful effect of the lire caused the assailant
terrible losses on each occasi(m, and enabled the defender gene-
rally to hold his i)osition. It was only by degrees and by dint
of hard fighting that the Prussian troops made any progress.
Their battalions be(;ame mixed up, the greater part of the
officers were killed or wounded ;t the enemy, on the other hand,
brought up fresh reserves unceasingly. To persist under such
circumstan(!es demanded the unshaken confidence of the general
connnanding, the (uiergy of all the leaders, and the entire
devotion of the troops. "I'he snceessful atUick of the Xlth
Army Corps upon the enemy's right wing was the first sign of
tlie long looked- for support.

Advance of
the 22nd
DiTision.

Attack of the XItu Army dmvH upon the Fuench

Right Flank.

We left the Xlth Army Corps at the point where the 41st
Brigade was pressed back to the eastern bank of the Sauer,
and the 22n(l Division had received orders to advance against
the enemy's right flank.

When tlie cin-ps artillery took the Surburg-Gunstett road
through the fon^st, the Division moved round the south side of
it. The 48rd Brigade led the advance, then came the artillery
of the Division, and last of all, the 44th Brigade. The former
brigade Avas deficient of two fusilier battalions. But of these,
as already observed, the fusilier battalion 82nd Regiment, told
oft' to occupy Surburg, left a company in that village, and fol-
loAved as part of the 44th Brigade. The fusilier battalion OSth
Regiment and the 13th Hussars had been ordered on the morn-

* Willi the exception of the company with the guns on the right bank of the
Saner.

t Besides those mentioned and others, Colonel r. Stosch commanding the 4Gth,
llajors T. Hcugcl, 6th Regt., nnd Cunipe, 4Gth Regt., Colonel t. Bothiner, commando
lug the 17th Brigade, and Captain Scheibert, commanding the pontoon company.

173

ing of the 6th to make a reconnaissance m the Ilagcnaii forest.
These troops also joined tlio 44th Brigade hiter on in the
neighbourhood of Gunstett; only a squadron of hussars re-
maming on the Hagenau rodd.

Of the battalions of the 43rd Brigade which first came up,
Lieut.-General v. Gersdoi-ff. commanding the Division, sent
forward those of the 32nd Regiment to the south angle of
Gunstett, and those of the V)5th fui*ther to the right along a
forest path. Most of the Divisional artillery followetl the former.
The unlimbering of the 3rd heavy battery south of Gunstett
compelled a French mitrailleuse battery to withdraw at once.
All four batteries then moved up to and next the line of gims
of the 21st Division at Gunstett, whilst the infantry formed
up to the south and north of the village. The 44th Brigade
was also ordered to take the direction of Gunstett. The line of
guns was further reinforced by the arrival of the corps artillery,
the two heavy batteries of which could not, however, find room
to come into action, so that altogether there were 12 batteries
of the Corps in action.

Meanwhile, of the 2nd Brigade, the two firet battalions of the
88th Regiment had taken up a position at Spachbach and in the
ravine to the south ; the other three battalions of this Brigade*
were to the north of Gunstett, with the 14th lIuHsars in their
rear.

Lieut.-Geneml v. Oersdorff now gave orders for the 32nd
Regiment to advance by DUrrenlxich upon Morsbronn, and for
the 95th Regiment to move up to the fighting line of the 21st
Division. As the nature of the preceding struggles had neces-
sitated the deployment in skirmishing order of the various bat-
talions and companies of the 41st Brigade along the whole line
from Gunstett to Spachbach, the large units had ceased to exist
as such before the commencement of the attack, and detachments
of different regiments were indiscriminately mixed togcither.

Commencing with the right wing the course of the struggle
was as follows : —

The two battalions of the H8th Regiment crossed the Saner AcUance upon
iat Spachlmch in company columns at open intervals, and, in ^1»^» Nieder-
conjunction with portions of the 80th and 87th Regiments Co^ureof
assembled at that village, advanced towards the eastern edge Albi-echu-
of the Niederwald, which was lined by the enemy. During hauser Hof
their advance across the open meadows they were met by a f"^ Mors-
brisk fire of musketry, and also Avith some slnrapnel from the 12 to l o'clock.
Elsasshausen heights, this latter doing little execution. The
skirt of the forest was carried, and as the course of the action
necessitated a gradual wheeling to the right, the northern edge
of the wood was reached, albeit in rather loose order. The Ist
company 88th Regiment had been left at first in rear with the
battalion colour, but now likewise received orders to move

* The lit bftttalion 82iid Regiment wm, it will be remetnbored, with the head-
qimrten at Sulz.

174

forward. The retreating (letachments of the enemy made a
Btand in a wood between the Niederwald and Elsasshauseny
from which the forces at hand were insufficient to expel them.

In the centre of the line of attack of the coi-pe, six musketeer
companies of the 95th Re^ment* advanced trom Gunstett by
the liruch Hill towards Eberbach. On the left they were joined
by the Gth and 8th companies 87th Regiment. The 5th company
of this regiment remained at the briclge, the 3rd, 4th, ancl 7th
took up a position on the Ilagenau- Worth road ; the 3rd and 4th
companies of the 8()th Regiment in rear, and the 10th and 11th
companies further to the left. The rifles, followed by the 2nd
company 95th Regiment, moved on the right of the Eberbach
roacl agiiinst the Albrechtshaiiser Hof.f

The dense body of sldrmishei-B, preceding the entire lino,
gained the Ilagenau high-road at the first rush. The enemy
made an obstinate resistance on the heights in rear, in which he
was favoured by an open range for his projectiles down the
eiisteru slope, and by the massive buildings of the Albrechts-
haiiser Ilof. Consequently the att^ick made but slow progress
at first, and in doing so the left wing succeeded in gradually
rciiching the cover afTijrded by the hop plantations on the
Morsbronn-Froschwiller road, and from tnence outflanking the
Albrechtshaiiser Hof.

The enemy did not evacuate the place until the buildings had
been set on fire by the artillery, and imtil a musketry fire at
close range was brought to bear upon the occupants by our
troops on the cai)tured heights. The detachments, which had
fallen into some confiision during the attack, were first re-formed,
BO as to be in a position to meet the adversary's counter-attacks,
which might now bo expected from the NiedorAvald.

General v. lJt)se had remained on the field in spite of a bullet
wound in the right hip, which he had received on the Qimstett
heights. On the other hand, Cohmel v. KobHnski commanding
the 41 st Brigade was so badly injured by the fall of his wouudea
horse that he was obliged to quit the battle-field.

On the extreme leftjlank of the army corps the two musketeei't
battalions of the 82nd Regiment had in pursuance of orders com-
menced their march to Morsbronn rt4 DUrrenbach. The 44th
Brigade, bending away to the left fi'om its line of march, had
followed in this direction, and their leading detachments had
just come under fire, when they received General v. GersdorfTs
order to remain in nisorvo at (Junstett, In order not to with-
draw lh<5 troops outof Jicfion, General v, Schkt»i>^), commanding
the brigade, only ordered the 83rd Regiment, wiuch was further

* Tho 71 h aiul 8th compmuei rouiiuuod with tbo guns.

t After the truopi of tlio Xlih Army Corps had pasied tho Sauer, the 2ml batta-
lion 60th Kcgimoiit alto endeavoured to ioln hit own oorpt (the V th) on the WOrth-
Hagenau road, and, at already mentioned, made an opportune appearance with tb«
King't Qrenadiert on the left wing.

X £aoh ordinary regiment of infantry hot onQ fotilier and two mutktteev
battaliont.— -Tr.

liO

to the rear, to retire to Gunstoit, where it was joiiiocl by the
fusilier battalion DSth Rcg-iini^iit. Tlie offi'usive movement njwn
Morsbronn was meanwhile carried out in tlie following manner: —
In firet line came tlie nnisketeor battalions of* the 32n(l Regi-
ment in eight company coluniiiK; in rear of and overlappijig
them to the left were the 2nd and the fusilier battalions U-Ath
Regiment, each having 2 company columns in first and a half
battalion in second line ; then followed the three fusilier com-

5 allies of the 32nd Regiment, Avhichhad come up behind the 94th,
'he Dtli and 12th companies of the 80th Regiment advanced
from the lUuch Mill in rear of the right wing of the firet line,
wliilst the 1st battalion 94th Regiment occupied the passages at
Biblisheim ; the left flaiik of the attack was protected by three
squadrons of the 13th Hussars. The troops had to move forwaril
under a most destructive artillery fire, from which they found
no protection until they had gahied tlie foot of the heights. The
village of Morsbronn, which was but weakly occupied, was caj)-
tured at the fii'st nish by the 1st battalion 32nd Regiment,
whilst the 2nd battalion obtained a firm footing on the heights
further to the left.

Having by the capture of the positions of Morsbronn and
Albrechtshauser Ilof won the first points of support on the
western bank of the Saner, the next question was a combined
advance against the Niederwald, wliitherthe French riglit wing
was gi'adually withdrawing. To can*y this into effect, the
Prussian troops at Morsbronn must wheel to tlie right and move
in a north-westerly direction. They were in the act of making
some preparatory movements to a fresh formation for battle, and
had only partly traversed Morsl^roon, when they were attacked
by cavalry from the neighbourhood of Eberbach.

General Lartigue, commanding the Division on the French Attack o!
right flank, had very properly recognized the fact that any ^^^''^^if*" .
further advance of the adversary from Morsbroon could not fail ^wbrigade^
to compromise most seriously the French positions before Worth, Morsbronn,
In order to free this flank, which was tlie more innnediately 1 o'clock,
threatened, he gave orders for Mieliers cuirassi(»r brigade, which
was posted behind it in the bottom eastward of El)erl)a(;h, to
send forward a regiment against llio assjiilants' left llaiik. More
took place than was contemplated in the order, for both cuirassier
regiments and part of the Gth Lancers, Avhich had joined them,
were set in movement. — The ground over which the attack was
made had apparently not been reconnoitred beforehand, and was
extremely unfavourable for cavalry, as rows of trees cut down
cl(»se to the ground and deep ditches impeded tlie movement of
large bodies in close formation, whilst the infantry had a perfectly
open range over the gentle slopes of the otherwise exposed
heights.

In fii-st hue rode the 8th Cuirassiers in column of squadrons ;
on their right rear came 3 squadrons of the 9th Cuinissiei'S in
line, the 4th in column of divisions behind ; still further to the
right rear were the Lancers.

176

With no enemy at firat in view, this band of horsemen, more
than 1,000 sabres strong, advanced haphazard towards Mors-
bronn. H<n'o-like they bmved the musKctry fire directed upon
their left flank from the Albrechtshaiiser Hof, in their endeavour
witli rapid strides to strike the adversaiy while in process of
formation.

The latter prepared to advance, with the 32nd Regiment in
first, tlie 94th in second line. The 2nd and 4th companies of the
right flank battalions of tlie former regiment were on the
heights to the north-west of Morsbronii, the Ist and 3rd companies
were still in the streets of the village. The 2nd battalions of
the 32nd and 94th Regiments had already debouched on the
left of the place, the former in two half-lmttalions in line at close
intervals, flie latter in company columns ; the 3rd pioneer com-
pany was likewise present. The fusilier battalions of these
regiments were still to the south of Morabronn ; the companies
of the 80th Regiment coming from the Bruch Mill were only
approaching the northern entrance of the village.

When the first line of troops appeared on the heights, they
were received by so violent a musketry fire from the copses
south-east of Eberbach, that their further progress was impeded
for the time being. They were then cliarged by the hostile
masses of horse.

The infantry might have found shelter in the contiguous
vineyards and hop plantations, and some trees in front also
offered immediate cover. They received the venturesome attack,
however, just as they stood and, without forming either battalion
or rallying squares, in those formations which permitted of the

freatest effect being obtained from their fire. The 8th Cuirassiera
elivered their first charge upon the infantry which had just
debouched from the village. Here the cuirassiers came under
the simultaneous fire of the two companies and of the two half-
battalions of the 32n(l Regiment, which latter had deployed and
changed front half right. In a few moments the cuimasiers
suffered fearful losses. The remainder, charging past the right
and lijft of the infantry, and partly breaking through the
skinniHluTH oi'tlin 2nd (Mnnpany, endeuvonred to gain the open

(ground Ihrough the villago or round ils nortliorii nidu, but full
bill of the two companioN in the village streets and the
ftkinnishers of the 80tli Uegiment. The commander of the
French regiment, 17 officers, and many men fell into the bands
of the SOtli alone ; 130 mi wounded hornes were captured. Very
few of the brave l)and succeeded in cutting their way througli
and esimi)ing in a south-easterly direction.

The 9tli Cuirassiers fared no better. They were received at
a distance of 300 paeiis by a well-aimed fire from the pioiu er
company, which was posted in a broad group on the left of
the mfaiitry. One angle of the group was broken by the cavaliy
as they charged by ; part of the horsemen then passed round the
village and part turning into it likewise fell in with the 8()th,
Tlie mingled renmant of both regiments, purmied by a file-fire,
dashed onward in a soutli-easterly direction.

177

The lancers forming the last line of attack stnick the left wing
of tlie PrusRiau infantry. Here the 8th company 32ncl Regiment
wheeled to the left and deploying into line aelivcrcd a volley fol-
lowed by an effective file-hre upon the charging cavaliy. Ihose
who passed scatheless pressed forward thi'ough Morsbroim, follow-
ing tne cuirassiei's in the direction of DuiTenbach and Walburg.

The remnant of the scattered horaemen endeavom'ed by a long
circuit to rejoin their infantiT, which gave rise to fresh and
bloody collisions with the 13th IIuRsari^aud tlie infantry coming
up from the Sauer.

That regiment of hussars, which was intended to protect the
left flank of the troops at Morsbronn, had, o^\ang to the nature
of the ground, closed in its three squadron division-colunms pre-
paratory to a fiU'ther advance. Suddenly the remnant of the
French cavalry brigade approached them ve^Ure d tef^re from the
rear. It had approached to within 300 paces of the hussars,
when the latter wheeled about by divisions and attacked on the
spot, the divisions now in rear moving out to the right and left
upon the enemy's flanks. A brief hancl-to-liand struggle ensued,
in which the French cavalry, already broken, was repulsed and

|)ursued for some distance. After the 1st squadron of hussars
lad rapidly re-formed and again attacked, and tlie 4th squadron
had defeated the attempt <»f a Frcncli detachment to Avithdraw
unbroken through Laubach, the scattered remnants of the French
horse fled in an easterly direction towards Walburg. In their sub-
sequent wanderings they came repeatedly under the fire of the
Prussian battalions at and in rear of Morabronn, many horaes
and men being captured. MicheFs brigade and the 6th Lancers
were almost destroyed ; veiy few horsemen could have reached
the army unscathed. The Piiissian hussars lost 1 man killed,
23 wounded, and 35 horses ; the losses of the infantry were very
inconsiderable.

This chivalrous advance of the cavaliy had enabled the French
infantry of the extreme right wing to withdraw unmolested to
Eberbach and the contiguous portion of the Niederwald, towards
which point they were now followed by the Prussian troops fi*om
Morsbronn. The first line wuk fonnod of the whole of the 32nd
Regiment, with the pioneer company on its left ; in roar marched
the two companies of the 80th Regiment and a miscellaneous
detachment of different regiments. The fusilier battalion 94th
Regiment advanced along the Eberbach valley further on the
left, its 9th and 10th companies travei-sing the copses on the
easfem bank, whilst the other two on the west side of the brook
moved forward without much opposition upon the village of that
name. The 2nd battalion 94th Regiment on the right followed
along the road from Morsbronn to Froschwiller in rear of the
right wing of the 32nd, and behind the former, the Ist batta-
lion of the regiment, which had meanwhile come up from
Diirrenbach.

The line advanced in this order without encountering any
resistance at first, and ultimately came hi contact on tiio right

178

Advance oi'
tlio Frcncli
tigiiinst the
Albrcclits-
liaiiscr Ilof.
Advance of
I he Xlth
Army Corps
agnin^t the
Kiptler-walil.

with the troops at tlio Albrcohtshaiiscr Ilof, whore the following
events had meanwhile taken place : —

At 1 o'cK)ck, as we know, me troops, which had become sepa-
rated in the attack, were engaged in assembling at this point, the
companies and half battalions in second line having even by
degrees been brought up into the fighting line. The troops were
generally veiy much mixed up ; besides the rifles there were
6 companies each of tlie J)5th and 87th Regiments, and 4 com-
panies of the 80th. The 83rd Hegiment, hitherto held in reserve
at Gunstctt, had like the fusilier battalion of the *J5th passed the
Sauer at the Bmch ililland was moving towards the Albrechts-
haiiser Ilof.

The distiilnition of the troops of the Xlth ArmyCoi-ps at that
time is shown on the sketch opposite. It will be seen that the
first lino was fonned roughly of three main groups, viz., at
Moi-sbronn, at the Albrechtshaiiser Hof, and in me Niederwald,
whilst there was still an available reserve at Gunstett.

Such was the situaticm when, shortly after the foregoing
cavalry attack, bodies of French skimiishers followed by strong
colmnns, advanced towards the Albrechtshaiiser heights. The
first force of the blow fell upon the rifle battalion while still in
skirmishing order, compelling it to fall back. The troops further
to the south were also mvolved in the rearward movement ; the
position at the Albrechtshaiiser Ilof had to bo abandoned. The
nro of the ailillery at Gunstctt, hithci-to masked by its own
ti-oops, rapidly checked, however, the further advance of the
French infantry ; the Prussian elarmishei*s succeeded in making
a stand and rencAving the contest, until they were most oppor-
tunely supported by fresh battalions arriving from Gunstett.

The first to deploy was the fusilier battiilion of the 95th, wliich
coming up past the right of the rifles, moved in four company-
columns against the south-east side of the Niedenvald ; its sbr-
mishera, closely followed by the supports, forced their Avay into
the wood and steadily advanced in spite of the repeated counter-
strokes of the enemy. In rear followed the 83rd Regiment, of
which three fusilier companies followed along the Worth road ;
the two nnisketeer battalions advanced to the attack on tho
left of the 9t5lh, each having' its two centre compauioN in
front, the Hank companies followng as half-battalions. Tho
heights to the north-west of the Albrechtshaiiser Hof were re-
captured, and a hostile forward movement, before which the Ist
battalion had to give Avay for the time, was repulsed on tho
aii-ival of the 2nc\ battalion; both l^attaliona then made a com-
bhied charge, dnuns beating, towards the southern border of the
Niederwald. The adversary now fell back to tho interior of the
wood, having continued his defence, supjDorted by the fire of
artilleiy and mitrailleuses, until the assailant was within 50
paces of the outskirti^.

This resolute advance of tho three fresh battalions was followed
by the troops which had suffered so heavily in the provioub fight»
a connexion being thus established with the right flank of the
32nd Regiment coming from lilorsbroun. Tne Prussian line

ShetoQ^ diecbstcibuticKLGf the stoops <]£l})eJUTAEii|^ Cbupe
in. the.Altack on fhe ^^edcmnld.

{M.!tr,||IFIELD. LitH 'ii. BtfOHD S LO^(>-T Cm<

170

skinniahing witli ecatterod troopers of Michers brigade, advjiiucd
towards tlie outskiiia of the wood abandoned by the eiieniy.

The let company 95th Regiment captured a I'm-co colom*, the
bearer of which had been shot ; the 0th company 32ud Rep^ment,
moving foi*ward upon Eberbaoli, took MarHlinl MaoStalion's

WhilBt the entire southern edge of the Niederwahl was now
occupied, the north-eastern part of which had boon for some
time maintained by the detadiments whicli crossed at Spach-
bach, the fusiUers of the 94tli Regiment moving along the
Eberbach on the extreme left flank were approaching the village!
of that name.

As the 11th company had established itself firmly in a hollow
road to the south of the village, and the 12th was advancing to
outflank the entire south side of the place, while the other two
companies were also approaching from the east bank, the enemy
retired to the heights on the north-west. He maintained this
point stubbornly as long as the troops held out in the Nieder-
wald, so that the fusiliers were unable at first to debouch from
the captured village. But when the oft-mentioned skii't of the
wood nad to be abandoned, the foimer occupants of Eberbach
also withdrew further northward. The fusilier battalion left
its 9th company in Eberbach, and with the remaining three,
established a connexion with the other two battalions of the
remnent on the west side of the wood.

Tlie right wing of the French army having thus been thro^vn
back into the Niederwald, the next point for consideration was
the Crown Prince's instructions, which had meanwhile arrived,
for a further advance upon the hostile positions at Elsasshausen
and Froschwiller in concert, as mucli as possible, ^vith the attack
of the Vth Army Corps in front. In order to ensure its success.
General v. Bose did not hesitate to employ his whole force, and
therefore gave orders to bring up the artillciy and the three
battalions still in reserve at Gunstett.

General Hausmann, commanding the artillery, had already
brought forward the 1st H. A. batteiy to the westcm bank of
the oauer, to await a favourable opportunity for comhig into
action ; it was followed by the 14tn Hussars, which deployed
between the Niederwald and the Sauer, the battery continuing
its advance along the Worth high-road in rear of the fusiUers
of the 83rd Regiment. Shortly after, the whole of the artillery
of the Xlth Army Corps crossed the Sauer and took a northerly
direction behind the infanti-y ; last of all came the 1st Hght,
3rd and 6th heavy battenes, which had been originally at
Gunstett, but had been likewise ordered to move forward on
hearing of the advance of the Wilrttembergers. The general
movement was joined in by the escort to the guns — the 7th
and 8th compames 95tli Regiment.

The three oattalions of the reserve experienced much diffi-
culty and loss of time in efrcctiiig the passage of the greatly
swollen Sauer to the south of Spachbach. The fu.silicr battaUon

0 2

180

88 til Regiment, witli two eompauy-eolumus iu the fii'st line,
advanced up the ravine leading to ElsasBhatisen ; the 82nd formed
up between the brook and the high-road in four half-battalions
as second line.

Meanwhile the foremost fighting line had penetrated further
into the Niederwald.

The 32nd Regiment, marching parallel with the left wing
outside the wood, ascended the heights north-west of Eberbach,
capturing numerous fugitives coming out of the wood. It then
moved towards the Froschwiller-Reichshoflfen high-road. The
13th Hussars reconnoitred further to the left.

The Ist battalion 83rd Regiment, leading the advance of the
infantry in the wood, deployed on the right, the 2nd battalion
on the left, of the Morsbronn-FroschMaller road. They were
followed in second line (reckoning from the left) by the 94th
Regiment, the re-formed portion of the rifle battalion, and the
fusnier battalion 95th Regiment. In rear of the left flank of
this second Hue came the six musketeer companies of the 95th,
partly re-fomiud and partly mixed up with portions of the 80th
and 87th Regiments, which during tJic advance of the French
on the Albrechtshauser Ilof, had got out of order and had not
been al>le to reorganize in consequence of their gieat loss in
oflicers.

Slowly and not without great sacrifices, owing to the stout
resistance ofl'ered by the enemy's skirmishers, the two musketeer
battalions 83rd Regiment gained ground in the wood. All eight
companies had gi-adually to deploy into one line of skinnishers,
the leading of which was very much liampered by the thick
undergrowth. They ultimately reached the northern edge of
the wood. An open space, 200 paces in breadth, separated
them from the copse, l)etV)re which the previous attack of the
88th from Spacjhbach had c<»nic to ast^uid. The four nmsketeer
battalions of the 83rd and 88th Regimentw now deployed into
line along the northern skirt of the Avood, The miscellaneous
detachmentH <>f the 95th, 80th, and 87th Regiments, came up
from the rear b('tweon those regiments, while at the same time
the 7th, 47th, and 50tli Regiments, fighting on the left wing of
the Vth Army Corps, also lent their co-operation.

The French still occupied the copse in question ; between it
and Elsasshausen were strong reserves. Up to this time their
attacks had been solely directed upon the 88th, which regiment
was driven back l)y a succession of blows ; they now directed
the whole of their ellbrts against the i'resh troops which appeared
on the northern edge of the wood. After a short but vigorous
skirmish, strong bodies moved fonvard from the wood along
the Morsbronn road to the attack of the Niederwald, and forced
the attenuated and exhausted lines of the 83rd to retire. These,
however, received support from the advancing troops. Close
to the road, and on both sides of it, were deployed the musketeer
battalions; further to tlie left the fusilier battalion 94th Regi-
ment, and on the right of the road, the unbroken part of &e

181

rifle battalion. With di'iiniB beating they advanced to uicot
the enemy, who had gained ground in the wood, the movement
being again joined by the repulBod firet line. The Frcncli
skirmishers were driven in, a battalion in column was dispersed
by the file-fire of the 7th and 12th companies 94th Regiment ;
the open ground was traversed simultaneously with the re-
treating enemy, and the wood captured. The fusiher battalion
88th Regiment penetrated simultaneously into the wood from
the east, and was there once more united with the other two
battalions of the regiment. Colonel Kohn v. Jaski, commanding
the regiment, was here killed by a shell.

The result of these successes was to force back the right wing Capture of
of the French army to Elsasshausen ; we were now immediately ^^■^■•^"*"»o"«
in front of the enemy's position at that point. It was strongly
occupied ; several batteiies were posted on the heights westAvard
of the ^dllage, and in rear of it strong reserves were visible.

The French artillery at Elsasshausen played so effectively
upon the northern edge of the Niederwald and the copse occu-
pied by the Prussians, that the latter had to choose between
a further advance, or the relinquishment of the advantages
which had been purdiased at such great saci-ifices. Against the
fonner altematiye was the consideration that the troops were
exhausted, that their unity had been broken in the preceding
struggles, and that there were only tliree intact battalions in
reserve — the fusilier battalion 83rd Regiment, which advanced
with the artillery along the Worth roao, and the two battalions
82nd Regiment, which had been brought up viA Spachbach. On
the other hand, any pause in the attack under j^resent circum-
stances M'ould relieve the enemy, and enable him to turn with
his whole force upon the Vth Anny Coi-ps.

General v. Bose, fully appreciating the situation, had already
drawn forward his nearest batteries m order to ovei-power the
French artillery. Colonel v. Bronikowski with the 1st H. A.
and 5th heavy batteries, took up a position in rear of a cheny
avenue east of Elsasshausen ; further on the left, the 3rd H. A.
5th and 6th light, the 3rd and 4th light of the 2nd division,*
and further to the rear the 4th heavy, came into action, under
the command of General Ilausmann. This line of guns directed
its fire upon the village and the enemy's guns alongside it. In
doing so, it was compelled to approach rather closely to the
French infantry, which was chiefly posted on the road from
Worth to Gundershoffen, forming a (loop cuttini^ witli fences
on each side. The artillery succeeded iu setting lire to Elsass-
hausen, but did not force the enemy from the village. General v.
Bose now ordered a combined attack. On the signal, *' The
whole will advance," the skirmishere, preceded by their officers,
dashed from the Niederwald upon the enemy with ringing
cheers. Those in the second fighting line who could do so,

• A DiTirion of field artillery coDSwts of four baitcrioH : 1 wo ]ic!iv> (O-pr.) and !\ro
light (4-pr.)— Tr.

182

followed ; the detachments of the Vth Anny Coi-pe nearest to
tlie riglit whig joined in the attack, which was powerfully sup-
ported by the l)atterie.s in action. Despite the withermg fire of
the Fniich, the open space between the wood and village was
qui^ld}' travciised. Tlie fusilier battalion of the 83rd, and part
of tlio 2nd l)attalion of the 82ntl, mixed with detachments of
the Vth Anny Coips, forced their Avay into Elsasshausen from
the caytwarcl; the ninahidrr of the last-mentioned battalion
endrjivdurod by paysing nj) a .small gidly on the right of the
village to take it in rear. The fusilier battalions of the 82nd
and 88th, the 1st and 3rd companies of the 83rd, the 1st bat-
talion of the i)4th, and detachments of other regiments in rear
of all, moved against the western heights from which the
enemy's artillery had been firing. Two guns and five miti*ail-
leuses here fell into the victora' hands.

The storming of the village after the preceding fight in the
wood, had mixed up the brigades, and liad paruy Drokeu up
the miity of the battalions. The front of the new position ran
in general along the road from Elsasshausen to Gundei'slioffeu.
The 44th was the only brigade wliich was pretty well together;
on its flank and rear were portions of all the various regmient«,
which in their present condition offered no true reserves.
Neither did the battalions in first Ihie present for the time the
ai)pearance of tactical units. The ofHcera were everywhere
engaged in re-forming their companies and battalions ; they
were animated in their efforts by the presence in the line of
skirmishers of the superior officers, notably of Generals v. Bose,
V. Gei-sdoi-fl', and v. Schachtmeyer.

On tlio left of tlu^sc masses, which were still somewhat in
disorder, the 32nd Regiment continued its advance on the west
of the El>erbach, towards the Reichshoffen road. The muske-
teer battalion of the 88th, and the fusilier battalion of tlie 94th,
assembled hi the Niederwald, the 2nd battalion 87tli Regiment
more to the rear at Eberbach, the fusilier battalion at Spach-
bach. On the right of and intermixed with the infantry of the
Xltli Corps accumulated at Elsasshausen, the left wing of the
Vth (Jorps— narts of the 7th, 4t;tli, 47th, 50th, and 68th Regi-
ments— liad likiiwise t^iken part in the preceding struggle.

The Ijatteries which had co-operated in the capture of Elsass-
hausen had also moved forward. The two H. A. batteries were
now \vithin 2,000 paces of Froschwiller, on the north of the road
froiii Worth to Elsasshausen, and with their left Hank close to
the lattci- village. The 5tli lieavy buttery, when endeavouring
to find a still more forward position, had stuck fast in the soft
^Tound of a deep hollow, and after hooldng in additional horses
under lire, had great diflieulty in even bringing up 3 guns into
positioj) for the present. The three batteries * of the 22nd Divi-
son, on (luitting the Worth road, had taken up a position on
the heights south-east of Elsasshausen, and prepared the infantry

* 3i*d und 4th light, 4th heavy balteriM.

183

attack on the village, directing their fire at times npon distant
bodies of hostile troops. The remainder of tlio artilleiy ap-
proached the scene of action along the Worth road, firetly the
artilleiy of the 21st Division, and lastly the throe batteries
which had been held in reserve at Gnnstett.

Although the foregoing circumstances could not fail to
militate ae^ainst the leading of the infantry, the troops accmnu-
latcd at Eisasshausen commenced, nevertheless, to move forward
in the direction of Fros(jlnviller. The 83rd Kegiinent. with other
detachments, ascended the heights north of the meadows in
their front, and penetrated into the position occupied by the
French artillery. An energetic attack on the part of the enemy,
however, put a stop to then further pro gi*css ibr the present.

After the loss of Eisasshausen ana tlie heights north-west of Attack of the
the village, the French felt the necessity of relieving their en- f^]'^*^^'^ \

dangered right wing by vigorous counter attacks. Strong ^vMiTu^n \
bodies of infantry were set ui movement from Froschwiller upon El^iiMhauson.
Eisasshausen and that part of the battle-field further to the
eastward between the latter village and Worth.

The blow fell fii'st upon the Pnissian right wing at Eisass-
hausen—the fusilier battalion 83rd Regiment, the 2nd battalion
82nd Regiment, and those parts of the Vth Corps which were
fighting at this point. Having no intact supports, almost with-
out leadera, loosened and exhausted by the long and violent
stniggle, these troops were unable to withstand the clun'ge of
the French masses, and sought shelter in the Nicderwald. The
detaelunents following in rear found themselves involved in this
retrograde movement ; as also the 3rd H. A. battery, which was
in the act of moving round the village in order to find a position
to the west of it. The forward movement of the advereary,
which up to that point had been attended with success, now
came to a standstill, owing to the advance of parts of the 94th
Regiment upon his right nank. General llausmaim ordered the
H. A. battery and the 6th light battery, which had come up
abreast of it, to halt and fire case ; the retiring detachments
were quickly re-formed and led forward anew.

At the commencement of the French attack, the 1st H. A.
batteiy had come up near to Eisasshausen, where a favourable
opportunity ofierea for its employment. The 2nd battalion
58th Reg-iment approached the east side of the village simul-
taneously with it, just as the heads of the enemy's columns
appearea on the heights to tlie north, scarcely ROO paces distance.
Although at this time the Prussian infantry furtlier to the left
was retiring, the H. A. battery unlimbered ; and, whilst other
batteries of the Xlth Corps came into action eastward of Eisass-
hausen, this battery, after a few rounds of shell, received the
advancing foe "with case, until the latter found himself compelled
to retire when only 150 paces distant. Captain Sylvius, the
commander of the battery, was wounded on this occasion by a
miuket ball.

Shortly after the attack of the French infantry upon Elsa^^s-

184

hauBen had been beaten off, they made an attack with their
cavahy, which also failed.

Bonnemain's Divifiion, consisting of four regiments of cuiras-
siers, had quitted its original position at me soui'ces of the
Eberbach for one further to the right, ui consequence of its
exposure to shell fire. When the order for attack anived, the
1st Brigade was to the right front of the 2nd in a fold of the
ground ; both brigades were in close column of squadrons.

The Prussian battalions, after repulsing the attack of the
French infantry, had by this time nearly re-foiined. They fol-
lowed up the enemy m his retreat to Fi-oschwiller throu^
Elsasshausen and over the high ground to the north, whilst in

f position on both sides of the latter village there was a total
orce of seven batteries of the Xlth Army CorM.*

The ground for the attack of Bonnemain's Division was, like
that of Michel's brigade on the previous occasion, extremely
unfavourable, as the numerous ditches and stumps of trees, as
high as a man, impeded the movements of bodies of horse, and
the infantry found cover in the fenced hop plantations and vine-
yards. For this reason the infantry only here and there formed
themselves into knots on the approach of the cavalry; the
majority remained in their original formation, and received the
cavalry with an annihilating file-fire, ably supported by the
batteries, which first fired shell and then case.

In this way the 1st Cuirassiers, leading the attack by succes-
sive squadrons, were compelled to retire with great loss, having
previously been checked m their career by a ditch. The 4th
Cuirassiers moved rapidly towards the left for a distance of more
than 1,000 paces, in order to find a favourable position, but were
also dispersed by the adversary's fii*e without being able to reach
him. The commander of the regiment was wounded and fell
into the hands of the 2nd battalion 58th Regiment. A still
worse fate befel the other cavalry brigade, which was now
coming up. The 2nd Cuirassiera, attacking by wings, lost,

* Tho troopa wliicb were more or less engaged against tbo French cuirassiers,
were the following : —

XIth Aniiv Coitva.

Ist battalion CUh Regiment.

Fusilier bnttalion 88th Regiment.

1st battulion 83rcl Regiment.

Fusilier battalion 82ml Regiment, and detachments of other rcgimonta.

3 guns of otli heavy 1

6th and'zn.! light - [ix't^^rios co.,tw«Kl of EliosAonscn.

1st and 2nd hoary -J

''th r It - ' > batteries westward of Elsassliauscn.

Vtu Abuy CoBpa.

5th and 6th companies 60th Regiment.
1st battalion 7th Regiment.
2nd battalion 58th Regiment.

1st battalion 60th Regiment, and ])art9 of different companies of the
mil, 46th, and 47th Keiriments.

185

beeddeB 5 offioers killed and many wounded, 129 men and 250
horses ; the 3rd Cuirassiers lost tne colonel, and although only
half came under fire, they had 7 officers, 70 men, and 70 horses
killed and wounded. Tne remainder took to flight in every
direction.

Shortly after this failure of tlio gi-eat French attack on Elsass-
hausen, the head of the 2nd Wiirttemberg Brip^ado readied that
place ; at that time, as wo shall see, the Ist liavariaii Division
nad also come into action. It now only remained for the Com-
mander-in-Chief to deal the last decisive blow upon Froschwiller.

GENERiVL Advance and Capture of Froschwiller.

After a struggle lasting for several hours, both Prussian Coi*ps
had succeeded in driving in the French army upon the key-stone
of their position at Froschwiller, in destroying the greater part
of their cavalry, and from their position on the south threatening
the line of retreat upon Reichshoffen. But these corps were
gradually losing blooa in isolated struggles against the stubborn
resistance of the brave enemy, who was able to tuni with all his
sti'ength against them alone, since the 4th Bavarian Division had
been thrown on the defensive after the failure of its cnteiprise
against Neeh wilier, and tlie troops of the let Corps were de-
tained by the swollen waters of the Saner.

The arrival of German brothers in arms was more and more
to be desired, in order by their fresh strength to ensure the
success of the assault upon tlio last bulwark of the enemy.

The Crown Prince had been able to watch clearly the course
of the battle from his position on the heights between Worth
and Diefibnbach, and especially the progress of the Xlth Coi^ps to-
wards Elsasshausen. He had in consequence at 1.30 p.m. directed
General v. d. Tann to advance across the Saner to the support
of the Vth Corps, and at the same time sent orders to General
v. Obemitz, commanding the Wiirttemberg Division, to march
from Gunstett to Reichshonen, with a view to iutorcepting the
retreat of the French.

This latter oflGlcer had hastened on in front of the 2nd Wiht- ArrWal of the
temberg Brigade,* and had watched the course of the action Wuittem-
from the Gunstett heights. He ordered the brigade to resume ^^Sih»cwen
its march at once on this village, whither it was to be followed (After Sp-m.)
as rapidly as possible by the rest of the troops, especially the
resei*ve artillery. The reserve cavalry had, as we know, received
instructions from General v. Bose to advance by way of Eber-
bach on Reichshoffen just after the Xlth Coi-ps Avas firmly
establislied on the Albretchtshaiiser heights.

As the action had already drawn near to Elsasshausen when
the 2nd Brigade arrived at Gunstett, General v. Obemitz ordered
the troops to continue their march without halting. The 2nd

* See p. 166. A« the 6th battery was attached to the re8ei*ye cavalry, General t.
StarklofI had 4| battalions and 1 battery nt liis disposal. See Appendix XI.

186

battalion 5th Regiment and the Gth battery crossed the bridge
near the Bruch Mill, the other battalions scrambled down into
the Sauer valley between Qunst^tt and Spachbach, and made
use of the bridges prepared by the Pnissian pioneei^s. During the
passage the brigade received the Crown Prince's order to march
to Reichshoifen. But as the struggle at Elsasshausen was in-
creasing in intensity, and the Prussian officers declared support
at that point to be desimble, Qeneral v. Starkloff consiaered
that it was necessaiy to vary the prescribed direction of march,
and ordered the different battalions, as soon as a sufficient time
had elapsed for their assembly, to move forward by the shortest
road into the fighting Une on either side of the bmiiing village
of Elsasshausen.

The first arrivals were* the rillo battalion in company-columns
at open intervals (the 4th company advancing through the
Niederwald was detained as escort to the guns), and the 1st
battalion 2nd Regiment. Both these detachments filled the gap
between the regiments of the Xlth Corps westward of Elsaseh
hausen. The 1st battahou 5th Regiment and the Gth battery,
the latter unable to find space for action in the close line of
Prussian guns, followed the rifle battalion in reserve. The 2nd
battalion 5th Regiment, in purauance of its order to move on
FroscliAviller, went past the line of artillery of the Xlth Coips
on the east of Elsasshausen, whilst the 6th and 6th companies
2nd Regiment remained temporarily^ with the guns. The reserve
cavalry with the 5th battery contmued its advance on Reichs-
hoffen by way of Eberbach.

Thus the Wtirttembergei-s also came up in separate bodies into
the fighting line, yet eveiy where forming a solid support to the
scattered battalions of the Xlth Corps.

Of the latter,* only the following troops were available for the
impenduig attack : m and near Eteasshausen were the 2nd bat*
talion 82nd, the 1st and fusilier battalions 83rd, the fusilier bat-
talion 88th, and various companies, some intermixed, of the 95th
Regiment ; fuiiJier on the left reaching to Eberbach was the
94th Regiment, to the west of it was the fusilier battalion 82nd,
and on the cxtrenu; left flank, the 32nd Regiment. The other
battalions were still assembling at Elsasshausen and farther to
the south, so that only portions, as for instance, detachments of
the 80th and 87th Regiments, rejoined the first line in time to
take part in the assault on Froschwiller. Shortly before the end
of the battle, the 3rd and 4th light batteries joined the left flank
of the eight batteries of the Xlth Corps, which had co-operated
in repulsing the attack of the French cavalry. The remainder
were not again employed in the last phase of the battle ; five
batteries of the Vth Coi*ps were, however, intermingled with the
line of guns of the Xlth Corps.t

After this description of tlie occurrences on the left wing of

* See Plan, Ilnd Period.

t Xlte 4tli, 6tb, ond 6lh light, the Gth and Glh heavy batteries.

187

the German army up to the oomnieucement of the attack on
FfOBchwiUer, it is necesearv to turn onr attention to the state of
affairs at other points of the battle-field.

Whilst the left wins of tho VtliAnny Corps was participating PromMof
in the success of the Alth at Elsasshausen, the frontal attacks the vtUAnny
of the former -were inosccuted without iiitennission. The 19th '^**'
Bngade had gaint'il groiuid along both sides of the Wcirth-
Frosch wilier road. It was complete, with the exception of a
half- battalion of the 4Gth Regiment and the grenadier company
left with the artillery on the eastern bank of the Saner ; the
fusilier battalion, 40th Regiment, formedthe right wing as before.
The 1st pioneer company was also with this brigade ; in rear of
them, the remainder of the .'^Tth Fusiliers had assembled at the
western issue from Worth. The 1st and fusilier battalions, 58th
Regiment, were in action on the eastern edge of the Frosch-
wilier heights. The 18th Brigade advanced into tlio space
between VVcirth and Elsasshausen, the King's Grenadiei*s being
nearest to the latter village. The 2nd battalions, 58th and
SUth Regiments, a half-battalion of the 46th, and 50th Regi-
ment (20th Brigade), intenningled with troops of the Xlth,
were engaged on the extreme left flank of the Vth Coi'ps.

The seven batteries of the corps brought forward tna Worth
had, after threading their way with difficulty through the town,
moved towards £lsasshausen, where the four batteries of the
10 th Division took up a position on tlie west, the 4th light to
the east of the village ; the two heavy batteries of the corps
artilleiy had likewise followed, but did not come agaiii into
action. The other seven batteries still remained on the eastern
bank of the Sauer on the road from Worth to Giii'sdorf, with the
4th Dragoons on their left ; the 14th Dragoons had moved
away towards the Saw Mill.

The 1st Division of the 1st Bavarian Coii>s, it will bo remem- Aniral of the
bered, was moving up to Gorsdorf with its advanced guard at ^ ^raxmn
1 o'clock, the 1st Brigade being still on the march from rreusch- °'^'*
dorf ; the general commanding the corjis had hastened on
in front in order to concert witli the commander of tlie Vth
Army Covpn as to the co-operation of his troops. As the Crown
Prince's instructions for the march to Fi-osehwiller arrive<l at
this moment, General v. d. Tann gave orders for the Ist Division
to move forward and outflank the enemy's left wing.

In pursuance of these instructions, General v. Stephan forth-
with ordered the 2nd Brigade to cross the Sauerbach in their
front and at the Old Mill ; the 1st Brigade was to follow in rear
along the path leading from the mill to Frosclnviller.

Two battalions of tlio 2nd Brigade were accordingly moved
off towards the mill ; the other foiu* were ordered to advance to
the front in two lines, the 2nd Regiment on the right, the 11th
on the left wing. On descending into the Sauer valley the
leading battalions were met -^vith a brisk fire. This was re-
sponded to by the Bavarians, who at the same tune commenced
to fell some trees in order to provide foot bridges in siddition to

188

the existing bridge at the mill. The two battalions of the riffht
wing crossed at once, and made their way over the wood-oTad
heights between the Sauer and Sulzb'uchel, where they fell in
with the detachments of tlie Ilnd Bavarian Corps which had
been left there ; but as they had become sepamted in struggling
through the undorgTowth, they had to be first re-formed at
the SaAv Mill.

Meanwhile the first lino of the left wing had also crossed the
Sauer. It traversed the low ground between the two brooks at
the double, waded through the Sulzbiichel, and climbed the
eastern slopes of the Froschwiller heights. The 2nd battalion,
2nd Regiment, moved fonvard in company columns at open in-
tervals, its left flank resting on a ravine descending &om
Froschwiller ; the 1st battalion, 11th Regiment, with two com-

Eanios thrown out in front, placed itself on the right. The 3rd
attalion, 2nd Regiment, moved from the second line to the
right flank of the last-named battalion, and there came in con-
tact ^vith the detachments of tlie Ilnd Bavarian Coiiis, of whicli
mention has aheady been made. Part of the 2ud battalion,
11th Regiment, originally intended as a reserve, sent forward
shortly after tv/o companies in the same direction. This mis-
cellaneous body of troops on the extreme right flank of the
Qeiman line of battle, end(iavoured by degrees to press forward
from the edge of the heights, in which they were at fii-st un-
successful. The enemy, ui addition to his naturally strong posi-
tion, was well covered, against the Bavarian skirmishers, benind
abattis and shelter trenches. A stationaiy action resulted, in
which the artillery on the eastern bank of the Sauer partici-
pated, firing over the heads of their own troops.

Close to and in rear of the 2nd came up at this juncture the
1st Brigade, the head of which had reached Gorsdorf at 1.45

8.m., and had at once moved forward in column of route to the
Id Mill. On the right of the 3rd l)attalion, 2nd Regiment, and
in line witli it, came up tlie two fii-st battalions of the Body-
guard Reghaent, the 3rd battalion forming up temporarily at
tlie foot of the heiglits. The two l>attalions of the 1st Rugimont
and the Dth Rifle battalion, following in roar, were posted as
reserves at the roadway over the Sulzbiichel, where they were
joined by the 2nd Rifle battalion. The 3rd Chevauxlegers
followed as far as the Old Mill. Gruithuisen's battery, the fire
from which was masked by the infantiy, sought in vain a suit-
able position on the western bank of the Sauer, but had to return
with its purpose unaccomplished.

The troops which had now come into action* produced no
decisive result at first; several bayonet attacks were beaten off
by the murderous fire of the delendcrs. At about 3 o'clock,
owing to the two foremost battalions of the Body-guard Regi-

* The following were now in action at this part of the battle-iicld ; the let and
2nd Brigades of the Ist Bayorian Corps ; tlic Ist and 2nd battalions 5th Regiment,
the 3rd battalion 11th Regiment of the Ilnd Bavarian Corps ; a half-battalion d7th
Regiment, and tlio 5th Rifle battalion of the Vtli Corp?,

189

ment having been fired at from the wood in rear by mistake,
there was a rearward movement to the Saw Mill, in which the
3rd battalion, 11th Regiment, was also involved. As the enemy
pressed forward from his position in pursuit, General Dietl
moved to meet him with the 3rd battalion of the Body-guard
Re^ment and the 2nd Rifle battalion. The retiring troops were
ralued and joined in the advance of the fresh battalions^ the
two battalions engaged in the outflanking movement and parts
of the 5th Prussian Rifle battalion also coming up on their right.
Owing to the combined eifoiis of these troops, the contest on
the edge of the Froschwillcr heights was re-established and
the enemy tlirown back into liis entrenchments.

Up to mis time the contest on the right wing of the German
army had either been stationary on the edge of the Frosch-
willcr heights, or had surged backwards and forwards over it, but
after 3.30 p.m. ground was visibly gained on the plateau towards
Froschwiller, a result chiefly brought about by the flanUuK
advance of the right wing imder General v. Orff" — 2nd, 9th, and
4th Rifle battalions, and tne 1st battalion 2nd Regiment--«nd
of the Prussian detachments.

This advance of the troops took place as follows, counting
from the left : to the south of the road from the Old Mill to
Froschwiller were the 2nd battalion of the 2nd and the greater
part of the 1st battcdion of the 11th Regiment. These troops
nad therefore to advance in the open outside the wood, and
were consequently, after the great losses they had sustained, in
circumstances of great difficulty. To the north of the road and
fighting in the wood were the 3rd battalion of the 2nd and the
2nd battalion of the 11th Regiments, besides the iufantrv
battalions of the 1st Brigade, the two first battalions of the 5tn
Regiment (Ilnd Bavarian Corps), and the two Prussian fusiUer
companies. The line was extended bv the 2nd and 9th Rifle
battalions of the 1st Brigade on botn sides of the road from
Langensulzbach to Froschwiller, and still further to the right
came the troops of the 2nd Brigade making the outflankmg
movement, viz. : the Ist battalion 2nd Regiment and the 4th
Rifle battalion, which had brought up the companies held in
reserve at the Saw Mill ; the Prussian riflemen were also at this

Eoint. This extreme right wing was followed by the 3rd
attalions of the 5th and 11th Regiments of the Una Bavarian
Corps.

Meanwhile the two battalions of the 59th Regiment, which
had been kept back at Gorsdorf, advanced to the attack on the
left flank of the Bavarians. As no progress had been made by
the latter on the opposite heights, but on the contrary, the rear-
ward movement already described had taken place. Colonel Eyl
with his 8 companies, the fusiliers in second line, crossed the
Sulzbachel and moved along the south of the Froschwiller road
towards the eastern slopes of the heights in his front. Although
encountering a stubborn resistance, and having to purchase
each forward step with great loss of life, the enemy's position.

190

Htrengthcued with ehclter treuches and abattis, was Btorined at
the point of the bayonet ; the standard of the 3rd Zouaves was
here captured. Colonel Eyl had two horses shot under him,
and although woiuidod, continued to lead on his men. The 59th
now came mto communication on the right with the Bavarians
who were also advancing and on the left "with the two battalions
of the 58th Regiment coming up from Worth, so that the greater
part of the 17th Brigade was again united on the right wing of
the Vth Army Coips.
R?Mi°^U^ Thus between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon, the entire

German line of battle, from Eberbach to the heights south-
east of Neehwiller, was engaged in an enveloping advance
upon Friischwiller, though not without couBiderablu derangement
of the unity of tlie Ctirps. Many details of tho momentous
struggle for this last bulwark of the French army defy all
description, as troops from the south, east, and north reached
and stormed the common goal almost siumltaneonsly ; and the
subsequent convulsive surging of friend and foe precludes any
precision in fixing the times, and consequently any attempt
to establish a connexion between the various isolated collisions.
All the corps participating in the battle were destined, with some
troops or other, to pluck the palm of victory at the' decisive
pointy the richest spoil of trophies falling into the hands of
those troops who were nearest to the flanks of the enemy's line
of retreat upon Reichshoffen.

We will attempt to give an outline of the coui*so of events.

The attack upon Froschwiller had been prepared by artillery,
the batteries of v. Ohnesorge and v. Gillern (3rd H. A. and 5tli
light of Vth Corps) advanchig with great bravery bej^ond the
line of skirmishera to within ease range of the village. They
had in so doing captured four guns abandoned by the enemy ;
the firat-named battery repulsed single-handed a cavalry attack
which was launched upon them. Although the teams suffered
heavily from the enemy's shower of projectiles, both batteries
directed a destructive fire solely upon tho village and the
Reichshoffen road, and thus prepared the way for the storming
infantry.

Lieut.-Colonel v. Link, conunanding tho 3rd WUrttemberg
Rifle battalion, accompanied by his adjutant and some thirty
sharpshootera under Cliptain v. Greiff, had reached a hollow not
far from the village. Observing some rearward movements
on the part of the French to tlie west of the village, he at
once, the fiiist on this side, soiuided the " advance," and, although
wounded, boldly dashed in front of his riflemen to storm tlio
Reichshoflen road.

The Corps commander with his battalions, partly re-formed
and partly in process of formation, was advancing from the south
upon Froschwiller under a murderous fire from tho enemy. The
troops again suflcred heavily. General v. Bi>se was badly
wounded for the second time ; Li<utcnant v. lleineccius, of the
general staff, and two orderlies fell in his immediate vicinity ;

191

General v. Stein, chief of the general staff, had a horse killed

under him; Major Kasch, 87th Regiment^ who had been already

wounded three times in the couree of the battle, was mortally

wounded. General v. Schkopp, Jiowever, led the troops to their

destination in the most unmuching way. He was followed

into the village, now on fire at several places, by Colonel

Marschall v. Bieberstein, with a reserve quickly foimed from

men of all regiments.

Froschwiller was simultaneously attacked and captured at

other points. To the left of the Worth road the two grenadier

battahons of the King*8 Grenadiers, the 2nd battalions of the

59th and 47th, and with the latter Captain Sarweyof the Wiirt-
temberg - - . . _ _ .

into the

commander,

gained the gardens south-west of tKe village imder the personal

guidance of the commander of the regiment, Colonel v. Kingler,

and had there compelled a mitrailleuse battery to limber up

and retire.

Various detachments of regiments of the Yth and Xlth Army
Corps, led in person by Colonel v. Henning, commanding the
19th Brigade, charged along and to the right of the Worth
road. Wiirttemberg troops had advanced against the south-
east entrance of the village, as follows : tlie 5th and 6th
companies 2nd Regiment moved in this direction, the latter
seizmg the churchyard ; the 2nd battalion 5th Regiment, after
crossing the Worth-Froschwiller road, moved forward in the
valley parallel to it, and entered the village simultaneously
with the Bavarian troops.

To the north also, on both sides of the Langelsulzbach road,
the 1st Bavarian Division and the troops of the Ilnd Bavarian
and Vth Prussian Corps engaged in that vicinity, succeeded by
4 o'clock in overcoming the vigorous resistance of the enemy
on the Froschwiller heights, and in throwing him back on the
village. These detachments reached the northern and easterri
sides of Froschwiller simultaneously with the retreating foe, and
probably somewhat before the capture of the southern side ;
some then forced their way into tlie village, others advanced
in a westerly direction towards the Reichshoffen road.

The French maintained for some time a desperate but hope-
less street fight in the village, the west side b^ing now in the
{>os8ession of the 94th Regiment. The wounded General Raoult
ell into the hands of the 1st battalion 5th Bavarian Regiment ;
an eagle, with the pole shot away, had already been captured
by the 3rd battalion 2nd Regiment, in the forest. Those not
takeji prisoners in the village fled in complete disorder along
the Reichshoffen and Niederbronn roads, and in so doing came
under fire of the Prussian batteries, and of parts of the Xlth
Coips, which moving up the Eberbach in advance of the others^
hini approachc4 that main line of retreat of the French.

Some French reserves still held their ground to the north of

192

the high road. Whilst an infantry brigade avoided a threatening
attack by a timely retreat upon Reichfihoffen, a battery main-
tained a doBtructivc fire upon the advancing dotachmentfl of
the 94th and the fusilier battalion 82nd Regiment. But wlien
Lieutenants v. Specht and Sehultze, with sldimishcrs of the
11th and 12th companies of the latter regiment, approached to
^vithin 300 paces, and, after a brief file-fire, dashed fonvard
upon the batteiy with a cheer, teams and gunners fled into the
adiacent wood. Six guns and liml)ors fell into the hands of the
bold assailants, who were not even to be driven away by a
vigorous fire fi*om skirmishers in the forest. The fusiliers, on
the contrarj", established themselves in the ditches alongside
the road, and from thence drove the enemy still further into
the wood.

Numerous fugitives were captured on the Reichshoffen road
by the 82nd Regiment, which had advanced through the Gross
Wald.

By 5 o'clock the struggle at Fixischwiller was at an end.
The Bavarians assembled at the western exit, the Wiirttem-
bergers at the south-west of the village. General von der Tann
brought forward his 2nd Division, which had just reached
Gorsdorf, to Froschwiller, and despatched the battalions of the
5th Regiment, the 3rd Chevaiixlegers, and Baumiiller's 4-pr.
batteiy (2nd Division), belonging to the Ilnd Bavarian Corps,
in pursuit toward Reichshoffen and Niederl^ronn. The Wiirttem-
berg Brigade received orders to advance to Gundershoffen.

The Pursuit.

The French Commander-in-Chief, as we have seen, had main-
tained the struggle to the veiy last against the superior forces
of the Gennans ; his troops had fought evei-ywhere with mreat
bravery ; whole bands of hoi*se had voluntanly sacrificed them-
selves to relievo the pressure upon the other arms. But as the
anny was surrounded on all sides, and its solo line of retreat
seriously menaced, all further resistance umst ceaso. The stream
of fugitives sweeping along the Froscliwiller-ReichshofTen road
could n(»t bo stayed ujitii Ihe Falkensteinbach had been placed
between themselves and the pursuing enemy. To this position
Lespart's Division of the 6th French Coii)S had meanwhile
come up, and had taken up a supporting position at Niederbronu
to receive the debris of the 1st (Jorps.

From the moment that the issue of the battle was no longer
iloubtful, the Crown Prince had issued orders to hang closely
upon the flanks of tho enemy's anticipated retreat. Imme-
diately after the struggle at Froschwiller was ended, measures
were taken for a vigorous pursuit. This naturally devolved
upon the outer flanks of th" German army, for which the direc-
tion of their march and the freshness of tho troops particularly

fitted them.

Whilst the WiirltcnibiTg infanhy, alter [mssing the Saner,

193

had bent away towards Elsasshausen, following the sound of
the cannonade, the WUrttemberg reserve cavalry, as we know,
kept on its way to Rcichshoffen. Between 2 and 3 o'clock
General Count Sch^ler, with his five squadrous and the 5th
battery att^iched, encountered a detachment of 400 Zouaves
emerging from the Niederwald near the Albrechtshaiiser Hof,
who laid down their arms without resiRtance. The Ist squadron
4th Cavalry was charged with the escort of the prisonei's ; the
other four squadrons advanced upon Reichshoffen rm Eberbach
and the Gross Wald. But as they were much delayed by
having to clear a barricade at Eberbach, and to scour the wood
crowded with the enemy's stragglers, they did not reach the
issue from the wood opposite lleichshoffen until about the time
the struggle at Frosch wilier was drawing to a close.

The W^iirttemberg column now marching on DiefTenlmch, com-
posed of the 3rd Brigade, 5 Iwitteries of reserve artillery and
2 S(piadrons of the 1st Cavalry, had received the Crown Prince's
order to march to Reichshoffen whilst advancing from Holschloch
along bad forest tracks. In consequence of this, the 2 squadrons
and 5 batteries trotted past Gimstett to Albrechtshaiiser Hof,
where the artillery took up a positicm pending the reconnaissance
of the cavalry. In consequence of a previous order from the
Comraander-hi-Chief, the I4th Pnwsian Hussars, which had been
joined by the squadron of the 14th Dragoons in Gunstett, was
also moving to Gundershoffen by way of Eberbach. At the
desire of the Prussian commander, the 8th Wiirttemberg battery
was attached to them.

The other four batteries and the two squadrons continued
their march on Reichshoffen. The commander of the latter,
LieuL-Colonel v. Ausin, was recommended by Geneml Blu-
menthal to move as rapidly as possible; he therefore hastened
at the fastest pace by way of Schirlenhof. The four batteries
of reserve artillery endeavoured to follow, but he was soon
lost from their view, owing to the enclosed nature of the
ground.

AVe may here state in anticipation that the 3rd Wih-ttemberg
Brigade and the rescirve artillcTy reasRemblod later at Engelshof,
where they were joined at midnight by the Ist BrigaiK', which
was likewise called up from Keimerewiller.

At the close of the battle, therefore, there was moving upon
Gunderahoffen and Reichshoffen from the south-east a tot4il force
of six Wiirttemberg and five Prussian squadrons, with two
AViirttemberg battenes.

As early as 1 o'clock an order had been sent by the CVown
Prince to the Ilnd Bavaiian (5orps to press upon the enemy's
line of retreat in the direction of Reichshoffen. General v.
Hartmann had received the order at La:igensulzbach about half»
past 2 o'clock, and assigned the duty in question to the 5th
Brigade, which at that time was advancuig by Mattstall, and
now received orders to move via Neehwiller. It was followed
by the lancer brigade, some squadrons of the 1st Chevauxlegers,
a batteiy, and afterwards by th^i remainder of the 3rd Division^

194

with llie exception of tlie ICtli Riginu'iit, wliich vas left near
Jiitfich.

In addition to thc-ec, two liattalionn of the 5th Regiment, the
3rd (^hevaiixlegurs, and Bauniiiller's hattevy were, as w^e know,
after tlie captnre of Frosdnviller, ordered by General v. d. Tann
in pursuit of the enemy towardb Reichshoffen and Niederbronn.

The 4th Cavalry Division was too distant to be made use of
this day. An order was sent to it to move foi'ward at once to
Gunstctt, so as to be ready at daybreak on the njorning of the
7th for a further advance.

The troops despatched in innnediate pursuit came across the
dehiin of the defeated army at the position on the Falkenstein
brook, and the fresh troops of Lespart's Division of Failly's Corps
at Niederl)ronn.

On the left wing Colonel v. Bcrnnth, with the 5 Pnis^ian
squadrons and the AN'iirttemberg Imttery, advanced upon Gun-
dershoflen, at which place his advanced troops were fired upon
by hostile infantry. On the approach of the cavalry the French
retired to the further bank, slill keeping up their fire. A French
column was now observed to have met with an obstruction
further to the north near the iron foundiy on the eastern bank
of the brook. (Jolonel v. liernuth directed the 4th squadron of
hussars against its rear, and advanced with the other squadrons
along the near bank against the escort, of which only a part
succeeded in escaping to the other side of the brook. 13 officers
and surgeons, 18G men, 240 horses, 1 gini, 4 ammunition wagons,
and 1() other carriages fell into tlu- hands of the Prussian horse-
men. An attemj»t on the part of s(»me unbroken hostile detach-
ments to recaj)ture the prisoners and carnages was defeated by
the firo of the battery, which had come into action to the east of
Gundershoften. In the evening Colonel v. Bernuth bivouacked
at Eberbach ; the scjuadron of dragoons was sent to the 10th
Division at Froschwiller.

As the 1st squadron 3rd (Rivalry, hading the; advance of the
Wiirttemberg reserve cavalry, debouched from the Gross Wald
ojjposite Reiclishoflen, it encountered an unbroken detachment
of French infantry, which was at once attacked and dispersed.
Another hostile detachment withdrew to Reichshoffen, when the
4th (Javalry deployed from the wood. Von Riipplin's batteiy
(No. 5^ came into action on the Elsasshausen-Reichshofi'en road,
and directed an effective case lire upon the Froschwiller road,
down which hosts of fugitives of all amis were pressing pell-
mell towards the Falkenstein valley.

From the south were aiqiroaehing at this time the two
squadrons under Lieut.-Colonel v. Ausin, which had passed
to the right of the iron foundiy, whilst the battery was throwing
shell into Reichshoffen. Regardless of the place being barri-
caded and occupied by the enemy, the Wiirttemberg cavalry did
not hesitate to attack sabre in hand. They forced their way
through the banicade at the southern entrance of the town,
where all surrendered without resistance ; Sergeant-Major Koch,
of the 4th squadron 1st Cavalry, capturcd a Turco standard.

105

The 4th pqiiadron 4th Cavalry coming up fi-om the south-
east dashed into the park of the ReichKhofTon ohjltc^au, but was
detained by the breaking down of abridgti. Li(?utonant Kurr, who
hastened on in person to ihe chateau, made prisoners of General
Nicolai, commanding a brigade of Conseil DumesTiirs Division,
and his staff. Colonel Count Normann, with the 2nd and 3rd
squadrons, moved to the Niederbronn road, where the division
of the latter squadron forming the advanced guard, under 1st
Lieut. Speth-Schiilzburg, met the cavalry of Lieut.-Colonel
V. Ausin, which was advancing in the same direction. At the

J)aper factory half-way to Niederbronn they came across a
Trench battery which had been brought to a stand-still, and
captured it in spite of the bullets whicii were showered on the
horsemen. In this attack Lioutenant Rpoth was kilhul and
Lieut.-(>>lonel v. Ausin wounded.

In their further advance on Nied'jrbronn the Wuittemberg
horse, in conjunction with the Bt^varian infantiy coming up from
the eastward, approached within range of the supporting position
taken up by Lespart's Division. As the horsemen Avere fired
upon by infantry from the forest in their front, and were
annoyed by the bursting of the sluills from a well-screened
battery, they were marched back to Reichshoffen at 7 p.m.

At 9 o'clock the WUrttemberg cavalry bivouacked at the
southern issue of the town, and sent foi-ward patrols to Gum-
brechtshoffen and Zinswiller. During their transport to Reichs-
hoffen part of the prisoners succeeded in effecting their escape.
The following were brought in : 2 officers,* 107 men, several
loaded wagons, 1 standard, 3 guns, and 1 mitrailleuse. Our
own loss amounted to 2 officers and 3 men killed and
wounded.

The 5th Bavarian Brigadef received the order previously men-
tioned for their forward movement to Reichshoffen, when their
head arrived to the north- east of Langensulzbach. After thread-
ing their way with much difficulty through the village, which
was blocked with wagons, they took the road leading through
the wood to Neehwiller, followed by the lancer brigade. As
the fire at Friischwiller was still very brisk, the commander
of the brigade ordered a company to skirt the western edge
of the wood and move upon that village, so as to keep up
a communication with the troops engaged there ; the 8th Rifle
battalion, which led the advance of the origade, took the same
direction after searching Neehwiller. Meanwhile the fighting at
FroBchwiller had ceased, and General v. Schleich now moved
forward the brigade along the path leading from Neehwiller
down to the Jagerthal,} whilst the 3rd battalion 7th Regiment,
the lancer brigade, and v. Massenbach's battery alone remained

* The French General, who had been taken prisoner, vias allowed to remain tem-
porarily at Beichshoffen.

t Seo Appendix XL

% The fijenwarsbach flows in this ralley, discharging itself into the Falkenstcin
brook in the neighbourhood of Beielishoflen. Ihe hamlet of J6geithal lies higher
up the Mine Talley.

D 2

1S)6

bcLiiul temporarily at Neolnviller. As the fikimnKhers of the
8th Kifle battalion were fired iij)(»n both iron) the " Grose Wald "
and from the further bank (»f the Schwarzbach,* the brigade
was divided. The 2nd and .'hd battalions fith Regiment placed
themeelves on the immediate left of the rifles, and the whole
then advanced through the wood in a southerly direction, re-
maining on this side of tiie brook, drove the enemy, whooflered
little lesistance, before them, and reached the slopes of the
KeiuhshoflVn heights outside the wood at 6 o'clock 'in the evening.
The troops left at Neehwiller in the first instance had meanwhile
followed, the 3rd battalion 7th Regiment taking up a position at
the south-west corner of the wood, close to a t\)rd over the brook.

The other two battalions of the brigade were somewliat
delayed at first in crossing the Schwarzbach. The 1st battalion
()th Regiment passed across felled trunks of trees, the 2nd
battalion 7th Regiment found a foot-bridge fui'ther to the north,
probably that at the **Rau8(:henwa8ser" steelworks. During
their subsequent advance upon Reichshofi^en, hostile detach-
ments appeared on the left flank. In ccmsequence of this, the
greater part of the two battalions now moved in the direction
of Nied(irbronn.

Meanwliile Cieni?ral v. Schkich had received the order of the
Corps connnander *• to follow up the enemy vigorously, to
"reap the fruits of the victory with the cavalry, and in any case
" to occupy the railway station at Reich shoflen." As Reichs-
hoffen was already occupied by other (lennan troops, General
v. Schleich only ordered u battalion and two squadrons of the
1st Chevauxlegers to take that <lirection, and the remainder of
his battalions, which were still to the eastward of the Fal-
kensteiji brook, to advance with v. Massenbach's and Loffl*8
batteries towards Niederbronn. A few rounds from the two
Raivarian batteries caused the enemy to withdraw rapidly to
Oberbronn. He was followed up with an eflective cannonade ;
the Bavarian infantry occupied Niederbroon. The 2nd Lancers,
which on the anival of (ieneral v. Hartmann were ordered at
8 p.m. to advani'C in pursuit, passed the infantiy, and struck
the enemy to the west of Niederbronn. By the time night
set in many ])riHoners had been takun inside and outside the
village. At the Reichshofl'en station, two locomotives, 100 laden
wagons, and a gmi were found ; in the village itself, 1,300
wounded and miAvounded French, and a second gun.

These successes were shared by the troops detailed in pursuit
by (Jeneral v. d. Tami, which appeared before Niederbronn
with V. JSrhleicirs brigade. The Hrd sciuadron 3rd Chevaux-
legers, under Captain Nagel, trotted aliead of the infantry
towards Niederbronn, and although tinder fire of the enemy's
infantry captured two giins with their teams and several wagons,
which during the hasty flight of the foe had become hopelessly

* Tlio Schwarzbach flows in tliis valley, diBcharsing itself into tho Falkenstein
brook in the neighbourhood of Reiciishollcn. The hamlet of JVgerthal lies higher
up the same vallej.

197

entangled while endeavouring to escape to the railway station.
The let squadron found a gun overturned on the liigh road
between Keichshoifen and Niederbronn.

When darkness put an end to the pursuit, the 5th Brigade
with the two batteries bivouacked at Niederbronn ; its outposts
on both sides of the Bitsch road in the direction of Oberbronn
and Jagerthal. The lancer brigade and General v. d. Tann's
detachmentBoccupiedbivouacks atlleichshofFen, whore they were
joined later in the evening by tlie part of the 3rd Division
which had followed in rear.

The Crown Prince rode over the field of battle in the evening,
and greeted his victorious troops amid the rejoicing of o Ulcers
and men. The entire country between Moi-nbronn and Lang(ui-
sulzbach, but more particuhirly the road from Froseh wilier to
Reichshoffen, bore traces of the grand and decisive victory, the
extent of which was now realized for the fii-st time.

Besides taking 200 officers and y,000 men prisoners of war,
the Ilird Army had captured the following trophies: 1 eagle,
4 Turco standards, 28 guns, 5 mitrailleuses, Ul limbers. 26
wagons of rifles and side arms, 158 other carriages, and 1,11KJ
horses. Victory had been pureliased with a lows to ourselves
of 489 officers and 10,153 men.*

That evening the army bivouacked as follows : —
Vth Army ('orps at FrtJseh wilier.
Xlth Army Corps at Elsjisshausen and Worth ; Colonel

V. Beniuth at Eberbach.
Ist Bavarian Corps. — Ist Division and others at Frosch-
willer; infantry of the 2nd Divisionf and the ai-tillery
reserve at Preuschdorf ; cuirassier brigade at Lamperts-
loch ; the purauing detachment at Reichshoffen.
Ilnd Bavarian Corps — partly at Lembach, partly at Reichs-
hoffen; 5th Brigade at Niederbronn.
Of Werder's (Jorps:

The 1st and 3rd Wiirttemberg Brigade and reserve artillery
at Engelshoff; the 2nd Brigade on outpost duty at (Jun-
dershoffen and Griesbaeh; reserve cavalry at ReiuliKhollen.
The Baden Division at (Junstett and Sell waab wilier.
The 4th Cavalry Division had received orders to advance to
Gunstett at 6 p.m., where they arrived at half-past 1) o'clocjk.
They there found further instructions from the Crown Prince to
move off in pursuit towards Ingwiller and Buxwiller at daybreak
of the 7th, whilst the Bavaiian cavalry was to advance along
the Bitsch road, and the Wurttembergers were to scour the
neighbourhood of Zinswiller and Uhrwiller between the Bava-
rian and Prussian cavalry. In consequence of this, Piince
Albrecht moved forward to Eberbach before daylight, pushed
the 2nd Body-guard Hussai-s to Griesbaeh and Gundershoffen,
and after three hours' rest renewed the pursuit.

* Tide Appendix XII.

t Tbej had marched there from Frdechwillcr to get their knA|)sai^k8, which had
been dimrded in order to accelerate the niitrch.

198

The 12th Division of the Vlth Army Corps ha I been com-
pletely ass(3mble(l at Landau since the morning of the 6tli
August. It there received the order from army nead-quartei-s
already mentioned, to despatch two battalions to Weissenburg
and to move forward the remainder of the Division on the same
day to Pirmasi^ns, thnmgh the AnnweilerandBer^zabern valley
with a view to making a demonstration upon Bitseh, and of
maintaining the communication between the Ilnd and Ilird
Armies. In pureuanco of these orders, the advanced guard of
the Division reached Dahn in the afternoon, where it was joined
by the 5th Bavarian rifle battalion ; conununication with the
Ilnd Army, as ordered, was maintained by the 15th Dragoons
from Hinter-Weidenthal.

The purtait
on the 7th
August.

The vanquished Frencli army, after being received in the first
instance under the shelter of Lespart's Division, which was itself
after a brief 8trug<^le drawn into the stream of fugitives, con-
tinued its retreat that evening and during the night along all
the roads leading to Z.iIkm'u (Sivcnui). ontanges' Brigade of
Lespart's Division also took this same scmth- westerly direction ;
Abbatucci's Brigade, which was joined by some thousands of
stmgglers from the Ist Corps, alone retired upon Bitseh.

The bulk of the French army reached the neighbourhood of
Zabern in the coui-se of the 7th, where they were joined by
numerous fugitives from all directions.

General Failly had been the whole day near Bitseh, in the
eculiar situation that he was expected to support ^lai^shal
lacMahon at Worth with his right, and General Frossard at
Spicheren with his left wing. Whilst the thunder of the can-
nonade resomided from botli directions, he considered that it
was his duty to gnard the ** gap of Uohrbach " witli the part of
the CiM'ps still liift to him, and secure the roads from Pinnasens
and Zw(;il»nl(rkcn. Although in uninttn'rupted teU-gruphit; oom-
muiii<'a1i<»n withllu: miirHhnI, no furtlKir instriictions reat'ln^l him
until the m^ws arrived in the evening of the defeat of both the
neighbouring Corps. He at once called a council of war, and
in accordance with its renolutions marched at \) p.in. with both
his Divisions to LUtzelstein (Petite Pierre). Ah there was no
special garrison for Bitseh, a battalion, the douanii'rs of the
neighbourhood, some ai'tillorymen and ofiicinls, and, provi-
sionally, the tnuns of both Divisions were left behind,

Wlnle the fragments of Marshal llacMahon's iwiuy were
thus endeavouring to unite in a south-westerly direction, the
head-iiuarter staff of the Ilird Army were at first (piite igmnant
of the enemy's real line of retreat, as the German troops could
not will be pushed into tht! ])aK.sages of the Vosges at night.
The retnvit of Abbatucci's Brigade ah>ng the Bitsdi road. U-d
to the imi)res.sit»n that MacMalnn was endeavouring to ri-ach
tin* main lmj>erial Army in Lorraine. A telegraphic despatch
was thi-rt^fore sent tliat rtaim*. night to the 12th Division, to

199

advance to Bltsch on the following morning and there intercept
the fugitives.

Moreover the intelligence from the cavalry, which reached the
head-quarter staff early on the 7 th, confirmed this impression.
The Body-guard Hussiira wliich had been pushed forward to
Gundershoffen and Griesbach, reported to the 4tli Cavalry Divi-
sion that French troops had neither retreated to the southward
by Hegeney, nor by Mietesheim and PfaffenhoflFen. The Division
thereupon deemed it advisable to send forward that regiment
alone in the direction of Ingwiller as prescribed by head-
quarters, and to march with the rest to Niederbronn by way of
Keichshoffen. There they found the Bavarian cuirassier brigade
wliich had left Lampertsloch at daybreak, and passed through
Worth.

As some hostile infantry showed themselves at the entrance
to the mountain passes, the cavalry did not entt^r them : only
one squadnm of Bavarian cuirassiers was able to reach the
Wiisenkopfl to the north of Oberbronn. The observations made
at Niederoronn left no doubt that part at least of the enemy's
forces had retreated by the Ingwiller road, and induced Prince
Albrecht to pm^sue the enemy in that direction ; the Bavarian
cuirassier brigade joined him.

The road in question showed the most evident signs of the
very recent retreat of a disorganised army. Arms and kuap-
sacKS cast away by their owners, a deserted gun and abandoned
carriages were to be seen upon the roads and on every side ;
a number of marauders were seized ; stragglers fired from the
houses and the neighbouring heights. At 10 o'clock in the
forenoon the Division reported from Ingwiller to army head-
quarters ** the main line of retreat of the French has been via
" Niederbronn to Bitsch, but a considerable part has fallen back
'* rid Ingwiller."

Buxwiller was reached at 11 a.m., where for the first time a
longer halt was made after the protracted and fatiguing ride ;
at 5 p.m. the cavalry, consisting of 30 squadi'ons,* with 3
batteries, resumed it43 march upon Zabern. On the road to that
place the number of stragglers increased; at Steinburg the
advance was met with volleys of musketry ; a railway train
was seen starting towards Zabern. Contact Avith the enemy
was again renewed.

After the Bavarian batteiy had driven out the occupants of
Steinburg by tlirowing a few shells into the place, the Division
bivouacked in tlie neighbourhood at 8 p.m. ; it had marched 41
miles in the 24 houra. The passages over the canal were held
by dismounted hussars, and outpost« were tlu'own out to the
westward in the dii'ection of the mountains.

At a later hour in the evening information arrived, from which
it appeared that the cavalry camp was threatened from the

* IndusiTe of the BaTariann. Two squadrons were toU off as escort to the
prisoners.

200

direction of Zabem. A detachment sent to destroy the railway
to the soutli of Steinburg, and the hussars patrolling on the
other side of the canal, were fired upon by infantry ; a report
was received from Monswiller that several French battalions
were advancing upon Steinburg. As it was not advisable for
the cavalry to be involved in a night action under unfavourable
circumstances, the bivouac was removed to Buxwiller, further
to the rear.

The other cavalry reconnaissances ordered by the head-quarter
staff tended to prove that there was no hostile force oi any
importance either in a westerly or north-westerly direction.
The Wiii-ttemburg cavalry had only seen one French battalion
at Buxwiller, and some stragglei*8 at Zinswiller ; the Bavarian
lancer brigade had sent forward from Jiigerthal some detach-
ments towards Sliiraelbronn, Liesbach, and Philippsburg, but
again retmned to Niederbronn without seeing anything of the
enemy ; they had, however, met with the patrols of tiie Vlth
Corps at Dambach.

Ihe commander of the 12th Division, Lieut.-General v. Hoff-
man, had resolved on his own responHibility to march upon
Bitscli, before receiving the order to that efiect. He readied
StUrzelbronn on the 7th, and pushed forward his advanced
guard to Herzogshand ('* la main du prince"), thus effecting a
communication with the 5th Dragoons at Haspelscheidt. Patrols
sent forward towards the Niederbronn road and Bitsch, repoiled
that many fugitives had passed tlu'ough Egelshardt during the
night, and that troops had certainly bivouacked at Bits(;hon the
preceding evening, lait had marched away southward in the
night. Ah a matter of fact no enemy was visible in the immediate
vicinity of the fortress, although the patrols were fired upon
from tne ramparts by artillery and musketry.

The appearance of (jei-man cavalry at Steinburg would seem
to have inspired Marshal MacMahon with serious appiehensious
for the safety of his furtlier retreat. At any rate he continued
it during the night of the 7th-8th, as far as Sarrebourg, so that,
from that place to Buxwiller, a distance of 23 miles and the
mountains separated him from the pursuing cavalry. The 5th
Corps from Liitzelstein united with the beaten fragments from
Worth at Sarrebourg, whence entire forces, moving in several
columns, retired upon Luneville by forced marches.

Under these circumstances contact with the enemy, which
had been temporarily resumed on the evening of the 7th August,
and again lost for the reasons already assigned, was never re-
gained. When the Third Army entered the Vosges on the
8th August, the enemy was no longer in front of it.

Before accompanying it on the march to the Moselle, let us
fiist turn to the German forces on the Saar, where a decisive
action took place at Spicheren simultaneously with the victory
at Worth.

201

The Battle of Spicheren on the 6th August.

Introduction.
The position occupied by Frossar<rs Corps* on the evening PosifcioM
of the 5th August, extended generally from the Saar south of g^TSJck^
St. Arnual as far hb the railway between Stiring-Wendel and and Forbaoh.
Forbach, a front which was occupied in almost its whole length
by the Spicheren heights. The northern slopes of these wooded

action at Saarbrticken has already made us familiar. Towards
the west the country is at firet flat and open. The gap between
the forests of Spicheren and Stiring, which to the south of the
Drathzug pond is naiTOwed by the projecting Stiring copse to
700 or 800 paces, is completely closed further back by the
village of Stiring-Wendel. Westward of and parallel to the
Forbach-Saarbriickeii railway, a thickly wooded range of heights,
only passable at the roads, extends up to the Saar. These latter
are numerous enough, but are difficult of ascent and often fonn
narrow defiles.

Under these circumstances all advantages of ground were on
the French side. Even were the heights, which abut imme-
diately on the south, reached from Saarbriicken, the Spicheren
heights and the extensive woods precluded any further insight
into the locaUties in rear. On the other hand, from the opposite
side an almost unlimited view could be obtained of the country
to the north as far as the Saar ; moreover from the church tower
of Stiring-Wendel the ground could be watched towards the
north-east as far as the Reppertsberg.

These natural defensive qualities of the French position had
been increased by artificial means. Shelter-trenches and gun-
pits crowned the ridge projecting north-eastward from the
Spicheren heights, whose rocky escarpments gave as mucli
security from escalade as those of a fortress. The northern and
eastern edges of the village of Stiring-Wendel, with its massive
buildings, are flanked within effective gun-shot by the station
and the ii'on foundry which project from it like bastions.
Shelter-trenches had also been thrown up on the open Kaiiin-
chenberg neiir Forbach, which prevented an approach to the
town from the north-west.

The 5th and 6th Cavahy Divisions, as already mentioned, Caralryrecon.
were pushed forward in front of the two German Armies, to- Jf****°^ *"^
wards the Blies and the Saar. of*tlie*Stii*

On the left flank the railway from Saargemiind to Rohrbach Augiut.
had l)e6n destroyed at several points ; the reports received from
the fi'ont confirmed in every respect the opinions alreadv formed
of the enemy's condition. Their tenor was to the effect that
since the 5th August there had been a general rearward move-
ment of the enemy along the whole line, and that troops had
been embarked by rail at Morsbach and Forbach.

• Vide p. 143. "

202

A detachment of the 3rd Lancers under Captain Hammerstein
had, it is true, been briskly fired upon on the night of the 5th-
6th when crossing the bridge over the Soar from St. Johann ;
but in the early morning the outposts of Redem's Brigade ob-
served that the heights south of baarbriicken^ hitherto occupied
by French infantry and artillery, were deserted. The advanced
picquet from the Brunswick Hussars, under Lieut. Schweppe,
at once trotted forward through the town; the remainder of
the outpost squadron followed. They were joined from the left
by a division of the ()th Cuirassiers of Griiter s Brigade with a
view to closely following up the retreating enemy. Thes<* weak
detachments, nowever, came upon a hostile force of some two
battaUous, one squadron, and a batteiy deployed in position be-
tween Drathzug and the Stifts forest. A slight skumish took
place ; but this first brush was beaten off by the enemy's artillery
fire, so that we were unsuccessful in gaining a closer insight into
his position. It seemed probable, however, that these French
troops were only covering the supposed embarkations at Forbach.
Other reconnaisstiuces were made over the Saar at Wehrden
on tliis same morning. The Oldenburg Dragoons moved from
that place upon the cnomy*H left flank ; leaving a squadron at
Ludweiler, tlie remain<ler trotted onwanl to Carling and ilan:-
sous Varsberg. To the eastward of the latter place they met
^vith some French cavalry, behind which detachments of infantry
were marching to the westward upon Guerting; a large French
camp was viHible at St. Avoid.

At 8 a.m. detachments of the lllh Hussars had also crossed
the Saar at Wehrden and moved forward in various directions.
A division at Gersweiler watched the retreat of the enemy from
the drill-gi'ound and descried his camps to the south of Stiring-
Wendel ; another division moved towards Schoneck. While the
latter was advancing alxmt 11 o'clock towards the northern edge
of the Stiring forest, it Avas iircd at by infantry* and lost men.

The commander of the regiment, who had proceeded with a
squadron in the direction of Ludweiler, was able to observe
clearly from an elevate<l knoll the enemy's camp at Forbach
and the n)0venients of troops in the direction of St. Avoid.
Smaller detachments of Hussars, whic:h pushed forward still
further in rear of the enemy as far as Carlsbrunn and St. Nicho-
las, gave confirmatory evidence.

All these reconnaissances tended to show that at this time there
were still considerable bodies of troops at Stiring- Wendel, For-
bach, and St. Avoid ; yet it became more and more probable that
they were already in the ait of retiring. It certiiinly caused us
much surprise that the passages of the Saar were not destroyed.
Lieut.-General v. Uheinbaben, who, as we are aware, was at
that time in command of both Cavalry Divisions, had moved for-
ward in person to Saarbriicken. \A'ith a squadrim from each of
the 6th Cuirassiers and the 3rd Lancers, he pressed through the

* Oenerul Vergo {see p. 143) had posted a half battalion of tl)c.77th Begiment at
that place for the protection of his left flank.

203

town, and. under a briflk caimouade from the Spichoren heights,
occnpied the drill-ground.

He reported this by telegraph to the Commander-in-Chief of
the Second Army towards 11 oV^lock, ad<ling: "The French
" occupy the Spicheren heights with infantry and artillery ;
" they are in the act of tri</i//miri;?j ;" shortly after, in a second
telegi'am, *' Hostile lines are deploying on the heights this side
** of Forbach. Advanced guard of the lAth iJicmon arrived at
" SaarbrUcken to occupy the town."

On the evening of the r)th Auji^ust a teh^grani had been sent Measuref
from the royal head-quart era at Mainz to the Cotnraander-in- f^^H*?^ ^J
Chief of the Ist Army : " As the enemy appears to be retiring u^^ Armiei,
" from the Saar, the passage of the frontier is now open ; at the AdTsnce of
** same time you should cross the Saar below Saarbriicken, as the ^* .^f*** ,
*• road to St, Avoid through that town belongs to the Second gjJiJrtrtckeii.
" Anny." This telegram, however, did not reach the Ist Army
imtil the night of the Gth-7th August.

Meanwhile Prince Frederick ('harles and General v. Steinmetz
had already received the orders,* jireviously alluded to, pre-
scribing the forward movements of their arnnes. In compliance
with those orders, the advanced gujud of the llird Army Corps
moved on the morning of the Gth August on the east, and those
of the Vlllth and Vllth on the west, of the Rhine-Nahe Rail-
way, along the roads leading to St. Johann, so that the con-
tinuance of the murch of the right wing of the Ilnd Army and of
the left wing of the Ist Army must bring both to the same point
of passage of the frontier stream.

Of the Vllth Army C()r[)s, which advanced from the neigh-
bourhood of Lebach, the 13th Division was on the march to
Piittlingen. Its advanced ^uard was to move as far as Volk-
lingen ; tlie squadi'ons of hussare leading the column reached
that pla(;e at 1 1 a.m. Soon after the 1 1th llussars also a.ssemi)led
there, with the exception of Honu? divisions Avhich had either not
yet returned from the previously-mentioned reconnaissances on
the left bank of the Saar, or had joined the Ciivalry on the drill-
ground.

The 14tli Division had been ordered to move to Guichenbach
and push forward an advanced guard, the outposts of which
were to occuipy the edge of the Kollerthal forest towards Saar-
briicken and Louise nthal. On the march the conunander of
the Division. General v. Kameke, gathered i'roin reports received
that the enemy's positions south of Saarbriicken were aban(hnied,
and that only weak detachments were visible, as already me!i-
tioned, between Drathzug and the Stifts forest. He reported to
that eflect to the general eonnnan<Hng the Yllth Army Corps,
who was then on the march to Dilzbnrg, and asked if he might
cross the Saar iuidt?r those circumstances, so as to seize the

• Pp. 113 nml 103.

204

heights south of Saarbriickeu before the enemy was able to
re-occupy them. General v. Kameke received a reply that he
might act on his own judgment.

Meanwhile his advanced guard under General v. Francois*
reached Guichenbach at hali-past 9 o'clock. As the weather
was cool and the troops fresh, the commander of the Division
ordered the advanced guard to proceed, and after occupying
Saarbriicken to throw out its outposts on the heighta The main
body continued on the march.

As the Division was approaching the town, it was met by
General v. Goeben commanding the Vlllth Corps, who after
returning from a reconnaissance to the Saar, had contemplated
moving forward the advanced guard of his own Army Ooi'ps,
then marching on Fischbach, to occupy Saarbrucken. He gave
up his intention of so doing for the present, on finding that the
14th Division was already moving with that object in view, but
at the same time offered nis support in the event of the enemy
again advancing.

The advanced guard of the 14th Division now crossed the
northeniuiost of the two bridges between St. Johann and Saar-
brQck'en. As soon as the 3rd battalion 39th Regiment, marching
at the head, reached the drill-ground at 11.30 a.m., the enemy
opened a vigorous cannonade from the already-mentioned spur
of the Spichereu heights, the so-culled Rotherberg, which in-
creased in intensity when the 1st light battery, following imme*
diately in rear, debouched from the sunken road upon tne drill-
ground. The battery unlimbered to the west of the high road
on the southern slopes of the ridge, and responded to the
enemy's guns, apparently eight in number, at a aistance of 2,000
yards, with gooa effect, as far as could be judged. The enemy's
£iins were posted partly on the steep declivity of the Rother-
berg, partly in a more elevated position some hundred ytu'ds to
the rear, firing with great vigour but with little result.

Meanwhile further to the left the other two battalions of the
39th Regiment moved up to tlie northern slope of the Repperta-
berg. General v. Kameke further ordered the 2nd battalion
74th Regiment from the main body of the Division to cross the
railway bridge between Malstatt and Burbach, so as to secure
the passage at that point by the occupation of the railway
cutting at Deutsch Hill. U'he battalion was instructed to keep
up comnmniavtion with the 39th Fusiliers on the left ; the other
two battalions of the 74th Regiment were also drawn to the
left bank of the Saar to reinforce the advanced guard, ho that
General v. Fran<^*ois had both regiments of his brigade at
disposal.

General v. Rheinbaben joined the forward movement of the
advanced guard of the 14th Division on the left flank, and took
up a position with both liis squadrons behind the northern slope

* The ortler of man;1i of both Dtrisions of the Vllth Armj Corps U given in
Appendix XIII.

205

of the Galgenberg, to which place he alBO called up the squadron
of the Brunswick Hussars.

As none of the enemy's infantry was visible, and as he did
not attempt to pass the line between Drathzug and the
Rotherberg, the action showed no signs of becoming serious for
some time.

This seemed to give colour to the original supposition that
the French detachments were only intended to cover the em-
barkations at Forbach. At this tune reports were received fiom
the cavahy patrols which had been puslied forward, estimating
the enemy's force at 3 regiments of ini'antiy, which, as we shall
see, agreed with other calctilations.

We vriW first turn to tho Second Army.

The head-quarters at KaiKcrslautern had been informed at
an early hour in the morning, by a report from the 6th Cavalry
Division, of the evacuation of the St. Aniual heights. As this
seemed to establish a partial retrograde movement of the enemy
and the probability of a complete retreat, it was judged expe-
dient in any case to seize the passage of the Saar, thu» left
open, and without inducing a premature offensive, to hang
closely upon the enemy. To this end Prince Frederick Charles
sent an order by telegraph at 8 a.m. for both Cavalry Divisions
to keep the touch of the retreating foe, the 5th Division to
advance to Saarbriicken, and the iVth Army Corps to push
forward an advance guard to Neu-Hornbach.

In agreement with this provisional order, the respective desti-
nations of all the corps for the march of the following day were
further laid down.*

Meanwhile head-quarters had been transferred to Homburg,
where General v. Rheinbaben's telegrams were received at
noon. As the last one evidently showed that part of the First
Army was on the line of march of the Second, the Ilird Corps
was directed to occupy Saarhriiclen that day ; and General v.
StUlpnagel, commandmg the t5th Division, received full powers
from Prince Frederick Charles to order the I4th Division to clear
out of the to^vn and road.

But before the amval of these orders General v. Alvenslebeni
commanding the Ilird Army Corps, had on his own judgment
of the situation, after asctatain in g the enemy's withdmwiU from
Saarbriicken, ordered the 5th Division to occupy the place with
a vanguard, and the main body to advance to within four miles
of it.

Even this arrangement had been anticipated by events
on the left bank of the Saar. Before we follow any further

* The foUoiring dettinations were to be reached on the 7th August : —
Ilird Arm J Corps ; Saarbriicken, adTaneed Guard at Forbnch.
IVth „ Nou-llurnhiich, adyaitccd guard, at Kohrbach and Bitsch.

Tills Corps waf to communicate on tho left with the 12th Divinion, which, accord-
ing to report, had reached Pirmasens on the 6th.

The Xth Corps was to advance to St. Ingbert in support, if required, of the
Ilird ; the Guard to Assweilcr ; the I Xth Corps with its head as far as Bezbnch ;
the Xllth to Honiburg.

20G

their course subseqiient to the arrival of the 14tli Division,
it will be interesting to consider the action, taken chiefly on
their own responsibility, of those commanders who were in a
position to co-operate in a sti-ugglo on the further bank of the
Saar.

General v. Doeri\ig, commanding the ftth Infantry Brigade,*
had ridden through ISaarbriicken early that morning, on hearing
the intelligence that the cavalry supports had crossed the Saar.
When on tlie other side of the town, between 9 and 10 o'clock,
he observed in rear of the French linos of skirmishers, (M)lumnA
of infantry advanvimj from Forbuch, which disappeared from
view in the wooded countiy east of the main road and behind
the high ground.

Hence it appeared to him that the isolated advance of the
14th Division was not sufficiently secured, and he thereupon sent
orders to his brigade, then marching on Dudweiler, to move to
Saarbriicken without delay.

The 5th Division advanced in two main columns on the morn-
ing of the 6th August from the neighbourhood of Neunkirchen
towards the Saar, in order to reach its destination abreast of
Dudweiler, as prescribed for that day. The combined Oth
Brigade t marched along the Saarbriicken high road, the com-
bined loth Brigade on St. Ingbert.

The troops of the fomier column had just moved into (juarters
— the advanced guard at Sulzbach ana Dudweiler, the main
body at Fricdrichsthal and Bildstock — when the previously-
mentioned order amved in the noon hour, from their brigade
commander, to continue the march to Saarbriicken. General v.
Stiilpnagel, who received intimation of this at noon, at once
rode forward to St. Johann with the first squadron and the
light battery of the advanced guard.

Of the combined 10th Brigade,} the 12th Regiment was at
Neunkirchen ; the remainder had occuined qnarters at Spiesen
and St. Ingbert at noon. A communication was received soon
after from the 6th Cavalry Division, from which it was gathered
that they were in the act of assembling between Ensheim and
Ormesheim, as hostile troops Avero said to be advancing from
Habkirchen, on the Blies, to Assweiler. In consequence of this,

• Belonging: to tlie 51 li Division, Illnl Anny Corps,
t Combined 0th Brigiule : Mnjor-Oeneral t. Ddring.

AdTanced Quard : Colonel t. Qarrclts.

48tk Eeginient.

Ist and 2nd sq. 12th Dragoons.

8nl liglit battery-

Sanitary detachment.
Main body : Lieut. -Col. t. L'Estocq,

Slh Bodyguard Grenadiera.

Srd Rifle battalion.

3rd heavy battery.
X Combined 10th Brigade : Major-General t. Schwerm.

12th Kogiment.

52nd Regiment.

Srd and 4th sq. 12th Dragoons.

4th heavy and 4th light Uttteriet.

207

General v. Schwerin ordered hie brigade to assemble at St.
lugbert, which place was readied by those quartered at
Spiesen at 2.30 p.m. ; at tins time an ainionncemont was re-
ceived from the 12th Regiment that it had been othcnvise
disposed of.*

General v. Doering's report, which was forwarded by the
Divisional commander, had meanwhile reached the Corps com-
mander at Nemikirchen, and (icneral v. Alvensleben at one©
gave orders that as many troops^ of his Co}*jys as possible were to
be brought up to Saarbriicken in the course of the day. The
12th Regiment and the 20th Regiment of the 6th Division were
to be brought up by rail to St. Johann. Ordci-s were sent to
St. Ingbert to march the 52nd Regiment and all the available
artillery to Sac'irbriicken. General v. Schwerin was able to
comply at once with this instruction as his troops were assem-
bled ; the 1st company 52nd Regiment was alone left to hold
the railway station. The brigade commenced its march in the
indicated direction at 4 o'clock, the General hastening on in
person to the battle-field with the cavalry and artillery.

It has been already mentioned that General v. Goeben had

t remised his support to the 14th Division in the ev(nit of its
eing required. As the (leneral, when on the nm<l to rejoin his
Corps, observed that the cainionado on the fintlior bank of the
Saar was increasing in intensity, he determincid to move fonvard
the nearest troops of his Corps to the battle-field. This was the
16th Division, the advanced guard of which had just reached
Quierscheidt and Fischbach towards noon, where it was to be
quartered.

On arriving at Fischbach, General v. Goeben found that Lieut.-
General v. Barnekow commanding the Division, had, on hearing
the thunder of guns, acted on his own responsibility and resumed
the march \srii\\ his advanced guardf just as it was engaged in
throwing out its outposts towards the Saar. At the same time
the main body of the Division had also been called to arms in
its quarters round Wcminetsweiler and Landswciler. In c»rder
not to have too great on interval between the main body and
advanced guard, the 72nd Regiment of Colonel v. Rex's Brigade
and the two available batteries were to follow on to Fischbach
and the 31st Brigade as far as Quierscheidt. (leneral v. Goeben
could therefore look forward with certainty to the KUh Division
co-operating in the struggle now raging on the other bank of the
Saar, and it was therefore considered unnecessary to bring for-
ward the 15th Division, now standing with its head at Holz ; he
again returned to Saarbiiicken.

When the advanced guard under Colonel v. Rex emerged at
1.30 p.m. from the Kollerthal forest, an officer who had been
sent lorward to the 14th Division reported that apparently there

• It WM at St. Wendel.

f Advanced Ouard of 16th DiTision (Colonel t. Rex, commanding 82nd Brigade)
connisted of 40tli Regiment (7th company detached as escort to B.Q.) 9th Hupsan,
6th heavj and Gvli light hr^tteree, pontoon c nipanj^ and eanitaiy detachment.

208

was no immediate necessity for a support, but that it would be
desirable for the 16th Division to move up to the south of Saar-
briicken. General v. Bamekow therefore ordered the advanced
guard to continue its march to St. Johann ; the main body also
received orders to follow to that place.

General v. Zastrow, commanding the Vllth Army Corps, had,
as we have seen, empowered the conanander of the 14th Division
to act according to his own judgment, but subsequently con-
sidered it desirable to push forward his tohole Corps to the Saar.
In order to obtain the sanction of army head-quarters to this
measure. Captain v. VVesternhagen of the geneml staff* was sent
to Eiweiler, whore (Jeneral v. Steinnietz had an'ived from Tholey
towards noon. The commander-in-chief confinned General v.
Zastrow's view in the foUoAving terms : —

" The enemy must be punished for his negligence. I am like-
wise of opinion that in order to prevent the enemy from re-
occupying the positions which he has abandoned on tlie left
bank of the Saar, their occupation is necessary in the interests of
the Second Army ; and that an attempt should be made to inter-
rupt the embarkation of the French troops at Forbach, which is
said to be weakly pix)tected."

Meanwhile fresh information had reached the head-qnartei'S
of the Vllth Anny Corps at Dilsburg, which threw a douut upon
the enemy's continuing his retreat, and which rather pointed to
the adoance of fresh French troops upon Saarbriicken. When
the aforesaid confirmation of his proposals reached General v.
Zastrow between 12 and 1 p.m., he at once adiipted the following
measures : —

The 13th Divisitm was ordered to advance to Viilklingen and
Wehrden, pushing forward its advanced guard in the directions
of Ludwciler and Forbach, and sending out patrols to discover
the strength and intentions of the enemy at t orl)ach. The 14tU
Division was to take up a position, with a reinforced advanced
guard on the left bank of the Saar at Saarbru(;ken, draw forward
the main body to liockfjrshausen, throw a bridge there, and
patrol towards Forbach — instructions which in pouit of fact had
already been exceeded, owing to the commander having been
accorded full liberty of action. The corps artillery was ordered
to march to Puttlingen, north-west of Volklingen.— After these
orders had been despatched General v. Zastrow proceeded with
his staff to SaarbrticKcn.

The Con)mander-in-Chief of iha First Army had at the same
time instructed Colonel Count Wartensleben, the Quarteraiaster-
in-Chief, to ride forward to that place to obtain more accurate
information of the state of affairs. This officer read on the road
the later reports sent from the battle-field to the commander of
the yilth Army Corps, which left no doubt that the action had
augmented both in extent and importance, a fact which the
increasing roar of artillery tended to confirm. The colonel sent
a comnmnication to this effect to General v. Steinmetz at
Eiweiler.

The foregoing description shows, how in consequence of the

209

intelligence from the left bank of the Saar mnce the morning of
the 6th August, all the meaenres of the Germans compassed a
timely and sufficient co-operation, but at the same time that the
commanders in front line by their independent ref^ohdiona com-
pletely anticipated the orders of superior uuthority. To this last
circumstance the 14th Division was specially inch^bted for the
support it received from the neighbouring corps, which, late as
it ivns, arrived at an opportune moment. We sliall see of what
vital importance was the airival of that support in the severe
struggle, which that Division had at first taken upon itself
single-handed.

It 18 not easy to glean from French statements at what hour
General Frossard resolved to accei^t the contest and lii-st con-
templated reinforcing his ad vancetl detachments. If these latter
were not intended to cover the embarkation of troops at Forbach,
as ascribed to them, still the Pnissian suppositionB were well
foinided, in so far as it was evidently their object to cover a
retreat to more rearward positions. When tlierefore French
reports refer the conunencement of the action to 9 a.m., thev can
only allude to the driving in of the Prussian reconnoitring
cavalry by artillery fire.

General Bataille, who was encamped with the 2nd Division on
the Getingen plateau, says in his report* that he heard the first
8(mnd of guns at lOa.m., and thereupon made his aiTangements.
But at that hour ahots could only have been fired at the cavalry
patrols, as the 14th Division didnotfoiTn up l)efore Saarbriicken
until three hours later. The battle was not really opened until
the first hour after noon.

The JIovements of the 1 1th Division up to 4 p.m.

The small interval separating the low range of hills on the Sihmiion oi
left bank of the Saar from the pasnages over that river renderecl "<>o"-
it advisable, for the better security of the latter, to move further
forward and eject the apparently weak forces of the adversary
from their commandnig position, as from that point of vantage
all the movements on the ground hitheito occupied by the
Prussians could be perfec^tly overlooked. General v. Kameke
had the less hesitation in advancing with this object, that in case
of need he could calculate upon the support of the neighbouring
coips, as we have already mentioned. He therefore ordered,
shortly before 12 o'clock, General v. Francois to drive the enemy's
artillery ofl' the Rotherberg.

Instructions were given to the main body of the Division for
the 28th Brigade to cross thc^ railway bridge wckI of Saarbriicken,
and the batteries to pass through the town.

• Tlic original was found in the rainp of Flavigiiy, abandoned bj tlie French on
the 16th August.

210

First ftdrance
towards tho
Spicheren
heights.

General v. Francois made the following arrangements in execu-
tion of his purpose.

The 2nd battalion 74th Begiment having^ already advanced
from Deutsch Mill upon Drathzug, the 3rd battalion 39th Kegi«
ment (only 3 companies strong*) was also set in motion from tne
Reppertsberg in the same direction, with a view to gaining the
left Hank of the French position on the Spicheren heights,
dolonel V. Eskens, with the other two battalions of the regiment,
was to aim at a similar result on the enemy's ri<jht flank from
the Stifts forest.

Two battalions of the 74th remained in reserve on the Rep-
pertsberg and drill-gi'ound, to wliich place General v. Fran9ois
ordered up the 9th company 39tli Regiment from Neu^lorf.

At noon the throe batteries of the main body reached the
scmthern BlopeH of the Reppertsberg, whereupon the battery
belonging to the advanced guard moved fonvard 500 paces from
its position westward of the high-road.' WheeHng slightly to
the left at the heights north-east of Drathzug, it came into action
and brought an apparently efiective flanking fire to bear upon
the enemy's guns on the Rotherberg. As the efibrts of the bat-
teries on the lleppei-tsberg, on the other hand, were unavailing
against the enemy's well protected front, the commander of the
division moved them to the scmth-west slopes of the Wintorberg,
from which iiositicm they took the enemy's guns on tho Rother-
berg so ellectually in flank at a diKtance of 1,800 im(!e8, that the
latter were shortly compelled to withdraw further up the heights.

Meanwhile (/olonel v. Eskens hud comnieneetl the prescribed
movement with his H(!Ven companieK.t of which the Ist and 3rd
companies had especially been severely handled by the enemy's
distant fire before leaving the Reppei-tsberg. Some cover being
found meanwhile in the gully leading from the Winterberg to
the pond, the 39th moved in company-columns at open intervals,
the 2nd and 3rd companies in first, the 1st and 4th companies in
second line, and the three companies of the 2nd battalion in rear
of all. In this formation the low ground was traversed, first
under a brisk but ineffectual artilleiy fire, and afterwards under
musketry. They followed the path leading from the pond along
the hollow west of the Stifts forest towards the sjiddle between
the hill tops of the Gifert and Pfaffen forests, which was dis-
tinctly recognisable from the thinness of the trees at that point.

The men doffed their knapsacks on reaching the foot of the
heights. The northern edge of the wood being found unoccupied,
they conmienced to climb the thiekly wooded slopes, in doing
which most of tho men bore off* to the westward of the saddle.
They met with no opposition until they reached the crest of the
heights, where the 40th French Regiment of the Une had occu-
pied th(; wood. Here the struggle swayed backwards and
forwards, until the two foremost comjianies ultimately succeeded

* The 9th cent pan j had been ordered to move on BockcrBhau«en vid Neudorf in
order to ninintain tlie communication with the I3th Division.

f The Rth companv was in rhnrgo of thu bn^^gnge. Sco ApiK^idix XI il.

211

in gradually dnving back the enemy's skirmiBhers, and gaining
the south-east border of the Gifert forest. From this point a
French camp at Spicheren was completely overlooked.

As the enemy occupied in force a hollow path on the south of
the saddle, and kept up a withering tii*e upon the bordera of the
surrounding woods, the two companies were unable to proceed
any further.

The other two companies of the battalion gradually came into
action in the thin wood on the left flank ; first, by the 1st company,
with the exception of a section left as escort to the coloiu*, and
afterwards further to the left the 4th ccmipany, which endea-
voured to outflank the enemy's right. In moving through the
more open part between the (Jifert and Pfaffen forests for that
purpose, it came across strong bodies of French, posted behind
the edge of a ditch. When the company advanced with fixed
bayonets to the attack, the enemy retired half right, and then
directed such an overwhelming fire upon the assailants in the
open, that they were compolled again to seek cover in the wood.
A second attempt to gain a flank position by pushing still more
to the left also failed. The contact with the battalion was lost,
and a brisk fire from all sides compelled them to return to their
old position.

While the 1st battalion was engaged in this way, the 2nd
had also advanced, its 5th company following in rear of the
others as a reserve. Keeping up their left shoulders, this bat-
talion took more the direction of the Rotherberg, from which
they were now met by a strong flanking fire. Scaling the
steep slopes of the Gifert forest, the 7th company took part in
the chequered skirmish in the forest on the right of the 3rd,
during which it lost its commander. Captain Aludrack. The
6th company had also penetrated into the wood further to the
right, suffenng heavily from the flanking fire of the French
chasseurs on the Rotherberg.

By half-past 2 o'clock they succeeded in gaining the crest,
some 300 or 400 feet in height, and the soutliern skirt of the
Gifert forest. An attempt to move further failed before the
murderous fire of the enemy's artillery and musketry, which
was now directed from Spicheren at short ranges upon the 39th,
who were partly separated fi-om the adversary by a deep
ravine. The 6th company took up a position outside the
wood, at a distance of 500 paces from the eastern slopes of
the Rotherberg.

On the first symptoms of an impending serious attack upon
his position, General Laveaucoupet had sent the 10th Chasseur
battalion of Doen's Brigade into tlie horse shoo trench, which
rose immediately above the steep sides of the Rotherberg,
and which had been hitherto occupied by the sapper company.
During the further coui*se of the action, the French general
of Division drew forward the whole of Slicheler's Brigade
from its encampment to the north of Spicheren, sending the
24th Regiment to the right wing in support of the battalion of
the 40th driven back in the Gifert forest, and the other battaUons

E 2

212

of tlie latter re«^irnent to the Rotherberg. The battery at that
point, as already mentioned, had been withdrawn to the rear ;
the two others were in position immediately to the north of
Rpichon^n, liriii^:^ upon the Prussian companies whenever they
attempted to debouch from the CJifert forest. The two squadrons
of the 7th Dragoons, attached to the Division, were watching
the Siiubach against any surpri8e froin that direction,
uoon Stirir^ ^^ ^'^ o'clock the 2nd battahon 74th Regiment came up on
Weildel. " ^^^^ extreme right flank of the Prussian line at Drathzug. That

homestead was occupied by a company; two othera having
ensconced themselves on either side of the railway ; the com-
pany left originally at the Saar bridge was also called up.
During this advance the enemy was not seen. As the north-
east corner of the Stiring copse appeared to be unoccupied, the
skirmishing division of the Oth company was thrown into it. By
degi-ees the enemy appeared to become aware of the presence
of Prussian troops, and threw some shells into the homestead.

In pursuance of the orders received from General v. Francjois,
the 3rd battalion 39th Reg-iment now came up from the drill
ground to the Folster heights, advancing in three company-
columns between the high-road and the railway. Some hostile
g\ms, which were hitherto unobserved, came rapidly into action
between the high-road and Stiringcopse, and opened a vigorous
fire upon the battalion, the infantry also firing from the
Spicheren slopes; little damage, however, was done. The
skirmishing division of the 12th company was pushed forward
towards the high-road to protect the left flank, and the battahon
after crossing the Folster heights at once moved towards the
copse. Whilst moving through it, connection was established
with the skinnishing division of the 74th, which was at this
time engaged with the enemy's advancing lines of skirmishera.
Verge's Division, forming tlie left wing of the French position,
was at this time distributed as follows: Of JoH vet's Brigade at
Stiring Wendel, the 77th Regiment was occupying that village
and the iron foundry, and sweeping the railway and the adjacent
Hkirts of the forest with its lire. A half-battalicm, as ah'eady
mentiunrd, was pushed forward towards Schoneck. The 7l)tK
Regiment and tiie 3rd Rifle battalion were deployed in firat
line to the north and north-east of Stiring Wendel, most of the
rifles l)eing in Stiring copse. Both regiments of Valaze's
Brigade were still on the Kanincheuberg near Forbach; the
three batteries of the Division were in action between the copse
and the high-road. They soon however had to retire to the
heights abutting on the east of Stiring Wendel, in consequence
of the annoyance they suffered from the advance of the Prus-
sian infantry.

The 39th, under Major v. Wangenheim, had pressed onward
as far as the middle of the co[)se, regardless of the brisk fire
from the enemy's musketry and mitrailleuses. The increasing
thickness of the undergrowth, and the superiority of the enemy's
force, which became more and more apparent at every step,
prevented, however, any further progi-ess. The three companies

213

established themselves in the wood, as well as they could, but
held out with difficiJty and not witliout severe loss against the
successive onslaughts of the adversary's troops, particularly of
the rifles. Just as little head was made by the skirmishing
division detached towards the high-road, as the enemy held the
homesteads at that point. The division took up a position in
a hollow road, about a thousand paces from the custom house,
and kept up a brisk fire from this covered position upon the
French infantry and artillery.

In order to keep pace with the advance of the 3i)th, the 2nd
battalion 74th Regiment, on its right, had crossed the railway
under a heavy mitrailleuse fire ; only the skirmishing division
of the 6th company was left in the Stiring copse. The battalion,
under Major v. Eberstein, advanced into the Saarbriicken parish
wood, which was not occupied by the enemy ; the 7th company,
leading the advance, reached the southern margin at 1.30 p.m.
Breaking up entirely into lines of skirmishers, this company at
once commenced a sharp skirmish with strong detachments of
the 77th French Regiment on the heights to the nortli of Old
Stiringen. It suffered heavily ; Captani Osterwald, commanding
the company, was severely wounded. Tlic two divisions of the
Cth company (;ame up on tlie right of tlie 7th, in (u-der to
extend the line of fire; in rear of all moved the remainder of
the battalion in company-columns at open intervals.

As an unfavourable turn in the action on the further side of
the railway had meanwhile become apparent, the commander
of the battalion sent back the 8th company, as a temporaiy
measure, to the railway-crossing west of Urathzug, where its
skirmishing division became shortly involved in a vigorous fight
on the permanent way, losing many men. On the other hand,
the company succeeded in repulsing a Frencli column moving
by the side of the pond, by reserving their fire until it had
approached to within 100 paces.

The whole of Jolivet*s Brigade with the rifle battalion had
now deployed within and on both flanks of the Stiring copse,
and had pressed back the three companies of the 3i)th more and
more to tlie rear. Under these circumstances, Major v. Kberatein
brought over the remainder of his battalion to the east side of
the railway without being followed by the enemy, and at the
same time the much needed support came up to the SDtli from
the rear.

The two battalions of the 74th,* originally held in reserve,
were, as we shall presently see, also in the act of moving for-
ward at this period f between 1 and 2 o'clock). Tlio 3rd com-
pany had already skiiied the eastern edge of the parish wood
via Deutsch Mill, their object being, if possible, to approach
unobserved the left flank of tho enemy's artillery on the Rother-
berg, the shells from which had wrought considerable damage
to both battaUons when making their first ascent of the heights
south of Saarbriicken. The other seven companies, the fusfliers

* The let and the fusilier battalione.

Firit advance
upon the
Icbtherberg.

in first line, were advancing upon the Rotherberg, when General
V. Fraiifois received intimation of the didtressed state of his
right wing. In consequence of this, he ordered the 1st and
2nd companies to proceed in the direction of the Stiring copse.
They were joined, when passing over the Folster heights, by
paii; of the 3rd company, which had meanwhile debouched
n*om the parish wood at Drathzug, and had already suffered
heavily from the musketry and mitrailleuses. The remainder
of this company moved towards the high road.

After advancing from the Folster heights into the Stiring
copse for about HOG paces, the 2nd company joined the hard
pressed right flank ot the 39th whilst the 1st companv further
to the left lent its support to the detachments as they lell back,
and again led them iorward.

These fresh troops effected a change in the situation of affairs,
in that soon after 3 p.m. the southern and western edges of the
copse were mastered. The two companies of the 74th which
during the contest in the wood had entirely moved up on the
right flank of the 39th, emerged from the western edge and
advanced towards the railwuy, sullering but little loss from the
brisk musketry fire of the enemy. They now came within range
of the French artillery east of Stiring Vv endel, which swept the
whole of the ground between the parish wood and Old Stiringen.
The fire of a French battalion from the yard of the foundry
also caused them much annoyance, and in order to oppose it
Captain Weber, with half of the 1st company, pressed forward
across a marshy swamp, in which the men sank up to their hips,
towards a house on the railway close to Old Stiringen. They
occupied it, and brought an effective flanking fire to bear upon
the hostile battalion from both stories.

As the fight in the copse turned in favour of the Prussian
arms, the 2nd battalion 74th Regiment resumed its old position
at the southern edge of the parish wood. Towards 3 o'clock
the skirmishing diviKitms of the 5th, Gth,* and 7th companies
stormed the heights of the old coal pits in front of Old Stiringen,
which were then occupied by the 5th company. This latter
afterwards extended its line of skirmisliers to the right as far
as the true Stiring forest, the Gth and 7th companies throwing
themselves into the cutting on the Old Stiringen-Sehiineck
high-road. The 8th company drawn fonvard likewise from the
railway remained in reserve at the northern foot of these heights.

We must again revert to the period anterior to 1 o'clock.

The Rotherberg, conspicuous at a distance by its glowing
red hue. projecting like a bastion from the enemy's front, and
flanking all lines of approach along the open gi'ound, miisi be
captured if it be desired to eject the enemy from his strong
position.

1'lie difliculty, nay inipossibility, of an unaided fx'ontal attack
on that point could not oe disguised^ and a flank movement to

* This Bkinnishing diTision, originally left in tbe Stiring copte, had meanwhile
rejoined iU battalion.

215

the left and right was therefore resorted to with a view to
facilitating the assault.

As Colonel v. Eskens* advance in the former direction with
the Ist and 2nd battalions 39th Regiment now appeared to be
making headway through the Oifert forest, the coininauder of
the Division gave orders for the attack of the llotherborg.
Shortly after 1 o'clock General v. Frangois led thither in person
the two battalions of the 74th from the drill-ground.*

To support this movement the tliree batteries were brought
forward from the Wiiiterberg to tlie Galgenberg. Although
wthin range of the enemy's musketry, they directed their fire
upon the troops on the Spi<-here!i heights.

The fusilier battalion had deployed mto line with its companies
at 80 paces interval, the whole of its skirmishing di\nBion8 being
from 150-200 paces in front. In this formation it traversed the
open hollow from the Reppertsberg and Galgenberg under a
destructive fire from the enemy's batteries and shelter-trenches.
With every moment the losses increased, but the attenuated
ranks closed again, and without a waver reached the foot of the
heights. Major v. d. Mulbe commanding the battalion had long
recognised the difficulty of his und(»,rtaking. Ho deemed a
direct ascent of the steep ami rocky slopes impracjtieable, with-
out a corresponding flanking movement. Restraining the
attempts of some of the more foolhardy, he ordered every man
to get under cover below the heiglits, at the same time keeping
up out a moderate fire upon the enemy's riflemen j)ercliod above
them. As the enemy swept the entire foot of the hei^jhts from
his shelter-trenches, which lined the edge of the piecipice, cover
was only to be obtained by crouching under the rocky walls.

Meanwhile General v. Fran^-ois had retnrned to the 1st bat-
talion, which was following the, fusiliers at some little distance
and overlapping them on the right. It will be remembered that
ui consequence of intelligence from the riglit wing, the General
had ordered the Ist and 2nd companies into the S tiring copse,
and that the 3rd company was also employed partly there and
partly towards the liigh road. The 4th company had also been
originally assigned a south-Avcsterly direction ; it afterwards
received a contrary order to move towards the east side of the
Rotherberg, with a view to supporting the debouch from the
Gifeii; forest. Without much loss the company reached the
north-west corner of that forest, where it found protection
against the enemy's projc^ctiles imder one of the i)rojecting
natural teiTaces, and took up the connection on the left with the
6th company 39th Regiment. The i)th company of ihe latter
regiment, wliich had iust arrived on the drill ground, was also
brouffht up towards the Rotherberg.

Colonel V. Pannwitz, commanding the Tith Regimont, who
had accompanied his fusilier battalion in the first instance, was
now returning to the rest of his command. General v. Francois

* The Ist and the fusilier battalion. The 9th company 80th Regiment ovdorcd up from
Neadorf to that phice, had not yet arrived. See p. 210.

216

gave him the command of the right wing of the fighting line,
and after making the necessary arrangements, again rode forward
to the Rotherbcrg.

But nt this point it was imposyible to advance for the present,
so that the stniggle was confined for a time to the cflbrts of the
artillery. Tlieir well-aimed fire compelled the adversary's bat-
teries still visible on the Rotherberg to Umber up. Less success-
ful was the effect upon those French guns which were originally
at Golden Bremm, out had subsequently withdi'awn nearer to
Stiriug Wendel on the approach of tlie Prussian infantry through
the copse. The battery of the advanced guard, however, came
into action against them from the neighbourhood of Drathzu^,
whither it had advanced from its second position* about 3 o'clocK.
A French ammunition wagon was blown up ; the hostile batteries
ceased firing shortly after and retired. In order to improve this
advantage the 2nd heavy battery was also brought over to the
west side of the high road ; but the withdrawal of the French
artillery had left it nothing to fire at. It therefore took up a
position on the northern point of the Folster heights, and sub-
sequently opened an ellective fire upon columns of French
infiuitry moving forward upon the Spichoren heights.!
Arrixml of the Towards 3 p.m. the 28th Brigade gmdually came up into the
28tk Brigade, action On the right flank between the high-road and the Stiring

forest.

In accordance with General Kameke*s already mentioned
orders^ the brigade (5 battalions strong §) commenced to cross
the railway bridge south-west of ilalstatt at 12 o'clock, and
subsequently moved without halting along both sides of the
railway.

The advance was led by the 1st and 4th companies of the
53rd Regiment ; the remainder of the regiment followed in three
half-battalions, the rear being brought up by the 77th Regiment.

As the parish wood was already found m the occupation of
the 2nd battalion of the 74th, which was then preparing for the
previously described attack upon the old coal pits, General v.
VVoyna resolved to movu against the enemy's left flank, lie
swept round to the right with the 1st battalion 53rd Regiment,
and advanced along the slope of the Stiring forest under a
heavy fire from the adversiiry. The two half-battalions of
fusiliers followed this movement with some difficulty through
the thick undergrowth, gradually losing contact with the leading
battalion. The skirmishing division of the 11th company, thrown
out to the left as flankers, moved on the east of the railway
towards Stiring Wendel. We shall see presently that both bat-
talions gradually came into action to the north of the village on
the extreme right wing.

The 77th Regiment, following in rear, came up from a variety of

• See p. 210.
f Down's brigade.
t See p. 209.

§ The 2nd battalion 53rd Regiment, acting at escort to the corpt artillery, did not
reach the field of battle until erening.

unp pa/^- 2i7

'UANWiRFietO LiTH 22 dtOPCRD S tOVCNT GaHOKM

217

directions into the foremost fighting line. The 2nd and 3rd com-
panies had ascended the Schanzenberg at Deutsch Mill, and were
now forcing their way by a long detour through the thick under-
growth of the parish wood, so as to gain the enemy's left flank
as had been prescribed to them. The 1st and 4th companies
moved along tlic railway, and tnwnnls l\ o'clock the former side
by side with the 31>th occupied the soutlicrn angle of the
Stiring copse, the latter regiment gaining a position abreast of
them on the permanent way. The two other battalions followed
at first in the same du'ection. On reaching the south side of
Deutsch Mill, between 1 and 2 o'clock, they were requested* to
eject the enemy from the copse through which he was still
advancing, and afterwards to move towards the Spichoren
heights. In order to comply with this request the 2nd battalion
entered the copse shortly before 3 o'clock.

The fuHiliers, who had followi^d the 2nd battaHon in tho first
instance, quitted the railway at Drathzug, crossed the north-
east corner of the copse, and subsequently moved over the open
ground towards the Golden Brcnun and naraque Motitou home-
steads situated on the high-road.

The l«5th Hussars had taken up a position south of the drill-
ground in the Ehrenthal in order to maintain the connection
between the two ^vings of the extended line of battle.

The sketch opposite shows the distribution of the Prussian
troops up to 3 p.m. and will serve to explain the proceedings
now about to be described.

At the commencement of the action the whole of the bat- Sifcuation on
talions of the foremost brigade (v. Francois) were enij>loyed in ^*** "**** •*
attacking, as simultaneously as circuinstanc(,»s W(ml(l alloNv, the ^*"*
front and flanks of the adversary's position. As it then became
apparent that these forces were insufficient for the purpose, all
the reinforcements had to be drawn from the brigade (v.
Woyna) which followed. The arrival of the latter at various
points of the line of battle mixed the brigades and rendered the
exercise of command very difficult, especially on the right
whig, where the battalions of different regiments had already
become intermingled.

On the French side, in addition to the 3rd Chasseur battalion,
the whole of Jolivet's Brigade was brought forward by degi'ces
uito the foremost fighting line of the left whiff eastward of
Stiring Wendel. But as these troops gmdually Tost ground in
the vigorous and fluctuating engagement, General Frospard also
ordered the 32nd Regiment of Valaze's Brigade to advance from
the Kaninchenberg to Ktiring Wendel. As the left flank was
at that time already threatened from the direction of the forest,
General Verge threw two battalions of this regiment into the

• Thia request waa preferred to them by the adjutant of the 74tli, who, on being
wounded, had come out of action in order to fetch fresh lior^cs for himself and hi^
chief. The latter had told him to ai<k any troops which he might meet on the ruad,
to more to the western slopes of the Spichcren heiglits.

218

iron foundry, and retained the third in the village as reserve.
The artillery of Verge's Division in action to the eastward of
Stiring Wendel, although reinforced later by a 12-pounder
battery from the resei've, was unable, as we have seen, to hold
its ground against the fire of the Prussian artillery. On the
bloAving up 01 an ammunition wagon it commenced its retreat,
in effecting which it was obliged to abandon five guns on the
Old Stiriugen-Spicheren road, owing to casualties among the
teams.

In order to secure his position at this point against any
attempt to force it. General Frossard brought up to the neigh-
bourhood of Stiring another battery of horse artillery from the
reserve and two squadrons of the 4th Chasseurs, the latter
taking up a position to the south of the village with the two
squadrons of the 7th Dragoons attached to Verge's Division.

General Laveaucoupet had brought up his rifle battalion and
the whole of Michelei-'s Brigade into the action on the Spichereu
heights, partly to the Rotherberg, partly against the two
Prussian bji^ttalions pressing forward in tlie Gifeii; forest. But
as the aiiimuuition of the French troops was partially expended
and their resistance commenced to relax, Doen s Brigade was
set in movement to make an enveloping attack towards
3 o'clock : the 2nd Regiment against the Prussian left wing, the
63rd to the Rotherberg. The latter in its advance came under
the already mentioned fire of the Prussian artillery on the
Folster liuiglits.

Whilst the wliole of Laveaucoupet's Division was tlius
gradually l)rought forward into the engagement, the head of
Bataille's Division reached the Spicheren plateau from Oetingen.
BastouFs Brigade, reinforced by a battalion of the 23rd Regiment
and a battery, had marched ni the forenoon directly the can-
nonade was audible to the northward. On finding that the
Stiring positions were also threatened, General Bataille ordered
up the rest of his Division in this direction. Only the rifle
battalion and a company of engineers were left behind to guard
the camp at Oetingen.

We may here state that the G7th Regiment of Bastoul's
Brigade subsequently moved towards the north-western slopes
of the Spicheren heights, from which the low groimd at Stinng
is commanded. Of the GGth Regiment, one battalion advanc^^d
to the Rotherberg ; another, with the battalion of the 23rd
Regiment, moved olF further to the right, in order to support
Micheler*8 Brigade, engaged in the Gifert forest. The 3rd
battalion of the GOth Regiment took up a position at Spicheren.
The battery which had come up with Bastoul's Brigade rein-
forced the artillery of Laveaucoupet's Division, which was firing
iiTCgularly for want of ammunition. The other two batteries
marched to Stiring Wendel.

Of the other troops of Bataillo's Division set in movemeut
towards that place, the two battalions of the 23rd were subse*
quently employed, partly in the village itself and partly on the
extreme left ^ving, to meet the outnanking movement which

219

was constantly threatening from the Stiring forest. A battjilion
of the 8th took up a position south-east of Stiring Wendel in
reserve; the other two were called up to the Spicliuruii heights
by General Bataille.

At 3 o'clock the whole of Verge's Division, with the exception
of the 55th Regiment at F(»rl)ach, was engaged in tlie low ground
at Stiring ; Laveaucoupet's Division was on the SjucHieren heights.
Bataille*s Division was in the act of advancing towards both
wings of the line of battle ; part of it had already arrived on the
Spicheren plateau.

As aheady mentioned,* the French batteries on the Rother- Storming of
berg and on the Forbach high-road had been compelled tore- the Bother-
treat, owing to the visible superiority of the Prussian artillery ; ^^th of
the infantry on the arrival of the 28th Brigade also made unmis- Genenl r.
takeable progress in the direction of Stiriiig Wendtil. Under iJ'ratov*'"-
these apparently favourable circumstances, Litnit-Qeneral v.
Kameke repeated his former order to attack the enemy and drive
him from the Rothorbcrg. When those instnictions reached
General v. Francois towards *i o*(^lock, th(* fusilier battalion of
the 74tht was holding its grouiul in the nuinner already de-
scribed on the slopes of the heights. The moment for tlie assault
was happily chosen, in so far as at this time the firing from the
enemy's shelter trenches was on the wane ; the adversary's
attention was turned more to the right, where the participation
of the 4th company of the regiment,t in conjunction with the
39th under Colonel v. Eskens in the Gifert forest, was now
making itself felt. The 9th company 39th Regiment.t under
GapUiin Heniihold, which had been ordered uj) by General v.
Fran9ois, was also approaching the foot of the heights.

Leaving a small cletachment in rear, the fusiliers of the 74th
Regiment, led by their general, commenced scaling the steep
and rocky slopes. Climbing with cUlficulty from Icnigi? to hidge,
and resolved to attack the enemy with butt and Uiyonet, they
approached nearer and nearer the edge of the heights. After a
few minutes th(^ foremost shelter tri^nch skirting the edge was
reached, to the evident surprise of the French riilemen, who
were driven out after a short resistance and took refuge behind
an undulation of the higher gi'ound. Small though the room
and murdenms the fire, the men speedily rallied round their
cliiefs for a further advance, as the French infantry were making
a vigorous counter-attack from the direction of the Gifert forc^st.
At this moment, the Uth company of tlie I)9th, encouragiMl by
the cheers of General v. Franrois, also reached the heights. The
general, placing himself at tlu»ir head and waving his sword on
high, exclaimed, " Forward, my bravo Thirty-ninth I " and led
the small band with drum beating against the outnumbering
enemy.

• See p. 216.
t Sec p. 215.

220

Pierced with five bullets, the brave general sank to the earth*
The annihilating file-fire of the French rendered any further
advance impossible ; the remnant of the five companies,* how-
ever, remained unflinchingly by the side of their dying com-
mander.

General v. Francois expired after a few minutes, breathing the

words, " It is indeed glorious to die on the field of battle. I die

*' in peace, for I see that the battle progresses onward."

l^»ej«| ot In order to meet the danger threatemng from the Qifert forest,

£e GH^^ *° considerable bodies of French had, as we have seen, been set in

forert. movement in that direction, part of which acted in immediate

support of Micheler's Brigade, while part endeavoured to out-
flanic the extreme Prussian left.

The 1st battalion 39th Regiment, which was here engaged,
resisted, in the most heroic way, the ever-increasing superiority
of the French. Major v. Wichmann, commanding the battalion,
fell; several officers wore placed hors de combat; no supervision
or unity of action was possible on the steep and woody slopes.
The men, exhausted by the long struggle, liad partly fired away
their ammuniticm ; there was neither support at hand nor the
wherewithal to replenisli their pouches. Under these circum-
stances, with three hostile battalions attacking them in front and
at the same time outflanked on their left, the Prussians ulti-
mately found themselves compelled to retreat. The enemy
followed as far as the northern skirt of the wood, from whence
he directed a destinictive file-fire upon our shattered troops as
they retired to the Winterberg, but without making any further
advance. He seemed satisfied with occupving the depression
between the Gifert and Pfaffen forests, and the adjacent out-
skirts with the 2nd Regiment ; the 24th was again withdrawn.!

At the same time that the Prussian battalion on the left flank
was engaged with the two lust-named regiments, a similar
unequal struggle was taking place further to the right, where
Major V. d. Hardt with 3 companies of the 2nd battalion was
opposed to the 40th French regiment of the line. The 6th com-
pany maintained its position in front of the Rotherbcrg,} from
whence it had supported v. Fran^ujis' attack with its fire. On
the other hand, the two companies pushed forward to the
southern border of the Gifert forest were forced to retire by
degrees to the ridge, and part even as far as the northern edge
of the wood. As the enemy did not press after them, but rather
moved off to the left towards the Rotherberg, the 7th company
succeeded in maintaining its position on the northern slopes of
the Gifert forest. The 5th company, close on its left, again
advanced to the ridgo, and the greater part of the 3rd company,
on the left wing, conformed. Onl}*^ a division of the latter com-

* The fusilier battalion of the 74th and 9th coinpany 39th Bef^ment.

t There is no doubt that this caution on the part of the enemy may be ascribed to
his having remarked the adyanco of fresh Prussian reiuforeements, to which we
shall presentlj allude.

I See p. 211.

221

pany had joined the other part« of the lot battalion in the rear-
ward movement to the Winterberg. Towards 4 p.m. tlie latter
took post there alongside of the recently arrived reinforcements.

The arrival of fresh forces had nnqucstionably become of the
greatest importance to the Prussians, in order to support the 14th
Division, extended over a front of nearly 3 miles, in its hitherto
unequal struggle. The dense columns of Bastoul's Brigade could
at tliis time be distinctly seen descending the PfaflTenberg
towards Spicheren. At any moment we might expect our
attenuated front fighting line to be driven back or pierced by a
general advance of the enemy's overwhelming force.

CtouRSB OP THE Action later in the Afternoon.

On his arrival at Saarbriicken, General v. Goeben, as the senior AmT»l of tbr
general officer present, assumed the chief command on the battle- ^f "*^'^*?'
field. This occurred at the time when the 28th Brigade had j^thWvSSoL.
moved into the wooded country at Stiring, when General v.
Fran9oi8 was storming the sides of the Rotherberg, and when
the troops in the Gifert Forest were already giving way before
the enemv's superior forces. A speedy reinforcement was urgently
required by the weak and evidently hard-pressed left wmg in
the Gifert forest and on the Rotherberg. General v. Goeben
therefore resolved to employ the arriving troops against the
steep and wooded northern slopes of the Spicheren heights, so
as to obtain a permanent footing there, and taking the enemy's
positions in flank, press forward to the plateau. It seemed
unadvisable at the present juncture to hold back any reserves, it
being above all things necessary to restore the wavering fight.
In case of need, the parts of the Ilird and Vlllth Army Corps,
which might be expected later on, would form a reserve.

For the present — ^between 3 and 4 o'clock — the only troops
at disposal were the foremost detachments of the 5th and 16th
Divisions, which arrived almost simultaneously, the one on the
Winterberg, the other on the Reppertsberg.

The 9th Hussars and the two batteries led the advance of the
16th Division. They reached the Reppertsberg soon after
8 o'clock, and took up a position in the Ehrenthal next to the
15th Hussars.

Of the batteries, the heavy one was the first to advance west
of the high-road to the Galgenberg, where it was followed by
the light, moving on the east of the road, as the great distance
of the Reppertsberg precluded any good effect against the
enemy's artillery on the Spicheren heights. The fire of these
fresh rrussian guns was airectetl for a time chiefly upon the
mitrailleuse battery of Laveaucoupet's Division, which, on the
withdrawal of the Prussian companies in the Gifert forest, had
advanced to the south-west angle of that wood.

By 4 o'clock the three battalions of the 40th Regiment had
come up by degrees to the Reppertsberg behind the batteries.

222

The first six companies were set in movement towards the
Botherberg, the other five* towards the Gifert forest.

The commander of the 5th Division, General v. Stulpnagel,t
had reached the battle-field with the light battery after 2 o'clock ;
he had ordered the squadron of dragoons to proceed along the
light bank of the Saar, to observe Saargemiind. After 3 oxlock
the remaining troops of his advanced guard reached the Winter-
berg, having crossed the old bridge of St. Johann in rapid
succession.

The renewed ofFensive movements which were in preparation
from the Reppertsberg and Win terberg now took place under the
effective co-operation of these G batteries of the Finst Army.

The respective positions winch these batteries maintained
until after G p.m. are shown on the sketch below.

Sketch.

Shoioing the positioiis of the batteries of theht Army at 3.30-6 j>.m.

I
f

6/ILCCW8CII6

M
4^

f9l»L

9orNi?f«BCRa

EXFLAVATIOK. — ^Tlie figures in the numerators denote tbe numbers of tlie batteries

(Boman >■ heayy; Arabic ■■ light). The numbers in the de*
nominators indicate the regiments to which the batteries belong.

The batteiy on the Folster heights, with its front to the south-
east, maintained an effective flanking fire upon the Spichcren
heights. Hostile columns of infantry, which on several occasions
endeavoured to gain the Kotherberg from the rear, wore forced

* See remark, p. 207t
t See p. 206.

223

by its fire to retire. It also hindevod two hostile liattoriee in
tneir attempt to come into action on tlie lioiglitfl againRt it. It
also dismonnted two pieces of a mitrailleuse battery, which had
appeared during the course of the action on the spur of the
Forbacjh lieights projectnig towards (Jolden r>ronnn, and com-
pelled it hkemse to retire.

The two batteries between the high road and Drathzug had
engaged with success the enemy's artillery at Stiring Wendel,
and gave eflfectivo support to the fusiliers of the 77th in their
advance upon the two nomesteads on the high-road. They sub-
sequently impeded the advance of hostile columns which were
attempting to descend from the Forbach heights to the farm
buildings. In this they wore assiHtcd by the nearest battery on
the east of the high road, whilst the two batteries on the left
flank brought then* fire to bear upon the hostile troops on the
Rotherberg or on the high-road, according as the fluctuations of
the infantiy fight demanded, until the decisive advance of the
Prussian infantry ultimately masked the fire of the ai-tillery and
caused its suspension.

After the 48th Regiment had assembled and formed up on the
Winterberg, General v. Doring, with the concurrence of the com-
mander of t^e 5th Division, oraered the Ist and fusilier battalions
under Colonel ▼• Garrelts to advance against the Gifert forest
at half-past 3 o'clock. The troops proceeded in the direction
previously taken by Colonel v. Eskens, towards the saddle of the
mil between the (jifert and Pfaffen forests, which was recog-
nizable by the thinness of the wood at that point. The 2nd
squadron of the 12th Dragoons scoured the flank towards
St. Amual, on the left bank of the Saar ; the battery at first
remained on the Winterberg, and sulisequently advanced to the
line of guns on the Galgenberg, but owing to the want of a suit-
able object did not open fire.

The debris of the 1st battalion 39th Regiment was moved into
a supporting position further to the rear.

At this time the Ist battalion 12th Regiment* had likewise
reached St. Johann by rail. It advanced at once to the Repperts-
berg, and was thence set in movement for tlie Rotherberg at
4 p.m. The 2nd battalion of the regiment, which an-ived half
an hour later, followed, taking a direction more to the left towards
the east side of the heights.

General v. Alvensleben, commanding the Ilird AiTiiy Coips,
had also travelled by one of these trains to St. Johann. He
hastened forthwith to the battle-field, where he fully agreed
with General v. Stiilpnagel tliat the hitended attack on the
French right wing must be followed up with all possible vigour.
In consequence of this, the latter officer at 4.30 p.m. ordered the
2nd battalion 48th Regiment to advance from the Winteibcrg, in
order to fill in the first place the gap between Colonel v. Gan*elts'
two battalions and the troops coming from the Keppci-tsberg.

These and the subsequent measures, although emanating irom

• Bee pp. 206>7.

224

the generals of different army corps and armies, were in unison
with the general control of the action assumed bj General v.
Goeben, and were for the most part mutuallj" agreed upon by
the various commanders. Generally speakmi^, Generals v.
Doeriug, v. Stiilpnagel, and v. Alvensleben led the advance from
the Wiiiterberg: Generals v. Kameke, v. Bamekow, and v.
Goeben that by the Reppertsberg and Galgenberg.

At half-past 4 in the afternoon General v. Zastrow, command*
ing the Yllth Army Coips, arrived on the battle-field, and
assumed the chief command as the senior in rank.
Benewed A tremendous struggle for the possession of the heights now

Gitot^orett** ^lifi^ed on the Rotherberc, and in the Gifertand Pfaffen forests,
and on the In firat line on the French aide counting from the left, were the
Botherberg, 63rd Regiment, the lOth (/haAseur Imttalion, and the 2nd Regi-
4^imd7 ment ; opposed to them at the outset, and with difficulty main-

taining the ground which they had gained, were the 10 com-
panies* of the 14th Division, as the previously mentioned 8 bat-
talions of the 5th and 16th Divisions only joined in by degrees.
The course of the struggle admits of the main features being
alone depicted, as the troops of the four different brigades became
mixed up at an early period, and owing to the difficulty of fixing
precisely the times of the different phases of the action, no great
exactness in the details can be attempted. Let us commence
with the left wing.

The two battalions of the 48th Regiment under Colonel v.
Garrelts advanced in the following formation towards the eastern
part of the Gifeit forest ; the fusiliers in first line, the 9th and
12th companies in company-columns, the remainder as a half-
battalion in rear ; in rear of all came the Ist battalion, likewise
in half-battalions. These troops reached tlie foot of the heights
not far from the oft-mentioned saddle, under a slight shell and
musketry fire, passing the last strip of ground at the double.
Whilst tlie 1st battalion remained tem[»orarily in reserve behhid
an eai-thern bank, the fusiliers commenced to ascend the wooded
slopes of the ravine. The adveraary, crouching in the ditches
ana under cover of tlio large trees, received them with a brisk
fire. On finding himsulf, however, taken in flank by the 9th
company, which luul brought up its right shoulder, he withdrew
skirmishuig through the high wood. The fusiliers retaining
generally their original formation, followed, losing many men
and reached the southern skirt of the wood about 6 p.m. The
enemy withdrew across the open between the Gifert and Pfaffen
forests, just as he had done in the first attack of the 89th,
with a view to making another stand in the deep ditches of
the road leading to it from the south, and there overwhelming
the fusiliers with superior forces. Mennwhile, at the instance of
Lieut.-General v. Stillnnnpel then present, the Ist battalion had
advanced with the object of turning the adversary's right.
Covering its own left flank with a division, it reached the out-

* The fusilier buttnlion nnd the 4th co ni pan r 74th Segiuicnt ; 9th, 5th, 6th,
7th, and t>ro*thirds of the Srd conipaD}r 301 h Kegiroent.

225

skirt of the wood half an hour after the fusilierfl, just at the
moment when the enemy was making a vigorous forward
movement with strong bodic's of skirmishers. It succeeded in
repulsing thom at all points, and maintaining the edge of the
wood which had been captured.

On the Rotherberg the situation of the five Prussian com-
panies* had assutned so unfavourable an appearance after General
V. Francois' death, that a support became more and more
neccssaiy. Ammunition had ah-eady begun to fail, and it was
only by exemplaiy steadiness that the shelter trenches firet
captured on the extreme edge of the heights could be maintained.
On the ridge gently shaping upwards from thence, the enemy
had strongly occupied two other defensive positions. The
nearest was on a swell of the ground commaii<ling the entire
slope as far as the lower edge* of the heights ; the second position
consisted of shelter trenches on the most elevated part of the
ridge, the adjacent wood forming a safe support. Ihe infantrv
defence of both positions was supplemented by artillerv, which
was advantageously posted further to the rear on the heigh t8,t
any advance on tlie part of the Prussians along the naiTow
tongue of the heights would l)e flanked by the French from the
Gifert forests The Prussian Fusiliers only awaited the arrival
of the first reinforcement to commence this movi'inent.

The 3rd battalion 40th Regiment was in point of fact at this
moment apnroacliing. When the 9th company of the regiment
commenced the ascent of the Uotheiberg, the Prussian com
batants had almost entirely ext)ended their ammunition. Ad-
vancing together they captured the nearest hostile jjosition on
the swell of the gnmnd. The 12th company, which had made
a wider circuit to the eastward, and had thereby gained the
right flank of the third position along the ridge, came into view
soon after. After a short but vigorous musketry action, th©
adversary gave up this positicm as well, and threw hunself into
the nearest part of the Gifert forest and into the pits in front,
which liere brought the action to a standstill. General v.
Bamekow now ordered the other two companies to advance
into the foremost fighting line. After rapidly climbing the
heights, the lOth followed the western slope, captured HO men
in a small ravine, and then operated against the enemy's left
flank from the nearest heights ; the 1 1th took part in the front
attack.

Whilst the Prussians were thus fighting transversely to the
ridge in a long line at open intervals, strong detachments of the
lOtn French Chasseur battalion and 6iird Kegiuient broke out
of the Gifert forest against their left flank.

At this critical moment, however, fresh forces on the Prussian
side took a decisive part in the most opportune manner.

* Fusilier battalion 74tb Regiment and 0th company 3!)tli R4*gimont.

t It may here be noticed that a deeply sunken Tulley seiMirates the Stifts and
Oifert forests, and also the Rotherberg from the more open hrighte on the noui h.
See Plan.

2i>G

Of the iBt battalion 12th Regiment, tlie let company advancing
on the treat of the road from Saavhriicken to Spicheren, had
climbed the Ki»therberg, and in concert with the troopR fighting
on the open ridg(5 repnlned the fiiBt oflensive movement of the
enemy. Kastivard of the wime road, the 2nd company had
meanwhile dashed up to within 300 paces of the strongly occu-
ied northern edge of the Gifert forest, ensconced itself in a
lollow in front, and thereby supported the half-battalion, which
was following, in its advance up the eastern slope of the Rother-
berg. This latter was thus enabled, after sending forward strong
bodies of skirminhers vn\\\ closely following 8ni)poi*t8, to partici-

Iiate in the violent st in ggle on the heights. The positi(»ns which
lad been gninedwere successfully maintained against two fresh
atUicks of the French, in which Colonel v. Renter, connnanding
the 12tli Regime]it, who accompanied his leading battalion, was
mortally wounded.

The western ixirt of the (li/ert forest was, however, still in the
enemy's hands, and to that point chiefly were now directed the
combined eflbrts of the fresh reinforcements, which arrived in
rapid succession from the AVinterberg and Reppei-tKberg.

The 2nd battalion 48th Regiment, which was intended, as we
are aware, to fill the gaj) between the troops advancing from
both points, had formed into company-columns at open intervals
on approaching the northern edge of the forest. Those of the
right wing moved towards a steep and strongly occupied ravine,
stonned it Avitli heavy loss,* and then skirting the western edge
of the wood drove before them the encany who still offered I'esis-
tancc (m the heights. The two companies of the left wing had
penetrated into tlie wood further eastward. With loud cheers
and with drums beating they slormcd the ridge within the wood
m conjunction M'ith the troops already engaged at that point.f

The 1st battalion lOth Regiment had originally advanced from
the Rei)pertsberg in half-battalions, but on approaching the
heights also formed company-columns. The 1st and 4th moved
to the eastern slope of the Rotherberg and seized the north-west
comer of the Gifert forest, with the assistance of the troops
fighting there. The 2nd and Hrd (;ompanies penetrated into the
wood further to the left. Both whigs of the battalion met with
a very violent resistance ; several officers were badly wounded,
Befon^ 5 t>'eloek the 2nd battalion 40th Regimentt came up in
rear of the last two companies, and also took part ni the stnig-
gle which was surging backwards and forwards in the wood.
The fui-ther they penetrated into the forest, the more violent the
firing and therefore the more stubborn the enemy's resistance.

Tlu^ 2nd battalion 12th Regiment, which only disembarked in
St. Johann at 4 o'clock, had in its advance from the Reppertsberg

• Tlio coinniniMkr of tlio 6th company, Captain Werner, ivat among the killed.

t Tho 2nd conipinij of (be 12ih, the 4tli company of the 74th, and the 2nd batta-
lion of the 39th Kegimeiitft.

X See note on p. 207. The 7th compiiny al»o made its appearance during the later
part of the action on the Spicheren plateau.

loUhct vojcte, 22€.

227

taken a direction midway between the Rotherberg^ and the eastern
part of the Gifert forest, with a view to maintaining the com-
munication between the separated \^4ng8 of the 5th Division, a
duty which had been originally assigned to the 2nd battalion
48th Regiment. When this battalion also joiiiud the action at 5
o'clock, the fighting was still raging round the highest point of
the heights in the forest ; the Prussian troops, however, were
already in general gaining ground towards the southern edge.

Independently of the more isolated action in which the 1st and
fusilier battalions 48th Regiment were engaged at the Pfatfen
forest, there were 32 Prussian companies employed Ijetween
5 and 6 p.m. in the Gifert forest, and on the bare ridge to the
westward ; of these the fu.siliei*s of the 74th Regiment were
ahme collected as a battalion.*

Ilicy met with a very stout opjxwiticm from Laveaucoupet's
Division, the whole of which was now engaged; parts of
IhistouFs biig-ade had also come up into line.

The struggle swayed backwards and forwards, advantages
being gained and lost according as fresh troops came up to the
one side or the other.

This obstinate wood fighting entailed heavy losses. Even the
companies w^ere much mixed up ; those detachments wliich had
lost their oflicers joining themselves on to other troops. The
Prussians were however making more and more progi-ess. They
drove the advei-sary down from the most elevated point, and
by degrees almost out of the Gifert forest, nearly the entire
southern edge of which was reached and in their hands by (>
o'clock. Somewhat later the enemy was completely driven out
of the Pfaffen forest and forced down into the ravine on the
southern side. The south-west angle of the first-mentioned
forest was the only place the Prussians coidd not pennanently
maintain, as the enemy redoubled his efforts espec^ially in that
direction, and supported his repeated attacks with a heavy fire
of guns and mitmdleuscs. The configuration of the ground ^vas
favourable to the French, in so far that while giving an open
field for artillery, it permitted the deployment of a broad front
against the nanow ridge, fnmi whir.li alone the whole of the
Prussian troops as yet m the Gifert forest <and on thi», Rotlier-
berg were endeavouring to press for%vurd. In order to eject the
enemy from his present position, it was first nc^cessjiry to gain
the saddle between the Spicheren and Forbach heights from
the west side of the Rotherberg, and thence the enemy's loft
flank. We shall see how the reinforcements which subsequently
an-ived were employed for this purpose.

• Fiisilier battalion and 4t.li compnrv 7ltli Rr^iTuent -= 5 cos. \ ^..., p:^:.:^-
6tli. 6tli, 7t1., yili.niulgrfutrrjmiiVf :5rtUo.31MhKcgt..- 4}, „ 1 1 ^t"" ^*v««on.

40th Krgimcnt -11 ,, KJHiDiTision.

1st and 2Dd bottrilionf, 12th Ui'gimciit • - '" ? " l^ 5th Dimion

»» J

2nd bait alien, 48Hi Regiment "4

Total - - 32J

See adjoining sketch.

F 2

228

Engagements
at Stiring
Wendel and
on tlio liigli
road: 3to6
p.m.

While in the niauner just dotuiled, the PinfMrian left wing esta-
blished itself on the northern portion of the Spicheren heights,
the engagement in the hiw ground at Stiring nad also received
a fresh inipnlse by the arrival of the 28th Hngade, without pro-
ducing any immediate results. The movement for enveloping
the enemy's left flank, initiated from the north by the 53rd Uegi-
ment, was wanting in the necessary support, because the greater
part (»f the 77th Regiment, which followed, was, as we know,
employed in another direction. The detachments which came up
by degrees into the battle-field north-east of Old Stiringen,
were, as has been mentioned, not fighting either as a regiment
or brigade ; unity of ccmimand was also hampered by the im-
possibility of seeing over the wooded country, Un<ler these
circumstances, iu spite of all the bravery of the connnanders
and of the troops, the forward movements undertaken after 4 in
the afteriujon only led to isolated and transient successes.

But as the attacks from thU side threatened the principal
communi(;ati()ns of the French, they must have appeared so
dangerous to General Frossard as to induce him, tt»wards4p.m.,
to bring forward liis last regiment, the 55th, which had been
kept in rear at Forbacli, and the remaiinler of the artillery re-
serve to Stiring Wendel. Thus not only was Verge's entire
Division engaged against eight partially isolated Prussian bat-
talions, but half of Kataille's DiWsion had also, as we are
aware, taken the (hnction of Stiring Wendel, and had joined
by degrees in the action at that phu.*e.

With this premise, let us consider the separate struggles which
deveh>ped from the situation of the action at 3 o'clock.*

General v. Woyna had continued his turning movement against
the enemy's left wi/nj with the 1st battalion 58rd Regiment,
Driving detachments <»f the 3rd French Chasseiu* battmion iu
the Stiring forest before him, he reached about 4.30 p m. the
neighbcmniood of the branch railway coming from the old coal-
pits, where it bends southward toStuing Wendel at the.edgo of
the wood. I'he battalion took up a position opposite the jnace,
which was found however ho strongly occupied, that an attack
without reserves held out no pronjiso of succeHs. A vigorous
fire was shortly directed from the church tower and factories
S(mth of thii main line of rail upon the detac^hment thus suddenly
ai)pearing within such dangerous proximity, which, however, had
become disconnected during its rauid advance in the Avood from
the two half-battalions of the fusilierH following in rear. This
to all a]»j)enr.ince isohited situa1i(»n in front of the well-known
extremely strong i)ositi(m of the adveniary, decided General v,
Woyna to withdraw the battalion (ov the pm|)osti of firat re-
gaining tlie connection with the rest of the brigade. He was
ign(»rant. however, of the fact that the latter had meanwhile
been othenvise employed.! The battalion moved iu about the
direction of Drathzug, leaving at first the 4tli company at the

* Spo okctoli facing |i. 217.
t See p. 2L6.

229

branch railway to protect the retreat, and when tliis withdrew
to follow the battalion, a skirmiHhing division for the same
piupose.

When the old coal-pits, as we have scon, fell into the hands of
the 2nd battalion 74tn Regiment at 3 o'clock, the latter pro-
ceeded to occupy the nearest houses in Old Stiriuj^en. Parts of
this battalion, m concert with the two companies of the Ist
battalion,* which had advanced from the Stiring copse, then
caotured a brick-kiln close to tlio main railway.

Meanwhile 1st Lieutenant Wachs, witli tl»o4th company 77th
Regiment, was approaching this part of the field of battle from
the railway embankment. As the enemy aj)peared to be aban-
doning the outlying homesteads of Old 8tiringen, this company
followed him into the place, and pressing forward from house to
house reached, shoiily after 4 o'clock, a railway arch strongly
occupied by hostile riflemen and infantry. After a long mus-
ketry action the company carried it by storm and occupied the
nearest houses on the other side of the railway. They captured
some 30 prisoners, besides killing and wounding many of the
enemy.f

The three companies of the 39th Regiment, which had been
fighting since noon in the Stiring copse, were joined in first line
about 3 p.nL by the Ist company 77th Regiment, under Captain
T. Manstein. The musketry and artillery fire from the enemy's

C'tion at Stiring and from the main road, caused them heavy
; the commander of the company was killed, and two other
officers were wounded. The enemy made repe^ited attempts to
regain the southern edge of the wood, in which he was success-
ful towards 4 o'clock. His further advance, however, was tem-
porarily stopped by the arrival of the 2nd battalion 77 th Regi-
ment. This battalion, as we know, had entered the wood at
3 o'clock from the direction of I)rathzug,t the Gth and 7th
companies in first line, the two others following as a half-bat-
talion. The 7th company on the left flank subsequently emerged
from the wood in order to move towards the mam road. Major
V. Koeppen with the remainder reached the fighting line of the
39th just at the critical moment previously mentioned. The enemy
opposed the most vigorous resistance to the advance of these
fresh troops. Mitrailleuses rattled away from the spur projecting
from the Forbach heights towards Golden Bremm ; numerous
rounds of case were fired from Stiring-Wendel ; an unin-
terrupted musketry fire was kept up from the borders of the
village and from the shelter trenches alongside the liigh-road.
Our brave troops, however, succeeded in retaking the soutliern
edge of the wood at a heavy loss, and in ultimately wresting
from the enemy the south-eastern angle which he had so stub-
bornly defended. The 6th company now occupied a steep
declivity to the south-west of the wood; the 5th company

• See p. 214.

t Some offioen ftnd men of the 58r(1 Regiment alao took part in thin attack.

t See p. 217.

230

cjiidoavoiirecl to croHs the open and ruach the five hostile guns
which had been left there, but wjie compelled to give up the
attempt in consequence of the anniliilating cross-fire. On the
other luind, the remains of a partially broken up camp, which
had been left stunding at the south-tiast border of the co))SC,
besides a quantity of camp-equipage, were captured, and later
m the day six filled limbera.

Two additional attacks which the enemy made upon the edge
of the wood in the interval up to 5.30 p.m. were successfully
repulsed; but most of the officei-s, among them three company
leaders, were now wounded, and the adjutant of the battalion
killed.

From the <;()mmenceniei»t of the struggle for the copse, the
Prussians had been careful to protect themselves on the side of
the Forbach high-road. The enemy had pushed forward strong
bodies of skirmisherK into the open ground between it and the
copse, the massively built and strongly occupied homesteads of
Baraque Mouton and Golden Bremm serving them as points of
suppoi-t. On the anival of Bataille's Division upon the battle-
fiela, portions of the 8th and a battjilion of the UGth llogiment
had been pushed forward to this point to form a suitable link
between the troops on the plateau and those on the lower
ground. For this purpose they occupied the two aforesaid farms
and the wooded slope of the Spiclieren heights immediately con-
tiguous.

The skirmishing division of the 12th company 39th Regiment
had originally undei*t{iken the duty of guarding this flank ; later
on the greater part of the 3rd company 74th Regiment.* After
3 o'clock the 7th company, detachmg itself from the 77th Regi-
ment, came up to this point, and in company with the other two
detachments moved upon the custcmi house, which forms the
easternmost of the group of houses on the high-road. Under the
enemy's ^vithering fire, causing the troops heavy loss and placing
all the officers of the 7th company 77th liai^ment fwrs de combat^
the progi-ess towards the chosen object of attack was slow but
continuous.

Col(»n(?l V. Paiinwitz, conniianding tlui 71th Hcgimcnt, had
now assumed the connnand at this part of the battle-field
whither tlie fuHiliors of the 77th Regiment were also advancing
from the Stiring copse.f They had formed in two half-battaUons,
following one another at full distance, and were moving forward
in the hollow at the scmth-eastern edge of the wood with the
intention of thence gaining the heights ascending to the hij^h-
road. As they wheeled to the left on reaching the last pomt
the f<mr ccmipanies became so arranged that those of the leading
hall-battalion (Dili and 12th) now forming the right wing and
taking the <liriiction of Bamque Mcmton, the others moving upon
Golden Bremm. Thus some six companies, inclusive of the

• Soo pp. 212 ami 213.
t >oo p. 217.

231

detachments already advancing upon the custom liouso, were
now moving upon the group of houses previously indicMted.

The custom house was first captured. The two half-bat-
talions, however, which reached the heights to the west of it,
suddenly came under a murderous fire from the French skir-
mishers and guns on the slopes. The hulf-battahon on the right
flank lost in a short time its commander, Captain v. Daum, and
more than 100 men. Under these circumstances the only chance
of success lay in a bold attack. Major Bressler, connnanding
the battalion, placed himself at the head of the two attenuated
companies and led them, drums boating, to the storm of Baraque
Mouton, whilst the other half-battalion pressed forward in like
manner upon Golden Bremm. The enemy's skinnishers were
thrown back into the farm buildings, wliich they defended with
great pertinacity until 4 o'clock, when they fell into the hands
of the stormers, after a hard struggle and at a gi-eat sacrifice of
life. These now commenced to strengthen themselves in the
captured buildings. They succeeded in maintaining themselves
permanently in spite of the enemy's almost uninterrupted fire
from the strongly occupied noii;h-west slopes of the Forbach
heights, which covered tliem with every sort of missile.

During this fortunate, but otherwise isolated succtiss, on the
front of the French left wing, the latter was now threatened
with a new danger on the flank.

The two fusilier half-batt^ilions of the 53rd Regiment had
advanced (m the right of the first battalion into the Stirhig
forest, sti'iking the issue from it to the west of the point where
the latter battalion had taken up a temporary position fronting
Stiring Wendel.* Whilst the I2th company remained in a sup-
porting position on the skirt of the wood for the protection of
the right flank, the 9th traveled the small open space westward
of the coal tramway, and with loud cheers forced the hostile
detachments in their front from the railway embankment back
upon the factory buildings lying to the south of it. Captain v.
Bastineller now burst open the doors of the nearest houses,
occupied them, and arranged them for defence. A well aimed
fire from every story of these houses forced the adversary to
evacuate the north-western part of the j^lace, and to tlirow
himself into the loopholed building of the u'on foundry. The
company, however, deemed it advisable to retreat towards the
forest, as the 12tJi company reported the advance of larger
hostile detachments upon the right flank.

Soon after, however, fresh forces appeared on the scene. The
2nd and 3rd companies 77th Regiment, under Captain v. Frank-
enberg, advanced from the coal tramway upon the factory
buildings situated outside the foundry. In this attack the 9tn
company 53rd Regiment again joined ; the buildings were re-
taken, maintained, and the enemy pressed back into the iron-

* See p. 228.

232

'Works tlionimlves. The skinniHliing ilivifiion of the 4tli coiiipaiiy
SiJrd Kof^iinent, which had been left in rear,* also took part in
tluH contest. Further to the right the other fuBilier half-bat-
talion of the wune regiment participated in the action at Stiring
Windel ; tlie 1 1 th company following the enemy in hifi rear-
ward movement in the forest had advanced in)on Verrerie
Sophie, captured the heights in front, and from thence moved
upon Stiring ^Yendel ; the lOtli had from the commencement
moved away more to the left and taken part m the fighting at
the north-west side of the village.

The struggle at this j)(>int passed by degrees uito a stationary
musketry ac^tion, which was (jam'iul on by the French with con-
stant reinforcements from the IWd diasseur Imttaliim, and from
the 32nd and 77th Iteghnents (»f the line, A Piiiusiau detach-
ment endeavoured from tht^ railway cutting to timi the left
flank of the straggling buildings near the iron foundiy, in doing
which the skirmishers were within 70 paces of (me another, the
French eusccmchig themselves behind coal wagons and piles of
rails. The Piiissians were unable to make any further progress ;
still thev maintained the captiued buildings under the enemy's
liefivy shell lire.

The French position at Stiriiig Wendel was thus partly taken
in rear; but the Prussijuis had no intact body of troops to serve
them as re8ei-\'e and enable them to follow up the successes
gained with such bravery, or even permanently to maintain
their positions. About 5 o'clock the 7 Ith Regiment from their
more elevated jxisition at Old Stiring(?n, observed the approach
of masses of hostile infantry and guns along the 6lo])e8 of the
S)>icheren wood south of Stiiing Wendel. This was a detach-
ment of BatailK's Division,! the batteiy of which at once opened
lire upon the Prussian tr4)o])s at Ohl St iringen and reached them
with its shells. At the same time oflensive hostile movements
Avere i»bserved along the high-r(»ad to the east of Stiring Wendel.
Major Werner, who had assumed the commandas the senior field
oflicer, did not deem it advisable under the circumstances to
continue any longer in a ])osition ait such (;lose quarters to the
enemy, when thctni was no pr<»Npeet of suppint or of furtlua*
success; he therefore gave orders for the retreat of the six
companies of the 74th liegimcntj towards Drathzug. We shall
shortly see that the remainder of the troops fighting in the low
groiuid about Stiring were nujre or less mvolved in this rear
ward movement, due to the general forward movement of the
French, which was now commencing.

• See p. 22t>.

t Seopp. 2IHuik1 221.

{ let au<l 2n(l ('oni))uitit'd uiid tin; 2ik1 battalion, 71i)i Kcgiuient. See p. 2:i0.

233

The Battle after 6 p.m.

Daring the action at Stiring Wendel, whica we have just Oeneral id*
Bketched, very considerable forces* had been by degrees brought ▼»*"'• ^^ *^«
up on the French side. As, however, these appeared inadequate R^jJ^^enfc of
to restrain the forward pressure of the adversary, General Bat- the Pruflsaaa
taille, who was present, ordered up his G7th Re^jiiaeut, which was "g'^fc ^^ ^
at that time on the Forbach heights close to tlie Spicheren Old Jj^^^^
Stiringen road, and was now moving along it down into the Wendel.
valley. A battalion occupied the U'on foundry and commenced
a musketry action with the Prussian detachments enclosing it on
all sides ; the other two battalions formed up behind a steep
slope eastward of the foundry. Under cover ol these fresh troops
the French batteries again advanced to the east side of the village
and opened a vigorous fire upon the Stiring copse. But as the
effect produced did not answer their expectations, and the
Prussians continued to maintain the wood, General Battaille
ordered both battalions to advance to the attack. The 8th |

Regiment, which had been held in reserve on the south-east of
the village followed in second line. With skirnn*Hhei-8 in front,
the remainder in column, the open ground towards the south-
east angle of the copse was crossed under a most eflTective cross
fire from that point and from the railway embankment. The
Prussian detacnments much attenuated by their previous stnig-
les and deprived of many of their leaders, could no longer hold

eir position against the enemy's energetic advance in superior
force. The three French battalions succeeded at the first rush
in reaching the wood and in gaining a firm footing therein.f

The Ist company 77th Regiment which had up to this time
held its groimd in spite of all its losses, was almost entirely dis-
persed ; 1st Lieut. Hoppe collected and led back the weak rem-
nant. The debris of the three companies of the 2nd battalion
found themselves after a desperate struggle gradually pressed
back with the 39th as far as the middle of the copse.

Some French batteries followed their infantry as far as the
Schoneck road^ and in concert with the artillery on the Forbach
heights commenced to cannonade the open ground between the
copse and the Spicheren heights. Other batteries remained in
reserve on the slopes of the heights south of Stiring Wendel
and swept the ground to the north of the village and railway.
Simultaneously ^vith this attack on the Stiring copse the French
troops had also advanced from Stiring Wendel in other directions
and taken possession of the surrounding ground as far as the .'

borders of the forest.

* The whole of Verge's DhiBioii and tlie reterre aitillerj, parte of Talabr^gue't
Caraliy DiTision, 2 battalions of the SSrd and 1 battalion of the 8th Regimente, and
2 baiterie* of Bataille's Pi? inon. See alto pp. 218-220, and p. 228.

t On this occasion the if rench recaptured the flTe guns which they had preTiously.
abandoned.

234

The rearward movement of the 74th,* ordered hy Major Wer-
ner, took place as follows : part followed the line of rail, pai-t along
the Schoueck road, then turning to the right through the forest
moved likewise upon Drathzug. Smaller detachments of the
39th, 53rd, and 77th Regiments, which had been engaged in the
struggle in this neighbourhood, joined in the movement ; the
4th company 77 th llcgiment which had remained alone at
the railway culvei-t eflfected its retreat with no inconsiderable
loss.

The detixchments engaged in the noithem part of Stiring
Wendelt and the vicinity retired slowly towards the Stiring
forest. Parts of the 11th and 12th companies dSrd Regiment
covercMl the rittreat by t4iking up a finii positidu on the flank at
the railway cutting in I'ront of Vcrrene Sophie. The enemy
followed them from Stiring AVendel over the railway embank-
ment, but failed to capture tlie edge of the wood, which
was obstinately held by the 2nd and 3rd companies 77th
Regiment.

Simultaneouslj'' with the general forward movement from
Stiring Wendel, which pressed back the right ^ving of the Prus-
sian fighting line, |)ai*ts of the 8th Regiment also advanced from
the Forbach heights into the long ravine leading down towards
Baraque Mouton, in order to endeavour to recaptiu'e the group
of houses occupied by the fnsilier battalion 77th Regiment.J
With the aid of reinforcements drawn from Golden Bremm, and
with the co-operation of the batteries on the Galgenberg and
Folster heights, they succeeded in beating off the French attack.

The last arriving reinforcements of Bataille's Division were
now also in action on the Spicheren plateau. The two battalions
of the 8th Regiment, which had been despatched there, partici-

Eated in the general forward movement of Laveaucoupet's
division towards the Rotherberg and the Gifert forest, which
somewhat pressed back the foremost Prussian detachments, so
that at G p.m. the French were in ])Ossession of the s(mth-west
angle of the Gileit forest, and the heights at the Pfaffen
forest.

Some time j>revi<)n.sly the Generals commanding the Ilird,
Vllth, and VI ilth Army Corps had met upon the road on the
Galgenberg heights, for the purpose of concerting as to the
further measures for carrying on the contest. At that time the
positions in front of Stiring Wendel (m the right wing were still
in our hands, while in the action on the heights to Uie left the
Prussian troops were observed to be gradually gaining ground ;
the success of the day was to all appearance ensured. A provi-
sional telegrai)hic report to this eflect was sent by General v,
Goebcn from the field of l)attle to His llajesty the King, (ieneral
v. Alvensleben, who had been for some tune watching the course
of the atition from tlie Wintcnberg, deemed it however advisable

" oee noie 4. i»o j*. *.uji<.

t The 2nd and Srd companies 77th Regiment, and the greater part ot tlie fusilier

ittaliou 53rd Regiment. See p. 231.

J See pp. 230 231.

23:)

to eive aa increased impulse to the forward movement on the
Spicheren plateau. He supervised the employment to that end
01 the troops of his corps as they camo up, and took general
command on that section of the battle-fiehf.

General v. Zastrow on his w.iy to tiie scoiio of action had
already sent an officer to \^'»lkll!».li;ou to make tlio VMh Division
acquainted with the change in the situation since thi» despatch of
the corps ordci's from Dilsbnrg.* He supposed tliat the Division
was on the march to Forbach. Reports, liowever, now came in
of the unfavoumble tuni of the action at Stiring Wendel, and
the enemy's shells bursting on the Galgenbcrg showed only too
plainly the progress which he was maknig. In consequence of
this, the General rode forward over the Folster heights in order
to judge for hhnself as to the state of affairs on the right wing ;
he also ordered the batteries on the Galenberg to move to the
Folster heights, with a view to preparing a counter attack.
From that point they were able to play a more efficient part in
the action on the heights, which was now iiu'liiiing towards the
Forbach ridges.

We must now follow the farther course* of the battle on the Progrewof

Spicheren plateau. Ihesji^i^n

The main body of the 9th Brigadef had quitted its Quarters at plateau, after
Friedrichsthal and Bildstock towards 2 o'clock, anci, without 6 p.m.
halting, traversed the 9 miles to St. Johaun, where the vanguard
arrived before 5 o'clock.

In the huiTy of leaving, the 3rd Rifle battalion had inserted
itself betweeti tJie companies of" the leading battalion of the
Body-gnard Grenadiers, in such wise that 3 ccmipanics of the
latter followed in rear of tluj rifles. The AVinterberg was ap-
pointed as the general place of asscunbly of the troops.

It had been originally intended to move the whole of the
Body-guard Regiment through the Stifts forest upon the adver-
sary's right flank, a direction wliicli, in point of fact, was taken
by the commander of the 1st battalion with the leading 3rd
company. The other three companies, which came up afterwards
for the reason just stated, received, however, orders to advance
towards the western slope of the Spicheren heights for the pur-

1)0se of gaining possession of the saddle south of the Rotlicr-
)erg.

With this object in view, Capt^ain Blumenhagen led the 1st
and 4tli co!nj)anies np the flat gully, which ascends in an easterly
direction from the custom hcmse on the Forbach high-road
towards the saddle in question ; the 2nd company followed.
When the first line reached the ridge, it was received with a
witheruig fire. But the grenadiei*s dashed forward from the
edge of the wood at the double, wrested the southermost knoll
of the Rotherberg from the enemy, in spite of his obstinate
defence, and forced their way into the south-west corner of the

» Soc p. 20S.
t Sec p. 2(Hi.

236

Gifcrt foreet. The 2nd company remained on tlie western slope
of the heights, co-operating in the defence of the homesteads
on the high-road,* which still continued to be threatened by the
enemy.

This resolute advance of the three companies forced back the
centre of the enemy's line of battle as far as the southernmost
and more elevated point of the Spicheren heights and the busliy
slopes of that wooa. No further progress could, however, be
made for the present ; the enemy rather persevered in his eflForts
to regain the gi'ound which he had lost (m the plateau.

Before even the action hud tissumod this phase, the superior
commanded were unanimously in favour of bringing up cavalry
and artillery to the Spicheren pliittuiu, so as to give mure decisive
efleet to the present successes of the infantry ; Colonel v. Rex,
commanding the 82nd Briga<le, wlio had been present at the
struggles of the 40th Regiment, had particularly begged for the
support of artillery.

General v. Alvenslebcn, cm returning to the left flank from the
council, which had been held as already mentioned on the high-
road, charged General v. Biilow commandhig the artillery of the
Ilird Army Corps with the special arrangements refemng to his
arm ; he alKo requested (Jeneral v. Itheinbaben to endeavour to
move forward his cavalry, which, hurrying up from all sides on
hearing the roar of the cannonade, had been assembling since
noon on the battle-field.

The 17th (Brunswick) Ilussai-s, following the advance of its
outpost squadron through Saarbriicken, had reached the Ehreu-
that, at 3 o'clock. The 19th (Oldenburg) Dragoons, which after
returning from a reconnaiss«ince towards St. Avoldt had com-
menced to take up quartera on the right bank of the Saar, again
advanced by way of Volklingen and Schoneck, reaching Drath-
zug at 4 o'clock, (leneral v. Kheinbaben had brought up both
regiments to his position on the northein slopes of the Galgen-
berg, so that from 5 p.m. 10 squadrons, inclusive of the de«
tachments which had been there sines noon,| were united under
his ordei*H. He ordered the Brunswick Hussars for the intended
enterprise. The 11th Hussars, which had assembled near
Wehrden at noon, also ariived somewhat later by way of
Drathzug, and shortly after (> o'clock the remainder of the 6th
Cuirassiers, so that, exclusive of the cavalry regiments of the
three Infantry Divisions, there wore now 17 squadrons on the
battle-field.§

• See p. 234.
t See p. 202.

X k Bquodron from each of tlio following : 6th Cuimssien, 3rd Lanccn, and I7th
Ilusaars. See pp. 202 and 204.

§ 17th Hussars • - - 4 squadrons.

19th Drafc'oons - - -4 „

11th llusitars - - -4 „

6th Cuirassiers • - 4 „

3rd Lancers • • - 1 squadron.

Total 17 squadrons.

237

The Brunswick HuRsars, breaking into column of divisions
to the riglit, trotted forward into the h)w ground west of the
Spicheren heights. As the officers sent on in front could find
no path, the regiment endeavoured to clamber up the steep and
in places rocky slopes, but came under a violent musketry fire
which compelh^l them to retrace their stepH with Ioks. In com-
pliance with General v. AlvoiiKleben's requoRt to renew the
attempt, the regiment now moved towanfs the north side of
the Rotherberg, where the Saarbriicken road leads along an
embankment formed of logs of wood before rising to the Spi-
cheren heights. It is not possible to turn off this road, as a
precipitous wall rises on the right hand, and on the left the
slope falls with a steep descent, while some places are scai'ped
like cuttings. On reaching the high ground, the 1st squadron,
leading the advance, endeavoured to form up. The ground, m
consequence of the quarries, loose stones, and shelter trenches
was scarcely passable for cavalry; moreover, the adversary
directed an artillery and musketry fire wherever a horseman
showed himself. The attempt had to be abandoned and a
retreat made to the hollow road, which the other squadrons
were on the point of ascending. The regiment remained for
some time close under the rocky escai-pment, formed in twos,*
suffering considerable losses from the ceaseless bursting of
shells. The hussars were subsequently removed to a position at
the foot of the heights.

Dtu*ing these devoted but fruitless efforts on the part of the
hussars. General v. Billow had ordered up artillery to the
heights. For this pui-pose there were at disposal the two
batteries (3rd hght and 3rd heavy) of the 0th Brigade under
Major V. Lvncker, the same which General v. Stiilpnagel had
brought with him, and which on reaching the battle-field had
joined the left flank of the line of artillery on the Galgenberg.
Both batteries had received instructions to follow the first
advance of the Brunswick Hussars, but their attempts to mount
the heights fi'om the west side were equally unsuccessful, and
they subsequently took the same road Ibnned of logs of wood,
which has previously been described. This road, at all times
difficult, was plougned up by the constant bursting of shells,
and was so narrowed by the hussars halting there, that 1st
Lieutenant v. Pressentin and the leading gun of the 3rd light
battery, led by Sergeant Schmidt were alone able to reach the
heights. A j'>yful (^iieer from the struggling infantry greeted
this first appearance of the wished- for arm.

In order to obtain a suitable range upon the ground, which
rose in terraces towardH the south, the gun was driven along
the edge of the Gifert forest to beyond the extreme line of
Prussian skirmishers ; but as its h»Kse8 began to increase rapidly,
it was again withdrawn some 100 paces to the rear, undcT cover
of an earthen bank. A few minutes later. Captain Stumpff
bi*ought up to the same position the rest of the battery, which

• Or " Half- sections,*' ns it would be called in our service.— Tr.

238

had been delayed by No. 2 gim capsizing over the log embank-
ment. Of the heavy battery, Avitn which Captain Vot^e shoiily
followed only one division at firftt wae able to come into action
c-loBC to the western edge of the heights. The great recoil on
the shelving groinid luoretiver rindered the service of the gims
difficult.

Facing these 8 guns, at a distance of only 800 paces, and

wx'll protected behind shelter trenches, was a line of French

infantry, which, in concert with three batteries further to the

rear, directed a vigorous fire nnon them. The effect of the

Prussian shells, however, C(>mi)elled tlu! eui'my by degrees to

abandon the field, so that after a short time tlie remaining four

guns of th(! heavy battery wcn^ enabled to come into a<'tion to

the left rear of the light battery dose to the (iifert forcKt. Tjje

glorious struggle maintained by these two battcriis cost them

nearly half their gunners. The comma ndir of the division,

Major V. Lyncker, and several other officers were wounded.

The butteries steadfastly maintaiiicd their ))ositi«>n8 until the

end of the battle against the superior force of artillery opposed

to them, and in face of the repeated forward movements made

by the enemy from the Forbach heights and the Spicheren

forest.

Cspitmof The reinforcements advancing to the Rotherberg aiid Gifert

h**ht«****^* forest after half-past 3 o'clock had given a favonrable turn to

Course of the the situation of the fight at that jjoint. but being naiTowed by

battle on the the long ravine on the south, this ontllanking movement had

plateau. j^qj; produced the anticipated impression on the enemy's position.

Nor had the anival of the three companies of the Body-gmird
Grenadicra and the two batteries as yet sup(;rinduced any deci-
sive change. For the naiTow space for deployment on the
Prussian side hampered their advance, which had to be pur-
chased at the heaviest sacriiices. 1'he enemy still occupied a
more elevated position and a broader front ahmg the entire
northern sh)pe of the Forbach lu'ights fn»m the Spiel leren forest
to the northward ol the viUage of that nami*. Repeated attacks
froni this strongly occupied position gave umnistakeable indica-
tions of an eiVort to regjiin tluj lost ground, to retain which
every eflort of the Prussians had to be solely directed.

It was, however, still possible to reach the position occuj)ied
by the enemy, by endeavouring to jness forward from the wcast
through the Spicheren forest towards the Foi'bach heights.
Such an ofl'ensive movement was in some measure prej»ared by
Captain Blumenhagen's companies having gained a firm footing
on the heights from that direction, and by the detachments of
the 14th Division* having also maintained the farm biiildings on
the high-road, as they had repulsed with slaughter all the
attacks from the Spicheren forest as well as a cavalry charge
fronj the direction of Stiring Wemlel.

For these reasons, tlie (jieneral commanding the Ilird Army
Coips, after communicating with the other generals of his Coips

• See p. 284

239

who were present, resolved to employ the battalions not yet
brought into the action in a forward movement along the high-
road against the west side of the Forbach heightR.

At this time the absent portions of tlie 5th Division had
reached the battle-field. Firnt came the fusilier battalion 12tli
Kegiment, which had been near tlie viiKivard on tlio Wiiiter-
berg since 5 o'clock, followed by the rifl(i battalion an<l the 2nd
battalion Body-guard Oreiiaclii'rK, wliicli had taken np positions
on the drill gnmnd and the Keppertsberg. In addition to these,
General v. Schwerin,* with his two squadrons of dragoons
and two batteries anived shortly before (5 o'clock ; tlie latter
had joined the artillery on the (uilgenberg, the fire, from which
had been mute for some time owing to the want of suitable
objects. The head of the 52nd Regnnent was also close up,
and at 6.15 p.m. Captain Schmidt with the 4tli light battery of
the Ist Anny Corps reported his arrival.t

Whilst the bloody struggle on the Spicheren heights was
maintained on both sides witli ecjual obstinacy, the chief efforts
of the assailants Avere now directed against the Forbach heights
and Stiring Wendel. We shall se(^ that the whole of the rein-
forcements which came up mov(Ml in the fii*st instance in the
former direction, the 52nd Regiment participathig iu the
renewed atlvance on Stiring Wendel.

This decisive advance was powerfully supported by the
artillery, which moved forward to the Folster heights at
(5.30 p.m. in pursuance of the i)reviously nuntioncd or«uT fr<»m
General v. Zastrow. The thne batteries of the 14th Division
first took post there, west of the high-road, ironting towards
Stiring Wendel ; their right flank was joined by the 2nd heavy
battery from the direction of Uratlizug,t so that Major v.
Eynatteu ccmld employ the concentrated fire of his 24 puns
either against the hostile troops which had advanced by Stiring
Wendel or against the Forbach heights. This fine of guns was
extended to the eastward of the high-road by the two Latteries
attached to the 10th Brigade, which especially directed a very
effective and successful fire upon the nivine leacUng down from
the Forbach heights in a nortlierly direction towards the custom
house. The light batteiy of the l<)th Division and the battery
of the Ist Army Coi-ps were also employed at first in this direc-
tion. Rut {18 the space was too limited for 4 batteries, and as
no suitable place could be found on the R(»therberg, the two
Iwitteries were withdrawn to the foot of the heights in rc»ar as
reserve.

• Of the 10th Brigade, the 12th Pcpiinent., «s we saw, had hcon forwarded hy
nil from Neuukirchen ; the remainder of the DiTision mnri-lied from St. Ingbert.
See p. 207.

T This batterj had come direct from KOnigslerg, in Pniraia, in the same train,
and was to hare disembarked at Neunkirclicn. In consequence of tlie report of au
action raging to the south of Sunrhri'trken, the commander of the battery at onee
resolTcd to continue his journey to St. Johnnn, and thence hnHlor.cd to the field of
battle.

X This batterr had up to thnt time directed its five with good cflTcct upon the
hostile trco{<s Hud La'tcries visible on the Spicheren plateau.

240

Let us first connider the atruggUfor the Farbach heights.

About the same time as the artillery advance, the fusilier
battalion 12th Regiment moved by General D5riug*8 orders at
first in tlie siime direction which CapUiin Blumenhagen had
taken with the 1st battalion Body-guard Grenadiers.

Towards 7 o'clock General v. Alvensleben ordered the 2nd
battalion of this latter reghnent and the 3rd Rifle l)sittalion to
follow from the Reppertsberg. In order to establish unity in
the command, Licut.-Colonel v. Lewtticq was placed in charge
of the three battalions. The 3rd company of the Body-guard
Grenadiers,* which had been originally despatched in the
direction of the Stilts foreMt, was fctche<l back and temporarily
attacluMl to tin; 2n<l battalion.

The funilirr battalion 12th Regiment to which Licut.-Cyolonel
V. Lcstocq betook himself had meanwhile moved oft* from the
right in company-colnnnis, and advanced along the western
foot of the Spicheren heights. Undaunted by the very heavy
losses caused by the vigorous nmsketry and mitrailleuse Are
from the northern spur of the Forbach heights, it gained the
foot. The 9th company, leading the advance, pressed forward
up the slopes; the other three which had come up to the home-
steads on the high-road, were also ordered by Lieut.-Colonel v.
Lestocq to climb the hillside. This officer then moved away to
join the rifle battilion.

The latter had meanwhile advanced along the ravine east-
ward of the custom house, and had thence worked its way
onward. Itw line of skirmiKhers, pushed forward along the edge
of the heights, had come in contact on the left with the com-
panies under (!^aptain Hhnnenhagen,t wliich ha<l been established
there for some time ; the remainder of the battalion endeavoured
to gain as much cover as possible from the annihilating fire of
the enemy's inlantry on the Forbach heights.}

Lieut.-Colonel v. Lestocq felt very soon convinced of the
impracticability of a frontal attache from this side upon the
Forlmch heiglits, where m(»roover the number of troops already

!)reHent was suffic-icnt to hold the adversary in check. He there-
ore determined to load the riflis and the 2nd battalion Body-
giuird Grenadiers, now approaching along the slopes of the
heighis, back to the high-road, with a view to (»nerating from
the homesteads by a movement iurther to the right. The last-
named battalion first desrended the slopes, traversed the open
f)lain to the foot of the lieights at the double under a sharp
lostile fire, and commenced the ascent of the slopes of the
Spicheren forest from Golden Brenjm. The 3rd company of the
regin»ent joined in this advance ; the 5th was, however, left at
(iolden Bivnim, as the former occupants had advanced for the
most part with the fusilier battalion of the 12th Regiment.

• See p. 2:j5.

t Seo ))». 2a8 niid 235.

t Major y. Jena, the comninndorof i\w battalion, had been bad!}' wounded and

carried from the iield.

241

The rifles quickl^r followed this movement from the slopes of
the heights to the high-road. While traversing the open plain
also at the double they were overwhelmed by a file-fire from
the enemy's troops, which had advanced to the attack along the
ravine stretching northwards from the Forbach heights. But at
this juncture the Prussian detachments moving to tlie westward
of the ravine came upon the flank of the hostilo advance, which
was also played upon by the hatterica on the Folster heights.
The enemy was repulsed.

Generally speaking the fusilier battalion of the 12th formed
the advanced left flank of the attacking lino in the Spicheren
forest, which was prolongcnl to the right rear by the 6th, 7th,
8th, and 3rd companies of the Boflv-ffuard Grenadiers. The
latter were followed W the 3rd Rifle oattalion, which thereby
protected the right flank against the gully ascending from
Baraque Mouton. Of the miscellaneous detachments of the
14th Division,* which had previously captured the homesteads
on the high-road and as yet maintained them successfully, some
joined in the attack on the Forbach heights, the remainder
shared in the simultaneous advance on Stiring Wendel. The
two batteries of the 10th Brigade on the Folstor heights had
also followed the advance of the infantry by superior orders, but
as there was no suitable position for them at the foot of the
Forbach heights, they returned to their original position, which
offered far greater advantages.

The French offered a tough and desperate resistance to the
fosilier battaUon 12th Regiment, but being worsted in repeated
liand-to-hand fighting, they were driven back over the northern
ridge of the Forbach heights with the loss of many prisoners
The 9th companv and the skirmishing divisions of the llth and
12th companies followed beyond the eastern edge of the wood.
Lieutenants Schroder and rabst, although both wounded, had
brought their leading men to within 200 paces of some French
artillery posted on a higher knoll, when a hostile battalion
advanced and drove these weak detachments back into the
wood. The French forward movement, however, came to an
end as the successive Pmssian companies emerged from the
wood and fell upon the advensary's right flank.

The four companies of the Body-guard Grenadiers also met
with a vigorous resistance when ascending the slopes of the
Spicheren forest further to the south, whilst the 5th company,
from its position at Barac^uo Mouton on the lii^h-road, swept
the long ravine with its fire. After a ^ort skirmish which was
effectively supported by the flanking fire from the left of the
12th company 12th Regiment, the enemy withdrew towards
Spicheren as the evening was closing in. Two full ammunition
waffons were captured.

The rifle battalion, as we know, had followed this movement
of the Body-guard Grenadier companies, and supporting their

* The 7th companj and tho fusilier battalion, 77th Regiment, parts of the
3rd companji 74th Kogimcnt, and of tho 12th company 39th Regiment.

242

advance ou the right flauk, reached the Bouthernmost angle ol
the Spicheren forest at nightfalL Still further to the rieht
General v. Schwerin had brought up the 52nd Regiment. That
Regiment, on advancing from the Keppertsberg, bad formed its
first line of the fusiliers in company-columns, and had passed
through the PruBsian line of ^uns to the westward of the high-
road. Just as our troops on me hill north of Golden Bremm had
commenced to wheel to the left towards the Forbach heights,
the enemy again opened a murderous fire of artilleiy from
Stiriug Weiidel. In conHcqucncoof this the subsequent advance
was made in two directions by order of Geneml v. Schwerin,
six companies gradually moving in the direction of Stiring
Weudel, and only the 11th company and the 2ud battalion
continuing the wheeling movement wnich had been commenced
towards the Forbach heights. This battalion had thrown out its
flank companies, the remainder following them as a half-
battalion ; the 11th company formed the right wing. Although
the enemy still held the western edge of the ravine ascending
from Baraaue lilouton, the farm buildings on the high-road were
gained witli little loss. From thence, after a brisk action with
the enemy's skinnishers, our troops passed to a general attack
upon the opposite borders of the wood, which were evacuated
by the adversaiy in favour of the plateau after a slight resist-
ance. The two flank companies followed him along the sides
of the ravine, the half-battalion advanced in column along the
trough of the valley; the 11th company was on its right and
conforming to its movements.

It was now dark, and the enemy in retreat at all points ;
wounded men abandoned by the enemy were alone met with.
On reaching the further edge of tho forest, the hidf-battation
proceeded to search the wood lyuig to the eastward on the road
to Spicheren ; the two flank companies followed the retreating
enemy in the direction of the most elevated bare knoll, on the
southern slope of which tho difierent parts of the battalion re-
assembled.

This onvolonnunt of tho For) )aeh heigh tn had boon consider-
ably facilitated 1>y tho circuniHtauco that the enemy had
employed his last mau in tho continuous strugKle on the side
of the Uotherbeiy and Gi/ert fovcist^ so that he nad no fm*ther
reinforcements available ior tho struggle at the Spieheren forest

At 7 p.m. Layeaucoupet's Diviaion, supported oy those parts
of Bataiue's Division on the plateau, haa again advanced to a
general attack upon the positions captured by the Prussian
troons. The stroke was directed from the southern knoU of the
Spicheren heights towards tho saddle bordering the Rotherberg
on the south, a nearly simultaneous advance oeing made from
the long ravine north-cast of Spicheren upon the southern edges
of the Sifert and Pfaffen forests. These offenhive movements
were supported by a vigorous infautiy fire from the shelter
trenches on the ridgeB to the noith ol Spicheren, and by the
batteries in action on the northern rfope of the Pfaffenberg.

Owing to the severe loeses from the t-nemy'sfire the Prussian

243

detaohmentB in the Gifert forest* foimd tbemselves once more
compelled to yield to the violence of the blow, so that the
adversary held possession of the slopes south of that wood for a
short time after nightfall.

On the other hand, he had not succeeded in making any
progress on the side of the Rotherberg. The advance of the
Bocfy-ffuard Grenadier companies, under Captain Bluraenhagen,
upon the flank of this oflFeiisive movement of the French, and
the first appearance of the 3rd Rifle battalion on the western
slopes of the Spicheren heights, had exercised an influence from
the verj'- commencement, and broke the force of the blow to a
certain extent. The Prussian detachments maintained their
position on the saddle ^vith obstinacy, the two batteries of the
vth Brigade continuing; an effective fire.

The storm which shortly after threatened to burst from the
Spicheren forest, completely paralysed the offensive movement
in preparation towards the north. The enemy withdrew to the
Forbach heights, and,beine att'icked in flank and rear, abandoned
this last position after a short but vivid musketry action. At
nightfall the French troops retired from the plateau at all points,
under cover of a brisk fire of artillery, which was once more
opened at half-past 7 o'clock from the numerous batteries
concentrated on the Pfaffenberg for this particular purpose.

The Commander-in-Chief of the ^ 1st Armv had received
reports from the Quartermaster-in-Chief as well as information
of the advance of the 16th Division to Saarbriicken. In conse-

auence of these, General v. Steinmetz had moved at once to
lie field of battle, which he reached at 7 o'clock and immediately
rode forward to the Spicheren heights. The thunder of the
French spms from the Pfaffenberg, mingled with a slight rattle
of musketry, proclaimed the last heavings of the mighty
struggle. Cannon shots were also heard further off towards
Forbach, which seemed to indicate the arrival of the 13th
Division on the battle-field. The fighting was still very brisk
in the low ground at Stiring, where the rrussian troops were
once more assuming the offensive.

The energetic advance of General Bataille had, as we have Capture of
Been, not only relieved the French in the immediate neighbour- Stiring
hood of Stiring Wendel, but also enabled them to recapture the "Won^*-
southern part of the Stiring copse.

The 77th had already retired from tho copse in order to
re-form at Drathzug, and it was only with great difliculty that
the 89th held the northern part of the wood, which they were
ordered to do at all hazaros by General v. Zastrow who was
present.

The advance of the French left wing, so successful at first,
had already begun to falter under the effective fire of the
batteries on the Folster heights, just as General v. Woyna, at
7 o'clock, again brought forward tho united portions of his

* TliMe, AS we know, oonsistad of companios of the 89tb, 46th, 12th, and 40th
Bagimenta which had been engaged in the preTiouB action.

G 2

244

brigade* from Drathzug. Whilst he, iu concert with the 39th,
Boon made decided progress in the copse, the 52nd Regiment
was also gaining ground in the open countiy to the eastward.
The 10th company was leading the advance of that portion of
this regiment, which was moving on StiringWendel.t It threw
forward its skinnisliing division along^ a gentle degression
leading towards the village with a view to dislodgmg the
enemy s batteries in that dn*ection ; the 9th and 12th companies
followed. The 4 th company, on the right wing of the regiment,
moved along the south-eastern edge of the wood ; in rear of it
came the 2]id and 3rd compauii's as a half-battalion.

The troops advancing in tho copse met with no fmlher
serious opposition ; tho open ground was, however, still swept
by muuketrv from the Forbach heights and from the direction of
Stiring. The hostile batteries at Stiring Wendel again put
forward eveiy effort, and thereby stayed the progress of the
52nd between the high-road and the copse. In consequence
of this Major v. Eynatten ordered Captam Gotz with the 2nd
light battery of the 14th Division to advance to the level heights
north of Golden Bremm, where it overAvhelmed the enemy's
gims with a heavy fire at a distance of only 1,400 paces, and
speedily silenced them.

Meanwhile, General v. Woyna had driven back the waveiing
foe upon Stiring Wendel, and had occupied the southern edge
of the copse, Avhere he was joined by the 4th company 52nd
Regiment. Wliilst the echoes of the trumpet soundmg the
French retreat on the Spichoren heights were falling upon the
ear, the 39th, with that company, and with detachments of the
77th Regiment, moved forward to the attack of the foundry
and the slag-heap which surrounded it, behmd which the enemy
was posted. This bulwark, so obstinately defended in the
preceahig struggles, was taken by stonn at 8.15 p.m. J At the
same moment, the 2nd, 3rd, and 9th companies 52nd Regiment,
by a vigorously executed charge, drove the hostile troops, still
holding out to the eastward of Htiring Wendel, back upon tho
village, without giving them time to occupy tho shelter trenches
in front of it.

The tightin^- biuaine more languid ; the enemy appeared to
be in retreat, (loneral v. JSchworin, however, did not deem it
advisable to remain for the night immediately ui front of a
jilace not entnely abandoned by the enemy, ana therefore, with
tho concuiTcnce of the commander of the Division, \vithdrew
the troops, who had meanwhile re-foimed, to Stirinff Wendel
at 8.45 p.m. Some isolated hostile detachments stul offered
stubborn resistance at this point. In order to prevent our own
men from firing into ona another in the dark, the General

* The Ist and part of the fusUior battalion, 58rd Ecgimont, the 2nd and parts of
the lit battalion, 77th Bogiment.

t Seep. 242.

t Lieut. Wagner, 62nd Begiment, here captured a camp colour belonging to the
3rd Vrenoh ObiMaeur battalion.

245

sounded the ** cease firing,'^ and ordered the whole of the troops
to advance with loud hurrahs against the west side of the
place, whereupon the eneray^ gradually ceased to offer any
lurther resistance. The Prussian outposts could be established
on both sides of the Forbach high-road, the right wing resting
on Verrerie Sophie.

Whilst the 52nd thus captured the greater part of the south
of Stiring Wendel, and while searching it made 300 more

Erisoners, Major v. Wangenheim with the remainder of the 3rd
attalion 39tn Regiment* scoured the northern farm buildings
and slag-heaps, wnere isolated combats attended with heavy
loss did not come to an end until after 11 o'clock.

The struggle on the Spicheren heights, as we have seen, had
died out somewhat earlier. The Prussian troops formed a
broad bow round the village, stretching fi-om the Schoneck road
along the eastern and soutliem edges of the forest to beyond
the plantation at the Pfaffea forest. In rear of this extended
line of troops, which were for the most part exhausted and
mixed up owing to the long and obstinate struggle, a fresh
reserve had collected towards nightfall at the foot of the
Rotherberg and the Spicheren heights. Besides cavalry it
included the three batteries present of the Vlllth and 1st .Mmy
Corps, and also the infantry wliich airived on the field of battle
after 6.30 p.m. These were the fusilier battaUons of the Body-
guard Grenadiers and 20th Regiment, and last of all the 2nd
battalion 53rd Regiment, which had marched 27^ miles in 13
hours.t

As the enemy held out for a time on the highest point of the
Forbach heights. General v. Doering determined to employ the
fresh troops for a forward movement in that direction, and sub-
sequently to advance upon Forbach with a mixed detachment
of various regiments. Both enterprises were, however, coimter-
manded by General Stiilpnagel in consequence of the darkness
having meanwhile set in and the appai'ently general retreat of
the French. The Prussian troops on the plateau began to make
arrangements for a bivouac and to place outposts ; the latter
were subsequently reUeved by the last anived oattalions of the
Illrd Army Corps.

Advanced Guard Action op the 13th Division at Forbach

ON THE Evening op the 6th August.

In pursuance of the previous day's order, the advanced
guard of the 13th Division]: reached Volklingen towards noon,
and occupied the district abutting on the Saar with the van-

* The three companiee, which had been fighting since noon in the oopee,
mustered onlj 6 officers and 150 men in the erening.

t This battalion, as we know, was destined to escort the corps artiUe^i Tilth
Annj CJorps, and had marehed with it at 6 a.m. from Wadem 9id Nnnkirchen to
Lebaeh } it was there leUered from that duty and continued its march, almost with-
ont halting, to Saarbrackon.

1 19ee Appendix ZIII and p. 208.

246

guard. As the hussar patrols, which had been recounoitring
on the left bank, reported the advance of hostile battalions from
Great Uossel, General v. d. Goltz pushed forward as a tem-
porary measure the rifle battalion nud a squadron of hussara by
way of Wehrden. A report of this circumstance reached
General v, Gliimer coiunianding the Division between 12 and
1 o'clock, just as he and his main body had reached the neigh-
bourhood of Piittlingen, where it was to occupy close quarters.
He at once rode forward with the 4 th squaaron and the 6th
light battery to the advanced guard at Wehrden.

Meanwhile a continuous thunder of ^ns from the south-
east had been audible for some time at this latter village. As,
according to the latest reports, the enemy was said to be fight-
ing between Stiring Wendel and Forbach, General v. d. Goltz
resolved to bring the whole of the advanced ^ard to bear
against his left flank. The commander of the Division approved
of this course, and sent ordera to Piittlingen for the main body
to get under arms and follow the advanced guard.

The latter now proceeded on ita march to Great Rossel,
accompanied by the reinforcements brought by General v.
Gliimer ; a company of rifles and a division of hussai'S had
already been puslied forward by Clarenthal upon Schoneck.
When the troops were approaching the neighbourhood of Great
Rossel at 4 o'clock, they received the orders which had been
issued by the general commanding the corps from Dilsburg
3 hours before.* The general tenor of the movements therein
prescribed had been already carried out. The troops had
marched 23 miles since 5 a.m. without halting to cook, and up
to this time had seen nothing of the enemy. A considerable
camp on the Forbach heiglits could alone be seen in the
distance. The distant roar of artillery from the eastward, the
echoes of whicli wore deadened by tne gi'eat forests, was no
longorlieard; the action in that direction seemed to have come
to an end. 'Phe commander of the Di\asion who was with the
advanced guard, had also received a communication from* the
head-quarters of the 1st Army, from which it transpired that the
Commander-in-Chief had no intention of entering upon a serioui
engagement on tlio left bank of the Saar that day. Under
these circumstances (icncral v. Gliimer ordered the troops to
halt to the north of Great Rossel and place their outposts; the
main body was ordered to bivouac at Volklingen.

At G o'clock the cannonade again became audil>le at Great
Rossel; tlie hussar patrols, which had been sent forward, re-
ported at the same nour the continuance of the fight to the
south of Saarbriicken. At this moment the officer despa'.i/hed
by General v. Zastrowj amved, bringing intelligence that the
14th Division was biiskly en^ged at the Spicneren heights,
and requesting the 13th Division to co-operate in the action.
In consequence of this, General v. dL Goltz at once set off

• See p. 208.
t See p. 235.

247

towards Forback along both banks of the Rossel. The fusilier
battalion 55th Regiment, the Srd squadron and the 5th light
battery took the direction of Emraersweiler through Great
Rossei ; the three rifle companies present moved fonvard on the
right bank towards Weber's Tan-mill ; the remainder marched
along the direct road from Little Rossel to Forbaeli. The 1st
squadron, sent forward to reconnoitre, reported that the heights
west of the town wore entrenched, and, in common with
Forbach, appeared to be strongly occupied. This had been the
more expected, as these positions covered the adversary's main
line of retreat.

The two musketeer battalions of the 55th Regiment now
formed in half-battalions in the Leisch forest, nrepaiatorv to a
further advance along both sides of the high-road. The 6th
light battery opened fire against the Kaninchenberg and the
ground in rear of it.

After General Frossard had gradually ordered up the whole
of Valaz^'s Brigade for the defence of Stiring Wendel, there
were only 2 squadrons of the 12th Dragoons and about 100
engineers left behind at Forbach, which were subsequently re-
inforced by 200 reserves of the 12th Regiment. Lieut.-Colonel
Dulac had occupied the shelter trenches on the Kaninchenberg
with these men, and dismounted some of his dragoons for the
same purpose.

mien the companies of the Prussian left-flank coliunu de-
bouched, they were received by a brisk shower of bidlets ; they
thereupon took up a position close to the high-road, behind the
bushes and undulations of the gi*omid, with a view to engaging
the enem^ in front. The battery also came up nearer, and
directed its fire chiefly upon the outskirts of tlie town, in which
hostile troops and eolumns appeared to be in constant motion.
A train which was starting westward wns compelled to put back
in consequence. The fast approaching twilight, and the dense
powder smoke enveloping tne heights, did not allow of the
strength and occupation of the enemy's position being observed.
The greater part of the 2nd battalion had moved on the south
of the high-road towards the western slopes of the heights and
seized one of the enemy's shelter trenches.

The three companies of rifles ascended the south-western
slopes of the heignts from Weber's Tan-mill, and opened up
a communication with the detachments of the loft flank column.

The French, being thus outflanked on the left and almost
taken in rear, commenced their retreat.

As, however, it was already in jeopardy, the French com-
mander ordered the dragoons, who had meanwhile mounted, to
move forward to the attack.

Though boldly executed in the failing light of the evening,
the attack was repulsed with great loss by the 5th company
55th Regiment and the Srd rifle company,* who reserved their

* According to Lieut.*Coloael Dulao's report, 4 officers wcr« killed riuI irottn(!cd
SS ineti and as manj officers were placed hors de combat.

248

fire until the adversary had approached to close quarters. The
anrival of night precluded any further continuance of the action ;
only some isolated Prussian detachments followed the enemy in
his retreat to Forbach. He kept up so brisk a fire, especially
on the high-road at the railway arch, that it did not seem
advisable to commit the ti'oops to a street fight at night merely
for the sake of occupying the town. The advanced Prussian
detachments were therefore brought back to the French
entrenchments on the Kaninchenber^.

The right-wing column had reacned Emmei-sweiler, and its
battery had taken up a position on the heights west of the
village. From that point an effective fire was directed mainly
upon the Forbach-Morsbach road and the railway, causing some
hostile reinforcements, which wei-e moving up irom St. Avoid,
to retrace their steps.

Meanwhile General v. Oliimer had also started the main
body of his Division on its march to Little Rossel. A report
from the battle-field, received on the road, caused the 15th
Begiment to bend away towards Stiiing Wendel. As the dark-
ness prevented it from regaining its connection with the 14th
Division, this regiment also came up to Little Rossel, where the
remainder of the troops arrived towai'ds 9 o'clock at night*

Positions of the Contending Forces on the Evening of

THE 6th, and in the NiGIIT 6TH-7TH AUGUST.

At the conclusion of the stniggle at Spicheren, General v.
Steinmetz gave orders for the scattered troops to re-form as far
as possible, and to bivouac generally on the battle-field. The
Ilird Armv Corps drew forward its two last arriving battalions
to the plateau, and iumished the outposts. The * fusilier
battalion Body-guard Regiment threw them out south of the
Gifert forest, as far as the crest of the Spicheren heights, upon
which the two batteries of the 9th Brigade also remained.
Touching them on the right were the fusiher battalions of the
20th and 12th Regiments, the former extending to the northern
slope of the Forbach heights, the latter on tlieir western
declivity. Between the Kreiitzberg and VeiTerie Sophie, but
not immediately connected with the troops on the Spicheren
plateau, were the outposts of the 52ud Ilegiment, which had
been assembled to the west of Stuing Wendel; in front of
Forbach was the advanced guard of the 13th Division.

The main body of the 13th Division was at Little Rossel in
rear of the right flank of the entire position. That part of the
infantry of the 5th Division which was not employed on out-
post duty (.'oncentrated at the Kt^ppertsberg. Tlie two
inuskc'tccr battalions of tlic 2()tli Uogiment, which reached St.
Johaun by rail late iii the evening, followed their fusilier
battalion to the foot of tlie Forbach heights.

The 14th Division assembled generiuly in the low ground
aboiit Stiring, roimd the copse ; some 1>attaUous, among them

249

thoee of tho 39th Regiment, remained for the night at the
various points of the battle-field where they Imd been last
engaged.

The artillery bivouacked ffencrally in their final positions on
the Folster heights, and on the Oalgenber^. Besides tho bat-
teries alreadv mentioned, the whole of the horse artillery of the
Ilird and VUth Army Corps and two field batteries of the 6th
Division came up from different directions during the evening ; a
second battery of the 1st Anny Corps also arrived by rail from
Neunkirchen. These batteries had taken no part in the action,
but were placed under cover in the neighboiurhood of the battle-
field.

The main body of the 16th Division, owing to the lonff dis-
tance separating its quarters from the field of battle, did not
arrive until the struggle was over ; it bivouacked between St.
Johann and Malstatt, where it was joined by part of the 40th
Begiment.

For reasons previously stated, the attempt to employ the
cavalry in the struggle on the Spicheren plateau was relinamshed;
since noon only 2 squadrons of the 12tn Dragoons had oeen on
reconnaissance duty up the Saar. Tho 1st squadron ordered to
reconnoitre towards Saargemiind, had sent forward a division
alou^ the left bank, which was however prevented from proceed-
ing beyond St. Arnual by a more numerous body of hostile
horsemen ; the squadron sent along the right bank, however,
reached the neiRnbom*hood of Saargcmiincl. Its patrols had
been fired at by hostile infautry'to the north of Wolferdinff ; two
hostile squadrons were seen on the heights south-east of Zmsdng.
Between S€iargemund and the neighboming village of Neun-
kirchen very considerable bodies of troops were ob8ei*ved, the
strength of which was estimated at 20,000 men.* A division of
the 2nd squadron, which was watching the ground on the left
flank of the infantiy engaged in the Oifert forest, had advanced
as far as Grosbliedersdorf. A French squadron endeavoured to
cut off its retreat, but left the road clear for it without any
apparent reason. Another oflicer's patrol had trotted onward to
darling, westward of the battle-field, but on being attacked by
a detachment of mounted chasseurs, withdrew by Lauterbach.

The darkness of tho night and tho gcncrjillv unfavourable
nature of the ground on the Spicheren plateau, did not render it
advisable to send largo bodies of cavalry in pursuit of the enemy,
who was retreating in good order. The 3rd and 4th squadrons
of the 12th Draffoons, who had dismounted between 8 and 9
o'clock and led tneir horses up the eastern ravine of the Forbach
heights, were fired on while assembling on the summit by some
infimtr^ stragglers in the copse on the bpicheren-Schoneck road.
Two divisions which trotted forward towards Spicheren and
Etzling found a camp still occupied at the latter village. In
the course of the night two squadrons of the Brmiswick Hussars

* HoDtaucloii*! PiTinon and LapMflct'i Brigade.

S50

advanced by St. Amual and Oroabliedersdorf, where they cap-
tured some more prisoners.

Qeneral Frossard had gradually brought up the whole ot his
corps into the struggle,* and was seriously engaged at all points
when the last arriying Prussian reinforcementa prepared to
break through the centre of the French line of battle on the
Forbach heights. To this may be added the exceedingly
threatening appearance of Prussian troops on the left flank at
Forbach, by which all oommunications to the rear were en-
dangered. As, moreover, there were no signs of the expected
reinforcements from the 3rd French Corps, General Frossard,
under these critical circumstances, issued orders for retreat as the
sun was going down. But as the high-road to St. Avoid was
already commanded by the Prussian fire at Forbach, Generals
Verff6 and Bataille first received instructions to withdraw from
the Tow ground at Stiring towards Oetingen. The right wing
of the corps on the Spicheren plateau assembled under cover of
ilie artillerj^ on the Plaffenberg to the south t)f Spicheren, and
likewise retired upon Oetingen at 10 o'clock. Dunng the nip;ht,
General Frossard ordered Verge's and Laveaucoupeta Divisions
to continue their retreat on Saargemiind, to cover which General
Bataille|s Division took up a position close to his recent camp on
the Oetingen heights. Sendmg on his ai-tillery and train in front,
the latter also followed at daybreak on the 7th of August. ^

As these movements were not int^ered witii by the Prussians,
they could be effected in fair order. Notwithstanding this, 1,200
to 1,500 unwounded prisoners fell into the hands of the victor,
besjdes many wounded men and the camp eijuipment abandonea
on the battle-field by the Ist and 3rd Divisions ; on the day
after the battle the large army stores collected at Forbach, and
a bridge train, were also seized.

The nature of the contest here described was such that the
toss on the Prussian side exceeded that of the French. In the
former case it amounted to : —

Killed - - - 49 officers 794 men.

Wounded- - 174 „ 3,482

Missing - - — „ 372

Total- - 223 „ 4,648t

General Frossard states his loss as follows: —

Killed - - - 87 officers 283 men.

Wounded. - 168 „ 1,494
Missing - - 44 ,, 2,052

Total . - 249 „ 3,829

* Bxdudiug the rifle battaliou of Bataillo's Division, which wa« left at Oetingen,
39 battAlioni were eonced in the battle,
t See Appendix XlV.

251

We muBt not omit to make honourable mention of the pon-
daot of the inhabitants of Bt. Johann and Saarbrticken, who
had not hesitated to expose themselves to the enemy's artillery
fire while bearing refreshments to the troops and succour to the
wounded.

In conclusion, it will bo of interest to watch the action of
those parts of the Prencli army which might have been able to
extena their much-expected co-operation in the battle on the
6th August. As early as the forenoon, about the time of the
advance of the 14th Division to Saarbriicken, General Frossard
had teleeraphed to Marshal Bazaine at St. Avoid his conception
of the situation of affairs, and proposed that reinforcements
should be held in readiness to meet any circmnstance whioh
might arise. The Marshal ^roxnised this, and had issued orders
to that effect to the three Divisions at SaargemQnd, Puttelange,
and Maiienthal^ none of which were on an average more than
9 miles from the field of battle.* It would appear that the
Marshal considered the force at St. Avoid indispensable for the
protection of the great road at that point, as from a communi-
cation sent to him by the Imperial nead-quarters he expected
the adversary to attack that town from Calling. AVhen the
Marshal later in the afternoon began to feel uneasy as to the
issue of the struggle, he sent up a regiment by rail to Forbach,
but it could no longer reach tlie place, as the line was com-
manded bv the fire of the I3th Division, and returned without
accomplishing its mission.

IMetmann's Division at Marienthal, which had set out in the
forenoon for Forbach via Bening, in accordance with the
Mai^shars orders, must have marched very slowly and with
frequent halts. When Juniac's cavalry brigade, leading tlie
advance, was approaching the battle-field, General Frossard,
who had no lack of that arm, ordered the brigade to return to
Benmg, as he very probably foresaw^ the necessitv of keeping
the great road clear, more especially for his carriages. Met-
mann's Division only reached r orbacn late in the evening, and
moved to the heights east of the town, wliich were not yet
occupied by the Prussians. Here it received intelligence of the
retreat of the 2nd Corps, and at once marched away, reaching
Puttelange at daybrealc on the 7th August.

General Castaffny, on hearing the distant cannonade about
noon, moved off Tiis Division on his own responsibility from
Puttelange, but took a direction too much to the right. As the
action in a northerly direction had apparently ceased after he
had proceeded about 4 miles, his Division retraced its steps to
Puttelange. He had scarcely reached the place when the
echoes of the cannonade were heard afresh. The Division once
more commenced its march at 6 p.m.^ this time straight on
Forbach, and while on the road received orders from the
Marshal to join General Frossard. After reaching Folcklingen at
9 p.m., and pushing forward vanguards to Forbach, it received

• 3«e p. 143.

252

intelligence of the retreat of the 2ud Corps. The Division
returned for the second time to Puttelauge, where it anived
with Metmann's Division at daybreak on the 7 th.

Neither did the brisk cannonade pass unobserved at Saar-
gemiind, wliere Montaudon's Division arrived on the morning of
the 6th, to rehevo General Failly's troops. But not until the
receipt of orders from St. Avoid to advance to Grosbliedersdorf
did it commence its march ; leaving at 4 p.m., it reached the
neighbourhood of Rouliug at 7 p.m. As the evening was noAv
setting in, General Montaudon sent forward an officer to pro-
mise his assistance for tlie following dav; but on hearing the
result of the battle at midnight, ho joined Metmann's and
Castagny's Divisions in the neighbourhood of Puttelange on the
morning of the 7th August.

(JoNCLUDixo Remarks.

At Spicheren, as at WiJrlh, a forward pressure of the van-
guards towards the foe had brought about a decisive action
which was never contemplated for the 6th of August.

On the Sauer it was known that the foe was in front of us,
and it was therefore assumed that he would make a stand. The
preparations for a battle had been already arranged, and they
were only anticipated by twenty-four houi-s.

On the Saar it was conjectured that the adversary was in
retreat. If we wished to hold him fast, or at any rate not lose
his touch, action was necessary. This was lelt instinctively, so
to speak, by every one ; and as it was no longer a question of
days, but probably of a few hours only, tlie leadmg troops
lapsed into action of their own will and without loss of time.
This conduct was in perfect accord with the views of those in
authority, although at the moment the resolution was taken no
ordera had been received from that quarter.

At the time when General v. Steinmetz at Eiweiler sanc-
tioned the passage of the Saar contemplated by the Vllth Army
Coi^ps, the 14th Division was already engaged with the enemy
on the left bank. And before Prince Frederick Charles' orders
were received to keep the French at the sword point, and also
to hold the passage at Saarbriicken, the van of the 9th Brigade,
which had been set in movement by General v. Doering, was
approaching the field of battle.

The advance of General von Kameke did not clash with the
arrangements of the authorities, as it was directed against an
enemy in the act of retiring. Under this supposition, the autho-
rities at ^lainz had already on the evening of the 5th declared
the passage of the frontier below Saarbriicken open to the 1st
Army. The independent offensive of the 14th Division was
therefore perfectly in unison with the spirit of the German
generalship, which directed every effort to hang closely on the
adversaiy. It is perfectly true that the attack in q^uestion might
in all probability have tailed, had the 14th Division remained

253

^thout Bupports. But even iii this case the adversary would
have been Drought to bay, and the isolated failure of a small
part of the army in presence of superior forces would have had
no real influence on the course of tlie operations.

Supposing, on the other hand, that General Frossard had
fwt been attacked on the 6th August, we must remember that
before that date, or at a time when the Imperial head-quarters
might still look for fresh strength by a junction with MacMahon's
army, the retreat of the 2nd Cc^rps was in contemplation.* It
may therefore be assumed that the Army of the Rhino, on
receiving intelligence on the morning of the 7th of the result of
the battle of Worth, would have commenced its retreat without
being attacked. In this case it would in all probability have
reached the Moselle without having previously sustainecl a loss
in the defeat of one of its corps.

A comparison of the course of the two battles fought on this
day shows, in the case both of Worth and Spichcren, tlic French
in a strong and well-prepared defensive position.

In front of the former place there were on the eve of the
battle about one and a half German army coras, and the re-
mainder were on the mommg of the 6th en route tor the positions
from whence the attack was to take place on the following day.
It was thus rendered possible to deploy a superior outflanking
force in the course of the battle, by which the victory was
decided in the afternoon, and its fruit reaped while there was
still daylight.

At Spicheren, on the other hand, only the vanguards of the
nearest army corps were present, feeling their way towards the
Saar, and it was not until noon that one of these advanced
guards encountered the enemy's superior force. The magnetic
efiect of the thunder of the cannonade brought up reinforce-
ments, some promised, others imexpcctcd; but arriving from
distances even of a day's march they could not be effective imtil
late in the day, leaving the assailant in the minority during the
whole course of the battle. The forward launch of a few fresh
battalions at a moment when the retreat was threatened from
in rear of the flank at Forbach, and the French commander had
no more reserves in hand, consummated the victory.

The attack of the 13th Division would evidently have
operated more decisively, had it reached and occupied Forbach
before darkness set in ; this was however prevented by circum-
stances already adverted to. On the other hand, it must not be
forgotten that the enemy's superiority would have been still
more marked, if, on his side as well, instead of the eccentric
rovings of tlu-eo Divisions in rear of the battle-field, all the
forces available within the bomids of time and distance had
co-operated in the common cause. That perpetual eagerness on
the part of the Germans to close with the enemy, that comrade-
like tie between one commander and the other, and that
assumption of responsibility in view of a well-timed co-opei*ation

• See p. 143

S54

do not appear to have existed to the same ezteat in the French

army.

la a tactical point of view^ the confonnatiou of the. gpx)und
at Worth admitted of all arms being employed in a most advan-
tag^eons manner. There were more than 850 German gnns in^
action ; the French cavalry was vigoronsly employed in the
struggle. The confi&^uration of the ground at Spicheren, on the
oUier hand, precluded the emplo^ent of cavalry almost
entirely, and tne action of the Prussian artillery was limited to
a few points, with, in many cases, but narrow space for deploy-
ment, of which, however, regardless of their losses, they
effectually availed themselves. At first there were but 24 guns
present to aid the infantiy in its diflicult task, and, till towards
the end of the battle, inclusive of the batteries at Fortnch,
there were not more than 13 Prussian batteries in action.

But it was not to this cause alone that were due the flpreat
losses in the infantry, giving to this battle so especially bloody
a character, but rather to the fact that firom the commencement
the circumstances on the Prussian side were antagonistic to the
exercise of a single controlling power in the action, and that
durinflr the whole course of the struggle there was never a large
unbroken reserve available. Singly, as the reinforcements came
up, they were at once moved into the fighting line, to reinstate
it in itsposition or to feed it. It was only the last assault upon
the Forbach heights, coupled with the flank attack of the 13th
Division, which forced the exhausted adversary to retreat ; the
immediate pursuit was precluded by the setting in of night.

Under tnese circumstances the material gains from the battle
of Smcheren could not nearly compare with the rich trophies of
/ the tllrd Army at Worth. iBut tne moral value of a victory
'^' extends far beyond the limits of the battle-field. It bears its
significance on its face. The entirely unlooked-for intelliffenoe
of a simultaneous defeat in Alsace and Lorraine came Eke a
thunderclap in the sunshine upon the over-confident capital of
France ; even in the Imperial head-auarters all resistance was
renounced for the moment. Thus in tne course of the following
week the whole land, as far as the Moselle^ fell into the hands of
the Germans.

255

Retreat op Marshal MacMahon's Army upon Chalons
AND Advance of the IIIrd Army to the Moselle.

The interval since the 2nd August had demanded very severe
efforts and considerable sacrifices on tlie part of the IIIrd Army.
After toilsome marches, bivouacs under torrents of rain, and
two severe engagements, the necessity of a day's rest became
imperative. Consequently the majority of the troops remained
on the 7th August hi tlie quarters and bivouacs whitih they
had occupied hi the vicinity of the battle-field. Tlie only excep-
tions were that the Ilnd Bavarian Corps concentrated around
Niederbronn, and the 2ud Bavarian Di\nsion advanced from
Preuschdorf to Oberbronn. The P>adeii Division occupied Hage-
nau, where 14 French ofRcei-s and 103 men were taken prisoners
and a number of service wagons and stores captured.

As we are already aware, the pursuit instituted by the
cavalry was discimtinued at the entrances to the difficult moun-
tain passes, and thus even on (he 7th August all contact with the
enemy had ceased to exist. Owing to this circumstance the
extent of the disorder prevaiHng in the French army after the
battle of Worth, as well as the real direction of its retreat,
could not be precisely estimated by the headquarters at Sulz.
The earUer report* from the cavalry, and the known fact that
Abbatucci*8 French brigade had retired upon Bitsch, led to the
supposition that Marshal MacMahon had likewise taken this
direction with a view to closing in uj)on the main Imperial
army.

The arrangements for continuing the advance were based on
these presumptions.

In order to traverse the northern Vosges by all the available
roads, it was necessary in the first place to bring up the marching
columns of the left wing to the more southern entrances of the
mountains. From these points the chief lines of communication
tend generally noy-f/i-westward ; on emerging from tlie passes
they resume in many iiistanc<^s a «(>M///-weHterly direction. The
mountain roads were, as a rule, very bad, an<l for the most part
barred by forts. According to report the inhabitants were in
arms. There seemed every po88il)ility of meeting ^vith the
enemy in force on the westeiTi side of the mountains.

Under these circumstances it was resolved to move towards
the Saar, in such a manner that the whole of the marcliing
columns should simultaneously reach the line Saarunion-Sane-
bourg about the 12th August.

The French, however, had bent away in another direction,
and by forced marches gained more and more gi-ound in their
retreat. CoDsequently the immediate contact with the enemy
was not regained for the present.

When the 5th Corps under General de Failly joined the

A 2

256

Marshal at Sarrebourg on the evening of the 8th Augiiflt,* the
ai-my of the latter was still deficient of the greater part of the
7th (^orps, of which, as we have seen, Conseil Dumesnil's Divi-
sion had alone been involved in the defeat at Worth. Dumont*s
Division, wiih a brigade of Ameil's Cavaliy Division, was still at
Lyons on the 6th AiigiiRt, for the pm^pose of maintaining public
order in that city. Liebeil's Division, with the other brigade
of that Cavalry Division and the reserve artillery of the 7th
Coi-ps, was pushed forward from Belfort to Miihlhansen, with a
view to protecting southern Alsace from the enterprisef w^hich,
to all appearance, was then threatening from the German side
of the Upper Rhine.

The subseouent proceedings of this force are so significant
of the internal condition of the French army at that time that
we will examine them here somewhat closely.}

When Lieberts Division reached MiihlhauHcn on the 6th
August, no preparations had been ma<le for its sul>sistence. In
the evening rations were, it is true, issued to the troops, but they
could not be cooked as no wood was given out until the following
nioniing. When at length the cooking kettles were on the fire,
orders arrived at \) o'clock for an immediate march. In addition
to the news of the defeat at Worth, a report was current that the
Prussians had crossed the Rhine at Markolsheim and Huningen.
As it was considered that from the latter point the line of retreat
on Belfoi*t by Altkirch was seriously menaced, the march to
Belfort was at once commenced, without making a single attempt
to find (mt for certain whether there was any truth in the rumour.

This nimecessary haste in the departure, the claims of hunger,
and a three-hours' delay in crossing the canal bridge, had such a
veiy injurious eftcct upon the temper of the troops that all control
over them during the rest of the march was lost. Arms and
knapsacks were thrown away without number; the road was
covered with stragglers abusing their officers.

In the villages this entirely unexpected retreat produced
the greatest consternation ; the inhabitiints fled into the woods
with their goods and chattels. Even at this stage the ci^^l
authorities mcited them to this measure, and wherever it was
complied with the people suff*ercd m<n'e damage than if they had
remained at home and put up Avilh the billeting.

Without having seen an enemy, Liebert's Division bivouacked
at Dannemarie on the evening of the 7th August with only half
its effective, and resuming its march as early as 4 o'clock the next
morning reached the bivouac at Belfort on the evening of the 8th
August, by a road c()vered with carts belonging to the fugitives.

The Division remained there for more than a week, employ-
ing the time in strengthening the works of the fortress, tne
garrison of which consisted at that time of only 500 partly
formed Gardes Mohiles.

• * re p. 2lX).
t Sec p. 140.
X Extract from tho " Ilioloire de rArmio de Ch&lons, par im Tolontaire."

257

On the 12th Aneuet, after the arrival of Dumont's Division
from Lyons, the 7th Corps at Belfort numbered about 20,(X)0
men and 90 guns.* But even now tliey neither moved to meet
the enemy, wlio was ah-eadv in front of StraHKburg, nor did they
attempt to join the Ist and 5th Corps.

These two Corps had continued their retreat from the neigh-
b(mrhood of Sarrebourg on the 9th August, moving in three
cohunns, rid Uechicourt and Bhimontim Liuievillo, and byCirey
on Baccarat.

Although the 5th Corps had been placed under Mai-shal llao-
Mahon from the 5th Augustf it neverthelesR continued to receive,
even after the 7th, direct communications from the Imperial head-
quarters, prescribing independent movements of a most contra-
dictoiy nature. For instance, an order was received at Rechicourt
from the Emperor, summoning the 5th Corps to Nanoy. A dis-
patch h'om Marahal Leboeuf, which came subsequently at 10 p.m.,
explained this order, leaving it an open question, that in case of
necessity the movement might take place in the almost opposite
direction of Ijangres.

From what has already been stated, it follows that a retreat
by Nancy might still have taken place without interrupti(m ; the
railway was as yet also available. But nimour had already placed
the Prussians at Pont-a-M(nxRRon, and the condition of the
French troops did not appear to allow of their being again
brought in contact with the enemy for the present. General
Failly consequently did well in selecthig the direc^ticm of Langres.
On arriving at Charmes, however, he received distinct orders to
march upon Toul, witli the idtimate object of being called up
to Metz or Chalons. After commencing his movement to Toul
on the 1 2th. in accordance with these orders, he received a tele-
grnm from Marshal Leboeuf in the nftvrnoon, ordering him to
take the road to Paiis which seemed the most suitable; tlio
ca'der to march upon Toul had been revoked by the Emperor.
General Failly at once inclined away to the left and proceeded
by Mirecourt and Lamarche to Chamont, where he arrived on
the IGth. On the 17th he received instructions that he was
again placed under Marshal MacMahon, and that the latter was
retiring to the Camp of Chalons.

The Marabal had meanwhile also bent away southwards in his
retreat, in order to reach the less exposed railway in the uppor
valley of the Marno. Destroying the bi-idgrs in tin 'ir rear, iiis
forccHt crossed the Moselle at Bayou on the 1 Itli August; they
reached the river Madon at llaroue on the 12th, the lileuse near
Keufehateau and above that place on the 14th; they halted on
the 15th.

On the inth the transport of the 1st Corps by railway com-

• According to '* Le 7*. Corps par le Priuco Bibesco." Paris, 1872.

t See p. 142.

X The Ist Corps, Conseil Dumesnirfl Diyision And Bonnernains* CaTalrj Division.

258

meuced ut llaiiuis,* and this wan coutiimed on the following
days from the st^itions of the Upper Marne railway. The whole
of the caviih-y and part of the artillery continued uieir march by
road.

By the evening of tlui 19th the Corps was completely as-
sembled in the camp of Chalons. The 5tli Corps, moving chiefly
by road, reac^hcd the camp on the 20th and 2l8t. The reserve
artillery of this corps was forwarded by rail through Bar sur
Aube to Paris, and from thence to Kheinis. The 7th Corps took
the same route.

On tlie l()th Angnst the 7th Corp.s recc;iv<'d telegraphic ordei*s
from Paris to move to Chalons. The two Divisions were trans-
ported to Kheims by 52 trains between tlie 17th and 22nd
August by way of Vesonl, Langi'ca, Chaumont, Troyes, and
Paris. Many deieetH were hen; brought to hght; in particular
neither the time nor the means for cooking or for watering the
lioi*ses were considered.

At Chalons, Conseil Dunusnirs Division rejoined the 7th
Coips. At this place General Trochu had meanwhile collected
the 12t.h Corps, of Avhich General Lebrun now received the
command. 'Ihis Corps was composed of some regiments de
marche and marines, of parts of the ()th Corpsf which had not
been dispatched by rau with it to the Moselle and of the
regiments of the line brought up from Toulouse.

llarshal MacMahou was appointed Commantler-in-Chief of
the four aniiy corpsj assembling at Chalons, to Avhich was also

i'oined Margueritte's Cavalry Division in addition to that of
ionnemains.

AuvANci: OF THE IIIkd Army to the Saar.
Sth to the 12rii August.

On the 8th August the Ilird Army moved off on a broad front
towards the VoKges, the two Bavarian Corns§ forming for the
most part the right, and the two Prussian Corps the left wing.
The \Vurttembergl)ivision was in the centre and, as long as the
direction of the march allowed, formed the advanced guard of
the Vth Army Ct>rns, to which it was assigned for this object.
The nil Cavalry l)ivisi»»n n^mained fiu* a time at Buxwiller and
Steiid)urg in rear i>f the left wing, so as to cross the mountains
behind tlie inf. intry uf the Xlth Army Corps. The 12tli Division
marching imlepemleiitly formed the extreme right wing. In its
advance I'rom JStiirzelbri»mi|| it was aliso to give support in the
direction of the Ilnd Army in the possible event of the IV^th
Corps being involved in an ai:tii)n at Kohrbach, but if not. it was

• Station on tlie line lutwoon Noufi-liattMU inul Chaumont.
t The (M'llti's M lit t%) t lii< rurpd. luul its (•on.-ciiucnt iiiovementd, uill be more par-
tiou1url> iillu(ti'il to in iIom ribin*; tlte advance of the lat and Ilnd Armici).
X 'V\w l.-t, Tilb, 7tb, :ii d 12ili.
§ 'I'bc .L>u\uriuii Luiia.-.icT lirig;;ilc was a^:iin ussii^niHl to tbc 1st liavaiian

II Sto p. L*(;).

■2. ,

259

to follow to Saanmion in rear of the Ilnd Bavarian CorpB. The
troopB received inatnictions to carry 3 days' iron rations* with
them; the trains were to remain two mnrclics in rear and were
not to enter the mount^iin passes until tliey had been traversed
hy the troops. The colnnms W(3ro to maintain conimnni cation
with each otJier and in tlie evunt of any fighting were to afford
as much mutual support as p()F?Ril)lo.

Tlic 11th Division, the rcinaindor of the Vltli Anny C'orps,
and the 2nd Cavalry Division were gradually asKonibliug at
SiUz and Ilagenau in rear of tlie advancing araiy. The trans*
port by rail of these troops was impeded by the trains of
wounded and prisonera coming in the reverse direction, and
was not finished imtil the 11th August.

The Baden Division reached Brumath on the 8th August and
remained there for a time watching Strassburg.f

On the right flank of the army, as early as tlie 8th August, 8th and 0th
the fortress of Bitsch, which closes the road to Rohrbach, had -^"K"**-
to be taken into consideration.

The Ilnd Bavarian Oorps, which was in bivouac this day
at Egelshardt, pushed forward a brigade to witln'n a mile of the
place. The 12th Division had received orders in the forenoon
to advance to Klein Redercliing, east of Rohrbach ; when its
leading detachment came withm range of the guns of the
fortress in the afternoon, it was received with a brisk cannonade.
La Roche's Bavarian batteiy responded, throwing incendiary
shells into the town ; as, however, no visible good was eftecteci,
the firing was shortly suspended. Some of the gunners were
wounded and a gun-carriage destroved.

The indifferent bye-roads, which the small though almost
unassailable fort forced us to use in order to pas» round it, were
at once reconnoitred and improved as much as possible. The
12th Division which had at first moved into bivouac at
Herzoffshand, made a night march as far as Haspelscheidt,
crossed the Hanviller plateau with some difficulty (m the

* The " iron ration " oonrists of a snpp] j of bacon, biscuit, rice, coflcc, and salt,
and is carried as far as possible by the men thcniselTcs. Tlieno radons arc held in
reserro, and are intended to provide against the troi>pH being left witlioutfiHjdntany
time. — Tr.

t With regard to the advance of tbc IFInl Anny to the Soar between 8th-12th
August, attention is directed to the sketch opposite, upon which the lines of march
and chief 6tappes of the nmin columns for each day are indicated. When there
was not suflicient room in the ncnrent villagcH for quartering the troop.% thoy had
to birouac during their march through the mountains.

Beferences to sketch : —

- ■■ Line of march of main columns and advanced

guards.

A. n. Q. « Army Iiead-qnartcrs.

v., XI. = Vth, Xlth Army Corps.

I. B. and II. B. «* 1st Bavarian and Ilnd Bar. Corps.

12 D. - 12th Division.

W. D. and Bd. D. — Wurttcmbcrg Dim. and Baden Divn.

4 C. D. "B 4th Cavalry Division.

The other Arabic numerals denote the dates in August on whlcli the respective
columns occupied the Tillages.

2(>0

followiii*^ (lay, and l)y this circTiitouH route reached the neigh-
bourliood of Schorhach and Loug-eUlieini on the i)th.

Tlio Ilnd Bavnviau (/orps, Iravin*]^ a battalion and a sijuadron
temporarily heliind to observe Hitseh. made a detour on the l»th
Au^-ust round the »onili <ii' the pl;ic<* alonp^ iorewt roads over the
Ibihenkopr and reaehed Lenibei*^, whieh had been ori^nally
designated as the niareliing* point of the l8t liavaii \\\ (^orps.
'^rhis hitter ('orps, after hivouaeking at IWrenthal and 3b>uter-
hausen on tlie 8th, moved on the \)\\\ bciyond Lemberg as far as
Euelienberg", the cuiransier l)rij;*a(U' to ftbaitbronn.

The Wihttendierg I)ivisi(»n liad advanced as far aw the
entrances to the mountain [kinsib near In4»;\viller on the 8th
Au.i»ust, and lia<l (h'spatched a Hanking (Uitaclnnont to Slench-
hoifen and another to Itotlihuch. While the hittm* under Li<;u-
tenant Kurzof th(! It h Cavalry, was reconnoitring hi tin* direction
of the little fortof Liehteid)erg.it was tired at whereupon the Divi-
sion received orders to atta<'k the mountain fastness on the *Jth.
General v. Obernitz detaihcl for the enterprise the 1st and iJrd
Kiile Battalions, half a scpuidnui of the 4th Cavalry Regiment,
the 2nd and 3rd batteries (4 Prs.), and a pioneer detachment.
General V. Iliigel was appointed to the cimimand of those troops.

On the *Jth they ap])roaehed Lichtenberg from two sides.
The main e(»hnnn, of M'hich the two batteries formed a jmrt,
marched from IngwilKa* along the VVhnmenaii road over the
BoUenberg against the west side of the place. The 3nl |{ifle
Battalion and a division of cuirassiers to<»k the road along the
Itothbach valley, and thence moved partly from Neumiihle
against the north fnait, and partly by another steep forest path
against the east front.

lioth batteries of the main c(»hunn t(K)k up their first position
at a distance of 2,200 paires from the fort. As, however, the etleet
of the tire could not be observed owing to a thick mist, they
advanced some 800 paces forward and took up a new position
on both sides of the road where, bending to the eastward, it
emerges from the wood. They lunt made use of a mitrailleuse
which ha(lb(»en captured at Worth but it speedily became unser-
vicc^jible. The fort answen^'d with a vigorous but almost in-
effective fire of shell and small arms. A CiJUipany of the IstUiflo
l>attalit)n remaimd as iscort t'> the gims. the other three ad-
vanced to the (»ast sidi^ of the village of Liihtenberg, which was
unoccupird by the enemy, where they to<ik up a ])OHitioii and
corniected thenisrlvi.s with the skirmishers of the 'M\\ Rillc
Battalit)n. At half-past U o'clock two more companies of the
2nd Regiment under JIajor v. (iravenitz appeared before the
south-east angle of the tort. These had originally remained
behiml to garrison Lauterbach, but were now following their
Division anil had spontaneously hastened to the scene of action.
The skirmishers of this crmipan)'' succeeded in api»roaching
within 100 paces of the rampart unperceived by the enemy and
in gaining a firm position there. A division forced its way
close up to the palisades.

261

At half-past 10 o'clock the French artillery was reduced to
silence ; the reconnaissanccR carried out in the interim had,
however, shown that the fort was quite secure against escalade,
and that the 4-pr8. were incapable of making a breach. The best
marksmen havuig been told off to fire at the embrasures, our
immediate efforts were limited to throwing shells into the
interior of the fort.

When General v. Ol^ernitz received a report of the st^te of
affairs, he despatched a 6-pr. battery, which arrived at nocm and
opened fire on the left of the 4-prs. The effect produced being by
no means decisive, Lieut.-Colonel v. Marchthaler brought four
guns of the 6-pr. batteiy to within (>()() paces of the south-east
angle of the fort and set fire to the buildings in the interior. But
the fort still showed no signs of a surrender. A parlementaire
calling upon it to do so was received with a shower of bullets.

Orders arrived shortly after from Genei-al v. Obernitz to
cease firing, and merely invest the fort, in the event of the
6-prs. being likewise unsuccessful.

In accordance with this, General v. Hiigel ordered the Ist
Rifle Battiilion to occupv those points which were of importance
for the investment. While caiTying this out, Lieut.-Colonel v.
Steiger commanding the battalion was mortally wounded, and
Captain Borst placed liors de combat About 4 o'clock the
General moved off with the rest of his troops to rejoin the
Division, which had meanwhile advanced from Ingwiller in a
north-westerly direction towards Meisenthal and Puberg.

The two companies of the 2nd Infantry Regiment, which it
will be remembered had established themselves close up to the
fort, were not able to withdraw to Rothbach without loss. The
defender fired repeated volleys after them, neglecting, apparently,
all attempts to extinguish the fire. As the flames were now seen
to rise aoove the principal building, Lieut.-Colonel v. March-
thaler again bnmght forward the 6-pr. battery, which was alriady
retiring, and continued to throw shells into the conflagration
until tne main building fell in. At 8 p.m. the fort hoisted
the white flag. Captain Sussdorf, who nad succeeded to the
command of tiie rifle battiilion, concluded a capitulation with
the commandant, 2nd Lieut. Archer, 96th Regiment of the Line,
by which the fort and the war material therein were to be
handed over on the following day, and 3 officers and 2LS men*
composing the garrisim, made prisoners of war. The trophies
of victory consisted of 7 guns and 260 chassei^ot rifles, with
ammunition. The loss of the Wurttembergers amounted to
12 killed and 24 wounded, besides the ofiicei'8 mentioned.

The Vth Army Corps, on the left of the Wiirttember^ Divi-
sion had reached the foot of the mountains at Weiterswiller on
the 9th August, and had pushed in a detachment as far as
Eckartswiller. Captain v. otruenseo of the General Staff made
a reconnaissance of Fort Liitzelstein which lay on the future

* Including 34 wounded.

262

line of march of the corps. As it proved to be al)aiidouecl by
the enemy, it was occupied by the Ist battiHon 37th Ke^ment.
Twenty-thi'ee French straggh^rs were there taken prisoners,
and G guns with ammunition captured. Information was also
received that on the night of the 7th-8th some of General de
Failly*s troops had bivouacked near tlie fort.
lOth August. The 1 lira Army, wliicli had been marching westward with

an increasing breadth of front on the 8th and Uth August, now
again naiTowed its front in advancing towards the scmth-west.
This Avas occasioned by tlie circumstance, that, on the first in-
correct report of Ifarshal llacMahon's line of retreat, the Ilnd
Army had ivceived orders from the royal head-quarters to anti-
cipjitc the Marshal with their left wing by Rohrbach. In con-
Bciiurnce of tliis tlic hkuI from that place to Lorcntzrn was
already occupied by the IVtli Army Oorps on tliu 8th Au;^iist,
so that the hne of luart^h to Uohrbach originally prescribed for
the Bavarians had to be given up by tliem, and they had to
take a road more to tlie south by Diemeringen. The 12th
Division alone marched by way of liohrbach.

At 3 a.m. on the lOth August, the following telegiam from
the royal lu'ad-cpiartcrs reached the Crown Prince's head-
quarters, which iiad been transferred on the 8th to Merzwiller,
within the rayon of the Xlth Army Corps.

'*Ist and Ilnd Army connnonce their advance to the i\b)sellc
on tlu' loth. iJiri'ct ion of right wing of Ilird Army, Saar-
imion-Dieuze ; cavalry well iu front."

This telegram was followed in the afternoon |)y an ix-
[)lanatory despatch to the folK»wing efleot from (jeneral v.
kloltke, adtlrcsHcd to all three army head-quarters, dated Saar-
briicken iUh August, 8 p.m. : —

Ue)>orts receiveil lead to the supposition that the enemy
has withdrawn behind the ^loselle or Seille.

All three armies will follow this movement. The Ilird Army
takes the road ISmunmion-Dieuze and those south ; the Ilnd
Anny the road St. Avold-Ni)meny and those soutli ; the Ist
Army the road Saarlouis-Boulay-les Etangs and those south.

In ordiT to cover the march, the cavalry is to be sent
forward to a (MUisiderable distamus and is to be sunported by
advanced guards thrown out well to the front, so tliat, should
the necessity arise, each army may hfivc time to close up.

Any deviations from those lines of inarch a^iU bo ordered
by His Majesty, as the position or movements of the enemy
may demand.

The loth August may be employed by the Ist and Ilnd
Armies in giving the troops rest, or in placing them on the
roads designated for them.

As the left wing cannot n-iwh the Saar until the 12th, the
Corps of the right wing will have comparatively short marches.

Whilst, in pursuance of these orders, the columns of the right
wing of the llird Army gave way to their left in the manner

I'l

2G3

already deBcribed, the Wurttemberffers advanced to Adams-
wilier on the 10th Au^URt, and the Vtli Army Corps as far as the
vicinity of Woj^er, out cavalry detucliments from the north,
belongini^ to the IV th Army Corps, had already scom^ed the
ground along the front as far as Fenestrange and Sarrebourg.

The Xlth Army Corps, the command of which had devolved
upon General v. GersdorfF after General v. Bose's severe wound
at Worth, formed the extreme left wing of the army, and roa(rhed
the neighbourhood of Hattmatt and Dossenheim on the Dtli
August. According to instiiictions from army head-quarters it
waa to reach Sarrebourg by the 12th, making use as well of the
Zinzelthal road, and invest* the fortress of Pfalzburg which lay
on its line of march.

In accordance with this order General v. Gersdorff marched
on the 10th August with the 21st Division and the coi-ps artillery
from Hattmatt along the main road by Zabem, in the direction
of the fortress, as far as Quatre Vents, and ordered a recon-
naissance of the environs.

The 22nd Division, at present under General v. Schkopp,
a<lvanced fi'om Dossenheim by way of the Zinzelthal to ^letting.
Close in rear followed the 4th (3avalry Division.f

The reconnaissance had shown that Pfalzburg was com-
pletely armed, abundantly provided with food, and garrisoned
by 1,200 men,J under an energetic commander, Major Taillant.
The summons to surrender sent by both Divisions of the Xlth
CoiTps was decisively rejected by the commandant ; to the
threat of a bombardment, he sent the laconic reply, '* J*accepte
*' le bombardement."

General Haussman now ordered the artillery to take up the
positions previously selected : the four batteries of the 21st Divi-
sion at Les Barraques, 2,800 paces S.E. of the fortress ; the six
Uitteries of the corps artillery 4,600 paces E. of it, with their
left flank resting on the road. As soon as it was dark these 60
g^ins commenced a brisk cannonade, to which the fortress only
replied with ten guns, which opened fire bjr degrees and caused no
damage to the Prussian batteries. As it was impossible to ob-
serve the effect of our fire owing to the darkness and the pouring
rain, the bombardment was discontinued ; the Prussian batteries
had expended nearly 1,000 shells in three-quarters of an hour.

The Xlth Army Corps was this evening at Mittelbnmn and
Netting on its two lines of march ; the investment of Pfalzburg
was handed over to the advancing troops of the Vlth Army
Coi-ps.

* A clerical error m the order made eintekliessen (inyest) into tituehittMen (bom-
Urd).

t This Dirision should not hare crotsed the mountains before the 11th, but in
its anxiety to meet the enemy again, had mored forward on the 10th on its own
responsibility.

{ According to the official report of the French court of inquiry upon the capi-
tulations, the garrison consisted of the 4ith battn. 63rd Regiment, and a battalion of
Garde Mobile, besides 52 artillerymen and some 200 vtragglers from the 1st Corps,
making a total of 1,232 men.

26i

11th August. Tlicro waH now no loup^or any doubt that the French Iiad

retreated from Woi-tii and Hiti^uh upon Barrebourg. The Cnnvn
Prince, whose headqnartera had been at Peterebach since the
10th, liud roceivt'd a comrnnnication from the IVth Army Corps
at Saarunion. that it inti'iuk'd remaining in that neighlhiurhood
during the llth. Under thuse circumstances it now became
necessary to bring the army to tlie Saar on a still more con-
tracted front. But in order to enable it to open out during
its Hulmequent advance, the 4th Cavalry Division was ordered
provisionally to press forward through SaiTebourg and recon-
noitre the neighbomhood of Luneville and Nancy in the course
of the next few days, whilst the Xlth Army corps was to follow
by ISarrebourg.

In accordanee with tlieHeiiiKtrncticms the 4th Cavalry Division
roach(;d the; crons roads at ileming on the llth. The 2iid
Body-guard Mussai-H, which, with two companies of the lK5th,
formed the advanced guard, occupied iSt. Georges on the
LunevilK; road; a squadron of lancera was pushed forAvard
from Sarrebourg to Langatte, on the north-west.

Shoi-tly bi'fore the anival of the cavalry the bridge at Dianne
Capelle had been blown up ; a pioneer detachment of the Xlth
Corps, wliieh was despateht;d on wagons from Sarrebourg, coia-
pleted a bridge of boats 200 paces south of the spot by the next
afternoon. Other explosions led to the conclusion that there
were demolitions elsewhere.

Under cover of the Cavalry Division, the Army reached
the line of the Saar betwtjon Pistorf and SaiTebourg* with three
Corps and the AViirttend)erg Division. As the neighbourhood
of Saarunion was at this time otherwise occupied, and an there
was a deficiency of roads for a sinmltaneous movement in the
narrow tract available for the fc»rward march, the 12th Division
and the Ilnd Bavarian Coi-ps had to remain temporarily in roar
at Lorentzen and Diemeringen.
12th August. By the 12th August the army had fim'shod its deployment,

as the IIn(l Bavarian Corps, and the 12th Dlviwion, had tujw
also come up into front hiiu, and all parts of the army were on
the roads wliieh they were to make use of in their subsequent
advance to the Moselle. For this purpose, the 1st Bavarian Corps
moved from Pistorf up the Saar towards the neighbourhood of
Bettborn,

Thus the army on the evening^ of the 12th August had four
Coips and the \Vui*ttemberg Division extended over the nine
miles of ground between Sarrebourg and Fenestrangci ; the luU
vauee<l guards were pusluul forwanl totlu; left bank of the Saar.
The 12th Division alone (ux'upied a detached position on tlio
right of Saarunion. The troops had now ret-eivod instructions
to call up their trains to the Saar, The army head-quarters
remained at Petersba(jh on the 12th.

The 4th Cavalry Division had on this day made considerable

Seo sketch fuoing p. 250.

265

proffresfl. The let squadron of the 2nd Body Guard Huwars
made incursions as far as Luneville, "whorc it only met with
some wounded French soldiers who had been loft Ix^hind.
The burgomaster handed over the gold(»n key of the town to
Captahi V, E^oncet., with a letter to the (Jrown Prince, wherein
he promised to comply with all demands of the Gennan troops,
in return for which he begged f(»r the protection of the town and
its iidiabit^intf). The sqnadron bivouack(;d to the* (»aM of the
town. The Division reached the neighbom'hood of Moyonvicj on
the road to Nancy, and occupied that village Avith the advanced
guard. A parlementaire wlio had ridden forwai'd to demand the
Bun'ender of the neighbouring fortress of Mar^al was received
"with fire.

On this day Colonel Wright with the 5th Dragoons reached
Dieuze from Saarunion. Tins regiment likewise belonged to the
4th Cavahy Division, but had, as we have seen, carried out the
reconnoitnng duties along the Palatinate frontier under great
fatigues from the commencement of the campaign. After assemb-
ling at Zweibriicken on the ()th August, the regiment moved on
the 7th to rejoin its Division. On this day it made a reconais-
sance in the direction of Bitsch, after receiving intelligence of
the battle at Worth. It was hoped that the debris of MacMahon's
aimy would bo met with, but such, however, was not the caise.
The 4th Squadron (5ame so near the fortress, that it was fired
upon and suffered a loss of 4 killed and 5 wounded. Its further
advance as far as Saarunion was carried out in conjunction with
the 8th Infantry Division. At this point the regiment was once
more united to the 4th Cavalry Division, and Krosigk's brigade,
to which it belonged, with the two already mentioned companies
of the 95th, foi-med thenceforth the advanced guard of that
Division.

While the Ilird Anny was advancing to the Saar the Baden
Division had despatched on the 6th from Bnimath its three
regiments of dragoons, nine batteries, and six comi)anies of
infantry on waggons, towards Strassburg. The cavalry earned
its reconnaissance to the glacis of the fortress, and exchanged
shots with the gannson, which decisively declined to suiTonder.
Although there was no prospect of gaining possession of the
impoilant place by a coup do main, still tlie line of railway
from Strassburg to Lyons and the teh^gi'aphs were sucees^fully
destroyed; Vendenheim, an imi)ortant point as regardinl our
own communications, was als(» orcjupied.

On the evening of the lOth August, tlie Divimon received
direct orders from General v. Moltke at the royal head-quarters,
to prevent any reinforcements of hostile troops or matenal being
brought to Strassburg, especially from the S(mthward. ** A
" complete investment the best ; reinforcements to that end on
" the way," were the words of the order.

The Baden Division, having thus ro(;eived an independent
mission, was uicluded no longer as a part of the Ilird Army.

The forces meanwhile collected at Sulz and llageuau under

266

•

General v. Tumpling* had followed after the army, and their
advanced parties reached the eastern foot of the VosgeH at
Bux wilier and Ingwiller on tlie 11th August; the c(»ps artillery
of the YIth Amiy Corps was still at Hagenau. The general
etappen inspection had also been moved to Buxwiller, and had
placed the railway as far as Steinburg in working order. General
V. Tumpling had received instructions likewise to cross the
mountams, and while doing so to invest the foi-tress of Pfalzbure
in such a way that the troops on the march should be secured
against the sorties of the garrison.

The lltli Division stai-ted for the mountains at 3 a.m. on
the 12th August. It moved generally in fighting order, and
with caution through the ZinzoUlml, as the naiTow pass was
said to bo occui)ied by VoHges si laq) shooters. The roads were
so inip.'iKsablc that it was evening before the neip^hbourhood of
Vesciicini was reached. The coi'jiS artillery moved from llagenau
to Buxwiller.

The investment of Pfalzburgwas ontnisted toMajor-Gcueral
V. Eckartsberg ; the 38th Fusiliers, the 6th Rifle Battalion, the
4th souadnm 8th Dragoons, and the 1st Heavy Battery were
placeci at his disposal for the pui-pose.

The rifle battalion formed a left^flanking party on the manrh
from the eastwaid as far as Quatre Vents, and threw forward an
advanced picquot to La Poste des chevaux. The other troops
marched along the Zinzelthal road by way of HoberhofT to
Vilsberg, and took up a position west and north of the fortress
as follows : — The Iwt battn. 38tli Uegiment at Mittelbronn, the
3v(l buttn. on the roads ti» Saanniion, Vilsberg, and Biichelberg,
kL'Ci)ing up conmmnicatiou with the rifles ; the remainder as a
general reserve at Vescheim. The outposts were pushed forward
on all three sides almost to the glacis of the fortress. The
commandant was sunnnoned to surrender, but again refused to
do so. As preparations for aiming the ramparts of the fortress
had been observed from the Mittelbnmn side, fire from the
heavy batteiy was opened against this point at half-past 5 o'clock
in the afteniotm. The ganison answered vigorously along the
whole front with musketry and artillery, continuing to do so
throughout the nif;ht, but in a loss degree. The Prussian out-
posts found cover in the buildings suiTounding the fortress, but
m spite of this had a loss of 5 killed and 13 wounded.

As IMalzburg closed the important road over tlie Vosgesfrom
Zabern to Sarrebourg and was a standing menace to the rail*
way in the valley of the Zorn, it was in every way desirable
to gain speedy possession of the place, and avoid a protracted
investment. Tl\o more complete reconnaissance ordered from
army head-cpiarters had led to the idea that the end might bo
attained by a vigorous bombardment with field artillery, and

• See p. 269.

267

General v, Tumpling received instructions to make the
attempt.

In addition to the troops already mentioned, the General
brought up the 51st Regiment on the 13th August, surrounded
the fortress completely, and ordered the corpw artillery to como
up from Buxwiller by way of the Zinzenthul and Metting.

Meanwhile, with the help of men detailed from the 2lBt
Brigade at Hangwiller, emplacements for lotteries were thrown
up on the heights 1,500 paces soutlx of Vescheim, on both sides
of the road, and the guns were placed m position during the
night.

At 7.30 a.m. on the 14th the whole of the ten batteries of the
corps artillery and 11th Division opened fire at ranges varjring
from 3,300 to 4,000 paces. The tortress answered with eight
or ten guns, of which two were 24-prs. and one mortar. At the
end of half an hour a conflagration was o1)6erved in the town,
and although the cannonade only lasted until 5 p.m., fires
broke out at several places.

The artillery had expended 1,800 projectiles; a division of *
the 51st Regiment had moved from Mittelbronn as far as the

flacis and exchanged shots with the garrison. The commander,
owever, obstinatelv refused to surrender, and it was therefore
manifest that the place was not to be subdued by field artillery.
In order, therefore, to make up in some degree for the time
which had been lost in the attempt, General v. Tumpling
followed the army to Sarrebourg on the evening of the 14th.
The two musketeer battalions of the 51st and a squadron of
dragoons remained provisionally before Pfalzburg, and observed
the fortress from the north and south until they were relieved
by landw^ehr troops on the 19th and 20th August.

Thb Adyancf. of thb IIIrd Abut to thi Mosellb.

After the main forces of the IIIrd Army had completed their
concentration on the Saar in the manner already described,
orders were received from the Crown Prince in the afternoon of
the 12th August for a further advance to the Moselle. Such an
advance had been contemplated almost simultaneoiisly by the
royal head-quarters at St. Avoid, for on the night of the 12th-
13th a dispatch from thence intimated that the Ist Army
would advance to the Nied in the direction of Metz, the Ilnd

moving abreast of it with the left wing on Chateau Salins ;

it then went on to say that " the II Ird Army was to continue
*• its advance towards the line Nancy-Luneville. Its further
** movements will be decided upon in the next few days. The
" trains may foUaw the Army Corps in all cases as far as the
'* Meurthe and Moselle."

In accordance with this the IIIrd Anny moved ofi* towards iSth Anguit.
the Moselle once more on a broader front.* On the 13th August

* Soe iikotcli opposite p. 26S.

268

a sqiiadron of the 4 th Cavahy Division connected themselves at
Chateau Salins with the left wing of the Ilnd Army. The
advanced guard of the Division* had invested the small fortress
of Marsiil dui-ing the morning. As the commandtmt did not
accede to the proposals made to him, and would only surrender
on the condition of the garrison being allowed a free departure,
the horse artillery l)atterie8, which were passing with the main
body of the Division, threw 87 shells into tiie place ; the garrison
responded with a sinale shell, received the troops advancing to
the glacis with musketry fire, but even now renised to capitu-
late.

A report was meanwhile received from the squadron of hus-
sarst which had proceeded to the other side of Luneville, that
Nancy was also unoccupied. In consequence of this, the Divi-
sion continued to advance in this direction on the 13th as far as
Moncel, the advanced guard to Champenoux.

Four squadrons remained provisionally in observation before
Marsal.

The main body of the aimy reached the line Dieuze-Blamont
this day, and occupied double its fonner extent of front.
The 12th Division was alone on the Saar at Fenestrange. On
the right wing, the advanced guard of the Ilnd Bavarian Corps
aiTived at Dieuze, and pushed forward three l^ttalions and a
regiment of Che vaux- lagers that evening to Marsal. relieving
the same night the detachment left behind by the 4th Cavalry
Division.

On the extreme left flank the Xlth Army Corps advanced
to Blamont and Avricouit. The 13th Hussars made incursions
as far as Baccarat, and there destroyed the telegraphic com-
munication. Army headquarters moved to SaiTebourg.
14Ui August. The 4th Cavalry Division reached Nancy on the following

day, occupied the town, and pushed forward the 5th Dragoons
beyond tlie place to the westward. The French post of the
preceding day, amongst which were letters from Metz of the
loth to the 13th August, fell into their hands. It aj^peared from
the contents that a considerable portion of the French army was
in that neighbonrhood, and that a l)attle was expected daily.
Considerable bodies of troops were said to be assembling at
Chalons.

The cavalry patrols pushed forward in various directions
found the bridges over the Moselle at Frouard and Pont St.
Vincent uninjured, but the stone bridge further up at Basse-
Flavigny w^as dcKtroyed. Communication was opened with the
5th C:ivalry Division by way u( Frouard and intelligence, was
received that Pont a MoussiUi was occupied by infantry of the
Ilnd Army.

The Mini Army moved forward this day as far as the Hue
Moyenvi(;-Luiicville ; the 12th l)ivisiou and the 1st Bavarian
Corps remained iu second line at I^ieuze and Maizieres.

* Tilt' lOth I'uvulry Jiri^ailo and two cos. l)5th Kegimcnt. Sec p. 2(M.
t Sec p. 2<ij.

209

Considerable stores of supplies were found at Luiieville,
especially of oats. After abundantly satisfying the wants of the

{>assiug troops, the remainder were formed into a grand depot
or the use of the army. Intelliffenee was received that
Marshal MacMahon had retired to ChalouB ; General Failiy was
said to have moved away southwards with a view to taking up
a firm position in the southern passes of the Vosges.

The Ilnd Bavarian Coips had during its march by Dieuze to
Movenvic invested the fortress of Marsal on both banks of the
Seille with the 7th Infantry Brigade, the Lancer Brigade, and
seven batteries of reserve artillery. The guns had been placed
in position to the north and south of the fortress, and a battery
Iiad just opened fire by mistake, when the commandant con-
cluded a capitulation with the parlementaire sent to him. The
garrison were made prisoners of war, and 60 guns, 8,000 rifles,
considerable stores of ammunition and other war material fell
into the hands of the Bavarians. Among the prisoners there
was not a single artilleryman. This circumstance explained why
only one cannon shot had been fired from the fortress. General
V. Martmann occupied the place with a company of the 9th
Regiment.

The Vlth Army Corps reached Sarrebourg on the night of
the 14th- 15th ; army headquarters moved to Blamont.

On the following day the 4th Cavalry Division on the right W*^^««"»«^
wing I'emained at Nancy. The Vth Corps reached the Meurthe
at St. Nicholas and Rosiires, and pushea two advanced guards
over the river. The Xlth Coi-ps on the left wing advanced from
Luneville to Bayon on the Moselle, where the stone bridge was
found to be destroyed. After constructing two pontoon bridges,
the 44th Brigade, the 13th Hussars, and two oatteries moved
forward as advanced guard, the outposts taking up a position
between Harou^ and Vaudeville on the river Maaon.

Both Bavarian corps, the Wurttemberg and the 12th Divisions
were in second line at Einville, Moncel, Sommervilliers, and
Arracourt; the Vlth Corps remained at Sarrebourg. The
Crown Prince transferred his headquai*ters to Luneville. On
this day the 2nd Cavalry Division also came under his direct
orders. It had left Mainz on the 7th August, on being placed
imder the commander of the Ilird Army, and had received
instructions from the royal headquarters to follow this army
with all possible speed. The Division crossed the firontier at
Weissenbur^ on the llth August, and followed tlie YIth Cori>s
across the Vosges. After a nme days' march, during which it
traversed a distance of 160 miles, St. Georges was reached on
the 15th August.

On the 16th August the Ilnd Bavarian Corps came up into 10^ Angnti.
the first line at Nancy, and the Vth Corps pushed forward ad-
vanced guards to Richardmenil and Basse Flavigny on the
Moselle. The bridge which had been blown up at the latter place
was again made passable by the pioneers within 27 hours, and
by means of the bridge trains a second passage was constructed.

270

The Xlth Corps, the WUrttembereera, the let Bavarian Corpii,
and the 12th Division remained in the positions which they had
taken up on the 15th August ; the other parts of the Vltii Uorps
followed from Sarrebonr^ as far as Blamont.

The 2nd Cavalry Division advanced in the direction of Bac-
carat as far as the neighbourhood of Montigny, As the pre-
viously mentioned rumour of General Failly*8 retreat towards
the South Yosges received confirmation by more recent reports
and intelligence, the Division was assigned the special duty of
protecting the left flank of the army from that quaver.

On the right wing, the 4th Cavalry Division moved forward
as far as the road leading from Toul to Colombey, and despatched
the same day half a squadron of the 2nd Hussars on either flank,
so as to accompany the Division in its subsequent advance at
the distance of a da^'s march and gather intelligence as to the
enemas army. A similar detachment was sent a day*s march
ahead of the Division. The Ilnd Bavarian Corps also sent for-
ward its cavalry beyond Nancy to Pont St. Vincent and in the
direction of Toul. The outpost squadrons of the lancer brigade,
which had advanced by Gondreville close up to the fortress,
observed an action developing on the north bank of the Moselle
and Mame Canal about noon. In order also to occupy the
attention of the fortress on the south side, the lancer brigade
advanced as far as Dommartin and opened fire with the horse
artillery battery against the fortress at a range of 1,200 paces.
The latter responded, but without causing any loss to the
Bavarians. As the action in the north was broken off during
the afternoon, the Bavarian battery also ceased firing. The
lancer brigade then went into bivouacs at Gondreville, its out-
posts watching the fortress without molestation firom the enem^.

The troops which had come into contact with the enemy m
front of Tout were parts of the IVth Armv Corps, consequently
the left flank of the Ilnd Army, and it will now be necessary to
describe the events which had taken place between the lower
Saar and Moselle since the battle of Spicheren.

271

MoTiMiNTS or T?i Abmt from ths Lower Saab to thb Mosbllb.

Junction or thb Ist and IInd Armibs ; DEPLOTiiir.NT for a further

Adyancb on the Left Dank of thb Saar.

In the early morning of the 7 th August a thick mist overhung ^th Angnit.
the battle-field of Spicheren and the neighbourhood.

At daybreak Gruter'e brigade of the 6th Cavalry Division
reached fromGudingen the drill ground at ISaarbrucken,* where
it was rejoined by the 6th Cuirassiers.f

In order to regain the touch of the enemy, the 3rd and 15th
Lancers at once moved towards Forbaclu The 12th Dragoons,
15th Hussars, and the 2nd H. A. battery of the Vllth Army
Coips joined them ; Captain v. Knoblauch with the 3rd squadron
of tiie Cuirassiers took the direction of Saargemiind, and found
in the village of Etzling some 500 Frenchmen, including many
officers, who had been left behind mostly in a wounded state.

When the lancers appeared before Forbach towards 6 a.m.,
they were fired upon by infantry. The place was now attacked
simultaneously on the west and north by the advanced guard of
the 13th Division which had received orders during the night
from the corps commander to advance at daybreak against the
flanks and rear of the enemy, should Forbach not have been
previously evacuated.

General v. d. Goltz gained possession of the townt after a
brief skirmish, and took up a position on the Kreuzberg to the
e€istward, facing Saargemiind, whilst the main body of the
Division moved up to the Forbach railwav station. Meantime
Griiter's cavalry brigade, in concert with the regiments and the
battery of horse artillery which had joined it, advanced as far
as Morsbach, where it bivouacked, thro^ving forward its outposts
alon^ the St. Avoid road and towards the south. The patrols
which scoured the country in all directions found Calling on the
west and Far8chwiller§ on the south unoccupied, but discovered
hostile troops of all arms drawn up in a strong position at
St. Avoid. In consequence of this some changes of front and
position of the 13th Division took place during the same after-
noon : two battalions and a batteiy belonging to the main body
advanced by way of Morsbach to serve as an immediate support
to the cavalry at Rossbriick ; the advanced guard of the Division
took up a position on the St. Avoid road, and afterwards
bivouacKed to the south-west of Forbach.

The commander-in-chief of the Ist Array and his staff had
passed the night at St. Joliann ; this army executed the follow-
mg movements on the 7th : —

* On the right bank of the Saar south of St. Johann.

t It will be remembered that this regiment was present at the battle on the pre-
Tioos day.

1 As stated on p. 250, considerable stcires and a bridge train were here rnpturrd.
5 N.N.W. of PutU'Unge.

B 2

272

The Vllth and Vlllth Army Corps had been ordered to
employ the day chiefly in bringing up troops still in rear, and
in re-organising the different units after the loosening they had
sustained in the battle. Accordingly the 14th Infantry Division
assembled at Stiring Wendel. The corps artillery of the Vllth
Army Corps, which reached Saiiibriicken in the forenoon, moved
to Volklingen on learning that the Forbach road was assigned
to the Vlllth Army Corns.

Tho KJth Infantry IMvision crossed to the left bank of tho
8aar, and bivouacked in the uoighbourhood of Drathzug ; the
15th Infantry Division and the corps artillery gradually came
up to the Saar in the coui-se of the forenoon, and went into
bivouacs on the right bank between Malstatt and Burbach.

The 3rd Cavalry Division had been instnicted to search
the roads leading to Metz from the direction of Saarlouis. It
marched by Saarwellingen to Fraulautern, and pushed forward
patrols over the Saar, which found Bouzonville unoccupied, but,
on the other hand, came across French in&ntry and cavalry at
Tromborn, on the road to Boulay.

Of the troops* recently assigned to the Ist Army, the 1st
Anny Corps had with its two Divisions from Birkenfeld and
Kaiserlautern reached the neighbourhood of Tlioley and Ram-
stein on the 6th August, and were brought up to Lebach and
Sand on the 7th. The 2nd Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division
likewise advanced from its points of disembarkation at Birken-
feld and Neunkirchen in the direction of Lebach on the 7th,
whilst the 1st Cavalry Brigade commenced its disembarkation
at Birkenfeld.

Meanwhile the telegraphic order from Mainz, already quoted,t
had reached the commander-in-chief of the Ist Army, assigning
the main road from Saarbriicken to St. Avoid to the Ilnd Army.
In consequence of this. General v. Steinmetz transferred his
head-quarters on the 7th to Volklingen and issued ordera that
evening to tho Vllth and Vlllth Anny Corps to evacuate the
road in question on the foUo^ving day by bearing away to the
right. The commander-in-chief of the Ilnd Army was informed
of these an*angements.

Of this latter army, the 6th Infantry Division was completely
assembled at Neunkirchen on the evening of the 6th of August,t
and from thence marched away to Saarbriicken at 3 a.m. It
there received orders to relieve the 5th Infantry Division in its

{positions. Accordingly, the greater part of the 11th Infantry
Brigade took over the line of outposts from Stiring Wendel to
the oaur ; the main body of the 6tn Infantry Division bivouacked
on the Galgeul)erg ; the 5th Infantry Division was quartered in
Saarbriicken and St. Johann.

• Bee p. 101.
t See p. 203.

X With tli6 excepHon of those troops which had alreadv appeared on the battle
field.

273

Both Cavalry Divisions of the Ilnd Army had received orders
from headquarters to shift theu* positions as follows: Barby's
and Redem's brieades, which had assembled at Saarbriicken on
the morning of the 7th, were ordered to move to Saargemund,
which they did along the right bank of the Saar. The 19th
Dragoons were alone to move up along the left bank by Spi-
cheren to Saargemiind, and thus maintain the communication
with the 6th Cavalry Divisfon. Of the latter, Griiter's brigade,
as we are aware, had already moved forward to Forbach in the
early morning. Ranches hussar brigade, which hud been watch-
ing the neighbourhood of SaargemCInd from the lower Blies on
the 6th, was brought up by Saarbriicken on the morning of the
7th and bivouacked on the drill-ground with the 6th Cuirassiers,
which had been left behind from Oiiltei^s Brigade.

In this way all three brigades of the 5th Cavalry Division
now found employment on the left wing of the army, while the
6th would for the future exercise its activity on the right wing.

During its presence on the lower Blies, Ranches bn^ade had
during the 6th August observed French troops marching from
the eastward towards Saaxgemiind, and reported to army
headquarters early on the 7th that this village was still occu-
pied m force by tne enemy. Bredow's brigade, while making a
reconnaissance from Medelsheim,* had also met with French
infantry at Rohrbach, and ol>8erved a considerable camp at
Bitsch, which increased in size during the course of the day.

These observations, taken in conjunction with the news of
Marshal MacMahon's defeat at Woi-th and of his supposed
retreat on Bitsch, left a most decided impression that the
adversai-y wished to keep his hold on the Bitsch-SaargemOnd
road. Tnis view was confirmed by a telegram despatched from
the royal headquarters at 6 a.m., in which the suggestion was
thrown out that, as MacMahon might reach Bitsch on the 7th,
the cavalry and the left wing of the Ilnd Army should be
opposed to him on the 8th at Rohrbach.

Tlus proposal, so thoroughly in agreement with his own
views, was at once entered into by Prince Frederic Charles.

The IVth Army Corps, which was on the march towards the
neighbourhood of Alt nombach, received orders to move to
Yolmunster that same day, push forward its advanced guard
to Rohrbach, and make such arrangements that it could be
completely assembled at Rohrbaoh by 8 a.m. on the following
morning at the latest. For this object, Bredow*s brigade of the
5th Cavalry Division was assigned to the Corps; the Guard
Cavalry Division and a Guard Infantry Division were to be ready
to support it at Gross Rederchingt on the 8th, whilst with the
same end in view the Xth Corps was given a more south-
westerly direction. In the event of the enemy making a pro-
longed resistance at Saargemiind, no serious attack was here to

* About luJf-wsT between BliesoMtel and Kohrbacli.
t K.W. of Bohmch, on the road to SaargemAnd.

274

be made from the eastAvard. It was rather in contemplation to
move up the Ilird Corps from its present position on thn left
batik of the Saar against Saargemiind from the north.

Had Marshal MacMahon really taken the supposed direction,
he could not have escaped a fresh and complete defeat.

Prince Frederic Charles also transferred his headquarters on
the 7th from Homburg to BHescastel ; the IVth Army Corps took
up the positions just indicated. The other Corps reached the
points assigned to them in previous orders, consequently with their
foremost line in the neighbourhood of Assweiler and St. Ingbert.*

Barby's and Redem's cavalry brigades occupied quarters on
the lower Blies and Saar between EJein BUttersdorf and Hab-
kirchen. Late in the afternoon a detachment of the latter brigade
found Saargemund abandoned by the enemy. The 17th Hussars
occupied the village and captured considerable supplies of pro*
visions and stores, as well as some locomotives wmch had been
left behind. The outposts from the regiment thrown out
towards the south-west regained the touch of the foe, whose
infantry were occupying Woustwiller, the other arms being
encamped further to the rear at Eniestwiller.
Sth August. After the undisputed occupation of Saargemund, the only im-

portant collision to be expected for the present with the enemy
was that of the IVth Army Corps and those parts of the Ilnd
Army which had taken the same direction, in order to be on
the spot if this should happen. Prince Frederic Chai*les moved
with nis staff by way of Klein Rederching^ towards the Bitsch-
Rohrbach road on the morning of the 8th August. Between
Klein Redcrching and Rohrbach stood in accordance with orders
the IVth Army Corps deployed in order of battle.

The hostile army expected from Worth did not, however,
make its appearance ; neither did Bredow*s cavalry brigade, in
its incursions far to the southward, discover any traces of a large
French force ; it only met with detachments of the Illrd Army.
It was now plain that Marshal MacMahon must have taken a
more southerly direction in his retreat.

The IVth Corps now passed over to the Rohrbach*Saarunion
road, its advaiiced guard moving this day as far as Loreutzen.
The whole of the Guard Coi*p8 assembled at Gross Rederching ;;
the Xth Corps reached the neighbourhood of Saargemiind and
occupied that town witll i^ advanced guard. The IXth Corps
nt Bexbach and the Xllth at Homburg closed up their columns.
The llird Army Corps also remained for the most part stationary,
the 6th Division alone advancing beyond Stiring Wendel, and
occupying Forbach with its advanced guard in the afternoon.

The hrad-quartors of Prince Frederic Charles were trans-
ferred on the 8th to Saargemiind.

* Guard Corps, Assweiler ; Xth, St. Ingbert ; IXth, Bexbaeh } Xllth, Hom-
burg. See note on p. 205. The Ilnd Corps wm still on its way bj rail.

t Klein Bedcrcliing is not near Gross Redcrching, but about 2| miles E. of
Bohrbach and N. of the Bitsch road.

X A battalion was sent from that plaee to Saargemiind.

275

The shifting of the left win^ beyond Rohrbach had caused
such an increeusie of front to tne Ilnd Army that it appeared
desirable for the commander-in-chief to distribute the cavalry,
which had hitherto been employed by independent Divisions,
among the different Army Corps.

The Guard Corps and Xllth Corps had already their own
Cavalry Divisions at disposal, and the Hessian cavalry brigade
was with the Xlth Corps. The 6th Cavalry Division was therefore
assigned to the Ilird Army Corps, and the 5th was distributed in
such wise that Bredow's brigade remained ^vith the IVth, and
Barby^s and Redern's brigades passed to the Xth Corps. In the
event of a battle, the commander-in-chief reserved to himself the
concentration of the Cavalry Divisions, and the disposal of them.

Meanwhile, the cavalry had executed the following move-
ments on the 8th August : —

On the left wing the greater part of Bredow's brigade reached
the district between Lorentzen and Saarunion. Throe squadrons
of the 7th Cuirassiers, which were reconnoitring the Vosges from
Lemberg,* met with hostile infantry at Wimmenau, by whom
their Airther advance into the mountains was disputed. Upon
this they rejoined their brigade by way of Lorentzen.

BarDy's and Redem's Inigades had advanced by way of
Saargemiind to Puttelange and Saaralbe. Both places were
found abandoned by the enemy. The patrols thrown out
beyond Puttelange observed the withdrawal of French troopsf
towards the south-west ; nothing could be seen of the enemy
from Saaralbe.

On the other hand the French were still visible in large num-
bers in the direction of St. Avoid. Major v. Thiele, who had
proceeded on the morning of the 8th to reconnoitre with a party
of the 12th Dragoons, attacked some hostile troops at Haut
Hombourg,} and after capturing some prisoners withdrew, as
the enemy opened a vigorous musketry fire and even placed
some guns in position.

In the afternoon Griiter's brigade of the 6th Cavalry Divi-
sion sent out a strong reconnoitring party from their bivouac
at Morsbach towards St. Avoid and Lixing, whilst a squadron
of the 8rd Lancers sought to connect itself with the 5th Cavahy
Division by way of Metzing, and thereby complete tlic line of
observation southward.

When Colonel v. Alvensleben with three squadrons of the
15th Lancers§ appeared before St. Avoid in the afternoon, he
found the place still strongly occupied. Captain v. Plotz, moving
by Lixing, also discovered a large hostile camp at Gross Ten-
quin^l At 5 o'clock, however, the foe was observed to be

* Point oC inteneotion of the roadi from Bittch and Bohrbach to TngwiUer.
f Apjparently about 8,000 ftrong.

I l^oint of interaection of the rulway and road to the E. of St. Arold.
{ A aquadion bad been diepatohed the preriooi day in an carter] j direction to-
ward! Kerbaeh, in order to complete the connexion with the 6th CaTalrj DiriBion.
I About 0 milea 8. of 8t. AtoM.

276

retiring from St. Avoid towards the west ; the lancers at once
entered the town, and found a number of wounded men and
stragglers fVom the 3rd Fi*ench Corps.

Colonel y. Alvensleben followed the enemy with two squad-*
rons along the Metz road as far as Long^ville, where some
French battalions, with cavalry and artillery, had taken up a
position as rear guard. While continuing to watch them at
close quartera, it was observed that these troops also retired
upon Bionville on the approach of night. The lancers imme-
diately resumed their aavance. Their patrols, who rode right
among the enemy, were fired upon at times by infantry; at
other places even large detachments offered no opposition
to them. The whole bearing of the enemy gave the impression
that the confidence of the troops was already shaken and their
discipline broken.

Leaving a squadron at Longeville, the remainder proceeded
for the night to St. Avoid. The connexion with the 6ih Cavalry
Division was established at Puttplange by means of the detach-
ments sent to the south-east.

On the first telegraphic intelligence of the battles of Worth
and Spicheren reaching the headquarters of His Majesty the
King at Mainz, the possibility of barring Marshal MacManon's
retreat was the first point considered.

The steps taken in consequence naturallv affected at the same
time the other parts of the 1st and Una Armies, the present
military situation requiring that they should be under one undi-
vided command within immediate rea^h. For this reason the
royal headquarters had been already shifted on the 7th August to
Homburg in the Palatinate, where His Majesty the King arrived
the same evening at 7 o'clock.

The contemplated advance of the German main forces from
the lower Saar to the neighbourhood of Metz was, as already
mentioned, to be executed by a gradual wheel to the right upon
the 1st Army as a pivot.*

In order to attack with a deployed front ^he Emperor Napo-
leon*s army, which was presumed to be in a strength of five Corps
on the Moselle, and at the same time outflank it on the rignt
with superior forces, our own right wing must be itself held back.
The advance of the latter, i.e. or the Ist Army, must be the more
retarded for the present as circumstances already alluded to
had caused the left wing of the Ilnd Army to make a wide
detour southward, and the centre was still engaged in concen-
trating. It may further be added that since the battle of
Spicheren we had no accurate knowledge of the enemy's pro-
ceedings, and, Consequently, our further measures depended

• See p. 106.

277

on the reports of the cavtdry as to the whereabouta of the main
French army.

With this object General v. Molke telegraphed as follows to
the commander-in-chief of the 1st Army : —

**Hi8 Majesty orders the let Army to remain to-morrow
(8th) with the Vllth and Vlllth Army Corps in its present
position between Saarbrlicken and Volfclingen, to occupy the
bpicheren Heights, and hold them against any attack.

General v. Steinmetz, as we are aware,* had projected a
movement of the two army corps in question towards the right
for the 8th, so as to leave the St. Avoid road free for the Ilnd
Army, and had already issued the requisite ordera. The intelli-
gence received in the interim, that the llird Array Coi-ps might
I possibly be employed in the direction of Saargemund, had now,
lowever, induced the belief that this corps was in fact already
on the march to that place, and that the important road to St.
Avoid was therefore denuded of troops. For this reason it was
deemed necessary to modify the orders previously given. This
mistaken view was subseqiiently set right by a telegram from
the headquarters of the Ilnd Army ; at the same time also the
foregoing instructions arrived from the royjil hiMuhpiai-ters.

The Allowing movements took place in tlio Ist Army during
the 8th August : —

The Vllth Army C<;rps, which was in the act of mo^ang to
the Volklingen-Carling road, suspended its march in pursuance
of orders to that eflFect, so that with the exception of the corps
artillery and the trains, only the advanced ^ard of the 13th
Infantry Division reached that road at Ludweiler, the main body
halting at Klein Rossel. The 14tb Division advanced to Forbach
and Morsbach. Their outposts extended on both sides of the
road from St. Avoid, connecting themselves towards the east
with the advanced troops of the Vlllth Anny Corps.

The latter corps had been moving dmiug the morning along
both banks of the Saar towards Volklingen and Wehrden in
order to take up its assigned position in rear of the Vllth Army
Corps.

General v. Goeben, commanding the corps, fii-st recalled the
1 6th Division, and afterwards the 15th from the right bank of
the Saar, in order to occupy the Spicheren Heights, which,
according to an incorrect report, appeared to be threatened from
Puttelange. In consequence of tnis the corps took up a posi»
tion at Spicheren in the course of the day, and pushed its
advanced g^rd southward beyond Etzling. The corps artillery
and trains remained in the valley of the Saar.

The 3rd Cavalry Division, which had already proceeded
beyond Saarlouis as far as Picard, was recalled to the right bank
of the Saar, and bivouacked at Derlen. Officer's patrols con-
tinued to watch the enemy on the left bank.

• Page 272.

278

The Ist Anny Coips arrived at Volkliiigen and Plittlingen
vrith the let Infantry Division, and at St. Wendel ^th the Snd.

Five regiments of the 1st Cavalry Division reached the neigh-
bourhood of St. Johann; the 9th Lancers bivouacked at
Lebach*

During these movements of its various peu^a, active recon-
naissances were pushed westward in advance of the entire front
of the Ist Army. All the rcpoils from the numerous cavalry
patrols pointed to the fact tiiat the enemy had even in this
northern district alrc^uly abandoned the positions hitherto held at
Bouzonville, Boulay, and Bouchcpom, and had retired to Metz.
The result of these reports was not however known to the com-
mander-in-chief until lato in the evening, and consequently, as
we shall sec, had no influence on the orders for the 9tn August.

His Majesty the King issued the following army order from
his headquarters at Hombiurg on the 8th August : —

" Soldiers I The pursuit of the enemv who has been repulsed
after sanguinary struggles has alreaay brought a large part
of our army over the frontier. Several corps will this day
and to-morrow set foot on French ground. I trust that the
discipline for which you have hitherto been distinguished,
will DC especially maintained in the enemy's countiy.

" We are not waging war against the peaceful inhabitants
of the country; on the contrary it is the duty of every
honoiir-loving soldier to protect private property, and not to
suffer the good name of our arms to be tarnished, even by
isolated instances of indiscipline.

" I rely on the good spirit which animates the ai-my, but at
the same time also on the firmness and vigilance of every
officer.

•« (Signed) William.'*

Retreat of the A glance at the enemy's situation will facilitate the compre-
RpeMhbehind hension of the proceedings which have been, and are about to
"-»'**• be. described.

During the first days of August all offensive plans had
been renounced at the headquarters of the Emperor Napoleon,
and serious attention had been directed to the defence ot home
territory.

While, however, there was still the possibility at that time of
uniting the two separated bodies of the army on the middle
Moselle, somewhere .ibout Nancy, this junction must after the
defeats at Worth and Spicheren be sought further westward, or
given up altogether.

The first consideration was, to unite the parts of Alarshal
Buzaine's army by a reai-ward march. For this purpose the
lower French Moselle with its forti'csses offered the nearest

* During llic morning llio regiment, after dkembarkiug b> squftdrous at Birkeu<
feld, marched more than 23 miles to Lebach.

279

euitable position, where five corps, inclusive ot the Guard,
might be assembled. Cauroberfs Corps had, it is true, only
just commenced to move bv mil from Cnalons to Nancy, and as
to the situation of Frossard s defeated Corps nothing was known
at this moment. Moreover the fact could not be concealed that
the roads to Paris were open to the Crown Prince of Prussia,
and that his presence on the upper Moselle would take in flank
any position which might be occupied lower doAvn on the river.

Ihese probably were the considerations which, coupled with
the truly paralyzing influence of two simultaneous defeats, led to
the resolve, as early as the 7th of August, of a general retreat of
the whole army on Chalons. Preparatory orders were issued
with this object, and were in process of execution.

Mansdial Canrobert was instructed to cause the Gth Corps to
remain at Chalons, and to recall those troops now moving by
rail to Metz. The 3rd Corps brought up its Divisions which
had been dispatched to Saargemiind and Puttelange,* and
marched by Faulquemont across the German Nied, leaving a
strong rearguard temporarily at St. Avoid, under the protection
of wmch the Guard withdrew to Courcelles Chaussy and the
4th Corps through Boulay. These last two Corps continued
their march in the direction of Metz on the 8th, and during tiiat
afternoon and evening the rear guard of the 3rd Coi-ps also
withdrew by Longeville to Bionville.

General Frossard had reached Saargeiniind on the morning
of the 7th August,t and acting at first on his own responsibility,
continued in uxe forenoon his retreat as fiir as Puttolange with
tiie 2nd Corps and Laposset's brigade of the 5th Corps. On
receiving at this place a commimication from the imperial head-
quarters with reference to the projected movement to Chalons,
he marched to Gross Tenquin on the 8th, in order to rejoin the
army bv this circuitous route.

In tne meantime the authorities in Metz had abandoned the
resolution made on the first impression of defeat.

Considerations of foreign, and especially of internal policy,
made it a very serious matter to open the campaign by surren-
dering territory half way to Paris. It is certain that there would
have Deen no lack of orators in the National Assembly ready to
give eloqpuent expression to their indignation with regard to the
bad handling of the army, views which no doubt would have
met witii cordial response in the country. Moreover, in France,
perhaps more than in any other country, public opinion must be
studied. This circumstance outweighed the piurely militaiy
aspects, and thus the idea of meeting the German army east-
ward of Metz was on6e more embraced.

Orders to this effect were at once sent to the Guard, the 8rd
iind 4th Corps, and on the lOtii to General Frossard. Marshal
Canrobert was instructed to resume his transport by rail to Metz ;

• 8m pp. 251-S68. t See p. 230.

2^0

Il\e reserve cnvvalry, wliich had afisciublod at Nancy, received
ordeiti to move up to Metz.

As these measures gave a force of more than 200,000 men
at Metz, there was really no reason at present for despairing of
success. The Germans were apparently lingering in their
advance, there might yet be time to bring up tne reserve army
now forming at Chalons opportunely to the Moselle, and a thou-
sand accidents, the consequences of which can never be esti-
mated in war, might once more turn the fortune of war in favour
of the French arms. Cfrt«iinly the Hupcriority in point of num-
bera was on the whole decidedly on the side of the (Germans.
But large masses, though able to fight on a limited space,
require Yor their movements a considerable extent of front and
depth. In the passage of the Moselle at widely separated points,
mistakes might occur, which, if skilfully tuiTied to account by
the French at one point might give the superiority on one day.
A victory gained over a part of the German army would cause
the remainder to halt.

In order to attain such a succtiss, be it understood, no mere
expectative defence would suffice; an ever watchful and
vigorous action was demanded, to which the large fortress of
Metz would afford a very suitable suppoit.

But this main bulwark of the eastern frontier of France was
HO little prepared for the war so long contemplated against Ger-
many, that General Coffiniires, the commandant of Metz, declared
that, if left by himself, he could not hold the place a fortnight.
Thus for the time being the fortress had to be protected by the
army, instead of the latter by the forti-ess. After reconnais-
sances had been made, it waa resolved to take up a position
west of the French Nied and to strengthen it ^vith neld works.

It was occupied on the 10th August. The 3rd Coips, at pre-
sent under General Decaen, whs in the centre between range and
Courcelles Chaussy; close behind were the Guards. Tne 4th
Corps formed a retired flank on the left between Lea Etangs and
Glattigny ; the 2nd Coii)s on the right at Meroy le Haut. The
latter nad pushed forward Lapasset's brigade of the 5th Corps.

The movements hito this position gave, for the time, the
impression of a general retreat to the Gennan reconnoitring
detachments, with however tlie possible ulterior design of
resummg the offensive with united forces after the concentra-
tion had been completed. A closer insight into the new plans
of the French Commander-in-Chief could only be gained on the
10th August.

th August. The Ilnd Anny was still engaged in drawing forward the

rearward portion of Hh troops.

[n accordanco with orders from Army headquarters, th<;
IXth (JorpB advanced to St. Ingbert; the Xllth arrived at
llabkirchen on the BHes; tlie Ilnd commenced to disembark at

281

Neunkirohen. The IVth and the Guard Corps remained for the
mofit part at Lorentzen and Gross Uederching ; whilst the Xth
Army Corps at SaargcmUnd went entirely over to the left
bank ot the Saar. The Ilird Anny Corps was merely ordered
to take up a position at Forbach duiiug the i)th. The reports
of the 15th Lancers about the enemy's retreat from St. Avoid,
however, decided General v. Alvensleben to move forward as
far as that place at once.

The 6th Infantry Division, to which the lancer regiment in
question was attached, occupied St. Avoid and pushed forward
outposts towards Longeville. The remainder of tlie corps and the
(ith Cavalry Division, which was now attached to it, occupied
quarters on the Forbach high road and to the south of it.

The 15th Lancers had advanced along the Metz road to
Marange and remained close to the enemy, who again aban-
doned ins position east of Bionville in the evening and retired
over the German Nicd as far as the heights of Pluppecourt.

Captain v. Cramm of the 2nd Dragoons* had found Faulque-
mont, further to the south, unoccupied ; Lieutenant Czettritz
of the same regiment reported that Marshal Bazaine's head-
quai-ters were there on the 8th, and that the marshal had had a
visit of some hours' duration of the Emperor from Metz. Thus in
front of the right wing of the Ilnd Army there was evidence
more or less clear of the presence of large bodies of the enemy,
while in front of the left the touch of the adversary had been
gradually lost. Captain v. Rochow, from the staff of the IVth
Army Coi-ps, reconnoitred with a division of the l«)th Lancersf
in advance of the front of the Ilird Army as far as the Strass-
burg-Paris railway, and destroyed it to the south of Pfalzburg,
without meeting with the enemy. Other patrols from the 5tn
Cavalry Division brought in some stragglers from the 2nd
French Corps from Altroff. J Recent bivouacs were found there,
and traces of strong colmnns of infantiT, which could only have
passed through the place on the preceaing night.

No important change took place in the position of the Ist
Army dm-ing the yth August.

On the evening of the 8th a partial movement of the troops
westward had been planned at the headquarters in Volklingen
on receipt of intelligence of the enemy's retreat from Bouzon*
ville and Boulay ; but the idea was given up in consequence of
the receipt during the night of a telegram from the royal head-
quarters at Homburg containing the lollowing order: —

" As we have no intelligence as yet whether Boulay and
Bouzonyille are evacuated by the enemy, the Ist Anny will
remain in its present position on the yth."

• Divisioiial cftTalnr of the 6th Infantrj Division.

t Belonging to Bredow's caTRlry brigade, which had been recently assigned to
the IVth Army Corps.
X S.E. of Or. Tenqiiin.

28i

G^zxnl ▼. St^iuMiZf in now repeating his report about the
erac-raa&ick cf li.e two riilagea.* ezpreased the opin>:« that the
Wn wi:-^ --^^ li-e r^tre=*tb:g Lostiie arxnr wonld pn:>LablT be tyand
as Ji'i- AT.li IT B:"_iej>:ni: he coii&eqnentlT prc»poaed sendisg
f -rwird iLrr Hi.'i.t wir.^ of the 1st Anny in Uie din^ction of the
Urir:? j' a-'-- '«V:tL tLls • ! j^ct Le at once orlereJ the Srd CaTahy
L*rris.i I..- rro ni. .itr*r t^e enemy's pr^sdona, espeiJ^IlT in tLe
c.rr»:ti-i. ■ : b- -n.^-epm az.d St. AvcH, fvr whkh porpoee a
ta:?^!:.^ ir n th-^ ist Arcky O.-rpe was attached as sapporL
G^:t*rki T. i- •irv^>::i dil n.t. for the present, deem it advan-
ti^^«=r.~* to *:ii.i.- .-T IzA^ detacr.aierite «.f caTak^ in tLe wooded
!t rxTii-trr ir. fr*nt r.f the l«t Armr. He thenrfcre re-
ii-rr^i »:•.:. tf.t: Lirri-i -n at l>eri»:n, but angmented the nnmber
cf ^.frern p^iiroLi oii tL*r kft bank ol the Saar.

ft^tii tc-ese latter, as also more especially the txiasar patrrls
cf ti:« 13th IrJantiT Lnriaon, c»nnrmed in the comae of the

day tLe g*:t*=rAl retr>:at c-f the entriny over the German Xted ;
i^teHigen:^ waa alsu re<x*ivt:d of the occupation of SC Aruld by
tTC<-ym of the llnd Army.

Tne royal h*:faii<4i:arters movel on the 9th August from Hcn^
burg to 2^rbrii*.4Len. where Uis Uajesty the King amred at
hail'-past 4 o'cl'xk.

The con-.-entrati«.'a of the main armT on the Saar being as good
as completcrd, and the situation of the enemy b^ng also snffi-
caently cleared np by the reports of the carafay, a general adrance
to the Moeelie was decided upon in the evening of this day and
the preparationa were commenced. With this object General
T. Uokke issued genoal directioDa^ the snbetance of which haa
been already commimicated.! prescril^izig the fines of march and
the billettxng zones for the three German anniesL

In accordance with these directions the road fix>m Saaibriicken
by St. Arc Id to Xomeny formed generally the fine of demazca*
tion between the tight wing of the lind Army and the area of
morement of the 1st Army to the north of it. The secnritj
of the mar?h and the timely nnion of the armies^ if necessary,
to be mainly effected by a jntiiciona employment of cavalry

and by wid-rly tiirown oat advanced guarda. For reasons nr^>
victisiy set f- rth the ri Jit wiiig La- I to make dir»rter marcni-s^
wLi'.L tL-r»-t -ri; iirrlitr^i m.re pioticularly to the 1st Army. It
was further detirrTur:e*l that bjth pardea tf the right wing were
to rcst on tLe It/th. or at any rate oiJy pUce their troops on the
roa-is ailt^rttrd to them.

The area for requiidtions was so marked out in correspondence
with the lii^eis of march, that a znne 7 niiies broad at the side
of th'sr miiiii roads was appointed for this purpose to the troopa
n^ATchin^ al'-ng them.

TLe IlLj Ani^y furtL*. r received or lors to form a large mag

• T^e c«*u!«;r&m tent br him We oa the evcc:: < oT tie Sti hml aC^u*«i*iT ajt
t 2n» p. 2b-:.

282

General v. Steinmetz, in now repeating his report about the
evacuation of the two villages,^ expressed the opinion that the
left wing of the retreating hostile army would probably be found
at St. Avoid or Boucheporn : he consequently proposed sending
forward the right wing of the Ist Army in the direction of the
latter place. With tliis object he at once ordered the 3rd Cavalry
Division to reconnoitre the enemy's positions, especially in the
direction of Boucheporn and St. Avoid, for which purpose a
battalion from the Jst Army Corps was attached as support.
General v. d. Groben did not, for the present, deem it advan-
tageous to employ large detachments of cavalry in the wooded
and hilly country in liont of the Ist Army. He therefore re-
mained with the Divinion at Derlen, but augmented the number
of offcers^ patrols on the left bank oi the Saar.

^th these latter, as also more especially the hussar patrols
of the 13th Infantiy Division, confirmed in the course of the
day the general retreat of the enemy over the German Nied ;
intelligence was also received of the occupation of St. Avoid by
troops of the Ilnd Army.

Tne royal headuuartera moved on the 9th August fi'om Hom-
burg to Saarbriicken, where His Majesty the King arrived at
half-past 4 o'clock.

The concentration of the main army on the Saar being as good
as completed, and the situation of tne enemy being also suffi-
ciently cleared up by the reports of the cavalry, a general advance
to the Moselle was decidea upon in the evening of this day and
the preparations were commenced. With this object General
V. Moltke issued general directions, the substance of which has
been already communicated^t prescribing the lines of march and
the billetting zones for the three German armies.

In accordance with these directions, the road from Saarbriicken
by St. Avoid to Nom^ny formed generally the line of demarca-
tion between the right wing of the llnd Army and the area of
movement of the Ist Army to the north of it. The security
of the march and the timely union of the armies, if necessary,
was to be mainly effected by a judicious employment of cavalry
and by widely thrown out advanced guards. For reasons pre-
viously set foiih the right wing had to make sliorter marcnes,
which therefore applied more particularly to the Ist Army. It
was further determmed that both parties of the right wing were
to rest on the 10th, or at any rate only place their troops on the
roads allotted to them.

The area for requisitions was so marked out in correspondence
with the lines of march, that a zone 7 miles broad at the side
of the main roads was appointed for this purpose to the troops
marching along them.

The Ilnd Araiy further received orders to form a large maga-

* The telegram sent hj liim late on the rrcniug of llie 8tb had obTioutlj not
readied llomburg when the foregoing order woi isAued.
t See p. 26:i.

in
c

■*

2d3

zine at Saanmion for the Ilird Armj. The feeding of this armj
was attended with special difficulty, as at this time there was
no railway communication to the rear which could be placed
at its disposaL The IVth Army Corps was entrusted with the
execution of the order.

Thi Adtance op tub 1st and IInd Akmies to the French Nied

AND Moselle.

On receipt of the general directions just alluded to, General 10th Angut
V. Steinmetz resolved to spend the 10th* in moving the Ist
Army to the roads which had been allotted to it.

1 he army was completelv united, as the Ist Army Corps and
the 1st Cavalry Division had brought up their last detachments
to Piittlingen and St. Joliann on the 9tn.

In pursuance of ordcra from army headquarters, tlie Vllth
Corps moved to Carlin^ and I'llopital on the 10th, and the Ist
to Creutzwald. The advanced guards which were pushed for-
ward as far as Porcelette and Guerting, occupied the country
between Boucheporn and Ilargarteu with vanguards. In second
line came the Vlllth Army Corps at Lauterbach, and the two
Cavalry Divisions at Ludweiler and Ueberherrn. Army head-
quarters were transferred to Lauterbach.

Many difficulties had to be overcome in marching to this
position, such as are too prone to arise when large bodies of ^
troops, after being concentrated for battle, have to diverge
agam for their suosequent movements. The distances to be
traversed had been in themselves but moderate, yet the cross-
ings with the Ilird Corps in Forbach and delays on the road
from Volklingen by Lauterbach to Carling, which had to be
used in common by the greater part of the 1st Army, made the
day a very arduous one. During the night the troops bivouacked
in the pouring rain, on the clayey ground and without straw.
The trains wliich had been left behind on the Saarbriicken-
Forbach road could only be brought up on the following day,
and this was a matter of ^reat difficulty.

As the Cavalry Divisions of the Ist Army were not in firet
line, the immediate contact with the enemy on this side had
almost entirely ceased. It was only from the advanced guard
of the Vlltb Army Coi-ps that a report was received in the
afternoon from Captain v. Schiitz, 8th Hussars, to the effect
that hostile Corps were to the west of Fouligny.f

On the right wing of the IInd Army, the Ilird Corps
remained in its advanced nosition near St. Avoid, while the
IXth moved forward beyontt Saarbriicken.

In the centre, the Ath Corps moved from Saargemiind to
Puttelange ; behind it the Xllth closed up to its front at

* For the 10th and 11th August tee the opposite sketch.

t On the Oennan Nied where it i« eroFPed bv the rotul from ^{. Ato]<1 to Metz.

284

Ilabkircheii. On the li'ft wing, the (iiiard and the IVth Anny
Corps reached the Saar at Saaralbe and Saaioinion.

Tlie cavahy cuntinued in observation well lu advance of the
front of the four leading Corps. On the left flank of the IVth
Ai-my Corps, Bredow's brigade moved to Eschwiller,* its patrols,
as on the preceding days, pushing forward as far as Pfalzburg
and Sarrebourg without encountering any hostile detachments.

The trooj)8 of the 5th Cavalry Division, which were attached
to the Xtli Army Cor|)s, had hastened on westward more than
a day's march ahead. On the left, Redem's brigade reached
Landroif;t on the right, Barl)y's brigaile annved at Faulqtiemont.
Their line of outposts stretched from Baronville, on the road
from Saargtmnind t(j Nancy, ahnost as far as Raville, on the
road from St. Avohl to Metz. On the latter were still the 15th
Lancers, at close quai-ters with the enemy. By order from
the headquarters of the iind Army, the Ilird Army Corps
brought up tlie other regiments of the 6th Cavahy Di\n8ion as
far as the district between St. Avoid and Faulqnemont during
the course of the day.

In front of this whole line of observation numerous patrols
and light detachments pushed their reconnaissances still fuilher
westward. They found many opportunities of making prisoners
and bringing in valuable intelligence with regard to the French
positions.

Lieutenant v. Podbielski, from the staff of the Xth Coi-ps, had
ridden upwards of 1) miles beyond Falquemont in company
with a division of the 13th Lancei's, commanded by Lieutenant
v. Treskow. After capturing several men from a hostile infantry

Eatrol, the Prussian horaemen pushed foi'ward into the wood
etween Berlize and Domangeville, and there, in the immediate
neighbourhood of the enemy, watched his proceedings. Large
camps were visible at Pange, Mont, and Puche, Strong columns
were marching from Metz to Coiu'celles Cliaussy. Considerable
bodies of infantiy were in position to the west of the French
Nied, and had pushed forward a battahou on the railway to
Sanry. Intelligence was also received that considerable rein-
forcements had reached Metz from Nancy.

These discoveries agreed with the repoit from Colonel v.
Alvensleben, conmianding the 15th Lancers, that, according to
the observations of Inn patrols, tlie French, presumably the 3rd
Corps, had stopped their rearward movement at Plappecourt and
Pont k Cliaussy on the French Nied.

From the left wing of Redern s brigade. Lieutenant v. Hiiiich-
feld, 10th Hussars, made a reconnaissance beyond Ch&teau Salins
without finding any trace of the enemy. The contents of a
French field post which he captured yielded, however, impoi'tant
disclosures as to the internal state of the enemy's amiy,
11th August. The Ist Army remained in the i)osition taken up on the lOth.

^ b} miles S. of Saarunion.
t 6i miles W. of Or. Tenquin.

285

Captain v. Hymmen, 5tli Lancers,* reconnoitred in advance of
the front as far as the vicmity of Cond6 Northeii, at the con-
fluence of the German and French Nied.

Of the Ilnd Army, which was continuing its advance south-
westward,! the four leading Corps reached the line Faulquemont-
Ilarskirchen ; the two in second line followed beyond Forbach
and Saargemttnd. Barby's and Redern's cavahy brigades were
in advance of the right vnng between Remilly and Delme;
their scouts searched the country in front, from Pange west-
ward as far as Nom^ny on the Seille, southward as far as
Cli&teau Salins. It was joined in the latter direction by Bredow's
cavalry brigade, which had advanced as far as Fenestrange
and was watching the country from Marsal to SaiTebourg.

The 6th Cavalry Division} and the brigade of dragoons of
the Guard were posted at Tliicourt and Bermering between the
advanced line of cavalry and the fom' leading army coips.§
The head-auarters of the Ilnd Army moved to Puttelange.

As the 1st Army halted, and the Ilnd continued its half-left
movement with the right wing, a gap about 9 miles in width was
left in the first line between Carling and Falquemont. It was
temporarily filled by the Bodyguard Grenadiers, which had
remained at St. Avoid as escort to the royal head-quarters.

The latter had received, during the forenoon of the llth
August, the reports on the observations made on the previous
day by the cavalry.

As these pointed to fresh enterprises on the part of the
enemy, and every moment might necessitate concerted counter-
measures. His Majesty the Kins; had resolved to move that day
up into the first hue at St. Avoid. He arrived there at 4 p.m.

In the course of the day both army headquarters reported
their views and intentions for the 12th August. General v.
Stiehle wrote : —

The result of yesterdav's reconnaissances leads to the im-
pression that the enemy has suspended his retreat and again
advanced from Metz in no inconsiderable force, with the inten-
tion probably of taking the offensive, but in any case of
maintaining the strong position west of the French Nied.

In this event it appears desirable that he should be merely
held fast in front, wlule the decisive blow is delivered against

* Belonging to fche Srd GaTalrj DiriBion.

t The orders to this eifect were issued before the reoeipt of the reports upon the
ohserrations of the csraln^ on the 10th August.

X This Diyision found the place assigned to it, on the right wing of the 6th Cavalrj
Division, occupied this daj bj the latter.

§ See sketch opposite p. 283. The positions occupied bj the troops were as
follows : — IVth Corps, Harslcirchen, W. of Saarunion ; Advanced guard, Miinster —
Quard Corps, Gueblange and Insming ; Brigade of Dragoons of the Guard, pushed
forward to Bermering—Xth Corps, Uellimer ; Advanced guard, Qtt. Teuquin and
Landroff — Ilird Coips, Faulquemont^IXth Corps, Forbar>h; Advanced guard,
Bening — Xllth Corps, at Saargemdnd on the left bank — 6th Cavalrv Division. Thi-
oourt— of the Yth, Barbj's brisade at Remillj, Han sur Nied, Batiroont ; Redern's
brigade, Lucj, Delme, Laneuville ; Bredow's brigade, Fenestrange, liirschland.

2^(1

his right flank. Ab in the nature of things this more defensive
role devolves upon the Ist Army, tlie comniander-in-cliief of
the Ilnd Army purposes, us a ]^reHminary to the flank attack,
a Avheeling movement to the right, for which the Illrd Army
Corps standing fast at Fahpiemont is to form the pivot. The
movements to be extnuted for this pm-jjose are ordered for the
1 2th August, M'itliout, however, for the present, deviating more
than necessary fn»m the main direction towards tlie Moselle.

(u'uend v. Steinnitt/ eont<Miiplated leading forward the Int
Army towards t)ie (ierman Nied, and in doing so to extend its
front; the; tw^o Oavahy Divisions on the outer flanks were to
incline inwards and push forward advanced guards in the
direction of iletz.

On receipt of these reports, the commander-in-chief of the I«t
Army was instructed to send the Cavalry Divisions at once in
uilcauve o/'the general front, with a view of clearing up the still
incomph'te inlelligence from that quarter, as suggested in pre-
vious instruct io])s. In other respects the royal headcjuarters
were qiute agreed upon the views and measures submitted bv
the two commanders-in-chief. As, however, the present
military situation appeared to demand a closer concentration,
the more general dnections hitherto issued no longer sufficed
for the army connuanders. Circumstances might arise when it
would be necessary for the supreme comman<ier-in-chief to be
able to dispose of individual coq)s without further reference, so
as to ensure tlie ci>-operation of all the forces.

To this end the following order, adtlressed to the com-
manders-in-chief of the 1st and Ilnd Armies, was isisued from
St, Avoid at 7 p.m. : —

"It is not improbable that there is a consider d le hostile
torce in front of Metz, on the left bank of the French Nied.
A closer concentration of the 1st and Ilnd Army is therefore
necessary. His ilajesty the King orders as follows : —

'*Tlie IlTrd Army Coi-ps at Falquemont will form the
'point irajqmi for this concentration.

*' The 1st Army will move two C\)rps early to-morrow into
the line Boulay-Marange, and one to Boucheporn.

** 'J'he Ilnd Ami}' will push forward the IXtli Army* Cori>s
to Longeville west of St. Avoid; the Ilnd Anny Corps will,
iu so far as it may lu^ available, close up to the latter place.
'J'lie Xth ('orps will follow after th(J Illrd.

"The (luard, IVth, and Xllth (Jorps, are to be brought
forward towards the left wing t)f the indicated position, that
they may either (Hose uj) to it or continue theii* march in the
direction (»f Nancy, as occa.sion may demand.

** (Signed) V. MoLTKE."

* Tin's C^orp.i hiul ronnnoiu'tHl itrf (lirciiibnrLation ut Neuukirclion oil lliu 9tb.
*^tf< uiultT l)th August.

287

The Ilird and IX th Army Corps were immediately informed
of the orders affecting them.

It may be remarked beforehand, that his Majesty the King
followed the further advance to the Moselle in the centre of his
forces along the Faulquemont-Herny road, which formed the
line of demarcation between the two armies, and where in
consequence a direct interference in either direction would be
soonest felt and be most quickly effective.

The arrangements made by the headauarters of the Ilnd
Army for the 12tli August almost entirely agreed M-ith the
intentions of the higher authorities. The only pomt of difference
lay in the du'ection assigned to the Xth Corps. In answer to a
query from the commander-in-chief, the royal headquarters
confirmed his dispositions, in accordance with which the Xth
Corps, instead of following in rear, was to move to Landroff
immediately on the left of the Ilird Corps. There were still
five army corps* on the 11^ miles of front from Boulay to Faul-
quemont prepared to afford one another mutual support. But
within a day, if necessanr, nine army corps could be united for
a common effort, either for the attack of the French positions
on the Nied or for a resistance to the enemy's advance.

The positions which were taken up in accordance with these ^^^^ August,
orders by the two Geiman armies during the course of the 12th
August are shown on the sketch facing page 288.

Behind a front of not more than some 18 miles occupied by
five army corpst between Boulay and Morhange, came a second
line of four more} between Bouchepom and Munster. This latter
was well closed up behind the rigid wing, upon which all decisive
measures seemed to hinge for the present ; the IVth Army Corps,
which was further to the rear behmd the left wing, was in com-
munication with the Ilird Army. The course of the Qerman Nied
indicated generally the line of the advanced guards and outposts
of the corps on the leading right wing. Of the two army head-
quarters, tne 1st went to Boucnepom, the Ilnd to Gross Tenquin.

In advance of the entire front the cavalry formed a inick
veil, extending generally along the west side of the Nied below
the jimction, ana then along the German Nied ; in the course of
the day it was pushed forward far beyond the line of the river.
The two Cavalry Divisions of the 1st Army had advanced from
both flanks during the uight, and had reached Bettange and
Raville early on the morning of the 12th August. They then
threw out advanced ^lards, the 3rd from Bettange to Gondre^
ville, the 1 st from Raville to Pont-M]lhaussy . On the upper course
of the French Nied the 6th Cavalry Division made a reconnais-
sance by Pange towards Metz. On its left were BarW's and
Redem's brigades at Remilly and Raucourt, then the brigade
of dragoons of the Guard at Oron, and lastly on the extreme

• Ih« Iflt, TUlh, Vnith, Illid, ud IXth Oom.
t n» tit; yni^ nird, xth, and Gmurd Cbrpi.
t Th& yillth, IXth, Xllth, and IVth Coipt.

0 2

288

left flank, forming a crochet, wiis Bredow's cavalry brigade to
the uoi*th-ea8t of Dieuze.

Almost all the corps of both armies had up to this date only
the first line of ti'ains with them, the second was to join them
in a few days. No thought could be given to bringing up the
waggon parks from home by i*ail until tlie transport of troops
was completed.

TIu) Ktuppcui IiiH|)(iC!li<)iiK foll()W(!d tlio corps at a dayV march
in roar, and as a rule movuil into (he po^itiun just quitted by
the headquartorn. The field telegraph performed important
services by maintaining the ccumnuuication each day between
the cliief bureaux, more j)ar(ieuhirly between the headquarters
of armies and the royal lieadquarters.

As has been already mentioned, the different corps had been
assigned separate districts for requisitions by the royal head-
quarters. 1 he advancing armies evidently could only be sui>-
pHed with a minor part of their necessaries of life from theii
own resonrci'S ; the eninuy's country must make ujj the defi-
ciencies. The reiiuisitions ordered for this purpose were executed
in a regular manner under military superintendence. If^ at first,
they did not on all occasions secure the results expected fi'om
them, it was chiefly due to the circumstances that on the one hand
the necessary skill in this branch of militaiy duty can only be
attained by long practice, and on the other that the regardless
seizure of what is recpiired, wherever it is found, is opposed to that
respect for the property of others which is innate m most men.

The larger the masses of the advancing troops, the smaller
the front on which they niarc!h, and the fewer the number of
separate through roads — the greater arc the difficulties, naturally,
in feeding the troojjs.

Thus there (tonld not fail to be instances, even in tlie advance
of the ist and Ilnd Armies upon Metz, where eneroachmcnts of
one body of troops on the requisition district of another occurred,
besides other causes of fri(ttion. The situation of the armies
had beirome exeeedinglj'^ diflicidt for many reasons. The roads
were sodden fiom continuous rain, and it was perfectly impos-
sible to move alongside them. The quartering of men and
hoi*ses was thereby rendered so difficult that repeated bivouack-
ing became xuiavoidable. llarching in hilly country was quite
unsuited to men born in the plains; at one time the troops
had to eopci with great heat, at another with continuous wet
weather. AH this had sueh an injurious effect upon the health
of the troops that in one Division, for instance, which had never
been under tire, there were 682 men in hospital.

Every posnible arrangement had been made to prevent irre-
j^'ularities. Instrne.tions had been given that the trains should
not iollow th<'. troops until noon of the day on whicli they had
marched, that they were under all eireunistances to make way for
the men and never halt on the roads ; that all carnages in excess
of thi' re,i!;ulation number were to be sent away without any excep-
tion. This order was very rigidly executed. The Feldgensd-

289

armerie, who were intrusted with this dut j, did not always suf&ce,
as they were employed occasionally in duties beyond their proper

Sphere. Consequently very decisive interference was frequently
etnanded on the part of the higher authorities to repress irregu-
larities which had come under observation. These proceedings
could not be permitted, for disorder, unless nipped ui the bud,
spreads like an infectious disease.

Such difficulties, it is plain, can be more easily overcome among
the troops in front of the enemy than in the roar of the army.
Here the sometimes endless mob of undisciplined ))ark waggoners
makes the task appear almost hopeless. Elements, which form
no part of the army, may have often committed excesses which
have been unjustly ascribed to the troops.

In the course of the 12th August fresh reports came in from
the cavalry, the tenor of which was surprising, in so far that it
was evident that the adversary must have again changed his plans.

Whilst on the XOth August there had been evident signs of a
decisive stand behind the French Nied and of an advance of the
troops by Metz, since the 11th rearward movements of the French
towards the fortress had been observed along the entire front of
the 1st Army and of the Ilird Army Corps. The lancer detach*
ment, under Captain v. Hymmen,* sent forward from the 3rd
Cavalry Division, had remarked as early as 5 o'clock that a hostile
force of some 40,000 men encamped at Les Etangsf had struck
their tents. West of the French Nied, the roads leadiing from St.
Avoid and Boulay to Metz were covered with deep columns of all
arms, which were marching awav in the direction of the fortress.
Captain V. Hymmen followed by way of Les Etangs, and at
11.30 a.m. saw the enemy's rearguard halt at Bellecroix, where the
two roads meet. Other repoi^ts were received to the same effect.

In one of the field hospitals left by the enemy at Courcelles
Chau8efy4 sick belonging to the French 2nd, 4th, and Guard
Con)s were foimd. Captain Brix, of the 15th Lancers, reported
earfy on the 11th August the retreat of the enemy from the camps
at Mont and Sillv;§ he had followed as far as Puohe. The
stragglers whom he captured belonged chiefly to the 3rd, some
also to the Guard and 4th Corps ; meir statements were to the
effect that these corps, after many marches and countermarches,
were now being led^back to Metz. The villages on the road,
especially Pont-&-Chaussy, were arranged for defence, but were
no longer occupied. The patrols from Barby's brigade, which
had been pushed forward further on the left by Pange, also found
that the camp previously observed at Puche was now abandoned.
In front of the left wing of the Ilnd Army, Lieutenants v.
Hirschfeld and v. Werder, of the lOth Hussars, reconnoitred

* See under llfch August.

t Watt of the French Nied, on the Boulay-Mctz road.

X Saat of Font-I^Chau88j ; it must not be confounded with the Courcelles sur
Nied on the nulwaj, of which mention htm already been made.
§ South and north of the road from St. AtoIq to Mets.

290

beyond Moyenvic, even as far as Nancy, which was found un-
occupied. Such were the obserrations of the 11th August,
whicli received confirmation next day.

On the extreme right wing, a patrol of the 8th Cuirassiers,
under Lieutenant v. Voigts-Rhetz, from the 8rd Cavalry Divi-
sion, had taken the direction of Thionville. At Stockange,
scarcely four miles from that place, he met with French dragoons
foraging, took from them some horses and several waggons con-
t<iining outs, and learnt, on continuing his ride to the open
gates of the foi*tress, that it was almost exclusivelv garrisoned
by gardes mobiles.* Generally speaking the wtole of this
northern district between the Nied and Moselle appeared to be
entirely denuded of French troops.

Captain v. Hymmen, whose pati-ols had remained even during
the night in uninteiTupted contact with the foe, rode forward with
40 hoi-semen as far as Bellecroix on the morning of the 12th, and
there captured a French convoy of oats. Some 600 paces further
westward came in view the badly guarded camp of a hostile
Division ; other camps extended apparently up to the walls of
Metz. The village of Valliferes was occupied by the enemy.

From the advanced guard of the 8rd Cavalry Division, pushed
forward to Condreialle, Colonel v. Liideiitz, with three divisions
of the 14th Lancers, moved in the afternoon by St. Barbe as far
as Poix, wliere they were fired upon by the enemy. From this

Joint also considerable hostile camps were observed in the
irection of Metz.

The 1st Cavalry Division sent forward patrols from Pont-i-
Chaussy as far as the Puche heights ; cavaliy outposts were here
met with, and it was also observed that there were infantry
encampments on both sides of the great roads to Metz.

The patrols of the 15th Lancers also met with strong hostile
detachments to the west of Puche.

A reconnaissance on a large scale had l)een carried out, as
already mentioned, by the (>th Cavalry Division. At 8 a.m..
Ranches brigade "with the horse artillerj- battery moved forward
from AiTiance towards Pange. It was followed by GrOter's
brigade, whicli remained in support on the Nied and kept up the
connexion on the left bank with the 5th Cavaliy Division.
Elauch's brigade found Paiigo unoccupied, but on proceeding
further perceived a hostile camp to the west of Ars Laque-
nexyt and Coincy. At Laquenexy they had already been met
with a vigorous musketry nre. Alter the horse artillery battery
had thrown a few shells into the village, it was evacuated by the
enemy. Cwptain v. Crimm followed with a squadron of the 8rd
(Zieteii) Ilussara as far as Ars Laquenexy, but was there opposed

* A garde mobile belonging to the garrison was taken prisoner and a Prussian
reserye man set free, who had been detained in the fortress.

t The tliree rillftges, Villers Laquenexy, Laquenexy, and Ars Laquenexy are
distinct villages ; the latter is the more important of the three.

291

t)y very large bodies of infantry, which forced him back beyond
Laquenexy.

The other parts of the brigade had meanwhile takon a more
northerly direction. The 16th Hussars remarked dm*ing their
advance by Marsilly and Coincy extensive infantry encampments
at Gri^' and Bomy. Still further on the rigbtvCaptain Krell,
with his squadron of the 3rd Hussars, scoin*ed the country by
way of Ogy towards Noisseville, at which place liis men were
received with fire. Bending away towards St. Barbe, Lieu-
tenant V. Byerii descried camps of all amis between Sorvigny
and Metz. On the left flank of the brigade, Captain v. Buggen-
hagen, 3rd Hussars,* at Courcelles-sur-Nied, and Count Harden-
berg, 3rd Lancers, at Orny, encountered hostile detachments of
cavalry, which rapidly moved off on the approach of the Prussian
horsemen.

The two brigades of the 5th Cavalry Division, attached to
the Xth Army Corps, were carrying on the duties to the south
of the Metz-Saarbriicken railway.

Here Captains v. Vaerst of the 1 1th Hussars and v. Rosenberg
of the 13th Lancers, duriiig their advance by Chesny to Jury,
came across a squadron of French chasseurs, which they pursued
towards Peltre. The village was occupied, and there was a
hostile camp visible to the north of it. When a dismounted
division of mtssars advanced in skirmishing order towards the
village, the camp was alarmed and a batterv brought into action.

Further on the left, three squadrons of the Brunswick Hussars
advanced from Luppy, by Fleury and Magny-sur-Soille,t towards
Aletz. They arrived within 2^ miles of the fortress -without
coming across any hostile troops, and observed extensive camps
to the south and east of the place.

The district in front of the left wing of the Ilnd Army as far
as the Moselle was found entirely fi'ee of the enemy.

By order of General v. Voigts-Rhetz, commanaing the Xth
Corps, numerous enterprises were here undertaken for destroy-
ing the railway on the left bank of the Moselle.

As early as the night of the llth-12th. Captain v. Kotze,
10th Hussars, with part of his squadron and a pioneer section
under 1st Lieutenant Neumeister, left Aulnois-sur-Seille^ for this
purpose. After they had crossed to the left bank of the Moselle
at Dieulouard by means of a bridge thrown recently by the
French, and were commencing to destroy the load railway station,
some French infantry arrived by rail from Nancy and prevented
them from continuing their work. The oflRceiV patrols sent out
by Captain v. Kotze on the following morning to Dieulouard
and Pont-i-Mousson discovered that the latter place was unoccu-

* These were the detachments which had been despatched from Gruter's brigade
to ^9ep np oommanications with the 5th Cavalrj Diyision.

t South of Mets and close to the point where the railway from Saarbrttckcn
crosses the Seille.

t 4>| miles E. of Nomeny.

292

pied, but that the railway on the left bank of the MoBelle had
been restored and that coiifiiderable traffic had taken place.

Later in the day, Captain v. Thanvenay, from the staff of the
Xth Army Corps, also reachi^d Pont-i-Mousson with 20 sabres
from each of the Bnins^vick Iliissar and Oldenburg Dragoon
regiments. In riding through the town this detachment was
fired upon apparently by stragglers, who, however, rapidly dis-
appeared. The dragoons dismounted and commenced to destroy
the railway on tlie left bank of the Moselle and the telegraph
wires, whilst thn hussara alighted at a farm on the right bank.
In this state both were suipnsed and dispersed by the Chasseurs
d'Afi-ique of Margueritte's brigade.* Several hussars were killed
in a hand-to-hand mel6e, the remainder, including 2 Officers,
were taken prisoners.

Witli those dragoons who had succeeded in mounting.
Lieutenant v. Toll attempted to swim the swollen waters of the
Moselle, in which many were drowned. The remainder of this
band of German hoi-se found protection at Raucourt,t where
two squadrons of Redern's brigade had arrived in the course of
the day, and where they were joined towards evening by the
whole brigade.

Besides these enterprises in the direction of Dieulouard and
Pont-&-Mou8Son, another had been made sgiinst the important
railway junction at Frouard. Captain Brauns with a squadron
of the Brunswick Hussars had ridden there by way of ]^Iarbache;
the Divisional Staff Officer, Captain v. Heister had joined him.
But also at Frouard, the completion of the work of destruction
was prevented by hostile infantry which arrived at the station.

On the extreme left wing, (japtain v. Kleist, 10th Hussars,
continued his incursions southward. In the afternoon of the
12th August, he reached Nancy and entered the populous town,
now deserted by the enemy's troops.

During these enterprises towards the Moselle, single horae-
men had been more than once fired upon from the houses. This
defiant participation of civilians in nostilities, and at a time
when as yet there could not be any question of acts of oppression
or violence on the part of the Germans, must infaliibiy entail
the worst consequences for the population. At present, how-
ever, we abstained from ordering repressive measures.

From the extensive reconnaissances made on the 12th
Aug^ist, the German Headquarters Staff were perfectly informed
at all points as to the situation of the foe. But this bold action
on the part of unsupported horsemen was naturally inadequate
to ensure the permanent destruction of the Moselle railway, along
which part of Canrobert's Corps was being transported from
Chalons to Metz on this very aay. It was, however, gathered
from tlie whole of the observations made along the entire front
of the German Army, that the French had again abandoned the

* Itt Brinde of du Barail*s Betarve Cayalry Division. Set p. 21 of Appendix,
t N. of Nomenj.

293

positions west of the Nied, which they had only recently taken
up and indeed partly entrenched, but that they were still in
considerable force to the east of Metz; that on the other hand
the country above the fortress as far as the Moselle was entirely
free, and that even the main points of passage over the river
were unoccupied.

Consequently it appeared imperative for the Ilnd Army to
throw forward its vanguards at once, in order to secure the
important line of the Moselle before the reconnaissances of the
Oerman cavalry should induce the enemy to reoccupy that
position.

With this object the 19th Division of the Xth Armv Corps
was ordered to resume its march on the afternoon of the 12th
August as far as Delme» where it bivouacked at midnight.

The reports received at St. Avoid fi*om both commanders*
in-chief during the afternoon, led the royal headquarters to the
determination to take immediate advantage of the favourable
conditions arising from the existing state of affairs.

At 4.30 p.m. the following order was therefore issued to the
three armies : —

'^ So far as our intelligence enables us to Judge, the
enemy's main forces are in the act of retiring througn Metz
over the Moselle.

'' His Majesty commands :

" The 1st Army to advance to-morrow, the 18th, towards the
French Nied : main body on the line les Etangp-Pange and
hold th0 railtvay station at Courcelles ; cavalry to reconnoitre
in the direction of Metz and cross the Moselle below it. The
1st Army will thus cover the right flank of the Ilnd.

** The latter to march on the line Bnchy-Chateau Salins,
push its outposts to the 8eille and endeavour if possible to
secure the passages of the river Moselle at Pont-ii-Mousson»
Dieulouard, Marbache, &c. Cavalry to reconnoitre beyond
the Moselle.

** The Ilird Army to continue its advance towards the line
Nancy-Luneville.

"(Signed) v. Molt^b."

As these orders caused the 1st Army to move straight upon
Metz, General v. Steinmetz had to be prepared for an attack
by, in all probability, superior forces of the enemy, who was only
9 miles in front of him. Should this, however, take place, the
Nied forms a suitable line of defence, and even were the 1st
Army compelled to give way, the pursuit on the part of the
enemy must be at once brought to a standstill by the mere
fronting of the Ilnd Army.

On the other hand the position of the 1st Army on the Nied
secured the neighbouring Army, advancing in .considerable
breadth to the passages of the Moselle, against all enterprises
on the part of the French on the right bank of the river, for the

204

lat Army could inimecliately aHHiirao the offensive in the event
of the foe venturing to move along its front to the southward.
Should the French, however, retire through Metz, and
advance up Htroam along the further l/ank to meet the llnd
Anny, this army could if ncc(;8sary ildl biick on the Crown
Princc'H Army, whilst the Lst Army in that case, lea'\ang troops
to observe Metz would be able to cross the Moselle immediately
above the fortress, and take the enemy in rear.

Under these circumstances every movement on the part of
the enemy must be closely and narrowly watched,
l8tliAugust.<* The left wing of the Ilnd Army was approaching the
Moselle by forced marches. The IVth Army Corps reached the
neighbourhood of Chateau Salhis. As the intentions of the
royal heathpiartei-s opened a wider field for the cavalry west of
the Moselle, iJredow's brigadcf was ordered to rejoin its Divi-
sion, which it did at Jallaucourt.

The Guard Coii)s moved to Oron and Leraoncourt, whilst
the brigade of dragoons of the Guard with a horse artillery
battery Avas pushed forward towards Dieulouard in order to
secure the passage of the river at that point.

After a ride of 28 miles, Captain Prince of Ilohenzollem with
the 4th squadron 1st Dragoons of the Guard crossed the Moselle
and took part of his men still further west beyond Dieulouai'd.
While the retnaindcr of tlui squadron was (engaged in destroying
the railway station, fcnn* trains containing hostile infantry
steamed up in succession from the direction of Frouard. The
enemy only opened a slight fire upon the dragoons and quickly
returned to Frouard. The battery of horse artillerj', wliich had
meanwhile come up, sent a few shells after them.

Further down the Moselle, Redern's and Darby's cavalry
brigades had during the morning already appeared before Pont-
4-Mous8on. As detached parties of the enemy's infantiy were
found to be occupying the town and the vineyards lying to the
east of it, a squadron of the Brunswick Hussars was dismounted
and, skirmishing with the enemy, drove them out of the town
and its neighboiu'hood. Another squadron proceeded to the
railway station, whence, only shortly before, at 9 a.m., a
hostile battalion had left fen* Metz. During the afternoon the
19th Division of the Xth Ai-my Corps anived at Pont-k-
Mousson, after having, as we are aware, bivouacked the pre-
vious night at Delme. It occupied the town and puslied for-
ward detachments towards Metz along both banks of the
Moselle, and furthermore two battalions of the 57th to Dieu-
louard. The latter anived there during the evening.

Redern's brigade, which had already taken up the outpost
duties on both banks, sent forward the Brunswick Hussars daring

* See oppoBJto sketch ; for the 1st Armj tee aho tLe plan of the battle of
Colombey-N ouilly.

t Hitherto attached to the IVth Amiy Corps.

295

the afternoon to Regni^ville en Have in the direction of Thiau-
court. The patrols from the regiment had frequent encounters
Mrith the French chasseurs h clieval. Darby's cavalry brigade
bivouacked on the right bank of the Moselle to the east of Pont-
k^Mousson ; the 20th Division of the Xth Anny Corps reached
Delme and Aulnoift-sur-Seille.

The 6th Cavalry Division in front of the right wing of the
Ilnd Army had been relieved in its position at Pange on the
Mied early in the morning by the two dragoon regiments be-
longing to the Ilird Army Corps. This Division had received
orders to occupy the district between the Nied and Moselle from
Sorbey to Corny and thereby screen the advance of the right
wing of the Army against observation from Metz. The 16th
Hussars, who were protecting the right flank of the Division in
its necessary flank movement to the left, met on the high
road to Nancy, a hostile squadron of dragoons which weis
foraging at Fleury. The latter made a hasty retreat to Magny,
which place, as well as the village of Marly above it, was
strongly occupied by the enemy ; a French camp was visible
upon the heignts on the west bank of the Seille.

Ranch's brigade now took up a position from Courcelles \>y
Pouilly to Corny, therefore somewhat in advance of the indicated
line. The left wing was formed by the l(»th Hussnrs, who
patrolled as far as the loft bank of tlio Moselle ; the .'h-d Hussara
were on the right wing. Next to the latter were the two
dragoon regiments of the Ilird Anny Corps. Further recon-
naissances snowed that Augny was unoccupied, but that beliind
the villages of La Grange Mercier, Magny, Peltrc, Jury, and Are
Laquenexy there were the separate camps of two or three corps.
All the places in question appeared to be strongly occupied and
arranged for defence : numerous infantry outposts were thrown
out in front of them. Encampments were also visible on the
Moselle to the west of Montigny.

Oriiter's brigade was quartered in Vemv and the neighbour-
ing villages, in rear of Ranch's brigade. Connexion was esta-
blished with the 5th Cavalry Division at Pont-i-Mousson.

Screened by this veil of cavalry the right wing of the Ilnd
Army moved into the positions prcHoribcd for it. In immediate
support of the 1st Army were — the Ilird Army Coi-ps at Bechy
and Buchv, the IXth with its advance at Hemy, tne Xllth in
the neighoourhood of Thicourt. The Ilnd Corps had completed
its disembarkation and had already collected three brigades at
St. Avoid in the course of the day ; the head-quarters of the
Ilnd Army moved to Delme.

The 6th Cavalry Division had just taken up a position between
the Nied and the Moselle, when, about 11 a.m., the 1st Division
was approaohinff from Pange.

On receipt of the orders issued from the royal head-quarters
on the afternoon of the 12th, General v. Steinmetz had resolved
to take up a position between the two branches of the Nied with
the whole of the 1st Army. Two army corps were to form a

296

front along the French Nied of about 4^ miles as the crow flies,
with another corps in rear on the German Nied, occupying the
same length of front, whilst the Cavalry Divisions were to be
pushed forward on both wings in advance of the foremost line*
The 1st Cavalrv Division was specially intended to protect the
right flank of tne Ilnd Army.

When the 1st Cavalry Division, in accordance with its instruc-
tions^ commenced its flank march to the left on the morning of
the 13th from the IMetz-Saarbrucken road,* it first fell in with the
dragoons of the Ilird Corps at Pange, who had received orders
to quit their position there on the aiiival of detachments be-
lon^ng to the Ist Army. As the dragoons reported that they
haa come across the enemy's cavalry on the left bank of the
Nied, General v. Hartmann on his arrival at Pange ordered the
8th Lancera to cross the river. Whilst the lancers pressed back
some squadrons of French Chassemrs to Coligpiy without any real
resistance being offered, the Division continued on its march by
Villers Laquenexy to Mecleuves, and at the same time relieved
the outposts of the 6th Cavalry Division on both sides of the
Metz-Strassburg high-road. }* rom Mecleuves the 4th Lancers
advanced in the direction of Jury, for the purpose of making a
closer reconnaissance of the enemy's position there and at Mercy
le haut,t which had been observed by the hussars. The 2nd
squadron, which was in advance, came at Jury under a brisk fire
from hostile sharpshootei-s, who lay completely concealed behind
the railway embankment. Chesny and the wood to the west
were also occupied by the enemy. Considerable stir took place
in the enemy's camp at Mercy, and as the lancers now fell oack
slowly, they were followed by six hostile squadrons, but only
as far as the railway embankment east of Jury.

The 4th Lancers placed their outposts abreast of Frontigny,
and bivouacked to the south of Mecleuves.

The 8th Lancers were brought up from Villers Laquenexy
to join the Division at Pontoy in the coiurse of the afternoon.

The Vllth Army Corps reached the French Nied, next the
Ist Cavalry Division. The 14th Infantry Division moved to
DomangeviUe, and occupied the railway station at Courcelles
and the bridge over the river to the eastward with tlie fusilier
battalion 53rd Regiment.

Of the 13th Infantry Division, the 25th Brigade with two
batteries and a squadron took up a position at Pange. Further
to the rear, behind the two Divisions, was the corps artillery at
Bazoncourt.

Major-General v. d. Goltz crossed to the left bank of the Nied
with the advanced guard of the Army Corps, consisting of the
26th Brigade, 7th Rifle Battalion, three squadrons 8th Hussars,
and the 5th and Gth Light Batteries. As the enemy was occupying

* Tlie let Cavalry Divieion, as wc have already aecii, reached Couroellea Chautty
and Pont-^-Chauesy on the road in queBtion on the 12tii.
t The Tillage it called Merry le haul, or Mercy Ics Mets.

297

Jury and Are Laquenexy, and strong detachments were visible
at Aubigny, Coincy, and Colombey, the outposts could not be

Kushed forward to the intended position between Jury and
[arsilly. The rifle battalion therefore occupied the copses to
the west of Laquenexy. The main body of tne advanced guard
bivouacked to tne west of Villers Laquenexy.

In the course of the afternoon some reconnaissances and forag-
ing expeditions were made in advance of the front. For these
purposes, two companies of the 15th Re^ment advanced towards
Ars La(][ueiiexy and a rifle company in the direction of Jury; the
former were met with a brisk fire especially from Chtlteau
Aubigny, but in spite of this the foraging was carried out. The
rifle company found Jury unoccupied ; on the other hand the
enemy was observed in the neighbouring woods and at the
point of intersection of the Stiussburg high-road with the railway.
As two strong columns of hostile infantry and a squadron sub-
sequently advanced from Mercy, the rifle company withdrew.

The 1st Army Corps had also reached the French Nied ; its
position was dose to the two great roads from Saarbrucken and
oaarlouis to Metz, with an advanced guai'd pushed forward on
each of them. The advanced guard of the 1st Infantry Division,
under Major-General v. Falkenstein, consisting of the 2nd Bii^de,
the Ist Rifle Battalion, the 1st Dragoons, and the whole of the
Divisional artillery, had advanced beyond Pont-k-Chaussy, and
had pushed forward an outpost squadron on both sides of the
high-road as far as Retonfay and Ogy. In rear were two rifle com-
panies in the Vaudreville wood, two companies of the 43rd on
the high-road, about on a level with Maizery, five companies of
the same regiment, a squadron and a battery at the Landremont
brick kilns.* The remainder of the advanced guard bivouacked
to the west of Pont-k-Chaussy ; the main bocfy of the Division
and the corps artillery were to the north of Courcelles Chaussy.

Except a false alarm at noon, the day passed here without
incident. At nightfall the cavalry outposts between Retonfay
and Ogy were rdieved by three companies.

The Ist battalion 13th Regiment was pushed forward from
the 13th Infantry Division to Collignv towards evening, in order
to fill the gap in the line of outposts between Ogy and the copse
at Laquenexy.

The 2nd In&ntry Division bivouacked at Landonvillers. Its
advanced guard, consisting of the 44th Regiment, 3 squadrons of
the 10th Dragoons and the 5th Light Battery, under Major-
General V. Memerty, had advanced along the g^eat road from
Saarlouis past Glattignv, but did not meet the enemv's advanced
picquets until it was close to Servigny. Whilst tlbe dragoons
skinnished with them, the battalions and the battery formed up
at Petit Marais. The enemy, however, remained inactive ; and
not a movement appeared to take place in his camps at Nouilly
and Bomy.

* 2} miles K.B. of Maizerj, on the Metz-Saarbrflcken high-road.

2{)8

Major-General Memcrty withdrew to les Etung8abont2p.ni.
Tlie 4tli squadron of dragoonu earned on the outpoat duty from
Retonfay as far as the neighbourhood of St. Barbe. The fusilier
battalion of the 44th remained in support between Glattigny
and the Libaville wood.

On the extreme right flank of the Army, the 3rd Cavalry Divi-
sion had advaneed towards the fortress along the Bouzonville
njad, until the 7th Lancers, leading the advance, were fired upon
from Bremy. The regiment remained at Avancy, extended the
line of outposts of the 2nd Intantry Division as far as the
vicinity of fcJanry, and thrcAv out the 2iid squadron to the right
flank beytmd Vigy for ])rotection against Thionville. The
other regimentH went into bivcmac-s at Vry.

In the course of the afternoon, Lieutenant v. Miiller L wth a
patrol from the 7th Lancers advanced towards Thionville, and
when about 5 miles east of tlie fortress came across some hostile
cavalry and infantry. Another j)atrol fiom the regiment which
had crossed to tlu5 other bank of the Moselle by the feny at
Hauconcovu't, returned without having met \\ath the enemy.

The more important retuinnaissiinces on the left bank of the
river, ordered by tht; royal headcpiarters, were prevented, as the
enemy had removed all the craft on the river to a place of 8afet3\

In rear of the 1st and VJIth Corps, was posted on the Gennau
Niedas general reserve to the 1st Anny, tho Vlllth Army Corps,
with the 15th Division at Bionville, and the IGth at Varize and
Uelstrofl'; the corps artillery wjis at Brouck. The army head-
quarters were transferred from Boucheporn to Varize.

From reports received this day on the state of aflfaira at
Thionville, tlie connnander-in-chief had every reason to expect
that a coajp^de-niain against this fortress would be successful.
With this object, the 31st Infantry Brigade, a squadron of hussaina,
a battery and a company of sappers were despatched the same
evening, the 13th, from HelstroiF to the vicinity ofBettangc.
Major-General Count Gneisenau, ajjpointed to carry out this
enteiprise, had received instructions to march the foUo^ving
evening close to Thionville, to take up a position imder cover
for the night, and at dawn on the 15th to endeavour to capture
the fortress by suiprise.

The advance of the 1st Army on the 13th August, which has
just been descnbed, was preceded on both flanks by the Cavalry
Divisions which led the way into the positions already specified
The heights west of the French Nied were reached without even
meeting with any hostile patrols. Not until this point was
attained, where the enemy's positions and camps near the Bois
de Grimont, at Nouiliy, Borny, Mercy, and Magny, as far as the
Moselle south of ilontigny suddeidy unfolded Uko a huge picture
before the Prussian leadmg detachments, did the separate de-
tachments come in contact with the French advanced troops,
who, however, limited themselves generally to a strictly defen-
sive attitude.

The touch, which since the 7th August had beeu almost lost

299

owing to the rapid retreat of the French, was once more closely
resumed along the whole front of the Ist Anny. The question
now was, what inferences should be drawn from the enemy's
very peculiar proceedings.

Various iuoications during the day's march of the Ist Army,
as. for instance, aritingements for fortification which had been
observed, encampments recently abandoned, and especially the
circumstance that the villages through which our men passed
were mostly denuded of their inhabitants, led to the conclusion
that the project of facing the German Army in the position west
of the Nied had been lately and finally abandoned. The view
which was now obtained into the principal position of the
French immediatelv to the east of Metz left no doubt that they
were prosecuting their rearward movement, although at present
they had not passed the Moselle.

In order to satisfy liimself of the state of affairs, Major-
General v. Sperling, chief of the general staff of the Ist Army,
rode along the line of outposts from Laquenexy to Retonfay.
The impression conveyed to him by the attitude of the French
was, that no offensive movement was contemplated, though the
possibility of such a proceeding was not excluded. There might
also be an intention to hold the position in rear of the two
brooks which unite near Nouilly.

These conclusions were communicated in the afternoon by the
commauder-in-chief of the 1st Army to the royal headquarters,
which were moved from St. Avoid to Herny on the 13th.

That the French, contrary to what was hitherto supposed, had
not completed their retreat over the Moselle, oould not but be
desired oy the German royal headquarters, as it facilitated the
execution of their own plan. On the other hand a certain amount
of difficulty in the situation could not be disguised. For it was now
necessary to halt the Ist Army for the present within immediate
reach of the enemy, whilst the impending passage of the Moselle
by the Ilnd Army must involve a separation of the forces. As
the French were still in considerable force to the east of Metz,
arrangements had to be made to support the Ist Army by the
right wing of the Ilnd Army in the event of the former being
attacked. Thus it became necessary to hold back the latter to
some extent, and this was the more necessary as the left wing
had on its part to make a considerable detour in its wheeling
movement to the right on the other side of the river.

Under these circumstances the following order was issued
from Herny at 9 o'clock on the night of the 13th :

*' From intelligence received considerable hostile forces are
still halting this forenoon at Servigny and Borny, this side of
Metz*

''His Majesty orders that the Ist Army will remain to-
moiTow, the 14th, in its position on the French Nied, and will
observe^ by pushing forward advanced guards, whether the
enemy retires or advances to the attack. To meet the latter

300

eventually, the Ilnd Army to-morrow will advance the Illrd
Corps at Jirst only abreast of Pagny,* the IXth to Buchy,t
where, at a distance of 5 miles, they will be prepared by a
well-timed march to take part in a serious action before Metz.
On the other hand the 1st Araiy will be in a position to pre-
vent the advance of the enemy southwards bv a flank attacL

" The remaining corps of the Ilnd Army will continue their
advance towards that part of the Moselle between Pont-k-
Mousson and Marbache. Tiie Xth Corps will take up a posi-
tion in advance of Pont-a-Mousson.

" The cavaliT of both ai-mies is to be pushed forward as far
08 possible^ and molest any retreat of the enemy along the
road from Metz to Verdun.

"(Signed) V. MoLTKBL'*

The instructions for the Ilird and IXth Corps herein con-
tained were, owing to the advanced period of the day, conveyed
direct to them fi'om the royal he^idquarters by orderly ofBcei-s.
With regard to the other corps of the Ilnd Army, Prince
Frederic Charles had already, before the arrival of the above
order from Herny, made independent arrangements which were
in perfect accord with the intentions of His Majesty.
14th August. In accordance with these aiTaugements the general wheeling

movement to the right, which had been commenced during the
preceding days, was continued on the 14th August, but now on
the standing pivot formed by the 1st Aimv. In close con-
nexion witli the latter and in readiness to am>rd it support, the
right wing of the Ilnd Army, still continuing to observe Metz,
closed up to the westward in such manner that the Illrd
Army Corps, forming its advance, was only sUghtly moved
forward. The centre of the Ilnd Army made good its position
at Pont-k-Mousson, the left wing hastening by forced marches
to the Moselle.

Thus the IVth Army Corps reached the nei^hbom-hood of
Armancourt,} the 1st Guard In&ntry Division with its head at
Sivry, and the 2ud Guard Infantrv Division reached the Moselle
at Dieulouard. The Divisions of the Xth Army Corps assembled
at Pont-&-MousBon, to which place Prince Frederic Charles also
moved his heudquaH^rs this day, and where for all eventualities
a position for battle on the left bank was reconnoitred and pre-
pared. The watch posts on the loftily situated castellated ruins
of the lif oussouberg perfectly overlooked the country as far as
Metz. Two battalions of the 78th, two squadrons of dragoons,
and a light batteiy were pushed forward towards the foi^tress
on the left bank of the Moselle as far as Vandi6res ; the 38th
Iniantiy Brigade advanced to the bifurcation of the roads to

* On the high-road from Motz to Nancy.

t On the high-road from Meti to Strassburg.

{ 7th Infantry Division, Armancourt; advanced guard, Leyri 8th Infantry
Division, Malancourt and Maiihou6. The pUoet referz«a to in tho movAiDentt of the
14th August are indicated on the sketch facing p. 294.

301

Thiaucourt and Flirey, so aa to act as support to tlie cavahy in
its incursions westward.

The IXtli Army Corps, upon which for the 14th August
devolved the chief duty of acting in support of the Ist Army,
reached Buchy and Luppy with the 18th Division, and Bichy
with the 25th. Next to the IXth came the Ilird Corps with
the 5th Division at Vigny, and the fJth at Louvigny. The Xllth
Army Corps moved to Sologne, forming a support to the Ilird
and IXth m the event of the enemy advancing southward along
the right bank of the Moselle. The Ilnd Army Corps coming
up in rear, arrived at Faulquemont.

In advance of the front of both armies, the independent
masses of cavalry continued to carry out their duties.

From Dieulouard the brigades of lancers and dragoons of the
Guard moved forward, the former to Villers en Haye, the latter
to Rog^ville. The patrols feeling southward found Frouard
unoccupied. On the other hand, Captain v. Trotha's squadron
of the 2nd Dragoons of the Guard came across some of the
enemy*M ohasseurs k cheval close in front of Toul, and after a
ehort mel6e drove them into the suburb, without a single shot
being fired from the ramparts upon the audacious pursuers. As
1^ circumstance induced the belief that the plc^ce was aban*
doned or only weakly occupied. Captain v. Trotha sent an
o£Bcer to demand the surrender of the fortress. The comman-
dant answered this demand from a handful of cavalry with a
dry ^ repaasez une autre fois,** followed promptly by some shots
firom the houses, and gardens, so that all retreat for the
dragoons was apparentiv cut off. They, however, cleared the
road with sabre and carbine, gained the open, and on their way
back destroyed the sluices which retained the water in the
ditches of the fortress.

Of the 5th Cavalry Division, Bredow's brigade arrived at
Pont-ii-llousson, whilst the other two brigades moved forward
on the plateau west of the Moselle — Barby's brigade to Thiaiw
court and Redem's brigade beyond that place to Beney. De-
tachments from both brigades scoured the ground to the north-
ward. Captain v. Rosenberg, with the 4th squadron 13th Lancers,
rode along the valley of tne Moselle as far as Ancy, barely 7
miles from Metz, where he fell in with hostile infantry, whose
brisk fire necessitated his retreat. Captain v. Vaerst who with
the 1st and 4th squadrons of the 11th Hussai-s had covered the
right flank of Redern's brigade on the 13th, had received instruc-
tions to move forward by Pagny* and scour the neighbourhood
adjoining the great road from l^Ietz to Verdun. Shortly after
1 p.m. a report was received from this officer stating that he had
reached that road vift Buxiires and had caused his patrols to
reconnoitre the forts west of Metz, without coming m contact

with hostile troops.

* On the left bank of the Mosello, north of Pont^ji-Mouiison; it mu:*t not*, he
oon founded with Pognj lee Goin, on the right hank, on the Mct/.-Naiicj rond.

302

The 6th Cavalry Division had remained in the position
which it had taken up the previous day between the Seille and
Moselle, facing Metz. The 16th Hussars observed early in the
morning a pecliliar movement in the French camps on both sides
of the great road from Metz to Nancy. Workmen were engaged
in throwing up entrenchments ; railway trains came and departed
in rapid succession to and from the fortress. Between Marly
and Mangy dismounted squadrons were visible ; on the left bank
of the Moselle, at Ancy, in&ntry and Chasseurs d*Afrique. On
the other hand patrols of the Zieten hussars found the camps at
Peltre and Mercy-le-haut unchanged from the previous day. In
the course of the morning Ranch s hussar brii^de was relieved
by Griiter's heavy biigade ; the 3rd and 15th Lancers formed
the outposts.

The curious persistence of the French round Metz at a time
when two Prussian corps had already reached the middle
Moselle, and when the cavalry were already scouriuK the Verdun
road, hardly permitted of any other explanation than that the
enemy intended to attack the 1st Army, which might be sup-

f»osed to be isolated, owing to the broad front occupied by the
Ind Army in its advance. It was soon evident that the fore-
sight shown by the royal headquarters in keeping considerable
forces for the present ready to act south of Metz was not
unwarranted.

The advance of French columns on Fleury — which turned
out afterwards to be merely for the object of relieving outposts
— caused the 6th Cavalrv Division to be alarmed at 2 p.m. ; and
whilst in consequence thereof it was still standing in readiness,
the roar of artillery and musketry, rapidly increasing in brisk-
ness, resounded towards 4 o'clock from the north-eastward. The
15th Lancers and a squadron of the 6th Cuirassiers now ad-
vanced by Fleury to reconnoitre to the other side of the rail-
way. Peltre, Mercy-le-haut, and the eutrenchments in that
neighbourhood were now found to be abandoned by the
enemy ; the latter, to judge from the still perceptible traces,
must have marched off in the direction from which tne thunder of
artillery was heard.

303

The Battle of Colombey-Nouilly. 14th August.

Introduction.

The ponition oooupied by the French Army of the Rhine be-
hind the Nied* had even on the first day, apart from strategical
considerations, proved itself tactically defective. The much
wooded district to the east of the little river made it difficult to
observe the advance of the compact masses of the German forces,
to encounter which in open ground might, from recent experience,
appear hazardous.

The French headquarters, therefore, decided upon concen-
trating the army more closely in front of the fortress.

We hare already seen how the movements consequent upon
this resolution were watclied by the German cavalry ; the
French cavalry as a nile did not carry their reconnoitring
duties beyond the positions of the infantiy posts. The un-
usual appearance of French cavalry in advance of the line of
outposts on the 12th August was due to the circumstance that
reconnaissances towards Faul^uemont and Nom^nj had been
ordered by the supreme authonty with a view to gaming clearer
information. But even these incursions were not pushed
beyond the Nied» and the Imperial headquarters remained quite
in the dark as to everything which was taldng place beyond that
position.

The strength of the French Army concentrated under the im-
mediate protection of the forts now amounted to 201 battalions,
116 squadrons, and 540 field gun8.t

The vacillation, so baneful to the French cause, in the
supreme command of the army reached a definite climax on the
12th Aueust, as on this da^ the Emperor Napoleon resigned his
command absolutely, nominated Marshal Bazaine to the chief
command of the Army of the Rhine, and prepared to withdraw
his hf'adquaiiers from the army.

Without haviuff gained a victory the Emperor dared not
return to Paris. He had hitherto, therefore, remained with the
armv, retaining the Guard at his disposal in the light of house-
hold troops. Afflicted with grievous oodily ailments, the sorely-
tried Prince, who now neither ruled in France nor gave orders
to his army, saw his fate no less dependent on the struggles in
the field than on those in Parliament.

The monarch, at whose di8p(>8itJon lies the State with its
resources, is only entitled to lead the army in the field when
competent to command the troops in person, and take the

• 866 p. 280.

t Th6 Vlth Corp6 wm atiU d6ftci6iit of 9 b«ttelioni, sU ito oaTalry, and 13 bftt«
i6riM. Th666 troop6 oould not now reach Mots as th6 Q«nnani had amady occupiad
th6 railway in tha fallay of iha Mosello. A r6gim6nt of ChatMurt belonging to the
let CaTalzy Dirition had ideo found the way to Mets no longer open.

D 2

804

weighty responfiibility of all that may happen in the field upon
his own shoulders. Failing these conditions, his presence with
the army cannot but have a paralysing influence.

Marshal Bazaine had still to pay constant attention to the
Emperor*8 safety, to the opinions of his suite, to the proposals of
men who did not wisli to retreat, but at the same time were not
responsible for the consequences of a longer delay. In order ti>
be able to form his resolutions luiswayed, the Marshal could not
but earnestly wish that the Emperor, and with him a host of un-
authorised advisers, would quit the army. For by one tvtll alone
must the operations be controlled ; when influenced by several
counsels, no matter how well meant, this will must always lose
in clearness and decision, and the leading of the army which
depends upon it will become uncertain. The consistent prosecu-
tion of one idea, though it ma]^ only partially meet the given
circumstances, will attain the object more rapidly than a frequent
shifting from plan to plan, if only for the reason that the
coimter orders unavoidably resulting firom the latter course
must always have a disadvantageous influence on the confidence
and powera of the troops.

All the more discerning men in the French army had been
long convinced of the necessity for a further retreat, and tliat it
should be carried out as far as Chalons. Once the retreat
appeared unavoidable, any further lingering at Metz could not
but be ruinous, as soon as the leading troops of one of the
German armies had crossed the Moselle above the fortress.

It would seem that the Emperor, influenced by these consi-
derations, had prescribed to the new commander-in-chief, as
his first task, the withdrawal of the army primarily to
Verdun.

In the forenoon of the 13th August, at the same time that the
Prussian troops regained their touch of the French outposts, the
Marshal issued the following order for the retreat to the west-
ward which was to commence next day ; its unimpeded execu-
tion, however, owing to the proximiiy of the adversary, could
no longer be calculated upon with certainty.

•* The 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions will march off from their
*' camps at 1 p.m. in the direction of Verdun, the 1st Division
** along the road from Gravelotte by Doncourt and Conflans, the
" 8rd along the road from Gravelotte by Mars-la-Tour. The 3rd
'' and 4th Corps will take the former, the 2nd and 6th Corps the
"latter road; the (iunrd will follow the 6th Corps." With
rcf^jird to the tiino of dt'parturc of the coqw it would only appear
to have been fixed, tluit all wore to be in readiness to march at
5 aan. on the 14th. Gravelotte was prescribed as the destina-
tion of the two Cavalry Divisions for the 14th ; in the event
of the water being* iiisuificient, the 3rd Cavalry Divinion was to
proceed to Kezonville. Military bridges had been thrown over
the Moselle below the fortress.

When the order reached the various coi-ps, the 2nd Corps
wi\H covering the StraHnlmrg high road in the neighbourhood of

b()5

Peltre. Verge's and Bataille s Divisious were on the heighto
between Peltre and Magny-eur-Seille, Lapasset's brigade* near
Ch&teau Mercy. Laveaucoupet'e Division formed a second lino
of defence at Basse Bivoye, but on the morning of the 14th
occupied the outlying forts, as it was to be left behind to
garnson Metz.f

The 3rd Corps had its main front towards the east, and had
Montaudon*8 Division at Grigy, Metman s at Colombey, Cas-
tagnv's at Moritoy, and Aymard's at Nouilly,

l^he 4th Corps was posted in roar of the left wing of the
ord, Grenier's Division m the vicinity of Wey ; the other two
covered furtlier to the left rear the Bouzonville and KMange
roads. The 6th Corps was partly between the Moselle and
Seille, partly on the left liank of the Mosello at Wojppy, and
partly in the forts. The Guard was in rear of the 3rd Corps.

Since early dawn of the 14th the numerous trauis of the army
had been engaged in passing from the right to the left bank of
the Moselle ; it was not until nearly noon that the troops of
the ()th, 2nd, and 4th Corps commenced their retreat from both
flanks, the 3rd Corps and the Guard remaining generally in their
old positions.

The movements had already been g(iing on for some time
when the thunder of guns from the direction of the Nied be-
tokened the commencement of an action. Part of the marching
columns at once turned back. The troops, confused by marches
and countermarches, hailed with joy the prospect of an approach-
ing contest, and their conduct therein will show that they had
not entirely lost confidence in their own strength.

The order issued on the 13th August from the headquarters
of His Majesty the King} reached tlie commander-in-chief of
the 1st Army at Vaiize that same night. General v. Steinmetz
regarded the task assigned to him as essentially a defensive one,
except in the case of a stroke by the foe southward. The idea
of attempting a frontal attack upon the hostile masses posted
under tlie protection of their forts was not at all contemplated
by him. ouch being the case, the General issued an order at
2.30 a.m. on the 14th in which he briefly infonned the troops of
the Ist Army that they were to remain that day in their posi-
tions. The Ist Cavali-jr Division was further made acquamted
with the instructions issued by the royal headquartei-s to the
Ilnd Army, and General Hartmann was ordered to direct
especial attention towards Metz.

The early morning of the 14th August passed peacefully.
The outposts had remarked nothing of importance in advance
of the entire front of the army. From 11 a.m., however, reports,
at first singly, but gradually increasing in number, arrived at

• Belonging to the Vth Corps. See p. 280.

f IVo battalions each irero sent to Forts Queiilou. Ft. Julion, Bollccroix, St.
C^iipntin, and Mosellp, three bat ta lions to Fort rinppovillc ; tlie tlice bnttcrit's to
the forts on the right bank of the Moselle.

; See p. 209.

30(>

the various head-quarters, stating that rearward movements ot
the foe towards Metz had been observed. The first intimation
on this subject was a report from Lieutenant Stumm, 8th Hussars,
who believed he observed at 10.45 a.m. from Marsillj *' a slow
^* retreat of the foe from the positions at Ars-Laqueiiexy,
" Coincy, Noisseville, Colombey, Lauvallier, and Vantoux/'

At 12.15 Major-General v. Pritzelwitz reported from the
heifi^hta of Chateau Gras, that the camps at Borny were apparently
broken up and the troops withdrawn, but that the villages
of Vreniy, Poix, Survigny, Noisseville, and Wontoy were still
occupied by hostile infantry. At 3 p.m. Captain v. .larotzki,
of the staflf of the 2nd Infantry Division, remarked that Vremy
was now abfindoned by the enemy, and that French troops were
no longer visible north-east of the line Vremy-St. Julien as far
as the Moselle.

Half an hour later detachments of the 10th Dragoons observed
troops also moving off from the camp at Servignv towards Metz.
At 4 o'clock the patrols of the 3ra Cavalry Division reported
the evacuation of Chieullcs and of the camp near the Bois de
Grimont.

Similar observations had also been made on the Prussian left
wing. At 12.30 p,m. General v. Hartmann reported from the
heiglits north of M^cleuves, that the adversary was still hold*
ing Peltre and the wood south of Mercy le Haut, but that he
had already withdrawn strong detachments from the camps
hitheilo seen between Mercy and Metz ; soon after, that hostile
troops of all arms had heon clearly observed retiring from
Mercy since 1.45 p.m.

These reports agreed completely with the real state of afiairs ;
the retreat of the French Army to the left bank of the Moselle
had commenced.

General Baron v. ManteufTel, conunanding the Int Anny Corps,
had already ridden forward to his outpostfi towards 2 p,m., and
had witnessed in person the rearward movements of the French
masses hi front of him. As viewed from the positions of the
Ist Army Corps, these movements might be preliminary to a
combined movement against the Vllth Corps or to preparing
an attack upon the Ilnd Army. The General, therefore, to
meet all circumstances, ordered both his Divisions to stand to
arms and be ready for battle.

Although the enemy's intention in fi-ont of the Ist Corps was
not clearly apparent, the advanced guard of the Vllth Array
Ctnps could have no doubt that the enemy was abandonina
his position before Metz and retirinff upon the fortress. With
this fact before him, Major-General Baron v. d. Goltz c«m8idered
that he nmst act at once. An attempt to molest the with-
drawal of the French as much as possilJe, and to retard the
retreat which was contemplated, appeared to be justified by the
onlinary rnles or war, and indeed necessitated .by the present
stiMt'gical situation. In addition to this, the alarming and

807

the movement thereby occasioned in the let Army Corps led
likewise to the supposition of offensive measures on the part of
this corps.

General v. d. Qoltz therefore decided upon an independent
advance, and quitted his bivouac at Laquenexy with the ad-
vanced guard of the Vllth Army Corps* at half-past 3 o'clock.
He communicated the movements observed in the Ist Army
Corps to the 13th and 14th Infantry Divisions, and called upon
that coi-ps and the 1st Cavalry Division to support him in his
advance.

The scene of the struggle now commencing in the afternoon
of the 14th August is the Metz plateau which rises eastward
of the Seille^t It gradually ascends from the south in the
direction of St. Barbe. The conspicuous church tower of this
village forms an excellent landmark in the surrounding district.
The latter is distinguished generally by its broadly swelling
ridges, the view over which, especially in the northern parts, is
but little interrupted by the villages, which, as is tiie rule
throughout Lorrame, lie mostly in the open. On the other hand,
in the southern part are found numerous parks and other small
copses} between the larger woods of Ars Laauenexy and Failly.

Of exceeding importance is the generally deep valley which at
first trends noruiward by Colombey, and afterwards bends away
as the bed of the Valliires brook, in a westerly direction towards
the Moselle. The entire plateau is divided by it into a smaller
south-western and a larger north-eastern half, which may be
designated briefly from their main features, as that of Borny and
St. Sarbe. Of the brooks which flow from the east and north-
east into the Colombey and Yallitees valley, that coming from
St. Barbe and flowing between Servigny and Noisseville past
Nouilly 18 of special importance. The vine-clad slopes of this
watercourse are contiguous to the northern bank of the YaUi^es
brook as far as the Aloselle. The deep bottom of the brook
coming from St. Barbe separates the plateau of that name into
a west and east position.

The previously indicated positions of the French commanded
the Borny plateau, and in general also the western portion of the
St. Barbe plateau. Through the eastern ran the main lines of
advance of the Ist Army from the Nied, especially the two grt^at
roads from Saarlouis and Saarbrticken, which unite on the
Borny heights near Bellecroix.

• 26th Infantry Brigade, 7th Rifle Battalion, 8th Hum an, 5th and 6th Light
Batteries.

t Tide deecription of the crotind, p. 88.

t Some of theee were out aown when carrjinii out the works of iureslnnent st a
later period, so that the neighbourhood appears in the precent daj more open than
foruierlj .

308

The Battle from 3.30 to 7 p.m.

"^^(wS^Tth*^ Geiicial V. d. Goltz'a fii-st intention being only to capture

vilth Army *^® position of Colombey, he cauBod hie troops to advance for

Corps mores this purpose as follows : —

Itto^k"^^^**** Colonel V. Delitz with the two inuRktteor battalions of tho

15th and the 6th Light Battery moved past Marsilly on the
west, in the direction of Cliatean Anbigny. On his left marched
tho 7th RiiK? Battalion by Ars T.aqiionoxy on ('olombey, whilst
the 8tli Ihissai'N covired the ninveiiient on the right flank, and
later on fomicd the artillery esroi-t. The remainder of the
advanced guard followed in sct^ond hnc by Marsilly.

Between Anbigny and Coincy tht* foremost divisions of hussars
encountered a hostile squadron, which opened fire, and then
rapidly ^\^thdrow behind the thicket occupied bv French in-
fantiy. At 4 o'clock the Ist battalion di'ployed in tnis direction,
and against Chftteau Aubigny. Boceived in front "with an in-
effective volley. Major Bergius made a flank movement round
the south side of the chateau with the 4th Company, causing
the enemy to retire in all posnible haste to Coloinbey ; he
was followed by some well-aimed rounds from the 5th Light
Batt<Ty, which had just anived to the northward of 5Iarsilly.

By order of (leneml v. d. (ioltz» the 2nd and 3rd Companies
took a supporting position at the clulteau; the Ist, followed by
the 6th and 7th ot the 2nd l^ttalion, took the direction of Lk
Planchette in order to turn the enemy on the right; the 4th
joined on the left the rifle battalion in its advance from Ars
Laquenexy to Colombey.

The latter, which had suffered from shell fire during its
advance, had deployed three companies in a depression of the
ground, whilst the 2nd Company which had been on outpost
duty covered the left flank of the battalion in the direction of
the bushy giound south-west of Colombey occupii.'d by the
enemy, and in doing so speedily became engaged in a biisk
skirmish. The Ist and 3ra Companies, in consequence of this,
came up in rear of the 2nd, and took up a firm position in the
hollow road leading from the ch&teau; the 4th, however, in
concert with the last-named musketeer company, passed to the
attack of the heights scuith of (^olombev, which were captured
at the first rush. The shelter trenches thrown up at that point,
and subsequently the farms at Colombey, were occupied after a
brief struggle, in whi(rh the 5th and bth Companies of the 15th
Kegiment coming up from the east also participated. The 6th
Light Battery had, in the meantime, come into action to the
north of Aubigny and had aflbrded bv its fire considerable £up-
port to the onset of tlie infantiy. A forward movement maae
by the enemy from the west with a view to recapturing
Colombev, was vigorously repulsed.

In this way a finn footing was established on the fiirther bank
of the valley, but no additional jnogress coidd be made at pre-
sent. The French were posted in strong bodies on the heights

309

west and north of Colombejjr as far as the Saarbriicken road, so
that even the companies which had moved against La Planchette
could make no he^vdway on the western slope of the valley.

The 6th Light Battery was engaged with two hostile
batteries, and as it was at tliis time taken in flank by a third, it
retired about 400 paces to a position on the left of the 5th Light
Battery, which had meanwhile come into action to the south-
west of Coincy, At all points we were engaged in a vigorous
action against superior forces.

As soon, however, as General v» d. Goltz perceived that the
engagement had assumed a graver cliaracter, he at once took
care to support his first line by the arriving troops of the
advanced guard.

Shortly after the commencement of the battle the fusilier
battahon of the 55th had been despatched by Coincy to the
Saarbriicken road, as a hostile movement upon Montoy was re-
ported. Advancing upon La Planchette in company-columns
at open intervals, the battalion threw itself simultaneously from
the south and east into the hedges in front of the vineyard at
that place, and commenced a vigorous and bloody musketry
action at close quarters with the enemy occupying the vine-
vard,* As La Planchette was captured shortl v after by other
ri-ussiiin detachments, the enemy abandoned the vineyard ; the
battalion was now able to press onward through it

In the bushy hollow between Colombey and La Planchette
the Gth and 7th Companies 15th Regiment alone were as yet
engaged. The fusilier battalion of this Regiment was now led
fcH-ward in this position. On the right pressed forward the 11th
Company of the regiment along tho north side of the Coincy
brook in concert with the 1st Company, which, as we have
ah'ead}'^ seen, had advanced from Chfttoau Aubigny as far as the
houses of La Planchette and taken up a position therein. While
the smaller half of the lOth Companv joined this advance, tho
remainder occupied the thicket at the confluence of the two
brooks, and from that pofait took part in the combat. The 9th
Company supported the above companies of tho 2nd battalion
in their advance on the western slopes of the Colombey valley.t
The 12th Companjjr moved to Colombey and captured the
eh&teau park in conjimction M'ith the detachments fighting there.

Both musketeer battalions of the 55th also moved on
Colombey. Advancing along the Coincy-Colombey road, the
1st and 4th Companies took up a position at the bridge near
the latter place, whilst the 2nd and 3rd mounted the heights to
the north of it. The 2nd battalion crossed the brook further
soutli, and occupied with two companies each the border of the
park and the farm buildings.

* In tilts action Ut Lieut. Sclicringer lending tlio 11th Co. wna mortal] j and
Cnptain t. Sinits soTerelj wounded.

t In tins action aaainit tho adTenarr holding the heights, Lieut. -Colonel t.
Kawecz«nski, oommandinff the battalion, was wounded, and Ji»t Lieut, v. I'ruiid*
ZTnfki, in charge of the ftth Company, found o heroV gmre.

310

It was past 5 o'clock. A determined and bloody action had
been rap^in^ for an hour upon the western slope of the brook.
Although the Prussian detachments under General v.d. Goltz hud
at present succeeded in maintaining the heights at Colombey
which they liad taken at the first rush, yet, (m the other hand,
the adviinoe of the riglit wing south of the Saarbrucken high
road had encountered throughout an insuperable resistMUce. The
I^'onch held especially a little fir wood lying on the Colombey-
Bellecroix road. The main body was, as already mentioned,
further to the rear l)etween Colombey and Borny,* whither con-
stant reinforcements were seen to arrive. The enemy preceded
his enveloping attack with a devastating file-fire, by which he
hoped to drive the weak Prussian advanced guard from the
ground it had captured.

When the action assumed this phase, which was by no means
devoid of danger, supports were already also advancing on the
Prussian side, From the east the other half of the 13th Divi-
sion was hastening to the help of its sorely-pressed advanced
gnmrd, whilst, on the north, the 1st Army Corps had complied
with all possible speed to the summons addi'es^sed to it, and
had already enterea upon the contest.

IrriTalof General v. Manteufiel had received General v. d. Goltz's

**^A^^f tSf request for support in his forward movement shortly after
m Army ^ o'clock, and in consequence at once despatched orders to his
CoriM, 4.45 to Divisions already under arms, and also to the two advanced
e.aup.m. guard8,t to act vigorously, overthrow the enemy, but not to

allow themselveH to be enticed within range of the forts,

The advanced guards now moved off almost simultaneously
along the two gieat roads, which lead to Metz from the east-
ward and unite at BelleiToix not far from the fortress.

The advanced guard of the 1st Infantry Division moved
from the neighbourhood of Silly along the Saarbrucken road.
The Xst Light Battery, which formed part of the vanguard,
hastened ahead of the infantry by Maison iso)ee, under escort
of some divisions of dragoons, and brought the first immediate
help to General v. d. Goltz's troops, by coming into action at
about 4.45 j^.m. on the south side of the Coincy brook and open-
ing fire against the heights north of Colombey, Put by the
desire of General v. Gliimer, commanding the 13th Infantry
Division, who had meanwhile come up, the battery shortly after
took up a position to the south-west of Montoy near the Saar-
briicken road, with a view to supporting the advance of the
infantry along the left bank of the Colombey brook. In doing
so, the battery was received with a most destructive fire from
the enemy, the commander, Captain HofTbauer, being badly
wounded at an early period.

* Srd Corps, the Guard iu i-ear.

t At Sillj and Lee Etai.g«. Sec pp. 297-298.

311

The advanced guard of the 2nd Infantry Division at Les
EtangB had been reinforced in the forenoon by the 4th Regi-
ment and the 6th Light Battery.* The 4th sqn. 10th Dragoons
had just been relieved at the outposts by the Ist. sqn. and
arrangements were being made for moving forward the 1st
battn. 44th Regiment beyond the present position of the fusilier
battalion at Glattigny and LibaviUe into a new outpost line,
St. Barbe-Retonfay, when the order came to attack.

General v. Memerty advanced forthwith at a trot with the two
batteries and squadrons at Les Etangs along the Noisseville
road, and ordered the infantry to follow him as soon as possible.
About the same time that HoiFbauer's battery took up its posi-
tion at Montoy, the two batteries of the 2nd Division came into
action west of the Noisseville brewery, on both sides of the high
road from Saarlouis. The 10th Dragoons assembled close at
hand as their escort.

l^he infantry of both advanced guards strained eveiy nerve
to follow the llatteries which had hastened on ahead. On the
right wing of the line of battle the first to appear was the 1st
battalion 44th Regiment, formed in company columns at open
intervals. The 4th Company remained at the brewery in
reserve ; with the other three, Major v. Ziegler took the cureo-
tion of Nouilly, part moving through Noisseville, part passing
to the north and south of that village. In spite of the enemy s
vigorous fire from the heights the battalion continued its march
towards the village in question.

The 1st Company ascended, from Noisseville, the vineyard on
the northern slope of the gully which, starting fW)m St. Barbe,
passes between Servigny and Noisseville towards Nouilly ; the
2nd and 3rd Companies advanced on the south of this valley.
After the 1st Company had at first driven the French skirmishers
at Nouilly in front of them, it became involved in a vigorous
combat on the heights east of the Mey copse, where the enemy
encountered them from densely-occupied shelter trenches. At
this time the other two companies reached Nouilly, which,
although abandoned by the enemy, was stronglv barricaded.
Onward they laboured through and around the village towards
the heights, in order to bring the necessary support to the 1st
Company. This, however, had been provided m another way.
The 2na Battalion had reached Noisseville shortly after the 1st ;
from thence the 6th and 7 th Companies were sent after the 1st
Company round by the north of Nouilly, wliilst the 5th and 8th
remamea temporarily in reserve at Noisseville,

Thus, on the extreme right flank of the line of battle at
Nouilly five companies of the 44th Regiment were hotly engaged
up to this time in a very unequal struggle against the Mey
heights, where a superior enemy was opposed to them, in places
at not more than 250 to 300 paces distance.

* It thenfore now confuted of the entire 8rd Infantry Brigade (4th and 44th
Regiments), the 10th Dragoons, and the 5th and 6th Light Batteries. See p. 297.

312

On the left wing of the Ist Army (3orp8 the vanguard of the
1 Ht Infantry Division had dniwn in its outposts* for an advance
upon Montoy, and had given a hand to Goltz's brigade in the
stiTig^le.

Wlulst the 1st and 2nd Compiinies of the Ist Rifle Battalion
pressed forward by Flanville as far as the heights north of
Montoy, Colonel v. Russe with the 43rd Regiment followed the
g^'eat Saarbriicken road, and appeared about 5.30 puin. on the
heights east of the l;iHt-naniod village. Ah reports Wi-re hero
received of a French advance througli Lauvallior, Colonel v.
Busse, forming his regiment in half biit tali on s, ordered it to pass
Montoy in this fonnation, and cross the hollow which mns to
the northward of it. The two fusilier half-battalions first
advanced through and round the oast of the place, ascended
the heights on the other side, and then inclined away to the
left, so as not to mask the artillery fire of the 2nd Infantry
Division near the brewery. The 2nd Battalion followed and
took up a position on the right wing of the attacking line,
which continued to advance on Lauvillier and La Planchette,
driving the adversary's skirmishers in front of it. The Ist
battalion, which had already lost its commander, Major v*
VVuthenow, while crossing the Montoy valley, followed each of
the two foremost battalions with two of its companies. The
regiment thus iurnied two equally strong wings, in each of
which two half battalions were in fii-st, and one in second line.t
On the extreme left wing of the regiment were the two rifle
companies, which moved forw.ird along the Montoy valley, and
with whose assistance the lUsiliers sooa succeeded in capturing
Lauvallier.

We now conmienced to move south of this village in the
space between the two great roads, up the heights which rise
to the westward. The enemy meanwiule kept up so vi^rouB
a fire upon the slopes descending to Lauvallier from bis tiers of
shelter trenches, that the rifles and fiisiliers were unable to
make any further progi-ess in the direction of Bellecroiz,

Shortly afterwards detachments of the 2nd Infantry Divi-
sion also took pai*t in this struggle, which was canied on with
great exasperation, but was at first unattended mth any deci-
sive result.

Meanwhile the absent troops of the 3rd Infantry Brigade
had come into Une on the Noisseville heights ; first the fusilier
battalion of the 44th, then the 4th Regiment. Colonel v. Book-
ing, connnandinff the fonner regiment, now ordered the 4th
Company, which juid hitherto been left in rear at the brewery,
to advance in the direction of Goupiilou Mill; it was thus to

* Fusilier bnttnlioii of the 43rd, Ist and 2Dd Cos. of the Ist Bifle Battalion.

t Ut k 2nd. 0th&12th. Ktli&llth. (Jlli^Ttb. 5th&8tK.

Irt KilloM. 2ml&;ird. (lanl Kogt.) l8t&4th.

313

rejoiii the other companies of the battalion, which as we are
aware had already victoriouBly crossed the Nouilly valley, and
with their right wine had even forced their way into the copse
eastward of Mey. General v. Memerty kept the remainder of
the infantry in the first instance at Noisseville.* But as some
time after, about 6 o'clock, a renewed hostile advance was re-

K)rted from the riglit wing in the direction of Vany and Villers
)rme, the general ordered the fusilier battalion of the 4th to
be ready to reinforce the right wing, and the other two batta-
lions to advance along the high road towards Bellecroix, since
the ever increasing roll of firearms from that side led to the
apprehension that the adversaiy might break through between
the 1st and 2nd Infantry Division.

After advancing beyond the artillery positions westward of
the brewery, Colonel v. Tietzen, commanding the regiment, de-
ployed the Ist battaUon in company columns on both sides of
the high road.

A brisk fire of shell and shrapnel from the Bellecroix heights
received the advancing troops.f On the south of the road.
Major V* Schrotter, with the 1st and 4th companies, reached
the Lauvallier valley, which was already in our hands, and at
once took part in the action on the further side of the valley,
where the fusiliers of the 43rd and the two rifle companies were
making vigorous efforts to gain the heighta.

The first assault failed.J We were compelled to abandon the
slopes upon which we had partly gained a footing, and seek shelter
in a depression of the ground. Falliiig back upon the support of
the 2nd and 3rd Companies, 43rd Kegiment,§ the troops as-
sembled for the renewal of the attack.

The 2nd and 3rd Companies of the 4th Regiment had mean-
while advanced north of the great road from Saarlouis, and had
endeavoured, under heavy loss, to gain possession of the French
position, which was strong at all points. But neither here were
any decisive successes gamed in the first instance. When the
2nd Company began to waver on the half ascended slopes, Colonel
V. Tietzen brought up the 5th and 8th, and sliortly after the
remaining companies of his 2nd battalion, in order to support and
extend the right wing. At the same time were seen coming up
from the southward tne three half-battalions of the 43rd, which,
forming the right wing,|| had, as already observed, taken the
direction of the Saarlouis high road, and from thence bending
away to the left towards the Lauvallier heights were now
hastening to the scene of action.

* 5th and 8th Go*. &nd the fusilier battalion of the 4ith ; 4th Begiinent.

t At the yny oommeiioement Lieat. t. Diezebki, in charge of the 3rd Company,
wae wounded.

t Oaptain Kanter, 43Td Begiment, was wounded ; Captain Walil, 4th Begiinent,
was lulled.

{ The half -battalion, which followed the left wing of the regiment in second line.
^^> note t on preoeding page.

II See note t on pnreding page.

314

Wliilst Major Schwcnke, with the 5th and 8th Companies oi'
the 43rd, turned Lauvallier by the south and joined the 2nd and
3rd CompanieH in the action between the two high roads, the
other two cjompanies of the 2nd battalion proceeded to occupy the
village. The Ist and 4th Companies, forming the half-battalion
of the 2nd line, arrived at Lauvallier shortly after. They at once
moved forward in a north-westerly direction along the valley,
with a view to supporting the right wing of the 4th Regiment.*

Thus, by 6 p.m., along the whole front between Colombey
and Nouilly, the grouter ])urt of the infantry of the advanced
guards of three Divisionst had become gnidually involved in a
still undecided struggle, in which the artillery, i.vhich followed,
had aUo taken part in considerable force.

The three batteries of the 1st Infantry Division} had moved
from their bivouac near Pont-i-Chaussy at 5 o*clock. On reaching
the neighbourhood of Silly, the divisional commander, who had
ridden onward in person, ordered up the two heavy batteries at
a trot.

On coming abreast of Montoy, they proceeded a few hundred
paces in advance of Hoff bauer's battery, which was in action to
the north of the Saarbriicken road, and unlimbered to the south
the latter. They were joined shortly after by the 2nd Light
of Buttery which came into action somewhat to the left rear.
Although exposed to the enemy's infantry fire, the three bat-
teries continued to play upon the heights on the further side of
the Colombey brook, m order to support the companies of the
13th Division engaged at that point, whose attempts to press
onwards had been hitherto imattended with success.

The fire of the combined batteries, the command of which
devolved ui>on (Captain v. Ilom on Major Munk being woimded,
did not fail in its effect ; after 6 o'clock the companies of the
15th and 55th Regiments made visible progi^ess like\vise from
the left bank of the Colombey brook.

The two heavy batteries of the 13th Infantry Division had
also hastened f(u*ward at a ti*ot fi*om the bivouao at Pang^,§ in
advance of tho infantry. The 5th, which was the firat to anive
at Coincy, was forthwith ordered by (General v, d, Ooltz to
cross the valley at Colombev, in order to afford support to
the troops engaged at the park against a superior hostile force.
Immediately the battery came into action on a small meadow
close to the eastern corner of the park, it was suiTOunded by
a semicircle of hostile sharpshooters at scarcely 900 yards
distance, and received fire simultaneously from them, from mi-
trailleuses, and from another hostile battery firing shrapnel. The

* Captain t. KOnigeegg, in charge of the la«t-mentioned half- battalion of the
4drd, had been alroadj wounded ; he declined, however, to leaTO bia men, ftnd met
his death during this forward moTcment.

t The 13th, let and 2nd.

X The 2nd light, lat and 2nd heavy of the Ui Armj Corps. The 1st light had,
as we are aware, liautened forward in front of the advance. Bee above.

§ See p. 296.

315

losses which it sustained in consequence were so great, that
even from the commencement the regular service of the pieces
was impossible. The battery commander, Captain Schnack-
enberg, all the oiRcers of the battery, many non-commissioned
officers, men, and horses were wounded. After succeeding with
the greatest difficulty in firing 28 slioUs, the junior officer.
Lieutenant Riihle v. Liliensteni, who was only slightly wounded,
brought with the aid of infantry the completely crippled battery
under shelter of the Colombey farm buildings. After some
time spent in effecting repairs the battery* was again brought
into position alongside the the two light batteries on the Coincy

road.t

The 6th Heavy Battery had at first followed the 5th. The
divisional commander, Major Wilhelrai, inclined away with it in
a northerly direction from Ogy, crossed the Saarbriiclcen road,
and brought the battery into position at the south-west corner
of Montoy. It here i einforcea the ripht wing of the artillery of
the 1st Division in their fire agamst the left bank of the
Colombey brook, which was still defended with obstinacy.

Thus by H p.m. there was a total force of 60 IVussian guns in
action as follows: — On the left winjj, to the south of the Coincy
brook, three batteries of the Vllth Army Corps; between the
brook and Montoy, four batteries of the Ist and one of the
Vllth Army Corps ; on the right wing, near the brewery, two
batteries of the 1st Army Corps. Thus the focus of the Prussian
artillery position lay in the centre of the line of battle, to the
south of Montoy. This co-operation of the artillery in the
struggles carried on with such unremitting tenacity and
depperation by tlie infantry, had been nlreaay of such avail
as to enable difierent detachments of the Istf and 13th §
Infantry Divisions to gain the opposite bank beyond Lauvallier
and La Planchette. A further advance towards Bellecroix,
however, appeared as yet impraeticable. Between Colombey
and the Saarbriicken high road all attempts to gain grouna
on the left bank of the brook had likewise failed, as the enemy
succeeded in holding the fir copse on the Colombey-Bellecroix
roa^.

A change in the situation of the struggle was, however. Attack of the
brought about on the Pmsaian left wing by the attack of the Iri^e^ISd^
25th Infantry Brigade. the whole of

The officer commanding the Vllth Army Corps received at the artiUerj
4 p.m. the first intelligence that the advanced guard brigade of ^^ Jl^
the 13th Infantry Division was following the enemy in his re- Up1»7pS.

* A gun without limber was dragged awaj by one hone.

t The 5th and 6th light batteries, it will bo remembered, belonged to Goltz'
adranoed guard.

i From the 48rd Sesiment and Ist Rifle Battalion.
§ From the 15th and 55 th Regiment*.

316

treat from Ara Laquenexy. At 4.15 p.m. a Hecond report was
received that the advanced j^iard in question was ah'eady in-
volved in a serious action. In this report General v. Glumer
at the same time requested permission to follow up the 26th
Infantry Brigade with the 2f)th, which had already been set in
movement by his orders.

General v. Zastrow did not consider a serious attack in the
direction of the fortress within the spirit of the orders of the
commander-in-chief of the 1st Army. But in order to be pre-
pared for any contingency, he now also despatched ordei-s for the
14th Infantiy Division and the corps artillery to advance to the
heights between Laquenexy ami Colligny. He rode in person to
the point where Goltz's brigade was engaged. On his reaching
tlie Colombey heights soon after 5 o'clock, the advanced troops
of the 1st Infantry Division, and on their left the head of the
25th Infantry Brigade, were already moving into the line of
battle. Of this brigade the 1st l)attalion 13th Regiment,* which
had been at Colligny since the jn-evicms evening, was the first
to move on the alarm of the 13th Division; it advanced on
Coincy by way of Ogy. The 3rd battidion 73rd Regiment had
been left behind in bivouac at Pange ; with the remaining four
battalions of his brigade, llajor-General v. Osten Sacken was
also on the march to Coincy.

General v. Zastrow perceived at once that the combat had
become serious and could not now be broken off. He assumed
the command on the left wing, ordered forthwith the 25th
Infantry Brigade to take part in the fight at the Coh)mbey
brook, and issued a second order to the 14th Infantry Division
to post the 27th Infantry Brigade between Marsilly and Colom-
bey, as a reserve at his special disposal, while the 28th was to
support General v. d. Goltz*s left wing.

On arrival at the scene of action. Major Klipfel with the 1st
battalion 13th Regiment advanced between the (Joincy bottom
and the Saarbiiicken road and ascended the heights on the left
bank of the Colombey brook. The battalion lost its commander
and the four company leaders t in the stubborn action which
raged at this point ; it had, however, supported on the right and
left by detachments of the 1st Infantry Divisitm and the 26th
Infantry Brigade respectively, already gained some gi'ound on
the heights between the two high roads, when the 1st battalion
73rd Regiment came up to reinforce it.

Advancing in half-battalions and sunported by all the com-
panies present of the 13th and 15th llegiments, the battalion
drove back the enemy to the poplar avenue, which leads from
Colombey to Bellecroix. With General v. Osten Sacken and its
commander, Lieut.-Colonel v, Deutsch, at the head, it then ad-
vanced without halting towards the betore-mentioned fir copse
near the poplar avenue. In front of this, under a murderous nre,

• See under 13t1i AupiHt.

t Capfthii T. Hiilut iind nt'clclicriii, Ul T.init. v. Onibcn, wei-c wouuiled ; Captain
Rifgen, killed.

317

the compauies in the Colonibey paik had been engaged for a
considerable time, and had Buffered very considerable losses/
The stormers pressed into the copse in spite of a withering
shower of bullets and gained the further side. But the ground
captured with such great bravery coidd not be maintained.
Taken under fire firom three sides, the detachments which had
penetrated were repulsed with heavy loss,t and in their retro-

Kade movement impeded the further advance of the 2nd
ttalion 78rd Regiment, following in the same direction*
General v. Osten Sacken rallied his retreating detachments
in the wood on the brook, and in the valley of Colombey. On
arrival of the fusilier battn. 13th Regiment from Coincv, the
General led forward the troops once more to the attack. Lieut.-
Colonel V. Langen, commanding the 2nd battn. 73rd Regiment-,
moved with his two half-battalions towards the north side of the
fir copse, and that part of the poplar avenue which abuts upon
it. He was joined on both sides by the detachments, assembled
by General v. Osten Sacken. Lieut-Colonel v. Deutsch, in spite
of his wound, continued at the head of his battalion, as long aa
he had any strength remaining. The 9th Company of the nisi-
Ker battn., 13th Reeiment, clune pertinaciouslv to the wood on
the Colombev brook ; Major Bcmmer also led forward the other
three towards the fir copse. The 2nd battalion of this regiment
coming up from Coincy was now not far from the Saarbnicken
road, advancing in rear of the centre of the line of battle.

In addition to these, the movement was shared by the 3rd
and 4th Companies of the 1st Rifle Battalion, which started with
the rear portions of the 2nd Brigade, and bending to the right
from the Saarbriicken road at the Maison isol^e, advanced along
the low ground from Montoy. They now crossed the Colombey
brook to the south of La Planchette, under a vigorous fire from the
enemv, and joined the right wing of the 25th Infantry Brigade.

The attack, thus prepared and vigorously carried out, met
with success. About 6.45 p.m. the position on the Colombey-
Bellecroix road,t which had been hitherto maintained by the
adversary with the greatest stubbornness, was captured. The
French retired from this point upon Bomy, whilst those to the
north of the Saarbriicken road still held out. The victorious
Prussian troops now made good then* position along the poplar
avenue and in the fir copse.

With this decisive result, the action on the extreme right wing
of the Vllth and the extreme left of the 1st Army Corps, was
to all intents and purposes brought to a close. The Prussian
troops sought in vain to advance onward from this position

* The 4tix Go. 16Ui Beat, loti here all its oAoen ; Major Bergiiu, who accom*
panied this companT of his battalion, was also badlj wounded. Ci^tain t. Steinwehr
of the 2nd battn. 65th Reeiment was killed.

t Of the 1st battn. 73ia Begiment the battalion oommander and Captns. t. Peters-
dorff and t. Bardeleben were wounded, the latter mortaUy^.

t This for the most part is a flat hoUow way, flanked thnraghout its entire lensth
on both tides with a oIomIj planted row of trees, altemateW poplars and flrs, so that
it forms a regular defansiue outttng. The flr copse, which has been frequsntlj
referred to, is an open oopse with loft j trees.

318

towards the cross-roads at Belleeroix ; their forward movenients
were repulsed by the enemy.* Equally fruitless were the
repeated attempts of the French to regain the lost ground. An
especially vigorous attack undertaken still later in the evening
was sharply repulsed bj Lieut.-Colonel v. de Busche with the
2nd Battalion 13th Regiment.t

While the events, described as having taken place in the
vigorous stniggleof v.Glumer's Division, caused a decisive change
in favour of the Prussian arms, the situation on the right wing of
the 1st Army Coi-ps had become, for the time, somewhat critical.

General de Ladmirault, who was conducting the passage of
the 4th French Corps over the bridges at Chambiire, had left
Grenier's Division in the neighbourhood of Mey for the purpose of
covering the retreat. It was against the advanced detachments
of this Division that the companies of the 44th Regiment had
gained, at the first onset, the advantages to wliich reference has
recently been made.t As soon as General de Ladmirault was
informed of this, he ordered both his other Divisions and the
reserve artillery at once to show front. He gave instructions for
(Jissey's Division to advance upon Mey, with a view to giving
immediate support to Grenier^s Division, which was now yielding
ground, and at the sametimeproceeded withLorencez'Division to
turn the Prussian right wing by the north of the St. Barbe road.

The attack of the 44th on tlie Mey wood had at this time
already made progress, althougli with considerable loss.§ Major
V. Ziegler, however, recognised the danger threatening from the
north, and on purpose to avoid it in time, brought back his three
companiesjl in good order to Nouilly. The other detachments of
the regiment, in view of the enemy's superiority, were also re-
called oy signal in order to relieve them from defeat in detail.
At the same time General v. Memerty ordered the fusilier
battalion 4th Regiment, which had been held in readiness
to cover his right flank, to retire now to Servigny, whilst the
fusilier battalion 41th Regiment took up a supporting position
at Noisseville.

It was past half-past six o'clock ; the Ist InfantryBrigade was
still on the march to Montoy, the 4th was to the east of Ch&teau
Gras. The 3rd Cavalry Division, alarmed at 5 p.m. by the
thunder of the guns, had come up vid St. Barbo to the right
wing of the line of battle in puimiance of a request from
General v. Pritzelwitz, and had taken up a position in rear of it
at Retonfay. A squadron of the 7th Lancers was in observa-
tion on the right flank.

In order to meet the danger from the flank attack threatening
from the Bouzonvillo road, their first endeavour was to bring the

* On this occaaion a French squadron of culrauicrs nrhich cliargcd the ekir-
mishcrs of the rifles was repalsed with great loss.

t In one of the last phases of the action Lieut, t. Alrensleben, in charge of the
4th Rifle Companj, was mortallj wounded.

t See pp. 311 and 812-313.

§ See p. 313. Captain y. Puttkammer fell iK^re.

11 Tho 4th Co. had only rocenlly been moTcd from the brewery toward* the
Ooupillon mill. See p. 312.

319

guns into play. With this object the 5th Light Batteiy was
called away from its position at the brewery, and placed to the
north-east of Noisseville close to the edge of the long valley ;
it was from that point able to give support to the battalion in
Servigny. Three other batteries shortly after came into action
immediately to the right and north of this battery ; first the
horse artillery batteiy of the Cavalry Division,* escorted by a
squadron of lancers, and afterwards the 5th and 6th Heavy
Batteries which had hastened ahead of the 4th Infantrv Brigade.
The last-named battery was ordered by General v. Bergmann,
who was personally commanding the artillery of the 1st Army
Corps, to take up a position still further to the north of the
others, between Senngny and Poix.

French batteries had come into action on the heights of
Villers FOrme, but no further advance of the enemy, as expected
from that place, was as yet observable. It was soon evident that
the three rrussian batteries on tlie edge of the valley at Noisse-
ville were too far distant from the heights at Villers FOrme to
produce an effect upon the enemy's artillery. They, therefore,
again limbered up, and advanced in a northerly direction for the

Purpose of seeking more favourable positions near Servigny.
'he 5th Heavy Battery found a site close to the south-west
side of this valley ; tlie 5th light battery to the noiih of it,
on the left flank of the 6th heavy, which was already posted
there. The horse artillery batteiy proceeded beyond Poix, and
took up a position on the Bouzonviile road.

Whilst these four batteries now came into action on the
extreme right wing, the 5th light battery which had been
brought forward firom the brewery into the centre of the line
of battle, was replaced by the amval of the corps artillery of the
1st Army Corps.t

The latter had set out from the bivouac near Courcelles
Chaussy at 5 o'clock. The batteries of horse artillery, followed
by the heavy batteries, had advanced along the Saarbriicken
road ; the light batteries had made use of a military road con-
structed to tiae south of this road, and a bridge over the Nied.
At a quarter past 6 o'clock both horse artillery batteries un-
limbered on the left flank of the 6th Light Battery, which was
still in action to the west of the brewery.

To the south of Montoy, where the four field batteries of the
corps artillery were to take up their position, the space was so
contracted by the five battenes in action,} that it was only on
the extreme left flank that the 8rd Heavy Battery could find a
site, which was not particularly favourable from its low situation.
Lieutenant-Colonel Gregorovius, commanding the divisioUi
Grossed the low ground at Montoy with the 4th Heavy Battery,

• lit H. A. BatteiT of VHth Annj Corps.

t The Slid and Sid H. A. Batteries, and the 2nd Field Dirision, consisting of
the 8rd and 4th Liglit and the 8rd and 4th HeaT7 Batteries. See p. 71*.

t 1st Field DiTision of the 1st and the 6th Hearj Battery of the Vllth Armr
Corps. See p. 814.

E 2

320

and took up a position at the north-west angle of the vineyard on
the other side, which position extended beyond the left flank of
the horse artillery batteries, and flanked them.* It successfully
supported from that place the su1)sequent advance of the 3rd
Re^ment.

Whilst the attack of the 25th Infantry Brigade had about 7
p.m. secured to the Prussian troops the possession of the left
Dank of the Colombey brook, south of the Saarbrilcken high road,
the infantry combat north of this road was doubtfully swaying
backwards and forwards. In order also to develop greater
artilleiy power on this part of the battle field, Captain v. Homf
determined to bring forward across the valley the four batteries
of the 1st Infantry Division, which were in action to the south
of Montoy. He brought the 1st Heavv and 1st Light Batteries
across the bridge at La Planchette, and unlimbered immediately
behind the infantry skirmishers, at a distance of 1,200 paces fi-om
the enemy. He then brought foi-ward the other two batteries*
and placed them on the right of and between the first mentioned.

Sketch.

1st Field Diyision of the 1st Aimy Corps.

Q LauTalltcr.

— -^ 2nd Light BatUry.

-S- 1st HeaTj Battery.

• •••••

From Mats rziizzizizizirizzriiimiizziiizziirr

to Saarbrucken

♦- — + 2nd llearj Battery.

-I- 1st Light Battery.

The effective ai-tillory fire from this very forward position,
which was maintained until the end of the battle, contributed in
no small degree to supporting the sulwequent advance of the

too much elevation.

Meanwhile, General v. Mantcuffel, having observed from the
Noisseville heights that the enemy kept on extending his left
wing to the northward, issued the following orders : —

" Major-General v. Meraerty will hold, under all circum-
stances, the positions of Noisseville and of the Nouilly valley.
To co-operate in this, the corps artillery will also be brought up
closer to Noisseville. The 1st Infantiy Brigade now advancing
along the Saarbrucken road, will, on arrival, be posted near the
brewery as general reserve. The 4th Infantry jBrigade, which
is also approaching, will pass round the north of Noisseville,
and, after leaving two battalions in the vuUey there as reserve,
will meet the outflanking movements of the enemy by a
counterstroke on his left flank.**

* Both light batteries of the corps artillery wore not able to come so quickly
alonff the mtUtary road ; they did not come up until hnlf-au-hour later,
t See p. 814.

321

In ezecntion of these orders the batteries posted between the
brewery and Montoj wheeled half-right, so tnat they now occu-
pied a fine between NoisseTille and Lauvallier. The two horse
artilleiy batteries formed the right wing, close to the south-west
angle of Noisseville. Next to them came the 6th Light Battery,
then the two heavy batteries of the corps artiUei-y,* and lastly
the two light batteries of the same, whidi arrived at 7.30. and
took up a }>osition to the left, adjoining the batteries of the Ist
Field Division.

Thus, from this moment, the whole of the artillery of the
1st Army Corps became engaged. Inclusive of the horse artillery
battery of the Cavalry Division, it showed 90 guns in the front ;
of these, 24 were to the south-west of LauvaUier, 42 between
that place and Noisseville, and 24 between Servigny and the
Bousonville road near Poix.

SriTGH.
ArtUlerf of the Ist Army Corps towards 7 p.m.

to Bousonrillf .

From Hets

Battery of 8rd C. D.

a Poix.
+ 6th Ueary.
•I- 5th Light.

Q Seryigny.
•h 5th Hcary.

a Noisseyille.

to Saarloiiis.

-^4th

8rd Light

D LauTallier.

1st Field DiTision.
. (4 batteries.)

* The 8rd Heary Battery had been meanwhile likewise brought up from its
unfarourable position south of Montoy.

322

On the extreme left wiug of the Ist Army the 7th Rifle Bat-
taHon, under Lieiit.-Colonel Reinike, had meanwhile, for two
hours, carried on an obstinate contest with a superior hostile
force.

As has been already montioniHl, the 4th Company of this bat-
talion, in conjunction with det^ichments of the IStii Regiment, had
at the commencement of the battle, captured the hostile shelter
trenches on tlie licights south of (volombey, whilst tho other
three companies were engaged under fire further to the left.*
Between these heights and the woods in the direction of Borny
was perfectly open ground, so that, in face of the numerically
stronger enemy holding the wood, but veiy slow progress could
be made. The 2nd Company had, however, succeeded in occu-
pying some scrub east of the Borny wood, and from that place
harassed the right flank of the French with its skirmishers. The
battalion conmiander had also ncared the adversary with the 1st
and 3rd Companies by taking them along an ascending gully and,
from its upper end, bringing the fire of two divisions of the 3rd
Company to bear upon the enemy lying under shelter in the wood.

Ihe rifles, posted in this way round the north-east angle of
tlie Borny wood in a semicircle, had been unable to make any
progress during tho protracted skinnishing, although they had
nevented the adversary's advance against the left flank of tho
^•ussian position at Colombey. The steady and well-directed
fire of the rifles caused the French especially heavy losses at this
pohit.

Such was the position of afiairs when, towards 7 p.m., the
heads of the 28th Infantry Brigade appeared on the scene where
the rifles were engaged.

The Battle from 7 to 9 p,m,

ArriTal of tba On receipt of the fii-st request, prefeired bv General v. d. Qoltz
14th Infantry to General v. Kamekef before commencing his attack, the latter
DiTiiion. officer had ordered his Division to stand to arms in the bivouac

at Domangeville.} After he had set out with his Division towards
4 o'clock, he received at VillersLaquenexy a communication with
regard to the attack upon Colombey, Avith the request that he
would support it on the left flauK. Whilst, in consequence
of this, the Division was now continuing its march on Ars
Laqiienexy, Gen(?ral v. Kamekc recjoived in rapid sncccKHion the
Corm Conunandei*s' orders,§ of which the second sunmioned tho
27th Infantry Brigade to the neighbourhood between Marsilly
and Colombey as genei'al reserve to the corps. Consequently
General v. Woyna, with the 28th Infantry Brigade, aloae con-
tinued in the previous direction, and appeared, as already
observed, on the battle-field to the south-west of Colombey
towards 7 o'clock.

• Sec p. 308. t See p. 307. J Hce p. 296. § Sec p. 816.

323

Ad the fusilier battalion of the 53rd occupied, aa we know, the
station at Courcelles siur Nied,* while the fusilier battalion with
the 8th Company 77th Regiment had been appointed as escort to
the corps and divisional artillery, General v. Woyna had not quite
four battalions of his brigade at disposal. During his advance,
however, the 1st Light Battery and the 15th Hussars were
assigned to him. The latter was directed upon Grigy to cover
the left flank, but found the place occupied by the enemy.

The infantry had advanced by way of Ars Laquencxy, and
extended its right wing as far as Ch&teau Aubiguy.

As soon as the 53rd Regiment, leading the advance, came
within range of the enemy's fire, Colonel v. Gerstein deployed
his 2nd battalion into company columns, which pushed forward
into the alreadjr-mentioned position of the three riile companies,
and opened a vigorous file-hre upon the edge of the opposite
wood.

The 1st battalion formed half-battalions in rear of the 2ud.
The 1st and 4th Companies followed at first the right wing of the
2nd battalion by way of Ch&teau Aubigny, but afterwards, for
the purpose of outflanking the adversary's right, moved onward
in a south-westerly direction in rear of the line of battle of the
rifles and the 2Dd battalion. Their movement being screened
by a hedge, both companies, first of all the 4th and then the 1st
extending to the left and beyond the former, reached the poplar
avenue leading to Grigy. The^ took up a firm position there
and commenced a musketry action against the south side of the
Borny copse, which was likewise strongly occupiedf

The 2nd and 3rd Companies had worked their way from Ars
liaquenexy through the wood on the west as far as the rear of the
the left wing of the foremost battalion. When they subsequently
advanced beyond La Grange aux Bois, they found, on the left,
Kehl's half battalion already engaged, whilst, on the ri^ht, the
2nd battalion and the rifles were carrying on a contest against the
east side of the copse. They therefore formed up temporarily on
the deeply sunken road to Borny, and, facing the copse, formed
a reserve to the brigade in rear of the centre of its line of battle.

Colonel V. Conrady, commanding the 77th Regiment, had been
ordered to extend the left flank of the brigade with the seven
companies at hand. In pursuance of this he had likewise moved
towards the poplar avenue leading to Grigy, in rear of the line of
battle. Two companies of the 1st battn. wheeled up towards the
south-west angle of the Borny wood, the other five companies
advanced towards Grigy along the avenue in question. The two
first maintained a standing fight, in conjunction with the left
wing of the 53rd, against the south and south-west sides of the
copse, which was stm defended by the enemy with stubbornness.

Meanwhile the 1st Light Battery had come into action at

* See p. 296. This Gouroelles sur Nied must be distinguiBbed from the Cour-
celles Chatuty preriouslj referred to, where the l^t Division hud bivouacked.

t Ist Lieutenant jLehl, ,in command of the half battalion, was killed in this
action.

324

the northeniinoBt angle of the Ars Laquenexy wood, and from
that point played a most efficient part in the action on the right
I ^^£ ^^ Woyna's brigade.

The rifles and the 2nd battalion of the 53rd under Major
Himpe now advanced together against the north-east comer of
the copse, and made a concentric attack upon it with success.

During this infantiy combat the 15th Hussars had formed a

connecting link between the troops of tlie 18th Infieintry Di-vision

coming up from the southward, and the 1st Cavalry Division,

which, on its part, connected itself with the left wing of the

28th Infantry Brigade in action at Qrigy.

Attack of the The 18th Infantry Division belonging to the Ilnd Army, had

18th Inhaatrj after a severe march, reached the Metz-Strassburg hi^h roud ou

OKftl^ the afternoon of the 14th August, and bivouacked wim the main

Difitiras. body at Buchy. At 5 p.m., when Lieutenant-General Baron v.

Wrangel was on his way to his advanced pai*ties at Orny, he
received the report of an action heard to the northward, conse-
quently, with the 1st Army. Colonel v. Alvensleben/ command-
ing the 15th Lancers, at the same time made further communi-
cations of a similar nature. In consequence of these, a partici-
pation by the 18th Infantry Division U'om the southward, in the
apparently still vigorous but undecided contest, mve promise
ot ^eat success. This view was shared by Colonel v. firanden-
6tein,t commanding the outposts, from independent observation.

Lieutenant-General v. Wranj^el, on receipt of the first in-
telligence, had given onlors for his main body to hold itself in
readiness to march. He now issued orders for the Division to
advance rapidly noithwarils, reported this to the officer com-
manding the lAth Army Corps at Luppy, and foiihwith moved
off with the advanced guard westwaru of the Strassburg high-
road on Peltre.

Leading the column were two squadrons of the 6th Dragoons,
close in rear followed the 2ud and 3rd battns* of the 36th, with
the dud Light Battery of the 9th Artillery Regiment. These troops
were joined shortly after by the other two squadrons of the Dra-
goons, which were attached to the main body of the Division.

Peltre was found to bo evacuated by the enemy. Colonel v.
Brandensteiu now hastened forward, with the batteiy and a
sauadron as escort, to the heights of Mercy le haut Chftteau,
whither he was followed by the remainder of the dragoons and
provisionally by two companies of the 2nd battalion At 6.30
p.m. Captain v. Eynatten unlinibered at the angle formed by
the high road and the road leading to the chateau, and opened
fire upon a hostile battery at Grigy and the columns of French
infantry now visible there.

The Ist Cavalry Division, which was especially detailed by the
commander-in-chief of the Ist Army to watch tne enemy's pro-

* This ufUcer was returning, rii Floury, from the rcconnaisiance alluded to on
p. 802.

t Commoiuicr of the 8Glh Fusiliers.

325

ceediugSy had as early as 1*45 p.m, perceived the rearward move-
ment of the French.* During the course of the afternoon the
4th Lancers, supported by an infantry detachment which had
advanced as far as Jury, endeavourea to cross the railway, but
were prevented by the resistance of the enemy's rearguards. In
consequence of the communications received as to the intentions
of General v. d. Goltz and of the action commenced shortly after
by the Vllth Armv Corps, General v. Hartmann had assembled
his Division at Mecleuves and united the two cuirassier regi-
ments into a brigade under Major-General v. Liideritz.

At 6.30 p.m., on the approach of the advanced guard of the
18th Infantry Division, Cuderitz' cavalry brigade with the
hoi'se artillery batteryt crossed the railway east of Frontigny,
abreast of tfie Division. Whilst two squadrons of the 2nd
Cuirassiers formed the connection with the Vllth Army Corps
between Mercy le haut and Ars Laquenexy, Captain Preinitzer,
with the battery and the 4th squadron 3rd Cuirassiers as escort,
passed between Peltre and Mercy le haut to the west side of
the Strassburg high-road, fi-om which place he beUeved that he
could take a more effective part in the fight. In spite of all the
difficulties presented by abbatis and trenches, the battery gained
the plateau of the ridge between Peltre and Grigv. In conjunc-
tion with Eynatten's battery, and in its gradual advance occu-
pying a position to the left front of the latter, it played a
successful part in the attack on Grigy.

While the remaining cuirassier squadrons formed up in readi-
ness on the high-road, the infantry of the 18th Division con-
tinued their march upon and alongside it.

Major-General v. blumenthal, who assumed the command of
the advanced ffuard, had caused Peltre to be temporarily occu-

Eied by the 6tn and 7th companies of the 36th Kegiment ; he
ad moved forward by Mercy le haut with the remaining six
companies of the regiment. He now came into commimication
with the troops of Woyna's brigade, advancing simultaneously
from the eastward towards Grigy, and supported them in the
fight. The enemy abandoned the village, wnich was occupied by
the 2nd battalion of the 77th ; he likewise evacuated the southern
part of Bomv wood, into which the rifles and the companies of
the 53rd had abeady penetrated from the north-east. J

The advanced guard of the 18th Infantry Division was next
followed by the 84th Regiment. As soon as its approach ap-
peared to secure the occupation of Peltre, the other two com-
panies of the 36th Re^ment, which had been left beliiud there,
advanced along the high-road.

After 8 o*clock the 2nd Heavy Battery, which had hastened
forward from the main body of the 18th Infantry Division, came
up alongside of Preinitzer's battery. Both batteries directed a

* See p. 806.

t The lit H. A. Battery of the Itt Artillery Regiment.

X See pp. 888-824.

326

coucentrated fire upon the enemy, who was eivinff way at all
points from Grigy and Bomy wood.
Piognu and The events on the right wing of the Prussian line of battle

Cii^'^*ii ^*^v® been followed up to the period when the detachments
jjf^j^^'^ which had been pushed fonvard by way of Nouilly and towards
Corps. the Mey copse were retiring before a superior hostile force, and

when General v. Manteuiiel took measures to meet the outflanking
movement which was threatening from Villers FOrme.* His
intention, as we have seen, was, by the deployment of a laree
force of artilleiy and the retention of the 1st Iniantry Brigade
behind the Nouilly valley, to hold this position defensivelv, but
at the same time to deal a counter stroke with the 4th Inuintry
Brigade upon the left flank of the adversary*s advance.

in the struggle of the Corps, so far as our descriptiou extends,
seven battalions were already engaged. Of the 2nd Infantry
Brigade, there were the 43rd Regiment and two rifle companies,
in conjunction with the right wing of the 13th Infantry Division ;
from the 3rd Infantry Brigade, the greater part of the 4th Regi*
ment was fighting on tlie heights of Bellecroix. Of the latter
brigade six companies of the 44th Uugiment were engaged at
Nouilly and Mey.f In addition to these the fusilier battalion
4th Regiment had been already despatched to Servigny. The
remainder of the two advanced guard brigades, whichhad as ^et
taken no part, had now to be brought up to restore the wavermg
fight.

Before the measures in (luestion of the coips commander were
carried into effect, General v. Memerty had ordered the other
half of the 44th Regiment,| hitherto held back at Noisseville, to
give support to the companies retiring by Nouilly, and to prepare
for the attack.

In consequence of this the 5th and 8th Companies moved
forward to recapture the recently al)andoned heights to the south-
west of Nouillv, whilst Major Dallmer, with the fusilier battalion,
advanced agamst the village itself and the heights to the noiiih
of it. The fusiliers had deployed eici^ht divisions into one line
of skirmishers ; the remaining four aivisions followed in close
order. In this fonnntion the left wing of the battalion traversed
the low-lying village still unoccupied by the enemy, whilst the
right passed to the northward of it. After ascending the
opposite vine-clad bank, the battalion took up the contest against
the French now advancing by Mey, whilst the two companies oi
the 2nd battalion pressed forward at the same time in the vine-
yards south-west of Nouilly.

These detachments of the 44th Regiment were now also
joined by battalions of the other advanced guard brigade.

Lieut.-General v. Bentheim, conunanding the Ist Infantry
Division, who was directing from Lauvallier the attack on the

• See pp. 318 and 320.

t Inclusive of the 4ih Companj which only moYed to the Goupillon mill later.

X 5th Co.| Stb Co., and Fuulier Battalion.

32t

Belleoroix heights, had Bent orders to the 3rd Regiment, now on
the march, to turn off to the right towards Montoy, and after-
wards to adyance in a north-westerly direction, fey doin^ so
the connexion between the Ist ana 2nd Infantry Diyisions,
which in the opinion of the General was as yet too loose, would
become perfectly secure.

Colonel V. Legat received this order as the regiment was on
the Saarbriicken road, nearly abreast of Flanville. He at once
chaneed direction and advanced by way of Montoy towards
Nouilly, The 1st battalion leading the advance had already
thrown forward the two flank companies when south of Montov,
and moved in the new direction in two parallel lines, the right
wing bein^ formed of the Ist Company in front and the 2nd
Company in second line. From the heights of Montoy the
struggle at Lauvallier and Nouilly could be distinctly observed,
giving rise to the impression that the enemy, who had just re-
captured the vineyards of Nouilly, was endeavouring to out-
flcmk the Prussian right.

The Colonel now assigned Lauvallier as the point of direction
for the 1st Battalion, and brought forward the 2nd Battalion
on the right wing for the purpose of gradually outflanking the
adveraary by a liolf-right movement and a left wheel. The
fusilier battalion was to follow this movement.

The order, in the first instiince, alone reached the left wing
of the 1st Battalion, so that the Ist and 2nd Companies retained
the direct road to Nouilly, and only the two otlici-s, in accord-
ance with the instructions, took the road through Lauvallier.

The 2nd Battalion, following the 1st and 2nd Companies,
moved, after crossing the high-road, towards the south-west
angle of Nouilly; the fusiUer battalion, on its left, took the
direction of tlie Goupillon mill. In this order the regiment ap-
proached the valley Detween Nouilly and Goupillon, the enemy
from the further slope of the heights keeping up a brisk fire
upon these newly visible troops.

Before we describe their subsequent proceedings we nmst cast
a glance at the situation of the Wt wing of the Ist Army Corps
on both sides of the Saarlouis hij^h-road.

It has already been remarked that the first attack of the fore-
most troops of the 1st Division* and of some detachments of the
2nd advancing from the brewer y,f had failed against the Belle-
oroix heights south of this road, but that subsequently the troops
had received support from one of the advancing half-battalions.|
Somewhat later the 2nd battlion of the 43rd Regiment had
arrived and moved from Lauvallier on both sides of the great
road towards the heights in question, whilst the troops which
had given way were also once more led to the front.

All the detachments had gradually gained so much ground

* The FuBilior Baitn. of the 43rd and 2 oos. of the Ut Rifle Battalion. Sec p. 313.
t The Ist and 4th Cos. of the 4th Regiment. Bee p. 318.
X The 2nd and 8rd Got. of the 48rd ; the other two cos. of the let Battn. were
fighting to the north of the Saarlouis road. Sec p. 314.

328

in tbe tough and bloody action, that the artilleiy of the 1 at In-
fantry Division, as we have already seen, was enabled to un-
limber on the west side of the valley.

The 3rd Company 3rd Regiment, after ascending the slopes
from Lauvallier m a westerly direction, now also took part in
this protracted contest, wliich was maintained with unabated
stubbornness.

Between 7 and 8 p.m. the troops fighting at this point sue*
coeded in prossiue forward to where the poplar avenue from
Colombey meets the Saarbriicken road, and there completing the
connexion with the ri^ht whig of the 13th Infantry Division.
The troops of this Division kept firm hold of the ground which
had been so bloodily contested. Some detachments, as, for in-
stance, the ftisilier battalion 55th Regiment, had established
themselves to the north of the Saarbriicken road.

North of the Saarlouis road, after the failure of the first dash
for the Bellecroix heights made on the south of it. Major v.
Schrotter, commanding the 1st battalion 4th Regiment, had
endeavoured, with the 1st and 4th Companies, to join the other
half of his battalion, and succeeded in doing so. With the
latter, as we are aware. Colonel Tietzen, commanding the re^-
ment, had for some time been maintaining a desperately^ bloody
contest for the possessiou of the heights between the high-road
and the De la Tour mill, during which the two musketeer
battalions of the 43rd had gradually come up alongside with
the half battalions which were advancing on the north side of the
high-road.* While the 6th and 7th Companies of the latter regi-
ment had first pushed along the high-road up the heights into
the thick of tne struggle, and relieved Colonel v. Tietzen's
exhausted companies, ine 2nd battalion 4th Regiment also ap-
peared immediately to their right. Its commander, Major v.
Conring, had despatched the 7th company to the Qoupillon mill
for the purpose of taking up the connexion with the 4th Company
44th Regiment, and had leit the 6th in reserve behind the valley;
he advanced >vith the 5th and 8th to the right flank of the fore-
most fighting line on the Bellecroix heights. But with these
small forces no progress could be effected against the strong
positions of the enemy between Bellecroix and Vantoux.

In consequence of the necessaiy retreat of the detachments
of the 44th on the Nouilly heights, the troops engaged to the
south of the De la Tour mill were seriousl v threatened in the
right flank. In order to obtain some relief on this side, all the
detachments of the 4th Regiment at hand advanced to the
attack ; the firat, personally led by the commander of the regi-
ment, was the Ist battalion of the 4th, which, on the amval of
Major V. Schrotter, as stated, had been reformed in the Lau-
vallier valley. It was foUowed by the parts of the 2nd battalion
which had just been engaged on the Bellecroix heights, and by
the 6th Company left behind the Lauvallier valley.

• The 6th and 7th Cos. of the 2nd Battalion, the 1st and 4ih Cos. of the 1st
Battalion in rear.

329

Into this second line of attack advanced also the half-battalion
of the 43rd Regiment^* consisting of the 1 st and 4th Companies;
The 4th Company of the 3rd Regiment advancing by Lauvallier
also joined in this movement, which took the general direction
of Mey and Vantoux.

In consequence of the view being impeded by the broken
nature of the ground, </it> attack also resulted in isolated advances,
which were quite ineflFective, owing to the strength of the enemy's
positions. Though losing heavilyt very little progress could be
made, until at length the arrival of the two intact battaUons of
the 3rd Regiment produced a decisive change at this point.

At the nrst rush they ascended the vineyard in front from
the Goupillon side, Nouilly and the environs having just before
fallen into the hands of the 44th. Colonel v. Le^at's two bat-
talions, accompanied by the 6th and 7th Companies of the 4th
Regiment and on his immediate right by detachments of the
44ui, now pressed forward victoriously along the Mey heights,
whilst the repulsed adversary retired upon tnis village and the
copse lying to the eastward of it. Major v. Arntm led the 2nd
battalion 3rd Regiment against this wood, surrounded it with the
5th and 8th Companies n*om the south-west and with the 6th
and 7th from the north-east, and captured it at the first assault.
Upon this the 12th Company of the regiment, and the two com-
panies of the 4th which liad advanced with it, also pressed for-
ward into Mey and occupied it in the darkness which now
prevailed.

The long line of guns south-west of Noisseville had played
an essential part in this decisive struggle on the Mey heights,
especially during the first advance. This line had been mean-
while joined by Major Coester, with the two horse artillery bat-
teries of the corps artillery, Vllth Corps, when his services were
no longer required at the places where his own corps was engaged.
But as the successful attack of the infantry upon the Nouilly
heights and the advance towards Mey shortly rendered the action
of artillery unnecessary at this point, all four horse artillery bat-
teries moved forward as far as the edge of the valley north of
Nouilly, from whence they at the same time prepared the way
for the advance of the fusilier battalion of the 4th Regiment.

This battalion, which had been previously sent to Servigny,
had been acting as escort at that place, and at Poix, to the four
batteries which, on the extreme right flank of the Prussian line
of battle, were engaged in cannonading the hostile artillery on
the heights of Villers rOrme. After our efforts had been con-
fined as yet to holding the hostile artillery to some degree in
check, Lieut.-Colonelv. Pallmenstein received orders at 7.45 p.m.
to advance to the attack. With the 12th Company in front, the
battalion moved off in the direction of the hostile batteries, the
right flank being covered by the 9th Company advancing along

• Soe p. 827.

t Captain Anders, commaudiog the 5th Co. 4th Rogiment, wm killed.

330

the Boiizonville road. When the battaHon came into action,
between Mey and Villcrs rOrnie, in the firat shades of twiUght,
the batteries at the latter phice had already retired, but the
flashing of rifles and the thud of bullets betokened the pre-
sence of hostile infantiy. The battalion opened fire, and con-
tinued it until it was no longer answered on the French side.*

WhilHt the enemy was thus giving way generally (»n the
battle field to the north of the VallicrcH brook and the Nouilly
valley, a reaction had taken place in the situation of the fight
between Lauvalliur and the Goupillon mill.

After a long and bloody struggle against the strong positions
between Bellecroix and Mey, the strength of the troops, whose
foi*mation had been much loosened during the course of the
fight, began to fail. Being already for the most part deprived
of their leaders, the various detachments f gradually dropped
back into the Lauvallier valley on the approach of night, and
commenced to move along the eastern slope to the high road.
Lieut.-General v. Bentheim, who was at this time with the
batteries of the left ^ving, hastened towards the retiring troops,
and by his exhoitations brought them to a stand. After they
had been fomied into two large bodies the General placed him-
self at their head with drawn sword, and again led them fonvard,
drums beating, to the edge of the valley and against the enemy,
who now also began to give way at this point.

Meanwhile perfect darkness had almost set in. Over the
whole of the extensive line of battle from Grigy to the Bouzon-
ville road the hostile army was in full retreat towards Metz
and the Moselle. The long range heavy artillery from the works
of thti fortress, espccjially from Fort St. Julien, now i»pened fire
upon the general advance of the Prussian troops.

On the extreme left flank, Captain Preinitzer with the horse
artillery battery of the Ist Cavalry Division followed up, with
frequent changes of position, the adversaiVs retreat from Qrig5%
as long as the flashes of the enemy's nre-arms pennitted an
approximate estimation of the range.

When the struggle on this wdng ceased at 9 p.m., the troops
in that direction^ were brought back to their former bivouacs.
The 4th Lancers, which had been assembled at Jury, took up the
outpost duties on this side of the fortress.

The appearance of fresh troops on the scene whore the 1st Army
Coi-ps was engaged, ledstilllaterin the eveningto some encountera
with the enemy. Whilst the struggles as yet described — main-
tained, it is true, by all their available strength, and not without
important support from a numerous artillery, — had been entirely

* The battalion lost in this action two company leaders : Capt. ▼. SohulUendorif
was Iciilod and Lieut. Erdinannn wounded.

t These were parts of the 43rd, 4th, 44th, and 8rd Begiments, coniequentlj of all
regiments belonging to both adrauced guard brigades, which, from their being in
the centre of the line of battle of the Ist Army (>>rpe, had not participated either
in the odranco of the right wing upon Mej, or in that of the left towards the northern
side of the poplar arenue from Colombej.

X From the ISth Infantrj Pirision and the 1st Caralrj DiTiston.

331

suBtaiuedby the advanced giiardB, both the other u) fan try brigades
of the corps had uninterruptedly continued their advance.

When the let Brigade, which had Quitted its bivouac near
Courcelles-ChaUBsy at 5.30., arrived at Montov, General v. Gayl
directed the 1st battalion 4l8t Regiment at its head to move upon
Lauvallier, whence a vigorous roar of battle resounded at this
very moment. The General next sent forward both his fusiUer
battalions'*' to Noisseville for the purpose of supporting his
apparently threatened right flank, and took up with the re-
mainder of the brigade a position in reserve near the brewery,
as ordered by General v, Manteuffel. On reaching this place
the last crisis, already described, of the fight in the Lauvallier
valley had taken place. When General v. Bentheim once more
led forward his troops against the enemy, he had, in order to
ensure success, also ordered the advance of the Ist Brigade. As,
however, the co-operation of the latter was no longer wanted, the
2nd battalion 41st Regiment, alone advanced from the brewery
by wajr of Lanvallier, and took up a position to protect the
batteries of the 1st Infantry Division in action on the west side
of the valley.

Meanwhile the 1st Battalion of this regiment, which had
already taken the direction of Lauvallier from Montoy, moved
further along the slopes of the valley. Accompanying at first on
the left rear the advance of Colonel v. Legat upon Mey, the bat-
talion under the personalleadingof Lieut.-Colonel v.HUUessem,
commanding the reeiment, continued this forward movement
through Vantonz on V alli&res, and from thence ascended the ridge
in the direction of the Bouzonville road. The columns of General
Ladmirault retiring along this road were here met with, and a
battery was forthwith brought into action by them to meet the
imexpected flank attack. No further advsmce of the weak
detachments in the immediate neighbourhood of Fort St. Julien
could of course be attempted. After the foremost companies had
maintained a file-fire for some time on the high road by which
the enemy was retiring, the battalion was brought back by way
of Yalliires.

Of the fusiliers sent forward to Noisseville the two companies
of the Crown Prince's Regiment had gradually inclined so far to
the left that they were able to take part in General v. Bentheim's
last advance against the Bellecroix heights. They then advanced
independently, and after crossing the Yallieres orook ascended
the opposite vine-clad slopes, apparently to the westward of the
point previously passed by the battalion of the 41st, which was
now seen to be skirmishing on the riffht flank. In the darkness
which had meanwhile set m, thev stul endeavoured to take at
least a demonstrative part in tnis struggle, by beating drums
and firing vigorously.

Later on both companies united with the detachments of the

* Onlj 6 oompMiiM in all. The 9th and 11th OompanieB of the Grown Prinoe't
(the lit) Regiment had remained in rear to hold Courcelloe-Chauiey.

332

4l6t on the south side of tlie Yallihes valley, where other
isolated blows had been meanwhile dealt against the enemy's
retreat.*

The fusilier battalion 4lRt Regiment had continued in the
direction of Noisseville, originally assigned to it. The 10th
Company passed round the west of the village, crossed the valley
in front, and in the course of the evening reached Villers TOnne.
The other three companies, which had t^iken the road eastward
of the village, occupied the vineyards between Noisseville and
Serviguy, and from thence kept up conimimication with the 4th
Infantry Brigade.

Formed up in the first instance at Chateau Gras and fiom
thence marched on Noisse\a]le, this brigade received instructions
from the commander of the corps at 7 p.m., to send forward
two battalions to Nouilly, and with the rest of the troops to meet,
from Servigny, a threatened flank movement of the enemy.
In accordance with this, both gi*enadier battalions of the 5tii
Regiment first moved round the north of Noisseville upon
Nouilly. As on their airival the crisis at that point had been
already fortunately overcome through the advance of the fresh
companies of the 44 th and the energetic attack of the 3rd
Regiment, the two l)attalions were posted as reserve in the
vineyards to the north-west of Nouilly.

For the purpose of canning out the remainder of his task,
General v. Zglinitzki had ordered both musketeer l)attalions of
the 45th Re^nient to cross the valley in front and the vineyards
in the direction of Semgny. Passing to the westward of this
village, they took the direction of Villers I'Onne, as previously
taken by the fusilier battiilion 4th Regiment; the general fol-
lowed this movement with the two fusilier buttalioiis of the
brigade. Owing to the existing circumstances, however, it
was never carried out, for, as the action ceased at all points at
nightfall, the further advance of the brigade was stopped. The
musketeer battalions remained on the liei^hts of Nouilly and
Villers TOnne, * the fusiliers in a depression of the ground,
somewhat furtlior eastward.

It has been already statgd that the commandor-in-chief of
the Xst Army had no intention of attaoking^ the French within
immediate range of their fortress ; neither, indeed, did the con-
tents of the reports, which rcachtul the head-quarters at Variee
even during the early part of the afternoon, foreshadow a collision
vnth the enemy on the 14th August. But when towards 5 o'clock
further reports from the 1st and VIII tb Army Corps had brought
the intelligence, surprising under the oirouniBtances, ot an im*
pending or already commenced action on the Mets plateau,
Genertd v. Steinmetz moved off towards the Soarlouis road, and
sent oflSoers firom his staff to various points of the battle-field;

• In one of tbeie Captain r. Horn, iSrd Ragimont, wa« killed.

333

ivith orders to break off the action. Aa, however, it was evident
fipom farther reports that the struggle was raging in earnest,
the General now ordered Rex' brigade* likewise to advance
from its position near Varize upon les Etangs. The remainder
of the Vnith Army Corps received orders to move from Bion-
ville to Varize.

Shortly before, a req^uest from General v. Pritzelwitz to sup-
port the 2nd Infantry Division in its stniggle against the French
advance upon Pont k Chaussy, also reached Colonel v. Rex, who
applied to the general commanding his corps, if he might com-
ply with this demand. General v. Goeben was unable to attaoh
any serious importance to an attack undertaken so late in the day,
on the supposition that it was commenced by the enemy. More-
over, he was unwilling to see his Army Corps, which formed the
reserve to the Army, weakened unnecessarily, and he therefore
made the pennission to move forward the 32nd Infantry Brigade
dependent on the concurrence of the commandeNin-chief. The
recently-mentioned order to march on Varize did not reach
General v. Goeben, until nearly 9 o'clock. This officer had
personally convinced himself that the struggle in front of Metz
was at an end, and now very properly doubted the expediency
of holding his corps in readiness for a niffht march ; he reportea,
however, that his troops would be ready at daybreak. Under
the existing circumstances this view of the situation of affairs
could not but meet with the approval of the commander-in-
chief.

Meanwhile Generals v. Steinmetz and v. Manteuffel had met
at the brewery towards 8 p.m.

At this time vigorous fighting was going on at different

{joints, but the issue of the battle could no longer be doubtfal,
or on the slopes of the valley between Colombey and Nouilly
the enemy's Ime was driven back at all points, and was evidently
already in retreat towards Metz. An hour later the struggle
was entirely ended. Only the heavy fortress artilleiy still illu-
mined the darkness of the night with the shell it hurled upon
the Prussians. On the heights at the brewery the band of the
Crown Prince's Grenadier Regiment struck up the '* Heil Dir im
Siefferkranz."

Jwight and the propinquity of the fortress prevented any
further profit being denved from the advantages we had gained.
The possibility was also not excluded of the hostile masses, pre-
sumed to be between and in rear of the forts, again moving
forward with reinforcements at daybreak against the present
&r-advanced positions of the 1st and Vllth Army Corps.

General v. Steinmetz therefore ordered the return of both
Corps to their former positions, but, in consideration for the
wounded and the victorious feeling of the troops, allowed the

* The 82iid Inftatry Brigade, Vlllth Armj Oorpe. The ofcher hrigade of the
10th lafimtTf DiTJnon wm »t that time, m we^ are aware, carryuig out the enter-
;niM against ThionrUle.

334

latter to remain on the captured battle-field for the next few
hours.

The advance of Rex' brigade to los Etangs, commenced in
pursuance of former instructions, had been countei*manded in
consequence of the favourable issue of the battle. On the other
hand, Gciiend v. Steinmetz sent orders in the course of the
night to the 3rd Cavahy Division, which had moved into bivouac
at 8.15 p.m. on the approacli of evening, to return to the field of
battle and cover the removal of the wounded.

The movements of the Ibt Amiy Corps were canned out in
accordance with these orders of tnc commander-in-chief, and,
withcmt neglecting all possible care of the wounded, continued
far into the night. The corps subsequently resinned its former
outpost position.

The general connnanding the Vllth Army Coi'ps had, mean-
while, given indimendent ordei-s that, **in oraer not to allow any
'* wounded to fall into the enemy's hands, and to maintain the
" honour of having held the battle-field," the corps was to
bivouac, firelock in hand, on the severely contested ground, and
not return until daybreak to its former positions. As the com-
mander-in-chief's iustructions were not received until late at
night, the orders which had been isHued remained valid.

The line of outposts of the coi'ps extended close in fi'ont of
the fortress from urigy past Borny wood, then along the oft-
mentioiKMl ])()plar avcmie of Colonibey to the Saarbriicken road.
On the right wing, which HtretrluMl as far as the Saarlouis high-
road, two coinpanios of the 7th Pioneer Battalion had under-
taken the ()uti)OHt duties.*

The battle of Colombey-Nonilly had entailed heavy losses on
both sides, especially on that of the attacking troops. They
amoimted on tne pail of the Prussians to close upon 5,000 men,
including 222 officers.f

* Tlie 2nd and 3rtl. Thc^' had been plnceil from the commencement of the actiou
nt the disposal of the coninmnder of tlic 13th Kcginient.
t The lu88 is dibtrlbutc<l among the brigadee as follows :

1st Inf. Bngude 02 men.

o 1 1 r'79 fTlie two advanced guard brigades

Qi " o«9 " S of the corps i the last was 7

"^^^ " "^^^ »' I battns. strong.

4th .. 10

1st Army Corps-

n *^ i»

nth liifv Divn i ^'^^^ " '^^ " ^ battns. strong.

lJthInt).l)nn.j^,.j,^ „ 1,087 „ 7 „

281 h „ 128 „ The other brigade of the 14th

Division whs not engaged.
18th Infy. Divii. 35th „ 35 „

The Artille'ry lost a total of 122 nu-n.
The loss of the cavah'v was verj slight.
Compare ulso Appendix p. 113 et seq.

A eompirison with the two previous bnttUvs r^hows tliat in these latter the foHow-
\\\'^ iufniitry bri«^iidos siiiiYered losses (!<fecding 1,000 men.

At Worth : LSth Infy. Bri^rmlc - 1,177 ( 7th and 47th Regts.)

19th „ . 1,023 ( 6th „ 46th „ )

20th „ . I,<i25 {;.\h{\\ „ 5()th „ )

At Spi..)uMvn: 27th „ - l.nVJl^JSMh „ 7Mh „ )

335

The French loss is giveu according to their returns as
follows : —

Killed - 42 officers - 335 men.

Wounded - 157 „ - 2,484 „

Missing - 1 „ - 589 „

200 officers. 3,408 men.

Of these, 140 officerK and 2,702 men, or by far tlie greatest
part, belonged to the 3rd Corps, the commander of which,
General Decaen, succumbed a few days later to a severe wound
received in the battle. Marshal Bazaine, the commander-in-
chief, had received a severe contusion.*

Concluding Observations.

The battle of Colombey-Nouilly may be cliaracterised in itd
origin and course as an improvised attack entered into from a
correct appreciation of the cncumstances, but which at the same
time, as regards the higher object, carried with it certain dis-
advantages.

The successes at Weissenburg, Worth, and Spicheren which
were known to the troops, and which were even in part gained
W them, had inspired gi-eat hopes of victory throughout the
Geiman army. During tlie advance from the Saar to the Moselle, I
places were constantly passed where the enemy had Avithout any
attempt at resistance abandoned positions, which had evidently
been prepared for defence. This continuous retreat without
halting or resistance could not but engender a feeling of gi*eat
superiority in the German army, and awaken the desire to bring
the apparently panio*stricken foe once more to bay. To this may
be aaded an important motive in the case of the Ist Army,
namely, the natural wish to lighten the work of the Ilnd Annv,
which, as was well known, would after crossing the middle
Moselle have to oppose the further retreat of the adversary. But
at that time the greater part of the Ilnd Anny was still on this
side of the river ; in order, therefore, to gain the necessaiy time i^^
for the accompUshment of this task, it was necessary to detain
the enemy at Metz, in order to delay as much as possible his
projected movement westward.

When, therefore, on tho afternoon of tlie 14th August, there
were evident tokens that the French were desirous of retiring
over the Moselle, a certain feeling of excitement took possession
of the troops which had advanced beyond the Nied. Kegarding,
in all probability, the first movements of the neighbouring corps
as the commencement of an action, the one was anxious as soon

* From llanbal Bazaino*s work, " L*ArTn6o du Kliin, dcpuis le 12 Aotit jiisqu'nu
29 Octobre, 1870."

F 2

386

as possible to come to the help of the other, and thus the same
idea is expressed in the reports of Generals Manteuffel and y. d.
Goltz — each wishes to move forward becanse he believes the
other is about to attack.

That so active a feeling of comradeship, such rapidity of
resolution, bears with it the germ of great successes, has a^ain
been proved by the results of the battle of Colombey-NouiUy.
But at the same time the fact must not be ignored that the form
of the improvised attack is not unattended witli danger, and
in this respect also a profitable lesion may be learnt from the
14th August.

From the skirmish, which was commenced on the Prussian
side for the sole purpose of a reconnaissance in foi*ce, there kindled
a hot and bloody struggle, in which by degrees nearly two army
corps became engaged, without their becoming really subject to
one common control. Even within the two anny corps many
difficulties prevented unity of command, because the first attacks
of the comparatively weak vanguards upon the enemy's strong
poHitions occasioned repeated criHos in the contest. In conse-

Siienco of this tljo troops which followed had to be j)U8hed up as
ley arrived by detachments to feed the struggle in the fore-
most line, so that the higher commanders found themselves
unable for a considerable time to collect bodies of infantry for a
decisive blow.

If tlie mode of advance on the Prussian side was a natural
consequence of the existing circumstances, it is difficult to
understand why the French did not at once meet the isolated
firat attempts of the Prussians witli greater energy. The retreat
over the Moselle had, it is true, already C(»ninienced on the wings
of the French army, but in the centre, the very point upon
which General v. d. Goltz directed tlie firat attack, stood the 3rd
Corps ready for battle, and at this time entirely assembled in
the positions so well calculated to rei)el it. Close in rear was the
Guard as an intact reserve. For the protection and unmolested
execution of the retreat, a firm occupation of the Colombey
position with strong rear guards would have been desirable
under all circumstances. But the most important points of
passage, Colombey, La Planchette, Lauvalher, Nouilly, were
captured by the Prussian vanguards at the firet rush, and were
maintained for a long time by them Avithout any support.

The isolated attacks made by the French with a view to re-
capturing the lost powts only led to minor results. Colombey,
La Planchette, and Lauvallier never, and Nouilly only for a time,
again fell into the possession of the French.

A very special peculiarity of the action in fi-ont of Metz was,
however, also due to the foct that it commenced at an hour
when battles are in many cases already decided. Hence it was
that, on the Geniian side, by no means all the forces were able
to participate in the action, which, as regards the time and space,
might otherwise have been available.

337

The two advanced guards of the let Army Corps had the
double duty of supporting the frontal attack of the Vllth Corps
and of keeping at arm's lengtli the attack of the enemy's
superior force on their own rigiit flank. Only the artillery of
the main body of the 1st Army Coips was fully employed, and
upon the 13th Division of the Vllth Corps fell on this occasion
the brunt of the struggle, which was mainly contested by five
Prussian Brigades agamst five French Divisions.*

The French position would have been most threatened had
the 18th Infantry Division coming from the south been able
to reach the battle-field in considerable force, which was how-
ever not possible owing to the late hour of the day. Yet the
effect produced by the appearance of its vanguai-de on the right
flank of the French line of battle must not be under-estunated.

At the close of day the victorious assailant had made eood
his hold on the western edge of the Colombey valley and on
the Mey heights. It is tnie that the enemy still maintained
the centre of his main position on the Boniy and Bellecroix
heights, which he only abandoned during the nieht— no doubt
on account of the general situation and the outflanking move-o
ment threatening from Mey and Origy, but in other respects oi
his own free wiU and unmolested, This circumstance appears
to have induced Marshal Bazaine in his account of the battle to
dedare himself unconquered, and also called forth the Emperor
Napoleon's congratulations, ** Yous avez rompu le charme.

The doubtful value of this success becomes clear, however,
when it is considered that on the Prussian side a further advance
was neither contemplated nor on the whole possible. With a
large fortress immediately supporting them, the French had, how-
ever lost all the ground winch lay beybnd the range of the
forts ; the relinquieSment, on their own judgment, of the battle-
field tDithin range could not evidently be contested with them.

The true importance of the success gained on the ri^ht bank
of the Moselle would now become manifest on the left. This view,
which to a certain extent had led instinctivelv to the battle, was
at once grasped with complete certainty at the headquarters of
His Majesty at Hemy, as is clearly expressed in the directions
of the 15th August ; — *' The circumstances under which the 1st
•* and Vllth Aimy Corps, as well as parts of the 18th Infantrv
** Division, gained a victory yesterday evening debarred all
** pursuit. The fruits of the victory can only be gathered by a
" vigorous offensive on the part of the Ilnd Army towards the
** roads from Metz to Yerdun."

In point of fistot the battle of Colombey-NouiUy had so delayed
the retreat of the adversary on Yerdun that it was possible to

• The Ind, Sid, MK 26ih, 28eh Pnistian Brigades againit the 4 DivinoiM of
the 8rd Frenoh Gorpe eiioi Grenier'i DiTiiion of the 4th.

338

bring that movement entirely to a stand by the Itattle of
Vionville-Mars la Tour, and afterwards to advance from the
westward to make the enveloping and decisive attack in the
battle of Gravelotte-St. Privat. Thus the events of the 14th
August form the first link in the series of great conflicts round
Metz, which primarily led to the investment, and ultimately to
the capitulation, of ^e main French Army.

:^3';»

The Operations of the Tst and IInd Army on the ir)Tn and

l()Tn Auoust up to the Battle of

ViONVlLLE — ILVRS LA ToUR.

The 15tii August.

The preceding narrative has shown that tlie proceccUngfl of
the French after the battle of Spich-.'ron had at first given rise
to the supposition that there wouM be no further engagement
of any importance on this side of thy Moselle, but that from the
viore recent reports of the German cavalry, a change in the ad-
veraaiy's intentions had become clearly manifest. Consequontly
since the 12th August, the possibility of moetuig with the bulk
of the French army on the right bank of the Moselle was never
lost sight of in any of tlio aiTangemont« emanating from the
headquarters of H.M. the King, and hence the army order of the
14th August, 6 p.m., prescribed the following movements for
the next day : —

On the right wing of the IInd Army, the Ilird, IXtli, and
Xllth Armv Corps were merely to close up their columns and
to cook betimes ; the IInd was to continue its forward movement.
The first line of the 1st Army, the 1st and VII th Army Corps,
was also to reUvin its present position ; the Vlllth, however, was
to draw forward to Bazoncoiut,* as a prelude to the projected
movement of this army to the left, and to a closer connection
with the right flank of the neighbouring anny. With a view to
shedding light upon the adversary's movements, instructions
were given to the IInd Army to send forward the entire force
of cavalry available on the left bank of the Moselle against the
enemy's communications between Metz and Verdun, supporting
it in the directions of Gorze and Tliiaucourt by tliose Corps
which should first pass the river. For tliis purpose the Ilird
Corps was also to make preparations on the 15th for throwing
a bridge below Pont h Mousson.

When repoi-ts now came in during the night that a battle had
taken place to the eastward of Metz, those general arrange-
ments were supplemented by additional orders. The followmg
telegram was despatched frcmi the royal headquartoi-s at llerny
to the commander-in-chief of the 1st Army towards morning of
the 15th August:

** His Majesty commands the 1st Army to maintain this day
the ground won in yesterday's battle, so far as it docs not
lie within effective range of the guns of the fortress. The
Vlllth Corps is to be brought forward at once in support of

* Wiih the exception of the troo|)s sent against Thionrille. Tlio intention of
BurpriBing this fortroM bj a coup de main hod been reported to the ro} al head-
quMrters.

A 2

340

the let and Vllth Corps. Ilio IXth Corps, which has
alrtady taken part yesterday, will move up close to the field of
battle.

(Signed) V. MoLTKE."

In aceordance with these instrnetions, General v. Steinmelz*
fortliwith advanced the Ist and Vllth Army Corps once more to
the field of battle, whilHt the Vlllth was to be drawn forward
into the rip:ice between the high roads from Saarlouis and Saar-
briicken. The Ist and 3rd (^avahy Divisions received orders to
take np positions on the flanks of the two Corps in fii'st line and
to pnsh lonvard their outer wings in the direction of lletz.

On the morning of the loth August, while these ordei-s were
• in process of execution, the King moved with his staff from
Herny to the battle-field. Lieut. General v. Podbielski, Quarter-
master General, who had personally preceded him, came very
speedily to the conclusion that there could be no longer any large
force of the enemy to the eastward of Metz. As under these cir-
cumstiUUM'S it was ot importance that the Ist Army should also
be passed to the k^ft bank of the Moselle without loss of time,
the general sent ad interim instructicms to the Vlllth Anny
Coii)s, to direct its march upon Oniy. After His llajesty the
King had personally convinced himself of the correctness of this
view, provisional onhjrs were also sent to the Ist and Vllth Army
Corps to suspend their march to the battle-field. Between 10
and 11 o'clock in the forenoon, the King met General v, Stein-
metz, who was visiting with his staft'the front of the Ist Army,
on tlic heights to the east of Flanville. Away beycmd lletz
were seen rising at nuiny points h)ng clouds of dust, which ap-
peared to indicate the retreat of the French westward.

In consequence of the change in the aspect of afiairs, and on
being informed of the instructions already issiied to his three
Army Corps, the commander-in-chief of the Ist Anny ordered the
Coips to take up a position in the course of the day between
Courcelles Chaussy and Orny, the two (yavalry Divisions
observing Metz fmni Avancy and Veniv.t

Thus the following movements of the Ist Anny took place
during Xh^ day : —

On the extreme right wing, the 3rd Cavalry Division, in com-
pliaiu^e with orders received duvinfr the night.J moved forward
to the neighbourhood of St. Barbe and ('bateau Gras, its patrols
r<*co?moitriiig up to Fort St. .Fnlien. After thoroughly searching
the battle-field in company wilh the 10th Dragoons and bring-
ing the wounded to a place of si^curity, the Division returned
at y a.m. into bivouac near Vry ; the 7th Lancers remahied at
Avancy and Vigy. Tlie line oi outposts thrown out by the

* Army ohLt, Varize, 15tli Auguttt, 7 a.m.

t Tlio nriiiy oixlor for the Iitt Anny. iMue<l on the heights of FlanTille in the
forenoon of the loth August, sent the Ist Conn to Couruellee Chauasy, the Vllth
between Fange and Courcelles Station, the Ylllth to Orny.

X &ce p. 334.

JDiTinon towiurcUi the fortreBB rested its flank on the Moselle
at llalroy, and xaa in a south-easterly direction as fiir as
Seryigny. • -

The 1st Army Corps, as we are avaie, had in the coarse of
ihe night reoccupied the pontions held previously to the battle.
Both regiments of cayalry returned before daylight to the
battle-fidd, the patrols of the Ist ' Dragoons pushing forward on
this occasion beyond Belleeroix, without even meeting with
hostile ou^KMts. When the army order £>r a general advance
to the battle-field was received on the morning of the 15th, the
1st Infantry Brinde was at once sent off as advanced guard to
tfaison Isol^ The remainder of the troops had not yet left
their bivouacs when the royal orders, already referred to, arrived,
causing a temporary suspension of their movements. The Ist
Infimtry Division at Gouroelles Chaussy once more brought
forward its advanced guard fitxm ICaison Isol^ to Pont 4
Chaussy. The 2nd In&ntry Division remained meanwhile at
Les Etangs and Glattigny, bot in consequence of the order issued
firom the Flanville heights by General v. Steinmetz, moved like-
wise to Courcelles Chaussy in the afternoon. A squadron of the
lOth Dragoons continued in observation towards NoissevUle ; the
outposts of the 1st Infantry Division were on both sides of the
Saarbriicken road, between Yaudreville and Maizeiy.
. The Tilth Army Coros remained during the night on the field
of battie ; Qeneral v. manteufiel had promised his support in
the event of a tceah engagement At daybreak a position for
battle was first taken up east of the Colombey brook, between
La Planchette and Ars Laquenexy. In consequence, however, of
the order issued on the previous evening by General v. Steinmetz,
the troops subsequentiy reoccupied the general positions held
before the battie : the 13th Infantry Division at I^AQg^ with an
advanced guard at Laquenexy ; the 14th Infantry Division at
Doinangeville*'^ and Courcelles sur Nied; the corps artillery at
Basoncourt ; the outposts in their old position. The cavalry
patrols pushed forward towards the fortress also corroboiuted
the complete retreat of the adversary. An officer's patrol belong-
ing to the 8th Hussars reached the homestead of I^s Bordes * at
6.80 a.m., which it found in the occupation of French infiuLtry ;
there was nothing to be seen elsewhere of the enemy. Another
patxol of the 15 th Hussars brought in seven prisoners firom the
vicinity of Fori Queuleu.

The commander-in-chiefs order to move forward to the batUe-
field was not carried into effect by the Vlltb corps, as the move-
ment was countermanded firom the royal headquarters before it
was commenced. The subsequent order firom the commander-in-
chief also entailed no change in the position of the corps.

The Ylllth Army Corps had moved off on the morning of
the 15 th in a westerly direction with a view to occupying the

• HftU-wfty between Bdleeioiz and Mats.

342

C*tion preflcribed by the eommaader-iii-chief between the roftds
ing from SaarlouiB and Saarbrueken to Metz. When the
heads of the columns* readied Les Eiangs and Pont k-Cbaawsf,
they were met by the more recent instmctions ordering the
Corps to the neighboarbood of Omy. They now stmdt off to
the left and continaed the movement by CoUigny and Ooor-
oelles Bor Nied. Being detained by the columns of the IXth
Army Corps marching towards Peltre from the southward, the
troops did not reach their appointed destinations until late in
the afternoon. The 15th Infantry Divinon occupied quarters in
the districts of lidhon, Buchy, and Basse Beuz. The 82nd
Infaotiy Brigade* bivouacked further to the north on the
8trassbuig high road, occupying the villages of Chesny and
Frontigny. (Sroeral ▼. Goeben had his headquarters in Ch^risey.

The 1st Cavalry Division, which received at 9.80 a.nL the
order first issued by the commander-in-chief to advance to the
battle-field on the left of the Vllth Army Corps, moved off
from Pontoy in compliance therewith and readied the neldibour-
hood of Ifarsilly viA Ars Laquenezy. It there met with the
outposts of the VUth Corps, and at the ssme time heard
of the suspension of the advance of the 1st Army by order
of His Majesty the King. A squadron, thrown out in the direc-
tion of Mete, sent forward its patrols dose up to the works of the
fortress. Beports firom the uLih Army Corps and from the 6th
Cavalry Division corroborated the enemy's retreat; they also
brought the news that the troops of the Ilird Army Corps ^ere
on the point of crossing the Moselle, where they were nbortiy
to be joined by the 6th Cavalry Division.

As General v. Hsrtmann received no further orders,! he
bivouacked with his Division that evening to the west of Cour-
oelles sur Nied, in rear of the outposts of the Vllth Army
Corps.

General v. Steinmetz had shifted his headquarters to Bason-
court in the afternoon. The line of outposts of the Ist Army
ran from Malroy on the Moselle past Senagny and Marsiily to
Jury.

The commander-in-diief of the Ilnd Army had proceeded to
Pont k Mousson on the Uih August, and, bdbre receiving intel-
ligence of the events occurring to the east of Metz, had made the
following arrangements for the 15 th : —

The IlLrd and Xllth Army Corps were to advance to the
Soille, the former to Cheminot^ the latter to Nom^y; the
IXth Corps was to rest in its positions after the four recent
severe marches. The Xth Corps received instructions to throw

* The other brigade of the 16th Infantxy BiTiiion wu engaged in the ezpeditioa
to Diedenhofen.

t The order to more to Veray did not reach the Dmiion, and the oflloect at/A
frcm the latter to anny headqnarteta were nnahle at fint to find them.

313

forward strong dctachraonts northward from Pont a Mousson
into the valley of the Moselle and along tlio plateau lying to
the westward. The Giuud Corps was ordered to eloso up its
columns at Dieulouard ; the IVth Araiy Corps was to move
to the Moselle at Cu.stinos, and oe(ni[)y Marbache on the left
bank with its advanced guard.

The first definite intellii:i;i'nce about the battle was contained
in the following telegram from the royal h(5adf(uarterH, which
reached Pont k Mousson on the morning of the 15th : —

** Ist and Vllth Coi'ps, after a severe struggle, drove back
a strong force of the enemy upon Metz yesterday evening.
Troops of the 18th Division have also talcen part. IXtli
Corps will this day draw forward close to tlio battle-field.
The disposition of the Ilird Corps, for the time being, is
reserved. Pursuit along the Metz-Verdun road important.

(Sd.) V. MOLTKE."

This intelligence caused some changes in the prescribed ar-
rangements. At 7 a.m. General v. Voigts llhetz received orders
to send forward the 5th Cavalry Division to the left bank of the
Moaelle in the direction of the Metz- Verdun road and thence
towards Metz, with a view to finding out whether the enemy's
forces had already retired from tlie fortress, or whether they were
still engaged in doing so. Barby's and Redern's brigades were
to be employed in first Ihie, and accompanied by horse artillery
were to advance with all possible speed in the prescribed direc-
tion, until they obtained clear information of the enemy's inten-
tions. They were at the same time to open up communication
towards the north with the cavalry of the Ist Army.*

Both Infantrv Divisions of the Xth Corps, in accordance with
the original order, were to be pushed forward in the valley of
the Moselle and towards tlie north-west, so as to act in support
of the cavalry. The brigade of dragoons of the Guard received
instructions to move forward from Rogeville to Thiaucourt, and
there to place itself at the disposal of the general commanding
the Xth Corps.

The Ilird Army Corps received orders to discontinue its march
to Cheminot, and to halt and cook in its present position. This
order crossed a report from the corps commander, General v.
Alvensleben, in which this officer gave notice of his intention to
pass the Moselle that day, the 15tTi, as after the engagement of
the preceding day no further attac^lc on the part of tlie advoi'sary
uoeu be apprehended on the right bank of the Moselle, and that
consequently a rapid advance on the left bank was of the highest

* The royal hendqunrters, as wo are aivarc, had previnu^I j BUfrgcfltod a forward
niOToment of this cavalry ovor tlio Moscllo below Alctz. Tho order Usiicd from
Ucrny in the eroning of the 14th, also pointed out tliat tho 3rd Cavalry Division
wai not to be limited in its forward movcniont by any other instructions. On
page 298 are given, however, tho reosjus which caused tho undertaking to be
abandoned.

importance. But as the disposition over the Ilird Corps had
been expressly retained by the royal headquartei's, the com-
mander-in-chief of the Ilud Anny, in order to avoid any misap-
prehenbion, repeated the above-mentioned order. It met the
corps just us the advance of the 5th Infantry Division had reached
the iSeille at Pomnierieux, and that of the tith had passed beyond
Cheminot as far as Bonxieres sous Fruidraont. They bivouacked
for the time being at these places.

Meanwhile the following telegium was despatched at 11 a.m.
from the Flanville heights to tlui commander-in-chief of the
Ilnd Anny : —

•' French completely thrown back into ^Ictz, and probably
by this time in full retreat to Verdmi, All three Corps of the
right icing (Ilird, IX th, and Xllth) are note placed at the free
disposal of tite army commander-in-clutif. The Xllth is already
on the march to Nomcny.

(Sd.) V. MoLTKE."

In consequence of this telegi'am, the Illrd Army Coras received
instructions to continue its advance to tlie Moselle ; both Divi-
sions resumed their march at 5 p.m., the greater part without
having finished their cooking. I'iie 5th Infantry Division crossed
at the bridge near Noveant, wliich had been left intact by the
French, and at midnight settled down to a short rest in bivouacs.
Detachments, each consisting of a battalion and a sauadroD,
were pushed forward to Domot and Gorze respectively. The 6th
Infantiy Division effected its passage higher up at Champev.
As from the high level of the water the light Heid bridge tram
was only suiHcient for one foot-bridge, the artillery, the greater
part of the 2nd Dragoons, and all the waggons were sent by way
of Pont k Mousson. After a very toilsome march these latter
troops did not move into bivouac at Pagny and Amaville until
nearly one o*clock in the morning.

The IXth Army (yorjm, in pursuance (»f direct orders from the
royal lica(l(|iiJirti'rjs, had moved forward as far as the neighbotir-
ho«>d of IVltre on the iiiornin^- of the l.")th, and remained there
ready for acti<»»i until the afluruoou, when it occupied quartera
in the nei;^lil>ourlioo<l of V'crny.

The Xllth ArJiiy Corps had at firHt been posted between
iSologne and Dclnic, in order, if necessary, to serve as a support to
the IXth. ^Vhen the situation of aftairs had become more clear,
the greater part of the fornur corps was drawn forward to the
Seille at Nouicny, and the 24th Division alone left at Moncheux
and Achatel.

The Ilnd Army Corps reached the neighbourhood of Han sur
Nied.

During this gi-aducil advance of the right wing of the Ilnd
Anny, tlur Gtli Cavalry Division ccnitinued to watcli Metz, mak-
ing incnr.sinns, in iloini;' so, al(»n^- both banks of the Seille up to
the suhnrliy of the fortre«« ; it Uiaintained connecliun with the
liesifian cavalry brigade to the eastward.

315

During the early raomiiig Major v. Hesberg with three squad-
rons ot the Gth CuiraBsi(3rK and two guns had advanced along
the right bank of the Soillo beyond le iSablon, without encounter-
ing the enemy. His traces, however, were to be seen every-
where : half-finished entrenchments and abandoned camping
places. A few isolated stragglers were alone captured ; the in-
nabitants of the vilhiges fired repeatedly upon the troops. To
the west of the httle river Colonel Count v. d. Grobcn with two
squadrons of the 3rd Lancers, a sc^uadron of the Gth Cuirassiers,
and two guns, reached Chateau Krescaty and sent forward ad-
vanced parties to Montigny. This suburb of Metz was fouud
unoccupied; near it were seen numerous abandoned camping
places, entrenchments as yet incomplete, and considerable stores
of provisions at the railway station.* Everything here likewise
confirmed the belief that the adversary had entirelv evacuated
the country to the east of the Moselle. Owing to the thick fog
the outlines of the advanced forts could barely be distinguished,
and hence it could not be aRcert4iined for certain whether these
works were aimed or not. On the other hand, a camp, apparently
plunged in the deep slumber of the morning, was visible on
the west bank of the Moselle, between Mouhns les Metz and
Longeville les Metz. Colonel Count v. d. Groben, who was
with his main body at Bradin Farm, unlimbered the two
guns on the gently sloping side of the valley and threw a
few shells into the camp, causing thereby evident coiifusion.t
The French brought a battery into position; the guns
from Fort St. Quentin also opened fire, without, however,
reaching the Prussian guns and chivalry. Colonel Count
V. d. Groben hereupon retired for the purpose of rejoining his
Division. The latter, by order of the connnander of the Ilird
Army Corps, quitted its position at noon to follow this corps
over the Moselle. But on reaching Pommerieux on the Seille,
it received instructicms to halt, and in accordance with a subse-
quent order moved into bivouac in the neighbourhood of Coin
Bur Seille.

Two squadrons of the 3rd Lancers had remained on outpost
duty in the direction of Metz between the lower Seille and the
]\loselle. Their patrols, which reconnoitred without hindrance
as far as Montignj and oj»poMtc Moulin les Metz, had several
other opportunities during the day of observing movements of
the enemy's forces on the left bank of the Moselle in a westerly
and south-westerly direction.

Lively encounters with the enemy took place on the left bank
of the Moselle.

Before the commander-in-chief's order J \vas received, General

* The cavalry rippod up the sacks of salt and rice 'n ith their lances and sabres,
and (lestrovcd tiio coutcnt:», so fur ad was pos^sible in the hurry of tlie moment.

t According to the Frencli ro))ort!« the lirst of thetH) sholls |)lunged into a tent,
killing and wounding sererul French ofllrers. The Inq)crial heudq^uortcrs were also
at the camp, and were now shifted further to the rcai*.

i Hoe p. 342.

316

V. VoigtH llliutz, 111 perfect agrcernunt with its general teiio.
had made the following arruuijements for the 15th August : —

In order to meet a hostile ollensive movement, which was firs
expected, the IDth Infantry Diviwion had been fonned up sinei
4 a.m. for the defence of the hastily fortified position on the left
hank of the Moselle near Pont a Mousson. The 20th lufonti*}
Division was in suppoi-t at, and to the east of, the town.

As no enemy appeared, the 38th Infantry Brig-ade was pushed
fvirward from the point of junction of tlie Flirey and Thiaucouil
roads as far as the latter town, in support of the 5th Cavalry
Division. The detachment, which was at Vandiijres undoi
Colonel V. Lyncker,* marched down the valley of the Aloselk
to Noveant. Major v. Studnitz with two divisions of the 9th
Dragoons pushed forward beyond this village to Vaux, and from
that point watched the march, during the afteniooii, of hostile
columns past Moulin les Mctz along the Verdun road.

The remahider of the li)th inliintry Division and the horse
artillery batteries of the (Jorps followed the 38th Brigade to
'J'hiaucourt ; the 20th Infantry Division and the field batteries
of the corps aiiillery remained at Pont k Mousson. A sccoud
bridge had been thrown over the Ikloselle at Atton.

I'he 5th Cavalry Division was to advance at iii*st to Fresnes
en Woe'vrc!, and then t<) wards Metz until it was able to observe
the enemy's movements ; at the same time it was to open com-
iiiunication with the cavalry of the 1st Army expected from the
northward.

General v. Rheinbaben had in consequence ordered Kedern's
brigade to advance six miles northward from Beney as far as
Lachaussee, to rei^onnoitre in strong detachments from that point
towards the iletz-Verdun road, and harass any movement which
might take place along it; one reg-iuieiit of the brigade was to
remain at Beney. Barby's brigade received orders at Thiau-
court to dispatch the 4th Cuirassiers to Dommartin,t for the
purpose of acting as support and of covering the flank of the
projected enterprise. Bredow's brigade, which had reached
Pont a Mousson on the 14th4 ^vas brought up to Thiaucouil;
in order to reliev(3 Barl)y'8 brigade at that point, and on its
own part to mam tain the communication with the cavalry of the
Guard.

General v. Kedern left three squadrons of the 10th Hussars§
in rear at Beney, and moved otl' in tlie prescribed direction at
4 a.m., with his remaining six squadrons|| and the battery of
horse artillery. The fog was so thick that they coidd scarcely
see 200 paces in fi'ont of them. From Lachaussee a squadron
of the 17th Hussars was sent to Latcmr en Woevre, and one

• See p. 300.

t 2i miles S.E. of Lacluais-gc.

I See p. 301.

§ The l&t squndron bad been sent to Naiiey. Sec p. 292.

II The 17th iluBsars aud two equudrons oJ: the 11th Uussors. The other two
squadrons of this regiment were at Buxieres under Capt. v. Vaerst. Bee p 801.

347

of the 11th HiisBavs viil Sponville to Mars la Tour, witli a vievr
to unveiling the proceedingR along the great road to Verdun.
Both squadrons reported tliat there was no enemy to be seen.
As, however, at this very nioment, luilf-past 8 in the moniin.Q:,
shots fell from the noi-th-east, the four squadrons* still avail-
able advaneed in this direction. According to the reports
which met them, large bodies of cavalry were in movement.
On reaching the neighbourhood of Xouville, two cavalry regi-
ments were, in point of fact, seen advancing on the Puxieux
lieights. Tlie bfittery now c;uue into action to the north-east of
Xonville, and by its lire caused the hostile (Rivalry to retire in a
nortlierly direction ; General v. Redern followed at a trot as far
as the Puxieux lieights. From this point several hostile regi-
ments of cavalry were descried in the lower ground south of
Mars la Tom* ; some of them were formed up in line, another was
moving in a narrow column, with its rear turned towards the
Prussian cavalry. About 800 paces south of Mars la Tour were
two batterics.t

Captain Schinner again utilimbered and opened fire upon the
last-mentioned regiment, which then disappeared at an ac-
celerated pace behind Mars la Tour. The French batteries on
their side engaged in a cannonndo with tlie Prussian, maintain-
ing it for an hour, and suffering no inconsiderable losses. As
any further continuance of the lire against tlie more, numerous
artillery of the Frojieli gave no proiuisc of sn<rcesH, (Jenend v.
Redern withdrew his men about 1,;300 paces, under cover of a
swell of the ground. The enemy merely followed up this move-
ment with a few shell, and shortly after sent one of his batteries
away in the direction of Metz.

Meanwhile some more l^-ussian squadrons had arrived. The
two squadrons of hussare under Oaptain v. Vaeratf had resumed
their reconnaissances towards Metz during the early morning, and
while so engag(jd came into collision with four hostile regiments of
cavahy and two batteries to the east of Rezonville. Bringing hi
nine French dragoons as prisoners, they then withdrew viftVion-
ville and TronvilIe§ to Chanibley. They here met with a squadron
of the 4th Cuirassiers, which had been sent forward from Dom-
martin to recoiuioitre. The three S([uadrons continued to watch
the enemy, who liad followed them, until he was compelled by
the previously described approach of Redern's brigade to retire
iq^on Mars la Tour. The remainder of the, 4th Cuirassiers had
moved off on receiving intelUgence of the state of affairs at
Dommartin, and reached I*uxieux just as the cannonade had
ceased on the Prussian side. About the same time, at 11 a.m.)

* Three of the 17th, and one of the 11th Ilussan.

t Accoi-ding to the reports of Redoru's brignde there wore apporontly three bat-
teries. The !b>enclL narrative of the events, howevtT, sajs diBtinctly, '* Gheneral
" Korton cunie up with Grauionl's brigade and two batteries."

} See noto on p. 346.

§ Both villa .^ea were cleared out of furago en pastauL

348

the three squadrons of the 10th Hussars also arrived, having
been called up from tlieii* position at Bcney by the souud of
artillery.

General v. Rodem, who now had eleven squadrons of his
brigade at disposal, and was covered on the right by the
cuir<i88iei*s at Puxieux, determined to advance west of Maria-
ville Farm towards the high road so as to intercept the enemy's
retreat westward. I'he scouts of the lOth Hussars, leading the
advance, came under a brisk fire on the heights in front of
Mars la Tour from two hobtile squadrons, which had formed up
to the south-west of the village, the regiments previously
observed having taken up a position at its eastern issue.

It was half- past one o'clock in the afternoon. The battery of
horse artillery once more unlimbered for the purpose of pre-
paring the attack; but the commander of the Division, who
uad just come up, forbade any further advance, as in his opinion
such a step, in the evident supii^riority of the enemy, held out no
prospect of success.

Meanwhile the other two regiments of Barby's brigade, like-
wise summojied by the sound of artilleiy, collected at Puxieux.
A shoi*t time after, Bredow's brigade also arrived at Xonville, so
that after 2 p.m. thirty-four Prussian squadrons* and two horse
artillery batteries were available in the neighbourhood south of
Mai's la Tour.

The euemy,t however, now retired to the vicinity of Vionville,
The Pioissian cavalry went into bivouac : Kederu's brigade at
Xonville, Barby's brigade at Puxieux. Bredow's brigade at
Siizemont, west of, and fronting, Mai*s la Tour, on both sides
of the high road.

With a view to opening up communication with the cavalry
of the 1st Army, a squadron of the 16th Lancers was detached
from Bredow's brigade in a northerly direction, during the course
of the afternoon. At Jarnyt it came across a hostile battalion
and a strong detachment of Du Barails Cavalry Division, which
had been pushed forward as early as the 14th along the northern

• The 5th Cavuli*}' Division was coiiipU'tc with the exception of the (Miiui(li*un of
tho lOtU Uu^isars sent to Naiicv, and u Mjiuulron of tho I3th i)rngooD>, wliich woa
keeping up conimunicutions with the ciivalrj of the <Ju2ird bj way of Flirej.

t A bur\ej of the inorenients of the French unny since the 14th AugUbt will pre-
cede tho dtseription of tlio buttle of Vionville -Mum la Tour. Tlie following
remarka, derived from French tioureos, will serve to throw light upon the proceed*
ings here described : —

The Urd Keserve Cavalry Division (Forton) with two batteries of horse artillery
had received ordera on the morning uf the l&th to reconnoitre the roud past Mars la
Tour, uix)n which, as early as tlic piwious daj , Prussian luissnrs had ridden close up
to Metz. G-eneiul Forton fell in wiih the sipiadrons under Captain y. Vacrst at
Rezonville, and ordered tlie brigade of dnigoons, under Prince Alurat, to follow theui
up past TiHinvilio to Puxiuuz. Coming under 111*0 of Schirmer's Pru9»ian IniMery,
Murat's brigade turned oil to ^Fars la Tour, where it joined tho rest of tho Division.
Tlie thunder of the artiiler)' had me:inwhile also summoned Valahivgue's Cavalry
Division of Frossard's Corp» ; .still this Division d>»i's not appear to iiave goii«M'nr
bt^votul Vionville, us Fori n's Division nut it when reiurnm;; from Mji*s la Tour.
Both Dirisions of French euvalry \\\\\t into bivouacs lo the cast of Vionville.

% Ou the road from Mciz to Verdun by wuy of Conilans.

319

road from Meiz to Verdun. On their return the Lancers fell
into an ambuscade of Chasseurs d'Afrique at Mars la Tour, and
lost some men.

The French scouts annoyed the outposts of the 5th Cavalry
Division with such pertinacity and bohluess that whole Bquad-
rons had to be repeatedly sent forward to drive them in. The
camp of Barby's brigade at Puxieux, which had been constantly
disturbed by the bullets of the long-ranging French carbines,
was in consequence removed furtlur to the rear. Captain
V. Kotze of the lOth Hussars, who was passing with his squadron
towards evoning by the Kouth of Vionvillc in the direction of
Rezonville, observed on the heights at that point bodies of the
enemy of all anns, estimated at :;J(),()(K) men, who were engaged
i]» cooking at their camp.

On tlie left w4nR of thft Ilnd Army, both Infantry Divisions of
the Guard crossed the liloselle at Dieulouard in the course of
the 15th August; the advanced guard was pushed forward as
far as the inn of Les Quatre Vents.* Of the Cavalry Division
of the Guard, the dragoon brigade marched to Thiaucourt; the
cuimssier brigade took up a position at Bemicourt and linked
itself with the squadron of dragoons of Bredow's brigade at
Flirey. The lancer brigade advanced to Menil la Tour,t making
incui-sions towards Toul and to the Meiise. In the first-men-
tioned direction Captain v. Rosen with the 2nd sq. 3rd Lancers
of the (fuard advanced under lire closer up to the fortress, and
sent forward a parlanientairo with a summons to surrender,
which was, however, rejected by the ccmnnandant as on a former
occasion. The squadron returned in the afternoon to Menil la
Tour, without having suffered any loss.

On the 15th the IVth Army Corps reached the positions
assigned to it at Marbache and Custines.

The apparently weak garrison, and the lax manner in wliich EijiodiUon
the small fortress of Tliionville was guarded, had, a« already |f**?"\ ^
mentioned, induced the commander-in-chief of the 1st A nny to (xrionTiUe).
attempt a coup de main upon the place, the preparations for
which had been made on the 18tli August, J In this expedition
advantage was taken of the services, as guide, of the Prussian
reserve man,§ liberated in the reconnaissance of the 12tb August,
who fi'om having been compelled to work for a time at the in-

• At tlie point of intcwection of tbc high roads from Dieulouonl to Toul, and
from Morl)ache to the we*>t.
f Point whero the Toul- Verdun road crosses tlio Terrouinboch.
i See p. 298.
§ Soo p. 290, and the remark thereto.

350

IreTiohnientR in tlie fortresK, waw accnrattly acquainted with the
locality, and guaranteed to conduet the troops intended for the
real attack across a ford about 1,000 paces above th«i city to the
left bank of the Moselle, against the weaker side of the fortress.
The success of the enterprise S'jenied to be favoured also by
Ihe circunistancii tliat, from all accounts, the g'ates of the forti'css
were opened at the signal of a bell every morning at 4 o'clock.

Major-General Count Gneisonau moved off from Gomelange at
5 p.m. on the 14th August. The hussiir squadron was sent on in
front in order to veil the march, which was executed silently and
rapidly. During a shcu't halt at nightfall, the general imparted
to all the oilicers, down to the caj)tains, the nature of the task
committed to him, and made the following general arrangements.

Under ccmduct of the guide the troops intended for the real
attack, with the pioneers at \\w. head, were to pass to the left
bank of the Moselle across the ftud. A smaller detachment
was then to move to the railway station and destroy the lines
of telegraph and railway to Metz ; the main column, composed
of two battalions, was to advance ]KUTly against the Metz gate,
and partly along the towing-path into the town, with a view
afterwards of showing front towards the bridge-head on the
right liank of the Moselle. -Two other battalions were detailed
to take up a supnorthig position at the ford; the two still
remaining received orders to advanci^ cilong the right bank of
the M(»selle and make a display ol' ftjrce against the bridge-
head. The general intended to keep the squadron and battery
temporarily in reserve at Haute Yiitz.

In the evening the march was resumed. As they were
traversing the Stu(;kange forest at midnight by the bright light
of the nuxm, the 5th co. (lUth Regiment, leading the advance,
was several times challenged by hostile cavalry patrols. Towards
1 a.m. the brigade reached the Bois de Yiitz, a small wood
situated quite close to the fortress, Avhere it encamped. As even
at this stage French horsemen made repeated dashes at the
Pnissian posts concealed in the wood, tiiere could no longer
be any doubt that the enemy was on his guard ngaiiist a suiprise.

It was not, h(»wev(ir, desira)»le to abandon, without further
ellbrt, the attempt once connueneed. About 8 a.m. the troops
advanced in the prescribed manner towards the fortnvss; at
4 o'clock the leading troops of the detachment intended for the
left bank of the Moselle liad reached the appointed place of
passage. But the rising which had takc^n place in the water
during the last few daj's nnidenMl the ford impassal)le, Con-
sidenu)le bustle already j)revailed in the town ; the movements
of the Prussians in the open ground arimnd the fortress could
not fail to be distinctly seen from its rjimpavts. French words
of command resounded from the bridge-head, and almost simul-
taneously the fortress opened a vigorous shell 6re.

The surpiise of the place had failed ; an assault could not be
thought of; retreat aare not be defeiTed. It was therefore
commenced without delay, and only molested by the enemy's

shell fire.* After the different dctachiiKMits liad assembled at
Stuckange, the brigade reached the neighbourhood of Kedange
towards noon of the 15th AugUKt, after an ahnoRt uninterrupted
march of 17 hours-t

TiiF. IGrii Auc;isT.

At 0.30 p.m. on the 15th August General v. Moltke issued MoremenUof
directions l<)r the KUhto tlie conimandcrR-in-chief of the 1st and ^^® UtAnny.
Ilnd Anny, the puqioi-t of wliirli was as follows: —

" So long as the strength of the enemy's force loft behind
at Metz remains undetermined, the 1st Army will leave a corps
in the neighbourhood of Courcelles, wliich will be relieved as
soon as possible by the troops coming up from Saarlouis
under Lioutenant-General v. Kuunner.J The otlier two corps
of the Ist Army will tak(^ un a position on the line Any-
Pommcrieux, between the S(iille and Moselle, on the IGth. A
bridge over the latter river is to be thrown at once, if not
already done by the Ilird Army Corps. Prompt intelUgence
of the movements executed by the Ilnd Army un the 15th
18 expected ;§ with regard to further measures, the following
general remarks may be niade : —

** The cir(;umst4inces imd(^r wliieh the Tst and VITth Army
Corps, as well as parts of the 18th Division, gained a victory
last evening, precluded all pursuit. The fi-uits thereof can
only be reaped by a vigorous offensive on the part of the Ilnd
Army towards tlie Metz-Verdun roads, by r resnes and by
Etain. The commander-in-chief of the Ilnd Army is
empowered on his own judgment to cany such into effect
witJi all the means at his disposal.

"The heads of the llird Army have reached the line
Nancy-Dombasle-Bayon this dav, its cavalry is reconnoitring
towards Toul and to the southward. The head-quarters of
His Majesty the King will be at Pont b. Mousson from 5 p.m.
to-morrow."

On receipt of this despateh (leneral v. Steiinnetz made the
necessary aiTangements at onee.||

• The cnsualties were 4 men of the 2nd battn. 29th Regiment wounded. At the
requeel. of Major-Generol Count G-noiflcnau, the Commandant of Snarlouis had
ordered out. part of the garrivou to act in support to the enti-rprisc of the 15th
August. These troops, consisting of the 1st battn. 70th Regiment, 21 hussars, and
2 ffUDs of the sortie battery, took up a position at Palstein. As, howerer, thej re-
oeired intelligence in the oourse of the day tlut the enterprise had failed, thej
marched back to Saarlouis next morning.

t The positions of the French and German armies on tlie e>cning of the loth
August are shown on Sketch No. 4.

} See p. 146.

§ Bj the telegram of the forenoon of the 15th, the commander-in-chief of the
Ilnd Army had had all his corps onco more placed at his disposal.

II Army order, Baxoncourt, 15th Auf^uHt, 11 p.m.

352

According to these, the Vlllth Corps was to move off on the
16th to Lony and Arry, the Vllth to the neighbourhood of
Ponim(5rieiix, tlie Ist Cavalry Division through Pouilly to Fey.*
The Int Army (^orps avuh appoint od to take up the presorilx^d
})08ition before Ahtz at (JourctlleH-sur-Niud. To keep up the
comniunicatiou be t ween this oorp8 and the other parts of the
army, the Ihd Cavah y Division was temporarily made use of,
receiving orders to proceed to the neighbourhood between Cour-
celles-sur-Nied and Alecleuves. As the area of movement was
rather limited by the propinquity of the enemy's fortress on the
one hand and by the hues of march of the llnd Amiy on the other,
attention was again directed to the utilisation as far as possible
of the few available roads, allotting to the trains the flank
most removed from Metz. The Vllltli Army Corps, which, as
we have seen, had been since the 15th Augiist on the left wing
of the army, and consecjuently lending the flank movement to
the westward, was to move off at G a.m. ; the remainder of the
ti'oops were to regulate accordingly their respective times of
departiu'c.

General v. Steinmetz also sent two more special despatehcHt
to Generals v. Manteuffel and v. Kummer, which were to serve
as a basis for many measureH which might probably have to be
independently tiiken in the next lew lumiu Among other mattei'S
it was especially noted that tlie railway station at Courcelles, as
the immediate store depot of the army, must be adequately pro-
tected against Metz. The necessary instructions were also given
as to the shoilest road forbringingback to the army Gneisenaus
brigade, 8d)out which there was as yet no intelligence.

The VII I th Army Corps moved off on the morning of the KJth
in the prescribed direction; the IGth Infantry Division J fi'oni
Chesny past Fleury and Coin les (Juvry to Any, the 15tli from
the neighbourhood of Liehon to Marieulles. As the fonner Di\a-
sion was entering Arry, between 12 and 1 o'clock, the sound of
artillery was heard from the north-westward. Away beyond
Gorze could be distinctly seen signs of a vigorous action surging
biickwards and forwards. It was known that the Ilird Army
Corps was engaged in a hot and unequal stniggle between
Gorze and Rezonville, and was already said to be suffenng from
want of ammunition. A short time after repeated demands for
sup[)ort came in from the oth Infantry Division. General v.
Baniekow report<*d to this effect to the general connnanding the
Vlllth Army Corps at Lorry ; he re(;ei veil instructions fnnn that
ollicer to comply with the request and to join in the action
according to his own judgment. How this was canied out will
be described later.

The 15th Division had not moved from Liehon until 8 a.m.,
o^ving to a delay in the arrival of the order in question, and as

• East of Corny.

t Appendice;) XVI and XYII give the text of these despatches.
X 32nd Infantry Brigade, 8 B^ns. 9th Hussara, and 3 batteries of Divisional
artiUory.

353

early as 9 o'clock met at (JheriKey the inarching columns oi the
IXth Array Corps, which were moving forward via Vemy to
Sillegny. An ofiicer of tho general fitaff from the royal head-
quarters coming up at tliis moment, produced an open order
from Crcneral von Moltke, in accordance Avith which tlio IXth
Anny (yorps was if possible to cross tliat day by tlic Inidges
thrown by the Ilird Corps at Any, and, in tho event of coming
across any troops of the Ist Army, it was to precede them.

Under these cinnnnKtances iluj 1 r)th Infantry Division remained
temporarily fit Cherisey. As Ihe lieads of tlio Vllth Anny Coi-ps
also reached that place at 1 p.m., it resumed its march by way
of Verny and Pommcrioux, and sid)8e(picntly bivouacked at Ma-
rieulles, witli an advanced guard at Vezon. Smaller detachments
were thrown out on the right Ihmk to Fey and Coin les Cuvry.
The trains did not come up with the troops until late in the
niglit in consequence of these crossings of tlie line of march.

Tho Vllth Anny Corps, in jiursuancc of the an-angoments of
its commander, had moved off at 8 a.m. in three main columns :
the recent advanced guard under (rcneral v. d. (xoltz by Juiy
and Clicsny, the remoindrr of ilie loth Division by Mccleuves,
The Division occupied (punters and bivouaes on the right
bank of the Seille at Pomn i eric ux, the greater part of the recent
advanced guard at Verny. The remainder of the coi-ps marched
as a left flank column, sweeping round further to the south by
way of Saniy, Aube, and Goin. The 14th Infantiy Division
crossed the Seille, bivoiuu^ked on the left bank to the north of
Sillegny, and pushed forward an advanced guard to C(»in sur
Seille ; the coips artillery remained on tlie right bank at
Louvigny. General v. Zastrow occupied Sillegny with his
headquarters towards evening, after the staff of the IXth Army
Corps, proceeding to the Moselle, had evacuated the village.

The Ist Cavalry Division had marched off from Ccmrcelles
8ur Nied at 7 a.m. It took the road through Jlccleuves and
Flcurv to the left; bank of the Seille, and t)ivouacke<l to tho
south of Fey, The 9th Lanet^rs threw out outposts between
Augny and Jouy aux Arches. The patrols reconnoitrhig towards
the fortress were fired at from Fort St. Privat, apparently by
national guards;* otherwise nothing could be seen of the
enemy.

Thus on the evening of the 1 (»th August two Army Coi-psf and a
Cavalry Divisioii of the Ist Army were assembled in the narrow
tract between the Seille and the Moselle, in readiness ftn* the
passage of the latter streiim. General v. Rt<'inun't>5 (Altered (!oin
Hur Seille with his sfalf lo\v;iv<ls cveninjj;' nnd esijiMitshed his
headcpiai'ters there for tlie night.

The Ist Army Corps, which hnd assembled in the vicinity of
Courcellcs Chaussy on the 15tli, set out in the forenoon of the

• Tins fort at that time consist^'d niorrly of hijjh aiimly rampart?,
t £xrlu8iTc of those rctiirniii|^ from Thionvillo, mihI tlie \r.irt'i of Ihc VII I(h
Corps niroadv dofipntfhoii to liir l):il(l.-fi«'M.

351

KUh lor Cnuroellcci Biir Nicvl, in acx'nnlaiico with the orders it
hiul received. Tlio l.st Infantry Division moved to Laqiieiiexy,
pusliiii*^ iorward an ;nlv;ui(;ed <^uard to Ars Laqilcnexy. The Ist
i)ragoonB covered tliin inovement by taldng up a poBition at
Montoy until tlio cveninpr, and tliroAvin^^y forward detachments
towards BcUocroix and Borny, thus aiibrdincj; protection at the
same time to tlio pioneers and men of tlio sanitary corps who
had l)een engaged on the battle-field Binco the 14th. The
2nd Infantry Division nnd the cm-ps artillery vrent into l)ivoiuics
at Com'cellcH Kur Nied. An advanced guard puehed forward
to the went beyond tho neighbourhood of Frontigny, threw out
vedettes towards Metz on botii sides of tho higli road which
connected themstjlves with th(jse of the Ist Infantry Division at
Grigy.

The 3rd Cavalry Division, tho outpowts of which were still
touching tho Moselle at Malroy on the morning of tho 16th,
had (piittiul Viy l)etween 12 and 1 o'clock. It marched by
St. Barbe, Colligny, andCJonrccllessnr Nied, covering its flank in
tho movement by a detachment moving by way of Flanviilo and
Ogy. Without liaving come into contact Avith the enemy, tho
Division went into bivouac at JJeekuves between 6 and 8 p.m.
Genorsd Oount Gntnjjenau's bngad(5 ntturning from the direc-
tion of 'JliionviMe rrat^lied ('onnM-llcs snr Niul on the Kith,
and Avas instructed to (.•on{iiiu(; its r.iarcli next dny in the direc-
tion of Any as far as the Mosi^lli'.
^rrangomonts Tho communicritioiis Avhieli arrived from tho ro3-al head-
Army. ^ quarters in tho course of tlie ir>th August, as well as the reports

(if the separate corps, (^specially of tlie Ilird Army Corps,, had
convinced tho cor.niianiler-in-cln\f of the find Army that the
French forces were already in hasty ritn*at towards tho lleusis
and that it was therefore necessary to follow them up at once.
This view and the intention to cross the llosello with tlie main
body of tlio army on tho KJth, were reported by telegraph to
the royal hoadcpiarters as early as 11 a.m. on tho loth. As
no contrary instructions were received from that quarter, Princo
Frederic Charles promulgated at 7 p.m. the following arrange-
ments for tho 16tn August:*

The Ilird and Xth Army Corps and tho two Cavalry Divisions
attached to tliem were dcisignect for an advance in force against
tho road to Verdun. Tho Illrd (vorps and the Gth Cavahy
Division were to cross the lloselle below Pont a Mousson. Tho
formei* received instructions to move by way of Gorze towards
Vionville and Mars la Tour; tho latttr was, at the discretion of
its commander, to mako a circuitous movement from Pagny
past Thiaueourt, for the purpose of reaching tho great road to
Verdun by this route. The Xth Corps, after calling up the troops
still in the valley of tho llosello, was to continue its advance

• Army onlcr, Pont A Momson, 15th Aucusfc, 7 p.m. Tho contents are ffi?en in

App. xvm.

355

from Thiaiicourt to St. Hilaii-o and Maizoray.* The IXtli Corps
recoived inHtructious to advance to Sillogny with (; viow tn fol-
lowing the Ilird Corps to Gorzo on the ITth.f

The troops which were keeping the true westerly direction
towards the Mouse, received tho following orders : — The Xllth
Army Corps was to concentrate at Pont a MouBson, push forward
an advanced guard to Kegnievillo en Hayo and its Cavalry
Division to Buxemlles in the direction of tlie Jleuse. Tho
Guard Corps received orders to march to Bernccourt, nnd its
advanced guard to Rambucourt, conRoqucntly a long day's march
to tho westward beyond Dieulouard; the IVth Army Corps was
to reach tho vicinity of Les Saizerais, and throw forward its
advanced guard to Jaillon in the direction of Toul. The
advance of the Ilnd Army Coit)s, moving beliind tho right wing
of the anny, was to reach Ihicny. Lastly, the ad viinced Cavalry
Divisions were ordered to reconnoitre the roads to the Meuso
and the passages over that river between DieucJ and Conmiercy,
with reference to their prospective utilisation by tho army.

According to this design of the commander-ui-chiof, a move-
ment towards the Meuso became tho directing idea of tho
operations. Starting with tho assumption that tho French
army would not be again cncoimtored on the lloselle, it was
hoped, from the capacity of German troops for marching, tliat
the adveiTsary would yet bo reac^hed on tne former river. Tho
inteUigence which arrived from tho .^)tli Cavahy Divi^don during
tho l5th August, had not as yet brou.Lvht to light the nuil
situation of affairs; and when the general direetiouH from tho
royal headquarters, § v/hich reached Tout u Mousson at 10.30 p.m.
on the 15th, attached a special importim<io to tho occupation of
the Metz- Verdun road, it might be assumed that this require-
ment was sufficiently met by sending two Army Corps ana two
Cavalry Divisions in that direction.

All parts of the Ilnd Army moved off on the morning of tho
16th August in perfect accord with the foregoing histiiictions
of the commander-in-chief ; even tlie reports which came in from
the Ilird Anny Corps up to midday could give no occasion for
any modification of tho previous orders.

In the French army tlu^ withdrawal westward, whitili had been MoTomoiiU of
ordered on the 13th|| and interrupted by the battle of Colombey- *^^''Jhri4tb
Nouilly, was a^ain resumed on the 15th August. To protect it, SiuguBt.*
the Cavalry Divisions of du Barail and Forton had been already

f>U6hed foi-ward boyond Gravelotto along tlie two main roads
eading to tho Meusc.lf

* Tho 6th GftTaliy DiTlaion, as wo are awnrt*, wns oboo^ly in tho nci'^hbourhood of
Man la Tour.

t As already montiotioci, tlio IXth Corps recoived ordors on tho Jtorononn of the
IGih from the royal headquarters, to cross tho MoboHo that day, if possible.
South of Verdun.
See p. 887.
Sea p. 804
Tide remarks on p. MS.

n 2

356

In rear of Forton's Division, the left wing of the anny reached
the neighbourhood of Rczonville and Gravelotte. The movement
to thoBG placiis and the camps occui)ied in the course of the day
were, as ahoady mentioned, watched hy the Pnissian cavahy.*
The two corps Avhich had Uikcn part in the IwittleatColombey were
no longer abl e that day to reach the destinations assigne d to them for
the 1 5th — St. Marcel and Doncourt. Of the /5rd Corps, lilontaudon's
Division alone took up tlic prescribed position between Verneville
and St. JIarcel in tlie afternoon ; NayralVf and Aymard*sJ
Divisions did not amve in that neiglibourhood imtil late in
the niglit. 'J'he Bois Doseuillons lay in fix)ut of the corps
marching northward. Metman's Di\'iaion was obHged to remain
in rear at the island of Chambiere. Lastly the 4th Corps, Avhich
was to lead the way in the retreat, reached Lessy at the foot
of Mont St. Quentin with Ijorencez' Division alone. (^Jissy's and
Grenier 8 Divisions were still in the valley of the Moselle, at
Woippy and Devant les Fonts, as {dl the roads leading fi'om the
valley to the ])lateau were com|)letel y blocked by the trains.

The Enii)eror Na])oleon and Marshal Hazaine transfencd their
Jieadquarters in Gravilottc in the course of the 15th August.
The departure of the Emperor from the army did nottiike place
until the early uKn'ning of the UJth August; he w^as escorted by
do France's brigade of cavalry of the Guard as far as Doncourt,
and from thence by Margucritte's cavali-y brigade of du Barail's
Division.

On this morning also the retreat of the army was to be resumed
at 4 a.m. The left wing was quite ready to do so, but the
right, as already mentioned, had tiiree of its Divisions still in the
valley of the li[oH(;lle. Marshal L(?b()euf, who had assumed the
comnuuid of the ihd Corps in theroom of General Decaen, mor-
tally wounded on the 14th, requested under these circumstances
that all further movements might be postponed until noon.
Marshal Bazaine assented to tliis proposition, and the troops of
the left wing consoipiently received orders torepitch their tents,
as *' it might possibly be afternoon before they would move oflF."

The recently abandoned camping places were now reoccupied.
The most advanced was Prince ilurat's dragoon brigade at
Vionville ; between that village and Rezonville were Gramont's
cuirassier bngadc§ and Valabregue*s Cavalry Division.|| Imme-
diately to the Avest of Rezonville were tlie camps of the 2nd and
(>th (Jorj)s, tlu' former to th(! south of the highroad, the latter to
the north of it; Tixier's Division was in line with the 3rd Corps
at St. Marcel. The Guard was at Gravelotte.

While the left wing of the army was thus tenqiorarily halted,
the Divisions of the right wing, left in the valley of the Moselle,
set out on their march. Staft* officers were still busily engaged

• h'ce pp. 345-346 and 340.

t Previously Gastagny's.

t Frenously Dccaen'a.

§ Murat's and Gramont'B brigades of cnralry formed Forton's DWiiion.

II Belonging to the 2nd Corps.

357

there in orgauising the traiue and in clearing the roads for the
troops, when at 9 a.m, the roar of aiiilleiy betokened an attack
on tlie part of the GernmiiH.

In spite of this inconvenience the situation of the French was
in noAvise critical. The fortress of Metz prevented a direct
advance of the 1st German Army from tlu^ eastward. Against
an attack from tho south there were three French corps ready
to show front on the road to Verdun, While their left flank
was well supported, they had a strong body of cavalry on their
right wing ; behind them, at less than three miles distance, was
the principal part of the 3rd Corps.

Tlie Divisions stDl engaged in advancing from tho valley of
the Mosello could also in any case reach the battle-field in the
coui-se of the day. It might further be in'esumed that they
would only have to deal at fii'st with part of the Ilnd German
Aimy. A decisive and vigorous attack of tho nearlv concen-
trated French anny upon this latter wcmld manifestly Jiavc best
ensured tlie further retreat behind the Mouse.

The Battle op Vionville — Mars la Tour (up to 3 p.m.).

FiKST Appearance of the 5tii and Cth Cavaltit Divisions, 8-10 a.m.

General v. Voigts Rhctz (loomed it advisable to combino
with the inarch of his cori)s to St. Ililairo* a reconiiaissauce in
force upon the encampment remarked in the vicinity of Rezon-
ville on the evening of the ISth. For the oxetmtion of this
enterprise he had detailed tho 5th CavjJry Division, under Lieut.-
Genural V. Kheinbaben. By order issued through Lieut.-Colouel
Caprivi, chief of the general staft', he caused the two horse
artillery batteries of tlic corps artilleiy Avith an escort of the
2nd sqn. 2nd Dragoons of tlic Guard, to be brought up early on
the 16th as a reinforcement from Tliiaucourt to Xonvillo. As
resei-ve to the reconnaissance, the half of the 37tli Infantry
Brigade, which was at Tliiaucourt, was further instriK'te*! to re-
imite forthwith at Chand)leyt with ( Jolonel v. Lyncker's detach-
ment, despatched along the Jlosello valley to Noveant. Mean-
while General v. Voigts Rhetz purposed marching with the
remainder of the 1 Uth Infantiy Division and tho brigade ofdragoons
of tli«i GuardfroniThiaucourtto St. Hilaire,whilst the 20th Infantiy
Division was to follow from Pont a Mousson to Tliiaucourt.

Redern's hussar brigjide, intended to lead the reconnaissance,
had moved off from its bivouac at Xonville at G a.m., and was
formed lip to the west of Puxieux bottom. To it were attached
the four batteries of horae artillery Avhich were on the spot ;{
Major Kiirbcr, commanding tho horse artillery division of the

* See pp. 354, 365.
t 3 miles soutli of Mars la Tour.

t The two batteries of tlie 5tJi Cavalry Dirision, nnd tlic J wo Ijorsc arlillcry bat-
teries of the Xth Corps. 8eo Appendix, pp. 48* and C2.*

35H

Xth Coi*pg, nssuined the coniniaiid of them. At half-past
8 o'clock the brigade moved off past the south of Tronville,
towards Vionville. It was followed on the left rear by Bredow'a
brigade from Suzemout past Mars la Tour, and by Barby's
brigade in rcBorve from Xonville to Ti-onville.

Rederu's brigade had sent forward the three squadrons of the
10th Hussars* and Schirmer's battery as advanced guard. They
were followed, at line distiinee,! on the right by the 11th Hussai-Sy
and on the left by the 17th Bmnswick Hussars, each in squadron
columns at close intervals, but with a large interval between the
regiments, so as not to hamper the movements of the batteries.
The previously-mentioned squadron of dragoons of the Guard
had joined the Bnmswick Hussai^s, from which a squadi'on was
detached in a westerly direction from Maizeray4

Intelligence had been received from the outposts that to the
west of Vionville, close to the village, there was a hostile
cavaliy camp, in which cooking was going on, and which in
other respects was quite off its guard. In point of fact the
hussars met with no French patrol to the other side of Tron-
ville. Schirmer's battery unlimbercd on a commanding height
(901) to the north-east of the village, and opened a completely
luiexpectcd fire at a most effective close range upon this camp
of Murat's dragoon brigade, especially upon some squadrons
v/hich were just moving off to water in a westerly direction.§
Major Korbcr now advanced with the other batteries to the
same hill, wliilst the three regiments of cavahy took up a posi-
tion to cover the lino of guns.|| At the very first round of shell
the hostile cavalry fell into wild confusion. A French squadron
indeed attempted to advance to the north of tlie village of
Vionville, and a battery to the noilh-west edge of it, but both
were unable to hold their gi*ound against the fire of the Prussian
guns ; they speedily followed the rest of the cavalry, which
abandoned the camp in the greatest haste, and disappeared in
an easterly direction.

About 500 paces west of Vionville, at the point of junction of
the roads from Mars la Tom* and Tronville, there lies some rising
gi'ound iVom which there is an extensive and open view in all
directions. To that point Major Kiirber now brought up liis
guns, with a view to cannonading the camps of the French
infantry and cavahy at llezonville. The advance took place
by batteries from the left, so that tlie horse artillery battery of
the IVtli Army Coips came finsfer into action in the angle of the
road just mentioned; next to and in line with it on the right
was the 3rd, then the Ist of the Xth Ai-my Corps, whilst the
2nd still remained temporarily in the position at Tronville.

* Sec J). 2[f'^ and remark, p. 34G.
t 800 pacc.^.— Tii.

X Tliia Hqiiaih-oi! rejoined tlio regiment in the cour:>o of the day.
§ From the Kivni-h Ueijorls.

II The IClh lluistara ou tlic right in a hollow, the 17tli on the left, tko lltli at
Ti*onville in rear of the centre.

H50

The French cainpfl had jimt been galloped through and
alarmed by the hasty retreat in thoron/^h diRorder ot the dragoon
brigade,* when the abovo-mi ntioncd batteiiee direeted tlieirfiro
upon them. Almost at the Bame moment tlie horse artillery
battery of the 6th Cavahy Divisionf appeared and opened fire
from the south. Gramont's eun-aesier brigade, which was the
most advanced, had mounted in good order, and then moved
away northward towards the wood on the Roman road, probably
with the object of avoiding its right flank being turned by
Bredow's brigade. Making a circuit past Villers aux Bois, it
afterwards joined the di-agoons which had nicanwliile re-
assembled on the plateau of Rezonville.

At the first cannon shots the troops in the French infantry
camps. Ijing fmiher to the rear had rapidly fallen in ; strong
detacliments were sent forward to Vionville. Under these cir-
cumstances the Prussian cavalry, which had hitherto accompanied
the artillery in its forward movement, had to desist from any
further advance for the present. Of Rcdern's brigade, the lOtii
Hussars consequently formed up in the hollow stretching down
from Flavigny. The rest of the brigade, which had assembled
at Tronville by order of the Division commander, but which in
consequence of the enemy's heavy fire was unable to ascend the
plateau to the north-east, of Vionville, took up a covered posi-
tion at the southern odc^e of the Tronville copses. For the
same reacon, Bredow's bngade had been sent away northwards
from the high road, and remained stationary for a time in a
hollow close to the eastern edge of the same copses. From
their western edge Barby's brigade, which liad advanced there
from Tronville, was watching the country lying to the north.

The horse ai-tillery batteries remained at first in their far
advanced position at Vionville. Although cannonaded by hos-
tile artillery from the north-east, they directed their fire away
over that village against the advancing mtisses of French
infantry. The squadron of dragoons of the Guard and the Ist
squadron of the Brunswick IluRsai's acted as the immediate
escort of the batteries.

Such was the position of affairs with the 5th Cavalry Division
about 9.30 a.m.

As already mentioned,t the Gth Cavalry Division was still left
on tlio right bank of the Moselle, obsei-ving Metz, whilst the
Ilird Army Coips elTocted its passage at Novcant and Champey
during the night of the 15-ir)th. At 2 a,in., however, Duke
William of Mecklenburg, commanding tlie Di^^sion, had received
orders from General v. Alvensleben, commandiiig the Corp8,§ to
make arrangements to finish crossing the Moselle at Corny by

* Froui tlio Trork : Compagne do 1870. La Cavolcrio Frongaisc, par lo Lt.-Colonol
Bonio.

t The 6th CaTaliy BiTision hod, as tto ore aTraro, roccivcd orders to adynncc from
the soutli towards the Metz-Ycrdun road. Sco p. 854.

I Page 344 ot seq.

I The 6tli CwtXrj DiTision, as wo arc aware, was at that time attached to the
mrd Aimj Corps.

360

5.30 a.ni., bo ub to take up a poBition at the head of the corpB.
The Diviaion was at once called to arms. But as tlie suspension
bridge at Corny could only be crosBcd singly and dismounted,
the passage was not conipUitcly eflFoctod until 7 o'clock. Half
an liour later the advance was continued by way of Gorze ; in
front were tlie Zieten Hussars, then the 16th Huss»irs and the
batteiy of horse ai*tillery, in rear Griiter's brigade, from which,
however, two squadrons of the 3rd Lancers were still left on
the right bank of tlio Moselle pc^nding their relief by troops of
the Ist AiTTiy. From the advanced parties of the 5th Infantry
Division, wliicli had ah-eady dming tlie night occupied the im-

Eortant gorge at Gorze, it was ascei-tained that there were
ostile cavalry posts on the heights of Rezonville : thfere were
also said to bo detachments of infantry in the woocU stretching
from tliat vilhige towards Gorze. Major v. Schonfels, the staflF
officer of the Cavalry Division, who had trotted forward -with
the leading squadron of huKHars past (Jorao towards Rezonville,
coiTobor
the h
Itiuicl]

Hank skirting the Bois des Pretres, whilst Griiter's brigade was
ordered to keep up communication with the 5th Cavalry Division
by way of Buxieres and Mara la Toun The battery remained
at firat in a suppoiting position to the north of Gorze* But
when shortly after, about 9 o'clock, the corps commander's order
arrived from the vicinity of Chambley to lead forward the entire
Division to the plateau, the battery was sent after Griiter's bri-
«ide,and the latterwas ordered to bend away to the right through
tlie Bois de Gaumont for the purj^ose of gaining the heights.

When Ranch's brigade reached the heights to the north of
Gorze it came under a brisk fire from the Bois de Vionville,
from which it suffered no inccmsidorabh; loss. As the advance
of a single brigade agahist the masses of in faii try now marching
up at Rezonville gave no promise of sucijuss, it reiiied behind
the slope and took \i]) a position on both sidts of the Gorze-
Vionville road.

Griitcr s brigjult-, on reaching tlu? platu.iu, drove the rapidly
retiriuL;* Kkirmibhcra lieforo it, whilst the battery of horse artillery
opened ihe Ironi tlie right flank iqjon some infantry camps
which wonj observed at the Boiw de St. Arnould. This was
about U.l') am., alino.st at IJhj same time that the artillery of
tlie 5tli ('avalry l)ivisit>u was startling the French camps at
Rezonville with tlieir lire from the westward.

A UKmientary co-operation had thus taken place between the
two Cavalry Divisions. In a wide semicircle, open to the north-
east, they encompassed the heights, against which, however,
the French infantry were now advancing to the attack on lines
radiating from the centre — Rcz(mville.

The panic of llurat's dragoon brigade, previously described,

• East of Qorze on tho Novt-aut road.

had not been transmitted to the infantry of the French left wing.
Whilst the whole of its cavahy retired behind the Rczonvillo
position, the infantiy rapidly moved off to drive the Prussian
troops from the brink of tlie heights upon which they had
appeared. Genera^ Frossard at onoe brought forward Bataille's
Division in the direction of Buxieres, and occupied Flavigny
and Vionville with it. Verge's DiviKion movect towards the
Qoi-ze heights, and further on its left, forming a crotchet with
it, Lapasset^B Brigade* advanced through the Bois de St. Anionld.
On the right and somewhat behind the 2nd Corps, Marslial
Canrobert also ordered the advance of Bisson'sf and la Font de
Villier's Divisions of the ()th (Joi-ps froni their positions west of
Rezonville to Vionville and Flavignv. Levassor-Sorvars Divi-
sion was in reserve east of Rezonville, -wnth its front towards
the Bois de St. Arnould, in roadiness to meet any turning move-
ment from that direction. Tixier's Division still remained for
the time being in the vicinity of St. Marcel.

To meet the bodies of infantry advancing on the Rezonville
plateau both Fmssian Cavalry Divisions had moved into the
positions already described. The batteries of lioi*so artiUeiy at
Vionville, previously under fire of the enemy's gtms, and now
also over\vlielmed with the bullets of his skirmisliers from the
neai' border of the village, found themselves compelled to
withdraw to a depression of the ground east of Tronville. Cap-
tain Bode with the left Hank battery, which was screened by
the poplars on the roads to liars la Tour and Tronville, and
somewhat withdrawn from the murderous fire fi*om the village,
was alone able to continue the cannonade, without, however,
checking the advance of the French right wing. Bredow's
brigade nad in consequence to quit the hollow east of the Tron-
ville copses ; it withdrew through an opening in the wood as
far as its western edge, and took up a position on the right of
Barby's brigade. The 10th Hussai*s retired before the fire of the
enemy's uifantry, which occupied the farm buildings at Flavigny,
as far as the du Sauley farm. Griiicr's brigade, owing to the
prcfwurc of Verge's Divisiijii, d(iKC('nd(ul an far aK 1h(^ iiodhern
edge of the Bois de Gaumont, t(» wliit-li pljujo it was shortly
followed by the horse artillery battery, alter a brief but vigorous
cannonade.

At this time — nearly 10 o'clock — there appeared, at the ex-
tremities of the great arc formed by the cavalry, the advanced
parties of the 5th and Cth Infantry Divisions. Advancing from
Gorze and Tronville, they reached the edge of the plateau at
the present phase of the engagement.

In the earlier movements there were still grounds for the

opinion on the part of the Prussians, that they had only to deal

' with an unusually strong rearguard of the French army retiring

* Tho brigade of the 5th Corps, which hod joined the 2nd Corps at Saargcmand.
tiatoanooupot'e Division of the 2nd Corps had oocupiod the Mets forts. Soo p. 805.

t Of this DiTisioa onlj tuo 9th Line Kegimcnt was present. See Appsudices,
p. 16».

3(:2

along tlio nioro northern roaiLi ; hut the cuurse c»f the ucxt few
hours showcid that in roiihty the gn^ater pait of the army was
on the tionthcni road, Avhi(th h^ids direetly to Verdun. To attiick
this far eiij)erior fc^ree witlioui pros[)ect of speed}' and lasting
8upi)ort, was the task with wkieh General v. Alvensleben eharged
his army corps, and which he and his troops carried through
with iron perseverance.

The baltle-fiehl of the lOth Angiust lies to the west of Rezon-
villo on both sides of the southern main road from Jlotz to
Verdun. This h^ads betv/een flravelotte and the river Yrou
over an open and broad plate:ui,* bounded on the east and soutli-
east by large connected woods, which iiioro particularly clothe
the ui)per parl.H of tlie ;';lope« talh'ii;^' towards the Jloselle. Smaller
woods extend northward of t!ie hi^h road along the so-called
Roman road, pre^;entin.J^• also towards that side a screen to the
movements of trooi)s. In other respects the plateau, especially
at the highest p^iiuts of its lon;^- and luoadly-swelhng ridges,
permits of an t^^tended viitw in all directions. Cover from
fire is ollered in general only b/ the natural undulations of the
ground and by some large lioUows, in which the villages of
Kezonville, Flavigny, Vionville, and ilars la Tour are situated,
and wliich, more or less deeply depressed, divide the plateau
into scpai*ate positions. Tlie mc/st remarkable of these are the
two pjuallel valh^ys, one of wliit^h falls to the east of Kezonville,
the other througli tin's village towards the south, and the flat
valley commencing near Flavigny, which after firet interaecting
the plateau in a south-westerly direction, bends round througli
the Hois de Gaumont to Gorze, iind fonnsthe southern boundary
of the battle-lield.

Another equally important p:)sition is that between the Trou-
ville heights and the plateau of Bruville and St. Marcel on the
north. This passes at first as a gentle depression from the
vicinity of Vionville towards the Kcmian road, then on the
noi*thern edge of the Tronvillo eoi).ses becomes a deeply sunken
valley, which unites to the north of Mars la Tour with a parallel
valley of the Yron.

TuK Movements of the IIIkd Akmy CoitP3 ina-oiiu Noo:;.

in fulfilment of the army order of the evening of the l/ith,
the Ilird Army (Jm-ps, aftia* a short nigiit's rest, moved forwanl
from the valley of the lloselle on the morning of the l(>th.
Since half-past 7 o'clock the 5th Infantry Division had been
foUov/ing the Gth Cavalry Division along the valley road from
Noveant to Gorze, with the object of taking as soon as possible
the direction of Vionville, which had been assigned to it. Tho

9th Brigade fonncd the advanced guard of the Division ; two

* ■ ■ -

* Compare tlie general description of tho country on p. 88.

3()3

battalions and a squadron of dragoons had been loft behind at
Dornot and Coniy as a protcctioii to the right flank against Mctz,
and to secure the bridges over tho Moselle.*

The 6th Infantry Division with the corps artillery had moved
off from Arnaville as early as 5 o'clock, and was to march by
way of Onville and Buxiircs to Mars la Tour. Tho general com-
manding the corps was with this column.

The head of the 5th Infantrj^ Division reached Gorze towards The 5tli In-
9 o'clock. It was known from the repoiis of the outposts and ^onti7
of the 6th Cavalry Division, which had already assembled there, ^*^*"^"'
that bodies of the enemy Avere apparently advancing along the
Rezonville plateau in the direction of Gorzc. In consetiuence of
this General v. Doring ordered the northern issue from tho little
town at the Cfite Mousa and the farm of St. Thiebault on the
west to bo occupied by two companies each of the outpost Imtta-
lion,t whilst the 9th Brigade was passing through the village.

When tho two squadrons of dragoons leading the advance
alon^ the Flavigny road reached the plateau, they were received,
like Kauch's hussar brigade shortly before, by so vigorous a fire
from French infantry that they were obliged to withdraw to tho
farm of Anconville.

Immediately in rear of tho dragoons, however, Colonel v.
Garrelts had meanwhile ascended tlie ridge with both musketeer .
battalions of the 48th, with the intention of gahiing the project-
ing ansAe of the Bois de Vionvillc, in accordance with the order
which he had received. He had for this puq^ose deployed tho
let battaUon on the left and the 2nd on the right, each of them
in two lines, and had made such rapid progress that toAvards
10*15 a.m. the 1st light battery was able to unliniber on his
left flank. General v. Doring nov/ ordered the advance of the
rest of his infantry to the heights ; the fusilier battn. of the Body
Guard Regiment was alone temporarily retained at Gorze. The

* Order of mftrcli of tho 5tb Infantry Division on tho morning of tho ISth
August J —

Outposts at GK)rzo during the night : —

2nd battn., 8th Body Guard Grenadiers.
4t]i sq., 12th Dragoons.
9th Infnntnr Brigodo as odvancod guord : Muj.-Gcn. v. Doring.
Ist oBCt 2nd sqns.. 12th Dru<Toous 1 i i r* ^ n ii

l8t aiKl 2nd k^tn... 48th K,!gi.i.e..t| '^^^™"«' ' ^'- "• ^"•«1"-
Fusilier battn., 4Slh IvegiTnont •

1st light battery

3rd I'iQo battalion • . • •
Fus. battn., Stli Body Guard Grcn. J
lOUi Infantry Brigade : Moj. Gcnl. v. SchT\'erin.
1st battn., 52nd Begimcnt.
2nd light battery.
Ist heaTy „
2nd „ „

2nd and Fus. baUns., 52nd Begimont.
2nd and Fob. bottns., 12th Regiment.
Left in the Talley of the Moselle t —
At Dornot : Ist battn., 8th Body Guard Grenadiers.

8rd tqn., 12tli Dragoons.
At Oomy ; 1st battn.* 12t]i Begimont.
t 2iid battn., 8th Begiment

^Rfain body of ndv. guard :
Liout. Col. V. L*£sliHN|.

364

fusilier battu. of the 48th fonnorl up in two lines at tlie fanu of
Anconville and odvanced into the hghtiug line on the immediate
left of the battery. The 3rd Rifle Battalion occupied this fann
with its 4th company, the other three moved up diagonally to
the right in rear of Colonel v. Garrelts' musketeer battalion.

Lieut.-Goncral v. Stiilpnagel, connnanding the Division, had
at flrst considered his advanced guard suflieient to repulse the
hcistile detachments coming up from the direction of Uezonville.
He intended meanwhile to continiie his advance by Flavigny
with the rest of the Division, but was soon convinced by per-
sonal inspection that tlie kindling struggle would absorb all
available foi'ces. As the Ist light battery imder Captain Stupha*
sius had a hard U\&k in front of the ever-increasing masses of
the foe, and had already been roughly handled, the General
brought up forthwith to tlie heights the whole of the artillery
marching with the lUth Brigade. After the 2nd heavy battery
had reaclied the place, being the lust to come up owing to its
having to await tlie passage of the lOth Brigade through Gorze,
the whole of the 24 guns of the 5th Infantry Division were now
concentrated in action under Major Gallus.

On the French side the whole (jf Verge's Division had mean-
while dei)loyed on this part of the battle-field. Valaze's brigade
formed tho right wing on the open plateau, whilst Jolivet'a
brigade traversed the Bois de Vionville and emerged from its
south-western edge. Both made the most vigorous efforts to
outflank the Pi-ussian troops and drive them off the plateau.

On the Prussian right wmg, tho musketeer battalions of the
48th antl the three rifle companies meanwhile advanced vic^
toriously towards tho Bois do Vionville and entered it. In tho
severe but indecisive combat in this wood, which often led to
hand-to-hand fighting, they made, however, but slow progress.

Still further eastward, the parts of the Body Guard Kegiment
originally retained at Gorze had a<lvanced by General v. Doring's
orders through the woods direoHy upcm lli'zonville ; Alajor v.
Verseluier k-d the way from (V)te Alousa with the f)th and 8th
companies. Thusc vt-ry shorlly came across troops of Lapassut's
brigade in the Buis de St. Arnuidd. In order to overcome the
stubborn resistance which was olllacd, the other companies of
the 2nd battalion (rame up from tit, 'i'hiebault, and later on the
fusili(jr battalion of the regiment advanced from G(n-ze hito the
wood. Like the Ibth in the B«)is de Vionville, the two battahons
of the Body Guard Keghnent waged a sangiihiary, but steadily
advancing struggle in the Bois de Ht. i\i*nould.

Less favourable, howiver, was the state of allairs on the left
Aving of the i)th iirigade. The fusilier battn. of tho 48th had
gont; past the 1st light battery in order to attack the French
infantry deployed in front of it. Whilst Major Selie, com-
manding the battalion, led forward the 10th company into the
enemy's lire, Lieut.-Colonel v. Estoeq* endeavoured by a circling

* Sec the order of march, ou the precediug page.

365

movement to his left to gain the adversary's flank vnth the
other three companies. But tlio cfTort, although made with
great energy, failed against the enemy's considerable superiority
of force, tlie fusiliers being ontflanktMl on the left. Tlic three
companies sufFcrod such heavy Ioh-sch tliat,th(»y had to retire in
complete disorder to the liois de (lannioiit. Later on the debris

i'oined partly their own reginuMit and partly the 52nd, tlie Ist
)atta]ion of which, forming the advance of tlie lOth Infantry
Brigade, was most opportunely Jip[)roa('liiii«:^ the already en-
dangered flank of the baiteri<is.

In accordance Avith General v. Diiring's urgent request for
support, Major Count fcSchhppenbach, without awaiting the
deployment of the regiment, launched liis open company
columns upon the pursuing enemy. Ho succeeded in driving
him back so far as to relieve the pressure upon his own artilleiy.
But the battalion suffered fearful losses from the overwhehning
fire of the adversary. At the very conmicneemcnt JIajor v.
Schorlemmer, one of the field ofHi^ers, was killed ; from hand to
hand changed the colour, as onvi standard bearer after another
was laid low by the enemy's bullets. All the officerR of the
battalion were in a short space of time placed horit de cofnhat.
When their commander was also compelled to ijuit the scene of
action from a severe wound, the remainder of the heroic bat-
talion retired to the valley in their rc^ar.

At this time, shortly after 11 a.m., Jlajor-General v. During
fell mortally wounded when hastening forward to his sorely
pressed left -wing.

Whilst the French were just moving ofl* to attack it vigor-
ously, Colonel v. Wulften was also approaching with the other
two battalions of the 52nd Regiment. They ascended the
heights at the double, the 2nd battaliim on the left, the fusiliers
on the right, and drove back the enemy with fire and bayonet
towards Flavigny. This decisive blow likewiwe entailed con-
siderable sacrifices. Major 1 lerwaith v. Bittenfeld. commanding
the fusiliera, fell during the glorious advance of his battalion ;
Major V. Biinau was wounded. (Ja|)tain llildebrand assumed
the command of the 2nd battalion in place of the latter, and
followed the retreating enemy to Flavigny, in doing whieh he
brouglit up the Gth and 7th company from tlu^ second into the
first fine. The attenuated fnsilita' companies, whosc^ pouches
were nearl}' emptied of annnunilion, took up a. position on (he
captured ground, mingled with men from oIIht batfciHons in
that quarter, and protected the left flank of the artillery, which
had meanwhile gone further forward.

The next most important objecjt was to maintain the captured
ridges south of Flavigny.

The remainder of the 10th Brigade had followed quickly after
the 52nd Regiment. The fusiUer battalion of the 12th followed
the 2nd battalion of the 62nd to Flavigny. Whilst these troops
were for the time behig separated from their brigade. General v.
Schwcrin asseniblcd the fragments of his other troops round the

36fi

2juI l)aUali()ii of the 12ili, aB a titill iiiibrokcu nucloiiu, and formed
tlicm on both sides of the road from Biixicros to llczonville, with
their front towards the latter village. He was also joined hero
by the (Jtli company of the (J 1th, which had been intended as
escort to the coi-ps headquarter.H, and which, apnrehonsivo of
not being able to rejoin the 6th Division, had shared in tho
attack maile by the fu8iliei*s of the 52nd Regiment.

It was mid-day. In front of tlu^ left wing of the 5th Division
tho foe was in gradual retreat. Tho batteries from tho other
colnnm of the Ilird Army Cor[)s which had been led forward
past Tronvillc iiad for some thiie pant taken part in the tight,
and l)y their effective fire had contributed to the success of the
52nd Regiment.

On the right wing, the light in the wood waa still proceeding
with undiminished vigour. At II o'clock the 48th and the rifles
had gained the angle of the IJois de Vionville which projects
towards Flaviguy and a part also of its northern edge ; Colonel
v. (larrelts and Major Schaer were killed in this combat. The two
battiilions of the I5ody-guard Regiment were still struggling for
the possession of the northern edge of the Rois de St. Amould.

Lieutenant-General v. Stulnnagel had taken up his position
on the right ilank of the artillery. Ho conducted tho action
from that point, and rode repeatedly into the foremost lino of
the troops, now deprived of their chief conunanders, encouraghig
them with his exhortations.

Meanwhile an unexpected reinforcement had arrived.

The detachment of the Xth Army Corps at Noveant* had
only rueeived the order to reunite at Chambley with tho S7th
Brigade,t just as Iho 5th liifautry Division was advancing from
the valley of tho Moselle, and had hi consiMjuence followed thia
Division. When they rejiclied CJorze Colojiel v. Lyneker, hear-
ing the contiimons roar of the caimonade, was induced to bring
forward his infantry, formed in half battalions, to tho battle-
field, and to place liimself at tho disposal of (leneval v. Stiilp-
nagel. 'i'he latter requusted him to protect tho artilleiy line,
whicli shortly aiU'.Y r(.*a(,'hod a strength of 30 guns by the arrival
of Coionel V. Lyncker's battery.

The batteries, not without losing many men themselves, had
steadily followed tho infantry which had pressed forward under
heavy sacrifices. Wheeling gradually to tlie right, they took up
a posiHon about noon, with the right ilank resting on the c(n'ner
of the Rnis do Vionville, which was 0';cupied by tluj 48th and the
rifles. The left flank, not far from the point of intersection of
the G(»rzc-Flavigny and Buxieris-Rezonvillc roads, was secured
by General v. SchwiMiji's Irooj.H. In adviince of th(i front and
between the batteries were the tliree leading half battalions of
Colonel V. Lyneker. The fouith, consisting of the 5tli and 8th

* Tho 2iul and Fud. I):iltii8. of the 7SlU I^''^t.., tiic lat and 3rJ squadrons of the
Oth Dragoons, and the lat lij»ht bnltcn-. M.hj p. flW.
t Soi" 1). ;J57.

3^7

COS. of tho 78th, finding itself in rear of the batteries during the
advance, had stnick off to tlio right from Gorzo under Capt<iin
Barteuvrorffer, with a view to joining tlic troopn engaged in tho
Bois do Vionvillo.

Tho i)th Infantry Divisioji, v/hioh Avitli tho corpR artilloiy ArrWftl of ilio
formed tlio other column of the Ilird Army Corps, had first J>i;ii?on"aiS
received intelligence near Bayonvillo, about (5.30 a.m., through of tho corps
an officer's patrol of tho 2nd .I3rngoons, that the enemy's out- artillery,
posts were between Tronvillo and Vionville. At 8 o'clock, on
emerging from the Bois do Harl, large French camps were
clearly distinguished at Vionville and llezonvillo. The Division
now formed up at Buxicres, the 12 th Brigade in front, the 11th
in rear, each in two lines.*

After giving instructions to the 6th Infantrj' Division not to
allow itself to be di*awn into an engagement before the 6th
Cavalry Division should have reached the plateau to tho north-
ward, General v. Alvenslcbon, commanding the corps, rode
forward in person to reconnoitre, escorted by two sqiuidrons of
dragoons.

As favourable reports at this timo from the 5th Infantry V
Division led to the assumption that the foe in his front was
engaged in withdrawing to the northward, the corps commander
gave orders to the 6th Infantry Division at 9.30 a.m. to move in
a northerly direction past Mars la Tour upon Jamy, so as to bar
the adversary's retreat to the westward. A report to this effect
was sent to the commander-in-chief of tho Una Army at Pont k
MousBon.

Meanwhile, Maior-General v. Billow, commanding tho artil-
lery, had personally infonned hiraRolf of the position of affairs
with the Cavalry Divisions, and had sent histructions to meet
the Divisional artillery, ordermg it to hasten forward at a trot into
the positions which he designated. The 2nd Dragoons received
orders to follow the advancing batteries. The 6th light battery,
which was at the head, had, after bending away to the south
of Tronville, come into action immediately on the right of the
2nd horso artillery battery of the 5th Cavalry Division.! After

* 12th Brigade, Colonel t. Bismarok :

64th Begimont.
Ck)loncl Boron Trcusch r. Buttlar-Bmudcnfols.

24th Eogimont.
Colonel Count zu Dolimi.

11th Brigade, Major-Gcnorol r. Botlimaler:

35th I^cginient.
Colonel dii Plcssis.

20th Begiment.
Colonel T. Fhitow.

Tho only dcllciencj ttos the 6th co. GKh BcgUncuti wLicIi, as olreadj mentioned,
had joined tho Cth Infantry Division,
t See p. 358.

3r>8

tlio 5th light Iwitteiy of the Illrrl Army Coi-ps had also come up
to the Scanie place, all three advanced in an easterly direction,
the two fir.st-ni(.'nti<»niMl IwiilerieK towards the cemetery hill south
of Yionville, lliu 51ii lit;lit fuitlier to the left int<» a position
between tlie church and the high road. The enemy's infantry
fire from Vionville and Flavugny, however, very soon compelled
these battijries to retire behind the western slopes. The two
heavy batteries <^f the (Jth Infantry Division were brought
forward by Lieut.-Colnncl Heck from the du Saidey farm to an
eminence south-west of Flavigny, and from that point resumed
their lire at 10 a.m. against the bodies of infantry assembled
between Vionville an<l Flavigny and upon the adversaiy's
artillery. The former had to be held at bay without assistance,
as their own infantry were still on the march ; three squadrons
of the 2nd Dragoons held tlu.'mselves in readiness for attack in
a position to the right rear of the batteries.

This Hue of guns was reinforced soon after and extended to
the right by the arrival, towards lO.JlO a.m., of Major Lentz, with
both l»ors(» artillery batteries of the corps artillery, which he had
brought forv/ard from Onvilliiai a trot past the clu Sauley farm;
the remainder of the cori)s artillery was following him along the
same road and at the same pace.*^ Still further to the south tho
battery of the r>th Cavalry Divisiont had recommenced firing,
ftmnhig the liid^ of ctainexion with the artillery of the 5th
Infantry Division. A powerful line of guns now crowned tho
heights, which had been recent!}' evacuated by the cavalry, from
Tronville as far as the l>ois de \'ionville ; their projectiles pre-
pared the way for the infantry pressing forward on both wings.

The, ()th Iniantry Division had come up abreast of Tronville.
A further advance northward would evidently have no longer
been compatible with the existing circumstances. After the
general connnaiiding the corps had given orders to this effect,
the commander of the Division, ijcut.-General v. Buddenbroclt,
rode forward in pereon to reconnoitre the enemy's positions at
Vionville and Flavigny. He at once became convinced that
they were strongly occupied, uiul therefore detennined to employ
all his available force to eject the enemy. For this purpose, at
10.30 a.m.. he wheeled his brigades to the right, and moved
tlu^ 12th along both sides of the high ro.ad from Mars la Tour,
Avliile tho 11th took the road from Tronville.

Of tlie 11th Brigade, lh(? 35th Fiisihers Avere in first, the 20th
IJeginient hi seconil line. The fusiliers crossed the heights s(mth
of 'ironville, ui)on which in the morning the horse artillery bat-
teries had first come into action, and then moved with the 1st
bidtalion towards thti village of Vionville, with the 2nd towards

* Bnttoiios of Lieut.-Coloncl Ucck and Major Leutz.
fith licavy. 6th heavy.

•I- •!•

IteL H.A. 3rd H.A.

•I- •!•

t 2iul If. A. baOi-ry ol' tiic TITrd Army Corps.

tho cemetery and the clustet of IrceR Ijiiig fiutlicr to the east,
and with the 3rd towards Flavigiiy.*

The 12tli Brigade deployed Bimult.iiiconRly on tho iinmcdiate
left of tho 11th. Tho G4th liegimont was to attack Vionvillo
from the west and north ; the 24th llogiment, overlapping tho
left, foimed a refused echelon, and was intended, if necessary, to
cover the left flank from the direction of the Tronville copses.t
Opposite the 6th Infantry Division were tlio advanced troops
of Bataille's Division of the 2nd, and La Font do Villiers'
Division of the 6th Corps, viz, : in Vionvillo and Flavigny the
12th Chasseurs, the 23ra line regiment of Pouget's brigade and
the 93rd line regiment of Colin's origjide. The 8th line regiment
of Pouget's brigade was to the north of Flavigny, occupying in
force the clumps of trees in that direction. Somewhat furmer
to the rear were posted the other parts of the two Divisions.
Fauvart Bastoul's brigade filled, as second line, tho interval
between Pouget's brigade and Verge's Division, wliich latter, as
we are aware, faced the 5th Infantry Division. Bec^uet do
Sonnay's brigade was on the heights noi-th-east of Vionville,
and immediately on its right, extendinj^ to the Roman road, was
tho 9th line regiment of Bisson's Division.

Whilst the 6th Infantry Division was in the act of advancing
towards these positions of tho enemy, it was rejoined, as already
reported, by the batteries of tho 5th Cavalry Division, which had
been driven off the Vionville heights. On the left wing at the
high road the 1st horse artilleiy battery of the Xth joined tho
Ist of the IVth Army Corps, which had remained in action
at that point; both proceeded to direct their fire upon tho
French artillery on the Roman road. Colonel Baron v. a. Uecke
re-occupied the cemetery hill with the 2nd and 3rd horse
artillery batteries of the Xth Army Corps, and endeavoured from
thence to shell Vionville and Flavigny. The squadron of dragons
of the Guard thenceforth formed the escort of these batteries.

Still further south, Colonel v. Dresky, commanding tlie corps
artillery of the Ilird Army Corps, posted the 6th Ught battery
at a quarry for the like purpose of firing at Flavigny, Between
the two horse artillery batteries of the loft wing came up shortly
after the 1st heavy battery of the Xth Army Corps ; it had,
under escort of six divisions of the 9th Dragoons, hastened
ahead of the 37th demi-brigade, wliich was marching under
Colonel Lehmami from Tliiaucourt past Chambley in the direc-
tion of the roar of the cannonade.

The 3rd battalion of the 35th Fusiliers formed the right wing Attaek upon
of the advancing line of infantiy ; it had thrown foi-ward two ^"^P^^^*^*
companies into first line, of which the 11th company moved on ^J&i^^ ^
Vionville in order to show a front to the enemy's flanking
fire from the clump of trees. With the other three companies

* This cluster of trees surromids a watering plnco.

t Tlieee ore tho woods, broken into pot-ohcB, whidi extend to tho north of thd hiirh
rood as for os the Roman rond ; thry will be aftc»rvr:\n]a cicticribcd more in detail.

370

Major Melcliior advanced along the bottom towards Flayigny,
ana took up a fiim poBition in the hedges about 400 paces south-
west of tno village, with a view to opening the attack by
Bkirmishing.

The 2nd battalion endeavoured to gain from the cemetery hill
the clump of trees lying between Flavigny and the high road*
The two foremost companies were alone successful in gaining
any groimd in this direction, whilst the half battalion which
followed was so reduced by the enemy's fire in crossing the
heights^ tliat the debris had to bo ml lied at the cemetery. Of
the first-mentioned pui'ts of the battalion, the (Jth company,
taking advantage of the form of the ground, gradually bore off
somewhat to the right upon Flavigny, the 7th to the left upon
Vionville, in order by this means to suiTOund the clump of trees^
from both sides. In doing so, the last-mentioned company
came into connexion Avith the Ist battalion, half of which had
advanced against the southern part of Vionville. The third
company had at first been movmg between the \dllage and
cemetery towards the same clump of trees, but had afterwards,
from inability to make further progi^ess, joined tho 6th and
turned more in the direction of Flavigny. Lastly, the 4th com-
pany, passing to the south of the cemetery, had met with the
11 til and 7tli, which, as already stated, had approached the left
wing of the regiment.

The 20th Regiment liad at fii*st followed the fusilieis at tho
ordinary intervals between lines; but on coming under fire of the
enemy's shells, the two first battalions received orders to form the
resei've. In consequeneo of this, with the exception of the 3rd
company engaged in the diroction of the clump of trees at Fla-
vigny, tlujy assembled in the valluy cast of Tronville, and were
temporarily halted there.

Tlie fusilier battalion leaving for the present the i)th and
10th companies at the Vionville cemetery, continued its advance
with the other two towards the same clump of trees. Shortly
after the 9th and 10th companies also moved forward with a
view to supporting the left wing of the fusilier regiment in its
attack upon Vionville. The 12th joined in this advance.*

In accordance A^dtli the order ol the commander of tho Divi-
sion, the G4th Regiment had also m(»ved forward to the attack of
Vionville along the high road fiom Mars la Tour. The fusilier
battalion, folloAving at first as second line, but subsequently
brought up on the left of the first line for the purpose of outfiank-

• 35th Koginiont : —

Upon Flavijriiy :—G!h, 3nl, Oth, lOlli, uml 12lli.

Upon Vionville : — Ist, 2nd, Ith, llLh, and 7th.

At the Cometcrjr : — 5ll» and 8!h.
20tb Kcginicnt . —

Upon the chiinp of trees : — 3rd and lllli.

Upon Vionville :—ytli, lOth, and li!th.

Ecacrve at Tronville : — Ut, 2nd, 4th, and Ilnd b:ittn.
In the subsequent ])art uf llie aetion tho 0th, lUth, and 12lh cos. of the 2Cth
Bepment again moved up to the 11th '^n the rii^lit.

H71

ing Vionville from the north, skuMnislicd throtigli the soiitliern
part of the TronviUe copses iii concert, with tlio 11th and 12th
compauieH, but without encouuteriug any rosistiince. Liout.-
Colonel V. AVunsch wheeled the l»th and lOtli to the right at the
ravine rising from the north toAvards Vionville, and advanced
upon the northern edge of this village, in which niovenient they
were followed by the 11th company. At the wanie time the
2nd battalion under Major v. GoiRchon, the 5th and 7tli com-
panies in first, the 8th in second line, advanced against the west
side of the village. Betwei^n the two wings of the regiment the
1st battalion prepared the general attac^k by a vigorous skir-
mishing fire.

SuiTOunded and attacked from the north, west, and south,
Vionville was captured by a bold dash towards half-past
11 o'clock. The foe abandcmed the village with considerable
loss, especially in prisoners ; among the wounded on the Piiis-
sian side was Colonel v. Bismarck, the commander of the 12th
Infantry Brigade.

During the attack just described, the 24th Regiment advanc-
ing in rear of the ()4th had i>u8hod its 2iid battalion to the
left into the Tronville copses, while with tlio other two it had
taken up a supporting position at the corner of the wood nearest
to Vionville.

Leaving the 8th company in the wood as reserve. Major v.
Rechteni advanced with the 2nd battalion up the depression
north of Vionville as far as tJie vicinity of the Koman road. It
there found itself involved in a vigorous action with bodies of
infantry and artillery, whose long lini^s stretched across the
heights lying to the eastAvard as far as the high road. Under
these circumstances the other two battalions liad after a short
time to follow into this same depression, for the puipose of pro-
longing the right flank of the line of battle. In this position,
therefore, the 24th Regiment was engaged by companies, in a
single long line,* against the far outimmbering and ever in-
creasing masses of the enemy .t

Conscious of the danger to his left wing, General v. Bndden-
brock brought forward from his available reserve east of Tron-
viUe tlie 2nd battalion of the 2()th, which at once moved up
into the fighting line of the 24th. The general also sent orders
to his division artillery, hitherto employed on the right flank, to
take up a position near the village of Vionville, which had
meanwliile been ciiptured, with a view to supporting the left
wing more effectively. In conformity therewith the 5th light
battery, which after its retreat iVom tlu^ original position south

* The companies were iil tlie following order from loft to right : —
6th, 6th, 7th, 8rd, Ist, 2n(l, 4th, llth, 12th, 9th, 10th.
The 8th co., originally in resorro in tho wood, was also brought up into the fighting
line in the course of the struggle.

t From CSanroberi's Ooipe. Besides la Font do Yilliers' Division and tho lN;h
lino regiment of Biason*B lATision thoro was also Tiller's Division, which had boon
drawn from St. Marcel. Sec p. 369.

C 2

^72

of Viouvillo Jiad coiao into action in tlio vicinity of Tronvillc, first
wont forward to the iiorth-woKt side of the former village. It
was followed, after a brief interval, by Lieut.-Colonel licck's two
heavy batteries, and in conjunction with Major Korber's batteries
on the right, took up the cannonade against the French ai*tillery
on the Roman road, ni which some further reinforcements Hhoi-tly
after participated. Not long after the capture of Vionville the
remainder of the corps aitilleiy of the llird Army Ooq)s reached
the battle-field, after experiencing many difliculties. The 3rd
heax'T battery replaced to the south of Flavigny bottom the
two batteries of the Divisional artillciy which had just been
called away from that place ; the 4th heavy and 4th li^-ht biit-
teries advanced into the interval between this depression and
the Vionville cemetery, the 3rd light taking up a position between
the cemeteiy and the village near the batteries of Colonel v. d.
Beck. In common with the others it directed its fire upon
Flavigny and the heights to the east. NotAvitlistanding the
attempted co-operation tlie Prussian batteries were in a most
trying position, opposed to a numerous hostile artilleiy, and
suffering no inconsiderable losses.

The separation which had existed from the commencement
Ixitween the Divisions of the 1 1 fi'd Army Coi'ps, and their attack
from diflerent sides, had necessitated a considerable extension
of front. This had been considerably dinnnished by the pre^'iou8
victorious advance fi'om the south and west ; but almost the
whole of the infantry and artilleiy was already employed in
first line and pitted against superior forces Avithout prospect of
immediate support. In order to some extent to compensate for
tlie absence of reserves, it appeared advisable to have the cavalry
close at hand, and for this reason General v. Rheinbaben witn
the 5th Cavalry Division had placed himself at the temporary
disposition of the general commanding the Ilird Army Coips.

At the request of the latter, Barby's and Bredow's brigades
assembled in rear of the (Uh Infantry Division on the western
slopes of the eminence (901) between Vionville and Mai-s la
T<mr. In rear of the left wdng of the 6th Infantry Division
collecti'd the two brigades of the 6th Cavalry Division. Both
bodies of cavalry were under cover and ready at a moment to
render any necessary support to the fighting infantry.
Advnncc from The numerous French artillery on the heights at the Roman
Vioimllc and Yond had, shice the loss of Vionville, maintained sucli a -sigorous
^RT?gnv. fi^'® upon that village, that its occupation could only be ensured
by a further advance. To this end the remainder of the
infantry reserve, the 1st battn. 2()th Regiment, was fetched up,
the 3rd com})any of Avhich, as we are aware, had already joined
the fusiher battnlion in the first advance of the regiment.*
Majcn* Stocken led the three companies forward between the
village and the cemetery, and succeeded, in conjunction with the
fusiher companies of the 20th and 35th Regiments, in gradually

• See p. 870.

373

approaching the heights to the eastward after a vigorous and
sanguinary struggle.*

At the same timo the frith Regiment broke forward from
Vionville. The Ist battalion advanced along both sides of the
high road ; immediately on its right was the greater part of tlie
fusilier bntttilion. The 2ndlinttaTion moved from ihv Koutli-caRt
angle of the village in the direction of the clump of tnu's north
of Flavigny, and the 12th co., after searching the Tronvillo copses
and passing through Vionville in a Routliorlj' direction, again
joined the extreme right flank of the reginient.t

In this advance over the almost bore plateau against the
broad front of the French there instantly kindles an obstinate
contest, in the blood-bcdewcd variations of which unity of
command is speedily lost. The watchfulness of the Bub-
ordmate commanders and the bravery of individuals take
its place. Guided by the formation of the gi-ound, the enemy's
sweej)ing fire, and the momcnttuy inspiration of the officers,
the company columns at full intervals are moved hither and
tliither and intermingled. Stragglers join stragglers and bear
a hand again in the fight to the best of their power. Vain would
be the attempt to reproduce a true picture of this wild struggle
in all its details. After a long and embittered contest the
Prussians press forward about 1000 paces in an easterly direc-
tion, and as they at length succeed in wresting the position at
the clump of trees and the adjacent heights from the enemy, the
latter turns to retreat. A French ^n falls at this period into
the hands of the pursuing Prussian infantry.

At the suggestion of Colonel v. Voigts Enctz, chief of the staff
of the Ilird Army Corps, Captain Prince Wittgenstein and
Lieutenant v. Hantlemann with the two squadrons present of
the 2nd Dragoons of the Guard and Bruns^vick Hussars, dasli
from the left flank of the horse artillery batteries upon the
retiring battalions of Pouget's and Colin's brigades. These,
however, preserved a sufficient bearing to continue their retreat
in good order.|

The farm-buildings of Flavigny, which had been finnly held by
the enemy up to this time, had been meanwhile set on fire by the

» Otli, loth, 12tb, l8t, 2nd, 4t]i ; let, 2n(l. 4tli, 1t\i, llth.

20 85

t Tho forward advance from YionTillo took placo in somewhat the following
front ! —
4th, 8rd. 2nd, Ist, 9th. 10th, llth, Gth. yth. 8th, 12th ; 1st, 2nd, 4th ; Ist, 2nd, 4th, 7th, llth.

64 20 35

The cos. mentioned in the previous noltj with tlie .1-L-L__ i— T — in advance, as

above mentioned, went forward, during tho course of the action, to tho right

of tho * * and in tho direction of Flavigny, against which village tho

fitli, 8rd. OtlK lOih. ISth ^^^ ^ ^^ ^^ ^^ advancing from tho west and south-west.
35th
t Aceordinff to the daj-book of the 2nd Dragoons of the Guard, thij squorlron
lost 7o horses m its bold charge.

374

PiTLBsiau guiiB directed upon tliein from different sides. Against
this point of support of the French, the left wing of the 5th had,
as already niontioiied, advanced from the south, and the right
wing of the 6th Infantry Division from the west.* Parts of the
12th, 52nd, and 35th Kcgiments penctrntod simultaneously or
nearly so into the village, captiu'ing immcrous piisonera.!

The occupation of Flavigny gave the first real point of suppoit
to the front of attack facing the Oiist. Held by the 3rd battalion
of the 35th and by portions of other regiments, the village from
that time forward fonned the centre of the line of battle of the
Ilird Army Corps, and lUi especially valuable support for the right
wing of the Gtli Infantry Division. The broad semicircle in
which the Prussian troops had originally smTOundcd the plateau
of Rezonville had shortened to a chord, upon which the army
corps opposed an heroic assistance to all subsequent attacks of
the outnumbciing adversaiy.

CaVALRV EnQAQEMENTS on the HeZONYHiLE PliATKAU.— Abrital
OF PUUS8IAN AND FkENCU UeiNFOKCEMENTS.

(12 TO 3 1\M.)

Situation of During the foregoiug ejigageniunts at Vionville and Flavigny,

affairs on both the 9th Infantry Brigade had also been gaining ground in the
earW port of wood-figlit ou the extreme right wing of the Prussian luie of
the afternoon, battle. Lieut.-Colonel v. L'Estocq had assmned the command of
(See Flan 5a.) the two battalions J in the Bois de St. Amould, and after a hard
struggle had gained the northern edge of the wood ; but beyond
this point he coidd make no progiess towards the height (970)
in front of llczonvillc. The troops in the Bois de Vionville §
had likewise secuied further advantiiges, and had captured the
western angle of this wood. They were advancing victoriously
towards the end which projects northward in the direction of
Rezonville. On the open heights between the Bois de Vionville
and the BuxiereH-Ilizonville road, protected by three half-bat-
talions of the Xth Corps and the trnops collected by General v.
Schwerin, were thirty Pmssian guns|| hotly engaged with the
batteries of Verge's Division, which had been reinforced from the
great artilleiy reserve. Two battalions If belonging to, but sepa-
rated from, the left wing of the 5th Infantiy Division were tbl-

• Sec pp. 366 and 369 et aeq,

t In Appendix XIX. un uUt;ni])t lius boon nuulu to throw light upon the dotuiU
of the (»ceuiHition of IHimgny, us far tis id podriiblo iu view of the Tarious and parti/
contnidictory reports.

J 2nd and Fiis. baltus. of the 81 li Regiment.

§ 1st and 2nd buttns. of thc-^bth ; the 3rd rifle bnttu., which had brought forward
its '1th 00. from Anconvillc ; tho 5th and Stli cos. of the 78th Regiincut.

II 6th. 7th^ and Fu9 ; ITnd, Ist^nd Fiis., Fu».^ 6lh f^u^ batteries of the oth
7S 12 62 48 G4i

Infantry Division aud the Ist hght battery uf the Xth Army Corps. 3ec pp. 865*366.

5 IL and ?H£:
52 lii

lowing up the adyantageSy resulting from the capture of Flavigny,
iu the direction of the liigh road.

A little to the left rear of this front facing the north, and iu
the vicinity of the quarry ravine already mentioned, were the
Gth light, the third heavy, and the three hoiBe ai-tilleiy batteries
of the lUrd Army Corps.* They closed to a certain extent the
gap between the fighting lines of the two Infantry Divisions,
wmlst the remaining eleven batteries at present arrived were
partly in position on the Vionville cemetery height,t and partly
on tiie height at the hi^h road north-west of this village,} having
chiefly borne a share m the severe fighting of the 6tn Division*
The neater pai-t of this Division § was now pressing forward
from Flavimy and along the Vionville high road towards Rezon-
ville, whither the vanquished and exhausted adversary com-
menced to retire.

But on the extreme left wine of the line of battle, in the
vaUey between Vionville and the Koman road, the 24th Regiment
in company columns at open intervals was waging an embittered
straggle against superior forces. The 2nd battn. 20th Regiment,
whicn had advanced into the fighting line at that place, was also
unable to make any further progress.

Thus tiie Brandenburg Army Corps, almost entirely dependent
on its own resources, had as yet on the whole grappled sue-
cessfiilly with two French Corps. Of the Xth Aimy Coips,
whose original line of march was directed generally upon tit.
Hilaire, there was onlv the 37th Brigade on the battle-field at
present. The smaller half of it, under Colonel v. Lyncker, had,
as we are aware, for some time past taken part in the engage*
ment of tlie 5^ Iniantiy Division ; the remainder of the brigade |
had been brought up by Colonel Lehmann through Chambley,
and placed at tne disposal of the general commancQng the Ilird
Army Corps at 11.45 a.m.

The amvalof this support was most welcome. General v.
Alvensleben ordered the demi-brigade to take up a position
temporarily at Tfonville ; only the 2Dd battalion of the 91st
Regiment continued its advance towards the copses north of the
high road, as fresh reserves wore urgently required in rear ot
the extreme left wing of the Gth Division.

With the exception of this trifling reinforcement of infantry,

• Including tlie H. A. battorj of 6tU Cav. Dirn. Sco p. 368.

t 3rd and 4th light, 4th hoavj of the llird Army Coq)4, 2nd and Srd H. A. of
the Xth Army Corp*.

{ 5th and 6th heavy, 6tli light of tho Ilird Army Corps ; 1st H. A. battery of
tho IVth Army Corps (belonging to tho 5th Cay. Divn.) ; 1st hoary and Ist II. A.
of the Xth ^rmy Corps.

§ The 85th and 64th Uogts. ; 1st and Fas. battus. of tho 20th Bogt. Vide details
of the preceding nanatiTe.

II The 91st Kegimcnt (except 1st and 4th cos.) and the 1st battn. 78th Kegiment.
The 1st hcayy battery and li squadron of dragoons had hastened ahead of tho
infontiT. Half a squadron had neon employed to maintain the connection with
Colonel T. Lyncker, and joined later on the two squadrons imder Major t. Studnits.
See pp. 300 and 346.

37r>

the Kccoiul line to the whole PruB.siuii Hno of battle wan at that
time formed solely of cavalry.

Immediately in rear of the engaged infantry was their Divi-
sional cavalry, concentrated for the most part in the centre,
on either side of the horse artillery batteries of the Ilird Army
Corps. On their light came the 12th Dragoons, tho 3rd squadron
of whicli had come up from the valley of the Moselle and had
posted itself in rear of the Bod}'^ Guard iiegimcnt at the southern
edge of the Bois do St. Anumld. Tho 2nd Dragoons were to the
west of the quany ravine ; the Ist squadron had been sent to the
Vionville cemetery hill. Here were also tho oft-mentioned
squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons of the Guard and of the Bruns*
wick liussai-s. Of tho 9th Dragoc^ns, the squadrons attached
to Colonel V. Lyncker's detachment had joined the 12th Dra-
goons, wliile the remainder formed up with the 2nd Dragoons.

Further down in the quarry ravine was tho 6th Cavalry
Division in a strength of Kovcntecn scjuadrons.*

Redern's cavalry brip^ide was protecting both flanks of the
Cth Infantry Division. The 11th and 17th Hussars were coming
up from the high road to Flavigny bottom, in order to estab-
lish comnmnication l)etween the 5ui and Gth Infantry Divisions,
whilst the lOth Hussars advanced from the du Sauley farm
towards tho Tronville coi)ses, and took up a position in rear of
them. The other two brigades of the 6th Cavaliy Division
stood near Tronvillo; the 13th Dragoons alone remained in
tho advanced position west of the copses, having orders to
observe the movements of tho French masses appcaruig at
Bruville and St. Marcel.

On the enemy's side, after the first Prussian cannon shots had
fallen amidst Murat's brigade in the morning, tho conmiander-
in-chief, Marshal Bazaine, had betaken himself to the battle-
field ; he had there approved tho provisional aiTangements mado
by the 2nd and (Jth Corps, and taken measur<« to support
them. It would appear that his principal object was not to be
forced away from iletz ; ho believed that ho foresaw an intention
to that effect in tho advance of the Prussians.

Willi ihiH iniprc'ission Mtcj;uHly in view during the whole day,
the niarHhal <lirei:to(l hi.s uttuiitiou chiefly to tho woods which
si^Mad out to tho Houth of Gnivclotto and Rezonville, from
whicli direction he Avas particuhirly apprehonyive of being oi\t-
flanked. For ihii rojujon Lovasfc-or-Sorvars Division of the Gth
Corps li:ul already lialtc:d to tho ciibt of Rezonville, with its front
towards the south. Tlie Zuuavca of Iho Guard, with a cavalry
brigade of the fiuard and s.-uie artillery, were also posted by
tho Mur.sharu orders facing tho south, where tho valley descend-
ing from the Bois do la Juree cuts the liigh road between
Gravelotto and llezonville. Still further eivstward, at the post*
ing house, fronting tho Bois des Ognonsi he placed the three

* Two squadrons of tho 3nl I/iinccrs were still on tbo right bank of thc'Motielle.
tlio 4tli squadron of iUo Gth Ouirassicrs was somcwhiit further in front, acting as
escort to tbo battery.

^77

other regiments of Picard's Guard Grcuadicr Division, and in
rear of it» on the commanding height of Alalmaison, as la^t
reserve, Deligny's Guard Voltigeur Division.

Thus in tlio iirst instauco all tlio Guard and part of the Gth
Coi'pB had boon , placed on a section of tlio battle-lield against
which no real attack whatever was made.

Witli ii view to support tliis dc;feiisive position which Gc^iicral
Frossard and Jhirshtd (yanroboit had Kelcctcd a iiiilii lu front of
lle250iiville, the reserve artillery wjis broui^ht forward and tem-
porarily parked to the east of Kezonville. Inuiuidiately on the
right of the artillery was Forton's Cavahy Division, well covered
bv a swell of the ground, and on the left of it Valabregue's
davalry Division.

The present measures, however, speedily proved inadequate
to cope with the energetic attack of the Illrd Prussian Corps.
The hicreasing extension of the Prussian left wing* had already
caused Marshal Canrobert to bring up Tixier's Division from
SL Marcel to the front, and to place one of its brigades in the
wood to tho north of the Roman road. The 3rd and 4th Corps
had, however, received the eommandor-in-chiefs instructions to
GXi)edito their march, and, in lieu of then* earlier orders, to move
up on the right of tlie line of battle. Upon this ^larshal Bazaino
had betaken himself in advance of the front of tlie 2nd Corps ;
he there watched tho vigorous, but on tho whole fruitless,
efforts of his troops to gain ground in a southern and south-
wofitom du'ection.

It had been, in point of fact, tho original intention of tho
commandoi'S of both French corps to remain on the defensive
in tho position in question boforo Rozonvillo; but as the forma-
tion oithe ground nowhere presented a clearly destined position,
it resulted that the detachments at first opposed to the sudden
attack of tho Pnissians frequently passed beyond the general
fighting line. Tliese attempts, however, led m no instance to
any decided RUecesses. The engagement in the main on tho
French side rather assumed the character of isolated attacks,
in which the reinforcements coming up in supi>ort only took
part in successive fractions. Owing to the ever increasing fire
of the Pi'ussian artillery, the 2nd Oorpg had to be very early
supported from the artillery reserve. Tlie loss of VionviUe and
the reinforcement of the PrnsKism guns at that place caused
more heavy batteries to bo drav.-n forv\'ard, whicli took post
towards noon north of Kczonville close to the wood where the
guns of Tixier*8 Division had previously come into action.

To oppose tho slow but firm and continuous advance of tho
Prussian infantry, tho French Divisions had by midday gradually
brought forward into first line tlieir second brigades, hitherto
apparently kept in rear.f

• The 2 Ith Regiment.

t Tho French reports which vro have nt present occn, being mtlior of a general
nature, do not explain this point vrrv clrarly ; at ill the course of the taction Ivads us
to conclude that auch was tlie ease. ^^^-** "7 rT'''^'^^^

378

Lapasset's brigade, as wo know, formed the extreme lef*t flauk
of their line of battle. It was posted between the two valleyB
which descend from the Bois de la Juree and from Rezonville to
the Bois de St. Arnould, and had probably pushed fonvai'd only
part of its forces into the last mentioned wood. Not until it had
Dcen driven out of this place were all its troops deployed upon,
and in rear of, the open height (970) south-east of Rezonville.
Inmiediatelv on its ri^ht, as before mentioned, JoUvet's brigade
had crossed the south-western edge of the Bois de Vionville
but had afterwards to give way before the forward pressure of
the 48th. General Verg^ moved up, in consequence, his other
brigade ( Valaze) on the right into tlio fighting line ; this, how-
ever, also found itself at once attacked by Geueml Schwerin's
troops.*

On the right flank of the 2nd Corps, General Bataille at the
very commencement had, as we have seen, thrown his brigade
nnder Pouget into Flavigny and Vionville, to which place
Colin's brigade of the ()th Corps was also pushed forward.

The other available troops of Bataille s Division and of the
6th Coips in advance of Bezonville were still in second line,
althougn ready to engage : Fauvart Bastoul's brigade between
Flavigny and the Rezonville - Buxieres road, Becquet de
Sounay's brigade and the 9th Regiment of the line to the noiih-
east of Vionville-t

Such was the situation of affairs when Valaze*s brigade,
yielding to the energetic pressure of General v. Schwerin, began
to retire towards the high road. General BataiUe now leads
forward in person Fauvart Bastoul's brigade into the fight ; it
finds itself^ nowever, at once exposed to an enfilade fire from the
Prussian artillery, the batteries of horse aiialleiy on the cemetery
hill being particularly efiective. General Bataille is wounded ;
General Valazi, badly hit, falls shortly after; both brigades are
thrown into disordei', and then* retreat speedily degenerates into
a huiTied flight. Further to the right, almost simultaneously with
the foregoing catastrophe, Vionville falls into the hands of the
Prussians ; in the centre of the 2nd Ooi^ps the stubbornly defended
clump of trees at Flavignv is wrested from the 8th Regiment of
Pouget's brigade, then the village is lost, and now the entire
right whig streaniH back along* the high road to Rezonville.
Fint attack In order to re-aiiimatc tlie battle in the 2nd Corps, Marshal

of thel^nch Bazame and General Frossard had recourse to their cavahy.
/JJIg^ V The nearest at hand were the ord LancersJ at Rezon\dlle, and
the Cuirassiers of the Guard; the former received orders to
charge the pursuers, the latter was to follow in echelon on the
right rear. The lancers moved off ^vith two squadrons, but
speedily returned with their mission imaccomplished, ** because

* Muin body of the lUtU lirigudo and other troops rallied at the cross roadd
Bouth-cast of Fkyigny. See p. 365.
t See p. 369.
) Belonging to the Gth Cori)8 and attached to Lapassct'd brigade.

n7o

** no definite object of attack had been pointed out to tkem."*
General du Preuil had formed tho Cuira8sici*s of the Guard into
two lines, each of two sijuadrons, which he ordcicd to movo
forward at a gallop ; the fifth squadron followed as third lino.
Checked in their career and thrown into confusion at first by
baggage waggons and other camp equipage strewn over the
ground, the regiment nevertheless carried out the prescribed
attack witli siupassing bravery.

It fell in with those companies of the Pnissian 10th Infantry
Brigadewhich were moving forward at tliis time east of I'lavimy
in the direction of the high road. Captain Hildebrand nad
deployied the 6ih and 7th pos. of the 52nd into line ; they are
awaitm^ with muskets at the ** shoulder" the first charge of tho
French norse. Powerless it shivers |before the murderous filo'
fire delivered at 250 paces. Right and left of the little body charge
the lines of horsemen ; the rear rank of the Prussians faeces about
and fires from the rear into the cnenw, who is now also received
with a fire as calm as it is deadlv n'om tho fosilier cos. of the
12th, and firom the troops of the 6th Infantry Division advancing
between Flavigny ana the high road. Far and wide is the
field strewn witn the dead and Uie wounded; the leader of the '
52nd, Captain Hildebrand, is killed ; but 22 officers, 208 cuiras-'
siers, and 243 horses is the cost to the French cavahy of the
attack upon the infantry of Brandenburg, aad it is only by the
swiftest night that the weak renmant saves itself from destruction*

Close under shelter of the bumine Flavigny stood the 11th ^'^^^J"'.
and 17th Hussars of Redem's brigade. At the instigation of ^J^'
Lieut.-Colone1 v. Caprivi^ the chief of the staff of the mSi Army PniMiui brf-
Corps, who was present and had been watching the approach of g»de and ad-
the enemy's cavalry, Lieut.-Colonel v. Bauch tlu'ew himself, with Jh^oSf. Diy.
the three squadrons of the Bnmswick Hussaiv and the remainder (12.46 to
of the 2nd squadron of the 2nd Dragoons of tiu3 Guard, upon the l p.m.)
already broken cuirassiers of the French Guard. On his right
rear followed Lieut-Colonel v. Eberstein with the 11th Hussars,
which charged the stragglers of the retreating Blench infantry.

While continuing the pursuit, hostile artillery appeared
between tho roads leading from Buxiires and :Vrom Flavigny to
Rezonville; it was a battery of artillery of the Guard just
brought up by Marshal Bazaiue in person. .Lieut-Colonel v.
Raucm ordered part of the Ist sqiiadron to wl leel to the right
and charge the flank of the ^ns, while Captain v. Vacrst,
11th Hussars, attacked them sunultaneously :m front. Com-
pletely tfiJcen by surprise, the battery had scarce! y time to deliver
a few rounds when the hussars were upon the m. The French
commander-in-chief, borne away in the flight o: f the teams and
his own personal escort, was exposed for some ) minutes to tho
most imminent danger. However, he ultims ttely found pro-
tection in the 3rd French rifle battalion, which had been lett as
reserve to Yalaz^'s brigade, whore the path f rom Flavigny to

* French Report.

3«0

Rczonvillo meets the high road. Afl at this moment Fronch
cavalry* were moving forward from various quarters to meet
the hussar attack, the latter was brought to a close and retreat
became unavoidable. The Brunswick Hussars rallied in the
bottom south-west of Flavigny, the 11th Hussars on the ceme-
tery hill. For lack of draught horses, the captured guns could
not be brought away.

As soon as the retreat of the 2nd French Corps was observed,
General v. Alvensleben, the ^enei-al commanding, had sent
orders to the 6th Cavalry Division to advance from their
covered position! and take up the pursuit of the beaten enemy.
The conveyance of the order, the ascent of the heights, and the
deployment of the Division took some little time. In their
formation of attack, Ranch's brigade on the right formed the
front line, Griiter's brigade on the left in 6chelon, the rear line.
The latter, again, was divided into two lines, of which the rear*
most was in double Echelon to the foremost.}

During this time, however, the advei-sary had not been inactive.

In order to receive the broken 2nd Corps in its retreat and to
take its place in the line of battle. Marshal Bazaine had brought
up Picard's Grenadier Division from the posting house at
GFravelotto, liaving previously ordered the Volti^eur Division to
move forward from Afalmaison to that place in its stead. The
Grenadier Division was deployed to the south of Rezonville in
order to reoccupy the lines quitted by the 2nd Corps ; its 3rd
Regiment was appointed specially to support Lapasset's brigade.
Near this Jolivet's brigade had hold its position for some time,
but that also retired on finding its right flunk threatened.

* A squadron oach from the 4th Chassoun 2i Chcval and Iho 5th Huesars (belong-
ing to tho 6th Corps) which formed Marshal Bozaino's escort,
t Further down in tho quari7 ravine. Sec p. 876.

J Gth Cayalut ■Divisio>-.

Eauoh'fl Brigade.

16th Hussni-s. 8rd Hussars.

Col. T. Schmidt* Col. t. Zieton.

Griltor's Brigatlo.
15th Laucci-8.
Col. V. Alvonslcbcn. .

3rd Lancers. Otli Cuirosifiiorrt.

OoL Count GrGbon. Lieut .-Col. Count Lynr.r.

Bee also note on p. 376.

.181

Thii3 tlio 6tli Cav?ilry Division, in its advance about 1 o'clock
along tho plateau in the formation already dcBcribcd, found no
longer fleoing detachments in its front, but fresh intact bodies of
troops. AVhen the Prussian cavalry now trotted forward through
tho line of guns, and tried to deploy for attack in front of it,
the space for the movement was found to be very limited, as
both wings had to avoid masking their own batteries; and,
moreover, the squadrons of dragoons* hitherto kept in rear of
the artillery had joined tho front hue. In addition to this, the
hussar squadrons of Redem's brigade now retiring had to be
admitted tlurough the intervals which were already too narrow.

In consequence the Division only partly deployed; generally
speakuig it remained in a lino of squadron columns, which
moved forward in the space between Flavigny and the Buxieres
road towards the high road in the closest order, exposed all tlie
time to a vigorous shell and musketry fire. The enemy's
cavalry which had shown in small bodies withdrew rapidly, the
infantry found cover in the open and in the ditches of the high
road ; their fire playing upon the mass of horaemen was aided
by that of the French artillery from distant positions north of
the high road and from behind Rezonville bottom.

Under these circumstances a continuation of the cavalry
attack gave no promise of success. Colonel v. Schmidt, who, on
Colonel Ranch being wounded, had assumed the command of
the now halted brigade, wheeled it about by divisions, and
while retiring at a walk cjiused the squadrons to take their
proper inter\''als, a movement which was effected with sangfroid
luiaer die enemy's heavy fire. In this manner the colonel led
the brigade into a covered position at Flavigny. Both regi-
ments had suffered no inconsiderable losses, especially the
Zieten Hussars, whose commander, Colonel v, Zieten, was
mortally wounded.

Griiter's brigade was equally unsuccessful in producing its
full effect. The 15th Lancers had a brief hand-to-hand skirmish
with the cavalry detachments which had hurried forward to
Marshal Bazaine s protection ;t the 6th Cuirassiers endeavoured
to advance in line towards the high road ; but tho ever-increas-
ing efficacy of the fire from tho enemy's infantrj'- rapidly brought
this attack to a close. As quietly as if on the drill ground the
Prussian regiments of cavaliy moved under their leaders' orders,
keeping their front directed towards the enemy. Colonel Count
Grooen covered the retirement of the brigade to Flavigny with
his two squadrons of Lancers, wheeling them up to the front
several times at the walk.

This apparently fruitless advance of the cavalry had, however,
been so mc of use in giving the artillery the desired opportmiiiy
of taking up a more forward position.

* 9th and 12th Bmgoons. Comparo proTious namtiTc.
t Bcc aboro.

382

Bfanttonihe
Mffeem put of
the battle.
Hold.

AdTBxioe of
thePnutiaa

Bn^ftgexnont

between the

6th Infantry

DiTision and

Oanrobert'B

Corpe.

(Up to 2 v.zi,)

The batteries of the 5th Infantry Division* once more ad-
vanced, wheeling an eighth of a circle to the right. The 2nd
heavy battery, on the right wing, remained with its flank resting
on the wood, the occupation of which was now perfectly secured ;
its northern edge was flanked by the Prussian artuery from
their new position. By this arrangement the front of then* ovm
infantry was covered, and the enemy prevented from pressing
forward over the height in front (989) into the woods, an
attempt which he frequently made. During the occasional pauses
in the engagement, the batteries on the left flank also opened
fire upon the French positions on the other side of the highroad.
As a general rule tlie engagement on the eastern part of the
battle-field partook of the character of a stationary action, in
which the Prussian infantiy,t who had almost expended their
ammunition in the hard contest, were likewise unable to make
any decisive progress beyond the northern edge of the Bois de
St. Amould. The heights in front of Rezonville (970 and 989)
thus remained in the hands of the enemy.

In the centre of the line of battle, on the immediate left, of
General v. Schwerin's position,! Colonel v. Dresky with the
three hoi-so artillery batteries of the Ilird Army Corps ci^oHsed
the road leading from Gorzo to Flavigny. Fiuilier on the left,
in the direction of the last-named village, Captain Schmner was
hastening forward with the 2nd horse artillery battery of the
Xth Army Corps into the new artillery lino. He was followed
by the two batterien which had hitherto been standing in the
vicinity of the quany raviiie.§ Simultaneously with these
movements. Colonel v. d Beeke l>roug'lit forward the artillery
from the cemetery hill | over the gnlly to the north of Flavigny
and on the finther side of it took up advantageous positions,
in which ho slightly overlapped the left of Colonel v. Dresky 's
batteries. The 3rd light biittery of the Ilird Army Corps at
Vionville had advtUicecl at the request of General v. Rothmaler
through this village and acro.ss the high road, in order to
support from the northern side the vehement stiugglo against
the 6th Freneli Corps.

The advance of the (Jth Infantry Division along the Rezon-
ville high road speedily encountered opposition from fresh forces.
In foUowng up the brigades of Pouget and Colin, driven from
Vionville and Flavigny, the Prussian infantry became exposed
to a vigorous flanking fire from the left. Marshal Canrobcrt
had deployed Becquet de Sonnay's brigade on the north of the
high road facing it obliquely, whilst the eugagonu.nt with the

* Ul uiid 2ii(l light, l.^^t uiul 2ihl licuw uF 111/ Illril, 1m1. liglil or i\w Nth Cor)K-.

S%>e p. 37-1.

t The Ut and 2nd bnldii*. of (hr -tSili, iltc 3rd rino buttii., (ho 5lh ami 8(h i-os.
of (ho 78th on ilie west, and tlie fiisdier battn. of tho tiUi on the wcdt> of tlio
bottom.

t Pages 305—36(5.

§ 6th lif;ht and Srd lieavy bati cries ol Tlird Anny Corps.

II Srd H. A. of tlio Xth^^Hb light and lib heavy batteries of the Ilird Army
Corps.

24th at tho gully between Vionvillo and St Marcel waa con-
tiuned by tho 9tli repimont of tho line. On tho right flank of
tho latter, Pcchot'R brigade of Tixicr'B Division, which had been
bronght up from St. Marcel, hud ah'cady taken part in tho
action on the Roman road. Tlie inarwhal had theroforo wheeled
hia whole coi*ps an eighth of a circle to tho left, extending its
right wing at the same time, and thoroby compelled the 6th
Infantiy Division to dolnv its forward movement on Rczonville
and front towards the north.

Tho short pause, prevailing during tho preceding cavahy en-
gagements, in the lighting of tlie Prussia!! infantry, had given
time for a slight rcorganiHation of the dillerent tinits. In pro-
poi-tioti as this took place, the (jhange of front just alluded to
and a general advance in tho dh'ection of tho Roman road were
at the samo timo cailHod into elloot. Tho French guns posted
along it had moanwliilo received aooessions of strength ; their
flro made frosh gaps in tlio battalions, already thinned in tho
provlous struggles.

After boating ofC tho chargo of tli(^ French cuirassierH, tho
remains of tho two batiah*onh of fho lotli ilrigade,''' forming
tho right wing of the new lino of attack, press forward towards
tho centre of the French positions. They even reach the high
road west of Rezonvillo, but are then ovenvhehned with a mur-
derous rain of muRket bullets, which places nearly all the offlcera
Iwr^ (h combat^ When their last (iartridgo is expended, tho
weak remnant withdraws to Vionvillo and Flavigny.

On tho left of these two battalions, (leneral v. Rothnjalor had
moved off the assemblo<l detachments of the 11th Brigade.
Whilst the gi'eater part of the 35th Regiment remauied in occu-
pation of the Flavigny-Vionville powition, Lieut. -Colonel v.
Alton, with five companies,J gained the liigh road, but was tmable
to press forward beyond it. Ho, however, took up a firm position
in the ditches, and by holding them, gave protection to the bat-
teries further to the south. Colonel v. d. Becke now brought the
2nd and 3rd horse artilleiybattei-iesof the Xth Anny Corps from
the gi'ound in front of Flavigny up to tho high road, whence they
supported from their favourable positions the infantry fire upon
the Roman road. The fusiliei-s on the left flank of the 85th, and
still further to tho li^ft tlio 1st battn. 20th Regiment, had prcssccl
fonvard some himdred paces beyond tho high road.

Tbe 64th Regiment loi-med the connecting Ihik between the
fighting line of the 11th Brigade and tho extreme left flank of
the Ilird Army Coi-ps at the oft-mcntioncd valley between Vion-
villo and tho Itomau road. At that point, afttn* lunirB of iighting,
the situation had become more and nKuc critical. The 24th
Regiment, in company with the 2nd battalion of the 2()th, liad, it

* Fu8. bftttn., 12th Bcgimcnfc ; 2i)tl battn., 62ik1 Rcgimont.

t Tho commaiidor of tho fusilier battalion, Major ▼. d. ChoTallrric, had boon
already wounded at Iho captun) of Flavifpiy, consequently boforu tlic cuiraseior
charge.

t The 1/jf, 2nd, 4tli, 7th, and 11th cop., and stmpprlcrs from other ropinients.

is tnie, repeatedly beaten off the enemy's attacks, which were
opened \vith a ^vithering fire ; but the ranks of these troops
had been ah*eady visibly thinned, and both here and in other
parts of the Division great losses had been sustained among the
senior officers. Ot the 20th Regiment, Colonel v. Flatow, Majors
Blum and v. Steuben were wounded ; of the 64th Regiment,
Lieut.-Colonel v. Winterfeld was killed, Major v. Gorschen
wounded ; of t\n^ 24th, Majors v. Sellin and v, Rechtem were
killed, V. Liidiritz badly w(mndod, and (>olonel C(mnt Dolnui
had received a contusion. Gojieral v. Rothmaler had a horao
shot mider hun.

Whilst th(». battalions of the 6th Division were thus holding
their jmsition Avith difficulty against the enemy's forces on the
Roman road, there appeared to the north of St. Marcel large
bodies of fresh troops, which were moving forward against the
left flank ol the Prussian line of battle, and were already
sweeping with their artillery the valley leading up to Vionville,

To stave off tliis threatening danger there was alone avail-
able Colonel Lehmann's demi-bripado, which, as already men-
tioned,* had reached Tronvillo ; its head, the 2nd battu. Olst
Regiment, had continued the advance noiiliwards. On reach-
ing the high road, Major v. Kienitz moved "with the 6th and
7th COS. to Vionville, and afterwards took part in the action
of the 64th, which Wiis endeavouring to press forward to the
eastward beyond that village. The two companies following
under Captain Goldschmidt had, however, continued in the
direction assigned to the battalion by tlie staff officer of the 6th
Infantry Division. They had afturwards traversed the Ti-on-
villo copses and advanced into the fightuig line of the 2nd
battn. 24tli Regiment.

The Tronville copses consist of two adjacent woods, witli a
gi-eat deal of thick undergrowth. A broad open space divides the
south- western and smaller from the larger wood, in which latter
there is another wide clearing wliich runs up so deeply from the
south-east that it is, to all intents and purposes, like%vi8e
separated into two halves. A projection from tlie wcstem side
of the larger wood completely flanks the first open space. The
wood is bomided on the north by a valley to which allusion has
already been made,t through the broad bottom of wliich runs
tlie bed of a brook, dried up on the day of the battle.

At 12.30 p.m. the remainder of Lehmann's demi-brigado Wiis
likewise brought forward into these copses. The 1^ battalions
of the Oldenburg Regiment — the 2nd and 3rd cos. on the right
wing, the fusilier battalion on the left — toiled with difficulty
through the thick undergrowth of the different copses, which
were already under shell fire from St. Marcel. After severe
efforts they at length reached the eastern edge and the salient
north-east angle of the wood, the noi*them border of which

• S.-P p. 875. t Sco p, SG2.

385

was occupied about this time by the 1st battalion of the 78th
Re^mcnt.

A vigorous fire from the long-ranging chassepot was now
directed upon these troops, to which, on account of the great
distance, they were unable to reply with the noodle gun. At
the very commencement Major v. Runckelof the 78th Regiment
was wounded; the commander of the Oldenburg Regiment,
Colonel T. Eameke, was killed at the north-east angle of the
wood. Major v. Napolski with the two musketeer companies
of this latter regiment strives in vain to advance into the open;
outflanked on melefl, he finds himself compelled to retire to the
border of the wood, whither the left wing of the 24th has also
withdrawn.

These positions were provisionally maintained, although even
at this time fresh reinforcements were continually arriving in
their front on the right wing of the French army.

The reports from fugitive villagers of a continuous advance of *^'> advance
large bodies of Prussian troops from the Moselle valley towards ^^ FrcncU
Gorze, could only have increased Marshal Bazaine's apprehen-
sions for his left flank. It was owing to this, that the rifle batta*
lion of the French Guard, and afterwards the rest of the Division
of Yoltigeurs of the Guard, were pushed fonvard into the Bois
des Ognons, and their place occupied by bringing up Mon-
taudon s Division of the 3rd Corps by way of Yilliers aux Bois to
the posting house at Gravelotte. On the south of this village
were being rallied the two shattered Divisions of the 2nd Corps,
guarding the valley leading down to Ars. All the other parts of
tiie army, however, were employed in reinforcing their own right
and outflanking the Prussian left wing. Two Divisions under
Generals Nayrnl and Aymard deployed about 1.30 p.m. between
St. Marcel and Bmville, keeping up connexion on the left with
Tixier's Division of tlie 6th Corps. In rear of these the 4th
Corps was on the march vi& Doucourt. After Lapasset's brigade
had been reinforced by the 3rd Regiment of Grenadiers,* a
brigade of Levassor-Sorvars Division was also advanced through
Rezonville to the westward, in order to rejoin the left flank of
the 6th Corps.t

Marshal Canrobert had up to this time successfully resisted all
attempts io thrust him from his position ; he observed that the
fire of the Prussian troops opposed to him was becoming weaker,
and that to all appearance their strength had begun to faiL
Being protected on his left by the advance of fresh troops, and
assured of the speedy co-operation of the 3rd and 4th Corps, the
marshal resolved to take advantage of the favourable turn of
events, and move against Vionville with all his force.

* See p. 880.

t Thus Manlud Canrobert had the following parte of his oorps at dispOBal to the
west of Besonyille :— >

9th Regiment of Bisson's Division . . J *^™*" '*^-

Tizier*s Division, nortli of the Bomau road.

386

Caralrycbarga
of Bredow'a
brigade and
ita rosulta.
(2-8 P.U.)

Ou the other Bide, General v. Alvensleben had now succeeded,
through the impetuous advance of his two Divisions, in drawing
upon himself four hostile Corps and in forcing them to deploy.
With these results he might rest content, tliere was no necessity
for any further advance ; liis present object was rather to avoid
being crushed by the enemy's superior force. For it was only
2 p.m., the day therefore young; no infantry, not a gun in
reserve, and the nearest support, the 2()th Division, as yet a long
way in rear. It was now time to see what a self-saciificing
cavahy could do, for that alone was at hand to be launched
against the attack opened by Mai*shal Canrobert.

After a consultation between the general commanding the
Ilird Army Corps and the commander of the 5th Cavahy Division,
the latter had undertikcn to Kccurc the left flank of the corps
^vith two brigades, and to place tiio ihird at the special disposal
of General v. Alvensleben. For the first of these duties there
were, as already mentioned, the regiments of Redern's brigade,
and the 13th Dragoons of Bredow's brigade employed at difi'erent
points, whilst the other parts of the Division had l)een with-
draAvn from the west side of the Tronville copses towards tho
vicinity of that village.* IJarby's brigade now received orders
to make a fresh advance to the west ot those wodds, in order to
protect the infantry therein from the attack which threatened
from the direction of Bruville.

There remained at the disposal of General v. Alvensleben tlio
two heavy regiments of Bredow's brigade. They had been
hitherto halted on the north-west slopes of the Tronville heights
in squadron columns at close intervals, and at General v. lihein-
baben's instigation had moved off in this formation to the
western issue from Vionville. During the movement an orderly
officer of the Illrd Army Corps brought orders to the brigade
for two squadrons to reconnoitre through the woods nortli of
the ^^llage, for which pui'pose a squadron was chosen by lot
from each regiment.f

Meanwhile the crisis already depicted had arisen in the general
situation of the engagement, and had l)een recognised by
Geneml v. Alvennleben. In order first to relieve tho 6th In-
fantry Division, and at the same time to bring about a rapid
decision, it appeared of primary importance to silence the
hostile batteries on the Roman road. Colonel v. Voigts Rhetz,
chief of the general staff, brought orders for General v. Bredow
to attack. The latter saw at a glance that, under existing cir-
cumstances, the objecjt could only be gained by an energetic
attack, in which the cavalry must charge home, come what naght,
and if necessaiy should and must sacrifice itself. With this reso-
lution the general proceeJotl without delay to carry cmt his

• See p. 376.

t Thoso two hqufidi'onH, tho iJnl of tliu 7(h Cniris: ic.s ami the l>t of tlu* Ifitli
Laiirers, advaiKcd in nicuauui.o with their spcvial liii-iiion, consequL'iUly takint^ no
jiart in tlu; cli:ir<:<> of tlio bri^jjiwU*, an 1 sub^iiui^.itly formed rallying points for tlio

(l(j!)i'i:i ( f I'lvir r vinviit*.

387

instructions. Ho ordered his six still available squadrons fii^st to
front eastward, and then 'wheeled to the loft, in order to make
use in his subsequent movement of the covcu* nfIord(Ml \iy tlie
depression of the ground to the north of Vionville ; thiiH protected
he wheeled to tlio right by divisiouK, took intervals while riding
forward towards the edge of the heights lying to the eastward,
and formed line to the front.

Ifh Cuir.

IWh Lan,

INI
Mil
UN

II II
UN
till

' •■■■■■•

rm
rm

I I I I ViOKVILLE.

7M Cuir. X^a Lan,

Under an overwhelming artillery and infantiy fire pom-od in at
close range, the brigade dashes forward in line, Major Count
Schmettow with the 7th Cuirassicra* on the left, and Major v. d.
DoUen with the 16th Lancers on the right, against the nearest
masses of the enemy. The fu-st French line is ridden over, the
line of guns broken through, teams and gunners put to the sword.
The second line is powerless to check the vigorous charge of
horse ; the batteries on the heights fm-ther to the rear limber
up and seek safety in flight. Kager to engage, and thirsting
for victory, the Prussian squadrons cliarge even through the
valley which descends from the Roman road to Rezt)nville, until

* Tbe oominandar of the regiment had been laid up since the beginning of t lie
campfttgn in oonaequence of a serere faU with his hone.

r> 2

388

at length after a career of 3,000 paces they are met on all adea
by French cavalry.

Foi-ton's Cavalry Division, which at the commencement of the
battle Avas pai-fly dispersed, had been, as we have seen, again
asBGinbled by Marshal Bazaine to the north of Rezonville and
been formed up imder cover.* A most &vourable opportunity
was now presented for repairing the fault committed in the
morning. General Forton sent Murat's brigade of dragoons
against the front, and the 7th Cuirassiers agamst the left flank
of the Pni8sians,t and two squadrons of the 10th Cuii'assiers to
attack them in rear. At the same time, Yalabr^gue's Cavalry
Division moved up from Rezonville.

General v. Bredow sounds the recall. Breathless from the
long ride, thinned by the enemy's bullets, withont reserves, and
hemmed in by hostile cavahy, they have to fight their way back.
After some hot mSl^es with hostile horsemen, they once more cut
their way through the previouslv over-ridden lines of artillery
and infantiy ; harassed by a thick rain of rifle bullets, and with
the foe in rear, tlie remnant of the two regiments of Prussian
cavalry hastens back to Flavigny. The hoBtilo cavalry undei'took
no serious pursuit ; they limited their efforts chiefly to makine
prisoners of the wounded, and of those horsemen whose jaded
steeds compelled them to remain behind.

Bredow'b brigade rallied in rear of Flavigny. Neither of his
two regiments could at fii-st form more than one squadron out of
the three which had taken part in the charge, for the bold attack
had cost them half their men and horses.f Major v. d. Dollen,
commanding the Lancers, had fallen into the enemy's hands as
he lay beneath the dead body of his horse. Captain Meyer of
the Cuirassiers fell at the heaa of his squadron.

Meanwhile General v, Uedeni had brought up the 11th Hussars
between Vionvillo and Flavigny, in support of bredow's brigade.
The services of that regiment Averu, however, not called for, as
the adversary, "with fai* superior forees,§ had only followed up
witli flankera.

The victiiiiH of this eharge, courageous inito death, had not
fallen in vain. The commenced advance of the 6th French
Coi-ps was checked, and was now — it is stated, by order of
Mai'shal Bazaine, who was at this moment apprehensive of a

• See p. 359.

t The 7th Fi'Oiich Cuirassiers ngainst the 7th Prussian Cuirassiers,
j Tho six 6quudi\>ns, iu all under 800 strong, had the fallowing losses : —

Cuirassiers 7 oflicers, 189 men, 209 horses.
Laiicera 9 ,. 174 „ 200 „
§ According to Frciicli reports, tho caralry which opposed Brcdow*B Brigade
amounted to 3,100 horse : —

Alurat's Brigade (Ist and 9th Dragoons) . . i- 600 1 v .^
Gramont's „ (7th and 10th Cuirassiers) . . - 800 J •^*'"*'"'
4th Chasseurs .. .. .. .. » 4001

Gth „ of live squadrons .. .. -> 500 V Yalabr^gue.

7th nnd 12th Dragoons « 800 J

3,100

389

fresh attaok on his left flank — entirely abandoned. At any rate
the French made no fresh advance from the direction of Rezon-
ville this day. Thus the pressure was again completely taken
off the 6th Infantry Division on this side. During the charge of
the cavalry, the 1st battalion and the fusilier cos. of tlio 2()th
Regiment had ascended the long-contested edge of the lioights
from the high road and taken up a firmer poRitioii than before,
opposite the Roman road. They were supported in this move-
ment by different detachments of the 64th Regiment on the left,
and by the two Oldenburg companies,* and parts of the 35th
Regiment on the right. As the enemy cunic again into action
but very gi*adually between tlie high road and the Roman road,
and in the copses on the latter, these troops maintaine<l tlieir
advanced positions, even some lime after the left wing of the
Division had been compelled to retire. On the other hand, the
pause in the mfantry fight had been utilised in witlidi-awing the
much-thinned ranks of the 64th Regiment bchhid Vion^nlle, for
the purpose of forming a reserve at that point ; for it might be
assumea that before long the want of it would be again felt in
the north.

It was now 3 o'clock.

The engagement between those troops which faced each
other east and west is, in consequence of the present exhausted
condition of both sides, continued chiefly by the artillery, with
varying energy. On the west of the present field of battle,
however, fresh forces have come up both from the south and the
north. Between them a fresh and severe struggle kindles as
the afternoon progi*esses I

The Battle after 3 p.m.J

Artuval op the Xtk Army Corps (up to 5 p.m.).

Diuring the time that the cavalry charge just depicted was Rotircir.cnt of
taking place between the high ro.ul to Rezonvillc and the Roman tho PruBsian
road, Barby's cavalry brigade i, in aceordiuKH* with the iask J.V'^*' ^^-II*^ *^
assigned to it, had assumed its duties of jjiotecting the left
flank from the direction of Bruville. Leaving the Troiiville
copses on the right, the brigado crossed the deep valley in
front, and together with the 13th Dragoons, which were already
there, took up a position on tho opposite bank for the purpose
of watching the enemy's troops, visible at Bruville and
St. Marcel. Nearest to the enemy on the southern slope of the
long ridge (834) were the two regiments of dragoonsj; behind
them were the two heavy regiments in squadnm columns.

• 6th and 7lli. See prcrious narratirc.

t Tho Plan 5 B gires the i^cnoral position of ilie opposed armies towards 6 p.m.

t The 13th and 19th. The former regiment had pushed forward a squadron
each against the two villages. The other mored in a body towards the side of St.
Marcel.

The adversary at Bruville and St. Marcel, etill awaiting ap-
parently the reinforcements advancing from Donconrt, limited lus
eflbrts at fii-st to a rather sharp fire of shell upon the Prussian
cavalry,* v/hilst lu; maintained a delaying action with his infantry
again.st the Tronville eoi)HC8. When, however, Gronier'a Division
of the 'tth (yivpa had reached l>niville, and had reinforced the
riglit wing of the ih'd, the French considered the moment for a
fmther advance to have arrived. About 2.45 p.m. the enemy's
infantry moved forward in dense swarms. Shortly afterwards
Barby's brigade found itself tcmehed by the fire of the skirmishers
posted behind bushes, hedges, and ditches, then overwhelmed
with volleys from a range of GOO to 800 paces, whilst the
mitrailleuses joined with their tire from the rear. The Prussian
cavalry therefore withdrew slowly in the direction of Tronville.
Against the Tronville copses was now dii*ected the whole
weiglit of the enemy's attack, for which the two Divisions of
the 3rd Coipsf were formed up in front, while Grenier's Division
of the 4th on the right, and Tixid's Division of the 6th Coi-ps on
the left, were en<lcavouring to turn the flanks of the Prussian lino
of battle. Owing to the pressm-e of 'i'ixier s Division, the valley
betwecji Vionvillcand St. llarcel had first to be evacuated. The
Brandenburg batlalions.J which were nearly destroyed in the
long struggle at that point, witlidrew towards the copses occu-
pied by Lehmann's dcmi-brigade. ]iut when these had likewise
fired their last cartridge at the pursuhig enemy, the north-east
angle of the wood had to be yielded, its defendei's finding them-
selves pressed back into the interior with heavy losses. Still
the wet ground, thick withiuulergrowth, hampered the enemy s
forward movement. Turning to account every advantage, the
Prussian companies retired step by step, although they were at
the same time being gradually outflanked from the wcNt. Not
until after more than an liour's fighting did the French succeed
in gaining possession of the northern part of the wood, in
efteeting which they were supported by the fire of their batteries
commanding tlie valley towards Vionville.

'J'he gnns concentrated to the west of Vionville afio'rded a
rallying point to the left wing of the Prussian fighting line
which was thus pressed back.

]^>tli horse artillery l)atteiios of the Xth Army Corps had,
IVoni Ihc ir r^^'cent ])();^ition east of VionvilK*,§ efiectively supported
fur some time ilie attack of Ihe infantry against the Koman
rojul, Ijiit in coiji^equence of the heavv losses which they
h:ul sustained were afterwards temporarily withdrawn. When
tlie action at tlie Tronville copsi'S assiuued the phase just
depicted, the i\vd liorse artilK ly battery again advanced round

*• 'L'liis wns ivplicd to for soiuo time by the hor*e artillery battery of the Prussian
CuiinU whicii >vitli tl;o bri^udc of clra<;oou:) of tUo Guard liad hastened ahead of tho
lyth Hrilf-Division. Si*9 p. 398.

f Nnyral ;ind Aynmrd, Sec p. 385.

X The 24th Regiment and 2nd battn. 20Lli Kogiuicnt.

§ See p. 382.

301

the Boiitli of Vionville at a gallop, and came up between the
batteries of the Cth Infantry Division,* which had been posted
bj' General v, Buddenbrock on the west side of the village to
the north of the road, and had been firing without iiitonnission
for a considerable time.

The French artillery at the Roman road and to the south of
St. Marcel meanwhile directed a powerful cross-fire upon those
four Prussian batteries, which were at the same time reached
by infantiy fire from the Tronville copses, and taken in reverse
by a battery on the ridge south of Bniville through the opening
in the wood. As, moreover, the ammmiition was nearly
expended, the commander of the Division, who was present,
ordered the four batteries to abandon their very advanced
positions. Lieut.-Colonel Beck ordered them therefore to retire
in echelon to a position of readiness in rear of the heights
south-west of Vionville, where they replenished their ammu-
nition.

Major Eorber's batteries, which in their positions south of the
high road had been hitherto somewhat withdrawn from the
enemy's flanking fire, liad now to bear the bmnt of the French
superior forces, which were pressing forward from three sides.
He was joined shortly after by 1st Lieut, v. Pressontin with the
8rd light battery of the Ilird Army Corps, wliich had supported
the attack towards the Roman road from its position north-cast
of Vionville.t When the left flank of the Prussian line of battle
was thrust back, this battery also found itself threatened by
the enemy's infantry, and in consequence had to commence its
retreat, which was not effected without heavy loss. The battery
had to unlimber frequently, in order to keep off" the enemy, who
was pressing forward to close quarters, until it ultimately suc-
ceeded in reaching Major Korber's positions and forming up
with him.

But meantime the situation of affairs at this point had also
become more and more critical. Three batteries of Grenier^s
Division had come into action on the heights west of the Tronville
copses, and their projectiles took in reverse the line of Prussian
guns on the high road, iioth batteries of the left wingj were
obliged to show front to the loft rear, in order to open fii'e in
this direction, whilst the other two,§ forming with them a right
angle, continued their fire towards the north and north-east.

Meanwhile the Prussian infantiy had evacuated the Tronville
copses, protected by the brave front shown by the artillery. The
remnant of the four Brandenburg battalions formed up to the
east of Tronville. The 24th Kcgimcnt had in its obstinate
resistance^ prolonged for five whole hours, lost SJ) officers and
1,000 men ; of the fusiUer battalion all the officers were hors de

• 5tli light, 5tli and 6t1i hcayy. Sco p. 375.

t See p. 382.

t Ist H. A. of tlio IVth and Crd Hglst of tbo HIrd Army Corps.

S Ist heavy and Ist U. A. of the Xlh Anny Corp3.

ao2

romlntt, and tlio cnlonr l)cavers had l)i'on twice nhot doAni. Jii
like mttiiner the 2nd battahoii of the 2()th was g,Teatly reduced.
The battalions of the 37th deini-bngade, which had also suf-
fered heavily, occupied Tronville, and an*anged the \'illage for
defence; theyhad sustahied a totalloss of 20 oflicera and 600 men.
Detachments of the demi-brigade continued to maintiiin their
groimd in the western partof the copses,as the enemy only pressed
forward in force on the eastern edge. In view, however, of the
immense preponderance of the French forces, their advance across
the high road might bo momentarily expected. In this critical
situation of the engagement, the 20th Infantry Division, after a
march of 27 miles, reached the battle-iiuld ncarTronville at 4 p.m.
The troops at General v. Voigts Khctz's dinposal, as already
mentioned, had at first received general instructions to push
forwanl on the left of the Ilird Army Corps against the enemy's
lines of retreat to tlie Meus(\ In accordance with the ordera of
the general connnanding,* the troops had moved off from their dif-
ferent j)ositions on the morning ot the 16th, and those intended
for a reconnaissance in force towards Rezonville were by midday
gradually involved in the engagements on the plateau in that
direction.!

General v. Schwarzkoppen with the remainder of the 19th

Division had commenced his advance at 7 a.m. from Thiaueourt

in the direction of St. Ililaire, whither he had been preceded

by the brigade of dragoons of the Guard placed imder his

ordera. During the march feeble sounds of cannon had been

Jieard on the right. This was at first considered to betoken an

action between the 5th Cavalry Division and a French rear

guard ; but in <n-der to as(5ert^\in for certain the state of affairs,

(ieneral v. Yoigts-lihetz rode forward witli the 3rd sq. 2nd

Dragoons of the Guard by way of Woel to Jonville. The arrival

at this moment of reports from Lieut. -Col (mel v. Caprivi,} chief

of the staif, who had been despatched from Thiaueourt in the

morning, cau.sed tlie general to move at once to Tron\alle, whither

(Colonel Lelnnann's demi-brigade, according to a report from that

oflicjcr, hadalns'idy pro(*eedc(l of its awn accord from (^hambley.

( )n rea<;hing Tronville the general found the whole of the neigh-

boTU'ing Corps involved in a serious engagement. lie therefore

at once issued tluj necessaiy orders in all directions, so as to

bring up his own troops as quickly as possible to the battle-field.

Re-occupation The 20th Infantry Division, with the field di\n8ion of the

Tronville corps artillery attached, had reached its appointed position at

copse* by the Thiaucourt at ll.oO a.m., and pushed outposts westward along

20th Infantry the road to Verdun. The roar of artillery which resounded

Division. j^ |j^g f^^. distance caused them while on the march to send

away officer-patrols in a northerly direction. A conmiunica-

• Sec p. 357.

t 6th Cavalrv DiriDion, three horae orlillcry bat tori ci of the Xth Corps, with a
:':^undi*oii of Drugoonn of the Guard, the 37th lufy. Brigade, the Dth Dragoons, and
two iicld l>atterioi of the Xth Corps. Compnrn the preceding narratire.

; fijco p. 357.

tion from Liout.-Colonel v. Caprivi, Rent from tho battle-field,
confinned Major-General v. Kjraatz in tho resolution ho had
abready formed of leading forward his entire Division to that
place. The troops were set hi motion with all possible speed by
way of Charey and St, Julien.*

I'he two leading battalions of the 39th Brigade reached the
neighbourhood of Chambley about 2.J^0 p.m., and continued
their advance to Tronville under General v, Woyna.

General v. Eraatz had sent forward the staff officers of the
Division to reconnoitre towards Tronville, and had ridden
forward in person in the direction of Flavigny. As there
appeared to be a visible want of infantry in the centre of the
line of battle of the llird Army Corps, tho general considered it
of primary importance to support it at once, lie therefore sent
orders to the 39th Brigade to join with one regiment in the
action of the 5th Infantry Division, and, in accordance therewith,
the three rear battalions of the brigade bent away to the right
from the column of route. On rejoining the Division at the
du Sauley farm. General v. Kraatz also sent forward the two
batteries marching with that brigade towards the eastern side
of the battle-field. The two heavy batteries of the corps artil-
Iciy took the same direction shortly after.t

Whilst in the neighbourhood of St. Julien, Colonel Baron
V. d. Goltz, commanding the conis artillery, had received i)er-
mission from the commander of tne Division to hasten forward
with his two light batteries { to the battle-field ; the 16th Dra-
goons, at the head of the Division, were to act as escort to the
two batteriea Tho regiment had, however, already gone on
independently, formed up between Puxieux and Tronville, and
subsequently placed itself, according to recjuest, at the disposal
of the commander of the 5 th Cavalry Division.

Meanwhile Colonel v. d. Goltz had gone past the 39th Brigade
^vith his two batteries, and from Chambley had struck across

* Ordrr of march of tlio 20th Tnf. Division in itfl adrnnco from Thiaucourt to tfie
battle flehl :—

lf)th Dragoons

1st and 2nd bnttns., 79th Kegt. . .
3rd light and 3rd heavy batterica .
1st and 2nd battns., 56th Hegt. . .

Fus. battn., 79th Ki^gt

6th and 6th light batteries . . "*

6th and 6th hcarv bati cries

17th Begiment *

4th light and 4th hcarj batteries .
1st and Fas. battns., 92nd Regt. .

10th rifle battn _

The Fus. battn., 79th Begt., had been on outpost duty, and consequently away
fimm the regiment.

The Fus. battn., 66th Begt., which had been led in rear to guard the army head-
quarters at Pont i Mousson, had to await relief by the 2nd battn. of the 92nd, and
was now coming up from that place.

t The arrim of these troops (1st and 2nd battn. 56th Regt., Fus. battn. 79t]i,
8rd light, 8rd, 5th and 6th hea?^ batteries) on the scene of action of the 6th Infantry
Dinsion will bo presently described.
t The 6th and 6th.

39tli Brigade (Woyna).

Of the corps artillery.

40t}i Brigade (Diringshofen).

394

country in a northerly direction. Conducted by a staff officer
of the Xth Army (jorps to Tronvillc, he took np a position to
the west of the village, so as to oppose the enemy's enveloping
attack on the Tronvillc copses.

The m.iH«(;H (»f infantry of (Jrenicr's Division, advancing on the
wcHt of the c<^>p8f8, j)ropar»'<l at once to press forward nito the
wood still occupied by the last detachments of the 37th denii-
bi-igadc. Wlum the hostih.' infantry had arrived within a mile
and came under fire of the Prussian artilleiy at Tronville, the
latter opened upon them, and was responded to by the three
batteries of (jreuier's Division on tlic heights north of the high
road. Taking a<l vantage <»f a rctn»grade movement of the
enemy's infantr}', Colonel v. d. Goltz brought Ixith his batteries
up to the high road, and after u short cannonade likewise drove
away thofl(; gims, against which Major Korber's line of artil-
lery had hitherto been opposed luider circtunstances of great
dimculty. An attempt on the part of the colonel to cross the
high road with his batteries and the two squadrons of the 4th
Cuirassiers attached as escort, fiiiled at the outset, owing to the
vigorous fire of the opposing infantry.

The so two batteries of the cot\)h artilleiy were joined shortly
after by the 4th heavy and 4th liglit batteries, which had been
fetched up at a trot from the column of route of the 40th Infantry
Brigade, and now extended the lino of gimson the highroad as
far as tbo wood on the ri^lit. The four batteries directed a
coiHunitiatcil lire on <ho I'leiich artilleiy, which had again un-
lin)l>ered to the n.tnWi of Druville.

I'lie success acjhieved against the French artillery had also
induced Major Korber to Avheel uj* the left wing of his artillery
line once more to tluj iiortli. InunetHalely afterwards, hoM'evcr,
his four biitieries found theinsjlvcs attacKcd by hostile swarms
of skirmishers, which were prcKsiug on towards them from the
Tronville copses to Avitliin 1,()0() paces. At this critical moment
arrived tlie 2ud liorso artillery battery of the Xth Anny Coras,
which had just replenished its annnunition, and by its help tlie
encuny*H onHlau;;ht wns repnlscd.* The French hastened back
in disorder to the adjoining e^lj^N' oi'tho wood, from which they
never again v<M»tuved to emerge.

Th(j advanced partion of the 2()lh Divisioji had meanwhile
arrived.

Towartlrt huU-past i\ o\;lov.k llu [wi) b.Mttns. of the 70th Regi-
ment, whieli were advancin;)^- tiAvardy the north, had reached
Tronville, and had formed ecnjipany columns at open intervals
to the south of that vill:)^';o. AIU r a fjiort conHultation between
till? general comniaiuiing tiiid {ha eoininiinder of the Division,
they wenj at once moved oil* in the direction of the copses, from
which detnehinents of the tioo^'S hitherto defending them

•* Juijor KoriiiT littil tbcr*'ft»!V l.lic fo'.lov, ing fivo baltLTica at Iiis dLi^osal : — 1st
n. A. ol" tho IVt]i, 3r! \l^h\ of the lllnl, 1st luivy, 1st and 2nd II. A. baUcrica of
tho Xth Army Corps.

395

were continually pouring. The .Ist battalion passed by the
west of Tronville, which was occupied by the 1st company ; the
2nd remained in reserve on tlie hi^h road, the other two occupy-
ing, for the protection of the batteries upon it, the western edge of
the smaller copse, which was as yet unapproached by the enemy.
The 2nd battalion, keeping Tronville on its left, traversed with
the 5th, 7th and 8th cos. the eastern part of this copse, whilst
the 6th company, which was on the rignt flank, advanced directly
upon the south-east ccmior of the large copse. The three fii'st-
named companies in crossing the open space, came under mus-
ketry fire from the flanking noi-th-west projection of the great
copse ; they, however, forced their way as lar as the first clear-
ing, on the nearest edp^e of which they took up a finn position.
The 6th company had found iho south-east corner of the wood
free from the enemy. In its further advance it came under a
heavy fire ; still it succeeded in reaching the noi'th-east part of
the wood on the further side of the clearing.

The positions in question were, in general, finnly held by the
battalion. The enemy's skirmishera upon the heights at the
Roman road directed their fire against the Tronville copses,
without, however, causing any very serious loss. Later on the
6th company endeavoured to press forward along the north-
eastern plateau ; a withering hr(^ however, in front and on his
left flank compelhul Captain v. Sc^honfeldt to retire into the
wood, after having maintained, with the assistance of parts of
the 7th and 8th cos., the open hill-slope in front for a consider-
able time.

Wliilst the 2nd battn. 79th RcgiiiKnit, in the manner thus
described, captured the oastern side of the Tronville copses, and
showed front towards the lloman road, further progress was
made in the other parts of the wood. Into the corner of the
smaller copse, already occupied by three companies, followed,
on thelarrival of the 4()th Brigade, the 2nd co. 79th Regiment
from tlie high road, and about 5 o'clock pressed forward to
the north-west projection of the large copse. The advereary did
not await the attack, but, on tlie contrary, withdiew comjjletely
froin that corner of the wood followed by tho company, which
pressed on towards the northoi ii edge and there continued to
skirmish with superior forces of tlie enemy's infantry until
nightfall.

Meanwhile, towards half-past 4 o'clock, the 40th Brigade had
formed up at Tronville. As the two battalions of the 79th
Regiment had separated to the right and left in their advance
through the copses. General v. Kraatz ordered the 17th Regi-
ment, which fonned the first line of the 40th lirigade, to follow
into the wood and fill the gap in the middle of the foremost
lino of battle. Each battalion formed its flank companies in
first line; the other six companies followed in lino of half-
battalions at deplojring intervals. After the regiment had passed
beyond the east side of Tronville in this formation, it entered
the large copse under the enemy's shell fire, gained the clearing.

and lengthened the loft winj^* of the 7Uth, Avhich had penetrated
therein.*

» The three battalions still available of the 40th Brigadef were
posted by General v. Kraatz in a position of readiness between
the high road and the southern copse, where they were joined
at 5 o'clock by the fiisiHcr battn. of the 5()th, just arrivid from
Pont a Monshjon, Fresh forces were therefore once more avail-
able to repel any renewed attack.

Such, however, did not tjike plate for the present. The French
Divisions, which had been enc^aged in the previously described
attack on the copses, had reverted to nearly their original circum-
stances. From their positions, on tlie lloman road,t and on the
heightjsi between it and the road Irom Bruville to Mars la Tour,§
they threw shrapnel and conuiion shell into the wood. The valley
lying in front of its northern edge separated the combatant
detachments of infantry. Colonel v. d. Goltz's two batteries had
advanced along the west side of the copses as far as these heights
on which, not long before, the farthest-advanced line of guns of
Grenier's Division had been posted. The batteries of the 40th
Brigade had Ukewise followed the advance of the infantry on
the west of the copses, and had taken up a forward position
about GOO paces beyond the high road.

Owng to the opportune arrival of the 20th Infantry Division
on the left flank of the Ilird Army Corps, and the occupation of
the Tronville copses, the original position of affairs at that point
had been re-established. This rapid change, the retreat of a far
superior force of the enemv in front of a few &esh battalions, can
only be perhaps explained by tlie simultaneous co-operation of
other causes.

The vigorous attacks of the Prussians from the direction of
Vionvillo nad caused Marshal Bazaine to reinforce the 6th Corps
west of Rezonville in the manner already alluded to ; || his
chief solicitude was, however, still directed to his oAvn left wing,
and he consequently remained there in person, in order to be
able to meet in good time any turning movement of the German
forces in the woods on the left bank of the Moselle. Less ap-
prehensive about tlie right wing of the army, he had about
5 o'clock merely sent orders to JIarslial Leboeuf to maintain
(**de maintenir fortement") his position in conjunction with
the Cth Corp.H. This order, and perliai)s also a certain anxiety
on the part of Jlarshal Lelxxjuf lor his own right flank, caused
by the intelligence of the advance of German troi»pn by way of
Hannonville upon Ville sur Yron,may have induced him, in face
of the advance of the 2()th Division, to suspend once more the
attack now in progress upon Tronville.

• cth, 7th, and 8th companiis.

t Tho 1st and Fus. buttns. of llio U2iul, lOtli riflo bnttnlion ; the ktte»* hud also
advanced into the copsos in tlio fir>t inbUinto, but had been again withdrawn.

X Tixi<'r's l)ivi;^ion of thu Gtli Corps.

§ In this space had been previously Htandin^; NaynVs and Aymavd'a Pi^ibions of
the 3rd, Grcnici- s of tlic 'ItU Corps. Nayral's J)ivi:.nou liad been meunwiiile called
away by Marslial Bazaino for employment elsewhere.

II See p. S85.

397

The detachment, -whoso appearance at Hannonvillo had made Adnmie of
itself remarked at tliis Btap^o, was the Half-Division* wliich had theii.thllnlf-
becn originally moved early that morning toAvards St. Hilaire, gt.Thiriro '^
inider General v. Schwartzkoppeu, and of which the brigade andifrjxlc-'
of dragoons of the Guard had reached the latter village at 10 a.m. plojinont at
During the march the patrols had heard the soimd of guns to the ^*" '** ^""''"
eastward, although indistinctly, and as this continued Major-
General Count Brandenburg II., with the sanction of the com-
mander of the Division, advanced with the 1st Dragoons of the
Guard and the Ist horso artillery battery of the Guard, in the
direction of the supposed field of battle.

In other respects General v. Schwartzkoppen saw no cause at
present for deviating from the direction oi march prescribed in
the general order to the army. This would bring him ultimately
on the noith-west towards the reach of the Mouse below Verdun,
over which it was supposed the French army was now in the
act of crossing. Intelligence with regard to the occurrences of
the preceding day led him to conjecture that the proceedings to
the eastward were merely attacks on a strong rearguard, Avith
which the Ilird Army Corps, in conjunction with the 37th Bri-
gade directed on Chambley, was quite competent to deal. It
was known also that the general commanduig the corps was on
the battle-field ; his orders from tJieuce might be expected, and
until then the instructions already received must be followed,
the object of which was also to throw light upon the movements
along the northern road by Etain.

Under these circumstances the troops were ordered to form
up temporarily to the south of St. Hilaire. The 2nd battn. 57th
Regiment and the two sauadrons of the 2nd Dragoons of the
Guard, left behind at St. ililaire, received instructions to place
outposts in the direction of Verdun, and to make a reconnaissance
towards the Etain road.

Before the troops were completely formed up, an order received
shortly after noon from General v. Voigts Bhetz summoned the
Half-Division to the nieighbom-hood noii;h-east of Chambley in
support of the Ilird Army Corps.

The direct road to that point passes through Jonville and
Xonville. But as it was meanwhile ascertained from more
recent reports that Colonel Lehmann was hotly engaged to the
north of Tronville, the great road to Mars la Tour was chosen,
as it would either bring them on the left flank of the fighting
line, or, should the enemy have meanwhile gained ground, on his
flank and rear.

In order to protect the trains the outpost battalion with a
weak detachment of cavalry remauied at St. Hilaire ; the 4th sq.
2nd Dragoons of the Guard trotted on at once to Mars la Tour :

* Tlio 38th Iniantiy Brigade with the 2n<l light and 2ud hcayj hattcrics, and the
2iid and 3rd pioneer companies of the Xi\\ Army Corps. Besides tlieso tlio brigade
of dragoons of the Guara and 1st II. A. battery of the Guard, the former only six
rquadrons stronff. Of the 2nd Dragoons of the Guard there was, as is known, a
squadron with toe horse artillery batteries of tlic Xth Corps ; another was witli
General t. Toigts-Rhots. See p. 302.

398

G eneral V. Schwartzkoppen resumed his march with the remainder
of the troops* shortly aGfter 12.30 p.m.

General Count Brandenburg nad meanwhile reached the
vicinity of Mars la Tour, and from that point watched the move-
ments of the masses of French troops visible to the north.
Reinforced by the squadron which had hastened up from St.
Hilaire, he advanced in the direction of Ville sur iron, and
descried in the vicinity of that place a superior force of hostile
cavalry, which, however, remained entirely inactive. Whilst the
1st Dragoons of the Guard skirmished towards the wood near La
Grange faim, occupied by French cavalry, the 4tli sq. of the
2nd Dragoons of tlie Guard moved with the battery to the
plateau in front of Bruville, from whence the guns responded
tor some time with good results to the fire of the French artillery
which was directed at Darby's bricade-t The enveloping attack
upon the Prussian left wing and the general retreat of the latter
induced General Count Brandenburg about 3 p.m. also to retire
upon Mai-s la Tour. He took up a covered position to the south-
west of the village with his five squadrons and the battery.

At 3.30 p.m. (ieiionil v. Schwartzkoppen, with the head of his
Half Division, reached Suzomont. Ho had originally intended
to move by way of Ville sur Yron against the flank of the enemy,
whose position was guessed chiefly by the rising powder smoke.
But more recent signs coupled with the reports which met him
placed it beyond doubt that there was no longer time for such
a circuitous movement, but that it was imperative to make aa
rapid a junction as possible with hiH own left wing in the direc-
tion of Tronville. In order to ensure the connection with the
other parts of the corps under all circumstances, the fusilier
battn. of the IGth was pushed forward on the right to Mariaville
farm ;t the squadron of dragoons brought up from St Hilaire
was sent to the left towards the Etain road, as the clouds of dust
to the northward led to the supposition that troops were march-
ing along it.

The remaining four battalions and two batteries,§ after having
formed in order of battle at Suzemont, continued their march to
Tronville at 4 o'clock.

From the heights in that direction General v. Voigts Rlietz had
at half-past 3 o'clock sent fresh orders to General v. Schwartz-
koppen, in which the latter was informed of the unfavourable

* FiTO battalions, two pioneer oos., a squadron, and two batteries,
t See p. 390.

J This farm lies a niilo to the south-west of Mara la Tour.
§ Formation of the 38lh Brigade (Wodoll) in thcj advance from Suzomont : —

r>7tli Kcj^imeiit.
Fusilier. Col. v. Craniu'h. Ist.

2nd keayy battery. 2nd light batt-cry.

+ +

16fh Ecgiment.

lat. Col. T. lirixen. ITnd.

The Ilnd battn., 67th Bogt., at St. Hilaire ; Fub. battn., 16th Begt., at MariariUe
farm.

a99

state of affairs at the Tronvillo copses, as also of the presence of
a Cavalry Division on his own left ilank, and was requested to
attack the enemy's right wing. Tins was i\w. (Titical jnnetnre
already described, when, after the loss of the nortliern copse
and shortly beftn-o tlic arrival of the 20tli Division, the advance
of the enemy from tlu* copses mid over the high road was
momentarily expectecL The previous direction of the march on
Tronville was therefore maintained. But by the time the 88th
Brigade in the neighbourhood south-west of Mars la Tour was
approadiing the position of the Dragoons of the Gunrd, the situ-
ation had become more favourable. Tlie (Miemy had not erossed
the higii road, on the contrary PrusRiau 1:)atteries had passed
over it. The battalion columns of the 20th Divisit)n were
already distinctly seen advanchig toAvards the Tronville copses,
the re-occupation of which was just then reported.

It therefore appeared advisable to take immediate advantage
of the change of affairs, and to give a decisive impetus to the
frontal attack of the 2()th Division by delivering a flank attack
in a north-easterly direction. As. however, we were in ignorance
of the real extent of the French right wing and of the constant
arrival of fresh forces in its rear, we coidd only hope that such
a movement woidd outflank lliat wing of the enemy in ihemost
elTective way.

With this object General v. Schwartzkoppcn resolved to ad-
vance with all his forces to the attack of the Bruville heights,
during which the right wing was to direct its march, upon the
north-west angle of the Tronville copses. The brigade of Diu-
goons of the Guard received instnictions to advance westward
past Mars la Tour to Ville sur Yron, with the pui-pose, in conjunc-
tion with the Cavalry Division supposed to be there, of supporting
the decisive blow against the riglit wing. General Count Bran-
denburg was in the act of carrying out this order when he was
entnisted by the General commanding the Xth Corps with the
duty of protecting the batteries in action on the high road. He
accordingly took up a position to the south-east of Mars la Tour
with the 1st Dragoons of the Guard, whilst the 4lh squadi-on of
the 2nd Dragoons of tho Guard jxnd the battcuy of horse artil-
lery, in pursuance of the original order, turned along the Jamy
road.

Meanwhile the 38th Brigade had continued its movement,
and as the advanced parties of the dragoons had reported that
Mai*s la Tour was occupied by the enemy, the musketeer battalions
of the IGth Regiment wheeled to the left in tlie direction of the
village. It was, however, soon apparent that only a few Chas-
seurs d'Afrique had ridden into the place, and on the approach
of the dragoons had again beaten a hasty retreat.

The 16th were now movhig forward in the hollow which leads
up from the south-west to Mai-s la Tom-, whilst the 57th Regiment
with tho batteries went round by the south of tho place. The
fusilier battn. 16th Regiment, again brought up from Mariaville
farm, followed in the latter direction, and joined the right flank
of its regiment at the oast side of the village.

400

As soon as the heads of this regiment had passed, through
Mars la Tour and had gained' the opposite edee of the village,
the latter was so overwhelmed with shell m>m the heights
lying to the north-east that in a few minutes it was on fire
in several places. Lieut-Colonel Schaumann now took up a
position with the two batteries of the brigade to the north of
the village and responded to the enemy's fire in conjunction with
the batteries of Colonel v. d. Goltz,* which were already hotly
engaged on his right

Meanwliilo General v. Schwartzkoppen, in accordance with
his resolution previously referred to, issued orders for the attack,
which overtook the left -wing of the 38th Brigade just as it gained
the northern ed^e of the villugu. Tlie brigade now deployed iu
a broud an; to tlio north-eant oi llars-la-Tour, the liattalions in
one coDtiiiuous Hue, each with two conipaniea hi first line. The
^■jS^t wiug, on which were the two pioneer companies, remained
shghtly withdrawn, as a natural consequence of the direction of
its march. With the two companies on the extreme left wing,
which extended as fur as the road to Greyere farm, it was in-
tended to completely outflank the adversary.!

• Bee
between
XUi An ^ ^^ ^ ^

6th and Ctli liglit of tho corpi ortiiicry, 4th UeaTV and 4th Tight batteriei of the 26th
PiTiaion.

t Order of attack of tho 88th Brigade north-eust of Mars la Tour.

6th

N.K.

8th

'<j

*!«

"A.

\u\

V'^

MiJUl LA I'OVU.

401

The Corps oommauder, General v, Voigts-Rhctz, meeting
General v. Schwartzkoppen shortly after 5 o'clock to the east of
Mars la Tour, coniirmed his dispositions.

The front taken up by the Xth Army Corps at 5 o'clock formed
therefore an angle, facing north, -with the former line of battle*
Whilst the 38th Brigade on the extreme left win^ at Mars la
Tour was preparing for the attack of the Bruville heights, five
battalions of the 20th occupied the Tronville copses ; four others
were in reserve behind, while the renmant of the 37th demi-
brigade had assembled further to the roar at Tronville. Six
batteries of the corps were in position on the north side of the
high road between the copses and Mars la Tour. Large bodies
of cavaliy were held in readiness near Tronville, at which place
Barby's brigade and the 13th and 16th Dragoons* had collected
when an attack on that village appeared imminent. The
10th Hussarst were to the north of ruxieux. Still further in
front, in immediate support of the batteries, were two squadrons
of the 4th Cuirassiers at the south-west angle of the copses, and
the 1st Dragoons of the Guard south-east of Mars la Tour. Of
the 2nd Dragoons of the Guard, the 5tli Squadron was making
incui-sions towards the Etain road ; the 4th and the horse artillery
battery of the Guard were accompanying the advance of the 38th
Brigaae on the left flank. The remainder of the corps and the
cavalry attached to it had come into action on the eastern part
of the field of battle where the Ilird Army Corps was postecf.

Opposite the actual front of the Xth Army Corps were the
French troops which had assembled since midday on the Bru-
ville plateau and were occupying the ground, ai
between the Roman road ancf the road from Bnivil
Tour. From the former place the fire was maintained upon the
Tronville copses by Tixier's Division of the 6tli Corps. This
Division was in connection wth the troops still present belong-
ing to the 3rd Corps on the heights south-west of St. Marcel,
while furtiier to the west were tne Divisions of the 4th Coi-ps
advancing by way of Bruville. The right flank of tho entu-o
position was covered by the masses of cavalry assembled to the
north of Greyere farm.t

ENGAGiaiENTS ON THE KbZONVILLE PL/VTEAU.

(3 TO 5 P.M.)

The first communication of the commencement of the battle Amnd of
reached the headquarters of the Ilnd Army at Pont k Mousson Prince Fredo-
about 10.30 ajn., from the general commanding the Ilird Army ™ ?JjSjf^ ^
Corps. It, however, only reported the preparation for an flddT^^
enveloping attack on the French camps at Vionville and Rezon-

• The latter, it wiU be remembered, belonged to the 20th Infantry DiriBion.

t Tlie lOth Hussan of Rcdcm'u Brlgaile had halted hitherto at the Tronville
copses, but in consequence of tlie withdranal of the Trussiau infantry from that
place had gone into the position mentioned.

J This will bo defcnbcd in detail eubsecjuentlj^.

1^;

4«2

ville, at tho Banio timo giving expression to the belief that the
opposing forces wore in the act of retiring noi'thward.

Under these circumstances another Anny Order was issued
at noon,* which, from tho course matters had heretofore taken,
had for its general purpoi-t a further advance to. and over, tho
Meuse. Shortly after, however, additional instructions of a spe-
cial nature were sent to the IXth Army Corps, to carry out at
onccy as far as possible, the movements prescribed in that order for
the next day, so that it might be in a position to protect the right
flank of the Ilird Army Corps in its advance northward.

But when it became known at 2 p.m. from a communication
of General v. Kraatz that this c()r[)8 was hotly engaged, and
that the 20th Division had already advanced to its support,
Prince Frederic Cliarlcs procjceded with his sbiff to tho battle-
field. Travei-sing the 14 miles and upwards of road at a rapid
Eace, the Prince reached the scene of action of the 5th Infantry
dvision about 4 o'clock. Loud were the cheers of the troops at
the appearance of the chief who for ten years had commanded
the Ilird Army Corps, and had already led it to victory in
former campaigns.

The Prussian troops on the Rezonville plateau were still hold-
ing veiy much the same positions between Vionville and the
Bois de St. Aruould which they had carried at noon, and had
since occupied with a strong force of artillery. Opposed to them
were the French on the gently sloping heights roimd Rezonville.
Both positions, being defended by an infantry equipped with
breech-loaders, were so sti'ong that any direct attacks would in
all probabihty fail. For very circuitous turning movements,
however, the Prussians were deficient of the necessary forces,
whilst the French commander-in-chief, as already mentioned, con-
sidered it his main object to secure his communications with Metzs
firom flanking movements up the valley of the Moselle, and pro-
bably for this reason reframed from employing lus numerous
reserves for a decisive attack upon the left flank of the Prussians.
Prince Frederic Charles surveyed the battle-field from the
north-west angle of the Bois de Vionville, and at once recog-
nised that on tho eastern part all that was requisite was to
maintiiin firmly the positions already in our hands. On the other
hand, Avith the left wmg, where the arrival of the Xth Army Corps
was imminent, it Wixs liis intention to take the offensive. The
Prince expressed himself to tliis effect to tho commanders there
present, who made their arrangements accordingly. Under such
ch'cumstanccs the principal role in the engagement on the
Prussian riglit Uank would devolve uj^m the artillery.

Seven more batteries had come u[) by degi-ees from various
sides into the long Hue of guns in action between Flavigny and
tho Bois de Vionville, which were in two main groups under
Colonel V. Dreaky and Major Gallus respectively, but in conscj-

* Appendix XX give= tlu; wordiut; of tlii> order, which in consequcucc of later
vents wiiH not put into execution.

403

queuce of the much reguired replenishing of the ammunition
snowed many gaps.* The four batteries which had left the
colmnii of route ot the 20th Division at the du Sauloy farm had
arrived from the west ; the two which first came up under Major
Krause had ranged themselves among Colonel v. Dreskv's horse
artilleiy, the omer two under Majcn* Cotta had unlimbered on
the left of the artilleiy of the 5th Infantry Division, the com-
mander of which, Major Gallus, had been mortally woimded a
short time previously. The lOth Infantry Division, which was
advancing over the Moselle from the eastward, had also sent
forward its three batteries. Lieut.-Oolonol llildebrand, mth the
two foremost, had endeavoured to pass round t\u\ loft flank of
the 6th Infantry Division, and, simultaneously with the charging
infantrV) to force his way onward in the direction of Rezonville.
After the failure of this advance all three batteries, together
with those of Major Cotta, took up a position between the main
ffronps of artillery previously descnbed. General v. Billow,
from the centre of the line of battle, superintended the co-
operation of the batteries on the front fachig the Roman road
and Rezonville, purposing at all risks to prevent the enemy's
breaking tiirougn.
The hue of guns of the Prussian right wing, reinforced in the

* The line of guns on the Prussian right mng : —
Flatiovt.

' V

-•^'^fts,.

ifi

VOfKn^

UiyorOotta.

Arty, of 6th Inf. Dir.
Major Qallus (80 guns).

Isfc and 2nd light,

Ist k 2nd hoavj of Illrd Corps.

Ist light of Xth Cor|>B.

Boia DB

Vl01IYI£LB.

M 6th light & 6th hoavy ^

of V Illth Corps. 6th hcary of Ylllth Ooips.

3.80 p.m.

4 p.m.

E 2

404

maimer just described, continued to maintain a steady but
moderate fire at the enemy's artillery, which also returned the
cannonade from theii* positions north of the high road.

The character of the firing was marked generally by the cir-
cumstance that the Prussian batteries hardly ever changed their
positions, and their mark only under special circumstances ; the
l?rench artillery, on the other hand, wore in constant movement.
On their side fresh batteries were unceasingly appearing, firat
here, then there, but only to disappear as promptly as they came,
and to leave to others at other points the continuance of the
struggle. It was open to asaumj)tion that the superior accuracy
of the Prussians rendered this manoeu\aing necessary, and that
the proximity of tlie large French artillery reserve provided
them with the necessaiy means.

The gi-eat strength of the French forces collected at Rezon-
ville, however, enabled them at the same time to carry out with
their infantry the same system of reliefs pursued with regard to
the artillery. This led to an unceasing liow of fresh troops into
the French skirmishing lines, which were encouraged thereby
to make attacks in gi-eaterorless force. They were but seldom
made good to within range of the needle gun, but on the con-
trarv, failed even against the combined action of the Piiissian
artillery ; at the same time the result was that the Prussian
infantry, which advanced to meet them, became involved in
isolated enterprises, which were not altogether in unison with
the general instructions for their conduct, to which allusion
was previously made, and proved utterly futile against the
enemy's strong positions. Tnis was particularly the case with
the reinforcements amviiig gi-adually on the right wing, which
\ritli warlike rivalry seized eveiy oppoi-tunity to emulate the
thinned battalions of Brandenburg in tlieir self-devotion.

The two battalions of the 78th (East Friesland) Regiment,
which had unived on the battle-fiekl behind the 5th Infantry
Division, had hitlierto shared, to a slight extent, in the capture
of the Bi)is do Vionville, but for the most part had been em-
ployed in escorting the Divisional artillery.* "When towards 4
o'clock the Istbattn. Body Guard Regiment, which had come up
trom the iMoselle valley, was appointed to this duty, Colonel v.
Lyneker thought that ho ought to take advantage of an appa-
rently favourable moment for an attack on the height (989) south
of Kezonville. He therefore moved off with his fusiliers from the
left,Avith the othor half battalion of the regiment from the right
winc;' of the artillery, but was only able to advance a few hundred
yards. The colonel, Majors v. PreuKS and v. Wins, and all the com-
j)unylead(n-8, were wounded hi this gallant but fruitless attempt.

On the loft of the East Friesians, General v. Schwcrin had pre-
jKirhd a similar advance. At that point Lieut.-Colonel v. Kali-
nowski led forward the two grenadier battalions of the 12th

* The Ctli and 8th cos. in tho Bois do Yionville, tho 6tli co., 7th CO., and the
iiidlicr biittr.lion with tho batteries. Sco pp. 3G6-3G7 and 374.

Kegimeut* to the attack, which, as ah'cady mentioned, was
joined by two batteries of the 16th Infantry Division. The
adversary's vigorous fire likewise nipped this enterprise in the
bud ; tliey succeeded, how(;vcr, in jmsning forward tlu^ir linn of
skirmishcn'R into the valley lyin/^ nt tin; foot of the height now
attacked (5)89), and in txikiiig up a position therein.

In rear of this part of tlin Pnissian lino of battle appeared
about half-post 4 o'clock Cohnul v. Block witli tJio three batta-
lions which General v. Kraatz had despatched from the vicinity
of Cliambley to the support of the 5th Infantry Division.f
After traversing the Bois do Ganmont with no Httlo trouble
and ascending the slopes in front, tliey deployed, the r)6th on
the left and 79th on tlie right, and with advanced companies
and lines of skinnishers took the general direction of the north-
west corner of the Bois de Vionville. In this formation they
passed beyond the artillery line, taking a direction bet-vreen the
two main groups, and then advanced towards the height south of
Rezonville (989). A vigorousfire from the high road voiy speedily
compelled the left wing of the 56th to throw back its flank in
tliat direction, thus forming an angle with the 10th Brig^ade.
The right wing, suffering considerable losses, took up a position
on the slope of that height, and maintained itsiclf tljere for a
long time under a continu(m8 fire, and in spite of the isolated
attacks of the enemy. Both battalion commandei's of the r)(>th
Regiment, Majors v. Zichlberg and v. IlenningR, wore killed in
this advance.

Although these enterprises led to no decisive result, y(.'t the
general position of the engagement on the eastern part of the
battle-field was in nowise imfavourable towards the close of
the fifth hour of the afternoon. The l(>th Divisioii which
reached Gorzo at 4 o'clock was already sharing in the action
at the Bois de St. Arnould, and General v. Stiilpnagel had

guaranteed the commander-in-chief that the 5tn Infantry
ivision would maintain its position irt the Inst. Under thcfo
circumstances Prince Frederic Charles betook himself soon aftc*r
5 o'clock to the heights south-west of Flavigny, which per-
mitted the best view. From that place he was able to follow
the course of the action on the left wing as well, and send tho
necessary orders in any direction.

The state of affairs in the centre of the general Hue of battle
had undergone hardly any change during the afternoon. General
V. Buddenbrock, according to the assurance he had given to tho
general commanding the IlIrd Army Corps, still contimied to
maintain the positions at Vionville with the Gth Infantrv Division.
Parts of tho Division held the heights north-east of the village,
which they had mounted during the great cavaliy charge at that

* The Ist battalion, which was originallj left behind to guard tho bridge over
Um MotoUe at Corny, had meanwhile followed and reached the battle-field towiirdA
2 p.m.

t 1st and 2nd battns. 66th Begt.> Fua. battn. 79th Regt. See p. 893.

4or>

point ; other detachmcuta had come up nearer to the gans which
wero in action north-west of Vionville against the Roman road.
The nearest to the now position of the commander-in-chief was
the 64th Regiment, fm'ther to tlio west towards Tronvillo were
the remains of the 2ith Regiment and of the 2nd battn. of the
20th; they formed tho connection with the Xth Army Corps.

At the time when the Frencli right Aving, retiring before the
20tli Infantry Division, abandoned the Tronville copses, and
withdrew the artillery posted to the west of it across tho great
ravine, tho five batteries under Major Korber had advanced,
wheeling to the right, from the poHitions which they had
hitherto maintained to tho west of Vionville.* They took up a
fresh position on the height between that village ana the larger
coi>se, and continued to fire from that point upon the French
artillery on the Roman road.

The visibly increasing state of exhaustion in the straggle on
both sides in tho centre oi the line of battle, hardly permitted
our expecthig any fiirther enttiprises on a large scale in that
dii-ection ; the occupation <^f the most essential points of support
between the llird and Xth Army Coi-ps might be considered
sufliciently ensured. From the Prince's position the impression
was gained that there was a deficiency of infantry in the centre
of the French line of battle ; because along and to the north of
the Roman road a long lino of guns fonned apparently the sole
connexion between the two wings. But shoiiJy after 5 o'clock
vigorous firing was audible from the direction of Mars la Tour,
betokening evidently the expected attack of the 19th Di\'Tsion.
In view of this state of affairs the Prince sent ordera to General
V, Eraatz that ho might send forward some battalions in line,
with drums beating, over the high road to tho attack. But in
ccmsequenco of tlie situation of tho battle which had meanwhile
supervened on the left whig, this order could not be carried into
effect for the present.

Engagements between Mars la Tour and Bruville.

(C to 7 P.M.)

On tho extreme loft wing the 38th Infantry Brigade had
meanwhilcs iuunediately after its et>ueentration at Mara la Tour,
advancud iu tlio stated fonnatiout to tho attack, supported on
tlie li ft by tho 2in\ iK-avy l)nttc5ry.

Und(a' a vigorous lire of shtll and sln'apnol, but without suf-
furing any groat h'srs thcrefi(»m, the brigade ascended the nearest
ridge. In passing over ilw bare hill side, which falls at first
with a (;*t^ntle i;lopc tuWiirds tho ol't-nuMitioued valley in front of
the French position, the trooi)S Averc received with a nmrdorous
musketry and mitrailleuse fire.

With regardless energy, however, the Westphalian re^ments
press onward ; the second line moves up to the skirmislung line

^ Sec p. 39-1. t Soe P- 400.

107

in order to fill the vacancies in the rapidly thinned mnks ; onlv
weak detachments are left in close order behind the front. Ai-
temateljr making rushes of 100 to 150 paces, and lying down, the
companies hastily descend the hill side. Here comes unexpectedly
to view in their front a steep ravine, in places hard on 50 feet
in deptli, like the ditch in front of a strongly occupied entrench-
ment; but even this obstacle does not stop their advance.
Scaling the opposite slope, all five battalions rise quickly to view
within 150, 100, yea even within 30 paces of the Frencn line.

A withering file-fire is now poured in from both sides.
The difference between needle gun and chassepdt ceases at this
ninge, and every ball hits its mark. But the adversary's superior
force is too overwhelming ; for Cissey's Division has come up at
the double on the right wing of Grenier's Division, and throws
itself at once upon the already shattered Prussian brigade.

For a few bnef minutes only rages the struggle on the hill ;
tho retreat has to be sounded, first by the 16th Regiment. The
remains of the brave battalions fall back into the valley
beneath, and the fire of the adversary advancing to the crest
increases the losses almost to annihilation.

Colonel V. Brixen commanding the 16th Regiment is killed by
a ball in tho head ; Major v. Kalinowski is struck down badl^
wounded; Lieut. -Colonel v. Roell of the 57th Regiment is
killed ; General v. Wedell also sustains a slight contusion. The
commanders have had their horses shot under them, most of
tlie oflScers are already either killed or wounded, and Colonel
V. Cranach, the only officer still mounted, bearing the colour of
the 1st battalion in his hand, leads the remnant of the brigade
back to the high road. After an uninterrupted march of more f
than 27 miles and the subsequent hot engagement, the strength
of many now failed. Upwfu-ds of 300 men are no longer capable
of ascending the rear slope of the steep ravine and rail into the
enemy's hands. The two pioneer companies on the extreme
right wing which have gained the north-west comer of the
Tronville copses and taken up a finn position therein, endeavom*
by their flanking fire to stop the French advance, but the
adversary has already crossed the ravine, and every moment
may see the charge of the raasRc^s of horsemen now moving up
rapidly in rear of his right wing.

For the second time on this memorable day the Prussian
cavalry steps in readily to the rescue of the endangered sister
arm.

General v. Voigts-Rhetz orders the retreat of the remains ot
the 38th Brigade upon Tronville ; Generals Count Brandenburg
and V. Rheinoaben,* on the other hand, receive, towards 6 p.m.,
the order for an advance at all ha2sards.

The Ist Dragoons of the Guard, which were the nearest at ^J?*"*"* t,

hand to the south-east of Mars la Tour, trot forward at once j^rmSm Md

; FrMidi

* Bee p. 401, as to the positions at that time of the bodies of caroLry soath-eost ^^^^»
of Slan la Tour, and south •west of Tronville.

408

across the high roud iu diviBioii-columus iii order to gain
the right ilauk of tho Frcncli iuftuitry. The countiy to the
north-east of the villa^, difficult to cross on account of the
hedges and tlie enemas fire, delays the advance and renders
deployment difficult. With three squadrdkis in lin^ — the fourth
being held in reserve at Mara la 1 our — ^Colonel v. Auerswald
dashes at the advancing foe; thcbrigiidecommandcr accompanies
tho charge. On the ri<^ht of the dragoons, south of tno St.
Marcel road, Major v. Kuylcnsijorna locids fonvard the two
squadrons of the 4th Cuirassiers left there an escort to tho bat-
teries, but on account of the violent mitrailleuse and chassepot
iire was unable to deliver home his attack.

The charge of tho dragoons falls chiefly on the 13th Regi-
ment of tlie lino belonging to Grenior's Division, which much
broken and ridden down gathers ai*ound its eagle. The 57th are
released from their perilous position, and all those hostile detach-
ments which have crossed the eastern part of the ravine again
retire over it. But when the Dragoons of tlie Guard rally in
rear of the Prussian ai-tillery, after their brief but gallant char^
nearly all their leaders are found to be missing. Majorv.Kleist,
Captains Count Westaip, Prince Beuss, and Count Wesdehlen,
are killed, 7 other officei*s, 125 men, and 250 horaes placed kors
de combat; while the moiially wounded commander, Avith a cheer
for the king, places the command of the regiment in the hands
of Captain the Prince of liohenzoUem.

The chargoof cavalry, just described as having taken place on
the right wing of the 38th Brigade, had at the same time relieved
the pressure on the left. The 2nd heavy battery under Captain
Lancclle laid followed the 16th Regiment to the fatal mvine, and
had hold its position there to the last. After being obliged to
keep at bay with canister the French infantry pressing on to
close range, it now eilccted its junction with the line of guns at
Mars hi Tour. On the extreme right wing Major v. liledem was
i*allyiDg the fusiliei-s of tho 57th on the high road; on the
extreme left Major v. Klitzing was leading back the 5th co. 16th
Regiment in the long valley parallel to tho high road from Janiy
to Mars la Tour, during wiich he found an opportunity for
taking part with his fire in the cwivalry engagement just com-
mencing on the broad i)latoan of Ville sur Yron.

Almost fiininlUiniH)nsIy with tlio attack of the 38th Brigade,
and in suiiport of its left lliink, lliu Iht hoY^a artillery battery of
the Guard JUid tho 4lh sqii. :2iul Dragoons of tho Guard nad
advanced at firnt along the .Jarny road to the nearest command-
ing heiglit (TStS). After cannonading the bands of horse which
appeared to tlie north of (iieyoro fann, the battery advanced to
the point where the road fn»m Villc sur Yron to Greyero farm
meets the high road. Captain v. Planitz, after v/heeling to the
right, turned his guns towards the countiy north of that
homestead, and was just directing his fire upon the enemy's
infantry pressing towards him across the ravine, when he found
himself attacked on the left flank almost at the same moment

400

by the 2ud Choasear d'Afrique. This movement had, however,
not escaped the Dragoons ot the Guard. Captain v. Hindenbors
dashed towards the threefold superior enemy, and purchased
with his own life the safety of the battery, which reached
Mars la Tour unharmed.

The squadron in its turn was opportunely supported. Their
regimental commander, Colonel Count Finckeustein, had ridden
to moot the 5th Cavalry Division, and liad fii-st fetched up the
13th Dragoons in support. This regiment, with Colonels Count
Finckenstoin and v. JJrauchiisch leading, threw itself with all its
force into the thickest of the tight now edging off' to Mars la
Tour. The French Chasseurs took to flight, during which they
were feed at from the valley by the 16th, und followed by the
Prussian cavalry abreast of Ville sur Yron.

But the latter was now compelled to sound the assembly, as
considerable bodies of hostile horsemen came into view.

General Ladmirault had already taken the requisite steps for
securing his threatened right wmg by collecting a numerous
body of horse in rear of it. There were at his disposal his own
Cavalry Division, under Legrand, and those parts of du Barail's
1st Reserve Cavalry Division, which were in the vicinity. The
latter had assiguea the 11th Dragoons to the infantry, and of the
four chasseur regiments of du Barail's Division only the 2nd
was present, as Margueritte's brigade had marched away with
the Emperor in the morning, and the 4th Regiment had not as
yetreacned Metz. On the other hand, de France's cavalry brigade
of the Guard, which had accompanied the Emperor from Grave-
lotte to Doncourt, remained in that neighbourhood, and at an
early period of the day liad skirmished with the Prussian drar-
goons of the Guard near Ville sur Yron. To these immediately
available six regiments* we must next add the greater part of
Cl<Srembault's Cavalry Division, which Marshal Lebceuf had set
in movement to Bruville in support of the 4th Corps, retaining
at his own disposal only Juniac's brigade of dragoons.

At the time of the attack by the 38th Brigade on the Biiivillo
heights, those first-mentioned six regiments of cavalry had taken
up a position between Greycro farm and Bruville on the east
side of the long valley. But as General Ladmirault was desirous
of thoroughly secm-ing his right flank, which appeared to liim
more and more in danger, ho had in consequence ordered his
cavalry generals to descend to the open plain of Ville sixr Yron
and there deliver a decisive blow. In pursuance therewith the
Chasseui'S d'Afrique of du Barail's Division first traversed the
valley, and while they executed the previously described attack
on the battery of the Prussian Guard, the tnree regiments of

• 2nd and 7th HusMn of Montaigu's Brigade 1,. ,. tv^:-j«.»

8rd Dragounf of Gtondrocourt'fl Brigade J ^^6"^^ * DiTiaiou.
2nd Ohasacun of du Barail'ti PiTiflion.
Lancen of the Ouard \ *^ !?-.«««»« 'r.:m<i«
Dragoons of the Guard ; ^ ^^*^^ * ^''S^*'-
Compare appendiceal p. 3*, et icq.

410

Legrand's DiviBion, and on their right do Frauce'a brigade of
the Guard, moved Himultaneously to the west side of this valley.
They afterwards wheeled to the left into several lines, front
towards ilie south, and so formed that tlie foremost was always
overlapped by tlio ono following innnediately in rear of it.
Moutaigu's hussar brigade, which was deployed nearest to the
Jamy road, formed the left wing, and at the same time the first
lino.*

On the Prussian side the whole of the cavalry assembled
between Tronville and Puxieux had moved forward*! 1'he 13th
Dragoons had gone round to the left of Mara la Tour, over-
thrown the French Chasseurs in the manner previously described,
and had refonned in good time to meet the newly arriving
masses of hostile cavalry. The sauadron of Dragoons of the
Guard was also formed in three divisions by the regimental
commander, and joined the left flank of the 13th Dragoons.

Meanwhile Barby's brigade had firet trotted forward in a
northerly direction as far as the high road. But after con-
vincing himself of the impossibility, in face of the infantry
now streaming back, of getting past the right of ilara la Tour,
General v. Barby by a wheel to tlie left passed round the south
side of the village, during which ho was joined by the IGth
Dragoons and the 10th Hussars.

After crossing the great road from Verdum the cavalry de-
ployed to the north-west of Mara la Tour in two lines ; in
the first was Barby's brigade, in the second the last-named
Ferments, both lines in squadron-column84

To the right front coula be seen the recently described closing
scene of the mfilee round the battery of the Prussian Guard;
further to the left in the back ground appeared, however, the
approaching masses of horse of Legranas Division and of de
France's bngade.

In order to avoid having their right outflanked by the enemy's
cavaliy, the 13tli Dragoons moved a little to their right, and
then wlioeling up to the left advanced at a gallop to meet the
French hnssar briu^ado, wlii(;li, led by General llointaiffu, was
juHt charging tlio drag()(»ns iv.nl was only a few huudrea yards
distant. In consequence* of their change of fi'ont the dragoons
were Hoiiiewhat loose, so that hi the collision the French hussars
broke through the vrido intervals of the squadrons. They were,
however, as speedily overthrown in turn by the airival of the
loth Prussian Ilus.sar.s under Ctjloiiel v. Weise, whose three
sqiKulrons then passed round both tlanks of the dragoonu, and
from thence tool: a ptiU laoro .'lioctivo part in the charge.

Immediately after tlii^i openin;^* scene of the cavalrj^ struggle,

* Vido sketch on oppoi-itc pjij(0 (I).

f Yido p. -101, uiid skotoli on oppo.-ilo pn^c (II). Two sqimdrozid of the -Uh
Cuir.i£sic» were, na wo liuve pcon, deUiilcd im escort to the guud i ouo dquudron of
tlio 10th IIus^al•s wart in tlie iicij^lihourhood of Nancj.

J Vido oppositi^ ykoteh (ill). The lliili L:iiicer3 had, when riding past Mars la
Tour, detached a tf^iuadrou to the 38th Infantry Drigado, in order to allbrd imme-
diate support whilst they wert» rallying.

FACE P. 410.

liUi* « the Top>D«pT IVar Office. )^«r CW.VTilaou Tl.£.I%c««or

411

General t. Barby with the other regiments also appeared on the
field of battle farther to the left ; well ahead himself of his first
line, which deployed from the right abreast of Ville sur Yron.
The open space which became more and more contracted to
the northward prevented the two squadrons of cnirassicra from
deploying. They therefore followect in division columiis in rear
of the centre, with the IGtli Dragoons on their right.

Towards 6.45 p.m., almost simultaneously and with great vio-
lence ensues the general collision of the masses of horse through-
out the entire long line. Brealdng through and themselves
pieroed, both sides endeavour to gam the adversary's flank by
squadrons. A tremenduous dust cloud rises and envelops for a
brief moment a surging hand-to-hand conflict of more than
6,000 horse, in which, however, victory is shortly seen to incline
towards the Prussian arms. General Montoigu falls into our
hands badly wounded, and General Legrand meets his death in
the vain attempt to bring the 3rd Dragoons to the succour of
the beaten hussar brigade.

De France's brigade had allowed the Pnissian charge to ap-
proach to close distance. But then, at 150 paces, the Lancers
of the Guard advance -with impetuosity to encounter the Olden-
burg Dragoons, the French Dragoons of the Guard apparently
havmg only just been able to deploy. The French brigade is
outflanked by the Hanoverian Lancers, and at the same time
attacked by the 5th squadron 2nd Dragoons of the Guard, whicli,
returning from their reconnaissance towards the north, and dash-
ing over hedge and ditch, advanced on the enemy's flank and
rear. The reformed detachments of the Chasseurs d'Afrique
endeavour to support the yielding brigade of the Guard ; but
like a powerfal wedge the Westphalian Cuirassiers press
onward into the conflict, whilst the Hanoverian Dragoons
attack the enemy in flank and rear.

Soon the great dust cloud is seen to recede towards the north.
The entire force of the French cavahy has taken flight, and
hastens away to the passages over the valley in the direction
of Bm ville.

Towards that point five <)f Clcroiubault's regiments of cavalry
were standing. Seeing the clonds of dust whii ling in tlie plain
on the other side, the General orders Bnichard's chasseur brigade
to cross the valley, just as the hus^sars in their flight are upon
them. The disorder v.'hich euRues is ntill more incrcaocd by the
misintei-preted signals of General do Franco, "wlio sounds the
halt for his own men. Brncliard's brigade finds itself borne
away in the receding stream ; Jlaubranolies' dragoon brigade is
still able to cross the ravine and to form up on the western side,
without, however, being able to move forward.

Parts of the 2nd Chasseurs d'Aliique, which had suffered a
repulse on an earlier occasion, had meanwhile occupied the copse
at Ville sur Yron, and kept up a fire from thence upon the Prussian
cavalry. The infantry swarming out of the valley of the Greyfere
farm and a 12 pr. battery also combined their fire in order to pre-

vent the threatened piercing of the French right wiug» and thereby
placed a barrier to the pursuit at the passages over the valley.

The Prassian bands of horse reformed on the contested phuu,
and then slowly retired upon Mars la Tour, protected by tlie
13th Dragoons. A squadron of dnxf^oons bclonp'ng to (3(5rcin-
bault*8 Division followed, but Avith circuuiftpectiou and at some
distauce.

The brilliant victory of the Prussian cavalry had been gained
with proportionately not verj- grout losses. Yet several of the
leaders boldly riding in advance had met their death. Colonel
Count Finckenstioui commanding the 2nd Dragoons of the
Guard, and Major v. Hertell of tlio 10th Hussars, had fallen.
The body of Colonel v. Scliack of the 13th Lancera was sought
in vain ; not till months after could his grave be found, which
had been dug by the villagera.

With this, the most important cavalry engagement of the
whole war, the danger so recently threatening the Prussian left
wing was finally averted. Content with the maintenance of his
own position at Grey&re farm, General Ladmirault no longer
considered it advisable to advance on Tronville and Mars la
Tour in the approaching darkness.

Meanwhile, under the protection of the cavalrv, the exhausted
remnant of the 38tli Brigade had re-fonned. They encamped
that evening round their shattered colours* to the south-west of
Tronville on the Buxi&res road, in the immediate vicinity of
Lehmann's greatly thinned demi-brigade, which lay mostly
between Tronville and du Sauley fatrm.

Although any further attack on the part of the enemy was
scarcely to be expected in the twilight now prevailing, yet
General v. Voigts Khetz took the necessary steps for maintain-
ing at all hazards the heights between Tronville and Mars la
Tour which were so favourably situated for defence.

For this purpose he withdro^v to the south side of the high
road the six batteries of his corps, which had courageously held
their positions to the north of it throughout all the changes of
the struggle previously described. They were suppoi*ted on the
left by the regiments of Rhcinbabon's Cavalry Division return-
ing from their charge, and on the right by the 20th Infantry
Division posted hi front of Tronville.

By the time the previously-mentioned order from the com-
mander-in-chief had reached General v. Kraatz,t the latter, on his
return from a reconnaissance in the wood, and therefore in igno-
rance of the aiTival of the 19th Half-Division, had already de-
spatched an officer to the general commanding the Xth Corps, for
tne purpose of rendering a report on the present situation of tlie

* The pole shattorcd bj a shot was alono sarod of the colour of the 2nd hafctn.
16ih Bcgt. ; tho head, apparentlj carried airay bj a fragment of aheU, together with
(he streamers, was brought bj the Frenoh to Mets. The fire battalions which wont
into action with 95 omoert and ^546 men had a total lose, including aomo870
prisoners, of 72 officers and 2,542 men, consequently nearij 60 per cent of their
original strength, tho proportion between killed and wounded being as 8 to 4.

t See p. 406.

413

20th Division, and of gaining information as to tho state of affairs
on the left flank. On reaching the head-quarter staff just as the
38th Brigade had been ordered to retreat on Tronville, the oflBoer,
probably through a mistake of persons, received instructions for
tho Division to assemble atlronville and occupy tlio village.
When this order reached General v. Kraatz, lie was in un(us-
puted possession of the Tronville copses ; while from a neigh-
Douring height on the high road Prussian battalions could be
distinctly seen retiring on Tronville, followed by hostile infantry.
General v. Kraatz, under these cii'cumstances, thought that he
ought not to lose sight of the importance of a timely occupation
of the oommanding heights at Tronville, and therefore made his
arrangements in accordance with tho instructions.

Harassed by a vigorous shell fire, but showing a bold front
and with little loss, the battalions which were assembled on the
high road retired upon Tronville, whilst tho detachments in the
wood still held their ground.

As this rearward movement inspired the general commanding
the Ilird Corps with apprehensions for his loft flank. Colonel v.
Voigts-Bhetz, chief of the staff, had betaken himself to the 20th
Division, in order to put forward these considerations. Prince
Frederic Charles, who had likewise remarked this movement
upon IVonville, sent several ofiicers of his staff to order the
battalions to advance again so as to ensure a favourable issue to
the battle.

This had, however, been arranged by General v. Kraatz on his
own responsibility, as a favourable turn had taken place in the
action on his left, and the possession of Tronville now seemed
sufficiently ensured. In order to occupy the copses with fresh
forces, he directed the fusilier battn. of the 56th to advance
through the western, and the rifle battalion through the eastern
part of the wood, both of which reached the further edge with-
out meeting the enemy. Onlv a few divisions of the 4th rifle
company, ^imch had separatea previously, were engaged in a

f>rotracted skirmish in the north-east angle; this, however.
Ucewise ended with the retreat of the adversary.

The Ist battn. of the 92nd was appointed to occupy Tronville ;
the other battalions of the 20th Division moved into a position
of readiness to the south-west of the nearest copse. In the
vicinity were both batteries of the Division, forming the right
wing of the new artillery line, to which allusion has already
been made.

Such was the state of affairs nt 7 p.m. on the left flank of the
Prussian lino of battle.

Conclusion of the Battle on the Prussian Right Wing.

(5 TO 2 P.M.)

Although the struggle on the western part of the battle field Podtkm of
drew to a close at tne approach of nightfall, it lasted further ftj't*'^
into the night at the pouit where the Illrd Army Corps was ^^"^*
engaged.

Tho gradual an-ival of the PruBsian reiuforccinents coming up
from tho other side of the Moselle gave fresh impulse to tho
contest on tho iii},lit win*;^, and as Marshal Bazaino, from tlio
view witli wlikh lio wnn rnslitid, niUKi. have been OHpecially
alive to tliihj din;cti()n of Jitt:icl:, iVv.'.sli troops were constantly
bronj^'ht up nu the FrcMich siihi to thu .struggle at this point.

After tlie previous enturprises «»f thu Prussians from the direc-
ti(m of VionviUe had eauHod L(iv;iKu)r Sorval's Division* to push
forward for the purpose of rejoining tho Gth Coi-ps to the west
beyond iios'.onville, the marehal hatl still at his disposal very
considciaMe forces for hin front facing the south.

The Division of Grenadiers of the Guard which had advanced
into the line of battle in place of Frossard's Coq^s had occupied
the height facing the IJois de St. Amould (989) with two regi-
ments, which — apparently about the time of tho advance of mo
78th — ^liad been reinforced by two regiments of the 1st brigade
of Voltigeurs of tho Guard. The 3rd Gnaiadiors of the Guard,
in conjunction with Lapasset's brigade, held the height lying
fiirther eastward (970) on the Rezonville-Gorze road. When
the arrival of the 16th Prussian Division made itself felt towards
5 o'clock, the greater part of Montaudon's Division,! hitherto
in position at the Gravelotto posting house, was brought up to
this point, which was of such special importance in holaiug
Rezonville. The rest of this Division remained with the Chas-
seur battalion of the Guard in the Bois des Ognons. On the
east of tho valley descending li'oni the Bois de la Juree, a
mitrailleuse Imttery had been placed in position facing the Bois
des Ognons, with a view to ineeting any widely circuitous
movements in the valley of the Moselle.

Besides those parts of the army hitherto mentioned, the
following were stul in reserve in the neighbom-hood of Grave-
lotto — the 2nd brigade of tho Voltigeurs of tho GuiU'd near tho
posting house, Frossjird's Cor])s on the upper issue of tlio Ara
valley, and Forton's and Valabrcguo's Cavalry Divisions on the
eastern slope of the heights north of Rezonville.

This position was for tho most part taken up at the time when
the first Pnissian reinforcennjnts coming up from tho right bank
of the Moselle advanced to the attack.

In order to carry out the instructions received at 11 a.m.fi*om
Pont a Mousson, which, in conseauence of the battle on the 14th
August, ])re8crihod the drawing forward of the IXth Army Corps
over the Moselle bridge used by tho Ilird Corps, General v. Mau-
stein had moved off the 18th Division with the corps artillery
towards Arrv, the 25th towards (/orny. The former reiioivod a
communicjition from General v. (Joiiben at noon, that he was then
advancjing with all available parts of his Army Corps in the
direction of the engjigement, which to all appearance was taking
place on tho othor side of Noveant. Upon this General v. Wmu-

^ At fi»t only one brigade, but Ifttcr on tbe othor as veil,
t Of the 3rd Corp.^.

415

gel had eent the 11th Grenadiers to Corny, to occupy the bridge
at that point ; the commander of the regiment was iiistmcted to
place hmiself under the ordora of the Vlllth Corps.

In spite of their gi-eat fatigue from tlie long marches which f^^f^^^
they had been making, the troops of the l()th Infantrj' Division i)i^,ion[
on arrival at Any,* moved oIF again as early as 1 o'clock, so as
to comply with the call for Bpeinly support from the 5th Divi-
sion, rhcy crossed the Mof^Jllo at Corny, and roaoliod Gorzo
with thc^ir advanced parties ai ii.TO p.nu Tlio 1 lih Itufi^niont
had joined this advance, as Colonel v. Sehoning thought that
tlic protection of the passagci of the river at Corny, with which
he had been entrusted, would bo ])est secured by participating
m the struggle raging in front.t

Renewed requests from the battle-field had previously induced
General v. Baniekow, commanduig the Division, to send forward
his batteries, escorted by the three squadrons of hussars.^ About
4 o'clock the general formed tip his nine battalions to the south
of the Bois de la Croix St. Marc,§ in order to gain from that
pouit, through the Bois des Chevaux and the Bois des Ogiions,
the flank and perhaps even the rear of the enemy. At the
special desire, however, of General v. Sttilpnagel, he abstained
from so circuitous a movement, and only puslied forward the
2nd battn. of tlie 72nd into those woods to cover the right flank.
The remaining five battalions of the 32nd Brigade, retaining
their order of mai'ch, advanced through Gorze to C6te Mousa,
and from thence through the Bois ae St. Amould; the 11th
Regiment followed in the same direction.

The 72nd Regiment reached the northern border of the last-
named wood towards 5 o'clock. It there found the two
battaUons of the Bodyguard Regiment, the leadera of which,
Lieut.-Colonel v. L'Estocq, M«ajor8 v. Seydlitz, v. Verschuer, and
V. Schlegcll,|| had all been wounded, whilst the men were running
short of ammunition after more'than six hours' fighting. Colond
V, Helldoi-fi* now deployed the fusiUers to the east of the
Rezonville road, the 1st battn. along it, and in this formation
advanced to the assault of the heights in front under a hail-
storm of projectiles of every description. In spite of the heavy
losses they succeeded in stormmg the heights ; but they were

• See p. 352.

t Order of march of the 16tk Inf. DiTision and tbo 11th Begt. from Arry to

Gorzc: —

'2nd, 3rd, and 4lh sqns., 0th Hussars.
Fwi. battn. 72nd Rcgt.
5 til liglit and 6th heavy battorics.
Ipt and 2iid buUii. 72ihI Uei'.t.
Ut battn. 40Uillog(.
6tli heavy batUjry.
2nd and drd battns. 40th Beet,
tilth Bcgt. (belonging to 18th DiTn.).
The other parts of the 16th Divn. (Slst Infy. Brigade, Ist squadron of Hussorti
6th light batteiy, and a sapper company) were, as wc know, still on the return
march from the neighbourhood of Thionvilic.
J See p. 403. § East of Gorzc.

II Tlie first would not Icaro liis men, tin* otlicr two succumbed !« their woundn.

32nd Tnfy. BriRado
(Col. V. Ilex).

unable to hold tlictu against tlio very superior forces of the
French reservcB. Colonel v. llelldorfFwafi Idlled, and Major v.
Oertzeu wounded ; towards half-past 5 o'clock the 72nd round
themselves compelled to withdraw to the wood, from which
Colonel V. Eberstoin was now advancing to their support with
the 40th Regiment.

He had sent his 2nd biittn. along the high road, whilst tlio
others, the 1st on the right and the 3rd on the left» moved along
the two ravines, their advance being again joined by parts of
the 72nd Regiment. The left wing once more succeeded in
driving back the enemy, and in occupying a conspicuous house
on the height in front.

But the HohenzoUeni Fusilici-s, after losing their regimental
commander in the attack, were now also forced to yield before
the fresh advancing columns of the French.

After this severe and sanguinaiy struggle, Colonel v. Rex,
commanding the brigade, reauested the support of the 11th
Regiment, which had been held in reserve from the commence-
ment at the south side of the wood.

Wlien Colonel v. WitzendorfT, chief of the staflf of the Vlllth
Army Corps, retnrning from the front, brought this request to
the regiment, it had just received orders about 6 o'clock from
the corps head-quartera to return to its old bivouacs. As, how-
ever, this order was issued before information could evidently
have been received of the sharp action at Gorze, Colonel v.
Schoning had no doubt as to where his duty called him. Ho
forthwith hastened through the Bois de St. Aniould and de-
ployed his three battalions on the further side between the road
and the western ravine, for the attack of the height (970) which
had already been twice canned and again lost. Those of the
56th who were at hand, under Captain v. Montbart, joined in
this advance. But the issue of the contest was again ni nowise
different. For the third time the enemy, driven back to some
distance at the commencement, pressed forward anew with
superior reserves. Colonel v. Schoning and Major v. Ising wei*e
mortally, Lieut.-Colonel v. Klein shghtly wounded. The regi-
ment was compelled to retire to the lower ridge nearest the edge
of the wood, upon wliich detachments from all the regiments
engaged here up to the present time had formed a skirmishing
hue. Tlicir combhied fire checked the advance of the 1st
brigade of Montaudon's Division, and indeed the infantry attacks
on both sides during the day failed generally sooner or later
against the ovcrwheliuing file-lire of the defence.

Marahal Bazaiuo could, however, now regard as certain the
occupation of the important height south of Rezonville (970).
But in order to clear his front beyond the height (989) lying to
the south-west, he took steps after 6 p.m. for a further advance
between the roads from Gorze and Buxi^re&

Led in person by the French generals, the 2nd brigade of
Voltigeura of the Guard,* brought up from the posting hoiuie,

* Prulmbl/ ihe Zouatcs of tbo Guard as weU.

417

adyanced with dense bodies of skirmishers a^aiust the 56th, which
was driven back, partly upon General v. Schwerin's advanced
troops and partly to the Bois de Vionville, on the northern border
of which tne fusilier battn. 79th had already taken up a strong
position between the detachments of the 5th Infantry Division.

But even the French wore unable to hold the height, as the
well-aimed lire of the Prussian artillery made any position there
untenable. It remained thenceforth unoccupied, and alonff the
wliole Rezonvillo front the lire of the infantry was dunilj for
almost an hour. Then, however, it broke out again, and this
time on the extreme cast.

The 2nd battalion 72nd Regiment, which had been pushed Advance in
forward into the largo woods to cover the right flank of the the direction
32nd Brigade, had, alter toiling through the thick undergrowth, /7p.JnT^
gained tlic western border of the Bois des Ognons at 7 p.m., and
from that point directed a vigorous fire upon the left flank of
the hostile detaclmients occupying the height south of Rezon-
ville (970). In consequence of this the detachments of the 5th
and 16th Divisions, assembled at the Bois do St. Arnould, found
themselves under tho nccepsity of resuming tlioir advance. But
even thifi advance shared the fate of the othew. After a brief
success tlicy had to givo way before tho supoviority of tho
French reserves ;• when the latter, on their part, advanced to the
attack of the Prussian positions, they were repulsed repeatedly
with heavy losses.

In tliis changeful struggle in the twilight, the advanced parties
of the Hesse-Darmstadt (25th) Division had taken part still fur-
ther to the eastward. General v. Manstein, in ignorance of what
had occurred at Gorze, had originally not intended to brinjc his
troops over the Moselle on the 16th, in ccJusoquence of their
being somewhat fatigued with the preceding marches. But
when the midday orders of tfie commander-in-chief reached him
at 3 o'clock, by which tlie IXth Army Corps was to get as far
on its way as possible to tho destination prescribed for the 17th,
he at once ordered it to cross tho river at Aitv and Corny.

Prince Louis of Ilesse had already received niformation of the
intentions of the commander-in-chief, and in conseauence had
made all aiTangements for his Division to move by way of
Corny. The 50tn Brigade, which was further eastward, received
orders to advance to the bridge ; General v. Wittich after
sending foi-ward the 2nd squadron at a trot to gain intelligence
of the situation of aflaii's,! commenced his march for Gorze at

* Apparently reinforced by the Division of the 3rd Corps brought up uioanwliile
from the neighbourhood of St. Marcol. Soo remark on page 896.
t Order of march of the IIosse-Darnistadt troops vi& Noveant to Gorze : —
2nd sqn. let Cavalry,
let and 2nd battns. let Rcgt.
Ist hoary ]

2nd heavy V batteries of tho Hessian field division.
IstUght J

let and 2nd battns. 2nd Bogt.
Ist, 8rd, 4th sqns. Ist Cavalry.
The rifle battalion of the brigade had been detained by the tr>\Ins during tho pre-
ceding marches, and did not join the otlicr troops until night.

418

4.30 p.m.» with 4 battalions of the 49th Brigaddy the Ist Cavabrj,
and p batteries.

The passage of the naiTOw and swaying suspension bridge
between Coi-ny and Nov^ant caused considerable delay. In con-
sequence of the reports which meanwhile arrived, it was resolved
to bring forward the bitteries at once vi& Gorze to the point
where the 5th Division was engaged, and to bend away to the
rieht of the road with the infantry, in order to reach the left flank
oi the enemy's Une of battle. By desire of the commander of
the 16th Division, the troops took the direction of the Bois des
Chevanx. But as the paths through the great woods, in which
the shades of darkness were akeady falling, were narrow, it was
half-past 7 o'clock before the six leading companies of the 1st
Regiment encountered the French Chasseurs of uie Guard, which,
as we are aware, had been holding the Bois des Ognons for a con-
siderable time. Although at first outflanked by the enemy, the
Hessians were supported by the half-battaUon which was follow-
ing, and then forcea their way with the bayonet. They advanced
to the northwest edge of the wood, and firom that point directed
their fire against the French reserves, which wiuidrew in the
direction of llezonvillc. It was impossible, however, to obtain any
further successes. As hostile troops were still holding out on the
rightin thewood,aprolon^8d action wascairied on with them, until
General v. Manstein, whohad been some time present, ordered the
contest to be discontinued after 10 p.m. The brigade encamped,
rifle in hand, on a clearing of the wood, and pushed its line of out-
posts partly as far as the oorder of the wood opposite Rezonville.

The other parts of the IXth Army Corps also followed to
the left bank of tfeo Moselle in the evening. The remaihder of
the .25th Division encamped behind the Bois des Ognons, the
cor[)s artillery in the valley south-east of Qorze, tlie 18th
Division at Arnaville.*

From his position at Flavigny Prince Frederic Cliarles had
not ceased to watch the ^neral course of the engagement on
both wings of the long Ime of battle. As the firing became
more vigorous in the east towards 7 o'clock, and the reports
received gave reason to expect the arrival of the IXth Army
Corps ou this wing, the commander-in-chief considered the
moment suitable for agaui making an attack in force. He in-
tended for this j>ui'po8e, in accordance with the view already
mentioned, to employ more particularly the left wing and the
large body of artillery. The staking of the last strength of man
and horse after liours upon hours of sanguinary fighting was to
show the enemy that the Prussians had both the ability and
the firm will to triumph in the yet undecided struggle. The
moral impression of such an advance, enhanced by the con-
sternation to be expected from a sudden attack in the twilight,
appeared to guarantee a favourable result.

* A battalion of tlii;) laltcr had been cent forward to Are in the night for the
piirpobo of Kt.H.'uiint( the biidro j't Nov6ai!t.

419

With tills intention the Prince issued orders at 7 p.m. for an
advance on Rezonville. As the batteries of the 5th Infanti-y Di-
vision had been suflFcring for a considerable time from a deficiency
of ammunition and horses, they were no longer capable of any
further advance, and therefore continued to fire from tlicir presout
positions. In then- placo, liowever, Lieut.-Colnnel StnnmfF
brought forward the If.t liglit and 2nd Iicavy b;\tha-ioK of tlic
IloMsn-Dunnstadt Division, wifJi whiuh lin had juKt. cMnno np inio
the artillery line from the dirocliou of Ciorzo.''* J lo waw joined
by the 1st light battery of the Xtli Army Ccn-ps, which hud lirod
away their ammunition but had replenished it.t

From the centre of the artilleiy lino Colonel v. Drcsky set
in movement the three horse artillery batteries and the 6tli
light battery of the Ilird iVrmy Corps.$ Among the former
moved the two batteries of the 20th Division and on the right
the 5th heavy battery of tlio Xth Army Corps, whilst the (Jth
heavy battery remained in position with the artillery of the 5tli
Division. §

The 3rd horse artillery battery of the Xth Corps fornu^d the
left flank of the advancing Hue of gnus. It haa joined some
time previously, as already mentioned, the batteries of the (»th
Infantry Division, which were repleninhing their ammunition to
the souih-west of Vionville ;|| when, however, it resumed its
advance in pursuance of the order to attack, it was only able to
move at a walk. The 4tli light and 4th heavy battta-ies of the
llird Army Corps, which were endeavouring to advance still
fui'ther to the left nearest to the high road, found their debouch
presently impeded by a vigorous musketry fire from the ditches
on the Kezonville road.

The advance of tho artillery was followed on the north of the
high road by those detachments of the 25th Regiment which
were assembled there under Lieut.-Colonel v. Alton, and by
Majors Stocken and v. Pirch with the remains of the 1st and
fusilier battalions of the 20th llegiment.

In this order did the Prussian attacking line advance against
the enemy's positions at Kezonville.

At 8 p.m. the batteries indeed crowned the long-contested
ridge (989) to the south of this village. But at the same moment
a muraerous fire was directed upon them from the east and north,
while General Boiirbaki had collected 54 guns of the French
artillery of the Guard on the further side of the llozonville valley.

• Tho Ilrsftian 1st Jimrv battrrv \uv\ n\rv'M\v ntruck <»ir into llic wood witli Mio
49th hr\*iw\Cf nm\ couUl not now bo recalled from that direction.

t TJiis bntlcry which belonged \o Colonel v. Jj,>ncker's detiiehnicnt hiM.1, iib wc aro
awore, been attached to the artillery of the Gth Division.

J Tho 9n\ hoary battery of tho lllrd Corjw, hitherto also posted at Ihnt point,
had shortly before, in pursuanco of ortlei^, tnken up a iMBitioii ivcst of Viouvilic, on
the right ilJink of Major K6rbor*s lino <»f gun?.

§ Tbcso vero tho two batteries lu the corps artillery which h:id al>vo left tho
column of route of the 20th Division. Their commander, Licut.-Coloncl Cottn, had
already been wounded.

II Seep. 891.

F 2

420

The Prussians responded for some time \vith a heavy fire, and
then retired by batteries into their former positions.

Meanwhile the two brigades of the nth Cavalry Division had
arrived, having been summoned by Prince Frederic Charles
fi'om their positions south- west of Flavigny. Griiter's brigade
advanced in squadron columns at open intervals along the road
from Buxi^res to Rezonvillo ; its iirst line was formed of two
squadrons of the 3rd Lancers, the 6th Cuirassiers* being in
echelon on their left rear and the 15th Lancers on their right
rear. The 12th Dragoons accompanied the advance on the right
of the brigade. The hussar bngade had likewise opened out
like a fan; the 16th Hussars were on the right wing, the
squadi'ons of the 9th Dragoons, which were present, followed
as second line. In this order of battle Colonel v. Schmidt
passed to the north of burning Flavigny and took the direction
of Rezonville.

The twilight was now failing; the flashes of the enemy's
artillery and musketry alone enabled us partially to distinguish
the objects of attack. Griiter's brigade advanced through the
Prussian artilleiy lino, but soon met Avith strong bodies of the
enemy's infantry, the fire fi-om wliich caused it considerable loss.
After the retreat of the batteries the cavalry also found itself
compelled to withdraw behind the nearest height.

The hussar brigade, which in riding forward towards Rezon-
ville had crossed the great road from Vionville Avith its left
wing, came across, some few hundred paces to the noi-th of it,
the previously mentioned detachments of the 6th Infantry Divi-
sion, which had just found themselves threatened by an attack
from the enemy's cavalry, and in consequence were firing
vigorously in all directions. After Colonel v. Schmidt had
brought forward the entire hussar brigade to the north side of
the high road and through the Prussian infantry, ho charged
towards a mass hardly distinguishable in the darkness, wmch
meanwhile moved away to the right. Shortly after the hussars
found themselves in the middle of hostile infantry, which fired
on the Prussian squadrons. The latter dashed through the
kneeling ranks of skirmishera in front of them, dispei'sed some
formed bodies of infantry, but in the darkness of tne night no
greater result was possible against the hostile infantry. An
attempt on the part of Colonel v. Schmidt %vith about 50 of the
Zieten husHnrs to dispei*se a dottichmeiit keeping up a vigorous
fire from the enemy s right wing, failed in the present total
darkness in couscqueiico of the flagging ctmdition of the horses,
which had been under saddle since 2.30 a.ra. without having had
a feed or a drop of Avater.

Whilst the French infantry retired upon Rezonville, the
hussars were again %vitiidrawn over the hign road.

The commanders of both Pixissian cavSir^ brigades engaged
in this struggle were wounded, and Major-General Griiter auo-
cumbed to his serious wound a few weeks afterwarda

* Three squadrons strong.

421

The narrated course of the engagement of the Xth Army
Corps and the evident snperiority of the opposed French forces
did not permit of the execution of the attaclc in force purposed
by the commander-in-chief. General v. Voigts-Rhetz had,
however, given a definite promise to maintain his positions
between Mars la Tour and Tronvillc to the last. When towards
8 o'clock the firing in the direction of Kcizunville increased in
intensity, General v. Kraatz advanced upon Vionvillc with the
Ist battn. 17th Regiment and the fusilier battii. 92ud Regiuieut.
The 4th light battery took up a position on the height west of
the village, and the 4th squadron 16th Dragoons rode forward
in the direction of Rezonville, but was driven back by a musketry
fire.

It was now past 9 o'clock before the contest had ceased at all
points. Deep silence then reigned over the broad expanse upon
which since 9 o'clock that morning death had been reaping so
terrible a harvest. The hot summer's day was succeeded by a
cool night, and after almost Ruperhuman efforts the warriora
snatched a short rest in their bivouacs. Aci'oss the plateau of
Rezonville, so hardly won in the fight, stretched in a broad bow
from the Bois des Ognons to the Tronvillc copses the lino of
PiTussian outposts, which on the rising of tlie moon was ex-
tended by the cavalry of the left wing over the blood-stained
field of Mars la Tour as far as the Yron brook.

The fearful losses in the twelve hours' battle were in point of
numbera about equal on both sides. Inclusive of but a small
proportion of prisoners the losses of tlio (lermans as of tho
French amounted to 1(5,000 men,* and up to tho evening victory
hung in the balance. For so little as the Prussians succeeded
in driving the more than twofold superior forces of the French
from their main positions, just as little had the latter been able
to recover the ground lost by midday, and to re-open their line
of mai'ch through Mars la Tour.

The true importance of the day does not lie, therefore, in the
tactical results. There was no immediate reaping of the ad-
vantages gained on either side, for as tho day fell neither of tho
opposing forces was able to move a step beyond tho battle-field.
The darkness of night had put an end to the struggle. The
following morning showed tho Germans in possesnion of the
battle-field and the abandonment of their positions by tho French.

• French losses : —

Frossard'fl Corps (2nd).. .. 201 ofRccrs, 5,035 men.

Leboeafs „ (3rd) . . . . 9S „ 7i8 „

Ladmimult's „ (4th) . . . . 200 „ 2»258 „

Canxobert's „ (6th) . . . . 191 „ 6,457 „

Ghuurdt 113 „ 2,010 „

Beserre Caralrj . . . . 70 „ 465 „

Eeserve Artillerj . . . • 6 „ 105 „

Total 879 officers, 16,128 men.

(indasiTe of priaonwi), and 1 gun.
For the German losses, vide App. XXI.

422

Operations op the 1st and IInd Armibs to the Eve op

THE 18th August.

Procbbdinqs on thb Leff Wikq of thb IInd Aeiit on

THB 16th August.

The CorpB belonging to the IInd Anny, which had taken no
share in the battle of Yionyille, proceeded to take up in the
course of the 16th of August tho general poeitions prescribed bj
the anny order of the previous evening. The IInd Army Corps,
which since its debarkation had followed in uninterruptealy
severe marches tho right wing of tho army, bivouacked in the
neighbourhood of tho Metz-Strassburg high road : with the 8rd
Infantry Division at Buchy. the 4th at Soigne, and the corps
artilleiT at Luppy.

Of the Xllth (Koyal Saxon) Army Corps, the Cavalry Division
had already moved off at 5 a.m. from Louvigny and Cheminot to
Pont h, Mousson, where it was for some time aelayed as the 40th
Infantry Brigade was crossing the Moselle there at that time.
The Division reached Nonsard at 2 p.m. vi4 Regni^viUe en Hay e,
and pushed forward outposts towards the Meuse, now not far
distant, in the direction of St. Mihiel.

Both Saxon Infantry Divisions had reached their bivouacs at
Nom^ny on the 15th, part of them not till late in the nisfat.
After a short rest, and without having cooked their meal, tney
moved off on the morning of the 16th for Pont ii Moussou.

Although, in addition to the stone bridge at this place, the
recently constnicted bridge at Atton was available, and indeed
made use of, yet the meeting of the stafls of different general
officers and of the numerous trains at Pont k Mousson occasioned
many stoppages in the movements. The 23rd Infantry Division
reached tlie neighbourhood of Regnieville en Haye shortly after
noon ; tlio coi-ps artillery bivouacked in rear of it at Montauville.
The 24th Division occupied quarters in and around Pont k
Mousson at 6 o'clock in the evening. The trains only reached
the left bank of the Moselle during the night, and there bi-
vouacked on tlie Diculouard road. The Crown Prince of Saxony
had his head-quarters at Pont i\ Mousson.

The Cavalry Division of the Guard had already reached Apre-
mont* from Diculouard in the com-se of the forenoon, thrown out
its outpcjsts towards the section of tho Mouse between St, Mihiel
and Commercy, and linked itself with the Saxon cavalry through
Buxerullcs. Tho other parts of the Guard Coi-ps moved as far as
the neighbourhood of teaumont, and were therefore about half
way between tho Moselle and the Mouse. The advanced guard of
the C()rj)s bivouacked at Bouconville, the remainder of the 2nd
Infantry Division of the Guardf near the Manx la Clifivre pond,

* South-east of St. Mihiel.

t Fart fonned the odranced guard.

423

the coi-ps ai*tilleiy at Beaumont. The 1st Infantry Division of the
Guai-d occupied quarters round Berndcoui-t, the head-quarters of
the OoiT)s being at the same place. On the extreme left wing of
the Ibid Army the last detachments of the IVth Army Corps were
crossing the Moselle at Marbache, while its advanced troops
were showinp; front towards Toul in a south-weKterly direction.
TluiR iho 8tlilnfanh*v Division reached Marbache. and Belleville,
the corps artillery further forward tlie neighbourhood of les
Saizerais, whilst tho trains v/ere still (m tho nght bank of tho
llosello. Of tho 7th Infantry Division which was bivouacking
near llozieri^fl en llayo, the veiiifonu'd 14th Infantry Brigade*
Avas pushed forward towards 'I'oul as advanced guard.

Tho l)3rd Reghnent, the dragoons, and tho heavy battery,
went into bivouacs on the Francliovillo heights, and from that
point watched tho country in front between the Moselle and the
Thiaucomt-Toul road, whilst the remainder of the advanced
guard was quartered in tho villages on the left bank of the
Terrouin brook.

As the whole of the Corps had commenced its march at early
dawn, tho positions just indicated were occupied for the most
part by the forenoon, and by the advanced guard as early as
tho mormng, of the li)th August. Tho liead-quai*ters were at
Ics Saizcrais.

The recent cntorpiiscs of isol.'ited squadrons of the Guard, and Exj^editio
tho reports which they rendered, had led General v. Alvcnslebon I. *® ^^^^'
to behave that Toul must bo occupied by a weak and careless
gan'ison, and be very indifferently armed. The fortress closed
a line of railway, tho possession of which, hi the event of a
fm-ther advance into the interior of the enemy's country, would
be of special value to the communications of the Gorman army.
In consideration of these circumstances the general ordered
tho place to be reconnoitred and an attonn)t made to gain
possession of it by a coup de mnin.

Cavalry patrols from the advanced guard h«ad ridden forwoi'd
in tho morning towards Toul, forced their v/ay into the northern
suburb of St. Mansuy, and oidy thence were driven out by the
advance of hostile inlantiy. From statements of tho inhabitants
it appeared that the fortress was but wc.vikly garrisoned by some
1,000 or 1,200 French gardes mobiles. General v. Zychlinski
commanding the advanced guard, in con3e([ucnco of this intel-
ligence betook himself to hi^s advanced posts wth a view to
reconnoitring in person tho condition of the fortress. On his
way thither he was met by the order of tlij general connnand-
ing, to which allusion has jii;Jt been made. In consequence of
this he formed up the troops (juartered on tho TeiTomu brook,
and at 11 a.m. assembled the advanced guardf at Franchevillo,
to which place Major General v. Scherbenhig, connnanding the

* Tho 27t1i and OSrtl Kcgirocnt.8, 7t1i Dragoons, let licary and 2ud light batteries,
two pioneer compnuies, and tho light bridge ti*ain.
t Excepting tho 2nd pioneer company and the bridge train.

424

artillery, had also brought up the 2ud heavy batteiy from
Rofii^res en Haye.

Both heavy batteries were at once led forward. The Ist
came mto actiou on a hill east of the Pont k Mousson road
about 2,000 paces fi'om the enceinte of the fortress, the 2nd in
the vineyards on the southern shipes of the Mont St. Michel.
Dismomited dragoons formed a temporary escort to the guns,
whoso fire was first directed against tlie ramparts.

The 2nd light batteiy arriving from Jaillon reinforced the
position at St j^lichel with two guns, while tne remaining four
were held provisionally in reserve fur employment elsewhere.

It was soon evident that the bombardment of the enceinte
would not lead to any result. The enemy merely replied with
six guiiR, and was ho perfectly covered by the high trees on the
glacis and enceinte, that it was impossible from the outside
either to see the position of the guns or to drive the intantry
garrison from the ramparts.

General v. Alvenslebcn, commanding the Corps, who had
arrived in person, gave orders imder the circumstances for fire
to be opened on the to-svn, with a view, if possible, to bring
about a capitulation by this means.

Meanwhile about 12.45 p.m. the head of the infantry column
had arrived in front of the fortress and the real attack upon it
now opened under the command of General v. Zvchlinski*

The intention generally wiis, as far as possible, to surround
the place with skimiishers, with a view to baning all the issues
to the enemy, whilst at the same time a passage was to be
effected over the ditch, and an entrance forced through the
north gate of the fortress.

The 2nd battalion 93rd Regiment had been appointed by the
general commanding to act as escort to the guns on Mont St.
Michel ; two battalions of the 27th Regiment were kept back
as general resei-ve; the other Lattiilions were told oft to the
investment and real attack, which was first commenced by the
3rd pioneer company moving forward to reconnoitre the passage
of the ditch.

Under the fire of musketry from a considerable distance, the
pioneers reached the canal which borders the foot of the glacis
on the north sitle of the fortress. The first glance throngli the
trees disclosed to view a well-pn^served bastion front wth a
wet ditch and a ravelin. Volunteers, who had doubled across
the canal bridge under the enemy's fire and then observed at
close quarters the works from the tt)p of the glacis, confirmed
and amplified still further those observations. As therefore the
conditions were deemed unfavourable for an assault at this
point, attempts were made to gain the ramparts elsewhere.
VVliilst a portion of the company remained as reserve in the
Hubnrb of St. ]\Iansuy, the remainder moved across the canal
bridge some 400 paces to the eastward, and from thence, under
cover at first of the hop gardens, towanb; the salient of the
nearest ravelin. After traversing a strip of meadow land under

I .

425

. the enemy's fire, the one pioneer division took up a firm position
in the ditches at the foot of the glacis, and, together with the « v

infantiT which had meanwhile arrived, commenced a fusillade , \

upon the garrison of the place.

About 1 p.m. the fusilier battalion of the 93rd Regiment had
first advanced through the suburb of St. Mansuy towards the
north front of the fortress ; in rear of it the 1st battalion of the
regiment had taken up a position at the point where the rail-
W{^ intersects the Francheviile road.

The 10th company, which Avas leading the advance, crossed
the canal bridge between the suburb 'and the fortress under the
enemy's heavy fire, and afterwards pressed forward in skirmish-
ing order across the glacis as far as the main ditch ; here the
commander of the company, Captain v. Brosy, was mortally
wounded. The 11th co., which liad followed the railway em-
bankment in a westerly direction, and subsequently advanced
firom the side of Mont St. Michel towards the fortress, opened
fire against the enceinte on the right of the 10th. The 9th,
which crossed the canal bridge in rear of the 10th, prolonged
the line of fire to the left ; the greater part of the 12tn wedded
itself between these two companies, one of its divisions bemg
alone retained in the suburb as first reserve. Thus deployed^
the fusilier battalion was engaged in a sharp and close skirmish
chiefly against the north ravelin which covered the main gate
of the fortress.

Meanwhile the greater part of the 2nd battalion had also
pressed forward as far as the ed^e of the ditch on the right of
the fusiliers. Entrusted originally, as already mentioned, wiiJi
escorting the batteries on Mont St. Michel, Major v. Schwemler,
commanding the battalion, very soon recognised that the enemy
was restricting himself solely to the defensive. Leaving only
the 5th company on the southern slopes of the hill, he had in
consequence descended from it, and under a vigorous fire from
the enemy taken up, first with the 6th company,* a firm posi-
tion in the gardens opposite the north-west front of the place.
On its left came up tne 7th ; the 8th was somewhat further to
tile rear in secona line. In this advance the battalion com-
mander, who was on his horse in the skirmishing line, only 100
to 150 paces from the enemy, was mortally wounded.

Any further advance appeared impracticable, as the draw-
bridges were raised, and along the entire north and north-west
front no point of passage could be found across the main ditch,
forty feet in width and filled with water.

Smiultancously with the advance of the 93rd against the
north front, the 2nd battn. 27th Regiment had moved along the
railway towards the western suburb and the railway station.
The march along the permanent way progressed at first without
impediment, as the railroad passes through an elevation of the
ground, and is also protectea from the side of the fortress by

* One of its diTisions was left oa special escort to the guns.

420

garden walls and houses. But after this an open space had
to be crossed, wliicli was completely under nre from the
enceinte. Under the eyes of the commander of the Division,
Lieut.-General v. SchwarzhofF, tlio 8th co. fii-st rapidly doubled
over the dangerous place, but not without loss. The parts of
the l>attalion wliich followod found themselves received with so
vigorous and woll-ilire(;tcd a fire that the leaders of the two
foremost companii'H were quickly wounded, and Major Joffroy,
conniKinding the battalion, likewise sustained a severe contu-
sion through tlie fall of liis wounded horse. Captain Dammcrt,
alrcjuly wounded, agahi mounted bin liorse, but shortly after-
wards Bank down a second time. In spite of this all four
companies ultimately united, alth<mgh with considerable losses,
in the neighbourliood of the railway station, which was now
occupied by half the battalion. Captain v. Witzleben with
the 7th and parts of the 5th and Gth cos. advanced towards the
heights near the subxu'b of St. Evre, in order to complete the
investment towards that side. By means of a sluice-gate the
canal was first crossed, and then the mill leat which flows to
the south of it. Protected by the walls of the vhieyards, they
gained and occupied without further loss a flirm on these
height4^, Avhilst a special dotaehment was pushed forward to the
nearest Irifurcation of the roads.

Meanwhile the portion of the battalion left at the railway
station had sent forward a division to the glacis in order also to
co-operate from the west side in the fusillade upon the rampai^ts.
As, however, the railway station appeared too weakly occupied,
reinforcementsweresentfor,and Colonel v. Krosigk, commanding
the DJJrd, brought the two ilank companies of his first battalion
from its position nortli of St. lilansuy to the railway embank-
ment. This movement did nut gain its object without losses ;
Lieut.-Colonel Wenier, commanding the battalion, was wounded.

We had, however, succeeded in investing Toul vnth. the ex-
ception of tlie south side ; for from the eastAvard the Bavarian
lance 1' brigade had advanced as far as Dommartin and opened
fire with its battery of horse artillery upon the fortress.* But
the fire of the skirmishers »s\varming up the glacis and of the
.artilleiy on the heights had up to this time led to no special
result; the conilagrations atinany points of the town caused by
the bmsting of the shells had been on each occasitm rapidly
extinguished. Success coidd only be ensmcd by throwhig a
bridge over the ditch and gaining thereby a forcible entry into
the interior of the fortrej,s.

With thi.s ol)jeet, dinin?;' llie liist Jidvance (if (he infantry
through the «ul)urb oi' ISt. Maii:;uy, tv/ci guns of the light batteiy
had been brought up to that point in order to be ready to take
part. When about 2 p.m. the first heavy Ijattery came up from
its previous position to Mont St. JMiehel, one of its guns was
also placed in the same suburb. Lieut.-Colonel v. Freyhold,

• Sec p. 270.

427

oommanding the divisioni brought up this gun under a wither-
ing fire from the enemy's infantry to within 100 paces of the
enceinte in order to blow in the gate of the fortress at short
range, and to bring down the drawbridge. As, however, the
powder smoke, and the closely planted trees impeded the aim,
this attempt was also unsuccessful ; after the eighth round it
was therefore abandoned.

The artiUeiy and engineer officers wore at tliat time busily
engaged in seeldng for a more KUitablo position for blowing in
the gate, when between 8 and 4 p.m. the general cominanaing
ordered the engagement to be broken off.

In order to receive in their retreat the troops engaged with
the enemy, and whose path onco more lay under chassepot fire.
General v. Alvensleben posted the two battahons of the 27th
which had been held in reserve, the regiment of dragoons, and
the 4th rifle battalion,* which had meanwhile arrived, on both
sides of the Francheville road.

General v. Zychhnski conducted the retreat from the advanced
position. As a previous assembly of the battalions in the confined
ground on the canal could only have been efiected with difficulty
and not without fresh losses, thev retired by small detachments,
which the enemy foDowed up with an effective shell fire.

Although the 93rd thus succeeded soon after in falling back
upon the supporting position just mentioned, the withdrawal
ot the 2nd battn* 27th Kegiracnt from the south-west side of the
fortress was attended with some difficulty. The orders of the
general commanding had not reached this battalion ; the various
pai*ts were therefore continuing their fusillade upon the enceinte,
when towards 7 p.m. it wjis distinctly perceived for the first
time that the engagement had entirely ceased on the north
side. The adjutant of the battalion, who had been sent away to
find out the position of afiaii-s, met, on the approacli of nightfall,
a detachment of troops which had been sent foi-ward to protect
the battalion in its retreat, and was now occupying the railway
station, whilst the battalion was gi*adually assembling at a
brickkiln in the vicinity. The subsequent retreat also by the
north of Mont St. Michel was carried out unmolested, as the
enemy during the whole time made no sortie from the fortress.

The whole of the troops employed agaitist Toul re-occupied
that evening their old quarters and bivouacs. The losses in
the undertaking had not been inconsiderable. They amounted
to 6 officers, 44 men killed, and 11 officers, 1 surgeon, 129 men
wounded, besides 1) mi»sing.t

On his arrival at Les Saizorais, General v. Alvensleben found
a despatdi from the commander-in-chief of the Ilnd Army. An

* The rifle battalion in consequence of a former order joined the odTanoed guard
thi« daj.

t vUe Appendix XX. Different indiTidunlB had mode repeated attempts to wade
through the (utches of the fortress and scale the wall in front, which was actually
accomplished by Stieler of the 10th oo. and Boog of the 11th co. of the fusiliers of
the OSrd. The latter succombed shortly after to the wounds which he reoeiTed.

428

entoipi-ise ao;ain8t Toiil was therein sui^gested from the same
groiindB which had decided the general to make the attempt
which has just been narrated. Ho believed that a repetition
would be altogether wanting in chancea of success, and that
same evening, the 16th, repoited to this effect to army head-
quartei-s. However desirable and important the possession of
Toul might be, it did not appear advisable immediately after
the battle tliat large forces should be occupied in front of that
fortress, perhaps for a considerable time.

The iVth Army Corps abided therefore by its previous orders,
in virtue of which it was to resume its advance in a westerly
direction next day.

The 17tii of August.

Arrangements His Majesty the King had as early as the 15th August
of the royal bccome Convinced from pei*sonal observation on the battle-neld
and'^of th!^Irt ^^ Colombey that the French Army had withdrawn from the
and Iliid eastern environs of Metz, thereby transferrins the centre of
Amtioi events entirely to the left bank of the Moselle. It has been

erenhi^onh '^^^^^^^^^^ ^ d^® course that the necessary steps were at once
ifitrand^the* taken to hasten the advance of tlio Ilird and iXth Army Corps
inoniiiiKof ovcr the Moselle, and to bring the Ist Anny above Metz closer
thei7ih. to the river. Hereupon the royal head-quartei'S were also

shifted on the 16th from Hemy to Pont k Mousson, which place
the King reached in person during the afternoon.

The fii-st intelligence of the commencement of a struggle to
the west of Metz had reached Herny before noon. Lieut.-
Colonel V. Bronsart of the general staff, who had been despatched
from the royal head-quai'tcra to watch the course of affairs on
the left bank of the Moselle, had joined the Hlrd Anny Corps,
and at 9 a.m. reported from Buxi^res that preparations were
being made for attacking a hostile camp at Rezonville. This
communication enclosed a telegram despatched by the com-
mander-in-chief of the Ilnd Aimy from Pont k Mousson at 11.45.
On reaching the latter place General v. Molike found a despatch
from General v. Stiehle awaiting him, which amplified those
first reports, and was intended more particularly to explain the
motives of the commander-in-chief at the time of his moving off
to the battle-field. From this despatch it was evident on the
one hand that the enemy had appeared in considerable force in
front of the Tlird Army Corpn at Rezonville, and that both
Divibioiis of the Xth Corps had turned off in the direction of
the fight. In other respects, however, the head-quarter staff
of the Ilnd Army were still acting on the assumption that they
would only have to deal with a cuiisiderable fraction of the
French army, which it was now intended to force away north-
ward with the three nearest Corps,* whilst the left wing of the
array was to continue its advance to the line of the Mouse. In

• Illrd, Xth, and IXth.

4L>9

the event of aifairs taking tins course it had been already in
contemplation to place those three Corps inidor the chief com-
mand of General v. Voigf s-Rhetz, as soon as the presence of
Prince Frederic Cliarles should be required on the left wing of
tho Ilnd Army.

The supreme authorities attached a still wider impoi-tance to
the contents of the reports which had been received, and beUeved
that they even now recognised a new turn of affairs. In order,
however, to ensure in any case a timely support on the 17th
August to the troops already engaged, the Crown Prince of
Saxony* received orders that evening direct from the royal
head-quarters to move off the Xllth Corps at 3 a.m. by way of
Thiaucourt to Mars la Toui', and to pusli forward his cavalry
towards the Verdun road. It was known that the IXth Corps
was already engaged in crossing the Moselle, and as the other
paiis of the Ilnd Army were Inrther from the scene of the
stniggle than the Corps of the Ist Arniyt assembled between the
lower Seille and the Moselle, these were first brought up.

Already in the afternoon, at the first news from the battle-field,
an oflicer of the general staff from the royal head-quarters had
been despatched to General v. Stouimetz. He carried verbal
orders to that officer from the lung, to hold the Vllth and Vlllth
Army Corps in readiness on the following morning at Corny and
Arry, with a view to crossing the Moselle immediately in rear of
the IXth. This provisional arrangement was followed by an ex-
planatory despatch from General v. Moltke at Pont k Mousson,
m which the idea was mooted of forcing the enemy, attacked that
day at Rezonville, to the northward and away from his commu-
nications with Chalons. All the trains were, however, to remain
on the right bank of the Moselle until further notice.

When these instructions reached the commander-in-chief of
the Ist Army at Coin sur Seille towards 8 p.m., he had already
made arrangements in that spirit for the following day.

On the road to his new head-quai-tei-s General v. Steinmetz
had received a communication from General v.Goeben that troops
of the Ilnd Army were engaged in the neighbomhood of Gorze,
and in consequence the bridge trains of the Vllth and Vlllth
Army Corps were at once ordered to be brought forward from
the columns of route. Each Corps had received instructions to
throw a bridge over the Moselle before the early morning at the
verv latest, the Vllth at Corny, the Vlllth at Any.

(5n receipt of the order from the royal head-quarters General
V. Steinmetz issued the following supplementary instructions:
the Vllth Army Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division were to be
held in readiness next morning at the former, and the Vlllth at
the latter viUage ; the 3rd Cavahy Division on the other hand
was to take up a position between Pouilly and Marley, in order

* Th0 Prince, m we know, bad alio readied Pont K MouBson on the 16th. See
p. 422.
t See p. 353.

1 i

430

to protect the passage of the Moselle and the trains left on the
H^t bank from the direction of Metz.

The bridging of the river was urged forward with all the
available strength during the night. The pontoniers of the
Yllth and IXth Ai-my Corps laid three new pontoon and trestle
bridges near the already utilised suspension bridge at Corny ;
General v. Goobeii threw a second bridge at Arry close to that
made by the Illrd Army Corps, Meanwhile Captain Baumann,
of the general staff of the Ist Army, was engagea in clearing the
roads, which were still covered by the trains of the IXth Army
Corps,* in order to enable the troops to pass, a task which he
accomplislicd l)efore morning.

Prince Frederic Charles had taken up his head-quarters at
Gorzo on the evening of tlio IGth August. After the issue of 'the
battle the head-quarters of the Una Army had to be prepared
for a fresh attempt on the part of the evidently superior K>rces
of the French to re-open the way westward which was now
barred to them. Owin^ to the great exhaustion of the troops
who had taken part in the struggle, arrangements had to be maae
for bringing forward fresh forces as early as possible to the
battle-field, so as to meetthe expected attack in sumcieut strength.
After the Prinee liad made the needful arrangements for re-

Slenishing the ammunition, he issued the necessarv orders to the
ifferent troops between 10 and 11 o'clock Uiat mght
The Ilnd and IVth Army Corps, which were at Buchy anc}
les Saizemis, two long days' march from the battle-field, could
not be calculated upon for the next dav ; they were to abide
by their previous oraers,t in virtue of which the former was to
move up to Pont \ Mousson, the latter to continue its advance
in the direction of the Mouse as far as the neighbourhood of

Boucq.J

The Xlltli and the Guard Coi-ps were also 18 to 20 miles away
from the battle-field ; still it was possible to bring them up in
the course of the ITtlx. Special notifications were therefore
sent to them and to the IXth Corps, acquaintiag them with the
events of the day, and at the same time giving the following
orders for the 17th :

The IXth Army Corps, whoso liead-quarters were at Gorze,
was directed to assemble at daybreak on the heights north of
the village. The Xllth Army Corps was to move off that same
niglit, gain the neighbourhood of Mars la Tour by way of
Thiaucourt, and take up a position in re^ir of the Xtli Corps.
Lastly, tho Guard Cori)s waw ordered to march Avithout delay to
Mans la Tour by way of Bciiey and Cliambley in order to take
post on the left of tho SaxonK, whilst its cavalry was to con-
tinue its advance towards the Meuse.

* The IXth Corps, as wo aro aware, had been proviuusly ordered to cross tho
Moselle before the Ist Army ; the instructions for the trains to remain on tho right
bank was only contained in the subsequent order just mentioned.

t Army order 16th, 12 a.m. Vide App. XX, p. 126*.

X SoTcn miles £. of Commercy.

4'U

At 11 p.m. Prince Frodoric (Jharlca despatched to His Majesty
the king a pro\'i8ional report on the issiio of the battle, and upon
the measures which had just 1)eou taken.

As the most distant troops of the IXth Army Corps had to
march not quite 9 miioR to tln^ prescribod place of assembly,
their ariival durinff tho early moriiint2: in rear of tlie i-if^ht
Aving of the line of uattle inij^-lit bo ox[)('cted Aviili groat con-
fidence.

Less certain appeared the timely support of tho left wing by
tho Xllth and Guard CorpM. The zeal of tlie connnaiulei-s,
however, gave an impetus to the exeent ion of thoKO movements.

In consequence of the uistvnctions previously received from
tho royal head-quartera,* the commander of the Xllth Army
Corps had given ordei-s for his Cavalry Division to assemble near
VigneuUes at 4 a.m. on tlio 17th, and then to move forward at
once in order of battle towards Harville. In the event of its
not meeting with the enemy so near as that place, the Division
was to move onward to the Metz-Etain road, ivith a vicAv to ac-
quiring as precise intelligence as it could with regard to the
condition of tho enemy, and at the same time to endeavour to
intercept all troops and convoys — anangements whicli evidently
aimed at striking as rapidly and deeply {is possible at the French
communications with the west.

The measures of the commander-iu-chief had likewise been
anticipated by the 23rd Division in a suitable manner. Captain
V. Klenck, of the Saxon service, wlio was dei)uted to keep up the
communication with tho 5th Cavalry Division, and in doing so
had been a spectator of the engagement of the Xth Army Corps,
arrived at the Divisional head-quarters at Regnieville en Haye
after 10 o'clock. He was tlie bearer of a request from General
V. Voigts-Rhetz, with the sanction of Prince Frederic Charles, for
the 23rd Division to advance to Tronville, tlie arrival there of
fresh forces with the least possible delay being intimated as very
desirable. Prince George of Saxony, commanding the Division,
ordered his troops to stand to arms at once and to move ofif by
way of Thiaucourt Their own head-quarters and those of the
Guard Corps were apprised of the ordei*s which had been issued.

When tnis intelligence reached tlie latter shortly before mid-
night, the general commanding. Prince August of Wiirttember^,
detenninea for the present to suspend the advance to the Mouse
ordered for the 17th. Pendinix orders from tho c(mimander-in-
chief, he at once concentrated in a nortlujily direction his two
Infantry Divisions wth the coips artilleiy at Flirey and Riche-
court, the cuirassier brigade at Heudicom*t. By these anti-
cipatory arrangements the commander of the Guard Corps was
enabled to comply promptly with the instructions from Gorze
Ivhich reached him m the coui*se of the m'ght.

At 5 ojn. the corps commenced its march past Beney ui ac-
cordance with the orders. The brigade of lancers of tho Guard

• See p. 429.

432

alono reinainod ou the Mciise villi a view to watching towards
the west from St. MihieL*

The rcpoit despatched by Prince Frederic Charles from Gorze
at 11 p.m. reached tlie royal head-quarters at Pont a MouRSou
after midnight, wluthcr at the Pame time Lieut.-Colonel v.
Bronsart had also returned IVom the battle-field and made his
verbal rcport.t It was now known that two Prussian Army Corps
had HUBtanied a K(iV(Te and sanj^ii nary struggle against superior
hostile forces, and that it was above all things necessary to support
the former in good time in the positions which they now held. As
the importances of the nitnation became more and more evident,
His ila je«ty the king resolved to betake himself with his whole
stall" at early daAvn to the baltln-licld. General v. Steinmetz was
informed of this, and in*ged to hasten the advance of the 1st
Anny over the Jloselle as mui;h as possible. As the preparations
to this end had already been madti, the order, which reached
Coin sur Seille at 4 a.m., coidd at once be complied with. The
15th Division, which with the coq)H ai-tillery of the Vlllth Coips
had reached the neighbourhood of Lorry the evening before,
commenced crossing the Moselle at Any at 5 o'clock, whilst the
general c(mimanding, General v. Goeben, hastened forward in
person to the battle-field. At G o'clock General v. Zastrow
ordered the Vllth Anny Corps at Sillegny and Ponnuerieux to
stand to anus, and marched with it to Coniy. The Ist Cavalry
Division assembled at Fey. General v. Stennnetz moved off to
Cornv in order to await the anival there of the Vllth Coi-ps,
which he contemplated sinding on afterwards to Gravelotte.
Morning of At 4.IK) a.m. Prince Frederic Charles had once more taken

A ** ^^f^ th ^^P ^^® P°^^ ^^^ observation on the battle-field near Flaviguy.
battle-field. ° After a quiet night at all points, the advanced posts in the

glinmier of the morning heard the French bugles, and as the
morning broke the enemy's line of outposts came into view on the
heights between IJniville and liezonville. In front of the latter
village the line thickened at times to a lino of skirmisliei-s, so
that some believed that they recognised preparations for the
expected attack ; however, nothing of the sort took place.

In front of the Ilird Army Coips was Lieutenant v. Rohr with
the ftrd squadron 15th Lancers, furnishing the outposts and keep-
ing up an imfiagging touch of the enemy. He dispersed a detacn-
ment of infantry which was advancing from the campe east of
Rezonville towards the battle-field, and captured 30 prisonei-s.
Later on these camps were seen to l)ec()me gradual!}^ empty,
while bodies of troops were drawing olf in an easterly direction
towards Gravelotte. Ilezonvillo still remained in occupation by
the enemy, who on several occasions repulsed with nmsketry fire
the Ifincer patrols riding forwartl towards the village.

At () a.m. His Majesty the King appeared on the battle-field and
betook himself with the royal head-quarters to the height south

* Tho 1st and 4tli cos. of Queen Elizabeth's Rcgiuicut remained as a guard to the
field bakery established in St. Miliiel.
t See p. 428.

438

of Flavigny, where the whole of the IXth Army Corps had pre-
viously come up on the right of tlio 5th Infantry Division. The
next few hours passed without any remarkable incident, while
the partly contnirdictory reports presented no clear idea for the
moment of tho conduct and intentions of the enemy.

Movements of hostile troops ''in a westerly direction towards
Jamy " were reported, but at the same time lines of skirmishers
were observed on the heights of the Bois de Vaux, through
which artillery were driving away along the Metz road, whilst
again columns of infantry were retiring along the Vemeville
road. In apparent contradiction to this a report came in from
an officers patrol of tho IGth Hussars, that hostile bodies of
troops wore collecting to the west of Gravelotte on both sides
of the Conflans roaC and that detachments of all arms were
continuously advancing to that point, especially from the direc-
tion of Vemeville, where at that time a cavalry brigade was
also in position. As the commander of the patrols had become
impressed that a fresh French Corps was collected at that place,
and was already preparing an offensive movement, Major Count
Haeseler, of the head-quarters of the Ilnd Army, rode forward to
reconnoitre. He came to the conclusion that from the enemy's
movements no attack was to be expected from that quarter ; uie
enemy would, on the contrary, appear merely to have taken up
a rearguard poHthn at Gravelotte, and that to judge from the
smoke he was engaged in cooking.* Moreover Rezonville re-
mained up to 11 a.m. in the occupation of the French.

Whilst we were thus constantly feeling the enemy in ad-
vance of the right wing of the Ilnd Army, the touch in front
of the left and towards the north became graduallv weaker,
until at last it was completely lost. In order to throw light
upon the matter, it must be borne in mind that the Prussians
expected the French to advance at the first dawn, and that con-
sequently the arrangements were limited chiefly to meeting an
attack.

The 11th Hussars which had pushed forward a squadron from
Mars la Tom: in the direction oi Doncourt at 5.45, reported the
presence of hostile troops at Bruville, and that a large camp was
visible at the same place ; it was also asserted that movements
of troops from St. Marcel, apparently in the direction of Verdun,
had been seen. Another squadron of the regiment, however,
which had been despatched towards Jamey between 10 and
11 a.m., remarked clouds of dust between Doncourt and Joua-
ville. From their direction the decision was given in favour of
movements in a north-easterly direction towards Metz, in oppo-
sition to the report previously mentioned.

The varied nature of the contents of all these reports is ex-
plained for the most part by the actual proceedings of the French
army on the morning of the 1 7th August

* Both the obsemtionB of tho commander of the petrol end the opinion of the
etaif officer proTed correct, os the conrao of tho oftmtive will show.

484

Whilst the Germans had resolved to maintain the advantaMa
gahied on the 16th, and to tins end had made preparations tor
beating off any attack, the course of the batde had impressed the
French commander-in-chief that he had had to deal with at least
equal forces, and that on the following day he wonld have to
contend against a decisive superiority on the side of the Oermans.
Marshal Bazaine did not, however, feel himself equal to accept
such an attack in his present positions, neither, in the face of the
threatening line of advance of the Gorman army, did he believe
himself capable of carrying out the movement now commenced
towards the Mouse, for wliich, however, the roads by Etain and
Briey wore at that timo still open. Other important circum-
stances claimed consideration ; tne self-reliance of the leaders and
of the troops, at any rate in many cases, had been shaken,* and as
an eq^ixaordinary expenditure of ammunition had taken place in
the battle, and the provisions in the hands of the troops were only
flufiScient for a day, it appeared above all things necessary to
replenish these stores. The trains and wagon parks had been
unable to follow immediatoly after the corps ; they had all been
directed to the Gravelotte road, which they covered far down to
the Moselle valley. For all these reasons Marshal Bazaine deemed
it necessary to diraw in his army nearer to Metz in order to await
the attack in an impregnablef position backed by this fortress.
Against this the marshal hoped that the strength of the German
army, already weakened in the previous engagements, would so
crumble to pieces that the marcn to the Mouse could be resumed
without impediment on the 19tii or 20th.

In the nidit of the 17th, therefore, the French commander-in-
chief issuedthe order for retreat, in which there was the tollow-
ing sentence : ^ The great expenditure of ammunition which has
** taken place, and the circumstance that provisions for several
^ days are not available, prevent our commencing the march
" wmch was provisionally decided upon. We will therefore at
•* once withdraw to the Plappevillo plateau.**

In the early morning the army commenced its movements in
the two main directions past Verneville and Gravelotte towards
the broad ridge of Boncourt, Amanvillers, and Point du jour. It
was originally intended that the 6th Corps should take up an
advanced position at Verneville, but this intention was again
abandoned. ^ With a view to covering the retreat du Barail's
Cavalry Division remained temporarily at Verneville, and Met-
mann's Division of the 3rd Corps to the west of Gravelotte.
Advanced parties of the latter occupied the woods in the Ars

* Opinions differ ezoeedingly as to whetlier the French were in a condition for an
immeiuato renewal of the Ifight or not. Anyhow, it 10 indieatiTO of the itato of
affairs on tlie morning of the 17th, that a Fit^nch military writer, while speaking in
favour of the possibihtj of such an advance, suggests at tlio same timo that persons
should have boon sent through tho bivouacs in order to "enlighten the French
soldiers about the victor^,*' and to awaken confldenco in them. Another writer, on
tho other hand, is of opmion that the advance of tho Prussians on the 17Ui August
wduld have caused a general panio.

t Blarshal Bazoincrs oxpreiwion is 'UnexputfuabUy

135

valley, and became engaged there towardfl noon in a skinrneh
with the advanced guard of the Ist Army.

In General v. Moltkc's despatch, which reached Coin sur SeiDe Bngagcmcnt
on the evening of the IGtJi, with iiiBtnictioim for tho Tst Army to y^^,^* ^^** *"
cross the Moselle, the subsequent inovomeutH wore Icl't to the
commander-in-chief, with the proviso that the troops were to be
brought as soon as possible against the cnc^iny. As it was neccs-
eary above all things that the situation of affairs on the left
bank of the Moselle should be tlioroughly cleared up, Colonel
Count Wartensleben, the quaii:cnnastcr-iii-chiof, was sent on
ahead in that direction at daybreak. That officer, after an
interview with General v, Moltlco on the Flavigny heights, dis-
patched an oflScer with the following intelligence and instruc-
tions for the Ist Anny : —

" The enemy, who is for the most part retiring upon Metz,
still holds Rezonville and Gravelotte. The Vllth Coii)s, after
crossing at Corny, should advance byway of Ai's upon Grave-
lotte and occupy the Bois do Vaux on the right flank ; the
Vlllth Corps, leaving Qorzc on the loft, should take the
direction of Rezonville."

General v. Steinmetz, who had mcanTshilo betaken himself
from Corny to Noviant, hereupon ordered tlie further advance
of both Corps at 8.45 a.m., and gave instructions for the 1st
Cavahy Division to move the Iiead of its column to Corny. When
the quarteimaster-in-chief had made a verbal report on his return,
a special despatch was sent to General v. Manteuifel, desiring
him to make a demonstration with his artillery against Metz on
the right bank of the Moselle, in order to draw off the attention
of the enemy as much as possible from the decisive proceedinffs
on the left bank. General v. Steinmetz then betook himself
wth his staff to the Vllth Army Corps.

The advanced guard of that Coi-ps, consisting of the 28th
In&ntry Brigade,* the 2nd sqn. 15th Hussara, and the 1st light
battery, had meanwhile moved off from Noveant for Ars at
9 o'clock under General v. Woyna. When the squadron wliich
led the advance bent away into the lateral valley ascending from
AiB to Gravelotte, and was approacliing the second mill, it was
&ed upon by infantry, and some ot the hussars were wounded.
General v. Steinmetz, who had just reached the spot in person.
ordered the woods to be attaclccd. General v. Woyna deployed
both battalions of the 77th into company columns, and gave them
instructions to sain the edge of the wood at the issue of the valley
opposite Gravelotte. Whilst the fusilier battalion of the 53ra
followed in rear, both musketeer battns. of the same regiment
were pushed forward shortly after into the Bois de Vaux ; the
2nd along a' narrow path leading past the Msmce Mill towards
Bozerieufies, the Ist on the rigiit through the wood, which is

* Wiih the csoepiioii of the fusilier battn. 77th| detaohed as escort tothe ooips
tttOtoiX.

0 2

430

iiOcarly everywhere thickly grown with brambles and underwood.
Tliis greatly impeded the advance, csj>ecially that of the detach-
ments in close order; yet the appai'cntly weak enemy* was
pressed back further and further in the vigorous skirmish.

At 1 p.m., the 77th, after losing three officersf and somo
twenty men, succeeded in gaining the north-east border of the
Bois (fes OgnouH. A half-battalion, which had advanced as far
as the oust edge of the Bois dos Vaux for the protection of the
right Hank, again moved off to the left on the approach of the
two nmsketeer battns. of tluj 53rd ; the latter had also di'iveu
the hostUo detachments before them.

The eutnny, presHtnl back in this manner, held for some time
the northernmost corner (»f the Boik des Ognons, but afterwards
evacuated the entire plateau south of Gravelotte, and ultimately
the village also at 3 p.m. Aletiviann's Division once more re-
joined the 3rd Coi-ps, Avhich had taken up a position on the
northern part of the Point du jour plateau. Later on du Barail's
Cavali-y Division was also withdrawn from Verneville behind
the rignt "wing of the new French position.J

The Prussians did not press in pursuit. During the engage-
ment in the wood verbal mstructions had been sent to the com-
mander-in-chief of the Ist Army from the royal head-quarters to
break off the action, as such a proceeding was not witlim the
intention of the supreme authorities for tnat day, but that the
morrow should rather see it undertaken "with combined forces.§
In agreement with this, General v. Goeben also reported that he
had received orders from General v. Moltke to stay the move-
ment on RezouAnlle previously ordered.

General v. Steinmetz had in consequence given instructions
that as soon as the edges of the wood were gained, they should
be occupied, and that only weak ihfantry posts should be pushed
in advance. In order, liowever, to become more accurately
acquainted with the enemy's positions, Generals v, Steinmetz,
V. Zastrow, and v. Kameke, with their staffs, rode forward to
reconnoitre on the heights which ascend gradually towards
Gravelotte. Away beyond the Bois do Vaux were now perceived
the extensive encampments of the French army on the opposite
plateau of Moscou and Point du jour. Emplacements for guns
and other defensive an-angements could bo distinctly seen, as
also considerable movement in the camps. There could no
longer be any doubt that we were at close quarters with a very
consideriil)Ie ))art of the enemy's army. The appearance of a
large group of horscmcu in the vicinity of Gravelotte diew forth

* Parts of MctinAnn*8 DiTision ; part of the 2nd Grenadier Quard^, according to
iho reports of tlio 28tli Brigade.

t Gapta. Y. Frankenburg ma mortally wounded.

% The positions of the ^Hmch army will be described more in detail in the narra-
tive of the battle of GraTelotte-St. Privat.

§ Several officers of the royal head-quarters staif were despatched simultaneously
and by different routes to carry these important communications. They aU reached
General t. Steinmets within a short time of one another, aeon after midday.

4 p. 7

a lively and well-aimed fire from the mitraillciiBos posted at
Pont du jour, the clustei-s of bullets strildug the ground in th(^
immediate vicinity of the Pnissian generals.

General v. Woyna, who had ridden fonvard as far as Grave-
lotte, and from that point luxd observed the cavalry camp still
standuig in the neighbourhood of Vcrneville, fonned the inten-
tion of bombarding it with artillery. As experience had, however,
shown that the mere appearance of Prussian guns was wont to
draw the French on to an engagement, General v. Steinmetz,
adhering closely to the order wliich he liad received, forbade the
execution of the design. In order, as far as lay in his power, to
remove every cause for a cannonade, he at once sent back a
battery, which was already approaching the upper issue from
the wood along the Ars valley road.

In explanation of the interference of the supreme authorities,
to wliich allusion lias just been made, it is necessaiy to return to
the position taken up by the king on the Flavigny heights.

Tne reports of the cavaliy patrols wliich, dm-ing tlio course of
the forenoon, reached the commander-in-chief of the Ilnd Army
and the royal head-quartci-s at the same time, were not in
Rufiicicnt detail to bring the enemy's designs thoroughly to light.
The personal observation of the king and of tho liigher com-
manoers was for the most part confirmed, the conviction
gradually gaining groimd that an attack on the part of the
enemy need not be expected for that day, and that tlie adver-
sary must rather have receded from the positions which he had
heretofore held. Still uncertainty prevailed as to the direction
of the French retreat, especially as to whether the entire army
had gone nearer to Metz, or whetlier it, at least in part, had
resumed, bv the more northern roads to the Mouse, tne march
intemiptea on the 16th. As the Flavigny heights permitted of
a more comprehensive survey of the country lynig to the north-
east, but less, however, towards the north and north- west, tho
constant reports of movements of troops in the latter direction
gave room for both suppositions.*

On the east, towaras Metz, it was known for certain that the
troops of the 1st Army were in close proximity with the enemy,
yet even there it could not be seen whether the wliole French
army was in their front or only a large paii of it, wliile another
part might have commenced its marcn to the Meuso. Some
information on the latter pomt might be expected from the
Saxon cavalry, which had in the interim proceeded more than
18 miles from their previous bivouacs in order to gain the Etain
road.

Meanwhile the king passed through the encampments of the
troops which had been engaged on the previous day, and ex-
pressed his thanks to them for their bravenr, and the successes
they had achieved. The battalions of the Ilird and Xth Army

* The iDoro so as flio aeccmd report from the 11 ih Hiusars was not brought to tho
knowledge of the commandcr-in-cnief.

438

Corps on tlio heights of Flavigny and TronviUe had been
thoroughly reorganised. Tho units wliich had been dislocated in
tlie engagement were either re-fomied, or, where the severity of
the losses rendered it necessary, were newly combined. The
ammunition columns, wliich had been emptied to replenish the
troops, had gone away to Hcmy in order to bring up the neces-
sary supplies in good time from the reserve park of tlie Ilnd
Army, which had arrived there from Saargemiind. Stores of
provisions were at hand in ample abundance ; as, however, an
msui&ciency of water was felt on tho plateau, the bivouacs of the
5th Infantry and 6tli Cavalrjr Divisions were removed to the
vicinity of Cliambley and IJuxicrca

Intelligence was now received of the approach of the Xllth
and Guard Corps. Tho former had reached Xonville with its
advance as early as 9.30 a.m., and after resting for an hour in
consequence of the news that tho enemy was not attacking,
resumed its march to Mara la Tour. The advance of the corps
could be distinctly observed from the position of the commander-
in-chief of the Ilnd Army. A report was received from the Guard
Corps towards I p.m. that it was moving upon Ilag^ville.*

There were, therefore, soon after midday of the 17th August
seven Army Corps and three Cavahy Divisions of the 1st and
Ilnd Armiest at hand, or within such proximity that the
supreme authorities could calculate upon them for a certainty in
the event of the contest being renewed. As, however, tho
enemy had not attacked, but on the contrary tho interval
between the contending armies was increased by his retreat, it
was now the time and opportunity for making smtable anunge-
ments for tho renewal of tho stniggle wliich had been merely
deferred, and especially for infusing harmony into the move-
ments of tho two German aimies.

When it had been detennined under these circumstances to
pass to the attack with combined forces on the 18th August, it
was necessary in tho first place to take care that the flankmg
movement initiated by the 1st Amiy should not lead on the
17th to a serious collision, tho extent of which from recent
experien(;o could not be foroseen. Instructions to this effect
were sent at noon to General v. Steinmetz, who, as already
mentioned, at once complied with the views of the supreme
authorities, and endeavoured in every way to ensure tho execution
of the order.

Witli the decline of the action in the Bois de Vaux in the
early mornuig of the 17th August the change in the general
military situation caused by the battle of Vionville had been
brought to a provisional termination. Whilst the troops engaged

• S.W. of Chambley.

t y Iltli, Ylllth Oorps, and 1st Cavalry DiviBion of tlie I«fe Army i Illrd, IXth,
IClbi Xlltli, and Guard Curps, 5tli and Gth CaYolry DiriBions of the Ilnd Army.

439

in the battle of Colombey held the relative fronts which cor-
responded in direction to their natural communications^ an
almost opposite condition of things had supervened as early as
the forenoon of the 16th August, which was only partly compen-
sated during the battle by the 3rd and 4th French Corps
wheeling south in the afternoon and maintaining their positions
against the Xth Army Corps. The natural communications of
the French army with the capital and the interior of the country
lay, it is true, entirely on their right flank, and, in view of the

Eosition of the Germans, could only bo maintained and secured
y a renewal of the engagement.

As the French did not, at any rate for the present, feel them-
selves equal to this, and therefore withdrew then* right wing some
distance nearer to Metz on the morning of the 17th, this move-
ment must naturally bring the contending forces opposite to one
another with their fronts strategically reversed — ^presuming that
the Germans resolved to accept tlie proffered conditions. For
in the impending struggle there was always the important
advantage for the French, that they could support themselves
on a large fortrerss, whilst the German army had a hostilely dis-
posed couutiy in its rear.

Such was the general situation of affairs when in the afternoon
of the 17tli August the arrangements of the supreme German
authoritioB for the next day were isBUcd.*

* Am tlieso form the groundwork and introduction totho battloof Gravdotto^thej
will bo giYcn in tho next Bcction of tho narratiro.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX I.

ORDER OF BATTLE
Of the Army of the Rhine in the beginning of August 1870.

Comuakdeb-in^Chisf

Chief of Staff -
Sub-Chiefs
Commander of Artillery

„ Engineers

Du'ector-G-eneral m Parks
Intendoni-Gkneral •
Commltndant of Head-quai-ters

Total of the Troops.

- Napoleon III.

Marshal le Boeuf.

General Lebran and General Jarras.

General Soleille.

General Coffini^res de Nordeck.

General Mitrece.

Wolf.

General Letellier Blanchard.

Imperial Guard
Ut Corps MeMahon
Snd „ Frotsard •
8rd M Basaine •
4th „ Ladmiranlt

5tfa n ^^^7 -
6ib fp Oanfobert
7tfa „ Dooay, Felix
Orraliy Beserre
Artinerj

f»

Total

89
62
39
39
49
38

332

24
28
16
28
16
16
24
20
48

220*

12
20
15
20
15
15
20
15
6
16

154

Number of

Guns.

60
96
72
96
72
72
114
72
80
96

'80

Mitrail-
leuses.

12
24
18
24

18
18

6
18

144

After the mobilisation of the Army of the Rhino, there ]*emained
behind in France and Italj :

3 battalions of light infantry in Algiers.
The foreign regiment in Algiers.

4 infantry regiments in Algiers.

4 ,1 99 near Toulouse.

2 „ 99 in Civita Vecchia.

115 Fourth battalions in process of mobilisation in the interiort
6 Cavalry regiments in Algiers.

2 99 ,9 near Toulouse and in Civita Vecchia.

10 batteries (8 in Algiers, 2 in Civita Vecchia),

* It appears donbtfol whether the four squadrons per regiment, the number here
assumed) has been exceeded as a general rule.

F 2

IMPERIAL GUARD.

General Commanding
Chief of the General Staff
Commander of Artillery •

• General BoarbakL

• General d'Anvergne.
- General P£ de Arros.

_ J

FIRST DIVISION.

Commander • • Gtneral Deligny.

FiBBT Briqadb, General Brinceurt.

l8t regiment of YoHigeon of the Qaard • - -

—

and ^ „ „ ...
Rifle batUUon of the Guard . « . - -

—

Second Bjugadk, General Gamier.

3rd regiment of Voltigears of the Goard - - •

—

4tll „ „ „ . • -

^^^

mm^

ARTILLERY.

Commander, Lieat.-Colonel Gerbaut.

N08. 1 and 3 batteries, No. 5 battery (mitrail.) of the

Guard Field Artillciy regiment ...

Engineers : 1 compa y of the drd Engineer regiment -

Total of 1st Division -

SECOND DIVISION.

Commander - - General Ficard.

First Brioide, General Jeanningros.

Gnard Zouave regiment ......

iBtregimentof Grenadiers of the Guard ...

—

...

SsGOMD Brigade, Genl. Le F<nttevin de la Croix.

2nd regiment of Grenadiers of the Guard • . -
3rd », t» fi • - -

8
8

—

ARTILLERY.

' Commander, Lieut.-Colonel Denccey de Cevilly.

Nos. 3 and 4 batteries, No. 6 battery (mitrail.) of

the Guard Field Artillery regiment - . .

Engineers : 1 company of the 3rd Engineer regiment -

—

Total of 2nd Division

CAVALRY DIVISION.

Commander - • Qeneral Denrauz.

F1B8T BbioadB) General Halna da Tretay.

Guides regiment ....-..••-
Regiment of ChaaMUi-i-Cheyal of the Guard • • . .

SsooHO BsxoADBi General de France.

R^gineotofLaneenoftheGaard- ..--••
n Dragoon! n ' " " ' ---

Thibd Bsioadb, General da Freull,

Regiment of CoiraaBen of the Goard •-..-.
n Carbineers ^^ •••---

ARTHXERT.

Nos. 1 and 8 batteries of the regiment of the Horse Artillery of
tbeGnard .......

Total Cavalry DiTision • • • . •

Gons.

ARTILLERY RESERVE.

Nos. Sf 4, 5, 6 batteries of the regiment of the Horse Artillery of the
Gmurd -.---...-

Total Artillery Reserve ...

1 Train Squadron.

Total of Uie Guard Corps : 23 battalions of Infantry, 1 Rifle battalion,
24 sqnadronsi 60 guns, 12 mitrailleusesi 2 Engineer companies.

FIRST ARMY CORPS.

General Commanding ... Mai-shal MacMahon,

Duke of Magenta.

C'liicf of the General Staff - - General Colson.
CoQiDiandcr of Artilloiy - - General Forgoot.

FIRST DIVISION.
Commander - - General Ducrot.

First Brigade:, General Wolff.

18th Regiment of the Line ...
96th „ „ - . -

18th Rifle battalion ....

Second Brigade, General de Fostis du Hoolbee.

45th Regiment of the line ...
l8t Zouave regiment - . • -

ARTILLERY.

Commander, Lieut-Colonel Lecoeavre.

Nob. 6 and 7 Batteries, No. 8 (mitraii.) of the 9th

Artillery- Regiment .....

Engineers : 1 company of the 1st Engineer Regiment -

Total of the 1st Division .

SECOND DIVISION.
Commander - . General Douay (Abel).

First Brigade, General Pelleticr de Montmarie.

60th Regiment of the line ....

74th „ „ . .

16th Rifle Battalion . . . . .

Second Brigade, General Fello.

78th Regiment of the Line . • . .

1st Regiment of Algerian Sharpshooters

ARTILLERY.

Commander, Lieat.-Colonel Caavet.

Nob. 9 and 12 batteries, No. ID battery (mitraii.) of the

9th Artillery Regiment - - . -

Engineers : 1 company of the 1st Engineer Regiment -

Total of the 2nd Division .

8
8
1

3
8

8
3
1

3
8

THIRD DIVISION.
Conmumder - - General Baoult.

First Brigade, General L*H^riller.

8€th Begiment of the Line . - .

Snd Zooave Bfi#nment . . •

8th Bifle fiattabon - - - .

48th
2nd

SscoiTD Brigade, General Lefebrre.

toftheLine - . .

ment of Algerian Sharpahooters

ARTILLEBT.
Commander, Lieat-Colonel Chegnillaame.

Nos. 8 and 6 batteries, No. 9 batteries (mitnul.) of the

ISth Artillery Begiment . . - -

Bngmeers: 1 company of the 1st Engineer Begiment -

Total of the 3rd Diyision •

FOUBTH DIVISION.
Ck>mmander - - General de Lartigae.

First Brigade, lient-General Fraboolet dc Kerldadec.

ftethB^gfanentoftheLlne ....
8rd Zouave Bttiment - ....

iBt Bifle Battahon .....

SsooMD Brigade, General Lacretelle.

87th Beoiment of the Line* . . .

8rd B^gunent of Algerian Sharpshooters

ABTILLERY.
Commander, Lieat-Colonel Lamande.

Nos. 7 and 11 batteries,No. 10 battery (mitrail.) of the

laih Artillery Begiment . . . .

Engineers : 1 company of the 1st Engineer Begiment -

Total of 4th Division . . .

3
1

8
3

3
3

* This Begiment remained in garrison at Strasborg.

Sqnadroni.

CAYALBT DIVISION.
Cominante * - General Doheaiie.

Ttwn Brioxds, Qeneral de SepteiilL
8rd Hnfitn nd llth Chmenri • . .

Sboomd Bbioxdx, Qeneral de Nantootx.
loth Dragooniy Snd and 6th Lanoert ...

TmsD Bjuoadb, General IGeheL
8th and 9th Cairaseiera . . • •

Total of Cavalry Division

Gnna.

ARTILLEBT BB8BBVB.

Commander - - Colonel de Vaaaart.

Not. 11 and IS Batteriea of the 6th Artillery Begiment -

Not. 6 and 11 Batteriei of the 9th ., ,,

Noi. I, S, 3« and 4 Batteriea of the aoth Hotm Artillery Beglment

19
It
S4

Total Artillery Beacrve

Companiee.

ENGINEEB BESBBYB.
1 1 Companiea of lit Engineer Begiment

Total of tho Ist Corps :— 48 battalions of Infantry, 4 Rifle batUlions,
28 squadrons, 96 guns, 24 mitrailleuses, 6^ Engineer companies ; if we
deduct the 87th Regiment, only 45 battalions of Infantry, &c.

SECOND ARMT COBFS.

General Commanding
Chief of the General Staff
Commander of Artillery •

- Greneral Frossard

• General Saget.

• General Gagneux.

7IB8T DIVISION.
Commander - - General Yerg^

Ste8T Brioibs, Qeoeral Letellier V alaa^.

%%tA JUtAaB0Mt «f iKm Titui • • •

65lh M » - - •*

M BIfle Batiidion ....

Bboovd iBaioii>x, General Jdivet

7%ik BegiiMBt of the line
T7th „

ABTILLEHT.
Commander, lient-Colonel GhaTindret
Noi. ff and li Batteriee,No. 6 Battery (mitraSL) of the

ath ArtiUeiy B^giment
Bagineen : 1 Company of the 8rd Engineer Bcgiment

T^ytal of the iBt Division

SECOND DIVISION.
Commander - - General BataiUeti

Fust BniOAOB, General Fonget

Sih Bcgiment of the Line ...
28rd „ >, ...

18th Biile Battalion ....

SnooHi) Bkioads, General Fanvart Bastonl.

eathBegimentoftheline . . . .

67th „ „ . . . .

ABTILLEBT.

Commander, Lient-Colonel de Mainlenant

Noi. 7 and a Battetiei^ No. 0 Battery (mitralL) of the

athArtiileryBegiment* . . . •

Engineen : 1 Company of the 3rd Engineer Begiment

Total of the Snd IXtlaion

3
3

3
3
1

3
3

THIRD DIVISION.

ComtnaDder - General Meric dc Labrugicre

de Lavcaucoupct.

FinsT Brigade, General Doena.

^adllogiincmofthe line . . . -

63rd 9, „ . - - -

10th Rifle B;ataUon . - . - -

Bkconi) BitinADKy General Micheler.
24th Regiment of the line - . . -

40th „ „ ....

ARTILLERY.

Commander, Lient-Colonel Larroquc.

No8. 7 and 8 Batteriea, No. 1 1 Battery (mitrail.) of
the 1 5th Artiller}' Regiment ...

Engineers : 1 Company of the 3rd Engineer Regiment

Total of 3rd Division

3
3
1

3
3

CAVALRY DIVISION.

Commaudcd by Brigudier-Gencral de Balabr^gue.

FiBST BiiioADE, General de Balabregue.
4th and 5th Chasseurs . - - - .

Bi^coND BiiiGADE, General Bachelier.
7th and 1 2th Dragoons ....

Total Cavalry Division

Squadrons.

8
8

ARTILLERY RESERVE.

Commander - • Colonel Beaudoain.

Nos. 10 and 1 1 Batteries of the 5th Artillery Regiment

Nos. 6 and 10 „ 15th „ „

Nos. 7 and S „ 17th Horse Artillery Regiment

Total Artillery Reserve

ENGINEER RESERVE.

2 Companiefc of the Snd Encineer Regiment -
Detacmnent of Sappers of the 1st Engineer Regiment

Guns.

12
18
12

Engineer
Companies.

Total of 2nd Corps : — 36 battalions of Infantiy, 3 Riflo battalions,
16 squadrons, 72 guns, lb mitrailleuses, 5 Engineer companies.

THIRD ARMY CORPS.

General Commaiidiiig - - Marshal Basaiae.
Chief of the Greneral Staff - General Mandqne.
Commander of Artillery - General de Grimaudet de

Rochbouet.

FIBST DIVISION.
Comnuoider - • Qeneral Montaiid<m.

Fnav Bbxoabb, Geneiai Baron Aymard.
51tt Bggiment of the line •- . •

eSSQ t ft If >• • a

18th Bifle Battalion - r

GeDcna

8
8
1

SaooRD BniaiiKBi
81tt BegbMBt of ifat Line

98dl 99 99

CSEnohant

8
8

ABXILLBBT.

OommandeTy lieot-Colonel Fom^goiis.

Not. 8 and 6 Batteries, No. 8 Battery (mitrail.) of the

410 Aiiiuefy ueginient ^- • • .

Bngineen : 1 Company of the 1ft Engineer Begiment

Total of let DiTirion . «. .

SECOND DIVISION.
Commander - - General de Caetagny.

FmsT BBioAnn, General Nayral.

19ih Begiment of the line -

41at 9, » - • • •

15tb Bifle Battalion - - - . .

Snoonn BniOAns, Qeneral Dapleeeis.

6fHh Begiment of the Line . - . .

90th „ „ - . - .

ABTILLEBT.

Commander, lieat-Colond Delange.

Nob. 11 and 18 Batteiiea, No. 9 Batteiy (mitrail) of the

4th Artilleiy Begiment ...
Engineen: 1 Company of the let Engineer Begiment

Total of 8nd Division - . .

8
8

THIRD DIVISION.
Commtnder - - Gfincnl Metman.

FnsT BaiGADs* General de FoCier.
of the Line ...

7tb

7th Rifle Battalion

Seooud Brioabr, General Aniandeaa.
69th Regiment of the Une . • .

71tt MM - . .

ARTILLERY.
Commander, Lieat.*Colonel Semp^.

Not. 6 and 7 Batteries, No. 5 Battery (mitratl.) of

the 11th Artillery Regiment . . .

Engineers: 1 company of the let Engineer Regiment -

Total of 3rd Division

FOURTH DIVISION.
Ck)mmander • General Decaen.

Fi&tT Brigade, General de Braner.

44th Regiment of the Line ...
60th „ ,. - . -

nth Rifle Battalion ....

SsooMD Brioade, General Sangll-Ferri^re.

80th Regiment of the Line ...
85th It n ...

ARTILLERY.
Ck>mmander, laent-Colonel Mancoarant.

Nos. 9 and 10 Batteries, No. 8 Battery (mitraiL) of
the 1 1th Artillery Regiment ...

i: 1 company of the Ist Engineer Regiment -

Total of 4th Division

3
3
1

3
3

3
3
1

3
8

CAVALRY DIVISION.

• *

Commander « General de Cl^rembaalt
FiBSY Bjuoabb, General de Brachard.
2nd9 8id» and 10th Chaasenn - • • - .

SitooVD BnxaADB, General Chtyault de BCaubranchee.
2nd and 4tli Dragoona . . . • .

TmiD Bbioads, General Baron de Juniac.

5tli and 8tii Dragoona - . • . . .

Total of CaTalrjr Dirision

Sqnadrona.

Gnna.

ARTILLERY RESERVE.

Commaiider - *• Colond de L^|aiJle«

Voa. 7 and 10 Balteriel of 4th ArtiOeiy Regiment
Nol.llaiiai2 „ nth „ ff '

Noa.1,2,8,4 „ 17th Hone Artillery Regiment -

Total Artillerjr Reserre

It
12
24

Engineer

J !

ENGINEER RESERVE.
H compaidea and a detaehment of lappera of the 2nd Regiment

Total of Srd Co^8 : 48 battalions of Infantry, 4 Rifle battalioniB, 28
aqnadronii 96 gunfl, 124 mitrailleuses^ 5^ Engineer companies. '

Mi«b

tm I

FOURTH ABHY CORPS.

Greneral Commanding • General de Ladmiranlt

Chief of the General Staff - General Oamoiit.
Commander of Artillery * Greneral

FIBST DIVISION.
Commander - Gkneial Coortot de CHisey.

Fan Bbiqads, Qeneral Coont Brayer.

1st Regiment of the Lino . . •

6th „ „ ...

SOth Rifle Battalion ... -

Sbooki) Brioadb, General de Qolberg.

57th Regiment of the line . • - -

78rd » » . . . .

ARTILLERY.
Commander - Iieut.-Colonel de Karp.

Nob. 5 and 9 Batteries, and No. IS Battery (mitraiL)

of the 15th Artillery Regiment . - -

Engineers : 1 company of the 8nd Engineer Regiment

Total of Ist Dirision

SECOND DIVISION.
Qomninder - - General Qrenier.

FntBT BaiOADB, General V^ron dit BeQeooort*
ISth Regiment of the Line . . -

i3ld n » - - -

5th Rifle Battalion . . - -

3
1

Seookd Brioads, General Fradier.
64th Regiment of the Line -

»8th n n ...

ARTILLERY.

Commander - Iient.-Colonel de

Nos. 6 and 7 Batteries, No. 5 Battery (mitraiL) of
the Ut Artillery Regiment - - • -

Engineers : 1 company of the 2nd Engineer Regiment

Total of 2nd Division

3
3
1

3
3

THIRD DIVISION.
ConuBUider - G«iieral latiffle de Lorencei.
Tmn BuoADBy Qenenl Count Fajol.
15th Begiment of the Line • - .

2nd

Bfittalion

Sboohd Bkoadb, General Beiger

54tli Regiment of the Line • . . .

65th »9 n • • • -

ARTILLERY.

Commander - lieat-Colonel Legardenr.

Noa. 9 and 10 Batteriea^ Ho. 8 Battery (mitndl.) of

the lit AitOkrj Regiment ....

Engineers : 1 eompany of the 3nd Engineer R^ment

Total of the 3rd DiTision

3
3
1

j
1

Squadrons.

CAVALRY DIVISION.
Commander • • General Ligcand.

FtAR BsiOADBy General de Montaiga
2nd and 7th Hnnan - - . - .

BaooKD Beioisx, General de Gondreconrt.
3rd and 11th Dragoona ....

8
8

Total of CaTahy DiTision

ARTILLERY RESERVE.

Noa. II and 19 Batterlea of 1 at ArtiUery Begiment

Nos. 6 and 7 » 8Ui ^ „ „

Noa. 5 „ 6 „ 17th Horse Artillerj Begiment -

Total of ArtiUery Besenre

Gona.

19
19
19

•r:-/

Conpaoieik

BNQINBER BESBRYB. ,
1 eompan}' and deteehment of Sappers vf the 9ndEngmeer Regiment •

-P-4i

Total of 4tli Oorpgi 96 ImUaUoiib of Infimtry, 8 Bifle Uttalioii8» 16
equa^nsi 72 gaDi^ 18 miindUea8eB| 4 EngiDeer oompaniog.

FIFTH ARMY CORPS.

General Commanding •
Chief of General Staff -
Commander of Artillery

- General de Faiily.

- General Reason.
• General Li^dot.

FIRST DIVISION.
Commander - - General Qoie.

FiasT BaioiDK, Geaenl Saarin.

11th Regiment of the Line - . -

46th ., „ ...

4th Bifle Battalion • . . •

3
S
I

Sboond Brioadb, General Baron Nieolas-Nicoks.

eiitBegimentoftheUne • • . .

—

setn $9 n - - - .

ARTILLERT.

Commander • lieut-Cdlonel BoUand.

Not. 5 and 6 Batteries, and No. 7 Battery (mitiail.) of
the 6th Artillery Begiment- . . .
Engineers : 1 company of the 3nd Engineer Be^ment

,,^_

•

Total of the Ist DiTision.

SECOND DIVISION.

Commander - General de TAbadie d'Andreia.

FiasT Brioabb, General Lapasset

^4th Regiment of the Line ....

—

.—

—

»7th » n ....

14th Rifle Battalion .....

—

SECOin) Bbioade, General de Uanssion.

49thRegiment of thcLine ....

—

— .

—

88th i» w ....

^^^

^""

^"^

ARTILLERY.

Commander . Lieut-Colonel Bougault.

Nos. 7 and 8 Batteries, and No. 5 Battery (mitrail.) of
^ the 2nd Artillery Regiment- ...
Engineers : 1 company of the 8nd Engineer Regiment

Total of the 2ud Diyision

THIRD DIVISION.
Commander - General Gajot de Lenpart

F1R8T BniOADBy General Abbatucci.

17th Regiment of the Line - . . .

27th .. „ - . . -

19th Rifle Battalion . . . .

Skoond Brigade, General Fontanges de Cooxan.

30th Regiment of the Line - • . .

68th „ If »f •

ARTILLERT.

Commander - Licnt-Colonel Montcl.

N08. 11 and IS Batteries, and No. 9 Battery (ml-

traiUeoie) of the Snd Artillery Brigade
Engineers : 1 companj of the 2nd Bngbeer Regiment

Total of 3rd Dirision -

3
3
1

3
3

Squadrona.

CAVALRY DIVISION.
Commander - - General Brahaut.

First Brioadb, Generol Viscount de Ficrrc de Bemts.
5th Hussars, 12th Chasseurs . - . • .

Second Brioade, General de la Morti^re.

.3rd and 5th Lancers ------

Total of Caralrj Division

8
8

Guns.

ARTILLKRY RKSKUVE.

Commander Colonel de Salignac F^nelon,

Nos. 6 and 10 Batteries of the 2nd Artillery Regiment

No. 11 „ „ 10th „ „

No. 11 „ n l*th „

Nos. 0 and 6 ,» „ 20th Horse Artillery Regiment

Total Artillery Reserye

12
6
6

Engineer
Companies.

ENGINEER RESERVR
1 company and detaehnent of Sappers from 2nd Engineer Regiment -

Total of 5th Corps : 36 battalions of Infantr}', 3 Riflo battalions, 16
sqnodronsi 72 gnnsy 18 mitraiUeusesy 4 Engineer companies.

29982.

SIXTH ARMY CORPS.

Genciiil Commanding -
Chief of the General Stall'
Comninndcr of Artillci-y

- ^larslial Canrobert.

- General Henrj.

- General Labnstie.

FIttST DIVISION.
Commander - • General Tixier.

First Brioadk, General Pecbot.

4th Regiment of the line ...
10th „ ,, - - -

9th Rifle Battalion - . - -

Second Brioade, General le Roy dc Dais.

12th Regiment of the Line . . -

100th

ARTILLERY.

Commander, Lieut-Colonel Montluisant.

Nos. 5, 7, and 8 Batteries of the 8th Artillery Regi-
ment -.----
Engineers : 1 Company of the 3rd Engineer Regiment*

Total of 1st Division

SECOND DIVISION.
Commander - - General Bissou.

First Brioade, General Archinard.

9th Regiment of the Line - - • -

14th* . . - -

Second Bhic.adi:, General Maurice.

20th Regiment of the Line* - - -

31st*

9»

ARTILLKRY.*

Commander, Lieut.-Colonel Colcomb.

Noa. 10 and 12 Batteries, and No. 11 Battery (mitraU.)

of the 8th Artillery Regiment - - -

Engineerv : 1 company of the 3rd Engineer Regiment*

Total of 2nd Division

8
3
1

3
3

3
8

I
7^

* The troops distinguished hy * did not go to Metz if hen the corps was moved
there from Chilons, consequently the toUl at Meti was 89 battahons of infontry, 1 nfle
battalion, 36 guns.

THIRD DIVISION.
Commander - - General la Font de Villiers.

FnuT Bbioade, General Becqnet de Sonnay.

76tfa Regiment of the Line . . -

9l8t „ „ - . -

Sbcokd Bbxoadb, General Colin.

93rd Regiment of the line ...
94tb

ARTILLERT.

Commander, Lieut-Colonel Jamet.

Noa. 5, 6, 7 Batteriea of the 14th Artillery Regiment -
Engineers : 1 company of the Srd Engineer Raiment*

Total of SrdDiTiflion

FOURTH DIVISION.

Commander - - General le Vassor-Sorral.

First BrioadBi General de Margnenat

25th Regiment of the Line ...
26di

Skoohd Bbiqadm, General Count de Chanaleilles.

28th Regiment of the Line ...
70th „ » - - -

ARTILLERY.

Commander, Lieut-Colonel Noury.*

Not. 7, 8, and 9 Batteriea of the 10th Artilleiy Regi*
ment ••«••-

Engineers : 1 company of the Srd Engineer Regiment*

Total of the 4th Division -

8
3

3
8

8
8

* The troops distinguished by * did not go to Mett when the corpa was moved
there from Chllons, consequently the totnl at Mets was 39 battalions of infantry, 1 rifle
battalion, 36 gons.

G 2

100

CAVALBT DIVISION*
Commander - - Gencml de Saligwie-Fteeloii.

FiBtT Bbioadb,, General Tilliard.
Itt Hoaearty 6th Cbaaaeari . . . . ,

Sbooxd Brioadb, General SaTarene.
Ist and 7th Loncen • . • • •

TiflBD BuoADB, General de Seville.
5th and 6th Coiraasiera ....

Total of Cavalry Division -

Gnna.

ABTILLEBT BESBBYB.*

Commander - • Colonel Deapiela.

Kot. 6, 6, 10 and 18 Batteriea of the 10th Artillery Begiment

No8.8and9 „ ^ 14th „

Nos. 1 and 8 „ „ 19th Horse Artillery Begiment

>»

Total Reserve Artilleiy

24
18
18

Engineer
Companies.

ENGINBEB BBBEBVE.*
I company and detachment of sappers of the 3rd Engineer Begiment

Total of the 6th Corps : 48 battalions of In&ntrj, 1 rifle battalion,
24 squadrons, ] 14 guns, 6 mitrailleusesi 5 Engineer companies.

* The troops distinguished by * did not go to Mets when the corps was moved
there from ChAlons, conseqnentf y the total at HeU irss 89 battalions of inikntry,
1 rifle battalion, 36 gnns.

101

SEVENTH ARMY CORPS.

Greneral Commanding •
Chief of the General Staff
Commandci' of Artilieiy

General Douay (Felix.)

General Renson.

General Bai'on de Licgeard,

FIRST DIVISION.
CommaDder • - Gf«aeral Conseii Dumesnil.

First Brioads, Qeneml Nicolai.

drd Bfgiment of the Line ...
Slat ,f »» - - -

17th Rifle Battalion . . . -

Seookd BaiQADB, General Maire.

47th Regiment of the Line - . .

99th „ „ . . -

ARTILLERY.

Commander, Lieut-Colonel Guillemain.

Kos. 5 and 6 Batteries and Ko. 11 (mitrail.) Battery

of Uie 7th Artillery Regiment . • .

Engineers : 1 company of the 2nd Engineer Regiment

Total of the 1st Division -

SECOND DIVISION.
Commander - - General Licbert.

First Brigidb, General Gaiomar.

5th Regiment of the line ...
37th „ „ - - .

6th Rifle Battalion ....

Second Brigade, General de la Bastide.

63rd Regiment of the Line ...
89th

ARTILLERY.

Commander, Lieut.-Colonel Clouzet.

Nos. 8 and 9 Batteries, and No. 12 Battery (mitrail.)

of the 7th Artillery Regiment ...

Engineers : 1 company of the 2nd Engineer Regiment

Total of 2nd Division

3
1

3
3
1

9
o

(3c3

102

THIRD DIVISION.
Commander - - Gknenl Dumont

FnsT BxxoADK, General Bordat.

52nd Begiment of the
79Ui „ f,

Sbookd Bbioadb, General de Bittard des Fortes.

8Snd Begiment of the Line . - •

88rd

ARTILLERT.

Commander, Uent-Colonel Bonnin.

Noa. 8 and 9 Batteries, and No. 10 Battery (mitrail.)

of the 6th Artillerf Bcffiment ...

Engineers : 1 eompany of the 2nd Engineer Begiment

Total of 3rd Division

3
8

Bqnadrona.

CAVALBT DIVISION.
Commander - - General Ameil.

First Brigade, General Cambriel.
4th Hussars, 4th and 8th Laneers • . «

Sbcoicd Brigadb,* General Jolif dn Coulomhier.
6th Hussars, 6th Dragoons . - . •

Total Cavalry Division -

Guns.

ARTILLERY RESERVE.
Commander - - Colonel Aubac.
Nos. 7 and 10 Batteries of the 7th Artillery Regiment

Nos. 8 and 12
Nos. 8 and 4

18th

19th Horse Artillery Regiment

ToUl Artillery Reserve

18
18
IS

* This brigade remained at first iu Joyous uud never rejoined the 7th Corps.

103

Engineer
Companies.

ENQINEBR RESERVE.

1 oomumyof 2nd Engineer Regiment and detachment of Sappers of
l8t Engineer Raiment

Total of 7th Corps : 86 battalions of Infantry, 2 rifle battalions, 20
squadrons, 72 gons, 18 mitrailleases, 4 Engineer companies, or ezdading
the 2nd Cavidry Brigade, 86 battalions of infantry, 2 rifle battalions,
12 squadrons, Ac.

CAVALRY RESERVE.

VIR8T DIVISION.*
Commander - - General da BandL

Four BRZGira, Qenenl Maigaeritte.
1st Regim«nt of Ghaaseors d'Afriqne

SxooiCD BBXcura, General de LijaiUe.
Snd Regiment of CauMHems d'Afiriqne

4ih n - „ . . .

4
4

ARTILLERT.

Commander, Chef d'Eseadron Lojrer,

Hoe* 6 and 6 Batteries of the 19th Horse Artilleiy Regmient

Total of Ist DiTision

SECOND DIVISION.
Commander - - General Visooont de Bonnemains.

FiHST Bbioadb, General Girard.

1st Caiiasders ---•-•
*th „

SieoRB BuoADS, General de Braaer.

Snd CoirasBicts ....
9rd ddraasiefs - - . .

ARTILLERT.
Commandar, Chef d'Eseadron Astier.
NoJ^B^^^Wb. 8 Batteiy (mitrail.) of the 19th Horse

Total of 2nd Dirision

4
4

6
6

A^iS^lM^Tf ?'^'^"."i2*^'^«^* regiment with the amy, and not mrtU
the lOth did the 1st, 2nd. and Srd Resiments reaeh M«te '' ^*"

Regiments reach Mets.

101

THIRD DIVISION.

Cominander - - General de Fortou.

First Bbioade, General Prince Murat

1st Dragoons ......

9th Dragoons .....

4
4

—

Second Bbioadk, General de Gramonf.

7th Cuirassiers ......

10th „

4
4

—

ARTILLEKY.

Commander, Chef d*£sctdron Clcrc.

No. 7 Battery and No. 8 Battery (mitrail.) of the 20th Horse
Artillery Regiment .....

—

Total of 3rd Division

—

Total of llcserve Cavalry : 48 s(inndroiis, 30 guns, 6 initroUeuses ; ou
the 10th August with the army 44 squadrons, &c.

]MAIN ARTILLERY RKSP]RVE.
Commander - - General Cunu.

Guns.

13th Artillci7 Regiment, Colonel Salvador.
Nob. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, II, and 12 Batteries

18th Horse Artillery Regiment, Colonel Toussaint.
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 Batteries ...

Total Main Artillery Reserve

MAIN ENGINEER RESERVE.

Companies.

1 company (Telegraph) of the 1st Engineer Regiment -
1 company of the Sid Engineer Regiment
1 company (Railway) of the 3rd Engineer Regiment •
Detachment of Sappers ....

Total Main Engineer Rescr%'e

1
1
1

Total of Army Reserves : 48 Equadrons, 126 guus^ 6 mitrailleuses,
3 Engineer companies.

105

APPENDIX II.

Fboglamation of tbe Empbrob Napoi^eon to the French Nation

on the 2drd July 1870.

There are solemn moments in the life of nations when national honour,
violently roasedi attains to an irresistible force, domiDates all other
interests and assumes the sole direction of the country's destinies. One
of these decisiTe hours has struck for France.

Prussia, towivds whom we testified nothing but the most conciliatory
feelings, both during and since the war of 1866, has paid no attention
to our good will and forbearance. Launched on the stream of invasion,
she has proToked mistrust everywhere, necessitated excessive arma-
ments^and turned Europe into a camp where uncertainty and fear for the
morrow reign supreme.

A recent incident has revealed the instability of international relations
and exhibited the whole gravity of the situation. We have entered our
protests against the last pretensions of Prussia. They have been evaded
and followed by contemptuous acts. Our country was pervaded by a
deep sense of irritation, and at once a cry for wai* echoed from one end
of France to the other. Thci*c rcmnlus nothing for u.s but to entrust
our destiny to the decision of arms.

We war not with Germany, whose independence we esteem. We
wish that the nations forming the great German nationality may freely
di^ose of their destinies. As for ourselves^ we demand the establish-
ment of a state of things which shall guarantee our safety and give us
an assurance for the future. We desire to gain a lasting peace iSatd on
the true interests of nations, and to put an end to this precarious state in
which one nation emplovs its resources to arm against another.

The glorious standard, which we once more unfurl against those who
challenge us, is the same which bore throughout Europe the civilising
ideas of our great revolution. It represents the same principles and will
inspire the same spirit of devotion.

Frenchmen I I am about to place myself at the head of that valiant
army which is animated by love of duty and of country. It knows
what it can do, for it has seen victory accompanying its march in all
quarters of the globe.

I take my son with me despite his youth. He knows the duties which
bis name imposes upon him, and he is proud of sharing the dangers of
those who are fighting for tbeir country.

May God spe^ our efforts ! A great people defending a just cause is
mvindble.

Napoleon.

106

APPENDIX m.

Pboolamation of the Empkbor Napoleon IIL to the Abmv.

Soldiers!

I am about to place myself at your head to defend the honour and soil
of the country.

You are pitted against one of the best armies of Europe, but others
which were quite as worthy have been unable to withstand your brarery.
The same thing will occur again.

The war now commencing will be long and severe, for its theatre is
one which bristles with obstacles and fortresses; but nothing is too
difficult for the perseTering efforts of the soldiers of Africa, the Crimea,
China, Italy, and Mexico. Ton will again prove what the French army,
animated with the feeling of duty, fortified with discipline and buniing
with the love of country, can perform.

Whatever may be the rood we take beyond our frontiers, we shall
come across the glorious tracks of our fathers* We will prove our-
selves worthy of them. All France follows you with its ferventprayers^
and the eyes of the world are upon you. On our success hangs the fate
of liberty and civilisation.

Soldiers ! Let every one do his duty, and the God of armies will be
with us.

Napoleon.

Head-quarters, Metz, 28th July 1870.

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109

APPENDIX V.

ORDER OF BATTLE

Of the German Armies on the Ist August 1870 under the supreme

command of

H.M. EiNo WiLUAH OF Prussia,

Heab-quartebs of H.M. King Williah.

Chief of the General Staff of the Army : General oflnfaiitry Baron r.

Mollke.
Quartermaster General : Lieuienani- General v. Podbielski.
Inspector General of Artillerj : General of Infantry y. Hindersin.
Inspector General of Engineers; Lieuienani^Creneral v. Kleist
Adjutant General to H.M. the King : General oflnfatdry y. Bojen*
Principal Adjutant General and Chief of the Military Cabinet : lAewu*

nant'General y. Tresckow.
Intendant General of the Army : Lieutenant* General y. Stosch.
General attached to H.M. Staff: Major- General y. Steinacken

Kns!Q*B Aides-de-Camp.

(1) Colonel V. Albedyll (vide Military Cabinet) $ (2) Lieutenant-
Colonel V. Lucadou; (3) Lieutenant-Colonel Count y. Lehndorff;
(4) Lieutenant-Colonei Anton Prince RadziwiU ; (5) Lieutenant-
Colonel Count y. Waldei'see ; (6) Major y. Alten*

General SrAfP.

Adjutants to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army : (1) Major de
Claer, attached to 13M Dragoons; (2) 1st Lieutenant y. Burt,
60th Regiment.

Chiefs of Sections: (1) Lieutenant-Colonel Bronsart y. Schellendorf;
(2) Lieutenant' Colonel y. Yerdy du Vemois ; (3) Lieutenant-
Colonel y. Brandenstein.

Officers of the General Staff : ( 1) Major y. Hollebeuy of the Royal Saxon

Dragoons of the Guard; (9) 1st Lieutenant Schmidt, 1st Dra-
goons (Prinee Albreehfs).

Executiye Commission for Railway Transport : (1) Lieutenant- Colonel
y. Brandenstein {vide Grenenu Staff) ; (2) Weishaupt; Director of
Railway Administration in the Ministry of Commerce ; (3) Captain
Zingler (vide General Staffs ; Kinel, principal clerh in Ministry
of Commerce,

Adjutants to Inspector-General of Artillery : (1) Major Fassong, attached
to Guard Field Artillery Regiment; (2) Captain y. Rheinbaben,
Guard Artillery Brigade.

Adjutants to Inspector-General of Engineers : (1) itfo/or Peters, attached
to Staff of Engineer Corps; (2) Captain y. iritie, 1^/ Engineer
Inspection,

110

Intendnntur : Adjutant to Intcndant-Gcnernl, 2/ic/ Licutcnaui v. Stoscli,

94th (Grand Duke of Saxon^^s) Regiment, Field Intendont,

Couficillor of War v, Goldenberg. Assistant, Fritze.
Commandant of Head-qunrters : Major Baron y. Locquenghicu, of the

Cuirassiers of the Guard.
Head-quarter Guard: (1) Captain v. Albedyll, of the 2nd (Qfieen's)

Cuirassiers ; (2) Captain v. Knobelsdorff-Breukenhoff, of the 4th

Grenadier Guards {Quee7i*s).
Director of Military Telegi*aplia : Colonel Meydam, attached to War

Ministry,
Head Field Commissariat Officer of tho Army : Chief Commissary

Bornor.
Head Field Post Office : Principal Fivld Postmaster v. ZschUscIicn.

Present at Head-quarters.

H.B.H. Prince Charles op Prussia, General of Artillery.

Adjutants : (1) Major v. Zglinitzki ; (2) Major Count Seyssel d'Aix ;
(3) Captain Coimt Donhoif, of the 2nd Guard Landwehr
Cavalry*

H.B.H. THE Grand Duke of Saxony.

Adjutants : (1) Major- General Co?i;?/ v. Beust ; (2) Major v. Riesen-
wetter ; (3) 2n€l Lieutenant v. PalezieuZi Zrd Artillery Brigade,

H.R.H. Prince Luitpold op Bavaria.

Adjutants: (1) Captain BiironY.lAta^oock ; (2) C(»p/ai/i Freyschlng
V. Frcycnstcin ; (3) Captain attached and Secretary^ Couni v.
Berchem,

H.B.H. the Hereditary Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin.

Adjutant : Major Baron v. Nettelbladt.
Militaiy Attach^ from Russian Court : Lientenant-General and Adjutant
General Count Kutusow.

War ]Ministry.

War Minister : General oj' Infantry v. Roon.
Chief of Staff : Licutc?iant' Colonel Ilartrott.
Adjutants : (1) Major v. Buddonbrock-Hettcrsdorf, 1st Body-guard

Cuirassiers {Silesian) ; (2) 1st Lieutenant v. Roon, Fusiliers of the

Guard,
Staff Officera : (1) Major llaeniscli ; (2) Major \,hetto^y ; (3) Captain

Golz.

Military Cabinet.

Colonel V. Albedyll (vide King^s Aides-de-Camp), Chief of Section,
Colonel V. Tilly, Chief of Section, Major y, Haugwitz, attached
to 2nd (King William IV.) Grenadiers.

Ministry ior Foreign Affairs.

Federal Clumccllor and Minister Presitlcnt : 3fajor- General CovLniv.

Bi^marck-Schdnhauscn.
Secretaries of Legation : Abcken, v. Keudcll, Count v. Hntzfeld, Count

V. Bismarck -Bohlen.
Royal Commissary an«l Inspector of Volnntcor Nursing: Heniy XI.

Prince of Pless, Major attached to the Army,
Attached: 1st Lieutenant v. Sali^^cb, Wth Landwehr Cavalry,

Ill

SCUXABT OF FOHCBS (Ist AogUBt).

IfftAimy ...
Ilnd „ . . .

IHid „ . . -

Other field troops

Total of Gennan Arinies

50
166
128

140

474

39
148
lOS
100

S82

80
91
80
63

264

180
646
480
378

1»684

1st army.

Cohxander-in-Chiei' : General of Infantry y. Steinmetz.

Chief of General Staff : Majar^General y. Sperling.

Quartermaster in Chief : Coltmel Cou$U ▼• Wartenaleben.

Commander of Artillenr: LUuienatU-GenerfU Schwtatz, Inspector of

ike 2nd ArHUery Inspection.
Commander of Engineers and Pioneers : Major^ General Biehler,

Inspector of the Zrd Engineer Inspection.

General Staff.

(1) Major T. Levinski L$ (2) Captain Banmann; (8) Captain r.
Banchhaupt, 79M Regiment; (4) \st Lieutenant Baron v. Collas,
Zith Fusiliers.

Adjutants.

(1) Captain Wittke, Z2nd Regiment; (2) Captain v. Prankenberg
ProBchlitz, attached 1st Lancers; (S) Captain v. During, Zrd
Grenadier Guards ( Q^een Elizabeth) ; (4) \st Lieutenant Gaede,
4#A Dragoons ; (5) 2nd Lieutenant v. Braunschweig, 6M Grenor-
dsers.

Field Officer and Adjutants to the Commander of Artilleiy.
Field Officer : Major Siber, 4M Artillery Brigade.
Adjutants : (1) Captain Blecken ▼. Schmeling, Guard Artillery
Brigade ; (2) Captain Koehler, \st Artillery Brigade.

2nd Engineer Officer : Major v. Giese. Adjutants to the Commander
of Engineers and Pioneers : (1) Captain Hoffmann, Zrd Engineer
Inspection ; (2) 1st Lieutenant Diener, Zrd Engineer Inspection.

Army Intendant : Intendant, 1st Lieutenant Suker. Field Intendant,
Assistant Intendant Pauly.

Armj Surgeon General : Surgeon General Dr. Schide.

Commandant of Head-quarters : Major v. Strantz, attached lOth
Lancers.

Field Gensdannerie : Lieutenant- Colonel Domdorf, division commander t
Captain Thilo, 6th Gensdarmerie Brigade.

112

Gener.vl Inspkction of Etappek.

Inspector General : Lieutenant- General Malotki v. Trzebiatowski
(unattached).

Chief of General Staff: Major v. Ditfnrth.

Adjutants: (1) \st Lieie tenant Etfiicrt, loth Regiment (Prince Fretle-
rick of the Netherlands); (2) 2nd Lieutenant Lortzing, 11th
Regiment.

Artillery Officer : Major Burbacb (retired).

Engineer Officer : Major Dost (retired).

Intendunt : Assistant Intendant Metzger.

Commnnder of Divi:$ion of Field^ensdanneric : Major Schulz.

PUESENT AT IIeaD-QUARTERS.

Admiral H.II.H. Prince Adalbert of Prussia.*
Adjutant : Captain of Corvette Le Tanneux v. Saint Paul Illaire.

Summary of Forces.

Vllth Army Corpi - - - - -
Vlllth „

3nl Cavalry Division . . - . •

25
25

14
IS

2N)

Total of 1st Army ....

StmSKQUENT REIXFOBCi:yEKTS.

1st Army Corps - - . - -
Ist Cavalry Division - - - - -

50
25

8
24

180

84
6

Total

270

VIItii AR^IY corps.
Gknkral Cummaxdin(} : General of Infantry v. Z.vstrow.

Chief of General Stnff : Colonel \\ Angiir.

Comniaiidor of Artillery : Major^General v. Ziuimcnnanu, Commander
of 1th Artilleri/ Brigade.

Commander of Engineers and Pioneers : 3Iajor Trenmann, Commander
of 1th Pioneer Battalion.

General Stall: (1) Major v. Kxdtcnbom-Slaeliau ; (2) Captain v.
Westemhagen ; (3) 1st Lieutenant v. Mikuach-Buchberg, 39/A
Regiment*

* H.R. H joined the Army on the 4th August

113

Adjutants: (1) Captain y, d. Knesebeck, 42n€? i?e^tni«n/ ; {2) Captain
V. Funcke, \^h Dragoons ; (3) Xst Lieutenant v. Ditfurth 1., SSth
Regiment; (4) 2nd Lieutenant Prince Hcinrich XVIII, Reuss,
Sth Lancers*

Adjutants to Commander of Artillery : (1) \$t Licute^iant v. Reichenau,
II th Arttllery Brigade ; (2) 2nd Lieutenant Leopold, Ttk Artillery
Brigade*

2nd Engineer Officer : Captain Kastcn, attached 3rd Engineer Inspection*
Adjutant to the Commander of Engineers and Pioneers: 2nd
Lieutenant Schulcr, Zrd Engineers Ltspection*

Commander of the Head-quarters Guard: 2nd Lieutenant Count v.
Villers, \Sth Hussars.

Present at Head-quarters : Hereditary Prince of Schaumburq-

LiPPE.

18th infantry division.

Commander - Iieat.«Qeneral t. Gl&mer.

Offleer of General Staff : MfjorT.Werder.—A^iatants:
(I) OaptainT.Lomryllih Dragoons I (2) Istliea-
tenant ▼. Boeh and Folacb I. 55Ui Regiment.

SSxn Invaktbt BsiaiDBy Major-General Baron r. d.

Oaten or Sacken.

A^Qtant, let lieutenant Herwarth t. Bittenfeldt, 2nd
Foot Guards.

ISth Regiment, Colonel t. Frankenberg-Ladvigsdorff
7Srd Fosilieny Lieut.-Colonel ▼. Loebell

26Tn Ikfantrt Brigadb, Mijor- General Baron v. d.

Golts.

Adjutant, let lientenant Baron y. Quadt and Huchten-

bmck, S4th Foailieis.
15th Regiment (Prince Frederick of Netberlands)

Colonel T. Deiits . . . . -

55tii Regiment, Colond t. Barby . . -

7th Rifle Battalion, lient-Colonel Reinike -

8th Haasara, LieQt.-Colonel Arent ...

3rd Field DiTision of 7fh Field Artillery Regiment

(5 and 6 heaTT, 5 and 6 light batteries), Mfdor

Wilhelmi

2nd Field Pioneer Company of VUth Army Corps

with the entrenching tool column, Captain Ootie -
3rd Field Pioneer Cmp^y of Vllth Army Corps,

Cwtain Cleinow 1 . . . .

No. 1 Sanitary Detachment

Total of ]|dth Infantry Diyision
29982.

8
3

1
1

114

14TH INFANTRY DIVISION.

Commander - Lieat-General t. Kameke.
OAeer of General Staff, Major Baron v. Ililgcrs ;
Aiyutonu, (1) Captiiin v. Borcke, S9th FusOien,
(2) Ut Lieutenant Meesc, 39th FoaiUers.

27T1I IKFA^TBY Bkiqauk, Major General v. Frauyois ;
Adjutant, Ut Lieutenant ▼. Dieskau, 79th liegiment.
39th FttoUiers, Colonel ▼. Eskena . . -

74th Regiment, Colonel v. Panuewitx - - ~

28th Infaktbt Brigade, Major-General t. Woyna ;
Adjutant, Ist Lieutenant t. Romberg, 42nd Regi-
ment*
53rd Regiment, Colonel ▼. Gcntein-IIohcnstein
77th Regiment, Colonel v. Conrady - - -

15th Hussars, Colonel v. Coscl (unattached) -
Ist Field Division of 7th Field Artillery Regiment
(1 and 2 heavy, 1 and 8 light batteries), Major
Baron v. Kynatten - - - - -

Ibt Field rionccr Coni|>any of Vllth Army Corps with
light field bridge tram, Captaui Junker
No. 2 Sanitai-y Detachment.

Total of 14th Infiintry Division

3
3

— 4

CORPS ARTILLERY.

Colonel V. Ileldcn Samowski, Commander of 7th Field Artillery

Regiment.

Horse Artillery Division of 7th Field Artillery Regiment (2nd and 3rd
Horse Artillery Batteries, Major Coester . . . -

2ud Field Division of 7th Field Artillery Regiment (3rd and 4th heavy,
3rd and 4th Light Batteries), Lieutenant-Colonel v. WeUman -
No. 3 Sanitary Detachment

Total of Corps Artillery

Gnns.

12
24

Columns-Division of 7th Field Aitillery Regiment, Major v. Fragstein-

Niemsdorff.
Artillery Ammunition Colnnms Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Infantri/ Ammu-
nition Columns, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4. Pontoon Column.

7th Train Battalion 3fajor Baron v. Botlimar.

liesercc Hospital Dcp6t. Horse Dcj>6t. Field Bakery Column.
Provision Columns Nos. 1 , 2, 3, 4, 5. Ftcld Hatpitals Nos. I, 2, 8,
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. Train-escort Squadron.

Total of the Vllth Aimy Coi^s : 24 battalions Infantry, 1 rifle battalion,
8 siiuadroDS, 84 guns*, 3 Pioneer companies.

115

VniTH ARMY COBPS.
Obnebal ComiASDJXQ : General op Infantrit t. Goeden.

Chief of Gcfneral Staff: Colonel v. Witzendorf.

Commander of Artillery : Colonel v. Kamecke, Commander of the Sth

ArHllery Brigade.
Commander of ]^gineers and Pioneers: lAeutenant'Colonel Schnlz,

Commander of the Sih Pioneer Battalion. >

General Staff: (1) Major Bumke; (2) Captain Bogalla v. Bieberstein;

(8) Captain v« Ahlbom, 68M Regiment.
AdQatants : (1) Mmot t. Aweyde> 81#f Regi$nent; (2) Captain Baron

y. Lilieni 8I& Mustarsf (3) Itt Lieutenant Lcngerich, 29tk Regi'

ment; (4) l$t Lieutenant Count v. Westerbolt-Gysenberg, 7th

Husiort.
Adjutants to Commander of Artillery : (1) IH Lieutenant Schiinebergy

2nd ArtiUer^ Brigade; (2) 2nd Lieutenant Kaufmann I., 8M

Artillery Brigade.
2nd Engineer officer : Captain Engels, Brd Engineer Intpeeticn.
Adjutant to Commander of Engineers and Pioneers: 2nd Lieutenant

Baron ▼• Kittlits, Zrd Engmeer InspeeHon.'
Commander of the Head-quarter Gnard : 1st LieutinatU Suertnctadty

Bth Cuirassiers.

■ • • - - ! •. :• •

Pbebekt at Hsad-Quabtbbs : Prince Hugo of SohUnbubg-

' : WALDXlfBimO. :

15IH INFANTRY DIVISION.

. Cominaiider - lieuteniuit-GeneraL ▼. Weltiien.

Oflcer of Genenl Staff: Mijor Lentse. A^iutants:
(1), OaptainBohde, 74tli Begiment ; (2), 1st Lieat
Fkiedenci, 65tli B^^ment

9I9TR Ihyamtbt Baioinxy lii^r-Geiieral T.Wedell.

A^jatRDt, Ivt Lieateoant t. Schwedleri 69th Regiment.

88rd IWlierB, Lieat-Colonel ▼. Henning
60th B^gimenty Colonel t. Dannenbeig

80th ImrmrmT Bbicudb, MijoMieiwfal ▼. Stmbberg

AfBnlMit, lit LieoteDant r. CarlowiUi STth Beg^ent

asth Bagiment, Golonel t. Bosensweig

67tb B^iment, Colonel ▼. Zglinicki - - .

8th Bifle Battalion, Malor t. Oppdn-Bronikoirfki -

7ih (Kings) Hhibms, Colonel Baron ▼. I>oe .

lit Field DiTision of the 8th Field Artillery Beghuent

(1st and Snd HeaT^, 1st and and Light Batterie8)|

Ifidor Mertens • . -
Snd lldd Pioneer Company o^ Vlirth Corps with

cntreDefaing tools ecrfamn, Captab Eichapfel
1st Saimry Detaohnant

Total of 16tfa Infimtiy DiTision

8
8

fl4

IIG

16th infantry division.

Commander - lieut-General t. Barnekow.

OiBcer of General Staff, Captain Haasel. A^jutanta,
(1) Captain Cardinal v. Widdem, llth Grenadien ;
(3) Ist Lieutenant ▼. Trotha, 9th Huasars -

31 ST Infaktut Brioadk, Migor-General Count
Neidhardt ▼. Gneiaenau.

Adjutant, Ist lieutenant Fragatein v. Niems<lorff,

74th Regiment.

2dth Regiment, Licut.>Colonel v. Blumroedcr
69th „ Colonc, Beyer v. Kiirger

82nd Imfantht Brigade, Colonel v. Rex.

A4|utant, lit Lieutenant Wtllert, 88rd Regiment

40th Hohenxollem Fnsiliers, Colonel Baron t. Eber-

Btein.
72nd Regiment, Colonel v. Ilelldorff . • .

3
8

9th Huasars, Colonel t. Wittich or Iliuzman-Uall-

Bian.
drd Field Diyision of 8th Field Artillery Regiment (5th

and 6th Heavy, 5th and 6th light Batteries), Lieut.-

Colonel Hildcbnmdt ....

Ist Field Pioneer Company of VII Ith Corps, with

Li^t Field Bridge Tmin, Captain Callniann
8rd Field Pioneer Company of Vlllth Corps, Captain

Richter, II. . - - . -

No. 2 Sanitary Detachment.

Total of 16th Infantry Division

3
8

1
1

Guns.

CORPS ARTILLERY.
Colonel V. Broecker, Commander of 8tli Field Artillery Regiment.

Horse Artillery Division of 8th Field Artillery Regiment (Ist, 2nd, and 3rd
H. A. Batteries), Lieiit.-(yoloncl Borkcuhugun ....

2nd Field Division of Stli Field Artillery Regiment (3nl and 4tl\ Heavy,
8rd and 4th Light Batteries), Major Zvrinnemann . . .

No. 3 Sanitary Dotachmcnt.

ToUil of Corps Artillery

18
24

Colamns-Division of 8th Field Ajrtillery Regiment, Captain Eggers.
Artillery Ammunitio7i Columns, Nos, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, Infantry Am^
munition Columns, Nos, 1, 2, 3, 4. Pontoon Columns.

8tb Train Battalion, Colonel v. d. Marwitz, Reserve Hospital DepSt.
Horse DepSt Field Bakery Column. Provision Columns Nos, 1|
2, 3, 4*6, Field Hospitals, Nos, 1 fo 12. Train^scart Squadron,

Total of VllXtli Army Corps : 24 battalions of In&ntry, 1 rifle batta-
lion, 8 squadrons, 90 guns, 8 Pioneer companies*

117

THIRD CAVALRT DIVISION*

Ckmnuuider - lieat-Genenl Count t. d. Groben.

Officer of Oeoend Staff, Captain Count t. WedeL

A^atantii (1) Captain Baron t. Boonbm, 4th Cairas-
lieora i (S) lat Tiiiwiliqnant ▼. KlClber, 9th Hnsiaxt.

6zB Catilbt Bjuoadb, Bl^or-Qeneial t. Mima.

A4]Qtant| let Tiientenant t. Meyarfdd, 14th HoMais.

8th Coiiaaaien. Colonal Coont t. Boedem

7th Lanoera, lieot-Cokmel T. Peatel . . .

7iB Cavajlet Bbxqids, M^or-Oeneral Count in Dohna.

Adjutant, iBt lieutenant t. Holtsenbeoher, ISth Dragoons.

5th Lanocra, lient-Colonel Baton t. Beitaenatem -
14th Lancerst Colonel t. Lilderita ....
lit Hone Artillery Battery of 7th Field Artillery Regiment,
Captain Sehrader . • • • •

Total of 8rd Cayalry Diyiaion

No. 1 FnsLD Railway Diyisiok.

Director : Gavemment Councillor and Commiuioner of fForks^ Dirksen.
Company Commaiider : Captain Neuhaas, 20th Landwehr Regimeni.

No. 1 Field TsLxaBAPH Dinsioy.
Commander : Captain May, Aik Engineer Inspection.

* The regiments of the Srd Cayalry Diviaion formed parti of the Yllth and Vlllth
Gorpa until the 8rdAugnity on whieh day they were ibrmed into a DivLdon. A
profinoD-oolmnn, a field hoipital, and half Sai^ary Detachment of the Vllth Corpa
were aiaigned to the DiTiiion.

* 1

118

IlND ARMT.
CoiLUANDBR in-Chisf : H.R.H. Gbnxsal of Cayalby PsnrcB

FbBDSBICK ChARLKS of FftU88IA«

PerBonal A^ntants : (1) Major ▼. Krosigk ; (2) 1 Jl Lieutenatii y. Nor-

manny aitaehed \6ih Hussars ; (8) \st Lieuiaumi Omni t. Bjuiiti L,

attached 3rd Hussars*
Chief of the General Staff: Major^Gcneral v. Stieble, Khig^s Aide-de-

Camp,
Quartermastei'-in-Chief : Colotiel v. Hertzberg.
Commander of Artillery : Lieutenant^GenerM y. Colomier, Inspector of

the iik Artillery Inspection.
Commander of Engineers and Pioneers ; Colonel Lenthans, Inspector oj

the Srd Pioneer Inspection.

General Staff.

(1) Major Schmidt ; (2) Major Count y. Haeseler ; (3) Captain Steflfen ;
(4) Barony. Richthoden» Guard ArtiUery Brigade ; (5) IstUeu-^
tenant Hugo, 48lA Regiment ; (6) 1st Lieutenant Baron y. d. Golta,
4lst Regiment.

Adjutants.

(1) Major V. Niesewand, Sth Dragoons; (2) Captain Herzbruchi 2nd
Foot Guards ; (3) Coptotn Milson, I9th Dragoons ; (4) Captain y.
Bjern, 60th Regiment ; (5) 1st Lieutenant y. Wai*tenberg, 64th
Regiment ; (6) 2nd Lieutcnimt v. Moltzahn, Zrd Lancers.

Field officer and Adjutants to the Commander of Artilleiy: Field
officer, Major v. Wei-der, attached to Guard Garrison Artillery
Regiment. Adjutants: (I) Captain y. d. Burg, Wth Artillery
Brigade; (2) Captain Baron v. Hadcln, 8M Artillery Brigade.

2nd Engineer officer: Captain v. Bergen, 1st Engineer Lispection
Adjutants to tlio Commander of Engineers and I^oneera ; (1) \st
Lieutenant v. Holzer, 4th Engineer Inspection ; (2) \st Lieutenant
Castcndyck, Zrd Engineers Inspection.

Army Intendant : Intendant Engelhard.

Field Intendant : War Councillor^ Captain y. iSchwedler.

Army Surgeon -General : Dr. Loefilcr.

Commandant of Head-quarters : Captain Baron y. Williseu, Srd
Lancers.

Commander of Head-quoi^ter Guaitl : Captain Count y. Wartensleben II.,
Hussars of the Guard.

Field Gcnsdarmerie : Colonel Knrth, Division Commander; Captain
Schrocder 1.

Genekal iNsrECTiON OF Etappen.

Inspector-General : Major^General v. Ticdemann.

Chief of the General Staff: Major Loewe.

Adjutants: (1) Captain v. Chappuis, 27id Grenadier Guards ; (2) 1st
LieutencuU Douglas, 21 th Landtcchr Cavalry ; (3) 2n{l Lieutenant
Baron v. Werther, Cavalry ofZ5th Reserve Landwehr Battalion.

Artilleiy Officer : Colonel v. Schlegell (retired).

Engineer Officer : Major v. Monsterberg (retired).

Intendant : Assistant Intendant Lampol.

Commander of Field Gendarmerie Division : Major v. Wichert,

119

Pbbskmt at Hbab-Quabtbrs :

H.H. DuKB Paul ov liaoBxsiniuito-SoHWEBiN.
HA Lamdqratx Fbsdbrigk or Hesse.

SUHMART OF FORGES.

»f

GiUTd Corp0 -
Ilird Army Corps
lYth
IXth

Xllth (Saxon) „
6th CaTahy Diyifion
6th

n
If

Total of nod Army
Further remfbrcemoiita

Total

89
36
25
88
25
89

156
25

148
8

181

166

15
14
14
15
14
16
2
1

91
14

105

90
84
84
90
84
96
If
6

546
84

680

GUARD CORPS.

Oeneral C!oiaiAin>iKa : H.R.H. Gekeral of CavalrTi Prince

Augustus of WUrtembero.

Chief of the General Staff: Major- General y, Donnenberg.
Commander of Artillery : Majcr-'General Prince £[raft of Hohenlohe-

Ingelfingen, King's Aide^de" Camp and Commander of the Guard

Artillery Brigade.

Commander of Engineers and Pioneers: Lieutenant- Colonel Begun v.
Wangenheimi Commander of the Guard Pioneer BtUtalion.

General Staff: (1) JIf a;or v. Roon ; (2) Crr/^^ain y. Lindoquist ; (8) Cap-
tain V. Stulpnagel, Ist Foot Guards.

Adjutants: (1) Major v. DerenUiall, 2nd Gretiadier Guards; (2) \H
Lieutenant v. SendeUi Dragootis of the Guard; (3) \st lAeutenant
V. Ramm, Ath Foot Guards; (4) 1^^ Lieutenant v. Nickisch-
Rosenegk, Gardes du Corps Regiment.

Adjutants to the Commander of Artillery : (1) \st Lieutenant Brau-
mvJIleTfGuard Artillen/ Brigade ; (2) 2fid Lieutatant Clausen v.
Kaas, Guard Artillery Brigade,

2nd Engineer Officer : Captain Sey fried, \st Engineer Inspection^
Adjutant to the Commander of Engineers and Pioneers : 1st
Lieutenant y. Wangenheim, \st Engineer Inspection.

Commander of the Head-Quarter Guard : \st Lieutenant v. Trotha,
4M Foa Guards.

YKBSExn at Head-Quarters : Prikce Nicolaus of Nassau.

120

ut guabd infantry division.

Commaiider - - Mi^or Genenl t. Pi^.

Officer of General Staff, Captain t. HoUeben. Adju-
tant), (1) Mi^or Count Ysenbni^-FliUippt-Eich and
Biidingen, let Grenadier Guards } (2) 1st Lieutenant
Y. Daum I., 2nd Foot Guards.

1st Guard Infaittiit Brioadv, Major-Gcneral t.

Kessel.

Adjutant, 1st Lieutenant t. Mitala£^ 4th Foot Guards.

1st Foot Guards, Colonel ▼. R5der . . .

Srd „ Colonel y. Linsingen

2nd Guard Irvantry Brigade, Major-General
Baron y. Hedem.

Adjutant, Ist Lieutenant y. Sydnr, 2nd Grenadier

Guards.

2nd Foot Guards, Colonel Count y. Quiits -
Fusilier Guards, Colonel y. Erckert . . -

4th Foot Guards, Colonel y. Neumann

Guard Rifle Battalion, Mi^or y. Amim
Guard Hussars, Lieut.-Coloncl v. Ilymmcn -
Ist Field DiTision, Guard Field Artillery Regiment
(Ist and 2nd Heavy, Ut and 2Dd Light Batteries),
Iieut.-Colonel Bychelberg - - . .

1st Field Pioneer Company of the Guard Corps with
Light Field Bridge Train, Captain y. Bock
No. 1 Sanitary Detachment

Total of 1st Guard In£intry Division -

2nd GUARD INFANTRY DIVISION.

Conunander - - lieutenant-General y. Bndritaki.

Oificer of the General Staff, Captain y. Weiher. A^vl-
tants, (1) 1st Lieutenant v. Liebenau, 1st Foot
Guards; (2) 2nd Lieutenant y. Vtebahn I., 1st
Grenadier Guards.

Srd Guard Infantry Bkicade, Colonel Knappe

V. Kuappstiidt.

Adjutant, 1st Lieutenant v. Berg, Srd Foot Guards.

1st Grenadier Guards (Emperor Alexander), Colonel
Y. Zeuncr ------

3rd Grenadier Guards (Queen Elizabeth), Colonel
Y. Zalnskowski • • - . .

4th Guard Ikfaktrt Brigade, Major-General

Y. Berger.

Adjutant, 1st Lieutenant y. Twardowski, 3rd Foot

Guards.

2nd Grenadier Guards (Emperor Francis), Lieut.-
Colond Y. Boehn - • - - .

4th Grenadier Guards (Queen's), Colonel Count y.
Waldersee -•---.

8
8

8
8
8

8
8

121

Giufd Bhafmhootcfi Bftttelion, Kiifor t. Fabeok
Snd Qiiard Luiocn, HJ9. Prince Heniy of Heite
8rd Fkdd DiTision, Gmnd Field Artillery Begiment
(Sth and eth HesTT, 5th and 6th Light Batteries)
lieat-Colonel T. Kieinbaben . . .

Snd Field Pioneer Company of the Guard Corps,
Captain t. Bpankeren, with Intrenching Tools
Colnnm --.•••
8id Field Pioneer Company of the Guard Corps, Cap-
tain T.Kranae - • . . .
No. S Sanitary Detaehmcnt

Total Snd Guard Infantiy Dirision

1
1

Squadrons.

<}UABD CAYALBT DIVISION*

Commander • - Uentenant-Qeneral Count t. d. Golta.

Oftccr of General Stali^ Ki^or t. Ostan.

A^intanta, (1) Ifi^or t. Saldcm-Ahlimb, 1st Guard Laneera i (2) lit
lieutenant t. Britake, 2nd Guard Landwehr Cavalry.

1st GuAxp Catalbt Bbioadb.

Commander, Mi^or-Gencral Count t. Brandenburg I.

A^utanty Snd Lieutenant t. Bdneradorfl; let Body-guard Cuiraniers.

Gaidea dn Corps, Colonel ▼. Krosigk - . . .

Guard Cuirassien, Colonel Baron ▼. Brandenstein

Snd Guard Cayaxat Bszgads.

Commander, Ltetenant-General lULU. Piinee Albrecht of

Personal A^ntants, (1) Captain Count ▼. Amim, Sod Guard Land-
wdur CaTiury t (S) 1st Lieutenant Count t. d. Schnlenbarg-WoUfiM
barf, attached Snd Dragoons i (8) Captain ▼. Merekd, of the Gene-
ral Btait
A^iutant, 1st Lieutenant Count of Eulenburg, 8rd Cuirassiers.

1st Guard Lancers, Lieut-Coloael t. Bochow ....
8rd M Colonel, Prince Frederick William of Hohenlohe-

IiMelfingen.

8id Gniu) Catalrt Bbioadb.

Commander, lieutenant-General Count t. Brandenburg II.

A^iutant^ Snd Lieutenant t. d. Schulenbui^, Sth Lancers.

ist Guard Dragomis, Colonel t. Auerswald . • - •

Snd „ Colonel Count y. Finckenstein . • .

Total of Guard OaTalry Dtrlsion

4
4

i*«fci

* No batteries were permanently assigned io the Guard Cavalry
the neocssity arose they were attached to it from the War Artillety.

ion; when

122

C0BP8 ARTILLERY.

Colonel V. Scherbening, Conunander of the Qnard Field Axtillery

Rcfriment.

Hone AitUlenr Diyision, Guard Field ArtiUery Regiment (1, 2, 3, H. A.

Batteries), Mijor Baron t. Boddenbrock ....

and Field DiTiflion, Guard Field Artillery R^ment (8rd and 4th HeaTy,

and 8rd and 4th Light Batteries), Major y, Krieger . . -

No. 3 Sanitary Detachment.

Total of Corps Artillery - . . .

Gvns.

18
S4

Columns-DiyiBion Guard Field Artillenr B^^ent, Major y. HeiDeociuB.
ArtiUery Ammunition Column^ ifos. 1 to S. Infantry Ammuniium
Column^ Nos, 1 to 4. Pontoon Column.

Guard Train Battalion^ Major v. Schickfuss.
Reserve Hospital Depot. Horse Dep6t. Field Bakery Column.
Provisiofi Columns, Nos. I to 5. Field Hospitals^ Nos. 1 to 12«
Train-escort Squadron.

Total of Guard Corps : 27 battalions Infantiy, 2 rifle battalions, 82
squadrons, 90 guns, 3 Pioneer companies.

inBD ARMY CORPS.

General Commanding : Lieutenant-General v* Alvenslebkn II«

Chief of the General Staff : Colonel v. Yoigts-Rhctz.

Commander of Artillery : Major- General v. Billow, Commander of the
Zrd Artillery Brigade.

Commander of Engineera and Pioneers : Major Sabarth, Comman€ler of
the Zrd Pioneer Battalion.

General Staff: (1) Major w. Kretschman; (2) Captain v. Stuckradt;
(3) \st Lieutenant v. Twardowski, 38M Fusiliers.

Adjutants: (1) Cajytain v. Schweinitz, 2nd Body-guard Cuirassiers;
(2) Captain y. d. Schulenburg, Zith Fusiliers; (3) 1^/ Lieutenant
V. Klosterlein, 64M Regiment ; (4) 2nd Lieutenant y. d. Schulen-
burg, Zrd Hussars.

Adjutants to the Commander of Artillery : (1) 2nd Licutefiant Uhde,
4/A Artillery Brigade ; (2) 2nd Lieutenant Steinlein^ Zrd Artillery
Brigade.

2nd Engineer Officer : Captain Bruhn, attached 4th Engineer Inspection.
Adjutant to Commander of Engineers and Pioneers : Lieutenant
Ney, 2nd Engineer Inspection.

123

rr^

5th infantbt division.

Comiaander - - lieatenant-GenenJ t. StulpnageL

Oflcer of Qenenl Staff, Midor t. Lewinski II. A4jn-
touts, (1) Captain Wodtke, 45th Begiiiient i (2)
find lieutenant Coont ▼. Bernatorfi^ 8rd Lancers
(Emperor of Russia).

9th iNrAMTRT BntOADiy Mijor-OeDeral t. Doring.

A^iotant, Is) Lieutenant t. Bismarck, 4th GrmadierB.

8th Bodj-gnsrd Grenadiers, lieat-Colonel t. L'Estocq
48th Beglment, Llettt-^lonel t. Qarrelts

lOA Irvantbt Briqadb, Biijor-General ▼. Schwerln.

Adjutant, let Lieutenant t. Seydllts IL, 7th (King's)

Grenadiers.

12th Qfsnadiers (Prinee Charles of Prossia), Colonel

▼. Beater.
52nd Beglment, Colonel v. Wolffen . - .

8
8

8id Bite Battalion, ICijor T. Jena . . .

12th Dragoons, Mijor Pfeffer v. Salomon

Ist Field Division, 8rd Field ArtUle^ Beglment (1st
and 2nd Hearj, 1st and 2nd Light Batteries), Mijor
Ghdlos - •

3rd Field Koneer Company, Ilird Army Corps, Cap-
tain Thiemann - - . . .
No. 1 Sanitary Detachment.

Total of 5th Infantry DlTision r

6iH INFANTBT DIVISION.

Commander - Lientenant-General Baron v. Budden-

brock.

(MBecr of General Staf^ Midor T. (Jeiffsler. A^atants,
m 1st Lieutenant Fohl, 87th Fosiliers; (2) let
lAeatenant t. Krocher, 15th Lancers.

1 1th IxFAMTftT Bkioadb, Mi^or-G^eneral y. Bothmaler.

A^iatant, 1st Lieutenant lichtenstein, 8th Body-
guard Grenadiers.

20th Beglment, Colonel t. Flatow ...
35th Fosiliers, Colonel dn Plessis . . .

12th Infantbt Brioadb, Colonel ▼. Bismarck.

Adjutant, 1st Lieatenant ▼. Harklowski I., 25th

Beglment

24th Bcgiment, Colonel Coont sa Dohna
64th M Colonel Baron Treasch ▼. Buttlar-
Brandendfels .....

2nd Dragoons, Cdonel t. Drigalsld - .

8rd Field Ditl8ion,8rd Field ArtilleiyBegiment (5th
and 6Ui Heayy, 5th and 6th Light Batteries), llijor
Beek .......

2iid Field Pioneer Company, Ilird Army CV)rp« with
Entrenching Tool Colomn, Oiptain Bredan •
No. 2 Sanitary Detachment.

Total of 6th In&ntry Diyislon -

8
8

124

Guns.

Pioneer
Companies.

CORTS ARTILLEKY.

Cclonel y. Dresky, Commander of the 3rd Field Artillery

Regiment

Horse Artillery Division of 3rd Field Artillery Regiment

(l8t and 2nd I LA. Batteries), Major T^entx
2nd Field Division of 3rd Field Artillery Regiment (3rd

and 4th Heavy, 3rd and 4th Light Batteries), Major v.

Lyncker- - - - - ' -
1st Vield I^oueer Company, Ilird Army Corps, vith Light

Field Bridge Train, Captain Kuutze - -
Kg. 8 Sanitary Detachment

12
24

Total of Corps Artillery . - -

Columns Division, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, Captain Borcliard.
Artillery Ammunition Column^ No$. 1 to 5. Infantry Ammunition
Columns J Nos, 1 to 4. Pontoon Column,

3rd Train Battalion, Major v. Pfanncnhcrg.

Reserve Hospital Dep6t. Horse Depot, Field Battery Column. Pro^
vision Columns^ Nos, 1 to 5, JFteltl HospitcUs^ Not, 1 to 12. Train-
escort Squadron,

Total of Ilird Army Corps : 24 battalions Infantry, 1 rifle battalion,
8 squadrons, 84 guns, 3 Pioneer companies.

IVtii army corps.

Genehal CoMMANDiKii : Genkual of Infantry v. Alveksleben L

Chief of tho General Stalf :" Colonel v. Thile.

Commander of Artillery : Major- General v. Scherbcniug, Commander
of the 4th Artillery Brigade.

Commander of Engineers and Pioneers : Lieutenant' Colojiel v. Eltester,
Commander of 4th Pioneer Battalion,

General Stall*: (1) Major v. Wittich ; (2) Captain \\ Ileineccius ; (3)
1st Lieutenant v. Stiickradt, attached 28//i Regiment,

Adjutants : (1) Captain Sucre, 79th Reghncnt ; (2) Captain v, Novillcy
5th Lancers ; (3) 15/ Lieutenant v. Klitzing, ^Ist Regiment; (4)
2nd Lieutenant v. Dewall, 16/A Lancers.

Adjutants to the Commander of Artillery : (1) 1^/ Lieutenant v. Rcppert,
4th Artillery Brigade ; (2) 2ml Lieutenant Mellin, 4/A Artillery
Brigade.

2ad Engineer Officer : Captain Kuappe, \st Engineer Inspectioft,
Adjutant to Commander of Engineers and Pioneers : 2nd Lieutenant
Mannkopffy 4th Engineer Inspection.

Commander of the Ilead-quarter^Guard ; 1st Lieutenant v. Ostcn, 12//i
Hussars.

Pkesent at Head-quarters : II.R.II. the Hereditary Prince of

Anhalt.

125

7th infantry division.

Commaiider - Lteatenant-OeneiBl t. Gross or v.

SchwarshoS

Offieer of General Staff: Captaiii Bergmann. A4)a-
tants, (1) Captain StolU 50th Regiment; (2) Ist
lieutenant v. Jagov, Reserve of 7th Cuirassiers.

ISth IxTFAVTKT BRIGADE, Mijor-Geueral v. Boiries.

Adjutant : 1st Lieutenant Kriegsh^m, 7 Ist Regiment.

96th Regiment, Colonel v. Schmeling - - •

66th „ Lient-Colonol Count t. Fincfcensteln -

14th Infaktrt Bbioadb, Mijor-General t. Zjcblinski.

A^iotant, Ist Lieutenant Yahlkampf, 87th Fusiliers.

S7th Regiment, Colonel t. Fressentin - - -

98rd •• Colonel y. Krosigk . . .

f»

19th Hussars, lient-Colonel r. Suekow

2ttd Field DiTision, 4th Field ArtiDerr Regiment (3id
and 4th Heavy, 3rd and 4th Light Batteries), Mijor
T. Gilsa

1st Field Honeer Company, IVth Army Corps, with
Light Field Bridge Train, C^>tain Schults L
No. 9 Sanitary Detachment

3
3

8
8

4th Rifle Battalion, Major y. Tietton-Vorbeck -
7th Dragoons, Lieut.-Co]onel Baron t. Schleinits
1st Field Division, 4th Field Artillery Recent (Ist
and 9nd Heavy, 1st and 2nd Light Batteries), Lieut-
Colonel V. Freyhold ....
9nd Pioneer Company, IVth Army Corps, with En-
trenching Tool Column, Captain Tetxlaff -
3rd Field Pioneer Company, IVth Army Corps, Cap-
tain T. Wasserschleben ....
No. 1 Sanitary Detachment

Total of 7th Inftntry Division - - 13

8th infantry division.

Commander - - Lieutenant-General v. SchOler.

OlBcer of General Staff, Major y. Kretschmann. Adju-
tants, (1) Captain y. Sehenck, 9th Lancers; (2)
2nd Lieutenant Kempe, 86th Fusiliers. Attache'],
H.LH. Prince of Schwarsburg-Rudolstadt.

15th Imfantbt Bxioadb, Mijor-Genenl v. Kessler.

Adjutant, 1st Lieutenant v. Rohr, 83nl Regiment

8 let Regiment, Colonel y. Bonin ... 3
71st „ Lieut-Colonel v. Kloeden - - 3

16th Infahtht Brioadk, Colonel Y. Scheffler.

A4Jvtant, 2nd lieutenant y. Alhedyll, 2nd Grenadiers.

86tfa FosOien, Colonel Y. Horn ... 3

96th Regiment, Lient-Colond y. Redern - - 3

1
1

Total 8th Infimtry DiYision

126

C0BP8 ABTILLBBT.
Ck>loDel CrnniiB, Commander of 4th lieU Aitillerf Begimont.

Hone ArdlleiT DiTiaon, 4tli Ii«ld Ardllery Regiment (2iid and Sid H.A.

Batteries), £ieat-Coloiiel Font .....

3rd Keld Ditwod, 4tli Field Artillery Begiment (5tb and 6th HeaTj, 5th

and 6th Light), Major Stdtier ......

No. 8 Suiitary Detachment

Total of Corps Artillery -

13
S4

Colomna Division^ 4th Field Artillery Regiment, Captain Meisner.
Artillery Ammunition Calumny Nas, 1 to 5. Infantry AmmumHou
Calumny Nas, 1 lo 4. Pontoon Column.

4ih Train Battalion, Major v. Wjssota-Zakrzewski.

Reserve Hospital DepSt. Horse DepSt, Field Bakery Column.
Provision Columns^ Nos. 1 to 5. Field Hospitals^ Nos. 1 lo 12.
TVain^escort Squadron,

Total of IVth Army Corps : 24 battalions Infantry, 1 rifle battalion,
8 squadrons, 84 guns, 8 Pioneer companies.

IXth ARMY CORPS.

GEMER.VL COUUANDIliG : GENERAL OF LSPANTRT V. M.VNSTEIN.

Chief of the General Staff: Major Bronsart v. ScheUendorf.

Commander of Artillery : Majors General Baron ▼• Pattkammer, Com-
mander of the 9th Artillery Brigade.

Commander of Engineers and Pioneers : Major Uutiei', Commander of
9th Pioneer Battalion,

General Staff; (1) Major y. Wriiiberg ; (2) Captain Lignitz ; (3) Captain
Scherf, Hesse General Staff.

Adjutants : (I) Major v. Doring, 57/A RegimetU ; (2) Captain Kuhlweiu
T. Rathenow, \st Body-guard Hussars; (3) 1st Lieutenant v.
Britzke, IIM Lancers; (4) 2nd Lieutenant v. Rymoltowski,
llth Grenadiers.

Adjutants to the Commander of Artillery : (1)15/ Lieutenant Reuschcr,
3rd Artillery Brigade ; (2) 2nd LCsutenant Forsbeck, 9th Artillery
Brigade.

2nd Engineer 0£Beer : Captain Sommer, it/i Engineer Inspection.
Adjutant to Commander of Engineer and I^oneers : 2nd Lieutenant
Erfling, 4 th Engineer Inspection.

Commander of the Head-quarter Guard : Ist Lieutenant y. Maltzahn,
16th Hussars.

127

18th infantbt division.

ConUBMider - lieut-Genenl Baron ▼. WnmgeL

Ofloer of General BtaS, Mdor Lost A^Jntanto (1),
Captain T. Bnlow^ 16tfa Lancers ; (2), Ut lieu-
tenant T. Maiklowdd II., S5th Begiment.

85th IiVAXTHT BtiOADHy Mijor-Ckneral t.

Blomentlial.

Adjutant: lit lientffiant T. Homy 8nd Foot Guards.

86tli FnsQiers, Colonel t. Brandenstein

84th Begimenty Colonel T. Winkler . • •

88th Ixvamtrt Bii«ax>b» M^^^MJenenl t. Below.

Adjutant: Ist Lientanant t, Qnitsow, 37th Fusiliers.

11th Grenadtersi Colonel ▼. BchOning

86Ui Begimenty Colonel Baron t. Falkenhansen

9th Bifle Battalion* If^or Y. MinkwiU
8th DratooDiL Colonel Baron t. Hovwald -
1st Field DlYiaion» 9th Field ArtOleiT Be^ent (1st
and 9nd HeaTj, 1st and 2nd l4^ Batteries),

li^ T. Gajl
2nd Field Pioneer Company, IXth Axmj Coirpsy irith

Bntrenofaing Tod Cohnnn, Cgptahi Fiedler
Srdineld Pioneer Company, uth Anny Cotps, Ci^

tabSeholta

Ko.;l Baiiitarj Detaehment

Total of 18th Infrntiy Diyifion

25th GharI) Duoal Hisn INFANTBT
DIVISION.

Commander - lient^Qeneral H.LH. Prince Louis

Ofieer of General Stalls (1\ ICitfor t. Hesse { (2),
Captain T.Haekewits, of the Pmssian Army. Adju-
tants, 1st Ueatenant M5Ucr, 8rd Begiment; (2), 1st
Lieatenant Bothe, Artillery.

Commander of Field Artillery, Llent^-Cdonel Stompff,

Prussian Army.

49th Ihvastrt BnoADS, "hUMiot-Qeiunl ▼. Wettioh,

Phissian ibmy.

A^ntant^ 1st lieutenant Mangold, 1st Begiment

1st Body-Gnard Be^^nent, lieat-Colonel Conlmann -
2nd (Grand Dnke) Begiment, Colonel Krans
1st (Goard) Bifle BattiOion, Mi^r Laatenboger

50ni iHVJunmT Buoiipa^ Colonel t. Lyncher.

Adjutant, 1st lientenant Kr5mmdbein, 4th Begiment

8rd Begiment, lieot-Colonel Stamm ...
4th Beghnent Colonel Zwenger, Prussian Axmy
2nd Bifle Battalion, Mijor Tmter - . .

9
3

2
2
1

1
1

128

25TU Cavalry BaiOADB, Major-General Baron ▼.
Schlotheim, Fnusiau Army.

Adjutant, I St Lieut Baron ▼. Gemmingen-Hornberg,

l8t Cavalry.

I St Cavalry (Guard Chevaux Legers), Lieut.-Colonel

T. Grolmann - - - - -

2Dd Cavalry (Body-guard ChoTaux Lcgert), Major

Boron ▼. Buseck - - - - •

Horso Artillery Battery, Captain Boron v. Schaffer-

Bemstein ------

Field Diyislon (1st and 2nd Heavy, let, 2nd and 8rd

Light BattericM), Major v. Ilerget - - -

Pioneer Company with Light Field Bridge Train,

4
4

Captain Brentano

Bupi

Sanitary Detachment

Total (Grand Ducal Hesso) Division

6
30

Gons.

COUPS ARTILLERY.

O)lonel V. Jagcinanu, Commander of 9th Field Artillery Regiment

2nd Field Division, 9th Field Artillery Regiment (3rd and 4th Heavy,

8rd and 4th Light Ritteries), Lieut-Colonel Darapsky -
2nd Horse Artillery Battery, 9th Field Artillery Regiment, Captain KOnig

Total Corps Artillery

24
6

CJolumns Division, 9tb Field Artillery Regiment, Captain v. Liisswitz.

Artillery Amtnumtion Column^ Nos. I to B. Infantry Ammunition
Columuj Nos, 1 and 2.

Grand Ducal Hcssc Ammunition Columns Division : Major BickneL

Artillery Ammunition Columns^ Nos. 1 and 2. Infantry Ammunition
Columns^ Nos. 1 ofid 2.

9th Train Battalion : Major Giersburg.

Reserve Hospital Dej)ot. Horse Depot. Field bakery Column.
Provision ColumnSy Nos. 1 to 3. Field Hosjntals, Nos. 1 to 6.
TVain-escort Sqtiadrons.

Grand Ducal Hesso Train Division : Major Kolb.

Reserve Hospital Depdt. Horse Depot. Field bakery Column.
Provision Columns, Nos. 1 and 2. Field Hospitals^ Nos. 1 to 6.
Train-escort Detachment.

Total of IXth Army Corps, 20 battalions Infantry, 3 rifle battalions,
12 equadious, 90 guns, 3 Pioneer companies.

129

xth akmy corps.

Geheral Cousianding : General of Infantbv, v. Yoiots-Rhetz.

Chief of the Greneral Staff: Lieutmani-Colonel v. Caprivi.
Conmuiiider of Artillery : Colonel Barofi v. do Becke, Commander of

IQih Artillery Brigade.
Commander of ^igineers and Pioneers: LietUaiani-Colmiel Cramer,

Commander of \(Hh Pioneer Battalion,
General Staff: {}) detain Seebeck , (2) C^tain Barm v. Hoiningen

or Huene ; (8) let Lieutenant Podbielskiy 9th Dragoons.
Adjutants: (1) major Gerhardty 85M Regiment : (2) Captain v. Plotz,

2nd Dragoons of the Guard; (3) 1st Lieutenant v. Lessing, ffjth

Regiment ; (4) Ist Lieutenant v. Willich, attached 9th Lancers.
Adjutants to tiie Commander of Artilleij : (1 ) 1st Lieutenant Looff,

6/A Artillery Brigade ; (2) 2nd Lieutenant Otto, lOM Artillery

Brigade.
2nd Engineer Officer : \st Lieutenant Neumeister, Ath Engineers

Inspection.
A^utant to the Commander of Eneineers and Pioneers : 2nd Lieutenant

Rothenberger, 4th Engineer Inspection.
Commander of tlie Head-quarter Guard: 1st Lieutenant y. Bomstadt^

IZth Lancers.

19th infantry division.

Commander - Lieat.*QeiieraI ▼. Bohwarskoppeo.

Oilieer of Qcneral Stair, Mi^or t. Seherft Adjutants
(1), Ist LieatenantEggelixig, SUiLuioen; (S),8nd
lieoteoant v. Bernath, I., 16th Begiment

87tb IsFAimT BaiGADi, Colonel Lehmann.

Adydtant, Ist lieatenant t. Bomsdoff, 1st Foot

Guards.

78tli Be^faneat, Colonel Baron t. Lyneker

91st Begbnent, Colonel t. Kameke ...

38ni Imvavtbt BmiOADB, Mi^-^Seneral ▼. Wedell.

A^Jatant, 1st Licntenant y. Kalbacher, 11th Gre-
nadiers,

16th B^gfanent, Colonel T. Brizen . • •

67th „ Colonel t. Cniaach ...

£S

9th Dragoons, lieot-Colonel Count t. Hardenberg«

attached lath Hassan - • . .

1st Field Dirlaion 10th Field Artilleiy Begiment (Ist

•ad tad Heayy, let and Sad light Battenes) Lieut-

Golond Sehanmann ...

Sad Field Fkmeer Company Xth Anar Coips, with

fistraachlng Tool CcJanm, Captain Mcjeav
grdFldd FkiMar CpmpanyyXth Army Corps, Captab

Ka 1 Sanitary Detachment;

I ••

Total of 19tli Infantry DiT<aon

8
8

99989.

130

20TII INFANTRY DIVISION.

Commander, Major-Qeneral ▼. Kraatx-Kosehlau.

Officer of Geoeral Staff, Captain Baron y. WilUaen.
Adjutants, (1) 1st lieutenant t. Schenckendorf, 3rd
Hussars; (2) 1st Lieutenant Baron v. EWerfeldt,
or V. Beyerfi^rdc-Werries, 2nd Grenadier Guards.

d9TU Ijifaktry Brioadk, Major-General y. Woyna.

Adjutant, 1st Lieutenant v. Mayer, ISth Regiment.

56th Regiment, Colonel y. Block ...
79th „ Colonel y. Valentini ...

40TII Infantry Brigade, Major-Geueral v. Dirings-

hofcn.

Adjutant, Ist Lieutenant Schrob, 35th Fusiliers.

17 th Regiment, Colonel y. £hrenbeig

92nd .. Colonel Haberland ...

10th Rifle Battalion, Major Dunin y. Przychowsky -
16th Dragoons, Lieut-Colonel y. Waldow
2nd Field Division, 10th Field Artillery Regiment
(3rd and 4th Heavy, 3rd and 4th Light Batteries),
Mi^of Krauso .....

ist Field IMoneer Company, Xth Army Corps, with
Light Field Bridgo Train, Captain Kleist -
No. 2 Sanitary Detachment.

Total of 20th Infiintry Division

3
8

Qons.

CORPS ARTILLERT.

Colonel Baron v. d. Golts, Commander of the 10th Field Artillery

Regiment.

Horse Aitillery Division, 10th Field Artillery Uegimcnt (1st and 3rd Horse
Artillery Batteries), Major Korber - . . . .

3rd Field Division, 10th Field Artillery Regiment (5th and 6th Heavy, 5th
and|6th Light Batteries), Lieut.-Colouel Cotta ....
No. 3 Sanitary Detachment.

Total of Corps Artillery

12
24

Columns Division, 10th Field Artillery llegimcnt : Major Strackeijan.
Artillery Ammunitian Columns^ Nos, 1 to 6. Infantry Ammunu
lion ColumnSy Nos, 1 to 4.

10th Train Bnttnlion : Major v. IJergc and Ilerrendorfif.

Reserve Hospital DepSt. Horse Depot. Field Bakery Column.
Provision Columns, Nos. I to 5. Field Hospitals^ Nos. 1 to 12.
Train-escort Squadron.

Total of Xth Army Corps, 24 battalions Infantry, 1 rifle battalion
8 sqnadroiis, 84 guns, 3 Pioneer companies.

131

XHth (ROYAL SAXON) ARMY CORPS.

Gkneral Combianding : H.R.H. General of Infantry, the Cro^tn

Prince of Saxony.

Personal Adjutants : (1) Major-General and Adjutant- General Prince

George of Schonburg-WaUlenburg ; (2) Captain Count Vitzthum

v. E^tadt.
Chief of the General Staff: Lieutenant- Colonel v. Zeschwitz.
Commander of Artillery : Major- General Kohlcr, Commander of the

\2th Artillery Brigade.
Commander of Enginecra and Pioneers : Major Klemm, Commander of

\2th Pioneer Battaliotu
General Staff: (1) Major Schweingel; (2) Captain v. Hodenberg;

(8) Captain Edler y. d. Planitz.
Adjutants : (I) Major Baron v. Welck ; (2) Captavi v. Minckwitz, L,

I2th {Crowfi Prince) Rifle Battalion; (3) Ut Lieutcnaat Edler

V. d. Planitz, Guard Cavalry; (4) Ist Lieutenant Miiller v.

Bemeck, 101^/ Gretiadiers {King frtlliam (f Prussia) ; (5) \st

Lieutenant v. Shimpff, Guard Cavalry.
Adjutants to the Commander of Artillorj : (1) 1st Lieutenant y. Kretz-

schmar, I2th Artillery Brigade ; (2) 1st Lietitenant\, Rabenhorst,

II., \2th Artillery Brigade.
2nd Engineer Officer : Captain Portius, Engviccr Division of General

Staff.
Adjutant to the Commander of Engineers and Pioneers : 2nd Lieutefiant

Schubert, 12/A Pioneer Battalion.
Commander of the Head-quarter Guard: Captain y. Wurmb, IO8//1

Regiment.

Present at Heab-quarters : H.R.H. Charles Theodore, Duke of

BAyARLA.

A(\|utant : 1st Lieutenant Baron y. Reck, 1st Cuirassiers.

9SBD INFANTRY DIVISION.

Commander - H.R.H. Lieateaant-General Prince

George of Saxony.

Personal Adjutant, Captain y. Ehrenatein. Officer of
General Staff, (1) Lieuteoant-Colonel Schabert;
(2) Oq»tain y. rneiticlike, 103rd Regiment Ad-
jutant, C^>tain y. MinckwiU, II. 102nd (Crown
Prinoe) Bflgimoit

45Tn Ikfahtst Bhioadb, M^or- General y.

Granshaar.

A4jntaBt, lit Ueatenant Schmals, L, lOIit Grenadiers.

lOOIh Body Guard Gicnadien, Colonel Garten
lOlat (Kiu William of .Fnssia) Grenadiers, Colonel

lOSth EJldnniihers (Fnsilien), Colonel Baron y. Hansen

132

46TII Ikpaxtry Brioadb, Colonel v. Montb&

Atljatimt, Ist lieutenant v. Scbultes, lOted RegimenL

lOSnd Begiment, Colonel Rodorff . . .

lOSrd „ Lieutenant- Colonel Dietrich

Itt Cavalry (Crown Prince), Lientenant-Colonel v. Sahr
l8t Field DiTiaion, 12th field Artillery Regiment

(1 and 2 Heavy and 1 and 2 light BattcriasX lien-

tenant-Colonei v. Watsdorff ...

2nd Company 12th Pioneer BatUlion^ with Entiench-

mg Tool Column, Captain Richter ...
4rh Company 1 2th Pioneer Battalion, Captain Friedrich

No. 1 sanitary Detachment.

Total of 23rd Infantry Division

24TII INFANTRY DIVISION.
Commander - Major-Generil Ndirhoff v. Holderberg.

GIBcert of the General Staff, (1) Mijor v. Ttchirtchky
n. Bdgendorf ; (2) Captoin v. fiiilow. Ac^ntant,
l8t Lieutenant v. Carlowits, 12th Rifle Battalion
(Crown Prince).

47tu Infaktuy Brigade, lilijor-General v. Leonhardi
Adjutant, Ist Lieutenant Wagner, 1 05th Regiment

104th Regiment (Prince Frederick Augufitus), O>lonei

▼• Elteriein.
105th f. Colonel V. Tettau - . .

12th Rifle Battalion, Major Count Iloltzendorff

48TII Infants V Bkigadk, Colonel v. Schulz.

106th Regiment (Prince George), Colonel v. Aben-
droth ----..

107th Regiment, Licutcnaut-Colonel v. Schweinitz
13th Rifle Battalion, Colonel v. Gutz •

2nd Cavalry, Major Genthe - . . .

2nd Field Division, 1 2lh Field Artillery Regiment (3 and

4 Heavy and 3 and 4 Light Butteries), Major Richter
Srd Company, 121h Pioneer Battalion, with light field

bridge train, Captain Schubert ...
No. 2 Sanitary Detachmect

Total of 24th Infantry Division -

S
8

8
1

8
8
1

I
1

133

Squadrons.

Gans.

12TII CAVALRY DIVISION.

Coinmaader » - Mijor-General Count z. Lippe.

Officers of General Staff. (1) Captain Reyher ; (S) Captain ▼.
Kirchbach. Adjutant, Ist Lieutenant v. KOnneritz. 3rd
Cavalry.

23iiD Cavalry Brigade, Major-General Krug t. Nidda.

Adjutant, 1st Lieutenant v. Boxberg, 18th Lancers.

Guard Cavalry, Colonel v. Csrlowitz . - - -

17th Lancers, Colonel v. Miltitx . . . •

24T1I Cavalrt Brigade, Major-General Senfft v. Pilsach.

A^utant, 1st Lieutenant Hdnning 0*CarroIl, 8rd Cavalry.

8rd Oavalry, Colonel v. Standfest . . . -

1 8th Lancers, Lieutenant-Colonel v. Trosky . • .

1st H. A. battery, ISth Field Artillery Regiment, Captain
Zenker -------

Total 12th Cavalry Division -

Guns.

CORPS ARTILLERY.
Colonel Funclce, Commander 12th Field Artillery Regiment.

3rd Field Division, 12th Field Artillery Regimen* (5 and 6 Ueavy, 5 Light
Batteries), M^Jor Hoch - - - -

4th Field Division (7 and 8 Heavy, 6 Light Batteries) and 2nd H. A.
battery, 12th Field Artillery Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Oertel

Total Corps Artillery ...

18
24

Columns Division, 12 th Field Artilleiy Regiment, Lieutenant- Colonel
Schoimer.
Artillery Ammunition Columns, Nos, 1 to 5, Infantry Ammunition
Columns^ Nos. 1 to 4. Pofttoon Column*

12th Train Battalion : Colonel Schmalz.

Reserve Hospital DepSt Horse Dej^St, Field Bakery Column.
Provision Columns, Nos, 1 to 5, Field ITosjntalsy Nos, 1 to 12.
Train^escort Squadron,

Total of Xllth (Royal Saxon) Army Corps ; 27 battalions Infantiy,
2 rifle battalions, 24 squadrons, 96 guns, 8 Pioneer companies.

134*

Squadrons.

Guxis.

6TII CAVALUY DIVISION.*
ConimaDdcr - Ident.-Genera) v. Kheinbnbcn.

Officer of Qenenil Staff, Captain t. Heister, 10th Hussars ;
Adjutants, (1) Chaplain v. d. Knescbeck, 12th Hussars;
(2) Ist IJeulcnuiit, (\)Uiit v. IMcttonhcrg-lArnliausen,
4th CuinissiicrH.

Attacliedy Major-Gcneral v. Straut2 ; A(\jutant| 1st Lieu-
tenant V. Gosslur, IMh Hussars.

llTH BniGADK, 2kIajor-General v. Barliy.

Adjutant, Ist Xiieutcnant v. Marschall, 0th Lancers.

4th Cuirassiers, Colonel v. Amim . • - -

13th Lancers, Colonel y. Schack ....
1 9th Dragoons, Colonel v. Trotha ....

12TII Cavalrv Briqade, Alajor-Gencrul v. Bredow.

Adjutant, 2nd Lieutenant y. Klitzing, 5th Dragoons.

7th Cuirassiers, Licut.-Colone1 v. Larisch - . -

16th Lancers, Major V. d. Dollen . . - -

13th Dragoons, Colonel y. Brauchitsch - - -

13TII Cavalky Buioadk, Major*GcncraI v. Uedern.

Adjutant, 1st Lieutenant y. Goctz, Gih Dragoons,

loth Hussars, Colonel v. Weise - - - .

1 1th „ Licut.-(^ol(>ni4 Baron v. Kllcr Eherstein
17th „ Liout.-Coloncl y. Bauch, attached 2ud Guard
Lancers -----.-

1st Horso Artillery Battery, 4th Field Artillery Regiment,
Captain Bode ......

2nd Horse Artillery Battery, 10th Field Artillery Regiment,
Captain Schirmer .....

Total of 5th Cavalry Division

6TII CAVALRY DIVISION.!

Commander - H.H. Duke WiUiam of Mecklenburg-

Schverin.

Officer of General Staff, Major v. Schunfels; Adjutants,
(1) Captain v. Treskow, 15th Lancers: (2) IstLientenant
v. Usedom, Ist Body-guard Hussars.

14X11 Cavaijit RniGADE, Major-Gencrul Barun y. Diepen-

broick-Griiter.

Adjutant, Ist Lieutenant v. Schachten, 8tli Lancers.

6th Cuirassiers (Emperor Nicholas I. of Russia) Lieut.-
Colonel Count e. Lynar . - - - -

3rd I^ancerf (Emperor of Bussia) Colonel Count y. d.
Groben .-.-.--

15th Lancers, Colonel y. Alvensleben

4
4

4
4
4

* One Provision Column from the IVth and one Field Hospital from the Xth Ann}
Corps were assigned to this Division.

j One Provision Column and one Field Hocpital of the Illrd Army Corps were
assigned to this Division.

135

—

Squadrons.

Guns.

ISm Catalet Bbioads, MaJor-QeneTal t. Banch.

Adjutant^ lit Deatenant Count r. Boss, 7th (King's)

Hnssan.

3rd Hnaian (2Qetlieii) Colonel t. IQethen - . -
16th ,, Colonel ▼. Schmidt ....

—

2nd Hone Artilleiy Battery, 3rd lleld Artillery Begiment,
Captain Wittttock

Total of 6th Catalry Divisiou . • -

4th Field Bailayay Division.

Director : RaUway fforks Inspector Nenne.*

Company Commander : Captain v. Seydlitz-Kursbach-Ludwigsdorff,
28rd Landwehr Begiment.

2nd Fold Telegraph Division.
Commander : Cngptain Herrfahrdti attached 2nd Engineer Lispectian.

* BepreaentatiTe of railway oontraetor Ylereggv,

136

IIlBD ARMY.

Comhamder-in-Chibf : General of Imfantht H.B.H* the Crown

Prince of Prus8ia«

Personal Adjutants: (l) Major v. Mischkey atiacked General Siaff of
the Army ; (2) Captain Count z. Ealcnberg, Raerve of 1st Foot
Guards ; (3) Captahi Baron t. Sohloinitz, attached Sth Dragoons.

Chief of the General Staff: Lieutenant-General y. BlumenthaL

Quartermaster-in-Chief : Colonel v. Grottberg.

Commander of Artillery : Lieutenant" General Herkt, Inspector of the Zrd
Artillery Inspection,

Commander of Engineers and Pioneers : Major* Gefteral ScholZy Inspector
of 2nd Engineer Inspection,

General Staff.

(1) Major V. Hahnke; (2) Captain Camatz; (3) Captain Lenke ; (4)
Captain v. Wolff, ^rd Greiutdier Guards ( Queen Elizabeth) ; (5)
1st Lieutenant v. Viebahn, BOth Fusiliers: (6) IK Lieuienani
Bronsart v. Schellendorf, 89M Grenadiers.

Attached : Captavi v. Xylonder, Bavarian Staff.

Adjutants*

(1) Major Dresow, 2nd Grenadiers {King Frederich William IV.) i (2)
Captain v. Sommerfcld, 2nd Foot Guards s (3) Captain ▼. Matins,
Gardes du Corps; (4) 1;/ Lieutenant y. Bosse, 14th Begiment ;
(5) 2»r/ Lieutenant Baron v. Biasing, 8M Dragoons; (6) \st
Lieutenant Count y. Seckendorff, Beserve 1st Foot Guards.

Field Officer and Adjutants to the Commander of Artillery.

Field Officer : Lieutenant' Colonel Hartmann, attached Wth Field

Artillery Bcgimefit.
Adjutants: (1) Captain v, Treuenfels, Zrd Artillery Brigade. (2)
Captain y. Kriiger, 10/A Artillery Brigade.

2nd Eugincer Officer : Major Schumann. Adjutants to Commander of
Engineers and Pioneers: (1) \st Lieutenant Heyde, 2nd Engineer
Inspection; (2) \st Lieutenant y. Kleist, 1^/ Engineer Inspection,

Army Intendant : Councillor of War BaiTctzki. Field Intendant :
Councillor of War Mtiller.

Army Surgeon General : Surgeon General Dr. Boger.

Commandant of Head-qunrtcrs : Major y. Winterfeld, personal adjutant
to ILBJL Prince Alexander of Prussia.

Commander of Ilead-quartcr Guard : 1st Lieutenant v. Blumenthal,
12//i Dragoofis.

Field Gcnsdarmerie : Lieutenant^ Colonel y. Hymmem, Division Com^
mawlcr. Captain Bohm.

General Inspection of Etapfen.

Inspector-General : Lieutenant' General v. Gotsch (unattached).

Chief of General Staff : Major Baron v. d. Goltz.

Adjutants: (1) Captain y. Ratheno\y, Cavalry of 6th Landwehr Begi"
ment; (2) 1st Lieutefiant Count Keller (retired); (3) 2nd Lieu^
tenctnt y. Rabenau, Beserve of Srd Artillery Brigade.

Artillery Officer : Lieutenant- Colonel Erdmann (retired).

Engineer Officer : Major Bachfeld (retired).

Intendant : Assistant Intefidant Schumann.

Conmiander of Field Gcnsdarmerie Diyision : Major Haack.

137

Attached: Royal Bavarian General Inspection op Etappen.

Inspector-General : Major- Gaicral v. Mayer.

Officer of General Staff': Lieutenant' CoUniel Count Ben*I tie la Bosia.

Adjutants : (1) Ist Lieutcna^U Lossowt 8th Regiment ; (2) isi

Lieutenant Ott, 6th Regiment {King of Prussia).
Commandant of Artillerj : Major Baron v. Harsdorff, 2nd Artillery

Regiment.
Commandant of Engineers : Major Kieeman, Et^gineer Staff.
War Commissarjr-in-Chief : Backert
Commandant of Field Gensdarmerie : Captain Heiss.

Attached to the Coxhand of the IIIrd Army: Lieutenant-
general V. Werder.

General Staff: Captain Zieglor, 78M Regiment. Adjutants : (1)
Captain r. StUipnagcl, 9M Rijie Battalion ; (2) 1^1 Lieutenant
v« Briinneck, Guard JDragooiis.

Present at Head-quarters.

H.H. Ernest il.f Duke of Saxe Coburg Gotha.
Adjutants: (1) Mqfar y. Schrabisch, attached 95th Regiment; (2)
lit Lieutenant ▼• Zimsary 7th Cuirassiers.
H.BJI. Eocene, Duke of WCrttemberg.
HJt.H. Prmee.William of Wurttemberg.
HJLH. Hereditaiy Grand Duke of Saxony*

▲diutant t Captain r. Bodnum, attaohed 94M Regiment.
H.B.M. Beredlterf Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Strelits.

Adlatant i Obbmei r. Gitfem.
The Hereditarj Mnce of Hohensolleni*Biffinaringen*
Bepresentatire of the Rojal^ BaTarian [Held Armj : Major^General
Count Y. Botbmer, Adjutant: Captain Baron v. Godtn, /rom
Quartermaster-GeneraPs J)€jHirtme9it.
Royal Bavarian Military Attache : Major v. Freyberg-Eisenberg.
Royal Wiirttemberg Military Attache : Lieutenant' Colonel v. Faber du
Fanr.

SuHUARY OF Forges.

VthAnnj Corps - . • . .

Xlth ^

Itt BaTarian Anny Corps . . • -

Hud „ „ . . -• .

Wiirtembeig Held Dirision . . . .

Baden )» • • . .

4t1i CsTaliy DiTirion . • - - -

Total of IIIrd Army . -. . -

Snbseqacnt reinforcement of Vlth Army Corpii

,1 „ Snd CiiTiiliy Diyision -

Total -..---

—

128

102

—

153

134

84
84

96
96
54
54
12

480
84
12

676

138

vth army corps.

General Couuandino : Lieutenamt*6enbral y. Eibchbach.

Chief of the General Staff: Colonel y. d. Escfa.

Commander of Artillery : CoUniel Gaede, Commander Sih ArtiUery
Brigctde.

Commander of Eiiginecrs and Pioneers : Major y. OwKtien, Commander
5ih Pioneer Saiialwn.

General Staff: (1) Captom Mantey ; (2) Cr/platnStielery.Heydekampf;
(3) \si Lieutenant Baron v. Keibnitz, Slth FkuUien,

Adjutants: (1) Major Manch^, 12M Dragoons; (2) Captain y. Hngo,
7th^{King*s) Grenadiers; (3) Ist Lieutenant Cleinow, 68^A Regi-
ment; (4) 2nd Lieutenant y. Hennigs, 1^ Lancers*

Adjutants to the Commander of Artillery : (1) \st Isieutenant Baron v.
Dalwig, Guard ArtiUery Brigade ; (2) 2m/ Lieutenant Mertens L,
6/A Artillery Brigade.

2nd Engineer Officer : Captain Pirscher, attached 29id Engineer Lispec-
tion. Adjutant to the Commander of Engineers and Pioneers :
2nd LietUcnant Grioben, 2nd Engineer Inspection,

Commander of the Head-quarter Guard : Captain Baron v. Wechmann
(unattached).

9ni INFANTRY DIVISION.

Comnuuider - Major-General v. Sandrart.

OiBcer of General Staff, Major Jacob!; AdjntanU,
(1) Captain v. Winterfcld, 20th Regiment; (2)
1st Lieutenant Raron v. Richthofvn, 10th Lancers.

17Tn Infantbt Riugade, Colonel v. Bothmer.

A^Jatant, Ist lientenant Keller, Ist (Croim Prince)

Qrenadien.

08th Regiment, Colonel t. Rex . . -

69th Regiment, Colonel Eyl - - - -

18Tn Infantry BniaADE, Major-General
▼. Voigts Rhetz.

Adjutant, Ist laeutenant Sandes v. Ilofiman, 48th

Regiment.

7th (King's) Grenadiers, Colonel ▼. Kothen -

47th Regunent, Colonel v. Burghoif ...

5th Rifle Battalion, Major Count t. Waldersec

4th Dragoons, Lieut-Colonel t. Schenk

Ist Field Division, 5th Field Artillery Regiment
(1 and 2 Heavy and 1 and 2 Light Batteries), Major
Eippmg - - - - - ^ -

Ist Field Pioneer Company Vth Army Corps, with
light field bridge train. Captain Scheibert -
No. 1 Sanitary Detachment.

Total 9th Infantry Division - - -

3
8

139

iotu infantry division.

Commander - Lieat.^enenl v. Schmidt

Officer of General Staff, Captain v. Stmensee ; Ad-
Jatants, (1) Captain Melma, 62nd Regiment, (2)
2nd Lieutenant Knhlmay, Ist Lancers.

19tr Ikfjlktst Brigade, Colonel v. Henning aaf

Schonhoff.

Adjutant, Ist Lieutenant y. Wangenheim,
69th Regiment
6th Grendiers, Colonel Fldckher ...
46th Regiment, C(^onel ▼. Stosch . . .

20th Ihfavtrt Bsioij>B, Major-^neral Walther

T. Montbary.

Adjutant, Ist Lieutenant Lauterbaeh, 48rd Regiment
37th FusiUers, Colonel ▼. Heinemann
50th Regiment, Colonel Mi<^lmann ...

14th Draimma, Colonel t. Sehdn ...
Srd Ileld DtTision, 5th Field Artillery Regiment

(5 and 6 Heayy, 5 and 6 Light batteries), Xieut-

ColonelROhl - ;. . .

Sad Field Pioneer Company , Vth Corps, with Entrench-
ing Tool Column, Oiptain Hummel

Srd Field Pioneer Company Yth Corps, Captain

Qfintiel

No. 2 Sanitary Detaehmont

Total of 10th Infantry Diyision

9
3

S
8

1
1

CORPS ARTILLERY.
Lieut-Colonel K5h]er, Commander of 5th Field Artilleiy Regiment

Horse Artilleiy Difision, 5th Field Artillery Regiment (2 and 3
Horse Artillery Batteries), Mi^r Pilgrim - . . .

2nd Field Division, 5th Field Artuleiy Regiment (8 and 4 HeaTj, 8 and
4 light Batteries), Lieut-Colonel y. Borries - . .

No. 3 Sanitary Detachment

Total of Corps Artillery

Quns.

12
24

Columnfl Diyision, 5th Field Artillery Regiment^ Major Beiche, 2nd
ArtUkrp Briaade.
ArHllery AmmuniHan Columis^ Na$. 1 to 6. Infantry Ammumiion
Columnsj Nos. 1 to 4. Pontoon Column.

5th Train Battalion, Major Herwarth v. Bittenfeld.

Beserve HotpUal Dep6t. Horte DepSt. Field Bahery Column.
Provision Columns^ Nos. 1 to 12. Tram-^seort Squadron*

Total of Yth Army Corps: 24 battalions Infantry, I rifle battalion,
8 squadrons, 84 gnns, 3 Pioneer companies.

140

Xlrn ARMY CORPS.

Genkral Commanding : Lieutknant-Gkxerai. v. Rose.

Cliief of tlio GeniM-al Staff: Major^Gcncral Stein v. IvAininski.
Commander of Artillery : Major- General Ilnusmnnn, Commander of

II th Ar tiller i/ Brigade.
Commnnder of En^ineors aiid Pioneera : Major Critger, Commander of

Wt/i Viouver liattalimt.
Gem ral Stuff: (1) Major v. Sobbe ; (2) Captain v. Miiller ; (3) Ul

Lieutenant v. Ileincceius, 88//i Ueyiment.
Adjutants: (1) Major v. Wiilffen, 3rrf Grautdiers ; (2) Captain Baron

V. Dornberg, 9M Hussars; (3) Captain v. Rose, \Zth Dragoons ;

(4) \st Lieutenant v. Pfuhlsteiu, 9Uh {Grand Duke of Saxony)

liegimetU.
Adjutants to the Commander of Artillery: (1) \st Lieutenant Fischer,

8M Artlllerg Brigade ; (2) 2nd Lieutenant Kaiser, ll</t Artillery

Brigade,
2u(l Engineer OIRcor : Captain v. Giirtncr, Ath Engineer Lispection.

Adjutant to the Commander of Engineers and Pioneers : 2;u/

Lieutenant Osier, Atk Engineer Ltspection.
Commander of the I lead -quarter Guard: 1*^ Lieutenant Kchl, 5t/t

Dragoons.

pKKbENT AT IIkAD-QUAKTEUS :
II.II. GKOKGKy Dl'KE OF SaXE MbININGEN.

Pi:in<:e of Wiep.

8
z

218T INrANTHY DIVISION.

CominaDder - Lieutcnaiit-Gencral v. Scliachtmeyer.

Officer of General Staff, Major v. Gottber^. Adjutants,
(1) Ist Lieutenant Baron Senfil v. Pilssich, 2nd
Grenadier Guards ; (2) 1st Lieutenant Count v.
d. Schulenburg-Wolfsburg, 80th Fusiliers.

4l8T Infantry Brigade, Colonel t. Koblinski.

Adjutant, Ist Lieutenant v. Schlegell, 88tfa Regiment.

80th Fusiliers, Colonel v. Coloinb - - -

87th Regiment, Colonel Grolmann - - -

42xn Infantry Brigade, Major-General v. Tliile.

Adjutant, 1st Lieutenant ▼. Schlotheim,
30th Regiment.

82nd Re<:;inicnt, Colonel v. Borrios

88th

ik)Umc\ Kobn v. Jaski

nth Rifle Battalion, llajor v. Johnston

14th Hussars*, Colonel v. Bemuth ...

1st Field Division, 11th Field Artillery Regiment
(1 and 2 Heavy and 1 and 2 Light Butteries) Major
▼. Langen ------

1st Field Pioneer Company, XI th Army Corps, with
liffht field bridge tmin. Captain v. Holly u. Ponient-
nets ------

No. I Sanitary Detachment.

Total of 21st Infantry Division -

3
3

HMk

141

2220> INFANTRY DIVISION.

Commander - - Lieatenant-G«neral y. Gendorff.

Officer of General Staff, Mi^or v. HoUeben, A^jatants,
(1) Captain County. Schlippenbach, 5th Dngoons ;
(S) Snd Lieutenant t. Kleist, 83rd Begiment

4SxD iNFJLirrnT Beioadb, Colonel y. Eontaki.

A4Jatant| lit Lieotenant Bnchfinck, 70th Begiment.

S2nd Begiment, Colonel y. FOrster ...
95th „ Colonel y. Beckedorff

4th Ixfahtrt Bbxoadb, Mijor-General y. Schkopp.

Adjutant, Itt Lieutenant y. Diepow, 9Ut Begiment.

83rd Regiment, Colonel Marschall y. Bieberatein
94th (Grand Duke of Saxony) Begiment, Colonel y.

13th Huaaara, Lieutenant-Colonel y. Hendnck •

2nd Field Diyiaion, 11th Field Artillery Regiment
(8 and 4 Heayy, 8 and 4 Ught Batteriea), B£dor y.
Ualar

tnd Field Pioneer Company, Xlth Corpa, with En-
trenching Tool Column, Captam Eckert

8rd Field Pioneer Company, Xlth Corpa, Captain
Kiiater - *

No. 8 Sanitary Detachment

Total of SSnd In&ntry Diyiaion

3
3

8
8

1
1

Guna.

C0BP8 ARTILLBBT.

Colonel y. Oppdn-Bronikowaki, Commander of 1 1th Field Anillery

Begiment.

Hone ArtiBeiy Biiriaioa, 11th Field Artillery Regfanent (1 and 8 H. A.

batteriea), Major Knipl!?r

8rd Fidd Diyiaion, 11th Fidd ArtiUery Reghnent (6 and 8 Heayy, 5 and 6

Light Batteriea), MiO^ Arnold
No.

12
24

8 Sanitary Detachment

Total of Corpa ArtiUery -

Colamns Diyiaiony 11th Field Artillery Regiment, Captain Trustedt..
AriUUrp Ammmnium Colunm$f No$. I to 5. Infantry AmmwiiHon
Columnif Nas, 1 to 4. Poniocn Column.

11th Train Battalion^ CoUmel Schnch. . i

Suerve Ho9pUal DtpdL Hone DeptL'/Reld Bakery Coltki$u
Columns^ No$. 1 io 5. Field HospUaU. Ifos. 1 to 12.
Squadron.

Total of Xnh Army Corps t 24 liatialions In&ntrj, 1 rifle battalion^
' 8 sqiiadronKy 84 gons^ 8 Pioneer companies.

142

1st BAVAKIAN AUMY COUPS.
Akmv Cobps Cobimandant : Gensbal op Infantry v. d. Tann-

RATIISAMnAUSEN.

Chief of the General Staff: Lieutenant- Colonel v. Heinleth.

Field Artillery Director: Major-General v. Malais^, Commandant of

the \st Artillery Brigade.
FicUl Engineers Director : Lieutenant- Colonel Ricni.
General St^iiF: (1) Major v. Parsevul ; (2) Captaiit Ilclvig.
AdjutanUs: (1) Cajttain Baron v. Ste ailing ; (2) \st Lieutenant Baron

V. Ascli.
Adjutnnt to the Field Artillery Director : \$t Lieutenant ^iAioVkXivagev^

Artillcrt/,
Adjutant to the Field Enginocrs Director: \st Lieutenant Franck.
Officers of the Topographical Bureau : (1) Captain Diirr; (2) Xst Liew

tenant Schuhmncher, Zrd {Prince Charles of Bavaria) Bcgiment,
Conimandiint of llead-quarlors : Captain Griinberger, Body-guard

Regiment,

•
m

1st infantry division.

C'ominaiidant - • Lieuteiiant-Gcnrral v. Stephan.

General StalF, (1) Lieut nianl-Coloiurl OrlF, (2) Major v.
i>afferliiig. Adjutants, (1) Captain Wangcn,* Infantry;
(2) l8t Licuti'imnt Baron v. Uoinan, (*avalry. Kngineer
Officers, (1) (Japtain Ilaid ; (2) Ist Lieutenant Geigel.

1st Infaktry BniGADi:, Major-Gencral Diet).

OlHccr of General Staffi Captain Aii^stwurm. Adjntant,
Ist Lieutenant y. Baligand, Infantry.

Leib Bcgiment, Colonel v. Ttiuffenbach ...

1st Beffiinent, ('oloncl Both - . - . .

2nd Rifle Battaliou, Major y. Vallado ...

2kd Infantry Buioade, Major-Gencral v. Orflf.

Officer of General Staff, Captain v. Brauniniihl. Adjutant,
1st Lieutenant Bitter v. Xylondcr, 2nd Rifle Battalion.

:iiid Regiment (Crown Prince), Colonel Baron v. d. Tami
11 til Regiment (v. d. Tann), Colonel Count v. Leubltiug
4th Rifle Battaliou, Miyor Reschrcitcr ...

mil Rifle Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Baron v. Massenbach

Urd Clievauxlf^crs Kcginieut (Duke l^Iaximilian), Colonel
Baron v. Leonrod ----..

Artillery Division [1st (4-pr.), 3rd (l-pr.), 5th (6-pr.), and
7th ((5-pr.) batteries, 1st Artillery Regiment, Prince
Lnitpold], Lientenant-Colonel Bitter Y. VoUmar -

Ammunition Column, 1st Artillery Regiment.

1st Sanitary Company.

Ist Field Commissariat Division.

9th Field Hospital.

Total of 1st Infantry Division -

3
2
1

* 1st Lieutenant Baron v. Schleich, Artillery, replaced Captam Waagen, who fell aick.

143

2kd infantry division.

Commandaiit - lieatenant-General Count z. Pappenheim.*

General Staff, (1) Lientenant-Golonel Mack; (S) Msgor
KriebeL Adjutants, (1) let lieutenant Enler-ChelpiD, In-
&nti7; (2) lit Lieutenant y. Regemann, Cavalry. £n-

gneer Officers, (1) Captain KOrbling (2) 1st Lieutenant
dmer.

BSD Irtavtrt Bbioadb, li^jor-General Schumacher.

Officer of General Staff, C^>tain Ritter y. Xylander.
Acyutant, Captain Menges, Infantry.

3rd Regiment (Prince Charles of BaYaria), Colonel Schnch •
12th R^jment (Queen Amalie of Greece), Colonel Heyl
1st Rifle Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Schmidt

4th Infabtrt Bbioade, Mfjor-General Baron y. d. Tann.

Officer of Genera] Staff, Captun Eppler. Adjutant, Captain

Michell, Infimtry.

10th Regiment (Prince Louis), Colonel Baron y. Guttenberg-
13th Regiment (Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria), Colonel
Count Y. Tsenburg . . . . .

7th Rifle Battalion, lieutenant-Colonel Schultheiss -

4th ChcYauxlegers Regiment (King's), Colonel Baron y.
Leonrod .......

Artillery DiYision [and (4-pr.), 4th (4-pr.), 6th (6-pr.), and
8th (6-pr.) batteries, 1st Aitillery Regiment, Prince Luit-
poldj Major Mussinan .....

Ammunition Column (1st Artillery Regiment).

4th Sanitanr Company.

2nd Field Commissariat Division.

2nd Field Hospital.

Total of 2nd Infantry DiYision .

8
2
1

2
1

Squadrons.

Guns.

CUIRASSIER BRIGADE.

Mijor-General y. Tauach.

Officer of General Staff, Oiptain Count v. Tattenbach.
Adjutant, 1st Laeutenant y. KOnitss, CaYalry.

Ist Cuirassier Regiment (Prince (Charles of BaYaria), Colonel
Feichtmayer ......

2nd Cuirassier Regiment (Prince Adalbert), Colonel Braumuller

6th (^evauxlegera Regonent (Grand Duke Constantine Niko-
lajewitsch). Colonel Baron Y. Krauss ...

Ist (4-pr.) H. A. battery, 3rd Field Artillery Regunent (Queen
Doirager), Captain Baron y. Lepel ....

•
4

4
4

Total of Cuirassier Brigade

* Mojor-General Schumacher commanded the DiYision, Colonel Heyl the 3rd
Brigade, Y'ben Lieutenant-Gcncrnl Count z. Pappenheim fell sick.

Oant.

ABTILLEBT RESERVE DIVISION.

Srd Artillery Regiment (Queen Dowager), Colonel Broosetti.

1st Division [Snd (4-pr. H. A.)> 3rd (6-pr.), nd 4th (6-pr.)

Major Graraicb.
Snd DiYiaion [Sth (6-pr.) and 6di (6-pr.) batteries], Mijor Daffner
3rd Division [Ith (6-pr.) and 8th (6-pr.) batteries], ICiyor Will -
AmmnniCion Column (1st Artillery Regiment, Prince Luttpold.)

Total Artillery Reserre

IS
IS

1st FIELD ENGINEER DIVISION.

Srd Field Engineer Company, with S Pioneer Trains, S Bridge Trains,
and 1 Field Telegraph Train, Major Schnislein ...

Pioneer

Main Ammunition Column (Srd Artiliery Ragiment, Queen Dowager)^
Major Hinges.

5ih Field Commissariat Divisimu 6th ami \Qth Field Hospitals,

Total of Ist Bavarian Annj Corps: 20 battalions Infimtryy 5 rifle
battalions, 20 squailrons, 96 guns, 3 Pioneer companies.

IInd BAVARIAN ARMY CORPS.

Abhy Coups Commandant : General of Infantry Bitter v.

Hartiiann,

Chief of the General Staff: Colonel Baron v. Horn.

Field Artillory Director : Major' General Lutz, Commimdimt^ 2nd

Artillery liriyudc.
Field Engineer Director : LicntetunU- Colonel Vogt.
General Staff: (1) Major Heilmann; (2) Captain Lindhainer.
Adjutants: (1) Captain Baron v. Sazenliofen ; (2) Captain Harracb,

In/atitry.
Adjutant to tbe Field Artillery Director: 1st Lieutenant Hofmanu,

Artillery,
Adjutant to tbe Field Engineer Director: \st Lieutenant Stcimnetz.
Officers of tbe Toi>ograpbical Bureau : (1) Captain Count v. Holnstcin,

12M Regiment ; (2) 1^^ Lieutenant Truksa, 9/A Regiment.
Commandant of Ueud-quarters : Captain v. Austn, 9lh Regiment,

145

9m INFANTBT DIVISION.

Conunandant - - lieutenant-General t. Walther.

General Stall; (1) lii^ Streiter ; (2) Captain Baron t. La
Roehe of the ArtiUerj ConaoltatiTe Commiftion. Adjn-
tanta, (1) Captain DOrlf ; (S) lit lieatenant Schenk,
Infittitry. Bniineer Ofieers, (I) Captain Miehell i (S) Ist
lieutenant Keeter.

0th iHviinrmt BuoiJ>% Ifajor-General r. Sohleieh.

Oflleer of Gcnend Staff, Captain t. Standt. AdQatant,
let lientniant Bomhardi Infantry.

•th B^gisMBt Cpng TVIlUam of Pnuaia), Colonel Btemitter -
7tfa n (Hohenhanaen), Colonel H6fler
8fh Blfle Battalioni Iient^<>Monel Xohlermann

611i IxwAKTMr BsiOADa, Cobnel BOrriee t. WisaelL

Ofloer of General Sta£ Captain KfUihuano, War Academy.
A^ntant, let lieutenant Klggl, In&ntry.

J4thBegiaMnt^tftniann), Colonel Diehl . . -

6th It . (Qng John of Saxony), Colonel Baron t.
!ueiibeM«
ard Bifle BattaHon. Ueot-ColoMl Baron ▼. Horn -

let Cheranx Iwra Beghnent (Emperor Alexander of Baasia),
Colonel T. Grondherr .....

Artillery Di^sion [3rd (4-pr.), 4th (4.pr.), 7th (6-pr.), and
;6-pr.) Batteriea. 4th
M^orltehler

8th (6-nr.) Batteriea, 4th ArtUlery liqsiment, King's]

Ammnnition Column (4th Artillery Begiment).

8rd Sanitary Company.

8rd lUd Comndaiariat DiTiaion.

8rd Held HoepitaL

ibtal of Srd Infantry DiTiflion •

4TH INFANTBT DIVISION.

Conmandani - - lieutenant General Comt y. Bothmer.

General Staff, (1) lient-Colonel Wirthmann ; (S) liCaior
Fleachnei. AdUntattta, (1) Captain Popp, Inflmtty $ (8)
lit lieotenant 8ohalidt| Cvfikj, Ikigineer Officers, (1)
Captain Schwabl j (8) let lieutenant Leber.

7ih Ihtaktbt BxioiDB, ICaJor-General ▼. Thiereok.

Officer of General Staff, Ci^tam Kellner, 1st Begiment
(Kmg^s). Adjatant, Ist lieatenant Schmidt, Inlhntry.

5th Beghnent (Grand Dnke of Hesse), Colonel MOhlhaor -
8th „ (WredeX Colonel T. Heeg . . .

eth Bifle BattaUottf Major Caries . . . .

89988.

8
9
1

8
8
1

146

•

}

8th Infantbt Bbioadb, Major-Qenenl HailliDger.

Officer of General Staf^ CapUun (ML Adjatant, 1st
Lieatenant Hohe, Ini^rj.

Srd Battalion, Ist (King's) Regiment, Major v. SchlichtegroU
3rd „ 5th (Grand Duke of Hesse) Regiment, lii^

Baron t. Feilitisch.
1st Battalion, 7th (Hohenhansen) Regiment, Gkptain lien-
tenant Kohlermann.
.3rd Battalion, 11th (y. d. Tkum) Regiment, Major t. Gropper
grd „ 14th (Hartmann) Regiment, Major Remidi y.

Weissenfels.
5th Rifle Battalion, Ueat.-Oolonel Baron v. Gmnppenberg -

loth „ „ Lieut-Colonel ▼. Heckel . . -

8nd Cherauz legers Regiment (Taxis), Colonel Horadam

ArtiUenr DiTfsion [1st (4-pr.), Snd (4-pr.), Sth (6-pr.), and
6th (6^.) Batteries, 4th Kind's Artillery R^ment],
Lieut-Cx>lonel Baron v. Crailsheim ...

Ammunition (Column (4th Artillery Regiment).

find Sanitary Company.

4th Field Commissariat DiTision.

4th Field Hospital

—

Total of4thInfkntry Division -

Squadrons.

Guns.

LANCER BRIGADE.

Major-General Baron y. ^lulzer.

Officer of General Staff, Captain Belli de Pino. A^utant,
Ist Lieatenant Marc, Cavalry.

1st Lancers (vac. Grand Duke, successor to Nicholas of
Russia), Colonel Count v. Yscuhnrg ...

2nd Lancers (King's), Colonel Baron v. Pflummem -

5th Chevaux legers Regiment (Prince Otto), Colonel y.
Weinrich -------

2nd (4-pr. 1I.A.) Battery, 2nd Artillery Regiment, Captain
Baron v. Masse iibacli - - - - -

4
4

Total of Lancer Brigade -

147

Ooni.

ABTILLEBY RESERVE DIVISION.

2iid AitOleiy Regiment, Colonel ▼. Fillement

l8t DiTirion [l8t (4.pr.) H^., 3rd (6-pr.), and 4th (6-pr.) Batteries],

Lieat-ColoDel Eckart
2nd Divinon rffth (6-pr.)> and 6th (6-pr.) Batteries], Major Blano
3rd Di?kion rJHi (6-pr.), and 8tli (6-pr.) Batteries], Major Hollenbach -
Ammnnition Golomn (4th Artillery Regunent).

12
12

Total of Artillery Beserro . . .

Pioneer
Companies.

2ifo FIELD ENGINEEB DIVISION.

3rd Field Engineer CJompan^r, with 2 Pioneer Trains, 2 Bridge Trains,
and 1 Field Telegraph Tram, Major Kern.

Main Ammanition Column (2nd Artillery Regiment) Major Beden-
bacben
6M Field Commissariat Division* 7th and Sth Field Hospitals.

Total of Ilnd Bavarian Army Corps ; 20 battalions In&ntry, 6 rifle
battalions, 20 squadrons, 96 guns, 3 Pioneer companies.

wCrttemberg field division.

CoMVANDER : Lieutenakt-Gbkbral y. Obebnitz, Prussian Armt.

Chief of the Staff : Colonel y. Bock, 65th Regiment, Prussian Army.

Chief of the General Staff: Colonel v. Triebig.

Commander of Artillery : Colonel y. Sick.

Engineer Officer : Captain Baron Schott y. Schottenstein.

Bureau for Field Operations : (I) Captain Baron y. Falkenst^n ; (2)
\st Lieutenant Jager ; (3) ist Lieutenant y. Wiederhold.

Bureau for Interior Economy : CL) Lieutenant- Colonel Baron Pergler
y, Perglasy JVar Ministry; (2) Captain Reibely 1st Eegiment

Adjutants : (1) Captain Count y. DUlen, Zrd Cavalry; (2) Captain y.
Stosch {Prussian Army) 4<A Rijk Battalion; (3) \st Lieutenant
Count z. Dohna {Prussian Army\ 1st Rifle Battalion ; (4) 1st
Lieutenant y. Langenbeck (Prussian Army)^ Guard Cuirassiers^

Adjutanjb to the Commander of Artillery : Captain Gleich.
Commander of the Staff Company : Captain Heiorich.

K 2

148

18T Field Bbioade, M^o'-Oeneral ▼. ReiUenstein.

Officer of General Sta^ Captain "Phtt, Adjutant, Itt Lieatenant

Schmid.

1st Begiment (Qaeen Olffu's), Colonel t. Berger
7th „ Colonel Y. Bampacher . • • • ,

ind Riiie Battalion, Lieut-Colonel t. Kndner • * • .

1st Sanitary Section.

2in> Field Briojldk, Blajor-General v. Starkloff.

Officer of General Staff, Captain Sarwey. Adjutant, Ist Lieutenant

Dettinger.

2nd Regiment, Colonel ▼. Ringler . . • . .

fiih „ (Kinc Charlea), Colonel Baron v. HQgel
8rd Rifle Battalion, laeut-Colonel v. Link ...
tad Saiiitiiry Section.

8ro Field BaioAOE, Major-General Baron ▼. HiigeL

Officer of General Staff, Captain Schill. Adjutant, Itt Lieutenant

Biltingcr.

ard Regiment, Colonel v. Pfeilfelinann - . . .

8tb - Colonel y. Mauch ....

lit Rifle Battnlion, Ueat.-Colonel v. Steigcr ...
drd Sanitary Section.

Total of Infantry Brigades

Battalions.

2
2
1

Sqoadront.

CAVALRY BRTGADB.

Commander - - Major-Gcneral Count v. Scb^ler.

Officer of General Staff, Captain Count ▼. SSeppelin. Adjutant,

Captain Gleich.

Ist Cavalry (King Cliarlcs), Colonel v. Ilarling

2nd „ (King William), Colonel B:tFon v. Fulkcnstein

8rd „ (Queen Olga), Colonel Count v. Normann

Totul of Cavalry Brigade

4
2
4

Guns.

ARTILLERY.

1st Field Artillery Division [ist (6-pr.), 2nd (6-pr.), 8rd (4-pr.) Batteries], 18

Lieut-CJolonel v. Marchtluiler.
2nd Field Artillery Division [4tli (4-pr.), 5th (4.pr.),and 6th (6-i)r.) 18

Batteries], Lieut-Colonel Roschmann.
8rd Field ArtiUery Division [7th (4-pr.), 8th (4.pr.), and 9th («-pr.), 18

Batteries], Major Lenx.

Total of Artillery

149

Pioneer Corpe, whh Bridge Train and Entrenching Tool Column,
Lieat-Colonel Ldffler.

Pioneer
Companies.

Horsed Ammunition Beserve (Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Columns) Captain
Cuhorst.

Train, Captain Uhland.

^th Sanitary Section. Field Horse DepSt. Field Slaughter-house,
Field Bakery. Provision Columns^ Nos. 1» 2, 3, 4. Field HoS'
pitalSf Nos. 1 to 6.

Total of Wiirtemberg Field Division ; 12 battalions Infantry, 3 rifle
battalions, 10 squadrons, 54 guns, 2 Pioneer companies.

BADEN FIELD DIVISION.

Division Comhakder: Lieutenant- General v. Beyer, Grand
Duchy of Baden War Minister.

Chief of the General Staff: Lieutenant-Colonel v. Leszczjnski.

Commander of ArtiUery: Colonel v. Frejdorf, Commander of the Field
Ariillery Regiment.

Engineer Officer : Major Wentz, Cmnmander Pioneer Division.

General Staff: (1) Major Baron Tlits v. Amerongen ; (2) Captain
OberhoiYer ; (3) Captain Baron Boeder v. Diersburg.

Adjutants: (1) Captain v. Friedeburg, attached to General Staff; (2)
\st Lieutenant du Jarrys Baron v. La Boche, Srd Regiment;
(3) 1*^ Lieutenant Noeldecke, Pioneer Division (also Commander
of Head-quarter Guard).

Adjutant to the Commander of Artillery : 1^^ Lieutenant Baron v.
Neubronn, of the Field Artillery RegimefU.

Adjutant to the Engineer Officer : 1^/ Lieutenant v. Froben, attached
Ath Regiment.

§§

l8t Infantry Brioade, Lieutenant General du
Jarrys Baron ▼. La Roche.

Adjutant, Ist Lieutenant Baron Rdder ▼. Diersburg,
attached, Ist Leib Grenadiers.

Ist Body-guard Grenadiers, Colonel Baron v. Wechmar
Fusilier Battalion, 4th Begiment (Prince William),

Mi^r Baui^r.
Snd Qrenadier Regiment (King of Prussia), Colonel

V. Rens.

—

150

Combined Inpantrt Brigade (3rd), Major-Genenil

KeUer.

Adjutant, Ist Lieutenant Grohe, attaclied Stli

Begiment.

3rd Begiment, Colonet Miillcr . . .

5th „ Colonel Sachs . - . .

3rd Dragoons (Prince Charles), Lieut.-Colunel Baruu
V. Gemming«ru.

Ist Field Division of the Field Artillery Begiment (Ist
and 2nd Heavy, Ist and 2nd Light Batteries), Lieut-
Colonel v. Tlieobald . . . .

Pontooners Company, with Light Field Brid;ro Train
and Entrunehing Tool Column, Captain Lichtenauur
Sanitary Detachment.

Total of Lifantry Division

3
3

*i4

Squadrons.

Guns.

CAVALKY BBIGADE.

Major-Gcneral Baron v. I^ Boche-Starkenfels or Vultoe.

Adjutint, 1st Lieutenant Baron v. Bciehlin Afcldegg,
attached 2nd Drago<^ns (Markgrave Maximilian).

1st lieib Dragoon!*, Lieut.- Colonel Baron ▼ Schaffer
2nd Dragoous (Markgrave Maximilian), Colonel Wirth

H.A. Battery, Captain Baron v. Stetten ...

4
4

Total of Cavalry Brigade

Guns.

COUrS AUTILLERY.

Major Bochlitz.

2nd Field Division of the Field Artillery Begimeut (3rd and 4th IleaA'y,
3rd and 4th Light Batteries) .-..-.

Total of Corps Artillery . - - -

Coluiuiis Division of the Fiehl Artillery Kegiment ; Major Englcr.

Infantry Ammxinitioii ColnmnSy Nos, 1 €md 2, Ariillefy Ammn-
nition Columns^ Nos, \y 2, 3. Pwitoon Column,

Train Division : Major v. Cbclins.

Horse Depot, Field Bakery Column. Provision ColunmSyNos,\^
2, 3. Field Hospitals, Xos, 1 to 5, Train-escort Squadron.

Total of Baden Field Division ; 13 battalions Infautiy, 12 squadrons,
54 guns, 1 Pioneer company.

161

4th cavalry division.*

Commander - GenenlofCftTaIx7,H.R.H. Prince
Albrecht of Ptnsda (Father).

Personal Adjntanto, (1) Mi^r v. Qrodiki, 3rd (Ziethen's
Hnaian ; (9) Oaptein Hagen, lat (Prince Albreclit of
Pnusta) Dragoona.

Officer of General Staff, Major v. Versen.

A^ntants, (I) Gq;>tain v. Treskow, 7th (King*!) Hunan ;
(2) Ut lieatenant t. Baehmayr, 14th Hnsaari.

Attached, Mi^^'^'-^^^^''*^ ▼• Treekow ; Adjutant, let Den-
tenant Sartorins, 19th Dragoons.

8th Cayalbt Bbioade, liajor-General t. Hontheim

Adjutant, 1st lieutenant Becker, 14ih Drago<Nis.

5ih Cnirasaiers, Iieat-C!olonel v. Arentschildt

10th Lancers, Colonel Baron t. Bamekow ...

9th Gatalbt Bbuudb, Mijor-Gen«ral t. Benhaxdi.

Adjutant, Ist lieutenant Baron ▼. Stosoh, 2nd Body-guard
~ "^ Hniaais.

Itt Lancers, Cokmd T. Reekow • . . .

6th I, Mi^r T. KnoUoch • . . .

K^TH CSataiat BuoADx, kijor-Gcneral ▼. Krosigk.

Adjutant, 2nd lieutenant Count ▼. d. GrOben,

15th Hussars.

2nd Body-guard Hussars, (Colonel t. Schanroth

5th Dragoons, Colonel Wright . . . .

1st Horn Artillery Battery, 5th Field Artillery Regiment,
Cwtmn T. Manteuffrf .....

2nd Hofse Artillery Battery, ilth Field Artillery Regiment,
Captain t. Schlotheim .....

Total of 5th CkTalryDWision . . .

Squadrons.

Guns.

4
4

2iid Field Railway DiTision.

Chief : Commiisioner of GavemmefU JVorkSf Wex.

Company CSommander : Captain Jaekel^ d7th Reserve
Battalion*

Bdyal Bavarian Field Railway Diviaion.
Chief: j^ft^tneerGyflslmg.
Company Commander : Captain Ulrich, Engineers.

3rd Field Telegraph Diviaion.
Commander : Captam Eanffmann, \st Engineer Inspector.

* Cne Prorision Caluaui of Vth Corps and half a Sanitaiy Detachment from the
Xlth Corps were aarigned to this Dirision.

152

Field Tboops not fosuino pabt of thk thbxb Abioxs ov thb

1st August 1870.

1st army corps.

General CouMANDiNa : General of Cayalrt Baron v. Manteuffel,

King's Aide-de-Camp.
Chief of the General Staff: Lieutenant' Colonel v. d. Bnrg.
Conunaader of Artillery : Major- General v. Bergmann, dommofider of

the Ist Artillery Brig<»de»
Commander of Engineers and Pioneers : Major Fahland, Commander

of lit Pioneer Battalion,
General Staff: (1) Major Baron v. Amelnnxen ; (2) Captain v. d.

Hude ; (3) Captain Lignitz, attached 70th Regiment.
Adjutants: (1) Major y. frankenburg, 44th Regiments (2) Ccq^tain

Y. Briinneck, ISth Hueeare; (8) \$t Lieutenant Heinrich% 4ih

Grenadiers $ (4) let Lieutenant Sackersdorff, let Dragoone.
Adjutants to the Commander of Artillery : (1) let Lieutenant Pohl, let

Artillery Brigade; (2) Lieutenant Weber, 1st Artillery Brigade.
2nd Engineer Officer : Captain v. d. Groeben, 1st Engineer Inspection,
Adjutant to Commander of Engineers : 2nd Lieutenant Qnaasowski, 1st

Engineer Inspection,
Commander of Head-quarter Guard : 2nd Lieutenant ▼• d. Goltz, 12//i

Lancers,

IST INFANTRY DIVISION.

Commander • lient-Geaenl t. Benthom.

Offloer of General Staff, Major t. Schrdtter ; Adjutanto,
(1) Captain Michaelis, 6th Grenadien, (2) lit lieu-
tenant T. Treackow, 18th Laneen.

1st InFAKTitT Briqadb, MaJor-GenenJ t. Gay I.

Adjutant, lit lieutenant r. Kosa, 9th Grenadiera.

lit (Crown Frinoe) Grenadiers, Colonel ▼. Maiiow -
4 lit Regiment, Iieut.-Colonel Baron v. Meencfaeidt-
Hulleisem.

SivD Ikfaktrt Bjiigade, Major-General v. Falkenstein.

Adjutant, lit Lieut t. Schmeling, 10th Grenadien.

3rd Grenadiers, Colonel v. Legat ...
48rd Regiment, Colonel t. Buise ...

lit Rifle Battalion, Lieut.-Colonel v. Ploetz -

lit Dragoons, (I^rince Albrecht of Pmiiia) Xieut-

Colonel T. Maiiow . - • . .

1st Field Diviiion, Ist Field Artillery Regiment (1 and

a Heavy, 1 and 2 light Batteriei), Migor Munk
Snd Field Pioneer Company lit Corpa with Entrenching

Tool Column, Captain Neumann • . .

3rd Field Pioneer Company, lit Corps, Captain

Riemann ......

No. 1 Sanitary Detachment

Total 1st Infantry Division . . .

3
3

I
1

163

2kd infantry division.

Commander - Major-Qeneral t. Fritselwiti.

Oftoer of General Staff, Captain t. JaroUU i Ad-
Jntants, (i) Captain Piepenberv, 56th Beg^ent,
(9) 2nd Lieutenant t. Sancken, 8u Lanoers.

Smd ImriRTBT BuoAiiB, Major-Qeneral t. Memerty.

A4Jotant, Itt Lientenant ▼. Brandenitdn, 7th Bifle

Battalion.

4th Qrenadiert, Colonel t. Tietsen n. Hennig -

44th Begiment, Colonel t. Boeeking • « -

4Ta Ihyaktbt Bbioadx, Major-Qeneral t.

Zglinitski.

Adjatant, Ist lieutenant Wolff, 1 8th Beghnent

5th Grenadleri, Colonel t. Binem * • •

45th Begiment, Colonel t. Matsechefahl

10th Dtngooni. Colonel Baron t. d. Golts
9rd Field Dirldon, let Field Artillery Begiment (5
•nd 6 Heaty, 6 and 6 Light Batterict), Major

MOlltr

Ill Field Pioneer Company Ist Corpe with light field
bridge train, CapUin Bitter . . .

Bo. 8 Sanitary Detachment

Total of tad Infantry Diyieion

8
8

3
3

Gnna.

COBFS ABTILLEBY.

Colonel Jung^, Commander of the 1st Field Artillery Begiment.

Hotie ArtaUerj Ditiflion, 1st Field Artillery B^lment (2 and 8 Horse

ArtHlery Batteries), M^Jor Geihards
2nd Field Diridon, 1st Field ArtUleiy Begiment (3 and 4 heary, 3 and
4 li^t Batteries), Lieut-Colonel GregoroTius ...

1^. 3 Sanitary Detadunent

12
24

Total of Corps Artillery

Coliiiiins divisioiiy Ist Field Artillery Rwrnent, Major Eaonhoveiu
ArHUery Ammunition Columm^ Nas. I to 5. Infantry Ammu*
nUian ColumnSf Nas. I to 4. Ponioon Column.

Ist Tmin Battalion, Major Ealan t. Hole* .

Seierve Hapiial IkpSt. JBbne DtpSi.. Held Bakery Column.
Brovuion Columns^ Noi. 1 to 5. t^eld HospUah^ No$. 1 to 12.
TVtdn^eteort Squadron. *

Total of l8t Anny Corps : 24 l|»ttalioii8» Infantryy 1 rifle battalioDi 8
sqiiadroDSy 84 snnsi 8 Pioneer companies.

154

umd abmt corps.

Gkitebal CoiiMAm>iK6 : Genekal op Infamtbt ▼• Franbsgkt.

Chiefofthe General Staff: Colonel t. WichmaxuL,

Commander of Artillery : Majaf General ▼« SHeiat, Commander of 2nd
Artillery Brigade,

Commander of Engineers and Pioneers : Major Sandknhl, Commander
of the 2nd Pioneer BaUaSon.

General Staff: (1) Major t. Petersdorff; (2) Captain ▼. Unnihe;

(3) 1st Lieutenant v. Kesslem, 2lit RegimenL

Adjutants : (1) Captain v. Blomberg, 5th Grenadieri; (2) Captain y. d.
Marwitz, 3rii Dragoons ; (8) \st Lieutenant ▼. Naao, 9<A Lancers ;

(4) 1^1 Lieutenant y. Burchardt, A9tk Regiment.

Adjutants to the Commander of Artillery : (1) 1st LieutenatU Crusei
4M Artillery Brigade ; (2) 2nd Lieutenant St^flfen, 2nd Artille^
Brigade.

2nd Engineer Officer : Captain Weber, 1st Engineer Inspection.
Adjutants to the Commander of Engineers : 2nd Lieutenant Mache, 1st
Engineer Inspection,

Commander of the Head-qoatter Guard : 1st Lieutenant Morits, 6th
{Bluchers) Hussars.

3BO INFANTRY DIVISION.

Commander - Major-Qenend t. Hartmann,

Officer of the General Staff, Mijor Stockmarr; Ad-
jutants, (1) Captain y. Benningaen, 44th Regiment i
(2) iBt Lieutenant t. Sichart 1, 8rd Dragooni.

5Tn Invamtry BaiGADB, Major-Qenerai v.

Koblinaki.

Adjutant, 1st Lieutenant y. Frankenberg-Prosehlits,

50th ]Etegiment.
2nd Qienadiers (King Frederick William IV.)i Colonel

T. Ziemietzki .....

42nd Regiment, Colonel ▼. d. Knesebeck

6th Infarthy BaiaADB, Colonel y. d. Decken.

Adjutant, Ut Lieutenant Kleinhana, 75th Regiment

14th Raiment, Colonel v. Yoss • • .

54th ,. Colonel t. Busse

3
S

2nd Rifle Battalion, Major y. Netier ...

3rd Dragoons, Colonel Baron y. Willisen

lit Field Division, 2nd Field Artillery Regiment (1
and 2 Heavy, 1 and 2 Light Batteries), liiljor Baron
Y. Eynatten .....

Ist Field Pioneer Company, Ilnd Corps with light
field bridge train. Captain v. Wissmann
No. 1 Sanitary Detachment.

Total of 8rd Inlantry Division

3
8

155

4Tn INFANTRY DIVISION.
Commander - Lieutenant-Qeneral Hann v.

Ofloer of General Staff, Captain Bote; A^atants,
(1) Captun Milneh, 74th Regiment, (2) Ist Lieo-
tenant v. GMesheim, 4th Laneerc

Itb Infaktbt BniOAoSf Mijor-General da Trossel.

Adjutant, Ist lieutenant Martens, 44th Beghnent.

9th Gfenadicrs, Colonel r. Ferentheil a. Grappenberg
49th Regiment, Lieat«-Colonel Laorin

8tb Ivfantbt Bbioadb, Major-Genend t. Kettler.

AnUntaat, let Lieutenant t. Oertien, SOtfa Regiment.

aiit Regiment, Iient.-Colonel t. Lobenthal -

61st „ Colonel T. Wedell . - -

11th Dragoons, Lleni-Colonel ▼. Gnretxki-Comita -
3rd Field DiTision, 2ttd Field Artfllery Regiment (5

and 6 Heavy, 6 and 6 light Batteries), lieat-Colonel

Baner ......

2nd Field Pkmear Company llth Corps, with En-

treaohing Tool Colomn, Captain Grethen -
3rd Field Pioneer Company Ilnd Corps, Captain

Baleke ......

No. S Sanitary Detachment.

Total of 4th Infantry Division

3
8

Guns.

CORPS ARTILLERY.
Colonel Petsel, Commander of the Field Artillery Regiment

Horse ArUUery Division, Snd Field Artillery Regiment (2 and 3
Horse Artillery batteries), Lieut-Colonel Maschke - - •

2nd Field Divisbn 2nd Field Artillery Regiment (3 and 4 Heavy, 3
and 4 Light Batteries), Mijor HUbner . . . .

No. 3 Sanitary Detachment.

12
24

Total of Corps Artillery

Colnmns Diyision, 2nd Field Artillery Regiment, Major Grabe, 5ih
ArtilUfy Brigade.

Artillery Ammunition Columntj No$* I to 6, Infantry Ammu*
nition Columns^ Not. 1 to 4. Pontoon Column,

2nd Train Battalion, Colonel Schmelzer.

Reserve Hospital Dep6t, Horse Dep6t, Field Bakery Column*
Pioneer Columns^ Nos. 1 to 5. Iielil Hospitals, Nos, 1 ^o 12.
Train^escort SqiLodron.

Total of Und Army Corps : 24 battalions Infantrji 1 rifle battalion^
8 squadrons, 84 gans, 3 Pioneer companies.

156

VlTH ARMY CORPS.
General CoMMAKDma : General of Cayalbt v. TUmplino.

Chief of the General Staff: Colonel v. Salviati.

Comnmnder of Artillery : Colonel v. Ramm, Commander 6th Artillery

Brigade,
Commander of Engineers and Pioneers : Major Albrecht, Commander

of 6th Pioneer Battcilion.
General Staff: (I) Major Rose; (2) Captain Schmidt ▼. Altenstadt ;

(3) Captain MUnuich, 77th Regiment
Adjutants- (1) Major Schach v. Wittenau, 6th Cuirassiers; (2) Major

V. Boeltzig, Z6th Regiment ; (3) \st Lieutenant v. Gk>ldammer,

18/A Regiment; (4) \st Lieutenant ▼. Lierea u. Wilkaui 15I&

Dragoons,
Adjutants to the Commander of Ailillery : (1) \st Lieutenant Kniger,

5th Artillery/ Brigade; (2) 1st Lieutenant Pochhammer^ 6th

Artillery Brigade,
2nd Engineer Officer : Captain Sclioll, 2nd Engineer Inspection.
Adjutant to the Commander of Engineers and Pioneers : 2nd Lieutenant

Maiss, 2nd Engineer Inspection,
Commander of Head-quarter Guard: \st Lieutenant v. Bissing, 6th

Hussars.

llTii INFANTRY DIVISION.

Commander - - Lioatcnaut-Qeneral r. Gordon.

OiBcer of General Staff, Major v. Sehkopp. A^jntants,
(1) lieutenant y. Miiller, 8rd Laneen (Emperor of
Russia) ; (2) Ist Lieutenant Synold t. Sdiux, 4th
Hussars.

21 ST Invantby Buigade, Major General v. Mala-

chowski.

Adjutant, Ist Lieutenant Pedell, 23rd Begiment.

loth Grenadiers, Colonel v. Weller - • .

1 8th Regiment, Colonel Baron v. Bock

22nd Infaktry Brigade, Major-General v.

Eckaiisbci^.

Adjutant, 1st Lieutenant Mimd, 22nd Regiment.

38th Fusiliers, Colonel v. Schmcling - . .

51st Regiment, Colonel Knipping ...

Cth Rifle Battalion, ^Injor v. Walther ...

8th Dragoons, Lieutenant^Colonel y. Winterfeld

Ist Field Division, 6th Field Artillery Beffiment,

(1 and 2 Heavy, 1 and 2 Ught Batteries), Major v.

lilienhoff-Zwowitzky . . . .

'3rd Field Pioneer Company, VI. Corps, Captain Glum
No. 2 Sanitary Detachment

Total 1 1th Infantry Divifion -

3
8

3
3

167

ISxH INFANTRY DIVISION.
Gommander • - lieatenaat-Gtiiend t. Hoffinann.

OiBoer of General Staff; Ki^or Kenler. A/dQntanta,
(1) Captain t. d. Lanken, 2nd (Ring IVederiek Wil-
liam I v.) Grenadier!} (2) Ist Lieutenant Engel-
mann, I., 62nd Regiment.

SSrd IrarAxvTRT Brioadb, M^or-General Gftndell.
A4}ntaDt, let Lieutenant Thiel, 6th Qrenadien.

S2nd Regiment, Colonel r. Quistorp • . •

62nd „ Colonel T. Bessel - • .

24th Ikfamtbt Brioads, KijorwQeoeral t. Fabeck.

A4}utant, l8t Lieutenant Bublita, 25th Regiment.

28rd Regiment, Colonel t. Brieaen
n

68rd

Colonel T. Thielau

16th Draffoons, Colonel ▼. BoMa . • .

Srd Field Dirlaioo, 6th Field Artillery Regiment

(6 and 6 Heavjr, 5 and 6 Light Batteries), Mijor

Blooh T. Bottmte • • - . .

in Field Pioneer Company, Vl. Coipf,inth Uirht field

tektee tnb, Captain Klefeker - .

2iid Aid Pioneer Company} YL Corps, with Bn-

tienohiBg Tool Column, Captun Gohl
Na 1 Saniteiy Detachment

Total of 12th Infimtry Division -

8
8

I
1

CORPS ARTILLERY.
Colonel Arnold, Commander of 6th Field Artinery Regiment

H. A. Dividon, 6th Field Artillery Regiment (1 and 2 H. A. batteries).

Ifmor T* GarcaynskI - - • . ■ . ^ .

Snd Add DlTislon, 6th Held Artillery Regiment (8 and 4 Heavy S and I

Lidit Batteries), laeutenant^lon/l l]^Uer . "«» * '^••▼y. » and 4
No. 8 Sanitary Detachment

Total of Corps Artillery - . .

Guns.

12
24

Columng DiTision 6th Field Artillery Regiment : Captain Tomitias.
Anillery Ammumtian Columns, Not. 1 to 6. Infantry Ammu-
nition Columns, Nos. 1 to 4. Pontoon Column.

6tli Train Battalion : Lieutenant- Colonel Arent.

Reserve Hospital DepSt. Horse Dep6t. Field Bakery Column
Provision Columns Nos. 1 to 5. field Hospitals No. \ to 12.

Total of Vlth Army Corps : 24 battaUons Infantry, 1 rifle battaUon
8 Bqnadrons, 84 gans, 3 Pioneer companies. *

158

Squadrons.

18T CAVALRY DIVISION.*
Commander - - Lieatenant-Gcncral v. HarUnami.

Officer of General Staff, Major v. Saldem. Adjutants, (1)
Captain Baron v. Eiehstedt-Peterswaldt, Cavalry of 84th
Reserre Landwehr Battalion ; (2) 2nd Lieutenant Count
I. Eulenberg, Ist Guard Dragoons.

Attached, Major-General Kmg t. Nidda. Adjutant, Ui
Lieutenant ▼. Massow, 11th Dragoons.

18T Cavalry Brioadk, Major-General y. Lfideriti.

Adjutant, Ist lieutenant t. Jerin, 6th Hussars.

Snd Cuirassiers (Queen's), Colonel t. Pfuhl ...

4th Lancers, Lieutenant-Colonel v. Radedtc

9th Lancers, Lieutenant-Colonel v. Kleist . . -

Snd Catalrt Brigade, Major-General Banmgarth.

A(^utant, l:it Lieutenant Dallmer, 14th Lancers.

drd Cuirassiers (Count Wrangel), Colonel v. Winterfeld
8th Lancers, Colonel ▼. Below . . . -

18th Lancers, Lieutenant-Colonel r. Rosenberg

No. 1 n. A. battery, 1st Field Artillery Regiment, Captain
V Selle.

Total of Ist Cavalry Division -

2kd CAVALRY DIVISION.f

Commander - - Jjicutcnaut- General Count y.
Stolbcrg-Wemigerode.

Officer of General Staff, Captain Kihler, 8th Dragoons. Ad-
jutants, (1) Captain Count v. Ballcstrem, 1st Body-guard
Cuirassiers ; (S) Ist Lieutenant t. Holwede, 6th Hussars.

8rd Cavalry Brigade, Major-General v. Colomb.

Adjutant, 1st Lieutenant r. IMttwitc, 8th Dragoons.

Ist Body-guard Cuirassiers, Colonel v. Oppen

2nd Lancers, Lieutenant-Colonel Rode . . .

4Tn Cavalry Brigade, M»jor-Gencral Baron v. Barnekow.

Adjutant, 1st Lieutenant v. Trcu, 2nd Body-guard Ilussnrs.

1st Body-guard Hussars Colonel v. Hanstein

5th (Blucher'.s) Hussars - - . - -

5tii Cavalry Brioadk, Mnjor-Gcneral v. Baumbach.
Adjutant, Ist Lieutenant v. d. Osten, 12th Hussars.
4th Hussars, Major v. Brozowski . . . .

6th Hussars, Licuteuant-Colonel v. Griivcuitz

No. 1 H. A. battery, 2nd Field Artillery Regiment, Captain
v. Ekensteen --.-..

No. 3 H. A. battery, Gth Field Artillery Regiment, Captain
Wcltz

Total of 2nd Cavalry Division -

Quna.

—

....

-.•

—

** One Provision Column and half a Sanitary Detachment of the Ist Army Corps
were attached to this Divisioo.

t One Provision Column and one Field Hospital of the Vlth Corps were attached
to this Division.

159

17th infantry division.

Commftnder - Ideatenant-Qeneral y. Schimmelmann

Officer of Ckneral Staff, Mf^or Fiflcber. A^utants,
(1) 1ft Lieatenant t. Balliueck, Ist Engineer In-
spection ; (S) 1st Lieatenant t. Liyoniiis, 76th Begi-
ment

88bd Imfavtbt Bbioadb, Mijor-General Baron

T. Kottwits.

Adjutant, 2nd lieatenant ▼. Manstetn, 72nd Regiment
76th Regiment, Lieatenant-Colonel t. d. Osten

76th

Colonel ▼. Conta

84Tn Infantrt Brioadb (Grand Dacby of Meck-
lenborg), Colonel r. lianteuffel.

Adjutant, l8t Lieatenant y. Oidtmann, 4tfa (Queen's)

Qrenadier Guards.

89th Grenadiers, CSolonel ▼. Eleist - -

90th Fusiliers, Lieatenant-Colonel v. Fapstein

14th Rifle Battalion, M^or y. Gaza •

17th Catalbt Bbioade, li^or-General y. Ranch.
Adjutant, 1st Lieatenant y. Bfllow, 2nd Lancers.

17ih Dragoons, C!olonely. Kahlden ...

18th „ Lieatenant-Colonel y. Rathenow

nth Lancers, Colonel Augustus Count a. Solms-
Wildenfels.

No. 1 H. A. Battery, 9th Field Artillery Regiment.
Captain Pratsch.

3rd Field Diyiston (5 and 6 Heayy, 5 and 6 Light Bat-
teries), and No. 3 H. A. Battery, 9th Field Artillery
Regiment, Major Kossel ....

1st Field Pioneer Company, IXth Corps, vith liirht
field hridffe train, Captahi LiHe - . ^ .

Part of Columns Diyision, 9th Field Artillery Regi-
ment,—Artillery Ammutdtion Columns, Nos. 4 and 5,
Infantry Ammunition Columns, Nos. 8 and 4. Pon-
toon Column.

Part of 9th Train Battalion—

Nos. 8 and 8 Sanitary Detachments. Proyision Columns,
Not. 4 and 5. Field Hospitals, Nob. 7 to 12.

— Total of 17th Inftntry Diyision

3
3

8
3

4
4
4

160

QUARD LANDWEHR DIVISION.

Commander - lieat 0«Deral Baion y. Loen.

Oflieer of General Staff, Captain Henraith t. Bitten-
feld, 4tli Foot Guards. Adjatanta, (1) Captain t.
Yaaelstein. Fnsilier Guards ; (2) Ist lieutenant t.
Crane, attached 4th Foot Guards.

Itt Guard LAitDtrKim Brioadb, Colonel Girodx

Y. Gaudy.

Adjutant, 1st Lieutenant y. Boon, Fusilier Guards.

Ist Guard Landwehr B<^ment, Colonel y. Plehwe •
2nd „ f, „ Colonel y. Grawert -

2nd GuABD Lavdweur Brigade, Colonel y. Roehl.

A4intant, 1st Lieutenant y. CapriYi, 2nd (Emperor
Francis) Grenadier Guards.

Ist Guard Grenadier Landwehr Regiment, Lieut.-

Colonel V. Itauchaupt.
2nd Guard Grenadier Landwehr Regiment, Colonel

Defies Y. Glisscsynski.

2nd Reserve Hussars, Major Count a. Dohna -
CombiDed Artillery Division (1 and 2 Ueavy, Light

Reserve Battery of the Guard Corps), Major v.

Schweiser (unattached) . . . .

1st Gaiiison Pioneer Company, Xth (}orps. Captain

Peru .----.

Pontoon Column Xth Corps, Ist Lieutenant Bertram.

Total of Guard Landwehr Division

1st LANDWEHR DIVISION.

C!ommander - Major-General v. Tresekow.

Officer of General Staff, Captain v. Schultsendorff.
Adjutants (1) Captain Stoermer, 43rd Regiment;
(2) 1st Lieutenant v. Bassewits, 2nd Gienadien
(King Frederick WilUam IV.)

First Landwehr Buioade, Ck>lonel Baron v. Bud-

denbrock.

Adjutant, 1st lieutenant v. Studnita, 49th Regiment.

1st Combined Pomeranian Landwehr Regiment (No.

14/21), O>lonel Zitsewitz - . . .

2nd Combined Pomeranian Landwehr Regiment (No.

(21/54), Colonel V. Osttowski

3
8

8
8

3
3

161

Sbcokd Lamowbbr Brioadb, Major-Geneial v.
Ayemann (unattached).

Adjutant, Itt Lieotenant Naandorff, 98rd Begiment.

3rd Combined Pomeranian Landwehr Re^ment (No.

26/61), O>lonel t. Berger.
4th Uombined Pomcraniiui Landwehr Regiment (No.

61/66), Colonel Gtericke.

Snd Resenre Liaoen, O>lonel y. Bredow (unattached)
Combined Artillery Diviaion ^1 Liffht Reeenre Bat-
tery, Ilnd Corps ; 1 and S Ifght Reserre Batteries
of IXth Corps), Major Weigelt, 9th Artillery
Brigade ......

Ist Garrison Pioneer Company, Ilnd Corps, Captain
Roese ------

Total of Itt Landwehr Diyision

Snd LANDWEHR DIVISION.

Commander - Biajor-Genend ▼. Sdchow.

OiBcer of General Staf^ Captain Richter, S5th Fusi-
liers. Adjutants, (1) Captam v. Heynits, 24 th
Regiment; (2) 2nd Lieutenant Kdpke, 35th Fusi-
liers.

3rd Landwbhb Brigade, Colonel ▼. ArnoldL

Adjutant, 2nd Lieutenant Pauli, 48th Landwehr

Begiment

1st Combined Bradenbuig Landwehr Regiment (No.

8/48), lieut-Oilonel y. Btftlpnagel.
2nd (Combined Brandenburg Landwehr Regiment (No.

12/52), Colonel t. Kettler.

4th Landwsbk Bbioadb, Colonel Banisch.

Adjutant, Ist lieutenant Trippell, 20th Landwehr

Regiment

8rd Combined Brandenburg Landwehr Regiment (No.

20/60), lieut-ColoiMl Bteinfeld.
4th Combined Bnadenboig Landwehr Regiment (No.

24/64), Colonel y. Krohn (unattached).

4th Reserye Laaesrs, MtAor y. Bomsdoiff

Combfaied ArtUlerr Diyislon (Heayy, 1 and 2 Light

Batteries, Xtfi (Jmrpa), M^or Caspari, 7th Artillery.

Brkade ------

Snd (wrison Pioneer Company, IXth 0>rps, Captain

Total of Snd Landwehr Diyidon

29982.

3
3

4
4

18 —

162

3rd LANDWEHR DIVISION.

Commander - Major-Oenend Baron Schnlcr v.

Senden.

Oficers of General Staff, Captain v. Rhein. Adjn-
tanu, (I) l8t Lieutenant Mache, 6th Grenadien;
(a) Ist Lieutenant Reimer, 5th Grenadiers.

5th Laadwihs Brioadb, Major-General ▼. Ruville.

Adjutant, 2nd Lieutenant Ludera, 6th Landwehr

Regiment

Combined West Prussian Landwehr Regiment (No.

6/18), Lieut-Colonel ▼. Brandenstein.
Combined Lower Silesian Landwehr Regiment (No.

18/46), Lieut-Colonel ▼. OMel (unattached).

6th Landwbiir Brigade, Colonel Baron ▼. Qilsa.

Adjutant, 1st Lieutenant Baron t. Massenbach, I.,
18th Landwehr Regiment.

1st Combined Poscii Landwehr Regiment (No. 19/59)

Licut.-Colonel Baron v. Boenigk.
2Dd Combined Posen Landwehr Regiment (No. 58/59)

Lieut-Colonel v. Wittgenstehi (unattached).

1st Reserve Dragoons, Mujor v. Keltsch

Combined Artillery Division (1 and 2 Heavy, Light
Reserve Battery, Vth Corps), ICijor v. Schwdn-
ichen, 6th Artillery Brigade ...

3rd Garrison Pioner CJompany, Vth Corps, Captain
WestphaL* . . - - -

Total of 3rd Landwehr Division

3
8

3
3

No. 3 FIELD RAILWAY DIVISION^

Director : Commissioticr of Works^ Simon.
Company Commander : Isi Lieulenani Burger, Zrd Landwehr Baiialum,

No. 4 FIELD RAILWAY DIYISION.f
C/Ommandcr : I si Lieutenant Friedheim, 3r<f Engineer Inspection*

* The Srd Garrison Pioneer Company of Vth Army Corps was removed from the
3rd Landwehr Division on the 5th August

\ Nos. 3 and 4 Field Railway Divisions belonged to the armies of operation on the
Rhine but remained at the disposal of U.M. the King's Head-quarter staff.

163

GOVERNMENT-GENERAL in the Districto of the Ist, iind, IXth,

and Xth Anny Corps.

Goveknob-Gbnebal : Genebal of Infaktby, Vogel v. Falckensteim.

Chief of the General Staff : Cohmel Veith.

Artilleiy Officer: Lieuimiani'' Colonel Rihheatro^i aitached Guard Field
Artillery Regimetit.

Ist Engineer Officer : Colonel Dietrichi Inspector of the 2nd Pioneer
Inspectwn.

General Staff : (1) Major t. Adler, Staff of Engineer Corps ; (2) Captain
K1ihn$ (8) 1st Lieutenant v. Fnnk, 60th Regiment; (4) Captain-
Lieutenant Zeinbschy Navy.

Adjutants: (1) Captain Count v. Kleist, Cavalry of 2nd Guard Land*
wehr Regiment ; (2) CapiainyogeiiY.FB\ckcnsteinfS2nd Regiment;
(3) 1st Lieutenant v. StUlpnagel^ Zrd Foot Guards; (4) \st Lieu*
tenant Krahmer, 2Sth Regiment,

2nd Engineer Officer : Captain Billerbeck, 9rd Engineer hispection.

Adjutant to the Ist Engineer Officer : 2nd Lieutenant Bctzhold, 2nd
Engineer Inspection.

At disposal : Judge Hoppenstedt.

Attached for duty : (i) Rear-Admiral^ Prince William of Hesse (h.p.)
(2) Lieutenant' Colonel^ Prince Charles v. Lichnowsky, attached to
the Army.

Commander of the Head-quarter Guard : Captain v. Knoblauch (re-
tired).

Genebal Cobiuamd ov the Mobilised Tboops witiiin the Govebn-

BiBNT Rayon.*

Genebal Cobimandino : H.R.H. Fredebick Fbancis Gband Duke of

Mecklendubg-Schwebin.

Chief of the General Staff : Colonel v. Erenski.

Commander of Artillery : Lieutenant-Colonel Wiebe, Ist Artillery
Brigade.

Commander of Engineers and Pioneers : Colonel Braun, Itispector of
\st Pioneer Inspection.

General Staff: (1) Major Strempel ; (2) Captain Count v. Schlicffen ;
(3) Captain v. Vietinghoff, 9th Artillery Brigade.

Adjutants : Captain am Ende, 76lA Regiment ; (2) Captain v.Leithold,
attached Bth Body-guard Grenadiers; (3) Captain v. Kleist^
attached A.th Dragoons ; (4) \st LietUenant v. YLotte^ Reserve of
Gardes du Corps.

Adjutant to the Commander of Engineei's and Pioneei's : 1st Lieutenarit
V. RoRsing, 1 St Engineer Inspection,

* On the iBt August the 17th Infaotiy DiTision and the 2nd Landwehr DiTision
were under the direct orders of the General commanding; the Gnard Landwehr
DiTision was also expected in a few days, and the 1st Landwehr DiTision somewhat
later.

](>4

GOVERNMENT-GENERAL in the districts of tho Ilird and IVth

Army Corps.

Goveunou-Gknebal : General of Infantky v. Bonin, King's

Aule-de- Camp,

General Stuli': LicutciuuU' Colonel v. Bei^r.

Adjutants : (1) Captain Olberg, aiiached 4ih Guard GretuMtUcrs ; (2)

1st Lieutenant Count v. Wilamowitas-MoUendorf, Cavalry of 2nd

Guard Laiidtvehr Regimefit.

GOVERNMENT-GENERAL in the districts of the Vth and Vlth

Army Corps.

GtOYERNOB-GeNEBAL : LiEUTENANT-GeNEBAL v. L5WENFELU.

General Staff: Major Szmula.

Adjutant : Captain v. Versen, attached 3rd Grenadiers,

GOVERNMENT-GENERAL in Uiu dibUicts of the Vllth, Vllltk,

and Xlth Army Corps.

GovkrnoR'Gkneual : Gemeual of Infantry Herwarth v.

BiTTENFELD.

Chief of the General Staff: Lieutenani- Colonel v. Scheliha.

Greneral Staff: (1) Major Strecciua ; (2) Captain Edler v. d. Planitz ;
(3) \st Lieiit€7iant Frittwitz v. Gaffron» 1st Grenadier Onards
{Emjyeror Alexander).

Adjutants: (1) Captain Schmidt v. Knobelsdorff, SM i7iu«<ir« ; (2)
Captain v. Schell, IIM Artillery Brigade; (8) Captain v. Corls-
hauson, attached 3rd Lancers (Emperor of Russia); (4) \st
Lieutefumt v. Bricsen, Cavalry of SO^/t Lafidwehr RegimaU ; (5)
2nd Lieutenant v. d. Lippe, 69//i Regiment,

GOVERNMENT-GENERAL in the dbtrict of the Xllth Aimy Con>s

(Kingdom of Saxony).

Goveunou-Genkbal: Lieutenant-General v. Fabrice, ifoyai Saxon

fVar Minister,

Genehd Staff: Major Ileydenreich, War Ministry,
For Employment: Captain v. Egidy, \0\st Grenadiers (King IVHUam
(f Prussia).

GOVERNMENT-GENERAL for the Kingdom of Wiirttemberg.

Governor-General: Lieutenant-General v. Suckow, Royal

Wurttemberg War Minister,

AdjutiUit : Major v. Steinheil, War Ministry,

LONDON:

rriiited by GEoudi: E. Eyub aitd William Spottibwoooe,
PrinU)n to tku Quoen's most ExccUout Mi^esty.

For Uor Majoiity'ti Stationery Oflloe.

[P. 1«0.— 1000.— 10/78.]

88'

APPENDIX VL

Head-qaarters of His Majest;^ the King.
Ik order to ensure nnif ormity in the transaction of business between
the head-quarters staff of Anmes and the royal head-quarters, it is

(1.) That every Army head-quarters staff should not only r^rt

* immediately by telegraph all important occurrences, but,

even if noUiing fresh has happened, should communicate l^

telegraph with this oflBce at least twice daily (as a rule m.

the mortung and afternoon), any changes in the head-

fuarters of me Armies^ of the Army Corps, or of the Oavalry
MTisions.
(2.) That every official letter should, in addition to the date, have

the hour of despatch marked upon it.
(8.) That in all correspondence, whether by telegram or letter, in
reference to despatches or letters emanating from this office,
the journal number of the despatch or letter should always
be quoted.

(Signed) y. Podbielski.

Uain^ 8rd August, 1870.

IVEB8ITI

»«

1 ^

APPENDIX YIL

ARMY OBDER.

Ilead-quarters, Winuweiler, 4th August, 1870.

Accoixliug to iDtelligence received from the cavalry, the eueiny is
in considerable force on the banks of the Saar beyond Saarbriicken
(Prossard*s Corps).

Our Lst Army is this day on the line Lebach-Ottwciler, with its
head-quartera at Tholey. The Ilird Ainny has this day a-ossed the
frontier of Alsace.

The Ilnd Army will, in the course of the next few days, effect its
concentnition on die lino Neunkirchen-Zweibriicken as follows : —

IIIrd Army Corps.

On the 5th August the IIIrd Anny Cori)8 will move its head-
Quarters and leading troops as far as St. \Vendel, and will be quartered
nve miles to the north and oast of the place.

On the 6th August the Corps will march to Neunkirchen, to which
place the 5th Infantry Division precedes it on the 5th,

On the 7th August the IIIrd Army Coi*p8 will push forward aa
advanced guard as far as Sulzbach, whilst the 5th and Gth Gavaliy
Divisions will still furnish the out(x>st8 in the direction of the enemy
until they receive my orders relieving them from this duty.

This order with regard to the cavalry is to apply to all Corps.

Xtii Army Corps.

On the 5th August the Xth Army Corps will march its leading
troops as far as Konken, vi& Cusel, the rear of the column if possible to
Uimet. Ilead-quarters to Cusel.

On the Gth August the head of the Corps will reach Klein Ottweiler,
head-quarters to Waldmohr, rear of colunm as much closed up as
possible.

On the 7th August the Corps will concentrate at Bexbach on the
railway, and will throw forward an advanced guard as far as St»
Ingbert on the 8th August.

IVtu Army Corps.

On the 5th August the IVth Army Corps will move the 8th
Infantry Division to Zweibriicken, the rest of ^e Corps to Ilomburgi
to which place the head-quarters wull be shifted.

On the Gth August the Corps will advance to Zweibriicken (head-
quarters) and pu^ forward an advanced guard on a line with Neu-
Hombach.

Guard Corps.

On the 5th August the Guard Corps will move the head of its column
to MUhlbach, the liead-^uarters to Landstuhl, and close up the rear c^
the column as far as Kaiaerslautem. The district northward of the line
of railway IIochspeyer-Kaiserslautem-Hanptstuhli with the exception

85*

of the town of Eaiflerslantern, is not to have troops quartered in it.
The Cavuhy Division of the Guard will also move forward iu the
manner thus indicated.

On the 6th August the Guard Corps will reach Homburg with the
head of its column, the rear closiug up to Hauptstuhl ; head-quarters,
Homburg.

On the 7th August the main body will reach Bliescastel, and on the
following day will push forward two advanced guards to Assweiler and
into the valley of the BUes.

IXtii Army Corps.

On the 5th August the IXth Army Corns will advance into the
rayon on the right bank of the Lautor between Katzweiler and
Kaiserslautem, exclusive of the latter town, which is assigned to the
Guard Corps, aud will be quai*tered within a range of 4^ miles N.E. of
the Lauter. Head-quarters to be shifted to Otterberg.

On the 7th August the IXth Corps must reach the rayon included
between its advanced troops at Walumohr (where its head.quarters will
be) and the rear at Ober-Miesau and Nieder-Miesau. I leave it to the
AnnY Corps to decide by reconnaissances whether part of the Coips
can be marched from Otterberg to that place by the north of the
Beichswald and the Landstuhl moor. On the 6th August, however,
the main road may be made use of and troops quartered iu the rayon
from Hauptstuhl up to and inclusive of Landstuhl.

The arrangements adopted bv the Corps for the march and the
position of its head-quarters on the 6th is to be reported to-morrow.

XHtii (Royal Saxok) Asosy Corps.

On the 5th Au^t the Xllth Army Corps will reach Enkenbacb,
Mehlingen, Neimkirchcn* with the head of its column ; head-quarters
Enkeubach.

On the 6th August the Corps will advance to Kaiserslautem (head-
quarters) and the immediate vicinity on the right bank of the Lauter.

On the 7th August, head of column to Miihlbach ; rear at Land-
stuhl, where the head-quarters will be.

On the 8th August the Corps advances to Homburg (head-quarters
also).

The Guard, IXth and Xllth Ai*my Corps, which move by one and
the same road, forming a defile 23 miles long, will leave behind the
second line of trains and the heavy baggage in to-day's rayons, and
will endeavour to avoid any unnecessary intervals in their columns of
march.

The town of Kaiserslautem is not to be passed by the second line of
trains before the 7th August, and then as follows : From 4 to 8 a.m., by
the trains of the lYth Army Corps only (so far as those deficient have
reached that place) ; from 8 to 12 a.m., by the trains of the Guard
Corps ; from 12 a.m. to 4 p.m., hy those of the IXth Army Corps ; and
from 4 to 8 p.m., hy those of the Xllth Amiy Corps. The maintenance
of order at this point and on the road to Homburg will be the first test
of the field gendarmerie in their duties.

M^ headquarters move to Kaiserslautem on the 5th August, where

* Kennklrchcn near Ober-Mehlingcn.

at 5 pjn. offioera from the IVtb, Guard, IXth and Sltb Anny CbqpB
will atteud to receiye orders.

On and after the 6th August my head-quarters wiU be at Homburg,
to which place an officer from each Corps, and from the 6tb and 6tii
Cavalry Division, will be sent daily to receive orders.

All the lines of relays are to be called in eariy to-morrow morning.

From the 6th August, the Etappe Sand will oe kept open for the
reception of that part of the Ist Army Corps disembarfang at Kaisers-
lantern on its march to Thdey, and from tne 8th August the EUf^
St. Wendel. These Etappen are not to be occupied by other Corps.

That part of the Corps which disembarks at Birk^eld may be now
quartered on the perfectly clear road towards Tholey.

(Signed) Prinob Fbsdxuok Chabus.

General of Oavaliy.

APPENDIX VIII.

Order op Maboh of the Vth, XIth, and IInd Bavarian
Army Corps on the 4th August, 1870.

Vth ABMT CORPS.

lilBVTESkST'QBVERAL T. ElBCHBACn.

Advanced Guard : (17th Infantry Brigade)i Major Oeneral v, Saiid-
rart, Commander of the 9th Infantry Division.

Advance : Colonel r. Rex, Commander 3rd baltaltou 6Sth Regin.cnt
(Posen.)*

1st squadron 4th Dragoons (Silcsian), Captain v. Trr)rla

ffen. Treyden.
2nd squadron, 4th Dragoons (Silesian), Captain v. Rosen.
1st company, 5th Rifle Battalion (Silesian), Captain v.

Schyremler.
4th company, 5th Rifle Battalion (Silesian), 1st laentennut

V. Gersdorlf.
1st Battalion 58th Regiment (Poscn\ Major v. Gronefold
1st Light Battery, 5th Field Artilleiy Regiment (Lower

Silesian), Captam Michaelis.
Fusilier Battalion, 58th Regiment (Posen), Major v. Klass.
Detachment 2nd Field Pioneer Company.

Main Body of Adva>'Cei> Guabd : Colonel v. Botlimer, Commander 17tli
Infantry Brigade.

Fusilier Battalion, 59th Regiment (Posen) Major Cunmie.
2nd Light Battciy, 5th Field Artillery Regiment (Iiower

Silesian), 1st Lieutenant Haupt.
59th Regiment (Posen), f 1st Battalion, Major v. Stosch.

Colonel Eyl - - \ 2nd Battalion, Mcnor Ehrhardt.t
2nd and 8ra cos., 5th Rifle Battalion (Silesian), Major

Count Waldersee.
8rd and 4th squadrons, 4th Dragoons (Silesian), Lieutenant

Colonel V. Schenck.
2nd Field Pioneer Company and Entrenching Tool Coliuno

Captain Hummell.
Section of No. 1 Sanitary Detachment.

* The 2nd Battalion 58tb Regiment, Major B5ttelior was at Annwoiler.

t The 2Dd Battalion 69th Regiment was left in a aupporting position on the
laft bank when the advanoed guard was crossing the Lauter, and onlj rejoined it«
xai^ment towards the dose of the action.

88»

Maix Boiiy: Lieiiti naot-General v. Strlimidt, Gftiiimaiidcr 10th In-

faotry Dividioiu

(I.) ISrn Im AJnrRT BnaAPX: MajoT'OeDenl t. ToigU-BheU.

•-4U Tf ^ * /T f^^ Battalion, Major Schulz.

4.th Reffiment (Lower I 2„d Battalion, Marv-Mittelstaedt.
bili-f«iaij). Colonel v.< t, •■• o ** ■• -^r • \t-

BurghoiT - - V" elifeW '' ^' "'

Snd Heavy Battt-n-, 5th Field Artillery Reginieut (Lower

Silesiaii), Captain Anders.
l.st Heavy Batter}-, 5th Field Artillery Regiment (Lower

Sil(.*sian). Captaiii Matschke.
7tli Kind's 4jrenadi<.'r flHt Battalion, Major v. Unnih.

I«r«riiiiriit (Wot J 2nd Battalion, Major Sehanmaiiu.

I'nis>iaii), (*ol(iiiel| Fusilier Battalion, Major v. Kaisen-

V. Koc-then - - L l^erg".
Stjction of No. 1 Sanitary iK-tacluiu-nt and 2 Field Ho^5Jlitals.

(2.) CoKi'if Abtillkkt: Li« utciiant- Colonel Kbhler.
2nd Field Division, 5tli /-Srd h. b., Captain Aletzke I.

Field Artilleiy ]«e;d* I 4th h. b., Captain LilieuhoiT Zwo-

ment (l>ower Sile-J witzki.

sian), Lientenant- I 3i'd 1. b.. Captain Knaack.

dilom-l V. BoiTies. L4th 1. b., Captain Habelmann.
llor.* Artillery Divisio... Stin ^^ ^ ^ ^ j„ ^^.^„j

Field Art.) leor Kegi.uei.t I 3^ ^^ ^ 'captain v. Corvi-

No. 3 Sanitary Deta^-lnnent.
(3.) lOrn Infatvtry Dmsiox : (12 battalions, 4 squadrons, 4 battcrios.)

Xlxn ABMY COBPS.

IjIeutexaxt-Gexbral t. Bosb.

Advanced Guaud : (42nd Infantry Brigade), Major-General v. Thile.

4th squadron, 14th Hussars (Hessian), Captain v. Lierea u.

AVilkau.
Fusilier Battalion, 82ud Regiment (Hessian), Major v. Tschir-

schky.
2nd Light Battery, 11th Field Artillery Regiment (Hessian),

Captain T(-ii1k'1.
1st Heavy Battery, 11th Field Artillery Regiment (Hessian),

Ca])tain Neumann.
82nd Regiment (HesO ^^^ Battalion, Major Count v. Sehlieffen.

BoItIcs ^' j 2nd Battalion, Maj. Baron v. Henneberg.

^oii T> * /v^« f Ist Battalion, Major Heye.

88th Regnnent (Nt^s. I 2^^^ Battalion, lieutenant - Colonel v.
sau) Colonel Kohn^ Zglinitzki.
V. J asKi. j^ Fusilier Battalion, Major Baron v. Hilgers.

2nd and drd squadrons, 14th Hussars (llessian), (Tolonel v.
Bemuth.

Detachment 1st Field Pioneer Company, with 4 fafts of bridg-
ing material.

Section of No. 1 Sanitary Detachment

89*
Main Bodt:

(1) 2l8T IvwAJmY BxTXBiOH ; Lieutenaiit-Genenl t. Schaohtmejer.

(4l8t Infantry Brigade, Colonel v. Eoblinsld.)

Ist sopadrony 14th Hussars (Hessian), Cu>tain v. Oolomb.
11th Kifle Battalion (Hessian^, Major v. Johnston.

1«* JS" ^^^^^"^ /A*^ ^^^^llst 1. b., Captain Normason.
M^Z US^' ^"""^' h-^ ^^ < Ca^un Engelhard

Colonel Grolmann. ^^^^ Battalion, Mijor v. Grote.
80thFasiIiers(Hes« fist Battalion, Lieut.-Golonel v. Oetingcr.

sian), Colonel v.< 2nd Battalion, Major y. Schon.

Colomb. (^8rd Battalion, Major t. Below.

Ist Field Pioneer Company, with light field bridge train. Captain

▼• Hollir n. Ponientoetz.
Section of No. 1 Sanitary Detachment.

(2) COBPS Abtillsbt : Colonel r. Oppeln-Bxtmikowiki (6 bstteiM.)*

(8) Stun iHTism Dimiov : Lienteiiant-GkiMral r. Gendozff (18 batUIiont,
4 tqnadroiii^ 4 lMitteriet.)t

nxD BATABIAK ABICT COBPS.

OnrBBAL 07 IVTAimiT, BlTTBB T. HABnCAVV.

(1) 4th Ikfaktbt Division: Lieutenant-General Connt v. Bothmer.

Adtihcid GviBD I Colonel Mdhlbaiur, Commander 6th Begiment (Qnnd
Pake of Hene).

8rd sqnadron, 2nd Chevanzlegers Begiment (Taxis), Captain
Schmanss.

10th Rifle Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel ▼• Heckel.

6th batterv (6-pr.), 4th Artillery Begiment (King's), Cap-
tain A. Bauer.

8rd Battalion, 5th Begiment (Grand Duke of Hesse), Major
Baron ▼• Feilitzsch.

4th squadron, 2nd Chevauxlegers Begiment, Captam ▼.
Ellenrieder.

BiQBT FLAVxnro-DiTAOincnnF t 8rd Battelion 9tli Begiment (Wrede),
Major Beron t. Ebner.

* Of the bone aitillerj division (Ifaior Knipfer), one battery (let) was oom*
Wf^nAfA hf Captain 8ilTios» the other (Bra) by Captain OhneiOTge. JBoth took part
iatheaetion*

t The a2ad Dirinon tent into the Bienwald a left flanking detaehment eon*
riitbig of ftid Battalion 94th Bttrfment (Thttringian) under Mjor ▼. Wuesow and
the ted equadiOB Uth Huenn (Heerian).

90*

Hinr BosT : 8th Ihvavtbt BBxaASi : * Major-Q^ncrol IbiDiiifir.

1st Battalion, 7th Begiment (Hohenhausen), Gaptaia Koh*
lermanii.

2nd Battery (4-pr.), 4th Artillery Regiment (King^s), Gap-
tain Wurm.

8rd Battalion, 1 1th Regiment (v. d. Tann), Major y. Gropper.

8rd Battalion, 14th Begiment (Hartmann), Major R^cb ▼.
Weiasenfels.

7th IvviVTBT BBlGiPXxt Major-Cknenl r. ThierddL

Ist Battalion, 6th Regiment (Grand Duke of Hease), Major

Gebhard.
2nd Battalion, 5th Regiment, Major Goes.
6th Rifle Battalion, Major Gariea.
Ist and 2nd squadrons 2nd Ghevauxlegers Regiment (Taxis),

Golonel Uoradam.
2nd Sanitary Company.

(2.) Sbd iKFAinnY Division: Lieutenant-General v. Walthcr(13 bat-
talions, 4 squadi'ons, 3 batteries)4

(3.) Abtillery Reserve Division: Colonel v« Pillement (7 batteries).

(4.) Lanceb Bbigade: Major-General Baron v. Mulzcr (8 squadrons,

1 battery).S

* Tho 3rd Battalion let Regiment (King'b) \rluch belonged to the 8th Brigicle,
had not been able to readi tho Dmsion, and waa xnarching nith the 3rd BiTiaton.
The 6th Biflo Battalion, Lieut-Colonel Baron t. Gumpenburg, was atill on detach*
ment in the mountains.

t Tlio let and 2nd Battalions 9th Begiment, Hsjors Loe and r. Parseral (7th
Brigade 8rd BiTision), were on outpobt duty on the morning of the 4th August ; the
Ibnner joined its Division at Otterbaoh, Beehtcnbach and Ikhveigen, the other just
before Weissenburg.

t The 8rd Division Tins ttill deficient of the Srd batterj (4-pr.) 4th ArtiUeiy
regiment ; a battery from Bothmer's Ditision marched with the Srd Di? ision ; tho
battalions of the 6tli Regiment (Colonel Bdsmiller) were commanded by Majors Keok,
Damboer and Bail.

§ 2 squadrons of the 6t1i CheTauilegers Begiment were still in the mountains,
the other two were called in on tho morning of tho ith from their late positions'
on outpost duty to form connecting posts, &c.

APPENDIX IX.

Return op Casualties in the Action at Weissbnburg,

vth army corps.

6«iienl Commaiiding ...

Staff of 9th Infantry DlTidon
68tli Begiment* Itt Battalion

tt n Fu. Baittallon
eech Bagiment, lat Battalion

M „ Fw. Battalion
7tli Kinir'a Ofcnadien, lit BattaUon

•••
•>•

•*•
•••
•••

tt II

,. M Fna. Battalion

47thBailniettt» M BattaUoii

tt II 2ad Battalion ...

,, tt F^ Battalion

64h Billa Battalion

4th Diagoooa

lat Flald DiTlaion, 6th P. A. B., lit 1. b.

^^iL^fi II 2nd !• *•

•asn unwoona ••• ••■ ••• ...

tnd IfeldDlTidon, tth F. A. B., trd h. b.

Vth AnsfCoiTa

•••

••«

••■
•••

•*.
•••
«••

•••

••.

••*

•••

•«•

«.«

•■«

••

■••

KOted.

1
4

18 142

7
$

2
1

Wounded.*

1
1
7
4

4
4

9
6

1
1
S

1
1

121
88
15
75
84
40
125
11
7

27
82
4
7
8
2

681

2
1

8
1

MiMing.f

1
9
6

Total.

6
8

4
11

2
8
2
1

16S

106

166

88 8U

t
t
8

Naiies of thb Officbrs and those doing Duty in that Gapaoiit.

1. KILLED.

58th Regiment (Posen) : Major v. Gronefeld ; Captain Baron y. Kittlitz;

2nd Lieutenants v. Neumann and Haack ; Ensign Schubert.
59th Regiment (Posen) : 2nd Lieutenant Dirlam.
Tth King's Chrenadiers fWest Prussian) : Captains Batoch and v. Beyer ;

1st Lieutenants Scnoltz, Siemon and ▼. Loga ; 2nd Lieutenanta ▼•

Tschirschk^ u. Bogendorff and Hanel ; Ensigns v. Howel and v.

Ql5den ; Vioe sergeant-major Schfirff.
47th Regiment (Lower Slesian); Major ▼• Winterfeld.
4th Dragoons (Silesian) : Major Baron Senfft v. Pilsach.

& WOUHDED.

General commanding: Lieutenant-Oeneral v. Eirchbach.

Staff of 9th DiTision: Major Jacobi, of the general staff.

S8th Regiment (Poeen): Captains y. Sebottendorf, Breetz and Bauer;
1st Lieutenants Bpangenburg, Wagner and Eristen; Snd Lieu-
tenants Lange I, Ihdobek, Krafft ana ffieder; Vice sergeant-major
Aieseia

• Indnding tho66 who died of th«r wounds, and ihoue who were sot
ditaHH br thnr wmmds to neoesaitate levring their ragim6iit8.

t Of Uw misBingy some retomed 6ab6eq[iientlj } others nerer r^oined.

59th Regiment (Posen) : Captain Jaensch ; 2nd Lieutenants Haack and
Schmidt III ; Vice sergeant-major Trotte.

7th King's Grenadiers (West Pnissian) : Majors Schaumann, v. Unruh
and V. Kaisenberg ; let Lieutenants v. &ydlitz and v. Maltitz ; 2nd
Lieutenants Baron v. Eirchbach, v. Siegroth, y. Schaper, Baron v.
Luttwitz and v. Santen ; Ensign v. Uheinbaben ; Non-commissioned
ofiScers Jiihnich and Schneider.

47th Begiment (Lower Silesian) : 2ud Lieutenant v. Oppeu ; Ensign v.
Mosch.

5th Rifle Battalion (Silesian) : Major Count y. Waldersee ; 2nd Lieu-
tenants y. Holwede and Lemp.

4th Dragoons (Silesian): 2nd Lieutenant y. Nickisch-Roscnegk.

Ist field diyiHion 5th Field Artillery Regiment (Lower Silesian): 1st
Lieutenant Franke. *

XlTH ARMY CORrS.

Killca.

Wounded.

UlMing.

ToUl.

SOtta Fualllerf , Ist Battalion

„ ,, 2nd Battalion

,, „ 8rd Battalion
87tb Bcgimcnt, lit Battalion

fi „ 2nd Battalion

,, I, Fnailien

lltb Bifle Battalion

88th Begiment, lit Battalion

lith Hunan

lat Held Division, 1 1th F. A. It., StalT

„ „ 2nd h. b.

ISthHuiaan

Hone Artj. DIt., Ilth F. A. B., Ist h. a.

2nd h. a.

• ••
■ ■ •

• ••

b.
b.

Total

4
10
6
2
I
1

1
2
2
1
6

67
I

1ft

9
8

229

2ft

4
1
2

«■
2
7

300

ft
8
1
8

Names of Officers and those Doixa Duxv in that CAPAcrrr.

1. KILLED.
87th Regiment (Nassau): Ensign Rahtz; Vice sergeant-major Ilerbait.

2. WOUNDED.

80th Fusiliers (Hessian): Captain v. Bolleben; 1st Lieutenants v.
Miiller and v. Usiar-Gleicheii ; 2nd Lieutenants v. Bassewitz,
V. Henning auf Schonhoff, Pfeiffer and v. Werner.

87th Regiment (Nassau) : Captains Wiest, Ebhard, v. Lossau ; 1st
Lieutenant v. Yoigts-Rhetz ; 2nd Lieutenants Hoegg, v. Goetz and
Eltester ; Vice sergeants-major Vincent and Fester.

Ist fidd division 11th Field Artillery Regiment (Hessian): Major v.
Langen; Captain Engelhard.

JJm BATABUN ABMY C0BP3

KiUed.

6th Regiment (Klnfr William of rruitia)

lat Battalion

ti M „ Srd UattalloQ

8th BWe Battalion

9thBcgiment(\Vrede), Irt BatfeiLMaa

tf II ted Battalion

It „ Srd Battalion

6th Rifle Battalion

Steff of 8th Infantry Brigade

6th Regiment, Srd Battalion

7th „ 1st Battalion

11th „ Srd Battalion

Nth ,, Srd Battalion

10th Rifle Battalion

2nd CheTattxlegem (Taxle) ...
AttiUery Div. (4th Regt.) 2iid (4-^.;

ti II 6th

It It 6th

4th Field Engineer Company

(4.IW.) f.b.
(6-pr.) f.b.
(6-pr.) f.b.

Total

Woonded.

o
X

Hitting.

...I 4 42

1
2

6
8

7
2

269 21

Total.

19
28

8
8

1
8
9

12
8
1

61
6

116

847

1
2

"l
1

18
I

Names of Officers and Ist Class Asfirakts.

1. KILLED.

drd Battalion, 5th Reffiment (Qrand Duke of Ilesse): Lieut.-Golonel

v. Baar-Breitenfelo.
drd Battalion, 14th Regiment (Hartmann) : Captain Lauterbach; Ist

Lieut Schumacher ; Lieutenant Herrmann.

2. WOUNDED.

Srd Battalion, 5th Regiment: Major Baron v. Feilitzsch; Captain
Ament ; 1st Lieut. Weigand ; Lieutenants Wittman and Schmitt.

8rd Battalion, 11th Regiment (Tann) : Captain Tiinnermann ; Ist Lieu-
tenant Murmann ; Landwehr officer-aspirant Schmauser.

10th Rifle Battalion : Captain Correck ; Ist Lieutenants Baron v. Mas-
senbach and Emmench.

Artillery Division of the 4th Infantry Division : Captain A. Bauer.

APPENDIX X.

Disposition of tiik IIIrd Army for the Sth August.

" Head-quarters Schweig^hofen, 4th August, 1870.

" The army will continue its inarch on Stradsburg to-morrow.

(1.) The 4th Cavalry Divi8ion will move off from its bivouac at 5
a.m. and advance by way of Aitenstadt along* the Hagenau road,
with a view to seeking out the enemy in the direction of Hage-
nau, Suffelnlieiin and lloppeuheim, and for the especial purpase
of reconnoitring the ground ; a regiment is to be sent forward
from Sulz to the westward as fur as Worth and reconnoitre the
ground as far as Reichshoffen. The two rnilwa3''s at Hagenau
and the railway at Kinchshoffeii are to be destroyed as far as
possible.

(2.) Hartmann's Bavarian Corps will advance along the Bitscli road
as far as Lembach, and will bivouac there with its outposts
thrown forward beyond Lembach ; their connection to be mahi-
tained with thase of the 5th Aimy Corps. Corps head-quarters,
Climbacii. March at 6 o'clock.

(3.) The Xlth Army Corps will move forward along the Hagenau
road and along the railway to Sulz and will bivouac to the south
of this latter place with its outposts pushed forward in the
direction of the Hagenau forest. It will break up from its
bivouac at 6 a.m.

(4.) The Vth Corps will move off at 8 o'clock and march in two
columns vii Sulz to Preuschdorf, where it will bivouac with its
front in the dii'ectiou of Worth, and will place outposts towards
Reichshoffen.

(6.) Werder's Corps will march towards Sulz and bivouac west of
Aschbach on the line of railway. Outix)Sts towards Rittera-
hoffen, Hatten, and Nieder-Rodem. It will quit it^ bivouac at
6 a.m.

(6.) 1st Bavarian Corps, v. d. Tann, will move off at 5 o'clock by
way of Aitenstadt and bivouac at Ingolsheim.

(7.) Head-quarters will in all probability be at Sulz to-morrow.
Trains will be brought forward; those of the Ilnd Bavarian
Corps to Woissenburg, those of the other Corps to the Ijauter.

(Signed) FnEDRuiCK William.

Crown Prince of Piiissia.**

»$♦

APPENDIX XL

Ordre de Bataille and Orders of March of the German
Troops engaged in the Battle of Worth on

THE 6th August, 1870.

Ordxk de Batauxe of the Vth Aiuit Gk>BP8.

LmmvivT-GivzEiL t. XaaMMnom*

Ohi«f of the General Staff : Ck>loDel ▼. d. Bsch.

Oommmiider of Artillery i Oolonel Oaede.

OommaDder of Bngineera and Pioneers : Major v. Owstien. ^

9iH Imfamtbt Dituiox : Mai.-GeDeral ▼. Sandrart.
OiBcer of General Staff : Major Jaoobi.

17th IvviimcT Bbiqadb t Colonel t. BoUimer.

59th R^fft, Colonel Evl.
Isi, Major t. Stosch ; Ilnd, MAj. Ehriiardt ; Fub^ Maj«
Oumme.
58ili Begt., Colonel ▼. Bex*
let) ^9^ Wernecke ; Ilnd, ' Maj. Boettcher ; Faa.,
Maj. KlaflB.

leiE ImriVTBT EaiaADB t lfiaJ.-G«ii. t. Voigte Bhete.

47ih Befft. Colonel ▼. Bnrghoff .

Ist, Maj. Schnlz} Ilnd, Capt. v. Sydow; Fas., Capt
Masnch.
7th King^s Qrena^ers, Colonel t. Etthen.

Isty Capt. y. Kraoht; II, Capt Laacke; Fds.,
0^>t, V. d. Mttlbe.
5th Bifle Battalion, Capt. Boedicker.
4th Dragoons, Lient-Cfolonel ▼. Schenk.
Ist field division, 5th F. Art Begt, Maj. Eiroing.

1st heavy, Capt. Matschke , 2nd heavy, Capt. Anders.

1st liffht, Capt. Miohaelis ; 2nd liriit, Ist Usnt. Haapt
1st field pioneer company with Bght field bridge train,

Owt Schflibert.
2nd field pioneer company with entrendimg tool colnmn,

GaptHnmmel.
No» 1 Saoitafy detachment

• %

96*

10th Infaktrt Diyision : Lieut-Gen. v. Schmidt.

OflBoer of General Staff: Oapt. v. Strnenaee.

19th iHrAHTBY Bbioadb : Colonel r. Henning auf Sehdnhoff.

46th Regt., Colonel v. Stosch.
let, Maj. V. Gallwitz-Dreyling; Ilnd, Maj. v. Malls-
zewski ; Fus., Maj. t. Campe.
6th Grenadiers, Cobnel Floeckner.
Ist, Maj. V. Heugel; Ilnd, Maj. Bauer; Fus., Lieut.-
Col. V. Webern.

20th Ivfaktbt Bbioadi : Maj.-Qen. Walther v. Honbmry.

50th Begt., Colonel Michelmann.

Ist, Maj. Kossing; Ilnd, Oapt v. S^ampts; Fus., Lieut.-
Gol. V. Sperling.
d7th Fusiliers, Colonel v. Ueinemann.

Ist, Major Ltttgen; Ilnd, Maj. v. d. Busche-Hadden*
hausen ; Ilird, Major v. Sydow.
14th Dragoons, Colonel v. SchOn.
drd field division, 5th F. Art. Reeiment, Lieut.-Col. Rohl

5th heayy, Gajit Kirsch ; 6th heavy, Capt Schmedes.

5th light, Capt. Schmidt; 6th light, Capt. Caspar!,
drd field pioneer company, Capt Giintzel.
No. 2 Sanitary detachment.

CoBPB Abtillbbt : liiout.-Col. Kahler.

II. A. division, 5th F. Art. Regt., Maj. Pilgrim.

2nd II. A., Capt. Wendt ; drd II. A., Capt v. Corvisart-

Montmarin.
2nd field division, 5th F. Art. Regt., Lieut.-Col. v. Berries.
3rd heavy, Capt. Metzke I ; dth heavy, Capt. v. LiUen-

hoff-Zwowitzki.
3rd light, Capt Knaack ; 4th light, Capt. Habelmann.
No. 3 Sanitary detachment.

Ordre de Bataille of the XItii Army Corps

Libittsnavt-Qbkebal v. Bobb.

Chief of the General Staff : Maj.-Gen. Stein v. Kaminski.
Commander of Artillexy : Maj.-%len. v. Haussmann.
Commander of Engineers and Pioneers : Maj. Criiger

2l8T Infantry Division : Lieut.-Geu. v. Schairhtmeyer.
Officer of General Staff : Maj. v. Gottberg.

4l8T Ikfantby Bbioadb : CoL t. Kobliuski.

80th Fus., Col. V. Colomb.

Ist, Lieut.-Co1. V. Getinger ; Ilnd, Maj. v. Schon ; llird,
Maj. V. Below.
87th Regt., Colonel Grolman.

Ist, Maj. Easch ; Ilnd, Maj. v. Grote ; Fus., Maj. Schulz.

97*

42kd Lytavtbt Brioads : Maj.-Gen. t. Thili*.

82iid B^., CoL V. Borries.

Isty Maj. Count v. SchliefiFen ;* Ilnd, Maj. Baron v. Ileii-
neberg ; Pus., Maj. v. Tschirschkv.
88th Regt., Col. K^Iui v. Jaski.

1st, Maj. Heye; Ilnd, Lieut.-Col. v. Zp^tinitzki ; Fus.,
Maj. Baron v. Hilgcrs.
11th Kific batii., Maj. v. John.ston.
14th Hussars, Col. v. Beriiuth.
1st field div., 11th F. Art. Regt., Capt. Teubel.

1st heavy, Capt. Neumann; 2nd heavy, Capt. Engelhard.

1st light, Capt. Nonnann ; 2nd light, 2nd Lieut. Nirrn-
heim.
1st field pioneer com. with light field bridge train, Capt.

V. Holly and Ponientzietz.
No. 1 Sanitary detachment.

22nd Infantry Division : Lieut.-Gen. v. GersdorlT.

Officer of General Staff: Maj. v. HolIel)en.

43VD IVTXVTKT BSTOIDB : Col. T. £ontzki.

95th Regt., Col. v. Beckedorfif.
1st, Maj. V. Eckartsberg ; Ilnd, Maj. v. Gayetto: Fus.,
Lieut.-Col. V. Bassewitz.
32nd Regt. : Col. v. Foerster.

Ist, Maj. Hieksoh ; Ilnd, Lieut.-Col. v. Zacha ; Fus., Maj.
Fisoher.t

44tF IkfASTET BrIOAPK : Maj.-Om. T. Prliknpp.

94th Regt. : Col. v. Bessol.

1st, Maj. V. Becker ; Ilnd, Maj. v. Wnssow; Fus., Maj.
V. G^lieu.
8drd Regt., Col. Marschall v. Bieberstein.

Ist, Maj. V. Sodenstern ; Ilnd, Maj. Schor ; Pus., Lieut.-
Col. Weber.
18th Hussars, Lieut-Col. v. Henduok.
2nd field div., 11th P. Art. Regt, Maj. v. Uslar.

3rd heavy, Capt. Kuhne I. ; 4th heaves Capt. Reichert.

3rd light, Capt. Gossler; 4th light, 1st Lieut, v. Heppe.
2nd field pioneer com., with entrenching tool column, Capt.

Eckert
3rd field pioneer com., Capt. KUster.
No. 2 Sanitary detachment.

• The lit battn. 82ii<l B^^gi. wa» dctarhcd f o Snlx m cpooH !o the Illrd Army
brmd-qiiftrt«n.

t Tb« 12th comiMiiij 32nd Kogt. ^as left irith ii rqimdron of flic 13(h IIuFWirs
at Snrburg.

98*

Coups Autillbkt : Col. v. Opprln-Bronikowtki

II. A. div., 11th F. Art Rcgt., Maj. Koipfer.

1st H. A., Capt. Sylvias ; 3rd H. A.| Gapi. v. Ohnesorge.
3rd field div., 1 1th F. Art. Regt-, Maj. Arnold.

5th heavy, Gapt Horrfahn}t ; 6th heavy, Gapt Wettstein.
5th light, Gapt Baron ▼. Qillem; 6th light, Capt.

Kiihne II.
No. 3 Sanitary detachment.
Golumns div. : Gapt. Trttatedr.
Train hattv.: Gol. Schnch.

Ordkr of March of the 1st Bavarian Ikfantry Division.

LisnTEyiyT-OBKEBiL T. Stbphak.

Advanced (juard: (2nd Infantry Brigade): Maj.-6en. v. Orff.
Adyakcb : Maj. Reach reiter (Commg. 4th rifle battn.).

3rd H(]., drd Ghevauxlegers.

4th sq., 3rd Chevauxlegors.

4tli Rifle battn.

Ist hattn., 2nd Regt., I^faj. v. Saner.

Main Body of AiiVAKCEO Qvard: Col. Count t. Leublflng (OomiDg.
nth Begt.).

2nd sq., 3rd Ciievauxlegera -IGol. Baron v. Leonrod,

4 of l8t sq., 3rd Ghevauxlegers j Gommg. Regt.

2nd battn., 2nd Regt., Maj. Mehn (Col. Bar. v. d. Tann,

Commg. Regt.).
3rd f. baty., 1st Art. Ri*^t., Capt. v. (imndherr.
3rd battn., 2nd Regt., Maj. Steurer.
1st battn., lith Regt., Maj. v. Biiumen.
2nil battn., 11th Regt., Maj. Boehe.

M.\l> lloi»v: {{>[ InljinJi-v Jiiij^Mili") : Mttj.-Gcn. Dietl.

i of 1st sq., 3nl Clicvauxlegern.
iiiid Rifltj iMltalion, Maj. v. Valljulo.
1st f. bntty., Ist Art. Rogt., Capt. (irnitluiiseii.
r»th i". batty., 1st Art. Regt., Capt. Baron v. Ilutten.
71 Ii f. batty., Ist Art. Regt., Capt. v. Schleich.
Uo(iy-g»mrd Regt: (-ol. v. Tauffenbarh.
l8t, Maj. Kckart; lliid, Maj. v. Bauor; Ulrd,* Maj.
Count V. Joner.
l.^t hattn., IsL Regt., Maj. v. liiinoschloss 1 Col. Roth,
2iid battn., Ist Regt., Maj. Daffonreither j Gommg. Regt.
'.Mil rifle battn., Lieut. -Coj. Baron v. Massenbach.
4tli f. b:itty., Ist Art. Rec^t., ('apt. Raumiiller.t

* K\t'»'pl 1lu» 12lh i'ouip.u»\ wbit'li was ultix'lu'd to tlic train,
t B«i«»i>;iii^ io lilt' 2ihI liii'a!)ti7 ]>ivt9ioii.

)

Ordfr of March of thk 4tii Havakun Infanthy Division

lilKrT.-OEK. CorS-T V. BOTHMER.

Advanced Guard: (7th Infantry liriga<lr): M:ij.-(f»'n. v. Tlnrn ( k,

Al>VAXCK : Miij. Caries (oommp. Glh rillr linUn.)

I diviRiou, 2ji(1 f'^., 2n«l Ohcvn'ixlt';;* r>.
6th rifle battn.

Main Body of Adv. Guard : Col. t. Hccr (ConiniR. f'th R(»?jl.)

1st battn., 9th llogt., Maj. Lo«».

1st f. batty., 4th Art. Kcgt., Cap*. VVui in.

2nd battn., 9th Regt., Maj. v. Parsoval.

.3rd battn., 0th Regt., Maj. Haron v. Ehiini .

l8t sq., 2nd Ohovanxlegers - -1 ... ir^^^.i,,^

3rd sq., 2nd Chcvanxlogors - - > /(jj,,jj«^n. }y^^\

JJ divns., 2nd sq., 2nd ('hevauxlogor.sj ^ * A- » & •

Left Fiankiko Detacrmknt : Moj. (loos {Commj». 2n(l HnUn.Stli Hrgl.)

4th sq., 2nd Ghevanxlegers.

Ist battn., 5th Regt.. %[aj. (tebhiint.

2nd battn., 5th Regt.*

Main Bonr: (8th Infantry Brigade): Maj. -Gen. Maillin.fjer

5th r. batty., Ith Art. Kngl., Capt. IleroUl.

Hrd battn., Ist Regt., M«ij. v. Schlichtegroll.

J5rd battn., 5tU Rcgr., (Japt. v. Seckirchner.

2nd f. batty., 4tli Art. Regt., Capt. Kii<hii(>frVr.

Cth f. batty., 4th Art. Regt, Lieut.-(/ol. (lis^^nn .

1st battn., 7th Kegl., ^apl. Knhl<M-mRiin.

3rd l)attn., 11th Regt., Mnj. v. (fiop|Ki.

J)rd battn., 14th Regt.. ISbij. n<Mnicli v. \V< '!.<>*< •nlV!-*.

10th rifle battn.. liipnt.-C.-ol. v. Ilerkrl.

Attachrd from Kk!«ekti-: A«TII.!,KKV I>ni-io\ : (Uf Pivti.) • l.» •(.«!.
£ckart.

1st II, A., 2iid Art. Regl., Capl. Mjirnn \. lu I In; In .

3rd f. baty., 2nd Art. Regt., Capt. Spci k.

4th f. baty., 2nd Art. Hcgl., Capt. l*»:iroii zu Uhtin.

AtTACBRD from LlNCRR IJarOADF: M:ij.-0«n. UnroM V. Mu?/<'".

3rd sq., 5th Chevauxlegers \Vu\, Wcinricli (r«.f7VMii'.

4th sq., 5th OhevauxlegtMM j l?egt.)

Ist Lancers, Col. Couiii v. Vseiibmg.

2nd II. A., 2nd Uegl., Cnpt. H:in»n v. Mi>^« nlmcl!.

Or1>KR of MaRCIT rH' TIIK 1' \ V \I?M N TK'ni)!- > riwr*,»l !M r.v Hn«rr.i!r

roKW Mlh.

5th Infantrv HiiiGAOl: Mtij.-Ucii. \. ScMiiili.

8th rifle battn., Lieiit.-Col. Kn]i|(ini:mM.
(>th Regt., Col. Bosmillor.

Ist, Maj. Keck ; Ilnd, Maj. DainlwuM- : II Ii.l. i\I:ij. MmII.
2nd battn. 7th Regt., Maj. GainbM - \ ( '.»!. J Killer.

3rd battn. 7th Regt., Maj. FjeiditensttTn j rnir.nrr. Ti»';.'t

• This battJ^Uon hondcil I'lo nmin I)0'1t n'< f;u a** MriU:4t«al].

H 2

10(r

fjAVriR BkkiadR: Mttj.-Grii. Baron v. Muizcr.*

2nd T^anoerB, Col. Baron v. PHuniDier.

l8t Lancers, Col. C<»unt v. Ysetiburg'.

3rd and 4th «(i., 6th Ghcvanxlegere, ('ol. V. Weinrich.

2nd II. A., 2na Art. He^t., Capt. Baron v. Mas^enbach.

DiTlCBBD ITBOK SRD InFANTRT DiTlBION.

l8t and 2nd sq., let Chevauxleger», Lient.-Col. Count r.

Froberg.
ard f. batty., 4th Art. Rftgt., Capt. LorsI.

Obdek ok MAncii or Parts of the Wurttembkrg Division.

2nd FiBLD Brigade : Maj.'Gen. ▼. StarklolT.

3rd rifle battn., Lieiit.-Col. v. Link.
5th batty., 2nd F. Art. div., Capt. v. Ruppliu.
6th batty., 2ud F. Art. div., Capt v. Wagner IL
Ist battn., 2nd Rcj^t., Lieut, -C<j1 v,"^

Wangenheim - - - I Col. v. Ringler,

5th and 6th Cos., 2nd Regt., Capt. f Conung. Regt.

Glaserf
l8t battn., 5th Regt., Maj. v. Staff •

Col. Baron v. Hugel,

2nd battn., 5th Kegt, Lieut.-CoI. v. ^ (iQ^jniir Refft
Drescher - - -J »• o

Kbsertk Cava let : Muj.-Gcn. Count v. Sch^ler.

4th Cavalry, Col. Count v. Normann.

IM, sq., Jlrd (Javalry, Capt. Count v. Gronfeld.

* When Die lancer brigade was drawn forward on thia lecond occaaion it waa com-
plete, with the exception of half a squadron deanatched towaida Bitach. The lat and
2nd ■quadrona 5tli Oherauxlegen were detached to the Palatinate.

t The 7th and 8th co9. 2nd Ri'gt. formed the garrison of Lauterbure with tlio
2nd squadron 8rd CaTalrj ; the other 2 squadrons of the "Rep,, were stul in their
garrison.

lOl*

»• • • •

APPENDIX 301

List or CisajU.iiiB nr tbb Baxxlb or WSbxh.

ViH ABMT OOBPa

Oorpi Artaiflry TCh A. a

eth

TtoMTUiOovpt

KaJOM OV tbb OFnOEBS AHir THOSB ACmrQ XH THAT ClPACETr.

1. KILLED.

58th BegimeQt : find Lieni Liebert L

69tli Begiment : 2iid Lieuto* Schmidt II, Weinmaiui,

7tli King's Grenadiers: 2nd Lieat. CoontT. Canner; N. CS. O. t«

Wartenbvig.
47th Regiment : (3oL ▼• Barghoff $ 2nd LienL Fleming.
6th Grenadiers : 2nd Lieut Wolff ; Tice ser^t-mijor Wagner.
4Gth Regiment : Captn. ▼• Loseberg ; let Ideut. v. i^eckwits ; 2nd

Lients. t. Podewills, t. Bomsdorff II, Schwerdtfi^ery t« Barghofi^

T. Wedelstaedt^ Giersch, JaiK ; Ensin Heise.
87th Fusiliers : 1st lieut Walther ; 2nd Lieuts. Brendd, Bichter, Wolff-

Noesseii Baht, Heinke, Zelasko.
5(Hh B^giment : Captn. ▼• Burgsdorff ; 1st Lieuts. ▼• WIssel, t. MfUlen,

heim, y. Walther, ▼« Nowag-Seeling ; 2nd lieuts. Frey, Hayn,

Bothe, Oppermann, Haase ; Ensigns, Bichter, Landroigt ; *l^

sergt-rnqors Stein, Tinter.

t. WQUNDBD.

Staff of 17ihiii£ brigade: Ooknd and trigada eomtBapilarT. Boflimer^

SMk BegiflMDt : MiQor Boetteher; Oaptn. ▼. Ziegkr xu XlMiaaaaii i

lat lieiit KratndmMr ; 2nd Lieota. t. B<^^ Liebari II, IVam-

mami, Schnlsy ▼. Oettinger, Nehae^ Pflucker ; BtrgL-m^ot Gour-

oinaki; Yioaaergt.Hiii(jcr Booafeedt; Enaign Bents.

SdOk B^ginwDt: Colond.Bjl; Oiffaia. ▼• 'Dobaebftta, t. d. Wanaa^
Jaanaeb, FidHner; lat lieota. Plaetaohke, Barkn; Snd liaiita.
MnDar 1^ Haaek, Kntoiar, ▼. Rnnfoi^ NoUlinc, Etocb, Metake^
T. Hobbeig, Bondik, Choraa; Yioe aargte.«DMg<* Mfilkr, WoUFf
EnafgnBcand*

7ib Xbu^a Granadiara : O^te. Franski i lat lianta. t. Jaatnanaki,
T. Waddataad^ ▼• Hngo; Snd IMita. t. FbiUpabonit t. Kaapts*
: T. Ji^witB, T. Jordan, Bartaobi Yioa aergtB^vHgor Hnarihadi,
Bomp t N. C O/aSpin], T. WIooben^ Count ▼• Stnebwiti.

47ib B^daaant : Mqor Sdink; Cbptna. t. ScbimmfMpinjg, t. Wodal-
•ataadt; lat lianta. Haydenrdeb, Mnller, ▼• Winnings t. TVeakow j
5bid liaata. t. Ponoat^ Scbopia, KUnenilflgd, t. ICaltite, CWQa,
T. Habtf, FOratar, t. Dreakyt BSokfertb, t. TroOia, KmI, Klink,-
FUgal, Lobe ; Vioa aai!gta.-aHJor Ahmann, Bavop^ Wmr, Ban-
. noity Gaddom, Staoaal, DaTid, Bock, Jnng t Enaigna t. Bonaladi^
RCO.Kthn; Staff aaig6on,I>oetorBatko.

<& BUo battalion : Snd liaot Ibanaa.

41b Dn^oona: Snd liaol. ▼• Waldoir.

lat £diTn«gtb ¥. Arty. B^giment : Migor Bpping.

6<b Granadiera: Colonal FtSdJieri Migor T.Heosel; Captna-Bann
- T. LQdmgbanaan or WoUi^ t. Mocbow, v. BnaMoa, Baion t. Bi<^
boAn } lat Ueat Sdiola ; Snd Uenta. Obrenbaifg, DMaeb, T. CSm^
po^ TriMT, Bnppieobt, WoUenbaivt, Eoniger, T. Gatb^^
Sitmar, T. GimU, King; Tioa aergta.-nii^ Knobal, Gonti,
Gbriat^ Zfirn, Padnr, Hairbwy Bomonann; Enaigna Sdundar,
T* Petaradoiffl

46Cb Bagimont : Ckdonal t. Stoaob ; Migor Gampa i Oaptna. t. Klaaa;
. T. Sydow, Steinbnmn, Patmnky ; lat Lienta. Satti^ Tita^ Ptadhnr,
Bradan, Adamcsyk ; 2nd. Lients. Seidd, Storm, t* Maaannhafh,
T. Koaterita, t. Caettrit^ B7I], Wiedner, Bioake, Krantdnger^ t.
BomadorffI,Schliabits; EnaignBitteri N. a O. Dedcardi 1 Staff
Surgeon, Doctor Hiraobberg.

87tb Fodliera : Oaptna. t. Polenta, Eioepke ; lat Lient ▼• Aanratb; Snd
Lienta. Plebn, ▼. Malacbowaki, r. Barken, Nitacbke^ PoU, Ffoifiar,
T. Schweinicben, ▼• Enmatomski, Beinecke ; Vice aergta.-niijor
Menxd, Franke, Hildebrandt, Elette, Stobr.

AMb Begiment : Colonel Ificbehnann ; lieat-CoL ▼• (^[Mrlingj Ouptn.
Holaermann ; 2nd lieota. Backfortb, t. ffiqrot^liedbend,
Fiacber I, Fleck, Carstaedt, Thiel, Zaramba^ Scbaeeu WinUer,
Fritadi n, T. Pacsenaky n. Teocsin ; Enaigna Tbid, Sdioengartb,
GhHuiwald.

14tb Dragoona : Snd lieot ▼• Featenbeig-Pakiacb. . r

ard £ diviakm 6tb F. Arty. Begt : 2nd lient. t. ZakraewakL

Coipa artillery Vtb Corpe; Captn. Metoke ; ■2nd lieot Deyka; Actiiig
Staff Sntgeon, Dr. Elom.

«tb Pioneer battn. : Gapt. Scbeibert ; 2nd lient t. GizycU.

103^

XiTU ARMY CORPS.

Connnand SUlf

21H Infantrj DlTiiion.

BU9

SUIT of 41te Infoatry BricAde •

ministry Brigade {|?2|e«lSS;,:

42od lofontry Brigade {^ *>

UthBlflelMitteUoo • • ''•

HthHamn

1st f. difliioii llih F. ArtnieiT Regiment -

22iid lafanferf Diviiion.

Mrd Initotry Brigade /»*»•«*»«»»
Staff of 44111 iBfaatry BriM^ . '*-
4401 iBfttilrt Brigade l^***^"*^*

IMbBMnif . *'.

tad t ditkita llth F. Artfllefy Be^eni-
Corp§ Artillery Xlth Oorpa
llth pioneer battalion

Total Xlth Corps

Killed.

1
1

■

69
66
70
47
24
12

28
66

49
66

4ff7

4
57

Wounded.

1
1

7
21

18
16

168

•>

266

294
260
249
117
17
14

171

298

296

214
16

2,246

16
47

Missing.

—

60
17

Totil.

1
1

9
27

1
22
14

— 170

1
657
682
647
664
149
61
15

249

681

$85

272

2,965

16
104

150

Names of the Officebs ajud those doing Duty in that Capacity.

1. KILLED.

Command etafif : Ist Lieut of general staff v. Heineccius.

80th Fas. : Capt. v. Borcke ; 2nd Lieat. v. Battler ; Vice Sergt.-Maj.
Adolph.

87th Reg^.: Maj. Kasch; Capts. v. Lossau, Caesar; Ist Lieuts. y.
Lettow-Vorbeck, v. Lindeiner or Wildan, Protzen, Rtthle v. Lilien-
stem ; 2Qd LieutSa Hambache, Melior ; Vice Sergt.-Maj. Mdller.

82nd Regt. : Capt. v. Koux ; 2lid Lieats. Gotze, Wermuth, Schoppcr ;
Ensign Nenber.

88th R^gt. : Col. K5hn v. Jaski ; Capt. v. Graeveniiz ; 1st Lieut. Pelet ;
2nd Lieuts. Wihn, Blumhof, Pluschke.

llth Rifle battn: Capt. Marschall v. Bieberstein ; Int Liunt. Horstmaun ;
2nd Lieut. Baron v. Eiverfeld.

32nd Regt. : Ist Lieut, v. Beeren ; 2ud Lieut, v. Leheuner.

95th Regt. : Capts. Schussler^ Stockcl ; Ist Lieut, v. Motz ; 2ud Lieuts.

Schneidewind, Klein ; Ensign Oansen.
83rd Regt.: 1st Lieuts. Vogt, v. Kutzleben; 2iid Lieuts. Knappe,

Scliauss.

94th Regt. : Capt t. Esebeck.

104

2. WO UN UK I).

CoDunaQd blai'l* : Liuut.-lieu. v. lio^e, loiumaudiug ; Capt. aud Adj. v.
Bose.

Staff of 2l8l Div.: Ist Lieut. Stutuni, orderly officer.

Staff of 41st Brig'. : OoL v. Koblinski, couiinanding.

80th Fu3. : CoL v. Goloinb ; Capts. v. Roeder, v. Kietzel ; lat Lieuts. ▼.
Leng«^rke, Morsbach ; 2iid Lieuts. v. Uslar, Oleicben II, Wagner,
V. Trapp, V. Sodeu.steni, WagenknecLt, v. Heeringen, v, Werner
II, Scheele ; Vice SergC-Maj. Baumauu.

87tl» Rijgt. : (ytipts. V. Kettler, Miillor, Wicst, Alcfcld; Ist Lieut a. v.
iIaxthauscii,C;iomnierer 1 ; 2iid Liouts. v. Roesler, Billiarz, Tilmanu,
Uoin, V. (lotz, Oostorreioh, Eltcstcr ; Vice Sergts.-Major Schraude-
bach, Tiingliug, Ilildebrandt ; EiKsigii Janke.

S'2i\d Regt. : (5ol. v. Boriies ; Majnrs v. T<;liirs(;hky, Baroii v. llenaeberg ;
(Japts. lircBslor, ICIoetzke; Ist Lieuts. v. Treskow, v. Sturinfeder,
Frag3teiu v. Nieinsdorff, Meckel ; 2iid Lieuts. ▼. Helmrichy Baroa
V. Eckard.steiu, v. Trcuenfeld, Witzell, Feege, Hohensee, Below,
Rochlitz ; Vice Ser.-Maj. Stock ; Ensigns Brunskow, Wisotzld.

d8th Regt. : Capts. v. Elpons, v. Uagen ; Ist Lieut. Koeppen ; 2nd
Lieuts. V. Leheniier, Baerthel, v. Bieberstein, T.Schlereth, Pelissier,
Marquardt, v. Madai, Spaugenberg, Schlicbter ; Vice Sergt.-Maj.
Keller ; Ensigns Cornelius, Arend, Jungermann.

nth Rifle battn. : 1st Lieut, v. Both.

14th Hussars : 2ud Lieut, v. Schonfeldt.

Ist f. div. Llth F. Art. Begt.: 2nd Lieuts. Castendyk, Eiaeutraut.

22ud lufantiy Div.

32ud Regt.: Maj. Ilicksch ; Capt. v. Wiutzingerode ; Ist Lieut, v.
Steiglitz ; 2nd Lieuts. ▼. Donat, Dehorn, Schmidt ; Vice Sergt.-Maj.
Buttmann.

•J5th Regt. : Col. v. Hcckodorff ; Maj. v. Eckartsberg; Capts. v. Wan-
genheiiu, Viemeusel, v. Hopffgarten ; 1st Lieuts. Bartenatein, ▼.
Gossler, v. Janson ; 2nd Lieuts. Fritze, v. Brandenstein, Kieslich,
Schulze, v. Schrabisch, Mil Her, Bartenstcin, Berger, v. Tiedemann;
Vice Sergt.-Maj. Todtenwarth; Ensigns Behrend, v. Hanstein,
Tcichchnauii.

Staff of 44th Brig. : l{$t Lieut, aud Adj. v. Diepow.

83rd Regt. : Majors v. Sodenstern, Schor ; Capts. Baron v. Boeuigk,
Becker; 1st Lieut, v. Montowt; 2nd Lieuts. Penther, Baron v.
VVachtmeister, v. Borger, Eschenhagen, Luia, Bech, Schlenke,
Korn, V. Gilsa, v. Apell II, v. Henning aut Schonhoff, Silber;
Ensign v. Schilgen.

iUth Regt.: Majors v. Wussow, v. Necker ; Capts. v. Rhaden, Heyne ;
1st Lieuts. V. Nostitz, v. Egloff stein, Mahr ; 2nd Lieuts. v. Kamptz,
Count Keller, v. Hartmanu, v. Blunxenthal, Berendes, v. R^ge.

Corp.<^ Art. Xlth Corps : Capts. Sylvius, Herrfahrdt ; 2nd Li^ut. Stumuu

105'

In BAVAKUN ARMY C0B1>8.

Killed. 1

Wounded. 1

MlMing. 1 TotaL

•

■

•

3
6

Begiment ^^^^ | . . .

—

2
2

—

38
21

—

10
30

—

30
53

—

...

MstbattaUon

—

lat fiegiment • Znd „ . • .

.mm

.1^

— .

Und rifle tettalion-

.—

<—

riBfcbfttUlion

___

— .

3d (1 Begiment < 2nd „ . . .

142

—

i—

193

Isrd ., . - .

—

—m

^•

m—

106

rmbakUUon -

.mm

118

lUh Begiment- 2nd „ . . .

—

106

C4lh rifle battalion

_•

— .

—

.m-

—

Ift

3rd Cberanslegen

—

ArtiUery of the let Division.

^ 1st field batterj -

—

1st Kegiment ] JU ;•

^ .,

^.^

Uh ;, . . -

—

477

"1-

20ft

746

. K]

[ll:

ED.

let Regt. : let Lieut. Nusch.

2ud Regt. : Ist Lieat. v. Ilaren ; v. Schubart, Count t. Wolkensteio,
Wagner, Mayer.

11th Regt. : Gapts. v. Jager, Oertel v. Hofstetter ; 1st Lieut. Count v.
Armannsperg.

2. WOUNDED.

Body-guard Regt.: Capt. Wagner; Ist Lieut. Rinecker; Ueata.
Baron v. Lichtenstein, Bemhard, Count v . Arco, Schreiber, Baron
V. Donerberg, v. Weber, v. Vincent.

Ist Regt. : Lieut. Bedall.

2nd Rifle battn. : Ist Lieut. Merkel.

2nd Regt. : CaptB. Bedall, Schmidt ; Ist Lieuts. v. Baron v. Zu-Rheiu,
▼. reller, Weiss ; Lieuts. Dachs, Ott ; Landwehr officer candidates,
Eugel, Westermayer.

11th Regt. : Capt. Baron v. Pollnitz ; Lieuts. v. Tausch, Haas, Geissler ;
Landwehr Lieut. Klostermeyer ; Landwehr officer candidate,
Krammel.

4th Rifle battn. : Lieut. MUUer.

106^

llvD BAYABIAN ARMY COBP8.

{Irtbatulioo
2lMl „
am „
7ih]te8lm«Dt {J;* battalion

8th Bifle battalion-
Ut CheVauxleKflrs

5th Bagtment { Ji'i,*'*"^ ""

iUt batulion
2nd ,,
3rd „
Mh BIfla batUlion
Staff of »th Infantry britraUc
Srd battalion lit KcgUnont -
Srd „ 5th
!•( „ 7th
ard H Hth
trd M Uth
lOUi Eifle baUaUon
tod Ohtraiudegen

•I
»•

»»
It

Artillery of the Uth Division.

4th ArtiUery Ilefflment {}JI^^^ ^^^
2nd Artillery Bcgiment, Srd field battery

Killed.

2
1

3
1

2
1

U
7
3
7

— ' 2

— I 3
1 I 2

9 I 52

Wounded.

1
1

4
3
1
I
1
7

I
3

5
1
1

3
1

11
106
47
70
53

60
•
82
12
57
14
4

•»

524

4
2
Id
23
7
3

6
5

ToUL

1
1
4
$

3
t

I
3

1«

133

74
10
40
18
•8
18
4

667

4
1

1. KILL£D.

6th Regt. : Laiidwehr officer candidate Less.

dth Regt : Capt. Feuerlein ; 1st Lieut. Hoffmann ; Lieuts. Dietz, Todt,
Bauer.

6th Rifle batto. : Lieut Kugel.

3rd battii. 1st Regt. : Maj. v. Schlichtegroll.

10th Rifle Battn: : Ist Lieut. Franz.

2. WOUWDED.

7th Regt. : Oapi. Bisohoff ; 1st Liuiits. Nuuberger, v. Schuiid, Pflaumer.

5th Regt. : 1st Lieut, and Adj. Kllr:sv-h( r ; Ist Lieut, v. Dair Armi.

9th Regt. : Majors Loe, v. Farseval; Captn. Veith, Kilmer; Lieut, v.
Sprunuer; Laudwehr Licutd. Pohl, Kram; Landwehr officer
candidate, Lowenheim.

6th Rifle battn. : Capt. Scliweuiiuer.

Staff of 8th lufy. Brig. : Maj.-Geu. Mailliuger.

drd battn. Lst Regt. : 1st Lieuts. Baron v. V5]derudorff, Bedat, Nusch ;
Lieut, and Adj. Prand ; Lieuts. Diehl, v. Maier ; Landwehr officer
candidate, Bomhard.

3rd battn. 11th Regt. : Lk^ut. llosth.

3rd battn. 14th Regt. : Gapt. Wening; Lieuts. Muller, Herzog.

107^

BOTAL WURTTEMBEBa FIELD DITISION.

2nd Begiuent

5th „

3rd BJfle 1«tt«IioD-

1st Cavalry -

3rd „

4th „

Total

KUkd.

1
19

Wounded.

4
2
5
I

125
19

121
1
1

Missing.

271

7
13

Total.

2
6
1

152
27

ir.6

1
2
1

3.19

1
2

1. KILLED.

2nd Regt. : 1st Lieuts. SchiiKsjer, Keller I, Neuiler.

3rd Rifle batn.: 1st Lieut. Nicthnmmer.

4th Gavnlry : 1st Lieut. Speth v. Schiilzburg.

2. WOUNDED.

2iid Regt.: Lieut.-Col. v. Wangenhoiiu ; Jst IjKmiIs. ('ii'iuni. Knob;

Lieut. Zttrn.
5th Regt. : Maj. Stapf ; Capt. v. Sterucnfels.
Gi-d Rifle battn. : Lieut.-Col. v. Link; 1st Lieut, v. Oraovoiiitz; Lieut.

Muff ; Ensigns Landerer and Sick.
\fi\ Cavalry : Lieut.-CoI. v. Ausin.

TOTAL LOSaES.

KUled.

Wounded.

Missing

•

Total.

■

o
41

•

i
1

Vth Pnuaian Corps

877

179

8,782

777

220

6,486

187

XIUi „ „ - . -

4A7

188

2,248

—

265

—^

179

2,966

169

1st Bavarian „ . . .

«4

477

_•

205

746

llnd Bavarian „ . . .

624

— .

—

667

WurUemberg Field Division •

5
106

2
173

12
383

271
7,297

166

339

Total •

1,488

1,378

(SO

10,163

841

108*

APPENDIX XIII.

Ordeb of Makch of the Two Infantry Divisions of the
VIIth Army Corps on the Morning or the

(>Tn August, 1870.

Uth Infanticy DiviiiiON: Licut.-ticii. v. Kaiuoke.

^UVAVCUU (JirAUU: Muj. -(it'll. V. Fraiii;oi4.

Ist Bi\iu 15th fluHHarn.

8rd battn. 39th Fus.

l«t li^ht battery, Gth FitiUl Art. Regt.

]8t and 2iid battns. d'Jth Fua *

No. 2 Sanitary detachment of VIIth Army Corps.

Ist com. 7th pioneer battn., with light field bridge train.

Maut Body : Maj.-Oen. t. Wojii;^

2nd, drd, and 4th sqns., 15th UuBaars.

74th Regt.

2Dd light, Ist and 2nd heavy batteries, 7th F. Art. Begt.

Ist and Fus. battns. 53rd Kegtf

77th Regt.

Baggage and trains.

13tu iNrAHTUY Division : Lieut.-Geu. v. Glumer.

Advancbd Gvabo : Haj.-Qon. v. d. Goltx, Conimg. 26th Bng.

fist and drd sfps. 8th Hussars.
Advance < 2 corns. 7th Rifle battn.

[ 2nd battn. 55th Regt.
Lst and Vnn, battns. 55th Regt.
5th light battery, 7th F. Art. Ri^gt.
2 COS. 7th Rifle battn.

Maik Body : Muj.-Gen. v. d. O^tcu Sacken, Comiug. 2otLi Brig.

1st and 2nd battus. 15th Hogt. (Fus. battn. detached a.s

escort to corps artillery).
73rd Regt.
I3rd Regt.

2nd and 4th sqns. 8th Hussars.
Gth light, 5th and Gth heavy batteries, 7th F. Art. Regt.

* The 8th co. was in charge of tho baggage.

t Th9 2nd battu. 53rd Regiment waa detached at etfc^ort tuthe corpg artiUer/.

109^

APPENDIX XIV.

Return op Casualties in the Action at Spicheren on

THE 6th August, 1870.

IIlBD ARMY CORPS.

staff

5th Infantrj Dl? isloa.

9th Inftoitrj
Brigade

• V

uitry )
le. 11

'48th Begt. (Bnaden-

barg).
8th Body guard
Qrenadien.
12th Orenadlen
lOth Infantry ) (Brandenburg).
Brigade. jS2nd Begt. (Bran-
denburg).
3rd Bide batalion (Brandenburg) -
Ifth Dragoont (Brandenburg) -
m field diT., 8rd F. Art. Bcgfment •
No. 1 Sanitary detachment

Total -

Killed.

4
4
8
1
1

132

o
H

Wounded.

8
2

2
10

260

21
8

27
3
2
4

453

328

609

51
1

35
1

1
6
1

Mipsing.

1,671

Total.

548
380
771
116

66
1

89
1

1,912

1. KILLED.

48th Regt. : Maj. Klingnth ; Capts. v. Kracht, (Jforh ; 2nd Lieut, v.

FalkenhauseD.
Body-guard Grenadiers : Ist Lieut. Beelitz; 2!k1 Lieutfl. v. Kaplienj^st,

2£charice ; Vice Serp^.-Maj. (Trnner.
52nd Regt. : 2nd Lieut Voss.
12th Grenadiers : CoL v. Renter; Maj. v. Johow; Capt. v. Oppen; lut

Uents. V. Hobe, v. Reventlou, v. Francjois ; 2nd FJeut. v. Firch ;

Vice Sergt.-Mai. Cochius.
3rd Rifle battn.; 2nd Lieut, v, R<*x.

2. WOUNDKD.

48th Regt.: Capts. Stiilpner, AVemer, v. Kameke, Dallmer ; 1st Lieuts.
Baron v. Ilammerfltein, v. KauiienRki, Hitthanaen van dem Bosc*!) ;
2nd Lient8. v. Spaldine, v. iRaendorfT, Coler, llolthoff, Winckler,
Kionitz« Kunth, Vosfl, Ernst ; Vice Serp^t.-Maj. Pawjow ; Ensip^nn v.
Hrieacn, Puppel; Assist. -Surg. Dr. v. I ley no.

Body-guard (.Trenadiers : Capt Sack ; 2nd Lieuts. v. Bot*k, ( )o»terrc»i('h.
V. Triitzschler, Hermann, v. Uiindell, Ilehu, Spilling.

52nd Regt. : 2nd Lieuts. Ueppe I, Streichhan ; Ensign \Vel)er.

12th Grenadiers: Gapt«. Boenkc, v. Fromberg, Rogge, Flessing; Ist
Lients. t. MuUer, Oldenburg, v. Studnitz, Rraushaar, v. Thick,
V. Oppen, Schrdder; 2nd Lieuts. v. Roon, v. Pbllnitz, Schwarz,
Graewe, v. Maustein, Detring, v. Kaminietz, Meyer, v. Milller,
Papst, PreusB ; Vic« Sergt.-Maj. Franke ; Ensigns Dchnikt Dioiist-
mann ; N. C. O.'s (lenz, (i,unth«r.

:'n'i\ Rille lialtn. : Maj. v. .Inux : 2nd Lieut, v. Muller.

2nd field div., ;)rd An. Ho^t. : Maj. v. Lyiick«»r ; 1st Lieut. HiMobrandi
'Jud Licuts. Klul>oi', Weichbrodt.

VII rn ARUT CORPS.

Killed.

Woundfld.

Vittin/;.

Total.

•

1
0
7

4
A

•

i4$>

144

126

478

•

3
5

•

1
1

H
29

10
11

2
1

•

C5
6

401
4&7

151

417

1
•J2

•

■

13th lafantry Diviaion.

ftftth BeRtment (Westphmlian) -
7th Rllla tattalion (WeatphalUn;
ard field div.. 7th P. Art. Reginiont -
8tb HoMan (Weitphalian) -

1 4th Infantry Pi vijton.

/'Sraff

-""""fi'l74lh Ucgimcnt (Hano-
V verian).

.-jth Bri«. J 7;n, Begt. (Ilanocrian) -
15th Ilua^ars (UanoTeriun) -
1st field dlv., 1U\ F. Art. Monimcnt -
No. 2 Sanitary detachment -

•>

78
60

3
1

1
27
36

14
26

62d
661

209
602

1
24

3
7

43
2

Total -

t>6

1,.VJ0

—

219

— jlli

2,217

1. KILLED.

27lli Infantry Brijj:.: Maj.-(ion. v. Francoi**.

39th Fus.: Maj. y. Wichinann ; Capt. BudiTirk ; 1st Lieuts. v. Beaulieu,
Windiscli, Meineckf ; 2n<l Lieuts. ^[orgenroth, Schmitz, Vaupel ;
N. C. 0. S|>icker.

74th llogt : Capt. Olofl'; Iht Lieut. Ii(.'hinann ; 2nd Liouts. Schrader,
Schnackenburg II, (Iruuwald ; Feldjager Glaussen ; Eusigu Baring.

53rd Hegt. : 1st Lieuts. v. Kappard, Kir.sten, Moyor ; 2nd Lieut, v.
Spiegel.

77th Regt.: Capta. v. M:ni'>lrlM, v. IJaiini ; 1st Lieut. ?>;himdt ; 2nd
fiieutH. V. iUum, v. Ih-yth-kaniplY.

2. WOUNDJ-;]).

r»5th liogt.: Capt. Krui:k«MKM;L;- ; Isl F/uMit. v. (iiisa I ; Ensign v. Alten.

7th Kifle l)attn. : Capt. v. Knsscrow.

;^rd fiflil div.. Till V\ Ail. Rr-'t.: L*iid I J. nl. v. Ihaiis*-.

o\)i\i Vws.: (^apts. Nril/Kc rmnlmld; 1st Lieut. Rerueekir; 2nd Lieuts.
Muller, HiH'huntr, v. roiill. ijeltiiardt, Ix^hrhoff, Jjongard, Ilockel-
mann, Scheiller, WViiu r, Unt/c, TietJinont : Vice Sergts.-Maj.
Schcjwe, KipptT, laini niuar her ; N- C. 0. Farcnholz.

74tli Regt.: Capta. v. Sahsch, Siemens, Osterwald, v. Koschkull,
V. Gabaiu; 1st Lieuts. v. \Vt)bschitzky, v. Berries, »Schnacken-
biirg I, Koschitzky, Schwitzke ; 2iid Lieuts. Tottleben, v. Aruoldi
Junghann, Massow, Schayer, Ilunau.s, Scholi, Machholz, Soparth,

Ill*

Consentios, Richard, ▼. Fischer, Lax, v. Czarnowsky, Rost ; Vice
Sergt8.-Maj. Uebcrhorst, Kleyensteiiber, Wolffgarten ; Ensign v.
Pannwitz.

53rd Kegt.: 1st Lieut. Baron -v. d. Osten-Sacken ; 2nd Lieuts. Wintzer,
Muser, Kock, Schnitzler, v. Warendorf; Vice SergtvS.-Maj.Weinholt,
Sprickmann - Kerkeriug ; Ensign Bacmeistcr ; StafF-Surg. Dr.
Stiehl.

79th Regt. : Cants, v. Marsciiall, Rasch; 1st Lieuts. v. Ijorentz, v.
Sillich ; 2na Liouts. Peters, v. Rentz, Frank, Kallcnbacli, Lchr I,
Lehrll, Greiff, Priebel, Goppert, Peters II, v. Ostrowsky, Uarke,
Biedenfeld, Gr^hnhoff; Vice Sergts.-Maj. Hasenkamp, Jacobsohn;
Ensign FriebeL

1st field oir. 7th F. A. Reg^t. ; 2nd Lieuts. Kfimper, v. Fransecky.

No. 2 Sanitary detachment ; 2n(l Lieut. Menger.

VTTlTH ARMY CORPS.

—

Killed.

Wounded.

MiMing.

Totel.

348

4
9

361

13
9

61
61

•

1601 iBfutry DiTivion.

40ih Beflment (RohensoUern)

9th RaMarfl (Bheniah)

3rd FJcIrt Division, Pth F. A. Roi?!nicnf

*
•

26
25

468

5
10

483

18
17

Total -

—

3.'^

1. KILLED.

40th Fus.: Capt. v. Schulz; Ist Lieut;'. Srhroedor, Detert ; 2nd Lieuts.
Frilhling, Cramer.

2. WOUNDED.

Maj. Simon; Capts. Lutke. Koach, Krug, Kretschmer, v. Blomberg
Adams ; 1st Lieuts. Ilevelke, Studt, Sclieele ; 2nd Lieuts. Jobst I
Calov\-, Conzen, v. Lass.iut, ^leyer, Ilamniachcr, v. Ekonateen,
V. I^nries, Jiittnor ; Vice Sergt.-Maj. Stock.

KilM.

Wounded.

Mtminff.

Total.

Officers

•

hi.

1-4

•

ritb Cavalry Division.

19th Dragoons (Oldenbnrg) -
11th Hujwirti (Westphalia) -

I7ih IIuMars (Brun««wlclt)

—

2
10

„^

1
2

11
32

Totil

—

r»

- —

3ft

Cth Cavalry Division.

(itii Cnnos-tio'n 'I'mnMcnburj;)

—

Total

—

112^

WOUNDED.

19tb Drag. : Enaigu Eckmeyer.

17th Hoflsara: 2nd Lieota. y. Steinberg, y- Baoae.

TOTAL CASUALTIES.

IIM Army Corpt

Vllth

YllIUi „

Mb CKftlrj Divltion

Total •

Kincd.

18
20

260

478

794

24
84
18
18

WOOBdCd.

6ft

174

l,ft71

1,620

861

8,488

22
88

127

219

— 872

112
2ft

1,912
2,217

8ft

228 :4,646 214

64
68
8S

Dr. Engel'a work ** Die Verluste der Deutschen Armeen " has been
utiliaed in preparing the foregoing returns.

LONDON:

PsiVTSD JOJL Hia Majbbtt'0 Statiokut Omcit
Bt nimmtftOH mi) Sons, St. Mabtin'b Live, PRiirrviii iir OaniirimT

TO HsR Majutt.

(Vft. 2105a 250 5 I 82—3232)

118*

APPENDIX XV.

Return of Casualties in the Battle op Colombey-Nouillt.

IfT ARMY CORPS.

Butt and BeflBMBti.

lit Inbntry D;tiaion.

8Uff of lit Infantry DtriiiloB

{Statroflgtbrignd*
Ist Or«nadieTB
4]«t H«flni«nt

2nd Infr.bri^da ^^^ tU:g\meni
lit tide tettellon ....

Itt DrasooM

Ittf. dim. lit F. Arty. B«ft.

Total-

2nd InfUitry IMtIsIob.

(Staff of Srd brigade
trd Infy. brigade-! 4th Grenadier*
( Ikh Begiment

4th infy. brigade {J;J,«--«*S

10th Dragooos

•rd f. dfTii. 1ft r. Attj.

lit field ptonMreo. lit A,

Mo. S Sany. I>etBiw

T^ytal

Oorpi Artmtly Itt A.C. (H Jl. and 2iid

f. d*Tn.)

Ko. I Saay. Detrnt . . . .

Total LDiiIiiA.0.

Killed

or Died of

Wounds.

11
S

':o

187

-J02

t»

432

76
128

I
1

207

640

I
6

8
2

Wounded.

1
17

21
8

ri6

10
16

418

619

209

1,2«1

824
10

7
8

788

1,981

2
23

11
I

lUsdng.

2
27
14

27
12

1
28
82
II

19
28

118

Total

6
66

682

736

289

1,716

488

462

11
8

4
I

979

2,708

2
8

10
8

146

NojflNAL Roll of OfpiObrs and those acting in that Capacity

WHO were Killed or Wounded.

Staff of Isi Inhnirj

Difinon
4Ut Bi«iBflii
8rd ~

Ulod or Died of Wonnde.

fl) dftptn. T. Kluftfer.

(8) lit Lieut. OuaDiU.

(4) Id4 Lieat/Kalau r.

HoTen.

(5) Xmign Borbstaedt.

Wounded.

(1) Li^uL-Gen. T. BenUleiiil.

(1) dajyta. T. Doering.
(4) Hajor r. Arnim.

(2) Caj^tn. Sohroeder.

i8) „ Hemnann.
*) » Wegener.

(6) Ist Lieut. B^ron t. d.
Ooltis.

114*

Staff and BegbnenU.

43rd Begiment

l8t rifla battalion

Itt field Division, let
ATtilloi7 Regimont.

4th Granadien

KiUed or Died of Wounds.

(6) Vice Sergeont-Major
B&ttke.

(1) Major Schmidtmann

T. Wuthenow.

(2) Captn. Barou r. d.

Trenk or v. Koe-

nigsegg-

(3) Captn. V. ITom.

(4) „ Jan J.

(6) 1st Lieut. Baron t.
Bubl or Schimniel-
penning t. d. Oje.

(6) 2nd Lieut, t. d. Oa-

ten Sacken.

(7) 2nd Lt. Tischler, II.
[81 ,, SchulU.

[9) „ Kossack, II.
[10 Ensign t. Glaaenapp.
[11) „ MuUer r.
Bmnae.

Wounded.

(1) Ist Lieut. T. Alrens-
leben.
2nd Lieut, y. Amim.
Bertram.

•>

](\) Captn. T. Schultzon-
dorf.

(2) „ Anderf.

(3) „ Wahl.

(4) Ist Lt. T. Diezelsky.

(5) 2nd Lt. Erocsewski.

(6) M Behnke.
„ Boehm.

Ensign Paul.
Tice Sergeant-Major
Kruger.

(6) let Lieut. Quedenfeldt.

(7) 2nd Lieut. Luotken.
Mauracli.

T. Livoniiu.

Weazkalnya.

Boaencrana.

Borbstaedt.

Troebncr.

Gerlocb.

Ortbmann.

Liebermann t.
Sonnenberg.
17) Ensign t. Foelkeraamb.
1) Oaptn. Puppel.

(10)

(11)

[12
19
14

16)
[16)

If
»l
»t
II
II
tl
It

(2)

6)
6)

7)
8)

[8)
10)

[11]

[12

[1»)

ill!

»•

•I
II
II
•I
II
II

•I

Vice

„ Kiuiter.
1st Lieut. T. Sc'hefFer.

Brausewetter.
Cramer.
2nd Liout. Bejme.

Sperling, I.
Sackersdorff, I.
Xieistner.
T. Stuckradt.
Guaonua.
PoUier.

Rogalla T. Bie*
fa«rstein.
(14) Ensign Schmidtmann t.
Wuthenow.
Blteater.
T. Saucken.
Sergeant - Major

Hejmuth.
MH liner.
N. 0. O. T. Knobloch.
Zeroch.
Woth.

(1) 1st Lieut. Mejer.

(21 „ EyckbuBch.

(8) 2nd Lieut. Count t. Scblip-

penbaoh.

(4) ,, Grabe.

(5) „ GusoTius.

(6) „ Mueller.

!7) Ensign Bauingart.
8) „ Wusielewski.
(1 1 Major Munk.

(2) Captn. Hoifbener.
:3^ „ Puppel.
(4) 2nd Lieut. Iloffmann.

Korsch.
Ottsenn.
,t Gauda.
1st Lieut. Erdmaun.

n Donat.
2nd Lieut, r. Betalaff.
▼. Sanden.
Buhnau.
Schall.
Orth.
Bemy.
f9) Ensigh t. d. Groeben.
[10) Tice Serjeant • Major
Fiebelkom.

II
•I

II
II

II
II
II
II
i»

115'

Staff and BcginMBta.

KlDtd or Diad of Wounds.

Wonndod.

14ih Regunent

No. 8 San. Detmt (2nd
Section).

1^ Cb^ytn. T. Puttkamer.
2) let Lieut, t. Wind-

heira, I.
Kflntzel, I.
„ T. Schmidt.
2nd lit. T. Dioiseglii.
„ Schneider.
„ Johanesson.
Yioe Seneant-Major
PielluB<m.

(8'
8

(1) Major Dallmer.

(2) „ Bock.
[8) Captn. Caapari.

lit Lieat, t« Berser.

II Hi mini.
2nd Lieut, t. ZamhrzrckL
I, T. Wickode.
SchOnbom.
Haunit.
Borchmann.
Blcch.
yiceSergt.-Major Baring.
Rieidel.
Bother.
Kuckhein.

4)
6)

M
II

10)

[11)

12)
18)
U)
15)
[1) 2nd Lieut Kuaheim.

•I
II

VIlTH ABMY OOBFS.

HMd-qaarttr Staff

ItKh InfMitiT DiTiMon.

Staff of iBfeAtrj OlTislon

/'Staff off 2601 Mgade -

SSthMftdo ixsrtFiMlllmdrtaiid
C tadbattaUoM).

ttthbrfffido t56UiBl5ai«i»
TthrMotattalkQ

Snf.dtm7aiF.iJir.BH(t •
Sad Add ptooftfoo. Vllltt ▲. a
Mo. % Sanitary Ottaal. - •

Total •

14lh lafinUy DiTitloa.

t7lh

"'*<*^ inttligtaNatOstaiid
. taibaMM).

Ill C dlm.f Ttti F • Ai|j«

VDtal • •

imnay, Tnnk a. o. (b. a.

tadlLdifn.)
TetallMTIIIhA.a* - •

Kfflod

or Died of

Wound!.

T
6
1

78
96

Its

116

n
1
1

468

IS
1

s
s

Woand«d.

7
18

IS
8

190
S4S

SS4

8
66

lOS

I
7

84
8

MlMing.

Total.

8
18
80

21
8

7
S

104

864

470

688

1,846

1,S«0

s
1
s
s

IS
64

116*

Nominal Roll of Officers and those acting in that Capacity

WHO ^'ERE Killed or Wounded.

Staff and Bcgiuicnti.

Stuff of 25lh brigade

18th Refj^iment

7drd Fusiliers
(Ist and 2Dd buttus.)

16th Regiment

65ih Rogimetit

Killed or Died of Wounds.

(1) Captn. Ritgeii.

(2) „ Rommel.

(3) Ist Lt. Biihcmeycr.

(4) 2Dd ,. iriiUt, 11.

(5) „ Alfter.

(6) Vice S. Major llonke.

(1) Cnptn. T. Bnrdflobcn.

(2) „ Cstau.

(3) „ FiHcher.

(4) lot Lieut. T. Ma«i»on-

bach.
(6) „ Braun.

(6) 2 lid Lieut. Fihchcr.

(7) „ Krdiiiuim.

(8) Ensign Oiose.

(1) Ist Lieut. V. Prond-

zjniiki.

(2) 2nd Lt. Wischmeyer.

(3) „ Miiller.

(4) „ T. Billow.

(5) ,, Wissmaun, I.
(6.) Sergt. -Major Balster.
(7) YicoB. MajorNauas.

(1) Captn. T. St I'inwrhr.

(2) lat Lt. Hchmngor, 1 .

(3) ff Groacurth.

(4) „ Oalli.

(6) „ T. Popping-
hausen.

Woondcd.

(1 ) Maj.-Genl. Baron t. d. Osten

or Sacken.

(2) Ist Lieut. Ilerwarth t.

Bittenfeld.

(1) Major Klipfel.

(2) Captn. ▼. Hulst.

(3) „ Beckhenui.

(4) 1st Lieut. T. Gruben.

(5) 2nd Lieut. Gescher.

(6) ,, Matthias.

(7) „ Kleineoi^en.

(1) Licut.-Col. T. Dcutsch.

(2) Captn. T. IVtorsdorff.

(3) lat Lieut. Lincke.

(4) 2nd Lieut. Rehbtnder.

(5)

T. Keber.

(6)

T. Beeren.

(7)

Meyer.

(8)

>l 1

\ EortzflciachjII.

(»)

f»

Gerlaeh.

(10)

Busz.

(11)

Kriigcr.

(18)

»l

Kraetke.

(1) Lieut. -CSolonel T. £avec-

zynaki.

(2) Major Berxiu*-

(3) C^tte-T.

Forckenbeck.

(4)

» ▼.

d. Buache-Had-
denhausen, IL

(5) 1st Lieut

. T. Langen.

(6)

Flach.

(7)

T. W'unub.

(8)

2nd Lieut. Theusiier.

(0)
10)

T. Roacbi.

T. Dambroweki.

(U)

Baron r. d.

Buache-llflnnefeld.

(12)
(18)

»i

T. Seydlits.

t»

Paetz.

(14

T. Hugo.

(16)

Coesfeld.

(16)

^Vessel.

(17)

Gravenstein.

(18)

Wantrup, II.

(10)

Gellem.

(20) Sergt. -Major Baxmejer.

(21) ., Klose.

(22) Tice S.-Major Breoke.

(1) Captn. I'ruifitein r.

Nieniadorff.

(2) „ Delius.
(8) „ T. Sanitz.

1st Lieut. T. Brause, I.

8izt T. Armin.

Baron t. Ayx.

T. Leazozynaki.
2ndLieut.Kluok»I.

Scheringer, II.

Brinkniann.

Hucbzermeyer.

Joly.

»i

117'

Staff ftnd Itogtanenti.

66th Begiment — otmi.

7th rifle battalion

8rd {. dim. 7th F. A.
Begt.

68rd Begiment
(1ft and 2nd battni.)

77th Besiment
(lit ana 2nd hattni.)

KIIM or Died of Wounds.

(1)

[1]

2nd Lieut. Perthes,
II.

Itt Lieut. Baehr.
2nd Lieut. BorggreTc.

„ Dirterici.
Bmign Kdnig.
let Lt. T. Sechttrath.
Eehl, I.

Wounded.

(18^ Ensign Schmidt.
(14) „ T. Engelbrechten,

if.

il5) Vice S.-Major Hoifbauer.
16) ,, Sack.

(1) 1st Lieut. Baron t. Bols-

hausen.

i2) 2nd Lieut. Baron T. Oar.
2) Captn. Schnackenbm.

(2) 2ndLkeut.BiilileT.IdUent

stern.

1) Captn. Schenk.

2) 2nd Lient. Bechem.
„ Opppenrath.

Tice S.-Migor firauer.
N.C.O. Btorkowsky.
1st Lient. Wischer.
2nd Lieut. Bheinen.
Geppert.

(8)

»l

IXth ABMY corps and CAVALRY DIVISIONS.

Staff mad Begiment*.

18th lafttatiy DtrMm.
rmh Wntmm (2nd and Srd

brigade } 84Ui**'*B«giinent (FodUer
C batte.).

Total loss IXth A. C. -

1st Cavaliy Diflslon.

1st ear. brig., tad OoinMlers
Sad,, ,, Srd Catrasslers
1st H. A. Uttj., 1st P. A. Begt. -

Total loss 1st CD.

Srd Catalfj XMrisloa.

fth ear. brig., 7th

I th ^f f ■ 6th juMB«an -

1st H. A. batten 7th P. A. Bagt. -

Killed

or Died of

Wonnds.

Total loss Srd CD.

Woonded.

19
1

Missing.

I
I

Total.

SI
4

s
s

s
1

lis*

TOTAL LOSS.

119*

ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

In the French translation of the work bj Captain Costa de Serda, of
the General Staff, some of oar statements with regard to the French
forces have been supplemented as follows : —

P. 121. To the remark there made he sajs : —

'* Septeail's brigade marched with Donaj's Division on the 8rd, and
bivouacked with it ; it was deficient of two squadrons of the 11th
Regiment.'*

P. 123. To the remark he adds :— •
" The detachment observed bv the Bavarians consisted of two bat-
talions of the 74th Reeiment, which had bivouacked west of the road
and moved towards the point first threatened; they Were at once
brought to the right wing, for the purpose bf supporting the 50th
Regiment on the Geisberg. Owing to this, Major v. Ebner met with
no troops in the Lauter valley during his reconnaissance. The 78th
and 96th Regiments took no part in the battle ; the men of these
regiments taken prisoners by the Yth Corps were stragglers.*'

P. 132. To the paragraph between lines 15-18 : —
" The cavalry only rode forward to Riedsels, and did not occupy
the village. The 3rd Hussars in particular made a reconraissance
along the slope B of the Geisberg between 9 and 10 o'clocki and af ter-
warcb took up a position in the hollow way which leads from the
three poplars to Altensiadt. In this position it formed the connexion
between the two croups into which the Division was separated, but
was driven away m>m thence by the batteries at Windhof and moved
by the road towards the hollow between the hills 767 and 812.*'

P. 135. To the statement on lines 18-19 : —

" The chasseur battalion attached to Nansouty's cavalry brigade
(p. 122) took no part in the action. Some reserves, who were desirous
of joining the battalion, were despatched by rail for Weisscnburff, but
cot out at the last station but one just as the din of battle was heard.
These were the men subsequently taken prisoners by the 11th Prussian
rifle battalion.*'

P. 136. To the statement on lines 7-8 : —

" These were stragglers and men slightly wounded. The infantry
visible on the heights was part of the 36th Regiment, which was
marching on Worth."

P. 136. To the statements between lines 9-10, and same page
line 1, et seq. : —

'* The retreat took place in the following directions: The tirailleur
regiment, the cavalry and artillery, along the mountain roads of
Pfaffenbronn, Kleebnrg, and ' Du pigeonnier ' ; the remnant of the
2nd Brigade, which had been pressed back to Bremmelbach, had
reached Sulz vid Dirlembach, Kcssonach, Moraclholfen, and Rotsch^
wilier; from Sulz the 74th and 50th Regiments were marched to
Haorenau, the former along the high road, the latter vid Oberbetsch-
doxt ; on the mominff of the 5th these regiments were forwarded by
rail to ReichshofiFen. '

120*

TI.

On page 122 it is stated that General Dncrot, on receiving at Worth
on the evening of the 3rd reports of the advance of strong colnmns of
the enemy from Landaa, had ordered Doaaj*s Division not onlj to
remain at Weiasenburg, bnt if necessary to accept the contest. From
Oeneral Dacrot's recently published brochure, *^ Guenre des f rontieres.
Wissembourg. R^ponse du GiSn6ral Ducrot k I'^tat-major Allemand/*
it appears that this general had given no such order, and moreover in
his measures he attached no special importance to the maintenance of
Weissenburg. The order to Donay 's Division to take up a position
near and in Weissenburg had already been given by Marbhal
MacMahon on the 2nd August.

III.

An explanation has been since received with regard to the note on
p. 217« The adjutant had received orders from General v. Franfois to
tell the two battalions 'vt hioh were visible from the heights south of
DrahtBug to move towards the western slopes of the Spicheren
heights.

Appendices.

P. 109*. Instead of '' 1st field divn. 3rd F. A. Begt./' read 2nd
field divn.," &o,

P. 109*. Among the killed in the 48th Regiment should be in-
cluded the name of Ensign v. Randow.

P. 1 10*. 3rd line from bottom. For "1st Lieut, v. Wobschiteky,'*
read *' Dobschitzky." For " Massow " read " Messow."

P. 111*. For " 2nd Lieut. Friihling " I'eod " Fiihling." For "v.
Lassaut^' read "v. Lassaulz.'*

I2f

APPENDIX XVI.

lo Genkbal y. Mantiuffel.

Your Excellency has been instructed by this morning's Army
Order to take up a position for the time being with your Army Corps
at Coorcelles, facing Metz. In this position the Army Corps will oe
relieved as speedily as possible by the troops of Lieut.-General v.
Kammer, and will then follow the Army over the Moselle. General ▼.
Kammer's Corps should reach Saarlouis on the 15th inst., and your
Excellency is desired to place yourself in direct commanication with
that officer, so as to arrange about the relief in the Goorcellea position,
and give him the necessary reports as to the state of affairs before
Mets. With this object all the material received np to that time with
regard to Metz will he handed over to your Excellency for transmission
to General y. Kummer.

As np to this time no report has been received here of Gneisenan's
brigade, which was detached from Yarize towards Thionville, yonr
Bxoellency is instructed to make inquiries about it, and eventually,
through the Inspector (General of Etappen or Summer's Corps, to
give it such marching orders that it may rejoin the Army with the
least possible delay.

With this object General v. Goeben has already made the necessary
preparations by which the brigade in question is to be given all admis«
sible relief Qmapsacks carried in carts and other measures), and of
which your Excellency is hereby informed. Yon will afterwards be
good enough to report to me, in detail, the intelligence you receive of
the brigade, as well as its arrangements for the march.

Should the relief of the 1st Army Corps at Conrcelles be so delayed,
that on account of the long distance from the Army it would be no
longer practicable to send officers daily for orders, your Excellencrf
will keep up the communication as much as possible with my heacU
quarters by some other means, and subsequently follow along its
Etappen line in order to rejoin it with the least possible delay.

; (Signed) v. Steihiixtz. \

122'

APPENDIX XVIL

To Obkbral t. Eummib.

YouB Excellency is hereby informed thai in accordanoe with
■nperior orders the Ist Army Corps of the Army nnder my oommand

* has taken np a temporary position at GonrceUes (railway 8tation)i

until such time as it is relieved by yonr troops. It is very desirable
that this relief shoald take place as soon as possible^ in order that the
Corps may be again brought np to the Army; and I request your

1^ Excellency to place yourself for this purpose in oommunicatipn with

General ▼. Manteuffel commanding, and at the same time to inform me
direct when the relief in question takes place. I would remarki alsp
that the Couroelles railway station is at the same time an important
store dep6t for the Army, and requires especial protection from the
side of MetE. All the reports, plans, Ac. at my disposal bearing upon
the fortresSi will be handed oyer to you by General y. Manteuffd.

(Signed) y. STaonnn.

• *

k
\

12.T

APPENDIX XVIIl.

Yesterpat evening the oneray was attacked by parts of the 1st
Army and of the 18th Infantry Division before Mctz, and thrown back
into the fortress.

The hostile army is now in retreat towards the Mense. The ILid
Army will therefore follow the enemy in that direction without delay.

The IlIrd Army Corps, as already arranged, will complete its

Kssage of the Moselle below Pont k Monsson, and will reach the
etz-Yerdnn high road at Mars la Tonr or Vionville by way^ of
Noveant and Gorze. The head-quarters should be as near as possible
to Jdaxn la Tour. The 6th Cavalry Division can be sent forward from
Pagny towards that road by way of Pregny and Thiaucourt.

The Xth Corps, which, by the despatch, this day, of the 5th Cavalry
Division is already in paort on the march for Thiaucourt, will continue
its advance to-morrow along the Yerdnn road, to about the line St.
Hilaire-Maizeray, and will draw forward as much as possible the
parts of the corps still at Pont h Mousson and those on the march in
the Moselle Valley.

The Xllth Corps will march to-morrow from Nomeny by way of
Pont & Mousson with its advanced guard as far as Bcgui^villo en Haye,
and will close up its columns at Pont h Mousson.

The Cavalry Division should bopushed forward as far as the Meuse*

The Guard Corps will reach Kambucourt to-morrow with its ad-
yanced euard, and the neighbourhood of Bern^conrt with the main
body and the head-quarters.

Ijie lYth Corps will move up its advanced guard to Jaillon, head-
quarters to Les Baizerais.

Connection with the right wing of the Illrd Army should be es-
tablished in the direction of Nancy.

The IXth Corps will march to-morrow to Silleffuy in order next day
to follow the Ilird Corps to Gorze over the field bridges, constmoted
by this corps at Nov^nt.

The Ilnd Corps will reach Buchv to-morrow with its advanced
parties. The advanced Cavalry Divisions will, as they progress, recon-
noitre the roads to the Mouse and the passages over the river, under
the condition that the points of passap;e at Dieue sur Mcuse and
G£nicourt sur Meuse should be reconnoitred for the Xth, Ilird, and
IXth Corps ; that at Bannoncourt (situated on the left bank, 4| miles
N. of St. Mihiel) for the Xllth, and the points of passage at St. Mihiel,
Pont sur MeusOi and Commercy for the Uuard, lYi^ and Ilnd Corps.

(Signed) Frxdbbio Charles.

121

APPENDIX XIX.

Tde Caituuis of Flavigny in the Battlk of ViOKYiLLE — ^Mars

LK TOUU.

The lianilct of Flavigiiy is Bcj>arato(l by tlio Qorze-St. Marcel road
into a sonthem and northern group of houBCS. It is tho only locality
which can servo as a support to the attack or defence in an engage-
ment to tho south of tho liczonvillc-Yionville road.

At tho commencement of the battle on the mominp^ of the ICth
August, detachments from Pouj^'ct's brigade of the 2nd French Corps
advanced to the lino Vionville-Flavigny. When the 6th Corps sub-
sequently took ])art in the engagement, it occupied both these villages
with detachments of Colin's brigade, in order to secure its position
north of the high road. Thus when the Prussians advanced to the
attack, Flavigny was occupied by troops belonging to two French
Corps.*

When the 10th Infantry Brigade was pressing forward victoriously
on the heights sonth of Flavigny about 11.30 a.m., the 2nd battn. of
tho 52nd and tho Fus. battn. of the 12th bent away from the left flank
and made an independent advance in a northerly direction. In doing
so the 12th and 11th cos. of the latter regiment found themselves at
first in the foremost line ; but shortly after the other two companies came
up abreast, whilst the Gth and 7th cos. of the 52nd moved forward as
a half battn. on tho right flank of this attacking line. The 5tli and
8th cos. followed in the same formation in rear of the left wing.

While advancing in this formation against the south front of
Flavigny, the companies were received with a vigorous fire from the
enemy. They, however, continued to gain ground supported by the
artillery from tho heights in rear, until the 10th co. with tho skir-
mishing divisions of the llih ultimately succeeded in scrambling over
ditches and garden walls into the southern portion of the hamlet. The
ovenfv'helming chassepot fire of the defenders, however, compelled
part of the assailants again to withdraw and seek cover in the furrows
of the field. The two skirmishing divisions alone succeeded in
ensconcing themselves behind the garden walls, and from thence
caused serious annoyance to tho enemy with their fii'e at close range.

Meanwhile Prussian batteries had come into action on the cemetery
hill south of Vionville. When Flavi^iy was in fiames from their fire,
all the eight companies of the 10th Brigade dashed fonvard towards
the hamlet. The troops on the right wing,t having Flavigny on their

* Pougct's Brigade incUulcd the 12th chusEour bnttn., tho 8th and 23rd Bcgts. of
the Lino; Colin*B Brigade, tho DOrd and IMlh Bogtf. of tlio Line. Tho French
accuiints dilfcr very ^videly as to tho hour nt which Fluvigiiy wob occupied by tho
tiro brigades. General FrossartVs nsecrtiou that the (ith Corps did not occupy the
hamlet until after 2 p.m. on its evacuation by the 2nd Corps, is in any case in-
correct, as the Prussian troops made prisoners belonging to both French Corps when
capturing tho place towaitls 1 oVlock.

t 12tb, 6thand7th.
12 52

125*

loft, now wheeled up from the eastward. In face of this enveloping
attsbck the enemy abandoned the barning Tillage in large masses ; the
three cos. of the right wing resumed their direction at once towards
the high road in order to prosecnto their forward movement in that
direction. The remaining companies forced their way into the
Ronthern part of the hamlet, and likewise advanced without halting
in the direction of the high road ; only a few mon remained in the
buildings in order to rofrcsli tlionisolves at a well.

During this attack from the south and cast, detachments of the Gth
Infantry Division had also come np from the south-w&st. On the
right wing the greater part of the 3rd. battn. 35th Regiment* was
moving towards 11 o'clock along the valley south-eiist of Tronville, in
the direction of Flavigny, and pressed onward with no inconsiderable
loss to within 400 paces of the hamlet. The hedges at that point
aObrdcd some cover against the enemy's infantiy fire. The loft flank
of the battalion was in connection with the 3rd co. of the regiment,
which in conjunction with parts of the Gth advanced from the Vion*
ville cemetery towards Flavigny, but on account of the vigorous fire
from that point was only able to croas the perfectly open ground but
slowly and by rushes of skirmishers.

But as soon as the hamlet was seen to be in flames, these detach*
ments of the 35th also made a dash forward and forced their way from
the west into the northern g^up of houses. In doing so the 3rd oo.
moved along the hedges i-ound tho place, and endeavoured to gain
ground to the north. The 3rd battn. captured tho farm buildings,
took numerous prisoners, and maintained possession of the hamlet for
the rest of the battle.f

* The lOth CO. leading, the 9th and 12th closo beliind.

t It is Tory certain that the detachments of the 6th and Gth Infantry DiTisions
which Iiad penetrated into Flavigny had not been acting in concert, irliich is ex-
plained bj the fact that tlicj pressed forward from different sides, and into variout
parts of the place, and that tho companies of tho 5th Division scarcolj halted »
moment therein. The preparations of the Gth Division for tho attack on Flavigny
vrcre quite screened from the view uf the 5th Division by the intervening valley.

126*

APPENDIX XX.

H.Q., Font a Monfison, 16th August, 1870,

12 a.m.

Abmy Order.

Tlio Ilnd Army will rcsumo its forward movcmont to the Meuse to-
morrow. Tho 1st Army will for tho next few days be in rear of the
rieht flank of the Una Army. Tho right wing of the Ilnd Army
wul bo guided in its movements by the direction of tho enemy's
retreat, so that

The Xth Corps will later on cross tho Meuso below Verdun. A
detachment should be sent in the direction of that fortress.

Should the Xth Army Corps be led far to the north in pursuit,
Clermont en Argonne and 8t. Menehould are fixed as the points
on which it should move as tho right wing of the Army.

The Ilird Army Corps will march to-morrow upon Etain, which it
should occupy with the advanced guard, in tho event of the
enemy's proceeding^ not entailing other arrangements. The
force left at the Moselle to guard tho bridge should be brought
forward as soon as it is relieved by tho IXui Corps, which ti£es
place this day.

The IXth Corps will reach Mars la Tour to-morrow. If feasible, it
will replace the field bridge of the Ilird Army Corps to-morrow
by a bridge of boats procured from the Moselle, and after doing
so will send tho light field bridge train after the Illrd Corps.

The three above-mentioned advanced Corps of the right wing
(which should report their positions daily to my head-quarters as
given below) will keep up mtercommunication, and in any large
engagement with tho enemy, General v. Yoigts Bhetz may first
consider the Ilird and then tho IXth Corps at his disposal.

Should, as may be expected, such an engagement not take place,
the Ilird Corps will move in the direction of Dieue sur Meuse on
the 18th, the IXth Corps upon Fresnes-G6nicourt sur Meuse, and
secure the passages over the river as soon as possible. Should
the IXth Corps arrive tho first, it will secure both passages.

Tho Xllth Army Corps will advauco to-morrow with its head as far
as Vigneulles, the main body to St. Benoit en Wouvrc, where its
head-quarters will be. Tho cavalry will be pushed up to and
across the Meuse.

On the 18th the Xllth Corps will direct its advance upon
Bannoncourt, and secure the passage over the Meuse at that
point.

127*

The Gaord Corps will move to-morrow to St. Mihiol, pusli forward
a strong advanced guard to the left bank of tho flense to secure
the important passage, and have its head-quarters in St. Mihicl.
The -cavalry will advance in the direction of Bar lo Due.

The IVth Army Corps will move forward during the next few days
in tho direction of Jaillon, Sanzey, Boucq, towards Commercy,
provided that the fortress of Toul docs nob cause a partial delay
in the advance.

'J'lio 1 hid Army Corps will roatjli Pout a. Moussoii to-morrow, and
will move on its advanced parties in tho direction of Limey,
Flircy, St. I^Iihiel. Head* quarters, Pont a Mousson.

]^Iy head-quarters will bo at Thiaucourt after 5 p.m. this day,
and in St. Mihiel from noon to-morrow till further notice.

When the Ilnd Army has reached the l^Ieuse, and secured the
passages, a halt of some days will in all probability take place
until the wing armies come up abreast of it.

All the corps will send orderly ofEcers to my head-quarters
doily. The officers may use carriages if they wish, tying their
riding horses to them, with an escort of infantry orderlies.

(Signed) Frederio Ciiarlks,

General of Cavalry.

128»

APPENDIX XXL

Betdbn or CAsuALTiEa IN THB Battli or yioiini.Li— Mass i>a Toub.

niBD ABMY COSFS.

Knied

or Died of

WonndcO.

lOWag.

TMaL

WoondB.

Staff and Baglneiita.

■

•

•«

Ilaad-^oartcr Staff

—

6tb Infantrj DlrUion.

(-Brigade Staff

^„,

9thlnf.}8tb Body Qaard G re-

121

891

523

Brig. ) nadiera

V48th Rcglnient

171

— .

421

^_^

696

10th Inf. C?i*»V?«Sta''

«.

..^

, „

Brli 12tb Grenadiers

""«• (.62ndBegiment

8rd BMo battalion

106

—

207

422

345
62

82
7

806
121

—

51
1

—

60
8

1,202
184

12tli Dragoona

^^^

*»

latf. dim. 8rd F. Artj. Bcgt. ...

165

8
andl

AMt.

125

"~*

12
and 1

AMt.

162

200

No. 1 Saor. Detmt

—

Surg.

4
2,175

—

Surg.

Total

84d

196

1S2

8,107

andl

aadl

Ajat.

AMt.

Bnrg.

Smg.

ethlnitotr/DlTliloii.

DiTlalon Staff

«^

fBrigade Staff

—

, II

*•

^^^

20th Bcgiment

154

683

..m.

700

11th 7nf.

andl

aadl

Brig. '

Staff
Surg.

^86th Fiidillert

250

&IaJ.
18

584

851

fBrigade Staff

ii—

—

12th Inf.

24th Beglment

1ft

294

32
and 1

719

—

47
indl

1,089

Prig.

Staff

^64th Begimont

187

Surg.
27

49G

,^„

Surg.
41

683

andl

suff

Suff

Surg.
MaJ.

IAmL

SadDiagooni

—

lAMt.

Surg.
2

—

iTd f. diT. Srd F. Art, Begt. ...

...

Surg.
2

No. 2 Sony. Dctmt

—

103

—

flff

Total

900

115

2.896

116

159

3,412

2 Staff Surg.-

mm ^

2 Staffs

aig.-

llaji.

Uaje

•

1 Staff Surg.
1 Ajsu Surg.

I Staff 1
lAut.

Sorg.

Jurg.

Corpt Artin«7'

H. A. DiTn. Srd F, Artj. Rcgt.

o-j

188

(lit and Srd batti.)

Sod f. divn. 3rd Arty. Begt.

—

^^^

108

No. 8 Sony. Dotmt

—

151

—

Total

—

IIS

249

ColuiUDB Dirialon.

ard V. Arty. Begt.; Srd Arty.

___

S 20

Ammn. Col.

~ '1

129"

TOTAL LOSS is the IIIud ARMY CORP.S.

Killed

nr Died <if

^Y(mndc^I.

i^inj;.

Total.

Woundii.

Stmff and BegimenU.

•

•9

•

■

•

ff3

*«i*

•>«;

1-^

Hend-ouarter Stnflr

ftth Infantry DiTiMton

H45

I9(i

2,17:>

r»s

—

139

3,107

249

•Wl It It ••• ••• •••

!K)0

102

lift

2,3!1C

—

IIG

159

3,412

159

Corps ArtUlerj

IftI

J»5

—

'—

119

249

Columns Dlrbion

—

Total

1,770

ICl

217

4.0()S

211

203

310

6.C41

677

2StnffRurK.-

2 Staff Surg.-

Blajn.

Blajg.

1 Stuff Surff.

1 Staff Surg.

•

2 AhnI. SurfC'

2 Jl-Bsc. Surg.

NoMiNAti Roll of Officeiis, those acting in that Cai'ACitv, and

SUKOBONS, WHO >VBKE KlLLED Oil WOUNDKD.

Staff and Begiments.

Hcad-quarten Staff . .

Staff of 9th lofy. Brig.
8th Body Grd. Grena-
dicn.

48th Begimcnt

Killed or diinl of Wounds.

(1) let Lieut, v. Lutzov,
Commg. H.Q.. cavj. escort .

ri) M. Oonl. T. During.

(1) Ma j. Baron T.Versehurr.

(2) II I, T. Sehlegoll.

(3) Captn. T. Gorszkowski.

(4) „ Y. Klinguth.

(5) 2ad Lieut, t. Kunow.ski.
(61 „ Graowc.

(7i „ Scidel.

(8) II T. Bonin.

(9) |. V. Blanck-

onsee.

(10) Vice Scrjeant-Miyor

Brcdemejcr.

(1) Colonel ▼. Garrelts.

(2) ^lojor Scboer.

(3) 1st Lieut. GraiTunder.

!4) II T. d. Oelsnitz

6) 2Dd Lieut Burchard.

(6) „ Pliiliupi.

(7) Vice Serg.-Maj. Biicha-

Icr.

(8) I, Lilmmchen.

Wounded.

(1) 2nd Lieut. Steinlciui 8rd
Arty. Brig., "Adjt. to
Connndr. of Arty.

(1) Licut.-ColonclT.L'Estocq.

(2) Major v. Scydlitz.

(3) Cnptn. Kroil.

(4) ,1 Blumenliagcn.

(5) ,1 T. Rott.

(6) II Baron v. Hammer-

stein.

(7) Isi Lt. Count, r. Goetzen.
(H)

(9)
(10)

(11)

If
tf

Baron v. Ridit-

hoffen.
V. llolwedc.
V. Gamier.
Oesterreich.

(12) 2nd Lt. ▼. Sommerfcld

11. Falkenhayn.

(13) ,1 Karstodt.

(14) II Sicrcks.

(15) ,1 ▼. Frondfynski.

(16) ,1 PfoiflTer, IF.

(17) VicrSorg.-Mnj. Meu^sncr.

(1) Captn. V. Kfimoko.

(2) „ Wentzel, I.

(3) 1st Lieut. V. den Brincken.

(4) Prinz ▼. Buchau.

(5) 2ud Lieut. Molidre.

(6)
(7)

Spnogborn.
Wentzeli II.

(8)

>»

y. Bohr.

(9)

l»

Bahr.

(10)

TirpitK.

(11)

Graewo.

(12)

Tobye, I.

(13)

Kom.

(U)

Knisc.

(15)

»»

Bcrghauer.

(10)

Vice

Scrg.-Major Gdthe.
11

130'

Stair and Ueginienta.

«t4i!rof 10th Infy. Brig.

121 h Crcnadiei

r!«

52ud Kegimciit

3iil Bille iiuUuUon ..

Ist field (Hvn. Srd F.
Arty, llogt.

KillcU or dIcU of Wonnil^

(1) 1st LicuL. luul Dri^.
Adjt. V. Si'^'dlitz, II.,
7tli Grcmulicra.

(1) ifiijo • V. (I. Clicvallino.

(2) Capln. OnVi-Tnaiin.

(:?) 1st M.ul. V. .Ahltfvldt.
(0 2iia Lieut. Pabst.

(1) Major IhTWurtli v.

Dittoiifrld.

(2) „ V. Sdiorlcnimer.

(3) Cupln. Ilildobrnml.

V. Faihpii-

LMudifcki.
„ r. Aiuiu'hhuuiicn.
ls>t Lieut. V. Tliiiiuon.
V. Soiiiinorfehl
u. VnlKiMiliiivii.
T. iScliepkj.

i»

(C)

(7)

(S)

(9) 2nd Lieut. Vnccli, IL

IL'ld.

V. Kojipv.

T. Kargcr.

Schaefor.

Prassdo.

IVtsch 1.

Kirt'lir.cr.

Petseh II.

CJruiscr.

(10)

(11)
(12)
(13)

(11)
(L-))

(10)
(17)
(18)

i»
tf
II
)i
>f
ti
II
fi

(1) 2nd Lieut. Count v.
Bivdow.

(1) Major Gallud.

(2) Onptain Yolbrccht.

(3) Ist Lieut. V. Ilcidcn*

roich.
(i) 2nd Lieut. Loivhcrt.

Wounded.

(1) Jtt Lieut. V. llejdel»reek.

(2) „ 8chroeder.

(3) 2nd Lieut. Cochiuf.

(I) „ V. Ddinmin^;.
(5) ,, lloirmnnn.

(.;) „ iieiUioir.

(7) „ SiKjrling 11.

(S) „ Ko\v.an.

(9) Vieo ►S{(t.-jMj. Gl■a^,^nl:mn.

(10) ., liormaun.

(II) „ ilekardt.
(12) ,, Coler.

(1) Major Count V. Schlippcu-

bacb.

(2) ,, V. Biinnu.

(3) Captn. Pappritz.

Blunionthul.
Khun.
T. Poseel;.
V. Scldiehting.
T. Liitcken.
TapiHT.
(lb) let I<icut. Gebhard.

(11) „ Graetx.

(12) „ V. OcrtJEcn.

(13) 2ud Lieut. Aschenboni.

(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(R)
(0)

II
i»
>*
l»
>l
It

>l
II
II
II
If

»*

Kautenberg.
Kanimbly.
Kuhne.
V. Rbadc.
r. Zawadzkv,

Divising.
"Wagner.
Jiuron V. IXuu*

vmld.
lUuinenthal.
V. KlcisL
Nuth.
Mullor, I.
MuUer, II.
Fink.
Foerstor.

(U)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)

(19)
(20)
(21)

(2:0
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)

(29) Ensign v. Alrcnulcbcn.

(30) „ Dctring.

(31) Tice Serg.-Major Made-

Jung.

(32) ,, Schnase.

(1) Captn. Grucff.

(2) „ HamickolL

(3) Ist Lt. Baron ▼. Koclien-

berg.

(4) 2nd Lieut. Oppcmiann.

(5) „ Fritze.

!6) „ T. Wasincr.

7) Ensign Cranz.

(1) Oapto. Knobbe.

(2) let Lieut. Puacber.

(3) 2nd Lieut. Krttger, II.

(4) „ Brcbmer.
(o) „ Uaase.

131

FtcfT nnd Beglnicnli.

48tlL Regiment — oont.

StAflT of 6th Infy. Dirn.

20(h Regiment

35fh FusUirn

t •

SlaflT of i2th Brigade..

KillrU or ilird of WuiindM.

(I) Oipln. V. SchepAO.
(3) lit Lieut. V. Mriboni.
(3) 2nd Lieut. WaMcrfall.

„ Nehring.

„ Wegener, II

,1 Lunun^.

„ Staeliow.

„ Niendorff.

(6)
(fi)

(8)

Wotindfd.

(1) Ist Lieut. V. Rcitzen-

•toin, It.

(2) ., T. QiilhiiuFsen

(3) 2rid Lieut Bauer, I.

(4) * „ .tunghaot, I.
(6| „ Ootteotren.

(6) „ V. Budden-

broek.

(7) Ekieign Rose.

(6) 2ud Lieut. Fl&tlie.

(7) „ SchrSder.

(8) Vice Sorg. -Major Faber.
As8t. Surgeon Dr. Lissa.

(1) 2nd Lieut, and Orderly
Ofllcer r. Kalckreuth,
2nd Dragoons.

(1) CWoncl V. Flatow.

(2) AInjor v. Steuben.

(3) „ Blum.

(4) Captn. llubuer, IL

Kdring.

Baron v. Hadaln.

Tbortsen.

r. Wietersbeim.

Eircbhor.

Borgomann, I.
(U) Ut Lieut. Brandt.
(12) H Frieso.

(18) „ r. Borowski, I.

(14) „ Sehubka.

(16) „ Wegener, I.

(16) 2nd Lt. T. Borowiki, II.

(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

(9)
(10)

II
If
i»
*f
II

(17)
(18)

(10)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)

(2«)
(27)
(28)

»t

n
»
»»
ft
11
II
II

ft
If
11

Rodewald.

Baron v. Lode-
bur.

Gottheiner.

V. Walokniti.

V. Berenliorit.

V. Lening.

Podratz.

Ebol.

Bclmudt V.
Knobelsdorf.

Biirkuer.

T. Daasel.

Ziedrieli.

(29) Ensign Homann.

(30) „ Zindel.

(31) „ Danneuberg.

(32) „ Nioolai.

(33) „ T. Kablden.

(34) ., Karnes.

Stoff Sui^. Mnjor Dr. La
Baume.

(1) Captn. ▼. Scbiitz.

(2) „ Cammerer.

(3) „ r. Kcitzensteini II.

(4) 2nd Lieut, v. Randow.
Bauer, II.
Sever.
T. Rocliow.
Martehall.
Hellmcr, in.

T. RoelL

Moder.

T. Jnnphan0,II.

Adami.

Olsliau^cn.

Buchholtz.

(16) VieoScrgt.-M»jorv. Met-

zpnthin,

(17) „ Block.
(1^) ,1 Zielu'.
(1) Colonel V. Bifi*narck.

II L'

ff
fi
If
If
If
>f
»f
f*
ft
If
ft

na*

staff and BtgiiMBt*.

21th Bcgimont

64111 Begiincut

SUM or die4 or Woondt.

(2)
(8)
(*)
(5)

(7)

(8)

(9)
(10)

(11)
(12)

(18)

(U)
(18)

Major T. Sellin.

n Bechtem.
Capt. Bfarauardt.

„ Siercks.

„ T. Brodowiki.
2nd Lieut. Hugo.

V. Ficbig.

ft
II
It
»t
II

T. Bandow.
Thicle, II.
T. Borck.

T; QuASt.

T. KlOstep-

Icin, II.
r. Bcicben-

buch, ir.

Costenoble.
Niemak.

(1) Lt.-Col. V. WiiiUrfeld.

(2) Captain t. Glascnapp.

(3) „ TortiloTiut.

(4) 2ndLicut.T.BancbetJ

(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

(11)
(12)

It
It
•I
i»

II
II

(13

(14) Eotign Leo.

T. Dcnchau.
(tlilMDier.
V. Kngclhart
Holler.
Op|ienuann.
V. Amim.
BtoBoh, II.
▼. Loepor.
Geim.

Weaadcd.

•>

»i

(1) Col. Count zu Dohna.
Major T. Luderitz.
Cbpcn. Cramer t. Baum-
garten.
Yoigta-KOnig.
Brenning.
SondecifaAUBen.
Ziegner.
lit Lieut, r. Sobierstedt.
T. Nettelborit.
T. Kloeterletn,L
T. Borastedt.
Bunckel.
T. Kottwitz.
V. BrocUiiuen.
Baron y.d. Oaten
or Saeken.
2nd Lieut. Breithaupt, L
T. Unrub.
T. Kegelein, I.
Baron t. Eber-

•tein.
T.Beichenbaofa,
I.

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)
(10)

(tl)
(12)
(18)
(14)
(15)

(16)

17)
(18)
(19)

(20)

»•
ft
>i
tl
II
II
>i

II
II

(21)

(M)
(28)
(2*)
(86)
(26)
(«)
(28)

(»)
(30)
(81)
(82)

II
tl
91
It
II
»

T. Scbkopp.

KrOnig.

Winterfeld.

Fttbndricli.

▼. d. Oaten.

Kurta.

Bahn.

T. Boaainaki.

Lorenzen.

T. Boatken.

DAring.

Fielitz.

Staff Surg. Dr. Geisiler.

(1) Major T. Goencben.

(2) Captain Ewald.

(8)

<*^
(6)

(«)

(7)

(8)

(9)
(10)

(11)

(12) 2nd Lieut, r. Thiele.

(18)
(14)

Schols.

T. Scbenckendorff.
Witteke.
T. Limburg.
T. MCUendorir.
Habclinann.
T. Hjmmen.
lit Lieut. T. L'Ocillot da
Man.
Baron r. Lorenz.

II
*i
II
>i

r. Knobelidorff-
Brcnkenboff.
Baron t. d. Oa-
ten or Sacken.

(16)

Kev.
Dahma.

(16)

(W)

Ganti, II.

(18)

Taubert.

(19)

Heckert.

(20)

Sebultzc.

(21)

»•

Koch.

(22)

V. Wunsoh.

(28)

V. Zaboroivaki.

(24)

Buntebartli,

13;^''

SufT and Ucglinent.«.

6 nil Regiment — coat.

2tul Dragoons,

3rcl ficlil (liv. 3r(l F.

Artj. Rcgt.
Coqis artillcrv
II. A. Dini.*30lh F.

Art. licet.

(Ist ami 3rd batts.)

2nd f. dim. Sid F.
Art. Bogt.

(1) Captn. Tlocdcnbcfk.

• «

Wounded.

(25) 2nd Lieut. Ilorzcr.

(26) Vice Scrgt.Miijor Dank-

ward t.

(27) „ Soilcr.
SlafT Snrgi»on Mujor Dr.

Piibl.
Afst. -Surgeon Dr. Straub.
(1) Captain t. iSclilicht.
{•!) 2nd Liout. Kobde.

(1) Cnptnin Scberingor.

(2) 2nd Lieut. Gerber.
(3)

W'eyer.
MnsMilskj.
Miiller or Wiobr.
Wolter.
Ablcrs.
(1) let Lieut, v. rresscntin.
2nd Lieut. Abrens.

(6)
(T)

It
II

»♦

VIIlTH AR^IY CORPS.

Killed
or Died of
Wounds.

Woonded.

HfSSiDfT.

Toul.

StafT and Re);;Iinents.

•

s
8

Q
o

5
16

•

17
rzo

•

I
1

•

■•69

684

3
37

6
O

•

4
03

•

<;«
C

•

g
94

48
<>95

16th Infantry Divifion.
Division StafT

32nd Infj. BriR. | .j,,^^ lugimcnt

9th lluwars

3nl. f. divn. 8th F. Arty. Hcgt

17
»6

1
1
3
ft
64

Total loss

—

5ft

Nominal Roll of Officbus, those acting in that Capacitv, and
Suhgeons who werb Ktllrd ob Wounded.

Staff and Rpgimcnt«.

Killed or died of Wounds.

Wounded.

40lU Fusib'cri

(1) Colonel Baron v. ICbcr-

(1) 1st Lieut. Gnn-elts.

Btcin.

(2) 2ud liieut. GohUeliinidt.

(2) Ciiptn. Oriindner.

(3) „ V. Felbcrt.

(3) „ Baron v. Blom-

(1) ,, lliilsen.

bci-g.

(5) „ Jobat, II.

(4) 2nd Lieut, v. Olasc-

(0) „ Ucrinenp.

nnpp.

(7) ,, Mi(?eher.

(5) Vieo St'Pgt.-Mnjor

(8) Knsign iratunuMistedc.

Qass.

(9) „ ▼. Tretionfeld.
(LO) „ Baron v. Hunold-

Btein.
(11) Vice Sergt. Major Lein-

pertz.
1 (12) „ Stuinfort.

134'

Buff and Beglmenta.

72nd Begiment

3rd f. dim. 8th F. A.

Killed or dkd of Woiuidi.

(1) Colonel r. UeUdorff.

(2) Major ▼. Oertsen.
(8^ Captn. T. Hanstein.

(4) Ist Lieut. T. Alvena-

leben.

(5) 2nd Lieut, t. Boem-

cken.

(0)

(7)

(8)

(9)
(10)

(11)
(12)

(1»)

>f
91
>*
*l
I*
»
f*

Back, I.
Batscli.
Bertram, II.
Stedcfeldt.
Jacob.
Wcstphal,
Oottlieincr.
Riick, II.

(14) Kndgn Bode.

(15) „ T. Ill^SP.

(10) „ Wifko.

(1) 2n(l Lieut, v. Bfotxi'ii.

(1) Chptn. T. BentiTegni,

(2) „ FreyUg.
(8) ,1 Mennisgen*

(4) 1st Lieut Baron r. Stein-

ieker.

(5) „ Zedtwitx.

(6) I, Meibom.

(7) 2nd Lieut. Lambert.
Eiselt.

Baumgarten.
Gropitti.
T. ETeaiel.
Elirenberg.
Bertram,!.
Bauerteig.
llolhnig.

Ooiint V. Kill'
niedcl.

(17) „ V. LoainskT.

(18) „ Ludke.

(19) N. C. O. Kanpiacb.

(20) „ Smaban.
(1) Oaptn. Hammer.

(9)

(10)

(11)
(12)

(18)

(U)

(15)

• ■

(16) Gnsigii

IXtii army corps.

Killed
or Died of
Woundt.

Wounded.

UlMinc.

Total.

SiniVnniUlceinicntH.

1
1

CI 1

•
«

■

•^

■

•
V.

•

Oflieert,

•

)Stli infantry Division.

acili Infy. lirii;., lllli 0 rfnadirrs

17
17

:i3»

—

'J4
-J4

750
760

—

1,119

Total

—

1.11

'.::»lli llcssinn Division.

49tii Infy. ( in Reifinient tUody iJiuml) ...

I'rip. ( 'Jnil lieginicnt

Divu. of liild ImiU.'*. ('ind lioavy)

I;:
7

'10
359

■

2
2

1
1

—

47
27

1
1

Tutiil

Total \om of Army Coii»s

803

—

1,194

186*

NomNJUL Boix OF OFnosBfl^ thosx Aomro in that Oapaoitt^
• SnaBom who mam Killbd ob WomnuBiiu

nth

tedBcgiaMit

(S) Iftjor T. Isbg.
(8) OapOL T. LoIm^

4) irt. lieot Kfk^.

6) „ T.WieMJCfty-

{;

a)
(«)
w

(W)

•9

T.Werder.
▼•Wikmowitf.
▼.WaUhofibo.
T.Coloinb.

JldObtt*

▼. Eberti.
T.BtoekliMi-

n ▼• TmIuii-
baoSf IL

(14) „ Biaifa.

(15) Bkiiiign ▼. OppeL
(leS H Bipkt.
(17) Tiee Sargt-U^or

(1) iMOt-OblMMl T.

(5) Oq»tiL WtDoUor.

(8) , T.86MML

(4) latliastT.BoiM^X

(5) „ T.MmlML

(6) .„ : CJoOBt ▼.

(7) SaniianL KtUuie.

•9
ft

liBke.

▼. 4ydow9 1.

.♦ .♦

(8)

(»)

(10)

(11)
(1»)
(1«)
(1*)
(1»)

(W)

(1»)

(IS) iMgBOoOBtT.Molft^

(1») _j, OootT.llollka^n.
(M) Vim 8M8t,;mj«r Hath
(«1) » KrcMdMW.
(SS) , Bottk^f.
(*8) , T

(»*)

(1) Sad liwt. KiwM.

"Xm ABMT CX}BF8.

MdlMid

«rSM«l

SotaL'

UutBtglimnt
«Mv T A. f Brigade Stall -

^^* UTtti Bcetntti*

flliDnicooni

M f . difiu IMh V. Arty.

tflSTptooetf 00. Xfh Oarpt
Srd f . vkneer eo. Xlh OoriM
Va 1 Bany. Bttmt. •

Votal •

186

audi

Midi

SoiK.

987

1388

81
•nd8

Biugi.

8
8

un8

8
8
1

•Bdl

8lUK.

86
1

86
andl

8av*

Sorg.

1
1

U88

i-.

•adt

1S6»

XDkd
crDMof

■

tiDteL '

■MMilifiaMnti.

•

Wk IrtMli J thUaa.

JtttiJBlt ortlrfit

U
B
t

•

1
•

U
li

4
1
I
S
•

att

•

a
a

1
u

m
a

aa
u

4
1
1
4

«4

ai
u

at
at

a
a

«pld •

—

uat

141

OiiptAitflliij.

nyt • • • •

EA.41m.lilbV. A.B.
CMMnHltetti.).

tot

—

a
•1

a
ai

IHi £ «?•« IMIi p.inr.

•V

—

VbM •

4
•ndl

—

4
audi

•Of.

•W

•

ToTJX Lo44 nr

Xm Ammx Coxn.

€lOipilHill«7

uat

ati

44
44

44
4

uia
an
iia

1
at
ti

lat

iSt
i«

1
tt
tts
lat

•

uia

lat

uid4

▲Mt

Mtt

•Dd4

Atit

Its

KoMnrAL Boxx or ths Ownomm^ xHoax AcriKa nr that GAPiciTr,

JJXD SUBOBOKS WHO WKBB KllJ.KP, WOUHDXD^ OB HlSSIMO.

•Itfaiid

7a«bR4giatnt

Pntteh.
Ikhtenfelt.
Koch.

(I) Ooloiiel Baron T.I(7iiekcr.
(a) Kijor T. Bimekd.

(d) ^ Matttm or r.Fkvoff.
(4) ^ T. Wina.

(6) Cftpta. Bumland.
(4) g, B4ft«nweiffcr.

(7) n T. BcnniagieiL
(a) n T. Bhdnbabtn.
(t) M GrootmuB.

(10) I, T.FMltB.

(II) „ T.Eittowiky.
(la) Itt lient. T. Nimptaeli.
(18) ^ T. I>icnar.
(U) » Bnnaeiretler.

(15) M ▼• I^MUB.

(16) Sod iMot T. Eakt.

137'

Staif lad BegimenU.

78th Begiment — eont.

Kilted or died of Woimdv.

Olst B«gimcnt

Staff of S8th Inf. Bri-

gade.
16th Rpgiment

(1) Colonel T. Komckc.

(2) Captain (Jetlier.

(3) let Lieut. Tenge.

(4) „ T. Bonin.
Znd Lieut. Scholtz.

Kock.

V. BttltEing.

flluwen.
Wicbcu.
Wallrotli.
Id) Ensign t. Bandotr.
(11) Vice Sergt -Major
I&Bsler.

!12) ,1 Bunnemann.
13) ,, Moaen.

Wounded.

(6)

(7)

(8)
(«)

>»
»»

(1) Colonel T. Brixen.

(2) Capt. Baron Schonlts-

T. Aschoraden
or de Terra.

(3^ ,, Mebes.

(4i ,, T. Amim, I.

(5) „ Scholten.

(6) Itt Lieut. Wenbomc.

(7) „ Count V.

Gluszczcwski.

(8) „ T. Amim, II.

(9) tf Schmits.

(10) 2nd Lieut. Unruh.
(11)

Baron t.
Ejnatten.
Sclirocder.
Ulrieh.
Heidsieck.
Schwartz.
Kibbentrop
Vorucrck.
Baron t.
Ilanstoin'Knorr.
Gruner.
Engelhard.
Dornauer.
Riedel.
KOppelmann

(24) Ensign Barau v. d.

Boreh.

(25) Tice Sergt. -Major t.

Brackelmann.

(26) „ Leopold.

(27) „ Verron.

(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)

(19)

(20)

(21

(22]

(23)

1$
It
If
»»
f>
*»

»i
»»

[17) 2nd Lieut. T.WjKheUki.

;i8)

(19)
(20)

(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)

>»
It
tt
it
>»
If
tt
It
It

V. Kleist.
▼. L'Estoeq.
T. Busse.
Pielko.
Milthaler.
Kaempife, I.
Mantell.
Ilobelmann.
Geisler.

f27) Ensign t. Coffraiie.
(29) „ Hasbanh.
Asj»t. Surgeon Dr. SehHlter.

(1) Major T. Kienitz.

(2) Captain Behneko.

(3) ft ITenz.

(4) „ Goldscbmidt.

(5) let Lieut. Wolf.

(6) 2nd Lieut, t. Thiimm.

(7)

T. Weddig.

(8)

Bonigos.

(9)
(10)

Somm^*.

Botse.

(11)
(12)

»t

Schmidt.

Bdhrasen, II.

(13)

t»

Willich.

(1) Maj.-Genl. r. Wedell.

(1) Mi^or ▼. KalinowskL

(2) Captn. T. Lieres u. Wilkau.

(3) „ Bruns.!

(4) „ Schultze.

(5) „ T-BorcU-duYemaT.

(6) „ T.Nereo.

(7) 2nd Lieut. Baron v. Hoevel .
Chx!8chen.
Thurmann.
T. Zostrow.
MoliB.
Ziehen.
Sehrader, II.
Schroieding.'
Wolff, I.
T. Arent«child.
Wiegand.
de la Corbiire.
Fricdrichscn.

(20) ViceScrgt.-Maj. Schulte-

Frohlinde.

(21) I, Flottmann.
Mi88ing~2nd Lieut. Simmers-

bncb.

(9)

(10)

(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)

(16)
(16)

(17)
(18)
(10)

}l
»
It
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II

138*

Staff and Begimento.

67tli Begiincnt

9tli Drngooiiii . .

2nd pioD. i*om])y. Xth

Coriw.
No. 1 Sany. Detmt . . .
60th Beginieiit

79th Regiment

17t1i Kogiutcut

Killcfl or died oT Wounds.

SI) Lieut.-Coloncl t. KocU.

2) Ist Lieut. EhrhnrUe.'

(3) 2nd Lieut. Weinliagen.

(4) „ Lindner.

(5) Knsi^^n Bittmer.

(6) Vice Scrgt.-Major

Thiel.

(I) Knsign Kotlirr!

(1) ^lajor V. Zic*hll)cr^.

(2)

T. Heniiingi.

(9) 1st Lieut. Neuendorf.

(1)

(5)
(6)

Groscliufr.
r. Haza-Bad-

litz, I.

Graff, I.

(7) 2Dd Lieut. Sclunncr.

(8)
(9)
(10)

(11)
(12)

(13)
(14)

Kocli, I.
Bccliein.
Ballauf.
Bin Kndc.
Biormonn.
Boos.
Viro Scrgt.-Miijor
Vorfen.

>i
>t
t»
II

(1) Ibt Lieut. Civd('.

(2) 2ml Lieut. MnoktMif^en.

• •

(I) (;;«])ln. Wald.vl.nii.lt.
A'ici' ^Scl*gt.•M.'^jol• WeisS'
niiiller.

tTomided.

(1) Captn. Botljgc.

(2) f^ Baron r. Bemewitf .

(3) n Tuebben.

(4) 1st Lieut. T. Ncrec.

(5) „ T. Borckc.

(6) 2n() Lieut. Uocnig.

(7)

Schreiber.

(8)

T. Arnim.

(9)

Bnron T.Scbim-

mclinnnn, I.

(10) „

Fink V. Finkeu-

etcin.

(11) ..

llunJius.

(12) .,

Lnnghcinckcii.

(18) ..

T. d. l^Iiilbr.

(14) Knsigi

I Fliiggc.

(15) Vice

8ergt.-Mnjor

Locfller.

(16) ,. Wagner.

(17) K. C. O. Hillsmann.
Assist. Surgeon Dr. Frcse.
As.iist. Surgeon Dr. Schultze.

(1) Captn. T. Zcschau. '

(1) Captn. Kffncrt.

(2) „ T. Monbart, IT.

(3) 1st Lieut. Brcnken, I.
(1) M Brenken, II.
(5) 2nd Lieut. Donant.

(7)
(8)

(»)
(101

(11

n
>f
II
II
II

Anger.
Koch, II.
Dieckniann.
Majer.
Graff, II.
Macrkor.

(12) Vice Scrgt.-Major VtLM-

sauer.

(13) „ Hansen.

(14) „ Ilager.

(1) ^rnjor Bai*on v. Stciimckcr.

(2) Captn. Cornelius.

(3) „ V. Bosie.

( ^) „ V. SchOnf.^Ult. 1.
(o) Ibt Lieut. V. Ilrydebreck.
('») „ Kieuieyer.

(7) 2nd Lieut. h\liinelzer.

(«)
(0)
(10)

(il)
(12)

(13)
(U)

(J 5)

(IG) Vic»;S(T|{t.-SIuj. linitmcr

(1) Cnptn. V. Gro$siiiaa.

(2) 1st Lieut. Trii).

(3) „ Liicdung.

(4) Vice Sergt.-Mujor Weg-

mani).

II
II
II
i»
•I

II
II
II

Toctzmann.

Scliun.

V. Khrcnstein.

Kadocli.

T. Ucchtritz-

Siciiikirch.
niq)c.
Held.

139'

Stair and ReKlmcats.

92nd Begtinent
10th Rino Battalion

IGlli Drngoons

2ndf.diTn.lOtli F.Arty
Regt.

Corps Artillery Staff. .

H. A. dim. (iBt and
3rd bntt<;rics).

3idf.diTn.10th F.Arty.
Regt.

Kllleil or died of Wounds.

(1) 2iul Lieut. T. Koblinslci.

(1) Captn. Lenz, IGfch Rogt.
att<1. to Intendnntiir.

(1) 2nd Lieut. .SchclDinas.

Wounded.

(1) Ist Lieut. Otto, IT.
(1) 2nd Lieut. Laron v. Kirch-
bach.

(1) Lieut. -Colonel t. Wnldoir.

(2) Captain r. Morstoin.

(3) 2nd Lieut, t. Motz.

(1) Cnptain liurbacli.

(2) let Lieut. Stolterfoth.

(3) 2nd Lieut. Bachmann.

(4) „ V. Grumbckow.

(5) „ T. Bulius.

(1) l8t Lieut. Riickhcim.

(2) 2nd Lieut. Bluhm.
Afist. Surgeon Dr. Moritz.

(1) Liout.-Col. Cotta.

(2) 2nd Lieut. Varnor^.

GUARD CATALRY DITISION.

Killed

or Died of

Wounds.

Wounded.

Btt«iini;.

Total.

Staff .ind Kejflmont.^.

•

•id

■

o
B

•

■

115

Srd Guard CaToIrx Brignde.
1st Dragoons ol the Ouard

1st II. A.' baity. Guanl V. Arty.'Rcgt!' ...

9
3

17
13

»04

105

4
3

Hi
4

5
11

—

204

150

Total loM

312

\bb

—

200

361

Nominal Roll of OPFiCERf^, those actino in that Capacity, and
Surgeons who were Killed, Wounded, or Missing.

Staff and Regiments.

1st Dragoons <»f the
Guard.

2nd Dragoons of the
Guord.

KjIUhI or died of Wound-*.

(1) Colonel V. Auorswnhl.

(2) Major r. Klci-fc.

(3) Cnptn. Count v. Wcst-

arp.

(4) „ Hcinrich,XVII..

Princv of J?ou98.

(0) „ Count T. Wc3-

dohlcn.
(G) Ist Lieut. Count r.
iSclnvcrin.

(7) 2nd Lieut. v.Trc.'^pkrtw.

(8) „ Count 35U Sohns-

Sonnonwulde.

(9) Knsifrn v. Tresckow.

(1) Colonel Count Fiiick-

V. Finckcnstcin.

(2) Capt.'iin BcneckendorJT

T. Ilindonburp.

(3) 1st Lieut. V. SSzorda-

helyi.

Wounded.!

(1) 1ft Lieut. V. Ivohr, III.

(2) 2i.tl Lie-it. V. KW>chcr.
(})) „ Count T.Strach-

witz.
(1) „ Botho Count zu

Stolberg-Rossla.
l^Iissing — Ensign Count t. Baa-
8cwit7.-Behr.

(1) IstLicut.Baron v.Wrangel.

(2) 2nd iiieiit. v. Czottritz*

Kcuhauss.
(-) „ V. Fiobig-An-

gelstein.

iin*

1 CAVAI.KV mVliilOX.

NoiiiNAf, Boi.r, 01

t)LKUi;ONR 1

OfUCKHS, TICOSi: AOtlSil 1\ THAT CaVACIIV,

110 wKitc Killed, Wounded, oe Mi^jsiNc.

Stiff ukI BceiiiiMiIi.

KMU...

„.,<W„„n„,.

Woiindfl.

Staff uf lltli Cjv, Itri".

(1) lit Lieut, and Brig. Ailjt.
r. UBNcliall.OthLonixn.

I^n.-cni, OnltrlT UBcn-.

4th Cuinu.i.T»

(I) 2ii.l I-u

It. T. S.-lliifiT-

(1) C-nptn. ». Lub,-r,..ani..

Vuit.

(::) in Lieut. Count t. EorlT-

(3) „ Bawii T. LUicii.
(1) „ V. Butllnr.
(J) &i(l Lieut. T. Alt-Slutlrr-
hcim.

13lli Lmi.tr*..

{!) fuloiid

r. SliatL.

{[) Uujor r. BuJ.jL.ibrocl.

(2) l»t Litut. V. Colnur.

(3) 2u<1 Lieut. Bnroiir.U ml r.
(i) M ". Almci.ln.

(3) „ V, W,Hlcll, r.

I'Jll, llniB."...*

<1) MI,i,.i.

. Z.'.l.'liK-'.

(1) Cnl^Him. Lurl, L

(i) 2.,.i Li.-

1. V. Lmk, il.

(i) I.I IJeut. v.a.O.U7..

(a)

fulltlt T.

I.iittii'haii.

(»> ,. Unron v. ... (u
Kgl<Fff.teiu.

(I)

V. Unger,

(I) 2nJ Lieut. V. Toll.
(J) „ V. Aitrti.

(B) „ I.-hOD.

(D ., T. K.™rW.
(bj „ r. d. M.nriti.

141

Staff and Rr^mcnti.

Staffof 12th Car. Brig.

'ill Cuinissicn

• •

16tli Lancers . •

13th Dragoons

Staff of 18th Oar. Brig.
10th Hussars • .

11th Hussars . .
17th Hussars . .

1st H. A. battj., 4th
F. A. Regt.

Killed or dii-d of Wound.*.

(1) Cnptn. Meyer.

(2) 2n(l Lieut, v. Ploctz, II.

(3) „ Count Sier-
storpff.

(1) 2nd Lieut. Baron t.

Bomnn.

(2) ,. T. Qellhoni.

Wonnd<d.

(1) 1st Lieut. KogtUlii v.
Biebcrstein.

(1) Major T. Hoi-tcU.

(1) Ist Lieut Baron v.
Tilrcke.

(1) 2nd Lieut, and Brig. Adjt.
y. Klitzing, 6th Dragoons.

(1) Captain t. Heister.

(2) Ist Lieut, r. Branconi.

(3) 2nd Lt. Laurcntz Camp-

bell of Craignish.

(4) „ Friese.

(1) Captn. T. Porembskr.

(2) let Lieut, t. Schmidt.
m 2nd Lieut, t. Richthofcn.
(1) „ Burdmrdfc.

(5) „ Kramer.

(0) „ Jordan.
I^rissing— (1) Maj. t. d. Dollen.

(2) 2nd Lieut. Yogt.

(1) Ist Lieut. T. Sohaumbe^.

(2) „ T. Munchliausen.

(3) 2cd Lieut. Luttieh.

(4) », T. Zychlinski.

(5) ,. Janensoh.

(6) y, Eokhardt.

(1; 1st Lieut, and Brig. Adjt.
T. Goets, 6th Dragoons.

(1) 2nd Lieut, r. Trotha> I.

(2) ,» Braune.
(8) ,, Dietse.
(4) Ensign t. Kmer.

1) 2nd Lieut. FeMt.
li Lieut.-Colonel t. Baiioh,

2) 1st Lieut. Dedekjnd,
(I) 2nd lieut, Oemler,

•/

•^^

Oxn CAVALRY DIVISION.

Staff and Begimenbi.

•■■ •*• •«•

14th Car. Brigade.

Brigade Staff
Sth Cuiraailen ...
trd Lancera
15th Luicen

••• #■• ■••

•«• • ■ • • • ■

Brigade Suff
8rd Huaian
loth IluKRan

Total ...
l&th Car. Brigade.

• •• •• • • ■ • ■ • •

••• ••• ••• •«■

•«• •• ••■ taa

Total

2nd 11. A. batty. Srd F. Artr. Kcgt. . .

Total lofli ...

Killed
or Died of
Woonds.

8
6

4
24
18

183

214

Wounded.

Missing.

1
1
8

C
2

If*

6
14
24

88
2?

115

I ft

173

•

6
20
12

lie I 1 26

Total.

1
2

I
9
8

23
84

160
88

198

24 1 20

274

107

188
72

[206

41
854

142^

Nominal Boll of OFncEB^, THOdK aotino in that Gapagitti and
Surgeons who wxbi Killed, Wounded, ob Missing.

Staff and Begiments.

St&ffoflith Car. Brig.

6th Guinssiers • .

8rd liADCcn • .

15th Lanoers • •

SuaroflSthCav.Brig.
8rd HoMan . .

ISthHuaaan ..

Killed or dl«d of WomuU.

(1) Major-Gknl. Baron t.
Diepenborick-G rikter.

(1) Tice Sergt-Miyor
Bockehuann.

(1) Colonoi V. Zietcn.

(2) GapUiin v. Qrimui.

(3) 2na Liout. r. KUnckc.

(1) 2iid Lieut. Boron v.
Lachinann.

Woimdcd*

(i) 2nd Lieut, r. Stechow.
(1) 2nd Lieut. Wendler.

(1) GapteinBrix.

(2) „ T, PlocU.

(3) 2nd Liont. Helm.
(1) Maj.-Oenl. r. Baucb.

(1) Itt Lieut. T. Baiow.

(2) „ T. Sohaper.

(3) 2nd Liout. r. Witileben.

(4) ,y T*. Byem.

(5) H Miihlbei^.
Miflsins— 2ud Lt. t. Wodoll.

(1) G(3onel T. Schmidt.

(2) Irt Lieut. T. DOrr.

Total Loss ik tiik Battle ov VioNriLLB-MABa la Tovb.

Staff owl Uegiui«nU.

Illrd Armx Corpii

Vlllth Arni7 Cori>«
IXth Armj Corps
Xth Amy Ooipi

Guard Ciiv. Divn.
(thCav. Divn. ...
eUiCaT. Divn. ...

Total

Killed
or Died o(
Wottodi.

'^3
IT
72

1,770

244

Jt59

1,642

2?)

IGO

4,186

461

246

812
429
214

1,698

Wounded.

217 ^ 4,668

B<*)«idcs
2 Staff Surf.

1 Staff Surg.
1 Ant. Surg.

129

684
808
2,861

and 4 Aist.

Surgt.

7
46
18

156
686
178

470 9,932
Besides

2StaffSarg.
Majs.

1 Staff Surg.

6 Aist. Surgs.

!11

40
96

40
187
116

648

Hilling.

1
2
1

m..

208

16
76
26

962

1
24

386
24

890

Total.

810 6,641

2StaffSazs.

Hate.
IStaffSttiv.
I Asst. Sonr.

1,194
4,945

42
202
and 4 Asit.

Surgi.

20
62
20

200
880
274

711 16,079
Besides

2 Staff Surg.
Hajs.

1 Staff Surg.
6 Aaift.SuryB.

677

861
902
864

.786

143*

APPENDIX XXII.

List of Casualtiks in the Expedition to I'oi'l,

IGth August, 1870.

ivtu army corps.

Staff nHd Rc^monts.

Killed
or DinI of

ith Infj. Dir.

DiTLilon Staff

!lth Infy. f 27ih Rcjiiincnt
Brig, injidltcgimcnt

7th DraffoonR

1st f. (llvn., 4th V. Arty. Rc^t. (Ist

and 2nd lu-aTy, 2nd liffht Imlty.) .

3nl f. ploni'tToo., IVth Army CorpN

Tot:i!

2
1

20
2*

WomKlnl.

Ml-Kl'llff.

5
and 1
Aut.
Kurp.

11
nn d 1

AflfsC.

•Sursf.

I2f>

G
o

Total.

G
o

6
!>
ond 1

AMt.

Surg.

17
and 1
Afwt.
Kurir.

lOtf

182

8
6
4

Nominal Roll of tui: Offickiis, tjiosk actincj in that Capacity
AND Surgeons who wuri: Killkd or Woundkh.

Staff nnd Ecgiments.

27th Regiment

98rd Regiment

Killed or ilii-d of Wotuidjt.

(I) 2iul Lieut. T. Maltzttlin.
(-i) „ Koil.

(1) Miyor X. Schwemler.

(2) Captn. r. Bpo«y.

(3) '\'ico Scrgt.-Mttjor Kas-

Woumlcd.

(I)

per.
Miiblpliordt.

Ist f . divn. 4th F. Arty.

Regt. (1st heavy

batty.).
3rd f. pion. oo., H'tli

Corps.

• •

(1) Major Jofffoy.

(2) Captn. DaniQiorl.

(3) „ Ilnock.

(4) 2iid Liout. MttUer.

(1) Lieut. -Colonel Werner

(2) 2nd Liout. Hanke.

('^) )i Boron t. Rech-

(^) ^ »> Hcrrman.

(5) Ensign t. Knoblauch.
A8st.-Surgeon Br. Koermiffk.
Ensign T. Michaelis. ^

(1) Ensign Kemper.

(Wt. 703J. 500 12 I 81. H. & S. 27Dil)

ERRATA.

11
It

N.B. — The earlier copies of the Isb Section are paged with the text and
appendix consecatively. It has been since considoi^ed desirable
to page them independently, so as to keep the text and
appendix separate, and tliis has been done in tlie later copies,
and will be so in future. The appendices to the 1st Section
should therefore be paged 1*, 2*, 3*, &c 82*.

Corrections and Additions to First Section.

Text :—

Page 26, line 16 from bottom - For '* Raoult" read " Doiiny," and add *' At

this time (end of July) Ducrot's Dmsion
was already at BeiclishofTon, and had pushed
forward dctaehmonts towards the frontier."
Correct Sketch 1 accordingly.

45 „ 33 from top - - For "Tauberbischofsheim" r«arf "Wertheim."

66 ,1 14 „ • - For " Belgian " read " Luxemburg."

70 „ 17 „ • • For *' to collect on the line Wadern-Losheim "

read "not to pass the line Wadem-Saar«
burg."

Appendices : —

Page 121 or 89« foot note • - For " War Artillery " read " Coi-ps Artillery."

122 or 40* •> - -To staff of Ilird Army Corps add Commander

of Head-quarter Guard : 1st Lieutenant y.
Liltzow, 12th Dragoons (reserve).

124 or 42*, line 9 from bottom For "v. Beppert, 4th" read **r. Boppert, 6th."

151 or 69* „ 12 „ - For "6th CuTalry Dirision " read "4th CaYalry

Division."

„ 157 or 75* », 7 from top - For " Major-General (Jundell " rearf " Colonel

Gundell." Ho was ])roniotcd Major-General
on 18th January, 1871.

158 or 76* „ 20 „ - For " t. Sclle " i-cad " Proinitzer."

158 or 76* „ 4 from bottom For " One provision column " read "A detach*

ment of a provision column (with a waggon*
park column) of the Ilnd Army Corps and
half a Sanitary/' &c.

160 or 78* „ 0 from top - For " Ist Lieutenant v. Boon," &c., read " 2nd

Lieutenant Bcichert, 35th Fusiliers."

163 or 81* - • - To " staff of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg*

Schwerin" add "Present at Head-quarters
H.S.H. Duke of Saxe-Altenburg."

9»

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